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Ethos - Thesis for digitisation

Thesis details:
'The Global Public and its Problems: A Deweyan Examination of Global Democratic Theory'

By John Christopher Narayan.

Please exclude the following sections/pages:

- Page 1 → includes a poem from a 3rd party source
- Graphs from pages 236, 243 + 245 → graphs from 3rd party sources.
- Map on page 265 → from a 3rd party source.
Abstract

Since the fall of the Berlin Wall and the end of the Cold War there has been a new radicalism across the social sciences espousing the need for *global* democracy. Taking its inspiration from theorisations of late 20th and early 21st century globalisation, advocates of Global Democratic Theory (GDT) look to transcend the violence, inequality and suffering that have often accompanied modernity. GDT thus offers normative visions and practical steps towards securing global citizenship and democracy, which would secure economic and social justice for all citizens of the world. The thesis proposes that GDT, due to its pursuit of its normative agenda, actually tells us very little about the current state of global politics. In order to move beyond the limitations of GDT, the thesis provides both theoretical and empirical advances. On the theoretical side, the thesis outlines how John Dewey’s work in *The Public and its Problems* (1927) sets out an evolutionary form of democracy in response to a rapidly globalising economy. This Deweyan approach to global democracy and the lessons it provides has not been fully appreciated by contemporary scholars of globalisation. On the empirical side, Deweyan insights are used to interpret and explain the politics of the ‘Financial Crisis’ of 2008 and subsequent ‘The Great Recession’ in order to provide a richer account of the current state of global politics and the possibility of global democracy. In all, the thesis demonstrates how Dewey’s work serves not only as a timely rejoinder to the theories of GDT but also offers important insights into the politics of contemporary globalisation.
Acknowledgements

Although the intellectual process is often a lonely existence, from conception to writing it is undoubtedly not a sole endeavor. Indeed, without the help of others it would be nigh on impossible. And in due course I wish to thank the following for their help during the formation of this piece.

To my wonderful wife Rosie Narayan, whose intellect and unconditional love and support have always been a place where I could take refuge or draw strength from whenever the books have started to hit back! This would not have been possible without you.

I would also like to thank John Holmwood for his intellectual companionship and general tolerance of my unabashed trait of disagreeing with him on the principle that he is my supervisor. Thank you for the support through the years and the hard work that you have put into my own work.

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Special shout must be sent to ‘The Turtles’: Kai, Martini and Nicole who were my drinking and debating companions at our time at The University of Birmingham and beyond. It was and is a privilege to count on you as friends. I love you all!

I would like to thank my family, the ‘Narayan clan’, for their support of my intellectual endeavors down the years. I would also like to thank the Browns and Nicksons, especially Lorna and Joe, for welcoming me into their family. This work is dedicated to Gustav, Galia and Ellie and all the others yet to come who will be our future.

A special thank you must also be reserved for Rosie’s mum Louise Brown and Tilly. A lot of this work was either conceived or written at her house. Thank you for your support and for cooking my dinners for 4 days of the week!

Finally I would like to thank my Mother and Father for their love and for dreaming for me long before I knew what it was to dream.
The Problems of Global Publics:  
A Deweyan Examination of Global Democratic Theory

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Part One: Cosmopolitan Horizons

– WH Auden, "Musee des Beaux Arts"
The words of WH Auden's *Musée de Beaux Arts*, his reflection of the Breughel's painting *Landscape with the Fall of Icarus*, provides a take on the 'human position' and its ability to react to the plight of others beyond our daily lives. Auden appears to embrace the idea of an indirect and perpetual apathy humanity shows to towards one another's suffering. In juxtaposing the extraordinary event of the fall of Icarus and the indifference shown by witnesses, preoccupied with their mundane day to day tasks or leisurely pursuits, Auden attempts to reveal how our moral reaction to the suffering and plight of others beyond our daily lives is often one of atomised indifference. The moral of Auden's poem is not, however, simply about suffering but also about the possibility of the collective human community. The human position of suffering seems to disclose the fact that the events of our daily lives are taken by Auden to take place beyond an event horizon where it appears impossible for such events to affect and communicate to outside observers. The idea of community and the coming together of humanity to bear witness or indeed change the course of events are simply never considered by Auden. In *Musée de Beaux Arts* it is therefore the absence of the idea of community, which casts an immense shadow over the poem's landscape.

To most past and contemporary social science there is a hollow ring to Auden's almost religious like acceptance of the suffering of others and the implicit comment on the idea of a human community. Auden's philosophy of suffering seems to be making the fatal error of merely interpreting the 'human position' without contemplating the point of its possible change. And such a philosophy finds its contemporary opposite in what we can dub Global Democratic Theory (GDT). As Robert Fine (2007: 1-6) points out, since the fall of the Berlin
Wall and the end of Cold War there has been an emergence of a new radicalism across the social sciences, which espouses a global form of democracy (Beck 2005, Held 2010, Dryzek 2006, Bohman 2007). The overriding rationale of GDT is that the violence, inequality and suffering that currently affects large parts of the world stem from the consequences of late 20th and early 21st century globalisation and, moreover, that these consequences can be controlled or even eradicated through the use of global democracy to manage globalisation.

In contemporary academic parlance the word ‘globalisation’ is rather causally thrown around here and there and has become somewhat of a theoretical cushion that appears to mould to the posterior of whoever seems to sit upon it. This phenomenon is not new, even in the mid 90’s, with globalisation fast becoming one of the favourite buzzwords of academic and political fashionistas, Susan Strange (1995: 293) railed against evocations of the term which simultaneously appeared to mean both everything and nothing. Yet, for theorists associated with GDT, the term ‘globalisation’ is taken to concern a spatial phenomenon based on a continuum of the ‘local’ at one end and the ‘global’ at the other. Globalisation thus implies an increasing interconnectedness across different domains of human activity, between states and their inhabitants, from the economic to the cultural to the political. This increased interconnectedness represents a shift in ‘...human organisation and activity to intercontinental or interregional patterns of activity, interaction and the exercise of power’ (Held 2010: 28-29).

Such interconnectedness between countries are said to be measurable via mapping how trade, finance, communications, pollutants and violence move across borders and lock nation states into relationships and patterns of behaviour. And whilst GDT accepts that the spatial phenomenon of globalisation is a process that has historical precedents or eras of
globalisation that predate the 20th century, the assumption is that the deep underlying drivers of the post 1945 multilateral order have been marshalled by political and economic forces to create a distinct and historically unprecedented form of globalisation (Held et al., 1999: 7-10 cf., Beck 2005, Hardt and Negri 2000: xii-xiii, 31).  

The underlying deep drivers of contemporary globalisation are best described as the following:

• **The IT Revolution** – The ‘time space compression’ (Giddens: 1990) associated with the changing nature of global communication technology (internet, real time TV/News, mobile phones)

• **Global Markets** – The development of global markets in goods and services such as finance and manufacturing, and the new global division of labour that decentralises production away from developing nations to developing countries such as China and India.

• **Global Governance** - The emergence of multilayered and multilevel politics, where the nation state increasingly looks ‘downwards’ towards city and sub national politics and ‘upwards’ towards supranational, regional and global associations, laws and institutions (e.g. UN, IMF, World Bank, WTO, NAFTA, EU, G20 etc).

• **Democratic Values** - The spread of democratic values across the regions of the world and negative backlashes against such values since the end of the Cold War.

---

1 Globalisation as a historical process is a much-contested field with estimates of the rise of globalisation ranging from the 11th century right up to the 19th century. I shall return in more detail to debates surrounding the history of globalisation in chapter 5.

2 This list of deep drivers is adapted from Held (2004: 11) and (2010: 28-29, 149-50).

3 As Wade (2009a: 145) points out the terms Washington Consensus, Globalisation Consensus or Neo-Liberal Consensus are often used interchangeably. Indeed, one could add to this list the terms market fundamentalism, globalism, world-market ideology and Neo-Liberal globalisation. To aid conceptual clarity I shall use the term Neo-Liberal globalisation here (Held 2004: 11) and (2010: 28-29, 149-50).
• Global Migration - The pressure of migration and movements of peoples linked to shifts in demography and the growth of populations.

• The internationalisation and integration of Security – The onset of global terrorism and consequent globalisation of the ‘War on terror’ since 9/11 and the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction.

GDT views these deep underlying drivers as marking the post 1945 multilateral order out as a distinct form of globalisation because they provide a historically unprecedented form of interconnectedness. For example, the increased globalisation of trade, production and finance are seen as interconnecting countries as never before. And despite the divisions and conflict of the present age, it is argued that societies are so interconnected today that developments at the local level – whether economic, political or social – can acquire almost instantaneous global consequences and vice versa (Held 2010: 29-30, 148-49).

Whilst writers associated with GDT believe that the deep underlying drivers of our present age of globalisation are structurally irreversible, or at least likely to be operative for the foreseeable future, they throw questions as to the normative destinations globalisation should be allowed to take us towards (Held and McGrew 2007: 213). GDT writers therefore argue that the extension of democracy beyond the confines or sheer naked interest of the nation state would help to not only manage the consequences of globalisation but marshal globalisation for greater global equality, prosperity and peace. And as GDT writers are often quick to point out, they view the present order as holding the seeds of growth for the flourishing of global democracy (Beck 2006, Held 2004; Dryzek 2006; Bohman 2007).

Through placing economic globalisation, human rights, international law and global governance at the centre of its intellectual and political agenda GDT not only sees the
suffering of any parts of humanity as a contingent state of affairs created by socio-economic and political circumstance but also as an undeniable moral problem which must be addressed by those with power to do so. Advocates of global democracy therefore look to counter human suffering globally through offering normative visions and practical steps towards securing forms of citizenship and democracy which would secure economic and social justice for all citizens of the world. In many ways, then, GDT presents the most cogent normative response to both Auden's philosophy of suffering and the lack of social and economic justice within our present age of globalisation.

Why the need for this study then? Surely the paradigm of GDT appears to provide the social sciences with the normative goals to reject Auden's religious and anti-modern view of human suffering and embrace practical plans to address injustices of the present. However, as Nietzsche reminds us, poets act shamelessly towards their experiences because they constantly exploit them. Just because one finds the morality of Auden's take on the absence of human community to be insufferable does not disqualify its potential validity. And on a more thoughtful appreciation, one which rejects its religious acceptance of the enduring reality of suffering, the real message of Auden's poem may be the reality of the perpetual indifference humans have shown towards each other and the questioning of this perpetual indifference?

Indeed, one need not disagree with GDT's normative wishes to disagree with the prognosis that the current order holds the seeds for global democracy's flourishing. When one takes a cursory glance at the levels of global democracy evident around global issues such as climate change, global poverty or the upholding of international law it becomes rather dispiriting. Moreover, even writers associated with GDT seem to acknowledge that the
‘...evidence is wanting that we are getting better at building appropriate governance capacity’ (Held 2010: 146). The first goal of this study is thus to show that Auden’s spectre, the one derived from the deeper appreciation of his words, haunts global democracy because it reveals the contingent nature of the human community and global political action. Moreover, I shall seek to bring to light that whilst the normative goals of global democracy are admirable, such theory readily fails to come to terms with the nature of community and how this is linked to an extension of democracy beyond the nation state.

To accomplish this, the study will return and recover the work of Pragmatist philosopher John Dewey on the relationship between democracy, community and what he called ‘publics’. Pragmatism and the work of Dewey in particular has a chequered past. Having risen to prominence at the start of the 20th Century both Pragmatism and Dewey seemed to lose this prominence by the 1950’s. By the late 20th century, however, Richard Rorty’s idiosyncratic evocation of classical Pragmatist thinkers such as Dewey brought new eyes to both Pragmatism and the work of Dewey in particular (Westbrook 1991). Although Pragmatism today is a flourishing paradigm of thought (Westbrook 2005) it is safe to say that its political philosophy is still very under appreciated.

In particular, contemporary writers, favouring his work on epistemology, ethics and education, have largely ignored Dewey’s political philosophy. And this is also apparent in how writers within GDT have also ignored Dewey’s insights into democracy and its fate as a global endeavour. I aim to highlight that Dewey’s political writings from the 1920’s onwards revolve around the arguments for an evolutionary form of democracy in response to a rapidly globalising economy. Moreover, I will argue that the central contention of Dewey’s political philosophy essentially fills in the gaps that exist within GDT about the contingent
nature of the human community and global political action. The second goal of this study is therefore to highlight how a Deweyan approach to global democracy not only provides a timely rejoinder to other theories of global democracy but also offers important insights into the future examination of global democracy.

**Chapter Outline**

To achieve the study’s dual mandate of highlighting the inherent weaknesses of GDT and how Dewey’s work can help us overcome such philosophical shortcomings the study will consist of three parts:

The first part of the study will comprise of three chapters, which will seek to introduce the problematic and justification of global democracy vis-à-vis Neo-Liberal globalisation. Chapter 1 will take on the challenge of introducing readers to the subtle difference proponents of GDT evoke between the underlying drivers of globalisation and the policy prescriptions of Neo-Liberal globalisation. This chapter shall also include an analysis of the apparent consensus about the Neo-Liberal globalisation by revisiting its claim to have delivered a fairer and more equal global economy. Chapter 2 will examine how, in the face of the perceived failure of Neo-Liberal globalisation to deliver such a fairer and more equal global economy, proponents of GDT offer normative visions to reform such a state of affairs. This will revolve around examining the difference between a global democracy from ‘above’; those who favour a heavily designed institutional framework for global democracy, and a global democracy from ‘below’; those who favour a more agential and experimental form of institution and policy creation.
Chapter 3 will function to provide a critique of GDT by arguing that all strands of it embrace an 'ontology of paradox'. The overriding point of this chapter being that advocates of global democracy not only fail to engage with the research of others about the limits and obstacles facing global democracy, but also fail to engage and explain the very obstacles and limits that they themselves acknowledge hinder the path to global democracy.

The second and third parts of the study will attempt to provide a theoretical and empirical answer to the questions I pose towards global democracy. In the second part I aim to highlight how the central contention of John Dewey's work within *The Public and its Problems* (1927), which revolves around an evolutionary form of democracy in response to a rapidly globalising economy, has not been fully appreciated by contemporary scholars. To accomplish this, part two will proceed via three chapters of argument. In chapter 4, I shall highlight the context of *The Public and its Problems* by returning to the 1920's debate between Walter Lippmann and John Dewey about the nature of the public(s) and their relation to democracy. This shall include examining Dewey's response to Lippmann and Democratic Realism and his outlining of his own form of pragmatic 'Creative Democracy'.

Following on, in chapter 5 I will examine how Dewey's idea of The Great Society and its impact on democratic praxis centre on issues of globalisation and the possibility of global community and political praxis. Moreover, I shall argue that Dewey's arguments concerning the nature of publics and their relationship to democracy, too often narrated around nation-state politics, actually raise issues that highlight his advocacy and subsequent problematization of global democracy. In chapter 6, I shall reflect on the Deweyan lessons handed down to 21st century observers and advocates of global democracy. Ultimately, the chapter will contend that the nature, political efficacy or viability of any conception of
‘global democracy’ can only be adequately gauged by revisiting and confronting Deweyan concerns about the political efficacy or viability of publics and their relation to democratic praxis.

The final part of the study will focus on the empirical examination of global democracy by focusing on the events that have unfolded since the onset of ‘The Great Recession’ in 2008. This will consist of three chapters. Chapter 7 will narrate the ‘Bank Recapitalisation’ and ‘Keynesian Stimulus’ publics of elites and experts, which emerged after the collapse of Lehman Brothers and enacted the stimulus packages of 2008-2009. And will conclude by examining how ‘bourgeois democracy’ and rehabilitation of neo-liberalism were at the heart of policy after the collapse of Lehman Brothers. Chapter 8 moves the story onto the rise of the ‘Austerity’ public of elites that emerged to complete the rehabilitation of neo-liberalism and perpetuate ‘bourgeois democracy’. After highlighting how austerity is simply a litter of half-truths, I turn in chapter 9 to the citizen publics who have emerged in response to austerity and rampant bourgeois democracy. I will end the chapter by examining whether such movements provide strong evidence for the viability of global democracy in a climate of elite and expert smokescreen and subterfuge. Through taking The Great Recession as a critical case study, I shall highlight how Dewey’s work helps us comprehend not only the politics of globalisation, but also the present and future of global democracy.
Chapter 1: What’s the problem: The reckless driving of Neo-Liberal Globalisation

1.1 Driving Under the Influence: Neo-Liberal Globalisation

Before we examine the strands of GDT in detail, I think it would serve us best if we begin from the problem that the normative visions of GDT wish to correct. This requires us to understand the distinction such thinkers make between the terms ‘globalisation’ and what is often dubbed the Washington Consensus, Globalisation Consensus, Neo-Liberal globalisation or simply Neo-Liberalism.3

As outlined in the introduction, GDT view these deep underlying drivers of modern globalisation as marking the post 1945 multilateral order out as a distinct form of globalisation because they provide a historically unprecedented form of interconnectedness. For example, the increased globalisation of trade, production and finance are seen as connecting the economies of nations as never before. And despite the divisions and conflict of the present age, it is argued that societies are so interconnected today that developments at the local level – whether economic, political or social – can acquire almost instantaneous global consequences and vice versa (Held 2010: 29-30, 148-49). On the other hand, however, these underlying deep drivers form the basis of the battle for the politics of globalisation and the foundation of the normative visions of global democracy. Whilst such theorists believe that the deep underlying drivers of our present age of globalisation are structurally irreversible or at least likely to be operative for the

3 As Wade (2009a: 145) points out the terms Washington Consensus, Globalisation Consensus or Neo-Liberal Consensus are often used interchangeably. Indeed, one could add to this list the terms market fundamentalism, globalism, world-market ideology and Neo-Liberal globalisation. To aid conceptual clarity I shall here on in defer to only using the terms Neo-Liberalism or Neo-Liberal globalisation.
foreseeable future, they ask hard questions as to the normative destinations such drivers should be allowed to take us towards (Held and McGrew 2007: 213).

<table>
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<tr>
<td>3. Tax Reform</td>
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<tr>
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It is this sense of there being scope to manage or more aptly drive the very drivers of globalisation (what we can call the politics of globalisation) that forms the basis of GDT’s critique of Neo-Liberal globalisation. Since the 1980’s, Neo-Liberal globalisation or quite simply Neo-Liberalism, has been the hegemonic policy prescription for how national economies should adapt to the effects of the deep drivers of globalisation and how the drivers themselves should be driven forward⁴. The hegemonic ascent of Neo-Liberalism,

⁴ My point here is subtle rather than simply straightforward. On one hand, I am stressing that the underlying drivers of globalisation and Neo-Liberal globalisation whilst currently entwined are not the same thing. However, globalisation and its underlying drivers are not an autonomous and objective thing in itself but
both in economic and political circles, can be traced back to the collapse of the Bretton Woods regime and its form of ‘Embedded Liberalism’.

Embedded Liberalism, the name given by John Ruggie to the international monetary system established at the Bretton Woods conference in July 1944, had essentially created a post-war order of globalisation in a largely Keynesian image. With the goal of avoiding the interstate rivalries that had caused World War II Embedded Liberalism put forward a multilateral international monetary system that favoured domestic interventionism (Ruggie 1982: 393). The lynchpins of this international monetary system were new (IFI’s) International Financial Institutions (IMF, World Bank, GATT) and a new monetary regime of fixed exchange rates, founded on the convertibility of US Dollars into gold at a fixed price, which provided enough trade liberalisation to secure healthy world commerce whilst allowing national governments to pursue domestic social and economic agendas.

This pursuit of domestic social and economic agendas was achieved primarily through Embedded Liberalism’s international monetary system facilitating the emergence of ‘embedded liberal states’ or what we commonly see as modern welfare states (Blyth 2002: 4-5). In practice embedded liberal states were empowered by the embedded liberalism regime to make the underlying drivers of globalisation subservient to domestic policy objectivities such as full employment, economic growth, social insurance and social welfare.

This was pursued through national policies such as state subsidies for R&D, state owned rather sets of human practises which create transnational effects. Neo-Liberalism should rather be seen as offering economic and political policies on how to best adapt national economies to the effects of the underlying drivers of globalisation. However, one must also appreciate how Neo-Liberalism’s policy prescriptions have come to have effects on the trajectory of the underlying drivers of globalisation themselves. For instance, as we have all lately been made aware of as of 2008, Neo-Liberal globalisation and its conception of financial liberalisation have been instrumental in transforming the global markets in services such as finance.
enterprises and capital controls; the allowance of such national polices through the GATT’s failure to include the liberalisation of areas such as agriculture and services (banking, insurance); and the GATT’s rather functional failure to enforce global free trade in the areas opened up to liberalisation. Somewhat ironically, these policy diversions from standard free-trade principles would actually lead to a rather successful global economy. Embedded Liberalism is today commonly known as the Golden Age of Capitalism because it oversaw ‘...the most rapid rates of economic growth and most enduring economic stability in modern history.’ (Frieden 2006:300)⁵.

Nevertheless, the perceived failure of Embedded Liberalism to deal with the stagflation associated with the economic downturn of the 1970’s led to the very political and economic basis of the Bretton Woods regime being challenged⁶. Enacted through the military success of General Pinochet in Chile (1973) and subsequent political successes of Margret Thatcher (1979) and Ronald Reagan (1980), Neo-Liberal globalisation essentially replaced the dominant Keynesian assumptions of Embedded Liberalism with Freidman style monetarism⁷. The main policy recommendations of Neo-Liberal globalisation, spelt out in Table 1 above, basically update 18th Century economic liberalism with modern day notions of political democracy and monopoly e.g. patent law (Chang 2007: 13). However, Neo-Liberal globalisation is still fundamentally founded on the old liberal’s twin belief of the ‘efficient markets hypothesis’ and ‘comparative advantage theory’. These two theories,  

⁵ We shall return to these growth figures below but for more detail on the Bretton Woods system see Friden (2006: chapters 12&13) and for arguments for a new Bretton Woods style settlement for the 21st century see Rodrik (2011).

⁶ This itself had been started by a number of factors such as the OPEC oil cartel that emerged in 1973 and consequent spike in the oil price.

when combined, provide the foundation of the argument that the free market offers maximum economic efficiency and growth, whilst government intervention (capital controls, import quotas, welfare schemes) is harmful because it reduces such competition. Such unhindered competition on a global scale allocates national economies to areas of specialisation in which their production techniques are as high in value as possible.

In sharp contrast to the shallow form of integration under Embedded Liberalism, where the global trade regime allowed relative autonomy for the domestic policy arena (tariffs, capital controls), Neo-Liberal globalisation favours deep forms of global integration, or what Dani Rodrik calls 'Hyperglobalisation'. Under the tenets of hyperglobalisation, economic globalisation becomes an end in itself and is summed up in the belief:

'...that national economies with more liberalization of trade and finance, higher market integration across borders, easier hostile takeovers of corporations, and a narrower economic role of the state experience higher economic growth, less poverty, higher social mobility and less inequality than those with less, other things being equal. The normative conclusion is that market liberalisation, increasing economic integration across borders, and the exit of the state from trying to steer the composition activity is the right direction of policy reform everywhere.' Wade (2009a: 142-43)

In practise, the implementation of the core tenets of Neo-Liberal globalisation, both within nation states and at international level, result in the distinction and hierarchy between domestic policy and global trade policy disintegrating. This translates into a scenario where national governments embark on polices that they believe will earn them global market confidence and trade and capital flows via:
‘...the insulation of economic policy-making bodies (central banks, fiscal authorities, regulators, and so on), the disappearance (or privatisation) of social insurance, the push for low corporate taxes, the erosion of the social compact between business and labour, and the replacement of domestic developmental goals with the need to maintain market confidence.’(Rodrik 2011: 202).

The result is that the domestic control over economic policy becomes restricted and subservient to the interest and requirements of the global economy and its agents and agencies. Not only are national domestic policy choices, such as welfare provision or labour laws, seen as a possible impediment to the core tenets of Neo-Liberal globalisation, but the tenets of Neoliberal globalisation inherently attempt to frame all domestic policy choices in their own ideal of hyperglobalisation (ibid., 83).

After its initial cementing in the Anglo-Sphere in the 1980’s the doctrine of Neo-Liberalism was then transported across the globe to Latin America, Africa and the ex-Communist States of Eastern Europe through a redesign of the mission objectives of what became known as the ‘Unholy Trinity’: the IMF, World Bank and latterly established WTO. This is inherently seen as a panacea to the ‘bad old days’ of state interventionism and economic protectionism by Third World countries during the 1960’s and 1970’s (Chang 2007: 21-27). And by the mid 1990’s Neo-Liberal globalisation had seemingly come to stand in for the term globalisation altogether and became hegemonic in US economic departments, the

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8 This was nominally achieved through structural adjustment programmes (SAP’s) in the wake on the 3rd world debt crisis of 1982 and transition of ex-Communist states into democratic market economies at the start of 1990’s. These programmes were essentially loans with inbuilt conditionalities, which imposed tenets of Neo-Liberal globalisation, such as the privatisation of state owned enterprises, upon the economies of recipient countries with or without their wish to embrace Neo-Liberal globalisation (Chang 2007: 32-34). For more detail on Neo-Liberalism’s enforcement by the IMF, World Bank and WTO in the tropics and ex-Communist states see Bello (1999), Chossudovsky (2003), Easterly (2006), Friden (2006), Harvey (2005), Klein (2008) and Stiglitz (2002). For an attempt at a more ‘balanced’ account of this process and the actions of the International Financial Institutions see Woods (2007).
international financial institutions and the domestic policy agendas of left-of-centre, Third Way advocates such as Blair and Clinton. In fact Harvey (2005: 93) argues that it was Blair and Clinton rather than Thatcher and Reagan who did the most to consolidate Neo-Liberal globalisation both domestically and internationally. The highpoint of this process being the establishment of the World Trade Organisation in 1995, whose remit is to maintain Neo-Liberal standards and rules for the global economy. Collectively, this convergence of domestic and international policy around Neo-Liberal globalisation in the 1990’s became known (by John Williamson’s term) as ‘The Washington Consensus’ (ibid., cf. Stiglitz 1996). The hegemonic ascent and implementation of Neo-Liberal globalisation within policy circles led to a series of academic, political and popular writings on the effects of Neo-Liberal globalisation and possible policy choices for nation states. These hyper-globalist writers present Neo-Liberal globalisation and its spread across the globe, whether for the better or the worse, as a presently unfolding reality which nation states, national economies and national societies have little power in resisting. For instance, summing up the zeitgeist of hyper-globalist thinking, Tom Friedman’s *The Lexus and the Olive Tree* (2000), made a division between those countries who were intent on modernising through Neo-Liberal

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9 One has to qualify here, however, that whilst neo-liberal globalisation has gained hegemonic status in the Anglosphere it has not conquered every major economy outside of the Anglosphere. A number of national economies in Europe and Asia for instance have not totally adopted Neo-Liberal policy or have embarked upon such a process slowly (Blyth 2008). As Harvey (2005:87-88) points out, often Neo-Liberal globalisation has been impelled through a process of uneven geographical development where states or regions place pressure on neighbours to follow their lead. However, even this is tempered by local political conditions and asymmetric relations between First and Third World countries. For example, Margaret Thatcher and successive governments, in the face of popular resistance, have never been able to fully privatise healthcare or the education system. Ronald Reagan and latterly George W. Bush also saw fit to break with neo-liberal policy and run budget deficits to respectively fund the Cold War and the War Against Terror. And as Weiss (2009) states, elements of the US and UK economies such as R&D subsides are inherently anti Neo-Liberal. Equally in the Third World and ex-Communist states where neo-liberalism has been enacted in purer forms there has often been a tempering of such polices by the resurgence of anti-democratic or populist politics (e.g. Putin’s Russia). However, as Wade (2009b) makes clear, the neo-liberalism of the Anglosphere has called the shots in terms of global policy ‘norms’; even if they are adapted to local circumstances.
globalisation, the Lexus producing world, and those who were still embattled over who owns which olive tree.

This division for Friedman, was itself false because the ‘electronic herd’ of international financers, who could instantly move billions of dollars with the click of a mouse, were forcing all countries to adopt the "Golden Straightjacket" of Neo-Liberal globalisation anyway. Not only was such a straightjacket unavoidable but it was the only sure fire way to achieve economic prosperity and join the Lexus buying world (Friedman 2000)\textsuperscript{10}. And by 2004, Martin Wolf's influential \textit{Why Globalisation Works} argued that the potential for greater economic integration had been barely tapped and that enlarging of global markets was now needed to raise the living standards of the poor of the world. In line with Thatcher's famous idiom of 'There being No Alternative' to Neo-Liberal globalisation, other approaches to economic development were now to be seen as mere 'commentary' (Wolf 2004)

\textsuperscript{10} Although I have presented hyper-globalism in terms of its narration by economic liberals it should be noted that hyper-globalism spans the entire political spectrum and unites normally antagonistic bedfellows such economic liberals on the right with centrist Third Way advocates (Giddens 2000; Blair 1998) and Neo-Marxist authors of the left (Hardt and Negri 1999; Glyn 2006). For example, Hardt and Negri view Neo-Liberal globalisation's driving of the underlying drivers of globalisation as founding the rise of a capitalist Empire that stretches across the globe. In such a Neo-Marxist account, capital has always been driven towards forming an unrestrained global market but has historically been constrained by doing so by nation state interests (e.g. mercantilism/colonialism/imperialism). For example, whilst the practises of 19\textsuperscript{th} century imperialism provided avenues for the expansion of capital into foreign territories its spatially fixed boundaries and subservience to nation state interests created a 'straight jacket' for free flow of money, technology, people and goods (Hardt and Negri 2000: 31, 332). With the hegemonic ascent of Neo-Liberal globalisation, however, capital is no longer constrained by imperialism or the nationalist interests of the embedded liberalism order. And through the founding and perpetuating of decentralised and deterritorialised global networks of production and division of labour capital has now found a 'smooth space' akin to the conception of a world market. The ultimate symbol of this 'smooth space' being the transnational corporations that now directly distribute 'labour power over various markets, functionally allocate resources and organise hierarchically the various sectors of world production.' (Hardt and Negri 2000: 31-32). What differs in these hyper-globalist accounts of the impact of Neo-Liberal globalisation, however, is not the empirical reality of hyper-globalism but the normative appraisals of such policies and practises. Neo-Marxist authors such as Hardt and Negri who uphold a hyper globalist account of Neo-Liberal globalisation see such a process as increasing inequality, poverty and unequal distribution of wealth rather than actually fostering economic development and greater equality.
1.2 Challenging the Consensus

The apparently unquestionable consensus on the merits of Neo-Liberal globalisation is unsurprisingly open to be questioned. On a simple theoretical level, the idea that self regulating free markets with little government intervention function to produce prosperity for all is a myth. As Rodrik outlines, whether considering domestic or global variants:

‘...markets and governments are opposites only in the sense that they form two sides of the same coin. Markets require other social institutions to support them. They rely on courts to enforce property rights and regulators to rein in abuse and fix market failures. They depend on stabilising functions that lenders of last resort and countercyclical fiscal policy provide. They need the political buy-in that redistributive taxations, safety-nets, and social insurance help generate. In other worlds markets do not create, regulate, stabilise or sustain themselves. The history of capitalism has been a process of learning and relearning this lesson.’ (2011: 237 cf. Chang 2010: 1-10)

A ‘market’ and what is deemed ‘free’ within it are not objectively determined but actually political choices. It was not so long ago, for example, that men, women and children were traded as commodities across the globe. Even if Neo-Liberal globalisation favours some social institutions (property rights/immigration control) and practises of government (WTO rules) over others (social insurance/ redistributive taxation), it is mere anathema to suggest that free markets are in fact free of governance. The implementation of Neo-Liberal globalisation required and perpetually requires constant government intervention both within the nation state and at the international level of global governance.
Of course, it would be quite easy for supporters of Neo-Liberal globalisation to see such a critique as theoretical brinkmanship. One can admit Neo-Liberal globalisation inherently has social institutions and practises of government but that such social institutions and practises of government create the optimal conditions for ‘free’ markets and the chances of prosperity for all. The proof is in the pudding after all and the hegemony of Neo-Liberal globalisation is ultimately based on the empirical claim that the enactment of Neo-Liberal globalisation since the 1980’s has been an economic success. This rests on claims that Neo-Liberal globalisation has bequeathed strong economic growth; that developing countries incomes are catching up with developed countries incomes; and that global poverty rates and inequality have fallen significantly (Wade 2009a: 143, Held: 151). However, the problem with the above narrative for GDT and indeed others outside the paradigm is that the driving of the deep underlying drivers of globalisation via the tenets of Neo-Liberal globalisation has actually been that economically successful. Moreover, Neo-Liberal globalisation’s economic record shows devastating economic divergence or stagnation rather than economic catch-up.

As a whole, the world economy, in terms of global real GDP, grew on average 4.8% under Embedded Liberalism (1951-1973) compared to 3.2 % per year under Neo-Liberalism (1980-2009). This may not sound like a significant decrease but had Embedded Liberalism’s average growth figures been maintained, the world economy would be over 50% larger than it is today (Skidelsky 2009: 118). This slowdown in growth is also reflected in per capita terms, during the 1960’s and 1970’s the world economy grew at 3%, whilst since the 1980’s

Neo-Liberal globalisation has garnered itself a whole panoply of critics from different theoretical backgrounds, from Marxists such as Harvey (2005), Glyn (2006) and Dumenil & Levy (2004); Third World activists such as Bello (2004); Polanyian critics such as Blyth (2002) development economists such as Chossudovsky (2005), Chang (2007, 2010), Wade (2009), Rodrik (2007, 2010) and Stiglitz (2002, 2006, 2009); and conservative writers such as John Gray (2002).
it has grown at a rate of 1.4% per year. And the same trend can be found in the growth figures of individual developed countries. For instance, the US per capita income rates grew at 2.6% per year under Embedded Liberalism but declined to 1.6 under Neo-Liberal globalisation. Equally, the UK saw its per capita income rates grow at 2.4 under Embedded Liberalism but decline to 1.7 under Neo-Liberal globalisation. In fact the developed countries of Western Europe have been unable to ever match the growth rates of Embedded Liberalism (4-5% per year) under the tenets of Neo-Liberal globalisation (Chang 2010: 19, 142, 145)\(^{12}\).

When turning to the economic performance of developing countries it must firstly be noted that any estimates of the performance of developing countries under Neo-Liberal globalisation are highly misleading because of the rapid development of China and (to a lesser extent) India in the same period. Whilst China and India have since the 1980's posted strong growth figures and reduced poverty numbers, accounting for 30% of the total of developing countries income by 2000, both countries did not subscribe to Neo-Liberal globalisation and have plotted their development behind protectionist economic policies such as tariffs, capital controls, controls on FDI and other forms of government intervention. As it turns out, then, the biggest benefactors under Neo-Liberal globalisation have not really been Neo-Liberal economies (Chang 2007: 29-30, Rodrik 2011: 149-156, Wade 2009a)\(^{13}\).

\(^{12}\) It should be noted that not all critics of Neo-Liberalism are necessarily as complementary of Embedded Liberalism. Harvey (2005:11 cf. Silver 2005) maintains that whilst embedded liberalism expanded export markets in South East Asia, most notably Japan, and parts of South America the attempt to export development to the rest of the world stalled. According to Harvey Embedded Liberalism was thus largely a Western regime and that for the Third World it represented a mere 'pipe dream'.

\(^{13}\) Some within the Anglophone have attempted to argue that China and India's growth has been down to policies of Neo-Liberal globalisation. Equally, some left wing writers such as Harvey (2005) see China as a state which has embraced Neo-Liberal globalisation, albeit with 'Chinese Characteristics'. This, however, seems to miss the point that the 'Chinese Characteristics' that underpinned China's economic growth bear more resemblance to the embedded liberalism era than Neo-Liberal globalisation (see Rodrik 2011, Chang 2007 and 2010 and Arrighi & Zhang 2011). Equally India saw its initial leap in economic growth under reforms and
With that said, even with China and India included, the economic performance of developing countries has been far worse under Neo-Liberal globalisation than the period of Embedded Liberalism that preceded it. For instance, annual growth rates in the developing world between 1980-2000 halved (1.7%) from those experienced between 1960’s-1970’s (3.0%). In the areas where Neo-Liberal globalisation was specifically exported through the IMF and World Bank programmes such as Latin America and Africa the stalling of economic growth has been profound. In Latin America annual growth rates dropped from 3.1% in the 1960’s and 1970’s dropping to 1.7% in the 1990’s and flat lined to 0.6% between 2002-2005 (Chang, 2007: 27-28). Africa’s plight under Neo-Liberalism has been even worse, with the modest annual growth between the 1960’s and 1970’s of 1-2%, replaced with basically nothing (0.2%) between 1980-2009 (Chang 2010: 118-119).

This evidence of economic divergence or stagnation rather than catch up is also reflected in average income statistics. Including China in calculations of average income catch-up between developing and developed word yields some catch up from the late 1980’s to 2007 but still sees average Third World income at only 18% of First World income. And when one takes China out of such calculations there is no catch up at all. Indeed from the 1980’s there is a decline and a relative flat line through the 1990’s and early 2000’s, reaching 15% of average First World income by 2007 (Wade 2009a: 150-51, see also Freeman 2009). And furthermore, income inequality in developed nations has itself increased. In the UK, for regulations that were protective of its economy. This is of course does not valorise China’s authoritarian state, which is inherently anti-democratic. Nor does this obscure the fact China and India’s development has seen bad effects such as rising wealth inequality and environmental degradation or that both countries may move towards or are in fact currently embracing more Neo-Liberal polices (e.g. China’s ascension to WTO). However, it seems better I believe to see China and India from the 1980’s through to the first decade of 2000’s as prospering and playing a vital role in the global arena of Neo-Liberal globalisation through non-Neo-Liberal means rather than as fully fledged Neo-Liberal states who bucked the trend of Neo-Liberal globalisation’s economic failures (see Arrighi & Zhang 2011 for a position that ponders whether or not China’s economic strategy may equal a new Bandung consensus).
example, the average income of the top 10% of £55,000 in 2008 was almost a 12 times higher than that of the bottom 10%, who had an average income of £4,700. This 12 to 1 ratio marks a move from the 1 to 8 ratio found in 1985. At the same time, the share of national income by the top 1% of UK income earners also increased from 7.1% in 1970 to 14.3% in 2005. The US also saw its ratios jump, between 1979 and 2006, the top 1% of earners doubled their share of national income from roughly 10% to 22.9% and the top 0.1% increased their share from 3.5% to 11.6% in the same period. Thus, where as in the 1980’s the ratio between the average income of the top 10% in relation to the bottom 10% was 10 to 1, by 2008 this had become 15 to 1 (OECD: 2008, Chang 2010: 144).

When one considers the poverty headcount again, how one factors in China drastically affects the results. Poverty is measured on two counts, the ‘extreme’ count which is based on those living $1 a day and the ‘ordinary’ count of $2 per day. According to the World Bank the number of people living in extreme poverty dropped by 400 million between 1981 & 2001 from 1.5 billion to 1.1 billion. This saw the proportion of the world population living in extreme poverty fall from 33% to 18% in the same time period. However, the problem is that the fall of the extreme poverty count relies mainly on China which did not practise the tenets of Neo-Liberal globalisation. And when one considers the ‘ordinary’ poverty level, even with China included, there has been a rise in poverty between 1981-2001 (Wade 2009a: 151 see also Held and Kaya 2007). These figures have seen even World Bank researchers admit that the developing countries have not benefitted as much from Neo-Liberal globalisation as first thought (Chen and Ravaillion, 2008).

The statistics concerning growth rates, income catch up and poverty headcounts all point to the fact that whilst the development of parts of Asia, through measures that are counter-
intuitive to the tenets of Neo-Liberal globalisation, has seen global inequality— the distribution of income between all the world citizens regardless of statehood—fall slightly, the world has not become drastically more economically equal under Neo-Liberal globalisation. In fact subtracting China from the calculation of inequality between countries since 1980 translates into a scenario of rising inequality between countries (Held 2010: 153). Those currently excluded from the world economy such as sub-Saharan Africa and parts of Latin America, the ‘bottom billion’, face the daunting prospect of having to wait until wage gaps in Asia open up room for their own development in the same vein as wage gaps emerged between Asia and the First world in 1980 (Collier 2007: 86). And on a world scale, the First World has seen the number of challenger states—states whose average income in the next two generations would put them within 2/3rds or more of per capita incomes of the poorest First World states—actually fall between 1978-2000 (Wade 2009a).

In sum, then, contra the claim of its advocates, Neo-Liberal globalisation has been both a relative economic and ethical failure. It has neither brought about greater economic growth nor been the harbinger of greater equality and economic prosperity for the world’s developed and developing countries. More to the point, Neo-Liberal globalisation seems to have made the world a structurally more unequal place. As Chang (2010: 145) points out, the irony is that:

‘... since the 1980’s we have given the rich a bigger slice of our pie in the belief that they would create more wealth, making the pie bigger than otherwise possible in the long run. The rich got the bigger slice of the pie all right, but they have actually reduced the pace at which the pie is growing.’
What theorists of GDT do with such evidence, however, is not just question the faulty economics of Neo-Liberal globalisation but also the political system which underpins such a regime. As we shall explore in the next chapter, GDT suggests that Neo-liberalism has not just been an economic and ethical failure but also, due to its commitment to hyper globalisation, a democratic failure. GDT authors look to highlight how a greater extension of democracy across the globe to help regulate the underlying drivers of globalisation would secure greater economic prosperity and ethical responsibility for humanity and her planet. And it is to those normative visions of global democracy that we now turn to in the next chapter.
Chapter 2: Global Democratic Theory

Across the various positions of Global Democratic Theory (GDT) Neo-liberal globalisation appears to be an erroneous economic theory at best and at worst, an ideological front set up to maintain the hegemony of the First World countries and their dominant elites. The key point, however, is that the normative visions of GDT all wish to offer different ways of driving the underlying drivers of globalisation. Thus, whilst writers with different normative visions of what constitutes global democracy all see globalisation as being currently tied to the practises of Neo-Liberal globalisation, they also hold steadfast with the conviction that, pace Thatcher’s TINA doctrine, the aforementioned deep underlying drivers of globalisation can be driven differently and towards different normative ends. The problematic of GDT is therefore not how to destroy globalisation but rather, the proper forms that globalisation should take to reach economic and social justice.

To get to grips with GDT I believe it best to see the paradigm as being split between advocates of a global democracy from ‘above’, those who favour a heavily designed institutional framework for global democracy, and advocates of a global democracy from ‘below’, those who favour a more agential and experimental form of institution or policy creation. Of course, there will be critics of this approach who point towards the homogenisation of thinkers or futility of stressing the division between the respective strands of GDT. On both counts I plead guilty, because, as I aim to show below, despite their superficial theoretical differences, the two sets of GDT inherently end up with same flawed ontological assumptions concerning the political potentialities of their own theories.
2.1 Global Democracy from Above: Cosmopolitan Democracy

Global democracy from above can largely be summed up in two words: Cosmopolitan Democracy (in an ever increasing literature archetypal examples of Cosmopolitan Democracy can be found in Archibugi 2004, 2008, Beck 2005, 2006, Held 1995, 2004, 2010, Held et al. 1999, Kaldor 2003, McGrew 1997, 2002). In direct contrast to liberal approaches to global governance, which look to extend deliberation through traditional nation state structures, at the heart of Cosmopolitan Democracy beats the desire to ‘globalise democracy, while at the same time, democratising globalisation’ (Archibugi 2004: 438). In short, Cosmopolitan Democracy looks to radically reform the post-war multilateral order to achieve the normative goals of greater democracy and economic and social justice. This translates into the provision of institutional plans and processes that would not only increase the democratic deliberation and decision making between nation states but also the number of centres and non-state actors involved in such democratic deliberation and decision making (Smith and Brassett 2008: 79).

Cosmopolitan Democracy primarily justifies its proposals to radically reform the post-war multilateral order by highlighting how underlying drivers of contemporary globalisation create global political problems that the current multilateral geo-political order and the Neo-Liberal globalisation cannot solve. On one hand, Cosmopolitan Democrats point to the fact that underlying drivers of contemporary globalisation and its unprecedented form of

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14 There others such as Habermas (2006), Monbiot (2003), Ruggie (2003), Stiglitz (2002, 2006) and ex-UN diplomats such as Annan (2005) and Malloch-Brown (2011) who whilst not advocates of Cosmopolitan Democracy per se, are advocates of achieving Global Democracy primarily through reform of the macro institutions of global governance. Although I do not cover the work of these authors, the questions I ask of Cosmopolitan Democracy and all positions of global democracy in the next chapter should be extended to the work of these authors.

interconnectedness create unprecedented transnational consequences (Held 2010: 4). These consequences of contemporary globalisation are best seen as ‘global problems’ such as sharing the planet (climate change, water deficits), sustaining humanity (economic security, poverty, food security, conflict prevention) and developing global rules (global trade, tax and finance law, nuclear proliferation). The increasing magnitude and impact of such global problems on the daily lives of citizens across the world brings to the fore that we no longer live in discrete national communities but rather are members of interconnected ‘communities of fate’ (Held 2004: 168) or ‘communities of risk’ (Beck 2005: 82, 103) where the fortunes of one nation are tied, often asymmetrically, with the trajectory of another:

‘...it is not only the violent exception that links people together across borders; the very nature of every problem and process joins people in multiple ways. From the movement of ideas and cultural artefacts to the fundamental issues raised by genetic engineering, from the conditions of financial stability to environmental degradation, the fate and fortunes of each of us are thoroughly intertwined’ (Held 2010: 118).

The recognition of the problems of global interconnectedness also reveals for Cosmopolitan Democrats that no single nation state can solve these problems alone (Held 2010: 14). On a simple governance level, the underlying drivers of globalisation and the global problems they bequeath, such as the formation of world markets or climate change, are simply beyond the institutional reach of one nation to control. For instance, the emergence of global markets and actors such as MNC’s raise questions about the true effectiveness of national economic policy; whilst climate change cannot be solved through one nation’s energy policy alone.
At the same time, proponents of Cosmopolitan Democracy also embrace the idea that the nation state is no longer, if it ever was, the sole locus of political power (Beck 2005: 53-54, 63-64). This is the aforementioned process by which the underlying drivers of globalisation see the nation state's power transformed and interlinked with new complex networks and agents of power at regional and global levels. The consequence of these transformations is that there has been a process of deterritorialization of political authority and sovereignty away from the nation state and subsequent reterritorialization which now includes, but goes beyond, the nation state. A situation compounded, if not accelerated, by Neoliberalism's form of hyperglobalisation, which not only makes the nation state subservient to free-market economic policies but establishes the authority of global governance institutions (IMF, WTO, World Bank) and global markets over the nation state. The result of this process if that the classic conception of 'modern sovereignty', where autonomous nation states exercise unquestionable authority within bounded political communities and resolved their differences with another through 'reason of the state' and diplomacy, is now essentially defunct (Held and McGrew 2007: 211 cf. Archibugi 2008).

Instead of taking the collapse of modern sovereignty to translate into the idea that hyperglobalisation is the only alternative, however, Cosmopolitan Democrats argue that nation states must come to terms with such reality. In this sense, nation states must seek a collective and democratic multilateralism, which includes all those whose fates are interlocked in networks of economic, political and environmental interaction, if we are to have any chance of solving our collective global problems (Held 2010: 4, 160). The paradox of our times for Cosmopolitan Democrats, however, is that given underlying drivers of contemporary globalisation and the emergence of global problems, there has been little
attempt to really pursue a collective and collaborative multilateralism. In fact, perversely, our primary tools for dealing with globalisation and its problems are argued to be predominantly national and local, weak and incomplete. This is primarily because the post 1945 multilateral order appears to be structurally flawed. For instance, Held (2010: 160) identifies 4 current deep rooted problems that afflict the institutional nexus of post 1945 multilateral order:

1) The lack of a clear division of labour between the various international organisations of global governance, whose functions overlap and objectives often contradict one another.

2) The inertia or inability of such international organisations to mount collective problem-solving, which results in the cost of inaction outweighing potential action.

3) The lack of ownership of global problems at the global level, which leads to global problems slipping between agencies at the global level e.g. climate change.

4) The accountability deficit and asymmetric nature of international organisations. For example, multilateral bodies such as the IMF and World Bank are rarely able to be held account to non-state actors and bodies such as the IMF, World Bank the UN are set-up (e.g. voting power/permanent security council) with asymmetric relations of power between developed and developing countries.

The institutional weakness of the post 1945 multilateral order is compounded by Neo-Liberal globalisation's policy objectivities becoming the 'internal compass' for nation states and the international institutions of global governance such as IMF, World Bank and WTO (Beck 2005: 71-87, 79-80, 87). The prioritisation of market liberalisation above all other
factors is purported to have led to political resistance or unwillingness to address areas of market failure such as global environmental degradation or rising global poverty and inequality levels; the underemployment or unemployment of available resources to rectify issues such as global poverty; and the emergence of global capital flows which destabilise and often hold national economies to ransom (Held and McGrew 2007: 227-228, Beck, 2005: 52-54).

Cosmopolitan Democrats thus claim that the hegemonic influence of Neo-Liberal globalisation and its handing over of power from governments to market forces has further weakened the potential governance of the underlying drivers of globalisation at local, national, inter-state and global levels. The combined outcome of the hegemony of Neo-Liberal globalisation and such deep rooted institutional problems is that the current composition of the world’s multilateral order resembles anything but the collective and collaborative arena it needs to be in order to deal with globalisation and its inherent global problems.

It comes as no surprise, then, that Cosmopolitan Democrats believe that the collective and democratic multilateralism that could solve such a geo-political crisis is Cosmopolitan Democracy. But what exactly is Cosmopolitan Democracy? The most sustained explanation of Cosmopolitan Democracy is to be found in the work of David Held (1995, 2004, 2010).16

16It is on the issue of the actual architecture of Cosmopolitan Democracy where one finds the greatest difference and nuances of emphasis between the various theorists of Cosmopolitan Democracy. For instance, despite being perpetual co-authors, both Held and Archibugi differ over whether one should hold onto and expand the concept of sovereignty (Held 2004, 2010), or junk the term altogether and embrace a global constitutionalism (Archibugi 2008). Also, within David Held’s (1995, 2004, 2010) work, one will find quite detailed institutional blueprints as to how a global Cosmopolitan Democracy, which is Social Democratic in nature, should be set up. On the other hand, Ulrich Beck focuses less on institutional blueprints and in his own treatises about Cosmopolitan Democracy (2005, 2006) he talks far more generally about Cosmopolitan strategies going forward and attempts to also re-orient social science research to deal with the contours of globalisation. I thus focus primarily on Held’s work because it offers the most substantive statement of what a Cosmopolitan Democracy would look like in reality. However, despite some clear differences of emphasis
Primarily, Held articulates that in order to manage globalisation towards the goals of social and economic justice there must be political reform that bequeaths both the centralization and decentralization of political power. Taking its philosophical foundations from Kantian conceptions of Cosmopolitan hospitality,17 Held firstly argues for the centralisation of political power through the establishment of a global Democratic Public Law (Held 2010: 16-17 cf. Held 1995: 238). In essence, Democratic Public Law points to the existence of basic rights or standards that no agent, irrespective of being a representative of government, state, or civil association can violate. This principle is fleshed out in the stance that: ‘...human beings are in a fundamental sense equal and that they deserve equal political treatment; that is, treatment based upon the equal care and consideration of their agency irrespective of the community in which they were born or brought up’ (Held 2002:23).

In practice, Held’s Democratic Public Law would find its institutional expression in the form of a global framework of law which would subordinate regional, national and local sovereignties and form the basis for the equal treatment of all (Held 1995: 234). This would, for example, see the entrenchment of universal sets of rights and obligations through the formation of a new overarching set of cosmopolitan rights; an interconnected global legal system on human rights and economic, criminal and environmental law; the submission of all nations to the Intentional Court of Justice and International Criminal Court jurisdiction; and the creation of new international human rights and international environmental courts to address global problems (Held 2010: 104-105).

there are also clear affinities between the thinkers of Cosmopolitan Democracy as regards to the historical foundations of Cosmopolitan Democracy, how post-war multilateral order should change, the new role of the nation state in the 21st century and how conceptions of global citizenship figure in such changes. 17 It is not my intention to extensively examine how Stoic and Kantian forms of Cosmopolitanism inform and are critiqued by practitioners of forms of New Cosmopolitanism. For a more detailed historical overview of this relationship between Classical and New Cosmopolitanism see the introduction and the respective contributions of Nussbaum and Brown in Brown and Held (2010).
Somewhat counter intuitively, Held views the centralisation of political power that Democratic Public Law inaugurates as providing the grounds for the decentralisation of political power. This is based on Democratic Public Law dovetailing with Held's principle of conception of democratic 'all-inclusiveness'. At its most simplest the principle of democratic all-inclusiveness articulates a conception of democracy that mandates that all those affected by public decisions should have an equal opportunity to influence or regulate (directly or indirectly through representatives), those public decisions (Held 2010: 173-74).

The key point here, Held argues, is that such a political principle exposes the fallacy of the hegemonic link between democracy and modern sovereignty.

Traditionally, democracy and the relationship it evokes between decision makers and decision takers has been seen to revolve around the concept of a bounded political community within a nation state. However, Held (2004: 98) points to the fact that such a link has only ever been contingent in the expression of democracy; that is, when the decision makers and decision takers were bound by geographic proximity. As we have seen, however, due to globalisation the relations between decision makers and decision takers is no longer simply contained within the territory of the nation-state, but citizens of one nation state find their fate bound with citizens in other nation states; in communities of fate. The principle of all-inclusiveness thus brings to the fore that not only must democracy not be conflated with the nation state but that it must adapt to the contours of contemporary globalisation (Held 2010: 173-177 cf. Held 1995: 228, Archibugi 2008).

In Held's eyes, Democratic Public Law founds a form of Cosmopolitan Sovereignty, which recognises the principle of democratic all-inclusiveness and challenges the apparent congruence between sovereignty, democracy and the nation state. This is because under
Cosmopolitan Sovereignty the very concept of sovereignty is taken ‘...as the networked realms of public authority shaped and delimited by an overarching cosmopolitan legal framework’ (Held 2010: 19). The outcome is that Cosmopolitan Democracy and its take on sovereignty is defined by the principle of “heterarchy”, where there is a “divided authority system subject to cosmopolitan democratic law” rather than a single nation state or overarching world government (McGrew 1997: 250 cf. Archibugi 2004: 454).

This ultimately facilitates three wholesale changes in the pursuit of democratic all inclusiveness. The first is that legitimate exercise of democracy is linked with the upholding of Democratic Public Law rather than being simply located in bounded political communities and nation states. The nation state ‘withers away’ as sole power and is embedded within a complex array of local, regional and transnational democratic arenas that utilize and seek to enforce cosmopolitan law (Held 2010: 19, 101-101). The second is the interlinked notion that such arenas of democracy can be flexibly used to tackle political problems when necessary. For instance, under Democratic Law, local problems such as housing, education, and policing are to be solved within spatially delimited arenas (city, region or state) and global problems such as climate change and poverty are to be pursued within regional and transnational arenas. In turn, the system aims to be fluid; allowing for local arenas to be supplemented by regional and transnational ones if they are found to be unable to include all those affected by public decisions (Held 2004: 107-8).

Finally, the third wholesale change that Cosmopolitan Sovereignty inaugurates is the rise of what Held calls ‘cosmopolitan citizenship’. In this sense, the very meaning of citizenship would move from its current articulation of membership of a bounded political community, which grants rights and responsibilities, to citizenship under Democratic Law that provides
all persons with rights and responsibilities. This is fundamentally the idea that all people will have ‘...an equality of status with respect to the fundamental processes and institutions which govern their life expectancy and life chances’ (Held 2010: 179). Cosmopolitan citizenship would see individuals become members of diverse and changeable political communities –locally, nationally, regionally and globally- if the principle of democratic all-inclusiveness is to be held within the context of a historically unprecedented form of globalisation. And as Held reminds his readers, just like democracy, there is only a historically contingent connection between citizens and the national community. A link that is continually weakened as globalisation places humanity in various communities of fate (Held 2010: 180).

To achieve the enactment of Cosmopolitan Sovereignty, its recognition of democratic all-inclusiveness and rise of Cosmopolitan Citizenship, Held puts forwards a whole raft of possible institutional reforms to the multilateral order. At the heart of this would be the extension of democratic and deliberative forums and bodies at regional and global levels. This would include for example, a radical reform of the United Nations and its General Assembly, which would become a global assembly or global parliament. The agenda of a new global assembly would be the examination of global problems and the setting out of legal and institutional frameworks to address such global problems. In addition, Held suggests the reforming of the UN security Council, so that each nation is represented on equal footing; the creation of an independent and permanent peacekeeping force to deal with regional and global security threats; the creating of regional parliaments and governance (for example in Latin America and Africa) and the enhancing of the EU’s power;
and the creation of an Economic and Security Council that could deal with issues of natural and human disasters (Held 2004: 109-14, 164-65).

Nevertheless, it is not just political reform of the multilateral system that Held’s Cosmopolitan Democracy endeavours to achieve. In tandem with the reform of the multilateral political order via Democratic Law and Cosmopolitan Sovereignty the global economic system is also paramount to securing the tenets of Democratic Law and Cosmopolitan Sovereignty. Primarily, this economic reform would entail the replacement of Neo-Liberal globalisation with a new form of embedded liberalism or what Held (2010: 166) denotes as ‘social democratic globalisation’. Following the work of Ruggie (2003), Held puts forward the idea of reconstructing social democracy for the global arena (Held 2004: 16-17).18

Shifting the traditional idea of social democracy, where national government both utilizes and mitigates market mechanisms through social democratic institutions such as the welfare state and redistribution of the profits of growth, social democratic globalisation would aim for the global calibration of markets towards global poverty reduction and the protection of the vulnerable. Such a new economic agenda could be achieved, it is argued, through two key legal and institutional movements. The first would entail the use of overarching tenets of Democratic Law to not only provide the ethical codes of particular industries but the use of human rights and law to mitigate the basic laws of the free market and corporate practise. This would see the creation of laws that link economic, human

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18 As pointed out at the onset of the chapter, Ruggie (2003) does not explicitly tie his own ideas of reforming social democracy and creating a new global regime of ‘embedded liberalism’ to Cosmopolitan Democracy. He is also sceptical of the claim that the current practises and institutions of the post World War Two multilateral order seen are an expression of Cosmopolitan Democracy.
rights, commercial, environmental and transnational law together much like the Social Chapter of the Maastricht Agreement and the NAFTA regime (Held 2004: 154-155).

The second movement of economic reform would attempt to restore the principle of democratic all-inclusiveness to the global economic system and deal with the perceived asymmetric relations between developing and developed countries that Neo-Liberal globalisation both justifies and perpetuates. The immediate task of such reform would be to stem the hegemonic enforcement of Neo-liberalism as the sole route to economic development, both within national and international policy circles, to facilitate the necessary space for individual countries to pursue their own development polices (Held 2010: 169). This would entail a fundamental remodelling of the architecture of the global economy through the reforming of International Financial Institutions to make them more democratic and representative of developing countries and to re-orient their focus towards securing the ethical principles of Democratic Public Law (Held 2004: 112).

Moreover, this would mean the elimination of unsustainable debt; seeking ways to reverse the outflow of capital assets from the poorest countries to the north; new forms of global taxation on financial transactions (Tobin Tax) and Carbon/Fossil Fuel use whose proceeds would be used to fund development; and the creation of new finance facilities for development in the poorest countries (Held 2004: 55-70, 164-65). The overall impact of such reforms being the perceived reconciliation of the development goals of the West and the nations who make up the proverbial ‘rest’ (Held 2010: 169).

For writers, such as Held (2010: 240) and Beck (2005: 65), the political project of Cosmopolitan Democracy does not simply begin from the political ether or normative imagination. On the contrary, Cosmopolitan Democracy is said to already be partly
constituted by the post World War Two multilateral order which, shaped and formed by the lessons of the Holocaust and the Second World War and in founding human rights and the United Nations, recognised that human well being, respect, and the satisfaction of basic human needs went beyond geographic boundaries. This in turn has laid the ground for the development of multilateralism, international law and multilayered governance. In many respects, then, the founding of Cosmopolitan Democracy will complete an ‘unfinished’ project begun post 1945. And for Cosmopolitan Democrats the agents who could bring about such change are to be found in the emergence of Global Civil Society and the nation states who now find their sovereignty being challenged by the effects of Neo-Liberal globalisation.

In the first instance, Cosmopolitan Democrats (Kaldor 2003, Beck 2005, Held 2010) point to an emerging global civil society of ‘new’ social movements and NGO’s as offering a new form of global politics through the creation of transnational civil networks. Global Civil Society has been most fully examined by Mary Kaldor (2003), who traces its origins to the ascendency of ‘new’ social movements and the end of the cold war. ‘New’ Social movements, as they have come to be known, trace their own origins to the 1968 protests and contrast with ‘Old’ social movements. Old social movements tended to be associated with labour movements or movements towards self-determination/liberation such as anti-colonial movements. Organised hierarchally, with committees and chairmen, such movements addressed the nation state and were essentially mass membership movements. New social movements, on the other hand, focused on new issues (human rights, environmentalism, Feminism, Third world solidarity) and have far more decentralised and participatory organisational structures.
On the back of such organisational structures, New social movements pioneered new forms of protest and the use of the modern media technology such as TV to further their campaign goals (Kaldor 2003: 84-85). Global Civil Society consequently emerged, Kaldor argues, when 'new' social movements, during the Cold War, utilised modern communication technology (telephones, faxes,) and the advent of cheaper travel to challenge the segmentation of the world into East and West blocs with a conception of human rights and freedom. Out of the revolutions of 1989 and into the 1990's, a new conception of global civil society (one which made radical demands for the global account of political and personal rights that went beyond the state), was brought about by a new wave transnational activism and the explosion of international NGO's (ibid., 74-77).

At present, global civil society functions as a social space where transnational civil networks, which can encompass NGO's (Oxfam, Amnesty International), social movements (anti-globalisation, anti-global poverty) and individuals, create forums of communication and information exchange through the use of ever changing and more advanced forms of communication technology (internet, social networking, indymedia). The power of such transnational networks, argues Kaldor, lays in their ability to create a 'boomerang effect' when local issues are made transnational issues and the subsequent transnational support is used to buttress progressive arguments and impel change from states and international institutions (e.g. movement against Apartheid). And even more poignantly, such transnational civil networks can help the steps towards Cosmopolitan Democracy when they induce what Kaldor (2003: 96) calls the 'double boomerang effect'. This transpires when the publicising and movement of local issues to the transnational arena facilitates the recognition that such local problems, such as Land Mines or Human Right abuses, are in fact
global problems which demand the creation or development of globally binding Cosmopolitan Law (Ottawa treaty on Land Mines) or Cosmopolitan Institutions (International Criminal Court).

Nonetheless, whilst viewing the power of global civil society as being valuable to the cause and despite being less powerful than ever before in its history, Cosmopolitan Democrats still believe that the project of Cosmopolitan Democracy must be linked to the power of nation states. As Beck points out, whilst there cannot be Cosmopolitan Democracy without global civil society, there can also be no Cosmopolitan Democracy without the alliance of politicians and national governments. For whilst the actions of global civil society can keep national and international political institutions to account, ultimately ‘without the state, there can be no collectively binding decisions, no legitimation.’ (Beck 2005: 251). Held (2010: 246-249) illustrates this further when he suggests that it is a collation of political groupings that could in theory bring forth Cosmopolitan Democracy in the 21st century.

This collation of political groupings, whilst including global civil society, largely focuses on nation states, such as those European countries with social democratic traditions and faith in multilateralism such as the EU project, the USA when under progressive President’s and the newly powerful BASIC countries. A political scenario where nation states, who realise the impotency of modern sovereignty in the face of Neo-Liberal globalisation, come together to enact the foundations of Cosmopolitan Democracy through the ‘...strengthening of multilateralism, building new institutions for providing publics goods, regulating global

19 The BASIC countries are made up of Brazil, South Africa, India and China. The bloc was founded by an agreement in 2009 to act jointly at the Copenhagen conference on climate change to represent the common interest of such developing countries and challenge the dominance of Western advanced states at international meetings. The BASIC countries are not to be confused with the BRIC countries (Brazil, Russia, India China), which has moved from simply being an acronym for newly developing countries (who in the future will change the balance of economic power between developing and developed countries) to an actual geo-political bloc who now meet annually.
financial markets, creating a new global trade regime that puts the poorest first, ameliorating urgent social injustices that kill thousands of men, women and children daily, and tackling climate change and other environmental problems' (Held 2010: 249).

2.2 Global Democracy from below: Transnational Deliberative Democracy

There are a whole plethora of theoretical positions and authors we could place under the rubric of global democracy from ‘below’: from the environmental; to the human rights movement; to the anti-globalisation movement and continuing relevancy of Communism. However, I believe that the best example of global democracy from below emerges from exponents of transnational deliberative democracy. Exponents of transnational deliberative democracy can be said to offer the most plausible expressions of global democracy from below because, whilst such positions correspond with others in the belief that the top-down nature of Cosmopolitan Democracy is at best insufficiently democratic and at worst a potential source of domination, they in turn offer coherent and extensive counterproposals to the democratic enactment of global democracy. Archetypal examples of such transnational deliberative democracy can be found in the respective work of John Dryzek (2006) and James Bohman (2007), who, whilst not entirely agreeing with each other, do correspond in the belief that transnational forms of deliberative democracy are more favourable than Cosmopolitan Democracy in extending democracy globally.

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20 In addition to the deliberative democratic thinkers I have chosen to discuss one could easily put under the rubric of global democracy from below other writers from other traditions, who whilst differing on the details, also advocate the bottom up agential power in the formation of global democracy. Examples can be found in rival accounts of Global Civil Society (Keane 2003); the anti-globalisation/global justice movement (Klein (2002), della Porta et al. (2006) and Smith (2008)); Human Rights activism (Keck and Sikkink (1998)); global environmentalism (Newell (2000) and Faber (2005)); and the global Labour movement (Evans (2008, 2010) and Silver (2005)). This not to say anything of Neo-Marxist authors such as Hardt and Negri (2000, 2004), Callinicos (2003) and Harman (2009) who still invest their faith of global Communism in the rise from below by in a multitude or traditional conception of the Proletariat. Whilst I do not extensively tackle the work of these authors it is my contention that the problem of the ‘normative figure’, which I address at the end of this chapter, haunts any intention to spread democracy beyond the nation state. As such, the questions I ask at the end of this chapter of the discussed forms of global democracy would also apply to the work of these authors.
The main driving force of transnational deliberative democracy's arguments against the soundness of Cosmopolitan Democracy revolves around the issue of its perceived reduction of democracy's normative expression to self-determination by a singular *demos*. As James Bohman points out, democracy has historically and philosophically come to mean the rule of a people or *demos* rather than the peoples or *demoi*. Taken to be a singular political subject, the demos signified inhabitants of a singular territorial space, whether that be a city, district or nation (Bohman 2007: vii). This conception of a self-legislat ing demos, which is both the author and subject of its own laws, is essentially the democratic component of modern sovereignty. And as we have seen, with the collapse of the effectiveness of modern sovereignty in the light of globalisation, authors point to a simultaneous collapse in the effectiveness of national democracy. Where Cosmopolitan Democracy goes wrong, Bohman contends, is in viewing the goal of global democracy as the re-establishing of the demos on a global scale. This is because such an attempt to reconstruct the demos on a global scale does not acknowledge that the reality of the transnational polity is made up of *demoi*: multiple democratically organised units which may possibly come into conflict with each other (ibid., 33). For critics such as Bohman, then, the implementation of a Cosmopolitan Democracy through the engendering of an overarching Democratic Public Law can only take place through submitting all demoi into a self-determining singular demos. However, whilst such a proposal creates a continuity between democracy within the nation state and beyond the nation state, any form of deliberation about the nature and practise of global democracy itself ultimately becomes null and void (Bohman 2007: 40-42). Put simply, Cosmopolitan Democrats take Cosmopolitan Democracy as the only possible expression of global democracy.
This point is best captured by Dryzek who contends that Cosmopolitan Democracy's focus on recreating a singular demos and its inability to deal with plural peoples actually contradicts the goals of its own take on democracy. For if democracy consists of the capacity of all those affected by public decisions to have an equal opportunity to directly or indirectly influence or regulate those public decisions, then it is within the democratic mandate for citizens to call into question the very legitimacy of the Cosmopolitan Democratic order. Through essentialising the identity of democracy with cosmopolitan law, Cosmopolitan Democrats are seemingly unprepared to deal with very normative questioning that democracy brings to the fore and is unable to comprehend the fact that the two facets of their project, Cosmopolitan Law and Global Democracy, may ultimately 'pull in different directions' (Dryzek 2006: 144).

Although differing in how they perceive details of the very concept in the first place, both Dryzek and Bohman believe that the best way to achieve a robust global democracy is a transnational form of deliberative democracy. Unlike the classic liberal model of democracy, where the political process becomes the aggregation of voting preferences, deliberative democracy attempts to inaugurate a more dialogical politics (Flyn 2004: 437). Deliberation in this context is taken to mean the process of 'social learning' by which participants hold the potential for a transformation of their preferences as a consequence of exchanging views with others via non-coercive communication. The process of democratic deliberation facilitates the participation of all those affected by political decisions in the deliberation of such political decisions (Dryzek: 27-28). A deliberative approach to a transnational form of democracy should therefore be taken to mean the facilitating of transnational '...public
reasoning geared toward generating political decisions or public opinion about how to resolve shared problems' (Smith and Brassett 2008: 72).

The best way to secure such transnational deliberation and in turn, transnational democracy, is therefore through a transnational public sphere. This conception of a deliberative transnational democracy via a transnational public sphere stems from a critical engagement with Jurgen Habermas' model of deliberative democracy and its conception of the national public sphere (Dryzek 2006: 61, Bohman 2007: 60-61, Chochran 2002). In Habermas' (1998) model of deliberative democracy the national public sphere, which emerges from the associations of civil society and is perpetuated by modern communication technology, functions as a deliberative space for all citizens to form public opinion. Such deliberative space is created by and for communication, characterised by both formal (public debates, citizen forums) and informal (neighbourhood associations, letters to the editor, radio phone-ins) deliberative arenas (Habermas, 1998: 229). In principle, within the public sphere all speakers should be able to articulate opinions and have others respond and articulate their own opinions in response on equal terms. At the same time, rather than simply being face to face, such deliberation addresses a potentially indefinite audience. Taken as a whole, the public sphere is an arena where citizens can passively consume or actively deliberate with an array of discourses and form public opinion about how to best solve shared problems (Bohman 2007: 61-62).

The 'communicative freedom' of the public sphere is key for Habermas' (1996: 442) conception of deliberative democracy because it hands citizens 'communicative power' when it is able to influence the administrative power contained within formal decisions
making arenas such as the nation state legislatures. As Dryzek (2006: 61-62) points out, this communicative power largely translates into the process where the formation of public opinion affects democratic elections and in turn the legislation that emerges from such national legislatures. For both Dryzek (2006: 104) and Bohman (2007: 61-63) the time-space compression associated with the increase of new telecommunications technology (TV, internet) and the emergence of global civil society now make it possible to create a transnational public sphere which can influence the networks of global governance and help inaugurate a form of transnational deliberative democracy.\(^{21}\) Indeed both Dryzek and Bohman take Habermas to task for essentialising the relationship between the public sphere and the nation state and failing to see how the public sphere could be expanded to promote a form of transnational deliberative democracy (Dryzek 2006: 24, 98-99; Bohman 2007: 39-40).\(^{22}\) However, as we shall see below, whilst united in their belief in the potential for a transnational deliberative democracy via a transnational public sphere, both writers disagree with one another about the best modus operandi of this global democracy from below.

\(^{21}\) Just as Bohman and Dryzek, I am making the distinction, not always done by others (See Kaldor 2003 for example), between global civil society and a transnational public sphere. The former should be seen as a space of action and dissemination by activists and NGO's, whilst the latter is, as stated above, an arena where citizens can passively consume or actively deliberate with an array of discourses and form public opinion about how to best solve shared problems. And whilst the two are not mutually exclusive and indeed interactive, they are not the same thing. For instance, I point out below and hope to flag up throughout the study, that one could have very active global civil society actors and still not have a very active transnational public sphere.

\(^{22}\) More recently Habermas (2001; 2006) has used his work to outline a form of global democracy and largely replicates elements of Cosmopolitan Democracy in its exposition of a three tier system of the national, transnational (regional) and supranational (global) of institutions. In many ways its replicates many of the failings I narrate afflict GDT in general in next chapter. For a more detailed examination of Habermas' work on these issues see Scheuerman (2008).
2.3 Dryzek – Transnational Discursive Democracy

For Dryzek (2006) the current conflicts within the international system are best described as ‘clashes of discourses’. In Dryzek’s parlance, a discourse is taken to mean:

‘a shared set of concepts, categories, and ideas that provides its adherents with a framework for making sense of situations, embodying judgments, assumptions, capabilities, dispositions, and intentions. It provides basic terms for analysis, debates, agreements and disagreements. Its language enables individuals who subscribe to it to compile the bits of information they receive into coherent accounts organised around storylines that can be shared in intersubjectively meaningful ways’ (Dryzek 2006: 1).

Following the lead of his Cosmopolitan Democrat counterparts, Dryzek (2006: 101-103 cf. 2008), locates Neo-Liberal globalisation as the hegemonic discourse of national and global policy agendas, which is governed by a decentralised and undemocratic network of global governance. However, the current international system, whilst under the hegemony of Neo-Liberal globalisation and its mantra of TINA, is now being increasingly called into question by the process of reflexive modernisation and the proliferation of alternative discourses. Reflexive modernisation is best seen as a process whereby the traditions and discourses of socialisation are increasingly likely to be questioned by individuals who have an increased access and awareness of alternative discourses and identities.
Under reflexive modernisation, which itself is perpetuated by the effects of the underlying drivers of globalisation (such as increased telecommunications), the privileged hegemony of Neo-liberal globalisation is now increasingly challenged by alternative discourses of anti-corporate globalisation and human rights and regressive discourses of xenophobic nationalism or religious fundamentalism. The world as we know it under the hegemony of Neo-Liberal globalisation is therefore not a static one, but one where ever increasing amounts of individuals are thinking reflexively about the present and about international affairs (Dryzek, 2006: 20-21, 126).

In a context of such discursive difference and conflict, Dryzek argues that the multilateralism associated with Cosmopolitan Democracy is both infeasible and possibly undemocratic. On one hand, Dryzek argues the current decentralised and undemocratic network of global governance is an eclectic mix of mechanisms ranging from the formal (nation states, IGO's, international law) to the informal (Global Civil Society, national public spheres). In light of the complexity of global governance mechanisms and the sheer proliferation of different discourses under reflexive modernisation, the idea of institutions relinquishing their power and individuals across the world subsuming their national, regional, tribal, religious and civilizational interests and identities under the project of Cosmopolitan Democracy, is simply not realistic. For example, normative divisions can be found about global policy not only between the US and Islamic fundamentalism but also between US and their supposed allies in Europe over the meaning of the ideals of democracy and freedom. Moreover, Dryzek points out that even if such multilateral negotiations were to take place, as history shows, they would inherently be slow and vulnerable to perpetual breakdown (Dryzek 2006: 153-54, 160-61).
With this critique of multilateralism and Cosmopolitan Democracy in mind, Dryzek (2006: 158) suggests that whilst one recognises the continued importance of formal international and state organisations as sites of authoritative power, the limits of directly democratising such formal organisations may have been reached. An alternative strategy would rather seek the democratisation of the global governance mechanisms as they currently exist. As a result, Dryzek contends that the extension of democracy across borders would be better served by the expansion of a Habermasian style deliberative democracy to international politics, via a global public sphere (Dryzek 2006: 27). However, contra Habermas’ conception of the national public sphere, Dryzek envisions the transnational public sphere as an informal and decentralised deliberative space, which rather than simply being linked to the influencing of elections, would function towards the:

‘... effective inclusion of different values, bringing an increasing range of questions to the public agenda and rendering communication and deliberation more open and less prone to symbolic distortion’ (Dryzek 2006: 160-61).

Although Dryzek’s conception of the transnational public sphere encompasses actors beyond civil society, such as corporations and members of governments and intergovernmental organisations deliberating and acting in non-authoritarian ways, the key actors within his conception of transnational public sphere are the NGO’s and social movements within global civil society (Dryzek 2006: 24, 112). For whilst the agents of global civil society lack the formal political power of states and the economic power of multinational corporations, Dryzek believes that they have the greatest scope to think ‘reflexively’ and hence disseminate discourses which challenge the hegemony of Neo-Liberal globalisation’s global policy agenda (Dryzek 2006: 123).
In this way, the agents of global civil society are key to creating a transnational public sphere. However, unlike Cosmopolitan Democracy and the arguments of Mary Kaldor, the mission of Dryzek's conception of global civil society is structured around discursive contestation rather than an ancillary role of helping to found Cosmopolitan Law or Cosmopolitan institutions. This is because Dryzek believes that a more authentic deliberation takes place over longer periods of time and within informal arenas of deliberation where the costs of changing one's mind or position are not as likely to be structurally blocked or deemed too costly (Dryzek 2006: 52-57).

Ultimately, Dryzek contends that the goals of such discursive deliberation via the transnational public sphere and the vibrancy of global civil society are the education and dissemination of counter hegemonic discourses to broader transnational publics. The creation of transnational public opinion is therefore taken by Dryzek (2006: 154) to be able to influence not only the institutions of global governance institutions but also the actions of corporations and the policy of nation states with the capacity to make decisions within their jurisdictions. Indeed, as Dryzek notes, looking at the history of transnational movements against apartheid, corporate globalisation, the discrimination of indigenous people and environmental pollution, it is this dual contestation of the actions of international institutions and the actions of states and corporations that has been most successful (Dryzek 2006: 157-58).

2.4 Bohman - Republican Cosmopolitanism

Upon scrutinising Dryzek's work, Bohman acknowledges how one could be drawn to a transnational public sphere which, spurred on by social movements and NGO's, would engender transnational forms of communication and contestation. Indeed, in the midst of
the deterritorialization and reterritorialization of political authority and sovereignty away from the nation state to network forms of governance and the subsequent lack of regularised political influence (elections) over such network forms of governance, informal networks of contestation appear the only way to influence decision making at the global level (Bohman 2007: 65-66). However, in the eyes of Bohman (2007: 42-44), Dryzek’s work is unsatisfactory because it reduces transnational deliberative democracy to being ‘contestatory’ rather than actually democratic. This charge centres on Bohman’s belief that Dryzek’s conception of transnational democracy does not itself live up to the ideals of deliberative democracy.

As we saw above, deliberative democracy, when conceptualised in terms of the nation state, conceives citizenship as engendering communicative freedom which is then transferred into communicative power when it influences the outcomes of democratic elections and the formation of state law and policy. Bohman contends, however, that Dryzek’s valorisation of an informal global public sphere, which forgoes attempting to democratise or found new democratic transnational institutions in favour of contesting hegemonic discourses, engenders communicative freedom but not communicative power. Without the ability of a global public sphere to directly influence the institutions of administrative power associated with global politics, Bohman argues that the communicative freedom of citizens is not guaranteed to become communicative power and hence is not sufficient for the democratisation of global politics (Bohman 2010: 445-446). The ‘institutional minimalism’ of Dryzek’s conception of transnational democracy, through denying the need for the formal links between the global public sphere and sites of transnational administrative power, thus removes the active powers of citizenship
associated with deliberative democracy and reduces global politics to simply activism and protest (Bohman 2007: 42-44).

A more robust form of transnational democracy must therefore avoid both the pitfalls of Cosmopolitan Democracy’s inflexible legal framework and the impotency of Dryzek’s transnational discursive democracy (Bohman 2007: 44). In light of what he takes to be the new circumstances of politics (Neo-Liberal globalisation) Bohman looks to follow the example of John Dewey and see such new social facts as ‘demanding a normative and conceptual understanding of democracy and its geography’ (Bohman 2007: 3-4). To accomplish this he looks to normatively ground his conception of Transnational Deliberative Democracy in the republican value of freedom as non-domination. In this scenario, domination is not taken to mean simply tyranny or arbitrary interference but rather the arbitrary use of normative power to impose duties and obligations. To conceive freedom as non-domination is thus to imbue citizenship with ‘a particular normative status, a status allowing one to create and regulate obligations with others.’ (Bohman 2007: 9). This republican value of freedom as non-domination is best realised through democracy, which Bohman understands as a:

‘set of institutions by which individuals are empowered as free and equal citizens to form and change the terms of their common life together including democracy. In this sense, democracy is reflexive and consists of procedures by which rules and practises are subject to the deliberation of citizens themselves’ (Bohman 2007: 45).

Taken together, the republican value of freedom and its democratic expression contrast with other conceptions of democracy such as Held’s principle of all-inclusiveness. Rather
than seeing democracy as the achievement of a form of popular sovereignty where all those
affected ought to be able to participate in the decisions that affect them, Bohman’s position
argues for ‘a minimum set of powers and conditions that would make it possible for citizens
not be dominated and thus to be free to make claims of justice in unjust circumstances’
(Bohman 2007: 35 cf. 173).

This conception of the ‘democratic minimum’ can be understood as the capacity of all
citizens to initiate deliberation in order to amend the normative framework of democracy
and practises of social life in regards to their claims of justice and the capacity to set an item
on the open agenda and initiate joint public deliberation (Bohman 2007: 28, 55). The
democratic minimum thus serves to provide both communicative freedom and
communicative power associated with deliberative democracy’s conception of citizenship
by designating ‘just those necessary conditions of nomination necessary for
democratisation- that is for citizens to be able to form and change the terms of their
common life’ (Bohman 2007: 45-46). How exactly the democratic minimum is engendered
through constitutionalised rights and institutions is open to debate and ultimately a
reflexive exercise based on the upholding of the democratic minimum in the first place.

In holding the value of freedom as non-domination, Bohman also contests the dominant
interpretation of republicanism found in civic republicanism which perceives freedom as
being equivalent to membership of the demos. Moreover, just as Held does with his
principle of all-inclusiveness, Bohman argues that the value of freedom as non-domination
issues its own warrant for the need for Cosmopolitan and transnational forms of democracy
(Bohman 2007: 102). This transpires because, as we have seen, the practises of Neo-Liberal
globalisations, such as the flows of global financial markets or global division of labour,
create asymmetric transnational relations which can affect an indefinite number of people. The actions of large multinationals, financial markets and powerful states, whether they intend to or not, can affect an indefinite number of people whose interests were never factored into the decision process or who have no effective stake or control over the institutions that affect their life chances. These transnational relations are thus asymmetric and potentially lead to domination through the 'non-voluntary inclusion' of others (Bohman 2007: 24-25). The republican value of freedom as non-domination thus presupposes that within the context of Neo-Liberal globalisation the upholding of democratic minimum and hence democracy must go beyond the nation state to fulfil the very tenets of non-domination.

To achieve such transnational democratisation, upholding the value of freedom as non-domination and the democratic minimum across the transnational relations engendered by Neo-Liberal globalisation, Bohman returns to the idea of a transnational public sphere. Unlike the national public spheres, which can be defined by an encompassing mass media and cultural unity and spatial congruence, Bohman envisions the transnational public sphere as being formed through a network of media communications and to be 'distributive': a culturally hybrid public of publics rather than a unified public sphere in which all communicators participate (Bohman 2007: 76-77). Up to this point Bohman largely mirrors Dryzek's conception of transnational public sphere which, spurred on by social movements and NGO's, engenders distributive transnational forms of communication and contestation over claims of justice.
However, as shown above, on their own, such transnational publics do not fulfil the democratic minimum because of their sole dependence on contestation to affect political decisions. To become ‘strong’ rather than ‘weak’ publics and uphold the democratic minimum, Bohman argues that such a distributive transnational public sphere must also be embedded into a larger institutional and political context in which citizens can transfer such communicative freedom into communicative power and achieve the democratic minimum (Bohman 2007: 81-83).

Bohman labels his approach to achieving such transnational deliberative democracy ‘Cosmopolitan Republicanism’ because it firstly presupposes the need for at least some global institutions such as the International Criminal Court and robust human rights that secure the democratic minimum for individuals who sufferer domination. Contra the tenets of Cosmopolitan Democracy, however, Bohman does not take the establishment of a Cosmopolis to be the central plank of such a Cosmopolitanism because of its tendency to lead toward a rigid constitutionalism that may possibly become undemocratic. Furthermore Bohman suggests there are limitations of such institutions in the enforcing and protecting of such rights and statuses (Bohman 2007: 132). To counter this, Bohman sees the global institutions as part of over lapping and polyarchical structure which facilitate the upholding of the democratic minimum. The centrepiece of Bohman’s Cosmopolitan Republicanism’ and its over lapping and polyarchical structure are democratic states (demoi) who choose to pool their sovereignty in the pursuit of federalist and regional projects of political integration such as the EU (ibid., 189).24

24 Bohman is less clear on the detail of the relationship between such global institutions and rights and regional, national and local institutions than Cosmopolitan Democracy. However, it is clear that the relationship between the global institutions and the regional federalisms is itself a form of federal decentring,
Taking the EU as the only, if insufficiently deliberative, example of a transnational polity 'in the making', Bohman examines how the EU could become a fuller transnational democracy in the sense of Republican Cosmopolitanism. Just as representative institutions did for the nation states, Bohman contends that the EU must democratise the transnational policy via making its political agents more diverse and accountable (ibid., 154). This could be achieved through two complementary procedures. Firstly, a written constitution which would give European citizens the normative powers of the democratic minimum, 'the right to have rights', which includes the power to change the very nature of those of rights and duties.

And secondly, the provision of sites and locations, locally, nationally and transnationally, where such citizenship can be utilized in direct deliberation with the institutional powers and authorities of EU (Bohman 2007: 128-29). In essence, this would see the EU become a site of multilevel interlocking and interactive sites that institutionally empower citizens in the transnational public spheres. And to accomplish this, Bohman not only stresses the need for reform of European institutions such as the European Parliament and its deliberative practises with the public spheres of various EU nations but also the extension of direct designed to avoid the pitfalls he sees in Cosmopolitan Democracy. In this sense, Bohman takes that regional formations will not only themselves deliberate with others within other regional formations to create global institutions and rights but also refract global institutions and rights into their own politics and hence create the foundations of a wider Cosmopolitan order. For instance, his conception of human rights translates into a situation where the very normative and intuitional frameworks of such human rights would be open to the perpetual deliberation of the citizens under the jurisdiction of regional formations. Bohman (2007: 145-151) points towards the EU's 2000 Charter of Fundamental Human Rights of the EU and accompanying supranational European Court of Human Rights as an example of such a process. In this scenario, citizens of the EU can utilize such rights across local, national and transnational locations within the EU and through the use of the democratic minimum may even change the nature of how such rights are implemented. However, the Charter on Human Rights also provides normative powers to non-EU citizens (political rights) who reside in the EU and who must also have their human rights respected. Thus, even though human rights are refracted into the politics of the EU, for Bohman, such global institutions and rights are used to create a Cosmopolitan 'human community' that regional formations are a key part.
forms of deliberation which would create and institutionalise a transnational public sphere of EU citizens within the everyday politics of the EU (2007: 147-150).

It is Bohman’s opinion that such an institutionalisation of the influence of an EU transnational public sphere would not require unimaginable changes but rather, the democratic opening and extension of transnational forms of deliberation which are already utilised within the EU. For instance, he points at the Open Method of Coordination (OMC) and National Action Plans (NAPS) of the EU on issues such as unemployment, regional development, education and poverty reduction, which are processes where administrative agencies and policy experts within the various EU states transnationally deliberate with other agencies and experts in other EU states at various locations and institutions of the EU.

Although the deliberation is structured by initial goals (reduction in unemployment/ poverty reduction) from the EU Commission, it is not designed to create a uniform policy for all states but rather to draw on the range of local knowledge of problems and to draw out the best solutions for conditions within respective member states. In the very process, which can take place at various levels within the EU (local, national, transnational), deliberation may reveal that such goals/ends lead to the revision and redefinition of such goals and ends. In the case of the NAPS for example, the European Commission creates sets broad targets (e.g. literacy levels) for member states however these ends are not fixed but rather themselves informed by the process of deliberation. This form of shared deliberation introduces for Bohman what Cohen and Sabel (2003) call ‘learning by monitoring’, which via shared deliberation institutionalises a perpetual process of reform within everyday politics (Bohman 2007: 86-88, 158-159).
 Nonetheless, the problem with these deliberative practises such as the OMC and NAPS, is that they still remain semi-public, as contributions to such deliberation is open to other administrative agencies and experts rather than the general populaces of the EU. To this end, such deliberative mechanisms lack the ability to gain popular legitimacy across the populaces of the EU and run the risk of juridification (Bohman 2007: 159). To counter this, Bohman suggests that such deliberative mechanisms should be opened to the general public through the use of ‘mini-publics’ and points to the example of how a Citizen’s Assembly on Electoral Reform was empowered by the Premier of British Columbia to make proposals for electoral reform within the province. Using randomly chosen ‘ordinary citizens,’ the Assembly became a forum of deliberation between ‘citizen-representatives’ on the behalf of the wider public, managing to gain popular legitimacy and informing wider public deliberation about the reforms. The proposals of the Assembly were then voted upon by all citizens to secure the popular legitimacy.

The utilization of such mini-publics, Bohman argues, in tandem with deliberation with experts within regional formations would effectively remove the legitimacy problems encountered by deliberative mechanisms such as the OMC and NAPS. This is because the inclusion of ordinary citizens, who are stakeholders or a representative body of citizens, bypasses the semi-public nature of expert forums and hands citizens normative powers to deliberate, form opinion and make recommendations and decisions (Bohman 2007: 140-141). On this basis, Bohman contends that the implementation of mini-publics could and should go beyond the use of OMC and NAPS and be used to enable ‘a more open-ended process of participation and the empowerment of those affected by policy’ (Bohman 2007: 88). For example, mini publics could be constructed by agenda-setting EU bodies other than
the EU Commission and also in reaction to events that demand the convening of such publics such as economic crises. Rather than simply offering consultation or contestation then, the use of mini-publics effectively decentres power through providing citizens with institutionalised normative powers which shorten the feedback loop between publics and institutions of government. And as various publics within various demoi interact with each other and make normative decisions Bohman argues that a process begins whereby there is a 'deepening of democracy' over which the delegating institution has no real direct control (Bohman 2007: 87-89).

In sum, then, rather than believing that one should bring about a total reorganisation of the international institutions under Cosmopolitan Law, or that a directly transnational deliberative process can just count on the contestation of movements of (global) civil society, Bohman looks to provide foundations for citizens to resist domination and enact the democratic minimum. And Bohman sees the implementation of mini-publics and institutionalisation of the normative power of transnational public spheres, across regional federal blocs under a system of Republican Cosmopolitanism, as the best way to achieving such a semblance of transnational democracy. Taking note of the above and his belief in the nation state and the actors of global civil society one can see that Bohman takes transnational deliberative democracy to be a system where both political institutions and actors '...ongoingly and iteratively construct the public or publics with which it interacts and which it empowers to make decisions and to change its procedures' (Bohman 2007: 88, 189).
Chapter 3: An acute case of an Ontological Paradox

How then are we to assess the merits of GOT? It should be said that both conceptions of GOT are not without their critiques. Dani Rodrik (2011: 207-232), echoing the earlier critiques of Dhal (1999, 2001) and Kymlicka (1999), argues that large-scale global governance solutions such as Cosmopolitan Democracy run up against fundamental limits. These include the facts that political identities and loyalties still revolve around the nation state; that political communities are still largely organised on a national rather than global basis; and that there are only a narrow set of global norms and, otherwise, large scale differences on desirable institutional arrangements. The reality of a divided world polity, argues Rodrik, means that transnational institutions and mechanisms are never likely to be ever significantly supported enough at a national level to be sufficiently able to govern globalisation.  

Equally, Brassett and Smith (2010: 414) question whether authors such as Bohman and Dryzek, who espouse the virtues of Global Civil Society and a potential transnational public sphere overplay the capacity of such arenas to effect political change. Specifically the co-authors, echoing the earlier critiques of global civil society by Chandler (2005, 2007) and Chandhoke (2005), point to a lack of analysis of the stratified relations between different groups within Global Civil Society (e.g. North Vs South, NGO’s and social movements) and the plural and often conflicting positions such groups hold concerning the governance of globalisation, the legitimacy and role of global institutions and the political strategies that citizens should adopt.

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25 Rodrik (2011: 228) does not just, however, object to the concept of global governance such as that envisioned by Cosmopolitan Democracy on feasibility grounds alone. As an economist and an advocate of a renewed and redesigned 21st century Bretton Woods regime he believes that overarching global rules may actually not be desirable for economic growth or actual management of the global economy.
This is to say nothing of Neo-Marxists, such as Hardt and Negri (2004, 2010), who see the
strands of GDT as offering an ‘illusionary’ critique of Neo-Liberal globalisation and inherently
missing the key problematic of democracy and globalisation. This is because such theories of
GDT never call into question the basic elements of capitalist society and its ‘republic of
property’ - where the power of private property lays in a few hands, where the majority are
forced to sell their labour to maintain their existence and a large section of the world’s
population are excluded from even partaking in this cycle of capitalist exploitation. Such
‘socially democratic’ politics, which propose reforms that seek to achieve the goals of
equality, freedom and democracy, are thus always impotent because they fails to see how
questioning the function of capital, private property and the practises of elites is integral to
achieving such goals in the first place. And in a typical Marxist cadence, Hardt and Negri
conclude that advocates of GDT in fact propose self-defeating reforms where ‘...all elements
of the existing social order stay firmly in place’ (Hardt and Negri 2010: 20 cf. Bello 2004,
2008).

Taken at face value, the above critiques sound as if they point to flaws and omissions within
the ontological narrations of globalisation offered by authors who champion the politics of
global democracy. In so doing, such critiques appear to expose the limits and obstacles to
the feasibility of achieving global democracy which proponents of GDT failed to take into
consideration. This is true to some extent; GDT functions with an incomplete or under
researched ontological narration of globalisation that has glaring omissions about the
nature of the politics of globalisation. However, this is only half the story and fails to expose
the ‘ontology of paradox’ that underpins both GDT from above and below and consequently
lays the foundations for such an incomplete ontology of globalisation and its politics.
As such, in the first section below I shall show, somewhat bewilderingly, that the limits and obstacles to the feasibility of achieving global democracy are in fact outlined and acknowledged by proponents of GDT and then all too conveniently forgotten when they propose the enactment of their normative political vision. Rather than simply failing to engage with the research of others about the limits and obstacles facing global democracy, proponents of GDT also fail to comprehend the very obstacles and limits that they themselves acknowledge do hinder the path to global democracy. GDT thus suffers from a form of ontological split personality whereby the present oscillates between both quashing and facilitating global democracy. As a consequence, such theories end up telling us very little about the potential of global democracy and the current state of the politics of globalisation whilst also failing to interact with research and theories which could open new avenues of insight about such issues.

3.1 An Ontology of Paradox

To get to grips with what I mean by the ontology paradox I want to return to the perceptive arguments made by Luke Martell (2007) about positions taken in the debate about globalisation. As Martell outlines, since the mid 1990's there has been a debate about the ontological nature of Neo-Liberal globalisation, which can be summed up in 'three waves' or 'three positions' of globalisation theory. The first wave can be said to be the aforementioned hyper-globalist perspective on the effects of Neo-Liberal globalisation. The second wave of globalisation theory, known as the sceptic perspective, is essentially an empirical rebuttal of the hyper-globalist account of Neo-Liberal globalisation. The third

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26 The wave analogy was first made by Hay and Marsh (2000) and the three positions of globalisation theory were detailed by Held et al. (1999). I follow Martell (2007, 2010) in merging the two together by mapping the waves onto the three positions.
wave of globalisation theory, which is defined by the transformationalist perspective associated with GDT, can be seen as an attempt to walk a middle path between both hyperlobalist and sceptic perspectives. What Martell stumbles upon is how the ontological assumptions of the sceptic perspective actually match the transformationalist perspective, but end up in divergent and contradictory politics. Below I narrate Martell’s work and then extend the work by showing how the ontological split personality of GDT is exemplified in what I denote as the ‘problem of the normative figure’.

The most prominent sceptic perspective is to be found in the work of Hirst et al. (2009 cf. Mosely, 2005 and Hay 2007), who contend that Neo-Liberal globalisation has in fact created a highly internationalised rather than a truly globalised economy. The above claim is based on distinct ideal types, which Hirst et al. (2009: 18-21) use to characterise an internationalised vis-à-vis a globalised economy. Within the strictures of such ideal types, a globalised economy is a scenario where national economies and international transactions between national economies are ‘subsumed’ and ‘rearticulated’ by global (interregional and transcontinental) processes and transactions.

As a result, private national economic actors and public governments face uncertainty about the adequacy of their actions as the national social space becomes subservient to global processes and transactions. In contrast, an internationalised economy is one where the principle participants are still national economies, but where trade and investment produce interconnection between national economies. This process integrates national economies and their actors into world market relationships; but based on national specialisation and an international division of labour. This form of economic interdependence, however, does not
make the national space subservient to global processes and transactions but rather, sees the refraction of international economic relations through national polices and processes.

Utilising their ideal types and diachronic quantitative economic data Hirst et al. (2009: 3-4) go on to show that Neo-Liberal globalisation has in fact created a highly internationalised rather than truly globalised economy. Moreover, the authors contend that the highly internationalised economy of the present is not even unprecedented. Today’s highly internationalised economy is one of a number of distinct conjunctures of the international economy, which have been constructed since 1860’s when modern industrial technology became the generalised basis of Western economies. And in terms of openness Hirst et al. contend that the current international economy has only recently become as open and as integrated as the gold standard era 1870-1914. This is based on evidence that there is a lack of genuine transnational corporations, with most companies still based nationally and only trading regionally or multi-nationally; the fact that capital mobility has only recently started to shift investment and employment from advanced economic countries to a select few developing countries (China, India, Brazil); the concentration of Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) amongst advanced and again a select few newly developing countries; and the marginalisation of the Third World in both investment and trade.

For Hirst et al. (2009: 3) the nature of the flow of trade, investment and finance reveal that the world economy is not global but rather a highly internationalised economy separated into a triad of trade blocs (Europe, Japan East Asia and North America). Rather than globalisation, Hirst et al. argue that it is the process of supranational regionalisation, where nation states combine in an integrative economic or monetary union and then conduct intra

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27 I will return in more depth to what has become known as The First Great Globalisation in chapter 5.
and inter-regional trade, which best characterises our present. And on the basis of the
evidence of supranational regionalisation Hirst et al. argue that the major economic powers
of the G8, China and India have the capacity, if they were to coordinate multilaterally, to
bring to bear greater governance over financial and other international economic practises.
However, whilst such world markets are in fact not beyond the scope of regulation, the
current scope of such governance is constrained by the interests of the major economic
powers and the economic beliefs of their political and economic elites.

The third wave of globalisation theory, which is defined by the Transformationalist
perspective, can be seen as an attempting to walk a middle path between both hyper-
globalist and sceptic perspectives. The archetypal example of the Transformationalist
perspective is to be found in David Held’s aforementioned appreciation of globalisation and
Neo-Liberal globalisation (see Held at al 1999 cf. Held 2010 and Held and McGrew 2007). As
outlined in chapter 1, Held’s account of globalisation and the implementation of Neo-Liberal
globalisation is largely similar to other writers associated with theories of GDT.\(^\text{28}\)

To recap, contra the sceptic perspective, such an appreciation of globalisation largely
embraces hyper-globalism’s narrative that the deep underlying drivers of the post- 1945
multilateral order and the consequent implementation of Neo-Liberal globalisation have
created a distinct and historically unprecedented form of globalisation. However, where
transformationalist perspectives depart from hyper-globalism, especially the hyper-
globalism of the economic liberal variety, is in the belief that such a form of globalisation is
not teleological or necessarily favourable to the interests of all nations. Moreover,

\(^{28}\) Although it is only Held who labels himself a Transformationalist, as stated in chapter 1, writers such as
Beck, Kaldor, Bohman and Dryzek’s account of the effects of Neo-Liberal globalisation largely mirror the
Transformationalist account of Held’s. Where they disagree is in the details of the normative vision they
believe would solve the global problems engendered by globalisation and implantation of Neo-liberalism.
transformationalist perspectives follow others in pointing to the fact that empirical data reveals Neo-Liberal globalisation to have been economically unsuccessful in creating greater global equality and use such facts to justify their arguments for the extension of a form of global democracy.

Martell (2007: 187-190) notes that on the surface there are undoubted differences between transformationalists and sceptics on issues such as defining a globalised versus an internationalised economy, the historical periodization of globalisation and the normative proposals to deal with the effects of Neo-Liberal globalisation. Yet, Martell goes on to suggest that when one looks beyond these surface differences the transformationalist and sceptic ontological appreciations of Neo-Liberal globalisation actually converge on many issues such as the economic and political hegemony of Neo-Liberalism within the Western economies; the changing nature of modern sovereignty with the deterritorialisation of capital flows and the move towards supra-regionalisation; global economic and political stratification between developing and developed countries; and the potential for the nation states to reassert themselves in regional or multilateral blocs.

What comes to separate the transformationalist and sceptic perspectives for Martell is not so much their ontological descriptions of Neo-Liberal globalisation, but the normative proposal of global democracy and ideas about its feasibility. Whilst sceptics put forward the idea of nation states acting in regional or multilateral blocs to temper Neo-Liberal globalisation, they make it clear that their own normative vision is probably unlikely or to be made politically difficult, by obstacles contained within the present. Moreover, for sceptics, obstacles contained within the present such as the economic and political hegemony of Neo-Liberalism and the stratification between developing and developed nation states
make global decisions such as that proposed by Cosmopolitan Democracy even more unlikely. What Martell perceptively flags up is that whilst transformationalists largely follow the sceptic analysis in recognising the political obstacles facing the reform of Neo-Liberal globalisation they fail to consider such obstacles when expounding the possibility of global democracy:

'The differences between sceptics and transformationalists' normative political conclusions seem to stem, more from the transformationalists' globalists conclusions than from the substance of their arguments; in practice, these often share similar ground with the more sceptical approach... focusing as they do on inequality, stratification and power; nation states (albeit reconstituted ones) for whom there are different possible activists strategies; and the re-territorialisation and regional blocs... The more appropriate political conclusion from such a picture of the current world order would seem to be one that recognises inequality and conflict, nation-states, and regional or multilateral like-minded blocs, as indentified by the sceptics, as the more likely structures in future politics (Martell 2007: 191).

Whilst Martell provides a valuable general insight into the ontology of paradox of transformationalists and those who use such an ontology to found arguments for global democracy, his argument can be further developed by examining just how such an ontological split personality is exemplified in what I denote as the 'problem of the normative figure'. This is where radical agents, such as those within global civil society, or the leaders and populaces of nation states, are presented by proponents of GDT as being unhindered by the very ontological obstacles that their own theories acknowledge to
perpetuate the hegemony of Neo-Liberal globalisation or hinder the progress towards global democracy.

Take for instance the conception of global civil society or transnational public sphere invoked by GDT. As we have previously seen, for advocates of Cosmopolitan Democracy global civil society is to play a key role in raising the awareness about global problems and help spur on nation states to form a coalition of the willing, which could bring about Cosmopolitan Democracy. Concomitantly, writers such as Dryzek see global civil society actors as being pivotal to establishing and securing a global public sphere and transnational discursive democracy. Again, the role Dryzek envisions for groups within global civil society is one of raising awareness for the wider publics contained within democracies. And as highlighted above, critics of such a valorised conception of global civil society point to a lack of appreciation of issues such as the stratified nature of Global Civil Society and the overplaying of the capacity of such arenas to effect political change. The problem, however, is the belief that those who hold such a valorised conception of global civil society fail to appreciate issues such as the stratified nature of Global Civil Society and the overplaying of the capacity of such arenas to effect political change is not actually all together true.

On the issue of the stratified nature of Global Civil Society, for instance, Mary Kaldor (2003: 92), notes the ‘NGOization’ of global civil society where Northern NGO’s have greater access to the centres of political power and funding, as Western states have come to see NGO’s as possible vehicles for their own interests, dominating the agenda at the expense of their counterparts and social movements in developing Southern states. Moreover, proponents of global democracy acknowledge that some NGO’s and current transnational networks contained with global civil society are not to be seen as being favourable to the project of
extending global democracy but rather the perpetuation of Neo-Liberal globalisation (Kaldor 2003: 107; Dryzek 2006: 105). This is to say nothing of the transnational unity to be found amongst religious extremists and xenophobic nationalists (Dryzek 2006: 59-60, 123). Contra their critics, then, global civil society is actually taken by proponents of GDT to be a stratified arena of contestation and inequality between various NGO’s and social movements.

What the above exposition on the stratified nature of global civil society should have indicated is that theories of global democracy actually include within their analysis the very obstacles that others believe limit the potential of global civil society. My point, however, is that such obstacles and limits, rather than being unacknowledged, seemingly disappear when the proponents of global democracy are extolling the virtues of global civil society or the transnational public sphere with regard to their normative vision for global democracy.

Take for example, Mary Kaldor’s statement that:

‘The array of organisations and groups through which individuals have a voice at global levels of decision making represents a new form of global politics that parallels and supplements formal democracy at the national level. These actors do not take decisions. Nor should they have a formal role in decision making since they are voluntarily constituted and represent nobody but their own opinions. The point is rather through access, openness and debate policy makers are more likely to act as a Hegelian universal class, in the interests of the human community ’ (2003: 107-8).

This paragraph is typical of the paradoxical ontology that leads GDT to suffer the problem of the normative figure. On one hand, Kaldor, in a similar way to the way Beck (2005: 75-76) and Dryzek (2006: 123) and in a nod to her own critics such as Chandler (2007), admits that
such an arena lacks the ability to grasp formal political power. And at one point, Kaldor (2003: 100) even admits that the current new social movements and NGO's are largely composed of a cosmopolitan, educated minority who, unlike the old social movements, lack the ability to instigate popular mobilisation. On the other hand, and equally discounting her previous talk about the stratification of global civil society, Kaldor still articulates global civil society as a new form of global politics that may deliver greater global democracy via influencing policy makers.

The problem here is not that the two narrations of the current state and potential role of global civil society conflict with one another, but rather the fact that there is never an explanation for how the current state of global civil society could be reformed or empowered to overcome the acknowledged obstacles that hamper it and by default the goal of global democracy. Quite remarkably, it is as if by magic the problems of stratification and the lack of influence over formal decision making which advocates of global democracy acknowledge do hinder global civil society suddenly disappear or are deemed unimportant when the project of global democracy is being valorised.

One can find the same discounting of previously acknowledged obstacles towards global democracy in Dryzek's valorisation of global civil society and its role in his vision of Transnational Discursive Democracy. As I noted earlier, Dryzek is very much aware that the transnational public sphere is a divided and stratified arena. However, his narration of the 1999 Seattle protests at the WTO Ministerial Meeting, for example, appears to gloss over the previously acknowledged fissures and differences of opinion found in the groups that made up the protests. The goals of anarchists, the labour movement and opinions of public intellectuals like Joseph Stiglitz are quite plainly not going to totally match up. As Brassett
and Smith point out the 'irony is that Dryzek establishes a powerful and avowedly multiperspectival conception of global civil society — a decentralised network with no common agenda — only to value it for having a singular 'impact' on the singular global discourse of market liberalism’ (2010: 420).

There are also fundamental questions to be asked about Dryzek’s paradoxical take on the effectiveness of such transnational discursive democracy. More specifically, how such transnational discursive democracy is able to influence change within a context of Neo-Liberal globalisation. Although Dryzek (2010: 186) is right to point out that the anti-globalisation movement took issues of global political economy out of technical authority and into the public realm. As Frieden (2006: 470 cf. Halliday 2000) notes, whilst the protests at Seattle did bring into light institutions such as the then G7, WTO and IMF, the protests had very little impact on the actual meeting of WTO. And as narrated in chapter 1, Neo-Liberal globalisation, even after the ‘battle of Seattle’, has seen levels of domestic and international inequality actually rise rather than fall. This would seem to reflect Dryzek’s (2006: 123) position that global civil society actors possess discursive power rather than formal political power. However, rather than seeing such an empirical observation as being a disadvantage to the cause of global democracy it is simply repackaged as an apparent advantage with no real evidence offered as to why such a conclusion should be derived.

The same paradoxical take on the effectiveness of such transnational discursive democracy can be found in Dryzek’s (2010: chapter 10) more recent work on global environmentalism. Once more Dryzek goes on to suggest that, whilst ‘NGO’s, scientists, and other activists’ have gotten this issue of climate change onto the top of global and national policy agendas, transnational discursive democracy may be limited to such deliberative transmission. And
Dryzek (2010: 188-89) expounds on the virtues of contestation of climate activists within a transnational public space via discourses that espouse ‘climate justice’ or the earth’s ‘ecological limits’.

Again Dryzek (2010:188) is correct to highlight how such transnational activism and discursive contestation has been somewhat effective through challenging sceptical accounts of climate change and exposing the funding of climate change scepticism by large energy corporations. However, as Dryzek himself admits the discursive power of the environmental movements has its limits and the problem resides within the state structures that underpin global governance. Thus, whilst there is deliberation in the transnational public sphere on issues of climate change within the formal arenas of political power, within and between states and international organisations, it is ‘less easy to discern much in the way of deliberative authenticity’. And when Dryzek talks about international negotiations on climate change from Kyoto (1997) onwards under he United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) he paints an even grimmer picture:

‘In the case of the Kyoto protocol (covering only developed states), most of them chose not to adopt such police, even if they ratified the protocol. Many of these states cam no where near meeting the targets they agreed in Kyoto, and much do not feature enough in the way of internal deliberation to make this shortfall. There is no mechanism at all to punish them for their lack of compliance... This illustrates the more general point: governments may be held to account by their own publics, but accountability that crosses national boundaries is very weak and so in terms of the global deliberative system accountability is highly problematic.’ (Dryzek, 2010: 189)
Dryzek then continues on that the failure of 'meta-deliberation' between states, the most powerful actors in the global governance systems, means that there is 'failure in 'decisiveness' in matters of global democracy. This failure in turn creates avenues for the discourse of market liberalism and the economic lobbying of large corporations to short-circuit the advances made by the actors within global civil society and the discourses such as climate justice within the transnational public sphere:

‘Agreements that are negotiated reply on the voluntary actions of states for their implementation, which (as the Kyoto experience illustrates) is frequently not forthcoming. And the policy actions taken by states often respond in large measure to the weight of lobbying by powerful economic interests. The emissions trading schemes are generally well stocked with exemptions or free permits for the biggest and most powerful emitters of greenhouse gases. Deliberative advances in public space may actually displace failure into empowered space. So energy corporations that have failed when it comes to sponsorship of a discourse of scepticism may simply turn to twisting the arms of governments, meaning the deliberative system as a whole loses decisiveness.’ (Dryzek 2010: 190-191)

The question that arises here is whether the evidence being uncovered here substantiates Dryzek’s (2010: 196) conclusion that transnational discursive democracy ‘…is well placed to go global, though the terms in which it does so mean leaving behind many of the taken-for granted.’ Indeed, I would suggest that the evidence presented by Dryzek himself, where global civil society is limited to discursive contestation and nation states ride roughshod over international agreements, seems to contradict his own conclusion that transnational deliberative democracy is well placed to go global.
Moreover, such a paradoxical account of transnational discursive democracy provides very little consideration as to how such conditions within global civil society may in fact call for the reconsideration or reformulation of what we take 'global democracy' to mean and stand for in both theory and practise. Now, one does not have to disagree with Dryzek's (2012) recent claim that proponents of global democracy are asking too much of the concept by evaluating it by hallmarks of national democracy such as electoral ballots. However, does the inability of global civil society and the transnational public sphere to hold states and their governments to account really constitute democracy beyond borders? Or moreover, are we satisfied that global democracy can be accomplished if the actions of global civil society and the transnational publics sphere are confined to mere contestation or transmission of discourse? In this sense, the concepts of 'global civil society', 'transnational public sphere' and 'transnational discursive democracy' ultimately remain untouched by the very empirical realities their research uncovers and as a result appear rather unworldly.

This ontology of paradox embraced by GOT is even more apparent when one comes to examine the role of the nation state and international institutions. Both strands of global democracy locate the nation state as the key agent in the formation of their respective take on global democracy. As we have seen, for Cosmopolitan Democrats, nation state leaders (via forming multilateral coalitions) are the key agents capable of bringing about the international institutions and practises of Cosmopolitan Democracy. Equally, for those who valorise the global public sphere, the nation state and its influence over international institutions and practises is key to either informally (Dryzek) or formally (Bohman) securing the legitimate normative influence of transnational activism and a transnational public sphere. On the other hand, as we have seen, both strands of GOT believe that Neo-Liberal
globalisation’s policy objectives have become the ‘internal compass’ for Western nation states and the international institutions and policy agendas their governments provide support towards and confer legitimacy upon (IMF, World Bank, WTO).

The problem with this juxtaposition of the current and potential politics of the nation state and international institutions is that they fundamentally contradict and conflict with one another. And there is very little empirical evidence offered as to exactly how the hegemonic status of Neo-Liberal globalisation within national and global policy agendas is changing, or how the actions of Global Civil Society or transnational public sphere are changing the mindsets of the politicians and elites within the institutions of global governance. In fact, as we encountered in Dryzek’s narration of state action in the policy area of climate change, the evidence provided by proponents of GDT often appears to counterintuitive. Bohman’s work, for example, paradoxically suggests the possibility of a democracy of the demoi through states who appear non-too preoccupied with such a project. Take for instance his suggestion that the EU could reform to include the use of transnational mini-publics. That is once transnational agents, such as those within global civil society, emerge ‘... it is a matter for formal institutionalisation, just as sustaining the conditions for the national public sphere is a central concern for the citizens of democratic nation states’ (Bohman 2007: 81).

However, despite these claims, Bohman provides no sustained evidence that such a process is indeed happening or that the national governments or their publics are seeking to organise on such a transnational basis. On contrary, Bohman actually acknowledges that the 2005 rejection of the referenda to ratify the European Constitution by the Dutch and French seems to suggest that such transitional organisation is unlikely and disfavoured amongst national publics within the EU. And it is ultimately the current lack of ‘strong’ transnational
publics, a situation akin to what Bohman call’s Dryzek’s version of transnational democracy, which compels Bohman to argue for the institutionalisation and consequent bequeathing of normative (political) power to transnational publics.

More recently, in response to criticisms (Hogan, 2010; Gilbert, 2010 and Warren, 2010) of using the EU as a model for his conception of Republican Cosmopolitanism Bohman has suggested that whilst the EU has the potential to further democratisation to create a demoi it is ultimately not forthcoming:

‘The EU presents one sort of feedback model for enabling democratization, in which primarily the transnational-level institutions that enhance democracy at the lower levels. Certainly, even in the EU the interaction can go the other way: democracy exercised at the lower levels (in cities, regions, and states) can enhance the democracy of higher levels, especially as these suffer from the potentially dominating effects of juridification that often make transnational institutions so distant and alien. With such mutual interaction across levels and locations, a highly differentiated polity works not merely creating various policies, but also in creating a regime of human rights that can multiply realize the powers of citizenship and make them more rather than less robust. For the lower levels to begin to democratize the higher level institutions, a commitment to an increased role for publics and citizen representatives is necessary, which so far the EU has not made.’ (Bohman, 2010: 82)

Bohman goes on to defend his use of the EU as an example of the possibility of Republican Cosmopolitanism by arguing that ‘...the role of real examples is to develop realistic extensions of the possibilities of the present, which have a specificity that mere philosophical reflection cannot achieve.’ This in itself is not a problem, one could argue that
philosophy and politics in general would be much helped by attaching its analysis and formation of ideals to real world practices. However, Bohman’s paradoxical take that the non-furthering of democracy within the EU is tantamount to suggesting a democracy of the demoi is realizable or forthcoming is both bizarre and analytically unhelpful.

Quite simply, Bohman’s work appears to suggest a normative possibility through a real world example but seldom delves into the empirical limits of reconciling such a normative possibility with such an empirical reality. Such a position seems to remove issues such as the political power of national elites and nation state public perception of the regional formations such as EU from the debate transnational democracy and the (non)-emergence of a democratic demoi within the EU. As a result, Bohman’s apparent use of ‘real examples’ seems to lapse into the form of detached ‘philosophical reflection’ he wishes to transcend.

This paradoxical take on the actions of the nation state is even more pronounced by proponents of Cosmopolitan Democracy. Take for instance, Held and McGrew’s comments in 2007 reflecting on 9/11, the subsequent ‘War on Terror’ and the changing contours of the global economy:

‘Surprisingly, it is an opportune moment for cosmopolitanism social democracy. With the resurgence of nationalism and unilateralism in US foreign policy, uncertainty over the future of Europe after the ‘no’ votes in France and Holland, the crisis of global trade talks, the growing confidence of China, India and Brazil in world economic fora (especially in relation to world trade negotiations), and the unsettled relations between Islam and the West, the political tectonic plates appear to be shifting.’ (Held and McGrew, 2007: 230-231)
From the above it appears that the 'political tectonic plates' appear to be shifting towards creating upheavals, such as the vibrancy of US unilateralism, the rejection of EU integration and the emergence of new geo-political and economic rivalries, which actually bequeath anti-cosmopolitan rather than cosmopolitan outcomes. Yet, Held and McGrew seemingly find that such a context, where there is an absence of international multilateralism provides the perfect grounds for Cosmopolitan Democracy. Using the existence of post-War institutions such as the UN and the apparent growing realisation the 'public good' requires 'long term 'co-ordinated multilateralism' they go to argue:

'The present world order combines both elements of paradise and power: of power politics and cosmopolitan values. A coalition of political groupings could emerge to push these achievement further, comprising European countries with strong liberal and social democratic traditions; liberal groups in the US polity in support multilateralism and the rule of law in international affairs; developing countries struggling for freer and fairer trade rules in the world economic order; NGO's, from Amnesty International to Oxfam, campaigning for a more just, democratic and equitable world order; transnational social movements contesting the nature and form of contemporary globalisation; and those economic forces that desire a more stable and managed global economic order.' (Held and McGrew, 2007: 233-34 cf. Held, 2004)

With the absence of such a collation emerging between 2007 and 2010, David Held repeats that same paradoxical take on the chances of nation states bringing forth reforms that may produce Cosmopolitan Democracy. For instance, once more we are told that despite an apparent increasing recognition that global problems cannot be solved unilaterally and that
the lack of progress on global poverty, climate change and nuclear disarmament points to the fact that such global problems require:

'... collective and collaborative action – something that the nations of the world have not been good at, and which they need to be better at if these pressing issues are to be adequately tackled. Yet, the evidence is wanting that we are getting better at building appropriate governance capacity' (Held: 2010: 146 cf. 13-14).

This admission by Held that present conditions within the politics of nation states appears unfavourable to global democracy adds to the fact that he and his Cosmopolitan Democrat cohorts provide no sustained evidence, other than pointing at the formation of the post World War Two order, that the Cosmopolitan Democracy they espouse is backed by the leaders or populaces of nation states, or those in charge of the global institutions they wish to redesign. Moreover, Held’s own work actually appears to suggest that the current state of national and inter state politics actually disfavours global democracy. To suggest otherwise from such evidence appears nothing but paradoxical. After all, a present marked by the stratified and limited power of global civil society, where political elites appear punch drunk on the tenets of Neo-Liberal globalisation, appears to be less rather than more likely to embrace global democracy. Yet, despite this Held (2010: 246-47) goes on to literally repeat his earlier 2007 claim that a ‘coalition of political groupings could emerge to push these achievements further...’

29 For a similar and all too bizarre acknowledgment about the slim chances of Cosmopolitan Democracy becoming a political reality and then the use of such evidence to argue for the growing realisation of the need for Cosmopolitan Democracy see Beck (2005: 83-85).

30 More recently, Held and Archibugi (2011) have admitted that they have often failed to provide an adequate account of the agent who could bring Cosmopolitan Democracy. They then go on to list possible agents such as dispossessed, global civil society and state actors without providing any real evidence that such actors are actually driven by the goal of Cosmopolitan Democracy.
What should now be clear is that views about nation state politics, their elites and the prospects of global democracy are indicative of the way in which theorists of global democracy, both from above and below, make paradoxical claims that flounce the very evidence their own analysis seems to throw up time and time again. This is essentially the ontology of paradox at the foundation of GDT, which, as shown above, provides a non-too sturdy support for the normative edifices and figures of political action set upon. For GDT writers to then claim that the actions of those within global civil society could create a transnational public sphere or that a coalition of willing nation states could bring into existence new forms of governance such as Cosmopolitan Democracy or Republican Cosmopolitanism is rather akin to saying the sun will not rise tomorrow: it is possible, but the evidence suggests that is very unlikely.

3.2 On the Failed Relationships of Global Democracy Theory

With that said, one must be careful of what one draws from the above analysis. The flagging up of GDT’s paradoxical ontology is not an endorsement of a form of political fatalism. The problem here is not that writers of global democracy have normative visions that appear farfetched or improbable. Most normative visions appear presently incompatible or unsuited to the present as they reveal our displeasure with our current state of affairs and outline what we think the present ought to be. And just as the case would be epistemologically, to be normatively caged within what is currently perceived to be possible or likely would not only be a deathly blow to social science and democratic politics, but also to human ingenuity and advancement in general. Rather, much like the alcoholic or chain smoker who claims they can quit whenever they choose to do so, GDT appears to be in permanent denial about the actual nature of the present.
The result is that proponents of GDT fail to come to terms with the obstacles that their own analysis shows to face their own normative visions and through neglecting the ramifications of such obstacles, end up revealing very little about the status of global democracy or the politics of globalisation. We are told nothing, for example, of how or why the acknowledged obstacles facing global democracy, such as the current limitations of global civil society, or the hegemonic influence of Neo-Liberal globalisation, are perpetuated or how they could be countered politically? And apart from the brief hints to its actual precarious state we are told nothing concrete about what the actual state and chances for global democracy in present day politics are? Moreover, the lack of answers to these questions also highlights a refusal by proponents of GDT to go beyond their paradoxical ontology and actually interact with competing or complementary research which could shed light on or open up new avenues of research about the nature of the current politics of globalisation. Below I highlight areas of research where GDT's failure to engage leaves more questions than answers about the past, present and future of global democracy.

![Figure 1: Rodrik's Political Trilemma](image.com)

Adapted from Rodrik (2011)
The aforementioned work of Rodrik (2011: 184-206) sees him conclude that the historical record shows the 'political trilemma' of the world economy, since the advent of global capitalism in the 19th century, has been characterised by deep economic integration of Hyper-Globalisation, the Nation-State and Democratic politics (see Figure 1 one above). The dilemma introduced by this trilemma, as Rodrik sees it, is that we cannot have hyperglobalisation, democracy and national self-determination at the same time and can only have two out of three at the most. This is due to the fact that national democracy and the deep integration of hyper-globalisation are inherently incompatible.\textsuperscript{31} Hyper-globalisation, such as the form of it found in Neo-Liberal globalisation, does not aim to improve the functioning of nation state democracy but rather looks to secure the lowest market costs for commercial and financial interests. And in doing so, as noted in chapter 1, such a policy regime not only prioritises the interest of multinational enterprise, banks and investment houses over the demands of domestic politics, but in fact moulds national polices around the interests of global capital.

With global democracy unlikely, due to a fractured world polity, Rodrik (2011: 205) advocates a move towards a 'thin globalisation' that would reinvent embedded liberalism for the 21st century and give up on the deep integration of hyperglobalisation. One of the fundamental pieces of evidence for this endorsement of a 'thin globalisation' rather than global democracy is that national identities and attachments to the nation state trump global identities and conceptions of global citizenship. Quite simply, Rodrik believes that 'people see themselves as citizens of their nations, next as members of their local

\textsuperscript{31} Rodrik points to the fact that the hyperglobalisation of the gold standard era was underpinned by a lack of democracy and faltered as more modern forms of democratic practise (wider suffrage, social insurance) rose to prominence across Europe.
community and only last as global citizens’ (2011: 231). Moreover, he suggests that a strong sense of global citizenship exists for the wealthy and those with the highest standards of education and that conversely, attachment to the nation state is much stronger amongst individuals from lower social classes. The result is that the movement towards the construction of a transnational polity is to be seen as the project of a globalised elite rather than the world’s majority.

The reason global democrats should take such issues seriously is that Rodrik forms his arguments not only from survey data taken from The World Values Survey, but also from the historical record. For example, Rodrik (2011: 184-187) examines how Argentina’s embrace of the Neo-Liberal globalisation and its ‘Golden Straight Jacket’ facilitated a sovereign debt crisis in the wake of the 1997 Asian Financial crisis and the loss of export of markets due to Brazil’s devaluation in early 1999. The result was that by 2001 the Argentine government, in an economy already suffering from economic recession and mass unemployment, embarked upon austerity policies and fiscal cuts to maintain the tenets of Neo-Liberal globalisation and maintain investor confidence. Rather than economic recovery, however, such polices lead to domestic bank runs and the shrinking of incomes for Argentine citizens. This in turn, sparked mass protests, nationwide strikes, and rioting and looting across Argentina’s major cities. By Christmas 2001 the government had resigned and Argentina had been forced to freeze bank accounts, reinstall capital controls, devalue the peso and default on its foreign debt.

What the Argentine case and others, such as Britain’s leaving of the Gold Standard in 1931 and the very founding of the Bretton Woods agreement, highlight for Rodrik (2011: 189) is how the incompatibility of hyper globalisation and domestic politics and the lack of global
identities translate into a situation where ‘domestic politics wins out eventually’ and that when push comes to shove ‘democracy shrugs over the Golden-Straightjacket’. Moreover, cases like Argentina reveal for Rodrik how when deep integration is pushed too far, the consequences of hyper globalisation see domestic constituencies primarily turn towards the nation state and not global civil society or institutions of global governance for help or as a site to vent their anger. Although domestic governments may then turn to such global governance institutions and constituencies may in turn unite with transnational activists or turn their anger on global governance institutions (as they did in Argentina when the government turned towards the IMF for loans and the rioters railed against IMF conditionality built into such loans), the primary source of political action and protest takes place around the nation state and national governments.

Whilst it may appear that Rodrik’s research debunks arguments for global democracy, any proponent of GDT should take such issues seriously and as grounds for future research. For instance, if Rodrik is right about the primacy of nation state politics in the politics of globalisation and in the moments where the consequences of hyperglobalisation go too far, one can still enquire as to what happens to ideals of global democracy and the movement towards the democratic reform of the institutions of global governance both in day to day politics and in moments of crisis? Do such ideals become merely empty ether or do they appear in discourse and practise as logical alternatives or complementary polices when domestic constituencies resist hyperglobalisation? How are such ideals narrated by the domestic constituency suffering the consequences of hyperglobalisation? How do other nation states view the domestic constituency and its government when ‘democracy shrugs over the Golden-Straightjacket’? And what is the role, if any, of global civil society and the
institutions of global governance in such moments? These questions, some of which are potentially answered by others below, bring home that rather than simply embracing a paradoxical ontology, which recognises the significant limitations and stratification within global civil society or the priority of nation state politics but then forgets such issues when valorising the project of global democracy, proponents of GDT would be better suited to explore what actually transpires within the politics of globalisation.

3.3 Elites, Capital and Politics: Why everyone needs some Neo-Marxist friends

This trend of GDT's embrace of a paradoxical ontology stifling engagement with potentially enlightening or competing research on the politics of globalisation is also reflected on the issues of elites and their adherence to the tenets of Neo-Liberal globalisation. As pointed out above, both strands of GDT highlight the nation state as a key vehicle for the enactment of global democracy whilst simultaneously claiming that the elites of nation states and the international institutors engendered by nation states have internalised Neo-Liberal globalisation's policy objectives. However, as also outlined above, advocates of GDT ultimately fail to provide any real evidence that the present it narrates is in the process of becoming the future it wishes to come to fruition. Moreover, other than pointing to its results (priority of economy over environment, poverty, income inequality), such writers fail to shed light on why Neo-Liberal globalisation is hegemonic and how this then impacts on the cause of global democracy.

In contrast, Neo-Marxists, such as David Harvey (2005: 152), argue that Neo-Liberal globalisations and its implementation by political elites was not simply an uptake of an erroneous economic theory or the pursuit of a false utopia of economic growth but actually a 'class project' of restoring or reconstituting ruling class power and profit. We have already
seen how the advent of Neo-Liberalism has seen an increase in income for the top 1% and in income inequality, but this leaves out the fact that embedded liberalism resulted in a ‘Great Compression’ of the share of the top few percentiles of the US and UK income distributions. As Wade outlines, in the US for example:

‘...the income share of the top 1% fell from a peak of 23% in 1929 to about 8% in 1970, and stayed at around 9–10% through the 1970s, while the middle three quintiles experienced the biggest income growth. The hidden agenda of the Reagan/Thatcher revolution was to reverse this ‘Great Compression’ and allow income and wealth to be restored to their rightful owners at the top—combining market liberalisation with an array of state measures which had the effect, intended and unintended, of intensifying redistribution upwards’ (2009b: 541).

From a Neo-Marxist point of view, Neo-Liberal globalisation is essentially a class project which restored the share of income of the top 1% in capitalist countries but also remoulded this class by shifting power from manufacturing to finance and information technology capital. In the UK, for example, Harvey points out that the Thatcher government facilitated an attack on the aristocratic traditions that dominated The City, military, and the judiciary and replaced them with the ‘brash entrepreneurs and the nouveaux riches’ such as Branson, Soros, and Lord Hanson. And, as similar processes have taken place in various countries around the world, Harvey believes there has been a consequent formation of a transnational set of elites, within business and politics and within and outside the West, who share similar economic worldviews (Harvey 2005: 31-38).

Hardt and Negri push the Neo-Marxist argument further by suggesting transnational elites, who occupy positions as leaders of ‘major corporations’ negotiate with elites within
'dominant nation states' and the elite bureaucrats of supranational institutions (IMF, WB, WTO) to maintain and perpetuate such a project. The institutional relationships of the nation state and global levels of political and economic control do not conflict but form the institutional relationships of an 'Empire' of global capital. In this sense, the nation-state now finds its jurisdiction and authority is undermined and transformed by both a process of 'denationalisation', where state policy looks to enforce the Neo-Liberal globalisation and the transnational corporations and supranational bodies open the nation state up to flows of global capital (Hardt and Negri 2004: 162-68). This can be seen for example at places such as the World Economic Forum in Davos, which brings home the fact that 'business, bureaucratic, and political elites are certainly no strangers' and that the 'same few individuals so often pass effortlessly from the highest government offices to corporate boardrooms and back in the course of their careers.' (Hardt and Negri 2004: 168).

The Neo-Marxist account of political elites and their role in perpetuation of Neo-Liberal globalisation may look quite similar to the narration of political elites offered by writers such as David Held. Both sets of writers argue that political elites have internalised the policy objectives of Neo-Liberal globalisation. And both sets of writers also argue that modern state sovereignty has been usurped as the underlying drivers of globalisation and Neo-liberalism bring about the deterritorialization of political authority and sovereignty away from the nation state and subsequent reterritorialization of such power beyond the nation state to include global market forces and undemocratic networks of global governance (Hardt and Negri 2000: xi, 307).

However, the claim of the Neo-Marxists goes beyond the account of writers such as David Held because it offers a reason and narrative for exactly why Neo-Liberal globalisation has
assumed hegemony and the impact of such a process on any future politics. Rather than simply suggesting that Neo-Liberal globalisation is problematic because it has been internalised by elites, suggesting the problem is the hegemony of an erroneous economic theory, Neo-Marxists suggest that Neo-Liberalism is part of a class project of national and transnational elites to maintain and perpetuate unequal class relationships and to redistribute wealth and income.

One does not need to buy fully into the narrative of Neo-Marxism to consider how even a hint of truth to such claims would open up more questions and avenues for research concerning global democracy and the hegemony of Neo-Liberalism. In light of such claims about elites we can ask how political and business elites within nation states interpret the ideal of extending democracy globally? Does the link between politics and big business, for example, mean that global democracy is seen as a friend or foe to the priority of capital? And how are practises associated with GDT (e.g. Tobin tax) articulated by political and business elites? Are they narrated in a positive or negative light? And does the perception of global democracy differ amongst elites across the developed/developing world divide? As Peter Evans (2008: 294-95) contends, for example, the ‘...elites that command state apparatuses, even in the poorest countries of the Global South, are also likely to be material beneficiaries of the global neo-liberal regime.’

In relation, we must also ask whether the deterritorialization of political authority and sovereignty away from the nation state and subsequent reterritorialization of such power beyond the nation state to include global market forces and undemocratic networks of global governance is simply an effect of Neo-Liberal globalisation or actually a new form of global form of ‘sovereignty’ which has been created ad hoc to manage the global market
and circuits of production in its interests of global capital (Hardt and Negri 2000: xi, 307 cf. Gill 2008). If the latter has an element of truth to it, for instance, the absence of global democracy in the present, which so bemuses proponents of global democracy, becomes far easier to explain and the chances of global democracy in the future becomes a far less tangible reality. Again, proponents of GDT would be better suited to explore what actually animates the politics of globalisation in the first place rather than simply pontificating about some of its machinations.

3.4 Plutocracy

The reflection above on the nature of elites both within and beyond the nation state also reveals the lack of attention paid by advocates of global democracy towards the interplay between national and international spheres of politics. As pointed out in the last chapter and above, the method by which GDT gets around the issue of the so called collapse of modern sovereignty is for nation states to consolidate their losses together. Nation states and their political elites pooling their resources and collaborating with another, with some cajoling by global civil society, are said to be key to remoulding (Cosmopolitan Democracy/Cosmopolitan Republicanism) or regulating (Transnational Discursive Democracy) the international system of politics and the global economy in far more just and democratic ways. Advocates of GDT, however, seem to simply infer that the remit of global civil society or the deliberation of a transnational public sphere would supersede the priority of the national public sphere or conceptions of the national interest. Yet, as highlighted above, the very evidence such writers uncover, reveals that global civil society is stratified and that collaboration and cooperation is failing to take place amongst nation states. Due to their embrace of ontology of paradox, writers associated with GDT therefore pay little heed to
how the relationship between national and international arenas of politics affects such a process.

As highlighted above, the Neo-Marxist response to how the relationships between national or international arenas of politics affects global democracy would simply centre on the role of elites and the class project of redistributing wealth and income upwards. What this presupposes is that the political institutions of the nation state and the international institutions are not only under the hegemony of Neo-Liberalism but that such hegemonic influence is constantly being perpetuated. Again, one does not have to buy into the Neo-Marxist belief of a ruling class to believe that certain income groups would favour certain policies over others and then use their resources to gain influences over government policy. For instance, financial journalist Robert Peston, who is far from being any kind of Marxist, argues that democracy has essentially been put up for ‘sale’ and whether through the direct sponsorship of politicians and parties or through the acquisition of media businesses ‘the voices of the super-wealthy are heard by politicians well above the babble of the crowd...’ (2009: 346).

American Political Scientist Martin Gilens (2012a, 2012b) takes this argument further by suggesting that if democracy is the ability of all citizens, taking into account disparities such as time, knowledge or interest, to have a relatively equal influence over the polices their government adopts, then current American democracy is skewed by economic inequality. Departing, however, from simply looking at the influence of 99th or 99.9th income percentile of the super-wealthy, Gilens turns towards examining the influence of the 90th income percentile and the group he denotes as the ‘affluent’ vis-à-vis the middle class (50th income percentile) and poor (10th income percentile) (Gilens, 2012a: Ch. 8). On the whole, Gilens
suggest that Americans, both rich and poor, often agree on government policy such as foreign military campaigns, The War on Drugs and across the board federal income tax increases. However, as he points out:

‘When preferences diverge, the views of the affluent make a big difference, while support among the middle class and the poor has almost no relationship to policy outcomes. Policies favoured by 20 percent of affluent Americans, for example, have about a one-in-five chance of being adopted, while policies favoured by 80 percent of affluent Americans are adopted about half the time. In contrast, the support or opposition of the poor or the middle class has no impact on a policy’s prospects of being adopted... These patterns play out across numerous policy issues. American trade policy, for example, has become far less protectionist since the 1970s, in line with the positions of the affluent but in opposition to those of the poor. Similarly, income taxes have become less progressive over the past decades and corporate regulations have been loosened in a wide range of industries.’ (2012b)

Gilens goes on to suggest that the most straight-forward explanation for such a representational inequality in terms of policy outcomes is the fact that the affluent are more likely to vote, volunteer in political campaigns and to make large political donations than their less well off counterparts. Low-income citizens are less likely to vote, have lower rates of voting and volunteering, whilst the middle class have modest differences with the exception of being unable to replicate the large political donations of the affluent. The underlying argument here being that the ability to make large political donations in tandem with the greater political engagement of the affluent, although sometimes tempered by the
ability of low income groups (labour organisations) or religious groups to mobilize large numbers of volunteers, gives the affluent more sway over policy outcomes. Indeed, Gilens suggest that cross-alliances do not dent the influence of the affluent, as even when middle class policy preferences align with the poor, the influence of the affluent remains strong (Gilens 2012a: 239 cf. 2012b).

The work cited above is useful to an exploration of the current state and future potential of global democracy because the influence of the affluent and poor on domestic politics has a knock on effect on international politics. For example, Gilens (2012b) highlights how, in contrast to the affluent, the poor and middle classes have been united in opposing free trade agreements such as NAFTA and the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade but that the reality is that ‘...the affluent few have gotten what they want.’ In turn, whilst affluent Americans largely support free-trade policies such as NAFTA and the GATT, they are also supportive of non-military aid to developing countries. On the other hand, the American poor are constantly opposed to all these aspects of foreign policy (Gillen 2012: 107-08).

Contra Neo-Marxism and in answer to some of questions outlaid by Rodrik’s political trilema of the world economy, Gilens’ findings suggest that it is not just political and business elites but also the nature of nation state politics and hegemony of many of the facets of Neo-Liberalism (e.g. free trade) amongst the affluent, which makes Neo-Liberal globalisation policy’s regime hegemonic. The question, then becomes, how does the dominance of the affluent in policy formation affect international politics and the ideals of global democracy? Surely the favouring of policies such as NAFTA, lower corporate tax and deregulation by the affluent would conflict with the extension of global democracy akin to say Cosmopolitan Democracy.
Nonetheless, this should not be confused with simply class politics where the affluent are demonised and other groups valorised. As Gillen’s work reveals, the poor, as sections of the nation state who have benefited the least under Neo-Liberal globalisation at a national level and who you might take to be predisposed to change, actually oppose policies (foreign aid) associated with global democracy. This buttresses Rodrik’s point about domestic politics ‘wining out eventually’ and highlights an economic and political nationalism that can arise in response to the effects of Neo-Liberal globalisation. For instance, a BBC World Service Poll (2008) revealed that citizens within highly developed countries, such as France, Germany Spain, South Korea and Japan and to a lesser extent the US and UK, found economic globalisation to be occurring too quickly and that the national economy was unfair as a consequence. The obvious point to ask is whether such backlashes against economic globalisation are prone to eliciting anti-internationalism amongst some citizens of nation states? If so, how does this then impact on the ideals and potential of global democracy? Do national elites, for example, play on such ideals of economic and political nationalism to maintain the status quo within the nation state? And if so how does this translate on an international stage?

Such evidence and the unanswered questions they evoke bring home the fact that advocates of global democracy have only scratched the surface as to how national politics affects the international dimensions of politics and the cause of global democracy. Gillen’s work for example highlights that economic inequality, which has widened during the era of Neo-Liberal globalisation, fundamentally weakens the ability of nation state democracy to actually live up to the tenets of democratic representation. And by looking at such issues in
tandem with the reflections of Rodrik, we can see that such a state of representational inequality can actually lead to an anti-internationalist nationalism.

This is to say nothing of the divide that exists between developed and developing worlds and their polities when it comes to the issue of economic globalisation. In the same BBC World Service Poll (2008), citizens within countries such as the Philippines, Brazil, Kenya, Mexico and Indonesia, whilst recognising the structural inequality of their economy, actually took economic globalisation to be growing too slowly and argued that it should be sped up. Again this seems to buttress Rodrik's point that the world's polity is largely fractured on such issues and opens up questions about the fate of global democracy within such an environment.

3.5 Depoliticalisation

Finally, such discourse on the interrelation of nation state and international politics must take into consideration political disenchantment and apathy within nation state politics. As pointed out above, in the American context, low income citizens are less likely to be involved with formal political engagement. Pushing this argument further, work by writers such as Hay (2007: 14-15), reveals that across the board in advanced capitalist countries political engagement via electoral turnout has fallen. However, Hay points to the fact that it is within those countries that have embraced Neo-Liberal Globalisation, such as the US, UK and New Zealand, where the decline in voter turnout has been most prominent. Rejecting the wholesale explanation of such a political disenchantment and apathy by 'demand side' explanations such as Putnam (2000), which argue that a decline in social capital and the breakdown of community explains such political disengagement, Hay (2007: 55) argues for a
greater look at the ‘supply side’ of the process and the changes in the political ‘goods’ being offered to ‘consumers’ within the electorate.

The crux of Hay’s argument, much like those embraced by advocates of global democracy, is that national political elites have internalised the logic of Neo-Liberalism. Moreover, as pointed out in chapter 1, the hegemony of Neo-Liberalism amongst both its traditional home of the Right and its new home of Third Way governments has seen national elites embrace the idea that they must earn global market confidence and trade and capital flows through actually removing the state’s role in economic policy-making bodies (central banks, fiscal authorities, regulators), what we would normally dub public services (energy, railways, social insurance) and allowing the market to determine issues such as corporate tax levels.

Hay argues that this process has seen the ‘depoliticisation’ of previously highly political areas of policy (interest rates, pay settlements, labour law, tax regimes) and led to national politicians not only doubting their ability to govern in the face of Neo-Liberal globalisation but also facilitated the shift of political power to other non-democratic sites of power (central banks, supranational institutions).

The knock on effect, argues Hay, is that citizens have come to see the political goods being supplied to them by formal politics as being incapable of actually providing democratic representation. As Hay sums up, the hegemony of Neo-Liberal globalisation amongst elites:

‘... has served to unleash a tide of depoliticising dynamics as policy-makers have, effectively, questioned their integrity, their professional competence and their capacity to make policy – and have off-loaded their responsibilities to others in the process. When our political elites seem to hold such pessimistic assumption about their competence, credibility and autonomy, is it any wonder that as citizens of the
polities they serve we have come to share in their crisis of political confidence and competence? Is it any wonder that we participate in formal political processes increasingly reluctantly and, in ever smaller numbers?' (Hay 2007: 151).

Hay's narrative of political disenchantment and apathy fills in the blanks as to the political effects of the hegemony of Neo-Liberalism amongst political elites and politics of the nation state. But Hay's narration of political disengagement also has implications for any aspiration of global democracy. In terms of reflecting on how political disenchantment and apathy within nation state politics impacts on the cause of global democracy we must return to the point that advocates of global democracy seem to pay little heed to how the relationship between national and international arenas of politics affect global democracy. In the paradoxical world of global democracy the main thrust of global democracy will be delivered by national politicians and global civil society but this seems to underplay that the 'nation' state is the unit being asked to carry out most of the work. However, we need to consider that nation state politicians are still national politicians and if their domestic constituencies are unable to hold them to account or push for more global democratic reform then it is unlikely to be a policy priority. And we have already seen above that groups within the nation state can actually embrace policy platforms that appear hostile to global democracy.

This also leads to further questions. What are the tangible consequences for nation state elites that global civil society can hold over national elites vis-à-vis a politically disenchanted national polity? And how does one interpret the rise of global civil society in the light of accounts of political disenchantment and apathy within nation state politics? In simple terms, the two accounts appear to contradict one another with a narrative of hyper political activity being contrasted with one of political disengagement. Writers such as Chandler
(2009 cf. 2010) push this contrast further by taking the rise of global civil society and global issues to be linked to the hegemonic ascent of Neo-Liberal globalisation on the right and centre left and the breakdown of democratic politics within the nation state.

The 'globalisation of politics' is taken by Chandler to be the '...reflection of a general disengagement from political struggle and a historically low level of political contestation' within the nation state. This has had a double effect, with the first being the ascendance of consumer style politics where the ‘...wearing of a pin or ribbon as an expression of solidarity or 'making one’s voice heard' at demonstrations, often reflects how ethical gestures’ have replaced political engagement with formal politics. The activists of global civil society who move from struggle to struggle are in Chandler's eyes indicative of ‘... the decline of representational forms of politics – which involved winning people to ideas or political platforms rather than just expressing one’s own awareness' and highlight how when political practice becomes ‘globalised’ it becomes ‘much more immediate and unmediated’ (2009: 541).

The second effect, Chandler argues, is that elites within national governments have welcomed the emergence of global issues, global social movements and the narration of the collapse of modern sovereignty because it allows the states to 'portray themselves to be activists at the global level and at the domestic level merely administrators or managers' (ibid., 542). This consequently allows elites an alibi about the enactment of Neo-Liberalism and the lack of representational politics at the global level:

‘Through globalising their political engagement, governments evade the accountabilities which come with representational politics, and radical critics can similarly evade the need for representational legitimacy. A global problem cannot,
by definition, be solved by a particular government: it is held to be beyond sovereign power, political responsibility and accountability. There is no global government, no institutionalised political authority, that claims responsibility for formulating policy or for its implementation, or which can become a strategic object of global resistance’ (ibid., 541).

The globalisation of politics and the clamour for global democracy is therefore counterintuitive because it serves as an ‘ideological’ mask for the very reason why such global democracy is not forthcoming. Chandler suggests that it is therefore no surprise that without a revitalised national democracy, global politics is based on weak foundations of accountability, where underneath the rhetoric of global values and global struggles we uncover a lack of policy clarity and political engagement. Once more, one does not accept all of this narrative to point to avenues of research opened up by such claims. Quite simply, there is a perpetual question of how the apparent political disenchantment and apathy within nation state politics affects the cause of global democracy?

3.6 What to do next? Two Roads

Ultimately, it is the bizarre ontological split personality of theories of global democracy, rather than their omissions, which prevents them from interacting with such research and also providing a more accurate picture of the chances of greater global democracy and the current state of the politics of globalisation. To make advances we must not fall into the same trap of embracing an ontology of paradox; regardless of our conviction about the need of global democracy. I thus believe there are two options open to us.
As a first step toward resolving these problems, we can attempt to do what the proponents of global democracy do not do and empirically explore, both synchronically and diachronically, the relationship between arenas such as global civil society, the transnational public sphere and nation state politics, to provide a richer understanding of the status of global democracy and the current politics of globalisation. One can find valuable additions to such empirical knowledge in the work of Brassett (2009), Della Porta et al. (2009), Smith (2008), Tarrow (2005, 2011) and Tilly and Wood (2009) who examine the interplay between global civil society, transnational social movements and the politics of nation states. Whilst this work is incredibly valuable and this study is indebted to it, as a second step on the road I believe best to travel I suggest we should not only attempt the analysis of the present but also attempt to gain greater historical and theoretical insight into the nature of the politics of globalisation. To this end in the next three chapters I shall examine the work of John Dewey and his neglected insights about the nature of democracy, publics and globalisation. The aim of such exposition being the very uncovering of a more refined historical and theoretical framework from which we can empirically explore the politics of globalisation.
Part Two: Dewey and Globalisation: The Problem of Global Publics

Within this part of the study I aim to highlight how the central contention of John Dewey’s work within *The Public and its Problems* (1927), which revolves around an evolutionary form of democracy in response to a rapidly globalising economy, has not been fully appreciated by contemporary scholars. Moreover, I shall argue that the central contention of Dewey’s *The Public and its Problems*, serves not only as a timely rejoinder - *avant la lettre* - to GDT but also offers important insights into the future examination of globalisation. To accomplish this, this part of the study will consist of three chapters. In chapter 4, I shall highlight the context of *The Public and its Problems*, returning to the 1920’s debate about the utility of democracy as a form of governance. This will include an examination of Dewey’s response to Democratic Realism’s challenge towards democracy within America and his outlining of his own conception of ‘creative democracy’.

Following on, chapter 5 will examine how Dewey’s narration of the impacts of the Great Society on democratic praxis, which are initially sketched out in *The Public and its Problems* and subsequently reflected and elaborated upon in his work until his death, centre on issues of globalisation and the possibility of a global community and political praxis. Here, I shall argue that Dewey’s arguments concerning the nature of publics and their relationship to democracy, too often narrated around nation-state politics, actually raise issues that not only force us to revise the debates about the politics of globalisation but also the very possibility of global politics in the first place. In chapter 6, I shall reflect on the Deweyan lessons handed down for 21st observers and advocates of global democracy. Ultimately, the chapter will contend that the nature, political efficacy or viability of any conception of global democracy can only be adequately gauged by firstly revisiting and confronting Deweyan
concerns about the nature, political efficacy and viability of publics and their relation to the practice of democracy both nationally and internationally.

Chapter 4: Creative Democracy

4.1 Unfashionable Democracy

Fashion! Turn to the Left
Fashion! Turn to Right
We are the goon squad
And we’re coming to town
Beep, Beep - David Bowie, Fashion

When Dewey published The Public and its Problems in 1927 the lyrics of David Bowie’s Fashion would have served as an excellent soundtrack to the political climate. Democracy had become an unfashionable aspiration, with populations in Europe beginning to turn to the extreme Left and Right for their political settlements. In Russia the October Revolution was nearly ten years old, in Italy Mussolini had been in power for 3 years and in Germany both volumes of Mein Kampf had been published. At home in the USA, even the merits of pretence of a democracy in the country had come under attack. The catalyst for this attack on America’s democracy revolved around the dissipation of the post World War One optimism for reconstructing America in fairer and more just terms. As James Kloppenberg points out, whilst Progressives put forward reforms for economic justice and fairness, such

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32 In case there is another pedantic Bowie fan, other than myself, reading this I am quite aware that the theme of Fashion’s lyrics was not the re-emergence of political fascism in the UK in the 1980’s but rather the ‘style fascism’ that dominated that era. Dare I say it, however, the misinterpretation of the lyrics probably makes for a better interpretation of the song!

33 I say pretence because America in 1927 cannot be deemed a full democracy in the normal liberal sense—because most of its African American population did not possess the ability to participate fully in civil or political life. America only becomes a full liberal democracy in 1965 with the passing of the Voting Rights Act, which built on the Civil Rights Act of 1964, to stop racist inspired literacy tests and poll taxes preventing African American citizens from taking up their right to vote.
reforms were 'strangled' by older patterns of thought and behaviour that re-emerged in the climate of revolution (Kloppenberg, 1986). The breakdown of this optimism amongst American progressives in turn gave way to the rise of trenchant intellectual critiques of the suitability of democratic government for 1920's America. These critiques of the suitability of democratic government, conducted by American political scientists and commentators, formed what became known as 'democratic realism'. And by the 1930's the paradigm had become near hegemonic in American Social Science (Westbrook, 1991: 281-86).

The main charge of democratic realism against democracy was that democracy in its then current form was unable to provide a stable or efficient government for advanced industrial societies. For democratic realism the institutions of democratic government, which were based on democracy's core beliefs in the capacity of all people for rational political action and the belief in the maximising of civic participation in public life, were in fact counterproductive to good government in industrial societies (Westbrook, 1991: 281-82). The main articulation of this position was to be found in the work of Walter Lippmann and his two treatises against standard liberal thought - *Public Opinion* (1922) and *The Phantom Public* (1925). Within these works, Lippmann puts forward the idea that 1920's America had entered into The Great Society, which made the core beliefs of democracy unrealisable.

The concept of The Great Society, adapted by both Lippmann and latterly Dewey from Graham Wallas' (1914) book of the same name, was essentially shorthand for the complex industrial and mass consumer society America had become post World War One. The end of the American Civil War had signalled that America would use its vast reserves of raw materials and land to become a continental nation state with an industrial economy rather
than being a decentralised federation of states with an agrarian economy. This process had seen America not only master the steam, coal and railway based technologies and industries of the First Industrial Revolution, but also become the leader of the Second Industrial Revolution of the late 19th century and early 20th century. This process saw the systematic application of science to the industrial process in the new oil, electricity and chemical based industries of automobiles, synthetic material production and the onset of consumer durables (Morris, 2011: 510; Friden 2006: 152; Lind, 2012: 5-10). The result was that, as early as 1914, the US economy, both in absolute figures and per capita terms, had overtaken Britain as the biggest economy in the world. And by 1919, due in part to the economic consequences of World War One, the US possessed more economic output than all of Europe combined (Kennedy, 1987: 242-244).

The Great Society, Dewey outlined, through its improvements in industrial production, travel and transportation (railways, cars), media (radio, newspapers) and communication (telegraph, telephone) not only eliminated distance as an economic and social factor but also created ‘interaction and interdependence’ on an unprecedented complex and wide scale (LW2: 307). In industry, for example, the new corporations of 1920’s America such as GM, Ford and General Electric did not just produce oligopolistic industries but had become vertically integrated entities. Such vertically integrated corporations and the widespread use of electricity, cheaper steel production, chemical industry and the advent of the assembly line thus delivered mass industrial production.

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34 This process was largely achieved through direct state intervention and the ‘infant industry’ protection devised by Alexander Hamilton and the use of high industrial tariffs. A practise that saw America enforce the highest industrial tariffs of any developed nation right up until 1945. See Chang (2003, 2007) and Lind (2012).
As a result, where as prior to 1890 manufacturing could be completed in small factories after 1890 the average plant size in industries such as automobiles increased immensely. For example, the average car plant in 1909 had around 200 workers and produced 10 cars per week; by 1929 this figure had turned into 1000 workers and more than 400 cars per week. This meant that although in 1929 there were fewer car plants than there had been in 1909 car production in 1929 (5.4 million) far outstripped the 1909 figure of 126,000 and the average American worker now produced ten times as many cars as in 1909 (Friden 2006: 61-63, 161).

The changes brought about by the move from an agrarian to an advanced capitalist society had essentially brought about massive changes in the day-to-day life of Americans. The revolution in corporate structure and industrial production, which saw consumer durables such as cars, radios and refrigerators become the driving force of economic growth, had seen the concomitant revolution of mass consumption. And as productivity soared the prices of consumer durables dropped. Ford's Model T, for example, reduced in price from $700 in 1910 to $350 in 1916 and by 1916 it took only six months for the average American to earn enough money to buy one. By 1929, Americans were driving some 26 million cars or trucks. And this is to say nothing of the 20 million phones installed by 1930, new public highways and railway lines, the advent of chain stores and modern advertising, radio set sales, electric stoves and heaters, consumer credit and the fact that by 1924 you could even buy sliced bread (Friden 2006: 62-63 155-72, Leuchtenburg 1993: 178-202).

For writers such as Lippmann the emergence of The Great Society created a far too complex industrial and corporate environment for a normal citizen to exercise rational political judgement about how such a society should be governed. The common citizen for Lippmann
was being driven along by industrial innovation and expertise that he could not grasp and was also distracted by mass consumption. As a result, modern citizens were incapable of grasping their immediate present, their own interests and essentially living in a world they 'cannot see, [do] not understand and [are] unable to direct' (Lippmann, 1925:4). The democratic goal of maximising all citizens civic participation in public life was thus simply 'bad only in the sense that it is bad for a fat man to try to be a ballet dancer' (Lippmann, 1925: 29). The only solution, argued Lippmann, was for normal citizens to give up the concept of self rule and move towards a system of elitism, whereby experts who are in a position to grasp the complexities of The Great Society would create and enact social policy. In this context, citizens would only play the role of siding with or against different elites, playing no role in policy formation and simply voting for the 'Ins when things are going well and the Outs when things are going badly' (Lippman, 1925: 126).

In Dewey's eyes the attacks upon democracy by Communism, Fascism and Democratic Realism were bound to fail miserably or end up in violence and bloodshed. Quite simply, democratic realism's quasi-Platonism and Communism's and Fascism's authoritarianism, which held experts or rulers as the only ones capable to enact polices that would be wise and beneficial to the common good of society, contradicted the historical record. The emergence and practise of democracy itself had shown that it is only through wide consultation and discussion that wider social needs and common goods are uncovered. As Dewey colourfully put it, the man '...who wears the shoe knows best that it pinches and

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35 For Dewey democratic realism represented a revival of the Platonic notion of Philosopher Kings, substituting the expert for the philosopher because 'philosophy has become something of a joke, while the image of the specialist, the expert in operation, is rendered familiar and congenial by the rise of the physical sciences and the conduct of industry' (LW2: 363).
where it pinches, even if the expert shoe maker is the best judge of how the trouble is to be remedied' (LW2:364).

To subsequently remove the input of the masses and leave government policy to an elite was to create an oligarchy closed off from knowledge of the needs which they were supposed to serve. Dewey therefore feared that rule by an elite group in which the masses could not express their needs would resemble an oligarchy managed in the interests of the few rather than the many. And as Dewey reminded his readers, such fears were not mere abstractions when history patently highlighted how the ‘...world has suffered more from leaders and authorities than from the so-called folly of masses (LW2: 365).

*The Public and its Problems* is best seen as attempting to walk along the path that Dewey believed the far Left and Right in Europe and democratic realism shed light upon but refused to travel: the contemporary problem of democracy within the Great Society. Moreover, Dewey sets himself the goal of answering the question that he believed Lippmann and others hastily skimmed over by rendering the masses innately incapable of civic organisation: Why is the contemporary Public seemingly unable to intelligently perform the tasks that democracy requires of them? To accomplish this, Dewey embarks upon two interrelated tasks within *The Public and it's Problems*. The first task involves Dewey reconstructing the concept of democracy as a form of ‘Creative Democracy’ which

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*Please note that although I shall primarily focus here on Dewey’s *The Public and its Problems* (LW2), when necessary I shall also utilize work that precedes and succeeds the aforementioned title. The reason for doing this, as noted by others such as Kadlec (2007:100) and Campbell (1995:147), revolves around the incremental appreciation of economics and politics that Dewey’s social philosophy exhibits from the roaring Twenties onward through the Great Depression in works such *Individualism Old and New* (LW5), *Liberalism and Social Action* (LW11), and the onset of World War Two *Freedom and Culture* (LW13). Indeed, Alex Honneth (1998) believes that *The Public and its Problems* marks a wholesale shift, whereby Dewey throws off his previous Hegelian shackles and finds a more coherent argument to justify democracy. Thus, despite his earlier political radicalism, *The Public and its Problems*, Dewey’s only work of formal political philosophy, marks a focal point to read both the past and future works of Dewey’s social philosophy back into.*
redefines the political concepts of the ‘state’, ‘public’, ‘government’ and ultimately ‘democracy’ itself. The second task, which we will examine in the next chapter, involves the examination of why the democracy of Dewey’s present within The Great Society bore a poor resemblance to his own vision of democracy as a way of life.

4.2 Problematic States and their problematic Publics: The futility of State Theory

The commencement of Dewey’s first task sees him return to the perennial question of what exactly democracy means as a concept? It was Dewey’s belief that the meaning of democracy and the justification for its practise had seemingly become lost in the hubris of democratic realism. In the journey to reconstruct and redefine the concept of democracy, Dewey initially returns to another, if not the most, perennial question of political philosophy: What is the origin and nature of the state? In reference to what he believed were prior flawed theories of the state, from the works of Aristotle through to and beyond Hegel, Dewey cautions his readers that the ‘moment we utter the words “The State” a score of intellectual ghosts rise to obscure of our vision’ (Dewey, LW2: 240).

This obfuscation, Dewey contended, arose because theories of the state resorted to mythological ‘state forming forces’ or ‘political instincts’ to explain the state and its functions. For example, Aristotle’s claim that man by nature is an animal that lives in a state, or Social Contract theorists’ claims that the state emerges after a pre-deposited fictional state of nature, tell us nothing about how actual states come into being or why states take on different forms at different points in history. Such theories merely repackaged the outcome of a given social process (Greek City State/ Liberal democracy) as its cause and reduplicated in ‘... a so called causal force the effects to be accounted for.’ Ultimately,
Dewey charged, such theories hold no more explanatory value than the statement that opium had sleep inducing effects because of its 'dormative powers' (Dewey, LW2: 240-41).

Following his dismissal of the explanatory value of prior theories of the state, Dewey begins his own analysis of politics - its institutional forms and practices - from the very empirical starting point he believes the aforementioned theories neglect: the history of human activity and its consequences (Dewey, LW2: 243). Building upon his prior engagement with Darwin's theory of evolution and the psychology of William James, Dewey puts forward an argument for the social nature of both the self and morality. The foundation of this argument is that like all objects within nature, human beings exist in an environment where 'conjoint, combined, associated action is a universal trait of the behaviour of things' (Dewey, LW2: 257). What we take to be human nature or what we take to be the human 'self' is said by Dewey not to be an immutable property or instinct which individuals then utilize to interact with their environment, but rather an entity which is produced as the outcome of the interaction of the human organism with its environment.37

This interaction of human organism with its environment takes place through what Dewey denotes as habits, which 'bind us to orderly and established ways of action' (Dewey, LW2:335).38 In this sense, habits are not simply recurrent or routine ways of behaving but

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37 Dewey's conception of individuality as not being originally given but constructed under the influences of associated living is evident from his earliest writings (EW1:48-49), but finds its most sustained expression in his most sustained work on social psychology Human Nature and Conduct (MW14). For Dewey's own take on Darwin's influence on his philosophy see the essays in (MW4) and for an example of his take on the influence of William James see the essay 'The Vanishing Subject in the Psychology of James' (LW14: 155-167).

38 It should also be noted that Native biological instincts or impulses are not deemed by Dewey to be non-existent but rather dynamically interpreted and structured into ways of behaving with the environment through habits. For instance, the impulse of hunger does not ordinarily, except in situations of starvation, define the means of its pacification. Rather, the pacification of the impulse is determined through the ways (habits) humans have formed or found access to food in their environment (See MW14: Chapter 12).
rather acquired predispositions or modes of response, which generate ease, skill and interest when individuals interact with their environment:

'For we are given to thinking of a habit as simply a recurrent external mode of action, like smoking or swearing, being neat or negligent in clothes and person, taking exercise or playing games. But habit reaches even more significantly down into the very structure of the self; it signifies a building up of and solidifying of certain desires; an increased sensitiveness and responsiveness to certain stimuli, a confirmed or impaired capacity to attend to and think about certain things. Habit covers in other words the very make up of desire, intent, choice, disposition which gives an act its voluntary quality' (Dewey, LW7:170-71).

The important point to consider here, however, is that we do not simply create our habits out of thin air, but rather acquire and learn our habits from what Dewey calls 'social customs'. Much like the language we speak, individuals inherit and form their personal moral habits from the uniformities, habits, or set ways of conduct of the respective social groups they are born into or are associated with throughout their lives. From birth onwards individuals find that established social customs, which saturate such habits with meaning, are taught and transmitted to them through the associated life they have with other humans (Dewey, MW14: 43-52). As Dewey points out, the sailor, miner, fisherman and farmer think about their actions, but their thoughts fall within the framework of accustomed occupations and social relations. In Dewey's eyes, then, what an individual actually is as a self, that is, how an individual thinks and acts, is ultimately dependent upon the nature and movement of their associated life (Dewey, LW5: 275).
It may be tempting to think from the above that Dewey assigns priority of society over the individual; that the individual is only an expression of society. However, Dewey's point is that the human self is produced through pre-existent associations and the social customs of other humans not society on large (Dewey, M14:44 cf. Gouinlock 1972:105-106). This does not discount that social customs can stretch across society but such a subtle distinction highlights how societies are not uniform but rather pluralistic entities structured through what Dewey calls a 'Cultural Matrix.'

This is fleshed out in Dewey's statement that:

'Society is one word, but many things. Men associate together is all kinds of ways and for all kinds of purposes. One man is concerned in a multitude of diverse groups, in which his associates may be quite different. It often seems as if they had nothing in common except that they are modes of associated life. Within every larger social organisation there are numerous minor groups; not only political subdivisions but industrial, scientific, religious, associations. There are political parties with differing aims, social sets, cliques, gangs, corporations, partnerships, groups bound closely together by ties of blood, and so in endless variety. In many modern states, and in some ancient, there is great diversity of populations, of varying languages, religions, moral codes and traditions. From this standpoint, many a modern political units one of large cities for example, is a congeries of loosely associated societies rather than an inclusive and permeating community of action and thought.'

The idea of a 'cultural matrix' corresponds to a society's socio-economic, technological and intellectual (religion/science/philosophy/politics) practices, which determine the associative

39 The conception of cultural matrix being utilised here originates from Experience and Nature (LW1) and not The Public and its Problems but is assumptions are easily found throughout it and Dewey's work in general.
relations (occupations, family structures, and geographical links) and the meanings (habits/customs) attached to those associated relations by various social groups. Thus, at any given synchronic moment within a cultural matrix there exist individuals and groups who share different associated relations and different habits and different social customs. Indeed, Dewey suggests, that the more complex a cultural matrix of a society, the more likely it is to include individuals who possess habits, which are informed by differing or even conflicting patterns of social customs (Dewey, MW14: 90).

The ability of a society’s cultural matrix to produce groups with different or even conflicting habits and social customs revealed for Dewey that morality, when taken as defining acceptable parameters of both individual behaviour and behaviour between individuals and groups within society, is also a socially determined activity. Whilst all humans form associations with and are formed by associations (habits/social customs) with natural objects and other humans beings within a cultural matrix; it is also the case that all human action has possible consequences for other natural objects and other human beings who share in association or who inhabit the same society:

‘Some activity proceeds from a man; then it sets up reaction in the surroundings. Others approve, disapprove, protest, encourage, share and resist... Conduct is always shared; this is the difference between it and physiological process. It is not an ethical “ought” that conduct should be social. It is social, whether good or bad’ (Dewey, MW14:16).

Importantly, however, Dewey contends that what separates human associations from that of natural objects such as assemblies of electrons, unions of trees, swarm of insects, herds
of sheep or constellations of stars, is the ability of humanity to intelligently perceive, reflect upon and subsequently plan to secure certain consequences and avoid others (Dewey, LW2: 243 cf., 250, 257). This ability of humans to intelligently perceive the consequences of associated action is structured around two kinds of consequences: those which affect individuals directly engaged in a transaction of associated behaviour and those that indirectly affect individuals beyond those immediately concerned in the transaction.

Within this distinction, Dewey finds the germ of the distinction between conceptions of private and public transactions. Transactions where the consequences of action were confined, or thought to be predominantly confined, to those directly engaged in such associative behaviour were said to be private. Transactions where the consequences are perceived to be extensive, enduring and serious for persons beyond those immediately engaged in such transactions were said to be of a public disposition. However, Dewey refines his position further by stating that this distinction was ultimately drawn on the scope and extent to which consequences were deemed important by a society to warrant control, whether through inhibition or promotion. In essence, all private transactions of associative behaviour have the propensity to become public when they are perceived to have extensive, enduring and serious consequences for others beyond those directly engaged in them. As such, there is no domain of activities that is intrinsically private (Dewey, LW2: 243-45 c.f. 252-53).  

There are many private associations, such as those within the family, which as a society we deem necessary for public bodies to intervene in (e.g. social/child services). Commentators such as Gouinlock (LW2: xxv) therefore argue that Dewey would have been better off speaking of the problem of regulating the adverse consequences of social behaviour per se. However, as outlined above Dewey does this and more by acknowledging that the very definition of public and private is historically relative, open to contestation and ultimately defined by those within a society. In short, Dewey's position leads us to constantly question the presentation of the Public and Private; especially any presentation of the Public and Private as historically static and mutually exclusive spheres.
It is within the distinction between private and public transactions that Dewey finds the key to the origins of the ‘nature and office of the state’, arguing that the perception of public transactions leads to emergence of what he calls a ‘Public’ and subsequently the founding of a state. In Dewey’s sense of the term, a public comes into existence when persons, having become conscious of and sufficiently affected by the consequences of associative behaviour (habits) to deem it unacceptable, form a collective group or movement with a common interest in having such consequences systematically controlled or cared for (Dewey, LW2: 245, cf., 52-53, 260). However, such a public faces a dilemma due to the fact that the very consequences that call forth a public expand beyond those directly engaged in such associative behaviour.

The regulation of such consequences cannot be conducted by the primary groupings involved in the respective associative behaviour in the first place (although self-organisation by a group to regulate its activities is also an important phenomenon). Consequently, in organising themselves to deal with such indirect consequences such a public creates special agencies and appoints officials such as legislators, judges and executives (which might include members of a public acting as citizens) to regulate behaviour and protect (through laws, rights and establishment of practises) their interests. These officials and special agencies, argues Dewey, are what we nominally call government and help bring forth a state. However, as Dewey is at pains to point out, the state does not solely consist of the inaugurating of government or the rise of a public but rather the state is the political organisation of the public through government:

'The lasting, extensive and serious consequences of associated activity bring into existence a public. In Itself it is unorganised and formless. By means of officials and
their special powers it becomes a state. A public articulated and operating through representative officers is a state; there is no state without a government but also there is none without a public’ (Dewey, LW2: 277 cf. 245-57, 260).

The central premise of Dewey’s conception of the state is its foregoing of any philosophical attempt to find the true nature or essence of the state in order to embrace an anti-essentialist view of the state. In this sense, Dewey argues that after the formation of a state through the political organisation of a public, its functions (governmental practises, parameters and composition) are themselves prone to changing in character and tone due to the changing historical conditions of associative behaviour and the rise of new publics. In simple terms, Dewey argues that the state possesses a historical relativity of form and function rather than a static and enduring nature

The reason for this historical relativity of state form and function, Dewey stressed, involved the fact that the consequences of associative behaviour are linked to a society's cultural matrix and the historical propensity for the properties of a society's cultural matrix to change (Dewey, LW2: 263). A cultural matrix, Dewey contends, is itself always open and prone to change due to socio-economic and technological transformation, migration, exploration or wars that modify pre-existing associations or create new associations (habits/customs) and consequences altogether. At the same time, the very perception or meaning attached to the consequences of associated behaviour and the best methods to

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41 Although Dewey’s uses the terms publics, state and government he points out that these terms do not then necessarily shackle these terms to modern conceptions of the nation state. As Dewey (LW2: 276n7) points out ‘the text is concerned with modern conditions, but the hypothesis propounded is meant to hold good generally.’ The terms state, government and officer are therefore freely used by Dewey to denote functions rather than elements distinct to the modern state and could feasibly used in other contexts. As I shall show in character 6, however, this did not mean that Dewey did not see the historically shackles the nation state seemed to place on publics and how they went about reforming government and the state.
deal with such consequences can itself shift in terms of a change in intellectual habits. For instance, scientific discoveries or the emergence of a new political paradigm may radically alter how people approach the consequences of associated behaviour (Dewey, LW2: 263-65 cf. 254-55, 278-29). On the back of this, Dewey stresses that changes in a cultural matrix, what we can also call societal change, is a historical fact, which injects perpetual and potentially revolutionary change in multifarious and different marks of intensities across the various relations of associative behaviour within a society (Dewey, LW11: 41).42

Concurrently, Dewey’s concept of a public does not denote a static and homogenous body of people but rather plural and ever-changing publics brought into existence in reaction to changes in a society’s cultural matrix and the consequences of associated behaviour.43 On a synchronic level, publics are plural, ranging in size, strength and interests due the variety of associations, habits and social customs a cultural matrix puts into practise and the perceptions of consequences a cultural matrix provides (Dewey, LW2:254-55). For instance, if one considers issues such as animal rights, immigration, homosexuality, women’s equality or welfare provision, it is clear that at any one moment in time there are potentially multiple publics with their own agendas and interests, who may or may not support another public’s cause.

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42 As we shall see, Dewey believes that the rate of change in cultural matrix in industrial/capitalist based societies is far more pronounced than prior the agrarian societies that preceded it. However, the important point here is that Dewey highlights how social change is often differentiated, in its form and intensity, across different relations of associative behaviour (family, school, church, the school, science, art, and economic and political relations) rather than mono-causally across the whole of society.

43 As Westbrook (1991: 305) notes, Dewey’s use of the ‘...definite and indefinite articles tended to obscure his contention that in any given society the Public was, at most, a collective noun designating plural publics that concerned themselves with the indirect consequences of particular forms of associated activity.’
A person may belong to many different publics, based on how they are subjected to or perceive the consequences of associative behaviour. No two publics are therefore likely to ever have the exact same membership but a public may possibly possess members from other publics (Goiunlock in Dewey, LW2: xxvi-xxvii). In turn, because publics are differentiated by the associative behaviour invoked by the contours of material culture, publics may even be constructed in response to other publics. It is quite often the case, for example, that some publics hold interests and ideas of how the state could manage such interests, which other publics may find inherently unreasonable or even dangerous because they conflict with their own interests and values. Consequently, there is, Dewey stresses, often room for dispute or conflict between the interests of differing publics (Dewey, LW2: 275, 354 cf. LW11: 56).

On a diachronic level, publics also come into existence and pass out of existence in response to the variety of associations a cultural matrix puts into practise and the perceptions of consequences a material culture provides. Publics may not only continue on from and modify the interests from where previous publics left off (e.g. religious/socialist/feminist movements) but may be entirely original movements whose values and interests differ markedly from publics that precede them. All publics, however, emerge within a strategic context where the state and its institutions of government bear the hallmarks of the interests of previous publics. For example, new publics engendered by new conditions in material culture have often found that their inherited institutions, beliefs and traditions of government, which reflect the interest of older publics, suffer from a cultural ‘lag’ and are unfit to meet their needs (Dewey, LW2: 255 cf. LW13: 97, LW11: 54, LW12: 82-83).
New publics will therefore often seek to modify the institutions and officials of government to suit their present interests and consequently modify the nature and functions of the state (Dewey, LW2: 255). This may itself include fundamentally changing the nature and functions of a state as it has been laid down by previous publics, such as those that founded the state in the first place. In turn, the modification of the state’s institutions of government, through changing the nature of associative behaviour and creating new forms of cultural norms and values, will affect and modify a society’s cultural matrix and subsequently provide a new cultural matrix (consequences/perceptions of associative behaviour) for the possible emergence of future publics.

In light of the perpetual propensity of a cultural matrix to change and call forth synchronically and diachronically differentiated publics, then, Dewey declares that the state is a historically relative entity whose functions were ‘ever something to be scrutinized, investigated, and searched for’ and hence remade and reorganised in reaction to the conditions of culture (Dewey, LW2: 255). Dewey sums up his historicist view of the state by propounding that:

‘The consequences vary with concrete conditions; hence at one time and place a large measure of state action may be indicated and at another time a policy of quiescence and laissez-faire. Just as publics and states vary with conditions of time and place, so do the concrete functions which should be carried on by states. There is no antecedent universal proposition which can be laid down because of which the

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44 It should be noted here that ‘new’ public in this context does not necessarily mean that the consequences of associated behaviour in question here are newly created by changes in material aspects of a cultural matrix. It is quite possible for a new public to emerge in response to a change in the cultural foundations, which facilitate a new perception of long established relations of associative behaviour. It also possible that a new public may newly reflect the interests of previous older publics who were themselves marginalised or whose grievances were deemed unworthy for public control via government.
functions of the state should be limited or should be expanded. Their scope is something to be critically and experimentally determined.’ (LW2: 281)

Concluding his examination of the state, Dewey argues that the philosophical preoccupation with an all encompassing theory of the state’s nature had always been a mirage of a goal in the first place. In provisional terms, whilst one could declare rudimentarily that the state was the political organisation of the public via government and that such arrangements had certain historical traits of function, ultimately ‘...what the public may be, what the officials are, how adequately they perform their function, are things we have to go to history to discover’ (Dewey, LW2: 253-256).45

4.3 The history of publics and the spectre of violence

The qualification that publics, government and consequently the state are historically relative properties, based on the movements of a society’s cultural matrix, is inherently the cornerstone of Dewey’s recasting of the meaning of democracy and the justification for its practise vis-à-vis other forms of political settlement. This gambit involves Dewey initially reminding his readers that historical relativity of the state meant examining the formation

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45 As Westbrook (1991: 303-305) points out, although Dewey seems to follow pluralism in regarding the state as secondary and functional in response to the interests publics it should be noted that he did not see the state as simply balancing the interests of publics. Moreover, Dewey backs the role states could take independent of direct public formation but on the basis that the government and their officers could take actions in the wider interest: ‘It is quite true that most states, after they have been brought into being, react upon the primary groupings. When a state is a good state, when the officers of the publics genuinely serve the public interests, the reflex effect is of great importance... A measure of a good state is the degree to which it relieves individuals from the waste and negative struggle and needless conflict and confesses upon him positive assurance and reinforcement in what he undertakes.’ (LW2: 280). Moreover, as we shall see below and in the next chapter, this form of state activism only becomes problematic for Dewey when it does not facilitate the ability of publics to democratically challenge or remodel the governments and state.
of statehood and its evolution in the messy reality of human history. Detached from an appreciation of history, it is quite easy to read Dewey's theory of a state being based on a functional logic of publics emerging and progressively altering the institutions and practises of government in response to the changing conditions of culture.

In this schema, the state's evolution would resemble the progressive role set out for it in Pluralist philosophy, whereby the state neutrally arbitrated and included the interests of differing publics, who have similar potential and resources for accessing and modifying the formation of government and state functions. Contra Pluralism's vision of state, however, Dewey pointed out that the very history that highlighted that states evolved via changes in the cultural matrix and the rise of publics, also brought home the fact that such an evolution did not necessarily guarantee the 'propriety or reasonableness' of the publics or the political acts, measures or systems which emerged from such a process (Dewey, LW2: 254).

For instance, Dewey highlights that the intellectual foundations (science/political ideologies) of a cultural matrix do not necessarily provide publics or governments with correct or just perceptions about associative behaviour. One has only to think about certain ideologies and subsequent government policies towards women, immigrants, non-whites, or homosexuals over the 18th, 19th and 20th centuries to see that the observation of the consequences of associated human behaviour is open to the same error and illusion as the perception of natural objects. The emergence of a public can also not be equated with an a priori expression of correctness or justness. As highlighted above, publics can emerge in response to other publics or often come into conflict with another due to incompatible interests. This process itself can lead to the emergence of illiberal or unreasonable publics. Again, one has
only to look to history to find how illiberal publics have shaped unjust state formations or even how what we today would call progressive publics, such as the ones that emerged to demand the abolition of New World Slavery and women's enfranchisement, were opposed by publics that demanded the status quo or even a heightening of illiberal practises. As a consequence, Dewey contends that mistaken prescriptions, based off such false observations or stemming from the wishes of illiberal publics, can consolidate themselves in laws and administrative policies of government creating retrogressive rather than progressive consequences (Dewey, LW2: 254).

The historical evidence that culture could facilitate incorrect perceptions of associative behaviour or even invoke illiberal publics served to underline for Dewey that publics have rarely been of equal standing in a society. The historical relativity of the state’s form revealed not only that other social groups precede the state, but that the state always exists as a ‘distinctive and restricted social interest’; an agency whose form and functions is set-up to meet the demands and protect the interests of specific publics within specific cultures at specific junctures in history (Dewey, LW2: 253-54). Historically not all publics, whether progressive or retrogressive, have been able gain access to the government and modify the nature and function of the state.

For example, although states are brought into existence via the emergence of a public there are often other publics that are excluded from forming government in the very act of founding a state. This process itself normally reflects socially stratified relations between groups within society at that juncture in history. And whilst the parameters of such social stratification may shift over time due to shifts in power, from say heredity lineage to
economic class, the power and prestige of government is nearly always held in esteem by dominant groups. The ability to gain access to the privileges of government has therefore often been distributed through birth into a dominant class, caste, race or gender rather than an ability to govern (Dewey, LW2: 254, 283-84). This has created circumstances throughout history, where various publics and their interests have found themselves excluded, often unjustly and to their detriment, from the very process of the state being rediscovered and remade over again in reaction to the conditions of culture.

Indeed, Dewey suggests that the primary task for any public is to achieve such recognition of itself across wider society to give weight to its attempts to modify government and associative behaviour in its interests (Dewey, LW2: 283). Yet, Dewey points out that any cursory examination of history reveals that this process has been fraught with social conflict and political upheaval. Such conflict centres on how new publics, whether reflecting new interests or newly reflecting old ones, often find that their interests are in direct conflict with those previous publics who hold and regulate political power. For example, as stated above, new publics have often found that their inherited political institutions, beliefs and traditions, suffer from a cultural ‘lag’ and are unfit to meet their interests. However, due to the cultural lag of the institutions and social stratification that often underpins the state and its government, new publics have commonly been unable to access or utilize their inherited state and its government to institute change.

46 There is of course an obvious link between the power of dominant groups and the ability to control the cultural foundations of a material culture. For instance, it would be very helpful to the interests of dominant groups to have cultural foundations that deem the causes of subordinate groups and their publics as irrational or incorrect and hence unsuited for remaking the state. Dewey is, however, very careful not to fall into a Marxist style conspiracy narrative that simply equates knowledge as ideology and thus a simple expression of power. Nevertheless, as we shall see, although Dewey never uses the terms hegemony or ideological control, he was quite aware of how the interests of dominant groups within society was ultimately refracted through ideas and conceptions of common sense within material culture (LW7: 326).
Moreover, Dewey suggests that well institutionalised states and their incumbent governments, which reflect the interests and often contain members of previous publics, have historically hindered the process of the remaking of the state. This transpires because the needs of newly formed publics often challenge the moral values or interests of the previous public(s) which have shaped the present state and its government. Subsequently, well institutionalised incumbent states and their governments have historically used the institutions and practise of government to counteract, discredit or suppress the rival interests of new publics. This expulsion of new publics from partaking in the remaking the state and government has, Dewey contends, often been the catalyst for violent revolution:

'The new public which is generated remains inchoate, unorganised, because it cannot use inherited political agencies. The latter, if elaborate and well institutionalised, obstruct the organisation of the new public. They prevent the development of new forms of state which might grow rapidly were social life more fluid, less precipitated into political and legal moulds. To form itself, the public has to break with existing political forms. This is hard to do because these forms are themselves the regular means of instituting change. The public which generated political forms is passing away, but the power and the lust of possession remains in the hands of the officers and agencies which the dying publics instituted. This is why change of the form of states is only effected only by revolution' (Dewey, LW2: 255).
What is of pertinence here is Dewey’s belief that the historical relativity of culture and the emergence of new publics translates into a situation where a society is always in a process of transition and hence potential moral conflict. This conflict between the needs of old experience and of new experience, what we often refer to as social problems, is inherently a moral conflict because it concerns what should be within a society. Such conflicts, brought about by the events of a shifting cultural matrix, inherently question the values, principles and ends and corresponding social institutions (practices and institutions of government) that should exist at that specific historical juncture (Dewey, LW13: 151, 184 cf. LW11: 36-37).

This does not so much amount to a belief in the inevitability of moral conflict, but rather, through an appreciation of history, to the warranted assertion about the inevitability of social change and the potential for moral conflict between old and new experience. All societies are dependent and based upon the experience accumulated in the past (interests and government of old publics/old habits and customs) but are also subjected to conflicting new forces and new needs (interests of new publics/ new habits and customs), which demand that patterns of experience and institutions are shaped towards their interests. And whilst the rate and extent of the pull between the old and new may vary across time and space, Dewey argues that such change is always forthcoming.

All societies, in some form, thus have to come face to face with the dilemma of integrating potentially conflicting moralities of old experience and new experience (Dewey, LW11: 36). However, as the prior notation of the historic propensity of violent revolution makes clear, striking the balance between (or even contemplating integrating the old and the new) has typically been beyond the political wit of humanity. Moreover, Dewey believed that the
dilemma of integrating potentially conflicting moralities of old experience and new experience had led some into a belief in the necessity of violent coercive revolution (Dewey, LW11: 41, 56-61 cf. LW 14: 113). And on this basis, Dewey concludes that the fundamental problem of political settlement in any society seemingly revolves around the question of how to manage social change and mediate potential moral conflict between the old and new experience without the necessity of coercive or violent politics.47

4.4 Making the case for Democracy as a Way of Life

Rallying against democratic realism's caricature of democracy as merely being a set of defunct institutions, whose failings are only outweighed by the erroneous belief in their ability to succeed in the first place, Dewey puts forward democracy as the answer to the problem of how to manage societal change and mediate its potential moral conflicts. In making such a statement, Dewey begins his attempt at deepening, clarifying and ultimately reconstructing the idea of democracy. Although acknowledging the embodiment of the concept in popular suffrage and elected officials, what we commonly call 'political democracy', Dewey contends that the idea of democracy must be separated from its external organs and structure. To reduce democracy to specific institutions or practices is

47 There will be some that argue that violence is a legitimate form of politics and in fact is the only way to bring about change within society where there are strongly resistant organised publics. Dewey's reaction to such claims would be to agree with the first statement under certain conditions but to totally dismiss the second statement. Dewey's take on revolutionary violence is driven by a reaction to the argument for violence's historical necessity and an historical appreciation of violence's limits. On one hand, Dewey's aversion to violence was driven by what he saw in theories such as Marxism which deposited the historical inevitability of violence between two polar classes. This for Dewey seemed illogical because such a dogmatic view of history limits the use of non-violent means a priori. Moreover, Dewey saw revolutionary violence as an option that had become historically discredited and limited. On one hand, Dewey saw history as showing that violence between two groups had produced pyrrhic victories where much that was done had to be done over to restore democracy (LW9: 110-11). On the other hand, the advancement of military technologies meant that the civil or international wars that would see the changeover of power would have the potentiality to ruin all parties and indeed civilisation itself. This point itself made it doubly important that violence was seen as means that should be only employed as a last resort (LW11: 55-58). Despite this, and interpretations that paint him as a card carrying pacifist, Dewey did not rule out the use of violence all together. In certain circumstances and having come via the use of collective and collaborative intelligence rather than sheer dogmatism Dewey believed that the positive use of force could be pursued (LW14: 75-76).
quite simply to miss the fact that democracy is inherently something 'broader and deeper' than such institutions (Dewey, LW2: 325, cf. LW11: 217 and LW7: 349). This broader and deeper meaning revolves around viewing democracy as the best method for establishing and maintaining a society's sense of community. And as we shall see, Dewey sees the establishment of community through democracy as paramount to peacefully managing moral conflict as it emerges throughout history (LW11: 56, 182 c.f. LW7: 329). 48

Dewey's reconstructed meaning of democracy is principally exemplified in his demarcation between democracy as a 'way of life' and 'political democracy' as a system of government (Dewey, LW11: 217 cf. LW2: 325 and LW14: 226). The key to understanding Dewey's conception of democracy as a method for dealing with social change and moral conflict centres around viewing the former as providing the ethical mandate for the constant renewal of the institutions and practices of the latter (Dewey, LW2: 325 cf. LW 11: 182, 218). In its simplest expression, democracy as a way of life represents for Dewey the expression of the democratic ideal or idea (Dewey, LW7: 348-49 cf. LW2: 327). 49

Underpinned by the Lincolnesque belief that no human is wise enough to rule others without their consent, democracy as a 'way of life' is premised on the necessity for the equal 'participation of every mature being in the formation of the values that regulate the living of men together' (Dewey, LW11: 217-218 cf. LW13: 294).

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48 The most sustained narration of Dewey's democracy as a form of 'conflict resolution' is to be found in William R. Caspary's Dewey on Democracy (2000). However, Caspary's account, although very good on highlighting Dewey's similarities to contemporary positions of conflict resolution, fails to really get to grips both with the evolutionary nature of Dewey's conception of democracy in response to changes in material culture and the global political connotations this view holds in light of 19th, 20th and 21st century forms of economic globalisation.

49 Confusingly, across different texts and sometimes within the same text interchangeably, Dewey also uses the terms 'democracy as a social idea', 'method of social intelligence', 'intelligence', 'experimentalist method', 'collective intelligence', 'co-operative intelligence', 'liberalism' as well 'democracy as a way life' to describe his take on the democracy as the best method for dealing with social change.
The values in question here are the moral values (principles, ends) that justify and inform the social institutions (habits/customs/institutions of the cultural matrix) that influence both how individuals act and relate towards both themselves and one another. Within these parameters, democracy as a way of life is best seen as an ethical commitment to the principle that those who are affected by social institutions should have a certain share in the production and management of those institutions through contributing to the formation of social policy (proposed reforms of social institutions). Dewey describes this ethical commitment as:

'the opportunity, the right and the duty of every individual to form some conviction and to express some conviction regarding his own place in the social order, and the relations of that social order to his own welfare; second, the fact that each individual counts as one and one only on an equality of others, so that the final social will comes about as cooperative expression of the ideas of many people' (Dewey, LW13: 295-96).

What is worth noting here is that such an ethical commitment operates on a balanced set of equality of participation and communication in the formation of social policy. On one hand, each individual or group of like-minded individuals who have grouped together (publics) is taken to be equally affected in quality, if not in quantity, by the social institutions under which they live. All individual or groups of like minded individuals, regardless of any native (race, sex) or artificial (class, intelligence, political beliefs) endowments, should subsequently have the chance and opportunity to communicate their own conception of moral value.
This fundamentally entails an equality of opportunity to express their own needs and desires, their conceptions of how social life should go on and how the social problems they perceive to exist can be solved via reforming social policy. In short, all individuals or groups should have an equality of opportunity to have their moral values solicited and potentially registered in social policy; so as to secure the social institutions that they believe will bring about the full development of their capacities as individuals (Dewey, LW11: 219-220 cf. LW7: 349-350).

On the other hand, however, this equality of opportunity to contribute to the formation of social policy is balanced by the recognition of the aforementioned social nature of morality. As Dewey points out, ‘...capacity to endure publicity and communication is the test by which it is decided whether a pretended good is spurious or genuine. Communication, sharing, joint participation are the only actual ways of universalizing the moral law and end’ (Dewey, MW12: 197). The drive for the solicitation and registration of individual or group morality in social policy must always be refracted through the knowledge that such policy will affect and have consequences for ‘other’ individuals or groups within society; who in all likelihood, due to stratification and different interests engendered by the contours of culture, may share different or competing moral standpoints. The equality of opportunity to express moral value is therefore always used to facilitate the ‘mutual conference and consultation’ between those groups or individuals who hold differing or competing conceptions of moral value. The overall aim of such mutual conference and consultation being a form of collective problem solving; where members of society co-operatively collaborate in the appraisal and forming of new social policy in regards to mediating moral conflicts.
In essence, then, the balanced equality of democracy as a way of life and its focus on collective problem solving, highlights Dewey's faith in a deliberative (conference, consultation, negotiation and persuasion) form of political settlement. A process which, Dewey believed, would allow moral conflicts and the resultant social policy decisions to be settled in the 'widest possible contribution of all- or at least the great majority' (Dewey, LW:56). However, this deliberative form of political settlement is only able to deal competently with moral conflict both synchronically and diachronically, argues Dewey, because democracy as a way of life facilitates the establishment and maintenance of a society's community. As detailed earlier, just as atoms, stellar masses and cells in nature, Dewey states that humans within a society directly and unconsciously combine in associated behaviour. Such associated behaviour needs no explanation or meaning; it is simply the way things are structured by culture.

The attempt to provide explanation or meaning to associative behaviour and its consequences is for Dewey based on communication, whereby symbols or signs are produced about such associative behaviour and its consequences. The creation of symbols and signs or what we can call a common language is thus exactly what publics do when they offer their narrations of associated behaviour and its consequences to wider society. The pivotal point here is that such a process, whereby explanation or meaning is given to associative behaviour and its consequences and then communicated to others, is for Dewey the move towards the establishment of community (LW13: 176).

'A community thus presents an order of energies transmuted into one of meanings which are appreciated and mutually referred by each to every other on the part of those engaged in combined action. “Force” is not eliminated but is transformed in
uses and direction by ideas and sentiments made possible by means and symbols’ (Dewey, LW2: 331).

On this basis, Dewey takes the form of community invoked by democracy as a way of life to be the best means to deal with moral conflict and social problems both on synchronic and diachronic levels. This is quite simply because the ethical commitment of democracy as a way of life translates into the perpetual maintenance of a community, whereby everyone is afforded an equal opportunity to express moral value and potentially, through deliberation, have that moral value embodied in social policy.

On a synchronic level, as we have seen, changes in culture often produce new publics who desire to change what they believe are illegitimate or unsuitable social institutions. Due to stratification and the clash of interests that regularly occur between old and new publics, historically new publics have often been cut out of the process of remaking the state and have had to resort to violent revolution to achieve their objectives. Within the remit of the ethical commitment of democracy as a way of life, however, all individuals and groups possess the right to express their moral value. Dewey subsequently believed that the movement towards the necessity of violence to facilitate the changing of the state is largely eradicated under the democracy as a way of life because such an ethical commitment aimed:

‘...to bring these conflicts out into the open where their special claims can be seen and appraised, and where they can be discussed and judged in the light of more inclusive interests than are represented by either of them separately... The more the respective claims of the two are publicly and scientifically weighed, the more likely it is that the public interest will be disclosed and made effective’ (Dewey, LW11:56).
In this sense, Dewey’s democratic community does not so much do away with moral conflict, which itself is an impossibility, but looks to mediate conflict and avoid violence through facilitating the communicative inclusion of all publics. Indeed, to borrow the words of Dewey’s friend and intellectual collaborator George Herbert Mead, this conception of democratic community is nothing short of the institutionalising of revolution. For not only is democracy as a way of life and the democratic community it gives rise to, geared towards facilitating the potential reform of all social institutions, including the institutions and practises of political democracy, but the reform of social institutions through co-operative deliberation and problem solving. Such an approach is not only potentially radical and revolutionary, but also socially cohesive because of its refusal to ground violence and bloodshed as first principles in the act of being radical and revolutionary.

The democratic way of life and its democratic community sheds light upon Dewey’s hopes for a diachronically flexible and self-corrective form of deliberative and co-operative problem solving to mediate the moral conflicts which are ‘bound to arise’ in society (Dewey, LW14: 227-228). For under the tenets of democracy as a way of life the problematic of facilitating the participation of every mature being, in the formation of the values that inform a society’s social institutions, is never deemed to be permanently solvable, but rather as a challenge whose demands change across time and space. This is because of the ethical commitment that all members of a society will have the chance to voice their moral value and have the potential to inform social policy functions with recognition of the historical relativity of both culture and the interests of the individuals within that culture.

The pursuit of democracy as a way of life and a democratic community is therefore premised on the idea that such an endeavour can only be achieved by a constant solicitation
and registration of the desires, needs and wants (moral values) of groups or individuals as they emerge or change in relation to changes in culture. A process where all forms of moral value espoused by new publics, across time and space, would always possess the right to be heard and be deliberated and, if sufficient evidence of its merit emerged, the chance of ultimately changing social policy (Dewey, LW7: 350). At the heart of the democratic way of life and its sense of community, thus beats an educative rhythm, which looks to ensure a perpetual equality of communication and cooperative problem solving as social conditions and conceptions of moral value shift throughout history.50

4.5 Democracy as a Way of Life + Political Democracy = Creative Democracy

The question which now remains, however, is how does Dewey’s conception of democracy as a way of life relate to what we commonly call political democracy as a system of government? What should be clear from the preceding exposition is Dewey’s belief that democracy as a way of life and its sense of community provides the respective ethical and deliberative foundations for the mediation of conflict via facilitating the co-operative reform and remaking of social institutions in response to changing contours of culture and the rise and fall of publics. The interesting point here is that Dewey conceives that democracy as a way of life is not just about political democracy but about the perpetual participation of every mature being in the formation of the values of the social institutions under which they live. As such, Dewey takes that the justification and purpose of the institutions and practise of political democracy are both bound to the democratic way of life.

50 As this and the earlier narration of the Dewey’s conception of the state and publics should make clear, contra James Livingston’s (2001: 51-56) otherwise excellent reading of The Public and it’s Problems as the valorisation of cultural politics via an active civil society, Dewey’s concept of creative democracy makes distinct claims about the ability of publics to gain access to and modify the state and the political representations of government (LW2: 245-54, 327). In short, Dewey makes the point that only having an active civil society of publics is not an ultimate guarantee of having a successful democracy.
On one hand, Dewey asserts that the institutions and practises of political democracy should always endeavour to further the pursuit of democracy as a way of life. This means that the institutions and practises of political democracy should endeavour to facilitate the evolution of other social institutions to mediate the changes in culture and conflict between old and new experience. And to this end, Dewey contends that the institutions and practise that we commonly associate with political democracy such as universal suffrage, recurring elections, responsibility of those who are in political power to the voters and the freedom of speech, inquiry and assembly are the means which have been most expedient at various historical junctures towards the pursuit of the ethical commitment of democracy as a way of life and the upholding of a democratic community (Dewey, LW1: 218). This is because such institutions and practises of political democracy, through their commitment to equality of discussion, consultation and publicity, are premised on the uncovering and communicating of social needs and troubles and hence facilitate both the ethical mandate of democracy as way of life and the collective solving of such problems (Dewey, LW2: 364).

On the other hand, however, the institutions and practises of political democracy are themselves simply social institutions. They are not the final ends or values of democracy as a way of life but rather the mechanisms towards the ‘effective operation’ of the ideal (Dewey, LW2: 325). Against the trend of what he saw as the quasi-religious idealisation of political democracy’s institutions and practises and other social institutions in general, Dewey argues we must not see democracy as being ‘fixed in its outwards manifestation’ (Dewey, LW1: 182). The institutions and practises of political democracy are not beyond criticism or innovation themselves and are to be appraised on how such means and the consequences they produce contribute to the effective operation of the democratic ideal.
For instance, the emergence of moral conflict and the pursuit of deliberatively solving such a problem may uncover that an institution or practise of political democracy is unfit or unsuited to meet the demands of facilitating the democratic way of life in the current contours of culture. Consequently, such defunct institutions and practises of political democracy, just like other social institutions, must be adapted or updated, through deliberative problem solving, to meet the needs, problems and the conditions of the contemporary configuration of culture (Dewey, LW11: 182 cf. LW13: 299).

The linkage between democracy as a way of life and political democracy brings home Dewey’s conception of ‘Creative Democracy’. Creative democracy is simply shorthand for the working link between the democratic ideal and its outward manifestation in social institutions. For democracy as a way of life is not so much to be statically handed down across generations, argues Dewey, but rather to be creatively interpreted and enacted anew by each generation and its various publics in regards to their present:

‘The very idea of democracy, the meaning of democracy must be explored afresh; it has to be constantly discovered, and rediscovered remade and reorganised; while the political and economic institutions and social institutions of government in which it is embodied have to be remade and reorganised to meet the changes that are going on in the development of new needs on the part of human beings and the new resources for satisfying these needs’ (Dewey, LW11: 182).

Creative democracy, where the democratic ideal is used to structure the evolution of social institutions through mediating the conflict of publics, is, Dewey concludes, the only way to

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51 I use the term ‘Creative Democracy’ not only because it best sums up the evolutionary nature of Dewey’s idea democracy but because Dewey himself uses the term to sum up his position in his 80th birthday celebration address: ‘Creative Democracy – The Task Before Us’ (LW14: 224-230).
master both the changes in social reality that are already here and destined to come forth. This is the sense in which Dewey suggests, contra its critics, that the 'only cure for ills of democracy is more democracy' (Dewey, LW2: 319). However, this was no mere empty slogan for Dewey. Taking in his immediate context he warned that any attempt to merely standstill and not deal with an ever shifting social reality and ever changing publics, whether this be an uncreative and static democracy, a 3rd Reich, Communist Utopia or reincarnation of Philosopher Kings as experts, would likely place humanity on the backward road to extinction. Moreover, as we shall encounter in the next chapter, Dewey believed that creative democracy was needed not just within the nation state but beyond and between the nation states of the globe. For the violence of revolution had itself been revolutionised and without a form of global creative democracy humanity now possessed the unprecedented ability to be the authors of its own collective destruction.
Chapter 5: John Dewey - The Global Democrat

'The present state of the world is more than a reminder that we have now to put forth the energy of our own to prove worthy of our heritage. It is a challenge to do for the critical and complex conditions of today what the men of an earlier day did for simple conditions' (LW14: 225).

As the last chapter made clear, John Dewey’s conception of creative democracy points towards the perpetual adaption of social institutions, including democratic institutions and practises themselves, as new publics are engendered by social change. Within this chapter, I aim to highlight how Dewey’s conception of creative democracy was fundamentally informed by what he took to be global interdependence of The Great Society. This centres on how Dewey believed that creative democracy needed to be exercised not only within America but also outside and between nation states and the various publics engendered and scattered across the globe, by what we have come to call the first age of modern globalisation. However, I also want to highlight that whilst Dewey was all too well aware that The Great Society required global forms of democratic governance, he was also all too aware of the lack of a political culture open to such change, both within and beyond the USA.

To achieve this, the chapter will have three movements to its argument. The first section will highlight the globalised nature of The Great Society by showing how such a time period has today become known as the ‘First Great Globalisation’. The second part of the chapter will focus on how Dewey’s ideas about creative democracy not only acknowledged the global dimensions of The Great Society but compelled him to propound the need for global democracy. The third section will focus on Dewey’s consequent problematization of his own
solutions of a global Great Community and global democratic governance. This shall focus on his arguments about the eclipse of the public and stalling of creative of democracy within modern liberal democracies and how aspirations towards global democracy were harmed by such a process.

5.1 The Great Society as the First Great Globalisation

Upon a cursory glance it may seem bizarre, or rather some 100 years too late, to return to the work of John Dewey in order to gain a greater appreciation of globalisation and possibilities of global democracy at the start of the 21st century. After all, Dewey appears to be a creature of a wholly different epoch, born some 18 months before the Battle of Fort Sumter and dying only some 6 years after George Orwell had coined the term 'Cold War'. To read his body of work is thus to enter a world that does not even include bearing witness to the potential mutual destruction of the Hydrogen Bomb nor The American Civil Rights Movement, the Vietnam War and the winds of change that flattened European Imperialism. And this is to say nothing of events, such as the fall of the Bretton Woods regime, the hegemonic ascent of Neo-Liberalism, the end of the Cold War and the rise of communication technology such as the internet, which have been the catalysts for contemporary debates around global democracy.

However, just as it is in the practise of law and its definition of what counts as a credible eye witness, when looking at the historical record a fleeting glance at events is not within the bounds of credible evidence. Not only was the American Civil War (1861-65), to which Dewey was born into, fought just as much due to the diametric views on international trade policy between Southern and Northern States, as it was fought over the immorality of chattel slavery. But at the end of his life he also saw the global ramifications of the atomic
bomb and the emergence of the Truman Doctrine which effectively committed the United States to a global struggle against the Soviet Union and her allies. When one adds to this that Dewey lived through World War One, the aforementioned rise of Communism and Fascism, the Great Depression and the fait accompli that was the Second World War, the 'global' nature of his age becomes slightly clearer. This issue, however, needs further unpacking because it becomes clear that what Dewey took to be 'The Great Society' was not just the radical transformation of the American nation state from an agrarian to a corporate capitalist society but also the radical transformation that happened to the global economy during 'The Long 19th Century' (1815 to 1914).

Prior to the 19th there existed a well-defined intercontinental trade system that linked Europe, Asia and the Atlantic colonies of European empires (Findlay and O'Rourke 2007: 365). This had seen world trade grow at 1 percent per year during the 17th and 18th centuries. However, as writers such as Frieden (2006), Findlay and O'Rourke (2007), Morris (2011) and Rodrik (2011) point out, The Long 19th century saw the radical transformation of global trade and finance. We can call this radical transformation of the global economy during the long 19th Century as the process of 'The First Great Globalisation'.

This process was inherently driven by historical factors such as industrial revolution and its insudtrial (steamships, railways) and communication technology (wireless telegraphs and telephones) reducing inefficiency and transaction costs of world trade; the hegemonic

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52 I follow Dani Rodrik (2011) in calling this the First Great Globalisation but it should be pointed out that the actual dating of globalisation and when it began is extensive. Janet Abu-Lughod (1989) for instance traces networks of global connections back to before the 1500s and writers such as Findlay and O'Rourke (2007) and Hopkins (2002) acknowledge earlier forms of globalisation. However, as my use of the term the First Great Globalisation suggests the form globalisation initiated by the industrial revolution and its technologies is distinct in the way it connected various parts of the world vis-à-vis earlier forms of globalisation.
ascent of Free Trade ideas as espoused by Smith and Ricardo; the subjection of national macroeconomics to the priorities of the international monetary system of the Gold Standard; the economic hegemon's (Britain) embrace and upholding of the Gold Standard; Free Trade and the consequent export of investment capital by the City of London; the global migration from the Old World to the New; and the practise of European Imperialism and opening up of Asia to practises of Free Trade, combined to create the first genuine integrated world economy. As Jeffery Frieden outlines, The First Great Globalisation translated into a scenario where:

'... the world economy was essentially open to the movement of people, money, capital and goods. The leading businessmen, politicians, and thinkers of the day regarded an open world economy as the normal state of affairs. They assumed that people and money would flow around the world with few or no restrictions. Trade protection, although common, was seen as acceptable departure from the norm, driven by the exigencies of short term domestic or international politics. Capitalism was global, and the globe was capitalist. (2006: 29).

By the mid 19th century the onset of The First Great Globalisation saw world trade grow at a rate of 4 percent per year for the rest of the century (Rodrik 2011: 24-25). And by 1913 every country in Western Europe, bar Spain and Portugal, had industrialised and such developments also took in places such as Argentina and Japan. Moreover, a global economic regime emerged across what we today call asymmetric global North and South relations. In this global division of labour the rich and industrial North exported industrial products in exchange for the primary commodity exports of the poor and largely agricultural South. This caused not only intercontinental commodity price convergence but also the trebling of living
standards in Western Europe and more than a quadrupling of living standards in British
offshoots (Findlay and O'Rourke 2007: 402-207, 412-415).

Writing in 1919, and over what he perceived as the burning embers of such an order, John
Maynard Keynes provides a wonderfully colourful first hand account of what is meant by
The First Great Globalisation:

‘What an extraordinary episode in the economic progress of man that age was which
came to an end in August, 1914!... The inhabitant of London could order by
telephone, sipping his morning tea in bed, the various products of the whole earth,
in such quantity as he might see fit, and reasonably expect their early delivery upon
his doorstep; he could at the same moment and by the same means adventure his
wealth in the natural resources and new enterprises of any quarter of the world, and
share, without exertion or even trouble, in their prospective fruits and advantages;
or he could decide to couple the security of his fortunes with the good faith of the
townspeople of any substantial municipality in any continent that fancy or
information might recommend. He could secure forthwith, if he wished it, cheap and
comfortable means of transit to any country or climate without passport or other
formality...’ (Keynes 1919: 6-7)

As Keynes alludes to above, the Long 19th century was eventually brought to a shuddering
halt by the outbreak of World War One and the rise of trade protectionism that arose from
such a global conflict. The period after World War One is commonly held to be a period of
‘de-globalisation’ with the onset of 1920’s hyperinflation, The Great Depression, trade
protectionism and xenophobic nationalism, seeing the world economy split into autarkic
However, the evocation of the term de-globalisation is slightly misleading as it misses the attempt, between 1925 and 1929, of the developed powers such as Great Britain and the US to foolishly attempt to restore the world economy through the reestablishment of the gold standard. As such, even after World War One, and in the midst of some trade protectionism and the project of rebuilding Europe, the world’s industrial production grew by more than 1/5 between 1925 and 1929. And with the rise of American style mass production and mass consumption, exports swelled to double pre war levels and world trade became 42 percent greater in 1929 than in 1913 (Frieden 2006: 140).

This boom was primarily created by the rise of American economic hegemony and Wall Street’s taking over from the City of London as the world’s financial centre. Although the US rejected Britain’s political engagement and underpinning of the long 19th century, the rise of American investment capital, taking over from the role of European investment capital, saw over £1 billion a year in loans emanating from New York to foreign destinations between 1919 and 1929. And between 1924 – 1928, Americans lent on average $500 million per year to Europe, $300 Million per year to Latin America, $200 million per year to Canada and $100 million per year to Asia.

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53 See Findlay and O’Rourke (2007), for example, who call their chapter on the global economy between 1918-39 ‘De-globalisation’

54 This folly was at the heart of Keynes’s works A Tract of Monetary Reform (1923) and A Treatise on Money (1930) where Keynes was attempting to point out to policy makers that the gold standard and the policies linked to its maintenance were unsuited to post-war conditions. This was because early 20th century capitalism’s new structure of corporations, more organised labour markets and the advent of trade unions vis-à-vis the independent farmers, small businesses and individual workers, now meant that the subordination of national economies to the priority of world conditions was now both economic and political dynamite (Frieden 152-54). The details of this great political and economic folly during the inter war is covered remarkably well in Ahamed’s Lord’s of Finance (2009)

55 Despite all of this global economic integration the reality was that US during this period embraced forms of political isolationism in comparison to international ‘conductor’ Great Britain had been when she was the world’s preeminent economic power.
In tandem, American industrialists and corporations also scoured the globe for foreign direct investment in plants and other ventures. Over the 1920's American firms invested some $5 billion dollars overseas and saw the rise of multinational corporations such Ford and General Motors (GM), who became well established in major and minor economies across the globe, and the internationalisation of the activities of American commercial banks (Frieden 2006: 140-141, 160-161). This of course was all to lead into the void of The Great Depression and the spread of autarky and ultra nationalism. However, the key point is that the ideals of the long 19th century and The First Great Globalisation, post 1914, still cast a large shadow over the activities of not only America but also the globe post 1914. The question, of course, is how did the casting of such a shadow appear to John Dewey? As I show below, Dewey fully understood that The Great Society was inherently a national and international creature.

5.2 The Two threads of Creative Democracy

By 1927, when Dewey wrote *The Public and its Problems*, he was all too aware that The First Great Globalisation was heavily linked to problems of publics and the practice within The Great Society. If perceived correctly, *The Public and its Problems* conception of The Great Society encompasses not only the great transformation of American life but also the global interdependence created by The First Great Globalisation. Unfortunately, the global dimensions of The Great Society are rarely taken seriously enough by Dewey scholars.56 As

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56 I say this because if one reads major studies of Dewey such as Caspary (2000), Hickman (2007), Kadlec (2007), and Westbrook (1991, 2005), one finds a real dearth of exposition of the global nature of Dewey's political writings. For instance, Hickman (2007: 32) acknowledges that Dewey put forward an idea of global citizenship but simply locates this as an earlier account of Global Civil Society. As I show below, this is not what Dewey had in mind and its lack of detailed study on these issues lends itself little credibility. Caspary's study of Deweyan democracy (2000:3) acknowledges that Dewey wrote about issues of globalisation and democracy on a global scale but then suggests he will not talk about such issues because they can be detached from
a result, what is often missed, again even by proponents of Dewey's work, is how the global dimensions of The Great Society fundamentally informed Dewey's conception of the praxis of creative democracy. Moreover, if read with this understanding in mind, Dewey's political writings from the 1920's onwards can be seen as untangling two intertwined threads concerning the pursuit of Democracy as a Way of Life and the practise of creative democracy within The Great Society.

The first thread, which has been covered by some authors such as Westbrook (1991) and Kadlec (2007), but which has been largely marginalised in other appraisals of Dewey's work, concerns the effects of The Great Society within America. On this issue, Dewey sounded a warning to the American nation that the country needed to embrace Democracy as a way of life and enact creative democracy domestically to deal with the complexity and stratification he saw within American corporate capitalism and avoid the embrace of the authoritarian politics he associated with Fascism, Communism and the expert governance of Democratic Realism. Examples of this train of thought can be found throughout Dewey's work from the assessment of Dewey's take on democracy. My argument in this chapter, however, is that Deweyan democracy in relation to The Great Society cannot be understood properly without considering issues of globalisation and democracy on a global scale. Finally, Westbrook (1991:309n31) only devotes a footnote to international dimensions of The Public and its Problems and then only mentions the second preface written in 1946 as the key element in this line of thought. However, as I show below, he misses that the fact that Dewey's conception of The Great Society was inherently shorthand for not only the domestic context but the First Great Globalisation that was in full effect at the turn of the 20th century. Moreover, Westbrook fails to see how Dewey's problematic in The Public and its Problems and many of his future political writings focuses on this relationship between the international and the domestic.

There have been some writers such as Cochran (2002, 2010) and Bray (2009) who have attempted to deal with international ramifications of Dewey's thoughts. Molly Cochran's (2002, 2010) work is probably at the foremost of this endeavour and her work has made a valuable addition in highlighting that Dewey's theory of democracy provides a better approach to democracy at a global level than those mapped out by writers such as Habermas, Dryzek and Held. However, her approach is stifled by the fact that she views Dewey's work as indirectly addressing the global and hence fails to see how Dewey both espouses global democracy but then questions its feasibility and links this back to domestic politics. In her most recent work she has attempted to update this position but again fails to adequately see how Dewey believed the domestic and global forms of democracy were interlinked and interdependent.
1920's onwards where he puts forward ideas about a form of Democratic Socialism. This took the form of suggested reforms such as unemployment insurance, the minimum wage, the 30 hour week, more progressive taxation such as a land tax, worker democracy, media regulation, and the socialisation of banks, land and key industries. Such reforms, Dewey believed, would help towards alleviating the stratification and lack of democracy he associated with American corporate capitalism.\footnote{Many of Dewey's reforms have come to be enshrined in Embedded Liberalism and the rise of Welfare States of the mid 20th century. However it should be pointed out that many also did not. Contemporary issues such as the balance between works and leisure, industrial democracy, education provision and the socialisation of the economy would benefit from a return to some of the old Professors ideas.}

Nevertheless, Dewey was also aware that much of the complexity and stratification he associated with American corporate capitalism and what he took as The Great Society were also engendered by developments of the global economy and the relations between nation states. The second thread concerning the international pursuit of Democracy as a Way of Life and the practice of creative democracy, which is even more marginalised than the first in accounts of Dewey's work, thus recognises The Great Society as not only an American phenomena but also as essentially what we today call The First Great Globalisation. As Dewey makes very clear in \textit{The Public and its Problems}:

\begin{quotation}
'The new era of human relationships in which we live is one marked by mass production for remote markets, by cable and telephone, by cheap printing, by railway and steam navigation. Only geographically did Columbus discover the new world. The actual new world has been generated in the last hundred years.' (LW2: 323)
\end{quotation}

Not only did Dewey recognise such unprecedented economic interdependence between nation states as the greatest change in human history, but that such change now created
forms of associated behaviour and consequences of associated behaviour which now spanned across national and continental boundaries. Hence Dewey’s formulation that the irony of the 19th and early 20th century was that the ‘...consolation of peoples in enclosed, nominally independent, national states has its counterpart in the fact that their acts affect groups and individuals in other states all over the world.’ (LW2: 315 cf. LW13: 190).

In *The Public and its Problems* the most striking exemplar of the global nature of The Great Society provided by Dewey is World War One and its aftermath (LW2: 314-317). Dewey begins by highlighting how the war itself was truly global with the involvement of ‘every continent upon the globe’ and not only saw colonial possessions drawn in but self-governing nations enter voluntarily and countries with racial and cultural differences, such as Great Britain and Japan and Germany and Turkey, form alliances. However, the global nature of the conflict aside, Dewey took World War One to reveal the interdependence of countries in The Great Society and that the consequences of associated behaviour often did not respect national borders. For instance, Dewey highlights how the breakdown of world trade during the war saw a consequent scramble by the belligerents to secure commodities such as raw materials, distant economic markets and foreign capital, which had previously been in abundance due to the economic interdependence prior to World War One.

At the same time, Dewey saw that the breakdown of such global economic relations created consequences for the everyday life of people across the globe. For example, American farmers, who experienced temporary prosperity through the increase in demand for agricultural products during the war, saw their economic outlook become bleak when the consequences of the establishment of peace (war debts, the centralisation of gold reserves in the US, depreciations of foreign currencies) meant that wartime levels of export demand
declined and failed to even return to pre war levels. Dewey fully acknowledged that the misfortune of American farmers was relatively insignificant in comparison with the other economic consequences of peace, such as the hyperinflation in Germany (Weimar Republic) and stimulation of European nationalisms, but it revealed how day to day life in one region of the world was now fundamentally linked to, and affected by, the behaviour of others on the other side of the world (LW2: 316).

In essence, World War One vividly brought home for Dewey how the interdependence of nation states in The Great Society meant the consequences of associated behaviour now spanned across borders. Rather than being a matter of sheer empirical description, however, Dewey found that the case of the American farmer illustrated how little 'prevision and regulation' of such transcontinental interdependence actually existed and how people had as much control over such events as they were, as they had over the vicissitudes of the climate (LW2: 316). In 1927, then, the political conclusion he drew from the global nature of The Great Society and the World War it had helped to facilitate, was how the existing political and legal institutions and practises were incapable of dealing with the current situation. Contrasting his present with that of Pax Romana, Dewey contended that:

'There was a critical epoch in the history of the world when the Roman Empire assembled in it itself the lands of peoples of the Mediterranean basin. The World War stands out as indubitable proof that what then happened for a region has now happened for the world, only there is now no comprehensive political organisation to include the various divided yet interdependent countries. Anyone who even partially visualises the scene has a convincing reminder of the meaning of the Great Society: that it exists, and that is not integrated' (LW2: 315).
Dewey's subsequent plea for the 'non-political forces to organise themselves to transform existing political structures: that the divided and troubled publics integrate,' makes it perfectly clear that he acknowledged that due to globalised economic relations the pursuit of the democratic way of life and practise of creative democracy needed to also be a transnational endeavour: not only within America but outside; and between nation states and the various publics engendered and scattered across the globe. By 1927, then, Dewey was all too well aware that the globalisation of the early 20th century now required reform of government that would allow for transnational communication and collaboration and global forms of democratic government. Or to put in more of a Deweyan inflection: that The Great Society now needed to become a Great Community which could perfect '...the means and ways of communication of meanings so that genuinely shared interests in the consequences of interdependent activities may inform desire and effort and thereby direct action' (ibid., 332 cf. 314,327).

One can find the same sustained, if not ever growing conviction, that The Great Society was engendered by modern globalisation and lacked political regulation at the international level when one reads elements of Dewey's work through the Great Depression and the rise of trade protectionism, the build up to World War II and in the aftermath of the defeat of the Axis Powers.\(^5\) These intervening years (1928-46) had made it clear for Dewey that without a common rule of law and a machinery of government at the international level to manage the international effects of The Great Society, the only way nation states knew or

\(^5\) For example, see the essays 'International Co-operation or International Chaos' (LW11: 261-265), 'World Anarchy or World Order?' (LW15: 204-209), 'Contribution to Democracy in a World of Tensions' (LW16), and 'What kind of World are we Fighting For?' (LW17). The international dimensions can also be heavily found in major works of the period of Dewey’s career such as Freedom and Culture (LW13) and the preface of Liberalism and Social Action (LW11), which highlights Dewey’s regret that space and time constraints stopped him putting forward ideas of liberalism in the context of international relations.
sought to deal with the effects of globalisation were economic (autarky, trade protectionism) or military forms of warfare (LW11: 261-262). And due to the economic interdependence of modern globalisation and the change in modern warfare technology (the Atom bomb) and tactics (total war) this now meant that the daily life of every human being on the planet could be affected by such forms of warfare (LW15: 204-205).

After World War Two Dewey now stated more straightforwardly that not only were such practices undemocratic, but that the old traditions, customs, habits of belief and institutions of 'old-time diplomacy, power blocs, power politics and precepts of international law' were as 'outworn and impotent as the old-time muzzle-loading gun' in dealing with the transnational reality of The Great Society. As Dewey furthered:

‘...until old traditions and habits are transformed, they make us powerless to cope with the problems which are indeed related to those traditions and habits. Our thinking, our moral and emotional conditioning, our entire way of life – all these still belong to that early period in history when the peoples of the earth were truly isolated, having but few points of contact and communication, and these only with nearby neighbours. Wars were correspondingly local' (ibid.,: 204-5).

A world with such interdependence, lacking means to deal with the effects of such interdependence sans forms of warfare, was essentially a form of 'anarchy'. It was now the 'tragedy of our time' that every person on the planet belonged to a 'world unit' without being a member of a 'world society' which possessed a common rule of law and a machinery of government at the international level to manage the international effects of
The Great Society (ibid., 204). And in far more literal terms than those found in The Publics and its Problems, Dewey spelt out that:

‘The peoples of the Earth, not just their governmental officials, must find effective answers to the following questions. Is a world government possible? How shall it be brought into being? By unilateral and coercive action of some or one nation, or by general cooperative action? What shall be its machinery? What responsibilities shall it possess in order that a common rule of law, expressing the needs of a world society, may substitute a system of peace and security for the present war system? These questions are urgent; it is imperative to face them at once, directly and with utmost seriousness. They are not matters of abstract theory but of utmost concern’ (ibid., 206).

Although Dewey was not as forthcoming about possible reforms that would produce creative democracy at the international level as he was concerning democratic socialism within the American nation state, changes after World War Two revealed to him that only an attitude of sheer cynicism and defeatism would deny that it was now possible to create a workable form of global democracy. And in the second preface to The Public and its Problems, written a year after the end of the Second World War, Dewey cites the formation of the United Nations and the opening of debate about the nature of the organisation as evidence that there was a growing sense ‘...that relations between nations are taking on

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60 In this essay Dewey seems to confuse matters by using the term world society to stand in for Great Community but his conception of World Society is inherently another term for Great Community and should not be seen as breaking the society/community distinction outlaid in the previous chapter.

61 This is not to say that he had nothing to say on these issues, for example, Dewey railed against imperialism and was in full belief that the world's natural resources should be shared out for the benefits of citizens of the world.
properties that constitute a public, and hence call for some measure of political organisation.

This was, Dewey argued, the rightful extension of the debate within nation-states as to what was ‘public’ and what was ‘private’ in the context of relations between national units. The formation of the UN thus signalled an acceptance by nation states of the political responsibility, as opposed to weak moral responsibility that so easily broke down in the 1930’s, that each national unit had towards one another (LW2: 375-76). And in organisations such as UNESCO Dewey found more evidence that armed conflict was potentially being usurped as the primary method to deal with the effects of globalisation. For instance, he believed that UNESCO offered ‘...the peoples of the world a symbol of what is now desirable, and of what may become an actuality’ (LW16: 400-401). The challenge of ‘discovering and implementing politically areas of common interest’ of an interdependent world was thus what Dewey took to be the new political ‘imperative’ of the 20th century (LW2: 379).

5.3 The obstacles to Global Creative Democracy: How to create problems to your own solutions?!

From reading the above it would not be erroneous to conclude that Dewey, in much the same vein as some of his contemporaries, was a firm proponent of some form of global democracy. However, the point of differentiation between Dewey and contemporary advocates of global democracy is that he never countenanced embracing an ontology of paradox which neglected the obstacles facing the project of enacting global democracy. For instance, writing in 1946 and in the essay where he most vigorously puts forward the need
for the global extension of democracy, Dewey initially counters pessimistic accounts about the practical feasibility of global democracy with the point that earlier generations could never have foreseen democracy across a land area as big as the USA. However, this optimism towards the project of global democracy is tempered by Dewey's belief that it was just ‘...as necessary to appreciate the immense difficulty of the undertaking as it is to have the will to take unreserved part in it’ (LW15: 206).

The 'immense difficulty' in the enacting of global democracy was the fact that The Great Society had ‘...invaded and partially disintegrated the small communities of former times without generating a Great Community' (LW2: 314). As a result, Dewey concluded that the ‘...new age has no symbols consonant with its activities' and provided no communication of signs and symbols between citizens who were involved in national and transnational associations and consequences engendered by The Great Society. The irony of this state of affairs, given The Great Society's technological advancement in communication (telephone, wireless telegraph), was not lost on Dewey:

'The ties which hold men together in action are numerous, tough and subtle. But they are invisible and intangible. We have the physical tools of communication as never before. The thoughts and aspirations congruous with them are not communicated, and hence not common.... Our Babel is not one of tongues but of the signs and symbols without which shared experience is impossible.'(LW2: 323).

This is why, within The Public and its Problems, Dewey pleas for 'divided and troubled publics' across not just America, but the world, to integrate in order to create a Great Community, which could bring forth democratic governance both at the national and international level. And this plea is reiterated again in Dewey's work during The Great
Depression and in the events that lead to World War Two. Why then did Dewey argue that the publics of The Great Society were divided and troubled publics? What was stopping the emergence of a Great Community? Somewhat expediently, and all too typically in the abstract, Dewey ends the 1946 essay with the answer to such questions when he warns that whilst it was imperative to 'begin' the path towards a form of global democracy:

'...as has been only too proved by the two devastating world wars the movement toward production of more comprehensive social organisation, the very movement that brought national states into being has been widely arrested' (LW15: 209).

When taken with Dewey's conception of democracy in mind, it becomes clear that the forestalling of the emergence of a Great Community was not due to spatial-temporal limits to the practise of democracy, but what Dewey saw as the arresting of creative democracy and the democratic community at the level of the nation state. The arresting of creative democracy and its ability to update the practices and institutions of democracy was forestalling the 'production of more comprehensive social organisation' not only within the nation state but also outside the nation state. Of course, this answer itself begs the question: What did Dewey take to be the reason for the arresting of creative democracy within the nation state? And how did this arresting of creative democracy within the nation state impact on the cause of global democracy?

a. The Eclipse of the Public

The answers Dewey provides to the questions above, found in his work from the The Public and its Problems onwards, see him initially outdo Democratic Realism at its own game. In superficial agreement with Democratic Realism, Dewey argued that it was the complexity of
The Great Society, which had led to the ‘eclipse’ of publics and a sense of community within nation states and the subsequent arresting of creative democracy. This had transpired because The Great Society’s multiplication, intensification, complication and trans-nationalisation of associative behaviour now outstripped the comprehension and knowledge of average citizens (LW2: 314-317). The age when citizens could entrain a few general political principles, such as embracing states’ rights vis-à-vis centralised federal government or free trade vis-à-vis protectionism, and apply them with confidence through supporting one political party over another, was now essentially over. Citing the example of the problem of industrial tariffs Dewey furthered:

‘For the average voter today the tariff question is a complicated medley of indefinite detail, schedules of rates specific and ad valorem on countless things, many of which he does not recognise by name, and with respect to which he can form no judgment. Probably not one voter in a thousand reads the scores of pages in which rates of toll are enumerated and he would not be much wiser if he did. The average man gives it up as a bad job.’ (LW2: 317)

Due to the fact that modern industry was ‘too complex and intricate,’ citizens were essentially ‘bewildered’ by the machinations of The Great Society. Unable to correctly locate where the indirect consequences that were affecting their daily lives came from, citizens could now not generate publics which could foster the reform of social institutions of the state to control and regulate such consequences:

‘An inchoate public is capable of organisation only when indirect consequences are felt rather than perceived; and when it is possible to project agencies which order their occurrence. At present many consequences are felt rather than perceived; they
are suffered, but they cannot be said to be known, for they are not, by those who experience them, referred to their origins. It goes, then, without saying that agencies are not established which canalize the streams of social action. Hence the publics are amorphous and unarticulated' (LW2: 316-317).

At first glance one may find Dewey's account of what he took to be the eclipse of publics as not too dissimilar to the view of Democratic Realism. In fact Dewey appears to hold the same conviction as Walter Lippmann when highlighting how the voting public struggled to intellectually cope with the complex manoeuvrings of The Great Society. However, whilst both Dewey and Democratic Realism locate the 'intelligence' of the masses as a key reason for the stuttering of democracy, they radically differ on what they believe were the reasons for such a state of affairs. Democratic Realism took it to be the case that the masses' were a priori incapable of ever grasping the contours of The Great Society because it was too complex and demanded expert rule. Dewey, on the other hand, saw the lost nature of the public and the collapse of democracy to be down to wholly contingent reasons that limited the intelligence of the masses.

Primarily, Dewey identified the limiting of the public's intelligence and subsequent eclipse as being a result of the fact that modern liberal democracies within The Great Society had only achieved 'Bourgeois democracy' rather than actual creative democracy. The historic emergence of liberal democratic governments in the 19th century 'had been an accompaniment of the transfer of power from agrarian interests to industrial and commercial interests.' Whilst there had been a change in the social order, the rise of democratic government through handing industrial and commercial interests; the ability to 'command the conditions under which the mass of people have access to the means of
production and to the products of their activity...’ continued to give ‘power to the few over the many.’ The reality was that in liberal Bourgeois Democracies, power lay in the hands of ‘finance capitalism’, no matter the claims of so called governments of, by and for all the people. And whilst Dewey freely admitted that it would be ‘silly’ to deny that there had been great gain for the masses within liberal democracies, such as qualified suffrage, freedom of speech, press and assembly, he also viewed it as intellectual hypocrisy to ‘glorify these gains and give no attention to the brutalities and inequities, the regimentation and suppression’ which plagued the system of economic liberalism (LW11: 296-97).

This was no understatement. Although 1920’s US society was one of apparent prosperity, it was still marked by severe economic inequality, unprogressive income tax, precarious employment, lack of industrial democracy and a relatively nonexistent welfare state to mitigate such circumstances. By the time of The Great Depression, when such material inequality and the lack of means to deal with such conditions became even more acute, Dewey lamented that there were now ‘millions of people who have the minimum of control over the conditions of their own subsistence’ (LW13: 300). Yet, as Dewey points out, ‘no economic state of affairs is merely economic’ (LW11: 295). The most unjust and immoral

62 As Leuchtenburg (1993: 200-202) highlights the prosperity of the 1920’s made it seem to some that the US was achieving the goals of socialism without socialism’s means. In this sense, The Great Society did have some significant good effects on the lives of ordinary American Citizens. The US in 1928 spent on education as much as the rest of the world; radically improved school and college attendance; cut infant mortality rates by two thirds; and increased life expectancy for Americans from 49 to 59 years. However, as Leuchtenburg goes on to show, these statistics do not touch on the aforementioned racial segregation at the heart of the US life or the fact that material inequality actually increased by the end of 1920’s before the onset of The Great Depression. As Livingston (2011: 54) points out, the 1920’s saw income shares shift from wages to profits. By 1929, then, 90 percent of tax payers had less disposable income than in 1922, whilst corporate profits rose 63 percent, dividends doubled and the top 1 percent of taxpayers increased their disposable income by 63 percent. In the same period there had also been a net loss of 1 million manufacturing jobs due to the increased efficiency of technology, which resulted in around a 20 percent fall in the share of wages in the expenditure of industrial corporations. These numbers seem to bring home Dewey’s point that whilst there had been gains for wider society; these changes had been tempered by even wider gains for certain parts of society at the expense of others.
aspect of such an unequal economic state of affairs was the role they played in the eclipse of the public and the stunting of creative democracy. As Dewey outlined:

‘The same forces which have brought about the forms of democratic government, general suffrage, executives and legislators chosen by majority vote, have also brought about conditions which halt the social and humane ideals that demand the utilization of government as the genuine instrumentality of an inclusive and fraternally associated public’ (LW2: 303).

The halting of the social and humane ideals Dewey associated with creative democracy were inherently down to Bourgeois democracy being founded on the idea that laissez-faire capitalism was the true expression of human liberty. This had arisen, Dewey stressed, because in the fight against arbitrary government action and religious freedom, mid 19th century philosophical branches of Liberalism, from Adam Smith to the Mills’, had identified the ‘immutable truth’ that human liberty was to be found in the practises of laissez-faire capitalism. In this sense, human nature and natural law could be said to be fulfilled when liberty was perceived as the equal right of every individual to conduct free economic enterprise free from government constraint, so long as they broke no law on the statute books.

This in turn would be socially beneficial because such the activities of self interested individuals would automatically create competition that would provide socially needed commodities and services. Any government intervention that interferes with this form of liberty was to be taken as an attack on liberty itself. Ultimately, this conception of liberty, which was presented by 19th century Liberals as an ‘immutable truth’ across time and space, was used by the commercial and industrial classes to firstly usurp the vested interests of
mercantilism and then serve as the hegemonic justification for Bourgeois democracy (LW11: 26-27, 287-86 cf. LW2: 291-93).  

Dewey found that the hegemonic perpetuation of the ideal that *laissez-faire* capitalism equalled the 'philosophy of liberty' had had a profound impact upon the intelligence of the masses and the subsequent eclipse of the public. By the 1930's it was apparent that *laissez-faire* capitalism and its conception of liberty had delivered extreme stratification rather than the liberty of all. However, defenders of the status quo, such as commercial and industrial interests who benefited from such conditions and philosophies such as Social Darwinism, pointed towards how supposed natural inequalities of individuals in moral and intellectual make-up not only explained economic inequality but how such consequences were the effects of the natural law of economic enterprise. Against the failure of those who were naturally deficient in being innovative, independent and economically proactive stood the success of those ‘rugged individuals’ who managed to practise liberty and gain wealth and property. 

As a result, defenders of the status quo again retorted that any government intervention interfered with this form of liberty and was therefore to be taken as an attack on liberty itself. Such arguments were indicative to Dewey of how, within the confines of Bourgeois democracy, the very concept of intelligence itself had fallen under the strictures of *laissez-faire*. However, as he reminded his readers, this simply reflected the failure of modern proponents of liberalism and the industrial and commercial interests to recognise or admit

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63 Of course the ideal that *laissez-faire* capitalism equalled the 'philosophy of liberty', argued Dewey, was itself incorrect. Such a philosophy failed to acknowledge how 'effective liberty' was a historically relative concept based on the social conditions of the cultural matrix at a given moment in time.
how individuals were formed by interaction of the human organism with its environment
and how the current economic regime affected such interaction (LW11: 29-32, 47-48, 286).

In this sense, 'effective intelligence' was not an 'original, innate endowment' but rather the
process of 'embodied intelligence' deposited by social habits and customs (LW2: 366). And
railing against both apologists of laissez-faire capitalism and Democratic Realism, Dewey
highlighted how economic relationships and hegemonic ideals of Bourgeois democracy
worked in tandem to limit the access of the masses to information and educative practises
that could bolster their intelligence. The majority engaged in the production and
distribution of economic commodities, argued Dewey, had no share in the ‘...imaginative,
intellectual -emotional – in directing activities in which they physically participate’ (LW5:
104). The strictures of industrial and economic relations within The Great Society, such as
the mass production techniques of Fordism, meant that that mass of individuals tended to
‘become cogs in the vast machine whose workings they do not understand, and in whose
management they have no part or lot in’ (LW11: 252).

This lack of emphasis on developing the mind of the masses could also be found in wider
public education polices of liberal democracies, which through lack of, or unworthy
standards of, provision systematically failed to provide the masses with the knowledge they
needed in order to make correct judgements about the nature of The Great Society they
inhabited. The public school system merely reproduced the hegemony of Laissez-faire
capitalism and its conception of liberty. For example, by 1935 between 12 million Americans
had reached the employment age since 1929 and at least half had not found steady
employment due to The Great Depression. What Dewey found equally as appalling as this
situation was how the public education had so ill equipped the youth to comprehend The Great Society and perpetuated the so called merits of Laissez-faire capitalism:

'It is terrible enough that so many youths should have no opportunity to obtain employment under the conditions set by the present economic system. It is equally terrible that so many young people should be refused opportunity in what we call a public education system, to find out about the cause of the tragic situation, and, in large measure, should be indoctrinated in ideas to which the realities about them given them the lie. Confusion and bewilderment are sufficiently rife so that is not necessary to add to them a deliberately cultivated blindness' (LW11: 354).

Added to the intellectual hegemony of stratification, Dewey also believed that technological innovation and subsequent integration into consumer capitalism also affected the ability of the public to comprehend their present circumstances. This largely concerned the nature of the new media technologies and their integration into mass production and mass consumption. Man after all, Dewey contended, was a 'consuming and sportive animal as well as a political one' and the power of 'bread and circus' to distract citizens from political concerns was nothing new. But he took the sheer number and variety of modern cheap consumer products, such as the 'movie, radio, cheap reading matter and motor car', as a wholly unprecedented scenario of political distraction.

'In most circles it is hard work to sustain conversation on a political theme; and once initiated, it is quickly dismissed with a yawn. Let there be introduced the topic of the mechanism and accomplishment of various makes of motor cars or the respective merits of actresses, and the dialogue goes on at a lively pace. The thing to be remembered is that cheapened and multiplied access to amusement is the product
of the machine age, intensified by the business tradition which causes provision of
means for an enjoyable passing of time to be one of the most profitable of
occupations' (LW2: 321-322).

Although Dewey did not hold that such modern media technologies and products had been
purposefully created as a Culture Industry, the fact that they did not originate in deliberate
desire to divert political interest did not lessen their effectiveness in that direction (LW2:
321). The use of modern technology and modern mass production techniques to create
mass consumer products thus lead to forms of mass consumption that often crowded out
political concerns of citizenship.

Nevertheless, when Dewey examined how such new media technologies, such as the
‘telegraph, telephone, radio, cheap and quick mails,’ impacted upon the dissemination of
information as ‘News’ to the public, he saw even more cause for concern. News, as Dewey
stated:

‘...signifies something which has just happened, and which is new just because it
deviates from the old and regular. But its meaning depends upon relation to what it
imports, to what its social consequences are. This import cannot be determined
unless the new is placed in relation to the old, to what has happened and been
integrated into the course of events. Without coordination and consecutiveness,
events are not events, but mere occurrences, intrusions; an event implies that out of
which a happening proceeds’ (LW2: 347).

The problem Dewey found with this present news coverage was that it centred on triviality
and sensationalism. Driven by the ‘catastrophic, namely crime, accident, family rows,
personal clashes and conflicts,’ such news coverage did not supply continuity of coverage to its audiences but rather supplied whatever would be taken as the ‘new par excellence’. As a result, Dewey quipped that the contents of news coverage became so interchangeable, that only the ‘date of the newspaper’ could inform us whether such events happened ‘last year or this, so completely are they isolated from their connections’ (ibid.,).

The explanation of this state of affairs, argued Dewey, was once more in the mixing of business practises and interests with modern media technology. Bourgeois democracy’s ‘quasi-democratic’ habits of free speech, free press and free assembly created fertile ground for different sources of news production and public discussion. However, such freedoms were structurally prone to being undermined by the fact that the centralisation and concentration of the means of production and distribution also had concomitant effects upon the organisation of the public press. As Dewey noted, the smoothest road to control of political matters was through the construction of public opinion and it was no coincidence that the gathering and sale of news had become part of the existing system of ‘pecuniary profit’ (LW2: 348-49).

This not only resulted in the influence of ‘private interests in procuring suppression, secrecy and misrepresentation,’ but also the importing of the hegemony of consumer capitalism into news production and dissemination. This was what Dewey took as the explanation for the sensationalist and triviality of what passed for news. Thus, either through the perpetuation of a certain style of consumer capitalism in news production and dissemination, or through direct ownership and influence, Dewey believed that large corporate capitalism naturally influenced the publishing business (LW13: 168).
Contra the arguments of Democratic Realism and defenders of the *laissez-faire* capitalism, then, Dewey argued that the eclipse of the public was not down to its innate intellectual deficiency but largely down to the artificial intellectual inequality engendered by Bourgeois democracy and elements of its consumer culture:

'The indictments that are drawn against intelligence of individuals are in truth indictments of a social order that does not permit the average individual to have access to the rich store of the accumulated wealth of mankind in knowledge, ideas, and purposes. There does not now exist the kind of social organisation that even permits the average human being to share the potentially available social intelligence. Still less is there a social order that has for one of its chief purposes the establishment of conditions that will move the mass of individuals to appropriate and use what is at hand. Back of the appropriation by the few of the material resources of society lies the appropriation by the few in behalf of their own ends of the cultural, the spiritual, resources that are the product not of individuals who have taken possession but of the cooperative works of humanity' (LW11: 38-39).

It was therefore useless, Dewey lamented, to ruminate about the apparent failure of democracy until the sources of its failure had been grasped and steps were taken, namely using government action to address such economic and intellectual inequality, to bring about that type of social organisation that would deliver the masses with the correct knowledge to comprehend The Great Society and practise creative democracy. For without such change we simply 'have no way of telling how the apt for judgment of social polices the existing intelligence of the masses may be' (LW2: 366)
b. The National and Global Eclipse of Creative Democracy

The effects of the eclipse of the public meant that creative democracy at the level of the nation state had essentially itself become eclipsed. Not only did ordinary citizens have no real democratic control over The Great Society at the national level, but publics were not able to emerge and articulate demands that could generate the reform of social institutions in the first place. Principally, Dewey realised that the eclipse of the public allowed the regime of ‘Bourgeois democracy’ to continue to underpin the institutions and practises of political democracy at the nation state level. Due to the fact that democratic government had arisen with such a conception of liberty, capitalism and the practise of democracy were now seen as ‘Siamese’ twins, where to attack one was to threaten the life of the other (LW13: 137). Indeed, Dewey took the example of the application of laissez-faire to individual intelligence to be indicative of how liberalism’s tenets had become part of wider political malaise within political democracy, which now acted as ‘an instrument of vested interests’ of capital to oppose further social change’ (LW11: 35).

This in turn had a pincer effect on the nature of political democracy under Bourgeois democracy and its perpetuation of the eclipse of the public. On one hand, Dewey argued that in the 1920’s and 30’s political parties ruled but they did not govern, acting as quasi ‘servants of the same dominant railway, banking, and corporate industrial forces’ (LW6: 186 cf. LW5: 442). This was not just through blatant or corrupt control of government, but rather because the hegemonic identification of capitalism and democracy and the ability of business to actually organise itself as a public meant that it was able to reform the state and government in much the same way as ‘dynastic interests’ controlled government two centuries prior (LW2: 302). Therefore in the inevitable clash between private property
interests and the interest of the masses, all the 'habits of thought and action' impelled the institutions of political democracy to side with the former over the latter (LW6: 159).

On the other hand, the fact that political parties acted in the interests of capital rather than people had significant impact on the actual eclipse of public. Government intervention on the effects of such an economically and intellectually stratified society was always palliative and dealt with symptoms rather than what Dewey took as the causes of such a state of affairs. This in turn locked the masses into the perpetual supporting of one impotent political party over the other, breeding a swing style democracy where the 'tidal wave' swamps one party and the 'landslide' carries the other into office. In such a form of politics, instead of real policy difference, it was rather 'habit, party funds, the skill of mangers of the machine, the portrait of the candidate with his firm jaw, his lovely wife and children, and a multitude of other irrelevancies' which determined the outcome of political democracy (LW2: 311).

The impotency of existing political forms to direct and manage the social effects of The Great Society was also now generating 'distrust in political democracy and all forms of popular government' (LW13: 105-106). This was because political democracy, with its established institutions and practises under hegemonic control of laissez-faire capitalism, had seen its 'symbols lose connection with the realities behind them' (LW11: 51). The majority of the voting public, convinced that there was 'no important difference between the two old parties' and that to vote for one over the other was to signify very 'little', thus lost faith with democracy (LW6: 185). Not only did this further add to the political apathy engendered in the majority under the auspices of Bourgeois democracy and its consumer culture, but with such public apathy, political democracy itself became stratified and turned
into just another 'business' run by the 'bosses' and 'managers' of the 'political 'machine'.

Political Democracy was thus left to the machinations of professional politicians and elites, who rather attempting to serve the public, looked to keep or obtain power for the sake of keeping or obtaining power within the confines of Bourgeois democracy (LW2: 321, LW7: 353-354).

The ultimate political effect of the eclipse of the public within the nation state was destruction of the Deweyan sense of community and disharmony within the nation state. This point is pivotal; whilst Dewey believed citizens were unable to correctly locate where the indirect consequences that were affecting their daily lives came from and hence could not generate publics which could foster the reform of social institutions of the state to control and regulate consequences of The Great Society, he did not believe that citizens could no longer generate publics. As he pointed out:

'It is not that there is no public, no large body of persons having a common interest in composition in the consequences of social transactions. There is too much public, a public too diffused and scattered and too intricate in composition. And there are too many publics, for conjoint actions which have indirect, serious, and enduring consequences are multitudinous beyond comparison, and each one of them crosses the others and generates its own group of persons especially affected with little to hold these different publics together in an integrated whole' (LW2: 320).

The irony of The Great Society was that the more it made citizens more interdependent through its division of labour and production, the more it seemed to create divisions of interest between various groups across society. In fact, due to the inequality and stratification of Bourgeois democracy, Dewey saw that groups and their publics referred
back to the old form of being antagonistic towards one another, rather than democratically addressing the cause of their dissatisfactions.

As Dewey noted in 1939, the emergence ‘in political life of populists movements, square deals, new deals, accompanies depressions on the party of those most directly affected – farmers, factory labourers etc, ‘was indicative of how such groups were kept from ‘uniting politically by divergence of immediate interests’ (LW13: 106). Under Bourgeois democracy, then, the educative rhythm of creative democracy, which looks to ensure a perpetual equality of communication and cooperative problem solving as social conditions and conceptions of moral value shift throughout history, was essentially non-existent.

Stuck with old and out-dated social institutions, a form of democracy that was actually not democratic, and an eclipse of the public and community which could bring reform to such social institutions, creative democracy was thus stunted at the nation state level. The state of political democracy in America pre World War Two was a prime example of this process and it had ultimately been left without the reform of social institutions, such as wider and reformed education, workplace democracy and comprehensive unemployment insurance which it needed to deal with the consequences of The Great Society. As Dewey noted, whilst Americans had inherited the local town meeting practises of democracy of their agrarian forefathers, these practises were now insufficient to enact reforms suitable for ‘national affairs- now also affected by world conditions’ (LW13: 95 cf. LW2: 306).

Even at the Federal level, the success of industrial forces in controlling political parties had locked in what Dewey viewed as a flawed system of two party adversarial politics. The idea that the conflict between political parties would bring out ‘public truths’, stressed Dewey, was a kind of ‘political watered down version of the Hegelian dialectic, with its synthesis
arrived at by a union of antithetical conceptions' (LW11: 51). And whether it was the ‘rugged individualism’ of the Hoover regime, or the ‘piecemeal polices undertaken ad hoc’ of FDR’s New Deal, which whilst seeming radical did not really reform the ‘institutional scheme of things’, political democracy merely ‘drifted’ along, largely consolidating the economic and intellectual stratification of Bourgeois democracy (LW11: 45, 61-62 cf. LW13: 315). The result, as Dewey observed, was that The Great Society and its new age of human relationships had ‘no political agencies worthy of it’ (LW2: 303).

It has become the norm to read Dewey’s account of the eclipse of the public and the stunting of creative democracy as simply being concerned with the American nation state. However, there is no doubt that Dewey’s claim that The Great Society had no political agencies worthy of it, extended to matters of global democracy. As outlined above, the underlying theme of The Public and its Problems and his writings thereafter, is of the need for The Great Society to become a Great Community. And Dewey knew that The Great Society did not just stretch across North America but rather traversed the world’s continents. That such an international Great Community and global democracy was not presently forthcoming due to the eclipse of the public was paramount in Dewey’s mind. Writing in 1939, Dewey reflected on how since World War One the ‘world communities’ had failed to ‘meet and forestall’ needed change and left ‘us with old problems unsolved and new ones added’ (LW13: 316).

Dewey held that the failure to initiate such change was undoubtedly down to the fact that Bourgeois democracy and the breakdown of creative democracy within the nation state made such change improbable. This was down to two interrelated reasons. The first reason was that the hegemony of Bourgeois democracy always meant that political leaders would
attempt palliative measures that maintained the hegemony of capitalism and its conception of liberty. We have seen how this strangled the reform Dewey thought needed at the level of nation state. However, Bourgeois democracy’s control of The Great Society was not only based on domestically stratified societies in the West, but functioned through a global economy based on the captive export and raw material markets of non-Western countries (LW11: 55). As a basic provision of global democracy the wretched of the earth would have been set free from the shackles of imperialism and have been given the right to have a democratic right in the first place. By any stretch of the imagination, global democracy in the Deweyan sense would hardly have been palliative or predisposed to being friendly to the interests of capital.

The second reason was that the eclipse of the public meant citizens were in no position to demand their leaders enact such changes. In fact the consequences of The Great Society and the eclipse of the public and community at the nation state undoubtedly had detrimental effects on how nation states viewed and conducted international relations towards one another. As Dewey noted in The Public and its Problems, throughout history man has had problems getting on with his fellows, even in his neighbourhood. With The Great Society’s engendering of the transnational forms of relationships and interdependence, Dewey noted that man was not now ‘more successful’ with getting on with his fellows ‘when they act at a great distance in ways invisible to him’ (LW2: 317). The subsequent problem of there being too many publics who were ‘diffused and scattered and too intricate in composition,’ who were subsequently antagonistic towards one another was therefore not confined to groups within the nation states, but also extended to publics between nation states themselves.
As the 1930’s had shown, antagonism towards citizens of other nation states, either through outright Fascism or ideals of isolationism, could be seen to be one of the last points of unity that the divided and troubled publics of nations states had left. It was therefore no surprise to Dewey that the failure of the world communities to meet and forestall the failings of Bourgeois democracy and regulate the transnational consequences generated by The Great Society through creative democracy at home and aboard had seen the growth of ‘exacerbated Nationalism’ and left democracy as an ideal and form of government under attack from both the ‘right and left’ (LW13: 106, 316). As Dewey noted:

‘The career of individuals, their lives and security as well as prosperity is now affected by events on the other side of the world. The forces back of these events he cannot touch or influence – save perhaps by joining in a war of nations against nations. For we seem to live in a world in which nations try to deal with the problems created by the new situation by drawing more and more into themselves, by more and more extreme assertions of independent nationalist sovereignty, while everything they do in the direction of autarky leads to ever closer mixture with other nations – but in war’ (LW13: 180)

The rise of Fascism and hyper-Nationalism was the exemplar of this process and was essentially down to the result of the inequality and stratification of Bourgeois democracy and its inability to provide citizens with intellectual and political means of respectively perceiving and controlling the consequences generated by The Great Society. Dewey saw the success of Fascist movements as being down to their ability to fill the political void citizens experienced in Bourgeois democracy by momentarily appearing to offer an explanation and political solution to the drastic changes engendered by living in such an
interdependent world. Of course such explanations and political solutions were a mirage that led to totalitarianism. Rather than creating a community in Dewey’s sense, such movements attempted to restore a simulacrum of forms of community, such as völksgemeinschaft, that were hostile not only to Bourgeois democracy, but also the ideals of Creative Democracy and the Great Community (LW13: 176, 315-316).64

This was the scenario Dewey feared most when considering the future of global democracy: the eclipse of the public in nation states and the consequences engendered by The Great Society leading citizens to turn away from forming a Great Community and turning upon one another. This view is summed up when, in the midst of The Great Depression, trade protectionism and the increasing sense of another world war, Dewey castigates the hostility of not only Fascism, but also the citizens contained within Bourgeois democracies towards the ideals of global democracy and a Great Community:

‘We cannot blame our Government or any other government for not instituting new polices as long as the peoples themselves are engaged in the futile task of identifying patriotism with isolation, and trying to gain independence without regard to independence that now exists. It is up to us, the people, to develop a genuine cooperative spirit and sense of mutual interests that bind the nations of the world together for weal or woe – and at the present time largely for woe. The principle of good neighbourliness is as fundamental in international matters as in the village or the city... We shall refuse to live up to it at our peril, the peril of depression,

64 Dewey opposed Fascism and Communism because they essentially did what Corporate America did, but substituted big business for a bureaucratic state. As Westbrook (1991: 452) outlines, both Communism and Fascism were to Dewey uses of violent state power to enforce a form of autocratic corporatism which stifled democracy.
unemployment, degraded standard of living, and of war that will kill millions more and destroy billions more of property' (LW11: 263-264).

It was thus Bourgeois democracy and The Great Society's engendering of 'divided and troubled publics' within and between nation states and the breakdown of creative democracy at the nation state level, that Dewey saw as the 'immense difficulty' facing global democracy. Until The Great Society was converted into a Great Community, the Public would perpetually remain in eclipse (LW2: 324). As without publics who could comprehend the complexity and trans-national nature of The Great Society, communicate transitionally and challenge the hegemony of Bourgeois democracy, there was no chance of real political innovation both within and outside the nation state. Post Second World War, this undoubtedly was the key challenge Dewey identified as facing the new political 'imperative' of global democracy after the world war and its own quest of 'discovering and implementing politically, areas of common interest' between the peoples of the world. For the failure of projects like the UN and other innovations at the transnational level to offer the peoples of the world a symbol of what may become an actuality would be the perpetuation of Bourgeois democracy and the isolationism, nationalism and outright hostility to others of the pre war era. And with such failure came not only the potential of the utter destruction of all the material gains of The Great Society, but also catastrophic loss of human life.
Chapter 6- Deweyan Lessons for the 21st Century

After journeying through the work of John Dewey and his views on The Great Society and the formation of a Great Community, it seems that we potentially come to an impasse. How are we to use his work for our own purposes? How does Dewey’s work help us contemplate our own present form of globalisation? And how does Dewey’s work inform an analysis of global democracy in the 21st century? The use of historical analogy is always a curious endeavour, as no matter how similar such history is to the present day the reality is that history, by its very definition, can never be a true reflection of our own present. However, maybe the focus on reflection and symmetry is itself a false endeavour and the use of history is best seen as providing extra colour to the spectrum through which we view the present. Perhaps, then, just like the death of a dying star light years away, the actual unfolding of events and the lessons to be learnt from the past can only be truly seen long after those events have actually taken place.

Drawing from such an approach to historical analogy, I outline 4 Deweyan lessons for the 21st century and our own hopes for global democracy. Moreover, these lessons highlight that what we often take to be the problems of ‘globalisation’, the collapse of ‘modern sovereignty’ and ‘global democracy’ are simply new ways of expressing old concerns and debates. And that maybe those of us in the present would be better served by returning to Dewey’s ruminations about these old concerns for new insights into our own present day problems.
6.1 A Great Society does not equal a Great Community or Why Globalisation does not equal Global Democracy!

One of the most galling aspects Dewey would have encountered reading modern global democratic theory is how such theorists such as Held, Dryzek and Bohman often conflate the division between society and community and neglect the implications of such a division:

‘Associated or joint activity is a condition of the creation of a community. But association itself is physical and organic, while communal life is moral, that is emotionally, intellectually, consciously sustained. Human beings combine in behaviour as directly and unconsciously as do atoms, stellar masses and cells... They do so in virtue of their own structure, as man and woman unite, as the baby seeks the breast and the breast is there to supply its need. They do so from external circumstances, pressure from without, as atoms combine or separate in presence of an electric charge or as sheep huddle together from the cold. Associated activity needs no explanation; things are made that way. But no amount of aggregated collective action of itself constitutes a community... Even if “society” were as much an organism as some writers have held, it would not on that account be society. Interactions, transactions, occur de facto and the results of interdependence follow. But participation in activities and sharing in results are additive concerns. They demand communication as prerequisite (LW2: 330).

Moreover, Dewey was adamant that a democratic community was enacted through the conscious creation of signs and symbols, habits of thought, language and action, which ‘...add the function of communication in which emotions and ideas are shared as well as joint undertakings engaged in’ (LW13: 176).’ In this sense, Dewey bequeaths us the lesson that
democratic communication and the subsequent practise of creative democracy are not things that merely arise from an interdependent society but rather need to be established on the back of the interdependence which arises from societal associations as necessary, but not sufficient, conditions.

This distinction between society and community held, for Dewey, not just across local and national societies but also the international associative relationships created by the advent of The Great Society. Although the associative relationships and technological advancements, engendered by The Great Society, created large scale global interdependence and industrial co-operation, Dewey did not believe that such conditions alone were sufficient to create a Great Community. In fact, Dewey believed technological advancements and the accompanying new habits and social customs, engendered by The Great Society's associative relationships, to actually be counterintuitive to community. For instance, we have already seen that Dewey thought that the mass communication revolution (wireless telegraphs, telephones, radio) did not by default create a greater sense of community, or rather the type of communication that generated community, both within and beyond the nation state. And in this sense, Dewey's belief that the advent of mass communication technology actually helped to create habits, which contributed to the breakdown of the public sphere, places him as a precursor to later media critics ranging from Adorno and Horkhemier to the enfant terrible that was Jean Baudrillard.65

Even if he was not totally sold on conspiracy narrative of his successors, Dewey recognised what Tim Wu (2011: 6) has recently highlighted, which is that the modern mass communication technologies of the 20th and early 21st century have often been brought within the structures of industrial capitalism and become a 'highly centralised and integrated new industry' in their own right.
Even more tellingly, Dewey introduces the idea that other than mass consumption, the very habits and customs of industrial society and its democracy may currently be counter to the pursuit of community. This was illustrated by Dewey in his response to the subsuming of the concept of intelligence under the strictures of laissez-faire capitalism. The concept of 'effective intelligence' created by 'embodied intelligence' (habits/customs) was not simply about the dispelling of a static or innate conception of intelligence, but also showed how technological advancements and new habits of the industrial order also lead to an eclipse of the public. This can be narrated as an argument that modern capitalism simply destroys the ability of the masses to comprehend The Great Society by turning them into the aforementioned 'cogs' in the vast machine whose workings they do not understand, and in whose management they have no part or lot in. We have also seen how Dewey lambasted the social order for failing to provide an adequate level of suitable education, which would allow the public to get a greater understanding of their present.

The under-education and intellectual alienation of the masses was of course a problem; however, it was not the end of the story. Dewey's use of the term 'cogs' needs to be clarified because it does not simply translate into a belief that the masses had regressed and become less advanced primates in The Great Society. Reflecting on the new habits of knowledge and industry in 1927, for example, Dewey highlighted how present day citizens could, due to education and a relative popularising of science, talk about and understand science in ways far more complex than their ancestors:

'Capacities are limited by the objects and tools at hand. They are still more dependent on habits of attention and interest which are set by tradition and institutional customs. Meanings run in the channels formed by instrumentalities of
which, in the end, language the vehicle of thought as well of communication is the most important. A mechanic can discourse ohms and amperes as Sir Isaac Newton could not in his day. Many a man who has tinkered with radios can judge of things which Faraday did not dream of. It is aside from the point to say that if Newton and Faraday were now here, the amateur and mechanic would be infants beside them. The retort only brings out the point: the difference made by different objects to think of and by different meanings in circulation. A more intelligent state of affairs, one more informed with knowledge, more directed by intelligence, would not improve original endowments.’ (LW2:366)

Contra Democratic Realism, Dewey held that citizens could, through improving education and media practises and forging a greater involvement in industry and politics, develop habits that would allow them to act more intelligently without necessarily making them ‘omnicompetent’ or improving their native levels of intelligence. The proof itself was already apparent in the skill and knowledge of the amateur and mechanic compared to that of Newton and Faraday. The under utilisation of the intellectual potential of masses in judging public matters thus functioned on the lack of habits rather than inability of the masses to ever master such habits. And this points towards Dewey’s hopes that the spread of such new habits would aid not only a citizen’s appreciation of their present circumstances, but facilitate creative democracy.

This reflection on the nature of the industrial and complex habits of The Great Society also brings home the fact that just because citizens are conducting complex tasks and interdependent relations with one another, it does not follow that such habits will produce the understanding of community. Moreover, Dewey’s reflections on the division between
society and community recognise over 70 years earlier what critiques of global democracy such as Kymlicka notes, which is that a community is not defined by ‘the forces people are subject to, but rather how they respond to such forces...’(1999:437).

Contra writers associated with global democracy, whilst we may live daily in a globalised world, it does not automatically mean that our political ideals and identities have also become globalised. From a Deweyan perspective, this translates into healthy and historically based scepticism of narratives where our current period of globalisation and advancement in modern communication technology or industrial cooperation of individuals across the globe, are said to presuppose the emergence of ‘communities of fate’, ‘transnational public spheres’ or any other movement towards global democracy. Moreover, Dewey provides a historical lesson that such globalised conditions may not necessarily lend themselves to the actual emergence of what he took to be community both on a national and global level.

Ultimately, it is the signs and symbols of a possible global democracy within our present that we must consult and analyse. What are the signs and symbols of the 21st century that facilitate both national and transnational communication? Do they even exist and are they effective in creating a Great Community in the 21st century? And are these two types of community actually contradictory or antagonistic towards one another? For example, are the actions and praxis of Global Civil Society strong enough to provide such transnational communication? Or are they, as the evidence of global democracy's own evidence suggest, too weak at the moment to create a Great Community? Rather than simply inferring that a globalised society will become a globalised community the Deweyan lesson is that all communities are made and not simply produced by associated behaviour and technological
innovation. And that we must turn our attention to how hopes of a Great Community are actually being constructed in the 21st century.

6.2 A Great Community would likely be a community of national communities

The discussion of forming a Great Community brings us to the question of the best means of bringing about such a Great Community and the forms of government that would serve it. As we encountered in chapters 3 and 4, in global democratic theory the nation state has a paradoxical role of being fundamentally weakened by globalisation and also being necessary to the facilitation of global democracy within globalisation. The problem with this perspective, as critics such as Rodrik (2011) have pointed out, is that it neglects the prominence of national identities and politics and the interplay between the national and international levels of politics. One of the chief lessons of Dewey's work on the potential for global democracy is that it must not only begin from the unit of the nation state but must include and arise within the nation state.

Examining Dewey's account of The Great Society we can see that his work highlights that another supposed contemporary problem, the collapse of modern sovereignty, is actually a lot older than we care to admit. Throughout the 1920's and 1930's Dewey continually highlights how the interdependence of the world nations engendered by The Great Society has not only seen consequences of associated human action become transnational but also how these transnational consequences affected the ability of nation states to govern properly. Writing in context of The Great Depression and trade protectionism Dewey notes:
'Bad results work both ways. In order to compete with other nations, a competition artificially made harder by the present system of barriers, labour standards are lowered at home. The other nations find that unless wages are reduced at home and labour speeded up, they are disadvantage. Their standards are put in peril. We have made almost universal the inquiry of Cain: “Am I my brother’s keeper?”' (LW11: 262)

As outlined in the last chapter, it was on the back of these conditions and out-dated policies of nation states that Dewey constructed his own arguments for the extension of democracy globally and took to task what he saw as bull-headed nationalism which turned ‘indifference and antagonism into a positive virtue’ in the face of such global interdependence. His subsequent conclusion was that the doctrine of national ‘Sovereignty,’ that had buttressed regressive protectionism, quests of autarky and global war, was a complete denial of political responsibility nation states had towards one another (LW2: 376).

In light of such statements one might infer that Dewey would take the national political arena and nationalism to be mere transitory stage in the extension of global democracy. In this sense, the concept of all-inclusiveness or what Dewey called the extension of democracy as a way of life, would be best served by politically empowering, either through cosmopolitan law, global civil society, a transnational public sphere or supranational democratic institutions, those affected by the consequences of associated action, irrespective of nationality. After all, as Dewey made clear, political democracy was only effective when the ‘government exists to serve its community, and that this purpose cannot
be achieved unless the community itself shares in selecting governors and determining their policies' (LW2: 327).

And as Dewey was under no illusion that The Great Society must become a Great community then it only follows that it should be the Great community that picks its governors. The problem with this account, however, is whilst Dewey (LW2: 377) recognised the decline of modern sovereignty and his i anti-essentialism saw him claim that ‘The State is pure myth,’ he also understood that the loyalty of citizens to the cultural membership of the nation and its political fusion in the nation state would have to be taken seriously if global democracy was to be successful (LW15: 208-209).

The rise of European Nationalism, which was cemented by Napoleonic Wars and the resistance of foreign rule, Dewey argued, had created a form of nationalism that consolidated ‘formerly disperse political and social forces’ (LW15: 208). However, this ‘modern state unity’ had not only been created by resistance to foreign rule but also by The Great Society’s technological advancements (railways, telegraph, and telephone). These technological advancements in turn, not only created the aforementioned economic interdependence amongst the citizens of the nation state, but even more importantly the ‘rapid and easy circulation’ of opinion and information, which created a national identity beyond the face-to-face communities of people’s daily lives and laid the possibility of new forms of national democratic government (LW2: 306-307). This process of cultural membership, contended Dewey, creates a national ‘culture’ which is exemplified in ‘...ways of living so ingrained by long habituation that they form the very fibre of a people'. And as
the inter war and post world war periods had made clear, this fibre was so tough ‘that it will resist, often unto death, attempts made from without to destroy it’ (LW15: 208).66

At the start of the 20th century, then, Dewey, recognised what modern writers such as Anderson (1991) and Billig (1997) point out, which is that nation states offer not only legal inclusion but a cultural membership that is always in the process of being remade. And such nationalism, with its exclusive and aggressive side forms a ‘conspicuous’ obstacle towards global democracy. However, Dewey also noted that nationalism was ‘two-sided’ and that the sense of wider social order and organisation provided by the nation states and its nationalism should be seen as ‘positive advance’ (ibid., 208-209). By this, Dewey viewed the nation state as a serious unit of social action not only because of the aggressive side of nationalism but because it was exactly one of those means which have been most expedient in the pursuit of the ethical commitment of democracy as a way of life. The nation state was therefore valuable because it was capable of upholding a national democratic community and a national practise of creative democracy.

With both sides of nationalism in mind, then, Dewey took that the nation state and its institutions of democracy could not simply be deemed surplus to requirements or superseded but must play an active part of global democracy:

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66 The spread of such Nationalism outside of the West and into regions such as Asia also bought home for Dewey that the age of European imperialism was now over and that the idea of a global military hegemon was also unfeasible. Dewey thus understood in 1946 the ramifications of what was to become known as ‘Third World Nationalism’ and no doubt would have recoiled in horror had he had lived to see the Vietnam war and other countless apparent interventions in the 3rd World by Western countries throughout the cold war.
'A wider community of interests cannot possibly be attained by the negative process if wiping out communities of belief, action and mutual support which have behind them centuries of loyalty. Without a basis in them, a world government would lead a precarious existence. If a world government is to gain the hearty support of the peoples of the earth it must actively enlist the energies of national states as dependable organs for execution of its politics. It can accomplish this result only as those polices give the social value of National States a more secure opportunity to flourish than they now possess' (LW15: 209).

From the above it is clear that Dewey, much like modern advocates of global democracy, acknowledges that nation states would essentially underwrite any form of global democracy. It would transpire via coordinated and collaborative actions of nation states either through joint state ventures or the granting of legitimacy to supranational institutions such as the UN, which would then form the fulcrum of global democracy.

Where Dewey departs from his contemporaries, however, is in taking this fact and the issue of the primacy of the nation state and nationalism seriously. Seen from this point of view, the above sheds light on how Dewey believed the 'divided and troubled publics' could integrate through the politics of the nation state to form global democracy. A Great Community, although facilitating transnational communication, would most likely find its political expression through nation state communities who through 'selecting governors and determining their policies' could play a part in the deliberation and decision making that would transpire at the international level.
In Dewey’s eyes it was this vitality of community and creative democracy at the national level which could facilitate the emergence of a Great Community or a community of communities and the practise of creative democracy at the international level. This is why Dewey was adamant that it was the eclipse of the public and the breakdown of creative democracy at national level that explained the lack of global democracy. The lesson Dewey therefore provides for 21st century observers is that global democracy cannot function on the reification of the global at the expense of the nation state and its politics, but rather should always take the primacy of nation state politics into account.

It is also important, however, to note that the above does not commit the reverse sin via reifying the nation state, nationalism and nation state politics at the expense of the global or transnational. Whilst we should not abandon the ideas and practises of global citizenship, global civil society, transnational public spheres or even transnational democratic federations (EU) it is imperative from a Deweyan position that we take the recognition of the role of nation sate seriously if we are to assign it such a key role in the role of global democracy. For example, a Deweyan position would not rule out or argue against the formation of transnational publics, created by the actors within global civil society for instance, which then campaigned on issues such as climate change or global poverty on a transnational scale. Indeed, this process would be central in the creation of signs and symbols for a Great Community to gain some sense of itself across the globe and would reflect Dewey’s ideas that ‘non-political forces to organise themselves to transform existing political structures: that the divided and troubled publics integrate’
However, as pointed out in chapter 4, Dewey believed that the political power of publics centres not just on mobilisation but on the ability to change the institutions and practises of government. And as Dryzek and Kaldor point out, the power of transnational publics upon global governance would be in affecting national governments in either the altering of their own practises and institutions or the practises and institutions of the global governance institutions that they confer legitimacy upon. For Dewey, such a change would still have to run through national politics and the politics of the nation state and those global concerns may in fact be better served by attempting to harness the politics of the nation state in favour of such issues. The same scenario would undoubtedly play out if governments or citizens were to espouse an overarching Cosmopolitan Democracy or a transnational form of democracy such as Bohman’s conception of the EU.

History may come to show us, for example, that a transnational formation of a democracy of demoi is the future. However, as past history has already shown us, it has been the feeling of loss of national sovereignty and the resistance of an all-encompassing European identity that has thwarted further European integration. The inability of the EU in 2005 to ratify its own constitution through the loss of ‘national referenda’ was thus down to the politics of the nation state and national communities. And if the project is to go further and indeed create Bohman’s vision of a more integrated democracy of demoi, it will be down to national politicians who are first and foremost accountable to national citizens.

The irony of Dewey’s position is that it refutes essentialism but deals with the often harsh reality of such anti-essentialism. Although embracing anti-essentialist conceptions of the public, state and government, which does not essentialise those concepts with the nation
state, Dewey's views seems to posit that the emergence of the nation state and nationalism places a historically contingent limit on the nature of global democracy. Moreover, Dewey denotes that nationalism, the identification of justice by citizens with their nation state and the national democratic community has historical fortitude. And in Dewey's eyes such cultural membership of the nation state was to be taken very much like a solid brick wall; whilst it is undoubtedly a construction, one would be very hard headed to believe that one could simply walk through it. In a similar way to the work of Rodrik (2011), Dewey believed that the power of nationalism, even in the midst of globalisation and the collapse of modern sovereignty, meant that political action, including matters of global democracy, would predominantly transpire around and centre on the politics of nation states and their governments.

6.3 Democracy begins at home

As we can garner from above, a Deweyan position mandates that we take the nation state as one of the primary building blocks of global democracy. The logical consequence of this appraisal of how global democracy could best be enacted is Dewey's subsequent lesson that national conditions of democracy and community are pivotal to forming a Great Community and the practise of global democracy. Moreover, Dewey suggests that without the pursuit of democracy as a way of life and the practise of creative democracy within the nation state, there is little chance of the pursuit of democracy as a way of life and practise of creative democracy beyond the nation state:

'It is said, and said truly, that for the world's peace it is necessary that we understand the peoples of foreign lands. How well do we understand, I wonder, our
next door neighbours. It has also been said that if a man love not his fellow man who he has seen, he cannot love the God whom he has not seen. The chances of regard for distant peoples being effective as long as there is no close neighbourhood experience to bring insight and understanding of neighbours do not seem better. A man who has not been seen in the daily relations of life may inspire admiration, emulation, servile subjection, fanatical partisanship, hero worship; but not love and understanding, as they radiate from the attachments of near-by union. Democracy must begin at home, and its home is the neighbourly community’ (LW2: 368).

The above highlights two interrelated points about the role of the local and national community in the pursuit of global democracy. The first is the point that the local community, the one of face-to-face intercourse in institutions such as the family, school and neighbourhood, is central in Dewey’s eyes to other forms of community such as a possible Great Community. This is because it is within these daily and face to face relations that the primary aspects of communication and acquiring of habits and social customs takes place. Moreover, it was within the neighbourly community that ideal and practise of pursuing a democratic way of life would be taught, learned and put into practise.

The second point is that the local is fundamentally informed and affected by the nation and the international dimensions of a globalised world. The Great Society was taken by Dewey to invade and destroy elements of local communities and led to the ‘immediate source of the instability, disintegration and restlessness which characterise the present epoch’ (LW2: 367). This is why Dewey firmly believed that the ‘heart and final guarantee of democracy’ was the ability of neighbourhoods and friends within the confines of their living rooms to
discourse freely with one another about the news of the day (LW14: 227). However, whilst Dewey doubted a Great Community could ever ‘...possess all the qualities of the qualities which mark a local community’, he was equally as certain that the local community could facilitate a Great Community’s sense of ‘free and full intercommunication’ through its ability to be reordered and enriched by the ideals of a Great Community.

Given his aforementioned take on the role of nation state and nationalism in forming a Great Community, Dewey’s subsequent views of actively utilising the local and national arenas to help form a Great Community and achieve the international practise of creative democracy lead him to advocate, what we can call in modern parlance, a form of Cosmopolitan Nationalism. As Robyn Eckersley (2007: 689-690) points out, Cosmopolitan Nationalism functions on the basis that:

‘Not only would citizens see themselves as belonging to a nation that extends help to those in need (such as tsunami victims); they would also regard the international role of their state, represented by their political leaders, as one of working multilaterally to changed international structures to alleviate global injustices on a systemic basis.’

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Dewey’s focus on the face to face communication has, over the years, been presented as the ramblings of an old man with nostalgia for a form of localism lost to history (see Westbrook 1991 and Cochran 2002 for example). However, as my exposition highlights this is actually far from the truth. Indeed, such nostalgia for earlier, and so called ‘simpler’ times, made Dewey downhearted: ‘I find myself resentful and feeling sad when, in relation to present social, economic, and political problems, people point simply backward as if somewhere in the past there were a model for what we should do today’ (LW 13: 299).
And it is plain to see from the prior discussion, and the summation of his view below, Dewey's views on the best way to achieve a Great Community largely follow the contours of this way of thinking:

‘With our fortunate position in the world I think that if we used our resources, including our financial recourses, to build up among ourselves a genuine, true and effective democratic society, we would find that we have a surer, a more enduring and a more powerful defence of democratic institutions both within ourselves and with relation to the rest of the world than the surrender to the belief in force, violence and war can ever give’ (LW13: 302).

This embracement of a form of Cosmopolitan Nationalism is why Dewey was so adamant the struggle to secure the democratic way of life was not simply about choosing respective focal points of political action such as the local, national or global but rather was to be ‘...maintained on as many fronts as culture has aspects: political, economic, international, educational, scientific and artistic, religious’ (LW13: 186). And there is no greater example of this than Dewey's own immediate present and his take on the school system at that time. The nation's school system, for example, was seen by Dewey not just as a place of training for industry, but also an underutilised arena where there could be a positive and constructive cultivation of the democratic way of life both within and beyond the nation state. Moreover, Dewey believed that the school, as an institution that taught the democratic way of life, could be reformed and better utilised to ‘...break down class division, creating a feeling of greater humanity and of a membership in a single family...’ (LW13: 302).
Contra contemporary proponents of global democracy, then, a Deweyan position on global democracy requires that we do not take our current phase of globalisation and the advent of the need for global democracy to simply transcend local or national democracy and the importance of their forms of community. Whilst contemporary advocates of global democracy are quick to point out that local and national economic issues are tied up with the global economy they fail to acknowledge and then research how this informs the relationship between national and international politics. We have already seen how Dewey believed the emergence of The Great Society, the shattering of local and national community and the eclipse of Creative Democracy at the nation state prohibited the emergence of Creative Democracy at the international level via actually leading to the embrace of hyper nationalism, beggar thy neighbour trade protectionism and autarky. And in this instance, Dewey highlighted how the collapse of community and democracy at the local and national level translated into the collapse of any hope of a Great Community.

The key lesson that Dewey's work bequeaths to us in the present is that we must come to terms with the fact that fronts of culture are in fact linked and feed back upon one another and that this was no more apparent than in the relationship between the local, national and international. Indeed, Dewey's work goes beyond simply pointing at an interactive and iterative relationship between the local, national and international by actively pointing to an order of phases between the sites of democratic community. Given the pivotal role of the nation state to its cause, global democracy's very fate, in its manifestation and implementation, is taken to rest with the vitality of local and national community and democracy and its ability to foster a form of Cosmopolitan Nationalism.
In the second phase, the fate of the local and national community is taken to rest on the success of such Cosmopolitan Nationalism and the implementation of creative democracy at the global level. For without a form of global democracy the local and national levels are beset with instability, disintegration and restlessness. However, Dewey is quite adamant that the second phase cannot happen before the first phase has taken place. It is not just that we cannot examine the chances of global democracy without taking into consideration the status and vitality our democracy at home. But rather without a strong form of creative democracy at home there will never be creative democracy away and beyond from home. And this is the case even if our ultimate goal is to make the ‘away and beyond’ our ‘home’ in the final instance.

6.4 The spectre of bourgeois democracy must be exorcised

The Deweyan formulation that a Great Community and the practise of creative democracy at the international level must begin at ‘home,’ inherently brings us back to the conditions of the national community and the need for a ‘true and effective’ national democracy. What emerges from the underlying theme of Dewey’s advocacy of Cosmopolitan Nationalism as the best means to achieving global democracy is of a present haunted by the spectre that he called bourgeois democracy. We have seen, for instance, that creative democracy and the pursuit of democracy as a way of life demands the perpetual adaption of social institutions, including democratic institutions and practises themselves, as new publics are engendered by social change. However, Dewey also understood that such adaption centred on the promise of political democracy being ‘... a mode of government, a specified practise in selecting officials and regulating their conduct as officials’ (LW2: 286).
In this scenario, democracy not only needs enlightened publics but enlightened publics who can appoint enlightened officials and governments to live up to the ideal of being creative both nationally and internationally. And Dewey was all too aware that Bourgeois democracy and its engendering of the eclipse of the public was a hindrance not only to any practise of creative democracy but the very practise of a form of political democracy which could facilitate the practise of creative democracy in the first place:

‘The dominant issue is whether the people of the United States are to control our government, federal, state and municipal, and to use it is behalf of the peace and welfare of society or whether control is going to go on passing into the hands of small powerful economic groups who shall use all the machinery of administration and legislation to serve their own ends’ (LW6: 149).

On a sheer historical level, then, Dewey’s work on the eclipse of the public and stalling of creative democracy provides us with the realisation that problems of such material and intellectual inequality, political distraction and apathy, elitism and plutocracy, which as we explored in chapter 3 are taken to afflict our current democratic praxis, are not unprecedented but rather have afflicted democratic praxis since the late 19th and early 20th century. And whilst we would be fools to deny that our present has made advances (Dewey’s present had no real welfare state for example), in light of the narration of neoliberalism outlined in chapter 1 it is more than feasible to suggest that our present political strictures still exhibit the key traits of bourgeois democracy.
Rather than simply being a point about historical continuity of bourgeois democracy, however, Dewey's work also reveals analytical lessons about the interconnected nature of the conditions of a national democracy run under the auspices of bourgeois democracy, hyperglobalisation and the possibility of global democracy. For instance, we have become accustomed to noticing how inequality between developed and developing nation states, such as the unequal representation within international institutions such as the IMF, World Bank or UN, affects the cause of global democracy. However, Dewey's take on the effects of Bourgeois democracy brings home the fact that material and intellectual inequality and consumerism within the nation state and the eclipse of the public fundamentally informs the ability of publics to grasp their present conditions and affects the praxis of democracy both within and beyond borders.  

On a participation level, for example, Dewey is adamant that without the provision of knowledge and habits, within social institutions such as education and political democracy, which lead to the greater political awareness and participation by the masses there is little to no chance of creative democracy at the national level. Moreover, Dewey suggests that within the context of globalisation, the perpetuation of high levels of material and intellectual inequality within nation states often breeds an anti-Cosmopolitan nationalism and the rejection rather than embracement of global democracy at the international level. Dewey therefore extends his narrative of the collapse of community and democracy at the local and national level to the hope of forming of a Great Community by linking such a collapse to the structural inequality engendered by bourgeois democracy. For contemporary

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68 Somewhat ironically, this point is recognised by developed countries when assessing the development and governance of developing countries. It does, however, seemingly disappear when developed countries assess the inequality within their own borders.
eyes, the question then becomes how does the structural imbalance, such as inequality, engendered by our own contours of bourgeois democracy affect our current publics and how do these affect ideals of global democracy? Does the structural imbalance within nation states, for instance, lead to the embrace of an anti-Cosmopolitan nationalism?

This analytical lesson about the interconnection of the auspices of bourgeois democracy, hyperglobalisation and the possibility of global democracy is again repeated in Dewey’s reflection on how the national political arena and party politics cannot simply be transcended or deemed unimportant when examining global democracy. Indeed, as outlined in chapter 1, the hegemony of Neo-Liberalism amongst both its traditional home of the Right and its new home of Third Way governments seems to eerily reflect Dewey’s (LW5: 442) rumination that the political parties within his present had become ‘the errand boys’ of big business within The Great Society. And the process of political disenchantment and apathy within nation state politics narrated by writers such as Hay (2007) seem to mirror Dewey’s narration of The Great Society’s own political disenchantment and apathy; where the belief that reigned supreme was that there was no important difference between the two old parties,’ and where to vote for one over the other was to signify very ‘little’ (LW6: 185).

The key point that Dewey’s work hands down to us, however, is that we cannot simply disconnect the current state of national democracy or a lack of a proper national democracy within bourgeois democracy from the issues of forming a Great Community and practising creative democracy both within and beyond the state. As Dewey comments on his own present, although national democratic practises and institutions favoured the interests of a
'privileged plutocracy' and were inflexible and uncreative under the hegemony of Bourgeois democracy, it was nevertheless:

'..sheer defeatism to assume in advance of actual trial that democratic political institutions are incapable either of further development or constructive social application. Even as they do exist, the forms of representative government are potentially capable of expressing public will when that assumes anything like unification' (LW11: 60).

Once more we can see that Dewey, much like modern advocates of global democracy, acknowledges that nation states and their political institutions and practises of government hold the key to both national and international reform. However, Dewey departs from his contemporaries by actually taking this issue seriously and stressing the need to examine the link between national and international arenas of community and democracy. And when one factors in an elitist and plutocratic Bourgeois democracy the need for examining this link between the arenas of a national and a possible global democracy becomes even more apparent. Quite simply, the issue of who controls the nation state and whose interests it serves are too important to the cause of founding a Great Community and praxis of creative democracy internationally.69 Rather than simply noting that the state has become a fulcrum for Neo-Liberalism, al la GDT, we must examine how the strictures of Bourgeois democracy maintain such as state of affairs both national and internationally.

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69 Daniel Bray (2010) also makes the point that a form of 'Pragmatic Cosmopolitanism' would effectively demand effective leaders of nation states but he fails to see how Dewey believed the contours of Bourgeois Democracy affected national politics.
A Deweyan analysis of global democracy would thus not just examine the sign and symbols of a possible Great community, but would implore to ask questions about our present national democracy, such as who are the people who represent the public within national political institutions? Is our political democracy open to all citizens and all political discourse? Quite simply, can publics remake the state? Is national political democracy co-opted by big business and the hegemony of Bourgeois democracy? How do national politicians help to perpetuate the hegemony of Bourgeois democracy? And how do these affect not only national forms of democracy but also movements and ideals that espouse to take democracy beyond the state?

At the same time, such a position would also want to explore how political apathy and disenchantment in our present affects Bourgeois democracy – is such apathy and disenchantment actually pivotal to the perpetuation of the plutocracy of our current era? Does such apathy towards formal politics mean that populaces are in fact apolitical or are they finding new outlets other than formal politics to express their politics? And if so, how does such apathy and disenchantment of the public with formal politics match up against the ideals and machinations of social movements and groups within Global Civil Society? The answers to these questions under the tenets of a Deweyan analysis of global democracy simply cannot go unanswered. For the underlying answers to these questions will reveal how the conditions of our national democracy are related and in fact inform the ideals, practises and hopes of global democracy in the 21st century.70

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70 This fact is important because even if one embraces Rodrik’s substantive criticism of Global Democracy, the actions of nation state leaders at the international level and the motivations behind them are readily important. One then does not have to agree with Dewey’s ideas of global democracy to find his formulation of the relationship or rather his breaking of the dualism between the national and international levels valid.
6.5 Global Democracy: A new name for an old problem?

What the preceding exposition of Dewey's work should have made clear is that the 'problem' of global democracy is a lot older than we believe. Indeed, Dewey's work from the 1920's onwards can be seen as an attempt to deal with incoherence and impotence of national democracy in a globalised world. And there is little doubt that had Dewey lived to see the collapse of the Cold War and the rise of late 20th century globalisation he too would have seen it as a moment to signal the potential move towards global democracy. For instance, Dewey would have largely agreed with Cosmopolitan Democracy about the need for the rule of law at the international level. In Dryzek's case, Dewey would have agreed with the emphasis on what he would have seen as the formation of transnational publics. And of all the theorists encountered, James Bohman's work is the most Dewey-like in its philosophical conception because of its emphasis on providing citizens with the resources to fight off domination. The question that arises from this, however, is how does Dewey's work relate to and differ from his contemporaries associated with GDT? What is the overall contribution of a Deweyan perspective on global democracy?

To get to grips with these questions I want to return to the argument that GDT suffers from the embracement of an ontology of paradox and to do this I want to examine Dryzek's conception of what he calls a 'post-Westphalian ontology'. In his recent work Dryzek argues that globalisation, global civil society and the contours of global governance mean that we must now shift our ontological conceptions of international relations. More specifically, he argues that we must shift from examining global democracy via a Westphalian ontology to a post-Westphalian ontology which:
‘... enables us to take more seriously the possibility that global civil society is central
to meaningful global democratisation, rather than an ersatz substitute for elections
or a supporting way station on the road to cosmopolitan institutions or indeed
something whose contribution to global democracy has to be ruled out because it
cannot play the same role that it does within states. Becoming post-Westphalian in a
deep ontological sense means letting go not only of the idea of the sovereign state,
but also of the individualistic basis for the establishment of sovereign authority
formalised by Thomas Hobbes at the same time as the Treaty of Westphalia... A post­
Westphalian ontology can stress discourses and informal networks as well as
individuals and formal organisations.’ (Dryzek 2012: 113-114)

What is interesting here is that Dryzek creates a distinction between a Westphalian and
post-Westphalian ontology where the latter transcends the limitations of the former.
However, as I have shown in chapter 3, one could argue that theories of GDT all espouse the
virtues of ‘discourses and informal networks’ at the expense of really examining ‘individuals
and formal organisations’ both at the national and international level. The crux of the
argument that GDT embraces an ontology of paradox centres on the fact that the limitations
and obstacles global democracy faces, both in the guise of individuals (national publics and
politicians/technocrats) and formal organisations (national governments/supranational
institutions) at both national and international levels, are seemingly acknowledged but
never truly deliberated or countenanced properly in GDT’s analysis and evaluation of global
democracy.

GDT writers thus create a dualism between the Westphalian age of nation states and
national democracy and the post-Westphalian age of discourses, global civil society and the
emergence of global governance and end up paying too much attention to the latter over
the former. As such, GDT does not truly embrace a post-Westphalian ontology, but an
ontology of paradox where discourses and informal networks, even when it is
acknowledged that they do not do so, are taken to have transcended the importance of
Westphalian nation states and national democracy in the formation and pursuit of global
democracy. And as I highlighted in chapter 3, in embracing such an ontology of paradox,
proponents of GDT often wield conclusions about the vibrancy of global democracy in the
face of evidence which appears to contradict such assertions. In this sense, we can say that
GDT pays little heed to the Westphalian elements that remain within a post-Westphalian
ontology.71

It is on this final point that we see that a Deweyan approach to global democracy is not a
dismissal of GDT. In fact, GDT offers insights into how global civil society and the emergence
of a transnational public sphere in the early 21st century offer the potential for the
advancement of global democracy. However, a Deweyan approach can act as a corrective or
rebalancing away from GDT’s ontology of paradox and towards the actual embracement of
a post-Westphalian ontology. A Deweyan position on global democracy achieves this
through two key interventions. The first is the idea that the post-Westphalian condition or
what he called the emergence of The Great Society is a lot older than we commonly believe.
We have been living within a post-Westphalian ontology since the dawn of the First Great
Globalisation and there may indeed be lessons we can learn from our predecessors’

71 Dryzek (2012) attempts to distance his position from that of Cosmopolitan Democrats such as Held via
espousing a post-Westphalian ontology. My argument here and in chapter 3, however, is that both Dryzek and
Held and other GDT writers such as Bohman actually replicate an emphasis on the post-Westphalian elements
on the present without truly examining how the remaining elements of the Westphalian order (states, national
democracy) also inform such a post-Westphalian ontology.
appraisal of democracy within a globalised world. This study is itself a case in point – we
turn our backs on our history at our own peril.

The second intervention is that a Deweyan approach actually provides a far better account
of how to examine a post-Westphalian ontology. Rather than merely taking post-
Westphalian (or what Dewey would call the emergence of The Great Society) to mean the
simple transcending of the prior epoch, a Deweyan position views this as a new complex
environment which incorporates both the old and the new; a situation which mandates that
we examine the links between both the Westphalian and post-Westphalian elements of our
present in order to forward the democratic way of life. For instance, Dewey’s ideas that
global democracy, although being informed through transnational citizen publics, will largely
centre around the vibrancy of inter-nation state relations through ‘Cosmopolitan
Nationalism’ at home and abroad, and that this itself would be informed through the
tackling of ‘Bourgeoisie Democracy’ at home, are pivotal to an appraisal of global
democracy. Indeed, this is the key insight Dewey bequeaths to us who now live within the
current confines of The Great Society: the fate of global democracy is inherently linked with
the fate of national democracy.

The merits of a Deweyan position can easily be seen when one returns to the work of GDT.
Take Dryzek’s (2006, 2010, 2012) work for instance, his account of Transnational
Discursive Democracy argues that the actors of global civil society and discourses within the

72 This flaw in Dryzek’s work is actually surprising given his earlier work within Dryzek et al (2003). In this work
Dryzek outlines a number of different state formations such as the neo-liberalism within the UK and US vis-à-
vis the social market approach in Germany affect how national social green movements can affect democracy.
The book essentially serves as handbook of the best strategies for green social movements within such state
typologies on how to avoid co-option by state forces and create social change. However, Dryzek and he fellow
authors (2003: 131) close the international structuring of green agendas off and focus largely on national
contexts. Dryzek would have been better of taking his approach of looking at the interplay of between
democratic structures in the national context into an analysis of how the very same national democratic
structures also interact with global civil society and the agenda of global democracy.
transnational public sphere struggle to hold national governments to account and limit global democracy to contestation. At this point Dryzek (2012) seals off the debate about global democracy by simply stating that global democracy is qualitatively different to national democracy and that the use of global civil society as both an arena of contestation and circumscribed agent do not necessarily conflict with the goal of global democracy.

A Deweyan approach to global democracy would undoubtedly agree with Dryzek; that democracy can not be reduced to its practises at the national level, but it would question why contestation is the only real alternative left at the international level and why nation states are allowed to renegade on their international commitments. For instance, a Deweyan position would not accept that the formation of publics at the transnational level constitutes democracy. As we have seen, for Dewey there is no democracy without an ability of publics to remodel the social institutions of government. The vibrancy of contestation then does not translate into actual creative democracy. A Deweyan position would thus question why national publics cannot and do not hold their national governments to account on such issues? Are such global issues seen as anathema to national politics? Or is this because of the practises of bourgeoisie democracy causing regulatory capture by an elite, political apathy amongst the masses and a lack of Cosmopolitan Nationalism at home? The same questions would also be applied to empirical realities facing Cosmopolitan Democracy or Republican Cosmopolitanism. Fundamentally, then, a Deweyan position forces us to take seriously the links between democracy at home and abroad when examining the current practises and conceptualisations of global democracy.
What should be clear from the above is that a Deweyan take does not simply provide the answer to the enigma that is global democracy. If anything a Deweyan approach to global democracy further complicates matters. Beyond all else, however, such a position mandates that we approach social reality head on and deal with the mess we are likely to encounter; even if it pains our normative convictions to do so. As Dewey noted:

‘...reflective thinking transforms confusion, ambiguity and discrepancy into illumination, definiteness and consistency. But it also points to the contextual situation in which thinking occurs. It notes that the starting point is the actually problematic, and that the problematic phase resides in some actual and specifiable situation... thinking is continuous process of temporal reorganisation within one and the same world of experienced things, not a jump from the latter world to one of objects constituted once for all by thought’ (LW1: 61).

In keeping with the tradition of Dewey's approach to reflective thinking, this study will now attempt to take on the Deweyan lessons encountered above and enter the confusion, ambiguity and discrepancy of our present. The final part of this study will therefore focus on the empirical examination of global democracy by focusing on the events that have unfolded since the onset of ‘The Great Recession’ in 2008. Through taking The Great Recession as a critical case study, I endeavour not only to highlight how Dewey's work helps us comprehend the politics of globalisation, but also the present and future of global democracy.
Part Three: From Lehman Brothers to the Occupy Movement

The previous part of the study presented John Dewey's ruminations on The Great Society as providing pertinent analytical lessons for the 21st century advocates of global democracy. Within this part of the study I aim to utilise those Deweyan analytical lessons to analyse the politics of The Great Recession and its cascade of crises. Rather than explain every detail of the Great Recession it will aim to highlight how the cascade of crises from the fall of Lehmann Brothers onward highlights a history of publics and the persistence of what Dewey called bourgeois democracy. Moreover, this history of publics highlights a democratic disconnect between publics of transnational elites, which emerged after the fall of Lehman Brothers and who are subservient to the tenets of bourgeois democracy, and citizen publics which have emerged since 2008.

To highlight this history of publics this part of the study will be divided into two chapters. Chapter 7 will narrate the ‘Bank Recapitalisation’ and ‘Keynesian Stimulus’ publics of elites and experts, which emerged after the collapse of Lehman Brothers and enacted the stimulus packages of 2008-2009. And will conclude by examining how bourgeois democracy was at the heart of policy post the collapse of Lehman Brothers. Chapter 8 moves the story onto the rise of the ‘Austerity’ public of elites, which emerged to complete the rehabilitation of market fundamentalism. After highlighting how austerity is simply a litter of half-truths, I turn in chapter 9 to citizen publics who have emerged in response to austerity and rampant bourgeois democracy. I will end the chapter by examining whether such

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I say this because there has been an explosion of academic and journalistic accounts of the events leading to Lehman and the fall out that ensued. See Lo's (2012) 23 book reviews of books on the 2008 crisis and The Great recession, onto to which one could easily add another twenty or so titles.
movements provide strong evidence for the viability of global democracy in a climate of elite smokescreen and subterfuge.

Chapter 7: Transnational Elites and their Publics

7.1 Flash Gordon and the Defenders of the Global Economy

‘If money isn’t loosened up, this sucker could go down’ – G.W. Bush (cited in Herszenhorn: 2008)

‘It was while I was flying across the Atlantic that I resolved what we as government had to do... I wrote it on a piece of paper, the thick black felt-tip pens I’ve used since a childhood sporting incident affected my eyesight. For good measure, I underlined it twice. It simply said: RECAPITALISE NOW.’ – Brown (2010: xvii-xviii)

The words of the then leaders of the US and UK governments after the fall of the investment bank Lehman Brothers highlights how both governments eventually moved from panic to action. George W. Bush’s penchant for providing the quotable, even when trying not to do so, arose once more when he warned Congress about their rejection of Ben Bernanke and Hank Paulson’s $700 Billion Troubled Asset Relief Program (TARP). On Monday the 16th of September 2008, for example, the Dow had fallen 504 points, which was at the time the biggest drop since 9/11 (Rawnsley 2010: 577). And by September 25th, ten days after the fall of Lehman, the interconnection of Lehmans as counterparty in interbank loans and Credit Default Swaps and the fear of economic meltdown spread by media technology, basically ‘brought the entire world capital market down’ (Krugman cited in Haldane: 2009). As President Bush put it, as only he could, for the American government to
not now do anything or to reject the plan hatched by the Chairmen of the Federal Reserve and US Treasury Secretary was tantamount to letting the American economy 'go down'.

Gordon Brown's narration of his transatlantic flight on the 26th September 2008, two days after Bush's comments, took place just hours after he had met with President Bush in order to sell his government's idea of bank recapitalisation to help solve the banking crisis. Much like Paulson, Brown's government realised that global crisis in world capital markets, where banks could not raise enough capital to cover their liabilities, was actually a symptom of a deeper problem of US and UK banks being overleveraged and undercapitalised. The collapse of the US housing bubble had resulted in large losses for financial institutions that had bought or become connected by 'toxic assets' backed by mortgage payments. This in turn had left overleveraged financial institutions with simply too little capital to lend and too much debt to roll over. Exacerbated by Banks trying to sell assets in an attempt to pay their debts asset prices fell and left banks with ever dwindling amounts of capital on the balance sheet (Brown 2010: 47).

By this point Brown had largely come to the right conclusion on two major economic and political points. One was that the TARP program, which centred on buying toxic assets off banks, would likely be slow and ponderous because the toxic assets could not be quantified and that the banks needed recapitalisation in order to deleverage and start lending to the real economy once more. The second was that the US approach of dealing with one

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74 The Bush administration had already signalled its intent with an $85 billion bailout of the US insurance company AIG the day after the Lehman Bankruptcy. This in turn had signalled a reversal of a reversal: Lehman Brothers had been allowed to go bankrupt by Paulson whilst earlier in 2008 investment bank Bear Stearns and as late as the weekend before the government-sponsored mortgage enterprises Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac had not.
institution at a time and only on a national basis was itself too slow and ponderous to calm panicking markets. Rather, what was needed, was coordinated action across firstly the UK and US but also Europe, whose own interbank market had drawn to a standstill.

Although, both events happened within only days of each other, they mark distinct points in the historical unfolding of the crisis from the national to multilateral coordination on a transnational level. Up to this point, the US, UK and European governments had been fire-fighting flare-ups in their own banking systems without much co-ordination. Ireland, for example, announced a guarantee on the 30th of September on all deposits in the country’s main banks for two years without informing its own central bank: the European Central Bank (ECB). On the 5th October 2008, Germany appeared to follow Ireland’s action and as Rawnsley (2010: 581) points out, ‘threatened to endanger the rest of the EU’ by encouraging the moving of capital into Germany and out of EU countries not offering guarantees. The UK government itself had been partaking in such fire-fighting methods with the part nationalisation of Bradford and Bingley and the waiving of completion laws to merge the solvent Lloyds TSB with insolvent (HBOS) Halifax and Bank Of Scotland (Smith, 2010: 174-180).

This all changed, however, on the 8th October, when the UK government announced the availability of £50 billion of public money in capital, £250 billion in guarantees of lending in the inter-bank market and an increase in the Bank of England’s Special liquidity Scheme which allowed banks to exchange mortgagees for bonds from £100 billion to £200 billion (Rawnsley, 2010: 588). And when HBOS, Lloyds TSB and RBS utilised such funds and were partly nationalised, with the UK tax payer taking a majority stake in Royal Bank of Scotland.
(57%) and a 40% stake in the now merged HBOS and Lloyds TSB, the Brown government’s realisation that what was needed was recapitalisation, as well as guarantees, liquidity and toxic asset management, seemed to present a more coherent approach for fellow governments to pursue. On the same day Germany, France, Italy, Holland, Spain and Austria announced similar recapitalisation and guarantee schemes. And on the next day, Hank Paulson used elements of the TARP program to inject capital into nine major US banks and countries from Australia to South Korea followed suit (Brown, 2010: 66). The result was a surge on stock markets and cooling of the mass panic that had helped to nearly bring about the ‘apocalypse of a total banking collapse’ (Rawnsley, 2010: 597).

On the back this turn of events, Paul Krugman (2008) asked ‘Has Gordon Brown, the British prime minister, saved the world financial system?’ and went on to suggest an affirmative answer:

‘This is an unexpected turn of events. The British government is, after all, very much a junior partner when it comes to world economic affairs. It’s true that London is one of the world’s great financial centres, but the British economy is far smaller than the U.S. economy, and the Bank of England doesn’t have anything like the influence either of the Federal Reserve or of the European Central Bank. So you don’t expect to see Britain playing a leadership role... But the Brown government has shown itself willing to think clearly about the financial crisis, and act quickly on its conclusions. And this combination of clarity and decisiveness hasn’t been matched by any other Western government, least of all our own... Luckily for the world economy, however, Gordon Brown and his officials are making sense. And they may have shown us the way through this crisis.’
Much has been made from a biographical point of view about whether or not it is right to characterise Gordon Brown as the world’s saviour in 2008 (See for example Rawnsley, 2010; Radice, 2010). This is because of the obvious dichotomy of Brown’s failing on the domestic front and his spectacular rise in prominence on the international scene (Brown even made The Time 100 in 2009) and Brown’s own recognition of that dichotomy in a rather ill-advised slip up in Parliament. The question of Gordon Brown’s historical legacy is, of course, a matter for political historians to fawn over. The key point for our study, however, pivots on the fact that Krugman’s praise of Brown is actually unintentionally misleading because it seems to suggest that the UK only provided an example of how to tackle the post-Lehman banking crisis and that those other countries then followed this lead.

What had actually emerged in London amongst Prime Minister Brown, his Chancellor Alistair Darling and technocrats such as the Governor of The Bank of England Mervyn King was not a plan which was then merely copied, but a plan that was copied because its general outlines had already been exported through lobbying and discourse amongst other elites. For instance, Brown’s plane journey home had prefigured not only a meeting with President Bush but an impromptu meeting on the 25th of September of world leaders in the one ‘dingiest’ of rooms in the UN building after a meeting of the UN General Assembly. Here Brown was to ‘test whether there was a common approach to financial crisis, whether there was a chance the world could come together in one forum, and whether the G20 meeting of any other arrangement could command consensus.’ (Brown, 2010:44). The meeting also

75 I am of course taking about the moment when Gordon Brown uttered the words at the dispatch box in the House of Common that his government ‘had saved the world’ instead of ‘saved the world’s banks’ as was written in his notes.

76 In 2008 King appeared to have turned an entire 180 degrees on the issue of moral hazard attached to bailing out financial institutions in the light of UK government’s nationalisation of Northern Rock in 2007. In a speech made some nine months before Lehman Brothers failed, King actually suggested that nationalisation, even forced nationalisation, was now the best strategy for governments (Rawnsley, 2010: 579).
resulted in Brazilian President Lula proposing that the UK would assume G20’s finance ministers’ chairmanship some three months earlier than its allotted date.

The same focus on acquiring the hegemony of the British approach amongst governments was simultaneously pursued by Darling and King at the G7, where King told other politicians and technocrats that what was needed was a ‘little less conversation, a little more action’.

And also by Brown at his invitation to the then new euro group of 15 heads of state, of which Britain was not a member or originally invited. Here Brown relayed to European leaders and European technocrats like the ECB’s chairmen that although the financial crisis may have originated in America it was now also a European crisis due to the amount of toxic assets within the European banking system and the high leverage levels of leverage European banks were running in comparison to their American counterparts (ibid., 62-63).

At this point, the Brown government’s ascendancy amongst other governments was best reflected by praise from its historically antagonistic ally the French; when President Sarkosy revealed to Gordon Brown that he ‘...loved him. But not in a sexual way’ (Rawnsley, 2010: 593).

From a Deweyan approach to global democracy the events of 2008-2009 clearly reflect that nation state leaders, national technocrats and international organisations such as the IMF clearly formed a transnational public. The initial leadership shown by the Brown government and the multilateral nature of what followed seems to bring home the fact that rather than just setting an example, the Brown government helped to directly construct what amounted to a transnational public of elites (politicians and technocrats) post-Lehman Brothers. Together with the US, other countries within Europe such as France and economic technocrats one can easily see that the UK government helped to form a public which
conducted what Dewey believed was the primary task for any public: to achieve such recognition of itself across wider society to give weight to its attempts to modify government and associative behaviour in it interests (Dewey, LW2: 283).

This was not a public of citizens attempting to change the state and government of their respective nation states. But rather, as Dewey suggested, it was the likely trajectory of global democracy, a public of national governments acting in consort and attempting to remould both national and international governance. Most importantly, however, what emerged from the formation of such a transnational public of elites was the lasting sense that multilateralism through coordinated and collaborative actions of nation states was the best way forward in the crisis of the real economy, which ensued after September 2008.

This was reflected, for example, when domestic monetary policy, which pre-crisis had followed the Neo-Liberal mantra of inflation targeting, was subject to coordinated interest rate cuts from central banks such as the Bank of England, the Federal Reserve, the ECB, the People's Bank of China and Bank of Canada.77 By February 2009 both the Federal Reserve and the Bank of England had cut rates to 0.5% and both emulated the actions of the Bank of Japan at the turn of the century by embarking on quantitative easing78 (Smith, 2010: 197-201). However, the most significant policy change which came about on the back of the emergence of such a transnational elite public and its enduring sense of the need for multilateralism, was the appearance of a new transnational consensus within this transnational elite public about the need to return to Keynesian analysis and policy prescription to deal with the crisis in the real economy.

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77 The changing of monetary policy actually took place on the same day (8th October 2008) of the initial announcement of the structure and funds of the UK government's bank bailout and continued through 2009.
78 Quantitative Easing involves central banks creating money to effectively buy assets such as government debt issues.
7.2 The apparent return of the Master: Keynesian Stimulus

The grounds for the emergence of what we can call a 'Keynesian Stimulus' public had been laid with the growing expert opinion of economists such as the IMF's Chief economist Oliver Blanchard and public interventions by economists such as Barry Eichengreen, Paul Krugman and Joseph Stiglitz. The banking crisis in 2008 had now morphed into a crisis of the global economy which saw 7½ per cent decline in the GDP of advanced economies and a 6 % per cent decline in Global GDP (annualised) during the fourth quarter of 2008 (IMF, 2009: xv). These authors saw the bank recapitalisation policies as the first step of a re-emergence of Keynesian policy prescription and subsequently believed that the second step would be to use Keynesian policies such as increasing government spending (fiscal stimulus) to stimulate demand to deal with the fall in aggregate demand, rising unemployment and the liquidity trap national economies and governments were now confronted by in late 2008/early 2009.

This had been rather revolutionary because it seemed to suggest that lessons Neo-Liberalism had provided for over thirty years were actually factually wrong. As Farrell and Quiggin (2012: 21) point out:

'The dominant approach to macroeconomic policy was based on the assumption that an independent central bank, adjusting short-term interest rates in line with a 'Taylor rule,' could manage the economy in such a way as to achieve both stable inflation and reasonably steady economic growth. Active fiscal policy could not improve on this outcome, and would effectively be neutralised by offsetting

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79 This is where at zero per cent interest rates citizens are still unwilling to purchase as much as they are willing to produce. At the same time, the amount being saved – income not spent on consumption – is more than the amount businesses are willing to invest (Krugman 2012: 136).
adjustments to monetary policy. The "Great Moderation" (a general reduction in the volatility of output, prices and employment beginning in the 1980s) was seen as the happy outcome of this policy framework.

The IMF was the first to herald the return of Keynesian policy when it called for a $2 trillion coordinated stimulus in late 2008 at the G20. The UK government was again at the heart of policy action announcing this sea change in economic thinking, with the first fiscal stimulus package of any advanced Western economy in November 2008. This amounted to £20 billion stimulus, the centrepiece of which was a cut in VAT from 17.5% to 15% which was to run from December 2008 to the end of 2009. This had taken place nearly simultaneously with the announcement of China’s $584 billion stimulus package and was followed by Barrack Obama’s signing of $787 billion American Recovery and Reinvestment Act (ARRA) in February 2009. Throughout 2009 countries such as France, Japan and Germany and others across both the developed and developing worlds put forth their own fiscal stimulus packages (Skidelsky, 2009: 19 cf. Table 2 below).
Table 2: Fiscal Stimulus Packages 2008-2009

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Total fiscal package (USD billions)</th>
<th>Total fiscal package as a percentage of GDP in 2009</th>
<th>Likely spending in 2009 (in USD billions)</th>
<th>Spending in 2009 as a percentage of GDP</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Argentina</td>
<td>13.2</td>
<td>3.9</td>
<td>13.2</td>
<td>3.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Brazil</td>
<td>3.6</td>
<td>0.2</td>
<td>3.6</td>
<td>0.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Canada</td>
<td>31.06</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>15.53</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>China</td>
<td>586</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>257.84</td>
<td>6.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>France</td>
<td>32.75</td>
<td>1.1</td>
<td>33</td>
<td>1.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Germany</td>
<td>103.3</td>
<td>2.8</td>
<td>44.42</td>
<td>1.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Italy</td>
<td>6.3</td>
<td>0.3</td>
<td>6.3</td>
<td>0.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Japan</td>
<td>110</td>
<td>2.3</td>
<td>70.4</td>
<td>1.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Netherlands</td>
<td>7.56</td>
<td>0.8</td>
<td>7.56</td>
<td>0.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Spain</td>
<td>14.05</td>
<td>0.8</td>
<td>14.05</td>
<td>0.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>United Kingdom</td>
<td>36.36</td>
<td>1.3</td>
<td>33.81</td>
<td>1.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>United States</td>
<td>787</td>
<td>5.6</td>
<td>251.84</td>
<td>1.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Advanced Economies</strong></td>
<td><strong>1194.41</strong></td>
<td><strong>515.6</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Developing and Emerging Economies</strong></td>
<td><strong>795.57</strong></td>
<td><strong>378.87</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Khatiwada (2009)

Although the enduring legacy of the transnational elite public and its sense of multilateralism created post-Lehman’s had laid the ground for such initiatives, it would be a misnomer not to consider the elite lobbying that also transpired to form the ‘Keynesian transnational elite public’. Initially, as Smith (2010: 196) and Newman (2010) outline,
German Chancellor Angela Merkel and policy makers were essentially opposed to the idea of fiscal stimulus of any kind. The UK and US governments, however, applied external pressure to Germany, with Gordon Brown once more lobbying the EU member states to form a coordinated policy and the EU Commission itself pushing for Germany to spend 1% of its GDP on stimulus packages before the European council summit in December 2008 (Farrell and Quiggin, 2012: 25). In turn, Brown once more sought to get global coordination on stimulus before the meeting of the G20 by embarking upon a three continent tour in five days, a week before the summit. This saw him deliver speeches at the European Parliament and in the US and conduct a press conference with President Lula in Brazil, all of which argued for the need of stimulus to revive the global economy (Brown 2010 cf. Rawnsley, 2010: 623-625).

The zenith of the ‘Keynesian Stimulus’ public and its continuance of the traits associated with the transnational elite public that preceded it, took place at the G20 conference in London in April 2009. The overall tenor of the G20 was presented as nothing less than the reformation of global governance and approach to globalisation. It was here that that Keynesian transnational elite public, spearheaded by Brown and the rock star status of newly elected President Obama, announced the supplanting of the G8 with the far more representative G20 which now included Brazil, India and China; the three fold increase of the IMF’s resources to $750 million, $250 billion in credit for trade finance and the provision of $250 billion currency reserves for developing nations. Moreover, the leaders’ communique engendered multilateralism further through a commitment to coordinated economic stimulus totalling up to a mind boggling $5 Trillion.

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80 The G20 member countries are Argentina, Australia, Brazil, Canada, China, France, Germany, Italy, Indonesia, Italy, Japan, Mexico, Republic of Korea, Russia, Saudi Arabia, South Africa, Turkey, UK, US, EU.
'We are undertaking an unprecedented and concerted fiscal expansion, which will save or create millions of jobs which would otherwise have been destroyed, and that will, by the end of next year, amount to $5 trillion, raise output by 4 per cent, and accelerate the transition to a green economy. We are committed to deliver the scale of sustained fiscal effort necessary to restore growth' (G20, 2009).81

7.3 Creative Democracy or Bourgeois Democracy?

How then do we assess the publics of transnational elites, which emerged from 2008 up to 2010 from a Deweyan perspective on global democracy? At the time many believed that the long cherished ideas of neo-liberalism were being challenged after being shown to be questionable. Keynes' biographer Lord Skidelsky (2009) proclaimed 'The Return of the Master'; whilst Dani Rodrik (2008), citing challenges by economists such as Paul Krugman, Martin Wolf and Larry Summers, even seemed ready to declare the 'death of neo-liberal globalisation'.

Keeping in line with this style of thinking and as hinted at above, one could argue that the leadership shown by the Brown government seemed to take such a questioning of neo-liberalism into the international arena. And that the multilateral nature of what followed seems to bring home the fact that rather than just setting an example, the Brown government helped to directly construct what amounted to a transnational public and community of elites and experts (politicians and technocrats) post-Lehman Brothers. The actions of 'Bank Recapitalisation' and 'Keynesian Stimulus' publics can be said to have lived

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81 The G20 was to later announce changes to the voting distribution in the IMF to try and reflect the new found appreciation for the rising economic power of countries like China and India. The organisation also provided the impetus for reforms of voting representation in the World Bank (see Wade 2011b).
up to cosmopolitan nationalism that resides at the heart of a Deweyan conception of global democracy.

The crux of the argument here is that there was a realisation amongst elites that rather than pursuing unilateral strategies, what was needed was multilateral action in order to deal with what amounted, either through direct contagion or through the panic of markets, to a global financial crisis. Moreover, this was the realisation that communication between respective nation state elites and coordinated and collaborative actions at state and inter-state level, such as bank recapitalisation or interest rate changes, would be key to securing not only national financial systems but the overall global financial system.

This in turn was built upon by the emergence of the Keynesian Stimulus public whose elites coordinated multilateral stimulus packages which were ‘...instrumental in averting a potential deflationary spiral and protracted period of exceedingly high unemployment ’ IMF (2011: 18). And in the process of the Keynesian Stimulus public supplanting the G8 with the G20, the proposed reform of international financial institutions like the IMF and its demand for new global banking rules in the guise of Basell III, one could argue that this process amounted to a form of cosmopolitan nationalism which enacted creative democracy at the international level. In short, it appears that both publics recognised that their own national interests were linked with the national interests of other nations and that multilateralism trumped unilateralism.

Without doubt the ‘Bank Recapitalisation’ and ‘Keynesian Stimulus’ publics and their multilateral policies have meant that we have endured a global Great Recession and in large
part avoided another global Great Depression. However, as writers such as Stiglitz (2010) point out, the problem with the above narrative is that it only tells half of the story. It is quite true that neo-liberalism was questioned and that the Brown government did help to construct a transnational public elite. And that at various moments this looked much like Dewey’s suggested trajectory of global democracy: a public of national governments acting in consort and creating a transnational ‘community’ of sorts. However, just as Dewey was aware that publics could be created which harboured undemocratic intentions we must also be aware of such possibilities. And as we shall see below and in the next chapter, what has happened since late 2008 is not governments and technocrats forming a public to enact creative democracy at the domestic and international level, but rather the perpetuation of bourgeoisie democracy both at home and beyond.

Dewey argued that in the 1920’s and 30’s political parties ruled but they did not govern, acting as quasi ‘servants of the same dominant railway, banking, and corporate industrial forces’ (LW6: 186 cf. LW5: 442). This was not just through blatant or corrupt control of government, but rather because the hegemonic identification of capitalism and democracy and the ability of business to actually organise itself as a public meant that it was able to reform the state and government in much the same way as ‘dynastic interests’ controlled government two centuries prior (LW2: 302). Therefore in the inevitable clash between private property interests and the interest of the masses, all the ‘habits of thought and action’ impelled the institutions of political democracy to side with the former over the latter (LW6: 159).

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82 A recession is normally taken to be a GDP contraction of six months, where as a depression is period before the real level of GDP regains its previous high.
What is startling is that the very same characteristics Dewey aligns with the practise of bourgeoisie democracy in the 1920's and 1930's are easily found in the bank bailouts of 2008. And as I document below, in 3 key areas one can easily find the tenets of bourgeoisie democracy, where through the hegemonic identification of capitalism and democracy lead governments to favour property interests over the interests of the masses, in the actions of the 'Bank Recapitalisation' and 'Keynesian Stimulus' publics.

1) Bourgeoisie Democracy created a blank cheque to socialise losses and privatise profits

The debate about whether the nationalisation of banks via recapitalisation was the right course of action has raged since September 2008. The adage 'too big to fail' has essentially become the byword for explaining that governments and technocrats believed that UK and US bank balance sheets posed a systemic risk to the domestic and latterly global economy. At the height of the banking crisis, for example, the biggest 6 US banks had combined asset footprint that totalled 61 % of US GDP and the top four UK banks held assets footprints that were equal to 394% of GDP (Blyth 2013: 82-84). And as we have seen, the result of this was that in 2008 the UK and US governments, acting in the apparent interests of their citizens, effectively nationalised most of their biggest banks. In turn governments across Europe followed suit in what can be seen as the largest corporate bailout in history.

Governments and taxpayers in 2008 effectively bailed out the incompetence of the financial services at unprecedented expense to the public purse. In fact the numbers are mind-boggling. In the US the up-front costs of the bailout amounted to 12.1 percent of GDP, around $1.75 trillion. However, when the entirety of the Fed's commitments are factored in,
such as guarantees and foreign-exchange swaps with foreign central banks, this total approaches near 80% of GDP and totalled some $12 trillion (Stiglitz 2010). In the UK the guarantees and bailouts peaked at 83% of GDP at £1.2 trillion but more recently has been revised down to a not too measly sum of £512 billion by 2011 (NAO 2010). Some of this money is only on state balance sheets as guarantees and may not actually be paid out, but the direct bill for the financial crisis will run into tens, if not hundreds, of billions.

As Robert Peston outlines, the favouring of the finance sector’s interests over the general citizenry is easy to spot with the bank bailouts of 2008:

‘In 2008 when it all went wrong for banks and for the economies of Britain and America, bank bosses and traders lost some of their accumulated wealth, if it was held in bank shares. And their pay fell a bit, although not remotely in proportion to what happened to the value of their banks. Nor did they hand back the vast bonuses and rewards they had pocked in the previous years, even though we now know those bonuses came from profits generated in a way that came to bankrupting us all. As for the allegedly sophisticated institutions that lent to banks, they weren’t forced to endure write-offs of their loans to banks... So those mainly responsible for the banking crisis suffered limited pains – in stark contrast to the rest of us.’ (Peston 2012: 49-50)

The above quote highlights the inherent favouring of the interests of finance capital over the interests of citizens in both the short and long term. In 2008, governments essentially provided banks and financial institutions with a blank cheque to transfer their losses from the state to the government and keep the profit. In this scenario, top bank executives and creditors benefitted from government money and actually exploited such a situation to
extract immediate capital out of the bailout; a scenario that would not have happened if financial institutions had been left to go bankrupt. Indeed, the handing out of government-backed monies appeared to open the flood gates for bankers to game the system.

The prime example of this form of short-term opportunism happened in the US where the government seemed to provide money with very little oversight as to where it was going or why it was actually needed. The Bush administration for instance, worried that if AIG was not bailed out, large banks to which it had sold credit-default swaps, and which function like insurance polices on corporate failure, would also begin to fail. Prior to its bailout AIG had been negotiating with the banks in order to get write downs and accept as little as 60 cents on the dollar. However, the banks were confident that the government would not allow AIG to go bankrupt and thus held out for 100 cents on the dollar (Johnson and Kwak 2010: 169-170).

With the AIG bailout that objective was achieved and the initial £85 billion bailout of AIG eventually ballooned to $180 billion. From this, over a quarter of it would immediately go to settle debts with Goldman Sachs, Merrill Lynch, Bank of America, Citigroup and foreign banks such as Deutsche Bank (Johnson and Kwak 2010: 169-170). And disturbingly one can find similar examples of bankers gaming the system to extract money from the government and transfer losses to citizens in bailouts of Citigroup and Bank of America after its merger with Merrill Lynch (Sorkin 2010: 533-537). These examples bring home the fact that in the

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83 The Bank of America merger with Merrill Lynch, for example, was presented as the best way to save the latter. However, in the run up to the deal Merrill Lynch’s trade losses ballooned and by early 2009 Bank of America was itself to ask for $20 billion bailout from the government to cover itself. What later emerged, however, is that Merrill Lynch’s executives had made the balance sheet of the bank even worse by paying themselves billions of dollars just before the deal was signed.
initial stages of the crisis the US government seemed to favour the interests of finance capital and didn’t use the leverage it had over banks to extract the best deal for its wider citizens.

The use of hundreds of billions of dollars in the US was apparently geared towards saving insurance and pension funds from big losses. Banks and financial institutions were presented as ‘socially worthy’ claimants. However, this thinking seemingly disguises the bailing out of banks that conducted risky lending with saving those with whom we have made a social contract. The alternative of simply throwing money at things without oversight simply carries no weight. As Stiglitz (2010: 130) bluntly puts it, there was ‘no justification for spending twenty dollars to bailout investors so that one dollar can go to a pension fund that might otherwise be in trouble.’ Instead of simply giving Wall Street carte blanche the US government should have examined where the money needed to go and made sure it went there and only there.

Despite finance capital’s brazen approach of from socialising losses and extracting profits from tax payers in the crisis of 2008 the greatest example of government favouring finance capital interests over the interest of ordinary citizens centres on the long term effects of the 2008 bailouts. This concerns what has happened to the real economy and banking industry after the crisis of 2008. Or rather what has happened to the real economy and what hasn’t happened to banking industry post 2008. As we have seen post Lehman Brothers the global economy nosedived and unemployment soared across both advanced and developing economies. Lost output from 2008 to 2011 totals some 8 percent across advanced economies. And as Haldane (2010) outlines the total loss of output (now and in the future) is between one and five times annual world GDP in 2009. To put this in cash terms, the
financial crisis led to output loss of $60-200 trillion for the global economy and between £1.8-7.4 trillion for the UK.

With such a contraction of GDP also came fall in state tax revenues and states took on debt on to plug the shortfall. Governments thus began running budget deficits in the first instance and saw increased government debt in the second instance. (Blyth 2013: 46). Between 2007-2009, for example, the UK, the US and the Eurozone increased public debt by between 20-40% of GDP (Blackburn 2011). And as the IMF (2010: 14) point out, two-thirds of the increase in debt across OECD counties and the can be explained by the fall in GDP during 2008-9, the cost of bailing out financial sectors and revenue losses from lower asset prices and financial sector profits. This is why the 2012 report issued by the Better Markets Institute of Washington locates the total cost to the US economy, when GDP loss is factored in, as somewhere around $13 trillion dollars (Blyth 2013: 45).

These secondary costs induced by the financial crisis and the recession it brought about, however, have not been passed onto the financial industry. In fact rather perversely, the baking sector has continued to be a site of bonuses and profit. By 2009 whilst unemployment in the US was around 10%, due to what had now become known as The Great Recession, banks were seemingly ‘minting money again’. Goldman Sachs posted record profits of $13.4 billion and paid out $16.2 billion in bonuses, on average $498,000 per employee. Even apparently ‘troubled firms’ like Citigroup and Bank of America raced to pay off their TARP money as to not undergo the bonus restrictions they signed up to when taking US government funds (Sorkin 2010: 545-46). By 2012 the US banking industry had recovered to the point of posting $34.7 billion profits. (Nasiripour, 2013). In the UK, bonuses in 2009 stood at the same levels as 2006 and the wage bill for The City actually rose from
£32 billion in 2007 to £37 billion in 2009 (Peston 2012: 46; Englen at al: 31). By 2012 the underlying pre-tax profit of the UK’s top five banks (Barclays, HSBC, Lloyds Banking Group, RBS and Standard Chartered rose by 45% to £31.5 billion.\(^8^4\)

What the contrasting fortunes of the baking sector and national economies bring to life is how the bank bailouts and actions since 2008 favoured the interests of finance capital over citizens. Both the UK and US governments have brought in a ‘bank levy’, which aim to recover money given out to the financial sector and to promote better business practises. The thinking on the latter point being that banks would roll back executive bonuses to cover the levy fees. However, when the details are examined the numbers don’t really add up. For instance, President Obama’s ‘Financial Responsibility Fee’ is geared towards securing $90 billion over 10 years from 2014 (Braithwaite 2010). The Labour government did implement a 5-month bonus tax at the end of 2009 but it was temporary so as not to make the City of London uncompetitive in a global finance and its successor, the UK’s collation government, brought in a bank levy that raises around £2.6 billion a year (Peston 2012: 371). Yet, when one compares these figures to the estimated secondary costs of the UK (£1.8-7.4 trillion) and US (12-13 trillion) the ruse becomes clear that ‘banks may have made the losses, but the citizenry will pay for the losses’ (Blyth 2013: 47).

\(^8^4\) This figure was later reduced to £11.7 billion, some 40% down on 2011 profits. However, this was nothing to with tough business conditions but rather because the banks had been find for regulatory failures such as the misspelling of Payment Protection Insurance (PPI) to people who could not claim in the first place.
2) Market fundamentalism persisted post-Lehmann Brothers even in the face of evidence that contradicted such belief

The question that emerges from the bank bailouts of 2008 is why did they favour of finance capital’s interest in the first place? The actions of governments post Lehman Brothers have been taken by some to be a reflection ‘regulatory capture’ by finance capital. As Stiglitz (2012:253) points out, ‘...in the great bailout that marked the beginning of the Great Recession, the head of New York Fed was one of the triumvirate (along with the federal reserve and secretary of Treasury) that shaped the bailout, determined who got saved and who got executed. And he, in turn, had been nominated by a committee that consisted of bankers and CEOs from the same firms that were bailed out on the most favourable terms.’ As Englen et al. (2012: 173) highlight, the City of London has also gained greater influence and access through successive Conservative and Labour governments since the 1980’s and the UK’s government’s susceptibility to the City’s influence increased markedly under New Labour.

However, despite this accusations of plutocracy and outright corruption what makes the link between finance capital and government truly powerful was the hegemonic ideas of neo-liberalism amongst near all concerned. As Wade outlines, the crisis and its aftermath highlights the hegemony of neo-liberalism rather than its demise and saw the re-emergence of neo-liberal ideas that had served governments well in the 30 year period beforehand. Old habits die hard and neo-liberalism was too all intents and purposes still the dominant policy paradigm even after the fall of Lehman Brothers (Wade 2011a: 17, 31-32).

What the above highlights is the validity of Dewey’s contention about bourgeoisie democracy not simply being about blatant corruption but the hegemonic identification of
capitalism and democracy where in the inevitable clash between private property interests and the interest of the masses, all the 'habits of thought and action' impelled the institutions of political democracy to side with the former over the latter (LW6: 159). The real reason the bank bailouts took place in the way they did then is because governments had bought into the narrative of neo-liberal globalisation and continued to do so even in the face of evidence that contradicted such a belief.

The bank recapitalisation programs of the UK and US government highlight how both governments attempted to restore the priority and efficiency of the market in a belief that this would restore prosperity. The model of bank bailouts via recapitalisation that most governments followed, especially the UK, was Sweden’s approach of the early 1990’s. When Sweden suffered a banking crisis in 1992, produced by the collapse of a property boom, its government took control of near all banks and restructured them. At the end of this process the Swedish government re-privatised the banks in the late 90’s breaking even with the Swedish taxpayer and maintaining the flow of credit in the economy (Peston 2012: 373-375). However, because of residual beliefs about the inefficiency of government and the public sector vis-à-vis the apparent efficiency of markets and the private sector the governments of the Bank Recapitalisation public did not nationalise but rather ‘semi-nationalised’ banks.

In the UK, for example, based on the advice of Treasury technocrats such as Tom Scholar, John Kingman and Shriti Vadera, the worry was that nationalised banks would turn into supposed unproductive state entities. On the basis of this, the UK Financial Investments (UKFI) company was created and staffed by recruits from The City of London to manage the banks in a commercial way and to create value for taxpayers and shareholders. This allowed
banks like RBS and Lloyds to continue running as independent commercial companies and to allow their boards to continue to make decisions in the best interests of shareholders. The thinking being that when the banks would return to profit the government, as Sweden’s government had done in the 1990’s, would sell its shares at a profit (Peston 2012: 373-374). This process was also replicated in the US where both President Bush and his successor President Obama rejected nationalisation on the basis that it contradicted the free market and the so-called ‘American way’ (Stiglitz, 2010: 111-118).  

The problem with this approach of reinstating the principles of the free market by governments was twofold. On one hand, such an approach failed to question how neo-liberalism’s values of the power of markets and the incentive of shareholder value helped to create the financial crisis in the first place. As Englen et al. (2011) point out, the pursuit of shareholder value and the excessive remuneration for top executives for securing such shareholder value largely explains the over leveraging which caused the financial crisis in 2008. The US and UK government policies of leaving control of the banks to apparently self-interested independent commercial companies, who pay market rates on pay, effectively restored the credibility of such practises rather than questioning them. Moreover, both UK and US governments took it as axiomatic that market forces, rather than government intervention, would help to restore banks to profit and via eliciting such market-self interest to eventually alleviate the financial burden governments and tax payers had taken on. This

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85 The same non-criticism of neo-liberal ideals can also be found in the way banker remuneration was not regulated after the crisis. The pay of top bankers increased tenfold in the UK between 1990-2006, whilst average gross pay did not even double. In the 2007-8 financial year, at the height of the crisis, 45% of all bonuses paid in the UK, some £19 billion, was paid as bonuses in the financial sector despite it only accounting for 3.7% of the workforce. Even in 2011, RBS’ chief Simon Hester, who is technically a state employee, took home pay packages worth £7.1 million (Peston, 2012: 46). The rationale here was that government owned institutions must be able to attract top bankers in order to restructure and reform the insolvent banks governments had to rescue.
coming on the back of the biggest example of how free markets are essentially prone to creating consequences which go against the interests of citizens.

On the other hand, the policies of governments fundamentally failed to acknowledge how those very principles were actually suspended by government action in the 2008 financial crisis. Put simply, in late 2008 capital markets were claiming that the price of US and UK bank’s assets were incorrect and on that basis were withdrawing liquidity in the form of short term lending to banks. Governments intervened because the ramifications of such market action would have essentially bought down the banking sector both nationally and internationally. One can argue that this was necessity to safe guard the banking system and literally guarantee that citizens could withdraw their money from cash points in late September 2008. But the basic argument still stands: governments questioned the logic of free markets and took actions that basically suspended markets by substituting commercial capital for public expenditure. Yet, this apparent realisation that markets are not always rational or beneficial was routinely forgotten after the saving of the financial industry via recapitalisation.

Without government control of banks, UK and US banks for example, have been left to make commercial decisions about lending. In essence, banks were left to act as if they were never actually bailed out by the government. In turn, as banks have attempted to deleverage, they have contracted their lending to the wider economy. This was partly to be expected due to the deleverage process, but what also happened was that banks have effectively stopped lending to business and the general real economy. During December to February 2012 for instance, bank lending to business in the UK contracted at 7.9%, which small and medium sized business need to expand and grow (Peston 2012). Despite
government attempts to force banks to lend by setting targets like the ones under project Merlin, the reality is that banks received public funds and then have been starving the public of funds. Again some deleveraging was needed and loans to risky loans should be harder to obtain. However, the reality is that successive governments have abided by bourgeoisie democracy’s mantra that the market knows best and that the market secures democratic outcomes. In turn government have failed to get the lifeblood of capital out to people who actually need it and favoured the interests of those who do not deserve such support.

3) *Both publics provided palliative policy dealing with the symptoms rather than the causes of the financial crisis*

In the hindsight the bailout of the banks was probably economically correct and politically inevitable. The alternative of simply allowing the market to correct itself would have probably led to depression (Stiglitz 2012). And as Peston (2012: 49) outlines ‘when mega banks get into difficulties, they are always bailed out and rescued by taxpayers’ because no politician wants bank failure to happen on their watch. But if we agree with this we subsequently don’t have to agree with the means used to achieve such ends. Or to put it in a Deweyan register we don’t have to agree with the bourgeoisie democracy that informed the means of the bank bailout and which dealt with the symptoms rather than the causes of financial crisis. For a different that argues that banks should have probably been left to go bankrupt see Blyth (2013)

The classic case in point is the structural flaws that were left and indeed remain within banking sectors. Given that many have argued, incorrectly as I show below, that the banking crisis was simply a regulatory failure derived from the de-regulation under neo-liberalism it
is rather odd that there has been little regulation post 2008. The case of moral hazard in banking is a classic example. Where governments simply handed out billions to banks without punishing the excessive risk taking such institutions had partaken in. As Stiglitz (2010: 135-37) outlines, in the case of the US, the government could have been forward looking and decided not to reward excessive risk taking with a bailout. In its place the government could have rewarded healthy and well-managed banks or even constructed new banks with TARP funds. Rather the actions of the US government seemed to reveal a perverse moral hazard that suggested that those who committed the worst practise of risk management were to get the biggest gifts from government.

The outcome of this is that whilst banks have been stabilised through public funds and socialised their losses they are still too big to fail. In the US, Bank of America absorbed Countrywide and Merrill Lynch and saw its asset base jump from $1.7 trillion to $2.3 trillion. Whilst JPMorgan Chase absorbed Bear Stearns and Washington Mutual and grew from $1.6 trillion to $2 trillion. In all the biggest five banks in US now have balance sheets that equal 56% of GDP up from the 43% at the height of the crisis. The situation is even worse in the UK. In 2008, the UK’s four biggest institutions had 64 per cent of market share, and that share had been falling; by 2010, it was 77 per cent. Within the UK banking sector RBS (£1.5 trillion), Barclays (£1.6 Trillion) and HSBC (£1.6 trillion) whose loan and investments match or are even higher than UK GDP of about £1.5 trillion (Kwak and Johnson 2010; Peston, 2012: 389-90). To paraphrase someone more eloquent than myself, then, some 4 years down line and billions later these banks still hold the potential to bring this sucker down.

When one turns to Keynesian Stimulus public the same issue of neo-liberal resurgence amongst elites emerges. As writers such as Krugman (2012) and Stiglitz (2012) have made
clear, the relative size of the fiscal stimulus packages were too small and did not tailor themselves to long-term investment but rather looked to save the present order. This is itself backed up by the fact the stimulus packages also failed to come to terms with how the very structure of their societies facilitated the financial crash in the first place.

Roubini et al. (2010: 2-3) point to the fact that the financial crisis was largely a bye product of how the global economy has been structured under the tenets of neo-liberal globalisation. This has basically seen the world economy become split between surplus countries such as China and Germany who export to deficit countries such as US, UK and southern European states. In export countries such as China and Germany wages and thus internal demand are held down by state policy forcing other countries to run trade deficits. The outcome was that world economic growth became dependant on the expansion of demand in US, UK and other deficit countries. In turn this induced capital flows from surplus countries to achieve such ends:

'The resulting fragility manifested itself in two kinds of problems. The first was the external problem of currency recycling from surplus countries to deficit countries (especially from China, with its giant dollar surplus, to the United States, with its giant deficit). The second was the corresponding internal problem of credit recycling in the United States and the UK, as households and firms took on the debt corresponding to the external deficit, raising debt-to-income ratios to historically high levels.' (Wade 2009: 10-11)

This situation was compounded by the rise of wealth inequality within advanced economies like the US and UK which shifted wealth from those who readily use their all their income to consume to those with a lower marginal propensity to consume. The result of such a
situation was that speculative surplus capital at the top of the income stream was diverted into financial speculation, which contributed to the power of financial capital and laid the ground for its risky endeavours. Surplus capital and the international capital flows were thus used to fund a great expanses of credit, which helped to mitigate the insufficient aggregate demand such wealth inequality normally generates. As Wade (2009: 13) sums up:

'The liquidity crisis itself was due to holders of securitized financial assets suddenly panicking about not knowing the reliability of the loans wrapped into their securities; and to financial organizations restricting credit because of not knowing their would-be borrowers’ exposure to "toxic" assets or to other organizations holding toxic as-sets. The liquidity crisis then transmuted into a global economic crisis as the inherent tendency to overproduction broke through the earlier credit-and-debt defenses against overproduction—overproduction itself being partly a consequence of widening income inequality.'

What this highlights is that it was therefore incorrect to believe that temporary stimulus and the restoration of bank lending to pre-crisis levels would be a desirable outcome or be likely to address these issues (Stiglitz 2012: 233). In fact the movement towards deficit countries to expand imports to rebalance could not take place without expansion of domestic demand in surplus countries such as Germany and China. Despite the claims of Brown (2010) and Darling (2011) these issues were never really countenanced by the Keynesian Stimulus public in any form of policy. Indeed, as we shall see in the next chapter, Germany fails to see how its growth model is key to understanding the Eurozone crisis.

This failure to act on the core issues of the financial crisis is also exemplified in the wealth inequality was inherently accepted by elites within the Keynesian Stimulus public because it
was literally the flip of the same coin used to justify paying supposed market rates for bankers. Within the tenants of Neo-Liberalism the competitive labour market provided optimal income distribution; pay is fair as long as markets are competitive. The Keynesian Stimulus public failed to see how such income inequality, which is structurally embedded in economies such as the US and UK, was part of the reason why economies became 'debt-intensive' in the first place. And as Wade (2012) shows, wealth inequality continues to rise both within and between developed and developing states. What was thus seen in polices of the Keynesian Stimulus public, however, was the inability of elites to go beyond the hegemony of Neo-Liberalism and its ideal of the market dictating the perception of reality.

7.4 Wither (Creative) Global Democracy?

This tracing of the political reaction to the financial crisis as a Deweyan history of publics inherently has two important insights for the current politics of globalisation and fortunes of global democracy. In the first instance, the actions of states had essentially proven once and for all that when push came to shove nation states could act multilaterally and move against markets. Neo-Liberal globalisation may have bought about the decline of modern sovereignty but when acting together nation states can achieve multilateral goals. However, in the second instance it is quite clear that the tenor of the transnational elite publics did not depart from the tenets of bourgeois democracy. The policies of the Bank Recapitalisation and Keynesian Stimulus publics were asymmetrical, with finance capital receiving the benefits and citizens receiving very little of the upsides. And there actually was a rehabilitation of ideas of market fundamentalism that others thought had been thoroughly questioned and discredited
There consequently was not great rethinking of cherished ideas but rather the negation of questions about the general order of Neo-Liberal globalisation such as income distribution and the status of banking. Rather than Deweyan creative democracy, the Bank Recapitalisation and Keynesian Stimulus publics continued to practise bourgeois democracy with neo-liberal ideals informing government policy. The status of banking is the greatest example of the negation of neo-liberalism’s apparent negation. For after committing trillions of public expenditure to the financial system and uncovering the now well known secret that the banking sector, due to the liabilities it creates is effectively always part of the public sector even when in private hands, government’s continued to treat banks as private entities. It was not only the banks that had catastrophically failed but also elites who failed hold their nerve and move on from neo-liberal’s long cherished ideas. And as I show in the next chapter, this form of bourgeoisie democracy has not only become more prevalent in the age of austerity but has also led to a return to bull headed nationalism and a contemporary eclipse of the public.
Chapter 8: Austere World

Upon first glance it is tempting to see the ‘Bank Recapitalisation’ and ‘Keynesian Stimulus’ publics of elites and experts, which emerged after the collapse of Lehman Brothers and enacted the stimulus packages of 2008-2009, as a unified collective of 21st century government interventionists and Keynesians. However, as the last chapter showed this narrative fails to acknowledge the hegemony of neo-liberal globalisation amongst elites and how government policy not only reasserted neo-liberal ideals of markets and non-government intervention but also saw the continuance of bourgeois democracy. Within this chapter I shall examine how the practise of bourgeois democracy, where the interests of capital and markets are placed above ordinary citizen, have continued with the rise of a transnational public of elites and experts, which we can dub the ‘Austerity’ public.

The chapter will thus consist of three sections. In the first section I sketch out how the transnational Keynesian Stimulus public was replaced by an ‘Austerity Public’. This entails examining the campaign of elites and experts who opposed the Keynesian Stimulus public both from those outside and those inside the Keynesian Stimulus public itself. The second section then goes on to demonstrate how the polices of the ‘Austerity Public’ display bourgeois democracy in full bloom and inherently put to an end any residual cosmopolitan nationalism amongst elites and experts that was evident in ‘Bank Recapitalisation’ and ‘Keynesian Stimulus’ publics.
8.1 From Schadenfreude to the Euro Crisis: The rise of austere elites

‘In the scary months that followed Lehman Brothers, just about all major governments agreed that sudden collapse of private property had to be offset, and they turned to expansionary fiscal policy and monetary policy – spending more, taxing less, and printing lots of monetary base- in an effort to limit the damage. In so doing, they were following the advice of standard textbooks; more important, they were following the hard-earned lessons of the Great Depression. But a funny thing happened in 2010: much of the word’s policy elite – the bankers and financial officials who define conventional wisdom – decided to throw out the textbooks and it quite suddenly became the fashion to call for spending cuts, tax hikes, and even higher interest rates even in the face of mass unemployment.’ (Krugman 2012: 188-189)

The words of Paul Krugman are a paradox of both reality and myth. The reality is that in 2010 elites and experts had moved from a public of ‘Keynesian Stimulus’ to a public of ‘Austerity’, which appeared to forget Keynes’ contribution to economics. Krugman and other Keynesian economists who were key to forming the Keynesian consensus amongst other experts had essentially become voices in the wilderness, when not so long ago they seemed to be informing government policy.

The myth, however, as shown in the last chapter is that the move to austerity was a sudden move out of nowhere. The start of the rehabilitation and reassertion of neo-liberal globalisation’s ideas of free markets had itself taken place before austerity became a policy norm across the advanced economies. And as I highlight below, austerity is essentially the
return to orthodox neo-liberal ideas that markets are always correct and that government is a hindrance to economic growth. Contra Krugman, the unravelling of a Keynesian consensus to dissensus and then back to relative consensus on the need for fiscal austerity should really have come as no great surprise. Moreover, the rise of the ‘Austerity’ public of elites and experts simply confirmed the rehabilitation and reassertion of neo-liberal globalisation’s policy ideals and the continuance of bourgeois democracy.

The beginning of the emergence of the Keynesian Stimulus public had not been uncontested and had even been contested by people who would end up within the public itself. The Governor at the Bank of England, just before the G20 meeting in London, had voiced concerns about the UK’s fiscal position in light of its own stimulus package. Whilst the Conservative Party (still in opposition in 2010) who up to now had backed the New Labour government’s policy in the financial crisis now saw the fiscal condition of the UK as a policy platform to attack Labour upon (Rawnsley, 2010: 623).

On the continent, post-Lehman Brothers the French and German governments held the belief that the 2008 financial crisis was inherently down to the irresponsibility of Anglo-Saxon Capitalism and indulged in schadenfreude citing UK and US slavish adherence to ideals of deregulation and loose money. This was reflected in President Sarkozy and Chancellor Merkel initially rejecting the need for stimulus and German finance minister Peer Steinbeck mocking the UK’s apparent conversion from the supply side economics of neo-liberalism to ‘crass Keynesianism’. And although both Germany and France would eventually join in the Keynesian Stimulus public that emerged in 2008-2009 they were

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Even though as it turns out Eurozone banks were more exposed to risk that their US and UK counterparts via having lent more to foreign governments within the Eurozone. By 2010 Eurozone banks were taking on far more risk that US and UK banks lending 35% more on average relative to their capital than UK banks (Peston 2012: 232)
undoubtedly resistant followers of what appeared to be international consensus amongst elites and experts.

Table 2: Government gross debt (as a percentage of GDP)

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<td>Actual</td>
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<tr>
<td>United States</td>
<td>71.6</td>
<td>85.2</td>
<td>94.4</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>105</td>
<td>115.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Euro Area</td>
<td>70.1</td>
<td>79.7</td>
<td>85.8</td>
<td>88.6</td>
<td>90</td>
<td>86.6</td>
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<tr>
<td>France</td>
<td>68.2</td>
<td>79</td>
<td>82.3</td>
<td>86.8</td>
<td>89.4</td>
<td>87.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Germany</td>
<td>66.4</td>
<td>74.1</td>
<td>84</td>
<td>82.6</td>
<td>81.9</td>
<td>75</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Italy</td>
<td>106.3</td>
<td>116.1</td>
<td>119</td>
<td>121.1</td>
<td>121.4</td>
<td>114.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Japan</td>
<td>195</td>
<td>216.3</td>
<td>220</td>
<td>233.1</td>
<td>238.4</td>
<td>253.4</td>
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<tr>
<td>United Kingdom</td>
<td>52</td>
<td>68.3</td>
<td>75.5</td>
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<tr>
<td>Canada</td>
<td>71.1</td>
<td>83.3</td>
<td>84</td>
<td>84.1</td>
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<td>73</td>
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Source: IMF (2011)

By late 2009 and early 2010 the effects of dealing with the financial crisis had lead to a rise in national debt of countries that had launched bank recapitalisation and fiscal stimulus packages. Between 2007-2009, for example, the UK, the US and the Eurozone increased sovereign debt from between 20-40% of GDP (Blackburn 2011: 33; Table 2 above). At the same time, there had been a stabilisation of GDP and growth had returned amongst the advanced economies in 2009 and early 2010 (Wade 2011a: 14). Early in 2010 economic conservative commentators such as Niall Ferguson and even left leaning economists such Jeffrey Sachs, began to question the stimulus route and began arguing for fiscal consolidation or what has become known as austerity politics of public spending cuts, tax rises and interest rate rises (Blyth and Shenai 2010).
This thinking was replicated in technocratic institutions such as the Bank for International Settlement and in the OECD, whose spring 2010 Economic Outlook called for spending cuts, tax rises and higher interest rates (Krugman 2012: 189-90). The consensus around Keynesian stimulus amongst the elites appeared to wane in the movement of such a body of expert opinion and moved towards fiscal consolidation. The first prime examples of this being when The ECB and Germany, citing rising fiscal deficits, resisted US calls for another round of stimulus packages in early 2010 (Farrell and Quiggin, 2012: 36). And the subsequent announcement in March 2010 by Gordon’s Brown’s government of their plan to implement £50 billion pounds worth of spending cuts should they win the May 2010 general election (Englen et al., 2011: 222).

In 2010, the move from Keynesian stimulus to austerity became complete amongst most of the transnational elite public that arisen in response to the 2008 financial crisis. The catalyst for this being the attack on the Greek state by capital markets as the true nature of its fiscal position became clear. Unable to raise loans to finance its budgets deficit Greece was forced to go cap in hand to the EU and received a €110 billion Euro bailout from the ‘troika’ of the EU, ECB and IMF in exchange for implementation austerity measures and the reform of its public sector. On the back of this, the newly formed collation government in the UK, headed by Prime Minister Cameron and Chancellor Osborne, who had earlier argued that the fate of Greece could become the fate of the UK, now prepared plans for an emergency budget in June 2010.

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88 The outgoing Greek government in 2009 had effectively committed fraud with the aid of investment banks like Goldman Sachs had hidden public debt as currency transfers. When George Papandreou took over as Prime Minister he uncovered a financial deception of gigantic proportions where Greece’s budget deficit was not the projected 5% but actually 15.6%.

89 See Osborne (2009), which argues that the then Labour government spending policies could attract the wrath of the bond markets as Greece had started to endure in late 2009.
Figure 2: OECD implemented (2009-11) and planned austerity measures (2012-15) as GDP %

As Wade (2011a: 15) outlines, it was the unusual coming together of British and German governments, albeit with some resistance from the Obama administration, which facilitated a volte-face by G20 leaders at the Toronto summit in June 2010. The undoubted consensus amongst the transnational elite was a relative agreement to now halve budget deficits by 2013:

'Sound fiscal finances are essential to sustain recovery, provide flexibility to respond to new shocks, ensure the capacity to meet the challenges of aging populations, and avoid leaving future generations with a legacy of deficits and debt. The path of adjustment must be carefully calibrated to sustain the recovery in private demand. There is a risk that synchronized fiscal adjustment across several major economies could adversely impact the recovery. There is also a risk that the failure to implement consolidation where necessary would undermine confidence and hamper
growth. Reflecting this balance, advanced economies have committed to fiscal plans that will at least halve deficits by 2013 and stabilize or reduce government debt-to-GDP ratios by 2016.’ (G20, 2010)

After its cementation as the policy norm (see figure 2 above) for advanced economies within the G20 in 2010 the policy of the austerity was itself publicly underpinned by two central contentions. On one hand, the situation of Greece, as is espoused by elites such as Osborne and Merkel, was taken be no outlier. Rather, Greece was emblematic of the fact that nation states across the advanced economies had been profligate in their public spending and now needed to move towards fiscal consolidation in order to avoid being punished by the bond markets.

On the other hand, this assumption was buttressed by the economic assumption that fiscal consolidation can actually be expansionary in the current context and create economic demand and growth. In this scenario, although a reduction in government spending is taken to reduce demand the creation of ‘confidence’, either through the perception of lower interest rates inducing investment or consumers gaining confidence about the governments long term tax plans and hence spending again, is taken to more than make up for the shortfall. In short, fiscal consolidation is taken to generate conditions of confidence that would offset the reduction in demand caused by lower government spending (Krugman 2012: 196). And these contentions have held fast as the European Sovereign debt crisis has evolved throughout 2010 (Greece, Ireland), 2011 (Greece 2nd bailout, Portugal, Italy) and 2012 (Spain) as various countries and their financial institutions struggled to raise money on

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90 This was primarily based on the work of Harvard economist Alberto Alesina who updated his earlier work from the 1990's with Silvia Ardagna in 2009. Alesina and Ardagna (2009) essentially became the bedrock of claims about expansionary austerity.
capital markets and required EU and ECB assistance to remain liquid and/or solvent. This assistance has come at the demand by the ECB that governments who receive assistance embark upon austerity

8.2 Austerity: bourgeoisie democracy with a different name

If it is safe to conclude that ‘Bank Recapitalisation’ and ‘Keynesian Stimulus’ transnational publics of elites and experts were still in a sense governed by the hegemony of neo-liberalism and the practise of bourgeois democracy. Then it is equally safe to say that the Austerity public of elites and experts which created relative transnational consensus on austerity have completed the restoration of neo-liberalism. But what does this exactly mean? Below I firstly highlight how the tendencies of bourgeois democracy amongst elites has created a false argument for the merits austerity, which has the all too real consequences of benefiting finance capital and the interests of those at the top of the income stream. And in the second instance I argue that such an approach has led to the collapse of even the pretence of multilateralism that was the hallmark of the ‘Bank Recapitalisation’ and ‘Keynesian Stimulus’ publics.

a. Big bank takes little bank

The fundamental rationale of austerity is that capital markets, primarily the bond market, have shown that advanced economies have far too big public sectors and that government spending is hurting economic growth and creating unsustainable debt burdens. This rationale has been espoused by political elites such as members of the British collation government and members of the Eurozone such as Germany. As pointed out above, this rationale is based on two central contentions. On one hand, the situation of Greece is taken
be no outlier but rather as being emblematic of the fact that nation states across the advanced economies have been profligate in their public spending and need to move towards fiscal consolidation in order to avoid being punished by the bond markets. On the other hand, this assumption is buttressed by the economic assumption that fiscal consolidation can actually be expansionary in the current context and create demand and growth.

The problem with the above argument about austerity as good democratic government is that both its central contentions stand on shaky ground and actually reveal the practise of bourgeois democracy and the collapse of the traces of cosmopolitan nationalism that were residual parts of the prior transnational publics. Take for instance, the process where political elites and technocrats have attempted to, in the words of Krugman (2012: 179) 'hellenize' the narrative of advanced economies about the reasons for the fiscal positions of advanced economies and the threat of the bond markets. This argument that nation states have been over spending is undoubtedly disingenuous because Greece is actually an outlier amongst other countries.

Not only in terms of the fraud Greece conducted with Goldman Sachs in order to cook it books but also the nature of the budget deficits it was running vis-à-vis G20 countries. As highlighted in the pervious chapter, the reason why states took on large budget deficits and increased sovereign debt was down the financial crisis and its secondary costs. Only 1/10 of the ‘average’ 39 percent increase in debt to GDP ratios G20 has been down to fiscal stimulus or what we can call extra spending. The vast increase in public debt, two-thirds according to the IMF, and the running of budget deficits can rather be explained by the fall in GDP during 2008-9, the cost of bailing out financial sectors and revenue losses from lower asset prices.
and financial sector profits. (IMF 2010: 14) Most advanced economies in Europe and North America can be accused of spending based on false assumptions of GDP growth and low inflation buoyed by runaway global finance but they were not simply over spending at the point of the onset of financial crisis in 2008.91

The same thing can be said about the second half of the argument that attempts to Hellenize the current fiscal balance of advanced nation states: the threat of the bond markets. This inherently misunderstands the nature of the present and its liquidity trap. This is where at zero percent interest rates, citizens are still unwilling to purchase as much as they are willing to produce. At the same time, the amount being saved – income not spent on consumption – is more than the amount businesses are willing to invest (Krugman 2012: 136). The scenario today is that the private sector has been deleveraging and has excess savings that do not compete with government spending. There is quite simply a glut of money in the private sector that needs an outlet and government debt is essentially a safe investment for UK and foreign private sector excess savings. This is backed by the fact that UK government borrowing costs are at historical lows and essentially the UK can borrow money at 0% interests rate. As Martin Wolf puts it, governments who are scaremongering about ‘bond vigilantes’ are ‘terrified of a confidence bogey who is asleep’ (Wolf 2011a).92

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91 See Portes (2011) for similar arguments specifically against the view that the UK was running large fiscal deficits before the 2008 crisis. As Wolf (2010a) makes clear, the economic legacy of New Labour rather than being one of over spending was the hubris to believe in the ‘...conventional wisdom about the prospects for durable economic stability, the robustness of modern financial markets and, surprisingly perhaps, the strength of the post-Thatcher UK economy. He [Gordon Brown] then doubled up on this bet by building his plans for public spending on the assumption that the good times would roll on forever’

92 As Wade (2011a: 38n11) points out the ‘UK government argues that borrowing costs have been contained only because of its plans for tough spending cuts. Not so. The spreads on UK government debt over German bunds stabilized in February 2010 and have fallen only 0.2 percentage point since the election, which suggests that the government’s strong fiscal stance has brought only modest credibility gains’
The assumption that fiscal consolidation can actually be expansionary is also a half-truth dressed up as a fact because it fails to comprehend the current situation. The work of Alesina and Ardagna (2009) does not, for example, take in consideration that many of the options they suggest would induce confidence, such as lowering interest rates or devaluing of currency, are not available to today’s governments because their central banks are running interests rates at effectively 0% or because they are part of a monetary union. At the same time, because countries who are interconnected trading partners (e.g. Eurozone countries and the UK) are all embarking on austerity at the same time there is very little chance of an export boom fuelling economic expansion because there is simply very little demand (Krugman 2012: 198). As George Soros explains, successful expansionary austerity such as that embarked upon by Canada in 90’s is not possible today:

‘For a very good reason: economic conditions are very different. The global financial system is reducing its excessive leverage and exports are slowing down worldwide. Fiscal austerity in Europe is exacerbating a global trend and pushing Europe into a deflationary debt trap. That is, when too many heavily indebted governments are reducing their budget deficits at the same time, their economies shrink so that the debt burden as a percentage of GDP actually increases’ (Soros 2012)

This has been recently backed by the IMF who argue that when economies are in the midst of a liquidity trap and synchronised austerity policies, any attempt to reduce budget deficits by 1 per cent has a multiplier effect of 1 to 1.5. This translates into a scenario where a reduction in spending equals to a reduction in GDP by 1 to 1.5 % (IMF 2012: 43). As Larry Summers (2012) argues, this means that austerity is actually ‘counterproductive in terms of
creditworthiness’ as it ‘reduces incomes, limiting the capacity to repay debts’ and achieves only a modest reduction in budget deficits. Whilst at the same time such austerity stifles growth by reducing capital investment and perpetuating unemployment. Ironically, then, it is not government spending but the very practise of austerity and its slavish adherence to correct judgment of the market, or rather what elites mistakenly believe the market is saying in relation to government spending, which is actually stifling growth and employment.

In the UK, for example, on the back of relative economic recovery in 2009 the onset of austerity saw the economy return to recession in 2012. The onset of austerity in turn led to sluggish growth in between these recessions, which actually means that the UK is actually living under a depression that is set to be longer than one endured during the Great Depression between 1930-34 (Peston 2012: 151). Whilst in the Euro zone GDP is projected to contract in 2012 by -0.4% and only grow by 0.2% in 2013. Individual countries within the Euro zone under enforced austerity by the EU due to bailouts such as Spain (-1.5, -1.3), Italy (-2.3, -0.7), Portugal (-1.7, -3.0) are projected to contract in 2012 and 2013 respectively. And as a consequence unemployment rates at the current time Spain (26.2%), Greece (25.4%), Portugal (16.3%), and Italy (11.1%) continue to rise year on year (Guardian 2012: see figure 3).
What should not be inferred from my above analysis is a simple either/or between austerity and fiscal stimulus. One does not need to fall into a false debate about fiscal austerity vs. stimulus in order to grasp the current state of the global economy. As Roubini (2010) points out, in an ‘...ideal world, where policymakers could credibly commit to medium­ to long­term fiscal adjustment, the optimal and desirable path would be to commit today to a schedule of spending reductions and tax increases, phased in gradually over the next decade as the economy recovers.’ And even the G20 (2010) communiqué in Toronto outlined that there is ‘...a risk that synchronized fiscal adjustment across several major economies could adversely impact the recovery.’ The question then becomes, why is the current public of transnational elites firmly set on austerity? Why did they agree to such policy initiatives in
the first place and not heed their own warnings of synchronized fiscal adjustment? And why have they been misrepresenting the facts on issues like the explanation of sovereign debt and expansionary fiscal consolidation?

The details of the answer to these questions can shift in different context; austerity in Europe has different factors behind it than austerity in the Anglosphere (UK and US). However, they both still fundamentally centre on the perpetuation of bourgeois democracy where the interests of capital and markets are placed above those of ordinary citizens. I will return to the Eurozone in the next section but in the Anglosphere it is quite clear that the return of neo-liberalism, which began post-Lehman Brothers, has come full circle post-2010. Whether real as in the case of Greece or imagined as in the case of the UK or the US, the rise in sovereign debt since 2008 has facilitated the advance of neo-liberal desires of certain national elites and technocrats to shrink the welfare state. The hegemony of neo-liberalism amongst political elites had meant that even prior to the rise in sovereign debt caused by the financial crisis the welfare state was seen as bloated and counterproductive for market efficiency and economic growth (Blackburn 2011: 33). The sovereign debt crisis and panacea of austerity has essentially buttressed this take on state expenditure. As one can see below in Figure 4 the welfare state, health care and pensions are the biggest targets of austerity:
The best example of this use of austerity to achieve a shrinking of the welfare state can be found in arguments by deficit hawks in the US and UK. The British coalition government, for example, has trumped the New Labour’s government’s proposed spending cuts. In 2010 Chancellor George Osborne announced spending cuts of £81 billion, which include 25% cuts across all government departments and a proposed £18 billion cut in the welfare budget. In all when taxation rises are factored some the total package of fiscal consolidation would amount to £113bn by 2014-15 (Wolf 2010b). What emerges from this picture of aggressive cuts to state expenditure, however, is the sheer hypocrisy of bourgeoisie democracy. Osborne’s 2010 emergency budget, for example, is regressive and disproportionally falls on
poor who depend more on the state but who had no real part in causing the financial crisis (Browne & Levell 2010). And as highlighted above, the shrinking of the welfare state is actually having little to no effect on the economic fortunes of advanced economies.

What austerity is having an effect upon, especially within neo-liberal havens such as UK and US, is the disproportionate transference of wealth upwards to the top (Wade: 2011a: 35). As the OECD (2013) has recently outlined, the result of the financial crisis and recession has seen a worsening of inequality within advanced economies. Across OECD countries, whilst the average income of the top 10% in 2010 was similar to that in 2007, the income of the bottom 10% in 2010 was lower than that in 2007 by 2% per year. Out of the 33 countries where data are available, the top 10% has done better than the poorest 10% in 21 countries throughout the crisis.

This is even more apparent in the UK, which as highlighted earlier is the poster child for using austerity to remodel the state and its provision of welfare. In the year to June 2010, for example, the average director’s remuneration in FTSE 100 companies increased by 55 percent and the median director’s remuneration by 23 percent, while average earnings for the rest of the population increased by 1.5 percent. By 2011 the average pay awarded to a FTSE 100 CEO including bonuses equalled £4.8 million – some 184 times the average wage (£26,000) of a full time British employee. Whilst in 2012 it became clear that large corporations such as Apple, Amazon, Google, eBay and Facebook have paid UK corporation tax of less than £20 million on sales over £12 billion (Peston 2012: 410-414). When this is added to the direct and secondary costs of the financial crisis and the return of banks to exorbitant profit the problem of bourgeois democracy where the interests of capital,
especially finance capital, are subsidized and put over the interests of ordinary citizens is pretty clear for everyone to see.

b. Die Multilateralism Die!

What then are we to make of the rise of the Austerity public in terms of global democracy? As highlighted in the last chapter, whilst the Bank Recapitalisation and Keynesian Stimulus public attempted to reanimate the policy objectivities of neo-liberalism and effectively practised bourgeois democracy there was a genuine construction of form multilateralism around stemming the financial crisis. In a limited sense one may even argue that traces of cosmopolitan nationalism could be detected in how nation state leaders seemed to tie their own national interests with the fate of others. However, with the onset of austerity it has essentially become every country for themselves. In this situation, somewhat perversely, the hegemony of austerity means that every country has the objective of securing their own future in the face of once more all powerful and all knowing global markets. And this has seen a return to the bull-headed nationalism that Dewey so warned against in 1930’s.

The primary example of austerity leading to the collapse multilateralism can be seen in the way elites in Eurozone, namely the Northern countries such as Germany, have narrated the Eurozone crisis. Austerity in the Eurozone, for example, is inherently being pursed due to Germany’s hegemonic influence over the ECB and its role as the economic superpower within the Eurozone. The reason for this revolves around the hegemonic influence of Ordoliberalism amongst German elites. Constructed as a post war response to classical liberalism and Nazi state intervention Ordoliberalism dictates that states must create rules (order) so that the market (liberalism) cannot be captured by cartels or monopolies:
'The central tenet of ordoliberalism is that governments should regulate markets in such a way that market outcome approximates the theoretical outcome in a perfectly competitive market (in which none of the actors are able to influence the price of goods and services). Ordoliberalism differs from other schools of liberalism (including the neo-liberalism predominant in the Anglo-Saxon world) in that it places a greater emphasis on preventing cartels and monopolies. At the same time, like neo-liberalism, ordoliberalism opposes intervention into the normal course of the economy. For example, it rejects the use of expansionary fiscal and monetary policies to stabilise the business cycle in a recession and is, in that sense, anti-Keynesian.' (Dullien and Guérot 2012)

Significantly, however, although Ordoliberalism breaks with neo-liberalism over the role of the state its economics remain as 'classical as Smith and Hume' (Blyth 2013: 140). In this schema prosperity is gained through actions that favor the supply side of saving and investment rather than the demand side and consumption. Ordoliberalism was essentially merged with the ideal of the social market economy of the 1950's and set the rules for German economic development going forward. Significantly, however, although Ordoliberalism breaks with neo-liberalism over state as Blyth suggests its economics remain as 'classical as Smith and Hume' (2013: 140). In this schema prosperity is gained through actions that favor the supply side of saving and investment rather than the demand side and consumption. And as Dullien and Guérot (2012) further, such thinking has led to a contemporary consensus in Germany which largely resembles Neo-Classical Economics in the Anglosphere where:

'Output and employment are determined mainly by supply factors. If demand falls
short of supply, neo-classical economists believe that prices and wages will adjust swiftly so that demand increases again and any excess supply rapidly disappears. If prices and wages sometimes do not react quickly, they would argue that this is due to legal barriers such as collective bargaining or legal minimum wages. The solution is structural reform to make markets more flexible.'

This approach to economic development has largely been incorporated into the ECB constitution and EU Commission's competition based policies (e.g. telecommunications, energy supply) and through the rules based approach to EU governance (e.g. Maastricht Treaty and the Stability and Growth Pact). With this in mind it becomes clear why Germany was initially a reluctant participant in the Keynesian Stimulus public and an all too keen participant in the emergence of austerity. In German eyes the start of the sovereign debt crisis amongst southern European states, which following Krugman (2012: 178) we can call the GIPSI (Greece, Ireland, Portugal, Spain, Italy) countries, is a consequence of a loss of economic competitiveness and excessive state spending in the deficit countries. The logical reaction is for GIPSI countries is then to resort to deflationary wage restraints to restore competitiveness and immediate cuts to government spending to restore bond market confidence (Dullien and Guérot 2012).

The key point here is that German and by default EU institutions still revolve around the same tenants of bourgeois democracy as neo-liberal countries such as the US and UK. This is because despite different approaches to state intervention both privilege efficient markets over the interests of citizens or rather see citizen interests as centering on efficient markets. The problem is that such a hegemonic belief in the efficiency and correct judgment of markets has led Germany to misunderstand and misdiagnose the Eurozone crisis.
Moreover, the narrative that Eurozone crisis centres on the profligate nature of the southern European states and hence can be solved with austerity misses how the structure of the Eurozone or the exposure of northern European banks to southern European private and public sector debt.

As highlighted above, the ‘Hellenization’ narrative of profligate government fails to explain the rise of nation state debt in the G20. The fudging of the facts in hellenization of countries like Spain and Ireland is beyond all doubt. In 2007, for example, Spain and Ireland had respective public sector debt to GDP ratios of 36% and 25%. This was well below the 60% figure the EU’s Growth and Stability Pact (1997) had apparently placed on its members (Peston, 2012: 251). What actually made both countries vulnerable when the financial crisis hit was that both countries had property and credit booms that saw household and private business take on massive debts. And it has been the bailout of Irish and Spanish banks and the collapse of the property boom that has swelled sovereign debt.

Now it is very true that economies such as Spain had a failing economy post 2008 and the onset of their own austerity packages in 2011 has acerbated their situation. As we have see unemployment in Spain stands at 25%, with youth unemployment at 50% and a fiscal deficit of 8.6% (OECD 2012). One could argue that such numbers would explain why capital markets started to desert Spain but it actually does not. The main problem Spain has is that it does not have a central bank or its own currency. The ECB, as per Germany’s wishes, whilst being the central bank for the Eurozone is not permitted to print money in order to

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93 Spain has for example started a temporary increase in income tax, saving tax and property tax (local); no public sector hiring (with few exceptions); a freeze of public wages; a freeze of the guaranteed minimum wage; elimination of renting subsidies for young people. The government has also started to draft an amendment to the law on political parties in order to reduce their subsidies. (OECD 2012).
fund a country’s debt. And as pointed out above, Spain and other countries enacting austerity in the Eurozone, lack the ability to devalue their currencies because of being in monetary union with the other members of the Eurozone. It is thus the fundamental structural problem of the Eurozone, which has created the sovereign debt crisis in the wake of governments bailing out their financial industries:

‘By transferring what had previously been their right to print money to the European Central Bank, the member states exposed their sovereign credit to the risk of default. Developed countries that control their own currency have no reason to default; they can always print money. Their currency may depreciate in value, but the risk of default is practically non-existent ‘(Soros 2012 cf. Krugman 2012: 183)

The reason the bond markets have targeted the GIPSI countries sovereign debt is three fold. Firstly, austerity has exacerbated the economic down turns in those countries. Secondly, investors fear that GIPSI countries can’t devalue to raise exports. And thirdly, investors don’t believe that the ECB will not print money to pay off the debts and those countries like Spain, Greece or Italy may default. All three of issues then act to trigger off bond market ‘vigilantes’, who have pushed up the price of GIPSI sovereign debt to the point the ECB has had to provide emergency funding via loans that came with austerity policies attached. It is the nature of the Eurozone and its monetary union, then, rather than nation state profligacy that has created the sovereign debt crisis in Europe. And why even though the UK has more debt and a bigger budget deficit it can borrow money at historically low interests rates whilst Spain is squeezed until the pips squeaks (Soros 2012). When told this way, however, the story does not fit with the narrative that all the GIPSI countries have been profligate.
Indeed, when one digs further into how the Eurozone structures facilitate the current crisis it becomes clear that the seeds of the crisis were also sown by the same structures.

The primary reason the Eurozone is in this mess is because of national government failure in the midst of structural conditions engendered by monetary union between Germany, Europe's powerhouse economy, and Southern states. When the Euro was launched Germany's economic power and credit rating was applied to all Eurozone countries, which saw the interest rates for the nations of Southern Europe fall not only on government debt but across the board on household and private sector borrowing. This was the form of cheap credit that would see national governments sit back and do nothing as the indebtedness of households and private sector debts increased radically. Spain's overall indebtedness doubled to 360% of GDP by 2011 and the private sectors of Portugal, Ireland, and Italy all saw their private sectors take on massive debt. This explains for instance why Spain and Ireland had debt fuelled property booms and why their national governments did nothing as tax revenues increased (Peston 2012, 255).

At the same time, however, Germany experienced significant debt and wage inflation linked to the reunification between East and West Germany and as a result when Germany joined the Euro it lost out to countries on other countries on wage competition. However, German authorities embarked upon labour market and other structural reforms in early 2000's. This now made it easier for Germany employers to fire workers, whilst the government reduced unemployment benefits and job seekers received greater assistance. This in turn expanded the labour force and kept wages down in Germany. The German state also adopted a constitutional amendment requiring the federal budget to be balanced by 2016 (Soros 2012).
The result was that Germany effectively regained cost advantage by holding down the costs at home as southern European debt fuelled growth drove up labour costs abroad. By 2004 onwards Germany starting running 5% current account surpluses and had an export-led boom, significantly financed by housing and consumption booms in the southern Europe (Soros 2012). As Peston (2012: 261) ruefully quips, ‘Greek and Spanish profligacy was a pretty good analgesic for the pain that would otherwise have been felt for the pain that would otherwise have been felt by Germans from their cost-cutting.’

Nevertheless, German elites with their slavish adherence to bourgeois democracy and faced with a domestic population that fails to really grasp Germany’s role in the crisis have embraced the narrative that it was GIPSI fiscal profligacy of state spending that has caused the Eurozone crisis. Within this narrative the wider arguments about the Eurozone’s structural imbalances between current account surplus countries and current account deficit countries are ignored or deemed unimportant. And the fact that most of southern European private sector debt that spurred German economic growth came from northern European banks, which are now over exposed to such bad debt, also disappears.

What is equally apparent here is how such bourgeois democracy in Germany has affected conceptions multilateralism within the Eurozone. The natural course of action based on such imbalances between surplus Germany and the Southern states is for Germany and other surplus countries in Eurozone to actually become the source of demand rather than supply for deficit countries like the GIPSI countries. This would entail not austerity but inflation through fiscal expansion by Germany other surplus Eurozone countries (Krugman 2012: 185). However, the embracement of the austerity argument that markets are correct
and hence their judgment that GIPSI countries are profligate public spenders gets rid of this course of possible action going forward.

At the same time the embracement of austerity argument that markets are correct and hence their judgment that GIPSI countries are profligate public spenders also highlights how bourgeois democracy has fostered a lack of cosmopolitan nationalism within Germany itself. The southern European States, although not blameless given their private indebtedness, cannot not devalue or print money as they do have their own currency or central bank and are themselves, as Germany too, locked in a monetary union. The primary problem is that the Eurozone is a monetary union that lacks the fiscal union of other currency unions like US. In the US, for example, not all states are equal in their economic performance and failing states like Nevada are effectively bailed out through transfers from the Federal government (Krugman 2012). However, what German elites do not want to do, given that Germany is the strongest economy in Eurozone and her ill-informed citizens would themselves say no, is to offer the German taxpayer as the final guarantor of southern European states (Soros 2012). The reality is thus that the Eurozone is driving towards the edge of an economic cliff with very little to suggest it has the intelligence to hit the breaks\textsuperscript{94}.

Regardless, of what does happen, however, the reality remains that German elites and their valorisation of the market as the purveyor of truth seemingly collapses European multilateralism and signal the death of any nascent form of cosmopolitan nationalism. And in doing so the German led ECB has gone about systematically destroying multilateral relations between EU nation states and restored to a bull headed nationalism that has run

\textsuperscript{94} It is becoming increasingly clear that Eurozone will have to move towards fiscal union and some form of debt sharing via a ‘Eurobonds’ that would effectively pool all of Europe’s debt together. This seems to be strategy of new ECB President Mario Draghi (2012) who has spoken of the need for a new public space to accompany the deepening of fiscal ties between countries. It remains to be seen, however, given the nature of nationalism in other Eurozone countries and within Germany itself whether a United States of Europe is forthcoming.
shot over democracy in southern European states. In this sense, southern European citizens are bearing the brunt of the failure of their financial centers and the failure of Germany to admit her own role in what has become a European tragedy.

What is worrying is that the lack of cosmopolitan nationalism shown by German elites in the Eurozone highlights how the rehabilitation and reassertion of ideals such as the rationality and efficiency of markets is actually symptomatic of a wider decline of the limited sense of community amongst nation states and their elites engendered by the events of late 2008. The prime examples of this can be found in the fate of projects that as was argued in last chapter appeared to promise a quasi form of creative democracy at the international. Level. The reforms of the ‘Bank recapitalisation’ and ‘Keynesian Stimulus’ publics in arenas such as the G20 were not fully thought out and actually undemocratic (e.g. G20 vis-à-vis the remaining 197 UN states). However, even such structurally flawed plans have become ether as the nascent belief in multilateralism has crumbled with the onset of austerity. For example, Wade (2011b) not only questions the legitimacy of representativeness of G20 but also flags up that the reforms engineered in 2010 by the G20 for the IMF and World bank actually did relative little to enhancement the representation of developing countries and were actually the site of nation state realpolitik between the US, European nation states and China.

The same can be said for reform of the global banking standards that were much talked about in 2008 and 2009 and were delivered in 2010 in the guise of Basel III. It had been hoped that states would be able to form new global rules that would force banks to hold more capital than the previous rules of Basel II and Basel I, which had allowed the massive overleveraging to take place. However, as Martin Wolf (2010c) outlined, the ‘...world needs
a smaller and safer banking industry. The defect of the new rules is that they will fail to
deliver this.' The reason for this is because nation states looked to tailor the regulation to
suit their national financial sectors needs. For instance, Germany and France opposed high
level capital ratios desired by the Governor of the Bank of England’s Mervyn King and the
early phase in of such rules because they had found out how insolvent their own banks
actually were (Englen 2011: 232). The result being that the Basel rules have been kicked into
the long grass and now do not come into play until 2018/19 (Peston 2012: 389).

This re-emergence of nation state realpolitik at the IMF and World Bank and the lacklustre
nature of Basel III can be linked to an emergence of a more ‘bull headed nationalism’ post
the collapse of the ‘Keynesian Stimulus’ public and re-emergence of markets as the primary
explanation of sovereign debt and justification for austerity. The ramifications of this
collapse of multilateralism and cosmopolitan nationalism is that in many ways we are still
not too far removed from situation of four years ago in 2008. The reform of global banking
rules has largely ground to a halt due to the timidity of the Basel III and allowed nation
states to redefine finance once more as a national priority. For instance, the UK Chancellor
George Osborne diluted his own Independent Commission On Banking’s 2011 report on
reforming UK banks by rejecting its high leverage ratios in favour of Basell III’s lower
leverage ratios. This was done to avoid losing the City of London’s privileged position as one
of the world’s hubs of financial services via penalising in it global competition. And the same
competitiveness argument has been utilised by the UK government to deny the validity of a
European Financial Transactions Tax (FTT) has used the same arguments.

Nevertheless, perhaps the most dangerous thing that has emerged with rehabilitation of the
market as the grounding of truth is that the destruction of nascent multilateralism amongst
elites has left the global economy in a state of anarchism. The move to austerity has effectively curtailed the communication between governments that would be invaluable to deal with on-going Great Recession and issues such as Euro zone crisis. Instead, fractures are emerging with governments in the GIPSI countries coming to resent what Germany and her inability to own up to her own role in the Eurozone crisis. And even international institutions appear to be at odds with the very nation states who endorse and provide them with legitimacy. For example, more recently the IMF (2012) has turned against synchronised austerity in the face of evidence that such synchronised austerity is counterproductive. On one hand, this is good because it hands anti-austerians the chance to create a transnational consensus and community amongst elites. On the other hand, without a consensus about the way forward both between nation states and international institution such a situation may compound the bull headed nationalism states are currently pursuing.

This worry is no understatement. By 2011 even the supposed leader of the free world had come to the conclusion the collapse of the multilateralism engendered by the events of 2008 through to the stimulus packages of 2010 was a real problem:

‘When we met in London two years ago, we knew that putting the global economy on the path to recovery would be neither easy nor quick. But together, we forged a response that pulled the global economy back from the brink of catastrophe. That’s the leadership we’ve demonstrated before. That’s the leadership we need now – to sustain economic recovery and put people back to work, in our own countries and around the world’ (Obama 2011)
The perverse consequence of the rise of the austerity public and the hegemony of its economic ideals is that such an approach actually has pitted nation against nation in deficit reduction. There is thus no real transnational public of elites and experts anymore but rather nations once more bowing or being forced to bow to the power of the market. Even if we argue that the reforms put forward by the Bank Recapitalisation and Keynesian Stimulus publics of elites and experts were never much more than a smokescreen for the status quo; that status quo was better than this present. The global economy and global politics therefore appears in a state anarchy with the only constant being bourgeois democracy and extraction of wealth up towards the higher echelons of the income stream.
Chapter 9: Democracy Eclipsed

The narratives of the two preceding chapters should have bought home the fact that bourgeois democracy is alive and well in the early 21st century. The reassertion of neoliberalism’s hegemony was and is being carried out because national democracy and by consequence global democracy are in the thrall of bourgeois democracy. As it stands, this is far removed from Dewey’s idea of the Great Community, which would involve the practises of creative democracy at both national and international levels. But the question remains what about the publics of ordinary citizens? How have they reacted to what was and continues to be an international economic crisis? And what do their actions tell us about the prospects of global democracy?

To answer these questions I shall firstly how initial public bewilderment and anger Post—Lehman Brother’s bankruptcy produced publics that turned to mainstream politics for help. In turn I shall highlight how this seems to have changed with backlashes against austerity in Europe. However, I will suggest that there has been a rise of publics who are apathetic towards political democracy because of a democratic disconnect between elites and citizens. Moving on I shall examine the rise of Occupy Movement in 2011 and how despite the movements redeeming points its lack of desire to reform political democracy makes its politics ultimately impotent.
9.1 Return of the Public?

The initial action of citizens can be seen as a mixture of sheer bewilderment and anger at events post September 15th 2008 and subsequent near collapse of the Anglo banking sector. This was predominantly due to the members of the Bank Recapitalisation public keeping details of the banking crisis behind closed doors. For example, the public was not made privy, until around year after about the emergency loans given by the Bank of England to the Royal bank of Scotland and Halifax and Bank of Scotland between October 2008 to January 2009. And if not for journalists such as Robert Peston the actual scale and nearness of the collapse of the UK banking sector would have probably never been properly relayed to the public by those elites attempting to deal with the crisis. Even then it could be argued that due to the complexity of the financial crisis the public in the UK and US were initially eclipsed. When the reality of the situation post-Lehman Brothers did start to filter into the general knowledge of ordinary citizens their initial anger seemed to turn on governments and the new public enemy number one: bankers (Skidelsky 2009: 23-25).

Can we thus talk of an emergence of publics in directly after the crisis of 2008? There was of course an effect in general elections such as US and UK in 2008 and 2010 respectively. Holdbrook et al. (2012) argue that the fall of Lehman brothers did have an effect of swinging independent voters to Barack Obama and away from John McCain. And the financial crisis in the UK discredited the New Labour government’s claims to economic competency. This was both through New Labour’s actual failure, over the course of ten years, to regulate the banking industry and the re-writing of history by the Conservative opposition that blamed austerity on government overspending. These responses were in a sense typical of the early citizen responses to the financial crisis in that they largely turned towards established
political channels to register their discontent: general elections. And this generally reflects the respective insights of Rodrik and Dewey that when globalisation creates strife within the nation state citizens look to their national governments for help and to express their anger.

Yet, as early as 2009 at G20 conference in London, which included a confrontation between protestors and workers in the City waiving £10 pound notes at them from office windows and the unfortunate death of newspaper vendor Ian Tomlinson (Rawnsley 201: 628), one could see an emergence of a public anger towards formal politics. And with the onset of austerity across the UK and Europe there emerged publics around 2009 into 2010 that replicated the move towards protest as the main political weapon of citizen publics.

For writers such as Tarrow (2011: 261) this highlighted that ‘... despite globalisation – societies do not respond in lock and step to the same stimuli ... countries responded to the Wall Street crash with different combinations of transgressive and conventional contention.’ Contra Tarrow, I believe despite the differences in responses there are discernible traces to quite a lot of these movements that unite in them a commonality of sorts. The dominant characteristic that unites nearly all of these movements is their exasperation at such little engagement by political elites but their consequent disengagement with formal mainstream politics. This centres on citizen disenchantment with formal politics as citizens realised that the actions of national elites displayed all the hallmarks of bourgeois democracy post 2008.

This is rejection of mainstream politics is even more apparent in the EU where conceptions of a European democracy, politics and political identity have been discarded in national based protests in Ireland, Greece and Spain in the light of the EU’s enforcement of austerity:
'At present, the public in many Eurozone countries is distressed, confused, and angry. This finds expression in xenophobia, anti-European attitudes, and extremist political movements. The latent pro-European sentiments, which currently have no outlet, need to be aroused in order to save the European Union.' (Soros 2010).

Now we neither have the time nor space to run through all these movements in chronology or in extensive detail but The Indignados ('The Outraged') movement in Spain, which has taken direct inspiration from the Arab Spring, illustrate this point nicely. As Castañeda (2012) outlines the Indignados ('The Outraged') movement arose out the fact that young Spanish citizens did not feel that economy offered them any chance of employment. Having been locked out of the labour market because of low wages young people became apathetic towards formal politics. Trust in 'politicians, the government, parliament, and the justice system was virtually nil' and when the financial crisis and in turn austerity impacted Spain this 'desperate' generation followed the citizens of Egypt, Ireland, Greece, and Portugal in protesting in the streets and occupying public spaces. (Puig 2012: 210).

Utilising Web 2.0 technology such Facebook, Twitter and Blogs the 15M or May 15th 2011 movement emerged in Madrid and soon spread around all of Spain. The goal of the movement was to bring attention to the May 22nd local and help bring attention to cause of opposing the political elites of Spain. Working without leaders and through decentralised and distinct city movements public assemblies were created through occupying public space. This was done for example through camps set up in public squares, which utilised working groups to disseminate knowledge to citizens on issues regarding:

'education, health, migration, national finances, proposals for alternative national budgets, movement fundraising and accounting, internal security and so on.'
Different proposals were written carefully and formally, uploaded to the Internet, printed and distributed among the occupiers, who would later be asked to debate and vote them. Walking through the camp, one would see single and collective tents as well as booths hosting commissions, libraries and book sales.⁹ (Castañeda 2012: 311).

Despite this politically charged organisation the 15M movement was inherently apathetic towards formal mainstream politics. May 22 thus saw the increase in protest votes with a 48% increase in null votes and 37% increase in blank votes. This was mainly to voice discontent with the incumbent leftist government who had initiated austerity in Spain. And it was this abstention of young voters, which helped the conservative Popular Party to gain electoral victory. The new government did not listen to the protestors but rather continued the austerity packages in line with those advocated by the ECB (P; Castañeda 2012: 309-311).

9.2 Enter The Occupy Movement

The citizen publics, which have emerged in response to austerity in Europe have largely been reactions against bourgeoisie democracy at home. And some such as the Indignados have been able to transnationalise their form of politics⁹⁵. However, no social movement or civil society group that has emerged in response to financial crisis and austerity has had the same impact transnational impact as the emergence of New York's Occupy Wall Street Movement. What has become known as The Occupy Movement or simply Occupy seems to represent a watershed for many academic commentators. Judith Butler saw the movement

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⁹ Indeed, groups like the Indignados have created transnational links not only with groups across Europe but groups from Chile and were involved in helping form Occupy Wall Street (See Castañeda 2012).
as people standing together ‘making democracy'; Angela Davis called the movement as the resistance against all occupations stretching from New York to the Middle East; Slavoj Zizek called the movement’s ‘basic message’ as nothing short as ‘what social organisation should replace capitalism?’ (Harcourt et al. 2013).

Inspired by the Arab Spring and Indignados movement the Occupy Wall Street Movement cam into the spotlight on the 17th September 2011 with the occupation and establishment of a camp at Zuccotti Park. As well as this form of site occupation, the movement also utilised Web 2.0 technology such Facebook, Twitter and Blogs to not only promote its cause but to ask others to join the cause in their respective countries. The slogan ‘we are the 99 per cent’, which focused on the wealth capture by the top 1% of population in the US, seemed to strike a chord with citizens around the world in midst of The Great Recession and shadow of the banking of crisis. The movement itself saw itself as part of a ‘broader movement: which is largely a rebellion against undemocratic regimes answerable only to global power structures (especially financial ones) and in the name of popular, direct democracy’ (Graeber 2012: 17)
On October 15th 2011 the movement launched a day of global action that saw Occupy camps open all across North America and Europe to cities in Argentina, Australia, Japan and North Africa. In all, the Guardian (2011) logged 951 protests in 81 countries (see figure 5) and the spread of similar tent communities as found in Indignados movement in Spain. David Graeber (2012a: cf. Tarrow 2011), one of Occupy’s founders, points out the main rationale of Occupy Wall Street stemmed from its anarchist roots. The Occupy movement, much like the Indignados, operates on a ‘decentralised and leaderless’ form, which rejects
formal political engagement to avoid conferring legitimacy on existing political institutions and laws.

Occupy thus functioned on the premise of disobeying the ‘conventional political grammar’ and marked a move towards political rather than civil disobedience. In this schema, civil disobedience can be seen as the hallmarks of prior social movements such as The Indian Independence movement and US Civil Rights movement. Within these movements its members accept the legitimacy of the political structure and institutions but look to reform the existing laws that such structures and institutions enforce. To do this movements of civil disobedience often practise the art of breaking the law to highlight the law’s unjustness. In contrast, political disobedience is styled as resistance to the ‘way we are governed’ and translates into the resistance:

‘... of the structure of partisan politics, the demand for policy reforms, the call for part identification. It rejects the very idea of expressing or honouring “highest respects for law” It refuses to willingly accept the sanction meted out by our legal and political system. It challenges the conventional way in which political governance takes place and actors who govern us. And, beyond that, its resists the very ideologies that have dominated the post-war period.’ (Harcourt et al. 2013: 46-47)

The Occupy Movement’s initial goals, then, were to promote freedom and sense of community between its participants rather than create demands which could seized and co-opted by mainstream political parties. This rationale is why the tent occupations became central to the movement, which attempted to create communities not only through
frequent assemblies and participatory decision-making structures but also through providing kitchens, libraries, media centres and educational spaces where ‘...anarchist principles of mutual aid and self organisation’ could flourish (Graber 2012b: 145 cf. Hardt and Negri 2011). Occupy camps were therefore about deliberative interaction and about forming new ways of living in a neo-liberal world:

‘What they want [...] is to do exactly what they are doing. They want to occupy Wall Street. They have built a campsite full of life, where power is exercised according to their voices. It’s a small space, it’s a relatively modest group of people at any one time, and the resources they command are few. But they are practicing the politics of place, the politics of building a truly public space. They are explicitly rejecting the politics of narrow media, the politics of the shopping mall. To understand #OccupyWallStreet, you have to get that it is not a media object or a march. It is first and foremost, a church of dissent, a space made sacred by a community. But like Medieval churches, it is also now the physical centre of that community. It has become many things. Public square. Carnival. Place to get news. Day-care centre. Health care centre. Concert venue. Library. Performance space. School.’ (Stoller, 2011).

Towards the end of 2011 there was a crackdown on Occupy and camps in New York, Oakland, Montreal and Berlin were violently cleared by state authorities (Calhoun 2011). By 2012 the last remaining high profile camps in London and Washington DC were cleared by state authorities. More recently, however, the Occupy Movement has relented on its earlier claims of not making formal political demands through producing a Global Manifesto in May 2012, which has been derived from its International Occupy Assembly. (Occupy 2012) The main gist of the Manifesto are a set demands not addressed to ‘illegitimate’ governments but the ‘people of the world, both inside and outside our movements’. The essence of

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96 See Smith and Glidden (2012) for a fascinating critique of this form of democracy from research into the Occupy Pittsburgh Movement.
the manifesto puts an emphasis on democratising the global economy for the general welfare of people. Many of their ideas such as a maximum wage, a global FTT, a new declaration of human rights and democratisation of International Financial Institutions like the IMF are far from eccentric and largely replicate large elements of GDT.

9.3 How to win friends but still not really influence people

What then are to make of the citizen publics that have emerged since the financial crisis? Do such publics point to the forming a Great Community via the tenets of cosmopolitan democracy and the practise of creative democracy at home and abroad? The answer is that such movements have presented more despair than hope and represent the globalisation of the politics of disenchantment with bourgeois democracy; where the focus on creating alternative conceptions of community has come at the real expense of empathising the reforming of the democratic community at home and abroad. Why then has this happened? The answer is quite simple. The biggest effect of austerity’s subordinating of whole national populations to the dictates and whims of rational and all knowing markets has been the destruction of national democratic communities. For in the face of questions about whom they actually represent governments have clearly substituted market interests for those of citizen interests.

The initial reaction of citizen publics in 2008 was to move towards their governments but as elites formed transnational publics without real democratic input, and which obeyed the market rather than the people, the magnitude of government’s complicity with the interests of capital has meant a rise in disenchantment with formal politics. This apathy does not mean a collapse of citizen politics but apathy towards political democracy because of it facilitation of bourgeoisie democracy. In this situation the majority of the voting public,
convinced that is ‘no important difference between the two old parties and that to vote for one over the other was to signify very ‘little’, have lost faith with political democracy (LW6: 185). Movements like The Indignados in Spain, bring home the fact that citizens are acting just as Dewey believed politically apathetic citizens were doing so in 1930’s.

However, from a Deweyan point of view this is inherently more dangerous situation for democracy as a way of life. On one hand, the rise of extreme politics marks overtones of the anti democratic politics that emerged from The Great Depression. On the other hand, even if we can argue that political extremism is a minority position within such public, the alternative of an anti-political populism that simply rejects political democracy is even more worrying. For whilst citizens have appeared to organise themselves into publics in response to austerity these publics lack the ambition or desire to gain access to influence the reforming the state. The fatigue of bourgeois democracy simply renders them exasperated with political democracy all together.

This for Dewey ultimately reduces such groups to civil society advocates or even mere observes rather than publics who can effect change. This is because as Dewey believed the state and its government had the remit to reform social institutions. And without this emphasis of reforming the institutions of political democracy the practise of creative democracy both at the domestic and international level becomes highly improbable. More importantly, in their apathy, such publics leave society to the same professional politicians and dynastic interests of capital who have enacted austerity and collapsed the national community in the first place. Unlike finance capital, then, the citizen publics that have emerged to oppose austerity have not been able to exercise their true power as publics
capable of reforming the state and government. These publics, as Dewey would have argued in 1930's, are publics who are ultimately eclipsed.

Nothing illustrates this argument better than the Occupy movement. Occupy clearly formed a citizen public which created signs and symbols of information and solidarity in the same way as groups such as Indignados but on a much larger scale. Occupy’s narrative of the exploitation of the 99% by the 1% spoke beyond Wall Street and Manhattan and translated into other contexts all across the world. The main strength of the Occupy outside of the spatial freedom of camps was essentially rhetorical. Although the main Occupy camp in New York and others across world were closed down by the police and often in violent ways Occupy also provided a visual and vocal denouncement of bourgeois democracy. As Stiglitz (2012: xiv) points out, over two-thirds of Americans supported Occupy because ‘protestors were peaking to their values.’ Martell (2012) furthers this viewpoint by stating that Occupy’s main role has been to provide oppositional language for defending modern welfare states in the face of austerity:

‘The protests of the 2010s have also been the welfare state that gave security and opportunities to post-war generations. This is being torn from under the feet of the current, young and justified by deficit reduction but clearly ideological. Of course you can say that the wider publics haven’t been voting against capitalism. But that’s not what Occupy’s about. It hasn’t stood for election. But its words are on people’s lips. In a poll a year ago more than half agreed that protesters are right to want to call time on a system that puts profit before people.’
Moreover, Occupy managed to get something on the agenda, which as pointed earlier, rarely gets mentioned as a political problem within formal politics: income and wealth inequality. The framing of the issue of the bottom 99% against the top 1% effectively captured the rage felt by citizens about the financial crisis. And the concept of the ‘undeserving rich’ has become a useful to contrast against arguments about the apparent mob of ‘welfare scroungers’ and profligate nature of welfare spending. There is even a case to make that this rhetoric fed into policy circles and political discourse (Wade 2012: 24). For instance, new French President Hollande proposed a new top 75% tax rate for high earners and radical technocrats such a the Bank of England’s Andrew Haladane (2012: 2) credited Occupy has helping to stir the re-regulation of finance. Moreover, a highpoint for Occupy appears to have been leaders President’ Obama’s endorsement the ‘Buffet rule’ which named after the investor would see a 30% tax on millionaires and his integration of Occupy’s focus on wealth inequality in his 2012 State of the Union Address:

'It was the Occupy Movement’s ability to connect in a way that the president had not that gave Obama the political space to shift the focus of the nation's ire from the poor to the rich: to talk about responsibility and hand-outs – not with regard to the poor, but to the rich in general, and the financial industry in particular. At one stage, the president even appealed to the 98% of the country that earns less than $250,000. "Let's never forget," he said: "Millions of Americans who work hard and play by the rules every day deserve a government and a financial system that do the same. It's time to apply the same rules from top to bottom: no bailouts, no hand-outs, and no cop-outs. An America built to last insists on responsibility from everybody" ’ (Young 2012)
On the back of this apparent influence one would have thought that Occupy heralded a perfect Deweyan style public for the practise of creative democracy both at home and abroad. Not only did Occupy Wall Street in the US through highlight the complicity between finance capital and US government but they also saw such a complicity as being linked to neo-liberal globalisation and other countries, both formally (UK, EU) and non-formally democratic (Egypt), within the global economy. Occupy can thus be said to be bearers of a cosmopolitan nationalism that held the possibility of reforming democracy at home and aboard.

The problem as I pointed out above, however, is that Occupy replicated the same disenchantment with political democracy that other movements against austerity also embrace. As Wolf (2012) put it at the time of the emergence of Occupy: ‘Is this the beginning of a resurgent leftwing politics? I doubt it. Are the protesters raising some big questions? Yes, they are.’ This brings us to the crux of matter from a Deweyan point of view: community. The concept of community constructed by Occupy was largely based around its camps, the ethos within those camps and the trans-nationalising of that ethos across the globe. However, the form of community constructed around these practises would not in a Deweyan sense be classed as the formation of a ‘democratic community’. This is because the public formed by Occupy practised a form of ‘political disobedience’ that cut off any participation with the institutions and actors of political democracy. And as pointed out above, it is within these institutions such as the state where the ability to implement creative democracy both at home and aboard is most paramount.
Thus, although the Occupy Movement has taken the issues of the dominance of financial capital global its embracing of political apathy towards formal politics has meant that it has voluntarily chosen to make the social institutions of democracy off-bounds as a political target. And without an engagement with social institutions and the sign and symbols to encourage this such as a clear set of demands or practises to rally around there can be no facilitation of the practise of creative democracy both at home and abroad. Occupy therefore practised a hollow form of cosmopolitan nationalism because it never held the possibility of creative democracy at home or aboard.

Despite Occupy's rhetorical power it was therefore politically vacuous because of its very ideal of democratic praxis. One can see the political vacuum itself in the thought of those who valorised Occupy as heralding a new form of democracy. Take Hardt and Negri's (2011) statement that Occupy symbolised a new constitutional moment:

'Confronting the crisis and seeing clearly the way it is being managed by the current political system, young people populating the various encampments are, with an unexpected maturity, beginning to pose a challenging question: If democracy -- that is, the democracy we have been given -- is staggering under the blows of the economic crisis and is powerless to assert the will and interests of the multitude, then is now perhaps the moment to consider that form of democracy obsolete?'

What Hardt and Negri exude here is a form of philosophical and empirical hubris. The result is that citizens who harbour progressive politics and who want to push beyond neo-liberal globalisation now are said to have to evacuated the contours of domestic politics and do not see democratic institutions as hospitable. But this conflates the destruction of community at
the national level and the hopes of creative democracy with the destruction of bourgeois democracy

As the last two chapters have shown, Neo-Liberalism may have staggered but it did not fall and quickly reasserted itself against the masses within advanced economies. Despite suffering one of its biggest crises bourgeois democracy is alive and its political institutions still effectively hold the best hand. In fact it was Occupy who was left staggering after the sustained blows of police batons and water cannons in late 2011. Hardt and Negri's (2011) celebration that no 'Martin Luther King jnr.' would emerge from Occupy who would help negotiate with the state and government therefore appears to entirely miss the point. This is because the reality is that the state and government are both key for creative democracy at home and abroad. Much like the idiocy of tellingly your child that the bullies will leave you alone if you don't respond to them, the act of not interacting with the institutions of political democracy does not mean that they will fall and crumble.

The result of Occupy's failure to launch a clear set of demands to rally around and its rejection of formal politics created a vacuum for the very co-option of their ideas or the simple ignoring of their rhetoric all together. As Tarrow (2011) points out, whilst elite policy makers have often embraced Occupy and provided a name check in the same breath this was normally followed with a 'but...' that reduced the movement to a minority protest whose heart in the right place but whose methods are misguided. Hollande's 75% tax rate has yet to materialise and The Buffet rule was put to Congress but it fell to filibuster from The Republicans. And as we have seen wealth inequality has actually risen within The Great Recession. Thus, regardless of the merits of the emphasis on the underserving rich given the previous account of the breakdown of the multilateralism at the international level, the
continuing hegemonic effect of Neo-liberalism and the ascent of austerity seems to highlight the vivacity of bourgeois democracy rather than the reach of Occupy. As Wade sums up:

‘The net result is that politicians have done little beyond talk to rein in inequality at the top. They and their intellectual supporters have tended to steer public debate along the track of “Does individual X deserve his £1.4 million bonus?” and “Why should people be rewarded for failure [leaving intact the premise that ‘whatever-corporate-boards-will-bear’ should be given for ‘success’]?” Once on this track, the issues of the society-wide structure of income distribution and demand generation are bypassed...And so the assumptions prevailing before the financial crash and the Occupy movement continue to prevail in government circles. . Especially in the Anglosphere, arguments like “governments are corrupt and inefficient,” “state interference with market incentives lowers economic welfare,” “the free market maximizes freedom,” “failures must be allowed to fail,” “austerity is the solution to recession” continue to command wide emotional support.’ (2012: 24-25)

The Occupy Movement thus suffered from the same problem that afflicts the publics of The Indignados and the other national movements against austerity: there is a lot of talking, there is even a lot doing but there is very little actual policy change at the centres of power: political democracy and its officials. And the reason for this is because very form of ‘political disobedience’ or what Dewey would have taken to be political apathy creates a political vacuum that will always be filled by more bourgeois democracy rather than a radical reform or revolution of the current system. Occupy and the other movements against
austerity lack the democratic power to really create change and seem to reject and in turn perpetuate their own inability to inherit the task of the democratic way of life.

9.4 Occupying Democracy

The pages of this chapter and the two preceding chapters have painted a dark landscape with only rare flashes of light. The persistence of bourgeois democracy and the eclipse of citizen publics means that creative democracy at home and abroad appears to be a long shot. However, I want end this chapter with what I believe is a Dewey would say to the citizen publics created by movements such as Occupy. The primary message from Dewey would be for such publics to not abandon their creation of community within Occupy camps or alternative ways of living but to incorporate such a sense of community to include interacting with the formal institutions of political democracy and the formation of a democratic community. As cited earlier, Dewey fully believed that it was:

'..sheer defeatism to assume in advance of actual trial that democratic political institutions are incapable either of further development or constructive social application. Even as they do exist, the forms of representative government are potentially capable of expressing public will when that assumes anything like unification' (LW11: 60).

And the actions taken by democratic governments post 2008 despite their inherent favouring of the interests of capital should not blunt our perception of government's power. We should be alert to the power shown by the 'Bank Recapitalisation' and 'Keynesian Stimulus' publics. As I highlighted earlier, there really was a realisation amongst such elites that rather than pursuing unilateral strategies, what was needed was multilateral action in
order to deal with what amounted, either through direct contagion or through the panic of markets, to a global financial crisis. And this was the realisation that communication between nation state elites and coordinated and collaborative actions at state level, such as bank recapitalisation or coordinated interest rate changes, would be crucial to securing not only national financial systems but the overall global financial system. Gordon Brown did really 'save the world': but it unfortunately was the neo-liberal world we should have left behind.

Nevertheless, such actions bring home the fact that the belief that states are powerless within the confines of Neo-Liberal globalisation is a misnomer we must learn to forget. Once more we must heed the Deweyan lesson that democracy begins at home and our national state is one that we must win back in order to affect change beyond it. The actions that were used to rescue banks and maintain Neo-Liberal ideals the practises of these publics, how they were formed and how consensus and community was achieved, highlights how powerful a collection of national elites working together could be. If we can restore a connection between citizens and national democracy and create conditions that would perpetuate cosmopolitan nationalism amongst citizens and elites, then there is no reason why a new transnational public of national elites, with a sense of creative democracy rather than bourgeois democracy, could achieve greater global democracy for the world's population.

And it with this realisation about the power of formal political institutions that it becomes apparent that progressive groups like The Occupy Movement have something to learn from an unprogressive movement like the Tea Party in US. The Tea Party was probably the first major citizen public to emerge post-Lehman Brothers and inherently represents both
elements of continuity and disparity with the citizen publics that would follow it. The continuity is like other publics The Tea Party has been disgusted with what it sees as corruption at the heart of political democracy. The disparity is that Tea Partiers looked to infiltrate the GOP and formal politics whilst other publics in the response to The Great Recession and onset of austerity have moved away all together.

The Tea Party’s genesis can be traced to the bank bailouts of 2008 and the initiation of US stimulus, where grass root activists who are typically Republican voters set out to rid the US of what they saw as an unholy alliance between finance capital and government. In February 2009, when CNBC report Rick Santelli argued that the Obama’s administration stimulus package amounted to corporate welfare. On the back of this Santelli invited ‘capitalists’ for a ‘Chicago Tea Party’. This in turn went viral and the Tea Party and this brand of 21st patriotism was taken up and advertised by Fox News. Against such an unholy alliance between finance capital and government Tea Party activists put forward the ideal of real ‘free markets’ which does not end in monopoly and huge corporate entities (Wade 2012:33).

By April 2009 hundreds of thousands rallied and marched on what was dubbed ‘Tax Day 2009’. And this activism drew the attention of conservative advocacy groups, right wing media stars like Glen Beck and rich conservative benefactors 97 By late 2009 and early 2010 the Tea Party stood as a beacon for supposed ideals of the ‘free market’ such as smaller government and lower taxes and became the main opposition to President Obama’s

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97 As Skocpol and Williamson (2012: 12-13) contend the Tea Party is thus not a bottom up or top down entity but rather has evolved out of intermixture of grass roots activists; national funders and ultra-free market advocacy groups that wish to mould the Republican Party (GOP) who fund the party’s grass root activity to achieve such ends; and conservative media hosts from Fox news to radio and the blogosphere. However, as Wade (2012: 33) also points the fact is that the Tea Party is itself funded by ‘millionaires and billionaires from big business, not by the entrepreneurs of small and medium-size enterprises whom they celebrate’
Affordable Care and Patient Act or what has since become known as ‘Obama care’. Unperturbed by failing to repeal Obama care The Tea Party’s activism helped the GOP win the November 2010 midterm elections and seize The House of Representatives. The was a double success as not only did Tea Party aligned governors take charge in places such as Florida, Ohio and Wisconsin. But on the back of this election success many of the other GOP winners openly admitted an affinity with the Tea Party’s ideals and the activism of its grass roots (Skocpol and Williamson 2012:3-5).

The Tea party although heavily linked to formal politics is actually exemplary in the trend for citizen publics in the post-Lehmann Brothers world becoming disenchanted with political institutions and political parties. The difference between them and other citizen publics is that whereas such disenchantment has lead to apathy for The Tea Party it has became a source of politicisation. This might sound like a contradiction but when you factor in the its relationship to the GOP it becomes clear. As Skocpol and Williamson (2012: 180-186) point out, Tea Partiers do not consider non-Tea Partiers as the true heirs to GDP and espouse an ideal of ‘Government by and for the Tea Party’. This has translated into a scenario where the Tea Party has attempted to take over the GOP’s apparatus such as the local and state committees which direct resource during elections and who make nominations. At the same time Tea Partiers have shown no love for GOP members who oppose their ideology. This was highlighted when Tea Partiers went against the strong business wing of the GOP and were effectively ready to let the US default on its debts during the debt ceiling debacle of 2011. And the party have also played a significant part in achieving austerity in the US through the imposition of spending cuts to the Federal budget in exchange for raising the debt ceiling.
The Tea Party movement may look to be a bizarre creature because of its rather eccentric and in the case of President Obama flat out racist viewpoints. However, if we put its considerable ugly aspects to the side The Tea Party should be seen as one of the most cogent responses to the financial crisis: formal politics is bankrupt and is unable to be reformed by those within it; thus we the people must reform it from within. As counterintuitive as it thus seems, the most Deweyan public, in formal rather than normative terms, to emerge out the financial crisis has been the Tea Party. Whilst The Tea Party is an illiberal public it has to all intents and purposes become a public that has quite literally attempted to reform the state and the democratic community and unfortunately for progressives been successful. The Tea Party thus highlights that for progressive movements like Occupy the only way to move from having weak rhetorical and contestation based power to having the power to enact change is to move towards a platform that looks to interact and reform political democracy.

This Deweyan analysis of Occupy's strengths and fundamental weakness would probably be given short shrift by Graeber (2012) or Harcourt et al. (2013) because of its emphasis of working with the formal institutions of political democracy they take to be bankrupt. However, it is given credence and can actually be found in the work of one of Occupy's biggest supporters Noam Chomsky. Chomsky (2012: 54-55) was quick to outline that he believes Occupy is an indictment of the neo-liberal order. The emergence of Occupy is therefore the first ‘major public response’ in 30 years to what he perceives as a bitter class

98 The Tea party has of course since the 2012 US elections been given a setback via a drop in support. But this has nothing to do with strategy of how to reform politics but rather with the content of the reforms they wish to enact. The Tea Party is essentially an anti-democratic community party because it does not want to interact or deliberate with others about the nature of social institutions or its own beliefs As they move the GOP ever rightward and away from the African American and Hispanic vote that will be the key to winning American elections going forward they seem to miss the fact that as James Livingston (2009) has pointed out: even though the Left lost the battle for economic justice it did win the 'culture wars'.

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war that has led to ‘social, economic and political in which the system of democracy has been shredded.’ Chomsky goes to argue that the Occupy’s poll support is a ‘big step’ from engaging with the wider populace and actually ‘being part of their lives, something they think they can do something about’ (Chomsky 2012:72).

He thus recommends two things for Occupy to pursue as a movement, The first is that the educative and communicative ethos of the camps should be broadened so that they essentially create a general ‘Occupation’ and ‘bring in wider sectors of the population’ This in turn would be supported by ‘worker and community’ appropriation of the economy through co-operative enterprises. In the same breath, however, Chomsky argues that this from of community should be wedded to a more formal political platform. And in many ways Chomsky’s suggestion for such a platform largely mirrors the social democratic ideals of the New Deal and embedded liberalism. In fact Chomsky points towards the gains of The New Deal legislation as proof of what ‘large scale popular activism’ can achieve.

Nevertheless, Chomsky’s ideas of reregulating finance, orientating government towards creating growth and eradicating corporate personhood are based on Occupy’s supporters gaining entrance to political democracy and challenging the hegemonic influence of capital over political democracy. Taking the example of the US primaries as a case in point Chomsky argues for greater participatory democracy from Occupy supporters to change the political system. Chomsky’s argument centres on the fact that the way the primaries are carried out in the United States is radically undemocratic. Where candidates show up to a town and declare ‘Here’s what I am going to do’ and ‘Of course they don’t say much. And if they do say anything no one has a reason to believe them’. Chomsky thus puts forward the idea that:
‘... the people in town would get together, have town meetings and discussions and come up with some ideas about what they think ought to be down in the locality, in the country, foreign policy, the whole range. They might just pick their own candidates; or, if there are national candidates running, they could say “You come visit us if you like, but we won’t want to hear speeches from you. We’re going to tell you what we think policy ought to be. And if you can convince us that you’ll accept these polices and carry them forward, then maybe we’ll vote for you” Either that or direct representation coming out of communities would be a democratic alternative to the farcical system that we simply take for granted.’ (Chomsky 2012: 78-79)

In turn, such participatory democracy would not just be about ‘elections’ but would involve the Occupy supporters getting behind legislation which for example would restrict capital’s influence on politics (e.g. state funded parties) and give populaces the right to ‘recall’ candidates without a constitutional crisis (Chomsky 2012: 79-83). In Deweyan parlance, then, what you can see is that Chomsky’s idea for the expansion of the Occupy largely centres on how Occupy as a public can gain democratic recognition and enact creative democracy. Chomsky therefore recognises that Occupy was never going to muster a communist revolution within advanced economies; there is just not the appetite for such things in countries at this time. And that it becomes even more nonsensical to equate Occupy with movements such as the Arab Spring, regardless of the praxis similarities, when the revolution in countries such as Egypt was largely around securing the very liberal democratic freedoms that Hardt and Negri believe are now obsolete.

In Chomsky’s eyes, just as Dewey’s would have viewed the world today, it is thus bourgeois democracy rather than liberal democracy that must be eradicated and the democratic
community within the US reconstructed through a reformation of political democracy itself. And that to accomplish this, Occupy as a public must gain recognition of itself across wider society via civil society activity and interacting with political democracy. Moreover, Chomsky also recognises that Occupy's politics, whose aspirations are to form some form of Great Community, can only spring from a reform of democracy at home. In this sense, then, Chomsky clearly echoes a Deweyan position on democracy both nationally and globally by highlighting that it is imperative that progressive politics such as Occupy, which unlike its enemies such as The Tea party currently stands outside formal politics, returns back home so that it can Occupy government as well as the streets.
Conclusion: Global Democracy: A Community Matter

How then does Deweyan approach to global democracy relate to and help supplement contemporary GDT? At the start of this study I conjectured that Auden’s poem Musee des Beaux Arts was questioning why, for example, any of us would, in the position of the ploughman or those on the delicate ship, deem the fall of Icarus or any event of suffering as an unimportant failure? And I went further in suggesting that these questions hit right at the heart of the GDT and its desire for global democracy. What this study has shown is that the answers to Auden’s questions were given to us by Dewey via his argument that society does not automatically constitute a community. We live in a society, but we have to purposefully make our community out of the perception of our consequences of associated behaviour.

Dewey’s great contribution to the theorisation of global democracy revolves around how the issue of community complicates global democratic aspirations. On one hand, community at the international level doesn’t just change because of the size scope or nature of life: the great community and the practise of creative democracy cannot simply be inferred by the existence of globalisation or what Dewey calls the great society but must be made through conscious effort. On the other hand, Dewey highlights how community at the global level is inherently dependant upon community at the national level. Or to put this with even more of a Deweyan accent: the possibility of democratic community at the international level is inherently dependant upon the health and status of the democratic community at the national level. What a Deweyan approach to assessing global democracy brings to fore then is an analytical focus that knits together the fate of democracy beyond the nation with democracy within the nation.
This brings into focus how Dewey’s work rebalances the ‘post-Westphalian ontology’ or what I called the ‘ontology of paradox’ that is embraced by GDT. As I have shown GDT writers get the point of emphasis wrong: they believe that democracy beyond the nation will solve the problems of a lack democracy within the nation. The new elements of the ‘post-Westphalian ontology’ such as economic globalisation and its consequences are taken to have made the older elements of the Westphalian order less important. However, as I pointed out at the end of chapter 6, this does not countenance for Dewey’s work revealing that the post-Westphalian order is a lot older than we think. Nor does it acknowledge his equally important conclusion that democracy, even with a global aspiration, must begin at home due to the current power of the nation state and national community’s role in regulating the nation state.

Dewey’s rebalancing of GDT thus has paradigm changing effects for the study of global democracy. In the last three chapters of this study, for instance, many of GDT’s main assumptions have been shown to be empirically correct. The actions of political elites from 2008 does bring to fore that nations states do have the power to create change at the international level. And the emergence of Occupy highlights that global civil society does exist and does have contestation and rhetorical based power. However, as we have seen, Dryzek’s work cannot account for why transnational publics like Occupy cannot hold national politicians to account over international issues and Cosmopolitan Democrats cannot account for why national leaders do not form Cosmopolitan collations. And it becomes clear that Dewey’s focus on the relationship between national and international community can help us to fill in such blanks.
Under a Deweyan gaze, the primary problem currently facing global democracy today is a democratic disconnection at national level and its consequent impact on democracy at the international level. As Wade (2011a: 17) suggests and as the evidence in the last few chapters prove:

‘Many governments, notably those of the United States and the UK, home of the two major financial centres, became beholden to the financial industry more than to any other (except possibly defence). They relied on it for political support, election campaign financing, and tax revenues and were readily persuaded by the self-serving idea that financial markets are efficient and self-adjusting (as distinct from self-destructing), hence that “light-touch regulation” is sufficient... One might expect that the neoliberal ideas that have shaped economic policy in the West for more than two decades would have crash-landed on facts and common sense about the current crisis; but the signs are that they retain much of their hold over policymakers and the economics profession only slightly softened at the edges’ (Wade 2011a: 17, 31-32)

Nation state elites such as our political leaders in the Anglosphere and Europe are essentially obstacles to achieving a sense of democratic control of finance and Neo-Liberalism. They have become institutionalised into believing that there is only one way to do things and that there is no alternative to neo-liberal globalisation. At the same time, the consequent actions of national elites have led their own populaces, as Dewey realised all those years before hand, into believing that there is little to no hope of redemption in national politics. The result is that capital, especially finance capital, has effectively filled the gap left by citizens (Englen et al. 2011).
The collapse of national democracy in turn makes international democracy a distant hope because as we have seen national political elites are the key for change at the international level. The inability of national elites to bring order over neo-liberal globalisation is inherently down to hegemonic influence of finance capital and neo-liberalism as economic blueprint. And what we saw in the elite Bank Recapitalisation, Keynesian Stimulus and more recent Austerity publics is very much akin to Dewey's fears about democratic realism and the idea of elite or expert publics detached from the democratic input of the masses. In first instance this was because the contours of bourgeois democracy before the crisis essentially left such elite publics free of democratic insight. And in the second instance because citizen publics that emerged in response to austerity like The Occupy Movement did not feel able to participate in political democracy.

The debate about the vibrancy of global democracy therefore cannot simply be about social movements, global civil society or collation of willing nation states but must also examine bourgeois democracy at home. Under this approach issues such political apathy, inequality, social mobility, educational practises and regulatory capture within the national context inform and affect the possibility of global democracy. As we have seen, one cannot for example understand the UK's pivotal role in forging austerity as a policy norm for advanced economies in 2010 without understanding how her political parties are linked to finance capital and embrace neo-liberalism. And one cannot understand Germany's role in the formation of austerity without understanding ordoliberalism or the narrative of export success that underlies her national politics. Equally, one cannot understand how such a state of affairs is perpetuated without understanding how civil society and its citizen publics have become disenchanted with formal mainstream politics.
And just as one cannot understand the non-extension of global democracy in the age of austerity without understanding the health and status of the national democratic community; it also apparent that the extension of global democracy will not happen unless the obstacle of bourgeois democracy is countered and eradicated at home. For example, the influence of finance capital over UK politics at the global level will not change unless democracy, via the rise of publics and reformation of the state and government (e.g. state funded parties), is enacted and creatively implemented to produce cosmopolitan nationalism. And one cannot see this very process happening unless those within civil society actually believe that they can achieve such change through the institutions of political democracy. Quite simply, then, the events from the fall of Lehman Brothers onwards bring to the fore two things Dewey knew very well in the 1920's. Firstly, the health and status of the national democratic community is, and in the current configuration of the global economy and global governance is probably always going to be, key to any aspiration of global democracy. And as long as bourgeois democracy exists at the national level we will only ever get piecemeal or palliative democracy both at home and aboard. What then for the future of the democratic community both at home and beyond?

In 1938, Dewey restated the belief that creative democracy should replace the bourgeois democracy of the Great Depression and what he saw as the half-house of the New Deal legislation:

'... every generation has to accomplish democracy over again for again for itself; that its very nature, its essence, is something that cannot be handed on from one person or generation to another, but has to be worked put in terms of needs, problems and
conditions of the social life which, as years go by, we are a part, a social life that is
changing with extreme rapidity from year to year' (LW13: 299)

The generation that would succeed Dewey would heed his call and out of the ashes of World War II create the regime that was embedded liberalism, both within and between nation states. However, as we have seen, Neo-Liberal globalisation has effectively ruptured the idea of the democratic community both at home and abroad. Ironically, then, the creative task facing us today, very much resembles Dewey's present, in that we need to reformulate our democracy at home to cope with the contours of a globalised world. Yes, the details may be different, after all Dewey's present contained no IMF, World Bank or WTO and the global economy still functioned on the decaying privilege of European imperialism. Yet, when turning to other issues which demand global democracy such as climate change, global poverty and food and energy security, it becomes clear that the creative task facing us today is the taking up of our democratic inheritance and reconstruction of democratic community both at home and beyond. And this centres, as it did in Dewey's time, on the eradication of capital's hegemonic control over government and dispelling the political apathy such a state of affairs casts over the masses. Will this happen? Who knows, my only hope is that on the lower frequencies, I speak for you?
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