Conjectural variations in aggregative games: an evolutionary perspective

Possajennikov, Alex (2015) Conjectural variations in aggregative games: an evolutionary perspective. Mathematical Social Sciences, 77 . pp. 55-61. ISSN 0165-4896

PDF - Requires a PDF viewer such as GSview, Xpdf or Adobe Acrobat Reader
Available under Licence Creative Commons Attribution Non-commercial No Derivatives.
Download (298kB) | Preview


Suppose that in symmetric aggregative games, in which payoffs depend only on a player's strategy and on an aggregate of all players' strategies, players have conjectures about the reaction of the aggregate to marginal changes in their strategy. The players play a conjectural variation equilibrium, which determines their fitness payoffs. The paper shows that only consistent conjectures can be evolutionarily stable in an infinite population, where a conjecture is consistent if it is equal to the marginal change in the aggregate determined by the actual best responses. In the finite population case, only zero conjectures representing aggregate-taking behavior can be evolutionarily stable.

Item Type: Article
Keywords: conjectural variations, aggregative games, indirect evolution, evolutionary stability
Schools/Departments: University of Nottingham UK Campus > Faculty of Social Sciences > School of Economics
Identification Number:
Depositing User: Possajennikov, Dr Alex
Date Deposited: 07 Aug 2015 17:02
Last Modified: 15 Sep 2016 15:25

Actions (Archive Staff Only)

Edit View Edit View