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SOCIO-ECONOMIC IMPACTS
OF PRIVATISATION ON WOMEN MADE
REDUNDANT FROM SUDAN’S BANKING AND
MANUFACTURING SECTORS

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ABBREVIATIONS

FDI: Foreign Direct Investment
FHH: Female Head of Household
GDP: Gross Domestic Product
GNP: Gross National Product
IFLs: International Financial Institutions
IMF: International Monetary Fund
NGOs: Non-Governmental Organisations
OECD: Organisation of Economic Cooperation and Development
SAPs: Structural Adjustment Programmes
SSA: Sub-Saharan Africa
UN: United Nations
UNDP: United Nations Development Programme
WB: World Bank
ABSTRACT

This study focuses on the experiences of a group of women made redundant from public sector institutions in Sudan. It aims to explore the consequences of privatisation and redundancy on women's employment, and economic and social positions.

It also considers whether the women's experiences varied according to their occupations, as the study sample comprised women professionals and women workers made redundant from the banking and manufacturing sectors respectively. This research is of particular importance, because it primarily sets out to investigate the changes that happened in women’s employment status, as well as women's economic and social positions, as a result of privatisation policies that emerged in a fast-track process implemented in public sector institutions in the early 1990s. In addition to the socio-cultural factors that are structurally rooted in that society, particular aspects undermine women's position in society, including patriarchal structures that were historically institutionalised at the household, society, labour market, and state level, and the discriminatory gender inequalities practised against women in the domestic domain. The collective interactions among these have seriously undermined women’s employment, and their economic and social positions in Sudan.

The findings from this study indicate that women, made redundant as a result of privatisation, experienced adverse impacts on their employment status, as well as their livelihoods.

Constraints within the context where women experienced redundancy due to privatisation, still do not consider the changing positions of women in public sector institutions, and at the household level as well.
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INTRODUCTION

Background

Privatisation constitutes one of the major components of adjustment programmes introduced by the two Bretton Wood institutions in 1944, i.e. the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the World Bank (WB). The macro-economic ingredients of such programmes are divided between the twin institutions; the IMF is concerned with stabilisation programmes that are designed to reduce both the balance of payments deficit and inflation through, for example, exchange rates management, devaluation of currency, contraction of aggregates demand, tighter monetary policy, increased budgetary cuts, including cuts to subsidies and price increases. While the WB attends to the longer-term changes that aim to eliminate structural imbalances in the national economy, which they seek to achieve structural transformation from non-tradable to tradable, reform public sector inefficiency, reduce the state’s domain, and increase the role of private sector through privatisation, and or liquidation of state-owned enterprises (Jiyad, 2003, p.6).

Although each institution has its own designed programmes, there are areas of overlap between them. For example, in Africa, the IMF and WB have agreed upon a prescription, including SAPs and privatisation policies, to address the economic crises of African countries.

Privatisation, as a term, is used to cover several distinct and possible alternative means of changing the role of the relationship between the government and the private sector; it is further defined as selling and transferring of at least part of the state’s ownership of enterprises to private owners (Calvin Kent in Divano, 1995; Paul Cook and Colin Patrick, 1995).

This trend of changing the roles of government and markets, known as ‘neo-liberal economics’, is a predominant school of contemporary economic theory (Companion, 1999).

Privatisation, or sale of assets owned by the State, represented the key economic development defining the last two decades of the 20th century. Three main features
of such a process are commonly observed, namely vastness in scale, variation in attempts and differentiated consequences. The rapid spread of privatisation in the 1980s was on a large scale, taking place in many OECD countries, Latin America and many Asian countries (Ramanadham, 1993). The largest in scope was the British initiative under the Conservative Thatcher Government; by the end of 1980s, the UK’s telecoms, gas, electricity, aviation, steel production and water supply, had all become largely private sector activities. In fact, by 1986, Britain had become a model case for privatisation (Gormely, 1991; Ramanadham, 1993; Ernst and Young, 1994).

During the 1980s and the 1990s, a wave of privatisation swept the developing countries, the number of firms undergoing change now well exceeds 100,000, and the total value of assets has been very large, in most of the regions, including Latin America, Asia, transition region, in the Middle East and Sub-Saharan Africa (Bridsall and Nellis, 2003, p.3).

Privatisation, in general, is regarded as a mechanism to increase productivity, efficiency and outputs, and, arguably, to enable an improvement in social services by passing publicly-owned (or State-owned) assets to private owners. For the desperate, poor countries, selling State-owned assets was the means to raise funds for government budgets. Hence, countries of different political systems, or at different stages of development, had encountered different types of problems before attempting privatisation. While the prescription for treatment was the same, i.e. privatisation, it has not resulted in homogenous solutions. Some countries have succeeded and have achieved economic growth through privatisation. Evidence generally shows that privatisation has been among the more successful of the liberalizing reforms, in the sense that privatisation has yielded good returns to new private owners, has freed the state from what was often a heavy administrative and unproductive financial burden, and has provided governments in place with fiscal boost; additionally, it has helped sustain a large process of market-enhancing reforms (Bridsall and Nellis, 2003, p.13). However, other countries have faced failure in their privatisation processes, including many examples in Latin
American, African, Middle Eastern, and some transition economies. The causes of failure are possibly linked to missing the opportunity in the process of privatisation to maximise the efficiency of the private sector, improve the economic performance, increase competitiveness in their markets, and maximise equity gains. This, on the whole, means the government in place failed to achieve its announced privatisation objectives.

Privatisation in Sudan was announced in 1992, as part of the three-year economic salvation programme (1990-1993) adopted by the current government, which took power in 1989 through a military coup. This programme was a response to the chronic economic problems faced by the country, which had been inherited from the previous political regimes, as claimed by the government.

Sudan was no exception in following privatisation like many other developed and rapidly developing countries responding to the economic crises experienced worldwide during the 1980s and 1990s. However, is it just that privatisation became a fashion and 'everybody' wanted to do it, as Jiyad (2003) suggested, or were there underlying reasons why the Sudanese government participated in, and launched the process of privatisation? 1) Privatisation in Sudan has been implemented as 'home grown', with no support from the IMF or the WB, the designers of such programmes under SAPs and liberalisation packages; 2) privatisation has been implemented in an unsuitable political situation caused by the economic sanctions imposed on Sudan by the international community, led by the US, which resulted in weak foreign direct investment (FDI) flows, and lack of foreign private investors to participate in the privatisation process; 3) the current government followed privatisation with very low economic growth, which made the decision of privatisation questionable in Sudan; 4) lack of public support, as privatisation was implemented at the beginning of the 1990s, in the early days of this regime, which seized power by force; 5) social impacts of privatisation, especially labour redundancy has affected the livelihoods of a considerable number of families in the different regions in the country, which made privatisation a sensitive political issue in Sudan; 6) international economic and political sanctions.
on Sudan, extended to the field of research, as Sudan has been excluded from most WB and IMF studies; and 8) the researcher originally came from Sudan, and she realizes the importance of studying privatisation as a sensitive economic and political issue, and to explore its socio-economic impacts on women, and to reflect this in academia.

Privatisation by most countries was part of economic globalisation pushed by the international financial powers represented by the IMF and the WB. The WB and IMF were the main international financial institutions (IFLs) responsible for supporting member States’ financial and economic structures on the international level (Mary, 1996). Since the 1980s and for the next two decades, economic restructuring, including privatisation, became one of the major conditions for new lending, and much aid to developing countries, according to the policies of the IMF and the WB. These conditions were encapsulated in a prescription known as the Structural Adjustment Programme (SAP); the main axes were economic liberalisation and privatisation policies, and political convergence towards a Western democratic model. These institutions succeeded in pushing most of the debt-ridden developing countries to adopt SAPs, including privatisation, in order to improve their economic and political structures, and also be eligible for future lending. Sudan, like many other developing countries, had been urged to take the IMF and WB prescription.

The growing momentum of privatisation in the heavily indebted countries in the 1980s and the 1990s attracted the interest of scholars from different disciplines, particularly economists and political scientists. New perspectives for examining the classic theories and practices of privatisation have been established; moreover, the ways privatisation has affected the economy of these poor nations and the people involved came under significant scrutiny. However, most of the scholarly work has its limitations, as it has restricted itself to the macro-economic impact of privatisation, or the ideological justification of privatisation. An example of the micro-studies conducted about the impact of privatisation at household level or women, was a study about 'the Privatisation Process and Its Impact on Society',
done by Ddumba-Ssentanmu & Adam Mugume (2001) at Makerere University institute of Economics; another study is ‘Gender Bias and Family Distress: The Privatisation Experience in Argentina’, by Rosa N. Geldstein (1997). Other areas have not been given much attention, such as the relationship between privatisation and the increasing inequalities in ethnicity, gender and regions. Consequently, this knowledge gap has encouraged scholars from other fields, i.e. sociologists, feminists, and gender scholars, to make their contribution.

In Sudan, the debate on privatisation extended to the national level, as Sudanese economists, development researchers, trade unions, student unions, and the media joined the debate over this issue. It was apparent that issues related to privatisation are ‘sensitive’, economically as well as politically (Dianvo, 1989). In Sudan, the process of privatisation was not fully supported nationally, as people did not trust the government. The fact that buyers of public assets were mainly foreigners, and the large scale of labour redundancy caused a political problem.

Research Justification

The debate, in itself, is not the whole reason for me to examine the impact of privatisation closely; the literature reviewed has demonstrated a gap in our knowledge, as the gender perspective has always been absent when privatisation is studied, especially at the national level, and to some extent at the regional and international levels. This despite the fact that the issue of integrating women in development has emerged as a central concern for development and gender scholars, and has been envisaged as a prerequisite of ensuring social justice and equity. In the last twenty years, and in response to the demands of women’s movements, and the UN mandate, national governments and international development agencies have adopted special policy measures to promote women’s advancement (Khalfalla, 2000).

Since the UN Decade for women (1976-1985), the demand for policy attention has been framed in terms of projects and access to, or integration into, development policy-making and project implementation institutions. The most important institution was the State, as it represents the central machinery of distribution and
allocation of resources. Therefore, the State has become the critical arena for the promotion of women at all levels of policy formulation (Goeiz, 1995). As a result of the cumulative efforts of women’s movements, gender activists, and UN agencies, the fourth conference of women in Beijing in 1995 came to put women at the top of the agenda worldwide. Furthermore, the Beijing platform of action assigned two critical areas of concern, dealing with women and economy, and women and poverty. These two areas were significantly impacted by State economic policies, as reflected in women’s well being, and the need for gender equality in terms of access to, and distribution of resources. This international trend aiming for the advancement of women, supported by UN agencies and the international women’s movement, urged national governments in developing countries to adopt national policies for the advancement of women. Although many governments have national policies for women’s advancement, the degree of implementation is still a controversial question. Sudan’s example reflects one such experience; the current government has had a separate strategy for woman in the Sudan National Comprehensive Strategy (1992-2002). While it was the first time for government to assign a separate strategy for woman, it limited women more to their reproductive role as wives and mothers rather than the productive role (Khalfalla, 2000). It is also worth mentioning that a new policy for the empowerment of women was endorsed in 2007, but it lacked the supporting political will and funding, as well as the technical expertise for proper implementation.

Literature about Privatisation

Widespread privatisation drew the attention of scholars from different disciplines, who analysed and studied its various aspects. In addition, the increasing participation of women in all aspects of economic, social and political life, has also led to growing attention from international and national, institutions and agencies, as well as development researchers and gender scholars lobbying, working and producing research in order to achieve the ultimate goal of women’s empowerment and gender equality. This long history of the women’s movement and gender
scholars moved the researcher to seek to make a modest contribution towards these cumulative efforts, by studying the impact of State privatisation on women in the Sudanese context. This besides the knowledge gap identified when reviewing the literature written about privatisation, especially at the national level. Specifically, the study of privatisation and its socio-economic impacts on women made redundant from banking and manufacturing sectors in Sudan leads to a revisit of the social mitigating programmes that should be in place to reduce the negative shock caused by privatisation.

The government followed privatisation and aimed to increase government revenue and reducing government expenditure by selling state-owned enterprises, attracting more domestic and foreign investors, reducing the balance of payment deficit, and providing more employment opportunities (Elbeely, 2003). Some Sudanese economists (e.g. Awad, 2002, p.23) have argued that privatisation was not the best solution for Sudan’s economic problems, while others have commented on the implementation process and the motives behind the use of privatisation policies. Awad (2002) argued that the “Sudanese economy is known as an agricultural economy where privatisation is more applicable to more industrialised or modernised economies”. Others, like Suliman (2005), argued that: “Motives behind privatisation are complex and controversial, the ruling regime in Sudan expediently used privatisation of State-owned enterprises to acquire more economic and political power for its followers/affiliates”.

Others regarded it as politically motivated, but at the international relations level; Elbeely (2003) “perceived that the government of Sudan has implemented privatisation to find acceptability in the eyes of international [sic] community”. Meanwhile, Musa (2002) argued that: “the motives are merely economic ones but the implementation was really problematic”.

While economists debated the suitability of privatisation given the nature of the Sudanese economy, the applicability of privatisation to economic structures, or the motives behind it, seeking an answer for these questions has remained important.
Regardless of whether the goals of this programme were primarily economic or political; what are the socio-economic impacts of privatisation on women made redundant from the public sector enterprises (i.e. banking and manufacturing).

**Research Objectives**

The study aims to explore the socio-economic impacts of privatisation on women made redundant in Sudan’s banking and manufacturing sectors, and how these impacts influenced women’s employment, and their economic and social position in the Sudanese context.

This qualitative approach seeks to make an original contribution to understanding the changes happening in the lives of women, who were made redundant due to privatisation, by explaining how women account for their experiences at the micro level.

The impact of privatisation on women in Sudan has not been researched before; this is why there is a scarcity of information about it. This study has tackled the issue of privatisation and its impacts on women in Sudan, asking whether privatisation changes women’s employment status, and how this in turn influences women’s economic and social positions at family and societal levels.

The feminist literature on development has been especially critical, charging SAPs with carrying out their objectives on the backs of the poor, especially poor women (Moghadam, 1999). Following the emergence of a more critical analysis of privatisation, feminist scholars and researchers have conducted a number of studies to reflect the consequences of the introduction and implementation of global economic restructuring on women and other marginalised groups. These studies have two main streams regarding privatisation policy. Some studies focused on the social impact of privatisation, i.e. the reduction of government spending on social services, such as health, education and other benefits. Other studies have concentrated on the critical analysis of the formulation and implementation of macro-economic policies, and their impact on discrimination against women; they were concerned with how neglect of gender analysis at different levels leads to the deprivation of women’s economic and social rights. The majority of these studies
have been done by prominent research institutes, and UN agencies, or for papers presented at conferences. One example of the studies done on Eastern European countries and the Soviet Union was carried out by the World Institute for Development Economics Research of the United Nations University in 1992. Another is the Report on Women in a Changing Global Economy (WIDER, UN, 1994). It is clear that the issue of gender analysis of macro-economic policies at global, regional and national levels has growing importance. But is still limited and does not cover all the regions and countries that undergo economic restructuring, including privatisation.

This study is focused on women's concerns, as a social issue, but also an economic issue. Women's concerns are not only relevant when considering the social effects of macro-economic and privatisation policies, but gender is also an important analytical category for economic analysis and policy programming (Evets, 2002). One of the direct impacts of privatisation is labour redundancy, which is considered a socio-economic issue; accordingly, the impact of privatisation on women who were made redundant from the banking and manufacturing sectors is the socio-economic cost of privatisation, which ultimately has implications for women's social position in the family as well as community. However, it is not merely the social impact of privatisation, as has been argued in other studies, where the discussions have emphasised the impact of privatisation and the free market economy on women, and how it influenced their access to social services, such as health and education.

In the case of Sudan, surprisingly, only few studies of its privatisation experience have been carried out by international financial institutions, perhaps owing to the country's isolation during the early 1990s. It is worth mentioning that a number of theoretical studies were done on the economic effect of privatisation in Sudan (Awad, 1990; Abu Affan, 1992; Kendawe, 2001), and other empirical research on the economic and management efficiency of privatisation in certain public sector enterprises, such as the Abuna’ama agricultural project, Sudanese Communication
Company, SATA company, and Gezira agricultural scheme (Hamad, Eltayb and Elbeely, 2001; Hasan, 2002).

Meanwhile, no empirical research has been done on the socio-economic consequences of privatisation in terms of total numbers of workers, lost income, and possibilities of re-employment for redundant employees. The bulk of studies on privatisation have concentrated on the impact of privatisation on the efficiency of the economy. This emphasis is understandable in view of the pressing need to sell privatisation as ‘good’ economics. The other side of the story, namely, the socio-economic consequences for redundant labour, were the least investigated aspects (Musa, 2002, p.9). As the socio-economic cost of privatisation has not been given wide attention, the gender dimension of these policies has not been highlighted, or taken into account in any of the studies done by Sudanese researchers and economists.

**Research Methods**

An alternative approach to studying privatisation is through case studies, as was indicated by some researchers:

"Case studies usually provide a rich source of descriptive data and more readily address qualitative as well as quantitative aspects, moreover, casework is grounded in the experiences of countries and some researchers feel more comfortable when conducting research using ‘real people’ and ‘real organisations’ rather than simply using statistics" (Parker and Kirkpatrick, 2003, p.4).

All of these studies utilised case studies as a research strategy, in order to investigate the effect of privatisation on the improvement of efficiency. However, the gender dimension was always absent.

This study followed the qualitative research strategy, as did other studies, because of the lack of quantitative data about privatisation; however, the original contribution added here is the gender perspective used to explore the impact of privatisation on the employment, economic and social positions of women. Two case studies were drawn from the sectors that were strongly affected by privatisation, namely banking and manufacturing. Women factory working in these
two sectors comprise two extremes of Sudanese society, i.e. women professionals and unskilled women workers; this would enable a diversified image of the effect of privatisation on the two groups, as women bankers are among advantaged groups, while women workers are considered a disadvantaged group and represent the vast majority of Sudanese women. The selection of the two sectors and the sample of 60 women was dependent on the use of the quantitative method of data classification and analysis.

This study followed the feminist perspective to analyse and conceptualise the accounts of women respondents, who were made redundant due to privatisation. As privatisation was a product of the new international order, a growing body of literature criticised neo-classic economics, and the changes brought in terms of policies and structures. Some feminist scholars, such as Burnell (1999) and Charuseela (2003), perceive ‘neo-liberal’ economic policies as a challenge facing women worldwide, especially women in developing countries. The implementation of economic restructuring and privatisation programmes has impacted on women in various ways: feminisation of the labour force, informalisation of the female labour force, feminisation of unemployment, and feminisation of poverty.

With respect to women in Sudan, they work in low-paid jobs, and poor working conditions; 88% of working women are under the poverty line (Gender Indicators Survey, 2004). Moreover, poverty rates in Sudan rose to 49% of the population (National Population Census, 2008) with an increase in women-headed households to 25% in 2002, and increased to 73% in 2008 (National Population Census, 2008). Moreover, the informal sector has become feminised, as the number of female labourers in this sector reached 26.8% in 2008. In view of this situation, women are expected to be more vulnerable than men to the influence of privatisation, and expected to have the same experiences as women in other developing countries.

Generalisation of Research Findings
The study does not claim to generalise its findings, or claim representativeness of the sample, because of the limited sample coverage, rather it attempts to explore the experiences of women, who were made redundant due to privatisation, and how
they saw the effects of redundancy on their lives. Moreover, their accounts and insights indicate the changes that happened in their employment, and economic and social positions. The study also seeks to draw the attention of researchers and policy makers to the importance of incorporating the gender dimension in research, and policy formulation and implementation. It also aims to fill a gap in the information, which is characterised as being somewhat gender in sensitive.

Origins of the study

This thesis focuses on accounts of women, who experienced redundancy due to the privatisation of two enterprises: the Bank of Khartoum and the Friendship Factory for Readymade Clothes. I undertook this study for the following reasons; firstly, social policy is one of the areas that has attracted my interest, because of the crucial role played by the State, and analysing State policies was the topic of my MA research: ‘Towards Gender Sensitive Policies in Sudan: Analysis of Sudan National Comprehensive Strategy (SNCS) 1992-2002’. Secondly, I worked for five years in the General Directorate for Women (the national machinery responsible for women), Ministry of Social Welfare, Woman and Children. During that period, I was very close to the policy and decision-making ‘centres’, where all the policies and strategies were developed, and presented to people in conferences and workshops for approval. Thirdly, I have a personal interest in studying women’s concerns, especially the ones relating to the economy and the labour market.

Study Limitations

Firstly, the use of the qualitative method does not mean an underestimation of quantitative methods. But the lack of adequate and updated quantitative data about privatisation and women in Sudan left me with no other choice.

Secondly, security reasons have restricted my mobility in other states or towns, besides the limited resources available to me as a PhD student.

Thirdly, the study has focused on the micro-level, as it depends on the accounts of the sample respondents; the macro-level, which relates to policy analysis, is a good potential area for further research.
Methodological considerations and issues

There are important issues relating to the paucity of data in Sudan: the available data are not updated and most are not gender disaggregated. Therefore, throughout the study, I tended to use relatively ‘old’ information. In other instances, I depended on reports and assessment studies prepared for the UN agencies in Sudan.

Another methodological concern is the paucity of data available about Sudan. The researcher was faced with the problem in various ways: lack of updated data—the last national population census was held in 1993, the last labour force survey was carried out in 1996, and the last household survey undertaken in 1978 (World Bank, 2003). At another level was the scarcity of data related to the research topic ‘woman and privatisation’. Very few studies have tackled this issue, and the gender dimension was always absent. Consequently, the researcher followed a qualitative research strategy to explore the impact of privatisation on women in Sudan, through utilizing respondents’ accounts and perceptions. The data collected, reviewed, generated from both secondary and primary sources, is backdated to 2007 and before, but is still valid, as the situation of women is still the same as reflected by the 2008 national population census. Regarding privatisation, the process still continued with the same government attitudes and practices.

Thesis outline

The thesis comprises eight chapters: the first chapter gives background information on Sudan, and also includes detailed description of women in Sudan. Chapter two presents a literature review on privatisation, and the theory and experiences from various regions and the experience of privatisation in Sudan. Chapter three provides the theoretical framework of the study to understand privatisation in Sudan, while chapter four is presenting the methods, methodology and the general characteristics of the respondents. Chapters five, six and seven reflect the analysis of primary data, and Chapter eight consists of the research conclusion.
CHAPTER ONE
WOMEN IN SUDAN

Contexts and issues: Profile of Sudan

Sudan is the largest country in Africa, and ninth in the world, covering an area of 2.5 million square kilometres. It shares extensive borders with nine countries, resulting in large refugee flows from several of these countries. This has also greatly increased the risk of conflict and political tension with trans-border tribes and State neighbours. In common with many other countries in Sub-Saharan Africa (SSA), Sudan experienced many years of political tension and civil war since its independence in 1956. The colonisers left behind the seeds of political tension and conflict that could flare up at any moment.

Sudan’s climate varies with tropical weather dominant in the far south, savannas in the central area, and dry and desert-like conditions in the north of the country. The diversity of Sudan’s geography is also reflected in its multicultural, multi-ethnic and multilingual people.

According to the World Bank (2003), Sudan’s total population was around 32 million, with an average household size of 5.6 persons, and GDP annual growth rate of 2.6%. The majority of the population, estimated at 67%, live in rural areas. Arabic is the official language, while Islam has been the official State religion since the application of Sharia Laws in 1983. Generally, religion has a strong influence on people’s daily life, and government has articulated all national policies and legislation based on Islamic principles. This was first done in September 1983 under the Numeiri regime, but then suspended by the democratically elected government that took over in 1986. However, Islamic legislation was reinstated in 1989, in a ‘fundamentalist’ pattern, by the new military government that seized power that same year.

Sudan’s economy is primarily agrarian since ancient times, with its vast arable lands, and plentiful water from rivers and seasonal rains, which irrigate large numbers of agricultural schemes in different parts of the country. Farmers comprise
more than half Sudan’s population, where 53.5% of men and 79.7% of women work in the agricultural sector (Labour Force Survey, 1996). Although British colonisers introduced the modern sector between 1899 and 1955, available data indicates that almost all the development expenditure went into infrastructure projects, like railways, roads, post and telegraphs, and other public services (Abu-Affan, 1985). These principally served the colonial presence in the country rather than the people. Industrial activities in the country were all of a cottage industry type, with the manufacturing of cotton into coarse fabric, ivory, leather and wood products. However, the sharp increase in demand for raw materials by the British textile industry led to intensive cotton cultivation in the Sudan. The first stage of an embryonic modern manufacturing sector in the country was represented by cotton ginning factories (Abu-Affan, 1985). Private ownership dominated the industrial sector in Sudan until the late 1960s and early 1970s, when the government intervened massively through a process of confiscation and nationalisation of large numbers of industrial firms. In the late 1980s, most of these industrial firms were privatised.

Regarding banking, it can be claimed that the sector was first established in Sudan at the start of Anglo-Egyptian Condominium Rule in 1899. The National Bank of Egypt was the first commercial bank to open a branch in Sudan, followed by Barclays in 1913; these banks and others were established to cope with the new economic development happening in the country, mainly to serve commercial interests and facilitate financial deposits and transactions with other countries (Alim, 2000).

As was mentioned, both manufacturing and banking sectors can be considered new, modern sectors in Sudan. However, these sectors did not find sufficient support from successive governments after independence in 1956, to enlarge their economic base and influence people’s livelihood.

Therefore, until recently, the vast majority of Sudan’s population were still rural inhabitants living in very poor conditions, their average per capita income estimated at US$395 in 2001. According to Sudan’s 2008 fifth population census,
the incidence of poverty in Northern Sudan is 46.5%, besides wide regional disparities in economic and social development. While well endowed with natural resources, in relation to its population, Sudan’s economy has been substantially underperforming.

The government federal administrative system
Sudan became a federal country in 1992, when a three-tier system of government (federal government, states, and localities) was introduced. There are currently 26 states, 16 in the northern and 10 in the southern part of the country. Each state is headed (theoretically) by a governor, and organised on a decentralised government model with state assemblies and ministers.

Political evolution of the Sudanese government and political system
Considering socio-economic developments in Sudan since independence, six major changes may be described.

• First, a Republic came into being on the eve of independence in 1956, and consisted of a freely elected parliament dominated by the two large traditional political parties, the Umma party and the United Democratic Party (UDP).

• Second, in 1958, a military coup took place; the parliament was dissolved, all political organisations were banned, and a Supreme Council of twelve military officers ran the country.

• Third, in 1964, a nationwide general strike led to the October revolution, which toppled the military rulers and restored democracy, whereupon the traditional political parties (Umma and UDP) once more dominated the parliament.

• Fourth, in May 1969, a group of military officers led by Gaafar Numeiri and largely supported by the Sudanese Communist Party seized power in the country.

• Fifth, in April 1985, a popular uprising ended Numeiri’s rule and restored democracy. This period witnessed the appearance of the National Islamic Front (NIF) alongside the traditional political parties.

• Finally, in June 1989, the military took power in a coup headed by Brigadier Omer Al-Beshir, and largely supported by the NIF party. The parliament was
dissolved, and political parties were again banned. This government continues to rule the country to the present day.

The domination of the current government by the NIF can clearly be seen in the new regime’s adoption of the Islamic movement’s discourse, as well as announcing the implementation of Islamic Sharia in 1991.

In these circumstances, the National Conference for Economic Salvation (NCES) was held in October 1989. The conference mainly explained the government economic philosophy with regard to the role of the State in economic activities (NCES, 1989).

The conference stated clearly that the state should not intervene in any economic activities, except in certain circumstances, such as provision of essential commodities, setting profit margins, and determining a minimum wage. The conference also stressed the importance of relying on market forces when determining the prices of various goods and services (NCES, 1989).

Backing this doctrine, the Governor of the Central Bank of Sudan argued that:

“the state should restrict itself to the provision of an enabling environment for the private sector to flourish, rather than competing with it in its various economic activities” (Elbeely, 2003).

It is obvious that the current government built all its political and economic programmes according to its ideological background, which was to a great extent influenced by Islamic principles and teachings. In 1999, the NIF, which had evolved into the National Congress Party (NCP) split, and Dr. Al-Turabi, its former leader, formed his own party called the People’s Congress Party. This change had positive impacts on the government’s image internally, with greater popular support for the government; externally, it found praise from different Arab, African and Western countries. Accordingly, the position and image of the government largely improved, and this paved the way for it to negotiate with the international community over the economic sanctions imposed on Sudan since the early 1990s.

International pressures emerged in view of the new international order; on the one hand, it accused the Government of Sudan of the continuing civil war in south
Sudan, because of the hegemony of the military and the non-democratic regime. On the other hand, the ‘rebel’ movement in the south found huge support from the international community, as a result of lobbying and pressure by human rights, and other civil society organisations. In addition, internal problems manifested in the deteriorating situation of a large proportion of the population, especially in the areas affected by war, represented in displaced people, and increasing numbers of poor people due to the costly and prolonged civil war extending for more than 50 years. All these factors led the current government to sign a Peace Agreement with the Sudan People Liberation Movement (SPLM)—the leading movement fighting the government. This agreement entailed new political arrangements, including change from a totalitarian to national unity government, change of the constitution, and preparations to hold elections for the democratic transfer of power in Sudan. Despite all these changes, the totalitarian regime still controlled Sudan politically and economically. Moreover, people in Sudan were challenged by the emerging conflict in Darfur (Western Sudan), which dramatically affected economic, political and security conditions.

**Economic performance since the 1990s**

Although there has not been any national household survey since 1978, some social indicators illustrate the levels of welfare, as do indicators from Sub-Saharan Africa, which help approximate the situation in Sudan (World Bank, 2003).

*Economic Growth*

The real GDP growth rate expanded at an average of 6.6% per annum in the late 1990s. The growth was perhaps due to the economic reform package launched by the present government, the start of oil production and favourable weather for agricultural production. However, widespread poverty, skewed income distribution, and inadequate delivery of social services still remain serious problems. In the 1980s, the economy experienced deep structural problems. The most prominent was the major budgetary imbalance represented by excessive expenditure, growing at a much higher rate than revenues. This resulted in an escalation of the budget deficit with increased borrowing from the banking system;
official data show that the budget deficit reached more than 9.8% of GDP in 1998 compared with an average of 2.4% for the preceding 8 years (Osman, 2001).

Inflation was very high in the early 1990s reflecting widespread fiscal deficits and domestic credit expansion; inflation reached 133% in 1996, and was gradually reduced from three to one digit (from 133% to less than 10%) (Ibrahim, Elobodi, Holi, 2003).

With inflation running at three-digit levels during 1992-1996, with no access to external finance, and the continuing drain of resources to finance the civil war in the south, the government balanced the budget through drastic cuts in public expenditure, especially social services and infrastructure development, which was downsized to 0.8% in the 1990s (Elbeely, 2003; Ibrahim, Elobodi, Holi, 2003).

Stabilisation of growth was costly in social terms. Yet, the government justified its stabilisation programme on the grounds that it brought inflation down to single-digit levels after 2003, and improved prospects for sustainable growth.

Structure of the economy

Agriculture

Sudan is predominantly an agricultural country with a vast endowment of agricultural land, livestock, forestry, fisheries and minerals. These constitute its potential for development. Agriculture accounted for 39% of the GDP in 2001, and 95% of export earnings; moreover, it provides livelihood for about 80% of Sudan’s population. Sudan’s exports are mainly agricultural primary goods, e.g. cotton, gum Arabic, oil seeds and livestock. Despite its vast agricultural endowment, the country’s imports are mainly agricultural, consisting of wheat, rice, tea, coffee, fruits, vegetables, etc.

Sudan’s economy remains traditional, with farming providing a livelihood for 80% of the population; more than half the people live in rural areas, working as farmers, which means that people have not yet moved to modern sectors like manufacturing. Sudan owes its financial health mainly to its strong command over agricultural operations, where 41% of the country’s GDP comes from agriculture (World Bank, 2003). The agriculture sector also provides employment for 61% of all employed
people in Sudan (World Bank, 2003). The country exports a large number of agricultural products to other countries, where some of the most commonly exported products include sesame seed, and cotton (Salih, 2003). Therefore, the sector seems to have strong potential for women looking for employment in the country. The country makes every effort to improve its financial health by focusing on this sector. Operations in this sector are carried out mainly by public sector organizations. However, some divisions are privatized, thus offering greater scope for women looking to work in these organizations. The sector offers them employment opportunities to help in maintaining the sound financial health of the country.

Industry

The industrial sector in Sudan, for the moment, represents a comparatively small part of the economy. However, its share increased to 18%, and accounted for 43% of GDP, due to the recently emerged oil industry. The industrial sector primarily produces import-substitutes of consumer goods using imported raw materials, machinery, and equipment. The most important industries in this sector are textiles, leather, cement, and food processing industries; from the latter, the most important are sugar, flour and edible oils industries.

The industrial development process and planning of the modern manufacturing sector in Sudan took place immediately after the country gained its independence in 1956. The first national government determined that industrialisation was essential for the process of economic growth, and was to be the domain of private initiatives. But this policy was discontinued as the second military government took power in 1969, and returned the industrial sector to public ownership. The government of the time was driven by socialist ideology, and decided to enlarge the role of the public sector in all economic activities, while curtailing the role of the private sector. Accordingly, a process of confiscation and nationalisation of industrial firms took place in the mid-1970s. However, the government failed to transform the predominantly agricultural and pastoral economy into an industrialised, semi-industrialised or industrialising one (Abu Affan, 1985).
In 1985, a democratically elected government took power; it tried to undertake economic and political reforms, but was thwarted by time-consuming conflicts between the political parties in the ruling coalition, along with the escalating civil war in the south. This government was short-lived, as the 1989 military coup removed it from power (Elbeely, 2003).

Successive governments attempted to improve the industrial sector, but its share of GDP fell continually from the mid-1980s to the mid-1990s, yet, in 2001, this began to increase reaching 18%. However, this trend tended to change as the government pursued a programme of privatisation, which targeted large numbers of public sector industrial enterprises, which had by then reached twenty-two entities. This made it the sector, which had experienced the most privatisation (HTCD, 2005). At the same time, the government expanded heavy industries to serve oil extraction and refining; yet all these industries are State-owned, because they are considered of strategic importance.

Despite the progress in the industrial sector, Sudanese economists, like Abu Affan and Awad, considered Sudan a non-industrial country, with a fragile and emerging industrial sector. The sector was constrained by the absence of proper planning, infeasible projects, infrastructure bottlenecks, political instability and internal conflicts.

The late beginning of the establishment of the modern sectors in Sudan, which began in real terms only after independence (1956), and the achievements made towards a modern economy are still very limited, and have made very modest contribution to economic growth in the country. This is unlike other countries that built their modern economy after independence, such as Egypt, which established a large industrial base after independence in 1952. Another example is Malaysia, which gained independence in 1972, but established a very strong and competent modern sector, and made a huge transformation from a traditional to a modern economy.

Although oil production has given the industrial sector a good boost, it only started in 2003, and is too new to contribute to modernisation of the Sudanese economy.
Moreover, it is still confronted by many challenges, represented in the repayment of loans to the foreign oil companies, and the conflict over oil revenues between the government and their partner in the national government, the SPLM.

Petroleum

This has emerged as major source of economic growth and revenue for the government. It is also one of the major factors that kept the country’s civil war going. In 2001, oil revenue accounted for 75% of the country’s exports, while non-oil products including Gum Arabic, livestock, sesame, and others accounted for only 25% (IMF, 2002).

Relationship between the IMF and Sudan’s Government

The major international financial institutions, namely the WB and IMF, have frequently advocated privatisation. This was their prescription to improve the performance of loss-making or unprofitable public enterprises. Therefore, IMF policy aimed to push debt-ridden countries (Latin America, Sub-Saharan African, Middle Eastern, and some Asian countries) to follow economic restructuring, including privatisation, to settle their economic problems. Sudan was among this group, as it failed to repay its debts to the IMF. This might be due to the economic problems related to budget deficits, or other constraints relating to the political instability. In this situation, the IMF considered that privatisation was likely to be the best solution for the economic crisis in Sudan as this would lead to reduced government budget deficit, increased efficiency and profitability of the privatised enterprises. Moreover, it would restrict the economic role of the State, and at the same time enlarge the private sector and civil society organisations.

Sudan’s disagreement with the IMF began in 1984, during the Numeiri regime. The government’s arrears to the IMF had reached eight billion dollars, without any genuine policy from the government to tackle the problem (Elbeely, 2003). The fund took action against Sudan, measures which continued until September 1990. Under this regime, the IMF declared the country to be a non-cooperative State. Later, the IMF suspended Sudan’s voting rights in August 1993. In April 1994, the IMF’s Executive Council recommended the withdrawal of Sudan from
the Fund. Two years later, in 1996, the Fund decided to suspend efforts to force Sudan to withdraw its membership, but relations have still not returned to normal (Strategic Institute, 1998).

The relationship between the two parties remained shaky, but it was thought that political rather than economic motives were responsible. This view stemmed from Sudan’s weak relationship with Western countries in general, and the US in particular, with accusations made against Sudan’s government in relation to continuing violation of human rights, and offering safe haven to terrorists. As these countries, especially the US, had the largest share in the Fund’s budget, they were able to influence and manipulate the IMF decision-making process; the US had the largest share in the Fund, and hence the strongest voting position (Elbeely, 2003).

In June 1996, a new Minister of Finance was appointed, who announced a three-phase strategy to deal with the situation (Osman, 2001). Firstly, to focus on designing a comprehensive structural economic programme aimed at alleviating distortions in the economy. Secondly, to concentrate on restarting payment of parts of the government’s arrears to these institutions as a gesture showing willingness to co-operate. Finally, to engage in direct negotiation with the financial institutions concerned in order to reach agreement regarding the scheduling of arrears, as well as the resumption of financial and technical aid to the country.

A few months later, the government continued its privatisation programme and adopted another two structural programmes, which were implemented during 1997 and 1998, in order to gain acceptability in the international community and the international financial institutions (Elbeely, 2003).

Due to continuous contacts and co-operation with most Western European countries, namely France, Germany, the UK, Italy and the Netherlands, the main obstacle remaining was the relationship with the US Government, which continued to oppose any decision in favour of Sudan.

With this partially enabling international environment, Sudan regained its full membership in the Fund and its full voting rights in August 2000. After normalisation of the relationship with the IMF, Sudan managed to restore its
relationship with the WB, and the first step was to secure technical aid to the country (Osman, 2001).

**The Labour Market and Unemployment in Sudan**

Economists have identified important roles for equity, as well as full employment in order to enhance economic growth along with the greater sustainability within society in Sudan. Newer growth concepts and several classical theories along with various positions in the literature have shown that the main objective is to achieve equilibrium and full employment in Sudan’s labour market. The failure in achieving full employment and the problem of unemployment have become serious, bringing a mismatch between labour demand and supply. This may have significant macroeconomic effects, and also hinders development and increased economic growth. Thus the country aims to leverage the power of full employment for the purpose of reducing the negative effects related to unemployment.

The long run strategy for sustainable development and economic growth aims at leveraging sustained peace, mobilising sufficient resources (human and economic), reforming institutions internally, stabilising economic and political affairs, harnessing balanced development strategies, and building reliance on Sudanese workers and domestic capital (Elnur, 2009). Additionally, there is a need to rise above the challenges and several strategic problems to deal with economic development. Thus, achievement of sustainable development and economic enhancement in the case of Sudan largely depends on planning to reduce poverty, to decrease the rate of unemployment and also to modify the structure of the labour market. The rate of success and achievement of strategies to reduce the poverty and unemployment rates need to be consistent. Dealing with the problems related to the mitigation of poverty fully depends on the development or formation of proper and more suitable employment opportunities within Sudan. The creation of permanent employment or jobs involves availability of sufficient and sustained income for poor people to help the nation reduce poverty levels.

High rates of unemployment in Sudan are of key importance. The increasing rate of FDI inflow along with the enhanced wealth has increased the migration rate to
Sudan. Accordingly, the number of migrant workers has increased within the labour market, especially in the private sector, which affected the configuration of the labour market, and also contributed to increased unemployment (Waal, 2005). Sudan suffers serious structural problems in terms of political stability, regional inequalities, regular conflicts, low skill levels, and incidence of poverty. These have all deeply affected the labour market and led to higher unemployment. Thus, preparation for employment and up-skilling has become a vital to overcome challenges, and strategic problems, in the economic development in Sudan.

Table 1: Socio-economic characteristics of Sudan—source: UNDP (2009)

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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Sudan</td>
<td>29.2</td>
<td>2086</td>
<td>0.531</td>
<td>57.9</td>
<td>60.9</td>
<td>39.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Africa</td>
<td>438.6</td>
<td>2729</td>
<td>0.547</td>
<td>53.0</td>
<td>65.3</td>
<td>35.9</td>
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<tr>
<td>Asia</td>
<td>317.3</td>
<td>5817</td>
<td>0.724</td>
<td>68.8</td>
<td>87.1</td>
<td>64.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Europe</td>
<td>720.8</td>
<td>31,755</td>
<td>0.902</td>
<td>74.9</td>
<td>99.2</td>
<td>58.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Latin America and the Caribbean</td>
<td>675.5</td>
<td>10,077</td>
<td>0.821</td>
<td>73.4</td>
<td>91.2</td>
<td>43.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Northern America</td>
<td>281.7</td>
<td></td>
<td>0.932</td>
<td>79.2</td>
<td>96.5</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Oceanian</td>
<td>36.9</td>
<td></td>
<td>0.900</td>
<td>76.4</td>
<td>93.0</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>East Asia and the Pacific</td>
<td>1631.3</td>
<td>5,733</td>
<td>0.700</td>
<td>72.2</td>
<td>92.7</td>
<td>69.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Latin America and the Caribbean</td>
<td>437.5</td>
<td>10,077</td>
<td>0.821</td>
<td>73.4</td>
<td>91.2</td>
<td>83.4</td>
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<tr>
<td>South Asia</td>
<td>2,202</td>
<td></td>
<td>0.719</td>
<td>68.1</td>
<td>71.2</td>
<td>66.2</td>
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<td>OECD</td>
<td>31,647</td>
<td></td>
<td>0.912</td>
<td>79.0</td>
<td>89.1</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>European Union (EU27)</td>
<td>299.3</td>
<td>9856</td>
<td>0.917</td>
<td>79.0</td>
<td>91.0</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>High human development</td>
<td>742.2</td>
<td>13,569</td>
<td>0.873</td>
<td>72.4</td>
<td>94.1</td>
<td>82.4</td>
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<tr>
<td>Medium human development</td>
<td>3,063</td>
<td></td>
<td>0.856</td>
<td>66.6</td>
<td>80.0</td>
<td>63.2</td>
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<td>Low human development</td>
<td>240.2</td>
<td>802</td>
<td>0.423</td>
<td>51.0</td>
<td>47.7</td>
<td>47.0</td>
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<tr>
<td>World</td>
<td>5,903.3</td>
<td>5,972</td>
<td>0.703</td>
<td>67.5</td>
<td>83.9</td>
<td>65.5</td>
</tr>
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</table>

The table describes the characteristic socio-economic features, and key demographic structures of Sudan, including the diversities between Sudan, Arab countries, African and other regions of the world, in terms of economic development, measured through GDP per capita, index of human development and population. Sudan sustains high population numbers along with a low level of economic development. The classification of economies in the WB puts Sudan along with lower medium-income economies. Furthermore, UNDP HDI indicates that the average rate of GDP per capita is lower than other world and Arab countries (Elnur, 2005). It includes other parts of HDI, such as mixed ratios for
enrolment and average life expectancy, along with the rate of literacy. Furthermore, the indicators of UNDP and estimations from the IMF World Economic Outlook (IMF, 2002), show that, compared with other poorly developed countries, Sudan suffered from higher rates of unemployment and poverty.

Sudan is large in area, but the economy is small in global terms. According to the concepts and classification of the United Nations and WB, Sudan lies among SSA countries, and between the higher indebted countries, and lower and poor income groups. For example, the WB and UNDP have shown lower rates of GDP per capita income in the case of Sudan—at the extreme of least developing countries—and less than all World regions. In spite of higher and increasing rate of FDI inflows to Sudan, it is different from other regions in the world. Sudan experienced a higher increase of debt services as a proportion of exports and as a percentage of GDP in the period from 1990 to 2005. It was probably because most African countries, especially Sudan, rely on a larger influx of foreign assistance from various other sources. Sudan is considered among the top ten receivers of gross Official Development Assistance (ODA) between 1990 and 2007.

**Implications of Price Liberalization for Labour: Rising Cost of Living**

It is broadly believed that SAPs within Africa have brought about greater want on the part of workers, along with some economic successes in compensation (Free Labour World, 1992). The elimination of controlled prices means prices of services and goods in several countries have skyrocketed. The commercialised public utility services increased their service charges. Healthcare, education and electricity, which used to be provided through public sector, also substantially increased charges. Sudan experienced excessive rates of hyperinflation in the past eight years, in which the inflation rates were of three-digits. In the mid 1990s, inflation rates were fuelled through an excessive supply of money in order to finance the regular devaluation and the state budget deficit, bringing continuous devaluation of the Sudanese pound against US dollar rates that have been largely liberalised.
An increasing inflation rate has direct, as well as continuing impacts, on the labour market within the formal sector. It caused adversities on the part of workers whose salaries were not properly increased. On the introduction of Sudan’s Structural Adjustment Programme (SSAP), the living standards of workers decreased. In 1994, it was calculated that the minimum wage level was sufficient to cover almost 25% of the cost of living (El-Soudani International, 1994). The Sudan Workers Trade Union Federation (SWTUF) is an umbrella organisation related to trade unions within the country. The National Council for Wages, in which the SWTUF are represented, gives reviews of salary levels over six month periods, showing increased salaries do not match the increasing rate of inflation. At times, salary rises within the public sector depend on backdates which are too small and too late. This is because it depends on numerous governmental institutions to effect payments in the long run. Some workers such as teachers cannot be paid more frequently than at six month intervals within some remote states. But salaries in the private sector have been considered higher than in the public sector, although the real incomes of workers are regularly eroded through increasing rates of inflation.

**Why Sudan accepted privatisation**

The current government’s decision to embark on liberal economic policies, including privatisation, can be largely seen as a means of gaining acceptability in the eyes of the international community, especially Western countries and the US government.

The government created a model that was compatible with the IMF’s prescription, and adopted policies, in line with what IFLs and Western countries were advocating. The government wanted to improve its image internationally, which had been badly damaged by US allegations that the government had sponsored international terrorists (Elbeely, 2003).

As a result of implementing these packages of economic reform programmes, the international community removed economic sanctions, and the government looked to attract more foreign investors to the country, encourage the domestic private sector to participate positively in the economy, and to improve the standard of
living and widen employment opportunities. Unfortunately, none of this happened, as economic sanctions were not removed until recently, with the exception of the IMF and WB, who restored their relationship with Sudan in 2000 and 2003 respectively. Moreover, it was nearly ten years after the implementation of privatisation, which was too late to assist the government in cushioning the adverse effects of the privatisation process on vulnerable people in Sudan.

The government’s Islamic background may be considered one of the motives behind its tendency to adopt privatisation. The government followed Islamic principles not only in economic aspects, but also in all other facets of life. This is illustrated by a prominent Islamist economist, Baghir-Alssadr (1980, p.):

“Islam accepts markets as the basic co-coordinating mechanism of the economic system. Islamic teaching holds that the market, through perfect competition, allows consumers to obtain desired goods, producers to sell their goods, at a mutually acceptable price”.

This was also underscored by Al-Turabi, who emphasised the importance of Sharia in daily life, by insisting that that “Sharia must guide all matters of life and the source of all laws” (Lesch, 1998). Its manifesto also declared that the economy, educational system and social programmes must be based on Islamic principles and must promote religious faith.

Whatever the reasons for the current government to adopt privatisation, the economic programme of privatisation is still ongoing, as indicated by the report of the High Committee for the Disposal of Public Enterprises (HCDPE) in 2005, and writings of the popular press. Newspapers, such as Al-Intibaha, wrote about the privatisation of A’asalyia sugar factory (16 June 2009), and Al-Rayalam, also wrote about the privatisation of Sudan Airways (February 2009).

**Public Sector Enterprises in the 1980s and 1990s**

In the 1980s and 1990s, the number of public sector enterprises amounted to 190. They can be classified as follows:

- Public corporations with budgets supervised by the Ministry of Finance were 73; 17 were in the agricultural sector; 33 were in the industrial sector, 8 in the
transport, communication, tourism and hotels sectors; and 15 in the energy and diversified sector.

- Forty were public companies owned by the State, and registered under the Company Act of 1925. As a result, they were free from Ministry of Finance control.

- Twenty-six were government banks supervised by the Central Bank, and seventeen were joint ventures supervised by the Investment Department, which was part of the General Department of State Owned Enterprises (SOEs) at the Ministry of Finance (the Technical Committee for the Evaluation of State Owned Enterprises, 1992)

For the purpose of this study, I will focus on the industrial and banking sectors as the institutions studied were selected from these two sectors.

*The industrial sector*

Sudan’s industrial sector in the 1980s and 1990s included five major elements, each of which comprised a number of factories: specifically, the sugar sector, with four factories; textiles, with eight factories; the leather-tanning sector with three tanneries; the food industries with four factories; the cement sector with two factories; and the Central Foundry (Ministry of Finance, 1990).

Enterprises in this sector had continuous deficits throughout the 1980s and 1990s, ranging between £LS 162 million in 1982/83 up to £LS 359.6 million in 1988/89. It was thought that the government policy of assigning real prices to the products of this sector would lead to remarkable improvement in their performance, but this was not the case (Ministry of Finance, 1990).

Additionally, many factors were said to be responsible for the poor financial performance experienced by most of the sector’s units: declining production capacities; technical problems; severe shortages of raw materials, spare parts and fuel oil, as well as lack of adequate funds, plus the shortages of electricity. All these factors hindered their operations, impacting negatively on their productivity and leading to a decline in anticipated revenue.
Other important factors could be related to the poor productivity of the agricultural sector: the major provider of raw materials; security problems as some of these factories are very close to war affected areas; the continuous devaluation of the Sudanese currency increased the cost of production, which influenced their level of competitiveness; and finally the high interest rates on bank loans (Ministry of Finance, 1990).

These enterprises were at the top of the list for disposal to the private sector. Industrial units recorded the highest score of privatised enterprises, as twenty-two units were sold or mainly transferred to the ownership of State governments, through the Al-Aylola mechanism (a method for transferring public-owned assets from the federal to state government).

The banking sector

The financial sector consists of twenty-six operating banks, and a number of other financial institutions, including insurance companies and informal lenders. The commercial banking sector comprises around seventeen joint-venture banks, two state-owned commercial banks, three foreign bank branches, and four specialised banks.

Traditionally, the financial sector has been characterised by heavy government intervention and regulation. The Central Bank imposed detailed requirements on lending, dividing the economy into priority sectors and sub-sectors for which the banks were required to extend credit. An example is that credit for agriculture was a priority; other sectors like manufacturing and others were prohibited from receiving bank financing. The Central Bank prescribed different prices for credit depending on status and geographical allocations. Credit to public enterprises was extended directly by the Bank of Sudan (Al-Msrafi, 2002).

Elements of Islamic banking were introduced in 1984, and the current government has been based completely on Islamic principles since 1992. The adoption of a full-fledged Islamic system poses certain challenges to modern banking; the development of suitable financial and monetary instruments is restricted by the
prohibition of interest. Therefore, only a mix of Islamic financial instruments and conventional ones could solve the problem (Kheir, 2003).

Since 1997, the Bank of Sudan has been dismantling restrictions and liberalising the financial system. Therefore, the financial sector is consciously under pressure to become efficient. Especially, after the close system of supervision, unifying banking account systems, as well as regulations on capital adequacy ratios, according to Basle Standards, was introduced.

A programme for the restructuring strategy was initiated in 1992 with the aim of strengthening the capital base of small banks, reducing non-performing loans, and improving loan evaluation. The share of non-performing loans is still high, and most banks did not fulfil Basle requirements for capital adequacy by the end of 2001. Accordingly, the Central Bank suggested a package of reforming polices, which resulted in the amalgamation or restructuring of most of the banks, which in the end were sold to the private sector.

**Women in the manufacturing and banking sectors**

The increase of women's share in the labour force has become a reality during the last two decades due to the different socio-economic changes that have taken place in the country. These changes are mainly related to the increase in educational attainment among women, especially in the urban setting; men's emigration seeking better jobs and payment; men also deserted work in the formal sector, because of low wages; and the economic deterioration experienced by large segments of society.

The drop in women's share of labour force in the agricultural sector, plus rural-urban migration were also important factors, which led women to look for employment opportunities in other sectors, with better pay and encouraging working conditions. The main sectors that absorbed large numbers of women employees were the manufacturing sector; the sector was a resort for uneducated women, as they were mainly employed in labour-intensive industries that did not required any special skills or education. The other sector was banking, where women professionals found good chances for work and payment, as most men
were no longer interested in working in the formal sector, where salaries are very low.

*Women in the manufacturing sector*

The majority of the achievements won by women were during the Numeiri regime that took power in 1969, and started to enlarge the industrial base in Sudan. It has tended to change the traditional economy to a fully industrial economy. The regime's attempts to improve and develop this sector were the most remarkable to date. Based on its socialist ideology, the regime created large employment opportunities for poor people, in order to transport them from the traditional sector into the new modern sector, which was the industrial sector.

The emancipation of Sudanese women was given a real boost by the Numeiri regime, which paid considerable attention to raising women's status, and the equalisation of women's role in the socio-economic life of the country. Under this regime, Equal Pay was implemented and women were encouraged to participate in the labour force, especially in the industrial sector, where young, unskilled women with low education entered in large numbers; in particular, the labour intensive industries, such as textiles, where women constituted 90% of labour (Textile and Spinning Trade Union, 2002).

*Women in the banking sector*

With reference to the national census of 1993, and an update of the 1996 survey, the size of the workforce in the banking sector was increasing. In 1993, the number of women working in the sector was 10,886 (17%), and men 51,517, rising in 1996 to 18,855 (23%) women and 61,629 men.

Women's share in the labour force had increased by around 7,969 compared with 10,112 for which is a good sign that the gap between men's and women's shares is increasingly narrowing. Women constituted 23% of the workforce in the banking sector, bearing in mind that 10 out of the 26 banks were not recruiting women. In addition, another reason for women's percentage to be lower than men's, is that women are not recruited into manual jobs (porters, cleaners, etc.) as are men.
Manual workers constitute a high percent of the staff in the banking sector, comprising more than 15% (Kheir, 2003; Al-Msrafi, 2005).

Other statistics showing that women comprise a high percentage of banking sector workers were reported in the Bank of Sudan (the Central Bank). Women were 33% of its staff, while in the Bank of Khartoum, women composed 48% of staff (Bank of Khartoum, 2002).

Women in the Sudanese Context

This section provides an overview of women’s position in the Sudanese labour market in the last two decades. This description is of the overall background employment context within which the study respondents worked and lived out their family lives. During the last two decades, women’s participation in the labour force in the developed and developing countries has tended to follow changing patterns and trends accompanying the global economic restructuring, which has led to increasing women’s participation in the manufacturing sector (particularly, the export-led industries). However, with worsened work conditions and falling wages, a large number of women entered the informal sector (this sector also grew after the introduction of SAPs and privatisation), as documented by feminist researchers, such as Moghadam (1998), Baden (2003), and Kheir, (2003), where Sudan was part of this global order. Although Sudanese women were increasingly taking up paid employment for quite a long time, this was characterised by ‘four’ key elements.

Firstly, women were more likely to be attached to the labour force in rural areas than urban areas. Women were employed in large numbers in comparison to men in the traditional/agriculture sector of the economy. Secondly, because of the male dominant culture in society and the labour market, women were generally employed in what had been defined as ‘women’s’ jobs; this gave rise to what has been termed the horizontal segregation of the workforce. Thirdly, they were typically found in the lower grades of employment hierarchies, while men dominated the higher levels; also described as vertical segregation. Fourthly, the deterioration in economic conditions, rising poverty and the increased rates of
unemployment forced a growing number of women into the informal sector, as one of their strategies for survival.

The share of women in the labour force is considered to be a crude measure of their contribution to production. The percentages of women’s share in the labour force went up from 22% in 1993 to 28% in 1996; although it is increasing, it is less than the average rate of increase in women’s participation in the labour force in Sub-Saharan African countries, which is estimated at 39%. Women’s economic activities take three main forms of participation: the formal sector, the traditional (agricultural) sector, and the informal sector. The formal sector is divided into sub-sectors, which include the civil service, public sector enterprises and the private sector.

**Women’s Occupational Structure**

Women’s economic activity continued to rise during the last decade, reaching 28% (1996 labour survey) compared with 72% for men, while female’s participation in the labour force has increased to 32% compared to 68% of males (2008 national census). From all economically active men and women, 89% were employed, while 11% were unemployed. The unemployed are split into two groups, one seeking employment for the first time, and the other currently unemployed, but who had worked before. The percentage of women seeking employment for the first time comprised 87%, while the percentage of men was 79% (Statistical Year Book, 1998). This increase in the number of women seeking jobs for the first time resulted from increasing rates of education among women, plus the pressing economic situation during the 1990s (Elshowya, 2002). The increase of women coincided with the increase of unemployment, which had risen to 28% for women versus 13% for men (Labour Force Survey, 1996).

**Vertical Segregation**

If we compare these figures with the same data for 1983 from the Ministry of Labour, we find that women’s percentage share of the total senior posts has not changed between 1983 and 1996, remaining at 3.3%. Significant questions arise here as to why women’s percentage share in senior posts remained the same over
13 years. Women’s percentages in clerical jobs fell from 45% in 1983 to 34% in 1996. The percentage of women in professional jobs rose from 11.7% in 1983 to 44.7% in 1996. This large increase is attributed to the increase in university education of women.

**Rural-Urban Unequal Gender Division of Labour**

The change in economic structure during the past decade had different impacts on men and women owing to their different positions in society and the economic sector. The share of the agricultural sector decreased from 65.6% (in 1983 national census) to 60.7% (in the 1993 national census). Women’s share dropped from 84.3% to 79.6% but is still high compared to men’s, which was estimated at 58.4% in 1983 dropping to 53.5% in 1993. In 2008, women’s share in the agricultural labour force dropped to 49%, and was accompanied by an increase of women’s share in the community services and manufacturing sectors.

Women’s employment in the manufacturing sector is still limited. They constituted only 13.23% of the workforce in manufacturing, including textiles and garments, food processing, and pharmaceuticals. This indicates that women working in the modern manufacturing sector are specifically dominating low-paid jobs; a situation that increases the vulnerability of women earning their livings.

**Horizontal Segregation**

There is currently a gender-biased division of labour, where some professional occupations are dominated by women, such as elementary occupations, technicians and associate professionals, and service and sales workers. The table below shows that agriculture and related occupations still absorb large numbers of women, reaching 1,500,721; however, the number of women is under half that of men in agricultural occupations. Women’s representation is still low in comparison to males in professions like managers (men are 519,700, while women are only 56,356); for professionals (men are 244,251, while women are only 191,198) and transport; also in manufacturing-related occupations women are less represented than men (men are 313,767, while women are only 13,994) (2008 national census).
In the public sector, women tend to work in the social services and finance, followed by the manufacturing sector: their percentages were 18.70%, 17% and 13.2% respectively. In the private sector, a high percentage of females are concentrated in production, or as unskilled workers, who constitute 68.6% of employees; 8.2% were in professional and technical jobs, and 7.8% were in clerical jobs.

Consequently, these changes make women more exposed to privatisation and its subsequent policy of redundancy, because they are concentrated in unskilled jobs with lower wages, and have fewer years of experience (Elshowya, 2002; Elbeely, 2003; Kheir, 2003).

Table 2: Major occupation groups of population 10 years of age and over—source: Census of Population (2008)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Major occupation group</th>
<th>Female</th>
<th>Male</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1.1.1.1.1 Manager</td>
<td>56356</td>
<td>519700</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Professional</td>
<td>191198</td>
<td>244251</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Technical and associate professional</td>
<td>55908</td>
<td>126356</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Clerical support workers</td>
<td>74096</td>
<td>148057</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Service and sales workers</td>
<td>521745</td>
<td>587394</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Skilled, forestry and fishery</td>
<td>1500721</td>
<td>2239846</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Craft and related trades workers</td>
<td>78788</td>
<td>715090</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Plant and machine operations and assemblers</td>
<td>13994</td>
<td>313767</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Elementary occupation</td>
<td>446678</td>
<td>1867766</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Not stated</td>
<td>403191</td>
<td>234147</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Women constitute 26.8% of the informal sector, comprising the self-employed, and those engaged in petty-trading, selling tea and food and so on. The majority of these small-scale businesses are funded by national and international Non-Governmental Organisations (NGOs) and some UN agencies, with a very small
contribution by the government (Kheir, 2003). These women are mainly poor, displaced, with limited education and qualifications, and poor financial and human capital. However, this easy entry into the informal sector is accompanied by different forms of harassment practised by local authorities to collect tax and tariffs, and from male labourers, and even male customers. The absence of legal protection from the government has made the situation more difficult for women, as this sector is excluded from the labour laws. In addition, women's chances of promotion are minimal.

Inevitably linked to these features of segregation is the persistence of the pay gap. The annual average gross earnings for women employed full time were US$645 and US$2,139 for men, i.e. women’s income is only 30% of men’s income in one year (Awad, 2001, p.34). Women continued to earn lower wages than men, because of employment in what are perceived as women’s jobs, as stated earlier, which are traditionally undervalued, and therefore under-paid. Women are also usually employed at lower levels in organisational structures, and consequently do not benefit from legislative provisions for equal pay, because they could not secure jobs in the same grades as men (Crompton, 1997). It will be seen that the sample on which this study is based reflects aspects of these four major elements of women’s position in the Sudanese labour market.

Women's economic position

In Sudan, there are no precise data about women’s productive activities in the two domains, the informal and the household. This is due not only to the lack of gender-disaggregated data, but also because of the information gap chronically existing in the Sudanese context.

Generally speaking, women’s productive activities were more dominant in the agricultural sector that until recently absorbed the majority of rural labourers. Women’s work in this sector was an extension of their domestic role, as they were participating in family farms, with the financial and material returns controlled and spent by the family breadwinner—the husband or father. Urbanisation has led to
major transformations in family structures, and the economic activities performed
by men and women (Ibrahim, Holi, Elo'bodi, 2003).

The nuclear family has emerged as the common type of family in developing
countries, following the example of the developed world, coupled with the decline
of the popularity of the extended family, which was widespread in the past.
Anthropologists referred this trend to the changing economic conditions, besides
the impact of urbanisation on people’s lives (Gasimelseed, 1998; Yousif, 2003).
The gender division of labour has also been affected by the changes occurring in
the socio-economic conditions of Sudanese society. As women have tended to
undertake added roles beside their domestic family, productive roles, women were
likely to be the main family provider. Family structures have been changed along
with the increasing numbers of working women, who succeeded in entering new
fields, such as the manufacturing, service, and even public sectors, rather than
being confined to the traditional sector only, as discussed in the previous section
about women’s employment. These changing family structures reflect the degree of
women’s participation in household/family subsistence: in some instances, the
family’s poor economic conditions made it necessary to have more than one
income earner. This situation is becoming most common in Sudan, due to the
deteriorating economic conditions of large segments of society. This point has been
affirmed by Ibrahim, Holi and Elo’bodi (2003), where deteriorating wages,
devaluation of the currency, and rising prices, resulted in poor economic conditions
for large numbers of families in Sudan.

On another vein, a woman needs to take responsibility for her family, especially if
she is widowed or divorced. Therefore, the percent of female heads of households
increased to 25% in Sudan (Kheir, 2003, p.39) and has become 28% in 2008. The
phenomenon of households headed by women has emerged, especially among low-
income groups, and is becoming very common worldwide, but especially in the
developing countries. As an example, in Kenya, FHH families are at 40%, and in
Ghana, it comprises almost half of rural families. It is estimated that women are the
sole breadwinners in one quarter to one third of the world’s households (Stewart, in
Afshar, Dennis, 1992, p.14). The new gender division of labour has impacted positively on the position of women in the household, yet women are still challenged by male domination at that level.

The Sudanese family also features the classic form of intra-household inequalities, where the unequal allocation of resources within the household results in differential allotments of nutrition and health care; this reflects the perceived inferior value of women as one existing form of intra-household inequality (Moghadam, 2005, p.23). This form of intra-household inequality is most common in rural, and some semi-rural areas in Sudan. However, this study is challenged by another form of intra-household inequality, which may take the form of gender-differentiated decisions on the part of fathers, brothers and husbands (Da Gama, 1985).

Women's economic role has changed in the Sudanese context, due to the demographic and socio-economic factors of the last two decades. As women have become FHHs; they have also become the income sharers in the household, which has changed the gender stereotype ascribing women as economic dependents and men as the breadwinner. Apparently, in the Sudanese family, working women have assumed multiple roles, as mothers, wives and income sharers. Therefore, it becomes critically important to understand the impact of state privatisation policies on the changing roles of women in the labour market and family laws.

Women's social position

Social attitudes towards women differ between and among women in Sudanese society due to its diversity. Northern women are bound by the traditional Islamic code of conduct, which has contributed to a restriction on their movements, and created sexual barriers preventing mixing between men and women. While in the customary laws in the south, women are more outgoing, and the same level of sexual segregation in the household is absent, as life is less restrained for southern women.

Gender segregation, popular in Muslim societies, deepened the division between private and public spheres; women are relegated more to the private domain than
are men. "Women are forced to have their domain in the private sphere as their social competence is measured by their motherhood and their capability to be an obedient wife" (Grawert, 2001).

Marriage is probably is the most important social event in the lives of Middle Eastern men and women. It is through marriage and having children that adulthood and self-realisation are achieved. Particularly in the urban setting, the beginning of married life coincides with the couple setting up their own household (Hoodfar, 1999).

Marriage in both Muslim and non-Muslim societies in Sudan is a contractual arrangement between families rather than partners, and its main purpose is procreation (Hall and Ismail, 1985). The practice of arranged marriage has tended to disappear among the younger generation, especially in the urban areas. However, the purpose of marriage remains the same, 'reproduction', which is also deeply rooted in Islamic culture.

For a woman to remain unmarried is something against the traditional ascribed role determined for her since childhood, which is the maternal role. This reflects the influence of socialisation on women's lives as they are brought up to be wives and mothers, rather than anything else. The idea of remaining single by choice is beyond the imagination of almost everyone in the society (Hoodfar, 1999). But the point needing to be discussed is that if a woman does not have the choice to be single, and it is the norm in our society for the woman to wait for a man to ask for her in marriage; so in this case who needs to be blamed by society? The man, woman or society itself?

In rural, and some urban areas in Sudan, the prestige of the head of the family depends on the number of children he has. Therefore, polygamy is common in most, except among educated women with modern outlook (Hall and Ismail, 1985). Under the requirements of Islamic law, a Muslim husband is restricted to four wives at any one time, but in the south, the only limitation is a man's pocket (Hall and Ismail, 1985).
The practice of polygamy is not only social, but also has an economic dimension, and is very common in Sudan, and many other African countries; men tended to have more than one wife and a large number of children to serve as labourers on the family farm, or work in animal husbandry. The centrality of family life in Sudanese society has been a positive and negative force in women's lives. Women are honoured for their roles as mothers, and are considered the backbone of the society and the family. Yet at the same time, women shouldered all the domestic responsibilities as their primary role, with little or no contributions from husbands.

The influence of religion is reflected in the strong link between religion and the state, which has serious implications for defining the space within which women can manoeuvre, particularly as women's economic well being, is generally linked to their marital status and laws governing marriage (Olmsted, 1999).

The influence of religion on women's lives is not limited to personal matters related to marriage and marital status; it has also extended to their participation in the public sphere: “women's access to the public sphere, though diminished with increased urbanisation, access to employment, birth control, education, the public sphere discourse on women’s roles can all be linked to family law and religious interpretations” (Hale, 1996).

The above discussions have shown the extent to which the state can influence and control women's lives through the implementation of family laws. However, some scholars such as Olmsted (1999) perceived that culture and the strength of patriarchy in the region are far more important considerations than religion.

Sudanese women's status presents a number of contradictions, as indicated by Hale (1996). An example is female genital circumcision, a practice viewed by many as a subordination of women, yet prevalent among Sudanese women: 89% of women in Sudan have submitted to this practice. On other hand, the number of Sudanese women doctors is among the highest in the Third World, with a high proportion of lawyers and other professionals, and there is a history of strong women's organisations and politicians. This would seem to support a claim that Sudanese
women have a great deal of autonomy. The question here, is however we explain these contradictions?

Thinkers like Hall and Ismail, attributed this to the conflict between traditionalism and modernism, where Sudanese women are caught between the opposing and formidable currents of the old and the new (Hall and Ismail, 1985). Others refer this to the influence of patriarchal control represented in the form of family laws and religious interpretations used by the State to control women’s lives, particularly in personal issues, such as marriage, divorce, and child maintenance, besides the restrictions on women’s mobility and movement.

Socio-economic change always has particular impact on women’s position in society. For Sudanese women, social position was influenced by the change from the traditional mode of production and lifestyle, where women enjoyed more freedom in the traditional communities as was indicated by Grawert (2001): “The former social power of women was gradually pushed back, the British colonialist included only leading men in their system of rule, which accelerated the decline of women’s political and social power”.

After that women’s positions changed due to the introduction of urbanisation and modernisation, where new modern sectors were established with increasing involvement of women, but with new gender arrangements: the division of private and public sector is a major feature of this stage of development. Moving to the era of globalisation, where all national economies should be integrated into one global economic system, women’s social power and visibility tended to shrink and diminish.

**Women’s legal rights**

Sudan’s constitutional declarations recognise women’s human rights. For example, the 1956 Transitional Constitution acknowledged gender equality and barred discrimination against women. Article 21 of the 1998 Constitution affirms equality before the law, regardless of gender and other attributes.

However, there are no legally binding articles in the constitution to ensure that the rights of women are protected in reality. An example is the Labour Act of 1997,
which has provisions for women's specific concerns, including maternal health, leave of absence, and equality in pay and employment. These provisions have yet to materialise in reality to improve women's living conditions, whose labour conditions are quite different from the legal stipulations (Hamza, 2002).

As for legal rights, under civil law, Sudanese women had equality. But this situation has changed after the new legal framework introduced by the current government, with a new Muslim Act in 1991. This encompasses family law, which has significant influence on women's lives. However, an important fact needs to be mentioned here, linking religion and family law with women could possibly lead to their emancipation, if Quran interpreters and legislators are not biased or extremist (Olmsted, 1999).

National Strategies and Policies for Women’s Advancement

National policies of Sudan, since independence, paid great attention to the development of the economic sectors by focusing on exports, large-scale production, and private sector investment programmes. However, these largely neglected other social and political sectors. During this period of time, women as a group were completely marginalised in national government plans (Abukashwa, 1990).

The 1970s and 1980s witnessed several endeavours from government to integrate women in the national planning process, through specific women’s projects and programmes’ attempting to address women’s needs as mothers and wives (Badri, 1993).

In response to the international developments regarding women’s empowerment, and the coming of the new military regime, women have had special attention from the current government based on its ideological background. It was the first time that a separate strategy for women was included in the Sudan National Comprehensive Strategy (1992-2002). This strategy came in recognition of the role of women in society, with special emphasis on their important role in the family. Therefore, the strategy concentrated on women’s roles as wives and mothers.
In 2007, a national policy for women’s empowerment was formulated with the financial support of the United Nations Population Fund -the researcher was in charge of the team, which wrote the policy project proposal in 2001-. Theoretically, the policy document is very comprehensive, and potentially could lead to the advancement of women in Sudan, providing it found the political will, adequate resources, and the technical expertise.

**Women and Trade Unions**

The women’s movement is historically recognised in Sudan, since 1947, in the struggle against the British and within the Sudanese national struggle. Women’s significant contribution was evident in the emergence of a number of civil society organisations, particularly popular organisations and the existing political parties. Later, women formed their own organisation, the Sudanese Women’s Union (SWU). This was a national body, but allied to the Sudanese Communist Party. During this period, the movement achieved much of Sudanese women’s demands on all fronts, social, economic and political. Key among them was the entitlement of women to equal pay, yet women’s representation in the trade unions was not at the top of the SWU agenda. In the 1970s and 1980s, the SWU was affiliated to the Numeiri regime, which was leftist. The same is true of the current government, where the SWU is now an affiliate of the NIF, or currently the NCP. These two periods were characterised by a focus on political mobilisation and on issues relating to childcare, and maternal health, which are directed more to the reproductive role, rather than the productive role, which is the concern of this study. Despite the progress in the lives of women due to the support offered by this movement, the issue of women in trade unions was not taken care of by the SWU, and the percentage of women in decision-making levels is still very weak (Al-Malik, 2000).

**Conclusion**

Sudan-like many other African countries, suffered from chronic problems that hindered the process of economic growth; among these factors are political instability and the dominance of totalitarian regimes, along with the prolonged civil
wars and internal conflicts, which have led to the backward situation in this country. On other hand women were part of this situation, as women’s progress in the Sudanese context was faced with major constraints. The lack of access to social service, economic resources, in addition to the unequal participation in the labour market, especially at decision-making levels, left women in an inferior position in society. And that increased their vulnerabilities to the risks of implementation of privatisation policies, which were launched in the early 1990s.
CHAPTER TWO
PRIVATISATION IN SUDAN

Introduction

This chapter gives an overview of the historical background of neo-liberal economics, as part of the changing political-economic scene worldwide, and the policies that it has entailed represented in the stabilisation and structural adjustment policies. An analysis of privatisation as part of SAPs packages is also presented. Moreover, a review of literature related to the impact of SAPs and privatisation on economic growth and efficiency performance, as well as their effects on households and women, are explored and analysed.

Economic Globalisation

Economic globalisation, the new ‘flexible’ or ‘post-Fordist’ production system is guided by the current neo-liberal economic orthodoxy, which also entails SAPs for developing countries as the only solution to economic crisis, and the path to economic growth. Moghadam (1998) perceived globalisation as mainly aimed at downsizing the chances of different cultures, where people are instead aligned to one dominant culture; politically, it leads to minimum government, and increases the space of civil society organisations at the international, regional and national levels. In the economic domain, which is influential in peoples’ lives, globalisation is aimed at disseminating neo-liberal economics all over the world, and in the developing countries, under the guise of SAPs.

Historically, the changing political and economic circumstances of the 1980s have resulted in a radical change in all regions in the world. Global restructuring is a continuous, multi-level process that is best viewed as a combination of economic changes at national and international levels. It comes as a response to the economic crisis of the 1980s, and the process has grown even tenser since the early 1990s, when the consolidation of the global economic markets produced an integrated and interdependent global economy, whose vulnerability has increased accordingly (World Survey, 1994). According to the same survey, the debt crisis precipitated massive economic restructuring as economies around the world struggled to adjust
to the burden of external debt. The set of restructuring tools consisted largely of stabilisation packages and SAPs based on the neo-classical and monetary principles of economic theory that have dominated western countries throughout the past thirty years. As discussed by Moghadam and other development scholars, for example, Stewart (1994), globalisation, beside its political and cultural forms, also entails economic reform, reflecting the philosophy of the neo-classical economics that advocated economic restructuring.

**Policies of economic restructuring**

Regarding the term, economic restructuring, several definitions were offered. Economic restructuring is a broad term, encompassing an array of economic policies that overall involved a shift to a more market-oriented economic system with less government intervention. It used four main contexts: 1) establishing either general development policies or structural adjustments in developing countries; 2) informing transition policies of post-socialist countries; 3) devising changes in government spending and labour market reforms in the more developed or OECD countries; 4) characterizing changes in the global economy as a whole (UN Report, 1995).

**Forms of economic restructuring**

The UN report (1995) illustrated that economic restructuring takes different forms, depending on the region and the level of the economy of each area. For developing countries, the prescription consisted of SAPs, post-socialist countries were offered transiting policies, and the developed countries were held to changes in government spending and labour market reforms. The outcomes of these transformations have changed the economic conditions all over the globe, where losers are much more prevalent than winners. They also diversified it, bringing wider socio-economic inequalities.

The market reforms promoted by neo-liberalism are also characterised as supply-side economics, 'the Washington Consensus' or market fundamentalism. Liberalisation is the code word, which defines the degree to which articles,
financial instruments, fixed assets, messages, and ideas can circulate throughout the world economy free from state-imposed restrictions (Peterson, 2003). This led to minimum government versus an expanding private sector that hoped to enlarge people’s opportunities in the labour market, and provide better services and facilities in the free market. This, in other words, means that governments desert their responsibilities to offer education, health and jobs for their citizens, and instead leave everything to market mechanisms. This is why the government of Sudan depends very much on the notion of minimum government and maximizing labour market responsibility, irrespective of the existing economic and social inequalities, particularly gender inequality.

It has been argued that the neo-liberal philosophy of ‘free markets’, on which the economic (financial) aspect of globalisation is based, is inimical to concepts of full employment, public goods, and social rights. But economics usually portrays changes associated with economic restructuring in terms of macro-economic variables, such as growth of gross domestic product (GDP). The effects on women, as well as the human costs are rarely considered. The focus on efficiency and profit is in line with the tenets of the neo-classical approach to economics (UN World Survey, 1994).

**Institutions of economic restructuring**

Afshar and Dennis (1992) argued that “economic restructuring over the past two decades has involved significant changes in the structure and composition of the major global institutions, the power structures within which the world’s women must function and struggle for change”. We need to look at the global institutions to see if gender equality is a primary goal and, if so, to what extent they promote it, in terms of financial capacity and having authority to enforce. Global institutions can be divided into several general categories: Multi-National Corporations (MNCs) and their production networks, International Financial Institutions (WB and IMF); the UN agencies; prominent governments; and NGOs. The WB and IMF are two key international prominent organisations, which through economic restructuring endeavours seek to shape borrowing, and countries’ macro-economic
policies in line with their vision (based on the neo-classical economic paradigm of economic development). They are fundamentally concerned with borrowers’ ability to repay debt, lowering trade and government deficits, and opening markets, rather than with increasing employment and reducing societal inequality.

The discussion about economic globalisation is relevant to the study topic in the sense that the new international order is offering one prescription that is expected to suit all countries worldwide; in particular, the one relating to SAPs, which are mainly designed for developing countries.

**Theoretical Premises of Structural Adjustment Programmes (SAPs)**

The 1980s was a decade of adjustment of the third World, for most countries in Africa and Latin America, and for quite a number of countries elsewhere in the developing world (Stewart, 1994, p.8). The primary purpose of the establishment of IMF in 1944 was to act as platform for international monetary cooperation among countries, with the ultimate goals of establishing an orderly international system of exchange rates and support the achievement of full employment. The financial and monetary policies affecting the balance of payments of the member states were, and continue to be, the main focus of the IMF activities. In close cooperation with the WB, these countries were offered loans against the acceptance of an adjustment programme; containing a set of policy reforms in different areas. To this end, the IMF introduced two forms of enlarged credit facilities; the first, Structural Adjustment Facilities (SAF) to provide assistance on concessional terms to low-income developing countries (Stewart, 1994 in IMF, 2003), and the Enhanced Structural Adjustment Facilities, intending to address the problems of poor countries (often African countries). According to Zawalinska (2004), the structural facility arrangements were made available to eligible countries undertaking three years comprehensive macro economic and SAPs. The structural adjustment was therefore defined as ‘a process of market-oriented reform in policies and institutions, with goals of restoring a sustainable balance of payments reducing inflation, and creating the conditions for sustainable growth in per capita income’ (Corbo, Fisher, 1995, p.284)
To explain the nature of the policies designed by the IMF and WB, Stewart articulated the content of these policies as follows: ‘stabilisation and SAPs are these policies designed to correct the imbalances in the economy in the short run, they are policies associated with the Fund’. There are three elements of these policies: 1) demand restraint, with emphasis on public expenditure reductions, credit control and real wage restraint; 2) switching polices especially emphasizing exchange rate reform and devaluation; 3) long term supply measures are designed to increase efficiency, with the emphasis on an increased role for markets and reduced role for public intervention. Demand restraint policies have dominated Fund programmes, being a universal feature, while for the WB policies are predominantly adjustment policies not stabilisation policies, although there is some overlap between the two institutions with programmes of the Fund containing elements of adjustment and those of the Bank elements of stabilisation. Examples of this overlap occur in the case of Africa, where the two institutions very often form joint programmes. Seventy-eight percent of Bank adjustment conditions from 1980-88 related to efficiency and seventy-two percent from 1989-1991 (Stewart, 1994, p.12).

In these reforms, the Bank shares the market-oriented philosophy of the Fund. Policies include: 1) trade policies (generally import liberalisation), 2) industry, energy, and agricultural policies (with emphasis on reforming and deregulating the price system); 3) reforms of the financial regression), 4) rationalisation of government and administration of public enterprise reforms (with emphasis on privatisation) and 5) social policy reforms.

**Privatisation as part of SAPs**

Privatisation is one type of structural policy, which often forms part of the adjustment package; in transition economies, it was proposed in order to accurately define property rights and improve the efficiency and profitability of the economy. The most prevalent failure in the socialist economies was badly-defined property rights, and improper incentives in the economies (Stigiliz, 1997, in Zawalinsk, 2004), while for African countries the IMF diagnosis of the African crisis, was as
follows: ‘macro-economic stability, pricing reforms, and a redefined role for the African states’. SAPs has their origins in Africa, where they were implemented in response to the economic crisis and aimed to address a mix of market and government failures (Zawalinska, 2004, p.5)

Where in the developed or OECD countries, they did not apply SAPs comprehensively, however, they tended to devise changes in government spending and labour market reforms; and they hinged on the views of prominent neo-liberal economists, for example, Acton and Drucker (in Titmuss 1974), who called for ‘reprivatisation of government’: virtually all non-military government functions should be ‘reprivatised’ or return to the market place.

**Structural Adjustment Programmes (SAPs) in Developing countries**

The two regions most affected by adjustment during the 1980s were Sub-Saharan Africa and Latin America and the Caribbean. The reasons why they are the most affected are low economic growth, high budget deficits, high poverty incidence.

According to Stewart (1994), this decade was characterised by three main features: 1) the decade was one of rising poverty in Africa and Latin America—a sharp reverse in previous trends of gradual reductions in the numbers in poverty. In Asia in contrast, poverty was reduced over these years (because they adopt these SAPs earlier than other countries). Between 1985 and 1989 the numbers in poverty in Sub-Saharan rose from 191 million; in Latin America and the Caribbean the numbers rose from an estimated 91 million in 1980 to 133 million in 1989 (Stewart, 1994). 2) Reduced progress in improving human indicators such as infant mortality rates, and worsening indicators of educational performance in many adjusting countries. 3) The decade also saw rising unemployment, which is perceived as one of the major consequences of SAPs (Melink 2004), a conclusion shared with Stewart (1994). Probably the most painful effect of SAPs was high and persistent unemployment resulting from restructuring and privatisation process. In his study, Melink found that all countries experienced a jump in unemployment from levels close to zero, up to 20% over the first 5 years; this together with
reduction in expenditure on social policy, was probably the most painful cost for households across all households in these countries (Meilink, 2004).

The effect of SAPs on employment rates differs between households in the urban and rural areas, and from one country to another. Meilink (2004) indicated that 'the problem of unemployment seemed more severe in urban households, which had weak safety nets, than in rural ones, where the possession of land at least allowed for subsistence farming. Therefore, in the example of Poland, one could observe a positive migration from urban to rural areas. However, this is not the case in Sudan, and in many other countries African countries as an example of Ghana, where unemployment led to the negative migration from rural to urban, due to the deterioration, which happened in the agricultural sector. So it seems that SAPs very severely hit the labour market. Here we can recognise the link between SAPs and privatisation, privatisation through its subsequent policy of retrenchment, could be one of the channels affecting households. Not all adjusting countries had poor performance of this kind: for example Indonesia succeeded in reducing poverty and improving human indicators, while adjusting, as did Colombia. But good performance on human indicators among adjusting countries was the exception rather than a rule.

**Structural Adjustment and Households**

In this entire framework, the well-being of households was only implicitly assumed, in the goal of sustainable growth in per capita gained, and that it would benefit the whole society (Meilink, 2004). In order to understand the links between the proposed reforms and households we need to define the role of the latter in the economy. In economic theory households perform two roles: on the one hand they enter the market place as consumers (of goods and services), on the other hand they provide labour as a production factor needed to produce these goods (Collins, 2000). Therefore, from the economic point of view the impact of SAPs on households should be analyzed first through their effect on consumption—quality, quantity, availability, equity of distribution. And second through the changes in the labour market: income, employment, and wages.
However, there also many other ways that households could be looked at, for example, from the perspective of economic theory, the impact of SAPs could be analyzed on different levels. A few examples are: 1) one channel through which structural reforms could directly affect household was public expenditures, postulated cuts in current transfers and subsidies on goods and services, which could directly reduce households resources and lower their purchasing power. And that in turn could lead to deepening poverty by forcing households to reduce their consumption or to change their consumption patterns towards cheapest goods (Angor, 2002). In the Sudan case, however, if the reduction in public expenditure leads to a reduction in future taxes, the result could be positive for household in the long-run. 2) Another example is the effect of inflation, which impacts on households but is an unavoidable effect of price liberalisation: increasing prices of goods and services reduce the purchasing power of households, and, therefore, hurts them directly and immediately. In the Sudan case, however, if the increase in public sector prices in the long run leads to lower fiscal deficits and reduces inflationary pressure, then the net effect on households may be positive in the long run (Agenor, 2002). 3) The informal sector is also one the channels through which SAPs could hit households. The 1980s saw increasing informalisation of the labour market. Between 1980 and 1985, urban informal sector employment increased by 6.7% per annum, while industrial wage employment increased by only 0.1% per annum. The rising proportion of employment in the urban informal sector, together with the decline in real average and minimum wages in the formal sector, depressed real incomes in the urban areas, leading to a rising incidence and intensity of urban poverty. This is indicated by the rather piecemeal evidence available: for example, there is evidence of increased incidence of urban poverty for some years in the 1980s in Zambia, Tanzania, Ghana, Senegal. Jamal and Weeks (in Baden, 2004, p.154) summarise their findings as follows: 1) real wages have fallen sharply, the formal sector has declined, living standards of urban workers and peasants have drawn closer together, and in some countries urban poverty now rivals rural poverty in intensity and extent. Evidence of reverse
migration (rural-urban) in Ghana, Tanzania, Zaire, and Nigeria also suggests rising urban impoverishment. 4) Finally, there is evidence of relative and absolute deterioration in the position of formal sector urban workers. Since 1980, the position of wage earners in the non-agricultural sector, and especially in the public sector, has worsened compared with other socio-economic groups (Stewart 94, table 6.8, 6, 9). Along with the deterioration of formal sector because of the falling wages, it can be concluded that privatisation is a channel through which SAPs could also affect households severely due to massive layoffs.

Discussion of the third channel is very relevant to the study topic, which is the subsequent effect of privatisation on those laid off, and its effect on households. However, the study needed to focus analysis on the socio-economic impacts of privatisation on women.

Structural Adjustment Programmes and Women

The key hypothesis here is that SAPs do not adequately address gender concerns: the chief goal of SAPs is in terms of macro-economic stabilisation and achieving higher levels of growth, greater efficiency in allocation of resources. The greater efficiency in allocation of resources was again to be addressed through trade liberalisation and greater export-orientation of the economy, increased role for the private sector, and various reform measures (Baden, 2003, p.4). Their impact depends not only on the nature of the policies but also, critically; on the role women perform in the economy and society. As Stewart argues (1992), the ways in which SAPs affect women depend on women’s roles in society. It is useful to highlight four main roles: 1) women as producers; 2) women as managers of household consumption; 3) women as mothers and carers; and 4) women as active in the community.

a) One of the major effects of SAPs was the fall in real wages, which affected both men and women. But again there is some evidence to suggest that women were worst affected, and with a further deterioration in the relative wage due to the increasing inflation (Baden, 2003). An example of this is Peru, where women’s wages fall by 15% during the period of SAPs implementation-1976-1984.
b) Additional female participation was concentrated in the informal sector, which grew as a proportion of total employment, while average earnings fell (Stewart, 1992; Afshar, Dennis, 1992; Baden, 2003; Moghadam, 1999)

c) Cuts in government expenditure on social services formed an important element in the package. There were significant falls in real expenditure per head in these sectors in about two-thirds of the countries of Sub-Saharan Africa and Latin America in the early 1980s. An example is Jamaica, where real expenditure on education per head fall by over 30 percent, during 1980-1985, and on health by 20 percent; in Zambia real expenditure on health fell by 22% from 1982-1985, p.27). Cuts in health and education facilities caused deterioration for both women and families, however it is much more related to SAPs rather than privatisation.

d) SAP packages affected prices in five ways: through the reduction in/ abolition of subsidies, especially on food; through price control; through raising producer prices for farmers; through the impact of devaluation on domestic prices and through the imposition of charges for various publicly provided services (health and education services). This, of course, affected women as household consumption managers, and shouldered them with more domestic burdens, more effort in food preparation, more time taking care of the sick in the family (Stewart, 1992). This is also relevant to the broader SAP policies, affecting households and women as well, though it has less to do with privatisation as the focus of this study.

e) The decline in formal sector employment reduced women’s opportunities. Where they were focused on public sector privatisation as part of adjustment packages, women suffered especially because in general there are relatively more women employed on better terms, than in the private formal sector (Stewart, 1992; Baden, 2003; Moghadam, 1998).

The latter point regarding the decline in formal sector employment due to privatisation’s subsequent policy of retrenchment, is more relevant to privatisation as part of SAP packages, and will be elaborated in the section on the impact of privatisation on women.
Critiques of SAPs

Intense debate continues on the merits and demerits of adjustments programmes designed by the IMF and the WB. Coloclough and Green (1988, in Meilink, 2004, p.1) question whether the conventional ways of adjusting macro-economic imbalances are remotely good enough, if other human imbalances such as high infant mortality rates, malnutrition, lack of access to basic health and education services and absolute poverty are more extensive as a result. These two authors have also stressed that the IMF and WB have not considered human beings in their designing of the stabilisation policies. 'By applying short-term stabilisation policies, the IMF has been accused of only focusing on national and sectoral aggregates as variables to influence economic growth, but the real actors, 'human beings', remain invisible in these programmes. And because the IMF initially completely disregarded the impact of their policies on the poor, the institute has been blamed for practicing stabilisation with an inhuman face (Coloclough and Green, 1988:3, in Baden, 2003). This mistrust of the IMF financial approach was voiced in another influential publication: 'Adjustment with a Human face' protecting the vulnerable and promoting economic growth' (Cornia, 1987, in Stewart, 1994, p.2).

SAPs impacted on households, workers and women, through a number of routes: 1) for formal sector urban workers, there is evidence of relative and absolute deterioration in the position of wage earners in the non-agriculture sector, and especially in the public sector, which worsened in comparison with other socio-economic groups (Afshar, Dennis, 1992; Stewart, 1994; Moghadam, 1998; Musa, 2002; Baden, 2003).

2) Intensification of urban poverty in the developing countries, due to the decline in the real and minimum wages in the formal sectors, removal of subsidies from goods and services, cuts in government expenditure on social services (there is evidence of increased incidence of urban poverty during 1980s in Zambia, Tanzania, Ghana, Senegal, and Sudan) (Afshar, Dennis, 1992; Stewart, 1994; Moghadam, 1998; Musa, 2002; Baden, 2003).
3) The 1980s saw increasing informalisation of the labour market. Between 1980 and 1985, urban informal sector employment increased by 6.7% per annum (Stewart, 1994). Other development and feminist scholars like Moghadam (1998), Baden (2003), Meilink (2004), Afshar, Dennis (1992), and Musa (2002) agree about the tendency of labour to change for the informal sector in most developing countries, particularly Africa, Latin America and Caribbean, and some Asian countries, like Bangladesh.

4) The problem of unemployment seemed more severe as large numbers of formal sector employees, have experienced job losses due to the shrinking of formal sector, and the high percent of lay-offs resulting from privatisation (Meilink, 2003; Zawalinska, 2004; Baden 2003).

The problem is not only the implementation and its mechanisms, but also the wider context of the policy reform, which had not incorporated the interests of the vast majority of society, including women (Hundker, 2001).

The above discussion provides a theoretical background of the SAPs as part of the neo-liberal economic theory, which spread all over the world through globalisation of the one international economic order. SAPs, as an emerging key policy in most developed and developing countries have been discussed, their impact on households and women also explained. In the following section detailed information on the origins, theoretical premises, definitions, forms, conditions, advantages and disadvantages, proponents and opponents of privatisation, and finally, empirical evidence of the experiences of privatisation will be discussed.

**The origins of privatisation**

In studying privatisation as part of Structural Adjustment Policies that hinges on the neo-liberal economics, there is a need to review debates from different disciplines of social science, such as sociology, economics, and politics that have emerged with the evolution of social, political and economic systems that have taken place recently, and whose influence has spread all over the world.

The welfare state has emerged as an alternative to political systems, which prevailed before the Second World War, and were the dominant policy model in the
United States and Europe. There were two broad models of welfare states: one in which the state assumes primary responsibility for the welfare of its citizens. The other entails the creation of ‘social safety-nets’ of minimum standards of varying forms of welfare (Sudan falls in this group).

The US and West European countries were aligned with the former model of welfare state, where the state assumes primary responsibility for the welfare of its citizens by providing them with services and income.

1930s witnessed the emergence of Keynesian General Theory, which is ontology of policy conclusions to be applied to cases of market failures or, simplistically, a manifestation for government intervention. This theory was much applicable during the economic depression of the 1930s in the pre-world war period, as it has justified government’s actions and spending to counteract the market fluctuations, through government social policies. An example of that is the UK government, which has followed major social reforms, providing health care, education, family allowances, which were necessary to have more cohesive society. And this trend was dominant during post-war period and through to the period of Thatcher’s government.

During the post-war period new perspective of social policy scholars was emerged, and According to them, the central role of the state consists of social insurance, public assistance, health and welfare services, and housing policy. Social policy represents the core function of the welfare state an example of them is Titmuss (1974).

This definition contains three objectives: firstly, the aim being beneficent policy directed at providing welfare for citizens; secondly, including economic and non-economic objectives, for example, minimum wages, minimum standards of income maintenance; thirdly, involving some measures of progressive redistribution in command-over-resources from rich to poor, from one ethnic group to another, from working life to old age, and so on (Titmuss, 1974).

However, waves of change appeared from the late 1960s onwards, bringing states and governments to change their primary role of national planning and regulation
of markets, and give up most of these responsibilities to the free market. This trend started primarily in the United States.

The failure of American welfare and social policies to deal with the issues of race relations, and poverty has led to a movement for the ‘reprivatisation of government’. Indeed the moral questions raised by Acton in Titmuss, 1974, have been applied in practice in the USA, a return to the market place. He also calls for “the reprivatisation of governmental functions” or “the substitution of official bureaucracies with pluralism, freedom, adaptability and community focuses”. This is said to characterise non-governmental agencies in the area of social services.

The basis of the case for ‘reprivatisation’ was advanced in 1969 by Peter Drucker. His argument is that virtually all non-military government functions should be ‘reprivatised’ or returned to the market place. He argues that government, especially central government, is too big, too rigid, and too remote from the grass roots, too unresponsive to consumers and welfare rights, and too costly. He concludes government is by its very nature unfit for the effective delivery of goods, and should, therefore, be freed from these burdens in order to concentrate on a leadership role.

The trend of changing roles of government and markets, known as ‘neo-liberal economics’ is the predominant school of contemporary economic theory. For most economists, neo-liberal economics is the standard to which all other schools are compared (Companion, 1999).

It started from the premise that resources are scarce and human wants are unlimited and defined economics as the science of choice. The cornerstone of neo-liberal economics is its reliance on supply and demand analysis to explain prices and output simultaneously (Companion, 1999). This means the free market can operate more effectively than centralised government to satisfy people’s needs.

In his work on New Imperialism, David Harvey argued critically that neo-liberal economics was led by the US and the UK. According to him, neo-liberalism as a political doctrine goes back to the late 1930s. It is radically opposed to communism, socialism, and all forms of active government intervention beyond
that required for private property arrangements, market institutions and entrepreneurial activity.

The general crisis of over-accumulation became so apparent in the 1970s, that neoliberalism was taken seriously as an alternative to Keynesian and other more state-centred frameworks for policy making (Harvey, 2005).

The leading countries were the US and UK, as mentioned by Harvey (2005). In 1979, UK Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher together with US President Reagan transformed the whole state activity away from the welfare state towards active support for the 'supply-side' conditions of capital accumulation (Harvey, 2005).

Therefore, there has been the forcing of open markets through world institutional pressures exercised by the IMF and WB, whose policy frameworks have changed almost overnight, largely backed by the US. A few years later the neo-liberal doctrine had risen through these institutions. This first began in the Anglo-American world, but subsequently throughout much of the rest of Europe and the world.

'New imperialism' appears as nothing more than the revisiting of the old, though in a different place and time (Harvey, 2005), as can be understood, neo-imperialism is a new form of colonisation practised by the great power in the world, i.e. the US, its allies and institutions.

The above discussion provided background on the evolution of privatisation as part of neo-liberal economics, described by Acton, Freidman as 'reprivatisation'; simply meaning that things have returned to the old norms. Furthermore, the views of critics of neo-liberal economic, social policy scholars like Titmuss, and the militant views of Harvey, were also discussed.

Debate about the free market has extended to recent days, where the global economy has witnessed one of its worst recessions, beginning in 2008. Large numbers of private companies either closed down, or downsized their operations, and consequently lay off large numbers of their employees. Again there are arising tendencies to return again to follow the Keynesian school.
Definitions of Privatisation

From an economic point of view, Calvin Kent defines privatisation as the transfer of functions for which the government previously held a monopoly into the hands of the private sector (Divano, 1995). On the other hand, Paul Star, sees privatisation as a policy movement and as process that show every sign of becoming a 'a shift of individual involvement from the whole to the part: that is from public action to private concerns'. While for political scientists, V.V. Ramanadham argues that in the United Kingdom, the idea that privatisation most prominently is 'denationalisation', in the sense of transferring ownership of public enterprise to private hands. Paul Cook and Colin Patrick (1995) see privatisation as a range of different policy initiatives intended to change the balance between the public and the private. They distinguish three main approaches to privatisation: 1) a change in the ownership of enterprise, 2) liberalisation or deregulation, 3) a transfer of goods and services from the public to the private sector, while the government retains ultimate responsibility for supply services. According to the different definitions given above, 'privatisation' is a term used to cover several distinct and possibly alternative means of changing the relationship between the government and the private sector. Privatisation can be defined as the selling and transferring of at least part of the state’s ownership of enterprises to private owners. It can also be defined as the process whereby the government hands over management of assets or services to private interests. The term privatisation therefore has been used cover an array of different policies. In this study its meaning is restricted to the transfer of productive assets or public enterprises from the state sector to the private sector.

Conditions and prerequisites of privatisation

It has been argued privatisation is less appropriate for regulation (of firms or individuals) than for the distribution of services. It is less appropriate when social services are involved than when physical services are involved. It is less appropriate for a core service than for auxiliary services (Gormely, 1991). Like deregulation, decentralisation, and other reforms, privatisation is not a plan for all seasons. It is likely for privatisation to succeed in services such as transport,
electricity or railways, rather than health, housing or education. The debate now focuses sharply on human services, or social services, such as care for the sick, the poor, the mentally ill, children and the elderly. These services involve not the manipulation of equipment, but interaction with people. Therefore, Titmuss (1974) discussed in his work, *The Gift Relationship*, how blood donation was changed from voluntary action and transferred to the free market, and how all the social services were being transferred from state control and ownership, and subjected to free market forces.

Privatisation in developing countries is often accompanied by macro-economic reforms such as stock market and trade liberalisations that could influence the outcomes of a privatisation programme. The empirical literature has shown that macro-economic reforms have an effect on the developing economies. Using a similar analysis, D'Souza et al. (2001) documented sharply different results for firms privatised in developed countries. While we find that the institutional environment and the ongoing macro-economic reforms are important determinants of performance improvements after privatisations, D'Souza et al. (2001) showed that firm-level variables are the most important factors in explaining the performance changes. These opposite results enhance the fact that privatisation in developing countries indeed obeys particular constraints and has a dynamic of its own.

In the case of Sudan, there was no enabling environment prior to the implementation process, because the government did not have a stock market to rely on when commencing its privatisation programme. Although the government had attempted to establish a legal framework, yet implementation was hindered by many constraints; the most important among them is the lack of democratic government, which is expected to provide a more supportive political environment. Sudan’s experience is different from other developing countries, where: “there has been an accelerating trend in most of the parts of the world, not only in Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union, but also in Africa, Latin America and Asia.
towards the installation of democratically elected governments or at least
government that consider themselves to more representative for people's interest
than the former totalitarian or authoritarian regimes" (Ernst and Young, 2003).
According to this argument, the existence of democratic or elected government is
considered one of the determinants of a successful privatisation programme, which
was not the case in Sudan, when the government commenced its privatisation
programme.

Forms of privatisation

There are different types and methods of privatisation (Major, 1999). The choice of
a particular method depends on the goals pursued by the government, the cost of
each method and other factors and constraints. The costs include both micro-and
macro-economic ones, as well as administrative and direct disbursement of state
costs.

There are six commonly-used forms of privatisation in industrialised developed
and developing nations (Dinavo, 1995): contracting out, the first and simplest form
of privatisation; vouchers, the transfer of income to a citizen in order to increase
the individual's ability to purchase a good or service; joint venture, sale of assets
by the government to the private sector; subsidies, a very common form in the
developing countries; load-shedding, involves the government abandoning some
activity, which may or may not be picked up by the private sector, private payment,
management privatisation, and liberalisation or deregulation.

The process of privatisation can be classified into various forms (Kikeri et al.,
1992). These include political privatisation, where all citizens are provided with
shares or vouchers of state enterprises regardless of their economic viability, their
capital stock and their management; fiscal privatisation, where firms are sold to the
highest bidder in order to increase public revenues; economic privatisation, in
which the government or a government agency manages the restructuring and
negotiates clauses on employment, social benefits, training and redundancies with
potential private entrepreneurs.
Advantages and disadvantages of privatisation

Privatisation is not only an economic, financial and social issue, but also a very sensitive domestic and political issue, especially in developing countries. Like most reforms, privatisation involves winners and losers. The quality of social services may deteriorate, as much as it can transform public services, in some instances dramatically.

Advantages of privatisation

Privatisation can maximise consumer choice, promote competition and improve quality and efficiency of goods and services (Dinavo, 1995), eliminate costly subsidies, and thereby reduce government deficits. It is the best means to respond to consumer demands and needs (Dinavo, 1995). It helps improve the quality of goods and services produced in the market, creating jobs by increasing demand in production; this results in cost savings, improved performance or both (Gormely, 1991). It also leads to lower prices and greater supply, gaining control of, or improvement in, public policy objectives through the creation of regulatory bodies increasing the firms’ efficiency (Cheong and Mullins, 1991). In this regard, several multinational studies have recently documented a performance improvement of newly privatised firms in developed and developing countries (Dewenter and Malatesta, 2001). The point is that privatisation is not a solution for performance; even the public sector can do better, especially if it is well managed.

Other views of those who support privatisation, many of whom emphasise efficiency. According to Gormely (1991), supporters of privatisation claim the following: greater accountability to the consumer, greater accountability to politicians, listening to workers, decentralisation, and public audits. Star maintains that those in favour of privatisation draw their inspiration from the following three different visions of a good society: a) economic efficiency, b) returning power to communities, and c) reducing government load. Moderate proponents also believe that cautious and selective use of privatisation can be a tool to help government run efficiently (Osborne, 1993). Other moderates maintain that, when subjective
criteria are involved, when savings are hard to quantify, when jobs are threatened, the government should be careful about privatising.

The proponents of privatisation have perceived it primarily as an economic operation motivated by economic welfare. This approach operates on the implied assumption that politician administering the affairs of state are unselfish public servants, motivated to devise and pursue those policies to provide the greatest benefit to the general public (Gormely, 1994). Moreover, this approach is not a comprehensive one as it neglects other dimensions of human development that might be affected by the implementation of privatisation, such as health, education services.

Others perceived that, the motives behind privatisation might have ideological justifications, because of the belief that the government has become too large, and the private sector can do many things more efficiently and effectively than the public sector (Ernst and Young, 2003). While the debate about the political motives of privatisation gained great attention, most governments, which followed privatisation policies, were driven by political goals; this negatively influenced the outcomes of the privatisation programme. This is similar to what happened in Sudan: the privatisation programme was primarily motivated by the political aims of the ruling party, to gain more economic and political power, internally and externally.

In the case of Sudan's success stories, one example is telecommunications. There was an increase in profitability, and quality of service as well. However, the government monopolised the market in its favour, and the prices of services have increased in a dramatic manner (Musa, 1996). This point is also argued by others, who perceived that: “It is not clear how far the results for telecommunications will transfer to other industrial sectors, because telecommunication is subject to major technological change, leading to scope for fast output growth, reduced costs and new competition, but these opportunities may be missing for sectors facing more restricted growth trends” (Parker and Kirkpatrick, 2003).
The point is that privatisation is not a solution for performance; even the public sector can do better, especially if it is well managed. Privatisation has been a key component of structural reform programmes in both developed and developing countries. Full privatisation has a greater impact than partial privatisation, and monopolistic sectors show an increase in profitability that is above the component explained by increases in productivity, which reflects their market power (Sheshinski and Lopez-Calva, 2003).

Disadvantages of privatisation

The following are some of the claims by those opposed to privatisation. According to Starr (1988) some of the utilities provided by the government benefit society at large, but are indirect and difficult to measure, or unable to produce a profit, such as defence. Government workers are more efficient, competent, and experienced than private sector employees doing the same work (Starr, 1988). There is opportunity for corruption, the ugly stepchild of privatisation, leading to public distrust of the democratic process (Hebdon, 1995). Opponents of privatisation are also concerned about the impact on the perceived legitimacy of public administration when third parties act in the name of the state to deliver services (Hodge, 2000:241), especially where accountability from the state becomes absent due to the changing roles of state and the private sector.

Ballard (2000) contends that privatisation is the ‘low road’ available to local governments to improve productivity, while new management innovations to increase internal productivity, such as restructuring through improved labour/management cooperation, are the ‘high road’.

Others like Petrazzini, suggests that, the reduced transparency and accountability for infrastructure and service provision, the loss of public assets. It can also lead to loss of jobs (Petrazzini 1995:19). Number of studies done by (Bridsall and Nellis, 2006; Parker, Kirkpatrick, 2003; White, Bahtia, 2004) have also pointed to privatisation subsequent policy of retrenchment, they have agreed that it is one of the salience areas, yet it is important, as privatisation could have negative effects on employment.
Privatisation Impacts at the Firm Level

There are number of studies reviewing the impact of transferring productive assets to the private sector in industrialised economies. On balance they suggest that privatisation, per se, may not be the critical factor in raising productivity and reducing production costs: more important is the introduction of effective competition or regulation (Marin and Parker, 1998; Sheinski and Lopez-Calva, 1999; Megginston, Netter, 2001; Shirley and Walsh, 2001) in Parker and Kirkpatrick (2003). However, they did not deny the benefits yielded by improving economic performance of the privatised firms, especially, in high incomes countries. A study by Bridsall and Nellis (2003) has analysed privatisation from another angle, which is the distributional effect of privatisation in a number of developed and developing countries. Although the focus of the two studies is different, as the first emphasized the economic performance impact of privatisation, while the other tackled the distributional effect of privatisation, however, both discussed privatisation at the firms level and they have reflected some experiences of developed and developing countries.

A study by Parker and Kirkpatrick reviewed a number of econometric studies on the impact of privatisation on economic performance for developing countries. On the one hand the review discussed some studies that may reflect some positive outcomes of privatisation. Firstly, the best known was carried out for the WB by Galal, Jones and Vogelsan (1992). They compared the performance of 12 large firms, mostly airlines and regulated utilities, in three developing countries: Chile, Malaysia, and Mexico and one developed country, the UK. The study endeavours to explore both the changes in economic efficiency and welfare effects by looking at price and output changes and the impact on consumer and producer surplus. The study concluded that in 11 of the 12 cases considered net welfare gains resulted, on average 26% of each firm’s pre-divesture sales. Moreover, this result is accounted as a considerable welfare gain, especially as it was obtained without negative welfare effects for employees. Their study is therefore cited frequently as confirmation of the merits of its neoliberal agenda (Parker, Kirkpatrick, 2003).
There two weaknesses mentioned by Parker, Kirkpatrick (2003): first, the data is very small, consisting of only 12 firms and only three developing countries, all middle income. The degree, to which the results can be generalised across the developing world, especially to lower income economies, is far from clear. Secondly the effects of ownership and competition on performance are not modelled, leaving open the possibility that economic gains attributed to privatisation may have resulted from other structural reforms.

Second, alongside the study by Galal, Tandon, Vogelsang, the research by Megginson (1994) is also extensively cited. Megginson et al compared mean performance results for three years before and three years after privatisation, using data containing 61 firms in industries in 18 countries in the period between 1961-1990. He reported that privatisation was associated with higher profitability, more efficiency, larger sales and more capital investment. However, the study was dependent on creating a data set from various sources, with possible data inconsistencies resulting from different accounting practices. Also the term privatisation was not clearly defined in the paper. He also did not report separate results for developing and developed countries. All these studies use aggregated data from a number of economies and this means that possible differences between developed and developing countries, or between regions is concealed.

Other studies focus only on the developing countries, were also carried out. The first to be considered is by Ramamurti (1997). He looked at restructuring and privatisation in the Argentina national passenger and freight railway, the study finding labour productivity grew dramatically, by 37% resulting largely from labour shedding. The enterprise reduced its employment level by 79%, however, claims that labour does not suffer as a result of privatisation, could be misleading (Parker, Kirkpatrick, 2003). In a similar vein, a study of electricity reform in Chile, found evidence of a large rise in labour productivity in the privatised firms. Case studies in Argentina, Peru, Chile and Brazil, reported in Gray (2001), suggest that the results were fewer blackouts, higher labour productivity and lower electricity losses. Moreover, the increased productivity led to lower consumer prices, reduced
by 40% within five years in Argentina's electricity sector, and by 25% within 10 years in Chile, a very long-term effect).

Plane's (1999) study of total factor productivity and price changes in the privatised electricity company in Coted’iivre also suggests that privatisation has brought about benefits for consumers. Also, a number of studies of water and sewerage provision, privatised mainly through concessions, have been similarly favourable to privatisation. In Gabon the first two years of private operation led to a 25% improvement in service continuity and improved billing (Gray, 2001 in Parker and Kirkpatrick, 2003).

By contrast, a number of case studies have raised questions about the extent to which the performance improvement identified with privatisation necessarily results from privatisation. Examples of these are: the study of Sachs and Eilat 2001 (in Parker and Kirkpatrick 2003), their study of the transition economies, but with clear lessons for developing economies. They argue that in response to such failures the reform process needs to go beyond privatisation, by hardening budgetary constraints, increasing market competitiveness, addressing agency issues, including contracting and incentives and clarifying the firm’s objectives.

5) Sampson (1995), studying the impact of banking privatisation, found no conclusive evidence that performance had improved, and Benell's preliminary review of performance under privatisation in Sub-Saharan Africa concludes that 'no SSA country can be singled out as a very successful privatiser' (Bernell, 1997, p.1800).

Other studies reflecting disappointing results for privatisation concerned the managerial and administrative capacity within government to privatise successfully, and the motivation to privatise (Cook, 1999). Parker (2002), points to serious weaknesses in the political and administrative machinery that led to frequent delays in Taiwan’s privatisation programme.

Rohdewold (1993) provides a particular good study of the failures that can occur in developing countries, detailing Nigeria's privatisation programme, from the mid-1980s. Driving this policy was the need to satisfy regional and ethnic interests and
there was an attitude favouring state sell offs in sections of the civil service. Zambia’s programme of privatisation has been acclaimed as a model for the rest of Africa by organisations like the WB (White and Bhatia 1998), but Cariag (2000) suggests that the programme has been deeply flawed, allowing the corrupt acquisition of assets by those linked to the ruling political party. In a similar vein, Mesegenr (2002 p.5) comments that in India the privatisation of telecommunication was dogged by corruption, while in Mexico the privatisation of the banks allowed drug traffickers to buy banks’ stocks and seek election to bank boards. They conclude that, if complementary reforms are not sufficiently developed, change-of-title privatisation may have a negative performance impact (Sachs and Eilat, 2000, p.39). According to Yotopouls, 1989, in addition to the need for complementary structural reforms, developing countries may have weaknesses in terms of management capability and capital raising after privatisation.

Concluding remarks regarding the economic impact of privatisation in developing countries made by Torp and Rekve (1998, p.78), who have reviewed a number of case studies of privatisation in developing countries, suggest that ‘divesture has played only a minor role in the reform of state enterprises, and that various have been more dominant than the actual results’. Adams et al: (1992) and White and Bhatia(1998) come to a similar conclusion, pointing to regulatory weakness underdeveloped capital markets and political goals as constraints on successful privatisation. In general, and consistent with this finding, they conclude that the most successful privatisations have been in the higher income developing countries, where the institutional structure to support a private market is likely to be more developed(Parker, Kirkpatrick (2003).

The case study evidence is broadly favourable to privatisation. However, it reveals that other structural reforms, notably introducing more competition and effective state regulation, may be crucial in ensuring that economic performance improves. Case study evidence also suggests that the relationship between privatisation and performance improvement is complex and the performance improvement not
axiomatic. Where privatisation occurs in low income countries the result may not be the creation of a more competitive and dynamic economy as assumed by the champions of the policy, but monopoly or imperfect markets.

The study *Assessing the distributional impact of privatisation* (Nancy Bridsall and John Nellis 2006) will be reviewed as it is of great relevance to in this study, in terms of assessing the overall equity effects that could result from privatisation. Moreover, the study also tackled privatisation and its subsequent policy of retrenchment, which led to lower employment and worsened working conditions. The study is an attempt to assess the nature of any trade-off between the efficiency and equity outcomes of the process, to enlighten the public debate about policy and programme decisions that are ultimately made in the political arena.

Bridsall and Nellis (2006) discussed why distributional effect of privatisation matters. Largely, they argue it is because inequality itself matters, in at least three ways: 1) first most societies possess and exercise some implicit limits on their tolerance for inequality, independent of its effects on growth and efficiency. 2) There is mounting evidence that inequality can and does hinder growth, particularly in developing economies where institutions and markets are weak. 3) It is increasingly evident that inequality can perpetuate itself by affecting the nature and pace of economic policy and unproductive political arrangements. The overall effect of inequality shows who gains and who loses from privatisation, not only at firm level but also at society and individual levels.

In subsequent years, equity gains could be reinforced or reversed depending on political pressures and on regulatory capacity in an institutional and technical sense. For example, in the UK, privatisation of electricity sector may provide large initial efficiency, but non aggressive on incomplete regulation in the years immediately after sale may mean that the new owners and not consumers capture most of the initial gains (Bridsall and Nellis, 2003). So it is evident from the study here, that the winners from privatisation are the new owners of the privatised firm, and not the consumers as promised.
Government of Mexico, Cote d’Ivore and Mozambique received in the first few years following sales, more from privatised firms in taxes than from direct proceeds of sales. A ‘flow of funds’ analysis in Bolivia shows, in the first four years, a positive financial return to government of US$ 429 million (Bridsalls, Nellis, 2003). Another example of a developing countries, in Brazil, privatisation of the state telecommunication monopolies may have brought huge efficiency gains, with greatly increased coverage and access and quality for consumers and for productive sectors for which communications is a critical input. But underpricing the firm sale to ensure the sale is successful may mean that middle class income taxpayers lose out and the windfall gains go to a small number of new owners, increasing the overall concentration of assets. And the problem may be greater if these gains go primarily to foreigners: there may be no direct effect on the domestic distribution of wealth and income but rather a sense of unfairness in the society as a whole (Bridsall and Nellis, 2003).

In their extensive literature review, covering 65 empirical studies at the firm level, and across countries, Megginson and Netter (2001) conclude flatly that ‘privately-owned firms are more efficient and more profitable than otherwise-comparable state-owned firms’ (Bridsall, Nellis, 2003; Parker, Kirkpatrick, 2003). This not to say that always and everywhere privatisation has worked well. Controversy continues about the effects of privatisation in particular settings where complementary reforms are not in place; competition is still limited, and regulatory and supervisory capacity embryonic. (Bridsall, Nellis, 2003; Parker, Kirkpatrick, 2003).

On the whole privatisation has proven its economic worth. The shift to private ownership generally improves firms’ performance. There are some exceptions, but this finding holds up in most countries, including some that are very poor, and many of the formerly socialist economies in the transition region.

One of the salient areas not considered by this study is the problem of employment or loss of jobs lost problem, as the paper could not give elaborate conclusions on the distributional effects on employment. This is because: 1) there is little detailed
information about the incidence of workers laid off; 2) many of those laid off upon privatisation were neither very rich or the very poor: job losses in many cases hit hardest the privileged middle class, or working class.

The concluding remarks of the two studies are likely to be relevant the research topic, as they perceived privatisation as good, but only if implemented with other complementary reforms; and the assessment of the distributional impact of privatisation led to emergence of inequalities in society. These conclusions will formulate part of the theoretical framework; the other part will be explored drawing on feminist literature reviewed in the next chapter.

**Privatisation: the Impact on Households**

The growing literature that has been developed in the last two decades about privatisation generally either discussed the technical efficiency gains at the enterprise level, and at the economy-wide level (Bridsall and Nellis, 2003) or the distributional effects on wealth and income. However, employment and gender equality were founded as salient areas. Even theories and studies that have discussed changing ownership of enterprise from public to private hands, are more concerned about individuals, rather than families or households. Privatisation is intended to benefit households, employees and the economy as a whole. Households benefit when greater efficiency that can be achieved through privatisation is passed on to them, in a form of lower prices, better quality goods and services and wider choice. On the other hand, privatisation in principles improves economic efficiency, which in turn contributes to higher economic growth, which if persistent and balanced should, on average, benefit households. Privatisation also introduces competition into the privatised sectors, which usually is beneficial for customers because prices to tend to decline.

In order to understand the links between the proposed reforms and households, we need to contextualise the role of the household in the economy. In economic theory, households perform two main roles: 1) on the one hand they enter the market place as consumers of goods and services; 2) on the other hand they provide labour as production factor needed to produce these goods (Collins 2000). Therefore, from
the economic point of view, the impact of privatisation on households could be analysed first, through its effect on consumption, in quantity, quality, availability, equity of distribution; second through the changes in the labour market in income, employment, wages (however, this is more to do with SAPs as a whole rather than with privatisation per se).

Privatisation in principle improves economic efficiency, which is in turn contributes to higher economic growth, which if persistent and balanced should on average benefit households. Privatisation is also hypothesised to introduce competition in the privatised sectors, which usually is beneficial for customers because the prices tend to decline, with broadening ownership (Meilink, 2004).

However, there is also other way that household could be looked at, for example, the social impact of privatisation, represented in the massive layoffs, which could affect households severely. Although it is one of the salient areas, there are as yet few attempts to shed light on it.

Discussing the impact of privatisation on households is an important topic, however, here there is a need to narrow the analysis to the socio-economic impacts of privatisation on women from a gender perspective.

Privatisation Impact on Women

Growing numbers of studies explore the effects of SAPs on women, specifically in the developing countries. Also there are considerable numbers of case studies, which have discussed privatisation, and its impact on the economic growth and efficiency performance in the developed and developing countries. Yet very few attempts have been made to explore the social cost of privatisation, which is mainly related to employment retrenchment, let alone gender equality issues.

One important study, edited by Valentin. M. Moghadam (1992), is Privatisation and Democratisation in Central Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union: The Gender Dimension. The study briefly looked at two major issues: firstly, what changes have occurred or are likely to occur in participation rates, sectoral distribution, and income benefits; second, what happened to the women employees of privatised firms? The study hypothesised that privatisation would have especially adverse
effects on women, at least in the short-run. The gender dimension of restructuring in the former socialist countries lies in the change to women’s status as workers in a region of the world, which one enjoyed the highest rates of female labour force participation.

**What are the effects of privatisation?** 1) Women faced unemployment, marginalisation from productive work, loss of previous benefits and forms of social safety nets (in Poland, husbands’ wages were raised compensate for women’s employment (Moghadam, 1992, p.18). From the market point of view, female labour become in Eastern Europe is more expensive than male labour because of the costs involved in maternity and child and childcare provisions. Withdrawal of the state support for working mothers in the former socialist countries is likely to diminish the identification of women as both workers and reproducers and has been replaced with an extensive ideology of reproduction. The study, although one of the first to tackle the issue of gender and privatisation, however has a number of weaknesses. On one hand the study mixed privatisation and economic restructuring in its wider form, including social policy reforms. Secondly, the study took place in the former state socialist countries, where massive privatisation processes have taken pace, coupled with major transformation in the political, and social structures. The two regions are perhaps not similar in their economic, social and political contexts. But the experience of privatisation and its impact on women, has some similarities to the current study.

Another key study, Gender Bias and Family Distress, the Privatisation Experience in Argentina, was by Rosa. N. Geldstein, 1997. Geldstein aimed to examine SAP and the particular impact of privatisation on the lives of women and families. The paper explored some of the major effects of Argentina’s structural adjustment and privatisation on the urban labour market. These include: a decrease in employment and income among men; increasing rates of female unemployment; a deterioration of working conditions for both male and female workers and diminished state support for the family, which has forced women to work harder both in the labour
market and at home. This has led to changing their economic roles, as they have been undertaking more family responsibilities with the fall in employment and wages of male heads of household. And this in turn has contributed to weakening the legitimacy of patriarchal authority in their society.

Although the study adds to our understanding by using gender differentials in explaining the effects of SAPs and privatisation in Argentina, it also reflects on the influence of Macro-economic policies (SAPs and privatisation) on reducing patriarchal authority. But the study did not assess the specific effects of privatisation on women employees; the author referred this to lack of systematic studies on the effects of privatisation on total employment, let alone women’s employment.

Other studies argued the impacts of privatisation on women as linked with structural adjustment: ‘of all the structural adjustment policies, the privatisation of public enterprises as well as the restructuring of private firms in general have lasting negative effects on employment (Geldstein, 1997; Baden, 2003; Afshar, Dennis, 1992; Stewart, 1994; Moghadam, 1999). As privatisation policies led to widespread labour retrenchment, women were among those vulnerable groups affected by lay-offs in the privatised firms. Women have also been indirectly affected by loss of male jobs and reduction of family earnings.

In Sub-Saharan Africa and Latin America countries, women who are employed in the formal sector tend to be employed in the public formal sector, not private, whereas in these countries, the public sector has suffered losses in both employment and real wage levels, which have not been compensated by private sector growth (Baden, 2003). SAP and privatisation are likely to have adverse effects because: 1) the focus of these polices is on efficiency, growth and liberalisation of markets, ignoring income and other forms of inequality, including between men and women; 2) they also ignore structural features and constraints, treating the market as one un-differenced market.

This argument suggests how SAPs and privatisation could have an adverse effect on women, either because these policies have not consider distributional
inequalities of income and wealth including the gender differentials between men and women, or the neglect of the structural constraints (including gender inequalities) existed in the labour market in most developing countries. Those two points are relevant to the study's theoretical framework regarding gender analysis.

**Privatisation Experiences around the World**

During the past two decades, the pace of privatisation of SOEs around the world has increased greatly. The focus of this section will be on some lessons learnt from different regions around the world, with special emphasis on Eastern Europe, Sub-Saharan Africa, and the Middle East.

**Privatisation in Eastern Europe**

The collapse of socialist systems in Eastern Europe furnished the path towards privatisation in an unprecedented manner. Moreover, the shift from communist societies to capitalist ones caused enormous changes in the economy, and women, without exception, were affected. The first comprehensive analysis of the industrial restructuring that has taken place since 1992 in Central and Eastern Europe was by Anderson et al. (1997). This involved more than 6,000 industrial firms in seven countries, looking at which government policies have been most effective at speeding up enterprise restructuring. Privatisation is the single most important factor in restructuring. Anderson et al. (1997) compared the extent of restructuring by firms in seven Central and Eastern European countries: Bulgaria, the Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland, Romania, the Slovak Republic, and Slovenia. Privatisation is associated with significant increase in sales revenues and labour productivity, and to a lesser extent, with fewer job losses. However, Stiglitz (1999) argues that privatisation has not been successful in most East European countries, because the problems encountered in this process have a negative impact on public support for market reforms.

Economic transition has caused deterioration in the economic status of women, as governments failed to promote new economic roles and opportunities for women. Prior to 1989 women's economic activity rates in this region were among the highest in the world. However, after privatisation women remained concentrated in
jobs and sectors with lower pay and less prestige. Associated with vertical and horizontal segregation of the labour market was a persistent gender wage gap of 20% to 25% (Ruminska-Zimmy, 2002)

Privatisation can be very difficult unless special measures are implemented to help cushion the negative impact on employment. Of these, the social consequences of restructuring, including privatisation and especially the challenge of re-employment, are worldwide problem, and a constant theme in all European countries.

*Sub-Saharan Countries*

This section is devoted to privatisation in Sub-Saharan and developing countries. It provides background and describes the impact on gender and employment. The international economic environment witnessed major changes in the 1970s and 1980s, such as the introduction of floating exchange rates, as well as a hike in petroleum prices (Carvounis, 1984). These resulted in the increase of debt to unmanageable proportions (Pfeifer, 1999). The solution to this crisis by both the WB and IMF was the introduction of SAPs in developing countries. Sub-Saharan African states urgently need expanded and more dynamic private sectors, more efficient and effective infrastructure/utility provision, and increased investment from both domestic and foreign sources. Privatisation became a central element of economic reforms in most countries in Sub-Saharan Africa during the 1990s. Yet, empirical evidence regarding the impact of privatisation remains scarce.

A characteristic feature of the African economy in the 1990s was the speed with which governments extricated themselves from direct ownership and management of businesses (Drum, 1993). Although the process was part of a global trend, it has tended to have larger economic and political connotations in Africa than elsewhere (Bennel, 1997; Drum, 1993). The speed of privatisation is directly related to the shares that politicians or their relatives could fetch in the privatised firms to compensate themselves for the loss of the rents previously enjoyed under state ownership (Laffont and Meleu, 1999).
In competitive sectors, over 300 enterprises in over 30 countries that have long
been earmarked for privatisation were still pending for sale in 2004 (OECD, 2004);
and in most countries in the region, water, electricity, telecommunications,
railways, airlines, and petroleum product distribution sectors are still state-owned
and operated (World Bank, 2005). With particular reference to privatisation, it is
acknowledged in many studies that there are winners and losers.

Arab and Middle Eastern Countries

This section reports on privatisation in the Arab and Middle Eastern countries.
Rich, middle-income and poor Arab countries, radical, moderate and conservative,
are now embarking in various degrees on the privatisation process. The Egyptian
government announced a detailed privatisation programme in January 1993, and
Algeria in March 1995. Some Arab countries like Egypt and Jordan adopted SAPs
integrated with international funding agencies, such as the WB and IMF; others
like Syria and Iraq implemented reforms due to an increased economic crisis, and
in the case of Sudan, privatisation was a home grown programme, implemented in
isolation from the IMF and WB (Jihad, 1996), or for budgetary reasons, as in the
Arabian Gulf countries. Due to prior arrangements with the new owners, as in
Egypt and Morocco, privatisation did not lead to job losses. However, in Tunisia,
privatising companies resulted in a 26% loss in the labour force. The difference
may lie in privatising profitable companies in the former and unprofitable ones in
the latter.

Heller and Schiller (1989) reviewed thinking on the fiscal impact of privatisation
against the background of developments and prospects for privatisation in Arab
countries. They argued that the fiscal impact is likely to be slight in the absence of
fundamental structural reforms by Arab countries to secure gains in a locative
efficiency by the privatised enterprises.

The Sudanese Privatisation Programme

It is hard to find an empirical study that focuses exclusively on the effects of
privatisation policy on employment retrenchment in Sudan. However, this section,
will review some of the studies done so far.
The Sudanese economy witnessed different periods of transformations and changes influenced by political instability. These periods can be summarised as follows. The period between 1956 and 1978 witnessed the implementation of an expansionary policy to transform the backward economy. However, these policies resulted in fiscal and monetary imbalances. During 1978-1985, the country achieved economic recovery, and was the period of the beginning of the involvement of the IMF in the Sudanese economy. In the 1990s, the situation was aggravated by the IMF declaration of Sudan as a non-cooperative country. Consequently, economic sanctions were imposed on Sudan. In view of this situation, the regime declared its intention to reform the economy as the first priority. Accordingly, a set of measures, including the introduction of liberalisation and privatisation, was announced in the early 1990s as part of the government's Three-Year Programme (1992-95), which is a broader programme for economic restructuring, liberalisation and public enterprise reform including privatisation. The privatisation process has continued to the present day.

In a similar fashion, in most African countries, privatisation has been included as part of a broader programme of public enterprise reform. Objectives have been set collectively for liberalisation, restructuring and privatisation, for example, in Benin, Cameroon, Ghana, Kenya, Nigeria and Tanzania (White, Bhatia, 1998). In other countries, such as Zambia, the privatisation programme is self-standing, and has its own set of objectives.

Another interesting feature is that the experiences of privatisation in West Africa tend not to include references to ownership. Sudan also has the same experience of not mentioning ownership as an objective for its privatisation programme. This marked in contrast to East and South Africa, where ownership is a sensitive issue and broadening ownership is regarded as a key objective. This made their experience similar to privatisation in West and East European countries.

Privatisation was introduced within an unsuitable environment in Sudan. By this we mean the political and economic sanctions imposed on the country affected the participation of foreign investors. Similarly, the inherited weaknesses of the
domestic private sector have constrained the effective participation of its members in the implementation process. The lack of a financial infrastructure is hindering the efficient implementation of the programme.

These programmes are arguably, on the one hand, designed to create economic efficiency, political liberalisation and better livelihoods for the Sudanese people. Yet, on the other hand, they have indeed affected Sudanese society with increasing unemployment, a rising number of poverty headcounts, and a role reversal in women’s position in the labour market and in general.

As announced by the current government privatisation was initiated in Sudan, because of the poor financial performance of Public Enterprises (PEs), and the negative impact on the public purse. Since external debt increased from 1.2 to 8.3 billion US$ during the period 1975-1984, the Sudanese government was urged to adopt a series of adjustment programs by the IMF and WB. This resulted in adoption of privatisation since the 1990s. Privatisation in Sudan is home grown; neither negotiated with, nor supported by the WB or IMF. It is a carbon copy of SAP in other African countries, but with harsher effect (Musa, 2002)

Objectives of Privatisation

In Africa, case studies suggest that the principal objectives for African governments divesting or privatising have been the following: political change; the need for WB and IMF and donor financial assistance; the need to generate sales proceeds; to divest trouble from some state owned enterprises; the need to maintain employment levels (White, Bahtia). Political change is considered as one of the incentives for privatisation in Africa, as these two authors pointed to the process of democratisation that has been introduced in a number of African countries, which has heightened the need for openness, accountability, and private sector development, led by a reduction in state intervention. Sudan’s privatisation programme has similar objectives to these African countries. However, political change was not part of Sudan’s government objectives: the current regime is a totalitarian one.
In identifying the motives or objectives of privatisation in Sudan, one should consider the different points raised by some Sudanese researchers (Sulman, 2007); motives behind privatisation are complex and controversial. While ostensibly claiming the efficiency gains and public finance imperatives of privatisation, the ruling party in Sudan expediently used privatising state-owned enterprises (SOEs) to acquire more economic and political power for the NCP.

While Musa (2002) based his argument on an economic approach rather than a political one, he perceives PEs in Sudan as continuing to cause a significant monetary burden in implementation of SAPs and this has negative consequences on increasing the cost of living. The primary objectives of privatisation were better allocation and efficient use of resources and reduction of the fiscal burden caused by the SOEs.

In 1990, the government of Sudan initiated a privatisation programme by establishing the Technical Committee for the Disposal of Public Enterprises (HCDPE). Based on financial viability, the HCDPE listed 117 SOEs for privatisation in 1992. There were two phases for application of the programme. In the first phase (1992-1997), 57 SOEs were privatised. During the second phase (1998-2003), however, the proposed sales and liquidations of 60 SOEs were not completed.

The 57 privatisation transactions recorded in Phase I secured 554 million Sudanese Dinars for the Treasury. Phase II is ongoing, whereby efforts are underway to privatise 24 more enterprises, expanding to 81 enterprises in 2005 (HCDPE, Report, 2005), while the remaining 36 enterprises were under the process of privatisation.

According to Suliman (2007), the Sudanese sectoral distribution of privatised entities approximately matches the framework set up by White and Bhatia (1998) for Sub-Saharan Africa, with the bulk of privatisation transactions occurring in agriculture and manufacturing, followed by trade and services, transport, telecommunications and tourism, and energy; public utilities and energy remain far behind.
The implementation of privatisation by sectors was as follows: in the agriculture and industry sectors, privatisation was implemented by 28% and 24.6% respectively; trade represents 21.1%; transport, communications and tourism 19.3%, with energy at only 7% (http://www.mof-sudan.com/English/privatization_programme.htm, 11/03/2006).

In terms of the privatisation methods used, most transactions were conducted by free transfer of ownership (34.9%), followed by full sale (28%), liquidation (10.5%), restructuring (7%), partial sale (5.3%), lease (1.8%), and public offering of shares (3.5%).

With regard to the features of privatisation, there is a wide spectrum of privatisation as a methodological process, aimed at redistribution of roles among public and private sectors. According to the overall policy, guaranteeing better exploitation of attainable resources in society will ensure economic luxury for all sectors of that society. The privatisation experiment in Sudan, which started in 1992, had different stages. The programme of disposal was endorsed by the Cabinet in Decree 1155 of 28 October 1992, with 107 enterprises privatised according to the following classification:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Strategic enterprises of distinct social importance and financial and economic capabilities</th>
<th>Remain in the public domain</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>on-strategic enterprises of no social importance, but have good economic and financial capabilities</td>
<td>Transfer to the private sector</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>Strategic enterprises of no social significance and have no economic and financial capabilities</td>
<td>Transfer to joint-stock company</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>on-strategic and insignificant enterprises with no financial and economic capabilities</td>
<td>Liquidate</td>
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The proponents of privatisation in Sudan claimed that it has achieved some of its objectives, specifically the increase of privatised firms' profitability; they take Sudatel (Telecommunications Company) as an example.

While the opponents consider that the government failed to increase its revenues through privatisation. Elbeely (2003) examined the impact of privatisation, and its economic and political consequences in Sudan. It has been partially successful due to the intervention of government in the internal decision-making process, and also the power of the president. Privatisation was implemented to generate more revenue in Sudan. However, its impact on investment is meagre (Elbeely, 2003).

Another view supporting this argument, raised by Dagdvrin (2006), is that the contribution of privatisation to Sudan’s revenue has also been meagre. The estimated total revenue of privatisation in Sudan is 1.2, 3.2 and 8.3 billion Sudanese Dinars for the years 1992/93, 1993/94, 1994/95, respectively. The net revenue, however, is lower (1999).

The contribution of privatisation to Sudan’s revenue has been meagre for many reasons. Firstly, sale proceeds have been limited. Secondly, neither the losses/profits of the privatised companies, nor their contributions to tax revenue has been properly monitored in the post-privatisation period. Over 70% of the companies surveyed provided no evidence of tax payment (Dagdverin, 2006).

Another point raised by the opponents of privatisation related to the effect on employment. It could be indicated that the SAP and privatisation in Sudan, as in other African countries, had negative implications for labour in the formal sector. This is because the SAP had significantly raised the cost of living, had resulted in massive retrenchments, had eroded industrial democracy, and had failed to promote employee ownership (Musa, 2002).

In Sudan, as far as employment is concerned, 8, 944 workers lost their jobs following the introduction of the first phase of privatisation in 1992/1997, according to HCDPE (2004). Estimated that the total number of job losses was 13, 000. Contesting this figure, the Ministry of Manpower has estimated that 60, 000 will have to lose their jobs by
the end of the second phase (Elbeely, 2003). These figures are challenged by the Vice President of the Sudanese Workers Trade Union, who claimed that 88,000 employees had lost their jobs by the end of the first phase, and that 140,000 will have to lose their jobs when the second phase is finally completed, according to HCDPE (2004). The government has no accurate figures of the numbers of retrenched employees. However, these variations in the numbers of retrenched employees indicate that the percentage is quite high. According to the desk review conducted during the field work period, it is found that the number of the employees who were made redundant due privatisation reached to around 132,000.

As a matter of fact, socially, redundant labourers were badly affected by privatisation; most of the redundancy process was applied with no compensatory plans for the displaced labour. Privatisation of Sudatel (Sudan Telecommunications Corporation) resulted in 77.7% reduction in the number of employees. However, this joint venture telecom company is often considered 'the success story' of privatisation in Sudan (Elbeely, 2006); in Sudatel, for example, 6,000 out of 8,000 have been made redundant. There was neither a re-deployment programme, nor training for the redundant workers. Many enterprises and agricultural schemes opted for varying degrees of labour cuts. Out of 15 of the enterprises, 10 displayed sustained reductions in the workforce varying on average between 20-60% of the employment levels at the time of privatisation. According to Musa (1995), privatisation in Sudan has brought negative social consequences. Though there are no statistics on the exact number of layoffs, it is certain that thousands of workers have been made redundant. Dagdeviren (2006) also perceives that the outcomes of privatisation in terms of employment have been mostly negative.

In Sudan, privatisation is perceived as unfair, and hurting the poor (especially those living in the country's peripheries), and empowering the powerful and privileged NCP affiliates. Privatisation is seen as causing layoffs and demotions, increases in the price of goods and services, enrichment of a corrupt leadership, and ultimately a widening of the gap between rich and poor (Musa, 2002).
The privatisation programme in the developing countries would have often been assessed on the grounds of efficiency. Dagdeviren (2006) presents a roadmap framework of empirical analysis of privatisation in Sudan. The author did not support the arguments that privatisation contributes to the efforts of poverty alleviation through various channels such as efficiency, employment creation and revenue generation for government. The outcomes of privatisation in terms of employment have been mostly negative.

The above critiques of privatisation are based on the grounds of efficiency and revenue generation. Yet Suliman (2007) has also levelled political accusations against the recent government. He alleges that current privatisation policies in Sudan, while claiming the efficiency benefits and public finance imperatives of privatisation, have been exploited by the ruling elites, dominated by the NCP, to expand their economic and political power. He raised two main issues, self-dealing and inequality. In terms of self-dealing, it is clear that all of the potentially profitable privatised enterprises are managed and controlled by NCP affiliates. In many cases, enterprise shares were sold by invitation to specific personalities. In fact, some of the successful companies, such as Sudatel, have been allowed to exercise monopoly power for an extended period of time, and reap exorbitant profits within a short period of time. The rudimentary nature of public capital markets, and the absence of democratic accountability and institutions precluded public participation, and eroded the credibility of privatisation policies.

The main factors attributing to the successful outcome of privatisation are identified by Abuaffan (1992). For privatisation to be successful, it requires competition, transparency and speediness, as prerequisites to minimise the adverse effect of privatisation. Parker and Kirkpatrick have also stressed the importance of strong institutional capacity to support a private sector: ‘most successful privatisations have been in the higher income developing countries, where the institutional structure to support a private market is likely to be more developed (Parker, Kirkpatrick (2003). The privatisation programme in Sudan has been implemented in the presence of institutional and capacity problems.
The weak institutional capacity contributed negatively to the outcomes of privatisation in several ways. Firstly, absence of accounting practice; therefore the value of assets could not be determined properly. Secondly, privatisation started without first putting in place of an appropriate mechanism for compensation of workers. Thirdly, the pre-condition for privatisation to lead efficiency gains did not exist. Fourthly, there was absence of the necessary legislative framework and regulatory organisation. Finally, there was a lack of transparency (e.g. Sales without tender) (Dagdeverin, 2006). Moreover, the existing inequalities in the Sudanese context, such as those between rich and poor, rural and urban, men and women, worsen the impact of privatisation.

Inconsistent with Birdsall and Nellis (2003) and Buchs (2003), privatisation is seen as causing layoffs and demotions, increases in the price of goods and services, enrichment of a corrupt leadership, and ultimately a widening of the gap between rich and poor. The main complaint is that, even if privatisation contributed to improved efficiency in some sectors (such as telecommunications), it had a negative effect on the distribution of wealth, income, and political power. Birdsall and Nellis (2003) argue that the distributional effect of privatisation matters in three ways: (1) most societies have a limit on their tolerance of inequality, regardless of the effects on growth and efficiency; (2) inequality hinders growth, particularly in developing countries where institutions and markets are weak; and (3) inequality can perpetuate itself by affecting the nature and pace of economic policy and establishing unproductive political arrangements. Similar to the Russian case documented by Hellmann et al. (2000) and Nellis (1999), in Sudan a lack of institutional checks against corruption has helped a set of connected people illegally acquire resources and property rights. As their resources and economic power increased, this leadership became capable of blocking subsequent competition-enhancing and redistributive reforms.

Privatisation in Sudan has been characterised by an unsystematic ‘trial and error’ approach at the level of implementation that caused layoffs and demotions, increases in prices of goods and services, enrichment of the corrupt leadership and
ultimately widening the gap between the rich and poor (Suliman, 2007). On the other hand, ad hoc application of privatisation resulting in enormous social and economic consequences hit large disadvantaged segments of society, the majority of who are women. Some of the major consequences of privatisation were labour redundancy and rising unemployment, other consequences such as removal of government subsidies from essential goods and services, increasing poverty rates, cuts in government spending on social services are likely to be linked with SAPs.

**Labour Redundancy**

While it seems that no one doubts that privatisation will bring efficiency, there is widespread concern that it will have negative effect on employment. Despite the concern about job losses in Africa, case studies showed that governments have done very little to track the effect of privatisation on employment. In Mozambique, one of the criteria for evaluating bids is the bidder’s commitment to maintaining the labour force at the existing level; both Benin and Zambia have used employment guarantees in an attempt to contain post-privatisation retrenchment (White, Bhatia, 1998, p.94). These guarantees have not always been easy to enforce. However, they are attempts from African governments to protect formal labour employees. Unlike the case of Sudan, where the government decided to dispose of state owned enterprises before the sales operation begin.

Privatisation has resulted in enormous redundancies in the public sector. In accordance with the 1990 Act, which empowered the High Committee of Disposal of Public Enterprise to “exercise any legal power to terminate the service of the employees of the privatisation conditions without any prejudice to their end of service benefits” (Musa, 2002)

The Ministry of Manpower estimated that 60,000 will have lost their jobs by the end of the second phase (Al Rayalam, 2001). These figures are challenged by the Vice president of the Sudanese Workers Trade Union, who claimed that 88,000 employees had lost their jobs by the end of the first phase and 140,000 would have to lose their jobs when the second phase is finally completed. The government has
not given accurate figures for the number of retrenched employees, but the variations in the figures given indicate that the number is high.

The government has attempted to reduce the impact of its privatisation policy's initiative of labour redundancy through the following:

Technical experts from the United Nations Industrial Development Organisation were invited by the HCDPE in 1992 to help design a safety net programme. The experts requested information on the numbers of redundant employees, as well as a detailed list of institutions that might be expected to help in offering training and employment opportunities for the redundant employees; unfortunately, this mission ended in failure in 1995, and left the country as the government had not given them authorisation to publish their report (HCDPE, 1997). Subsequently, this task was handed to the Ministry of Labour and Manpower and the HCDPE; reports produced by those government bodies have indicated absence of any government effort regarding the recruitment or retraining of the redundant employees (Elbeely, 2003).

Another salient area related to mitigating the social impact of privatisation on the retrenched employees, which has not been part of government's agenda in most African countries. Only few attempts to design and implement redeployment schemes have been made, examples are Benin, Senegal and Zambia) (White, Bhatia, 1998). Other example given in Bangladesh, as non-governmental organisations, like Grameen bank, were supporting retrenched women through provision of credits and income generating projects.

For the case of Sudan, no action was taken to establish any mechanism to mitigate social impact of privatisation, until August 2000, when a fund was set up to tackle the problems of the redundant labour of the privatised enterprises. The fund's board of trustees comprised representatives from the Ministry of Finance, Ministry of Manpower, the Social Security Fund, the Pensions Fund, and the Sudanese Workers Trade Union.

The fund was started with a budget of 800,000 US dollars in 2000, paid by the Ministry of Finance. The main functions of the Fund included the provision of
adequate finance to the redundant employees to enable them to establish their own projects, as well as help them retrain in skills, which were hoped to improve their prospects of quick reemployment.

However, the fund failed to improve the situation of redundant employees, as the majority of them failed to repay their loans, and the training programme was not attracting large numbers of the target group. The end result was a huge financial loss for the fund of 90% of its budget. When I visited the fund’s office, I was shocked by the poor conditions of the office, comprising only two rooms, with very old furniture and two out of date computers, and only two staff members, the manager and a part-time secretary. As a result, I wondered if the fund was actually capable of undertaking this mammoth function, which is to support thousands of redundant employees. The fund’s files were the main source of my primary data, as I found around 132,000 files of the redundant employees, who came from different institutions and different sectors where privatisation had been implemented massively since the early 1990s.

The privatisation programme design and framework in Sudan does not adequately address gender issues. The focus is on efficiency, growth and stabilisation, with less significance given to structural constraints and inequalities, including those between men and women.

**Conclusion**

SAP and privatisation were products of the economic globalisation that tended to integrate all countries worldwide into one international economic system hinging on the neo-liberal economy. For developing countries the IFLS, namely the IMF and WB, designed a prescription of SAPs, which included privatisation as complementary reform policy. Privatisation as policy has positive and negative outcomes, which depend on the degree of implementation of privatisation, the level of the economy, and nature of the political system needing to be accountable and democratic to ensure justice implementation of privatisation. The most successful privatisation operations tended to be found in the higher income countries; while adverse effects were experienced in the low income countries as is evident through
the case studies, particularly the African countries. The main factors hindering implementation of successful privatisation, especially in the developing countries were related to: 1) the need for complementary structural reforms, and to ensure they are used appropriately; 2) inadequate institutional and managerial capacities to facilitate the implementation of privatisation; 3) political biases and corruption were also serious constraints.

Privatisation policies were the most crucial, and they have influenced peoples' lives directly as experienced in Sudan. These policies were implemented in unfavourable circumstances; therefore they have encountered several socio-economic consequences, the most important among them being labour redundancy, where large numbers of public sector workers were made redundant, among whom women represented a high percentage.

The next chapter will give the study's theoretical framework to understanding privatisation in Sudan, and to analyze and conceptualise women's experiences of redundancy situation resulting from privatisation.
CHAPTER THREE
UNDERSTANDING PRIVATISATION IN SUDAN

Introduction
As indicated in chapter one, women’s position in the Sudanese context is perceived to be subordinate to men as reflected in state policies. This appears in the different institutions, starting with the labour market, society and household/family levels. Yet, how can we explain their subordination in Sudan?

There is a growing body of literature by feminist scholars, who debated issues of women’s subordination by the capitalist system in the form of neo-liberal economics that entail SAPs, as well as privatisation that impacted on women’s work, besides the influence of patriarchal systems that operated in the different institutions, i.e. family, society, labour market and the state.

Feminists and Economic Development
As indicated in Chapter one, privatisation policies have resulted in changing women’s position in Sudan. These changes are described as leading to exploitation and subordination of women. In accounting for the changes occurring in the lives of women in Sudan, there is a need to look to the theoretical literature, which has attempted to conceptualise women’s marginalisation in economic development terms, at international, regional and national levels.

Some feminist (e.g. Charles, 1993) and development scholars debated the relation between economic development and the advancement of women in different parts of the world; also the evolution and transformations that have taken place in the gendered division of labour in the different economic and political systems, such as the capitalist and socialist systems, and the Third World (Charles, 1993).

Much of this debate was sparked by Ester Boserup’s view on women’s role in economic development, which was first published in 1970. Since then, there has been a proliferation of material analysing the situation of women in the Third World, and the impact of colonial rule and development on the gender division of labour. Much of the literature is feminist-inspired, but can be distinguished
theoretically in terms of the way in which development is conceptualised. The effect of socio-economic development on women is a hotly debated issue. The viewpoints on this issue can broadly be summarised under three perspectives, as argued by Charles (1993).

The first approach, adopted by Boserup, maintains a modernisation perspective, which distinguishes between modern and traditional sectors, and argues for a fully-fledged industrial society of West European or North American type. For those adopting a modernisation approach, it can be argued that women are disadvantaged, because they are 'left out' of the development process; they therefore need to be integrated into it (Rogers, 1980; Boserup, 1989). This approach perceives that development increases women's marginality.

The second adopted a Marxist or Marxist feminist approach, and argues that the problem is not that women are 'left out' from the development process, but that they are integrated into a transforming gender division of labour, which rests on their continued subordination. The main advocates of this approach are Beneria and Sen (1981), Elson and Pearson (1984), Elson (1991), and Charles (1993).

A third approach conceptualises development as a process of development of different forms of patriarchy, and regards the development of capitalism as the stage of patriarchy, which turns women into housewives the world over (Mies, 1986; Mies et al., 1988). Under this condition, males are considered as primary members within the family, and all decision-making powers are left to male members. Females are dependent on the male members to carry out any of their tasks. Women work in a subordinated position, which gives males the power to control them. This concept increases the involvement of females in various household activities that make them turn into housewives.

The three approaches presented by Charles (1993) described the relationship between women and economic development as follows: women are either marginalised due to modernisation, or integrated in a situation of inequality, which increases their subordination, or are subordinated as a result of influence by patriarchal structures.
Other work by Setti (1999) discusses the effects of economic development on women. She suggested three perspectives, summarised as follows:

The first thesis is the integration thesis, which holds that development leads to female liberation and sexual equality by involving women more centrally in economic and political life. According to this view, economic development involves women centrally in public life as the expansion of jobs for women in industry and related services integrates them into the modern labour market (Rosen, 1982). This thesis further argues that modernisation enriches women's opportunities, while helping them acquire skills and aspirations to take full advantage of their options (Hoselitz, 1970; Eistenstadt, 1996).

The integration thesis is in line with the modernisation approach. Ester Boserup is one of the popular advocates of this approach that argued that women are disadvantaged, because they are ‘left out’ of the development process; therefore they need to be integrated into it (Rogers, 1980; Boserup, 1989).

The second thesis is the marginalisation thesis, which maintains that capitalist development makes women peripheral to productive roles and resources. This thesis holds that capitalist development isolates women from production and political control. Men are drawn into the labour force as commodities in exchange for wages, while women are relegated to domestic and subsistence activities within the household; their isolation from production results in economic dependence on men, which limits their autonomy and access to cash, property and other resources (Smith, 1975).

This thesis has been criticised by Marxists, and proponents of the Marxist feminist approach. Marxist feminist scholars, like Beneria, Elson and Sen, argue that the problem is not because women are ‘left out’ of development, but because they are integrated in a transforming gender division of labour, which rests on their continued subordination (Beneria and Sen, 1981; Elson and Peasrson, 1984; Elson 1991; Charles, 1993).

The third thesis is the exploitation thesis that claims modernisation creates a female proletariat supplying low-wage labour for accumulating profit (Setti, 2003). This
thesis is consistent with Marxist feminists' analysis of women's role in capitalist societies. It assumes that development often makes Third World women more central to industrial production, but that their involvement is more harmful than beneficial (Charles, 1993).

According to this view, women provide cheap and easily expendable labour, because discriminatory hiring practices, sex-segregated labour markets, and inadequate preparation weaken their position in the labour market.

The two sets of approaches conceptualise economic development from the feminists' perspective; they are quite similar without identically coinciding, and so are complementary. The first thesis of integration coincides with the second approach of Boserup that holds development leads to women being 'left out' of the development process, and that women need to be integrated again. This approach was one of the popular ones in the 1970s, and was advocated by Women In Development (WID) researchers. However, it has been criticised by the advocates of the marginalisation thesis, who claim that women were integrated into transforming conditions that resulted in the continuation of their subordination. The third approach of Marxists feminists, i.e. the exploitation thesis refers women's exploitation to the capitalist system, while the peculiar and different approach is presented by Mies, who referred women's exploitation to the patriarchy system.

The exponents of the exploitation thesis perceived that Third World women's liberation and equality require a radical transformation of three interlocking systems: imperialism, which subjugates all Third World people; capitalism, which exploits all workers; and patriarchy, which oppresses all women (Setti, 1999).

The exploitation thesis, which holds that women's subordination is due to capitalism, coincided with Marxist feminists, who called for reforming the capitalist system that exploits women workers. This approach is claimed to be a relevant approach for this study in terms of feminist conceptualisation of the causes of women's subordination and exploitation in view of economic development. Mies has another way of approaching women's subordination, which is rather linked to patriarchy and not merely any economic system like capitalism; yet she
perceives the patriarchal system to be a later stage of capitalism. This conceptualises the theoretical framework of the study: the capitalist system is represented in privatisation as part of the state’s policies, while the patriarchal system is structured in the state, labour market and family/household levels in the Sudanese context.

Feminists Theories and Women Work

Different feminist schools tackled the issue of work differently; accordingly we need to highlight the main concern of each school, then to discuss how each of them deal with the issue of work. The first wave of feminism emerged at the beginning of the last century. Liberal middle class women initiated their movement calling for justice and equality, this first wave of feminism assumed that women suffered injustices because of their sex.

Liberal feminists organised campaigns for equality, equal pay, equal civil rights, equal access to education, health and welfare and equal access to the democratic political process. First wave feminism created a new political identity for women. They won legal advances, and public emancipation, the vote, motherhood protective legislation and women legal status (Hum, 1992).

The second wave in feminism is Radical Feminism that emerged during the 1970s. Radical feminists opened new grounds in feminist theory and stimulated new forms of political activities among women. Radical feminists’ state that male domination over women could be seen in all societies, they claim universality of women’s oppression. They turned race and domestic violence into political issues. They questioned what was taken for granted in existing understanding of nature and society. They discussed power relations in the family, and hence rejected liberal strategies of acquiring justice within existing social order (Ramazanoglu, 1989).

Marxist feminists see women’s oppression as tied to forms of capitalist exploitation of labour, and thus women’s paid and unpaid work was analysed in relation to its function within the capitalist economy (Stacy, 1993). They questioned the adequacy of Marxist theory and politics since socialism, and argued, that although material conditions of women improved, it did not end women’s subordination.
Marxist feminism reacted against universalism, which was stated by Radical feminists, as they were very conscious of class divisions among women, but they agree with them in focusing in power relations between men and women (Ramazanoglu, 1989). Besides the main three classic feminists, there are other feminists groups like Socialist feminists, Black feminists, postmodernists, and others.

Regarding the issues of work Radical feminists consider the family as the site of women’s oppression, as dominated by male heads and being the focal point for sexual division of labour. They see men as a group responsible for women’s oppression (Stacy, 1993); hence issues of work are discussed within men’s control exercised on the productivity of women.

Liberal feminists focused on fitting women into existing social and political structures. Moreover, they want to bring women into the decision-making process of all public institutions on an equal basis with men, so that these bodies will take account of women’s issues. They seek to improve women’s access to work and education, and to maintain their legal rights in full equality in the work sphere (Ramazanoglu, 1989). So women’s work is one of the central themes to liberal feminists, and many of the legal rights concerning work were obtained as a result of their struggle. In this study, we are concerned with the importance of work in the lives of women, which was emphasised by them.

Marxist in their explanations of history, and as explained by Engels, who states that women’s subordination emerged in the transition from non-class to class societies; especially as it is linked to the emergence of private property. Following Engels, Marxist feminists looked more closely to the issue of production to understand the mechanisms of women’s subordination. They view women’s disadvantaged position as being mainly due to the lack of economic power, i.e. access to economic resources.

Marxists give work and productivity great significance, they also consider patriarchy in their discussion, but did not discuss constraints to work, like the redundancy question, which is a Third World issue, so there is no literature on this
issue specifically, but we can find related literature within feminists' discussion of the state, later within this chapter.

Also it is clear that access to economic power alone does not remove women’s subordination, but we would like to know the extent to which Marxists’ statements apply to women made redundant, in seeing how far loss of income as an economic power contributes to women’s disadvantaged position.

After reviewing the main schools of feminism, and how they perceive the importance of work, we then investigate how patriarchy influences women’s mobility and alternatives.

**Feminist Discourse and Patriarchy**

Maggie Humm (1995) affirms the difficulty of defining feminism, pointing out that feminists have widely different concerns and analysis. However, she has suggested that all feminists share a woman-centred perspective. Stacey, J. (1993) cited that feminism is a body of knowledge that tries to analyse and explain why women are subordinated in society and have less power than men, and suggested a means to change and challenge this situation.

Today feminism is viewed as a global, political movement organised around women’s oppression that addresses more than purely economic issues. The ultimate goal of the present movement is to change the powerlessness of women worldwide, and to define existing societal structures to honour the integrity of women (Henderson, 1999).

For the purpose of this study, Liberal and Marxist feminists and theories respectively have been considered. Liberal feminists have followed a long tradition of campaigning for improved rights and opportunities for women, without seriously questioning the existing organisation of society (Ramazanaglu, 1989). Their concerns are focused on fitting women into existing social and political structures. Moreover, Liberal feminists wish to bring women into the decision making process of all public institutions on an equal basis with men, so that those bodies will take account of women’s issues. Furthermore, Liberal feminists are closely associated with the rhetoric and practice of equal opportunities. They seek
to improve women’s access to work and education, and to codify their legal rights. In addition, their stance on the gender division of labour—the allocation of social and economic tasks by gender—has been described in the ways in which women are disadvantaged compared to men in employment.

Marxist feminists represent a wide variety of scholars, who have attempted to apply a dialectical approach in analysing sources of gender oppression. Marxist feminists locate women’s oppression in social class, race and ethnicity. They attempt to separate gender from social class, and consider capitalism, imperialism and sexism as inseparable. Liberation of women is thus linked to liberation of oppressive social class relations (Mannothoko, 1992). However, non-traditional Marxist feminists see women’s oppression as part of capitalist exploitation.

There have been different ways of analysing the relationship between patriarchy and capitalism. Depending on the degree and form of their engagement, there are three main positions. First, they can be considered so closely intertwined that they become not merely symbiotic, but fused into the system. Eisentein (1979) took this position, arguing that patriarchy provides a system of controlled law and order, while capitalism provides a system of economy in the pursuit of profit. Second, patriarchy and capitalism can be regarded as analytically distinct. Writers differ in their mode of separation between patriarchy and capitalism; some allocate a different structure to the different systems, while others do not (Mitchell, 1975; Hartman, 1979). Meanwhile, Mies (1988) takes a mid-way position on the separation and integration of patriarchy and capitalism. For her, patriarchy and capitalism are seen as very closely connected, but ultimately capitalism is merely another form of patriarchy. Furthermore, Mies uses the term ‘capitalist patriarchy’ to refer to the current system, which maintains women’s oppression, and is the latest stage of capitalism. The second position, which has been adopted by scholars like Mitchell (2003) and Hartman (1982), perceived the two systems of patriarchy and capitalism to be distinct. This coincided with the fact that most Marxist feminists have abandoned a dualist approach, and now conceptualise patriarchy as relatively autonomous yet co-existing with capitalism (Walby, 1986; Mitchell,
1966). This position will be considered as the theoretical basis of this study in using patriarchy as a concept.

According to Walby (1992), patriarchy is composed of six structures: patriarchal relations in the household; patriarchal relations in paid work; patriarchal state; male violence; patriarchal relations in sexuality; and patriarchal relations in cultural institutions. While this model was developed within the context of the last 150 years of UK history, with some modification, the main features are globally relevant (Moghadam, 1996). This would make it applicable to developing countries, including Sudan.

Many writers have argued patriarchy as having insuperable problems, because it is inherently essentialist, or has an inability to grasp cultural diversity. This criticism has been levelled, especially, against the use of the concept of patriarchy by radical feminists, particularly those who focused on the issues of reproduction and sexuality. Moreover, there are those who have doubts as to whether patriarchy is an appropriate term to grasp the complexity and diversity of gender relations (Barrett, 1980; Rowbotham, 1981; Segal, 1987; Alcoff, 1988, Walby, 1992; Moghadam, 1996).

The arguments about the significance of patriarchy in women’s lives revolve around whether or not women perceive patriarchy as oppressive. The interest behind much of the literature growing out of the women’s movement has been to document women’s oppression so that they may recognise exploitation when they experience it in their daily lives (Jones, 1970).

In order to understand women’s oppression and subordination, feminist scholars developed the concept of patriarchy. Literally, the word means ‘rule of the father’, and can refer to the power of an individual man over a household, which might include one or several women, children, slaves property etc, or even the extended family unit (Pateman, 1988); this is the classical definition of the term. However, Walby (1986; 1990) offered another definition, which is much more appealing to contemporary scholars. She states “patriarchy is a system of social structures and practices, in which men dominate, oppress and exploit women.” This means
patriarchy as a conceptual tool makes it possible to argue that domination of women by men is not a personal matter, but a structural problem.

Another contribution was made by a third world socialist feminist writer on patriarchy (Bahsin, 1993). The term was originally used more generally to refer to male domination, to power relationships by which men dominate women in different societies, regardless of the status, economic situation or class of women. Bahsin (1993) quoted from Sylvia Walby: “patriarchal control to women lives exists in two areas, first women’s productive labour force outside the house in the paid work and inside the household”. Men control women’s labour outside the home in several ways. They force them to sell their labour, or they may selectively allow them to work from time to time. Then women are excluded from better-paid jobs, they are forced to sell their labour at very low wages, or work within the home in what is called home production. Men also control women’s reproductive power, as deciding how many children they have, and when to have them, whether to use contraceptives or not, and what type to be used.

According to her, patriarchy also appears within areas like religion, depending on the interpretations made, and how it is practiced in real life. The legal system in many countries favours men; family laws also express this patriarchal control. Regarding the economic system and economic institutions, most property and direct economic activity, and those who determine the economic value of different productive activities are men. Most of the productive work done by women is neither recognised nor paid, and household work is not evaluated at all. The political systems and institutions are male dominated (Bahsin, 1993).

This is the general situation of women in the developing countries context, as Kamla Bahsin perceives it. Women, who had succeeded in getting paid jobs, are among the few lucky women, who had succeeded in breaking a lot of barriers to attain such status; redundancy ends or obstructs these success stories.

Mitchell (1966), a Marxist feminist, advocated the co-existence approach to patriarchy and capitalism, and argued that the association of women with the private, and men with the public had hardened into a truism and ideology. Men had
been associated with workplace, politics, and religion, in their institutional forms, intellectual and cultural life in general, and the exercise of power and authority. Women were associated with the private, i.e. home, children and domestic life. The roles assigned to men were given greater significance and importance. The question within this study will be: did women after redundancy return to their former private domain?

Feminists and the state

The state is an abstraction that refers to a set of relations, practices and institutions. A state is not monolithic, uniform or unitary. Each state consists of a variety of sites, institutions, operations, and functions. States claim a monopoly on legitimate use of force, and the power to determine what force is legitimate. States have been described as protection rackets, assuming rights, control and reward for protecting citizens, while their own behaviour is often what most threatens those it supposedly protects (Pettman, 1996).

Feminists’ analysis reveals that the state is in almost all cases male-dominated, and is in different ways a masculine construct. It is simply not possible to explain state power without explaining women’s systematic exclusion from it. Different feminists deal with the state differently. Liberal feminists seek to end state-directed discrimination against women, and urge action for equal rights for women through the state. Socialist feminists see the state as transmitting dominant class interests, as well as gender interests, and often race and ethnic interests too. While seeking state transformation, many also recognise the need to engage with the state in defence of women’s practical gender interests. Radical feminists see the male state as part of the oppression faced by women. They are often unfriendly to any further interference of the state into women’s lives, yet many also urge state action in defence of women’s rights (Pettman, 1996).

State identification of women as mothers, and the provision of a particular kind of support to women in welfare states have been characterised as a shift from private to public patriarchy. Women in the United Kingdom and the United States have been described as client citizens, in a dichotomy that sees men treated as workers
and women as mothers, despite the large numbers of women who are both. In Scandinavian countries, women are construed more as citizen workers. Socialist states were committed to equality for women and men, and treated both as workers. Third World states have become increasingly centralised and bureaucratised since independence. In Third World countries, the state plays a major role in the formulation of social policies, development strategies, and legislation that shapes opportunities for women, such as family law, working mothers’ legislation, and education, health and population, which certainly affects women’s status and gender arrangements. Strong states with the capacity to enforce laws may undermine customary discrimination and patriarchal structures or, on the contrary, may reinforce them (Moghadam, 1993). The active role of some Third World governments in national development, and in sponsoring education and offering jobs in the expanding government sector, make women no longer rely on a male guardian for their survival, but rather look to the state. Women face a lot of problems after the state deserts its responsibilities towards education and employing citizens (Mernissi, 1987). Most states still translate women’s issues into welfare issues, and contain women in the category of a special-needs group, rather than analysing the gender impact of state policies, and the impact of gender power on people’s lives (Mernissi, 1987).

Aside from the state having biases against women, there is also a male bias faced in the labour market. Macro-economic policies ignore the fact that some kinds of work are socially divided as women’s or men’s work, so changes in demand for labour will not result in a smooth reallocation of labour from one activity to another, according to the labour market mechanism in facing the barrier of the sexual division of labour (Elson, 1991).

Women’s secondary status in the labour market, as shown in the literature, is reflected in the lower pay of women compared with men doing the same jobs. Also women form a reserve army of labour, which is easily fired when firms want to cut back on their labour force, and easily re-hired when firms want to expand again. Women are never as free as men to work as labourers. This situation is understood
to occur as a result of women’s socially constructed roles in the family and society (Elson and Pearson, 1981).

Issues investigated by this study, include labour redundancy, and its implications on women’s employment, economic and social positions, performed within a gender perspective in a society characterised by male dominance and institutionalised gender differences. This necessitates viewing feminists’ ideas on work and gender roles debates, and this may help in developing a conceptual framework.

**Conclusion**

The conceptual framework, which governs this analysis of this study rests on feminists’ premises of gender based cultural, social and economic differences and gender inequalities. Males and females may both face the risks of structural adjustment and privatisation as part of the neo-liberal economy, which represents the new capitalism order spread all over the globe. However, women may also be faced with gender inequalities in the labour market, and may be challenged with institutionalised patriarchy in the family, society, and above all the state level.
CHAPTER FOUR
METHODS, METHODOLOGY AND RESPONDENTS

Introduction
This chapter will explain how the decision to use a qualitative approach and methodology for the study stemmed from my ontological position. This emphasised the need to collect the women's own accounts, in order to undertake the type of analysis, which would allow me to address the research questions within the theoretical framework of the study. My position on the status of the interview data will then be presented, together with an explanation of how this linked to my epistemological position. I will also describe the process of sample selection and explain that the sample contained both women bankers and women factory workers in order to enable a comparison of their accounts within my analysis.

Choice of methodology
It is essential for researchers to choose the appropriate method that suits the research questions and the main areas of concern. This study applies a qualitative research strategy in the form of in-depth semi-structured interviews, and focus group discussions as the main methods. Interest in using multiple methods has emerged in terms of enhancing research validity and reliability. Moreover, justification for the choice of these methods lies in the nature of the study. Choice of a certain method is grounded in epistemological and ontological considerations (Bryman, 1999). Others, like Hammersly (1999), see that the selection between qualitative and quantitative methods depends on the purpose and circumstances of the research being pursued, rather than being derived from an epistemological commitment to one methodological paradigm. Owing to those two positions, this study is much closer to the second position indicated by Bryman (1999), who argued that the researcher's choice of method is ultimately owed to their epistemological and ontological commitments. The nature of the study, the respondents targeted by the research, and the implicit goal of the
research made feminist methodology the most ‘appealing’ methodology to be followed by the researcher in spite of the ‘cautions’ and ‘criticisms’ it might bring. The study is aligned to Harding’s position, whose perception coincides with many other feminist philosophers, “who by virtue of differences in the nature of their discipline can both ‘do’ research and remain at the level of epistemology” (Stanley and Wise, 1990), instead of working at the level of ‘ideology’ as Smith does. This differentiates their project from other feminist philosophers [i.e. Smith], who operate very much at the level of ‘ideology’. Smith’s analysis proceeds from the position that Harding silences, encompassing the sexualisation of women’s experiences.

Frequently, feminists have used qualitative methods, and this approach is commonly viewed as more ‘appropriate’ for achieving feminist goals. It is true that feminists have advocated that qualitative methods are more suited to their purposes. They argue that “methods at the more quantitative ‘positivistic’ end of the spectrum claim to be more scientific and neutral, that is for this reason feminists have attacked them arguing that they in fact represent a male stream view of the world under the guise of science” (Abbott and Wallace, 2000).

It is my opinion that a preference for a particular methodological and epistemological schema should not be seen as negative, or as underestimating the value of alternative ‘methods’ of working. As no standardised way of working exists, surely it is best to apply and adapt the methods we use to suit the research question. I am challenged by the argument that feminist research is just ‘good’ research and argue that, although it cannot provide ‘the answers’, it does provide what Letherby (2003) calls “a different way of looking at the world”. As Letherby proposes, while principally the methods feminists use are not significantly different from those that non-feminists employ, the distinctiveness lies in the dialogic relationship between the researcher and the researched, within the reflexivity of the approach, and the relationship between this and what is known. Letherby (2003) states “feminist research is distinguishable from other forms of research by the
questions asked, the location of the researcher within theorising and the intended purpose of the work produced”.

Another distinctive character of feminist methodology according to Letherby (2003) is related to the fact that theorising women’s experience has not been possible before, within the existing theoretical paradigm, because the conventional research methods had ignored women voices, and certainly women’s experiences of gendered power relations have been a source of knowledge, which masculine sociology has neglected. Caroline Ramazanglu remarks on the ways in which feminist methodologists have debated the problems of how experience can be validated. Feminist methodologies are then, according to Ramazanglu’s analysis, a “new way of knowing and seeking ‘truths’, but they are also forms of political commitment to the empowerment of women” (Ramazanglu, 1992).

It is my view that research needs to do more than simply reaffirm the dominant ideologies about women’s place in the world. Therefore, feminist arguments about the importance of experience versus method may then serve as a useful function in opposing the fixity of methodological ideas. However, for the other theme related to the feminist perception towards research as a ‘way’ to women’s empowerment, this study claims to lead to women’s empowerment by highlighting their experiences of redundancy due to privatisation policies and reflecting them in the domain of academicians and researchers. It is hoped that this is reflected to policy makers at the national level, and donor organisations at the international level. So in this sense, the study would lead to empower women, but through the conventional way that encourages women to break their silence, and speak out about their suffering.

Hammersely (1992) identifies “the ubiquitous significance of gender and gender asymmetry” as one of the distinctive features of feminist methodology. This theme is also relevant to the study area on privatisation policies and its effects on changing women’s positions where gender asymmetry appeared at the different levels: state, labour market, society, and family. The study respondents were only women from two public enterprises, as opposed to both women and men, but this
was based on the researcher's choice and interest in showing women's perspectives. The choice of adopting the feminist perspective does not stem from a single or neutral position, but from one acknowledging the diverse and complex nature of the differences amongst feminist opinions. Therefore, there is a need to discuss the problems and possibilities that emerged from adopting this perspective.

A) At the personal level, I am committed to many disadvantaged women in my country, one of the developing countries, who still live in the ‘darkness’ of illiteracy, sickness, poverty and male domination. This commitment has driven me to undertake every possible effort to support those who are on the margins of society.

B) Lessons learned from my previous experience working with women at the policy-making level, and among women at grass roots level have shown me that research could lead to considerable changes in women's lives, particularly if there is no available data.

C) Identifying my work through the lens of developing countries would enrich the diversification of feminist theories, rather than “create mini-theories under the larger feminist theory umbrella” (Baillargean, 2004).

D) The feature of ‘commonalities’ and ‘differences’ in feminist perspectives that “allows for a way of holding on to commonalities and differences in the belief that there are times when commonalities are more important than differences and vice versa” (Haw, 2004, lecture), encourages a researcher like myself to follow this perspective, as I am concerned about cultural sensitivity in my society. However, the nature of the study is more related to the epistemological, rather than the ideological level, as discussed above.

E) Finally, in order to contribute to the cumulative body of knowledge and achievements undertaken at the global, regional and national levels, I ‘sensitised’ myself to interact positively, rather than being a recipient, as is the norm in our country: we are still recipients of everything, including goods, services, technology and even knowledge.
Choice of methods

In the case study, the researcher focuses on a particular case, including its background and respondents, through which the more detailed aspects of the case itself can be known. I reviewed a wide range of literature relevant to privatisation policies during the 1990s and onwards, and its impact on the redundant employees, especially women. Different conditions and forms of privatisation have been discussed as well in the literature. The experience with privatisation has been explored on a global extent, including the advantages and disadvantages related to privatisation. Privatisation in Sudan has been explored, as well as considering patriarchy as the major cause against the women working in a successful manner. In this context, I found that very few studies were undertaken, and they appeared to be gender blind. However, to address my specific research questions, I decided to conduct an empirical research on redundant women from two privatised public institutions.

There are a number of ways to conduct qualitative research, ranging from ethnography to observation. As these are not suitable for my study, I chose in-depth unstructured interviews with individual women as my research method, in addition to the use of focus group discussion.

Secondary data were collected from different sources as part of my fieldwork when visiting related ministries, offices and university libraries. Information collected, included official documents, policy statements, national strategies, reports, and conference papers published by the government in relation to privatisation policies. In addition, I referred to newspapers, magazines and academic research and studies (i.e. postgraduate theses).

In addition to the interviews conducted with women made redundant, managers of the Bank of Khartoum and the Friendship Textile Factory were interviewed to understand the point of views of those who implement privatisation. Other

1 Such as privatisation on global level, patriarchy as the major problem, neoclassical theories, different policies of economic restructuring.
interviews were conducted with Bank of Khartoum staff, the head of the Public Banks’ Pensioners’ Union, and the head of the Benefits Fund for Displaced Employees; finally, interviews with trade union members were carried out as well. The outcome of these interviews was the gathering of important information and figures that were not available in reports, or papers written about the privatisation experience of the two institutions. This was also valuable additional information to the secondary data, as it supported the analysis of the primary data as well.

The status of interview data
The researcher must be clear about what she/he wants to achieve in an interview. Those who use qualitative research from the feminist perspective will look at women’s experiences to construct knowledge. The researcher will try to access this through the stories of respondents.

Sample selection procedure
I carried out my fieldwork study in Sudan in the period July 2007 to January 2008. Khartoum, the capital city, was the selected location for the study sample. The study sample was constituted of those women who had lost their jobs due to the implementation of the privatisation programme in Sudan since the 1990s. The sample size was 60 women respondents, who were selected from two institutions, the Bank of Khartoum, and the Friendship Textile Factory. The Bank of Khartoum represents the banking sector, and an advantaged group of women, experiencing damage and difficulty in their lives. The Friendship Textile Factory represents the manufacturing sector from which women workers were drawn, and reflects the reality of the masses of women in Sudan.

The main data collection method used for primary data were semi-structured interviews with redundant women. Focus group discussion was conducted with 20 women; 10 women from the banking sector were selected from five branches (i.e. two from each branch), while for factory workers the 10 women selected were the only women still employed. Discussions that were organised with women still employed in the same two institutions, confirmed and supported the interview accounts. For secondary data, there were interviews with decision makers and trade
unionists, besides the official reports and statistics, magazines and newspapers, and researches and studies.

**Changing the study sample**

In the first plan for the fieldwork, the study sample consisted of 30 household units selected from five sectors: agriculture, manufacturing, services, the public sector, and professionals. The method for data collection was semi-structured interviews, conducted with husbands as well as wives, besides the questionnaires for the basic information relating to age, education, marital status, area of living, and occupation of the spouse.

However, when I commenced the pilot interviews with the husbands, who had lost their jobs from the different sectors mentioned above, I realised that it was not useful to continue with the same work plan, as I would not be able to obtain the data and information that will address the research questions. This was due to a number of factors:

- Firstly, the main respondents, the husbands who were made redundant, claimed that they did not have enough time to spend with me, either because they were fully occupied with casual jobs or were under the stress of searching for alternative work. Therefore, they were not interested in wasting their time without being rewarded. So I could not conduct the interviews either with the husbands or with the wives, the majority of whom stayed at home.

- Secondly, other husbands were reluctant to participate in the interviews, because they were at risk of government accusation of agitating the redundant employees against the regime. So they wanted to avoid taking part in any activity that might lead them to be detained, or to lose their jobs.

- Thirdly, the group of husband respondents who were employed preferred to have the interviews at their workplaces. This made it difficult for me to meet their wives at home in the evenings, because their houses are located in far distant areas. Moreover, it was very difficult to be given directions, as there are no street names or postcodes in the area. Also, there was a lack of electricity in
most of these areas. That was in addition to the unwillingness of the husbands for me to visit their houses in the evenings.

• Fourthly, I also find that it would not be possible to discuss sensitive issues of violence and spending and household decision-making when men were in the room; I preferred to interview women independently.

• Finally, another important constraint I faced was to catch the targeted respondents from the agricultural sector, because most of the privatised agricultural schemes were large-scale schemes, which are located outside Khartoum. This would have necessitated me travelling to another area, but because of time, resources and security restrictions, I was unable to achieve this.

Despite the time consumed in this exploratory stage, during which I carried out a pilot survey of the study population, this was a very useful experience. It put me on the right track, and led me to make necessary changes in the study sample, which helped generate relevant data for my research objectives.

Changes made related to the initial sample size. It was changed from 30 household units selected from five sectors to 60 cases of redundant women, who lost their jobs due to the privatisation process. These women were selected from two sectors, manufacturing and banking. I depended on the lists of women made redundant from the institutions, which were provided by the trade unions of the Bank of Khartoum, and the Friendship factory; I also had names from women’s organisations. After that I made one list for each institution, then attempted to select women based on; different geographical locations, different age groups, different education levels, different marital status, different job grades, different phases of privatisation.

These changes allowed me to explore substantive areas in my research topic, about which little is known. They also yielded in-depth information, as the emphasis was only on women respondents, and with the focus on two sectors, rather than spread over five. Moreover, the change in the study population allowed me to have more time with the principal victims of the privatisation process. Basically covering the
5 different sectors would have taken more time to collect the data. This would even have made me limited to small number of respondents being covered from each of these segments. Therefore, the decision was made to cover just two sectors to collect the data. This had helped in reaching the outcomes that are based on thorough study of the two sectors. This might have biased the results, because the results depended on manufacturing and banking industry only. Therefore, the results shall not be treated as common for all the sectors.

It also allowed me to interact with the women respondents in an enabling environment, with no interference from their husbands, which was not always the situation as in certain circumstances husbands stayed with us, and listened to what their wives' say. Therefore, women's respondents sometimes feel restrained because of the presence of their husbands, and because of this I needed to conduct further interviews sessions with some of the respondents. Also the interviews were conducted in the respondents' homes away from people loyal to the government. This environment encouraged women to speak freely, and express their views, experiences and knowledge, confidently and with open hearts. Consequently, I succeeded in collecting most of the information that I felt was relevant to my research topic, and which assisted me in the analysis of the research problem.

**Identification of the study sample**

Since I changed the size and context of the sample, I needed to start from scratch. Huge effort was exerted, and considerable time spent to identify the study sample. The two sectors, manufacturing and banking, were chosen for the sample, and the sample size collected was 60 who lost their jobs due to the privatisation process. This sampling has been done in order to ensure that the outcomes are attained based on the coverage of wide range of sample from the two sectors.

The first step was to collect information about the public institutions that had been privatised, and the numbers of retrenched employees, and their classification by sector, gender and region. For such information, I reviewed all the official reports written and issued about the privatisation programme in Sudan since the 1990s. All the existing reports and documents were concerned more about the economic
impact of the process, rather than focusing on the social impact of privatisation. They provided only superficial information on the social consequences, and the total numbers of employees made redundant, without classifying them by gender. Thus, the total population of women who lost their jobs since the 1990s was not documented in any official reports or papers. Furthermore, there were no figures indicating their distribution by sectors. The lack of gender disaggregated data in the official reports on the implementation of privatisation reflects the insignificance and lack of attention given to the problems of disadvantaged people, the majority of whom are women. In the process of identification of the study population, a baseline survey was done in five stages.

Desk Review

The first step was showing the head of the Displaced Employees’ Benefits Fund the letter from the University of Nottingham to gain permission for access to documents in their custody. Following his approval of the work I wanted to do, I immediately formed a team of four people, including myself, to work on the raw data available. We started with the manual task of counting the files kept in their archives. We managed to find around 34,574 files (desk review done by researcher in 2007) for redundant employees, which were kept in large filing boxes.

Step two was cluster sampling done to identify the sectors from which the employees had been dismissed. We started first with the classification of the institutions’ specialisation and under which sector they fell. Six sectors were identified: manufacturing, agriculture, communication and transportation, banking, energy and mining, and other sectors.

Step three was the final step of the manual work, which involved disaggregating the data by gender, so as to find out the numbers of women dismissed from each sector.

Step four was statistical work, entering the data into the statistical program, SPSS. Since the total number of files was 34,574, we decided to take 10% of the total population, which were around 1,787 files. Each file contained one form containing 14 questions answered by the cases and kept for the purpose of the Benefits Fund.
The questions asked were related to the age, education, area of living, marital status, family size, respondent’s occupation, spouse’s occupation, experience, years of employment, the institution they came from, the type of training they like, and the type of project he/she wanted funding for. All this information obtained from each case was entered into SPSS. From this, very useful outputs were obtained, especially ones relating to the representation of gender in each sector.

Step five was to use the information generated; I identified manufacturing and banking, as the two sectors in which women were most affected by privatisation. The choice of the two sectors was determined on the basis that they illustrate some features of the process in which I was interested. The choice of two sectors out of the total six sectors is representative, and would give a broad picture, rather than simply focusing on one sector. The two sectors reflect two extremes of Sudanese society; the manufacturing sector showing the status of women workers, representing the lowest class in terms of education, living conditions and social backgrounds. On the other hand, the banking sector reflects middle-class women, who have better education, better standards of living and high social status. Moreover, they reflected the different levels of women’s vulnerability to the risk of job loss. The choice of the two sectors was due to the high incidence of dismissed women from these sectors in comparison to others. Furthermore, there were no previous studies on the privatisation experience of these two institutions, the Bank of Khartoum and the Friendship Textile Factory.

The first institution was selected from the textile manufacturing sub-sector, where women comprise the majority of employees. The Friendship Textile Factory is one of the factories privatised in 1996. The factory was established in the 1980s with the aim of improving living conditions of families who live in the Khartoum North area, and creating new employment opportunities for women, who comprised the entire staff of the factory.

The other sector is banking, where women were also recruited in high percentages, much like the textile manufacturing sector. The Bank of Khartoum is the largest
public bank in Sudan, and has passed through five phases of privatisation. Women were the majority of the employees made redundant by the bank.

**Preparation of the women respondents’ list**

After completing the selection of the two institutions from which I had chosen the study sample, the next step was the identification of the women respondents laid off from their jobs due to the implementation of the privatisation programme in these two institutions, since the 1990s.

I planned to have 60 cases, 30 from each institution. Yet, it was not an easy job to trace those cases, especially after they had left their workplaces. There were no accurate contact details, and it was very difficult to locate them by living location. Therefore, to identify the sample of the study, I attempted to use my own network and personal relations to locate the cases for the study. I paid a visit to the trade union office where I had a meeting with the person in charge of the labour relations office. He directed me to contact some key persons in the trade union office: the head of the government bank’s union, the head of the textile industries’ union, the secretaries of social relations and women secretaries. Actually, meeting with these persons helped me not only to make contact with the dismissed women, but also to carry out interviews with key persons in the trade union office; in addition to the documents and reports that I had already managed to collect. However, I devoted considerable time to meeting these people, either because they claimed to be very busy, or because of the prevailing culture of carelessness about time keeping. This delayed my work for two weeks, during which I constantly contacted them by phone, and visited them at their offices.

Finally, I managed to obtain part of the information relevant to the dismissed women from the two institutions: some of the names and the contacts. I was also introduced to the deputy secretary of the social relations’ office. This lady was one of the women, who had been laid off from the Friendship Textile Factory. So she helped me extensively by providing me with links to women from different districts; besides that, she accompanied me on my visit to the factory.
The members of the trade union gave me the contact for the head of the
government bank's pensioners' union. This gentleman was very cooperative, as he
agreed to have an informal meeting with me, during which he provided me with
useful information. He also gave me two names of women members of the union; I
managed to find one of them. She was very helpful, and prepared a list of women
respondents dismissed from the Bank of Khartoum; later, she accompanied me on
my trips to meet the cases.

I also benefited from my relations with the staff of the Bank of Khartoum: the
Human Resource Department staff and the secretary of the board of trustees; both
gave me a number of women's names and contacts. Moreover, and at a later stage,
they facilitated the organisation of focus group discussions with women, who were
still employed there. Although this took a long time, more than I had planned, I
managed to obtain a list of 80 women, who were laid off from the Bank of
Khartoum and the Friendship Textile Factory.

**Interviews**

The interview questions mainly fell into five groups: information relating to the
personal characteristics of the respondents, women's employment status, women's
economic position, and social position after they have been made redundant and
the coping strategies adopted by women to deal with their new situations. I
prepared the interview questions and collected the papers and pens and other
stationery that I might need during the interview sessions. I started with the
respondents from the Friendship Textile Factory, and then those from the Bank of
Khartoum.

For the Friendship Textile Factory, it was difficult to trace the targeted women,
because of the length of time that had elapsed since the closure of the factory in
1996. In addition, most respondents live in areas, such as Alhalfayh, Shaabia,
Aldrushab and Alsagay, which are near to the factory site, located in Khartoum
North province, the biggest industrial area in Khartoum; the capital Khartoum
consists of three provinces, Khartoum, Khartoum North and Omdurman. Khartoum
North province is far from my area of residence in Khartoum province, at around
25-30 km distance. I needed to cross the bridge between Khartoum and Khartoum North province, and then take the motorway using three types of transport. Therefore, I spent four hours every day travelling to respondents’ homes. I made an initial plan for my travels, and started by determining the area in which the majority of the respondents live, which is: Alhalfya, then Alshaabia and, finally, Aldrushab and Alsagay areas. Then, a key woman informant recommended four women guides from each area.

In order to reach the individuals in the sample, a list for visits was prepared based on the geographic location. Using this list, I reached the target sample by the use of bus, train, and then taxi. I took all the required stationary with me to ensure that there was no lack of resources when I reach to the sample. Sampling was done on a random basis to arrive at better results.

The interviews were conducted at the homes of the women respondents, as requested by the women. The remarkable thing was the enthusiasm and cooperation that the women showed when I started to work with them. Despite the encouraging environment, there were still some obstacles to be faced: women respondents refused to record their voices and tended to be uncomfortable and reserved in their conversation. Accordingly, I depended on note-taking and trying to write every single detail, which was a difficult job. Secondly, women were not always available or ready at the first visit, so I needed to visit them again a second time. Thirdly, the time consumed by each interview was around 2-3 hours, so the maximum I was able to do was three interviews per day, and sometimes only two per day, depending on the women’s personal circumstances. Finally, after the revision of the interview notes, I found some gaps and missing information, which meant I had to go back to some of the respondents’ homes.

After I completed the interviews with the dismissed women from the Friendship Textile Factory, I kept each set of interview notes in a separate file, with the remarks and observations done during my visits to the respondents’ homes. Examples of those were the type of housing, number of people living in the same
accommodation, the look of the women and the way they spoke about their experiences.

The experiences with the women respondents from the Bank of Khartoum were slightly different, because the woman who was helping me was very disciplined and organised. First she prepared a comprehensive list of the dismissed women, which included dismissed women who had lost their jobs through the four phases of the privatisation process experienced by the bank: 1996, 2000, 2002, and 2006. These women came from Omdurman, Khartoum North, and Khartoum provinces.

When I decided to start the interviews it was straightforward, because the majority of the respondents had mobile phones. Most of the interviews were conducted at respondents' homes during the daytime for those, who were not employed and in the evening for those who were employed. Other interviews were done in the bank's different branches.

Although the respondents from the bank have more awareness and were very open, they still became reserved when we started to tape record their interviews; hence, they asked frankly to have the interviews without the tape recorder. Another constraint I faced was the distance, especially for the respondents, who live in Omdurman province, as I needed to travel for distances of around 35 km, and to use three types of transport to reach the respondents' homes; it was the same to take a trip to Khartoum North.

The major problem I faced with these respondents was their failure to be committed to their appointments with me, either due to their social obligations or their attempts to find new jobs. The employed women respondents preferred to have the interviews at their homes rather than at their workplaces, because they were afraid of being watched by the government people, or to be at risk of losing their jobs. Therefore, I needed to visit them at their homes in the evenings, especially after they showed their welcome and their husbands' willingness.

I finished the interviews with the women respondents from the Bank of Khartoum, and I then wrote up all the details of the interviews and the observations I had made
during my visits, as well as the notes I recorded during the interview session. This is besides the filing system, I made to keep each case in a separate file.

**Focus Group Discussion**

The aim of group discussion is to give more evidence of the adverse impacts of privatisation on women, as it reflects not only women, who have been made redundant, but also the women who are still employed were adversely affected. The last step in the process of data collection was the focus group discussions, with the women who were still working in the two institutions, the Bank of Khartoum and the Friendship Textile Factory. Ten women respondents from each institution were interviewed. The main questions of the interviews were related to their personal characteristics, working conditions in the bank before the privatisation process, working conditions after the implementation of the privatisation programme, the women’s status in the current time under the new management system, and what were the prospects for women’s position in the bank.

**Issues of ethics and access**

Getting access to research participants is crucial, so a clear plan was needed to be put in place before commencing the process of fieldwork. In my country, obtaining data is one of the most difficult jobs to be undertaken: there is a low level of awareness about the significance of data, a lack of awareness of the importance of disseminating and sharing information with others, and very poor filing and record-keeping in most public and private enterprises. So this situation made my mission much harder, as my study relates to government enterprises. However, I attempted to use my personal networks as I had worked in the civil service for more than ten years. Throughout the fieldwork, the power of personal networks proved its effectiveness in this study, as I managed to get access to the 60 women respondents, who had been made redundant.

Issues related to ethics and access, to some extent, are different in the context where I have carried out my study. One example is the level of awareness of people in general, and women specifically, with whom I conducted the interviews. They did not give any attention to my introduction about my study’s objectives; the letter
of the University of Nottingham to allow me to access any needed information, or my speech about consent. Instead they just wanted to start talking about their experiences. In such cases, respondents could be exploited by a researcher, who might not respect the confidentiality of their accounts.

This situation made me feel more responsible concerning their rights to know everything about the study, the position of the researcher and confidentiality: very few of the respondents asked to keep their anonymity. Confidentiality as the primary safeguard against unwanted exposure is also a crucial ethical issue in qualitative research (Manson, 1996). It is usual to use pseudonyms, so as to protect the research subjects’ privacy, and to protect them as well from any risk that might threaten their personal security.

For some of the respondents, access was slightly difficult as they had been made redundant a long time ago, so in order to trace them I needed some time. Also finding a suitable location for conducting the interview needed to be assessed: in some cases of employed women, they preferred to have the interviews conducted at their houses rather than in the workplace. Such considerations were taken seriously by the researcher, to make things more suitable for the respondents.

In ‘dressing up’ for research purposes, I needed to consider people’s cultural attitudes; I was wearing the Sudanese ‘tob’ when I went for an interview session. I was attempting to gain acceptance from the community and the women as well. Others were also worried about the threat of persecution by government and security people, but this did not stop them from taking part in the interviews; on the contrary, they assisted me in reaching their colleagues. During this process of data collection, I had been warned by the women respondents that I might be at risk of being watched by government security people, because some of the women had experienced harassment from the government security forces. This meant I was at risk of government persecution at any time because of the nature of the topic. Politically, it is a very sensitive topic to discuss. Therefore, government people might think that I participated in agitating people against the regime. Especially, as there were protest marches organised by some of the displaced employees from
different institutions, who had claims against the government, and were in the process of submitting these claims to UN agencies and other related domestic human rights organisations.

At the beginning of my research about privatisation in Sudan, I was not aware of the political and security concerns that might be aroused. When I commenced the fieldwork, the women respondents warned me about studying this topic. Depending on my previous employment as a civil servant, I also benefited from my personal networks, to gain access to the data in the two privatised enterprises, and to trace the redundant employees, who had left a long time ago. Accordingly, I did not find any difficulty, or harassment from security people. However, I was very alert to any action that might threaten my safety; in the end I am seeking the truth as a researcher. The risk may also appear, if I publish my work, because the research findings to some extent are critical and sensitive. In order to protect myself, I may need to omit some parts of the thesis, or abandon the idea of publishing my work, although this is not in line with people’s and women’s interests.

Data analysis process

The data generated from the in-depth interviews were categorised and constructed in order to discover the main and sub-themes in the interviews. The first stage was data grouping. In this process, I classified similar statements into groups, and then developed main themes and sub-themes based on the research topic, concern and interviewee’s group.

Interviews were conducted in the Arabic language, and the transcription also made in Arabic first and then translated into the English language, which consumed a considerable time in the data analysis process.

Validity and generalisation

The criterion of generalisation is not the prime aim. The details of the particular context are regarded as crucial to the understanding of the respondents’ experiences. While it is possible that insights/concepts/analysis developed for a particular study may be applicable elsewhere, it is not claimed that this will
necessarily occur. Accordingly, the claims of respondents are limited to the study sample.

Sample description
The sample was constituted from two groups of women, who were made redundant from the Bank of Khartoum and the Friendship Factory. The following are the personal characteristics of the sample, their age, education, income, marital status, family size, job scale, date of job termination, husband's/ father's occupation, economic position at the family/ household levels, relationship with the labour force and the responses for the decision of redundancy.

Women in the banking sector
Regarding the respondents from the Bank of Khartoum, the age composition of the respondents was taken in the year of redundancy. The figures show that more than half of the respondents (76.7%) were less than 50 years. Redundancy negatively affected women in senior jobs, and reduced their share in decision-making. Moreover, it led to women, who still had 10 to 15 years of service remaining to become redundant. Additionally, women were made redundant at the age of high ability to contribute, as they become less involved in family responsibilities, their children having already grown up, which meant they have more time to devote to work.

Table 3: Age of Women Bankers

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>NO</th>
<th>Age</th>
<th>Women in banking sector</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>35-45 years</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>45-55 years</td>
<td>15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>50 years and more</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Total</td>
<td>30</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: interview data with women respondents in 2007

Education level was taken as one of the redundancy criteria, where the bank management targeted secondary school leavers. However, when we look to the respondents' education, figures show that 56.6% of them are university graduates and 20.0% were postgraduates, while only 23.3% are secondary school leavers. So
these figures refuted the claim by the bank’s management, because the highest percentage of redundant women consisted of university graduates.

Table 4: Education of Women in Banking Sector

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>No</th>
<th>Education</th>
<th>Women in banking sector</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>secondary</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>university</td>
<td>14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>Postgraduate studies</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>total</td>
<td>30</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: interviews with women respondents in 2007

Regarding monthly income of women bankers, the table below shows that half the respondents earn less than US$150 per month, and around 27% (8) earned less than US$350. While only four respondents’ monthly income reached the range between US$400 and US$500 per month, which reflected the deteriorating wage rates in Sudan, for professionals as well as workers.

Table 5: Monthly Income of Women in Banking sector

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Income in US $</th>
<th>Number of bankers</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>50-100</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>100-150</td>
<td>15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>150-200</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>200-250</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>250-300</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>300-350</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>350-400</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>400-450</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>450-500</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>30</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: interviews with women respondents in 2007

Table 6: Marital Status of Women in Banking Sector

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>no</th>
<th>Marital Status</th>
<th>Women bankers</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>Married</td>
<td>20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>Divorced</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>Widowed</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>Never married</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Total</td>
<td>30</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: interviews with women’s respondents’ in 2007
Concerning marital status, 66.6% of the sample were married, and 33.3% were single, including never married, divorced and widowed women. Only three women were second wives. Married women have a high chance of redundancy compared to other women or other employees, because motherhood and childcare responsibilities make them take maternity leave. This may affect their evaluation and performance reports, bearing in mind that these reports are one of the criteria for redundancy as well.

Thirty-three percent are divorced and widowed. This group of women are more likely to have family responsibilities, because they are the heads of the household, and in most cases are the only breadwinners. The bank management did not take this into account, when they made the decision of redundancy.

Thus, the majority of the redundant women have family responsibilities. Family members under the responsibility of the respondents fall into two groups. More than half the respondents are responsible for three to five family members; 26.6% of the women are responsible for one or two members. The redundancy situation is most likely to have disastrous consequences, particularly if we take the economists' classification of waged employees as the new poor.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Table 7: Family Size of Women Bankers</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>No</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>----</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: interviews with women's respondents' in 2007

Regarding occupational rank, the majority of the respondents were concentrated in scales one to three, i.e. jobs for senior managers, and 46.6% were in middle managerial jobs. This finding indicates the tendency of the bank management to make women in senior jobs redundant, or those eligible for senior jobs in the near future, while only 10% of the redundant women were from junior management.
Table 8: Job Scales of Women in Banking Sector

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>No</th>
<th>Job Scale</th>
<th>Women in banking sector</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>Scale 1</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>Scale 2</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>Scale 3</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>Scale 4</td>
<td>14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>Scale 5</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6</td>
<td>Scale 6</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7</td>
<td>Scale 7</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>30</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: interviews with women's respondents in 2007

Redundant women's years in employment fell in two main categories: about half the respondents were in the group with 20 to 25 years of employment, while 36.6% of the women fell in the 14 to 19 years of employment range. These figures showed that the women were made redundant when they had accumulated experience, obtained extensive training and acquired high skills and knowledge. The bank lost large numbers of highly qualified staff, who were a real asset to the bank and human resource in Sudan; yet they ended up on the street.

Table 9: Dates of Termination of Women in Banking Sector

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Date of termination</th>
<th>Women in banking sector</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1995-1997</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1997-1999</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1999-2001</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2001-2003</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2003-2005</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2005-2007</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>30</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: interviews with women's respondents in 2007
Concerning their husbands’ occupation, nearly one-third of the husbands were unemployed, eight of them either having become redundant or retired from work. Those still in work were employed in the public sector, where they earned lower salaries, which were not enough to maintain the family, i.e. the ‘new working poor’. A minority of the husbands had their own businesses.

Table 10: Women Bankers’ Husbands’ Occupation

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Husband Occupation</th>
<th>Women bankers</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1-Government official</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2-Professional</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3-Self-employed</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4-Armed forces</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5-Retired</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6-Redundant</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7-Unemployed</td>
<td>11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td><strong>30</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: interviews with women’s respondents in 2007

As is evident from the sample, the economic positions of women have changed to take new forms; rather than economically dependent, half the core sample of women were equal sharers, contributing all their income towards the household budget. One-third of the sample were female head of household or FHH, in the second category. The number of women contributing to the extended family tended to be lower among women bankers; only four respondents contributed to the income of the extended family. In the past, the significance of the extended family was more than the nuclear family.

Table 11: Economic position of Women Bankers in the household/family

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Economic position in the household/ family</th>
<th>Women Bankers</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Contributing all the income towards the household budget/ nuclear family</td>
<td>15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sole bread winner of the big family</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Female head of household (FHH)</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Contributing towards the extended family budget.</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Economically dependent</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td><strong>30</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: interviews with women’s respondents in 2007

Questioning the respondents about their relationship with the labour force, I found that 60% of the respondents were unemployed, 23.2% were self-employed (starting
from the level of sales traders to the business women), and only 16.6% were re-employed in paid jobs in the private sector.

These results reveal that a high percentage of women are unemployed, and groups of these women are still struggling to find jobs. They were faced with major constraints relating to gender discrimination, shortage of jobs, and nepotism.

The other group of women lost interest in going into any paid work again, as they experienced all kinds of unfairness, inequalities and discrimination. Therefore, they preferred to stay at home to look after their family members (young and elderly people). Women returned to the stereotyped gender division of labour as their role diminished from employed women to housewives. So women were back to domesticity after this long working experience, and after the long struggle to escape from the domestic domain into the public sphere.

The change in gender power roles will most likely influence gender power relations at the household level, as well as community and labour market levels.

Redundancy has resulted in immediate loss of income and other benefits, which will most likely affect women’s economic capabilities. The ones most affected are those who are still without jobs.

Table 12: Women Bankers' Relationship with the labour force

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>No</th>
<th>Relation with the labour force</th>
<th>Women bankers</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>Employed in a paid job</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>Unemployed</td>
<td>17</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>Self-employed</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Total</td>
<td>30</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: interviews with women's respondents in 2007

Women's responses to their redundancy were unpredictable, as it is very common among people in Sudan to tolerate any problem and accept the reality without complaint. However, the women's responses were the reverse of this situation. The majority of 20 women were protesting against the decision, and the other six women refused the decision and complained to the bank management, while only four women accepted the decision, as is usual in the Sudanese context.
Table 13: Responses Women Bankers to the decision of redundancy

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Responses to the decision of redundancy</th>
<th>Women bankers</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Acceptance of the decision</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Refusal of the decision</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Protesting against the decision</td>
<td>20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>30</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: interviews with women’s respondents in 2007

The direct social impact of redundancy was women’s feeling of social exclusion and the difficulties of being re-integrated in their communities. They lost their social networks at the workplace, and, at the same time, found difficulty in establishing new relations in their local communities, because they gave them very little time in the past, either because of full-time work or because of family responsibility.

Redundant women find themselves faced with significant challenges after losing their jobs. This situation leads women to resort to coping strategies to deal with the new situation. The data show that more women depend on benefits and allowances given for redundancy, or they are supported by others, mainly husbands and brothers; they may also rent part of their houses, or sell some of their properties.

Coping strategies were not only economic, but there were also other strategies used by the women to adapt to their new situation, especially those who were unemployed. A considerable percentage of the women joined activities at the community level, such as religious community organisations, or as volunteers for charity organisations.

Women factory workers

Concerning the redundant women’s sample from the Friendship Textile Factory, there are some variations. However the degree of similarities is much higher with women respondents from the Bank of Khartoum.

The age structure for women in the factory differs greatly from that of women from the Bank of Khartoum: the age of 53% of the respondents from the factory are
between 30 and 35 years, which means they were still at the age of building their work cycle, and 30% of the women were less than 30 years, so they were still at the beginning of their work cycle.

Table 14: Age of Women Factory Workers

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>No.</th>
<th>Age</th>
<th>Women factory workers</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>Less than 30</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>31-35</td>
<td>16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>More than 35</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Total</td>
<td>30</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: interviews with women’s respondents in 2007

The level of education is also completely different from that of the bank’s respondents: 43% of the factory respondents are secondary school leavers, while only 23.3% of the bank’s respondents had secondary school education only. In the factory, there were no university graduates, unlike the bank, where 56.6% are university graduates. This also reflects the variation between the two different classes.

Table 15: Education of women factory workers

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>No</th>
<th>Education</th>
<th>Women factory workers</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>Read and write</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>Intermediate</td>
<td>16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>Secondary</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Total</td>
<td>30</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: interviews with women respondents in 2007

Women factory workers reported their income as follows: one-third of respondents earned less than US$15 per month, seven respondents earned between US$30-45 per month, while only four earned more than US$45 per month. The other eight respondents did not mention their incomes; some did not remember because a long time had passed since being made redundant, and a few did not want to say. Noticeable here is that these figures indicate the deteriorating level of wages in Sudan. Despite the low wage, redundant women still see it as beneficial.
Table 16: Income per month for women factory workers

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>No</th>
<th>Income in US $</th>
<th>Women factory workers</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>0-15</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>15-30</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>30-45</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>45-60</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td></td>
<td>30</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: interviews with women’s respondents in 2007

Regarding marital status, 46% of women respondents from the factory were married, 43% were never married, and 10% were divorced and widowed. The percentage of women who have never married is very high among factory respondents, because they are younger, unlike women from the bank, where only 10% were never married. This also reflects the influence of class on marriage patterns, and on lifestyle in general.

Table 17: Marital Status of women factory workers

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>No</th>
<th>Marital Status</th>
<th>Women factory workers</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>Married</td>
<td>13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>Divorced</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>Widowed</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>Never married</td>
<td>13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td></td>
<td>30</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: interviews with women’s respondents in 2007

For the group of single women, whether they have never been married, divorced or widowed, the dismissal resulted in a great loss for them, either because they headed the household, or because of the prestigious status of being working women that they had before being made redundant.

Thirty-three percent of the respondents are responsible for one or two family members, while 23% of the women are responsible for three to four family members. This is in contrast to the bank’s respondents, where more than half are
responsible for three to five members, and only 26% are responsible of one or two members. This reflects the variation in family composition of the two different classes.

Table 18: Family Size of Women factory workers

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>No</th>
<th>Family Size</th>
<th>Women factory workers</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>0-2</td>
<td>21</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>3-5</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>More than 5</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Total</td>
<td>30</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: interview with women’s respondents in 2007

Redundant women’s years of employment ranged from ten years for 53% of respondents, and less than ten years for around 36%. Most of the women have working years of between 10-20 years, so they are in the middle of their working life and are well experienced.

As only 13 were married, and the remaining 17 either never married or were single mothers, women factory workers answered the question relevant to their husbands’ occupation as follows:

Three of the husbands worked as government officials, while five were self-employed, and the same number unemployed. This reflects the standard of living of families in the group, and the need for another income earner for family subsistence.

Table 19: Husband’s Occupation for Women factory workers

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>No.</th>
<th>Husband’s Occupation</th>
<th>Women factory workers</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>Government official</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>Professional</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>Self-employed</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>Armed forces</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>Unemployed</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Total</td>
<td>13</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: interview with women’s respondents in 2007

Women’s contribution to the household/family income is different from that of women bankers. More than the half the respondents hold responsibility for the
extended family. One-third contributed equally with their husbands towards the nuclear family, and only four respondents were FHH.

**Table 20: Women factory workers economic position in the household/ family**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Economic position in the household/ family</th>
<th>Women factory workers</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Contributing all the income towards the household budget/ Nuclear family</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sole bread winner of the big family</td>
<td>16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Female head of household (FHH)</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td><strong>30</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: interviews with women’s respondents in 2007

The factory respondents’ relationship with the labour force is very similar to that of the respondents from the bank. Despite the differences in the level of education and types of occupation and standard of living, they still have similar situations in their relation to the labour force. About half the respondents from the factory are unemployed, 33% have obtained paid jobs, while only 16% are self-employed.

**Table 21: Women factory workers’ relationship with labour force**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>No</th>
<th>Relationship with the Labour force</th>
<th>Women factory workers</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>Employed in a paid job</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>Unemployed</td>
<td>14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>Self-employed</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td><strong>30</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: interviews with women’s respondents in 2007

The major impact of redundancy on women from the Friendship Textile Factory is much clearer than that of women dismissed from the bank, because the standard of living of these women is very low, which makes them severely affected by redundancy and loss of the incomes and other benefits. Moreover, the shock of redundancy rather affects their social position at family and society levels; as they experienced a long struggle to seek work outside their houses. Redundancy means they have to go back to the domestic domain, and to the male control practised by fathers, brothers and husbands.
The responses of women factory workers are also different from that of women bankers, which to great extent shows the difference in level of awareness, and willingness to take militant action. Nearly two-thirds of the core sample either accepted the decision, or complained to the factory management, while 13 were protesting against the decision.

Table 22: Women factory workers' responses to the decision of redundancy

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>No</th>
<th>Responses to the decision of redundancy</th>
<th>Women factory workers</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>Acceptance of the decision</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>Refusal of the decision</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>Protesting against the decision</td>
<td>13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Total</td>
<td>30</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: interviews with women respondents in 2007

Conclusion

It is evident from the data generated from women's respondents made redundant from the Bank of Khartoum and the Friendship factory that they represent two extremes of working women in the urban setting in Sudan; women from the banking sector present a model of professional middle-income women, while women from the manufacturing sector reflect the model of poor working-class women.

Women's personal characteristics, i.e. age, marital status, number of children, level of education, monthly income, jobs grades are very different if we compared the two groups. The similarities appeared in their roles in the households and extended families; as equal sharer and head of households, or as contributors towards the budget of extended family.

Additionally, they also shared the changes in their employment status after privatisation; the majority of both women from the bank and factory were unemployed (i.e. half of factory workers, and 76.6% of women in the banking sector); they also had similar responses to the decision of redundancy, a considerable majority of women from the two institutions, either refusing the decision or protesting against it (i.e. two thirds of women from the bank, and the factory).
CHAPTER FIVE

PRIVATISATION AND WOMEN’S EMPLOYMENT POSITION

Introduction
To envisage the socio-economic impacts of privatisation and its consequent policy of redundancy on women, we need first to look at women’s employment status in the labour market prior to privatisation, and whether they experienced gender discriminatory practices in their workplaces; then to examine the changes in women’s employment patterns and positions brought by privatisation; finally the effect of the marriage between privatisation and practices of gender inequalities on women’s employment will be explained. The chapter will discuss the changes that have taken place in the employment status of women as a result of redundancy policy: where the government attempted to make large number of employees from the privatised firms redundant, women were among the first to go. Patterns of women’s participation in the labour market in the formal modern and the traditional informal sector are described first Their position in the labour market before the process of privatisation, is seen to explain the changes that happened in their employment status after the introduction of privatisation policies.

Women’s employment status in this context is discussed in terms of; women’s employment before privatisation; discrimination against women in the labour market and work place; women’s redundancy experience; women’s experience of job seeking; women’s responses to the changing situation after privatisation; adaptive responses women have had to mitigate their worsening economic situation; conclusion.

Women’s Employment Position Prior to Privatisation
In most developing countries women’s activities outside the household – as indicated by participation rates- are lower than those of men, but they have risen over the past thirty years. As a result women have formed an increasing proportion of the total labour force. In Asia, women formed 33.9% in 1985, in Latin America

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women 24.2% and in Africa they remained constant at around 32% (Stewart, in Afshar, Dennis 1992).

As in many developing countries, Sudan has witnessed an increase in the share of women in the labour force: according to the National Census in 1993 females’ formed 22%, which increased to 28% in 1996 (the labour force surveys), and then went up to 31.8% according to the National Census of 2008. Women’s share in the labour force in Sudan is still just less than the average of African countries (i.e. 32%).

The female labour force in Sudan is predominantly rural comprising 32% compared to 68% of males’ share of the rural labour force. As agriculture is the most dominant sector in the Sudanese economy which contributes 65.6 of the GNP in 1983, women’s share in this sector was 84.3% of the labour force in the same year. Women’s high participation, do not mean that they have access to land ownership, or control over resources. Evidence showed that women account for 36% of the agriculture labour force in developing countries as whole. However, in Africa women are the majority of the farmers, producing 90% of the food, but they are less important in export cash production’. Women’s situation in the agricultural sector in Sudan and in other African countries showed to the extent to which women were discriminated against because their participation in this sector considered as an extension to their domestic role. Therefore women are very much affected by the implementation of privatisation as they produce for family subsistence rather than producing cash crops for export. Sudan is not an exception in this regard.

Lately in the early 1990s, the share of agricultural sector in the GNP has dropped to 60.7% in 1993, this has accompanied with a decline in women’s share in this sector, which reached to 79.6% in 1993, to 49% in 2008. But it leads to an increase of women in other sectors namely: manufacturing and services sectors.

Consequently, women’s participation in the urban labour force has risen at increasing rates in the last decades, which has reached 16% compared to 84% of
males’ share (1993). This percentage has been absorbed in the formal sector, includes: public sector; private sector and the informal sector.

The public sector in Sudan has attracted large numbers of females’ employees, includes: banks, companies and commercial enterprises (Kheir, 2003), this sector considered as a large employer of women due to the facilities provided; such as social provisions, leaves, and other forms of facilities supporting women to continue work. Despite of the facilities provided women are still lagging behind because women are discriminated against in this sector, as they are concentrated in certain jobs and sectors compared to men. Evidence showed similar experience in Sub-Saharan Africa where the public sector represents about half of the formal sector employment in the region. Moreover, within the formal sector in Sub-Saharan, there is a concentration of men (Baden, 2003).

With regard to private sector to the private sector, women’s participation is low compared with the public sector, yet there is some progress happened in the past years (Yousif, 2003; Gasimelseed, 1998). In this sector females represent 68% of production and unskilled labour, 8.2% of professional and technical staff. In SSA, women who are employed in the formal sector are much more likely to be in public sector employment than in the private sector: an example is Kenya, where employment data show that women comprised 18.8 of waged employees in the private sector in the 1990s (Baden, 2003).

Women’s share of the labour force in the informal sector is especially large, estimated at 26.8% in Sudan, 53%, in Tanzania and around 40% in Peru (Sheilds 1980 p.23).

Apparently there is high tendency among women to enter the informal sector, because of it is more accessible, does not require education, training or skills.

Baden (2003) and Franke (1998) argued that women’s participation in the formal sector is characterised by their concentration in the small- scale, undercapitalised, low productivity, where as men have greater occupational spread in the sector. (Baden, 2003, p.95; Franke, 1998, pp.37-40)
The above discussion has reflected an unfavourable situation of women in the labour market in developing countries in general, and Sudan particular. This has influenced the effectiveness and the outcomes of SAPs and privatisation, as constraints on women’s flexibility hinder the success of adjustment in each case, typically, the constraints on women’s labour allocations cited include labour market discrimination, lack of education, limited access to credit or other inputs and reproductive responsibilities’ (Baden, 2003).

The increase in women’s employment in Sudan in the last two decades is a result of several socio-economic and demographic changes in the labour market. These changes were mainly attributed to the following factors: 1) the observed progress in women’s education; 2) shortage of manpower due to male emigration mainly to the Gulf countries; 3) high turnover of men as a result of low wages compared to the private sector, and 4) poverty conditions pushing more women into the labour market as cheap labour (Kheir, 2003). Osman and Elnagar (1989) have argued that ‘women’s economic participation in urban areas can generally be attributed to the economic strife resulted from the restructuring policies implemented during the 1980s, beside other factors related to the increased rates of women’s education, and emigration of men.

Stewart (1992) has also explained the main factors that led to the increase in women’s participation in developing countries: 1) the supply of female labour increased to compensate for the loss of real incomes at the household level as real wages fell and unemployment rose; 2) the shortage of male manpower, and 3) the high turnover of men as a result of low wages compared to the private sector. Women succeeded in increasing their visibility in the labour market, but they are still challenged by the emerging transformations occurring in macro-economic policies, which entailed Structural Adjustment Programmes (SAPs) and privatisation.
Discrimination against Women in the Workplace

Recruitment

Another level of discriminatory practices experienced by women is the discrimination practised in the work place. Women's accounts have reflected their conditions in the work place with respect to recruitment, promotion and the entitlements provided for women employees. Occupational features of women employees from the two institutions, the bank and the factory, are slightly different. The situation of women respondents from the bank was better compared with those drawn from the cloth factory because of their level of education and training, in addition to their high level of intellectual thinking. Also the high percentage of women recruited in the bank; qualify them to occupy a number of top management posts, despite discriminatory practise against them. Moreover, women were entitled to a wide range of social benefits (health insurance, social security, etc), besides their access to other economic resources, like loans offered to them (eg. housing, cars and crisis loans). Despite all these facilities provided for women, they still faced several challenges. Some of these challenges relate to work legislation and laws on employment, government policies adopted by public sector enterprises, including the Central Bank of Sudan.

The other discriminatory practices are referred to as the personal attitudes carrying gender discriminatory practices particularly from bank managers and decision makers, who were mostly men. These practices vary from a patriarchal system to restrictive Islamic laws.

Meanwhile, the case of women respondents from the factory reflects their low level of education, and the limited scope for training that qualifies them as factory workers. Their level of intellectual thinking and aspiration was much narrower as well. In factory daily work, there were no clear gender-based practices, as all the staff were women. However, discriminatory practices appeared clearly, when privatisation was implemented. Women were exposed to exploitative practices by the new management of the factory, as the redundant women were offered work, but with worsened terms of service and conditions.
The study elects to give general features of both institutions. Each case will be discussed separately with the focus on the respondent's reflections and insights and comparisons will be made where appropriate.

**Women in the Banking Sector**

From the responses of the women in the bank of Khartoum, it was found that the majority were concentrated in senior positions; more than half the respondents were in job grades one to three (grade one is highest rank in job grading in the bank of Khartoum). Despite the large numbers of women employees in the bank, and the high percent of women in management posts, there is still a gender bias against women in the occupational structure of the bank. Recruitment is one example, whereby women being denied the chance to be recruited as the bank's general director. No woman has been promoted to this post in the Bank of Khartoum, or any of the public or private banks; neither was women represented on the board of trustees of the bank (advisory body) since the establishment of the bank. This is confirmed by the last national population census, where it is found that men's representation in managerial posts is 519,700, compared with only 56,356 women. This reflected gender segregation, (i.e. vertical forms of segmentation) whereby the concentration of men in higher tiers and women in the lower tiers in any occupation pyramid (Bradley, 1999).

As data suggests, there is no legislation to deny a woman the right of being appointed as a bank's general director, or to be chosen as a member of the board of trustees, nor is there any refusal by women to occupy management posts (e.g. three women from the sample were recruited as Bank s' branch managers, which means they do not mind accepting top management jobs).

However, it seems that this is an undeclared policy of the Central Bank of Sudan, which issues all the regulations that control and regulate the work of all banks in Sudan.

**Promotion**

As regards promotion, it is shown from the respondents' accounts that some of the women have undertaken the responsibilities and duties of heads of department; yet
the bank management did not give them the full job title. Instead they are called them ‘acting head of department’. This practice is known as horizontal segregation. This discriminatory practice is most likely related to the personal attitudes of the managers at different levels in the bank, which reflects the prevailing culture of male dominance in the gender division of labour within the workplace. This argument was affirmed by Nassar (2003) in her study; she stated that:

- men and women might have different labour market experiences within the same institutions, workers of different gender having occupational characteristics might not experience similar earnings or mobility prospects at the enterprise level.

Women made redundant from the bank narrate their previous experiences in the bank before privatisation. An example is of Huda and Samira, who were recruited as acting managers of two main departments. Although they performed the job duties and responsibilities, the bank management did not give them the title of head of department. The responses of the women who occupied top management posts were, in a way not compatible with either their level of occupation as a professional or their gender awareness. Despite their strong awareness of gender discrimination practices against them, they reflected both submissiveness to male domination and unwillingness to struggle against it. When privatisation came, both discovered their mistakes, as they expressed them: ‘when I was fired from my job, I felt as if I had lost my life and I was doing something not worthy’ and ‘later on when I got fired, I recognised my mistake’. Rabeha has a different story: she was the head of the administration and finance department, who had to fight for her right to have her proper title. Her account also shows that women do not refuse to undertake top management posts.

This trend coincides with male dominating management, posts have created situations to marginalise women staff and confiscate their rights to promotion. The women recognition as effective measures happened a lip service and financial rewards. It apparently showed the strong pattern of stereotyping and discrimination against women by male managers and colleagues.
At another level, other groups of women in the bank held the same job grades for periods ranging between 5 to 12 years. Reflections on their experiences and their perceptions of experiences are presented below. One example is Nadia, who mentioned bias against females, as she has been promoted from rank 10 to 4 in eleven years, and from rank 4 to rank 3 in twelve years. Nadia did not accept this discrimination practised against her; accordingly she wrote several appeals to top management, but the responses to her appeals were only promises.

Perceptions of gender discriminatory practices experienced by women were mainly focused on two things: 1) the deprivation inflicted by the bank management, when they refused to promote women to the top management jobs as heads of departments, and 2) large numbers of women in the bank sample were stranded in their jobs' grades for five years and others for more. This situation made women more vulnerable when privatisation came: they were the first to go because of the large number at the same level, getting old, having remained in the job grade for long years), 2) additionally, most of the women lost the chance to have ‘end of service benefits’ because they were not promoted by the bank management.

Women’s respondents ‘accounts gave a strong evidence of the gender discrimination practised against women in terms of recruitment, promotion and training which left women in a disadvantaged position and in turn has increased their vulnerability to the threat of privatisation in a later stage.

Discrimination against women in the workplace, at the Bank of Khartoum, appears to arise from two major reasons: firstly, despite women’s high representation in the senior jobs which leads to their empowerment at decision making levels, they still suffer from their male managers; secondly, male managers benefitted from the absence of enforcing legislation, such as Equal Opportunity Policies or penalties enforced to punish those who are violating labour laws in formal sector enterprises. Hamza (2001) also suggested similar arguments. She stated, that ‘an important aspect of gender non-equality in the labour laws is that, despite mentioning that selection for public service, promotion and training are based on competition and qualification (Articles 18 and 19 of the Public Service Act, 1994), there is however
no provision in the Act for gender balance in recruitment, promotion or training opportunities, which results in serious implications for the rights of women to work, promotion and professional advancement.

This argument reflects the situation in the bank, where the management appeared to neglect labour laws that guarantee the rights of women employees to recruitment, promotion and training. They believed and adopted their personal attitudes about gender serotype division of labour in the workplace discriminating against women.

**Job-related Social Benefits**

Job-related social benefits have been secured by the labour laws for women at work; still there are violations by managers in different public sector enterprises. That is likely to continue, in the absence of a system of accountability and punishment. The Bank of Khartoum could be taken an example of public sector enterprises, where gender discrimination is practised here. An example is maternity leave, which employers are compelled to respect in law. The bank management gave only two periods of maternity leave for each woman employee, bearing in mind that the average family size in Sudan is six persons. This is not consistent with the labour laws that have granted women the right to maternity leave for each child during the job.

From the responses of the women, it is apparent that they accepted the situation without resistance, despite its unfairness. Women, who had more than three or four children needed to apply for other types of leave, i.e. sick leave or annual leave. Regarding other benefits and entitlements, both women in the bank and in the factory were entitled to social and health insurance, however, women in the bank were in a better situation than women factory workers, as they had high quality training and upgrading chances. They also had access to financial resources like loans for housing, car purchases, and crisis loans as well.

This situation indicates how strong the influence of personal attitudes of male managers on women’s status in the occupation was, it also underestimates the reproductive role of women employees, and equally that confirmed the problem is
not only related to legislation, but linked to the prevailing attitude of male domination in public sector enterprises.

Women also faced discrimination in terms of an occupational structure, as they were barred from holding the post of general director of the bank. No woman has held this post throughout the history of the banking system in Sudan, because it is known as a 'male post'. This practice illuminates the persistent pattern of gender segregation in the bank, especially the vertical form of segregation, which means the concentration of men in the higher tiers in any occupational pyramid (Bradley, 1999). In the banking sector, women were not only excluded from certain posts that are described as male posts, but also a considerable number of Islamic banks do not recruit women in any post in the bank. The leading bank, which initiated this practice, was the Faisal Islamic bank, established in the late 1980s. These biased practices reflect the dominance of patriarchal structures that are still governing public institutions in Sudan. For the women factory workers, as mentioned earlier, gender inequality was not critical before privatisation, as women workers comprised the whole staff of the factory. However, women factory workers were in a lower position, as they were only entitled to health and social insurance, plus their salaries, in order to keep them as workers; Moghadam (1999) labelled this as de-skilling of female factory workers; unlike women in the bank of Khartoum who were entitled to a better level of benefits. The above discussion gives a picture of the discriminatory practices experienced by women in the bank and the factory in the labour market and in the work place, which let women in a disadvantaged and exposed to the expected risks that may likely to be brought by privatisation.

**Women’s Employment position after Privatisation**

This section discusses the conditions of women employees after privatisation policies became a reality. The study sets out to answer some questions including: how did women cope with the redundancy stage; what did women do in their job search process; and where did women go from there?
Women's Experience of Redundancy

The analysis of redundant women's experiences in this chapter will be framed in a gender analysis perspective. Discrimination against women in the labour market in Sudan will be investigated. The perspectives of the new trends in the neo-liberal economy represented in the SAPs and privatisation policies that affect women's status globally, and specifically in the developing countries, will be developed as a useful comparative tool.

The process of implementing a privatisation programme led the government to undertake several policy initiatives that included labour redundancy, removal of government subsidies from essential goods and services, and reducing government expenditure on public services, including health care and education. The government cuts in social services, and the transfer of these services to the private sector, have adversely affected large segments of the society, particularly low-income families and women. For the purpose of this study focus will given to the labour redundancy as one of the implications resulting from the process of selling state-owned enterprises, led to enormous numbers of employees being made redundant in the public sector.

The Sudan experience is different from other countries in the region, for example Morocco and Egypt. These two countries tackled have the problem of employment cuts in a different way, they compelled the new owners of the sold state assets to keep all the employees for three years as a minimum period (Gyhad, 2006). There are examples from other African countries: in Mozambique, one of the criteria for evaluating bids is the bidder's commitment to maintaining the labour force at the existing level; both Benin and Zambia have used employment guarantees in an attempt to contain post-privatisation retrenchment (White, Bhatia, 1998, p.94). This method of implementation gives the employees access to training and upgrading programmes to help them cope with new developments in the enterprise. It also gives the employees enough time to search for other work. The situation in Sub Saharan countries is different, where often the public sector has suffered from
considerable losses in both employment and real wages levels, which have not been compensated by private sector employment.

This situation of Sub-Saharan countries is similar to what happened in Sudan, where the government issued an Act in 1990, which empowered the High Committee for the Disposal of Public Enterprises to exercise any legal power to terminate the service of the employees of the privatised enterprises without prejudice to their end of service benefits (Musa, 2002). The 1990 Act gave the managers of SOEs the capacity to get rid of any number of employees, when they started to implement the privatisation programme in the institution. Similarly, the Act put certain clauses within the act to secure the end of service benefits for redundant employees. Women interviewed have indicated that employees found great difficulties in obtaining their right to end of service benefits. Consequently, considerable amount redundancies in the public sector have taken place, without any plans to absorb the redundant employees in retraining programmes, or re-employment alternatives, so as to maintain their family subsistence.

Female labour force in Sudan is mainly dominating the public sector. This sector encouraged them by the facilities provided, an example of maternity leave, childcare services and other job-linked social benefits. When privatisation was implemented women were made redundant in large numbers from this sector. This point is affirmed by Moghadam (2005) who states that feminisation of the civil service is a prevailing feature of the neo-liberal economy.

The case of Sudan is very similar to other developing countries, as discussed by Stewart (1992). The decline in formal sector employment reduced opportunities for women. Where cuts in employment were focused on the public sector – as they are typically in adjustment packages - women have suffered especially, because in general there are relatively more women, employed on better terms, than in the private sector. Other examples are in Sri Lanka and Taiwan. Similar experiences were witnessed in the East European countries, according to Blanchard and associates in Moghadam (1992). They conclude that for Eastern European countries the process of adjustment that would emerge from unfettered market
processes would be likely to involve too little job creation, too much job destruction and too high unemployment.

The existing gender segmentation in the labour market confines women to certain jobs, and excludes them from senior decision-making jobs in certain formal sector enterprises (i.e. banking sector).

Elson's (1991) argued that recognition of gender segmentation of the labour market highlights three socio-economic factors responsible for the male bias in economic policies, and in privatisation in particular. The first factor is the sexual division of labour; some kinds of work are socially considered as men's. This comes as a result of the prevailing patterns of social values, and the division of labour inside and outside the household. The other two factors are the non-recognition of unpaid work, and women's responsibility within households.

This situation reflect that, women are amongst suffers in the labour market as they are not given enough opportunities to carry out work activities. Men are preferred in comparison to them making the women reluctant to any market opportunity. Therefore they are amongst the principal victims. It was found that women were among the highest numbers of redundant public sector employees, as they represented 54% of the victims of job cancellation in the public sector. According to Hamza (2001) the cancellation of jobs is a reason for termination of a person's service (Article 18 of the Public Service Act 1994).

These findings from the study interviewees—women who were made redundant as a result of privatisation, provide evidence of government practices during the implementation of the privatisation programme. It will reflect how far these practices were discriminatory against women, not only at the policy level (planning domain), but also within the organisational structures at the public institutional level (implementation level).

**Women's Job Seeking Experience**

The analysis of redundant women's experiences will be viewed in relation to gender and employment in aspects related to vertical and horizontal segregation, fragmentation, feminisation, and women's vulnerability in the labour market.
Bradley (1992) deals with the tendencies in gender dynamics, which relate to employment segmentation, fragmentation, feminisation of employment, polarisation and the gender homogenisations.

Nassar (2003) assigned gender segmentation of the labour market to these reasons: gender segregation by occupation, the feminisation of government employment, changes in job status and working conditions, the particular effects of unemployment, and the vulnerability of women in the labour market. Throughout this section, women respondents expressed suffering and struggle in their long journey of job searching, as women found themselves vulnerable and insecure with no jobs, no earnings and facing uncertain future prospects. The below example has reflected women's respondents work alternatives to provide family needs, while they are waiting for paid employment chance.

Ekhlas is one case from the banking sector; she stated that after she was made redundant, she started immediately to make cookies and pastries and sell her products to friends and neighbours, just to earn some money for family survival. She continued for two years, waiting for a paid job. Finally she managed to find a job in a private factory with the assistance of her relatives. Sitana's story is different, as she opted to add more qualifications to have better chances of employment; another different feature is her fragmented job search journey. She has mentioned that, after she was made redundant she was in shock for some time, helpless and uncertain, but with the support of her extended family she managed to recover. She started by studying and obtained a diploma in IT; after that she contacted relatives and friends for help in finding a paid job in the private sector, having previously worked for one year at a private company, which closed for financial reasons. Shortly afterwards she found herself at home, stayed for one year, and then she joined another private company for two years, but left because of the discrimination she experienced in that company.

Women from both institutions have had similar experiences of job searching. However, women factory workers have exerted great effort into finding new jobs, without considering the working conditions; as they live in very poor economic
conditions and their urgent need for an income to secure family subsistence. This is unlike women banking sector, the majority of whom have a higher level of aspiration, and whose living conditions are relatively better.

Findings of the research regarding the situation of redundant women after job loss indicates that a higher percentage of women made redundant from the bank and the factory were unemployed, (i.e. 57% of the women in the banking sample and 47% of the factory sample) Meanwhile, regarding women with paid jobs, it was found that women factory workers were employed in larger numbers than women bankers; (i.e. 40% (12) compared to 16% (5) respectively).

It is also noticed that the number of women banking sector who entered the informal sector, their percentage reaching (23% (8)), are greater compared to only (13% (4)) of women factory workers, who entered the informal sector. This can be considered a new trend emerging among middle-class women, who resort to the informal sector.

Experiences of women in banking sector and factory workers, who had been made redundant, can be classified into three categories, according to their job seeking journey. The first category is: successful employment in the formal sector (Women who were re-employed in paid jobs in the formal sector); Second category: Unsuccessful Experience of Re-employment in the Formal Sector (comprises those who gave up job searching, and went back to domestic settings, and came out of the labour force or were unemployed but they continued seeking jobs since the date of termination until the date the interviews were conducted); the third category is: Self-employed in the Informal Sector (women who failed to find any new jobs in the formal sector, and resorted to the informal sector as self-employed).

Successful Employment in the Formal Sector

Women in the Banking Sector

The Bank of Khartoum witnessed four phases of privatisation: 1995, 2000, 2002, and 2006. During the first two phases, the majority of the employees were made redundant from the bank. The same happened in many other privatised government enterprises, at the first stage of the implementation of the privatisation programme.
Women in banking sector are considered by international occupation standards as professionals. So, when they were made redundant, it was very difficult for them to find jobs, especially in their sector, the banking sector. Their level of aspiration for the type of jobs that might suit their career; level of qualifications and gender are also some of the factors that constrained their job search.

It was like a 'slaughter', as described by one of the respondents. She said implementation of the first phase of privatisation was like slaughter, as it was a shock for the employees because it happened all of a sudden. The bank’s management did not prepare the staff for the forthcoming changes, and there were no consultations or discussion meetings with the staff about their future prospects.

Women who succeeded in getting salaried work were the smaller group, as they represent only 16% (5) of the study sample. Although women in banking sector have restricted chances for paid jobs, there are still some who find jobs in the private sector, while for women factory workers, chances for getting paid jobs is better as they represented 40% (12 cases).

All the redundant women sought salaried jobs, because they believed that paid work is much more beneficial than any other form of work, like self-employment, or domestic work.

Their views and insights were in line with some feminist scholars such as Moghadam (1996), Charusheela (2003) who perceived paid work as a means to liberate women, and improve their status at family and society level. The theoretical debate about the notion of paid work, and whether it does liberate women is evolving in three ways. First, there is a proposition that paid work is more advantageous to the women than unpaid work; second, this often includes a second proposition that women are able to control the wages they obtain in paid work; a third and related presumption is that the advantages that a woman gains in employment increase the control she has in other areas of her life, such as the domestic division of labour, and in other social relations, such as access to political decision-making (Moghadam, 1996).
There are challenges emerging in regard to the notion of paid work. In many cases, women do not have the control over their income, so they do not have the same advantage from paid work as others do particularly male superiors. Moreover, a scholar such as Kabeer (2008) argues: ‘paid work holds the promise of empowerment for women’. Her views coincide with liberal and Marxists feminists schools, which we have discussed earlier. Consequently paid work is expected to increase women’s chances to have access and control over resources.

Ekhlas is an example of women in banking sector who accepted paid jobs, although working conditions are not like before; she mentioned that she was recruited as a finance manager; the working conditions were unfavourable as the salary was less than that in the bank; decision making was very restricted because of the interference of the factory manager, unlike the bank where everybody had a defined job description. She continued: her colleagues in the new workplace were younger than her, but they held better jobs and had better entitlements, in spite of their short experience. She accepted work in such an unfriendly environment because of her family’s economic need as her husband was made redundant from public service in 1991.

In addition to the deteriorated work conditions challenging women within the new work place, another challenge is the instability and fragmentation of their job search attempts. This theme was introduced by Sittana: she eventually found a paid job in the private sector. She has a more fragmented employment history, as she has had a long job search history, since being made redundant in 2000. She mentioned: - after several months of unemployment, she succeeded in getting a job in a large investment company and she has worked there ever since. She worked as the head of the administration and finance section. She feel comfortable in her work; however, she is still loyal to the bank as it was the workplace where she started her career.

Those who found paid jobs were the minority, they are considered as exceptional cases, because of their standard of living; being part of high socio-economic families. Accordingly, they have benefited from their family relations to secure
paid jobs in the formal sector. Although these women succeeded in getting jobs in
the formal sector, they faced a number of difficulties relating to stereotypical
gender discrimination. Huda did not only need to change her career path, but had to
work part-time, because of the scarcity of full-time jobs, and employers’ preference
for males in senior jobs. Others, like Ekhlas from banking sector, suffered a long-
term unemployment. She waited for two years, before resorting to the informal
sector; the easy but last resort for most of the desperate women, including women
professionals.

Women Factory Workers

The redundant women from factory workers have been re-employed in the
manufacturing sector, as different factories required new staff in various
specialisations such as shoe-making, spinning, food-processing and cloth-making
factories. Women do not mind working in any factory, even if it is not in line with
their previous experience, or less poor working conditions. Despite this
unfavourable situation (i.e. lack of previous experience, poor working conditions)
women factory workers accepted the work. But the government did not take into
account people’s needs and interests, as the new policies of privatisation extended
to other factories after the textile factories, such as shoe and food processing
factories. A few months later the government decided to close most of these
factories due to the privatisation programme that started in the 1990s. This
necessitated the sale of state-owned factories as part of the privatisation of the
public sector enterprises and the restructuring of the private sector factories. This
decision led women into unemployment again.

After the closure of the different factories, women turned to search for jobs in their
original sector, which is sewing and tailoring. It is worth mentioning that the
majority women are still working in sewing workshops and small factories, which
means they did not leave the sector in which they have long experience and skills.
It also showed that women factory workers may have been constrained by their
need for local work as it acceptable to men in their families.
Wafa, is middle thirties lady with three children, she has never stopped job-seeking attempts. She said: _Since she was made redundant in 1996 immediately started to look for work. She began with temporary work in a small sewing workshop in the Kobar area, which was very close to my home. Then, after she transferred to another big sewing workshop in Khartoum province, she worked for two years and then left that work because of the harsh work conditions, as the factory management does not give us any benefits, such as leave, health insurance nor any transport facilities. After one year of unemployment, she found work in a sewing workshop in Omudurman province. It was very far from her home although the salary was good, but no other facilities were provided. If, for example, anyone needed to be absent for one day for any reason you might find someone appointed in your place, i.e. there was no kind of protection for workers. After three years' service she recently moved to the Basigat factory for ready-made cloth. She likes the work in this factory despite the low salary in comparison to the previous one, because it is very close to her residence. Alshifa also give similar story as that of Wafa, which has reflected the fragmented nature of job search of women factory workers. This situation is affirmed by Nassar (2003) who pointed out _the main elements of women's vulnerability in the labour market are the lack of childcare facilities and transportation.

For women factory workers, transportation was one of the constraints that hindered their employment and their settlement in one job, because of the long distance they needed to travel, and the effort made by women to reach to their workplace early in the morning.

The stories of Wafa and Alshifa are typical, and are very similar to the experiences of the majority of female job seekers. It showed fragmented job search history, as women could not settle in one workplace for a long time, either due to the process of privatisation of the factories, or due to the deteriorating work conditions in the different factories. This indicates the exploitative nature of the labour market, as women were offered flexible forms of employment like part-time work, or others had to accept work in deteriorating conditions, which confirmed the claims of
feminist scholars; where one of the new trends, created by the neo-liberal economy, was a feminisation of labour.

This discussion gives a clear picture of the situations of women, who consistently wait for paid jobs as a secure pattern of employment for themselves. This group represented 40% (12 cases) of 28 women factory workers, which is a high percentage of the sample. This is unlike the case of women in banking sector who consist of only 16% (5 cases), who managed to find suitable jobs.

From the respondents' experiences it is evident that women factory workers accepted working in harsh working conditions. Moreover, most of the sewing workshops suffered from low financial capacities, and low level of competition with imported goods. Therefore, most of them tended to close or downsize their workload. Furthermore, they do not offer good work conditions to their employees. As women are not entitled to the minimum job conditions, such as permanent contracts, they do not have security in the workplace. This makes them vulnerable to the exploitation of the business owners who can get rid of them at any moment, without being questioned by any authority. This is due to the weak level of accountability and control from the government, as it abandoned its responsibility to market mechanisms. Moreover, new state policies have led to a weakening of the role of trade unions, which are assumed to protect workers' rights.

In addition, there are no other facilities provided, whether meals, leave, health cover, and childcare, so the environment is not an enabling one to help women to continue, or encourage them to settle in one workplace for a long period.

It is evident from the experience of women in banking sector that, they have more chances of job mobility, unlike women factory workers who were restricted to work in the same sector.

The experience of redundant women in banking sector as well as women factory workers that indicates a few of them who have found jobs opportunities were in the private sector. This indicates that there is some growth in the private a result of implementation of privatisation policies, however, employment chances are still limited and have not expanded as promised by the government. 'This situation
could be better off by adopting more expansionary macro-policies, reducing the recessionary elements of privatisation' Stewart (1992).

**Unsuccessful Re-employment in the Formal Sector**

Women, who insist on returning to work, believe in the importance of work in their lives, either because it again from a long struggle or women need work to maintain their family.

Most of the redundant women were looking for jobs in the banking sector, as they had long experience in this area, besides the extensive job training offered by the bank. Despite the high qualities these women had, they failed to find any jobs, not only in the banking sector, but also in other formal sector enterprises.

Fatima is one of the cases who talked about herself and her husband, who were made redundant from the bank in the same year, 2006. Fatima said: ‘In the first stages of privatisation, bank management exempted some cases, an example of which is the case of a husband and wife; they will make one of them redundant. But in the later stages of privatisation the bank management has cancelled that practice’. Fatima explained that she could not find any job opportunities because there are several determinants constraining women from joining salaried jobs in the formal sector. These determinants are age and gender discrimination. She believes that gender discrimination is ‘the main factor limiting my chances to find any work; however, I am still looking for a job’. (Fatima)

Fatima, and her husband were from the same age group, nearly 40 years, having similar experience in the bank. As professionals and belonging to the same socio-economic class, however, his chances of getting a salaried job were better than hers, because of his gender and because of the discriminatory practices known in the private sector in particular; as described by Moghadam (1999), the _private sector is known as unfriendly to women employees. Similarly, Samira has passed through the same experience, she was made redundant in 2000, she failed to find a suitable job, so she gave up my job search, and _the experience of her husband is different: he was also made redundant from his work as a banker, but he managed to find a job in a private company. Both women’s respondents remarked that, There
is a type of gender discrimination because their husbands had been made redundant from job for a few years, they still managed to find a job, but it is different for men because they can find jobs, not like us. They had managed to find a job much more easily than ourselves in the private sector, although they have the same qualifications and they were on the same job scale.

This point supported by Joekes's (1993) statement: _once women lose their jobs in the formal sector they are less likely than men to gain another.

The cases of Fatima and Samira reflect the difficulty women have in getting another paid job after redundancy, because of the competition they find from men, who were also made redundant, which increased the numbers of redundant employees seeking jobs. Because of the attitude of preference for males, most employers preferred to hire men rather than women, especially in senior posts, as indicated by the respondents' accounts.

The above discussion asserts that, women mentioned different reasons that blocked their employment of which gender discrimination was the major factor along others with age factor. Moghadam (1996) in her work in MENA region affirmed these arguments: _When women lose jobs as a result of restructuring, they may find it more difficult than men to find new jobs, partly because of the prevailing gender ideology that favours jobs for men as _heads of households'; moreover, the private sector is often less friendly to women than the public sector, which offers social insurance and other job-linked benefits to working women.

Moghadam (1996) has stressed that the gender inequalities in the labour market are the main factors that restricted women's employment chances and opportunities. Also there are evidence in Latin America showed similar experience 'once women lose a formal sector, they experience difficulty in finding another one' (Hirata and Hammerselt, 1990 in Baden, 2003). these points coincide with the opinions of the majority of the women respondents, who referred their long-term unemployment experiences to the stereotyping division of labour that structures the labour market in Sudan.
Moghadam (1996) also mentioned other important factors that contributed to the unemployment of redundant women, when she argued _the growth of the population of job-seeking women is propelled by economic need and declining household budgets, as well as educational attainment and personal aspirations._

She further mentioned that the growing numbers of women job seekers made it difficult for women to be absorbed in the formal sector. This is reflected in the experiences of redundant women in banking sector, who were faced by restricted employment chances in the formal sector. Moreover, the level of education and aspirations is also considered important, especially among middle-class women, as in the case of women in banking sector. This can explain the high number of unemployed women in banking sector which is a new trend among middle class professionals.

The experience of women in banking sector is slightly different from women factory workers although they shared high rates of unemployment, yet women factory workers got better chances of employment than the women bankers, this point explained by, Nassar (2003) in her study _expansion in the industrial sector opens chances for poorly-educated young women to work in poor work conditions_. This point is affirmed by Standing (1989) who illustrated _feminisation of labour'in its dual sense; of involving large numbers of women in the labour force, in deteriorating work conditions._

For women factory workers the group of those who are unemployed, or still waiting for a paid job, or women who stopped seeking jobs represents the majority of the redundant women, who decided to stop their job search altogether, after having worked for much of their lives; after struggling against their fathers and brothers to go to work, women returned to domestication.

The experience of Aisha is a potent example; she is unmarried and unemployed. She started to speak about her experience: _she decided to go for work; her father was against this decision, but her brothers encouraged her. She joined the work in the factory in 1985; her brothers lied to father and told him that she was going for adult education classes. After two years her father discovered that I had been_
working in the factory, and he prevented her from going to work. She stayed at home for some time; then her colleagues came to her house and managed to convince him, by telling him the factory is for women only. With the help of her brothers and colleagues she returned to the factory. She adds: has a feeling of bitterness after being redundant; she could not get any job, so she decided to stay at home to take care of her father as he is getting old.

Etimad’s story is similar to that of Aisha, but she has made different attempts to find alternative work. She is married with children, and unemployed husband; she was unemployed and looking for credit to start her own business, but failed to find any agency to support her. She mentioned: _it was a great shock to her to be made redundant from job because when she started work in the factory it was like a great victory for her. Her brothers were resisting her work until they visited the factory and found it was only women staff. Then they allowed her to go for work.

Women’s stories are very typical, as they gave up job searching and came out of the labour force. The reasons mentioned behind their lack of employment were related to their gender and level of education. In addition, class is an influencing factor in the sense that they do not have access, or connections to powerful people who can assist them in finding jobs.

One other point raised by one of the respondents was that there is _no access to credit facilities, as the government does not provide such a facility for poor people.

The last category is women who were in and out of the labour market. Women have a strong desire to return to work due to their deteriorating economic conditions, but at the same time, they could not accommodate having jobs in such deteriorating working conditions. Most of this group returned to be re-employed in the Sour factory (the privatised Friendship Factory for Ready-made Clothes), but with new contracts and in a difficult working environment.

Regarding the implementation of privatisation of the factory, it was an ad hoc process caused several problems and constraints that greatly affected the expected results of selling the factory in order to increase productivity and profitability. The
factory has passed through various phases of privatisation that have been implemented since 1996.

The first stage was between 1997 and 2000, when the factory was sold to the Popular Defence Forces (non-governmental militia). During this period, the new management of the factory faced difficulties in keeping the factory running as they depended on part-time workers, which cost the factory a huge amount of money as they were paid on a daily basis. To solve this problem the factory management resorted to re-employing women who were made redundant.

The second stage was 2000-2004; during this period, the factory was closed, the main factors behind its closure being the lack of production inputs, the high cost of production, and the level of competition with imported goods, as there is no protection offered to the local products by the government.

The third stage was when the factory was bought by the National Armed Forces, as a joint venture with the Turkish International Company. The shares were divided as follows: 60% for the Turkish company and 40% for the Armed Forces, which means the Turkish company, got the controlling stake in management decisions and in production priorities as well. During this period, the new management called the women again to rejoin the factory, with the same exploitative working conditions.

The fourth stage was in 2007; this last stage came through during this study. This period witnessed the dismissal of all women workers, who numbered around 200. Only ten women remained, as they were professionals in designing.

The new management imported foreign labour from Bangladesh to run the factory, claiming that this will help to reduce the cost of production. It is worth mentioning that all the labour force are men and work as tailors, while the highly-technical work was done by the women, who remained working in the factory.

The noticeable observation is that most of the women who returned to work are neither active members of the factory trade union, nor involved in any political activities. The women to whom I spoke were actively working with the trade union, and fought for the rights of the workers. When they applied for work in the factory, the new management refused to accept their applications.
The new work conditions are unfavourable to women workers, as they are worse than before. There are no permanent contracts, and contracts are renewed every three months. Moreover, women are not entitled to any benefits, such as health insurance, leave or transportation, as they used to have before. Moreover, women were enticed by the better pay, as they perceived that _the only good thing is the salary we get – it is higher than before. However, when we consider the inflation rate and the deteriorating value of real wages, we find that the salary is similar, or even less than we got ten years ago.

Redundant women were forced to accept insecure working conditions, and a discriminatory environment in the workplace due to their financial need and their families' poor economic conditions, in addition to that are the limited employment chances offered in the formal sector.

Nagwa is one of those who attempted to work again in the factory. Her story is a very interesting one; she said she was made redundant in 1996; she remained unemployed for four years, the period during which the factory was closed. In 2000 she came back to the factory. When the factory closed from 2000 to 2004, she was unemployed again for four years. In 2004 she joined the work in the factory after the new opening was done by the Turkish company. Then she continued to work in the factory until the new management decided to fire all the staff, which was in 2007. Then the factory management replaced the Sudanese workers with foreign workers imported from Bangladesh, accordingly, she lost any hope of being employed in the factory again; therefore she gave up searching for a job. Her example is representing the majority of factory workers who were kept working in the factory, until the management decided to get rid of all the national staff, and replace them with power cost imported labour.

According to the accounts of respondents, majority of redundant women became unemployed, and they are representing the losers of privatisation but there are others who were benefiting from privatisation policies, which have offered them new employment opportunities as part of the global economic system. So they could be considered as winners from privatisation policies.
The discussions of women respondents indicated the vulnerability of the poorly-educated, and women coming from low income families, who are in the lower strata of society. In addition to their low socio-economic status, they faced gender discrimination as it is deeply rooted in the structures of Sudanese society, which exposed them to further exploitation.

Despite their different socio-economic backgrounds both women in banking and women factory workers had suffered high unemployment rates resulted from privatisation policies, and this was also experienced in other regions: Moghadam (1992), Hundker (2001) and Baden (2003) gave examples from developing countries; (i.e. Bangladesh, Chile, Ghana) and some Eastern European Countries: ‘one of major impacts of privatisation is open unemployment which has become increasingly serious phenomenon’. She also added that one of the similarities between the Eastern European region and the Third World is that unemployment has increased due to privatisation.

**Women entering the informal sector**

In Sudan the informal sector comprises diverse heterogeneous activities from small scale enterprises by petty trading, street vendors, and home-based industries, handicrafts, selling of food and beverages, to small workshops. In general it is characterised by its easy access, low skills of labour, simple or indigenous technology, and lack of business records, labour intensive, non-permanent workplaces, lack of official organisation such as registration in labour unions and working outside state control (Kheir, 2003). As suggested by the above definition of the informal sector in Sudan, it has an inferior position, with no official structures, or protective laws or pressure groups. The wide range of activities absorb all different types of people, especially the disadvantaged.

From the responses of women in banking sector it is found that 27% (8) of the cases entered the informal sector, which is unpopular among middle-class women. The case of Da‘ad is very interesting; she has started her business with good starting capital, similar to Nadia. She mentioned that she searched for a job immediately after redundancy, but she felt it is going to be a long wait, so she
decided to do her own business. She started with renting the first floor in her house, then completed the second floor and offered that for rent as well. Then after some time she bought a flat in one of the investment towers; it is also rented. Then she became a lady/landlord as it is a safe investment for women.

Another type of business is reflected in the case of Nea’amat and Zeinb who started with small capital, and small scale business, she bought a Ragsha [it is a method of transport]. Its revenue is good; however, the expenses on repairs and spare parts are very high; my husband helped in managing this small business.

Awatif is divorced with no children. She is responsible for her extended family. Her story is different as she works as a petty-trader, selling women’s dresses, especially the Sudanese tob [national dress: it is a long piece of fabric that is wrapped all over the body]. She had been doing this for several years when she was still working, when privatisation came to the fore, she managed to overcome redundancy situation short time, unlike her colleagues who suffered a lot to cope with their new situations. Her situation was much better than most of her colleagues because she had another work alternative, she did not need to apply for any paid job, but continued in her business from which she received good earnings.

The story of Awatif was unique because no other woman in the bank is involved in such an activity; she succeeded in running her business, while she was still working in the bank. She was empowered by her business as it saved her from being vulnerable and dependent on others after job loss, especially in her case as a divorcee with no sponsor. Her situation is better than many women in banking sector who became disadvantaged after job loss and had limited resources.

It is noted from the reflections of women in the banking sector, who entered the informal sector, that they are joining this sector in higher numbers compared to women factory workers (women in banking sector are double (8) women factory workers (4). This indicates the new changing pattern of employment for professional women.

It is evident from the discussions above that there are common types of self-employment activities undertaken by the redundant women from the bank. Around
23% of the respondents resorted to renting part of their houses, or completing building work in their houses, or refurbishing old houses to offer them for rent as a strategy to depend on for their living. People in Sudan tended to resort to renting out estate, such as a house or a shop or store, as they were considered a safe investment. Therefore, women deal in such types of investment. However, this tendency increased the supply of estates offered for rent, which has led to the decrease in rents. Other cases undertake activities, which are traditionally described as women's work, because they are part of domestic activities, such as petty-trading, cookie-making and local perfume making.

Despite women professionals' high level of education and long experience in dealing with money in their work in the bank, women still undertake traditional types of investment, unlike men who enter large-scale investment with confidence and courage. That is probably attributed to women's perceptions of themselves, as they come to enter the public sphere after a longer time compared to men. It may also be due to the way they have been brought up, as women do not have the courage and self-confidence to go for big investment. As we have seen in the experiences of women respondents, they rely on their husbands even for their small-scale businesses.

The respondents used to undertake activities producing different items and services. The sample included: two women petty-traders (selling imported cloth), two _Ragsha_ (meaning local transport) owners, two women owners of service delivery shops, one having a printing and photocopying shop, and another having a communication service shop, one woman making and selling perfumes, and one preparing and selling cookies and pastries.

For women factory workers, this category consisted of the women who failed to get any paid job; accordingly, they resorted to self-employment. Consequently, women factory workers were compelled to join any paid work to maintain the family, and to satisfy their level of aspiration, as they had limited ambition, unlike women in banking sector.
Therefore, there are only a few women from the factory in the informal sector; only four cases had the courage to take the risk of changing their original sector to a new sector, where they did not have any relevant experience. However, there is no security in the job to informal sector workers.

As pointed out by Hamza (2003), the current labour laws and regulations in Sudan generally regulate the work of women in the formal sector, and the formal private sector, and do not cover the majority of women who work in the traditional and informal sector. So, workers in this sector are not protected by labour laws and regulations. Therefore, women factory workers were not involved in this sector in high numbers, which is surprising. An example of a woman running her own business is Bedour who is married with one child, she worked as a petty-trader; she resorted to this work because she gave up my job search. She complained of the limited access to credit facilities provided by the government or the non-governmental organisations that is besides the resistance she faced from her husband, as he does not accept my work as a petty-trader, unlike before when he was very supportive when I was working as a factory worker.

Another example is Nea'amat, a divorced lady with three children. She works as a tea-maker in the local market near her house. She said: she was forced to work in the market, as her family did not agree take that type of work. But, because of the great need of her children, she neglected her family, and the neighbours’ comments about my work were a negative one.

The discussions from women respondents demonstrated that the redundant women factory workers were experiencing the contradictions of stereotyping and discrimination at the household level, and fierce privatisation at the labour market level. The interviews have shown that most of the redundant women factory workers joined the informal sector for various reasons. The first is the poor living conditions of the women and their families. The second is the ease of entering the informal sector, as it does not demand education, qualifications, or high capital to start a small business. It is a resort for poor, illiterate and economically disadvantaged women. However, they enter this sector in small numbers compared
to women bankers, due to the social constraints mentioned. The respondents accounts reflected that privatisation in Sudan has led to the growth of informal sector with a new changing features, such as the involvement of middle class women in this sector. In contrast, women in banking sector enter to informal sector in large numbers (8 cases), exceeding that women factory workers, as they faced limited chances of paid jobs, i.e. they are double the women factory workers, although it is an emerging pattern of employment for educated middle-class women.

It was assumed that women factory workers may tend to enter the informal sector in greater numbers compared to women bankers; however, the reverse happened. This is most likely due to their social position in the family and in society, as their mobility is restricted by the control of fathers, brothers and husbands. Moreover, the perception of society towards informal work is that it is of low value and underestimated: the few who were self-employed were doing it secretly, or in conflict with male guardians. Therefore, women factory workers were less encouraged to enter the informal sector, because of the social constraints; although this sector is more suitable for them than for women bankers, because of it being easy to enter: no high level of education, no qualifications, no previous experience or initial capital needed. The increase of informal sector is not only limited to the case of Sudan, but also in other regions: Moghadam(1992) had mentioned that growth of informal sector is witnessed in East European countries (e.g. Hungary), Third World, and the MENA region (1999). As this sector is very vital to increase employment and income for women, the attitude of the government needs to be changed. Accordingly, policy action need to be formulated to improve the informal sector as an important sector that could assist the government to open up more employment opportunities and to alleviate poverty in the wider sense. The policy actions include: 1) increase accessibility to finance, 2) skill development, 3) organisation of market channels, and 4) provision of protective laws to keep women safe from violations and harassment practiced by local authorities, or by male counterparts in the sector.
Women in the Privatised Enterprises

Privatisation has not only impacted adversely on women who were made redundant, but it has further affected women who were still in jobs. Women's accounts from focus group discussions have shown that after privatisation there were new policies in the bank and the factory which led to more discrimination against working women, bringing conflict with their reproductive roles and family responsibilities. One example is that the bank management have cancelled maternity leave and childcare facilities, which left women with very limited options; either to apply for leave without pay, or sick leave (which is also restricted) or to look for other work alternatives. These discriminatory practices have led to the disadvantage of women as mothers and wives and also violated their labour rights. Moreover, health insurance was also excluded from the benefits, which also impacted negatively on working women: the burden of health expenses has increased drastically after the new policies of market liberalization as every individual needs to pay user charges for health services.

For women factory workers the effect was harsher, because they accepted work with different and unsecured terms and conditions. Women workers do not have permanent contracts; are not entitled to annual leave; medical insurance; absences; transportation and childcare facilities. This experience is witnessed in Argentina, where a study examined the Telephone and Airline companies. The main effect of privatisation in former companies thus far appear to be loss in certain job benefits and new feelings of insecurity, represented in 1) workers do not receive labour benefits, such as annual extra-pay compensation, 2) no health benefits, 3) workers do not entitled to employer contributions to the social security system, 4) workers do not have permanent contracts, as contracts renewed either on monthly basis, or every three months (Geldstein, 1997, p.562).

The above discussions have asked about policy changes that were implemented with the introduction of privatisation, which aims at increasing profitability, irrespective of employment legislations or other social considerations including women's concerns.
Conclusion

It could be safely concluded that impact of privatisation on women’s employment status appears to be mixed. It opens employment opportunities for some women in regions where there is high economic growth, but not for many in the least developed and poor economies, such as Sudan.

In the pursuit of increased productivity and lower labour costs, privatisation not only led to increasing rates of female unemployment, but also worsened working conditions of female employees. The limited employment opportunities in the formal sector, either in public or private domains, led women to stay for long periods of time unemployed, forcing them to look for other work alternatives, namely the informal sector. Despite the unfavourable work conditions in this sector, women comprise high proportion, as their percentages reached up to 26.8% of the labour force in this sector. This pattern of employment has also termed by feminists like Moghdam, 1998, and Standing, 1994 the ‘informalisation of female labour force’.

When privatisation came, it claimed to introduce more efficient criteria for hiring, including formal qualifications or personal interviews, making it difficult for women to compete as expensive labour (Geldestin, 1997).

Consequently, if privatisation tends to continue as part of the government overall economic policies, both the need for women to work and the constraints the labour market imposes on them will increase, while it would be neither reasonable, nor realistic to expect private enterprises to voluntarily act against their own economic interests. Therefore, the state should fulfil its duty to protect social welfare of its individuals. In order to maintain gender equity and the welfare of families, the state needs to provide guarantees that will secure women opportunities to work. This means: 1) designing labour policy that respects family as well as women’s needs, 2) safe and cheap day-care for children of working mothers near to their workplace, 3) post-privatisation programme to maintain women employees’ issues with the new employers of the privatised enterprises, 4) social mitigating programmes pertaining to training and skills upgrading, should be directed not only to male
employees, but also female employees. Moreover, social mitigating programmes could also be offered by Non-Governmental Organisations (NGOs), so NGOs could contribute to reducing the sufferings of redundant women. As an example, organisations in Bangladesh have helped to open considerable chances of employment for women, after the introduction of SAPs and privatisation (Khundker, 2001). This is not to say that all changes in women's positions as well as changes in the organisation of work are negative, change may also bring certain improvement to women, which could be greater empowerment and further changes in power relations in the family/household.
CHAPTER SIX

PRIVATISATION AND WOMEN'S ECONOMIC POSITION

Introduction

Changes resulting from redundancy have led to a considerable transformation in women's economic positions, at the personal and family/household levels; as reflected in the insights of the respondents. Throughout this chapter, discussions will focus on the respondents' accounts of their economic situations before privatisation and before redundancy. This is followed by an exploration of the changes that have taken place in women's economic roles at the family/household level: as women-headed households, as equal sharers in family/household budgets, and as economic dependents. Moreover, the adaptive responses undertaken by women in order to cope with their new lives after privatisation are also explained.

Women's Economic Status before Privatisation

The data presented below are the findings of the discussions and reflections given by women who were interviewed from two institutions: the Bank of Khartoum and the friendship factory for ready-made clothes.

The responses of women respondents who had been redundant by the bank of Khartoum are slightly different from those of the respondents from the factory. Although similarities between the two groups are a common feature of the data, yet there are some variations in relation to certain issues. Themes arising from discussions in relation to women's economic positions in the household/family before privatisation can be organised into five groups as indicated by the respondents' reflections: 1) women as heads of family/households; 2) women as equal sharer towards the family/household budget; 3) women as sole breadwinner of the big family; 4) women as economic dependents.

Women as heads of households

The first category of the respondents is women as heads of households. Some definitions of the term Female (women) Heads of Households (FHH) need to be presented first. Rogers (1988) argued that the term is linked to the model of the
nuclear family as the basic unit of society, and the concept of headship. In his
definition of ‘heads of household’, the main breadwinner is perceived to be the
financial supporter, with all other members defined as ‘dependents’. Based on this
definition, Moser (1993) illustrated the definition of the concept of FHH among a
wide range of households, and two main types have been identified. First, de jure
female-headed households, in which the male partner is permanently absent due to
separation or death, and a woman is legally single, divorced or widowed. This is a
common situation in urban poverty. Second, de facto female-headed households, in
which the male partner is temporarily ‘absent’. Moser’s definition is one of the
conventional definitions, which attracted many development researchers and planners.
Moghadam has given a contemporary definition of the term, which is broader. She
states ‘“the definition of female heads of households (FHH) distinguishes between two
types: the de jure, where FHH maintain their household alone, while de facto FHH
may include men who are unable or unwilling to work” (Moghadam, 2005). This
study opt to use the de facto FHH definition of Moghadam, which is broader, as the
sample of the study includes FHH, including single women and men who are unable
to work.
The core sample of women bankers revealed that one-third (14) of the respondents
are female heads of households; nine are married (including second wives, and
women responsible for families with disabled men); five are divorced and two are
widowed. According to Moghadam (2005) “the majority of women FHH in
developing countries are widowed, and to a lesser extent divorced or separated,
while in developed countries FHH are mainly single unmarried women”
(Moghadam, 2005).
According to the National Census of 2008, the highest percentage of households
headed by women are the households headed by married women, estimated at 73.0%
(i.e. 69.2 in urban setting, and 74.5% in rural ones).
Table 23: Female-Headed Households

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>%</th>
<th>Divorced</th>
<th>widowed</th>
<th>Married</th>
<th>Never married</th>
<th>Mode of living</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>100.0</td>
<td>5.4</td>
<td>18.1</td>
<td>73.0</td>
<td>3.5</td>
<td>total</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>100.0</td>
<td>6.4</td>
<td>19.3</td>
<td>69.2</td>
<td>5.0</td>
<td>urban</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>100.0</td>
<td>5.0</td>
<td>17.5</td>
<td>74.5</td>
<td>3.0</td>
<td>rural</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>100.0</td>
<td>5.5</td>
<td>21.9</td>
<td>69.7</td>
<td>2.9</td>
<td>nomad</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


Consequently, and unlike Moghadam’s (2005) account, the national statistics and the study sample indicated that married women comprise the highest percentage of FHH, and only two are widowed, while a new group has emerged, which is the group of second wives and the households that include men who are unable to work. However, a few years ago widowed women in Sudan comprised the highest percentage of FHH, and they are respected and accepted by society. More recently, and following the socio-economic changes in society, rates of divorce are growing, coinciding with the hard economic conditions. As a result, married women, in a new trend, tend to assume the responsibility for their nuclear and extended families. The cases cited below reflect the situations of some women, who are FHH. Ekhlas is 52, with three children. She states: ‘my salary is the only source of income for my family; I spend all my income on household needs, starting from food up to house amenities.’ She continued “my husband is a mechanical engineer; he was affiliating with the opposition against the regime and was dismissed on grounds of public interest in 1991” (employees who lost their jobs during the 1990s are most likely to have been made redundant either because of job cancellation or are made redundant on grounds of ‘public interest’). Mr Ali said: “Ekhlas not only supports the family financially, but she also holds the responsibility for taking care of all family aspects as I was not always available at home because of the prosecution of the security people.”

Alshoul is 54 years old with five children, and her husband was a government official. She said: “at the end of each month, my husband gives me his salary to spend on household needs, so I put my salary with his salary and then set priorities for our expenditure for each month.” Mr Taha, the government official, has been retired since
1994. He states: “I normally called my wife the minister of finance of the family as she is household manager.”

Maryam, a 65-year-old divorcee, can best explain this: “I returned to work after I got divorced; I am responsible for my two daughters.” She adds: “Since I have no one to support my family I decided to join the bank, in a junior job when I was 32 years old.”

Fiaza, a 48-year-old divorcee with one daughter, explains “my husband left me when my daughter was only four years old; since then I took the responsibility of taking care of her.”

Another example is a woman who mentioned that the main reason leading her to hold responsibility for her family is her marital status as second wife. As stated by Nadia is an example of a second wife. She said: “I took the responsibility for my two children, because my husband has another wife with nine children.” She continues: “we agreed beforehand that I will assist him in covering our family needs; therefore I spend all my income towards the household budget with a very minor contribution from his side.”

Polygamy is one form of marriage in Muslim societies. However, in Sudan over the last two decades, it has not been popular as a type of marriage despite the fact it is culturally unacceptable, especially in urban settings. However, polygamy in Sudanese society has flourished again due to two main reasons: the recent government is acting as an advocate for it in the media, mosques, and even in the public events of the ruling party. This reflects the influence of the patriarchal states on women’s lives as they control them through legislation or through the practices they enhanced; the second reason is related to late marriage of women due to education and work.

As for the women respondents from the factory the situation is different as the majority of the FHH are single unlike women bankers all of FHH are married, one-third of the core samples are FHH of their extended families. Most of the cases are either the elder daughter or the only daughter.

This was presented by Sitalnissa, a single woman, living with the extended family. She said: “she is the elder daughter in the family, she has got five sisters and brothers, her father is a retired worker. Her income was the main source of income, in addition to the pension of her father.”
Bothiana is a single woman living with the big family. She said “she is number three among eight sisters and brothers; she left education to go for a job to help her extended family, as her father has retired nine years ago.”

The increase of FHH numbers emerged as a pattern among middle-class families in the last two decades. However, as poverty rates rose to 49% of the population living in poverty conditions (National population census 2008), this has affected people’s financial capacities bringing deterioration in the standard of living of the majority of families; which in turn resulted in an increase of FHH to 25% in 2002 and 28% in 2008 (National population census). This phenomenon is not restricted to Sudan only, but there is evidence in other countries, for example, in Kenya, 40% of households are headed by women, in Ghana, almost one half, in Zambia, one-third (Stewart in Afshar, Dennis, 1992). Stewart also has mentioned that ‘it is estimated that women are the sole breadwinners in one-quarter to one-third of the world’s households’ (Stewart in Afshar and Dennis, 1992, p.23).

Moghadam (2005) pointed out in her study about feminisation of poverty in the developing countries that “expansion of FHH is one of the dimensions of the feminisation of poverty”. This is the situation in Sudan, where the growing numbers of FHH among low income families correlate positively with the increase of poverty (Ibrahim, 2000).

It is also evident elsewhere developing countries that FHH are among the poorest, according to Buvinic and Gupta (1994 in Moghadam 2005), who addressed the issue of female headship as an indicator of poverty, they found that during the 1990s, women-headed households are over represented among the poor in Latin America, Caribbean, Asia and Sub-Saharan countries. For example in Kenya, the national report indicated that the highest absolute poverty rates were among households headed by single women, namely 52%, compared with 44.3% of men (UN,1995b); this is similar to Cost Rica, where in 1988, 37% of destitute households were headed by women, compared with 13% of male-headed household (Pollack,1988 in Moghadam,2005). The over representation of women- headed households among the poor, is mainly due to 1) women’s higher dependency; 2) gender-related economic gaps, and because of
the greater time and mobility of women’s work (Buvinic, Gupta, 1994 in Moghadam, 2005).

The data of the study indicated that only four women respondents from the factory are FHH, while a large number of women respondents from the bank, are FHH. These findings dispute the prevailing notion that women from the poor section of society are most likely to be FHH. However, it is evident that professional women have high incidences of FHH.

**Women as equal sharers of the household budget**

This category of women represents around 26% of the sample of women bankers, and 31% of women factory workers: those women contribute an equal share towards the household budget, and in some cases their contribution exceeds that of their male partners.

The women bankers’ husbands initially worked as professionals, eight of them are unemployed; five were dismissed from their jobs due to job redundancy; one of them was dismissed due to public interest (political reasons); and the other two reached the age of retirement. While the other four are still in a job, they work as government officials who have low wages, as the highest salary in government does not cover their subsistence needs. According to Moghadam (1999) and Elshowya (2002) “government officials are known as the new working poor.”

Thus, due the circumstances of unemployed husbands, and low salary of husbands women’s incomes appear to be the main source income for family subsistence. This point is supported by Badri’s (1984) study about women’s work in Sudan; “75 percent of the women reported that their income was vital to the economic well being of their families”.

In response to the question about women’s contribution towards the household budget, the large majority of respondents said that they contribute equally to the budget of the households, either because their husbands were made redundant, currently receive pensions, or work in casual jobs, or because their husbands work within government institutions where they earn low salaries that are not enough to cover household expenses.
Samira, who is 58 years old with four daughters whose husband was made redundant due to privatisation, can describe this, she was spending all my salary on the basic needs of my family, which includes food and education, she was also responsible for house decoration or maintenance." Her husband, a banker employed by the French and Sudanese bank, adds: “my wife was really very supportive to our family; her support is becoming rather important as I left the bank in 2003.” He mentioned that: “We succeeded in supporting our daughters until they finished their university studies; one of them is an engineer and the other one is a dentist, the third one is a computer programmer and the fourth one is an economist who got married and now lives in the United Arab Emirates.”

The one exceptional case is a respondent who makes an equal contribution towards the household budget, and her husband is a business owner. Da’ad is married with four sons and one daughter. She was spending all her income on the basic needs of her family, although her husband has got a business but it does not provide enough for subsistence.”

In Stewart’s account (1994), ‘women’s role as producer fulfils two functions; it contributes to the national product and national welfare, and it generates income for the household’ (Stewart, 1994, in Afsher, Dennins, 1992, p.22). Women’s contribution to household budgets on such a considerable scale, implies the importance of women’s economic activity, not only to support family subsistence, but also to support the national economy as a whole.

This change in the economic position, towards income earner and as equal sharer with the male partner, eventually refutes the claim of the male breadwinner. Many economic and development planners rely heavily on this notion, which leads not only to excluding women from entitlements, but also supports discriminatory practices against women in the policies of recruitment and entitlements. Elson and Nilfur(1993) indicate “Male bread winner bias: A bias which operates with a norm in which men are assumed to be providing subsistence for dependent women and children. Such bias constructs the ownership of rights to make claims on the state for social benefits.
‘access to services, cash transfers, working age participation in the labour market’, the result has been exclusion of many women from entitlements”.

Another argument that discussed the decline of the male breadwinner was made by some feminists (e.g. Crompton, 1997) who mentioned that the rise of multiple breadwinner or dual breadwinner at the household level in Sudanese society has reversed the notion of males as bread winner an assumption held by policy makers, as a scenario on which to build their privatisation policy.

These arguments not only refute the issue of the male breadwinner, with biases or the decline, but also raised the issue of ‘multiple’ breadwinner or dual earner at the household/family level.

Despite evidence supporting new emerging changes in women economic role, yet decision – making authorities have not accounted it in the process of policy making and formulation.

Accordingly, various key institutions do not recognise this role: the state, the labour market and the family. The effects have become apparent in the implementation of privatisation policies, and in their consequences. Part of these social consequences is employment retrenchment, which affected women to a greater extent. Walby (1992) argued that patriarchal ideology operated in six areas, including paid work, housework, sexuality, culture, violence, and the state.

This has been reflected in an interview conducted with the national manager of the Bank of Khartoum, Mr Salah M, who states: “When we started the process of job cancellation, we thought that women were most likely to be supported by their husbands or any one of their relatives. Depending on this assumption the bank management tended to cancel most of the jobs that were occupied by women. The decision was based on the following criteria: headship of households, age factor, job rank, mobility, and the level of productivity.”

He adds: “Women in senior jobs need to be promoted either to be head of department or to be transferred to the regions as heads of local branches. The recruitment of women as heads of department is a decision of the board of trustees who prefer to have males in such senior positions, so it was difficult to recruit women as head of
department as they have their male colleagues in the same job rank. Regarding
women's mobility, it is very difficult to transfer women to the regions; it is constrained
by cultural factors as the local community does not accept women who live on their
own, especially the bank manager position if the region is a prestigious one.
Moreover, he explains, women's productivity normally declines after they get married
and have family responsibilities.
He gave an example, when a child or the husband or the woman herself is getting sick,
the woman needs to be absent from work to take care of whoever is not feeling well.
Another point was raised by the head of the Bank of Khartoum trade union, who said,
when we started negotiation with the management, we made an appeal in order to
exempt women who are widowed or divorced and it has been accepted in the early
phases of privatisation. But later on exemptions were not acceptable.
He continued the bank management took into account the interest of its employees;
therefore it tried to avoid making men redundant as they are the family breadwinner.
Mr Ahmed, the husband of Samira, gave another reflection mentioning that, I was
working as the head of the administration and personnel department; in terms of
promotion and recruitment I always preferred to give the chances to males rather than
females. He also adds, if I were asked about job cancellation, I would lay off women
first and then men.
He mentioned an incident that happened to him when he was first employed in the
bank, when I was first recruited, my boss was a lady; although she was very
competent I could not accept the idea of being headed by a woman, so I went to the
bank manager and I asked to be transferred to another department, but he managed to
convince me to stay and after a short period I would be in charge, and it happened.
The reflections given by the bank's general manager, the head of the bank's trade
union, the director of the friendship factory, and even one of the respondent's
husbands, who was a banker, confirm two things: 1) that the planners and policy
makers base their decisions on the prior assumption of the male breadwinner notion
(this is also reflected in the interview of the head of the trade union as well); and 2) the
patriarchal structure deeply rooted in the public enterprise institutions at the level of
organisational structure, and at the level of personal behaviour, as well as the national legislation support such practices.

Another noticeable remark is that a new trend among women respondents showing their concentration on their nuclear families in terms of income spending rather than the extended family, as distinct from the past when women employees used to devote considerable care to their extended families. This trend is a newly emerging phenomenon in the pattern of the family in Sudanese society, as the nuclear family structure becomes the norm in urban settings; the extended family pattern in the last two decades. This point is supported by Hoodfar (1997), who states that “the change of the blood kinship group as an extended family to the nuclear family based on marriage kinship emerged as an important characteristic of the urban family.

As far as women respondents from the factory are concerned, it was found that more than 31% of the sample was equal sharers in the budget of the household. They spend all their income on the basic needs of their nuclear families, as their husbands are either casual workers or self-employed with low and unstable incomes.

Zehour is 42 years old, married with five children. She has said she was spending all her income towards the family subsistence; it became rather important after the dismissal of her husband from the factory."

A basic finding in that for the factory group of respondents, the highest percentage of the women appears to be equal sharers in the household budget, while respondents from the bank, the highest percentage of the respondent FHH. This also confirms that the decline of the notion of the male breadwinner has become a reality, even among poor families; the notion of 'multiple' is growing instead.

It is evident that a considerable degree of socio-economic transformation has taken place in Sudanese society in the last two decades. This has led to changes in family life styles and structures in urban settings, including the following: 1) The increase in the numbers of FHH, not only for families headed by those are married or divorced, but also families with no working men; 2) The increase in the numbers of females who are equal sharers in the household budget; and 3) The emergence of a new trend of women who are sole breadwinners of their extended families. These changes in the
economic position of working women within the nuclear and extended family have shifted women’s position from economic dependence to income earner, and challenged the notion of male breadwinner with the new notion of dual or multiple earners. They also resulted in changing power relations at the household/family level, and positively influenced the gender division of labour in the labour market, and in society in general.

Women as economic dependents

Only four respondents rely on their husbands to cover all the family expenses. This might be due to the high incomes of their husbands. However, these women also contribute towards their children’s education, as they are studying in private schools and universities. These women also spend on their own personal expenses, on clothes, beauty therapies and participation in social occasions.

It is apparent from this data that only around 16% (four respondents) are dependent on their husbands as the family breadwinner, while the majority (84%) are either FHH, equal sharers in the household budget, or are the sole breadwinner of the extended family.

For women factory workers only two respondents mentioned that they are completely dependent on their husbands for their living. This reflects how far women’s economic dependency has dramatically diminished and become nearly invisible.

Women as contributors to the budget of both nuclear and extended family

Only one case of the respondents spends her income on her nuclear family and extended family. Zeinb is 48 years old, and married with no children. She said usually spend part of her income in the expenses of her household, as her husband is self-employed with small investment, which also needs subsistence. She also took part of her extended family responsibility, especially her widowed sister who has five children. And it is difficult for her to find work as she has very low level of education.

Six of the respondents from the factory contribute to the extended family, as they are single, and still live with their extended families. The extended family and low income are important factors behind the need for contributions of all family members towards the family income, as one income does not cover all the family expenses.
When privatisation came, and a redundancy decision was implemented, it was found that the majority of the women made redundant were from female-headed households, and nearly half of them were equal sharers in the household budgets, additionally, considerable number of the respondents is contributors towards extended family budget, while few number are economic independent.

Privatisation and women livelihoods

Redundancy has imposed itself at both personal and family levels. The effects at family level include: the adverse effect on women heads of households, the cut in women’s contribution towards the household budget, the diminishing level of women’s spending on children’s education, the limitation of women’s contribution to their big family budget, and the limitation of women’s participation in social activities, besides another new added burden of heal and entertainment spending.

The subsequent policy of redundancy has not taken into account the different composition of households and the intra-household inequalities, where men and women undertake different roles according to the prevalent gender division of labour in the Sudanese cultural context. Also men and women have different needs and interests, sometimes conflicting, and at other times complementary (Sen, 1992).

Moreover, policy makers not only do not consider the gender differential of roles and interests, but also do not consider the changes in those roles and positions, which convert women from economically-dependent persons to active economic participants in the labour market, and in the family/household. These two important parameters had not been taken into consideration by the decision makers in the two institutions (Bank of Khartoum, and cloth factory).

Privatisation and Female Heads of Households

Since the majority of the women are heads of households, the impact was very negative on the family’s standard of living.

Amna from the banking sector is a widow with five children. Her husband died in 2003, and she has taken responsibility for her children who were at different levels of education. The redundancy situation forced her to go to relatives, asking for assistance.
and support for family’s survival. Moreover, two of her sons have suspended their schooling as they cannot pay exam fees. Ekhlass has a different story as a married woman, not like Amna who is a widowed FHH.

Ekhlas is married with an unemployed husband and three children; her family depends entirely on her income. She said the redundancy makes us live in a tragedy as there is nowhere to go to; she stopped the children going to school, and started to borrow some money from friends and family to provide subsistence for her family, then afterwards she began to sell cookies and pastries.”

The expansion of FHH is one of the dimensions of the feminisation of poverty, privatisation has not only made women redundant, but led women into the situation of destitution of poverty, and this in turn led to deprive their families from the basic services of health, education and the decent living standard.

Cut the contribution of women as equal sharers in the household budget

The other group of women, who are equal sharers in the household budgets, represent 26% of the respondents. The redundancy decision leads to cut backs in their contribution towards their nuclear family, which in turn affects their living conditions as they restrict their spending to the basic needs of food and education.

Da’ad is married with four sons and one daughter. She said after the loss of her job, she found herself as a great loser, without a job, income and a husband.”

Moreover, she has been forced to transfer her children from private schools to public ones. She also convinced her daughter to leave her university studies to cut down the fees, and she let her get married to a rich man who is able to offer her a secure future.”

Fatima introduced another theme, as she and her husband have being made redundant from the bank of Khartoum. She is married with four children; she said the worst thing that happened in her life is the decision of job loss. Fatima continued the decision badly affected our life, as we were forced to leave the rented house where we lived to move to the extended family accommodation, in order to cut the rent.”

While for women factory workers the situation is even worse, as they do not have any earnings for subsistence.
Zehour from factory workers, she is married with five children, one of them being disabled. Her husband abandoned her, she returned to live with the extended family, all of us live in one room. We depend on relative assistance and support, as her brother is responsible for his family and our father and his wife. She continues, her children cannot go to school anymore.

Wafa and Alshifa, their situation were nearly similar to that of Zehour, as they needed to stop children from going to school; and they need to return to the house of the extended family, to save rent expenses.

Redundancy led most of these groups to a situation of impoverishment. For the group of equal sharer of family/household budget, their families were greatly affected by the loss of income, and this resulted in aggravating their poor living conditions. For the FHH, either married or divorced, their situation becomes worse and worse, and redundancy increased their disadvantaged situation.

**Privatisation and contributors towards extended family budget**

Regarding the third group of contributors towards extended family budget, the impact on those women, who are unmarried and still living with their extended families, was very hard. They were responsible for elder and young family members who have different needs, and the main problem faced by them was the health expenses of the elderly.

**Cuts in health expenses**

As far as the increase in the health expenses is concerned, before their job loss, women employed in the bank were offered health expenses entitlement for themselves and their families. After they lost their job these privileges have been stopped. The coincidence of this with other negative effects of privatisation (e.g. the introduction of user fees for education and health services) made health services and entertainment very expensive and not affordable for most families.

**Women’s Adaptive Responses**

Women have adopted different adaptive responses to mitigate the loss of their jobs. Some of these responses were used for a limited time after the job loss, until a job was found. As the case in the bank sample illustrates, one-third of the sample were using
the adaptive response of depending on others’ support, such as husbands, brothers and relatives, while 26% of the women started small-scale enterprises. The adaptive of renting the family house was used by more than 23% of the respondents, who resorted to rent part of the family accommodation in order to cope with their new situation. 13% of the women depended on borrowing from others, mainly friends, colleagues and relatives. Only three of the women sold some properties including land, furniture, and jewellery.

Another response that most of the women resorted to, is returning to, or continuing to live in the extended family house, to cut the high cost of renting the house. Moreover, all women bankers are entitled to end of service benefits, but no pension. While women factory workers are only entitled to pensions.

It is worth mentioning that all the sources of income are very meagre, and do not secure a decent living over a long time. No social security funds and no unemployment funds are available as in other countries (especially when the job cancellation took place all of a sudden and without planning). What aggravated the situation is that their dismissal coincided with the negative effects of privatisation, i.e. rising prices and high cost of services (Elshowya, 2002).

The data show various types of coping strategies adopted by women to deal with their new situations, which include: renting of the house, support by others, starting small-scale enterprises, borrowing from others, selling possessions, and pensions and gratuity.

Starting small-scale enterprises

Twenty-six percent of the respondents started small-scale enterprises, so as to address the needs of their families, as the chances of paid employment became very slim if not impossible for women in their situation. These types of entrepreneurship are considered as home-based activities. According to Ali, M., “by home-based activities we mean that the production activities are taken at home while the marketing may be done at home or outside.”

The respondents varied in items produced or services provided. The sample included: two women petty-traders (selling imported cloth), two ‘Ragsha’ (meaning local
transport) owners, two women owners of service delivery shops, one having a printing and photocopying shop, and the other one having a communication service shop, one woman making and selling perfumes, and one preparing and selling cookies and pastries.

Awatif is divorced; she sells imported cloth, namely 'tobes' the national dress for Sudanese women especially the white 'tobes' for working women, she was selling tobes since she has been recruited in the bank; her clients were her colleagues in the bank and its various branches."

The case of Awatif is considered a bit different from others, because she started her work quite a long time before she lost her job; therefore, she had good experience that mitigated the shock of the job loss. However, other respondents have resorted to these activities after they lost their jobs and have faced many difficulties in starting their enterprises. It was found that five of the women run and manage their activities from their homes.

Ekhlass case is different, as she continued to make cookies and pastries and sell them from home, even after she got a paid job.

All these activities are related and traditionally known as women's activities, which reflect the gender stereotypical division of labour. And even for the two women who have different types of activities (Ragsha), they supervised and managed their activities from home, with the help of their husbands. Only two women out of the eight respondents have run their own service delivery shops, one owning a printing and photocopying shop, and the other owning a shop for telephone communications services. They still face a number of problems and constraints, partly related to the locality (town hall), which collects taxes and other charges, and partly related to the prices of inputs and maintenance costs. The engagement of women in these activities is a recent pattern initiated by educated middle-class women as part of their coping strategies with the increasing poverty (Ali, M., 2000).

About one-third of the respondents attempted to start their small scale businesses with no assistance or support, neither from the government or the non-governmental organisations. These businesses help women to support their families, it to fulfil their
commitments towards their children’s schooling and other basic needs. The noticeable remark here is the engagement of educated middle-class women into the informal sector, previously dominated by low educated, unskilled women.

Other remarks are mentioned in relation to the level of investment in which women are involved. For women who are well-educated and well-trained with long experience as bankers, their daily work is management of financial transactions, investment deals, issuance of cheques, revision of treasury and accounts opening. Professional women are not able to start large-scale investments and just limit themselves to such low level sorts of activities, because of women’s traditionally-ascribed role, so they cannot take the risk of big investments on their own. Women are confined to the ascribed gender division of labour; men are known to make large investments, while the majority of women are still limited to small-scale enterprises.

Renting the house

Around 23% of the respondents resorted to renting part of their houses, completing building work in their houses, or refurnishing old houses to offer them for rent in order to generate income. Generally, in Sudan, people tended to resort to renting estate: a house, shop or a store, as they are considered a safe investment. Therefore, women deal in such types of investment. However, this tendency increased the supply of estate offered for rent, which has led to the lowering of rents.

Da’ad and Alshoul mentioned resort to the same strategy to earn alternative income, they offer part of their properties for rent,

The earnings from rent vary from one area to another, the average rate ranging between US$350 and US$600 per month, which hardly covers the expenses of these families.

Regarding the ownership of these properties, four respondents are owners, the other four women, husbands own the properties. There is also a changing aspect here, whereby there is an increasing number of women, who are property owners; unlike before when it was most likely that family prosperities were registered under the husband’s name, even if women had an equal share in that property.
Support by others

This strategy has been used as a short-run strategy adopted by around one-third of the core sample. Women tended to depend either on brothers, relatives or husbands. Amna, a widow depends on her brothers and relatives to support her family with the five children. Hayat story is different, she is from the banking sector, but came from poor family. She is single and has come to depend on her extended family. Mona is married and her husband does not work she lived with extended family and depend on her brother to support her family.

The three women’s respondents were return to be dependent on their extended families, although their marital status is different (i.e. one widowed, single and the third is married).

The above discussion indicates that the proportion of women who come to depend on others is only one-third of the respondents, which refutes the perceived assumption of the bank management, taking women as economic dependents, with relatives or a husband to support them. The experiences mentioned above explained the wrong assumption, and the unfair basis for their job cancellation.

For the women respondents from the factory, support by others is the only shared coping strategy with the women from the bank. As 40% of the respondents resorted to this strategy, they returned to depend on the support of others. The proportion of women from the factory is rather higher than that of the women from the bank, as only one-third of the respondents took this strategy.

Borrowing from others

Four of the respondents resorted to borrowing from others to address their family needs. The example of Sittana, reflects her experience with borrowing. She depends on loans from her family members and relatives.” Her status is better than others as she borrowed from family members, which is safer for her. Fatima and Nawal also resorted to the same strategy. The observable remark noted is that four of the respondents, who resorted to borrowing from others are married women, which implies that women do not always depend economically on their husbands; only one case is a second wife, who needs to help herself.
It is evident from the data that the percentage of the women who resorted to this strategy is very small, as the culture of borrowing is not popular in Sudanese society, because it is considered as humiliating behaviour to go and borrow from others. That is besides the risk of an inability to fulfil the commitment, which might lead to tarnishing the image of a person, and their loss of credibility. Despite all these precautions, women were forced to resort to such things for the sake of their families. The other reason that might encourage them is their nature in the bank. Women took the risk of such strategies due the absence of state funding bodies, which are supposed to provide funding for the needy in case of emergency and crisis.

* Selling possessions

Only two women adopted this strategy; they sold land, their homes, furniture and jewellery.

The decision to sell any property is normally taken by males, who are the owners of properties; it is very rare for women to take such a decision. These two women are heads of households, so they are taking charge.

* Having a pension

Other coping strategies adopted by the women from the factory are: depending on pensions, and another one related to education and training. The large majority of the respondents depended on their pension.

While only two decided to continue their education and training; one decided to complete her university studies, and the other one went for advanced training to qualify for a better job. Another group resorted to casual jobs in the informal sector.

It is crucial to note that the amount of income, generated by the above adaptive responses, although they are very meagre and do not secure a decent living over a long time.

**Conclusion**

Women’s economic positions were strongly influenced by these redundancies. Both groups of respondents from the bank and the factory have shouldered the impact of those policies in a similar way, as the issues emerging were related to the roles undertaken by women at family/household level before redundancy. Major groups in
the sample were from the FHH group, particularly, women bankers. The other group is women sharing equally in the household budget, while sole breadwinner in the big family represents a core group.

The FHH group emerged as a feature among professional women in the sample of women bankers; redundancy led these women to impoverishment in some cases, and in others to severe deterioration in their economic conditions. As the government embarked on its decision, based on the male breadwinner notion, in the implementation of privatisation policies, women employed in the public enterprises were the first to go. This indicated male breadwinner bias (Elson, 2000) in the process of policy formulation and implementation. Accordingly, the government's privatisation operation in the future, should consider the emerging changes which have occurred in family structures, such as families/households headed by females.

In the other group, where women are equal sharers in the household budget, they are also affected by the male breadwinner bias; this notion has negated the experiences of the respondents. According to some feminist scholars (e.g. Crompton, 1997), the notion of multiple income earner has become more popular with the decline of the male breadwinner. Consequently, it needs to be considered in privatisation programmes that will be implemented in forthcoming periods: men and women should be dealt with equally, with no gender discriminatory practices, at the level of policy makers or formal sector enterprises. As the different positions of women were adversely affected by privatisation, redundant women were forced to adapt, to cope with their new situations of economic disadvantage, through the sale of their properties, valuable items, borrowing from others, receiving grants from individuals and other forms of subsistence. Government was expected – and needed - to offer emergency assistance from Social Security Funds, to support redundant women employees and their families.
CHAPTER SEVEN

PRIVATISATION AND WOMEN’S SOCIAL STATUS

Introduction

Women’s social position was influenced by the implementation of privatisation and its subsequent policy of redundancy. Therefore, in order to investigate their social status, it is necessary to look first at the other factors that influenced women’s status in a broader sense. These factors relate to women’s employment status and changes that have occurred which influenced their economic and social status. This has been confirmed by some feminist scholars (e.g. Moghadam, 1993) who perceived that women’s social position cannot be studied in isolation from other intertwined determinants that shape women’s role and position in the society. Moghadam, explained this point as follows: “Access to remunerative work in the formal sector of the economy – as distinct from out-works, housework, other types of informal sector activities – is regarded by feminists and Women in Development researchers as an important indicator of women’s social position." (Moghadam, 1993)

Another contribution supporting this point is made by Charusheela (2003) who mentioned: “Indeed wage-income is often used both to explain women’s subordination and to measure their emancipation, with labour force participation rates making a key index in historical and cross cultural comparative studies of women’s progress.”

Women’s social position is to a greater extent influenced by women’s economic situation and their employment status. Both are affected adversely by the implementation of privatisation policies, as can be seen in the previous chapters that tackled those two topics.

This in turn, is expected to negatively impact on the social status of women made redundant, because the new employment and economic situation of women have led to: 1) declining sense of self-worth, 2) economic disempowerment of women, 3) increasing women’s ‘domesticity, 4) restricting women’s mobility, 5) Diminishing of women’s power. All these effects will be explored and discussed. Moreover, other social alternatives chosen by women to cope with their new realities will be explained.
Paid work represents an important factor that changes women’s lives positively, as it leads to the improvement of women’s economic autonomy, increases women’s self-confidence and also raises women’s bargaining power at home and in society as well. The notion of the importance of paid work or wage labour was earlier affirmed and legitimised by Marxist theorists following Engels: “Wage labour is one way of breaking down patriarchy and women’s isolation and dependence on men, it is expected to give women greater economic autonomy, to increase their authority in the household” (Moghadam, 1996).

Regarding the same topic of the importance of wage labour, modernist theorists also argue the point, with Rosen (1982) in Moghadam (1996) maintaining that:

“Wage labour liberates women by replacing the prescription that denies women access to jobs and education on the basis of gender with universalistic criteria based on individual achievement and merit. Moreover wage labour undermines patriarchal control by increasing women’s financial independence and providing them with productive skills and modern attitudes.”

The above-mentioned theoretical debate gives insights and opinions about the significance of wage labour in the lives of women, as it may lead to the improvement of women’s social and economic positions. However, the research here will put emphasis on women’s experiences of redundancies, as wage labour or paid jobs no longer exist, due to state privatisation policies that led to the selling of public enterprises and redundancy of the employees.

The responses of the redundant women will be analysed in view of the ‘bargaining power model’ that coincides with the views of modernists and Marxist theorists regarding the importance of wage labour in women’s lives. This model was initiated by liberal feminists, and implies:

“Increases in women’s independent incomes increase their relative fallback position and thus their bargaining power in the home, and presumably their status and wellbeing in society at large” (Charusheela, 2003).
Historical description of women’s position in society

Historical analysis of women in Sudan indicated strong patriarchal control over women’s labour in the colonial period, when most women were confined to the home. This situation extended to the period following independence in 1956, as the control of patriarchy has continued with the emergence of another new factor, religion, which was not considered before. This factor is most likely to increase the hegemony of the patriarchal system in the various institutions, such as family, society and the state (Hale, 1996).

As described by feminist scholars, patriarchy is a system based on separate spheres, with women confined to the home and men dominating the public sphere. This notion of separate spheres was heavily dependent on the man’s role as principal breadwinner, which gave the man control over income and the family labour force, and ensured women’s economic dependence. With the growth of industrial capitalism and the market economy, the control of the state and capital over women’s labour grew at the expense of individual male heads of household.

This was the situation in Sudan in the 1970s when the government expanded its industrial base by opening new public factories, where women were recruited in large numbers. Accordingly, patriarchy shifted from private to public control over women’s labour; as production moved outside the home into factories and offices, the household declined in economic and political importance.

But the emergence of the economic crisis that brought the policies of liberal economy and privatisation has threatened the gains won by women. This is eventually what happened to women in Sudan, where women were laid off from the labour market in large numbers due to state policies. Moreover, their family and society desired to make them return to their homes. This is evident in the reflections of the women interviewed below.

Privatisation and women’s social status

Job redundancies affect women’s lives severely, as they do not go to work for material benefits only, but also to fulfil their rights to work and to participate in public life as active members of society. So redundancy impacts in different ways on women’s
lives, as it leads to the disempowering of women economically, which in turn reduces
their autonomy and increases their dependence on men, leading to an increase in
women’s domesticity. It also results in limiting women’s mobility and changing
women’s power at the family and societal level. Finally, redundancy limits women’s
social relations, and leads to a decline in the sense of self worth among unemployed
women.

Declining women’s sense of self-worth

According to some feminist (e.g. Charusheela) perceived that “Employment provides
women with the financial independence needed for autonomy with the sense of self-
worth and self-confidence to partake in the public sphere. Furthermore, by entering the
world of work, women gain public recognition and status for their achievements, thus
increasing the overall status of women within the home and in the broader society”
(Charusheela, 2003).

Consequently, employment leads largely to positive changes in women’s lives, as they
feel more liberated and free, because they depend on their own financial resources.
This vision reflects the experiences of women who enter the labour force from
locations that allow work to be empowering, i.e. educated, upper-, and middle-class
women, usually searching not for a job, but a career, like women bankers. However, it
is also more significant and empowering for women factory workers, as they search
for a job that improves their social and economic status, but are not looking at the
level of career.

As revealed by the reflections of the women bankers, their participation in the labour
force improved women’s position in the family. This was because of the financial
independence they achieved by having jobs, and it also empowered them. However,
the redundancies resulted in the weakening of this position and led to a loss in their
place in the family. However, women factory workers are affected more adversely
than women bankers, as they belong to a lower class, and have poor living conditions
as well as low education levels. Therefore, work represents a high value asset added to
their lives, and it gives them social validation and recognition.
Nagwa spoke about her experience of the importance of work in her life, especially its effect on her appearance, her ability to organise her time, additionally the respect she saw in the eyes of her family and neighbours. As she mentioned, when she was at work, her life was organised as she had a timetable for the whole day; she used to care for herself and her general appearance. She added, she felt that she was important as she listened to people saying: ‘the factory transport has come to pick up Nagwa’, ‘the car has come back to drop her’, so she was really enjoying this respect from people: ‘It is unlike now. Nobody cares about her. Zuhour introduces another topic: she perceived work as a way to take herself out of her problems and family burdens. She said: ‘she used to go to the factory, which made her feel alive; when she saw people she forgot her problems.’

To the extent that employment brings social validation and recognition, women’s self-esteem and self-confidence increases. The emerging challenges faced by women that have been brought by redundancy, as they became unemployed, in turn led to low self-confidence as they became reluctant and hesitant in decision making, and developed low self-esteem.

*Women disempowered economically*

Women’s redundancy led to a reduction in their autonomy, as women were used to having their own incomes and having a free hand in how to spend. The new situation made women economically disadvantaged. It also led other women to a situation of impoverishment, as they were heads of households, and so was severely affected by redundancy and loss of income. Moreover, redundancy converted women from being independent women, who were income earners and supporters of their family’s budgets, to become instead dependent women, as they cannot even feed themselves.

Another respondent, who told her story of loss of dignity and deprivation, is Amna, who is widowed and bearing the responsibilities of her children. She said: “We live in a very poor economic condition.” She always spends the night thinking about where she can provide her children with food. She tends to take grants from neighbours and relatives, as she failed “to repay what I borrowed from people before”.

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She further explained that: “This situation puts her down as unrespectable in the eyes of her children.” The story of Amna shows the changes that happened in our society. Before, any family with orphans would primarily have been supported by close relatives, or otherwise by non-governmental organisations specialising in caring for orphans: even the government, through the Ministry of Welfare, had a special programme for orphans. But now, due to the deterioration of economic conditions and widespread poverty, people have limited resources to support each other; moreover, as the numbers of poor have increased, the NGOs do not have the capacity and financial resources to support all those people in need.

Zehour has been abandoned: her husband left her with the children. Hers is the saddest story among all the others. She said she feels as if she is a dead person, and she lives as a heavy burden, depending on her brother’s limited financial resources with an increasing number of dependents: his family, her father and his wife, her and her children. Furthermore, this situation humiliated her, as she depended on “grants and charity from relatives and good people.”

Many other respondents shared with Huda, Amna and Zehour similar experiences of deprivation and bitterness, but to different degrees, and in different ways. However, the most affected were the female heads of households, who are married, divorced or single mothers as they were used to depending on their own incomes. After redundancy, they tended to be economically dependent on others, and in many cases they tended to depend on grants given by relatives and neighbours. The respondents’ accounts here reflect the discrepancies created by privatisation in the lives of women, who used to be income earners and heads of household, and have now become dependent persons.

This case showed women’s vulnerability and insecurity, as no social security services are provided by the government for pensioners, or redundant formal sector employees. It also reflects the feeling of bitterness and loss of dignity, as she had been forced to be in a position where she received charity and grants from others.

Social Security Fund, Health Insurance Fund, Alzkat Fund (a fixed proportion of the wealth to be paid yearly for the benefit of poor in the Muslim community): all these
Funds are governmental organs in Sudan, but they have become incapable of addressing the requirements of people in need, due to the rise of poverty, not only among poor families, but middle-class families too; this decline affects the living standards of professionals as well as workers. Sudan is no exception, as this is happening in many of the developing countries that have undergone privatisation, leading to the weakening of the capacities of governments (UN World Survey, 1994). As revealed by the reflections of the respondents from both institutions, women have lost their financial power, and become disadvantaged, economically and socially. So it increases the dependency of women on their husbands, fathers and brothers, after their successful experiences in the world of work that have liberated them from the prevailing culture of male dominance and control. It also reduces their autonomy, because of the restrictions created that deprived women of the means of emancipation, work and income. The loss of independence and the diminishing role of women from participating in the labour force drove them back into the domestic sphere.

Privatisation and Women’s domesticity

The major loss happening in women’s lives as a result of redundancy is due to the large numbers of women, who have been sent out of the formal sector, as reflected by the experiences of women respondents of the sample, in both the institutions of the factory and the bank. Women claimed that work ate up a major part of their lives and then returned them to their homes. It is evident from the data that the highest percentage of the respondents from the factory and the bank were unemployed, either because they have been waiting for a long time for employment in paid jobs, or they have come out of the labour force as they gave up searching for jobs. So, consequently, women return to stay at home after their long struggle to gain the right to work and to break the chains that shackled them for ages and were forced upon them from the different institutions of family, society, labour market and the state. Even at the personal level, many women do not have the confidence to enter the public sphere. However, with the encouragement of other women, who have a better level of education and employment, and the changes in the socio-economic conditions, women have successfully entered the public domain in growing numbers, and become more
visible than before. However, state policies have not taken account of these achievements won by women, and the positive progress that has happened in their lives. Therefore, privatisation policies impacted adversely on women's lives by sending women back to their homes.

So women's domestication not only influenced women as individuals, whose social position deteriorated in society, but also their families who depend on them for their subsistence. Furthermore, the national economy was affected, as the state lost a high percentage of human resources, after spending a huge amount of money to provide them with training and upgrading programmes.

Some feminist scholars (e.g. Moghadam, 1998) debated the new changes in women's situation that were brought by neo-classical economics. They mentioned that the feminisation of the labour force is one of the features of the liberal economy, where women's participation increased along with deteriorating working conditions and low wage rates. Liberal economic policies and privatisation policies bring another contradictory effect accompanying the feminisation of labour: the housewife-isation of women in developing countries. The phenomenon of housewife-isation or domesticity is not a new one, but is flourishing within the free market system.

Boserup, Mies, and Tinker described women's marginalisation from the productive process in urban settings that resulted from capitalist development as 'housewife-isation'. This is quoted by Moghadam (1998): "The surge in female employment in developing countries began in the 1970s, following a period of capitalist development and economic growth characterised by displacement of labour and craft work, commercialisation of agricultural products, and rural-urban migration that resulted in the marginalisation of women from the productive process, especially in urban employment, some called this earlier process housewife-isation" (Mies, 1986; Boserup, 1970; Tinker, 1976; Moghadam, 1998).

The phenomenon of women's housewife-isation is common in developing countries, and has interrelated with weakness and strength of capitalist development. Recently, this phenomenon has appeared again with the emergence of the new capitalist system, as revealed from the interviewed women, who were returning to their houses and
confined to domestic responsibilities: this phenomenon is known as women’s domesticity or housewife-isation.

Moghadam also discussed this situation in another context of the Eastern European countries, where she raised a comparison between the two regions of Eastern Europe, and the Third World countries, of which Sudan can be considered as part. She states: “in the newly-privatised countries, this (re)turn to domesticity may serve the function of legitimating economic reorganisation and unemployment.” however, the situation of women in Eastern Europe region is much better than the Sudanese example.

As is evident from the respondents’ discussions, the situation of domesticity is growing among employed women, especially in urban settings in Sudan, due to the privatising of state-owned enterprises, as happened in the Bank of Khartoum and in the factory. Consequently, the domesticity phenomenon is not restricted to the Eastern European countries, although women there have better entitlements, but still there is an increase in the numbers of women who were came out of the labour force, and this problem also has spread to other regions of the world as well. Sudan can be considered as one of the most negatively affected by this phenomenon. Women’s accounts of their experiences of domesticity will support the above-mentioned discussions.

Hayat was another example of an unmarried woman. She said, because her father did not allow her to go to work, she stayed at home for a long time. She could not go out for work until after his death. She added: ‘After her father’s death, the family standard of living was bad, so her family were encouraged to let her go to work. Now she has returned ‘to square one from where I started a long time ago’.

The experiences of those respondents from the bank are reflected in the majority of the sample. It showed the degree of interference of the males—fathers, brothers and husbands, in women’s lives, their decisions and choices. Therefore, women were lagging behind in the various social, economic, and political aspects, which in turn confined women to the private sphere, and limited their role to reproductive activities, child rearing, housework and husbands’ responsibilities, rather than productive and public ones.
Women’s work was unpopular in Sudanese society during the 1970s. From the period of the 1970s and onwards, women’s participation in the labour force increased steadily. However, they were still limited to certain sectors of the economy, which were the formal sector for urban women, especially in the traditionally-ascribed women’s jobs such as teaching, nursing, and the agricultural sector for the rural women, who undertake their work as part of domestic work.

As explained by respondents, they suffered from structured domination through male control over their lives. The struggle of women to gain the right to work was not an easy process, but it required a high commitment from women, a high level of patience and hard work in both venues of workplace and home, so as to be up to the challenge. After the long struggle of women to gain these achievements, privatisation brought about this major setback in women’s positions. The setback that happened to women reversed women’s realities as it was a real shock for them; their lives became empty, with no big family responsibilities, with grown up children, family ties were weakened within the extended family or kin ties, which were weakened by urbanisation.

Another group of respondents were in a better situation than their colleagues as they have had better chances to participate in the labour force. However, their husbands gave them a challenge to balance between work and family responsibilities, so if they failed to fulfil such a commitment they would need to stop going to work.

Samira spoke about her experience as follows, she was very successful at the university, so she has been chosen to join the Bank of Khartoum. Human Resources staff often came to the faculty of economics to choose the best achievers in the final years, as few men or women graduate from the faculty of economics. Despite her success, her “husband did not allow me to work unless I could do my domestic work in a perfect way. I found it very difficult to remain at home doing nothing and being isolated, while other people in the world beyond home are working, and achieving their goals and doing things of value”.

The stories of respondents showed different experiences of less resistance to women’s work, perhaps because the families were encouraging, but husbands still had some reservations that challenged women’s balancing between employment and family.
Da’ad and Sittana brought new themes, as they had full support and approval of their families for their work.

Women’s responses give a historical description of women’s struggle to find a place in the labour force and to be liberated from domestication, and the attachment to family responsibilities. But the dynamics of capitalist development represented in privatisation policies and the patriarchal state in Sudan not only led to women’s marginalisation from the production process, but they further expelled women right of the labour force by sending women back to their homes.

Both groups of women—bankers and factory workers—were affected by the emergence of domesticity in their lives. However, some of the effects influenced women’s social position differently owing to their background, as we will see below.

**Privatisation Restricting women’s mobility**

It is revealed from the data that while all respondents were adversely affected in terms of autonomy and freedom of mobility, women factory workers were more affected than women bankers. Also, the group of single (never married) and divorced women were rather exposed at the societal level due to the consequences of job redundancies.

The insights of the interviewed women have explained this.

Nagwa has spoken about her experiences of her husband not wanting her to go outside the house, since she has no work to do. Aisha is unmarried and in her 40s but her father also restricted her movement, as he always asked her when she is going out. Therefore, she does not take any unnecessary trips. Etimad married, with unemployed husband, she spoke angrily about her situation, as she has been exposed to domestic violence by her husband.

The discussions above showed the negative experiences women factory workers passed through, as their mobility has been limited and made them more confined to the home. The case of women bankers is rather different, as few respondents have spoken about the obstacles relating to restrictions on their mobility.

As revealed, the most affected women are those who could not manage to get paid jobs in the formal sector. Women factory workers were most likely to be affected negatively, because of the low social status of their families and poor areas of living.
These circumstances made people in these areas more conservative, and more bounded by a set of values, norms and traditions, giving male family members the advantage of controlling women family members. The respondents’ reflections explain the new realities existing in women’s lives, which increased their feelings of discontent and helplessness, due to the loss of employment. This in turn meant loss of emancipation for women, as work had opened for them new venues of interaction, and new access to places where they could learn and enhance their skills.

Feminist scholars (e.g. Wallby, 1990) also commented on the importance of women’s mobility, as an indicator of women’s empowerment and independence. Regarding patriarchal structures in levels of society, Wallby mentioned that: “patriarchy operates at the level of family, society, woman’s sexuality, labour market, and the state.” So women fell under the dominance of male counterparts in the family: brothers, fathers and husbands; it even extended to the societal level, as people—like neighbours—still intervene in women’s lives, due to the prevailing culture of limiting women to the private domain, rather than the public one. The restriction on women’s mobility is related to the ideological construction of the society where women are presented as symbols and repositories of religious, national and cultural identity (Hajab, 1988). Threats to, or the loss of their women are seen as a direct threat to manhood, community, and family. It therefore becomes essential to ensure patriarchal controls over the labour, fertility, and sexuality of women (Merrenssi, 1993; Moghadam, 1993). Thus the perception of women as sex objects is not restricted to the family level, but extends to the streets, shops and other public places. Moreover, men still look to women as sex objects because, even today, if women go out shopping or to restaurants, they are most likely to find harassment from men. (Until recently there has been no legislation to protect women from sexual harassment in the workplace or even in public places, unlike many Middle-Eastern counties, such as Tunisia which has one of the most advanced family laws.)

So, before the redundancies happened in women’s lives, people were becoming familiarised with the visibility of working women in the streets, in public transportation, and in government offices. However, as the situation has changed,
society’s perception towards women, and women’s mobility has changed for the worse. It is shrinking the progress which had already taken place in the lives of women. Consequently, women’s leaving the labour force due to redundancies added a new social dimension that is leading to a deepening of women’s marginalisation and subordination.

Privatisation limiting Women’s social networks

The redundancy experience influences women’s lives to a great extent as they lose one of the most important assets they tended to establish through years of employment and interaction with others: the social networks built up with their colleagues and other people they meet during their working time. This advantage is provided for women by employment. As mentioned by Charusheela (1995): “Furthermore, as employment allows women to interact with a world beyond their home, they begin to think differently about their interests.”

This situation was reflected by the women factory workers, who stated that work was not a place for gaining material benefits; rather, it was a place where their personal and social needs were satisfied, and where they interacted and met with other people outside the domestic domain. Meanwhile, women bankers come from a different background and their age composition is different from that of factory workers; therefore, absence of social relations influences them in a different way.

The effect was similar for groups, those who are re-employed, and the others who are unemployed and stayed at home. As women are getting older, they find it difficult to build new relationships with people. That is for various reasons: some of them mentioned that they lost trust in people, as the values and norms have been changed in society; others mentioned their unwillingness to enter into new social relations, because they do not want to add any new commitments to other people. Below are the reflections of women factory workers, who have been more affected than women bankers.

Nagwa and Aisha have similar stories about their experiences, they told that work in the factory was their life as they went every day to the factory, spending the whole day there. Even when returning home, they spent time in preparing my things for the next
day, so their lives were fully occupied by the work. But after redundancy their relations with their colleagues were rather stronger than their relations with relatives.”

So the absence of employment means the loss of the social network that women had established with their colleagues through the years, which led to an increase in their self-worth and improvement in their position in society. Scholars mentioned that: “Social capital is understood as those aspects of social relations studies that can be converted into other forms of capital (i.e. economic or cultural) and analysis of it is thought to thereby help explain how individuals can improve or maintain their position in society” (Bourdien, 1977).

The absence of social relations has affected women factory workers more adversely than women bankers, because it is further linked to their mobility restriction. This is due to the low level of women’s participation and involvement in community organisation activities, unlike women bankers who take part in these activities in large numbers. It is also worth mentioning that all the respondents’ reflections about their redundancies indicate that this led to limiting their participation in social occasions, because of social constraints; in addition to their economic incapability to afford the expenses of sharing their social occasions with others. It represents a means of building solidarity and trust with other women. Such social networks lead to women’s empowerment, as they can act as a group; they also benefited from sharing and exchanging information and experiences. It also helps women to have new links that can help them to look for new jobs, or to think of forming social entrepreneurship. The social network also increases women’s feelings of self-worth and self-satisfaction. Moreover, the respondents suffered from the deprivation of their right to have autonomy in their lives without depending on others, as they claimed that the economic independence the job gives to them, leads to changes in their lives.

Women bankers were also affected by the absence of social relations; especially because of their age, they were hesitant to get involved in new social relations as they may bring new and unwelcome commitments and social obligations. Women bankers have tried to compensate for their feeling of emptiness caused by the lack of social relations by becoming involved in community organisation activities. Moreover, some
of the women participate in activist groups, protesting against government privatisation policies.
Da'ad and Alshoul started to participate in the activities organised by the religious organisation in their area." Most of the responses of the women bankers described the big changes that have happened in their lives, which affected them negatively; as redundancy left them with weak, or sometimes absent social relations, which has led them to have the feeling of social exclusion. As revealed by the women interviewed, women lost the desire and tendency to build new relations with people due to their age, or because of their unwillingness to be taken on new social commitments, which will be an extra burden.

Another group of women tended to fulfil the gap of social relations with their involvement in community organisations, ‘activities, mainly religious ones’; while a few were involved with groups protesting against the government.

Women’s participation in the community organisations has led to the empowerment of women. However, the majority of the women concentrated on the activities of the religious NGOs, which have respect and acceptance from society.

So women, as they become unemployed and get older think of activities that bring them the respect of society and people around them. This is similar to the activities undertaken by women, whose participation in community organisations is very limited, yet has the responsibility of caring for old people in the family, specifically their fathers. It is also well known in the Sudanese society that people who take care of elderly people find great appreciation and respect from the society.

This implies the importance of social networks in women’s lives, as it increases women’s sense of self worth. It also leads women to build their own solidarity and trust groups that make women more empowered and open to the public domain.

**Conclusion**

Women have experienced a major setback in their lives, as it reversed their experiences of social gains, instead of leading to their improvement. Redundancy brought by privatisation created a new trend in women’s lives; the situation of domesticity is considered as an emerging phenomenon experienced by women in the
developing countries, as in the case of Sudan. Moreover, the situation of redundancy coincided with gender inequalities existing in Sudanese society, where the divide was between the private and public spheres, which legitimised the restrictions put on women's mobility and their autonomy. It also denied women the social relations with other colleagues, and the links they had established through the years; so women returned to become socially excluded and attached more to their homes.

Some women think of other social coping mechanisms that are probably supporting them to adapt to their new realities, as they either form new community religious organisations, or take part in the activities of those organisations at the community level. This practice was mainly confined to women bankers with their limited participation in religious activities, while few women factory workers were engaged in these activities. This is greatly linked to their low level of awareness of the role of these organisations, and how they can bring women together in order to act collectively.

Women's participation in the political activities is a good sign—although their number is small—but this also reflects how women were interacting positively with the surrounding events, as positive actors and not as the usual victims or passive actors. This is confirmed by their responses to the decision of redundancy, as the responses of the women varied from acceptance, refusal to rejecting militantly as they complained to the court and went to protest.

On the one hand, women did not remain as passive victims of privatisation policies. However, they did tend attempt some coping mechanisms to help them adapt to their new realities. Women professionals undertook a number of coping mechanisms to assist them in solving their immediate need. Also, a considerable percentage of women resorted to borrowing from relatives and friends. Besides this, a few of the cases offered part of their house for rent so as to gain money for family survival. And others have opted to depend on their pensions, which covered a very tiny part of their expenses.

The majority of women respondents have shown a very militant response to the decision of redundancy. Both groups, professionals and workers, were resisting the
decision through their involvement in protest marches, in the activities of anti-
privatisation groups, and by making claims in court against the government. Another
group of women limited complaints to their previous managers, and the Ministry of
Labour. Very few women accepted the decision of redundancy without resistance.
Also noticeable is that women respondents were all aware of the meaning of
privatisation; I did not need to explain privatisation as a ‘technical term’. This is most
likely a consequence of the activities of anti-privatisation groups in Sudan. The
changes in the lives of women due to privatisation policies, and the redundancies,
greatly influenced their social positions, and represented a clear set back. This led
women to return to their homes, and to be restricted to the domestic private domain
under the control of the patriarch of the family, whoever ‘he’ is, a male relative or a
husband. Despite all these negative effects, a few positive things have happened:
circumstances of redundancy and the feelings of injustices led women to undertake
militant actions responding to the government decisions; women have also become
empowered to participate in political and community organisation activities.
CHAPTER EIGHT
FINDINGS AND CONCLUSION

In the last two decades of the twentieth century, many governments across the world adopted policies allowing the process of marketisation of the public sector and the privatisation of public assets (Collyer, 2003). This philosophy of neo-liberal economics entails Structural Adjustment Policies and privatisation that have led, in some countries, to a high level of economic growth, enlarged competitive markets and efficient private sector enterprises, as witnessed in the high income economies. However, in other countries with low incomes and poor economic growth, less competitive markets was the dominant feature of this free market economy. Sudan’s privatisation experience seems to be an example the latter group. The negative or positive outcomes resulted from those policies mainly depends on the scale of the economy, the political system, and public awareness and support.

In Sudan, privatisation emerged as a key policy of the national economic reforms, a programme implemented during the 1990s. The present government has advocated this programme as the most suitable socio-economic intervention for addressing Sudanese economic problems. This programme was intended to lead to economic growth by reducing debts, increasing the competitiveness of the market and improving the efficiency of productive sectors and enterprises, and hence lead to improving people’s livelihood.

It is observed that in spite of the central importance of policy to everyday life of citizens, and to the exchange relations between countries, the theory of policy has been a peculiarly undeveloped area of scholarship; in particular, sociology and anthropology. This has been reflected in studying privatisation, where there have been some attempts to analyse this policy reversal, to define its characteristics and to explain its origins, and to theorise its global spread.

There are deficiencies in policy studies, especially the ones that the impact of examined privatisation on people’s lives, along with the hegemonic definition of privatisation that focus on the economic definition of privatisation. All this has led to other disciplinary areas to develop alternative understandings of privatisation, and has
attracted other scholars to look at the ‘silent’ areas, such as the impact of privatisation on increasing inequalities among different social groups like ethnic groups and gender differentials. A few studies, e.g. Ibrahim (2000), have tackled the issue of ethnic minorities, discussed privatisation and ethnic minorities in the East European countries, with no mention to the gender dimension.

The visibility of women in public life increased, as they have made remarkable contributions in all aspects of life: economic, political and social. This emerging trend is not only restricted to the developed countries, but has also extended to most developing countries. This reality was accompanied by new developments and transformations in the perspectives of development planners, policy makers, who have contributed considerable efforts to incorporate women’s concerns into the mainstream of national policies and development. Although the achievements made were not up to the level of meeting women’s expectations, yet they step up the process of women’s advancement.

The emerged global feminist and women’s movements that have come as a few benefits of globalisation are seen to increase awareness about women’s empowerment and gender equality. It also seen as a mechanism to mobilise civil society and other pressure groups to lobby for incorporating women’s interests in the International organisations’ policies and national policies (i.e. UN agencies and the plans of national governments). This resulted in their main task to work as ‘watchdogs’ of any trends or actions that led to women’s marginalisation.

The debate of feminist scholars and gender researchers (e.g. Afshar, 1992, Moghadam, 1999) have described privatisation as a product of neo-liberal economy. They looked at its impact on women in the developed and developing countries. Some of these studies focused on the social impact of privatisation, where women were affected negatively by the transfer of social services from state control to the private sector, as these brought new burdens for women, such as the introduction of a user charge in health and education institutions. Other scholars (e.g. Elson, 1992) have given more attention to economic issues, which are related to the labour market and women’s participation in the productive sectors. Women’s employment has been
affected largely by the introduction of privatisation policies, as there are new changing patterns of employment, and new features of women’s labour force have emerged, such as flexible forms of women’s work, deteriorating work conditions, increasing wage gaps, and the absence of several employment rights.

This study is closely related to the second group of scholars, who have focused on the socio-economic impact of privatisation; the main concern of this study is the socio-economic impacts of privatisation on women from banking and manufacturing sectors in the Sudan.

Synthesising the research efforts in social-scientific literature, the study followed a gender perspective to analyse the socio-economic impacts of privatisation on women made redundant from banking and manufacturing sectors in Sudan. This study sets out to explore how women account for their subordination resulting from the implementation of these policies, and the changes that happened in their employment, economic and social positions. In order to understand women’s marginalisation resulting from privatisation, the study capitalizes on women’s experiences not only because they are a new way of knowing and seeking ‘truths’ (Ramaznglu, 1992), but also because women’s experiences have filled the gap in information about the socio-economic impacts of these policies.

Furthermore, interviews give more deep and detailed information about women’s lives after privatisation at the micro-level as well.

The sample of sixty women, who were made redundant from two public sector enterprises, (the Bank of Khartoum and the Friendship Factory for Readymade Clothes), was of particular interest, because the public sector was a large employer of women in Sudan (women were representing 31% of the labour force, according to the National Population Census) during the last two decades. At the same time, these two enterprises have undergone large scale privatisation processes: the bank of Khartoum since the beginning of the 1990s witnessed three phases of privatisation, and the Friendship factory had implemented four privatisation operations during the 1990s. These left large numbers employees with no jobs, all of a sudden left ‘on the street’. Women, however, comprised a high percentage of those who were made redundant.
This sample of sixty women was selected and they were interviewed in the context of a lack of quantitative data about the socio-economic impacts of privatisation in Sudan, and in particular in relation to women as a group; many difficulties were found in collecting information in Sudan, due to the poor information, documentation and filing systems. All these factors increased the value of the data generated from the interviews that were carried with women in the study sample. The information gathered from interviews with the women at the micro-level is basically original and more recent than other studies as it has been collected in the last years (2007, 2008). Therefore, this data can be used as pilot data for national policy oriented research, or a household survey.

This study has considered not only the experiences of women to account for their marginalisation from privatisation as the principal victims, but also to include other voices reflecting, other perspectives on the problem from different primary sources, (i.e. managers of the two privatised enterprises and trade union members), and a number of interviews were conducted with members of staff from both public enterprises, as well as members from the relevant trade unions. In addition, the contributions were made by women, who were still in their jobs in 2007 (the time the interviews were conducted) in the two privatised enterprises.

Despite some criticisms of privatisation, there are still success stories from around the world, Ernst and Young (2003). The success stories of the 1980s took place in countries whose economies gave an entirely free hand to the private sector, such as the United States, Germany, Japan, Korea, Taiwan, Hong Kong, and Singapore. However, this situation has been changed as a result of the recent global economic crisis that hit the world, especially in the industrialised countries.

The impact of privatisation on the economies of countries with low initial growth rates and political instability, such as Latin America, the sub-Saharan region, and the Middle East, suggested adverse effects of privatisation (UN World Survey, 1994). Sudan has fallen into this category, where "Sudan remains one of the world’s least developed countries in terms of such criteria as GNP per capita, its rate of growth, the level of industrialisation" (World Bank Report, 2003).
In the case of Sudan, privatisation was declared in response to the country’s economic crisis, as claimed by the present government, that took power by a military coup d'état in 1989. The motives behind this programme were varied and complex, depending on the government interest. Some Sudanese economists (e.g. Musa, 2002) have pointed out that privatisation was introduced by this government merely for political reasons. Some accused the ruling party affiliates of being among the first beneficiaries from this programme; others see that the government is seeking a better position in the international community, namely the IMF and the World Bank (Musa, 2002; Elbeely, 2003; Suliman, 1999). Meanwhile, for those who believe that motives behind privatisation are mainly economic, they support the government in its claims about privatisation. However, they have criticised the implementation process, especially the socio-economic part of it, which was concerned with employment retrenchment (Musa, 2001; Awad, 2002).

Considering the goals that motivated the government to follow privatisation policies, whether political or economic, does the programme achieve its goals? If not what are the socio-economic impacts of this programme?

Some Sudanese economists, for example Elbeely (2003) claimed that the government achieved none of the objectives of privatisation due to major constraints, as mentioned below. The necessary legal and institutional frameworks have largely been formulated, but they were not in use, and the implementation was flawed in several respects: 1) The lack of financial infrastructure, 2) the inherited weaknesses in the domestic private sector, 3) the political and economic sanctions imposed on the country affected the participation of foreign investors, 4) the lack of transparency and accountability of the government’s privatisation operations, and 5) privatisation is a ‘home made’ programme, due to the economic sanctions by the International Financial Institutions, which forced the government of Sudan to implement its privatisation policies in isolation from international financial agencies (Musa, 2003).

All these constraints have affected the outcomes of privatisation policies in Sudan, and made them harsher than in many other developing countries, that were able to receive international financial support, which contributed largely to cushion the shocks of
these policies. The above mentioned factors constrained the privatisation process in Sudan; and allowed the socio-economic impacts of privatisation to be harsh. These adversely affected large segments of society. The main consequence of privatisation “is seen as causing layoffs and demotions, increases in the prices of goods and services, enrichment of corrupt leadership and ultimately widening the gap between the rich and the poor” as evidenced by Musa (2002), HTCDP (2005), and Daderviren (2006). However, partial success was witnessed in some of the privatised enterprises, for example the Sudan Telecommunication Company).

The core concern of this study is labour redundancy as one of the major impacts of privatisation. The government got rid of large numbers of public sector employees, as the first step to preparing public enterprises for sale. This is considered the most negative impact of the programme as indicated by Daderviren (2006): “the outcomes of privatisation in terms of employment cuts have been the most negative among the others”.

The number of redundant employees reached 132,000 (the desk review done by the researcher in 2007). Elshowya (2000) and Ibrahim (2003) have indicated that, the number of the redundant employees represented one third of public sector employees (public sector employees were estimated at 720,000 in 2003 according to the Central Bureau of Statistics). Women were made redundant in large numbers owing to their concentration in the public sector enterprises, from which category the sample of the study has been drawn.

The problem of redundant labour became worse as the government had made no prior arrangements to solve their problems; whether through training programmes or re-employment plans, as was the case in other countries, for example Egypt and Tunisia. Similarly, in other African countries, case studies showed that governments have made some efforts to track the effect of privatisation on employment: in Mozambique, one of the criteria for evaluating bids is the bidder’s commitment to maintaining the labour force at the existing level; both Benin and Zambia have used employment guarantees in an attempt to contain post-privatisation retrenchment (White, Bhatia,1998, p.94). The government in Sudan have no social mitigating programmes to absorb the
problem of redundancy, neither short term emergency, nor long term training and re-employment strategies.

Consequently, privatisation in Sudan is becoming a sensitive domestic and political issue, as it has influenced people's daily lives of those who have been made redundant and could have support or assistance from the government to lessen the effect of redundancy.

Additionally, privatisation has favoured certain interest groups by giving them large shares of the benefits of the sold public enterprises, which in turn enriched the rich, and impoverished the poor; there is an increasing feeling of lack of confidence among Sudanese people in their government due to the lack of integrity and transparency in the implementation of privatisation policies. Above all, the problem of redundant labour has had a direct influence on people's and families' lives, which agitates people against the government and its supporters. Along with this growing 'hostile' environment against privatisation in Sudan, there is neglect by the state of the public interest, thinking only of its political interest.

In a similar vein international financial institutions (i.e. IMF and WB) have imposed their conditions on poor countries (i.e. Sudan) to be eligible for borrowing criterion, moreover, those institutions were thinking only of their political interests and the disagreement with the government, and neglecting of the poor people in Sudan.

In Sudan, the present government is expected to continue its privatisation programme,- as has been announced by the High Commission for the Disposal of Public sector Enterprise, in an interview on national Television 23/09/2011), In the future, therefore, the government needs to follow certain arrangements to achieve a successful privatisation that improves market competitiveness, public enterprises' efficiency as well as equitable distribution effects of privatisation. The arrangements include: 1) government need to introduce other complementary reforms to achieve positive outcomes of privatisation (Parker, Kirkpatrick,2003), 2) government need improve its institutional and managerial capacities to implement privatisation programmes, 3) government need to show transparency and accountability to the bidders and customers, 4) government is urged to gear its efforts towards a
democratised political system in Sudan instead of the present totalitarian regime, 5) Government need to have labour policy to absorb the impacts of redundancy, 6) government need to have social mitigating programmes to reduce the adverse effects of redundancy on employees.

Obtaining data is a major problem in Sudan, especially for researchers, planners and even policy makers. In the process of collecting information about the situation of women in the Sudan for this study, it is found that the recent Household Survey was done in 1978, the last National Population Census in 1993 (the new census is published in 2008), and the last Labour Survey was done in 1996. The present study, benefited from these sources as official information which give background information about the research topic. Other scattered and few data are collected from postgraduate theses done on women and gender studies in the University of Ahfad and other Sudanese universities and UN reports. Women’s studies in Sudan and the Middle East are isolated endeavours (Hale, 1998) mentioned that “until the 1980s, exclusion was the key word in describing Sudanese women’s studies and the body of literature on-gender in the Middle East.” Besides that exclusion experienced by the writings on women’s issues by Sudanese women scholars. The women’s movement in Sudan appears to be an elitist movement, as it does not always reflect the concerns of women at the grass roots.

Despite the progress achieved in women’s studies, their focus is directed to sophisticated issues, not fully reflecting the interests of ordinary women in Sudan. There is a challenge of scarce information related to the study, it was a great incentive for me to exert more effort to complete my study in an appropriate way, in order to make a modest contribution to academia, and the literature of feminist and gender scholars at the national and the international level.

There is neglect by the state of the existing gender inequalities in the labour market, society and family, as the government based its policies on pre-conceived ideas of women’s roles and the gender division of labour, which has changed drastically in the last few years, due to various demographic and socio-economic factors. However, these changes have not been considered in government policies and national plans.
Instead, the government builds its policies on classic stereotypical gender arrangements, which has led to adverse outcomes of privatisation policies on women's positions.

The aim in studying privatisation is to examine the socio-economic impact of privatisation on the formal sector employees who have been redundant, especially women, in Sudan, who have tended to absorb the shock of privatisation policies, particularly, when government desert its responsibility, and cede these to other mechanisms of free market economy, such as the labour market.

Privatisation policies based on neo-liberal economics that call for minimum intervention of government with an expanding market system. Based on this philosophy, the government of Sudan has abandoned its responsibility for addressing issues of redundancy caused by privatisation to the labour market mechanisms. This gives rise to two concerns: promoting the minimum government and maximised labour market responsibility changed women's employment status, and this in turn influenced women's economic and social position.

**Privatisation and Women**

This thesis primarily sets out to investigate the changes that happened in women's employment status as well as women's economic and social positions, as a result of privatisation policies. In addition to the socio-cultural factors that are structurally rooted in that society, particular aspects undermine women's position in society, including: patriarchal structures that were historically institutionalised at the household, society, labour market, and state level, and the discriminatory gender inequalities practised against women in the domestic domain. The collective interactions among these have seriously undermined women's employment, economic and social positions in Sudan.

**Privatisation and Women's employment status**

The qualitative findings of this study offer some evidence about existing gender inequalities inherent in the Sudanese context. The labour market is one of the institutions where one can easily observe the prevalence of male domination and patriarchal control, not only at the level of legislation, but also in daily practice at
workplaces. This bias appears in different forms of discriminatory practices: 1) Horizontal segregation is a daily practice: managers discriminate against women, jobs assigned to women are on low scales with low pay, 2) Vertical segregation is a very common phenomenon in the Sudanese context: respondents’ accounts reflected that the decision-making level and senior jobs are the world of men. This does not only prohibit women from being appointed to senior posts, but there are also some positions in public enterprises where women’s recruitment is not allowed; and 3) the gender segregation practice in the labour market caused the wage gap to increase, as women were apparently excluded from senior jobs and confined to low paid ones. This persistent pattern of discriminatory practices against women shows a clear divide between legislation and practice. While their degrees of importance are varied, to rectify this situation of gender inequality, several items of new legislation need to be made and existing regulations reviewed, endorsed and reinforced.

A major segment of the respondents have attributed gender discriminatory practices in the workplace to the lack enforcement of laws and regulations in relation to promotion, or the right to statutory leave. Others have perceived these as merely personal attitudes of discriminatory managers and colleagues. This type of practice has to be challenged by a strict ‘provision’ in the laws to ensure equality in workplaces. For the government to ensure gender equality, enforceable new regulations should include: 1) to issue a provision for an ‘Equal Opportunity Policy’ in Sudan, which needs to be endorsed in all public sector enterprises, 2) the government has to assign a penalty to violation of labour laws in the workplace, and 3) the informal sector also needs to be covered by the legal umbrella, as women experience harsh working conditions.

How did privatisation affect women’s employment

Women respondents’ accounts suggested that the major transformation that happened in their lives following privatisation is the large numbers of women who have become unemployed. The sample of women studied indicated that the majority of women professionals and workers have experienced the same problem of unemployment. Women respondents attributed this problem to a number of interrelated determinants,
including: 1) gender segmentation pre-existing in the labour market (both vertical and horizontal gender segregation), 2) the remarkable increase in the unemployed of both sexes in the formal sector, 3) gender and age are among factors that hinder women’s re-employment, 4) male preference in recruitment in the private formal sector, 5) increased imported foreign labour. All these factors made women decide to give up their job search and remain in their homes. A typical description of this situation of privatisation has been noted by Moghdam (1998), Geldestin 1997; Baden (2003) as follows: “feminisation of unemployment is one of the features of SAPs and privatisation policies in Latin America, Caribbean, Africa and some East European regions”

The impact of privatisation did not only lead to women becoming unemployed, but also women quitting the labour force. Sending large numbers of professional women back home, resulted not only in the loss of qualified and experienced employees, who represent an addition to the human resource wealth in the country. But it also led to the decline of the Gender Empowerment Measure (GEM), a measure used by the Human Development Report (produced annually by the UN) to evaluate the progress in women’s status in terms of participation in senior decision-making posts.

Women factory workers were affected in different ways, as they had poor education, lived in poor neighbourhoods, and came from low-income families. Consequently their negotiating position in any redundancy programme was poor, as they could not bargain with employers, because of their severe need for income to live on. It was also reflected in their fragmented employment search history, as they could not settle in one workplace due to the exploitative and unsafe working conditions. Deteriorating working conditions for women became a permanent feature of privatisation policies, as the role of government diminished, and its control over private factories and companies was weakened. Accordingly, contracted work conditions have declined, especially for those who were perceived as unwanted and expensive labour, Women were forced to accept work in unsecured working conditions where they were not
entitled to health insurance, leave, or childcare facilities and transport. In most cases, women did not have permanent work contracts (Geldestin, 1997).

It is evident from the women’s accounts that privatisation policies have not led to the improvement of women’s employment opportunities as promised by the government, but rather added a new threat to the already existing gender inequalities in the labour market. One of the respondents remarked, “I did not expect to leave my job for any reason but retirement or death; however, privatisation now is considered as the key threat.”

The observed unfavourable conditions of the labour market in Sudan have arisen as a result of problems of economic stagnation, which influence the demand for more employment, the deteriorating wage value, the increased unemployment rates, and the growing numbers of job seekers, especially among new graduates (Ibrahim, Holi and Elo’bodi, 2003). This coincided with pre-existing gender inequalities, historically structured as a manifestation of patriarchal control at labour market and state levels. All these have collectively acted to disqualify the labour market from absorbing the problem of redundancy resulting from privatisation. The government needs to adopt an expansionary policy to increase demand in the labour market, which will lead to open up new employment opportunities in the formal sector.

Women’s unemployment resulting from privatisation has impacted adversely on women’s livelihoods, depriving them of their earnings and job-linked social benefits. Furthermore, it left them in a disadvantaged position. Accordingly women started to look for other work alternatives in order to provide their needs as well as family needs. Informal sector was the only resort that could accommodate the needs of the women respondents who have been unemployed.

**Informal sector**

As shown in other studies (Moghadam, 1999; Afshar and Dennis, 1992), women’s employability has been affected drastically, both for professionals and unskilled women workers. As professional women failed to get salaried jobs in the formal sector, they have resorted to the informal sector to undertake different types of
economic activities, such as food processing, selling cosmetics and local perfumes, petty-trading and other businesses, such as investment in home furniture.

The case of Sudanese women is no exception in that respect, as both women from the banking sector and manufacturing have entered to this sector. However, it is a new trend among professional women to enter the informal sector: one-third of women respondents from the banking sector entered the informal sector. This is primarily dominated by poor, illiterate and displaced women, as entering this sector, does not require any level of education, qualifications, experience or capital to engage in business. At the same time, no protection is provided to those working in this sector; it is even excluded from the labour laws. There are increasing numbers of women working in the informal sector as a result of privatisation policies. This it is not only limited to the case of Sudan. This pattern of employment has become popular in the most developing countries, where large numbers of women have taken to the informal sector as a last resort. This phenomenon is described by Standing, 1989; Moghadam, 1999 as the 'informalisation' of the female labour force.

Realising the importance of informal sector is very vital to increase employment and improve the poverty situation of women in Sudan (Khier, 2003). The government needs to change its attitudes towards this sector. New policies are needed, such as: 1) policy action to increase accessibility to finance, 2) policy action to provide skill development, 3) policy action to organise market channels, and 4) policy action to issue protective laws to keep women safe from being exposed to violations and harassment by local authorities as well as male counterparts.

Privatisation and women's economic position

Privatisation policies were formulated and implemented in the context of the ideology adopted by the present government. It has a patriarchal character, which made the male-biased culture ore dominant and prevalent in the Sudan. Consequently, policies were based on the classic gender arrangements of men being the family breadwinners and women being economic dependants.

However, the qualitative findings of this study reflect the demographic and economic changes occurring during the last two decades. Moreover, new developments have
taken place in the economic positions of women for a number of reasons: 1) the deteriorating economic conditions of a high percentage of families forced large numbers of women to seek paid jobs, and 2) economic conditions in Sudanese society necessitated having more than one income earner for family subsistence. Consequently, women’s share in the household income has relatively increased to become equal to, and sometimes more than their male counterparts. In some cases, women were holding the household responsibility as Females Heads of Households. Apparently, these changes created new gender arrangements as many households tended to follow the dual earner-caregiver model (Crompton, 2001; Lewis, 2001). While this model has become common in most developed and developing countries, it has not yet been considered in the policy formulation process in Sudan.

The evidence given above reflects the implementation level, but the planning level has also shown stereotyped gender vision. In analysing the Sudan National Comprehensive Strategy (1992-2002), it was found that state policies were dealing with women as mothers, wives and housewives in the first place, rather than as working women (Khalfalla, 2000). Before the redundancy situation, women’s economic contribution at the personal, household, and family levels exceeded their male partners’ in many cases, as has been shown by respondents. Women had an equal share in the household budget; they were FHH, and the sole breadwinner of the extended family; very few women were dependent on the male breadwinner in the family.

As stated by the general manager of the Bank of Khartoum: “one of the criteria for the redundancy decisions was family headship; as men assume the breadwinning in their families; we gave them priority to remain in their jobs.” The director general of the Friendship Factory stated: “we were sure that when women lost their jobs, there must be someone among their family members that will take care of them. The notion of solidarity is very common in Sudanese society.”

Privatisation policies begin with the presumption of a male breadwinner, and women as economic dependants. Consequently, when the policies of labour redundancy came to the implementation phase, women were the first to be made redundant.
Female-Headed Households particularly have tended to bear the worst effect of redundancy, as women are the chief breadwinners of their families. The new circumstances led them into: 1) the vicious circle of poverty, resulting in their children dropping out of schooling, worsening nutrition, dwelling facilities and conditions, 2) professional and factory worker women’s status is also compromised by redundancy, as it reduces their autonomy, in both personal and family lives, 3) The influence on the lives of women workers affects their psychological and physical well-being, as women from this group experienced domestic violence at the household level as well as facing the community’s negative perception towards women, 4) women’s economic deprivation has increased chances of their vulnerability to future uncertainties, as it has limited their access and control of their monthly earnings, and 5) privatisation reduced women’s capabilities to satisfy their needs and those of their families/households.

Adaptive Responses of Women’s made Redundant

In trying to cope with their new realities, women have initiated various coping strategies: they have resorted to spending from assets they have saved in the past: women sold all their valuable items like jewellery, properties, furniture, cars and other things, which made women more vulnerable to future uncertainties, especially, in the absence of government safety programmes.

The weak social mitigating programmes, which should reduce the negative shock of redundancy fail to offer redundant women any sort of support, because these institutions were heavily tasked with issues dealing poor people, pensioners, the sick and the elderly. Moreover, besides the state’s weak financial contribution towards women as small-scale entrepreneurs, there has been inadequate investment in training programmes targeting redundant employees, with a special focus on women as a group.

Women’s social position

The influence of redundancy on women’s social position is seen as the major setback in the lives of women. Women reported that social recognition brought about by work was the great achievement that had taken place in their lives. So the disappearance of
this empowering factor led to a situation of uncertainty. Women workers were much more likely to be negatively affected than women professionals, due to their different social backgrounds.

The rise of domesticity is considered the major problem faced by the women in the sample investigated in relation to privatisation. The evidence of this study supports that privatisation has led to the rise of this old discourse associated with the rise and fall of the capitalist system. Historically, women participating in the traditional mode of production were mainly assigned to bear family work as an extension of their domestic role. With the emergence of modernisation, women have moved from the domestic to the public role, a move indicating the split between the public and private spheres (Charles, 1993).

The present privatisation policy in Sudan acted as a setback to so many efforts which attempted to liberate women, changing their social and economic status.

Women in the study have also been exposed to another complex situation, which is the restriction of their mobility. Women workers have mostly suffered from this problem due to their location in low income families, living in poor neighbourhoods. Women are greatly affected due to the declining a space within which women are able to manoeuvre, particularly as women’s mobility is generally linked to family law and religious interpretations (Olmested, 1999). These are patriarchal controls that aim to control and isolate women, as structured obstacles to gender equality and the ideology of separate spheres maintain patriarchal gender ideologies (Walby, 1994). This implies that ideological, as well as patriarchal control over women’s lives appear again, but in different forms, as women are made redundant, and lose their source of social recognition and independence.

According to the patriarchal perception male family members, brothers and fathers claim that they have authority to protect their sisters and daughters from the threats of the outside world. They perceive that women do not need to go outside the home, unless they have a genuine reason to do so. This practice is greatly relevant to working-class women, particularly the unmarried. These discussions explain a
persistent patriarchal pattern that still prevails in Sudanese society, which influences women’s roles and positions within the household and at societal level as well. Privatisation has mainly been focused on fiscal and monetary terms, and neglected other social aspects of human life and well-being. The diminishing role of women’s social networks has resulted from the situation of redundancy. Women have tended to lose one of their social treasures, which is the social relations with colleagues with whom they had established long-time relationships through the accumulating years of employment. Social capital theorists perceived social networks as a cause of empowerment for disadvantaged people, as they can improve their positions in society. Working women are most likely to be affected by the weakening of social relations, as it constitutes part of their social recognition, and improves their self-esteem. So the absence of these social relations is likely to have led to the social exclusion of women. Women professionals tended to compensate for the absence of social networks by getting involved in the community organisation activities. Women in this context resorted to this strategy as a coping mechanism to difficulties related to the new circumstances created by redundancy.

Concluding remarks

The literature reviewed throughout this study has shown that, at the ideological level, there are emerging perspectives with new confidence that have criticised the entire theory of the free market economy, and the changing roles between the state and the private sector. These changes include: 1) the International Financial Institutions, including the World Bank, have made a policy shifts in planning methodology, especially for developing countries The ‘severe disruptive social and political impacts of the early Structural Adjustment Programmes in Africa force the World Bank to pay more attention to the ‘human dimensions’ of the policies it advocated and supported’ (Wilson, Kanji, Braathen, 2001); subsequently the financial institutions changed their strategies from Structural Adjustment Programmes, including privatisation, to the Poverty Alleviation Forward Strategies, that aim to improve economic growth and people’s livelihoods in these countries; 2) privatisation policies have become questionable, especially after the last international economic crisis that has hit most of
the developed and developing countries, and led industrialised nations to urge governments to interfere in order to regulate the free markets. As Stigliz (2009, p.7) argues: ‘Market is an not self-regulatory; there is an important role for government to try regulate the market economy, through developing appropriate policy frameworks to balance between the role of the market and the role of the government’

In Sudan, privatisation is still expected to undergo privatisation operations in formal sector enterprises, seeking to improve economic growth, and increase the efficiency and profitability of public sector enterprises. But the government need to consider the considerable numbers of losers, especially those who will be made redundant from the formal sector, including women. A number of policy actions need to be carried through by the government to achieve positive outcomes in its privatisation programmes. These include: 1) the government needs to introduce other complementary reforms to achieve positive outcomes of privatisation (Parker, Kirkpatrick, 2003); 2) the government needs to improve its institutional and managerial capacities to implement privatisation programmes; 3) the government needs to show transparency and accountability to bidders and customers, 4) the government is urged to gear its efforts towards a democratised political system in Sudan instead of the present totalitarian regime; 5) the government needs to have labour policy to absorb the impacts of redundancy; 6) the government needs to have social mitigating programmes to reduce the adverse effects of redundancy on employees including women.

As in other developing countries adopting privatisation, the government of Sudan needs to: 1) consider and examine existing gender inequalities in the labour market, and translate the findings of this situation into its privatisation programmes and other national legislation and policies; 2) the assumption of traditional gender arrangements (family structures based on male breadwinners) needs to be revised and changed by the government when implementing privatisation programme in the future; 3) the emerging role of women as female heads of household needs to be considered by the government; 4) social mitigating programmes would be undertaken by the government.
during and after implementation of privatisation, need to be gender sensitive, in order to incorporate women's needs and interests.
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London.

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## ANNEX 2: WOMEN RESPONDENTS FROM THE FRIENDSHIP FACTORY

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<th>Husband Occupation</th>
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<td>Bedour</td>
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<td>second wife/ 1 kid</td>
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## ANNEX 3: INTERVIEWS DATES FOR WOMEN FROM BANK OF KHARTOUM

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</tr>
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<td>17/11/2007</td>
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</tr>
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<td>5/10/2007</td>
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<td>Fatima</td>
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</tr>
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<td>Fiaza</td>
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<td>Khalda</td>
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<td>Radwah</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nour</td>
<td>27/10/2007</td>
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### ANNEX 5: DATES OF INTERVIEWS WITH KEY PERSONS FROM THE BANK OF KHARTOUM, THE FRIENDSHIP FACTORY AND TRADE UNIONS

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<tr>
<th>Name</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>The General Manager of the Bank of Khartoum</td>
<td>12/01/2008</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The General Manager of the Friendship Factory</td>
<td>15/01/2008</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The person in charge of the Human Resource Department, Bank of Khartoum</td>
<td>28/08/2007</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The head of Personnel department in the Bank of Khartoum.</td>
<td>23/12/2007</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The Head of Trade Union of Khartoum Bank</td>
<td>01/09/2007</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The Head of Textile and Spinning Industries’ Trade Union</td>
<td>12/09/2007</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The Head of Social Secretary in the Head office of the Trade Union.</td>
<td>15/08/2007</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Focus Group Discussion for 10 women staff in the bank of Khartoum.</td>
<td>15/12/2007</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Focus Group Discussion for 10 women staff from the Friendship Factory</td>
<td>17/12/2007</td>
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