AGONISTIC DEMOCRACY AND THE CHALLENGES OF DIVERSITY:
EXPLORING PRACTICAL APPLICATIONS OF CONFLICT MEDIATION

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Practices of governance and practices of freedom always go hand in hand.

Abstract

This research explores whether, and how, theoretical concepts from agonistic democracy could be operationalised in order to mediate conflict in multicultural, pluralist society. It highlights three central themes of agonistic democracy: political contestation, contingency and necessary interdependency. It subsequently demonstrates the various ways in which these themes are employed, delineating three distinct agonistic approaches: the ‘perfectionist’ (as encapsulated by David Owen), the ‘adversarial’ (as represented by Chantal Mouffe), and the ‘inclusive’ (as symbolised by William Connolly and James Tully). The research then considers possible tensions between agonistic assumptions and further institutional consideration, and draws on new institutionalist literature to identify which kinds of institution could be compatible with agonistic democracy. It explores these through an experiment, which employs three distinct discussion frameworks, each representing a different agonistic approach. The research combines insights from the experiment and agonistic literature to gain a deeper insight into agonistic concepts and the potential for their operationalisation. It suggests that perfectionism is valuable in encouraging unity, adversarialism is effective in reviving passions, and inclusivity is useful in enhancing interactions between conflicting citizens. Finally, the research proposes an ‘agonistic day’ and demonstrates how a synthesis of all three approaches could mediate multicultural, pluralist conflict.
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# Table of Contents

Abstract ........................................................................................................................................... 2
Acknowledgments .......................................................................................................................... 3
Introduction .................................................................................................................................... 9
  A Brief Overview of the Project .................................................................................................. 9
  Background to the Project ......................................................................................................... 9
    Context ...................................................................................................................................... 9
    Unity vs. Diversity .................................................................................................................. 13
    An Agonistic Alternative ........................................................................................................ 15
    The Need for Further Institutional Consideration ................................................................. 17
    The Influence of Deliberative Democracy .............................................................................. 21
    Situating my Research within Agonistic Democracy ............................................................ 25
Research Questions ..................................................................................................................... 27
Approach ......................................................................................................................................... 27

Chapter One: The Theoretical Roots of Agonistic Democracy ..................................................... 32
  The political contestation of conflicting values ..................................................................... 32
    The revival of the political ...................................................................................................... 33
    Contestation ............................................................................................................................. 37
  The Contingent Nature of Politics .............................................................................................. 43
  The Necessary Interdependency of Citizens ............................................................................ 54
Conclusion ....................................................................................................................................... 60

Chapter Two - Three Approaches to Agonistic Democracy ......................................................... 62
  Perfectionist Agonistic Democracy: ......................................................................................... 62
  Adversarial Agonistic Democracy ............................................................................................ 68
  Inclusive Agonistic Democracy ................................................................................................. 76
Conclusion ....................................................................................................................................... 86

Chapter Three: Exploring the Need for Further Institutional Consideration ................................ 88

Conclusion to Part One .................................................................................................................. 104

Chapter Four: Methodology and Methods .................................................................................... 107
  A Brief Overview of the Empirical Research ......................................................................... 107
  Rationale for the Empirical Research ....................................................................................... 108
  Drawing on Quasi-Experimental Designs ................................................................................ 110
  Participant Recruitment ........................................................................................................... 114
  Limitations to Participant Recruitment .................................................................................... 118
  Data Collection ......................................................................................................................... 119
  Questionnaires ........................................................................................................................... 120
  Employing an Adaptation of Q Method to Create Questionnaires ......................................... 120
  Limitations of Using Questionnaires ....................................................................................... 122
  Video Analysis ........................................................................................................................... 125
  Limitations of Using Video Analysis ....................................................................................... 125
  Observers .................................................................................................................................. 127
  Limitations to Observer Sheets ................................................................................................. 128
  Triangulation ............................................................................................................................... 129
  Ethics .......................................................................................................................................... 131
Conclusion ....................................................................................................................................... 132

Chapter Five: Operationalising Agonistic Concepts ....................................................................... 134
Introducing the Perfectionist Framework: Revisiting Perfectionist Concepts .............................................. 134
A Brief Overview of the Perfectionist Framework ................................................................. 136
Creating a Discussion Framework Informed by Perfectionist Concepts ................................. 137
Creating Questionnaires Informed by Perfectionist Concepts ................................................. 139
Creating Observer Sheets Informed by Perfectionist Concepts .............................................. 142
Introducing the Adversarial Framework: Revisiting Adversarial Concepts .............................................. 143
A Brief Overview of the Adversarial Discussion Framework ............................................... 145
Creating a Discussion Framework Informed by Adversarial Concepts .............................................. 146
Creating Questionnaires Informed by Adversarial Concepts ................................................. 149
Creating Observer Sheets Informed by Adversarial Concepts .............................................. 151
Introducing the Inclusive Framework: Revisiting Inclusive Concepts .............................................. 152
A Brief Overview of the Inclusive Framework ........................................................................... 154
Creating a Discussion Framework Informed by Inclusive Concepts .............................................. 155
Creating Questionnaires Informed by Inclusive Concepts ...................................................... 158
Creating Observer Sheets Informed by Inclusive Concepts ...................................................... 160
Conclusion .............................................................................................................................................. 161

Chapter Six: Analysing David Owen’s Perfectionist Agonistic Democracy .............................................. 162
Perspectivism ........................................................................................................................................... 162
Eternal Recurrence ............................................................................................................................. 168
Perfectionist Competition .................................................................................................................. 174
Enlarged Mentality ............................................................................................................................. 179
Self-mastery ............................................................................................................................................. 183
Conclusion .............................................................................................................................................. 184

Chapter Seven: Analysing Mouffe’s Adversarial Agonism ‘The Political’ .................................................. 186
Collective Identities ............................................................................................................................ 194
Agonistic Struggle ............................................................................................................................... 200
Common enemy .................................................................................................................................... 206
Conclusion .............................................................................................................................................. 210

Chapter Eight: Analysing Connolly and Tully’s Inclusive Agonism Interdependency ................................................................. 212
Citizens as the Rulers and the Ruled .................................................................................................... 219
Overcoming Domination ...................................................................................................................... 223
Self-Modification and Challenge ........................................................................................................ 226
Contestability ........................................................................................................................................ 229
Conclusion .............................................................................................................................................. 230

Conclusion – Exploring Prospects for an ‘Aagonistic Day’ Exploring prospects for the operationalisation of concepts which promote political contestation ................................................................................................................................. 235
Exploring prospects for the operationalisation of concepts which promote contingency ................................................................................................................................................................................................. 238
Exploring prospects for the operationalisation of concepts which promote necessary interdependency ................................................................................................................................................................................................. 241
An ‘Aagonistic Day’ – Combining the Three Approaches to Agonistic Democracy ................................................................................................................................................................................................. 244
An Adversarial Beginning .................................................................................................................. 246
Inclusive View-Sharing ......................................................................................................................... 251
Unity through Decision-Making as a Common Quest .............................................................................. 256
How an ‘Agonistic Day’ can help to mediate value conflict.............. 261
What next? ................................................................................................. 262

Bibliography .................................................................................................. 263

Appendices: .................................................................................................... 274
Appendix 1: Initial Participant Recruitment Target List ......................... 274
Appendix 2: Initial Email Contact................................................................. 276
Appendix 3: Participant Recruitment Poster ............................................. 277
Appendix 4: Participant Recruitment Questionnaire ............................. 278
Appendix 5: Before and After Questionnaires ......................................... 281
Appendix 6: Participant Questionnaires ...................................................... 286
Appendix 7: Drawing on Q Method to break down audi alteram partem
..................................................................................................................... 293
Appendix 8: Pre-experiment Questionnaire from Pilot study ............... 294
Appendix 9: Example of Participant Uncertainty ................................. 296
Appendix 10: Observer Sheets ................................................................. 297
Appendix 11: Ethical Review Form.............................................................. 303
Appendix 12: Informative Email to Prospective Participants .............. 305
Appendix 13: Consent Form ..................................................................... 306
Appendix 14: Overview of the Empirical Research ............................ 307
Appendix 15: Charity Descriptions ............................................................ 317
Appendix 16: Common Enemy Video ...................................................... 318
Part 1
Introduction

A Brief Overview of the Project

This thesis considers whether, and how, concepts from agonistic democratic theory can be represented by practical mechanisms in order to help mediate conflict in multicultural, pluralist society.¹ It considers three distinct approaches to agonistic democracy: the perfectionist (as represented by David Owen’s work), the adversarial (as depicted by Chantal Mouffe’s account) and the inclusive (as symbolised by both William Connolly and James Tully’s work). It demonstrates how each of these approaches provides informal (and to some extent, formal) institutions, but lacks deeper consideration about how to operationalise these in practice. Drawing on new institutionalist literature, the thesis argues that, in spite of resistance towards agonistic institutions, agonistic democracy is not necessarily at odds with certain types of institution, and that further consideration of these could enrich the field. Using the three agonistic approaches to provide three distinct discussion frameworks, the empirical component of the thesis draws on experimental design to explore ways in which agonistic concepts might be operationalised, as well as their potential effects. Combining empirical and theoretical analysis, it evaluates the strengths and weaknesses of the theoretical concepts and their subsequent operationalisation. The thesis concludes by offering an account of an ‘agonistic day’ in which all three approaches are synthesised to mediate conflict in multicultural, pluralist society.

Background to the Project

Context

Before outlining the research question, it is important to first explain the need for a theory of conflict mediation, consider existing theories, and demonstrate the importance of this project.

¹ The thesis seeks to mediate (as opposed to, for instance, eradicate) conflict as a result of the importance of contestation to agonistic democracy. The importance of political contestation will be discussed in greater detail in Chapter One.
The research, and its focus on conflict mediation, is contextualised within multicultural, pluralist conflict in Britain and the global realm. When discussing multiculturalism throughout the thesis, I use Bhikhu Parekh’s definition in which ‘multiculturalism, then, is about cultural diversity or culturally embedded differences.’\textsuperscript{2} Additionally, I borrow Mark Wenman’s understanding of pluralism, which entails ‘a very broad conception of the political (understood as the ineradicable element of antagonism in human and in human/non-human affairs) and of politics (understood as the articulation or the enactment of social identities).’\textsuperscript{3}

Such multicultural and pluralist conflict is evident, for instance, in terrorist attacks, such as September 11\textsuperscript{th} and the London bombings; pro-life and pro-choice clashes, such as the murder of an abortion doctor in Wichita in 2009 and the bombing of a pro-life school bus in 2012; and incompatible values between religious groups and gay rights advocates, as demonstrated by the recent legalisation of same-sex marriage in the UK.

The thesis is also contextualised by perspectives, such as the one called for in David Cameron’s 2011 speech on radicalisation and Islamic extremism, which seek to unite society through consensus on shared values. Cameron argues that liberalism ‘says to its citizens: this is what defines us as a society...[and] each of us in our own countries must be unambiguous and hard-nosed about this defence of liberty.’\textsuperscript{4}

This focus on consensus is paralleled within the academy through liberal universalism, such as John Rawls’ original position; \textsuperscript{5} cosmopolitan democracy, ‘whose aim is to achieve a world order based on the rule of law and democracy,’\textsuperscript{6} and deliberative democracy, which asserts that ‘not optimal compromise, but unanimous agreement is the

\textsuperscript{5} Rawls, J. (1973). \textit{A Theory of Justice}. Oxford: Oxford University Press, p. 120.
goal of politics on this view.\textsuperscript{7} Thus, in politics, both within and outside of academia, there has been a tendency to attempt to mediate conflict through the formation of consensus. Such consensuses sometimes attach claims to neutrality, rationality and universality to their shared principles, as is evident, for instance in John Rawls’ *A Theory of Justice*.\textsuperscript{8} The original position and the veil of ignorance provide tools to reach the principles required for the governance of society in a neutral and universal manner. In so doing, these hypothetical concepts render citizens unaware of which values are significant to their society, and their own position and status within that society. Hence, it is assumed that the values chosen under such conditions are neutral. It is also assumed that such values are rational: Rawls states that justice and liberty are principles, which all ‘free and rational persons concerned to further their own interests would accept.’\textsuperscript{9} Further, Rawls attaches universality to these values, stating that ‘we can view the agreement in the original position from the standpoint of one person selected at random.’\textsuperscript{10} Similar universality is inherent in cosmopolitan democracy, which is, as David Held and Anthony McGrew assert, ‘essentially liberal global governance since it promotes and advances the project of a liberal world order in which global markets, the international rule of law, liberal democracy and human rights are taken as the universal standards of civilization.’\textsuperscript{11} Cosmopolitan democrats thereby also grant universal authority to liberal principles. Additionally, deliberative democrats have tended to advocate a style of conflict mediation in which dialogue occurs in an ideal situation,\textsuperscript{12} mirroring the emphasis which liberal universalists and cosmopolitan democrats place on both the neutrality and rationality of consensus. Jon Elster underlines this in the affirmation that, ‘all agree that [deliberative democracy] includes decision making by means of arguments offered by and to participants

\begin{footnotesize}
\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{8} It should, however, be noted that Rawls’ thinking moves away from neutrality, universality and rationalism in Rawls, J. (1993). *Political liberalism.* New York: Columbia University Press.
\item \textsuperscript{10} Ibid., p. 120.
\end{itemize}
\end{footnotesize}
who are committed to the values of rationality and impartiality: this is the deliberative part.’  

13  Bruce Ackerman echoes this in describing deliberative democracy as a ‘neutral dialogue.’
14  It should be noted, though, that more recent accounts of deliberative democracy, such as those offered by Amy Gutmann and Dennis Thompson, as well as John Dryzek, have moved away from emphasis on rationalism and impartiality. Such accounts will be discussed in the section, ‘The Influence of Deliberative Democracy.’

Alternative theories of conflict mediation abandon these emphases on creating unity through neutrality, universality, and rationalism, aspiring instead to render politics more inclusive by protecting minority groups and communities. This group is comprised of communitarians and group rights theorists. Communitarians, such as Michael Sandel and Charles Taylor, argue that ‘neutrality is impossible because try as we might we can never wholly escape the effects of our conditioning.’

15  As a result of experiencing diverse histories of conditioning, citizens will subscribe to a diversity of principles, according to Sandel. Thus, rejecting claims of liberal universalists, cosmopolitan democrats and deliberative democrats, Sandel – along with other communitarian thinkers - argues that values are ‘not universally shared,’ and any notion of a shared consensus is ‘a reflection of one hegemonic culture...[which means that]...only the minority or suppressed cultures are being forced to take alien form.’

16  Hence, in order to avoid such suppression, communitarians strive to protect communal interests. Group rights theorists share this critique of neutrality, universality, and rationalism, favouring enhanced diversity instead, and employing

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16 Ibid., p. 27.
additional group rights as a response. Will Kymlicka, for instance, demonstrates how treating values as neutral, universal or rational, forces minority groups to assimilate to dominant linguistic religious and customary norms since ‘the maintenance of a “colour-blind” constitution is taken to be the paradigm case of equal treatment.’ Parekh explains the dangers of this, affirming that ‘equal rights do not mean identical rights for individuals with different cultural backgrounds and needs might require different rights to enjoy equality in respect of whatever happens to be the content of their rights.’ Neutral treatment does not necessarily result in equality, according to group rights theorists. Therefore, they abandon attempts at neutrality, universality, and rationality in favour of diverse treatment shaped by the actors involved.

Unity vs. Diversity

Agonistic democracy problematises both camps of conflict mediation: it challenges those who aspire to promote unity through neutrality, universality, or rationalism by claiming that such language is exclusionary to those who do not subscribe to dominant values. Equally, though, it diverges from those who strive toward enhanced inclusion through the promotion of minority rights without considering the unity of society as a whole. Of the first group, Owen refutes the notion of state neutrality. He asserts that ‘if such [reasonable comprehensive] doctrines happen to agree on a particular issue, then, in the face of social agreement, it is not clear that the state should be neutral.’ Following this rejection of state neutrality, Connolly highlights the dangers of labelling values as neutral or universal, stating that, doing so renders such values ‘incontestable.’ Diversity cannot be valued, then, when such rhetoric ‘translates some of the very

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18 It is important to note that communitarianism and group rights theory are not two separate fields, with many thinkers, such as Charles Taylor and Will Kymlicka, overlapping across the two camps.
intrasubjective and intersubjective differences...into modes of otherness to be assimilated, punished, or liquidated.\textsuperscript{24} Theories that employ neutrality and universality can thereby exclude or marginalise minority citizens, aggravating tensions rather than mediating conflict. Mouffe observes an additional difficulty with such labels, asserting that it ‘can only reinforce a tendency, already too much present in liberalism, to transform political problems into administrative and technical ones.’\textsuperscript{25} Therefore, not only is neutrality potentially exclusionary, it can also remove substance from politics, leading to apathy. Mouffe also challenges the usage of rationality, affirming that ‘what is at a given moment deemed “rational” or “reasonable” in a community is what corresponds to the dominant language games and the “common sense” that they construe.’\textsuperscript{26} Thus, rationality derives from power, rather than a neutral set of values. As a consequence, those who do not subscribe to such rationality could be excluded or marginalised. It is my contention, then, that the first group of theories seek to mediate conflict by unifying society through a neutral, rational, or universal consensus, but in so doing, they have the potential to exclude those who do not adhere to the dominant values. Through this exclusion and marginalisation, these theories have a fragmentary effect on society and could increase, rather than mediate, the tensions and conflict inherent in multicultural Britain and the global realm.

On the other hand, group rights and communitarian theorists acknowledge the exclusionary potential of attaching neutrality, rationality, and universality to dominant values at the detriment of minority groups in society. Their alternative consists of placing greater emphasis on protecting and promoting the rights and desires of small groups and communities in society. This has included, for example, additional language rights in schools in Quebec, and the exemption of the Sikh population in Britain from wearing crash helmets on motorbikes. However, in focusing on diversity, such alternatives are

\begin{itemize}
  \item \textsuperscript{24} Ibid., p. 89.
  \item \textsuperscript{26} Ibid., p. 143.
\end{itemize}
also perceived as problematic with respect to promoting unity within society. Andrea Baumeister explores this, expressing concerns that ‘an emphasis upon radical diversity will give rise to a process of fragmentation which may...ultimately undermine the very notion of democratic citizenship.’

Iris Marion Young shares this apprehension, warning that placing focus on minority groups and communities might fail to unite society as a whole. She states that, since “any category can be considered an arbitrary unity”, such a strategy ultimately gives rise to an infinite regress which dissolves “all groups into individuals.”

As a result of the emphasis group rights and communitarian thinkers place on the rights of diverse sectors of society, rather than society as a whole, Baumeister affirms that there is an ‘absence of shared norms and standards,’ which renders ‘understanding and co-operation across group lines...likely to prove difficult.’

Thus, in spite of their efforts at overcoming the exclusionary potential of the former camp of theories, group rights and communitarian thinkers could fail to encourage the unity and unity emphasised by the first camp. As a result, the latter theories could further individualism and social fragmentation, failing to mediate conflict.

An Agonistic Alternative

Agonists on the other hand, do consider how to promote social unity. Owen, for instance, promotes an ‘agonistic community in which our common political identities are tied to a process of argumentation.’

Thus, on his account, commonality between citizens arises from engaging in a shared agonistic contest. Tully supports the assumption that participation in a common quest can unite diverse, and potentially conflicting citizens:

Participation in dialogues and negotiations over how and by whom power is exercised over us constitutes our identities as “citizens” and generates bonds of solidarity

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28 Young, I. in Ibid., p. 23.
29 Ibid., p. 23.
and a sense of belonging to the political association (the “people”) that comes into being and is sustained by this (game-like) activity.  

Similarly, Connolly rejects attempts at promoting unity through universality, neutrality, or rationality, instead promoting agonistic respect and critical responsiveness as behaviours that ‘multiply lines of connection through which governing assemblages can be constructed from a variety of intersecting constituencies.’ For Mouffe, unity is also important, however, she promotes this through different means. On her adversarial account, citizens share, not only engagement in a common contest, but also a commitment to liberal-democratic values. However, she distinguishes this from the first camp of theorists by rejecting the possibility of a universal, neutral, or rational consensus, emphasising the conflict that arises between citizens when interpreting and implementing these values. Agonist thinkers thereby consider how to promote social unity without emphasising neutrality, universality, and rationality. Both groups, then, demonstrate weaknesses in mediating value conflict: the former, in exhibiting an exclusionary potential and the latter, in exhibiting a fragmentary potential. However, the work of agonistic democrats seeks to consider how to bridge this gap by overcoming exclusionary consensuses, whilst also encouraging social unity.

In aiming to overcome both exclusion and fragmentation in multicultural, pluralist society, Connolly and Tully aspire to render society more inclusive through the promotion of principles of agonistic respect and mutual recognition, enhancing behaviour toward less dominant groups in society. Mouffe perceives exclusion as unavoidable and seeks to

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34 This distinction between Mouffe and the other agonists is of great significance for this project. Subsequent chapters will return to this issue, evaluating it alongside the other approaches.
render it less oppressive by acknowledging that any consensus ‘is, by necessity, based on acts of exclusion and that there can never be a fully inclusive “rational” consensus.’

Owen’s usage of ‘enlarged mentality,’ in which ‘toleration is the condition of one’s own integrity,’ similarly resonates with Connolly and Tully’s emphasis on overcoming exclusion.

Additionally, agonistic thinkers seek to avoid fragmentation by considering how to create unity between conflicting citizens. For instance, Connolly and Tully focus on the interrelated nature of society whereby citizens’ identities are constituted by a diversity of others. As a result, they promote unity by requiring citizens to critically work on their selves in response to others through principles such as critical responsiveness and audi alteram partem [always listen to the other side].

For Mouffe, unity is encouraged by the employment of a common enemy since, ‘to construct a “we” it must be distinguished from the “them”, and that means establishing a frontier, defining an “enemy”.’

Owen also promotes unity by engaging citizens in the collective ranking of values in which ‘social co-operation [i]s predicated on a common quest rather than on common agreement.’

Thus, by considering how to overcome exclusion and fragmentation, it is my contention that agonistic accounts of democracy can help us to address the weaknesses of each of the two camps.

The Need for Further Institutional Consideration

In spite of the gap which agonistic democracy fills as a theory of conflict mediation, I argue that its operationalisation requires further consideration. This argument resonates with a series of critiques, such as Andreas Kalyvas’ contention that agonist thinkers provide a ‘predominantly abstract and normatively inclined understanding of

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38 Although, whilst this may render society more inclusive, its primary aim is to enhance society by encouraging citizens to strive to surpass one another’s values. This is another significant distinction between the agonistic approaches, and will be considered throughout the following chapters.
political conflict that equates the radical impulse of democracy with permanent contestation and social inclusion.  

Similarly, David Howarth claims that Mouffe and Connolly’s theories both suffer from an ‘institutional deficit,’ whilst Ed Wingenbach tells us that they offer only ‘frustratingly shallow’ alternatives. Monique Deveaux demonstrates that, whilst exploring how citizens ought to interact, agonists do not suggest how to encourage such interactions to arise:

The vision of ‘an intercultural engagement of agonistic respect and critical responsiveness between contending identities linked together by multiple bonds of interest, interdependence and memory’ says nothing about what agonistic institutions could help to inculcate and sustain such respect.  

Yet, although several commentators have noted the lack of empirical consideration within the agonist field, attempts to address this have been limited and partial. Referring to Connolly’s work, Owen offers some suggestions as to which institutions might supplement Connolly’s ethos. These include mechanisms, such as PR voting, citizens’ assemblies, and participatory budgeting. However, by his own admission, this is limited to a ‘sketchy’ account, which demonstrates the need for further ‘specification of some criteria for reflecting on, and intervening in, political practice from issues of local activism to policy orientation to institutional design.’ Further, Wingenbach’s recent book, Institutionalizing Agonistic Democracy: Post-Foundationalism and Political Liberalism, provides us with an effective critique, which highlights the underdeveloped nature of agonistic institutions, however

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it does not offer ways in which agonistic concepts might be operationalised.

Rather, as Martin Nonhoff asserts, Wingenbach does the opposite, since ‘it becomes clear in the course of the book that maybe a theory of institutions can never be the most convincing aspect of agonistic theories of democracy.’47 This is a significant observation, which will be considered in greater detail in Chapter Three, and will require continual reflection throughout the thesis. As Wingenbach explains, ‘agonistic democracy does emerge from a tradition emphasising resistance and disruption.’48 Chapter One elucidates this through discussion of the agonistic emphasis on contingency, which requires an account of democracy enabling change and unpredictability. Additionally, agonistic democrats share a ‘principled desire to leave more up to politics in the sense that citizens should be free to contest the terms of public life and the conditions of their political association.’49 Yet, ‘to propose institutions is to impose limits on contestation of some sort.’50 Thus, agonistic notions of contingency and contestation appear to be in tension with institutions and their constraints, leading many agonists to resist attempts at further institutional consideration. One such example is Wenman’s account of ‘militant cosmopolitanism,’ which criticises agonistic democrats for working within liberal democratic traditions and practices, calling instead for ‘more radical moments of innovation’ to overcome domination.51

However, this thesis argues that certain types of institution are not necessarily incompatible with the promotion of agonistic principles. As Chapter Three explores, there are evident parallels between agonistic notions of contingency and contestation on the one hand, and the new

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institutionalist focus on more informal and fluid practices on the other. For instance, Michel Foucault’s assertion that, ‘without the possibility of recalcitrance, power would be equivalent to a physical determination’\textsuperscript{52} demonstrates the way in which relations of power require acts of freedom. This resonates with Vivien Lowndes and Mark Roberts’ claim that, citizens are not only ‘rule takers,’ they are also ‘creative agents who interpret rules, assign cases to rules, and adapt or even resist rules.’\textsuperscript{53} Hence, I suggest that, in addition to constraining actors, institutions can also empower them. To protect and promote agonistic notions of contestation and contingency, then, I promote institutions, which enhance the autonomy of citizens, empowering them as a result. This entails involving citizens in institutional decisions, such as those surrounding content, timing, guidelines, mediation, and decision-making practices.

In addition to arguing that certain institutions are compatible with agonistic theory, the thesis also affirms that such consideration of institutions could offer significant benefits to the field. First, deeper consideration of agonistic institutions could enhance the extent to which alternative democratic theorists engage with agonistic theory. Thomas Fossen supports this, affirming that institutional development is essential to allowing agonistic democracy to be perceived, not just as an effective critique, but also as a distinct alternative:

\begin{quote}
The agonistic critique of liberal and deliberative views of politics is by now familiar. To distinguish itself as a mature current of its own, rather than a footnote to liberal and deliberative accounts of politics, agonism needs to engage questions of law and institutions more thoroughly.\textsuperscript{54}
\end{quote}

Furthermore, I contend that further institutional consideration could enhance the theoretical discussion of agonistic concepts. As Chapter


Three explains, further thought about complementary institutions might also encourage agonistic democrats to address issues raised by critics, such as how to motivate people to engage in agonistic practices, how to widen access to agonistic contestation, and how to encourage behaviours such as agonistic respect. For example, by considering the implementation of deliberative democracy, Bruce Ackerman and James Fishkin are able to address questions about how to motivate citizens who are unwilling or unable to engage through monetary incentives.\textsuperscript{55} Thus, further empirical consideration can provide additional insights into theoretical concepts and their critics.

**The Influence of Deliberative Democracy**

In considering how to operationalise agonistic concepts, my thesis has been influenced by the recent work of deliberative democrats, who have made considerable advances in operationalising deliberative concepts. The most significant of these for my research is Ackerman and Fishkin’s *Deliberation Day*.\textsuperscript{56} Drawing on a series of deliberative polling experiments that seek to enhance participants’ knowledge of political issues, Ackerman and Fishkin propose a national holiday whereby citizens participate in deliberative democratic discussions, suggesting ways in which deliberative democratic theory could be operationalised.\textsuperscript{57} The significance of this work for my project derives from its focus on providing a practical model that brings deliberative concepts to life. My research is thereby shaped by the transformation of theoretical concepts into practical mechanisms that propose discussion frameworks. However, as the concluding chapter will discuss, there are two fundamental differences between the two projects, which reflect the differences between deliberative and agonistic accounts of democracy. The first entails the aspirations of the two projects: whereas *Deliberation Day* primarily aims to educate the electorate,\textsuperscript{58} the overarching goal of my ‘agonistic day’ is to mediate

\textsuperscript{56} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{57} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{58} Ibid., p. 167.
conflict between diverse citizens. The second refers to the context in which deliberative and agonistic behaviours exist. Whereas Ackerman and Fishkin focus their efforts on promoting deliberative behaviours during Deliberation Day, I also consider additional ways in which agonistic behaviours and practices might be encouraged to supplement the ‘agonistic day.’ Whilst it is by no means identical, then, I draw on deliberative research in order to address Fossen’s concern that ‘to distinguish itself as a mature current of its own, rather than a footnote to liberal and deliberative accounts of politics, agonism needs to engage questions of law and institutions more thoroughly.’

Considering the extent to which deliberative projects have influenced this thesis, and given the parallels between Deliberation Day and the ‘agonistic day’ proposed in the conclusion, it is important to explain why this thesis is rooted in agonistic literature, rather than deliberative theory. Let us first consider theorists, such as Jürgen Habermas, whose understandings of deliberative democracy place emphasis on both rationality and consensus. As Elster asserts, ‘according to the theory of Jürgen Habermas, the goal of politics should be rational agreement rather than compromise, and the decisive political act is that of engaging in public debate with a view to the emergence of consensus.’ This account of deliberative democracy is reflected by Joshua Cohen’s affirmation that ‘ideal deliberation aims to arrive at a rationally motivated consensus.’ These deliberative democrats diverge from agonistic democrats through their focus on rationality and consensus. As already mentioned (and as will be demonstrated in Chapter One), agonistic democrats have moved away from the concept of rationality. Mouffe, for instance, claims that exclusion is inevitable in politics and therefore ‘it is very important to recognize those forms of exclusion for what they are and the violence that they signify, instead of

61 Cohen, J, 'Deliberation and Democratic Legitimacy’ in Ibid., p. 75.
concealing them under the veil of rationality.”

Thus, in abandoning labels of ‘rationality,’ agonists such as Mouffe, aim to expose political exclusions. Linking to agonistic emphasis on contingency, unearthing exclusion can enable dominant norms and values to be challenged. The post-structuralist assumptions of this project – and its preoccupation with challenging power relations – reflect the agonistic emphasis on challenge and critique more than the tendency of some deliberative democrats to focus on rationality. Additionally, in striving for consensus, deliberative democrats, such as Habermas and Cohen, differ from agonistic democrats. Mouffe problematises the notion of consensus, asserting that ‘there can never be a fully inclusive “rational” consensus.’ For her, conflict is omnipresent and, as a result, every consensus necessitates some form of exclusion. This is echoed in the work of thinkers, such as Hannah Arendt, Ludwig Wittgenstein and Foucault, who, as Tully demonstrates, argue that ‘no agreement will be closed at a frontier; it will always be open to question, to an element of non-consensus, and so to reciprocal question and answer, demand and response, and negotiation.’ Once again, then, agonistic emphasis on contingency, and the subsequent understanding of agreement as a partial and on-going process, separates agonists from certain types of deliberative democrats. It also resonates with the post-structuralist assumptions underpinning this research by providing opportunities for minority citizens to play a larger part in the decision-making process.

Yet, in spite of the evident differences between agonistic democrats and those deliberative democrats who focus on rationality and consensus, it is important to remember that there is no uncontested definition of deliberative democracy. As Steven Macedo states, ‘the phrase “deliberative democracy” does not signify a creed with a simple set of core claims. Those who seek to advance the cause of democratic deliberation do not altogether agree about what the democratic ideal is.

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63 See the discussion on ‘The Contingent Nature of Politics’ in Chapter One.
or how it should be fostered.' Rather, I suggest that both deliberative and agonistic positions exist somewhere along a spectrum: whilst the promotion of rationality and consensus represents one end, agonistic emphasis on contingency represents the other, with a range of positions in between. Gutmann and Thompson, for instance, provide a significant example of deliberative democrats who have moved away from rationality and consensus. They challenge the notion of rationality, demonstrating that it cannot always guide citizens to a decision, since sometimes 'the best moral understanding that citizens can muster does not show them which position should be rejected from a deliberative perspective.' In asserting that rationality may not always enable decisions to be made, Gutmann and Thompson’s deliberative account resonates with the agonist abandonment of rationality. Further, they reject the prioritisation of reaching a consensus, focusing instead on encouraging citizens to ‘recognize that a position is worthy of moral respect even when they think it is morally wrong.’ This concept, ‘economy of moral disagreement,’ resonates with Connolly’s promotion of contestability in requiring citizens to ‘try to accommodate the moral convictions of their opponents to the greatest extent possible, without compromising their own moral convictions.’ Additionally, just as Connolly claims that his agonistic respect ‘differs from its sibling, liberal tolerance, in affirming a more ambiguous relation of interdependence and strife between identities over a passing letting the other be,’ Gutmann and Thompson assert that their notion of mutual respect ‘demands more than toleration. It requires a favourable attitude toward, and constructive interaction with, the persons with whom one disagrees.’ Hence, Gutmann and Thompson’s deliberative account shares the agonistic prioritisation of positive relations between citizens. Rather than emphasising the need to achieve consensus, Gutmann and

68 Ibid., pp. 2-3.
69 Ibid., p. 3.
Thompson highlight the importance of reaching an understanding that all citizens can respect, even though they may disagree with it. This resonates with agonistic emphasis on necessary interdependency, in which one purpose of engagement with others is to enhance relationships.\textsuperscript{72} As Gutmann and Thompson assert, ‘deliberation is not only a means to an end, but also a means for deciding what means are morally required to pursue our common ends.’\textsuperscript{73} Hence, the focus is on the process of deliberation, rather than the outcome it produces. This is similar to Owen’s account of agonism, which claims that ‘our capacity to cultivate nobility is tied to our public culture.’\textsuperscript{74} Hence, in challenging rationality and consensus, and emphasising relations of respect, some versions of deliberative democracy, such as that advocated by Gutmann and Thompson, appear to be close to agonistic democracy, and reflect the assumptions behind this project.

**Situating my Research within Agonistic Democracy**

In spite of the parallels between agonistic democracy and deliberative democracy, I argue that this thesis is best situated within the agonist field. The overarching reason for this is the emphasis agonists place on political contestation (which is explored in Chapter One). As Steven Griggs et al. affirm in *Practices of Freedom: Decentred Governance, Conflict and Democratic Participation*, ‘while deliberative theories are interested in elaborating the norms that ought to govern such practices, agonistic democrats think about the historical conditions of possibility – to use a term from Foucault – of contestation, as a vital element of practices of democratic governance.’\textsuperscript{75} As Chapter One and Chapter Two demonstrate, political contestation holds a different significance for each agonistic approach, but is important to each. For Owen, political contestation is important in promoting competition between citizens, which subsequently strives to enhance societal virtues. For Mouffe,

\textsuperscript{72} See Chapter One for a discussion of this.
political contestation revives citizens’ passions by provoking them to defend their interpretation and application of values against one another. For Connolly and Tully, political contestation is important in enhancing inclusivity since it encourages citizens to respectfully contest the beliefs of others. Political contestation is essential to this project because, in order to consider how democratic theory might be operationalised into practical mechanisms or supplementary institutions, one central question is how to encourage citizens to engage in democratic discussions. Political contestation, implemented either through competition, provocation, or inclusivity, is important in exploring how to enable access and motivate engagement. Aletta Norval highlights the importance of post-structuralist literature to this question of access, stating that one fundamental criticism of deliberative democracy is its tendency to ‘ignor[e] the impact of material inequalities on the ability of participants to partake as equals in dialogue.’ Thus, situating my work within the field of agonistic democracy enables me to supplement my consideration of institutions with thoughts about who might be included and excluded, and how to challenge such power relations and inequalities. Yet, in spite of my focus on agonistic democracy, deliberative democrats have had a significant impact on the thesis and it is important to note the invaluable contribution of their ‘imaginative attempts to think through, in practice, what an emphasis on deliberation might imply for democratic institutions and norms.’ Certain deliberative democrats, such as Gutmann and Thompson, have moved towards agonistic accounts of democracy and away from rationality and consensus, through placing greater emphasis on enhancing the relations between citizens. However, focus on political contestation renders agonistic democracy the most appropriate source of literature for the consideration of how democratic theory might mediate conflict through practices.

Research Questions

This thesis asks whether, and how, theoretical concepts from agonistic democracy might be operationalised to help mediate democratic conflict in multicultural, pluralist societies. In considering this question, it discusses the following six interrelated themes. Firstly, it returns to the theoretical roots of agonistic democracy, identifying three core themes that resonate throughout the field. It then outlines three distinct approaches to agonistic democracy, demonstrating that, in spite of their convergence on three core themes, different agonists use these to focus on different goals. Subsequently, the thesis brings the approaches back together, suggesting that each approach lacks sufficient consideration of how theoretical concepts could be transformed into practical mechanisms. Through a combination of empirical and theoretical research, it then considers ways in which agonistic concepts might be operationalised to mediate conflict. In so doing, it evaluates the strengths and weaknesses of each approach by combining theoretical evaluation with insights from the empirical work. Finally, the thesis offers a synthesis of the three approaches, providing some ideas about what an ‘agonistic day’ might look like.

Approach

In exploring how agonistic democracy could be operationalised, my thesis comprises two parts. Part One includes Chapters One to Chapter Three and entails the theoretical underpinnings of the research, whilst Part Two, from Chapter Four to Chapter Seven, focuses on the operationalisation of agonistic concepts and their subsequent analysis.

The purpose of Chapter One is to return to the theoretical roots of agonistic democracy in order to outline the themes that unify agonistic thinkers. I explore this through discussion of the work of Arendt, Foucault, Carl Schmitt and Friedrich Nietzsche. In so doing, I illuminate three themes which both resonate throughout the work of these thinkers.
and influence the work of contemporary agonists: political contestation, contingency, and necessary interdependency. The chapter suggests that these three themes encompass agonistic democracy, and are referred back to in the later analytical chapters.

Chapter Two demonstrates how these three themes are implemented in different ways by contemporary agonists, demarcating three approaches to agonistic democracy: the ‘perfectionist,’ as embodied by Owen, the ‘adversarial,’ as represented by Mouffe, and the ‘inclusive’ as depicted by Connolly and Tully. Whilst this list of thinkers by no means provides an exhaustive account of agonistic democracy, they constitute the focal point of my thesis for two reasons. First, their work is situated within democratic politics, rendering them particularly useful for consideration of how agonistic concepts might be operationalised. Second, they have each had significant impact on the field of agonistic democracy and the work of secondary agonistic democrats, enabling them to each offer various influential accounts of agonistic democracy.

The labels of these three approaches derive from the most prominent feature of their respective accounts. The term ‘perfectionist’ is borrowed from Fossen’s discussion of Owen’s work in which he defines perfectionism as a concern for improvement and the ends of politics:

Perfectionism here signifies a commitment to the cultivation and continuous improvement of citizens’ virtues and capacities. Perfectionist agonism constitutes a more fundamental challenge to liberalism because it provides a competing account of the ends of politics, suggesting that it constitutes an external rather than internal challenge to liberal theory from a normative standpoint.78

On Mouffe’s account, the role of the adversary is ‘the central category of democratic politics,’ since it restores passion to politics by creating

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collective identities constituted in opposition to one another.\textsuperscript{79} Finally, whilst Connolly and Tully propose separate accounts of politics, they are both categorised as ‘inclusive’ because of their emphasis on creating a political \textit{ethos} in which moral principles promote better interactions between conflicting citizens.\textsuperscript{80}

Having considered the core theory behind agonistic democracy and the different approaches to which these have led, Chapter Three then explores institutional consideration within the field. Combining discussions of agonistic concepts and new institutionalist literature, it evaluates the extent to which agonistic institutions have already been developed. It subsequently affirms the need for further thought whilst considering potential tensions between agonistic democracy and institutions. Finally, the chapter contends that certain \textit{types} of institution are not necessarily at odds with agonistic assumptions.

Once the first part of the thesis has outlined the theoretical components of agonistic democracy and the need for further institutional consideration, Part Two discusses the empirical element of my research, followed by theoretical and empirical evaluations. Chapter Four introduces the empirical component of the research, covering both methodology and methods. After providing a brief overview of the empirical work, it explains why quasi-experimental methodology was employed, demonstrating how my empirical work differs from classical experimental research in order to complement the post-structuralist assumptions underpinning the thesis. It explains and justifies the methods used in the participant recruitment and data collection processes. It frequently reflects on the limitations of the empirical research and the extent to which these were overcome.

Chapter Five details how theoretical concepts were operationalised into an experiment. It discusses how each theoretical approach

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For a justification of including both Connolly and Tully in 'inclusive' agonism, see Chapter Two.
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(perfectionist, adversarial and inclusive), was represented by a different discussion framework during the experiment. It then outlines the representation of agonistic concepts in participant questionnaires and observer sheets.

The subsequent three chapters comprise the analytical part of the thesis by combining discussion of the relevant theoretical literature with insights gained from the experiment. Chapter Six commences the first section of the analysis through reflection of Owen’s perfectionist agonistic democracy. The chapter discusses the potential for this agonistic approach to both enhance the autonomy of citizens and promote unity within democracy, whilst also expressing concerns that it may be less successful in preventing apathy or including a wide diversity of citizens.

Chapter Seven focuses on Mouffe’s adversarial agonistic democracy. It observes that adversarialism generally seems to be effective in motivating conflicting citizens into participation with one another and can be helpful in creating unity between ‘friend’ groups. However, it contends that further thought might be necessary as to how to motivate less dominant citizens to remain engaged; account for diversity and contingency; and enhance interactions and encourage unity between adversaries.

Chapter Eight addresses the inclusive approach of Connolly and Tully. It argues that their inclusive accounts offer important suggestions about how to improve interactions between conflicting citizens, and how to empower citizens to challenge domination. Yet, it also calls for more discussion about how to account for antagonistic relations, overcome reSENTIMENT, enable self-modification and change, and promote contestability without suppressing agonistic expression.

The concluding chapter combines summaries of the analysis with insights from deliberative projects to outline my proposed ‘agonistic
day.’ In proposing this model, the thesis promotes a synthesis of the three approaches. I argue that each approach has unique strengths and weaknesses and that these are reconcilable, demonstrating the importance of each to fulfilling the core aims of agonistic democracy.
Chapter One: The Theoretical Roots of Agonistic Democracy

Post-structuralist thought, in particular the field of agonistic democracy, has been highly influenced by the work of several thinkers. This chapter explores how the thought of Nietzsche, Foucault, Arendt and Schmitt has impacted upon the theory of agonistic democracy. Whilst these thinkers do not encapsulate all of those who have contributed to agonist thought, they resonate with my project as a result of their influence on the contemporary agonistic democratic thought of Owen, Mouffe, Connolly and Tully. I suggest that three principal themes resonate throughout the work of the thinkers: the political contestation of conflicting values, the contingent nature of politics and the necessary interdependency of citizens. I discuss the ways in which the thinkers converge and diverge on these themes, as well as demonstrating how these concepts are used in contemporary agonist literature and how they resonate with new institutionalist literature. Finally, I will demonstrate how the most significant of these differences emanates from Schmitt’s work, which, in spite of endorsing these three themes, provides a very distinct account of society, which often sits less comfortably alongside the other thinkers. This is echoed in Mouffe’s thought, which, as Chapter Two demonstrates, provides a very distinct account of agonistic democracy.

The political contestation of conflicting values

The notion of political contestation is evident throughout the work of the four thinkers. The call for a revival of the ‘political’ within the political realm is highlighted by Schmitt and Foucault’s emphasis on the necessity of merging the realms of politics and society, and blurring the boundaries between philosophy and politics. Through the promotion of more situated, citizen-centred accounts of politics, the thinkers argue for a revival of politics and for individuals to become citizens rather than subjects. For many thinkers (however, not for Schmitt), this is supplemented by emphasis on contestation as a public practice.
Contestation is perceived as a tool to render politics meaningful, prevent hegemony, expose domination, enhance individual autonomy and better society.

The revival of the political

Politics as a political practice constitutes the first component of political contestation, the first of three themes which unite thinkers associated with agonistic democracy. For Schmitt and Foucault, emphasis on the political derives from their critiques of the liberal public/private separation which they deem largely confines conflict to the private sphere in an attempt to mediate diversity. Arguing against this, Schmitt states that democracy ought to abandon ‘the nineteenth-century antitheses and divisions pertaining to the state-society (= political against social) contrast.’ He explains that such a dichotomy is unattainable since liberalism ‘like any other significant human movement… has failed to elude the political.’ This notion is echoed by Mouffe’s agonism, which draws heavily on Schmitt’s philosophy:

As current controversies about abortion clearly show, pluralism does not mean that all those conflicting conceptions of the good will coexist peacefully without trying to intervene in the public sphere, and the frontier between public and private is not given once and for all but constructed and constantly shifting.

Following this challenge to the divide between the political and the social, Schmitt argues against resolving conflict by consulting universal or rational norms on the one hand, or by turning to allegedly neutral arbiters, on the other. Instead, he promotes a situated account of politics in which citizens themselves make decisions about values, thereby reviving the ‘political’ element of politics:

[Conflicts] can neither be decided by a previously determined general norm nor by the judgment of a

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82 Ibid., p. 69.
disinterested and therefore neutral third party. Only the actual participants can correctly recognize, understand, and judge the concrete situation and settle the extreme case of conflict.\textsuperscript{84}

Foucault similarly rejects the separation between politics and society, however for him, this derives from an understanding of power in which ‘relations of power, and hence the analysis that must be made of them, necessarily extend beyond the limits of the state.’\textsuperscript{85} He demonstrates that politics is inseparable from society since state power is entangled in power struggles inherent in ‘the body, sexuality, the family, kinship, knowledge, technology, and so forth.’\textsuperscript{86} Thus, according to him, state power can only operate when it is ‘rooted in a whole series of multiple and indefinite power relations that supply the necessary basis for the great negative forms of power.’\textsuperscript{87} Drawing on Foucault’s work, Connolly affirms this in the claim that ‘the expansion of diversity in one domain ventilates life in others as well.’\textsuperscript{88} Hence, both Schmitt and Foucault refute the strict separation between state and society, thereby promoting more situated, citizen-centred accounts of politics, which seek to restore the political element to politics. Politics is necessarily \textit{political} in the sense that it does not, and cannot, exist only in government institutions isolated from the everyday lives of citizens. According to Foucault and Schmitt, these two spheres overlap, thus rendering politics a \textit{political} practice.

Different thinkers endorse the notion of politics as a \textit{political} practice for a variety of reasons. For Schmitt, for instance, the primary purpose of renegotiating the public/private divide is to overcome liberal depoliticisation and revive the meaning of political values. He

\textsuperscript{84} Schmitt, C. (2008), p. 27.
\textsuperscript{86} Ibid, p. 64.
\textsuperscript{87} Ibid, p. 64.
claims that separating the two involves ‘subjugating state and politics, partially into an individualistic domain of private law and morality, partially into economic notions.’\(^{89}\) As a result of attempts to divide politics into various arenas, Schmitt argues that it become meaningless and void of substance.\(^{90}\) Influenced by Schmitt’s work, Mouffe echoes this concern, stating that ‘it is indeed the political which is at stake here, and the possibility of its elimination.’\(^{91}\) Thus, for Schmitt, as for Mouffe, challenging the boundaries between the political and the social is not only inevitable, but also desirable since it helps to restore meaning and substance to politics.

This emphasis on renegotiating the dichotomy between state and society resonates with new institutionalist critiques of traditional institutionalism, whereby, as Lowndes asserts, ‘the focus was upon formal rules and organizations rather than informal conventions; and upon official structures of government rather than broader institutional constraints on governance (outside as well as within the state).’\(^{92}\) This echoes Schmitt’s critique of liberal politics as performing a predominantly administrative function, and his subsequent promotion of a more political account.

For Arendt, the emphasis on politics as a political activity in which citizens engage with one another is significant to her understanding of identity. She states that, ‘the public-political realm...[is where]...men attain their full humanity, their full reality as men, not only because they are (as in the privacy of the household) but also because they appear.’\(^{93}\) For her, one’s citizenship is dependent on engagement with others, thus her account of the political is also necessarily public. Contemporary agonist, Tully, echoes this, explaining that ‘when these activities are unavailable or arbitrarily

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\(^{90}\) Ibid., p. 72.
restricted, the members of a political association remain “subjects” rather than “citizens” because power is exercised over them without their say, non-democratically.  

Nietzsche also promotes the public realm in *Homer’s Contest* where he demonstrates how Ancient Greek competition enhanced people’s capacities. However, when discussing the ‘public’ component of Nietzsche’s account, it is important to note that this is limited. For instance, he prioritises the Overman (a non-conformist, who challenges norms and values and realises himself), over the herd (who unquestioningly follow their community). Unlike Foucault and Arendt, then, who promote an inclusive account of public politics, Nietzsche’s public sphere is restricted to particular individuals. In spite of this, Owen is influenced by Nietzsche’s work, but adapts it for contemporary society, asserting that ‘citizens strive to develop their capacities for self-rule in competition with one another.’ Hence, drawing on Nietzsche’s valorisation of Ancient Greek competition, Owen promotes a public sphere of politics in which one betteres oneself by striving to surpass other members of one’s community. Thus, for Arendt and Tully, as for Nietzsche and Owen, citizens enhance their capabilities by engaging in a political contestation of values. Yet, for Nietzsche, this public sphere constitutes a narrower definition, which prioritises those who are able to challenge current norms and values. Schmitt, on the other hand, advocates public contest because of its ability to revive the political nature of politics.

It is important to note, here, that whilst both Arendt and Schmitt evidently echo Foucault and Nietzsche’s calls for political accounts of politics, they do so in a different manner. Whereas the latter

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thinkers understand politics as interlinked with power relations, and therefore omnipresent, for Arendt, politics is a rare moment that ‘bursts into the context of predictable processes as something unexpected, unpredictable, and ultimately causally inexplicable – just like a miracle.’

Her account of politics involves action, which she prioritises over the spheres of labour and work.

Schmitt, too, prioritises the political realm with an ‘ardent emphasis on the political element of constitutional democracy.’ Whilst it has previously been mentioned that Schmitt’s work resonates with Foucault’s in ‘entail[ing] this dissolution and blurring of the connections between order, state and politics,’ this leads Schmitt to a very different conclusion about the nature of political contest. As Mouffe explains, this blurring of boundaries means that ‘every concrete order can be transformed into a political conflict, and hence reduced to its very basis.’

As a result, Schmitt demonstrates the overlap between the political and social realms in order to prioritise political conflict over social. This is mirrored in Mouffe’s work in which she claims that ‘when there is a lack of democratic political struggles with which to identify, their place is taken by other forms of identification, of ethnic, nationalist or religious nature.’

Contestation

The second element of political contestation of conflicting values is that of promoting politics as a contestation between citizens. However, the thinkers employ it in a variety of ways in order to achieve a diversity of ends. For Schmitt, contestation involves intrastate conflict, which threatens the existence of each side, thereby rendering conflict meaningful. For Nietzsche, contestation provides a means to challenging hegemonic values and allowing

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new ones to emerge. Foucault, too, perceives contestation as a tool to challenging hegemony, and demonstrates this through the continual oscillation between power and freedom, which prevents domination. For Arendt, as for Nietzsche, contestation can also enhance the autonomy of citizens.

Once again, Schmitt’s notion of contestation – and subsequently Mouffe’s - differs from the others here, focusing on the possibility of conflict between states. He argues that ‘what always matters is only the possibility of conflict,’ advocating the idea that it is the ‘very possibility of war which creates a specifically ‘political’ behaviour.’ Claiming that politics is dependent on such potential for conflict, he asserts that ‘a world in which the possibility of war is utterly eliminated, a completely pacified globe, would be a world without the distinction of friend and enemy and hence a world without politics.’ Drawing on this assumption in evaluating contemporary politics, Mouffe argues that ‘the blurring of the frontiers between left and right, far from being an advance in a democratic direction, is jeopardizing the future of democracy.’ For Schmitt, as for Mouffe, the constant potential for conflict poses ‘an existential threat to one’s own way of life.’ As a result of this threat, meaning is assigned to one’s way of life, provoking citizens to defend it, and reviving politics as a consequence. Thus, for Schmitt, perpetual contestation and the potential for conflict is the very essence of the political as it renders it meaningful.

Focusing primarily on interactions between individuals, as opposed to the state-centred account of Schmitt, Nietzsche highlights the potential for conflict to render political values meaningful. This is highlighted by Frank Cameron and Don Dombowsky, who describe the way in which Nietzsche initially perceives the Franco-Prussian war, as not entirely negative, but rather ‘in agonistic terms as a contest between French

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105 Ibid, p. 35.
106 Ibid, p. 35.
and German culture.'\textsuperscript{109} Connolly infers that Nietzsche would view the conflict of modern warfare in the same ambiguous terms since ‘war fosters great destruction, but it enables people to come to terms with what is important to them.’\textsuperscript{110} Nietzsche thus valorises the ambiguity that war and conflict produce, perceiving culture and the ability of people to understand what is important to them as significant elements of peace within war. Connolly follows this, affirming that contest ‘enables people to come to terms with what is important to them.’\textsuperscript{111} However, for Nietzsche, contestation is also significant in challenging hegemony and enabling new outcomes. Alluding once again to the Franco-Prussian war, Nietzsche valorises the oscillation between French and German cultures, arguing for ‘an agonistic, anti-hegemonic conception of war that would benefit culture.’\textsuperscript{112} On this account, contest enables society to challenge hegemonic values in order to reach better conclusions. He illustrates this through the example of Greek ostracism, which was employed to ensure the perpetuity of contest, and to prevent a winner from closing it. In \textit{Homer’s Contest}, the example of Miltiades’ demise illustrates the necessity of contest and demonstrates the danger of an absolute win.\textsuperscript{113} This idea is also present in Connolly’s agonism in which he states that ‘it is necessary to disturb and challenge – through publicity, exposés, and boycotts and through alliances with beleaguered states and nonstate peoples – a variety of presumptions, understandings, and loyalties inscribed in the nationstate.’\textsuperscript{114} Thus, through political contestation, dominant values can be challenged, thereby enabling new ones to come into being.

Foucault’s work supports the need to contest power inherent in ‘institutions, economic inequalities, language and even the bodies of

\textsuperscript{111}Ibid., p. 166.  
\textsuperscript{112}Nietzsche, F., Cameron, F. and Dombowsky, D. (2008), pp. 33-34.  
individuals.\textsuperscript{115} In so doing, he resonates with Nietzsche’s assertion that contestation enables hegemonies to be challenged. He expresses this through reference to power and freedom whereby he explains that freedom is a prerequisite for power to emerge and then be sustained. He argues that ‘without the possibility of recalcitrance, power would be equivalent to a physical determination.’\textsuperscript{116} It is thus the tension between power on the one hand, and freedom on the other, which enables contestation to take place. Foucault refers to the contestation between power and freedom as ‘“agonism”...a relationship which is at the same time reciprocal incitation and struggle: less of a face-to-face confrontation which paralyzes both sides than a permanent provocation.’\textsuperscript{117} Foucault informs us that this perpetual contest oscillates between the threat of an outbreak of conflict on one hand, and the enforcement of mechanisms of power on the other.\textsuperscript{118} Thus, such toing and froing is significant to preventing either freedom or power from becoming hegemonic. Foucault explains that ‘it is precisely the disparities between the two readings [of freedom and power] which make visible those fundamental phenomena of “domination” which are present in a large number of human societies.’\textsuperscript{119} Hence, by encouraging a continual contest between power and freedom, Foucault asserts that it is possible to expose domination by particular values. This converges with Nietzsche’s assumption that contestation between contending entities prevents either one from forming a hegemony.

For Arendt, contestation occurs in the political realm and is important in enhancing the autonomy of an individual. She argues that ‘it is companionship with others that, calling me out of the dialogue of thought, makes me one again – one single, unique human being speaking with but one voice and recognizable as such by all others.’\textsuperscript{120} Thus, for Arendt, the presence of others grants the individual the

\textsuperscript{115} Foucault, M. (2003), p. 16.
\textsuperscript{116} Ibid., p. 221.
\textsuperscript{117} Ibid., p. 222.
\textsuperscript{118} Ibid., p. 226.
\textsuperscript{119} Ibid., p. 226.
\textsuperscript{120} Ibid., p. 21.
autonomy to consolidate his otherwise complex and pluralistic beliefs. Furthermore, she demonstrates how contestation is a competitive process in which citizens strive to better one another, further enhancing their capabilities as a result. Using Ancient Greece as an example, she asserts that, ‘the polis, was permeated by a fiercely agonal spirit, where everybody had constantly to distinguish himself from all others, to show through unique deeds or achievements that he was the best of all (aien aristeuein).’\(^{121}\) She claims that such aspirations of excellence in the public realm cannot be equalled in the private realm since ‘for excellence, by definition, the presence of others is always required.’\(^{122}\) Drawing on Nietzsche and Arendt, Owen supports this, arguing that ‘persons contest with themselves and each other to achieve excellence.’\(^{123}\) Thus, for Arendt, the public arena encourages citizens to consolidate, express and argue for, their personal truth, enhancing individual autonomy. In short, ‘to be free and to act are the same.’\(^{124}\)

Nietzsche also promotes political contestation as a means to enhancing the capacities of citizens, but he goes further by arguing that the competitive process of contestation also improves society. As Owen explains, ‘Nietzsche argues that Hellenic education was based on the idea that our capacities only develop through struggle, whereby the goal of this agonistic education is the well-being of the polis.’\(^{125}\) As a result, contestation enhances individual capabilities, which in turn betters society. This is demonstrated in the assertion that ‘the public culture of Greek society cultivated human powers through an institutionalised ethos of contestation in which citizens strove to surpass each other and, ultimately, to set new standards of nobility.’\(^{126}\) Hence, in addition to motivating engagement between conflicting citizens and challenging hegemony, Nietzsche employs contestation to better the individual and enable societal progress.

\(^{122}\) Ibid, p. 44.
\(^{126}\) Ibid., p. 139.
All four thinkers thereby promote the notion of political contestation in some form. Schmitt and Foucault demonstrate that the dichotomy between the public and private spheres is false and needs to be renegotiated. Arguing against universality, rationality, and neutrality, Schmitt favours a situated account of politics in which citizens are participants. Foucault also calls for the blurring of boundaries between state and society, claiming that power extends beyond the state. He thereby also promotes a citizen-based, public account of politics. This broader understanding of power and politics resonates with new institutionalist accounts of institutions which move away from typical actors and organisations and incorporate ‘sets of rules that exist “within” and “between organizations, “as well as under, over and around them”.'

The various thinkers each emphasise the political nature of politics to different ends. For Schmitt, this constitutes an attempt at reviving politics by restoring the meaning to political values. For Arendt and Nietzsche, their public accounts of politics allow citizens to become citizens (rather than subjects) through participation. Importantly, for Schmitt and Arendt, unlike Nietzsche and Foucault, the political realm is a distinct entity, which ought to be prioritised.

In addition to providing a political account, the thinkers also highlight the importance of contestation to politics. For Schmitt, contestation is essential to threatening the existence of one’s way of life, thereby enhancing its meaning. For Nietzsche, it enables hegemonies to be challenged, and provides possibilities for the emergence of new values. Foucault, too, promotes contestation as a means to challenging hegemonic values, drawing on his understanding of power and freedom to demonstrate the importance of unearthing and challenging domination. For Arendt, contestation is important in enhancing the autonomy of citizens, and for Nietzsche, it also serves the purpose of enhancing individual autonomy, which in turn betters society.

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The Contingent Nature of Politics

A second theme emphasised by all four thinkers is that of contingency, which asserts that societal values are, and must be, open to continual contestation. As Norval explains, ‘once we are on the terrain of contingency, “nothing is guaranteed”, and everything is at stake: the question of the emergence of subjectivity is opened up and the contours and the boundaries of what can be regarded as “common space” is put into question.'\(^{128}\) This concept contrasts with truth, which thinkers, such as Plato, affirm can be discovered by rational beings.\(^{129}\) Conversely, Arendt, Foucault, Nietzsche, and Schmitt reject this assumption, arguing that claims to truth are expressions of power, which are potentially dangerous as they threaten to negate or eradicate difference. This resonates with the criticisms made in the introduction of neutral, universalist and rationalist approaches to liberalism. The thinkers thereby call for ‘untruth’ and the continual critique and challenge of values and standards in order to prevent domination and enable new lines of thinking. This resonates with new institutionalist thinkers, who argue that institutional analysis needs to evaluate not just the ‘rules of the game’ but citizens’ capacities to modify and transform these.

In *The Human Condition*, Arendt states that the ‘traditional concept of truth...had rested on the twofold assumption that what truly is will appear of its own accord and that human capabilities are adequate to receive it.’\(^{130}\) She rejects this assumption, likening any attempt at this to ‘jumping over our own shadows.’\(^{131}\) Nietzsche’s work parallels Arendt’s in abandoning the belief that there is a truth discoverable by humans. Stating that humans have ‘no further mission that would lead beyond human life,’ Nietzsche asserts that it is only humans who attach such importance to human intellect ‘as if the world pivoted around it. But if we could communicate with the mosquito, then we would learn that he

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131 Ibid., p. 12.
floats through the air with the same self-importance, feeling within itself the flying center of the world.'

Thus, contrary to thinkers such as Aristotle, Nietzsche asserts that humans are no more capable than animals at arriving at the truth. Connolly reiterates this in *Ethos of Pluralization*, affirming that 'my thinking denies a fundamental purpose, harmony, law, or plasticity of the world.' Instead of promoting universalism or rationalism, then, Nietzsche advocates ‘perspectivism’ whereby each individual’s understanding of truth is a personal interpretation. On this account, there is no universal truth or rational set of values, but rather a range of perspectives, each representing an individual’s perception of truth. Owen supports this in the claim that ‘all views are from somewhere, our perspectives are always already situated,’ and, as such the idea of a ‘non-perspectival perspective’ is contradictory. Nietzsche asserts that we can never view the world from outside of our perspectives, claiming that there is only the possibility that we ‘might one day have the power to peer out and down through a crack in the chamber of consciousness.’ This is reflected in Arendt's work, which argues that ‘absolute truth, which would be the same for all men and therefore unrelated, independent of each man’s existence, cannot exist for mortals.’ She states that we can only see the world by acknowledging that others perceive it differently, and we can only experience it by engaging with the diverse perspectives of others:

If someone wants to see and experience the world as it “really” is, he can do so only by understanding it as something that is shared by many people, lies between them, separates and links them, showing itself differently to each and comprehensible only to the extent that many

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136 Ibid., p. 161.
people can talk about it and exchange their opinions and perspectives with one another, over against one another.\textsuperscript{139}

In addition to affirming that all truths are opinions and perspectives that vary between individuals, Nietzsche and Foucault also demonstrate that truth claims are problematic since they are entangled in power relations. Foucault affirms that ‘truth isn’t outside of power, or lacking in power.’\textsuperscript{140} This is reflected in Connolly’s \textit{Identity/Difference}, which asserts that ‘if there is no true identity, the attempt to establish one as if it were true involves power.’\textsuperscript{141} Foucault argues that each society establishes a ‘regime of truth,’ consisting of what it chooses to accept as truths, how it chooses these, how these are then legitimated, and what/who has the power to decide upon these truths:

The regime of truth...that is, the types of discourse which it accepts and makes function as true; the mechanisms and instances which enable one to distinguish true and false statements, the means by which each is sanctioned; the techniques and procedures accorded value in the acquisition of truth; the status of those who are charged with saying what counts as true.\textsuperscript{142}

As Leslie Paul Thiele asserts, ‘it is the human condition to exist within a system of power.’\textsuperscript{143} Foucault illustrates this by discussing the intellectual, who was often ‘acknowledged the right of speaking in the capacity of master of truth and justice. He was heard or purported to make himself heard, as the spokesman of the universal.’\textsuperscript{144} Yet, according to Foucault, the intellectual was not the bearer of the universal, but rather, a specific actor, behaving in accordance with the relevant regimes of truth. He describes him as ‘the person occupying a specific position – but whose specificity is linked, in a society like ours,
to the general functioning of truth.\textsuperscript{145} Foucault demonstrates how the regime of truth impacts the intellectual in three primary ways. First, his position in society influences whether he represents capitalist or proletarian interests. Subsequently, his life-work conditions inform whether he primarily answers to the demands of his field or his university. Finally, ‘the specificity of the politics of truth in our societies’ \textsuperscript{146} shapes and constrains the knowledge he produces. Employing this example, Foucault shows how “truth” is linked in a circular relation with systems of power which produce and sustain it, and to effects of power which it induces and which extends it.\textsuperscript{147}

This notion that truth is enmeshed in power relations is mirrored in Nietzsche’s philosophy, which states that the human drive to discover commonalities and seal them in truth is dogmatic.\textsuperscript{148} Asserting that language is an expression of power, Nietzsche states that rulers ‘say “this is such and such,” they put their seal on each thing and event with a sound and in the process take possession of it.’\textsuperscript{149}

All of the thinkers express, not only the power relations inherent in truth claims, but also the danger that these pose to difference. Foucault demonstrates this through language by showing how the creation of a single, unified concept suppresses diversity. He explicates that ‘language must strip itself of its concrete content and leave nothing visible but those forms of discourse that are universally valid.’\textsuperscript{150} In The Order of Things, for instance, he questions whether it is legitimate to maintain separate categories for cats and dogs ‘even if both are tame and embalmed, even if both are frenzied, even if both have just broken the water pitcher.’\textsuperscript{151} In demonstrating the overlapping characteristics of two animals that have been conceptualised as two distinct entities,

\textsuperscript{145} Ibid., p. 73.
\textsuperscript{146} Ibid., p. 73.
\textsuperscript{147} Ibid., P. 74.
\textsuperscript{150} Ibid., p. 304.
Foucault challenges universalism and truth. He highlights that, by striving toward neat and convenient definitions or rules, we forget the messy reality and the ways in which truth needs to be challenged and modified. This is potentially dangerous in society because in order to universalise things and present ‘truths,’ it is necessary to ignore disparities that exist and exceptions to the rule, or characteristics that do not fit the rule. As a consequence, universalism has an exclusionary potential toward those who do not fall within the norm of each universal category. This is echoed in Tully’s work on pluralism, which demonstrates how if one group of society perceives itself as universal, it ‘cannot recognise and respect any plurality of narratives, traditions or civilisations as equal yet different, and enter into a dialogue with them on equal footing.’¹⁵²

This assertion that universalism is dangerous because of its exclusionary potential, is further explored in Nietzsche’s thought. His essay, *On Truth and Lies in a Nonmoral Sense*, echoes Foucault’s concerns with the manner in which universalism abstracts from the essence of the thing. Taking the example of a leaf, Nietzsche exposes how humans abstract from the difference between various objects (i.e. different types of leaves) in order to form a single concept (i.e. the leaf). However, he explains that, in so doing, we ‘overlook what is individual and actual,’ and as a result, the true essence of the leaf ‘remains inaccessible and undefinable for us.’¹⁵³ This reminds us of Foucault’s analogy of cats and dogs whereby the clear-cut separation of the two categories prevents us from grasping the individual nature of the animals themselves. Hence, both Foucault and Nietzsche assert that the categorisation of language ignores the unique characteristics of each entity, preventing us from grasping individuality, diversity and difference. This surely begs the question of how we deal with a type of leaf – or indeed human - that does not fit neatly into one of the traditional categories? Connolly explains how, for Nietzsche, every

individual ‘is at odds with the norm in some ways,’ and that because of societal ‘truths,’ ‘difference faces a struggle to create space for itself.’

Drawing on Nietzsche, Connolly highlights the exclusionary potential of universalism, stating that ‘to possess a true identity is to be false to difference, while to be true to difference is to sacrifice the promise of a true identity.’

Echoing concerns about the potential for truth to suppress diversity, Schmitt discusses this with reference to universal rhetoric. He affirms that if one entity professes to encompass humanity, it confiscates those terms from the other by default. He begins by emphasising the diversity of the global realm, referring to the political world as ‘pluriverse, not a universe.’ Consequently, he states that ‘the political entity cannot by its very nature be universal in the sense of embracing all of humanity and the entire world.’ Moreover, he rejects the possibility of one group or set of values representing humanity, affirming that ‘humanity is not a political concept, and no political entity or society and no status corresponds to it.’ Mouffe reaffirms this assumption in her discussion of democratic politics, stating that ‘for democracy to exist, no social agent should be able to claim any mastery of the foundation of society.’ Schmitt highlights the power relations inherent in humanity claims, stating that ‘the concept of humanity is an especially useful ideological instrument of imperialist expansion, and in its ethical-humanitarian form it is a specific vehicle of economic imperialism.’ He subsequently brings our attention to the dangers of adopting the label humanity, concerned that, on the one hand the term is no longer available to the other side, and, on the other, any atrocity would be justified in the name of humanity:

To confiscate the word humanity, to invoke and

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monopolize such a term probably has certain incalculable effects, such as denying the enemy the quality of being human and declaring him to be an outlaw of humanity; and a war can thereby be driven to the most extreme inhumanity.\textsuperscript{161}

Schmitt contends that by using the labels ‘universal’ and ‘humanity,’ politics would be transformed from a battle of politically opposed parties into a situation whereby the side operating under the cloak of humanity would be ‘forced to make of [the different Other] a monster that must not only be defeated but also utterly destroyed.’\textsuperscript{162} Mouffe has employed this idea in her adversarial account of democratic politics:

The aim of democratic politics is to construct the “them” in such a way that it is no longer perceived as an enemy to be destroyed, but as an “adversary”, that is, somebody whose ideas we combat but whose right to defend those ideas we do not put into question.\textsuperscript{163}

In addition to resonating with Mouffe’s adversarialism, Schmitt’s work also parallels that of Nietzsche, Foucault and Arendt in expressing the concern that universalism and truth threaten to suppress, exclude and destroy diversity.

Thus, the various thinkers argue that truth is not a discoverable entity and that any claims toward truth are entangled in power. They share the concern that claims of universality and truth are expressions of power and thus have the potential to suppress and exclude difference. Further, Arendt argues that universalism and truth pose barriers to contestation, since ‘standards are based on the same limited evidence inherent in a judgment upon which we all have agreed and no longer need to dispute or argue about.’\textsuperscript{164} To prevent the suppression of difference and to enable continual contestation, the thinkers promote the principle of contingency, or what Nietzsche terms as ‘untruth’ and

\textsuperscript{161} Ibid, p. 54.
\textsuperscript{162} Ibid, p. 36.
what Foucault deems to be ‘games of truth.’  

In *Beyond Good and Evil*, for instance, Nietzsche questions why humans do not traditionally prefer untruth and uncertainty from truth and certainty. Nietzsche condemns universalism for failing to ‘raise doubts here at the threshold, where doubts would be most necessary.’ The necessity of raising such doubts is outlined in *On the Genealogy of Morals*, in which Nietzsche states that ‘we stand in need of a critique of moral values, the value of these values itself should first of all be called into question.’

This notion is resonated in Connolly’s work, whereby he asserts that ‘every thought is invested by the unthought serving simultaneously as its condition and its limitation.’ Nietzsche thereby rejects the universalism and truth, promoting instead the necessity of contingency in which all moral values must be critiqued and called into question.

Drawing on the Ancient Greek employment of ostracism, Nietzsche illustrates the role of contingency in curtailing the power of the dominant. He states that, to ensure that a powerful force does not halt contestation, ostracism ‘banishes those strong enough to dominate the agon in order to keep the agon open.’ In emphasising the importance of keeping the agon open, Nietzsche’s philosophy suggests that contingency encourages the emergence of new lines of thinking. This is demonstrated through reference to the slave revolt, whereby the weak held feelings of *ressentiment* toward the ‘good,’ and, therefore, rendered themselves superior by inverting good and bad morality, thereby transforming good into ‘evil.’ Nietzsche asserts that the slave revolt ‘has a two-thousand-year history behind it and which has today

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165 It should be noted here that Ludwig Wittgenstein also discusses games of truth, and is highly influential to the work of James Tully. However, for the purpose of this thesis, the focus will be on Foucault’s games of truth as a result of their discussion of power. In *The Agonic Freedom of Citizens*, Tully explains how[Foucault] describes these practices as “games”, including, like Wittgenstein, the languages and forms of action in which they are woven and, unlike Wittgenstein, the relations of power that govern to some extent the conduct of the participants.’ P. 166.


167 Ibid., p. 6.


dropped out of sight only because it - has succeeded.\textsuperscript{172} This thereby illustrates how absolute success poses a barrier to further explorations of - and challenges to - history. In this case, it prevents people from challenging notions of good and evil. For Nietzsche, genealogy is an important tool for exposing domination since it involves exposing the power relations inherent in current morality.\textsuperscript{173} Through genealogy, we are thereby encouraged to think of critique and challenge, not as something that can be won or lost, but as a perpetual contest, which must be endlessly subject to challenge. This assumption that challenge and critique is vital to new possibilities is evident in Connolly's work on pluralism:

And I do suggest that the pluralist sensibility most compatible with generosity and forbearance between interdependent and contending identities is not anchored in the fictive ground of a transcendental command or universal reason. It flows...from care for the protean diversity of life and from critical responsiveness to new drives of pluralization.\textsuperscript{174}

Foucault echoes Nietzsche's calls for contingency and 'untruth,' suggesting a need to 'problematize traditional understandings of central concepts.'\textsuperscript{175} He asserts that this is imperative if we are to avoid being dominated by claims to truth and universality, proposing that, through genealogy, we criticise politics 'with a game of truth, showing what were the effects, showing that there were other rational possibilities, teaching people what they ignore about their own situation, on their conditions of work, on their exploitation.'\textsuperscript{176} In challenging the dominant discourses of truth, and consequently exposing viable alternatives, Foucault states that there is always the chance of overcoming domination through contingency. Such critique creates opportunities for new discoveries,

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{172} Ibid., p. 20.
\item \textsuperscript{173} Ibid., p. 8.
\end{itemize}
as Foucault demonstrates in the assertion that ‘there is always a possibility, in a given game of truth, to discover something else and to more or less change such and such a rule and sometimes even the totality of the game of truth.’\textsuperscript{177} This abandonment of universalism and truth is echoed by Tully in the claim that ‘our habitual forms of recognition are often stultifying forms of misrecognition which need to be upset and reversed from time to time.’\textsuperscript{178} In \textit{Truth and Power}, Foucault exemplifies the importance of ensuring that society’s current ‘truths’ remain contingent and open to challenge in order to enable the discovery of something new. With reference to the medical society, he argues that progressions in knowledge, ‘are not simply new discoveries; there is a whole new “regime” in discourse and forms of knowledge.’\textsuperscript{179} This highlights the importance of perpetually challenging and critiquing, not just controversial ideas, but also dominant and taken-for-granted forms of knowledge that exist in order to progress. Foucault thereby reveals how Nietzsche’s calls for contingency are important, stressing that the power relations inherent in societal ‘truths’ oblige us to challenge dominant ideas in order to overcome domination and offer new ways of thinking. Thus, both Foucault and Nietzsche value contingency for its ability to open up ‘alternative lines of thinking by scrambling the network through which it has been organized.’\textsuperscript{180}

Bonnie Honig explains how the promotion of contingency can alleviate oppression, affirming that critiques of universalism ‘create new values that are more viable and less impositional than the old ones.’\textsuperscript{181} This is demonstrated, for example, in Nietzsche’s recovery of ‘self-discipline’ in which he ‘valorizes the particularity and multiplicity that make the self resistant to the formation of moral, responsible subjectivity.’\textsuperscript{182} As a result of recovering self-discipline, Nietzsche switches the emphasis from universality to the particularity and multiplicity of each human

\textsuperscript{177} Ibid., p. 17.
\textsuperscript{181} Honig, B. (1993), p. 45.
\textsuperscript{182} Ibid., p. 63.
being, thereby rendering it less oppressive. This example of contingency shows that, by abandoning universalism, concepts can avoid marginalising those who fall outside of the norm.

Arendt also advocates the importance of contingency in creating something new. She affirms this through the introduction of labour into the ‘public’ realm, demonstrating that this has ‘liberated [the life] process from its circular, monotonous recurrence and transformed it into a swiftly progressing development whose results have in a few centuries totally changed the whole inhabited world.’

Tully demonstrates this in his work through the notion of ‘acting differently’ in which ‘the on-going conversation and conduct among the partners can modify the practice in often unnoticed and significant ways.’

The focus placed on contingency and the ability to modify the ‘rules of the game’ resonates with the new institutionalist emphasis on exploring how such rules are changed as a means to understanding institutions:

We need also to consider how “ordinary people” can develop capacities and seize opportunities to change the rules of the game, albeit with the constant threat of the re-imposition of dominant institutional constraints.

Thus, the four thinkers advocate the importance of both rejecting universality and truth, and focusing on contingency and challenge. Nietzsche and Arendt abandon traditional understandings of truth as something that is discoverable by humans. Instead, they argue that there are only perspectives, and that the more of these we engage with, the richer our own perspective becomes. Foucault, Nietzsche, and Schmitt show that claims to truth are expressions of power, and agree that, as such, notions of truth and universality threaten to suppress and exclude difference. As a result, Nietzsche and Foucault call for ‘untruth’ and continual challenge and critique. Along with Arendt, they argue that through such

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contingent politics we can prevent domination and encourage the emergence of new lines of thought. The emphasis these thinkers place on contingency reflects new institutionalist literature which highlights the importance of considering, not just the ‘rules of the game,’ but also the capacities of citizens to modify such rules. As a result, the kinds of institutions that are compatible with contingency are those that allow for change and grant citizens with the autonomy to contest them.

**The Necessary Interdependency of Citizens**

The four thinkers all assume and promote the necessary interdependency of citizens in society. They demonstrate how we understand concepts in relation to other, connected concepts. Subsequently, they blur the boundaries between ‘oppositional’ concepts, by demonstrating how such concepts often work together and even evolve into one another. They each argue that humans cannot fully exist outside of their society. For Schmitt, however, this assumption takes on a binary and collective understanding of identity in which opposing groups necessarily define themselves in relation to one another. For the other thinkers, interdependency resembles more of a web of relationality between diverse and plural individuals.

Nietzsche understands necessary interdependency to be a necessary component of our understanding of concepts in *On Truth and Lies in an Extra-Moral Sense*. Illustrating this through the example of nature, he explains how our understanding of one thing is reliant upon comprehension of several related concepts:

> We are not acquainted with it in itself, but only with its effects, which means in its relation to other laws of nature – which, in turn are known to us only as sums of relations. Therefore all these relations always refer again to others and are thoroughly incomprehensible to us in their
Nietzsche explains how, in spite of our inability to know the ‘thing in itself,’ we can comprehend it if we understand other related concepts. This is elucidated in *Beyond Good and Evil* through the example of thinking, which we are said to understand through its divergence from willing or feeling. He states that ‘saying “I think” assumes that I am comparing my present state with other states that I experience in myself, thereby establishing what it is.’\(^{187}\) Thus, we cannot understand the notion of thinking as an isolated concept; we *only* comprehend it by observing that which differentiates it from willing or feeling. Connolly also assumes this notion of relationality in his account of agonism, explaining that ‘to define a concept is necessarily to connect it with several others that need clarification.’\(^{188}\)

Foucault similarly echoes Nietzsche’s emphasis on interdependent concepts in *Man and His Doubles*. He illustrates relationality and collectivity through the painting of Las Meninas, in which ‘all the interior lines of the painting, and above all those that come from the central reflection, point towards the very thing that is represented, but absent.’\(^{189}\) Thus, by demonstrating the painting’s ability to convey the meaning of one absent idea through related ideas, Foucault shows the interconnected nature of concepts, demonstrating that we can enrich our knowledge of one concept by understanding another. This mirrors Nietzsche’s claims that comprehension of the term ‘to think’ is derived from comparing that state to other states we experience.\(^{190}\) This idea also resonates in Arendt’s work, in which she states that difference is ‘the reason why all our definitions are distinctions, why we are unable to say what anything is without distinguishing it from something else.’\(^{191}\)

Influenced by Foucault, Nietzsche and Arendt, Connolly uses necessary interdependency as a tool to emphasise the value of different

individuals in society, claiming that his identity ‘is further specified by comparison to a variety of the thing I am not.’ As a result, by demonstrating the way in which conflicting citizens are necessarily interconnected, his approach encourages unity.

This relationality is also discussed with reference to morals, which is made apparent by Nietzsche’s emphasis on the ambiguity between ‘good’ and ‘bad’ moralities in On the Genealogy of Morals. Refuting the dichotomy between ‘good’ and ‘bad’ values, Nietzsche rejects these concepts as entities which exist in isolation from one another. Instead, he explains the necessary relationship between them in which we could not recognise one without the other. In demonstrating this, he asks the reader, ‘what would the meaning of “beautiful” be, if contradiction had not first become conscious of itself, if the ugly had not first said to itself: “I am ugly”? He then shows how necessary interdependency can be promoted to encourage new positive possibilities to emerge from the bad, employing bad conscience as an example. He describes it ‘as an illness…but an illness in the same way that pregnancy is an illness.’ Thus, using this allegory, Nietzsche affirms that negative entities can have the potential to enable new and positive possibilities. He refers to this as the ‘actual maternal womb of ideal and imaginative events.’

This notion of necessary interdependency can be a powerful tool in blurring the boundaries between two opposites, rejecting, for instance, the distinction between good and bad, thereby preventing the dominant drive (i.e. the good), from suppressing the subordinate drive (i.e. the bad).

Employing euthanasia as an example, Connolly promotes necessary interdependency in Why I am not a Secularist, demonstrating how those in favour may initially be met with shock and perceived as acting cruelly toward the dying. However, he then shows how this supposed ‘bad’ morality might be considered ‘good’ when perceived,
instead, as concern for the dying.\textsuperscript{197} Thus, for Connolly, the concept of necessary interdependency can be useful in blurring the boundaries between seemingly oppositional entities, thereby promoting respect between conflicting citizens.

Just as Nietzsche demonstrates the interrelated nature of concepts, so does Foucault in his reference to nature and human nature:

\begin{quote}
Despite this opposition, however, or rather, through it, we see the positive relation of nature to human nature beginning to take shape. They act, in fact, upon identical elements...both reveal against the background of an uninterrupted fabric the possibility of a general analysis which makes possible the distribution of isolable identities and visible differences over a tabulated space and in an ordered sequence. But they cannot succeed in doing this without each other, and it is there that the communication between them occurs.\textsuperscript{198}
\end{quote}

Hence, just as Nietzsche highlights the interrelationality between ‘beautiful’ and ‘ugly,’ and ‘good’ and ‘evil,’\textsuperscript{199} Foucault underlines the relationality between man and nature. Arendt echoes this In The Human Condition, affirming that ‘things and men form the environment for each of man’s activities, which would be pointless without such location; yet this environment, the world into which we are born, would not exist without the human activity which produced it.’\textsuperscript{200} Such interrelationality and necessary interdependency between diverse (and often conflicting) concepts is mirrored in Tully’s Strange Multiplicity: Constitutionalism in an Age of Diversity whereby he states that ‘the strength of the constitutional fabric consists in the interweaving of different threads – a crazy quilt rather than a crazy house.’\textsuperscript{201} Through the metaphor of the quilt, then, Tully demonstrates how, in spite of their differences, diverse ‘threads’ - or cultures - work together. As in

\textsuperscript{198} Foucault, M. (1971), p. 337.
\textsuperscript{201} Tully, J (1995), p. 197.
Connolly’s work, then, Tully promotes necessary interdependency to highlight the importance of diverse others to society. Given the importance of difference and diversity, Foucault explicates that relationality requires us to focus on difference and Otherness:

Modern thought is one that moves no longer towards the ever-to-be-accomplished unveiling of the Same. Now such an unveiling is not accomplished without the simultaneous appearance of the Double, and that hiatus, miniscule and yet invincible, which resides in the “and” of retreat and return, of thought and the unthought, of the empirical and the transcendental, of what belongs to the order of positivity and what belongs to the order of foundations. 202

In this way, Foucault mirrors Nietzsche’s acknowledgement of the interdependency of concepts as a necessary feature of society in which all entities are interconnected.

As a result of the necessary links between these related concepts, morals and values, interdependency inevitably extends to the conduct of human beings. Connolly explains that, for Nietzsche, ‘humans are incomplete outside of social form.’ 203 Therefore, just as good is necessarily related to bad, one human is also dependent on various others. Arendt shares this assumption, stating that ‘no human life, not even the life of the hermit in nature’s wilderness, is possible without a world which directly or indirectly testifies to the presence of other human beings.’ 204 She claims that if we try to ignore the interdependency between us and other (either similar or different) humans, and attempt to live in isolation, then our life ‘is literally dead to the world; it has ceased to be a human life because it is no longer lived among men.’ 205 Tully reiterates this assumption in The Agonic Freedom of Citizens in which he equates participation in politics with becoming a citizen. 206 Thus, in addition to assuming interdependency as naturally emerging, Arendt,

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201 Ibid., p. 153.
200 Ibid., p. 157.
followed by Connolly and Tully, uses it as a tool to help cultivate relations between diverse citizens.

Schmitt also places emphasis on the necessity of diverse citizens to one another’s identities, however his friend/enemy philosophy discusses relationality in collective and binary terms, rather than understanding it as an entangled web of difference. Instead of seeking to blur the boundaries between oppositional identities, as Nietzsche and Foucault do, Schmitt values polarised positions. He states that politics ‘exists only when, at least potentially, one fighting collectivity of people confronts a similar collectivity.’ This is explained in Mouffe’s *The Return of the Political* in which she claims that ‘the condition of existence of every identity is the affirmation of a difference, the determination of an “other” that is going to play the role of a “constitutive outside.”’ Thus, for Schmitt, followed by Mouffe, the friend-enemy relationship, and thereby politics, can only occur if two collective state entities are present and define themselves in relation to each other. This echoes the emphasis Foucault, Nietzsche and Arendt place on the relationality of concepts. Hence, just as Nietzsche and Foucault emphasise the need to focus on difference, Schmitt’s politics also claims that the ‘other,’ enemy group is imperative to politics. However, for him, rather than highlighting their necessity to *one another*, he underlines their differences in order to enhance unity between one side in opposition to the other. Group unity thereby *requires* emphasis on the different other. He explains that ‘it would be a mistake to believe that a nation could eliminate the distinction of friend and enemy by declaring its friendship for the entire world,’ affirming that those who allege to have no enemies cannot be part of the political community and must exist only as private individuals. Instead of perceiving different identities as diverse but interconnected threads,

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209 Ibid., pp. 51-52.

210 Ibid., p. 51.
then, he perceives identities as necessarily oppositional and collective. Thus, to some extent, he echoes Nietzsche and Foucault’s calls for us to focus on difference and oppositions. However, he does this in order to create unity within one state against another, rather than blurring the boundaries in order to promote respect between all individuals.

Hence, Nietzsche, Foucault and Arendt all demonstrate the way in which concepts can only be understood in relation to other related concepts. Nietzsche then problematizes the dichotomy between ‘good’ and ‘bad’ morals by demonstrating how they often work together, and sometimes even produce one another. Similarly, Foucault and Arendt demonstrate how diverse – and sometimes oppositional or conflicting – entities can work together. Drawing on these assumptions, Nietzsche, and Arendt claim that humans are incomplete outside of social form, and are thereby necessarily interdependent to one another. Schmitt supports this assumption, but employs it in a collective manner whereby one group identity can only be defined in relation to another group. He states that politics requires conflicting others, and those who only have similar ‘friends’ cannot be part of the political community.

**Conclusion**

In sum then, the four thinkers endorse political contestation, contingent politics and the necessary interdependency of citizens. However, this is employed in distinct ways throughout their work, particularly in Schmitt’s state-focused, oppositional, collective account. In discussing political contestation, they renegotiate the dichotomy between public and private, problematise universality, rationality and neutrality, offer more situated, citizen-centred accounts of politics, and advocate contestation. Political contestation provides a tool for reviving the political, giving meaning to politics, challenging hegemony, and exposing domination. Such attempts at overcoming domination are also evident in the thinkers’ endorsement of contingency, which emphasise the need for contestable, open-ended institutions. In advocating this principle, the four thinkers reject universalism and truth, suggesting that claims to
truth are expressions of power, which subsequently need to be critiqued and challenged. They demonstrate how contingency can prevent domination and encourage new lines of thinking to emerge. They also promote necessary interdependency by highlighting our understanding of concepts as relational, and, for Arendt, Foucault and Nietzsche, showing how interrelated citizens work together, enabling each other’s existence and rendering one another incomplete outside of their society. For Schmitt, interdependency takes on a collective form whereby opposing groups define themselves in relation to one another, whereas for the others, interdependency resembles more of an entangled web of individuals. I will demonstrate the significance of political contestation, contingency and necessary interdependency throughout this thesis, since they emerge in the work of contemporary agonist thinkers, resonate - to varying degrees - with new institutionalist literature and provide the basis for analysing a range of agonistic approaches and their operationalisation.
Chapter Two - Three Approaches to Agonistic Democracy

Exploring how contemporary agonists employ the three themes of political contestation, necessary interdependency and contingency to different ends, this chapter outlines three agonistic approaches: the ‘perfectionist,’ the ‘adversarial,’ and the ‘inclusive.’ Owen represents perfectionist agonism, with Mouffe representing adversarial agonism, and both Connolly and Tully representing inclusive agonism.\(^{211}\) Just as, in the previous chapter, Schmitt sat less comfortably alongside the other thinkers, Mouffe’s adversarial approach ‘represents something of an outlier’\(^{212}\) when compared to the other approaches. Whilst these thinkers are not exhaustive of the agonist tradition, I focus on their work because of the impact it has had on the rest of the field\(^{213}\) and because of its relevance to democratic theories of conflict mediation. However, other post-structuralists working within the agonist field, such as Andrew Schaap and David Howarth, are significant to my project and enrich my insights into these thinkers. I should also note that, although I discuss Connolly and Tully together, as representatives of the inclusive approach, I do not seek to conflate their work. This chapter highlights, for instance, how Connolly focuses on preventing re-sentiment, whereas Tully focuses on overcoming domination. However, they exhibit important similarities which both fall into an inclusive understanding of agonistic democracy. Given the significance of both thinkers to institutional discussions within agonistic democracy, consideration of both of their work is necessary. Taking each approach in turn, the chapter discusses ways in which each thinker employs the three themes of political contestation, necessary interdependency, and contingency.

Perfectionist Agonistic Democracy:

The aims of Owen’s agonism differ greatly from those of either Mouffe’s, or Connolly and Tully’s. Rather than focusing on political

\(^{211}\) Just as Chapter One demonstrated the ways in which Schmitt differed from the other thinkers, this chapter shows how Mouffe differs significantly from contemporary agonists.


contestation as a means to reviving politics or rendering it more inclusive, Owen’s approach offers us a perfectionist account of agonism in which political contestation is seen as essential to the continual improvement of virtues. Assuming that each belief is perspectival and situated, he endorses a competitive public arena in which citizens enhance their own virtues by striving to surpass one another. As a result, individual capacities are strengthened, and society is bettered.

Owen’s perfectionist agonism assumes that society is characterised by ‘a plurality of conflicting conceptions of the good,’ and that each of these conceptions is ‘the product of a complex history of the entwinement of judgement and agency in the life of a community.’ On this view, the range of societal beliefs emerges out of our diverse interactions with the world, rendering our perspectives necessarily ‘embodied.’ Owen thereby rejects Kant’s categorical imperative for assuming the existence of universal morals:

I cannot reasonably demand (as Kant’s categorical imperative would have us do) that all persons should act in the way that I acted because other people may be committed to different evaluations (i.e., have different characters) which they experience as necessity under the aegis of eternal recurrence.

Rather, Owen acknowledges the situated nature of perspectives, claiming that ‘there can be no determinate judgement as to how, for example, education is to be best conducted; such judgements are necessarily perspectival.’ This assumption that each belief is necessarily perspectival resonates with the way in which Mouffe, Connolly and Tully promote contingency over universalism. However, it leads Owen to a distinct conclusion about which form agonistic democracy should take.

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215 Ibid., p. 138.
216 Ibid., p. 116.
217 Ibid., p. 139.
Owen promotes political contestation as a means to enhancing both the individual and society. For him, this entails collective consideration of which cultural practices and virtues should be cultivated and which should be discouraged (i.e. what should we do?) as well as related questions such as the degree to which we, as a public should collectively facilitate or hinder particular cultural practices.\footnote{Ibid., p. 145.} In promoting the contestation of such questions, Owen draws on Nietzsche’s concept of eternal recurrence. In *Nietzsche, Politics and Modernity*, Owen discusses eternal recurrence at length, demonstrating its meaning and significance in various contexts,\footnote{Ibid., p. 113.} yet for the purpose of considering Owen’s perfectionist agonism, I focus on its function as an ethical imperative which tells us to ‘act always according to that maxim which you can at the same time will as eternally recurring.’\footnote{Ibid., p. 113.} This aspect of eternal recurrence is of particular significance to Owen’s account of political contestation since it links to his concepts of self-mastery and integrity (as I will now demonstrate). Thus, in requiring citizens to act according to principles that they will continue to advocate, Owen’s primary question to those engaged in political contestation surrounding their perspectives is ‘do you desire this once more and innumerable times more?’\footnote{Ibid., p. 113.} Owen claims that citizens gain nobility (or self-mastery) when they strive toward eternal recurrence during engagement with others. He states that ‘it is apparent that one exhibits one’s nobility (self-mastery) 	extit{publicly} by acting in accordance with the commitments one espouses.’\footnote{Ibid., p. 118.} Owen then demonstrates how self-mastery encompasses two concepts of integrity: personal and ethical. He explains that we ‘use “personal integrity” to refer to someone’s life possessing a coherence and “ethical integrity” to refer to someone’s life exhibiting a coherence in terms of his or her substantive ethical commitments.’\footnote{Ibid., p. 117.} As a result, political contestation provides a platform for citizens to develop integrity through publicly affirming ethical
consistency and a coherent value set. As Owen explains, self-mastery requires integrity since 'one's capacity to keep promises to oneself is dependent on one’s mastery of one’s self at this time and is also the ethical work one does on oneself to develop one’s capacity for self-mastery.'

He affirms that forming such personal ethical commitments involves considering oneself, not just as an individual, but also as a member of a community. Linking this to concepts of shame and honour, he states that 'as a member of humanity I am accountable for the actions of humanity because these actions are also constitutive of what I am.'

This holds, not just for present and future actions, but also refers to how one relates to the past. Owen thus promotes political contestation as a means of redemption in which the shame of the past motivates citizens to strive towards a better society:

Nietzsche’s point is that rather than being consumed and, perhaps, paralysed by the remorse (nausea and pity) which attends our shame at humanity by committing such genocidal atrocities, we must struggle to redeem humanity by reflecting on such events in order to motivate us both to act with nobility ourselves and concomitantly, to pursue the goal of a humanity characterised by nobility (in which such expressions of ressentiment are impossible).

As a consequence of this need to redeem ourselves of the past, Owen states that the principle of eternal recurrence is 'a public activity in the sense of being subject to public criteria and exhibited through the consonance of actions and commitments, and as such is subject to public testing.'

Thus, Owen asserts that to argue for the eternal recurrence of a perspective is to claim that it represents 'the maximal expression of the virtues which characterise the practice in which the actor is engaged.' In so doing, Owen demonstrates how citizens gain integrity and self-mastery by 'testing these perspectives against each other in coming to an honest judgment concerning the degree to

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224 Ibid., p. 117.
225 Ibid., p. 119.
226 Ibid., pp. 118-119.
227 Ibid., p. 119.
228 Ibid., p 143.
which they satisfy the interests (exhibits the virtues) of the practice.\textsuperscript{229}

In addition to enhancing the capacities of citizens, such contestation also aims to better society. As Fossen states, ‘the aim [of self-mastery] is not only the achievement of greater excellence according to some specific measure, but to set a new measure of excellence to overcome the old.’\textsuperscript{230} In this way, integrity and self-mastery enhance society by continually challenging norms.

In an attempt at further encouraging a better society through the virtues of self-mastery and integrity, Owen employs the Nietzschean notion of competition. On this account, citizens ensure the well-being of the state by striving to surpass one another. Owen states that ‘the public culture of Greek society cultivated human powers through an institutionalised ethos of contestation in which citizens strove to surpass each other and, ultimately, to set new standards of nobility.’\textsuperscript{231} He demonstrates how citizens will gain more authority if they are seen to both exhibit integrity and gather support for their perspectives:

\begin{quote}
While Nietzsche’s position seems to entail equal access to the arena of political debate, the authority of a citizen’s voice within this arena of contest will depend on both the degree to which the citizen is publicly recognised as recommending a substantive doctrine (the question of integrity) and the degree to which the recommendation of this substantive doctrine can generate public support (the question of truth).\textsuperscript{232}
\end{quote}

Owen affirms that political contestation enhances society, not only through the development of self-mastery and integrity, but also through competition, which encourages citizens to surpass the capacities of others in order for their voice to be heard.

\begin{footnotes}
\item[229] Ibid., p. 143.
\item[232] Ibid., p. 161.
\end{footnotes}
In addition to rejecting universalism in favour of contingency (through the concept of perspectivism), and promoting a political contestation seeking to enhance citizens and society, Owen also employs the notion of necessary interdependency. Influenced by Nietzsche’s valorisation of nobility, he endorses this political contestation as the optimum expression of humanity:

Politics is revealed on this civic humanist account as the highest form of human activity, the privileged locus of the good life, since it is the arena of politics that we are concerned with the character of nobility in arguing about which virtues and values should be communally cultivated.233

In entering this contestation, he calls on us to adopt an “enlarged mentality” (to borrow Hannah Arendt’s use of Kant’s phrase), that is, our capacity to entertain a plurality of competing perspectives within the process of coming to a judgement.234 Thus, we are expected to tolerate the diversity of plural perspectives in society. Owen argues that, unlike Connolly’s agonistic respect and Tully’s mutual recognition, ‘one does not tolerate the views of others because this is the condition of reciprocal toleration of our views by them, one tolerates the views of others because this toleration is the condition of one’s own integrity.’235 As a result of protecting our integrity, Owen asserts that the virtues of truthfulness, or honesty, and justice will be further cultivated through the principle of toleration. He affirms that ‘precisely because one’s integrity is tied to tolerance, this position commits citizens to a form of society which is characterised by the cultivation of the conditions of honest and just argument between free and equal citizens.’236 Thus, Owen argues that through the competitive process of ranking our perspectives against one another’s, and in tolerating others as a result, the virtues of truthfulness and justice are cultivated.

233 Ibid., p. 160.
234 Ibid., p. 142.
235 Ibid., pp. 161-162.
236 Ibid., p. 162.
For Owen, truthfulness and justice are vital to the unity of a diverse society since these ‘are the prerequisites for reconciling contestation and community in a sense of solidarity, of being engaged in a common quest.’\textsuperscript{237} As a result, Owen’s aims of a perfectionist agonism are twofold: first, he employs Nietzsche’s notion of competition ‘striving for distinction and excellence in social practices, for ever greater words and deeds,’\textsuperscript{238} and second, he aspires to bring society together, not through shared values, but through a shared process of virtue cultivation. He illustrates this aim by demonstrating how his theory attempts to ‘cultivate the virtues appropriate to political argument rather than attempting to elide such argument; it views social co-operation as predicated on a common quest rather than a common agreement.’\textsuperscript{239}

Owen’s perfectionist theory of agonistic democracy thus seeks to improve society through a competitive process of contestation. It assumes that all beliefs are perspectival and formed through an individual’s interactions with their community. As a result, it promotes continual engagement with the community in order to enable citizens to fulfil their capacities for integrity and self-mastery. It advocates a competitive style of engagement to motivate citizens to surpass one another, thereby improving individual virtues and bettering society through the process.

**Adversarial Agonistic Democracy**

Mouffe’s adversarial approach offers us an account of agonistic democracy, which focuses upon reviving democracy through the creation of contending identities. According to Mouffe, citizens become apathetic when there is an excess of consensus, turning to extremist ideologies when they are lacking a range of clearly distinct identities to which they can relate. She thus refutes attempts at eradicating conflict through universalism or rationalism, insisting instead upon the importance of continual conflict for the preservation of democracy. For

\textsuperscript{237} Ibid., p. 146.
Mouffe, this conflict is achieved through the creation of contending positions with which people identify, enabling us to distinguish ‘us’ (the friend) from ‘them’ (the enemy). She argues that it is the existence of this friend/enemy divide, which encourages a collective identity to develop amongst friends, thereby promoting unity. The aim is subsequently to transform the enemy into an adversary, which entails acknowledging the legitimacy and worthiness of one’s opponent whilst continuing to argue against them. In so doing, Mouffe aspires to ‘transform antagonism into agonism.’

This adversarial theory of agonistic democracy differs from those of Tully, Connolly and Owen as it places primary emphasis on creating a distinction between contending collective identities in order to offer citizens positions with which they can identify.

Mouffe’s understanding of political apathy is of great significance to her agonistic approach as it outlines her view of both the problematic nature of the current political arena of political contestation, and the potential danger it poses. Like Schmitt, Mouffe condemns the depoliticisation of liberal democracy. In *The Return of the Political* she informs us that ‘it is indeed the political which is at stake here, and the possibility of its elimination.’ Mouffe attributes two principal reasons for such depoliticisation: ‘the current blurring of political frontiers between left and right’ and ‘an apparent excess of consensus.’ Of the former, she explains that when a clear boundary between political identities is lacking, citizens are unable to strongly identify with a given collective identity. As a result of this, Mouffe illustrates two potential problems which signify that ‘the blurring of the frontiers between left and right, far from being an advance in a democratic direction, is jeopardizing the future of democracy.’

First, she affirms that, when citizens are unable to identify with any one political position, a lack of collective

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242 Ibid., p. 5.
243 Ibid., p. 6.
244 Ibid., p. 5.
identity arises, threatening political unity. Mouffe states that ‘this in turn fosters disaffection towards political parties and discourages participation in the political process.’ Thus, according to adversarialism, democracy is threatened when its citizens are not provided with clearly distinct political positions with which to identify. As a result, hostility arises toward political parties, and political contestation – and thereby democracy - is hindered.

In addition to decline in political participation, Mouffe suggests another threat to democracy that stems from the blurring of political boundaries: extremism. She explains that this occurs when citizens lack unity through a collective political identity, and thereby seek alternative collective identities, such as ethnic, religious or nationalistic. According to Mouffe, ‘if [a vibrant clash of political positions and an open conflict of interests are] missing, it can too easily be replaced by a confrontation between non-negotiable moral values and essentialist identities.’ In order to overcome this, Mouffe suggests the creation of ‘diverse conceptions of citizenship which correspond to the different interpretations of the ethico-political principles: liberal-conservative, social-democratic, neo-liberal, radical-democratic, and so on.’ Thus, for Mouffe, forming collective political identities is essential to reviving democracy by enhancing unity - and thereby democratic participation – and preventing identification with extremist parties.

In addition to the dangers of blurring political boundaries, Mouffe also discusses the dangers, which arise from an excess of consensus. She explains that this excess arises out of the mistaken belief by both democratic theorists and politicians that conflict can be eradicated, and that consensus ought to be achieved. However, for Mouffe, aspiring towards an all-inclusive consensus leads to a democratic deficit. Importantly though, her adversarialism differs from the other

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247 Ibid., p. 5.
248 Ibid., p. 6.
249 Ibid., p. 104.
approaches, since she does not altogether reject aspirations of arriving at a consensus. Instead of abandoning the ideal of consensus, she calls on society to acknowledge the power relations inherent in consensus, affirming that ‘every consensus exists as a temporary result of a provisional hegemony, as a stabilization of power, and...it always entails some form of exclusion.’\textsuperscript{251} For Mouffe, democracy is enhanced, not through denying these power relations and exclusions, but rather in acknowledging and challenging them:

By constantly challenging the relations of inclusion-exclusion implied by the political constitution of "the people" – required by the exercise of democracy – the liberal discourse of universal human rights plays an important role in maintaining the democratic contestation alive.\textsuperscript{252}

On the contrary, if we fail to challenge these power relations and exclusions, then, rather than keeping the democratic process alive, ‘too much emphasis on consensus and the refusal of confrontation lead to apathy and disaffection with political participation.’\textsuperscript{253} Hence, Mouffe highlights the importance of acknowledging that any consensus – including those surrounding liberal-democratic institutions – is exclusionary. This additionally prevents apathy by emphasising the need to fight for a given consensus or institution in order to preserve its very existence. Providing us with an example of this Mouffe states that ‘liberal-democratic institutions should not be taken for granted: it is always necessary to fortify and defend them.’\textsuperscript{254} This fortification and defence is rendered essential when we acknowledge that the consensus surrounding them is partial. Mouffe asserts that it is our awareness of the impossibility of achieving a full consensus that ‘forces us to keep the democratic contestation alive.’\textsuperscript{255}

\textsuperscript{251} Ibid., p. 104.
\textsuperscript{252} Ibid., p. 10.
\textsuperscript{253} Ibid., p. 104.
\textsuperscript{254} Ibid., p. 4.
\textsuperscript{255} Ibid., p. 105.
Hence, Mouffe argues that, not only do the blurring of political boundaries lead to apathy, but so does an excess of consensus. Both of these factors can cause a depoliticisation of society, on the one hand, by posing a barrier to political participation and encouraging identification with religious, ethnic, or nationalistic extremism; and on the other, by encouraging hostility toward political institutions. For the former, Mouffe’s theory calls for a distinct range of political identities with which citizens can identify. For the latter, Mouffe requires acknowledgment that every consensus is exclusionary, and subsequently the continual challenging of each consensus. In order to provide citizens with a choice of distinct set of political identities, and to enable continual challenge, Mouffe adopts an agonistic approach that differentiates between friends, enemies, and adversaries.

Drawing on Schmitt, and echoing Owen, Mouffe also abandons universalism in her theory of agonistic democracy, advocating instead the principle of contingency. Just as Owen claims that perspectives are always situated, Mouffe asserts that ‘we have to break with rationalism, individualism and universalism,’ and acknowledge that all consensuses are ‘necessarily plural, discursively constructed and entangled with power relations.’ She insists that conflict, or antagonism, is inevitable in diverse societies, and thereby condemns rationalists who ‘instead of acknowledging the ineradicability of this tension, try to find ways of eliminating it.’ Employing Rawls’ approach to justice as an example of rationalism, Mouffe argues that such a view ‘leads to the closing of the gap between justice and law that is a constitutive space of modern democracy.’ Democracy is therefore suppressed when political contestation (in this case, of justice) is eradicated. She also demonstrates how such rationalism suppresses pluralism by rendering the dominant institutions incontestable. She affirms that ‘to present the institutions of liberal democracy as the

\[257\] Ibid., p. 7.
\[259\] Ibid., p. 32.
\[260\] Ibid., p. 32.
outcome of a pure deliberative rationality is to reify them and make them impossible to transform.\textsuperscript{261} As a result, Mouffe explains that ‘all forms of pluralism that depend on a logic of the social that implies the idea of “being as presence” and see “objectivity” as belonging to the “things themselves” necessarily lead to the reduction of plurality and to its ultimate negation.’\textsuperscript{262} This is because if we claim the dominant ideals to be ‘objective,’ then it renders them incontestable by diverse others. As a result, pluralism is unsustainable because it cannot exist alongside the dominant ideals. This echoes Schmitt’s concern that if a given group in society hijack the term ‘humanity’ to justify their ideals, then it renders the opposing side ‘inhumane’ and thereby negates diversity.

Hence, Mouffe advocates the principle of contingency, stating that ‘the frontier that [a liberal democratic consensus] establishes between what is and what is not legitimate is a political one, and for that reason must remain contestable.’\textsuperscript{263} She states that the fact that this process is an unending quest should not be a cause for concern because it ensures that the democratic contestation is kept alive.\textsuperscript{264} This thereby allows for a diversity of views to promote their legitimacy, subsequently overcoming the suppression and negation of pluralism. In this way, rather than eradicating difference, ‘democratic politics requires us to bring [traces of power and exclusion] to the fore, to make them visible so that they can enter the terrain of contestation.’\textsuperscript{265}

Echoing Schmitt, once again, Mouffe states that collective identities ‘are ensembles whose configurations are always something more than the addition of their internal elements.’\textsuperscript{266} She explains that ‘collective identities can only be established on the mode of an us/them.’\textsuperscript{267} This resonates with Sigmund Freud’s claim that ‘it is always possible to bind

\begin{itemize}
  \item \textsuperscript{261} \textit{Ibid.}, p. 32.
  \item \textsuperscript{262} \textit{Ibid.}, p. 19.
  \item \textsuperscript{263} \textit{Ibid.}, p. 49.
  \item \textsuperscript{264} \textit{Ibid.}, p. 33.
  \item \textsuperscript{265} \textit{Ibid.}, p. 34.
  \item \textsuperscript{266} \textit{Ibid.}, p. 10.
  \item \textsuperscript{267} \textit{Ibid.}, p. 13.
\end{itemize}
together a considerable amount of people in love, so long as there are other people left over to receive the manifestation of their aggressiveness. Therefore, without the ‘them,’ or the ‘constitutive outside,’ no ‘us’ could exist. Additionally, Mouffe affirms that this interrelationality is neither static, nor permanent, but that each contending identity continually affects the other. Mouffe argues that ‘in order to avoid any misunderstanding, let me point out that the “constitutive outside” is not simply the outside of a concrete content but something which puts into question “concreteness” as such.’ This notion of identity thereby leaves Mouffe with two conclusions regarding her theory of agonistic democracy: first, that if each identity cannot exist without its contending other, then no identity can claim to be a totality; and second, that if each identity is continually shaped and reshaped by an incommensurable other, then conflict and antagonism are ineradicable.

This notion of interlinked identity leads Mouffe to adopt an adversarial approach to agonistic democracy. Such an approach entails dividing society into friends, enemies, and adversaries. Employing the notion of ‘enemy’ to label those who are excluded from the political arena, Mouffe is clear that her position is distinct from ‘the type of extreme pluralism that emphasizes heterogeneity and incommensurability and according to which pluralism – understood as valorization of all differences – should have no limits.’ This, again, separates her from alternative agonistic approaches. Connolly, for instance, has been criticised for failing to sufficiently consider fundamentalism. By contrast, Mouffe argues that ‘limits to pluralism...are required by a democratic politics that aims at challenging a wide range of relations of subordination.’

She explains this by stating that total pluralism makes us blind to the construction of relations of subordination, thereby rendering us unable...
to challenge them. Moreover, she argues that, if we do not define an enemy to be excluded, then we cannot create a collective unity to challenge that enemy, and thus depoliticisation occurs. As a result, the agonistic contest between ‘us’ and ‘them’ refers, not to that which takes place between the friend and the enemy, but to that of the friend and the adversary. Mouffe demonstrates, then, that the struggle between the friend and the adversary occurs within a shared political space. She asserts that ‘in the case of liberal-democratic politics this frontier is an internal one, and the “them” is not a permanent outsider.’ This is in direct contrast to the enemy who is an outsider (however, this outsider status is not permanent since Mouffe affirms that what is and is not legitimate is to be continually challenged).

In distinguishing between the enemy and the adversary Mouffe also distinguishes between antagonism and agonism. She states that the former ‘takes place between enemies, that is, persons who have no common symbolic space,’ whereas the latter ‘involves...persons who are friends because they share a common symbolic space but also enemies because they want to organize this common symbolic space in a different way.’ Mouffe explicates this further in On The Political by defining ‘legitimate conflict.’ She asserts that legitimate conflict entails preservation of the political association. For this to occur, Mouffe argues that somehow a common bond must exist between the contending parties in order to prevent them from perceiving the other as an illegitimate enemy to be destroyed. This is significant because, by assuming that legitimacy is derived from common values, it renders adversarialism distinct from both perfectionism and inclusivism. Owen rejects the possibility of sharing allegiance to a set of values, arguing instead that cooperation arises from participation in a common quest.

Similarly, for Connolly, agonistic politics does not entail establishing

\[\text{274} \text{ Ibid., p. 20.}\]
\[\text{275} \text{ Ibid., p. 20.}\]
\[\text{276} \text{ Ibid., p. 56.}\]
\[\text{277} \text{ Ibid., p. 13.}\]
\[\text{278} \text{ Ibid., p. 13.}\]
common values, but rather ‘negotiat[ing] oblique connections across multiple lines of difference,’\textsuperscript{281} and for Tully, a sense of belonging comes from interdependency between different sets of values: ‘the strength of the constitutional fabric consists in the interweaving of different threads – a crazy quilt rather than a crazy house.’\textsuperscript{282} However, for Mouffe, we must perceive the adversary as ‘a legitimate enemy, one with whom we have some common ground because we have a shared adhesion to the ethico-political principles of liberal democracy: liberty and equality.’\textsuperscript{283} Therefore, in spite of our ongoing disagreement with the adversary, we perceive them as legitimate because we share their framework of values. In order to transform antagonistic relationships into agonistic ones – or enemies into adversaries - then, ‘modern democracy’s specificity lies in the recognition and legitimation of conflict and the refusal to suppress it by imposing an authoritarian order.’\textsuperscript{284}

Mouffe’s approach to agonistic democracy offers us a very different theory, emphasising the importance of continual conflict between legitimate adversaries within a shared framework of values. Her approach condemns the blurring of political boundaries and emphasis on consensus. Arguing that this leads to the depoliticisation of society, Mouffe calls for a range of clearly distinguishable collective identities in order to help revive democracy through vibrant debate within a shared framework of ethico-political values. Rather than seeing conflict as something to be eradicated, Mouffe perceives it, not only as inevitable, but also as essential to ensuring democratic engagement. Mouffe’s central thesis is that democracy should aspire to transform antagonism, or ‘enemies,’ into agonism, or ‘adversaries.’

**Inclusive Agonistic Democracy**

It is my contention that Connolly and Tully can be separated from Owen and Mouffe as they promote inclusive approaches which strive toward

\textsuperscript{284} Ibid., p. 103.
engaging a wider diversity of citizens in democratic participation.\textsuperscript{285} Connolly concentrates on ensuring that ‘ressentiment’ does not seep into the inner core of our being, dividing us too profoundly against ourselves, and encouraging us to search too actively for collective enemies,\textsuperscript{286} whilst Tully seeks to ensure that practices of governance ‘do not become closed structures of domination under settled forms of justice’.\textsuperscript{287} Yet in spite of offering two different angles, they have been coupled together because of their focus on inclusivity. Both thinkers converge on emphasising the interdependency of all citizens in society in which each gives meaning to another. As a result, both suggest more inclusive forms of political contestation, such as Connolly’s ethos of pluralization and Tully’s advocation of grass-roots politics. In promoting necessary interdependency, Connolly’s agonistic respect resonates with Tully’s mutual recognition, whereby both challenge the power relations between majority and minority groups. Similarly, agonistic respect and audi alteram partem share goals of critique and self-modification in encouraging future pluralisation. The focus of these concepts diverges, with Connolly striving to enhance interactions between citizens, and Tully aiming to overcome domination. However, both of them ultimately adopt these concepts in an attempt at rendering democratic politics more inclusive. Both thinkers also endorse contestability as a means to ensuring inclusivity through contingency. For Tully, contestability enables domination to be exposed and challenged, and for Connolly, it enables citizens to express doubts – and subsequently generosity and forbearance – about their positions.

First, the emphasis which Connolly and Tully place on inclusivity is evident through the way in which they perceive identity relations in political contestation. Following Nietzsche and Foucault, both thinkers discuss the importance of other identities to consolidating one’s own.

\textsuperscript{285} It is important to note that the label ‘inclusive’ is derived from my interpretation of their work, and not how they refer to their own approaches. The chapter suggests that Connolly’s approach renders democracy more inclusive by promoting the overcoming of ressentiment as does Tully’s through the overcoming of domination.


For instance, Connolly states that his personal identity ‘is further specified by comparison to a variety of the thing I am not.’ This thereby highlights the necessity of diverse others in enabling and enriching the meaning of a given entity. Connolly’s emphasis, here, on the importance of pluralism to any single entity resonates with Foucault’s discussion of the Las Meninas painting that was highlighted in the previous chapter. Tully attaches similar importance to the role of diverse identities in forming one’s own. Echoing Nietzsche and Arendt, he affirms that one cannot be a citizen without engagement with others, stating that citizenship is ‘not a status given by the institutions of the modern constitutional state and international law, but negotiated practices in which one becomes a citizen through participation.’ Thus, just as Nietzsche claims that humans are incomplete when isolated from others and Arendt states that one’s humanity arises through publicly appearing to others, Tully asserts that engagement with others is vital to acquiring citizenship. Hence, both Connolly and Tully agree that diversity constitutes a necessary component of political contestation by enabling people to consolidate their identities as citizens.

Although both thinkers promote inclusivity by emphasising the need for diversity and pluralism, they do so to achieve different ends. For Tully, the primary aim of promoting diversity and inclusivity is to overcome domination, whereas for Connolly, it is to enhance relations between conflicting citizens. Tully endorses the notion of ‘rule by and of the people’, which seeks to overcome domination by requiring ‘that citizens have a participatory say over the laws to which they are subject.’ Employing the example of EU negotiations, Tully asserts that citizens ought to be involved in the process of norm formulation, rather than simply voting on pre-drafted positions. He argues that this would render democracy more inclusive by ensuring citizens’ voices were heard.

In supporting a more inclusive politics which aims to overcome domination, Tully also advocates grass-roots politics, involving the comparing and contrasting of local languages and practices; critical dialogues between diverse citizens; continual negotiation of pre-existing norms; interplay and interaction with the governed; questioning and challenging power relationships; negotiating or transforming modifications; implementing changes; reviewing these changes; and reopening negotiations. He emphasises these as mechanisms by which more voices can be heard, thereby overcoming domination and promoting a more inclusive approach to agonistic democracy. Connolly similarly promotes a more inclusive politics whereby citizens engage in an ethos of pluralization in which ‘alternative perspectives support space for each other to exist through the agonistic respect they practice toward one another.

Through this ethos - which will be discussed in more depth in the following ‘necessary interdependency’ section - Connolly strives to prevent *ressentiment* by enhancing respectful conflict, rendering democratic politics more inclusive as a result. Although Connolly focuses predominantly on behavioural aspects of this ethos (something which the following chapter will discuss), Owen suggests that the following practices would be compatible with Connolly’s theory: participatory budgeting, citizens assemblies and juries, PR voting and preferenda. These practices strive to encourage a diversity of citizens to engage with conflicting others, providing opportunities to practice agonistic respect.

Both Connolly and Tully highlight the importance of interdependent identities in rendering political contestation more inclusive, agreeing that one’s political significance is reliant upon engagement with diverse

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291 Ibid., p. 227.
292 Ibid., p. 227.
others. Yet, in promoting a more inclusive politics, their aims diverge slightly: for Connolly, the primary purpose is to prevent *ressentiment* between conflicting citizens, whereas for Tully, the overarching goal is to overcome domination. In striving toward these goals, both thinkers promote practices that enable wider participation of everyday citizens. This is evident, for instance, in Connolly’s notion of agonistic respect. Comparing agonistic respect to liberal toleration, Connolly states that ‘liberal tolerance is bestowed upon private minorities by a putative majority occupying the authoritative, public center.’295 Highlighting the dangers of this, he argues that ‘you may have noticed that people seldom enjoy being tolerated that much.’296 Thus, Connolly favours agonistic respect, instead, for its attempts at ‘affirming a more ambiguous relation of interdependence and strife between identities over a passing letting the other be.’297 He suggests that agonistic respect can challenge *ressentiment* by ‘negotiat[ing] oblique connections across multiple lines of difference, negotiating agonistic respect between constituencies who embrace different final faiths and do not comprehend each other all that well.’298 Hence, by acknowledging the mutual nature of interdependency and promoting a web of respect, agonistic respect strives to challenge feelings of *ressentiment* between conflicting citizens. In so doing, it constitutes an attempt at overcoming the suppression of minority identities by challenging the taken-for-granted nature of majority identities, thereby enhancing possibilities for greater inclusion.

This challenging of identity relations resonates with Tully’s concept of mutual recognition, which aims to avoid the temptation to formally recognise another’s culture or way of life ‘as something already familiar to us and in terms drawn from our own traditions and forms of thought... Rather, recognition involves acknowledging [someone] in [their] own

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296 Ibid., p. 123.
terms and traditions as [they] want to be and as [they] speak to us.¹²⁹⁹ Tully demonstrates this notion, termed ‘mutual recognition,’ through Bill Reid’s sculpture of a canoe, *The Spirit of the Haida Gwaii*, explaining that we are unable to see it as a single entity, and therefore must perceive it from each of the angles of the individual passengers. The sculpture symbolises mutual recognition, encouraging us to see ‘as if we are being asked to see and hear them for the first time,’³⁰⁰ subsequently requiring us to suspend our prior understandings and assumptions. In promoting mutual recognition, Tully seeks to prevent the majority from imposing their interpretations on minority groups, thereby providing a further attempt at enhancing inclusivity by overcoming domination. Again, the fundamental goal of this is to enhance inclusivity through challenging domination, preventing minorities from being ‘silenced or [being] recognised and constrained to speak within the institutions and traditions of interpretation of the imperial constitutions that have been imposed over them.’³⁰¹ Just as Connolly rejects the assumption that interdependency is a one-way street in which a dominant majority tolerates an inferior minority, Tully rejects understanding as something, which a majority culture imposes on a minority culture. Thus, both thinkers strive to render politics more inclusive by preventing majority groups from dominating minority ones. For Connolly, emphasis is on improving interactions between citizens, whereas for Tully, the focus is on enabling more voices to be heard.

Both thinkers extend these ideas into mechanisms of critique and challenge, creating possibilities for the challenging of future dominant norms; something termed by Connolly as ‘pluralisation’. For Tully, this is through the notion of *audi alteram partem*, and for Connolly, this is through the notion of critical responsiveness. *Audi alteram partem*, offering an additional means of overcoming domination, encourages us to approach with ‘a willingness to listen to its culturally diverse spirits.’³⁰²

²⁹⁹ Ibid., p. 23.
³⁰⁰ Ibid., p. 23.
³⁰¹ Ibid., p. 24.
³⁰² Ibid., p. 23.
Listening to others is of great significance to Tully, who deems it to be ‘the first and perhaps only universalisable principle of democratic deliberation.’\textsuperscript{303} He stresses that this is of particular significance for those who ‘are silenced or misrepresented by the official rules or by the most powerful critics.’\textsuperscript{304} Thus, for Tully, \textit{audi alteram partem} is important in encouraging a more inclusive society by preventing minority groups from being marginalised. It also encourages norms to be challenged and reformulated since ‘this difficult form of critical multilogue enables the participants to see the limited and partial character of their self-understandings; to begin to move around to a broader view of the relevant considerations; and so open the possibility of reaching a fair judgment.’\textsuperscript{305} In \textit{Strange Multiplicity: Constitutionalism in an Age of Diversity}, Tully echoes these calls to challenge and modify norms through the symbol of Xuuya, a raven who continuously changes his identity. Using this metaphor, he demonstrates that ‘our habitual forms of recognition are often stultifying forms of misrecognition which need to be upset and reversed from time to time.’\textsuperscript{306} Thus, Tully advocates challenge and critique in order to overcome domination and promote inclusivity in both the present and future. He calls on citizens to adopt a ‘further enhance a critical attitude to one’s own culture and a tolerant and critical attitude towards others.’\textsuperscript{307}

Tully’s endorsement of challenge as a means to promoting future inclusivity resounds heavily in Connolly’s critical responsiveness. Critical responsiveness asks us to adopt a more open attitude towards others, in order to ‘render yourself better able to listen to new and surprising movements in the politics of becoming without encasing them immediately in preset judgments that sanctify the universality or naturalness of what you already are.’\textsuperscript{308} This echoes Tully’s calls for us to approach different cultures (including our own) with a critical attitude.

\textsuperscript{303} Tully, J. (2008b), p. 110.
\textsuperscript{304} Tully, J. (2008a), p. 170.
\textsuperscript{305} Ibid., p. 85.
\textsuperscript{307} Ibid., p. 207.
\textsuperscript{308} Ibid., p. 146.
in order to enable future pluralisation. Just as Tully states that *audi alteram partem* is essential to acknowledging the limitedness and partiality of our ideas, Connolly believes self-modification is essential to ‘shak[ing] up something in the established world… Propell[ing] a fork in political time, throw[ing] a wrench into the established code of obligation, goodness, identity, justice, right, or legitimacy.’

Thus, both thinkers deem it necessary to disturb current thinking through *audi alteram partem* and critical responsiveness. Yet, once again, whereas Tully promotes self-modification as a means of overcoming domination, for Connolly, the emphasis is upon preventing *ressentiment*:

> To cultivate critical responsiveness to a new movement in the politics of becoming is at once to work tactically on gut feelings already sedimented into you, to readdress refined concepts previously brought to these issues, and to work on the circuits through which the former connect to the latter.\(^{310}\)

Hence, both Connolly and Tully employ inclusive approaches to necessary interdependency through endorsement of agonistic respect and mutual recognition. These principles enable greater inclusivity by promoting respectful relations between conflicting citizens and asking citizens to recognise one another in their own terms. They also encourage future drives of pluralisation by encouraging self-modification through *audi alteram partem* and critical responsiveness, which ask citizens to listen to others (particularly those who are marginalised), and to be more open to diversity. Again, both thinkers promote inclusivity, but on Connolly’s account it aims to improve interactions between conflicting citizens, whereas for Tully it seeks to prevent the domination of minority citizens.

In promoting contingent politics, both Connolly and Tully also advocate the principle of contestability. Drawing on Foucault, Nietzsche and

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\(^{310}\) Ibid., p. 127.
Arendt, their emphasis on contestability derives from the assumption that truth is entangled in power relations and their subsequent rejection of universalism. Echoing Chapter One’s discussion about the dangers of universalism, Tully asserts that those who attach universality to their own ideals ‘cannot recognise and respect any plurality of narratives, traditions or civilisations as equal yet different, and enter into a dialogue with them on equal footing.’

He explains that diversity is threatened by universalism, which ‘already captures other peoples (and their legal and political civilisations) in its own presumptively universal categories.’ Tully thereby perceives universalism as a barrier to achieving mutual recognition whereby citizens understand others as they wish to be understood. He illustrates this with the example of EU rhetoric, showing how the employment of universal terminology, such as ‘peace and freedom,’ are used in contrast with labels, such as ‘barbarism,’ providing a barrier to understanding people in their own terms.

This resonates with Nietzsche’s calls for ‘untruth’ to blur the boundaries between ‘good’ and ‘bad’ moralities. Tully explains that when diversity is measured against universal principles in this way, citizens ‘cannot approach another people’s way of life as an alternative horizon, thereby throwing their own into question and experiencing human finitude and plurality, the beginning of insight and cross-cultural understanding.’

Thus, to prevent such domination and enhance inclusivity, Tully employs contestability through ‘acting differently,’ which attempts to ‘show what were the effects, show that there were other rational possibilities, teach people what they ignore about their own situation, on their conditions of work, on their exploitation.’ Thus, Tully’s emphasis on contestability focuses on exposing and overcoming domination through showing people alternative actions. Tully’s acting differently requires that we perceives the rules of politics as having ‘an element of “non-consensuality”,’ thereby always allowing room for their questioning, challenging and modification. It is this ability to question,
challenge and modify which enables citizens to overcome the domination brought about by current norms which attach universality to their ideals.\footnote{316 Tully, J. (2008a), p. 144.}

Connolly’s account of contestability draws influence from Nietzsche’s pathos of distance in which, whilst affirming a belief, citizens ‘come to terms viscerally and positively with the extent to which it must appear profoundly contestable to others inducted into different practices, exposed to different events, and pulled by different calls to loyalty.’\footnote{317 Connolly, W. (2005), p. 32.}

By acknowledging that others may contest our own beliefs, Connolly asserts that citizens ‘connect positively through reciprocal confession that those in each group confront doubts, forgetfulness, or uncertainties in themselves that may invert those confronted by others.’\footnote{318 Ibid., p. 125.} Thus, as a result of acknowledging contestability, relations are enhanced between diverse citizens who interact with ‘generosity and forbearance.’\footnote{319 Ibid., p. 125.} Thus, once again, Connolly promotes a more inclusive politics which aspires to prevent ressentiment and encourage more positive relations between conflicting citizens. Hence, both Connolly and Tully endorse the principle of contestability as a means of encouraging a more inclusive society. For Connolly, contestability entails preventing ressentiment by reducing the threat which one poses to the identity of another. For Tully, this entails exposing and overcoming domination by teaching citizens what could have been different about their situations, and consequently encouraging challenging, questioning and modification.

Thus, Connolly and Tully represent the ‘inclusive approach’ to agonistic democracy, which strives to involve a wider diversity of citizens in democratic engagement. They both share an assumption of identity as interdependent, in which citizens cannot fully exist without one another. As a result, they both promote democratic practices which encourage
wider participation of everyday citizens. They also both advocate the challenging of dominant power relations through agonistic respect and mutual recognition. Additionally, they share a commitment to future drives to pluralisation through critical responsiveness and *audi alteram partem*. Finally, they both adopt the concept of contestability in which the existence of alternate beliefs is emphasised. For Connolly, these concepts attempt to produce more positive interactions, whereas for Tully, they seek to overcome domination. Yet, both thinkers converge on the overall goal of promoting political contestation, necessary interdependency and contingency to render democratic politics more inclusive.

**Conclusion**

The chapter has outlined three distinct approaches to agonistic democracy, which employ political contestation, contingency and necessary interdependency to different ends. Drawing on Nietzsche, Owen’s account of political contestation focuses on enhancing society through the provision of a collective competition in which citizens strive to surpass one another. It promotes contingency through eternal recurrence and self-mastery whereby citizens challenge their own values, those of others and the standards against which these values are measured. It also emphasises necessary interdependency by engaging citizens in a common quest, thereby promoting cooperation.

Significantly influenced by Schmitt, Mouffe’s adversarial approach proposes a political contestation, which draws on citizens’ passions and provides an outlet for the expression of conflict. Her adversarial approach promotes contingency by ensuring that any consensus is ‘conflictual,’ enabling the adversarial group to continually challenge the hegemonic values. It promotes necessary interdependency through two means. First, each ‘friend’ group is constituted in relation to an oppositional, adversarial group, thereby creating unity between ‘friends.’ Second, the existence of a common ‘enemy’ group strives to demonstrate adversarial legitimacy to conflicting groups.
Finally, Connolly and Tully, drawing on Foucault, Nietzsche and Arendt, offer inclusive accounts of agonistic democracy. Their political contestation involves an ethos in which an entangled web of citizens comes together to contest their values. For them, contingency provides a tool to render society more inclusive by, on Connolly’s account, asking citizens to demonstrate the arguable nature of their position, and on Tully’s, requiring citizens to listen to one another in their own terms, and exposing alternate possibilities. They also promote necessary interdependency through normative behaviours, such as agonistic respect and critical responsiveness (for Connolly), and mutual recognition and *audi alteram partem* (for Tully), seeking to enhance inclusivity by challenging domination and overcoming *ressentiment*. 
Chapter Three: Exploring the Need for Further Institutional Consideration

Having outlined three distinct approaches to agonistic democracy, each seeking to employ agonistic concepts to different ends, I now suggest that they all converge on one component: underdeveloped institutional consideration. I will begin by discussing existing critiques of agonistic institutions, before analysing the extent to which agonists have considered institutions. Here, I draw on agonist literature as well as insights from the new institutionalist field. The work of Vivien Lowndes is particularly important to this thesis, not only because of its influence on new institutionalism, but also because of its ability to bridge a gap between post-structuralism and new-institutionalism (see, for instance, ‘Designing democratic institutions for decentred governance: the Council of Europe’s acquis’ in Practices of Freedom: Decentred Governance, Conflict and Democratic Participation).320 In exploring new institutionalism alongside agonism, I argue that agonists do offer a variety of informal institutions, but that there has been little thought about how to operationalise these. Considering resistance toward agonistic institutions, I propose that thinking through the realisation of these concepts could enrich, rather than undermine the field. I suggest that certain types of institution could enable contingency, and would, therefore, not necessarily be incompatible with agonistic principles.

Claiming that agonistic democracy requires further institutional development is not a new critique. Young, for instance, highlights the ‘abstractness’ of Connolly’s work, charging it with a ‘lack of political recommendations.’321 Schaap expresses a similar sentiment toward Mouffe’s work, arguing that ‘her theory lacks an adequate account of

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the institutionalisation of agonistic democracy.' Furthermore, Ed Wingenbach asserts that both Connolly and Mouffe provide only ‘underdeveloped suggestions for conceptualizing democratic institutions,’ which offer ‘frustratingly shallow’ alternatives. Significantly, such criticism is not confined to Connolly and Mouffe, with Kalyvas describing the field of agonistic democracy as a ‘predominantly abstract and normatively inclined understanding of political conflict.’

Thus, several critics highlight the abstract, normative emphasis of agonistic democracy, which I will now discuss.

In arguing for an account of agonistic democracy that considers how seemingly abstract, normative concepts might be operationalised, it is necessary to analyse the extent to which institutions have already been considered within the field of agonistic democracy. It is helpful here to draw upon new institutionalist understanding of institutions in which, in spite of variation across the field (Guy Peters notes that ‘there are at least six versions of the new institutionalism in current use’), ‘there seems to be a general agreement that, at their core, political institutions are “the rules of the game”’. This resonates with the post-structuralist assumptions of agonistic democracy in which ‘according to Foucault, the study of any game will involve, first, the analysis of the rules in accordance with which the game is routinely played.’ Fundamentally, for agonists, these rule-governed games – and therefore institutions – constitute formal and informal relationships, are constantly in flux, and have the potential to be shaped and transformed by actors:

Rather than restricting “agonism” to formal games and face-to-face contests, [Foucault] extends its application to any form of activity of language game in which the co-

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324 Ibid., p. 85.
ordination of action is potentially open to dispute, as a “permanent provocation”, and, within these manifold games, to any form of reciprocal interplay, or “incitation and struggle”, disputation takes, from sedimented games of domination where free play is reduced to a minimum at one end, through all the forms of negotiation and provisional agreements and disagreements, up to direct confrontations that break up the game at the other end.329

This parallels new institutionalist thought in which institutions can be both formal and informal, have the ability to change, and not only shape actors’ behaviour but are also shaped by actors themselves:

‘[Institutions] shape actors’ behaviour through informal as well as formal means; they exhibit dynamism as well as stability; they distribute power and are inevitably contested; they take a messy and differentiated form; and are mutually constitutive with the political actors whom they influence, and by whom they are influenced.’330

Unlike classical accounts of institutionalism, which focused upon “formal government institutions, constitutional issues, and public law,”331 new institutionalism discusses habitual and cultural rules, such as “beliefs, paradigms, codes, cultures, and knowledge.”332 More specifically, on the normative account of new institutionalism, institutions are sets of rules which “guide and constrain the behaviour of individual actors.”333 Lowndes and Mark Roberts inform us that institutions constrain behaviour either by formal and recorded rules; informal and demonstrated practices; or semi-formal and spoken narratives.334 Thus, when examining the extent to which agonistic democracy provides us with institutions, I consider rules, practices and narratives relating to

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329 Ibid., p. 168.
informal habits and culture as well as formal rules, organisations and government bodies which guide and constrain behaviour.

Despite emphasising the need for further institutional consideration in his book *Institutionalizing Agonistic Democracy: Post-Foundationalism and Political Liberalism*, Wingenbach does acknowledge that agonists provide ‘scattered reflections on the political implementation of an agonistic vision.’

This section of the chapter examines such reflections, demonstrating the institutional thought that has already occurred within the field of agonistic democracy. For instance, Owen’s perfectionism depicts an agonistic politics in which citizens engage with one another in a collective ranking of values. Drawing on Ancient Greece, he explains that democratic citizens strive to surpass one another’s values, bettering society as a result. In this way, Owen promotes political contestation through the institution of informal and demonstrated practices. As Lowndes and Roberts explain, such practices constrain behaviour, not through recorded rules but through demonstration in which actors repeat the behaviour of others:

Unlike rules, these are not formally recorded or officially sanctioned. Their mode of transmission is, rather, through demonstration: actors understand how they are supposed to behave through observing the routinized actions of others and seeking to recreate those actions.

The ranking of values Owen advocates is also guided by certain behavioural rules, for instance, the truthfulness and justice components of integrity. These require citizens to follow the rules of the game and refrain from cheating (truthfulness) whilst also reflecting honestly on one’s own performance (justice). This resonates with new institutionalist discussion of ‘a logic of appropriateness which tells [citizens] which practices they should follow in any given situation, and third party enforcement is the “binding expectations” of other actors in the

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immediate context.\textsuperscript{337} Hence, in perfectionist agonism, the rules of the game inform citizens of how they ought to act, and other citizens ensure that they adhere to these guidelines. However, I suggest that the informal rules in Owen’s account are slightly less concerned with enforcement, emphasising instead, the need to encourage these behaviours through collective competition and engagement in a common quest. This nuance between enforcement and encouragement is important when considering how to operationalise agonistic concepts.

Linked to this is Owen’s normative notion of ‘enlarged mentality’ in which actors are required to tolerate a diversity of perspectives in order to be considered integral citizens. Once again, in employing this concept, Owen provides an informal institution on what William Scott terms as institutionalism’s ‘normative pillar’ whereby ‘norms specify how things should be done; they define legitimate means to pursue valued ends.’\textsuperscript{338} In this case, requiring an enlarged mentality specifies citizens to tolerate one another’s opinions in order to attain integrity, thereby enhancing individual autonomy and society as a result. The behaviour of citizens is, again, guided and constrained toward how they ought to act. They are encouraged to follow such norms in order to be seen by others as having integrity.

Mouffe’s adversarialism also employs institutions, but, rather than focusing on informal practices as a means to guide and constrain behaviour, she makes use of what James Martin labels a ‘motivational narrative.’\textsuperscript{339} Lowndes and Roberts state the importance of narratives in constraining action:

The most effective political institutions are characterized by resonant stories. Although governments will always pass laws and seek to shape practices, a great deal of politics is

\textsuperscript{337} Ibid., p. 60.
about more subtle processes of explanation and persuasion.\textsuperscript{340}

Hence, by dividing the world into ‘friends,’ ‘adversaries’ and ‘enemies,’ adversarialism resonates with the narrative approach to constraining action. Lowndes and Roberts state that the importance of the narrative approach derives from its ability to 'provide an account not just of how we do things around here, but also why we do things the way we do.'\textsuperscript{341} This is significant when we consider the way in which Connolly’s work is criticised for inadequate consideration of how to motivate citizens to engage in an ethos of respect.\textsuperscript{342} Since Mouffe explains the motivation to engage as resulting from a provocation to win over the adversary, her narrative accounts for why citizens should engage with one another.

Just as citizens in a perfectionist society would be constrained by informal practices, which demonstrate the logic of appropriateness, and held accountable to these by the expectations of others, Mouffe’s adversarialism also employs informal and demonstrated practices. In creating a frontier between those who are to be included (citizens who endorse liberty and equality, and do not threaten the democratic process) from those who are to be excluded, Mouffe establishes a logic of appropriateness in which citizens demonstrate to one another what is acceptable, and hold each other accountable to this.

Both Connolly and Tully’s work employ similar informal and demonstrated practices as that of Owen’s value ranking. Agonistic respect and \textit{audi alteram partem}, for instance, provide informal rules, which guide and constrain behaviour. As Owen asserts of Tully’s work, ‘the diverse normative structures of different types of constitutional order have implications for what it is to engage in political contestation within

\textsuperscript{341} Ibid., p. 64.
and over the terms of those orders.\textsuperscript{343} Agonistic respect, for instance, requires us to respect views which conflict with our own, asking us to contain our anger or frustration toward a particular point of view in order to show respect for the person holding it. Whereas \textit{audi alteram partem} requires us to hold back from expressing our own view in order to encourage minority voices to be heard. Hence, such normative principles guide and constrain behaviour, thereby shaping the political contestation. According to Norval, normative rules, such as agonistic respect and \textit{audi alteram partem} may be particularly effective in ensuring cooperation. She states that rules and practices which best encourage compliance ‘may be those that cultivate trust and embody “a direct appeal to moral principles”.’\textsuperscript{344} This is significant when discussing Connolly’s normative accounts since they have been charged with insufficient consideration of how to ensure such normative principles are adhered to. Deveaux, for example, states that the normative principles of agonistic respect and critical responsiveness require institutions:

The vision of “an intercultural engagement of agonistic respect and critical responsiveness between contending identities linked together by multiple bonds of interest, interdependence and memory” says nothing about what agonistic institutions could help to inculcate and sustain such respect.\textsuperscript{345}

Yet on Norval’s account, Deveaux’s claim is unwarranted because respect is inculcated and sustained through social norms and logics of appropriateness.

Further, both Connolly and Tully provide links between these informal rules and practices, and ones that are more formal. Tully, for instance, ‘situates his agonism explicitly within the framework of constitutionalism,’\textsuperscript{346} and discusses how the European Union might

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\textsuperscript{346} Wingenbach, E. (2011), p. xii.
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become more agonistic. Additionally, as Howarth asserts, Connolly outlines six dimensions of the political: micropolitics; a politics of disturbance; a politics of enactment; a politics of representational assemblages; a politics of interstate relations; and a politics of non-statist, cross-national movements.\(^{347}\) Thus, both thinkers discuss informal institutions alongside more formal institutions.

It is evident that agonistic democracy does offer some important institutional insights. Each thinker develops agonistic concepts, which guide and constrain the behaviour of actors. Hence, I fully endorse Wingenbach’s assertion that [providing a critique of agonistic institutions] is not to imply agonist theorists have been wholly inattentive to the implications of their theoretical approach.\(^{348}\) Yet, as Howarth affirms, ‘though these accounts allude to the importance of democratic rules and procedures, there is still something of an “institutional deficit” in their respective theories, both in terms of their critiques of existing arrangements and in terms of their more positive alternatives.’\(^{349}\) For the purpose of addressing my central question, I consider the latter of these two ‘deficits’: providing a more positive alternative. It is my contention that, in spite of suggesting informal institutional concepts, agonistic democrats have given little suggestion as to ways in which such concepts might be operationalised.

If, for instance, we analyse Owen’s account of a public value ranking, it is not obvious what such a public ranking might look like, or how norms, such as enlarged mentality, truthfulness and justice might be established. As Anthony Arblaster affirms, ‘a spirit of citizenship is seen to imply a willingness to think and act as members of the community as a whole, not solely as self-interested individuals or as members of particular interest groups.’\(^{350}\) James March and Johan Olsen term this

the ‘logic of appropriateness’\textsuperscript{351} in which citizens learn how they ought to act from following the behaviour of others, and are encouraged to act in this way by the expectations of others. However, it remains unclear in Owen’s theory as to \textit{how} this spirit of citizenship emerges, or \textit{how} citizens are made aware of the logic of appropriateness. Further thought about supplementary institutions might be helpful in answering this, since as Lowndes and Lawrence Pratchett assert, ‘institutional design is an attempt to get meanings to “stick”.’\textsuperscript{352} Given the historical roots of his work, Peter Wagner and Nathalie Karagianannis highlight the crucial question: ‘how can this [Ancient Greek] model be translated to contemporary circumstances?’\textsuperscript{353} Perhaps, then, further institutional consideration could help to answer such questions, and help Owen’s meanings to stick.

Similarly, in spite of suggesting a series of informal narratives which constrain the behaviour of actors, Mouffe’s adversarialism is unclear as to how the ‘friend,’ ‘adversary’ and ‘enemy’ distinctions should be demonstrated to citizens. Lowndes and Roberts state that ‘for the narrative mode of constraint, the bases for compliance are frequently rehearsed shared understandings which lead to “taken-for-grantedness”.’\textsuperscript{354} However, in Mouffe’s adversarialism, there is an absence of discussion about how such a shared understanding of the friend/adversary/enemy narrative might arise.

Finally, in spite of their evident institutional consideration, Connolly and Tully, like Owen and Mouffe, offer little suggestions as to \textit{how} an ethos of agonistic respect might encourage respect and critical responsiveness, or \textit{how audi alteram partem} and mutual recognition might render institutions such as the European Union more agonistic. As Schaap highlights, ‘it is not clear how (or why) citizens come to have

the “agonistic respect” for each other that would ensure that their conflict remains non-violent.'\textsuperscript{355} As Lowndes and Pratchett affirm, in order for institutional rules to be effected they need to be created, recognised and embedded.\textsuperscript{366} Yet, whilst Connolly and Tully suggest both informal and formal agonistic institutions, they do not offer much insight as to which forms these might take, or how these could be recognised and embedded in order to take effect. Owen demonstrates this of Connolly’s work, arguing that consideration of the types of institutions and practices that support Connolly’s ethos is ‘a topic which has been rather under-elaborated in Connolly’s recent work.’\textsuperscript{357}

Thus, in spite of providing a range of informal and formal institutions, which guide and constrain behaviour, it is my contention that more thought is needed about how to supplement ‘predominantly abstract, normatively inclined’\textsuperscript{358} agonistic concepts with ideas about which forms agonistic democracy might take in society. As Norval affirms, ‘the criteria for thinking critically about democracy that may be gleaned from [poststructuralist theorists’] work are often left implicit in their accounts, and may have to be formulated explicitly by those interested in drawing them out.’\textsuperscript{359} However, this contention is not uncontroversial and Wingenbach highlights the potential for tensions between agonistic democracy and institutional consideration. He asserts that some agonists are resistant toward ‘the effort to sketch plausible institutional parameters for agonistic practices,’\textsuperscript{360} stating that ‘agonistic democracy does emerge from a tradition emphasizing resistance and disruption, so it is important to explain clearly why an agonistic theory of institutions is not oxymoronic.’\textsuperscript{361}

\textsuperscript{358} Kalyvas, A.’The democratic Narcissus: the agonism of the ancients compared to that of the (post)moderns’ in Schaap, A. (2009), p. 17.
\textsuperscript{361} Ibid., p. 80.
First, then, let us return to the agonistic rejection of rationalism and universalism, as outlined in depth in Chapter One. Agonists highlight the dangers of attaching these labels to political values, claiming that the tendency to do so negates diversity and suppresses pluralism. Foucault thus asserts that ‘the role of philosophy is also to keep watch over the excessive powers of political rationality.’\(^{362}\) As a result, Griggs et al. explain that, far from focusing on institutional exploration, most agonistic democrats are more concerned with ‘the modalities of subjectivity that are endangered by both practices of government and of freedom; in the manner in which norms come to be established and “normalised”; and the ways in which such hegemonic norms become and remain subject to contestation.’\(^{363}\) Following this, Lida Maxwell affirms that it is not institutions per se toward which agonists are hostile, but rather, they are ‘critical of a juridical view of institutions, which seeks to quarantine them from the unpredictability of political action.’\(^{364}\) Hence, when discussing institutions, it is important to consider opportunities for change and unpredictability.

In turning away from normalising or juridical institutions in favour of those which allow for challenge and transformation, the concept of contingency (which was outlined as one of the primary agonistic themes in Chapter One) is particularly useful. This concept is significant for agonistic democracy since it rejects rationalism and universalism in favour of challenge and critique. For Owen, this is important in enhancing individual autonomy and bettering society; for Mouffe, this is vital to keeping citizens engaged and overcoming apathy; and for Connolly and Tully, this is essential to enhancing interactions and challenging domination, thereby promoting inclusivity. However, as Foucault outlines in Subject and Power, the theme of contingency appears to be at odds with further institutional consideration. He argues that ‘the fact that an important part of the mechanisms put into

operation by an institution are designed to ensure its own preservation brings with it the risk of deciphering functions which are essentially reproductive.\textsuperscript{365} Hence, by employing elements that guarantee their own preservation, institutions \textit{typically} encourage reproduction and prevent critique and challenge, thereby posing an obstacle to the contingency that is fundamental to agonistic democracy.

However, as Foucault also demonstrates, actors also play a role in shaping institutions since ‘at the very heart of the power relationship, and constantly provoking it, are the recalcitrance of the will and the intransigence of freedom.’\textsuperscript{366} This resonates with Owen’s assertion that normative commitments are \textit{not}, as Kant argues, a set of determinate external constraints placed on our political agency, but rather, ‘non-determinate (\textit{not indeterminate}) internal conditions of such political agency.’\textsuperscript{367} This also resonates with Lowndes and Robert’s view that “rule takers” are not passive implementers, but creative agents who interpret rules, assign cases to rules, and adapt or even resist rules.\textsuperscript{368} They describe rule takers as ‘also rule benders and rule breakers,’ supporting March and Olsen’s claim that, in addition to constraining citizens, ‘[rules] increase action capabilities and efficiency.’\textsuperscript{369} Thus, just as institutions hold power over citizens, so too do citizens hold power over their institutions. As Wolfgang Streeck and Kozo Yamamura affirm, ‘institutions remain dependent on actors for their maintenance, defence, revision and rediscovery.’\textsuperscript{370} Hence, on this understanding whereby citizens are the constrainers as well as the constrained, institutions might not always be successful in reaffirming and reproducing their own position. Discursive institutionalism is helpful here, since on this account, institutional change occurs alongside a shift in the ideas and values that constitute the discourse:

\textsuperscript{366} Ibid., p. 790.
\textsuperscript{367} Owen, D. ‘The expressive agon: on political agency in a constitutional democratic polity’ in Schaap, A. (2009), p. 76.
In discursive institutionalism institutional change is defined through changes in the ideas and values that are the core of the discourse. Given that these ideas and values are created through discussion, that is discourse, among the members then institutional change much also reflect that change in that discourse.\textsuperscript{371}

Thus, fundamental to preventing such unquestioned reaffirmation and reproduction – thereby enabling the principle of contingency – is the provision of institutions that limit the power of institutional structures and emphasise the autonomy of agents. Owen affirms that ‘the normative commitments intrinsic to political membership cannot be fully specified in and through any set of determinate legal principles.’\textsuperscript{372} Instead, citizens ought to play a part in shaping the institutions which guide and constrain their behaviour, since as Norval asserts, ‘what is important is our ability to criticize – so as to animate - our institutions, and the imagination to change and challenge them, as crucial to the maintenance of our democratic institutions.’\textsuperscript{373} In order to enable the ideas and values of citizens to shape and reshape institutions, citizens might, for instance, become involved in decisions over which content should be discussed, how much time is required, which rules and practices should be followed, and which decision-making techniques to employ for each political contestation. Or, perhaps institutions could grant autonomy to citizens by establishing a set of rules or practices and requiring \textit{citizens themselves} to implement and negotiate these as a group, rather than enforcing them through an outside mediator. Institutions that increase the autonomy of agents seem compatible with Foucault’s rejection of power, which ‘categorizes the individual, marks him by his own individuality, attaches him to his own identity, imposes a law of truth on him which he must recognize and which others have to

\textsuperscript{371} Peters, B. (2011), p. 120.
\textsuperscript{372} Owen, D. ‘The expressive agon: on political agency in a constitutional democratic polity’ in Schaap, A. (2009), pp. 76-77.
recognize in him.’\textsuperscript{374} By restricting the amount of power held by institutions, whilst providing citizens with autonomy, institutions may be compatible with ‘agonism…a relationship which is at the same time reciprocal incitation and struggle, less of a face-to-face confrontation which paralyzes both sides than a permanent provocation.’\textsuperscript{375} In this way, then, ‘practices of governance and practices of freedom always go hand in hand.’\textsuperscript{376}

I have sought to argue, then, that certain institutions that limit the power of the ruler and enhance the autonomy of the individual may be compatible with the agonistic principle of contingency. It is now important to demonstrate why further institutional consideration is important and how it might, not only compatible with - but also significant to - enriching theoretical insights into agonistic democracy. In suggesting this, I return to the critics of agonistic democracy, who question what form agonistic democracy will take. Endorsing the agonistic notion of challenge, Howarth asserts, ‘but this in turn raises further questions about how this can be brought about: queries concerning the strategies, tactics and conditions of such projects and assemblages.’\textsuperscript{377} Critics also suggest the dangers that potentially emerge from failing to address the question of ‘how.’ Deveaux, for instance, emphasises how ‘agonistic democrats have so far had little to say about citizens who may refuse to cooperate with other citizens, or about groups that have an entrenched interest in having a conflict continue unresolved.’\textsuperscript{378} Hence, by offering little insight into which forms a political contestation might take, agonistic democrats do not discuss how to resolve potential problems, such as a reluctance, or refusal, to engage. Deveaux and Young also raise concerns that Connolly’s ethos may ‘require the relative social privilege enjoyed by political theorists,’\textsuperscript{379} or that access to political institutions; leisure time;

\textsuperscript{375} Ibid., p. 790.
\textsuperscript{379} Young, I. (1992), p. 514.
education; judgment and participation skills; and the impact of the mass media\textsuperscript{380} are all factors which affect the ability to participate. Consequently, by exploring supplementary institutions, agonists could gain deeper insights into such questions and concerns.

It is my contention, then, that if agonistic democrats were to offer further suggestions about how to operationalise existing agonistic institutions, they would be better able to consider how to address potential problems. As Lowndes and Roberts inform us, institutions \textit{empower} as well as constrain,\textsuperscript{381} and thus, perhaps further institutional consideration could provide mechanisms which encourage reluctant citizens to engage with others, or which enable socially disadvantaged or uneducated citizens to participate. In Ackerman and Fishkin’s \textit{Deliberation Day} project, by thinking about how deliberative theory might be operationalised into an annual day, they also offer solutions to problems, for instance by addressing barriers to motivation through monetary incentives.\textsuperscript{382} I argue that agonistic democracy could be enriched through further institutional consideration since this would provide further insight into how potential theoretical tensions might be navigated. As Fossen clarifies, ‘to distinguish itself as a mature current of its own, rather than a footnote to liberal and deliberative accounts of politics, agonism needs to engage questions of law and institutions more thoroughly.’\textsuperscript{383}

In sum, then, I contend that, agonist accounts \textit{do} provide informal institutions, which shape behaviour through demonstration, normative guidelines and motivational narratives, and that these are sometimes supplemented with consideration of more formal supplementary institutions, as in Connolly’s six dimensions of the politics. Yet, I argue that these are predominantly abstract recommendations, and beg the

\textsuperscript{382}Ackerman, B. and Fishkin, J. (2004), p. 4.
question of what their practical application might look like, or how such practices come to be recognised or embedded. I argue that, whilst there is a tension between institutions and agonistic concepts, this can be balanced by proposing institutions that ensure unpredictability, reflecting changing ideas and values, and engage citizens in decisions. In this way, I contend that institutions can provide space for contingency and contestability, empowering citizens, rather than simply constraining them. Finally, I suggest that further thought into the realisation of agonistic concept might also feed back into the theory itself, by providing further insight into questions raised by critics.
Conclusion to Part One

Part One of the thesis has provided the theoretical underpinnings of the research. It began by returning to the theoretical roots of agonistic democracy, demonstrating how Arendt, Foucault, Nietzsche, and Schmitt share three themes that resound across agonistic democratic theory. These include the political contestation of conflicting values, the necessary interdependency of citizens and the contingent nature of politics. Despite their convergence on these themes, the thinkers differ on their employment of these themes. This is most noticeable in Schmitt’s work, which constructs society on collective, adversarial identity relations between states, demarcating a specific arena of ‘the political.’ Chapter Two demonstrated the importance of these differences to contemporary agonistic approaches. It outlined three distinct approaches: the ‘perfectionist,’ the ‘adversarial’ and the ‘inclusive.’ It explained how each approach employs the three themes derived from the thinkers, but they often do this in different ways to arrive at different ends. It suggested that the purpose of Owen’s perfectionist agonism is to better society through collective competition, whilst Mouffe aims to provoke engagement between conflicting groups of citizens through passion and competition, and Connolly and Tully seek to render society more inclusive by challenging ressentiment and overcoming domination. Chapter Three is the crux of the thesis, arguing that agonistic concepts are largely abstract and that more thought needs to be given as to how they could be operationalised. Combining a discussion of agonistic theory with new institutionalist literature, it demonstrated that, whilst agonists have explored informal (and sometimes informal) institutions, more thought needs to be given to their practical application. Exploring the tension between agonistic principles and institutions, it suggested that certain types of institutional mechanisms would be compatible with agonistic notions of contingency. Further, it contended that more thought about the operationalisation of principles might enrich agonistic democracy by enabling it, first, to offer
an alternative theory of democracy and, second, to gain a deeper insight into how to overcome potential problems.

The next part of the thesis will supplement the theoretical exploration with an empirical component. It will begin by shifting the focus away from theoretical discussion toward questions of method and methodology. Drawing on experimental methodology, it will explore how agonistic concepts could be operationalised and the effects these might have on conflict mediation. Taking each approach in turn, it will analyse perfectionist, adversarial and inclusive approaches to agonistic democracy. Finally, it will draw on summaries from the theoretical and empirical evaluation together to propose an ‘agonistic day.’
Part Two
Chapter Four: Methodology and Methods

This chapter outlines how the empirical element of my thesis enables further consideration of ways in which agonistic concepts might be operationalised. Beginning with the rationale for the empirical research, it outlines the assumptions, which render an empirical component helpful. It subsequently distinguishes my experimental design from classical positivist approaches, highlighting the exploratory nature of my empirical research. It then explains why an experimental approach - rather than, for instance, participant observation – was most suitable in answering the research question. It outlines the participant selection process, justifying the use of various sampling methods and noting the limitations of each. It then discusses the range of data collection methods, including participant questionnaires, video-analysis, and observer analysis, demonstrating the advantages of these methods whilst also discussing limitations. Finally, it considers ethics, showing which techniques were implemented to treat participants with sensitivity and respect. Throughout the chapter I aim to justify the choices I have made, depict the obstacles I had to overcome and reflect on the limitations of the study.

A Brief Overview of the Empirical Research

In an attempt at gaining further insights into agonistic concepts, I supplemented my theoretical research with empirical explorations. This empirical work draws on experimental design by engaging participants in three value discussions, each representing concepts from one of the

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384 I would like to thank Professor Cees van der Eijk for all of his help with designing the experiment. His expertise has been invaluable in supplementing the theoretical work with an empirical dimension.

See videos on USB stick to watch each of the discussions:
Values discussion = video 1a (from 01:00) and video 1b (until 00:11)
Abortion discussion = video 2a (from 14:01) and video 2b (until 29:27)
Gay marriage discussion = video 3a (from 02:23), 3b, and 3c (until 05:48).

385 Please note, this chapter comprises a discussion of the methods used, it does not aim to show how the theoretical concepts of the three approaches were operationalised into three separate discussion frameworks for the Experiment Day, nor does it seek to give an overview of the Experiment Day. For an explanation of how the theoretical concepts were operationalised, please see chapter four. For an overview of the Experiment Day, please see chapter four.
three agonistic approaches outlined in Chapter Two. The experiment generates insights through participant questionnaires, observer insights and my own analysis throughout the day and from video footage. In April 2013, I conducted a pilot study with ten students from local universities in order to practice, evaluate and refine my empirical tasks. Then, in May 2013, the main experiment was carried out with nine participants, both students and non-students. In December 2013, I co-led six 2 hour seminars with my supervisor, Professor Lucy Sargisson, which were informed by the three experimental discussion frameworks. In combining theoretical discussion with empirical insights, the thesis primarily draws on observations from the main experiment, but also uses the pilot study – and to a lesser extent – student seminars.386

Rationale for the Empirical Research

As Chapter Three explains, agonistic democrats tend to prioritise theoretical exploration over empirical consideration. Given this, it is necessary to justify how the inclusion of an empirical dimension is important to a thesis grounded in agonistic democratic theory. I begin with two assumptions from which the empirical work arises. First, I assume (as argued in Chapter Three), that further consideration of how to operationalise agonistic concepts could enrich the field of agonistic democracy. Second, I assume (also outlined in Chapter Three), that agonist literature offers relatively little thought about how such concepts might be operationalised. As a result, the empirical component of the research serves to generate unique and innovative insights into how theoretical concepts might be operationalised. In so doing, it draws on experimental methods to explore practical representations of agonistic concepts through a series of controversial discussions.

In outlining the aims of the empirical work, it is useful to clarify what it does not aspire to do. David Gray affirms that ‘experimental...

386 The pilot study is drawn on more than the seminar discussions because very few changes were made between the pilot study and the main experiment. I am also able to refer to particular individuals and incidents since consent forms were completed for this event. This was not the case for seminar discussions and I thereby can only discuss patterns and trends which occurred.
methodology usually involved truth-seeking (as opposed to perspective- or opinion-seeking).\footnote{Gray, D. (2004). \textit{Doing research in the real world}. London: Sage Publications, p. 67.} As a consequence, it has predominantly been used as a tool to either prove or disprove theory. In order to fulfil this purpose accurately and effectively, ‘experiments are frequently viewed as prime examples of quantitative research and are evaluated against the strengths and weaknesses of statistical, quantitative research methods and analysis.’\footnote{De Vaus, D. (2001). \textit{Research design in social research}. London: SAGE, p. 10.} As such, researchers strive to ensure that experiments can produce results that are ‘objective, valid and replicable.’\footnote{Gray, D (2004), p. 67.} This involves isolating the experiment from external factors, such as history, testing and maturation.\footnote{Cook, T. and Campbell, D. (1979). \textit{Quasi-experimentation}. Boston: Houghton Mifflin, p. 51.}

This is not what I am doing. Adopting such a positivist approach to my empirical work would be at odds with the epistemological assumptions of the thesis. I follow Nietzsche, Foucault, Arendt, and Schmitt in rejecting the possibility of discovering the truth.\footnote{See Chapter One ‘The Contingent Nature of Politics’ for a more detailed discussion of this.} As Arendt asserts, all attempts at seeing the objective truth are like ‘jumping over our own shadows’\footnote{Arendt, H. (2013), p. 12.} since we can never escape our own assumptions and subjectivities. As a result, I abandon all attempts at conducting an experimental framework, which is created by objective practical mechanisms and evaluated objectively in order to prove or disprove agonistic theory. Rather, I assert that the practical mechanisms employed in the experiment arise from \textit{my} personal and subjective interpretation of agonistic concepts,\footnote{See Chapter Four for an explanation of how the theoretical agonistic concepts were represented by practical mechanisms} just as the findings I draw from experiment observations are interpretations, which are shaped by my subjectivity as well as the intersubjectivities between participants, observers and myself. This echoes Uwe Flick’s affirmation that ‘the subjectivity of the researcher and of those being studied becomes part
of the research process. whilst aiming to reduce the effects of external factors, I acknowledge the limitations of this and reflect on the impact such effects might have had on the findings. As a consequence, in spite of drawing on experimental methods, I adapt these for exploratory purposes. In seeking to glean deeper insights into theories of agonistic democracy, rather than to test them, my empirical research resonates with qualitative research whereby ‘research questions are tentative and most often not framed in terms of hypotheses (looking for “cause and effect”). thus, it is imperative that the empirical research abandons attempts to prove or disprove theoretical approaches, but instead aims to gain further insights.

Drawing on Quasi-Experimental Designs

When deciding which methods would be most appropriate to exploring how agonistic concepts might be operationalised, I considered a range of options. For instance, I had initially planned to conduct participant observation at the intentional community of The Findhorn Foundation. The community emphasises principles such as respect, listening and integrity, whilst also promoting non-hierarchical decision-making procedures, and implementing steering mechanisms to maximise inclusivity. These elements of the community resonate with Owen, Mouffe, Connolly, and Tully’s emphasis on the political, citizen-centred account of politics, which promotes necessary interdependency (through listening, respect and integrity) and values critique and challenge. Hence, in these respects The Findhorn Foundation seemed to offer an appropriate case for exploring how agonistic theory might be operationalised. However, one issue prevented Findhorn from providing a representative case for agonistic democracy: it is an intentional community, in which members share a set of core values.

396 See Common Ground Statement of Values: http://www.findhorn.org/aboutus/community/nfa/common-ground/#.UaYMRtLYjTo and community organisation: http://www.findhorn.com/nfa/NFA/AboutUs
and attempt to realise these by living and working together.\textsuperscript{397} This is problematic because agonistic democrats typically concern themselves with mediating conflict between those who do not share the same set of values. Connolly’s ethos includes ‘carriers of another creed,’\textsuperscript{398} Tully asks us to adopt ‘a willingness to listen to its culturally diverse spirits,’\textsuperscript{399} and Owen states that ‘our shared identities relate not to shared perspectives but to a shared process of contestation.’\textsuperscript{400} It is important to note that Mouffe is the exception to this, requiring citizens to endorse liberty and equality, and excluding those who do not from the political community.\textsuperscript{401} Yet, in spite of the parallels between Findhorn and Mouffe’s adversarialism, the emphasis placed by other agonists on conflicting value systems prevents Findhorn from providing a suitable case study.

Since I was unable to find a representative case study, I rejected the participant observation method in favour of a quasi-experimental approach.\textsuperscript{402} By drawing on experimental methods, I was able to develop theoretical agonistic concepts into representative discussion frameworks, enabling me to consider how such concepts might be operationalised. I could then engage participants in such discussion frameworks, and glean insights into ways in which different practical mechanisms might affect conflict. Thus, drawing on experimental methods resonates with the aims of my research by providing a platform to ‘control and manipulate aspects of a situation in order to observe the effects.’\textsuperscript{403} Donald Campbell asserts that one of the primary limitations of using this method is that the artificial conditions it


\textsuperscript{402} The following chapter explains why quasi-experimental method was used, rather than the classical experimental design.


\textsuperscript{404} Ibid., p. 9.
requires results in participants changing their behaviour. However, I attempted to minimise the effects of this by making participants feel more comfortable, for instance, by getting to know them throughout the day, providing time before the discussions for participants to get to know one another, and by providing regular food and drink breaks. Again, I did not aim for an objective experimental design, but sought to minimise external effects and reflect on the limitations of these.

The reason for drawing on quasi-experimental approaches (rather than classical experimental ones) is that they ‘do not use random assignment to create the comparisons from which treatment-caused change is inferred.’ In a classical experiment, participants are randomly ascribed to one of two (or more) groups; one, which acts as a control group, and the other(s) which receive treatment(s). This constitutes an attempt at preventing external factors from influencing the results of the experiment, thereby promoting the objectivity and validity typically valued by experimental researchers. Thus, if my experiment were to fall into the classical category, it would require three groups of participants who were randomly assigned to one of three discussion frameworks. On the classical understanding, this would enable me to observe the effects of different agonistic frameworks on the interactions between participants.

However, I decided to use the same group for all three discussion frameworks. The reason for this reflects my research question, which emphasises diversity and multicultural, pluralist conflict. In order to reflect this, participants were selected from diverse (and often conflicting) religious, ideological, ethnic and political groups. As a result, randomly assigning participants to groups would have been problematic since it would not ensure a representative level of diversity in each group. One alternative is the ‘matching’ method in which participants are selected to ensure that each group is comparable in

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terms of its religious, ideological, ethnic, and political components.\textsuperscript{406} However, comparability is also difficult since ‘it is difficult to find experimental and control groups that are closely matched in terms of key variables (such as age, gender, income, work, grade, etc.).’\textsuperscript{407} Additionally, a further problem with both random assignation and ‘matching’ - which resonates with the distinction between positivist and more exploratory approaches – is that these two techniques treat participants as objective entities, largely ignoring their subjectivities and intersubjectivities. This is evident from my experiment, for instance, when we consider Fiona and Arabella.\textsuperscript{408} In spite of their similar religious, political, and ideological views, Fiona was a quieter participant, who listened to and respected others, whilst Arabella was more dominant, often asserting her opinions as the truth, angering other group members. In spite of their similarities, then, each participant had a very different impact on the discussions. Thus, in order to best explore relations of potential conflict between participants and if/how these were affected by the three discussion frameworks, using the same participants appeared most appropriate.

The limitations of using the same group for all three experiments include effects from history, testing, and maturation. In the first, any effects which I observe during different discussion frameworks ‘might be due to an event which takes place between the pre-test and post-test, when this event is not the treatment of research interest.’\textsuperscript{409} Thus, I need to be mindful when evaluating the findings of the empirical work that the behaviour and interactions of participants might be affected by events which occurred in the breaks rather than the discussions themselves. In order to limit this, I did consider isolating participants during the breaks, however I decided that, as well as being impractical, it might also prevent participants from feeling comfortable enough with the group to express conflicting views. ‘Testing’ refers to the way in

\textsuperscript{408} Please note that all names have been changed to protect the anonymity of participants.
which ‘the effect might be due to the number of times particular responses are measured.’ It is thereby important to note that changes in relationships between participants during the final discussion about gay marriage, for instance, might be a spill over effect of the multicultural values discussion, or the abortion discussion. Finally, the notion of ‘maturation’ refers to ‘changes within individuals that result from natural, biological, or psychological development.’ For example, during the pilot study, several participants appeared to become bored and disengaged just before lunch. In the main experiment, steps were taken to reduce this by reducing discussion times, providing more frequent breaks, adding a question to the questionnaires asking why participants felt either bored or engaged, and asking participants about their interest in the topics prior to the experiment. However, it is important to bear in mind the way in which these factors may contribute toward the behaviour of participants.

Participant Recruitment

Nina Hallowell et al suggest that empirical research tends to look as if it ‘run[s] like clockwork, that researchers enter “the field”, collect masses of interesting data, encounter no problems (of any kind) en route, return to their offices and churn out a range of fascinating papers, get promoted and live happily ever after.’ However, this was certainly not the case during the participant selection stage of my research, which posed the largest obstacle to undertaking my empirical work.

The typical size of a focus group discussion is between six and ten participants. This seemed an appropriate number for my research since I needed to strike a balance between offering a diversity of opinions, without having so many voices that the discussions could not be mediated effectively. The first stage of participant selection entailed purposive sampling, which John Creswell describes as the sampling of

410 Ibid., p. 52.
those who ‘can purposefully inform an understanding of the research problem and central phenomenon in the study.’ Since agonistic democracy explores conflict between diverse citizens, it was imperative to find participants from a diversity of conflicting political, religious, ethnic/national groups, causal, and class groups. Additionally, participant selection was informed by existing criticisms of agonistic theory. Both Young and Deveaux, for instance, state that education is a necessary prerequisite for behaviour such as agonistic respect. Hence, to explore this, I attempted to find both non-student and student participants. The importance of this was underlined during the pilot study, which primarily sought to evaluate tasks, discussion frameworks and timing, and therefore used the convenience sampling of students from universities in Nottingham and Leicester. Throughout the discussions, it was evident that, in spite of their diverse religious and ethnic backgrounds, students held relatively homogenous views on discussion topics. Thus, the importance of diverse educational backgrounds appeared significant to the study. As a result, participant selection for the main experiment focused on contacting groups outside of the student body.

Purposive sampling began in January 2013 and involved sending emails to different political, religious, ethnic/nationality, causal, and class groups; the majority of whom were listed under Nottingham City Council Community Centres. To achieve maximum diversity, I emailed 25 different religious, political and ethnic groups. This email contained information about myself, my research, the purpose of the experiment, and details of the event. As Alan Bryman states, ‘prospective respondents have to be provided with a credible rationale for the research in which they are being asked to participate and for

415 See Appendix One for a list of these groups.
416 See the previous chapter for a discussion of this.
417 See: http://www.nottinghamcity.gov.uk/communitycentres
418 See Appendix Two for the participant selection email.
giving up their valuable time.'\textsuperscript{419} I received only three positive responses from these initial emails (of which two later dropped out due to other commitments) so it was essential to follow up these emails.

The second phase of participant selection entailed writing letters to groups on university headed paper. These letters also included a poster, constituting an attempt at targeting a wider audience because I feared that members of some groups – ethnic community centres, for example – might be less accessible by email.\textsuperscript{420} However, these letters did not lead to any responses, highlighting Creswell’s assertion that ‘convincing individuals to participate in the study, building trust and credibility at the field site, and getting people from a site to respond are all important access challenges.’\textsuperscript{421}

As Earl Babbie states, ‘whenever you wish to make more formal contact with the people, identifying yourself as a researcher, you must establish a certain rapport with them.’\textsuperscript{422} In order to build rapports, my third phase of recruitment involved visiting groups, explaining about my research and myself, and distributing posters and leaflets. As Bryman explains, it is easier to build a rapport in person because otherwise the researcher ‘is unable to offer obvious visual cues of friendliness like smiling or maintaining good eye contact, which are also frequently regarded as conducive to gaining and maintaining support.’\textsuperscript{423} At this stage, I also tackled low response rates by increasing the sample, placing posters in shops, job centres, and post offices around Nottingham and Beeston. Catherine Marshall and Gretchen Rossman support such adaptations, affirming that ‘sampling can change during a study and researchers need to be flexible.’\textsuperscript{424} However, only one participant responded to one of these posters, (and, after completing

\textsuperscript{419} Bryman, A. (2008), p. 117.
\textsuperscript{420} See Appendix 3 to view the poster.
\textsuperscript{421} Creswell, J. (2007), pp. 138-139.
the participant recruitment questionnaire, did not attend the experiment).

During the final phase of participant selection, a participant from the group ‘Society for the Protection of Unborn Children’ (SPUC) emailed to say that two of her friends (also from SPUC) would like to participate. Initially, I was hesitant about agreeing to this since prior relationships between the three would affect social interaction. However, I agreed for two reasons. First, I was concerned by low response rates since I still only had four recruits (three of whom did not end up attending the experiment). Second, and more importantly, since the two prospective participants had asked to attend, I was guaranteed two more people who were willing to engage with the issues for discussion. This is an example of snowball sampling whereby the researcher ‘collect[s] data on the few members of the target population [he or she] can locate, and then ask[s] those individuals to provide the information needed to locate other members of that population whom they happen to know.’ As Babbie informs, this method of sampling ‘is appropriate when the members of a special population are difficult to locate.’ Given both the diversity of individuals I sought, and the low response rates during participant recruitment, snowballing was a useful technique.

Later, I employed two further cases of snowball sampling when one of my colleagues recommended two participants: one of whom had previously been detained in Iran for promoting women’s rights, and the other who was a member of the Greek Orthodox Church and also identifies as a homosexual. Whilst these two participants limit the study since they already knew each other, they were invaluable in enhancing the diversity of the group.

The final phase of participant selection involved contacting the student body. I had decided to leave this closer to the event since I was close

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426 Ibid., p. 195.
to them and they were near to the event, making it easier to establish and maintain contact, whilst also reducing barriers of time and access. Since other participants had already completed recruitment questionnaires, I was aware of the diversity of the evolving group, and so emailed the student union versions of the wider society groups from whom I had no participants. I also emailed similar societies at local universities, including Loughborough, Leicester, Nottingham Trent and Lincoln. At Nottingham, I followed the emails up with lecture and seminar announcements to establish a rapport with the students. I also followed up with emails to the academic departments. One student belongs to the humanities department; one is a member of the university LGBT network, Buddhist Society, Women’s Network and Amnesty International; another is a member of the university’s Czech and Slovak Society; and a final one is an active member of the Nottingham University Conservative Association and also identifies as a homosexual. The final participant was one of my former students; whilst I was not his seminar tutor at the time of the experiment, I had taught him the previous semester. When evaluating the experiment findings, I will need to be reflective on the intersubjectivities that arise from my prior knowledge of this participant.

**Limitations to Participant Recruitment**

One factor that might have contributed to low response rates is the decision not to pay participants for their involvement in the experiment. Since participants were not paid, it suggests that they attended because they were both willing and able to share their views. In order to reduce barriers of time and cost, I reimbursed expenses and organised the experiment on a Saturday. However, access was perhaps more of a difficulty for parents or those working in certain professions (such as emergency service workers), as well as those who were unable to pay for transport. Had I offered monetary incentives to participants (which I did consider when the response rate was low), it may have broadened my sample to include those who were unwilling or unable to share their views.

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427 See Appendix 4 for the participant recruitment questionnaire.
views. For instance, in spite of students comprising only four of the nine participants, the majority of participants had previously had university educations. Thus, it is evident that my experiment attracted educated people. Perhaps if I had provided monetary incentives, I could have broadened this sample by motivating people to attend who might otherwise be unwilling to share their beliefs. Given concerns expressed by critics that agonistic democracy might be unable to mediate conflict between those who are unwilling to share their views, attracting such people could have enriched the research. However, I chose not to offer monetary incentives in order to attract participants who were genuinely interested in the topics of discussion, and could enrich the discussion with a diversity of views.

Returning to the opening quote, it is evident that, far from ‘running like clockwork,’ my participant selection process posed numerous obstacles. I suffered from low response rates and had to be flexible and modify my approach several times. Some of my participants were recruited through snowballing, some knew one another prior to the experiment, and one knew me beforehand. All of these factors will affect the way in which I explore their interactions and interpret the experiment. Yet in spite of these limitations, participants provided a diversity of views, which is necessary for the consideration of agonistic democracy.

Data Collection

First, I discuss the use of questionnaires, which were employed throughout the experiment to gather data about the participants’ views of the discussions. Subsequently, I examine the usage of video-recording in enabling my analysis of the discussions. Next, I explain how the two above methods were combined with the employment of observers who completed both predesigned observation sheets and qualitative notes on the discussions. Finally, I aspire to bring all of the methods together through an exploration of triangulation, discussing how this sought to reduce the limitations of each method.
Questionnaires

Questionnaires were administered at the beginning and the end of the day in order to assess whether participants’ perceptions had changed as a result of the discussions.428 These two questionnaires were identical aside from two features: the first included a question asking participants how strongly they felt about abortion and gay marriage, two of the three discussion topics.429 During the pilot study, it was evident that levels of conflict were considerably higher during the abortion discussion than that of gay marriage, so the question was added to explore whether the initial interest levels of participants might influence the level of conflict. The other difference between the ‘before’ and ‘after’ questionnaires, was that the latter asked participants to name the discussion in which: they felt most engaged; they were best able to express their opinions; their beliefs were most challenged; the quality of the opinions were the best; they developed an understanding towards others; they felt most passionate; and group unity was strongest. These questions were added to allow triangulation between the participants’ reflections of the process with my analysis of their behaviour during the discussions and their other questionnaire responses. I also asked them to fill in one at the end of each of the three discussions. The construction and content of these will be discussed in depth in the following chapter.430

Employing an Adaptation of Q Method to Create Questionnaires

An adaptation of Q method was implemented when constructing the participant questionnaires from agonistic theory. This entailed breaking down each complex and abstract concept into multiple sentences, each of which defines a particular element of the concept. The concept is only wholly represented when all of the sentences are combined. Q method has primarily been associated with quantitative research,

428 See Appendix 5 for a sample of each.
429 It was not possible to ask a similar question about participant interest in multicultural values because the discussion about this included a whole host of values which participants were asked to rank during the first discussion. Had the participants individually ranked their interest in these prior to the discussion, it would have affected the collective discussion.
430 See Appendix 6 for each of these.
however it is now ‘considered particularly suitable for researching the range and diversity of subjective experiences, perspectives and beliefs.’\textsuperscript{431} Geraint Ellis states that Q method ‘attempts to combine the qualitative study of attitudes with the statistical rigour of quantitative research techniques.’\textsuperscript{432} However, given my exploratory approach, my research focuses on the qualitative goal of conducting a study of attitudes, rejecting the latter of employing statistical rigour. My research draws from this study of attitudes by providing participants with several statements representing a variety of views.\textsuperscript{433} This was achieved by creating questionnaires comprised of statements, which reflect agonistic behaviours as well as some alternative beliefs. Q method requires that statements derive from sources such as interviews, academic literature and the media,\textsuperscript{434} and my research draws on literature from each of the three agonistic approaches as the basis for the statements. When employing this technique for ‘integrity’, for instance, I listed all definitions given by Owen. Next, in order to eliminate overlap, I ignored phrases that provided duplicate meanings. However, this is where my research diverges from typical applications of Q method. As Thomas Webler et al demonstrate, ‘Q participants are people with clearly different opinions who are asked to express opinions about the Q statements by sorting them, i.e. “doing a Q sort”.’\textsuperscript{435} Rather than providing participants with the full range of phrases and asking them to rank these, I provided them with a limited selection, which focused on the aspects of the theory I most wanted to explore. This reflected the time constraints of the experiment and aspired to keep participants engaged. Thus, I modified and, as a result of the pilot study, remodified these phrases in order to provide clear, concise statements for participants.\textsuperscript{436} The goal was to maintain the accuracy of the theory, whilst also creating statements that

\textsuperscript{432} Ellis, G. REDO Welcome | The Research. (online).
\textsuperscript{433} Shinebourne, P. (2009), p. 2.
\textsuperscript{434} Ibid., p. 2.
\textsuperscript{436} See Appendix 7 for an example of this through consideration of Tully’s principle of \textit{audire alteram partem}. 
participants could understand, and decide whether or not they identified with these. In drawing on Q method in this way, I was able to provide a nuanced account of agonistic concepts since I could explore which (if any) elements of a concept were present. For example, it might be that participants listened to others, but did not respond to explain their disagreement.

Limitations of Using Questionnaires

Primarily, questionnaires were implemented as they enabled me to trace perspectives across the day, and after the day, and to compare responses between participants. As Floyd J. Fowler Jr. asserts, ‘providing respondents with a constrained number of answer options increases the likelihood that there will be enough people giving any particular answer to be analytically interesting.’ Thus, standardised questionnaires were deemed more appropriate than interviews, for instance. However, in spite of aspiring toward standardisation, ‘it is naïve to believe that standardized questions will always received standardized, rational responses.’ This raises the concern that different participants interpret questions in a variety of ways. Yet, as Alan Buckingham and Peter Saunders affirm, we can reduce the dangers of this by ensuring that questions are ‘worded simply and kept short and unambiguous.’ In order to evaluate whether my questions fulfilled such criteria, participants of the pilot study were asked to inform me of any unclear questions, and such questions were reshaped for the main experiment. The pilot study was thereby invaluable in helping me to ‘eliminate or at least reduce questions that are likely to mislead.’ In addition to this, I remained in the room with the participants whilst they completed their questionnaires and regularly reminded them to ask for clarification at any point. I also tried to aid participants’ understanding by employing a clear format. In so doing, I

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438 Ibid., p. 189.
440 See Appendix 8 for an example of a questionnaire used in the pilot study.
441 Ibid., p. 189.
ensured that questionnaires were double-line spaced, consistently employed box ticking (with the exception of the interest questions which used a continuum scale), and avoided negatives. Gray explains that, by consistently employing a single response method such as box ticking, we receive clearer responses,\(^{442}\) and Babbie informs us that by avoiding the use of negatives, we reduce the likelihood that people will misread the question.\(^{443}\)

There is an additional limitation to questionnaires, which is particularly poignant when requiring participants to choose between several options. The danger is, that if they cannot choose, ‘respondents may give flippant, inaccurate or misleading answers, but the researcher is not in a position to detect this.’\(^{444}\) I tried to overcome this by encouraging participants to ask me questions, and telling them to note on their questionnaire instances where they were unsure of which box to tick.\(^{445}\) Another attempt at overcoming this was by leaving a space at the end of each questionnaire for additional comments in which respondents could note their uncertainty. Although this creates a larger and more complicated data set for analysis, it enriches the findings by allowing for nuanced positions.

A further issue is my comprehension of participants’ answers. Just as respondents face the problem of unclear questions, the researcher faces the problem of unclear answers. As Gray states, ‘there is no opportunity to ask questions or to clear up ambiguous or ill-conceived answers.’\(^{446}\) This became evident after the pilot study when the questionnaires demonstrated that several participants were bored during the abortion discussion, however the reason for the boredom was unclear. This was a significant weakness in the questionnaire since Mouffe’s claim that clearly defined, oppositional identities motivate people into engagement with diverse others was a significant point for


\(^{443}\) Babbie, E. (1992), p. 188.

\(^{444}\) Ibid., p. 189.

\(^{445}\) Ibid., p. 189.

\(^{446}\) See Appendix 9 for a sample questionnaire which notes the respondent’s uncertainty.  

\(^{446}\) Ibid., p. 189.
exploration. The questionnaires informed me that for many participants this was not the case during the abortion discussion, yet they did not inform me why this was not the case. The questionnaires were subsequently modified for the main experiment to probe why participants felt either engaged or bored.

Using questionnaires as a source of comparison also raises concerns over whether initial questionnaires are affected by previous ones; a factor I have previously referred to as ‘history.’ As Thomas Cook and Donald Campbell state, ‘familiarity with a test can sometimes enhance performance because items and error responses are more likely to be remembered at later testing sessions.’ Hence, as Arlene Fink explains, ‘[participants] may become alert to the kinds of behaviors that are expected or favored.’ In order to prevent this, I sought to avoid answers deemed as ‘correct.’ For instance, I decided not to employ the Likert scale whereby participants state the extent to which they agree or disagree with a statement. I had initially designed my questionnaires in this format, but felt that this encouraged leading questions, inferring ‘correct’ and ‘incorrect’ answers. Fowler Jr. supports this concern, claiming that ‘studies show that some respondents are particularly likely to agree (or acquiesce) when questions are put in this form.’ Instead, I used the list approach, providing participants with two or three statements and asking them to tick the one which most applied. In constructing these statements, I avoided extreme responses since it is less likely that participants would tick these options. Babbie endorses this, affirming that researchers should avoid including responses that they themselves would not feel comfortable admitting to. For instance, I was careful to word those responses which participants might find difficult to admit to in a sensitive manner.

Further, Gray observes that, ‘what we choose not to ask about, may just as easily reflect our world view as what we include in the questionnaire.’\textsuperscript{451} By using the list style rather than the Likert scale, participants were provided with a diversity of statements, which prevented the questionnaire from focusing solely on agonistic concepts of my research. It is still important to note that, in spite of this, the questionnaires focused on social behaviour, such as respect and understanding, and this will have affected the responses. However, I hope that this was somewhat countered by the exploratory nature of my research in which I did not seek to prove or disprove one of the three theories. This might reduce the likelihood that participants will aim to predict the ‘correct’ answers since it was explained to them that I was exploring how different frameworks of discussion may or may not affect social interactions.

**Video Analysis**

The rationale for the usage of video-recording is that observation adds a fundamental element in perceiving social interactions: it enables verbal communication and behaviour to be captured and analysed. The presence of a video-camera adds to such observation as, without it, my account of the day would be impeded by the ‘untrustworthy’ nature of memory.\textsuperscript{452} By contrast, however, ‘videotaping allows for repeat observation of fleeting situations.’\textsuperscript{453} This was particularly important for my experiment as the discussions moved quite quickly, and flippant responses or subtle behaviours (such as eye-rolling) might have been missed without reference to video-recordings. However, there are some limitations to the use of videos, which I will outline alongside an explanation of how I sought to reduce these.

**Limitations of Using Video Analysis**

Creswell alerts us to the practical limitations of using a video-camera, which have methodological implications. He states that the researcher

\textsuperscript{452} Babbie, E. (1992), p. 293.
must give some thought to the reduction of background noise, whether a close-up or distance shot is required, and the prime location for the camera. After the pilot study, I noticed that participants seemed to feel more relaxed, and were more talkative when there was more background noise. Thus, I had considered playing the radio throughout the main experiment in order to create a comfortable environment in which the participants felt at ease to express their opinions. However, a preliminary test showed that if background music was on then participants would not be heard on the video. Hence, this introduced a potential limitation to the study. I tried to keep this limitation to a minimum, however, by introducing other factors which aspired to create a warm environment, such as multiple coffee breaks; an ice-breaker exercise; getting to know the participants; and encouraging participants to leave for toilet breaks and refreshments as they pleased.

The decision to provide close-ups or distance recording was also a factor to which I devoted much attention. Close-up recording would have been useful in enabling an in-depth exploration of the behaviour and manner of individual participants. This would have been particularly useful in analysing the behaviour of one or two dominant members of the group. However, since my research focuses on interactions between people, I decided that distance recording would be the most appropriate method for capturing relations. In employing this technique, recording is not simply restricted to the individual who is currently speaking, but captures (albeit to a lesser extent) the expressions and behaviours of the others in the group too. The limitation of this method is that the camera captured data about some participants better than others, depending on their position in the room. I tried to combat this by the participant questionnaires and observer sheets and notes, yet this must be taken into account during the evaluation of experiment data.

Finally, the prime location for the camera was also significant, since ‘you should take care that the camera and recording equipment do not dominate the social situation.’\textsuperscript{455} This was paramount in reducing the extent to which participants’ behaviour changed as a result of the camera. In an attempt at preventing the camera from dominating the discussions, it was placed in the corner of the room on a maximum zoom setting in order to maintain the greatest possible distance between the camera and the participants. Additionally, a tripod was used as this seemed less invasive than a person holding the camera. Other measures, such as switching the camera on during the morning ice-breaker exercises and leaving it set up (but not recording) during breaks, were implemented to enable participants to become familiar with its presence. Indeed, as Gray acknowledges, ‘people may change their behaviour when being observed,’\textsuperscript{456} and this is perhaps further heightened with the employment of a camera. However, I hope to have somewhat lessened the effects of the camera on the participants’ behaviour through the discussed measures.

**Observers**

An additional limitation to video-analysis is that it only includes the interpretation of the researcher. As discussed in the previous sections, my interpretation will be influenced by factors, such as prior knowledge of the participants, intersubjectivities between participants and myself, and the clarity of questionnaire responses. Thus, to enrich the study and provide multiple interpretations, I combined questionnaires and video-analysis with data collected from three observers. These observers were colleagues from my department who, although aware of the general questions of my research, were unaware of the literature in my field. To enhance efficiency and comparability, each observer was given a quantitative observer sheet for each discussion.\textsuperscript{457} This included potential behaviours during the discussion, such as ‘lots of people involved in the discussion’ and ‘people staring into space.’

\textsuperscript{455} Ibid., p. 251.
\textsuperscript{456} Gray, D. (2004), p. 239.
\textsuperscript{457} See Appendix 10 for a sample of each of these.
These were derived from the statements produced in the Q methodology process. Observers were then required to write either never (N), rarely (R), sometimes (S), often (O) or always (A) for each characteristic every ten minutes. After ten minutes, observers began the evaluation again. However, I felt that these were quite limited, and so each observer was also provided with plain paper on which to provide a more in-depth account of interactions. This was particularly significant in instances whereby one or two people dominated, as the observers produced lots of qualitative data about specific individuals whose behaviour did not reflect that of the general group. The standardised format was employed in order to guide the focus of observers toward my research questions, enhance efficiency, and allow for comparison. It also provided observers with space to write their own observations on the plain paper, since ‘speedy handling of anticipated observations can give you more freedom to observe the unanticipated.’

The reason for employing three observers arose from the pilot study in which I had only used two. In analysing the content of their observations, I noticed a significant discrepancy between the two observers. However, I was uncomfortable choosing between two polar observations, as if one was ‘right’ and the other was ‘wrong,’ since this rendered the observers meaningless. I thereby decided to employ an additional observer in order to combat this problem. By adding an additional perspective to combine with participant reflections and my video-analysis, I aspired to present a richer picture of the experiment day.

**Limitations to Observer Sheets**

Given what has already been said about the tendency to change one’s behaviour under observation, the experiment was limited by the fact that four people were watching the discussions. Although it was not appropriate to get involved in the discussions (as our views might have

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influenced the views or behaviour of others), we attempted to reduce the effects of observation by ‘build[ing] rapport, established on “relationships that are emotional and personal, not formal and hierarchical”’. In order to build relationships which overcame formality and hierarchy, we dressed in a smart-casual manner, engaged with participants between discussions, and gave participants control of their space by encouraging them to have toilet breaks and take refreshments as they wished. Such attempts were limited by formal components, such as topics for discussion, time constraints, and our status as observers. However, by employing these measures, I aimed to reduce the impact of observation. In addition to adopting these measures, I also attempted to locate the observers at a distance from the discussion, since ‘people are likely to behave differently if they see you taking down everything they say or do.’ Additionally, just as participants are affected by the process of testing and retesting, so too are researchers – and in my case, observers. Cook and Campbell affirm that ‘instrumentation is involved when human observers become more experienced between a pre-test and post-test.’ Thus, changes between the discussions may also be affected by the observers’ familiarisation with the observer sheets as well as their increased knowledge of the participants. However, I attempted to limit the first by using the same sheets during the pilot study, and the same observers (except the additional one), thereby providing observers with an opportunity to practice completing the sheets. I met with all three observers before the main experiment, showing them the sheets and encouraging them to ask me about any questions they should have. Furthermore, the process of triangulation – both between the three observers, and across participants, observers and the video recordings – enabled me to dilute this limitation.

**Triangulation**

There are two different types of triangulation of which my research has made use: investigator triangulation and methodological triangulation. Investigator triangulation is when 'different observers or interviewers are employed to reveal and minimize biases coming for the individual researcher,'\textsuperscript{462} and this was employed to gather data sets which can be combined with my analysis of the video-recordings. In so doing, I attempt to provide alternative interpretations, which were not affected by the same assumptions as mine.

On the topic of methodological triangulation, Webb et al claim that all research methods are biased, and thereby 'argued for the use of a collection of methods, or multiple operationalism, which, they believed, would reduce the effect of the particular biases of each one.'\textsuperscript{463} In this way, triangulation can add richness to the empirical data because, as Norman Denzin asserts, 'the flaws of one method are often the strengths of another, and by combining methods, observers can achieve the best of each, while overcoming their unique deficiencies.'\textsuperscript{464} In my research, for instance, video-analysis and observer analysis allow for in-depth accounts of participant behaviour, an element that questionnaires do not enable. On the other hand, questionnaires allow for first-hand reflections by those involved in the discussions; something which is missing from observations and video analysis. Thus, triangulation offered richer understanding, 'perhaps by providing different perspectives.'\textsuperscript{465} On this view, my research offers a deeper understanding by combining the perspectives of those encountering conflictual situations with those of several observers who witness the situations and those of a researcher seeking to link such situations with theoretical perspectives. Therefore, by employing the two types of triangulation, I attempted to enrich my research, reducing its limitations by offering multiple perspectives.

\textsuperscript{464} Denzin, N. in ibid., p. 38.  
\textsuperscript{465} Ibid., p. 267.
So as not to cause harm to my participants, the research implemented several ethical measures in addition to obtaining ethical approval from the University of Nottingham. These include consent forms, careful wording of questionnaires, sensitive behaviour toward participants, and strategic timing of discussions.

The process of achieving informed consent was a lengthy one, beginning at first contact with participants. The posters and emails to which participants initially responded outlined the purpose of the research and gave information about the day. When contact was subsequently established with individual participants, they were then provided with a timetable of discussion topics, given details about the composition of the group, and informed about recording and observers. As much information as possible was provided to ensure that consent was fully informed. Following this, participants were required to initial and sign two copies of a consent form (one which I collected), outlining the details and purpose of the research. Participants had the chance to ask questions throughout this process, and were encouraged to email after the event, should they have any questions.

The next ethical issue was the wording of questionnaires, in which I attempted to avoid prejudiced or loaded terms that might offend participants. Similarly, it was essential that the observers and I were sensitive to participants’ opinions. Since the group held a diversity of views, it was important to avoid openly agreeing or disagreeing with participants. This was of particular significance given the personal nature of the discussion content in which one participant revealed that she had had an abortion, two participants revealed that they were homosexual and another revealed that he was bisexual.

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466 See Appendix 11 for my accepted Ethical Review form.
467 See Appendix 12 for a sample email.
468 See Appendix 13 for a copy of the consent form.
In addition to showing sensitivity toward participants, it was also imperative to ensure that conflict between participants did not get out of control. This meant being aware of rising levels of conflict and being prepared to intervene if necessary. Fortunately, intervention was not needed during my discussions, and one participant commented that they enjoyed the day because, unlike other events they had attended, they did not feel that people were ‘shouting down’ her views.

Finally, the experiment was designed so that the discussions were ordered in an ethical way. After the pilot study, it was evident that the adversarial discussion reflecting Mouffe’s politics had the highest levels of conflict and tension. On the other hand, people seemed to be more respectful and understanding during the inclusive discussion representing Tully and Connolly’s politics. As a result, I decided to put the adversarial framework as the second discussion of the day, and the inclusive framework as the final discussion. I felt it would be unethical to finish the day with a very conflictual discussion in which relations were hostile. Instead, by placing it in the middle of the day before a calmer discussion, I aspired to allow relations to improve between participants before they left the day.

**Conclusion**

This chapter has argued that further empirical consideration is important to agonistic democracy, and is restricted by existing literature. Thus, my empirical research aimed to generate new data, aspiring to enrich such consideration. Whilst drawing on experimental design, I rejected the classical positivist approach, instead adopting an exploratory approach. As such, my method is less concerned with providing internal and external validity, and more interested in providing reflection on the subjectivities and intersubjectivities that provide potential limitations to the study. I demonstrated the necessity of flexibility during sampling; showed how the combination of several methods offers a
range of perspectives; discussed steps taken to reduce the limitations of each method; and outlined ethical concerns.
Chapter Five: Operationalising Agonistic Concepts

This chapter demonstrates how agonistic concepts drawn from the three strands of agonistic democracy shaped the three discussion frameworks in the experimental research. Owen’s perfectionist agonism was represented by a discussion about the ranking of certain values; Mouffe’s adversarial agonism was brought to life during a discussion about abortion; and Connolly and Tully’s inclusive concepts were mirrored in a discussion on gay rights. I will discuss each in turn, explaining how each discussion framework was developed from theoretical concepts belonging to a particular strand of agonistic democracy.

Introducing the Perfectionist Framework: Revisiting Perfectionist Concepts

The first core concept of Owen’s perfectionist agonism is perspectivism, which emphasises that each perspective is one amongst many. Owen asserts that each diverse perspective is constituted by its historical community, following Nietzsche in assuming that individual questions, such as ‘who am I?’ and ‘what should I do?’ are closely linked to communal questions, such as those concerning our culture; ‘who are we?’ and those concerning our politics; ‘what should we do?’ Thus, for Owen, ‘politics is the practice through which the community reflects on and constituted itself as a community.’ Additionally, he affirms that citizens acquire autonomy and agency from engaging in communal discussion surrounding diverse perspectives. He claims that ‘it is in and through the history of politics as a practice that we become members of a historical community characterised by standards of excellence and the contestation of these standards.’ Thus, perspectivism involves acknowledgment that all perspectives are shaped by and also shape their historical community, and that through engaging with others about

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469 See Appendix 14 for an overview of the empirical work.
471 Ibid., p. 145.
472 Ibid., p. 143.
these perspectives, citizens become autonomous agents.

An additional perfectionist concept is eternal recurrence, which entails ‘act[ing] always according to that maxim which you can at the same time will as eternally recurring.’ This concept links to self-mastery and integrity since ‘one exhibits one’s nobility (self-mastery) publicly by acting in accordance with the commitments one espouses.’ Self-mastery requires personal integrity in developing a coherent set of principles, and ethical integrity in ensuring that these principles reflect one’s ethical commitments. One acquires such integrity communally since eternal recurrence is ‘a public activity in the sense of being subject to public criteria and exhibited through the consonance of actions and commitments, and as such is subject to public testing.’ Thus, perfectionism develops the self-mastery and integrity of citizens by requiring them to test their ‘perspectives against each other in coming to an honest judgment concerning the degree to which they satisfy the interests (exhibits the virtues) of the practice.’

The next concept constituting a fundamental part of perfectionism is Nietzschean competition. Employing Nietzsche’s analogy of the two Erises, Owen informs us that competition can channel envy into virtue and the resultant well being of the state. He explains this, asserting that competition encourages citizens to ‘strive to surpass each other, and, ultimately, to set new standards of nobility.’ Through this collective modification of standards of nobility, Owen affirms that ‘we develop our human powers,’ and consequently, society is bettered by ‘striving for distinction and excellence in social practices, for ever greater words and deeds.’ Owen affirms that competition is heightened because, in spite of equal access to political engagement,

473 Ibid., p. 113.
474 Ibid., p. 118.
475 Ibid, p. 117.
476 Ibid., p. 119.
477 Ibid., p. 143.
479 Ibid., p. 139.
480 Ibid., p. 139.
481 Ibid., p. 389.
citizens who exhibit more integrity and generate more support for their recommendations will gain more authority.\textsuperscript{482}

The final concept intrinsic to Owen’s perfectionism is ‘enlarged mentality.’ Borrowing this term from Arendt, Owen explains it as our capacity to entertain a plurality of competing perspectives within the process of coming to a judgement.\textsuperscript{483} Owen asserts that this principle arises from integrity, stating that ‘this position commits citizens to a form of society which is characterised by the cultivation of the conditions of honest and just argument between free and equal citizens.’\textsuperscript{484} As a result of adopting an enlarged mentality, according to Owen two consequences will arise: solidarity and self-mastery. Of the first, Owen explicates that behaving honestly and justly ‘are the prerequisites for reconciling contestation and community in a sense of solidarity, of being engaged in a common quest.’\textsuperscript{485} Thus, by exhibiting integrity through honest and just engagement, citizens become involved in a common quest of perspective testing, thereby developing solidarity. Second, Owen states that dialogue with diverse others encourages self-mastery. This concept encompasses the formulation of new standards, thereby resonating with Connolly’s critical responsiveness. Fossen describes self-mastery as ‘not only the achievement of greater excellence according to some specific measure, but to set a new measure of excellence to overcome the old.’\textsuperscript{486} Hence, Owen argues that, by engaging with a plurality of perspectives, citizens are not only able to improve existing standards, they can also challenge the criteria of ‘improvement’ itself. Thus, adopting an enlarged mentality toward conflicting views is fundamental to Owen’s theory, promoting both solidarity and the critique of existing values.

\textit{A Brief Overview of the Perfectionist Framework}

\textsuperscript{483} Ibid., p. 143.
\textsuperscript{484} Ibid., p. 163.
\textsuperscript{485} Ibid., p. 146.
Prior to the perfectionist discussion, the chairs had been left in a standard classroom format. I asked participants to rearrange the furniture as they thought best. Participants were given five cards, each one with the name of a different fictional charity, alongside a description of the charity and the values it sought to embody. Participants were given £15000 of replica money and were asked to divide this between the five charities, with the first charity receiving £5000, second £4000, third £3000, fourth £2000 and fifth £1000. They were not told how they should come to a decision on the order of rank but were informed that this was to be their collective decision. They were also asked to base their ranking, not on whom the charities benefit, but on the values they embody.

Creating a Discussion Framework Informed by Perfectionist Concepts

The primary difference between the content of this discussion and the subsequent adversarial and inclusive ones is that the perfectionist discussion incorporates a whole host of values. The reason for choosing several values for the basis of discussion, is to reflect Owen's view that 'modernity is characterised by an irreducible pluralism concerning the character of the good life.' Hence, values such as universality, duty and excellence were employed to demonstrate how values often conflict with one another. Thus, in including a diverse range of values in the discussion, I sought to represent the numerous conflicting values in society.

The introduction of several values into the discussion enabled the task to echo perfectionist agonist concepts. In asking participants to rank the charities according to which values they embodied, I aspired to explore eternal recurrence. By requiring participants to allocate sums of money according to the order of rank, I aimed to provide opportunities for them to enter into 'honest deliberation on the plurality of political perspectives,' in which the first value 'exhibits the best ordering of the

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487 See Appendix 14 for a description of each charity.
virtues for the community and that one exhibits is ordering of virtues as a citizen, that is, that one's political perspective expresses the ordering of one's soul.\textsuperscript{489} The task of ranking charities thereby encouraged participants to test their perspectives against one another, requiring them to reflect on which value best satisfied 'the maximal expression of the virtues.'\textsuperscript{490} All of the charities belonged to the same category (sports) in an attempt at preventing participants from focusing on the content and beneficiaries of the charities, instead encouraging them to consider the values they encompass. This was further aspired toward through the fictional element of each charity, since it prevented aimed participants from drawing on prior assumptions about existing charities.

In so doing, the task promotes four elements of perfectionism. First, the notion of an enlarged mentality is explored, since forming a collective order of rank necessitates engagement between plural perspectives. Second, self-mastery is enabled since the task requires participants to critically challenge existing values. Additionally, competition is given the opportunity to arise through the testing of perspectives.\textsuperscript{491} Finally, the group is given autonomy over parts of the task in order to explore solidarity.

Giving participants autonomy over the room layout also resonated with Owen's perfectionist theory. This reflects Owen's perspectivism in which he emphasises the importance of autonomy, which 'requires that one experience one's self as unified.'\textsuperscript{492} According to Owen, this unification arises through engagement with diverse others. In order to offer participants the opportunity to work together, they were granted autonomy with respect to the room layout. Additionally, the room layout aspired to promote 'enlarged mentality' in which solidarity forms

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\textsuperscript{489} Ibid., p. 145.  
\textsuperscript{490} Ibid., p. 145.  
\textsuperscript{491} The usage of replica money, which participants had to physically assign to each charity, was introduced following the pilot study to increase competition. Owen states that once citizens become competitive about their values, they will strive to surpass one another, and society will be enhanced as a result. It was my contention that by asking participants to place money on each charity (as opposed to communicating their decision verbally), the implications of the ranking order would be more evident, increasing the feeling of competition.\textsuperscript{492} Ibid., p. 101.
between citizens engaging in a common quest. By requiring participants to organise their physical space together, they became involved in a common quest. This also resonates with the new institutionalist notion of demonstrated practices, since providing collective autonomy encourages participants to follow one another’s behaviour. Finally, giving participants responsibility for their room layout promoted participation since they were required to reach a collective decision.

Similarly, participants were informed that it was their decision as to how they should arrive at an order of rank. Just as the room layout aspired to promote autonomy, so did granting participants power over the decision-making process. This also furthers solidarity in which, again, participants are involved in a common quest.

Creating Questionnaires Informed by Perfectionist Concepts

As discussed in the previous chapter, the questionnaires were created using Q method. They represented perspectivism through a variety of statements. One, for instance provides a choice between ‘we mainly discussed which values were important to us as individuals’ and ‘we mainly discussed which values were important to us as a group.’ This aims to explore the perspectivist view that the question of who I am (for instance, which values I endorse) is closely linked to who we are (cultural values). Another asks whether participants criticised certain values and practices (juxtaposed with whether they saw all values and practices as having equal worth). This reflects the perspectivist notion that political communities should be interested in ‘the question of which cultural practices and virtues should be cultivated and which should be discouraged.’ An additional pair of statements asks whether or not participants’ values were reflected by the final decision, relating to the perspectivist understanding of value discussion as a communal and collective practice. Two final pairs of phrases ask participants whether

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493 See Appendix 6 for the Values Discussion Questionnaires.
494 Ibid., p. 145.
the discussion made them reconsider who they are (or whether they were already aware of this), and whether reasons for their views developed through the discussion (or whether they already held these). These options aspire to explore the perspectivist idea of autonomy as something that arises through discussion with others.

An additional concept I sought to embody through the questionnaires was eternal recurrence. First, statements asking whether participants thought about which values were important to them relate to Owen's belief that who we are and what we should do are interlinked with who I am and what I should do. The next asks participants whether there was disagreement about the order of rank, which explores Owen’s emphasis on the existence of a plurality of perspectives. Following this, statements ask whether participants considered what makes a values 'good' or 'bad,' and whether they disagreed on 'good' and 'bad' values. This relates to Owen's notion of self-mastery in which citizens are to, not only evaluate values according to current standards, but to challenge the standards themselves. The subsequent statements consider whether participants responded or ignored those with whom they disagreed. This represents Owen’s view that ‘because one’s integrity is tied to tolerance, this position commits citizens to a form of society which is characterised by the cultivation of the conditions of honest and just argument between free and equal citizens.’ An additional pair of statements asks whether participants felt more or less respected after expressing their views, linking to Owen's understanding of an integral citizen as one who participates with others. Finally, the questionnaire asks whether those with the most authority were those whose views were expressed most clearly, shared most widely, or those who said very little. This provides an insight into Owen's assertion that authority arises through the clear expression of views and the harnessing of support for such views.

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495 Ibid., p. 162.
One pair of statements asked whether participants felt competitive about their values. In so doing, this question highlights Owen’s emphasis on competition as the driver for productive engagement. According to him, competition is of great significance because it encourages citizens to strive toward better values, thereby enhancing their standards of nobility - and those of society. This question will also be used to cross-reference with the adversarial discussion, which views a different type of competition as imperative to political engagement.\footnote{496}

Further statements aspired to provide insight into Owen’s concept of enlarged mentality. For instance, statements explore whether participants tolerated all views or whether they found some hard to tolerate. Likewise, another pair asked whether they tolerated all views or whether some were difficult to tolerate. These statements represent Owen’s view that toleration ‘for other views, a willingness to engage with them in an open and fair-minded way, is a condition of claiming one’s own beliefs to be true.’\footnote{497} Additional statements ask participants whether they felt like part of the group or whether they felt isolated from it, exploring Owen’s notion that bonds of solidarity are formed through a common quest, rather than common values. This will, again, cross-reference with the adversarial discussion, which promotes unity through shared values. A further pair of statements asks if the group felt like a single, united ‘group’ and, if so, whether this arose through adherence to shared values or engagement in a common quest. This echoes the previous statements in exploring Owen’s promotion of a common quest to create unity.

The questionnaires also explored issues, such as the impact of other beliefs on one’s own; whether or not the discussion was dominated by one or two individuals; whether interest levels increased or decreased during conflict; whether participants were able to set aside prior judgments; and whether the ranking order was temporary or permanent.

\footnote{496 This is discussed in more detail in the following section.}
\footnote{497 Ibid., p.161.}
The inclusion of these themes enabled comparison with the second and third discussions.

Creating Observer Sheets Informed by Perfectionist Concepts

In the observer sheets, perfectionism is embodied through the behavioural description ‘people become more sure of their own beliefs after hearing the arguments of others (i.e. they argued more strongly for their side),’ and simultaneously by the affirmation that participants changed their views after hearing the other side. This resonates with Owen’s notion of autonomy in which citizens are shaped by engagement with their community. It is also depicted by phrases stating that participants discussed which values should be encouraged (or included), and which should be discouraged (or banned). This reflects the communal nature of perspectivism in which a community constitutes and reconstitutes itself through the engagement of plural perspectives.

Eternal recurrence is symbolised in the observer sheets, first, by the assertion that people shared their beliefs with one another, representing the requirement that citizens publicly test their perspectives against those of others. Similarly, the statement indicating the sharing of a range of beliefs mirrors Owen’s calls for citizens to engage with a plurality of perspectives. This is echoed by a sentence claiming that participants engaged with those they disagreed with, explaining their disagreement. Further, phrases state that those with the most authority were those who expressed their views most clearly, or gained the most support, representing Owen’s understanding of authority which the promotion and support of a particular doctrine. Additionally, the observer sheets described participants discussing which values should be prioritised, and what constitutes a good value, symbolising Owen’s concept self-mastery whereby citizens challenge societal standards.

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498 See Appendix 10 for the Perfectionist Observer sheets.
499 Ibid., p. 161.
Competition was evident in the description ‘people became very competitive about their beliefs (i.e. they showed passion and frustration, they compared their beliefs to those of others, they criticised views of others, they showed how their views were better).’ Further, the statement that conflict enabled participants to arrive at new conclusions - ‘i.e. modifying their original arguments to reach new conclusions – not simply to side with dominant members’ – resonates with Owen’s emphasis on striving to surpass one another.

Enlarged mentality was reflected in the observer sheets by the notion of respectful behaviour, whereby people listened to one another, empathised, and did not interrupt, swear, shout or turn the discussion personal. It also involved reflecting on what people had previously said when considering their own beliefs. For Owen, the toleration of diverse beliefs is essential to one’s own integrity. Conversely, the sheets indicated that interrupting, shouting, swearing, not listening, rolling of eyes and sniggering all infer a lack of respect and thereby an absence of enlarged mentality.

Additionally, descriptions encompassing a large/limited number of participants involved in the discussion; and whether people changed their mind according to the dominant beliefs all seek to act as cross-references with the latter discussions.

**Introducing the Adversarial Framework: Revisiting Adversarial Concepts**

The first concept of great significance to Mouffe is that of the ‘political’. For Mouffe, the realm of the political ‘refers to this dimension of antagonism which can take many forms and can emerge in diverse social relations. It is a dimension that can never be eradicated.’

Claiming that citizens share value sets, but disagree on how to interpret and implement these, Mouffe states that antagonism, or disagreement, 

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‘provides the stuff of democratic politics,’ and should not be eradicated through consensus. Mouffe affirms that when an excess of consensus occurs, ‘passions cannot be given a democratic outlet,’ and citizens then turn to national, religious, or ethnic conflict. Thus, for Mouffe, conflict and antagonism are essential in ensuring democratic engagement.

In seeking to prevent citizens from apathy and non-democratic identification, Mouffe promotes a ‘vibrant clash of democratic political positions’ centred around the concept of collective identities. Unlike Tully and Connolly, who discuss identity in terms of interdependency between individuals, Mouffe focuses on interactions between two opposing groups. Her assumption is that ‘the very condition for the constitution of an “us” is the demarcation of a “them”.’ Hence, Mouffe’s concept of collective identity involves two opposing groups who are each constructed in relation to the other and is vital to maintaining the political element of democratic politics.

In motivating engagement, Mouffe promotes agonistic struggle through passion, which she labels as ‘the driving force in the political field.’ In order to harness passion, she proposes politics as a battle or war-like process in which ‘adversaries fight against each other because they want their interpretation of the principles to become hegemonic.’ Mouffe’s emphasis on passion constitutes a fundamental element in promoting agonistic struggle since it is used to encourage motivation between conflicting citizens.

An additional component of agonistic struggle is the ‘common enemy’ group, which is distinguished from adversarial groups through the concept of legitimacy. Mouffe asserts that our adversaries are people...
‘whose ideas we combat but whose right to defend those ideas we do not put into question.’\textsuperscript{507} According to her, the legitimacy of adversarial ideas arises from acknowledgement that ‘we have a shared adhesion to the ethico-political principles of liberal democracy: liberty and equality. But we disagree concerning the meaning and implementation of those principles.’\textsuperscript{508} By contrast, the demands of the enemy ‘need to be excluded because they cannot be part of the conflictual consensus that provides the symbolic space in which the opponents recognize themselves as legitimate adversaries.’\textsuperscript{509} For Mouffe, the common enemy – or the excluded group – is imperative to maintaining effective democracy.\textsuperscript{510} Drawing on Jacques Derrida’s notion of the ‘constitutive outside,’ she demonstrates how friends and adversaries perceive one another as legitimate, not just by recognising their shared principles, but also by contrasting them to the ‘excluded’ group; the enemy.\textsuperscript{511} Hence, the common enemy is essential to enabling friends and adversaries to perceive one another as legitimate.

A Brief Overview of the Adversarial Discussion Framework

The adversarial discussion centred around the topic of abortion. Prior to the discussion, tables were arranged in two rows, facing one another, and participants were asked to sit at one table if they think that abortion can be morally justified, and the other if they think that it cannot be morally justified. Each table was then asked to discuss which things they share i.e. values, views, characteristics; which things separate them from the other group; and how they feel about the other group and their views. Participants were then required to discuss a variety of abortion cases with the other group, including:

- A 30 year old couple have just found out at 26 weeks that their child will be born with Down’s Syndrome,
- A 14-year-old girl is pregnant as a result of being raped. She is 20 weeks into her pregnancy,

\textsuperscript{508} Ibid., p. 102.
\textsuperscript{510} Ibid., p. 14.
• A 33-year-old single career woman is 12 weeks pregnant. She wants to focus on her career and does not want children.

Halfway through the discussion, I showed participants a video that depicted pro-life and pro-choice extremism and emphasised how extremism invalidates the arguments of both sides. At the end of the discussion, participants were asked to vote (through a public show of hands) on whether abortion could be morally justified in each of the three cases.

Creating a Discussion Framework Informed by Adversarial Concepts

The topic of abortion was chosen for two reasons. First, abortion provides a controversial issue for discussion. Participant recruitment questionnaires from both the pilot study and main experiment indicated that participants held strong – and diverse - views on abortion. In providing a discussion topic about which participants feel passionate and hold different views, I sought to represent agonistic struggle and the political. This constituted an attempt at preventing apathy and political dissatisfaction and maintaining democratic engagement.

The second reason for discussing abortion was to encourage the formation of strong collective identities. This is contrary to other controversial topics, such as gay marriage, which enable more nuanced opinions. For instance, several participants were in favour of civil partnerships and gay adoption, but not gay marriage, thus it might be difficult to create strong collective identities around gay marriage. However, participant recruitment questionnaires indicated that several participants held more essentialist positions in which they were either for or against abortion, whatever the situation. The topic of abortion thereby appeared more compatible with Mouffe’s calls for strong collective identities.

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512 See Appendix 15 to see the images shown in this video.
515 An additional reason for choosing abortion as the discussion topic was that extremism exists on both the pro-life and pro-choice sides of the argument. This enabled me to present
The specific cases of abortion, which participants were asked to discuss were also designed to promote adversarialism. By using three different cases, I sought to provide the opportunity for nuanced views to surface. Mouffe explains the importance of this, affirming that ‘different forms of unity can be established among the components of the “us”’. Additionally, the introduction of these instances constituted an attempt at representing the practical emphasis Mouffe places on her adversarialism, as opposed to asking participants to discuss abortion in an abstract manner. In employing three practical cases, I also aspired to personalise the discussion to encourage participants to enter into a passionate contest surrounding the implementation of their values.

In addition to the topic and the associated questions, the adversarial room layout also played a part in bringing Mouffe’s motivational narrative to life. By requiring participants to sit with their ‘group,’ the room layout constituted an attempt at promoting strong collective identities. In addition to striving for unity within each group, the room layout also sought to provoke the collective identities into a passionate engagement with one another. The oppositional arrangement of the tables aspired to represent Mouffe’s references to adversaries, combat, fighting and struggle and operationalise her motivational narrative. The omission of an ‘unsure’ group, for instance, resulted from the desire to create distinctly different positions, as Mouffe’s theory requires. Thus, the decision to construct two polarised identities reflects Mouffe’s adversarial understanding of collective identity.

The two groups were phrased as ‘for’ and ‘against’ in an attempt at preventing rhetoric in which participants would feel as if they were identifying with an external group. For example, during the pilot study one quote was placed on each table, one drawn from the pro-life

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516 Ibid., p. 50.
association, the other from the pro-choice. However, many participants whose questionnaires had stated that they were generally against abortion identified more with the pro-choice citation. Thus, rather than attempting to represent an entire side of the debate in just one argument, I decided to phrase the positions in less nuanced, more concrete terms of ‘for’ and ‘against.’ In arranging participants in this way, I aimed to ignite passion and create an agonistic struggle. As a result of this, the room arrangement also tried to ensure the existence of Mouffe’s understanding of the political. The war-like set-up strived to encourage continued antagonism, preventing an excess of consensus and the subsequent disengagement.

‘For’ and ‘against’ positions were also created through the pre-discussion task, which asked participants about what brought them together as a group; how they differed from the other group; and what their opinions were of the other group and their values. The first question aimed to promote collective identity, whilst the latter two questions sought to enhance competition. By increasing competition between adversaries, I sought to render the discussion passionate and political.

The final adversarial element of the framework was the video of extremists shown halfway through the abortion discussion. This feature of the discussion aspired to promote two concepts: common enemy and agonistic struggle. By showing participants examples of extremism, I aimed to expose those who threaten democratic politics and are excluded from adversarial politics. This thereby defines the limits of the political space by ‘impl[y]ing] the establishment of frontiers, the determination of a space of inclusion/exclusion.’ By subsequently claiming that they undermine and invalidate the arguments of each group, I strived to create an ‘enemy’ group. The introduction of the enemy group sought to separate adversaries from ‘enemies to be

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destroyed\textsuperscript{519} in order to encourage adversaries to perceive one another as legitimate.

Creating Questionnaires Informed by Adversarial Concepts\textsuperscript{520}

One concept represented in the questionnaires is Mouffe’s concept of the political. The statements relating to this theme asked participants whether they believed disagreements with the other group were ongoing or temporary, exploring Mouffe’s understanding of conflict as continual. For Mouffe, antagonism and disagreement are of great significance since it is their existence that prevents the apathy that leads to disaffection with democracy.

The theme of collective identity also comprised a significant part of the questionnaires. One pair of statements, for instance, asks participants whether it was easy or difficult to choose which group to join, exploring Mouffe’s promotion of strong, collective identities. Similarly, the questionnaire explored whether participants felt a strong sense of identification with their group. Further questions asked whether participants felt any belonging to the other group. The significance of this became evident during the pilot study in which some participants appeared to understand the other group better than their own. This explores Mouffe’s claim that identities are created in opposition to another. Finally, statements on whether participants felt that their values were similar to those of their group are significant to Mouffe’s assertion that ‘friend’ groups form through a shared interpretation and implementation of liberty and equality.

The next theme I sought to embody in the participant questionnaires was agonistic struggle. Participants were asked whether they found the discussion more or less interesting during high levels of conflict linking to Mouffe’s claim that an excess of consensus causes apathy whilst conflict engages citizens. Other claims explore whether participants

\textsuperscript{519} Ibid., p. 7.
\textsuperscript{520} See Appendix 6 for the Questionnaire for the Abortion Discussion.
saw the other group’s values as having equal worth to theirs, resonating with Mouffe’s emphasis on adversarial legitimacy. Subsequently, phrases asking whether participants felt competitive reflects Mouffe’s claim that adversaries are provoked into contestation with one another. Further, the questionnaire asks participants whether it is the values themselves or their implementation about which the groups disagree. This reflects Mouffe’s assumption that adversaries share a set of values (liberty and equality) but disagree as to how to implement these. This is significant for the previous concept of legitimacy too, since, according to Mouffe, it is this awareness of common ground that allows each group to perceive the other as legitimate. It is important because it contrasts with agonists, such as Owen, who perceive unity as arising from participation in a common quest, rather than endorsement of common values. The final question relating to agonistic struggle is why participants found the discussion either boring or engaging. This was introduced after the pilot study where several participants had stated that the discussion was boring without explaining why. The reasons could be significant since interest and engagement are fundamental components of adversarial agonistic democracy.

A range of questions explored the concept of common enemy during the questionnaire. The questionnaire was split into three sections: with the first referring to the overall discussion, the second to pre-video discussion, and the third post-video discussion. The questions for the former and latter parts of the discussion were identical in order to allow for direct comparison. In arranging the questionnaire in this way, I aspired to analyse the effect of introducing a common enemy.

There were also several questions that were not directly associated with adversarialism, but were included to cross-reference with the other two discussions. These included reflection on whether or not one’s views became stronger as a result of engaging with others, whether the two groups worked together or separately, and whether a variety of people spoke in the discussion, or just a couple.
Creating Observer Sheets Informed by Adversarial Concepts

On the observer sheets, 'lots of people involved in the discussion' explores Mouffe's notion of the political as a rich democratic arena. Negative indicators of this include times when only a couple of people are involved in the discussion, or when people are not taking the discussion seriously (for instance, they are laughing, rolling their eyes or not listening) since these may indicate apathy and disaffection.

Collective identity is indicated by behaviour such as agreement between members of a group; participants supporting opinions of others in their group (either verbally or by smiling or nodding); participants saying positive things about their group; competition between the two groups (for instance, using language such as 'win,' 'best' and 'worst'); and behaving positively toward one's own group (such as smiling, laughing, listening to, sitting close to). Conversely, behaviour such as sitting apart from one's own group; arguing with members of one's own group; and hostility towards one's own group (interrupting, not listening, swearing, shouting, turning the discussion personal) indicate a lack of collective identity.

Agonistic struggle is indicated by behaviour such as people bursting to speak; fast pace of conversation (lots of back and forth discussion); people listening to one another (looking at the speaker, nodding, thinking); positive behaviour towards other group (smiling, laughing, listening to them); relating to the experiences of the other group; trying to understand the opinions of the other group; and both groups trying to work together as a whole. The first two indicators suggest the passionate element of agonistic struggle, whilst the latter phrases imply perceptions of the other group as legitimate. Contrarily, if participants are seen to be having private conversations; staring into space; experiencing awkward silences; and interacting at a slow pace, it implies that they are not acting passionately. Likewise, if they are

See Appendix 10 for the Abortion Discussion Observer Sheet.

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saying negative things about the other group; or showing hostility to the other group (for instance, interrupting, not listening, swearing, shouting, turning the discussion personal), we may infer that participants do not perceive the other as legitimate, a fundamental feature of agonistic struggle.

Finally, the affect of a common enemy is measured, not by additional behaviour indicators, but by referring to the same ones before and after the video. One exception to this was that an additional negative indicator was included in the post-video observer sheet: whether participants associated members of the other group to the extremists in the video.

**Introducing the Inclusive Framework: Revisiting Inclusive Concepts**

The first concept which Connolly and Tully both advocate is that of intersubjectivity. For Connolly, this arises through the notion of identity, which 'is always connected to a series of differences that help it be what it is.'\(^{522}\) Hence, on Connolly’s understanding, the existence of alternate identities is imperative to the existence of one’s own identity. Tully shares this view, affirming that identities are ‘overlapping, interacting and negotiated over time,’\(^{523}\) claiming that intersubjectivity is intrinsic to citizenship. Thus, intersubjectivity is significant to rendering society inclusive since citizens cannot fully exist without others.

The next concept of great significance to Connolly and Tully is that of citizens as simultaneously the rulers and the ruled. Tully calls for the rule by, and of, the people,\(^{524}\) which entails ‘a conversation of reciprocal elucidation and co-articulation with the demoi.’\(^{525}\) Connolly’s work also implies with a society in which citizens are involved in their own rule. Owen, for instance, suggests that Connolly’s theory would coalesce with ‘the deepening of formal democratic practices through recourse to

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\(^{524}\) Ibid., p. 227.  
\(^{525}\) Ibid., p. 242.
forms of democratic innovation (e.g. participatory budgeting, citizens’ assemblies, citizens’ juries, uses of direct democracy).\textsuperscript{526} The involvement of citizens in self-rule is thereby significant to rendering democracy a more inclusive process.

An additional concept endorsed by both thinkers is that of overcoming domination. This is evident in Tully’s notion of mutual recognition, which requires citizens to recognise others as individuals, rather than understanding them through prior assumptions and prejudices. It asks them to encounter others ‘as if we are being asked to see and hear them for the first time.’\textsuperscript{527} This strives to enhance inclusivity by overcoming the domination of the majority. Connolly’s notion of agonistic respect echoes this attempt at greater inclusion through the prevention of ressentiment. He challenges liberal toleration, claiming that it resembles a one-way street whereby a dominant majority chooses whether or not to tolerate an inferior minority. Rather, he promotes agonistic respect in an attempt at challenging power relations and associated ressentiment, by promoting respect that is ‘reciprocal between chastened constituencies who find themselves entangled in the pleasures, tensions, and risks of identity\textbackslash difference relations.’\textsuperscript{528} Thus, by challenging domination and working to enhance interactions, Connolly and Tully seek to promote a more inclusive agonistic democracy.

A subsequent inclusive concept in Tully and Connolly’s thought is self-modification and challenge. In Tully’s work, this arises through audi alteram partem in which citizens are asked to “always listen to the other side”, for there is always something to be learned from the other side.\textsuperscript{529} He claims that citizens have a duty to ‘listen attentively for voices that are silenced or misrepresented by the official rules or by the

\textsuperscript{527} Ibid., p. 23.
\textsuperscript{529} Tully, J., (2008a), p. 110.
most powerful critics. In Connolly’s work, this concept is apparent in the notion of critical responsiveness, which combines critical thinking (whereby citizens challenge whether the new ideas enable pluralism) with responsiveness (whereby receptivity to new ideas is required). Thus, Tully requires citizens to listen and learn from others, enhancing inclusion by challenging domination. Connolly calls on citizens to work on their selves in relation to the other, once again challenging *ressentiment* and rendering society more inclusive.

Finally, both thinkers endorse the concept of contestability. For Connolly, this entails acknowledgement that one’s own views will not necessarily be shared ‘while working hard not to convert that acknowledgement into a stolid or angry stance of existential resentment.’ He argues that, by expressing doubts about one’s position, it may ‘inject generosity and forbearance into public negotiations between parties who reciprocally acknowledge that the deepest wellsprings of human inspiration are to date susceptible to multiple interpretations.’ Hence, contestability may enhance relations between citizens, encouraging enhanced inclusivity. For Tully, contestability falls under his concept, ‘acting differently,’ which enables people to challenge domination. This involves demonstrating the effects of a particular course of action; considering rational alternatives; and alerting people to elements of their situation, their working conditions and their exploitation of which they are unaware. Tully informs us that this conversation enables citizens to overcome their domination and realise new ways of being. Thus, both thinkers advocate contestability to improve relations between conflicting citizens and overcome domination.

**A Brief Overview of the Inclusive Framework**

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530 Ibid., p. 170.
The inclusive phase of the experiment consisted of a discussion about gay rights. This entailed a sixty-minute discussion followed by a vote on the following questions:

- Should gay couples be able to enter into civil partnerships (as brought into the UK in 2005)?
- Should gay couples be allowed to marry?
- Should gay couples be allowed to adopt?
- Should churches, vicars and other religious places/persons be obliged to marry gay couples in a church or other religious place?

Participants were instructed to use these specific questions as a starting point for the discussion, but to feel free to discuss other issues relevant to gay rights. Prior to the discussion, chairs were arranged in a circle and each participant was given ten tokens for the discussion. Participants were asked to put a token in the middle of the circle each time they spoke, and to stop contributing to the discussion once they had used all of these tokens. Additionally, they were provided with discussion guidelines, consisting of:

- Try to respect others even if you disagree with their opinion,
- Try to set aside prior prejudices about people’s religions or cultures, and listen to the individual in front of you
- Try to listen to other people’s beliefs and reflect upon yours accordingly, and,
- Try to accept, and show others, that you are aware that not everyone will share your view.

Creating a Discussion Framework Informed by Inclusive Concepts

The rationale for asking participants to talk about gay rights is that it constitutes a controversial subject for the participants. Through the aforementioned participant selection process, I sought to recruit volunteers who held passionate, and often conflicting, views on gay rights. This is of great significance to Connolly and Tully’s work, since it

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535 As outlined in Chapter Four.
is situated within the context of diverse, and potentially conflictual, societies. The topic was therefore chosen to reflect such difference. Had participants held homogenous beliefs about the topic, the critical dialogue for which Connolly and Tully call would not be possible. The questions surrounding this discussion topic were also instrumental in seeking to provide a topic that would allow for a diversity of viewpoints. Unlike Mouffe’s understanding of difference as that which separates ‘us’ from ‘them,’ Connolly and Tully perceive difference to pervade ‘lines of difference.’ Hence, a range of questions surrounding gay rights was chosen in order to ensure a plurality of viewpoints. I sought to avoid a framework that encouraged participants to identify with either for or against positions. Since both Tully and Connolly emphasise the importance of diversity and pluralism, rather than dichotomy and adversarialism, I aspired to provide questions that enabled such nuanced diversity to arise.

In spite of providing a set of questions for discussion, I also suggested that participants use these as a foundation and then let the discussion evolve in alternate directions. In providing participants the autonomy to shape the content and focus of the discussion, I sought to promote Connolly and Tully’s calls for citizens to act as the rulers and the ruled. Tully explains that self-rule involves ‘members of the association hav[ing] some sort of say in the way political power is exercised over them through the laws.’ In granting participants autonomy to modify content and questions, they became involved in exercising power over themselves. Hence, in transferring power to participants in this way, I aspired to represent Connolly and Tully’s notion of self-rule.

In addition to selecting a topic that lends itself to an inclusive framework (while also granting participants power over this content), the layout of the room also strove to encourage inclusivity. During the previous discussion, tables were arranged into two lines opposite one another to

encourage passion and rivalry between two contending groups. However, in this discussion, the chairs were arranged in a circle to promote intersubjectivity, overcome domination (through the principles of mutual recognition), and encourage challenge and self-modification (through audi alteram partem and critical responsiveness). As Jenny Kitzinger states, 'sitting in a circle will help to establish the right atmosphere...to encourage people to talk to each other.'\textsuperscript{539} Unlike the adversarial discussion, the circular layout attempted to reflect identity as something that is 'defined through the collective constituencies with which I identify or am identified by others...[and] it is further specified by comparison to a variety of the thing I am not.'\textsuperscript{540}

In addition to aspiring to reflect the emphasis Connolly and Tully place on intersubjectivity, the circular layout also seeks to operationalise the informal normative institutions of mutual recognition and agonistic respect. It lent itself to an environment in which participants set aside their prior prejudices and recognised each other as individuals since, unlike the previous discussion, it did not encourage participants to affiliate themselves with a particular group or draw on prior assumptions about the other group. As a result, the circular layout enables participants to act as individuals, rather than a representation of either side of the argument, thereby fostering an environment that facilitate recognition of each individual in one’s ‘own terms and traditions as [they] want to be and as [they] speak to us.’\textsuperscript{541} Further, the circular design encouraged self-modification through promotion of audi alteram partem and critical responsiveness. This layout reduces physical barriers to interaction, such as the inability to see or hear those who are further away, ensuring that participants all had equal opportunities to be involved in the discussion. The critical nature of audi alteram partem and critical responsiveness was also facilitated by the circular layout of the discussion since, unlike the previous discussion, participants were not required to attach themselves to a particular identity for the duration

of the discussion. This might, therefore, enhance possibilities for participants to reflect and modify their beliefs, without feeling the need to represent a particular side of the debate.

As well as the content and the room layout, inclusivity was also sought through usage of tokens, which sought to prevent one or two individuals from dominating the discussion. This element of the discussion framework aspired, first, to operationalise calls for citizens to overcome domination by practicing agonistic respect and *audi alteram partem* toward a diversity of viewpoints. Just as the circular layout of the discussion sought to ensure that participants could be seen and heard, so too did the usage of tokens. In requiring participants to place a token in middle of the circle before they spoke, the framework aspired to prevent several participants from speaking at once.

In addition to providing participants with tokens, I also presented them with a list of guidelines for the discussion. These were given to transform a range of theoretical concepts from Connolly and Tully’s work into practical measures that could shape participants’ behaviour. These guidelines promoted: agonistic respect by asking participants to respect others, even when their views conflicted; mutual recognition by asking people to set aside prior prejudices and listen to the individual; critical responsiveness and *audi alteram partem* by asking participants to listen to others and reflect upon one’s own beliefs; and finally, contestability by asking participants to accept and demonstrate acknowledgement that not everyone will share one’s own view.

**Creating Questionnaires Informed by Inclusive Concepts**

In exploring the notion of intersubjectivity, the questionnaire asked whether participants could still relate to those with radically opposing values. During the pilot study, the tokens also included one which was a different colour. This token had to be used by the end of the discussion, signifying that each participant must verbally partake. However, I felt uncomfortable with forcing people to speak and concluded that, whilst Connolly and Tully sought to encourage minority voices to be heard, they would not necessarily insist on their participation.

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542 During the pilot study, the tokens also included one which was a different colour. This token had to be used by the end of the discussion, signifying that each participant must verbally partake. However, I felt uncomfortable with forcing people to speak and concluded that, whilst Connolly and Tully sought to encourage minority voices to be heard, they would not necessarily insist on their participation.

543 See Appendix 6 for the Gay Marriage Questionnaire.
views. This sought to gain an insight into whether interdependency is possible between conflicting citizens. It subsequently questioned whether participants felt like individuals or part of the group during the discussion, exploring whether participants felt interdependency toward the group.

The questionnaire then considers the notion of participation as significant to attaining one’s citizenship, exploring whether participants saw their ideas as formed during the discussion, or as previously formed. It also asked whether participants told others they disagreed with them and why, or whether they preferred not to respond, as well as the related question of whether the discussion showed that it was better to ignore or discuss conflicting others. These explorations represent Connolly and Tully’s assertions that engagement with conflicting others enhances interaction.

The questionnaire then asked about respect and recognition within the discussion by exploring how many people were involved in the discussion, how worthy and validity views were, whether quieter participants were encouraged to speak, and whether participants were able to set aside their prejudices and stereotypes about others. These questions sought to represent Connolly and Tully’s attempts at overcoming domination.

The next group of questions aimed to gain insights into self-modification and challenge by providing statements about the predictability of opinions, whether it was easy or difficult to understand conflicting views, whether the discussion helped participants to understand others’ views, and if there was any impact of listening to other opinions on one’s own views.

Finally, an exploration of contestability entailed asking participants whether they were more motivated to engage with those who accepted that not everyone would share their beliefs, whether or not is was easier
to engage with those who shared one’s own views, and whether or not the participants could accept that other people could not share their views. They thereby asked participants to reflect on whether they were able to acknowledge their own contestability.

As with the previous questionnaires, there were statements that cross-referenced with the other discussions in order to allow for direct comparison.

Creating Observer Sheets Informed by Inclusive Concepts

First, then, the concept of intersubjectivity was represented by the phrase ‘there was unity within the group’ and this was accompanied by suggested behaviour such as members of the group smiling at one another, nodding when someone put forward an argument, and referring back to previous points in the discussion.

Next, participation was indicated in phrases stating that there was a wide range of beliefs given in the discussion; lots of people involved in the discussion; people were made more aware of their own beliefs after hearing those of others (for instance, they argued more strongly); and people engaged with beliefs they disagreed with explaining why they disagreed. Conversely, negative indicators for participation were that one or two people dominated the discussion, and that only a couple of different views were given.

The next concept, overcoming domination, was reflected in several phrases combined with accompanying behaviour. The first phrase asked whether everyone’s views were respected, and this was supplemented by relevant behaviour, such as people listening to others, empathising with them, not interrupting them, not swearing, shouting or turning the discussion personal. An additional positive indicator was that quieter members of the group were being encouraged to speak. A

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544 See Appendix 10 for Gay Marriage Observer Sheets.
final phrase supporting the overcoming of domination is that participants were listening to others as individuals, rather than relying on prior assumptions and stereotypes. On the contrary, negative phrases encompassed those who did not respect others and entailed interruption, swearing, shouting, not listening or rolling their eyes; as well as those who relied upon cultural stereotypes and generalisations to form their argument.

Next, the observer sheets encompassed challenge and self-modification. Phrases indicating that this concept was evident in the discussion were people reflecting on their own beliefs after hearing those of others; people changing their beliefs after hearing alternate ones; and the group challenging current moral standards. Finally, the notion of contestability was represented in the phrase that suggested people acted positively to those who did not share their beliefs. This was accompanied by suggested behaviour, such as smiling, listening and responding positively.

**Conclusion**

This chapter has explained the ways in which agonistic concepts were represented by practical mechanisms during the experiment. This entailed incorporating agonistic concepts into the discussion frameworks, creating a common quest in which participants competitively rank their values against one another’s; an adversarial debate in which each side seeks to defend their arguments against one another; and an inclusive view-sharing discussion in which citizens challenged one another whilst trying to respect and listen to one another. I demonstrated how agonistic concepts were then explored in questionnaires and observer sheets through an adaptation of Q method.
Chapter Six: Analysing David Owen’s Perfectionist Agonistic Democracy

In this chapter, I analyse Owen’s perfectionist agonism by combining theoretical exploration with consideration of the operationalisation of perfectionist concepts during the values discussion. First, I suggest that perspectivism encourages a diversity of views, and could enhance opportunities for challenge and contestation, whilst also increasing the agency and autonomy of each individual. However, it may also fail to address the potential for apathy. I consider eternal recurrence, suggesting that it could encourage integrity, but abandoning the possibility to exhibit honesty when testing perspectives. I discuss the distinction between Owen and Mouffe’s usage of competition, exploring perfectionist competition’s effectiveness in motivating citizens to participate. I then argue that enlarged mentality could enhance group unity and encourage tolerance between conflicting citizens, but discuss the potential limits of this. Finally, I explore Owen’s concept of self-overcoming, demonstrating its potential to enhance society by encouraging citizens to challenge standards of excellence.

Perspectivism

In Owen’s notion of perspectivism, the diversity of views in society represents ‘a plurality of conflicting conceptions of the good.’\textsuperscript{545} We saw in Chapter Two that Owen claims that the diversity between these conceptions arises from the different history that belongs to each community.\textsuperscript{546} He, like Connolly, Tully and Mouffe, rejects the notion of universal values, arguing that the ranking of values is necessarily perspectival, and each individual’s preferences arise as a consequence of their particular historical community.\textsuperscript{547} As a result, Owen argues that ‘politics as a practice is concerned with the ranking of cultural practices and virtues, that is, politics is the practice through which the

\textsuperscript{546} Ibid., p.138.
\textsuperscript{547} Ibid., p. 139.
community reflects on and constitutes itself as a community.\textsuperscript{548} Thus, just as the values of each individual are a product of their historical community, the political community is also a product of such values. Furthermore, Owen claims that, since participation in this ranking encourages the re-articulation of communities, it provides each individual with agency and autonomy.\textsuperscript{549} This parallels Tully’s assertion that one cannot fully exist in isolation, and that ‘one becomes a citizen through participation.’\textsuperscript{550} In the experiment, I sought to reflect Owen’s perspectivism by providing participants with a range of charities – each representing a different set of values – and asking them to reach a collective decision about how a sum of money should be distributed between them. In framing the discussion in this way, I aspired to encourage a range of perspectives surrounding the differing values to surface.

Interestingly, participants themselves raised the issue of perspectivism during the experiment. For instance, Sam states that ‘everyone has different, sort of, right and wrong, don’t they?’ This echoes Owen’s notion that one’s value sets are ‘embodied perspectives, that is, our ways of knowing are tied to our ways of being-in-the-world.’\textsuperscript{551} As such, Sam supports Owen’s understanding of values as perspectival. Significantly, this differs from Mouffe’s understanding, in which citizens disagree over their employment but crucially share allegiance to particular values. However, the discussion suggests that, in addition to disagreement over which values to endorse, disagreement over how to implement these was also a factor in arriving at a value ranking. For example, towards the end of the discussion, Katayoun asserts that ‘duty is a very abstract concept’ making it a bit ‘tricky in this situation’ whilst Sam explicitly states that ‘we’ll all disagree on what responsibility is’ before demonstrating how people use moral arguments for their own gain. These comments resonate with Owen’s emphasis on

\textsuperscript{548} Ibid, p. 145.
\textsuperscript{549} Ibid., p.138.
perspectivism in which ‘a perspective is not just a complex of beliefs, it is a complex of beliefs which are rooted in common practical interests.’\textsuperscript{552} As a result, citizens not only disagree on which values to endorse, but also on how these should be defined and subsequently implemented. Further, participants seemed to promote their ideas, not as truths (as in the following adversarial discussion on abortion), but as perspectives throughout the discussion. Arabella, for example expresses her view on equality as ‘that’s how I would see [it],’ Katayoun argues that ‘from my perspective,’ and Sam explains that ‘that’s why I’ve put it, personally, at the bottom of the list,’ and other participants continually use ‘I think’ to share their views.\textsuperscript{553} This resonates with the gay marriage discussion, in which citizens used vocabulary, such as ‘I feel’ and posed questions to those they disagreed with, rather than accusations. It also suggests that the provision of a value ranking is useful in demonstrating perspectivism and thereby encouraging citizens to express their views in a non-essentialist manner. Thus, by asking citizens to rank a number of options against one another, rather than choosing one over the other (as in the following discussion), Owen’s perspectivism can be operationalised through a demonstrated practice, which encourages citizens to value a range of views.

Behaviour between participants appeared to constitute the view-sharing, collective quest that Owen discusses. This is contrary to the abortion discussion whereby participants appeared to strive to ‘win the debate,’ through the usage of statistics to prove their points, and the adoption of sarcastic, mocking tones and dismissive behaviour. Instead, participants nodded when others were speaking, referred back to one another’s points, and appeared to work together to come to a decision. At one stage, the focus moved away from the values and became about the charities and whom they benefited. Ben tried to get

\textsuperscript{552} Ibid., p. 36.
\textsuperscript{553} It is important to be mindful, here, of the order of the discussions. The perfectionist framework came first and, perhaps, encouraged participants to behave in a less essentialist nature since participants had only just met. However, the seminar discussions reflected the same perspectivist behaviour and those students had already had significant prior relations with one another.
the group back on track by suggesting ‘what you could do is actually think...’ This was met with several nods and Sam responded, ‘I think you’re right, I suppose we could get too carried away’ before asking the group whether they were happy to return the focus to the values. The way in which Ben respectfully guided the discussion, the positive reaction to his interjection, and Sam’s decision to check with the other members of the group, demonstrate the way in which participants worked together. This suggests Owen’s assertion that ‘it is in and through agonistic engagements within and over the terms of democratic citizenship that citizens exercise and develop the capacities and dispositions that compose democratic nobility’ and that, as a result, respect and tolerance arise because ‘giving other speakers their due is integral to becoming what (politically) one is.’

In addition to enabling, and indeed requiring, positive relations between participants, the exchanging of various perspectives throughout the discussion also promoted challenge. This challenge was evident in the way in which participants would use questions to probe one another on perspectives they themselves were not convinced by. For example, Sam said to Katayoun, ‘I don’t disagree but I’m just going to play devil’s advocate here. Some people argue that...’ Additionally, Arabella responds to Nikolaos’ views on duty as ‘yes, but isn’t that your responsibility as well...?’ However, such probing, questioning and challenge generally appeared to take the form of ‘productive’ conflict, in which it was evident from phrasing and tone that participants sought to gather more information from others to reconsider their own perspectives, and to strive for the most preferable allocation of sums. For example, when Erin challenged Sam on his assumption of poverty as an African issue, he built on her argument, rather than dismissing or disagreeing with it. In one instance Ben was critical of welfare benefits, and Sam responded with statistics about how many benefits recipients are ‘actually scroungers,’ with Erin adding that the ‘vast majority of

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benefits are spent on state pensions.’ However, Sam quickly moved onto Katayoun’s point, diffusing any potential arguments. This was contrary to the subsequent discussion in which participants attempted to ‘win’ the debate to the extent that an observer described it as ‘decend[ing] into chaos.’ This is demonstrated in the following chapter, which will discuss the way in which participants frequently interrogated one another and asked questions in an accusing or aggressive manner without challenging their own positions.

Further, the values discussion avoided back and forth exchanges between two or three dominant participants. Instead, participants appeared to work together in order to challenge one another’s views - alongside their own - in an attempt at reaching the most preferable order of rank. This supports Fossen’s understanding of Owen’s perfectionist agonism, which ‘signifies a commitment to the cultivation and continuous improvement of citizens’ virtues and capacities.’

Thus, it is evident that, in emphasising the need to create an order of rank amongst competing perspectives, engagement between citizens can become more positive and productive. This appears to converge with perfectionist aspirations of employing political contestation in order that ‘public debates gain in perspective and quality.’ Perspective derives from participants listening to one another, and quality comes from working together. This is also echoed by the reflective questionnaires, which demonstrated that five of eight participants stated that their reasons developed throughout the discussion as opposed to being consolidated beforehand. This supports Owen’s view that autonomy and agency develop through the process of contestation. As Fossen illustrates, ‘perfectionist agonism values political contestation not for its capacity to challenge violence and exclusion, but for its capacity to enhance citizens’ virtues and capacities — for its

558 One participant wrote that some reasons were developed before and some were developed after.
Thus, this discussion suggests that, when citizens are required to decide between competing perspectives, conflict may become more productive and positive, encouraging relations of respect between participants and bettering both the individual and the political community.

However, during the exploration of perspectivism in the values discussion, one observation arose which suggests a tension with encouraging continual challenge: the notion of apathy. When asked to compare the three discussions in a reflective questionnaire, none of the nine participants named this discussion as the ‘most engaging.’ It is important to take into consideration that the vast majority of participants were attracted by either the abortion or gay marriage discussions, and not the topic of multicultural values, and hence this might have affected interest levels. However, when this discussion was repeated during student seminars (in which participants were, importantly, not volunteers motivated to engage by the discussion topics), several of them commented that, by the end of the discussion, they had reached a decision simply because they had wanted to complete the task. This was also supported by the pilot study in which the group had finished their discussion after 30 minutes, despite the other discussions lasting between 70 and 90 minutes. This suggests, then, that the discussion framework may have played a part in encouraging apathy to arise.

I suggest that apathy might arise for two reasons. First, perhaps inclusivity and diversity are in tension with the motivation to engage. Throughout the values discussion, the more dominant participants were particularly effective at providing space for quieter participants to speak and ensuring that they were content with any decisions made on how to proceed, and participants continually challenged their own views and those of other participants. For example, when deciding how to go about the task, Arabella suggests ‘shall we read them all out, one by

\[560\] See the section on enlarged mentality for a more detailed discussion of this.
one, how about that?’ then later Nikolaos verifies ‘does anyone want to change the [money allocations]?’ The suggestions of participants were then modified as a result of others’ opinions, making the discussion appear inclusive. I am concerned that striving to arrive at a decision that satisfies the whole group risks the threat of futility. As Morris Rosenberg informs us in Some Determinants of Political Apathy, ‘one general factor contributing to political apathy is the feeling that activity is futile.’\textsuperscript{561} One potential reason for this feeling, according to Rosenberg, is that ‘an individual may feel that he is but one among so many.’\textsuperscript{562} Thus, perhaps by promoting greater diversity and inclusivity, apathy arises since the direction of the group constantly evolves to accommodate more perspectives. Certain restrictions, then, such as providing shorter time limits or reducing the size of discussion groups, may need to be incorporated into this discussion framework in order to strike a balance between encouraging diversity and inclusivity, whilst also retaining citizen engagement.

The second reason I suggest for participant apathy relates to Mouffe and her emphasis on passion. According to her adversarialism, politics ought to ‘mobilize…passions towards democratic designs.’\textsuperscript{563} As previously mentioned, most participants were attracted to the discussions because of either the topic of abortion or gay marriage, rather than a discussion about multicultural values. As a result, passion was more evident in the following discussions, as depicted by stories, heated exchanges, and a faster pace whereby participants were ‘bursting to speak.’ Thus, perhaps a lack of passion also played a role in rendering this discussion less engaging than the others. Maybe, then, Mouffe’s adversarialism could be helpful, here, in considering how to ignite passion prior to beginning the value ranking.

\textbf{Eternal Recurrence}

\textsuperscript{562} Ibid., p. 360.
Another primary concept of perfectionist agonism is that of eternal recurrence. As outlined in Chapter Two, Owen explains the principle of eternal recurrence as ‘testing these perspectives against each other coming to an honest judgement concerning the degree to which they satisfy the interests (exhibit the virtues) of the practice.’ The perspective deemed to represent the maximum expression of virtues of the practice is said to exhibit ‘eternal recurrence.’ As a result, perfectionism requires citizens to defend their values by ranking them against others, according to the extent to which they satisfy societal interests. A significant component of eternal recurrence is integrity, which asks citizens to consider the coherence of their own ethical principals whilst making such evaluations. Further, integrity requires that citizens, not only tolerate a diversity of beliefs, but also enter into ‘honest and just argument’ with conflicting others. Here, this resonates with Connolly’s agonistic respect and Mouffe’s legitimacy, both of which call for richer versions of liberal tolerance, which necessitate engagement. Further, eternal recurrence signifies that one’s authority depends on the extent to which one is publicly seen to promote a particular doctrine, as well as the extent to which one is successful in generating public support for it. In order to explore whether participants exhibited eternal recurrence, integrity and authority during the ranking process, I asked participants to allocate differing sums of money to a variety of charities.

Let us first examine the notion of ‘honest and just argument’ in which ‘one does not cheat by abrogating the standards (i.e., rules and/or norms) which govern engagement in a practice,’ whilst simultaneously ‘reflect[ing] honestly on the merits (degree of mastery) of our own performance.’ The rules of the game – as represented by the guidelines for the values discussion – entailed allocating sums of replica money to a range of charities, making this judgment based on the

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565 Ibid., p. 143.
566 Ibid., p. 142 and discussion in Chapter Two.
567 Ibid., p. 161.
568 Ibid., p. 142.
values represented by each charity (rather than based on who benefits), reaching this decision in a collective manner, and arriving at a decision in the allotted time period. These four rules of the game were followed throughout the discussion. First, participants remained focused on the task of ranking values and allocating sums of money accordingly. As previously mentioned, Ben interjected to remind others that the emphasis should be on the values of the charities rather than the beneficiaries. Furthermore, participants worked collectively by taking it in turns to read the charity descriptions, entering into dialogue about the values in question, and ultimately combining individual orders of rank into a collective decision. Finally, participants reminded one another about timekeeping: Nikolaos, for instance said ‘two minutes’ towards the end. This is in contrast to the second discussion, in which I had to intervene to stop the discussion and the third discussion, in which some participants broke the rules of the token regulation. By contrast, the group appeared to work together during the values discussion in order to adhere to discussion guidelines. This resonates with the ‘honest’ component of engaging in ‘honest and just argument’ in which participants kept to the rules and did not cheat. This differs from both the adversarial discussion, in which participants did not keep to time, and the inclusive discussion, in which some participants refused to abide by the token guidelines, continuing to participate when their tokens had gone. This supports Owen’s affirmation that citizens act honestly when they are involved in a collective quest since ‘the simple virtues of truthfulness and justice are the prerequisites for reconciling contestation and community in a sense of solidarity, of being engaged in a common quest.’ Thus, perhaps, by uniting participants in a collective task, they felt more responsible for the group, and as a result,

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569 It is important that the discussion about values came at the start of the day, and thus, another explanation for participants acting in accordance with the rules is that they were new to the experiment and the other participants. However, at the end of the day the effects of maturation might have encouraged participants to act differently. Thus, in future, it would be interesting to explore these discussions in a different order to gain further insights into this.

570 It is important to consider that an additional factor in timekeeping might have been the interest levels of participants – as previously acknowledged, most participants were attracted to the discussion either by the topic of abortion or gay marriage. Thus, perhaps passion for the topic plays a role in whether or not time was adhered to.

571 These will be discussed in more depth in the following two analysis chapters.

572 Ibid., p. 146.
behaved honestly. As Chapter Seven explores, this is in contrast to the Connolly and Tully discussion in which there were participants during both the pilot and main experiment that did not follow the rules. Perhaps, then, it is the provision of a common quest – and the resultant responsibility for other members of the group – which promotes the principle of honesty in politics.

In addition to following the rules and not cheating, both the video analysis and reflective questionnaires supported the notion that participants also exhibited integrity through honest reflection on their own performance. For instance, several participants, such as Arabella and Chris, even changed their beliefs after reflecting on the reasons others gave for their ranking orders. Arabella said to Nikolaos, ‘you said it would change your mind and I have.’ Additionally, seven out of the nine participants noted in their questionnaires that listening to others had some impact on their beliefs, either modifying or cementing them, with only two participants stating that engagement with others had no impact on their beliefs. Thus, it appears as though participants did ‘test these perspectives against each other in coming to an honest judgement concerning the degree to which they satisfy the interests (exhibit the virtues) of the practice.’\(^{573}\) Hence, it appears as though participation in a common quest can be effective in challenging citizens’ beliefs; whether this results in strengthening or transforming them.

In exploring the concept of integrity, I have considered honesty; I now consider whether justice - or participation and proficiency\(^{574}\) - arose throughout the discussion. First, this discussion appeared to encourage participation, with every participant engaging in the value ranking. This is in contrast to the following discussion on abortion, which was frequently dominated by two or three participants. Thus, this discussion suggests that the collective nature of the task encouraged the first element of justice; participation. Additionally, six out of the nine

\(^{573}\) Ibid., p. 143.
\(^{574}\) Ibid., p. 142.
participants stated that they would prefer to respond to those they disagree with, providing reasons for their views, rather than remain silent. Furthermore, all participants evidently recognised the value of participation in this discussion – irrespective of the quality or content of such participation – since they unanimously claimed that other participants gained respect for them when they expressed their views. It appears, then, that the values discussion enabled and encouraged the participatory element of justice in which virtuous citizens engage in the practice of ranking.

In addition to the participatory element of justice, the discussion also explored the proficiency component. Owen states that one’s authority is derived from two elements: first, the proficiency with which one participates, and, second, the extent to which one’s views are reflected by others. This view of authority was mirrored in the participant questionnaires in which seven participants claimed that those with the most authority were those who expressed their views most clearly, and the remaining two participants stated that those with the most authority were those who held the most widespread views. This was supported by video analysis and observer sheets, which demonstrate that those who had most authority, and thereby guided the decision-making process (Sam, Katayoun, Arabella and Nikolaos), were those who illustrated their views to others and gained support for these views. On the other hand, quieter members who appeared less confident in sharing their views (such as Fiona and Chris) were also less involved in guiding the discussion, thereby suggesting less authority. This supports Owen’s view that the authority of one’s voice is dependent upon being ‘publicly recognized as recommending a substantive doctrine,’ and one’s ability to ‘generate public support’ for such a doctrine. The proficiency element of justice in which it is vital to generate support for

575 However, we should note that this may be skewed by two factors: on the one hand, it may be enhanced by the fact that all participants volunteered to engage in a series of discussions with the knowledge that there would be conflicting others. On the other, it might be diminished by the fact that the discussion was the first of the series, perhaps preventing participants from engaging in controversial discussions as a result.
576 Ibid., p. 161.
577 Ibid., p. 161.
the doctrine was perhaps best demonstrated in the following discussion on abortion. One participant, Erin, was a very vocal participant, enabling her to meet the ‘participation’ criteria of justice. However, she was unable to gather support for her perspectives, noting in her adversarial questionnaire that she felt isolated from her group. She was also not seen to have much authority during the discussion with participants describing her as ‘aggressive’ in the questionnaires. Hence, it appears as if eternal recurrence emerged throughout the discussion through both honesty and justice, and that authority belonged to those who best fulfilled the latter principle. Thus, perhaps a collective notion of competition offers a significant incentive for citizens to strive towards better values, since doing so proficiently appears vital for their authority.

However, after observing the latter two discussions on abortion and gay marriage, one concern arises regarding the ‘honesty’ component of integrity. Although participants named the values discussion as the one in which their beliefs were most challenged, I argue that the notion of honestly testing one’s beliefs is problematic and potentially paradoxical. To explain this, let us return to Owen’s claim that ‘thinking about truth as independent of all possible activities of knowing is incoherent.’ On this account of the impossibility of independent truth, the question arises whether it would be possible to conduct an ‘honest’ examination of one’s own beliefs? As Owen demonstrates, one’s beliefs ‘express the ordering of one’s soul.’ Hence, surely any examination of such beliefs would be unable to escape the influence of communal values and practices that inform them? Honesty appears to connote objectivity or the very ‘thing-in-itself’ that Owen claims to be ‘incoherent.’ Since most participants were attracted to the discussions because of the topics of abortion and gay marriage, perhaps participants were better able to analyse their value beliefs honestly during the Owen discussion because their perspectives were less engrained. However, this begs

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578 Ibid., p. 30.
579 Ibid., p. 145.
580 Ibid., p. 31.
the question of whether participants would be able to practice honesty, and thereby modify their beliefs accordingly, if the discussion required them to discuss engrained and incompatible perspectives – such as those in the subsequent discussions.

**Perfectionist Competition**

An additional concept identified in Chapter Two as central to Owen’s perfectionist agonism is competition. It is important to note that the notion of competition endorsed by Owen differs from the collective one employed by Mouffe. Whereas, for Mouffe, 'vibrant confrontation provides an avenue through which the mobilized passions of democracy can be channelled toward adversarial rather than antagonistic outlets,'\(^{581}\) Owen’s understanding of competition derives from Nietzsche’s discussion of the second Eris, in which competition is employed to transform negative qualities into positive ones. Owen explains that the presence of contest turns the negative concept of envy into the positive notion of cultivating virtue, thereby assuring the wellbeing of the state.\(^{582}\) Following this, he draws from the Greek public culture of contestation in which ‘citizens strove to surpass each other and, ultimately, to set new standards of nobility.’\(^{583}\) Thus, for Owen, competition encourages citizens to challenge one another, which in turn challenges and enhances society. In order to represent Owen’s notion of competition, I asked participants to rank a range of competing values in order to promote the notion of contestation, and to explore whether this encouraged participants to strive to surpass one another, thereby reaching better conclusions.

What struck me about this discussion was the form contestation took on between participants. At first glance, it appears as though the discussion did not promote a competitive element. Five out of nine participants claimed in the reflective questionnaires that they did not

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\(^{583}\) Ibid., p. 139.
feel competitive about their views during this discussion. Additionally, the lack of competitive behaviour noted in the observer sheets appeared to echo that this was the case. This contrasted with the subsequent abortion discussion, in which participants employed competitive behaviour - such as using statistics to prove their point and employing sarcastic or mocking tones toward those with conflicting opinions. Yet, during the values discussion, participants appeared to listen to one another, reflecting on their own perspectives after considering conflicting viewpoints. However, in spite of the absence of an obvious form of competition, it appears as though a more subtle form of contestation could have been at play. First, in their qualitative notes, observers commented that several participants (Arabella, Ben, Sam, Fiona and Erin) held ‘strong viewpoints’ throughout the discussion. Next, as discussed in the previous section on perspectivism, the observer sheets and video analysis demonstrated that participants frequently challenged the opinions of those with whom they disagreed.

Such competition appeared to intensify toward the end of the discussion during the allocation of funds. One observer noted that during this process ‘personal views became more visible’ and all observers noted that competition increased between participants at this final stage. This suggests, then, that perhaps competition (in a collective contestation sense, rather than in an adversarial sense) may be more likely to occur through the decision-making process, rather than at the discussion stage since that is the point at which people’s perspectives are at stake. As a result, in order to cultivate virtue through competition, it may be necessary to require citizens to arrive at a collective decision, instead of simply sharing views with one another. This emphasis on action and decision-making resonates with the work of John Forrester, who affirms that ‘yes, conflicts of constitutive identities will abide, and inequalities of power will virtually always provide a setting for and partially constitute relationships at hand, but nevertheless democratic actors will have

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584 One of these participants did, however, indicate on the questionnaire that he did not feel very competitive, rather than not feeling competitive at all.
choices to make and take.\textsuperscript{585} This is of particular significance when we consider his claim that agonist theorists tell us little about ‘the performative ways in which real democratic participants, who raise claims of rights or entitlement, for example, might ever do more than “be heard”, or worse, “express themselves”.’\textsuperscript{586} Given this, I contend that the decision-making element of Owen’s common quest is a significant element to combatting the threat of futility.

In spite of competition heightening during the decision-making process, it is important to emphasise that such competition still did not reflect the confrontational, heated competition that occurred during the abortion discussion.\textsuperscript{587} Instead, competition during the values discussion appeared to constitute a productive and collective entity in which participants challenged one another in order to reach the best possible ranking order. This mirrors the suggestions of perspectivism in which ‘citizens strive to develop their capacities for self-rule in competition with one another.’\textsuperscript{588} Thus, the ends encouraged by Owen’s notion of competition appear to differ from those of Mouffe’s adversarial competition. In Mouffe’s understanding of adversarial contestation, ‘struggle among adversaries is a struggle in order to establish a different hegemony,’\textsuperscript{589} and thereby a battle to implement one’s own perspectives at the cost of those of the other side. Whereas for Owen, competition is not about ‘winning’ the debate, it is more about cultivating and expressing one’s own nobility throughout the exchange. Hence, adversarial agonism encourages citizens to focus on the ends of the discussion, whereas perfectionist agonism encourages citizens to focus on one’s conduct throughout the discussion. Perhaps then, this discussion suggests that by engaging citizens in a collective task, (rather than, for instance, forming contending groups who identify themselves in opposition to one another), we may encourage

\textsuperscript{586} Ibid., p. 141.
\textsuperscript{587} See chapter six for a detailed overview and analysis of adversarial competition.
competition to take on a different form. The competitive element of the values discussion fulfilled a productive purpose in which participants challenged one another in order to arrive at the best possible collective decision. This is quite contrary to the competitive element of the adversarial discussion in which participants appeared to attempt to prove to conflicting others the truth of their own view. As a result, the former enabled positive relations of cooperative engagement to form.

The decision-making during this discussion can be compared with that of the pilot study in which the same task was given to participants but they were not provided with any replica money. The participants in the pilot study seemed more apathetic to the allocation of funds, as demonstrated by the slow pace of discussion and the speed of the decision. This contrasts with the main experiment in which participants discussed one another’s ranking orders extensively and some changed their minds as a result. Nikolaos even linked his ranking order to the money allocation, explaining ‘that’s the reason why I placed £5000 to B.’ This resonates with Rosenberg’s argument that ‘in most cases a precondition for political activity is the conviction that what one does will make a difference, will have an effect of some sort.’ She explains that usually ‘political participation beyond the level of discussion probably has the aim of getting one’s will translated into political action.’ Of course, the experiment money was not real and political action did not happen as a result, however, I suggest that the usage of replica money heightened the feeling of action to some extent, rendering the discussion more meaningful. Yet, taking into account the previous discussion on apathy, I argue that my discussion framework could overcome apathy by incorporating more action into the discussion. This parallels Arendt’s focus on action, which she states ‘corresponds to the human condition of plurality, to the fact that men, not Man, live on the earth and inhabit the world.’ Hence, in addition to promoting engagement, Arendt demonstrates that action also creates

591 Ibid., p. 354.
unity between citizens. This might, perhaps, suggest that citizens become more engaged and more unified if the collective quest is, not simply discussion but action. As a result, perfectionist agonism might be strengthened by choosing relevant and topical discussion topics, and following Tully’s calls for civic practices that encourage more participation, such as norm formulation.

Although Owen’s less confrontational understanding of competition might be helpful in avoiding destructive conflict to occur between citizens,\(^{593}\) it does raise the concern of how to motivate citizens into engagement with conflicting others. Whereas Mouffe’s notion of competition provokes citizens to defend their values against those of their opponent, Owen presumes that ‘citizens strive to develop their capacities for self-rule in competition with one another.’\(^{594}\) This begs the question of what happens to those citizens who are not motivated to strive toward better virtues. My experiments included well-educated individuals who were interested in discussing the topics at hand, but I am concerned about how to engage those who are either less willing or less able to participate. Perhaps this is less of a cause of concern for Owen than, for instance, the inclusive approaches of Connolly and Tully. In *Equality, Democracy, and Self-Respect: Reflections on Nietzsche’s Agonal Perfectionism*, Owen states that ‘if democracy is to meet its own best aspirations, it requires citizens who cultivate those political virtues (e.g. independence of mind) which are necessary to this task.’\(^{595}\) Thus, perhaps perfectionist agonistic democracy is willing to forfeit a certain amount of inclusion in exchange for the participation of those with enhanced capacities.

Yet, if we reconsider the agonistic themes outlined in Chapter One, it is evident that this potential for exclusion in Owen’s work may be detrimental to the aims of agonistic democracy. For instance, a primary aspiration of promoting political contestation is to overcome the

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\(^{593}\) See chapter six for an exploration of the effect of adversarial competition on participants.  
\(^{595}\) Ibid., p. 126.
domination\textsuperscript{596} of hegemonic cultures. However, if certain voices are excluded from the societal contestation (either because they are unable or unwilling to participate), does this not pose a barrier to overcoming hegemony? Likewise, can contingency be assured if voices are excluded from the discussion? Finally, can bonds of necessary interdependency emerge between citizens if some are prioritised over others? Indeed, on Tully’s account, listening to others in their own terms, especially those who are marginalised or suppressed (and perhaps less able to cultivate virtues such as independence of mind), is a significant factor in promoting necessary interdependency. These questions reminds us of Norval’s earlier claim that agonistic democrats criticise deliberative democrats for ‘ignoring the impact of material inequalities on the ability of participants to partake as equals in dialogue.’\textsuperscript{597} Hence, in order to address both domination and fragmentation, more thought ought to be given to the inequalities which exist, as well as how to motivate people to engage in a discussion which cultivates virtues and capabilities. If we do not give further thought as to how to engage citizens in this virtue cultivation, I am concerned that an operationalisation of perfectionist agonism has the potential to exclude certain sectors of society from democratic politics, such as those who are less educated, or those who are not already engaged in political discussions. Wingenbach shares this concern that Owen’s perfectionist agonism might pose an exclusionary potential, stating that it promotes ‘elitism.’\textsuperscript{598}

\textbf{Enlarged Mentality}

An additional element of Owen’s perfectionism is his calls for citizens to employ an ‘enlarged mentality’ toward other participants. This concept encapsulates one’s ability to consider a range of contending perspectives when deciding upon an order of rank.\textsuperscript{599} Owen asserts that the ability to engage with a range of perspectives is vital to one’s

\textsuperscript{596} See Chapter One.
own integrity since, on his account, we cannot reach an honest and just judgment about the best values if we are unable to explore a diversity of conflicting perspectives.\textsuperscript{600} Thus, here, unlike Connolly and Tully’s account, the toleration of diverse beliefs does not seek to enhance inclusivity; rather it constitutes a necessary component of virtue cultivation. It follows then, as Fossen highlights, that eternal recurrence does not simply require citizens to challenge the perspectives of others but also ‘involves a commitment to continuous re-examination of one’s standards through an engagement with other perspectives.’\textsuperscript{601} In addition to providing for the cultivation of truthfulness and justice, employing an enlarged mentality also encourages bonds of solidarity to form, whereby ‘our shared identities relate not to shared perspectives but to a shared process of contestation.’\textsuperscript{602} This differs from Mouffe’s work, in which solidarity between conflicting citizens is promoted through acknowledgement of a shared set of values. In order to explore whether Owen’s notion of ‘enlarged mentality’ became evident through the emergence of tolerance and unity, the task of ranking a range of values was posed to participants as a collective exercise.

The discussion appeared to overwhelmingly suggest that an enlarged mentality was present between participants and that social unity arose as a result. First, it has already been established that, unlike the following discussion whereby participants often spoke over one another, raised their voices, and used sarcastic tones, participants were generally respectful of one another. When one participant was speaking, the others stayed quiet, listened to them and often reflected on – and sometimes even modified - their own views. When participants did disagree with one another, they used questions to probe further, thus giving the impression that they sought to understand one another’s reasoning and challenge one another. This suggests, then, that participants were tolerant towards others, and adopted a respectful attitude toward alternate perspectives in order to honestly

\begin{thebibliography}{99}
\bibitem{600} Ibid., pp. 161-162.
\end{thebibliography}
and justly assess the eternal recurrence of their own perspectives. This is contrary to the latter abortion discussion in which participants appeared to seek to prove that they were correct, and, as a result, were either dismissive of, or aggressive toward, incompatible arguments. However, this is not to say that there was no disagreement during the values discussion. Five out of eight participants\textsuperscript{603} indicated in the reflective questionnaires that there was disagreement about which values were most important. Similarly, observer sheets and video analysis demonstrated that there was often disagreement over the ranking of the values. Yet in spite of evident disagreement, observer sheets and video analysis also noted that there was not much heated behaviour or tension between participants. This thereby suggests that participants were able to entertain a plurality of perspectives, as Owen’s enlarged mentality requires.\textsuperscript{604}

This leads to the second element of enlarged mentality: promoting social cooperation by engaging citizens with a diversity of values in a common quest. It is important, first, to note that this common quest was steered by naturally emerging leaders throughout the discussion. The video analysis and observer sheets demonstrated participants such as Sam, Arabella, Katayoun and Nikolaos guiding the discussion by keeping others focused on the purpose of the discussion, suggesting decision-making procedures, and reminding others of the time. Yet, unlike the following discussion in which two or three participants dominated, the leaders of the values discussion created opportunities for other participants to engage. As one of the observers noted, ‘the more dominant members gave the others a chance to speak.’ These participants also repeatedly checked that others were happy with the agreed proposals. This resonated with the gay marriage discussion in which Sam was described by observers as ‘regulating the queue to speak.’ It is significant that, even when rules and institutions do not

\textsuperscript{603} The ninth participant noted that both of these were the case, writing that ‘we all agreed on a few, but initially disagreed on some others.’

\textsuperscript{604} Once again, it is important to bear in mind that this discussion was the first of the three and, therefore, might have been less affected by maturation than the other discussions, thereby encouraging more positive interactions.
impose a leader, groups appear to self-regulate, and leaders emerge. Interestingly, each time that the values discussion was repeated, several participants would manage the task, guiding the others through the process. Yet, there were no instances where one or two individuals took advantage of the situation and dominated the discussion. This supports Gulshan Ara Khan’s view, which is expressed through her promotion of Connolly’s work as a ‘largely self-regulating’ account of society in which ‘there is no account of the necessity of the leader that stands in for or represents the whole.’

Hence, the way in which several participants emerged as leaders, whilst providing opportunities for others to participate, suggests that participants did self-regulate during the common quest. As a result, this also appeared to enhance unity between participants. In the reflective questionnaires, for instance, participants chose this discussion as the one in which they felt the most group unity. Similarly, the values questionnaire concluded that eight of the nine participants felt like part of the group during this discussion. Furthermore, just as Owen claims that unity arises through participation in a common quest (rather than the sharing of common values), the majority of participants also ascribed group unity to their engagement in a collective decision. Hence, it appears as though unity between conflicting citizens is encouraged through the provision of a common quest, supporting Owen’s affirmation that unity arises through a common quest. This appears more effective than demonstrating to citizens that they share common values (as in the subsequent abortion discussion) since participants did not acknowledge such commonality.

It also seems more effective than promoting respect and understanding between conflicting citizens (as in the gay marriage discussion) since, in spite of enhancing participants’ conduct towards one another, it did not appear to challenge their assumptions about one another.

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606 See Chapter Six.
607 See chapter six for a more comprehensive discussion of how ‘the common enemy’ impacted upon group unity. See chapter seven for a more in-depth exploration of ‘inclusive’ notions of respect and understanding.
Although the collective nature of the discussion appeared to promote unity between the group, there is also the possibility of exclusion. As mentioned earlier, one of the participants stated that they did not feel like part of a group, but, instead, felt isolated from it. I am concerned that, once a group has formed, it could constitute the dominant majority, subsequently posing a barrier, which prevents those outside of the majority group from challenging decisions. Unlike the gay marriage discussion, where those who felt isolated from the group were provided with mechanisms to encourage participation, the values discussion relied on participants themselves. Perhaps, then, there is a possible tension between unity on the one hand, and inclusion on the other. This relates back to the discussion in the introduction which problematises those theories, which promote unity and consensus. Mouffe highlights the tension between encouraging diversity and inclusion on the one hand and promoting unity on the other:

A pluralist democracy is constantly pulled in opposite directions: towards exacerbation of differences and disintegration on one side; towards homogenization and strong forms of unity on the other... It is a tension that we should value and protect, rather than try to resolve, because it is constitutive of pluralist democracy.608

Thus, perhaps this tension between encouraging diverse participation on one hand, whilst promoting unity and cooperation on the other, is a necessary tension that cannot and should not be eradicated. However, I argue that it is important to be aware of this exclusionary potential, in order to consider ways in which the balance between inclusion and unity can be maintained.

Self-mastery

The final aim of Owen's perfectionism is self-mastery, or self-overcoming. Self-mastery involves contestation, regarding, not only which values constitute excellence, but also what excellence itself

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should be comprised of. Owen claims that, by challenging the criteria on which excellence is based, not only will societal virtues change, but so will citizens themselves. During the discussion, participants were encourage to contest the values – and not the charities – in order to explore whether participants would challenge, not only to what extent each value fulfilled the excellence criteria, but also what constitutes an ‘excellent’ society. Although the majority of the discussion was focused on ranking the values against current understandings of excellence, i.e. liberal values of liberty and equality, there were rare moments in which self-mastery appeared to surface. One of the charity descriptions, ‘Sport for Soldiers,’ for instance, stated that soldiers have ‘sacrificed so much’ for us that it is our duty to repay them, thereby implying that a soldier’s work is noble and admirable. However, Nikolaos challenged this assumption, explaining that as a soldier he killed Cypriot soldiers, asking ‘why should I give £5000 to that?’ By challenging the core assumption that a soldier’s work is noble and admirable, he challenges the criteria of excellence which society has provided. Similarly, Arabella attempts to categorise the values into those which prioritise the society as a whole, such as ‘Sport for All,’ and those which prioritise the individual, such as ‘The Sporting Excellence Trust.’ She claims that one’s ranking order will be affected by the decision to focus more on individual or societal values. In so doing, self-mastery arises as participants are encouraged to consider whether it is the protection of the individual or the society that constitutes excellence in a society. Thus, it appears as though, by encouraging citizens to rank values against societal standards of excellence, we also encourage citizens to challenge existing current standards of excellence.

Conclusion

This chapter has drawn on insights from the experiment as well as consideration of agonistic theory in order to analyse Owen’s

610 Of course, the chosen content impacted on the discussion; particularly in Nikolaos’ case since he had personal experience of the discussion topics.
611 This is explored in Chapter Seven, which discusses how the challenge that occurred appeared to only occur on a superficial level.
perfectionist agonism. I suggest that Owen’s perspectivism could enable citizens to perceive democratic discussions as view-sharing exercises, rather than as competitive debates to be won. This is significant to promoting political contestation and contingency through continual challenge and perfectionist competition. Yet, I endorse perspectivism with one hesitation: its admirable focus on diversity might also carry the potential for apathy. Further, I demonstrate how eternal recurrence could promote honest engagement; encourage citizens to challenge their own beliefs; and enhance participation through respect. However, I reject Owen’s emphasis on an ‘honest’ testing of perspectives, arguing that this principle is in tension with the passionate – and often antagonistic – manner in which citizens hold their beliefs. I affirm that perfectionist competition offers an effective tool for harnessing strong views and encouraging citizens to challenge one another, but that its most significant element is the decision-making process, which can help to combat apathy. However, I propose that more consideration ought to be given about to how to include and motivate a greater diversity of citizens to engage in perfectionist democracy. I suggest that Owen’s concept of enlarged mentality could promote positive relations of cooperation between citizens through emphasis on a common quest, encouraging self-regulation to emerge through non-dominant leaders. However, I highlight possible tensions between group unity and the potential for exclusion, arguing for a careful balance between unity and inclusion. Finally, I argue that the provision of a common quest could encourage citizens to challenge the criteria of excellence according to which they are being measured.
Chapter Seven: Analysing Mouffe’s Adversarial Agonism

Mouffe's adversarialism comprises four primary concepts introduced in Chapter Five: 'the political'; collective identities; agonistic struggle and the common enemy. In this chapter, I endorse 'the political' as a tool to prevent apathy, whilst also considering whom this might fail to engage. I challenge adversarial legitimacy, suggesting that this is undermined when commonality is not apparent to citizens. I then demonstrate the possible tension between advocating a collective understanding of identity, whilst also accounting for diversity and contingency. Additionally, I question how we can ensure that emphasis on conflict encourages productive relationships, rather than destructive ones. I subsequently propose that the attempt to separate politics from the political could be problematic due to the existence of conflictual, and potentially antagonistic, relations. Finally, I challenge the notion of the common enemy, contending that it might only unite adversaries if each adversarial group is made aware of the distinction between the other group and the enemy.

'The Political’

We saw in Chapter Two that Mouffe argues against an excess of consensus, claiming that the 'tendency to downplay the importance of the persistence of political oppositions is dangerous because it tends to hamper the proper workings of the political sphere.'\textsuperscript{612} She asserts that citizens become disaffected with, and resultantly turn away from, democratic politics when there is an absence of conflict. As a consequence, her argument is that 'if established parties do not offer agonistic alternatives, less democratic movements will offer alternatives that will mobilize passions of disconnected citizens.'\textsuperscript{613} Thus, for Mouffe, an excess of consensus threatens democratic politics as it can render citizens apathetic and encourage them to turn towards non-democratic outlets. Hence,

conflict and passion are intrinsic to both democratic participation and preventing citizens from turning to extremist alternatives. Mouffe parts company with ‘inclusive agonists,’ Tully and Connolly, by claiming that ‘radical pluralist democratic politics has to discriminate between demands that must be excluded and the demands that will be seen as part of the agonistic debate.’\textsuperscript{614} She thereby promotes a ‘conflictual consensus,’ which encourages continual conflict whilst also drawing a frontier between those included in the consensus and those excluded from it. According to Mouffe, conflict still exists amongst those included in the consensus since they contest one another’s interpretations of liberty and equality, whilst continuing to endorse the values.\textsuperscript{615} Those who are excluded, then, either do not adhere to the values of liberty and equality, or threaten the existence of democratic institutions.

Let us first consider Mouffe’s assumption that by ensuring conflict between opposing positions we retain citizens’ interest in democratic engagement. As Wingenbach explains, ‘Mouffe insists that affect and passion are essential elements of agonistic pluralism, emerging inevitably in the relations of antagonism ever lurking below politics.’\textsuperscript{616} As a result, she affirms that democracy must reflect such affect and passion in order to engage citizens in democratic politics. The abortion discussion appeared to support Mouffe’s assumption that heightened levels of conflict encourage interest. In the reflective questionnaires, eight of the nine participants stated that the discussion was more interesting during periods of increased conflict. Furthermore, when asked why they found the discussion interesting, participants wrote, for example: ‘to see how passionate people are about the topic,’ ‘the enthusiasm people defended their positions with,’ and ‘very strong opinions.’ Since many participants attributed their interest to the passion, enthusiasm, and strength of alternate

views, the discussion appears to support Mouffe’s thesis that passion is the ‘driving force in the political field.’ This is important since her motivational narrative – which employs adversarial rhetoric in order to provoke citizens into engagement – begins with the assumption that passion and the potential for conflict are motivating factors. As Chapter Two outlines, this fundamentally separates her from agonists, such as Connolly and Tully, who provide little insight into how to motivate citizens into engagement. This is significant since critics, such as Young and Schaap take issue with Connolly and Tully’s insufficient consideration of how to motivate engagement. Hence, the abortion discussion may support the contention that employment of a motivational narrative, which draws on citizens passions, can motivate citizens into political contestation with conflicting others.

However, this begs the question of who might not be motivated by passion and conflict. This is important since, as Mouffe herself asserts, although exclusions are inevitable, it is essential ‘to recognize those forms of exclusion for what they are and the violence that they signify, instead of concealing them under the veil of rationality.’ Hence, if passion and conflict motivate certain citizens to engage whilst excluding others, it is vital that we unearth such exclusions. First then, since citizens ‘fight against each other because they want their interpretation of the principles to become hegemonic,’ we might challenge whether passion will continue to motivate citizens whose interpretations never become hegemonic. This notion was explored during the experiment in Erin’s behaviour. She was a dominant character throughout the discussion, with observers noting that she ‘is taking over others’ arguments,’ ‘correcting [Sam’s] opinions’ and ‘dominating the group.’ However, during the discussion about aborting a foetus with Down’s

618 See Chapter Three for a discussion of this.
syndrome, several members of the group who were against abortion, made a succession of comments such as ‘that is just like so selfish,’ ‘you have to be a bit of a monster,’ and ‘it is driven by self-centredness.’ Nobody in the opposite group responded to these. Immediately following this, one of the observers noted that Erin ‘stopped participating [in the] debate.’ Later, she wrote in her questionnaire that she had felt isolated from her group and that it was ‘funny how many people are pro-life.’ One observer noted that she ‘appears as if she is disappointed with her group.’ Thus, perhaps Erin’s temporary withdrawal from the discussion could reflect feelings of isolation and disappointment, arising from surprise at how many people were ‘against’ her. 

Thus, I contend that passion could fail to motivate citizens who are continually defeated by the hegemonic contest. Supporting this, Howarth asks about the plight of those demands, claims and identities...[of] those who are perpetually defeated in the cut and thrust of agonistic politics, and who may turn away from an agonistic politics towards a more antagonistic stance." Like Howarth, my concern is that, even if conflict generally motivates engagement, its presence may be unsuccessful in engaging those who are constantly defeated by the dominant hegemony. This follows Mouffe’s usage of warlike rhetoric in which adversaries enter into a ‘fight’ or ‘battle’ with one another in order that their interpretation or implementation of liberty and equality ‘wins’. Mouffe assumes that a lack of conflictual positions turns citizens away from democratic politics. However, if one position is continually beaten by a hegemonic opponent, then its interpretation and implementation of values might never come into play. As a result, even though citizens might have a formal choice between contending positions, in practice there might only be one position of significance to democratic politics. Thus, I am not...
convinced that the provision of conflicting identities *necessarily* prevents citizens from turning away from democratic politics. For those who constantly ‘lose’ democratic contests, democratic disaffection and non-democratic expression may still pose a problem. It may, therefore, be useful to consider possibilities for providing forms of contestation that encourage participation through passion and conflict, but adopt a less hegemonic form.

In addition to those who feel beaten by the contest, I am also concerned about whether conflict will succeed in engaging those who do not find high levels of conflict engaging. This concern was first highlighted during the pilot study discussion. Out of the ten participants, only five stated that they found the discussion more interesting during high levels of conflict. In the main experiment, this was less evident since only one participant, Jakub, wrote that high periods of conflict rendered the discussion less engaging. This is perhaps due to the differences in participant recruitment: during the pilot, for instance, I primarily used postgraduate students, many of whom stated that their primary purpose for participation was to help out a fellow researcher. However, the recruitment questionnaires for the main experiment indicated that participants volunteered as a result of their personal interest in the discussion topics. The second group generally felt more passionate about the discussion topics, and were perhaps more ready to share conflicting opinions, which might thereby explain why they found high levels of conflict more interesting. In spite of this, Jakub claimed that the discussion was less engaging during high levels of conflict. The position of this participant and those of the pilot study challenge the notion that conflict *necessarily* motivates engagement and prevents apathy. For some, it appears as though high levels of conflict can actually be more likely to encourage democratic disaffection. Hence, not only am I concerned that Mouffe’s theory may not motivate the participation of those who are continually defeated, but also that it may fail to motivate those who are less engaged during
periods of heightened conflict. Schaap supports this concern in questioning Mouffe's view that 'conflict will necessarily have an integrative function within a democratic polity.' Again, this is significant for Mouffe’s agonistic account because she emphasises the necessity of exposing exclusions.

Perhaps yet more worrying, is that there seems to be some consistency between how vocal participants were during the discussions, and how much they were motivated by high levels of conflict. For instance, Stuart, Iris, Ben, and Alan were noted to be the dominant members of the pilot study, and all of these indicated that discussion becomes more engaging during high levels of conflict. On the other hand, the one participant in the main experiment who claimed to be less interested during these periods was Jakub, who was noticeably one of the quieter members of the discussion, commenting in his questionnaire that ‘it was more interesting for me to just watch people debating than to share my own view.’ This parallels my concerns about Owen’s perfectionism in that emphasis on passion and conflict might prioritise the participation of particular citizens; namely those who are more dominant. If Mouffe’s adversarialism prioritises those citizens who are already willing to share their views with conflicting others, I am concerned that less dominant citizens could be excluded from democratic politics. This is mirrored by one participant’s reflective questionnaire, which stated that, ‘whilst there were views listened to by a variety of speakers - it was evident that there were stronger members of the group that dominated discussion.’ This domination was also echoed by observers, who repeatedly wrote about the interactions between Arabella and Erin that constituted a large part of the discussion. Encouraging dominant voices at the detriment of less dominant ones seems to be in tension with agonistic principles of contestation, contingency and necessary interdependency which

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aim to overcome domination and render politics more inclusive. In *The Return of the Political*, Mouffe asserts that, since ‘our values, our institutions and way of life constitute one form of political order among a plurality of possible ones,’ each consensus must be open to continual contestation. However, if by focusing on passion and conflict we fail to engage quieter, less-dominant citizens, it is difficult to see how a consensus formed by the majority could be contested. As Howarth affirms, Mouffe’s adversarialism ‘must also make room for the passionate expression of differences and disagreements between citizens thus furnishing the conditions for a deep and meaningful pluralism.’ In order to encourage a deep pluralism by enabling contestation and contingency, perhaps Mouffe's motivational narrative needs to give more thought about how to motivate, not just the dominant citizens (who might not be lacking motivation to engage in any case), but also those less-dominant citizens.

The second component of Mouffe's notion of the political is that of providing a common symbolic space in which competing adversaries argue about how to interpret and implement their shared values. Following Schmitt, Mouffe employs this notion of commonality in order to promote unity between conflicting citizens. For her, it is imperative that participants perceive one another as 'legitimate' and 'worthy' opponents, rather than as an 'enemy to be destroyed.' Several aspects of the experiment suggested that participants did perceive the opposite group as worthy. For instance, Arabella referred back to the arguments of the other group, saying ‘you’re absolutely right,’ participants listened without interrupting when Nikolaos and Katayoun told personal stories, Fiona acknowledged perspectivism, saying ‘it's how you look on things,’ and Sam made attempts at understanding the roots

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of the conflict, saying ‘the crux of it always is…’ The questionnaires also demonstrated that six of the nine participants perceived all views as respect-worthy during this discussion.

Conversely, during the discussion, Arabella stated that the whole day was about values, and that the two sides endorsed different values. Additionally, when asked in the questionnaire whether conflict arose from a disagreement about which values to endorse, how to implement these, or a combination of the two, only two participants perceived conflict as arising only from their implementation (as Mouffe’s conflictual consensus affirms). The rest saw a disagreement about which values to advocate, either as playing a role, or solely responsible for the conflict between the two groups. Thus, I challenge Mouffe’s assumption that adversaries always recognise one another as legitimate, worthy opponents distinct from the enemy to be destroyed. She argues that legitimacy arises between citizens who view one another as sharing a common allegiance to the values of liberty and equality whilst arguing over the implementation of these. Yet, it is my contention that, if citizens are unaware of the commonalities between them, legitimacy will not be apparent and there is no way to distinguish between an adversary and an enemy to be destroyed. This reminds us of the emphasis agonist place on contingency and perspective, as opposed to universality and truth. As Nietzsche rhetorically asks, ‘what does man actually know about himself? Is he, indeed, ever able to perceive himself completely, as if laid out in a lighted display case?’

For Nietzsche, as for each of the agonist thinkers, the answer is no; one only knows one’s perception. On this account, then, commonality is only significant when each contending party perceives it as commonality. Stefan Rummens supports this concern over whether citizens will recognise their space as common. He explains that ‘democratic adversaries share a

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common symbolic space only if their common reference to the core values of liberty and equality is indeed understood by all parties as a *common reference*.\(^628\) Hence, the significance of a common space only arises when citizens themselves recognise it as so.

This is of fundamental importance to the primary aim of adversarial agonism: to channel antagonistic, and often destructive, conflict into agonistic, or productive, engagement. As Schaap informs, 'everything depends precisely on whether participants view their conflict as communal (‘agonism’) or non-communal (‘antagonism’).\(^629\) Whereas, if participants are unaware of a common space and therefore perceive their conflict as antagonistic, this poses a challenge to the conversion of destructive conflict into a positive entity. As a result, it is difficult to see how antagonism can be transformed into agonism if there is no perceived distinction between the adversary to be fought, and the enemy to be destroyed. The assumption Mouffe makes here about the ability of citizens to view one another as legitimate appears paradoxical with her critique of Connolly’s inclusive agonism in which she states that ‘it is only when division and antagonism are recognized as being ineradicable that it is possible to think in a properly political way.’\(^630\) Yet, it seems to me that Mouffe’s presumption that adversarial contenders will *necessarily* acknowledge their commonalities is at odds with this emphasis on division and antagonism. Perhaps, her work could be supplemented with Owen’s common quest approach, which promotes commonality by actively involving citizens in a ranking activity. Or, perhaps, it could be enhanced by engaging more with the normative principles of Connolly and Tully, which might actively encourage feelings of legitimacy to arise through respect and recognition.

**Collective Identities**

Mouffe's adversarialism states that, in order to ensure the existence of the 'political', citizens must be offered strong contending political positions with which to identify. This follows her assertion that democratic disaffection results from 'a lack of democratic forms of identification.') Conversely, she argues that in order to retain interest in democratic politics and prevent the apathy that could lead to extremist identification, citizens 'need to have the possibility of choosing between parties offering real alternatives.') In forming these alternative identities, Mouffe follows Schmitt in asserting that the construction of each is dependent on that which makes it different from another. Claiming that it is impossible for any identity to exist without a different other, she states that 'the very condition for the construction of an "us" is the demarcation of a "them".') Mouffe's notion of collective identities thereby builds on her concept of 'the political' in seeking to prevent apathy. Where 'the political' strives to motivate engagement through passion and conflict, the notion of collective identities aspires to provide strong positions with which diverse citizens can identify. Once again, Mouffe's notion of collective identities aims to promote unity between citizens. Rather than focusing on the unity of the entire 'inside' as her common symbolic space does, however, the creation of collective identities constitutes an attempt at forming unity within each 'friend' group. Such unity arises through the way in which each group identifies itself in relation to an opposing group. As Rummens affirms, 'the identity and unity of a "we" can be established and guaranteed only by the demarcation of a "they".') Echoing this, Paulina Tambakaki explains that 'a "we consciousness" arises through the agonistic lens the moment that frontiers are drawn and 'we' become separated from "them".')

631 Ibid., p. 8.
During the experiment, unity within each group was evident in the way participants often supported the arguments of those in their group. For instance, participants frequently referred back to points others in their group had previously made, they helped one another out with arguments, and they nodded in agreement when others in their group spoke. Similarly, six of the nine participants wrote that it was easy to decide which group to join for the discussion, in addition to six of the nine participants noting that they felt a sense of belonging to their group.636

Yet, in spite of seeking to enable democratic identification, Mouffe's notion of collective, oppositional identities could be problematic. The tension between representing polar positions whilst still accounting for diversity became evident at several points in both the pilot study and the main experiment. First, then, let us consider the pilot study. The participant recruitment questionnaires prior to the discussion had asked participants whether they were generally 'for' or 'against' abortion. The data from these suggested that there was an even split between those who were for abortion and those who were against it. However, during the abortion discussion, only one participant affiliated himself with the 'pro-life' table. In order to distinguish one table from the other, I had provided one quotation taken from Pro Life UK about the injustice and discrimination of terminating a human life on one table, and one citation from Abortion Rights UK about making abortions safe and legal for women on the other. Participants were then asked to sit by the quote with which they identified the most. There was a clear discrepancy between those who identified as 'against' abortion prior to the discussion but 'pro-choice' during the discussion. Upon reflection, there were several possible reasons behind the apparent shift in opinion. First, it is possible that participants wanted to distance themselves from members of the pro-life campaign and,

636 Two others said that they felt isolated from their group, and one participant did not feeling a sense of belonging to either group.
perhaps I had encouraged participants to change sides by employing ‘pro-life’ and ‘pro-choice’ labels and adding relevant quotes. Therefore, they might have held similar views to pro-life advocates but rejected the label. Alternatively, it is possible that participants were against abortion but for reasons other than the one given by the pro-life quotation (that terminating a human life is immoral). Thus, they might have belonged to the same umbrella group, but held a more nuanced position which they did not feel was represented by the citation. Additionally, there is the possibility that participants were generally against abortion as a personal choice, but they also agreed with the alternative statement that abortion should be legal in order to make it safer. All of these explanations highlight the potentially diverse and complex nature of forming contending identities. This suggests that there may be a tension between making space for the diversity of multicultural, pluralist society, whilst also providing strong, collective identities. Whilst Mouffe does mention a range of positions (for instance, liberal-conservative, social-democratic and neo-liberal), her dichotomous understanding of identity, in which collective groups are constructed in relation to one another, poses a barrier to such pluralistic positions. As Schaap explains, stating that 'Mouffe's hope to employ the Schmittian conception of the political in a way that is compatible with plurality appears problematic unless it can account for the emergence of more than two perspectives out of a conflict that is initially dichotomous'.

In addition to their complexity and diversity, perspectives are also fluid and changeable. Indeed, perhaps participants’ opinions on abortion had changed between the pre-experiment questionnaires and the pilot study. As Martin Beckstein demonstrates, identity is ‘a porous and somewhat phantasmatic projection, even if it is indicated by reference to a human collective. As such, it is constantly being

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re-negotiated from within.\textsuperscript{638} Connolly supports this, affirming that ‘even the dense, unconscious coding of personhood shifts over time.’\textsuperscript{639} Thus, this final explanation emphasises the way in which each identity is fluid and open to change, thereby echoing agonistic emphasis on contingency, in which challenge and critique encourage values to evolve. Whatever the case(s) for the discrepancy of participants’ positions, the pilot study highlights the importance of acknowledging that each strong position is constituted by a spectrum of views. The views do not exist in isolation, but may overlap with one another, nor do they provide fixed, unchangeable positions with which citizens will always identify, but, rather, they are fluid entities that citizens will sometimes identify with and sometimes reject. As a result, it might be useful to rethink Mouffe’s understanding of identity in order to account for diversity and fluidity.

As a result of the pilot study, the labels 'pro-life' and 'pro-choice' were removed during the main experiment, as were their supporting quotes. Participants were instead asked to decide between 'for' and 'against' positions. Yet again, though, the response to the initial identification demonstrated the diversity within each of the two contending positions. Erin was immediately uncomfortable with the label ‘for.’ Additionally, rather than identifying easily with either of the strong positions, one participant, Nikolaos, took a significantly long time to decide between the two groups. Two of the nine participants also noted in the questionnaire that they had had difficulty deciding between the two groups in spite of stating their position in the pre-experiment questionnaire. It is thereby evident that under the umbrella terms 'for' and 'against,' a whole range of positions exists, sometimes rendering it difficult to identify with either. Such diversity was also evident in the composition of the


groups. The ‘for’ group comprised of one participant who expressed uncertainty about the given scenarios, stating at the end of the discussion that either decision would have been understandable. Additionally, it included two women’s rights campaigners who were pro-choice under all circumstances. The ‘against’ group was more homogenous, but still offered a range, with some participants actively campaigning against abortion, and others against it as a personal choice. Thus, I suggest that there may be more diversity within each position than Mouffe’s adversarialism allows. As Wenman affirms, Mouffe’s configuration of collective identities is ‘the obverse of Tully’s depiction of the creative power of the horizontal citizen-citizen relations between glocal citizens.’

Promoting an oppositional account of identity, as opposed to Connolly and Tully’s more pluralistic one, has meant that concern with challenging domination ‘has receded into the background in her agonistic writings, to be replaced by a persistent emphasis on the underlying threat of hostility.’ As Howarth explains, ‘the encouragement of diversity can be jeopardised by an endeavour to build common identities.’ Hence, I am concerned that Mouffe’s understanding of identity might fail to fulfil agonistic aspirations of challenging domination and encouraging diversity. A unified understanding of each identity could suppress or marginalise diverse positions within each group. This is significant for adversarialism since it might fail to prevent apathy and fundamentalist identification. Yet it is also significant to the overarching agonistic aims of necessary interdependency, contingency and contestation. If Mouffe were to acknowledge the plurality within each position, adversarial agonism might be better able to challenge domination, encourage wider inclusion, thereby promoting democratic engagement and enhancing necessary interdependency, contingency and contestation.

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641 Ibid., p. 200.
Additionally, the third participant to claim a feeling of isolation toward her own group noted that she felt her values were different to those of her group. This resonates with Rummens’ earlier observation that commonality is only significant if it is acknowledged as commonality by citizens. In Erin’s case, she wrote that she did not perceive commonality between her and the other participants, nor did she feel a sense of unity to them. Perhaps, then, Mouffe’s notion of collective identity can help to achieve unity but on two conditions: first, that citizens must identify strongly with a particular position, and, second, that they feel as if they share similar values with the other members of their group. If this is the case, Mouffe’s adversarialism may be enhanced by considering those who do not identify strongly with polarised positions, or those who are unaware of the common values they share with members of their own group. I am concerned that without further consideration, Mouffe’s agonism could oppress the diversity of positions within society and isolate those who do not easily identify with a group.

**Agonistic Struggle**

Mouffe requires the relationship between the collective identities of friends and adversaries to take the form of an ‘agonistic struggle’. As previously touched on in the discussion of ‘the political,’ the rationale behind emphasising the need for ‘an open-ended political power struggle between competing political collectivities’ is to provide a motivational narrative which provokes citizens to engage in democratic contestation. This is based on Mouffe’s assumption that passion is the ‘driving force in the political field’, and that, as a result, passions should not be eliminated from democratic politics but should be channelled instead into adversarial competition. Driven by their passions, Mouffe contends that ‘adversaries fight against each other because they want their interpretation of the

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principles to become hegemonic.'\textsuperscript{645} In employing passion and competition to encourage engagement, Mouffe’s theory is ‘more [of] a provocation to adversarial conflict than a polite invitation to a dialogue that respects the integrity of faith.’\textsuperscript{646} Hence, in provoking citizens to protect their understanding and implementation of values from those of their adversary, Mouffe’s adversarialism does not ask citizens to engage in democratic politics, it provokes them to. If they wish to defend their beliefs against the competing ones of their adversaries, then they will participate. As a result, the ‘agonistic struggle’ component of adversarial agonism strives to provide citizens with a motivation to engage with conflicting others. This is of particular importance when we consider Connolly and Tully, who have been criticised for failing to explain why citizens would (or should) partake in their agonistic contestations. As Wenman claims, ‘Mouffe presents her realism as an alternative to what she reads as a certain naïve optimism inherent in the other contemporary theorists of agonism.’\textsuperscript{647} Rather than relying on citizens’ willingness to participate, Mouffe provides a motivational narrative to provoke engagement.

During the abortion discussion, participants were evidently provoked into engagement with the other side. The observers noted that the discussion had a fast pace, and people were ‘bursting to speak,’ reflecting the passion inherent in this discussion. They also wrote that negative behaviour, such as staring into space or having private conversations were rare, demonstrating the engagement of all participants. Such high levels of engagement were reflected in both the pilot study and subsequent student seminars. The latter discussions are particularly significant because the theme of abortion was swapped for topics, such as whether students should automatically get a 2.1 if the university library burnt down, and

\textsuperscript{645} Ibid., p. 7.
whether or not to support the lecturer strikes. Thus, by using various discussion topics whilst working with a similar discussion framework, it suggests that high levels of passion and engagement are at least partially affected by the discussion framework (and not just attributed to the discussion content). In addition to the evident passion and engagement during the main experiment, it was also apparent that some members felt competitive about their views. Arabella and Erin, for instance, repeatedly used evidence, facts, and figures to support their arguments. Erin responded to a comment about Down's Syndrome with 'I know, I work with people with Down's Syndrome,' whilst Arabella often incorporated facts into her argument such as ‘at 21 days the heart beats,’ and Fiona asked everyone if they knew what happened to a 16 to 20 week old foetus, stating that abortion ‘suctions out the brain and crushes the skull then removes the remaining body parts.’ Additionally, several participants claimed to find the discussion engaging because it provided ‘the chance to answer as well as I could the arguments presented by the other group,’ and ‘a good challenge to argue against 8 different people.’ It appears as if some participants perceived this discussion as a debate to be won through evidence. This contrasts with the following discussion, which, as the subsequent chapter demonstrates, was seen by many a view-sharing exercise to understand one another better. Hence, it appears as though participants were provoked into engagement in order to defend their beliefs.

However, although a framework influenced by agonistic struggle appears effective in provoking engagement through the promotion of passion and competition, I am concerned that it does not demonstrate adversarial legitimacy, which Mouffe deems as imperative to transforming antagonistic relations into agonistic ones.

648 I decided not to set abortion as a discussion topic for student seminars because of its emotive, and potentially personal, nature. Unlike the participants of the pilot study and main experiment, students in seminars had not signed informed consent forms and, thus, I felt it unethical to use the theme of abortion.
Legitimacy entails perceiving conflicting others as 'political competitor[s] we should acknowledge and respect.' Mouffe stresses how this builds on liberal tolerance, claiming that 'this is the real meaning of liberal-democratic tolerance, which does not entail condoning ideas that we oppose or being indifferent to standpoints that we disagree with, but treating those who defend them as legitimate opponents.' Hence, agonistic struggle encourages citizens to see one another as legitimate, in spite of their disagreements. Legitimacy thereby aspires to promote respect between conflicting citizens, striving to render disagreement productive by 'mobilizing [passions] towards democratic designs.' This understanding of respect thereby appears richer than liberal tolerance, which has been challenged for its one-directional, dominant nature whereby it 'is bestowed upon private minorities by a putative majority occupying the authoritative, public center.' As a result, acknowledgment of legitimacy constitutes an attempt at preventing violent antagonism, thereby enhancing relationships between democratic citizens.

However, I suggest that there is the potential for tension to arise when we draw on passion and conflict to provoke citizens into a competition with one another, whilst also requiring them to perceive one another as legitimate adversaries. Schaap supports this in the affirmation that 'it is questionable whether legitimating political grievances by providing greater scope for their expression serves to sublimate rather than intensify antagonism.' These concerns were reflected during the abortion discussion, which constituted the most heated discussion during both the pilot study and the main experiment. Hostility was demonstrated by observer sheets,

654 It is important to bear in mind factors such as maturation and history, here since behaviour might have been influenced by interactions during coffee breaks, and spillover
which noted that ‘[Erin] interrupted [Ben] in a really rude way.’ Additionally, Erin often used sarcasm, employing phrases such as ‘oh, wonderful!’ and ‘jolly good!’ whilst Ben accused Erin of ‘bend[ing] what I’m saying.’ Several participants also appeared accusatory, stressing the ‘you’ when responding to the opposite side. They also largely abandoned the ‘I think’ and ‘from my perspective’ of the previous discussion, replacing them with essentialist vocabulary, such as ‘it is’ and ‘you have to.’ At the end of the discussion, participants were shouting over one another and it took several attempts to stop break up the discussion. As one of the observers noted, ‘it descended into chaos.’ In the questionnaires, participants described others as ‘very aggressive’ and ‘trying to hurt other people or degrade them morally/ethically,’ affirming that the discussion ‘was not very productive since we were looking at the issue from very different angles.’ This behaviour therefore suggests that more needs to be done to demonstrate adversarial legitimacy to citizens in order to reduce hostility, and transform antagonistic, negative conflict into agonistic, productive conflict. I share Wenman’s view that ‘Mouffe’s overriding concern with the problem of antagonism means that she is in danger of losing sight of the positive goods of agonistic democracy.’ 655 Perhaps, then, Connolly and Tully’s normative principles would be useful to giving further thought about how to, not only mediate potentially antagonistic relations, but also to enhance improve relations of respect and recognition.

This behaviour links to an additional aspect of agonistic struggle, the distinction between politics, and the political. Mouffe draws on Schmitt’s assertion that the ‘political enemy need not necessarily be morally evil or aesthetically ugly.’ 656 She states that the confrontation between ‘we’ and ‘them’ must be conceived of ‘in

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Indeed, by focusing on political conflict, she aspires to channel conflict into political, democratic outlets, rather than non-political, non-democratic expressions.

However, this seems in tension with Mouffe’s own assertion that ‘as current controversies about abortion clearly show…the frontier between public and private is not given once and for all but constructed and constantly shifting.’ Since the separation between public and private is fluid, I contend that, so too, is the distinction between the realms of the political and the ethical.

Howarth raises similar concerns, asking 'how, for instance, does Mouffe's concept of agonism manage to mediate her sharp distinction between politics and the political, when the latter is closely identified with the inherent dimension of antagonism, which is then taken to be "constitutive of human societies".' Since Mouffe relies on passion, competition and conflict to motivate democratic participation, I am unconvinced that she can unproblematically separate politics from the political. The overlap between the two arenas was reflected in the experiment in which several participants labelled those who have abortions as ‘self-centred,’ ‘selfish,’ and ‘monstrous.’ Evidently, here, the distinction between the political act of discussing abortion merged with the personal ethics and morals of those expressing such views. As a result of drawing from one’s own personal morals and normative principles, and forming opinions of those held by others, it appears problematic to perceive the adversary as a political, but not moral, competitor. One participant acknowledged this, writing that participants were 'trying to hurt other people or degrade them morally/ethically.' As a result of the fluidity between the political and politics, it appears somewhat paradoxical to provoke political discussion by drawing on personal beliefs and associated emotions, whilst refraining from entering the realms of politics and ethics.

Perhaps, then, in transforming antagonistic conflict into agonistic conflict, Mouffe might need to acknowledge the inability of some (if not all) citizens to engage with others in purely political terms. Here, her theory could be enriched by insights from Connolly's attempts at overcoming *ressentiment*, which acknowledge negative feelings toward conflicting others and aims to overcome these by promoting normative concepts such as agonistic respect and critical responsiveness.

**Common enemy**

The final adversarial concept I seek to analyse is that of the common enemy. Mouffe's definition of the 'common enemy' involves those who are excluded from society. Against many liberals, Mouffe argues that no consensus can be formed without some act of exclusion, hence rendering the enemy imperative to democracy. Füat Gürsözü argues that, in demarcating an enemy, Mouffe's agonism 'has to discriminate between demands that must be excluded and the demands that will be seen as part of the agonistic debate.' This discrimination involves consideration of the legitimacy of the demands, both in terms of their content, and whether or not they threaten the existence of democratic institutions. By insisting upon the necessity of exclusion, Mouffe's adversarialism separates itself from Connolly's inclusive agonism. Connolly includes fundamentalists by stating that we 'merely call on [them] to acknowledge the contestability of [their] claims to intrinsic moral order and to affirm self-restrictions in the way [they] advance [their] agenda in the light of this admission.' In turn, this enables Mouffe to avoid the criticisms charged toward Connolly, which deem his theory 'naïve' and 'woefully inadequate' in the face of fundamentalism. Thus, by creating a frontier between the included and the excluded, Mouffe's theory provides an alternative -and perhaps
less naive and thereby more adequate - account of how agonistic democracy is to resist domination by fundamentalists.

In addition to separating itself from Connolly's inclusive agonism, Mouffe's concept of the enemy also seeks to distinguish itself from liberalism. Liberals too, see the necessity of drawing frontiers between the included and excluded. However, two significant factors demarcate adversarial frontiers from liberal ones: legitimacy and contingency. Liberals such as Rawls, often employ the labels 'reasonable' and 'unreasonable' to distinguish between the included and the excluded, whereas Mouffe uses the terminology 'legitimate' and 'illegitimate.' She critiques 'reasonable' and 'unreasonable' descriptions, asserting that anything included in this category simply 'corresponds to the dominant language games and the "common sense" they construe.' Mouffe thereby acknowledges that, whether or not a demand is perceived as legitimate 'is established through a given hegemonic configuration of power' and must thereby remain 'a political, contestable one; it should never be justified as dictated by a higher order and presented as the only legitimate one.' In employing legitimacy and contingency, then, Mouffe seeks to acknowledge the power struggle underscoring the frontiers of the included and the excluded. As a result, her theory aspires to avoid the oppression of the enemy by emphasising that 'the frontier that separates the people from their enemies [is] an internal one whereby the "them" is not a permanent outsider.'

In addition to distinguishing between those who can and cannot participate in democratic politics, whilst affirming the contingent nature of this, Mouffe's common enemy also aims to encourage unity between friends and adversaries. Just as Mouffe uses the existence of the oppositional other to constitute a collective identity within the political arena, she also uses the notion of the outside in order to unite friends...

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666 Ibid., p. 17.
and adversaries. Rummens explicates that ‘the creation of a political unity always requires an antagonistic opposition.’ Hence by alerting citizens to those who do not adhere to liberty and equality, or who threaten the existence of democratic institutions, Mouffe’s ‘enemy’ strives to demonstrate the legitimacy of adversaries to one another.

During my experiment, I employed the notion of the common enemy midway through the abortion discussion. In so doing, I showed participants a video entailing photographs and audio clips that depicted a history of abortion violence stemming from both the pro-life and pro-choice groups. The video concluded by informing participants that their enemies were not each other, but rather, extremists on both sides who invalidate their arguments and turn people away from the cause. Immediately after the video, the focus of participants moved away from each other and toward the extremists. For instance, Sam expressed an understanding of how extremism could develop on either side: ‘I mean I see why people do feel so strongly about this to kill people.’ Similarly, Arabella sought to distinguish pro-life groups from extremists, saying that ‘the vast majority of pro-life individuals are silent and prayerful and that’s all they are.’ Empathising with the opposite group, Nikolaos added that it is ‘similar with pro-choice.’ Thus, the initial behaviour of the participants appears to suggest that the concept of the common enemy provides a useful tool in forming unity between two adversarial groups.

Yet, just as Mouffe’s concept of legitimacy relies on citizens to perceive the similarities between them, surely her concept of the common enemy also relies on citizens to acknowledge the differences between adversaries and enemies. This consideration is raised during the abortion discussion, which, following the initial period of respite, quickly turned controversial, with Erin asking ‘do you know about the pro-life extremist protest that was on campus here a couple of months ago?’

668 Ibid., p. 382.
This time, the discussion became more heated with Arabella and Erin talking over each other. The observers noted that negative behaviour happened ‘often’ following the video, whereas it had only occurred ‘rarely’ or ‘sometimes’ until this point. Several participants also wrote in their questionnaires that the discussion became more heated after watching the video. Thus, just as I question whether adversaries are always able to perceive one another as legitimate competitors sharing a common, symbolic framework, I also question whether they can separate one another from the common enemy. This is echoed in Rummens’ concern over the enemy distinction in which, drawing on Jacques Derrida, he affirms that ‘what is other strange or inimical always already haunts what is proper, familiar or friendly. Therefore, the enemy is not an identifiable outside but is always present inside my own brother or friend, and, ultimately, always already present inside my own self.\(^{669}\) Hence, the separation between included adversaries and those who are excluded from the democratic contest might not be as easily identifiable as Mouffe implies. Perhaps some citizens will perceive a group to be advocating shared liberal democratic values, whereas other citizens will see them as either going against these values, or threatening democratic politics.

This ambiguity between the inside and the outside was evident in Arabella and Erin’s debate over Abort 27 following the video, in which Erin branded them as extremists and Arabella supported them, saying that they ‘are trying to educate people what abortion is.’ The way in which Arabella supported the pro-life group whilst Erin condemned them resonates with Rumen’s assertion that the identity of the enemy is not entirely separable from the identity of citizens. In the case of the common enemy, unity between adversaries is only achieved if the enemy is perceived as distinct from the adversary. If one side conflates the adversary with the enemy then they will be unable or unwilling to grant legitimacy to them. Yet, on the other hand, to employ a strict

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\(^{669}\) Ibid., p. 386.
demarcation between values to be included and those to be excluded appears at odds with the agonistic emphasis on contestation and contingency. For Mouffe, the liberal consensus governing ‘the inside’ must remain partial and contestable, which would be undermined by a narrower definition of the enemy. Perhaps, then, we need to rethink how to promote unity without encouraging further antagonism or threatening contestation and contingency. Here, Connolly and Tully’s ‘inclusive’ approach might be helpful in thinking about how to encourage unity through normative principles, such as agonistic respect and mutual recognition.

Conclusion

I suggest that Mouffe’s emphasis on passion and competition is generally successful in provoking engagement between conflicting citizens. However, I am concerned about those who might be excluded from this contest, such as those who are continually beaten by the contest, and those who are not fuelled by their passions or competition. As a result, I propose that Mouffe rethink the hegemonic rhetoric of her account by abandoning ‘winner’ and ‘loser’ terminology. I also contend that we give further thought about which practical mechanisms might encourage the participation of less dominant citizens. I demonstrate how collective identities can promote unity between adversarial groups in society, however, I argue that this understanding of identity does not account for diversity and fluidity. Thus, here, I suggest that Mouffe’s account might be enriched if it were supplemented with either Owen’s provision of a common quest, or Connolly and Tully’s promotion of agonistic respect and mutual recognition. Additionally, I reject the divide this requires between the realms of politics and the political, suggesting that political passion and competition can spill over into personal ethics and morality, and hostility can arise between citizens. Finally, I suggest that the common enemy could encourage adversarial unity if it is recognised as a distinct entity from the adversary group. However, I am concerned that, given the presence of passion and antagonism, such recognition might not emerge. Yet, to employ a
strict separation between the two, would, I suggest, be at odds with agonistic notions of contingency and contestation.
Chapter Eight: Analysing Connolly and Tully’s Inclusive Agonism

In this chapter, I consider Connolly and Tully’s inclusive concepts, combining theoretical discussion with an exploration of their operationalisation during the gay marriage discussion. I established in Chapter Five that inclusive agonism is constituted by five fundamental concepts: intersubjectivity, citizens as the rulers and the ruled, overcoming domination, self-modification and challenge, and contestability. I argue that emphasis on pluralistic interdependency can help to create more positive relations between conflicting citizens. Yet, I suggest that polarisation might still arise, even when it is not promoted. Subsequently, I suggest that, whilst inclusive agonism might effectively mediate the public sphere, it might be less successful in addressing underlying feelings of ressentiment. Next, I show how collective decision-making and non-dominant leaders can arise spontaneously, whilst also considering the dangers posed by those who threaten the democratic contest. I demonstrate the ways in which relations were more positive and inclusive during this discussion, as well as how regulatory institutions could be employed to empower less dominant citizens. Next, I discuss how the promotion of self-modification could encourage challenge, but that the transformation of values is a slow and complex process. Finally, I explore how exhibiting contestability could improve relations between citizens, but acknowledge that for some citizens this principle may be in tension with their feelings of passion.

Interdependency

Connolly and Tully both promote an inclusive version of agonistic democracy through their notion of interdependency, which is demonstrated through their understanding of identity relations. Although, as Chapter Two demonstrates, Connolly places greater emphasis on self-challenge, whereas Tully focuses more on encouraging a diversity of voices to be heard, both thinkers promote a
more inclusive version of democracy. In so doing, they highlight the way in which the existence of diverse identities is essential to the consolidation of one’s own identity. Connolly asserts that each ethnicity, gender, nationality, and interest is rendered meaningful as a result of various alternatives, echoing Foucault’s discussion of Las Meninas, which illustrates the possibility of grasping an absent concept through interrelated concepts. Also drawing on Foucault to promote interdependency, Tully claims that citizenship is not granted to people through law and institutions, but instead arises from engagement with others. In addition to Foucauldian influences, such an understanding also highlights the Arendtian roots of Tully’s work. Arendt affirms that, in order to achieve their ‘full reality,’ men need not only be, but also publicly appear. Both Connolly and Tully reject the notion that one can truly exist in isolation from others, promoting the concept of interdependency in which all identities in society are entangled in a web of interrelationality. I sought to promote interdependency during the gay marriage discussion by arranging a circular room layout whereby citizens were not organised according to their beliefs. The circular layout strived to prevent polarised positions, enhance physical inclusion, and encourage participants to perceive one another as interdependent.

Contrary to the adversarial nature of Mouffe’s account of identity, Connolly and Tully understand interrelationality as pluralistic, constituted by ‘the interweaving of different threads.’ This is significant since the previous chapter concludes that adversarialism does not sufficiently account for the possibility of nuances and contingency within conflicting positions. As Schaap demonstrates, ‘Mouffe’s hope to employ the Schmittian conception of the political in a way that is compatible with plurality appears problematic unless it can

account for the emergence of more than two perspectives out of a conflict that is initially dichotomous. The previous chapter suggests that this understanding of identity has the potential to threaten diversity and enhance hostilities between conflicting citizens. The pluralistic understanding, on the other hand, seeks to promote more positive and productive forms of conflict by encouraging citizens to ‘maintain a paradoxical tension between drawing upon their values and beliefs in the public realm of discussion and debate, and being receptive and respectful to other positions in order to avoid the temptations of fundamentalising their own position.’

The gay marriage discussion appears to suggest that, by moving away from oppositional, polarised forms of identity toward more interdependent ones, inclusive agonism might be more effective than adversarial agonism in producing more positive forms of conflict. Contrary to the abortion discussion, participants in the gay marriage discussion appeared to listen to one another more, use more sensitive language toward one another, and distance their arguments from others in the room. For example, participants refrained from swearing, shouting over one another and using sarcastic and mocking tones. In one instance, Arabella apologised to Nikolaos because her argument condemned an action of Nikolaos’ friend. When making this argument, Arabella turned to Nikolaos and said ‘I’m sorry, it’s your friend, I’m sorry.’ Similarly, when Ben was expressing an opinion, he avoided using an accusing tone. In spite of already coming out as gay, he said ‘we suppress them’ of how society treats homosexuals. By making himself part of the problem, he formed an argument without leading to accusations. Likewise, when Erin accused those against gay rights as putting forward certain arguments, she explicitly stated that ‘no-one is saying that today, nobody in this room.’ This provided a contrast with the abortion discussion in which participants frequently used ‘you’ in an accusatory manner, and created parallels between violent extremists on

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the video and the participants arguing the other side. Observers also unanimously described the discussion as ‘more respectful’ and ‘decent’. One participant also noted in his questionnaire that the discussion was ‘more friendly’ because ‘the format of the debate (chairs in the round) made it more comfortable for me.’ This supports Connolly’s view that ‘a lot can be held back much of the time’. Relations between participants appeared friendlier with people joking with one another about the queue to use discussion tokens, referring back to one another’s points, and even laughing with conflicting others following heated moments. For instance, the group laughed when Sam said ‘I put [a token down] because I thought I’d spoke too much.’ Additionally, when Erin followed one of Fiona’s arguments with ‘it’s not your word,’ Fiona replied ‘no, it’s my opinion’ and both of them laughed. Connolly affirms that ‘the idea is not to rise above faith, but to forge a positive ethos of public engagement between alternative faiths.’ This ethos appeared to develop during the inclusive discussion, with participants such as Erin and Fiona continuing to conflict over their faiths, whilst also engaging positively with one another. At first glance, then, this appears to support Connolly and Tully’s claims that inclusive agonism can create a more productive and positive form of conflict that ‘enables individuals and groups with relatively established identities to respect other faiths in the public realm.’

In spite of this, I am concerned by two aspects of interdependency, which were highlighted during the gay marriage discussion. First, I worry that Connolly and Tully’s pluralistic understanding of identity, although seemingly effective in producing positive relations, may not fully account for the ever-present potential for beliefs to become polarised. Second, and perhaps intertwined with this concern, is the

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It is important to consider the effects of history, here, in which participants had previously engaged in a heated discussion and some of them had therefore expressed a readiness to engage in a more friendly discussion. However, throughout each repetition of these discussions, the ‘inclusive’ framework seemed to promote more friendly and productive conflict between participants.
worry that negative feeling and hostility – and hence the *ressentiment* which Connolly focuses on overcoming – have not been mediated, but rather have been removed from the public realm of discussion. The first concern parallels Mouffe’s assumption that ‘democratic logics always entail drawing a frontier between “us” and “them”’.680 Whilst, as the previous chapter demonstrates, I disagree with Mouffe’s promotion of identity as necessarily constructed in oppositional terms, I argue, with her, that the *potential* for antagonism and oppositional conflict is always present. Although I want to reject Mouffe’s *promotion* of polarised positions, then, I am concerned that dichotomous positions may arise naturally in any case. For instance, during the gay marriage discussion, in spite of providing a range of questions to reflect a spectrum of opinions, a clear divide surfaced between for and against positions. One observer supported this, commenting that ‘there is a clear divide between for and against,’ and another wrote that ‘only Ben and Nikolaos have changed sides [from the previous discussion]’. These remarks were supported by the video-analysis which demonstrated that Arabella, Fiona, Chris and Jakub were evidently against gay marriage and gay adoption,681 whilst Erin, Sam, Ben, Katayoun and Nikolaos were all in favour. Thus, even though the discussion framework did not seek to create or promote collective oppositional identities, it appears as though such positions emerged naturally.682 This reminds us of Mouffe’s affirmation that ‘pluralism implies the permanence of conflict and antagonism.’683 Hence, although I suggest that the two sides are formed of a contingent spectrum of positions, rather than oppositional, unified groups, I assert that there is always the potential for positions to become dichotomous and oppositional. This is echoed in Mouffe’s discussion of Arendt and Connolly in which she claims that ‘what is missing here are two dimensions which I have argued are central for

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681 Although all, except Arabella, were in favour of civil partnerships.
682 Indeed, by placing the adversarial discussion before the inclusive discussion, this might have influenced participants to view one another in dichotomous terms. However, attempts were made to counter this, including the circular room layout and asking participants to sit next to different people from before.
politics: antagonism and hegemony.\textsuperscript{684} Thus, in presenting conflict as an entangled web of diverse positions, Connolly and Tully might not sufficiently emphasise the dichotomous potential of each. Focusing on diversity and plurality seems to encourage more positive interactions, however it might prevent Connolly and Tully from considering how to mediate antagonistic, or even fundamentalist conflict. As Deveaux affirms, Connolly’s agonism offers an ‘optimistic view,’\textsuperscript{685} whilst, for Wenman, it is ‘woefully inadequate’, naïve and insufficient when we consider the conflict between liberals and fundamentalists such as the 9/11 hijackers.\textsuperscript{686} In spite of this, though, as the last chapter argued, an alternative collective, adversarial interpretation cannot suffice in understanding identity relations, since it does not enable us to grasp the pluralistic nature of positions within each group. Perhaps, then, an understanding of identity relations is required which acknowledges its pluralistic, nuanced, and contingent nature, whilst also recognising its potential to become oppositional, antagonistic and divisive.

I am also concerned that, whilst interdependency appears effective in mediating relations in the public sphere, it may be less successful in addressing the underlying ressentiment between conflicting citizens. This is a concern for inclusive agonism, particularly for Connolly’s work, which requires citizens to work on themselves in order to enhance relations of interdependency:

\begin{quote}
Working on yourself in relation to the cultural differences through which you have acquired definition. Doing so to render yourself more open to responsive engagement with alternative faiths, sensualities, gender practices, ethnicities, and so on. Doing so to render yourself better able to listen to new and surprising movements in the politics of becoming without encasing them immediately in
\end{quote}

preset judgments that sanctify the universality or naturalness of what you already are.\textsuperscript{687}

In the gay marriage discussion negative relations still remained between participants, but seemed to take on a subtler form than in the previous discussion. Observers noted that ‘looks were exchanged’ between Erin and Katayoun, as well as between Erin and Sam following Arabella’s comments, and that Katayoun is speaking in an ‘accusing way.’ Additionally, Erin wrote in her questionnaire that ‘religion moulds some people’s values – because their religion says it is wrong, their minds are made up. Like sheep.’ Similarly, in a discussion with the observers and me following the experiment, Sam and Ben expressed shock and anger at the beliefs held by those against gay marriage. This contrasted with the abortion discussion whereby participants expressed their ressentiment towards one another openly, rather than confining it to private conversations. My apprehension, then, is that a pluralistic account of interdependency does not necessarily result in conflict mediation, but, rather, could transfer it from the public sphere of contestation into the private realm of subtle glances, questionnaires, and private discussions.\textsuperscript{688} Perhaps, there is the danger that if we focus too much on encouraging positive interactions, we might enhance antagonism in the non-political sphere. Alexander Livingston supports this concern, asserting that, ‘folding the politics of affective infusion into an agonistic but respectful process of negotiation begins to look a lot more like the redescriptive politics of the public sphere proposed by deliberative democracy.’\textsuperscript{689} Antonio Vzquez-Arroyo also shares this view, stating that Connolly’s normative behaviours ‘are expectations that, in spite of the misleadingly modest tone in which Connolly formulates them, echo Rawls’s call for people to accept the primacy of justice as fairness.’\textsuperscript{690} Thus, just as the liberal sphere of politics has been criticised for moving conflict from the public sphere to the private, I

\textsuperscript{688} Once again, history could be an important factor and such hostilities could be spillover effects from the previous discussions. It would therefore be interesting, and valuable, to repeat these discussions in a different order.
propose that, when endorsing Connolly and Tully’s normative principles, we need to be careful not to overemphasise the importance of these since this could suppress conflict and aggravate it in the non-political realm. Given the importance of political contestation for agonistic democracy, as outlined in Chapter One, this raises the concern that such normative principles might pose a barrier to overcoming domination and challenging *ressentiment*, thereby threatening the inclusive aspect of Connolly and Tully’s work. As a result, there is the possibility that ‘if established parties do not offer agonistic alternatives, less democratic movements will offer alternatives that will mobilize passions of disconnected citizens.’ As Mouffe argues, conflict is ineradicable, but also desirable since, if it is not provided with a democratic outlet for expression, it may result in more fundamentalist forms of engagement. Hence, Connolly and Tully need to be careful to maintain the balance between, promoting more positive interactions on the one hand, whilst also providing outlets for agonistic expression on the other.

**Citizens as the Rulers and the Ruled**

As outlined in Chapter Two, both Tully and Connolly seek to promote greater inclusivity by rendering citizens both the rulers and the ruled. For Tully, this entails overcoming domination by involving citizens in the formulation of laws by including them in on-going democratic discussion, and not confining their participation to the decision-making process. Connolly’s agonism echoes Tully’s calls for a more inclusive politics by requiring citizens to engage more actively with one another in an *ethos of engagement*, which aspires to overcome *ressentiment*. Owen suggests Connolly’s work would be compatible with civic practices, such as participatory budgeting, citizens assemblies and juries, PR voting and preferenda. Once again, this involves reserving citizens a place to become involved with the discussion and

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formulation process, rather than confining them to the realm of decision-making. In order to represent the notion of citizens as the rulers and the ruled during the gay marriage discussion, I did two things. First, although participants were provided with a list of discussion questions surrounding the topic of gay rights, I informed them that these were more of a platform for discussion, and that they should feel able to stray from these. Additionally, in spite of giving participants speech tokens, I avoided intervening in the usage of these, granting the group autonomy over counter-questions or token borrowing. Both of these components sought to grant participants greater autonomy throughout the discussion, encouraging them to act as the rulers and the ruled.

Khan’s view demonstrates the self-regulating ability of citizens in Connolly’s theory, affirming that ‘there is no account of the necessity of the leader that stands in for or represents the whole but rather the emphasis is on the abundant multiplicity of groups and identities that are perpetually coming into being.’ Thus, on this view, a leader is unnecessary to the regulation of group conflict since Connolly [and Tully’s] work ‘shares important similarities with [John] Locke’s conception of the state of nature as largely self-regulating.’ Instead, for Connolly and Tully’s theories, which focus on necessary interdependency, regulation ‘emerges though multiple lines of connection and bonds of interdependency between different groups, forces and constituencies.’ Hence, like Locke, Connolly and Tully perceive society as a self-regulating entity in which leaders need not be imposed from above since they emerge spontaneously through relations of interdependency. The gay marriage discussion generally reflected these assumptions about self-regulating society. For example, there were several instances in which participants wanted to ask follow-up questions, and asked whether this required a speech token: Chris asked the group, ‘can I answer [Erin] because she’s asked me a

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695 Khan, G. (2008), p. 205
question?’ and Sam replied ‘we’ll let you off, we’ll let you off,’ which was met with light-hearted laughter. The group frequently made quick and easy decisions as to whether or not a token was required and such decisions appeared largely uncontroversial. Additionally, there were a couple of moments where participants asked to respond immediately (rather than waiting in the queue) because their point was directly relevant to something another participant had just said. Again, other participants appeared generally happy to suspend the regulation of the speech tokens in these instances.

In addition to regulating themselves, the gay marriage discussion also demonstrated the spontaneous emergence of a leader. As one of the observers noted, Sam took on the role of discussion regulator, reminding other participants of their order in the queue. There are two things which appear significant about Sam’s role as regulator: first, he was not one of the dominant members in any of the discussions (Arabella was the most dominant member, as demonstrated by her borrowing of tokens). Second, he regulated the discussion in a friendly manner, jovially reminding people of the order and ensuring that quieter members were recognised. Although Sam was not one of the quietest members of the group, he was definitely not a dominant participant. This contrasts with Hobbesian concerns that when society is allowed to self-regulate, dominant citizens will seek to assert their power and authority.  

Echoing the analysis of Owen’s perfectionist account of agonism, this suggests that self-regulation is possible, without either dominating the discussion, excluding certain people, or imposing too many restrictions on people’s involvement. This resonates with new institutionalist notions of demonstrated practices whereby the behaviour of citizens is influenced and ensured by that of others. The discussion suggests that self-regulation can enhance inclusivity when the regulator represents the interests of the entire group, and encourages less dominant members of the group to participate. Hence, this supports

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Tully and Connolly’s calls for citizens to become the rulers as well as the ruled.

However, there were a couple of instances during both the pilot study and the main experiment which suggested that, even though the regulator did not seek domination, the lack of an imposed leader might enable other members to attempt to dominate the discussion. For example, during both the pilot study and the main experiment, one participant (Iris and Arabella respectively) ‘cheated’ with respect to the discussion tokens. They both employed several tactics to continue engaging in the discussion once they had used all of their tokens, involving borrowing tokens from other members, speaking without tokens, and writing comments to show to the group. Interestingly, these instances differed from the moments where the group collectively decided to allow someone an extra token, or to counter someone’s point. This domination appeared to be particularly frustrating to other dominant members of the group who did abide by the rules. For example, Stuart expressed his anger toward Iris in the gay marriage questionnaire, writing that ‘I felt less engaged with the discussion when I ran out of matchsticks; I felt some others were not always playing by the speaking rules.’ Dominant participants will be considered in more depth in the following section: overcoming domination, however these instances demonstrate the tension between self-regulation and autonomy on the one hand, and the possibilities of domination on the other, posing a potential obstacle to Tully’s focus on promoting inclusion by overcoming domination. The potential for such domination is addressed in Mouffe’s work in which she ‘identifies with Berlin’s anxiety about democracy as potentially authoritarian.’ Wenman expresses similar worries in the affirmation that ‘we meet the zero point of Connolly’s theorization in his recognition that the invitation to “agonistic reciprocity” may ultimately be flatly refused…He is simply silent about what to do when the invitation to constructive agonism is rejected.’

Hence, when considering the practical application of inclusive concepts, further thought may be needed about how to negotiate the balance between enabling autonomy on one hand, whilst preventing domination on the other. Perhaps Owen’s common quest is useful, here, in rendering citizens accountable to one another and reducing the risk of them seeking to dominate the group as a result.

**Overcoming Domination**

Interrelated to citizens as the rulers and the ruled, then, is Connolly and Tully’s focus on overcoming domination. Whilst Tully focuses on this more throughout his work, both thinkers strive to overcome domination through agonistic respect and mutual recognition respectively. Connolly compares agonistic respect with liberal toleration, claiming that, whereas the dominant majorities choose whether or not to grant the latter to inferior minorities, the former creates a web of respect in which each identity is necessarily dependent on all others.\(^{702}\) Tully similarly calls for a more inclusive understanding of respect through mutual recognition, asking citizens not to recognise alternative cultures through prior assumptions, but to listen to others in their own terms and as they wish to be heard.\(^{703}\) As a result of agonistic respect and mutual recognition, Connolly and Tully aspire to encourage more inclusive forms of respect by challenging the power of the majority, thereby overcoming domination. As Chapter Four outlines, I sought to represent the principle of overcoming domination in two ways. First, I explicitly asked participants to listen to one another in their own terms, and respect other beliefs even if they disagreed with them. Second, I aimed to encourage such behaviour by giving each participant an equal number of speech tokens to be used throughout the discussion. These two elements of the discussion – combined with the aforementioned circular layout – aspired to overcome domination.

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In contrast with the previous discussion, the gay marriage discussion appeared generally successful in overcoming domination. The questionnaires demonstrated that participants were unanimous in feeling that the gay marriage discussion contained a diversity of views, rather than being dominated by a couple of participants. This was also supported by the video-analysis in which, contrary to the frequent toing and froing between two or three people in the previous discussion, everyone spoke multiple times. This echoes Tully’s discussion of *The Spirit of the Haida Gwaii*, which he employs to demonstrate the importance of listening to people from a diversity of cultural backgrounds. Additionally, the comparative questionnaire also indicated that the gay marriage discussion provided the framework in which the majority of participants (six of eight) felt most able to express their opinions. These questionnaires are supported by previously mentioned observer sheets and video-analysis which demonstrate the ‘friendly’ atmosphere throughout the discussion in which participants appeared more respectful toward one another than in other discussions. For example, participants listened whilst others were talking, which provided a contrast with the abortion discussion in which participants frequently spoke over one another. Additionally, respect was evident in the manner in which participants took the views of others seriously. This, again, differed from the abortion discussion in which examples were often dismissed and arguments were often mocked or greeted with sarcasm. This resonates with Connolly’s affirmation that ‘[each perspective] provides a launching pad for pursuit of a political ethos in which alternative perspectives support space for each other to exist through the agonistic respect they practice toward one another.’

Hence, it appears that, in promoting listening and respect between participants, principles of *audi alteram partem* and agonistic respect can overcome domination and render democratic discussion more inclusive.

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704 Ibid., p. 23.
705 One participant did not complete this question.
However, as noted in the discussion of citizens as the rulers and the ruled, it was also evident that the possibility for domination still remained, since there were moments when a couple of members dominated the discussion. For instance, Iris (during the pilot) and Arabella (during the main experiment) continued to participate in the discussion despite having run out of tokens. In these moments, it thereby appeared as though the tokens were ineffective in regulating the discussion. Significantly though, there was one instance in which the tokens seemed to provide a channel into challenging the power of the more dominant members. The exchange between Erin and Arabella had become heated, and they continued to argue with one another disregarding the discussion tokens and the resultant queue that had formed. The heated exchange between them resembled the end of the abortion discussion in which passionate debate descended into participants shouting over one another. At the end of the abortion discussion, it was necessary to intervene in order to regain control of what the observers described as ‘chaos.’ In the instance between Erin and Arabella during the gay marriage discussion, I was concerned that it would be necessary to intervene once again. However, Fiona spoke up, reminding Erin and Arabella that they were not using their tokens.707

Interestingly, Fiona was one of the quietest members of the group throughout the day. Perhaps, then, regulatory mechanisms such as discussion tokens are of lesser importance when discussion is running smoothly, however they may have the potential to empower quieter members when it is necessary to challenge the dominance of other members. This resonates with Lowndes and Roberts’ claim that institutions can empower as well as constrain. In this example, it seems as though, whilst simply relying on participants to adhere to guidelines of respect and recognition could prove insufficient in affecting the behaviour of some, the tokens may provide an additional channel for

707 However, she did know Arabella prior to the discussion which might have influenced her behaviour. In spite of this, there was no such intervention during the abortion discussion.
others to reregulate the discussion. This also happened during the pilot study in which Alan, who, again, was one of the quieter members during the discussions, reminded Iris about the discussion tokens. This was different to the previous discussion in which participants were unable to stop everyone talking over one another at the end of the discussion and an observer noted that ‘they even ignored Marie.’ This thereby suggests that domination can be curbed, but additional mechanisms may be useful in providing avenues to challenge power relations. This reminds me of Deveaux’s affirmation that agonistic democracy ‘will remain an ineffectual bit of rhetoric in the absence of clearer ideas about how (or indeed whether) we can formalize such inclusion and recognition.’\textsuperscript{708} Hence, perhaps normative principles such as respect and recognition could be enriched further through supplementary mechanisms which empower the less dominant.

**Self-Modification and Challenge**

Although this concept is most evident in Connolly’s work, both thinkers attempt to enhance the potential for greater future inclusivity by endorsing the concepts of self-modification and challenge. For Tully, self-modification is encouraged through the principle of \textit{audi alteram partem} in which citizens are asked to listen to minority voices, which have been misrepresented or excluded by the dominant.\textsuperscript{709} When listening to such voices, Tully requires us to ‘further enhance a critical attitude to one’s own culture and a tolerant and critical attitude towards others.’\textsuperscript{710} Connolly similarly advocates self-modification through critical responsiveness, asking us to be more open towards others, and avoid comparing them to our prior judgments.\textsuperscript{711} Through critical responsiveness, Connolly also asks us to challenge current norms and moral codes.\textsuperscript{712} As a result of such challenge, both thinkers seek to enhance pluralism by questioning our taken-for-granted

\textsuperscript{709} Tully, J. (2008a), p. 170.  
\textsuperscript{710} Ibid., p. 207.  
\textsuperscript{711} Ibid., p. 146.  
understandings. During the experiment, I sought to encourage participants to challenge their own ideas by explicitly asking them to.

By adopting an attitude of self-modification and challenge, Connolly asserts that citizens become ‘more open to responsive engagement with alternative faiths, sensualities, gender practices, ethnicities, and so on.’ There were several indicators during the experiment that participants were challenging the opinions of others and were open to the challenge of theirs. First, Sam and Nikolaos, who started the discussion, finished their arguments by asking, ‘someone disagree with me.’ Unlike the previous discussion where participants were angered by disagreement, participants in the gay marriage discussion smiled and appeared ready to be challenged. Additionally, they often posed questions to other participants in order to better understand conflicting opinions. For instance, Arabella asked Erin about polygamy, Chris asked Ben about ‘in practical terms what’s the difference between gay marriage and civil partnerships?’ and Arabella asked Sam and Ben ‘if it’s so negative, that experience of being gay, why would you experiment?’

This discussion appeared more of a sharing of perspectives, in which each side explained their views to the other side, rather than a contestation in which participants must defend their values. Whereas the previous discussion resembled more of a debate in which ‘our interest in understanding is strategic: we want to win the debate, to understand our adversaries so we can find their weaknesses, so we can refute their arguments,’ the gay marriage discussion appeared to provide a space in which ‘players reach an understanding by “serving, returning and rallying” with one another in conversation.’ Thus, in promoting self-modification and challenge, it appeared to provide a platform on which participants willingly challenged one another’s views.

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through examples and alternate opinions, whilst also allowing others to question their viewpoints. One participant even told the others that in spite of his views remaining unchanged, the discussion changed his prejudices toward the other side. He wrote on his questionnaire that ‘my opinions formed before the discussion and they didn’t change a lot, but it changed in the sense that I understand others’ views better.’ Griggs et al. echo this in their discussion of participative politics, asserting that ‘actors who engage in this kind of interactive, participative politics discover that their interests are not fixed but shaped by the encounter with the realities of the problem at hand and the perspectives of other actors.’\textsuperscript{717} Hence, it appears that the promotion of self-modification and challenge may be effective in promoting understanding between conflicting citizens. Several participants also commented that it was necessary to think through ideas before speaking, hence suggesting that the discussion promoted the self-reflexivity which Connolly and Tully call for through critical responsiveness and \textit{audi alteram partem}. The predominant observation from students engaging in the seminar discussions was that this discussion promoted an enhanced quality of discussion since the token regulation increased the significance of each argument. This contrasts to the abortion discussion in which responses often took the form of spontaneous and heated reactions. Hence, perhaps a more regulated discussion framework could create space for citizens to both challenge one another and be more self-reflexive, leading to enhanced understanding and quality of discussion.

Yet, in spite of the potential for self-modification and challenge to render conflict more positive, it is important to note that it may take longer to change perspectives. This is affirmed by Connolly in \textit{A World of Becoming}, whereby he describes change as a problematic and complex process. He asserts that ‘a world of becoming is not a world of flux in which each force-field constantly morphs into something

radically different from its previous state.'\(^{718}\) This was mirrored during the experiment, for example, when participants wrote that their beliefs were actually challenged the least during the gay marriage discussion.\(^{719}\) Thus, perhaps the competitive nature of the previous two discussions enabled more challenge during the experiment. As Owen claims, the argumentation process is important ‘since it is through this process that our capacities for truthfulness and for justice are tested and cultivated.’\(^{720}\) However, it is my contention that, although change may be slower and more gradual through the process of self-modification, it is not impossible. Connolly, for instance, describes the process of change as a seed to be ‘cultivated,’ ‘a duration’ and something which ‘persists, mutates, evolves or connects to other force-fields.’\(^{721}\) What is needed, then, is further thought about the types of institutions, which might facilitate the cultivation of this seed. This might, for instance, include repeated emphasis on self-modification, as well as encouraging a critical attitude to everyday practices.

**Contestability**

In addition to requiring citizens to acknowledge the interrelationality of their identities, and calling for them to listen to and respect one another in their own terms, both Connolly and Tully also advocate the principle of contestability. The notion of contestability derives from their joint rejection of universalism, corresponding to the Foucauldian and Nietzschean assumption that any claim to truth is an expression of power.\(^{722}\) Both thinkers thereby argue that diversity is threatened by universalism since by claiming one identity as concrete it necessarily negates diverse others.\(^{723}\) Tully argues that this prevents plural

\(^{719}\) It should be noted, here, that participants’ passion for the topic could play a role in this outcome. However, the ‘before’ surveys indicated that only 3 participants felt stronger about abortion than gay marriage (with four rating them equally and two rating gay marriage as a stronger concern than abortion).
\(^{721}\) Connolly W. (2010), pp. 70-79.
traditions from entering into an equal dialogue with one another, endorsing instead contestability through the principle of acting differently. Tully’s ‘acting differently’ employs contestability by attempting to ‘show what were the effects, show that there were other rational possibilities, teach people what they ignore about their own situation, on their conditions of work, on their exploitation.’ Connolly also asks citizens to come to terms with the way in which one’s own beliefs are contestable, arguing that, in so doing, we avoid oppressing alternate beliefs since we enable them to exist alongside our own. Furthermore, he claims that by expressing doubts and uncertainties about our views, our interactions with diverse others can become more positive. Therefore, the goal of acknowledging contestability is to reduce the threat that each identity poses, thereby preventing suppression and marginalisation, encouraging inclusivity as a result. The discussion format sought to promote contestability in two ways: the first was through the discussion guidelines, which asked participants to accept (and demonstrate acknowledgement to others) that not everyone will share the same views. The second, and more subtle element, is the circular discussion layout. Through a circular discussion layout, the gay marriage discussion sought to encourage the sharing of views, as opposed to a competition in defence of them (as in the previous discussion).

Connolly tells us that contestability enables citizens to ‘work upon your faith and start to curtail its drive to the negation of alternative faiths,’ and the language used by participants suggests that the promotion of contestability did help to reduce the negation of others. For instance, Arabella and Erin, who were both dominant (and sometimes aggressive) during the abortion discussion, generally employed the language of contingency in this discussion. Arabella, for instance, often

724 Ibid., pp. 148-149.
727 Ibid., p. 64.
728 Ibid., p. 125.
preceded her arguments with ‘I think’ and ‘I believe,’ whilst Erin posed her views as questions, saying ‘couldn’t you argue though…?’ As a result of this, relations between participants seemed to be more positive, with the discussion adopting the form of view-sharing, rather than a contest to be won. In addition to promoting more positive and productive relations between participants during the discussion, the introduction of contestability also enabled participants to continually question one another. For instance, the group decided amongst themselves that tokens were not necessary if someone wanted to ask another participant about an opinion they had just expressed. As a result, participants frequently asked counter-questions (often providing examples or hypothetical scenarios) to further challenge the other person’s opinion. This is significant as it encouraged participants to keep the agon open. This resonates with the Foucauldian emphasis on maintaining a ‘permanent provocation.’

Unlike either the values discussion (in which the collective nature of the discussion often encouraged consensus), or the abortion discussion (which generally encouraged participants to defend their side’s views relentlessly), the gay marriage discussion provided space in which participants’ views could be probed further by others.

However, the gay marriage discussion raised two difficulties with the concept of contestability. The first was that, in spite of employing language, suggesting contestability, it was questionable as to whether all participants actually perceived their views as contestable. Arabella, for instance, employed universalism to her interpretation of Catholicism. When she was arguing against childless marriages, she said ‘well we would say that that is the wrong use, really, of marriage.’ In employing the term ‘we’, she presented her religious beliefs as generalisable to all Catholics. This was echoed throughout the discussion in which several participants, such as Sam and Erin, claimed that the definition of marriage is open to interpretation, whereas Arabella, Fiona and Erin all

sought to give a single, undisputable definition of marriage. For example, Fiona said ‘marriage is between a man and a woman,’ Chris spoke of destroying the true meaning of marriage and Arabella used statistics to argue that children are better off with heterosexual parents. Additionally, Fiona and Chris verify their interpretations of the bible with Arabella as if she was the authority on Christianity. The experiment supported Tully and Connolly’s affirmation that a lack of contestability can negate diverse others. For example, Arabella’s claim that she ‘can’t support gay marriage because I’m a Catholic,’ automatically implies that Ben cannot identify as both a Catholic and a homosexual (as he does). In contrast, by expressing contestability, ‘you work upon your faith and state to curtail its drive to the negation of alternative faiths.’ Thus, in spite of its admirable aspirations, it is apparent that contestability, like self-modification, is a complex goal, requiring time and practice. As Connolly asserts, it is difficult for citizens to accept their contestability, and ultimately ‘recompose’ their entrenched positions, since identities are ‘already crystallized constituencies.’

Vzquez-Arroyo explains how, for many, contestability is an unattainable goal since, as soon as a citizen accepts the contestability of their view, ‘s/he ceases to be [a fundamentalist], and becomes a liberal who happens to have a different religious view.’ Thus, just as inclusive agonism might benefit from further considerations of which institutions might support and encourage self-modification, it might also be helpful to explore ways in which contestability might be promoted through institutions.

One danger of promoting contestability is that it could reduce the importance of citizens’ beliefs. Although Connolly explicitly argues that acknowledgement of contestability ‘does not mean that you must forfeit faith in a loving or commanding god, give up secular faith in reason (or one of its surrogates), or adopt my nontheistic faith in the plurovocity of

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732 Ibid., xxviii.
being, I argue that this is in tension with the passionate, and potentially antagonistic, nature in which citizens hold these beliefs. Vzquez-Arroyo illustrates this through the example of an egalitarian, arguing that such a person ‘cannot accept that the presence of inequalities and domination is merely “contestable” when these are part of the everyday life experiences of people who suffer these in their bodies and psyches.’ At the same time, ‘ordinary people, who are striving to open up space for political contestation to redress unequal access to power and status cannot afford to practise the kind of forbearance that Connolly prescribes.’ Thus, enabling agonistic (and perhaps non-contestable) expression could help to overcome domination by acknowledging the importance of each position. Hence, in spite of Connolly’s assertion that contestability does not affect the strength of one’s beliefs, ‘doing so would lessen the critical import of their claims.’ As a result, it is important to strike a balance between promoting contestability (and avoiding essentialism) on one hand, whilst making space for agonistic expression (and overcoming domination) on the other. Here, inclusive agonism could be strengthened if it were to be supplemented with the adversarial approach.

Conclusion

By pulling together insights from the experiment with theoretical discussion, this chapter has evaluated Connolly and Tully’s inclusive agonistic democracy. I argue that their more pluralistic account of identity could enhance interactions between citizens, overcoming domination and rendering the contestation more inclusive. However, I suggest that, even if a pluralistic understanding of identity is promoted, polarised positions and antagonism could still emerge. I propose that, whilst respect and recognition might be effective in producing more positive relations in the public realm, it might be less successful at challenging engrained feelings of ressentiment. My concern is that, if it

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736 Ibid.
737 Ibid. (Italics added).
is unable to challenge *ressentiment*, inclusive agonism might fail to engage citizens in democratic politics. Additionally, I generally endorse the notion of society as self-regulating, demonstrating the possibility of the natural emergence of leaders, who do not dominate the process but actually *enhance* opportunities for inclusion. However, I endorse this with a caution; there is always the possibility that powerful individuals or groups could hijack the discussion. Further, I demonstrate that institutional mechanisms, such as discussion regulations, could empower less dominant citizens, providing opportunities to challenge power relationships. I endorse the promotion of self-modification and challenge, suggesting that they promote democratic discussion as a view-sharing exercise rather than as a debate, or competition, to be won, increasing the quality of discussion and promoting greater understanding between citizens. I propose that, whilst these principles seem effective in encouraging citizens to challenge their own beliefs, it might take slightly longer for them to actually change and transform the views of citizens. Finally, I suggest that, by promoting contestability, citizens are encouraged to avoid essentialist and fundamentalist behaviour, thereby enhancing interactions. However, I argue that this concept is in tension with passion and conflict, and therefore suggest that we think more about how institutions can maintain this balance.
Conclusion – Exploring Prospects for an ‘Agonistic Day’

I now want to question how effective each approach is at developing the three core themes of agonistic democracy as outlined in Chapter One; political contestation, necessary interdependency and contingency. I will then discuss how concepts from each approach might be operationalised into practical mechanisms. I argue that, whilst each of the three approaches is essential to democratic mediation, on their own they only offer partial accounts, thus by combining them, I suggest that the strengths of one can counter the weaknesses of another. Looking to Deliberation Day as an example, I will offer an account of a three-stage ‘agonistic day,’ which combines three approaches to agonistic democracy. The first stage employs adversarialism to mobilise passions and provoke engagement, with the second seeking to enhance interactions and render the discussion more inclusive, whilst the third and final stage strives to unite citizens through perfectionist decision-making. In sketching out this account of an ‘agonistic day,’ I consider which theoretical concepts we might want to retain and which to abandon or rethink. I also explore which mechanisms ought to be kept in order to operationalise the theoretical concepts, and which to reject or modify.

Exploring prospects for the operationalisation of concepts which promote political contestation

Let us begin with the agonistic notion of political contestation. Perfectionist agonism draws primarily on Nietzsche’s work, emphasising that citizens are dependent upon engagement in communal practices to obtain their autonomy. Thus, one aim of Owen’s account of political contestation is to encourage citizens to develop their own autonomy through communal engagement. Drawing on Nietzsche’s example of the second Eris, an additional aim is to promote a better society by focusing on the competitive element of public contest in which citizens to strive to surpass one another’s values. The adversarial understanding of political contestation, on the other hand,
draws on Schmitt’s critique of the divide which liberals draw between state and society. In order to overcome such depoliticisation, Mouffe’s adversarialism, following Schmitt, advocates an approach to political contestation whereby passion is reinstated into the political realm through strong identities, which are formed in relation to one another. This adversarial account perceives political contestation as a battle in which competing adversaries are provoked into defending their interpretation and implementation of values from the threat of those belonging to the other side. Finally, inclusive agonistic democracy, influenced by Foucault, Nietzsche, and Arendt, employs the notion of political contestation in order to overcome domination and render politics more inclusive. Asserting that each individual gains their meaning and significance as a citizen by engaging with a diversity of others, Connolly and Tully demonstrate the importance of normative behaviours in enhancing relations between citizens and encouraging challenge contestation, thereby focusing on an inclusive and diverse approach to political contestation.  

As the three analysis chapters suggest, each of these agonistic approaches offers important suggestions as to how political contestation can encourage conflict mediation in diverse societies. However, it is also evident that each of these is only partial and entails a series of trade-offs. Owen’s notion of political contestation, for instance, in which conflicting citizens participate in a political contestation surrounding the ranking of societal values, appears to be highly effective in developing citizens’ opinions, thereby enhancing their autonomy. By requiring citizens to arrive at the best possible ranking order, it also seems to be significant in encouraging continual challenge, and a better society as a result. However, I am concerned that this understanding of political contestation might not be successful in motivating all citizens to engage in this process. For instance, it might privilege those who are already willing to cultivate their own

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738 For a more in-depth discussion of how each agonistic approach employs political contestation, see Chapter Two.
virtues, whilst excluding others. This is significant when we consider Norval’s statement that post-structuralists have warned that some deliberative procedures ‘run the risk of ignoring the presence of power relations in the development of such norms.’ In order to enable agonistic accounts to recognise and challenge these power relations, it is essential to consider who is included in each approach, and who is excluded. Thus it is important to note that, whilst this approach to political contestation might be effective in developing autonomous citizens and encouraging challenge and change which is progressive, it might also exclude certain citizens. It might be helpful, here, to look to Connolly and Tully’s normative principles of agonistic respect and mutual recognition in order to consider how to encourage a more inclusive discussion to emerge. Mouffe’s concept of competition might also be valuable, in considering how to motivate conflicting citizens into discussion with one another.

Mouffe’s adversarialism provides important thought about how to provoke conflicting citizens to engage with one another. Her emphasis on competition appears significant to reviving passion into the political realm, and using such passion as a tool to convince citizens to engage with conflicting others. However, just as I am concerned that Owen’s approach might privilege those who already aspire to cultivate their virtues, I am equally concerned that Mouffe’s approach might privilege the participation of more dominant and competitive citizens at the detriment of quieter citizens, and those who frequently ‘lose’ the contestation. As Lowndes and Pratchett affirm, ‘power relationships shape the way that institutions develop over time. Institutions are inherently political, because rules create patterns of distributional advantage.’ Thus, it is essential to consider which power relations are privileged and who is advantaged (as well as who might be excluded or disadvantaged), and perhaps rethink the hegemonic

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terminology present in Mouffe’s account of political contestation, in addition to exploring which practical mechanisms might help to challenge the powerful and empower the powerless. Once again, Connolly and Tully’s agonistic respect and mutual recognition might help to keep quieter or less successful citizens engaged in the debate.

The ‘inclusive’ approach to political contestation takes the form of an ethos, which is largely self-regulated, but guided by normative principles, such as agonistic respect and mutual recognition. I suggest that these principles are invaluable in improving relations between conflicting citizens, enabling spontaneous and non-dominant leaders to emerge, and including a greater diversity of citizens in democratic discussion as a result. However, my concern with the inclusive approach to political contestation is that its self-regulatory nature might allow for more powerful members to dominate the discussion. When considering institutional design, Lowndes and Pratchett remind us that ‘new rules may be hijacked by powerful actors and adapted to preserve their own interests.’

Thus, it might be useful to consider which institutional mechanisms could be effective in preventing dominant citizens from controlling the political contestation (whilst also refraining from imposing institutions which suppress contestation). Owen’s provision of a common quest could be helpful, here, in creating solidarity between citizens in order to highlight the importance of teamwork and lessen the risk of certain citizens dominating the process.

Exploring prospects for the operationalisation of concepts which promote contingency

On the perfectionist account, contingency is promoted during the process of political contestation. Understanding democratic engagement as a collective ranking of values according to certain excellence criteria, Owen argues that citizens will challenge, not only one another’s values, but also the current criteria of excellence against which such values are analysed. For adversarial agonism, contingency

741 Ibid., p. 95.
appears to arise following the formation of a consensus, which Mouffe emphasises as partial and contingent. Adversarialism perceives exclusions as necessary for overcoming domination and ensuring democratic engagement. Finally, for Connolly and Tully, contingency is promoted in two ways: first, through the notion of self-modification in which citizens are asked to challenge their own beliefs. Second, it is promoted through the principle of contestability, which requires citizens to demonstrate to others that they acknowledge the arguable nature of their values as well as exhibiting their openness to new values and beliefs. This entails avoiding essentialist language, constituting an attempt at overcoming domination and encouraging both pluralism and pluralisation.\textsuperscript{742}

The perfectionist understanding of contingency, in which citizens, not only challenge their values, but also the excellence criteria to which they refer, appears successful in demonstrating the importance of participation, forming strong views and encouraging citizens to challenge the views of others. However, following my concerns about the potential of this approach to only motivate certain people to engage, I worry that contingency and challenge might be largely restricted to the consensus formed by more active members of the discussion. Thus, I suggest that there is a tension between promoting unity on one hand, and limiting exclusion on the other. However, given my discussion of the potential for apathy in this approach, which emphasises the importance of decision-making, I perceive this tension as a necessary one. It is perhaps important to be aware of this tension in order to balance between the two goals. A further concern about the perfectionist notion of contingency refers to Owen’s promotion of an ‘honest’ testing of perspectives. It strikes me that citizens cannot be honest about the extent to which their perspectives resonate with the excellence criteria since these perspectives are so engrained. Thus,

\textsuperscript{742} For a more in-depth discussion of how each agonistic approach employs contingency, see Chapter Two.
perhaps it would be helpful to abandon this terminology in order to reflect the agonistic and passionate nature of discussion.

The adversarial understanding of contingency is that all consensuses are necessarily partial, contingent and based on exclusion. In promoting contingency, Mouffe emphasises the importance of the revival of the ‘political,’ in which contest surrounds political, rather than nationalist, ethnic or religious identification. This seems particularly effective in encouraging a lively, passionate discussion to emerge, and retaining citizens’ interest in democratic politics. However, I have two hesitations about Mouffe’s notion of contingency. The first relates back to a previous observation about commonality in which it is only effective when it is perceived as such by citizens. In defining those who are altogether excluded from the democratic consensus, Mouffe introduces the notion of the common enemy, those who, either do not adhere to the shared principles of liberty and equality, or who threaten the democratic process. The common enemy is introduced to encourage unity between contending adversaries. However, just as commonality is only effective if it is perceived, I am concerned that the enemy group is only useful in demonstrating adversarial legitimacy if it is distinguished from the adversarial group. This leads me to consider whether there should be a sharper distinction between the adversary and the enemy. Yet, this would be at odds with agonistic notions of contingency in which the excluded enemy always has the potential to become an included competitor. However, I still find the notion of the common enemy problematic since it could easily be conflated with the adversary, increasing antagonism. As a result, I suggest that adversarialism look to agonistic respect and mutual recognition to encourage adversarial legitimacy without requiring a strictly defined enemy. The second concern about Mouffe’s notion of contingency is her prioritisation of the ‘political’ over politics. I argue that this requires an impossible divide, since the antagonistic potential of conflict blurs the boundaries between politics and ethics. Thus, inclusive agonism is
useful, here, in drawing on Foucault’s assumption that politics is everywhere.

The inclusive accounts of Connolly and Tully appear successful in encouraging citizens to challenge the beliefs of others and be open to having their beliefs challenged. Overall, they also seem effective in preventing citizens from using essentialist terminology when sharing their views, leading to friendlier and more positive interactions. However, it is important to acknowledge that the process of self-modification and challenge is a long and complex one, and that it might take time to transform the engrained perspectives of oneself and others. Thus, it might be useful to give further consideration as to which institutions might support this over time. It is also significant that some citizens will struggle to both acknowledge and exhibit the contestability of their beliefs to others, given the engrained nature of these values. It should therefore be noted that there is always the potential for tension to arise between holding one’s beliefs passionately, and acknowledging the contestability of those beliefs to others. Thus, it might be valuable to think about which institutions might strike a balance between the two in order to avoid the suppression of passion and agonism, and to prevent essentialist behaviour.

**Exploring prospects for the operationalisation of concepts which promote necessary interdependency**

On the perfectionist understanding of necessary interdependency, it is imperative to tolerate the views of others, thereby adopting an ‘enlarged mentality,’ as this is tied to one’s integrity. Owen argues that we cannot honestly and justly test a range of perspectives if we cannot first entertain a plurality of different perspectives. According to the perfectionist approach to necessary interdependency, unity arises between citizens as a result of being involved in a ‘common quest.’ This is contrary to the adversarial approach in which Mouffe argues that identity is constructed in a relational, adversarial, and collective manner. Thus, citizens are united with others belonging to the ‘friend’ group,
who, unlike the adversarial group, share their interpretation and implementation of values. In spite of their differences, they are also encouraged to perceive adversaries as legitimate by acknowledging their shared allegiance to the values of liberty and equality. Once again, this assumes a relational, adversarial, and collective understanding of identity in which the legitimacy of the adversary is in contrast to the illegitimacy of the excluded enemy group. It also places emphasis on the necessity of shared values, rather than a shared quest (as in Owen), or a shared ethos (as in Connolly and Tully) in promoting unity. Inclusive agonists, Connolly and Tully, promote a more pluralistic understanding of identity in which necessary interdependency is promoted between conflicting individuals through lines of respect and recognition. In so doing, they emphasise the importance of normative principles in challenging domination and enhancing diversity through respect, recognition, and listening.\footnote{For a more in-depth discussion of how each agonistic approach employs necessary interdependency, see Chapter Two.}

The perfectionist understanding of necessary interdependency, as advocated by Owen, appears to promote ‘productive conflict’ in which, rather than seeking to prove their points, or win the argument, citizens enter into a view-sharing process. In so doing, citizens appear to challenge one another’s views, not to discredit them or persuade them otherwise, but, rather, to attempt to understand them better and to re-evaluate the order of rank, thereby enriching their perspectives and enhancing the quality of the discussion. During the perfectionist account of necessary interdependency, it appears as if citizens work together and continually check decisions with the rest of the group. However, my concern with this aspect of necessary interdependency is that, whilst such non-domination and inclusion are important for enhancing inclusion, they might be in tension with retaining engagement. There is the potential that, if a common quest encourages citizens to continually check with others, such inclusivity might be intension with aims of productive change and societal...
improvement. As a result, if citizens feel that the quest is futile, there is the potential for apathy and democratic disaffection to arise. Thus, in order to prevent apathy and to keep citizens engaged in the democratic process, perfectionist agonism might be enriched by consideration of institutional limitations, such as time restrictions. It might also be strengthened if it were supplemented with Mouffe’s emphasis on passion as a means to retaining engagement throughout the discussion.

The adversarial account of necessary interdependency appears effective in demonstrating commonality between some citizens by distinguishing them from the adversarial group and enhancing unity. Similarly, it can be useful in promoting unity between adversaries by distinguishing them from the excluded enemy. This can help to revive the political arena by channelling passion and conflict into democratic discussion, thereby provoking engagement. However, I am concerned that this dichotomous account of identity cannot make space for its diverse and fluid nature. I argue that contending positions are not always fixed and polarised entities, but rather resemble more of a changeable spectrum. I worry that, by prioritising polarised positions, adversarialism may be less successful in engaging those who hold more nuanced and unstable positions, and thereby be unable to combat non-democratic expressions. I also contend that commonality is only a useful concept in promoting unity between friends and respect between adversaries (in which they are perceived as legitimate and worthy opponents) when it is evident to citizens. Considering the passionate nature of multicultural, pluralist conflict and the ineradicable potential for antagonism, it seems reasonable that such commonalities may not always be apparent. Here, I suggest that Mouffe’s adversarialism would be enriched through further consideration of Connolly and Tully’s approach in which identity represents a diversity and plurality of positions, and in which normative principles of agonistic respect and
mutual recognition can demonstrate legitimacy without requiring commonality to be evident.

Connolly and Tully’s understanding of interdependency, on the other hand, emphasises the pluralistic and diverse nature of identity. By combining this account of identity with ethical guidelines of respect and recognition, it appears valuable in enhancing relations between conflicting citizens in society. However, I propose that, even if we are to promote a pluralistic account of identity (and I argue that we ought to, in order to enhance relations and further inclusivity), dichotomous positions might arise anyway. I follow Mouffe in claiming that there is always the potential for antagonistic relations to emerge. However, I then reject her subsequent dichotomous account of identity. Thus, I propose that inclusive agonism and adversarial agonism should look to one another’s accounts of identity in order to account for possibilities for diversity and pluralism (and all of the associated nuances and fluidity) on the one hand, and the potential for polarised positions and antagonism on the other. I also suggest that, whilst normative principles are important to mediating conflict during the discussion, they might be less effective at challenging underlying feelings of ressentiment toward conflicting others. In this respect, I argue that Owen’s common quest would be useful, since it promotes collective challenge, whilst also encouraging solidarity and cooperation.

An ‘Agonistic Day’ – Combining the Three Approaches to Agonistic Democracy

The previous discussions surrounding how effective each approach is in fulfilling the three core themes of agonistic democracy, suggest that each approach brings something significant to the field of agonistic democracy. However, they also claim that no single approach can sufficiently embody all three of these themes. Thus, on its own, each agonistic approach provides a useful, yet partial, account of how agonistic democracy could mediate societal conflict. What I propose in this section of the chapter, then, is a combined approach, which seeks
to incorporate elements from each of the three agonistic approaches into an ‘agonistic day.’ Unlike the ‘Deliberation Day’ proposed by Ackerman and Fishkin, the primary goal of discussions is not to educate citizens on political issues, rather, it entails reviving engagement and passion in politics, rendering it more inclusive, enhancing interactions between conflicting individuals, and striving toward productive and progressive challenge. These aims seek to combine the fundamental aspirations of the three approaches to political contestation, contingency and necessary interdependency. Mouffe’s emphasis on passion and conflict, for instance, are valuable in considering which institutions might motivate engagement in political contestation. Additionally, Connolly and Tully’s promotion of normative behaviours, such as listening to and respecting others; particularly those who are marginalised or excluded, are important in helping to explore ways in which institutions can encourage more diverse participation. The promotion of these behaviours, along with Owen’s calls for a common quest, help to provide insights into the types of institution which can improve interactions between those holding conflicting, and potentially antagonistic views, in multicultural, pluralist society. Finally, Owen’s notion of collective competition is useful in thinking through which institutions might encourage continual challenge, whilst encouraging unity.

As a result, it involves everyday citizens contesting one another’s beliefs on significant and controversial topics, which divide society. Drawing on the Deliberation Day project, it entails calling together several groups of approximately 15 people once a year during a national holiday set aside for this purpose. However, unlike the deliberative day, the ‘agonistic day’ does not restrict participation to registered voters, but includes all UK residents. This is to reflect the Foucauldian assumption that power is everywhere, and thus, political discussion need not be limited to elections. By involving a greater

diversity of citizens in the discussions, I attempt to reflect agonistic goals of overcoming domination, rendering society more inclusive, and enhancing relations between a vast web of interdependent citizens. All of the 15 citizens from each discussion are asked to act to take responsibility for the chairing of their discussion. They are required to decide amongst themselves who will read the introduction to each discussion, who will read the provided guidelines to the group, and who will keep time. They are asked to intervene in the discussion in the case of aggressive language or violent behaviour. Depending on the severity of aggression or violence, interventions might entail reminding other participants of the discussion guidelines, asking everyone to take a ten minute refreshment break, or, as a very last resort, asking another participant to leave the discussion. However, the last option can only arise if at least eight participants agree. The rationale for the joint chairing of the discussion is rooted in the assumption that citizens are generally effective at self-regulating. As I argued in Chapter Three, if agonistic democracy is compatible with institutions (and I suggest that it is), then these institutions must enable citizens autonomy and empower them. If the ‘agonistic day’ were to impose a chair on the discussion, or even ask citizens to elect their own, I am concerned that it would threaten the autonomous nature of the discussion, thereby limiting opportunities for contestation and challenge. On the other hand, were the ‘agonistic day’ to altogether refrain from employing chairs, I suggest that more powerful citizens could use this to their advantage, dominating the discussion. Lowndes and Pratchett highlight the dangers of this, asserting that ‘new rules may be hijacked by powerful actors and adapted to preserve their own interests.’ This could undermine the potential for institutions to empower less dominant or marginalised citizens, by posing a barrier to contestation and contingency.

An Adversarial Beginning

The ‘agonistic day’ I propose begins by drawing on the work of Mouffe and her adversarial approach. As the thesis has argued, Mouffe’s work offers valuable insights into overcoming apathy toward democratic participation through the revival of passion and competition.\(^{746}\) This contrasts with the ‘inclusive’ approach, which repeatedly faces criticism for assuming that people are both willing and able to participate in an ethos of respect, thereby failing to consider those who might not be.\(^{747}\) It also contrasts with the ‘perfectionist’ account of Owen, which does not discuss how to motivate participants into engagement with one another, but instead relies on citizens to want to ‘strive to develop their capacities for self-rule in competition with one another.’\(^{748}\) By way of contrast, Mouffe’s motivational narrative of ‘friends’ and ‘adversaries’ escapes this problem, not simply by inviting citizens into engagement with one another, but by **provoking** them into contestation in order to defend their interpretation and implementation of values. The importance of this element of the ‘agonistic day’ cannot be underestimated when we consider that only 65.1% of UK citizens voted in the 2010 general election.\(^{749}\) Mouffe asserts that such apathy toward democratic politics needs to be addressed in order to prevent citizens from identifying with non-democratic positions, such as religious fundamentalist groups. Hence, by beginning the day by igniting people’s passions, I aspire to overcome such apathy and engage them in a passionate and conflictual political contestation surrounding their values. In so doing, the ‘agonistic day’ will ask participants to sit at tables according to their stance on the issue.

However, as Chapter Seven demonstrated, whilst Mouffe’s emphasis on passion and conflict are valuable to reviving political contestation, her dichotomous understanding of identity might not provide sufficient space to reflect multicultural, pluralist diversity. This could undermine her attempt at preventing apathy and non-democratic identification,

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\(^{746}\) See Chapter Seven for a comprehensive account of this.

\(^{747}\) See, for instance, Young, I., Schaap, A. and Wenman M’s criticisms in Chapter Three.


since citizens might not be able to identify with either position. It also
might turn some citizens away from democratic participation if they are
consistently part of the ‘losing’ group, and thereby excluded from the
consensus. This is important since Mouffe’s adversarialism is so
valuable in thinking through how to revive the political arena and ensure
that citizens engage in democratic politics. Thus, to address this, and
to better reflect the diversity within each end of the spectrum,
participants will be provided with a list of examples affiliated with either
side of the argument. In the case of abortion, for instance, one example
for the ‘against’ camp might be ‘against the ending of potential human
life,’ whereas another might be ‘generally against abortion, except
under particular circumstances.’ Likewise, the ‘for’ group might range
from ‘in favour of the women’s right to choose what happens to her
body,’ but another example might be ‘generally in favour of abortion as
an option, except under certain circumstances.’

By adding such examples to these groups, I hope to reflect the way in
which binary identities appear to sometimes surface inevitably, whilst
also promoting more pluralistic positions. This is based on the
assumption that Mouffe’s adversarial understanding of identity, in which
one group defines itself in relation to another, cannot fully account for
nuanced or changing positions in society. Yet, it also assumes that the
‘inclusive’ understanding of identity cannot sufficiently account for the
way in which dichotomous positions inevitably emerge, or the ever-
present potential for antagonistic relations to arise. Hence, by
combining the two accounts, it aspires to reflect the potential for
dichotomous positions, whilst seeking to promote a more pluralistic
account of identity. In addition to preventing apathy and encouraging
identification and engagement, this also constitutes an attempt at
enhancing relations between conflicting citizens. As Chapter Seven
argues, even though dichotomous identities might sometimes arise
naturally, if we actively promote these by asking citizens to define
themselves in relation to one another, we risk both aggravating
antagonism and preventing conflicting adversaries from perceiving one another as ‘legitimate’ opponents. The importance of transforming antagonism into agonism and promoting legitimacy is important in addressing the agonistic concept of necessary interdependency whereby citizens are necessarily interlinked.

A further component of the ‘agonistic day’ entails consideration of how to encourage conflicting citizens to perceive one another as ‘legitimate’ in spite of their differences. This is of great significance for all three agonistic approaches, with Mouffe promoting legitimacy and worthiness; Owen promoting enlarged mentality; and Connolly and Tully promoting agonistic respect and mutual recognition respectively. One component of the adversarial attempt at demonstrating legitimacy is Mouffe’s notion of the common enemy, which is employed to highlight commonalities between adversarial groups. I argue that the common enemy is problematic because citizens might struggle to distinguish between legitimate and worthy adversaries, and the illegitimate enemy who is necessarily excluded from democratic contestation. Indeed, emphasis on the enemy could aggravate antagonism if conflicting citizens conflate one another’s behaviours or values with those of the enemy. Yet, as Chapter Seven demonstrated, it would not be desirable to strengthen the distinction between the included adversary and the excluded enemy since this would threaten the agonistic prioritisation of contingency and contestation. These principles require that the frontiers between the included and the excluded, and the legitimate and the illegitimate are always contingent and open to further contestation. If the distinction between the enemy and the adversary group was sharpened, the enemy group would be less able to challenge the dominant values and norms, and as a result antagonistic relations could be aggravated. As Norval states, ‘what is important is our ability to criticize – so as to animate - our institutions, and the imagination to change and challenge them, as crucial to the maintenance of our democratic institutions.’\(^{750}\)

Hence, in order to enable citizens to criticise, change and challenge their institutions, it is essential that the divide between the included and excluded is contingent and contestable. Thus, the adversarial discussion will abandon the common enemy video, which was shown in the fieldwork experiments. Instead, the concept of legitimacy will be demonstrated in the following ‘inclusive’ discussion, whereby citizens are asked to practice certain behaviours toward one another, such as agonistic respect and mutual recognition. The rationale for not encouraging these behaviours in the adversarial discussion is that I endorse them with a slight hesitation. As Chapter Eight affirms, the promotion of these principles, whilst important in mediating conflict during the discussion, might be less successful in addressing and challenging underlying resentment between citizens. I am concerned that if the ‘agonistic day’ were to over-emphasise these, it might feel prescriptive and suppress, rather than mediate, relations of conflict between citizens. Instead, I seek a balance between providing an outlet for passionate expression (the adversarial discussion) and encouraging enhanced inclusivity through normative behaviours (the inclusive discussion). In this way, I aspire to combine the strengths of each of the three theories in to counter the potential weaknesses of others.

Thus, phase one of the ‘agonistic day’ seeks to mobilise passion and create competition through the provision of collective identities, whilst also providing space for plurality within each position. Furthermore, citizens will be given the option to change their positions during the discussion, resonating with the critique made in Chapter Seven, whereby Mouffe does not sufficiently account for the fluid and contingent nature of identity. By enabling citizens to move between different positions, I aspire to reflect and promote the contingent nature of agonistic politics in order to encourage critique and challenge. I also attempt to keep citizens engaged in the contest, and prevent them from feeling isolated from their group, and thereby apathetic toward
democratic identification. As Chapter Seven discussed in greater detail, Mouffe's adversarial account is significant to motivating citizens into engagement with conflicting others, and thereby preventing them from seeking non-democratic representation. However, I suggest that conflicting positions resemble more of a spectrum than oppositional poles, and that each dichotomous position is supplemented with a range of nuanced stances. I am concerned that when such diversity is not accounted for, citizens find it difficult to identify with their group, thereby threatening Mouffe's aims at preventing apathy and non-democratic identification. I am also concerned that, for those citizens who are continually part of the ‘losing’ group, it might enhance democratic disaffection and encourage non-political identification. I assert that, whilst some dichotomous positions might arise naturally, if we promote oppositions (in order to revive passion), then we might risk aggravating antagonism, rather than transforming it into agonism. By accounting for diversity and fluidity within each adversarial position, then, I hope to encourage participation and unity, and avoid increasing antagonism. Additionally, I abandon the notion of the common enemy, proposing that it might aggravate antagonism, rather than mediate it. In order to demonstrate adversarial legitimacy to citizens without employing the common enemy, this discussion will be followed by an ‘inclusive view-sharing’ one which encourages citizens to behave in a certain manner toward one another.

Inclusive View-Sharing

I endorse Mouffe’s view that conflict cannot, and should not, be eradicated from politics since doing so can result in the creation of an instrumental public sphere and citizens turning to non-democratic representation. However, Chapter Seven suggested a tension between the existence of conflict on the one hand, and ensuring that discussion is productive, on the other. Connolly and Tully assert that agonistic engagement has the additional purpose of developing respect and understanding for conflicting others, whilst acknowledging our own views as one amongst several. This is significant to promoting the
agonistic concept of necessary interdependency, in which all citizens are necessarily interconnected. It is also important to ensuring that political contestation is enriched by a diversity of viewpoints, and enables less dominant citizens to challenge and critique norms and values, thereby promoting contingency. As Chapters Seven and Eight discuss, inclusive agonism appears more successful than adversarialism in both enhancing relations of respect and understanding, and encouraging a diversity of views to be heard. Whilst the competitive nature of adversarialism appears generally successful in provoking agonistic discussion and mobilising passion toward democratic engagement, it also encourages citizens to try to ‘prove’ their arguments, and ‘win’ the discussion. As a result, this detracts from listening to and respecting others, and challenging one’s own views, subsequently posing a barrier to demonstrating adversarial legitimacy and worthiness. The competitive nature of adversarialism also tended to better suit more dominant participants, suggesting that adversarialism is less successful in challenging domination.

In order to promote less antagonistic relations between conflicting citizens, and to enhance the diversity of the discussion, the second part of the ‘agonistic day’ will entail view-sharing. Moving away from the debate-like nature of the previous discussion, view-sharing will be encouraged during the second phase of the day. During this phase, citizens are asked to sit in a circle and are each provided with an equal number of tokens. They are then asked to only speak when they have put their token in the middle, to remain quiet when someone else is using a token, and to stop participating in the discussion when they have used up all of their tokens. By arranging the second phase of the day in a circle and by regulating the discussion with tokens, I aspire to promote view-sharing by demonstrating the necessary interdependence between all citizens. This contrasts with the group layout of the previous discussion, which encourages competition between those

751 See Chapter Seven for evidence of this.
holding each position. By employing tokens to structure the discussion, I aim to supplement the previous discussion with several components. First, the tokens constitute an attempt at reflecting the focus inclusive agonism places on enhancing relations between conflicting citizens. For instance, they seek to realise the principles of respect and listening to the other side, by prioritising the person with the token and asking the others to be quiet and listen. This is important in helping to overcome the exclusions that might arise from Mouffe’s approach. For example, by creating space for every opinion to be heard and respected, quieter citizens might become more motivated and able to participate. This reminds us of agonistic concerns about how inequality and power relations affect the autonomy of citizens. Providing such regulatory institutions can empower those who are less educated or who come from minority cultures or religions to express their views. This contrasts with Owen’s approach, in which, as outlined in Chapter Six, authority derives from holding values which gather the most support. Hence, the inclusive stage of the day seeks to supplement perfectionism with opportunities for a greater diversity of participation. Additionally, as Fiona demonstrated by reminding Arabella and Erin of the queue to speak, the tokens can help to overcome domination by empowering less dominant citizens to challenge others. In this way, as the opening quote to the thesis asserts, ‘practices of governance and practices of freedom always go hand in hand.’ Just as the tokens limit the capacities of citizens by regulating their speech, they also offer opportunities for freedom and empowerment by providing a tool with which less dominant citizens can challenge the more dominant. A final reason for employing tokens during this phase of the day is to enhance the quality of discussion. The experiment suggested that, because the tokens limit participation, people thought more about their arguments, and the quality of the discussion was enhanced. This enriches perfectionist agonism, whereby Owen aspires to promote contingency as a means to reach better values and an improved society. Thus,

phase two primarily uses tokens to encourage the emergence of more positive interactions between citizens in order to include and empower minority voices, and to enhance the quality of the discussion.

They are also asked to follow several guidelines, including ‘try to respect others, set aside prejudices, listen, reflect on your own beliefs and accept and demonstrate to others that not everyone will share your views.’ However, in order to avoid rendering the discussion overly prescriptive, these are suggested as guidelines, rather than enforced as strict rules. As Chapter Eight demonstrated, whilst these principles are invaluable to promoting enhanced relations between conflicting citizens, over-emphasis on their specification can suppress conflict and eradicate it from democratic discussion, rather than mediating it. This is dangerous since, as Mouffe highlights, if passion and conflict are not given democratic outlets, citizens might identify with non-democratic, fundamentalist positions instead. Thus, the adversarial phase of the ‘agonistic day’ is important in creating space for democratic passion and conflict, whilst the inclusive phase is important in enhancing conflicting relations, so long as it provides guidelines rather than strict rules. As Lowndes and Pratchett assert, the informal implementation of these need not undermine their importance: ‘[constitutions, directives and organisational structures] are consciously designed and clearly specified, while [informal norms and conventions] are unwritten codes and customs – but no less effective because of that.’ Rather, this might remind us of Chapter Three’s discussion of demonstrated practices in which citizens follow the behaviour of others. Perhaps, then, over time, behaviours such as respect and listening will become norms, rendering the guidelines for the discussion insignificant, and therefore moving even further away from prescriptive politics.

The final ethical guideline, of accepting (and demonstrating to others) that not everyone will share your beliefs, relates to Connolly and Tully’s

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emphasis on contestability. This is a concept that I endorse with caution. As Chapter Eight outlines, the promotion of contestability is important in reflecting the agonistic emphasis on contingency. By asking people to demonstrate awareness that others will not share their views, it appears to encourage less essentialist language, whereby citizens question others or suggest alternatives, without needing to be ‘correct.’ This is important since it encourages more friendly relations between conflicting citizens, and thereby supplements adversarialism with enhanced interactions. However, I argue that, given the ineradicable potential for antagonism, contestability is an impossible requirement for many. As a result, the ‘agonistic day’ must ensure that there is a balance between promoting contestability (and preventing essentialism) and enabling passionate and agonistic expression (and overcoming domination). Thus, as a result, the ‘agonistic day’ will suggest contestability as a guideline, whilst not enforcing it as a strict rule. It will also be supplemented with the previous adversarial discussion, which provides space for agonistic behaviour and the expression of passions.

Chapter Eight discussed another concern with regards to the ethical behaviour promoted by Connolly and Tully: ressentiment. Whilst the promotion of these behaviours seems invaluable in enhancing relations between conflicting citizens, they appear less successful in challenging the complex and engrained feelings of ressentiment that might cause such conflict. As a result, this discussion will be followed with a common quest whereby respect emerges between citizens who are united in a common quest. It could also be encouraged through the repetition of agonistic practices. As Lowndes and Pratchett highlight, ‘not only do formal rules have to be created, they also need to be recognised by the diverse political actors involved, and then embedded over time.’\textsuperscript{754} Thus, perhaps if the ‘agonistic day’ was to become an annual event, and if it were to encourage agonistic behaviours in

\textsuperscript{754} Ibid., p. 93.
everyday life, then such *ressentiment* could slowly be challenged. This could help to encourage contingency and mediate conflict in wider society.

Hence, the inclusive, view-sharing component of the day aspires to supplement the passionate start to the day with enhanced relations, a greater diversity of voices, empowerment of minority citizens, and improved quality of discussion. It employs a circular layout order to promote the necessary interdependency of all citizens, thereby encouraging greater inclusion. Additionally, it uses the tokens as a tool to realise inclusive principles of listening and respect. This strives to enhance the relations between conflicting citizens, as well as overcoming domination and challenging power relations. The discussion also suggests a series of guidelines, including behaviours such as respect, listening and self-reflection. Yet it is careful not to over-emphasise these principles, or propose a prescriptive account which altogether eradicates conflict from the political contestation. It argues that when this occurs, citizens turn away from democratic politics and toward fundamentalist forms of expression. Thus, ethical guidelines are held in necessary tension with the promotion of agonism, passion and conflict. Finally, the framework strives to incorporate Connolly’s concept of addressing *ressentiment*. It acknowledges that this is a slow process and, therefore, proposes that the ‘agonistic day’ become an annual event, whilst also encouraging citizens to practice agonistic behaviours in everyday life. It also demonstrates the importance of following this discussion with a perfectionist one, informed by Owen’s common quest, which highlights the importance of conflicting citizens in fulfilling a common quest.

*Unity through Decision-Making as a Common Quest*

One of the weaknesses of both the first and second phases of the ‘agonistic day’ is that of unity. Whilst the first discussion promotes unity between collective groups, there is an absence of unity between *all* participating citizens. In the following discussion, in spite of emphasis...
on respectful behaviour toward others, the focus is on individual citizens and how they choose to express their ideas and use their tokens. Thus, the third and final stage of the day aspires to encourage unity between all citizens by proposing a common task in which citizens must make a collective decision. The ‘agonistic day’ begins with a political contestation whereby passions were mobilised and citizens were encouraged to debate their values with conflicting others. Then it opens up the discussion by making space for a diversity of views as well as promoting respectful, reflexive interactions, which enable interdependency and contingency. Now, the political contestation involves engaging citizens in a common quest, which promotes unity and cooperation, in addition to challenge and discussion quality, through the process of decision-making. This is important in giving meaning to agonistic discussion. As Forester asserts, this is important because ‘yes, conflicts of constitutive identities will abide, and inequalities of power will virtually always provide a setting for and partially constitute relationships at hand, but nevertheless democratic actors will have choices to make and take.’755 Thus, in addition to providing an outlet for democratic passion and conflict, overcoming domination and transforming relations between conflicting citizens, agonistic democracy also ought to consider decision-making.

In order to promote unity by involving citizens in a common quest, collective autonomy is significant to this discussion. During this phase of the day, then, citizens will be ask to reach a decision about the particular discussion topic, which they have previously debated and then shared views on. During the decision-making process, citizens will be asked to rank a series of preferences, rather than choosing between two options. This constitutes an attempt at preventing adversarial competition, in which citizens strive to win a debate, and instead promotes the view-sharing element of the inclusive discussion. This represents Owen’s calls for more pluralistic conflict, such a PR voting,

preferenda and citizens’ juries. Additionally, the discussion will refrain from telling citizens how to reach their decision, requiring them to work together in order to reflect perfectionism’s emphasis on communal autonomy. The ‘agonistic day’ provides a framework that moves away from polarised discussion in order to promote a more pluralistic form of conflict in which citizens are able and willing to challenge their own perspectives. As Chapter Six discusses, since citizens do not identify with one side in relation to another (as in adversarialism), they are better able to challenge their own opinions against those of others. This is important since it encourages the contingent element of agonistic democracy in which citizens challenge and critique each others’ values in order to come to new (and equally contingent) conclusions. However, in promoting challenge through the testing of perspectives against one another’s, I abandon Owen’s emphasis on honesty. As Chapter Six explains, requiring citizens to test their perspectives ‘honestly’ against those of others seems at odds with the conflictual and agonistic nature of discussion.

Additionally, by promoting competition as a collective quest to strive to surpass one another, perfectionism appears to promote more positive interactions between citizens, where they listen and respect one another, and challenge their own perspectives accordingly. This is significant to agonistic principles of necessary interdependency (in which all citizens are relational in spite of their disagreements), and contingency (in which citizens challenge their own views and those of others). However, I suggest that this notion of competition does not have the same provocative potential as Mouffe’s adversarial competition and might, therefore, fail to motivate certain citizens to engage. As Chapter Six outlined, Owen’s perfectionism may prioritise participation from those who are already committed to virtue cultivation. This is where perfectionism can be enriched through the former

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discussion, inclusive agonism, which employs discussion tokens in an attempt at encouraging participation from those less likely to engage.

Each time that this discussion framework was explored during the empirical work, several leaders emerged who guided the group through the process. In spite of this, none of these leaders dominated the discussions and continually checked with other participants whether or not they were happy with the decisions being made by the group. As a result, it is important that this phase of the discussion is not managed from above, but that autonomy and regulation rest with the citizens themselves. This is a significant feature of contingency as, without an imposed leader, perfectionism grants citizens the freedom to challenge and critique one another. However, one danger of such contingency and challenge is that citizens might become apathetic. As Chapter Six outlines, participants became apathetic to the discussion when it became cyclical. Furthermore, passion was more evident during the decision-making stage of the discussion. This is significant to the agonistic notion of political contestation, which seeks to engage citizens in a vibrant contestation surrounding their values. As Mouffe warns, if citizens are not engaged in democratic contestation, they may turn to other non-democratic forms of identification, threatening democratic politics as a result. Hence, in order to retain interest, time constraints will be placed on this final phase of the ‘agonistic day,’ which limit discussion time, placing emphasis on the necessity of reaching a decision in the allotted time. Here, then, it is evident that autonomy is in tension with engagement, since time constraints and emphasis on decision-making are placed on citizens in order to avoid apathy.

The collective nature of the discussion also requires citizens to reach some form of consensus, albeit contingent and contestable. The perfectionist focus on engaging in a common quest and reaching decisions collectively is important in creating unity between citizens.

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757 See Chapter Six for further details.
758 See Chapter Six for the detailed discussion of this.
The value of this cannot be underestimated when we consider the way in which agonistic democracy aims, not only to overcome the exclusionary potential of universalist or rationalist theories of democracy, but also the fragmentary potential of those focusing on groups and communities. It also might be useful in encouraging citizens to follow the rules of the game and interact positively with others since, as Chapter Six outlines, the provision of a common quest can make citizens feel more responsibility for other members of their group. This is in contrast to the previous inclusive discussion which focuses on citizens as individuals. However, my concern with the unity that this quest offers, is the exclusions upon which this relies. This follows Mouffe’s assertion that every consensus is necessarily based on certain exclusions. Thus, I suggest that the focus on unity, collectivity and consensus in the final phase is in tension with inclusivity. This is significant when we consider that one of agonistic democracy’s aims – in comparison to the focus of deliberative democracy, for instance - is to acknowledge power relations and challenge domination. Here, then, supplementing perfectionism by the second, inclusive, phase of the ‘agonistic day’ is essential to challenging domination and encouraging a greater plurality of views to be heard, respected and engaged with.

Thus, the third and final phase of the ‘agonistic day’ is essential to promoting unity, and addressing the fragmentation that agonistic theories of democracy perceive as dangerous to democracy. In drawing on perfectionism, I propose a decision-making phase that offers a plurality of choices to citizens and, therefore refrains from adversarial debate, and enables challenge and contingency. This is significant to reflecting agonistic democracy’s aims of reviving political contest and providing opportunities for continual challenge and contingency. However, in advocating a discussion in which citizens test their perspectives against one another in order to reach better ones, I abandon Owen’s notion of ‘honesty,’ claiming that it is an impossible goal. The pluralistic nature of this discussion also strives to promote
more positive relations between conflicting individuals, thereby resonating with agonistic notions of necessary interdependency. Yet, I suggest that this less provocative nature of competition may fail to motivate certain citizens into engagement, thereby demonstrating the importance of the inclusive phase of the day which encourages more citizens to engage. I assert that emphasis on collectivity encourages citizens to have responsibility for one another, which might thereby reduce the risk of them breaking the rules, interacting negatively with others, or seeking to dominate the process. However, I also show how such self-regulation might sometimes be in tension with the perfectionist emphasis on progress and, therefore, lead to apathy. Thus, I seek to combat this by implementing time constraints. I also show the importance of the adversarial framework in enhancing engagement. Finally, I demonstrate the importance of reaching decisions to preventing fragmentation, however I also suggest that this is in tension with inclusion since every consensus necessarily implies some forms of exclusion.

How an ‘Agonistic Day’ can help to mediate value conflict

In sum, then, the agonistic model of democracy could help to alleviate societal tensions by bridging the gap between the unity of rationalist, universalist theories of democracy on one hand, and the inclusive nature of communitarian and group rights theories of democracy on the other. I suggest that it can do so through implementing institutions that constrain citizens, but also empower them. Such a model focuses on the need for a revived political contestation of conflicting beliefs, which harnesses citizens’ passions and prevents them from turning to alternative forms of identification. It emphasises the importance of demonstrating necessary interdependency in which, in spite of their on-going conflicts, citizens are necessarily interlinked to one another. Finally, it highlights the importance of granting citizens freedom to challenge and critique current norms and values, which are entangled in power relations. Whilst this thesis has demonstrated that each account carries with it different strengths and weaknesses, I propose that by
operationalising the three, each one’s strengths can help to counter another’s weaknesses. It is my contention that agonistic democracy can mediate conflict by rendering democratic politics more engaging, inclusive, and unifying.

What next?

If we share Foucault’s view (and I do) that power and politics are everywhere, it seems logical to discuss which practices might supplement an ‘agonistic day’. I endorse an account of politics, which leaves much up to citizens. For instance, grass roots politics, civic practices, and participatory activities enable citizens greater autonomy, promoting engagement, challenge and progress. I also advocate a pluralistic approach to politics in which democracy is de-centralised and representation is diverse. Local government and proportional representation voting systems offer two institutional practices with the potential to include more people in the discussion whilst engaging citizens in a common quest. Additionally, circular seating, such as that employed in the European Parliament could help to render democratic discussions more inclusive. That said, we ought to also be mindful of the potential threat which democratic apathy poses to the success of these practices. It is thereby imperative that such diversity also makes space for the identification of potentially antagonistic positions. By ‘agonising’ political practices, it is hoped that democratic society might promote the admirable aims of agonistic democracy: political contestation, necessary interdependency, and contingency.
Bibliography


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Nottingham City Council Groups:

Oregonstate.edu, (n.d.). The Nietzsche Channel: On Truth and Lie in an Extra-Moral Sense. [online] Available at:


Appendices:

Appendix 1: Initial Participant Recruitment Target List

Political Groups:

Notts Labour:
info@nottinghamlabour.org.uk
Nottingham Labour, Unit 13a, John Folman Business Centre, Hungerhill Road, NG3 4NB

Notts Libdems:
info@nottinghamlibdems.org.uk
The Piggery, 8 Rectory Avenue, Wollaton, Nottingham, NG8 2AL

Anarchist Federation:
nottingham@afed.org.uk
AF c/o The Sumac Centre 245 Gladstone Street, Nottingham, NG7 6HX:

Rushcliffe Conservatives (and clubs within this – Patron’s Club, 200 club, Edwalton and Melton Coffee Club, Conservative Policy Forum):
office@rushcliffeconservatives.com

BNP
nottingham@bnp.org.uk

Religious Groups:

Christian Centre, Nottingham:
admin@christiancentre.org
Christian Centre Nottingham, 104-114 Talbot Street, Nottingham, NG1 5GL

Muslim Community Organisation (MCO) muslimcommorg@aol.com
MCO, Willoughby St, Nottingham NG7 1RQ

MCO Centre:
Beaumont Street, Sneinton, Nottingham, NG3 7DN

Progressive Jewish Congregation:
norman_randall@ntlworld.com

Notts YMCA International Community Centre:
icc@nottsymca.org

Nottingham Hebrew Congregation:
info@officenhc.co.uk

Nottingham Buddhist Centre:
info@nottinghambuddhistcentre.org
9 St Mary's Place, Nottingham, NG1 1PH

Islamic Centre Nottingham:
info@islamiccentrenottingham.org
3 Curzon St, Nottingham NG3 1DG
Hindu Temple Notts: 
215 Carlton Rd, Nottingham, NG3 2FX 

Ethnic/nationality groups: 
African Caribbean National Artistic Centre): 
admin@acna.org.uk 
31 Hungerhill Road St Ann’s Nottingham NG3 4NB 

Indian Community Centre: 
enquiries@theicca.co.uk 
99 Hucknall Rd Nottingham, NG5 1QZ 

Ukrainian Cultural Centre: 
clawson_lodge@hotmail.com 
Clawson Lodge, 403 Mansfield Road, Carrington, Nottingham, NG5 2DP 

Pakistan Centre: 
admin@pakistancentre.org.uk 
163, Woodborough Road, St. Ann's, Nottingham, NG3 1AX 

Causal groups: 
Society for the Protection of Unborn Children: 
people@spucnottingham.org.uk 

Notts LGBT Rainbow Heritage: 
nottsrh@hotmail.co.uk 

Nottingham Community and Voluntary Service: 
7 Mansfield Road, Nottingham, NG1 3FB 

Notts Women’s Centre: 
admin@nottinghamwomenscentre.com 
30 Chaucer Street, Nottingham, NG1 5LP 

Class Groups: 
Notts Golf and Country Club: 
general@thenottinghamshire.com 
The Nottinghamshire Golf & Country Club, Stragglethorpe Road, NG12 3HB 

Notts unemployed worker’s centre admin@nuwc.org.uk 
St John Street 
Mansfield 
Nottinghamshire 
NG18 1QH 

Sneinton Hermitage Community Centre: 
Sneinton Boulevard, Sneinton, NG2 4GN 

*If poor response, then ask students to fill spaces i.e. if missing a political group then ask the student union version of the group. If missing everything then ask a whole diversity of students.
Appendix 2: Initial Email Contact

Dear Sir/Madam,

I am a PhD student at the University of Nottingham researching how people’s interactions might change when they are encouraged to share their views on controversial issues in different ways. I am writing to ask whether any of your members would be interested in participating in an experiment which looks at the different ways opinions on abortion, gay marriage, gender rights and immigration can be shared.

The experiment is a one day event which will take place on Saturday 11th May 2013 at The University of Nottingham. Coffee breaks and lunch will be provided, as well as a reimbursement of transport costs. More details will be given to those who are interested.

During the experiment, participants will be asked to discuss a range of topics affecting multicultural society - such as abortion, gay marriage, gender rights and immigration. The experiment will enable citizens to explore three different ways of sharing views on these controversial issues.

Could you please either reply to me with a list of contacts for those who are interested, or ask them to email me directly at ldxmp9@nottingham.ac.uk by Friday 15th March 2013. Thank you for taking the time to read this. I would be extremely grateful to anyone who would be willing to take part in this experiment.

Yours sincerely,

Marie

Marie Paxton  
PhD Candidate  
School of Politics & IR  
University of Nottingham  
ldxmp9@nottingham.ac.uk
Appendix 3: Participant Recruitment Poster

Are you interested in sharing your views on abortion, gay marriage and multicultural values?

**Where?** The University of Nottingham

**When?** Saturday 11\(^{th}\) May (10:30 until 4pm)

**Compensation?** Transport costs of up to £20 will be compensated and lunch, refreshments and snacks will be provided.

On 11\(^{th}\) May, there will be three discussions held at The University of Nottingham on abortion, gay marriage and multicultural values. These discussions form part of a PhD project which explores how people’s interactions might change when the discussion framework changes.

If you would like to participate in these discussions, please email Marie Paxton on ldxmp9@nottingham.ac.uk (all lower case)
Appendix 4: Participant Recruitment Questionnaire

Please fill in the following survey and return to ldxmp9@nottingham.ac.uk as soon as possible. If you have any questions, please do not hesitate to email me.

Name:

Age:
- Under 18
- 18 – 24
- 25 – 36
- 37 – 48
- 49 – 64
- 65+

Gender:
- Male
- Female

Ethnicity:

White
- English / Welsh / Scottish / Northern Irish / British
- Irish
- Gypsy or Irish Traveller
- Other White background. Please state here:

Mixed / multiple ethnic groups
- White and Black Caribbean
- White and Black African
- White and Asian
- Other Mixed / multiple ethnic background. Please state here:

Asian / Asian British
- Indian
- Pakistani
- Bangladeshi
- Chinese
- Other Asian background. Please state here:

Black / African / Caribbean / Black British
- African
- Caribbean
- Other Black / African / Caribbean background. Please state here:

Other Ethnic Group
- Arab
Other ethnic group. Please state here:_________________________________

Prefer not to say

Education (please tick any and all that apply):
- GCSE’s
- AS Levels
- A Levels
- University bachelor’s degree
- University masters degree
- University research degree (i.e. MPhil, PhD, post-doc)

Occupation:
Please state here: ________________________________

Political Affiliation:
- Labour
- Conservative
- Liberal Democrat
- Scottish National Party
- Plaid Cymru
- Green
- UKIP
- BNP
- Other. Please state here:________________________________________

- None
- Prefer not to say

Religion:
- Christian
- Buddhist
- Hindu
- Jewish
- Muslim
- Sikh
- Atheist
- Agnostic
- Other. Please state here:_______________________________________

- Prefer not to say

Sexual orientation
- Heterosexual
- Homosexual
- Bi-sexual
- Prefer not to say

Who contacted you about this research?

_______________________________
Thoughts

Do you consider yourself to generally be pro or anti abortion?

- Pro
- Anti

Any additional comments:
______________________________________________

How important is this issue to you on a scale of 1 to 5? (with 1 being not important at all and 5 being most important)

- 1
- 2
- 3
- 4
- 5

Do you consider yourself to generally be pro or anti gay marriage?

- Pro
- Anti

Any additional comments:
______________________________________________

How important is this issue to you on a scale of 1 to 5?

- 1
- 2
- 3
- 4
- 5

Many thanks for taking the time to complete this survey.
Appendix 5: Before and After Questionnaires

Introductory Survey

For each of the pairs of statements, please tick the box for the statement you most agree with. Please only tick one statement for each number. If you agree with more than one statement, please tick the one that you identify most with.

Please write your name here:

____________________________________________________________________

(your name will be anonymised in the thesis or any further publications)

When talking about controversial issues:

1. □ I understand people whose beliefs conflict with mine
   □ I find it hard to understand those whose beliefs conflict with mine

2. □ I have the most respect for those who share my views
   □ I have equal respect for everyone

3. □ My beliefs always remain the same during discussion with others
   □ My beliefs often change as a result of discussions with others

4. □ My beliefs will become stronger as a result of discussions with others
   □ My beliefs will become weaker as a result of discussions with others

5. □ I find it hard to understand that people do not share my views
   □ I accept that other people may not share my views

6. □ I would rather keep my opinions to myself
   □ I am willing to share my opinions with others

7. □ I become more interested when the discussion becomes heated
   □ I lose interest when the discussion becomes heated

8. □ I view all views as equally worthwhile
   □ I see some views as more worthy than others

9. □ I feel I have nothing in common with those I disagree with
I feel you can still share common values with those you disagree with

10. ☐ Sharing common values with people is most important in bringing people together  
☐ Working towards a common goal is most important in bringing people together

11. ☐ Discussion with others gives me a better understanding of different viewpoints  
☐ Discussion with others does not help me to understand different viewpoints

12. ☐ My opinions are fully formed before the discussion  
☐ I develop my own arguments by listening to others

P.T.O.

And finally:

On a scale of one to ten (with one meaning that you have no interest in the following issues at all, and ten meaning that you are extremely interested), please circle the number which indicates your interest in the following issues:

13. Abortion: 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
14. Gay Marriage: 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10

Please add anything you wish to here:

____________________________________________________________
____________________________________________________________
____________________________________________________________
____________________________________________________________
____________________________________________________________

282
Concluding Survey

For each of the pairs of statements, please tick the box for the statement you most agree with. Please only tick one statement for each number. If you agree with more than one statement, please tick the one that you identify most with.

Please write your name here:

_________________________________________________________________________
(your name will be anonymised in the thesis or any further publications)

NB: Please note that there are two sections for this survey. The first part is a self-reflection. The second is a comparison of the three discussions.

When talking about controversial issues:

11. □ I understand people whose beliefs conflict with mine
    □ I find it hard to understand those whose beliefs conflict with mine

12. □ I have the most respect for those who share my views
    □ I have equal respect for everyone

13. □ My beliefs always remain the same during discussion with others
    □ My beliefs often change as a result of discussions with others

14. □ My beliefs will become stronger as a result of discussions with others
    □ My beliefs will become weaker as a result of discussions with others

15. □ I find it hard to understand that people do not share my views
    □ I accept that other people may not share my views

16. □ I would rather keep my opinions to myself
    □ I am willing to share my opinions with others

17. □ I become more interested when the discussion becomes heated
    □ I lose interest when the discussion becomes heated

18. □ I view all views as equally worthwhile
    □ I see some views as more worthy than others

19. □ I feel I have nothing in common with those I disagree with
    □ I feel you can still share common values with those you disagree with
20. □ Sharing common values with people is most important in bringing people together
    □ Working towards a common goal is most important in bringing people together

11. □ Discussion with others gives me a better understanding of different viewpoints
    □ Discussion with others does not help me to understand different viewpoints

15. □ My opinions are fully formed before the discussion
    □ I develop my own arguments by listening to others

P.T.O.

**And finally... Please only tick one box for each question.**

**Comparing the discussions:**

16. The discussion I found most engaging was:
    □ The charity discussion
    □ The abortion discussion
    □ The gay marriage discussion

17. I felt most able to express my opinions during:
    □ The charity discussion
    □ The abortion discussion
    □ The gay marriage discussion

18. My beliefs were challenged the most in:
    □ The charity discussion
    □ The abortion discussion
    □ The gay marriage discussion

19. The quality of opinions was best in:
    □ The charity discussion
    □ The abortion discussion
    □ The gay marriage discussion

20. I developed an understanding towards others in:
    □ The charity discussion
    □ The abortion discussion
☐ The gay marriage discussion

21. I felt most passionate during:
   ☐ The charity discussion
   ☐ The abortion discussion
   ☐ The gay marriage discussion

22. Group unity was strongest during:
   ☐ The charity discussion
   ☐ The abortion discussion
   ☐ The gay marriage discussion

P.T.O. to add additional comments:

________________________________________________________________________
________________________________________________________________________
________________________________________________________________________
________________________________________________________________________
________________________________________________________________________
________________________________________________________________________
________________________________________________________________________
________________________________________________________________________
________________________________________________________________________

285
Appendix 6: Participant Questionnaires

Values Survey:

For each of the series of statements, please tick the box for the statement you most agree with. Please only tick one statement for each number. If you agree with more than one statement, please tick the one that you identify most with.

Please write your name here:

_____________________________________

(your name will be anonymised in the thesis or any further publications)

During the discussion:
1. □ I shared my beliefs with others
   □ I kept my beliefs to myself
2. □ I respected everyone’s beliefs
   □ I found it hard to respect some beliefs
3. □ Listening to others had no impact on my own beliefs
   □ Listening to others made me challenge my own beliefs
   □ Listening to others cemented my own beliefs
4. □ I respected some people’s beliefs more than others
   □ I respected everyone’s beliefs equally
5. □ In the discussion there were a couple of dominant views
   □ In the discussion lots of perspectives were expressed
6. □ We mainly discussed which values were important to us as a group
   □ We mainly discussed which values were important to us as individuals
7. □ I become more interested when the discussion becomes heated
   □ I lose interest when the discussion becomes heated
8. □ The people who had most authority were those who expressed their views clearly
   □ The people who had most authority were those who expressed wide-spread views
   □ The people who had most authority were those who said very little
9. □ The group gained respect for me when I gave my views
   □ The group lost respect for me when I gave my views
10. □ I found it difficult to set prior judgements aside during the discussion
    □ I was open-minded during the discussion
11. □ We criticised certain values and practices
   □ We saw all values and practices as having equal worth

23. □ I felt like part of the group
   □ I felt isolated from the group

24. □ My values were reflected by the final decision
   □ The final decision did not reflect my values

P.T.O.
25. □ I felt competitive about my values
   □ I did not feel competitive about my values

26. □ I thought about which values are important to me
   □ I did not think about which values are important to me

27. □ The discussion made me reconsider who I am
   □ I already knew who I was before the discussion

28. □ We disagreed about which charities promoted the best values
    □ We agreed straight away on which order to rank the charities

29. □ We disagreed on what makes a 'good' or 'bad' value
    □ We all agreed on what makes a 'good' or 'bad' value
    □ We did not discuss what makes a value 'good' or 'bad'

30. □ My reasons for my views developed throughout the discussion
    □ I already knew the reasons for my views before the discussion

31. □ The group became a 'group' through the common values we share
    □ The group became a 'group' through the collective decision we were asked to make
    □ The 'group' did not feel like a single, united group

32. □ I tolerated everyone's views
    □ Some views were intolerable

33. □ I responded to people whose views I disagreed with
    □ I preferred to keep quiet when people said things I disagreed with

34. □ I view our order of rank for the values as permanent
    □ I view our order of rank for the values as temporary

Anything else you would like to add (for example, answers you want to expand on): __________________________________________________________
_________________________________________________________________
Abortion Survey:

For each of the series of statements, please tick the box for the statement you most agree with. Please only tick one statement for each number. If you agree with more than one statement, please tick the one that you identify most with.

Please write your name here:
______________________________

(your name will be anonymised in the thesis or any further publications)

NB: Please note that this survey is split into three parts: part one refers to the discussion in general. Part two refers to the first half of the discussion i.e. before the video. Part three refers to the second half of the discussion i.e. after the video.

Part one – overall. Please answer this section reflecting on the whole abortion discussion:

2. Deciding which group to join for this discussion was:
   □ Easy
   □ Difficult

3. When there were high levels of conflict, I found the discussion:
   □ Less interesting
   □ More interesting

4. I see the disagreements with the other group as:
   □ Temporary
   □ Ongoing

5. Now that I have tested them against the views of others, my opinions:
   □ Are stronger
   □ Are weaker
   □ Have not been affected

Part two – first half of the discussion. Please answer this section reflecting on the abortion discussion which took place before the video:

6. I felt that our group’s ideas were:
   □ Of equal worth to the other group’s ideas
   □ More worthy than the other group’s ideas
   □ Less worthy than the other group’s ideas

7. In terms of defending our ideas, I thought that our group had:
   □ More right to do so than the other group
   □ Less right to do so than the other group
   □ Equal right to do so as the other group

P.T.O.

8. □ I did not feel competitive towards the other group
☐ I felt competitive towards the other group

9. ☐ I felt a strong sense of identification with my group
   ☐ I did not feel a strong sense of identification with my group

10. During this task, the two groups:
   ☐ Worked together
   ☐ Formed two very distinct groups

10. Generally, I felt that my group’s values were:
   ☐ Similar to mine
   ☐ Different to mine

11. Disagreement between the two groups is a result of conflict over:
   ☐ Which values are important
   ☐ How to implement important values
   ☐ Both which values are important, and how to implement these

35. ☐ I felt a sense of belonging to my group
   ☐ I felt isolated from my group

36. I felt a sense of belonging to:
   ☐ Both groups
   ☐ My own group
   ☐ Neither group

37. I found the discussion:
   ☐ Interesting
   ☐ Boring

14 b. Please give a reason for the above answer:

____________________________________________________________
____________________________________________________________

38. During the discussion, most of the views were expressed by:
   ☐ One or two people
   ☐ A variety of people

39. ☐ All views were respect-worthy
   ☐ Some views were not worthy of respect

Part three – second half of the discussion. Please answer this section reflecting on the abortion discussion which took place after the video:

40. I felt that our group’s ideas were:
   ☐ Of equal worth to the other group’s ideas
   ☐ More worthy than the other group’s ideas
   ☐ Less worthy than the other group’s ideas

P.T.O.

41. In terms of defending our ideas, I thought that our group had:
   ☐ More right to do so than the other group
   ☐ Less right to do so than the other group
   ☐ Equal right to do so as the other group
42. □ I did not feel competitive towards the other group
   □ I felt competitive towards the other group

43. □ I felt a strong sense of identification with my group
   □ I did not feel a strong sense of identification with my group

44. During this task, the two groups:
   □ Worked together
   □ Formed two very distinct groups

22. Generally, I felt that my group’s values were:
   □ Similar to mine
   □ Different to mine

23. Disagreement between the two groups is a result of conflict over:
   □ Which values are important
   □ How to implement important values
   □ Both which values are important, and how to implement these

24. □ I felt a sense of belonging to my group
   □ I felt isolated from my group

25. I felt a sense of belonging to:
   □ Both groups
   □ My own group
   □ Neither group

26. I found the discussion:
   □ Interesting
   □ Boring

26 b. Please give a reason for the above answer:

________________________________________________________________________
________________________________________________________________________

27. During the discussion, most of the views were expressed by:
   □ One or two people
   □ A variety of people

28. □ All views were respect-worthy
   □ Some views were not worthy of respect

Please feel free to use the next page to add any additional comments:

________________________________________________________________________
________________________________________________________________________
________________________________________________________________________
________________________________________________________________________
Gay Marriage Survey:

For each of the series of statements, please tick the box for the statement you most agree with. Please only tick one statement for each number. If you agree with more than one statement, please tick the one that you identify most with.

Please write your name here:

_____________________________________________________________________

(your name will be anonymised in the thesis or any further publications)

During the discussion:

4. The opinions we came up with were:
   - [ ] All predictable
   - [ ] Sometimes unpredictable

5. The views expressed were mostly given by:
   - [ ] One or two people
   - [ ] A variety of people

5. When other people didn't share my views on gay marriage:
   - [ ] I accepted it
   - [ ] I found it difficult to accept

6. When people’s opinions differed radically from mine:
   - [ ] I found it hard to relate to them
   - [ ] I could still relate to them

7. My opinions:
   - [ ] Were fully formed before the discussion
   - [ ] Formed throughout the discussion

8. [ ] Some views were more worthwhile than others
   - [ ] All views were equally worthwhile

9. When I disagreed with someone:
   - [ ] I told them and explained the reasons why
   - [ ] I preferred not to respond

10. After listening to opposing views:
    - [ ] I still find it hard to understand them
    - [ ] I understand them better

11. Through engaging with others:
    - [ ] I understand better where they are ‘coming from’
    - [ ] I do not understand how people can hold such beliefs

P.T.O.

12. When people believed that not everyone would share their personal viewpoint:
    - [ ] Their viewpoint became less valid
    - [ ] Their viewpoint became more valid
13. I felt most motivated to respond to those who:
   □ Held views which made me angry
   □ Accepted that not everyone would share their views

45. I found it easiest to respond to those who:
   □ Held views which made me angry
   □ Held views which were similar to mine
   □ Accepted that not everyone would share their views
   □ Other. Please state:

46. The quieter members of the group were:
   □ Encouraged to speak by other members of the group
   □ Not encouraged to speak by the others

47. Listening to others:
   □ Changed my opinions
   □ Cemented the opinions I had previously held
   □ Had no impact on my opinions

48. This discussion showed me that it is better to:
   □ Ignore people who hold opposing beliefs
   □ Discuss with people who hold opposing beliefs

49. In the discussion, I felt like:
   □ An individual
   □ A part of the group

50. □ I found it difficult to set aside prior prejudices and stereotypes about people
    □ I tried to set aside prior prejudices and stereotypes about people

Anything else you would like to add:

________________________________________________________________________
________________________________________________________________________
________________________________________________________________________
________________________________________________________________________
________________________________________________________________________
________________________________________________________________________
________________________________________________________________________
________________________________________________________________________
Appendix 7: Drawing on Q Method to break down *audi alteram partem*

Someone who practices *audi alteram partem* might say, I:

- Listened to others
- Listened particularly to those who were silenced, excluded or deemed ‘unreasonable’
- Listened to others and, when I disagreed, I responded with reasons
- Prevented dominant ideas from suppressing marginalised ones
- Ensured everyone was recognised as worthy, and included in the discussion
- Have a deeper understanding of those I disagreed with as a result of listening and exchanging views with them
- Learnt things from listening to others
Appendix 8: Pre-experiment Questionnaire from Pilot study

**Before Survey**

Please circle the statement which you agree with. Please only circle one statement. If you agree with more than one statement, please circle the one that you identify most with.

When talking about controversial issues:

1. I understand people whose beliefs conflict with mine/I find it hard to understand those whose beliefs conflict with mine

2. I have the most respect for those who share my views/I have equal respect for everyone

3. My beliefs always remain the same during discussion with others/my beliefs often change as a result of discussions with others

4. My beliefs will become stronger as a result of discussions with others/my beliefs will become weaker as a result of discussions with others

5. I find it hard to understand that people do not share my views/ I accept that other people may not share my views

6. I would rather keep my opinions to myself/I am willing to share my opinions with others

7. I become more interested when the discussion becomes heated/I lose interest when the discussion becomes heated

8. I view all views as equally worthwhile/I see some views as more worthy than others

9. I feel I have nothing in common with those I disagree with/I feel you can still share common values with those you disagree with
10. Sharing common values with people is most important in bringing people together/working towards a common goal is most important in bringing people together

P.T.O.

11. Discussion with others gives me a better understanding of different viewpoints/discussion with others does not help me to understand different viewpoints

12. My opinions are fully formed before the discussion/I develop my own arguments by listening to others

Please add anything you wish to here:

____________________________________________________________

____________________________________________________________

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Appendix 9: Example of Participant Uncertainty

Gay Marriage Survey:

For each of the series of statements, please tick the box for the statement you most agree with. Please only tick one statement for each number. If you agree with more than one statement, please tick the one that you identify most with.

Please write your name here: [Redacted]

(your name will be anonymised in the thesis or any further publications)

During the discussion:

1. The opinions we came up with were:
   - [ ] All predictable
   - [x] Sometimes unpredictable

2. The views expressed were mostly given by:
   - [ ] One or two people
   - [x] A variety of people

3. When other people didn’t share my views on gay marriage:
   - [ ] I accepted it
   - [ ] I found it difficult to accept

4. When people’s opinions differed radically from mine:
   - [ ] I found it hard to relate to them
   - [x] I could still relate to them

5. My opinions:
   - [ ] Were fully formed before the discussion
   - [ ] Formed throughout the discussion

6. [ ] Some views were more worthwhile than others
   - [x] All views were equally worthwhile

7. When I disagreed with someone:
   - [x] I told them and explained the reasons why
   - [ ] I preferred not to respond

8. After listening to opposing views:
   - [ ] I still find it hard to understand them
   - [x] I understand them better

9. Through engaging with others:
   - [x] I understand better where they are ‘coming from’
   - [ ] I do not understand how people can hold such beliefs

P.T.O.
**Observer Sheet for Values Discussion**

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<thead>
<tr>
<th>Group Behaviour</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. People shared their beliefs with others</td>
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<td>2. People reflected on their own beliefs after hearing other people’s (i.e. they thought back to what they had previously said)</td>
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<td>3. People became more sure of their own beliefs after hearing the arguments of others (i.e. they argued more strongly for their side)</td>
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<td>4. People changed their beliefs after hearing the arguments of others</td>
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<td>5. There was a range of beliefs given</td>
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<td>6. Everyone’s views were respected (i.e. people listened to them, empathised with them, did not interrupt them and did not swear, shout or turn discussion personal)</td>
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<td>7. People did not respect the views of others (i.e. they interrupted, shouted, swore, didn’t listen, rolled their eyes, sniggered etc)</td>
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<td>8. There were only a couple of different views given about the different values/charities</td>
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<td>9. The most dominant people were those who were most ready to express their views</td>
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<td>10. The most dominant people were those whose views had the most support in the group</td>
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<td>11. The group discussed which values should be encouraged (or included)</td>
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<td>12. The group discussed which values should be discouraged (or banned)</td>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>13.</td>
<td>There were lots of people involved in the discussion</td>
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<td>14.</td>
<td>Conflict sent the discussion off track (i.e. descended into personal comments or off-topic discussions)</td>
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<td>15.</td>
<td>Conflict resulted in people coming to new conclusions (i.e. modifying their original arguments to reach new conclusions – not simply to side with dominant members)</td>
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<td>16.</td>
<td>Conflict resulted in people changing their views to share those of the most dominant members of the group</td>
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<td>17.</td>
<td>People became very competitive about their beliefs (i.e. they showed passion and frustration, they compared their beliefs to those of others, they criticised views of others, they showed how their views were better)</td>
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<td>18.</td>
<td>Participants discussed which values/charities should receive the money</td>
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<td>19.</td>
<td>Participants discussed how to decide which values are most important</td>
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<td>20.</td>
<td>People engaged with views they disagreed with (i.e. they gave reasons and arguments for why the other person is wrong)</td>
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</table>

Code = Never (N), Rarely (R), Sometimes (S), Often (O), All of the time (A)

This is reset at 10 minute intervals. Each observer will also be given an additional sheet of paper for every 10 minutes in order to write down things that are particularly poignant or which require further explanation.
# Observer Sheet for Abortion Discussion

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Group Behaviour</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. People bursting to speak</td>
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<td>2. Lots of people involved in the discussion</td>
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<td>3. People listening to each other (i.e. looking at the speaker, nodding their heads, thinking)</td>
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<td>4. Fast pace of discussion (i.e. lots of back and forths)</td>
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<td>5. People having private conversations</td>
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<td>6. People staring into space</td>
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<td>7. Lots of awkward silences (don’t count times when people are thinking about how to respond)</td>
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<td>8. Only a couple of people involved in the discussion</td>
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<td>9. Slow pace</td>
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<td>10. Participants agreeing with members of own group</td>
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<td>11. Participants supporting opinions of other group members (verbally or through body lang. i.e. nods/smiles)</td>
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<td>12. Participants saying positive things about own group</td>
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<td>13. Participants saying negative things about other group</td>
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<td>14. Competition between groups (i.e. lang. such as ‘win’, ‘best’, ‘worse’)</td>
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<td>15. Positive body lang. to own group (i.e. smiling, laughing, listening, sitting close to)</td>
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<td>16. Hostility towards other group (i.e. interrupting, not listening, swearing, shouting, turn discussion personal)</td>
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<td>17. Participants sitting apart from their own group</td>
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</table>
18. Participants arguing with other members of their group
19. Hostility towards own group (i.e. interrupting, not listening, swearing, shouting, turn discussion personal)
20. Not taking the discussion seriously (laughing at the content, rolling eyes at people, not listening to people)
21. Positive behaviour towards other group (i.e. smiling, laughing, listening to them)
22. Participants relating to the experiences of the other group
23. Participants trying to understand the opinions of the other group
24. Both groups trying to work together as a whole
25. Participants comparing members of other group to the extremists in the video

Code = Never (N), Rarely (R), Sometimes (S), Often (O), All of the time (A)

This is reset at 10 minute intervals. Each observer will also be given an additional sheet of paper for every 10 minutes in order to write down things that are particularly poignant or which require further explanation.

Observers to place a star on the sheet to indicate at which point the video was showed.
Observer Sheet for Gay Marriage Discussion

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Group Behaviour</th>
<th>10 min</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. There was a range of beliefs given</td>
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<td>2. People reflected on their own beliefs after hearing other people's (i.e. they thought back to what they had previously said)</td>
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<td>3. People became more sure of their own beliefs after hearing the arguments of others (i.e. they argued more strongly for their side)</td>
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<td>4. People changed their beliefs after hearing the arguments of others</td>
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<td>5. People were okay with the fact that others might not share their beliefs (i.e. they listened to others, smiled at them, responded positively)</td>
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<td>6. Everyone's views were respected (i.e. people listened to them, empathised with them, did not interrupt them and did not swear, shout or turn discussion personal)</td>
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<td>7. People did not respect the views of others (i.e. they interrupted, shouted, swore, didn't listen, rolled their eyes, sniggered etc)</td>
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<td>8. There were only a couple of different views given about the different values/charities</td>
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<td>9. One or two people dominated the discussion</td>
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<td>10. Quieter members were encouraged to speak</td>
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<td>11.</td>
<td>There were lots of people involved in the discussion</td>
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<td>12.</td>
<td>There was unity within the group (i.e. people were smiling and nodding, referring to previous opinions)</td>
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<td>13.</td>
<td>The group challenged current moral standards on gay marriage (i.e. questioned their original beliefs, challenged current laws and/or current cases)</td>
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<td>14.</td>
<td>People listened to others as individuals (i.e. they responded to the personal experiences, cultures, traditions and beliefs of others – they avoided pre-formed religious or cultural stereotypes or generalisations)</td>
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<td>15.</td>
<td>People relied on stereotypes when talking to people with different beliefs (i.e. generalisations, making assumptions about how people of a certain religion, culture or tradition would act)</td>
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<td>16.</td>
<td>People engaged with views they disagreed with (i.e. they gave reasons and arguments for why the other person is wrong)</td>
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Code = Never (N), Rarely (R), Sometimes (S), Often (O), All of the time (A)

This is reset at 10 minute intervals. Each observer will also be given an additional sheet of paper for every 10 minutes in order to write down things that are particularly poignant or which require further explanation.
Appendix 11: Ethical Review Form
If submitted by a student please pass to your supervisor for signature

Supervisor's Comments:

[Handwritten comments]

Name of supervisor

Date: 10/12/2012

Name

(Chair of RRC or representative)

Signed

Date: 1/10/13

When for Participant Selection

- The Muslim Student's Group
- The Women's International Community Centre
- African Women's Centre
- Christian Centre
- Australian Women's Centre
- RRC Women's Club
- RRC Victorian Women's Centre
- RRC and LGBT Society
- RRC Women's Centre
- RRC Women's Cultural Centre
- RRC Women's Centre
- RRC Women's Centre
- RRC Women's Centre
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- RRC Women's Centre
- RRC Women's Centre
- RRC Women's Centre
Appendix 12: Informative Email to Prospective Participants

Dear X,

Thank you so much for volunteering to participate in my pilot experiment – I am very grateful as I literally could not run it without you!

Here’s some more information about the day: the day is set to start at 10:30am and finish at 4:00pm on Saturday 11th May at The University of Nottingham. The group will be between 10 and 15 people. You will spend the day discussing different issues, such as abortion, gay marriage, and multicultural values.

Since my research is looking at the interactions between people, there will be a couple of people watching the discussions, and there will also be a video camera so that I can watch the discussions afterwards (as I will most probably be busy sorting out your food and drink, and other issues throughout the day!) If you have special dietary requirements, please let me know.

You will be given consent forms before the experiment outlining that I will refer to the event in my PhD thesis, and that parts of it may be referred to in journal articles or further publications, however all names will be anonymised. It will also state your right to opt-out of the discussions at any point.

If you have any questions, then please don’t hesitate to contact me.

Thank you again for helping me out!

Many thanks and best wishes,

Marie

Marie Paxton,
PhD Candidate,
School of Politics and International Relations, University of Nottingham,
UK-Nottingham NG7 2RD,
Tel.: 0044 790 623 5450

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Time</th>
<th>Event</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>10:30 – 10:45</td>
<td>Intro + Consent forms</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10:45 – 11:00</td>
<td>Icebreaker Exercise</td>
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<tr>
<td>11:00 – 12:00</td>
<td>Value Discussion</td>
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<tr>
<td>12:00 – 1:00</td>
<td>Lunch</td>
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<tr>
<td>1:00 – 2:15</td>
<td>Abortion Discussion</td>
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<td>2:15 – 2:30</td>
<td>Coffee</td>
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<tr>
<td>2:30 – 3:45</td>
<td>Gay marriage discussion</td>
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<tr>
<td>3:45 – 4</td>
<td>Conclusion</td>
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</tbody>
</table>
Appendix 13: Consent Form

Informed Consent Form for Participants

Please read the following and ask if you have any questions. Please complete the forms and sign both copies – one will be collected in, and the other will be yours to keep.

I volunteer to participate in a research event conducted by Marie Paxton from The University of Nottingham. I understand that the project is designed to gather information about how people’s interactions might change when they are encouraged to share their views on controversial issues in different ways. I will be one of approximately 15 people to take part in the discussions.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Number</th>
<th>Statement</th>
<th>Please initial box</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1.</td>
<td>I understand that participation in this event is voluntary. I will not be paid for my participation. I may withdraw and discontinue participation at any time without giving a reason and without penalty.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2.</td>
<td>I understand that if I feel uncomfortable in any way during the discussions, I have the right to decline to speak, or to leave the room at any time.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3.</td>
<td>I understand that participation involves a series of three discussions. Three people will be taking notes throughout the discussions. A video-camera will record the discussions.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4.</td>
<td>I understand that all videoed material and written documents will be used solely for research purposes, and will be destroyed on completion of the research.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5.</td>
<td>I understand that all information about me will be treated in strict confidence and that I will not be named in any written work arising from this study.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6.</td>
<td>I understand that this research study has been reviewed and approved by The School of Politics &amp; IR Research Ethics Committee at University of Nottingham.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7.</td>
<td>I agree to take part in the study.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8.</td>
<td>I agree to being video-recorded.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9.</td>
<td>I agree to the use of anonymised quotes in publications</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

____________________________              _____________________
Signature                              Date

____________________________              _____________________
Full name                              Researcher’s signature
Appendix 14: Overview of the Empirical Research

**Overview of the Empirical Research**

The empirical work consists of three value discussions, one representing concepts from Perfectionist Agonism (David Owen), another from Adversarial Agonism (Chantal Mouffe) and a final from Inclusive Agonism (William Connolly and James Tully). These discussions enable reflection on the research question of ‘whether and how can theoretical concepts from agonistic democracy be operationalised in order to mediate conflict in multicultural, pluralist society?’

**Timetable of Research**

April 2013: pilot study. The purpose of this was for the observers and I to practice the experiment; to test (and sometimes modify) the activities and questionnaires; and to cross-reference with the main experiment. The pilot study replicated the discussion format from the main experiment, although details such as timing and questionnaire layout were altered.

May 2013: main experiment.

December 2013: seminar discussions. The purpose of these was to cross-reference with the pilot and main experiment. The discussion frameworks remained the same, but I explored doing them in various orders and using a range of different topics.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>No. of participants</th>
<th>Main Experiment</th>
<th>Student Seminars</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>10</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>6 groups of approximately 25</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Age Range</td>
<td>18-24 to 37-48</td>
<td>18-24 to 37 – 48</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gender</td>
<td>4 females and 6 males</td>
<td>4 females and 5 males</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Students or Non-</td>
<td>All undergraduate or postgraduate students from universities in Nottingham and Leicester</td>
<td>Approximately 50% female and 50% male</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>students</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

| Diversity           | 3 members of the Society for the Protection of Unborn Children. One member of the Greek Orthodox Church who identifies as a homosexual. A participant who had previously been detained in Iran for promoting women’s rights. One humanities student who identifies as a bisexual. An active member of the University of Nottingham LGBT network, Buddhist Society, Women’s Network and Amnesty International. A member of the University of Nottingham Czech and Slovak Society. An active member of the Nottingham University Conservative Association and also identifies as a homosexual. | Various nationalities |
Employing a Quasi-Experimental Approach

To explore how theoretical concepts from agonistic democracy might be operationalised and ways in which these might affect the discussion framework.

- Discussion one (perfectionist agonism) involves providing participants with a range of sports charities, each representing one or two values, and asking participants to collectively allocate varying sums of money to the charities, according to their order of preference.

- Discussion two (adversarial agonism) requires participants to take part in a ‘for’ and ‘against’ debate about abortion, using three scenarios as the basis for discussion. Halfway through, participants are shown a video which uses pro-choice and pro-life extremism to demonstrate a common enemy to both sides.

- Discussion three (inclusive agonism) asks participants to sit in a circle and use speech tokens to discuss questions about gay marriage. Each participant must use one of their ten speech tokens whenever they wish to speak, and they can only contribute until their tokens have ran out. They are also asked to follow a series of discussion guidelines, such as respecting everyone, even those with whom you disagree.

The Participant Recruitment Process

Purposive sampling -> snowball sampling.

The Data Collection Process

- **Participant Questionnaires**
  Employed at the beginning and end of the day to explore whether participants’ perspectives changed. Completed after each discussion to explore effects of agonistic frameworks.

- **Video Analysis**
  Employed to explore interactions between participants, including non-verbal communication and behaviour. Sought to counter effects of memory.

- **Observer Sheets**
  Employed to explore interactions between participants. Sought to triangulate with video analysis and participant questionnaires to enrich the study with a diversity of interpretations.
### Conceptual Operationalisation

#### Discussion 1: Perfectionist Agonism

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Perfectionist Concept</th>
<th>Operationalisation in Discussion Framework</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Perspectivism</td>
<td>Provide participants autonomy over their room layout.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Engage participants in a discussion with diverse others.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Eternal Recurrence</td>
<td>Require participants to allocate varying sums of money to a range of charities in an order of rank.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nietzschean Competition</td>
<td>Encourage participants to test their perspectives against one another in a group discussion.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Enlarged Mentality</td>
<td>Require participants to engage with a plurality of perspectives.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Require participants to organise their physical space together.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Require participants to collectively decide how to arrive at their decision.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

#### Discussion 2: Adversarial Agonism

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Adversarial Concept</th>
<th>Operationalisation in Discussion Framework</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>The ‘Political’</td>
<td>Require participants to discuss controversial discussion topic of abortion.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Arrange seating in oppositional layout.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Require participants to discuss how they differ from the other group and what their opinions were of the other group and their values.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Collective Identity</td>
<td>Choose discussion topic of polarised nature, i.e. abortion.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Arrange seating in oppositional layout.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Require participants to discuss what brought them together as a group.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Agonistic Struggle</td>
<td>Require participants to discuss controversial discussion topic of abortion.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Require participants to choose between ‘for’ and ‘against’ group.

Require participants to discuss how they differ from the other group and what their opinions were of the other group and their values.

Show participants a video of extremism on both sides of the debate halfway through the discussion.

**Common Enemy**

Show participants a video of extremism on both sides of the debate halfway through the discussion.

**Discussion 3: Inclusive Agonism**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Inclusive Concept</th>
<th>Operationalisation in Discussion Framework</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>
| Intersubjectivity | Providing a discussion topic which allows for a plurality of views, i.e. gay marriage and associated questions.  
Arranging the room in a circular layout. |
| Citizens as the rulers and the ruled | Providing participants with the autonomy to shape the content and focus of the discussion by veering from the set questions. |
| Overcoming Domination | Arranging the room in a circular layout.  
Providing participants with ten discussion tokens each. Participants must use one token each time they speak, and can only contribute until their tokens have ran out.  
Providing a guideline for the discussion, asking participants to respect others, even when their views conflicted, and asking participants to set aside prior prejudices and listen to the individual. |
| Self-modification and Challenge | Arranging the room in a circular layout.  
Providing a guideline for the discussion, asking participants to listen to others and reflect upon one’s own beliefs. |
| Contestability | Providing a guideline for the discussion, asking participants to listen to others and reflect upon one’s own beliefs. |
Verbal and Behavioural Indicators of Concepts
Discussion 1: Perfectionist Agonism

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Perfectionist Concept</th>
<th>Operationalisation in Participant Questionnaires</th>
<th>Verbal and Behavioural Indicators (used in observer sheets and video analysis)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Perspectivism</td>
<td>Discussion perceived to be around which values were important to the group (rather than the individual). Participants perceived themselves as criticising certain values and practices (rather than viewing them all as equally worthy). Participants felt that their values were reflected by the final decision. Participants felt that they reconsidered who they are (rather than already having been aware of this). Participants felt that their views developed throughout the discussion (rather than having already held these).</td>
<td>Participants became more sure of their own beliefs after hearing the arguments of others (i.e. they argued more strongly for the other side). Participants changed their beliefs after hearing the arguments of others. Participants discussed which values should be encouraged (or included). Participants discussed which values should be discouraged (or banned).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Eternal Recurrence</td>
<td>Participants felt that they thought about which values were important to them. Participants felt that there was disagreement about the order of rank throughout the discussion. Participants felt that they considered what makes a value ‘good’ or ‘bad’. Participants felt that they disagreed on what makes a ‘good’ or ‘bad’ value.</td>
<td>Participants shared their beliefs with others. There was a range of beliefs given. The dominant group members were those who were most ready to express their views. The dominant group members were those whose views had the most support in the group. Participants discussed</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Participating in the discussion, participants perceived themselves as responding to those they disagreed with. Participants felt more respected after expressing their views. Participants perceived those with the most authority as those who expressed their views most clearly and who held the most wide-spread beliefs.

Participants discussed how to decide which values are most important.

Nietzschean Competition

Participants felt competitive about their values. Participants became visibly competitive about their beliefs (i.e. they showed passion and frustration, they compared their beliefs to those of others, they criticised views of others, they showed how their views were better). Conflict resulted in people coming to new conclusions (i.e. modifying their original arguments to reach new conclusions – not simply to side with dominant members).

Enlarged Mentality

Participants tolerated all views (rather than finding some intolerable). Participants felt like part of the group during the discussion. Participants felt as if the group became a single, united group. Participants felt as if a group formed through collective decision-making (rather than common values). Everyone’s views were respected (i.e. people listened to them, empathised with them, did not interrupt them and did not swear, shout or turn the discussion personal). Participants reflected on their own beliefs after hearing other people’s (i.e. they thought back to what they had previously said). Negative indicators include: interrupting, shouting, swearing, not listening, rolling of eyes and sniggering.

Discussion 2: Adversarial Agonism

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Adversarial Concept</th>
<th>Operationalisation in Participant Questionnaires</th>
<th>Verbal and Behavioural Indicators (used in observer sheets and video)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>The ‘Political’</td>
<td>Participants perceived disagreements with the opposing group as continual.</td>
<td>Lots of participants involved in the discussion. Negative indicators include: only a couple of people involved in the discussion, or when people are not taking the discussion seriously (i.e. they are laughing, rolling their eyes or not listening).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Collective Identity</td>
<td>Participants found it easy to decide which group to join initially. Participants felt a strong sense of identification with their group. Participants did not feel a sense of belonging to the other group. Participants felt that their values were similar to those of their group.</td>
<td>Participants agreeing with members of own group. Participants supporting opinions of other group members (verbally or through body language, i.e. nods/smiles). Participants saying positive things about own group. Competition between groups (i.e. language such as ‘win,’ ‘best,’ ‘worse’). Behaving positively towards one’s own group (i.e. smiling, laughing, listening to, sitting close to). Negative indicators include: sitting apart from one’s own group; arguing with members of one’s own group; and hostility towards one’s own group (interrupting, not listening, swearing, shouting, turning the discussion personal).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Agonistic Struggle</td>
<td>Participants found the discussion more interesting during high levels of conflict. Participants felt that the other group’s values had equal worth to theirs. Participants felt competitive towards the other group. Participants felt that disagreement with the</td>
<td>Participants bursting to speak. Fast pace of conversation (i.e. lots of back and forths). Participants listening to one another (i.e. looking at the speaker, nodding their heads, thinking). Participants relating to the experiences of the other</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
other group arose from the implementation of values (rather than the values themselves).

Participants trying to understand the opinions of the other group.

Both groups trying to work together as a whole.

Negative indicators include: private conversations; staring into space; experiencing awkward silences; and interacting at a slow pace.

*Rather than adding additional behavioural indicators, the common enemy concept was explored by comparing the verbal and behavioural indicators after the video to those which were observed before.

Negative indicator includes: associating members of the other group with the extremists in the video.

**Discussion 3: Inclusive Agonism**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Inclusive Concept</th>
<th>Representation in Participant Questionnaires</th>
<th>Verbal and Behavioural Indicators (used in observer sheets and video analysis)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Intersubjectivity</td>
<td>Participants felt that they could still relate to those with whom they disagreed.</td>
<td>There was unity within the group (i.e. participant were smiling and nodding, referring to previous opinions).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Citizens as the rulers and the ruled</td>
<td>Participants felt that their opinions formed during the discussion. When participants disagreed with someone, they told them so, and explained the reasons why.</td>
<td>There was a range of beliefs given. There were lots of participants actively involved in the discussion. Participants became more sure of their own beliefs after hearing the arguments of others (i.e. they argued more strongly)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
| Overcoming Domination | Participants felt that a variety of people expressed views during the discussion. 
Participants felt that all views were equally worthwhile. 
Participants felt that the quieter members of the group were encouraged to speak by other members of the group. 
Participants felt that they tried to set aside their own prior prejudices and stereotypes about others. | Everyone’s views were respected (i.e. participants listened to them, empathised with them, did not interrupt them and did not swear, shout or turn the discussion personal). 
Quieter members were encouraged to speak. 
Participants listened to others as individuals (i.e. they responded to the personal experiences, cultures, traditions and beliefs of others – they avoided pre-formed religious or cultural stereotypes or generalisations). 
Negative indicators include: those who disrespect others (i.e. interruption, swearing, shouting, not listening or rolling their eyes), and those who relied upon cultural stereotypes and generalisations to form their argument. |
| Self-modification and Challenge | Participants felt that the opinions the group came up with were sometimes unpredictable. 
Participants felt that they understood others better after hearing their views. 
Participants felt that they understood better where others are ‘coming from’ | Participants reflected on their own beliefs after hearing other people’s (i.e. they thought back to what they had previously said). 
Participants changed their beliefs after hearing the arguments of others. 
The group challenged current moral standards on |
Participants felt that listening to others affected their beliefs in some way, i.e. by changing them, or by cementing them.

Contestability

Participants felt most motivated to engage with those who accepted that not everyone would share their views.

Participants found it easiest to respond to those who accepted that not everyone would share their views.

Participants accepted that other people didn’t share their views on gay marriage.

Participants were okay with the fact that others might not share their beliefs (i.e. they listened to them, smiled at them, responded positively).

gay marriage (i.e. they questioned their original beliefs, challenged current laws and/or current cases).
Appendix 15: Charity Descriptions

Sports Charities

1. Universal Sports

2. Equality Through Sport

3. Sport for Soldiers

4. Tolerance and Diversity Through Sport

5. The Sporting Excellence Trust

Participants will be given 5 cards – one for each of the charities. On the cards will read:

1. Universal Sports is a group of people who aim to involve every single member of the community in sport. We believe that sport benefits everyone. Our aim is to make sport fun, accessible and affordable. The values this charity encompasses are: benefit for all, universality.

2. Equality Through Sport is a group of people worldwide who believe that poverty isn't inevitable - it is an injustice. We aim to overcome global injustice by using sport to affect change and encourage development in impoverished communities. We believe that every human life is of equal value and full of potential. The values this charity encompasses are: justice and equality.

3. Sport for Soldiers is a charity which provides rehabilitation for wounded soldiers. We believe that these soldiers have given so much for us that in return it is our duty to provide assistance when they are in real need. The values encompassed by this charity are: duty and responsibility.

4. Tolerance and Diversity Through Sport is a youth-led organisation working with young people to address discrimination and hate crime issues through. Our aim is to bring communities together through participation in sports teams and clubs. The values this charity encompasses are: tolerance and respect.

5. The Sporting Excellence Trust is a charity which aims to help elite athletes achieve their full potential in sport through the provision of excellent facilities and opportunities. We are passionate about making the best better. The values this charity embodies are: excellence and accomplishment.
Appendix 16: Common Enemy Video

Pro-life and Pro-choice Extremism

Both pro-lifers and pro-choicers face a common enemy when discussing abortion: abortion extremists.

Extremists have caused violence on behalf of pro-life and pro-choice...

Pro-life Extremism

Harlan Drake has been charged in the murder of pro-life activist Jam Pouillon.

Pro-choice Extremism

In spite of the differences between pro-choice and pro-life advocates, they all share one thing:

a common enemy.

This common enemy is ABORTION EXTREMISM.
Pro-life and pro-choice extremists pose a threat to both sides of the argument.

- They invalidate and delegitimise arguments
- They turn people away from the cause
- They intimidate people into keeping their beliefs to themselves.