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Strategy as an intertextual narrative:

A tale of fear and hope in the setting of Higher Education in the UK

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Abstract

This is a study about strategy. It uses the relatively underdeveloped but promising concept of narrative infrastructure to address a gap in understanding (Fenton and Langley, 2011) in how strategy as an intertextual narrative acquires stability and routine. Studies that have considered strategy as an intertextual narrative have largely been in settings in which strategy is made toward an unequivocal direction, within a relatively short time horizon (Llewellyn, 2001; Vaara et al., 2006; Riad et al., 2012). Framing to support availability and resonance of narrative building blocks, as part of the centralisation of meaning in strategy as an intertextual narrative, whilst evident (Vaara et al., 2004; Vaara et al., 2006; Riad, et al., 2012) is nonetheless underexplored. In response, this study considers strategy in the setting of higher education (HE) in the UK, where there is a greater plurivocality, in terms of multiple voices, at different levels, and a wider temporality. In a narrative enquiry in two research-intensive universities in the UK, including a review of policy documents (1992-2012), the study demonstrates how strategy achieves cohesion through powerful narrative framing, so that direction and thrust is maintained. It also provides one explanation of how strategy may unwind over time. Insight is gained because the three different facets—constitutive, manifest and ideological – of intertextuality have been considered (Riad et al., 2012). Notably, by examining manifest intertextuality, it shows that strategy is framed in a context of agitation and in an emotional register of fear and hope, extending the work of Riad et al., 2012. It also shows how in ideological intertextuality powerful framing, in which both wider plurivocality and greater temporality is apparently maintained, strategy endures
Publications declaration

The following is a list of my conference papers both related to and arising from the research carried out for this PhD.

1. HOLSTEIN, J. C. A., 2014. An examination of strategy as an intertextual narrative in the space between ‘organization’ and ‘setting’: a tale of enduring salvation from UK higher education In: 30th EGOS Colloquium Reimagining, Rethinking, Reshaping: Organizational Scholarship Rotterdam, The Netherlands. 3–5 July 2014


Acknowledgements

What they undertook to do
They brought to pass;
All things hang like a drop of dew
Upon a blade of grass.
William Butler Yeats (1865-1939)

Writing a PhD thesis is at times a very lonely endeavour and this has been no exception. It is however an undertaking that owes much to others and I would like to thank the following people who have provided me with support as it was developed and written. Firstly, I would like to thank my supervisors Ken Starkey and Mike Wright, for their constructive criticism, help, entertaining insight, academic fellowship and patience, throughout the period of study. It has been a really enjoyable and challenging experience. Secondly, I would like to thank the Economic and Social Research Council, together with Nottingham University Business School, for funding my doctoral study. Thirdly, I would like to thank all those that participated and helped to facilitate in this research project, making time to take part in interviews and for being generous in their contribution, engaging positively in the whole process. Finally I would like to thank all my friends and family who have supported me in many and various ways in this project. I would like to thank my parents in particular for their unconditional love throughout every part of my educational journey, including this one. And last but not least, I would like to thank my partner, Jay, for her love, support, patience and grace, through the ups and the downs of the PhD (and life).
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<tr>
<td>AHRC</td>
<td>Arts and Humanities Research Council</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BBSRC</td>
<td>Biotechnology and Biological Sciences Research Council</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BERR</td>
<td>Department for Business, Enterprise and Regulatory Reform</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BIS</td>
<td>Department of Business, Innovation and Skills</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CAT</td>
<td>College of Advanced Technology</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CBI</td>
<td>Confederation of Business Industry</td>
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<tr>
<td>CDP</td>
<td>Committee of Polytechnic Directors</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CIHE</td>
<td>Council for Industry and Higher Education</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CSR</td>
<td>Comprehensive Spending Review</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CVCP</td>
<td>Committee of Vice Chancellors and Principals</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DCSF</td>
<td>Department for Children, Schools and Families</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DES</td>
<td>Department for Education and Science</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DFE</td>
<td>Department for Education</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DfES</td>
<td>Department for Education and Skills</td>
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<tr>
<td>DfUIS</td>
<td>Department for Universities, Innovation and Skills</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DTI</td>
<td>Department for Trade and Industry</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EPSRC</td>
<td>Engineering and Physical Sciences Research Council</td>
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<tr>
<td>ESRC</td>
<td>Economic and Social Research Council</td>
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<tr>
<td>EU</td>
<td>European Union</td>
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<td>HE</td>
<td>Higher Education</td>
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<td>HEI</td>
<td>Higher Education Institute</td>
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<tr>
<td>HEFC</td>
<td>Higher Education Funding Council</td>
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<td>HEFCE</td>
<td>Higher Education Funding Council for England</td>
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<td>HEFCW</td>
<td>Higher Education Funding Council for Wales</td>
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<tr>
<td>HESA</td>
<td>Higher Educations Statistics Agency</td>
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<tr>
<td>HEIF</td>
<td>Higher Education Innovation Fund</td>
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<tr>
<td>IPPR</td>
<td>Institute for Public Policy Research</td>
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<tr>
<td>LEP</td>
<td>Local Enterprise Partnership</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MRC</td>
<td>Medical Research Council</td>
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<tr>
<td>NAB</td>
<td>National Advisory Board for Public Sector Higher Education</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NAO</td>
<td>National Audit Office</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NCIHE</td>
<td>National Committee of Inquiry into Higher Education</td>
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<td>NCUB</td>
<td>National Centre for Universities and Business</td>
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<tr>
<td>Acronym</td>
<td>Description</td>
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<tr>
<td>NERC</td>
<td>National Environment Research Council</td>
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<tr>
<td>OECD</td>
<td>Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OST</td>
<td>Office of Science and Technology</td>
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<tr>
<td>PAC</td>
<td>Public Accounts Committee</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PPARC</td>
<td>Particle Physics and Astronomy Research Council</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RAE</td>
<td>Research Assessment Exercise</td>
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<tr>
<td>RCUK</td>
<td>Research Councils United Kingdom</td>
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<tr>
<td>RDA</td>
<td>Regional Development Agency</td>
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<tr>
<td>REF</td>
<td>Research Excellence Framework</td>
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<tr>
<td>THES</td>
<td>Times Higher Education Supplement</td>
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<tr>
<td>TIC</td>
<td>Technology Innovation Centre (Catapult Centres)</td>
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<tr>
<td>TRL</td>
<td>Technology Readiness Level</td>
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<tr>
<td>TSB</td>
<td>Technology Strategy Board</td>
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<tr>
<td>SME</td>
<td>Small and Medium Sized Enterprise</td>
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<tr>
<td>UGC</td>
<td>University Grants Committee</td>
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<td>UUK</td>
<td>Universities UK</td>
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Chapter 1: Introduction

1.0 Introduction

1.1 Thesis background and aim

This is a study about strategy, a subject that has long been considered an important aspect of organisational life and the subject of much scholarly work. It is a study that considers strategy as narrative (Barry and Elmes, 1997) and is conducted within the broader ‘linguistic turn’ in organisational studies (Czarniawska-Joerges, 1995a; Czarniawska, 2004). There are two clear contributions from the expansion of narrative analysis in the study of organisations that have provided useful support to the development of strategy as narrative. The first is the view of the organisation as a plurivocal storytelling system to order and make meaning, in which strategy is a particular and important form of ordering (Lounsbury and Glynn, 2001; Currie and Brown, 2003; Rhodes and Brown, 2005; Fenton and Langley, 2011). The second is the view of the organisation as a site of discursive struggle, in which strategy is both an important political resource and one that requires active and sometimes contentious construction (Boje et al., 1999; Humphreys and Brown, 2002; Rhodes and Brown, 2005; Fenton and Langley, 2011).

Notwithstanding this contribution, the divergent focus of enquiry on constructs such as ‘identity’ and the choice of empirical materials, usually in fine grained analysis, by subsequent researchers following Barry and Elmes (1997), is one reason why the potential of narrative analysis of strategy has yet to be fulfilled (Phillips and Oswick, 2012). Moreover, there is a gap in the understanding of the relationship between strategy at organisational level and
the broader societal or macro-institutional setting within which strategy is produced (Jarzabkowski and Spee, 2009). It is a gap that a fuller treatment of strategy as narrative has the potential to address (Fenton and Langley, 2011; Vaara and Whittington, 2012). The gap identified is distilled here in the research question of **how does strategy as an intertextual narrative acquire stability and routine?** It is a question confronted in this study, by building on Barry and Elmes (1997) and subsequent work (Deuten and Rip, 2000; Llewellyn, 2001; Heracleous, 2001; Heracleous and Barrett, 2006; Vaara et al., 2006; Vaara and Monin, 2010; Riad et al., 2012).

Fenton and Langley’s (2011) proposal to interrogate and apply the concept of narrative infrastructure, first developed in work on product development processes (Deuten and Rip, 2000), has been used and developed to address the research gap and answer the research question. Relatively few studies, outside the broad treatment of narrative and structure (Dunford and Jones, 2000; Llewellyn 2001), have explicitly focused on the development of a narrative infrastructure. However, there are some considerations of intertextuality and discourse and narrative as dualities of structure and agency, implicit in the concept of narrative infrastructure (Heracleous and Barrett, 2001; Llewellyn, 2001; Heracleous, 2006; Vaara et al., 2006; Vaara and Monin, 2012; Riad et al., 2012), that supports its development. As a result, studies offer something to the understanding that it is combination of the availability and resonance of narrative building blocks, within narrative infrastructure, that explains the thrust and direction of strategy as an intertextual narrative. However, what is underdeveloped is an understanding of
the framing required to enable take-up of narrative building blocks, to maintain that thrust and direction.

The settings previously studied, in common with many others, have been turbulent, i.e. characterised by conflict, disorder and at times confusion. However, more importantly these have been settings in which strategy is made toward an unequivocal direction, within a relatively short time horizon. This has theoretical consequences.

Firstly, strategy drawn strongly from a notion of a predictable future at the expense of a foreshortened present and past (a shortened temporality) has the effect of reducing availability of narrative building blocks. Secondly, if too little attention is paid to the many and different voices (suppressing plurivocality), either as part of the setting or because of the nature of the research undertaken, then the resonance of those narrative building blocks that are dominant or in the political control of those actors who are dominant, prevails. Thus, if ‘narrative infrastructure’ is ‘the rails, along which multi-actor and multi-level processes gain thrust and direction’ (Deuten and Rip, 2000: 74) then strategy, in a foreshortened temporality and with suppressed plurivocality, quickly and temporarily establishes the rails and then actively greases them. The centralisation of meaning at the heart of thrust and direction is thus energetically supported, resulting in the ready and increased take up of dominant building blocks. Framing to support availability and resonance whilst evident (Vaara et al., 2004; Vaara et al., 2006; Riad, et al., 2012) is as a consequence, potentially underexplored. This is significant given that framing has long been recognised as an important element of how the messy complexity of organisational life is ordered (Goffman, 1974; Deetz, 1986).
need for ambiguity in the framing where there are competing narrative building blocks is some studies (Vaara et al., 2004) could even be interpreted as an early indication of the fragility of the suppression of plurivocality as a force to centralise meaning at the heart of intertextuality. This means that the treatment of the framing of narrative building blocks may also be a shortcoming within the settings studied, given that strategy had a relatively short shelf life (Vaara and Monin, 2010) and an ever-present tendency to unwind over time (Cartwright and Schoenberg, 2006), both between firms, and even within the firm (Heracleous, 2001).

In response, this study considers strategy in the setting of higher education (HE) in the UK, where strategy has been accomplished over a longer time period. It is a setting with a wider temporality and greater plurivocality. The study’s aim is to gain some understanding of how thrust and direction in strategy is maintained, to the extent that it acquires stability and routine (Fenton and Langley, 2011). When considering HE, it is the narrative of the university that is regarded as strategy (Barnett, 2011; Holmwood, 2011; Martin, 2012), in the sense that ‘it tells how the organisation and its members should be’ (Law 1994: 250; Czarniawska, 1997). An examination of strategy in HE in the UK is considered theoretically suitable for a number of reasons.

HE in the UK is a site of intense and politicised discourse, where pressures of reform, performance and accountability, driven by policy, have impacted (sometimes adversely) on universities (Deem et al., 2007; Barnett, 2011; Shattock, 2009; Collini, 2012; Shattock, 2012). It is a reform agenda that is intensifying (Brown, 2011; Holmwood, 2012; Barber, 2013). At the same time, there is thrust and apparently unambiguous direction in strategy (Barnett,
2011; Holmwood, 2011; Shattock, 2012), alongside remarkable continuity and consistency in practice within the organisation (Tight, 2009; Shattock, 2012). HE is thus a turbulent setting, in which strategy has apparently acquired a degree of stability and routine (Fenton and Langley, 2011). This is not to confuse stability with lack of turbulence (Scott, 1995; Tight, 2009; Shattock, 2012; Barber, 2013).

In addition, there are two features in relation to temporality and plurivocality in the setting of HE that are theoretically relevant.

The narrative of the university has a wide temporality. It is neither simply future focussed, nor is it solely at the mercy of the present, even though sudden changes in government spending reviews have a great impact. It is also associated strongly with the past (Barnett, 2011; Martin, 2012). This wide temporality is evident in two prevailing narratives of the university. One is the narrative of the traditional university, which because it is strongly rooted in the past, even a reified one (Barnett, 2011; Martin, 2012) is powerfully resonant (Erkama and Vaara, 2010). The other is the relatively recent narrative of the enterprise university, framed within the broader neoliberal discourse (Olssen and Peters, 2005; Tight, 2009) that has a strong future focus. The enterprise university is perceived as the dominant narrative (Barnett, 2011), particularly in government policy (Bridgman, 2007). The two narratives of the university have long been at odds and in competition (Shattock, 1994; Scott, 1995, Olssen and Peters, 2005; Diefenbach, 2009; Brown, 2011; Barnett, 2011; Holmwood, 2011; Collini, 2012) and simultaneously prevail.

There is also a great plurivocality in HE in the UK. This is because there are many equally powerful, autonomous and usually public agents, each
with voice and practiced access to an established narrative infrastructure and the differing and competing narrative building blocks within it (Shattock, 2012). Strategy is formed in a political system in public but also in private, where the boundary between levels and actors is blurred (Shattock, 2012). HE in the UK is a setting that has a wide and comprehensive plurivocality, in terms of multiple voices, at different levels, with a wide reach, in public and in private.

1.2 Contribution

The contribution of this study lies in the development of the concept of strategy as an intertextual narrative. It offers an explanation of how the overall thrust and direction of strategy is maintained, even endures, notably in politically rich settings. The maintenance of thrust and direction in strategy is a relevant question for organisations that perpetually operate in complex policy-rich and otherwise highly political environments. It is also relevant to organisations that are temporarily negotiating a period of political turbulence. What the study demonstrates is how strategy can achieve cohesion through powerful narrative framing, so that direction and thrust is maintained. It also points out the potential limits to this framing and thereby provides one explanation of how strategy unwinds over time.

It provides this insight because the three different facets—constitutive, manifest and ideological—of intertextuality have been considered (Riad et al., 2012). Firstly, the study shows how if strategy is only considered in constitutive intertextuality, then the framing effects are underplayed, and explanation of the endurance or otherwise of strategy, is underdeveloped. This affirms the theoretical basis for the study. Secondly, by examining manifest
intertextuality, it shows that strategy is framed in a context of agitation and in an emotional register of fear and hope. This extends the work of Riad et al., (2012), to a setting in which strategy has endured over a long period. It provides an additional insight that framing through fear may be a prerequisite for thrust in settings because it apparently suppresses plurivocality. However, given that strategy is also framed in a concern of creating order out of chaos and the location of chaos is different in the public and in the private realm, this has the contradictory effect of maintaining plurivocality. Thus, ambiguity in fear and hope equally supports thrust. Thirdly, in ideological intertextuality, it shows how powerful framing supports the centralisation of meaning at the heart of strategy, both in terms of creating order and reducing dissent. This is a framing in which both wider plurivocality and greater temporality, is maintained. It is this framing, that is supportive of the enduring unification of thrust and direction in strategy, over the long term.

The study also makes a contribution to practice. The insight into framing effects, particularly in public, is something is useful for strategy practitioners, given that public framing of strategy is largely in their remit. Although not its intention, this tentatively places the strategic plan back at the heart of strategy (Spee and Jarzabkowski, 2009) without necessarily privileging it.

1.3 Thesis overview and structure

1.3.1 Overview

Research has been conducted to explore the question of how strategy as an intertextual narrative acquires stability and routine. The theoretical approach
taken is broadly social constructionist (Czarniawska, 2008) and ‘subjectivist’ and conducted with assumptions most associated with interpretative research (Leitch et al., 2010: 57). It is an approach that is philosophically grounded in a hermeneutic tradition (Bruner, 1986; Polkinghorne, 1987; Rundell, 1995). The research has examined the narrative of the university, in a comparative case study (Yin, 2007). Case study is understood as a bounded unit of analysis (Stake, 2008) within a context, which involves the collection of empirical data from multiple sources (Robson, 2002: 178; Fitzgerald and Dopson, 2009). The unit of analysis is the ‘narrative of the university’.

Data has been constructed over a period of eighteen months starting in August 2011. The government’s policy on research, science and innovation, alongside the ‘research-intensive’ university, has been implicated in the ‘true’ narrative of the university and the dichotomously resonant narrative of the ‘enterprise’ university. Research, science and innovation policy, together with policy that presaged periodic reviews of the HE system in general, has therefore been reviewed, from the period 1992-2012. In addition, interviews were carried out with 42 participants, including policy-makers and senior managers, and other academic staff, within two participating research-intensive universities and the wider policy nexus. The two universities were selected, because they each belong to the same mission group, are classified as research-intensive and as ‘a multiversity’ (Kerr, 1963) and operate in the same policy context in the UK, although have slightly different historical origins. This is relevant because the narrative that underscores the notions of the university today is influenced by the past (Barnett, 2001; Martin 2012). Corporate documents covering a strategic planning period of eight years (2008-2015)
within the two universities were also reviewed. The analytical frame that has been used is one of narrative intertextuality; an approach proposed by Fairclough (1989; 1992) and further developed by Riad et al. (2012) that has been used and adapted here.

1.3.2 Thesis structure

The thesis is presented in three parts.

The first part (Chapter 2) locates the study in the current literature. Chapter 2 starts with an introduction to strategy and considers how a development of a narrative approach to strategy, would go some way to address a gap in understanding of how strategy draws upon the setting in which it is produced. It frames this gap as a question of strategy as an intertextual narrative, which can then be addressed by interrogating and applying the concept of narrative infrastructure. After a short overview of existing studies, which have largely been premised on some of the key elements of the narrative infrastructure concept rather than directly applying it, broad themes are identified. Having identified that availability and resonance are the two key features that enable and constrain thrust and direction of strategy, these features are then reviewed and a conceptual framework is developed and presented. The chapter concludes with a discussion concerning the focus of these studies that limits our current understanding and the consequent research agenda, including the research question.

The second part presents the research context and methodology.

Chapter 3 looks more closely at the theoretical basis for choosing to locate the study in HE in the UK, making the case for delineating the study to
one that looks at intertextuality in HE in England rather than the UK, focussed on the policy discourse around research in particular, in a twenty-year period 1992-2012 in pre-1992 universities. It starts by outlining the many historically constructed narratives of the university that are available and resonant in the context according to current literature. It considers the autonomous public actors and their role within the discursive space of HE in the UK, particularly at the blurred boundary between policy and strategy. It then examines the current policy context as a consequence of cyclical attempts at reform of the sector. It concludes with a summary of the case to delineate the study and implications for the research methodology more broadly.

Chapter 4 describes the research methodology and the process of carrying out the research. The chapter starts with a consideration of the theoretical assumptions on which the methodology is based, in what is essentially a hermeneutic enquiry. It then discusses the research design, outlining the appropriateness of a qualitative method and gives some consideration to the issue of quality and reflexivity in the research. A discussion of how the research is bounded in a case study is outlined, particularly the selections made in terms of the case as a whole, the policy period, the two participating universities, the interview participants and the texts. The chapter then goes on to outline the process of data ‘collection’ and analysis, including how the key policy documents were identified and isolated and how the semi-structured interviews were conducted. The chapter then outlines in detail how an analysis of intertextuality – constitutive, manifest and ideological - was conducted. It is an analytical frame employed is narrative intertextuality adapted from Fairclough (1989; 1992) and Riad et al. (2012).
The chapter concludes with further reflections on the challenges of the methodology chosen.

The third part presents the findings, discussion and conclusions.

Chapter 5 presents the findings from an exploration of policy texts between 1992 and 2012 implicated in the research, science and innovation policy agenda, as well as within the wider HE reform programme. The chapter starts with an overview of the developing narrative of the university in constitutive intertextuality within policy over the period. Recognising the increasingly dominant narrative of the enterprise university previously implicated in research (Bridgman, 2007), the chapter highlights how nonetheless this did not arrive fully formed in policy. Instead, it outlines how this narrative has developed in a transition of the university from science partner, to being part of an innovation process, and then as central or as a hub in an innovation ecosystem. It also outlines how the university has been further implicated in national and regional economic growth, and latterly in helping to rebalance the economy. The concurrent social mission within the narrative of the university in policy is also indicated. Subsequently, the absence of the narrative of the traditional university is challenged and findings support the view that it maintains wide availability (Martin, 2012), even in policy.

The co-existence of the two narratives of the universities – the enterprise university and the traditional university – is then outlined and considered in manifest and ideological intertextuality. In manifest intertextuality, how the narrative of the university is set in an emotional context of fear and hope, from being under threat in a global race and at the same time, within the hope of social improvement for the benefit of all. The chapter
concludes with a review of the ideological underpinning of the narrative of the university in policy. It describes two recognisable ideologemes, one is the *market*, apparently underpinning a broader public policy agenda (Kirkpatrick *et al.*, 2005; Brown, 2011). The other is the university as centre and a key part of a *civilising process*, previously identified in the mythological underpinning beneath the various and evolving narratives of the university (Nowotny *et al.*, 2001; Starkey and Madan, 2001; Barnett, 2011; Martin, 2012).

Chapter 6 presents the findings from a review of corporate documents and interviews within the two participating universities. It also presents findings from interviews with former and current national level policy-makers, involved in the research, science and innovation agenda. It looks in particular at how strategy is constructed through narrative, within the university, drawing upon the setting, in particular the policy space, in which it is produced. The chapter starts with an introduction to the two participating universities, both research-intensive but formed at different times in the early part of the twentieth century. For the purposes of the research, each is given a pseudonym that reflects a description that appears prominent in their corporate documents and which was reflective of the discussion within those interviewed in the respective universities. The first is described as a modern global university (MGU) and the second as a revitalised civic university (RCU). The dominant narrative of the enterprise university is identified in constitutive intertextuality within the university, and although this has previously implicated in policy academic research (Bridgman, 2007), this wider dominance is a new finding. The wider availability of the narrative of the traditional university is also considered (Martin, 2012). The subtle difference in how this dominance is
expressed and the availability of the non-dominant narrative of the traditional university, in each university is then discussed. The co-existence of the enterprise university and the traditional university narratives is then outlined and considered in manifest and ideological intertextuality.

Chapter 7 locates the findings in relation to the literature reviewed in Chapter 2, in a discussion, which develops the theory of strategy as an intertextual narrative. The chapter starts with a discussion on the nature of constitutive intertextuality within the setting of HE in the UK, identifying three intertextual themes – innovation, regional engagement and research excellence – within which the narrative of the university has been expressed and framed. It goes on to outline how the dominance of the narrative of the enterprise university has been enabled. A deeper analysis examining manifest intertextuality is used to show how a rhetorical emotional context of fear and hope appears to have resourced a change in predominant understanding of the university (Riad et al., 2012) in policy and in the university, outlined in constitutive intertextuality. Furthermore, the differences between public and private expressions of the university are discussed within this change of predominant understanding. The chapter concludes, from a deeper analysis of ideological intertextuality, with an explanation of the means by which the co-option of the narrative of the traditional university has been achieved, and how the dominance of the enterprise university is enabled.

Chapter 8 draws together the research findings and summarizes the theoretical contribution to understanding strategy as an intertextual narrative. It also reflects on the practical implications of the findings, particularly for those operating in pluralistic settings, and policy rich settings in general and HE, in
particular. Finally, the chapter points to a number of limitations of the study and possible future research directions.
Chapter 2: Strategy as an intertextual narrative: a research agenda from a review of the literature

2.0 Introduction

Strategy has long been considered an important aspect of organisational life and as a result has been the subject of much scholarly work. Traditional approaches have tended to treat strategy as a property of an organisation (Whittington, 2006) often at the expense of theory that provides insight into the messy organisational life within it (Jarzabkowski and Spee, 2009). Alongside these traditional approaches to strategy, a number of largely sociological responses have offered something different (Carter et al., 2008), for instance looking at how issues of power, politics (Mintzberg, 1987; Pettigrew, 1985), language, and notably narrative (Barry and Elmes, 1997) shape strategy. More recently researchers have focused on what people ‘do’ in the name of strategy and the ‘stuff’ thereby produced (Jarzabkowski, 2005; Johnson et al., 2007; Jarzabkowski and Spee, 2009) under the label ‘strategy-as-practice’ (SAP). Much of what has been studied in this new development in strategy research has been concerned with the talk and text of strategic practices (Samra-Fredericks, 2003; Laine and Vaara, 2007) thereby drawing implicitly and explicitly from wider linguistic (Czarniawska-Joerges, 1995a; 1998) and narrative traditions (Barry and Elmes, 1997). Concurrently research from what could be termed a narrative perspective (Boje, 1991; O’Connor, 2002; Brown, 2006) has also placed the text and talk of strategy (Rouse, 2007; Fenton and Langley, 2011) in the foreground.
The imperfections and shortcomings of the sociological approaches, notably the earlier focus within SAP on micro practices, have been acknowledged (Jarzabkowski and Whittington, 2008; Brown and Thompson, 2012). Nonetheless, research has widened both the scope of what constitutes strategy and consideration of the types of organisations in which strategy is practised (Vaara and Whittington, 2012). Furthermore, an understanding of strategy as a situated, multi-level, multi-actor (Jarzabkowski, 2005) and discursive activity (Fenton and Langley, 2011) has been usefully established. However, the inherent relationship between strategy at organisational level and the broader societal or macro-institutional contexts within which strategy is produced remains relatively underexplored (Jarzabkowski and Spee, 2009; Fenton and Langley, 2011; Vaara and Whittington, 2012). A more specific and recent criticism is that a better application of a narrative approach to the analysis of strategy would provide useful insight into how strategy draws upon the setting in which it is produced (Fenton and Langley, 2011; Brown and Thompson, 2012). To address this argument, it is necessary to first explore the underpinning theory of the organisation and strategy within a broadly narrative approach, particularly in relation to strategy.

2.1 A narrative approach to strategy

2.1.1 Introduction

There has been a rapid expansion of the use of narrative approaches in management and organisational theory in recent years (Czarniawska, 2004; Rhodes and Brown, 2005) built on the role of language in the constitutive construction of social reality (Wittgenstein, 1953; Berger and Luckmann, 1967;
Schutz, 1967; Rorty, 1979; Deetz, 2003). Narrative in common with the Aristotelian sense of story is understood as ‘thematic sequenced accounts [of events, experiences or actions, tied purposefully together by a plot] that convey meaning from implied author to implied reader’ (Barry and Elmes, 1997: 431). No distinction is made here between story and narrative, or other cognates such as myth, legend and saga (Brown, 2006) or the process of story telling or narration. Each is taken to be narrative since each is concerned with ‘sequenced events and plots that weave complex occurrences into meaningful wholes’ (Brown et al., 2009: 324). This centrality of meaning-making through emplotment is considered of greater significance than definitional nuance (Brown et al., 2009: 324).

Within this ‘linguistic turn’ (Czarniawska, 2004) the potential of taking a narrative approach to strategy was highlighted by Barry and Elmes (1997) who considered strategy to be somewhere between ‘theatrical drama, the historical novel, futurist fantasy and autobiography’ (1997: 433) and in whatever form ‘one of the most prominent, influential and costly [narratives] in the organisation’ (1997: 430). The divergent focus of enquiry and the choice of empirical materials by subsequent researchers is one reason why the potential of this narrative approach to the analysis of strategy has yet to be fulfilled. Much of the research citing Barry and Elmes (1997) has looked at other social constructs such as ‘identity’ or ‘change’ (Sillince, 1999; Currie and Brown, 2003; Brown and Humphreys, 2003; Humphreys and Brown, 2007) rather than ‘strategy’. The focus on these constructs and the nature of the empirical materials, often taken from within the organisation and in fine-grained analysis, has limited research into how narrative draws on the settings in which
Strategy remains an influential narrative and the question originally posed by Barry and Elmes (1997) about how strategy draws on narrative outside the organisation is still relevant.

How strategy draws on narrative outside the organisation can be framed in terms of a question of strategy as an intertextual narrative. Intertextuality is the idea that a text is relationally bound to other texts across time and space (Kristeva, 1980; Bakhtin, 1981; Fairclough, 1992: Fairclough and Wodak, 1997). Intertextuality is premised on the view that text is always in a state of production (Kristeva, 1980) in a relational dialogue (Kristeva, 1980; Bakhtin, 1981) with other texts in a ‘co-constructed (re)blending which is continuously being reconstituted’ (Keenoy and Oswick, 2003: 138). As a result ‘any text is constructed as a mosaic [and] is the absorption and transformation of another’ (Kristeva 1980: 66). This mosaic is embedded in and at the same time embeds social and historical relations across texts (Kristeva, 1980; Bakhtin, 1986; Fairclough, 1992; Riad et al., 2012). This is to understand text both in an everyday sense of a written document and the notion of text in a wider abstract sense of ‘elements mobilized in organisational communication, that have a permanence beyond the here and now’ and which include material and non-material artefacts such as ‘cultural beliefs, taken for granted rules and routines’ (Fenton and Langley, 2011: 184).

Strategy as an intertextual narrative remains relatively underexplored (Fenton and Langley, 2011: 1172). Nonetheless, two clear contributions from the expansion of a narrative approach in organisational and management theory offer a useful frame in which to examine this intertextuality. The first is the view of the organisation as a plurivocal story-telling system to order and make
meaning, in which strategy is a particular and important form of ordering. The second is the view of the organisation as a site of discursive struggle, in which strategy is both an important political resource and one that requires active and sometimes contentious construction. These contributions are discussed in the next section.

2.2.2  Theorizing organisations and strategy within a narrative approach

2.1.2.1 Organisations as plurivocal story telling systems

Organisations can be viewed as story-telling systems (Boje, 1991; Currie and Brown, 2003) where individuals construct their experiences in narrative form to represent complex patterns of human interaction (Bruner, 1991) and to make meaning (Currie and Brown, 2003; Rhodes and Brown, 2005). Narrative is a form of ‘meaning-making’ because it orders the disparate, independent and apparently unconnected elements that make up human action and events (Polkinghorne, 1988: 36). It substitutes meaning in and of events ceaselessly (Brown et al., 2009: 324), without finality (Brown, 2000) and in plurality (Currie and Brown, 2003). Narrative is critical to meaning-making in organisations because it helps ‘reduce the equivocality [complexity, ambiguity, unpredictability] of organisational life’ (Brown and Kreps, 1993: 48) for both internal and external constituencies (Boje, 1991). Narrative, in place of the endemically chaotic and disordered life in an organisation (Cooper, 1990), orders through emplotment (Rhodes and Brown, 2005) and notions of causality (Brown, 2004). Narrative ‘works to create some sense of stability, order and predictability and thereby produces a sustainable, functioning and liveable world’ (Chia, 2000: 514).
Order is partly achieved in several ways. It is achieved by selectively distilling a coherent portrait from complexity and disorder (Lounsbury and Glynn, 2001: 549). Moreover, taking clarity in one small area and through narrative, extending or imposing that clarity on another area that may be ‘less orderly’, also achieves order (Barry and Elmes, 1997: 430). This has the effect of extending reach within complexity (Rhodes and Brown, 2005: 173). Reach is also extended through reference to related norms about organisational life within narrative (Rhodes and Brown, 2005), thereby making meaning within broader strategic contexts (Dunford and Jones, 2002). Furthermore, order is achieved by reducing ‘uncertainty’ through the ‘creation of an account of a symbolic universe’ as if it were social ‘fact’ or ‘truth’ (Lounsbury and Glynn, 2001: 549) and in which narrative form or narrative style provides elements of predictability (Barry and Elmes, 1997: 437).

Strategy is a significant form of organisational ordering (Barry and Elmes, 1997). Strategy orders through interpretative framing (Goffman, 1974; Deetz, 1986; Dunford and Jones, 2000), ‘mapping’ (Barry and Elmes, 1997: 433), sequencing (Barry and Elmes, 1997), patterning a future trajectory (Tsoukas and Chia, 2002), selection and prioritisation (Fenton and Langley, 2011), and within narrative form (Barry and Elmes 1997). Strategy is a ‘developing narrative’ that ‘inscribes understandings of where the organisation has been and where it is going’ (Fenton and Langley, 2011: 1184) in an organisational template or ‘discourse of direction’ (Barry and Elmes, 1997: 432). It is this ‘direction-setting’ aspect that makes strategy particularly crucial to meaning-making in organisations. Strategy also serves to frame the way people understand and act with respect to an issue, making meaning within
broader strategic contexts (Dunford and Jones, 2002). In this way strategy is a key form of ‘reality’ mapping (Currie and Brown, 2003) and addresses an organisation’s key problem, which is as ‘much one of creating an inviting cartographic text as it is one of highlighting the right path’ (Barry and Elmes, 1997: 433).

Organisations are also essentially plurivocal or many-voiced storytelling systems with ‘as many narratives as actors’ (Rhodes and Brown, 2005) that produce both different organisational realities that exist simultaneously (Boje et al., 1999) and, some would argue, organisations themselves in ‘multidiscursive and precarious effect’ (Law, 1994: 250). This persistent plurality of different linguistic constructions (Carter et al., 2003: 295) produces ‘the simultaneous existence of differing and sequentially occurring vocalities’ (Humphreys and Brown, 2008: 405) that is understood as polyphony (Hazen, 1993) and is always present in organisations. Polyphony results from and is expressed in the exchange of both fully formed narrative and ‘fragments of stories, bits and pieces told here and there, to varying audiences’ (Boje, 2001: 5) in partial or incomplete narrative within the organisation. This exchange is ‘[an] interplay of centripetal (centering) forces and centrifugal (de-centering) forces of language’ (Boje, 2008: 194) known as heteroglossia (Bakhtin, 1981). Within heteroglossia, centripetal forces attempt to centralise meaning and centrifugal forces invoke ‘a multi-vocal discourse that opposes the centralising imposition of the monological world’ (Rhodes, 2001: 231).

Strategy is similarly plurivocal. It is actively constructed by multiple and interconnected ‘narrators’ (Barry and Elmes, 1997), it does not arise from monological authorship but in dialogical exchange (Barry and Elmes, 1997;
Currie and Brown, 2003) through discursive activity in competition (Rhodes and Brown, 2005). This exchange is *heteroglossic* interplay (Bakhtin, 1981; Vaara and Tienari, 2011) of ‘stories, contexts and audiences that lead to on-going and unending construction of meaning’ (Clegg *et al*., 2013: 555). Strategy made in this heteroglossic exchange is *polyphonic*. This exchange is not always benign since organisations are also sites of contest.

2.1.2.2 Organisations as sites of discursive contest

Organisations can be viewed not simply as social collectives where shared meaning is produced (Mumby and Clair, 1997: 182) in benign dialogical exchange, but as discursive spaces or even ‘sites of struggle’ (Hardy and Phillips, 1999; Hardy *et al*., 2000) where meaning is contested (Hardy *et al*., 2000) and where there is ‘a constant struggle for interpretive control’ (Brown, 2000: 67-68; Boje, 2008).

Narratives, as well as discursively constructing organisations, also offer a significant means by which they are ‘reconstructed as regimes of ‘truth’ […] dramatizing control and compelling belief, whilst shielding truth claims from testing and debating’ and as such are ‘potent political forms’ (Rhodes and Brown, 2005: 174) and legitimating devices (Brown, 1994; Suchman, 1995). Narrative can be used differentially to privilege certain interests at the expense of others (Humphreys and Brown, 2007) or certain accounts at the expense of others (Brown, 2000). Narrative can draw from politically and ideologically constructed settings, in ways that reinforce the ‘taken-for-granted’ nature of a dominant ideology (Greckhamer, 2010) extending the influence of that ideology. Narrative is critical to the expression and exercise of power in organisations, because it helps to create a sense of acceptance or legitimacy.
(Vaara et al., 2006) for the organisation or its activities (Brown, 1994; Suchman, 1995). Although, narrative can also serve as a limit to attempts at control, not least in counter-narratives that question the acceptance of the dominant narrative (Currie and Brown, 2003).

The place where meaning is contested and where there is a constant struggle for interpretative control, and where narrative is political, is the place where strategy is practised and produced (Fisher, 1984) through ‘texts’ (Barry et al., 2006). As a result, strategy may become a complex process of negotiation, where emerging narratives must be ‘wordsmithed’ to enable apparent cohesion (Fenton and Langley, 2011: 1182). This wordsmithing involves pulling together disparate and at times competing narratives in a ‘multi-storied process’ (Buchanan and Dawson, 2007: 680; Fenton and Langley, 2011; Brown and Thompson, 2012). This negotiation is often concerned with ‘surfacing, legitimizing, and juxtaposing differing organisational stories’ (Barry and Elmes, 1997: 444) within the polyphony of strategy, listening for diverse ‘points of view’ and ‘representing these in ways that generate dialogic understanding’ (Barry and Elmes, 1997: 444) and acceptance. It is done judiciously (Brown, 1998), and creatively (Brown, 2000), albeit at times unconsciously (Vaara et al., 2006). It is also done in a way which may allow for ‘ambiguity’ (Vaara et al., 2004) where the texts produced, however apparently cohesive, can be left open to different interpretations (Fenton and Langley, 2011: 1182).

2.1.3 Summary

Drawing together the complementary ways in which organisation and strategy have been theorised, it is argued that organisations are story-telling systems,
where a multiplicity of voices exists in perpetual plurality, making up and shaping organisational reality. Meaning is made through narrative to tame the contingency of social life, and to make order. Strategy as a ‘multi-storied process’ (Buchanan and Dawson, 2007: 680) is a significant form of organisational ordering. Strategy is actively constructed and made in dialogical heteroglossic exchange involving the use and mobilisation of narrative. This narrative is fragmented and disparate and at times competing (Currie and Brown, 2003). The active construction of strategy is made in political negotiation (Rhodes and Brown, 2005) and as polyphony has within it many differing stories (Barry and Elmes, 1997). Strategy is not made in isolation but draws upon narratives from the wider organisational environment or setting (Fenton and Langley, 2011; Vaara and Whittington, 2012) and is relationally dependent on that setting (Bakhtin, 1981: 338). In this way strategy is defined as a situated multi-level, multi-actor discursive activity that is socially accomplished through narrative (Barry and Elmes, 1997; Fenton and Langley, 2011) and is fundamentally an intertextual narrative (Bakhtin, 1981; Kristeva, 1986).

2.2 **Strategy as an intertextual narrative**

2.2.1 **Introduction**

There are limitations to the understanding of strategy as an intertextual narrative (Bakhtin, 1981; Kristeva, 1986; Fairclough, 1992; Fairclough and Wodak, 1997) or how strategy socially accomplished through narrative draws on and influences the setting in which it is produced (Fenton and Langley, 2011; Vaara and Whittington, 2012). Fenton and Langley’s (2011) proposal to
interrogate and apply the concept of narrative infrastructure provides a way forward. This proposal together with consideration of the political nature of intertextuality (Brown, 2000) is reviewed in the next section. Existing studies that have examined strategy as an intertextual accomplishment and which usefully have been premised on some of the key elements of the concept of narrative infrastructure, often without specifically addressing it, are also reviewed here. This review is designed to offer some insight into the usefulness of the concept of narrative infrastructure and the current limitations in related research.

2.2.2 The concept of narrative infrastructure

2.2.2.1 Outline of the concept

The concept of narrative infrastructure grounded in narrative ideas and first developed to explore product development processes (Deuten and Rip, 2000), has recently been identified as useful in examining a narrative approach to the analysis of strategy (Fenton and Langley, 2011). Embedded within narrative are narrative building blocks: basic units or themes which can be taken up in further narrative to become an accepted ingredient and ‘because of their being accepted, orient further action and interaction in the setting (and across its boundaries)’ (Deuten and Rip, 2000: 74). The cumulative effect of the ‘take-up’ of different units or narrative building blocks within narrative and ‘by actors in their material and social settings’ is the creation of ‘an evolving aggregation […] of a narrative infrastructure’ (Deuten and Rip, 2000: 74). The concept of narrative infrastructure offers a useful way of ‘operationalizing and understanding the broader notion of strategy emerging from and constructed by
narrative’ (Fenton and Langley, 2011: 1184). It comprises two interrelated ideas, which are outlined below.

The first idea is that it is ‘through the interaction of multiple levels of narrative among different people at different times’ understood as intertextuality, that ‘an overall thrust and direction’ of strategy may emerge (Fenton and Langley, 2011: 1185). This intertextuality embeds and builds up wider and norming social and historic relations within strategy in ways that engender mutual commitments to ‘which subsequent [narrative] becomes entrained’ or ‘pulled along after itself’ (Fenton and Langley, 2011: 1185). This intertextuality creates thrust and direction because of the way it provides an obliging guide to individuals and organisations.

The second and related idea concerns a useful way of viewing the relationship between narrative and human agency within narrative infrastructure (Fenton and Langley, 2011). This is based on the central idea that narrative does not just describe action but it is constitutive of it (Czarniawska, 1997) i.e. narrative has the power ‘to establish or give organised existence’ (OED, 2013) to action. Narrative provides the obliging guide and does so in a way by which individuals and organisations become ‘actors in their own stories’ (Fenton and Langley, 2011: 1186). Guidance and obligation is increased, but never completely determined, in intertextuality that includes ‘shared experiences and mutual commitments and understandings from previous encounters’ (Fenton and Langley, 2011: 1186) and essentially helps ‘to construct prospective narrative’ or a way of ‘telling yourself forward’ (Deuten and Rip, 2000: 85). When ‘narrative is recognised as constitutive of action, [narrative] becomes more than a tool [it] shapes organisational
landscape [in the form of a narrative infrastructure]’ (Deuten and Rip, 2000: 72). Further, when a narrative infrastructure evolves ‘actors become characters that cannot easily change their identity and role by their own initiative’ (Deuten and Rip, 2000: 74).

It is worth noting again here that strategy does not simply draw upon narratives from the wider organisational environment in a neutral attempt to make meaning or create order; strategy draws upon narratives from its environment or setting in political negotiation (Brown, 2006: 736). The work of Andrew Brown, particularly on the post-hoc political framing of disaster events, e.g. the Allitt Inquiry into attacks on children on Ward 4 at Grantham and Kesteven Hospital in the UK (Brown, 2000); the Cullen Report of the Piper Alpha disaster (Brown, 2004); and the inquiry into the Barings Bank collapse (Brown, 2005), offers insight here. Brown identified that narrative is framed in an artful way, creating a ‘truthful account’ (Brown, 2004) or even a ‘dominant mythological’ (Brown, 2000) account as an exercise in social control within a broader effort of de-politicisation of the events studied (Brown, 2000; 2004; 2005). This is done by drawing upon wider narrative forms and ‘genres’ in the construction of ‘texts’ to support ‘authoritative’ (Brown, 2004; 2005) or ‘absolving’ (Brown, 2000) voice and reading. De-politicisation is achieved in part by the authorial strategy deployed which centres on normalisation, observation and absolution to create a rhetorical and verisimilitudinous artefact (Brown, 2000: 45). Moreover, the fiction clearly created (Brown, 2000; 2004; 2005) both ameliorates anxiety provoked by the original disaster event and over-emphasises notions of control. Similarly, strategy as an intertextual narrative (Fenton and Langley, 2011) may be styled
as a benign exchange, an attempt to listen for diverse ‘points of view’, ‘representing these in ways that generate dialogic understanding’ (Barry and Elmes, 1997: 444). Strategy is nonetheless in this intertextuality an exercise in de-politicisation (Buchanan and Dawson, 2007; Kornberger and Clegg, 2011).

Outside the broad treatment of narrative and structure in the work of Dunford and Jones (2000) and Llewellyn (2001), few studies have explicitly focused on the development of a narrative infrastructure. However, there have been some interesting considerations of intertextuality, and discourse and narrative as dualities of structure and agency implicit in the concept of narrative infrastructure, which offer development of that concept and in a way which also builds on the work of Deuten and Rip (2000).

2.2.2.2 Overview of existing studies

Studies that have addressed strategy as an intertextual narrative are first outlined here and then common themes between the studies are considered.

In their study of three distinctly different companies responding to structural change in their respective contexts or markets, through reform or deregulation in particular, Dunford and Jones (2000) showed that organisational narratives drew on the settings in which they are produced and connected, often through managers expressing cultural repertoires from broader contexts.

Llewellyn (2001) in a case study of a modernisation project in a local council studied more explicitly the inter-relationship between the narrative of modernisation expressed within central government narrative, and the individual narrative accounts constructed in the project of modernisation at local level. Llewellyn demonstrated that an apparently chaotic picture of
project implementation was in fact ‘patterned by pervasive and largely stable deep structures that guide the course of events through their effects on agents’ interpretations and [discursive] action’ (Llewellyn, 2001: 775).

Eero Vaara and colleagues, among others, have looked broadly at intertextuality, particularly in public through studies of media texts, in their studies of mergers and acquisitions (Vaara, 2002; Vaara and Tienari, 2002; Tienari et al., 2003; Vaara, et al., 2006; Vaara and Tienari, 2011; Riad et al., 2012), including a merger that failed to materialise (Vaara and Monin, 2010), alliances (Vaara et al., 2004), and contentious closures (Erkama and Vaara, 2010). Mergers are typically based on ‘a description of an original state of affairs and a new transformed state’ (Vaara, 2002: 217) displaying a stylised notion of the past, present and future, in a similar way to the ‘discourse of direction’ in strategy more broadly. Vaara and colleagues demonstrated how strategy draws upon narrative structure and in ways that can determine direction, limit critical appraisal and increase thrust (Vaara, 2002; Vaara et al., 2006; Vaara and Monin, 2010; Riad et al., 2012). They have examined strategy in these cases broadly as exercises in building legitimacy, particularly in public and have accessed sets of discursive practices deployed by different stakeholders, including journalists as well as managers, most during or after a strategic event such as a merger. Legitimacy is taken to mean a ‘discursively created sense of acceptance in specific discourses or orders of discourse’ (Vaara et al., 2006: 793). In this location of strategy as a political construction through text and a focus on the sense of acceptance of a particular text in the broadest sense of the word (Fenton and Langley, 2011) they echo the work of Andrew Brown (2000; 2005; 2006). One key difference is that they considered
texts that were produced at the time, unlike inquiry reports that were produced post-hoc.

Heracleous and colleagues (2001) have also looked broadly at intertextuality in their studies of risk-placing in the then recently de-regulated London insurance market, surviving a financial crisis (Heracleous and Barrett, 2001) and change in a global human resources consulting firm (People Associates (PA)) (Heracleous, 2006). They found that certain structural features were implicit in surface expressions of communication and were persistently employed in the communication of different actors in different situations and at different times. It was this deeper structure, which made sense of the otherwise diverse and complex organising patterns and which, it became clear, provided a guide to action. The deeper structure and the surface communication were dynamically interrelated in a way that would be recognised as intertextual. Further, they find that intertextuality is recursively linked through ‘the modality of actors’ interpretive schemes’ (Heracleous and Barrett, 2001: 1060). What they mean is that actors draw on interpretative schemes, defined as ‘shared, fundamental [though often implicit] assumptions about why events happen as they do and how people are to act in different situations’ (Bartunek, 1984: 355), or shared meanings (Kuhn, 1970), to help make sense of text and to give it meaning. The interaction with text also reproduces and/or modifies the interpretative schemes that are embedded in social structure (Bartunek, 1984).

What these studies have in common is their attempt to work within and between different methodological levels, the meso-level narratives or discursive patterns within organisational settings and the macro-level, those
broader meta-based institutional and social themes. What is apparent is that strategy draws on broader narrative structures within the organisational setting (Dunford and Jones, 2000; Heracleous and Barnett, 2001; Vaara, 2002; Heracleous, 2006; Vaara et al., 2006; Riad et al., 2012) enabling strategy to be positioned in a particular context and that context to be positioned in strategy (Deuten and Rip, 2000; Heracleous and Barnett, 2001; Vaara, 2002; Heracleous, 2006; Vaara et al., 2006; Riad et al., 2012). At a collective level, this positioning is done through narrative building blocks which act as signposts to a general direction (Llewellyn, 2001; Heracleous and Barnett, 2001; Vaara, 2002; Heracleous, 2006; Vaara et al., 2006; Riad et al., 2012). These narrative structures are similarly expressed through building blocks at different levels in ways that ‘enshrine central themes [with] both normative and positive effects on their social context’ (Heracleous, 2006: 1060) and in a way that enables strategy, in terms of thrust and direction (Fenton and Langley, 2011).

### 2.2.3 The enabling and constraining role of narrative building blocks

#### 2.2.3.1 Overview

Many narrative building blocks were identified in the existing studies. These include deregulation (Dunford and Jones, 2001), modernisation (Llewellyn, 2001), globalisation (Heracleous and Barnett, 2001; Vaara, 2002; Vaara et al., 2006; Erkama and Vaara, 2010; Riad et al., 2012) and the market; even a future envisioned one (Vaara and Monin, 2010) and one in a fragmented form (Vaara and Tienari, 2011). The interaction between multiple levels of narrative is also well documented in existing studies, as is the view that it is this interaction that creates thrust and direction in strategy, for example in a merger
or acquisition (Vaara and Tienari, 2002; Riad et al., 2012), an alliance between independent companies (Vaara et al., 2004), the introduction of electronic risk-placing in the London insurance market in the City (Heracleous and Barrett, 2001) or the modernisation of a local council (Llewellyn, 2001). However, what is theoretically significant from these studies is that the thrust and direction of strategy are enabled and constrained through the availability of particular building blocks and through resonance of those particular building blocks. These features are explored in the next section.

2.2.3.2 Availability of narrative building blocks

From the existing studies the thrust and direction of strategy is enabled through intertextuality of available narrative building blocks (Llewellyn, 2001; Vaara, 2002; Heracleous, 2006). This makes sense because narrative building blocks must first be available to be put into effect or used. Availability can simply be the result of the dominance of particular building blocks, their dominance not just as a sign of ubiquity, but also a signal of pre-eminence. This dominance is significant because it can limit the availability of alternative narrative building blocks (Vaara, 2002; Vaara et al., 2004; Vaara and Monin, 2010) simplifying and constraining direction and at the same time increasing thrust, by constraining the potential drag from those alternatives.

Dominant narrative building blocks

In a case study of three organisations, each responding to de-regulation in the market economy, Dunford and Jones (2000) identified that strategic narratives within each company connected ‘intra-organisational practices to a key societal theme in the economic restructuring of the country’ (2000: 1223). For Dunford and Jones (2000) a government department’s narrative of
‘thinking like a business’ was playing out a broader societal narrative that occurs in de-regulated contexts. Dunford and Jones (2000) imply that dominance of this broader narrative drowned out any alternative.

In his study, Llewellyn (2001) found that the overarching and dominant modernisation narrative itself imposed a basic structure that constrained local actors. Any local claims of progress had to fit into this overarching narrative and it was this ‘fit’ that created thrust and direction. Llewellyn bases his understanding on the idea that once basic assumptions become embedded in narrative, the effect of the narrative stories can be constraining, thus limiting the options that appear to be available (Berger and Luckmann, 1967). Llewellyn also identified a narrative infrastructure of ‘public service’. However, he assumed the hidden ‘soft’ power of the government narrative of ‘modernisation’ to be preeminent without exploring how traditional notions of bureaucracy were being resourced among non-managers, in the wider organisation.

Unlike Dunford and Jones (2000) and Llewellyn, (2001), Heracleous (2006) in his longitudinal study of change in a global consulting firm, sought to pay more attention to both the potential interrelations among different modes of discourse and the constructive potential of those modes on their settings or contexts. He revealed three modes of discourse: the dominant discourse, the strategic change discourse and the marginalised counter-discourse, and showed their interrelation through deeper structural features transcending individual texts (Heracleous, 2006). However, echoing Llewellyn (2001) it is a dominant mode of discourse which forms ‘an overarching structure where other discourses must be located if they are to be taken seriously by those in power.
and by the members of the dominant sub-culture’ (Heracleous, 2006: 1080). In other words, communicative actions may be implicated in different terms, ‘success’, ‘adding value to clients’ or ‘undertaking strategic change’, but each had entrenched and shared structural features of a ‘means/ends relationship’ maintaining thrust and direction. The counter-discourse that had no such dominant structural underpinning was not enabling and as a result it was an ineffective counter-weight, offering little resistance to the direction or drag on the thrust of strategy.

In historical case studies of a number of mergers and alliances each primarily, although not exclusively through media texts, Eero Vaara and colleagues also found that a number of particular and to some extent common discursive characteristics or types with structural elements underpinned the respective narrative. They found that despite being only one of four discursive ‘types’ it was the ‘rationalistic’ discursive ‘type’ that was often dominant (Vaara, 2002; Vaara and Tienari, 2002) drawing as it did from a structural framework of ‘global capitalism’ (Vaara, 2002: 225). This dominance and its structural underpinning tended to offer ‘few possibilities for plurivocal or critical interpretations’ and ‘a specific tendency to hide internal politics among the decision-makers’ (Vaara, 2002: 238). This is echoed in their study of the alliance between European airlines (Vaara et al., 2004: 25). Here, it was lack of availability or access to alternatives, also due to the dominance of the ‘rationalistic’ discursive type, which further ‘naturalised’ alliance as the strategic direction. The effect of this dominance was to make a particular direction a question not of ‘if’ but ‘when’, to reduce or suppress plurivocality and thereby increase thrust.
Moreover, they found that the dominant structural underpinning of a narrative could also limit the critical appraisal of strategy in the wider setting (Vaara and Tienari, 2002). This was also the case in the failed merger between two pharmaceutical companies, where lack of availability also reduced critical appraisal and the faculty of critical appraisal of strategic direction (Vaara and Monin, 2010). Furthermore, this critical capacity was reduced at the time of the merger and to the extent of not providing an alternative frame for the post-hoc evaluation of that ‘failure’ (Vaara and Monin, 2010).

What the research has shown is that dominant narrative building blocks gained greater dominance by being used repeatedly, making multiple and deeper connections between texts and thereby securing even wider availability through repetition (Vaara, 2002; Vaara and Tienari, 2002; Vaara and Monin, 2010). In other cases this repetition was not enough to secure and maintain the dominance of certain narrative building blocks, dominance could only be maintained by co-opting the alternative in a way that framed all available building blocks within the dominant narrative (Llewellyn, 2001; Heracleous, 2006).

*Non-dominant building blocks*

There were many non-dominant building blocks available in the settings studied. Within some studies these alternatives have simply not been adequately addressed (Dunford and Jones, 2001; Llewellyn, 2001) whilst in others, these building blocks have been seen to resource a resistance to strategy and limiting thrust and direction, both successfully (Heracleous and Barrett, 2001) and unsuccessfully (Heracleous, 2006). This is to recognise that availability is also dependent on access.
In most studies it was only managers who could adequately resource strategy using non-dominant narrative building blocks. They did this by co-opting rather than subsuming or denying the alternative building block to enable thrust and direction (Vaara and Tienari, 2002). Thus, in positive promotion of the bank merger, managers accessed the cultural narrative framework, framing the merger in the narrative as a positive new culture rather than as the loss of a valuable old one (Vaara and Tienari, 2002: 291). This co-opting is also seen in other later studies, for instance with the co-opting of cultural or societal frameworks previously used to challenge a cross-border merger in the paper and pulp industry (Vaara, *et al*., 2006). Interestingly, these cultural and societal frameworks were particularly heavily deployed in the media and so had a ubiquity, which could not be ignored or to put it another way, as a result of this ubiquity there was a lack of potential reciprocity for the dominant ‘rationalistic’ discursive type in exchange between levels. However, despite this ubiquity non-dominant actors could not easily access them (Vaara and Tienari, 2002; Vaara *et al*., 2006).

What this suggests is that strategy is enabled by privileged access to particular building blocks and subsequent co-option of those building blocks (Vaara and Tienari, 2002; Vaara *et al*., 2006; Riad *et al*., 2012). As a result, the co-opting of non-dominant narrative building blocks could enable thrust and direction if the co-option was in the political control of the dominant actors in the setting and if required to counteract the intrinsic constraining effect of non-dominant building blocks.
2.2.3.3 Resonance of narrative building blocks

Existing studies have shown that availability of narrative building blocks and access to that availability whether ubiquitous or otherwise, is crucial. Moreover it is proposed that availability has an important concomitant in intertextuality, namely resonance.

Previous studies have already identified the importance of legitimacy in intertextuality (Brown, 1994; Suchman, 1995; Heracleous, 2006). Indeed the discursive process of legitimisation within intertextuality has been a central tenet of much of the work reviewed here (Vaara, 2002; Vaara and Tienari, 2002; Vaara et al., 2006). However, a focus on resonance rather than simply legitimacy gives an opportunity for a wider contribution of those studies to understanding strategy as an intertextual narrative. As previously highlighted, legitimacy has already been located as discursively constituted where discourse and the characteristics of discourse define what is legitimate, by creating a sense of acceptance (Vaara et al., 2006: 793). Acceptance, particularly in the contested arena of organisational life is not straightforward, nor is it to be understood to be particularly tacit or notably unachievable. It is however based on a key assumption. Acceptance assumes that in any text in the broadest sense, the reader has a role (Eco, 1981). What creates acceptance in a specific discourse or narrative building block from the reader’s perspective is whether they find some resonance with the message conveyed or the meaning constructed (Eco, 1981). As pointed out by Fenton and Langley, (2011: 1175) resonance in narrative has two components, ‘probability’ or a condition of internal coherence and consistency and ‘fidelity’ or a condition of correspondence, an acceptance by the reader that the narrative corresponds to
their sense of values and understanding of the world (Fisher, 1984). This resonance is an echo that reverberates or ‘sounds’ as ‘true’ (Brown, 1990) and is understood as a relational accomplishment of mutual trust and understanding in that ‘echoing’. In this sense resonance rather than just legitimacy, is considered as the key component of intertextuality.

Existing studies have shown that resonance is important even given the predominance of narrative building blocks or of building blocks being in the political control of dominant actors. Dominance and reciprocity in exchange between levels does not necessarily or simply equate to resonance, particularly where there are multiple and competing narrative building blocks (Llewellyn, 2001; Tienari et al., 2003; Vaara et al., 2004; Vaara et al., 2006; Heracleous, 2006). What has been shown is that resonance is something that is formed through framing (Heracleous and Barrett, 2001; Vaara and Monin, 2010).

Framing which achieves resonance

Framing which achieves resonance was apparent in the study of the ‘unthinkable union’ in the pulp and paper industry, where media text represented ‘authorities’ in ‘the market’ or ‘an individual expert’ (Vaara et al., 2006: 799). This was also evident in the case of the strategic alliance of airlines where rationalisation of the benefits of the alliance became ‘objectified’ as fact and where the dominant direction was disassociated from any problems of implementation (Vaara et al., 2004). This builds resonance in a similar way to public inquiry authoring (Brown, 2004), i.e. as exemplar attempts to resonate the actions and interests of different, mainly dominant groups, through the construction of a narrative ameliorating anxieties ‘by elaborating fantasies of omnipotence and control’ (Brown, 2000: 46).
A corollary of this type of framing is that which negates the resonance of alternative building blocks by aggravating fears. In this way, a traditional narrative drawing on a narrative building block of society that had resonance is framed using the dominant narrative building block of globalisation in a way that made ‘the traditional a problem’ (Vaara et al., 2004). As a result, alternative strategies were under-explored and overall thrust and direction maintained even when detrimental or clearly failing (Vaara et al., 2004). This echoes the earlier work of Llewellyn (2001) where traditional practice clashed with modernisation or where any change failed to live up to the prospective narrative, each was re-storied as ‘growth and learning’ thereby maintaining resonance (Llewellyn, 2001: 35).

In some cases this negation was not enough, rather the ‘reframing’ had to include the co-opting of the competitive narrative to be resonant (Vaara and Tienari, 2002; Vaara et al., 2006; Riad et al., 2012). Where broader concerns of the consumer and society such as ‘employment, ownership and competition’ within a societal narrative framework (Vaara and Tienari, 2002: 293) were heavily deployed in the media and in direct competition with an apparent dominant narrative in order to maintain resonance, framing started to include all the structural elements ‘in play’. Similarly, in their study of an acquisition of a US iconic company by a relatively unknown Chinese competitor, the hostile framing of the acquisition in the US media was re-framed in the Chinese media, as a ‘peaceful rising’ and ‘going out’ rather than a threat to US security and economy (Riad et al., 2012: 131).

More commonly, where there were multiple and competing building blocks, resonance was achieved in a framing that left open the possibility of
interpretation in two or more ways and was therefore helpfully ambiguous. For instance, Tienari et al. (2003) in their study of a cross-border financial services merger showed that strategic actors drew on different elements within the narrative structure even when contradictory and even at the same time. The discursive move could ‘appear hypocritical […] especially in retrospect’, although this was not considered to be deliberate, but rather an unintended consequence of a media strategy (Tienari et al., 2003: 391). Vaara et al. (2004) also showed how within the narrative structure there was a framing that was ambiguous and that the ‘fixation of ambiguous […] concerns’ was even a ‘normal state of affairs’ (Vaara et al., 2004: 28). Here, the use of the ambiguous notion of ‘independence’ alongside a countervailing notion of ‘rational’ in the discourse around the airline alliances should not be dismissed as a curious feature of airline alliances as they came in to being, but is potentially an institutionalised characteristic of intertextuality in circumstances where there were many and different resonant building blocks (Vaara et al., 2004: 28). They go on to argue that ambiguity within narrative can create positive dialectics and thereby produce healthy tensions, as was the case when alliances were being formed. Furthermore, this ambiguity only becomes problematic in contested space of organisational control or coordination, creating organisational tensions (Vaara et al., 2004).

However, in contrast to Vaara and Tienari (2002), Heracleous and Barrett (2001) found that where there was a tense standoff between equally resonant but competing building blocks, narrative was not framed in a way that enabled a conjoining resonance. In their study of the introduction of electronic risk-placing they found that there was little option to co-opt the competing
narrative building blocks contingently or otherwise, because these were out of the political control of the dominant actors, in this case the management. Furthermore, in direct contrast to Llewellyn (2001) for the non-dominant actors, the individual brokers, the narrative building block of ‘tradition’ was both available and not subsumed; it resourced both on-going resistance to modernisation and the subversion of strategic direction, constraining thrust in a way that allowed for the continuation of ‘paper’-based practices (Heracleous and Barrett, 2001).

However, what Heracleous and Barrett (2001) point to is something that is consistent across the studies rather than something that is unique to their study. Narrative infrastructure is a deep communicative structure that is relatively stable over time, having existed for a long time and having an on-going ‘potency in structuring communicative actions’ (Llewellyn, 2001: 773). Nonetheless this structure whilst stable can also shift over time, where potentially conflicting deep structures could assert themselves in different ways under different contextual conditions (Llewellyn, 2001: 774). This potential for reassertion means that any thrust and direction created through intertextuality has fragility. In this way, Heracleous and Barrett (2001) can be re-interpreted as a study where this fragility was shown as present rather than as temporarily ameliorated, as may be the case in other studies.

2.2.4 A conceptual framework

The studies reviewed here have offered something to the understanding of ‘narrative infrastructure’ as ‘the rails, along which multi-actor and multi-level processes gain thrust and direction’ (Deuten and Rip, 2000: 74). Deuten and Rip have also developed the notion of how ‘telling yourself forward’ (2000:
85) or ‘prospective’ narrative is constrained and enabled by narrative infrastructure. From these studies, strategy as an intertextual narrative has been conceptualised as follows and illustrated in Figure 1.

Figure 1   Strategy as an intertextual narrative

Direction and thrust of strategy emerge through the interaction of multiple levels of narrative among different people at different times (Fenton and Langley, 2011: 1185) in plurivocality (represented by multi-actor and multi-level boxes in Figure 1) and drawing upon constructed notions of the past, present and future (Czarniawska, 2004) or in temporality, as a ‘horizon of expectation’ (Ricoeur, 1984) (represented by past, present and future boxes in Figure 1), in particular social context. This intertextuality constrains and enables strategy as a prospective narrative, engendering and entraining commitment without completely determining it (Fenton and Langley, 2011). It is the combination of the availability and resonance of narrative building
blocks (illustrated in the dark grey boxes toward the right of the diagram in Figure 1) that offers an explanation of thrust and direction of strategy as an intertextual narrative. However, availability and resonance are not benignly extant, rather each is framed (also illustrated in the dark grey boxes in Figure 1) in intertextuality often as a political resource, notably where there are competing and equally resonant narrative building blocks. Framing in this sense is understood as a means of directing or focussing attention on narrative building blocks enabling both take up and acceptance in further narrative, supporting centralisation of meaning in heteroglossia (illustrated within the white box representing intertextuality in the centre of Figure 1) at the heart of intertextuality. The apparent ubiquity of particular building blocks frames them as pre- eminent. This pre-eminence excludes or limits the availability of other narrative building blocks. Pre-eminence enables focus on a particular direction and at the same time restricts the possibility of an alternative direction or even the critical consideration of an alternative direction. This constraint is more likely to enable thrust, because alternatives are thereby not enabled and do not then provide drag. Resonance is also framed in a conjoining way that encourages take-up, particularly if authoritative or in a way that reduces anxiety or concern. This can also be done through the negation of otherwise available and resonant narrative building blocks or through co-opting these alternatives to reconcile competition. Often conjoining resonance is framed in ways that leave open multiple possible interpretations and ambiguity (Czarniawska-Joerges, 1995a: 15). However, availability and resonance can also support resistance in a way that constrains both direction and thrust, particularly if intertextuality does not reciprocally constitute the activities of
practitioners (Deuten and Rip, 2000). In this case, multi-vocal forces that oppose the centralisation of meaning in heteroglossia come into play. Narrative infrastructure is built up over time, within intertextuality and in aggregation of that intertextuality, including the repeated use of narrative building blocks and strategy. This narrative infrastructure is represented by the surrounding dotted line in Figure 1.

The existing studies offer much to develop an understanding of strategy as an intertextual narrative, particularly in contentious circumstances. However, the intertextuality studied has had a particular focus; it has been tangibly time-bound and dominated by examination of intertextuality that was often reciprocal. The theoretical consequence of this focus is considered in the next section.

### 2.2.5 Intertextuality in existing studies

#### 2.2.5.1 Overview

The nature of intertextuality at the heart of these studies is outlined in Table 1, in terms of the strategy, which is being observed (‘event’), the types of texts studied, whether within the ‘event’ there is disagreement in public, whether the future is openly declared as a discourse of direction, where the main location of any debate is located and whether the voices in the debate are single or multiple. This offers an analysis of the nature of the plurivocality and temporality that has been studied to date. The time frame of that strategy (or ‘event’) is reviewed and assessed as to whether it offers a narrow or wide ‘horizon of expectation’ (Koselleck, 1985).
Most studies have been conducted in event settings (Table 1) such as mergers and acquisitions (Vaara, 2002; Vaara and Tienari, 2002; Tienari et al., 2003; Vaara et al., 2006; Vaara and Monin, 2010; Vaara and Tienari, 2011; Riad et al., 2012), closures (Vaara and Tienari, 2008; Erkama and Tienari, 2010) and project implementations (Dunford and Jones, 2000; Llewellyn, 2001; Heracleous and Barrett, 2001), which were overtly contentious. Many of the mergers and acquisitions involved merging or acquiring cross-national organisations, often in novel (Vaara, 2003; Vaara and Monin, 2010) or ‘unthinkable’ (Vaara et al., 2006) and ‘unprecedented’, ‘unions’ (Riad et al., 2012). Closures are by their very nature contentious (Vaara, 2002; Vaara and Tienari, 2008; Erkama and Vaara, 2010). The modernisation project in one council was in direct conflict with the traditional notions of strategic practice (Llewellyn, 2001), in a similar way to the introduction of electronic risk-placing in the London insurance market in the City (Heracleous and Barrett, 2001) and also in the case of de-regulation (Dunford and Jones, 2000). Furthermore, these circumstances were also ones where the ‘event’ horizon (Table 1) was relatively short and all-consuming, for instance from announcement to merger or acquisition or shutdown in under two years (Vaara and Tienari, 2002; Vaara, 2002; Vaara et al., 2006; Vaara and Tienari, 2008; Riad et al., 2012), or unavoidable and an immediate response to de-regulation (Dunford and Jones, 2000), new practices (Heracleous and Barrett, 2001) or proposed alliance (Vaara et al., 2004).
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Research</th>
<th>Event</th>
<th>Time-Frame</th>
<th>Texts</th>
<th>Voices studied</th>
<th>Voices studied</th>
<th>Future openly declared</th>
<th>Horizon of expectation</th>
<th>Plurivocality</th>
<th>Reach observed</th>
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<tr>
<td>Danford and Jones, 2000</td>
<td>Market de-regulation. Three organisations.</td>
<td>Artificial. Delineated to immediate response to de-regulation, one to two year time-frame</td>
<td>Interviews with key actors</td>
<td>Internal singular</td>
<td>Internal singular</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>Narrow</td>
<td>Singular</td>
<td>Private</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Llewellyn, 2001</td>
<td>Modernization project. One organisation.</td>
<td>Artificial. Delineated to life-time of one project, two year time-frame</td>
<td>Corporate documents; related to the project; interviews with key actors</td>
<td>Internal singular</td>
<td>Internal singular</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>Narrow</td>
<td>Singular</td>
<td>Private</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Heracleous and Barrett, 2001</td>
<td>New working practice within City, following de-regulation</td>
<td>Delineated to project introduction. Five years, between introduction and abandonment</td>
<td>Corporate documents; internal documents; interviews with key actors; observations</td>
<td>Internal multiple</td>
<td>Internal multiple</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Narrow</td>
<td>Multiple</td>
<td>Public</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Vaara, 2002</td>
<td>Mergers and Acquisitions. Eight organisations.</td>
<td>Delineated to merger/acquisition. Six that were acquired within two-year periods; one that was acquired twice in four years; one that was acquired then rationalised in three years</td>
<td>Media texts (business); corporate documents; internal documents; interviews</td>
<td>Internal singular</td>
<td>Internal singular</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Narrow</td>
<td>Singular</td>
<td>Public</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Vaara and Tienari, 2002</td>
<td>Two mergers and one acquisition</td>
<td>Delineated. From announcement to merger, under two years (1995-9)</td>
<td>Media texts (business and daily)</td>
<td>External expert, general</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Narrow</td>
<td>Singular</td>
<td>Public</td>
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<tr>
<td>Tienari et al., 2003</td>
<td>One acquisition</td>
<td>Delineated. From announcement to acquisition, under two years</td>
<td>Media texts (business and general)</td>
<td>External expert, general</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Narrow</td>
<td>Singular</td>
<td>Public</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Vaara et al., 2004</td>
<td>Alliance between number of independent organisations</td>
<td>Not delineated. Alliance activity over five years. History of failed alliances.</td>
<td>Media texts (business and general); corporate documents; interviews</td>
<td>Internal multiple</td>
<td>Internal multiple</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Narrow/wide</td>
<td>Singular/ Multiple</td>
<td>Public</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Heracleous, 2006</td>
<td>Organisational change in general</td>
<td>Artificial. Delineated in part by two years of participant observation, and historical analysis going back thirty years</td>
<td>Interviews; corporate documents; internal documents; interviews and focus group; observations</td>
<td>Internal multiple</td>
<td>Internal multiple</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>Narrow/wide</td>
<td>Singular/ Multiple</td>
<td>Private</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Vaara et al., 2006</td>
<td>Merger</td>
<td>Delineated. One year</td>
<td>Media texts (general and business)</td>
<td>External expert, general</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Narrow</td>
<td>Singular</td>
<td>Public</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Vaara and Tienari, 2008</td>
<td>Production unit shutdown</td>
<td>Delineated. From announcement to shutdown, about two years</td>
<td>Media texts (general – opinion leader)</td>
<td>External expert, general</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Narrow</td>
<td>Singular</td>
<td>Public</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Erkama and Vaara, 2010</td>
<td>Closure after take-over</td>
<td>Delineated. Three year between acquisition and announcement of closure. Just over a year before closure after announcement</td>
<td>Media texts (general -daily and TV); corporate documents; interviews; observation</td>
<td>Internal multiple</td>
<td>Internal multiple</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Narrow</td>
<td>Singular</td>
<td>Public</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Vaara and Motin, 2010</td>
<td>Merger, then de-merger</td>
<td>Delineated. Under two years between announcement of merger, merger and eventual de-merger</td>
<td>Media texts (business; national and international) and general –regional; corporate documents; interviews</td>
<td>Internal multiple</td>
<td>Internal multiple</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Narrow</td>
<td>Singular</td>
<td>Public</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Vaara and Tienari, 2011</td>
<td>Merger, then creation of new organisation</td>
<td>Creation of new group from mergers and acquisitions Planned and executed 1999-2001</td>
<td>Media texts (business and general); corporate documents</td>
<td>Internal multiple</td>
<td>Internal multiple</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Narrow</td>
<td>Singular</td>
<td>Public</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Riad et al., 2012</td>
<td>Acquisition</td>
<td>Under two years between announcement and acquisition</td>
<td>Media texts (business); two countries (and some general in China)</td>
<td>External expert, general</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Narrow</td>
<td>Singular</td>
<td>Public</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
It is worth noting that the texts investigated (Table 1), notably in the work of Eero Vaara and colleagues were largely of a particular type, namely that expressed in official communications and media texts in public (Vaara et al., 2006; Riad et al., 2012). The media, particularly that which was heavily business or regionally related, could be expected in these circumstances to be part of a broader effort of de-politicisation in a similar way to that of inquiry reports (Brown, 2000; 2004; 2005) increasing the relative homogeneity in and between texts. This is not in itself a limitation, because as particular forms of communication that seek resonance politically (Motion and Leitch, 2009) media texts and corporate documents can provide an insight into the narrative infrastructures and available and resonant building blocks. Furthermore, these texts were often supplemented by observations (Heracleous, 2006; Erkama and Vaara, 2010) or by story-telling interviews with key actors (Heracleous and Barrett, 2001; Vaara, 2002; Vaara et al., 2004; Heracleous, 2006; Erkama and Vaara, 2010; Vaara and Monin, 2010; Vaara and Tienari, 2011). Nonetheless, the intertextuality studied largely had a public rather than a private reach (Table 1). As mentioned previously, the events studied involved the public and at times contentious conjoining of well-known firms across national boundaries (Vaara, 2002; Tienari et al., 2003; Vaara et al., 2004; Vaara et al., 2006; Vaara and Monin, 2010; Vaara and Tienari, 2011; Riad et al., 2012), contentious regional closures (Vaara and Tienari, 2008; Erkama and Vaara, 2010) or an unprecedented merger within a particular sector in the same country (Vaara and Tienari, 2002; Vaara and Monin, 2010).

The voices in the debates (Table 1) studied were for the most part managerial, senior managers (Dunford and Jones, 2000; Llewellyn, 2001) or
key managerial actors responding to the strategic event (Vaara, 2002), although sometimes this included different levels in the organisational hierarchy, through interviews (Heracleous and Barrett, 2001; Vaara et al., 2004; Heracleous, 2006; Erkama and Vaara, 2010; Vaara and Monin, 2010; Vaara and Tienari, 2011), observations (Heracleous and Barrett, 2001; Heracleous, 2006; Erkama and Vaara, 2010; Vaara and Monin, 2010; Vaara and Tienari, 2011) and observation of on-line forums (Vaara et al., 2004); and outside the organisation through the study of media texts (Vaara and Tienari, 2002; Tienari et al., 2003; Vaara et al., 2006; Vaara and Tienari, 2008; Riad et al., 2012). The variety in the voices studied offers some insight into the polyphony (Hazen, 1993) that is always present in organisations. However, even accepting that these actors had a high degree of independence as senior managers or as expert commentators in the case of the media, which is open to debate, the nature of the strategic event meant that independent expression was curtailed. The exception was the studies that involved longer-term change initiatives (Heracleous and Barrett, 2001; Heracleous, 2006) or alliances rather than mergers between many different independent companies or autonomous actors (Vaara et al., 2004).

There was also a common temporal sense to strategy (Czarniawska, 2004) in these studies. Most studies were of strategy that drew strongly from the notion of a predictable future, at the expense of a foreshortened present and past (Table 1). The direction of strategy was signalled with the announcement of a proposed merger or the covert planning before announcement (Erkama and Vaara, 2010) or similarly with the announcement of a particular project (Llewellyn, 2001; Heracleous and Barrett, 2001). In the other non-merger
cases, strategy in the form of ‘project implementation’ also had a delineated but notional start and end point (Dunford and Jones, 2000; Llewellyn, 2001; Heracleous and Barrett, 2001). The exception is the longitudinal study of change (Heracleous, 2006) in a global consulting firm. It is the way this signalling constrains both notions of the past and the present in a focus on an endpoint in the future that is considered important, rather than any length of time taken prior to the merger announcement, in private or public discussion, and constrains any ‘horizon of expectation’ (Table 1).

2.2.5.2 Theoretical consequences

The settings studied, in common with many others, were turbulent, i.e. characterised by conflict, disorder and at times confusion. At the same time, strategy was made toward an unequivocal direction, within a relatively short time horizon, for example toward an acquisition, merger or a ‘modernisation’ project. This form of agitating disorder, in which a constant struggle for interpretive control could be expected, is also common in many other settings, as is the drive toward an apparently unambiguous direction. As a result we have gained a much better understanding of strategy as an intertextual narrative from these studies, in terms of how thrust and direction is enabled and maintained and this understanding can be more widely applied. However, what is also common in the settings studied is that strategy had a relatively short shelf life and an ever-present tendency to unwind over time, both between firms, such as after merger and acquisition (Vaara and Monin, 2010), that has been a noted feature in cases such as these (Cartwright and Schoenberg, 2006) and even within the firm (Heracleous and Barrett, 2001). The need for ambiguity in the framing of narrative building blocks identified in some studies
(Vaara et al., 2004) could be interpreted as an early indication of the fragility of the suppression of plurivocality as a force to centralise meaning at the heart of intertextuality, built in this way within an ever present agitating disorder. This is because in a struggle for interpretative control, any emergence of the de-centering forces at the heart of intertextuality would have a detrimental impact on thrust and direction. Thus, whilst promising, existing studies have not adequately addressed the question of how strategy acquires stability and routine as an intertextual narrative. The research programme undertaken here is designed to address this question and is built in theoretical terms, as follows.

Existing studies in strategy as an intertextual narrative have focussed on a context where strategy drew strongly from a notion of a predictable future but at the expense of a foreshortened present and past (Table 1). This is theoretically significant because strategy inscribes a ‘discourse of direction’ based on the past, present and the future. Furthermore, dominance of this one aspect of the discourse of direction strongly facilitates a break with the past, although a break that may be fragile. If ‘temporality’ is foreshortened in this way, where the ‘horizon of expectation’ is constrained, it reduces the availability of narrative building blocks from the past and increases the availability and resonance of those narrative building blocks that are future focussed. Plurivocality in the settings studied has also been similarly constrained (Table 1), not necessarily because of the lack of different voices, but rather as a result of the constraint on those voices. This apparent absence of plurivocality is also theoretically relevant because narrative infrastructure is built in exchange between levels, between people and in narrative, and in multiplicity. If plurivocality is reduced or even suppressed in this way, it also
reduces both the availability and access of narrative building blocks. It increases the resonance of those narrative building blocks that are dominant or in the political control of those actors who are dominant or who have privileged access to narrative building blocks. Finally, the reach in the settings studied was more likely to be public than private (Table 1). Reach is also theoretically important, because it provides the space for the expression of plurivocality, and public expression is notably important. However, private reach, is relatively underexplored, and this is also significant.

If ‘narrative infrastructure’ is ‘the rails, along which multi-actor and multi-level processes gain thrust and direction’ (Deuten and Rip, 2000: 74) then consequence of limitations in theoretical terms within existing studies is clear. In such settings, strategy quickly and temporarily establishes the rails and then actively greases them and thereby supports centralisation of meaning in heteroglossia at the heart of intertextuality. This would mean that framing to encourage take-up of narrative building blocks and the centralisation of meaning in heteroglossia at the heart of intertextuality would possibly be less significant. At the very least, the role of framing of the availability and resonance of narrative building blocks is potentially underexplored. This may also be a shortcoming within the settings studied.

2.3 Research agenda

To understand and develop further the concept of strategy as an intertextual narrative it is therefore helpful to focus on strategy built on a wider temporality and a greater plurivocality, drawn in a fuller expression of ‘a discourse of direction’ that includes notions of the past, as well as the present and the future and where many voices operate within many levels, in public and in private.
This may require a focus on strategy that has been accomplished over a longer time period than is typical within most of the existing studies, so that some understanding of how stability and routine is accomplished could also be gained. This is not to mistake stability and routine for lack of turbulence, instead it is important to also consider a setting that is characterised by ‘agitating disorder’, in whatever form. The theoretical basis of the research agenda is outlined in Table 2.

Research needs to be undertaken in a setting where temporality is lengthened and plurivocality is enabled. The features that would support this research agenda include ‘a horizon of expectation’ that is rooted in the past, but necessarily not at the expense of the present or the future (Table 2). Similarly, there would be space for multiple voices, across different levels within the setting; this would extend reach in ways that would support plurivocality. It would be helpful if this reach included multiple voices in both public and private (Table 2).

Table 2  Theoretical basis for research agenda

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Temporality</th>
<th>Existing studies</th>
<th>Features</th>
<th>Research agenda</th>
<th>Features to consider</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Past</td>
<td>Lengthened</td>
<td>Past</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Present</td>
<td></td>
<td>Present</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Future</td>
<td></td>
<td>Future</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Plurivocality</th>
<th>Suppressed</th>
<th>Voice</th>
<th>Singular</th>
<th>Enabled</th>
<th>Voice</th>
<th>Multiple</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Level</td>
<td>Singular/Multiple</td>
<td>Reach</td>
<td>Public/Private</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

| The setting of higher education (HE) in the UK is considered suitable to address the research question of how strategy acquires stability and routine as an intertextual narrative, for the following reasons.
The setting can be described as turbulent. HE in the UK is often a site of intense and politicised discourse, where pressures of reform, performance and accountability, driven by policy, impact on universities (Barnett, 2011; Shattock, 2009) sometimes paradoxically (Deem et al., 2007) and adversely (Collini, 2012). The marketisation and modernisation agenda, one political response to globalisation, is considered to have significantly intensified in recent government policy (Brown, 2011; Holmwood, 2011). The HE sector is currently under the threat of ‘an avalanche’ (Barber, 2013) that portends nothing less than a revolutionary disruption to how the sector operates. In addition, HE currently faces, like the rest of the public sector in the UK, ‘an age of austerity’ and attempts by the Coalition government (2010-2015) to dramatically reduce the fiscal deficit with concomitant attempts at reduction in public expenditure. However, this is a form of agitating disorder that it has faced for a number of years alongside sustained political attempts at modernisation (Shattock, 2012) and marketisation (Brown, 2011). At the same time, there is remarkable continuity and consistency in strategy in universities (Tight, 2009; Shattock, 2012) alongside unequivocal thrust and direction (Barnett, 2011; Holmwood, 2011).

There is a future focus to strategy in HE, based on the agitation described above. However, the narrative of the university is often constructed in relation to the past in a way that reifies a golden age (Barnett, 2011; Martin, 2012) and which powerfully cements its resonance (Erkama and Vaara, 2010). At the same time, the university is engaged in the policy nexus, in a concern for the present, often at the mercy of a developing spending review or
settlement. This present operates in political cycles that can be equally disputed and disruptive.

There are many narrative building blocks concerning the purpose of universities (Barnett, 2011; Martin, 2012; Shattock, 2012) that are both available and also have resonance in terms of probability and fidelity. This includes a reified narrative of the university, strongly rooted in the past (Barnett, 2011; Martin, 2012) and the relatively recent narrative of the university, framed within globalisation, within the broader neoliberal discourse (Olssen and Peters, 2005; Tight, 2009), that has a future focus. These two narratives are, and have long been, at odds and in competition (Shattock, 1994; Scott, 1995, Olssen and Peters, 2005; Diefenbach, 2009; Brown, 2011; Barnett, 2011; Holmwood, 2011; Collini, 2012). Thus, strategy is focussed on a temporality that equally includes the past, present and the future, in a discourse of direction.

HE is also a setting in which strategy is discursively constructed over the long-term. As a result, it is a setting where the narrative infrastructure might be expected to have acquired a ‘degree of stability and routine’ (Fenton and Langley, 2011). This is not to confuse construction over the long-term with lack of turbulence as discussed earlier (Scott, 1995; Tight, 2009; Shattock, 2012; Barber, 2013).

There are many equally powerful, autonomous and usually public agents, each with practiced access to an established narrative infrastructure and the differing and competing narrative building blocks within it (Shattock, 2012). These include established and autonomous universities, individual Mission Groups, Universities UK, industry bodies, and those bodies associated
with the government discourse, such as the Higher Education Funding Council for England (HEFCE), as well as individual departments of state, such as the Department of Business, Innovation and Skills (BIS). Strategy is practiced in a political system in public but also in private, where the boundary between levels and actors is blurred, given the interdependence between the machinery of government and the autonomous universities in the construction of policy and subsequent strategic practice made in ‘fuzzy’ accomplishment (Shattock, 2012). Significantly, HE is thus a setting that has a wide and comprehensive plurivocality, in terms of multiple voices, at multiple levels, with a wide reach, in public and in private.

The next chapter (Chapter 3) looks more closely at the theoretical basis for choosing to locate the study in higher education in the UK, specifically at the intersection between policy and strategy.
Chapter 3: Higher Education in the UK: a research setting

3.0 Introduction

A university is typically an institution that has higher degree-awarding powers (Tight, 2009). Although this is not the extent of its function (Kerr, 1963) it is the defining characteristic of the organisation in legal terms. There are 149 such institutions currently operating in the Higher Education (HE) sector in the UK (2013, BIS)\(^1\), although that number includes the schools, colleges and institutes of the University of London also permitted to award their own degrees, of which there are 12. In a move from elite to mass participation in HE successive governments national and local since the mid nineteenth century, have attempted to modernize and re-new the university tradition by creating new universities from scratch or out of existing institutions. As a consequence there are many different types of institutions operating as universities (Scott, 1994) and the HE sector in the UK today is a diverse one (Tight, 2009).

There has been a tendency to simplify this diversity to a classification based on origin (Scott, 1994: 94) featuring terms such as ‘ancient’, ‘civic’, ‘red brick’, ‘plate glass’ and ‘former polytechnic’ (Scott, 1994; Tight, 2009; Barnett, 2011; Shattock, 2012). The universities labelled in this way are illustrated in a typology adapted from Scott (1994) in Figure 2. The term ‘ancient’ has long been associated with the medieval universities of Oxford and Cambridge (Oxbridge). The first ‘new’ universities in the UK were those of the largely industrialized metropolitan cities such as Birmingham, Manchester and

\(^1\) BIS Statutory Instrument 2013 No. 2992
Liverpool that became known as civic universities. The Civics also became associated with the red bricks that were used to build them as a way of contrasting them with the English ancient universities made of sandstone and in a way that labelled them as a facsimile of an original (Truscot, 1943). The Colleges of Advanced Technology (CATs) and campus universities set up in the 1960s in the UK were described as the ‘new’ universities and ‘plate glass’ universities also to distinguish them from the pre-existing ones including the Redbricks (Scott, 1994). When the binary divide between universities and polytechnics was abolished in 1992, the universities created post-1992 became ‘new’ universities (Scott, 1994).

Figure 2 Typology of UK HE adapted from Scott (1994:54)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Typology</th>
<th>Example</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Ancient collegiate universities, governed by academic guild</td>
<td>Oxford, Cambridge, Aberdeen, Glasgow, Edinburgh</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The University of London, federal university</td>
<td>Birbeck (1920), LSE (1895), UCL (1826)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The ‘civic’ universities established in major English cities in the late 19th century and early 20th century</td>
<td>Birmingham, Bristol, Cardiff, Manchester, Sheffield</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The ‘redbrick’ universities founded in other cities in the early 20th century</td>
<td>Exeter, Hull, Leicester, Nottingham</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sui generis</td>
<td>Durham, Keele</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The ‘technological’ universities created from the former Colleges of Advanced Technology in the 1960s</td>
<td>Aston, Bath, Bradford, Brunel, City, Loughborough, Salford, Surrey</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The ‘old new’ universities set up on campus locations in the 1960s</td>
<td>East Anglia, Essex, Warwick</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The Open University</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The ‘new new’ or post 1992s universities, that is the re-designated polytechnics and higher education colleges in the early 1990s</td>
<td>DMU, Hertfordshire, Sunderland, Wolverhampton</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Universities set up from former Colleges of Higher Education or specialist colleges and some liberal arts Colleges</td>
<td>Cumbria, Bolton, Buckinghamshire New University, Chester York St John</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

It is worth noting that whilst much of the discussion here relates to the UK as a whole, Scotland has a different HE tradition from England and Wales.
The Scottish tradition includes the equally ancient institutions of Aberdeen, Glasgow and St. Andrews established by papal authority in the 15th century, and Edinburgh established in 1582 by the town council. These universities were different to their English counterparts, being locally rather than nationally focussed, largely non-residential, openly accessible and offering a broader range of subjects (Scotland, 1969; Vernon, 2004). They are part of a more comprehensive and some would say more advanced system than that in England, certainly before the turn of the nineteenth century (Tight, 2009). For many centuries the Scottish universities are seen to have ‘never acquired the same intensity of social remoteness as came to characterise English HE strongly influence by the culture of Oxford and Cambridge’ (Paterson, 1997: 30). This reputation apparently cemented the HE tradition in Scotland as a democratic one (Davie, 1961; Vernon, 2004).

The classification of universities outlined by Scott (1994) in Figure 2 2 is subtly maintained by universities singly and collectively through various university mission groups and understood and adeptly negotiated by many within the sector (Matthews, 2013). However, the differences between UK universities are more often simply and publicly expressed in terms of whether a university is ‘traditional’ and ‘research-intensive’ or ‘modern’ and ‘teaching-intensive’ (The Guardian HE Network, 2013). In this way former university colleges such as Nottingham and Southampton and universities formed as new universities or CATs in the 1960s can be labelled traditional as opposed to modern (Tight, 2009). Further, ancient universities set up in the Scottish democratic tradition can also be called traditional, as can the University of
Cardiff, a civic institution formed in 1893 and part of the federated University of Wales for over a hundred years.

The labeling of a university is more than simply a classification; it is a narrative by which the university as a ‘set of relations’ or an organisation is told and re-told (Law, 1991; 1994). Each individual narrative of the university ‘tells how the organisation and its members should be’ (Law 1994: 250) and offers a different strategy for performing organisational arrangements, generating particular structures and resistances (Law, 1994). In this way the narrative of the university is strategy (Law, 1991; 1994; Czarniawska, 1997).

The narrative of the university is acknowledged as having been influenced by a number of thinkers and traditions over the last one hundred and fifty years (Barnett, 2011; Martin, 2012) and has three progenitors, the *Ivory Tower* or elite university, the *Humboldtian* or research-led university (Barnett, 2011) and the *Utilitarian* or technical university (Martin, 2012).

### 3.1 The narrative of the university

#### 3.1.1 The ‘traditional’ university

A recognisably strong progenitor of the narrative of the university is that of the elite university or *Ivory Tower* (Tight, 2009) based on the tradition of Oxford and Cambridge colleges and often associated with the view of the university articulated by Cardinal Newman in 1876. For Newman ‘the business of a university is to make philosophical knowledge, enlargement of mind [or] intellectual culture or illumination its direct scope’ (Newman 1876: 124). It is a view that found echo in post-war debates on the future of universities in the UK in which Oxbridge was seen to embody ‘the idea of the university’ through
its articulation of teaching and scholarship (Moberly, 1949: 19). This is echoed on each occasion the idea of scholarship in HE is defended in the UK (Barnett, 2011; Holmwood, 2011; Collini, 2012). This, in many ways, has always been an idealised view of the university (Holmwood, 2011; Martin, 2012) both at the time of Newman (Tight, 2009; Barnett, 2011) and when Moberly was writing over seventy years later (Truscot, 1951; Barnett, 2011; Shattock, 2012), and certainly in contemporary expression (Barnett, 2011; Holmwood, 2011). Truscot in his contribution to the same post-war debate challenged the ideal by suggesting that ‘our [then] modern universities’ were being ‘half strangled’ by Oxford and Cambridge (Truscot, 1951: 31). Nonetheless, in the intervening years this so-called *Ivory Tower* finds echo in the wider narrative of the university including in the Redbricks studied by Truscot (Barnett, 2011).

Another progenitor of the narrative of the university is that of the research-led university based on the *Humboldtian* university tradition. This tradition was a particularly European rather than English construction. Associated with the reforms of Wilhelm von Humboldt in the early nineteenth century in Prussia, the Humboldt ideal stressed both teaching *and* research as the core and indivisible functions of a university, thereby stimulating *Wissenschaft* or learning that would in turn lead to *Bildung* or an all round humanistic education (Hofstetter, 2001: 107; Martin, 2012). This *Bildung*, funded by the State was designed for a professional and bureaucratic elite (Martin, 2012). The corollary in the UK was the ideal of an all-round education for an elite within the more general concept of scholarship, although this notion of scholarship lacked the research focus and research informed teaching of the Humboldt model (Hofstetter, 2001). The Humboldt model established first in
the Universität zu Berlin in 1810 was extremely successful in Germany and exported well in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, notably to the United States. The adoption of principles from the Humboldt model within the narrative of the university in the UK (Shattock, 2012; Barnett, 2011) was facilitated in part by the increasing interest in research both in policy debate and in practice, notably within existing and new universities in the early twentieth century in the UK, and by the diffusion of the Humboldt model elsewhere in the world. Consequently, the Humboldt principle of teaching informed by research and the importance of research as part of the wider narrative of the university, was, by the mid twentieth century, common currency (Committee for Higher Education, 1963 (The Robbins Report)). This adoption was not necessarily wholesale, because research in the German tradition has tended to cover both sciences and humanities whereas in the UK and particularly in policy, research has more ‘often been associated with the hard sciences’ (Barnett, 2011: 21).

A third progenitor of the narrative of the university is that of the technical university tradition, based on the idea of a Utilitarian social contract. The federated University of London and the civic universities of the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries in England and Wales, set up to address the industrial and societal needs ignored by the elite universities (Rothblatt, 1988) not to replicate them, owe much more in their early formation to this Utilitarian social contract than the ideals of Oxford or Berlin (Martin, 2012). They shared their intellectual roots with the ancient universities of Scotland (Phillipson, 1988), the German Technische Hochschule and the French Ecole Polytechnique (Martin, 2012: 546) in what might be termed a
European technical tradition in which universities are central to the industrialization of a nation (Tapper and Salter, 1978). It was the Civics, as they became known that had early involvement in research and development with local industry and thereby became central to the birth of many new science-based industries in the early twentieth century (Rosenberg and Nelson, 1994; Mowery et al., 2004; Martin, 2012). It has been argued that Colleges of Advanced Technology (CATs) in England and the ‘old’ new universities set up in campus locations in the 1960s and 1970s were also set up in this technical tradition (Tight, 2009), although these new UK universities were also consequent of an expansion in social sciences.

A technical tradition in the UK should not be confused with technical education per se. Indeed, pains were made in the post war settlement in HE in the UK to make a distinction between technology in university and technical education outside universities in technical colleges (University Grants Committee (UGC), 1950). The creation of polytechnics in the 1960s and 1970s in the UK was to accommodate an expansion of technical and predominantly vocational education first and foremost. Of course, this is not to deny that the policy was in some ways a challenge to established universities in England to improve access and accommodate better the expanding needs for HE (Shattock, 2012). Nonetheless, the polytechnics along with central institutions in Scotland were fundamentally designed as teaching institutions with an unspecified and modest future potential for research (Shattock, 2012).

It is the Ivory Tower and Humboldtian traditions that dominate in the current narrative of the traditional university (Barnett, 2011), a domination that is underpinned by two enduring myths (Martin, 2012). The first enduring myth
is the notion of academic independence and freedom, both in the governance of
the university with freedom from the State and in academic freedom or
freedom of inquiry by staff and students. This freedom was as illusory
contemporaneously in both Berlin and Oxford (Martin, 2012) and certainly
remains illusory given that as soon as universities became dependent on State
funding their independence and autonomy has been a matter for negotiation
and compromise (Shattock, 2012). The second myth concerns research. In the
UK it is historically accurate to associate research in universities with the
*Civics* borne in the technical tradition, because it was the *Civics* rather than the
elite universities of Oxford and Cambridge that were among the first to provide
some of the research drivers in their respective regions and areas of expertise
(Martin, 2012). However, research as central to the narrative of the traditional
university is a Humboldt rather than a technical university or *Ivory Tower*
legacy and universities formed in the UK under slightly different traditions
have nonetheless adopted it in a form of academic drift. Academic drift in this
sense is the way some institutions, particularly new ones creep into areas that
are traditionally the preserve of the ‘academic’ (Neave, 1979; Tight, 2009;
Barnett, 2011). It is also a drift that has been expedient in the face of
government policy.

The commissioning and funding of research in universities in the UK
was conducted under the long-established Haldane principle, outlined in the
Haldane Report in 1918 as one in which the primacy of the decision-making
should be academic-led and autonomous. It was under the Haldane Principle
that a number of Research Councils were subsequently established, starting
with the Medical Research Council (MRC). In the early 1970s government
policy toward research started to change, partly due to tensions between the Research Councils and government departments, particularly the Medical Research Council (MRC) and the Department of Health in the commissioning of research (McLachlan, 1978: 17) and partly due to financial pressures on research funding (Shattock, 2012). The Rothschild Review (1971) set up to examine the most effective arrangements for organising and supporting pure and applied scientific research and post-graduate training, in this constrained financial environment, was uncompromising in its view that ‘however distinguished, intelligent and practical scientists may be, they cannot be so well qualified to decide what the needs of the nation are, and their priorities, as those responsible for ensuring that those needs are met’ (Rothschild, 1971: para.8, 4). The re-direction of some 25 per cent of funding to individual government departments proved ineffective, as budgets were progressively eroded throughout the 1970s.

Dissatisfaction with the lack of accountability across the Research Councils, individual government departments and within universities, eventually led to increasing calls for accountability and measurement exercises, that were subsequently introduced in the early 1980s (Tight, 2009; Shattock, 2012). The ‘customer-contractor principle’ in Rothschild (1971) presaged much of the subsequent accountability agenda in research funding in the Thatcher and subsequent governments (Tight, 2009; Shattock, 2012), although arrangements in the beginning were perhaps a little more open-ended than Rothschild had originally envisaged (Kogan and Henkel, 1983). However, these research assessment exercises that have been carried out every few years since the mid 1980s have been the main driver behind the progressively greater
selectivity and concentration in research funding, as well as an increasing challenge to the accountability for research funding under the Haldane principle.

For much of the twentieth century, research was in fact a parallel role to the dissemination of knowledge for most universities in the UK (Robbins, 1963) and not every academic actively engaged in pure research or even applied research (Shattock, 2012). Post Rothschild (1971) in particular, the competition for research funding became both a primary and necessary means for universities to differentiate (Lucas, 2006). This helped to cement research as integral to the narrative of the university in the UK. The university that is most associated with this narrative of the traditional university is the pre-1992 so called ‘research-intensive’ university, particularly, although not exclusively, in England (Tight, 2009; Barnett, 2011).

3.1.2 The ‘modern’ university

At various times in the expansion of HE in the UK there have been ‘modern’ universities. At any one time, the nineteenth century University of London and civic universities of the industrial cities, then the university colleges and CATs that acquired university status between 1948 and the 1960s and the campus universities such as Essex and Warwick, were new and modern.

However, the universities most associated with the term modern in the UK are the former polytechnics and HE colleges that have been given university status, first in 1992 and then subsequently through the 2000s (The Guardian HE Network, 2013), including in Scotland the former central institutions that transitioned through CAT status to university status in 1992.
Polytechnics were originally largely teaching institutions similar to the *Fachhochschulen* in Germany and the liberal arts colleges in the USA (Martin, 2012), and to some extent the *grandes écoles* in France, although the latter were much more elite in scope and positioning than the polytechnics in the UK. The term ‘academic drift’ is particularly associated with polytechnics as they attempted to incorporate research into their missions (Pratt and Burgess, 1974) but this is in itself predicated on the notion of what is the preserve of a traditional university, which in turn is based on myths of academic freedom and research.

Polytechnics in the UK were decoupled from these myths at their inception. Firstly, polytechnics in England and their equivalent in Scotland were firmly placed in local authority control, at least until the removal of the binary divide (Tight, 2009) when they in effect transferred from local authority control to State control. The CATs at inception had also been under local authority control, but unlike the colleges that became designated as polytechnics, the CATs were soon funded direct from central government (Shattock, 2012). Whilst the freedom from State control of traditional universities may be illusory (Martin, 2012) unlike the pre-1992 universities, the former polytechnics have never had a chance to profit from that illusion, since they were tightly controlled within historically less generous local authority budgets and benefitted less in terms of research and teaching income in the post-1992 funding framework. Secondly, polytechnics were designed to be an alternative sector to universities, responding to the need for more vocational education (Crosland, Woolwich Speech, 1965) and as such were predominantly to be teaching institutions. They may not have fulfilled their science and
engineering vocational destiny at the time of their ‘upgrade’ to university status in 1992 but they remained teaching-intensive institutions (Pratt, 1999).

The academic drift of the polytechnics (Pratt and Burgess, 1974; Neave, 1978; 1979) despite commentary at the time concerning the adoption of a research mission (Pratt and Burgess, 1974) was more about the ensuing dominance of the liberal arts in their curriculum and the failure of their scientific vocational teaching mission. This was significantly different from the focus on research that characterized the academic drift of the pre-1992 universities. Consequently ‘modern’ has now come to refer exclusively to the former polytechnics and in a way that marks out ‘modern’ and ‘former polytechnic’ or ‘post-1992’ ‘teaching-intensive’ as opposite to ‘traditional’ ‘research-intensive’ universities. This is also the case in Scotland where the binary divide at the time was less pronounced and where there was a distinctive democratic tradition (Paterson, 1997). Academic drift seems to have reached its limit in the modern university, evidenced by the repeated resurrection of the idea of the polytechnic as distinct from the university (IPPR, 2013) and in continued and entrenched differentiation between pre and post 1992 universities (Shattock, 2012).

3.1.3 The ‘enterprise’ university

Both the narrative of the traditional and the modern university are evident in government policy discourse, but there is also a third narrative of the university, that of the neo-liberal or ‘enterprise’ university (Barnett, 2011; Holmwood, 2011), which is recognisable and some would say dominates (Bridgman, 2007).
Neoliberalism is ‘in the first instance a theory of political economic practices that proposes that human wellbeing can be best advanced by liberating entrepreneurial freedoms and skills within an institutional framework characterised by strong private property rights, free markets and free trade’ (Harvey, 2005: 2). Neoliberalism values market exchange and holds that ‘the social good will be maximised by maximising the reach and frequency of market transactions, and it seeks to bring all human action into the domain of the market’ (Harvey, 2005: 3-4). This political settlement has not been confined to political parties of the Right, but has been a feature of the last Labour governments and the current Coalition government in the UK. It is an approach in political economic terms that prioritises and develops a knowledge economy, i.e. an economy that is more strongly dependent on knowledge production, distribution and use than ever before and which is considered vital to the competitiveness of nation-states, particularly in the developed world (Olssen and Peters, 2005). Universities have been subject to the neo-liberal political settlement that has led to progressive ‘marketisation’ of the sector or the application of the economic theory of the market to the provision of HE in a way that seems unstoppable (Brown, 2011). Universities are also the vanguard of the knowledge economy and have a highly significant role in ‘the development of the know-how society’ (Shattock, 2009: 184) where there is ‘[…] an economic imperative is to make sure that scientific knowledge is used by business to create wealth’ (HM Treasury, 2004: 69). This is the neo-liberal construction of the university as one of enterprise (Bridgman, 2007).

The enterprise university is an amalgam of two other contemporary narratives of the university, the so-called entrepreneurial university and the
corporate university (Slaughter and Leslie; 1997; Chiapello and Fairclough, 2002; Shattock, 2009; Barnett, 2011) both of which are predicated on a neo-liberal political settlement.

It was Etzkowitz and others (2000; 2003a; 2003b) who in the early 1980s first articulated the idea of the entrepreneurial university. The entrepreneurial university is evident anecdotally in the mission statements of universities and industry-wide competitions such as the Entrepreneurial University of the Year, as well as in policy (DfES, 2004; BIS, 2011; Willetts, 2012). Despite its apparent ubiquity and whilst contemporaneous, this narrative of the university is hard to pin down and means different things to different people (Shattock, 2005; Barnett, 2011) although there is agreement that it is a neo-liberal construct (Bridgman, 2007; Philpott et al., 2011).

For Etzkowitz it is consequent of the requirements of the knowledge economy as ‘an independent and influential actor’ (2003a: 295), where the interaction of university-industry-government is ‘the key to improving the conditions for innovation in a knowledge-based society’ through the metaphor of the Triple Helix with ‘each institutional sphere maintaining its special features and unique identity whilst also taking the role of the other’ (Etzkowitz, 2003a: 302-3). For others it encompasses all activity from research commercialization to executive education that has the capacity to generate economic rents (Philpott et al., 2011) to being entrepreneurial as a cultural state (Shattock, 2009). The enterprise university is seen as apparently a natural, logical and processional outcome of neo-liberalism (Clark, 1998: Etzkowitz, 2003b; Shattock, 2009). The narrative of the enterprise university is apparently ubiquitous (Bridgman, 2007; Barnett, 2011) however its resonance in terms of
narrative fidelity and probability (Eco, 1981) is not (Barnett, 2011; Holmwood, 2011; Collini, 2012).

3.1.4 The ‘true’ university

The narrative of the university that has *resonance* (Eco, 1981; Fisher, 1984; Fenton and Langley, 2011) having both internal coherence and consistency, or probability, and corresponding to the reader’s sense of values and understanding of the world, or fidelity (Fisher, 1984; Fenton and Langley, 2011), is the narrative of the traditional university. It is this narrative of the university that reverberates or sounds as ‘true’ (Brown, 1990; Barnett, 2011; Holmwood, 2011; Collini, 2012) particularly in the face of the neo-liberal enterprise university. It is its echo of a reified golden age, which includes the *Ivory Tower* and *Humboldtian* ideals of academic freedom and research (Barnett, 2011; Martin, 2012) that powerfully cements its resonance and ensures that it endures (Erkama and Vaara, 2010).

In contrast the modern university is resourced from a different technical education tradition (Martin, 2012). The narrative of the ‘true’ university thereby encompasses all of those pre-1992 universities in Scott’s classification (1994), some to a lesser extent than others, but excludes the former polytechnics. The enterprise university is resourced from a relatively recent neo-liberal political economic settlement (Harvey, 2005; Olssen and Peters, 2005; Barnett, 2011) and ‘poses a direct challenge to freedom and autonomy’ (Bridgman, 2007: 487) of the narrative of the traditional university. The traditional university and the enterprise university have long been at odds (Shattock, 1994; Scott, 1995, Olssen and Peters, 2005; Diefenbach, 2009; Brown, 2011; Barnett, 2011; Holmwood, 2011; Collini, 2012) and could be

This ‘true’ narrative should not be mistaken for an accurate description of the complexity within pre-1992 universities or even an explanation of what is apparently missing from post-1992 universities (Shattock, 2012). It would be more accurate to say that research-intensive as opposed to teaching-intensive universities combine the traditions of Oxbridge and Humboldt with the technical tradition of the civic institutions and thereby operate as ‘multiversities’ (Kerr, 1963). The multiversity is not without tension, not least because of an inherent eagerness to serve society and to in turn criticize it (Kerr, 1994: 14). It is also accurate to say that post-1992 universities also hold pockets of excellence in research, alongside their predominantly teaching missions (Shattock, 2012). However, it is the research-intensive pre-1992 universities in the UK despite their status as multiversities (Kerr, 1963) and for most their technical and civic roots that are seen to embody the ‘true’ narrative of the university (Barnett, 2011). This ‘true’ narrative of the university, based on the two mythological positions in relation to academic freedom and the centrality of research, has primacy and is deeply embedded.

3.1.5 Summary

The HE sector in the UK today is a diverse one, since there are many different types of institution operating as universities (Scott, 1994; Tight, 2009), a diversity that has always been present in different forms, as the university has evolved (Martin, 2012). The different types are often categorized based on their origin in an esoteric classification that is subtly maintained and adeptly negotiated within the sector itself, not least by individual Mission groups that
represent different university ‘types’ in the UK and formed in response to the removal of the binary divide. A wider narrative of the university, expressed in terms of whether a university is traditional or modern prevails publicly and is widely available (Guardian HE Network, 2013) as is the neo-liberal enterprise university, a third and more recent narrative. However, it is only the narrative of the traditional university that is both available and distinctly resonant as the ‘true’ narrative of the university, a result of its relation to the past and the mythical golden age it reifies (Barnett, 2011; Martin, 2012). It is a narrative that has a particular English elite rather than Scottish democratic flavour despite the incorporation of a European technical tradition.

The two other prevalent narratives of the university – the modern and the enterprise university - are uncoupled from the traditional university narrative but for different reasons. The current narrative of the modern university is based on a different technical education tradition that initially had no place for the myths of academic freedom and research on which the narrative of the traditional university is predicated. Any drift toward the narrative of the traditional university is therefore shallow-rooted. The relatively recent narrative of the enterprise university is widely available, particularly in policy discourse and draws from a neoliberal political economic settlement that promotes the knowledge economy. As it relies on a requirement for greater accountability and impact in university research (Bridgman, 2007) including research commercialization in support of private economic development (Philpott et al., 2011) it fails to privilege academic freedom and autonomy while apparently suppressing it. As a result, the two narratives of the traditional university and the enterprise university are dichotomously resonant
(Shattock, 1994; Scott, 1995, Olssen and Peters, 2005; Diefenbach, 2009; Brown, 2011; Barnett, 2011; Holmwood, 2011; Collini, 2012). This is because there is a particular and central tension in relation to research (Bridgman, 2007; Barnett, 2011).

Within the research-intensive pre-1992 universities in particular, strategy as an intertextual narrative draws upon two widely available and essentially dichotomous narratives of the university.

### 3.2 Autonomous public actors

As well as having different and essentially dichotomously resonant narratives of the university in HE in the UK, there are also equally powerful autonomous and usually public actors illustrated in Figure 3, each with practiced access to the narrative of the university (Shattock, 2012). Given the devolution of HE in the UK the focus here is on the autonomous public actors within HE in England, although there are public bodies in the HE policy nexus that also represent Scottish and Welsh universities.

Figure 3 Public voices in HE in England
3.2.1 The HE lobby

There are many powerful universities in HE in the UK and as discussed many of these universities have been established for some time and even the relatively recent ‘new’ ‘traditional’ universities of the 1960s are now 50 years old. In that time universities have remained on the whole institutionally autonomous, although their freedom to make their own policy is bounded within a nexus of the individual university and their lobby groups, and the State and the machinery of government (Shattock, 2012). Some universities have more freedom than others, due to their relative independence in terms of State funding and in turn the State’s relative dependence on compliance from particular universities, in government policy. It is in this nexus that government policy is both publicly and privately expressed and negotiated (Shattock, 2012). Since the early 1990s universities have increasingly collectively lobbied in policy, both informally and formally (Shattock, 2012). The Committee of Vice Chancellors and Principals (CVCP) was for many years the key body that represented universities in their dealings with the government and is one such lobby group. The polytechnics in contrast had their own committee that was called the Committee of Directors of Polytechnics (CDP). With the abolition of the binary divide in 1992, the CVCP and CDP were combined into a larger CVCP or what many considered ‘an unwieldy group’ (Tight, 2009: 131). Restyled in 2004 as Universities UK (UUK) it attempts to represent all universities but has long struggled to articulate the common interests of its members in a collective voice (Tight, 2009). Currently it is comprised of 134 members, i.e. the majority of universities, including 112 that are classified as ‘recognised bodies with degree awarding powers’ by BIS
(2012), some designated as individual colleges and some as university colleges. UUK seeks to be ‘the definitive voice’ for universities in the UK and acknowledges ‘as a fundamental principle’ that the ‘diversity and autonomy of the UK’s HE sector are critical to its success’ (UUK, 2013). It continues to have ‘separate entrée into the policy process’ (Shattock, 2012: 2) but has been superseded in that process by the increasingly professionalized university mission groups formed at various times since 1992, especially the Russell Group and the 1994 Group (Shattock, 2012). These two groups represent nearly all of the pre-1992 universities.

The Russell Group came into being in response to the expansion of the CVCP and as a proxy for the disquiet of the pre-1992 universities, with the expansion of the sector through the abolition of the binary divide in 1992. It started as ‘an informal grouping of the vice-chancellors of Oxford, Cambridge, the main London colleges and the big ‘civics’’ and early justifications for its creation were framed as the need to create an elite sector able to compete globally (Scott, 1995: 52). However, this framing should not be used to hide the desire at the time to collaborate to protect the mutual self-interest of the pre-1992 universities in the new landscape post 1992 (Shattock, 2012). Such influence it was felt was difficult to achieve in the expanded CVCP (Shattock, 2012: 97). Not long after the formation of the Russell Group, another grouping of pre-1992 universities, the 1994 Group, comprised of former CATs and campus universities, as well as St Andrews, Durham and Leicester, came together under a similarly differentiating rationale, to consult and inform policy collectively.
For early commentators this ‘club’ strategy, epitomised by the formation of the Russell Group and the 1994 Group, was ‘unlikely to be robust enough to institutionalize a university elite without State intervention’ (Scott, 1995: 52). With the benefit of hindsight it could be argued that without the statutory intervention expected by Scott (1995), the university elite has been institutionalized nonetheless. The Russell Group in particular is a highly successful and professionalized lobbying organisation for 24 research universities in the UK, whose Director General, Dr Wendy Piatt, was previously Deputy Director in the Prime Minister’s Strategy Unit in the last Labour government and a former Head of Education at the Institute of Public Policy research (IPPR). In April 2012 four universities switched from the 1994 Group to the Russell Group - Durham, Exeter, Queen Mary (University of London) and York – reducing the 1994 group to eleven members and raising questions about its long-term sustainability (The Guardian HE Network, 2012).

The creation of the Russell Group and the 1994 Group was closely followed by similar groupings of the former polytechnics. The first was the creation of the Group of Modern Universities in 1997 (re-named the Million+, in 2007) and is currently conceived as a ‘think-tank’ promoting collaboration between universities and business and representing 27 largely business-focused universities. The second was the creation of the Alliance Group of a group of previously non-aligned universities that were mainly but not exclusively former polytechnics, and self-styled as innovative and entrepreneurial universities focussed on collaboration with industry.

The formation of self-selected groups of universities and the Russell Group in particular, as mission or lobbying groups had three significant
corollaries. Firstly, without overplaying the unity in the loosely coupled pre 1992 CVCP, it can be argued that the essential unity of a collective university voice in the post 1992 structure was undermined (Tight, 2009: 131). Secondly, it established a symbolic and public binary divide at the very moment of its actual abolition, ossifying a classification of UK universities to a pre-1992 position. Prior to 1992 any differences between universities were less public (Scott, 1994), post 1992 the differences were maintained and amplified (The Guardian HE Network, 2013). Thirdly, in support of the existing lobbying at the intersection between policy-makers and universities in private, it introduced professionalized and persistent lobbying supported by a more conscious and consistent framing in public. Individual universities and individual academics that sit on the various committees and working groups continue to supplement this professional lobbying. However, even here, their association with mission groups frames engagement in the policy process.

The universities themselves are not the only lobbyists in the policy nexus, for instance there are many industry representatives on university Boards of Governors, similarly there have been periodic State-sponsored policy fillips for greater engagement between universities and industry from the Rothschild’s Report (1970) through to the more recent Wilson Review (2012). These links are formalised in the founding principles of some of the university mission groups. As part of a broader and long-standing attempt by industry to influence policy in HE (Barnett, 2011), the link between industry and universities was formalised in 1986 with the creation of the lobby group: the Council for Industry and Higher Education (CIHE). As a result of the Wilson Review (2012) into industry and university collaboration, CIHE recently
reformed as the National Centre for Universities and Business (NCUB) with much the same remit. Outside CIHE, industry has influence as a major sponsor and recipient of university research.

### 3.2.2 The government

The basic structure of political responsibility and accountability for HE in government was established a relatively long time ago (1962-64). There is a department responsible for higher education, the evolution of which since 1992 is illustrated in Figure 4 and discussed below.

**Figure 4** Breakdown of Departments responsible for HE 1992-2012

What is remarkable is the relative continuity in this departmental structure until the mid 1990s and then again between 1995 and 2005. Changes were evident during the latter days of the Major administration (1995-1997) and throughout a series of changes in quick succession to roles and responsibilities in the last Labour Government (2005-2010). This was not the
norm. This continuity is replicated in the longevity of Permanent Secretaries, the most senior civil servants within the respective departments supporting the development and implementation of policy (Shattock, 2012). This longevity has not, however, been characteristic of appointments for individual Secretaries of State, apart from Sir Keith Joseph (1981-86), David Blunkett (1997-2001) and the current incumbent Vince Cable (2010-), most have lasted less than three years.

The current department responsible for HE is the Department of Business, Innovation and Skills (2009) formed out of the merger of the short-lived Department of Universities and Skills (DUIS) and the Department of Business, Enterprise and Regulatory Reform (BERR). BIS has taken over the main the functions of the former Department of Trade and Industry (DTI), as well as the parts of the universities, science and innovation remit previously held by the Department for Education and Skills (DFES) and Office for Science and Technology (OST). In addition to individual departments such as BIS, in recent years the Treasury has played a large and significant role in HE policy (Shattock, 2012). Universities are sensitive to the Treasury and the periodic Comprehensive Spending Reviews (CSR) because universities remain dependent on that public funding and for many years public spending on HE has grown progressively ahead of the growth in GDP, making the sector particularly beholden to Treasury ‘generosity’ (Shattock, 2012).

The government distributes public money to universities through two bodies. The first is the Higher Education Funding Council for England (HEFCE), with equivalents in the devolved governments of the UK. HEFCE distributes funds for teaching in universities and one part of the research grant.
The second comprises the seven Research Councils, which make a more specific distribution of the second part of the research grant. This separation of research funding comprises what is known a system of ‘dual-support’ for research (Figure 5).

Figure 5  The current quasi-government bodies that distribute research funds to HE (from Research Innovation Network, September 2010)

HEFCE became the government’s funding lever of choice in 1992 (its equivalents in the devolved Scotland and Wales were established at a later date). Prior to that as part of a planned economy model, the government worked through the University Grants Committee (UGC). Established in 1918, the UGC had a notoriously fractious relationship with the Thatcher governments in the 1980s (Tight, 2009). It was eventually wound up in 1989

2 Source is Research Information Network. Figures used are from 2009.
and its powers transferred to the short-lived Universities Funding Council that was soon superseded by the current funding body, HEFCE. In this way HEFCE gained primacy in the allocation of funding, but apparently to a much tighter government remit and direction than the UGC (Scott, 1995; Shattock, 2012). Since its inception, HEFCE has had five Chief Executives, drawn largely from senior management within academia and policy circles. The current chairman (appointed 25th July 2013) is Professor Madeleine Atkins CBE, formerly Vice-Chancellor of Coventry, succeeding Sir Alan Langlands, a previous Vice-Chancellor of Dundee University and former Chief Executive of the NHS, who in turn succeeded Professor David Eastwood in 2009. Sir Alan Langlands has since become Vice Chancellor of the University of Leeds, just as Professor Eastwood subsequently became Vice Chancellor of the University of Birmingham in 2009. This epitomises the ‘revolving door’ that has long existed between Whitehall and the university common room and which has long been a feature of HE in the UK (Dodd et al., 1952; Shattock, 2012).

Research councils have been a part of the structure of UK HE since the turn of the twentieth century, starting first with the Medical Research Council and expanding over the years to the seven subject-discipline councils that exist today³, as already discussed, part of the dual system of funding of research in the UK. In its subject area, each research council funds basic research, including doctoral studentships. The majority of research funding is allocated on a competitive bid basis. Research Councils UK (RCUK) created in 2002 is a strategic partnership of the UK Research Councils in the form of a non-statutory secretariat and is responsible for their co-ordination. RCUK’s remit is

³ Details of individual remit available at http://www.rcuk.ac.uk/about/aboutrcs/
‘to work together more effectively to enhance the overall impact and
effectiveness of their research, training and innovation activities, contributing
to the delivery of the Government’s objectives for science and innovation’
(RCUK, 2013).

As well as informal discussions in the nexus of policy (Shattock, 2012)
there are some formal and public policy consultations and public statements.
The direction of government policy is usually expressed in official publications
such as Green Papers, a form of consultative policy document and White
Papers that tend to set out details of policy often prior to legislation. These
papers, alongside legislative Bills of Parliament, are known as Command
Papers. In addition, there are a number of sessional select committees in the
UK parliament that meet on a regular basis to scrutinize spending, policies and
administration. Supplementary to these sessional committees are those set up
on an ad-hoc basis with a specific remit and deadline to investigate a key issue.
These committees are populated with the representatives of the lobbying
agencies outlined above, together with leading members of the various quasi-
government bodies that distribute funding, amongst others (Shattock, 2012).
The financial arrangements for the sector are periodically reviewed, usually as
part of the broader CSR of government expenditure and scrutiny by the Public
Accounts Committee (PAC) (Shattock, 2012) and also reported publicly and
periodically by the quasi-government bodies that distribute funds. Responses to
government expression of policy outlined above are provided by the various
lobby groups and other interested parties, including the quasi-government
bodies such as HEFCE and the Research Councils. This is often made in
scheduled consultation periods or as part of their on-going lobbying efforts and
positioning in policy discussion. In this way the HE sector has an established pattern and public expression of policy where the boundaries between government and other interested parties, notably the universities and their mission groups, together with industry bodies, are blurred. In contrast, there is a limited role for the public in the political system of HE in the UK apart from participation in the broader political system. Service on local university boards of governors is usually restricted to alumni and other local dignitaries or industrial heavyweights, a feature that is bemoaned by some commentators (Holmwood, 2011).

3.2.3 Summary

There are many equally powerful, autonomous and public actors shaping policy and university strategy in HE in the UK. These actors are interdependent and operate within the nexus of policy, in private and in public. Policy and strategy take place in the blurred boundary between the setting and the organisation. Private and public expression of policy operates to set patterns, involving Command Papers, spending reviews and sponsored consultations that has not changed in decades, outside the professionalization of lobbying in university or mission groups following the removal of the binary divide in 1992 and the increase in volume of submissions and counter submissions. This professionalization, has, however added a more conscious and consistent framing in public alongside the perennial discussions between policy-makers and universities in private.
3.3 Public policy and on-going reform

In the last three decades, universities have faced significant reform (Tight, 2009) driven from Westminster and impacting throughout the UK’s HE system. This is not to underestimate some of the potentially disruptive consequences of recent changes within the sector, for example the complete transfer of the cost of student funding from the taxpayer to the student in England (Browne Review, 2011), the reduction in capital funding for research in the UK (Treasury, 2010; 2013), the threat of open access to the business models of academic publishing (Finch 2012) or the removal of the cap on undergraduate student numbers announced recently in the Chancellor of the Exchequer’s Autumn Statement (BIS, 2013). Instead, what is argued is that earlier changes were as significant at the time, such as the removal of the binary divide in 1992 and the embedding of the Research Assessment throughout the 1990s, as those that the sector is currently facing. This is an argument that is made against the tendency in the current debates within HE to emphasise current changes as of a different order and scale (Brown, 2011; Holmwood, 2011). Nonetheless, universities have maintained ‘considerable continuities of practice’ through many recent periods of significant reform (Tight, 2009: 3).

3.3.1 Public policy and reform

Existing research has tended to chronicle a remarkable consistency in public policy since the Thatcher governments of the 1980s (Tight, 2009; Barnett, 2011). It is argued that policy has been built within a neo-liberal paradigm regardless of the political flavour of the government, such that the current
Coalition government in the UK is in many ways intensifying the direction of travel established by the Labour governments of the previous thirteen years, which in turn accepted the Thatcherite neo-liberal settlement (Barnett, 2011; Shattock, 2012).

In a neo-liberal political economy, policy seeks to structurally reform the public sector into markets and promote the apparent exit of the State (Brown, 2011; Kirkpatrick et al., 2005). Reform is predicated on the need to face up to inevitable and particular changes in the global economy (Steger, 2005) and is often accelerated as a consequence of limitations in State resource. This policy is both justified and underpinned by measures to improve accountability in respect of organisations that are publicly funded (Diefenbach, 2009; Shattock, 2012). Universities have faced the neo-liberal reform agenda or ‘marketisation’ (Williams, 1995; Brown, 2011) for some time (Olssen and Peters, 2005), the funding of increasingly mass participation (Silver, 1983: 183) in HE by the individual student rather than through general taxation, measures to support and empower student choice, the increasing selectivity and accountability in research funding, and in the argument for a greater contribution by universities to innovation and growth in the economy.

3.3.1.1 Marketisation

The seminal reports into HE since 1945 were each designed to shape the structure of HE in years to come (Tight, 2009). The Robbins Report (1963) was framed in anticipation of a necessary expansion in HE given the increasing numbers of those reaching the standard for university entry in the post-war baby boom. The Robbins Report (1963) embodied a post-war consensus for State support of all those qualified by ability and attainment to pursue HE
enshrined in the Anderson Report (1960) that created mandatory grants for undergraduate students. Subsequent policy related to periodic expansions of HE was forced to wrestle publicly and privately (Shattock, 2012) within this established principle.

The Dearing Report (1997) was produced out of one such wrestling match (Scott, 1995: 22) and was designed in a significantly different political climate to Robbins. By the mid 1990s the political consensus that supported increasing participation in HE was ‘log jammed’ when it came to how to fund any further expansion in financially straightened times (Shattock, 2012: 161). In its subsequent recommendation, to shift a greater proportion of costs onto students, the cross-party nominated Dearing Committee (1997) made an unsurprising break with Robbins (Tight, 2009), given that its rationale was to secure a funding settlement for universities and break the logjam. However, it was only in 2006 with the £3,000 top-up fees and provision for poorer students that something resembling Dearing’s proposals was finally introduced (THES, 2007).

The Browne Review (2010) was similar in aim to Dearing in that it sought to solve the issue of funding of universities and reported to a new government and one that also faced financial restraint, in the case of Browne, it was the Coalition Government intent on responding to the post-2008 financial crisis with dramatic public spending cuts. The Browne proposal to the transfer of almost the entire cost of the tuition from the State to the student was a politically expedient solution because it enabled a 40 per cent ‘cut’ to BIS by moving the cost of undergraduate student funding to a different balance sheet under the label ‘student loans’, although that did not prevent vocal opposition
(Edwards, 2010). Browne (2010) also proposed to establish a free market in which there was to be no limit on fees set by universities, provided they also offered bursaries and support to disadvantaged students. Given that the Treasury was still required to underwrite student loans, the policy eventually implemented by the Coalition government (2011) compromised on Browne by maintaining student number controls, alongside a recommended fee of around £7,000 and a maximum fee limit set at £9,000 (Shattock, 2012).

The sector’s subsequent and predictable unwillingness (Thompson and Bekhradnia, 2011) to self-rank fees between £7,500 and £9,000 subsequently led to the usual disincentives for breaching number controls and new additional incentives, the so called ‘core and margin’ approach, to force more meaningful differentiation. It is likely too that the fillip provided to private HE providers by the government’s decision to allow their students to access to State-backed student loans was in part to ‘creatively disrupt’ the sector, given its marked unwillingness to differentiate through fees (Thompson and Bekhradnia, 2012, 2013). The proposal by David Willetts announced by the Chancellor George Osborne in the Autumn Statement (December, 2013) to totally remove the cap on student numbers, funded initially by the sale of the student loan book, is another step toward marketisation. It is however considered to be an economically unsustainable one according to the Institute of Fiscal Studies (Crawford, et al., 2014). Further, it is likely to lead to the resurrection of the original Browne (2010) proposals for an unlimited fee regime by the elite universities, especially given their vocal opposition to increasing student numbers and need to generate additional income. The effect remains the transfer of the cost of undergraduate education from the State to the taxpayer
and the attempt to place ‘students at the heart of the system’ (Browne, 2010: 25) but as ‘consumers’ apparently exercising free choice in a functioning market (Brown, 2011).

Research policy was also relatively stable in the UK before 1985 (Shattock, 2012) despite financial pressures and the early signs of an appetite for selectivity in research policy evident in the Rothschild Report (1970). This was largely because the funding for teaching and research was considered to be coterminous, notably expressed in the Robbins report as ‘complementary and overlapping activities’ (1963: 557). However, the idea of every institution conducting research of equal value was inimical to a successfully performing market (Kogan and Hanney, 2000). The Thatcher governments were the first to strongly pursue the need for greater selectivity and greater accountability in research funding with the identification of an unaccountable black hole of £635m in 1984 in the UGC block grant that was notionally allocated to research (Shattock, 2012). This started with Cabinet Office in their review of government funded research in the early 1980s and was accelerated by UGC’s decision in 1985 to both account for research funding and seek to prioritise it to increase research quality (Shattock, 2012). The mechanism set up in the mid 1980s to drive selectivity in research, the Research Assessment Exercise, (RAE) and repeated at varying intervals (1992, 1996, 2001, 2008 and 2014) ever since, was designed to increase competition within and between universities (Henkel, 2000; Lucas, 2006), and through selectivity, rather than administrative design, to lead to the concentration of research in larger academic groupings (Shattock, 2012: 169). The current incarnation the Research Evaluation Framework (REF) that reports in 2014 has placed a much
stronger emphasis on the impact of research (Rebora and Turri, 2013) than previous exercises. However, the idea of impact from research featured in the review of the RAE (2001) by Sir Gareth Roberts (2003) and within a review of university and industry collaboration, the following year (Lambert, 2003). The latest impact agenda in REF has led to an increased administrative burden (THE, 2013) in an exercise that was already considered burdensome (Rebora and Turri, 2013). However, it is difficult to see how the need for accountability could be achieved without administration, burdensome or not.

RAE has had a number of paradoxical effects as a measure of research excellence. Its existence has tended to dramatically influence the choice of research fields, topics and methodological paradigms within universities in general (Henkel, 1999; Huisman et al., 2007; McNay, 2007) leading to increasingly mono-disciplinary (Fagerberg et al., 2012; Rafols et al., 2012) and mainstream (Martin and Whitley, 2010) research, with strong preference shown for research that was more likely to lead to publication suitable for RAE submission (Hopwood, 2008). RAE has also become a proxy measure of institutional reputation, affecting an institution’s ability to attract funding (Brinn et al., 2001) and academic staff (Broadbent, 2010) that in turn influences its future RAE or REF performance. This virtuous circle is to be expected, although RAE has also not been a level playing field (Butler, 2010) given that it makes a significant allowance for research environment and esteem in its measurement (Rebora and Turri, 2013). There is also the degree by which the system can be ‘gamed’ (Talib and Steele, 2000; Talib, 2003; Otley, 2010; Parker, 2011) that favours established research-intensive
universities and larger research groups and departments. This may be intentional.

The impact of the RAE as a symbol of the need for greater accountability and the surveillance of academic life has been much discussed. As mentioned previously, for many it is a policy that undermines the Haldane principle (1918) where the commissioning of research is the preserve of the academic acting autonomously, on which research excellence is predicated (Smith et al., 2011). However, it is worth noting that the function of the periodic assessment and the yearly allocation of research funds could not be carried out without the independent and voluntary support of the wider research community in the sector. It is academics that sit on the various panels adjudicating research bids and form part of the commissioning process, as well as the development of research foci in association with Government policy and consultations. Similarly, there is acknowledgement that academics have been able to game the RAE system to their benefit, either at an institutional level or individually in instrumental publication strategies or through networks that support research assessment (Hopwood, 2008). Therefore, the apparent loss of academic autonomy (Deem et al., 2007) can be overstated. The undoubted detrimental effects here are as likely to emerge between individual academics, as between institutions, advantages would tend to favour academics in research-intensive pre-1992 universities.

Ideologically synchronous with marketisation, although not its exclusive preserve (Neave, 1988) 1988), is the policy that seeks to make public organisations in receipt of public funding publicly accountable (Olssen and Peters, 2005), although this has been a particular priority in HE in the UK.
There are three reasons that this has been the case. Firstly, universities have been a relatively easy target, given the centralization of funds and their controlled and measureable distribution. Secondly, since 1981 universities have had to compete for any above inflation rises with other Government departments, they have been vulnerable to the need to account for funds that represent significant increases in comparison to other areas (Shattock, 2012: 188). Thirdly, the autonomy exercised by universities in the allocation of funding has long been perceived as a threat to the government policy of marketisation, and therefore attempts to bring the activities within universities to account, would be welcomed (Shattock, 2012).

This need for accountability has led to the introduction of measures to assess performance in many areas of university activity alongside the corresponding centralizing and corporatized structures and processes that enable this measurement (Henkel, 2000; Olssen and Peters, 2005; Tight, 2009; Martin and Whitley, 2010; Barnett, 2011). Accountability through ‘controls, regulation and performance measurement’ has been ‘the Trojan horse which […] has imposed restrictions on institutional [and individual academic] autonomy’ further encasing HE ‘in the framework of Government bureaucracy’ (Shattock, 2012: 210).

The increasing management and surveillance of individual academic performance (Barnett, 2011) have had an important impact on the academic working environment, individual academic autonomy and identity (Deem et al., 2007; Martin and Whitley, 2010). RAE in particular has triggered ‘the substantial changes in the management of the research function in universities and in academic professional culture’ (Henkel, 2000: 116). This is likely to
change significantly again with the Coalition government announcement (BIS, 2012) that it is seeking to implement the recommendations of the Finch Review (2012) for all publicly funded research to be ‘open access’ and in particular the preferred option in Finch that requires the author to pay a publishing fee to cover the costs of publication including peer review, the so-called ‘gold’ option (Mabe and Price, 2012). The debate is on-going, not least within parliament itself (Curry, 2013) given the highly critical report from the BIS select committee (BIS, 2013) but the intention of the Secretary of State is clear in his desire for ‘greater transparency to ensure a better deal for the taxpayers’ (Willetts, 2013). It is too early to say what compromises will be reached in implementation, although public reaction, for example from the Russell Group, has been negative (Russell Group, 2012) and concerns have been expressed in academe about the bypassing of existing practices that ensure rigour (Clarke et al., 2012).

3.3.1.2 University as economic actor

The requirement that universities support economic development more broadly (Shattock, 2012) and the knowledge economy in particular (Etzkowitz, 2003a) as part of the neo-liberal political economy, feature prominently in the policy discourse (Bridgman, 2007). For instance, as well as undoing the post-war consensus about the funding of HE (Tight, 2009: 86), which was breaking down at that time anyway, Dearing also required that ‘HE should be much more integrated with the wider society, especially the economy, than it has been’ (Barnett, 1999: 296). This integration extends to the provision of a highly educated workforce fit for industry, but is particularly concerned with

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research outputs that can be monetized (Slaughter and Leslie, 1997). Thus, if academic research has value then not only can it stand up ‘to the rigors of competition for limited funds’ (Olssen and Peters, 2005: 328) but it can also ‘increase responsiveness, flexibility and rates of innovation’ in the broader economy (Marginson, 1997: 5). It is the research-intensive universities that are particularly implicated in this role, given the centrality of research and its commercialization to the knowledge economy (Slaughter and Leslie, 1997).

The university support of the knowledge economy is often viewed in conflicting optimistic or pessimistic terms (Martin, 2012). For some this support is an opportunity for the university to take its rightful and central role in the knowledge economy (Clarke, 2004; Etzkowitz, 2004; Shattock, 2005). Representing ‘a normative change in science’ (Etzkowitz, 1998: 824), the university is only held back by the ‘inertia’ of the ‘loosely-coupled’ traditional university (Clarke, 2004: 170). For others the fundamental shift in the intellectual commons of the university is identified, as a significant threat to publicly funded basic research (Slaughter and Leslie, 1997; Barnett, 2003; 2011). There is evidence of a problem of support to the knowledge economy within universities, at individual academic level (Ambos et al., 2008), organisational level (Rohtaermel, et al., 2007; Perkman, et al., 2013) and even departmental level (Rasmussen et al., 2014), which has often been attributed to this conflict. However, each thesis underestimates the complex, intricate and often successful relationship between publicly funded research in universities and innovation in the economy more broadly (Mazzucato, 2014; Hewitt-Dundas, 2012; Perkman, et al., 2013). In the UK this relationship has been built on a more balanced view of knowledge as a potential source of both
competitive advantage and public good (Rasmussen et al., 2006: 531; Martin, 2012) that has not historically been an existential threat to the university or basic research (Martin, 2012).

3.3.1.3 Funding ‘crises’

The structure of funding for HE in the UK had been relatively settled for a number of years (Tight, 2009) until the recent changes in undergraduate student funding. The government, in the form of funding council grants has historically provided the majority of funding for teaching and research in universities, in the dual support system (Figure 5, p. 80). Tuition fees paid directly by the student, based on domicile and type of course, have progressively supplemented this income since the early 1980s. Similarly, universities have received research income from non-government sources, as well as supplementary income from rental and other commercial activities. In 2013, universities were still dependent on limited sources of income, not least government funding (Figure 6).

Figure 6       Sources of funding to HE, in England (HESA, 2014)
Universities have developed additional income from international student recruitment, postgraduate education, income generated from external organisations, through corporate education, consultancy and knowledge transfer outside first (research) and second stream (teaching) funding provided by the government, in order to maintain standards and provide capital for growth (Marginson and Considine, 2000; Shattock 2003; 2009). This non-government income, historically classified as third-stream income, however still only accounts for just over 30 per cent of the sector’s total income. As a result universities continue to be sensitive to funding crises in the broader public sector finances and any policies that seek to restrict government annual and structural deficit.

There have been two recognised and well-chronicled funding crises in HE in the UK in the institutional memory of the sector, at least among senior academics and which stand out in contrast to the significant improvement in both the amount and stability of funding since the late 1990s. The first was the cuts in university funding during Thatcher’s first government (1979-83) that was part of general Thatcherite attempt at retrenchment and re-structuring of public finances. In its role and in response, the UGC attempted to restructure the sector based on a more standardized unit cost between universities, to prioritize science and technology in the national economic interest and to start to focus research funding to a select number of institutions (Shattock, 2012). This subsequently caused major crises in the funding of some universities in particular and widespread destabilization in others. The second was during the Major government (1992-1997), when the combination of increasing student numbers and fiscal constraint in the face of recession led to a further funding
crisis in the sector (Tight, 2009; Shattock, 2012). By 1995, public funding per student had fallen from a baseline start of 100 in 1976 to 60 in 1995, with two significantly steep declines in 1981-1984 and again in 1989-1995 (NCIHE, 1997 (Dearing Report), chart 3.16). The National Committee of Inquiry into Higher Education (NCIHE) which became known as the Dearing Committee, was for some a CVCP success, given the reluctance of the political parties to examine how expansion in student numbers could be funded (Shattock, 2012: 133). Since the dramatic changes in the early 1980s, periodic public sector financial constraints have more often been used to provide a clear rationale for selectivity in research funding in terms of strategic areas and in its use to industry or widening participation targets (Tight, 2009; Shattock, 2012) rather than de-stabilize the system as a whole.

Since 1997, not only has funding been relatively settled for a number of years, it has also been a relatively generous and growing settlement in HE funding, particularly in research between 2002 and 2012 (Figure 7) designed to support innovation (Shattock, 2012. There was an increase through the introduction of variable tuition fees post-Dearing, and a strong upturn in international student recruitment, particularly postgraduate students, that has disproportionately benefited some of the leading universities (UUK, 2009).
It has been argued that this generous settlement has been significantly disturbed by financial constraints as a consequence of the financial crisis of 2008, and its aftermath in the Coalition Government’s fiscal tightening (Shattock, 2012) in an ‘age of austerity’, a so-called third crisis in funding. Between them the last Labour Government (2007-10) and the new Coalition Government (2010-) announced cuts to the HE budget totalling £1.2bn, to be implemented between 2010 and 2013. This was consolidated in the Comprehensive Spending Review (October 2010) that added a further £2.9bn cuts to the sector (Richardson, 2010). Additional cuts of £1.2bn have been made in the block grant between 2012 and 2013, representing a further cut of 15 per cent (Figure 7). These cuts have to some extent been alleviated by the relative stability in the non-capital budget for research albeit in cash rather than real terms, although this has had an impact (Figure 8).
Overall, the damage of any cuts to the teaching budget has been forestalled somewhat by the transfer of student funding from the State to the individual students, through a (currently) State-backed student loan. However, it has been argued recently that the proposed move to privatise the student loan book is in part the Department’s response to an apparent black-hole in funding of £900m caused in large part by the oversubscription of Home (UK domiciled) and EU (European Union domiciled) students in private HE colleges (McGettigan, 2013) and to prevent any further cuts prior to the 2015 election. None withstanding the instability caused by the complete transfer of the cost of tuition to the individual student and the reduction in real terms of the settlement for research, this HE in comparison to other publicly funded sectors, local government being one, is having a relatively good crisis. Furthermore,
universities in the UK, unlike some of their counterparts in France for example, are able to generate income from non-public sources.

3.3.2 Limits and differential impacts

The reform of HE in the UK has been sustained and persistent. However, policies that promote marketisation should not be mistaken for the existence of a functioning free market. This is because the power of individual students as ‘consumers’ is overestimated given their lack of knowledge about the differences between universities, despite the growth of league tables (Brown, 2011) and the relationship between cultural capital and educational aspiration (DiMaggio and Mohr, 1985). It continues to be the case that universities choose students more than students choose universities (Marginson, 1997; Bekhradnia, 2012). Similarly, research exercises to date have yet to complete the concentration of research into a few elite universities at the expense of others and the picture shows a ‘much more variegated and diverse system [of research] than national policies would imply’ (Shattock, 2012: 186). There is still a remarkable diversity in research in many universities outside those that are considered ‘research intensive’ and which account for the majority of research funding (Barnett, 2011; Shattock, 2012), although the current REF focus on funding research output of 3* publications and above may impact on this current diversity. Furthermore, as illustrated in the submission by UUK prior to the government’s 2013 CSR (Figure 9), concentration of funds is starting to increase again.
Whilst the impact of accountability on individual academic autonomy is marked and the threat to the independence of some poorly performing universities is very real, research has shown that the HE system in the UK on measures that include organisational, financial, staff and academic autonomy, is the most autonomous in Europe (Esterman et al., 2011). The measures most associated with accountability have for some ‘too often been compromised in their effectiveness’ by institutional autonomy (Shattock, 2012: 240). However, whilst there has been considerable change, the ‘hierarchies of institution […] are still pretty much intact’ and the ‘underlying values – of academic freedom and institutional autonomy, of the importance of teaching and research remain; though, as so often, under threat’ (Tight, 2009: 3). These are significant

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5 UUK Submission to the Comprehensive Spending Review, 2013: 17
‘continuities of practice’ that reach across a long period (Tight, 2009: 3), in the midst of persistent reform.

There is an argument that public policy and reform in HE has been destabilising for the sector as a whole (Brown, 2011) but what is often missing from this argument is acknowledgement that reform has had a disproportionate effect on different parts of the sector (Tight, 2009) and has consistently benefitted some universities at the expense of others. The former polytechnics took the strain in expansion in HE in the 1980s and early 1990s often putting in low bids for larger numbers of students and eroding their already low unit cost (Shattock, 2012). Even when rates were equalised across the sector, the heavily expanded former polytechnics had poor resource positions that they have found difficult to escape, not least because of their inability to take advantage of international student recruitment that carried a fee premium. These post-1992 universities remain heavily dependent on teaching income from UK undergraduates and subsequent changes or turbulence in this income stream disproportionately affects them. Whilst there is little evidence that the introduction of student fees has, at least in the short-term deterred the appetite or significantly reduced the number of applicants despite initial pessimism (Thompson and Bekhradnia, 2013), it did reduce applications from mature and part-time students, which constitutes a much higher proportion of the intake for the post-1992 than for the traditional universities. The turbulence caused by the measures offering unlimited recruitment of higher performing ‘A’ level students in the ‘core and margin’ policy despite initial problems, was destined to suit the traditional universities more. Any moves to make improved student choice (Browne, 2010) given that HE is a high credence service, favours
particular institutions with an elite reputation (Riley and de Chernatony, 2000). Taken together this tends to privilege already well-resourced pre-1992 universities, at the expense of post-1992 universities.

Similarly, selectivity in research, leading to further concentration in research funding overwhelmingly favours the pre-1992 universities and the golden triangle of Oxford, Cambridge and Imperial in particular. A funding model for research that increasingly focuses on Intellectual Property (IP), its development and exploitation (Lockett and Wright, 2005) suits universities with stronger blue chip links and networks, backed up by centralised and well-supported research commercialisation operations (Siegel et al., 2003) or highly research-intensive institutions (Hewitt-Dundas, 2012). Measures that promote further selectivity and research impact in particular disproportionately favour pre-1992 universities, not least because these universities have built links with industrial partners at all levels of research-intensity and to scale, not just in terms of support to management education or small business engagement common in the third-stream activities of the post-1992s (Hewitt-Dundas, 2012).

Furthermore, the continuity of practice to which Tight (2009) refers needs qualification. It remains the case that ‘managerialism’ or ‘the shift of power from senior academics and their departments to the central institution and the dominance of systems over academic values’ (Kogan, 2002) has been a corollary to reform in HE and much in evidence in the sector. However, it is far more embedded in the former polytechnics, because centralised and managerial control is, in large part, continuity of practice from their inception under local authority control (Shattock, 2012). The pre-1992 universities on the other hand
maintain some of the structures and ethos of collegiality despite the rise of the ‘manager academic’ identified by Deem and Brehony (2005) and the expansion of the professional and administrative functions in these universities (Shattock, 2012).

3.3.3 Summary

There has been remarkable consistency in public policy in the UK since the Thatcher governments of the 1980s. Policy built within a neoliberal paradigm has been predicated on the need for public sector reform, the introduction of markets and accountability measures for public funding. HE in the UK has long been subject to this reform agenda.

Marketisation has resulted in first the introduction of student tuition fees, then the transfer of the cost of tuition from the State to the individual student, although in the form of State backed loans and more recently the slow removal of the cap on student numbers. This is by no means a functioning market (Brown, 2011), although students are expected to take advantage of the choice that this market apparently provides them, as consumers. Universities have simultaneously been unwilling to rank themselves according to fee level and fees remain close to the limit of £9,000 in most institutions. Within research, the pursuit of greater selectivity and accountability in research funding, has led to the introduction of progressively more onerous research assessment exercises. Accountability measures have been persistently pursued in HE, partly because of HE’s requirement for above inflation funding, partly because funding is easily controlled and partly because the autonomy of universities has been a challenge to successive government’s reform. The impact of research assessment has been extensive, triggering changes in the
management of research in universities. The recent REF (2014) was concerned with measurement of the ‘impact’ of research, although signalled in 2003; this was a significant change in assessment that increased the burden of assessment still further. Significant reform is set to continue, not least with the introduction of ‘open access’ publication following the Finch Review (2012) that has had an adverse reaction in the sector. The university has also since the 1980s been required to support economic activity more broadly and the knowledge economy in particular, through the commercialisation of its research. This has often been viewed problematically within universities, but not as an existential threat to the university or basic research.

The structure of public funding in HE has been relatively settled for a number of years until the recent changes in undergraduate funding. There have been two funding crises in the living memory of those at a senior level in the sector, including early in the Thatcher government in the 1980s and later in the Major Government in the early 1990s. There followed a period of relative financial stability and even a generous settlement, including the financial fillip provided by the expansion of tuition fees post 2005. Recently, the restraint placed on public finances following the financial crisis post 2008 has led, particularly in the recent Coalition Government, to reductions in the capital budget for research, for instance.

The reform of HE in the UK has been sustained and persistent. However, this reform has limits and differential impacts. There is not a fully functioning market in HE and the reforms that have been introduced to support marketisation tend to favour the more ‘prestigious’ pre 1992 universities. The impact of research assessment has often been overstated and there remains
considerable academic and institutional autonomy in research, particularly in those universities that have high concentrations of research power and institutional arrangements that support autonomy, such as the pre 1992 universities. The pursuit of measures of excellence in research and the concomitant selectivity in funding also favours the ‘research-intensive’ universities and individual academics, who have that concentration or research power, but who are also are better able to ‘game’ the assessment process. Similarly, despite periodic funding crises and the undoubtedly difficult reduction in the capital budgets for research that have been introduced in the Coalition Government, in comparison with other publicly funded sectors, HE could be considered to be having a relatively good crisis. Universities in the UK, unlike their counterparts in other parts of Europe, also have access to extra sources of funding, particularly those per-1992 universities that has consistently recruited international students for a long period.

3.4 Implications for research methodology

The setting of HE in the UK is a suitable one in which to examine strategy as an intertextual narrative, because it enables a greater focus on plurivocality and temporality than has previously been considered. It is a setting where strategy is drawn in a fuller expression of ‘a discourse of direction’ that includes notions of the past, as well as the present and the future, and where strategy is drawn over a longer time period than is typical within most existing studies. In HE in the UK there are many voices operating on many levels, autonomous public and equally powerful actors operating at the blurred boundary between policy and strategy, drawing upon historically constructed narratives of the university that are available and dichotomously resonant. There is also a degree
of conflict and agitating disorder in both the direction and impact of policy, together with periodic funding crises. At the same time there is continuity of practice. Consequently, a study of how strategy as an inter textual narrative acquires stability and routine in HE in the UK, has the potential to provide insight. A closer examination of the setting has also shown how that study can be delineated.

There is a case for the narrative of the traditional university being the ‘true’ narrative of HE in the UK. The traditional narrative of university is also one that has a particular English elite rather than Scottish democratic flavour despite the incorporation of a European technical tradition. It is a narrative that is exclusively associated with the pre-1992 or ‘research-intensive’ universities. Research is also central to the narrative of the ‘enterprise university’ dominant in the policy discourse, and it is the research-intensive universities that are singled out to be central and particular players in the knowledge economy. It makes sense therefore to focus an enquiry on strategy as an intertextual narrative on research policy and within pre-1992 universities.

HE policy in the UK changed periodically but it is the change in 1979 that has a particular resonance not least the move to a mass HE system and the introduction of research assessment (Tight, 2009; Shattock, 2012). In line with the Thatcher neo-liberal political settlement, there has been remarkable consistency in policy from subsequent governments of differing political flavour, including the Labour governments (1997-2010) and the new Coalition government (2010-) that has been much remarked upon. However, it is 1992 that provides the watershed in respect of the research question, because it was the removal of the binary divide in 1992 that changed the nature of
intertextuality in the setting. This removal heralded the start of collective, professionalized and public lobbying by the traditional universities, supplementary to their long-established private access. As a result, whilst there are many equally powerful, autonomous and usually public actors, each with practiced access to an established narrative infrastructure and the differing and competing narrative building blocks within it, it is the mission groups and notably the Russell Group that have made a significant change to this practiced access.
Chapter 4 – Research philosophy and methods

4.0 Introduction

Research methodology is defined as the strategy behind the choice of methods to collect and analyse data and is not created in isolation (Crotty, 1998). It is a consequence of a theoretical perspective that provides a context for both the process of research and the basis for any consequent claims. It is also, some would argue, dependent on the relationship the researcher may have to the subject of study (Crotty, 1998). At the heart of any theoretical perspective is an opinion about how knowledge is developed or what it means to know (epistemology) (Saunders et al., 2003; Bryman and Bell, 2007; Easterby-Smith et al., 2008) and underpinning this opinion is a philosophy about the nature of reality (ontology). This is not straightforward, because the ‘study of being’ and a concern with ‘what is’ and with ‘the structure of reality’ is often embedded in our epistemology or ‘the way of understanding and explaining how we know what we know’ (Crotty, 1998: 10) and each has implications for the other (Saunders et al., 2007). It is acknowledged that some consideration must be given to ‘philosophical issues’, because ‘failure to think [these issues] through, while not necessarily fatal, can seriously affect’ both the efficacy of the research design and ‘the quality of management research’ (Easterby-Smith et al., 2008: 56). What is required as a prerequisite of quality in research is therefore a ‘thinking through’ of some of the philosophical issues within methodology in organisational research. This is not novel territory and acknowledgment needs to be given to the accounts that have already been made as well as to maintain a clarity and transparency throughout this chapter.
The difference between ontologies and therefore epistemologies is often characterised as whether ‘reality’ is external or internal to the individual and whether reality is something else, either the product of one’s mind (Burrell and Morgan, 1979:1) or ‘socially constructed’, particularly through language (Berger and Luckmann, 1967). This difference is widely accepted as constituting the basis of the two most influential paradigms (Kuhn, 1970) within organisational research, labelled as ‘objectivist’ and ‘subjectivist’ (Burrell and Morgan, 1979). It has been argued that plotting the assumptions of researchers within and through these paradigms, leads to ‘four possible paradigmatic positions – functionalist, interpretative, radical humanist and radical structuralist - in organisational research’ (Bryman and Bell, 2007: 26; Burrell and Morgan, 1979). There is disagreement about whether a synthesis between these positions can be achieved, with Burrell and Morgan (1979) in particular arguing for the maintenance of paradigm incommensurability to protect the diversity of scientific thought (Jackson and Carter, 1991) and others showing the benefit of using a multiple paradigm model to provide different insights (Hassard, 1991) although without necessarily collapsing the difference (Johnson and Duberley, 2000). There are many reasons to ‘bridge’ the differences although too few attempts (Buchanan and Bryman, 2007) and the ‘paradigm wars’ remain, although after many years are characterised as being currently in the form of a ‘cold war’ (Yanow and Ybema, 2009). One positive consequence of the debate about difference has been to create ‘an invigorating space’ for each of the approaches, as well as requiring a better account of the choice of research methodology of researchers in whichever particular ‘trench’
(Yanow and Ybema, 2009: 53). Each has the potential to improve organisational research.

Within the existing paradigmatic positions, the approach taken here is broadly social constructionist and ‘subjectivist’ and conducted with assumptions most associated with interpretative research, where all observation is theory- and value-laden and that investigation of the social world is not, and cannot be, the pursuit of detached objective truth’ (Leitch et al., 2010: 57). It is an approach that is philosophically grounded in a hermeneutic tradition. I have written sections of this chapter in the first person, in contrast to the rest of the thesis, since I wanted to provide a clearly reflexive and open account of the choices I have made during the course of the research.

The chapter is structured as follows. I first consider the theoretical assumptions on which the methodology is based. I then discuss the research design, outlining the appropriateness of a qualitative method and giving some consideration to the issue of quality, as well as my role as the researcher. I include a discussion of how the research is bounded in a case study and the selections I made in terms of the case as a whole, the policy ‘period’, the two universities chosen with the overall case, the interview participants and the ‘texts’. I go on to outline the process of data ‘collection’ and analysis, including how I identified and isolated the key policy documents and conducted the semi-structured interviews and the means by which I conducted an analysis of three facets of intertextuality. I conclude the chapter with further reflections on the challenges of the methodology chosen.
4.1 Research in a hermeneutic tradition

In ontological terms what is adopted here is an approach that is broadly social constructionist, in which it is accepted that the social world is produced and maintained between people, through their activities and interactions, in language (Berger and Luckmann, 1967). In this way, social actors have a role in fashioning each social reality; there are few pre-givens, such as government or university that confront interpretation as externalities (Weinberg, 2008). However, the promise that social constructionism offers to organisation studies needs to be carefully delineated (Czarniawska, 2008: 6). The approach here is built on Barbara Czarniawska’s interpretation of Berger and Luckmann, where it is not that reality is a social construction, rather it is that ‘there are a great many co-constructors whose ideas about reality differ’ and in this way ‘reality has no essence [and] is constantly re-constructed’ (Czarniawska, 2008: 6) (emphasis added). It is this idea that people construct their worlds and institutions and that knowledge is socially constructed that is essential to the study of organisations (Czarniawska, 2008: 6). This delineation makes social constructionism ‘a promising epistemological program’ with the assumption that reality remains (perpetually) under construction (Czarniawska, 2008: 6).

This is not to avoid ontology but to use the term when it may illuminate rather than obfuscate. This broadly interpretivist approach is conceived within an on-going hermeneutic tradition, and particularly one that follows Paul Ricoeur’s interpretation and development of Hans-Georg Gadamer’s (1900-2002) work.

Hermeneutics is understood as a concern with the systematic study of how we interpret things; invoke meaning and gain understanding, and is
acknowledged as an experience we reach through language and text (Alvesson and Sköldberg, 2009: 122). There have been a number of approaches to interpretation in hermeneutic enquiry. In early incarnation of modern hermeneutics by Wilhelm Dilthey (1833-1911) among others, it was taken that all texts in whatever form are expressions of human meaning. The reader or researcher achieved understanding of individuals and the meaning they placed in the text, through ‘a congenitally intuitive’, empathetic re-enactment (Einfühlung) of ‘a past experience’ (Alvesson and Sköldberg, 2009: 94), in a historical interpretation. Dilthey’s search was therefore for Erlebnis (lived experience) in a form of cultural and sometimes spiritual analysis. It was Hans-Georg Gadamer (1900-2002), drawing upon his own interpretation of Martin Heidegger’s (1889-1976) move into the existential hermeneutic of ‘Dasein’ (or Being) who developed a return to historical hermeneutic interpretation (Crotty, 1998: 100) and linked them.

For Gadamer, the reader ‘projects before himself a meaning for the text as a whole as soon as some initial meaning emerges in the text’ (Gadamer, 1975: 722). The reader approaches a part of a text, forms an interpretation of that part based on an imagined or supposed whole, gains a further sense of the whole, and reads successive parts in this way, in what is known as the ‘hermeneutic circle’ or circle of interpretation. Further and more importantly, the reader always sees something ‘as’ something, he cannot ‘just look’ because he is always in possession of an interpretation, a pre-understanding in which language is central (Gadamer, 1975). In Heideggerian terms, the reader is thus ‘situated’. To enter this somewhat vicious circle or to interpret, requires the reader to construct a way into the circle, to invoke meaning rather than simply
and unknowingly pre-conceive of or prejudice (pre-judge) meaning (Gadamer, 1975). This invocation of meaning or interpretation occurs against the background of our prior involvement and is for Gadamer ‘an effect’ of history. The essence of Gadamer’s thought according to Rundell (1995) is that we stand in a tradition and tradition is a fusion of horizons of past and present. The past and the present need not be consciously brought together, since the past is always present in the present. Meaning is invoked by moving back and forth, linking another existential world with our own reference system in a constant attention in a ‘fusion of horizons’ (Gadamer, 1989a: 306-307). In this fusion, tradition is ‘actually the achievement of language’ (Gadamer, 1989: 378, 389). Tradition ‘depends on being constantly assimilated and interpreted’, so that very interpretation ‘has to adapt […] to the hermeneutic circle it belongs’ (Gadamer, 1989: 397). This is what Gadamer calls *wirkungsgeschichtliches Bewußtsein* or ‘historically affected consciousness’ (Crotty, 1998: 100) and as a result, understanding in a hermeneutic sense is ‘to be thought of less as a subjective act than as participating in an event of tradition, a process of transmission in which past and present are constantly mediated’ (Gadamer, 1989b: 290). In ontological terms this ‘historically affected consciousness’ is our reality and epistemologically, interpretation is always a partial and historically situated account, mediated through language (Crotty, 1998: 121).

Similarly, Paul Ricoeur (1913-2005) acknowledges the essence of the hermeneutic circle, where interpretation ‘proceeds from a prior understanding of the very thing that it tries to understand by interpreting it’ (Ricoeur, 1984: 52) and emphasises that language in any symbolic or communicative form, carries meaning that can be uncovered through interpretation (Kearney, 1991: ...
However, in his attempt to take better account of temporality he departs from Gadamer, and in his work on *Time and Narrative* (1984-88) for Ricoeur the fusion of horizons in tradition is an achievement of narrative, and he thereby introduces the notion of narrative time. If the present is ‘an event [or discourse] of tradition’, it is so because it is given expression through narrative. This is the moment that historical time becomes human time ‘*to the extent that it is articulated through a narrative mode, and narrative attains its full significance when it becomes a condition of temporal existence*’ (Ricoeur, 1984: Time and Narrative: Vol. 1: 52). It is on this basis that in narrative, uniquely, ‘understanding’ can be reconciled with ‘explanation’ (Polkinghorne, 1988) in a ‘hermeneutical arc’ (Crotty, 1998: 94), a way of telling and a means of knowing (Bruner, 1986; Polkinghorne, 1988).

The research is acknowledged as built within a theoretical perspective that has its roots in the hermeneutic tradition as outlined. It is similarly recognisably embedded in and sympathetic with the social constructionist position taken by Barbara Czarniawska (2006). This is therefore also part of the broader ‘linguistic turn’ in organisation studies (Alvesson and Karreman, 2000; Deetz, 2003; Czarniawska, 2004).

**4.2 Research design**

**4.2.1 Introduction**

The research methodology is qualitative (Saunders *et al.*, 2007), as appropriate to the theoretical perspective. The focus of this qualitative enquiry has been on the construction and interpretation of texts that could provide insight into strategy as an intertextual narrative within HE and the university. Text has
been constructed and interpreted, through interview and document review, including government policy documents between 1992-2012.

What I understand qualitative methodology to be is a ‘situated activity’ that locates the researcher ‘as an observer in the world […] using a set of interpretive, material practices that make the world visible’ (Denzin and Lincoln, 2003: 3), not least my own. Evaluating the quality of this or any other method is concerned primarily with the quality of the data collection or construction to be consistent with the interpretative paradigm, analysis and theory building (Amis and Silk, 2008).

There are however particular challenges to this qualitative method. Quality in qualitative research requires reflexivity (Guba and Lincoln, 1981) in a way that brings the reader into a consciousness of construction (Gergen and Gergen, 2007: 467). The researcher therefore needs to acknowledge the multiple selves brought to the research setting – research-based selves; brought selves (the selves that historically and socially created our standpoints) and situationally-created selves (Reinharz, 1997: 5). It is only through this level of interrogation that we understand how the research is being shaped around frameworks in all their contradictions and binaries that form our own lives (Reinharz, 1997).

In pursuing a hermeneutic enquiry, there are two ways in which I am located as ‘researcher’ that offer an important impetus to reflexivity. Firstly, I am drawing attention to different and many narratives, including my own attempt as researcher to ‘creatively re-describe […] the world such that hidden patterns and hitherto unexplored meanings can unfold’ (Kearney, 2002: 12). It is a description that is acknowledged as partial and storied (Czarniawska,
1998). Secondly, I am acknowledging an epistemology that ‘the knower and respondent co-create understandings’ (Denzin and Lincoln, 2003: 35), a means by which the organisation is brought to life or ‘subjectively and inter-subjectively [perpetually] constructed’ rather than being regarded as ‘an object of study’ (Rhodes and Brown, 2005: 178).

In this process I have also been concerned to reflect on what I have brought to the role of researcher. I entered the HE sector after a career in industry, with a memory of a past university, albeit a halcyon one from my student days at Oxford in the 1980s, updated to some extent as a postgraduate student at a different Russell Group university in the early 2000s. It was during my work as a manager between 2002 and 2009 in first a research-intensive university and then a teaching-intensive university, that I became more intimately aware of the subtle nuance between university ‘types’ and the different narratives of the university that I have described earlier (Chapter 3). My decision to pursue an academic career in 2010 caused another transition that further stimulated my reflexive awareness. I have drawn on my different roles – in industry and in the university as a student, manager, apprentice academic and researcher in my reflection and have noticed the different contexts of each, or at a more essentialist level, the ‘traditions’ of each. I also note that this insight might be the result of a framing that has progressed from my deeper engagement with that nature of reality and knowledge, as part of my doctoral work, outlined earlier.

In addition to the reflection on my own journey as a researcher and understanding of the world, which I have attempted to chronicle reflexively, there are two acknowledged criteria that I have used to assist reflection on
quality in qualitative methodology, namely *trustworthiness* and *authenticity* (Guba and Lincoln, 1994). These are essential criteria that form the ‘contingent evaluation’ required of qualitative methodology (Johnson et al., 2006: 147; Amis and Silk, 2008).

A piece of research is trustworthy if it is credible; both in terms of the account that the researcher arrives at, but also that the research has been carried out using good practice (Guba and Lincoln, 1994). I have developed my research using a number of well-known good practices to improve its credibility. The research has been designed and conducted so that *triangulation* is at its heart, as a way of improving trustworthiness, by adding depth and breadth (Denzin and Lincoln, 2008), for example by reviewing the bulk of the policy and corporate documents prior to interview, and seeking a triangulation between ‘texts’ including and within the interview text in construction. Further, it has included making and noting observations as they occur through reflection on the data, because it provides a way of improving the dependability of the research process (Lincoln and Guba, 1985; Guba and Lincoln, 1994). The extent and depth of the study carried out, in terms of the period of policy studied, the corpus constructed, including in-depth interviews undertaken, provides the basis for ‘thick description’ or rich accounts of the details of a culture (Geertz, 1973) that improves wider understanding (Guba and Lincoln, 1994) and makes the account credible.

Research is authentic if it represents different viewpoints in the social setting fairly (Cope, 2005). In my research, for example, this has meant being mindful if one particular group is being privileged and making sure that by interviewing throughout the university different viewpoints could be included.
The viewpoints taken into account are those that appear to have salience in the policy nexus. Furthermore, authenticity can be achieved by providing better understanding of the organisations in which we work and in a way that has practical relevance, particularly if it helps members within the social setting gain a better perspective of others within the same social setting (Guba and Lincoln, 1994).

### 4.2.2 The bounded nature of the research – a case study

I have chosen to construct my research in a comparative case study (Yin, 2009) which for the sake of clarity is considered as a research design, only in that the case is a bounded unit of analysis (Stake, 2008) within a context and which involves the collection (by which I mean construction) of empirical data from multiple sources (Robson, 2002: 178; Fitzgerald and Dopson, 2009). The unit of analysis is the ‘narrative of the university’. Case study allows me to study the organisation and the context in which is at the centre of the research question. It is also useful when ‘the boundaries between the phenomenon and context are not clearly evident’ (Yin, 2003: 23) for instance within the policy nexus of HE (Shattock, 2012). It is particularly helpful where there is a need to gain a rich understanding of the processes being enacted, at multi-levels (Yin, 1984) over time (Fitzgerald and Dopson, 2009: 468; Martin, 2012). Case study provides for depth, rather than breadth and thereby the opportunity for ‘thick description’ through close observation of the culture and through an on-going process of interpretation and analysis (Geertz, 1973). The use of case study fits with the interpretative paradigm and research strategy adopted, precisely because it is a means of addressing context and complexity (Yin, 1994).
Case study research is often portrayed as having an ‘external validity’ or ‘generalisability’ problem (Stark and Torrance, 2005) despite the significant role in organisational study played by theory built from single or multiple cases (Eisenhardt and Graebner, 2007). This is to understand ‘generalisability’ in subjectivist terms in which the case study is often an inadequately representative sample of one (Bryman and Bell, 2007) and not legitimate for general theoretical claims (Miles & Huberman, 1984). There have been three approaches to unlocking the ‘generalisability’ problem. One is to simply ignore the problem as not applicable within qualitative methodology. Case study instead is the researcher’s narrative, which although theory-light, promotes a form of tacit understanding when shared (Stake, 1978). A second and widespread approach is to consider case studies as ‘analytically generalisable’ (Yin, 2009: 15), where the predicted results occur in a number of carefully selected cases or contrary results are produced but for predictable reasons (Tsouskas, 1989: 556). In this way, the research strategy can be theory-rich where the design of the case study is central to theory building (Eisenhardt, 1989). This is essentially an imitation of the logic of experimental research designs, which is drawn from an objectivist research paradigm. What is proposed here is a third approach that instead of treating particular cases as mere manifestations of generic concepts or ignoring any potential theoretical contribution, an attempt is made to find the ‘epistemic significance of the particular to shape the general’ (Tsoukas, 2009: 298). What is available from this approach is so called heuristic generalisations that offer ‘new and more incisive distinctions’ of the ‘general’, to think ‘analogically’, ‘testing’ conceptions of ‘what is going on’ through proximity to and feedback within the
study’ (Flyvberg, 2004: 392). ‘Moving up and down’ between ‘experienced reality and conceptual grasp’ refines understanding and explanation, in ‘analytical refinement’ (Tsoukas, 2009: 299). Decisions around selection within the case can be considered part of this refinement and are discussed in the next section.

4.2.3 Selection issues

4.2.3.1 Setting

As discussed in Chapter 2, to improve understanding of strategy as an intertextual narrative it would be helpful to focus on a setting where temporality is lengthened and plurivocality is enabled. HE provides one such setting, as outlined earlier (Chapter 3). There are many narrative building blocks concerning the purpose of universities (Barnett, 2011; Martin, 2012; Shattock, 2012) that are both available and also have resonance in terms of probability and fidelity. There are many equally powerful, autonomous and usually public actors, each with practiced access to an established narrative infrastructure and the differing and competing narrative building blocks within it (Shattock, 2012). HE is also a setting in which strategy is drawn in a fuller expression of ‘a discourse of direction’ that includes notions of the past, as well as the present and the future and where strategy is drawn over a longer time period than is typical within most of the existing studies. In addition, it is a setting, as discussed in Chapter 3, in which there has been a degree of ‘agitating disorder’, and periodically subject to disruptive policy and financial crisis (Scott, 1995; Tight, 2009; Shattock, 2012) over many years. There has nonetheless been a remarkable continuity and consistency in the practice of strategy in universities (Tight, 2009; Shattock, 2012), alongside its thrust and
apparently unambiguous direction (Barnett, 2011; Holmwood, 2011). It is therefore a setting where the narrative infrastructure might be expected to have acquired a ‘degree of stability and routine’ (Fenton and Langley, 2011).

4.2.3.2 Policy time-frame

The policy context under consideration covers a period of twenty years (1992–2012). The focus is the government’s policy on research, science and innovation in particular, but also takes into account the periodic reviews of HE in general. The focus on research in policy as discussed previously (Chapter 3) is appropriate because of its implication in the two dichotomous narratives of the university. The focus on the general reforms in HE is included because it is those reforms that encourage wider contribution to debates about the university, distilled in the various government policy papers (Shattock, 2012: Tight, 2009).

HE policy in the UK has been subject to perpetual change. Any historical period would present a picture of disruption, relative to and resonant in its time. However, it is the change in 1979 that has a particular pertinence for this study. The remarkable consistently in public policy since then (Tight, 2009; Barnett, 2011) is not unusual within a historical context, it is however different to that which preceded it. It can be argued that the current Coalition government in the UK is in many ways intensifying the direction of travel established by the Labour governments of the previous thirteen years that in turn had accepted the Thatcherite neo-liberal settlement in 1979 (Barnett, 2011; Shattock, 2012). Thus, whilst research policy was relatively stable in the UK before 1979 (Shattock, 2012) despite financial pressures and the early signs of an appetite for selectivity in research policy evident in the Rothschild Report
policy changed in the mid 1980s. The key change was to the process of research funding. As discussed in chapter 3, the Research Assessment Exercise, (RAE) and recently renamed the Research Excellence Framework (REF), introduced in the mid-1980s and repeated at varying intervals (1992, 1996, 2001, 2008 and 2014) placed an increasing emphasis on accountability and selectivity. Similarly, universities have faced the neoliberal reform agenda or ‘marketisation’ (Williams, 1995; Olssen and Peters, 2005; Brown, 2011) for example in the funding of increasingly mass participation (Silver, 1983: 183) in HE and the slow transfer of the cost to the individual student rather than through general taxation and measures to support and empower student choice, as ‘consumers’ of HE (Brown, 2011). Within the neoliberal liberal economy universities were required to support economic development more broadly (Shattock, 2012) and the knowledge economy in particular (Etzkowitz, 2003a). It is a period of reform that has seen the views of ‘multiple audiences carrying multiple agendas […] embedded into policy [in a new] global age’ that has included an on going ‘liberalisation’ of HE. (Barnett, 1999: 294). However, within this period of reform 1992 provides the key watershed in respect of the research question.

In terms of research and the role of the university in the economy (Shattock, 2012) the Science and Technology White Paper ‘Realising Our Potential’ in John Major’s Government in the parliamentary session 1992-1993 provides a defining moment. In terms of the structure of HE and mass participation, the removal of the binary divide in 1992 stands out among much of the reform in HE. These two policy ‘events’ mark out 1992 as the point in which the nature of intertextuality in the setting was changed. The developing
narrative of a neoliberal and enterprise university became increasingly implicated in policy and research policy in particular, bringing with it a competing narrative of the university. The removal of the binary divide heralded the start of collective, professionalised and public lobbying by the traditional universities, supplementary to their long-established private access. It was activity made in counterpoint to the ‘new’ universities and changed the nature of the practiced access to narrative infrastructure and the differing and competing narrative building blocks within the setting. This marks out policy post-1992 as of particular interest (Tsoukas, 2009). It has been important too, to include the most up to date manifestation of this policy by the Coalition government formed in 2010. This marks a period that includes five different governments and of three different political groupings, Conservative, Labour and Conservative-Liberal Democrat Coalition, and which allows for some understanding of differences and similarities over time, adding depth and breadth to the enquiry (Denzin and Lincoln, 2008).

4.4.3.3 Participating universities

As discussed in Chapter 3, the HE sector in the UK today is a diverse one, since there are many different types of institution operating as universities (Scott, 1994; Tight, 2009). Further, the different types are often categorised based on their origin in an esoteric classification that is subtly maintained and adeptly negotiated within the sector itself. However, it is the narrative of the ‘traditional’ university that is both available and distinctly resonant as the ‘true’ narrative of the university, a result of its relation to the past and the mythical golden age it reifies (Barnett, 2011; Martin, 2012). Universities associated with this ‘true’ narrative tend to be those that existed as universities
before 1992 and self-classify as research-intensive. Two universities were chosen within the case in an attempt to improve the potential to ‘extend our understanding of the phenomenon at hand’ (Tsoukas, 2009: 299). The similarities and differences are outlined below (Figure 10). Each is self-classified as research-intensive and belongs to the same mission group, is a ‘multiversity’ (Kerr, 1963 (1995)) and operates in the same policy context in the UK. However, each is slightly different in its historical origin.

Figure 10  Similarities and differences between participating universities

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Similarities</th>
<th>Differences</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Type</strong></td>
<td>Mission Group</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Governance structure</td>
<td>Civic / New Civic</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Structure</strong></td>
<td>Similar model</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Senior Management</strong></td>
<td>Newly appointed VC</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SMT, long association</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>with sector</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Functional Heads</strong></td>
<td>Long association with</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>home institution</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Academics</strong></td>
<td>Long association with</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>home institution</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Policy planning</strong></td>
<td>Same cycle</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Strong links with</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>government</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Same policy context</strong></td>
<td>Same policy context</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Different historical origin</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

This is relevant because the narrative that underscores the notions of the university today is influenced by the past (Barnett, 2001; Martin 2012) and therefore relevant in intertextuality. This makes the process of interest in the research more transparently observable (Pettigrew, 1988). The difference between the two universities is one of origin: one is a founding civic university
and one is a former University College and early campus university or ‘new’ civic (Scott, 1994).

4.2.3.4 Interview participants

As discussed in Chapter 3 there are many equally powerful, autonomous and public actors shaping policy and university strategy in HE in the UK, each with practiced access to an established narrative infrastructure and the differing and competing narrative building blocks within it (Shattock, 2012). These actors are interdependent and operate within this nexus of policy, in private and in public.

The participants were chosen from different groups within the university, including senior leaders, managers, and academics, covering all levels. Also included were policy-makers outside the university, that had operated within one or more of the last four administrations, including the current Coalition Government. Each participant was also selected for his or her ‘situatedness’ within the policy nexus. Taken together this offered the potential for insight into different narrators and audiences (Brown, 1986; Brown and Kreps, 1993). Each participant, as well as being a member of a particular group also had, by virtue of that membership, a particular role in his or her respective organisations as narrators of policy and strategy. In this way sampling was ‘selective’ i.e. a ‘calculated decision to sample a specific locale according to a preconceived but reasonable initial set of dimensions (such as time, space, identity or power) which are worked out in advance for a study’ and not ‘theoretical or purposeful’ in a grounded theory sense (Glaser, 1978: 37). Interview participants could be considered ‘informants’ best able to provide details on both policy and strategy (Cassells, 2009) at different levels within
different parts of the policy nexus and at different levels within the university (Table 3), offering a form of triangulation (Denzin and Lincoln, 2008).

Table 3 Participants in interview by role

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Senior Management/ Faculty Heads</th>
<th>Senior Academics</th>
<th>Functional Heads</th>
<th>Policy</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Case 1</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>18</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Case 2</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>18</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>6</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>42</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Within each university it was common for chosen participants, both at a senior and non-senior level, to have had direct and on-going engagement with policy, either in ad-hoc government policy reviews, through submissions to select committees, meetings with Ministers, or more frequently as members of a committee of the relevant research councils or within HEFCE. This is the nature of how HE operates as a system in the UK, where peer-review has formed the basis of how research is funded and assessed. In this way insight into the blurred boundary between the setting and the organisation was actively sought from relatively autonomous public actors. This selection improved the likelihood of greater reflexivity from participants on the intertextual narrative of the university (Ricoeur, 1984)

Participants were also chosen based on their longevity in the sector. Within the universities, most of the senior managers have worked in HE during the period of policy reform under investigation, and many of those interviewed had started out as junior academics in the 1980s, including some who had joined academe in the 1970s. Similarly among the policy-makers, there was a high degree of continuity in their service and as a result an ability to reflect on
It was this longevity that encouraged reflexivity on the historicity with the narrative of the university (Ricoeur, 1984) adding depth and breadth to the enquiry (Denzin and Lincoln, 2008).

4.2.4 A matter of text and intertextuality

The research pays attention to two sources of text, understanding text both in an everyday sense of a written document and the notion of text in an abstract sense (Fenton and Langley, 2011: 184). The first source was policy and corporate texts. The second source was text created through interview in the course of the research (Sims, 2009).

Policy and corporate texts are discursive artefacts produced in the name of ‘policy’ and ‘strategy’; with a degree of internal coherence (Eco, 1992: 65) that includes individualised and collective narratives of the university. These texts can be considered dominant forms of text (Brown, 2000; 2004; 2005) representing hierarchies of understanding that particularly shape the way the world is constructed (Shapiro, 1989: 13). Moreover, these texts are produced and re-produced by government, policy-makers and universities in a policy nexus (Shattock, 2012), often in direct response to each other, in an attempt to influence policy. This is a prime example of an intertextual narrative process. Superficial reading of policy texts shows how individual texts contain traces of other texts. However, in intertextuality ‘any text is constructed as a mosaic [and] is the absorption and transformation of another’ (Kristeva 1980: 66) that is embedded in and at the same time embeds social and historical relations across texts (Kristeva, 1980; Fairclough, 1992; Riad et al., 2012). Given that the space in and between ‘organisation’ and ‘setting’ is essentially plurivocal or many-voiced with ‘as many narratives as actors’ (Rhodes and Brown, 2005),
policy and corporate texts represent a perpetual distillation of a polyphony (Hazen, 1993) that is always present. In a distillation of polyphony, policy texts are clear manifestations of the on-going process within the interplay of centering and de-centering forces of language Boje, 2008: 194) known as heteroglossia (Bakhtin, 1981) at the heart of intertextuality (Rhodes, 2001: 231) that ‘both reproduce and reinterpret events across participants in ways that redefine meanings about the world which the various cited actors inhabit (Riad et al., 2012: 126). Thus, these texts are a key form in which various social relations, such as the narrative of the university, are embedded (Fairclough, 1992; Riad et al., 2012).

The interviews carried out in the research are also forms of text. This is because the interview itself is viewed as an active co-creation, which leads to a contextually bound and mutually created ‘story’ – the interview (Holstein and Gubrium, 1995), made up of both the transcripts of the interview and contemporaneous reflections on the interview, to improve reflexivity (Nadin and Cassell, 2006). This form of textual construction was deliberate and in line with the interpretative perspective (Cassell, 2009) in an attempt to create textual artefacts that could be considered in relation to policy and strategy texts. The presentation of ‘self’ within the interview (Goffman, 1959) was one that encouraged an active reflection on twenty years of policy (and earlier if the interviewee was so minded), so that the past could be explicitly brought into the present. In this way, the interview was understood to be a central component of a complex research context, rather than an isolated incident (Cassell, 2009: 506) or an unthinking or default way of proceeding through a
qualitative research method (Sims, 2009). In this way it was an intertextual accomplishment.

4.3 Research method

4.3.1 Overview

Data has been constructed and interpreted through a review of policy over a twenty-year period (1992-2012) including key government documents and 48 hours of semi-structured interviews with 42 individual participants carried out over 18 months between August 2011 and January 2013.

4.3.2 Data collection in practice

Data was constructed over a period of eighteen months starting in August 2011. In a policy review spanning 1992-2012 I traced the development of the government’s policy on research, science and innovation that had been implicated in the ‘true’ narrative of the university and the dichotomously resonant narrative of the ‘enterprise’ university. Also included were the periodic reviews of the HE system in general. I interviewed senior managers and academics within two universities and former and current policy-makers at national level, between December 2011 and January 2013. The interviews averaged over an hour in length and were all conducted face to face. A total of 48 hours of interviews were carried out with 42 participants (Table 3). Participants in interview by role. Corporate documents covering a strategic planning period of eight years (2008-2015) at the universities were also reviewed.
4.3.2.1 Policy documents

I started by chronicling which department had responsibility for HE and the science agenda over the period, which I then represented pictorially. This gave an early indication of how the key ministries responsible for HE and/or Science policy were changed and configured over the period. I was then able to identify which Secretary of State and which Minister was responsible for the relevant portfolio and to which Select Committee the business of HE and the science agenda would be reported. A figure summarising how the business of HE was structured in each parliament is included earlier (Figure 4, p. 78).

I then mined the entire database of Command Papers, which is searchable electronically, using key word searches and repeatedly cross-checking results. Command Papers are documents presented to Parliament by a Government Minister by ‘Command of Her Majesty’. There is no formal definition for a White or Green Paper, although it is accepted practice that ‘White Papers’ are statements of Government policy and ‘Green Papers’ are proposals which are published as an aid to public debate. Governments also commission external reviews of policy areas of concern, such as the Browne Review (2010). These reports are usually presented to Parliament in some form and are discussed in Select Committee and otherwise included in the policy process. I sourced Command Papers until 2004 from House of Commons papers online (HCCP). I systematically reviewed Command Papers in each parliamentary session. I searched using key words: ‘education’ ‘university’ ‘higher education’ ‘science’ ‘innovation’ and repeatedly compared the results to ensure that I was capturing all the key papers from different Departments and select committees. For papers from 2004 to 2012 I accessed two different
archives and the current government websites, using the same search terms and systematic approach. This data construction was helped by my contemporaneous knowledge of the sector covering this period. I also compared the findings with those papers chronicled in the literature (Tight, 2009). I was aware of these types of documents and their primacy in the policy nexus, being one of the fragments of the past that might inform the present and the future (Ricoeur, 1984). The Command Papers collected and consulted are summarised in Figure 11 and the key policy initiatives were identified in an early engagement with the data (Ragin, 1997: 27). I also included policy documents as they appeared during the course of 2012 and 2013. These were discussed in the interviews as ‘current’ policy in development and some of the participants had actively contributed to these particular policy texts.

Outside government Departments the key bodies for the university sector in terms of research were identified as HEFCE, Research Councils UK, and the mission group to which the universities belonged. I also similarly identified over the period publications in response to the key policy initiatives, which I evaluated according to their import in the broader policy ‘drama’ (Marston, 2004). This was to notice responses and contributory texts outside and within a formal consultation scheme within the data construction.

In this way the research made use of over 62 individual and different policy documents across each of the governments and each of the relevant departments concerned with both HE policy and the science and innovation agenda. The texts chosen were those clearly implicated in the policy process (Brown et al., 2012; Humphreys and Brown, 2002). It is these texts that in a highly structured field such as HE form a large part of the contemporaneous
‘naturally occurring’ texts (Phillips and Hardy, 2002). It is these texts that form part of the chain that ‘transform other texts’ in intertextuality (Fairclough and Wodak, 1997: 262).
Figure 11  Key Command papers 1992-2012

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Years 1992-2012</th>
<th>92 GE</th>
<th>93</th>
<th>94</th>
<th>95</th>
<th>96</th>
<th>97 GE</th>
<th>98</th>
<th>99</th>
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<th>10 GE</th>
<th>11</th>
<th>12</th>
<th>13</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Prime Minister</td>
<td>John Major Conservative</td>
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<tr>
<td>Government</td>
<td>David Cameron Con/Lib Dem Coalition</td>
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<td>Department for Education</td>
<td>Department for Education and Employment (DfEE)</td>
<td>Department for Education and Skills (DfES)</td>
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<td>Departments for</td>
<td>Department for Trade &amp; Industry</td>
<td>Office Science &amp; Technology (OST)</td>
<td>Office Science &amp; Technology (OST) (DfEE)</td>
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Themes
- Science & Innovation Policy Cycles
- Department for Trade and Industry (DTI)
4.3.2.2 Corporate documents

Individual universities periodically produce corporate texts in the form of strategic plans and annual reviews, usually covering five-year periods in a cycle that often coincides with Government Comprehensive Spending Reviews, or at least made in response and in relation to government policy. Strategic plans are still deeply embedded practices in organisations (Grant, 2003) reified and perpetually and persistently employed (Spee and Jarzabkowski, 2011). Universities distil the broader narrative into strategic texts over a long period and these texts are broadly derivative of previous versions. It is therefore possible by focusing on these texts for a single cycle to capture an organisational narrative over several years. Consequently I constructed texts including the strategic plan, annual reports and website from the two universities for the 2011/2012 academic year. The strategic plan covered the 2010-15 planning cycle, which was originally prepared in 2009. The annual review of 2011 covers the universities’ activities from 2010 to 2011, and includes a response to the change of government in 2010. This was designed to gain in-depth understanding of the archival material and at the same time to focus on key documents, which could then be shared with interview participants. The research made use of a total of 15 externally facing corporate documents and 44 pages from the participating university websites captured in August 2011, comprising a total text of 756 pages.
4.3.2.3 Interviews

The research also made use of interviews with senior managers and academics within two universities, and former and current policy-makers at national level. As discussed, this was an attempt to create textual artefacts that could be considered in relation to policy and strategy texts and which could further incorporate the historicity at the heart of this enquiry.

Choosing to interview at this level required particular access, ‘not a matter to be taken lightly, but one that involves some combination of strategic planning, hard work and dumb luck’ (Van Maanen and Kolb, 1985: 11). This was pertinent given that the research was not just dependent on gaining access at all levels within the universities and within policy circles, but also required a degree of intimacy and candour during the interviews. This made access a key issue, since the environment of the research was a relatively closed one (Bell, 1969). One advantage I had as a researcher was some knowledge of the first participating university, with some access to parts of the senior management and functional and departmental heads. After a short pilot of interviews with participants I knew well, I took a high risk of approaching the Vice Chancellor’s office early in the interview schedule. I did this to consciously gain proxy support from the VC’s office for my research project in approaching other members of SMT and faculty. I used the same technique in my approach to individual academics in the Science faculties, where there was a potentially higher amount of resistance to taking part largely because these academics tend to have clinical as well as academic roles. For example I would usually try to interview the Dean or at least have a confirmed appointment date
prior to interviewing an individual academic with the same school or Faculty. In the second participating university where I had no prior contacts I obtained access through the respective Vice-Chancellor’s office and interviewed the VC before I interviewed anyone else. I had prepared a list of key target participants before this interview and was able to gain the VC’s support in approaching these members of the Senior Management Team (SMT). I was able to cascade through the organisation in a similar way, building up personal recommendations from within each Faculty. I approached the policy makers in a similar way, establishing a shared contact either from interview participants in the universities or from third-party contacts in the sector. Whilst I consciously used networks in this way, I was careful not to exhaust the goodwill of those participants I had interviewed. I rarely made a direct approach without a shared contact. I used where possible the highest level of formal network I could, backed up by informal networks. I was fully supported in gaining access by my supervisors, who I also copy in, in email correspondence to arrange interviews. I thus developed a structured approach, that was equally opportunistic and which proved helpful (Buchanan et al., 1988).

I consciously maintained this goodwill by the way I approached the interview participants, conducted and followed up the interview. I was mindful of working with the various PA teams and extremely flexible when dates were occasionally changed. My initial email was formal and succinct and designed to assist with creating credibility (Healy, 1991). I confirmed the full details of the research as a follow up to the confirmed interview date. I followed each
interview with a thank you email, but only after I had checked the recording and made a point of reflecting on the discussion. I carried out the interviews in short bursts over the course of 14 months.

The interviews were ‘semi-structured’ and were conducted face-to-face in the participant’s work setting taking full account of the role of the interviewer in constructing the nature of the interview (Holstein and Gubrium, 1995; King, 2004). In the interview, my role as researcher was active (Holstein and Gubrium, 1995) and engaged, and I attempted to be ‘in conversation’ as ‘an equal’ with the participant. I used the four basic modes of non-verbal communication to establish this equality (Gordon, 1980). The interview was conducted in the participant’s office, but I negotiated a space away from the participant’s desk, to communicate a shift from the hierarchal to a more equal space, using the meeting table or by choice the comfortable seating area, that many senior academics have in their office. I was unafraid of silence in the interview, allowing the participant to develop thoughts or indeed fill the space when they clearly wanted to truncate their thoughts (Kvale, 2006). I tried to keep very still and unanimated in the interview, deliberately reflecting their norm of body language, which I had observed as common among senior academics. I was also conscious of being relaxed in my voice, keeping the pitch quite low. In this way I was able to re-mould the interaction to the needs of my research, using visual cues and small utterances useful when interviewing elites (Stephens, 2007). This was a fine balancing act and took a lot of energy, and was one of the reasons I found it difficult to conduct back-to-back interviews. I made notes in the interview where I was conscious of my
own mode of communication or where I had noticed that of the participant. I also used the space between interviews to reflect on the modes of communication in the interview, including reviewing where the participant had been animated or defensive, or significantly changed their body language. This was to improve reflection and analysis.

I also familiarised myself with the participant’s biography prior to interview and usually took something to evidence my preparation, for example copies of select committee reports, where the participant had given evidence, or a copy of the university’s research priority group statements, when the participant was a key contributor. This was also designed to increase credibility (Healey and Rawlinson, 1993). After the initial trial interviews, which I shared directly with my supervisors, I was encouraged to challenge more during the subsequent interviews (Kanter, 1977) and did so by reflecting on the research I have done in the policy documents, or directly challenging a statement. This challenge was gentle but assertive and usually elicited a positive and animated response.

Reflecting on the interviews collectively, I noticed how common it was for the participants to observe and reflect that the interview had caused them to think about something in more depth for the first time or given them the opportunity to articulate something that had been on their minds (Sims, 2009). There was even a confessional tone in some of the interviews, where participants would preface a statement by saying ‘I’m glad this is anonymised’ or ‘it would be better if I didn’t say this’. After I’d experienced this a number of times I added a formal question on ‘how widely shared are your views’ in
the interview script. I’d done this spontaneously when I came across this for the first time, but thought it a good feature to capture this in every interview. The confessional tone is more a reflection of the space the interview afforded the participants, rather than any great or burning secrets within the organisation. The candour was something that I noticed was common and was based on I think a desire of those taking part to fully participate in the doctoral research. There was no great expectation of a ‘pay-off’ for the research, although there was genuine interest in the findings. Rather there was a commitment to support the work of the university, one participant declared it thus:

“I was always grateful to the people who took part in my doctoral work, and promised that whenever I was asked I’d do the same’ (Interview Participant)

This candour also encouraged and supported an authentic rendering of the interviewee’s participation (Guba and Lincoln, 1994) that strengthened the research.

The interviews were carried out within a flexible and fluid structure, but guided by six topic themes. Prior notice was given of the research brief and the six broad themes (see Appendix 1). This was part of the overall research approach, which was one of openness and honesty to facilitate a mutually beneficial exchange between researcher and participant (Bryman and Bell, 2007). It was also necessary because participants, particularly those at a senior level, are ‘briefed’ as part of their job role and it would have been unusual for the interview to be any different. It was also a means of focussing the interview
quickly so that the time could be used more effectively. I also reflected that ‘being caught out’ was one possible concern of members of staff at this level given that the subject of the research was policy and the university. This ‘preview’ of the research topics did not affect the fluidity or the semi-structured nature of the interview.

I introduced the interview questions as broad themes and formed different ways of covering them, depending on the momentum and content of the interview. The first question about the participant often opened up the whole topic. This was largely because there was a degree of expectation about what may be of interest, but it also reflected the efficacy of the choice of the participant. If it is your role to consider policy and its implications within organisational strategy then it is obviously something you reflect upon when talking about ‘how you came to be in your current role’. This was as much by serendipity as by design. I was also able very early on in the interviews to open up the broad themes if the participant in this early answer, or in subsequent answers mentioned something related. Most interviews followed this free-flow style, and each topic fell naturally out of the other, not always in the order of the ‘questions’. Very occasionally I had to remind myself of one of the questions, usually in the last quarter of the interview, to ensure that we had covered the six main topic areas. In this way and given prior notice, the participants were thus complicit in ensuring that the key themes were covered. However, if they had prepared to the specific questions, which was rare, then this semi-structured nature of the interview meant that further probing and clarification could be carried out. In this way I was able to break through a
rigid formulaic structure, using open-ended questions to create an organisation and policy narration (Czarniawska, 1998) with the interview as a ‘performance text’ (Denzin, 2001: 27).

I encouraged the interviewee to reflect on and account for their understanding at a particular time in the ‘past’ as well as the ‘present’. This was particularly useful in examining the intertextual construction of the narrative of the university over time. I ensured that I had reviewed the majority of policy and corporate texts prior to the bulk of the interviews, so that reference could be made to those policy ‘events’ and so that text from the corporate documents could be discussed. As mentioned previously this was to imitate ‘equality’ of experience with the historical time frame, in order to improve reflection within the interview itself (Holstein and Gubrium, 1995). However, it also encouraged intertextual reflexivity. Introducing these texts within the interview itself encouraged a reflection on the double meaning of the policy and/or corporate text: that which the authors of the policy text may have intended, that which the reader interprets. Both reader and author are absent when the text is written (Eco, 1992). Neither the author nor the reader is privileged as to the meaning of the text, rather both were vicariously and abstractly taken into account during the interview and in the analysis. Understanding was thereby constructed to allow multiple interpretations without imposing ‘senses that would be preposterous to accept’ (Eco, 1992: 43). This was another attempt to gain a credible understanding of the narrative of the university, in reference to the policy and corporate documents or intertextuality within the interview itself (Lincoln and Guba, 1985). This is
where it became noticeable how valuable it was to select participants based on their longevity in the HE sector and who could reflect on any developing narrative, even though it was post-hoc. In this way the use of ‘texts’ offered the ‘triangulation’ that is a key feature of case study research design (Fitzgerald and Dopson, 2009; Yin 2009).

The interviews were recorded on a digital recorder and fully transcribed using a professional academic transcription service prior to analysis, again to provide a credible account (Sacks, 1984). The transcripts were reviewed against the original interview recording to test for accuracy and reliability. I took notes during the interview, often to remind myself of an apparently salient point, so I did not interrupt the flow of the participant, but also to record any points of contest or notable comments, as well any noticeable discord between the spoken word and contra indications – such as expressions of humour, to aid overall credibility in analysis (Lincoln and Guba, 1985; Guba and Lincoln, 1994). The interviews were generally of 60 minutes’ duration; only one was 45 minutes. Interviews with policy-makers and members of staff who had been in the sector for a significant period of time tended to over-run usually at their own instigation. As a result, there was 48 hours of interview recording to transcribe. I kept an interview journal to record observations prior and post interview, to improve reflexivity after and between interviews, and to support good research practice and theory development (Guba and Lincoln, 1994; Tsoukas, 2009).
4.3.3 Data analysis

4.3.3.1 Overview

Analysis takes place on a continual basis and within each moment of engagement with the data (Ragin, 1997: 27) including during its construction (Lincoln and Guba, 1985). Analysis is an inductive process of interaction and integration of theory and data (Strauss and Corbin, 1998; Van Maanen et al., 2007). The technique that is widely used in an inductive enquiry like this one is to develop ‘labels’ or ‘codes’ within the data in an attempt to ‘develop common and distinct conceptualisations for multiple observations across a data set’ (Locke et al., 2008:103). It is an iterative and flexible process in which conceptual categories are continually refined (Strauss and Corbin, 1998). In this evolved form of grounded analysis (Strauss and Corbin, 1998) the data does not speak for itself. It does however come alive in the engagement with theory and the researcher, and is convincingly grounded (Tsoukas, 2009).

4.3.3.2 First engagement

The corpus constructed during this research was extensive and at times dense and confusing. There are many different ways of referring to the same policy document for instance, and the filing system operated by the different websites could be esoteric. As a result, one of the first tasks I undertook was to sort the policy data. I developed a library system for the policy documents and organised them per government and parliamentary period, a library that evolved as I ‘collected’ the policy documents. A snapshot of this organisation is featured in Figure 12.
In this way I gained an understanding of the nature of the policy initiatives as they unfolded in time, and their intertextuality, during data ‘collection’ in an authentic rendering of the historical trajectory of the policy documents. This rendering process (Weber, 1990) was further helped once I had represented both the period studied and the policy cycles and themes, illustrated in Figure 11, p. 133. I then went through each document several times to gain a sense of the policy area that it was seeking to address. For each document I then selected key gobbets\(^6\) of text, an extract of text, often a few lines long, that I thought interesting and suitable for further examination and interpretation. These were simply extracts that illustrated the essence of the policy theme under consideration, as well as those that also sought to describe the university (Locke et al., 2008:103). What tended to be excluded from this extraction were

\(^6\) Gobbet is taken to be ‘an extract from a text, especially one set for translation or comment in […] examination’ (OED) in a way that can maintain the integrity of the extract AND relate it to the whole text in which it is placed.
the ‘facts and figures’ and ‘illustrative vignettes’ that tended to populate policy texts, particularly from 2007 onwards when HE came under the DUIS and its successor, BIS, thereby focussing on what was ‘transparently observable’ (Pettigrew, 1988). From this review of policy I obtained 931 extracts comprising approximately 51,000 words. These extracts were numbered and identified with both the government and the policy document from which they were obtained.

I did a similar exercise with the corporate documents and constructed texts that contained 82 extracts of text. On the other hand, the 48 hours of interviews that were professionally transcribed were left intact, once they had been checked against the original recording. The interviews transcribed amounted to 778 pages of text.

4.4.3.3 Analysis

The analytical frame used was one of narrative intertextuality; an approach proposed by Fairclough (1992) and further developed by Riad et al. (2012) that has been used and adapted here. A summary of the process and the developing theoretical categories used is made in Figure 13.

Analysis requires a high degree of integrity in the approach to framing and coding the data, using a theoretical framework in a consistent and critical way (Miles, 1979; Tsoukas, 2009). In practice it means a careful reading and re-reading of the texts, developing codes; classifying codes, grouping these codes into themes and identifying key concepts. As discussed, these concepts do not simply ‘emerge’ from the literature. They are part of an inductive
process which requires creativity based on the researcher’s ‘analytical ability, theoretical sensitivity and the sensitivities to the subtleties of the action/interaction’ (Corbin and Strauss, 1990: 19). They are concepts that are developed in acknowledgement of existing theory. The essence is to not to over-code the data, so that the codes are in some way divorced from the data and the original research question (Suddaby, 2006), rather to maintain a balance between ‘reading’ the data and interpreting it. I used a technique that allowed me to maintain the ‘whole’ of the data, at the same time as partitioning it into recognisable themes and being able to progressively deepen the analysis (Corbin and Strauss, 1990). I physically cut and sorted the individual extracts of text into broad themes, placing them loosely on sheets of A1 flipchart paper, moving them around to achieve a better fit (Miles, 1979). I think the difficulty of making inference from such an in-depth corpus was addressed in part with this tactic, which helped in ‘pattern matching’ and provided a means during analysis to attempt to develop ‘rival’ patterns and therefore explanations (Yin, 1999: 43), improving rigour. This pattern matching was temporary and flexible, allowing reflection of the analytical frame (Alvesson and Sköldberg, 2009). It was then only when I was satisfied that these extracts ‘belonged’ to a particular ‘directive’ purpose within the text, common with policy and corporate documents within policy rich arenas (Roe, 1994) that I fixed them to a particular A1 sheet. Thus, in the first I identified the narrative themes that were apparent in and between texts that were told and re-told (Vaara and Monin, 2010) and that constitute the interrelationship between texts or ‘constitutive’ narrative intertextuality. It was in constitutive intertextuality that
three elements of the narrative of the university were identified: as agent of science and innovation, agent of economic growth and agent of societal benefit. Since I had arranged the extracts of text within the categories in chronological order, I was then able to develop an analysis based on similarity and difference between government periods, conceptualising how the narrative had developed over time.

Figure 13  Narrative intertextuality: theoretical categories

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>The narrative of the university</th>
<th>Underpinning the narrative of the university</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>First order codes</td>
<td>Intertextual themes</td>
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<tr>
<td>The university</td>
<td>A (social) moving, startling, agitation</td>
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<td>Availability</td>
<td>Promoting take up—resonance</td>
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<td>DESCRIPTION</td>
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<tr>
<td>Agent of science and innovation</td>
<td>Lagging behind</td>
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<td>Science partner — part of innovation process — central to innovation ecosystem</td>
<td>Threat to Britain</td>
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<td>Losing out in a race</td>
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<td>Losing civic status and values</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Danger</td>
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<td>Agent of economic growth</td>
<td>FEAR</td>
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<td>Saving Britain</td>
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<td>Winning the race</td>
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<td>Saving civic status and values</td>
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<td>National</td>
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<td>Constative intertextuality</td>
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</table>

As I proceeded with the analysis I was then able to obtain more abstract themes in a second level of coding, linking between the different texts, highlighting elements. I did this several times. At this second analysis I drew out broader constitutive intertextual themes of innovation, regional engagement and research excellence. Moreover, this second analysis also exposed the intertextual rhetorical elements that promoted resonance (Vaara and Monin, 2010) and which thereby provided for implicit or explicit
agreement of the reader (Eco, 1981) and the take up in new text (Kristeva, 1980; Fairclough, 1992; Riad et al., 2012), in a focus on emotion. Rhetorical structure in this sense is one that exploits figures of speech, or other compositional devices such as metaphors or ‘description and counter-description’ (Edwards, 1999: 271) that in contrastive rhetoric persuade on an emotional level (Riad et al., 2012: 123). Vivid ‘rhetoric’ that has emotional register in text that is otherwise presented as ‘rational’ is highly noticeable (Brown, 2000; 2004; 2005). It was similar within the interview text, where the emotional register was apparent in the use of metaphors or figures of speech, particularly that which found intertextual echo with the policy or corporate text. There was an additional complication within the interview, since this use was sometimes sarcastic or overtly superficial. This is why it was important to note such additional cues to meaning during the interview to improve rigour (Stephens, 2007). The independent transcriber also noted apparent displays of humour in her transcription, which were written up as ‘[smiles]’ or ‘[laughs]’.

Emotion here is seen as a form of agitation, a ‘stirring up’ that disrupts the ‘rationality’ of text that would otherwise prescribe order and control (Brown, 2000; 2004; 2005). This disruption can be negative or positive. This analysis thus provided for ‘manifest’ narrative intertextuality (Riad et al., 2012) in similar ways to rhetorical structures (Czarniawska-Jørgensen, 1995b; Brown, 2000; Heracleous and Barrett, 2001; Heracleous, 2006) and in a way that was reflective of the ‘agitating disorder’ in previous studies of narrative intertextuality (Vaara et al, 2006) and within the case ‘setting’. Further, it is argued that emotion serves a particular purpose in strategy as an intertextual
narrative, because it is one means of deepening resonance, by linking cultural meaning systems expressed in narrative building blocks (Holstein and Gubrium, 2012: 262) at a deeper level. I identified ten themes that had an emotional register (Figure 13, p. 147) and which I was able to collapse into two over-arching categories of ‘fear and hope’ that united the recurrence of the identified themes (Figure 13, p. 147).

These two overarching categories of ‘fear’ and ‘hope’ have significance in hermeneutic understanding. Hope in hermeneutic terms is central to ‘a practicing, practical and active dimension’ of narrative time (Huskey, 2009: 19) defined by Ricoeur as ‘an expectation of a future good’ (Huskey, 2009: 18). Fear is equally central, but primarily as a form of ‘dread’ that ‘even our most benevolent act, the purest, kindness emotion, is doomed to failure’, although in this ‘dread’ we have also hope. (Huskey, 2009: 146-7). ‘Fear’ in this sense is a mixture of dread but also reverence (OED, archaic). This is to understand ‘fear’ and ‘hope’ as active and elevated emotional devices and thereby profound in this elevation or apotheosis.

I then returned to the A1 sheets for a third and deeper level of analysis. In this way I was able to maintain a sense of the breadth of the text as well as the depth, offering thick description (Geertz, 1973) in the process and consequent analysis. At this third analysis I was able to identify what might be termed ‘society’s stories’ that provide ‘the basic building blocks of cultural meaning systems’ (Holstein and Gubrium, 2012: 262), both widely available and resonant, that were being enabled through emotion. That these basic building blocks were also fundamental units of ideology was unsurprising
given that ‘ideologeme’ are always present within ‘(the text of) society and history’ (Kristeva, 1980:36) and that ‘ideologeme’ provide ‘an embodiment of an existing socio-ideological dialogue’ between different groups in society (Vargova, 2007: 423). This is also completely in tune with a hermeneutic enquiry, given that in hermeneutic terms ‘ideology’ is ‘text’ that has a reference and “the thing of the text is the world it unfolds before itself” (Ricoeur, 1991: 95). One effective signpost to ideologeme was the exploitation of semantic rhetorical devices such as hyperbole or symbols that are used to enhance meaning (Van Dijk, 2008: 737) within text. Together with claims of universality (Kristeva, 1969) in sacred form, this pointed to ideological intertextuality that establishes, maintains and changes social relations (Fairclough, 2003: 9) underneath constitutive and manifest intertextuality (Riad et al., 2012). Here the focus was on framing within intertextuality that endured, or co-opted rather than simply negated building blocks (Vaara et al., 2006) and that allowed long-standing co-existence of polyphony through ambiguity (Vaara et al., 2006). It was in this way that two ideologies were identified, and in opposition, as the primacy of the market versus the primacy of civilisation or civilising (Figure 13, p. 147)

4.3.4 Research ethics

Research ethics are central to the trustworthiness of this or any research undertaken in the social world. Research ethics are however often categorised narrowly in terms of the process of research, usually in conformity to certain procedures or rules. This is not to dismiss such rules as irrelevant; rather it is to
invite greater transparency and reflexivity (Bell and Wray-Bliss, 2009: 89). This requires a shift from compliance to ethical ‘procedures’ to casting ethics as ‘beliefs, thoughts, and values, as well as actions’ (Bell and Wray-Bliss, 2009: 89), all of which I have tried to reflect in this chapter and throughout the thesis. Thus, each participant was aware that the research had gained ethical approval within my home university, a formal requirement of ESRC-funded research. It could be argued that this was merely reinforcing a narrow definition of ethics, however, I was conscious of how I should ‘be’ as a researcher, developing and maintaining dispositions of ‘honesty, sensitivity, respectfulness, reciprocity and ‘reflexivity’’ (Bell and Wray-Bliss, 2009: 89) throughout the research project. In terms of the methodology in particular however I was conscious of two features of the research that could be ethically problematic.

Firstly, I was conscious that I had privileged access within the research. Participants in interviews often disclosed their perceptions and opinions about the policy environment, but also about the university or other institution as their place of work. It was not the purpose of the research to seek out commercially sensitive or damaging information; rather it was designed to construct an understanding of strategy within HE through an examination of the narrative of the university. However, there was a low risk that this construction could include information or comment which if freely and widely broadcast could be misinterpreted or could be damaging to the individual participant or the university’s public reputation or in some cases, create wider political capital or could simply be commercially-sensitive. The guidance
under which I conducted the research was that if the insight is useful but could be anticipated by any reasonable measure to be sensitive in the way described, then additional clarification would be sought from the participant and if pertinent and if required, the issue would be raised within the supervision process. There was however a much higher risk that privileged access, particularly to senior levels in the university and policy, could lead to the privileging of one account above another. I was therefore beholden as a researcher not to be sycophantically overwhelmed by the access and to challenge within interviews and to maintain this sensibility within the analysis.

Secondly, I was also aware that in choosing only two universities, both research-intensive institutions and both part of a leading mission group, and basing that choice on their different origins – one of the first civic universities and one former University College (and early campus university), that there was a medium risk that the universities could be identified. There were also a limited number of participants from the top of the organisations and therefore there was also a risk that individuals could be identified if job titles were used. There was also a risk that policy-makers associated with particular governments could be identified. What I have tried to do to counter that risk is refer to the universities as ‘A’ or ‘B’ and characterised them as ‘research-intensive’ universities. I also have categorised them as part of a wider class – civic and new civics. Furthermore, individual respondents have been classified by functional class as follows: senior management, functional head, academic head, academic and policy maker (existing or former). In addition, agreement was made with some participants that if I used a direct quote in my research
then I would seek their prior agreement. However, this ‘anonymity’ is reflexively performed most through the focus on the narrative of the university and in the analysis, where abstraction and theory development provides an additional layer between individual responses and expression of the research findings.

It was on this basis that I sought informed consent (Bryman and Bell, 2007) from participants prior to interview, by outlining in the email correspondence the purpose of the research and the basis on which anonymity was to be protected (see Appendix 1) and asking at the start of the interview if I could proceed on the basis of this research protocol.

4.4 Reflections and limitations

Qualitative case study research is by definition ‘bounded’ artificially in scope and in time, which always has an impact on the wider applicability of the findings. In an enquiry in a hermeneutic tradition, understanding is ‘to be thought of less as a subjective act than as participating in an event of tradition, a process of transmission in which past and present are constantly mediated’ (Gadamer, 1989: 290). Reflecting on my own participation in this ‘process of transmission’ within this research, I offer a number of limitations that could be considered.

This research is not seeking to claim any statistical generalisation, which would be improbable given the interpretative perspective. Instead what it offers is an attempt to provide something from the ‘particular’ that could be useful to the ‘general’ in so-called heuristic generalisation (Tsoukas, 2099).
The setting is delineated or bounded as one that has an agitating disorder, in which it is theorised that temporality is lengthened and plurivocality is enabled. There is a horizon of expectation’ that is rooted in the past, but necessarily not at the expense of the present or the future and there is space for plurivocality. There are narrative building blocks that are both available and also have resonance, accessible by equally powerful, autonomous and usually public actors, with practiced access over the long-term. This ‘particularity’ allows consideration of strategy as an intertextual narrative in settings that are long established and it may also offer some understanding to those settings that have previously been studied, such as mergers and acquisitions that have perhaps unwound over time. There is however the following limitation in the ‘particularity’ of the case.

The policy frame chosen is one that takes in twenty years of policy and is dominated by 13 years of Labour Governments. This domination is useful in both its type and length, offering some consistency in political philosophy. The reliance of a government on a particular political position could be seen as a limitation, except that policy at times appears barely indistinguishable between predecessor and successor governments (Tight, 2009; Barnett, 2011; Shattock, 2012). Moreover, this apparent consistency has been further explored by including both the earlier Conservative Government and the latest Coalition Government, even if that meant tracking policy in the immediate aftermath of its announcement and in a way that probably gave less time for that to develop and be reflected intertextually. In addition I have been particularly conscious to pay attention to difference as well as consensus and consistency. The
participating universities have been chosen based on their self-declared typology as ‘research-intensive’ and because they were part of the same mission group. However, neither is an Oxbridge university and given the ‘ivory tower’ association with the narrative of the ‘true’ university this could be considered a limitation. Further, it might underplay the dominance exerted by these older and more established universities in the policy nexus, as powerful individual actors. Indeed some of the intertextuality within policy mentioned Oxbridge specifically. However, what has been gained in the selection is the possibility of a slightly more nuanced understanding of the narrative of the university as it has developed in ‘civic’ universities that were founded post 1900. It is argued that this offers additional insight, particularly in respect of the co-option or even negation of narrative building blocks that could be associated with Oxbridge or even nineteenth century German universities (Martin, 2012).

The research has also focussed on the UK without considering its context within the European Union. In its consideration of HE policy, the research therefore makes no claim to inhabit other HE jurisdictions without further research.

The chosen participants are taken from all levels within the universities and additionally include policy-makers past and present. This participation was driven in large part on the basis of their relative function within their organisation and the policy nexus and their longevity in the sector. The research has not included some of the other autonomous actors, such as
industry, the media or organisations like the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD). These autonomous actors from outside the sector whilst important would not necessarily be able to participate in the same way as informants (Cassells, 2009) and would have been more difficult to locate. It is also a reasonable assumption given the history of HE in the UK that industry has had a voice in the policy nexus since the mid 1980s and which could be anticipated as being expressed within policy documents. Instead, the voice of industry is taken to be instantiated within the policy and corporate texts (Roe, 1994).

Further, at an abstract level it has been concerned with a viewpoint that is dominated by those actors who have a professional stake in the environment and reliance on policy and corporate texts, separated from their ‘creation’, although reflexively considered within interviews. Time has been spent in a wide review of policy documents, as well as interviews across two universities and within the policy nexus, rather than narrowing the enquiry to observation of ‘policy-formation’ in one government period over the course of a year or indeed within a single university at a senior level. Instead, ‘observation’ has been made vicariously in the interviews and in reflection on the formation of policy, and through the texts themselves. The trade-offs in research design have nonetheless resulted in a research programme that has brought together different ‘levels’ of the policy nexus in a comprehensive focus on intertextuality over a long period. It is theoretically generalisable in terms of the narrative intertextuality of strategy, that can be extended toward other
cases, provided that there is due reflection on the basis for that theoretical replication (Tsoukas, 1989) and consideration that it has been impossible to ‘attend to all the potential intertexts’ within the analysis (Kenney and Oswick, 2003: 140).
Chapter 5: The narrative of the university in policy

5.0 Introduction

This chapter presents the findings from an exploration of policy texts between 1992 and 2012 implicated in both the reform of HE and the science and research policy agenda. The research made use of over 62 individual and different policy documents across each of the governments and each of the relevant departments concerned with both HE policy and the science and innovation agenda since 1992. The corpus included key documents including: the 1993 Science and Technology White Paper *Realising Our Potential* in John Major’s Government (Duchy of Lancaster, 1993)\(^7\); one of the first White Papers of the Blair Government that outlined how *‘The Knowledge Driven Economy’* represented nothing less than *‘Our Competitive Future’* (DTI, 1998)\(^8\); the White Paper *Excellence and Opportunity* (DTI, 2000)\(^9\) that launched the new Labour Government’s science and innovation policy; the review across multiple governments’ science and innovation policies, to be led by Lord Sainsbury (2007); and the new Coalition Government’s *Innovation and Research Strategy for Growth* (BIS, 2011a).\(^{10}\) It also included key documents that had presaged reform in HE such as: the *Dearing Review* (NCIHE, 1997), the White Paper *The Future of Higher Education* (2009); the

\(^7\) Cm. 2250  
\(^8\) Cm. 4176  
\(^9\) Cm. 4814  
\(^{10}\) Cm. 8239
Browne Review (2010); and the HE White Paper in 2011 (BIS, 2011c). Also included were reviews of university and industry collaboration, from the Lambert Review (2003) to the more recent Wilson Review of University-Business Collaboration (2012); Encouraging a British Invention Revolution: Sir Andrew Witty’s Review of Universities and Growth (Witty, 2013), as well as the influential Hauser Review (2010) on The Current and Future Role of the Technology Innovation Centres (TICs) that straddled the last Labour and the new Coalition Governments. The various White Papers and Reviews were tracked in government responses and select committee reports, as well as departmental reviews, particularly after the formation of the Department for Universities, Innovation and Skills (DUIS) in 2008, and its descendant, the Department of Business, Innovation and Skills (BIS) since 2009 that developed reporting protocols for the science and innovation agenda.

As outlined in Chapter 4, the analytical frame used is one of narrative intertextuality, an approach proposed by Fairclough (1989; 1992), further developed by Riad et al. (2012) and adapted here. The policy process, where texts are produced and re-produced by government, policy-makers and universities in a policy nexus is a prime example of intertextuality (Kristeva, 1980; Bakhtin, 1981; Fairclough, 1992; Keenoy and Oswick, 2003). Any superficial reading of policy texts shows how individual texts contain traces of other texts; in one way simply the direct referencing of previous policy documents. However policy texts are also a form in which various social relations, such as the narrative of the university, are embedded (Kristeva, 1980; 11Cm. 8122
Bakhtin, 1986; Fairclough, 1992; Riad et al., 2012). Policy texts in particular are also dominant forms of text, representing hierarchies of understanding that shape the way the world is constructed (Shapiro, 1989: 13), offering a politically framed distillation of polyphony (Buchanan and Dawson, 2007) that is always present (Hazen, 1993). Policy texts are thereby a clear manifestation of the on-going process within heteroglossia at the heart of intertextuality that ‘both reproduce and reinterpret events across participants in ways that redefine meanings about the world which the various cited actors inhabit’ (Riad et al., 2012: 126).

The chapter starts with an overview of the increasingly dominant narrative of the enterprise university at a constitutive intertextuality that has been previously implicated in academic research (Bridgman, 2007). However, the absence of the narrative of the traditional university is challenged and findings support the view that it maintains wide availability (Martin, 2012), even in policy. The co-existence of the two narratives of the universities – the enterprise university and the traditional university – is then outlined and considered in manifest and ideological intertextuality. In ideological intertextuality, the two narratives are resourced with the ideologeme of the market, in the case of the narrative of the enterprise university, as previously identified (Bridgman, 2007) and in the ideologeme of civilisation in the case of the narrative of the traditional university (Martin, 2012).
5.1 Constitutive intertextuality: the increasingly dominant narrative of the enterprise university

The narrative of the enterprise university as previously identified (Bridgman, 2007) has been consistently implicated in policy text in constitutive intertextuality and dominates (Bridgman, 2007). This dominance has developed in a subtle way over time. Successive governments since the early 1990s have focussed on science and technology as central to the UK’s competitive position. Within this focus and in a few short years universities had transitioned from being a partner in the science base, through to being a key link in a global process of innovation, to being an important component of a global innovation eco-system. In addition, the economic role of the university both within and external to research, has broadened. The university has transitioned from being an agent of economic growth through activities that support the science base and innovation, to being a key economic anchor and thereby a singular and significant economic actor within the region, occupying part of the space that the Regional Development Agencies (and therefore central government) had previously occupied.

The narrative of the traditional university is also evident (Martin, 2012) and is resourced within and alongside the transition within policy over the period of the university from science partner to centre of an innovation ecosystem. It is a resourcing that is increasingly dependent on its association with the narrative of the enterprise university.
5.1.1 Universities from science partner to global innovation hub

5.1.1.1 A much needed partner in the science base

The 1993 Science and Technology White Paper Realising Our Potential from John Major’s Government outlined a commitment to building Britain’s ‘potentially very strong position in science and technology’ learning from other countries’ experience in order to ‘harness that strength […] to the creation of wealth in the United Kingdom’ (Duchy of Lancaster, 1993: 4). It was through a ‘new partnership between the science and engineering base, industry and government’ in which the government’s aim ‘to harness [these] intellectual resources [in order] to improve the economic performance and the quality of life’ (Duchy of Lancaster, 1993: 26) of the UK could be achieved. This ‘new’ mission was supported by ‘a new structure [through the Research Councils] for public funding of research’ and its management but based on ‘plurality’, ‘competition’, ‘selectivity’ and ‘accountability’ (DFES, 1991: 19). The proposal made to continue dual support for research announced in the May 1991 White Paper Higher Education; A New Framework, was nonetheless reiterated. As a consequence, the commitment to relative autonomy in research remained, but it became explicitly conditional and based on priorities that were ‘much more clearly related to meeting the country’s needs and enhancing the wealth-creating capacity of the country’ (Duchy of Lancaster, 1993: 26).

Universities as

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part of [the science] base’ had a role ‘to train and develop skilled and innovative people and to generate and transmit knowledge (Duchy of Lancaster, 1993: 24).

Industry was neither a silent nor an inactive partner and could not abdicate its responsibility ‘for investing in innovation and bringing new products to market’ (Duchy of Lancaster, 1993: 15) but what was required was a ‘closer partnership and better diffusion of ideas [with] industry, the financial sector and government’ (Duchy of Lancaster, 1993: 15). Universities also had to seek to provide and embrace ‘applied research’ in collaboration with industry (Duchy of Lancaster, 1993: 24) to develop and fund capacity building.

The 1993 White Paper is credited with re-positioning the role of science and technology as central to economic performance in a modern economy, at the heart of the enterprise university. However, this re-positioning did not mean the absence of the traditional university, which was still discernible in the partnership of the science base. There was still a high degree of importance given to autonomy in research and the development of individuals. However, these were increasingly seen in economic terms.

5.1.1.2 Key link in the global process of innovation

In 1997 a new Labour Government came to power after nearly two decades in opposition and one of its first White Papers outlined how ‘The Knowledge Driven Economy’ represented nothing less than ‘Our Competitive Future’
This challenged the government to go beyond its institutional partnership role in the science base and to create a ‘new approach to industrial policy’, the promotion of ‘competition […], enterprise, flexibility and innovation’ balanced with investment (DTI, 1998: 5). Notwithstanding the ‘new approach’, the White Paper *Excellence and Opportunity* (DTI, 2000)\(^{15}\) that launched the new Labour Government’s science and innovation policy, strongly echoed *Realising Our Potential* (1993). The difference between the two White Papers was subtle; it was now identifiably ‘innovation’ that was ‘the motor of the modern economy’ (DTI, 1998: 3) not simply ‘the application of science to tradable products’ (Duchy of Lancaster, 1993: 11) and as a result ‘making the most of research’ involved specifically ‘a discovery and innovation process’ and one that was ‘global’ (DTI, 2000: 6). The task facing the government was then how to ‘strengthen the links in the chain of innovation in Britain’ (DTI, 2000: 4). Indeed, policy would fail if it simply focussed on ‘one aspect of the innovation cycle, independently of the others’ (DTI, 2000: 4). Rather,

a comprehensive innovation policy [had to] embrace each stage of the cycle, from idea generation and acquisition, through transfer and dissemination, to public confidence and consumer markets (DTI, 2000: 6).

Policy was designed to create Britain ‘as the intellectual hub of the new global economy’ in which business and university collaboration was critical, with

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universities ‘reaching out and transferring their knowledge to business’ (DTI, 2000: 30) and doing so globally.

The early Labour Governments in their focus on a global innovation process as the motor of the modern economy, as opposed to simply science, further embedded the enterprise university at the heart of policy. However, the traditional university was still evident in this innovation process, not least because of the importance of excellent curiosity-driven research, which could not ‘be emphasised too strongly [as] part of our culture’ (DTI, 2000: 3). However, it was even more important because this research was seen ‘as vital to industry’. This was because ‘major innovations flow from breakthroughs made by curiosity-driven research’ (DTI, 2000: 3).

5.1.1.3 Central to the innovation ecosystem

‘Innovation’ continued to be a key feature of policy throughout each of the three Labour governments. Investment in research, whilst based on excellence through independent and critical academic-led review, was also conditional on universities playing ‘a more central role in research work of all kinds’ (H.M. Treasury, 2004: 72). This was a position that had been strongly endorsed in the previous government (Duchy of Lancaster, 1993: 24) and earlier in the Labour Government (Lambert, 2003). The ‘better integration of the research base’ with the ‘needs of the economy’ and making ‘business and university collaboration central’ both in terms of introducing new skills and commercialising new ideas continued to be reinforced (H.M. Treasury, 2004: 1).
As part of the 2007 Comprehensive Spending Review (CSR), the Chancellor of the Exchequer, commissioned a review of the governments’ science and innovation policies, to be led by Lord Sainsbury. Sainsbury reported much progress, not least in the translation of university research into commercial goods and services, which had ‘significantly increased in the past decade’ (Sainsbury, 2007: 5). Sainsbury identified that universities played ‘an increasing key role in the economy of the UK’ (Sainsbury, 2007: 1) with distinct ‘economic missions of equal importance’ (Sainsbury, 2007: 44). Within this diversity, it was proposed that little could be gained from research unless there are ‘strong links between the researchers and industry’ (Sainsbury, 2007: 23) so that knowledge is transferred for economic benefit. Sainsbury saw this progress as part of a much bigger change ‘in the purpose and self-image of the university’ as an ‘increasingly useful asset’; a change that had been driven by the concept of the knowledge economy,

an economy in which ideas and the ability to manipulate them are of more importance that the traditional factors of production (Sainsbury, 2007: 43).

Sainsbury (2007) established very early in the third Labour Government the idea that a country’s innovation rate depended on ‘inter-linked activities and international scientific and technological collaboration [in the] innovation eco-system’ (Sainsbury, 2007: 4). In this system, businesses ‘may take the lead, but do not innovate in isolation’ rather they collaborate and interact with other components in the eco-system, such as the government and universities
(Sainsbury, 2007: 23). Universities provide ‘inputs’ to this eco-system through on-going knowledge development and ‘government-supported research, both basic and applied or user-driven collaborative research’ (Sainsbury, 2007: 23). This eco-system had no boundaries between producer and consumer, nor did it have national boundaries given the ‘commercial and technological developments in other parts of the world [in] other centres of excellence’ and the operation of the global knowledge economy (Sainsbury, 2007: 24).

In *Innovation Nation* (2008) the newly created Department for Universities, Innovation and Skills (DUIS) sought to build on the government’s ‘knowledge economy programme’ and in particular the recommendations in the Sainsbury’s Review, which it had subsequently accepted in full, thereby acknowledging ‘the changing face of innovation’ (DUIS, 2008: 3) as originally expressed in Sainsbury (2007). In this way the government was ‘moving on [from a past understanding of] innovation as a simple process of investment in fundamental research leading to commercialisation by far-sighted management in industry’ (DUIS, 2008: 4) to the current one, in which

the path followed from laboratory to market place [of] insights generated by basic science critical to long-term innovation performance [was] a long, complex and uncertain [one] (DUIS, 2008: 3).

It continued to be important to invest in science and technology because ‘a world class research base is an important component of the UK’s innovation infrastructure’ (DUIS, 2008: 20). However, it was equally important to
accelerate the flow of research into society and to challenge scientists to work more creatively and entrepreneurially with one another and business (DUIS, 2008: 13).

*Innovation Nation* was strongly echoed in the White Paper *The Future of Higher Education* (2009) produced by its successor The Department of Business, Innovation and Skills (BIS) in ‘a more constrained public spending environment’ (BIS, 2009: 3), in which it became important ‘to maintain the progress we have made’ (BIS, 2009: 7).

When the university became central to an innovation ecosystem in policy, the dominance of the enterprise university appeared assured. The narrative of the traditional university did find echo, whenever the principle of research funding was outlined or defended as a means of ensuring excellence (Sainsbury, 2007; DUIS, 2008). However, this excellence was also increasingly being treated as an important component within an innovation ecosystem, rather than simply for its own sake.

**5.1.1.4 An innovation hub**

The new Coalition Government formed in May 2010 after an inconclusive election result. In its *Innovation and Research Strategy for Growth* (2011) the UK continued to be engaged ‘in an increasingly competitive global market’ and as with *Sainsbury* (2007) and *Innovation Nation* (2008) the country’s ability to thrive [depended] in large part on the effectiveness of our own innovation system [and] how we design it and how we choose to invest in it (BIS, 2011a: 8).
Britain was now competing in a ‘global innovation economy’ suggesting that global competitors had made some improvement in their commercialisation activity since the Sainsbury Review in 2007. Britain was once again well placed given its

global reputation for Innovation and Research [and a] knowledge base, which includes renowned universities and research institutes, [that] is the most productive among the G8 (BIS, 2011a: iv).

An innovation hub was an effective centre of ‘networks that link businesses with the research base and with the wider innovation ecosystem’ (BIS, 2011a: 47).

The ‘innovation hub’ concept, although underdeveloped in the Labour government post 2007, had survived the electoral transition to take centre stage in the new Coalition Government’s innovation and research strategy to more effectively integrate the innovation ecosystem. In a Coalition Government that was as determined as its predecessors to increase

knowledge exchange [this meant] facilitating networks, clusters and research campuses as hubs for interaction at local, national and international level (BIS, 2011: 90).

In *Encouraging a British Invention Revolution: Sir Andrew Witty’s Review of Universities and Growth* (2013), it was research-leading universities in particular that as research and knowledge exchange hubs were in a
pivotal position to identify the key breakthroughs and to establish the connections that [would] create the critical mass to anchor a technology in the UK (Witty, 2013: 24).

In common with its predecessors’ approach the Coalition Government’s strategy required the protection of the science and research budget, ring-fenced to create ‘a climate of confidence in our research base’ and to pursue the current challenge ‘to reinforce this strength and to develop further our capacity to translate this scientific excellence into economic benefits’ (BIS, 2011a: 10). It also required as before ‘strong connections between key actors’ (BIS, 2011a: 6) and the ‘publicly-funded research base to be part of the broader knowledge infrastructure that enables businesses to innovate’ (BIS, 2011b: 25).¹⁶

It was already the case that in technology-based sectors the links between the research base and business involved ‘long and closely-integrated supply chains’ not least because of the high R&D intensity (BIS, 2011a: 26). This integration was now required of the entire ‘innovation ecosystem’, because where the system collaborates well ‘networks develop into clusters of innovative, high productivity businesses which drive economic growth’ (BIS, 2011a: 46). This integration was to be further supported by the establishment of an elite national network of technology and innovation centres, or Catapult Centres (BIS, 2011a: 26).

Integration was also to be supported by an increasing emphasis on ‘openness’ in innovation. ‘Open innovation’ has access at its core; access for

¹⁶ Cm. 8239 Econ 15
business in this case is to the ‘UK’s research and information infrastructure’ meaning ‘its facilities and knowledge bases’ innovation infrastructure’, and was ‘paramount’ to creating and disseminating knowledge, and improving ‘our success rate in building high-growth businesses’ (BIS, 2011a: 6). ‘Open innovation’ also requires global collaboration because it means ‘harnessing new knowledge wherever it comes from’ given that ‘the geography of innovation was changing’ (BIS, 2011a: 26). It also meant ‘free and open-access to taxpayer-funded research’ because it offered significant social and economic benefits by spreading knowledge, raising the prestige of UK research and encouraging technology transfer (BIS, 2011a: 76).

It also required ‘openness’ or ‘open access to business, to equipment and technology expertise that would otherwise be inaccessible’ (BIS, 2011a: 27) and more generally

*opening up access to data, information and research that is held within the public sector so its economic and social value can be maximised* (BIS, 2011a: 73).

The Finch Review (2012) announced in the *Innovation and Research Strategy for Growth* (2011) was part of this ‘openness’ agenda and was designed to report on expanding access to published research findings. Finch
(2012) recommended the removal of pay walls to publications from publicly funded research were accepted in full\textsuperscript{17} and a decision that would have real economic and social benefits. It will allow academics and businesses to develop and commercialise their research more easily and herald a new era of keeping the UK at the forefront of global research to drive innovation and growth. (BIS, 2012).

For the Coalition Government, the innovation system it chose to design was one that recommended the transition to a publishing regime that unpicked nearly 350 years of publishing practice, a policy innovation that had hardly been signalled previously.

The dominance of the enterprise university in policy was significantly strengthened where the innovation ecosystem was comprehensively outlined in policy. This occurred post 2007 and particularly in the Coalition Government. The narrative of the traditional university was still discernible in policy, not least because governments throughout the period were at pains to offer reassurance regarding the link between research excellence and academic autonomy. For instance, in the Coalition Government, where the Haldane Principle [which] means that decisions on individual research proposals are best taken by researchers themselves through peer review. The Coalition Government supports this principle as vital for the protection of academic independence and excellence (BIS, 2010: 13).

\textsuperscript{17} Except for the removal of VAT from the process.
However, even here, research excellence was increasingly associated with the innovation ecosystem (BIS, 2011a).

### 5.1.2 Universities and a changing economic mission

#### 5.1.2.1 Agents of national economic growth in the global economy

For John Major’s Government it was ‘difficult to overstate the importance of science and technology for economic growth’ (Duchy of Lancaster, 1993: 53).18 Similarly, in the subsequent Blair Government universities could also be major agents of economic growth, responding to the influences of globalisation and new technologies, and the need to interact with businesses (DTI, 2000: 28).

The link between growth and the activities of universities within an innovation process or system was repeatedly used to justify both the expansion of HE and the broader investment within universities throughout the period. Investment in research was made because it fostered ‘the establishment and growth of new companies’ through innovation (DFES, 2002: 37).19 By the time of Sainsbury (2007) ‘politicians, industrialists and economists [were] beginning to see’ what had been the case in 2000: ‘universities as major agents of economic growth’ (Sainsbury, 2007: 43). It was an investment that was apparently reaping reward (Lambert, 2003). By the time of the Diamond Review on *Efficiency in Higher Education*, the contribution of higher education to the UK economy could not be ‘in doubt’ (Diamond, 2011: 14).

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18 Cm. 2250  
19 Cm. 5735
‘Growth’ under the Coalition Government had a number of familiar components. Investment in the science and research base was also explicitly required, as it had been many times in previous years, as ‘a key driver in promoting economic growth’ (BIS, 2010b: 3). The ‘emergency’ CSR of the Coalition Government in July 2010 chose to ‘prioritise support for world class science maintaining spending in cash terms […] to support long-term economic growth’ (H.M. Treasury, 2010: 23). It was soon confirmed that the government was ‘putting innovation and research at the heart of its growth agenda’ (BIS, 2011a: v). Economic growth was dependent on businesses and universities working more effectively within the innovation eco-system. Universities were ‘of fundamental value in the creation and transmission of knowledge for its own sake’ and additionally ‘a national and local asset supporting innovation and growth’ (BIS, 2011a: 47).

5.1.2.2 Agents of regional economic growth in the global economy

A significant part of the economic role of universities was regionally based, a role that has increased in importance and emphasis throughout the period. This role was at first embedded in the idea of different responsibilities for a number of regional actors, of which the university was one and which included central government. It was the view in John Major’s Government that

individuals, firms and institutions [including universities] each [had] a stake in improving the competitive position of their locality [and the

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20 Cm. 7928
21 Cm. 7942
22 Cm. 8239
role of government to] encourage these different interests to work together, so that available resources – from the private, voluntary and public sectors – can be brought to bear effectively [to improve the UK’s competitiveness] (DTI, 1994: 57).23

This local role was expressed clearly in Dearing (1997) as part of the ‘compact’ between society and HE in which ‘each locality or region’ needed ‘the engagement of higher education’. One contribution was essentially the ‘transfer of knowledge and skills between business and higher education’ and was ‘of great importance in England’s regional economies’ (DFES, 2002: 37). This regional economic role was supported and sponsored in two distinct political incarnations.

Under the Labour Government the region was seen as primarily a site for innovation within a globalised economy. This was epitomised by the Lambert Review into University and Business Collaboration (2003), commissioned by then Chancellor of the Exchequer Gordon Brown, that was made in response to greater mobility in the location of R&D capability by international blue chip companies. Lambert complimented universities, not least because it was ‘becoming easier for businesses to find [a] way on to the campus, and to identify academic partners with whom they can work’ (Lambert, 2003: 21). Universities had also increased in ‘relative economic importance’ partly because of ‘the decline of manufacturing and the rapid expansion of higher education’ (Lambert, 2003: 65). As a result, universities

23 Cm. 2563
were at the heart of ‘regional dynamic clusters that provide a source of competitive advantage to firms and that promote economic growth’ (Lambert, 2003: 65). In this way universities and other actors in the regions would attract investment from multi-national corporations (MNCs) in the UK (H.M. Treasury, 2004: 10-11).

Universities carried out this role as part of ‘dynamic regional clusters’ together with central government in the guise of the Regional Development Agencies (RDAs). The RDAs has been one of the first initiatives of the Blair Government in 1997, signalled in Dearing as part of an approach to develop ‘an economic strategy for regions’ (Dearing, 1997: 63) and support the economic missions of the nine Local Government Offices set up by John Major in 1994. RDAs enjoyed strong support for this role for thirteen years during three Labour Governments. The links between universities and RDAs were considered vital to economic growth, regional development and innovation. In partnership with the RDAs, universities were seen to attract talent and inward investment to a region; provide a bridge between public and private research; shape regional innovation strategies and stimulate social innovation though partnerships with local public and third sector organisations (Innovation Nation, 2008: 64).

Some ten years after the RDAs were formed the government was still welcoming the role ‘that universities play in engaging their local business community and strengthening local civic leadership’ particularly ‘as active
contributors’ to ‘the economic development strategies of the Regional Development Agencies and local authorities’ (BIS, 2009: 19).

One of the first acts of the Coalition following the Local growth: realising every place’s potential24 (BIS, 2010c) White Paper was to abolish the RDAs and replace them with Local Enterprise Partnerships (LEPs) that were styled as volunteer partnerships between local authorities and local businesses rather than an extension of Whitehall, alongside more measures to improve the leadership role of the Technology Strategy Board (TSB) as had been the case put forward in Sainsbury (2007). The TSB, together with TICs or Catapult Centres were to take on the innovation role that had been part of the Regional Development Agency’s remit. This support was given to business, given that businesses were ‘the key innovators in the UK. Through innovation, they drive productivity improvements and economic growth. Businesses of all sizes and in all sectors innovate’ (BIS, 2011b: 31). There was some reservation about LEPs’ ability to transform their localities ‘in the way our economy needs’ under the current funding arrangements (Heseltine, 2012: 40). However, this funding gap could be ameliorated because it was the university that offered LEPs ‘a valuable resource, both as sources of local comparative advantage through the attributes and roles […] and in the practical task of developing [their regional economic] plans’ (Witty, 2013: 9). These changes were supplemented by the introduction of Enterprise Zones, first announced in the 2011 budget, designed to emulate the business enterprise clusters that exist around research-intensive universities in the USA (Wilson, 2012: 3).

24 Cm. 7961
Universities were also required to undertake ‘a leading role in facilitating [regional] economic growth’ through their role as ‘anchor institutions’ by working with small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs) because unlike other institutions, universities had ‘a character of permanence’ (Witty, 2013: 16). Universities were ‘incentivised’ to ‘pro-actively to seek out innovative and potentially innovative SMEs and to support them with technology, expertise, talent and know-how’ (Witty, 2013: 8). It was also suggested that universities ‘should assume’ that such support included ‘an explicit responsibility for facilitating economic growth’ (Witty, 2013: 6).

The mission in relation to local communities and regions had developed. Universities were a central part of innovative regional clusters and engaged in the local regional economic agenda through research and innovation. As ‘anchor institutions’ these universities were now required to be a particular and important presence in the region in the absence of central government (BIS, 2010c; Wilson, 2012; Witty, 2013). The university has consistently been implicated in economic growth. This could even be considered as part of the traditional university’s narrative, specifically as an echo of the founding ethos among the Civics (Rothblatt, 1988; Martin, 2012). However, the economic growth in policy, particularly as part of the science base and latterly within the innovation eco-system, was increasing positioned within a global context and in the service of multinational corporations. In this way, wherever the university was implicated with growth in policy, it was the narrative of the enterprise university rather than the traditional university
reinforcing its dominance. However, ‘growth’ in policy over the period also had a regional imperative.

5.1.3 Universities and a changing social mission

The narrative of the traditional university has been consistently implicated in research. Thus when governments such as John Major’s Government talked about ‘the understanding and application of science being fundamental to the fitness of modern nations’ (Duchy of Lancaster, 1993: 1) it was not just in simple economic terms. There were ‘education and cultural reasons’, not least ‘the contribution to public services and the quality of life’ that justified public funding (Duchy of Lancaster, 1993: 1) that were of equal importance. Similarly the Labour Government vision was one that

recognises and values universities as creators of knowledge and understanding and as engines for applying new knowledge for the benefit of all (DFES, 2000: 21).

Further the creation of a ‘leading knowledge economy’ had at its core the desire to ‘improve quality of life in this country though new technologies and improved public services’ (DUIS, 2008: 2). It was in this economy that ‘the UK’s world-class research base’ was an ‘important component’ in delivering the new ideas that had the potential to deliver both ‘significant economic and

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25 Cm. 2250
26 Cm. 7392
social benefit.’ (DUIS, 2008: 6) (emphasis added). 27 In this knowledge economy universities were

the most important mechanism we have for generating and preserving, disseminating, and transforming knowledge into wider social and economic benefits (BIS, 2009: 7).

Similarly, for the Coalition Government it was ‘right to maximise the benefits of excellent research of all kinds’ since the impact that research has on ‘society, public policy, culture, the quality of life and of course the economy’ was welcome (BIS, 2010b: 3). 28

The benefit to society was often expressed as a mission that was more focussed on the individual and their ability to prosper, but which also had a social imperative. In an expansion of higher education there was desire to ensure that higher education was ‘more accessible to people from all sections of society’ (DFES, 1991: 8) 29, a desire that was echoed some ten years later, since ‘our future success depends upon mobilising even more effectively the imagination, creativity, skills and talents of all our people’ (DFES, 2002: 2). It was mobilisation as a ‘force for social justice’ (DFES, 2002: 2). This unblocking of talents was part of a concern with skills in an increasingly competitive global economy (DFES, 1991: 8) and by 2008 had become the prerequisite of an Innovation Nation (DUIS, 2008: Foreword) supporting both the nation and individuals ‘to flourish’ (DUIS, 2008). For the Coalition

27 Cm. 7392
28 Cm. 7928
29 Cm. 1541
Government ‘supporting individuals to fulfil their potential’ remained one ‘of the central pillars through which Government aims to secure sustainable growth’ (BIS, 2011c: 21).\(^{30}\) This was an echo of the narrative of the traditional university, particularly that within the Newman tradition ((Newman 1876: 124).

The societal impact of research and the broader activities of the university became progressively embedded within the narrative of the enterprise university and it became increasingly necessary to prove that benefit, through evaluation and then assessment of ‘impact’. One of the first mentions of ‘impact’ in this context was the Roberts Review (2003) in which research excellence needed to include ‘value added to professional practice, applicability, and impact within and beyond the research community’ (Roberts, 2003: 5). This became a key part of the assessment of research excellence from 2008 onward. Thus whilst it was ‘right to recognise the contribution that researchers [were] making through the wider benefit of their work’ it was equally important to have ‘a robust methodology to assess that benefit’ (BIS, 2011a: 2).\(^{31}\) As the renamed Research Excellence Framework (REF) approached, the arrangements for ‘assessing both the quality and impact of research in the (REF) in 2014’ were further justified on the basis of a

\(^{30}\) Cm. 8122
\(^{31}\) Cm. 7927
growing imperative in our uncertain economic climate for university research to make the greatest possible contribution to economic recovery and social well-being (HEFCE, 2012: 11).\(^{32}\)

This contribution was also to be made at regional level, where the ‘introduction of “impact” in the forthcoming Research Excellence Framework (REF) was designed to provide ‘another sort of incentive to translate research insights into benefits for local businesses’ (Witty, 2013: 8).

### 5.2 Manifest intertextuality: the fear and hope beneath the narrative of the university

In manifest intertextuality, the dominance of the enterprise university is supported by vivid metaphors, such as the modern world ‘being swept by change’ (DTI, 1998: 5), the UK being in a ‘race to the top’ (Sainsbury, 2007: 1), in which competitor countries were perpetually and ‘rapidly raising their game’ (BIS, 2011a: 8). In this way the narrative of the university is set in the context of ‘agitation’ and ‘anxiety’ and ultimately within a rhetorical context of ‘fear’ and ‘concern’. This fear and concern became manifest in the developing idea of the UK being in ‘a global race’ that it needs to win. However, at a different end of an emotional spectrum, often in very close proximity within a text, in ‘situated rhetoric of description and counter-description’ (Edwards, 1999: 271), the narrative of the traditional university is also embedded in a textual rhetorical context that held particular promises of improving the quality

\(^{32}\) HC 3
of life and contributing to society, representing ‘hope’, particularly in the future.

5.2.1 Fear – under threat in a global race

5.2.1.1 The UK under threat

For John Major’s Government the world ‘was changing rapidly’ as a result of globalisation, whereas ‘markets turn global as information becomes a worldwide commodity and protectionism retreats in the face of deregulation and enlightened self-interest’ and new competitors were emerging (DTI, 1991: 67). It was put forward that the UK had no room for complacency if our present excellence [in science and research] is to be developed as well as it must be to match competitors, old and new (Duchy of Lancaster, 1993: 4).

At the same time the proposed strengthening of the science base and improved partnership within it was something that was natural and even in the country’s long industrial tradition given ‘the intimate connection between free trade, the application of science to tradable product’ in the history of the UK and that Britain’s competitive position in the new global economy now rested increasingly on [its] capacity to trade in goods and services incorporating or produced by the latest science and technology (Duchy of Lancaster, 1993: 4).

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33 Cm. 2563
'Like it or not’ with ‘the Asian tigers prowling’ the UK had to become more competitive (DTI, 1996: vi.). It was for this reason that science and its application was seen as ‘central to success’ in the future (DTI, 1996: vi). This agitation was also evident in Dearing (1997) where it was ‘powerful forces driving economies of the world to greater integration’ (Dearing, 1997: Summary) that were ‘pervasive and persistent’ and applicable to all sections of the modern economy (Dearing, 1997: 4.13). This meant that the UK could not ‘afford to lag behind its competitors in investing in the intellect and skills of its people’ (Dearing, 1997: 1.14).

Similarly, for the Labour Governments of the period, the UK was also under threat, where ‘the modern world’ was ‘swept by change’ (DTI, 1998: 5) and in the ‘increasingly global economy of today’ with capital that was ‘mobile’ the UK’s distinctive capabilities are not ‘raw materials, land or cheap labour’, instead ‘they must be knowledge, skills and creativity’ (DTI, 1998: 6). This meant that

scientific excellence [was] only the start. In the modern knowledge economy it is not enough to generate research – we also have to make the most of it (DTI, 2000: i).

There was ‘a real danger that our current strength in the world [would] not be maintained’ (DFES, 2002: 13). Just as in the previous government ‘technology advances apace, new world orders are emerging, our society evolves’ which meant ‘Britain and its place in the world is changing’ (DTI, SET, 2003: 139).

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34 Cm. 3257
35 Cm. 3527
This advance and the associated globalisation were not without worry and moreover these ‘worries’ had ‘in the last twenty years taken on a new intensity’ (Lambert, 2003: 15). As before, it heralded a change that affected Britain’s ‘place in the world’ (Lambert, 2003: 15).

This sweeping change was placed in a rhetorical context in which the UK required ‘rescue’ (Lambert, 2003:11) firstly ‘from the problems caused by globalisation’ (Lambert, 2003:11) and secondly and relatedly, from ‘our own historical British problem’ (Lambert, 2003: 15) of under-investment by industry (Lambert, 2003: 1). Britain’s poor record of ‘turning its established strengths in basic research into marketable products and commercial success’ that had ‘long been a subject of concern’ was now even more ‘pressing’ (Lambert, 2003: 15). Under-investment was set to worsen because the investment decisions in R&D were less likely to be influenced by a company’s historical roots (Lambert, 2003:18). As a result, there could be no retreat to the past reliance on ‘the relatively low cost of doing business in the UK’, rather in the future, [the UK] will need to move up the value chain, and compete on its ability to innovate [and] universities must play a central part in this process (Lambert, 2003: 65).

Thus, when in the 2004 Budget the government confirmed its ten-year framework ambition to raise public and private expenditure it did so because this was required of nations ‘to thrive in the global competitive economy’ and because it had to ‘make good’ previous under-investment in ‘the bedrock of

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36 SET 2003
our economic future’ (H.M. Treasury, 2004: 1). Further agitation came in the form of the need for Britain to reduce the growing gap between it and the rest of the world, and ‘close the gap’ with the United States in particular (H.M. Treasury, 2004: 7). The investment needed to be stronger ‘than in the past’ and the knowledge created must be translated ‘more effectively into business and public service innovation’ (H.M. Treasury, 2004: 5). It was historically poor investment in R&D in the private sector that added a particular British dimension of fear to the hostile environment of change. In subsequent Labour Governments, having started to increase investment in R&D, ‘globalisation’ continued to bring a particular and ‘unprecedented challenge’ to ‘our quality of life, environment and security’ (DUIS, 2007: 8) to which the UK ‘must make a vigorous response’ (DUIS, 2007: 11). ‘Innovation’, as it had been in 2000, was ‘essential to the UK’s future economic prosperity’ (DUIS, 2008: 2).

For the Coalition Government that succeeded Labour in 2010, the threat to the UK from other countries had escalated. This was because ‘other countries understand that innovation is fundamental to economic success […] some countries […] innovate more effectively than others’ (BIS, 2011a: 7). The challenge came from other ‘innovation hubs’ not only in established, developed countries such as in the USA, Germany or Japan, or even the successful smaller scale countries such as Sweden, but the ‘the burgeoning BRIICS (Brazil, Russia, India, Indonesia, China, South Africa)’. Indeed ‘fast growing economies like China, Brazil or India [were] rapidly raising their game’ (BIS, 2011a: 8).
5.2.1.2 Going further in a global race

From 2007 the fear and concern about the threat that globalisation posed to the UK was more often described as a ‘global race’. It was a term first mentioned in the Sainsbury Review in 2007, which was as seminal as the 1993 Science and Technology White Paper Realising Our Potential in John Major’s Government (Duchy of Lancaster, 1993) had been, and which had assessed once again

the role that science and innovation can play in enabling the country to compete against low-wage, emerging economies such as China and India (Sainsbury, 2007: 1).

It was an assessment that was undertaken ‘enthusiastically because we believe that this is one of the major challenges the UK faces’ (Sainsbury, 2007: 1). Britain was now engaged in a ‘Race to the top’ (Sainsbury, 2007: 1) in which at no time since the Industrial Revolution [had] the restructuring of global economic activity been so great (Sainsbury, 2007: 8).

For Sainsbury we could be ‘one of the winners in the ‘race to the top’ but only if we run fast’ (Sainsbury, 2007: 8). Britain needed ‘a vision of our role in the global knowledge economy, and of how we can be one of the winners in the “race to the top”’ (Sainsbury, 2007: 160). The alternative was ‘the race to the bottom’ that should be avoided at all costs (Sainsbury, 2007: 9; Browne, 2010: 16). The ‘global race’ was picked up first in the Hauser Review (2010) and then subsequently in the Coalition Government. In the new global innovation
economy there was an additional challenge of speed, in terms of how fast technologies were now being commercialised. For Hauser,

it used to take many years, often decades, for academic discoveries to be commercialised [this had now] changed into a race between nations to bring new technologies to market more quickly (Hauser, 2010: 6).

For the Coalition Government the speeded up race that the UK found itself in required strengthening the UK’s ‘ability to accelerate the commercialisation of emerging technologies and to capture the value chains linked to these’ (BIS, 2011a: 1). It required that the country ‘position itself’ to ‘exploit new technologies emerging from the knowledge base’ (BIS, 2011a: 28). This translation had always been a key issue of competitiveness, but the UK’s competitiveness depended more than ever on

[its] ability to identify new opportunities at an early stage and mobilise resources of skilled people and investment capital to exploit them (BIS, 2011a: 28).

The ‘new’ competition meant that the UK had to ‘go much further [...] to make it easier for individuals, businesses and the public sector to innovate alone or in partnership’ (BIS, 2011a: 2). Going ‘much further’ required an innovation eco-system that was ‘more open and integrated’ (BIS, 2011a: 4). It also required greater collaboration wherever the ‘idea flows’ – eliminating unnecessary regional barriers which create domestic competition instead of marshalling our resources to run a global race (Witty, 2013: 4).
5.2.2 Hope – the promise of improvement

In much of the policy in the period studied the narrative of the traditional university is embedded in a textual rhetorical context that equally expressed hope about how universities, particularly as science partners and latterly as part of an innovation eco-system, held promises of improving society and the quality of life within the UK and the wider world.

5.2.2.2 A promise of benefit to society

For John Major’s Conservative Government, the promise of improvement offered by research was the solving of ‘practical problems – environmental, medical and social - in all parts of the economy and society’ (DTI, 1995: 148). For the Labour Government, the promise of improvement was more expansive, given that the science base was ‘integral to fulfilling the promise of modernising both the economy and the social fabric of the UK’ (DTI, 1999: iii). This was to build on the promise of past excellence and ‘our remarkable track record in research’ and ‘world-class science’ (DTI, 2000: i). It was a promise that was a natural outcome of investment, because of the

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37 Cm. 2867
38 Cm. 3257
39 SET 1999
‘transformation’ that ‘new technology […] founded on science’ was bringing and thereby changing our society and transforming our lives [and through] new products, new services and new processes [would help to] create wealth, improve our health, our environment, our quality of life (DTI, 2003: 5).40

Therefore, investment in ‘science and research’ was judged to be ‘critical,’ not only to the ‘UK’s economic success’ but to ‘the wider health and well being of our society’ (DTI, 2003: 122).41 As a result any investment in research was to invest in ‘improvements in things that matter to us, such as our wealth, health, environment, and culture’ (H.M. Treasury, 2004: 149). Similarly, it became innovation that was ‘essential to the UK’s future economic prosperity and quality of life’ (DUIS, 2008: 2). This was the basis of the support of ‘excellence’ in research and the encouragement of ‘innovation in all sectors’ that would help to ‘improve quality of life in this country through new technologies and improved public services’ (DUIS 2008:2).42

In the new Coalition Government, excellent research of all kinds would continue to have ‘major benefit for the economy, society, public policy, equality, culture and quality of life’ (BIS, 2010a: 2)43 and be a continuing

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40 Cm. 5877
41 Cm. 5877
42 Cm. 7392
43 Cm. 7927
impact that was welcomed by the government (BIS, 2010b: 3).\textsuperscript{44} In particular, it was the underpinning of technology-based sectors [by] strong universities and the wider research community [in response to] ‘global competition’ [that] enhance[d] our health, quality of life and creative output (BIS, 2011a: 16).\textsuperscript{45}

This was because innovation as well as being ‘the main pathway to sustainable economic growth’ was also the pathway to ‘higher real incomes and greater well-being over the long term’ (BIS, 2011b: 90).\textsuperscript{46} This duality of the promise of innovation continues to be recognised, with ‘a strong focus on the economic benefits [and] the wider impacts such as better health outcomes [and] environmental sustainability’ (BIS, 2013: 20).\textsuperscript{47}

5.2.2.3 Prospering in the face of global challenges

For the Labour Government the promise of improvement was a timely one given that we were ‘on the brink of exciting developments that [would] affect everyone’s lives’ (DTI, 2000, i).\textsuperscript{48} It was because we were ‘surrounded by breakthroughs’ that there was the opportunity to bring ‘prosperity, improve the quality of life and extend life choices for all’ if ‘guided and regulated in the right way’ (DTI, 2000, i)\textsuperscript{49}. It was ‘science’ that ‘more than any time before’

\textsuperscript{44} Cm. 7928
\textsuperscript{45} Cm. 8239
\textsuperscript{46} Cm. 8239 Econ 15
\textsuperscript{47} HC 35
\textsuperscript{48} Cm. 4814
\textsuperscript{49} Cm. 4814
provided the key to ‘creating new jobs, providing better health care, ensuring a cleaner environment and tackling crime’ (DTI, 2000:i). It was science that provided the opportunity to ‘create a world of our own choosing’, not least because ‘research […] aims to address [society’s] most pressing issues before us’ (DTI, 2003: 139). There continued to be many problems ‘facing Britain and the world’ (DUIS, 2008: 9)\(^{50}\) that could be tackled through ‘research and knowledge’ whether it was the ‘challenges of energy demand and use, climate change, global threats [or] ageing’ and thereby bring benefit to ‘business and the economy [and] improvements to society as a whole’ (DUIS, 2008: 35).\(^{51}\) It was by excelling ‘at all types of innovation’ that the UK would ‘meet the challenges of globalisation and to live within our environmental and demographic limits’ (DUIS, 2008: 2). It was university research more broadly that underpinned ‘our society’s ability to address the great public policy issues of our times’ (BIS, 2009:57). This was to prosper through ‘rapid innovation and technological change’ in the face of ‘the grand challenges that we face, including climate change and the demands of an ageing society’ (Hauser, 2010: 3).

For the incoming Coalition Government, global challenges ‘in areas like climate change, security and the demographic shift’ were ‘on an unprecedented scale’ (BIS, 2011a: 3). It was a challenge that included the need for ‘greater citizen engagement in our modern, technologically-driven society’ (BIS, 2011a: 53). It was only the creation of ‘an environment that fosters the

\(^{50}\) Cm. 7392  
\(^{51}\) Cm. 7392
world’s best innovators and the world’s best innovation’ that would meet this challenge (BIS, 2011a: 3). It was through innovation that solutions to the ‘emerging societal needs’ in all developed economies and the need for ‘more sustainable patterns of living’ (BIS, 2011a: 20) would be met. It was above all ‘advances in science and technology’ that were ‘key to UK economic growth and social prosperity’ and ‘long-term progress’ (BIS, 2011a: 53).

5.3 Ideological intertextuality: the ideologies beneath the narrative of the university

The intertextual production of the narrative of the university in the policy is underlined by two ‘ideologemes’. An ideologeme is a current historical mode of textual organisation that is always present (Kristeva, 1980:36). The first ideologeme is one that is recognisable as the primacy of the market that has previously been partially implicated in the narrative of the university of the enterprise university and apparently underpinning a broader public policy agenda (Kirkpatrick et al, 2005; Brown, 2011). The second ideologeme is one of civilisation within which the university is strongly implicated as both a centre and a key part of a civilising process (Nowotny et al., 2001; Starkey and Madan, 2001; Barnett, 2011). This has been implicated in the mythological underpinning beneath the various and evolving narratives of the university, including the narrative of the traditional university (Martin, 2012).
5.3.1 The dominance of the market

The implication of the university, as central to the primacy of the market has been made in several ways.

The university has been progressively co-opted at the behest of government and in the interests of the market, to ameliorate rather than challenge the problems of ‘enlightened self-interest’ (DTI, 1991: 67). It had a role in developing ‘British capabilities when companies alone [could] not: in education, in science and in the creation of a culture of enterprise’ (DTI, 1998: 5). It was in defence of the challenges of globalisation that the university had to became a ‘partner’ to business (Duchy of Lancaster, 1993: 15) in the matters of research and commercialisation of research. The university has also become ‘a major agent of economic growth’ responding to globalisation and business needs (DTI, 2000: 28). The university had as a consequence made it ‘easier for businesses to find [a] way on to the campus, and to identify academic partners with whom they can work’ (Lambert, 2003: 21). This amelioration now very clearly includes balancing the regional economy, by establishing universities as ‘anchor institutions’ in voluntary enterprise partnerships. This was instigated in the apparent absence of central government, but at the behest of the market (Wilson, 2012; Witty, 2013; Young, 2013).

The university in turn has to be more active within the innovation process (DTI, 2000) and it is innovation that has been pressed into service for the market. It was ‘innovation’ that was ‘the motor of the modern economy’ (DTI, 1998: 3). Moreover, ‘continual advances in technological knowledge in
the form of new goods, new markets, or new processes’ were required for growth (H.M. Treasury, 2004: 5), particularly in ‘an era of market liberalisation’ (H.M. Treasury, 2004: 53). It was innovation and the university’s part in an innovation process that became the ‘important determinant of economic growth in an era of market liberalisation’ (H.M. Treasury, 2004: 53). Furthermore, ‘in today’s global economy’ the investment in ‘science and innovation’ was

not an intellectual luxury for a developed country, but an economic and social necessity, and a key part of any strategy for economic success (Sainsbury, 2007: 22).

It was ‘an error to ignore globalisation and to retreat into protectionism [of the past]’ (Sainsbury, 2007: 21) and ‘if the gains from [innovation] were not clear to all those in society’ then the pressures for ‘protectionism’ would be increase (Sainsbury, 2007: 22). In ‘innovation’, business ‘may take the lead’ but we ‘do not innovate in isolation’ and as a result the university and government needed to improve collaboration and interaction in ‘an innovation eco-system’ (Sainsbury, 2007: 23). The alternative was ‘the race to the bottom’ that should be avoided at all costs (Sainsbury, 2007: 9; Browne, 2010: 16). It was a circumstance in which the UK, and its universities have to ‘aspire to be a world leader in research, technology development and innovation’ (BIS, 2011a: 4). It was innovation as a proxy for market globalism that was

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52 G95
53 G93
54 G94
progressively and more tightly implicating the university, innovation hubs’ (BIS, 2011a: 47) and ‘pivots’ or ‘arrowheads’ (Witty, 2013: 24), so that the ‘primacy of the market’ was further assured.

The implication of the university as central to the primacy of the market was further supported through the idea that benefits would be produced for all in the long run (Steger, 2005). Benefits of innovation included those in ‘all parts of the economy and society’ (DTI, 1995: 148). It involved nothing less than the ‘transformation’ of society and lives (DTI, SET, 2003: 5). It covered improvements in ‘all the things […] that matter to us’ (H.M. Treasury, 2004: 149)’ and that were ‘key to […] growth and social prosperity’ and ‘long-term progress’ (BIS, 2011a: 53).

5.3.2 Underpinning a civilising society

The implication of the university as central to ‘civilising’ the known world has similarly been made in several ways.

The university was a ‘place’ of civilisation with a duty of care to ‘civilising’ that needs protection. According to Dearing (1997) universities, being ‘fundamental to the social, economic and cultural health of the nation’ and contributing to the intellectual development of students and ‘the store of the world’s knowledge’, had to ‘accept a duty of care for the well-being of our democratic civilisation’ (Dearing, 1997: 8). This duty of care was embodied in the university as a place

where those who hate ignorance may strive to know, where those who perceive truth may strive to make others see; where seekers and
learners alike, banded together in the search for knowledge, will honour thought in all its finer ways, will welcome thinkers in distress or in exile, will uphold ever the dignity of thought and learning and will exact standards in these things’, (Dearing, 1997: Chairman’s Foreword) (emphasis in the original).

This is a sentiment originally expressed by John Masefield in 1946. It was however, a sentiment that reiterated because it ‘must continue to be so’ (Dearing, 1997: Chairman’s Foreword). This was because ‘as the world becomes more complex and fast changing, the role of higher education as the guardian or transmitter of culture and citizenship needs to be protected’ (Dearing, 1997: Summary).

In subsequent policy after Dearing, universities continued to provide ‘the necessary storehouse in science and technology, and the arts and humanities which defines our civilisation and culture’ (DFES, 2002: 92). The ‘traditional’ university, such as ‘Oxford and Cambridge [played] a critical role [in] the intellectual life’ as well as the economic life of the UK (Lambert, 2003: 6). Universities were also ‘a focal point’ for ‘people with intelligence and imagination to develop solutions to global and domestic challenges’ (DUIS, 2008: 63). Universities were at ‘the heart’ not just of the knowledge economy, but also ‘a civilised society’ (BIS, 2009: 18). This was a sentiment reiterated by the Coalition Government in their response to the Wilson Review, where universities were

55 Innovation Nation
centres of critical inquiry and free-thinking; [instilling] civic values in their students; and [extending] understanding through teaching and research (BIS, 2012: 3)\textsuperscript{56} that underpinned a civilised society.

The university was also an active force for civilisation. This was something that was strongly expressed in Dearing (1997) and echoed more broadly whenever there were reviews of the role of higher education. In this way universities were seen to play a huge role in our communities through the provision of cultural and sporting amenities and in passing on and preserving a set of shared societal values, including tolerance, freedom of expression and civic engagement (BIS, 2009: 18).

As well as economic leadership, universities have the capacity to ‘provide intellectual leadership in our society’ at the heart of ‘our shared intellectual life’ (BIS, 2009: 18). ‘Shaping our communities’, universities are ‘one of the key ways in which we engage with the wider world’ (BIS, 2009: 18). It was on this basis that the Labour Government welcomed the ‘role that universities play in engaging their local business community and strengthening the quality of local civic leadership’ (BIS, 2009: 19). This was also echoed in Browne (2010) where universities ‘generate and diffuse ideas, safeguard knowledge, catalyse innovation [and] stimulate regional economies’ but also ‘inspire creativity, enliven culture, and strengthen civil society’ (Browne, 2010: 14).

\textsuperscript{56} HC 903

*just as castles provided the source of strength for medieval towns, and factories provided prosperity in the industrial age, universities are the source of strength in the knowledge-based economy of the twenty-first century* (Wilson, 2012: Preface).

By quoting Lord Robbins’ requirement that universities ‘take responsibility for the transmission of a common culture and common standards of citizenship’, which they suggest ‘chimes with the aims of Professor Wilson’s review’ (BIS, 2012: 3)\(^57\), the Coalition Government like its predecessors was promulgating the idea of the university as a force for civilisation.

It was a force that latterly had a regional dimension. Not only did ‘many universities […] see themselves as important civic institutions in their city and region’ and it was this civic role which the government believed ‘is to be praised and should be enhanced’ (BIS, 2009: 19). Universities not only attracted ‘talent and inward investment to a region [providing] a bridge between public and private research and [shaping] regional innovation strategies’, they also ‘stimulate social innovation though partnerships with local public and third sector organisations’ alongside other ‘enterprise and entrepreneurial activity’ (BIS, 2009: 64).

Similarly for the Coalition Government, the university was ‘an important presence in the community’ and ‘a key cultural centre’ alongside its

\(^57\) HC 903
economic role in inward investment, employment and regeneration, providing ‘environmental and cultural benefits to the community’ (Wilson, 2012: 73). It was on this basis that the university was ‘an anchor institution’ (Wilson, 2012: 73). In response to the Wilson Review, the Coalition Government agreed that universities ‘increasingly lie at the heart of a city or region’s economy and wider civil society’ and further it was ‘well-nigh impossible to imagine any of our great cities without their universities’ (BIS, 2012: 3).  

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58 HC 930
Chapter 6: The narrative of the university within the university

6.0 Introduction

This chapter presents the findings from interviews with 36 senior managers, functional heads and academics within two participating universities, intimately involved in the policy nexus and strategic direction of their respective universities, alongside interviews with 6 former and current national level policy-makers, involved in the science and innovation agenda. The policy-makers interviewed included senior former and current representatives of leading bodies in the policy nexus, such as HEFCE, Universities UK and a leading Mission Group. The participants shared a high degree of longevity in their service and thereby had an ability to reflect on policy over a long period. Each had been intimately involved with science and innovation policy. It also includes analysis of 15 externally facing corporate documents covering a strategic planning period of eight years (2008-2015). Further documentary analysis included 44 webpages from the participating university websites captured in August 2011 (756 pages). This together with the transcribed interviews (778 pages) amounts to over 1500 pages of text, representing both a public and private, at least in the confines of a research interview, expression of the narrative of the university. As outlined in the methodology chapter the analytical frame employed is narrative intertextuality adapted from Fairclough (1989; 1992) and Riad et al. (2012).
The chapter starts with an introduction to the two participating universities, both research-intensive but formed at different times in the early part of the twentieth century. They are each given a pseudonym that reflects a description that appears prominent in their corporate documents and which was reflective of the discussion within those interviewed in the respective universities. The first university is described as a modern global university (MGU) and the second university is described as a revitalised civic university (RCU). The increasingly dominant narrative of the enterprise university is identified in constitutive intertextuality within the university, and although this has previously implicated in policy academic research (Bridgman, 2007), this wider dominance is a new finding. There is however a subtle difference between the MGU and RCU, in the former the dominance is emphasised as a global enterprise university, with the emphasis on global and in RCU, the dominance is emphasised as a global enterprise university, with the emphasis on enterprise. The wider availability of the narrative of the traditional university is also discussed (Martin, 2012). Both universities maintain traces of the traditional university narrative, within the theme of social improvement at a national and global level, making them virtually indistinguishable. What distinguishes them clearly is the scope of social improvement at the regional level. In MGU this scope is narrowed to one of a responsibility for widening the access of individual members of the local community, whereas within CGU the social responsibility and regional benefit of the university is more expansive.
The co-existence of the enterprise university and the traditional university narratives is then outlined and considered in manifest and ideological intertextuality.

The MGU is a research-intensive university in the UK formed in the late nineteenth century as a civic college, sponsored in part by local industrialists, with degree-awarding powers conferred by the University of London. The civic college moved to its current campus location in 1928 as a result of a significant gift by a local and well-known industrial benefactor and was awarded its own Royal Charter in 1948. It expanded its provision to include a Medical School in 1970. Under Scott’s (1994) typology, the university is described as a ‘new civic’, i.e. universities founded in the non-major cities in the early to mid-20th century. There are two distinguishing characteristics. Firstly, the university has made significant infrastructure development in the last twenty years, including the addition of a purpose-built campus on an iconic brown field site in the city in which it is located, housing the university’s Business School and including a relatively new purpose built space for technology incubation and various research institutes. Secondly, it has pioneered a model of international expansion, with the establishment of two purpose-built campuses in the Far East. It acknowledges a description as ‘the embodiment of the modern global university’ (Annual Review, 2010) taken from one of the leading guides to universities, in respect of all of its activities, including research and innovation and is therefore referred to here as MGU.
The RCU is also a research-intensive university in the UK, but was established by Royal Charter earlier, at the turn of the 20th century, as part of a civic ‘vision’ for the city in which it is located, incorporating in its founding a medical school and science provision. Under Scott’s (1994) typology, the university is described as a ‘civic’ i.e. universities founded in the major cities in the early 20th century and is also known as one of the ‘original redbricks’ (Truscot, 1943). There are three distinguishing characteristics. Firstly, during the 1960s it was a leading advocate in the expansion of HE and benefitted from a major expansion of its campus. It also proactively sponsored the development of two new universities, including a local CAT, which has since become a major research-intensive university. Secondly, the university is credited with above average influence in local and national policy, in health, social care and municipal government. Thirdly, it has been a pioneer in links with local industry and was one of the first universities in the UK to establish a ‘Faculty of Commerce and Social Science’, predating the current structure of the social sciences of many current universities by nearly fifty years. It acknowledges a description as part of ‘a radical’ tradition as ‘a civic university’ (Strategic Plan, 2010-15) one which it has recently sought to ‘revitalise’ and is therefore referred to as ‘revitalised civic university’ or RCU.

6.1 Constitutive intertextuality: the locally and individually configured narrative of the enterprise university

The narrative of the enterprise university that had been implicated in the policy text (Bridgman, 2007) is also evident in the corporate documents within the
university and among policy-makers. Similarly, the narrative of the ‘traditional university’ or research-intensive university is also strongly evident (Martin, 2012). As with the policy documents, in constitutive intertextuality, it is the narrative of the enterprise university that dominates, securing even wider availability through repetition (Vaara, 2002; Vaara and Tienari, 2002; Vaara and Monin, 2010).

6.1.1 The narrative of the university in MGU

6.1.1.1 A ‘global’ enterprise university

MGU’s Strategic Plan (2010-15) outlines a strong ‘asset rich’ position, a size and scale ‘as a comprehensive University’ that is ‘central to both our resilience in meeting challenges and capacity to respond to new opportunities’\(^{59}\). This is coupled with

a unique global footprint [...] the value of which is becoming ever more apparent in our increasingly globalised world’ (MGU, Strategic Plan)\(^{60}\).

MGU’s ‘unique global footprint’ is one reason that the university is ‘starting from a position of strength’ when faced with ‘very demanding times ahead for UK higher education’ (MGU, Annual Review 2010)\(^{61}\). Whilst this includes ‘confronting the emergence of Asia as a major competitor’, it is a confrontation that is best met by the university being ‘host’ (MGU, Strategic Plan)\(^{62}\) to a

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\(^{61}\) G20

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global academic community and ‘hub’ (MGU, Strategic Plan)\(^{63}\) to global business, driven through ‘effective business engagement’ that is viewed as ‘an essential means of ensuring discovery and innovations achieve their full and widest impact’ (MGU, Strategic Plan)\(^{64}\).

‘Mutually beneficial’ relations with business and industry’ are historically positioned in MGU as ‘part of our founding’ and ‘remain a key priority’ (MGU, Strategic Plan)\(^{65}\). However, because MGU’s global positioning is central in the strategic plan, it is only by acting as a global rather than simply a local institution that its intentions are likely to be fulfilled. Thus, its founding principles, including providing for the higher education needs of working men and women [of the local region] are played out now on many levels and on a national and global stage (MGU, Strategic Plan)\(^{66}\).

It is the university’s ‘experience in supporting research excellence and a track record in successful commercialisation’ that can then be utilised to make ‘a valued contribution within China and Southeast Asia’ (MGU, Strategic Plan)\(^{67}\).

Activities in 2010 ‘saw the University engaging with business on a global scale’ including ‘new business and research partnerships’ in many key

\(^{63}\) G14  
\(^{64}\) G12  
\(^{65}\) G12  
\(^{66}\) G16  
\(^{67}\) G11
areas of global concern (MGU, Annual Review 2010)\textsuperscript{68}. The internationalisation of this engagement has been

progressively increasing, broadening and deepening [notably] in Asia, with a string of new collaborations with major corporate players as well as global companies (MGU, Annual Review 2011)\textsuperscript{69}.

The university’s ‘global presence’ is persistently described in terms of its association with business, where the extensive range of influential contacts [that have been] created through educational and research partnerships [demonstrate] potential to grow [the university’s] business engagement on a global scale (MGU, Annual Review 2011)\textsuperscript{70}.

MGU is ‘ideally placed to develop compelling and high-value collaborations’ required as a result ‘of the demand for new technologies accelerating’ through the whole ‘globalisation process’ and ‘China developing its innovation infrastructure rapidly’ (MGU, Annual Review 2011)\textsuperscript{71}. In 2012 the university continues to enhance ‘its global strategic partnerships’ with ‘elite [south east Asian] businesses’ in a number of key research areas and industry sectors (MGU, Annual Review 2011)\textsuperscript{72}. Closer to home, in 2012, ‘a new centre of excellence’ was developed to ‘serve as a global hub to catalyse new

\textsuperscript{68}G22
\textsuperscript{69}G28
\textsuperscript{70}G29
\textsuperscript{71}G29
\textsuperscript{72}G31
collaborations with other institutions and industry partners’ (MGU, Annual Review 2012).\textsuperscript{73}

The narrative of the enterprise university within MGU is not only available but ubiquitous and preeminent in the corporate documents. The university is arranged in global terms, not least because ‘internationalisation is at the heart of everything we do as a university’ (MGU, Facts 2013),\textsuperscript{74} and in its association with business, through research and commercialisation, where it acts as ‘a hub’ or centre.

The narrative of the enterprise university is as widely available within the organisation although it is a slightly more prescribed enterprise university that is available. There is certainly recognition that the university has a significant [role] to play in underpinning corporate R&D and underpinning the knowledge based economy [making] research and innovation within higher education […] important […] at the end of the day innovation drives economic growth and new ideas drive innovation (Senior Manager (SM) 01 MGU 01).

This is because MGU is now ‘much more aware of the importance of knowledge exchange, knowledge transfer’ (SM01). There is also recognition more specifically that the university has ‘this role [knowledge exchange] to play in the economy’ (Functional Head (FH) 01). It is a role that involves

\textsuperscript{73} G32
\textsuperscript{74} G49
[not just] STEM subjects [but also] arts and social sciences [...] because new technologies, new ways of doing things have to be embedded to get maximum benefit (SM01).

This role is reserved to not ‘venturing above TRL (Technology Readiness Level) 4 space’ because ‘we have neither the resources nor the expertise to do that’ (SM01) and because MGU ‘should be focused on discovery, about disruptive things’ (FH01). This means that industry’s involvement is constrained and mostly after the university has ‘made an early investment’ and only ‘at the point you are saying, “that’s it, you’ve got to try and bring others in”’ (SM01). There is no lack of appetite for universities to ‘get some return for where we have input’ but ultimately

there are other organisations, people, who are better placed to exploit what comes out of universities maybe with the involvement of universities (FH01).

It is industry that has ‘responsibility for making [research] accessible’ (FH01). This is a challenge that the university assists in facing as ‘advocates [and] facilitators’ and telling

others why we have got skin in the game [but] you [venture capital and industrial partners] have got to get on with getting FDA approval to run the trials, etc. (SM01).

The role that MGU takes in its ‘collaboration with industry’ is seen as part of its ‘DNA’ and dates back to a ‘very important relationship developed with [a key local MNC]’ that underpins ‘the excellence that we have sustained in [a
number of research fields’ (SM01). It is the basis of a number of ‘hugely profitable relationships, both financial and intellectually’ (Academic Head (AH 01). As a result, MGU has a quite long track record of working closely with industrial partners [and] trying to do that cross over, turning ideas into patents, into licenses and so on (SM01).

This is recognisably the enterprise university as a ‘hub’ in an innovation eco-system, but with a limit on the collaboration that is required for ‘networks [to] develop into clusters of innovative, high productivity businesses which drive economic growth’ (BIS, 2011a: 46).

Moreover, the association of the enterprise university and the university’s founding principles DNA was problematic within MGU. There is ‘quite naturally’ resistance to how far the university ‘can travel toward business’ despite ‘our history’ (AH 01). This is a limit because we are entrepreneurs with a small ‘e’ in universities [as] reasonably bright, flexible people […] can find solutions to problems [but] we’re not businessmen (AH01).

Governments ‘since Thatcher [have] just got us into difficulties because we’re not interested, generally speaking, in business as an entity’ (Academic (AC) 01). Thus, whilst ‘there is more of an empathy with business than there used to be’, it always has limits (SM01). This is because the ‘drivers’ that support individual academic work in research are simply ‘different’ (SM01) and certainly ‘not consistent with the drivers that operate in the private sector’ (AH
01). The enterprise university is seen as too far removed from the ‘proper’ notion of a research-intensive university and MGU’s industrial and local ‘DNA’, even among senior managers and functional heads of the university. There is discomfort with research being transferred on a ‘global scale’ because although

increasingly we’re being driven down that route [it] sometimes, sits a bit uncomfortably in a ‘university like this one’ (SM01).

Instead, MGU is

all of the things that you would associate with a ‘research led’ institution [and is] all of those things in different ways [and using] these single labels such as ‘enterprise’ or ‘entrepreneurial’ […] in a global context is not always very helpful or appropriate (SM01).

6.1.1.2 A regional economic and social responsibility

The university recognises a regional economic responsibility, not least because of its commitment ‘to the city [in which it is located] and our local communities’ (MGU, Strategic Plan)\(^{75}\) and the legacy of the ‘transformational’ impact of ‘our founder’ and his ‘grand vision for [our] provincial city’ (MGU, Annual Review, 2011)\(^{76}\). Within the university, MGU is ‘hugely significant as a local body’ that has an economic impact regionally (SM01). MGU is
a substantive employer’ [and] a beacon to bring young and old people to the city […] a conduit for best practice [and] where technology transfer spinout companies cluster around (SM01).

MGU is also responsible for bringing inward investment into the region through its global collaborations (SM01). This is recognisably an echo of the ‘anchor role’ that has developed within the narrative of the enterprise university (Innovation Nation, 2008: 63), but there are limits.

Engagement with its locality is progressively expressed in terms of ‘community activity, where members of staff and students play an active and positive role in the community’ (MGU, Annual Review, 2012)\(^{77}\), notably ‘outreach’ activity to encourage local children to aspire to higher education. In the corporate documents, it is a role that is firmly embedded within a global context, where MGU ‘believes it is essential that staff and students see themselves as part of [this local and] the larger, global community’ (MGU, Strategic Plan)\(^{78}\). It is important to ‘signal that we do see ourselves as part of the community’ (SM01) However, local engagement is circumscribed to a social responsibility [that] goes to the heart of what this university is all about […] powerfully expressed through many initiatives including […] nearly 40,000 opportunities to engage in learning and prepare for higher education (MGU Facts, 2013)\(^{79}\).

\(^{77}\) G36

\(^{78}\) G16

\(^{79}\) G50
It is a responsibility that is recognised within the university, where the university has a role in terms of the public engagement sort of stuff, and increasingly, locally [...] with the change in fee structures and widening access [and] without claiming that this is the key purpose [of a university] but those are, obviously, additional things which have become more important over recent years (SM01).

MGU’s relationship with the region is said to be ‘historically difficult’, where the university ‘perhaps didn’t care very much about’ the region and ‘its locality’, despite its ‘history’ (AC01). This was a commonly held view that tempered most comments about the university’s engagement with the region. It is a view that was persistently attributed to the previous Vice Chancellor’s ‘reign’ (FH01). This was apparently because the university being slightly snooty [...] didn’t want to play locally [...] it wanted to be an international superstar (AC01).

It was a relationship that was perhaps complex given that the interrelationship between the city, the university, the government, research councils, the funding councils [is] hard to grasp [and] if you clutch too hard to certain pieces of paper [regional policy] you probably end up getting your fingers burned (SM01).

On this basis, MGU was sometimes institutionally reticent to fulfil its regional role. This reticence extends to the description ‘civic university’, which is
likely to be used instrumentally, for example during a senior management team meeting as a means to ‘benchmark the university’s fee setting’, to be in line with the ‘civics’ without necessarily ‘being one of them’ (SM01).

The ‘anchor role’ within the enterprise university is an uncomfortable one for MGU, but only in respect of its ‘difficult relationship’ with its region. Its broader social and economic role is firmly embedded within the narrative of the enterprise university, not least through prescribing its social responsibility in narrow terms in line with policy (BIS, 2011c: 21).  

6.1.2 The narrative of the university in RCU

6.1.2.1 A global ‘enterprise’ university

RCU’s Strategic Plan (2010-15) also outlines its challenge to ‘become a leading global university’ by ‘enhancing’ its existing ‘research power and reach’ and ‘extent of its global networks’ (RCU, Strategic Plan) alongside its comprehensiveness which it defines as the ‘breadth and depth of its academic portfolio’ and ‘size’. A new global perspective is central to RCU, delivering impact [that] makes a difference in [the city] and the region, across the country and around the world (RCU, Strategic Plan).

It is widely promulgated that the university has a historic association with industry and industrial development, a

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proud heritage as a ‘civic university’ [in which it] was established as a resource to secure a prosperous and successful future for the city and the region (RCU, Annual Review, 2011)\textsuperscript{83}

It is this part of its ‘civic roots’ alongside its ‘national eminence’, that it can couple with a new ‘global impact’ agenda (RCU, Strategic Plan)\textsuperscript{84} to contribute to economic growth and innovation, regionally, nationally and internationally.

It is this ‘engagement’ on a global scale that will

open new avenues for innovative research and provide opportunities to translate blue-sky research, born of our culture of innovation and enquiry, into practical solutions (RCU, Strategic Plan)\textsuperscript{85}.

‘Projects’ such as ‘a new collaboration in manufacturing’ are highlighted because they

create a commercial cradle for research innovation and establish [RCU’s] position as a significant provider of expertise [and] deliver economic and social regeneration by creating employment and disseminating knowledge [in and through global industrial collaboration] (RCU, Strategic Plan)\textsuperscript{86}

This is a recognisable feature of the enterprise university within RCU, where it is the role of the university

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\textsuperscript{84} G53  
\textsuperscript{85} G60  
\textsuperscript{86} G64
to deliver the best quality research it can, deliver the best quality teaching it can and make sure we interact with the appropriate partners to ensure that what we do is translated (SM02).

Moreover, this contribution is seen in regional terms, so that the global impact of an enterprise university has to be ‘coupled with growing civic engagement’ in the region (RCU, Strategic Plan)\(^87\). This is because the university recognises that whist it

strives to transform the lives of our students and to extend the originality and global reach of our research, we also recognise and are proactive in our civic responsibilities (RCU, Annual Review, 2013)\(^88\).

There was a clear link being made between the role of the university and its civic roots and responsibilities. The engagement with the world RCU was ‘urgently seeking’ was one that

will establish the University as a body capable of leading national and international agendas, inspiring our local and regional community [and] bringing the world to [the city and region in which RGU is located] (RCU, Strategic Plan)\(^89\).

There is a view that

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\(^{88}\) G81
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the civic, the national and the global are not in conflict with one another, they are all part of what a university like this can and should do and be (SM02).

There is ‘a wish to make sure we engage with the city as well as globally and bringing the two together’ (SM02). There is little resistance to the university being ‘economically useful’ through ‘its contribution to innovation’ (FH02), echoing the enterprise university as a ‘hub’, but there are limits. This is because it is vital to ‘get the balance right’ and avoid going too far into the end user [research] demands [and] becoming an industry and we’ve just got to be careful, I think, about that (AH02).

Similarly, the co-option of the civic within the enterprise university is incomplete within the university. This is recognised among senior managers, in terms of the difficulty of ‘academic buy-in on the ground’ to bringing the ‘civic, national and global’ together’ (SM02). It is even recognised as a potential danger, because just as football clubs are absolutely rooted in their local communities […] and yet have become global and divorced from their roots […]. There is something… I think we [universities] are on a similar trajectory. So, in 10, 15, 20 years’ time our key relationships will be with the partners that we can demonstrate our mutual benefit to around the world (SM02).
6.1.2.2 A regional economic and social responsibility

The university’s regional responsibility is firmly embedded in a civic context, both within the corporate documents and within the university. The university’s regional responsibility, based on its ‘heritage’ is profound. It is a heritage that is revealed in

a considerable economic impact, being directly or indirectly responsible for more than 9,500 jobs and generating £750 million of income [for the region] (RCU, Strategic Plan)\(^90\).

It ‘matters’ that the university contributes to the local economy [and] enhances the well-being and financial health of our city and region (RCU, Annual Review, 2013)\(^91\).

The university is probably one of the major assets for the region [and the UK and there is] no political or moral difficulty with remembering that at all (SM02).

The new attempt to revitalise the ‘civic university’ is also seen as a timely re-engagement with the region, because the university as a ‘beacon of innovation’ is the only bastion still standing in the regional landscape [and as a result] the [regional] enterprises […] are going to need something from the universities (FH02).

It is also timely in respect of the university

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\(^{91}\) G81
helping to deliver tangible growth [...] engaging with local industry to achieve that [alongside] a really important role in terms of global R&D [which] is also a new take and a bit of a return to the role and value of the university (SM02).

There is a recognition within RCU, that have mattered much more ‘in the last three or four years’ There is a recognition within RCU that questions over the its civic nature and its value to the city and its region are ones that has ‘mattered much more in the last three or four years [at least] rhetorically’ (SM02), although the university has long seen itself in regional terms rather than global ones. Instead [the new VC] has ‘reconnected, some of what we are doing and why we are doing it with the origins of the university’ (SM02) and where the university has ‘sort of come full circle’ (AC02).

This is recognisably an echo of the ‘anchor role’ that has developed within the narrative of the enterprise university (Innovation Nation, 2008: 63). However, the university’s ‘anchor role’ is widely understood in terms of its comprehensive civic responsibilities, as ‘inheriting and revitalising a real relationship between the city and its social economic political life and the university’ (AC02) given that the university ‘was very explicitly [founded] in order to serve [the city], really’ (SM02).

It is a heritage that is a

quite self-conscious understanding and development of the way in which we play a role in the quality of the economic, cultural, social and
governance opportunities in the city [...] in partnership and collaboration with other civic agencies (SM02).

It is being rebuilt through links that have always existed, maybe not as strongly as they should have done [which] are being developed and pushed as much as possible. So, re-establishing, if you like, the civic sense (FH02).

One view of this revitalised civic engagement is that RCU needs the city and the region more than other universities. The example of similarly geographically and historically located universities like ‘Chicago’ who can ‘afford […] being remote and detached from the city’ but [RGU] can’t [because] in order to be able to promote as strongly as we can our national and international endeavours we probably need the support of the city and we need to engage with the city (SM02).

It is a symbiotic and equal relationship because ‘a university like this needs a city to thrive just as a city needs a university like this to thrive’ (SM02). This is because actually, for quite a lot of what we do it really matters [...] the university is the pivotal point in the health economy of the [region] so ... of course we do cancer research of global impact and all the rest of it and I don’t for one moment diminish that but let’s just remember we have a particular local role as well (SM02).
The ‘anchor role’ within the enterprise university is a comfortable one for RCU and there is conscious co-opting (SM02) of the economic and social role of the civic within the narrative of the enterprise university especially in corporate documents and at a senior level within RGU.

6.1.3 The narrative of the university in public and in private

In the corporate documents within both MGU and RCU, the university is configured in global terms as part of an innovation eco-system, reflecting the dominant narrative of the enterprise university in the policy documents. Corporate documents are considered as verisimilitudinous (Brown, 2000) and public artefacts likely to be similarly constructed within the policy nexus (Vaara et al., 2004). However, there is a subtle difference between MGU and RCU. In MGU, this public expression was of the narrative of a ‘global’ enterprise university, whereas as in RCU this narrative had a different emphasis, as a global ‘enterprise’ university.

Within each university the narrative of the enterprise university also dominates. It is however held at a distance. In MGU, the university is in a potentially productive partnership with industry within an innovation eco-system that is global rather than local, but is also at a slight remove from industry. Within RCU, the university is one of enterprise, but based on the long heritage of a productive and mutually beneficial relationship between the university and industry, at a regional and national level, rather than simply as part of a global innovation eco-system.
The narrative of the traditional university is also available publicly and privately, and there is little difference between that expressed in the corporate documents and that expressed in discussion within the interviews. Each university has a role in social improvement, globally, nationally and locally. The difference between MGU and RCU concerned social improvement in the region. In MGU, this was constrained to a narrow social responsibility, for example around widening participation and improving access to HE for disadvantaged children in the area. In RCU, this role was unconstrained and formed part of a broader civic legacy, in which the university has an expansive role economically and socially, as well as culturally and politically in the city and the region.

6.2 Manifest intertextuality: the fear and hope beneath the narrative of the university

In manifest intertextuality, the university is supported by vivid metaphors, such as ‘aftershocks’ (MGU, Strategic Plan)\(^{92}\) and ‘chill winds’ (RCU, Annual Review 2011)\(^{93}\) of the financial crisis and the global economic downturn, creating a context of ‘agitation’ and ‘anxiety’, in each university. The fear about the current ‘crisis’ is publicly expressed alongside the view that the university is well positioned to overcome it. Within both MGU and RCU, the university is supported by similar emphasis on ‘danger’ that is ‘very real’ (SM01) and one in which ‘strong feelings’ prevail (AH02). However, this is a

\(^{92}\) G01  
\(^{93}\) G70
more specific danger, in which the university ‘[is] losing its ability to produce blue-skies […] world-changing research’ (SM01). This is a fear that is not expressed in corporate documents, but was widespread among all levels within the university, in both MGU and RCU. There was doubt that the university would be able to overcome this threat. At the same time, the narrative of the university is embedded in a rhetorical context, often in close proximity (Edwards, 1999: 271) that represents ‘hope’. Both universities shared a confidence in their ability to respond to the *world of opportunity that globalisation offers*. This response was likely to be globally in both MGU and RCU, but in addition had a regional dimension in RCU. It was a response that offered significant and *world-changing* improvements in the quality of life in society.

### 6.2.1 Fear – for the university in the age of globalisation

#### 6.2.1.1 Aftershocks and chill winds

For MGU the ‘‘uncertainty’ through which the university is currently living’ is of ‘a remarkable turbulence triggered by the global financial crisis and sustained by its aftershocks’ (MGU, Strategic Plan)\(^{94}\). This means that there is a ‘background uncertainty’ that ‘always makes planning more difficult, especially when that means looking out over a five year period’ (MGU, Strategic Plan)\(^{95}\). This uncertainty

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\(^{94}\) G01

\(^{95}\) G01
should never be a reason for indecision [because] that only creates more uncertainty and paves the way for stagnation rather than progression (MGU, Strategic Plan).  

Furthermore, this uncertainty means that ‘the higher education policy environment in the UK will be fluid and challenging for the foreseeable future’ (MGU, Strategic Plan). Despite the apparent consensus on the value of research to the UK economy, MGU’s strategic plan written in early 2010 made much of the danger to the ‘level of public funding available for research and knowledge transfer’ alongside a much longer term policy around ‘the intended concentration of that funding on fewer universities’ (MGU, Strategic Plan).  

Similarly RCU notes ‘the chill winds’ of change that include ‘the most significant changes in UK higher education for a generation’ and ‘challenging financial times’ that will continue to be ‘profound’ and likely to continue over the ‘next five years’ (RCU, Annual Review, 2011). The sector continued to face ‘unprecedented change’ that brought ‘turbulence’ (RCU, Annual Review, 2012).  

Each university considered itself well positioned to overcome the agitation of the current climate for HE. For MGU it was by
recognising and explicitly confronting the major challenges ahead [it]
set out to deliver the ambition in [its strategic plan] from a very good
place (MGU, Strategic Plan)^101.

This ‘good place’ included being ‘asset-rich’ with a very good ‘workforce’,
‘comprehensive’ in scale and with a unique ‘global footprint’ (MGU, Strategic
Plan)^102. ‘No-one should be in any doubt’ of the ‘very demanding times ahead’
but MGU starts from ‘a position of strength’ (MGU, Annual Review, 2010)^103.
In particular, MGU research success demonstrates that it is
capable of flourishing even in the current environment […] uniquely
positioned to contribute to the development of research capacity
globally (MGU, Strategic Plan)^104.

It was already the case that MGU was prospering with
excellent performance […] set against a rapidly changing landscape for
higher education [that] heralds very significant reductions in public

Equally RCU remained ‘on course’ and was able to ‘face the future with
confidence’ (RCU, Annual Review 2011)^106. This was because ‘turbulence’
created ‘opportunity’ (RCU, Annual Review 2011; RCU, Annual Review,
and investment continues to be made in ‘activities that enhance the reputation of our University in the region, across the UK, and around the world’ (RCU, Review, 2011)\textsuperscript{108} generating ‘impact’. The university was well placed, not simply to survive the current turbulence, but to emerge a still more resilient, successful, and influential academic force in our city; within our country; and across the globe (RCU, Annual Review, 2012).\textsuperscript{109}

6.2.1.2 Dangerous incentives and unwelcome consequences

The anxiety around funding was evident in the university but only as a key part of the so-called ‘below the radar risks’ (Policy Maker (PM)) to research in the longer term. The risks associated with government policy were similarly expressed within MGU and RCU, even down to the choice of metaphor. There was a recognisable ‘perfect storm’ that could bring about the ‘diminution’ of ‘blue skies activity’ (SM01). This ‘perfect storm’ was one that contained ‘the concentration of research funding [and] funding cuts [and] ‘impact’’ (SM02). The greatest and common fear within the university from this storm, concerned the threat to ‘blue-skies’ research. This long-term or blue skies research, without a specific end in mind, and was research that was considered integral to the narrative of the traditional university and was perceived as under threat.

There was a distinct fear because ‘capital budgets (for research) that have been absolutely crucified’ and would potentially force universities ‘to be

\textsuperscript{107} G72 G78
\textsuperscript{108} G73
\textsuperscript{109} G79
scraping around for different sources [of funds]’ (FH01). As a result blue skies research could soon be

a luxury in a climate that says “let’s not take risks, let’s put money on a proven track” and that, if money is short, some of that makes sense but [you still need] to look for sort of slightly odd ball ideas (AC01).

Moreover, for ‘universities of this [research-intensive] type’ was the university may be diverted in its need for income generation in the short-term and the ‘easiest to get’ would affect its focus on the longer-term, and the university’s objectives in terms of ‘research reputation […] might be diverted for short term accounting purposes (FH02). This was to misunderstand blue sky as ‘something completely novel […]’ that required significant ‘risk’ and in a way that would feed [the government’s] risk aversion’ (AC02). Misunderstanding was part of a more general lack of ‘deep understanding of how [research in] universities operate[s]’ (SM01), and was dangerous, because lack of long term funding would leave important areas of research underexplored.

It was a fear that was heightened by the general ‘short-sightedness [of government policy] […] particularly in terms of impact’ (AC02). ‘Impact’ was another ‘perverse incentive [to] focus on the short-term […]’ (SM01). Any policy agenda that came from the need to ‘account or show impact’ was ‘dangerous’ because it was designed by ‘non-scientists [who] don’t understand [that] you cannot plan a research strategy in the way you were planning to run a supermarket’ (AH01). The consequence was foreseen as one in which
research that was ‘completely “off the wall” and “weird and wonderful”’ would not be undertaken (SM01). The stakes were high because universities have to be places where fundamental blue skies research, call it what you will, takes place, because the kind of, the failure rate in ideas is higher than would be acceptable in the commercial domain (SM01).

This, together with reduction in funding, were ‘a step too far […] it’s so difficult, now, to get any funding for genuine just fundamental blue skies research’ (AH02). As a result a scenario could be imagined where if I put in a grant proposal about some wacky idea and I couldn’t actually prove it was going to work but if I could prove it, it would be very, very nice, and I signed it at the bottom “love from A Einstein, Patent Agent” what is the chance of getting that supported? (AC02).

The policy that ‘supported research concentration’ was also a concern in both universities, where there was ‘inherent’ danger in “putting too many eggs in one basket” even if it ‘was supposed to help the UK compete’ (AC01). There was some acknowledgement that it would eventually be ‘a struggle (for universities like this one) to compete with the “big boys”’ (AC02). This danger made the policy toward research funding and selectivity ‘troubling’ (FH01).

However, it was also recognised that even with some ‘very real dangers’ some of the positions taken in universities are a bit […] “Philistines” within the walls’ (SM02).
Policy-makers did not share the fears expressed within the university around blue skies research or research selectivity lading to further research concentration. What policy-makers perceived what a great amount of scare mongering […] if you listen to some in the sector’ (PM). It was imply a case and 
cruelly [put] no government [over the period] has seen an advantage in destabilising research in the way that they have seen advantageous reasons to destabilise teaching (PM).

Instead, the prevailing fear among policy-makers was within the ‘open access’ agenda whilst ‘apparently benign and motherhood and apple pie’ was ‘plagued with real danger’ such as

academics losing control over their own work, data being disseminated before it’s been properly checked, companies worried about ‘confidentiality’ […] people forget there are still hostile nations who actually do want to get access to our knowledge. And our knowledge, this is still one of this country’s big competitive advantages (PM).

6.2.2 Hope and the promise of preservation

The narrative of the university in the short-term was embedded in the belief of being able to benefit from the current ‘turbulence’, with a degree of ‘hope’ in the future, through the opportunity that globalisation provided. For MGU it is through ‘globalisation’ that ‘a world of opportunity’ is being opened up and it is through ‘strategic partnerships between business and higher education’ that ‘the benefits of globalisation’ can be ‘successfully realised’ (MGU, Annual
At RCU, the university is ‘seizing opportunities’ and ‘securing prestigious partnerships with international business and industry’ (RCU, Annual Review 2011), together with ‘initiatives’ that ‘encourage cross-disciplinary collaboration and generate globally significant research outcomes’ (RCU, Annual Review 2011). Moreover, the university’s international profile ‘has continued to blossom’ and it ‘can now claim to be a truly global institution’ (RCU, Annual Review, 2013).

In the longer term, the narrative of the university was embedded within a context of hope for the future of society and in solving pressing and significant global issues.

MGU’s broader declared purpose is ‘to improve life for individuals and societies worldwide’ (MGU, Strategic Plan) addressing ‘the most pressing global human concerns and global problems’ (MGU, Strategic Plan). The university’s success ‘entails developing ideas, creating discoveries and generating value and benefits by exchanging knowledge’ (MGU, Strategic Plan, 2010) thereby generating ‘real economic, social, environmental and cultural impact’ (MGU, Strategic Plan, 2010). The research ‘endeavour’ was
world-changing [focused on] turning [the] talents and abilities [of our] academic community [to] problems and challenges that affect societies and people on a wide scale (MGU, Strategic Plan)\textsuperscript{118}.

MGU is uniquely placed as a global institution to provide this ‘hope’ for the future, because it is able to address

some of the most pressing global human concerns and social problems in three very different but complementary national contexts simultaneously (MGU, Strategic Plan)\textsuperscript{119}.

This required ‘bold innovation and excellence in all that we do’ because ‘both knowledge and discoveries matter’ (MGU, Strategic Plan)\textsuperscript{120}. Research is prioritised in the university so that

in a concentration of expertise, collaboration and investment new ideas [are generated], the next generation of researchers and innovators [is trained] and fundamental challenges [are addressed] (MGU Annual Review 2010)\textsuperscript{121}.

The university is able to fulfil this promise through ‘its established reputation’ for ‘introducing this cutting-edge research to the global marketplace’ and producing ‘life-saving technologies’ (MGU Facts, 2010)\textsuperscript{122}. MGU offers hope
as a global Top 75 university [that by working] with business, industry and government […] new theories technologies and processes [can be developed] that will create a more sustainable planet (MGU, Annual Review, 2010)\textsuperscript{123}.

Furthermore, the university’s major fund-raising activities are designed ‘to make a real difference’ not just to the local community, but also on the major global challenges we face […] to transform research programmes, enrich the student experience and enable the institution to make an even greater contribution to the global communities we serve (MGU, Annual Review, 2011)\textsuperscript{124}.

The aim is to raise a significant amount in order to ‘change lives, tackle global issues and shape the future’ (MGU, Annual Review, 2011)\textsuperscript{125}.

There is a strongly shared sense within MGU that the university is contributing to some of the ‘major global issues of the day’ (SM01). This is because it is in universities that ‘things [are] discovered that could benefit mankind’ and where we are obliged to ensure ‘that [benefit] is actually realised’ (AH01). In the way ‘universities exist to undertake high pioneering, curiosity driven [research] if you like [that] benefits society as a whole’ (AH01).

Universities are

\textsuperscript{123} G23
\textsuperscript{124} G26
\textsuperscript{125} G25
in a position to do things that substantially change society for the better [...] to improve health [...] to make a significant difference to qualities of life (SM01).

This is not to deny that for some this hope was also one that had a regional focus,

whether by building social capital [...] whether that’s what we do through school improvement, whether it’s what we do through healthcare, whether it’s what we do for the arts and cultural [life] within the city (SM01).

This was a hope expressed for each of ‘the communities in which [MGU] was embedded’ (SM01).

Similarly RCU’s purpose was designed to make a significant ‘impact’ on the world’s issues, where its strategy is supported by ‘the best use of resources’ and the university’s ‘financial stability’ (RCU, Annual Review, 2010)\textsuperscript{126} to ensure

[...] collaboration between prolific research areas and promised outcomes that would be of global significance [through] innovation (RCU, Annual Review, 2010)\textsuperscript{127}.

There was recognition that RCU offered a promise by bringing its

\textsuperscript{126} G69
\textsuperscript{127} G68
resources to bear on societal needs, through knowledge development and transfer, and strategic partnerships in the intellectual, commercial, cultural and policy spheres (RCU, Strategic Plan, 2010)\textsuperscript{128}.

The imperative to meet global challenges and provide ‘hope’ by tackling them was also clearly and widely expressed. It is vital for ‘universities to be able to do fundamental research, blue skies research’ because

if you look at many of the big advances, that society’s needs, then that’s where there is a promise, in those sorts of studies (AH02).

A focus on social improvement was made regardless of the ‘knowledge economy’ because ‘what we [academics and the university] are about [is] ensuring the existence of resources in the long term so that future generations will benefit’ (AC02). This was a focus that was widely shared as core to the university, in which all of the university’s activities, including ‘research, teaching and our partnerships […] in fact, our knowledge transferring in the widest sense of the word [was] to help society’ (FH02).

Unlike MGU, in RCU, there was a much more widespread and explicit link made between the university’s ‘founding’ and the hope of social improvement. Often in the region, RCU was seen as having ‘lost its way and lost its connection somehow to the city’ and all the current VC is trying to do is to ‘take the university back to its roots, to what it’s all about, as a civic university’ (SMO2) in the broadest sense of making a positive difference in and to society.

\textsuperscript{128} G62
Thus, RCU may have been ‘designed to be prestigious’ but it was ‘also
designed to link into and help solve the problems of the day’ (AC02). Thus,
whilst its founding had ‘a very strong economic purpose’ what is crucial ‘is our
impact on the problems of wider society, solving society’s problems’ (AC02).
RCU provided alongside ‘economic competitiveness, a social good in terms of
the research base contributing to the quality of life in the UK’ (SM02). This
was closely tied to

research […] that’s going to make a difference […] that’s going to have
an impact on policy and people’s lives (AH02).

One senior manager summed it up well, recalling

being offered a lot of money for [a patent], millions and millions, and
millions of pounds, I’ve never had such a big offer […] the company
that was going to buy it was going to lock the patent away and not use
it. [We] didn’t take it […] above all we always hope to influence
society for the better (SM02).

The hope comes with a very powerful sense of practical obligation in
each university. The university is operating in ‘society’ but with ‘its
permission’ and as a result the university cannot be ‘an ivory tower’ because
‘society has a right to expect something from us as institutions’ (SM01). This
is not to ‘succumb to an entirely instrumental agenda’ but to be

mindful that we don’t exist in a vacuum and shouldn’t’ […] recognising
if we simply ignore the rest of society in its broader sense, it becomes
very difficult to defend our existence within that society (SM01).
Since we’re ‘in receipt of ‘public funds it’s important that the work ends up with products and is useful and important for society’ AH02). Universities ‘should not be ivory towers, behind closed doors [...] even if you didn’t see all the social and economic value in university, which I do see, [there is] a strong imperative that universities need to be engaging with the real world and contributing towards economic growth, social development, things like that (FH02).

Among policy-makers there was a shared view that the university served a higher interest and one that offered a social benefit, especially in terms of research that solved some of the most pressing issues of the day. So, you won’t find many ‘Gradgrinds’129 or instrumentalists among us. So it’s about that and it stems from a strongly held belief among many of us that if we can help people to do that we will have a better society and a better world to live in at the end of it. These are big questions, but we actually do believe all this stuff (PM).

The contribution to economic growth [...] is only part of the picture [of improvement], it is only one channel that the university serves society. That's I think in a nutshell how we see it. I don't suppose it comes as a surprise other people must have said the same (PM).

129 This refers to Thomas Gradgrind, the Headmaster in the novel *Hard Times* by Charles Dickens, dedicated to the pursuit of profit and utility above all else.
6.2.3 The abiding emotion within the narrative of the university

Fear provided a powerful rhetorical context for the narrative of the university within both MGU, RCU and among policy-makers. In the corporate documents this fear was palpable as one of immediacy, in which the university could respond positively. Within the university, the rhetorical context of fear transpired as apparently more discreet, comprising of ‘below the radar risks’ and was rarely publically expressed. Nonetheless this represented an existential fear for the university.

The rhetorical context of hope persisted within the narrative of the university, both within the corporate documents and the university, and among policy-makers. The university could solve the global challenges that the world faced. Hope in the power of universities to face the world’s problems head on and solve them represented nothing less than the university’s founding mission, notably in RCU. In contrast in MGU, in an echo of policy, the hope of social improvement became prosaically tempered, as being part of a quid pro quo for the university as recipient of public funding, where the university, within its walls ‘owed something in return’.

6.3 Ideological intertextuality: the ideologies beneath the narrative of the university

The two recognisable ‘historical modes of textual organisation’ or ‘ideologeme’ (Kristeva, 1980: 36) within the narrative of the university identified in the policy are intertextually reproduced within the university. The
first ‘ideologeme’ is one that is recognisable as the primacy of the market, previously implicated as part of the broader public policy agenda (Kirkpatrick et al., 2005; Brown, 2011), but in a way that co-option the idea of partnership in the service of the market. The second ‘ideologeme’ is one that is recognisable as a civilisation, again within which the university has been strongly implicated as both a centre and a key part of a civilising process (Nowotny et al., 2001; Starkey, 2001; Barnett, 2011).

6.3.1 The dominance of the market

In corporate documents, as with policy documents, the university has been clearly implicated in the service of the market. This service was subtly different in corporate documents where the university was actively pressed to build business partnership on a global scale, at the behest of both the government and international business. The university thereby serves the market through its global business and other partnerships. In this way, the university ‘provides the foundation for local and global research partnerships and collaborations’ that are commercially valuable (MGU, Strategic Plan)\(^\text{130}\). Moreover, the

key to a sustainable future lies in creating powerful international partnerships that are commercially based (MGU, Annual Review, 2010)\(^\text{131}\).

\(^{130}\) G09
\(^{131}\) G22
Partnership is based on ‘effective business engagement’ that in turn is viewed as ‘an essential means of ensuring discovery and innovations achieve their full and widest impact’ (MGU, Strategic Plan). South East Asia provides the site of these partnerships, in which the university has showcased its expertise [...] to engage in new initiatives in a region that will continue to dominate international headlines for decades to come (MGU, Annual Review, 2010).

Furthermore, strategic partnerships across higher education and business offer great potential for the successful realisation of the benefits from globalisation (MGU, Annual Review, 2011).

MGU looks forward to continuing to ‘demonstrate our potential to grow business engagement on a global scale’ (MGU, Annual Review, 2011). These partnerships are at the heart of [the university’s] mission, [our] reach extends far beyond its [physical location] to encompass partners across the world (MGU Annual Review 2012).

Within RCU, the benefit of ‘strategic partnerships’ in the ‘intellectual, cultural, commercial and policy spheres’ was considered vital (RCU, Strategic Plan).
as means of embracing the globalised world. It was on the basis that the university was

seizing opportunities to shape our university for the 21st century: securing our position amongst the world’s leading universities; being recognised for the quality of our research and graduates; and securing prestigious partnerships with international business and industry (RCU, Annual Review, 2012)\(^\text{138}\).

The nature of this partnership is considered differently within each university. In MGU, partnership is more likely to be part of ‘broadening our “research base”’ including with ‘other institutions’ such as ‘industry’ and the ‘community’ (FH01) to improve research per se, rather than simply in service to the market. This involved ‘exchanging knowledge’ in a precise use of the term and

[…] with [this region] that is […] quite disadvantaged in parts you can engage with them and develop excitement [or] a sense of interest in the university and what we do (FH01).

Similarly in RCU ‘partnership or at least most of it is about partnership and collaboration with other civic agencies’ (SM02). It was perceived that partnership was also integral within ‘policy’ and ‘strategy’, although the language ‘used to articulate policy […] was not the same as most academics would use [it] needed to be ‘deconstructed’’ it would be seen in terms of yes,

\(^{\text{137}}\) G62
\(^{\text{138}}\) G77
that’s what we’re doing” but they wouldn’t articulate it quite in that way (SM02). Moreover, the purpose of any partnership was about ‘our knowledge transferring in the widest sense of the word’ (FH02).

6.3.2 Underpinning a civilising society

The implication of the university as central to a ‘civilising’ or the known world is also replicated within the university and as with the policy documents, has similarly been made in several ways. It is the university’s relationship to knowledge that is central to the civilising of the ‘known world.’ This is because

the university values learning and knowledge for their own sake, as well as for the social and economic benefit they can bring (MGU, Strategic Plan)\textsuperscript{139}.

‘Mutually beneficial’ relations with business and industry are historically positioned in MGU as ‘part of our founding’ and ‘remain a key priority’ (MGU, Strategic Plan)\textsuperscript{140}.

According to the First Chancellor, RCU was founded to

provide a great school of universal instruction […] the most important work of original research should be continuously carried out in the most favourable of circumstances (quoted in RCU, Strategic Plan)

\footnotesize\textsuperscript{139} G09
\footnotesize\textsuperscript{140} G12
The university is embedded within an ‘ideologeme’ that recalls a historical purpose of ‘knowledge’ and ‘learning’. In MGU for instance, the university has ‘a fundamental role’ as

the site at which knowledge is advanced, at which you drive back the sort of boundaries of what we know (SM01).

In RCU, this fundamental role was ‘as a seat of learning [even if] that’s an old phrase’ (AC02). Moreover, the university is the ‘one true place’ that this ‘knowledge’ can happen.

It’s where those guys get the freedom to do the things they need to do [not like] the product development stuff is downstream or, parallel […] done by other people with another kind of mindset (FH02).

The university ‘should be the centre’ of

unfettered and undirected human enquiry to come up with new ideas and new understanding of the world […] the power to change things […] contributing to economic growth is only one of the channels through which this end is achieved (PM).

Universities have a broadly civic function (SM02). The university serves the civic when it gives people ‘a zest for understanding’ (SM02) and when it nurtures the passions that people have for broadening their mind[s] and their understanding of themselves and the world and whatever the world is to them (FH01)
It is in this ‘understanding’ and ‘broadening of minds’ that the ‘obligation to the values of democracy [that] remains’ as part of the ‘university’s historical purpose’ (AC01). It is a role in which the university is ‘actually conserving and passing on culture’ (AC01). Thus, the university is above all a place that has

long provided [the] understanding [to] shape, influence, change the way civic society thinks about itself, is governed, goes about doing certain things (SM02).

In this way universities are really key institutions in terms of democratic culture, giving people opportunities, which is why I see widening participation - not this *noblesse oblige*, being nice or trying to get bright kids from poor communities into top universities - I see it as part of the advance of democracy in our society, on a par with the 1870 Education Act (PM).

The university has had higher loyalty than just to their local community. If you, if you are a university that sees itself as having research as an important element then it’s serving the course of the advancement of learning [which does not] necessarily mean that you have to be collaborating with industry, it actually means that you are following a path of the advancement of learning (PM).
6.4 Framing the ‘university’ in the policy nexus

There is a sense within the university and among policy-makers that the intertextual production of the university is just that, a production. This does not reduce the impact on the change in the predominant understanding of the university. It does however point to a complacency rather than conspiracy in that change. This complacency is explored briefly here.

There was a consensus within the university and among policy-makers that government policy around science and innovation lacked political salience outside of HE. This was the case when policy had the potential to ‘profoundly affect the nature and the financing of a large range of institutions’ (SM02). However, research policy is not always without contention; a recent example cited was the changes in metrics and RAE announced in Gordon Brown’s Government, causing some ‘controversy’ in ‘government relations’ without ever being close to ‘making the front page of the newspapers’ (PM). Instead, science and innovation policy has a different sort of salience; one that is largely absent from public debate, but which nonetheless in its intricacy and nuance occupies the sector sometimes with quite fierce debate.

This debate largely takes place outside of the public arena, occurring in a policy nexus that operates at many different levels within the university and government. This nexus includes the various stakeholders outside the university as well. This process requires continual ‘lobbying’ effort including ‘spending a lot of time with research councils and a little bit of time with the funding council’ (SM02). It is a collective effort involving ‘a whole bunch of
people much further down the food chain’ supporting the case and including industrial contacts who ‘can make the case on our behalf’ (SM02). It involves ‘flag-waving’ in Research Council panels, especially ‘in terms of looking at the new directions’ (FH02). It is an activity that involves ‘favourable positioning’ by an individual university (AH01) and even classes of universities (PM). This favourable positioning is essentially two-way, given that it is in the government’s interests to actively engage those ‘substantial sectors that rely on public spending’ in ‘a process of thinking through the case and starting to lobby’ (SM02). Government policy-makers expressly use both soft and hard power, so that

they might say to [the universities] “look guys can you see the wind is blowing in this direction?” [and] connive to be influential [rather than] putting money into it (PM).

This has been the case in respect of broadening ‘research collaboration’ or introducing ‘open access publishing’ (PM). When substantial public sums are involved however, the connivance turns to ‘direction’, where ‘we say to them if you want money for research you've got to produce excellent research or you won’t get it’ (PM). In this ‘lobbying’ process the Treasury is portrayed as a ‘common enemy’ (SM02) and relations with the Treasury are characterised as problematic and often subject to wrangling (Shattock, 2012). In any event, universities have ‘always sold themselves to various governments as terribly useful institutions that can solve a hell of a lot of their problems for them’ including ‘in the Treasury’ (PM).
There are also more public ‘consultations’ within the policy process, which tend to take place ‘in the sector when major policy changes are imminent’ (SM01). During these consultations there will be ‘casual leaks’ so that ‘we (the university) know what’s coming and can do quite a bit of reading of the runes’ (SM01). The ‘least important’ part of this consultation may be the ‘formal submissions’ (SM02) but nonetheless the framing of any published document is extremely important, because a report, for example such as that from a select committee ‘which comes out in a hostile way that becomes very difficult’ because it represents ‘the tip of the iceberg’ (SM02), i.e. usually represents the settled and negotiated view that would be difficult to challenge post-hoc publicly and even privately. So as a group ‘we spell out that we are into innovation and actually we do really care about business. We’re not in our ivory towers focusing only on research’ (PM).

The response of the universities is, when required, ‘to cut to the prevailing political winds’, where it is likely and common that ‘we [the university] play back to the centre what it thinks it asks us to do even though it’s probably what we’re going to do anyway’ (SM02). Equally, it can mean ‘withdrawing from the game’ particularly if we knew ‘the end game was a done deal, so why draw attention to the fact that this is a bit of a problem?’ (SM01). It means ‘recognising how and when this is a game we can probably play quite well […] like ‘impact’’ (PM). However,

the ‘game-playing’ is required more and more since ‘policy has become much more ideologically based [within] this kind of neoliberal consensus [so
that] the universities’ response is required to fit in quite a narrow set of tramlines, really’ (PM)
Chapter 7  Discussion

7.0  Introduction

The purpose of this discussion chapter is to draw together the findings outlined in the previous two chapters in consideration of how strategy acquires stability and routine as an intertextual narrative. The research has focused on the narrative of the university in policy and within the wider university, on the understanding that the labeling of a university is more than simply a classification; it is a narrative by which the university as a ‘set of relations’ or an organisation is told and re-told (Law, 1991; 1994) and tells how the organisation and its members should be’ (Law 1994: 250). The narrative of the university offers a different strategy for performing organisational arrangements, generating particular structures and resistances (Law, 1994) and in this way the narrative of the university is strategy (Law, 1991; 1994; Czarniawska, 1997). What is understood from previous research and the analysis made of the context of HE (in chapter 3) is that there are broadly two narratives of the university in the setting – the enterprise university and the traditional university, with the latter as the ‘true’ narrative, and dichotomously resonant with the former (Diefenbach, 2009). Literature also suggests that the narrative of the enterprise university is dominant in policy (Bridgman, 2007) and that the narrative of the traditional university is widely available within the university (Barnett, 2012; Martin, 2012). The analysis of the narrative of the university in three facets of intertextuality – constitutive, manifest and ideological – in this research, offers a better understanding of how the
enterprise university has become dominant in policy and a new finding of the
extension of that dominance within the university, in both public and private
text. The chapter also discusses an additional new finding: how the
traditional narrative of the university is, contrary to previous research
(Bridgman, 2007) not absent in policy, and is also available within the
university but only in a very limited way (Barnett, 2011; Martin, 2012). Its
opposition to the narrative of the enterprise university is however constrained
in each. This chapter also outlines and reflects on how the dominance of the
narrative of the enterprise university is supported at both manifest and
ideological intertextual.

The chapter starts with a discussion of the nature of constitutive
intertextuality within the setting of HE in the UK, identifying three intertextual
themes – innovation, regional engagement and research excellence – within
which the narrative of the university has been expressed and framed. It then
outlines how the dominance of the narrative of the enterprise university has
been enabled by the co-option of the broader societal basis of the narrative of
the traditional university (Llewellyn, 2001; Vaara and Tienari, 2002;
Heracleous, 2006; Vaara et al., 2006), including that associated with a civic
legacy, through the available intertextual themes of innovation and regional
engagement within policy and the university. Co-option in this sense is taken to
mean that the broader societal basis and role of the university has been
appropriated, in order to neutralise it. It outlines how the framing of the
university within the intertextual theme of research excellence has resourced
the continued availability of the narrative of the traditional university and
opposition (Heracleous and Barrett, 2001), in constitutive intertextuality, although this availability is under threat.

A deeper analysis examining manifest intertextuality showed how the narrative of the university is set in a context of agitation and in an emotional register of fear and hope, echoing the findings of previous research on intertextuality (Riad et al., 2012). Furthermore, what is suggested is that the emotional register in manifest intertextuality is the location where narrative is crafted out of a concern with the creation of order out of chaos (Barry and Elmes, 1997). There is however a difference between public and private crafting. In public the chaos is the world out there in the form of globalisation and in private (at least in the university) the chaos is the world of government policy. This rhetorical context is explored and in a new finding within this context, the emotions of fear and hope appear to have resourced a change in the predominant understanding of the university (Riad et al., 2012) in policy and in the university, which is outlined at constitutive intertextuality, to one in which the narrative of the enterprise university dominates. It is suggested that the private crafting of narrative of the university and the intertextual distance in which the public expression of the university is kept within the university, does not resource the opposition of the narrative of the traditional university in constitutive intertextuality.

The chapter concludes with a discussion of the underpinning of narrative of the university by two ideologemes – of the market and of the Oecumene – in ideological intertextuality. The apparent dominance of market
globalism at the expense of the globalism of the Oecumene is then considered. It is suggested that the two otherwise dichotomous narratives of the university are unified in ideological intertextuality as globalism, in which the university was an axis mundi or mythical scared centre, and supported both the expansion of the market and of the Oecumene. This is offered as an explanation of the means by which the co-option of the narrative of the traditional university has been achieved.

7.1 Constitutive intertextuality

Although the narrative of the enterprise university is apparent (Etzkowitz, 2003a), it did not arrive fully formed in the UK HE setting. Its availability has extended and its dominance has been enhanced through the progressive co-option of the narrative of the traditional university (Vaara and Tienari, 2002; Vaara et al., 2006), as the university has transitioned from science partner within the science base to central to an innovation ecosystem over the course of twenty years, with notable acceleration post 2007. The framing of the university principally in terms of research within the intertextual themes of innovation and regional engagement has underpinned this transition and facilitated this co-option, in both policy and in the university. However, the traditional narrative of the university is neither absent in the university (Martin, 2012) nor is it missing in policy, which is contrary to previous research (Bridgman, 2007). Its wide availability has been enabled by the framing of the university within the intertextual theme of research excellence and resourced its opposition to the dominant narrative of the enterprise university.
This suggests there is a limit to co-option in constitutive intertextuality, although the recent emergence of impact in association with research excellence has the potential to intensify co-option and constrain opposition.

7.1.1 Availability ‘in policy’

7.1.1.1 Innovation

Between 1992 and 2012, the university transitioned from its partnership in the science base (Duchy of Lancaster, 1993), integral as a key link in a global process of innovation (DTI, 2000) to an important and central component of a global innovation ecosystem (Sainsbury, 2007; BIS, 2011a). This has been an inexorable transition that has accelerated in the last ten years.

In John Major’s Government, the two narratives of the university co-existed within policy. The university as a partner in a science base, alongside industry and government, had to ensure the development of research into tradable products (Duchy of Lancaster, 1993). Research and its transfer into tangibility, were chosen as a means to improve both economic performance and the quality of life in the UK (Duchy of Lancaster, 1993: 26). Research still contributed in the widest possible social sense (Duchy of Lancaster, 1993: 1), as well as in economic terms. The social and economic benefit did not always sit adjacent to each other in policy (Duchy of Lancaster, 1993: 1). Furthermore, the social imperative to ensure that an individual flourished was critical, in addition to equipping the nation with a skilled workforce within an increasingly competitive global economy (DFES, 1991: 8). Despite historical
antecedents that were attributed to the development of this economic mission for research, it was a relatively new imperative and the university as a partner remained an equal and independent actor, even if its contribution pointed more clearly toward the country’s economic performance (Duchy of Lancaster, 1993: 53). Any co-option of the narrative of the traditional university within the developing narrative of the enterprise university was therefore only partial (Vaara and Tienari, 2002: Vaara et al., 2006).

From 1997 the social and economic benefit of research became inextricably linked. When the new Labour Government in 1997 challenged all science partners, especially the university, to go beyond their institutional roles and become central to a global innovation process (DTI, 2000: 6) in the new knowledge economy (DTI, 2000: i), it did so, to create and apply new knowledge for the social and economic benefit of all (DFES, 2000: 21). Providing support to the innovation process notably included engagement with global business (Lambert, 2003). Similarly the progress of an individual was mobilised as part of the need for skills in the knowledge economy that was an integral part of overall social improvement (DFES, 2002: 2). This co-location of economic and social benefit of research within an innovation process represented a co-option of the narrative of the traditional university, i.e. an appropriation of its original meaning in general use, but without necessarily subsuming it, within the dominant narrative (Vaara and Tienari, 2002: Vaara et al., 2006). Moreover, the university could enter and exit the innovation process and still have a degree of self-determination.
In spite of this degree of self-determination, the university increasingly had to account for its research activity. The idea that the outputs of research should be measurable is traceable to earlier periods; at least in the economic contribution of hard science promoted in the Rothschild Report (1971) and the setting up of research assessment from the mid 1980s onwards. The need for the measurement of research also formed part of the broader evaluation of public funding that pre-dated neoliberalism (Neave, 1988). However, even following the introduction of the first RAE, a long-standing nebulous notion of the broader social impact of research (Barnett, 2011), i.e. improving the quality of life and solving problems in the world, remained within the narrative of the university (Duchy of Lancaster, 1993: 26; DFES, 2000; DUIS, 2008; BIS, 2009). This changed to one in which the benefit of research was almost exclusively embedded within an economic imperative.

It was early in the third Labour Government that the university became central to the innovation ecosystem (Sainsbury, 2007: 4). This was an interconnected system that included business, finance, and government, recognisable as the enterprise university (Etzkowitz, 2003a: 302-3). The idea of an innovation ecosystem attributed to *Science and Technology Realising Our Potential* (1993) in Wilson’s (2012) *Review on Business and University Collaboration* was not contemporaneous; it evolved after the Sainsbury Review in 2007. Each element of this ecosystem was mutually dependent and able to benefit financially from its contribution to global innovation (Innovation Nation, 2008: 64). The societal impact of research continued to be a recognisable feature (DUIS, 2008: 6), indeed, the government promoted the
university’s role within the innovation ecosystem, because of its desire to improve the quality of life and public services in the UK (DUIS, 2008: 2). Similarly, the improvement of the individual was co-opted within the need for skills that were economically useful and as a means for social justice (DUIS, 2008). However, it was within the innovation ecosystem that the social impact of research, as part of the promise of the knowledge economy, became much more closely linked and coterminous with economic impact, at an individual, regional, national and international level (DUIS, 2008: 2; BIS, 2009: 7). Furthermore, following the Roberts Review (2003) of the 2001 RAE, a more prescriptive notion of ‘impact’ was introduced and went on to form a key part of the assessment of research output from 2008 onward.

Notwithstanding the Sainsbury Review (2007) and its significance, the innovation ecosystem was relatively underdeveloped in policy in the Labour Government post 2007 (DUIS, 2008: 13). This was possibly a consequence of dual pressures; dealing with the aftermath firstly, of the financial crisis across all government departments and secondly, the focus within the newly formed Department for Business, Innovation and Skills (BIS) on HE funding prior to the upcoming General Election. Instead, the innovation ecosystem survived the electoral transition to take centre stage in the new Coalition Government (BIS, 2011a: 47). The social and economic benefit of innovation continued to be in close proximity (BIS, 2010b: 3) and as with its immediate predecessor, (BIS, 2009), in the new government (BIS, 2011c) this included much required growth as a consequence of the financial crash. Supporting the individual to fulfil their potential was also newly linked to securing sustainable growth.
(BIS, 2011c: 21). In an innovation ecosystem, globalisation and within it the free movement of capital, alongside under-investment in research and development traditionally associated with British business and noted by previous governments (Duchy of Lancaster, 1993; Lambert, 2003: 1) were presented as external or climatic factors and thereby natural and untouchable (BIS, 2011a). It continued to be right to maximise the benefits of excellent research of all kinds because of the welcome impact on society, including on quality of life and culture, as well as the economy (BIS, 2010b: 3). However, this impact was no longer a nebulous notion of improvement in society and the economy, but ascribed to a measurable and largely economic contribution within a framework of research excellence (BIS, 2011a; HEFCE, 2012).

The university could not exit an ecosystem, as it may have been able to exit a partnership or a process, because exit from an ecosystem would have symbolised expiration. The co-option of the broader societal basis of the narrative of the traditional university (Llewellyn, 2001; Vaara and Tienari, 2002; Heracleous, 2006; Vaara et al., 2006) within the intertextual theme of innovation had thus been made with the potential thereby to constrain local actors within both policy and the university (Llewellyn, 2001; Heracleous. 2006).

7.1.1.2 Regional engagement

The framing of the university within the intertextual theme of regional engagement, predominantly expressed in economic terms, had been present in policy since John Major’s Government. Economic engagement was central
within the region, precisely because of the greater mobility of research and development in multi national companies and the concomitant regional decline of industry (Lambert, 2003: 65). It was also an engagement that was needed to attract inward investment in a further globalising world where capital was international and unconstrained (H.M. Treasury, 2004; 10-11; Sainsbury Review, 2007: 16; BIS, 2009). The university was progressively engaged economically within its region throughout the period. It was engaged in a number of different ways, for example in the fusion of ideas within the science base (Duchy of Lancaster, 1993: 15) and in different forms of regional clusters. These clusters included those within a global innovation process (DFES, 2002: 37; Lambert, 2003: 65), or were dynamic clusters in an innovation ecosystem (Sainsbury Review, 2007: 16; BIS, 2009; BIS, 2011a), and latterly were business enterprise clusters (Wilson, 2012). These clusters were engines of regional economic growth (Innovation Nation, 2008) that needed to be turbocharged in the aftermath of the financial crash of 2008 and became central to helping the UK recover from the global downturn (BIS, 2009). In the new Coalition Government this was part of a need for rebalancing in the economy (BIS, 2011a). The on-going translation of research at regional level was even one new way that would demonstrate impact (Witty, 2013).

However, the university played a regionally appropriate role in this regional engagement, depending on its broader remit and its designation as a research or teaching intensive institution (DFES, 2000: 2). This meant for instance that the pre-1992 university could focus on its historic strength in research, but directed within the innovation process or ecosystem, globally and
working in partnership with large multi-national corporations. This pursuit of innovation on a global scale was paramount, although not necessarily purposively in tune with the region. In contrast the post-1992 university as a *modern university* could continue to focus on its historic strength in engagement with its region’s local business community through professional training and education, in a different kind of knowledge transfer (Lambert, 2003).

For much of the period, this was a regional engagement that the university made in partnership with industry and significantly, also with central government (Duchy of Lancaster, 1993: 15). Early in the Labour Government of 1997, this partnership was formalised in the formation and remit of the Regional Development Agencies (RDAs) (Dearing, 1997: 6). As discussed, one of the first acts of the Coalition was to abolish the RDAs and replace them with volunteer partnerships, such as Local Enterprise Partnerships (LEPs) (BIS, 2010c) alongside the introduction of Enterprise Zones, announced in the 2011 Budget (H.M. Treasury, 2011) but which were voluntary not statutory arrangements and despite much encouragement, have been slow to appear. In the place of the RDAs and post the financial crash and downturn in the economy, the university became critical to supporting regional economic development and growth (BIS, 2010c) as one of a number of ‘anchor’ institutions BIS, 2010c), rebalancing the economy of those communities *under stress*, as well as those that were *thriving* (Wilson, 2012: 73). Universities were critical in this role, because unlike other institutions, they had a *character of permanence* (Witty, 2013: 16). Energetic engagement was required and
notably, for the pre-1992 universities, this included engagement specifically with local SMEs (Wilson, 2012; Witty, 2013: 8).

Thus, the university had to support innovation and economic growth in the region *in the absence* of central government, although in partnership with other regional actors, including local government and industry. The university’s influence was material (Wilson, 2012: 73) in light of the absence of others and because of its leadership qualities among other local institutional actors (Wilson, 2012; Witty, 2013). Each university could choose how to fulfil this role depending on its strengths, although this anchor role was a matter of obligation for the university regardless of individual tradition (Wilson, 2012: 73) and went beyond previously configured regional roles. For instance a pre-1992 university could now be expected to engage *not just* with spinout or high tech SMEs in research clusters, but *all* SMEs because *innovation* was needed in *all* parts of the economy (Wilson, 2012; Young, 2013), taking on engagement that had long been the preserve of the post-1992 universities (Dearing, 1997; DFES, 2000; Lambert, 2003).

When considered within a broader HE remit, for example concerning the expansion of student numbers or revised funding arrangement for undergraduate students, then the *region* had long been a site of a social *compact*, beyond any economic instrumentalism (Dearing, 2007). This was an accord that progressively narrowed to a matter of fulfillment of individual aspiration in pursuit of economic advance (Browne, 2010) rather than
fulfillment in a social sense to a region and was otherwise largely absent post 2002 in the narrative of the university in policy.

In a significant change from the earlier period (Dearing, 1997), the university and its research formed a key part of its region within a global innovation process and latterly ecosystem, the university became the leading economic actor in the region in place of government and was socially engaged only as part of widening access. On this basis, the traditional narrative of the university, particularly in terms of a civic mission (Rosenberg and Nelson, 1994; Mowery et al., 2004; Martin, 2012) was further co-opted (Vaara and Tienari, 2002: Vaara et al., 2006).

7.1.2.3 Research excellence

Another prominent intertextual theme within policy was research excellence. In John Major’s Government excellence in research was present and needed to be protected and any complacency about that need for protection had to be addressed (Duchy of Lancaster, 1993: 4). In the Labour Governments, it was similarly an excellence that belonged to the research in universities and from which the innovation process and the new knowledge economy could (only) start (DTI, 2000). Investment in research, whilst based on excellence was dependent on universities becoming involved in research of all kinds, including applied as well as blue skies or curiosity-led (H.M. Treasury, 2004: 72). Furthermore, centres of excellence in research enabled the knowledge economy (Sainsbury, 2007: 24) and were the prerequisite of any innovation ecosystem (DUIS, 2008). In the Coalition Government it was a research
excellence that had by this time, long existed in the UK and it was simply the capacity to translate this excellence into economic benefit that needed to be improved (BIS, 2011a: 10). The difference between research excellence and the other intertextual themes of innovation and regional engagement is that whilst also linked in close proximity with economic benefit, it was more often and especially linked, with social benefit (DTI, 2000; Sainsbury, 2007; DUIS, 2008: 2; BIS, 2010) and academic freedom.

Research excellence was perpetually associated with academic and even institutional autonomy, with governments throughout the period at pains to offer reassurance regarding this link (Sainsbury, 2007). The Coalition Government reaffirmed the Haldane principle of academic independence in the funding of research as a matter of integrity that was vital to ensure research excellence (BIS, 2010). At an institutional level, this was an autonomy that was an English HE tradition (BIS 2011c), even helping the country adapt to dramatic changes in the global economy over recent decades (BIS, 2012).

Thus, within the intertextual theme of research excellence, the narrative of the traditional university was widely available and often in opposition (Heracleous and Barrett, 2001). This is different to other studies where alternative narrative building blocks were unavailable in public (Vaara and Tienari, 2002; Vaara et al., 2006; Riad et al., 2012). This is because research excellence is publicly associated and by dominant actors, with both social benefit and more pertinently, with academic freedom. In previous studies this non-dominant narrative has been re-storied, by dominant actors, as a problem
rather than left intact. The continued availability of the narrative of traditional university, that was otherwise non-dominant, in the intertextual theme of research excellence, demonstrated a limit to co-option of opposing narrative building blocks, even by dominant actors within policy.

However, alongside this continued association with academic autonomy, research excellence was also increasingly being treated as an important component within an innovation ecosystem and measurable primarily in terms of impact, rather than simply for its own sake and any intrinsic measurement (BIS, 2011a). The genesis for this treatment was the Roberts Review (2003) in which research excellence needed to include a form of value-added benefit or impact beyond the research community (Roberts, 2003: 5). The renamed Research Excellence Framework (2014), as a natural epilogue to Roberts (2003) heralds the beginning of future constraint on the availability of the narrative of the traditional university.

7.1.2 Availability ‘in the university’

In a new finding, this research shows that the narrative of the enterprise university was also dominant within the university, reflecting policy (Bridgman, 2007) especially in public, as might be expected in verisimilitudinous artefacts such as corporate documents (Brown, 2000), but also in private expression. In MGU, its international focus, which is portrayed a consequence of its civic founding, makes it a global enterprise university. In RCU, it was its long heritage of a productive and mutually beneficial relationship between the university and industry, at a regional and national
level that makes it an enterprise university. It was the combination of this civic founding and a new global focus that makes RCU a global enterprise university. At the same time, the narrative of the traditional university is almost entirely absent in public and only available in private in a non-dominant form. This availability was however, increased in association with a civic legacy, providing a fragile limit to the co-option of the enterprise university, even for non-dominant actors. The strength of this availability was relative. In MGU, where there was less of a link to its region, the non-dominant narrative of the traditional university was not widely available.

The dominance of the enterprise university has been enabled in the university in the same way as in policy, by the co-option of a broader societal basis for the narrative of the traditional university, including an associated civic legacy (Llewellyn, 2001; Vaara and Tienari, 2002; Heracleous, 2006; Vaara et al., 2006). The difference between policy and in the university is that this co-option has been made possible through the available intertextual themes of innovation, regional engagement and research excellence. In other words within the university there is little limit to the co-option of the non-dominant narrative of the traditional university, if in control of the dominant actors, in public. This echoes previous findings (Vaara and Tienari, 2002; Vaara et al., 2006; Riad et al., 2012). It is partly to be expected in corporate documents that as verisimilitudinous artefacts (Brown, 2000) provide authoritative accounts (Vaara and Tienari, 2002; Vaara et al., 2006; Riad et al., 2012), although this was not all pervasive in policy, which was also an authoritative account in public. What is suggested here is that this co-option in the university has been
enhanced in its association with each university’s founding civic legacy and which has enabled a co-option that was not available to dominant actors within policy.

7.1.2.1 Available in public

Innovation and the global university

Within MGU, the university was in a mutually beneficial relationship with business and industry and had a good track record in engaging with business and research commercialisation (MGU, Strategic Plan). Confronting both the problems and opportunities of globalisation, by being host to the global academic community and hub to global business (MGU, Strategic Plan), MGU was uniquely placed to support global innovation not least because of its unique global footprint (MGU, Annual Review, 2011). Valued almost exclusively in business terms, it was a footprint that provided the opportunity to build, increase and deepen business engagement on a global scale in partnership with elite business in globally strategic research areas (MGU, Annual Review, 2011), thereby delivering impact. Closer to home, the university was able to provide a hub to catalyse new collaborations with other institutions and industry partners, bringing global partnerships to the university (MGU, Annual Review, 2012). It was global engagement, and acting as a global rather than simply local institution, which ensured widest possible impact of innovation and research discovery (MGU, Strategic Plan). This was seen as a fulfilment of the university’s founding principles (MGU, Strategic Plan) and more simply because internationalisation was at the heart of
everything that the university did (MGU, Facts, 2013). The university’s social benefit in research was driven entirely within a global innovation ecosystem (MGU, Strategic Plan).

In RCU, the university was similarly focussed on enhancing its existing research power and global networks, to deliver economic growth and impact, born of a culture of innovation, and engagement could now be pursued on a global scale (RCU, Strategic Plan). This would open new avenues for innovative research as well as provide opportunities to translate blue-sky research into practical solutions (RCU, Strategic Plan). RCU was similarly well placed to MGU in its global ambition, but for a slightly different reason. RCU’s global industrial collaboration was built on its regional founding legacy, rather than its existing global footprint. Nonetheless, the region was reconsidered in global terms as a cradle for innovation but in a way that first and foremost drew the global into the region (RCU, Strategic Plan).

Regional engagement and the civic university

Echoing policy, the enterprise university has consistently been framed in MGU and RCU in the intertextual theme of regional engagement, but this engagement was simultaneously framed in global terms.

For MGU, this was straightforward, because its region was in several locations, national as well as international, and as a result it is at a slight remove from the region in which it was founded. MGU recognised a regional economic responsibility as a commitment to the city in which it was first located and as a legacy of the transformational impact of its founder (MGU,
Annual Review, 2011). The university was a major contributor to the region, as an employer and through its ability to attract inward investment (MGU, Annual Review 2012). However, the university contributed economically in China and Southeast Asia (MGU, Strategic Plan) as well as closer to home, a contribution that was deepening through its business engagement (MGU, Annual Review, 2011). Furthermore, locally, the university’s social benefit was more often constrained to one of widening participation or community activity that raised literacy levels in schools or encouraged students from disadvantaged backgrounds to apply to university (MGU, Annual Review, 2012).

Whilst RCU was much more closely embedded in its local region, it had a new global perspective that was central to delivering economic impact in its city and region, as well as across the world (RCU, Strategic Plan). This was based on its proud heritage, in which the university was established to secure a prosperous and successful future for the city and the region, (RGU Annual Review, 2011). An apparently laudable economic impact contributed to the financial health of the city and the region (RCU, Annual Review, 2013) and would not be circumvented in a new global outlook. RCU’s global impact had to be coupled with growing civic engagement in the region, because the university was proactive in its civic responsibilities (RCU, Annual, 2013). These civic responsibilities included bringing in global investment to an otherwise underfunded city and region (RCU, Strategic Plan).
Research excellence

Unlike in policy, the intertextual theme of research excellence did not publicly resource the narrative of the traditional university. Instead research excellence was enmeshed in either support to business engagement, expressly South East Asia (MGU, Strategic Plan) or to support a non-specific global stage (RCU, Strategic Plan). Composed in relation to funding, research excellence became key to the setting up various research centres (RCU, Strategic Plan) or innovation hubs, restructuring of research priorities or future funding endeavours (MGU, Strategic Plan).

7.1.2.2 Available in private

The narrative of the enterprise university was equally and extensively available privately within university.

Innovation and the global university

In MGU the university has a significant role in underpinning the innovation process or corporate research and development, not least because innovation drives economic growth and new ideas drive innovation (SM01). There appeared to be little resistance to the university being economically useful through its contribution to innovation (FH02). This involved engagement with global industry that was more present within the innovation ecosystem than regional industry (SM02) and that was hugely profitable, financially and intellectually (AH01). Its track record of working closely with industrial partners to commercialise research (SM01) was naturalised as it had been in public, as part of its founding DNA (SM01). In MGU, the university was part
of a global innovation process and an innovation ecosystem. Research was widely seen in MGU as having a social benefit globally and nationally to ensure knowledge was embedded for maximum benefit (SM01), not least because of the free rein under which research is undertaken (AH01).

In RCU the university was also part of an innovation process and a global innovation ecosystem. Any limit to the narrative of the enterprise university within RCU as more likely to be associated with being divorced from its roots in a global rather than a local enterprise role, not its enterprise role per se. This is because the university was first and foremost a beacon of innovation in the region (FH02). The university was pivotal and resoundingly a major asset for the region, a feature that even senior managers had no difficulty in remembering (SM02). This was a real relationship in enterprise with the region (AC02) and one on which the university was explicitly founded (SM02).

However, beneath this dominant narrative were echoes of the traditional university, both in terms of its research mission and more often the autonomy of its research endeavour. Thus, in MGU, the university’s role was reserved to not venturing above the TRL (Technology Readiness Level) 4 (SM01). This was not to deny that the university had to explain why it might have skin in the game (SM01) but it was up to industry to take research to the next (commercial) level. This was partly because the university does not have the resources or the expertise (SM01). It was also partly because there is a limit to how far the university can travel towards business even given MGU’s history (AH01). Despite any useful intrinsic inventiveness academics were not
businessmen (AH01) and not interested in business as an entity (AC01). Where the university was constrained was because the drivers between university and business were simply different (AH01). Business was less likely to take risks (SM01). The university was less likely to be interested in commercialisation. This made it perfectly appropriate that the university is about *discovery* and *disrupting established thinking* (FH01) in the early part of an innovation process, but not necessarily party always to the tricky business of making money, a distinction that could confidently be maintained. In RCU it was also vital to get the balance right (AH02), in a similar way to MGU, because there were naturally differences between what industry might expect from research and what would be appropriate for a university to deliver. The narrative of the enterprise university was generally more widespread in RCU, because of the association between innovation and the region. There was a confidence that the link with the region could be preserved, even in a global innovation ecosystem.

*Regional engagement and the civic university*

Within MGU regional engagement was similarly constrained as a global rather than regional *player* and where social responsibility was narrowly focussed. There was recognition that the university had a role to play in the economy, but not especially in the region, even if this is a role that the university has as part of its *DNA* (SM01). Furthermore, MGU’s relationship with the region was said to be *historically difficult* and even at a slight remove (AC01) as an *international superstar* rather than engaged locally (AC01) or a regional *hero*. Research was framed in its global rather than its regional benefit. A regional
reticence and a narrowed social obligation was similarly reflected within the university to one of public engagement activity, which admittedly had become more important over recent years (SM01).

Within RCU there was no moral difficulty in remembering the region’s importance to the university, although it was equally strongly believed, at least among senior managers, that the civic, national and global were not in conflict (SM02). Within the university, innovation was understood very clearly as something that benefitted the region both economically and socially (FH02). The difference between the two universities was that in RCU local engagement was also political in the truest civic sense (AC02), alongside the perception that the university and its city and region needed each other to thrive (SM02) in a symbiotic relationship. What was less embedded in RCU was the connection between the civic and the global. This was a connection that was perceived as underdeveloped in the wider university by senior managers (SM01). This underdevelopment was seen as dangerous simply because the university’s future, just like Premier League football clubs, belonged with global partners around the world (SM02).

Regional engagement dwelt within the global innovation ecosystem. This was an easy habitat for MGU, because it had many regions, it had a constrained social role in the region and existed at a slight remove from its historical base. In contrast, for RCU it was a habitat that was more civic than global that needed to encompass the social, economic and political entreaties of its founding region to be globally civic.
7.1.1.3 Research excellence

In private, research excellence was mostly associated with blue skies research and it was accepted as essential. It was not however necessarily linked in this way in public. In RCU, it was also operating at a global scale that ensured the impact of research and innovation (RCU, Strategic Plan). However, unlike MGU, it was an impact that always had a regional flavour and which benefitted the region. The creation of a cradle for innovation, whilst commercially driven, delivered both economic and social regeneration, particularly regionally (RCU, Strategic Plan). There was little resistance to this linking of economic and social benefit within the narrative of university at a global level, provided it was also tied to the impact in the region (SM02).

7.1.3 Conclusion

A focus on constitutive intertextuality in policy and the university highlights the availability of two narratives of the university: the enterprise university and the traditional university (Barnett, 2011; Holmwood, 2011; Martin, 2012) and the pre-eminence of the former (Bridgman, 2007). The argument that pre-eminence of the narrative of the enterprise university would ensure dominance by drowning out any alternative narrative has been made in other settings (Llewellyn, 2001) and could also be made here. Thus, a wider dominance of the enterprise university, although only previously implicated in policy (Bridgman, 2007), was reasonably anticipated in the university, at least in public (Brown, 2000), but not necessarily in private, given its dichotomous attributes (Diefenbach, 2009). The wider dominance in private in the university
is thus a new finding. In addition, in another new finding this dominance has been ensured not by simple repetition, but by the co-option of the narrative of the traditional university, in both policy and within the university. The increasingly dominant narrative of the enterprise university is identified in constitutive intertextuality within policy and within the university. The dominance has been ensured through the co-option of the narrative of the traditional university (Vaara and Tienari, 2002; Vaara et al., 2006), especially in terms of a civic mission (Rosenberg and Nelson, 1994; Mowery et al., 2004; Martin, 2012). This co-option is in public, and notably also in private.

In policy, co-option has been enabled by the intertextual themes (Riad et al., 2012) of innovation and regional engagement (Vaara and Tienari, 2002; Heracleous, 2006; Vaara and Monin, 2010). Any alternative narrative even if equally dominant, has to share the same structural underpinning to continue to be accessible (Heracleous, 2006), particularly in public. This could be because policy documents are verisimilitudinous artefacts providing authoritative accounts that normalise a structure (Brown, 2000) in which any narrative must be located to be taken seriously by any member of the dominant culture (Heracleous, 2006: 1080).

There are indications that unlike other studies (Vaara and Tienari, 2002; Vaara et al., 2006; Riad et al., 2012) within constitutive intertextuality there is a limit to co-option of an alternative narrative even by dominant actors and even in within dominant forms of text (Brown, 2000). The intertextual theme of research excellence, strengthened in opposition through an association with
institutional and academic autonomy, resourced the narrative of the traditional university, sometimes in opposition to the narrative of the enterprise university (Heracleous and Barrett, 2001). However, research excellence was not solely a concern of the academic community, instead it was progressively becoming a wider concern within the concurrent intertextual theme of innovation. This suggests that the resourcing of the traditional narrative of the university, within the intertextual theme of research excellence, could become limited. Thus, the current resourcing of the narrative of the traditional university was potentially fragile.

In a new finding, *within the university* the narrative of the enterprise university is also dominant and the broader societal basis of the narrative of the traditional university had also been co-opted (Llewellyn, 2001; Vaara and Tienari, 2002; Heracleous, 2006; Vaara *et al.*, 2006) through the intertextual themes of innovation and regional engagement. As a consequence, it is suggested that what is left of the narrative of the traditional university is divorced from the idea of a *Utilitarian* social contract, which instead has been incorporated into the narrative of the enterprise university. This would explain its domination within the university, notably those founded within the *civic* tradition.

*In public*, this co-option is similar to that in policy, as might be expected of corporate documents (Brown, 2000) and as prime example of intertextuality (Kristeva, 1980; Bakhtin, 1981; Fairclough, 1992; Keenoy and Oswick, 2004). The co-option is apparent in each university for different
reasons. In MGU the narrative of the traditional university has been co-opted and neutralised or negated (Llewellyn, 2001; Vaara et al., 2004) in its focus on internationalisation and in RCU it has been co-opted and validated, as part of a civic heritage that was supporting a new global engagement (Vaara and Tienari, 2002; Heracleous, 2006; Vaara et al., 2006). This suggests, in an extension of existing theory, that co-option can be driven in negative and/or a positive way. The intertextual theme of research excellence has not been able to resource opposition to this dominant narrative in either university.

*In private*, the narrative of the enterprise university is similarly dominant. This dominance has been supported by the co-option of the civic legacy within the narrative of the traditional university in both MGU and RCU in a similar way to the co-option in public. This is a new finding, showing a more extensive intertextual reach than highlighted in previous studies. This was an easier co-option in MGU because it had been at a slight remove from its local region though its internationalisation activity and was a more conscious co-option in RCU because RCU historically tended to be more locally and civically engaged. This suggests that co-option is contingent on the strength of the founding basis of the non-dominant narrative, within different organisational settings. It may also be because the civic heritage was less resonant in MGU than RCU.

The narrative of the traditional university is available in private within the university as part of the intertextual theme of *innovation* and *research excellence*, as in policy, but was non-dominant, yet resourced some opposition
to the dominant narrative. This suggests a limit to the co-option of the narrative of the traditional university; however, in a similar way to policy, there was a limit to this opposition, not least because of the developing link made between the university’s civic legacy and the narrative of the enterprise university.

The findings suggest that the narrative of the enterprise university, through the progressive co-option of the narrative of the traditional university, has formed an overarching structure in constitutive intertextuality in both policy and in the wider university (Heracleous, 2006). It has been a co-option that has had the potential to constrain local actors within policy and within university (Llewellyn, 2001; Heracleous, 2006). This constraint is potentially greater than in previous studies because the narrative of the traditional university has also been subsumed publicly and even privately.

### 7.2 Manifest intertextuality

In manifest intertextuality the dominance of the enterprise university is supported by vivid metaphors, such as the modern world *being swept by change* (DTI, 1998: 5), the UK being in a *race to the top* (Sainsbury, 2007: 1) in which competitor countries were perpetually and *rapidly raising their game* (BIS, 2011a: 8). This fear and concern was substantiated in the developing idea of the UK being in a *global race* that it needs to win. Within the university under the threat of *chill winds* and *aftershocks* of the global financial crisis, there was agitation or background uncertainty of a similar kind, although the university was *set relatively fair*. There remained much, at least through
innovation, that the university could mobilise in response, particularly publicly. In this way the narrative of the university was set in the context of ‘agitation’ and ‘anxiety’ and ultimately within a rhetorical context of ‘fear’ and ‘concern’, in policy and in the university. This was an agitation that was caused by globalisation as an external form of chaos.

In a different form of agitation that was concerned with the chaos caused by government policy, albeit in relation to globalisation, there were below the radar risks in private that threatened further and unrelenting anxiety, not least an existential fear for the loss of the capacity for blue skies research that caused greater alarm. These were shared by both MGU and RCU, and were not publicly expressed.

However, at a different end of an emotional spectrum, often in very close proximity within a text (Edwards, 1999: 271), the narrative of the university was also embedded in a textual rhetorical context that held particular promises of improving the quality of life and contributing to society representing ‘hope’, particularly in the future. This hope for improvement was often placed as the fulfilment of the promise of the university’s civic founding.

7.2.1 The rhetorical context of fear

7.2.1.1 Available in public

Globalisation was at the root of the public agitation, causing a rapidly changing world (DTI, 1991) in John Major’s Government, and a world subject to the powerful forces of change (Dearing, 1997) in the early Labour Government. Globalisation meant that even a modern country was nonetheless swept by
change (DTI, 1998: 5) that continued to bring *unprecedented* challenge to our quality of life, environment and security throughout the period (DUIS, 2008: 8). The UK was in a race (Sainsbury, 2007) that was speeding up (Hauser, 2010, BIS, 2011), in which the UK had to go much further than before (BIS, 2011a), marshalling all our resources (Witty, 2013) to win. Within this agitation there were reasons to be afraid.

There were dangerous competitors, from *Asian tigers prowling* (DTI, 1996: vi) to the *burgeoning BRIICS* that were *rapidly raising their game* (BIS, 2011a: 8). The dangers were compounded in the UK by the historic under-investment in research and development by industry (DTI, 1996; Lambert, 2003; H.M. Treasury, 2004), even less inclined in a globalised world to make investment decisions that respected their historic roots (DTI, 1996; Lambert, 2003). This under-investment contrasted with that by competitors old and new, and the gap needed to be closed between the UK and some of the leading countries and some of the new entrants (H.M. Treasury, 2004: 7). Latterly there was a greater confidence in the UK’s ability to escape its historical under-investment (Sainsbury, 2007), not least because investment in the publicly funded science base had increased, although this had not lessened the distance between the UK and its competitors, who have simply run faster (Sainsbury, 2007; Hauser, 2010; BIS, 2011a).

The UK had an enviable record in research, but the excellence of its science base was apparently in danger (DTI, 1991). This was because the UK was historically poor at making the link between research and *tradable*
products (Duchy of Lancaster, 1993). Competitors, new and old, were less constrained. Making this link was essential and the UK had no room for complacency (Duchy of Lancaster, 1993). Moreover, the UK’s science base would be diminished if it failed to respond (Duchy of Lancaster, 1993) and so would the country as a whole (DTI, 1996). Making the most of research continued to be a prerequisite for surviving the threats from globalisation and maintaining the UK’s place in the world (DTI, 2000) and a very real danger the UK’s current strength in the world would not be maintained (DFES, 2002). This danger was amplified in the period so that moving up the value chain and competing through its innovation was imperative (Lambert, 2003). This move was even more pressing given that the world faced the most significant restructuring of global economic activity since the Industrial Revolution (Sainsbury, 2007: 1). The threat posed by emerging low wage economies left the UK no choice but to engage in a race to the top, because a race to the bottom needed to be avoided at all costs (Sainsbury, 2007: 1; Browne, 2010). To win the race the UK had to run fast (Sainsbury, 2007: 8) and faster, not least because the terms of the race also started to change to one between nations to bring new technologies to market more quickly because technologies were now being commercialised at an increasing speed (Hauser, 2010: 6). It was only through the creation of the environment to support innovation that the unprecedented scale of the global challenge would be met (BIS, 2011a: 3). This meant going much further and required an innovation ecosystem that was more open and integrated (BIS, 2011a: 4). It also required eliminating unnecessary regional barriers to be able to run the global race (Witty, 2013: 4).
The fear of losing out in a rapidly changing and increasingly hostile environment provided a powerful rhetorical context for the developing narrative of the university. The UK needed to be rescued from its historically poor record of the commercialisation of research (Lambert, 2003:11). Without investment and without improvement in innovation, the UK’s science base had much to fear from being in a global race (Sainsbury, 2007; BIS, 2001a). The vigorous response (DUIS, 2007: 11) called for during the period, was not an intellectual luxury but a necessity (Sainsbury, 2007: 22) and required the university to be part of first a differently functioning science base, then part of an innovation process and latterly a hub in an innovation ecosystem. It also called for the university to be an anchor in the region. This was essential to the UK’s economy (Sainsbury, 2008), but moreover provided the means to meet what was an existential challenge (Sainsbury, 2007 BIS, 2011a) to our science base, our country and quality of life.

Research and innovation was also the key to addressing most pressing (DTI, 2003) and emerging (BIS, 2011a) societal needs, underpinning society’s ability to address the great public policy issues of our times (BIS, 2009:57) for everyone’s benefit.

Within the university the chill winds (RCU, Strategic Plan) and aftershocks (MGU, Strategic Plan) of the global financial crisis and subsequent economic downturn, with the concomitant impact on public finances, challenged the university, at least publicly. This constituted a remarkable turbulence that created uncertainty, not least because of the perpetual need
within the university to make long-term planning decisions (MGU, Strategic Plan). The university was neither excused nor compelled to indecision, otherwise it would stagnate (MGU, Strategic Plan). There was an additional threat of the reduction in the public funding, even for research and increased selectivity or competition for research funding, providing greater turbulence (MGU, Strategic Plan). It was turbulence exacerbated by changes in student funding mechanisms and the most significant HE reform in a generation (RCU, Annual Review, 2011). The changes were unprecedented (MGU, Strategic Plan; RCU, Annual Review, 2012), despite previous constraints in public funding, changes in research assessment, the removal of the binary divide and going even further back, the introduction of new universities in the 1960s, all unprecedented at the time, and subsequently well-known in the collective memory of many in the HE sector (Tight, 2009). Nonetheless there should be no doubt of the challenging times ahead.

However, based on its intrinsic strength, the university remained on course to survive and even prosper. The university had the virtue of a global footprint (MGU, Strategic Plan) and the global opportunity provided by current turbulence (RCU, Annual Review 2011; RCU, Annual Review, 2012). Facing the future with confidence was a prerequisite. It helped that each university was comprehensive in nature, globally strong (MGU, Strategic Plan) and globally opportunistic (RCU, Annual Review 2011), a force to be reckoned with globally (MGU) and regionally (RCU), financially independent (RCU, Annual Review, 2011) and asset-rich (MGU, Annual Review).
In addition, the most recent and remarkable turbulence at least offered ‘hope’, provided that the university embraced global (and business engagement) opportunity. The university was capable of flourishing even in the current environment, positioned as it was to contribute to the development of research capability, globally (MGU, Strategic Plan) and emerge a more resilient local, regional and global force (RCU, Annual Review, 2012). It was an act of self-rescue firmly and deeply entrenched in the publicly available corporate documents of each university.

This meant that the university could successfully navigate even in the fiercest of storms, provided it was sailing the ship of enterprise.

7.2.1.2 Available in private

Privately within the university, the chill winds and aftershocks were of a different order. Anxiety remained in relation to public funding, notably for research. This would discomfort the university, forced to search for short-term funding to make up any possible shortfall, not least in capital budgets. It was compounded by long-term developments around research policy to create a perfect storm, a choice of metaphor shared in each university. Anxiety was accentuated not simply by the turbulence caused by the financial crash, but by the disorder of government policy in relation to research. Unlike the publicly espoused risks of financial uncertainty, the risk to research was below the radar (PM) and understood within the university and by policy-makers (AH01). It was an existential risk to blue skies research (SM01) and not necessarily one that governments would understand (SM01). As discussed,
blue skies research was usually long-term, conducted without a specific end in mind, serendipitous, unpredictable and likely to be of major benefit to society if successful. It was this research rather than applied research that was associated with the narrative of the traditional university.

This risk was apparent in the crucifixion of the capital budgets for research (FH01), which had previously been relatively generous, at least under the second Labour Government and had been protected somewhat in comparison to other recipients of public funding in the immediate aftermath of the financial crash in both the Labour and Coalition Governments. Research budgets had of course been crucified before, at least in the living memory of those in senior management in the sector. This was a threat of a different order, because it was forcing universities to scrap around for funding (FH01) that might derail long-term research ambitions and affect reputations (FH02).

The fear was such that blue skies research might soon be a luxury rather than a necessity, in perverse form of risk-aversion (AC01) picked up from government (AC02). This was because the reduction in funding was a step too far and genuine, fundamental blue skies research would struggle to be funded (AH02). There was a sense that risk in research had its place in the university and nowhere else, not just because of the slightly odd ball ideas that form an existential part of blue skies research (AC01), but because the failure rate that is tolerated in the university would never be tolerated in the commercial domain (SM01).
Coupled with the reduction in capital budgets was increasing selectivity in research that led to further concentration of research funding. The danger of *putting too many eggs in one basket* (AC01) was inherent in research selectivity, although equally, individual universities could benefit from the bonus of concentration of funding. This bonus was unreliable and universities might struggle to *compete with the big boys* (AC02). Thus, even very powerful research-intensive universities had to be concerned that they may *lose out* through research selectivity. As discussed, policy-makers did not share these fears around research selectivity. This was not to deny that selectivity led to concentration and might cause some problems in some universities, but in an equivocation worthy of the most accomplished mandarin, this was not the *intention* of research selectivity, merely *a consequence* (PM).

The general *short-sightedness* of government policy, of which research selectivity was a part, and especially with respect to ‘impact’ heightened the anxiety (AC02). Impact provided a perverse incentive that meant a focus on the short-term in research and in the university (SM01). Designed by *non-scientists* it was a basic misunderstanding of a university’s research strategy because it could not be planned like a strategy to *run a supermarket* (AH01). This was another part of the perfect storm that would prevent the *wacky and the wonderful* being undertaken in research (SM01), even if when applying for a research grant and the patent agent happened to be “*Albert Einstein*” without *impact*, approval would not be forthcoming (AC02).
Another storm brewing was around open access that was similarly below the radar and apparently all motherhood and apple pie but was nonetheless plagued with real danger because it could threaten both confidentiality in research and even national security (PM).

The perfect storm was in danger of being overplayed and academics would be unnecessarily forming barricades to prevent “Philistines” within the walls’ (SM02). This was because some research policy was advantageous and could be framed to suit individual universities and groups of universities (SM01) and they (the policy-makers) were not necessarily Philistines nor within the walls. The theatrics or scaremongering around blue skies research within the university was considered unnecessary among policy-makers and some senior managers, not least because the government did not see the advantage of destabilising research in the same way it had with teaching (PM).

### 7.2.2 The rhetorical context of hope

Within the agitation of globalisation there was nonetheless a promise for society. This promise provided an assurance that gave hope.

Within globalisation, we were on the brink of exciting and unprecedented developments (Duchy of Lancaster, 1993) and scientific breakthroughs (DTI, 2000) that could positively affect people’s lives. This was an opportunity that was also unprecedented (DTI, 2000; DTI, 2003; Sainsbury, 2007; BIS, 2009; BIs, 2011a) and required a particular response (DTI, 2000; Sainsbury, 2007; BIS, 2011a), which if pursued provided hope.
The list of social concerns that could be solved through research and excelling in innovation was comprehensive. It was through the innovation process that the *breakthroughs* that surrounded us brought prosperity, improved the quality of life and everyone’s life choices (DTI, 2000). Research and innovation were the key to tackle any number of pressing issues of the time, including new jobs (DTI, 2000), providing better health care (DTI, 2000) and the ability to live within our environmental and demographic limits (DUIS, 2008: 2). Innovation had the potential to address the demands of an ageing society (Hauser, 2010) and the demographic shift (BIS, 2011a: 3). Research helps to: ensure cleaner environment (DTI, 2000), tackle crime (DUIS, 2000), assist us to live within our environmental and demographic limits (DUIS, 2008), solve the crisis of energy (DUIS, 2008), address climate change (DUIS, 2008; Hauser, 2010: 3), provide more sustainable patterns of living (BIS, 2011c) and foster greater citizen engagement through technology (BIS, 2011a: 53). Innovation could help deal with global threats (DUIS, 2008) and the threat to security (BIS, 2011a).

In John Major’s Government this was a promise of improvement to solve the practical problems – health, social and environmental – in all parts of the economy and society (DTI, 1995: 148). In subsequent governments, this promise became progressively more expansive. It was a promise that offered the hope for the *modernization* of both the economy and the social fabric of the UK (DTI, 1999: iii), a *transformation* of society and lives (DTI, SET, 2003: 5), the creation of a *world of our own choosing* (DTI, 2003: 139). It was a hope that would improve the things that *matter to us* such as our wealth, health,
environment, and culture (H.M. Treasury, 2004: 149), in society as a whole (DUIS 2008:2), enhancing our quality of life (DTI, 2003; DUIS, 2008; BIS, 2011a). It was an extent of improvement that was unlikely to be achievable for all.

Furthermore, there was the hope for economic improvement (Duchy of Lancaster, 1993; DTI, 2000; DUIS, 2008; BIS, 2011a), although this was increasingly inseparable from the hope for social improvement. Investment in science and research was premised on the hope of both economic success and wider health and well-being of society (DTI, 2003: 122). Innovation would lead to the UK’s future economic prosperity and quality of life (DUIS, 2008: 2). Similarly, in the Coalition Government it was modernisation and advances that would mean economic growth and social prosperity and long-term progress (BIS, 2011a: 53). It was innovation that was the pathway to sustainable growth as well as higher real incomes and greater well-being also in the long term (BIS, 2011b: 90). It was also excellent research of all kinds that was a major benefit for the economy and society, including equality, culture and the quality of life (BIS, 2010a: 2). This excellent research underpinned the response of technology-based sectors to global competition, but in a way that enhanced our quality of life and (economically) creative output (BIS, 2011a: 16). The inextricable linking of the promise of improvement in the economy and society has implicated the university in solving the problems that industry neither could nor would.
There was also a persistent rhetorical context of hope within the narrative of the university, both publicly and privately, and attributed to the university’s mission and part of its founding DNA.

Available in public

The declared purpose of the university was to address the most pressing global human concerns and global human problems in a unique endeavour (MGU, Strategic Plan; RCU, Strategic Plan). These were concerns that could be addressed through cutting-edge research, provided it made a real (MGU, Strategic Plan) and significant (RCU, Strategic Plan) impact economically, socially, environmentally and culturally (MGU, Strategic Plan), and of global significance (RCU, Strategic Plan). It was a promise to serve all of the university’s communities, globally (MGU, Annual Review, 2011) and regionally (MGU, Strategic Plan). This promise was not a chimera because it could be delivered.

Delivery was dependent on marshalling the strengths of the university, whether being able to operate in very different but complementary national contexts simultaneously (MGU, Strategic Plan), a reputation for the commercialisation of life-changing technologies in the global marketplace (MGU Facts, 2010) or extending research and commercialisation capability to a world stage (RCU, Strategic Plan). It was an outcome that could be guaranteed through collaboration with industry (MGU, Annual Review, 2010) and though prestigious partnerships (RCU, Annual Review 2011).
Available in private

The imperative to meet global challenges and provide ‘hope’ by tackling them was also clearly and widely expressed outside of corporate documents. Universities were in a position to substantially change society for the better (SM01), to solve the major global problems of the day and to improve the quality of life (SM02). It came with a powerful sense of social obligation that the university was only operating in society with its permission, and society had the right to expect something in return (SM01). This was a social good (SM02) and the right to something in return sometimes even trumped a welcome financial incentive (SM02). Universities were not ivory towers behind closed doors and needed to engage with the real world, not least because of this social obligation (FH02). It was not simply discovery that was vital, it was transfer of knowledge through which the university was beholden to ensure that benefits to mankind were realised (AH01).

This was commitment intimately linked with a founding mission, particularly in RCU, that had perhaps been lost and which was being rediscovered, and in which the university was being taken back to its civic roots (SM02). Within MGU even this local mission was recognised as a founding one, although it was more intimately associated with hope for global communities rather than simply local or regional ones. In MGU this hope of social improvement was also prosaically tempered as being part of a quid pro quo for the university as recipient of public funding, where the university, within its walls ‘owed something in return’.
7.2.3 Conclusion

The findings suggest that what has underpinned the co-option of the narrative of the traditional university is a rhetorical context of emotion in manifest intertextuality. Within this context the emotions of fear and hope appear to have resourced a change in the predominant understanding of the university (Riad et al., 2012) in policy and in the university. This rhetorical context has the potential to constrain actors at all levels (Llewellyn, 2001; Heracleous, 2006). It is this context of emotion that has underpinned the formation of an overarching structure of the narrative of the enterprise university in constitutive intertextuality (Heracleous, 2006).

In public, the agitation of globalisation, and fear of losing out in a globalised world, has been attached to the narrative of the university, with the traditional university being partially re-storied as part of the problem (Llewellyn, 2001; Vaara et al., 2004). This re-storying is only partial, because the university is plainly not the problem with reference to the intertextual theme of research excellence, ensuring the availability of an alternative narrative, outside the control of dominant actors and even within dominant forms of text (Brown, 2000). This demonstrates a possible limit to the agitation through fear, at least in public.

The fear that in the chaos or perfect storm of government policy, although evident in private, is not available in public, reducing its influence in the wider narrative of the university.
In policy and in the university, in public and in private, it is hope that has underpinned the co-option of the narrative of the traditional university, through positive emotion (Vaara and Tienari, 2002; Riad et al., 2012). It is suggested that this is because it is through hope that the two dichotomously resonant narratives of the university can apparently be reconciled, allowing for the ‘fixing of’ any contradiction (Tienari et al., 2003).

7.3 **Ideological intertextuality**

The intertextual production of the narrative of the university is underlined by two ‘ideologemes’ or ‘historical modes of textual organisation’ (Kristeva, 1980:36; Riad et al., 2012). The first ideologeme is one of the primacy of the market. Whilst previously implicated as part of the broader public policy agenda (Kirkpatrick et al., 2005; Brown, 2011), it is a new finding that this is also implicated within the university. The second ideologeme is one of civilisation, again within which the university has been strongly implicated as both a centre and a key part of a civilising process (Nowotny et al., 2001; Starkey and Tiratsoo, 2008; Barnett, 2011) underpinning the various and evolving narratives of the university, including the narrative of the traditional university (Martin, 2012). This research offers empirical support to the ideological underpinning of the university as a centre and a key part of a civilising process, *both* in public and in private *and* within policy and within the university.

What unites them is that each ideologeme is a specific form of global extension. One globalism is premised on the view that market liberalisation,
through integration and deregulation, is both inevitable and benefits everyone in the long run (Steger, 2005). The other, originally associated with the Greco-Roman classical civilisation, is the primacy of the known civilised world or *Oecumene*. It is premised on the dominance of European political institutions, science, technology and economic forms (McNeill, 1963) in particular following the eighteenth century Enlightenment. It has been associated with personal and national improvement, as well as the progress of humanity as a whole. It is through *civilising* that this improvement can be made. In a new finding, it is globalism that in ideological intertextuality underpins the otherwise dichotomous narratives of the university (Diefenbach, 2009) and enables apparent availability of each, but simultaneously the primacy of the market.

### 7.3 Ideological intertextuality

#### 7.3.1 Market globalism

The ideologeme of the market was evident within the narrative of the university, both in policy and within the university.

In policy this was demonstrable in three ways. Firstly, the university was placed within hyperbolic dualism of ‘market vs. protectionism’ (Riad *et al.*, 2012), in which the market was the only way forward in the face of *deregulation and enlightened self-interest* (DTI, 1991) and from which it would be *an error to retreat* (Sainsbury 2007). Secondly, the university has been progressively co-opted at the behest of government and in the interests of the market, to ameliorate rather than challenge the problems of that self-
interest, enlightened or not. It was in defence of the challenges of globalisation that the university had to become a partner to business (Duchy of Lancaster, 1993; Lambert, 2003) in research. It was in pursuit of economic growth in an era of market liberalisation (H.M. Treasury, 2004) that the university was required to support innovation. It was in this era that innovation was no longer an intellectual luxury and something that belonged to the university, but it was a necessity that belonged to the market in a modern economy (Sainsbury, 2007). On this basis the university was only one part, albeit an important one, of an innovation ecosystem (Sainsbury, 2007). It was innovation as a proxy for market globalism that was progressively and more tightly implicating the university as innovation hubs (BIS, 2011a) and pivots or arrowheads (Witty, 2013), so that the primacy of the market was further assured. Amelioration of the market now very clearly included not just support for economic growth, but balancing the regional economy as well, as acting as anchor institutions, in the apparent absence of central government, but at the behest of the market (Wilson, 2012; Witty, 2013; Young, 2013). Thirdly, the ideological underpinning of market globalism within the narrative of the university was further supported through the idea that benefits would be produced for all in the long run (Steger, 2005), in all the things and ways that mattered both economically and socially (DTI, 1995; DTI, SET, 2003; H.M. Treasury, 2004) and in the long-term (BIS, 2011a).

The ideologeme of the market was also evident within the university. The university was actively pressed to build business partnership on a global scale at the behest of both the government and international business. The
university provided the foundation for these partnerships in innovation (MGU, Strategic Plan) and at the same time secured its own sustainable future (MGU, Annual Review, 2010; RCU, Strategic Plan). It was also a partnership that offered the potential for the realisation of great benefits of (market) globalisation for the (social and economic) benefit of all (MGU, Strategic Plan; RCU Strategic Plan). Global partnership was at the heart of a historical mission for global extension by the university, either through pure internationalisation (MGU) or in a globally civic form (RCU). It was through partnerships in innovation that the university had the potential to shape its future (RCU, Annual Review, 2012). Partnership with business in innovation globally and regionally was a recognisable intertextual feature within the narrative of the university, throughout the university, albeit with an additional meaning. This partnership was in service of the market and society (FH01), but also for the benefit of all (FH02). It was also a partnership that involved other civic partners (SM02) not simply business.

7.3.2 The globalism of the Oecumene

The Oecumene is also is evident within the narrative of the university in policy and within the university. The implication of the university as central to civilising the known world has similarly been made in several ways.

The university had a duty of care for the well-being of democratic civilisation (Dearing, 1997), that co-existed within the knowledge economy. The university was at the heart not just of the knowledge economy but also a civilised society (BIS, 2009). The university’s historic contribution to seeking
truth, striving to know, upholding ever the dignity of thought and learning and offering a place of refuge for thinkers in distress or exile, must always continue, not least in the turbulent world of globalisation (John Masefield, quoted in Dearing, 1997). The university’s duty was fulfilled as place of refuge and just as a castle provided strength for medieval towns (Dearing, 2002) universities were destined for the same role within the knowledge economy (Wilson, 2012). The university operated as a place of safekeeping, as a storehouse of the world’s knowledge (Dearing, 1997) that defined our civilisation and culture (DFES, 2002). This university was a focal point in which intelligent and imaginative people found solutions to the world’s problems (DUIS, 2008) and a centre for critical inquiry and free-thinking (BIS, 2012).

The university advanced civilisation, playing a critical role in our intellectual life (Lambert, 2003), instilling a set of shared values including tolerance, freedom of expression and civic engagement (BIS, 2009). The university provided intellectual leadership at the heart of our shared intellectual life (Dearing, 1997; BIS, 2009). Moreover, it shaped transmission of a common culture and common standards of citizenship' (Robbins Review (1963) quoted in BIS, 2012). The university was one of the ways in which the UK engaged with the wider world (BIS, 2009).

Latterly this shaping of society had a regional dimension. The university held a civic leadership role, catalysed and economically stimulated the region enlivened and strengthened civil society (BIS, 2009; Browne, 2010).
The university was an anchor institution not just economically but culturally (Wilson, 2012), established at the heart of civil society in the region (BIS, 2012).

The implication of the university as a place and a force for civilisation was strongly echoed within the university, where learning was valued for its own sake, not simply instrumentally (MGU, Strategic Plan). The attachment to learning was perpetually portrayed as part of the founding mission of the university (RCU, Strategic Plan) and remained a key priority (MGU, Strategic Plan). This site or even seat of learning (AC02) was also a place that expanded the boundaries of knowledge for the simple sake of knowledge as well as for any wider benefit. (SM01). This was an unfettered freedom that had the power to change things in which the economy was only a part (PM). There was however a higher loyalty than just to the local community in the advancement of learning (PM).

The civic function of a university centred on the quest and the zest for knowledge and understanding, that could be shared (FH01). There was a democratising purpose in its civic obligation that was historical (AC01), in which widening participation was not in any way noblesse oblige, but crucial to the advance of democracy in our society (PM). Moreover, the university was obliged to help to change the way society thought about itself (SM02). It was on this basis that the university was also concerned with the preservation and dissemination of culture (AC01).
7.3.3 Conclusion

The findings suggest that the two ideologemes that underpin the narrative of the university are equally dominant and exist in close proximity in an ideological complex of competing presentations (Riad et al., 2012). However, the change in predominant understanding of the university, noted earlier in constitutive intertextuality and supported in manifest intertextuality by the emotional context of fear and hope (Riad et al., 2012) is also guided in ideological intertextuality by market globalism at the apparent expense of the globalism of the Oecumene. This is because the two ideologemes shared a unifying resonance as forms of globalism, permitting correspondence to a sense of values and understanding of the world (Fisher, 1984) in a way that leaves open multiple interpretations (Czarniawska-Joerges, 1995a) and which thereby powerfully supports unifying resonance. The ideologeme of Oecumene could continue to be powerful and yet still subsumed.
Chapter 8  Conclusion and implications

8.0  Introduction

This concluding chapter draws together the research findings and summarizes the theoretical contribution in terms of understanding strategy as an intertextual narrative. It also reflects on the practical implications of the findings, particularly for those operating in policy rich settings in general and HE, in particular. Finally, the chapter points to a number of limitations of the study and possible future research directions.

8.1  Contribution

The overall contribution of this study lies in the development of the concept of strategy as an intertextual narrative. It offers an explanation of how the overall thrust and direction of strategy is maintained, even endures, notably in politically rich settings. It provides this insight because the three different facets—constitutive, manifest and ideological—of intertextuality have been considered (Riad et al., 2012).

8.1.1  The narrative of the university – a summary

The narrative of the university, provided elements of predictability (Barry and Elmes, 1997: 437) as a form of order-making that reduced uncertainty in the social world (Lounsbury and Glynn, 2001: 549). It also provided a developing and on-going sense of where the organisation had been and where it was going (Fenton and Langley, 2011: 1184), in an organisational template or discourse of direction (Barry and Elmes, 1997: 432), in which the organisation, as a set of
relations or an organisation was told and re-told (Law, 1994: 250). In this way the narrative of the university tells how the organisation and its members should be (Law 1994: 250) and was strategy (Law, 1991; 1994; Czarniawska, 1997).

8.1.2 Strategy as an intertextual narrative

The setting of HE has proved to be a prime example of intertextuality. A set of social relations as strategy– the university – is embedded through the reproduction, reinterpretation and redefinition of meanings about the world in which various actors inhabit (Kristeva, 1980; Bakhtin, 1981; Fairclough, 1992; Keenoy and Oswick, 2004; Riad et al., 2012). It is actively constructed by multiple and interconnected narrators (Barry and Elmes, 1997) in the policy nexus, through discursive activity in competition (Rhodes and Brown, 2005). It arises in dialogical exchange rather than from monological authorship (Barry and Elmes, 1997; Currie and Brown, 2003). This exchange produces the simultaneous existence of differing and sequentially occurring tales – partially observed here in the narrative of the traditional university and the narrative of the enterprise university - that is understood as polyphony (Hazen, 1993) and always present. These two narratives of the university result from and are expressed in the exchange of both fully formed narrative and fragments of stories, partly, although not exclusively, in themes around innovation, regional engagement and research excellence. Within this exchange, known as heteroglossia (Bakhtin, 1981; Boje, 2008) there is competition between centripetal forces that attempted to centralize meaning and centrifugal forces.
that invoke a multi-vocal discourse opposed to the imposition of the monological world (Rhodes, 2001: 231).

The direction and thrust of strategy has been enabled through the interaction of multiple levels of narrative among different people at different times (Fenton and Langley, 2011), in plurivocality (represented by multi-actor and multi-level boxes) and drawing upon constructed notions of the past, present and future (Czarniawska, 2004) or in temporality, as an horizon of expectation (Ricoeur, 1984) (represented by past, present and future boxes Figure 14), in particular social contexts. This intertextuality constrains and enables strategy as a prospective narrative, engendering and entraining commitment without completely determining it (Fenton and Langley, 2011). As with previous studies, it was the combination of the availability and resonance of narrative building blocks (illustrated in the dark grey boxes toward the right of the diagram in Figure 14) that explains the thrust and direction of strategy, in a narrative infrastructure built up over time (illustrated in the outer dotted line of the diagram in Figure 14), in aggregation of that intertextuality. In particular availability and resonance, because they are not benignly extant, are framed (also illustrated in the dark grey boxes in) in intertextuality as a political resource (Figure 14). Framing in this sense is understood as a means of directing or focussing attention on narrative building blocks enabling both take up and acceptance in further narrative, supporting centralisation of meaning in heteroglossia (illustrated within the white box representing intertextuality in the centre of Figure 14) at the heart of intertextuality. This framing was to be expected where there were competing
and equally resonant narrative building blocks and this is reflective of previous studies, by using the three facets of intertextual analysis (Riad et al., 2012), this framing can be better understood.

Figure 14 Strategy as an intertextual narrative (conceptualised from existing literature)

8.1.2.1 Constitutive facet of intertextuality

In this setting which is highly plurivocal and in which the horizon of expectation is relatively wide, strategy is framed within several intertextual themes that have developed and changed over time and which tell the organisation forward (Deuten and Rip, 2000) and in a way that apparently maintains thrust and an unequivocal direction. By examining constitutive intertextuality, it is clear that dominant narrative building blocks are repeatedly
and recursively implicated. This apparent ubiquity frames the dominant narrative building block as pre-eminent, but unlike other studies (Vaara and Tienari, 2002; Vaara et al., 2006; Vaara and Monin, 2010) does not completely exclude the availability of other narrative building blocks, even in public. This is still the case where the non-dominant building blocks have been co-opted. Moreover, unlike other studies (Deuten and Rip, 2000; Dunford and Jones, 2001; Llewellyn, 2001; Heracleous and Barrett, 2001) this continued co-existence of opposing narrative building blocks does not cause apparent loss of thrust or deviation from direction, neither in public, nor notably in private (Heracleous, and Barnett, 2001). Furthermore, simply accepting that ubiquity frames one available narrative as dominant over another (Vaara and Tienari, 2002; Vaara et al., 2006; Vaara and Monin, 2010), even through co-option that increases resonance (Tienari et al., 2003; Vaara et al., 2004; Vaara and Monin, 2010), underplays the framing required at the centre of heteroglossic exchange (Buchanen and Dawson, 2007; Fenton and Langley, 2011; Vaara and Whittington, 2012) in settings such as this one. It may also underplay framing in the settings previously studied. This is because it is an inadequate explanation of how centrifugal forces in heteroglossia are suppressed and how centralising forces are enabled. Thus for example, whilst the co-option of a dichotomously resonant narrative building block has been comprehensive and this shows a more extensive intertextual reach that highlighted in previous studies (Llewellyn, 2001; Heracleous and Barrett, 2006; Vaara and Monin, 2020; Riad et al., 2012), how co-option has been enabled is not explained. The danger is that an explanation of strategy as a form of organisational ordering,
in which order is driven intertextually by a dominant narrative, is privileged. However, it is already known that the organisation is a site of discursive context (Brown, 2000; Boje, 2008); where emerging narratives must be wordsmithed to enable apparent cohesion (Fenton and Langley, 2011: 1182).

Instead, what is suggested from this research is that whenever there is tendency to focus on constitutive intertextuality, framing effects are underplayed and explanations of how strategy has endured and not unwound over time are underdeveloped (Vaara et al., 2004). Insight into the framing that drives the centralisation of meaning in heteroglossic exchange at the heart of intertextuality can be gained by examining manifest and ideological intertextuality (Riad et al., 2012), as has been the case in this research. This has resulted in two contributions to understanding strategy as an intertextual narrative. Firstly, this research provides a better understanding of how the co-option of apparently opposing or dichotomously resonant narrative building blocks has been enabled. Secondly, it supplies a revised conceptualisation of strategy as an intertextual narrative, which is outlined in Figure 15 and discussed in more detail below. This shows how framing impacts on plurivocality and temporality, and thereby enables and maintains thrust and unequivocal direction, even in highly plurivocal settings, where the horizon of expectation is relatively wide. This may be relevant in a number of different settings, including those previously studied, and could explain those occasions where strategy has also unwound.
8.1.2.2 Manifest facet of intertextuality

By examining the *manifest* intertextuality (Figure 15), it is clear that strategy was framed in a rhetorical context of emotion, namely *fear* and *hope*. It is in this rhetorical context that equally resonant narrative building blocks have been negatively or positively co-opted to reconcile competition (Vaara and Tienari, 2002; Heracleous, 2006; Vaara *et al.*, 2006, Vaara and Monin, 2010). In this way, it is through *fear* that an opposing narrative building block had been re-storied as part of a problem and co-opted (Llewellyn, 2001; Vaara *et al.*, 2004). Equally, it is through the rhetorical context of *hope* that a conjoining resonance is framed, in which probability and fidelity, is maintained (Vaara and Monin, 2010) and which retains reader acceptance (Eco, 1981). It is suggested that this is because of the way in which *hope* provides a conjoining resonance that leaves open multiple possible interpretations and ambiguity (Czarniawska-Joerges, 1995: 15). However, at the manifest level, strategy is also framed in a rhetorical context that does not completely correspond in terms of probability (Eco, 1981) and was inadequately resonant. This arose not least because the co-opted narrative is also storied as part of the solution in a way that provides for its continued availability and thereby provides potential opposition in *public*. Furthermore, there is also the rhetorical context of *fear* in *private*. 
Although there is apparently a lengthened horizon of expectation in the form of narrative time (Ricoeur, 1984) in this setting, in public, it is nonetheless foreshortened in the rhetorical context of fear. This creates agitation and the pressure to fix all concerns in an unequivocal direction that in turn enables thrust. This is an echo of the settings in which strategy as an intertextual narrative had been previously studied that were palpably time-bound, which draw strongly from the notion of a predictable future, at the expense of a foreshortened present and past (Llewellyn, 2001; Vaara, 2002; Vaara and Tienari, 2002; Tienari et al., 2003; Vaara et al., 2006; Vaara and Tienari, 2008; Erkama and Vaara, 2010; Vaara and Monin, 2010; Vaara and Tienari, 2011; Riad et al., 2012). This suggests that agitation; particularly in relation to the horizon of expectation or narrative time (Ricoeur, 1984) has the
effect of suppressing the centrifugal forces that invoke opposition to the imposition of a monological world (Rhodes, 2001: 231) thereby supporting the centralisation of meaning (illustrated by the dotted grey line from the box marked heteroglossia in Figure 15). Moreover, it is notable that this fear is and has been ever present, so that suppression is on-going. One conclusion could be that agitation may be a prerequisite for thrust in settings with a wider temporality and where there are, unlike previous studies, a number of apparently autonomous actors, notably in public.

However, in private, and in contrast, narrative time is not foreshortened, rather it is lengthened, and the resulting agitation through fear, remains to support centrifugal forces at the heart of heteroglossia. At the same time, hope has also been persistent, both in public and in private. This has the effect of maintaining a degree of plurivocality, leaving open multiple possible interpretations and ambiguity, seen in previous studies (Vaara et al, 2004; Heracleous, 2006). This would suggest a potential loss of thrust and a difference direction in strategy.

However, despite this potential for opposition in both the rhetorical context of fear in private and hope, in both public and private, strategy is not fragile, nor is the co-option in any apparent danger of being undone.

8.1.2.3 Ideological facet of intertextuality

A fuller explanation for the continued thrust and direction of strategy, where there is high plurivocality, in the form of many and equally powerful narrators, as well as equally resonant narrative building blocks and a wide horizon of
expectation, can only be made by understanding ideological intertextuality. This is where the existing socio-ideological dialogue between different groups in society is embodied (Vargova, 2007: 423) and framed in a conjoining way to maintain resonance. Each dialogue is produced and re-produced in public and in private, in variation but with a core essence intact, forming a continuum where the future remains faithful to the past (Levi-Strauss, 1978). What has been observable through ideological intertextuality is a framing that supports the centralisation of meaning, in a unifying resonance and wide availability. Firstly, this framing does not reduce narrative time. Moreover, it reaches simultaneously into the mythological narrative past and a mythical future, thereby lengthening it. Secondly, this framing does not suppress plurivocality, because in a similar way as that observed to hope in manifest intertextuality, it is framing that leaves open multiple possible interpretations and ambiguity (Czarniawska-Joerges, 1995: 15). In combination, what is suggested is that in this framing, conflict in heteroglossic exchange (Boje, 2008: 194) is dramatically reduced (illustrated by the dotted grey line from the box marked heteroglossia in Figure 15). As result thrust and direction in strategy is perpetually maintained (Deuten and Rip, 2000).

8.1.3 Conclusion – a matter of public and private centralisation of meaning

In this study our understanding of strategy as an intertextual narrative has been extended. The study has made much of how the narrative building blocks are framed to support the centralisation of meaning in heteroglossia. One way to
support the centralisation of meaning is to suppress the many and different voices in the organisation and the setting, and the fragments of different and competing narrative in a perpetual polyphony, at least those that do not support the imposition of the monological word (Rhodes, 2001: 231). Another way is to reduce the horizon of expectation or narrative time. This suppression and reduction has been observed in other studies and it has been observed here too.

As would be expected in dominant forms of text, such as policy or corporate documents in so-called hierarchies of understanding (Shapiro, 1989; Brown, 2000), there is a politically framed distillation of polyphony (Buchanan and Dawson, 2007), and centralisation of meaning is enhanced. However, this distillation occurs in private as well as might be expected in public. This has shown a more extensive reach of the centralising forces in heteroglossia at the heart of intertextuality, than highlighted in previous studies.

This reach is explained not by the suppression of plurivocality but by its maintenance, and not by the reduction of narrative time, but apparently by its lengthening. When looking at constitutive intertextuality, in a suppression of plurivocality, it appears that framing offers little room for take up of alternative narrative building blocks, thereby apparently maintaining (mono) direction and thrust, at least in public, although not in private. Similarly, in manifest intertextuality, it is a foreshortened narrative, driven in the emotional context of fear, and through agitation, that maintains thrust. Fear in private did not support change of direction, since plurivocality is also apparently suppressed in public, although it si through hope that a degree of plurivocality
is maintained, in both public and private. It is as ideological intertextuality that
the centralisation of meaning is better understood. Instead, what is apparent is
that the framing that apparently suppresses plurivocality is actually that which
allows it to prosper, without affecting either the direction or the thrust in
strategy, in both public and private.

It is argued that this framing is supportive of a unification of thrust and
direction in strategy, in public and in private, because it very powerfully
supports the centralisation of meaning in heteroglossia at the heart of
intertextuality. Firstly, it is a framing that placed the university as a modern
day, as well as an ancient, *axis mundi*, a mythical centre of the world, where
the *celestial* meets the *earthly*. This is a formidable strengthening of narrative
time within strategy. Secondly, it allows a multiple interpretation, both ancient
and modern, of the university, without their being in opposition, thereby
maintaining plurivocality. Thirdly, it addresses the issue of intertextual
distance that has been raised in discussion with respective narrators within the
setting. It is a framing that forms a mythical map, or *Mappa Mundi*, or a map
of the world, which in turn addresses the strategist’s key problem, which is as
much one of crafting an inviting cartographic text as it is one of highlighting
the right path (Barry and Elmes, 1997: 433). It is a framing that allows the
simultaneous mapping of order out of chaos (Barry and Elmes, 1997), in which
there are different and locations of chaos, one that is public and one that is
private, yet the ordering is the same.
8.2 Implications

8.2.1 Strategy practitioners and policy-makers in general

There are several implications of the findings in this study, for practitioners in a wider setting.

Firstly, the study offers theoretical insight into strategy as an intertextual narrative and how powerful narrative framing underpins direction and thrust in strategy. It provides insight into how cohesion in strategy, in terms of thrust and direction, might be better achieved in *wordsmithing* (Fenton and Langley, 2011: 1182), not least by the introduction of emotion into public framing, particularly hope. This could resource plurivocality, in a way that still contributes to the centralisation of meaning in heteroglossia, at the heart of strategy. It also demonstrates how in ideological intertextuality, strategy can endure, and reach from public into private realms, even in apparently turbulent settings, where there is high plurivocality and lengthened temporality. It also points out the potential limits to existing framing, particularly in constitutive intertextuality and may offer an explanation of how strategy unwinds over time. This is particularly useful for strategy practitioners, given that public framing of strategy is largely in their remit. Moreover, it provides insight into framing effects, particularly in public, carefully placing the strategic plan back at the heart of strategy (Spee and Jarzabkowski, 2009), without necessarily blindly privileging a dominant narrative.

Secondly, it provides insight for policy-makers, particularly with regard to the framing of policy. The findings suggest that policy is intertextually
powerfully, when it has reach in manifest and ideological terms. This is significant given the tendency of framing in policy to be rationalistic rather than emotional. It also shows the means by which policy can be ideologically framed to support a wider acceptance and intertextual reach.

Thirdly, much of the framing in this setting, in policy and in the organisation, is concerned with creating order out of chaos. However, there are different locations of chaos. This suggests that not only is it important for both policy-makers and those within organisations to appear to be distant from the overtly political, they each have a means to do so, in order to maintain some credibility within their respective spheres of influence.

8.2.2 Dangers and opportunities for the university

There are a number of specific implications for the HE sector. The biggest concern is that there appear to be very few possibilities for plurivocal or critical interpretation of policy in public. However, there are a number of developments that deeply concern the sector.

There is much concern, at least in private around funding and future strength in blue skies or curiosity driven research, the intellectual bedrock of any world-changing innovation. This has yet to achieve any political salience. In addition, there is little room to challenge the reform of academic publishing that has recently been recommended (Finch, 2012) and which is being implemented. It is a policy that is acknowledged, at least in private, as something of a surprise, when it appeared, particularly among the university and its Mission Group representatives. Similarly, the new regional role for the
university in the intertextual theme of *regional engagement* is in danger of encompassing the broader civic mission of the *Civics*, further constraining them in their wider political and simply *civic* role. It is also in danger of blurring and steadily eroding the boundaries between the different and regionally *appropriate* roles in the sector. As one participant put it, *everyone noticed when the polytechnics turned into universities post-1992, but no one has noticed that we’re now returning the favour and gleefully turning the universities into polytechnics*. This alleged transition from university to polytechnic may or may not be without merit, however, if that’s *all* the university is, then it is poor substitute for John Masefield’s (1946) university as a *place* where the *search for knowledge* is made to *banish ignorance*, *honouring thought in all its finer ways* and welcoming thinkers *in distress and exile*, and *upholding ever the dignity of thought and learning* to exacting standards.

Furthermore, in any of the intertextual themes, any expression of the university in private, rarely resources public opposition, given the almost total co-option of the narrative of the traditional university in public. However, these concerns are rarely echoed in public. There are three reasons, outside a general lack of political salience, that explain this reticence. Firstly, over the last twenty years policy has been justified as mechanism to meet a threatening and essentially external challenge and often, despite an expansion in funding in the mid-2000s, within resource constraint. This has maintained competition for funds between universities, but at the same time, with most research-intensive universities benefitting from available funds. Secondly, the universities have
long been part of the solution, rather than the problem, in the era of
globalisation. This is in sharp contrast to the policy narrative during the 1980s
(Shattock, 2012), although post 2011 the universities have once again become
a threat as well as a partner in the change required. Thirdly, there is a sense
within the university and among policy makers that the intertextual production
of the university is just that, a production. The intertextual distance in which
policy is apparently held in the university does not prevent the co-option of the
narrative of the traditional university and a change in the predominant
understanding of the university in public and in private; instead it provides
comfort in complacency and a cover for complicity.

If it is a matter of complacency and if the narrative of the traditional
university is to be more consciously offered in opposition to the dominant
narrative of the enterprise university, then a more conscious framing of the
narrative of the traditional university needs to be addressed in public,
particularly in corporate documents. In particular, the narrative of the
traditional university needs to be publicly expressed within the intertextual
themes of innovation, regional engagement and research excellence. The
resourcing of the narrative of the traditional university in the latter in policy,
offers an early opportunity, not least because this resourcing is currently under
threat. In addition, a focus on the value of blue skies research, outside
innovation and within an intertextual theme around public rather than simply
private (commercial and elite business) value, is one suggestion. This would
start to unpack the apparent neutrality in innovation that is otherwise deceptive.
This could be part of a collective and conscious framing by the various Mission
Groups, notably the Russell Group. It would require collective effort, given that the confidence that is publicly expressed within the university, around self rescue in the light of the threats and challenges of globalisation, is pervasive, and any breaking of ranks, to be publicly fearful, would potentially threaten a university’s ability to secure funding or maintain its competitive position. Nonetheless, any such consciousness-raising would provide a better platform to maintain the autonomy that the university prizes above all else.

8.3 Limitations and future directions

8.3.1 Limitations

How the setting was delineated or bounded in a particularity (Tsoukas, 2009) was discussed in the methodology chapter (Chapter 4), the limitations identified, are reprised and extended here. It was a setting that had an agitating disorder, but in which there were narrative building blocks that are both available and also have resonance, accessible by equally powerful, autonomous and usually public actors, with practiced access over the long-term. The limitations around this particularity are outlined as follows.

There is a potential limitation in that the period studied is one in which one political party was in government for a long period, although this was addressed to some extent by a consciousness around consensus and consistency between governments, as well as any difference. It is also widely acknowledged that policy at times appeared barely indistinguishable between predecessor and successor governments (Tight, 2009; Barnett, 2011; Shattock, 2012).
There is also a concern that the universities chosen were not Oxbridge institutions and given the ‘ivory tower’ association with the narrative of the ‘true’ university this could be considered a limitation. Furthermore, it could potentially underplay the dominance exerted by these older and more established universities in the policy nexus, as powerful individual actors. This is countered by the argument that a focus on post 1900 and so-called Civic universities has given a more nuanced understanding of the co-option or even negation of narrative building blocks that could be associated with Oxbridge or even nineteenth century German universities (Martin, 2012). However, further research in other parts of the HE sector may also prove also useful, particularly in terms of the regional role of the university.

Finally, one of the trade-offs in research design was being at a slight remove from the ‘creation’ of policy and corporate texts, instead time was spent in a wide review of documents and a focus within different levels within two research-intensive universities and in the wider policy nexus. Thus, the policy process has been observed vicariously within the interviews and in reflection on the formation of policy and through the texts themselves. The research programme that resulted was one that brought together different levels within the policy nexus and allowed for a longer period to be accommodated, which has been useful for understanding the nature of intertextuality in the setting. However, once completed, the research provides a platform from which to observe this process in a shorter period and in a focus on the policy-makers and their interactions, as well as the product of that interaction – the policy or corporate text.
Thus, it is proposed that the findings are theoretically generalisable (Tsoukas, 1989) in terms of the narrative intertextuality of strategy, in settings that are complex and policy-rich and otherwise political. This may also include settings that may be less complex, but in which organisations are temporarily negotiating a period of political turbulence. It is important however that all the potential intertexts – constitutive, manifest and ideological – are attended to within any analysis (Kennoy and Oswick, 2003: 140).

8.3.2 Future research direction

There are number of compelling reasons and possible opportunities to take this research further, both within HE in the UK and in other settings

8.3.2.1 Framing of the university – in HE

Strategy as an intertextual narrative in HE is an on-going process and there is potential to observe this process in a shorter period and in a focus on the policy-makers and their interactions, as well as the product of that interaction – the policy or corporate text. Ideally, this would be usefully undertaken in the aftermath of the next General Election in 2015.

Firstly, there will be a new government in May 2015, even if the Coalition Government is revived, it would still be new, not least because of recent changes within BIS and the slow dissolution of the accord within the Coalition Government, between 2010 and 2015 that would affect any future programme, at least in terms of presentation. The HE sector can at least expect either acceleration of marketisatation and/or further confusion and uncertainty in funding, the chaos of commercialising the existing student loan book and given
the current Opposition’s ambition to reduce tuition fees for undergraduate students. A post-election period would be an ideal time to examine the specific intertextuality between government and Mission Groups within HE in the UK, at the start of a new government and during the government’s period in office. This would potentially offer insight into framing the university in policy documents, extended to those produced by a Mission Group, both in public and in private. It could examine the consciousness of this framing, at a senior level.

Secondly, the chosen participants in interviews were taken from all levels within the case study universities and additionally include policy-makers past and present, but excluded other autonomous actors such as industry, the media or organisations like the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) or even lay members of a university’s Council. This is an omission that could be addressed in new research, particularly if it included observation of the formation of some of the policy and corporate documents. This would have the benefit of offering something to understanding the complicity or otherwise of university senior leaders in the co-option of the narrative of the traditional university.

Thirdly, at the time of writing, the consequences from the Scottish referendum, are unfolding, with the immediate pressure on the three main political parties in the UK to live up to their promise to provide further devolution of powers to Scotland. Devolution for England and (separately) in the regions has subsequently gained political salience. Whatever the eventual settlement the two-year period from September 2014 will be pivotal. There are
two potentially fruitful areas of research. Firstly, as discussed (Chapter 3) Scotland has a different HE tradition, and some would argue as a distantly democratic one (Davie, 1961; Scotland, 1969; Vernon, 2004). This different tradition would be worth considering in respect of the narrative of the traditional university, but even more so in the aftermath of the Scottish referendum. Secondly, the university has already been placed as ‘an anchor’ institution in the region, by the current Coalition government. Further strengthening of devolution to the regions would necessarily involve civic universities and the wider HE sector. The two narratives of the university would be worth considering in any new regional settlement.

Fourthly, the next cycle of strategic planning, at least within research-intensive universities in the UK, is about to start. Universities have been updating their strategic plans over the last eighteen months. Whilst a live review of the strategic planning process is no longer possible, the development of the narrative of the university within corporate documents, in response to the Coalition’s governments policy, in strategic plans 2015-2020, in intertextual production, could be examined.

8.3.2.2 Strategy as an intertextual narrative – other settings

More significantly, future research into strategy as an intertextual narrative could be made in other settings, not least to examine long-term framing in both public and private.

Firstly, research could be made in mergers and acquisitions and their subsequent unwinding through divestment, in an examination of intertextuality...
that is usually driven in a foreshortened temporality. This is pertinent given the tendency of mergers and acquisitions to unwind over time (Cartwright and Schoenberg, 2006). The need to fix concerns through ambiguity during the merger (Vaara et al., 2004) could be interpreted as an early indication of the failure to maintain the suppression of plurivocality and the fragility of direction and thrust. This would add to the understanding of strategy as an intertextual narrative in settings with apparently limited temporality.

Secondly, research could be undertaken in other highly plurivocal settings, where there are equally many autonomous actors and equally powerfully resonant narratives. The NHS in the UK would provide a comparable setting, because of its civic founding in 1948, the lengthened temporality and the heightened plurivocality, among not just professional actors, but also among the general public, and in the media. This would potentially add to the understanding of strategy as an intertextual narrative over time, but in a setting with high political salience.
References


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Appendix 1: Research themes and broad brief

Introductory statement
I am an ESRC doctoral researcher at Nottingham University Business School. My research focuses on the relationship between policy and organizational strategy. Thank you for agreeing to be interviewed.

This will be an informal interview about universities (in general in the UK) and their approach to a ‘call for entrepreneurship’ in the policy framework and their strategic responses as ‘corporate entrepreneurs’.

I am trying to get a picture from your point of view, of how government policy frames ‘the university’ and the case for organisational change within the university. And how a/the University responds to that framing –through their conception of the role of the university and strategic interpretation and reaction to policy. It would be helpful if possible, if we have a focus on policy of research, science and innovation; particularly targeted to research-intensive universities. However, if there were a wider point you wish to make about policy and the framing of the university, outside this focus, then that would be fine.

I would like to talk with you for approximately one hour. If you do not want to answer a question, please feel free to say no. The interview is completely confidential. No individual names will be used and quotes will be anonymized. With your permission, I would like to record the interview to maximize the accuracy of the data. The recording and its transcripts will not be seen by anyone beside my supervisors, and me and will under no circumstances be shown to anyone else in my home university. Do I have your permission to proceed?

The interview will cover five areas. To start I have a question about you and your current role. Then we will look at the policy context in relation to the ‘call to entrepreneurship’ in the university. Thirdly, we will discuss the policy as it impacts on the strategic discourse and strategy of the university. Fourthly, we will discuss the role of a university more broadly. Finally, we have an opportunity to reflect on how widely held you might consider your views.

Broad questions
1) How did you come to be in your current role?
2) How would you describe current policy for HE and how effective is it? What risks for the university, if any, are there in the current policy for HE? How has policy government changed during your involvement with HE?
3) In what ways do you think policy is translated into the strategy of the university?
4) One of the ways universities identifies itself with the ‘call to entrepreneurship’ through stated aims and objectives such as an aim to QUOTE FROM CORPORATE PLAN
5) Why do universities exist? What role do they perform? What is your vision for the university?
Definitions used

**Policy** - a course or principle of action adopted or proposed by organizations within the institution of Higher Education (government (direct and agencies); mission groups; industry; others). Mostly, policy will mean ‘government policy’.

‘Call to entrepreneurship’– as a ‘discourse of strategic change’ (Reed, 2002, p.2) which is underpinned by ‘a theory of political economic practices that proposes that human well –being can be best advanced, by liberating entrepreneurial freedoms and skills within an institutional framework, characterised by strong private property rights, free markets and free trade’ (Harvey, 2005, p.2).

**Strategy** - is taken to be a socially constructed reality, as negotiated meanings and as an inter-textual phenomenon; something that people in organisations do, rather than a position or performance an organisation has. This ‘doing’ of strategy is achieved though discourse (Barry and Elmes, 1997) and specifically narrative (Brown, 2006), where discourse and narrative is viewed as performative (Alvesson, 1993; Whittle, 2006).

Further information about the research project

As well as completing the analysis of national policy documents (1992-2012), I will be carrying out research in **two different UK universities**, interviewing different people from members of the senior management team, departmental and functional heads, to individual academics. This is to gain a picture at multiple levels within the organisation. The **universities have been chosen** because they are representative of a particular type of university. They are all research-intensive universities in the UK and can be classified as members of one of the following university ‘types’ – civic or new civic. **Individual participants have been chosen** because of the roles(s) they play within the university, particularly in terms of their strategic role and informed view of the policy domain, strategy more broadly and/or research commercialisation. This is supplemented by interviews with current and former policy-makers, and thought leaders, who **has been chosen** because of their ability to comment authoritatively on policy, either through their direct involvement or widely-read public commentary on policy.

When the data is analysed and published, the cases will be coded. Additionally, rather than specifying that there are members of a particular mission group, the characterisation will be ‘research-intensive’ universities or as ‘civics’. The origins of the university is significant within the case selection; so there may be some differentiation in terms of civic and new civics. Further, individual respondents may be classified by job role as follows, senior management, functional head, academic head, academic, policy maker (existing or former) and thought-leader. Some direct (or paraphrased) quotes will be used, if appropriate attributed to the participant only by either the class of the university and / or by function. So for example, ‘quote’ [SM1] [UC1] - meaning a member of the senior management in a case study1 university. In this way the responses will be confident and anonymised.

It is also worth bearing in mind, that what this research project is not about is individual universities; it is focussed on the narrative within the institution(s) of higher education. Within the analysis it is anticipated that abstraction and theory development would add a further layer between individual responses and the research findings.

Jeannie C A Holstein
27.6.2012 (REVISED 19.10.2012)
## Appendix 2: Policy documents per government 1992-2013

### Table 4 Coalition Government (2010-2013) Documents: Search terms: Higher education, research, innovation, science, university

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