

**AN UNFINISHED STRUGGLE?  
THE GUERRILLA EXPERIENCE AND THE  
SHAPING OF POLITICAL CULTURE IN THE  
CUBAN REVOLUTION**

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**Thesis submitted to the University of Nottingham for  
the Degree of Doctor of Philosophy**

**December 2013**

## Abstract

In the years that immediately followed the victory of the rebel forces in 1959, the new leaders of the Cuban Revolution seemed to approach the task of revolutionary governance as a continuation of the guerrilla campaign in the *sierra*. The leadership's empirical management of the Revolution in power betrayed its guerrilla roots, and resulted in an inchoate political system headed by charismatic *guerrilleros*. By the end of the first decade, however, it seemed that the Revolution's guerrilla past had been all but forgotten, as it established closer ties with the Soviet Union and subsequently underwent a process of 'institutionalisation'. Since that time, many Western scholars of Cuba have commented on the increased role of the military in the revolutionary leadership, and in other aspects of the Revolution which would normally be considered to be beyond the remit of most armed forces. These scholars have concluded that the pervasive presence of the military is evidence of the 'militarisation' of the Cuban Revolution.

This thesis calls into question this notion of a 'militarised' Revolution by arguing that such a perspective overlooks the guerrilla origins of both the Cuban armed forces and the Revolution more broadly, in addition to the signs and symbols that point to an on-going legacy of these origins in revolutionary Cuba. Using evidence derived from an analysis of the hegemonic discourse of the Revolution at different stages in its trajectory, this study demonstrates that the lived experience of guerrilla warfare has shaped the beliefs and values that have underpinned the Revolution since 1959. Together, these beliefs and values comprise a unique political culture in which the figure of the *guerrillero* is revered, and in which the guerrilla campaigns of the Cuban historical narrative are presented as unfinished struggles. The thesis argues that the active cultivation of this political culture has contributed to legitimising the long-standing presence of former *guerrilleros* in the revolutionary leadership, and has helped to garner the support of civilians for the revolutionary project. In addition to challenging the idea of a 'militarised' Revolution, this study also undermines the widely accepted notion that the Revolution was thoroughly 'Sovietised' during its second decade. An examination of the hegemonic discourse of the 1970s reveals that, while the Revolution transformed structurally during those years, the guerrilla ethos which had buttressed the revolutionary project in the 1960s remained unchanged.

## Acknowledgements

This doctoral research would not have been possible without the financial support provided by the University of Nottingham, for which I am truly grateful. It has been a privilege to spend over three years studying a country for which I hold a passionate interest. I am also thankful to the Society for Latin American Studies and the Graduate School at the University for awarding me funding to conduct field work in Cuba, an experience which was vital to the furtherance of this research.

My greatest debt is to my two supervisors, Professor Antoni Kapcia and Dr. Gareth Stockey, for their continued support, patience, invaluable feedback, and for believing in me and this project; I have gained immeasurably from their insight and expertise. I would also like to express my gratitude to the many people who helped me during my research trip to Cuba. For their guidance and advice, I am grateful to Fernando Martínez Heredia, Hal Klepak, Raúl Rodríguez de la O, José Bell Lara and Eduardo Yasells Ferrer; for their friendship and kindness, to Elga González and Bárbara Danzie; and for keeping me going and sharing daiquiris, to Raquel Ribeiro.

In the UK, fellow students and colleagues at Nottingham and in the Cuba Research Forum more broadly have helped to make the research process enjoyable and enriching. Special thanks go to my family and close friends for their on-going encouragement and understanding throughout the period of my PhD. In particular, I owe a huge debt of gratitude to my readers (Mum, Dad, Felicity and Michael); to my parents for always being supportive and for letting me follow my own path; and to David, for everything.

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## **List of Acronyms**

<b>CDR</b>	<b>Comités de la Defensa de la Revolución</b>
<b>EIR</b>	<b>Escuelas de Instrucción Revolucionaria</b>
<b>FAR</b>	<b>Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias</b>
<b>FEU</b>	<b>Federación Estudiantil Universitaria</b>
<b>FMC</b>	<b>Federación de Mujeres Cubanas</b>
<b>MINFAR</b>	<b>Ministerio de las Fuerzas Armadas</b>
<b>MNR</b>	<b>Milicias Nacionales Revolucionarias</b>
<b>MTT</b>	<b>Milicias de Tropas Territoriales</b>
<b>OLAS</b>	<b>Organización Latinoamericana de Solidaridad</b>
<b>PCC</b>	<b>Partido Comunista de Cuba</b>
<b>PSP</b>	<b>Partido Socialista Popular</b>
<b>SEPMI</b>	<b>Sociedad de Educación Patriótico-Militar</b>
<b>SMO</b>	<b>Servicio Militar Obligatorio</b>
<b>UJC</b>	<b>Unión de Jóvenes Comunistas</b>
<b>UNEAC</b>	<b>Unión de Escritores y Artistas de Cuba</b>
<b>UMAP</b>	<b>Unidades Militares de Ayuda a la Producción</b>

## Introduction

On 24 February 2008, Raúl Castro officially succeeded his brother Fidel as President of both the Council of State and the Council of Ministers of Cuba, following a nineteen-month period in which he had provisionally held these positions, owing to Fidel's poor health. Fidel's choice of successor was by no means a surprise, given that Raúl already occupied the posts of First Vice-President of the Council of State, and Minister of the Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias (FAR). Raúl was thus the obvious choice to take over the reins of power.

Even less surprising, perhaps, has been Raúl's selection of new members, along with the promotion of existing ones, for the Council of State since his succession. As the Minister of the FAR since 1959, Raúl had always been considered first and foremost a military man, as someone more suited to instilling tough military discipline than negotiating revolutionary politics (Bardach, 2009; Dumont, 1974; Latell, 2005). The long-standing commentator on the Cuban Revolution, Irving Horowitz, for example, recently described Raúl Castro as 'the orthodox military figure' who 'has become the spokesman for all things military and the heir apparent to the revolution itself. His orthodoxy extends to the cut of his uniform' (Horowitz 2008, 137). Accordingly, then, Raúl wasted little time in surrounding himself with men cut from a similar cloth. Several well-known *raulistas* have been awarded membership of the Council, while others have been granted a direct vertical promotion.<sup>1</sup> Among the latter was seventy-two-year-old Julio Casas Regueiro who, having held the position of First Vice-Minister of the FAR up until that point, found himself promoted to one of five vice-presidencies of the Council, in addition to replacing Raúl as the Minister of the

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<sup>1</sup> *Raulistas* is the term used to describe those loyal to Raúl Castro within the revolutionary leadership.

FAR.<sup>2</sup> Similarly, Ramiro Valdés Menéndez, one of only three men to have been awarded the title *Comandante de la Revolución*, occupies a vice-presidential post on both the Council of State and the Council of Ministers.<sup>3</sup> He had previously been made Minister of Information and Communications following Fidel's temporary hand-over of power in 2006. The perhaps inevitable upshot of these new appointments was a purging of numerous officials in the Cuban leadership, notably the comparatively young and reformist figures of Carlos Lage, former Vice-President of the Council of State, and Felipe Pérez Roque, hitherto Foreign Minister.

As mentioned, the ascendancy of high-profile military figures into the upper echelons of the Cuban leadership is in keeping with Raúl Castro's long-established image as, above all, a military man. Yet, for many observers, not only was this increase in power and influence awarded to the military fitting with the picture of Raúl, but of the Cuban Revolution in general. In other words, there exist a large number of Western academics who, since the early years of the Revolution, have commented on the supposed 'militarism' of the Revolution and, in turn, its transformation of Cuban society into a populace that could be described as 'militarised' (Bonachea and San Martín, 1972; Bunck, 1994; Dumont, 1974; Horowitz, 2008). The granting of additional authority to members of the armed forces has therefore caused little alarm; on the contrary, it is widely seen as a vindication of this long-held view that the Revolution is a militarised system of governance. Other events of recent years have also served in some ways to confirm this widespread perception: *Bastión 2004*, for instance, a strategic military defence

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<sup>2</sup> Julio Casas Regueiro passed away on 3 September, 2011.

<sup>3</sup> The other two figures upon whom the title of *Comandante de la Revolución* has been bestowed are Juan Almeida Bosque and Guillermo García Frías, both former *guerrilleros* who played prominent roles in the Revolution's insurrectionary phase.

exercise involving hundreds of thousands of Cubans (both members of the armed forces and civilians), is perhaps an explicit example of the so-called ‘militarisation’ of the Cuban Revolution.

In turn, many academics are of the opinion that such a ‘militarisation’ process is central to understanding the longevity of the political careers of prominent military figures such as Raúl Castro. The literature which attests to the ‘militarism’ of the Revolution has viewed the process as one which has legitimised the revolutionary leadership’s long-standing hold on power through its accompanying authoritarian approach to disciplining the Cuban population, the creation of a hierarchical society, the concentration of political power in the hands of a select few, and the active promotion of a ‘siege mentality’. It is widely accepted that, combined, these factors have played a key role in the survival of the Revolution since the late-1960s, and have enabled those at the helm of the revolutionary project to maintain a firm grasp on the reins of power (Gouré, 1989; Horowitz, 2008; Malloy, 1971; Petras and Morley, 1985).

However, such a perspective overlooks another defining feature of these high-ranking military officials, which may help to explain their political endurance. Not only are men like Raúl Castro prominent members of the armed forces, they are also, inescapably, former *guerrilleros*. Raúl, Casas Regueiro and Valdés Menéndez all played pivotal roles in the *sierra* during the uprising against the then dictator, Fulgencio Batista, which commenced with the landing of the *Granma* in eastern Cuba on 2 December 1956, and ended in January 1959 with the flight of Batista from Cuban shores, and the subsequent installation of the Revolution in power. It is,

therefore, interesting that those who helped to usher in the era of the Cuban Revolution in power in 1959 still find themselves in distinguished roles within the revolutionary leadership (with the exception, now, of Casas Regueiro), particularly given the various transformations and crises experienced by the Revolution throughout its trajectory. What is more, the ‘militarisation’ perspective fails to address the fact that the FAR has its origins in, and developed out of, the Ejército Rebelde, the very guerrilla force which sprang up in the isolated mountain regions of Cuba, and in which the above names participated.<sup>4</sup> These historical roots of the FAR render it distinct from other more traditional militaries, and particularly those in the rest of Latin America, which have been created and developed for the service of a state power (Klepak 2005, 2010). Cuba’s armed forces, in contrast, were founded upon a struggle waged by, and for, the people. The military historian Hal Klepak has written of this distinction, stating that the FAR ‘are in their own minds different from other Latin American armed forces because of their revolutionary past and their revolutionary tradition. They see themselves truly as the “people’s army” of a revolutionary people’ (Klepak 2005, 56).

Moreover, to talk of the ‘militarisation’ of the Cuban Revolution is to suggest that the FAR exist as a monolithic entity completely removed from the civilian sphere, though exercising authority over it. Such a suggestion indicates a lack of understanding as to how the armed forces operate in Cuba, and how they relate to the rest of the population. Since the creation of the Milicias Nacionales Revolucionarias (MNR) in 1959, a volunteer force under the control of the FAR (though not part of it

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<sup>4</sup> Ejército Rebelde was the name adopted by the guerrilla forces which fought in the *sierras* of Cuba during the struggle against the dictatorship of Fulgencio Batista between July 1956 and January 1959. After the fall of Batista, the Ejército Rebelde was gradually transformed into the FAR, a transformation set in motion by the creation of the Ministerio de las Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias (MINFAR) in October 1960 (Pérez, Jr. 1976, 261)

as such), the Revolution has cultivated a force of reservists who occupy roles in both the civilian and military spheres, thereby blurring the lines between the two. By the same token, many military personnel have assumed responsibilities in the civilian sphere, as will become clear in the ensuing literature review. In addition, it should be noted that the labelling by non-Cuban observers of certain figures within the political sphere as 'military' does not necessarily indicate that such men currently serve, or have ever served, in the FAR. Many of those who possess military titles were awarded them solely on the back of their participation in the guerrilla struggle of the 1950s, and may not have been actively involved in any 'military' activity thereafter (aside from their roles as reservists).

Furthermore, unlike the influence of military officials which, as will be discussed later, only really came to the fore in the late 1960s, it should be acknowledged that the guerrilla element within the leadership has, of course, been in place since the very inception of the Cuban Revolution. The sustained presence of the guerrilla cohort within the leadership is telling in that it is indicative of a continuity within the Revolution from the insurrectionary phase onwards. This continuity, in turn, leads one to question how the longevity of the political careers of these *ex-guerrilleros*, and not, therefore, military men, has been legitimised in the eyes of the Cuban public.

Clues which might explain this legitimacy are plentiful in contemporary revolutionary Cuba, particularly in the images and slogans promulgated by the leadership. In Havana's Plaza de la Revolución, for example, the outline of the image of Ernesto 'Che' Guevara has for many years adorned the Ministerio del

Interior building, while, in 2009, a similar outline of Guevara's comrade-in-arms, Camilo Cienfuegos, was erected on the wall of the adjacent Ministerio de la Informática y las Comunicaciones. Elsewhere in the city, and across the entire island, can be found similar visual representations of both Guevara and Cienfuegos, along with other images of the Ejército Rebelde, accompanied by revolutionary slogans such as 'Hasta la Victoria, Siempre!'. In addition, there is a clear encouragement of citizens to emulate the attitude and behaviour of the figure of the *guerrillero*, and particularly that of Che Guevara. The slogan of the Revolution's principal organisation for children of primary school age, the Organización de Pioneros José Martí, for example, illustrates how citizens, from an early age, are incited to model their behaviour on the archetypal Cuban *guerrillero*: 'Pioneros por el Comunismo, seremos como el Che'. Similarly, ubiquitous billboards carrying messages such as 'Che: Tu ejemplo vive, tus ideas perduran' and 'Queremos que sean como el Che' confirm this promotion of the *guerrillero* as the model revolutionary.

All these images, slogans and symbols point to a consistent veneration of the Revolution's *guerrilleros* throughout the Revolution's trajectory, and an active cultivation on the part of the leadership of the legacy of the guerrilla warfare enacted in the insurrectionary phase. This apparent reverence reserved for the Revolution's *guerrilleros* has been highlighted by Tzvi Medin, who observed that 'images of the fallen heroes of the revolution are constantly projected in the press, the arts, radio, television, and so on: as exemplary figures symbolizing both heroic existence and total revolutionary sacrifice' (Medin 1990, 34). The perpetuation of the guerrilla legacy in this way may partly account for the durability of the political careers of

those who participated in the guerrilla stage, insofar as it affords them historical legitimacy, a legitimacy of which Cuban citizens are continually reminded. The guerrilla legacy, as presented by the leadership, attributes the victory of the Revolution in 1959 almost entirely to the guerrilla rebels and, in this light, the former *guerrilleros* have earned the right to preside over the Revolution which they brought to power. The pervasiveness of the image of the *guerrillero*, and the promotion of the guerrilla ethos more broadly, cast further doubt on the applicability of the term 'militarism' to the Cuban revolutionary context. The concept of 'militarism' is, therefore, somewhat reductive in its failure to acknowledge the on-going legacy of the insurrectionary phase. Moreover, the very fact that there is a general tendency among *ex-guerrilleros* to self-identify as *guerrilleros*, rather than military men *per se*, further undermines the notion of a 'militaristic' Revolution. Indeed, the title of Fidel Castro's 2012 two-part memoir, *Fidel: Guerrillero del Tiempo*, suggests that his participation in the guerrilla struggle against Batista was a character-defining experience in his revolutionary career.

While this thesis challenges the assumptions posed by the notion of 'militarism', much of the literature that presents and characterises the Cuban Revolution as 'militarised' has, nonetheless, made a significant contribution to scholarly study of the Revolution, and has produced a conceptualisation which has become widely accepted within the field of Cuban studies. It is, therefore, necessary in the first instance to offer an overview of this literature in order to understand more precisely how it has attempted to explain both the presence of military figures within the leadership, and the longevity of their careers. The following review thus summarises the key texts and arguments in support of 'militarism', and serves as a point of

departure for explaining how this thesis will develop the ideas therein, and thereby offer an original contribution to the existing work in this area.

### **A 'militaristic' Revolution?**

The trend for characterising the Cuban Revolution as 'militaristic' can be said to have commenced in the early 1970s when scholars of Cuba began to reflect on the preceding few years of the Revolution's trajectory. It was generally understood that the Revolution had changed profoundly during this period, and no longer resembled the radical, and somewhat experimental, force for change that it had done in the early and mid-1960s. A pivotal moment for these scholars was the year 1968, when Fidel Castro announced the launch of the Revolutionary Offensive, a nation-wide project which was to see almost the entire population mobilised for agricultural work. This mobilisation was organised largely along military lines, with objectives framed in military terms. Julie Bunck, writing in the 1990s, highlighted the military element to the Offensive:

a range of officials exalted work and used military terms, even war dispatches, to describe their goals. Speeches adopted militaristic phrases, equating the labour force with a 'heroic battalion' and described labour efforts as 'struggles' or 'wars' (Bunck 1994, 144).

The desired culmination of the Offensive was to produce a ten million tonne sugar harvest in the *zafra* of 1970. The nationwide contribution to the *zafra* continued to be structured and controlled in a military style.

During this period, the Cuban government was also beginning to make concerted efforts towards a rapprochement with the Soviet Union, efforts which prefigured the almost wholesale adoption of the Soviet model during the period of

‘institutionalisation’ (or ‘Sovietisation’, the term preferred by many Western academics).<sup>5</sup> This so-called ‘institutionalisation’, commencing in 1970, involved widespread bureaucratisation, the professionalisation of the FAR in line with the Soviet military model, and the restructuring of the political system, to the extent that ‘Cuban politics increasingly took on the central features of Soviet political life’ (Binns and Gonzalez, 1980). In short, ‘The second decade of the Cuban Revolution brought Cuba fully within the Soviet ambit’ (Binns and Gonzalez, 1980).

Such profound changes to the revolutionary system in Cuba did not, of course, go unnoticed. Cuba commentators began to write, most with a negative slant, of the increased role of the military in both politics and the economy. In 1978, Jorge Domínguez highlighted this trend, stating that ‘It has become fashionable to write about the militarization of the Cuban Revolution, a concept that suggests that the late 1960s were drastically different from other years’ (Domínguez 1978, 377).

One of the first to comment on this apparent ‘militarisation’ was René Dumont, a French agronomist who visited Cuba in the 1960s in his role as European economic adviser to Fidel Castro. Dumont published two works, *Cuba: Socialism and Development* in 1964, followed by *Is Cuba Socialist?* in 1970.<sup>6</sup> Dumont was an early admirer of Castro and was keen to gain an understanding of the economic structures that underpinned the Revolution in its formative years.

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<sup>5</sup> The term ‘institutionalisation’ became standardised following the publication of Carmelo Mesa-Lago’s 1974 text, *Cuba in the 1970s: Pragmatism and Institutionalization* (Mesa-Lago, 1974).

<sup>6</sup> The original editions of these texts were published in French. The English translations referenced here were not published until 1970 and 1974, respectively.

In the earlier work, *Cuba: Socialism and Development*, Dumont commented on developments in the Revolution that, judging by his later writings, seemed to pave the way for a more entrenched militarisation of Cuban society by the end of the decade. Dumont wrote that:

Battalions of civilians have been formed on this military model, for instance, the women's brigades of tractor drivers of the green belt around Havana or the province of Oriente. Government offices, nationalised companies, and so forth, furnish workers for the harvesting of cane and coffee beans and caring for the crops; they are organized on the same principles. Civil defence, finally, is working along the same lines to organize production in case of war. Cuba is already on a war footing (Dumont 1970, 232).

Dumont's observations in this instance also bring to mind another term which has frequently been employed to describe, and account for, the general sense of fear of an enemy attack in Cuba, and the accompanying preparedness of its citizens: that is, the state of a 'siege mentality'. Dumont's comment that 'Cuba is already on a war footing' suggests that, in the early years of the Revolution, the country felt itself, with good reason, to be vulnerable to enemy attack. As we shall see in the course of this chapter, the depictions of a supposedly 'militarised' Cuban Revolution are often linked to the existence of a 'siege mentality' on the island.

Dumont's second work constituted a report on his return visit to Cuba later in the decade in which he examined the economic and political structure of the Cuban Revolution. Dumont commented that, in 1967, the Soviet Union advised the Cuban leadership to be stricter on its population in terms of achieving revolutionary objectives; he argued that, from that year onwards, Cuba followed this advice insofar as military involvement in the economy became prevalent, and there was a marked increase in the military organisation of Cuban citizens. Moreover, he suggested that the Soviets' advice to instil a greater sense of discipline was not, in fact, at odds with

the way in which certain members of the elite, notably Raúl Castro, felt Cuba should be governed. Dumont asserted:

Raúl Castro had always recommended stricter discipline, discipline like the army's, the only administration that gets itself obeyed and makes things move. It was the only way to close ranks, to continue a hard, bitter, uncertain struggle. This theory interestingly illuminates the development of both the 1968 Revolutionary Offensive and the third agrarian reform. They were to lead to a general militarization of Cuba's economy (Dumont 1974, 72).

Dumont did not hold back in his criticism of the transformation which he considered to have occurred in Cuba since his previous visit; indeed, he characterised this transformation as a 'neo-Stalinist militarization' of the Cuban Revolution (Dumont 1974, 123). Dumont argued that the increased involvement of the military in governmental matters (and in the Cuban economy in particular) had made it difficult to distinguish between the Party and Army. He contended:

Agriculture thus became more than just an urgent problem to be solved; it became a magnificent training ground for the army. Militarization was urged not only to eliminate inefficiency and disorganization, but to cope with the passive resistance of a growing number of unwilling workers. The Cuban population was more and more under the control of the Party and the army, and it became increasingly difficult to distinguish between the two groups since they both wore uniforms and carried revolvers (Dumont 1974, 100).

In turn, Dumont saw the 'militarisation' of the Party as having engendered a militarisation of society more generally. Dumont lamented this latter transformation as, in his eyes, it had reduced the possibilities for political participation for the average citizen:

This military society (...) follows a path leading away from participation; it leads to a hierarchized society with an authoritarian leadership, headed by a personal power that decides all problems, political, economic, and technical (Dumont 1974, 113).

Dumont's criticisms of this so-called 'militarisation' of Cuban society were widely read and absorbed by foreign observers of the Cuban Revolution, not least because Dumont considered himself a socialist and had previously been a sympathiser of Fidel Castro. Numerous academics writing on Cuba, and on the supposed 'militarisation' of the Revolution, would later make reference to Dumont's work (Aguilar, 2003; Bonachea and San Martín, 2003; Horowitz, 2008). In this way, Dumont might be considered to have set the ball rolling in terms of classifying the Revolution as 'militaristic'.

Another text, contemporaneous to Dumont's work, which contained references to the 'militarisation' of Cuban society was a collection of articles edited by Carmelo Mesa-Lago, published in 1971. In the preface, Mesa-Lago informed the reader that the volume's intention was to 'present a comprehensive, well-documented, up-to-date, and relatively objective study of the revolutionary changes that have taken place in Cuba from 1959 to 1970' (Mesa-Lago 1971, xi). He went on to add that:

the period from 1964 to 1970 is crucial to the understanding of the Revolution because it is a period in which dramatic decisions were made — decisions to change economic policy, reorganize planning, establish the Communist Party, support moral incentives, launch the Revolutionary Offensive, endorse the Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia, and harvest ten million tons of sugar (Mesa-Lago 1971, xiii).

A notable chapter in this volume, insofar as it dealt with the 'militarisation' of Cuban society, was James Malloy's contribution. Malloy's paper aimed to analyse the process of the creation of a new economic order in Cuba, and how the creation of such an order required a 'new political and economic framework with the avowed aim of national development' (Malloy 1971, 23). Of particular interest to this study is a section of the chapter entitled 'Moral Incentives and Militarization of Society

(1966-)' (Malloy 1971, 37). In it, Malloy discussed the dual process of establishing a moral economy in Cuba and the gradual militarisation of the Cuban people; Malloy contended that this process unfolded following Castro's announcement of the 'Revolution's commitment to the path of moral incentives' in August 1966, and soon thereafter the proclamation of the Revolutionary Offensive in 1968. Malloy wrote that:

At the same time that there is an increasing attempt to moralise the society, it is also being increasingly militarised. As stated, the proclamation of the Revolutionary Offensive was also a declaration of quasi-moral war. In a real sense, all Cubans are now considered to be soldiers in a vast producing army. As such, they are expected to adhere to the traditional military values of discipline and devotion to duty. Each is a soldier on permanent alert ready to join his brigade and fight with muscle and tool to win the economic war. The image of the army has become the image of society (Malloy 1971, 40).

He later continued:

All indications are that the army is the real locus of political power. The party is ostensibly the chief organ of political coordination, but its command structure is permeated at all levels by military men. Cuba's top military men hold key positions in both the army and the party, thereby guaranteeing not only the interests of the military institution, but a preponderance of military styles and values (Malloy 1971, 41).

In the latter citation, Malloy appeared to draw similar conclusions to Dumont regarding the apparent fusion of the Party and the armed forces, albeit in a distinctly less critical tone.

Elsewhere in Mesa-Lago's volume, Horowitz also commented on what he described as the 'general militarization of the Cuban society' (Horowitz 1971, 138). As will become evident below, Horowitz remains a leading proponent of the notion of a 'militarised' Cuba. In this particular work, Horowitz discussed the 'theory of the Stalinization of the Cuban Revolution'; however, unlike Dumont, he underlined that

his use of 'Stalinization' eschewed the 'emotive use of the term, employing it instead to refer to 'specific forms of social and political behaviour and institutions' (Horowitz 1971, 127). In line with this definition, one of the key characteristics of 'Stalinization' was 'the emergence of a leader and his small coterie as exclusive spokesmen for the Communist Party' (Horowitz 1971, 127). In the case of Cuba, Horowitz argued that this characteristic was evident in Castro's decision to surround himself with military men in the upper echelons of the Cuban leadership. He affirmed that:

The general militarization of the Cuban society is manifested by the fact that ten out of the twenty ministries are headed by military men of Castro's inner circle, who control the most strategic sectors, that is, agriculture, the sugar industry, mining, transportation, communications, labour, the armed forces, and internal order. All members of the Politburo, except two, and 66 per cent of the Central Committee members are also military men (Horowitz 1971, 138).

Once again, we see that the presence of high-ranking military figures in ministerial positions is cited as evidence of an increasingly militarised Cuban Revolution.

Staying with Horowitz for the moment, we might consider his edited collection *Cuban Communism*, first published in 1970, which contained various references to the notion which is of interest to us here: the 'militarisation' of Cuban society. Horowitz himself opened the collection with his appropriately entitled essay 'Cuban Communism', in which he again alluded to the growing number of military men in positions of power: 'Castro's appointment of a guerrilla cohort — Major Raúl Curbelo, Chief of the air force — as vice president of INRA is only one instance of the continued militarization of Cuban society' (Horowitz 1972, 17). What is also interesting in Horowitz's article is his interpretation of Régis Debray's *¿Révolution*

*dans la Révolution?* (Debray, 1967).<sup>7</sup> Unlike the majority of observers who would likely consider this text a call to arms to Latin American revolutionaries, not to mention an unreserved defence of the guerrilla path to revolution, Horowitz purported that a key deduction to be drawn from Debray concerned the overriding 'primacy of the military' (Horowitz 1972, 22). He conceived of the text as a discussion on the:

progression from the military *foco* to the political movement. Thus at the ideological level the revolution in the revolution represents the transformation of guerrillas into *gorilas*, into advocates of the total militarization of Latin America. This seems to incorporate rightist doctrine into a leftist framework. The revolution in the revolution is not so much a call for sheer militancy or a reflection of new class alignments as it is a call for the primacy of the military (Horowitz 1972, 21/22).

Horowitz thus seemed to be arguing here that Debray's thinking echoed Castro's supposed line of thought: that the military should assume authority over other forms of leadership. Horowitz even went so far as to place the Cuba of the early 1970s in the same vein as the tide of military governments/dictatorships which was sweeping Latin America at the time. He wrote that 'the general militarization of the hemisphere has had its left-wing reflex in Cuba' (Horowitz 1972, 18).

Moving on to another chapter in the *Cuban Communism* collection from 1972, Ramón Bonachea and Marta San Martín's article, 'The Military Dimension of the Cuban Revolution', was a notable contribution to the literature on the militarisation of the Cuban Revolution. In this work, the authors contended that the shift towards 'militarism' in Cuba was inextricably linked to the leadership's decision to adopt a socialist ideology in 1961. They wrote:

Ever since the Cuban Revolution proclaimed its allegiance to socialism there has been a marked emphasis on preparing responsible personnel to occupy decision-making

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<sup>7</sup> Debray's text will be discussed in detail in Chapter One.

positions in agriculture, industry, the military or education. This qualified manpower has been termed cadres or, more specifically yet, 'command cadres', a managerial development within the revolution (Bonachea and San Martín 1972, 247).

Bonachea and San Martín placed particular emphasis on the large scale involvement of youth in military-style education as a principal characteristic of Cuba's process of 'militarisation'. Specific mention was made of the role of the Escuelas de Instrucción Revolucionaria (EIR) in this process, in addition to the introduction of a draft for students to attend military schools as part of their *Servicio Militar Obligatorio* (SMO). The latter programme in particular was cited as being 'instrumental in extending military authority over youth' (Bonachea and San Martín 1972, 238).

The authors went on to argue that the manifestation of 'militarism' became ever more marked following the proclamation of the aforementioned Revolutionary Offensive which anticipated the *zafra* of 1970. The 'militaristic' element, the authors affirmed, could be found in the organisation of the Offensive around *puestos de mando*:

People were mobilised into squadrons, platoons, companies and battalions at the level of provinces, regions and municipalities under the supervision of the party from civil defense command posts (Bonachea and San Martín 1972, 253).

Later, following the *zafra*, they argued that 'militarism' seemed only to have increased:

The military organisation of the *zafra*, together with the number of cabinet positions already filled by FAR majors, could only confirm a vision of militarism throughout Cuban society (Bonachea and San Martín 1972, 255).

Endorsing the idea of a 'siege mentality' suggested by Dumont's work, Bonachea and San Martín's article proposed a link between the 'militarisation' of the

Revolution and the sense that there was an on-going threat of attack from an external enemy, namely the United States. In the opening lines, they stated that:

The militarism of Cuban society is now undeniable. On the surface, the militarization of Cuba seems to be the result of a policy geared toward establishing a strong defense on the home front as well as in respect to the United States (Bonachea and San Martín 1972, 229).

They continued with this line of thought later on in the chapter with the following depiction:

Military exercises are conducted every month in various parts of the island. The strategy is to crush the invaders before they approach the coast, or to annihilate them entirely if they land. Large quantities of human and material resources are mobilised to this end since any hesitation would be costly in terms of lives and time (Bonachea and San Martín (1972, 250).

The citations imply that the apparent increased 'militarisation' of the Revolution was not solely a means to improve the organisation of revolutionary tasks and programmes, nor simply was it only a means of disciplining citizens in order that they fully participate in their revolutionary duties. Rather, the 'militarisation' also had the concrete aim of ensuring that Cuba was adequately defended from an enemy invasion on all fronts.

Later in the decade, Domínguez offered a further contribution to the discussion of the military dimension, notably through his concept of the 'civic soldier'. According to Domínguez, the 'civic soldier' referred to the way in which many Cubans occupied important roles in both the civilian and military spheres, without any tension between the two, effectively 'fusing civilian and military life year round' (Domínguez 1978, 378). He argued that this trend became apparent from the mid-1960s at a point when:

the armed forces adopted social, economic, and political missions as well as purely military functions. From one point of view, civilians were militarised; from another, the military were civilianised. The result was the flourishing of the civic soldier at least through the mid-1970s (Domínguez 1978, 353).

Domínguez purported that the increased number of leaders who occupied civilian and military positions had 'intentionally made the civic soldier the norm for all, even in purely civilian organisations' (Domínguez 1978, 376). His observations here echoed the aforementioned works of Malloy and Dumont, which both pointed to increasingly blurred lines between the Party and the military.

Additionally, Domínguez found evidence of an enlarged military role in the Cuban Revolution in the establishment of Unidades Militares de Ayuda a la Producción (UMAP) in November 1965, and the Ejército Juvenil del Trabajo (EJT). The UMAP were put to use in the *zafras* between 1965 and 1967, but were eventually dissolved in 1967 following a protest by the Unión de Escritores y Artistas de Cuba (UNEAC). For Domínguez, the UMAP embodied the supposedly 'rehabilitative' role of the armed forces and their 'repressive mission' (Domínguez 1978, 357). The Ejército Juvenil del Trabajo, on the other hand, was a paramilitary arm of MINFAR dedicated to industrial and agricultural efforts (Pérez, Jr. 1976, 269). Domínguez saw the establishment of this 'Army' as 'an example of military role expansion, because it absorbed the productive activities of the Communist Youth Union' (Domínguez 1978, 378). Moreover, he considered it, along with the 'militarisation of the reserves', to have contributed to the expansion of the civic soldier role among the masses (Domínguez 1978, 378).

However, while Domínguez's work underscored the military dimension of the Cuban Revolution, and constituted a significant addition to the literature on the topic, he was careful to avoid the use of the term 'militarisation'. He contended:

I believe the concept of militarization is inappropriate to the Cuban situation because it fails to account for the special political quality of civic soldiers, who are important in many areas, from running the government to running farm equipment. These soldiers went to military school after they had fought and won the war against Batista, during which they acquired their extramilitary concerns for the first time. The Cuban civic soldiers have been different from the armed forces both in other Communist and in non-Communist countries because of their eagerness and conviction that military and political personnel and methods cannot be separate but must overlap if revolutionary goals are to be achieved (Domínguez 1978, 377).

Domínguez, then, though recognising that the military played a decisive role, did not view the armed forces as imposing order on Cuban citizens (an aspect one might consider characteristic of a militarised society). Rather, he considered the fusion of civilian and military roles as key to the preclusion of an outright 'militarisation'. What Domínguez proposed instead were two mutually influential spheres, as embodied in the 'civic soldier'.

The literature considered thus far has focused on the increased 'militarisation' in Cuba during the late 1960s and the 1970s and, in particular, how this 'militarisation' changed the shape of the Revolution and, in turn, acted upon its citizens. Yet, from the mid-1970s onwards, many scholars writing on Cuba found a new focus, albeit one that still centred on the Cuban military: Cuba's participation in Angola, beginning in 1975. The Cuban involvement in Africa contributed to the image of a 'militarised' Revolution, insofar as the FAR came to represent the Cuban Revolution on the world stage; it became the outward face of Cuban revolutionary foreign policy. Moreover, many concluded that the Angolan mission was the outcome of a successful 'militarisation' process in Cuba.

One scholar to draw such a conclusion was Edward Gonzalez who proposed that the concentration of power in the hands of military figures in Cuba engendered the decision to enhance the role of the FAR in overseas matters. He pointed out that:

The post-1970 process of institutionalization led both to the diversification of political elites within Cuba's ruling coalition and to the reconcentration of political power in the hands of the two Castro brothers and their followers. The Cuban leadership circle was broadened as veteran *fidelistas* from the July 26 Movement now shared party or government posts (...) *raulistas* (...) emerged as a pivotal elite element, comprising principally those military officers with long-standing personal ties to Raúl who either remained or had been reassigned to high-level posts in the party and government after 1970 (Gonzalez 1977, 6).

He continued:

If former military officers assigned to civilian ministries and agencies in the post-1970 period are treated as still identified with the military, the share of civilian ministerial figures on the PCC declines to 29 per cent, and FAR/MINFAR representation runs to 37 per cent, once more underscoring the importance of the military — among them many *raulistas* — in the new power constellation (Gonzalez 1977, 6).<sup>8</sup>

Gonzalez contended that the high proportion of military men in ministerial positions after 1970 led to the emergence of one of three strands of thought regarding foreign policy: 'the military mission tendency'. This tendency, he proposed:

derives from the outlook of Raúl Castro and other politically influential FAR/MINFAR officers. They stress the external role or mission of the Cuban armed forces. Their impact on Cuba's foreign activities stems not only from their enhanced political influence within the Cuban regime but also from the strengthened military capabilities of the FAR (Gonzalez 1970, 6).

With this notion in mind, the Cuban involvement in Angola could be partly explained by the desire of certain military-minded ministers to test Cuba's increased military capabilities in a foreign setting. Angola was seen as a means of receiving materiel for Cuba's armed forces from the Soviet Union, and of providing the FAR with valuable first-hand experience of warfare.

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<sup>8</sup> Partido Comunista de Cuba (PCC)

The presence of a huge number of Cuban troops in Angola stood in stark contrast to the smaller-scale covert support the Revolution had provided to burgeoning revolutionary guerrilla movements in Latin America, Africa and the Middle East in the 1960s. For many observers, this increased involvement was evidence enough of the 'militarisation' of the Cuban Revolution. Jiri Valenta, writing in 1981, described the increased weaponry of the FAR as a direct consequence of Soviet assistance:

Thanks to the Soviet-supplied MiG-23s, Cuba has the best-equipped air force in Latin America. Moreover, the Russians have helped to build a small but very modern and efficient Cuban coastal navy (...) The Cuban army meanwhile has been equipped with T-62 tanks of Soviet origin. The Soviet arms transfer to Cuba is relatively advanced in the overall context of the Soviet arms aid programme (Valenta 1981, 47).

The enhanced military capability of the FAR enabled Cuba not only to support the People's Movement for the Liberation of Angola (MPLA), but also liberation movements in other parts of the continent. Having witnessed the failure of Latin American guerrilla movements to foment revolution, Fidel Castro now viewed Africa as a continent 'ripe for revolutionary change' (Valenta 1978, 23). Thus, Valenta pointed out in 1978 that:

As of 1977, Cuba had extended its military presence from military technicians to combat units in nine African countries: Angola, Mozambique, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Tanzania, Equatorial Guinea, Sierra Leone, the Congo-Brazzaville, and Ethiopia (...) it is Cuba and not the U.S.S.R which directly demonstrates the 'internationalism' of its armed forces (Valenta 1978, 32).

It is important to mention here that, while the large-scale participation of Cuban forces in Africa may have contributed to the perception of the Revolution as a 'militarised' system of governance, Cuba's decision to dedicate much of its military resources to an overseas conflict may also indicate a temporary shift away from the so called 'siege mentality'. Cuba seemed to move from a defensive to an offensive

position, perhaps demonstrating that the Revolution, for the time being, no longer felt vulnerable, or isolated. The confidence of the Cuban leadership in committing a large number of its troops to foreign soil partly stemmed from the fact that, in the wake of its humiliating defeat in Vietnam, its neighbour to the north was not looking to become involved in any other Third World conflicts. Cuba thus appeared to seize the opportunity to act without the threat of US interference. Valenta reinforced this argument in his affirmation that 'the intervention can be characterised as a reactive and opportunistic move on the part of the U.S.S.R and Cuba' (Valenta 1978, 30).

Yet Cuba's apparent sense of security at this stage in the Revolution was to be short lived. As the Revolution entered its third decade, the leadership placed a renewed emphasis on the defence of the *patria*, largely as a response to the intensification of US hostility towards the island under the newly elected Ronald Reagan. 1980 saw the launch of a new defence strategy, the *Guerra de Todo el Pueblo*, which was aimed at producing large-scale mobilisation around the task of defending the island. As an integral component of this strategy, the aforementioned MNR were restored under the modified title Milicias de Tropas Territoriales (MTT) with the aim of providing the FAR with a strong back-up force in the event of an invasion (Klepak 2005, 60).

The increase in defence-orientated mobilisation, and the stress placed by the leadership on the potential for an attack, did not, of course, go unnoticed by Western observers of the Cuban Revolution, many of whom viewed the strategies of the *Guerra de Todo el Pueblo* as further confirmation of the 'militarisation' of the Revolution, and, specifically, of a 'siege mentality'. Petras and Morley declared, for

example, that one of Cuba's defining characteristics was its 'perpetual state of siege' (Petras and Morley 1985, 429). They reasoned that this 'state of siege' could be explained by 'the sustained hostility exhibited by the United States imperial state through seven administrations, Republican and Democratic, liberal and conservative — the longest blockade ever maintained by a dominant imperialist country' (Petras and Morley 1985, 429). In turn, this hostility and the resulting state of siege, they contended, had profoundly shaped the Revolution's development. The authors also referred to a 'socialist fortress mentality' which had 'forced Cubans to give priority to national security issues — the political system has been organised around creating the most effective military-preparedness system' and had led to 'overdeveloped institutions of national defence and underdeveloped institutions of democratic representation' (Petras and Morley 1985, 433/435). It is interesting to note here that, while perhaps critical of the outcome of the 'state of siege' in Cuba, Petras and Morley perceived of it as a 'necessary concern' and did not attempt to explain it away as simply 'paranoia' on the part of the Cuban leadership (Petras and Morley 1985, 435).

Let us now consider another key text which examined the role of the armed forces in the Cuban Revolution: Jaime Suchlicki's edited collection of essays on the Cuban military, published in 1989. The volume's aim was to 'review, examine, and explore the FAR's history, its evolution, and current status within the Cuban political context' (Morris 1989, iii). From the opening paragraph of James Morris' introduction, the significance of the role of the FAR in the trajectory of the Revolution was heavily underlined:

Over the past three decades, the FAR has dramatically evolved from its pre-1959 revolutionary origins into a professional military institution. The military has

contributed to Cuba's economic production and the country's infrastructure; it has lent its expertise to the state bureaucracy; and it has been Cuba's first line of national defence. Since the mid-1970s, the FAR has been one of the most important instruments of Cuba's global foreign policy. Throughout the course of the Cuban Revolution the military has maintained a central position in the polity, and generally the FAR has been held in high esteem by the Cuban people. This has been the case whether due to its early revolutionary legitimacy, its performance in the helping to consolidate the Revolution, or its battlefield successes at home or abroad. In sum, when stripped of its surface complexities, the Cuban armed forces have served as the principal base of political power for Fidel Castro and the leadership closest to him (Morris 1989, xiii).

To evidence these factors in Cuba, Damián Fernández's chapter made reference to various transformations within the Revolution, most of which he believed came into fruition in 1963 and 1968, the key period relating to the FAR's pre-eminence. Notably, he underlined the importance of the 'building of the Party within the armed forces' which contributed to blurring 'the distinction between civil and military boundaries' (Fernández 1989, 9). As we have already seen in the other titles discussed, this fusion of the civil and military in Cuba has been cited as one of the principal characteristics of the 'militarisation' of the Revolution by authors such as Malloy and Dumont. The involvement of the FAR in the organisation and undertaking of agricultural work was also considered a key factor in the 'militarisation' process. A significant example of this involvement was the deployment of 100,000 soldiers to participate in the infamous *zafra* of 1970; the FAR's role was referred to as *Operación Mambí* (Fernández 1989, 10). Responsibility for clamping down on 'absenteeism, lack of discipline, and inefficiency' was conferred upon the FAR, while 'the economic rhetoric and command structure of the time was clearly militarist' (Fernández 1989, 10). With regard to the latter point, we have seen that Dumont, in particular, found the military element of the Revolution's economic projects to be highly inefficient. Moreover, according to Fernández, the FAR's influence seemed to know no bounds, as 'military

methodology was applied to all spheres of society such as education, treatment of 'social deviants', and the arts' (Fernández 1989, 10).

Interestingly, Fernández also argued that, though the military maintained a majority position in the revolutionary leadership in the 1970s, not to mention becoming more professionalised, the 1970s could be considered as a decade of 'social demilitarization' in Cuba (Fernández 1989, 17). He contended that, as 'the PCC and other civilian institutions upgraded their organisational capability and became more adept in dealing with economic problems, the role of the armed forces was limited to national defence' (Fernández 1989, 13). In contrast, Fernández viewed the 1980s as a decade marked by the resurgence of 'popular militarisation', owing mainly to the pronouncement of the *Guerra de Todo el Pueblo*, and the organisation of the MTT (Fernández 1989, 17). He asserted:

Militarization in the 1980s differed from previous experiences in that the War of All the People has been better organized, better staffed and, increasingly professionalized. In this way, the two military options debated during the early 1960s, i.e. a professional, modern FAR and a popular militia may have been reconciled during the 1980s (Fernández 1989, 17).

Also of note in Fernández's text was that he perceived the 1980s as a time of a renewed sense of a 'siege mentality' in Cuba. He proposed that the 'events in Grenada in 1983 (...) reconfirmed the longstanding perception of the need to militarize the revolution, and it accentuated the pre-existent garrison state mentality' (Fernández 1989, 18).<sup>9</sup> Fernández also suggested that increased hostility in general

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<sup>9</sup> In October 1983, the United States led an invasion of Grenada in response to the coup which had ousted Maurice Bishop's Marxist-Leninist movement which had been supported by the Cuban Revolution. Around seven hundred Cuban personnel who were based on the island (only forty-three of whom were military personnel) surrendered to the invading troops, while twenty four were killed in action (O'Shaughnessy 1984, 15; Mazarr 1990, 278). Approximately six thousand US troops were

from the United States under Reagan could be considered a contributing factor in the rekindled sense of threat of an enemy attack. Indeed, the attitude of the United States was cited as one of the central components of this so-called 'garrison state mentality':

U.S. aggression and Castro's ideology helps us to understand the garrison state mentality that has existed on the island since 1959 and the recent military doctrine of 'War of All the People' (*la guerra de todo el pueblo*). Threats from the U.S. and the Dominican Republic and from within (...) in the initial hours led to militarization and the perception of Cuba as a besieged island. Thereafter, the regime has exploited this image to rally support and exert control through popular defense mobilization. Social militarization is also evident in the pedagogical emphasis on patriotic-military education from pre-school to university (Fernández 1989, 3).

Thus, in Fernández's writing, we see that 'militarisation' in Cuba, and mobilisation in general, were once again partly explained through the existence of a 'siege mentality' which had been manipulated by the leadership in order to encourage widespread participation amongst Cuban citizens. Fernández's ideas on the 'garrison state mentality' echoed those of Dumont and Bonachea and San Martín, whose work was discussed earlier.

Like Fernández, Aguila also cited the role of the FAR in the *zafra* as evidence of 'militarisation' through an 'extension of a military mentality, and the use of military methods in education, labor, agriculture and even commerce' (Aguila 1989, 35). Additionally, he viewed the MTT as 'another striking example of the regime's mobilisational capabilities, and of its penchant for inducing social militarization as a means of strengthening popular discipline' (Aguila 1989, 53). These factors, he purported, had contributed to the fact that the Cuban leadership had the ability to 'mobilize nearly 2 million citizens for national defence, almost 20% of its

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involved in the invasion which resulted in the capture of the island in just a few days (Meernik 2004, 176).

population. That is the highest proportion of potential military mobilization in any Latin American country, as well as the highest index of social militarization' (Aguila 1989, 33).

Similarly, Leon Gouré's chapter in this volume reinforced the arguments set forth by Aguila and Fernández, particularly those regarding the supposed 'garrison state mentality' described by the latter. Gouré wrote:

Castro takes to heart Lenin's dictum that "a revolution is only worth something if it is able to defend itself". According to the garrison state mentality presumably shared and deliberately fostered in Cuba by Fidel Castro as an important factor in legitimizing his regime and in maintaining the Cuban society in a perpetual state of mobilization, one would expect him to believe that "the proof of independence, the supreme proof, is that a country is able to defend itself and its independence in the face of an adversary as powerful as the US" (Gouré 1989, 63).

Here, it was again evident that the 'garrison state mentality' was considered fundamental to the ability of the Revolution's leaders to mobilise its citizens into defending the nation by military means. Gouré returned to this argument in the final chapter of the volume, in which he stated that:

The alleged US threat to Cuba and the image of the island as a fortress forever ready to repel Yankee aggression has been and continues to be an important tool of the regime's ability to mobilise the Cuban people and ensure its support. This lends the FAR added prestige and importance and also makes it imperative to continually improve its capabilities (Gouré 1989, 176).

Elsewhere in Suchlicki's text, Andrés Suárez offered additional evidence of the central role played by the FAR in Cuban politics in his chapter on 'Civil-Military Relations in Cuba'. Suárez made reference to Gonzalez's aforementioned concept of the 'civic soldier', and argued that the Cubans themselves had discussed openly the merits of a political-military leadership:

In several international conferences sponsored by the Soviets, the Cubans have suggested a new type of revolutionary leadership, a “political-military” leadership to replace the traditional communist leader; an expert in clandestine operations eternally waiting for the “maturation of objective conditions”. We prefer to call them “revolutionary soldiers”. These are men and women who profess a revolutionary ideology, who have discovered an aptitude for the military, and who perfect it in action (Suárez 1989, 132).

Once more, it is evident that the fusion of the civil and military in Cuban society has often been seen as tantamount to the ‘militarisation’ of the Revolution.

In the 1990s, authors taking a retrospective look at the history of the Cuban Revolution continued to examine the military aspects of the Revolution in power. One such author was Bunck, whose work, as stated at the beginning of this section, explored the active efforts of the Revolution’s leaders to engender cultural change; specifically, Bunck analysed their attempts to ‘create the proper *conciencia* (...) to mold a “new man”’ (Bunck 1994, xi). Different, then, to many of the authors that have been discussed here, Bunck’s work explored the ‘militarism’ of the Cuban Revolution through its manifestation in, and influence on, cultural practices and organisations in Cuban society. That said, Bunck did not ignore the significant role of the military in agriculture and industry, and the way in which its presence shaped the Revolution beyond these areas.

As with Bonachea and San Martín, Bunck identified 1961 as the beginning of the ‘militarisation’ process, although she associated it with the declaration of the ‘Year of Education’ and the subsequent literacy campaign, rather than with the declaration of the socialist nature of the Revolution, as such. In the campaign, Bunck found parallels with the way in which a nation might prepare itself for an impending conflict. She maintained:

The literacy campaign, involving more than one and a quarter million Cubans, also mobilized the masses in impressive fashion. As the campaign progressed, it reached a scope, duration, and intensity that states usually attain only on a war footing. The leadership's rhetoric charged the movement with the dramatic imagery of national emergency, revolutionary battle, and heroic victory. The literacy campaign thus revealed the militaristic style of the revolutionary leaders. It set a precedent of militarism that would steadily intensify over the next thirty years. Castro and his assistants conceptualised the literacy campaign, as they did nearly all national efforts, as a military exercise: as a "war", a "battle", or a "struggle". Over time this militaristic mentality came to dominate policy making concerned with cultural change (Bunck 1994, 26).

It is possible to identify in Bunck's words echoes of Dumont's aforementioned comment from 1964 that 'Cuba is already on a war footing' (Dumont 1970, 232). Both authors thus seemed to view the mass mobilisation of Cuban citizens along military lines as akin to that of a nation at war, with each citizen being called upon to act in the nation's interests. Based on these perspectives, the idea of a 'siege mentality', therefore, permeates areas of the Revolution not directly associated with the defence of the nation. At other points in the text, Bunck referred to the military element of the organisation of agricultural work as part of the Revolutionary Offensive in much the same terms:

Once the leaders launched the Offensive, a broad range of officials exalted work and used military terms, even war dispatches, to describe their goals. Speeches adopted dramatic militaristic phrases, equating the labour force with a "heroic battalion" and routinely describing labour efforts as "struggles" or "wars" (Bunck 1994, 144).

Tied in with the early manifestation of 'militarism' in the literacy campaign, Bunck devoted much time to discussing the 'militarisation' of youth in Cuba. She argued that the military were largely employed to bring into line those young people who did not conform to the leadership's ideas regarding the ideal revolutionary citizen. In the 1970s, for example, 'rural work-study programs were expanded to include primary as well as secondary schools' (Bunck 1994, 50). These programmes sought

to instil military discipline and ‘communist civic-mindedness’ among the students, in addition to agricultural expertise. The guiding motto of the programme was ‘estudio, trabajo y fusil’, which, Bunck argued, clearly illustrated the equal importance given to military training. Later, during the Rectification period, the leadership hoped to reintegrate Cuban youth into the Revolution; the Unión de Jóvenes Comunistas (UJC) in particular was charged with resurrecting the concept of “military discipline” among young people (Bunck 1994, 64).<sup>10</sup> Moreover, earlier in the decade, the government implemented an initiative entitled the Sociedad de Educación Patriótico-Militar (SEPMI). Bunck explained that this programme functioned as a “military outreach program” for Cuban youths (Bunck 1994, 67). Through the programme, young people ‘met with people who took part in famous revolutionary events, participated in seminars to study the legacy of José Martí, and promoted military sports (...) At the same time, SEPMI encouraged Cuban patriotism and imparted useful military skills’ (Bunck 1994, 67). Such programmes and organisations, Bunck affirmed, ensured that the ‘militarisation’ process permeated all areas of society.

Some more recent academic texts have maintained the focus on the ‘militarisation’ of the Cuban Revolution. One notable example is Horowitz’s voluminous monograph published in 2008. Horowitz, a known critic of the Revolution, perceives the generous authority awarded to the military in Cuba as central to the failings of the Revolution. Indeed, in his introduction, he declares that the 26<sup>th</sup> of July Movement

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<sup>10</sup> The ‘Rectification’ campaign (the ‘rectification of errors and negative tendencies’, to give it its full title) was formally initiated at the Third Communist Party Congress in 1986. The campaign signalled a shift away from the Soviet model of economic management which was thought to have cultivated ‘inefficiency, corruption, and profit-minded selfishness’ (LeoGrande 2008, 52). In its place, ‘Rectification’ aimed to recentralise economic planning, and to eradicate material incentives (LeoGrande 2008, 52). Voluntary labour would also play a central role in the restructuring of Cuba’s economy, much as it had done in the 1960s (LeoGrande 2008, 52).

'quickly morphed into the January 1<sup>st</sup> Movement of the Military'; it is this military style of governance that, under the 'family dictatorship' of the Castro brothers, has led to what he considers to have been a 'collective national disaster' (Horowitz 2008, ix). Horowitz stresses that, soon after Batista's overthrow, 'All power rapidly moved from civil to military instruments and to a party that performed all essential roles of civil society without the encumbrance of democratic exchange' (Horowitz 2008, 1). Much of Horowitz's argument for what he often terms Cuba's 'military sociology' finds its basis in the fact that he sees 'militarisation' as a natural step for guerrilla movements once they gain power. He contended in the mid-1970s that:

Guerrilla movements are, first and foremost, military movements in the making. They require organisation, leadership, discipline, obedience and a command structure that is understood by the rank and file (...) As in any regime that is a consequence of military engagements (...) a sense of the necessary ingredients of military victory is carried over and perpetuated in the post-revolutionary epoch of reconstruction and consolidation. Hence, to speak of the military sociology of Cuban communism is to deal with a characteristic that defines revolutionary forces from the outset, not those which are simply grafted onto the revolution after its assumption of political power (Horowitz 2008, 104/5).

In the following chapter, Horowitz continues with this line of thought when he asserts that 'the very origins of the Cuban military, steeped in guerrilla folklore and in Communist party indifference to spontaneous mass action, made the transition from civilianism to militarism not so much a matter of national upheaval as an expected stage of national development' (Horowitz 2008, 136). In this way, by placing the origins of 'militarisation' in the guerrilla insurrection, Horowitz is able to declare that he does not consider the process to have begun in 1968; rather, he affirms that he 'would probably date it somewhat earlier' (Horowitz 2008, 179). He states: 'It is my position that the military factor is endemic to the structure of the Cuban Revolution, spurred first, in response to US pressures culminating in the Bay

of Pigs' (Horowitz 2008, 179). Situating the beginning of the 'militarisation' process in the early 1960s is consistent with San Martín and Bonachea's aforementioned position: that 'militarisation' began at around the same time as the declaration of the Revolution as 'socialist' (i.e. 1961). It also coincides with Bunck's observations regarding the 'militaristic' dimension of the literacy campaign of 1961.

Horowitz then goes on to outline the different stages in Cuba's 'militarisation' which, he proposes, have corresponded to the changing needs of the Revolution. Firstly, he contends that the leadership looked to the military 'in classic Latin American tradition, for internal police functions, through the CDRs' (Horowitz 2008, 136). Secondly, the military was employed to mobilise the masses following the failed attempt to improve economic development through moral incentives. Thirdly, professionalism was encouraged within the armed forces in order that they could perform competently in conflicts overseas.

Of all these phases, Horowitz perceives of 1973 as a pivotal moment in the militarisation process, partly owing to the aforementioned role it acquired in the efforts to turn the economy around, but largely as a result of the ascendancy of Raúl Castro within the leadership:

Not only did 1973 represent a new stage in the militarization of Cuban communism, but it also witnessed the thoroughgoing displacement of Guevara as the number-two figure (even in death) by the orthodox military figure of Raúl Castro (...) Raúl's rise to a place second only to Fidel's, and increasingly paralleling Fidel's role in crucial state and diplomatic functions, can hardly be exaggerated. Raúl has become the spokesman for all things military and the heir apparent to the revolution itself. His orthodoxy extends to the cut of his uniform (...) and his insistence on creating ranks within the Cuban military that are isomorphic with military ranks elsewhere in the world (Horowitz 2008, 137).

Here, it is evident that Horowitz's argument is contrary to Fernández's comment discussed earlier, regarding the 1970s in Cuba as a period of 'social demilitarization'. Rather, Horowitz purports that it 'would take an ostrich-like self-deception to assume that since 1970 Cuba has been in a process of demilitarization (...) If anything, Cuban leadership has become more bellicose over the last several years in claiming the righteousness of the decision to resort to the military as the underpinning of the state' (Horowitz 2008, 175). He continues: 'To speak of some magic demilitarization having begun in the 1970s is, to put it mildly, idiosyncratic. Militarization is not easily turned on and off at will. Even Cuban authorities have not asserted such an extreme voluntarist position concerning demilitarization' (Horowitz 2008, 179).

Horowitz does, however, support the position of the majority of academics in stating that Cuban agriculture has been 'entirely militarized. Workers have been organised mobilized and organized into brigades' (Horowitz 2008, 177). He posits that militarisation in this area has been inevitable, owing to the Revolution's 'single-crop export "socialism"' (Horowitz 2008, 177). Horowitz cites this involvement of the military in the agricultural sector as a contributing factor in the institutionalisation of the fusion of the party and the military (Horowitz 2008, 422). Moreover, he reiterates the comments he made in 1971 when he asserts:

My own deepest impulse is to see the Castro regime as increasingly similar in function and structure to classical *golpista* regimes elsewhere in the hemisphere. In that sense, Cuba is the backwater of Latin American tendencies toward democratization (Horowitz 2008, 423).

In sum, the review of the above literature confirms the statement made earlier in the Introduction regarding the existence of a broad consensus in Western academia on

the subject of 'militarism' in the Cuban Revolution. Additionally, it allows for the conclusion that much of the literature on the 'militarisation' of the Cuban Revolution has been critical of such a process, with many arguing that the military dimension of revolutionary change has served only as an obstacle to genuine political participation in Cuba, largely as a result of the oft-cited fusion of the Party and the military. Several prominent academics have also pointed to the creation of a hierarchy along military lines within the Party, and some argue that this has inevitably produced authoritarianism within the Revolution. The general argument seems to revolve around the idea that the role of the military in economic matters, and, specifically, in the organisation of agricultural programmes, has not only been inefficient, but that Cuban citizens needed to be coerced into performing their so-called revolutionary 'duties' and would not have done so without enforcement by the armed forces.

What is more, the majority of the authors just reviewed are of the opinion that the long-standing presence of military figures in governmental positions has reflected an overriding concern with national defence which, at times, has meant that the immediate needs of Cuban citizens have been ignored. Aguila, for instance, referred to an 'unmitigated paranoia' within the leadership which 'adversely affects development efforts and reinforces a siege mentality that is unnecessary' (Aguila 1989, 33). This so-called 'siege mentality' has, on the whole, been presented as both a cause and an effect of the 'militarisation' process. On the one hand, some authors have viewed the development of a 'siege mentality' as the strategy which has legitimised the Revolution's shift to 'militarism'; the leadership's consistent emphasis on the Revolution's vulnerability to counter-revolutionary attacks has justified the need for the military organisation of the population in order to create a

fully prepared defence force. On the other hand, others have argued that 'siege mentality' is a consequence of the militarisation process, insofar as the pervasive role of the military in Cuban society and politics has produced an environment in which the nation constantly appears to be, to use Dumont's term, on a 'war footing' (Dumont 1970, 232).

### **A New Approach: The Guerrilla Legacy, Political Culture, and Discourse Analysis**

The body of literature just discussed has made a significant contribution to Cuban studies in its analysis of the changing face of the Revolution from the late 1960s onwards. It has offered useful insights into the workings of the Revolution and the way in which the FAR has made decisive contributions to the Revolution's economy, infrastructure, foreign policy, and, perhaps most significantly, its defensive capabilities (Morris 1989, xiii). It is not the purpose of this thesis to contest the idea of the pervasive role of the Cuban military in either the leadership, or in Cuban society as a whole, from the first decade of the Revolution in power. This characteristic of the Revolution is indisputable. The physical presence of the FAR and its members *has* loomed large, and still does, within many areas of the Revolution, such as political governance and the management of mass agricultural work, which one would normally consider to be beyond the remit of most armed forces. Moreover, the FAR itself has undoubtedly been transformed from a relatively disorganised guerrilla army into a professionalised military institution, a transformation which has brought with it an increased hierarchical structure, and a greater emphasis on military discipline and order, both within the institution itself, and within the Revolution more broadly.

Rather, the aim of this thesis is to question the very term 'militarism' and its use as a means of accounting for the Revolution's survival and that of its leaders. One of the problems with the term 'militarism' is that, when applied to the Cuban context after 1959, it is done so in a loose and impressionistic fashion, really referring to a steady process whereby supposedly:

- a) The FAR, as a more professional and hierarchical structure after 1972, began to move into areas of labour mobilisation (for example, the EJT) and to influence foreign policy, as evidenced by Cuba's involvement in Angola and Ethiopia.
  
- b) Cubans were marshalled in military-like structures (and language) into various mobilisations, such as in the Literacy Campaign and the Revolutionary Offensive.

However, in reality, 'militarism' as a concept is very specific in time (and often place), according to political science and history (Chickering 2008, 196). From these disciplinary standpoints, 'militarism' refers, on the whole, to the late nineteenth century growth of a belief (within newly professionalised militaries) in the military's corporate identity (thinking and acting as a unified 'one'), and corporate superiority over civilians. This belief resulted in a general propensity to engage, and intervene, if necessary, in political life in cases where the nation's unity and stability were 'threatened', whether by external forces or from below.

Integral to that sense of militarism was, therefore, the idea of a 'mission' to which the military had to be loyal (to 'save' country X or 'defend' country Y's sovereignty), and which justified intervention. Since that concept of militarism also became characteristic of the Latin American militaries from the 1880s, being reinforced from the 1920s (with the rise of corporatism as an elite-based idea) and then again in the 1960s (with the US-driven 'doctrine of national security'), the assumption grew that Cuba's supposed domination by 'the military' was simply a Cuban version of a wider problem. Hence, the use of the term 'militarism' to describe something perceived in Cuba was loose at one level (in that it meant different things and was often simply impressionistic rather than analytical) but also deliberate, relating a supposedly FAR-dominated Cuban system to the military dictatorships which emerged in Latin America in the 1960s. This latter comparative application has largely been propounded by critics of the Revolution, and is exemplified by Horowitz's aforementioned contention that 'the general militarization of the hemisphere has had its left-wing reflex in Cuba' (Horowitz 1972, 18).

Yet, as previously discussed, negative interpretations such as Horowitz's overlook the inescapable truth that Cuba's military, unlike others in Latin America, is heir to a revolutionary heritage which has permeated it with the belief that the armed forces operate on behalf of a revolutionary people; it does not, therefore, possess a corporate superiority over the civilian population in its role as defender of the state (Klepak 2005, 56). Instead, and as noted in the opening pages of the Introduction, in revolutionary Cuba the distinction between what constitutes the civilian and military sphere is quite often difficult to discern. Put simply, then, applying 'militarism' to the very specific context of the Cuban Revolution does not tell the whole story of

Cuba's military (or, for that matter, guerrilla) experience, both prior and subsequent to 1959, and its complex relationship with the leadership and general society.

Moreover, seen through the lens of 'militarism', the longevity of the Revolution and the political careers of those who participated in the insurrectionary phase can be explained by an increased authoritarian style of leadership and the concentration of power in the hands of a small elite (a direct result of a supposed military 'intervention' in government), both of which reduce citizen political participation, and the perpetuation of a 'siege mentality'. All these factors, as we saw in the preceding section, have been highlighted as defining characteristics of 'militarism' in the Cuban context. This focus on authoritarianism, discipline, and the so-called 'siege', or 'garrison state mentality', is somewhat myopic in its understanding of how the Revolution functions, how the leadership interacts with the rest of the population, and how it garners consent for a revolutionary project first envisioned in 1953 with the attack on the Moncada army barracks in Santiago de Cuba. Specifically, it neglects to consider the political culture which has underpinned the Revolution in power. This thesis rectifies this glaring omission by demonstrating how the guerrilla experience has shaped the political culture of the Cuban Revolution.

The notion of 'political culture' employed in the thesis is consistent with Richard Fagen's conceptualisation of the term in his insightful work, *The Transformation of Political Culture in Cuba* (Fagen, 1969). Fagen perceived of 'political culture' as "the system of empirical beliefs, expressive symbols, and values which defines the situation in which political action takes place. It provides the subjective orientation

to politics” (Fagen 1969, 5). To elucidate further, a political culture, which Fagen alternately terms ‘political socialization’, refers to the beliefs, symbols and values which are created by a political elite to determine how citizens relate to the political institution of said elite, but also to each other in a given political context (Fagen 1969, 2). The creation of a new political culture aims to institute a new ‘way of life’ in which the incumbent political power is afforded legitimacy (Fagen 1969, 5). It is important to add that, for Fagen, the notion of political culture does not encapsulate ‘recurring patterns of manifest political behaviour’ (Fagen 1969, 5). Instead, it sees such patterns (for example, a high level of citizen participation in the task of defence in revolutionary Cuba) as the outcome of the socialisation which accompanies a given political culture. It is such an outcome which is one of the objectives of creating a new political culture. With respect to the Cuban context, Fagen contends that ‘The primary aim of political socialization in Cuba is to produce a participating citizen, not just one who can recite the revolutionary catechism perfectly (...) The regime seeks to forge the new political culture in the crucible of action’ (Fagen 1969, 7).

Fagen’s concept is useful for an understanding of how the guerrilla generation has assumed a central role within the Cuban leadership throughout the course of the Revolution, insofar as it assists, in Fagen’s own words, in explaining ‘how and why certain political institutions function or fail to function in specific national settings’ (Fagen 1969 5). Moreover, the images, symbols and slogans which point to a veneration of the *guerrillero* in Cuba can be considered significant components of the political culture implemented and fostered by the leadership, in that they represent certain beliefs and values which have shaped the way in which Cuban

citizens have responded to the revolutionary project. In other words, the cultivation of the guerrilla legacy has assisted in establishing a context in which the idea of a leadership largely composed of ex-guerrilla fighters has been gradually normalised since 1959 and has become, to a certain degree, unquestioned. As Fagen has written, 'the Cuban elite has not in the main been interested in socializing citizens to pre-existing values and ways of behaving. Rather, the socialization process has been directed toward an attempt to create new values and behaviours in the context of new political settings' (Fagen 1969, 6).

It is this new political setting, and not, therefore, 'militarism', which has enabled the Revolution to endure crises where other less socially and culturally embedded political powers might have failed. The Revolution did not, for example, collapse with the resignation of Fidel Castro as head of the Council of State and the Council of Ministers of Cuba in 2008, an outcome which contradicts one version of the 'militarism' perspective. Cited earlier, Dumont stated that the 'militarism' of the Revolution was partly characterised by 'an authoritarian leadership headed by a personal power that decides all problems, political, economic, and technical' (Dumont 1974, 113). The smooth handover of power to Raúl Castro offered sufficient demonstration that the Revolution could not be reduced to the political power of one individual, but was instead buttressed by a political culture which legitimised the Revolution as a whole. Furthermore, the involvement of a significant proportion of the population in the aforementioned *Bastión* defence training exercise in 2004 revealed that the Cuban leadership, as Klepak has asserted, 'still has a striking ability to mobilize the nation in times of crisis' (Klepak 2008, 72). This level of citizen participation in the Revolution undermines Dumont's other claim that

‘This military society (...) follows a path leading away from participation’ (Dumont 1974, 113). Again, it is the political culture that has accompanied the Revolution in power since its formative years which has presented the task of defending it as a duty that all Cubans must fulfil.

A principal contention of this thesis is that a central component of the political culture developed by the Revolution has been the guerrilla legacy. This aspect has profoundly shaped the political culture insofar as many of the values, beliefs and symbols of which it is comprised amount to a promotion of the guerrilla ethos and the image of the *guerrillero*. Briefly mentioned in the opening paragraphs, evidence for this promulgation of the guerrilla ethos is ubiquitous in Cuba. The elevation of the heroes and events of the insurrectionary phase of the Revolution encourages Cuban citizens to emulate the values and attributes of the *guerrillero*, for instance the value of duty, or *deber*, mentioned above. What is more, the guerrilla legacy imbues the political culture, and, therefore, the Cuban people, with a profound sense of history, and, specifically, Cuba’s history of struggle for its independence. This history has been presented by the leadership as an on-going guerrilla struggle — that of the underdog fighting against much greater and more powerful enemies — of which the Revolution in power is the concluding chapter. In this portrayal of an unfinished guerrilla struggle, the Cuban people as a nation are designated the true leaders of the Revolution, and are thus afforded agency in determining the fate of the Revolution. Hence, they are not necessarily discouraged by the leadership from participating in revolutionary activity, nor simply subject to a military discipline which forces their involvement or consent. On the contrary, there has been a conscious attempt by the leadership to encourage participation, but, more

importantly, to create an environment in which the revolutionary project can be accepted by Cuban citizens as an inevitable stage of Cuba's long-standing quest for independence. In this way, where 'militarism' is overwhelmingly negative in its talk of authoritarian control and Cuba's perpetual state of being on a 'war footing', the guerrilla aspect of the Revolution's political culture is, on the whole, positive. For this reason, it is too reductive to say that authoritarianism and 'siege mentality' are central to understanding the durability of the leadership's political power. Instead, by taking into account the legacy of guerrilla warfare and its effect on the Revolution's political culture, one can begin to understand that the relationship between the leadership and the general population is far more complex, and involves a certain degree of complicity and consent which has contributed to the Revolution's survival.

It should be made clear here, however, that this study does not look to assess the reception of the beliefs and values relating to the guerrilla experience by Cuban citizens, nor does it measure the extent to which the acceptance of these values has manifested itself in increased participation and support for the Revolution. Aside from the obvious obstacles to undertaking such an assessment in revolutionary Cuba (both politically and methodologically speaking), the decision to overlook these aspects of the Revolution is also consistent with Fagen's assertion, cited earlier, that the notion of 'political culture' does not refer to 'recurring patterns of manifest political behaviour' (Fagen 1969, 5). Instead, under investigation here is the way in which the guerrilla experience has shaped the 'way of life' and the 'new interlocking system of political values and behaviours' which has been developed by the revolutionary leadership (Fagen 1969, 5).

This influence of the guerrilla experience on the shaping of values and beliefs is most evident in the language employed by the leadership in its communication with the rest of the population. It is language, after all, which acts as the primary medium through which those in power are able to express certain beliefs, and therefore create a new political culture. Accordingly, then, this study applies discourse analysis to texts issued at specific points in the history of the Revolution in power, in order to reveal the extent to which the guerrilla ethos has been actively perpetuated. The particular methodology of discourse analysis applied follows the approach which has been outlined by Norman Fairclough (1989, 1992). Fairclough's methodology, described in greater detail in Chapter Two, combines 'linguistically-oriented discourse analysis and social and political thought relevant to discourse and language' as a means of examining how discourse contributes to social change (Fairclough 1992, 64). Taking into account the influential work of Ferdinand de Saussure, Michel Pêcheux and Michel Foucault in the field of discourse analysis, Fairclough views discursive practice as having the capacity to 'naturalise' certain ideologies in its contribution to 'the construction of systems of knowledge and belief' (Fairclough 1992, 65/66). In turn, he argues that this ability of discourse to construct and naturalise ideologies contributes to 'transforming society and reproducing it' (Fairclough 1992, 65). It is necessary to underline here Fairclough's definition of what is meant by 'discourse' in his work. He states that his 'focus is upon language' and thus he employs the term 'more narrowly than social scientists to refer to spoken or written language use' as a form of 'social practice', as a way in which 'people may act upon the world' and each other' (Fairclough 1992, 62/63). With regard to his classification of what constitutes a 'text', Fairclough considers this

term to refer to ‘any discursive event’, whether spoken or written (Fairclough 1992, 4).

Consistent, then, with Fairclough’s interpretation, the discourse analysis employed in this thesis is applied to a range of texts, including books, newspapers, magazines and speeches. The analysis itself involves, among other aspects, an examination of how phrases are structured, and the meanings and ‘ideological investment’ attached to specific words, with a view to uncovering clues as to the belief system such wordings help to construct (Fairclough 1992, 77). This notion of discourse as a contributor to the ‘construction of systems of knowledge and belief’ and the naturalisation of a given ideology has important connotations for the study of the role of the guerrilla legacy in the Cuban Revolution. If we are to accept that the leadership’s discourse reflects its ideological outlook, then it follows that the marked presence of a ‘guerrilla rhetoric’ within that discourse is evidence that the guerrilla ethos constitutes one of the defining components of the ideology which underpins the Cuban Revolution.

Fairclough’s mention of ideology, however, requires further clarification here. The notion of ideology employed in this thesis is consistent with the Gramscian explanation of the term, and is thus defined in relation to the concept of hegemony, a more precise definition of which is also provided in Chapter Two. Antonio Gramsci argued that the pursuit of political power, or hegemonic control, involved the creation of ‘a new and integral conception of the world’ which was central to the task of ‘conquering’ the ‘subordinated masses of civil society’ (Gramsci 1971, 9). He wrote:

What matters is that a new way of conceiving the world and man is born and that this conception is no longer reserved to the great intellectuals, to professional philosophers, but tends rather to become a popular, mass phenomenon, with a concretely world-wide character, capable of modifying (...) popular thought (Gramsci 1971, 417).

Following Gramsci, then, the present work considers the ideology, or the 'way of conceiving the world', of the Cuban Revolution to be that of *cubanía*. The concept of *cubanía* is firmly embedded in Cuban literature and historiography, and can be briefly summarised as a combination of pride in the Cuban nation and an inherent sense of history. Antoni Kapcia, who has written extensively on the concept, offers a more precise definition of *cubanía*, describing it as 'the political belief in *cubanidad*'; *cubanidad*, in turn, can be considered a 'belief in the existence of an inherent 'cuban-ness', a desire to re-capture an imagined nation or community which has somehow been obscured by the involvement of exogenous factors, such as Spanish colonialism and, later, US imperialism' (Kapcia 2000, 22/23). Put differently, *cubanía* can be summed up as an innate belief in an independent Cuba and a Cuban national identity, fused with anti-imperialism. Kapcia asserts that this conceptualisation of *cubanía* is not about ideas, 'but rather of beliefs and values, that is the substance of which a genuinely consensual ideology consists' (Kapcia 2008, 92).

The present work argues that many of the 'beliefs and values' of which *cubanía* is comprised are those which represent the guerrilla ethos. To assist in outlining this argument, Kapcia's concept of ideological 'codes' is employed as a means of defining more precisely how these guerrilla beliefs and values relate to the wider 'world-view' of the Revolution. Kapcia identifies such 'codes' as 'building blocks

of the ideology, defining separately the values, as beliefs, that will collectively form the whole belief-system that constitutes an ideology' (Kapcia 2000, 13). In other words, codes can be understood as the pillars of an ideology, as specific sets of beliefs and principles. As will become clear in the subsequent chapters, the values which constitute the guerrilla ethos, and which have been promoted by the leadership, together form an ideological code, a mini belief system within the wider belief-system of *cubanía*, which has underpinned the Revolution since its inception.

Chapter One of the thesis provides a discussion of how we might conceptualise the perpetuation of the guerrilla ethos in the Cuban Revolution, and thereby produce an alternative to the term 'militarism'. It first considers the term *foquismo*, given that, for the majority of Western scholars, this term immediately calls to mind the Cuban theory, and experience, of guerrilla warfare. A detailed outline of what is meant by *foquismo* is offered, based on a reading of Che Guevara's *La Guerra de Guerrillas* (1960), and Régis Debray's *Révolution dans la Révolution?* (1967). This outline contributes to our understanding of what is meant by guerrilla warfare in the context of the Cuban Revolution, while also providing a reference point for the discourse analysis in subsequent chapters, which supports the hypothesis that the guerrilla ethos constitutes an ideological code within the leadership's discourse. There then follows an overview of the work of a comparatively small number of scholars who have argued against the categorisation of the Revolution as 'militarised' by highlighting the pervasive guerrilla element in the Cuban Revolution. The terms proposed by these scholars to define this guerrilla element are evaluated in terms of their pertinence to this study's examination of the code of the guerrilla ethos.

Chapters Two and Three are comprised of an in-depth analysis of the revolutionary leadership's discourse in the 1960s and 1970s, respectively. The discourse analysis will identify whether the language of the leadership during the first two decades reflected the on-going influence of the guerrilla experience through a promotion of the guerrilla ethos. The 1960s and 1970s have been selected as periods for examination, given the centrality of this period to those who have emphasised the Revolution's 'militarism'. Here, the dominant trend has been to pinpoint the mid- to late- 1960s as heralding the gradual shift to a 'militarised' Revolution, while the 1970s is generally perceived as the decade in which the process of 'militarisation' became complete, in line with the 'Sovietisation'/ 'institutionalisation' that the Revolution supposedly experienced from the late 1960s onwards. By contrast, based on an analysis of a cross-section of texts, Chapters Two and Three challenge the assumption that, by the late 1960s, the Revolution had undergone a complete transformation from an inchoate guerrilla-led system into one which was organised primarily along military lines, and which bore little resemblance to the Revolution which had assumed power in 1959. What the evidence in these chapters reveals is that, though the Revolution underwent profound structural change in the late 1960s and early 1970s, the beliefs and values which underpinned the revolutionary project remained unchanged. In demonstrating this ideological continuity, Chapter Three also undermines the widely accepted premise that the second decade of the Revolution can be characterised as a period of 'Sovietisation'/ 'institutionalisation'.

Chapter Four continues the analysis of the leadership's discourse by examining the so-called 'Special Period' of the 1990s. This decade offers an interesting case-study, insofar as it was a time of heightened instability and profound crisis which resulted

from the collapse of Cuba's principal political and economic ally, the Soviet Union, in 1991. Having already established that a 'guerrilla rhetoric' is evident in texts issued by the leadership in the 1960s and 1970s in the preceding chapters, Chapter Four demonstrates that the values related to the guerrilla ethos have constituted an ideological code at other points in the course of the Revolution in power, and have thus continued to shape the political culture of the Revolution long after the physical guerrilla struggle of the insurrectionary phase ended. Moreover, by presenting evidence of a resurgence of the guerrilla ethos during the 'Special Period', the chapter argues that the guerrilla code is a recourse to which the leadership turns when trying to steel the population to face a series of unprecedented challenges.

Finally, the concluding chapter ties together the evidence presented in Chapters Two to Four to demonstrate how the perpetuation of the guerrilla ethos has contributed to the survival of the Revolution over six decades, and how it has enabled the leaders of the Ejército Rebelde to maintain their political control over the revolutionary project. It also affirms the contribution of the thesis to the broader field of Cuban studies, and the avenues for further research which it opens up.

## Chapter One

### Conceptualising the Perpetuation of the Guerrilla Ethos in the Cuban Revolution

It has already been established in the Introduction that this thesis considers the term 'militarism' to be unhelpful when referring to the Cuban context, given that it does not account for the guerrilla origins of the Cuban Revolution, nor the evidence which points to an on-going legacy of the guerrilla experience under the Revolution in power. One of the first tasks which this study must necessarily undertake, therefore, is to decide upon an alternative conceptualisation which *does* consider the above aspects, and which will serve to classify the 'guerrilla code' throughout the thesis. In order to do so, this chapter evaluates the existing literature which has called attention to the legacy of guerrilla warfare, and which has attempted to categorise such a legacy in a specifically Cuban context.

The principal, and perhaps most obvious, term to be considered is that of *foquismo*, for three reasons. First, it is probable that, for non-Cuban scholars, this term is instantly recognisable given its inextricable association with the writings of Che Guevara concerning guerrilla warfare methodology, and its subsequent appropriation by left-wing armed revolutionary movements in Latin America during the 1960s and 1970s. That *foquismo* is a readily identifiable concept which immediately evokes images of guerrilla warfare (specifically, the Cuban experience of this form of insurrection) suggests that it is a suitable opposition to 'militarism'. Secondly, an examination of the term is useful in that the precepts of the methodology to which it refers are based on the events of the guerrilla insurrection of the 1950s. Given that

this thesis demonstrates that the lived experience of guerrilla warfare during that period has continued to shape the political culture of the Revolution in power, an examination of what is meant by *foquismo* will shed light upon what is meant by guerrilla warfare in the Cuban context, and, in turn, facilitate an understanding of how exactly its influence has manifested itself in the leadership's discourse. Finally, as will become clear in the following three chapters, echoes of Guevara's precepts of guerrilla warfare featured heavily in the hegemonic discourse of the 1960s, 70s and 90s, and thus constitute one of the key indicators of a promulgation of *guerrillerismo*. An understanding of these precepts at the outset is therefore essential if we are to appreciate fully the extent to which they were employed in the active perpetuation of the guerrilla ethos. The following section will thus present a detailed outline of the concept of *foquismo*, followed by a discussion of the applicability of *foquismo* as a characterisation of the 'guerrilla code'.

### **What is *Foquismo*?**

At its most basic level, the term *foquismo* refers to the Cuban theory of revolution based upon guerrilla warfare. The principal architect of the theory was Guevara who, having acted as one of the chief protagonists in the Cuban Revolution's insurrectionary phase, believed that important lessons could be drawn from the hard-won campaign. These lessons, he argued, would contribute to the development of armed struggle in Latin America, and would be universally applicable to all countries across the region. Guevara articulated his conclusions in his 1960 publication, *La Guerra de Guerrillas*, a text which would lay the basis for the conceptualisation of guerrilla warfare known as the *foco* theory. This work had an explicitly didactic function, intended as it was to provide would-be Latin American *guerrilleros* with a

methodology for fomenting revolution through guerrilla warfare. Harry Villegas, himself a celebrated hero of the Cuban Revolution, writes in the prologue to the 2006 edition that *La Guerra de Guerrillas* outlined 'un método, una guía y una forma para la toma del poder político en América Latina, por medio de la lucha armada', and aimed to equip armed struggle with 'una metodología y didáctica específicas' (Villegas 2006, 3). Guevara had intended for his friend and fellow *guerrillero*, Camilo Cienfuegos, to edit and amend the text prior to publication, but Cienfuegos was killed in a plane crash in October 1959. The work has thus formed part of Guevara's legacy alone.

In 1963, Guevara published two other works, both of which were also based on his experience in the *sierras* of Cuba. The most well-known of these works was *Pasajes de la Guerra Revolucionaria* (Guevara, 1963). Through its incorporation of excerpts from Guevara's diary, the text comprehensively chronicled the events of the Revolution's guerrilla war, and served to corroborate the conclusions summarised in *La Guerra de Guerrillas* by providing a detailed account of the strategies employed by the Ejército Rebelde. The other text to be published that year was an article entitled 'Guerra de Guerrillas: un método', which first appeared in the magazine *Cuba Socialista* (Guevara, 1963). In the article, Guevara reiterated the conclusions of *La Guerra de Guerrillas*, and reconfirmed his belief that armed struggle was the only viable path to revolution in the Americas.<sup>11</sup> This text, along with *La Guerra de Guerrillas*, will serve as the basis for the following outline of the *foco* theory.

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<sup>11</sup> Matt D. Childs argues that the article differed, however, from *La Guerra de Guerrillas* in its distinctly Marxist tone (reflecting the Revolution's entry into the socialist sphere), and in the absence of the 'democratic corollary' (Childs 1995, 616). This latter point, articulated in *La Guerra de Guerrillas*, proposed that guerrilla warfare could not be successful in countries in which democracy was, even superficially, in existence (Guevara 2006, 14).

It is important to note here that, while Guevara became indelibly linked to the concept of *foquismo* in Latin America, he never once used the term in his own writing; rather, Guevara spoke only of the guerrilla *foco*, and thus his methodology has become known as the *foco* theory. It wasn't until the publication of Régis Debray's *Révolution dans la Révolution?* in 1967 that the term was first used to conceptualise the methodology outlined by Guevara. More will be said of Debray's writings on *foquismo* later in this section, but it is from Guevara's work that the following tenets of the *foco* theory are drawn.

In the opening lines of *La Guerra de Guerrillas*, in a chapter entitled 'Esencia de la Lucha Guerrillera', Guevara outlined three unavoidable conclusions, or, as he referred to them, 'aportaciones', which could be drawn from the Cuban Revolution's insurrectionary phase, and applied to armed struggle in Latin America. He proposed:

Consideramos que tres aportaciones fundamentales hizo la Revolución cubana a la mecánica de los movimientos revolucionarios en América. Son ellas:

1. Las fuerzas populares pueden ganar una guerra contra el ejército.
2. No siempre hay que esperar a que se den todas las condiciones para la revolución; el foco insurreccional puede desarrollar condiciones subjetivas sobre la base de las condiciones objetivas dadas.
3. En la América subdesarrollada, el terreno de la lucha armada debe ser fundamentalmente el campo (Guevara 2006, 13).

Guevara's hypotheses (most significantly the second deduction) were to prove highly influential for countless guerrilla movements that emerged across Latin America in the wake of the Cuban Revolution's coming to power in the 1960s and early 1970s. Indeed, these three central tenets can be viewed as the motivating force behind the articulation of the *foco* strategy. In other words, having established that the victory of a small guerrilla army over a far superior force was entirely possible in Latin

America if the conflict was carried out in a rural area and could rely on the subjective will of the revolutionaries involved, Guevara sought to create a concrete methodology of revolutionary guerrilla warfare which used these three tenets as its point of departure.

At the root of this theory, the very starting point of a revolution, was the belief that a small group of guerrilla fighters could penetrate into an isolated, rural area and establish a base. Both Guevara and Castro referred to such a base as a *foco*. It was proposed that, from this centre of operations, the micro-army would be able to launch a guerrilla war and gradually disseminate over a wider area through the establishment of additional *focos*, eventually forming a network. The principal objective of the formation of a network was to gain control of the countryside, thus isolating urban centres. Cut off from the rest of the country, the city-based state mechanisms would be weakened to the point of destruction. At such a point, the guerrilla army, in collaboration with mass civilian support, would be in a position to descend from the mountains, or jungle, and assume control of the metropolitan areas.

It should be noted here that the *foco* base did not refer to a fixed geographical location. Rather, the idea of the *foco* denoted a clandestine body of highly-trained armed combatants which must remain constantly mobile. Guevara maintained that the *foco* should be comprised of just a small number of *guerrilleros*: approximately twenty-five men should the terrain be favourable (Guevara 2006, 36). In contrast, when operating in unfavourable terrain, Guevara was of the opinion that the *foco* should not consist of more than ten to fifteen men. He stated: 'cuando el número

pasa de diez las posibilidades de que el enemigo los localice (...) son mucho mayores' (Guevara 2006, 41).

Guevara considered the mobility of the guerrilla *foco*, and also, therefore, its diminutive size, to be critical features of an embryonic campaign, insofar as both characteristics would aid in diminishing the possibility of the *foco*'s detection by the state security apparatus. As such, it was stated that a guerrilla cell should maintain the flexibility to relocate should enemy forces be active within its vicinity. Guevara insisted:

Característica fundamental de una guerrilla es la movilidad, lo que le permite estar en pocos minutos lejos del teatro específico de la acción y en pocas horas lejos de la región de la misma, si fuera necesario; que le permite cambiar constantemente de frente y evitar cualquier tipo de cerco (Guevara 2006, 26).

This primacy of flexibility was also underlined in relation to the attitude and actions of the *guerrillero*; the individual fighter had to be prepared to confront and adapt to disparate circumstances in the course of the guerrilla struggle. Guevara contended: 'Otra característica fundamental del soldado guerrillero es su flexibilidad para adaptarse a todas las circunstancias y convertir en favorables todos los accidentes de la acción' (Guevara 2006, 28). In turn, such adaptability at an individual level would allow for the guerrilla army, as a collective, to perpetuate its state of mobility. Guevara advised that 'nunca conviene habituar al enemigo a una forma determinada de Guerra; hay que variar constantemente los lugares y las horas de operación y las formas de hacerlo también' (Guevara 2006, 39).

The mobility and flexibility of the guerrilla army were also fundamental tenets of the methodology, in that they allowed for the movement to turn its inferior size to its advantage. Constant mobility, and the capacity to move around undetected, would enable the guerrilla army to apply one of its most effective weapons: the element of surprise. Surprise attacks were central to a successful guerrilla campaign given that the small number of rebels impeded the possibility of participating in conventional, military battles. Instead, it was vital that the *guerrilleros* attack the enemy when least expected, and flee the scene before its target had time to regroup and retaliate. Such attacks could inflict not only physical damage, but could also dent the morale of the opposing forces, which would then be forced into the defensive position. Guevara wrote of this tactic:

Naturalmente, su inferioridad numérica hace muy necesario que los ataques sean siempre por sorpresa, esa es la gran ventaja, es lo que permite al guerrillero hacer bajas al enemigo sin sufrir pérdidas (Guevara 2006, 27).

Elsewhere in *La Guerra de Guerrillas*, he referred to this tactic as that of ‘muerte y huye’ (Guevara 2006, 20). He purported that the repetition of this strategy ‘sin descanso al enemigo’ would thoroughly demoralise the opponent, leaving it to believe that it was surrounded by the rebel forces (Guevara 2006, 20). Surprise attacks could also lead to the acquisition of additional weaponry by the rebels which would only serve to strengthen the campaign. Another means of undermining the enemy, according to Guevara, was to employ ‘otra de las terribles armas de la guerrilla’: the act of sabotage (Guevara 2006, 25). Sabotage, he argued, was capable of paralysing entire armies, and would demoralise the enemy to the point where the guerrilla army could attack with little fear of repercussion.

In order to achieve the required constant mobility, and, therefore, enact the aforementioned strategies, Guevara's methodology posited that the setting of a revolutionary guerrilla warfare campaign should be rural. As mentioned, this rule formed part of the three conclusions drawn from the Cuban Revolution's insurrectionary phase: 'En la América subdesarrollada, el terreno de la lucha armada debe ser fundamentalmente el campo' (Guevara 2006, 13). Guevara argued that rural environments offered the necessary space and isolation in which a guerrilla micro-army could manoeuvre undetected for an extended period of time. In contrast, guerrilla operations carried out in urban centres were strongly discouraged owing to the proximity of such activity to state security forces. Should urban operations become necessary during the course of a campaign, the city-based activity would need to be under the direction of guerrilla leaders based in the countryside. Guevara wrote that:

Es fundamental precisar que nunca puede surgir por sí misma una guerrilla suburbana. Tendrá nacimiento después de que se creen ciertas condiciones necesarias para que pueda subsistir, y esto mismo indica que la guerrilla suburbana estará directamente a las órdenes de jefes situados en otras zonas (Guevara 2006, 46).

He continued:

Su integración numérica no debe pasar de cuatro o cinco hombres. Es importante la limitación del número, porque la guerrilla suburbana debe ser considerada como situada en terrenos excepcionalmente desfavorables, donde la vigilancia del enemigo será mucho mayor y las posibilidades de represalia aumentan enormemente así como las de una delación. Hay que contar como circunstancias agravantes el hecho de que la guerrilla suburbana no puede alejarse mucho de los lugares donde vaya a operar (Guevara 2006, 46).

The primacy of the rural campaign expressed in Guevara's methodology for fomenting revolution marked a theoretical deviation from more traditional, Marxist-Leninist theories of revolution. Marx predicted that revolution would occur

predominantly in urban, industrial areas, while, similarly, it can be said that Lenin's theory was also metropolitan-minded, given the role it afforded to the industrial working class and intellectuals.<sup>12</sup> It was not Guevara's aim to discredit such theories, particularly in light of the Revolution's adoption of the Marxist-Leninist ideology soon after the publication of *La Guerra de Guerrillas*. Instead, he aimed to demonstrate that, given the specificities of the Latin American context, theories developed elsewhere were inapplicable with respect to the means of producing revolution. Guevara believed that strict adherence to theories which emphasised the role of the urban, working class masses was entirely ineffective in Third World countries, insofar as it failed to take into account the continent's not insignificant rural population. He asserted:

El tercer aporte es fundamentalmente de índole estratégica y debe ser una llamada de atención a quienes pretenden con criterios dogmáticos centrar la lucha de las masas en los movimientos de las ciudades, olvidando totalmente la inmensa participación de la gente del campo en la vida de todos los países subdesarrollados de América. No es que se desprecie las luchas de masas organizadas, simplemente se analiza con criterio realista las posibilidades, en las condiciones difíciles de la lucha armada, donde las garantías que suelen adornar nuestras constituciones están suspendidas o ignoradas. En estas condiciones, los movimientos obreros deben hacerse clandestinos, sin armas, en la ilegalidad y arrojando peligros enormes; no es tan difícil la situación en el campo abierto, apoyados los habitantes por la guerrilla armada y en lugares donde las fuerzas represivas no pueden llegar (Guevara 2006, 15).

Though contradictory to the aforementioned more orthodox theories, Guevara's insistence on *el campo* as the scene of conflict was, however, consistent with Maoist revolutionary theory which also upheld the primacy of rural campaigns. That said,

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<sup>12</sup> Lenin afforded little attention to the role of guerrilla warfare in revolutionary movements. His 1906 article 'Guerrilla Warfare' was one of the few instances in which he offered a perspective on this form of revolutionary struggle. In it, he contended that 'as a general rule, guerrilla warfare is waged by the worker combatant, or simply by the unemployed worker' (Laqueur 1977, 172). Lenin also differed from Guevara in his assertion that guerrilla warfare would only be an inevitable part of a revolution 'when the mass movement had actually reached the point of an uprising and when fairly large intervals occur between the big 'engagements' in the civil war' (Laqueur 1977, 172). Later, after 1917, Lenin spoke only disparagingly of this form of armed warfare (Laqueur 1977, 173).

the two theories differed with respect to the notion of liberated territories (Kohl and Litt 1974, 17).<sup>13</sup> Previously discussed, the success of Guevara's methodology was dependent upon the flexibility of the *foco*. The guerrilla *foco* was not, under any circumstance, to establish a fixed base, or an autonomous or liberated territory, at least in the nascent stages of the guerrilla campaign. Such a base would increase the chances of detection by the enemy, and force the *guerrilleros* into a defensive position, rather than one reliant upon the element of surprise. Only once a wider *foco* network covering a specific area was in place could a more permanent base be created. In the Cuban Revolution's insurrectionary phase, the Comandancia de la Plata in the Sierra Maestra, Cuba's first 'Primer Territorio Libre', was founded only after significant successes had been achieved, some seventeen months into the campaign.

More significantly, perhaps, Guevara's *foco* theory diverged from previous theories of revolution in its insistence that the guerrilla micro-army should not serve as the vanguard front of a political party located elsewhere. Rather, the guerrilla *foco* served as the nucleus of revolutionary activity, fusing the armed and political wings of a movement into a single entity. This aspect of the theory was clearly expressed in *La Guerra de Guerrillas*, in which Guevara contended: 'la guerrilla, como núcleo armado, es la vanguardia combatiente del mismo, su gran fuerza radica en la masa de la población' (Guevara 2006, 16). The principal objective of designating the *grupo armado* act as the 'base única' of the revolutionary struggle was to preclude

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<sup>13</sup> Kohl and Litt have written of the discrepancies between the *foco* and Maoist theories: 'Whereas the Yen-an region could be militarily detached and defended, there is no comparable opportunity in Latin America. The army can occupy any particular patch of ground it chooses, and hence the guerrillas are forced into a war of mobility, clandestinity, and attrition. This introduces the problem of security on a greater scale than in China: neither the guerrillas nor their supporters can rely on impenetrability of terrain (...) As embodied in the *foco* theory, these security-related problems led to a de-emphasis on mass-line work' (Kohl and Litt 1974, 17).

problems relating to factionalism, as might arise should the vanguard front be subordinate to the orders of a city-based headquarters (Guevara 2006, 18).

Moreover, the purpose of such ‘acción político-militar’ was partly to contribute to the political education of each member of the movement. From the initial stages of the insurrectionary phase, those fighting in the *sierra* understood that revolutionary consciousness:

could not be developed by means of propaganda or indoctrination but must arise fundamentally from revolutionary praxis: armed struggle and the restructuring of the land tenure system; participation in militant action; change in living conditions of the peasantry (Medin 1990, 6).

The idea behind the nucleus of the guerrilla *foco*, therefore, would be to ensure that every individual within a given movement would develop a revolutionary consciousness through the lived experience of physical struggle. The use of the term ‘revolutionary consciousness’ here is consistent with C. Fred Judson’s useful conceptualisation:

Revolutionary consciousness can be defined on the cognitive level as the awareness of contradictions in a society which has reached a stage, that of crisis, where a revolutionary outcome is possible. (...) Revolutionary consciousness implies faith and belief in victory, emotional identification with the cause of social revolution, and a belief that social regeneration will be made possible by revolution (Judson 1984, 2).

This form of consciousness-building in a revolution’s formative stages would form the basis of the project of national, social consciousness-raising in the years following the rise to power of a revolutionary movement. Guevara would later elaborate on the decisive role of consciousness in the construction of a socialist society in his 1965 essay ‘El socialismo y el hombre en Cuba’. In this well-known

work, Guevara argued that it was necessary to create an ‘hombre nuevo’, an ideal citizen with a highly developed *conciencia*, driven predominantly by moral incentives, and ‘consumed with passion for the nation and for the revolution’ (Blum 2011, 22). This ‘new man’ and, in turn, a new society would be formed through active and daily participation in revolutionary activity. As Guevara succinctly put it: ‘Nos forjaremos en la acción cotidiana, creando un hombre nuevo’ (Guevara 1979, 15).

What was evident, then, in *La Guerra de Guerrillas* was the desire to fuse theory and practice, an approach which he believed to be fundamental to revolutionary success, and one which motivated his articulation of the *foco* theory. For Guevara, no political education was necessary other than the direct, lived experience of revolution. He stated as such in ‘Guerra de Guerrillas: un método’: ‘No hay oficio ni profesión que se pueda aprender solamente en libros de texto. La lucha, en este caso, es la gran maestra’ (Guevara 1963, 168). In his emphasis on praxis and on the idea that, out of praxis, develops consciousness, Guevara’s work corresponds with the centrality of action in shaping ideology in Gramscian thought. Gramsci argued that a socialist consciousness could not be imposed on the general population from above, but must develop organically from their everyday working lives. He propounded that all individuals possessed the capacity to acquire an awareness of the social and economic conditions of the world in which they lived and, importantly, the need to change it, through their actions alone, arguing that, ‘Man is a process and more precisely the process of his actions’ (in Femia 1981, 113).

Guevara's focus upon praxis, and the fact that his methodology was based upon the already lived Cuban experience of struggle, is crucial to understanding the relevance of the *foco* theory to the leadership in the 1960s, and why it was reflected in the hegemonic discourse of that time, evidence of which will be presented in the following chapter. A critical component of the lived experience, according to Guevara, and a contributor to the development of revolutionary consciousness, was the interaction with the population local to the region in which a guerrilla *foco* was active. Direct cooperation and communication between citizens and *guerrilleros*, it was argued, would facilitate the shaping of a revolutionary consciousness of both parties. On the one hand, the combatants would come to understand the plight of the peasantry and, in turn, strengthen their belief in agrarian reform through revolution. After all, as Guevara posited, 'el guerrillero es, ante todo, un revolucionario agrario' and, as such, 'Interpreta los deseos de la gran masa campesina de ser dueña de la tierra, dueña de sus medios de producción, de sus animales, de lo que constituye su vida y constituirá también su cementerio' (Guevara 2006, 17). On the other hand, the citizens themselves would learn from the *guerrilleros* with respect to the possibilities for change through revolution and would, therefore, come to support, and potentially form part of, the revolution (Guevara 2006, 53). To realise this mutual advancement of revolutionary consciousness, Guevara advised:

Hay que establecer, al mismo tiempo que centros de estudio de las zonas de operaciones y centros de estudios de las zonas de operaciones futuras, trabajo popular intensivo, explicando los motivos de la revolución, los fines de esta misma revolución y diseminando la verdad incontrovertible de que en definitiva contra el pueblo no se puede vencer. Quien no sienta esta verdad indubitable no puede ser guerrillero (Guevara 2006, 24).

Providing the local population with a political education through such activity would constitute one of the methods by which the initial *foco* would be able to increase its

membership and, consequently, establish additional *focos*. Other means of winning civilians over to the guerrilla cause advocated by Guevara included the transmission of propagandistic messages via radio and other media such as newspapers; he considered radio to be the most effective channel (Guevara 2006, 127). This type of propaganda would serve to explain to citizens both the reasons behind the insurrection, and the proposed plan of action that the revolutionaries intended to realise. It was hoped that such propaganda would elicit sympathy for the cause and, in turn, physical support on the ground.

Guevara's strategies for acquiring new recruits, and hence widening the *foco* network, underlined the importance of popular support to his methodology. While the initial stages of a revolution would unfold in seemingly inauspicious conditions involving just a handful of men, ultimately, it would not succeed without the support of the general population. Denied such support, the *focos* would be condemned to perpetuate the condition of isolation which, though initially facilitating revolutionary activity, would, in the long run, preclude the possibility of defeating the enemy. It was only popular support which could enable the movement to make the leap from irregular force to an organised army capable of assuming power. Indeed, as his first hypothesis stated, it was 'las fuerzas populares', and not the guerrilla army, which would eventually win the war. Guevara was unequivocal in highlighting this aspect of guerrilla warfare-based revolution. He wrote:

Es importante destacar que la lucha guerrillera es una lucha de masas, es una lucha de pueblos: la guerrilla, como núcleo armado, es la vanguardia combatiente del mismo, su gran fuerza radica en la masa de la población. (...) El guerrillero cuenta, entonces con todo el apoyo de la población del lugar. Es una cualidad *sine qua non* (Guevara 2006, 16).

This principle regarding the necessity of mass support and the eventual creation of an 'Ejército Regular' was a component critical to the functionality of Guevara's methodology, and one which the majority of *foco*-oriented guerrilla movements in Latin America post-1959 failed to realise. The *foco* method was, after all, a means to initiating revolution, rather than an end. If the movement did not progress beyond the level of scattered rural *focos*, it could not expect to possess a strength which was sufficient to topple the state's security forces. Guevara made sure to highlight this message, that the guerrilla campaign was but one stage in the revolutionary process:

Queda bien establecido que la guerra de guerrillas es una fase de la guerra que no tiene de por sí oportunidades de lograr el triunfo, es además una de las fases primarias de la guerra y se irá desenvolviendo y desarrollando hasta que el Ejército Guerrillero, en su crecimiento constante, adquiera las características de un Ejército Regular. En ese momento estará listo para aplicar golpes definitivos al enemigo y acreditarse la victoria. El triunfo será logrado por un Ejército Regular, aunque sus orígenes sean el de un Ejército Guerrillero (Guevara 2006, 21).

Furthermore, underscoring the role of the wider population in *foco* warfare, and the goal of the formation of a regular army, might also have had the intention of demonstrating that this type of revolutionary warfare offered real potential for success. The concept of initiating a revolution with such a minority of participants may have seemed unthinkable to some would-be revolutionaries, who would likely have questioned the plausibility of what appeared to be something of a suicidal mission. Thus, positioning the struggle as one of 'the people' added a sense of purpose to the initial phase of the isolated *foco*, and offered hope to those who formed part of it. Guevara was attempting to boost the morale of those who might be facing a situation in which all seemed to be lost, and to encourage belief in the cause and its method. In other words, he was contributing to the development of a revolutionary consciousness in the *guerrillero*; that is, encouraging 'faith and belief

in victory' (Judson 1984, 2). Guevara stressed that, 'No debe considerarse a la guerrilla numéricamente inferior al ejército contra el cual combate, aunque sea inferior su potencia de fuego' (Guevara 2006, 16). As will become clear in the ensuing chapters, this notion that the rebel side should not consider itself inferior to the enemy permeated the hegemonic discourse in Cuba from the onset of the Revolution in power.

Yet, in spite of Guevara's insistence on the role of the masses in revolutionary warfare, it was his *aportación* regarding 'subjective conditions' which, in many ways, had the greatest impact on ideas of revolution, both in Cuba and in the rest of Latin America. Indeed, coupled with his proposal that 'popular forces' could defeat a nation's army, Guevara himself acknowledged the deliberate potency of his tenet that 'el foco insurreccional puede desarrollar condiciones subjetivas sobre la base de las condiciones objetivas dadas' (Guevara 2006, 13). He contended:

De estas tres aportaciones, las dos primeras luchan contra la actitud quietista de revolucionarios o seudorrevolucionarios que se refugian, y refugian su inactividad, en el pretexto de que contra el ejército profesional nada se puede hacer y algunos otros que sientan a esperar a que, en una forma mecánica, se den todas las condiciones objetivas y subjetivas necesarias, sin preocuparse de acelerarlas (Guevara 2006, 13).

The mention here of 'objective conditions' referred to the Leninist conceptualisation of revolution, which posited that the revolution could not be realised unless the 'objective conditions' of a popular uprising were already in place. Richard Gott has offered a useful description of such conditions: 'A revolutionary situation, according to Lenin, presupposes certain objective conditions: a political crisis which makes it impossible for the old ruling classes to continue ruling in the old way; a substantial deterioration in the conditions of the masses; and the rise of a genuinely mass movement' (Gott 1970, 15).

In contrast, Guevara's defining contribution to debates in Latin America on the most effective path to revolution was to declare that waiting for the 'objective conditions' to arrive was utterly fruitless, and simply furnished so-called 'pseudo-revolutionaries' with a useful excuse for their inaction (Guevara 2006, 13). As an alternative, he argued that revolution could be engendered through 'subjective conditions' alone, that it could be *made* by the revolutionary regardless of the 'objective conditions' with which he/she was confronted. The creation of 'subjective conditions' required nothing more than the subjective will of the individual to act. In other words, the revolution could, and should, commence without delay if based on voluntarism alone. The role of the guerrilla fighter was therefore to precipitate the revolutionary struggle of a given nation. Villegas writes that:

para el Che el papel de la guerrilla era de un catalizador, que aceleraría las condiciones de lucha en el pueblo, siendo consecuente con el principio de que el papel del revolucionario no es sentarse a esperar para ver pasar el cadáver del imperialismo, sino contribuir a acelerar las condiciones que propicien su colapso (Villegas 2006, 4).

Similarly, Peter Binns and Mike Gonzalez have noted that, in *La Guerra de Guerrillas*, 'Che insists that it is the revolutionaries who make the revolution (...) the assumption is drawn (...) that will power, the subjective conditions, can overcome the objective conditions for revolution. The protagonists of the revolution are the guerrillas, not the workers' (Binns and Gonzalez, 1980).

Given the immense task of catalysing the revolution, Guevara was careful to specify the necessary characteristics which a *guerrillero* should embody if a campaign were to be successful. Two chapters of *La Guerra de Guerrillas* were devoted to outlining these prerequisite qualities, 'El guerrillero, reformador social' and 'El guerrillero,

como combatiente’, though other guidelines relating to the *guerrillero* could be found elsewhere in the text. One of Guevara’s striking pronouncements in this respect appeared in the opening pages:

la cualidad positiva de esta guerra de guerrillas es que cada uno de los guerrilleros esté dispuesto a morir, no sólo por defender un ideal sino por convertirlo en realidad. Esa es la base, la esencia de la lucha de guerrillas (Guevara 2006, 21).

Here, there is no mistaking that, for Guevara, if one was to be a true *guerrillero*, one had to be willing to make the ultimate sacrifice: to give one’s life in the name of the revolution. Indeed, as he contended, the alacrity of the *guerrillero* to die for the cause lay at the very heart of this type of guerrilla warfare. In this sense, the *guerrillero* could possess only the most heightened revolutionary consciousness. What is more, Guevara stipulated that the guerrilla fighter had to be a risk taker, he should show courage and, perhaps more importantly, optimism in the face of adversity. He contended that the *guerrillero*:

debe ser audaz, analizar correctamente los peligros y las posibilidades de una acción y estar siempre presto a tomar una actitud optimista frente a las circunstancias y a encontrar una decisión favorable aún en los momentos en que el análisis de las condiciones adversas y favorable no arroje un saldo positivo apreciable (Guevara 2006, 56).

Similarly, the text stated that *foco*-based guerrilla warfare required extreme tenacity, and an ‘actitud de lucha’ from its *guerrilleros*, who would inevitably experience suffering and grave danger, often on a daily basis:

La actitud de lucha, esa actitud que no debe desmayar en ningún momento, esa inflexibilidad frente a los grandes problemas del objetivo final, es también la grandeza del guerrillero (Guevara 2006, 21).

In addition to these qualities demanded of a *guerrillero* if he was to excel as a combatant, this type of guerrilla warfare also necessitated that its participants possessed ‘cualidades morales’ (Guevara 2006, 57). In other words, the moral conduct of the guerrilla fighter should be nothing more than exemplary; the *guerrillero* should offer a shining example to the rest of the population if new recruits to the revolution were to be acquired. Guevara asserted: ‘el guerrillero debe tener una conducta moral que lo acredite como verdadero sacerdote de la reforma que pretende’ (Guevara 2006, 51). The religiosity of the metaphor employed here, whereby Guevara compared the *guerrillero* to a priest, was reinforced in Guevara’s contention that:

El guerrillero será una especie de ángel tutelar caído sobre la zona para ayudar siempre al pobre y para molestar lo menos posible al rico, en los primeros momentos del desarrollo de la guerra (Guevara 2005, 52).

Guevara’s employment of a religious lexicon in these examples underlined his conviction that the guerrilla *foco* was a force for positive social change which offered redemption to those willing to join its ranks. In effect, the realisation of ‘trabajo popular intensivo’ was akin to performing something of a religious conversion. The *guerrillero* should not, therefore, underestimate the magnitude of the role he/she was undertaking. Moreover, such language underscored the role of faith in catalysing revolution. Ultimately, it was unerring faith in the revolutionary cause which would bring about revolutionary change. The religious undertones in Guevara’s work were later echoed in the hegemonic discourse of the Revolution, examples of which will be discussed in the textual analysis of the subsequent chapters. Similarly, although to a far greater extent, Guevara’s tenet regarding the role of subjective conditions, and his prescriptive articulation regarding the attributes required of a *guerrillero*,

also permeated the leadership's discourse of the 1960s and 1970s. The revolutionary leadership can be seen to have drawn on, and actively promoted, Guevara's ideas as a means of inspiring and mobilising Cuban citizens. In this way, the guerrilla ethos lived on beyond the physical struggle for power. It is for this reason that a detailed examination of his writings has been included in this chapter.

Yet Guevara's principal goal in promoting the primacy of 'subjective conditions', and in producing the *foco* theory in the first instance, was to 'shake-up' existing ideas on revolution in the Americas, and thereby spark a new flame of revolutionary activity across the region. In line with the Leninist conception that the revolution should be international, Guevara advocated a pan-American revolution which would mutually strengthen revolutionary activity in neighbouring countries. Guevara perceived of the Cuban Revolution as the first step towards a continental rebellion. Indeed, in many ways, he conceived of Cuba as symbolic of the first *foco* in the Latin American revolution. In 'Guerra de Guerrillas: un método', he argued in favour of such a regional struggle against imperialism:

se hace difícil que la victoria se logre y consolide en un país aislado. A la unión de las fuerzas represivas debe contestarse con la unión de las fuerzas populares. En todos los países en que la opresión llegue a niveles insostenibles, debe alzarse la bandera de la rebelión, y esta bandera tendrá por necesidad histórica, caracteres continentales. La Cordillera de los Andes está llamada a ser la Sierra Maestra de América, como dijera Fidel, y todos los inmensos territorios que abarca este continente están llamados a ser escenarios de la lucha a muerte contra el poder imperialista (Guevara 1963, 173).

Guevara's unreserved calls for revolution did not go unheard in Latin America. For would-be revolutionaries who found themselves to be on a vastly unequal footing with respect to a potential conflict with the enemy (the state), the *foco* methodology (and, of course, the Cuban example more generally) illuminated the path towards

revolutionary victory. The Cuban success story generated a 'new faith in revolutionary action', demonstrating how an initially small band of militants could develop into a force strong enough to defeat a state's armed forces (Wright 1002, 41). Furthermore, the Cuban Revolution provided a 'home-grown' model of revolution that appeared to draw upon the specificities of the Latin American context; specifically, its (supposedly) largely rural composition. Guevara was keen to assert that, though Latin American countries may have differed in many fundamental aspects, *foco* warfare's core tenets were universally applicable within the continent. He argued that:

Es natural que las condiciones geográficas y sociales de cada país determinen el modo y las formas peculiares que adoptará la Guerra de guerrillas, pero sus leyes esenciales tienen vigencia para cualquier lucha de este tipo (Guevara 2006, 16).

In the early 1960s, numerous guerrilla movements sprang up across the region. The majority, operating in the countryside, sought to produce almost carbon-copies of the Cuban insurrection. Significant examples of rural guerrilla struggles of the early 1960s occurred in Guatemala, Colombia, Peru and Venezuela.<sup>14</sup> Though the longevity of each campaign varied from country to country, ultimately, all of these movements failed to produce revolution in their respective nation-states. Much of the blame for the defeat of these movements can be attributed to improved counter-insurgency methods which were developed around that time. In this way, not only did the Cuban Revolution inspire subsequent revolutionary campaigns but it also highlighted the 'necessity of versatile, resolute and informed counter-insurgency techniques' (Kohl and Litt 1974, 9). Thus the nascent movements of the 1960s faced

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<sup>14</sup> Though guerrilla warfare had been in motion in Colombia for over a decade prior to the Cuban Revolution, it was only in 1964 that an organized guerrilla front emerged with the aim of producing revolution (Wright 2001, 88).

a far greater challenge than that posed by Batista's forces; the enemy had developed counter-insurgency methods specifically designed to combat *foco* warfare. As Régis Debray noted in 1965: 'Une révolution socialiste révolutionne aussi la contre-révolution' (Debray 1967, 145).<sup>15</sup>

The string of failures that characterized the Latin American attempt to reproduce the Cuban Revolution appeared to herald the end of the application of *foquista* warfare in the region. Furthermore, the Cuban revolutionary model lost much of its currency following Guevara's disastrous effort to launch a rural *foquista* campaign in Bolivia, and his subsequent death at the hands of the Bolivian Army (aided by the CIA) in October 1967. The defeat in Bolivia was considered by many to symbolise the ultimate failure of Guevara's theory of rural guerrilla warfare. That said, guerrilla movements continued to emerge and establish *focos* in Latin America, most significantly in the Southern Cone. While, on the one hand, Guevara's death highlighted the deficiency of the Cuban model, on the other hand it transformed his figure into the heroic martyr of the Latin American revolution, and ensured that the myth of the "heroic guerrilla" would live on. This martyrdom inspired many to continue to fight to realise Guevara's dream of a hemispheric revolution. Thus, as Jorge Castañeda has succinctly remarked, 'The death of Che Guevara symbolized the end of an epoch, though it did not actually coincide with its conclusion' (Castañeda 1993, 80).

Moreover, Cuba's continuing active encouragement of a continent-wide revolution did much to buck the waning trend. One of the enduring symbols of Cuban support

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<sup>15</sup> 'A socialist revolution also revolutionises the counter-revolution'. NB: This and all subsequent translations are my own.

for revolutionary movements in the late 1960s was the Tricontinental Conference held in Havana in January 1966. This conference was the first meeting of the Organización de Solidaridad con los Pueblos de Asia, Africa y América Latina (OSPAAAL), which had been created by Castro just a few months before. The purpose of the meeting was to gather revolutionary governments and organizations with the intent of accelerating revolution throughout the Third World (Wright 2001, 34). Nelson Valdés has written that ‘on this and other occasions Cuba put its commitment to international revolutionary solidarity on the record’ (Valdés 1979, 89). This commitment was made explicit in President Dorticós’ opening speech of the Tricontinental, in which he proclaimed: ‘Es irrevocable nuestra voluntad de ejercer la solidaridad internacional’ and, citing Castro, ‘con Cuba, cualquier movimiento revolucionario, en cualquier parto del mundo, podrá contar con su ayuda incondicional y decidida’ (*Documentos Políticos* 1966, 23/4).

One of the outcomes of the Tricontinental was the establishment of the Organización Latinoamericana de Solidaridad (OLAS), which ‘gave priority attention to the Dominican Republic, Venezuela, Colombia, Guatemala and Peru’ (Domínguez 1978, 270). The purpose of the organization was ‘to serve as a mechanism for Havana to aid, coordinate, and provide leadership to pro-Castro guerrilla groups throughout the continent’ (Erisman 1985, 31). The OLAS had a short life-span, eventually being absorbed by OPSAAAL in the late 1960s. However, it did stage a noteworthy conference in Havana in the summer of 1967 which was attended by delegates from numerous prominent Latin American left-wing movements. H. Michael Erisman has contended that the foundation of the OLAS was a means for Cuba ‘to have a vehicle free of Soviet influence for implementing its radical line’ and came to epitomise ‘the

severity of Havana's disenchantment with the Soviets and their Latin cohorts' (Erisman 1985, 31).

Another means by which Cuba re-confirmed its endorsement of a Latin American revolution, and of particular note here, was the Fidel Castro-endorsed publication of Debray's aforementioned text, *Révolution dans la Révolution?*, in early 1967. A young French professor of philosophy working at the University of Havana, and an acquaintance of both Castro and Guevara, Debray sought to defend the Cuban revolutionary warfare model in his writings. Rather than considering the repeated failure of Cuban-style guerrilla warfare in Latin America to be evidence of deficiencies in Guevara's methodology, Debray believed that defeat across the continent had simply served to strengthen armed struggle, insofar as it offered valuable lessons for future movements. He argued that defeat would not only permit revolutionaries to perfect the model, and thereby succeed, but it had also reinforced the 'leçon de ténacité' evidenced by the Cuban insurrection. Debray contended that 'Pour un révolutionnaire, l'échec est un tremplin: théoriquement plus enrichissant que le succès, il accumule une expérience et un savoir' (Debray 1967, 20).<sup>16</sup> Moreover, he argued that setbacks elsewhere could not be attributed to shortcomings in the Cuban methodology, but instead resulted from the failure of would-be revolutionaries to identify the true contribution of the Cuban example: 'une nouvelle conception de la guerre de guérilla' (Debray 1967, 15).<sup>17</sup>

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<sup>16</sup> 'For a revolutionary, failure is a springboard: theoretically more enriching than success, it builds experience and knowledge'.

<sup>17</sup> 'A new concept of guerrilla warfare'.

Debray's aim, therefore, in publishing *Révolution dans la Révolution?* was to elaborate on and to highlight certain of Guevara's conclusions, in addition to incorporating ideas generated through long discussions with Castro, in order to breathe new life into the *foco* theory and, in turn, encourage a new wave of revolutionary guerrilla warfare throughout Latin America. An article published in the short-lived Cuban journal *Pensamiento Crítico* in May 1967 by the *Les Temps Modernes* correspondent, Rachid, stated the following regarding Debray's text:

A su vez, Debray intenta fijar ciertos tácticos y estratégicos enunciados a veces en 'La guerra de guerrillas' y extrae las profundas implicaciones políticas de la guerrilla cubana, su aporte decisivo a la experiencia revolucionaria internacional y al marxismo leninismo. Debray se hace intérprete de la situación. Nada más (Rachid 1967, 201).

As mentioned at the beginning of this chapter, Debray's expounding of Guevara and Castro's ideas resulted in the formal conceptualisation of Cuban guerrilla warfare strategies as *foquismo*.

Two notable precepts of Guevara's which Debray wished to highlight were those of 'subjective conditions', and the predominance of the countryside as the terrain of armed struggle. Debray underlined, at various stages throughout the text, the role of the individual in producing revolution, the importance of fomenting revolution without delay, and stated that 'le travail insurrectionnel est aujourd'hui le travail politique numéro 1' (Debray 1967, 125).<sup>18</sup> With regard to the rural nature of *foco* warfare, Debray was adamant that, though power was held and seized in the city, 'le chemin qui y mène les exploités passe par la campagne, inéluctablement' (Debray 1967, 122).<sup>19</sup>

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<sup>18</sup> 'insurrectionary work is today the single most important form of political work'.

<sup>19</sup> 'The path which leads the exploited there passes, unavoidably, through the countryside'.

Debray's work also expanded upon other aspects of Guevara's theory, whilst at the same time incorporating his own observations and conclusions concerning the correct path to a Latin American revolution. Specifically, Debray laid much emphasis on the primacy of mobility in a guerrilla campaign (and, inextricably linked to the latter, clandestinity), the fusion of the party and the army into a single nucleus (the *foco*), and the role of the masses in the revolutionary struggle. His conclusions were divided into four subchapters, each devoted to a different strategy: 'L'autodéfense armée', 'La propagande armée', 'La base guérillera' and 'Parti et guérilla'. The first topic, 'L'autodéfense armée', sought to reinforce Guevara's aforementioned assertion regarding the mobility of the guerrilla *foco*: 'Caractéristica fundamental de una guerrilla es la movilidad' (Guevara 2006, 26). Basing his analysis on the crushing defeat of subversive movements in southern Colombia in 1964 and in Bolivia in 1965, Debray argued that the notion of defending a fixed base, or a liberated area, as a starting point of a campaign was tantamount to disaster in Latin America. Like Guevara, he contended that such a base would convert the embryonic guerrilla army into a 'sitting duck' for the enemy. When the time of confrontation inevitably arrived, the *guerrilleros* would simply be wiped out, not having the sufficient firepower or strength in numbers to defend the territory which they had claimed as their own. Debray asserted:

La communauté en autodéfense n'a pas d'initiative: elle ne peut élire le lieu du combat, elle ne bénéficie ni de la mobilité, ni de l'effet de surprise, ni de la capacité de manœuvre. (...) la zone d'autodéfense sera l'objet d'un encerclement et d'une attaque minutieusement préparée par l'ennemi au moment choisi par ce dernier (Debray 1967, 26).<sup>20</sup>

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<sup>20</sup> 'The community in self-defence does not have the initiative : it cannot choose the place of combat, it benefits neither from mobility, nor the surprise effect, nor the ability to manœuvre (...) the zone of self-defence will be the object of an encirclement and of a meticulously planned attack by the enemy, at a moment chosen by the latter'.

A similar argument was put forward in the third subchapter, 'La base guérillera'. Debray reiterated the necessity of maintaining a nomadic, isolated unit (the *foco*) in the initial stages of revolutionary activity for a movement to be successful. He contended that, during these stages:

la base guérillera c'est, selon une expression de Fidel, le territoire à l'intérieur duquel se déplace le guérillero et qui se déplace avec lui. La base d'appui, dans l'étape initiale, elle est dans le havresac du combattant (Debray 1967, 66).<sup>21</sup>

To support his argument, Debray referred to the armed struggle phase of the Cuban Revolution, in which a fixed base was not established until seventeen months into the campaign.

For Debray, the notion that the *foco* was the centre of operations was also important in the sense that it would serve as an armed nucleus in which were fused the political and military wings of a given movement. Debray did not hold back in underlining this aspect which, of course, followed on from Guevara's emphasis on 'acción político-militar' and the 'base única'. He upheld that 'L'armée populaire sera le noyau du parti et non l'inverse. La guérilla est l'avant-garde politique "in nuce"' (Debray 1967, 125).<sup>22</sup> Furthermore, this idea of uniting the armed and the political contributed to the achievement of 'la réunion de la théorie et de la pratique'; the achievement of such a synthesis is key to understanding Debray's motives for producing a new model for revolutionary warfare (Debray 1967, 9).

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<sup>21</sup> 'the guerrilla base, according to one of Fidel's expressions, is the territory inside of which the guerrilla moves, and which moves with him. The support base, in the initial stage, is in the knapsack of the combatant'.

<sup>22</sup> 'The popular army will be the nucleus of the party and not the reverse. The guerrilla army is the political vanguard *in nuce*'.

In the second subchapter, 'La propagande armée', Debray again looked directly to the insurrectionary phase of the Cuban Revolution for an example of how to win the masses over to the side of the revolutionaries; following Guevara's lead, he was adamant that the guerrilla army 'doit s'appuyer sur les masses ou disparaître' (Debray 1967, 45).<sup>23</sup> In addition to carrying out the 'trabajo popular intensivo' advocated by Guevara, Debray proposed that the most effective propaganda was 'armed propaganda', particularly for a small, burgeoning movement. He defined the concept thus: 'La propaganda c'est une action militaire réussie' (Debray 1967, 56).<sup>24</sup> In other words, according to Debray, the best way to guarantee the cooperation of the masses was to carry out a successful operation against the enemy forces, much like Guevara had done with his promotion of the 'muerde y huye' tactic, mentioned earlier. Such operations would not only demonstrate the potential weaknesses of the enemy (dispelling the myth that the state could not be reckoned with), but would prove the capabilities of the guerrilla force, no matter how small in number. Debray stated:

Mieux que deux cents discours, la liquidation d'un camion de transport de troupes ou l'exécution publique d'un policier tortionnaire font plus de propagande effective, hautement et profondément politique, sur la population avoisinante (Debray 1967, 53).<sup>25</sup>

Consistent with the actions of the Ejército Rebelde, the tactic of armed propaganda denoted a move away from the orthodox method of gaining popular support through the staging of political rallies. Debray's *foquismo* deemed such rallies ineffective given that they could increase the vulnerability of attendees in the face of an enemy

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<sup>23</sup> 'must find support in the masses or disappear'.

<sup>24</sup> 'Propaganda is a successful military action'.

<sup>25</sup> 'Far better than two hundred speeches, the elimination of a troop carrier, or the public execution of a police torturer make for more effective, and thoroughly and profoundly political, propaganda on the neighbouring population'.

attack. To illustrate his argument, Debray pointed out that, in Cuba, 'en deux ans de guerre Fidel n'a pas tenu un seul meeting dans son aire d'opérations' (Debray 1967, 53).<sup>26</sup>

As intended, *Révolution dans la Révolution?* had a huge impact on Latin American revolutionaries. Debray's analysis of failed movements, and his apparent solutions to the problems they had faced, provided something of a lifeline to burgeoning left-wing revolutionary movements in Latin America, and legitimised the continued recourse to armed struggle. Debray's work was perhaps all the more influential given that it appeared at a time when much of the region, particularly the Southern Cone, found itself under the increasingly authoritarian rule of military dictatorships. Debray's conceptualisation of *foquismo* appealed to those challenging the might of such seemingly monolithic governments, outlining for them the path to victory regardless of the vastly unequal footing on which they were placed. The famed Salvadoran writer, Roque Dalton, wrote in his evaluation of Debray's text, entitled *¿Revolución en la Revolución? y la crítica de derecha*, that the French writer's work 'cayó precisamente como una bomba ideológica' in Latin America (Dalton 1970, 108). Yet, while Debray's renewed call to arms did much to instigate a new wave of revolutionary activity, his protestations regarding the rural setting of *foco* warfare were largely ignored. The face of guerrilla warfare after 1967 was markedly different to its previous incarnation: the arena of armed struggle had moved to the city.<sup>27</sup>

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<sup>26</sup> 'in two years of war Fidel did not hold a single meeting in his sphere of operations'.

<sup>27</sup> Walter Laqueur has discussed the shift to urban guerrilla warfare in his work *A History of Terrorism*: 'Latin American urban terrorists developed a doctrine, but more by instinct than on the basis of socio-political analysis. Latin America had the fastest rate of urbanization of anywhere in the world; to talk about the encirclement of the city by the village in Uruguay or Argentina was to invite ridicule. The political as well as the military and economic centres of power were in the big

Ultimately, however, the majority of Latin America's urban guerrillas of the late 1960s and early 1970s would fail to meet their objectives.<sup>28</sup> In the Southern Cone, where urban guerrilla warfare experienced its most prominent expression in the Americas, the right-wing military dictatorships, with the support of the United States, did not hesitate in applying highly-developed counter-insurgency measures and unleashing violent waves of repression in response to leftist agitation. Though Argentina's Montoneros remained active until 1979, the majority of the Southern Cone's urban guerrillas had been wiped out by 1974. Thus the second wave of Cuban-inspired guerrilla warfare came to an end.

With this second wave of crushing defeat came also a wave of criticism of Debray's theorisation. Much of this criticism hailed from members of the Latin American Communist Parties who remained committed to pursuing revolutionary change via a *camino pacífico*, thereby toeing the Moscow line of reform through electoral struggle. Brazil's Partido Comunista Brasileiro (PCB), for example, criticised *foquismo* from the outset, describing the theory in 1967 as 'a conception of revolution based on insurrectionary hotheads stirred up by adventures totally isolated from the mass movement' (Chilcote 1974, 84). Vehement criticism was also articulated by 'progressive', left-wing intellectuals, both within and external to Latin America (Dalton 1970, 9). Articles written by such intellectuals, and published in journals such as *Monthly Review*, fuelled the debate regarding the efficacy of

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conurbations; hence the decision to attack the enemy there and not on the periphery' (Laqueur 2002, 184). The most prominent of the urban-centred groups were the Tupamaros in Uruguay, the Montoneros in Argentina and the Movimiento de Izquierda Revolucionaria (MIR) in Chile. In Brazil, there was no single movement at the forefront of armed struggle but numerous groups which waged individual battles.

<sup>28</sup> A noteworthy exception to this trend was the Nicaraguan movement, Frente Sandinista de Liberación Nacional (FSLN). Emerging in 1961, the movement first attempted to foment rural *foco*-style warfare, but later adopted an urban guerrilla approach in the mid-1970s, thus transforming into a powerful armed opponent to the dictatorial regime of Anastasio Somoza Debayle. The Sandinista Revolution came to power in July 1979 (Wright 2001, 165).

*foquismo* as a means to revolution.<sup>29</sup> Many questioned whether Debray was best positioned to pontificate on the process of revolutionary change in the continent, given his status as a European bourgeois intellectual, whose lived reality was far removed from that of the underdeveloped nations of Latin America. Contradictions in Debray's work were frequently highlighted by his detractors. Notably, his articulation of the *ciudad-campo* relationship was held in disregard, given that the city was now the focus of revolutionary activity.

The widespread negative reaction to *¿Révolution dans la Révolution?* signalled the almost complete devaluation of the *foco* theory. Indeed, many aspiring Latin American revolutionaries, who had, at first, found great inspiration in Debray's work, concluded that the *foquista* theory did not constitute a viable guerrilla warfare methodology, and was by no means universally applicable in Latin America.<sup>30</sup> Even Debray himself would later concede that his theory was not entirely feasible, perhaps a consequence of having witnessed the devastating failure of *foquista* warfare in the Southern Cone. In a 1969 letter to the editors of *Monthly Review*, Debray stated:

The so-called *foco* theory in its simplest, most skeletal form of an isolated military detonator organized by itself, independent of any national organization or urban political work, is certainly an utopian notion. It is not a coherent revolutionary line capable of assuming the complex tasks of political leadership and organization in a concrete situation (Debray 1969, 237).

Those who sought to offer a more balanced, objective evaluation of Debray's work perceived of the vehement attacks against him as, in reality, an indirect criticism of

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<sup>29</sup> Leo Huberman and Paul M. Sweezy's edited collection, *Régis Debray and the Latin American Revolution: a collection of essays*, provides a solid overview of the criticism directed at Debray, much of which was published in *Monthly Review* (Huberman and Sweezy, 1969). See also: Alberto Methol Ferré (1967), 'La Revolución Verde Oliva, Debray y la OLAS', *Vispera*, 1 (3): 17 y ss.

<sup>30</sup> In their 1969 self-criticism, for example, the Brazilian guerrilla movement PCdoB-Ala Vermelha stated: 'O foco constitui mesmo o maior entrave ao desenvolvimento de ações armadas capazes de levar ao estabelecimento concreto da luta armada no país' (Partido Comunista do Brasil-Ala Vermelha (XIV) 1969, 351).

the Cuban Revolution and its promotion of armed struggle. In Dalton's aforementioned text, for example, he asserted that, 'es políticamente menos complicado atacar a Debray que atacar a quienes están en el origen de las ideas que expone el notable escritor francés, es decir, principalmente, el comandante Ernesto Guevara, el comandante Fidel Castro, etc.' (Dalton 1970, 108). Elsewhere in the text, he continued:

La obra de Debray habrá representado para esa crítica la oportunidad de atacar al Che sin decir su nombre, de atacar las posiciones revolucionarias sin nombrar sus encarnaciones concretas (...) no sólo se sustituía la figura del Che y las posiciones de la línea revolución latinoamericana por la figura de Régis y su obra sino que se reducían aquellas, exclusiva y excluyentemente a éstas (Debray 1970, 170).

Similarly, the Cuban intellectual, Fernando Martínez Heredia, has written retrospectively that 'la expresión "foquismo" fue la clave de una crítica al pensamiento político de Guevara que en ciertos casos llegó hasta descalificarlos a él y a la experiencia cubana' (Martínez Heredia 2010, 289).<sup>31</sup>

The polemic surrounding *foquismo*, and the implicit criticism it implied with respect to Cuba's stance on the most effective path to revolutionary change, appears to have resulted in the removal of the term from the Cuban vernacular, at least when it comes to describing the country's own revolutionary history. The analysis of texts from the 1960s and 1970s, which forms the basis of the following chapters, reveals no mention of the term during that period, whether in relation to the Revolution's insurrectionary phase, or to the wave of armed struggle which swept Latin America in the 1960s. The reason for this absence of the term in the discourse is clear: since

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<sup>31</sup> Laqueur confirmed this incidence of veiled criticism of the Cuban Revolution: 'The Latin American Communists (...) were reluctant to engage in a dispute with the Cubans because of their tremendous prestige in radical circles all over the continent. In the circumstances, Debray became the main butt for their attacks; he was merely an unofficial spokesman of the regime and could be criticized with greater impunity' (Laqueur 1977, 338).

the 1970s, but even at the peak of the *foco* idea's popularity in the mid- to late 1960s, Cuban discourse, 'official' and at other levels, has tended to distinguish between a) the *foco* (referring specifically to Che's ideas from 1960 onwards, and even, retrospectively, to the lessons of the Sierra struggle, b) *foquismo*, increasingly seen to be associated exclusively with Debray's (somewhat discredited) further theorising of those ideas, and thus to the whole question of mistaken concepts, and even examples, of guerrilla warfare in Latin America, and c) the idea of guerrilla warfare and its practice (the latter much broader than either term). Taking these distinctions into account, it is thus apparent that the term *foquismo* is unhelpful as a means of representing the undercurrent of the guerrilla legacy within the context of the Cuban Revolution, given its inescapable connotations of armed struggles elsewhere in Latin America. Instead, what is needed is a more comprehensive term which, while encompassing all of the aspects differentiated above, will allow for wider reference to the historical experience of guerrilla warfare in Cuba.

However, it should be noted here that the term *foquismo* is not entirely redundant to this study. Where the notion of a 'guerrilla code' is applied to the existence of a guerrilla ethos which was actively promoted as a tool for mobilisation *within* Cuba, it is still possible to identify examples of *foquismo* at times when the leadership was attempting to incite revolution in Latin America. As will become clear in the subsequent chapters, during the 1960s and 1970s, and later in the 1990s, the leadership has often espoused an incendiary discourse, and has concomitantly projected an image of Cuba as the first *foco* of a hemispheric revolution. Such rhetoric can be deemed *foquista* insofar as it forms part of the Cuban leadership's intermittent endeavour to promote armed struggle abroad. This endeavour at one

time involved the work of both Guevara and Debray in the dissemination of the message to foment revolution. Moreover, *foquismo* can be deemed an apposite description of this language, insofar as the enactment of this particular form of warfare only ever occurred outside of Cuba. The guerrilla struggle which took place prior to 1959 in the Revolution was simply a spontaneous reaction to the conditions with which those who arrived on the *Granma* were confronted. Guevara's conclusions were thus formed in hindsight, and his theory was 'an ex post facto rationalization of an improvised response to events beyond Castro's control' (Draper 1965, 25). The term, therefore, should not be applied to the Cuban experience but only to guerrilla campaigns which came after it, following its example, in locations external to the island's shores.

What is more, it is difficult to discard completely the notion of *foquismo* in this thesis, despite the reception of the term in Cuba, largely owing to the unavoidable fact that the Cuban leadership agreed to the publication of Debray's text in the first instance in 1967. That decision suggests that, at least at the time, the ideas which constituted Debray's conceptualisation of *foquismo* were consistent with those of the leadership. In other words, Debray's principles of armed struggle, and particularly his emphasis on subjective conditions, matched the perspective on revolutionary activity of those in power. It is, therefore, logical to suggest that this perspective was reflected, and can be readily identified, in the leadership's discourse around that time. There is, then, a case to argue that the notion of a *foquista* rhetoric is still valid and should not be overlooked simply because of the controversy which the term *foquismo* would later provoke. On the whole, however, the absence of *foquismo* in the Cuban vocabulary, and its association with armed struggles external to Cuba,

render it unsuitable as an over-arching term to describe the uniquely Cuban experience of guerrilla warfare, and the on-going legacy of this experience under the Revolution in power. Accordingly, then, we will now consider alternative terms which may categorise more pertinently this experience in the Cuban context.

### **‘Sierra Maestra Complex’, ‘Guerrilla Mentality’, or *Guerrillerismo*?**

In determining the appropriate terminology for what we are temporarily referring to as the ‘guerrilla code’, the necessary starting point is to consider the literature which has previously highlighted the guerrilla element which runs through the Revolution, and the terms used to describe this element therein. Such literature first emerged in the early to mid-1960s when a handful of academics working on Cuba started to question the concept of ‘militarism’ which was becoming commonplace in scholarly studies of the Revolution at that time, as demonstrated in the review presented in the Introduction. These academics, though far smaller in number, steered clear of categorising the Revolution in such potentially reductive terms, and instead opted to underline its peculiarities which they saw as stemming from its guerrilla roots, and which rendered its military distinct from other armed forces.

One of the most significant contributions to the discussion regarding the idiosyncrasies of the revolutionary style of governance in its early years came from the *guerrillero heroico* himself, Che Guevara. In 1963, Guevara published an article entitled ‘Contra el burocratismo’, in which, as the title suggests, he railed against the shift to bureaucratic organisation within the revolutionary government and its various ministries. The inefficiency and absence of initiative which this bureaucracy engendered were the result, Guevara argued, of the leadership having moved too

quickly to shed the influence of its guerrilla past on the shaping of the nascent government. It is in this way that Guevara drew attention to the fact that the construction of the Revolution in power, at least initially, owed much to the lived experience of guerrilla warfare. To this effect, Guevara asserted:

Nuestra Revolución fue, en esencia, el producto de un movimiento que inició la lucha armada contra la tiranía y la cristalizó en la toma del poder. Los primeros pasos como Estado Revolucionario, así como toda la primitiva época de nuestra gestión en el gobierno, estaban fuertemente teñidos de los elementos fundamentales de la táctica guerrillera como forma de administración estatal. El "guerrillerismo" repetía la experiencia de la lucha armada de las sierras y los campos de Cuba en las distintas organizaciones administrativas y de masas, y se traducían en que solamente las grandes consignas revolucionarias eran seguidas (y muchas veces interpretadas en distintas maneras) por los organismos de la administración y de la sociedad en general. La forma de resolver los problemas concretos estaba sujeta al libre arbitrio de cada uno de los dirigentes (Guevara 1963, 176).

Of note here is Guevara's mention of the concept of 'guerrillerismo' as the act of continuing to play out the armed struggle of the *sierra* in the realm of government administration and mass organisations. He also went on to talk of 'guerrillas administrativas' in reference to the disagreements that occurred between former members of the Ejército Rebelde over how best to interpret and implement new laws. Rather than adhering to the rules of the 'aparato central de dirección', the former *guerrilleros* were prone to arguing amongst themselves and to issuing their own decrees. Such descriptions, from a perspective internal to the Revolution, do much to contradict the notion that the Revolution was 'militarised', and convey a more complicated picture of the process of revolution-building following a guerrilla struggle. However, it should be noted that Guevara declared the period of 'guerrillerismo' to have ended one year into the Revolution in power with the onset of bureaucracy. He contended:

Después de un año de dolorosas experiencias llegamos a la conclusión de que era imprescindible modificar totalmente nuestro estilo de trabajo y volver a organizar el aparato estatal de un modo racional, utilizando las técnicas de la planificación conocidas en los hermanos países socialistas (Guevara 1963, 176).

It is clear, then, that Guevara's idea of 'guerrillerismo' cannot be invoked to argue against the application of the term 'militarisation' to the Revolution in later years, particularly during the 1970s. Nonetheless, one might be led to question whether the lived experience of the armed insurrection, so ingrained in the minds of its participants, could be so easily pushed aside as a source of inspiration for the revolutionary leadership.

Other works support this idea that the guerrilla insurrection continued to be a model of revolutionary action after 1959, and, contrary to Guevara, after 1960. Theodore Draper, for instance, commented in 1965 on the interference of the past in Cuba's revolutionary project, and of the leadership's apparent inability to shake off its guerrilla roots. Draper remarked that:

Castroism has tended to return to its origins. It has been obsessed by what might be called a "Sierra Maestra complex" — the legend of the twelve who with the help of a few hundred or a few thousand "illiterate, uneducated, and technically untrained" peasants allegedly overthrew a "regular, disciplined army" (...) In effect, Castro has oscillated between two extremes: to make a Cuba out of all Latin America or to make a Sierra Maestra out of all Cuba. (...) His past differs from that of all other Communist leaders and repeatedly insists on injecting itself into the present (Draper 1965, 219/220).

Draper was highly critical of what he saw as the leadership's propensity to perpetuate the guerrilla condition, seeing it as contributing to 'an immanent violence which turns inward as readily as outward' (Draper 1965, 221). He argued that such a predisposition to view violence as part and parcel of revolution could lead to ruin in the Cuban case (Draper 1965, 221).

Another academic to comment on the complexities of the Revolution with respect to the guerrilla influence was K.S. Karol, whose seminal work, *Guerrillas in Power: The Course of the Cuban Revolution*, was published in 1970. Indeed, the very title of his monograph makes reference to the guerrilla past, and present, of the Revolution's leaders. Karol was keen to stress that, in its first decade, Cuba's revolutionary government was formed of men who had been swiftly transplanted from the *sierra* to the upper echelons of the leadership, with little time for a political education other than what they had learned through the enactment of warfare. Accordingly, Karol argued that the way in which the Revolution in power was constructed was heavily influenced by the experience of these former *guerrilleros*. He commented that 'the sierra had not been simply a military test for the Castroists; it was also a social experiment, and had a decisive effect on the future of the Revolution' (Karol 1970, 42). This 'decisive effect' was apparent in the sense that the majority of the initial revolutionary initiatives, particularly those intended to revive the economy, were unstructured and insufficiently planned in such a way as one might expect of a guerrilla army. In other words, the revolutionary government lacked the order of an established political institution, and the military precision of an armed force in the traditional mould. Writing about his experiences in Cuba in the early 1960s, Karol observed:

I learned that INRA was still far too 'guerrillero' — to use Che Guevara's famous expression — i.e. neither coordinated enough nor properly planned. The Castroists themselves were the first to admit this and half amused, half shocked, they told entertaining stories about certain *granja* leaders who had come forward with all sorts of hare-brained schemes (...) their mistakes were inevitable, given their lack of experience and the scope of the task they had taken on (Karol 1970, 34).

However, while Karol made constant reference to the 'guerrilla-ness' of the Revolution in power, at one point describing socialist Cuba as Castro's 'new Sierra

Maestra', he did, at times, employ the term 'militaristic', particularly with reference to the closing years of the first decade (Karol 1970, 186). For instance, he wrote of the Revolutionary Offensive period that, 'Though the word 'militarisation' was never used officially, the whole country was, in fact, reorganised on the model of its army' (Karol 1970, 444). That said, though not shying away from the term, Karol did not seem to believe that the Revolution and, therefore, Cuba had been completely 'militarised'; rather, he pointed to *aspects* of 'militarism', such as the creation of the UMAP and the forms of 'repression' carried out during the Offensive (Karol 1970, 448). Moreover, if one considers the Cuban armed forces to have been shaped by the lessons of guerrilla warfare, Karol's assertion that Cuba was 'reorganised on the model of its army' does not necessarily contradict the notion that the lived experience of guerrilla warfare informed the development of the Revolution in power.

Similar observations concerning the apparent legacy of the guerrilla struggle in Cuba post-1959 were put forward by Gonzalez in 1974. Gonzalez proposed the existence of a 'guerrilla mentality', which, following Draper, he alternately labelled the 'Sierra Maestra complex'. According to Gonzalez, this 'mentality', or 'complex', led the Cuban leadership to view revolutionary rule as a continuation of guerrilla struggle; the leaders' style of governance thus seemed to be born out of their experience in the *sierra*, and did not, therefore, conform to what might be expected of a 'militarised' Revolution. Gonzalez wrote that the 'guerrilla mentality'/ 'Sierra Maestra complex' could be:

distinguished by (Fidel's) disposition to posit maximum revolutionary objectives, to take bold risks on behalf of these goals, to push defiantly in the face of adversity, to demand supreme sacrifice from his followers, and to rely heavily on improvisation and subjective factors for the accomplishment of his revolutionary undertaking. In the

end, this type of guerrilla-derived radicalism came to dominate not only politics but also the *fidelista* regime's economic policies (Gonzalez 1974, 109).

Much like Draper, Gonzalez's references to the 'Sierra Maestra complex' seem to be directed principally at Fidel Castro, and not at the revolutionary leadership as a whole. Though the conflation of Castro with the Revolution can lead to an oversimplification of the process of decision-making and of government in the Cuban context (ignoring, as it does, the role of other political actors) Gonzalez's and Draper's reflections are nevertheless useful. Castro's actions were not necessarily representative of the entire Cuban leadership, but he did, as Gonzalez pointed out, exert an influence over the thinking of those forming part of the '*fidelista* regime'. Castro's own 'Sierra Maestra complex' would likely have cultivated and perpetuated similar sentiments amongst other former *guerrilleros*.

This latter idea was put forward by Louis Pérez, Jr. in 1976. Pérez, Jr. argued that the Ejército Rebelde which transformed into the official state military in the 1960s was permeated with the memory of the *sierra* which, in turn, underpinned wider government initiatives in the early years of the Revolution in power. He noted that:

The theme of struggle as a continuum with the Sierra Maestra dominated government programs as efforts were made to fasten the *sierra* consciousness on to the military. (...) Rebel Army projects were designed to instil a commitment to the Revolution as defined by the *sierra* leadership. The Sierra Maestra provided the inspiration for all revolutionaries who were to partake of its ethos and emerge spiritually connected to the heroic struggle and politically committed to its leaders (Pérez, Jr. 1976, 263).

Pérez, Jr. thus described a clear, linear prolongation of the pre-1959 guerrilla insurrection which seemed to be actively encouraged by those who had been amongst its chief protagonists. Much like the other authors discussed here, he

proposed that this furtherance of the guerrilla struggle was characteristic only of the very first years of the Revolution; events such as the Bay of Pigs invasion in 1961, he contended, persuaded the leadership of the necessity of organising 'a professionally prepared armed institution' (Pérez, Jr. 1976, 265).

In contrast, Kapcia has argued more recently that the guerrilla ethos instilled by the insurrection has continued to underscore the Revolution throughout its trajectory. Kapcia contends that the supposed 'militarism' of the Revolution could be more aptly conceptualised as "guerrilla-ization", a characteristic born out of the '1960s "guerrilla mentality" which extolled the guerrilla (...) as the model for all commitment to the tasks of the Revolution' (Kapcia 2008, 152). He proposes that such a "guerrilla-ization", contrary to engendering 'a coercive militarist atmosphere', has, in fact, 'created a sense of collective struggle that gave ordinary Cubans a sense of empowerment and even quietly 'heroic' participation in the defence of their Revolution' which is 'less coercion than mobilization' (Kapcia 2008, 152). Elsewhere, Kapcia has applied the term 'guerrillerismo' to the Revolution's omnipresent guerrilla ethos. He has written that 'guerrillerismo' denotes an 'instinctive preference for voluntarism, for insurrection, for the subjective over the objective', as well as the attempt to 'universalise the ethos of the guerrilla into all aspects of life' (Kapcia 2000, 184/185).

Taking into account the various terms discussed here, it may be that the concept of *guerrillerismo* as a type of code which has underpinned the Revolution in power is the most appropriate alternative to the notion of an embedded 'militarism', for a number of reasons. Firstly, unlike the terms 'guerrilla mentality' and 'Sierra Maestra

complex', *guerrillerismo* is relatively neutral in its characterisation of the perpetuation of the guerrilla ethos. In other words, it does not imply a judgement of this aspect of the Revolution in power, but instead simply acts as a descriptor. In contrast, the concepts of 'guerrilla mentality' and 'Sierra Maestra complex' possess potentially negative connotations, particularly the former in the comparison it invites with another supposed 'complex', that of 'siege mentality'. In the coming chapters, it will become clear that the evidence which supports the existence of the 'guerrilla code' often concomitantly challenges the notion of a 'siege mentality' which, as we have seen, has been presented as a fundamental component of 'militarism'. In addition, the term 'mentality' can also be said to refer only to a 'way of thinking', and not a way of acting in, and shaping, the world. As stated in the Introduction, this thesis demonstrates that the continued influence of the guerrilla experience was outwardly expressed by the leadership at different points in the Revolution's trajectory, and contributed to the shaping of the political culture that underpinned the Revolution in power. The perpetuation of the guerrilla legacy should not, therefore, be reduced to the level of a 'mindset' possessed by former *guerrilleros* in the leadership. Moreover, the notion of a 'complex' suggests, in the psychoanalytical sense of the word, a repressed experience, or impulses, which continue to influence behaviour. While this concept might, to an extent, account for the expression of the guerrilla experience by the leadership, the ubiquitous presence of symbols and images related to the insurrectionary phase, not to mention the conscious veneration of its heroes, reveal that, far from being repressed, the guerrilla experience has been actively kept alive by the leadership. Furthermore, Draper and Gonzalez seem to have defined the 'Sierra Maestra complex' largely in relation to Fidel Castro. To reiterate, Gonzalez proposed that the 'complex' could be 'distinguished by (Fidel's)

disposition to posit maximum revolutionary objectives', while Draper argued that it was most evident in Castro's indecision over whether to 'make a Cuba out of all Latin America or to make a Sierra Maestra out of all Cuba', and the way in which his past 'repeatedly insists on injecting itself into the present' (Draper 1965, 219/220; Gonzalez 1974, 109). What this thesis shows is that the 'guerrilla code' is a set of values and beliefs which have been promoted by a leadership comprised of former *guerrilleros* in such a way that it has shaped the political culture of the Revolution in power, and has, in turn, helped to legitimise the revolutionary project. It cannot, therefore, be reduced to the actions, beliefs or, indeed, 'complex' of one individual.

In contrast to 'guerrilla mentality' and the 'Sierra Maestra complex', *guerrillerismo* offers a far more impartial definition of the perpetuation of the guerrilla ethos and all that it entails, and thus is perhaps a more suitable characterisation of the 'guerrilla code'. This impartiality results, in part, from the '—ismo' element of the term; this suffix tends to denote a given set of principles or beliefs, without conferring judgement on the root word to which it is attached. In this particular case, the '—ism' refers simply to the beliefs and principles which are associated with the word *guerrillero*. Deconstructed in this way, *guerrillerismo* seems to offer a particularly apposite definition of the propagation of the beliefs and values associated with the guerrilla insurrection, and the accompanying veneration of the figure of the *guerrillero*. Additionally, it should be acknowledged that *guerrillerismo* also provides something of a fitting alternative for the concept of 'militarism', in that it essentially allows for the replacement of one 'ism' - the set of principles associated with the military, in a general sense - with another, that is those related to guerrilla warfare.

*Guerrillerismo* is also a more useful term insofar as it enables one to circumvent the controversy connoted by *foquismo*, and the latter's obvious allusion to the insurrection of the 1950s, while at the same time encompassing the precepts of *foquismo*. Unlike *foquismo*, which is indelibly tied to a precise historical context and geographical location (Latin America, not including Cuba), *guerrillerismo* allows for a broader reference to Cuba's tradition of guerrilla struggle that precedes the articulation of both Debray and Guevara's guerrilla warfare methodologies and which, according to the official historical narrative of the Revolution, commenced with the independence struggles of the late 1800s. As will become clear in the following chapters, the guerrilla ethos promoted by the leadership does not derive its values from the experience of the Revolution's insurrectionary phase alone, but from Cuba's long-standing tradition of guerrilla warfare more broadly. Thus *guerrillerismo* does not simply replace *foquismo* as a concept; rather it includes it in its definition, allowing *foquismo* to be considered as fundamental to the development of the notion of guerrilla struggle in the Cuban context, only alongside other historical events and ideas.

By the same token, *guerrillerismo* is not applied in this thesis as a straightforward substitute for 'militarism', nor are the two terms proposed as binary opposites. Instead, what is intended by the use of *guerrillerismo* is a more nuanced understanding of how Cuba's armed forces differ from other military institutions, most notably in Latin America, as a result of the revolutionary tradition out of which they emerged, and from which their underpinning values are derived. *Guerrillerismo*, like 'militarism', allows for consideration of the pronounced military presence in Cuban politics and society, yet it seeks to explain this presence not by

resorting to obvious comparisons with other countries' military experiences, but by taking into account the legacy of guerrilla struggle in Cuba, a legacy which cannot be separated from the development of revolutionary institutions, military or otherwise, after 1959. In this way, 'militarism', a term rooted in nineteenth-century Europe, as discussed earlier, is unable to address adequately Cuba's historical specificities, or explain the complex relationship between the military and the leadership. Reference to Klepak's perspective on this issue is once again instructive here:

it is important to note that the FAR are rarely seen, and certainly do not see themselves as a repressive instrument of the government. They have not fired on the people to date and it is clear that doing so would be the most unacceptable thing they had ever been asked to do. They are in their own minds different from other Latin American armed forces because of their revolutionary past and their revolutionary tradition. They see themselves truly as the "people's army" of a revolutionary people (Klepak 2005, 56).

*Guerrillerismo*, in contrast to 'militarism', applies to a uniquely Cuban revolutionary context. In place of analysing the FAR (and the Revolution more generally) in terms of foreign models, the concept of *guerrillerismo* contends that there is a set of beliefs and values engendered and fostered by a tradition of armed revolutionary struggle that have come to form a central component, a constituent code, of the ideology which drives forward the revolutionary project: *cubanía*. To remind ourselves of what is signified by *cubanía*, the term can be understood as connoting an unyielding belief in Cuban sovereignty and national identity, combined with the principle of anti-imperialism and the sense that the answer to Cuba's problems can only be found 'inside, in a recourse to Cuba, to the Cuban people and in Cuban history' (Kapcia 2008, 90). Kapcia, among others, has argued that it is *cubanía* which, ideologically-speaking, has characterised the Revolution since its inception: 'With the victory of the Rebel Army in 1959, these beliefs and values were to transform from a counter-

hegemonic 'ideology of dissent' into a hegemonic one, henceforth 'guiding the whole revolutionary process and contributing to its radicalization' (Kapcia 2000, 175). This thesis argues that *guerrillerismo* represents one of the defining codes of *cubanía*, insofar as 'It is a set of related and cognate beliefs and principles that can be grouped together to make a coherent belief in a single, given value' (Kapcia 2000, 13). To elucidate further, codes can be thought of as the pillars of an ideology/belief-system, as representing the ideal values or qualities of a given group, or as 'a statement of what is desirable as a quality for all those who belong to that community, which should be put into effect and which is basic to the whole ideology' (Kapcia 2000, 13/14). The ensuing chapters will demonstrate that, as a code of *cubanía*, *guerrillerismo* signifies a number of 'desirable' values relating to the guerrilla ethos but also revolutionary struggle in a wider sense. Of note is the value of *voluntad*, or subjective will, the idea that the fate of a revolution is determined by the actions (or rather the will to act) of the individual revolutionary. As we saw earlier in Chapter One, this value was propounded by Guevara in his writings on guerrilla warfare methodology.

In its focus on subjective will and revolutionary action, *guerrillerismo* contributes to the development of the revolutionary consciousness of Cuban citizens, previously defined in this chapter as implying 'faith and belief in victory, emotional identification with the cause of social revolution, and a belief that social regeneration will be made possible by revolution' (Judson 1984, 2). According to Guevara (and Gramsci), revolutionary consciousness can only be obtained through direct participation and lived experience of physical struggle. By acquiring faith in the cause of the Revolution and a belief in the transformative potential of the

revolutionary project, the individual will also come to identify with the Revolution's ideology of *cubanía*. In this way, *guerrillerismo* not only promotes numerous 'desirable qualities' which the ideal Cuban citizen must possess, but, in so doing, it also shapes his or her world-view to the extent that it becomes at least partly consistent with the ideology which underpins the Revolution. In other words, citizens will come to accept as given, or 'normal', the beliefs and values housed under *cubanía* and espoused by the revolutionary leadership so that they remain unchallenged. This 'normalisation' of values has played an inherent part in the creation of the Cuban Revolution's political culture (its 'political socialisation' process), the main objective of which, as Fagen states, is 'to produce a participating citizen' (Fagen 1969, 7). It is the Revolution's deep-seated political culture which has contributed to its longevity and not, as implied by the 'militarism' perspective, an increased authoritarianism and the absence of political participation.

### ***Guerrillerismo*, Discourse and Power**

The promotion and acceptance of the values contained within the code of *guerrillerismo* can only occur if these values are communicated effectively by the revolutionary leadership to the wider Cuban population. As stated in the Introduction, this communication occurs largely, and most successfully, through language, although it is further buttressed by the proliferation of accompanying images. It is for this reason that discourse analysis is applied to the language of the Cuban leadership as a means of determining whether the values pertaining to the guerrilla ethos can be identified therein and, if so, the periods during which their presence is most palpable. The form of discourse analysis adopted follows the

methodology outlined by Fairclough (the specific aspects of which will be detailed in Chapter Two), which involves picking apart the composition of a given text and finding meaning in its vocabulary, ordering of phrases and overall cohesion. However, while this approach provides an extremely useful toolkit for performing a close reading of a text, a discussion on the wider implications of discourse is necessary here if we are to gain a more holistic understanding of its role in the acquisition and preservation of power. Foucault's substantial body of work regarding the relationship between discourse and power is particularly illuminating in this respect. Indeed, much of Fairclough's methodology draws on Foucault's writings on the 'discursive nature of power' and the potential of changing discursive practices to effect social change (Fairclough 1992, 55/56).

Foucault's definition of discourse is, at best, ambiguous, yet an important point to remember is that it is not to be taken as synonymous with language, but rather, as he wrote in his seminal work *The Archaeology of Knowledge*, as denoting a set of 'regulated practices that account for a number of statements' (Foucault 1972, 80). Put differently, Foucault is not so much concerned with texts in and of themselves, but with the unspoken rules and structures which determine what can be said in a given social context (Mills 2003, 53). He argues that these rules and practices allow certain statements to remain in constant circulation while others are simply excluded, writing:

in every society the production of discourse is at once controlled, selected, organised and redistributed by a certain number of procedures whose role it is to ward off its powers and dangers, to gain mastery over its chance events, to evade its ponderous, formidable materiality (Foucault 1981, 52).

This control over discourse, he proposes, in turn affects our perception of reality and the world around us, although we are not always cognisant that this 'structuring' of our reality is taking place (Mills 2003, 55).

In determining what statements can be circulated and what must be excluded, Foucault contends that the distinction between what is true and what is false plays a key part. This distinction is itself determined by the specific social, historical and political conditions in which they occur (McHoul and Grace 1993, 29). It should be noted that the idea of 'truth' in the Foucauldian sense does not refer to 'self-evident' statements, but to what is spoken or written by those in positions of authority or within established institutions (thus, conversely, anyone not in a position of power does not speak the truth) (Mills 2003, 58). As Foucault puts it: 'by the production of truth I mean not the production of true utterances, but the establishment of domains in which the practice of true and false can be made at once ordered and pertinent' (Foucault 1991a, 79).

The statements made by people in power become further authorised and supported by 'a range of practices and institutions: universities, government departments, publishing houses, scientific bodies, and so on. All these institutions work to exclude statements which they characterise as false and they keep in circulation those statements they characterise as true' (Mills 2003, 58). This circulation occurs in all areas of a given society, being replicated in books and educational curricula and, ultimately, transforming into 'common-sense-knowledge' (Mills 2003, 74). With regard to education in particular, Foucault asserts that, 'Every educational system is a

political means of maintaining or of modifying the appropriation of discourse, with the knowledge and the powers it carries with it' (Foucault 1971, 156).

For Foucault, then, discourse analysis is not about *what* is being said, it is about identifying the processes behind why a statement is being uttered and the practices which lead to it becoming 'true' and therefore reproduced time and again: 'At all events, one thing at least must be emphasised here: that the analysis of discourse thus understood, does not reveal the universality of a meaning, but brings to light the action of imposed rarity, with a fundamental power of affirmation' (Foucault 1971, 162). Foucault is interested in uncovering the 'historical specificity' of what is taken to be true in certain contexts, that is how truth is contingent upon its historical and political circumstances (McHoul and Grace 1993, 33).

It is important to remember, however, that, though Foucault's approach might appear intrinsically negative (insofar as it aims to uncover the seemingly manipulative use of discourse by those in power), Foucault is adamant that his analysis is concerned more with *describing* rather than criticising. To this effect, he writes in *Discipline and Punish: The Birth of the Prison* that, 'We must cease once and for all to describe the effects of power in negative terms: it "excludes", it "represses", it "censors", it "abstracts", it "masks", it "conceals". In fact, power produces; it produces reality; it produces domains and objects and rituals of truth' (Foucault 1991b, 194).

Such an objective approach to the study of language use by a political power provides a helpful means of thinking about and understanding how certain statements (namely those relating to *guerrillerismo*) are used, circulated and perpetuated in

revolutionary Cuba, and by whom. Complementary to Fairclough's approach, which allows for a thorough analysis of specific words and phrases in order to better understand the tenets that comprise the ideology behind the Revolution, applying Foucault's ideas enables a consideration of the bigger picture; it offers an explanation as to how these words and phrases come to be repeated and reproduced over time in different ways and in different types of text in the Cuban context. More importantly for the purposes of this study, Foucault's work shows how the reproduction of 'true' statements plays a crucial part in maintaining political power by contributing to the construction and preservation of a new reality (or, indeed, a new political culture) in which certain ideas and values, such as those encompassed by *guerrillerismo*, become normalised and unquestioned. In Cuba, these values and ideas are those that make up *cubanía*, the ideological glue that continues to hold together the revolutionary project. Thus, for Foucault, power is not about an 'all-encompassing opposition between ruler and ruled' nor a 'duality extending from the top down and reacting on more and more limited groups to the very depths of the social body' but about the perpetuation of ideas and values throughout a given society over time, and the creation of the conditions in which these ideas and values represent the 'truth' (Foucault 1979, 93/4). This conceptualisation of power is helpful when considering the Cuban context, in which the separation between state and civil society is not readily discernible, and in which power is mediated through ministries, institutions and mass organisations.

In the next three chapters, Foucault's notion of discourse will provide the broader conceptual framework for a detailed textual analysis that, following Fairclough, highlights the multiple linguistic techniques through which *cubanista* values and

ideas have been communicated effectively to the Cuban population at various stages in the Revolution's history. Consistent with Foucault's understanding of how discourse functions, the analysis will consider a range of texts produced by a variety of publishers and ministries in revolutionary Cuba to demonstrate how different 'practices and institutions' contribute to the reproduction and dissemination of 'true' statements issued by those in power (Mills 2003, 58). These texts include official speeches, military training manuals, newspapers, magazines and history books, more detail on the selection of which is offered in Chapter Two. Specifically, the analysis will show that the 'true' statements kept in circulation frequently promote the values and ideas that, together, define *guerrillerismo*, thereby confirming the applicability of the term to the Cuban context.

## Chapter Two

### *Guerrillerismo* in the 1960s

In the preceding chapter, we concluded that the term *guerrillerismo* offers the most apposite characterisation of the revolutionary leadership's sustained promotion of the image and ethos of the *guerrillero*. In order to substantiate this concept, the following two chapters comprise a discussion of evidence which supports its validity; this evidence is grounded in discourse analysis. This chapter first expands on the brief description offered in the Introduction of what is meant by discourse analysis for the purposes of this thesis. There will then follow an extended examination of selected citations from a number of texts which were published in Cuba during the first decade of the Revolution in power, that is between 1959 and 1969. This examination will demonstrate that the beliefs and values which constitute *guerrillerismo* were most evident in the language emanating 'from above', the official hegemonic discourse of the Cuban Revolution. The following chapter will then see a shift in the focus of the analysis to the period 1969-1981.

It is necessary first, however, to provide a definition of what is proposed by the reference to 'hegemonic discourse' in this context. As mentioned briefly in the Introduction, the concept of hegemony as employed in the thesis is consistent with Gramsci's conceptualisation, in spite of the ambiguity surrounding the term which arises largely out of the plethora of academic exegeses produced on Gramsci's work. Gramsci's concept of hegemony developed out of his conviction that Marxism placed too great an emphasis on the economic base as the root of political transformation (Kurtz 1996, 107). He thus aimed to produce a theory which

analysed in greater detail the acquisition and maintenance of political power, the way in which social classes interact, and 'the cultural and ideological forms in which social antagonisms are fought out or regulated and dissipated' (Forgacs 2000, 189). This theory was that of hegemony. Gramsci argued that political power, or hegemonic control, cannot be based on coercion alone, but rather 'is characterised by the combination of force and consent, which balance each other reciprocally, without force predominating excessively over consent' (Gramsci 1971, 80). For Gramsci, a fundamental factor in achieving the necessary consent was the creation of a new ideology, or world-view, which could be accepted by the mass majority in civil society. To reiterate partly his words cited in the Introduction, Gramsci asserted that 'what matters is that a new way of conceiving the world and man is born (...) with a concretely world-wide character, capable of modifying (...) popular thought' (Gramsci 1971, 417).

If we apply Gramsci's notion of hegemony to the context of Cuba in the 1960s, the position of 'hegemonic control' can, of course, be ascribed to those leading the embryonic Revolution. In spite of the fact that, upon arriving in Havana in 1959, the rebel leaders did not have a fixed ideology or world-view *per se*, the revolutionary campaign was underpinned by a set of values and beliefs which formed part of the pre-existing tradition of *cubania* (Kapcia 2000, 100). The adherence to *cubania* legitimised the revolutionary project in the eyes of the population, thus garnering for the leadership the required consent for achieving hegemony. *Cubania* remained the driving belief system behind the revolutionary project throughout the 1960s (and, arguably, until the present day), developing new and old constituent beliefs, and securing the hegemonic control by the revolutionary leadership. Returning to the

idea of 'hegemonic discourse', then, the analysis considers this term to apply to the discursive expression, or articulation, of the ideology of the Cuban Revolution, in both written and spoken form. While this thesis accepts that *cubanía* has consistently underpinned the Revolution, it also proposes that the values and beliefs of which *cubanía* is comprised may be modified, or feature more or less prominently in the hegemonic discourse, at different junctures (Kapcia 2000, 18). With this latter idea in mind, the analysis will establish whether, in the 1960s and 70s, *guerrillerismo* was a pre-eminent aspect of the leadership's discourse.

The ensuing analysis incorporates numerous texts published and distributed during the first two decades of the Revolution in power. The choice of texts under inspection is informed by Foucault's notion that statements issued by those in power are further reinforced and legitimised by a number of practices and institutions, such as government ministries, universities and publishing houses. As Sara Mills has put it: 'All these institutions work to exclude statements which they characterise as false and they keep in circulation those statements they characterise as true' (Mills 2003, 58). In order to establish which statements, or 'truths', are being perpetuated in the first instance by the revolutionary leadership, a significant part of the analysis is devoted to analysing speeches delivered by the former leader, Fidel Castro. If the *guerrillerista* language in the speeches of the leadership's highest authority is subsequently repeated in other forms of text, then it can be assumed that these statements constitute 'truths' in the Cuban context. After all, it is only those in positions of authority, according to Foucault, who are able to speak the 'truth'. In revolutionary Cuba, we can consider those who form part of the revolutionary leadership or, more specifically, the political stalwarts of the Revolution who fought

in the guerrilla struggle of the 1950s, to be in possession of the utmost authority. As we will see in the forthcoming chapters, these figures use the promotion of *guerrillerismo*, and an accompanying teleological historical narrative, to legitimise their hold on power.

The analysis takes into account, however, that, unlike the written texts discussed here, the medium of a premeditated speech constitutes a very specific ‘speech act’, one that is designed to serve as a vehicle for conveying a given message (Fairclough 1992, 84). In other words, its purpose is to project the ideology of the revolutionary leadership at a given moment, in such a way that the ideological message is communicated clearly and directly. The increased clarity in speeches, as opposed to written forms of text, might be seen to make the listener further aware of how their reality is being ‘structured’, and therefore less susceptible to ideological ‘manipulation’ (Mills 2003, 55).

Yet, for the purposes of this study, speeches still constitute an important source of determining how the leadership laid the foundations of its evolving ideology during its first decade in power and, crucially, whether *guerrillerismo* formed an identifiable component of this ideology. In the formative years of the Revolution in power, the leadership was obliged to express its ideology more explicitly in order to inform its people, not to mention foreign observers, of the nature of the Revolution and its underlying motivation. Speeches thus offer a clear indication of the general mood of the Revolution, and the message, or ‘truths’, that the leadership was trying to instil in the population at certain junctures. From a Foucauldian perspective, official speeches are of particular interest for discourse analysis because they are ‘verbal

acts' whose statements, in contrast to every day conversations and other forms of spoken text, are designed to be repeated and circulated and, ultimately, remain in the public imagination. Referring to this distinction, Foucault argues that there is something of a hierarchy of texts that exists in a society, in the upper echelons of which can be found official speeches:

I suspect one could find a kind of gradation between different types of discourse within most societies: discourse "uttered" in the course of the day and in casual meetings, and which disappears with the very act which gave rise to it; and those forms of discourse that lie at the origins of a certain number of new verbal acts, which are reiterated, transformed or discussed; in short, discourse which is spoken and remains spoken, indefinitely, beyond its formulation, and which remains to be spoken (Foucault 1971, 162).

It is these 'verbal acts' that are 'reiterated, transformed or discussed' and that 'remain spoken' beyond their initial utterance that are of interest to this study. That said, there is a lesser focus on speeches in the analysis of the discourse in the 1970s outlined in the next chapter. What the analysis in Chapter Three will demonstrate are *traces of guerrillerismo* in the early years of the second decade of the Revolution in power. These traces are not so frequently identifiable in the leadership's speeches in the 1970s given that, at that time, the process of institutionalisation, or 'Sovietisation', was in full swing. The rapprochement with the Soviet Union saw the leadership attempt to shake off the remnants of its guerrilla past, at least outwardly, thereby appearing to adhere to Soviet orthodoxy. The 'truths' established in the discourse of the 1960s, however, continued to be reproduced in other, less 'obvious', forms.

An analysis of texts in which ideological messages are conveyed more subtly will form the core of the analysis. Two of the key texts in this respect are the 1960

*Manual de Capacitación Cívica* and the 1973 edition of *Instrucción Política FAR*, both published by MINFAR. These texts have been selected as the focus of the analysis owing to their shared function as instruction manuals for enacting revolutionary duties, although their intended readerships differ: the former was directed at members of the voluntary MNR, while the latter was aimed at professional members of the FAR. The evidence of *guerrillerismo* in the language employed in both these texts is particularly telling, since it demonstrates that the leadership aimed to guide the actions of Cuban citizens and soldiers by promoting the values and beliefs associated with the guerrilla ethos, and not, therefore, 'militarism'. Moreover, as mentioned earlier, it is government institutions and ministries that, according to Foucault, aid in keeping certain statements in circulation while excluding others. The replication of *guerrillerista* statements in texts produced by one of the largest and most pervasive institutions in Cuba, MINFAR, will reveal that the values associated with *guerrillerismo* are those which the leadership aims to transform into 'common-sense-knowledge' (Mills 2003, 74). For this reason, the official magazine of the FAR, *Verde Olivo*, is also under review in the following chapters. *Verde Olivo*, founded in 1959 under the initiative of Raúl Castro, Camilo Cienfuegos and Che Guevara, features articles relating to general military matters and current events, yet it has a strong historical element, placing the spotlight on key historical events and figures. Though intended principally for members of the armed forces, it has a wider readership among members' families and friends.

In addition to texts published by government institutions, the analysis also examines texts with an explicitly educational purpose, such as history books. This type of text also contributes to the circulation and preservation of particular statements, insofar as

it is designed to be reiterated and discussed beyond the initial reading by the text recipient (Foucault 1971, 152). History books in particular allow for the presentation of a specific version of events that supports the ‘truth’ constructed and communicated by the revolutionary leadership; as will become clear in the next chapters, this version of events often plays up the role of guerrilla struggle in the Cuban historical narrative (to the exclusion of other events) to aid in granting historical legitimacy to former *guerrilleros* in power.

A similar function can be ascribed to newspapers and magazines. In revolutionary Cuba, where the media is state-controlled and censored, official newspapers and magazines on the whole comply with the practices of government institutions, in the sense that they repeat and reproduce statements that support or affirm the ‘truth’ or reality constructed by the leadership. Indeed, many academics have written of the central role played by the media in safeguarding the revolutionary government’s hold on power, largely by affirming the historical narrative that portrays the country’s leaders as the rightful heirs to this authority (Guerra, 2012; Pettavino, 1990). Publications under scrutiny in the ensuing analysis include Cuba’s only national daily newspaper, *Granma*, the self-proclaimed ‘Órgano Oficial del Comité Central del Partido Comunista de Cuba’. *Granma*, established in 1965, is Cuba’s most widely-read newspaper, carrying news and current events stories, alongside official announcements and speeches. The country’s oldest general-interest magazine, *Bohemia*, will also be examined. *Bohemia*, founded in 1908, was a vocal supporter of the Revolution during its first months in power, publishing an anthology of events that played up the role of the *guerrilleros* in the insurrectionary phase, and thereby helping to secure public trust for the new government (Guerra 2012, 42). Overall,

the purpose of this detailed analysis of a cross-section of texts is to provide an overview of the leadership's discourse at different points in the first two decades of the Revolution in power, with the aim of highlighting the presence of *guerrillerismo* therein.

As indicated, the specific historical period under scrutiny in this study runs first from 1959 to 1969; Chapter Three will consider separately the subsequent decade, from 1969 to 1979. Concerning the first decade of the Revolution in power, this period is an obvious choice for close examination given the topic of this study. In 1959, the Revolution was transplanted directly from the mountains to the city, from irregular guerrilla warfare to the seat of power. Those leading the Revolution had received their political education in the Sierra Maestra, arriving in Havana still wearing their *verde olivo* guerrilla uniforms, and with little idea of how the new revolutionary government should be constructed. With these historical circumstances in mind, it is reasonable to conclude that the formative years of the Revolution in power would offer the most fertile ground for unearthing evidence of *guerrillerismo*, given that it is somewhat improbable that the revolutionary leadership would have discarded its guerrilla past immediately after seizing power. Indeed, as has already been discussed in Chapter One, Guevara himself wrote of the phenomenon of *guerrillerismo* in his 1965 article 'Contra el burocratismo', in which he described how the guerrilla struggle of the *sierra* continued to play out in the realm of government administration. The evidence presented here thus highlights the extent to which the experience of guerrilla warfare continued to influence those holding the reins of power in the 1960s, and how, in turn, this influence shaped the way in which the leadership attempted to mould its citizens into 'ideal' revolutionaries. The evidence

further demonstrates that the guerrilla influence was reflected in the language employed by those in power as a means of including the rest of the population in an on-going guerrilla struggle, albeit one that was now about maintaining, rather than producing, a revolution. In addition to substantiating the notion of *guerrillerismo*, the evidence also concomitantly enables a refutation of the 'militarism' label which, as underlined thus far in the thesis, has been ascribed to the Cuban Revolution in power.

Briefly discussed in the Introduction, the form of discourse analysis which has been carried out for the purpose of this thesis is consistent with the methodology put forward in Fairclough's work, *Discourse and Social Change* (Fairclough, 1992). Fairclough's text offers a useful model for discourse analysis, one which aims to 'bring together linguistically-oriented discourse analysis and social and political thought relevant to discourse and language, in the form of a framework which will be suitable for use in social scientific research, and specifically in the study of social change' (Fairclough 1992, 62). Fairclough views discourse, or 'language use', as a 'form of social practice, rather than a purely individual activity or a reflex of situational variables'; this perspective, he argues, 'implies that discourse is a mode of action, one form in which people may act upon the world (...) as well as a mode of representation' (Fairclough 1992, 62). Furthermore, Fairclough contends that discourse plays a part in the construction of 'social identities' and 'subject positions' for social 'subjects' and types of 'self', but also in 'the construction of systems of knowledge and belief' (Fairclough 1992, 64). This latter point is particularly relevant to this research given that it aims to investigate how, through language, the Cuban leadership attempted to mould citizens into the ideal revolutionary subjects;

that is, individuals committed to defending the Revolution by following the precepts of which *guerrillerismo* is comprised.

In order to analyse how discourse engenders these identities and systems, Fairclough advocates using a framework which is comprised of four key areas: 'vocabulary', 'grammar', 'cohesion' and 'text structure' (Fairclough 1992, 75). He adds to these a further three categories which are more concerned with analysing discursive practice rather than a text in itself. These categories are as follows: 'the 'force' of utterances, i.e. what sort of speech acts (...) they constitute; the 'coherence' of texts; and the 'intertextuality' of texts' (Fairclough 1992, 75).

Fairclough then offers a brief explanation of what the four main categories imply in terms of a practical application, before providing a more in-depth guide later in the book. With regard to 'vocabulary', he proposes a focus upon 'alternative wordings and their political and ideological significance', in addition to 'word meaning'; he contends that 'particular structurings of the relationships between words and the relationships between the meanings of words are forms of hegemony' (Fairclough 1992, 77). A third suggested focus within this category is 'metaphor', insofar as attention should be given to 'the ideological and political import of particular metaphors, and conflict between alternative metaphors' (Fairclough 1992, 77). For grammar, Fairclough stresses the importance of clauses and their specific structure; he asserts that 'every clause is a combination of ideational, interpersonal (...) and textual meanings' (Fairclough 1992, 76). He recommends a consideration of the 'ideological investment' which can be inferred from the different ways in which certain events or statements are signified, and this includes taking into account the

use of agency in a given clause (Fairclough 1992, 77). Clauses are also an important factor to consider when examining the 'cohesion' of a text; Fairclough advocates an examination of 'how clauses are linked together, and how sentences are, in turn, linked together to form larger units in texts' (Fairclough 1992, 77). The linkages between clauses and sentences can be formed through the use of various techniques such as employing vocabulary from common semantic fields, referring and substituting devices, and conjunctions (Fairclough 1992, 77). Finally, concerning 'text structure', Fairclough states that this category also deals with the 'architecture' of texts, and 'specifically higher-level design features of different types of text to discern 'what elements or episodes are combined in what ways and what order to constitute, for example, a crime report in a newspaper, or a job interview' (Fairclough 1992, 77). Fairclough argues that different 'structuring conventions' can provide 'a lot of insight into the systems of knowledge and belief and the assumptions about social relationships and social identities that are built into the conventions of text types' (Fairclough 1992, 78). These four categories will be applied and explored in further detail in the following analysis.

### **Textual Analysis (1959-1969)**

From the opening weeks of the Cuban Revolution in power in 1959, the overriding message that the Cuban leadership wished to convey was clear: the Revolution had been won *by* the people, and *for* the people. This message was perhaps most obviously expressed in the triumphant speeches made by Fidel Castro during that first year. Castro wasted no time in voicing his gratitude to the Cuban people for making the Revolution possible, and in demonstrating his unbreakable faith in the

*pueblo*'s ability to withstand the pressures, both internal and external, which the Revolution faced.

In his speech of 1 January 1959, delivered in Santiago de Cuba's Parque Céspedes, Fidel Castro made sure to remind his audience frequently of the origins of the Revolution, and to instil a sense of ownership in the people of both the challenges already overcome and those which were to follow. Castro asserted:

Yo no voy a decir que la Revolución tiene el pueblo, eso ni se dice, eso lo sabe todo el mundo. Yo decía que el pueblo, que antes tenía escopéticas, ya tiene artillería, tanques y fragatas; y tiene muchos técnicos capacitados del Ejército que nos van a ayudar a manejarlas, si fuese necesario. ¡Ahora sí que el pueblo está armado! Yo les aseguro que si cuando éramos 12 hombres solamente no perdimos la fe, ahora que tenemos ahí 12 tanques cómo vamos a perder la fe (Castro, 1959a).

Castro declared that the support of the people for the Revolution was simply a given fact and thus was scarcely worth highlighting. Yet his very contention that 'la Revolución tiene el pueblo', although encased in negatives, effectively underscored the statement. Castro was also careful here to underline the foundations of the movement which had brought the Revolution to power, stating: 'Yo decía que el pueblo, que antes tenía escopéticas'. By pointing out that the Cuban people fighting to overthrow Batista were once only armed with small shotguns, Castro effectively laid emphasis on the historical feat of the initial group of revolutionaries; that is, that they were able to produce revolution despite the paucity of their resources. The inclusion of the diminutive suffix, '-icas', in 'escopéticas', served to stress further the rather feeble capacity of these particular firearms which, in turn, added to the imagery of poorly equipped rebel fighters. What is more, Castro's use of this type of diminutive, a feature typical of spoken Cuban Spanish, is perhaps indicative of an attempt on his part to demonstrate that he himself was one of the *pueblo* to which he

made reference. In other words, Castro was making a deliberate attempt to use the language of 'the people' and did not want to distance himself from his audience through the employment of a more formal rhetoric. This gesture of inclusivity is reinforced in the final sentence of the citation where Castro contended that, 'cuando éramos 12 hombres solamente no perdimos la fe, ahora que tenemos ahí 12 tanques cómo vamos a perder la fe'. The use of the first person plural in 'éramos' implied that, though there were only a small number of revolutionaries who participated in the embryonic campaign of 1956, the struggle of these few was representative of the struggle of the Cuban people as a whole. Similarly, the first person plural 'tenemos' seems intended to convey the message that the recently acquired military apparatus was not at the service of the state but of the newly-crowned leaders of the Cuban Revolution: *el pueblo*.

The very notion that the Cuban people were in charge of the Revolution, and that it was they who had ensured its victory, pre-empted one of the precepts which Guevara would include in *La Guerra de Guerrillas*, published the following year: 'Las fuerzas populares pueden ganar una Guerra contra el ejército' (Guevara 2006, 13). Informing the Cuban people that they would continue to lead the Revolution implied that the irregular approach of guerrilla struggle which had carried the Revolution to power was to continue. Put differently, the Revolution would not be fought in the first instance by soldiers trained to protect the state but, as in the *sierra*, by citizens fighting on behalf of their own people. It is thus possible to detect a promotion of the guerrilla ethos in the very first weeks of the Revolution in power which, in turn, compounds the idea that *guerrillerismo* grew organically out of the insurrection and was carried forward into the era of revolutionary government.

The reference in this citation to the ‘12 hombres’ who survived the *Granma* landing further reinforced Castro’s point regarding the inferiority of the original group of rebels who took on the state security forces in 1956, thereby conveying the message once again that initiating a campaign on an unequal footing did not necessarily preclude success. Castro’s words are an early example of the promotion of the myth of the *los doce* which recurs frequently in the leadership’s rhetoric throughout the Revolution’s trajectory. This myth refers to the belief that there were twelve survivors of the *Granma* landing who went on to launch the insurrection, although the exact number of rebels in the early stages of the campaign remains unknown. The myth became firmly inscribed in the Cuban imaginary following the publication of Carlos Franqui’s *El libro de los doce* in 1967 (but written shortly after the Revolution came to power). The book featured testimonial accounts of the insurrection from twelve of its central participants, although some, such as Haydée Santamaría, were certainly not present in the most nascent stages of the struggle in the *sierra*. Since the 1960s, this myth has transformed into something of a shorthand for those in power who have wished to underline not only the enormity of the challenge faced by the embryonic Ejército Rebelde, but also the tenacity of those involved who chose to engage in combat in spite of the unfavourable outlook. The idea of *los doce* also has clear biblical connotations, insofar as it invites comparison with the twelve apostles, although the resemblance is never explicitly alluded to (Judson 1985, 233). In the quotation in question, the seemingly deliberate parallels drawn between the ‘12 hombres’ and the ‘12 tanques’ provided a neat contrast which highlighted how far the Ejército Rebelde had come; that is, it had transformed from a vulnerable movement comprised of a handful of men to one which wielded considerable military might. The repetition here of ‘fe’ also added a further tone of

religiosity. Castro was suggesting that continuing to support the Revolution, even when victory seemed elusive, required a level of faith akin to that required by religion. Such language was reinforced by Guevara's later employment of a religious lexicon in *La Guerra de Guerrillas*, discussed briefly in Chapter One, and has been a consistent feature of the revolutionary discourse ever since. Fernández has argued that the leadership's religious rhetoric is evidence of a 'political religion' in Cuba, or a 'popular religiosity' (Fernández 2000, 63). He stated that, 'The religious feelings the *barbudos* (the bearded ones, as the rebels were commonly called) inspired were reflected in the media and in the discourse of the revolutionary leaders (...) The discourse is better understood as the language of passion that gave form to a political religion' (Fernández 2000, 65).

A similar message was conveyed elsewhere in the speech where Castro discussed the power of the *voluntad* of the Cuban *pueblo*. Comparable to the idea of 'fe' as a necessary component of revolutionary transformation, Castro declared in this citation that a lack of resources was irrelevant to the Revolution's odds of survival; what mattered most was the will of the people. Castro proclaimed: 'si no hay dinero, ¡no importa!, lo que hay es voluntad, y hacemos lo que sea necesario' (Castro, 1959a). This proclamation that the *voluntad* of the *pueblo* was more important than the financial wealth, or lack of, the Revolution again pre-empted one of the principal lessons of *La Guerra de Guerrillas*: that revolution could be produced through a reliance upon subjective conditions alone. It would thus appear that, from the outset, Castro intended to promote a voluntaristic approach to supporting and defending the Revolution, an approach which lay at the very core of the Cuban theory of revolutionary guerrilla warfare.

The stress upon the importance of *voluntad* was also in evidence in another of Castro's significant speeches from 1959, his 26 July address. Referring to the reasons behind the victory of the Revolution, Castro affirmed: 'No se ha cumplido pues la voluntad de un hombre o de un grupo de hombres; ¡se ha cumplido la voluntad de un pueblo!' (Castro, 1959b). Again, Castro was drawing attention to the potential of collective subjective will by attributing to it the defeat of Batista. Furthermore, Castro's assertion that 'no se ha cumplido pues la voluntad de un hombre' could suggest that his aim was to undermine the belief that the victory of the Revolution could, in an insignificant way, be attributed to his own tenacity and skill as a leader. Instead, he chose to affirm the decisive role of the Cuban people. In doing so, Castro's intention was to remind the Cuban people of what they could achieve through collective action, thus encouraging a continuation of participation of this kind.

Castro persisted in highlighting the pivotal role of the *pueblo* as the driving force behind the Revolution elsewhere in the speech. He stated that:

Ningún hombre es ni será indispensable. Lo único indispensable aquí — lo digo porque lo siento — es el pueblo. Si la Revolución no tuviera el pueblo, estaría perdida. ¡El pueblo es lo que importa, y el pueblo lo tiene la Revolución! Además, es consolador pensar, es consolador pensar que a un hombre lo pueden matar, pero a un pueblo no lo pueden matar, igual que un hombre puede ser traidor, pero un pueblo no puede ser traidor (Castro, 1959b).

Castro communicated a powerful message in characterising the Cuban people as 'indispensable': the Cuban Revolution would not survive without the support of citizens. This statement was compounded by the unambiguous proclamation, 'Si la Revolución no tuviera el pueblo, estaría perdida', and further reinforced by the emphatic exclamation of 'El pueblo es lo que importa, y el pueblo lo tiene la

Revolución!'. It would also appear that Castro intended to inspire confidence in the Cuban people with regard to the survival of the Revolution. The statement 'a un pueblo no lo pueden matar' implied that, as the people *were* the Revolution, the Revolution was therefore indestructible. The objective of the preceding phrase 'es consolador pensar', and its subsequent repetition, was to encourage the Cuban population to take comfort from their 'invincibility', and thus to recognise their potential strength in numbers, as a collective. Again, such statements pertaining to the power of the *pueblo* could be considered precursors to Guevara's conviction that 'las fuerzas populares' could conquer more powerful, institutionalised armies.

Castro's efforts to inspire confidence in the Cuban people, particularly through underscoring the potential for the underdog to succeed, continued throughout the Revolution's first year in power. Significantly, these efforts were equally manifest in speeches given on dates which did not form part of the official calendar of commemoration, thus suggesting that *guerrillerismo* formed a consistently integral part of the official discourse at that time. Noteworthy examples of this *guerrillerista* rhetoric can be found in Castro's opening and closing addresses to the X Congreso Nacional Obrero held in November 1959. In these speeches, Castro's message was still one which focussed on the primacy of the power of the Cuban *pueblo*, yet there appears to have been a heightened emphasis on the obligation to defend the Revolution, and at all costs. In the opening address, Castro was unequivocal in his belief that all Cubans had a defensive role to play. He informed his audience that 'por encima de todo tenemos un deber indiscutible: 'el deber de defender la Revolución (...) ninguno puede olvidar la responsabilidad que les corresponde para que la Revolución pueda contar con ustedes' (Castro 1959c, 25). In this example,

Castro referred to the collective responsibility for defence as a 'deber', a duty; this point was accentuated through the repetition of 'deber' within the first line. The first person plural of 'tenemos' compounds the collective obligation to the duty of defence, while the inclusion of the modifying adjective 'indiscutible', in addition to the noun 'responsabilidad', underlined the point that defence was a commitment to which all Cubans were tied without question. It should be remarked that Castro's employment of the word *deber* here was no accident; rather, it can be argued that he consciously chose to include it given its historical significance. It is likely that, even at this early stage of the Revolution, the word *deber* constituted what Fairclough might term a 'lexical item'. Fairclough recommends the use of this technical term over 'words' given that it 'captures the idea of expressions which have achieved a degree of stability and fixity' (Fairclough 1992, 191). By the time of the Revolution, *deber* was already linked to Cuba's previous struggles for independence and, more specifically, with the writings of the island's most famous *independentista*, José Martí. Martí frequently wrote of the centrality of *deber* as both an inherent feature of *patria* and a motivational force for revolutionary activity, as illustrated in the citations, 'el deber de un hombre está allí donde es más útil' (Martí 1895, 403) and 'el verdadero hombre no mira de qué lado se vive mejor, sino de qué lado está el deber' (Martí 1890, 103). This latter citation was incorporated into Fidel Castro's seminal 1953 speech, 'La historia me absolverá', thereby laying the foundations for the import of *deber* in the ideology of the Revolution.<sup>32</sup>

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<sup>32</sup> The full citation of Fidel Castro's intertextual reference to Martí in 'La historia me absolverá' read as follows: 'A los que me llaman por esto soñador, les digo como Martí: "El verdadero hombre no mira de qué lado se vive mejor, sino de qué lado está el deber; y ése es [...] el único hombre práctico cuyo sueño de hoy será la ley de mañana, porque el que haya puesto los ojos en las entrañas universales y visto hervir los pueblos, llameantes y ensangrentados, en la artesa de los siglos, sabe que el porvenir, sin una sola excepción, está del lado del deber."' (Castro 2008, 54).

By 1959, therefore, *deber* had something of a fixed and given meaning, one that was indelibly associated with the Independence cause and with revolutionary activity more generally. It can be argued that Castro intended to perpetuate and tap into this tradition which was recognisable to the Cuban people, and with which, therefore, they could become aligned, while also attributing some much-needed historical legitimacy to the current revolutionary cause, insofar as it was presented as a continuation of an on-going struggle which was rooted in Cuba's history. As will become evident through the course of the analysis of texts from the 1960s, the notion of *deber* was a common feature of the leadership's discourse throughout the first decade in power. It should also be noted here that the historical significance of *deber*, and its association with rebel struggle, serves to contradict Malloy's statement regarding the 'militarisation' of the Revolution, as discussed in the Introduction. Malloy proposed that Cubans citizens were viewed by the leadership as 'soldiers in a vast producing army' and were, therefore, 'expected to adhere to the traditional military values of discipline and devotion to duty' (Malloy 1971, 40). The unavoidable association of the term with Martí and Cuban history more generally demonstrates that the sense of duty required of the Cuban *pueblo* was not simply part and parcel of the Revolution's supposed transformation into a militarised system of governance, but rather was a pre-existing tradition which was re-articulated by the revolutionary leadership from the outset. Moreover, rather than being emblematic of 'militarism', this tradition overlapped with the concept of *guerrillerismo*; a sense of duty to the task of revolutionary struggle must be an inherent value of the *guerrillero*. It is the recognition of *deber* which engenders the subjective will to foment revolution.

In addition to the attention directed at the moral obligation of Cuban citizens to defend the Revolution, Castro also declared in this speech that the nation's workers, whom he was addressing directly, would be responsible for a continuation of the struggle undertaken by the Ejército Rebelde. Castro proclaimed:

Ustedes son el Ejército Rebelde en esta etapa de la Revolución; ustedes son la parte más importante del pueblo y del Ejército Rebelde en cualquier lucha futura que tengamos que sostener para defender la Revolución (Castro 1959c, 26).

These words are a clear example of *guerrillerismo*. Castro was stating in no uncertain terms that the struggle of the Ejército Rebelde had not finished, but rather would continue in other forms; in other words, the Cuban *obreros* would constitute the new guerrilla army. The phrase 'esta etapa' further compounded the suggestion of an on-going struggle, insofar as the Revolution in power was but the next step in the guerrilla struggle begun in the *sierra*.

In Castro's closing speech at the conference, the guerrilla foundations of the Revolution were highlighted once again, similar to his remarks in his January 1 speech 1959. He asserted: 'Es preciso recordar que éramos pocos, éramos muy pocos' (Castro 1959d, 46). The repetition of 'éramos pocos' served, of course, to underline the small number of participants in the initial campaign against Batista and, in turn, the enormity of the challenge which they were able to overcome. Later in the same speech, Castro continued with the same theme:

frente a la contrarrevolución vamos a luchar aunque sean muchos los de la contrarrevolución o sean pocos y aunque nosotros seamos muchos o seamos pocos, compañeros. Y, además, compañeros, porque sabemos lo que es luchar cuando somos pocos, porque están frescos todavía aquellos tiempos en que éramos pocos, pero buenos (...) Es preferible pocos buenos, que muchos malos, preferibles pocos pero seguros (...) (Castro 1959d, 54).

In this extract, Castro was again referring to the inauspicious beginnings to the Revolution in order to inspire his audience, informing them that, though the obstacles with which the Revolution was confronted might have seemed overwhelming, it was possible to overcome them, much as the Ejército Rebelde had done during the insurrectionary phase. Collective participation in the events of the insurrection was implied by the first person plural of 'sabemos lo que es luchar cuando somos pocos, compañeros'; the use of the plural subject as an agent in his speeches is a recurrent feature of Castro's rhetoric, further examples of which will be discussed in the course of the analysis. The inclusive nature of Castro's references to the history of the insurrection was further reinforced by the informal address, 'compañeros'. This term created a tone of familiarity to his discourse, and was another attempt at implying an equality between himself and his audience, and between those who had participated in the first nucleus of the guerrilla struggle and the rest of the population. The continued influence of the early days of the struggle was also evident in the line 'porque están frescos todavía aquellos tiempos en que éramos pocos' whereby Castro clearly stated that the guerrilla struggle lived on in the memory of its participants. Castro further attempted to convince his audience that being inferior in size to one's enemy did not herald defeat but, rather, could be conceived of as an advantage: 'Es preferible pocos buenos, que muchos malos, preferibles pocos pero seguros (...)' (Castro 1959d, 54). Traces of *guerrillerismo* are evident here in Castro's stress that the participation of a few good men was preferable to that of a large number of morally questionable combatants. This approach to revolutionary activity is essentially that of guerrilla warfare and, specifically, the guerrilla warfare enacted in the insurrectionary stage of the Revolution.

Thus far the analysis has established that, in the first year of the Revolution in power, Castro was keen to promote the example of the embryonic guerrilla campaign as a model for citizen participation in supporting and defending the Revolution. As discussed, Castro frequently underlined the lesson of triumph over adversity which could be drawn from the Revolution's insurrectionary roots. Moreover, Castro quite clearly intended to convey the message that the struggle for revolutionary change had not ended but had to be continued by the Cuban *pueblo*; indeed, they had a moral obligation, a *deber*, to do so.

The focus on the Cuban *pueblo* as the driving force in producing revolutionary change was sustained in one of the major texts to be published by the revolutionary leadership in the early years of the Revolution in power, the 1960 *Manual de Capacitación Cívica*. Briefly mentioned earlier, the 1960 *Manual* constitutes the core text to be analysed in this chapter. The *Manual* was produced by the Departamento de Instrucción within the Ministerio de las FAR as the leading educational text in the civic training of the members of the MNR, already referred to briefly in the Introduction. The Milicias were created on 26 October, 1959 as an additional force of 'civic soldiers' to protect Cuba against impending invasion; though under the control of the Armed Forces, they did not form part of them as such (Kapcia 2000, 113). In addition to their defensive function, the Milicias also 'provided a way of resocializing a considerable sector of the population and maintaining it in a state of mobilization' (Medin 1990, 156). Shortly after their creation, thousands of Cubans, mostly young people, had voluntarily signed up. Most frequently, members were assigned non-combative tasks, such as guarding buildings against the acts of sabotage that were still occurring at this point (Aguila 1989, 29).

However, the Milicias later proved to be an indispensable force, acting as the first line of defence during the Bay of Pigs invasion, and playing a major role in defeating the counterrevolutionary guerrilla movements that emerged in the Escambray mountains.

The intention of the Milicia's training manual was to inform volunteers regarding the nature and objectives of the Revolution, its historical antecedents, the tasks the Revolution needed to address, and the morals and discipline required of the ideal revolutionary. The opening section indicated that the text had been produced as an updated version of the text 'Curso de Orientación Revolucionaria', published in March 1959 by the Dirección de Cultura del Ejército Rebelde. This precursor to the 1960 version aimed to enlighten members of the Ejército Rebelde with respect to the concepts necessary to understanding 'la realidad revolucionaria' at the time of its publication (*Manual* 1960, 1). The 1960 *Manual* informed the reader that, while many problems had been resolved in the year that had passed since the previous edition, new challenges had emerged; additionally, concepts which in 1959 were relevant to revolutionary progress had inevitably become outdated. Consequently, the Departamento de Instrucción within the Ministerio de las FAR had deemed it essential to produce a revised edition. Regarding this issue, the *Manual* read:

De ahí la necesidad de otro libro, como este Manual de Capacitación Cívica, más completo, más actual, que no vaya a prestar servicio de aleccionamiento revolucionario y estímulo patriótico sólo a los miembros de las Fuerzas Armadas, sino que útil a los Milicias Nacionales, a todas las organizaciones y personas que apoyan a la revolución, es decir, a todo nuestro pueblo (*Manual* 1960, 2).

The *Manual* was divided into several 'Lecciones', thus providing a clear indication of its intended didactic function. The *lecciones* were housed under the following

headings: Revolución, Reforma Agraria, Industrialización, Geografía Económica, Historia de Cuba, Doctrina Martiana and Moral y Disciplina. A final section was composed of four significant speeches, three of which were given by Fidel Castro, including the 'First Declaration of Havana'. Though the month of publication was not indicated in the text, the inclusion of Castro's First Declaration, made in September 1960, suggests that the text was issued in the closing months of that year.

Within the first few lines of the *Manual*, there is a clear allusion to one of the key precepts of Guevara's theory of guerrilla warfare, as outlined in his text *La Guerra de Guerrillas*, published in the same year. The second paragraph of the first *lección* opens with the following sentence:

El factor fundamental en esta lucha victoriosa fué el Ejército Rebelde, cuyo núcleo inicial se formó en torno de Fidel Castro y de sus compañeros sobrevivientes del desembarco del Granma, en 1956, con la incorporación de campesinos, obreros y estudiantes a sus filas (*Manual* 1960, 5).

The reference to the 'núcleo inicial' in this citation can be directly associated with Guevara's work, which proposed that a revolution could be set in motion through the creation of an initial isolated nucleus, or *foco*, in which were fused the political and armed wings of a given movement. As Guevara stated in *La Guerra de Guerrillas*, 'la guerrilla, como núcleo armado, es la vanguardia combatiente del mismo' (Guevara 2000, 16). Here, the inclusion of the subordinate, non-defining relative clause accentuated the significance of the role of the primary nucleus within the 'lucha victoriosa' of the Ejército Rebelde, and served to highlight the fact that it was Castro and the other survivors of the *Granma* landing who were responsible for fomenting the Revolution in the first instance. The incorporation of this clause directly before the detail regarding the involvement of 'campesinos, obreros y

estudiantes' ensured that the role of these additional participants was undermined through its relegation to the end of the sentence. Moreover, the almost uninterrupted juxtaposition of 'Ejército Rebelde' with 'núcleo inicial' might have effectively conflated the two in the mind of the reader; in other words, this crucial aspect of the guerrilla struggle had the potential to become inherently linked to the Ejército Rebelde's victorious struggle. The marked separation here of those who constituted the guerrilla nucleus and the rest of the population was at odds with Castro's portrayal of the initial struggle as one which was carried out by the people, as evidenced in the previously discussed speeches from 1959. In those speeches, Castro's message was one of a collective victory of the Cuban *pueblo*; here, in contrast, the text underscored the fundamental role of the original *guerrilleros*, in particular Fidel Castro, whose name was foregrounded. This shift in message was indicative of the turbulent internal politics of that period, a time in which the former *guerrilleros* of the *sierra*, with Castro at the helm, were attempting to gain ascendancy within the Cuban government. Attributing the victory of the Revolution to their initial nucleus could be viewed as an effort to grant themselves historical legitimacy which, in turn, would have contributed to the justification of their rise to power.

What is more, designating the Ejército Rebelde and, therefore, its initial nucleus, as a 'factor fundamental' in the 'lucha victoriosa', created the effect of inserting the Revolution, and its guerrilla strategies, into the pre-existing Cuban tradition of *lucha*. The term itself would likely have resonated with a contemporary reader given that it had, and still has, something of a fixed meaning within Cuba, which pre-dates the appearance of the Ejército Rebelde in the Sierra Maestra. *Lucha* can be said to

embody the idea of a national struggle, and is heavily associated with the heroes of the Cuban historical narrative, such as the anticolonialist struggle of José Martí and the *mambises*.<sup>33</sup> Moreover, *lucha* might be considered to be one of the principal codes which constitute the concept of *cubanía*; this concept can be said to have underpinned the Cuban Revolution since its inception; one might define *cubanía*, on a basic level, as a fusion of pride in the Cuban nation with an inherent sense of history, combined with anti-imperialist undertones. These connotations and associations housed under the term *lucha* within Cuba allow for its classification as a 'lexical item', much like the term *deber*, as previously discussed. As with *deber*, a cultural or ideological significance can certainly be applied to *lucha*, affording it something of a fixed, contextually grounded meaning.

The overall effect of the juxtaposition of this 'lexical item' and the concept of the nucleus was to direct the reader to confer historical (and cultural) legitimacy upon guerrilla warfare as a new form of struggle, insofar as its methods were presented as another means of continuing the on-going *lucha* of the Cuban people against tyranny and domination. The overarching message here would seem to be that guerrilla strategies, particularly the notion of the 'núcleo inicial', were what would characterise and direct the *lucha* henceforth within the Revolution. The alliteration of the fricative 'f' in 'factor fundamental' aided in reinforcing the centrality of the Ejército Rebelde and, therefore, its nucleus in the Revolution's victory.

The idea that the embryonic phase of a revolution was fundamental to its success was echoed elsewhere in the *Manual*, although the focus was less overtly connected to

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<sup>33</sup> *Mambises* is the name given to the guerrilla fighters who participated in Cuba's struggles for independence, first in the Ten Years' War of 1868-1878, and later in the War of Independence of 1895-1898.

Guevara's tenet regarding the isolated nucleus; rather, an emphasis on the significance of the beginning of revolutions in a more general sense, and, specifically, the right of the individual to produce these beginnings, was evident.

This focus was clearly illustrated in the following citation:

Algunas personas piensan que la revolución termina con la toma del gobierno, pero en realidad, entonces, ha acabado de empezar. Fidel Castro se refería a esto diciendo que en estas condiciones 'adquirimos el derecho a empezar (...) muchos creyeron que la Revolución era ya el primero del enero la solución de todos los males del país (...) y que no era (...) sino tan sólo el derecho a empezar. El triunfo del primero de enero fue tan sólo el derecho a empezar' (*Manual* 1960, 16/17).

In this example, the intentional stress upon 'el derecho a empezar' was made apparent through its repetition. One can assert that this emphasis on 'the right to begin' was an implicit allusion to the *foco* theory and its principle of creating the 'subjective conditions' necessary for fomenting revolution, and of the capacity of the *pueblo* to produce a revolution. Furthermore, Guevara proposed that a revolution should be begun without delay. To reiterate the discussion in Chapter One, Guevara's two most fundamental precepts of the *foco* theory, as outlined in *La Guerra de Guerrillas*, were as follows:

1. Las fuerzas populares pueden ganar una guerra contra el ejército.
2. No siempre hay que esperar a que se den todas las condiciones para la revolución; el foco insurreccional puede desarrollar condiciones subjetivas sobre la base de condiciones objetivas dadas (Guevara 2006, 13).

These tenets unambiguously placed the onus of producing a revolution upon the *pueblo* who, in their potential capacity as *las fuerzas populares*, were able to create the necessary subjective conditions.

Returning to the citation in question, one can posit that that it was consistent with these guerrilla precepts, insofar as its purpose was to inform the reader that he or she

had the right to commence a revolution at once, and perhaps had a responsibility to do so, given that the need for revolutionary activity was at its peak in these early years of the Revolution in power. Employing the word 'derecho' might have had the effect of instilling a sense of entitlement in the reader with regard to revolutionary action; its intention seems to have been to suggest that the Cuban people, through the ousting of Batista and the subsequent establishment of a revolutionary government, had been granted the freedom to enact revolution and should, therefore, act upon this legitimate privilege. What is more, the use of the first person plural in 'adquirimos' added a sense of inclusivity and collective ownership to this idea of the 'right to begin', implying that the responsibility and freedom to commence the revolution was shared amongst all Cuban citizens.

Further weight was added to the focus on 'el derecho a empezar' through the assimilation of a section of an unspecified speech by Fidel Castro. The inclusion of speech in such a way is an example of a type of intertextuality referred to by Fairclough as 'discourse representation'; Fairclough favours this term over 'speech reportage':

because (i) it better captures the idea that when one 'reports' discourse one necessarily chooses to represent it in one way rather than another; and (ii) what is represented is not just speech, but also writing, and not just their grammatical features but also their discursive organisation, as well as various other aspects of the discursive event — its circumstances, the tone in which things were said, etc. (Fairclough 1992, 118).

In this instance, the text producer incorporated 'direct discourse representation', whereby the speech was introduced (though not contextualised) and thus manifestly demarcated from the rest of the narrative. The specification of the speaker would appear to be intentional; by introducing Castro as the producer of this discourse, it

served to legitimise the text to an extent, given his position at the time of Prime Minister of Cuba, but also, and perhaps more importantly, as a key figure in the launch of the Revolution in 1956. To elucidate further, the attribution of these words to a revolutionary leader who, as the text claimed earlier, was at the heart of the ‘núcleo inicial’ served in some ways to authorise them. Having been a significant player in the embryonic period of the insurrectionary phase, Castro was able to utter these words with conviction, thereby adding weight to their meaning.

The overarching message of this section of Castro’s speech was summarised in the final declarative sentence ‘El triunfo del primero de enero fue tan sólo el derecho a empezar’. This sentence contained no subordinate clauses which, through providing additional detail, might have obscured the key point being communicated. Ending the discussion of a particular point or topic with a punchy declarative statement was an effective means of encapsulating the argument; this technique might have aided in rendering the text more digestible for the reader while adding to the overall textual comprehension. This rhetorical device was characteristic of Castro’s discourse, additional examples of which will be discussed later in the text.

In the second *lección* of the *Manual*, entitled ‘Concepto de Revolución. La experiencia cubana y de América’, one can find an additional example of direct discourse representation of another of Castro’s speeches in which he again laid emphasis on ‘el derecho de empezar’. However, as in the above case, the speech represented was not contextualised, thus it was unclear whether both examples were borrowed from the same speech. In the second citation, Castro asserted:

Hace falta que la conciencia revolucionaria se apodere del país y que en el haber de esa conciencia (...) haya mucho más que lo que esa conciencia revolucionaria pueda perder, en el cambio de circunstancias de un país oprimido a un país que...al menos ha adquirido el derecho a empezar (*Manual* 1960, 26).

Again, the message here remained the same; that is, that the Revolution had not yet begun and thus required the revolutionary actions of all Cubans in order for it to commence. In addition to reinforcing the above message, the repetition of an intertextual phrase also served to produce greater textual cohesion. This repetition could be viewed as an illustration of a type of 'surface cohesive marking' referred to by Fairclough as 'lexical cohesion'; this mode of cohesion is created through the repetition of words (Fairclough 1992, 176). Alternatively, or additionally, it could constitute another form of surface cohesive marking known as 'reference', defined in one respect as 'a matter of referring back to an earlier part of the text' (Fairclough 1992, 176). Whatever its precise type, the repetition established a connection between these two *lecciones*. Such a connection would have facilitated the reader's understanding of the *Manual* as a whole by highlighting its principal messages at different stages within it. The use of direct discourse representation such as is exemplified in these citations can be frequently identified elsewhere, not only in this particular text but also in the 1973 *Instrucción Política FAR*, as shall be seen in the following chapter.

As discussed, the repetition of 'el derecho a empezar' seems to have had at its basis the notion of collective action; Castro's words suggested that the right to instigate a revolution was a shared one, and a responsibility which had been acquired by the Cuban population as a whole. The primacy of collective action was unambiguous elsewhere in the text. In another example of direct discourse representation of one of Castro's speeches, he stated:

Ese espíritu de sacrificio del pueblo, ese despertar de la conciencia de nuestro pueblo, esa disposición en que está de hacer los sacrificios que sean necesarios, esa seguridad de que sólo de sus fuerzas depende el triunfo, y que sólo los pueblos heroicos tienen derecho a ser pueblos libres y pueblos felices y pueblos independientes (...) eso es lo que nos alienta (*Manual* 1960, 25).

The repetition of *pueblo* was a clear indication that part of this speech's aim was to highlight how crucial the actions of the Cuban people were, as a collective, in driving forward the Revolution. Once again, there was reference to the notion of 'derechos' as being acquired through action; in this particular case, rights were the privilege of those who, as a people, had been heroic. The parallel structure and syndetic listing in 'pueblos libres y pueblos felices y pueblos independientes' accentuate the multiplicity of the rights that were afforded to the heroic, again, as a *pueblo* and not as individuals. These words also suggested that the people were in control of their own destinies; as Castro contended, 'esa seguridad de que sólo de sus fuerzas depende el triunfo'. This phrase hinted at Guevara's precept regarding the creation of the subjective conditions necessary for inciting revolution, insofar as it stated that the *pueblo*, through using their combined might and will, had control of the outcome of the Revolution. This sentiment regarding the power of the people was mirrored later in the text within the *lección* dedicated to 'Industrialización'. The Cuban population was referred to as 'el gran soberano, que es el pueblo', while the success of the industrialization project would not be attributed to the government but designated as a 'victoria revolucionaria del pueblo' (*Manual* 1960, 101). The aim of these statements was thus to confer a sense of power upon the Cuban people, and to inculcate the notion that the actions of citizens were valuable, not to mention crucial, to the potential achievements of the Revolution.

This attempt to bestow merit upon the collective action of the *pueblo* was reinforced towards the end of the text. In the *lección* ‘Moral y Disciplina’, the victory of the Revolution’s insurrection itself was attributed to the Cuban *pueblo*: ‘esta guerra la ganó el pueblo por la acción de su vanguardia armada combatiente’ (*Manual* 1960, 298). According to the *pueblo* the responsibility for the defeat of Batista transmitted an effective message: the Cuban people were capable of achieving the seemingly impossible, such as winning a battle against an enemy whose forces were numerically superior to its own. What is more, these words declared that it was the armed vanguard of the people which enabled the final victory. The reference to the vanguard here was a clear allusion to the *foco* theory, if one is to recall Guevara’s aforementioned assertion: ‘la guerrilla, como núcleo armado, es la vanguardia combatiente del mismo’ (Guevara 2006, 16).

Yet, perhaps contradictorily, there were instances elsewhere in the text in which the actions and attitudes of the individual within the Revolution, and not the collective, were brought to the fore. The following words taken from a section entitled ‘La Revolución de las ideas’ constitute one such example: ‘la revolución (...) pone en primer término la voluntad consciente del ciudadano en el logro de sus objetivos individuales y sociales’ (*Manual* 1960, 25). Here, the necessity of subjective will, of *voluntad*, was expressed in terms of the individual citizen, with a focus on achieving goals at a personal level.

Later in the *Manual*, an additional example of the notion of ‘voluntaristic’ action at an individual level can be identified within another of Castro’s speeches, the August 1960 ‘Acta de la segunda independencia’. As before, the inclusion of this speech

constituted a form of intertextuality, although this time the direct discourse was represented in its entirety and was fully contextualised. Castro declared: 'La democracia cubana le da a cada cubano algo más; la democracia cubana le da a cada cubano un fusil para defender sus derechos y para defender a su Patria' (Castro 1960a, 342). It is evident in this instance that there was an intentional stress upon every Cuban citizen as an agent capable of defending both his or her rights and homeland. The parallel structure of the two sentences underscored this emphasis, particularly through the repetition of 'cada cubano' within these sentences. The inclusion of the determiner 'cada' to qualify the noun 'cubano' was significant in that, unlike the alternative of using the plural noun 'los cubanos', for example, it further highlighted the message that every Cuban was granted the agency to defend himself or herself. The alliteration of the fricative 'c' in 'cada cubano' reinforced the weight already placed upon this phrase through repetition. What is more, the use of possessive pronouns in 'sus derechos' and 'su Patria' conferred an ownership upon 'cada cubano', and perhaps, therefore, was employed with the intention of instilling a sense of obligation upon Cuban citizens to defend these rights and the homeland. One might also note that the metaphor comparing democracy to a weapon was consistent with the leadership's tendency to express events or actions, in this case a democratic vote, in terms of an armed struggle, as part of an on-going *lucha*.

While the above citations demonstrate that, at times, the *Manual* shifted its focus from the collective to the individual with regard to creating the subjective conditions for revolution, in general, the emphasis of the text as a whole was on the necessity of collective action as a means of producing or sustaining the Revolution. Moreover, there is evidence to suggest that, when there was a focus upon the value of individual

action, that value was acquired only if the action was beneficial to the collective, whether it be a specific collective, or the Revolution more broadly. This latter point was illustrated in the segment named ‘¿Qué son las cooperativas?’ which formed part of the *lección* concerning ‘Las Cooperativas de la Reforma Agraria’. The segment read:

El movimiento cooperativo tiene más de cien años de existencia. No subestima al individuo, sino por el contrario lo tiene como fin primordial, procurando que desarrolle sus sentimientos y calidades humanas, dentro del marco de la sociedad en que convive. El cooperativismo propende al cuidado y atención del individuo, desde que nace hasta que muere, con todos los derechos inherentes a su condición humana. Pretende sustituir características de una sociedad basada en el lucro y la explotación, por las de una sociedad de economía cooperativista, basada en principios de penetración y solidaridad humanas (*Manual* 1960, 89).

The simple declarative sentence which opened this paragraph established that its main focus was the cooperative movement, a form of collective action which played a significant role in the early years of the Revolution. The historicity of this practice was made clear from the outset in ‘tiene cien años de existencia’. The foregrounding of this information seems intended to legitimise the practice of *cooperativismo*, insofar as it portrayed the formation of cooperatives as an inherent part of Cuban tradition, as a practice rooted in Cuban society. Yet, while *cooperativismo* is, by definition, a collective activity, the role of the individual within this collective was very much played up in this paragraph. Indeed, it claimed that the cooperative movement ‘propende al cuidado y atención del individuo’, and, significantly, had the individual as a ‘fin primordial’. There was also a focus here on the ‘derechos inherentes’ of the individual as a human being. This reference echoed the weight placed upon the notion of ‘derechos’ in the earlier citation regarding the ‘derecho a empezar’. Unlike the previous citation, however, in this instance the attention was on the rights of the individual, rather than the acquisition of collective rights.

That said, one can posit that the overall message in this example remained one that extolled the need for a collective approach to agrarian reform. The development of each citizen as described in the paragraph only appears to be necessary insofar as this formation will be beneficial to the cooperative as a whole, and to the wider goal of creating ‘una sociedad de economía cooperativista, basada en principios de compenetración y solidaridad humanas’ (*Manual* 1960, 89). The placing of this dependent clause at the end of the paragraph was effective in highlighting this notion of solidarity, and ensured that it was, perhaps, the lasting message of this segment.

The analysis of the *Manual* will now focus on the final section of the text: a transcription of Fidel Castro’s ‘First Declaration of Havana’. Similar to the aforementioned, ‘Acta de la segunda independencia’, the inclusion of the Declaration was a form of intertextuality and, again, the complete direct discourse was fully contextualised. The insertion of the speech now seems significant, if unsurprising; the Declaration constituted one of Castro’s most noteworthy and incendiary speeches up to that point in the Revolution’s trajectory. Occurring at a time when US-Cuban relations were rapidly deteriorating, the Declaration partly served as a very explicit projection onto the world stage of Cuba’s anti-imperialist standpoint. Moreover, the Declaration was a rallying cry for Latin American solidarity; Castro stressed that the Cuban leadership supported the notion of a pan-Latin American struggle against oppression.

For the purposes of this study, the Declaration provides an interesting, if implicit, illustration of the leadership’s *guerrillerista* discourse in the early years of the Revolution. What is more, given that this address was directed both at the Cuban

population and an external audience, the Declaration is also illustrative of a *foquista* rhetoric. As discussed in Chapter One, the idea that *foquismo* was invoked as a means of mobilisation becomes relevant when one refers to the leadership's efforts to incite revolution abroad, particularly in Latin America. This was one such effort, described by Domínguez as 'the first formal call for Revolution in the hemisphere' (Domínguez 1978, 27).

In the opening line of the 'First Declaration of Havana' there was an indirect allusion to Guevara's *foco* theory, or at least the very process of guerrilla warfare carried out by the Ejército Rebelde. Castro stated:

Junto a la imagen y el recuerdo de José Martí, en Cuba, Territorio Libre de América, el pueblo, en uso de las potestades inalienables que dimanán del efectivo ejercicio de la soberanía, expresada en el sufragio directo, universal y público, se ha constituido en Asamblea General Nacional (Castro 1960b, 346).

In this statement, it was the reference to Cuba as the 'Territorio Libre de América' which contained apparent connotations of *guerrillerismo*. The idea of the 'Territorio Libre' can be traced back to the insurrectionary phase of the Cuban Revolution during which Castro's headquarters, La Comandancia de La Plata in the Sierra Maestra, was designated as the first 'free territory' of Cuba. Thus, by referring to Cuba as the free territory of the Americas, one might argue that Castro's intention, conscious or not, was to forge a direct correlation between the guerrilla struggle and the situation in which Cuba found itself at the time of this speech. In other words, Castro aimed to present Cuba's new-found sovereignty as being the first step in the continent-wide revolution for which the Declaration called; to elucidate further, one could say that Castro here was in some ways implying that Cuba was the first *foco* of the Latin American revolution.

When considered in terms of discourse analysis, Castro achieved the effect of placing the Latin American struggle within a *guerrillista* framework through the use of presupposition. Presuppositions, according to Fairclough, are 'propositions which are taken by the producer of the text as already established or 'given'' (Fairclough 1992, 120). This rhetorical device can have a manipulative effect on the receiver of the text; Fairclough asserts that presupposition can provide text producers with:

a rather effective means of manipulating audiences through attributing to their experience things which they want to get them to accept. Because the propositions concerned are not made explicit, it is sometimes difficult for people to identify them and, if they wish to, reject them. So presuppositions can be (...) sincere or manipulative. But presuppositions can also have ideological functions, when what they assume has the character of 'common sense in the service of power' (Fairclough 1989, 154).

In the statement in question, Castro assumed that his audience would have sufficient knowledge of the events of the Cuban Revolution to immediately recognise the parallels drawn between Cuba's position in the continent at that time and the declaration of the first free territory within the island's shores; this recognition would therefore have likely led to an awareness of the underlying metaphor of Cuba as the first *foco* of the Latin American revolution. It could be argued that this 'general appeal to "background knowledge"' (Fairclough 1989, 154) had an ideological function in that it sought, through its indirect historical reference, to promote armed struggle in the Cuban mould that would produce further free territories in the Americas, or, in *foquista* terms, additional *focos*. It conveyed an image of Cuba as being at the vanguard of the continent's struggle against imperialism/despotism; this idea of vanguardism was central to Guevara's guerrilla warfare methodology. For the Cuban audience, the idea that Cuba was at the helm of revolutionary struggle might have been empowering; it implied a strength to the Revolution, and was likely intended to inspire pride in the Cuban people, thereby encouraging mobilisation.

That said, one must take into account the reception of the speech by an audience external to Cuba. While the victory of the Cuban Revolution was a seminal event in Latin American history, foreign observers may not have been as knowledgeable as the average Cuban with regard to the specific events of the insurrectionary phase (Cuban citizens, in contrast, would likely have known of the Comandancia de La Plata at the time of its designation as the country's first free territory). With this in mind, a non-Cuban may not have understood the intertextual reference, and therefore the *foquista* implications. However, the statement may still have contributed to the representation of Cuba as synonymous with the notion of a 'free territory', one that is not dominated nor constrained by an exogenous hegemonic power. The potential synonymy of Cuba and 'free territory' is partly created through what Fairclough terms 'rewording' (Fairclough 1989, 113). Castro made it clear that Cuba should henceforth be equated with this concept of a 'free territory', and that the two terms were interchangeable.

This idea of a 'free territory' might have also suggested defiance in the face of increasing hostility from the United States; it conveyed the message that it did not need to maintain economic or diplomatic relations with its North American neighbour provided it had its freedom/sovereignty. In this way, the Cuban leadership did not seem to be projecting an image of a nation besieged, but rather one that revelled in its independence and increasing isolation. The leaders appeared to be asserting that, in standing apart from its neighbours, the country was in prime position to assume the role of the vanguard of the Latin American revolution.

Castro's assertion of a 'Territorio Libre de América' fits the pattern of the way in which presuppositions are cued in text. One feature of the inclusion of presuppositions is the subordinate clause, which was employed in this example (Fairclough 1989, 154). Similarly, the very first clause (also subordinate) of the Declaration, 'Junto a la imagen y el recuerdo de José Martí', contained a presupposition, albeit of a more explicit nature; we can place this technique of using presuppositions under the more general heading of intertextuality (Fairclough 1989, 155). In this instance, Castro made a direct intertextual reference to an historical Cuban figure, José Martí, and, as with the previous example, presupposed that the audience was aware of his historical significance. Once again, the average Cuban citizen would have been fully cognisant of Martí's role in Cuban history and his ongoing legacy, both prior to and following the events of the Revolution. Martí was, and continues to be, considered the 'Apóstol' of Cuban independence and is one of the key, if not principal, symbols of the tradition of national struggle, or *lucha*. Thus, by referencing Martí here, and therefore suggesting a link between Martí's struggle and that of the Revolution, Castro attempted to confer historical legitimacy upon this speech, and upon the actions of the revolutionary leadership in general. The fact that the intertextual reference was made without introduction presupposed a shared national history with the audience, that history itself being a fundamental component of *cubanía*. The effect of this reference might therefore have been to conflate the *lucha* carried out in the Cuban Revolution with that of Martí and the country's pre-existing tradition of *lucha*. Moreover, if we accept that the rewording of Cuba as 'Territorio Libre' connoted a *guerrillera* struggle, then the juxtaposition of these two intertextual references had the effect of portraying *guerrillerismo* as a new form of *lucha* which could be placed in the same tradition as that of Martí. Castro's

attempt to evoke parallels between Martí's mission and that of the Revolution was aided by the manipulation of syntax in the opening statement. While the clauses regarding Martí and 'Territorio Libre' were subordinate, the main clause being 'en Cuba (...) el pueblo (...) se ha constituido en Asamblea General Nacional', they were foregrounded, thereby increasing their impact upon the audience.

In addition to serving as an early illustration of *guerrillerismo* in Castro's discourse, the 'First Declaration of Havana' also contains evidence which both supports and refutes the notion that a 'siege mentality' was encouraged by the leadership. Castro seemed to alternate between attempting to create an atmosphere of siege and promoting a sense of confident defiance. In some respects, it would appear that Castro intended to create the impression that Cuba, and, indeed, the rest of Latin America, was in danger of being attacked by the United States. Castro spoke of the 'conducta guerrillista y agresiva del Gobierno norteamericano' which 'ponen en peligro la paz y la seguridad del hemisferio del mundo' (Castro 1960b, 346). He also repeated the word 'intervención' in relation to the United States and Latin American nations; in one example, Castro purported that 'Esa intervención, afianzada en la superioridad militar (...) ha convertido (...) a nuestro América (...) en zona de explotación' (Castro 1960b, 346). Castro outlined previous 'interventions' by the United States in various Latin American countries and listed, at length, the 'crimes' committed by its government and other imperialist tyrannical nations whose 'oligarquías militares y políticas que mantienen a nuestros pueblos en la miseria, impiden su desarrollo democrático y el pleno ejercicio de su soberanía' (Castro 1960b, 348). These statements seem intended to promote the idea that there was a

very real threat posed not only by the United States but by imperialistic governments and despotism in general, and that this 'unlawful' involvement had a long history.

That said, despite this apparent threat, it does not appear that Castro wished to imply that Cuba was isolated, nor that it was in danger of being 'besieged'. Rather, there is a definite tone of defiance in this speech, and a sense that Cuba was standing in solidarity with the rest of Latin America, in addition to the Soviet Union and China.

Castro contended:

La Asamblea General Nacional del Pueblo declara, que la ayuda espontáneamente ofrecida por la Unión Soviética a Cuba en caso de que nuestro país fuera atacado por fuerzas militares imperialistas (...) constituye un evidente acto de solidaridad (...) brindada a Cuba ante un inminente ataque del Pentágono yanqui (Castro 1960b, 347).

The use of derogatory rewording of the United States government such as 'Pentágono yanqui', and the incorporation of lexical sets relating to criminality and despotism, had the ideological effect of casting the island's North American neighbours as the enemy and of attaching overtly negative connotations to the United States administration. The Cuban Revolution, conversely, was described in terms of 'dignidad', 'libertad', 'derechos' and 'soberanía', in addition to the repeated phrase we saw earlier, 'Territorio Libre de América'. Castro's use of language reinforced the impression that Cuba had agency in the on-going hostilities with the United States. Castro made it clear that Cuba was not a passive 'sitting duck' which would allow itself to be overcome by aggression directed at it from the North. Each point in the Declaration begins with an active, declarative sentence in which Cuba is the agent; Castro vehemently pronounced that 'La Asamblea General Nacional del Pueblo de Cuba condena/declara/rechaza/ratifica' and so on. Conferring linguistic agency on the Cuban people could be read as an intentionally symbolic means of

conveying the message that the Cuban people had reclaimed ownership of their island from the hands of the United States and would not relinquish this power without a fight.

Much like the texts included in the rest of the *Manual*, the 'First Declaration of Havana' also appeared to place emphasis on collective action. In the extract selected for analysis, it was again the Cuban people as a whole who were said to have formed the General Assembly: 'el pueblo (...) se ha constituido en Asamblea General Nacional'. Elsewhere in the speech he stated: 'Desde el primero hasta el último disparo (...) desde el primero hasta el último acto de la Revolución el pueblo de Cuba ha actuado por libre y absoluta determinación propia' (Castro 1960b, 347). Again, the emphasis here was upon the actions of the Cuban people as a whole, rather than selected individuals.

This idea of individual action possessing value only within a collective was perhaps illustrative of the principles that underpinned the *foco* theory. The theory posited that the subjective conditions for revolution could be engendered through the creation of the initial isolated nucleus, the *foco*. While this first *foco* had to be isolated, its wider aim was to produce additional *focos* with which it could form a network and, eventually, combine into a large force powerful enough to overthrow the enemy. Thus, a key characteristic of the theory was the notion that the isolated nucleus could only be effective once it formed part of a collective of *focos*. In the 1960 *Manual*, it would seem that this notion was applied to the individual Cuban citizen who was projected as something of a microcosm of the *foco* warfare process. The underlying message appears to be that there was a necessity for the subjective will to act on an

individual level, but that this action would only be effective if it was realised within a collective.

A comparable message was conveyed in another of Fidel Castro's seminal speeches from the early years of the Revolution in power, his 'Second Declaration of Havana' delivered in Havana's Plaza de la Revolución on February 4 1962. Unlike the relatively more constrained rhetoric of the 'First Declaration', in this speech Castro did not hold back in illustrating his unbridled hatred of North American imperialism; additionally, the tone was one of undoubted militancy, an unambiguous provocation to the people of Latin America to take up arms in the name of liberty. The overarching message of the Declaration was one of subjective will, of creating one's own subjective conditions in which to produce revolution, as had been outlined in Guevara's *La Guerra de Guerrillas*, published two years earlier. Moreover, Castro was adamant that, not only should action be taken immediately, but it should follow the armed path. In other words, the speech endorsed a *foquista* mode of action for burgeoning revolutionary movements across the continent.

Similar to the 'First Declaration', José Martí was mentioned in the very first line of the 'Second Declaration'; in this instance, however, Castro employed a more 'manifest intertextuality', whereby he quoted directly from a letter written by Martí shortly before his death in 1895 (Fairclough 1992, 117). Once again, presupposition was at work in the way Castro took it for granted that his audience would need little introduction to this letter, nor to Martí as an historical figure. With respect to *guerrillerismo*, the following lines from Martí's letter are of interest:

ya estoy todos los días en peligro de dar mi vida por mi país, y por mi deber...de impedir a tiempo con la independencia de Cuba que se extendían por las Antillas de los Estados Unidos y caigan, con esa fuerza más, sobre nuestras tierras de América (Castro 1962, 127).

The reference to *deber* mentioned here echoed its inclusion in the 'First Declaration'. As already discussed, in the previous declaration it would seem that Castro intended to draw parallels between Cuba's history of *lucha* and the struggle to defend the Revolution at the time of his speaking; that link he attempted to forge through the seamless juxtaposition of 'Martí' and 'Territorio Libre'. By opening the second declaration with an allusion to *deber*, Castro was proposing that this notion of 'duty', and *lucha* more generally, to defend Cuba's independence was still relevant for the situation in which Cuba found itself in 1962; that is, increasingly isolated in world politics and facing direct attacks from US-sponsored operations, such as the Bay of Pigs invasion the previous year. Furthermore, by introducing the idea of *deber* from the outset, Castro was promoting the idea that it was a 'duty' and, therefore, not a choice, for Cubans to defend the Revolution; it was a necessary act if Cubans wanted to continue in the tradition of Martí, the national hero.

Later in the speech, Castro uttered one of his most famous lines: 'El deber de todo revolucionario es hacer la revolución' (Castro 1962, 169). Here, he again returned to the notion of *deber*, yet this time he explicitly stated that it was the duty of each revolutionary to produce the revolution; put differently, this statement placed weight upon subjective will, on a 'voluntaristic' approach to Revolution, on the importance of the actions of each individual in sustaining, or, with regard to the rest of Latin America, producing the Revolution. With this stress on voluntarism in mind, one can argue that there is an unambiguously *guerrillera* element to this statement. As

outlined in Chapter One, one of Guevara's principal tenets of the *foco* theory concerned the individual's application of his/her will-power to create the subjective conditions in which revolution could be produced. To reiterate, Guevara concluded that: 'No siempre hay que esperar a que se den todas las condiciones para la revolución; el foco insurreccional puede desarrollar condiciones subjetivas sobre la base de las condiciones objetivas dadas' (Guevara 2006, 13).

Castro's point was made all the more clear by the use of a declarative sentence which contained no subordinate clauses which might have obscured the message he wished to convey. Additionally, the use of the determiner 'todo' further underlined the individual subjectivity of revolutionary action. Parallels can be drawn here between another of Castro's statements, included in his 1960 'Acta de la segunda independencia', considered earlier: 'La democracia cubana le da a cada cubano algo más; la democracia cubana le da a cada cubano un fusil para defender sus derechos y para defender a su Patria' (1960, 342). What is more, the implicit intertextuality, whereby Castro referred back to the earlier use of *deber* in the quote from Martí, without signposting its use as such, could be read as an attempt to create a conceptual link between the *lucha* of Martí and that of the revolutionary in the early 1960s; he could be seen to have been inculcating the idea that the 'duty' of the Cuban citizen was to continue with the *lucha* begun by Martí, only it would be a new kind of *lucha*, one that involved the 'subjective conditions' specific to the *foco* theory. This endeavour to place the past in the present was compounded by the way in which the text jumped back and forth in time; Castro seamlessly juxtaposed historical events, issues contemporaneous to his speech and a redemptive future created by mass revolution. This confusion of temporalities blurred the lines between past, present

and future, thus creating the effect that the events of each era belonged to the same tradition of *lucha*. However, in spite of the frequent shift in tenses, cohesion was produced through techniques such as the intertextual reference to words or phrases used at an earlier point within the text.

There are other numerous instances in the speech in which a *guerrillista* element to Castro's rhetoric was readily discernible. As an illustration, Castro referred directly to the subjective conditions necessary for fomenting a successful revolution: 'Las condiciones subjetivas de cada país — es decir, el factor conciencia, organización, dirección — pueden acelerar o retrasar la revolución según su mayor o menor grado de desarrollo' (Castro 1962, 140). Similarly, there were several examples where emphasis was placed upon the importance of subjective will, on the idea that revolutionaries could 'make' the revolution. For instance, in response to foreign critics who had accused Cuba of exporting its revolution overseas, Castro retorted: 'las revoluciones no se exportan, las hacen los pueblos' (...) ¿Y qué enseña la Revolución Cubana? Que la revolución es posible, que los pueblos pueden hacerla' (Castro 1962, 163). Later in the speech he attested: 'Pero esta lucha, más que aquella, la harán las masas, la harán los pueblos' (Castro 1962, 170). As in the 'First Declaration of Havana', however, these latter statements reveal that, while there was a marked stress upon subjective will in this speech, the necessity of producing action as part of a collective was the overriding message. Castro was clearly stating that it was the Cuban *pueblo* as a united whole, and not the individual, who would bring about revolutionary change, as demonstrated in the phrase 'la harán las masas, la harán los pueblos'.

There were also references to the isolated nucleus and the vanguard, both key tenets of the *foco* theory. Castro alluded to ‘la lucha inicial de reducidos núcleos combatientes’, before uttering the following statement: ‘¿Qué es lo que desde el comienzo mismo de la lucha de esos primeros núcleos los hace invencibles, independientemente del número, el poder y los recursos de sus enemigos? El apoyo del pueblo’ (Castro 1962, 166). Concerning the vanguard, Castro contended:

La actual correlación mundial de fuerzas, y el movimiento universal de liberación de los pueblos coloniales y dependientes, señalan a la clase obrera y a los intelectuales revolucionarios de América Latina su verdadero papel, que es el de situarse resueltamente a la vanguardia de la lucha contra el imperialismo y el feudalismo (Castro 1962, 167).

Similar to the ‘First Declaration of Havana’, the ‘Second Declaration’ also brought to the fore the question of ‘siege mentality’. As might be expected from the more militant ‘Second Declaration of Havana’, the tone of defiance was more explicit than in the previous Declaration, and was evident from the outset. Indeed, the final line of Martí’s letter, which was quoted at the beginning of the speech, read ‘mi honda es la de David’ (Castro 1962, 128). The biblical metaphor invoked was an undoubtedly defiant statement which suggested that, though smaller in size, Cuba had the strength and courage to triumph in a confrontation with the United States. Castro uttered similar proclamations of fearlessness at other stages in the speech:

En aquel cónclave inmoral, la voz titánica de Cuba se elevó sin debilidad ni miedo para acusar ante todos los pueblos de América y del mundo el monstruoso atentado, y defender virilmente, y con dignidad que constará en los anales de la historia, no solo el derecho de Cuba, sino el derecho desamparado de todas las naciones hermanas del continente Americano (Castro 1962, 147).

He also declared that, rather than Latin America, it was the imperialists who were living in fear: ‘No el miedo a la Revolución Cubana; el miedo a la revolución

latinoamericana (...) el miedo a que los pueblos saqueados del continente arrebatasen las armas a sus opresoras y se declaren, como Cuba, pueblos libres de América' (Castr 1962, 137). Castro attempted to create the impression that there was great solidarity between the revolutionary people of Latin America and that their combined strength would be powerful enough to overcome imperialist aggression. Cuba was presented as being far from isolated, instead assuming its role at the vanguard of a larger continent-wide movement. In this way, a 'siege mentality' was far from being promoted at this stage, despite the physical invasion of Cuba during the Bay of Pigs operation the previous year.

That is not to say, however, that Castro did not acknowledge the threat posed by the United States. In contrast, he actively sought to build a climate of fear. For instance, he listed the numerous 'crimes' committed by the US against Cuba since the Revolution had come to power:

Cuba ha vivido tres años de Revolución bajo incesante hostigamiento de intervención yanqui en nuestros asuntos internos. Aviones piratas, procedentes de Estados Unidos, lanzando materias inflamables, han quemado millones de arrobas de caña; actos de sabotaje internacional perpetrados por agentes yanquis, como la explosión del vapor La Coubre, han costado decenas de vidas cubanas; miles de armas norteamericanas de todo tipo han sido lanzadas en paracaídas por los servicios militares de Estados Unidos sobre nuestro territorio para promover la subversión (Castro 1962, 149/150).

The asyndetic listing employed here, which continued for some time, accentuated the multiplicity of the 'crimes' committed by the US against Cuba and therefore highlighted the very real danger that Cuba was facing. Moreover, Castro spoke of the 'terrorist' attacks carried out against Latin America as a whole:

Las misiones militares norteamericanas en América Latina constituyen un aparato de espionaje permanente en cada nación (...) Es notorio que las embajadas yanquis en distintos países de América Latina están organizando, instruyendo y equipando bandas

fascistas para sembrar el terror y agredir las organizaciones obreras, estudiantiles e intelectuales (Castro 1962, 142/143).

Castro seemed to be equating Cuba with the rest of Latin America in terms of the threat posed by US aggression; in this way, Cuba was not projected as being isolated but as part of an entire continent that lived in peril. Castro proclaimed that:

Ningún pueblo de América Latina es débil, porque forma parte de una familia de 200 millones de hermanos que padecen las mismas miserias (...) tienen el mismo enemigo (...) y cuentan con la solidaridad de todos los hombres y mujeres honrados del mundo entero (Castro 1962, 169/170).

With regard to taking a stand against this threat, however, Cuba asserted its role as the defiant vanguard of all Latin America.

Castro's Declarations of Havana were deliberately incendiary and, as briefly discussed in the opening pages of this chapter, constituted a specific type of 'speech act', one that was necessarily ideologically charged. In contrast, written texts, such as the *Manual de Capacitación Cívica*, though also reflecting and communicating the ideology of the leadership, tend to be less explicit in their intent to shape the consciousness of the reader. In such texts, the indications of *guerrillista* discourse are perhaps less conspicuous and are thus reliant on the inference of the text recipient.

This characteristic is true of another written text published in the 1960s by the revolutionary government: *Historia de Cuba: Curso de Superación para Maestros (Tomo 1)* (1964). This text was produced by the Ministerio de Educación for 'Maestros Populares y de Vanguardia' to furnish them with a solid understanding of Cuban history. As stated in the Introduction to the text, it aimed to provide 'una

visión panorámica de la evolución de la sociedad cubana desde su etapa inicial de comunidad primitiva, hasta el momento actual de tránsito al socialismo' (*Historia* 1964, 7). The short history 'course' is divided into sections that outline different stages in Cuba's history, from the Spanish 'conquest' up until the War of Independence of 1895. These outlines offer somewhat basic overviews of their respective periods, with central figures and events singled out for additional explanation. At the end of each chapter, key questions are posed to the reader (i.e. the trainee teacher) to aid them in identifying these figures and events.

This text has been selected for closer inspection in light of Foucault's contention that government institutions support the circulation of statements which are taken to be 'true' in a given society. The publication of the book by the Ministerio de Educación suggests that the statements contained within were consistent with the ideas and 'truths' put forward by the leadership, such as the *guerrillista* statements uttered by Fidel Castro in the speeches already discussed. Moreover, it takes into account Foucault's belief that, 'Every educational system is a political means of maintaining or of modifying the appropriation of discourse, with the knowledge and the powers it carries with it' (Foucault 1971, 156). In other words, education is one of the ways by which certain statements can 'transform' into 'common-sense-knowledge' (Mills 2003, 74). This is particularly true of history books which can present a version of events that corresponds with and supports the values and beliefs promoted by the leadership; the re-telling of history is an effective means by which certain statements or ideas can be perpetuated, while other ('false') statements or versions of events are excluded. That this text was aimed at primary school teachers renders it more

interesting still as a source for analysis, in that its version of history was also indirectly aimed at educating young people via their teachers.

Although this edition presented a version of Cuba's historical narrative up to 1895 only, there are numerous instances in which it is possible to detect elements of *guerrillerismo*. Indeed, what becomes immediately clear from an analysis of the text is that there seems to have been a conscious attempt to convey an image of a tradition of rebellion through the writing of this particular historical narrative. This tradition, as created in the text, stretched back not just to the wars of independence of the 1800s, which are often cited as precursors to the insurrection of the Revolution, but to the seventeenth century. The text stated that, while Spain enjoyed great financial gain from the exploitation of its colonies in the 1600s:

Cuba, aislada, va gestando una tradición de rebeldía, se van acentuando sus contradicciones. El siglo XVIII ofrecerá un panorama distinto pero en estas oscuras épocas de los primeros siglos coloniales se irá creando silenciosamente, a través de las sangres distintas que fluyen por la misma vena, una tradición de rebeldía, de independencia, de coraje y un impulso hacia la cultura y la superación de los marcos limitados de la colonia (*Historia* 1964, 83).

This assertion that the seeds of a 'tradición de rebeldía' were being sown some three-hundred years prior to the guerrilla struggle of the Sierra Maestra served to strengthen the already established notion of a tradition of *lucha*. While *guerrillerismo* was not necessarily connoted by this citation, it most certainly overlaps, in the same way as *lucha*, with the concept of 'rebeldía'.

A more obvious illustration of *guerrillerista* discourse was apparent in the section of the book which briefly profiled the well-known Cuban intellectual of the colonial period, Félix Varela. Varela was described in the text as 'El más notable exponente

de la lucha revolucionaria del Siglo XIX antes de 1868' and, in quoting the historian Roig de Leuchsenring, 'el primer intelectual revolucionario cubano' (*Historia* 1964, 139). In summing up his political thought, it was stated that one of Varela's essential principles was:

Que no era recomendable que se esperase en la Isla a la fructificación de los proyectos revolucionarios en favor nuestro de otros pueblos recientemente emancipados, sino que la revolución debía fomentarse y desenvolverse dentro de Cuba y por el propio y único esfuerzo de los cubanos (*Historia* 1964, 141).

The contention that Varela did not believe Cuba should wait until a more propitious time to launch a revolution is quite obviously consistent with one of Guevara's key precepts: that one should not wait until the 'objective conditions' for revolution were in place, but should instead rely on 'subjective conditions', or the subjective will of revolutionaries. This latter point in particular was reflected in the final phrase of the citation, 'la revolución debía fomentarse y desenvolverse dentro de Cuba y por el propio y único esfuerzo de los cubanos' (*Historia* 1964, 141). Again, Varela's political thought was portrayed as having been compatible with that of Guevara, but it also conformed to the overarching message being transmitted in the hegemonic discourse of the time; as has already been discussed in the analysis, in the first decade in power, the revolutionary leadership seemed intent on emphasising that it was the Cuban *pueblo* who had defeated Batista, and whose actions would determine the fate of the Revolution in power. This message was further reinforced in this text through the incorporation of such phrases as 'por el propio y único esfuerzo de los cubanos', where the inclusion of the adjective 'propio' further highlighted the notion that only the Cubans themselves had the power to create a revolution in Cuba.

There are other instances in the text in which heroic figures from Cuba's history are portrayed as having held views on revolutionary action which were aligned with Guevara's, and with *guerrillerismo* more generally. When describing the independence campaign led by Carlos Manuel de Céspedes in 1868, the text read:

Sólo doce hombres quedaron con Céspedes. "Aún quedan doce hombres, bastan para hacer la independencia de Cuba", afirmó el jefe de la revolución. No sería la última vez que con doce hombres se iniciara la lucha de todo un pueblo (*Historia* 1964, 180).<sup>34</sup>

It is the phrase attributed to Céspedes which is of interest here; it proposed that Céspedes claimed that a force of just twelve men was sufficient to win the war of independence. This idea that a numerically inferior side could win a war against a much larger enemy was, of course, consistent with Guevara's *aportación* that 'Las fuerzas populares pueden ganar una guerra contra el ejército', and with his notion that an initial *foco* of just a handful of men could foment revolution. Moreover, the allusion to 'doce hombres' was linked to the myth of the twelve survivors of the *Granma* landing, mentioned earlier, as suggested in 'No sería la última vez que con doce hombres se iniciara la lucha de todo un pueblo'. The text producer assumed that the contemporary Cuban reader would have been aware of the significance associated with *los doce*, and therefore chose not to spell it out as such; one can therefore argue that this mention of 'doce hombres' constitutes another example of presupposition.

The intended function of attaching this myth to Céspedes was clearly to draw parallels between the struggle of the Ten Years' War and that of the Cuban

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<sup>34</sup> Carlos Manuel de Céspedes was one of the leading figures in Cuba's Ten Years' War of 1868-1878. A plantation owner from Eastern Cuba, Céspedes heralded the start of the War with his *Grito de Yara* in October 1868, before freeing his slaves and co-ordinating the rebellion against the colonial Spanish government (Thomas 1998, 245-247). He was later killed by Spanish forces in 1874.

Revolution in its insurrectionary phase. The use of quotation marks guided the reader to believe that Céspedes himself uttered such a *guerrillista* statement, thereby legitimising it to a certain extent. Such punctuation was intended to suggest manifest intertextuality, yet there is no certainty that he uttered these exact words as the source is not provided. Still, the overall effect was to imply that Céspedes' strategies for fomenting revolution in 1868 were not far removed from those employed by the *Granma* survivors, and therefore formed part of, or laid the foundations for, the tradition of guerrilla struggle in Cuba.

As stated earlier in the analysis of Castro's 1 January 1959 speech, the allusion to the myth of *los doce* recurred in the Revolution's hegemonic discourse throughout the 1960s and, as the evidence presented in the next chapter will confirm, in the early 1970s. These periodic references to the myth of *los doce* can be considered 'cohesive markers', if one is to view the various texts produced on (or simply referring to) Cuban history in the Revolution's first decade as a single historical narrative (Fairclough 1992, 177). In other words, repeatedly returning to the same myth added cohesion to the historical narrative (and the hegemonic discourse), insofar as an image was created of an unchanged, and eventually effective, approach to revolution which had been tried and tested over the previous hundred years of struggle for independence. This approach was that of having the courage to continue with a revolutionary programme despite a lack of resources and a vastly superior enemy in terms of the number of combatants, which is, in essence, the ethos of *guerrillerismo*.

As a result of the repeated references, 'doce hombres' could also be identified as a presupposition, in the sense that its meaning was viewed by the text producer as a 'given', something readily identifiable and understood by a Cuban text recipient. Presuppositions might also be considered a form of intertextuality, whereby they constitute a means of incorporating other texts. As Fairclough has pointed out, from the intertextual perspective of presupposition, these other texts are not specific texts but rather 'a more nebulous 'text' corresponding to public opinion (what people tend to say, accumulated textual experience)' (Fairclough 1992, 121). This 'accumulated textual experience' is tantamount to the historical narrative articulated by the hegemonic discourse of the Revolution in power.

Continuing with the idea of the myth of the 'doce hombres' as a presupposition, its accompanying message would thus have constituted 'background knowledge' or 'common sense' to the average Cuban (Fairclough 1989, 154). The use of presuppositions in this way can be said to have a manipulative effect; if the text recipient cannot identify them as such, they cannot, therefore, be rejected (Fairclough 1989, 154). What is more, and to employ Fairclough's words, such examples of subtle manipulation suppose 'interpreting subjects with particular prior textual experiences and assumptions, and in so doing they contribute to the ideological constitution of subjects' (Fairclough 1992, 121). This latter point rings particularly true in the case of the myth of the 'doce hombres'; this presupposition aimed to inculcate *guerrillerismo* onto its 'interpreting subjects', the Cuban people, whereby they were repeatedly reminded of the potential of the underdog to emerge triumphant, without the message being spelled out as such. This lesson had the

potential to be internalised by the average Cuban, thus forming part of his or her 'ideological constitution'.

The concept that revolution could be won through a reliance on subjective factors is evident elsewhere in the text. Concerning Ignacio Agramonte's role in the Ten Years' War, the text stated:<sup>35</sup>

Pronto se hizo sentir en Camagüey la presencia de Agramonte y aunque escaseaban los recursos, la moral era firme. Un oficial de Agramonte que no podía comprender su fe le preguntó:

-Pero, General, "Con qué recursos cuenta Ud. para continuar la guerra? — "Con la vergüenza de los cubanos", fue la respuesta del Mayor (*Historia* 1964, 195).

As before with the citation attributed to Céspedes, the quotation marks in this extract were intended to imply that manifest intertextuality had been employed; that is, that these were Agramonte's own words. Again, as the source of the citation is not given, it is impossible to confirm whether this is true. The reader was told that, while 'escaseaban los recursos', Agramonte felt he could depend on the outrage of the Cuban people. Thus, once more, the message was relayed that material resources were not as important as the will of the people to continue in the struggle.

A similar message was expressed in the following citation which referred to the perspective of the Spanish forces in the independence struggle of 1868-1878: 'Los españoles no se atreverían en lo adelante a salir al campo en pequeñas columnas. Sabían que los cubanos, apenas sin armas, contaban con dos factores poderosos: la sorpresa en el ataque y el valor en la lucha' (*Historia* 1964, 197). Once again, the paucity of weaponry on the side of the revolutionaries was underlined, as

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<sup>35</sup> Ignacio Agramonte was a central protagonist and military strategist in the Cuban rebel forces in the Ten Years' War.

demonstrated in 'los cubanos, apenas sin armas'. What is more, the tactics of the revolutionaries of the Ten Years' War were described in such a way as to highlight their conformity to Guevara's strategies for guerrilla warfare. The proposal that the *independentistas* had 'sorpresa' as a tactical advantage paralleled one of Guevara's propositions regarding guerrilla warfare: 'Naturalmente, su inferioridad numérica hace muy necesario que los ataques sean siempre por sorpresa, esa es la gran ventaja, es lo que permite al guerrillero hacer bajas al enemigo sin sufrir pérdidas' (Guevara 2006, 27). As with the earlier citation attributed to Céspedes, the correlation between the style of warfare employed in the Ten Years' War and that advocated by Guevara was intentionally highlighted in order to further reinforce the impression that Cuba had a long-standing tradition of a specifically *guerrillera* struggle.

The citations examined from this edition of *Historia de Cuba* seem to substantiate the aforementioned proposal that, where speeches are perhaps more explicit vehicles for transmitting an ideology, the messages contained within texts that do not, at least ostensibly, have a political function are more implicit and must be inferred by the reader. Moreover, and as has been made clear in the discussion on presupposition, there is the potential for the reader to understand and possibly internalise a message without realising they are doing so. In this way, the inculcation of an ideology, or of certain values, might be more effective than direct appeals to the consciousness of the text recipient. Furthermore, while texts such as *Historia de Cuba* have a didactic function, they are also inherently ideological; the telling, or re-telling, of history as guided by any political power is always necessarily ideological, insofar as the historical narrative is shaped in such a way as to be consistent with the ideology of the leadership. This assertion certainly appears to ring true with regard to this edition

of *Historia de Cuba*, in which the presentation of history allowed for the creation of a tradition of *guerrillerismo*. This tradition afforded historical legitimacy to the revolutionary leadership's continued promotion of the guerrilla ethos in the 1960s: guerrilla struggle was presented as something inherently Cuban which the Cuban people had a duty to perpetuate. The representation of history under the Revolution in power can be considered a form of 'discursive rearticulation', in that the existing historical narrative was rewritten to meet the needs of those in charge (Fairclough 1992, 93). In other words, this rearticulation formed part of the struggle for hegemony of the revolutionary leadership, and, specifically, those within the leadership who had lived the guerrilla experience.

As the first decade in power progressed, more tangibly *guerrillerista* concepts continued to be dispersed in the speeches given on behalf of the leadership. As a case in point, the concept of 'subjective conditions' remained a recognisable feature of the hegemonic discourse. An illustration of the recurrent referral to Guevara's idea can be found in Fidel Castro's 2 January speech 1965, the sixth anniversary of the Revolution. Castro was keen to underline the increase in the revolutionary consciousness of the Cuban people that had occurred since 1959. He declared that, since the onset of the Revolution in power, 'los factores subjetivos han aumentado considerablemente, el pueblo que hoy es un pueblo mucho más organizado, mucho más revolucionario, mucho más preparado, no hay la menor duda' (Castro 1965, 183).

Here, Castro was attempting to convince his audience that, in spite of imperialist aggression and a lack of resources, the voluntarism of the *pueblo* was what counted

in terms of the Revolution's survival. Interestingly, Castro, as with his mention of 'condiciones subjetivas' in the 'Second Declaration of Havana', did not deem it necessary to pinpoint what he meant by subjective conditions. Rather, he assumed that his audience would be able to identify readily this concept; that is, one of producing Revolution based on the subjective will of the participating revolutionaries. This citation therefore constituted another instance of Castro's use of presupposition, of a 'general appeal to "background knowledge"'. Once again, the employment of the technique appears to have been a tacit but effective means of communicating *guerrillerismo* to the audience; Castro was able to promote the ideas and precepts of the 'heroic guerrilla', without referencing Guevara directly, nor his *foco* theory. Furthermore, it is an intertextual presupposition yet, unlike the earlier example of the 'doce hombres', the notion of 'subjective conditions' does not constitute a reference to a 'nebulous text', but a specific and well-known work authored by the heroic guerrilla himself, the very embodiment of *guerrillerismo*.

The 1965 Anniversary speech also highlighted the idiosyncratic nature of the leadership's methods of governance. Castro stated:

Nuestro país no se ha apresurado en crear instituciones formales. Realmente somos alérgicos al formalismo. Estamos apegados a instituciones esenciales, preferimos no crear algo, a crear algo con un carácter exclusivamente formal, o formalista (Castro 1965, 187).

Castro's statements in this extract revealed the somewhat unsystematic approach to the organisation of the revolutionary government in the first decade of power, insofar as he admitted that there had been no rush to establish formal institutions up to that point. This somewhat arbitrary approach to the organisation of the Revolution contradicts the picture of a system highly militarised from the outset, as painted by

academics such as Dumont and Bunck, whose work in this area was outlined in the Introduction, Castro's words implied a more *guerrillista* approach to revolutionary governance, one which did not intend to maintain the institutions established before the Revolution, or to copy models put in place outside of Cuba. As was characteristic of his speeches at the time, Castro referred to the tasks of the Revolution as being the responsibility of the collective. Government was not the job of the chosen few, but of those that had won the Revolution and were now in power: the Cuban people. This stance was presented in the personification of Cuba; the country was the subject of the opening sentence and was therefore granted agency in creation of institutions. The inclusion of the possessive pronoun 'nuestro' in 'Nuestro país no se ha apresurado en crear instituciones formales', effectively conflated the actions of the country and the Cuban people, or at least afforded the *pueblo* ownership of the Revolution's actions up to that point. The subsequent use of the first person plural in 'somos', 'estamos', and 'preferimos' further compounded this idea of collective decision-making.

However, despite claiming a metaphorical allergy to *formalismo*, Castro went on to stress that it was time for a change in attitude, arguing in favour of a more practical approach. He purported:

En los años próximos debemos crear nuestras instituciones estatales, y debemos crear nuestras instituciones locales (...) Es necesario que empecemos a preocuparnos por estas cuestiones. Es necesario que nos preocupemos por resolver estos problemas. Es necesario que avancemos en el terreno práctico y avancemos también en el desarrollo de las ideas (Castro 1965, 187).

This appeal for a more pragmatic, structured approach to revolutionary governance is consistent with the views of the majority of the authors who have written on the

militarisation of the Revolution. As outlined in the Introduction, many scholars have argued that the Cuban Revolution underwent a transformation in the late 1960s, whereby there was a noticeable shift towards greater organisation based on a military model. Yet an examination of Castro's well known closing speech of the 1967 OLAS conference, delivered on 10 August in Havana, reveals that, far from moving towards 'militarism', the Cuban revolutionary leadership remained committed to a promotion of both *guerillerismo* and *foquismo*.<sup>36</sup> Much like the First and Second Declarations of Havana, the promotion of revolutionary action was still very much a principal theme of the OLAS discourse. Castro continued to criticise imperialism while underlining the supposed inevitability of a Latin American revolution. This latter point had the added intention of reaffirming that Havana would not adhere to Moscow's policy of 'peaceful coexistence', despite its ideological and economic links with the Soviet Union.

Given the speech's projected message, it is perhaps unsurprising that it included frequent, direct references to the guerrilla struggle and the importance of the guerrilla vanguard, the armed nucleus, subjective conditions/will and, above all, *lucha*. Castro talked of 'La importancia de la guerrilla, el papel de vanguardia de la guerrilla (...)' 'La guerrilla está llamada a ser el núcleo fundamental del movimiento revolucionario' (Castro, 1967). There are several instances in which Castro outlined a guerrilla process of revolutionary warfare, although he did not refer to it as such. As an illustration, when describing the civil rights movements in the United States, Castro attested: 'Eso demuestra que muchas veces el movimiento puede comenzar primero que el programa'. Later, he stressed the necessity of action over ideas:

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<sup>36</sup> Briefly mentioned in Chapter One, the OLAS was a short-lived initiative of the Cuban Revolution designed to co-ordinate the guerrilla struggle in Latin America. The 1967 meeting constituted its first and only conference.

Esto no quiere decir que la acción deba esperar el triunfo de las ideas. Este es uno de los puntos esenciales de la cuestión: los que creen que es necesario primero que las ideas triunfen en las masas antes de iniciar la acción, y los que comprenden que precisamente la acción es uno de los más eficaces instrumentos de hacer triunfar las ideas en las masas. Quienquiera que se detenga a esperar que las ideas triunfen primero en las masas, de manera mayoritaria, para iniciar la acción revolucionaria, no será jamás revolucionario (Castro, 1967).

Castro's message in this extract was deliberately clear: aspiring revolutionaries should act immediately, and ideally by following the path of the heroic guerrilla. Moreover, there was a distinct emphasis on struggle at numerous points in the speech; the speech was permeated with the word 'luchar'. A significant case in point is the following statement: 'Hay que luchar. Tenemos que luchar' (Castro, 1967). The recurrent mentions of both the guerrilla path to revolution and *lucha* might have served to conflate the two concepts in the minds of the listener; it would seem that, for Castro, the two terms were interchangeable. In this way, it is possible that Castro's intention was to promote the idea that guerrilla struggle, and the struggle of the *sierra* more specifically, was tantamount to a new form of *lucha*. It is interesting to note that, unlike in the Declarations of Havana, in this speech, there were no intertextual references to Martí or other pre-Revolution heroes from Cuban history. Rather, Castro included presuppositions relating only to the insurrectionary phase of the Revolution. This selection of historical references implies that Castro was trying to convey the message that, rather than looking to Martí as an inspiration for *lucha* and heroism, the Revolution had produced its own heroes and could serve sufficiently as the only necessary example for revolutionary struggle; by this stage, the Revolution had already created its own myths and inscribed itself in Cuban history. Castro underlined the historicity of the Revolution in the following

quotation: 'Porque nuestra Revolución tiene su historia; nuestra Revolución tiene su historia' (Castro, 1967). Here, the direct repetition accentuated his point.

In addition to projecting a message of revolutionary armed struggle, the OLAS speech remained consistent with the First and Second Declarations of Havana in its overall tone of defiance. In this way, it too sheds light on the issue of whether a siege mentality was promoted by the revolutionary leadership during the 1960s. At this point in the Revolution's trajectory, Cuba was looking ever-more isolated; even the relationship with its closest ally, the Soviet Union, was under strain owing to Cuba's continued support for armed revolutionary movements in Latin America. Yet Castro did not tone down his vehement verbal attacks against imperialism, or also the Latin American Communist Parties, particularly the Venezuelan contingent, and anyone else who did not agree that armed action was the decisive path to revolution.

Early in the speech, Castro began to incorporate intertextual references to recent news reports on CIA activity on Cuban soil. His tone was undoubtedly mocking of the inability of the Agency to cause any significant damage to the Revolution. He frequently employed rhetorical questions to highlight the issue of covert but incompetent CIA activity against Cuba. The following extract is illustrative of such questions:

¿Es que acaso tenemos que probar que el imperialismo realiza actividades subversivas contra nuestra patria? (...) ¿No es acaso una enorme ingenuidad creer que la CIA es un organismo perfecto, maravilloso, inteligentísimo, incapaz de cometer la menor pifia? ¿Pero es que acaso no hemos leído en un libro escrito precisamente por periodistas norteamericanos historias tenebrosas acerca de las decenas y decenas de estupideces y de crímenes cometidos por la CIA? (Castro, 1967).

The ironic tone in this citation aimed to undermine any threat posed by the United States in its attempts to attack the Revolution. Castro deliberately mocked the frequent failures of the CIA, thus creating the overall impression that Cuba was not in any real danger, and was far from being 'besieged'.

That said, Castro's comments later in the speech revealed that he was not trying to suggest that Cuba faced no danger from external actors. In fact, he explicitly remarked that the threat posed to Cuba was ever-present and not insignificant:

Nadie considerará que los problemas de este país son problemas fáciles; que los peligros que se ciernen sobre este país son peligros insignificantes y minúsculos. Nadie podrá disminuir las circunstancias con que este pequeño país se enfrenta resueltamente, sin vacilación de ninguna índole, en las propias puertas del más poderoso país imperialista del mundo; y no sólo el más poderoso, sino el más agresivo; y no sólo el más poderoso y agresivo, sino el más sanguinario, el más cínico, el más engreído de los poderes imperialistas del mundo (Castro, 1967).

It is notable here that Castro referred to Cuba as 'este pequeño país'; this description served to underline Cuba's geographical inferiority in comparison with the imperialist powers, and thereby its vulnerability in the face of enemy attacks. This vulnerability was further reinforced by the repetition of similar phrases such as 'un país tan pequeñito como el nuestro' (Castro, 1967). What is more, certain comments of Castro's could be read as being intentionally paranoid. He spoke of 'una verdadera conspiración internacional en contra de la Revolución Cubana', 'una verdadera conjura contra nuestra Revolución', and, later, 'una repugnante conspiración para crear un conflicto entre la Revolución Cubana y los Estados del campo socialista' (Castro, 1967). It appears that Castro's purpose was to produce fear through his talk of 'conspiracy' and covert, subversive plots taking place behind the scenes between world leaders.

Yet, as with the majority of his other speeches, Castro finished this discourse with a final proclamation of defiance. He professed:

Pero una cosa podemos decirles: que nos sentimos tranquilos, que nos sentimos seguros, y que esta pequeña isla será siempre como un peñón revolucionario de granito contra cuyas rocas se estrellarán todas las conjuras, todas las intrigas, todas las agresiones. Y que sobre ese peñón revolucionario siempre ondeará una bandera que diga: ¡Patria o Muerte! ¡Venceremos! (Castro, 1967).

Although Castro once again underscored the island's diminutive size through his reference to 'esta pequeña isla será siempre como un peñón revolucionario', his final flourish made it clear that the Revolution would triumph and would not lose its resolve to fight back.

Overall, Castro's OLAS speech supports the hypothesis that, in the late 1960s, rather than gradually becoming 'militarised', the revolutionary leadership continued to espouse the values of *guerrillerismo*. This notion is further reinforced by an analysis of another text from this period, Jorge Ibarra's 1968 article, 'Un siglo de lucha armada: una herencia bien aprendida'. The article featured in a collection of Ibarra's work, published under the title *Aproximaciones a Clio* in 1979 (Ibarra, 1979). Ibarra, an historian, has published extensively in Cuba, one of his most significant titles being MINFAR's 1965 text *Historia de Cuba*. This text was later incorporated into the 1973 edition of *Instrucción Política FAR*, which will be discussed in the next chapter. Though he has never considered himself an 'official' historian, Ibarra has always been a vocal supporter of the Revolution, having participated in the 26<sup>th</sup> of July Movement in Santiago de Cuba, and later occupying posts in the Consejo Nacional de Cultura, the Dirección Política de las FAR, the Instituto de Historia and the Instituto de Ciencias Sociales. Ibarra, then, writes from a position very much

*within* the Revolution and it can thus be assumed that his views are reflective of those of the revolutionary leadership. It is for this reason that his text has been selected for analysis here. Furthermore, given that this study considers government ministries and publishing houses to play a key role in the circulation of 'true' statements, the publication of Ibarra's work by MINFAR and Editorial de Ciencias Sociales, among others, suggests that his work is supported by and, ultimately, supports, the Revolution in power.

Much like the Ministerio de Educación's *Historia de Cuba* considered earlier, it is immediately evident upon reading the article in question that the 'siglo de lucha armada' it discussed could have been alternatively titled 'siglo de lucha guerrillera'. In other words, those who fought in the independence wars of the 1800s were portrayed, once again, as having adopted guerrilla warfare as their means to fight the Spanish colonial power. This representation was made clear in the opening lines of the article: 'Las gestas independentistas del pueblo cubano en el siglo XIX, asumieron la forma de guerra irregular, de guerrillas, pasando por las etapas de desarrollo que han sido estudiadas por los clásicos militares marxistas de nuestra época' (Ibarra 1968, 183).

Similarly unambiguous references to the supposed guerrilla struggle of the *independentistas* were inserted throughout the text. As in *Historia de Cuba*, Céspedes's approach to his campaign in particular was presented as being one which adhered entirely to the precepts of guerrilla warfare, such as is evidenced in the following citation: 'Céspedes estaba consciente de que la relativa debilidad inicial del movimiento revolucionario determinaba la necesidad de la guerra de guerrillas,

como solución militar en una contienda dura y prolongada' (Ibarra 1968, 185). The mention of the 'relativa debilidad inicial del movimiento' established an obvious parallel between Céspedes' campaign and the embryonic stages of the Revolution's insurrectionary phase. As discussed elsewhere in this chapter, the leadership's discourse in the 1960s frequently underlined the inauspicious beginnings to the struggle that eventually ousted Batista; this tendency is perhaps best exemplified in the continued allusions to 'doce hombres'. These allusions were intended to inculcate the message that, though the prospect of victory might at times seem thoroughly distant, it was still possible to confront, and to overcome, a more ostensibly powerful enemy. This particular reference to the weakness of Céspedes' initial movement communicated that, in situations in which the rebel force was far inferior to that of the state security apparatus, guerrilla warfare was the only option. This latter idea not only justified the employment of guerrilla tactics but also demonstrated that, when obstacles seemed insurmountable, the guerrilla methodology could offer a means of continuing with one's struggle and, therefore, precluded the possibility of simply giving up. Such an idea might have been underlined here to a contemporary reader as a way of legitimising, and explaining, the recurrent promotion of the guerrilla ethos; if guerrilla struggle allowed a weak armed movement to continue fighting, then *guerrillerismo* would be the approach which prevented a vulnerable Revolution in power, with a world superpower as its principal enemy, from giving in and which, in turn, enabled it to survive. Indeed, as the title suggests, the armed struggles that had been carried out prior to 1956 constituted 'una herencia bien aprendida'; that is, those who fought in the *sierra* for the Revolution had taken on board the approach to rebellion which had been adopted by their forerunners. As many of the central figures of the *sierra* struggle went on to form part of the

revolutionary government, it could thus be deduced that this notion of guerrilla struggle as the solution to the problem of inferiority had been inherited by the Revolution in power which, in turn, might explain the perpetuation of *guerrillerismo*.

Another excerpt from the text illustrates Ibarra's intention not only to show that the conditions faced by the *independentistas* were similar to those which confronted the *Granma* survivors in 1956 (not to mention the entire nation under the Revolution in power), but that some of their tactics matched precisely the strategies which would later be advocated by Guevara. The text stated, for example, that 'en la provincia de Las Villas, debido a una serie de circunstancias desfavorables, las partidas insurrectas tuvieron que atenerse a la táctica de 'morder y huir' a las fuerzas españolas' (Ibarra 1968, 186). This mention of 'la táctica "morder y huir"' was a form of intertextuality, though not manifest, in that it echoed directly Guevara's discussion on the primacy of the element of 'surprise' in guerrilla warfare. Guevara wrote in *La Guerra de Guerrillas*: "Muerde y huye" le llaman algunos despectivamente, y es exacto. Muerde y huye, espera, acecha, vuelve a morder y a huir y así sucesivamente, sin dar descanso al enemigo' (Guevara 2006, 20). The deliberate correlation established here between Guevara's theory and the Ten Years' War reinforced the notion of a Cuban tradition of guerrilla struggle which the leadership consciously attempted to cultivate. It was this tradition which would confer historical legitimacy upon the continued recourse to *guerrillerismo* in the hegemonic discourse of the Revolution in power.

What is more, it is interesting to note that this article was published in 1968, the year of the so-called Revolutionary Offensive. As pointed out in the Introduction, it was

the launch of the Offensive, and the style in which it was organised, which initially prompted several academics to comment on the supposed 'militarism' of the Revolution. Notable examples include Bonachea and San Martín, who described the 'militarisation' of Cuba as 'undeniable' following the Offensive and the subsequent *zafra*, and the previously mentioned article by Malloy (Bonachea and San Martín, 1971; Malloy, 1971). To refer once again to an excerpt from Malloy's work, he stated that 'all Cubans are now considered to be soldiers in a vast producing army. As such, they are expected to adhere to the traditional military values of discipline and devotion to duty' (Malloy 1971, 40).

What Ibarra's text demonstrates is that, though outwardly the Revolution appeared to have favoured a military style of organisation, the revolutionary government was still endorsing the publication of work which promulgated the *guerrillista* message. Such evidence of the continued promotion of *guerrillerismo* contradicts Malloy's statement that Cuban citizens were expected to 'adhere to the traditional military values of discipline and devotion to duty', insofar as these values were not derived from the development of a 'militaristic mentality' but were instead rooted in the historic tradition, and lived experience, of guerrilla struggle (Malloy 1971, 40). This inconsistency between the leadership's methods of governance and the ideology espoused in texts which were not explicitly political set a precedent for the way in which *guerrillerismo* was communicated to the *pueblo* in the early half of the 1970s, as will become evident in Chapter Three.

## Conclusion

Based on the evidence presented in this chapter, we can conclude that, at least in the first decade of the Revolution in power, *guerrillerismo* was actively promoted by the revolutionary leadership. From the outset, the hegemonic discourse underlined the role of the Cuban *pueblo* in producing the Revolution, and stressed the *deber* of the population to maintain the Revolution in power. As stated, this idea that the *pueblo* had played, and would continue to play, a pivotal role in realising revolutionary change is one which conforms entirely to a general notion of guerrilla struggle. That is, of a non-institutionalised force which does not fight a state-sponsored war but which, in contrast, enters into combat at the grassroots level on behalf of the people and against the state. Indeed, this defining element of guerrilla warfare formed part of Guevara's three-point classification of guerrilla struggle based on the Cuban experience of insurrection: 'Las fuerzas populares pueden ganar una guerra contra el ejército' (Guevara 2006, 13).

In designating the *pueblo* as the torchbearers of the on-going struggle for revolution, the leadership's discourse necessarily advocated a collective approach to revolutionary activity. The task of supporting and defending the revolutionary project was one which Cuba, as a nation, was obliged to undertake. This message was often reflected in Fidel Castro's persistent employment of the first person plural to underline the inclusivity of revolutionary participation. This grammatical feature was evident in statements such as 'tenemos un deber indiscutible: el deber de defender la Revolución' in which the message of collective responsibility was unmistakable (Castro 1959c, 25).

That said, at times, the leadership's discourse expressed a marked endorsement of revolutionary participation on an individual level. Perhaps the most significant illustration of this promotion was the following statement from Fidel Castro's 'Second Declaration of Havana': 'El deber de todo revolucionario es hacer la revolución' (Castro 1962, 169). In this example, analysed previously in the chapter, the singular noun 'revolucionario', in addition to the determiner 'todo', highlighted the obligation of the individual to enact his or her revolutionary duties. The shift in focus between collective and individual action is reflective of the intrinsic contradiction contained within Guevara's *foco* theory. Where the individual is encouraged to take immediate action to foment revolution ('no siempre hay que esperar a que se den todas las condiciones para la revolución' (Guevara 2006, 13)), it is only as part of a *foco* comprising a handful of men in which such individual activity has the capacity to be effective ('el foco insurreccional puede desarrollar condiciones subjetivas sobre la base de condiciones objetivas dadas' (Guevara 2006, 13)). In turn, the *foco* itself can only produce the desired revolutionary change through the establishment of additional *focos*, and the eventual formation of a network which is sufficiently powerful to topple the state security apparatus. It is possible that the publication of Guevara's theory in 1960 contributed to this pendulum of collective/individual action. Prior to the articulation of Guevara's methodology, the evidence suggests that hegemonic discourse largely placed emphasis on the role of the *pueblo* as a collective in sustaining the Revolution; subsequent to 1960, the shifting between the primacy of the collective *or* the individual becomes more marked.

Regardless of this possible conflict, *guerrillerismo* remained a constant in the leadership's discourse throughout the decade. The potential of *guerrillerismo* to steel the masses by shaping the consciousness of social subjects through the inculcation of its constituent values was reinforced by the employment of certain discursive techniques. Of particular note was the frequent incorporation of presupposition, a rhetorical device discussed at length in this chapter. Presupposition afforded an ideological significance, or, indeed, hegemony, to particular words or concepts, setting them up as features of 'common sense'; in other words, certain terms, following Fairclough, are 'implicit, backgrounded, taken for granted, not things that people are consciously aware of, rarely explicitly formulated or examined or questioned' (Fairclough 1989, 77). Therein lies the manipulative quality of such presuppositions. In the case of *guerrillerismo*, its promotion did not always require explicit demands of the Cuban people to emulate Che Guevara or Camilo Cienfuegos, for example, thereby calling attention to the ideological project of the leadership and thus rendering it less effective, but rather involved more subtle appeals to 'background knowledge' (Fairclough 1989, 154). Such was the case with the recurrent allusions to the myth of *los doce*. Rather than spelling it out as such, this presupposition transmitted the message that it was possible to achieve victory despite apparently insuperable obstacles; additionally, it implied that being on the inferior side in an unequal confrontation was, in fact, potentially advantageous. This manipulative effect of presuppositions partly confirms Foucault's idea that discourse 'produces reality' in a given context, yet we are not always aware that such a 'structuring' of our reality is taking place (Foucault 1991b, 194; Mills 2003, 55). In this way, Fairclough's notion of presuppositions can be linked to Foucault's

discussion of how 'true' statements, through their continued reproduction in texts over time, transform into unchallenged 'common-sense-knowledge' (Mills 2003, 74).

Finally, another means by which *guerrillerismo* was promoted in the hegemonic discourse of the 1960s was through the attempt to establish guerrilla struggle as a tradition rooted in Cuban history. The re-presentation of previous rebellions, most notably the independence wars, as adhering to the same principles of guerrilla warfare as those who formed the Ejército Rebelde, conferred historical legitimacy upon the values encompassed by *guerrillerismo*, and the guerrilla approach to struggle more broadly. Moreover, this teleological portrayal of Cuban history, in which the Revolution becomes the concluding chapter in the quest for independence begun in 1868, implied a moral obligation on the part of all Cubans to participate in closing this chapter. In other words, Cubans had a duty to continue the guerrilla struggle, and emulating the *guerrillero* was projected as natural or inherent to the condition of 'being Cuban'. The frequent incorporation of 'lexical items' in the discourse, specifically *lucha* and *deber*, themselves traditions carried over into the post-1959 era, reinforced the historicity of guerrilla struggle and, in so doing, strengthened the promotion of *guerrillerismo*. The re-articulation of Cuban history evidenced here was one of the principal means through which the leadership sustained its promotion of *guerrillerismo* well into the second decade of the Revolution in power, as will become clear in the analysis of the discourse of the 1970s presented in the following chapter.

## Chapter Three

### *Guerrillerismo in the 1970s*

Noted in the Introduction, a significant number of scholars working on Cuba, writing at different stages of the Revolution's trajectory, consider that a shift to 'militarism' occurred or, at least, became more marked, during the late 1960s, and became more apparent still in the 1970s. Moreover, many of these scholars pinpoint the year 1968 and the launch of the Revolutionary Offensive as heralding the onset of a more militarised system of revolutionary government (Bonachea and San Martín, 1972; Fernández, 2000; Malloy, 1971). The Offensive signified the leadership's attempt to ameliorate the country's economic position through eradicating the remnants of private enterprise and material incentives, and through mass mobilisation drives intended to improve agricultural production (Mesa-Lago 1971, 301). It was the involvement of the FAR in the organisation of these mass mobilisations which appears to have prompted academics to conclude that the Revolution was becoming ever more 'militaristic'. As cited in the Introduction, Julie Bunck, for instance, wrote of the Offensive that, 'a range of officials exalted work and used military terms, even war dispatches, to describe their goals. Speeches adopted militaristic phrases, equating the labour force with a 'heroic battalion' and described labour efforts as 'struggles' or 'wars'' (Bunck 1994, 144).

The culmination of the Offensive was the drive to yield ten million tonnes in the *zafra* (sugar harvest) of 1970. Fidel Castro announced this objective in a speech given on 27 October 1969. Shortly after, he ordered the FAR to assume greater control of the administration of the harvest, and by the summer of 1970, 100,000

military personnel had been mobilised (Bonachea and San Martín 2003, 54). The FAR thus played an integral role in the *zafra*, and it was the degree of their involvement, at both the managerial and ground level, in addition to the role played by military figures in the revolutionary government more broadly, which contributed to the perception held by numerous foreign observers that the Revolution was moving towards 'militarism'. Indeed, Bonachea and San Martín have asserted that the military-led organisation of the 1970 *zafra*, 'could only confirm a vision of militarism throughout Cuban society' (Bonachea and San Martín 2003, 54).

This notion of increasing 'militarism' was in some ways reflected in the language employed in the aforementioned speech given by Fidel Castro on 27 October 1969. This speech constituted a rallying cry to the Cuban people to mobilise around the goal of cutting ten millions tonnes of sugar cane in the forthcoming *zafra*. Citizens of all backgrounds and occupations were expected to participate in what was being touted as an event of great significance in the history of the nation and, just as importantly, the Revolution. In the preceding chapter, we saw how a promotion of *guerrillerismo*, and, therefore, the historical image of the guerrilla fighter, was one of the means by which the leadership attempted to steel the Cuban *pueblo* in the task of defending the Revolution during its first decade in power. In this prominent speech from 1969, however, it is possible to discern a slight shift in language, whereby, rather than endorsing the *guerrillero* as a model for revolutionary action, Castro instead referred to the individual Cuban citizen as a *soldado*. An illustration of this shift is found in the following citation:

Y cada obrero, como un soldado, como lo haría en una trinchera defendiendo el país, como lo haría frente a un ataque enemigo, como lo hicieron los combatientes revolucionarios en los momentos decisivos, debe sentirse como un soldado en una trinchera con el fusil en la mano cumpliendo su deber (Castro, 1969).

In this extract, Castro explicitly informed his audience that, in participating in the *zafra*, they should behave in a manner similar to that of a soldier fighting in a trench. The employment of such vocabulary as ‘soldado’ and ‘trinchera’, which undoubtedly comprise a lexical set related to a generalised notion of the military, or of military combat, implied that the leadership was beginning to shake off its guerrilla past. It is possible that, with the increasingly pervasive role of the FAR in the Revolutionary Offensive, and particularly in the *zafra*, the leadership aimed to consciously endorse the image of the *soldado*, and not, therefore, the *guerrillero*, in order to nurture support for its armed forces in the tasks that lay ahead. Furthermore, given that, by this stage in the Revolution, the FAR had developed, and continued to evolve, into a more professionalised institution, the image of the *guerrillero* might have seemed outdated, both to the leadership and to the Cuban people (Klepak, 2005; Morris, 1989). In other words, the FAR was perhaps able to offer a more relevant, and highly visible, model for revolutionary participation in the shape of its own members. The repetition of ‘soldado’ here, and in the following extract, reinforces the notion that there was an attempt to ‘militarise’ citizens in some way: ‘Pero cada machetero ahí, cada soldado en esa batalla tiene que hacer todos los días un poco más de esfuerzo’ (Castro, 1969). The incorporation of the word ‘batalla’ in this example also unambiguously connoted military conflict.

While the selected citations partially substantiate the proposal that the Revolution became progressively ‘militarised’ from the time of the Revolutionary Offensive, traces of *guerrillerismo* can still be identified within this speech. As a case in point, when discussing the importance of ‘vergüenza’ as a motivating factor in carrying out one’s revolutionary duties, Castro stated that:

Y precisamente ese sentimiento es el que hace a los combatientes, a los buenos soldados en la guerra, a los buenos guerrilleros en la lucha. Ese factor que hace que el hombre sepa apreciar mucho más su honor que su propia vida (Castro, 1969).

In this extract, while the inclusion of ‘soldados’ was foregrounded, the juxtaposition of the two phrases in, ‘a los buenos soldados en la guerra, a los buenos guerrilleros en la lucha’, effectively placed equal emphasis on both types of ‘combatientes’, that is, ‘soldados’ and ‘guerrilleros’. What can be inferred from such juxtaposition is that, while citizens were more explicitly encouraged to emulate the *soldado* in this particular speech, the figure of the *guerrillero* still resonated as the embodiment of the ideal revolutionary. The incorporation of the tradition of *lucha* here, and of *deber* in the previous citation, further strengthened the notion that *guerrillerismo* was not entirely redundant at this point, given that both ‘lexical items’ drew much of their meaning from the island’s history of revolutionary guerrilla struggle.

It could be argued that this juxtaposition of images, the *soldado* and the *guerrillero*, mirrored what was occurring in the Revolution more broadly at this point in its trajectory. With the launch of the Offensive, the leadership sought to overhaul the Revolution, both socially and economically, through mobilising the Cuban people towards maximising the country’s resources. The wider objective of this overhaul was to precipitate the country’s progress towards communism (Kapcia 2000, 111). The measures taken during the Offensive were concomitant with the leadership’s gradual rapprochement with the Soviet Union. During the 1960s, the relationship between Cuba and the Soviet Union had often been fraught, with the Cuban leadership standing firm in its support for armed revolutionary struggle across the world. This support demonstrated a blatant disregard for the USSR’s stance of ‘peaceful co-existence’ with the West. Cuba thus resisted falling under the control of

another hegemonic power (the other being the United States), and instead pursued its own path to revolution, grounded in its own home-grown principles. Erisman has referred to this period (1962-1968) as one of 'Fidelista radicalism', which he describes as 'a time of intense growing pains in the Cuban-Soviet relationship. Both governments fluctuated between attraction and aversion, the Fidelistas becoming more erratic' (Erisman 1985, 25).

However, a delay in a shipment of Soviet oil to Cuba in 1968, in addition to the generally precarious economic conditions with which the Revolution was confronted, highlighted for the revolutionary government the extent to which it was dependent on its foreign partner. From then on, the Cuban leadership made concerted efforts towards a reconciliation with the USSR, most publicly through its backing of the Soviet Union's invasion of Czechoslovakia in 1968 (Aguilar 2003, 79). In April 1970, Castro declared Cuba's 'unshakeable alliance' with the Soviet Union, and over the course of the ensuing decade, the Revolution was gradually transformed into a system which more closely resembled the Soviet model of socialist government (Aguilar 2003, 79). As discussed previously, this period of 'institutionalisation' was characterised by widespread bureaucratisation, a professionalisation of the armed forces, and a restructuring of the political system which conformed to the Soviet template. These profound changes within the Revolution signalled a move away from the more unsystematic and arbitrary approach to revolutionary governance adopted by the leadership during its first decade in power. In other words, the leadership seemed to be distancing itself from its guerrilla past through its increasing adherence to Soviet orthodoxy.

Yet certain events which took place in Cuba during this very period suggest that characterising the 1970s as the decade of 'Sovietisation' does not quite tell the whole story. Perhaps the most obvious of these events was Cuba's decision to become involved in the Angolan Civil War in 1975. Far from toeing the Soviet line, Cuba's long-term participation in Angola signalled an outright defiance of the USSR's 'peaceful co-existence' understanding with the West, and is evidence of a revolutionary leadership intent on adhering to its own revolutionary principles. In other words, it had not fallen prey to Soviet hegemony entirely. Other, less obvious, examples of Cuba asserting its ideological independence also contradict the 'institutionalisation'/'Sovietisation' definition. Of particular note is the inauguration of the Centro de Estudios Martianos in 1976; the opening of such an institute raises questions as to why a resurgence in the elevation of José Martí as a national hero occurred at this time when, according to Soviet orthodoxy, his status should have been relegated simply to that of a bourgeois intellectual. More tellingly still, it should not be ignored that the Cuban Communist Party did not convene its first Party Congress until 1975, more than five years after the supposed wholesale adoption of the Soviet Communist model. This delay might suggest that, rather than there being a consensus within the Cuban leadership at the start of the decade to fall in line with Soviet orthodoxy, the years 1971-1975 were a period of internal debate in the revolutionary leadership regarding the direction of the Revolution thereafter. One might tentatively suggest that the reason behind the postponement lay in the presence of individuals, or a faction, within the upper echelons of power, who favoured a commitment to an endogenous approach to revolutionary government and not, therefore, the adoption of a foreign model.

Taking these seemingly anomalous events into account, the purpose of examining texts from the 1970s is to question the so-called 'Sovietisation' of the Revolution through an analysis of the language contained therein. The analysis will demonstrate that it is possible to find a continuation of the ideology expressed in the official hegemonic discourse of the 1960s. In Castro's aforementioned 1969 speech, for example, though the image of *soldado* was more prominent than that of the *guerrillero*, the *guerrillero* was, nonetheless, still present. This continued use of *guerrillista* rhetoric contributes to undermining the notion of a 'Sovietised' Revolution; it shows that the leadership had not so entirely bought into Soviet orthodoxy as previously thought, but instead continued to follow its own path, much as it had done since 1959, a path which was guided by the beliefs and values of *guerrillerismo*. Moreover, if one can support the claim that *guerrillerismo* continued to underpin the Revolution in the 1970s, one can also, therefore, counter the idea that a shift to 'militarism' was simultaneous to the process of 'institutionalisation'.

### **Textual Analysis (1969-1981)**

In the previous chapter, it was established that one of the means by which the leadership attempted to steel and to reassure the Cuban *pueblo* during the 1960s was to present the Revolution in power as a continuation, or the conclusion-in-process, of the struggles for Cuban independence which emerged in the late 1800s. This presentation of a tradition of revolutionary struggle afforded historical legitimacy to the Revolution in power, and seemed designed to instil in the minds of Cuban citizens the message that they had a duty, a *deber*, to honour the legacy of their heroic forefathers. Furthermore, it was continually underlined that this tradition was characterised by guerrilla struggle, which, in turn, communicated the idea that it was

the preferred approach to revolutionary action for the Cuban people. This re-telling of history constituted one of the ways by which *guerrillerismo* was promoted in the first decade in power.

The following analysis of key texts from the 1970s, will make clear that this method of promoting *guerrillerismo* continued into the second decade. A clear illustration of this pattern can be identified in a speech made by Fidel Castro on 31 December, 1969. The speech was reproduced in its entirety in an edition of *Verde Olivo* published on the 11 January 1970. Speaking about the ten-million-tonne *zafra*, the efforts for which were still underway at that time, Castro purported:

Esta lucha que están librando los cubanos en este momento con el machete cortando caña, no tiene menos importancia que la que librarán en 1868 y 1895 los mambises; no tiene menos importancia para nuestro país, para la plena conquista de la felicidad, del bienestar, de la independencia del país. Y la lucha que se libere en este momento con el machete se puede equiparar perfectamente con la lucha en la Sierra de los guerrilleros (*Verde Olivo* 1970, 18).

The reference to the 'lexical item' *lucha* in the opening line of this extract immediately indicates that Castro's aim here was to insert the *zafra* into Cuba's long-standing tradition of struggle. This objective became all the more clear in Castro's declaration that the harvest 'no tiene menos importancia que la que librarán en 1868 y 1895 los mambises', in which he unequivocally equated the significance of the *zafra* with the battles fought for independence. This latter point was further highlighted by the repetition of 'no tiene menos importancia' in the following phrase. Castro's assertion that the *zafra* was an important factor in achieving the 'independencia del país' communicated a powerful message to his audience, and underscored the notion that the Revolution in power was undergoing a process of concluding the struggle initiated some hundred years previously. The valuable role

assigned to the *zafra*, that of preserving the independence of Cuba, seems to have been aimed at bolstering the morale of those involved in the cane cutting, insofar as it outlined a distinct, not to mention highly significant, purpose to their activity. Moreover, the idea that the *zafra* was necessary for the achievement of the ‘plena conquista (...) de la independencia del país’ suggested that independence was not something definite and permanent, but rather was a vulnerable condition which one had to fight to maintain. In this way, Castro was attempting to encourage participation in the *zafra* by highlighting the message that, though the Revolution was in power, there was no room for complacency.

What was also manifest in this citation was the promotion of *guerrillerismo*. The final line of the extract clearly stated that the drive for an unprecedented sugar harvest was comparable to the *lucha* enacted by the guerrillas in the insurrectionary phase of the Revolution. This statement was reinforced by the incorporation of the adverb ‘perfectamente’, which served to underline the similarities between the struggle in the *sierra* and that of the *zafra*. This comparison of the two events transmitted the message that those who participated in the *zafra* constituted a new wave of *guerrilleros* whose task was no less significant in Cuba’s history than that of freeing the country from dictatorial control. The drawing of such parallels was, again, intended to encourage and to inspire citizens; Castro was informing them that their actions would serve to perpetuate previous struggles, while also conferring historical legitimacy on the continued calls for dedication to the cause of the Revolution. Using the *guerrilleros* as an example in this way also indicates that, while ostensibly the leadership was becoming more ‘militaristic’ in the organisation of the *zafra* and its approach to government more generally, it continued to view

guerrilla struggle as a relevant model and inspiration for revolutionary action, in whatever form. This notion is substantiated not only by the explicit mention of the ‘lucha en la Sierra de los guerrilleros’, but also by the reference to the *mambises*. To reiterate the point made earlier, the revolutionary leadership portrayed the independence wars of the 1800s as belonging to the country’s tradition of guerrilla struggle.

In addition to being used as an inspiration for Cuban citizens, the campaigns of the *mambises* were also employed as an example of revolutionary conduct for serving members of the armed forces. In the 3 January 1971 edition of *Verde Olivo*, for example, a six-page article entitled ‘Las tareas de las FAR en 1971’ drew heavily upon the combative style of the *mambises* to illustrate the fundamental elements of which a revolutionary army should be comprised. The article read:

En realidad el Ejército Mambí alcanzó un elevado grado de disposición combativa. El fundamento esencial que esto se debía a la razón moral que animaba a las valerosas huestes. El hecho de luchar por la Patria, por una causa justa, infundía fe en la victoria final y espíritu de sacrificio suficiente para llevar a cabo la lucha con entusiasmo y decisión, pero no hay que olvidar que la lucha continua, la actividad guerrera constante que tenían que desarrollar los soldados mambises también forjaba su resistencia y desenvolvía habilidades que los convertían cada vez más en competentes soldados (*Verde Olivo* 1971a, 28).

Once again, *lucha* was included in this extract based on its resonance as a ‘lexical item’ which, by this point in the Revolution’s trajectory, encompassed Cuba’s history of struggle. This citation also contained another example of religious lexicon in its reference to the word ‘fe’; the suggestion here was that no motivation other than faith in the future victory of the revolutionary campaign had been necessary for the *mambises* to continue their fight. This primacy of faith in a redemptive future, not to mention an ‘espíritu de sacrificio’, as central to revolutionary struggle can be

compared with the faith and sacrifice required by religion. These ideas of 'fe' and 'sacrificio' were alluded to frequently in the hegemonic discourse of the 1960s and 1970s, and, as discussed in the previous chapter, seem to substantiate Fernández's hypothesis regarding the existence of a 'political religion' in Cuba (Fernández 2000, 63).<sup>37</sup> The obligation to possess an unfaltering belief in 'la victoria final' also corroborates Fernández's concept that the Revolution is buttressed by a 'politics of passion' (Fernández 2000, 63). Fernández characterises the 'politics of passion' as being 'deeply affective', as encompassing the emotional and informal aspects of political activity and, more specifically, leadership (Fernández 2000, 21). Furthermore, he asserts that the 'politics of passion are grounded in the past but they chart a course for a utopian future'; this latter point is illustrated in the citation by the reference to the *mambises*' faith in final victory (Fernández 2000, 20). What is more, the line 'el fundamento esencial que esto se debía a la razón moral que animaba a las valerosas huestes' attests to Fernández's notion that a political religion is also characterised by a 'moral imperative' (Fernández 2000, 19).

The elevation of the *mambises* as models of the ideal revolutionaries who possessed faith in the inevitability of victory, made sacrifices in the name of this victory, and had finely tuned moral compasses, is noteworthy in that it suggests a continuation of the promotion of *guerrillerismo* in the early 1970s, given that the hegemonic discourse of the 1960s had already painted a picture of the *mambises* as forming part of the tradition of guerrilla struggle in Cuba. Thus, while the *mambises* were described at the end of the citation as having transformed into 'competentes

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<sup>37</sup> The example of the use of 'fe' in the hegemonic discourse discussed in Chapter Two was taken from Fidel Castro's 1 January speech, 1959. The citation read: 'Yo les aseguro que si cuando éramos 12 hombres solamente no perdimos la fe, ahora que tenemos ahí 12 tanques cómo vamos a perder la fe' (Castro, 1959a).

soldados' (and not, therefore, *guerrilleros*), the pre-established image of these combatants as guerrilla fighters would likely still have been inferred by the text recipient. In this way, this citation also illustrates the *soldado/guerrillero* dichotomy at work in the Revolution during the second decade. Though the term *soldado* was often employed explicitly, the guerrilla foundations of the leadership's conception of revolutionary struggle were still evident, albeit implicitly. That said, in this particular example, the text was directed at members of the armed forces specifically, thus the use of 'soldados' to describe the *mambises*, rather than indicating an ideological shift, may have been employed simply to allow the readership to identify more readily the parallels between their own struggle and that of the heroes of the independence period.

*Guerrillerismo* can also be identified in this citation in its echoes of Guevara's *La Guerra de Guerrillas*. Guevara proposed that the ideal *guerrillero* should possess 'cualidades morales', and stated that 'el guerrillero debe tener una conducta moral que lo acredite como verdadero sacerdote de la reforma que pretende' (Guevara 2006, 57/51). The citation from *Verde Olivo* reflected Guevara's emphasis on morality as a key factor in struggle through highlighting the fact that the reason behind the *mambises*' attainment of 'un elevado grado de disposición combativa' was 'la razón moral'. Similarly, there were also parallels with Guevara's work in the stress upon carrying out the struggle with 'entusiasmo y decisión'. In his work, Guevara contended that the *guerrillero*:

debe ser audaz, analizar correctamente los peligros y las posibilidades de una acción y estar siempre presto a tomar una actitud optimista frente a las circunstancias y a encontrar una decisión favorable aún en los momentos en que el análisis de las condiciones adversas y favorable no arroje un saldo positivo apreciable (Guevara 2006, 56).

The fact that the positive attributes of the *mambises* highlighted in an article from 1971 were similar to those put forward by Guevara in his definition of the ideal *guerrillero* in 1960 implies that the values and characteristics required of revolutionaries had not changed since the early years of the Revolution, despite the supposed onset of 'Sovietisation' and 'militarism'. In other words, the leadership had the same specifications and requirements of Cuban citizens as Guevara had once had of would-be *guerrilleros*.

Similar ideas regarding the importance of the attitude of the *mambises* in carrying out their campaign were manifest elsewhere in the article:

En nuestras guerras de independencia el valor y el patriotismo indiscutiblemente jugaron el papel principal en el mantenimiento del espíritu de lucha y de sacrificio necesarios para lograr la victoria final (*Verde Olivo* 1971a, 31).

As in the previous citation, reference was made in this extract to 'la victoria final', which again reinforced the idea of a redemptive future which was attainable only through struggle. Moreover, there was a repetition of the term 'espíritu de sacrificio' as a vital quality of the combatant if s/he was ever to accomplish the 'victoria final'. This repetition sustained the article's tone of religiosity, and reinforced the message that sacrifice played a fundamental role in driving forward revolutionary struggle. The idea of sacrifice also recalled one of Guevara's precepts; as stated in Chapter One, Guevara posited that, if one were to be a 'true' *guerrillero*, one had to be willing to make the ultimate sacrifice: to give one's life in the name of the revolution.<sup>38</sup>

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<sup>38</sup> Regarding sacrifice, Guevara wrote: 'la cualidad positiva de esta guerra de guerrillas es que cada uno de los guerrilleros esté dispuesto a morir, no sólo por defender un ideal sino por convertirlo en realidad. Esa es la base, la esencia de la lucha de guerrillas' (Guevara 2006, 21).

What was also evident in the article was a sustained focus on the notion of *deber* in the hegemonic discourse. In Chapter Two of the present work, it was argued that, in the 1960s, the leadership frequently employed the 'lexical item' *deber* in its rhetoric as a means of instilling in Cuban citizens the message that they had a moral obligation, a duty, to support and defend the Revolution. An illustration of the continued prevalence of *deber* is apparent in the following citation, in which the term was repeated twice:

Está bien claro que la defensa de la Patria es el deber y derecho de todos, como es también deber y derecho de todos prepararse adecuadamente para ello (*Verde Olivo* 1971a, 28).

Also manifest in this extract was the inclusion of the term 'derecho'. Again, this term featured heavily in the leadership's discourse during its first decade in power. In this example, participating in the defence of the Revolution was not only an obligation but a right of all the Cuban people. It would seem that the intention of positioning 'la defensa de la Patria' as a 'derecho' here was to confer a sense of entitlement upon the reader with regard to revolutionary action, similar to the examples discussed in the previous chapter. In other words, informing Cuban citizens that they had a right to defend the Revolution suggested that the Revolution itself had afforded them the freedom to fight for whichever cause they believed in. The employment of *derecho* reinforced the moral obligation implied by *deber*. The inclusion of the pronoun 'todos' denoted that the duty and right to defend the Revolution were a collective responsibility and a collective privilege, respectively. No one was exempt from the task of ensuring the Revolution's survival.

In contrast, at other points in the text, the *deber* of defence was conferred upon the individual within the FAR, rather than the collective. This shift in focus regarding the agent of revolutionary activity was evident in the section of the article which discussed the role of the FAR, as exemplified below:

Las FAR como ejército popular hacen descansar fundamentalmente en el factor moral, en la conciencia revolucionaria de cada combatiente, el interés por su preparación, que, además, es una obligación personal de cada uno y como tal está prevista en los reglamentos (*Verde Olivo* 1971a, 29).

In this citation, the message communicated was that being prepared for an enemy attack was not only the responsibility of the members of the armed forces but also of every Cuban citizen. Indeed, the subtitle to the section from which this citation is taken was 'La Defensa de la Patria es deber de todos' (*Verde Olivo* 1971a, 28). This latter point was articulated in the phrase, 'es una obligación personal de cada uno', in which the employment of the determiner 'cada' underlined the inclusivity of the duty of preparation. Similarly, the phrase 'cada combatiente' highlighted the fact that what was important was the revolutionary consciousness of every member of the armed forces at an individual level. This message was further strengthened by the alliteration of the fricative 'c' in 'cada combatiente'. The idea that defending the Revolution was the obligation of the individual citizen was repeated on the same page. It was stated that 'el paso por las FAR para prepararse para la defensa de la Patria es deber de cada cubano y en especial de cada joven' (*Verde Olivo* 1971a, 29). The reference here to 'cada joven' was telling, insofar as the text producer deemed it necessary to underline specifically the responsibility of the individual Cuban youth. This direct appeal to youth implies that, at that point in time, the leadership felt that young people needed to be reminded that they had a role to play in maintaining the Revolution.

The use of determiners as exemplified here appears to have been a recurrent rhetorical device in the hegemonic discourse. Indeed, in the analysis of texts from the 1960s, two significant examples of this technique were discussed. These were the citations, 'la democracia cubana le da a cada cubano un fusil para defender sus derechos y para defender a su Patria' (Castro 1960a, 342), and, 'El deber de todo revolucionario es hacer la revolución' (Castro 1962, 169). In both cases, and similar to the citations in question, the inclusion of the determiners, 'cada' and 'todo', underscored the individual subjectivity of revolutionary action.

There are additional instances in the article in which one can identify a stress upon the centrality of individual revolutionary action within the FAR. For example, it was also stated that:

la base de preparación de una unidad es la instrucción individual. Esto quiere decir que si el soldado personalmente no está bien preparado no hay unidad que funcione bien, ni hay posibilidad tampoco para las acciones coordinadas (*Verde Olivo* 1971a, 32).

These particular words explicitly informed the reader that the training and preparation of the individual was vital to the successful functioning of the unit of which they formed a part. Though this message was directed at members of the armed forces specifically, it did reflect the message being communicated to the rest of the population. That is, for the nation to be able to defend itself adequately, the individual citizen was obliged to undertake sufficient preparatory training. Such a lesson was imparted upon the reader in the previous citation, in which it was clearly stated that defence was not only the role of the collective armed forces but of every Cuban. The role of the individual soldier within the collectivity of the nation was also reinforced in the subsequent edition of *Verde Olivo*, the aforementioned official

weekly magazine of the FAR, which appeared on 10 January 1971. In another of the weekly articles entitled 'Las tareas de las FAR en 1971', it was written:

Cada soldado está en el deber de pensar y canalizar la trascendencia que tiene su conducta personal en el enorme esfuerzo colectivo que tiene que hacer nuestra nación para salir del subdesarrollo y para asegurar una alta disposición combativa que haga fracasar los planes agresivos del imperialismo contra nuestro país (*Verde Olivo* 1971b, 31).

Here, the soldier was reminded of the wider implications of his 'conducta personal', it was stated that each soldier must consider and harness the 'transcendent' quality of his own individual actions with regard to the 'enorme esfuerzo colectivo'. As before, the agency of the individual was underlined by the determiner 'cada', yet the agency could only be asserted within the collective.

The shift in focus from individual to collective action, and vice versa, was a persistent feature of the leadership's discourse. This feature was discussed in the previous chapter, particularly in reference to the 1960 *Manual de Capacitación Cívica*. Based on the analysis of the selected citations from that text, we concluded that, while individual action was promoted as an essential factor in driving forward the Revolution, it was also made clear that it could only be an effective means of revolutionary activity if it formed part of a *collective* endeavour for revolutionary change. The message contained within the previous citation implies that this idea remained intact in the early 1970s. This focus on collective action in general undermines the 'militarism' perspective, insofar as it reveals that participation on a large-scale was encouraged by the leadership. As we saw in the Introduction, several scholars argued that the supposed 'militarisation' of the Cuban Revolution

constituted an obstacle to genuine political participation (Dumont, 1974; Horowitz, 2008).

What can also be partly deduced from the last citation is that the so-called 'siege mentality' was, at times, still being expressed in the leadership's discourse. The final part of the extract, 'y para asegurar una alta disposición combativa que haga fracasar los planes agresivos del imperialismo contra nuestro país', demonstrates that the leadership felt it necessary to highlight that the threat of an attack on the Revolution remained a very real possibility in 1971. Accentuating the prospect of an enemy attack, particularly through the use of negative adjectives such as 'agresivos', was intended to motivate members of the armed forces into fulfilling their duty, both as soldiers and citizens, to defend the nation. That said, the mention of the 'enorme esfuerzo colectivo' and the assurance of an 'alta disposición combativa' served to counteract in some ways the sense of siege, or, at least, the vulnerability of the Revolution, produced through drawing attention to the spectre of an attack. Underscoring the capacity of the collective implied instead that the leadership wished to instil a sense of confident defiance in the reader (i.e. a member of the armed forces). The combined will of the people could ensure the Revolution's survival against any form of enemy aggression.

The notion that Cuba, as a small and vulnerable nation, could withstand an attack from a much larger enemy was echoed elsewhere in the same article in the form of another reference to the myth of *los doce*. In the previous chapter, we established that this myth was manipulated by the leadership during the 1960s as a means of promoting the message that fighting on the inferior side should not be a deterrent to

engaging in revolutionary activity, and nor did it preclude the possibility of victory. The myth of *los doce* was included in the article with reference to Carlos Manuel de Céspedes' campaign of 1868:

Llenas están las páginas de la historia combativa de nuestra Patria, de ejemplos que justifican nuestra concepción de lucha, desde la histórica primera derrota de las fuerzas cubanas dirigidas por Carlos Manuel de Céspedes el 10 de octubre de 1868, que se quedó con 12 hombres y con éstos decidió continuar la guerra, hasta el desembarco del Comandante en Jefe por Playa Las Coloradas en que se repitió nuevamente la historia, pero esta vez para culminar después de años de lucha y sacrificio, con la victoria definitiva del pueblo (*Verde Olivo* 1971b, 30).

This mention of Céspedes and his 'army' of twelve men echoed the citation from the 1964 text *Historia de Cuba* discussed in Chapter Two.<sup>39</sup> In this example, the reference to '12 hombres' was incorporated in the form of the subordinate clause: 'que se quedó con 12 hombres y con éstos decidió continuar la guerra'. The inclusion of this clause implied that the underscoring of Céspedes' resolve to continue fighting with only a handful of men was deliberate, given that it was not essential to the overview of Cuba's history of *lucha* which this citation provided. Moreover, its inclusion suggests that the leadership considered the myth, and its accompanying lesson, to be of continued relevance to the Cuban people in the early 1970s. That they did so is interesting, since, at that time, the Revolution was gradually becoming more stable, owing to its rapprochement with the Soviet Union, and the institutionalisation and material benefits that this rapprochement brought with it. These material benefits included an increase in the supply of modern armaments to the FAR, thus increasing its military capabilities, while the FAR itself became further professionalised as a result of the training it received from Soviet military personnel stationed in Cuba (Suchlicki 1997, 175/6). The increased

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<sup>39</sup> The citation in question read: 'Sólo doce hombres quedaron con Céspedes. "Aún quedan doce hombres, bastan para hacer la independencia de Cuba", afirmó el jefe de la revolución. No sería la última vez que con doce hombres se iniciara la lucha de todo un pueblo' (*Historia* 1964, 180).

defensive capacity of the FAR thus renders it significant that the leadership wished to reassure its members that being on the inferior side in a conflict did not necessarily reduce the potential for success. Highlighting the country's tradition of commencing *lucha* with a small number of combatants in this way is evidence that a guerrilla ethos continued to be promoted in the early part of the Revolution's second decade in power. In other words, it implied that, no matter the strength and size of the armed forces, the leadership did not want its soldiers to forget that the Revolution had been built on the back of the struggles of a few against many.

This tradition of *lucha* stressed here paralleled the elevation of the *mambises* discussed earlier in the chapter, and the many instances in which Cuba's history of revolutionary struggle was used to inspire citizens in the 1960s. The foregrounding of the adjective 'llenas' in the opening phrase of the citation highlighted the multiplicity of examples of *lucha* in the Cuban historical narrative, while the leadership's attempt to derive historical legitimacy from the tradition was explicitly alluded to in the phrase, 'ejemplos que justifican nuestra concepción de lucha'. The importance afforded to Cuban history in this extract, and the message that the Revolution was simply a culmination of the preceding hundred years of struggle, reveal that the leadership aimed to cultivate a strong sense of history in the members of its armed forces. The purpose of instilling such a sense of history might have been to ensure that, though the FAR was transforming itself structurally and thus becoming increasingly removed from its Ejército Rebelde origins, its guerrilla roots remained central to the ethos which underpinned the institution. In this way, the leadership, or, at least, certain figures within it, perhaps attempted to curb the Soviet influence on its armed forces by reminding its soldiers that Cuba had its own long-

standing and unique approach to combat, as expressed in 'nuestra concepción de lucha'.

Cuba's history of *lucha* was similarly illustrated in a book published in 1972 entitled *La Invasión: estrategia fundamental en nuestras guerras revolucionarias*. This text was not, however, published for the armed forces, but for members of the Unión de Jóvenes Comunistas (UJC). The UJC represents the youth wing of the Cuban Communist Party and, unlike the many mass organisations in Cuba, is a voluntary and selective organisation for young people aged between fifteen and thirty. Members are selected based on exceptional conduct in school and in voluntary work and membership in the UJC is often considered a rite of passage for those seeking full Party membership after the age of thirty (Henken 2008, 213).

This text has been included in the analysis owing largely to the timing of its publication. In 1972 the UJC held its Second Congress, during which concerns were raised over weaknesses in the organisation's political work. Following the Congress, the UJC embarked on a campaign 'to recruit hundreds of thousands of young people, or at least exert political influence on them. (...) The UJC proposed a reinvigoration of ideological work among the organization's cadres, and among youth at large' (Blum 2011, 78). The publication of this text by the UJC's Comisión Nacional de Historia in the same year as the launch of this campaign suggests that it formed part of the endeavour to improve the political and ideological education of Cuban youth. It is thus interesting to examine whether a key component of the campaign was a promotion of the beliefs and values associated with *guerrillerismo*. This being the case, one can conclude that the UJC, alongside government ministries and publishing

houses, constituted another important organisation that contributed to the circulation of the revolutionary discourse in the early 1970s. Furthermore, it reveals that Cuban youth were included in the attempts to inculcate *guerrillista* values upon the population; that many of these young people would likely go on to serve in the Party in the years that followed offers a critical clue as to how ideas and values are perpetuated over time in revolutionary Cuba.

*La Invasión* recounted three historical examples in which the strategy of invasion had been applied by Cuban rebels within their broader revolutionary campaigns. Its aim was to demonstrate how such a strategy had altered the course of revolutionary struggle in 1868, 1895 and 1958 and, in so doing, to reveal the similarities between these respective rebel campaigns. The wider purpose of the book was to aid Cuban youth in their understanding of the roots of the Revolution. On this subject, it was written in the book's introduction:

Un tema como éste que parecía agotado, abre sus amplias y aún oscuras puertas a los jóvenes, interesados en ampliar sus conocimientos con otras lecturas que los ayuden a escharbar en las raíces históricas que explican nuestra posición revolucionaria de hoy (*La Invasión* 1972, 11).

As with a number of the texts already discussed in the analysis thus far, one particular theme emerged as a constant from a reading of *La Invasión*: the potential of an inferior force to defeat a much larger enemy. This theme was illustrated by an extract from the final chapter, 'Las invasiones de Camilo y el Che'. It was written that, during the insurrectionary phase of the Revolution, Batista's security forces:

a pesar de contar con numerosos recursos bélicos y gran cantidad de hombres, fueron derrotadas por el Ejército Rebelde, con escasos recursos y una fuerza numéricamente inferior. El triunfo de la invasión de 1895 originó el debilitamiento del régimen colonial, que tuvo como consecuencia la destitución del capitán general Arsenio

Martínez Campos. La invasión de 1958 ocasionó el derrocamiento del régimen dictatorial y la huida del tirano Fulgencio Batista (Núñez 1972, 301).

The parallelism established by the repetition of 'con...recursos', and the mirroring of the syntax in the two phrases, 'con numerosos recursos bélicos y gran cantidad de hombres' and 'con escasos recursos y una fuerza numéricamente inferior', accentuated the great disparity between Batista's forces and the Ejército Rebelde in terms of their respective weaponry and manpower. Similarly, the foregrounding of the subordinate clause, 'a pesar de contar con numerosos recursos bélicos', underlined the extent of Batista's military power and also, therefore, the tremendous feat achieved by the Ejército Rebelde in defeating it.

A comparable message regarding the capacity of an inferior force to succeed in combat despite beginning on an unequal footing was evident in a chapter entitled 'La Guerra de 1895: La invasión'. When discussing the movement of the rebels during the Cuban War of Independence of 1895, the authors wrote:

La columna invasora había atravesado por cuatro provincias en 71 días, enfrentándose en cada una de ellas con el enemigo que trataba de impedirle el paso, sin que a pesar de la superioridad numérica y de armamento, pudieran impedirlo (González and Revelo 1972, 193).

Much as in the previous example, the inclusion of the clause, 'sin que a pesar de la superioridad numérica y de armamento', emphasised the overall supremacy of the enemy forces and, in doing so, again underscored the impressive accomplishment of the rebels in managing to outmanoeuvre them.

As a final point on *La Invasión*, it should be noted that the publication of this text was very revealing with regard to the supposed existence of a 'siege mentality'.

Rather than present Cuba as a country permanently vulnerable to attack, this text informed Cuban youth that, in times of revolution, the Cuban people were themselves capable of attacking the enemy and achieving victories. Far from being a passive 'sitting duck', Cuba had the potential to be an agent of aggression against the imperialist enemy. However, the historical examples of invasion featured in the text suggested that this agency could only be acquired through the enactment of guerrilla warfare, and not, therefore, through the application of traditional military strategies involving the large-scale participation of the armed forces. In this way, the text serves to undermine both the notion of a 'siege mentality' and that of 'militarism' more broadly in its elevation of the guerrilla warfare approach.

This challenge posed to the idea that the Revolution had become thoroughly 'militarised' by the early 1970s is sustained by an analysis of the language featured in a text published the following year, the 1973 *Instrucción Política FAR: Libro Segundo*. As pointed out in Chapter Two, the *Instrucción Política* constitutes the central text around which this analysis is based, not least because it serves as a point of comparison for the analysis of the 1960 *Manual de Capacitación Cívica* conducted in the previous chapter. Evidence of a similar *guerrillista* rhetoric in both texts will reveal that, contrary to undergoing a process of absolute 'militarisation' and 'Sovietisation' in the early 1970s, the Revolution continued to be guided by the same principles which had underpinned the revolutionary project in the early 1960s. These principles were those housed within the code of *guerrillerismo*. In contrast to the 1960 *Manual de Capacitación Cívica*, however, the sole intended readership of the 1973 *Instrucción Política* were the members of the FAR, that is, military professionals and not, as in 1960, civilian volunteers who had signed up to join the

newly formed MNR. That the *Instrucción Política FAR* had an expressly military readership renders it particularly useful to this study. If it can be proven that *guerrillerismo* was promoted within the military itself, then the hypothesis that *guerrillerismo* was promoted by the leadership at a time when the Revolution had supposedly become 'militarised' is further corroborated. In other words, if leading figures in the military were advocating an emulation of the guerrilla ethos by their own soldiers, it follows that both former and serving military men within the revolutionary leadership were also endorsing the same values to the wider population.

What is also interesting about the 1973 *Instrucción Política* is that it constituted the fourth re-issue of the text, having first been published in 1968 (under the same title), and then again in 1969 and 1971. Although it has not been possible to locate the second and third issues, a side-by-side reading of the 1973 and 1968 texts revealed little difference between the two. The unmodified content in the 1973 edition indicates that this fourth re-issue was a re-printing, and not, therefore, a revised edition of the original text. That the text was simply re-printed is revealing, insofar as it implies that the leadership considered the ideological message communicated in 1968 to be of continued relevance in 1973. Put differently, it suggests a continuity in the beliefs and values promoted by the leadership from the first into the second decade of the Revolution in power. As will become clear in the following analysis, these beliefs and values were those of *guerrillerismo*.

The intended ideological function of the *Instrucción Política* was made clear in its 'Prólogo', in which it was stated that the text aimed to educate FAR members

concerning the key events that formed part of Cuba's 'cien años de lucha', while also 'educarlos en la línea política de nuestro Partido Comunista, así como llevar a cada miembro de las FAR el conocimiento de la labor económica que se desarrolla en el país, en la cual participa directamente' (*Instrucción* 1973, 5). The overall objective of the political education offered by the book seemed to be to heighten the revolutionary consciousness of each soldier. Again in the 'Prólogo', it was claimed that the text would:

contribuir en forma concreta a la tarea educacional desplegada sistemáticamente por la Revolución sin que con él nos propongamos hacer de cada combatiente un especialista en esta materia, adentrarlo cada vez más en la formación revolucionaria del hombre nuevo, capaz de luchar y vencer tanto en el plano militar como ideológico frente al enemigo común de todos los pueblos, el Imperialismo Yanqui, y de igual forma desarrollar aún más en nuestras tropas la conciencia y actitud internacionalista que firmemente practica nuestro pueblo (*Instrucción* 1973, 5).

The text opened with a very concise preamble in which global, historical events of the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, such as the French Revolution and the US War of Independence, were cited as having influenced Cuban political thought in the 1800s. There then followed a detailed description of the events leading up to and during the Ten Years' War of 1868-1878. Subsequently, a comprehensive overview of Cuban history was recounted, commencing with the Ten Years' War and concluding with the installation of the Revolutionary government in 1959. This retelling of Cuba's history constituted approximately two-thirds of the text, and was lifted from Ibarra's 1965 work, *Historia de Cuba*, which had been commissioned by MINFAR. Although not explicitly denoted as such, it would seem that the overview was intended to act as an illustration of the 'cien años de lucha' alluded to in the following citation from the 'Prólogo':

La educación política en las Unidades de las Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias adquiere dimensiones extraordinarias ante la necesidad de pertrechar a nuestros jóvenes soldados con el conocimiento de las tradiciones legadas por los gloriosos combatientes Mambises y del Ejército Rebelde. Los hombres y mujeres de nuestro pueblo, que a través de cien años de luchas emancipadoras han hecho posible erradicar en nuestra patria la explotación del hombre por el hombre, la dominación burguesa nacional y extranjera (*Instrucción* 1973, 5).

The narration of the ‘cien años de lucha’ was followed by a summary of the achievements of the Revolution up to that point, such as agrarian and social reforms. The final chapters were entitled ‘La Revolución Latinoamericana’ and ‘La Defensa de la Patria’.

What is evident from a reading of the first few pages of the book is that the *mambí* approach to revolutionary combat was presented in such a way as to appear to have been consistent with the guerrilla tactics employed by the Ejército Rebelde in the Revolution’s insurrectionary phase, and later recorded by Guevara in *La Guerra de Guerrillas*. An illustration of this representation of the *mambises’* strategic approach can be identified in Chapter One, entitled ‘La Guerra de los 10 Años’:

No satisfechos los ardorosos partidarios de Céspedes con la fecha fijada para iniciar el movimiento armado se reunieron el 5 de octubre en el ingenio “Rosario” y acordaron lanzarse a la lucha el día 14 de octubre nombrando Jefe Superior de la Revolución a Carlos Manuel de Céspedes, quien entendía que “la hora era no solamente del patriotismo digno y desinteresado, sino de la acción, que ni la vacilación, ni la serenidad de juicio, ni la precisa lógica histórica o filosófica, jamás produjeron guerras, sino que forzosamente en éstas ha de imperar el apasionamiento que no advierte los obstáculos que va a derribar como alucinado”(*Instrucción* 1973, 13/14).

Within this paragraph, the quotation marks included before ‘la hora...’ and ending after ‘alucinado’ indicated manifest intertextuality, specifically direct discourse representation, although the text incorporated was unspecified. However, the foregrounding of the reporting clause ‘Carlos Manuel de Céspedes, quien entendía

que...' directed the reader to believe that these were Céspedes' words retrospectively describing the events of that period. The *guerrillista* elements in this example are manifest in the emphasis placed on 'la acción' and, in contrast, the negative connotations attached to 'la vacilación' with regard to producing a war. These points were in accordance with the *foco* theory's stress upon the primacy of action and its promotion of the idea that a revolution had to be begun without delay. If one is to accept that this citation can be attributed to Céspedes, then the aim of this discourse representation was to create the impression that this central figure in the Ten Years' War had a *guerrillista* outlook concerning warfare.

This impression had, in fact, been partly established in other texts previously published by the leadership. Discussed in Chapter Two, the 1964 text, *Historia de Cuba*, for example, revealed that Céspedes was shown to have held the belief that a revolution could be generated with just twelve men. As previously stated, this idea that a numerically inferior side could win a war against a much larger enemy was, of course, consistent with Guevara's conclusion that 'Las fuerzas populares pueden ganar una guerra contra el ejército', and with his notion that an initial *foco* of just a handful of men could foment revolution. The alignment of Céspedes with the myth of *los doce* was also mentioned earlier in this chapter in the analysis of a citation from *Verde Olivo*, in which his resolve to continue fighting, despite possessing a vastly inferior combative force, was underlined. To reiterate the citation, it was stated that Céspedes 'se quedó con 12 hombres y con éstos decidió continuar la guerra' (*Verde Olivo* 1971b, 30). The association of Céspedes with the myth, which was referred to in the previous chapter as a presupposition, was strengthened in the first chapter of *Instrucción Política*, in which it was written:

Refiere el general Mestre uno de los acompañantes de Céspedes que al expresar uno de sus hombres “que todo se había perdido”, Céspedes replicó enérgicamente la frase que en nuestra patria se ha hecho doblemente histórica: ‘Aún quedamos doce hombres: bastan para hacer la independencia de Cuba’ (*Instrucción* 1973, 15).

Also underscored in this particular citation was the correlation between Céspedes’ struggle and that of the survivors of the *Granma* landing in 1956. This parallel was highlighted by the words, ‘la frase que en nuestra patria se ha hecho doblemente histórica’. Similar to the example cited from *Historia de Cuba*, the text producer assumed that the contemporary Cuban reader would have recognised the connotations of *los doce*, and therefore elected not to clarify them explicitly. The purpose of the words, however, was clearly to invite a comparison between Céspedes’ campaign and that of the *guerrilleros* in the Revolution’s insurrectionary phase. The use of quotation marks implied direct discourse representation, which guided the text recipient into believing that Céspedes made this *guerrillista* statement, thus adding to its legitimacy. Though the source of the text was not included, meaning that its legitimacy could not be verified, it achieved the objective of suggesting that the approach to warfare in the Ten Years’ War was not entirely dissimilar to that enacted by the *Granma* survivors. Thus, according to the representation in the historical narrative articulated in the hegemonic discourse, the *mambises* set in motion Cuba’s tradition of revolutionary guerrilla struggle, which would later culminate in the Revolution of the 1950s.

Additional examples in which a *guerrillista* language was used to describe Céspedes’ actions reinforced the effect of seeing the Ten Years’ War through the lens of *guerrillerismo*. The text claimed that Céspedes insisted upon a single point of command during war:

Céspedes pedía un poder centralizado que garantizara el mando único, necesidad ésta imprescindible en toda Guerra. Mientras Agramonte sueña con la República democrática, Céspedes se pregunta: ¿qué República? ¡Hay que hacer primero la guerra! La República vendrá después, la guerra exige unidad de mando, poder central que ordene y dirija (*Instrucción* 1973, 25).

This idea of a ‘mando único’ was central to Guevara’s *foco* methodology. In *La Guerra de Guerrillas*, Guevara posited that the armed and political wings of a movement should be fused into a single nucleus, the ‘base única’, or *foco* (Guevara 2006, 18). He wrote that ‘la guerrilla, como núcleo armado, es la vanguardia combatiente del mismo, su gran fuerza radica en la masa de la población’ (Guevara 2006, 16). This idea of the ‘base única’ was also central to Debray’s theorisation of *foquismo*. Indeed, as pointed out in Chapter One, Debray considered this precept to be one of Guevara’s most significant contributions to guerrilla warfare strategy, and thus chose to highlight its importance in *Révolution dans la Révolution?*. Debray asserted: ‘L’armée populaire sera le noyau du parti et non l’inverse. La guérilla est l’avant-garde politique “in nuce”’ (Debray 1967, 125).<sup>40</sup>

What is more, there was a clear allusion to the *foco* methodology’s tenet in ‘¡Hay que hacer primero la guerra!’ that one had to produce the subjective conditions for revolution. The use of the agentless passive ‘hay que’ was effective in its implication that the necessity of ‘making’ war was a universal duty, and was not, therefore, exclusive to specific groups in society. The use of this grammatical construction also placed emphasis on individual, rather than collective, action. This point was fortified through the use of an exclamatory declarative sentence; the sentence contained no subordinate clauses which may have obscured its intended

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<sup>40</sup>The popular army will be the nucleus of the party and not the reverse. The guerrilla army is the political vanguard *in nuce*’.

message. Furthermore, the absence of quotation marks indicated that this section, beginning with ‘¿qué República?’, was not an example of direct discourse representation. Yet the reader was directed to receive it as direct discourse, given that it was presented as though it were Céspedes’ own speech, missing only the quotation marks to confirm it as such. This presentation was likely intentional, with the aim of adding authority to these words, and was an effective way of creating the impression that Céspedes’ views on revolution were in accordance with those of the *foco* methodology.

Later in the text, in a section which narrated the birth of the Cuban national anthem, other protagonists in the War were also credited with having had a revolutionary perspective which was consistent with *foco*-style guerrilla warfare:

Para ellos, esperar más era de cobardes. No estar seguros del éxito era también de cobardes. Acción era lo que se necesitaba y allí estaban los tres — eran suficientes — para levantar a Cuba sobre sus hombros. Del presente habían saltado al porvenir sin valladares que les contuviesen (*Instrucción* 1973, 107).

This citation referred to the three conspirators, Perucho Figueredo, Francisco Vicente Aguilera and Francisco Maceo Osorio, whose actions set in motion the events that would lead up to the Ten Years’ War. There was a definite sense here that the idea of subjective will, of a voluntaristic approach to revolution, as extolled by the *foco* theory, was being promoted. This idea was manifest in the manipulation of syntax in the third sentence, whereby ‘acción’ was foregrounded, thus placing emphasis on this noun. The repetition of ‘cobardes’ also aided in conferring a negative association upon procrastination and lack of faith with regard to commencing a revolution, suggesting that those who demonstrated these qualities were not brave. Moreover, the words clearly communicated that a negligible number of people was adequate to

start a revolution, in 'allí estaban los tres — eran suficientes — para levantar a Cuba sobre sus hombres'. The interpolation of 'eran suficientes' between two dashes was effective in highlighting this latter point, particularly as it was not a necessary component to the sentence, or the story, but was included as something of a parenthetical thought. Its inclusion thus seems to indicate that the text producer fully intended to stress the diminutive nature of the group which was able to launch a war, and, in so doing, promote the idea that the establishment of an initial *foco*, comprised of a handful of men, was integral to producing a successful revolution.

Elsewhere in *Instrucción Política*, one can identify a still more explicit illustration of how the Ten Years' War was partly portrayed as a struggle which adhered to the *foco* methodology. In a section entitled 'Necesidad de la Unidad revolucionaria', it was written that, as part of the armed struggle against Spanish rule, 'Existían tres focos insurrectos y tres gobiernos' (*Instrucción* 1973, 24). The text then went on to say that 'ante el peligro existente del fracaso de los tres focos revolucionarios, surgió la necesidad de la unidad, iniciándose las primeras gestiones de acercamiento que culminaron en la Asamblea de Guáimaro en Camagüey' (*Instrucción* 1973, 24). The implication that the rebels fighting the colonial power were divided into *focos* again seems designed to suggest that the Ten Years' War followed a similar trajectory to that of the campaign carried out in the *sierra* subsequent to the *Granma* landing.

Yet perhaps the most obvious instances in which a language of the *foco* methodology can be identified are those found in Chapter Two of the text which was devoted to the attack on the Moncada barracks in 1953. The section 'Antecedentes del asalto al Cuartel Moncada' was a partial reproduction of an article by Raúl Castro written on

the seventh anniversary of the attack (1960). Again, manifest intertextuality was employed, in that the text was fully contextualised and its author specified. In the article, Raúl claimed: ‘Por aquellos tiempos Fidel decía: “Hace falta echar a andar un motor pequeño que ayude a arrancar el motor grande”’ (*Instrucción* 1973, 142). On the next page, he continued:

Ya Fidel lo tenía decidido: el motor pequeño sería la toma de la fortaleza del Moncada (...) la que una vez en nuestras manos, echaría a andar el motor grande, que sería el pueblo combatiendo, con las armas que capturaríamos (...) Sólo había una parte débil del plan: si fallábamos en la toma del cuartel, toda se vendría abajo. Una cosa dependía de la otra, el motor grande del pequeño; pero era una posibilidad y detrás de ella nos lanzamos (*Instrucción* 1973, 143).

The figurative language employed in these citations, whereby the metaphor of small and large motors was used to describe the stages of revolutionary action, invited an association with the *foco* theory. The metaphor connoted the sequence of events set out in the theory: the establishment of an initial *foco* as a means of setting in motion a revolution, followed by the creation of a network of *focos* which would eventually form an ‘Ejército Regular’, able to defeat the state security apparatus (Guevara 2006, 21). It is possible to equate the ‘motor pequeño’ with the first *foco*, and the ‘motor grande’ with the subsequent stage involving a greater number of combatants and, therefore, *focos*. While this citation did not refer to a *foco* directly, it did, figuratively, focus on the importance of the initial stage of a revolution; in this case, it was the attack on the Moncada barracks which was the event that, through its very realisation, aimed to produce a revolution. This message was further underlined through the repetition of the ‘motor’ metaphor. Additionally, the representation (with questionable accuracy) of Fidel’s direct discourse within the intertext was an attempt at conferring legitimacy on this notion through its attribution to the Revolution’s leader. Parallels can be drawn here with the focus on the embryonic

stage of a revolution demonstrated in the 1960 *Manual de Capacitación Cívica*, analysed in the previous chapter.

What was also highlighted in this extract was the notion that the success of a revolution was completely dependent on the success, or failure, of the first revolutionary action. Despite the failure of the Moncada assault, this issue was presented as something of a minor problem. The use of the adjective 'sólo' in the declarative sentence, 'Sólo había una parte débil del plan', seemed intended to preclude the possibility of there having been any other weaknesses to this strategy for revolution. The metaphor was repeated for a final time in the text's referral to the Moncada defeat: 'El ataque al Moncada falló y el motor pequeño en ese momento no pudo echar a andar al grande' (*Instrucción* 1973, 145). In that instance, the temporal adverb, 'en ese momento', indicated that, while this strategy failed at Moncada, there was another, later example in which the small motor would successfully ignite the 'motor grande': that is, the landing of the *Granma* and the launching of the insurrectionary phase of the Cuban Revolution.

However, while the Moncada attack was argued to have failed to start up the 'motor grande' of a widespread revolution, the following section, 'Significado histórico del asalto al Cuartel Moncada', suggested that it was, in fact, the nucleus that would later set in motion the Cuban Revolution. It stated:

En la acción del Moncada, el 26 de julio, hacen su aparición los principales elementos dirigentes de nuestra Revolución. Moncada es el núcleo del Ejército Rebelde: el Ejército Rebelde es el núcleo del Partido. Alrededor de ese núcleo, porque existía ya ese núcleo con su propia dirección político-militar, fue como pudieron reunirse a su alrededor otras fuerzas políticas que forman el actual Partido Comunista de Cuba (*Instrucción* 1973, 155).

What is more, it was claimed that the Ejército Rebelde had been the nucleus of the Communist Party. It would appear that the intention of such statements was to establish a link between Moncada, the insurrectionary phase, and the Party, as it stood at the time of publication. The focus was on the significance of the 'núcleo', as was evident through the repetition of the word, and how, out of a nucleus, something greater could be produced. In this way, Moncada was presented not as a failed event, but as an event which sowed the seeds for the eventual birth of the Ejército Rebelde, whose campaign *would* be successful. The purpose of the interlinking of events was to remind the reader of the origins of the Revolution, to reinforce the fact that all these events formed part of the same Cuban struggle.

The use of a *guerrillista* language to depict the Moncada strike continued throughout the section, and was particularly apparent in the following citation:

Las revoluciones se realizan cuando hay condiciones objetivas para ello. Las condiciones subjetivas pueden irse creando en el transcurso de la lucha. Analizando las condiciones objetivas y subjetivas Fidel expresaba en su discurso del XIII aniversario del ataque al cuartel Moncada, el 26 de julio de 1966: "...esta cuestión de lo objetivo y lo subjetivo se refiere, lo primero a las condiciones sociales y materiales de las masas (...) Y los factores subjetivos son los que se refieren al grado de conciencia que el pueblo tenga".

Las condiciones objetivas existían en Cuba en aquella época y Fidel ideó cómo aprovecharlas. "A nosotros nos parecía que las condiciones revolucionarias había que crearlas y había que crearlas luchando", diría más tarde Fidel, "porque las masas lo que sentían era la opresión, lo que sufrían era las necesidades (...) El revolucionario tiene que actuar con ese sentimiento de las masas, con ese sentido que tiene de la explotación que sufre, de las necesidades que padece. Y el verdadero revolucionario no espera que esos llamados factores subjetivos se den de manera cabal".

"La lucha tiene que venir primero, e inevitablemente detrás de la lucha vendrá con ímpetu creciente la conciencia revolucionaria" (*Instrucción* 1973, 149).

In these paragraphs, the *guerrillista* elements, and, more specifically, the echoes of the *foco* methodology, were unmistakable. For instance, in the line, 'A nosotros nos

parecía que las condiciones revolucionarias había que crearlas y había que crearlas luchando’, there was a clear allusion to the *foco* tenet concerning the crucial role of subjective will in producing the subjective conditions for revolution. The repetition of ‘crearlas’ reinforced the message that subjective conditions had to be *made* through the actions of the revolutionary. In this instance, the emphasis would appear to have been on the role of the individual, rather than the collective, in producing the subjective conditions for revolution, as is evident in the use of the third person singular in the line ‘el revolucionario tiene que actuar con ese sentimiento de las masas’. Similarly, the final declarative sentence, ‘el verdadero revolucionario no espera que esos llamados factores subjetivos se den de manera cabal’, was aimed at mobilising revolutionary action on an individual level. This sentence in particular contained echoes of the opening of the second of Guevara’s three key precepts: ‘No siempre hay que esperar a que se den todas las condiciones para la revolución’ (Guevara 2006, 13). It should be pointed out that, while the central implication of these paragraphs was that the individual must produce the revolutionary subjective conditions, they also included the message that the subjective conditions were being produced on behalf of the masses. In other words, it was the collective whose suffering should inspire the individual, and who should benefit from revolutionary activity. This notion was comparable to that promoted in the 1960 *Manual de Capacitación Cívica*: that is, that the actions of the individual could only acquire meaning if they were carried out in the name of the collective. In the final line of the citation, ‘La lucha tiene que venir primero’, one can also identify parallels with the earlier statement attributed to Céspedes: ‘¡Hay que hacer primero la guerra!’ (*Instrucción* 1973, 25). Again, the point being made here was that an initial struggle,

created by the revolutionary, had to come before all other considerations, and that out of this struggle would arise the revolution.

Further on in the text, reference was made once again to the idea of creating the subjective conditions for revolution through a discussion of the Moncada attack. A rhetorical device ubiquitous in this text, direct discourse representation, was employed once more to promote this message in the section “‘La Historia me Absolverá’: programa de liberación nacional’. The text read:

En su intervención en la Universidad Popular, el primero de diciembre de 1961, el comandante Fidel Castro dijo:

“...sólo sobre bases de condiciones objetivas es posible, en un momento histórico, hacer una revolución...”. “(...) no puede haber revolución, en primer lugar, si no hay circunstancias objetivas que en un momento histórico dado, faciliten y hagan posible la revolución. Es decir, que la revolución no puede nacer en la mente de los hombres...Los hombres pueden interpretar una ley de la historia, un momento determinado del desarrollo histórico. Hacer una interpretación correcta es impulsar el movimiento revolucionario, y en Cuba, el papel nuestro, fue de impulsores de ese movimiento, sobre la apreciación de una serie de condiciones objetivas. Nosotros simplemente ideamos cómo aprovechar las condiciones objetivas existentes...” (*Instrucción* 1973, 180).

In this example, the emphasis was on building a revolution upon the pre-existing objective conditions. As before, this idea was undoubtedly *guerrillista*, if it is compared to Guevara’s second conclusion in *La Guerra de Guerrillas*: ‘el foco insurreccional puede desarrollar condiciones subjetivas sobre la base de condiciones objetivas dadas’ (Guevara 2006, 13). The text producer’s decision to include this particular section of Castro’s speech, beginning with “...sólo sobre bases de condiciones objetivas es posible, en un momento histórico, hacer una revolución...”, foregrounded the message that this direct discourse representation intended to impart on the reader. It also illustrated how direct discourse representation allowed for a certain amount of manipulation of the original discourse, insofar as it could be

selectively represented in order to convey the message of the text producer. Choosing to open the discourse with the adjective 'sólo' underlined the notion that there was no alternative to producing revolution based on the objective conditions already in place.

The final part of the text devoted to Cuban history concerned the guerrilla campaign carried out by the Ejército Rebelde between 1956 and 1959, in a section titled, 'Desarrollo de la Insurrección Armada'. Equal to the other examples discussed, the strength of the *guerrillista* language did not falter when it came to recounting the events in the *sierra*. The promotion of *guerrillerismo* in the chapter recounting the events of the insurrectionary phase of the Revolution is perhaps unsurprising, given that the guerrilla struggle of the *sierra*, according to the Cuban historical narrative, was the event which drew inspiration from, and, ultimately, concluded the previous struggles for independence. It also, of course, provided the basis for Guevara's methodology of guerrilla warfare, its successful outcome having legitimised its use as a model for revolutionary struggle.

Similar to the rest of the text, much emphasis was placed on the role of the people in this section, for example, 'El pueblo, actor principal de esta gloriosa epopeya revolucionaria' (*Instrucción* 1973, 331) and '¡Pero es definitiva es la acción del pueblo la que será decisiva para alcanzar el triunfo!' (*Instrucción* 1973, 205). As before, these words granted agency to the Cuban people with regard to the task of producing revolution, and echoed Guevara's tenet that, 'Las fuerzas populares pueden ganar una guerra contra el ejército' (Guevara 2006, 13).

Here we see also explicit references to the existence, and fundamental role, of guerrilla *focos* in the insurrectionary phase:

El desembarco del “Granma” y el levantamiento de Santiago fueron un nuevo llamado a toda la juventud al sacrificio y a la lucha. Sacudieron a las masas en forma definitiva. La existencia de un foco guerrillero, y después de un territorio libre controlado por la Revolución iban a constituir una fuente permanente de fe en la victoria (*Instrucción* 1973, 196).

These words clearly stated that it was the establishment of a guerrilla *foco*, and later a ‘territorio libre’, which pushed forward the Revolution, and which was a source of inspiration for those participating in it. The text producer thus intended to underline that it was guerrilla struggle which had played the most significant role in the successful outcome of the Revolution, as opposed to the other forms of rebellion which occurred during that time, such as clandestine activity in urban locations. What was also manifest in the citation was a continued use of a religious lexicon, identifiable in the inclusion of the words ‘sacrificio’ and ‘fe’. The attachment of the word ‘fe’ to the guerrilla struggle, this time in the sense that the *foco* was a ‘fuente permanente’ of faith in victory, reinforced the notion established in earlier texts that revolutionary struggle required an unfaltering belief in the attainment of the desired outcome. Moreover, it suggested that the guerrilla *foco*, and the territory that the *guerrilleros* would later liberate, were symbolic of the act of pursuing triumph over adversity.

The idea that the guerrilla struggle had made the greatest contribution to the victory of the Revolution was echoed later on in the same chapter, when it was stated that:

La lucha insurreccional en nuestro país adoptó diversas formas. La forma más alta, incuestionablemente, fue la lucha guerrillera que forjó el Ejército Rebelde, brazo armado y núcleo político de la revolución, primero en las Montañas de la Sierra

Maestra y luego en otros lugares hasta extenderse por todas las zonas rurales del país donde combatió y logró derrotar al ejército de la tiranía (*Instrucción* 1973, 269).

In this citation, the primacy of guerrilla warfare as a method of revolutionary struggle was more explicitly expressed than in the previous example, given that it was designated the 'forma más alta' of all the types of struggle waged during the insurrectionary stage. The idea of the guerrilla *foco* as an armed nucleus was also underscored here, with the words 'el Ejército Rebelde, brazo armado y núcleo político de la revolución'.

Thus far in the analysis of the 1973 *Instrucción Política*, we have established that there is much evidence to confirm the promotion of *guerrillerismo* in this particular text. The evidence for this promotion has largely been found in the text's historical narrative, particularly with respect to the presentation of the independence campaigns of the nineteenth century. These campaigns were conveyed as guerrilla struggles in the same vein as the Revolution's insurrection, while their perpetrators were shown to have held views consistent with Guevara's *foco* theory.

In Chapter Four of the text, however, we see a shift in focus to the potential for revolution in contemporary Latin America. This chapter bore the title 'La Revolución Latinoamericana' and was largely made up of the report provided by the Cuban delegation to the OLAS conference in 1967. The inclusion of the report was an example of manifest intertextuality, insofar as the context and title of the report were clearly stated: 'Informe de la Delegación Cubana a la Primera Conferencia de la Organización Latinoamericana de Solidaridad'. The OLAS conference, staged in Havana, was referred to in the previous chapter in the thesis, in which Fidel Castro's

closing speech to the event was analysed. As previously stated, the speech was deliberately incendiary. Castro did not hold back in his criticisms of imperialist domination, while simultaneously declaring the inevitability of a Latin American revolution. The message contained in the delegation's report was of a similar tone. Indeed, one chapter of the report was titled 'La Revolución es inevitable', and the report's purpose as a call to arms was unmistakable. To illustrate this latter point, in the aforementioned chapter it was stated that:

La violencia, en sus variadas manifestaciones, ha sido hasta hoy la única vía conocida para alcanzar el triunfo revolucionario. La violencia es la partera de la historia. No puede señalarse un solo caso, en el largo proceso histórico de la humanidad, en el cual la revolución haya alcanzado la victoria sin utilizar los medios de la insurrección o de la lucha armada. No existe experiencia en contra de esta afirmación, porque, sencillamente, no la hay (*Instrucción* 1973, 407).

It was thus clear that, at the time of its distribution, the report, and, therefore, the leadership, aimed to encourage violent armed struggle across the Latin American continent. Other excerpts from the report implied that the leadership was not promoting just any method of violent struggle, but a specifically *foquista* form of warfare. For instance, the report asserted that 'El escenario fundamental donde puede desarrollarse la vanguardia de la lucha revolucionaria no es la ciudad, sino el campo, no son las regiones urbanas, sino las montañosas' (*Instrucción* 1973, 411). This statement recalled, of course, Guevara's third *aportación* on armed struggle from *La Guerra de Guerrillas*: 'En la América subdesarrollada, el terreno de la lucha armada debe ser fundamentalmente el campo' (Guevara 2006, 13). Similarly, given that this report was published in the same year as Debray's *Révolution dans la Révolution?*, the citation also echoed Debray's insistence that, while power was held and, therefore, seized in the city, 'le chemin qui y mène les exploités passe par la

campagne, inéluctablement' (Debray 1967, 122).<sup>41</sup> Guevara and Debray's words were also reflected in the following citation: 'Si proclamamos ser revolucionarios, debemos atenernos a las consecuencias de esta actitud y debemos comprender la hondura y significado de esta posición. La vacilación y la duda, sólo pueden beneficiar al enemigo' (*Instrucción* 1973, 408). In this example, the negative outcome attributed to hesitation over revolutionary activity was consistent with Guevara's *foco* theory, and Debray's *foquismo*. Central to the *foco* theory, in its original and expanded form, was the idea that revolutionary action had to be undertaken without delay; one had to produce the 'subjective conditions' for revolution, instead of waiting for the appropriate 'objective conditions' to arise.

Finally, an additional instance of the promotion of revolutionary activity in line with the *foco* methodology and *foquismo* was identifiable in the report's emphasis on the establishment of a guerrilla vanguard:

La vanguardia estará en la guerrilla, la vanguardia estará en los dirigentes de la guerra. Lo confirma la experiencia histórica, y es algo que resulta evidente. Es necesario, por lo tanto, que en los países donde se desarrolle la lucha armada se comprenda con claridad que la dirección política de la revolución, la conducta política de la misma, debe estar a cargo de los dirigentes guerrilleros. Quienes no lo comprendan, claramente, no han entendido algo tan importante como la experiencia histórica de la Revolución Cubana, y el papel de la guerrilla dentro de la lucha de las clases. Si la guerrilla es la forma de lucha fundamental y se constituye en vanguardia, la dirección política debe coincidir con la dirección de la guerrilla (*Instrucción* 1973, 414).

These words were undoubtedly consistent with Guevara's belief that 'la guerrilla, como núcleo armado, es la vanguardia combatiente del mismo, su gran fuerza radica en la masa de la población' (Guevara 2006, 16). However, given the timing of the report's distribution, it is perhaps more appropriate to compare these words with

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<sup>41</sup> 'The path which leads the exploited there passes, unavoidably, through the countryside'.

Debray's work, particularly as the idea of the guerrilla vanguard featured more prominently in the latter's text than in Guevara's. Debray expanded on Guevara's proposal regarding a 'base única' by stressing the centrality of vanguardism to revolutionary struggle, and stating that the popular army would be the nucleus of the political party, as referred to earlier in this chapter (Debray 1967, 125).

In the fifth and final chapter of the text, 'La Defensa de la Patria', the rhetoric ceased to be expressly *foquista*, instead adopting a similar *guerrillista* tone to the rest of the text. This shift back to *guerrillerismo* was logical, given that this particular chapter was concerned with the defence of the Revolution and not the spread of armed struggle in other countries. In addition to unearthing evidence of *guerrillerismo*, an analysis of the final chapter also sheds some light on the issue of 'siege mentality', and whether or not this mindset was encouraged by the leadership in the early 1970s.

At first glance, one might conclude that a chapter entitled 'La Defensa de la Patria' would necessarily promote a 'siege mentality', in that it implied that the Revolution was in danger of being attacked. Indeed, there is much to support this assumption within the chapter. The text stated that Cuba was living 'bajo la directa amenaza del imperialismo yanqui', and that, 'El imperialismo quiere destruir nuestra Revolución, acabar con el ejemplo que nuestra Patria significa' (*Instrucción* 1973, 451/452). Such statements conveyed a clear message: the Revolution had an enemy to the north which plotted its annihilation. The focus on the necessity of preparation and 'disciplina militar' in the chapter compounded this notion of a Revolution under

siege, while also implying that the responsibility to defend against an attack fell to the newly professionalised FAR and its recently acquired modern weaponry.

Yet, as with the majority of the previous examples discussed in which the possibility of aggressive measures against the Revolution was underlined, the overarching tone of the chapter was one of confident defiance. The text implied that, rather than leading a besieged and isolated nation, the Cuban Revolution viewed itself as an example to other nations, and would thus refuse to allow itself to be isolated by North American imperialism. Through its example, the Revolution was bound to, and would continue to, establish relations with other nations fighting for a similar cause. The text read:

El imperialismo norteamericano sabe lo que significa nuestra Revolución para los pueblos oprimidos del mundo, sabe que su ejemplo se arraiga cada vez más en los corazones de los pueblos y quiere destruir o aislar ese ejemplo. Pero nuestro pueblo, fiel seguidor de Camilo y el Che, no dejará ni destruir ni aislar su ejemplo y ante la estrategia de agresión y crimen del imperialismo, opondrá su estrategia revolucionaria e internacionalista hasta las últimas consecuencias (*Instrucción* 1973, 443).

A sense of defiance was conveyed in this example through the words 'no dejará ni destruir ni aislar su ejemplo'. The reference to 'estrategia revolucionaria e internacionalista' was also interesting in its implication that, while the Revolution may have desisted to openly support armed revolutionary movements, it had not discarded its internationalist principles. This statement could be seen to have pre-figured the Revolution's involvement in the Angolan Civil War just two years later and, in this way, was a means of warning soldiers of the potential for overseas missions.

Religious connotations can once again be inferred from this extract, in the words, 'fiel seguidor de Camilo y el Che'. The projection of the Cuban people as faithful followers of the heroic *guerrilleros* implied a religious devotion to these two figures, while concomitantly setting them up as religious martyrs. This presentation evidences a promotion of *guerrillerismo* here, insofar as the *guerrillero* was elevated as a model for revolutionary action, or, in this case, for defending the *patria*, yet it also contributes to the substantiation of Fernández's concept regarding the existence of a 'political religion' in Cuba (Fernández 2000, 63).

The image of Camilo and 'el Che' as inspirational revolutionary heroes was manifest elsewhere in the chapter. An illustration can be found in the following example:

Decir "soy un soldado revolucionario, miembro de las gloriosas Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias de mi Patria y estoy dispuesto a dar mi sangre por mi pueblo o por cualquier pueblo que luche contra la explotación", es ser digno heredero del legado patriótico de Maceo, Martí, Máximo Gómez, Camilo y el Che (*Instrucción* 1973, 455).<sup>42</sup>

In this extract, it was made explicit that the members of the armed forces should consider themselves the heirs of the legacy not just of Camilo and 'el Che' but of the great *independentistas* who came before them. The listing of the *mambises*, together with the two of the most famous (and deceased) *guerrilleros* from the Revolution's insurrectionary phase, reinforced the idea that there was a continuity to Cuba's history of revolution. It implied that Cuba had endured a single struggle for independence, one which still continued under the Revolution in power, and whose

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<sup>42</sup> Antonio Maceo was one of the foremost figures of the Cuban independence struggles, having played a pivotal role in both the Ten Years' War and the War of Independence. Also referred to as the 'Titán de Bronce', Maceo has been described as 'one of the great heroes of Cuban nationalism' (Thomas 1998, 255n.). Máximo Gómez was another prominent leader in the same struggles, acting as the 'principal military strategist of the Ten Year's War', and military commander in the war of 1895 (Azicri 1988, 11).

reins were held by the FAR. Moreover, it created the impression that Maceo, Martí and Máximo Gómez were also heroic *guerrilleros*, given that their names were listed alongside, and, therefore, afforded equal status as the country's most famous guerrilla fighters. Of additional significance in this extract was the statement that members of the FAR must be ready to give their lives 'por cualquier pueblo que luche contra la explotación'. As with the previous citation, the implication here was that the leadership had not ruled out the possibility of future involvement in foreign conflicts.

A similar elevation of prominent *guerrilleros* from Cuban history was identifiable on the next page:

Los soldados que hoy forman nuestras FAR, están dotados de los mismos sentimientos que tenían Céspedes, Martí, Maceo, de los mismos sentimientos y del mismo coraje que nos legó el Che. Si queremos que la patria, si queremos que la revolución, que nuestras madres, como Mariana, se sientan orgullosas de nuestra actitud, seamos seguidores de los héroes del 68 y del 95, de Camilo y del Che (*Instrucción* 1973, 456).

Once again, the *mambises* were given equal status to Camilo and Che in terms of their importance as revolutionary heroes. Furthermore, the reappearance of the word 'seguidores' sustained the religious undertones established in the previous citation. In this instance, it was clearly asserted that, to be a good soldier, one had to demonstrate devotion to one's revolutionary forefathers through the emulation of their character. The text producer attempted to manipulate the reader into assuming such an attitude through the appeal to his or her emotions, as evidenced in the phrase, 'que nuestras madres, como Mariana, se sientan orgullosas de nuestra actitud'.<sup>43</sup> In some ways, this appeal was a mild form of emotional blackmail in its suggestion that ignoring the example of the *guerrilleros* would lead to disappointment on behalf of

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<sup>43</sup> Mariana Grajales was the mother of Antonio Maceo.

the soldier's mother. The employment of the emotional factor here is consistent with Fernández's idea that, in addition to a 'political religion', the Revolution has also fostered a 'politics of passion' (Fernández 2000, 63). This type of politics, he states, is 'deeply affective' and encompasses the emotional and informal aspects of political activity (Fernández 2000, 21).

What is also apparent in the final chapter is the attempt by the text producer to underplay the significance of the recently acquired materiel from the Revolution's Soviet allies. The text put forward the message that the efficacy of any weapon was dependent upon the courage and will of the man who handled it. Indeed, the subtitle to one section of the chapter was 'El arma vale lo que vale el hombre que la maneja' (*Instrucción* 1973, 457). In this section, the inferiority of both the *mambises* and the Ejército Rebelde with respect to their firepower was underscored, as shown in the extract below:

Pero lo que no sabían las hienas era que el Ejército Rebelde era digno heredero del ejército mambí, que luchaba por la misma razón que lucharon ellos, tenía el mismo enemigo, era el mismo criminal, el explotador, y si los mambises combatían con el machete contra el fusil, el Ejército Rebelde combatió con la vieja escopeta a la ametralladora, al tanque, al mortero (*Instrucción* 1973, 457).

Similar to the examples cited earlier from *La Invasión*, and several of the texts discussed earlier in Chapter Two, the purpose of such statements was to demonstrate that what mattered most in armed struggle was the will of the rebels, and not, therefore, the capacity of their weaponry. What can also be inferred from this extract is that the text producer wished to downplay the effect that the weapons obtained from the Soviets would have on the FAR's military capabilities. In other words, the intention was to remind soldiers that their greatest weapon of all was the historical

legacy of the *mambises* and the Ejército Rebelde, and the ability to be able to draw strength and inspiration from this legacy. In doing so, the text producer was promoting *guerrillerismo* by stressing the centrality of the attitude of the individual or, put differently, the subjective conditions, in revolutionary struggle. What is more, in minimising the impact of the newly acquired military apparatus, the text producer was, in turn, undermining the Soviet influence more broadly; additional resources and a restructuring of the political system did not signify a change in the values which underpinned the Revolution, nor did they indicate that the Revolution had transformed into a 'militarised' system of governance.

To conclude the analysis of the 1973 *Instrucción Política*, it would seem that the messages contained within the text were largely inconsistent with the practical changes that the Revolution was implementing at that time, and, therefore, with the subsequent interpretation of these changes as signifying a process of 'Sovietisation' or 'institutionalisation'. In the first instance, the text's focus on the one hundred years of struggle is interesting in that it was clearly aimed at disseminating the message that, though the insurrectionary phase had ended in victory in 1959, Cuba was still very much engaged in a battle, both to defend the Revolution against internal and external enemies, and to maintain it through participation in revolutionary activity. This message of continuing struggle would have been particularly resonant in 1968, the year the first edition of the *Instrucción Política* appeared, and not simply because it was the centenary of the commencement of the Ten Years' War. The year was also designated the 'Año del Guerrillero Heroico' in honour of Guevara who was killed in 1967 whilst attempting to establish a *foco*-based guerrilla campaign in Bolivia. This revitalisation of the myth of the heroic

guerrilla at that time was intended to encourage foreign revolutionary movements to persist in their attempts at armed guerrilla warfare, in spite of the overwhelming failure of *foco*-style warfare across Latin America during the 1960s. With this in mind, the incorporation of the 'Informe de la Delegación Cubana a la Primera Conferencia de la Organización Latinoamericana de Solidaridad' in the 1968 edition is unsurprising, insofar as its promotion of *foquismo* reflected the leadership's position concerning armed struggle at a given moment. It is logical that the leadership would have wished to inform its soldiers, and offer them a greater understanding, of the Revolution's foreign policy stance in this respect. Moreover, the labelling of 1968 as the 'Año del Guerrillero Heroico' served as an added reminder to the Cuban people that the need for heroism and action, as had been demonstrated by the guerrillas of the *sierra*, was still pertinent at that time. Cuba was experiencing a period of intense isolation from the rest of Latin America, ideological differences with its closest ally, the Soviet Union, and unremitting alienation from the United States.

As we have established, however, much had changed in Cuba in the time between the first publication of the *Instrucción Política* in 1968 and the appearance of its fourth edition some five years later. In 1973, the process of 'institutionalisation' was in full swing, and the Revolution's guerrilla past appeared to be a distant memory as, simultaneous to becoming 'institutionalised', the Revolution also became increasingly 'militarised', according to the majority of foreign observers. Indeed, Horowitz has argued that 1973 in particular was a pivotal moment in the militarisation process, largely as a result of Raúl Castro's increased authority within the Cuban government. To recapitulate the earlier citation, Horowitz states that:

Not only did 1973 represent a new stage in the militarization of Cuban communism, but it also witnessed the thoroughgoing displacement of Guevara as the number-two figure (even in death) by the orthodox military figure of Raúl Castro (...) Raúl's rise to a place second only to Fidel's, and increasingly paralleling Fidel's role in crucial state and diplomatic functions, can hardly be exaggerated. Raúl has become the spokesman for all things military and the heir apparent to the revolution itself. His orthodoxy extends to the cut of his uniform (...) and his insistence on creating ranks within the Cuban military that are isomorphic with military ranks elsewhere in the world (Horowitz 2008, 137).

Furthermore, with this process came a weakening of Cuba's support for revolutionary movements abroad, which signalled the end of its period of 'Fidelista radicalism' (1962-1968), to use Erisman's term. The decision to re-print *Instrucción Política*, with its overtly *guerrillista* and, at times, *foquista* rhetoric, thus now seems to be at odds with the Revolutionary project of the early 1970s. The inclusion of the 'Informe' in the re-published version in particular is highly significant. By 1973, the Revolution had curbed its more radical tendencies, and had ceased to offer its support vocally and financially for armed revolutionary movements. This new-found restraint was, as already mentioned, part of the leadership's attempt to establish closer ties with the Soviet Union. Choosing to include an explicitly *foquista* document in the re-published version of an earlier text thus raises the question as to why it was not removed, in light of the fact that it did not coincide with the leadership's new, more pragmatic approach. It is probable that this perpetuation of the encouragement of revolution overseas was an indication of the fact that, though more cautious in its approach, the Revolution was still committed to its principles of internationalism. Evidence of these principles was identifiable in the final chapter, which referred to the 'estrategia revolucionaria e internacionalista' of the Revolution, and the duty of Cuban soldiers to fight for other nations. This

proposal that Cuba retained its internationalist outlook in the 1970s is supported by Valdés:

After 1968, Cuban foreign policy was redefined and with it some of the facets of internationalism, but the trend away from adventuristic guerrilla plots did not signify a reversal of principles. Fundamental ideological beliefs were left intact; methods for implementing them were changed. Internationalist solidarity continued, but now it was founded on those movements that were already in power, or could succeed in taking power in a short space of time. Yet the convictions and daring outlook remained (Valdés 1979, 89).

Yet the greatest confirmation of the Revolution's integrity with respect to its internationalist rhetoric was the FAR's very involvement in overseas conflict, most notably in Angola.

Concerning the *guerrillerista* representation in the text of the campaigns enacted by the *mambises*, this was also notable for its apparent incompatibility with the Revolution's shift towards Soviet orthodoxy. In the texts from the 1960s analysed in the previous chapter, the representation of Cuban history as one of a perpetual guerrilla struggle was indicative of an attempt to confer historical legitimacy upon the leadership's continued promotion of the guerrilla ethos in its first decade, and its active support for revolutionary movements abroad. In the 1970s, however, such a portrayal of Cuban history and its prominent actors was demonstrative of an attempt to confer legitimacy not just on the promotion of *guerrillerismo*, but also on certain figures in the upper echelons of the Cuban government. To elucidate further, the purpose of shaping a *guerrillerista* history was to strengthen the hegemonic role within the government of those that had participated in the *sierra*. This hypothesis can be substantiated if one accepts the proposal put forward at the start of this chapter, that is, that the years 1971-1975 were a period of internal debate in the

government regarding the direction of the Revolution, and, specifically, whether it should proceed in the direction of Soviet orthodoxy. The fact that Cuba did not hold its first Communist Party Congress until 1975 suggests that such a debate was occurring behind the scenes. With this delay in mind, it is possible to argue that the former *guerrilleros* of the *sierra* were trying to assert their authority against those within the government who were pushing for this increased orthodoxy. This latter contingent was comprised of former members of the Partido Socialista Popular (PSP), Cuba's pre-Revolution Communist party, who had for many years been arguing for the establishment of closer ties with the Soviet Union (Mesa-Lago 1974, 7). Having suffered persecution in 1968 when a 'microfaction' of PSP leaders was imprisoned for 'antigovernment activities', the Revolution's rapprochement with Moscow saw to it that those associated with the PSP regained their standing within the leadership (Mesa-Lago 1974, 8). This revival of PSP figures may have impelled the former *guerrilleros* to assert their authority within the leadership. Such authority could be achieved by granting themselves historical legitimacy, a legitimacy derived not just from having participated in the key events leading up to the Revolution's victory, but from establishing parallels between their actions and other heroes from Cuban history. The claim that other, earlier historical actors employed the same *guerrillista* principles of producing revolution implied that those who initiated Moncada, and later the insurrection, should be afforded the same level of reverence.

There is a case to argue that the narration of a *guerrillista* history for political ends in the early 1970s was not a novel strategy for gaining hegemonic control within the Revolution. Indeed, the representation of the insurrectionary phase in Guevara's *La Guerra de Guerrillas* was a deliberate *mis*-representation with a similar objective in

the early 1960s. Guevara's account of the struggle against Batista neglected to afford sufficient attention to the support of the rural guerrillas' *llano* counterparts in bringing about the revolutionary victory, and instead overplayed the role of those who fought in the *sierra*. Consequently, the *foco* theory's central precepts were based upon a partially mythicised version of an historical event. Childs proposes that this mythification of the insurrection, and the resulting 'sierrisation' of the *foco* theory, was politically motivated, with its aim being to legitimise, to some extent, the so-called *fidelistas*' ascendancy in the formative Cuban revolutionary government (Childs 1995, 606). In other words, attributing a larger contribution of the revolutionary success to those who fought in the *sierra* (Castro and Guevara, for example) would justify their occupation of key governmental positions within the Cuban government. Childs argues that such a justification might have been necessary in 1962 when, following the declaration that the Revolution would adhere to a socialist ideology in April 1961, a new government was under construction, within which various discourses were competing for hegemony (Kapcia, 2000). The same former *guerrilleros* found themselves in a similar situation in 1973, and thus resorted to this tried-and-tested tactic: the re-articulation of an historical narrative in such as a way as to reinforce the political agenda of the narrator.

In addition to strengthening the hegemony of those who had fought in the *sierra*, the narration of a history of guerrilla warfare undermined the practical process of the 'Sovietisation' of the FAR, as mentioned earlier. Soldiers were informed of the long tradition of Cuban revolutionary leaders who had favoured an endogenous method of enacting revolution, as opposed, therefore, to borrowing from foreign models. Indeed, as the citations from *Instrucción Política* indicate, the 'cien años de lucha'

narrated could have been alternatively titled 'cien años de guerrillerismo'. The implication was thus that this Cuban 'tradition' of guerrilla struggle should be perpetuated by the FAR, despite its on-going transformation into a highly professionalised institution equipped with Soviet weaponry. The attempt to inculcate this message upon members of the armed forces is even more significant, in light of the fact that the head of the FAR was Raúl Castro. As already pointed out, the increased political authority granted to the younger of the Castro brothers has been viewed as instrumental to the supposed 'militarisation' process, yet he is also seen as having been a leading proponent of Cuba's rapprochement with the USSR and the general 'Sovietisation' of the Revolution. Phyllis Greene Walker suggests that Raúl's visit to the Soviet Union in early 1970 laid the groundwork for the changes that occurred thereafter, while Klepak contends that it was Raúl who spearheaded the 'Sovietisation' of the FAR, and who was 'instrumental in gaining more and better weapons from Moscow' (Greene Walker 1993, 122; Klepak 2005, 45). The re-issuing of *Instrucción Política* in 1973, with its explicitly *guerrillera* and *foquista* tone, is, therefore, inconsistent with the perception that the Revolution converted fully to Soviet orthodoxy in the 1970s, but it also questions the long-standing perception that Raúl Castro favoured a wholesale adoption of the Soviet model. It could be argued that, while he may have taken advantage of the improved relationship with Moscow to garner weaponry, he did not wish to transform the FAR into a carbon copy of the Soviet Armed Forces. Instead, as the analysis of *Instrucción Política* has shown, he made sure that his soldiers were educated in Cuba's revolutionary tradition, and were encouraged to emulate the values and attributes of the heroic *guerrilleros* whose struggles has resulted in the Revolution in power.

The representation of Cuban history as a narrative of perpetual guerrilla struggle continued to be expressed as the second decade of the Revolution in power progressed. Within this representation, the elevation of the *mambises* as heroic *guerrilleros* also endured. One striking illustration of this glorification was the 1974 book, *Hombradía de Antonio Maceo*, written by the historian Raúl Aparicio. Unlike the *Instrucción Política* of the previous year, this text was not directed solely at the members of the armed forces, but was instead published by UNEAC for the broader readership of the general public. It did share a similarity with the FAR text, however, in that it was also a re-issued edition of an earlier text, the first and only other edition having been published in 1966, in which year it was also awarded the Premio de Biografía 'Enrique Piñeyro' by UNEAC. Aparicio was a prolific writer, publishing articles in Cuba's leading newspapers and magazines, such as *Granma* and *Bohemia*, and several novels before his death in 1970. Much like another writer discussed in Chapter Two, Jorge Ibarra, Aparicio wrote from a position of authority within the Revolution, having carried out many international diplomatic missions for the Ministerio de Relaciones Exteriores. It is likely, therefore, that the views expressed in his writing were consistent with those of the revolutionary leadership and, in fact, contributed to the reproduction and circulation of its *guerrillera* values. His historical work is also another revealing example of how history has been used in revolutionary Cuba as a means of supporting the revolutionary project.

In the 'Preámbulo' to the second edition of *Hombradía*, Aparicio informed the reader that he felt the country needed an account of the life of Maceo, or the 'héroe' as he referred to him, which outlined the chronology of his life (Aparicio 1974, 13). He

went on to state unequivocally that the overarching purpose of the text was to facilitate a greater understanding of the contemporary Revolution:

Esta vida del general Antonio se desarrolló a lo largo del gran proceso revolucionario cubano del siglo pasado. Es por eso de singular importancia su conocimiento, como una contribución, por la vía de las comparaciones, a la interpretación de la revolución actual (Aparicio 1974, 14).

Throughout the text, it was frequently underlined that Maceo was a master of guerrilla warfare, and, for this reason, he should be revered. In the second part of the book, 'La formación. La guerra grande. La Protesta de Baraguá', for example, it was stated that, in the early stages of the Ten Years' War, Maceo had initiated 'una típica acción guerrillera' (Aparicio 1974, 76). It was written that Maceo had carried out:

(...) una típica acción guerrillera: con 37 hombres sorprendió una columna española, que tuvo que retroceder, y al hacerlo, se encontró con el fuego de 30 mambises estratégicamente emboscados, que le produjeron daños de consideración. Una clásica operación de guerrilla (Aparicio 1974, 76).

Similar to many of the examples already considered, the inferiority of Maceo's force, in comparison with the Spanish military column, was highlighted. This emphasis was expressed through the foregrounding of the prepositional phrase, 'con 37 hombres', at the beginning of the extract, and again in the reference to the '30 mambises estratégicamente emboscados'. Also comparable to the previous instances in which the diminutive nature of Cuban rebel forces has been stressed, this example again pointed out how the combative capabilities of the rebels were disproportionate to their inferior size. In other words, the smaller guerrilla force was able to achieve military successes through using its size to its advantage, and employing the strategy of surprise. As the text claimed, this tactic enabled Maceo's guerrillas to inflict 'daños de consideración' upon the enemy. Maceo's method of launching a surprise attack in this example was consistent with the recommendation made by Guevara in

*La Guerra de Guerrillas*: ‘Naturalmente, su inferioridad numérica hace muy necesario que los ataques sean siempre por sorpresa, esa es la gran ventaja, es lo que permite al guerrillero hacer bajas al enemigo sin sufrir pérdidas’ (Guevara 2006, 27).

The focus upon the ability of the *mambises*’ guerrilla forces to overcome their supposed inferiority, military speaking, was again evident towards the end of the text. Aparicio asserted:

Es la mano del general Antonio la que ha plantado la bandera cubana en el extremo occidental de la isla, dando cabal realización a la campaña de la invasión. Decenas de miles de soldados enemigos, con el mejor equipo militar de la época, no han sido capaces de detener al pueblo revolucionario en armas, guiado por sus mejores líderes. La campaña de la invasión ha demostrado que Cuba es capaz por sí sola de libertarse del poder colonial que la agobia. Lo ha demostrado con el esfuerzo de sus hijos mejores, los que han estado derramando su sangre combate tras combate. Y esos hijos mejores, son en su mayoría los más humildes hombres del pueblo. Y por sobre todos ellos, por su calidad de hombre integérrimo, reconoce toda Cuba al general Antonio, el mambí ejemplar (Aparicio 1974, 456).

In this extract, the disparity in the size and military strength of the two opposing forces was accentuated through the manipulation of the syntax in the second sentence. The foregrounding of the phrase ‘Decenas de miles de soldados enemigos’, followed by the inclusion of the prepositional phrase ‘con el mejor equipo militar de la época’, highlighted the extent of the military capacity of the Spanish colonial forces. Yet, as we are then informed, a high number of combatants and modern weaponry was no match for the Cuban *pueblo*. This latter statement perpetuated the message which was articulated in a large number of the citations analysed in the previous chapter: the Cuban people, as a collective, had the potential to overcome seemingly insurmountable obstacles. This idea also recalled one of Guevara’s three fundamental conclusions regarding guerrilla warfare: ‘Las fuerzas populares pueden ganar una guerra contra el ejército’ (Guevara 2006, 13). In this

example, however, the inclusion of the nonessential relative clause, 'guiados por sus mejores líderes', called attention to the fact that the Cuban people had been led by a select group of leaders. The inclusion of this phrase was clearly intentional, given that it was not an essential component of the sentence, and thus its purpose was to underline the fundamental role of strong leaders in the victory of popular forces. It suggested that the combination of 'las fuerzas populares' and strong guerrilla leaders was undefeatable. Such a message was particularly pertinent at the time of the book's publication, when, as already discussed, the *ex-guerrilleros* were attempting to assert their hegemony within the Cuban leadership over the former PSP members.

What was also noticeable in this extract was the reference to Cuba's ability to defeat colonial forces without any outside assistance, as pointed out in the phrase, 'La campaña de la invasión ha demostrado que Cuba es capaz por sí sola de libertarse del poder colonial que la agobia'. The incorporation of the adjective 'por sí sola' served to emphasise this point. Again, this message would have been particularly resonant at a time of increasing Soviet influence. It reminded the reader that, while it may have been receiving military support from abroad in 1974, Cuba had a proven ability to defend itself against foreign aggressors. The use of the present tense in 'Cuba es capaz' implied that this ability was still intact at the time of the book's publication. It should also be noted that the strategy of invasion, outlined in detail in the text *La Invasión*, was pinpointed as the tactic had allowed Cuba to liberate itself.

Not only did the text underline the crucial role played by leaders in the realisation of military victories, it also drew the reader's attention to the qualities possessed by such leaders, the prime example of which was, of course, Antonio Maceo. Of

particular note were the continual references to Maceo's strong will. In the second chapter of the book, Aparicio recounted an attempt by the Spanish to tempt Maceo to defect to the enemy side: 'La indignación de Antonio bulle en su pecho: domina sus sentimientos apelando a la misma voluntad que años atrás le ayudó a vencer la tartamudez' (Aparicio 1974, 76). The mention of 'voluntad' here perpetuated the focus upon subjective will in the hegemonic discourse, additional examples of which have been discussed in this and the previous chapter. In turn, this focus also perpetuated the promotion of *guerrillerismo*, seeing as subjective will was a central facet of Guevara's *foco* theory and, later, Debray's concept of *foquismo*. Guevara's *La Guerra de Guerrillas* was also reflected in the book's references to Maceo's intransigent position towards his revolutionary duty. Aparicio claimed of Maceo that, 'Ya pueden ser adversas las noticias de la revolución, él continuará inflexible' (Aparicio 1974, 79). This description painted Maceo as the embodiment of a great *guerrillero*, according to Guevara's characterisation of such a figure: 'La actitud de lucha, esa actitud que no debe desmayar en ningún momento, esa inflexibilidad frente a los grandes problemas del objetivo final, es también la grandeza del guerrillero' (Guevara 2006, 21).

Similarly, Maceo was portrayed by Aparicio as always having been at the forefront of any revolutionary combat, as illustrated in the line: 'El que va delante, el que no vacila en atacar' (Aparicio 1974, 54). This idea of being on the frontline of revolutionary action mirrored Guevara's proposal that *guerrilleros* should constitute the vanguard of any revolution, a point which was expanded upon and further stressed in Debray's *Révolution dans la Révolution?*. The mention of the fact that Maceo did not hesitate to attack the enemy also echoed the argument articulated by

both theories, that of the necessity of fomenting revolution without delay through a reliance on subjective conditions alone.

Another text which sought to convey the sustained pertinence of the example set by the *mambises* was the book, *Moncada*, published in 1975 by the Editorial de Ciencias Sociales del Instituto Cubano del Libro. Comparable to many of the previous texts in this chapter, *Moncada* was also a re-issued version of an earlier edition, having first been published in 1973 to mark the twentieth anniversary of the Moncada attack. The book's publication by the Instituto del Libro, itself a part of the Ministerio de Cultura, renders it a useful example of how the circulation of *guerrillista* statements was maintained by various practices and institutions in Cuban society. The reproduction of *guerrillista* statements in this way is consistent with Foucault's previously discussed analysis of how discourses are perpetuated over time in certain political and historical contexts.

The text contained no introduction or prologue to indicate the purpose of its publication, but it is immediately apparent that the text aimed to convey the historical significance of the assault on the Moncada barracks to a contemporary reader. To achieve its purpose, the text was made up of extracts from speeches (all of which had been given by either Fidel or Raúl Castro), articles, historical documents (including photographs), and testimonies from those who had participated in the attack.

Although the book was largely comprised of texts which related directly to the events of the Moncada attack, ten of the first eleven pages were devoted to images and citations connected to the independence struggles of the 1800s. Page two consisted

entirely of a photograph of José Martí, while pages eight and nine showed portraits of the Ignacio Agramonte, Máximo Gómez, Antonio Maceo and, again, Martí, alongside the following citation from Fidel Castro's 'La historia me absolverá': 'Se nos enseñó a venerar desde temprano el ejemplo glorioso de nuestros heroes y de nuestros mártires. Céspedes, Agramonte, Maceo, Gómez y Martí fueron los primeros que se grabaron en nuestro cerebro' (*Moncada* 1975, 8). The inclusion of this citation and the accompanying images indicated from the outset that one of the objectives of the text was to highlight the connectivity between the different revolutionary struggles which had taken place in Cuban history. It showed that the Moncada attack, as illustrated by the citation from 'La historia me absolverá', had drawn inspiration from the *mambises*, while the Revolution itself had sought to build upon the legacy of both these previous historical examples.

What was also made clear in the text was that, although the previous struggles had failed in their objective of liberating Cuba from colonialism and dictatorship, they had served the necessary function of initiating revolutionary action which, ultimately, had culminated in the Revolution in power. This message was clearly expressed in excerpts from an article by Raúl Castro, originally published on the eighth anniversary of the Moncada attack. In this one of many examples of manifest intertextuality included in the book, Raúl Castro stated of Moncada:

Aquél no era el asalto a una fortaleza para alcanzar el poder con la acción de un centenar de hombres, era el primer paso de un grupo decidido para armar al pueblo de Cuba e iniciar la revolución. No era una acción para quitar simplemente a Batista y sus cómplices del poder, era el inicio de una acción para transformar todo el régimen político y económico-social de Cuba y acabar con la opresión extranjera (...) Que no se trataba de apoderarse de la sede del gobierno y asaltar el poder, sino de iniciar la acción revolucionaria para llevar al pueblo al poder (*Moncada* 1975, 255).

These words convey the message that what was important was not achieving one's goal upon the first attempt, but the attempt in itself. This message recalled the idea expressed by both Guevara and Debray, that one should not hesitate to commence revolutionary action simply because the odds of success were seemingly low.

Another extract from the article was included later in the text, in which it was explicitly stated that Moncada had been the catalyst which would eventually set in motion the insurrectionary phase of the Revolution:

El ataque al Moncada falló y el motor pequeño, en ese momento, no pudo echar a andar el grande (...) el 26 de julio (...) sirvió de antecedente y experiencia para la expedición del 'Granma' y la acción guerrillera de la Sierra Maestra (*Moncada* 1975, 282).

The mention here of the 'motor pequeño' paralleled the inclusion of the same term in the 1973 *Instrucción Política*, discussed earlier. The repetition of this metaphor, first uttered by Fidel Castro in the 1960s, demonstrated the leadership's intent to perpetuate the focus on the primacy of action, itself a fundamental value of *guerrillerismo*.

In addition to continuing to present a linear revolutionary history, the text also underscored the inferior nature of the rebel group who assaulted the Moncada barracks. In another of the several excerpts from Raúl Castro's 1961 article, it was written:

No eran muchas las armas, ni mucho menos, de calidad que pudiéramos conseguir (...) nadie iba a imaginarse, por inconcebible, que fuese a ser atacada una fortaleza militar con escopetas de matar pájaros (*Moncada* 1975, 86).

As in many of the previous examples, these words aimed to demonstrate to the reader that a paucity of weaponry should not be a deterrent to fomenting revolution. A similar sentiment was expressed in an excerpt from a speech given by Fidel Castro on the 26 July 1967, an additional example of manifest intertextuality in the book. In the speech, Castro stated:

Ni las armas, ni el tipo de las armas, ni la experiencia, y ni siquiera los factores fortuitos, acompañaron a aquel primer esfuerzos. Pero aquel primer esfuerzo significó el camino que abrió para el pueblo revolucionario la conquista del poder (...) Y esa característica esencial del movimiento revolucionario, que surgió aquel día, es hoy también la característica esencial de nuestra revolución: la confianza del pueblo en sí mismo, la fe del pueblo en su causa, la convicción del pueblo que no habrá dificultad, por grande que sea, que no logremos vencerla; que no habrá camino, por difícil que sea, que no seamos capaces de seguirlo hasta el final (*Moncada* 1975, 284).

The repetition of the negative conjunction 'ni' in the first sentence of the citation reinforced the detail that the Moncada attack had gone ahead despite a complete absence of auspicious conditions. The inclusion of 'ni siquiera' in the fourth example further strengthened this point, as did the alliteration of the fricative in the words 'factores fortuitos'. In turn, this underlining of the unfavourable situation also highlighted the courage and determination of the rebels. Additionally, the repetition of 'aquel primer esfuerzo' called attention to the fact that, in revolutions, it was the first act which constituted the most important gesture of the struggle as a whole.

In this extract, it is also possible to identify evidence which challenges the notion of 'siege mentality'. The final phrases in particular, 'la convicción del pueblo que no habrá dificultad, por grande que sea, que no logremos vencerla; que no habrá camino, por difícil que sea, que no seamos capaces de seguirlo hasta el final', revealed that the leadership was intent on instilling, once again, a sense of confident defiance in the Cuban people. Cuba was not a nation besieged but one whose people

had the will to defend it at all costs. As the citation suggested, part of this confidence in the people's ability to confront even the most challenging of circumstances, derived from the fact that the *pueblo* had an unrelenting faith in the revolutionary cause: 'la fe del pueblo en su causa'. This reference to 'fe' sustained the religious undertones present in a number of the texts already discussed, both from the 1960s and the 1970s. 'Fe' was also mentioned elsewhere in the text, in another citation from Fidel Castro's 'La historia me absolverá' which was the only featured text on page 139:

Parecía que el Apóstol iba a morir en el año de su centenario, que su memoria se extinguiría para siempre, ¡tanta era la afrenta! Pero vive, no ha muerto, su pueblo es rebelde, su pueblo es digno, su pueblo es fiel a su recuerdo (*Moncada* 1975, 139).

Castro's reference to Martí as the 'Apóstol' in 1953, and the statement that 'su pueblo es fiel a su recuerdo', laid the foundations for the attachment of religious symbolism to the discourse of the Revolution. That this statement was reiterated, not to mention the fact that it was printed across an entire page, demonstrates how the leadership wished to perpetuate both the image of Martí, and encourage a type of religious devotion to his memory, much in the same way that a similar veneration was encouraged of the figures of Che and Camilo. In the 1973 *Instrucción Política*, for example, it was written: 'Pero nuestro pueblo, fiel seguidor de Camilo y el Che' (*Instrucción* 1973, 443).

As a final point on the 1975 edition of *Moncada*, it should be noted that the text was published in the same year in which the first Communist Party of Cuba Congress took place. The Congress marked the beginning of the institutionalisation of PCC rule, while it also saw to the agreement of new economic policies and the first five-

year plan (Dominguez 1993, 129). To all intents and purposes, the Congress thus seemed to serve as added confirmation of the complete 'Sovietisation' of the Revolution. However, texts such as *Moncada* continued to play up the Revolution's history of guerrilla struggle, and the many heroes who had contributed to this history, some of which were now in the newly strengthened PCC. As before, it can be argued that these latter figures wished to derive further historical legitimacy for retaining their positions of power within the revolutionary government. With *Moncada*, these former *guerrilleros* were basing their legitimacy not only in their participation in the insurrectionary phase of the Revolution, but in the fundamental roles they had played in the 'primer esfuerzo' of 1953.

The linking of the past with the present, and the supposed linearity of Cuban history, was explicitly pointed out on the front page of the 2 January 1976 edition of *Bohemia*. This edition of the weekly general interest magazine distributed throughout the country was published less than two weeks subsequent to the close of the first Communist Party Congress. The following words appeared on the cover of the magazine:

Recuerdése que el 56, dos décadas atrás, marco un año trascendente en el acontecer cubano, estampa de podredumbres pero también visión de luchas y esperanzas. Es el año del gran reto de 'libres o mártires' lanzado por Fidel y el desembarco de 'Granma'. Cada una de sus 52 semanas, siguiendo los diversos caminos de un proceso inexorable, conduce la epopeya de la Sierra Maestra y culmina victoriosamente en el Primer Congreso del Partido Comunista de Cuba que acaba de clausurarse (*Bohemia* 1976, 1).

The final statement in this extract is interesting in that it would seem to corroborate the aforementioned notion that there was a conscious attempt to remind the Cuban people of the origins of their Revolution and, perhaps more importantly, who had played a role in its embryonic stages. Of particular note was the choice to label the

insurrectionary phase as ‘la epopeya de la Sierra Maestra’. This designation was telling in its implication that the Revolution had been fought and won purely in the mountains, thereby ignoring the other forms of struggle that had taken place in the *llano*. In turn, this emphasis on the *sierra* of course overplayed the role of the *guerrilleros* in the victory of the Revolution and, in turn, in the process which had enabled the Congress to take place. What is more, the direct connection established here between the Sierra Maestra and the first Communist Party Congress mirrored the obvious linking together of Moncada, the Ejército Rebelde and the Communist Party in the 1973 *Instrucción Política*. To reiterate the quotation discussed previously, it was claimed that:

Moncada es el núcleo del Ejército Rebelde: el Ejército Rebelde es el núcleo del Partido. Alrededor de ese núcleo, porque existía ya ese núcleo con su propia dirección político-militar, fue como pudieron reunirse a su alrededor otras fuerzas políticas que forman el actual Partido Comunista de Cuba (*Instrucción* 1973, 155).

The promotion of *guerrillerismo* continued to be in evidence in other editions of *Bohemia* published in the second half of the decade. In the 14 October 1977 edition of *Bohemia*, a double-page spread featured a speech given by Fidel Castro at the inauguration of the Escuela de Iniciación Deportiva Escolar (EIDE) on 6 October of that same year. In this speech, Castro asserted:

Nuestros corazones son grandes y hay en ellos espacio para el entusiasmo, para el deber, para el espíritu revolucionario, para la voluntad, el tesón, la firmeza; hay en nuestros corazones un gran lugar para la obra creadora, para continuar el esfuerzo de nuestro pueblo, para combatir, para luchar (...) Tenemos el deber de cumplir nuestra obra, la obra de nuestra generación, y el deber de preparar el camino a las nuevas generaciones (*Bohemia* 1977a, 40).

Castro’s words demonstrate that the values associated with *guerrillerismo* — *lucha*, *deber*, *voluntad*, and so on — were still being promoted in the late 1970s as desirable qualities which all Cuban citizens should possess. The lexical item, *deber*, was

particularly emphasised, having been incorporated three times. What is also evident is that the 'duty' of participation in the Revolution was presented as a collective responsibility. This message was reflected in the use of the first person plural in 'Tenemos el deber', and also in the repeated employment of the possessive pronoun in 'Nuestros corazones' and 'nuestro pueblo'.

This notion of collective responsibility was fortified by Castro's remarks elsewhere in the speech. As an illustration, Castro stated:

Les pedimos un esfuerzo a los compañeros de la construcción de la provincia Ciudad de La Habana para que aceleraran las obras, y pudiéramos disponer ya de la escuela para este primer aniversario. Esto tiene un simbolismo muy grande, porque demuestra cómo el crimen no puede matar las ideas, cómo el crimen no puede detener la marcha victoriosa de un pueblo; cómo el crimen no, por monstruoso que sea, no puede matar la vida, y cómo la vida de cada uno de nosotros no pertenece a sí mismo, sino que pertenece a todos. Todos somos parte de algo mucho mayor que nosotros, que es la patria, el pueblo; nuestras vidas son partes de la vida infinita e inmortal de la nación cubana y de nuestro pueblo revolucionario (*Bohemia* 1977a, 39).

The 'crimen' referred to in this address was the terrorist attack on a Cubana de Aviación flight from Barbados to Jamaica the previous year, which resulted in the deaths of all seventy-eight passengers on board, including the entire Cuban national fencing team. In the final part of this excerpt, Castro asserted definitively that what mattered in the Revolution was the collective, and not the individual. In lines such as 'y cómo la vida de cada uno de nosotros no pertenece a sí mismo, sino que pertenece a todos' Castro was encouraging the Cuban people to look beyond their own individual concerns, and to consider the effect of their actions on the collective: the Cuban nation in its entirety. Castro's words were also intended to inspire confidence in the Cuban people, with regard to the survival of the Revolution. His declaration that 'el crimen no puede matar las ideas, cómo el crimen no puede detener la marcha victoriosa de un pueblo' once again demonstrated that, far from cultivating a 'siege

mentality', Castro was, in fact, attempting to instil a sense of assurance in the Cuban people.

A promotion of *guerrillerismo* was also manifest in other articles which appeared in the same 14 October issue of *Bohemia*. Given that this issue appeared just a week after the tenth anniversary of Che Guevara's death, it was perhaps unsurprising that such values were promoted at that time. Indeed, one page was devoted to the activities which took place during the 'Jornada Ideológica Camilo y Che' (*Bohemia* 1977b, 48). Similarly, another page featured part of a speech given by Ramiro Valdés to mark the anniversary, in which he underlined the attributes of which Guevara's character had been comprised:<sup>44</sup>

Uno de esos gigantes del pensamiento y de acción es el Guerrillero Heroico, Ernesto Che Guevara (...) Había forjado desde niño un carácter audaz y una gran firmeza de voluntad (...) tenía, sobre todo, la determinación combativa y la vocación del revolucionario (*Bohemia* 1977c, 58/59).

Again, there was mention here of *voluntad* as a defining characteristic of a *guerrillero*, along with bravery, as shown in 'un carácter audaz'. This reference to being 'audaz' recalled Guevara's own guidelines in *La Guerra de Guerrillas*, in which he argued that a guerrilla fighter 'debe ser audaz' (Guevara 2006, 56).

*Guerrillerismo* was also in evidence in another speech which appeared in this issue. In an address to the UNEAC Congress of 1977, the renowned poet, Nicolás Guillén, uttered the following words:

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<sup>44</sup> Ramiro Valdés participated in both the Moncada attack and in the insurrectionary phase of the Revolution. He later became a member of the Politburo, and was given the honorary military title *Comandante de la Revolución* in 1976.

tenemos clara conciencia de la responsabilidad que asumimos, del deber que contraemos, dispuestos como estamos a afianzar cada día más profundamente el proceso liberador de Cuba y su síntesis nacional: de Céspedes a Martí, de Martí a Fidel Castro (*Bohemia* 1977d, 54).

As in some of the examples already discussed, Cuba's independence was here presented as an on-going process, and one which needed to be further consolidated by the Cuban people. Guillén was also contributing to the presentation of Cuban history as a single, linear narrative of persistent struggle. This presentation was evident in his linking together of three heroic figures in, 'de Céspedes a Martí, de Martí a Fidel Castro', which seemed to imply a natural progression between the different stages of revolutionary struggle.

A similarly deliberate attempt at establishing commonalities between historic figures was evident in the 1979 book *Maceo y Che*, which was published by Editorial Gente Nueva, a specialist in books for children and young adults and housed under the Instituto del Libro, which, as mentioned, formed part of the Ministerio de Cultura. The purpose of this short book was to highlight the similarities between Antonio Maceo and Che Guevara through a selection of historical texts and, in doing so, to re-assert the relevance of these two 'heroes' to a younger audience. Specifically, it aimed to reveal that the two shared similar values, values which the Cuban youth should endeavour to emulate. As an illustration, on the back cover of the book it was written:

La coincidencia histórica de haber nacido ambos el mismo día no es lo único que une a estas dos figuras excepcionales, hay rasgos más sobresalientes que aúnan estas dos voluntades: La valentía, la intransigencia, la honestidad, el sentido de la solidaridad (...) distantes en el tiempo, pero unidas por el mismo ideal: el amor a la libertad (Alvárez Tabío and Soto Valdespino, 1979).

Included in the text was a speech given by Che Guevara on 7 December 1962 to commemorate the death of Maceo. In the speech, Guevara praised the Cuban people for their actions during the Bay of Pigs invasion:

Nuestro pueblo todo fue un Maceo, nuestro pueblo todo estuvo disputándose la primera línea de combate en una batalla donde todo sería frente y donde seríamos atacados desde el aire, desde el mar, desde la tierra, cumpliendo nuestra función de vanguardia del mundo socialista en este momento, en este lugar preciso de la lucha (Alvárez Tabío and Soto Valdespino 1979, 80).

The inclusion of such a speech in a text published in 1979, and indeed the publication of the text itself, was significant, given that it clearly communicated *guerrillista* ideas to the reader, such as that of the vanguard and *lucha*, as evidenced in the above citation. The text's publication suggests that *guerrillismo* continued to be promoted until the end of the decade. Moreover, it is important to acknowledge that this particular text was directed solely at young people. The book's intended audience implies that the leadership was keen to inculcate *guerrillista* values, and not, therefore, those associated with 'militarism', upon the new generation of revolutionaries who did not have first-hand experience of the Revolution's insurrectionary phase.

That said, while the above citations from 1977 and 1979 provide some evidence of a promotion of *guerrillismo* in the second half of the decade, in general, we can note that a *guerrillista* language became less identifiable in the hegemonic discourse post-1975. Where *guerrillismo* was evident, it was often juxtaposed with a rhetoric which extolled the rapprochement with the Soviet Union. In the 7 October 1977 issue of *Bohemia*, for example, articles which celebrated the legacy of Che Guevara (being, as it was, the eve of the tenth anniversary of his death), were

interspersed with articles narrating events from Soviet history, such as the Battle of Stalingrad and the October Revolution. Thus, it can be argued that, by the end of the decade, *guerrillerismo* and its constituent values ceased to feature so prominently in the hegemonic discourse of the Revolution.

The above hypothesis is partly confirmed by an analysis of a text published in 1981, the *Manual Básico del Miliciano de Tropas Territoriales*. Similar to the two core texts which have formed the focus of the analysis of the 1960s and 1970s — the 1960 *Manual de Capacitación Cívica*, and the 1973 *Instrucción Política FAR* — this text was also published by MINFAR. The intended readership of the text were the members of the newly formed *Milicias de Tropas Territoriales* (MTT). Like their previous incarnation, the MNR of the 1960s, the MTT were a volunteer force which acted as an adjunct to the FAR in the task of defending the nation. The MTT also served as a back-up force of reservists for MINFAR, and aided it in the ‘construction of defences, delivery of supplies and other efforts’ (Mazarr 1990, 277). The revival of a volunteer ‘army’ was deemed necessary in 1980 owing to the increase in US hostility following the election of Ronald Reagan. Kapcia contends of the period that, ‘while no one believed that invasion might result (since Pentagon studies had repeatedly indicated that military action would be impractical and costly), the signs pointed to a new ‘siege’, renewed pressure, and ‘the revival of vendetta politics’ (Kapcia 2000, 204). The creation of the MTT was a key strategy in the new defence stance launched by the leadership in 1980, the *Guerra de Todo el Pueblo*. As its name suggests, the aim of this stance was to increase large-scale mobilisation around the task of defending the island to ensure that, in the event of an attack, the Cuban nation would be able to ‘wage total war’ against an invader (Klepak 2005, 46).

These new defensive capabilities were based primarily around a more effective co-operation between volunteer *milicianos* and serving members of the FAR than had previously been witnessed, and received the full support of MINFAR (Klepak 2005, 46). The opening paragraph of the 1981 *Manual* provided clarification concerning the role of the MTT:

Las Milicias de Tropas Territoriales formadas por obreros, campesinos, estudiantes, amas de casa, jubilados; por hombres y mujeres del pueblo cubano, que acudieron al llamado de nuestro Comandante en Jefe en momentos en que el imperialismo yanqui aumenta sus amenazas agresivas contra nuestro país, constituyen conjuntamente con el resto de las FAR, el brazo armado de la Revolución y su misión fundamental es defender a nuestra Patria de las agresiones imperialistas, al mismo tiempo que garantizan la continuidad de la producción y el desarrollo económico del país (*Manual* 1981, 7).

The principal aim of the *Manual* itself was to act as an accompaniment to the practical military training the new *milicianos* were undergoing at the time of its publication. In other words, the *Manual* served as something of a handbook for transforming citizens into military men and women. The introduction directly addressed the reader in its explanation of the book's purpose:

Tú, como miliciano, formas una parte importante de nuestras FAR y por ello constituyes uno de los pilares sobre los que descansa la seguridad y la tranquilidad de nuestro pueblo (...) Para eso recibes la preparación combativa, para que puedas desempeñar exitosamente las misiones combativas que te asignen y cumplas ese sagrado deber de vivir por tu Patria y por tu pueblo (...) Ese es el objetivo de tu preparación, pero para lograrlo tienes que poner todo tu empeño, tu atención y tu entusiasmo en las clases y ejercicios que recibas y además estudiar y practicar lo que te enseñan. Para ayudarte en ello se hizo este manual (*Manual* 1981, 7).

The *Manual* was divided into thirteen chapters, all of which, bar the first chapter 'Generalidades', were concerned with the practical, rather than the ideological, aspects of military training. The chapter titles included: 'Distribución del Tiempo y Orden Diario'; 'Disciplina Militar'; 'Instrucción de Infantería'; 'Preparación Táctica'; 'Preparación de Tiro'.

Despite the text's explicit focus on the practicalities of military service, some, albeit few, elements of *guerrillerismo* were still discernible. Most noticeably, the emphasis on *deber*, so omnipresent in the hegemonic discourse throughout the 1960s and 1970s, continued to be expressed frequently in the *Manual*. An example of the incorporation of this 'lexical item' is identifiable in the following citation:

Ese deber dimana de mi lealtad a los principios de la Revolución Cubana, a la tradición mambisa de nuestro pueblo (...) y al ejemplo del glorioso Ejército Rebelde, de las milicias obreras y campesinas, de los combatientes internacionalistas, y de los heroicos miembros de las Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias (*Manual* 1981, 8).

This extract also demonstrates a sustained use of Cuban history as a means of inspiring a new generation of revolutionaries. Here, the text encouraged an emulation of the examples set by pre-Revolution revolutionaries with its references to the 'tradición mambisa', and also the 'Ejército Rebelde'.

Additionally, the text sporadically promoted values associated with *guerrillerismo*. An illustration of such values was manifest in the chapter 'Preparación Táctica': 'Debes tener presente que la tenacidad, la disciplina, la valentía, la ingeniosidad y la firme voluntad son condiciones indispensables para obtener la victoria sobre el enemigo' (*Manual* 1981, 75). The mention of *voluntad*, in particular, reflected the stress on subjective will central to the *foco* theory, and maintained the emphasis on this attribute in the hegemonic discourse of the 60s and 70s. Indeed, the excerpt's focus on the essential values which a *miliciano* should possess was indicative of the attention that was still being paid to the role of the individual in revolutionary action.

Overall, however, and unlike in the two previous MINFAR training manuals, a promotion of *guerrillerismo* was conspicuous by its absence in the *Manual Básico*

*del Miliciano de Tropas Territoriales*. As stated, the text's focus was largely on the finer details of military service, on guiding its readers in their development as military reservists. Within this focus, there was seemingly little room for any ideological or political instruction. What mattered was that these volunteers possessed a sound grasp of what it meant to be a soldier. In this way, the 1981 *Manual* serves here as something of a counterpoint to the other training manuals discussed in this thesis. Its distinct lack of *guerrillista* elements, along with the conscious or unconscious phasing out of a *guerrillista* rhetoric in texts which were published after 1975, suggests that, by the early 1980s, *guerrillismo* no longer encompassed the values or the ethos which the leadership wished to inculcate upon its citizens.

What also differentiated the *Manual Básico del Miliciano de Tropas Territoriales* from the previous two manuals, and, indeed, from the majority of the texts from the 1960s and early 1970s, was its portrayal of Cuba as a nation besieged. While in earlier texts the references to potential aggressive attacks from the United States were always counter posed with a tone of confident defiance, expressed through allusions to the strength of the Cuban people in resisting imperialist domination, the MTT *Manual* conveyed a sense of resignation to an enemy strike on Cuba, and, in place of emphasising the collective power of citizens, it instead focussed on the military capabilities of the FAR and the Tropas Territoriales combined. In other words, it stressed the importance of meeting the enemy on an equal footing, of responding to an inevitable military strike with comparable military force.

Indications of a 'siege mentality' were present from the first page of the text. In the previously discussed citation from the *Manual's* introduction, for instance, it was stated that the volunteer *milicianos*:

(...) acudieron al llamado de nuestro Comandante en Jefe en momentos en que el imperialismo yanqui aumenta sus amenazas agresivas contra nuestra país (...) su misión fundamental es defender a nuestra Patria de las agresiones imperialistas (*Manual* 1981, 7).

The contention that the United States was, at that moment, increasing its aggressive threats against Cuba set the tone for the rest of the text, as did the statement that the 'misión fundamental' of the MTT was to defend the nation against imperialist aggression.

The text also underlined the possibility that an attack could involve weapons of mass destruction, as demonstrated in the title of Chapter Twelve: 'Protección contra las Armas de Exterminio en Masa y los Medios Incendiarios'. The introduction to the chapter stated:

En caso de agresión contra la República de Cuba, el enemigo imperialista y sus aliados pueden recurrir al empleo de las armas de exterminio en masa. Igualmente pueden ser empleados los medios incendiarios (*Manual* 1981, 249).

The chapter then listed the types of weapon which could be employed against Cuba — nuclear, biological, and chemical — and how *milicianos* could learn to detect and protect themselves from such weapons. This concentration on aggressive measures which had the potential to annihilate the Cuban nation compounded the siege mentality which the text promoted.

Also in contrast to the *guerrillista* rhetoric expressed in previous texts, the MTT *Manual* did not downplay the weaponry available to the FAR and to the MTT. Many of the examples discussed in the analysis attributed the strength of the Cuban people to their deep-rooted values, and to the historical legacy of resistance from which they could draw inspiration. It was these elements which would allow the Revolution to resist imperialist aggression and, ultimately, survive. In this text, however, the potential of the FAR and the MTT to defend the island effectively was based largely upon their combined firepower and the cutting-edge weaponry both forces possessed. The following citation illustrated this new focus:

La calidad del armamento que posee tu batallón y su gran volumen de fuego, conjuntamente con tu alta moral combativa, hará que tu unidad sea invencible en el combate (*Manual* 1981, 171).

In this excerpt, the main clause — ‘La calidad del armamento que posee tu batallón y su gran volumen de fuego (...) hará que tu unidad sea invencible en el combate’ — clearly stated that it was the quality of a battalion’s weaponry which determined its invincibility. Conversely, while the moral factor was still included, it was incorporated only in the subordinate clause. This grammatical construction gave the impression that the role of morality in combat had been included as something of an afterthought.

Thus far, it has been established that the MTT *Manual* largely deviated in message and tone from the texts which had come before it. Yet there was one aspect of the language employed in the text which recalled the rhetoric of the 1960s and 70s, and which has been identified in a number of texts already discussed: religiosity. The religious undertones of the text were apparent from the outset. The first page

following the Introduction featured the ‘Juramento del Miliciano’. This ‘oath’ began with the words:

El juramento militar es un compromiso de honor que hacemos con la Patria, con la Revolución, con los heroes, con los mártires y con la tradición combativa de nuestros <<CIEN AÑOS DE LUCHA>> (*Manual* 1981, 8).

The opening of the text with a ‘Juramento’ had obvious religious connotations, given that oaths tend to call on a divine witness in the act of their declaration. The obligation of the *miliciano* to take such an oath implied that the leadership expected a religious devotion to the Revolution from its volunteers. The formality of the oath, and the sense that the *miliciano* was entering into an unbreakable agreement, was reinforced by the requirement to sign and date the document. Furthermore, the religiosity of the citation was further compounded by the reference to ‘los mártires’.

The religious lexicon underpinned the entire text. In Chapter Five, ‘La Bandera (Gallardete) de Combate’, an additional example of religious language can be identified:

La Bandera (Gallardete) de Combate de la unidad (pequeña unidad) de las MTT es un símbolo de honor, heroísmo y gloria del miliciano; representa un recordatorio a cada miliciano de su sagrado deber de servir fielmente a la Patria, defender valiente y abnegadamente cada palmo de la tierra natal contra los enemigos, sin escatimar su sangre ni la propia vida (*Manual* 1981, 31).

The reference to ‘sagrado deber’, in particular, is significant here, and in numerous other examples in the text. The attachment of the modifying adjective ‘sagrado’, with its obvious holy connotations, to the ‘lexical item’ *deber*, added further weight to the moral commitment of the *miliciano* to serve the Revolution and the *patria*. The accomplishment of one’s duty was presented as though it were an act of devotion to some higher power. In this case, such a higher power was an

anthropomorphised vision of the *patria*. What is more, in this construction, the historicity behind the meaning of *deber*, and the pre-existing weight of the term, was further compounded, insofar as it suggested that the idea of revolutionary duty was so inscribed in Cuban history as to have become sacrosanct. The religiosity of this extract also comes through in its declaration that it was the sacred duty of the *miliciano* to ‘servir fielmente a la patria’. As before, this phrase reinforced the idea that the exercising of one’s duty was symbolic of a quasi-religious veneration of the homeland. It should also be acknowledged that the previously discussed citation from the Introduction established the religious element to the text from its opening lines. To recall this citation, it stated:

Tú, como *miliciano*, formas una parte importante de nuestras FAR y por ello constituyes uno de los pilares sobre los que descansa la seguridad y la tranquilidad de nuestro pueblo, que trabaja por el futuro, confiado en tu capacidad para cumplir el sagrado deber de defender nuestra Patria y nuestra Revolución. Para eso recibes la preparación combativa, para que puedas desempeñar exitosamente las misiones combativas que te asignen y cumplas ese sagrado deber de vivir por tu Patria y por tu pueblo, para aniquilar al enemigo agresor y aún llegar al sacrificio de la vida si es necesario, como tantos héroes y mártires para garantizar la felicidad de esta generación y las futuras (...) (*Manual* 1981, 7).

In this extract, the repetition of the term ‘sagrado deber’, in addition to the employment of the words ‘sacrificio’ and ‘mártires’, applied religious undertones to the *Manual* which, in turn, underscored the gravity of the task which the volunteer force had opted to undertake.

## **Conclusion**

The extensive analysis of a cross-section of texts carried out in this chapter leaves little doubt that *guerrillerismo* continued to feature heavily in the hegemonic

discourse of the 1970s, at least in the early part of the decade. A close inspection of a range of texts published by various institutions has revealed that, through the reproduction and repetition of *guerrillista* statements, the ideas and values associated with the guerrilla ethos remained in circulation throughout Cuban society, and thus in the public imagination, well into the second decade. Similar to the rhetoric of the 1960s, the promotion of *guerrillerismo* was largely achieved through statements that supported the teleological re-presentation of the Cuban historical narrative. Specifically, the portrayal of heroic figures from this history allowed for the presentation of *guerrillerismo*'s constituent values, namely courage, *deber*, *lucha*, *voluntad*, *derecho*, among others. Readers, both civilian and military, were encouraged to emulate such values in the task of supporting and defending the Revolution. In turn, this active support of the Revolution would ensure the independence of the Cuban nation, an independence which was, at times, depicted as a vulnerable condition. The communication of these *guerrillista* messages to a military audience was of particular significance, given the FAR's profound transformation into a more professionalised institution from the late 60s onwards. The elevation of the *mambises* and the *guerrilleros* of the Sierra Maestra demonstrated that, while the FAR might have re-organised itself around the Soviet model, the values which had underpinned the institution in the 1960s, and which motivated its members, remained unchanged.

Another aspect which the discourse of the 1970s had in common with that of the previous decade was the sense of defiance it communicated to its audience. Any mention of outside threats to Cuban sovereignty was always juxtaposed with references to the strength of the Cuban people, and their historically proven ability to

overcome seemingly unbeatable odds. The expression of this confidence challenges the notion that the leadership's principal means of mobilising its citizens has, since 1959, involved a constant overplaying of the Revolution's susceptibility to attack from its enemy neighbour to the north. Such a notion, as discussed in the Introduction, has been espoused by numerous scholars, notably Fernández, who contended:

Threats from the U.S. and the Dominican Republic and from within (...) in the initial hours led to militarization and the perception of Cuba as a besieged island. Thereafter, the regime has exploited this image to rally support and exert control through popular defense mobilization (Fernández 1989, 3).

What the evidence from the first part of the 1970s reveals is that, far from encouraging a permanent 'siege mentality', the leadership instead sought to cultivate the strength of its own people through the use of positive examples of courage and bravery borrowed from Cuban history. Moreover, rather than simply battening down the hatches in anticipation of an enemy attack, the Revolution asserted itself as an agent of revolutionary action. To its soldiers, it stressed the necessity of *foquista* warfare in countries dominated by imperialist forces, and the duty of the Cuban people to express their solidarity with such struggles. The confirmation of the Revolution's continued commitment to its principles of internationalism came in the form of its participation in the Angolan Civil War, commencing in 1975.

After 1975, however, the presence of *guerrillista* (and, at times, *foquista*) statements in the hegemonic discourse became less apparent. The few examples in which a more implicit *guerrillerismo* was promoted in the second half of the decade tended to be juxtaposed with messages which extolled the flourishing relationship between Cuba and the Soviet Union. The starting point for the gradual

disappearance of *guerrillerismo* from the official discourse seemed to coincide with the convening of the First Communist Party Congress in 1975. As previously mentioned, the Congress heralded the greater institutionalisation of PCC rule, in addition to the implementation of new economic policies, both of which seemed to confirm the Revolution's increasing commitment to Soviet orthodoxy (Suchlicki 1997, 185).

The phasing out of *guerrillerismo* as a means of bolstering citizen morale seemed to be complete by the early 1980s. The absence of a *guerrillerista* language in the 1981 *Manual del Miliciano de Tropas Territoriales* provided evidence that the leadership no longer employed *guerrillerismo* to inspire revolutionary action. Instead, the text encouraged a religious devotion to the Revolution, while concomitantly nurturing a 'siege mentality' through an increased focus on the potential of an enemy attack, and the means by which the Revolution could defend itself from such an attack.

The attempt to develop such a mentality in the mind of the reader, and the requirement that *milicianos* possess an abiding faith in the cause of the Revolution, reflected the changes that were taking place within the Revolution, and in the country more generally. Between 1975 and 1985, a process of 'coherent institutionalisation' took place, within which the rule of the PCC was well and truly established (Kapcia 2000, 222). This process put an end to the debate which had afflicted the leadership in the early 1970s regarding the course of the Revolution: thereafter, it would subscribe to the Soviet model of communist rule. The new-found stability meant that the former *guerrilleros* within the Cuban government were no longer forced to defend so firmly their hegemony in the political vanguard. In other words, they no

longer had to derive historical legitimacy from their guerrilla activity in the *sierra*. What is more, for Cuban citizens, the public face of the Revolution was now the Party itself, and not so much the individuals of which it was comprised. For this reason, the former *guerrilleros* could not be seen to be actively strengthening their own historical legacy through the promotion of *guerrillerismo*.

Where *guerrillerismo* now seemed to be irrelevant to the Revolution's new political project, an increased religiosity acted as an effective substitute. In the same way in which *guerrillerismo* had encouraged Cuban citizens to emulate the heroic *guerrilleros* who had featured throughout Cuba's history of guerrilla struggle, the religious language found in the 1981 *Manual*, for example, implored the reader to honour the revolutionary legacy through a religious-like devotion to the Revolution in power. This devotion could be expressed through a commitment to defending the *patria* from imperialist aggression. In this way, the strengthening of the religious element to the hegemonic discourse went hand in hand with the promotion of a 'siege mentality'. The presentation of Cuba as a nation besieged was understandable at that point in the Revolution's trajectory. Not only had the US stepped up its hostility to Cuba under the presidency of Ronald Reagan, but Cuba had experienced its own internal crisis in 1980: the Mariel boatlift (Klepak 2005, 46). The boatlift took place between April and October of that year, and saw a mass exodus of 125,000 Cubans to Florida (Gott 2004, 266). This crisis, combined with the increasingly aggressive stance of the United States, shook the foundations of the Cuban government. With this context in mind, it is unsurprising that the leadership should seek reassurance in the devotion of its people, not to mention their physical

involvement in the task of defending the Revolution, the latter being most clearly evidenced in the launch of the *Guerra de Todo el Pueblo* in 1980.

The preparations put in place for waging a potential ‘total war’ and the cultivation of a ‘siege mentality’ in the early 1980s in many ways seem to conform to the defining characteristics of ‘militarism’ which were outlined in the Introduction. Yet, at this point in the thesis, it has already been made abundantly clear that, with its origins in a guerrilla army and its commitment to serve the Cuban people, the FAR does not conform to standard definitions of military institutions, particularly those in other Latin American countries (Klepak 2005, 56). Thus, while the FAR *did* preside over the implementation of large-scale defence strategies in the 80s, and a ‘garrison state mentality’ was seemingly encouraged, the term ‘militarism’ remains inappropriate to the Cuban context (Fernández 1989, 3). Though an explicit promotion of *guerrillerismo* was not in evidence, the guerrilla legacy was still manifest in the *physical* presence of the former *guerrilleros* in the Cuban leadership. Moreover, and as stated in Chapter Two, while the present work considers *guerrillerismo* to constitute one of the defining codes which make up *cubanía*, it also accepts that the values and beliefs that make up *cubanía* may be modified, or feature more or less prominently in the hegemonic discourse, at difference junctures (Kapcia 2000, 18). With this point in mind, we can propose that, in the 1980s, *guerrillerismo* did not disappear entirely, it was simply displaced, temporarily, by other codes which better served the needs of the leadership at that particular stage in the trajectory of the Revolution in power. This conclusion is confirmed by the evidence presented in the following chapter, which will reveal that the third decade was but a parenthesis in the leadership’s on-going perpetuation of the guerrilla ethos. In the 1990s, when the

Revolution was confronted with a very real threat to its survival, *guerrillerismo* was revived by the leadership to guide Cuban citizens through the challenges that lay ahead.

## Chapter Four

### The Cuban Revolution in the 1990s: A Return to *Guerrillerismo*?

The evidence discussed thus far in this study has confirmed that the presence of *guerrillerismo* in the hegemonic discourse of the Cuban Revolution was palpable in the first decade of the Revolution in power and, somewhat surprisingly, in the supposedly 'Sovietised' period of the early 1970s. What we can surmise from these findings is that the recourse to this ideological code occurred at times when the Revolution was under threat. This threat derived both from internal pressures, often related to disputes among the leadership concerning the direction of the Revolution, and increased external hostilities to the revolutionary programme which, at times, saw the country isolated from its Latin American neighbours (and in the world more generally). While the latter threat could be considered a constant in the Revolution's history, given the unyielding political stance of the United States, at certain moments the belligerence emanating from the north was more vocal and direct than at others, perhaps the most obvious example being the failed Bay of Pigs invasion in 1961. This heightened aggression influenced other nations to turn their backs on Cuba, leaving it to stand alone on the world stage. The present work has so far demonstrated that, at such moments of isolation in the 1960s and 1970s, the leaders of the Revolution employed a discourse which actively promoted the values of which *guerrillerismo* is comprised. Such an endorsement constituted an attempt to steel the population for resisting the pressures placed upon the Revolution at times when its future seemed uncertain or, to borrow the more commonly used term, when the island appeared to be under 'siege'.

With this trend in mind, it is reasonable to ask whether this type of rhetoric was evident at other points in the Revolution's trajectory. From the texts already examined, we have established that there was little indication of a promotion of *guerrillerismo* during the late 1970s and the 1980s. In its third decade, the Revolution was indeed facing up to a new challenge which threatened to destabilise it: the intensification in US hostility towards the island under the newly-elected President Ronald Reagan. Yet, as we have seen, an examination of the Cuban leadership's discourse from the early part of the decade soon confirmed that *guerrillerismo* was not invoked as a means of mobilising the population around the task of defending the Revolution. Instead, those in power appeared intent on stepping up the island's military capabilities, and on conferring a more military mindset upon the Cuban people. Citizens were encouraged to become 'soldiers' of the *Guerra de Todo el Pueblo*, the militias of the 1960s were revived as territorial 'troops', and mobilisation on the whole decreased. This shift to a more 'militaristic' approach can be explained by the continued support Cuba was still receiving from the Soviet Union, both militarily and in more general terms. Though ostensibly under 'siege' from the United States, the Revolution could still count on the backing of the world's other superpower, rendering it less vulnerable than it might otherwise have been. What is more, in the first half of the 1980s, the Revolution was no longer plagued by the in-fighting which had marked the leadership during the first decade and a half in power. The First Communist Party Congress of 1975 saw to it that revolutionary rule was concentrated in the hands of the Communist Party, and brought with it confirmation that the Revolution was firmly headed in the direction of Soviet orthodoxy. This consolidation of the leadership put an end to the competition for hegemony within the ranks of power. In short, it was no longer

necessary for the former *guerrilleros* to employ *guerrillerismo* as a means of legitimising their dominance.

In the 1990s, however, there is no denying that Cuba stood alone. The collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991 saw the Revolution face its greatest test since the counterrevolutionary invasions of the 1960s: the so-called 'Special Period'. Cuba faced unprecedented economic hardships following the dissolution of Comecon and the subsequent loss of approximately eighty per cent of its trade, the withdrawal of Soviet troops from the island signalled the end of Moscow's military support, and the Revolution lost its principal ideological ally, leaving it further isolated in its defence of socialism (Yaffe 2009, 265).

Cuba's economic woes were exacerbated by the aggressive measures of the United States. In October 1992, the US administration introduced the Cuban Democracy Act, also known as the Torricelli Act, which strengthened the existing embargo by prohibiting subsidiaries of US companies in third countries from trading with Cuba (Blight and Brenner 2007, 175). These sanctions would only be lifted if the Cuban government introduced free and fair (as judged by Washington) elections (Gott 2004, 303). The measures were further tightened with the passing of the Helms-Burton Act in 1996 which also laid down more specific guidelines for the imposition of democracy in Cuba, including the stipulation that both Fidel and Raúl be forbidden from participating in any future democratic government (Gott 2004, 304). The strict resolutions did much to discourage the investment of foreign capital in Cuba at a time when the country needed it most. The future of the Revolution was thrown into question, especially by countless external commentators who wasted no time in

proclaiming that the end was nigh for Castro's government. A notable example was the Miami-based journalist, Andrés Oppenheimer, who predicted the imminent breakdown of Cuban Communism in his 1992 book, *Castro's Final Hour: The Secret Story Behind the Coming Downfall of Communist Cuba* (Oppenheimer, 1992). Marifeli Pérez-Stable was similarly sceptical regarding the Revolution's future, writing in 1993:

by the early 1990s, Cuban socialism was becoming increasingly untenable. The international conditions that had buttressed it rapidly disappeared. (...) The end of the cold war had also weakened Cuban national security. The world that had allowed the Cuban Revolution to consolidate and the Cuban government to sustain socialism had come to an end (Pérez-Stable 1993, 174).

Yet, in spite of the gravity of the problems it faced, the Revolution *did* survive the challenges of the Special Period, with its socialist principles still largely intact. As Pérez-Stable herself stated, 'when the government declared the special period in peacetime, it signalled a commitment to socialism against all odds' (Pérez-Stable 1993, 158). The leadership was prepared to go to extreme lengths to protect the Revolution, and committed itself to mobilising the population into supporting and defending it. Specifically, and as had begun with the Rectification process, those at the helm of the Revolution looked to the 1960s for inspiration as to how to solve the monumental problems the country faced. Cuba had survived countless challenges during its first decade, and had successfully rallied Cubans around the cause of defending the Revolution at all costs. It appeared, therefore, that lessons could be learnt from the actions taken in those formative years. Consequently, with the onset of the Special Period came also a conscious resurgence of the writings of Che Guevara and a renewed glorification of Cuban history, while Cuban youth once again became the focus of the leadership's mobilisation drives (Kapcia 2000, 207).

As will become clear with the ensuing analysis, there is much evidence to support the hypothesis that the economic crisis of the 1990s engendered a revival of *guerrillerismo* within the official discourse in an attempt to maintain support for the Revolution, and to encourage greater efficiency in the workplace with a view to rescuing the failing economy. Furthermore, the clear evidence of *guerrillerismo* in the 1990s in turn undermines the notion that the Cuban leadership has persistently depended upon the cultivation of a 'siege mentality' as its principal mode of both mobilising the population and of garnering its support. As in Chapters Two and Three, this evidence can be derived from through an analysis of the discourse featured in a range of texts issued by the leadership in the 1990s. One of these text types is a number of speeches delivered by Fidel Castro. As discussed in the opening section of Chapter Two, key speeches made by figures of authority are useful indicators of the general mood of the Revolution and, from a Foucauldian perspective, of the 'true' statements that may come to be repeated and distributed throughout Cuban society by different practices and institutions. In the 1990s, when the Revolution faced possible collapse, speeches took on an added significance as the leadership made every effort to reassure the Cuban people, not to mention the rest of the world, that the Revolution would not be defeated. Speeches became a powerful, direct and immediate means of rallying Cuban citizens around the cause of defending the Revolution, and of informing them of the leadership's imminent plans for its reconsolidation. In this way, official speeches possessed a resonance not seen since the 1960s, when they served as the principal medium through which the leadership could communicate its programme for the construction of the Revolution in power, as well as its *cubanista* (and thus *guerrillerista*) beliefs and values.

To showcase how the utterances made on behalf of the leadership were reproduced and at which moments during the 1990s, the chapter presents evidence from Cuba's leading daily newspaper *Granma* and, given the increased attention afforded to the Cuban youth during the 1990s, the weekly newspaper of the UJC, *Juventud Rebelde*. While the analysis does include excerpts from editions that appeared on key dates in the revolutionary calendar, examples from non-significant dates will also be featured as evidence that *guerrillerismo* was consistently identifiable during this decade. It should be noted here that access to other, similar texts from the 1990s can be limited. The MINFAR periodical *Verde Olivo* that was examined in the previous chapter, for example, ceased to be published on a weekly basis during the Special Period as a result of a paper shortage; it will not, therefore, be included in the analysis in this chapter.<sup>45</sup>

### **Textual Analysis (1990-1999)**

From the opening days of 1990, there was little confusion as to the message the Cuban leadership intended to promote: the Cuban people were engaged in a battle to defend the Revolution at whatever cost. Citizens were encouraged to *resistir* and, above all, *luchar* if the Revolution was to stand any chance of survival. These messages all added up to an unmistakable tone of defiance.

In the 2 January 1990 edition of *Granma*, the first issue of that year, we can identify an emphasis on 'being prepared' for every occurrence, and, specifically, on being prepared to 'resist'. On page four, the headline across the double-page spread read: 'Nos preparamos para la obra que estamos llevando a cabo para defender el futuro

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<sup>45</sup> Similar to the case of *Verde Olivo*, the shortage of paper during the Special Period also affected the output of *Juventud Rebelde*, forcing its transition from a daily to a weekly newspaper in 1990.

que estamos construyendo' (*Granma* 1990, 4). These words were lifted from a speech given by Fidel Castro on 29 December 1989 at the 'inauguración de cinco plantas de materiales de construcción'. The speech was printed in its entirety below the headline. In this example of direct discourse representation, the phrase selected as the headline was significant in its summary of the intended message of the speech: to lay emphasis on the necessity of collective action to maintain the Revolution. By beginning the phrase with a first person plural, 'nos preparamos', Castro's address was immediately inclusive: Cuba was preparing itself as a people, thus it was not only the government that had to take action. This stress on the collective was underlined twice again with additional use of the first person plural in 'estamos llevando a cabo para defender el futuro que estamos construyendo'. Though he was directly addressing those who worked in the manufacture of construction materials, the wider meaning of the verb 'construir' is noteworthy here; Castro conveyed the idea that the Cuban people were 'constructing' the future of the country. This notion is interesting in that it related to the *guerrillera* precept of creating 'subjective conditions', and of being in charge of one's destiny through action. Castro seemed intent on underlining his point that it was in the hands of the Cuban people, as a collective, to shape their own futures; they would not be crushed by the 'objective conditions' which threatened the Revolution. Moreover, the present continuous tense employed in 'estamos construyendo' was effective in its implication that the Cuban people were *already* engaged in the process of building their future. This notion might have been encouraging for Cuban citizens, insofar as it suggested that the future was something attainable and concrete, and for which the foundations had already been laid. The statement was further underlined by the mention of 'defender'. Again, the sense here was that the future was something which could be

controlled, and defended, through action. As has become evident through the discussion in the previous two chapters, the potential strength and power of the collective was a recurrent theme in the hegemonic discourse of the 1960s and 1970s.

The 'future' was again referred to in the opening lines of Castro's speech:

Estamos preparados para todo, para grandes avances en el futuro, y trabajamos para eso con optimismo (...) Nos preparamos para resistir lo que sea necesario resistir, nos preparamos para defender la Patria (...) (*Granma* 1990, 4).

Once more, the repetition of the first person plural (on four occasions here) highlighted the importance of collective action, and the inclusive nature of Castro's address. In both sentences, the idea of 'preparation' was foregrounded ('estamos preparados'; 'Nos preparamos') which served to underline the portrayal of the Cuban people as ready for whatever challenges lay ahead. The projection of this image aimed both to bolster the confidence of the Cuban people in a moment of crisis, and to inform foreign observers that the Revolution was in a position to withstand any aggression directed its way, as reflected in, 'lo que sea necesario resistir'. There was a definite mood of defiance to these statements, in addition to a tone of positivity in the face of adversity, clearly conveyed in, 'trabajamos para eso con optimismo'. This sense of optimism casts doubt upon the idea that a 'siege mentality' was prevalent at this stage, although it should be remembered that this speech was given before the pronouncement of the Special Period, and prior to the intensification in US hostility towards the island.

The tone of defiance and the conviction that the Revolution would succeed was similarly evident in a speech given by Fidel Castro on 7 March 1990 to mark 'la

Clausura del V Congreso de la Federación de Mujeres Cubanas'. Throughout the speech, Castro made continual reference to the resilience of the Cuban people and to their ability to defend the country, and underlined his belief that Cuba was not, and nor would it become, isolated. Castro contended:

Y la teoría de la soledad...Nunca quien defiende una causa como la que defiende Cuba estará solo (...). Esperen, y si quieren nos lo dan después que estemos muertos, porque al mismo tiempo, van a tener que levantar una bandera, rendirle un homenaje al pueblo que supo ser todo lo valiente que necesitaba ser en esta era y que supo defender con la fuerza y el heroísmo necesarios la causa que le ha tocado defender en esta época (...) No vamos a estar solos, pero esa es una respuesta que les doy a aquellos que se preocupan de que si por todos estos problemas y lo que pasó allí y allá nos vamos a quedar aislados (...) El hecho de que nos preparemos y de que estemos dispuestos a vivirlo y a hacer lo que se corresponda en ese momento, es lo que nos hace sentir seguros y tranquilos, y es lo que nos da la convicción de que saldremos adelante, aunque pueda venir un período de ese tipo, como tenemos también la convicción de que saldremos victoriosos (Castro, 1990b).

It is notable here that 'soledad' was referred to as a 'teoría', rather than a reality. Castro unequivocally stated that 'No vamos a estar solos', again employing the first person plural to underscore the collective nature of Cuba's predicament. The sense of optimism was also retained in these words, indicated by the phrase: 'El hecho de que nos preparemos y de que estemos dispuestos a vivirlo y a hacer lo que se corresponda en ese momento, es lo que nos hace sentir seguros y tranquilos'. Consistent with the December 1989 speech, the emphasis was on preparation, and how, through being prepared, the Cuban people were able to feel 'seguros y tranquilos'. Moreover, the use of parallelism found in 'la convicción de que saldremos adelante' and 'la convicción de que saldremos victoriosos' further highlighted the message that the Cuban people were unwavering in their belief that they would overcome the obstacles confronting the Revolution in the early 1990s. Castro was thus attempting to reassure his audience that they need not question the

survival of the Revolution because the Cuban people, through their actions, possessed control over its destiny.

The theme of defiance and the notion that the Cuban *pueblo* determined the Revolution's future was sustained in another of Castro's speeches given on the 26 July 1990, shortly before the official pronouncement of the Special Period. Castro stated:

El pasado año (...) abordé estos temas y expliqué cuál era nuestra actitud, cuál debía ser nuestra actitud; cuál era y cuál debía ser la actitud de nuestro pueblo y cuál debía ser la actitud de nuestro pueblo; cuál era y cuál debía ser la actitud de nuestro Partido y de nuestros militantes revolucionarios; cuál debía ser la actitud de los comunistas, cuál debía ser la actitud de los patriotas; cuál debía ser la actitud de los millones de hombres y mujeres de honor de nuestro país: ¡La da luchar, luchar, luchar; la de resistir, resistir, resistir en cualquier circunstancia! (Castro, 1990b).

In this extract, Castro reiterated his words from a speech given in the previous year in order to underline their continued relevance. The primacy of an 'actitud de lucha' was particularly apparent. This recurrent reference is indicative of a promotion of a code of *guerrillerismo*, insofar as it underlined the subjective nature of the task of defending the Revolution. Castro was attempting to instil the notion that the actions and subjective will of each and every Cuban were fundamental to the survival of the Revolution. This message was accentuated further by the listing of the different sectors of society of which the Revolution was composed (for example, 'nuestro pueblo'; 'nuestro Partido'; 'nuestros militantes revolucionarios'). By naming each group separately, Castro intended to produce, once again, a sense that the defence of the Revolution was a duty of each citizen, regardless of their role in society. Furthermore, the employment of the possessive pronoun 'nuestro' compounded the

attribution of a collective responsibility to the Cuban people, particularly in the repetition of 'nuestro pueblo'.

Further evidence of the presence of a code of *guerrillerismo* in the above extract can be found in the parallels with Guevara's own words in *La Guerra de Guerrillas*. Guevara wrote: 'la actitud de lucha, esa actitud que no debe desmayar en ningún momento, esa inflexibilidad frente a los grandes problemas del objetivo final, es también la grandeza del guerrillero' (Guevara 2006, 21). Castro's continued emphasis on 'actitud' clearly echoed Guevara's original statement. Moreover, in addition to recalling the words of the *guerrillero heroico* himself, Castro invoked the Cuban traditions of *deber* and *lucha* in the parallelism employed in the phrasing of this extract. It has already been well established in the thesis that these two terms are 'lexical items' within the context of the Cuban Revolution, and are often juxtaposed. In other words, they are terms which have a fixed meaning with recognisable connotations, and thus would have resonated with the audience. It is telling that Fidel Castro continued to employ these terms in the 1990s as a means of mobilising citizens, much as he had done in the 1960s and early 1970s. By its fourth decade, the Revolution was markedly different to what had come before it, having adapted over the years to address the innumerable challenges it had confronted. Yet, as this citation demonstrates, the language employed by the leadership in times of crisis remained unchanged. Specifically, it drew on incontestable terms which were firmly rooted in the Cuban psyche, and whose meaning derived from pre-Revolution history.

Elsewhere in this particular speech of Castro's, it is possible to find additional clues that point to a promotion of *guerrillerismo* by the revolutionary leader. As an example, Castro stated:

creen los imperialistas yanquis que no podremos resistir. ¡Qué poco conocen a nuestro pueblo!, a este pueblo que cuando empezaba, cuando no era todavía una nación totalmente formada sostuvo una guerra de 10 años, en la manigua, contra una de las potencias militares más poderosas de Europa en aquella época (Castro , 1990b).

In this instance, Castro made an appeal to the collective historical memory of the audience through his allusion to the Ten Years' War. As established in the discussion of the 1960s and 1970s, this period in Cuban history was often evoked by the revolutionary leadership as a means of legitimising the perpetual call for revolutionary action. The purpose of this particular reference was no different. Castro intended to inspire Cuban citizens by reminding them of the country's revolutionary tradition, by underscoring the fact that, despite facing a far superior enemy in terms of strength and size, the fragile and divided nation of the late 1800s had stood firm for ten years in its war against the Spanish colonial power. It is clear, then, that Castro's objective was to draw parallels between the Ten Years' War and the crisis of the 1990s. If Cuba had successfully challenged a formidable enemy in the past, there was no apparent reason that it could not do so again.

This notion regarding the ability of *el pueblo* to defeat a much larger, more organised enemy was undoubtedly linked to the key precept which underpinned Guevara's guerrilla warfare methodology: 'Las fuerzas populares pueden ganar una guerra contra el ejército' (Guevara 2006, 13). Castro seemed intent on promoting this tenet at this point. The use of the possessive pronoun in 'nuestro pueblo' reinforced the idea that the Cuban people had a collective ownership of their history, and a

collective duty to defend the legacy of their ancestors. What is more, the demonstrative pronoun applied in 'este pueblo que cuando comenzaba...' added a sense of immediacy to Castro's words. The past and present were fused in this latter phrase, insofar as Castro did not differentiate between the audience standing before him and the *pueblo* which had participated in the Ten Years' War. This phrasing did much to strengthen the implication here that the Cuban people, through their actions, continued to write the historical narrative of revolutionary struggle begun in the previous century.

Castro achieved the effect of conflating the moment of crisis in 1990 and the Ten Years' War through the use of presupposition, an inherent feature of the hegemonic discourse of the 1960s and early 1970s. He assumed that his audience would have sufficient knowledge of the events and significance of the struggles of the independence period to understand and recognise the parallels he hoped to establish. This 'general appeal to "background knowledge"' had an ideological function, in that it sought to promote *guerrillerismo* by praising those that had previously struggled against much larger enemies (Fairclough 1989, 154).

Additional characteristics of a discourse of *guerrillerismo* are discernible in the speech. There was reference, for instance, to the *voluntad* of the Cuban people, expressed in the phrase: 'Les demostramos nuestra voluntad de lucha a los imperialistas, y les demostramos que cualquier aventura tendrán que pagarla a un precio impagable' (Castro, 1990b). The concept of *voluntad* was consistent with the pre-eminence of subjective will and the creation of subjective conditions proposed by *guerrillerismo*. In this instance, *voluntad* was portrayed as a feature of the collective,

as denoted in the possessive pronoun ‘nuestra’ which preceded it, in addition to the use of the first person plural employed twice in ‘les demostramos’.

The primacy of *voluntad* can also be identified in the book *A problemas viejos soluciones nuevas: El Perfeccionamiento Empresarial en el MINFAR*, published in 1990. This brief text was produced by the FAR to provide additional guidance to its members on the economic changes which has been proposed by Rectification; given the FAR’s increased role in economic matters during the Special Period, this text was directed first and foremost at those members who assumed such non-military responsibilities. The text, made up a collection of short essays, was edited by Julio Casas Regueiro, the aforementioned former *guerrillero* and long-standing *raulista* who was promoted to the Council of Ministers when Raúl Castro assumed the Presidency in 2008. One of its five chapters, written by José Cazañas Reyes, a journalist and one-time war correspondent for *Verde Olivo* in Angola, was entitled, ‘Voluntad Joven’, which demonstrated not only the importance afforded to subjective will in turning the economy around, but also the key role bestowed upon young people at that time. Furthermore, the text characterised the FAR on more than one occasion as forming ‘una sola voluntad a la hora de acometer un empeño’ (Casas Regueiro 1990, 95). In this way, the text was consistent with the idea discussed in the previous speech; subjective will was presented in relation to the collective which, as a body, could alter the course of the Revolution, whether it be through combat or the reconstruction of the Cuban economy.

To return to Fidel Castro’s discourse, in a speech given on the 26 July the following year (1991), Castro continued to push forward similar ideas regarding the primacy of

action and how, through action, the Cuban people could control the destiny of the Revolution. As was typical of his rhetoric, Castro again invoked the Cuban historical narrative, both as a means of adding weight to his words and to inspire his listeners.

He asserted:

¿Con qué nos pueden amenazar a nosotros que somos los descendientes de Maceo y de Martí, de Máximo Gómez y de Agramonte, del Che y de Camilo, de Abel Santamaría y Frank País? (...) Más bloqueo y más sufrimiento que los que padecieron nuestros antepasados no los podremos sufrir jamás, porque hoy somos dueños de la tierra, ya no pertenece sino al pueblo.

Y la Revolución Cubana es responsable, históricamente, de sus propios hechos y de sus propios actos. Y vean bien que decimos 'sus', porque fueron nuestros y no de otros, tenemos nuestras ideas, nuestras concepciones, y hemos hecho las cosas a nuestra manera (...) No había, ni hay, ni habrá nadie en el mundo que nos pueda dar órdenes (...) En esas condiciones tenemos nosotros que abrirnos paso. Es nuestro deber más sagrado y más elemental si queremos tener patria (Castro, 1991).

As in the previous speech, the purpose here was to inspire and to reassure Cuban citizens by reminding them that they belonged to a tradition of revolutionary action. The continued employment of the first person plural, a distinguishing feature of Castro's rhetorical style, reinforced this message, for example in the first line, 'a nosotros que somos los descendientes...'. The syndetic listing of significant figures from Cuba's history of revolutionary struggle was effective in allowing emphasis to be placed on each of these individuals, thus giving them equal weighting in terms of importance, while also accentuating the multiplicity of Cuba's national heroes. The overarching message of these citations, that of taking responsibility for one's destiny and of subjective action more generally, was evident throughout, perhaps most notably in the line, 'la Revolución Cubana es responsable, históricamente, de sus propios hechos y de sus propios actos'. Here, Castro seemed to have been suggesting that, as the Revolution was responsible for its actions, it was also partly accountable, therefore, for the dire situation in which it found itself. Responsibility for the Revolution's actions was explicitly conferred upon the Cuban people in the

following sentence: 'decimos 'sus', porque fueron nuestros y no de otros, tenemos nuestras ideas, nuestras concepciones, y hemos hecho las cosas a nuestra manera'.

In the final line, there is further indication of consistency with the code of *guerrillerismo* where Castro stated that, 'tenemos nosotros que abrirnos paso'. This statement, imploring Cubans to take steps towards protecting the Revolution, recalled the *guerrillista* precept that one had to *create* the necessary subjective conditions for revolution; one had to take the initiative regardless of unfavourable objective conditions. This idea of making one's own way, of performing the first revolutionary action, was accentuated by the subsequent line, 'Es nuestro deber más sagrado y más elemental si queremos tener patria'. Once again, Castro invoked the Cuban tradition of *deber* to confer responsibility upon Cuban citizens for taking action to defend the Revolution. Such statements were reminiscent of the strikingly *guerrillista* assertions of the 1960s. Specifically, they echoed the 1962 'Second Declaration of Havana' in which Castro proclaimed: 'El deber de todo revolucionario es hacer la revolución' (Castro 1962, 169). Moreover, another 'lexical item', that of *patria*, was also referenced, as an additional means of stirring the conscience of the listener.

In the first years of the 1990s, clues which point to the presence of *guerrillerismo* can also be uncovered in the editions of *Granma* published on or after the date commemorating the anniversary of Guevara's death, 8 October 1967. The 8 October 1991 issue, though not overflowing with articles devoted to 'el Che', did include the front page headline: 'Che: ejemplo vivo y presente'. Underneath were printed the words: 'Es nuestra determinación de hacer más con menos que también está incluido

en el concepto que tanto defendió el Guerrillero Heroico' (*Granma* 1991, 1). In this example, the reference to Guevara as an 'ejemplo vivo y presente' is interesting in terms of the promotion of *guerrillerismo*, insofar as it reveals how the leadership considered the archetypal guerrilla figure to hold continued relevance during the period in question. Through elevating Guevara as the model revolutionary, the leadership intended to encourage citizens to emulate the values and actions of the figure of the *guerrillero*. What is more, the idea of 'hacer más con menos' was consistent with the principle which underpinned *guerrillerismo*: fomenting revolution with just a handful of combatants and little weaponry.

The following year, on the twenty-fifth anniversary of Guevara's death, the promotion of 'el Che' as a model whose values and attitude should be appropriated by the people continued. On the back page of the 8 October 1992 edition of *Granma* the headline read: 'Che está más presente que nunca' (*Granma* 1992a, 8). The leadership's recurrent technique of fusing the past and present was in evidence again here in the way in which Guevara's legacy was portrayed as having a continued relevance two and a half decades after his death. Another headline in the edition exclaimed: '¡Nos dejó su ejemplo!' (*Granma* 1992b, 8). The article accompanying this headline was unequivocal in its intention to present Guevara as an 'ejemplo'. It stated:

Nos dejó su pensamiento revolucionario, nos dejó sus virtudes revolucionarias, nos dejó su carácter, su voluntad, su tenacidad, su espíritu de trabajo. En una palabra, ¡nos dejó su ejemplo! ¡Y el ejemplo del Che debe ser un modelo para nuestro pueblo, el ejemplo del Che debe ser el modelo ideal para nuestro pueblo! (*Granma* 1992b, 8).

Similar to numerous other examples, the concept of *voluntad* was mentioned in this extract which, as discussed, was inextricably linked to *guerrillerismo*'s primacy of

subjective will. There was also reference to ‘tenacidad’, a fundamental quality of any *guerrillero*. The inclusion of the indirect object pronoun ‘nos’ sustained the unfaltering prominence of the collective, and served to implicate the reader in the ‘duty’ of emulating Guevara’s example, which was no longer just that, but ‘el modelo ideal para nuestro pueblo!’. The foregrounding of ‘nos’ at the beginning of the extract accentuated the effect of including the reader in carrying forward the legacy of ‘el Che’.

Another article in the same edition further substantiates the hypothesis that a code of *guerrillerismo* can be uncovered at this stage. The headline, ‘El primer voluntario para las tareas más difíciles, más duras’, was compatible with the *guerrillera* tenet of creating subjective conditions, and of enacting one’s revolutionary duties without hesitation (*Granma* 1992c, 8). The ensuing text followed through with the idea of realising one’s revolutionary commitment:

si hace falta un ejemplo a imitar para llegar a esos tan elevados objetivos, son imprescindibles hombres como el Che, hombres y mujeres que lo imiten, que sean él, que piensen como él y se comporten como él en el cumplimiento del deber, en cada cosa, en cada detalle, en cada actividad; en su espíritu de trabajo (...); en el espíritu de ser el primero voluntario para las tareas más difíciles, las más duras, las más abnegadas...(Granma 1992c, 8).

The repetition of ‘ser el primer voluntario’ reinforced the encouragement to take initiative with respect to revolutionary activity, while the reference to the tradition of ‘deber’ produced a similar effect to the previous examples we have seen; the idea of carrying out one’s revolutionary duty was awarded historical legitimacy through the inclusion of this ‘lexical item’.

In the issue published the following day, we can find an example of direct discourse representation of Guevara's words. A short article on the front page asserted that Guevara's example was present in the repudiation of the Torricelli Act. Manifest intertextuality was incorporated in the line: 'Y así se dijo: "Careceremos de recursos, pero sobrarán voluntades para sobreponernos"' (*Granma* 1992d, 1). The representation of Guevara's words was clearly an attempt to promote the idea that what Cuba lacked in material goods, it made up for with the subjective will of the people. The *guerrillista* element is overtly apparent here in the lesson that one could overcome obstacles through the application of subjective will, or *voluntad*, which could, in turn, produce the necessary subjective conditions. The explicit attribution of these words to Guevara, the heroic guerrilla himself, afforded them added legitimacy. The declaration of one of the main headlines on the front page — 'Sobrarán voluntades para sobreponernos'— further buttressed the key point which the leadership wished to communicate (*Granma* 1992d, 1).

Thus far, the analysis has considered texts which were issued in the opening years of the decade. These years were undoubtedly a testing time for Cuba as it came to terms first with the collapse of the Soviet Union and the accompanying economic hardship, and secondly with the implementation of the Torricelli Act which only exacerbated the existing problems. However, it was the year 1994 which arguably marked the lowest ebb for the Revolution during the Special Period. Not only was the economy still in decline, but in August 1994 the government had to contend with a riot on the Malecón, later referred to as the *Habanazo*. The riot was largely catalysed by the 'continuing ambivalence about migration policy shown by both the Cuban and the US government', although, beneath the surface, it was also an

outward demonstration of the frustration felt by Cubans at the increased hardships of the Special Period (Gott 2004, 298). Added to this problem of visible internal dissent, the leadership would also have been aware of the disconcerting presence of thousands of US troops in neighbouring Haiti.<sup>46</sup>

The growing threats to the stability of the Revolution, both domestic and external, were reflected in the discourse of the leadership at that time and in subsequent years. The language emanating from the organs of power seemed to be more emphatic in its explicit calls for the participation of each and every Cuban in the struggle to defend the Revolution. Within this language, there was a more active promotion of *guerrillerismo*, insofar as its characteristics were more readily discernible. This strengthening of a guerrilla discourse was consistent with the hypothesis posited at the beginning of this chapter; that is, that the Cuban revolutionary government, at moments of crisis, unearthed its guerrilla roots in order to provide its citizens with an inspirational guide for enacting revolutionary duties.

The content of the speech made by Fidel Castro on 1 January 1994 substantiates these claims. Typical of his discursive style, in this speech Castro made constant reference to past revolutionary heroes to legitimise the continued struggle of the Cuban people. Speaking about the independence struggles begun in the 1860s, Castro commented: ‘Sí, larga ha sido la lucha, pero esa lucha no ha cesado’ (Castro, 1994). The invocation of *lucha* occurred frequently in this speech, as did the calls for the Cuban people to ‘resistir’, thus echoing the previous speeches already considered, specifically that given on the 26 July 1990. An image was also created in

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<sup>46</sup> US troops invaded Haiti in 1994 to remove the military regime which had assumed power following a coup in 1991. They remained on the island until March 1995.

this speech of the Cuban people as being ‘dispuestos a dar nuestra sangre y nuestras vidas sin vacilación alguna en defensa de nuestras ideas’ (Castro, 1994). This representation of Cuban citizens as being ready to defend the Revolution with their lives was characteristic of the attributes required of a *guerrillero*. To remind ourselves of Guevara’s words regarding this issue, he stated: ‘Cada uno de los guerrilleros esté dispuesto a morir, no sólo por defender un ideal sino por convertirlo en realidad. Esa es la base, la esencia de la lucha de guerrillas (Guevara 2006, 21). The parallels between Castro’s and Guevara’s words indicate that Castro was purposefully encouraging Cubans to emulate the disposition of the guerrilla fighter. Elsewhere in the speech, evidence that the endorsement of producing ‘subjective conditions’ continued at this stage is tangible. Castro implored the Cuban people to be strong in order to overcome the objective conditions they faced. He stated: ‘debemos ser lo suficientemente fuertes (...) para ser capaces también de vencer los obstáculos objetivos del mundo de hoy’ (Castro, 1994). This phrase conveyed the idea that the collective strength, or perhaps ‘subjective will’, of the population had the ability to alter the situation faced by the Revolution. The summoning of the lexical items ‘deber’ and ‘vencer’ added further weight to Castro’s argument, a technique characteristic of his discourse.

The promotion of the idea that subjective will could overcome any challenge continued throughout 1994; specifically, references to the primacy of *voluntad* were ubiquitous. In the 1 May edition of *Granma*, four pages were devoted to the Asamblea Nacional del Poder Popular of that year, one of the principal conclusions of which was that the will of the people would ensure the survival of the Revolution. To illustrate this point, the article on page two stated:

El gran consenso nacional que brotó claramente de esas reuniones, afirmó el Presidente de la Asamblea Nacional, es la voluntad de la inmensa mayoría de los cubanos de seguir resistiendo, de seguir luchando para salvar la Patria y la Revolución (Granma 1994b, 2).

In the 27 July issue of *Granma*, a comparable moral was communicated. The front page included direct discourse representation of a speech given by Raúl Castro on the forty-first anniversary of the Moncada attack. Raúl was reported to have contended:

La permanente enseñanza de Fidel es que sí se puede, que el hombre es capaz de sobreponerse a las más duras condiciones si no desfallece su voluntad de vencer, hace una evaluación correcta de cada situación y no renuncia a sus justos y nobles principios (*Granma* 1994c, 1).

The emphasis on the importance of the subjective action of the individual was explicit here, although, unlike in numerous other examples, the primacy of 'subjective will' was expressed in terms of 'el hombre', rather than 'nuestro pueblo'. The alliteration employed in 'voluntad de vencer' further accentuated the focus upon this concept as the key to the Revolution's survival.

The discourse issued in the following year continued to promote similar values which were consistent with those of *guerrillerismo*. In the 26 November 1995 issue of the newspaper *Juventud Rebelde*, for example, further instances of a focus on *voluntad* came to the fore. As already mentioned, *Juventud Rebelde* is the official newspaper of the UJC, originally established in 1965 and still distributed for sale throughout the country. The paper, which refers to itself as the 'Diario de la Juventud Cubana', features both national and international news stories, alongside articles discussing issues such as sport, politics, economics and sex education.

In an editorial on the revival of the *Milicias Universitarias*, it was written:

este retorno a nuestras luchas más recientes, se produce en los momentos en que la nación cubana reafirma su voluntad de construir el socialismo y cuenta con el apoyo mayoritario de los estudiantes y del pueblo. No se trata ni de militarizar las universidades (...): preservemos, con este paso, la tranquilidad de nuestras aulas y demos un lugar a todo revolucionario — que de manera voluntaria — esté presto a defender los intereses de su pueblo (...) Nacer como Milicia activa...dependerá en gran medida del protagonismo que sepamos darle a profesores y trabajadores (...) La escalinata, escenario histórico de mil batallas, ha de ser testigo de otro momento de honor, de testaruda voluntad de los estudiantes de defender su sueño universitario (*Juventud Rebelde* 1995, 2).

Here, the notion of subjective action was once again directed at the population as a collective, as exemplified in ‘la nación cubana reafirma su voluntad de construir el socialismo’. The mention of ‘construir’ in this phrase echoed the citation from Fidel Castro’s 1 January 1990 speech, discussed earlier in the chapter. The idea of ‘constructing’ socialism, and, therefore, the Revolution, afforded the Cuban people an active participation in pushing forward the revolutionary project. Additional weight was placed upon the concept of *voluntad* towards the end of the citation with the inclusion of the modifier, ‘testaruda’.

These words also demonstrated a rejection of the idea of a ‘militarised’ Revolution. Though the article referred only to university students, it is perhaps significant that it was deemed necessary to deny actively the militarisation of universities in the line, ‘No se trata ni de militarizar las universidades’. Instead, the reader was informed that the militias were open to every revolutionary that was ready to defend the Revolution ‘de manera voluntaria’. The interpolation of ‘que de manera voluntaria’ between two dashes was effective in highlighting this point, particularly as it was not an integral component of the sentence but was something of a tangential remark. Its inclusion thus indicates that the text producer fully intended to stress the point that

each revolutionary should be participating of their own will. Such an explicit refutation of the existence of a 'militarisation' process in one of Cuba's leading newspapers, albeit in reference only to its efforts to mobilise students, greatly reinforces the challenge posed by this study to the notion of a 'militarised' Revolution.

The emphasis upon doing things 'de manera voluntaria' also mirrored the underscoring of Guevara's willingness to be the 'primer voluntario', referred to in the 8 October 1992 issue of *Granma* already discussed. The inclusion here of the word 'protagonismo' is also significant. Again, it connoted a kind of 'subjective will' in its implication that the people should take a leading role in revolutionary action. Reference to the term was common during the Revolution's fourth decade. In the 1 January 1994 issue of *Granma*, for example, the front page headline declared: 'Otra vez, como el día del glorioso advenimiento de la Revolución, nuestro pueblo protagoniza una batalla sin par' (*Granma* 1994a, 1). The insertion of 'nuestro pueblo' provided additional evidence of the leadership's intention to underscore the agency of the Cuban people in order to compel them to enact their revolutionary duties. As a final point, the focus on the role of students in the article itself is indicative of the wider initiative to pay greater attention to the Cuban youth in the 1990s.

The centrality of *protagonismo* and *voluntad* in the hegemonic discourse was sustained throughout the 1990s and, if anything, became more prevalent in the latter part of the decade. Indeed, there is much to suggest that, from 1997 onwards, the resurgence of *guerrillerismo* is more perceptible than at any other time in the 1990s.

The leadership's discourse during this period indicates a growing confidence, one that was accompanied by a greater conviction to remain defiant in the face of US hostility. The possible explanations for an upshift in the tone of the official rhetoric are fourfold. First, the country's economic situation had ameliorated to a significant extent compared with the dark days of 1993-1994. This turnaround had much to do with the cultivation of a successful tourist industry which had come to overtake sugar as the country's principal generator of capital. Secondly, the government had achieved what could be termed a propaganda coup with the visit of the Pope to the island in 1998. In Pope John Paul II the Revolution appeared to have found an important ally in the fight against capitalism, and in the on-going conflict with the United States more broadly. Pérez-Stable confirms this view, writing that 'Cuba saw the Pope's presence on the island as a moral slap at the United States, particularly since John Paul II had recently denounced the social ills of unfettered capitalism with almost the same fervour he had mustered against Communism' (Pérez-Stable 2011, 61). Thirdly, the closing years of the decade brought with them the return to Cuba of Che Guevara's remains to the island, some thirty years after his death in Bolivia. The event did much to strengthen feelings of nationalism and to bring to the fore the optimism of the 1960s. Kapcia asserts:

the episode (...) inevitably recalled the heroism and sacrifice of the 1960s in a more productive and meaningful way than all manner of official speeches and slogans could do, either reviving memories nostalgically for those who had lived through the decade, or reviving interest in the writings of, and on, those years for those who were too young to remember (Kapcia 2000, 262).

Finally, there is a case to argue that the increase in confidence of the leadership was also related to the emergence of the so-called 'Pink Tide' phenomenon in Latin America. The election to the presidency of the populist, left-wing candidate, Hugo Chávez, in Venezuela in 1998 heralded a wave of left-wing governments in the

region which promised potential new allies for the Cuban Revolution. Similarly, the rise of new social actors across the continent, notably the Zapatista armed movement in Mexico, seemed to afford added legitimacy to Cuba's alternative political discourse (Levitsky and Roberts 2011, 1). Once more, Cuba was able to position itself at the helm of a continent-wide 'revolution'.

The front page of *Granma* on 1 January 1997 partly validates this proposal. Sandwiched between a photograph of Camilo Cienfuegos and Fidel Castro on the one side, and the title, 'Mensaje a nuestro pueblo' on the other, the front page article read:

Nuestra Revolución arriba, a su trigésimo octavo aniversario. Ciertamente, como nos lo previno tempranamente Fidel, ha sido entonces un camino difícil, de combates constantes, de heroísmo cotidiano (...) Viene el recuerdo aquel ejército de jóvenes e incluso de adolescentes, convertidos en alfabetizadores, que escenificó una de las jornadas más nobles y dignas de la Revolución, y convirtió a Cuba en el primer territorio libre de analfabetismo del continente americano (...) (*Granma* 1997a, 1).

It is the final part of this citation which is of interest here: the reference to 'el primer territorio libre de analfabetismo del continente americano'. The concept of the 'Territorio Libre' recalled the insurrectionary phase of the Cuban Revolution during which Castro's headquarters, La Comandancia de La Plata in the Sierra Maestra, was designated as the first 'free territory' of Cuba. The phrase also echoed a similar statement uttered by Fidel Castro in his 'First Declaration of Havana' in 1960, discussed in Chapter Two:

Junto a la imagen y el recuerdo de José Martí, en Cuba, Territorio Libre de América, el pueblo, en uso de las potestades inalienables que dimanán del efectivo ejercicio de la soberanía, expresada en el sufragio directo, universal y público, se ha constituido en Asamblea General Nacional (Castro 1960b, 346).

As already pointed out, this earlier example established a parallel between the Revolution's insurrectionary phase and the situation in which Cuba found itself in 1960. In other words, Castro presented the Revolution in power as constituting the first step in the continent-wide revolution for which the 'Declaration' called. Put differently, Castro was implying that Cuba was the first *foco* of the Latin American revolution.

While, in the 1997 citation, the wording did not state 'primer territorio libre' but 'primer territorio libre de analfabetismo', it should be taken into account that the text in question was expressed in written form and thus its particular syntax created a visual juxtaposition of the words 'primer territorio libre' for the reader. Similar to the statement in the 'First Declaration', the reference to Cuba as the first 'free territory' in the Americas brought to mind the memory of the armed struggle of the 1950s, yet it also emulated the language of the formative years of the Revolution when, as we have seen, the hegemonic discourse was infused with the code of *guerrillerismo*. The parallel with one of Castro's most famous speeches from the 1960s now seems aimed at reminding the Cuban people of the Revolution's 'glory years', a time when it could claim, with conviction, to be at the vanguard of revolutionary struggle in Latin America and, in many ways, the rest of the Third World. It is significant, therefore, that the leadership was reviving this language at a time when the Latin American left appeared to be experiencing a resurgence.

Moreover, the reference to 'el ejército de jóvenes e incluso de adolescentes (...) que escenificó una de las jornadas más nobles y dignas de la Revolución' was a deliberate attempt to inspire the Cuban youth. It demonstrated to young people the

potential outcome of the revolutionary action of youth; that is, allowing Cuba to continue to be at the forefront of revolutionary struggle, whether that be in the realm of literacy, or otherwise. The description of the young 'alfabetizadores' as having 'staged' one of the greatest days in the Revolution's history attributed the transformation of Cuba into the 'primer territorio libre de analfabetismo del continente americano' entirely to the agency of the Cuban youth of the 1960s. As in previous examples, the use of presupposition in this citation added to the effect of the message being conveyed to the reader. The text producer had assumed that the reader would have sufficient knowledge of the events of the Cuban Revolution to immediately recognise the parallels drawn between the insurrectionary phase, the early years of the Revolution in power, and its present-day circumstance. This recognition would, in theory, have enabled the reader to digest the image of Cuba as being at the vanguard of the continental struggle against imperialistic forces. This notion of the vanguard was central to Guevara's guerrilla warfare methodology and constitutes a key component of *guerrillerismo*.

The argument that Cuba began to re-envision itself as a revolutionary leader in the late 1990s is further reinforced by the discourse employed in the 17 April issue of *Granma* from the same year. The following words appeared in an article accompanying the 'Convocatoria al V Congreso del Partido Comunista de Cuba':

Cuba representa un baluarte incontestable y una esperanza para cuantos en el mundo empiezan a reagruparse para la lucha contra los terribles males de la globalización neoliberal (*Granma* 1997b, 4).

This quotation is notable for being markedly reminiscent of the language of the 1960s, which made frequent allusions to Cuba as being at the forefront, or the

'primer territorio', of revolutionary struggle. Additionally, the idea of Cuba as a 'bulwark' against tyranny in Latin America can be traced back to Fidel Castro's 'Historia me absolverá' speech from 1953, in which he stated: 'Cuba debía ser baluarte de libertad y no eslabón vergonzoso de despotismo' (Castro 2008, 47).

In this particular example, the idea was to promote an image of Cuba as being at the vanguard, or, indeed, the first *foco* of the *lucha* against globalisation. The mention of those that 'empiezan a reagruparse' appeared to be a direct reference to the people of Latin America. This issue of *Granma* appeared at a time when the neoliberal economic reforms which had been implemented throughout Latin America were being called into question by the aforementioned counter-hegemonic voices. It might seem fitting, therefore, that the Revolution would wish to portray itself as a guiding light for those engaged in political struggle. This image could provide political actors with an inspiration to continue with their campaigns, which would grant them the potential to transform into influential allies of the Revolution. What is more, the image of a 'baluarte inconquistable' in a wider revolutionary struggle could have contributed to legitimising the leadership's continued calls for the perpetuation of the revolutionary struggle at home.

In the same article, the parallels with the rhetoric of the 1960s were evident elsewhere. Specifically, reference was made to Guevara's concept of the 'new man', as evidenced in the following citation:

Estos días tan difíciles, en que solos habríamos de enfrentarnos a la tarea de llevar adelante lo que soñábamos, en heroica resistencia, permite que ha surgido un pueblo nuevo (*Granma* 1997b, 5).

In this instance, the attributes which Guevara had hoped would characterise the 'hombre nuevo' were implicitly projected onto the Cuban people as a collective, not as individuals. By stating that a 'pueblo nuevo' had emerged, the article suggested that the Cuban people had reached a stage where they were making sacrifices in the name of the collective, and, therefore, the Revolution. Furthermore, if we take into account another characteristic of the 'new man' according to Guevara, it was implied that they devoted themselves tirelessly to their revolutionary duties: 'El revolucionario, motor ideológico de la revolución dentro de su partido, se consume en esa actividad ininterrumpida que no tiene más fin que la muerte' (Guevara 1965, 382). Informing the population that they had become 'un pueblo nuevo' constituted an attempt to bestow upon them a sense of achievement and pride; they had realised Guevara's dream. This sense of pride may, in turn, have led to an increase in mobilisation as the population would have wished to continue fulfilling the criteria established by the heroic guerrilla. Presupposition was again at work here as the assumption is made that the reader would recognise the allusion to one of Guevara's most famous works.

A similar allusion to the concept of the 'new man' can be found in the 1 February 1998 issue of *Juventud Rebelde*. The main article on the front page, entitled 'Para jóvenes del tercer milenio', contained the line:

se plantea desde la vanguardia, la necesidad imperiosa de funcionar, crecer, revolucionar, haciendo al mismo tiempo hombres y mujeres nuevos y economía eficiente' (*Juventud Rebelde* 1998, 1).

In this instance, the youth were not presented as having yet transformed into 'hombres y mujeres nuevos'. Rather, the aim was to mobilise youth by suggesting

that, through carrying out their revolutionary work, they would simultaneously be conforming to the ideal of the 'new man'.

Other references which echoed Guevara's work were manifest in speeches and articles from the same year. In Fidel Castro's 26 July speech, for instance, he contended:

Martí tiene que llegar en un botecito con Máximo Gómez y un reducido grupo de hombres, por Playitas, porque aunque les habían confiscado las armas en Estados Unidos, las condiciones subjetivas en el pueblo estaban preparadas, habían transcurrido un número de años desde el 78, desde el Pacto de Zanjón, y el pueblo cubano estaba preparado para iniciar de nuevo la lucha por la independencia (...) (Castro, 1998).

As already firmly established in the present and preceding chapters, the concept of creating 'subjective conditions' for revolution was paramount to Guevara's writings on guerrilla warfare. In this example, the concept has been retrospectively applied by Castro to the events of the independence struggle at the close of the nineteenth century. Also outlined in the previous two chapters, the use of *guerrillista* terminology to describe historical events previous to the insurrection of the 1950s was a key feature of the hegemonic discourse throughout the 1960s and early 1970s. We have also seen that the purpose behind this *guerrillista* portrayal of past struggles was to present guerrilla warfare as a tradition firmly rooted in Cuban history. In other words, the re-presentation of previous rebellions, most notably the independence wars, as adhering to the same principles of guerrilla warfare as those applied by the Ejército Rebelde conferred historical legitimacy upon the values encompassed by *guerrillismo*, and the guerrilla approach to struggle more broadly.

A comparable intention motivated the use of *guerrillista* language in this extract. Castro aimed to underline the idea that it was possible to defeat a much larger enemy through the creation of ‘subjective conditions’, even when relying solely on the force of ‘un reducido grupo de hombres’. This notion underpinned this particular speech in its entirety. Throughout, Castro made similar allusions to the view that it was possible to achieve much with very little. Later in the text, when referring to the insurrection of the late 1950s, Castro made sure to underline the inferiority of the guerrilla forces in comparison with Batista’s troops. For instance, he stated, ‘los rebeldes no teníamos más que fusiles y minas’, adding a few minutes later: ‘sin contar con armas ni mucho menos para aquellos hombres — si acaso al final un arma y media por cada 10, y no armas de guerra precisamente, sino armas que podían adquirirse en las armerías’ (Castro, 1998). This stress upon the dearth of weaponry and manpower, both in the Revolution’s insurrectionary phase and in the independence wars, was highlighted frequently in texts published by the Revolutionary leadership of the 1960s and 1970s. In the 1964 text, *Historia de Cuba*, for example, which formed part of the analysis of the 1960s, it was written of the Ten Years’ War that:

Los españoles no se atreverían en lo adelante a salir al campo en pequeñas columnas. Sabían que los cubanos, apenas sin armas, contaban con dos factores poderosos: la sorpresa en el ataque y el valor en la lucha (*Historia* 1964, 197).

Similarly, the 1973 *Instrucción Política* stated: ‘y si los mambises combatían con el machete contra el fusil, el Ejército Rebelde combatió con la vieja escopeta a la ametralladora, al tanque, al mortero’ (*Instrucción* 1973, 457). What is more, the inferiority of the Cuban forces in both conflicts was underlined continually in the

first two decades through the reference to *los doce*, discussed at length in the preceding two chapters.

In addition to the stress upon producing subjective conditions when faced with a superior enemy, the aforementioned confident tone was apparent in this speech. Towards the end of his oration, Castro contended: ‘seguiremos luchando, tenemos razones para sentirnos confiados’. Moreover, Castro posited that the Cuban people had been fighting in their ‘trench’ throughout the history of the Revolution:

Creemos que hemos cumplido nuestro deber, toda una generación, al haber luchado sin tregua ni descanso durante 45 años desde aquel 26 de julio de 1953, manteniéndonos firmes en nuestra trinchera, en nuestros principios, con las mismas ideas que nos inspiraron aquel día (Castro, 1998).

While the employment of *trinchera* here may contain obvious military connotations, the metaphorical comparison it established between Cuba and a ‘trench’ was also reminiscent of a famous quotation attributed to José Martí: ‘trincheras de ideas valen más que trincheras de piedras’ (Martí 1891, 307). In the 5 May 1998 issue of *Granma*, in an article which recounted an interview with Fidel Castro, the leader was reported to have recalled these words, with reference to the Moncada attack:

A las mujeres se lo dije aquel día, recordando la frase de Martí que trincheras de ideas valen más que trincheras de piedra. A mí me llamaba la atención que Martí, un soldado de la Revolución, un combatiente, un hombre que muere en combate, en una carga de caballería, dijera un día: ‘trincheras de ideas valen más que trincheras de piedras’ (*Granma* 1998, 5).

The manifest intertextuality in this citation, whereby the incorporation of Martí’s words was clearly demarcated, was effective in adding weight to these words (in the eyes of the Cuban reader) as they were attributed to the ‘Apóstol’ of Cuban independence. Though Martí referred to a figurative trench of ideas (and did not

necessarily refer to Cuba as a trench in itself), his words can still be considered consistent with the *foco* theory. It is safe to assume that, in the 1990s, Cuba's 'trench of ideas' referred to its socialist principles. At a time when much of Latin America appeared to be sympathetic to socialist ideals, but was not necessarily taking up arms, the advance of Cuba's trench could occur through the spread of a shared ideology, rather than a physical struggle for power, as such. Castro had already made reference to Martí's words in his speech to mark the return of Guevara's remains to Cuba on 17 October 1997. Employing presupposition, a characteristic of his discourse, Castro exclaimed:

¡Bienvenidos, compañeros heroicos del destacamento de refuerzo! ¡Las trincheras de ideas y de justicia que ustedes defenderán junto a nuestro pueblo, el enemigo no podrá conquistarlas jamás! (Castro, 1997).

The metaphorical use of 'trincheras' can also be noted in other texts from 1998. In the 25 July issue of *Granma*, a short article implored the reader to 'hacer del barrio la primera trincheras de combate y la conciencia' (Suárez Ramos, *Granma*, 1998). The inclusion of the ordinal adjective 'primera' to modify 'trincheras' was significant in its implication that the trench established in the *barrio* would be but the first in a sequence of trenches established throughout Cuban society. In this sense, the *trincheras* of the *barrio* was almost akin to the first *foco*, which, it was hoped, would transform into a network of *focos*. The suggestion that the *barrio* was the starting point for revolutionary activity is also interesting in its promotion of grassroots activity. It conferred agency upon the average Cuban citizen, as part of a collective, to push forward the revolutionary agenda. A similar sentiment was evident in the 3 December 1995 issue of *Juventud Rebelde*, in an article on page three entitled, 'No hay dogmas para el barrio'. The article proposed that:

El país comienza y termina en el barrio (...) La mejoría nacional tendrá que pasar inevitablemente por la esquina de la casa, pero saldrá también del vecindario (...) sólo con la participación comunitaria, con el protagonismo del propio pueblo, se pueden impulsar muchos proyectos de cambio. El barrio no se puede gobernar desde afuera. Los diagnósticos hay que hacerlos allí. Las propuestas deben surgir de sus moradores, y las acciones también, con espontaneidad (...) (Rodríguez, *Juventud Rebelde*, 1995, 3).

The message that it was the people who were the driving force of the Revolution was unmistakable in this instance. Like the article in the 26 November 1995 issue of *Juventud Rebelde* discussed earlier, this citation made reference to the ‘protagonismo’ of the people. In other words, it endorsed the idea that citizens should be at the helm of any attempts to improve the country’s situation. The inclusion of the adjective ‘propio’ to precede ‘pueblo’ further emphasised the point that it was the responsibility of the Cuban people to act. The incorporation of vocabulary such as ‘participación’ and ‘impulsar’ produced a similar effect, insofar as both terms hinted at the concept of ‘subjective will’ as driving factors in the progression of the Revolution.

## **Conclusion**

The evidence presented in this chapter clearly demonstrates that *guerrillerismo* was actively promoted by the revolutionary government during the 1990s. Moreover, it reveals that the means by which *guerrillerismo* was endorsed in the hegemonic discourse remained largely unchanged from those that had been employed in the 1960s and early 1970s. The focus on subjective will, for instance, was revived in the fourth decade, most notably through a sustained reference to *voluntad*. Significantly, the appeal to subjective will was largely directed at the collective throughout the

decade, there being few instances in which the individual was singled out as the bearer of the responsibility for revolutionary participation. This emphasis on the collective can be said to reflect the extent of the crisis confronting the Revolution. It was vital that the revolutionary leadership mobilised the population as a whole as quickly as possible, through encouraging citizens to act in the name of the people, and not on behalf of individual concerns. The reaffirmation of the Revolution's socialist principles in the 1990s may also have influenced this focus on the collective, standing in stark contrast as it did to the individualism endorsed by neoliberal capitalism. Furthermore, events such as the *Habanazo* highlighted the necessity to remind Cubans, amidst unprecedented hardship, of the wider objectives of the Revolution: a struggle for the greater good.

Also in common with the hegemonic discourse of the first two decades of the Revolution in power was the promotion of *guerrillerismo* through the inclusion of presupposition and lexical items. *Deber* and *lucha* were permanent features of the leadership's rhetoric in the 1990s, while the frequent parallels drawn between the challenges of the Special Period and previous revolutionary struggles legitimised the sustained promotion of *guerrillerismo*. However, it should be taken into account that, in the Revolution's fourth decade, the leadership was partly addressing a new generation of young Cubans, for whom certain references to past struggles, revolutionary heroes or ideas, would not necessarily have constituted 'background knowledge' (Fairclough 1989, 154). Specifically, for those who had not lived through the early years of the Revolution, allusions to the work of Guevara would not have been instantly recognisable and would not, therefore, have been as effective in inculcating *guerrillerismo* upon the text recipient. Thus, rather than constituting

presuppositions, these references symbolised a conscious attempt by the leadership to *introduce* Cuba's history of revolutionary struggle to those who would guide the Revolution forward in the years that would follow. The collapse of the Soviet Union and the onset of the Special Period had focussed the leadership's attention inward, forcing it to look to the past to find the answers to Cuba's problems, as demonstrated in the revival of the writings and image of Che Guevara. As shown, this return to the ideas and values of the 1960s was communicated through the repetition in the official speeches and media of statements and words that echoed that era. This reproduction of statements had the effect of reconsolidating the 'reality', or the political culture, in which these traditional values, and thus the leadership's continued authority, made sense. In this way, the study of the discourse of the 1990s seems to confirm Foucault's proposals regarding how ideas are communicated over time in a given context.

Finally, the promotion of *guerrillerismo* in some ways precluded an intensification of the so-called 'siege mentality' in the 1990s. While the leadership did not hesitate to highlight the dangers which threatened the security of the Revolution, *guerrillerismo's* overarching lesson, that the collective subjective will of the Cuban people was sufficient to overcome the challenges posed by the Special Period, underpinned the official discourse. As discussed, in the latter part of the decade in particular, the evidence suggests that Cuba's isolation was not presented as a state of 'siege' as such. Rather, the leadership's rhetoric conveyed an image of the Revolution in the 1990s as a reincarnation of the Revolution of the 1960s: the 'baluarte incontestable' of the Latin American 'revolution'.

## Conclusion

### Cuba: A Guerrilla Nation?

From the moment the Cuban revolutionaries entered Havana in January 1959, the image of the *guerrillero* became instantly emblematic of the Cuban Revolution as a whole. The ubiquitous olive green uniform, worn by those who had descended from the mountains to take power in the cities, served as a constant reminder, both at home and abroad, of how the Revolution had been fought and, more crucially, won. Those at the helm of the nascent Revolution in power did little to dispel the perception that their leadership was comprised not of experienced politicians, but of members of the Ejército Rebelde, men (and a handful of women) whose only qualifications for the job that lay ahead were founded in a hard-fought guerrilla struggle. The guerrilla warfare origins of the Cuban Revolution afforded it a level of romanticism, insofar as it seemed to offer proof that the underdog — a band of poorly armed revolutionaries from a small island — could take on a world superpower and emerge triumphant. It was also a truly Latin American revolution, providing a home-grown, unorthodox model of insurrection that appeared to draw upon the specificities of the Latin American context. As Radu and Tismaneanu have noted:

Cuba was perceived as Latin America's redeemer, the Caribbean David who slayed the *norteamericano* Goliath (U.S. lack of support for Batista notwithstanding), but did it so in a flamboyantly Latin manner (...) while Guevara's involvement gave Castro's endeavour 'a definitely continental flavour (Radu and Tismaneanu 1990, 43).

In the first months, and even years, of the Revolution in power, the Ejército Rebelde leadership retained this flamboyant image by approaching the task of constructing a revolutionary government as a continuation of the guerrilla campaign in the *sierra*.

Pérez has argued that, for the *rebeldes*, 'The conflict had not ended on 1 January 1959; on the contrary, the scope of struggle had widened considerably' (Pérez 1976, 257). As a leading figure in the insurrection and subsequently in the revolutionary leadership, Che Guevara was central to the representation of a guerrilla-led Revolution. His charisma and good-looks only added to the romanticism already associated with the revolutionary movement, while his writings on guerrilla warfare methodology were a key contributor to the promulgation of the 'myth of the heroic guerrilla' (Wright 2001, 18). When speaking about the need to defend the Revolution in January 1959, Guevara's statement that 'todo el pueblo cubano deberá convertirse en un ejército guerrillero, pues el Ejército Rebelde es un cuerpo en crecimiento cuya capacidad sólo está limitada por el número de seis millones de cubanos de la república' effectively encapsulated the governing style of the revolutionary leadership in its formative years (Guevara 1959, 21).

Beyond this initial period, however, many foreign observers have argued that the somewhat erratic, guerrilla-style management of the Revolution in power, and the insurrection itself, appeared to have become a thing of the past for the Cuban leadership. While the olive green fatigues remained an enduring symbol of the foundations of the Revolution, it seemed that, in many other significant ways, the Revolution had been transformed into an entirely different entity, one that attempted to follow rigidly the path to Communism signposted by the Soviet Union. Gone were the unmethodical and often seemingly spontaneous organisation of revolutionary institutions and the application of the laws of the *sierra* to the task of revolutionary governance. In their place came a period of 'institutionalisation', in line with Soviet orthodoxy, that, in turn, laid the foundations for a profoundly

bureaucratic political system. The idealistic image of the *guerrillero* appeared to have become a distant memory, as those who had fought in the *sierra* now held the reins of the newly professionalised armed forces, the FAR, which played a fundamental role in the organisation of these recently established institutions, and in managing the mobilisation of Cuban citizens. For the majority of commentators on the Cuban Revolution, the widespread involvement of the FAR in the running of the Revolution was evidence enough that the Revolution was now well and truly 'militarised'.

This study set out to challenge this widely accepted concept in Western academia that 'militarism' can appropriately define the leadership style within the Revolution from the late 1960s onwards. It took as its point of departure the few scholars, discussed in Chapter One, who have suggested that 'militarism' is an overly simplistic notion that does not account for the idiosyncratic style of governance adopted by the revolutionary government or the specificities of the Revolution's historical roots. Such scholars have instead pointed to a supposed legacy of the *sierra* which, in practice, translated into the leadership's radical, and often risky, approach to revolutionary governance and decision-making. It was also reflected in the way in which the FAR was developed out of the Ejército Rebelde, and in the political education provided for its soldiers. Yet, while these scholars identified a legacy that problematised the concept of 'militarism', the majority based their arguments solely on a study of the Cuban Revolution in the 1960s. In this way, their work sought to account for the aforementioned revolutionary fervour of the immediate post-insurrection period, but did not apply to the Revolution's trajectory thereafter. It was thus the aim of this study both to challenge the concept of

'militarism', and to build upon the pre-existing arguments that disputed its relevance as a term to characterise the way in which the Revolution was organised and maintained. Specifically, it aimed to question whether the legacy of the guerrilla struggle extended beyond the Revolution's first decade in power, and into the period of so-called 'Sovietisation'/'institutionalisation'.

As has been noted throughout the present study, far from being forgotten, the lived experience of guerrilla warfare continued to inform the world-view which underpinned the Revolution long after the physical guerrilla campaign of the insurrectionary phase had ended. This on-going influence was clearly and consistently identifiable in the language expressed by the Cuban leadership, that is the hegemonic discourse, throughout the 1960s and in the first half of the second decade, before being resurrected in the 1990s. Moreover, we have seen that, within this discourse, there was found to be a continued emphasis on certain values, which not only directly echoed the guerrilla warfare methodology articulated by Che Guevara, but which also tapped into and recalled revolutionary guerrilla struggles that occurred prior to the insurrection of the 1950s. The promotion of such values aimed to contribute to the shaping of the revolutionary consciousness of both Cuban citizens and members of the armed forces (Judson 1984, 2). In other words, it encouraged an emulation of the values and attributes associated with the *guerrillero* as a means of mobilising the population and steeling them for the task of defending the Revolution.

Following Guevara and Kapcia, this study has conceptualised this on-going promotion of the guerrilla ethos as *guerrillerismo* (Guevara, 1963; Kapcia, 2000,

2008). In one sense, the elevation of *guerrillerismo* on key dates, for example 26 July or 1 January, is perhaps unsurprising; anniversaries commemorating the success of guerrilla activity are more likely to stir up a language of *guerrillerismo* than any other dates in the revolutionary calendar. However, the presence of a guerrilla discourse on other, less notable dates offers proof that there was a consistent, conscious promotion of a code of *guerrillerismo* through the reproduction and circulation of statements as an attempt to mobilise the population at points of greater instability, while at the same time helping to secure preserve the control of the revolutionary leadership. At times, where the intended recipients of such messages were external to Cuba's shores, it has been shown, in particular in Chapter Three, that the promulgation of the precepts of Guevara's methodology was tantamount not to *guerrillerismo*, but to *foquismo*, given that the latter term encompasses the principles of both Guevara and Debray's work, while also heavily connoting the struggles that occurred elsewhere in Latin America in the 1960s and 1970s.

The detection of the presence of *guerrillerismo* in the hegemonic discourse of the 1970s constitutes one of the principal contributions of this research to studies of the Cuban Revolution. As stated, it is generally accepted within Western academia that, in its second decade in power, the Revolution became thoroughly 'Sovietised'. This judgement is based entirely on the Revolution's adoption of the Soviet political and economic model from the late 1960s onwards. By contrast, the present study has shown in Chapter Three that, while it may have begun to transform structurally at that time, the beliefs and values which underpinned the Revolution remained unchanged. In other words, though foreign principles were applied to the practical management of the Revolution, at its heart, the Revolution was driven by values

which were rooted in Cuban history, specifically, Cuba's history of struggle, or *lucha*. The discovery that a resurgence of *guerrillerismo* was actively pursued by the leadership in the 1990s, as outlined in Chapter Four, further strengthens this study's contribution to scholarship on the Cuban Revolution. It showed that, when the Revolution appeared vulnerable, *guerrillerismo* was employed as a way of reminding Cuban citizens of where the Revolution had come from and why it was worth fighting to save.

Another important contribution of this thesis to academic work on the Cuban Revolution is the challenge it poses to the notion that the cultivation of a 'siege mentality' has been at the root of the leadership's successful mobilisation and defence drives. The thesis has demonstrated that the key to this success has not been based solely on the leadership's presentation of Cuba as a nation besieged, thereby creating a climate of fear, but rather on the exaltation of the guerrilla ethos. The promotion of this ethos has encouraged citizens to emulate the values and attributes of the *guerrillero*, and has presented the defence of the country as a duty which must be carried out in order to fulfil the legacy of the heroes of the revolutionary historical narrative. What is more, when viewed through the lens of *guerrillerismo*, Cuba's at times almost complete isolation has been presented as a positive condition, and one which has allowed the Revolution to assume its position at the vanguard of the Latin American revolution. Thus the evidence which supports the existence of *guerrillerismo* in some ways concomitantly undermines the presence of a 'siege mentality'. That is not to say that Cuban citizens have not been consistently reminded of Cuba's apparent 'sitting duck' status. Rather, what this study reveals is that the survival of the Revolution, and the leadership's ability to mobilise its

citizens, is not simply born out of the fostering of a negative mindset in which Cuba is constantly on a 'war footing'. Instead, *guerrillerismo* has offered a model, and consists of a set of values, that are entirely positive, and that have allowed for the defence of the Revolution to be seen not just as a necessity in a climate of aggression, but as a moral, almost religious, obligation which will maintain Cuba's status as a 'free territory'. Moreover, as the intermittent promotion of *foquismo* has revealed, the leadership has also conveyed the survival of the Revolution as vital to the advancement of the Latin American 'revolution', thus affording it a wider significance beyond the island's shores.

While this study has taken important steps towards unpicking and rethinking the established notion of a 'siege mentality', there still remains work to be done on this subject if we are to evaluate fully the pertinence of the concept to the Cuban Revolution. Such work might benefit from a comparative analysis of Cuba and other nations to which this term has been ascribed, for example, Israel (Arian, 1995; Bar-Tal and Antebi, 1992), in order to identify how far Cuba resembles or differs from these other contexts. Furthermore, the obvious psychological connotations of the word 'mentality' suggest that a more Social Psychology based approach might be useful in assessing the evidence for or against the perpetuation of this 'state-of-mind'. It goes without saying that both these approaches fall well beyond the scope of the present work.

The present work also leaves room for a more in-depth analysis of the hegemonic discourse of the 1980s. While the initial research conducted on this decade suggests that a marked presence of *guerrillerismo* in the hegemonic discourse is unlikely,

there is still scope to investigate whether it is absent throughout, and particularly during the period of Rectification commencing in 1986. Briefly mentioned in Chapter Four, this campaign heralded the distancing of the Revolution from Soviet orthodoxy and the return to the 'moral economy' of the 1960s. With this shift to previous, home-grown solutions to the country's problems came also a revival of the writings and image of Che Guevara. This instance of 'looking backwards' may well have brought with it a resurgence of the language of *guerrillerismo*, and thus may be worthy of additional attention. Another era which would perhaps merit analysis is the 'Batalla de Ideas' phase of the post-2000 period. First launched by Fidel Castro in 2000 on the back of the mass mobilisation drive to demand the return of Elián González to Cuba from the United States, the Batalla's wider aim was to re-unite a somewhat divided nation following the ordeal of the Special Period, and to revive revolutionary participation and morale (Kapcia 2012, 70/76).<sup>47</sup> In order to do so, the leadership looked to the methods adopted in the very first years of the Revolution in power, a time in which mass mobilisation, and, therefore, support for the revolutionary cause, was at its peak. Again, this revisiting of the ideas and approaches of the first decade may well have been accompanied by a *guerrillerista* discourse, evidence of which would further support the claim of this thesis that *guerrillerismo* becomes prevalent at times in which the Revolution is most in need of consolidation, and in which the nation itself is undergoing a process of re-building. However, though a study of these periods may offer further validation of the

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<sup>47</sup> Elián González was a five-year-old boy who was rescued from the waters off Florida's coast in November 1999 after the boat he had been travelling in from Cuba with his mother capsized, resulting in the drowning of ten of the twelve passengers on board. González was taken in by relatives in Miami, but his citizenship status soon became the subject of great controversy between the governments of the United States and Cuba. The boy's father requested his return to Cuba, a request supported by Washington but vehemently challenged by Florida's community of Cuban exiles. Debate over González's future dragged on for over six months, until it was finally decided that he should return to Cuba, following an intervention by the US Supreme Court (Gott 2004, 310).

conclusions drawn in this thesis, it is not essential to this work. The evidence already uncovered from the 1960s, 70s, and 90s not only provides sufficient confirmation that *guerrillerismo* has been promoted by the leadership at different stages, but it also responds directly to the literature on the ‘militarism’ of the Revolution, and the arguments which support the notion of ‘institutionalisation’, thereby shedding new light on these much studied periods.

An additional element that has not been addressed here is the reception of *guerrillerismo* by the text recipients themselves, the Cuban population. Measuring the level of acceptance and the impact of the messages contained within the *guerrillerista* discourse would require an extensive, qualitative research-based study, a task well beyond the reach of this particular project. Such a study might yield interesting results regarding the extent to which the hegemonic discourse has contributed to shaping the consciousness of the Cuban people, and how such consciousness-raising has been reflected in revolutionary participation.

Nonetheless, while the research presented here has focussed solely on the ‘top-down’ dissemination of *guerrillerismo* by the Cuban leadership, rather than how its messages have been received as such, the very survival of the Revolution and the continued support offered by the population suggest that *guerrillerismo* has functioned successfully as a means of mobilising citizens and steeling them for the sacrifices and hardship involved in maintaining the revolutionary project. That the Revolution endured the crisis of the Special Period intact, for example, can be attributed partially to the leadership’s rallying cries for increased participation, its show of defiance in the face of adversity, and its invocation of historical antecedents

as testament to the fact that the Cuban nation had survived such moments of trauma previously and could, therefore, do so again. Needless to say, the leadership's discourse is but one contributing factor among many that account for the Revolution's longevity. Yet, if we are to accept Fairclough's proposal (following Foucault) that 'discursive practice, the production, distribution, and consumption (including interpretation) of texts, is a facet of hegemonic struggle', it follows that the language emitted by the leaders of the Revolution has played a crucial role in the acquisition and the preservation of the hegemony of the Cuban revolutionary project (Fairclough 1992, 93).

As a significant feature of this language, *guerrillerismo* has thus assisted in the preservation of this hegemony, a contribution achieved through the promotion of its constituent values, such as *lucha*, *deber*, *voluntad*, and self-sacrifice. The thesis has argued that the perpetual elevation of these values, or beliefs, within the *guerrillista* rhetoric, significant evidence of which has been presented in the preceding chapters, and their rootedness in pre-Revolution history, has transformed them into 'lexical items', that is, terms which have a given ideological significance within the Cuban context (Fairclough 1992, 191). The ideological significance attached to these values — for example, *deber* — has rendered their meaning unquestionable. In other words, they have become part of the collective 'background knowledge', or, to use Foucault's term, they are taken to be established 'truths' in the specific context of revolutionary Cuba (Fairclough 1989, 154). This fixity of the meaning of *guerrillerismo*'s values is further strengthened by the way in which they have been constantly linked to historical figures and events in the hegemonic discourse. Text recipients are frequently reminded that heroes of both the

independence struggles and of the Revolution's insurrectionary phase have demonstrated the possession of such values and attributes as tenacity, a sense of duty, strong will, self-sacrifice, and so on. The invocation of pre-Revolution figures is particularly effective, insofar as these historical figures are, in many respects, untouchable. Similar to the way in which 'lexical items' such as *deber* possess a degree of fixity with respect to the meaning they encompass, so too do the heroes of Cuban history. José Martí, for example, represents Cuba's long-standing struggle for independence, a duty to the revolutionary cause, and an unyielding anti-imperialism. This image of Martí is accepted as fact in revolutionary Cuba, and the temporal distance which exists between his death and the onset of the Cuban Revolution in power means that this fact has remained, and will likely continue to remain, unchallenged.

In contrast, the heroic status of the former *guerrilleros* of the Revolution's insurrectionary phase who then went on to assume posts with the revolutionary leadership, *can* be contested. The errors committed by the leadership over the decades of the Revolution in power somewhat tarnishes the memory of the historic feat of the insurrectionary phase. For this reason, the invocation of the ethos of pre-Revolution *guerrilleros* or, for that matter, *guerrilleros* who passed away in the early years of the Revolution in power, Guevara and Camilo Cienfuegos most notably, has been an effective means of safeguarding the almost sacrosanct values attached to *guerrillerismo*. The revival of the writings of Guevara in the 1990s, for instance, illustrates this use of 'incorruptible' heroic figures. Guevara's premature and violent death in 1967 conferred upon him the status of martyr to the revolutionary cause, while also absolving him of any blame for the subsequent failures of the Revolution.

His fellow comrades from the *sierra*, however, at least those who were then serving in the revolutionary government, could not escape such blame, and neither did they necessarily attempt to absolve themselves of it. Yet the references to Guevara did at least divert some attention away from the crisis of the period, and provided the Cuban people with a figure upon which they could project their hopes for the future of the Revolution. Guevara, as the archetypal *guerrillero heroico*, symbolised the ‘glory days’ of the first years of the Revolution in power, when participation was at its peak, and the nation rallied around to ensure the survival of the Revolution. In a similar way, the frequent allusions to the events of the Ten Years’ War during the 1990s performed a similar function. The independence struggle of the late 1800s could be invoked as the model of revolutionary activity, particularly given that the heroic legacy of its participants pre-existed the Revolution itself.

As an ideological code, then, *guerrillerismo* has been effective in stirring up the support of the Cuban people as it is rooted in pre-Revolution history and thus its values cannot be called into question. The rootedness of these values, and their ‘common-sense’ quality, leads one to conclude that the efficacy of *guerrillerismo* as a mobilising tool lies in the act of simply pushing certain cognitive buttons; in other words, in calling to mind certain terms and historical events and reminding Cubans of what they already know and believe, but, as Foucault has highlighted, without necessarily drawing their attention to the fact that such ‘reminders’, that such a ‘structuring’ of their ‘reality’, are taking place (Mills 2003, 55). This continual ‘button pushing’ in the 1960s, early 1970s, and, later, in the 1990s, was intended to ensure that *guerrillerismo*’s values were firmly internalised and could not be forgotten by the text recipient.

The internalisation of these values increased the likelihood that they would be outwardly performed by said text recipient through their revolutionary participation. Yet, what this thesis has demonstrated is that, though text recipients have been targeted on an individual level using certain discursive techniques, the overall message of the hegemonic discourse was that the active contribution of the individual to the revolutionary project would only be of worth if it occurred alongside, and within, collective action. That is not to say that an encouragement of individual action has been deemed less important by the leadership, or that it has, in any way, been discouraged. On the contrary, the promotion of revolutionary participation on an individual level has been an obvious preoccupation of the leadership. The well-known phrase from Fidel Castro's 'Second Declaration of Havana' discussed in Chapter Two, 'El deber de todo revolucionario es hacer la revolución', epitomised the leadership's attempts to confer agency upon the individual actor in the task of 'making' revolution (Castro 1962, 169). On the whole, however, the overriding message within the hegemonic discourse in the periods examined was that this agency could only produce an impact if it complemented, and formed a constituent part of, a greater collective agency.

This notion that individual action derives its impact only in relation to the collective encapsulates the essence of guerrilla warfare and, more specifically, the *foco* methodology of revolutionary guerrilla warfare. Guevara's method encouraged the reliance upon subjective will, yet this 'will' could only produce successful action if it was acted upon within the collective (albeit a 'collective' comprised of only a handful of men) of the guerrilla *foco*. In turn, the guerrilla *foco* could only survive, and launch a revolution, if it succeeded in establishing a wider network of *focos*.

Finally, this network of *focos* could only meet its revolutionary objectives if it interacted with the masses to form a popular army. These sequential layers of activity which would lead up to the creation of a whole, the *ejército regular*, have been continually reflected in Cuban society since the onset of the Revolution in power, and in the way in which the leadership has stressed the need for participation at various levels. While citizens have been encouraged to act as individuals, as we have established, appeals have also been made for them to involve themselves in collective action at a local level. An example of such an appeal was highlighted in Chapter Four when, during the Special Period, the leadership laid emphasis on the *barrio* as the focal point of participation at a community level. The wider initiative for citizens to join Comités de Defensa de la Revolución (CDRs) since 1960 also illustrates how Cubans have been incited to act within a local collective. Beyond these community-based organisations, the creation of mass organisations, such as the Federación Estudiantil Universitaria (FEU) and the Federación de Mujeres Cubanas (FMC), has promoted participation on a national scale. Just as in Guevara's *foco* methodology, all these different organisations and means of participation together form part of one whole: the Revolution. Taking this idea further, and as the leadership has perpetually underlined, it is, therefore, the actions of the Cuban *pueblo* as a collective, and, more importantly, as a nation, which determine the fate of the Revolution.

This positioning of the Cuban people as the true leaders of the Revolution leads one to conclude that, while *guerrillerismo* as an ideological code has, at times, become less visible within the hegemonic discourse, the values and beliefs it encompasses have underpinned and shaped the political culture of the Revolution since its

inception. Indeed, the very fact that the Cuban *pueblo*, guided by the vanguard of the revolutionary leadership, controls the destiny of the Revolution is, in itself, a representation of the essence of guerrilla warfare methodology outlined by Guevara. That is, the potential for ‘popular forces’, led by the guerrilla vanguard, to be victorious over more powerful adversaries. While the majority of Cubans, particularly those of younger generations, may not have experienced physical combat, the mass participation of Cuban citizens in the revolutionary project throughout the trajectory of the Revolution seems to have fulfilled Guevara’s aforementioned prophecy that ‘todo el pueblo cubano deberá convertirse en un ejército guerrillero’ (Guevara 1959, 21). In many ways, this role ascribed to the Cuban people was predetermined well before the onset of the insurrectionary phase in 1956. In the struggle both to acquire and maintain its independence, Cuba, as a small, island nation, and suffering the ‘geographic fatalism’ of its positioning just ninety miles from the shores of its superpower enemy, has always been destined to assume the role of the *guerrillero* (Debray 1965, 146; Gott 2004, 191). To elucidate further, if we accept that *foco*-style guerrilla warfare is only applicable to situations in which the rebel force is far smaller and less powerful than its opponent, then Cuba, in fighting for its sovereignty, has existed in a perpetual state of such ready-made conditions. It follows, therefore, that the Cuban nation has been necessarily assigned the role of acting as a ‘guerrilla people’, of perpetuating Cuba’s image as one of the plucky underdog determined to stand its ground in the face of tremendous obstacles. With the victory of the Revolution, and the leadership’s presentation of the Revolution in power as the closing chapter in Cuba’s quest for independence, the transformation of the Cuban people into a guerrilla army became increasingly crucial for it to survive. The expression of *guerrillerismo* in the hegemonic discourse has

been key to this survival, serving as it has done not only to provide citizens with a model for revolutionary action, but as a reminder of the Cuban condition. In this way, it has constituted a vital component of *cubanía*, insofar as it has contributed to anchoring the Revolution in an historical context, and has, in turn, consolidated the legitimacy of the revolutionary project. This central role of *guerrillerismo*, as identified by this study, suggests that the following words, uttered by Fidel Castro on 21 May 1959, were not only applicable to the immediate post-insurrectionary period, but have remained relevant over several decades: ‘Nuestra revolución, que no es de ningún color, ni roja, sino verde olivo que es el color del uniforme del Ejército Rebelde, que salió de la entrañas de la misma Sierra Maestra’ (Castro 1959e, 42/43).

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