Identifying social norms using coordination games: spectators vs. stakeholders

Erkut, Hande and Nosenzo, Daniele and Sefton, Martin (2015) Identifying social norms using coordination games: spectators vs. stakeholders. Economics Letters, 130 . pp. 28-31. ISSN 0165-1765

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Abstract

We investigate social norms for dictator game giving using a recently proposed norm-elicitation procedure (Krupka and Weber, 2013). We elicit norms separately from dictator, recipient, and disinterested third party respondents and find that elicited norms are stable and insensitive to the role of the respondent. The results support the use of this procedure as a method for measuring social norms.

Item Type: Article
Keywords: Social norms; Dictator games; Norm elicitation
Schools/Departments: University of Nottingham UK Campus > Faculty of Social Sciences > School of Economics
Identification Number: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.econlet.2015.02.021
Depositing User: Kesaite, Viktorija
Date Deposited: 03 Sep 2015 14:13
Last Modified: 15 Sep 2016 23:51
URI: http://eprints.nottingham.ac.uk/id/eprint/29778

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