‘Quiet Americans in India’:¹
The Central Intelligence Agency and the Politics of Intelligence in Cold War South Asia

How is it that the poet got no applause when he recited his poem on the stage?
How is it that the other poet’s rhyme was not published in any paper?
Why is so much tension in husband and wife?
Why are the prices rising?
Why the pupils gherao [lock-in] their principal?
Why the parents are afraid of their adolescent daughters?
Why there is so much nudity in films?
And why our development plans fail to make any progress?
The root cause of all these is just one.
This is all due to the secret operations of the C.I.A.


In February 1967, senior officials from the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) were horrified when the American west-coast magazine, Ramparts, exposed the US intelligence organisation’s longstanding financial relationships with a number of international educational and cultural bodies. In a series of damning articles, reproduced in The New York Times and The Washington Post, Ramparts documented the CIA’s provision of covert funding to, amongst others, the National Students Association, Asia Foundation, and Congress for Cultural Freedom (CCF). In India, where the fourth general election campaign to be held since the end of British imperial rule in August 1947 was then in full swing, confirmation that the Indian Committee for Cultural Freedom, a local offshoot of the CCF, had accepted money from the CIA provoked an outpouring of public indignation.

¹ The phrase ‘Quiet Americans in India’ is taken from an article on CIA activity in India published by the Soviet journalist, A. Shalnev, in the Moscow daily Sovetskaya Rossiya [Soviet Russia], 3 November 1972. The term, ‘Quiet American’, became synonymous with CIA officers following the publication of Graham Greene’s novel, The Quiet American (London: William Heinemann Ltd, 1955), a semi-fictional account of the tragically misguided intrusion into the First Indochina War of an American intelligence officer, Alden Pyle.
ambassador in New Delhi at the time, lamented that fallout from the Ramparts furore was likely to prove particularly damaging to United States’ standing in India, ‘where we [the US] had developed especially close and extensive relationships with Indian universities and with individual scholars, none of which were in any way connected with intelligence operations.’

The public relations challenge Bowles faced in India as a result of the CIA’s activities was complicated the following month when *The Washington Post* published an essay written by his predecessor in New Delhi, the Harvard economist, John Kenneth Galbraith. With no little irony, Galbraith observed that recent events had confirmed the CIA to be, ‘a secret agency...with an excellent instinct for headlines.’ More significantly, Galbraith went on to recount his experiences of working alongside the CIA in the subcontinent, noting in the process, that the Agency’s, ‘activities were generally known to, and involved no conflict with, local [Indian government] authorities.’ In March 1961, before leaving to take up his ambassadorial posting, Galbraith had taken exception to the scale and scope of the CIA’s interference in India’s internal affairs. During a briefing provided by Richard M. Bissell Jr., the Agency’s Deputy Director of Plans, or clandestine operations, Galbraith was ‘appalled and depressed’ to learn of the CIA’s intention to spend a sum ‘well into the millions [of dollars]’ to bankroll the election campaigns of pro-Western politicians, and subsidize anti-communist Indian newspapers and magazines. Such activity, Galbraith lamented, was unlikely to prove effective in swaying Indian opinion, but was almost certain to leak into the public domain, damaging Indo-US relations and compromising his position as ambassador. Emboldened by the CIA’s public humiliation following its disastrous Bay of Pigs operation against the Castro regime in Cuba that April, Galbraith attempted to rein in the Agency’s activities in India. Although only partially successful, the ambassador’s resolve to limit

---

covert American intelligence operations in the subcontinent earned the disapprobation of the Agency, which dismissed him as, ‘basically anti-CIA.’

Back in 1967, opposition groups on the left of India’s political spectrum seized upon Galbraith’s comments in The Washington Post as confirmation that the CIA had been actively subverting democracy in South Asia. Exasperated by Galbraith’s indiscretion, the CIA’s Director, Richard Helms, curtly informed the former ambassador that he had, ‘raised unshirted hell in India and [had]...provided the central point of an acrimonious debate in the Lok Sabha [India’s lower parliamentary chamber].’ Fresh from the campaign hustings, India’s parliamentarians fed off rumour and suspicion surrounding America’s foreign intelligence service, and competed eagerly with each other to exhibit the toughest and most populist anti-CIA line possible. On 23 March, India’s Foreign Minister, M. C. Chagla, bowed to mounting pressure for government action and announced that a ‘thorough’ official inquiry would be conducted to ascertain whether the CIA had interfered in Indian politics. ‘We cannot permit foreigners or foreign governments to dictate to us what sort of a government we should have or what sort of people should be elected,’ Chagla asserted. ‘We will unearth any activity that is objectionable, that is against the national interests.’

The global spotlight that America’s press cast upon some of the CIA’s more questionable activities in early 1967, was to have a profound and enduring impact upon Indian perceptions of America and its intelligence services. In the wake of the Ramparts

---


5 Richard Helms to Lyndon Johnson, 28 March 1967, Box 9, Folder CIA Vol. 3 [1 of 2], NSF, AF, Lyndon Johnson Library, Austin, Texas (hereafter LBJL).

scandal, the CIA came to occupy a prominent place in mainstream Indo-US cultural and political discourse. Indeed, for the remainder of the twentieth century, and beyond, anti-American elements inside and outside India drew repeatedly upon the spectre of CIA subversion as a means of destabilising New Delhi’s relations with Washington. The blanket exposure given by the world’s press to CIA indiscretions after 1967, exemplified by the international media circus’ that developed around Congressional probes into the US intelligence community in the mid-1970s, made a deep psychological impression in India. Having publicly catalogued the CIA’s involvement in a series of plots to assassinate national leaders and subvert foreign governments, the chairman of one influential investigative committee, the Democrat Senator from Idaho, Frank Church, famously characterised the Agency’s behaviour as akin to, ‘a rogue elephant on a rampage.’\(^7\) Moreover, in India’s Prime Minister, Indira Gandhi, whose Congress Party saw its parliamentary majority slashed at the polls in 1967, India was governed for much of the next two decades by a leader with a visceral mistrust of Western intelligence services in general, and the CIA in particular. One former CIA officer, who served in India in the early 1970s, recalled that, ‘CIA agents...were to be found according to Madame Gandhi, beneath every charpoy and behind every neem tree.’\(^8\)

Remarkably, some reference to the CIA and its purportedly nefarious activities in the subcontinent can be detected in almost every significant exchange that occurred between Indian and American diplomats between the late 1960s and the late 1980s. In fact, during the latter half of the Cold War, what some commentators have referenced as an Indian national ‘paranoia’ toward the CIA and its clandestine activities, came to represent a constant and frustrating impediment whenever US policymakers sought to forge closer and more


constructive relations with India. In the mid-1980s, senior officials in the Reagan administration continued to bemoan that, ‘Mrs. Gandhi’s periodic swipes at the U.S. for interference in Indian internal affairs infuriate Congressmen and staffers alike.’

In June 1984, having recently returned from a visit to the subcontinent, US Vice-President, and former CIA Director, George W. Bush, felt compelled to write a letter of complaint to R. N. Kao, the head of India’s external intelligence service, the Research and Analysis Wing (RAW). Bush had taken exception to comments made by Indian government officials that linked the CIA with a secessionist movement in the Punjab, in northern India. In a private letter to Kao, an exasperated Bush emphasised:

...how taken aback I was to hear of recent Indian accusations concerning alleged CIA involvement in the Punjab. Media articles and statements by government officials linking CIA operations with occurrences in Amritsar are completely contrary to the fact and quite distressing. This turn of events is particularly unfortunate coming so closely on the heels of my statement in New Delhi respecting the unity and integrity of India and my long discussions with your Prime Minister.

Some three decades earlier, one of the very first books to reference the CIA, L. Natarajan’s, *American Shadow over India*, had been published in Bombay. The account that Natarajan provided of the CIA’s activities in India in 1952, which, if the author is to be believed, encompassed bribing Indian publishers, journalists and politicians to follow a pro-American line, generated little public or political comment in the subcontinent. By the end of the following decade, however, Indian authors and journalists had turned the chronicle of CIA misdeeds in South Asia, real and imagined, into something of a cottage industry. In

---

11 George W. Bush to R.N. Kao, 19 June 1984, Country File India 1984 [1] [OA-ID 19779], GWBL.
the late 1960s, communist publishing houses in India churned out evocatively entitled works such as, *I Was a CIA Agent in India*; *CIA: Manipulating Arm of U.S. Foreign Policy: Devil and his Dart: How the CIA is Plotting in the Third World*; and, *CIA: Dagger against India. 13*

The ubiquitous hand of the CIA had, such works proclaimed, been behind plots to oust India’s first Prime Minister, Jawaharlal Nehru, from power; assassinate Indira Gandhi, and her son Rajiv; encourage separatist movements in the north, west and south of India; and perhaps most bizarrely, implement a evangelisation plan to covert India’s overwhelming Hindu population to Christianity. 14 References to the CIA also began to cross over into conventional Indian literature. Notably, in 1964, the Agency appeared briefly in V. S. Naipaul’s classic work, *An Area of Darkness: A Discovery of India. 15* In contrast, a comprehensive account of the CIA’s cold war operations in India and, more precisely, the Agency’s wider impact on Indo-US relations remains a notable lacuna within the considerable body of scholarly work addressing America’s intelligence community. 16 The memoirs of CIA Directors and former Agency officials largely omit reference to India, or

---


15 Naipaul recounts sardonically how, during his travels across India between February 1962 and February 1964, he, ‘had grown tired of meeting young Americans in unlikely places. It was amusing, and charitable, to think that some of them were spies for the CIA or whatever it was.’ V. S. Naipaul, *An Area of Darkness: A Discovery of India* (London: Andre Deutsch, 1964), p. 172.

skim over intelligence operations in the subcontinent. Likewise, accounts of ambassadorial tours in the subcontinent, penned by such luminaries as Galbraith, Bowles, and Daniel Patrick Moynihan, offer only tantalisingly brief glimpses of the scale, scope and broader significance of CIA activity inside ‘the world’s largest democracy’.

India’s historic association with the development of modern intelligence practice is, in fact, particularly strong. Scholars of the subcontinent have documented the extensive networks of indigenous spies, political informants and propagandists that were co-opted by the East India Company from the eighteenth century to safeguard British interests in South Asia from internal revolt and external threats, originally from France, and latterly from imperial Russia. By the time the British retreated from the subcontinent in the aftermath of the Second World War, the manipulation by colonial security agencies of a deep and flexible system of social communication in India had contributed to a proliferation of amorphous ‘imagined’ communities with purportedly sinister and subversive anti-nationalist agendas.

In this context, the deployment of preponderant post-war American power and wealth in Europe and Asia appeared redolent to many Indians of a hidden neo-imperialist US foreign policy. More specifically, the CIA, as the ‘covert’ foreign policy tool of choice for US President’s in the early Cold War period, acquired a uniquely invidious status across the developing world as an anti-democratic socio-political malefactor. Indeed, in India, as elsewhere in the global South, from the late 1960s the symbolism attached to the CIA

---

overshadowed American diplomatic initiatives designed to win ‘hearts and minds’. Trust and confidence in US domestic institutions and amongst America’s international partners, and perhaps none more so than India, was corroded by a climate of conspiracy surrounding the CIA, which, in turn, fostered a political culture in the subcontinent that at times verged on paranoia.

By drawing upon theoretical frameworks utilized in recent studies of conspiracy theory, important new light can be shed on the political and cultural influences that have conditioned Indian perceptions of the CIA. Specifically, the manner in which the CIA’s notoriety in the subcontinent after 1967 was harnessed by left-wing sections of India’s political class to nurture populist anti-American sentiment, is suggestive of a systematic effort, whether conscious or subconscious, to associate the Agency with a broad conspiracy, centred on a plot to secure control of India, and the wider developing world.20 Here, parallels are evident with work conducted on the political dimension of conspiracy theories in the Middle East. In this context, scholars have demonstrated how notions of ‘conspiracism’ gained currency in mainstream political and media circles, and were subsequently exploited by authoritarian regimes to attribute poverty, economic decline and social stagnation to the imaginary construction of hostile external forces.21 Furthermore, in interpreting Indira Gandhi’s interaction with Western intelligence agencies in general, and the CIA in particular, emphasis is placed on the extent to which Gandhi’s family history, psychological make-up, and familiarity with the Agency’s covert action record in the developing world, amplified traits of insecurity and paranoia buried deep within the Indian premier’s psyche. Informed by

---


21 See, for example, Daniel Pipes, The Hidden Hand: Middle East Fears of Conspiracy (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1998).
the insights into psychological projection provided by Richard Hofstadter back in the 1960s, and more recent investigations into the malevolent ‘disease’ of political paranoia by Robert Robins and Jerrold Post, it is argued that the emergence of a conspiratorial paradigm in Indian politics around the turn of the 1970s, centred on the CIA, had a significant, enduring and detrimental impact upon Indo-US relations.22

‘The most satisfactory relationship’: Indian intelligence liaison with the West in the early Cold War

Following the end of British colonial rule in South Asia, both the CIA and the United Kingdom’s Security Service (MI5) moved quickly to establish close liaison relationships with, and provide training and support to, the India’s intelligence service, the Delhi Intelligence Bureau (IB). In June 1949, the IB’s first Indian director, Tirupattur Gangadharam (T. G.) Sanjevi, a 49-year-old former District Superintendent of Police from Madras, travelled to the United States for three weeks of talks with representatives from the CIA, Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), and the State Department. The importance that Washington attached to Sanjevi’s visit was underlined by George Kennan, then Director of Policy Planning at the State Department, and one of the driving forces behind the creation of the Office of Policy Coordination, which until the creation of the CIA’s Directorate of Plans in 1952, oversaw covert US psychological and paramilitary operations. In a memorandum distributed to the heads of America’s intelligence agencies, Kennan stressed that Sanjevi, who was known to be ‘very close’ to Jawaharlal Nehru, should ‘not only be given a cordial reception, but that high officials of our Government receive him.’ Reinforcing Kennan’s message, America’s ambassador in New Delhi, Loy Henderson, cautioned Washington that

the impressions Sanjevi took away from his trip to the United States were likely to have, ‘wide ramifications in our over-all relations with India.’

At the time, India’s security and intelligence forces were battling to suppress a violent communist-led insurrection in Telegana, in the south of the country. American diplomats were hopeful that the on-going threat posed by militant communism inside India would encourage Sanjevi to solicit advice and support from his counterparts in the United States. In the event, after meeting with a number of senior CIA figures, including Colonel Richard Stilwell, chief of the Agency’s Far East Division, Kermit ‘Kim’ Roosevelt, shortly to achieve notoriety for his exploits in Iran, and Director of Central Intelligence, Roscoe Hillenkoetter, Sanjevi’s visit was deemed by Washington to have passed off successfully. Significantly, and to the CIA’s immense satisfaction, Sanjevi welcomed an American offer to explore, ‘the possibility of establishing an official liaison on Communist matters.’ Intriguingly, a detailed profile of India’s intelligence director that was distributed to US officials ahead of his visit to the United States, was marked out for ‘most careful handling’ in view of the ‘delicacy’ of its principal source. Sanjevi, it seems, may not have been the first senior Indian government official to forge a working relationship with the CIA.

---

23 J. C. Satterthwaite to James E. Webb, 15 June 1949, RG59, Office of South Asian Affairs India Affairs 1944-57, Lot file 57D373, Box 2, Folder Memorandum to the Secretary 1949, National Archive and Records Administration, College Park, Maryland (hereafter NARA).

24 Joseph S. Sparks to Loy W. Henderson, 8 July 1949, RG59, Office of South Asian Affairs India Affairs 1944-57, Lot file 57D373, Box 2, Folder Official Informal July 1949, NARA.

25 Sanjevi was a good deal less enamoured with the reception that he received from the FBI, and in particular, the Bureau’s imperious Director, J. Edgar Hoover. To the distress of Loy Henderson, Sanjevi subsequently confided to the US ambassador that having, ‘been looking forward with particular enthusiasm to meeting and having a heart-to-heart with... J. Edgar Hoover’, he had been left ‘boiling with resentment’ by the off-hand manner in which Hoover had treated him. The ‘deep-seated pique’, which Sanjevi harboured toward Hoover was underscored when the Indian intelligence chief stated unequivocally to a shocked Henderson that, ‘if a liaison was contemplated [between US and Indian intelligence services] even remotely involving the F.B.I....he [Sanjevi] would not only advise against us making such a proposal but would personally oppose it if it were made.’ See, Loy W. Henderson to Joseph S. Sparks, 17 April 1950, and Richard W. Klise to Loy Henderson, 18 April 1950, RG59, Office of South Asian Affairs India Affairs 1944-57, Lot file 57D373, Box 2, Folder Official informal Jan-May 1950, NARA.

26 J. C. Satterthwaite to James E. Webb, 15 June 1949, RG59, Office of South Asian Affairs India Affairs 1944-57, Lot file 57D373, Box 2, Folder Memorandum to the Secretary 1949, NARA.
Under Sanjevi, and his successor, B. N. Mullik, who assumed control of IB in July 1950, the CIA and MI5, the latter of which maintained a declared, or overt, Security Liaison Officer (SLO) in New Delhi, enjoyed close collaborative relations with India’s intelligence services into the 1970s.\(^27\) Notably, the IB chose to ‘look the other way’ as CIA aircraft transited through Indian airspace in support of Agency sponsored resistance operations in Chinese controlled Tibet, and CIA operatives spirited the Dalai Lama out of Lhasa and into northern India following an abortive Tibetan uprising in 1959.\(^28\) Indeed, by the early 1960s, the CIA had a sizable, growing and active in-country presence in India. Having initially operated from a single ‘station’, or base of operations, in New Delhi, the Agency progressively extended the geographical scope of its activities, establishing a network of smaller out-stations in Bombay, Calcutta, and Madras. Inevitably, as the scale of CIA activity in India increased, the Agency found it increasingly difficult to preserve its anonymity. Abraham Michael Rosenthal, the New York Times’ correspondent in New Delhi for much of the 1950s, confided to his editor back in the United States that local CIA staff working under the guise of Treasury experts, Air Force contractors or members of specialised bodies, such as the Asia Foundation, were easily identified by Indian government officials and journalists. Agency personnel in India, Rosenthal noted, were widely referred to by Americans and

\(^{27}\) MI5 stationed SLO’s across Asia and Africa after 1945, where under the ‘Attlee Directive’, the Empire and Commonwealth remained primarily the preserve of the Security Service, and insulated from the clandestine activities of the British Secret Intelligence Service (MI6). The SLO role was to provide advice and support to local security agencies, whilst at the same time acting as conduit for the exchange of security related information between London and Britain’s former imperial outposts. It was not to engage in acts of subterfuge or espionage. The first SLO in India, Lieutenant Colonel Kenneth Bourne, arrived in New Delhi in 1947, while the last, a victim of Whitehall economies, was withdrawn, against the wishes of the then head of IB, S. P. Varma, in the late 1960s. See, Visit of Captain Liddell (Security Service) to the Middle East’, Confidential Annex to J.I.C. (47) 33rd Meeting (0), 9 June 1947, CAB 159/1; and Roger Hollis to Sir Burke Trend, 13 November 1965, CO 1035/171, British National Archives, Kew London (hereafter, TNA). See also, Christopher Andrew, The Defence of the Realm: The Authorized History of MI5 (London: Allen Lane, 2009) p. 137 and p. 481.

\(^{28}\) See, Kenneth Conboy and James Morrison, The CIA’s Secret War in Tibet (Lawrence: University of Kansas Press, 2002); and, John Kenneth Knaus, Orphans of the Cold War: America and the Tibetan Struggle for Survival (New York: Public Affairs, 1999). Knaus, who headed the CIA’s Tibetan Task force around the turn of the 1960s, has asserted that, between 1957 and 1961, over 500,000 pounds of arms, ammunition, communications equipment and medical supplies were delivered to Tibetan resistance groups by the CIA and its proprietary airline, Civil Air Transport. See Knaus, Orphans of the Cold War, p. 155.
Indians alike, as ‘the Halicrafter boys’, ‘because whatever their Embassy cover they all had offices in the same part of the Embassy basement and all had identical Halicrafter radios.’ The CIA’s involvement in Indian political circles, Rosenthal observed, appeared to be directed, ‘more than anything else in getting inside the Congress Party for purposes of information or influence.’ In 1959, the Agency demonstrated its ability and willingness to work with India’s ruling political party, when it helped to pave the way for the removal of a democratically elected Communist Party of India (CPI) government in the southern state of Kerala. By secretly channelling funds to Congress Party officials and local anti-communist labour leaders, the CIA helped to destabilise, and ultimately bring down, the incumbent CPI administration.

In a wider sense, in the late 1950s, toward the end of Dwight D. Eisenhower’s second presidential term, Washington had become increasingly concerned both at the growth of indigenous communism in the subcontinent, and the Soviet Union’s burgeoning ties with New Delhi. Eisenhower’s enthusiasm for bringing India and the United States closer together, primarily through the provision of generous American economic aid to Nehru’s administration, was subsequently embraced by his successor, John F. Kennedy, who looked upon democratic India as a strategic counterweight to the expansion of Communist Chinese influence in Asia. Indeed, at the beginning of the 1960s, and in particular for a brief period following the Sino-Indian border war of 1962, the locus of Washington’s effort to contain

29 Abraham Michael Rosenthal to Mr. Salisbury, undated, Box 159, CIA Series 1965-66, Raw Data, Harrison Salisbury Papers, Butler Library, Columbia University (hereafter HSP).
Asian communism was located not in South Vietnam, but in India. A series of very public CIA ‘failures’ around this time, beginning with the loss of a U-2 spy-plane over the Soviet Union in May 1960, and culminating in the Bay of Pigs fiasco the following April, had little immediate impact on Indo-US relations, or more pertinently, co-operation in the intelligence field. In July 1961, whilst on a tour of the southern India, John Kenneth Galbraith was surprised, and faintly amused, when in the course of being introduced to a group of local dignitaries, a man stepped forward and exclaimed exuberantly, ‘Mr. Ambassador, I am the superintendent of police here in Madras. I would like to tell you that I have the most satisfactory relationship with your spies.’

In the aftermath of the following year’s Sino-Indian border war, Indian and American intelligence agencies further strengthened their working relationships. Notably, the CIA assisted the IB in equipping and training a clandestine warfare unit tasked with monitoring Chinese military supply routes into Tibet. Under an agreement reached between James Critchfield, chief of the CIA’s Near East operations, and B. N. Mullik, Langley furnished support to the Indo-Tibetan Special Frontier Force (SFF), a unit modelled on the US Army Green Berets, or special forces. From the winter of 1964, SFF operations along the Sino-Indian border were co-ordinated through a joint Indo-US command centre in New Delhi. The Agency also oversaw the insertion of nuclear-powered surveillance equipment on two of India’s Himalayan peaks, with a view to collecting data on Chinese atomic tests. One US

---


33 See, Robert Kom to McGeorge Bundy, 14 October 1965, NSF; Robert W. Kom Papers, Box 13, Folder 6 Bundy, McG - Decisions 1965-66; and, Walt Rostow to President Johnson, 30 April 1966, NSF, Intelligence File, Box 2, Folder India's Unconventional Warfare Force, LBJL. Also, M.S. Kohli and Kenneth Conboy, Spies
diplomat, who served in the US Embassy in New Delhi throughout the first half of the 1960s, subsequently verified that the Agency’s presence in India at the time was, ‘very large, and very invasive...the CIA was deeply involved in the Indian Government.’

In fact, although many Indian government officials were aware of the existence of liaison relationships between the IB and their British and American counterparts, India’s intelligence chiefs worked hard to disguise the true extent and significance of their collaboration with Western intelligence agencies. In large part, such caution reflected a realisation on the part of senior IB officers that, as B. N. Mullik reflected, India’s premier, Jawaharlal Nehru, held a ‘natural’ and ‘strong prejudice’ against much of the work performed by intelligence organisations. In April 1950, T. G. Sanjevi had reassured American officials that, ‘he frequently had to take independent action without the knowledge of his government’, and, ‘regardless of the official attitude of his government, he would welcome the continuance of...unofficial contacts.’ Once he had succeeded Sanjevi, Mullik deemed it equally prudent to keep IB’s links with British and American intelligence agencies as quiet as possible. Were Nehru to get wind of the scale of India’s partnership with the CIA and MI5, Mullik explained to one British intelligence officer, much of the liaison activity would have to be curtailed.

When viewed through the prism of Nehru’s family history, the suspicion and distrust that the Indian premier, and more significantly, his daughter, Indira Gandhi, harboured toward foreign intelligence agencies is unsurprising. Before India’s independence in 1947, when not languishing in British prisons, both Nehru and Gandhi had been subjected to

---

36 Richard W. Klise to Loy Henderson, 18 April 1950, RG59, Office of South Asian Affairs India Affairs 1944-57, Lot file 57D373, Box 2, Folder Official informal Jan-May 1950, NARA.
oppressive surveillance by a British imperial security service that one contemporary American observer lauded as, ‘the finest political intelligence organisation in the world.’\textsuperscript{38} In later life, Gandhi emphasised the deep psychological impression left by witnessing ‘a large number of relatives, on both my father’s and mother’s side’ hounded and imprisoned for expressing political opinions inimical to the British Raj. ‘I do not know of any other family,’ Gandhi observed, ‘which was so involved in the freedom struggle and its hardships.’\textsuperscript{39} In post-independence South Asia, however, it was anxiety over CIA activity undertaken without the knowledge and approval of the Indian government, that most exercised the Nehru clan. In June 1955, in a speech delivered to a gathering of Indian diplomats in Salzburg, Austria, Jawaharlal Nehru made it clear that he regarded the CIA as an especially invidious threat to Indian democracy. ‘The United States are carrying on their espionage and secret service activities [inside India],’ Nehru assured his audience. ‘They have also been buying up newspapers and spreading a network of publicity organisations... We are more concerned with what the Americans are trying to do than the others.’\textsuperscript{40}

The unease that India’s political leadership felt towards the CIA were reflected in the Agency’s endeavours to maintain a low public profile. In 1965, shortly after being posted to New Delhi, the \textit{New York Times}’ correspondent, Anthony Lukas, noted that in India the CIA did its best to operate, ‘very much on the hush-hush.’ In contrast to the more overt presence


that it adopted in other parts of the developing world, such as the Congo, in India, Lukas found that the Agency went to, ‘great efforts to pretend that it doesn’t exist.’ The Agency’s challenge in disguising the ever-greater numbers of its officers seconded to the American embassy faintly amused Lukas, who much like Rosenthal before him, found little difficulty in identifying US intelligence personnel. The CIA’s resolve to keep its presence in India out of the public spotlight was made abundantly clear to the American journalist after he published a ‘light yarn’ in the Times. Lukas’ report referenced the emergence of a ‘protest movement’ amongst American diplomats, led by an unnamed CIA official, against plans to cull some ducks that had taken up residence in a pool within the US Embassy compound. Within days of the stories publication, Lukas was summoned to the Embassy by the resident press attaché, and tersely informed that he had been decreed persona non grata by the local CIA station chief. ‘I was told,’ Lukas advised his superiors back in New York, ‘that I had gravely compromised the agency’s security here.’ ‘What, I asked incredulously, had I done? The answer: I had informed the Indians that the C.I.A. was operating out of the Embassy.’

The CIA’s reaction to Lukas’ article was undoubtedly influenced by the fact that India’s broader relationship with the United States was under considerable strain at that time. Once Lyndon Johnson had entered the White House in November 1963, America’s focus shifted inexorably away from the Indian subcontinent, and toward South East Asia. Consequently, diplomatic tensions between Washington and New Delhi on issues ranging from the provision of military assistance, the supply of food aid, and the escalating conflict in Vietnam, were left to fester. In particular, having received the lion’s share of American overseas developmental assistance and food aid from the late 1950s, many Indians felt humiliated by the cycle of dependency that had come to characterise their country’s relationship with the United States. As the subcontinent experienced a succession of droughts

in the 1960s, India’s increasing reliance on American surplus wheat and rice to stave off famine, generated more resentment than goodwill. ‘The American role here,’ one Western journalist in India opined, ‘has been an object lesson in how to give aid and win enemies.’ Efforts by American officials in India, led by Chester Bowles, to maintain constructive diplomatic relations with New Delhi were not helped by a series of revelations that suggested the CIA had recruited assets, or informers, at the very top levels of the Indian government. Among those alleged to have worked for US intelligence, was Mac Mathai, Nehru’s private secretary. One of the Indian Prime Minister’s foremost biographer’s has gone as far as to state that throughout Mathai’s period of government service between 1946 and 1959, ‘the CIA had access to every paper passing through Nehru’s Secretariat.’

‘Spies and Saboteurs’: The intelligence Cold War comes to India

At the same time that the United States’ association with India was coming under strain, the Soviet Union’s relationship with New Delhi began to blossom. Until Joseph Stalin’s death in 1953, the Soviet government had disparaged India as an imperialist puppet. Both Nehru, and India’s spiritual leader, Mohandas Karamchand Gandhi, had routinely been dismissed by Moscow as bourgeois reactionaries. Under Nikita Khrushchev’s leadership, however, with ideological fervour having been displaced with a more pragmatic approach to international affairs, the Soviet Union embarked upon a concerted effort to woo nascent post-colonial states. India’s huge population, untapped economic potential, shared anxiety at China’s

43 Sarvepalli Gopal, *Jawaharlal Nehru: A Biography, Vol.3, 1956-1964* (London: Jonathan Cape, 1984), p. 122. Gopal based his assertion on records of discussions that had taken place between his father, and India’s President, Sarvepalli Radhakrishnan, and V. Sahay, India’s Cabinet Secretary, in 1966. Nehru had asked the Cabinet Secretary to investigate allegations linking Mathai to the CIA back in 1959. In contrast, a subsequent biographer of Nehru’s, who was afforded privileged access to his private papers, was unable to unearth any evidence linking Mathai to the CIA. See, Judith M. Brown, *Nehru: A Political Life* (London: Yale University Press, 2003), pp. 382-3.
international assertiveness, and in the form of Nehru, influence within the Non-Aligned Movement, all attracted Soviet interest. Moreover, where Soviet politicians led, the nation’s foreign intelligence bodies, in the form of the KGB and Soviet military intelligence, the GRU, soon followed. In 1961, with Khrushchev’s blessing, the young and dynamic KGB chairman, Aleksandr Shelepin, launched an aggressive covert campaign designed to undermine Western influence across the developing world. By 1967, Leonid Brezhnev had replaced Khrushchev, and the future Soviet premier, Yuri Andropov, had taken control of the KGB. The strategy of fomenting revolution across Asia, Africa and Latin America, however, remained unchanged. Indeed, during the Brezhnev era, the conservative Soviet Foreign Minister, Andrei Gromyko, was happy to cede the initiative for much of the Soviet forward policy in the developing world to Andropov and the KGB. In turn, Soviet foreign intelligence agencies concentrated a large proportion of their operational effort, outside of Europe and North America, on India.  

In May 1966, Chester Bowles warned Lyndon Johnson’s National Security Advisor, Walt Rostow, that the United States faced, ‘a period of acute competition with the USSR for leverage in India.’ Oleg Kalugin, then a rising star in the KGB’s First Chief (Foreign Intelligence) Directorate, has stated that around the time of the Ramparts disclosures:

...we [the KGB] had scores of sources throughout the Indian government – in intelligence, counterintelligence, the defense and foreign ministries, and the police. The entire country was seemingly for sale, and the KGB and the CIA had deeply penetrated the Indian government. After a while, neither side entrusted sensitive information to the Indians, realizing their enemy would know all about it the next day.

---


The following year, Bowles again urged an increasingly disinterested Washington to take heed of, ‘the massive effort the Communist press and the Communist party [of India] are now making to disrupt Indo-American relationships.’ In April 1967, in an article published in the *American Reporter*, a newspaper distributed by the US government in the subcontinent, Bowles complained bitterly of the ‘international character assassination’ being undertaken by sections of the Indian media. Communist propaganda in India, the ambassador fulminated, had maliciously charged American “‘spies and saboteurs’” with ‘plotting turn this country over to “Wall Street imperialists”, “Neo-Colonialists”, and “Neo-Cultural penetrationists.”’

Following that year’s Indian general election, for the first time since independence the ruling Congress party was faced with a credible parliamentary opposition. At the same time, Indira Gandhi’s government was assailed by sluggish economic growth, a food crisis, and a slump in export orders. In unfamiliar political territory, senior Congress party figures began to question the appetite of the Johnson administration to come to India’s rescue. ‘‘Unfortunately,’ a dispirited Bowles informed Lyndon Johnson, ‘the atmosphere in which the estimate of [the] future U.S. stance [on India] is being made, is heavily fogged by widespread public and Parliamentary uneasiness regarding admitted and alleged CIA activities... and general concern about the ability of the U.S. Government to maintain the required level of assistance here in view of demands in Vietnam.’

In actuality, the psychological writing had been on the wall for Indo-US relations from the moment that Indira Gandhi became India’s Prime Minister, in January 1966. As one CIA report from September 1973 observed, ‘left-of-centre Indian officials, including Mrs. Gandhi, have long held a conspiratorial view of U.S. activities in India which has been a

smouldering source of resentment against the United States.”

To many Western diplomats Gandhi appeared ‘vain’, ‘emotional’, ‘authoritarian’, and prone to ‘irrational’ fits of pique when events turned against her. Officials in Washington were particularly disconcerted by an anti-American undercurrent that appeared to influence many of Gandhi’s actions and utterances, a character trait that the Indian premier was commonly perceived to have inherited from her father. Following one bruising encounter with Gandhi in October 1970, US Secretary of State, William Rogers, complained that although the Nixon administration had, ‘been in office only 20 months’, the Indian premier was, ‘holding against us a paranoia going back to John Foster Dulles.’

An avid consumer of literature with a strong CIA theme, in 1974 alone Gandhi devoured Victor Marchetti and John Marks’, The CIA and the Cult of Intelligence, Antony Sampson’s, The Sovereign State: The Secret History of ITT, and David Halberstam’s, The Best and the Brightest. ‘The picture she would have [drawn of the CIA] from this selection,’ the American Embassy in New Delhi bemoaned, ‘...would hardly be objective.’

Equally, as one US ambassador to India, Daniel Patrick Moynihan, has pointed out, Gandhi had few qualms about co-operating with foreign intelligence agencies, including those of the United States, when it suited her interests to do so. In his 1978 memoir, A Dangerous Place, Moynihan confirmed that to his knowledge the CIA had twice intervened in Indian politics. On both occasions the Agency had funnelled money to the ruling Congress Party in a bid to head off the election of communist governments in Kerala and West Bengal.

50 ‘National Intelligence Survey: India September 1973’, NARA, CIA-RDP01-0070700200070032-3, CREST.
51 ‘Mrs. Indira Gandhi’, 15 January 1964, RG59, Records Relating to Indian Political Affairs, 1964-1966, Lot 68D207, Box 5, Prime Minister Nehru Jan-May 1964, NARA.
54 Saxbe to Secretary of State, No. 03530, ‘Prime Minister Gandhi Comments on CIA Activity’, 13 March 1975, RG59, Central Foreign Policy Files, Electronic Telegrams, 1/1/1975-21/3/1975, NARA.
In one instance, the ambassador charged, CIA money was passed directly to Gandhi in her capacity as Congress Party President. Others have pointed out, that whether she realised it or not, Gandhi’s principal political fundraiser during the early 1970s, Lalit Narayan Mishra, actively solicited money from the KGB. Rumours abounded in New Delhi at the time of suitcases stuffed full of banknotes arriving at the Prime Minister’s residence in the dead of night. Leonid Shebarshin, a KGB officer stationed in India in the 1970s, has documented an occasion on which he personally handed over a gift of two million Indian rupees to Mishra on behalf of the Soviet Politburo. Moreover, as Nehru’s closest political confidante and, after 1964, a Cabinet Minister in her own right, it is hard to conceive that Gandhi was not at least aware of, if not complicit in, joint initiatives with the CIA which the Indian government sanctioned in the wake of the Sino-Indian border war. In 1975, Gandhi’s links to the CIA would come back to haunt her when, in the midst of a crusade against the Agency’s subversive practices, the *Hindustan Times* began to publish details of the history of the Indian government’s relationship with American intelligence. In response, Indira Gandhi affected an awkward, and none too convincing, case of prime ministerial amnesia.

**The CIA and Cold War propaganda in India**

The success enjoyed by Indian left-wing groups in exploiting the *Ramparts* disclosures to fan concern over CIA interference in India’s internal affairs alarmed the United States’ British

---

55 Moynihan, *A Dangerous Place*, p. 41.

56 One of Gandhi’s political opponents, S. K. Patil, observed sardonically that after taking delivery of KGB ‘donation’s’, Gandhi did not even have the decency to return the suitcases in which they had arrived to their Soviet owners. Inder Malhotra, *Indira Gandhi: A Personal and Political Biography* (London: Hodder & Stoughton, 1989), p. 143, f.; Although the KGB had taken a considerable interest in Gandhi from the early 1950s, assigning her the codename VANO, no evidence has emerged to link the Indian premier directly with Soviet intelligence. Andrew and Mitrokhin, *The Mitrokhin Archive II*, p. 322.

57 Saxbe to Secretary of State, No. 03530, ‘Prime Minister Gandhi Comments on CIA Activity’, 13 March 1975, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy Files, Electronic Telegrams, 1/1/1975-21/31/1975; Saxbe to Secretary of State, No. 03606, ‘Indo-US Intelligence Cooperation Reported in Press’, 14 March 1975, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy Files, Electronic Telegrams, 1/1/1975-21/31/1975, NARA.
ally. After two hundred years of colonial rule in South Asia, the British retained a significant political, economic, and cultural stake in India after 1947.\textsuperscript{58} London also maintained an important intelligence presence in India, both overt, in the form of MI5’s SLO, and covert, through the work of the Information Research Department (IRD). The IRD had been established in 1948 to counter the spread of Soviet propaganda in Britain and throughout the developing world.\textsuperscript{59} During the 1950s, its personnel were seconded to British diplomatic missions abroad, and tasked with feeding anti-communist literature to networks of local journalists and politicians. IRD cultivated a wide range of contacts in India, and counted B. N. Mullik, and other senior Intelligence Bureau officers, amongst its customers.\textsuperscript{60} It was not until January 1962, however, that the first permanent IRD representative in India, Peter Joy, was posted to the British High Commission in New Delhi under cover provided by the British Information Service.\textsuperscript{61}

Over the next five years, IRD expanded its work in the subcontinent, establishing relationships with independent research centres and Indian government departments, including the Ministry of External Affairs, Armed Forces Information Office, Press Information Bureau, and All India Radio. By early 1967, Joy was working with over 400 ‘well-placed and influential individuals throughout India’, some of who received secret

\textsuperscript{58} The British led a Commonwealth of Nations that included India, and its neighbour, Pakistan; supplied India’s armed forces with much of its training and equipment into the late 1960s; and remained South Asia’s principal trading partner. John Freeman to CRO, 15 April 1966, PREM 13/970, TNA.


\textsuperscript{60} By 1953, Mullik was receiving regular deliveries of several IRD publications. See, V.C. Martin to G.S. Bozman, 7 October 1953, FO 1110/603, TNA

\textsuperscript{61} India’, Visit of Nigel Clive (IRD) to India and Pakistan, 5 December 1967, FCO 95/290, TNA.
payments for their services. In addition, two publishing houses in the Indian capital, and a regional newspaper article redistribution scheme, were paid to disseminate IRD material on a non-attributable basis through a British cover organisation, the International Forum. Under Joy’s guidance, the IRD was particularly successful in cultivating ‘assets’ in the Indian press. One IRD survey estimated that its material had appeared in over 500 Indian newspaper articles during the course of 1964 alone. ‘We are able,’ the IRD crowed, ‘to get the right article into the right paper at the right time.’ In 1967, having diversified its operations from New Delhi to incorporate work in Calcutta and Madras, IRD began lobbying Whitehall for permission to take on a more interventionist role in the subcontinent. ‘IRD should,’ its management argued, ‘concentrate more than hitherto on the cultivation of influential Congress Ministers, M.P.’s and senior civil servants.’

Fearful that “‘blowback’” from the anti-CIA campaign in India would compromise Britain’s covert propaganda operation, the United Kingdom’s High Commissioner in New Delhi, John Freeman, instructed the IRD to proceed with ‘particular caution’ and temporarily curtail some of its riskier activities. IRD officers were temporarily prohibited for seeking new Indian contacts, suspended meetings with existing ‘assets’, and implemented tighter security measures around the distribution of financial ‘incentives’. In rationalising his decision to order a ‘pause’ in IRD activity, Freeman argued that the spotlight which had been thrown on the CIA in India threatened to, ‘unearth the activities of other Western Missions and perhaps link these with C.I.A. Here we should be an obvious target.’ Furthermore, with communist dominated coalition governments having assumed power in Kerala and West Bengal,

---

62 Ibid.
63 One former Director General of MI5, Stella Rimington, worked for IRD in India for a brief period in the mid-1960s, distributing covert propaganda to Indian journalists, politicians and academics who, ‘had been recruited to use the material unattributably.’ Rimington confirmed the IRD’s success in placing material, some of which ‘was quite personal stuff about [Indian] politicians’, in Indian newspapers and magazines. Stella Rimington. Open Secret: The Autobiography of the Former Director-General of MI5, (London: Arrow Books, 2002), 75.
64 Peter Joy to C.F.R. Barclay, 8 May 1964, FO 1110/182; ‘India’, Visit of Nigel Clive to India and Pakistan, 5 December 1967, FCO 95/290, TNA.
Freeman was conscious that, ‘the spread of communist influence is now likely to enter the field of Indian domestic politics, and... in the process, the ability of the State Governments to uncover – or fabricate – “foreign influences” is of course increased.’

American diplomats in India evinced frustration that Indira Gandhi’s government, if not actively directing India’s leading communist leaning newspapers and magazines, such as *Patriot, Blitz* and *Link*, to carry salacious and defamatory anti-CIA content, was certainly doing very little to discourage the practice. The US Embassy in New Delhi noted that in one edition of *Patriot*, 11½ of its 28 pages were taking up with Government advertising. Likewise, an American analysis conducted on *Link’s* advertising income revealed that it was derived, in large part, from Gandhi’s Congress Party, at both national and state level. Moreover, All India Radio, a potent source of information in a country where two out of every three adults were illiterate, and the Press Trust of India, both of which were, as the British noted, ‘open to official pressure’, infuriated US officials by giving blanket coverage to spurious allegations implicating the CIA in subversive activity.

Throughout India’s general election in 1967, the KGB had employed a variety of ‘active measures’ in a bid to smear the CIA. Many of these utilised fabricated American documents drafted by Service A of the KGB’s First Chief Directorate, which specialised in disinformation. In one instance, a Soviet agent inside the American Embassy in New Delhi was able to pass templates of official US documents and sample signatures to the KGB. These were then used by Service A to forge a letter nominally from the US Consul-General in Bombay, in which it was suggested that the CIA had been channelling large sums of money

---

65 John Freeman to Sir Saville Garner (CRO), PL. 34/51D, 11 April 1967, FCO 95/200; ‘Brief Progress Report of IRD work in India, 1 January-30 June 1967’, FCO95/290, TNA.

to S.K. Patil, a right-wing Congress Party MP. By leaking a number of similar counterfeit letters to the Indian press, the KGB was able to keep the CIA firmly in the public spotlight. The Soviet disinformation campaign in India was assisted by the fact that, the CPI journal *New Age* aside, an estimated 16 English language Indian broadsheets, and a far greater number of vernacular newspapers, were regarded as, ‘fundamentally in sympathy with the Communist line’. One Soviet intelligence officer, who served in the KGB residency, or station, in New Delhi, subsequently confirmed that in seeking to blacken the CIA’s reputation in the subcontinent, the KGB had made full use of, ‘extensive contacts within political parties, among journalists and public organizations. All were enthusiastically brought into play.’

The scale of the Soviet ‘black’ propaganda initiative was such that, in the IRD’s estimation, by April 1967 the anti-CIA campaign run in the Indian press had begun, ‘over-reaching itself and thus blurring the target.’ Even the New Delhi law practice run by the rabidly anti-American former Indian Defence Minister, Krishna Menon, one IRD official noted with wry amusement, ‘has been accused of receiving C.I.A. funds!’ The Soviets problems were compounded when the results of the enquiry into CIA ‘interference’ in India’s general election, which M. C. Chagla had promised the country’s exercised parliamentarians, became available in June. In the report delivered to Chagla by the IB, both the CIA and the KGB were implicated in funding the election campaigns of their preferred candidates. So much evidence was accumulated by India’s intelligence service relating to KGB interference in the election, however, that the Soviet Embassy successfully lobbied Chagla to suppress the

68 ‘India’, IR1/545/3, 15 November 1967, FCO95/290, TNA.
70 Peter Joy to Mr. Clive, Mr. Tucker and Mr. Welser, IR 1/209/29, 20 April 1967, FCO 95/200, TNA.
reports findings.\textsuperscript{71} Although never quite recapturing the same level of intensity reached in the first half of 1967, the KGB and CIA continued to fight a ‘bitter’ and protracted propaganda war in the subcontinent during the final years of the decade.\textsuperscript{72} In New Delhi, Chester Bowles repeatedly voiced concern that the distracted and politically weakened Johnson administration was steadily ceding American influence to Soviet Union in South Asia. ‘The U.S. Government, diverted and confused by Vietnam and social tensions, seems to be pulling back [in India],’ a disconsolate Bowles wrote to Harrison Salisbury, the \textit{New York Times} journalist, in May 1968. ‘In the meantime the Soviets are successfully stepping up their efforts here with a great amount of skills and resources.’\textsuperscript{73} Bowles warning proved to be prescient. Under the Nixon administration in the early 1970s, the Soviet Union was to redouble its efforts to use the CIA as a political wedge with which to unhinge the United States’ relationship with Indira Gandhi’s government.

\textbf{Indira Gandhi, the Nixon administration and the politics of intelligence}

On entering the White House in January 1969, Richard Nixon quickly concluded that peace and stability in South Asia could best be maintained by furnishing India’s rival, Pakistan, with sufficient American economic and military assistance to counter-balance New Delhi’s preponderant regional power. Back in the 1950s, Nixon had earned India’s disfavour by enthusiastically supporting the Eisenhower administration’s decision to enter into an alliance with Pakistan. At the time, the then Vice-President had failed to warm to Nehru, whom he considered cold, aloof and bent on consolidating India’s dominant influence not only in South

\textsuperscript{71} ‘Brief Progress Report on IRD work in India, 1 January-30 June 1967’, and ‘India’, IRI/545/5, 15 November 1967, FCO 95/290, TNA.
\textsuperscript{72} Douglas Heck to Carleton S. Coon Jr. ‘Soviet Policy towards India’, 28 February 1968, RG59, Bureau of Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs Records Relating to India 1966-75, Lot file 72D5, Box 5 India-USSR 1968, NARA.
\textsuperscript{73} Chester Bowles to Harrison Salisbury, 2 May 1968, Box 1, Folder Chester Bowles, HSP.
Asia, but across the Middle East and Africa. Nixon’s National Security Advisor, and latterly Secretary of State, Henry Kissinger, subsequently reflected that the President always felt more comfortable dealing with the, ‘bluff, direct military chiefs of Pakistan…than the complex and apparently haughty Brahmin leaders of India.’

In December 1971, to Indira Gandhi’s fury, Nixon ‘tilted’ decisively towards Pakistan following the outbreak of Indo-Pakistan hostilities. In turn, having frustrated his effort to prevent East Pakistan’s transformation into the independent nation state of Bangladesh, Nixon returned Gandhi’s animus. After 1971, an atmosphere of deep mutual distrust pervaded Washington’s relations with New Delhi. Strained Indo-US tensions were subsequently aggrivated by differences over issues as diverse as the Gandhi government’s ties to the Soviet Union; the on going war in Vietnam; an outstanding rupee debt which New Delhi had accumulated purchasing US grain shipments in 1960s; and, India’s fledgling nuclear weapons programme. Within the confines of Nixon’s Oval Office, Indians came to be characterised as ‘bastards’, while Gandhi herself was derided as an ‘old witch’ and a ‘bitch’.

It was with an understandable degree of trepidation therefore, that on 24 July 1972, Kenneth Keating, Nixon’s ambassador to India, made a final call on Indira Gandhi before returning to the United States to oversee the President’s re-election campaign. Keating had

---

anticipated that his encounter with Gandhi might prove awkward. During a thirty-minute audience with the Indian premier, however, the ambassador was left stunned by the force of the ‘emotional and distorted’ attack that Gandhi launched against the Nixon administration. Significantly, Gandhi chose to vent her spleen by presenting Keating with a long and well-worn series of allegations linking the CIA with subversive activities in India. Forces inside American government, Gandhi assured an incredulous Keating, were ‘working against us in India’; ‘cooperating with communist extremists’ to destabilise her administration; and encouraging ‘a lot of American professors...to engage in improper activities injurious to India.’ ‘Incredible!’, the dumbstruck Keating subsequently cabled to Washington, ‘My successor has an even tougher task ahead than I anticipated.’

The rhetorical barbs that Indira Gandhi threw Keating’s way were, in part, driven by domestic political expediency. Whenever Gandhi’s domestic fortunes flagged, the Indian economy tanked, or the Congress Party found itself in political difficulty, it was all too easy to blame the malign influence of a ‘foreign hand’. During 1969, Gandhi had fallen afoul of the Congress Party’s elder statesman, known as the Syndicate, by shifting decisively to the political left. In July that year, Gandhi nationalised fourteen of India’s commercial banks, and sacked her conservative finance minister, and bitter political rival, Morarji Desai. The syndicate reacted by dismissing Gandhi from the Congress Party. In response, Gandhi formed a new breakaway party, Congress (R). In February 1971, India held its fifth general election, and Gandhi’s reconstituted party, which drew on support from the Moscow sponsored wing of the CPI, was returned to power on the back of the slogan, Garibi Hatao, or abolish poverty. In the months that followed, the CPI exerted pressure on its Congress (R) partner to adopt a radical socialist agenda by organising periodic demonstrations of civil disobedience, or ‘mass satyagraha’, in support of land reform, full employment, and wealth redistribution.

77 Keating to the Department of State, 24 July 1972, RG 59, Central Files 1970-1973, POL INDIA-US, NARA.
In the autumn of 1972, confronted with mass CPI orchestrated protests against rampant inflation, food shortages, and rising unemployment, Gandhi and senior Congress (R) officials elected not to admonish their communist allies, but instead to implicate the CIA, and the Agency’s domestic “accomplices”, with fomenting unrest inside India. Beginning in late September, Congress (R) president, S. D. Sharma, delivered a string of public speeches in which he claimed to have firm evidence, which despite repeated demands from the Indian press he declined to produce, proving that the CIA was colluding with right wing opponents of the government to, ‘throttle the Indian economy.’ On 9 October, on the eve of a national Congress (R) convention in Gujarat, Gandhi added her voice to the chorus of anti-CIA rhetoric by openly asserting that:

...elements in India, who had always been voicing opposition to the Government’s political economic and foreign policies, were receiving encouragement from foreign sources. The opposition was identical with criticism from abroad not only in regard to ideas, but also in the choice of words used. This made it clear that there were contacts between India’s critics at home and abroad.78

British officials in India, and much of the country’s English language press, dismissed the allegations levelled by Sharma and Gandhi at the CIA, as a ‘barefaced political stunt.’ The British High Commission in New Delhi informed London that the, ‘CPI have plainly been up to their necks in recent agitation’, whilst, ‘Indian security professionals do not put down [the] agitation to [a] CIA conspiracy.’79 The right-wing Indian periodical, Thought, observed sardonically that Gandhi had chosen to deliver her anti-CIA polemic in the very location where Mahatma Gandhi’s autobiography, Experiments with Truth, had played out. In an editorial entitled, ‘Hitting Out Wildly’, Calcutta’s respected daily, The Statesman, disparaged Gandhi’s implication that India’s economic difficulties were ‘due to CIA “machinations”’, as

78 ‘The Poodle Not House-Trained’, P. H. Roberts to Mr Martin, Mr Chittenden and Mr Everett, 19 October 1972, FCO 95/1347, TNA.
79 Garvey to FCO, No. 2595, 23 October 1972, FCO 95/1388, TNA.
simply ‘too infantile to be considered seriously.’ Casting a satirical, if equally damning eye on the CIA rumpus, the Indian Express printed a cartoon on its front page which depicted Sharma advising the Indian premier that, ‘This week’s CIA activities include four price-rise demonstrations, seven buses hijacked by students, plus one cyclone in Orissa.’

In lashing out at the CIA, Indira Gandhi undoubtedly calculated that the Agency would serve as a convenient external scapegoat for internal troubles, and at the same time provide a useful means of placating her CPI ally with a show of anti-Western bluster. Moreover, the British suspected that Gandhi would derive no little satisfaction from the knowledge that, ‘these allegations would stick in President Nixon’s gizzard.’ Not least, Indian government officials were fully aware that the CIA, which Nixon denigrated as a haven for Ivy League liberals at odds with his political philosophy, represented a particularly sensitive pressure point where the President was concerned. While on the surface India’s wider economic and strategic interests suggested that choosing to pick a quarrel with the United States made little sense, Gandhi was deemed shrewd enough to reason that, with Nixon seemingly assured of a second presidential term, ‘the US would be in no hurry anyway to resume aid, participate in debt rescheduling or make any other gesture towards India. Hence further deterioration in Indo/US relations was no skin off her nose while bringing internal benefits.’

Having beaten so hard on the anti-CIA drum, senior US officials began to worry that Gandhi risked creating a domestic political monster over which she would be able to wield increasingly less control. The Congress left wing, it seemed, aided and abetted by the CPI, had ‘gradually undercut’ Indian officials and politicians seeking better Indo-US relations and more pragmatic economic policies. ‘Ironically this latter group probably includes Mrs.

81 USIS Media Reaction Report, New Delhi, 26 September 1972, FCO 95/1388, TNA.
82 Garvey to FCO, No. 2595, 23 October 1972, FCO 95/1388, TNA.
Gandhi…’, one US official diplomat, ‘But the [anti-CIA] campaign is tailored to cater to her prejudices and sensitivities.’

Gandhi’s tendency to conflate political opportunism and the CIA appeared to be equally in evidence in June 1975, after the Allahabad High Court controversially found the Indian Prime Minister guilty of minor electoral malpractice during the 1971 general election. If upheld by India’s Supreme Court, the ruling threatened to invalidate Gandhi’s status as an MP and bring down her government. Later the same month, with her political opponents scenting blood and protestors having taken to India’s streets in almost equal numbers to both support and denounce her, Gandhi declared a State of Emergency, suspended civil liberties, and jailed her political opponents. Almost immediately, senior Congress Party figures loyal to Gandhi began attributing the unrest that had preceded the imposition of martial law to a ‘foreign hand’, and declared defiantly that the government, ‘would not allow Delhi to be turned into Chile.’ On 15 August, as India commemorated its independence from British imperial rule, Gandhi gave an interview to a Congress Party newssheet, Socialist Weekly, in which she observed pointedly, ‘Have these several Western countries not given full moral and material support to the most authoritarian regimes of Africa and Asia? Have we so soon forgotten what happened to Chile?’

Those members of India’s political opposition that had avoided imprisonment openly mocked the idea that external forces had been plotting to subvert the government. One Indian MP took to wearing a badge that proclaimed, ‘I am a CIA agent’, and made a tidy profit into the bargain by selling on copies to his parliamentary colleagues. Within the American

---

84 Schneider (Embassy New Delhi) to Secretary of State, No. 07903, ‘Allahabad Court Case’, 16 June 1975, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy Files, Electronic Telegrams, 1/1/1975-21/31/1975, NARA.
86 Schneider to Secretary of State, No. 08067, ‘Indo-US Relations’, 19 June 1975, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy Files, Electronic Telegrams, 1/1/1975-21/31/1975, NARA. See also, ‘Conspiracy Theories’, Hindustan Times, 1 October 2005; and, Moynihan, A Dangerous Place, p. 150.
Embassy, however, a file of Indian press clippings linking the United States government, and more particularly the CIA, with a conspiracy to overthrow Gandhi, grew larger by the day.\(^8^7\) The KGB residency in New Delhi, which in a reflection of the importance that the Soviet intelligence service attached to India, had been upgraded to the status of a main residency in the early 1970s, played an especially active part in feeding Gandhi’s suspicion that the CIA was actively plotting her demise.\(^8^8\) In doing so, the KGB was able to call upon the services of an Indian press agency, two daily and eight weekly Indian newspapers, and four popular magazines, all which received covert Soviet funding. During the course of 1972 alone, the Soviet residency in New Delhi claimed credit for placing almost 4,000 pro-Soviet and anti-US articles in the Indian press.\(^8^9\) Whilst it remains likely that KGB officers on the subcontinent exaggerated the extent to which they were able to manipulate India’s media, one of the world’s leading authorities on the KGB has gone as far as to state that, ‘India under Indira Gandhi was...probably the area for more KGB active measures than anywhere in the world.’\(^9^0\)

One of the KGB’s notable propaganda successes in India occurred in December 1972. That month, three of India’s leading newspapers, *The Times of India*, *Hindustan Times*, and *Indian Express*, reproduced a story which had first appeared in the Kuwaiti daily, *Al Siyassa*. The report alleged that the CIA had been complicit in a number of plots to assassinate Indira Gandhi. In the Indian parliament, communist MPs seized on the news, and demanded an

---

\(^8^7\) Saxbe to Secretary of State, No. 08751, ‘Press Allegations of US Involvement in India Domestic Situation’, 1 July 1975, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy Files, Electronic Telegrams, 1/1/1975-21/31/1975, NARA.

\(^8^8\) The KGB’s main resident, or station chief, in India between 1970 and 1975, Yakov Profoyevich Medyanik, was responsible for four KGB outposts in the subcontinent, in New Delhi, Bombay, Calcutta and Madras. Andrew and Mitrokhin, *The Mitrokhin Archive II*, p. 321.

\(^8^9\) Figures from the KGB’s archives list 3,789 articles as being planted in the Indian press in 1972; 2,760 in 1973; 4,486 in 1975; and 5,510 in 1975. By way of comparison, in Italy, the KGB took credit for placing only 48 articles in the local press in 1975; and 63 in 1976. Andrew and Mitrokhin, *The Mitrokhin Archive II*, p. 324.

\(^9^0\) KGB operations in India had become so extensive by 1974, that a new department, the Seventeenth department, was established within its First Chief (Foreign Intelligence) Directorate, which dealt exclusively with South Asia. Andrew and Mitrokhin, *The Mitrokhin Archive II*, p. 324.
official investigation to establish its veracity. D. D. Puri, the CPI Member of Parliament for Haryana, declared theatrically that the allegation represented:

...the most earth-shaking news...I would like to get an unequivocal assurance from the Government that if these is an iota of truth in this, if one-hundredth or even one-thousandth of this is true, there is no question of opening trade relations or any other type of relations with the United States of America. The Government must give us an assurance to this effect here and now. 91

To the British, the *Al Siyassa* story displayed all the hallmarks of a Soviet ‘smear’, and constituted a clear, ‘step up in the CIA/KGB slanging match in India.’ 92 Above all, the growing sophistication of the Soviet disinformation campaign in India impressed the British. *Al Siyassa*, it was noted, had established a reputation as an independent, politically moderate, and well-informed Arab newspaper, with no apparent connection to Soviet intelligence. Its editor, Ahmed Jarallah, who was known to senior IRD officers, was regarded as a generally pro-Western and conservative figure. In the past, Jarallah’s criticism of the Soviet presence in the Middle East had even seen him labelled as a CIA agent. By filtering anti-CIA propaganda through Jarallah, or more plausibly a more junior member of the *Al Siyassa* staff, the British conceded that the Soviets had ensured that any suggestion that the newspaper was a vehicle for KGB propaganda, ‘would probably ring false.’ 93

Moreover, to the intense frustration of American and British officials, the expansion of KGB operations in India continued to go largely unreported in the Indian press. Efforts made by the CIA, local United States Information Service officials, and the IRD to counter Soviet inspired attacks on the CIA by placing articles critical of the KGB in the mainstream Indian press, generated relatively modest results. At the height of the 1972 anti-CIA

---

91 Transcript of Indian Parliamentary debate, Rajya Sabha, RB: GDS T-1, 4 December 1972, FCO 95/1388, TNA.
92 ‘Alleged CIA Plot’, P H Roberts to H J Spence, 7 December 1972; Background note on *Al Siyassa*, 6 December 1972, FCO 95/1388, TNA.
93 B. R. Berry background note on *Al Siyassa*, 6 December 1972; Peter Joy to P.H. Roberts, 20 December 1972, FCO 95/1388, TNA.
campaign in India, the British could, ‘only find a handful of recent references to suspected KGB activity’ in the subcontinent’s newspapers. In one sense, the KGB’s comparative anonymity was undoubtedly reflective of the generally positive tenor of Indo-Soviet relations under Indira Gandhi. As previously indicated, from the mid-1960s onward, the strength of India’s economic and strategic links with the West steadily dissipated. Increasingly, New Delhi looked to Moscow to meet its economic and security needs, rather than Washington or London, a shift underlined by the signing of the Indo-Soviet Treaty of Peace, Friendship and Co-operation in August 1971.

Deeper cultural factors, however, may also go some way toward explaining the varying levels of Indian interest shown in the CIA and the KGB. At the turn of the 1940s, Loy Henderson detected an almost unconscious tendency on the part of Indians to, ‘exercise less restraint in finding fault with the United States than with the Soviet Union.’ Henderson attributed this phenomenon to the ‘deeper emotional responses’ evoked in Indians by American attitudes to questions of race, colonialism, and wealth redistribution, than by Soviet constraints on civil liberties and freedom of expression. Or put another way, the ambassador observed, ‘a general feeling [in the subcontinent] that the United States, as the most prosperous and technically the most advanced nation, is just a little too smug and that a bit of criticism now and then is good for the soul.’ United States Information Agency (USIA) surveys broadly supported Henderson’s impressions. One poll conducted by the USIA on ‘Indian Attitudes towards the U.S and U.S.S.R’ in 1956, revealed that respondents in India typically perceived America as ‘aggressive’ and ‘exploitative’, while the Soviet Union was

---

94 ‘Alleged CIA and KGB Activity in India’, H J Spence to P H Roberts, Ref. PRG2/302/5, 27 October 1972, FCO 95/1388, TNA.
95 Draft copy of Henderson address to Conference of US Foreign Service Officers, February 1951, Box 8, India Misc folder, Loy W. Henderson Papers, Library of Congress, Manuscripts Division, Washington DC.
generally deemed to be, ‘friendly to Asian countries’, and possess an, ‘economic system [that] leads to a rise in the standard of living of all in the country.’

Specific actions undertaken by the United States government and the CIA in the early 1970s can also be seen to have played a part in reinforcing the negative perception of America’s foreign intelligence service held many by Indians, and by Indira Gandhi in particular. Circumstantial evidence linking the United States with those responsible for the assassination of Bangladesh’s premier, Sheikh Mujibur Rahman, in August 1975, and exposes in *The New York Times* alleging that the CIA had run an agent inside Gandhi’s cabinet during the 1971 Indo-Pakistan War, unsettled the Indian premier. Above all, however, the CIA’s complicity in the bloody right-wing coup that removed the government of Salvador Allende in Chile, in September 1973, deeply affected Gandhi. After Allende’s demise, Indira Gandhi was genuinely concerned that she might be the next target on the Nixon administration list for regime change.

In a bid to reassure Gandhi that Washington wished her no harm, the American Deputy Chief of Mission in New Delhi paid a call on the Indian premier and stated unequivocally, ‘that of course, the US had not’ meddled in Chilean domestic politics.

Weeks later, Gandhi heard the CIA’s Director, William E. Colby, confirm to a US Congressional committee that, between 1970 and 1973, the Agency had spent more than $8

---

99 Moynihan to Secretary of State, No. 12063, ‘The United States as a Counter-Revolutionary Power: The Case of India and Chile’, 10 September 1974, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy Files, Electronic Telegrams, 1/1/1974-21/31/1974, NARA.
million in an effort to destabilize the Allende government.\textsuperscript{100} Earlier in 1973, shortly after he arrived in India to replace Kenneth Keating as US ambassador, Daniel Patrick Moynihan had cabled to Henry Kissinger that, ‘The paranoia out here is thicker than the dust.’\textsuperscript{101} Following Colby’s testimony, a dispirited Moynihan lamented that by handling the Chile question in such an inept manner, the United States government had done a first rate job of shooting itself in the foot in India. On 10 September 1974, Moynihan complained to Kissinger that Gandhi was now convinced:

...that we would be content to see her overthrown, as we have, to her mind, been content to see others like her overthrown. She knows full well that we have done our share and more of bloody and dishonourable deeds. This as such is not her concern. She knows all too much of such matters. It is precisely because she is not innocent, not squeamish, and not a moralizer that her concern about American intentions is real and immediate. And of course the news from the United States, as printed in the Indian press, repeatedly confirms her worst suspicions and genuine fears.\textsuperscript{102}

Moynihan’s gloom deepened further, when the investigative journalist, Seymour Hersh, obtained a leaked copy of his cable to Kissinger, and splashed the ambassador’s observations on Gandhi across the front page of the \textit{New York Times}.\textsuperscript{103}

Moreover, to Moynihan’s fury, Colby went on to compound Gandhi’s anxiety that the CIA was out to get her, by mounting a robust public defence of the United States’ need to exercise a covert action capability abroad. On 13 September, in an address before the Fund for Peace Conference, having first acknowledged the Agency’s track record of ‘assist[ing]
America’s friends against her adversaries in their contest for control of a foreign nation’s political direction’, Colby proceeded to argue that:

...a sovereign nation must look ahead to changing circumstances. I can envisage situations in which the United States might well need to conduct covert action in the face of some new threat that developed in the world...I thus would think it mistaken to deprive our nation of the possibility of some moderate covert action response to a foreign problem and leave us with nothing between a diplomatic protest and sending the Marines.  

On 2 December, Colby reiterated his support for covert action in an interview published in *US News & World Report*. After being replayed in the Indian press, this had the effect of whipping up a ‘wholly predictable storm’ in the subcontinent. In response, a perplexed Moynihan was left ‘groping’ for an explanation as to why Colby considered it necessary, or advisable, to openly debate the merits and morality of CIA clandestine operations. The Director of the KGB, the US ambassador noted ruefully, felt no similar compulsion to air the Soviet intelligence services dirty laundry in public. On 3 December, in a stinging cable sent to Henry Kissinger, Moynihan asked pointedly, ‘It is out of the question that some thought might be given in Washington to the effect in India of statements such as the Director has made? It is that nobody knows? Or is it that nobody cares?’  

Kissinger had, Moynihan reminded the Secretary of State, personally affirmed to Gandhi during a visit to New Delhi back in October, that the United States was not ‘directly or indirectly’ engaged in activities designed to destabilise India. ‘In what but an insane situation could a Director of Central Intelligence’, the ambassador speculated, ‘...find himself giving interviews to the press asserting a right to do what the Secretary of State had said was not being done in India?’ Half the Indian government, Moynihan emphasised, already

---


105 Moynihan to Kissinger, No. 16066, ‘CIA’, 3 December 1974, I: 371, India: Central Intelligence Agency Folder, DPMP.
suspected that the CIA was up to no good in India, while the other half were astute enough to recognise that by demonising the Agency and its purportedly nefarious activities in the subcontinent, they could outflank the Congress Party’s domestic critics. Colby’s outburst of candour, Moynihan underlined, had once again increased the likelihood that the CIA would be dragged into India’s internal politics. ‘Is there no way’, the ambassador urged Kissinger, ‘that [Colby’s] statement can be retracted?’

Indira Gandhi’s repeated assertion that the malevolent hand of the CIA lay behind most of India’s problems, whether genuinely held or not, consistently undermined Washington’s efforts to normalise Indo-US relations for much of the latter Cold War period. As Moynihan had underlined, when visiting India in October 1974, before getting down to any substantive business with his hosts, Henry Kissinger felt compelled to publicly affirm the ‘Kissinger Rule’, which committed Washington to repatriate any American official that the Indian government suspected of interference in its internal affairs. With the Ford administration having timed its first major policy statement on Indo-US relations to coincide with Kissinger’s arrival in India, the US Embassy in New Delhi optimistically hoped to draw some much needed positive publicity in the following days press. Instead, to the satisfaction of the KGB, which had passed a familiar batch of fabricated stories of CIA misdeeds on to friendly journalists, India’s newspapers ran with headlines proclaiming, ‘India asked to name CIA agents’, and ‘Suspicious U.S. Men to be removed from India.’ Despite the assurances provided to Gandhi by Moynihan, and his successor, Bill Saxbe, that they would resign if evidence emerged of CIA interference in Indian domestic affairs, Indian politicians and

---

106 Moynihan to Kissinger, No. 16066, ‘CIA’, 3 December 1974, I: 371, India: Central Intelligence Agency Folder, DPMP.
sections of the country’s media continued to accuse the CIA of acts of subversion throughout the 1970s.\textsuperscript{109} Indeed, an indignant Saxbe spent much of his time as ambassador in India between February 1975 and late 1976, making it clear to every senior Indian official that he encountered, that an improvement in Indo-US relations, ‘just cannot take place while the Prime Minister and other high Indian leaders continue to poke away at the US.’\textsuperscript{110}

By early 1976, however, with Gandhi’s government having disregarded numerous private warnings from the State Department to desist from publicly criticising the CIA’s purported activities in the subcontinent, the Ford administration resolved to punish New Delhi. Over the previous five years, the upsurge in anti-American sentiment in India had prompted both the United States government and US business to disengage from subcontinent. Between 1972 and 1975, the number of staff serving in the US Embassy in New Delhi halved. During the same period American companies turned their backs on India, with fewer than 40 US businessmen living and working amongst 600 million Indians.\textsuperscript{111} In Washington, India’s ambassador, T. N. Kaul, was frozen out by the White House and denied access to both President Ford and Kissinger. In January 1976, the Ford administration ratcheted up pressure on Gandhi by announcing the curtailment of a range of joint Indo-US scientific and educational programmes, and the postponement plans to resume developmental assistance to India, which had been halted back in 1971 during the Indo-Pakistan War. Given India’s continuing financial problems, the latter measure was expected to hit Gandhi’s government particularly hard. Between 1965 and 1971, India had received $4.2 billion in American economic aid, $1.5 billion of which had been appropriated during the early years of the Nixon administration. In rationalising the United States’ punitive policy to India’s

\textsuperscript{109} Saxbe to Secretary of State, No. 09951, ‘Ambassador Saxbe’s Meeting with Mrs Gandhi’, 24 July 1975, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy Files, Electronic Telegrams, 1/1/1975-21/31/1975, NARA.

\textsuperscript{110} Saxbe to the Department of State, No. 1767 February 5, 1976, National Security Adviser, Presidential Country Files for Middle East and South Asia, Box 12, India, State Telegrams to Secretary of State NODIS (3), Gerald Ford Presidential Library, Ann Arbor, Michigan (hereafter GFPL).

\textsuperscript{111} Daniel Patrick Moynihan, ‘We would Like India to be What India Is’, Newsweek, 20 January 1975.
Foreign Minister, Y.B. Chavan, Saxbe confirmed that the Ford administration had simply run out of patience with Indira Gandhi and her government. ‘[We have] reach[ed] a point,’ Saxbe informed Chavan, ‘at which we don't feel can continue to cooperate if [these] attacks [on the CIA] continue. We have said repeatedly that if the G[overnment] O[f] I[ndia] has any evidence of US interference we will act to eliminate it. I would resign.’

**Banishing the rogue elephant: Recasting contemporary Indo-US intelligence relations**

In the context of the early 1970s, the US government’s contention that the CIA was not involved in subversive activity in India, undoubtedly contained more than an element of truth. There is no doubt, however, that the Central Intelligence Agency had actively sought to influence India’s internal political landscape in the early Cold War period. During the first two decades following India’s independence, the CIA had a complex, and often conflicted relationship with the country’s political elite and the nation’s media. Despite the criticisms levelled at the Agency by India’s first premier, Jawaharlal Nehru, a number of CIA covert operations in the subcontinent were undertaken with the full knowledge and support of India’s intelligence service, and senior figures inside the ruling Congress Party. In the late 1950s, in Kerala, the CIA worked with the Congress Party to destabilise a democratically elected communist administration. For much of the 1960s, following the Sino-Indian border war, the Agency assisted the Indian government in strengthening its defences against an external threat from the People’s Republic of China. From 1967 onwards, the appearance of an embarrassing sequence of very public revelations implicating the CIA in illegal and morally questionable activities, both at home and abroad, propelled the Agency into the

---

112 Saxbe to the Department of State, No. 787, 15 January 1976, ‘Mrs. Gandhi’s Attacks on US’, National Security Adviser, Presidential Country Files Middle East and South Asia, Box 12, India, State to Sec State NODIS (3), GPFL.
centre of a political storm in the subcontinent which, while varying in its intensity, was to remain a dominant feature of wider Indo-US relations for the remainder of the Cold War.

It proved an enduring source of frustration to US government officials in the latter Cold War period that, at a time when the American intelligence presence in India was in retreat, and that of the Soviet Union expanding exponentially, the CIA remained firmly in the cross hairs of India’s politicians and press. In part, manifestations of an Indian ‘national paranoia’ when it came to CIA can be explained in terms of the deterioration in wider Indo-US relations that occurred toward the end of the Johnson administration and, more especially, after the Nixon/Kissinger tilt towards Pakistan in 1971. Nonetheless, other political and cultural factors undoubtedly played a significant role in shaping Indian perceptions of the CIA. Specifically, the CIA’s heightened public profile after 1967, both globally and in the subcontinent, transformed it into a convenient vehicle through which Indian politicians were able to vent populist anti-American sentiment. Furthermore, Indira Gandhi’s appreciation that the Agency could serve as political lightening-rod, deflecting attention away from her Party’s mismanagement of India’s formidable domestic problems, propelled the CIA to the forefront of official Indo-US discourse.

In one sense, the conspiratorial paradigm that gained such traction amongst sections of India’s political elite and national media can be explained in terms of the nation’s historic familiarity with the shadowy work of ‘foreign’ intelligence organisations in the subcontinent, which stretched back to the eighteenth century.\(^\text{113}\) Equally, the ‘conspiracism’ that gripped hold of India from the late 1960s, is suggestive of a more contemporary post-colonial expression of nationalism, not dissimilar to that evident in the Middle East. In India during the premiership of Indira Gandhi, or for that matter, Gamal Abdul Nasser’s Egypt, or Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini’s Iran, an inability to effectively tackle endemic social and

\(^{113}\) Bayly, Empire and Information, p. 365.
economic problems invited the temptation to court popular legitimacy by explaining away the national ills in terms of the machinations of a ‘foreign hand.’ Moreover, the fact that leaders in the developing world were able to point to genuine attempts undertaken by Western intelligence services to subvert the sovereignty of independent nation states, be they in Chile or elsewhere, made it all the easier to divert attention away from uncomfortable daily realities, and towards invariably illusory constructions of external subversion.

Likewise, when interpreted through the lens of the Nehru/Gandhi dynasty’s personal interaction with Western intelligence agencies, the CIA’s demonization in India appears less surprising. Having witnessed first hand the full force of a repressive British security system while participating in India’s fight for independence, it is unsurprising that Indira Gandhi acquired a highly developed sense of suspiciousness and distrust which, at times, appeared to border on the paranoid. It appears perfectly plausible, if difficult to establish beyond doubt, that the Nixon’s administration’s tilt toward India’s regional rival Pakistan, coupled with public revelations surrounding CIAs misdeeds, and not least the Agency’s complicity in bloody coups in Bangladesh and Chile, triggered a strain of persecutory paranoia buried within Indira Gandhi’s psyche. Certainly behavioural traits associated with persecutory paranoia, principally strong feelings of mistrust and a powerful inclination to deny ones own insecurities and hostilities and to project them onto others, appear all to evident in Gandhi’s words and deeds in relation to the CIA. 

It was not until after the Cold War had ended, the Soviet Union’s relationship with India had faltered, and the strangle hold exercised by the Nehru/Gandhi family on Indian politics had loosened, albeit fleetingly, that the CIA ceased to be a defining factor in Indo-US relations. Surprisingly little attention has been given by contemporary scholars to the wider political dimension of the Indo-American intelligence relationship. This represents a

---

114 Pipes, *The Hidden Hand*, pp. 26-7
115 Further insights into the political manifestations of persecutory paranoia can be found in Robins and Post, *Political Paranoia*, pp. 5-6.
remarkable historical omission given the extent to which Indian rhetorical attacks on the CIA, both official and unofficial, impacted upon Washington’s wider relationship with New Delhi from the late 1960s onwards. Moreover, from a more parochial standpoint, it appears likely that the CIA’s inability to remain out of the Indian political spotlight for long compromised its operational effectiveness in the subcontinent. Here, it is noteworthy that the CIA failed to anticipate nuclear tests conducted by India in 1974 and 1998.\footnote{See for example, ‘C.I.A. Study Details Failures; Scouring of System Is Urged’, \textit{The New York Times}, 3 June 1998; ‘CIA Faces Heavy Fallout over India Nuclear Tests’ \textit{The Wall Street Journal}, 13 May 1998.} Since, 1991, the end of one war, and the beginning of another, has transformed the CIA’s relationship with India. Significantly, in 2009, the first overseas trip Leon Panetta made after becoming Director of the Central Intelligence Agency was to New Delhi, to hold talks on intelligence co-operation in the ‘war on terror’ with his Indian counterpart.\footnote{‘CIA director meets with Indian security officials’, \textit{Associated Press}, 19 March 2009.} Yet, perhaps the most telling confirmation that the CIA has finally turned a corner in its relationship with India came in June 2011. At the time, the subcontinents newspapers were busy reporting on the destruction that rogue elephants had wrought in the southern Indian city of Mysore, and, not once, was the Agency’s name mentioned.\footnote{‘One Dead as Two Wild Elephants go Berserk in Mysore’, \textit{The Times of India}, 8 June 2011.}