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İNANÇ KAMBUROĞLU

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ABSTRACT

This thesis attempts to explain the change in Turkey’s foreign policy regarding Cyprus between 2002 and 2004. It argues that the overriding factor in this policy change was a change in leadership, i.e., the coming to power of the Justice and Development Party (AKP), which developed a decidedly liberal outlook on foreign affairs following its split in 2001 from the anti-Western, Islamist Welfare Party. Other crucial determinants included the Europeanization of the Cyprus issue and selective support for interest groups within Turkey, both of which were affected to various degrees by the European Union and a propitious change in decision-making context.

This thesis shows how constant policy failures during the 1980s and 1990s led to an identity crisis and the subsequent radical ideational transformation of the AKP whereby the party leadership renounced political Islamism and began to espouse an EU-oriented policy agenda and compatible rhetoric.

The arguments presented in this thesis contribute to the literature on foreign policy analysis, political leadership and Europeanization. With regard to foreign policy analysis, this thesis shows that foreign policy change is a multi-causal phenomenon that can only be explained by a combination of various concepts. Moreover, it argues that despite the fact that no ready-made formula can account for all cases of foreign policy alterations, changes in leadership and a favourable decision-making composition appear to be indispensable determinants of any foreign policy shift.

With regard to leadership, by applying a social-learning model to the analysis of the AKP leadership, this thesis follows the evolution of the Turkish Islamist Movement towards conservative democracy and an embracing of EU norms, which in turn resulted in a change in Turkey’s Cyprus policy. It is argued that Turkey’s new Cyprus policy was above all the consequence of a radical normative shift in the mindset of the new Turkish leadership.

With regard to Europeanization, this thesis demonstrates how the change in Turkey’s foreign policy vis-à-vis Cyprus was bolstered by the Europeanization process. In this context, it can be understood that the EU militated in favour of a policy alteration by Europeanizing the Cyprus disagreement with the acceptance of the Republic of
Cyprus into the EU in May 2004. The third essential determinant of Turkish foreign policy shift was the emergence of a propitious decision-making context within Turkey, which rendered such a policy shift possible.
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LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS

AKP-Justice and Development Party
ANAP-Motherland Party
APEC-Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation
BIA-Business Interest Associations
BSP-Bulgarian Socialist Party
CFSP-Common Foreign and Security Policy
CTP-Republican Turkish Party
DP-Party Democratic
DSP-Democratic Left Party
EC-European Community
ECHR-European Court of Human Rights
EFTA-European Free Trade Association
EOKA-B-National Organisation of Cypriot Fighters
EPC-European Political Cooperation
EU-European Union
FP-Virtue Party
HCCI-Hungarian Chambers of Commerce and Industry
HDZ-Croatian Democratic Union
IKV-Economic Development Foundation
ITC-Committee of Union and Progress
MGK-National Security Council
MHP-Nationalist Action Party
MÜSİAD-The Independent Industrialists and Businessmen’s Association
NAFTA-North American Free Trade Area
NATO-North Atlantic Treaty Organization
NSWP-Non Soviet Warsaw Pact
NPAA-National Programme for the Adoption of the Acquis
OSCE-Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe
PCC-Polish Chamber of Commerce
PKK-Kurdistan Workers’ Party
PSD-Social Democratic Party
ROP-Republic of Cyprus
RP-Welfare Party
TBMM-Turkish National Grand Assembly
TESEV-Turkish Economic and Social Studies Foundation
TOBB-Turkish Union of Chambers and Bursaries
TRNC-Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus
TÜRKİŞ-Confederation of Turkish Labour Unions
TÜSİAD-Turkish Businessmen and Industrialists’ Association
UBP-National Union Party
UK-United Kingdom
UN-United Nations
UNFICYP-United Nations Peacekeeping Force in Cyprus
URC-United Republic of Cyprus
US-United States
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PART ONE: DEFINING FOREIGN POLICY CHANGE

INTRODUCTION

1. Context of the Topic

This thesis seeks to explore the question of why Turkey’s Cyprus policy changed so abruptly between 2002 and 2004. While Ankara advocated a confederal solution until 2002, the AKP government started to favour a federal settlement in line with the UN parameters after coming to power in November 2002. The findings of this research demonstrate that there were three factors which explain this puzzling change. First, the new leadership came to power with a new mindset on foreign affairs. Unlike its predecessors, the AKP leadership recognized the need to find a federal solution to the Cyprus dispute. It made clear that “the Cyprus problem must be settled by all manner of means in line with the Annan Plan” (TBMM Reports Journal November 23, 2002). Second, the EU, in granting Turkey a membership perspective, thereby rendered a settlement a *sine qua non* for Turkey to proceed with its own membership process. The third factor was the emergence of a propitious decision-making context, which empowered the pro-settlement actors within Turkey and weakened those who were anti-solution.

The introduction starts with a background on the Cyprus question explaining the historical context of the Cyprus problem. The argument lays out the theoretical framework in which the Turkish foreign policy change on Cyprus is examined. In the third part of the introduction, the definition of change is made to make clear what is considered to be a change in foreign policy. In the fourth part of the introduction, the research methodology employed in this thesis is explained. The last part of the introduction is the general outline of the thesis.
2. Background

The beginning of the Cyprus problem can be traced back to the mid-1950s, when British colonial rule on the island started to fall apart. In 1960, with the involvement of Britain and the United States, the Greek and Turkish Cypriots were able to come to terms on the establishment of a bi-communal federation on the island. However, although the Turkish Cypriots were content with the 1959-60 agreements and the 1960 Constitution, which gave them equal rights within the state administration, the Greek-Cypriots were not. Eventually, their discontentment with the 1959-60 agreements, which fell short of their ultimate objective – the establishment of a unitary Hellenic state in which the Turkish Cypriots would enjoy minority rights, rather than power-sharing – led to the failure to implement the 1960 Constitution in 1963.

The Turkish Cypriots were ousted from their administrative positions in December 1963, and as a consequence of the emerging intra-ethnic violence, they were forced to live in small enclaves, isolated from the world and encircled by the island’s larger Greek Cypriot population until the military intervention by Turkey in 1974 (Interview 1 September 05, 2011). Talks between the leaderships of the two communities, which had begun in 1967, bore fruit in meetings held between 1977 and 1979, and the parties once again agreed on the objective of establishing a bi-zonal, bi-communal federation on Cyprus.

In fact, despite their professed aim, neither of the sides were committed to such a solution until 2002, and as the Greek Cypriots attempted to setup a unitary state in which Turkish Cypriots would have the status of a minority, the Turkish Cypriots, together with Turkey, worked towards establishing an independent Turkish Cypriot state (Interview 2 September 9, 2011; Interview 3 September 8, 2011).

The European Union accepted the Greek Cypriot application for EU membership in the name of the entire island in 1993. The negotiations with the Greek Cypriots started 1997. While the Helsinki Council of the EU in 1999
granted Turkey candidate status, it made clear at the same time that the Republic of Cyprus would be accepted as a member even in the absence of a settlement in Cyprus. As a result, the Republic of Cyprus became a member of the EU in May 2004 without a settlement and thus without any control on the northern part of the island.

Ankara’s stance on Cyprus did not change until the advent to power of a new leadership in Turkey in 2002. Shortly after forming a government in November 2002, Justice and Development Party (AKP) officials made a fundamental shift in Turkey’s Cyprus policy. Up until that point, Ankara had mainly been pursuing hard-line confederalist policies designed by TRNC President Rauf Denktaş, a highly esteemed figure among the Turkish bureaucratic and military elite (Interview 4 September 6, 2011). With the advent to power of the AKP, not only did Ankara move away from advocating a confederal model towards backing a resolution based on the UN parameters of a bi-zonal, bi-communal federation, it began to assume a pro-active role in trying to reach a settlement along these lines, eventually going so far as to allow the UN Secretary-General to attempt to catalyse a settlement in January 2004 by filling in the blanks in those areas of the UN plan upon which the Cypriot parties had been unable to reach agreement.

3. The Cyprus Question as an Intractable Problem

The Cyprus question has proved so intractable as it is a protracted and intense disagreement between ethno-national groups who see their interests and even their survival in zero-sum terms. Moreover, the groups see their interests as being mutually incompatible. Competing claims for sovereignty by distinct ethno-national groups give rise to the most intractable political divisions. In such cases, negotiation, bargaining and compromise are difficult, since the claims of one side are usually unacceptable to the other. This animosity may then be intensified by the trauma of ethno-national violence (Bose 2007: 1-2). In Cyprus, the Greek and Turkish communities are divided by mistrust and fear. This suspicion is fuelled by the media, while the educational system and,
in the Greek Cypriot case, the Church, further colour each group’s perceptions of the other (Khashman 1999: 6).

Having two distinct school systems emphasizing the dissimilarities between the two communities, sharpens their consciousness of their different national identities and their opposing loyalties, and inhibits the forging of a common Cypriot identity. In Greek Cypriot schools, students are taught to see Greek territorial expansion and enosis (unification of Cyprus with Greece) as desirable (Lindley 2007: 228-9). The Church maintains control over most of the schools and brings teachers over from Greece (Interview 5, September 29, 2011).

In the educational systems on both sides of the island, the goals are ethnically defined. The educational system and history are used on both sides with competing allegations to sovereignty and statehood. Against this background, history has become the main battleground for the legitimation of contradictory political claims. It is “fetishized” and given a voice not just to speak but to command. It has become a moral force with the authority to dictate what is morally (and, by extension, politically) desirable for Cyprus and its future (Papadakis et al. 2006: 4-6). This made the parties persist in their maximalist positions and view the Cyprus question as a zero-sum game, in which gain for the one is considered to be the loss of the other. Until 2002, both sides persisted on these maximalist zero-sum positions, a unitary state on the Greek Cypriot side and a confederation on the Turkish Cypriot side.

4. Nature of the Puzzle

Until 2002, the policies of the parties were defined along nationalistic and zero-sum lines. While the Greek Cypriots presumed a unitary Hellenic Cyprus, where the Turkish Cypriots would merely enjoy minority status, the Turkish Cypriots and Ankara sought a confederal formula on the basis of two sovereign states. This was based on the policies of Denktas. These maximalist positions did not allow the parties to consider a formula, where both sides
would have to make compromises under the UN parameters with a view to unifying the island. However, the stance of Ankara on the Cyprus question started to change with the advent of a new leadership in Turkey in November 2002. This was puzzling in that for the first time a government in Turkey began to proactively advocate a federal formula on the basis of the UN parameters to the extent of allowing the UN Secretary General to fill in the parts in the accord, where the parties could not converge. This thesis seeks to find out the causes behind this abrupt policy change under the AKP government, which actively backed a settlement along the parameters set out by the UN. This was in contrast to its predecessors, including the coalition government of 1999-2002, that failed to make such a fundamental shift despite the credible membership perspective for Turkey furnished by the EU at the 1999 EU Council Helsinki summit.

5. Argument

This thesis aims to identify the causes behind Turkey’s sudden change in foreign policy vis-à-vis Cyprus from 2002. It argues that three main factors triggered the process by which Turkey abandoned a policy of resolution on the basis of a two-state or confederal model in favor of a federal solution: the advent to power of a new leadership with a new conciliatory mindset in foreign policy, the impact of the European Union in terms of the Europeanization of the Cyprus dispute with Greek Cypriot accession and, the emergence of a propitious decision-making setting within Turkey to shift Turkey’s Cyprus policy.

Some authors explain Ankara’s new policy on Cyprus in terms of domestic power considerations within Turkey (Kinacioglu and Oktay 2006; Robins 2007), whereas others view the new leadership and its new approach to foreign policy as the paramount determinant of this policy change (M. Ozcan and Usul 2010; Uslu 2011). Researchers also point to the simultaneous processes of democratization, Europeanization and the de-securitization of foreign policy-making in Turkey (Terzi 2005; Kaliber 2005; Tocci 2005;
Kirişçi 2006; Aras 2009; Özcan 2010). In this regard, some have emphasized the EU accession process as the cardinal reason for Turkey's policy change (Terzi 2005; Kaliber 2005; Kirişçi 2006; Aras 2009), whereas others give precedence to a bottom-up process of democratization within Turkey, bolstered by an EU component (G. Özcan 2010; Tocci 2005). However, democratization and the de-securitization of foreign policy may not have an immediate influence on foreign policy behaviour, and none of the above-mentioned scholars provides a detailed explanation that combines theories of leadership, foreign policy analysis and Europeanization in explaining Turkey’s foreign policy shift on Cyprus, nor can they adequately account for the radical ideational transformation in Turkey’s new leadership that led to their espousal of EU norms and a new policy on Cyprus. The essential question here – and one that has not yet been sufficiently analysed – is how a political party originating from a strongly anti-Western, pro-TRNC Turkish Islamist movement came to prioritize both EU membership and a new policy on Cyprus, diverging not only from its predecessor, the Islamist Welfare Party, on the Cyprus question, but from other mainstream political parties, which held fast to the status-quo oriented policies in Cyprus. In a parliamentary speech, Baykal, the leader of the main opposition party, aired that “if you are not in a position to create better conditions for our kin in Cyprus, then abandoning the status-quo might be contrary to our interests” (TBMM Reports Journal November 26, 2002).

Although the EU is often presented as the most significant actor in Ankara’s new Cyprus policy (Terzi 2005; Kaliber 2005; Kirişçi 2006; Aras 2009), such accounts fail to provide thorough analyses of how the EU accession process affected Turkish foreign policy vis-à-vis Cyprus that draw on theories of Europeanization. This thesis argues that the EU contributed to the process of Turkish foreign policy change vis-à-vis Cyprus by Europeanizing the Cyprus dispute and empowering pro-settlement interest groups in Turkey. Thus, the EU played a crucial role in swaying Turkish foreign policy towards Cyprus by providing a credible membership perspective for Turkey.
This thesis illustrates how the advent to power of a new leadership with a new outlook on foreign affairs was the crucial determinant of Ankara’s new policy on Cyprus. The AKP was formed at a time when the Turkish military was cracking down on Turkey’s Islamists. Modernizers (yenilikçiler) within the Turkish Islamist Movement, known as the National View Movement, split off to form the AKP following the shut-down of the Islamist Welfare Party in 1998. Realizing that an Islamist party could not accede to and maintain power within the Turkish political setting – Turkish Islamist parties were closed down by the Turkish Constitutional Court not only in 1998, but in 1971, 1981, 1983 and in 2001, on the grounds that they had allegedly become the focus of activities aimed at undermining Turkey’s secular-democratic system – the AKP espoused EU membership as its main objective in order to enlist EU support to protect the party against the powerful secular establishment of Turkey.

In analyzing the process by which the AKP renounced its Islamist past and came to embrace an EU-oriented agenda, this thesis relies on Thomas Risse’s social-learning model, which describes how ‘resonance’ and ‘critical junctures’ lead to the reconstruction of identity and the redefinition of interests (Börzel and Risse 2003: 66; Risse 2001: 203). ‘Resonance’, which accounts for the appropriateness and legitimacy of a particular identity construction in a specific political setting (Risse 2001: 203), demonstrates how an institutionalized secular domestic context forced the Turkish Islamic Movement to transform its identity, since Islamism did not resonate well in such a setting. Recognition of the fact that the only way to come to and remain in power within the Turkish domestic structure was to give up their Islamist identity indicates the ‘social learning’ of the AKP. The social learning model also posits the presence of ‘critical junctures’, which describes a novel and uncertain environment, crisis, or vehement policy failure that facilitates a policy shift (Risse 2001: 212-3 and 562). After such a policy failure, identity re-construction comes about after a process of arguing, persuasion, social learning and redefinition of identities and interests (Börzel and Risse 2003: 66). While ideational transformation may originally be triggered by a desire to remain in power or some other political considerations, once the identity re-
Whereas different approaches, such as Realism, Liberalism, Constructivism and Rationalism, are also examined in Chapter V, Section 1.2, the findings of this research demonstrate that all of these accounts were limited in their explanation of the concept of foreign policy alteration due to the complexity and multi-dimensional aspect of the phenomenon. Realism maintains that the political decisions are a consequence of structural determinants on which the decision-makers do not have any control. However, this thesis clearly shows that the decisions of the decision-makers are not simply a consequence of structural dynamics as suggested by the Realists.

Liberals, on the other hand, assert that liberal institutions make a crucial impact on the decisions of the policy-makers arguing that cooperative behaviour within an anarchic and hierarchical system is possible on the basis of norms, regimes and institutions, which provide states with various channels of political exchange rather than only the interstate channel advocated by the realists (Keohane 1984). This argument holds true, notwithstanding, as long as the leadership has a disposition to espouse such norms and values of the liberal institutions. As expounded in Chapter VI, Section 1.2. and 1.3, while the coalition government was reluctant to embrace EU norms and values, the AKP government was disposed to do so.

Constructivism regards concepts as socially constructed in line with the identities and interests of the key actors in the system. Thus, these concepts may be changed by the human agents by a process of social practice and interaction. Constructivism puts special emphasis on “shared ideas”, which construct the identities and interests of human actors. These “shared ideas” are not given by nature, but can change by a process of social construction (Wendt 1992). Ideas may only have an impact on foreign policy behaviour, however, as long as they are espoused by the leadership as states are abstract entities without the power to make decisions. While the coalition government failed to espouse ideas to pursue a more constructive and pragmatic policy on Cyprus,
the AKP government adopted such ideas and made the EU membership and thus the settlement of the Cyprus problem its political goals. In this sense, constructivist, leadership and social learning approaches account for why the coalition government held fast to the traditional confederalist line on Cyprus disregarding the views that circulated around for a solution in Cyprus and why the AKP government opted to embrace such ideas for a settlement in Cyprus.

In this sense, Liberalism and Realism fail to recognize the weight of leadership and social learning, which are the ineluctable components of any decision on foreign policy alteration. Therefore, “Constructivism”, ‘leadership’ and ‘social learning’ are the main approaches employed in this research.

This thesis draws on leadership and Risse and Checkel’s social learning model in spelling out not only why the AKP government resolutely and proactively favoured a federal settlement in the island on the basis of the UN parameters, but also why the coalition government, the AKP’s predecessor, failed to do so and held fast to the idea of forming a confederation in Cyprus. An account of the behaviour of both political formations calls for a “cognitive approach and the learning process” on the part of both the AKP and the coalition government. In this sense, “leadership dynamic” stands out as an critical component of any decision of foreign policy shift. As analysed in Chapter VI Section 1.1, whereas the coalition parties preceding the AKP had forceful cognitive priors as regards the maintenance of the status quo in the island, and thus failed to change Ankara’s Cyprus policy, the AKP government, in the face of constant policy failures, was able to re-define the party’s identity and interests through a cognitive learning process. Such a re-definition led to the espousal of a new pragmatic policy on Cyprus. While this ideational transformation rooted in the cost-benefit calculations of the AKP initially, it outlived this pragmatic alteration and stuck.

Within this context, the failure of Turkish Islamist politics and the closure of the AKP’s predecessor Welfare Party (RP) on January 16, 1998 by the Turkish Constitutional Court, which ruled that the activities of the RP were undermining the principles of plural democracy and laicism in Turkey,
represented a ‘critical juncture’ – as did the upholding of that ruling by the European Court of Human Rights (ECHR), which demonstrated that the European context was not going to support the survival of an Islamist party in Turkey.

In relating Risse’s social learning theory to the AKP’s shift on Cyprus, this thesis also draws on an adoption-costs model. Namely, it maintains that the AKP government’s adoption of an EU-oriented policy agenda and its espousal of a foreign-policy change on Cyprus were initially motivated by cost-benefit calculations. However, the process of cost-benefit analysis and ideational transformation of the party go hand in hand.

After focusing on the role of the new Turkish leadership, this thesis examines how the EU accession process contributed to Turkey’s foreign policy change vis-à-vis Cyprus. The first and foremost aspect entails the Europeanization of the Cyprus discord. The Europeanization of the Cyprus issue with the prospective entry of the Republic of Cyprus into the EU meant that any Turkish government aspiring to EU accession would be obliged, under the *acquis communautaire*, to apply EU norms to the Republic of Cyprus. In fact, the 1996 Customs Union agreement between the EU and Turkey required Ankara to extend this agreement to all new members of the EU, including the Republic of Cyprus. Within this context, Turkey would have to allow Greek-Cypriot-flagged vessels and aircraft to use its ports and airports. In the event, because it has refused to do so, Turkey’s accession process has been frozen since December 2006. Accordingly, a settlement of the Cyprus dispute has become a sine qua non for Turkey to clear its own pathway to EU membership.

The EU accession process also impacted on Turkey’s Cyprus policy by empowering certain domestic actors within Turkey between 2002 and 2004. The credibility of EU membership strengthened the hands of pro-EU domestic actors – above all the government but also the Turkish Businessmen and Industrialists Association (TÜSİAD) and other non-governmental organizations favoring the Annan Plan – and weakened that of EU-sceptics
opposing the plan, most important among them, the military. Accordingly, while pro-EU, pro-Annan Plan domestic interest groups became more vocal as the referendum approached, dissenters were forced to remain silent.

Any foreign policy decision can be understood as being made by an ‘authoritative decision unit’ consisting of either a predominant leader, i.e. a single individual with the power to commit (or withhold) all of a regime’s resources related to a particular issue regardless of any opposition by others, a single group, or multiple autonomous actors (M. G. Hermann and Hermann 1989: 365-6). In the latter case, decision-making may be more difficult, since numerous influential actors may be capable of complicating or obstructing the decision-making process.

With regard to the change in Turkey’s Cyprus policy that occurred between 2002 and 2004, this shift was facilitated by Prime Minister Erdoğan’s role as the ‘predominant leader’, who after an interactive process with the other actors in the decision-making group, made a decision to change Turkey’s Cyprus policy.

6. Defining Change

In conceptualising shifts in foreign policy, this thesis employs Kleistra-Mayer’s model, which identifies and defines three different types of change: change in programmes/instruments, change in strategies/problems/goals, and change in political/normative foundations. Instrumental change involves a change in methods or means – for example, diplomatic negotiations, instead of military force – but not in ultimate goals. In other words, with instrumental change, the policymaker changes what s/he does and how s/he does it, while his/her purposes remain intact (Kleistra and Mayer 2001: 392-3). With regard to Cyprus, by expanding the UN Secretary-General’s role to include the power of arbitration rather than restricting him to a mission of ‘good offices’, which did not include the right to set forth plans, proffer suggestions, or impose them on the parties, Ankara changed a crucial instrument in the negotiations. This
instrumental change was designed to catalyse a solution, and it made possible the emergence of the Annan Plan, in which the Secretary-General himself ‘filled in the blanks’ on which the parties had been unable to converge.

In the case of a change in strategies/problems/goals, the policymaker redefines or forfeits his/her goal so that not only does the policymaker change what s/he does and how s/he does it, his/her purpose also undergoes a shift. Changes in policy statements and policy actions can also be defined as changes in problems/goals (C. F. Hermann 1990: 5), as in Turkey’s move away from the idea of a confederal settlement in Cyprus it had advocated implicitly since 1960s and explicitly since the mid-1990s towards acceptance of a federal model in full compliance with the UN parameters from 2002 onwards.

Finally, normative and political foundational change involves a shift in the underlying concept of foreign policy (Kleistra and Mayer 2001: 392-3), as in the institution of the policy ‘zero problems with neighbours’ put forth by Ahmet Davutoğlu, an adviser to the Turkish prime minister since 2001 and appointed to the post of foreign minister in 2009, to replace the hard-line outlook that had dominated Turkey’s foreign policy prior to 2002. After this date, Ankara began emphasizing its ‘soft power’, attempting to establish friendly relations and smooth out differences with its neighbours on the basis of economic inter-dependency in a stable neighbourhood. It was within this framework that Ankara took the initiative in attempting to settle the Cyprus dispute.

7. Research Methodology

This thesis analyses the case of Turkey’s foreign-policy shift on Cyprus between 2002 and 2004 on the basis of qualitative data. This time period chosen as this is the only period that a substantial shift in Turkey’s Cyprus policy occurred by the concurrence of three determinants: leadership, the EU and decision-making. Given the fluid, multi-factorial causality of foreign-policy change, establishing the causes of a specific instance of foreign-policy
change requires a detailed, inductive analysis of the particular case in question. By using the case-study approach, this thesis identifies variables, hypotheses and causal mechanisms to account for Turkey’s foreign-policy change vis-à-vis Cyprus after 2002.

The collection of data relating to this study was hindered by the absence of a clear-cut theory capable of accounting for foreign-policy change in general. This lack of a definitive theory can be attributed to the fact that foreign-policy change is a complicated, multi-causal process that involves numerous factors that are not necessarily the same in all cases. In order to introduce a multi-causal explanation for Turkey’s foreign-policy change vis-à-vis Cyprus, a model was developed following a thorough examination of the literature on foreign-policy change in general and on Europeanization in particular. Based on the findings of the literature review, factors with the potential to influence foreign policy were grouped under four main categories (Table 1).

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<tr>
<th>Category</th>
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<td>Individual Policymakers/Leaders</td>
<td>Preferences and Interests of the leadership</td>
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The model was then constructed using the relevant factors as independent variables. The three relevant independent variables are found to be the international institutionalisation (the EU), the decision-making mandate and the preferences and interests of the leadership, which are written in bold in
Table I. After the pertinent independent variables are determined, I explored whether the above-mentioned three types of foreign-policy change occurred as the dependent variables.

Data was collected from various political texts (speeches, press conferences, party statements) the media (newspapers, television/radio broadcasts, internet resources), the academic literature on Turkey’s foreign policy, including relations with the EU, Cyprus and other countries, and the literature regarding general aspects of foreign policy, foreign-policy change and Europeanization. Written papers signed by the government, official documents and publications of the Turkish Foreign Ministry along with documents generated by various institutions relevant to Turkey’s foreign relations, such as the EU Commission and the UN Security Council, were also analysed. Furthermore, approximately 20 interviews were conducted with academic experts on Turkish foreign policy, Cyprus and Greek-Turkish relations; diplomats from the Turkish Foreign Ministry and the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus (TRNC) Ministry of Foreign Affairs; other politicians from both the governing and opposition parties in the TRNC; and a Turkish-Cypriot journalist in Nicosia during August-September 2011.

A multi-dimensional model was constructed to explain how the advent to power of a new leadership and EU determinants affected Turkey’s new Cyprus policy. This thesis contributes to the academic literature by applying a social-learning model to the case of the AKP, and it contributes to the literature on Europeanization by disclosing how the Europeanization process unfolded in the case of Turkish foreign-policy change on Cyprus. Among the potential causes of foreign-policy change listed in Table I, the model employs ‘leadership with a new outlook on foreign affairs’, ‘the EU’, which encompasses ‘the Europeanization of the Cyprus dispute’ and ‘emergence of a propitious decision-making composition’ for a change in foreign policy.
8. Outline

This thesis has sought to answer the question, “What were the reasons for the radical shift in Turkish foreign policy vis-à-vis Cyprus between 2002 and 2004?”

Chapters I and II establish the background against which this question will be answered. While Chapter I provides a chronological overview of the Cyprus problem that looks at the emergence of the disagreement, the causes of the conflict, the legal and constitutional aspects of the discord, the question of federalism, the role of outside powers and various conflict-resolution initiatives, including the UN parameters for Cyprus, Chapter II focuses on Turkish foreign policy in general during the 1990s and 2000s and Turkish foreign policy towards Cyprus since the 1950s in particular, and it includes a review of the literature on the determinants of Turkish foreign policy.

Chapter III draws on Kleistra and Mayer’s conceptualization of foreign policy change to expound on what really changed in Ankara’s Cyprus policy between 2002 and 2004. Accordingly, it highlights the change in foreign-policy instruments represented by replacing the UN Secretary-General’s role of ‘good offices’ with that of arbitrator in the dispute; the change in foreign policy goal from the institution of a confederal solution to the establishment of a bi-zonal, bi-communal federation in line with UN parameters; and the normative change represented by the AKP’s abandoning of Turkey’s security-oriented foreign policy in favour of one with a more conciliatory and cooperative outlook on foreign affairs.

Chapter IV explicates foreign-policy change in general, presenting a list of determinants derived from the literature. Accordingly, the causes of foreign-policy change are subsumed under four chief categories: causes related to the international system, causes related to the domestic system, causes related to organizational structure and causes related to the leadership. In this chapter,
various of these determinants are analysed, and their relevance to the Cyprus case is explored.

Chapter V offers a detailed theoretical framework that explains foreign-policy change in Turkey. In the first part of the chapter, ideational changes at the leadership level are described according to a social-learning model that accounts for the advent to power of a new leadership with a new identity emerging from an ideational crisis induced by policy failure. The ideational transformation of the Turkish Islamist Movement from Islamist to centrist and its adoption of an EU-oriented foreign-policy agenda from early 2000s onwards is explained by a social-learning model, with an adoption-costs model also used to account for the initial motivation behind the AKP’s foreign-policy change on Cyprus.

The second part of the chapter spells out the role of the EU in Turkey’s foreign-policy alteration. After first accounting for international institutionalization as a cause of foreign-policy change in general, it examines the role of international institutionalization in terms of the specific case of Turkey’s foreign-policy shift on Cyprus, namely with regard to the institutionalization of EU norms required by the ‘acquis communautaire’, which made a settlement on Cyprus a de facto condition for any Turkish government aspiring to EU membership. The chapter also attempts to explore the explanatory value of Europeanization theories in relation to Ankara’s new Cyprus policy. Within this framework, determinacy of conditions, legitimacy of conditions, credibility of conditionality and size and speed of rewards were examined as alternative explanations; ultimately, it was understood that these models are unable to furnish more than a scant understanding of Ankara’s new policy on Cyprus. In addition to discussing the Europeanization of the Cyprus issue, this chapter also establishes the theoretical background against which the issues of the EU’s empowerment of certain interest groups within Turkey.

Chapter VI applies the theory on leadership outlined in the previous chapter to the case of Turkish foreign-policy change vis-à-vis Cyprus. The chapter starts with an explanation of the process that led to the political Islamists’ move
Chapter VII continues to apply the theory developed in Chapter V to the case of Turkish foreign-policy change vis-à-vis Cyprus by highlighting the EU’s impact on this policy. After analysing the Europeanization of the Cyprus question, it examines alternative theories that could potentially account for Turkish foreign-policy change on Cyprus. This chapter also looks on the positions of the EU member states as regards Turkey’s membership and the Cyprus question. Chapter VIII discloses how a propitious decision-making composition emerged in Turkey and allowed Erdoğan to make a radical shift in Turkey’s Cyprus policy by extensively drawing on primary sources.

The conclusion offers a summary of the main assertion of this thesis, namely that the 2002-2004 shift in Turkish foreign policy vis-à-vis Cyprus was the result of a combination of dynamics related to the Turkish leadership and to the EU in terms of Europeanization of the Cyprus dispute and a propitious decision-making context. This chapter also points out the contributions to the literature made by this thesis and clarifies the potential capacity of the model constructed to account for the Turkish foreign policy shift on Cyprus to explain foreign-policy change in general. In fact, the model employed in this study is applicable to the specific case of Turkish foreign-policy change vis-à-vis Cyprus in 2002-04 and cannot be automatically applied to other cases of foreign-policy change without an exhaustive, inductive analysis of the specific location and time period in question. That said, however, leadership and a
favourable decision-making composition seem to be ineluctable components of any foreign-policy alteration. Moreover, the general model embraces a wide range of variables with the potential of altering foreign-policy dynamics, from international institutionalization to bureaucratic advocacy, and can be used as a starting point by scholars of different areas for their own case studies.
CHAPTER I: THE BACKGROUND TO THE CYPRUS QUESTION

In order to give the reader some insight into the origins of the research question, this section discusses the Cyprus controversy, illustrating how Ankara’s policy on Cyprus changed. As the involved parties and the United Nations (UN) have all envisioned a federal solution for Cyprus, I first analyse what the prospects of success of such a solution have been. I conclude that it has been a problematic formula for the solution of the Cyprus disagreement, which is characterized by nationalist standpoints on both sides. However, there seems no alternative to a federal model in Cyprus as a confederal settlement is unacceptable to Greek Cypriots and a unitary state is unacceptable to Turkish Cypriots. Secondly, I outline the UN parameters for a solution on the island, which is a bi-zonal, bi-communal federalism. Thirdly, I review the literature pertaining to the political situation in Cyprus. This literature gives insight into the nature of the disagreement, sets out the causes of the Cyprus conflict, outlines various propositions for conflict resolution in Cyprus and discusses the legal and constitutional aspects of the Cyprus controversy and the role played by outside powers and institutions on the island.

1. The Cyprus Question and Federalism

As the involved parties and the UN are all seeking a federal settlement in Cyprus, it is useful here to explore what conditions are required for federalism to be successful, and to consider the extent to which these exist in this case. Success depends on three cardinal factors: communities and their leaders must be committed to the idea of federation; crosscutting cleavages must exist within the societies seeking federation; and there should be more than two units in the federation to minimize confrontation between the two dominant units (Khashman 1999: 5-6).

First, there should be a widespread conviction among all communities or states that federalism is a worthwhile objective, and a genuine desire to become a
federal entity. All parties must be willing to compromise and share power, and there must be mutual sympathy between the peoples of the states to be federated. There must be assurance that no one unit will seek to dominate the others. A willingness to embrace federalism is more likely where leaders are trusted by their communities and where there is no strong tendency to nationalism. In a federal system, minority groups will have a level of representation in government that is at least proportionate to (if not greater than) their numbers (Dodd 1999: 1-2).

However, the Cyprus conflict is a protracted and intense disagreement between ethno-national groups who see their interests and even their survival in zero-sum terms. Moreover, the groups see their interests as being mutually incompatible. Competing claims for sovereignty by distinct ethno-national groups can give rise to the most intractable political divisions. In such cases, negotiation, bargaining and compromise are difficult, since the claims of one side are usually unacceptable to the other. This animosity may then be intensified by the trauma of ethno-national violence (Bose 2007: 1-2). In Cyprus, the Greek and Turkish communities are divided by mistrust and fear. This suspicion is fuelled by the media, while the educational system and, in the Greek Cypriot case, the Church, further colour each group’s perceptions of the other (Khashman 1999: 6).

In the case of Cyprus, the consciousness of different national identities and dissimilarities between the two communities were sharpened by the presence of two distinct school systems. Such a context impeded the emergence of a common Cypriot identity. The Greek Cypriot educational system regards Greek territorial expansion and enosis (unification of Cyprus with Greece) as desirable policy objectives. The Church has a predominant position in the schools and decides which teachers would be brought over from Greece to teach in Greek Cypriot schools (Interview 5 September 29, 2011). In both Greek and Turkish Cypriot educational systems, the political the goals are defined ethnically. The history taught in the educational system contains competing allegations as regards sovereignty and statehood, which renders
history the main battleground for the legitimation of contradictory political claims (Papadakis et al. 2006: 4-6).

Although the two communities lived side by side between 1571 and 1963, they remained essentially separate; there was little intermarriage and only limited participation in a common social and cultural life. Although they coexisted peacefully enough, their sense of a common Cypriot identity was limited; this was eroded in the early 1900s and declined further between 1955 and 1960. It was crushed entirely in the violence of 1963-1974, when Turkish Cypriots were forced to live in tiny enclaves under a blockade imposed by Greek Cypriots. The blockade undermined any lingering belief that cohabitation was workable. The media, educational systems and Greek Cypriot Church have ever since served to divide the two societies. Since there is no precedent in Cypriot history for the idea of a single, national Cypriot identity, in which people are treated as individuals and not as distinct groups, any federal agreement is likely to collapse. This was the case with the 1960 Constitution, which lasted only until 1963 (Lindley 2007: 228-9 and 37).

The lack of cooperation between groups on the island means that they are unlikely to accept or commit to a federal constitution. When a partnership agreement was reached in 1960, the Greek Cypriot commitment to enosis and suspicion on the part of the Turkish Cypriots quickly brought the partnership to an end. It is doubtful that Greek Cypriots would commit themselves to federation and likely that Turkish Cypriots would feel threatened by any such Greek Cypriot offer. There is little tolerance of or appetite for compromise in either community or leadership (Khashman 1999: 6).

The second determinant of success in federal systems is the presence of crosscutting cleavages which might mitigate any confrontation between the dominant units. Crosscutting leverages are those unifying elements that cut across social groups. In Switzerland, for instance, Catholicism cuts across seven German, one French and one Italian canton and functions as a unifying element for them all. The presence and promotion of activities that generate organizations running counter to national divisions, such as labour unions,
business and educational institutions, mitigate the risk of bi-communal confrontation (Dodd 1999: 1-2).

The stability of federal systems is actually enhanced by the presence of a variety of ethnic/religious groups with competing interests. Rather than giving rise to violence and instability, these cleavages make the system function more effectively. However, where a federation is split along religious, national or linguistic lines, there is a greater risk that the country will be torn apart by violence. Where there is more than one cleavage, the potential risks are cancelled out and no single cleavage can become rooted in the system. The 1960 Republic of Cyprus was a dyadic, bi-communal, federal structure, where society was separated along religious, ethnic and linguistic lines. Since the two societies were divided on every issue, crosscutting cleavages did not exist. In the absence of other factors that might have served as integrative glue, it was harder for the federal structure to operate and the communities to cooperate. In such cases, the minority group’s dissatisfaction with aspects of day-to-day politics can be enough to destabilize the system (Khashman 1999: 3 and 6).

Thirdly, the more units there are in a federal entity, the greater are its chances of survival. When the federation encompasses only two federal units separated by ethnic or religious divisions, the risk of confrontation between the two communities is higher. In the case of Cyprus, federation is generally envisaged as bi-communal (there are only two communities) and bi-zonal (the island is divided by a border). However, as both communities are very nationalist in outlook and lack any sense of commitment to a common authority, the situation might soon turn into a zero-sum game. The population imbalance on the island further complicates matters. In federations, decisions are generally taken by a majority. In such cases, the minority group soon becomes dominated by the majority group (Khashman 1999: 6-7).

Cyprus is clearly divided along ethnic/religious lines. In the absence of any common identity, it is unlikely that a socialist or liberal party will emerge that attracts members from both communities. Greek Cypriots and Turkish Cypriots alike would vote collectively to protect the interests of their
respective ethnic/religious community. In this situation, the minority Turkish Cypriots could soon be dominated by the majority Greek Cypriots on every issue apart from those that call for separate approval from both communities. This might lead to the outbreak of tensions, as in the case of the 1960 Constitution, and the breakdown of the system.

In the three years following the foundation of the Republic of Cyprus in 1960, the Greek Cypriot majority strove to impose its dominance on the minority Turkish Cypriots, leading to inter-communal violence and the collapse of the system. The Annan Plan of 2004, which was rejected by Greek Cypriots, also envisaged a bi-zonal, bi-communal federation. As will be shown in the next chapter, the UN continues to propose a federation similar to the 1960 model. But as long as the parties remain unengaged with the process and committed to pursuing their own nationalist, zero-sum objectives, any federal resolution is likely to follow the same path as the 1960 system.

Having said this, the bi-zonal, bi-communal federation proposed by the UN seems – for all its deficiencies – to be the only alternative for Cyprus. The Greek Cypriot and Turkish Cypriot communities have different preferences in regard to settlement: while Greek Cypriots would prefer a unitary state in which Turkish Cypriots would be a minority, Turkish Cypriots would prefer a two-state solution. Neither side finds the other’s solution acceptable. Public surveys on both sides indicate that both Greek Cypriots and Turkish Cypriots see a bi-zonal, bi-communal federation as the only viable settlement for the island (Lordos et al. 2009: 12). The success of such a federation rests on the ability of both sides to abandon their nationalist discourse, espouse a post-nationalist viewpoint and respect the rights and concerns of the other community.

Turkey’s position on the Cyprus issue is crucial because external actors are very important in the Cyprus conflict. The creation of a shared identity, or the coexistence of separate identities are made more difficult by Greek-Turkish mainland rivalry. Full settlement and greater cooperation between Greece and Turkey are necessary if the Cyprus conflict is to be resolved (Elise and
Lisaniler 2009: 208). Turkey is the only country that Turkish Cypriots want to see as a guarantor power on the island. Ankara’s new Cyprus policy is an essential step towards a post-nationalist standpoint both in Turkey and Cyprus. Ankara has not just changed its traditional stance on the Cyprus question by moving away from confederalism towards federalism; it is now actively promoting a settlement based on the UN parameters.

2. The UN’s Parameters for Cyprus

After the collapse of the federal Republic of Cyprus in 1963, inter-communal talks for the re-unification of the island started in 1968 between Denktaş, the leader of the Turkish Cypriot community, and Clerides, the leader of the Greek Cypriot community, under the auspices of the United Nations. The talks continued on and off until the 1974 interventions of the Greek junta and Turkish military (Sözen 2010b). In April 1975, a Population Exchange Agreement was concluded between the two sides. Turkish Cypriots present in the south after the 1974 Turkish military intervention were transferred to the north and the Greeks in the north moved to the south. By this agreement, bizonality was confirmed and endorsed as a UN parameter (Özgürgün 2011).

On February 12, 1977, the parties compromised sufficiently to agree on four points, the first and fourth of which were significant from a constitutional perspective. First, the parties agreed that Cyprus should be an independent, non-aligned, bi-communal, federal republic. Second, they settled that the powers and functions of the central federal government should safeguard the unity of the country while still having regard to the bi-communal character of the state (Dodd 1999: 2). The parameters agreed upon by the parties, and confirmed by the UN, were that Cyprus should be a bi-zonal (with regard to its territory), bi-communal (with regard to its constitution) federation governed by the principle of political equality. Since the late 1970s, all talks between the parties have taken place under the auspices of the United Nations and have aimed to achieve a solution within these parameters.
The principle of bi-communality has constitutional significance; under this principle, the constitution must acknowledge that the power and the competencies of the state are shared by the two communities (Sözen 2010b). Bi-zonality, on the other hand, is the territorial aspect of the negotiations. It assumes the “clear majority of land ownership and population” by Greek Cypriots in the south and Turkish Cypriots in the north. It is envisioned that only a small percentage of Greek Cypriots would settle in the north and vice versa in order not to threaten the dominance of the Greek Cypriots in the south and Turkish Cypriots in the north (Interview 6 August 24, 2011).

Although the parties agreed on the bi-communal, bi-zonal and federal character of the republic in the 1977 High Level Agreements, their definitions of federalism varied considerably. Whereas Greek Cypriots had in mind a federal structure akin to a unitary state, with a powerful central government, Turkish Cypriots argued for a confederal or two-state structure with a weak central government and strong constituent states. Both approaches were a long way from the bi-zonal, bi-communal, federal settlement promoted by the UN. Neither party changed its maximalist stance until the early 2000s.

A comprehensive settlement plan that took into consideration the conflicting demands and concerns of the parties was not tabled by the UN until 2004. The Annan Plan was first introduced by the UN in 2002. It was revised several times and put to simultaneous referenda on both sides of the island in April 2004. But while 65% of Turkish voters accepted the plan, 75% of Greek Cypriots rejected it. While the Turkish side had changed its position towards the acceptance of a federal settlement based on the UN parameters, the Greek Cypriot side continued to press for a unitary state, in which Turkish Cypriots would only be granted minority status. “United Cyprus Republic” as pictured by the Greek Cypriots was a government owned by the Greek Cypriots and thus it was Cyprus represented by the Greek Cypriots that would accede to the EU on May 01, 2004. The Turkish Cypriots would only be incorporated to the already existing Greek Cypriot state as citizens having equal rights (Interview 7 September 27, 2011). The Annan Plan, on the other hand, envisaged a compromise agreement that involved concessions on both sides. The Turkish
Cypriot approval and the Greek Cypriot rejection of the plan indicated that while Turkish Cypriots had renounced their maximalist ideal of setting up their own state on the island, the Greek Cypriot side was not keen to share power under a bi-zonal and bi-communal federation.

Ankara’s acceptance of the Annan Plan was a crucial move towards the resolution of the conflict in Cyprus. Having previously espoused the maximalist position and sought confederation, Ankara changed its position in 2002 and accepted the UN parameters. It has made sincere efforts to find a solution based on these parameters, playing a major part in the emergence of the Annan Plan and changing the dynamics of the Cyprus conflict. By this policy change, Ankara and Turkish Cypriots demonstrated that they were committed to finding a resolution, even if the settlement plan was entirely laid out by the UN (Interview 3 September 8, 2011).

3. Literature Review on Cyprus

The literature on Cyprus covers four main areas: the causes of the Cyprus conflict, conflict resolution in Cyprus, legal and constitutional aspects of the Cyprus question and the role of outside powers and institutions. Although all these research fields are broadly related to the subject of this thesis – the post-2002 change in Turkish foreign policy – none of them directly tackles this issue. The following sections review the literature within these four areas, highlighting their relevance to the subject of this research.

3.1. Causes of the Cyprus Conflict

The causes of the conflict are one of the most widely studied fields in research on Cyprus. The ethno-national tension (Bryant 2004; Papadakis et al. 2006; Bose 2007; Loizides 2007; Anastasiou 2008) and both sides’ refusal to compromise (Yeşilada and Sözen 2002; Pericleous 2009) stand out as the most significant reasons for the Cyprus conflict.
Intense and protracted ethno-national tensions give rise to the most intractable political dissensions; ethno-national groups tend to view their interests and even their survival in zero-sum terms and as incompatible with the interests of other groups. This is exacerbated when one ethno-national group lays claim to sovereignty. In such cases, negotiation and compromise are difficult because the claims of one side are unacceptable to the other. The situation may be intensified where there has been ethno-national violence (Bose 2007: 1-2).

The conflicting nationalist narratives in Cyprus emerged in the late 19th century as it changed from a religion-centred society under Ottoman rule into a society that saw itself in terms of ethnic groups. The arrival of modern, nationalist sensibilities helped fracture Cyprus. Both communities appropriated the ideas and materials of modernity to reinvent themselves and their concept of citizenship. Muslims and Christians were transformed into Turks and Greeks with distinct national identities, based on conflicting nationalist narratives (Bryant 2004: 15-6).

The British colonial period (1878-1960) witnessed the rise of Greek and Turkish nationalism in Cyprus. This was not the usual story of European colonizers encountering a people without history; while Greek Cypriots, who sought enosis, viewed themselves as the creators of Western civilization, Turkish Cypriots, who wanted taksim, saw themselves as the heirs of the glorious Ottoman Empire. These mutually antagonistic identities came into conflict during the decolonization process and the founding of the republic in 1960, leading to ethno-national violence. The problem with Cyprus was not the absence of history, but the overwhelming presence and influence of history, which was used by both sides to support their competing claims to sovereignty and statehood (Papadakis et al. 2006: 1-6 and 6-8).

The Greek and Turkish Cypriot nationalist ideologies have undermined relations between the two communities. This dual nationalism has been engineered by leaders on both sides and fostered by the nationalist nature of the political culture (Anastasiou 2008: 8-9); ethnic differences are entrenched in the political parties, intellectuals and the press on both sides. Both ethnic
communities maintain political and cultural bonds with their respective motherlands, to which they feel a strong sense of nationalism and loyalty; they identify themselves as Greek Cypriot or Turkish Cypriot, rather than simply Cypriot (Loizides 2007: 172-3).

Scholars have pointed to the lack of cooperation between the two sides, showing how each has sought to achieve a unilateral victory at the expense of the other. The failure of the Annan Plan is ascribed to the emotionally charged Greek Cypriot mentality, which was anachronistic to European post-nationalism and a direct consequence of the Grand Idea of Greek irredentism. By rejecting the plan, the Greek Cypriots demonstrated that they were incapable of adapting to the post-war transformation of Europe and the new European dream. The Greek Cypriot approach was based on an irredentist perception of the nation state values, which turned into a mainstream ideology that allowed no room for reconciliation with the island’s other community. Unable to internalize the European paradigm, Greek Cypriots failed to make a politically sound evaluation of this ideology and its likely consequences. Had they relinquished their irredentist ambitions, it might have been possible to overcome the ethnic divisions of the past and reunite Cyprus. The island could have been an example of the European paradigm of unity in diversity, rather than a centre of friction (Pericleous 2009: 86). As it is, EU membership presents a major challenge in terms of the resolution of the Cyprus question. The entry of Greek Cypriots into the EU, without a settlement on the island, has only served to reinforce the Greek Cypriot strategy of non-cooperation (Yeşilada and Sözen 2002: 277-9).

I would argue that the fundamental cause of the Cyprus discord is the adherence of both sides to ethno-national concepts of national identity. However, while the Turkish Cypriots’ approval of unification in April 2004 seems to indicate a readiness to withdraw from this nationalist position, the Greek Cypriot leadership refuses to abandon its aspiration to unite the island under a unitary state. Turkish Cypriots have not just accepted the idea that the island should be unified under the UN parameters; in 2003, they brought to the presidency a solution-oriented leader to replace the nationalist President
Denktaş, who had served for decades. The abatement of the nationalist mentality among Turkish Cypriots and the emergence of solution-oriented parties are both supported by the Turkish government and have facilitated the change in Turkish foreign policy.

Examination of the causes of the Cyprus discord may shed light on how a settlement might be achieved. This issue is analysed in the next section. The current stalemate in Cyprus can only be overcome if Cypriots can move past the old concept of ethnic nationalism and internalize the culture of mutual coexistence seen in other European societies.

3.2. Conflict Resolution in Cyprus

A number of scholars have focused on what type of settlement is best for Cyprus, with possible solutions ranging from federation to a two-state arrangement. While some scholars see bi-zonal, bi-communal federation as the only viable settlement (Lijphart 2004; Sözen and Özersay 2007; Lordos et al. 2009; Trimikliniotis 2009), others argue that federation is not a good formula for Cyprus (Arsava 1996; Bartmann 1999; Khashman 1999; Fouskas and Tackie 2009). Instead, they proffer alternatives ranging from a Hellenic Greek Cypriot state (Fouskas and Tackie 2009) to a confederation or a two-state formula (Arsava 1996; Bartmann 1999; Dodd 2005; Bose 2007).

Supporters of federation contend that the federal formula is viable in a deeply divided society if power is shared efficiently and group autonomy is protected. Power-sharing means that representatives from all key groups participate in the political decision-making, particularly at the executive level. Group autonomy ensures that these groups have the authority to run their own domestic affairs, notably in the areas of education and culture (Lijphart 2004: 97-9).

It is claimed that the majority of Cypriots are dissatisfied with the status quo and want a solution; research suggests that 81% of Greek and 74% of Turkish
Cypriots accept that a bi-zonal, bi-communal federation is the only viable settlement (Lordos et al. 2009: 11-2). It has been argued that the Annan Plan was for the most part a viable, functional and fair solution for both Cypriot communities. De facto or de jure partition or a majoritarian, unitary, non-geographical consociation is not viable, and would be both costly and dangerous. For these reasons, it is argued, it makes more sense to use the Annan Plan as the foundation for the future negotiations on unification rather than to start from scratch (Trimikliniotis 2009: 107).

Supporters of the Annan Plan argue that its vision of a loose bi-zonal, bi-communal federation composed of two constituent states is the logical outcome of the principles and agreements that have been reached by the two parties and approved by the international community over the past four decades. Although such a settlement does not meet all the demands of either party and forces them to make compromises, it secures the fundamental needs of the two sides. (Sözen and Özersay 2007: 131 and 38-9).

Others question the feasibility and applicability of federalism for profoundly divided societies (Khashman 1999; Bose 2007; Emilianides 2009), arguing that federalism is not just a constitutional condition, but a social-psychological attitude on the part of the decision-makers. Maintenance of a federation hinges on the commitment and goodwill of the decision-makers and acceptance on the part of the common people, both of which are absent in Cyprus (Khashman 1999: 2-3 and 6-7). The constitutional structure of the federation suggested in the Annan Plan is also criticized. It is contended that the plan was built on division and discrimination rather than democracy and the protection of fundamental rights, and that the emerging state would be unviable since it would lack constitutional guarantees to function properly with regard to the executive, the legislative and the judiciary (Emilianides 2009: 95). Accordingly, some authors propose splitting the hostile peoples into sovereign or at least autonomous territorial components. However, it is also argued that stability and coexistence in the most tumultuous parts of the world can only be sustained in the long run by soft frontiers and cross-border cooperation (Bose 2007: 2-4).
Some scholars criticize the imperial, post-colonial arrangements that governed Cyprus from 1958-60 and offer a post-imperial constitutional model for the island (Fouskas and Tackie 2009). They argue that the constitution imposed on Cyprus by Britain was essentially dysfunctional, and that it enabled British and imperial powers to intervene in Turkish Cypriot-Greek Cypriot disagreements and protect their interests – effectively maintaining their imperial rule. These authors suggest that Cyprus can address the problem by opting out of the security constraints imposed by NATO and the Anglo-Saxon powers in the eastern Mediterranean, and by constructing a post-imperial solution based on island-wide economic cooperation and societal integration, rather than ethnic-political separatism. This solution should be engineered by Cypriots themselves (Fouskas and Tackie 2009: 1-7).

Other authors propose a confederal or two-state settlement in the island (Arsava 1996; Bartmann 1999; Dodd 2005). They argue that Cyprus should be split into two politically equal, sovereign states, each with the right of self-determination. Any solution should be constructed on this reality. (Arsava 1996: 49-51) Given the failure of the Republic of Cyprus, it is argued, any abiding resolution must be based on political and constitutional equality between the two communities (Bartmann 1999: 6-7). Critics of the federal model envisioned in the Annan Plan argue that in this type of state, the smaller community is the minority within a majority voting system. In the absence of any other interest group, there would be nothing to counteract the Greek Cypriot majority’s domination of the legislature or the executive – violating the UN principle of political equality between the parties (Dodd 2005: 50-1).

3.3. Legal and Constitutional Aspects of the Cyprus Question

While a number of scholars have chosen to concentrate on the legal status of the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus (Arsava 1996; Bartmann 1999; Hoffmeister 2006; Geldenhuys 2009), others have examined the legal and constitutional features of the Republic of Cyprus, ranging from the 1959-60
agreements to the Annan Plan (Sözen 2004; Hoffmeister 2006; Sözen and Özersay 2007).

While some contest the statehood of the TRNC (Arsava 1996; Bartmann 1999; Hoffmeister 2006; Geldenhuys 2009), others focus on its legality (Hoffmeister 2006), and others on its independence (Arsava 1996; Bartmann 1999; Dodd 2005). Those contesting its statehood argue that it fails to meet Western standards of governance and violates prevailing international norms. States of this kind may function for several years, but such unilateral bids for recognition are seldom successful in the long term. They may even have destabilizing effects across the region. Even where a prospective state’s claim to statehood is recognized in principle, translating this conceded right into political reality may be problematic if there is significant opposition from other countries. There may even be attempts to keep such states outside the international mainstream. Trapped in limbo by their ambiguous status, unrecognized states face an uncertain political future. (Geldenhuys 2009: 1-4).

It has been argued that when Cyprus was decolonized in the 1960s, the UN charter extended the right of self-determination to the population as a whole, not to Greek and Turkish Cypriots separately. Nor are Greek Cypriots entitled to self-determination on the basis of their numerical majority as claimed by the Greek Cypriots. (Interview 5 September 29, 2011) Since neither side has the right to separate self-determination, decisions can only be made with the approval of the majority within each ethnic group. Thus, the Greek Cypriot petition to the UN for enosis in 1960 was illegal since it was not backed by the majority of Turkish Cypriots. It is also contended that the TRNC was not a founder - lacking a legitimate political status - in the establishment of the United Republic of Cyprus (URC), which was not abolished in the Annan Plan. For this reason, the island’s future lies with the URC, as an independent and sovereign state with a single international legal personality (Hoffmeister 2006: 7-9 and 193).

Those who see the TRNC as an independent state (Arsava 1996; Bartmann 1999) assert that it has everything a state should have: a society, country,
sovereignty and all the required institutions. As per international law, recognition is not necessary to the formation of a state. These authors argue that Cyprus is in effect already split into two separate sovereign states; the Greek Cypriot and Turkish Cypriot communities are politically equal and enjoy separate rights of self-determination (Arsava 1996: 49-51). The failure of the Republic of Cyprus is ascribed to the growing inter-communal violence and the gradual expulsion of Turkish Cypriots from government, particularly between 1963 and 1974. Some authors even argue that Greek Cypriots lost their right to a republic when they recast Turkish Cypriots as an ethnic minority in the new state rather than their partners in nation-building. According to these authors, any abiding resolution in Cyprus must be based on political and constitutional equality between the two communities (Bartmann 1999: 6-7).

Another group of authors have examined the legal and constitutional features of the power-sharing mechanisms in Cyprus, from the 1960 Constitution to the Annan Plan (Sözen 2004; Hoffmeister 2006; Sözen and Özersay 2007). They distinguish between the 1959 Zurich and London agreements, which were based on a non-territorial federative structure, and the Annan Plan, which visualized a territorial federative/confederative structure composed of two constituent states with a single international legal personality and sovereignty. The Annan Plan granted each community a high level of autonomy (even semi-sovereignty) within its respective boundaries. (Sözen 2004: 74-5). These authors argue that the central legal question of the Cyprus discord is whether a new Republic of Cyprus should be a continuation of the existing state or whether it should become the successor of two predecessor states, the TRNC and the Greek Cypriot state, as envisioned in the Annan Plan (Sözen and Özersay 2007: 138-9). They point out that the original legal documents (1959-60) establishing the Republic of Cyprus also envisioned a federation and did not grant either community the right of self-determination.(Hoffmeister 2006: 7-9 and 193).
3.4. The Role of Outside Powers and Institutions in Cyprus

A number of scholars have explored the role played by international organizations in attempts to resolve the Cyprus disagreement. It is maintained that Cyprus conflict can be analyzed within the context of three intertwined circles. In the first circle, there are the Greek and Turkish Cypriots. In the second one, there are two homelands, Greece and Turkey. In the outer circle, there are significant external actors, which cannot be overlooked in the case of strategically located Cyprus (Interview 8 July 29, 2011). Thus, its resolution lies not only in a reconciliation of interests of the Greek and Turkish Cypriots, but also in a strategic reformulation of the foreign policy objectives and priorities of the actors involved (Müftüler Bağ 1999: 560). Authors focus on the roles played by the UN (Richmond and Ker-Lindsay 2001; E. Aksu 2003; Palley 2005; Yakinthou 2009), the EU (Diez 2002; Christou 2004; Tocci 2004; Hannay 2005; Sepos 2008; Anastasiou 2008; Michalis 2009) and other actors (Yeşilada and Sözen 2002; Pericleous 2009; Morgan 2010). Greater third party involvement is seen as essential (Yeşilada and Sözen 2002; Hannay 2005; Bose 2007; Anastasiou 2008; Michalis 2009) to overcoming the bitterness and mistrust between the parties and any interference from those with a vested interest in ensuring hostilities continue (Bose 2007: 2-4).

Some have focused on the role of the UN in the Cyprus discord (Richmond and Ker-Lindsay 2001; E. Aksu 2003; Palley 2005; Yakinthou 2009). The UN Secretary General’s offer to conduct a so-called “good offices” mission was accepted by both communities on the island and endorsed by the Security Council. This involved him facilitating discussions between the disputant parties, although neither group would countenance until 2002 anything more than this since they believe that no outsider can judge their best interests. It has been argued that in the run up to the elaboration of the Annan Plan, the UN Secretariat exceeded the proper limits of its mission (particularly in late 2002, early 2003 and March 2004) by attempting to arbitrate between the parties, rather than impartially aiding them to attain a resolution of their own (Palley 2005: 5-6 and 10-2). Thus, UN intervention in Cyprus can only extend
so far as the parties’ consent and its own principle of neutrality allow (E. Aksu 2003: 148-50).

Other scholars impute the failure of previous settlement attempts to the inadequacy of UN diplomacy, which, they argue, has not addressed the island’s deep-seated political and ethnic divisions. The Secretary General’s good offices mission was ill-equipped to unravel intractable local and regional animosities, constrained as it was by both inside and outside interests and the inevitable politicization of the talks. Indeed, it has been suggested that the UN should eschew addressing political issues such as matters of sovereignty and territory, which it finds difficult to deal with (Richmond and Ker-Lindsay 2001: xviii-xix). Critics of the UN cite its mistaken and unfair treatment of Cyprus, particularly United Nations Security Council Resolution 541 (1983), which after the declaration of the TRNC urged member states not to recognize and offer aid to the new state and which recognized Greek Cypriots as the only representative of the Republic of Cyprus and denied Turkish Cypriots any formal status in their own state. This is seen by some as a pivotal moment; the isolation of the Turkish Cypriots by the UN deprived them of any legitimate power to offset the Greek Cypriot position at the international level and removed any incentive for Greek Cypriots to come to terms with the other side (Yakinthou 2009: 172). In this sense, there are very few incentives for the Greek Cypriots to bargain over the reunification of the island with the northern part, which it claims as its own, but occupied and controlled by Turkey (Rotberg 2009: 246).

Since Cyprus joined the EU, a number of authors have focused on the effect this organization has had on the dynamics of the Cyprus question (Diez 2002; Christou 2004; Tocci 2004; Hannay 2005; Sepos 2008; Anastasiou 2008; Michalis 2009). It has been suggested that the Cyprus dispute will only be settled when the island transforms itself into a post-modern society and adopts a political arrangement that transcends its historical insecurities. Cypriots have to move on from their past and create their own history. In this sense, the EU is regarded as a post-nationalist society for the creation of a similar model in Cyprus. (Michális 2009: 3-4 and 206). Diez, for example, in 2002 suggested
that EU could bring about a solution in Cyprus by the prospect of EU membership and concomitant ideational transformation towards a post-nationalist society or “postmodernisation” of identities, which is the only way for a just and peaceful settlement in Cyprus (Diez 2002: 12-3).

It is claimed that the EU could help bring about an enduring solution in Cyprus by fostering the post-modernization of its identities and politics (Diez 2002). Not just Cyprus, but also Greece and Turkey might be transformed by Europeanization and globalization. There are those who contend that the entry of Cyprus into the EU guarantees the emergence of a multi-ethnic, democratic structure and political process on the island. Within the EU framework, they argue, the Cyprus issue might be revisited outside the confines of nationalist discourse (Anastasiou 2008: 208).

Within such a scenario, any settlement in Cyprus would depend on what incentives and conditions the EU offered to the two communities on the island and to Turkey. The EU’s inconsistent and ambivalent attitude towards Turkey’s membership had eroded its credibility in that country, but the unification of Cyprus reawakened the desire in Turkey to join the EU and catalyse the transformation of the Turkish state and society. Unification would also enhance the EU’s credibility as a “soft security” provider at the global scale, since it might be seen as evidence of an influence that extends beyond the union’s borders (Christou 2004: 183-4 and 86-7). It has also been suggested that the EU can play a constructive role in the resolution of the conflict by accepting Turkey’s membership and promoting the entry of Turkish Cypriots into the union (Hannay 2005: 50-1 and 236-8).

In the event, the EU was unable to sway Greek Cypriots from their nationalist position and Cyprus subsequently played a strategic role in blocking Turkey’s accession, initially through Greece and subsequently as a member in its own right by using its veto power (Sepos 2008: 149-51). The EU’s failure in Cyprus has been ascribed by some authors to its inability to grasp the complicated make-up of the parties concerned; having fundamentally different objectives, what are incentives for some players become disincentives for
The EU accession framework was unable to offer significant incentives for a settlement that addressed the basic interests of both principal parties. Any such settlement would have to be based on inclusive, multi-system governance with shared sovereignty, permeable borders, secured freedoms and protected cultural and historical properties (Tocci 2004: 2-3).

Tocci also claimed that the manner and timing with which EU membership was promised to the Republic of Cyprus limited any chance the EU might have had of solving the discord, and in fact, had unforeseen negative consequences (Tocci 2007: 39-40). By granting Greek Cypriots EU membership in the absence of a settlement and treating them as the sole representatives of Cyprus, the EU swung the power balance in the Greek Cypriots’ favour and harmed any chances of a settlement. The EU lost its leverage with Greek Cypriots in the run up to the Annan Plan. While it created incentives for solution on one side, it disincentivized the other (Yakinthou 2009: 172).

In addition to the UN and the EU, some scholars have focused on the role played by other actors in the Cyprus conflict (Yeşilada and Sözen 2002; Pericleous 2009; Morgan 2010). The main players were the US along with the EU, Greece and Turkey. Some authors saw the process as being related to the US’s overhaul of its foreign policy; responding to developments in the Middle East, it attempted to protect Eurasian energy resources and counteract the unfavourable effects of Islamic fundamentalism. Turkey was at the centre of such planning. These authors argue that as the Kemalist establishment declined, the power balance shifted in Turkey, threatening domestic and even regional instability and posing a potential risk to Western interests in the region. Against this background, the settlement of the dispute and the normalization of relations between Greece, Turkey and Cyprus within the European paradigm would have taken on a global significance (Pericleous 2009: 21-2). Some scholars even propose that there should be greater US involvement to overcome the stalemate, arguing that an effective third party would have been crucial for coordinating the initiatives of the UN and the EU. The US, which has substantial influence over Greece and Turkey, and
therefore on both Cypriot parties, is best placed to fill the role of mediator (Yeşilada and Sözen 2002: 277-9).

Those who have examined British history on the island argue that British colonial governance has been partly to blame for the failure to find a solution in Cyprus. The British are criticized for their failure to engage with the Cypriots, their lack of understanding of Cypriot identity and the low quality of most of the British colonial governors. The exclusion of Cypriots from democratic political participation from 1931 onwards meant that, post-independence, there was no tradition of bi-communal consensus politics on the island. The British policy robbed subsequent Cypriot generations of the political leadership and experience they needed to make the 1960 Constitution function. Nor has there ever been just one Cypriot culture. This ambiguity as regards the Cypriot identity has trickled down to Cypriots themselves; some arguing, for example that few islanders refer to themselves as Cypriots without the Greek or Turkish prefix (Morgan 2010: 256-7). Morgan went on to suggest that the elusive concept of “Cypriotness” had to be more deeply rooted if an integrated Cypriot community was to be generated. This insecurity leads Cypriots themselves to believe that the Cyprus disagreement will ultimately be settled through outside intervention (Morgan 2010: 256-7).

Turkey played a crucial role in working up the Annan Plan into an agreement, alongside the US, EU and UN following the change of leadership in Ankara. Many have argued, however, that a solution in the island required greater international involvement (Yeşilada and Sözen 2002; Hannay 2005; Bose 2007; Anastasiou 2008; Michalis 2009). Insofar as the Cypriot parties could not reach a solution alone, the Turkish government repeatedly asked for greater UN engagement after 2002 and gave the UN the authority to arbitrate (going beyond the power of good offices). Indeed, it was Ankara’s initiative that rendered the emergence of the Annan Plan possible.
CHAPTER II: TURKISH FOREIGN POLICY IN GENERAL AND TOWARDS CYPRUS IN PARTICULAR

This chapter considers four main themes that are related to my research topic: the determinants of Turkish foreign policy from the 1990s onwards; literature related to Turkish foreign policy in general; Turkish foreign policy towards Cyprus from the 1950s onwards; and the reasons for Turkey’s policy change on Cyprus. In the second part of this chapter, after briefly examining the Turkish foreign policy at the period of interest (1990s and post-2001), I continued with the Turkish foreign policy towards Cyprus during the same period. In the case of 1950s, between 1960 and 1980, and 1980s, I merged Turkish foreign policy and Turkey’s Cyprus policy as during this period Turkish foreign policy was in large measure dominated by the Cyprus conflict.

1. Determinants of Turkish Foreign Policy

1.1. Determinants of Turkish Foreign Policy in General

The literature identifies four key factors that have shaped Turkish foreign policy. The most important of these are its Western orientation (Oran 1996 and 2010; Soysal 2004; Oran 2010) and anti-revisionism (Deringil 1989; Oran 1996 and 2010; Hale 2000; Onar 2009). Also highlighted are the impact of Atatürk (Cooper 2002; Stone 2004) and Turkey’s Ottoman legacy (Robins 2003; Ahmad 2004; Fuller 2004; İlgırt and Özkeçeci-Taner 2012).

Turkey’s Westernism is seen in its commitment to capitalism, secularism and democracy, while its anti-revisionism is expressed in its adherence to the status quo in international politics and to current international borders (Oran 1996: 353-4). Despite the problematic relations between Turkey and the EU, Turkey’s desire to join the EU is unlikely to change. Turkey’s collective defence engagements, foreign trade connections and long-standing cultural and social bonds with the West render a change in orientation unlikely (Soysal 2004: 44).
The country’s anti-revisionism was illustrated at the formation of the Republic in 1923 when it abandoned the expansionism, irredentism and universalism associated with Ottomanism, while also refusing to embrace pan-Islamism or pan-Turkism (Fisher Onar 2009: 232). It has been suggested that anti-revisionism took root in Turkish foreign policy following the country’s defeat in World War I (Hale 2000: 57-8) and was prompted by Atatürk’s dictum “peace at home, peace in the world”. The primary objective of Turkish leaders being the survival and continuity of Turkey as a sovereign independent state, they were careful to eschew any form of adventurism in their foreign policy (Deringil 1989: 3).

Atatürk, the founder of modern Turkey, remains a significant influence on Turkey’s foreign policy. Adherence to Atatürk’s legacy is evident in both domestic and external political spheres (Cooper 2002: 122). His principles of non-expansionism, non-imperialism, non-adventurism, non-chauvinism, non-revanchism and legality remain the basic norms shaping Turkish foreign policy (Stone 2004: 2-3).

A number of authors have underlined the role of history – specifically Turkey’s Ottoman heritage – as a determinant in Turkey’s foreign policy. The abortive Sevres Treaty of August 1920 continues to influence Turkish policy-making. The Treaty of Sevres, which was signed by the Ottoman Sultan, left the majority Turkish-Muslim population of Anatolia with a rump state in the centre of Anatolia. Although the treaty was never enacted, the fear it engendered continued to shape Turkish foreign policy, particularly after the end of the Cold War (Ahmad 2004: 9).

The death, destruction and impoverishment brought by the defeat in the First World War were followed by the occupation of the imperial capital and the division and subjugation of the empire. Only the leadership of Atatürk saved Turkey from extinction. The legacy of this period is still evident in the continuing reverence for Atatürk and a national conviction that Turkey must be self-reliant. Many Turks believe that Sevres betrayed Western Europe’s
real intentions towards Turkey (Robins 2003: 104-5). Indeed, the Kemalist elite believed that no other state can be trusted and that Turkey has to be ready to fight for its territorial integrity at any given time. Kemalist circles still largely view the world from this perspective of endangerment (Ilgit and Özkeçeci-Taner 2012: 15).

I agree with the authors who argue that Western-orientation and anti-revisionism remain the paramount principles of Turkish foreign policy. Atatürk’s principles of non-expansionism, non-irredentism, Westernism and non-imperialism have had an undeniable impact on Turkish foreign policy, having been followed by Turkish rulers up until the 1990s. Indeed, this thesis shows that these principles have played a role in Turkish foreign policy towards Cyprus. However, as the following sections show, the Ottoman legacy, particularly Ottoman suffering under Western capitalism and the Sèvres fear of dismemberment have also had a lasting impact on the foreign policy behaviour of the Turkish elite (Ahmad 2004: 9). This was particularly evident in the EU-sceptic coalition government’s (1999-2002) inability to devise a new pragmatic policy on Cyprus by sticking to a confederal solution on Cyprus due to their fear of loss of territory.

1.2. Determinants of Turkish Foreign Policy between 1990-2001

It is underlined in the literature that the end of the Cold War had wide-ranging repercussions on world politics. After the collapse of the Soviet Union, a new “world disorder” arose as countries from the Balkans to Central Asia and the Middle East descended into ethnic nationalism, religious fundamentalism and terrorism. Turkey, sitting at the centre of these unstable regions, faced numerous challenges. The period in the aftermath of Cold-War until the 9/11 incident has been a re-adjustment process for Turkey’s foreign policy and a search for a new international role in a changing world. (Gözen 2004: 27-32).

With the fall of the Soviet Union, Turkey’s regional weight was initially bolstered. To the north, the Soviet Union disappeared, to be replaced by the
weaker countries of the Caucasus. Soviet satellites in the Balkans broke free, and Greece became mired in problems with Albania and Macedonia. In the Middle East, Iran struggled to regain stability after its destructive war with Iraq, in 1990-1 Gulf War and Syria remained without a protector. Turkey was able to relax, though as it turned out, not for long (Oran 2010: 359-60). Old ethnic and nationalist conflicts, long frozen by the Cold War, soon resurfaced. Multi-ethnic countries like Yugoslavia began to crumble and Turkey found itself surrounded by growing instability in the Balkans, the Caucasus and the Middle East (Buzan 2001: 3).

In the 1990s, Turkey entered its post-Atatürk period. Up until this point, Turkey’s traditional isolationist-oriented policy and its cardinal principle of restricted international engagement had remained intact, but against the background of growing regional tension, they were no longer adequate. Turkish foreign policy traditionally favoured adherence to the status quo, but the regional status quo was changing, and the country was forced to expand and diversify its foreign policy to address the new instabilities. (Buzan 2001: 3). It adopted a pragmatic approach based on multilateral cooperation and alliances with Europe and the United States. Continuing its tradition of circumspection, it retained its policy of non-expansion and made no attempt to establish a monopolistic zone of influence (Kut 2001: 9-11).

While anti-revisionism and Westernism remained the cardinal principles of Turkish foreign policy in the 1990s, growing international instability forced Ankara to become more assertive about protecting Turkish interests. However, this new activism was not reflected in its Cyprus policy; Ankara continued to stick to its traditional policy, which aimed for a confederal structure on the island. This was because the coalition governments that ruled Turkey in the 1990s stuck to the old security oriented standpoint in foreign policy and Cyprus was seen as a national cause on which no concessions could be made.
1.3. Determinants of Turkish Foreign Policy from the Early 2000s to Date

The literature focuses on a number of key areas: a first group of scholars have underlined the effect of democratization, liberalization and globalization on Turkish foreign policy (Tocci 2005; Aras 2009; G. Özcan 2010; Kösebalaban 2011; B. Park 2012); a second group have focused on the foreign policy vision of the new leadership in Turkey (Rabasa and Larrabee 2008; Davutoğlu 2010; M. Özcan and Usul 2010, Sözen 2010a) and a third group have discussed the impact of Europeanization in Turkey since 1999 (Terzi 2005; Kaliber 2005; Kirişçi 2006; Aras 2009). The democratization and Europeanization processes in the Turkish context go hand in hand.

Authors considering the impact of democratization, liberalization and globalization (Tocci 2005; Aras 2009; G. Özcan 2010; Kösebalaban 2011; B. Park 2012) argue that foreign policy under the AKP is built on the principle of liberalism and use of economic relations to achieve its objectives. The populist and progressive forces which support the AKP seek to expand their economic power and to undermine the monolithic power structure. By empowering the non-establishment societal components, globalization and the associated process of liberalization have considerably weakened the centre’s power base in Turkey and undermined the privileged status of the Westernist elite (Kösebalaban 2011: 3-4). It has been argued that Turkey has made considerable strides towards modernity with its growing civil society, the formation of a diaspora of Turks living abroad, expanding media and communications, ongoing democratization and greater integration into the global economy (B. Park 2012: 5-6).

These scholars maintain that Turkey’s democratization and modernization are motivated predominantly by endogenous factors: the Turkish themselves have increasingly come to question the validity of Kemalism in the 21st century. The changes in Turkish society may have coincided with the beginning of its accession into the EU, but many Turkish actors are arguing that the country should accept the Copenhagen criteria for its own sake, not just to meet the
demands of the EU. This internal change is evidence of the ongoing evolution of the Turkish nation-state (Tocci 2005: 82).

These researchers contend that Turkey’s democratization has enhanced its strategic merit in the eyes of the Western world, especially since the 9/11 attacks, which were seen as originating from the radical regimes of the Middle East. Not only is Turkey strategically located, it is also seen as a model for the Middle East and Central Asian Turkic republics (Sönmezoğlu 2004: 88-9). Since the September 11 attacks against the US, the democratic-liberal transformation and globalization of the Middle Eastern countries has become a priority for the US. The failure of the globalization process in nearly all of these countries has made Turkey even more important in the eyes of the West as a shining example of a Muslim state with a Western orientation, able to combine a functioning democracy and modernization programme with a traditional Muslim population (Oğuzlu 2007: 89-90).

A second group of scholars have discussed the role played by Turkey’s new leadership in the development of its foreign policy (Rabasa and Larrabee 2008; M. Özcan and Usul 2010; Davutoğlu 2010). These authors contend that while the AKP government has been keen to maintain Turkey’s Western orientation as one of the main pillars of Turkish foreign policy, it at the same time has aimed to deepen and broaden Ankara’s bonds with the Middle East, Central Asia, the Caucasus and the Balkans. This is in accordance with the AKP’s doctrine of “strategic depth”, or the belief that Turkey’s strategic position and its control of the Bosphorus enable it to play a significant international role (Davutoğlu 2001). The strategic depth concept is informed by Turkey’s Ottoman past and its historical and cultural ties to the Balkans, the Middle East and Central Asia. Turkey’s strategic depth enables it to play a regional power role and to establish multiple alliances, which serve to counterbalance Ankara’s ties with the West and give it greater freedom of action (Rabasa and Larrabee 2008: 75-6).

Davutoğlu is generally credited as the inventor of strategic depth and the architect of AKP’s new foreign policy (and thus the most influential foreign
He identified six guiding principles underlying the new Turkish foreign policy. The first is the need to balance security and freedom; freedoms should not be sacrificed for security, but nor should they be allowed to lead to chaos. The second is the need to avoid problems with neighbouring countries; this is achieved by cultivating good relations with them, minimizing security risks and maximizing joint interests. The third principle is to pursue proactive engagement and preventive diplomacy. The belief is that high-level political dialogue, economic interdependence, a common approach to security and mutual tolerance will help secure regional stability. The fourth principle is to establish balanced and systematic relations with all global powers, while the fifth is to play an active international role. Finally, Turkey’s foreign policy is guided by a desire to change the country’s image on the international stage. Seen as a hard power throughout the Cold War, it now wishes to be viewed as a rising economic power, culturally inclusive and a source of military security (Davutoğlu 2010).

The third group of scholars have underlined the impact of Europeanization since 1999 (Terzi 2005; Kaliber 2005; Kirişçi 2006; Aras 2009). They contend that considerable legal, political and economic reforms have been undertaken by Turkey in accordance with the Copenhagen criteria. As the country has transformed internally, political attitudes have changed, as have its perceptions of who it sees as friends and enemies. Internal transformation, and changing attitudes to other countries in the region, have begun to reshape the foreign policy preferences of policy-makers. Both they and the public have begun to see their environment through new eyes and to remember past relationships and cultural and civilizational affinities. They are now keen to explore opportunities for engagement in these regions. The foreign policy elite is focused on making Turkey an effective player from Africa to the Far East (Aras 2009: 30-5).

These academics maintain that Turkey’s traditional foreign policy rhetoric was “realist” in outlook and built on the concepts of national interest and military power, particularly in the 1990s. Since 1999 and the onset of the
Europeanization process, however, the foreign policy elite has changed its thinking, and Turkey now positions itself as a soft power. In this sense, the EU has transformed Turkish foreign policy-makers through the process of social learning, identity construction and norm internalization. Having initially affected the behaviours of policy-makers, the Europeanization process has gone on to influence their perceptions and thinking (Terzi 2010: 1 and 5).

Although democratization, liberalization and globalization (Tocci 2005; Aras 2009; G. Özcan 2010; Kösebalaban 2011; B. Park 2012) and Europeanization (Terzi 2005; Kaliber 2005; Kirişçi 2006; Aras 2009) are significant determinants, I agree with those who suggest that the most significant factor has been the foreign policy vision of the new leadership (Rabasa and Larrabee 2008; Davutoğlu 2010; M. Özcan and Usul 2010). Without a new leadership with a new outlook on foreign affairs, a policy change would not have come about. Turkey’s domestic transformation and democratization would not automatically have brought about a new foreign policy on Cyprus. Had this been the case, the coalition government would have abandoned its traditional, security-oriented line on Cyprus.

Despite the essential role played by the EU in altering Turkey’s Cyprus policy under the AKP government, it had had no impact on the previous coalition government’s Cyprus policy. A policy shift was only possible with the arrival in power of the AKP leadership. While the social learning, identity construction and norm internalization aspects of the Europeanization process (Terzi 2005) may offer an attractive explanation for the change in policy on Cyprus, it should be noted that their effect was not automatic. Social learning may account for the AKP’s new Cyprus policy, but it had no effect on the previous coalition government, which had a sceptical attitude towards the EU. The AKP government, emerging as it was against a background of policy failure and ideational transformation, was receptive to such social learning. In contrast, the coalition government, whose thinking was conditioned by historical and institutional setting, was unable to conceive of a new Cyprus policy. We may conclude then that the crucial factor in Turkey’s new policy was the new leadership and the EU.
2. Turkish Foreign Policy towards Cyprus

This section focuses on Turkey’s Cyprus policy since the 1950s. It is divided into four sub-sections. These are Turkey’s Cyprus policy in the 1950s, Turkey’s Cyprus policy between 1960 and 1980, Turkey’s Cyprus policy in the 1990s and Turkey’s Cyprus policy after 2001.

2.1. The Emergence of the Cyprus Question and Turkey’s Cyprus Policy in the 1950s

The Ottoman Empire conquered Cyprus in 1571 and ruled the island until 1878. In the 1877-8 Russian-Ottoman war, Russians occupied large sections of Ottoman territory in the Balkans and eastern Anatolia. Under the Treaty of Berlin, signed in June 1878, Britain received Cyprus from the Ottomans in exchange for its promise to support them against the Russian Empire (Çetinsaya 2007: 7-8).

The 1923 Treaty of Lausanne represented international recognition of the Republic of Turkey. According to the treaty, the Ottomans officially ceded sovereignty to Britain on Cyprus. The treaty sought to balance the interests of Greece and Turkey around the Aegean by prescribing the de-militarization of the Aegean islands close to the Turkish coast and the exchange of the Greek population in Turkey and the Turkish population in Greece. The equilibrium established by the treaty lasted in Cyprus until the mid-1950s (Soysal 2004: 42).

The Cyprus problem began to emerge when British colonial rule on the island started to fall apart in the mid-1950s. At the Tripartite Conference, held jointly with Britain and Greece from August 29 to September 7, 1955, Ankara’s initial reaction was to advocate the continuation of the status quo (i.e. British colonial rule). Otherwise, Ankara argued, the island must be returned to its previous owner, which was Turkey (Interview 10 August 26, 2011).
When Britain was defeated in the Suez operation in 1956, it lost its status as the ultimate power in the Middle East to the United States. It no longer needed Cyprus as a colony but wished to retain military bases on the island. Among a number of possible solutions was the partition of the island, which was embraced by Ankara as a policy on December 28, 1956 and announced in the Turkish parliament by Prime Minister Menderes. Britain proposed several plans, all of which were rejected – it seemed that a solution was becoming increasingly elusive (Fırat 2010b: 360-1). Finally, the US, fearing the outbreak of a conflict between its two NATO allies, got involved. Wanting to avoid a tussle in the eastern flank of NATO between Greece and Turkey and to preserve the integrity of the alliance, it set forth the independence formula for Cyprus (Interview 11 September 16, 2011).

On the cusp of the Cold War, Greece and Turkey were not in a position to resist American pressure, and an agreement was reached at the Zurich conference of February 6-11, 1959. A deal was signed at the London conference on February 19, 1959, and on December 19, 1959, Britain agreed to grant the right of self-determination to Cyprus. The US and Britain’s desire to maintain stability in the southern flank of NATO at this high point of the Cold War pushed them to seek a solution on the island. The result was the 1959 and 1960 treaties that founded the Republic of Cyprus. The treaties provided a power-sharing mechanism for the Greek and Turkish communities on the island, but while Ankara and the Turkish Cypriots were satisfied, the Greek side was unhappy with the agreements, which fell short of their aim – to set up a unitary state (Türkeş 2007: 159-60). During this period, Ankara changed its initial stance of “partition” of the island between the two communities towards the advocacy of the “independent Republic of Cyprus” established by the 1959-60 treaties (Fırat 2009: 439-40).

Under the Treaty of Establishment, the British were allowed to keep two military bases on Cyprus as “sovereign base areas”. The Treaty of Alliance allowed Greece and Turkey to keep a certain number of soldiers on the island, while the Treaty of Guarantee prescribed that the Republic of Cyprus could
not be unified with any other state. The aim of this stipulation was to prevent enosis (unification with Greece: the Greek Cypriot preference) or taksim (partition of the island: the Turkish Cypriot preference). The Treaty of Guarantee also laid down that the independence and unity of the island would be guaranteed by Britain, Greece and Turkey. These countries were given the right to act jointly or unilaterally if the status quo was in peril (Lindley 2007: 230).

The 1960 agreements envisioned a consociational federal model for Cyprus. In the absence of any other alternative, the two communities were forced to accept this formula. However, once Britain had relinquished its control, the forces of division within Cypriot society became increasingly powerful. It soon became clear that the majority of Greek Cypriots wanted to bring about enosis (Khashman 1999: 5). This paved the way for the collapse of the federal system in the next decade.

2.2. Turkey’s Cyprus Policy, 1960-1980

Between 1960 and 1980, as the immediate fear of nuclear exchange gradually receded after the Cuban nuclear crisis (1962) and the superpowers settled into the status quo, the Cold War lost some of its terror. Turkey attempted to capitalize on this slight thawing of the tensions between the two blocs and to reduce its over-dependence on the US and pursue a more autonomous foreign policy. Its most significant act in this regard was its intervention in Cyprus in 1974 (Oran 2010: 393 and 409).

Throughout this period, the Cyprus question was the main determinant of Turkish foreign policy. Since the early 1960s, Turkish policy towards Cyprus had been moulded in reaction to changes in Greek policy towards the island. The abolition of the power-sharing mechanism, the deconstruction of Turkey’s guarantor status and the reduction of Turkish Cypriots to minority status were integral to Greek policy, the final aim of which was to establish a unitary state which could be integrated into Greece. The Turkish side, for its part, sought to
keep the power-sharing mechanism intact and circumvent *enosis* (Türkeş 2007: 160).

The status quo set up by the 1960 agreements finally collapsed thanks to the inter-communal violence that took place from 1963 onwards. In November 1963, Makarios, the Greek President of the island, proposed 13 amendments to the 1960 Constitution. (Ahmad 2004: 32). However, since they would have removed the veto and quota powers of the Turkish Cypriots, changing them from equal partners into a minority within the republic, the proposed amendments were rejected by the Turkish side on December 16, 1963. Fighting broke out between the two sides in Nicosia on December 21, 1963, and in March 1964, the United Nations Peace-keeping Force in Cyprus (UNFICYP) arrived on the island (Lindley 2007: 230). But the violence also had further-reaching effects; it precipitated a crisis between Greece and Turkey and prompted Ankara to start thinking about the idea of a Turkish military intervention in support of the Turkish Cypriots (Ahmad 2004: 32).

On March 16, 1964, the Turkish Grand National Assembly authorized the government to stage a military intervention in Cyprus under the Treaty of Guarantee (1960), on the grounds that it was necessary to put an end to the suffering of the Turkish Cypriots (Erhan 2010: 413-6). The collapse of the power-sharing mechanism and refusal of the Greek demands in December 1963 were followed by pogroms and population movements, confirming the Turkish Cypriots’ worst fears (Robins 2003: 118). In 1964, Turkish Cypriots were forced out of administrative office by the Greek Cypriots; they were told in 1965 by the then President of the island, Makarios, that they could only return if they consented to the 13 constitutional amendments (Sözen 2010b).

On January 15, 1964, the London conference was convened to bring the conflict to an end. Denktas argued that the 1960 agreements had failed to provide security for Turkish Cypriots and effective guarantees were needed. Accordingly, it was necessary to set up a federal state composed of two communities, and to separate the two communities geographically. Ankara
adopted this as Turkey’s official position, reviving the idea of partition (Fırat 2010b: 437).

Ankara had been content with the status quo established by the 1959 and 1960 agreements and had supported the idea of a republic in Cyprus between 1958 and 1964. However, events had demonstrated that the 1960 agreements could not guarantee the security of Turkish Cypriots, leading Ankara to conclude that this security would only be made possible if they were ceded their own territory (Uslu 2004: 212). For this reason, in 1964, Turkey’s policy towards Cyprus started to change, gradually evolving into a desire to see the establishment of a bi-zonal federation, where the two communities would be separated.

By 1967, Greek and Turkish Cypriots were finding cohabitation increasingly difficult. The exclusion of the Turkish community from constitutional-bureaucratic structures pushed them to carve out their own administrative mechanisms (F. Aksu 2010: 209). Makarios had made it clear that unless Turkish Cypriots assented to the 13 amendments, he would not let them resume their previous administrative positions, so on December 28, 1967, the Temporary Turkish Cypriot Administration was declared, followed on February 13, 1975 by the Turkish Federal Republic of Cyprus. Ultimately, the Turkish Cypriot position was to create a federal, divided Cyprus; like Ankara, they had come to believe that it was impossible to guarantee the security of Turkish Cypriots while they were spread all over the island.

In 1967, a military junta took power in Greece. The junta decided to unite Cyprus with Greece (enosis) in order to offset its internal impotency within Greece. Makarios whose final goal was also to achieve enosis, but over a longer time period (Interview 1 September 5, 2011) feared that the move might prompt Turkish military intervention as a guarantor power (Sözen 2010b). In response, the military junta in Athens staged a coup d’etat against Makarios on July 15, 1974 (he managed to escape assassination by fleeing through a back door) (Karpat 1975: 186). Athens immediately replaced him with Nicos Sampson, the head of the EOKA-B (National Organisation of
Cypriot Fighters), whose ultimate aim was to achieve *enosis* of Cyprus with Greece (Aydin 2000: 128-9). On July 20, 1974, Turkey, resorting to its right as a guarantor power under the 1960 Treaty of Guarantee, finally sent troops to Cyprus to prevent Greece from invading the island. The Turkish troops occupied sections of the island in the north (Sözen 2010b).

Following the Population Exchange Agreement, which was signed by both sides in August 1975, Greek Cypriots still in the north moved to the south and Turkish Cypriots remaining in the south were transferred to the north, creating two homogeneous regions (Lindley 2007: 231). Ethnic separation of the island, which had started in 1963, was completed by Turkey’s military operations in July and August 1974 (Robins 2003: 132).

The inter-communal talks that had started in June 1968 under the auspices of the UN resulted in the conclusion of the High Level Agreement (1977-9). The two leaderships agreed on the establishment of a bi-zonal, bi-communal federation, in which the functions of the state would be shared equally by the two communities. Since then, all talks have been aimed at finding a solution based on these parameters.

Given the de facto division of the island from 1963 onwards, the outcome of the 1977-9 High Level Agreement was in line with Ankara’s expectations. It also echoed Ankara’s view – held since 1964 – that any settlement should be based on a bi-zonal, bi-communal federation. This policy was formulated in response to Greek Cypriot attempts to undermine the Republic of Cyprus and to root out Turkish Cypriots from the island, as a way of protecting the security of the latter.
2.3. Turkey’s Cyprus Policy, 1980-1990

In General

In the 1980s, Turkey faced international isolation because of its human rights breaches and the 1974 military intervention in Cyprus. The country endeavoured to broaden its foreign relations and to extricate itself from international isolation, but its foreign policy autonomy was to some degree compromised by its continuing economic dependence on the US (Oran 2010: 534-6). While Turkey’s human rights’ infractions contributed to the deterioration of its relations with the EU, its relationship with the United States was relatively unproblematic; mainly because Washington saw Ankara as a strategic outpost against the Soviet Union and Iran (Aydın 2003: 87-9).

By the 1980s, the Soviet economy, unable to compete with capitalism, was breaking down. Gorbachev, who came to power in April 1985, decided to address the political and economic ills of the Soviet Union, but his efforts were unable to prevent the social crisis and the ultimate collapse of the USSR (Tellal 2010: 617). Since then, the US, the Western model of international capitalism and Western attitudes towards human rights have moulded the world.

Meanwhile, important events were also taking place in Turkey. In September 1980, there was a military coup (the military junta lasted until 1983), while on November 15, 1983, Turkish Cypriots declared the formation of the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus (TRNC). The Turkish side made it clear that declaration of the TRNC did not mean they had abandoned the idea of a settlement based on federation. (Olgun 1999: 7) However, although Greek Cypriots never wished to share power with Turkish Cypriots, they were able to portray Ankara as the unreasonable side – by playing on its bad human rights record (Sözen 2010b).
2.4. Turkey’s Cyprus Policy, 1980-1990

The Turkish desire to see a bi-zonal and bi-communal federal settlement for Cyprus continued into the 1980s. However, in this period, a rift emerged between Turgut Özal, the Turkish Prime Minister (1983-1989 and later President 1989-1993), and the Turkish bureaucracy. Özal, who had a more pragmatic and trade-oriented outlook on foreign relations of Turkey, viewed Cyprus as an obstacle to Turkey’s expansion of its commercial and economic bonds with its neighbours (Kemal Kirişçi 2006a: 11). He was in favour of solving the Cyprus dispute and normalizing Greek-Turkish relations on the basis of trade. To do this, he argued, it was necessary to take the initiative in the Cyprus talks by excluding Denktaş. However, the Turkish bureaucratic elite continued to back the policies of Denktaş, as it had since the 1950s.

On August 9, 1980, a new round of talks began between the two Cypriot communities with the initiative of Özal. The Turkish side’s objective was to reach a federal solution composed of two regions and two communities. On January 17, 1985, a draft agreement, which envisioned a federal republic of Cyprus built on an independent, non-aligned, bi-zonal, bi-communal state with two official languages, was presented to the parties by the UN. While the Turkish side signed the draft agreement, the Greek side turned it down. On July 25, 1989, a new plan was submitted to the parties by Perez de Cuellar, the UN Secretary General. In the new plan, the Federal Republic of Cyprus would be composed of two federal states and its constitutional structure would be based on two zones and two communities. Although the plan came close to meeting the concerns of the Turkish side, it was repudiated by Denktaş, who had not been part of the consultation process (Fırat 2010a: 584 and 91-3).

Prime Minister Mesut Yılmaz seemed to be ill at ease with Özal’s initiative to settle the Cyprus discord and pointed out that “no Turkish government was in a position to make compromises on Cyprus contrary to the nation’s desire” (Uslu 2004: 219). Yılmaz was not the only person reluctant to put pressure on Denktaş to accept the plan. The Turkish bureaucracy and political elite’s
support for Denktas made it impossible for Ozal to force the issue. Thus, Ozal’s pragmatic approach failed and Ankara continued to follow the hard-line confederalist policies of Denktas until the 2000s.

This period also saw the beginning of the Europeanization of the Cyprus issue following Greece’s accession into the EU in 1981. Throughout the 1980s and 1990s, the EU (or EC as it then was) favoured Athens over Ankara, and the Cyprus issue played an increasingly bitter role in EU-Turkish relations, to the point where Turkey eventually became alienated from Europe (Eralp 2009: 4-5).

The lack of conviction among the Turkish leadership, the fragmented decision-making structure in the Turkish political context and the lack of support from the EU combined to curb any real chance of policy change in the 1980s. While President Ozal had a more pragmatic approach to the Cyprus question, Prime Minister Yilmaz, backed by the Turkish military and civilian bureaucracy, held to the traditional line. In such an environment, President Ozal could not push for policy change single-handedly. The leadership of the AKP, on the other hand, was convinced that change was necessary. Its decision-making structure was such that no other actor was in a position to thwart such a policy shift. Moreover, the party was aware that Turkey’s accession to the EU hinged on finding a solution in Cyprus.

2.5. Turkey’s Cyprus Policy, 1990-2001

In General

After the Cold War, Turkey’s main foreign policy principles, goals and priorities did not initially change. It continued to advocate preserving the status quo and to pursue a pragmatic policy based on multilateral cooperation (Kut 2001: 9-11). However, the instability encircling Turkey compelled it to get involved in all these conflicts and to diversify its relations. Ankara’s foreign policy had to be expanded and diversified in response to the changing
political geography. Under this new framework, Turkey’s chief orientation continued to be towards the US and the EU, but it also became more assertive in its policies towards regions like the Balkans, the Middle East and the Caucasus. These developments were calculated to help Turkey realize its political objectives in the region.

**Turkey’s Cyprus Policy in the 1990s**

In the 1990s, the Cyprus issue became increasingly Europeanized as the republic embarked upon its application to join the EU. The Greek Cypriot administration applied for EU membership in the name of Cyprus as a whole in July 1990. The EU accepted this application in 1994 and commenced accession talks with the Greek Cypriot administration on behalf of the whole island in December 1996. When the EU included Cyprus in the enlargement process, Turkish foreign policy started to change. Having been outwardly committed to a bi-zonal, bi-communal federal solution in Cyprus since 1964, Ankara changed its position in the mid-1990s to seek a confederal settlement. This policy lasted until 2002 when the AKP reverted back to the policy of a federal settlement in Cyprus.

In April 1992, Boutrus Boutros Ghali, the UN Secretary General, submitted a framework agreement, which comprised a Set of Ideas. Like the Perez de Cuellar (1984-6) propositions, the Set of Ideas was a federal settlement which underscored the political equality of the two communities. While the Turkish Cypriots accepted, the Greek Cypriots ruled out the Set of Ideas out of hand. When it came out that the EU was prepared to open accession talks with the Republic of Cyprus, this inevitably led to the perception that the republic would be accepted as an EU member with or without a settlement (Dodd 2005: 42-3). The Greek Cypriots, who were already half-hearted about coming to an agreement with Turkish Cypriots, became even more disinclined towards a federal solution when the EU membership process started. Indeed, they expected to be able to use this process to achieve their ultimate objective of a unitary state.
When the Greek Cypriot Administration was accepted into the EU accession process in 1994, the Turkish side started to formulate a confederal solution. The Turkish leadership feared that the principles of bi-zonality and bi-communality, which had been advocated by Ankara hitherto, were bound to be compromised under the EU, which grants the rights of free settlement and property ownership to all its citizens (Interview 12 August 08, 2011). In such an environment, the sovereignty of a federated Turkish state of only 250 000 people could easily be watered down, unless it was protected by special guarantees inserted into EU law (Interview 13 September 07, 2011). Accordingly, in August 1994, the Turkish Cypriot side declared that a federal solution was no longer possible on the island. Upon the approaching of the entry into effect of the EU-Turkish Customs Union agreement on December 31, 1995, Denktas feared that entry into effect of such an agreement might compromise the projected customs union agreement between Turkey and the TRNC. Denktaş appealed to President Demirel, who convened the NSC to discuss the issue. After the NSC meeting, a Joint Declaration was issued, on December 28, 1995, by Turkey and the TRNC, stipulating the simultaneous accession of the TRNC and Turkey into the EU (Uslu 2004: 224-5). This was seen as a much more effective way of preventing Turkish Cypriots from being subsumed by the larger Greek-Greek Cypriot population.

In January 1996, Greece and Turkey came to the brink of war in the Aegean because of uninhabited islands (Imia/Kardak) when Turkey landed troops on an island in the face of the Greek troops who were located on a different island. The crisis could only be overcome by an American intervention by intense telephone diplomacy admonishing the two countries that “the one that shoots first would be in trouble with the US” (Milliyet January 31, 1996).

Richard Holbrooke, the US Under-Secretary of State for European and Middle East Affairs, voiced that “as demonstrated by the Imia crisis, so long as Greek-Turkish tension endures in the region, the stability would be elusive in the Eastern Mediterranean” (Milliyet February 1, 1997). Holbrooke qualified the Kardak Crisis as “a very grave incident, which seemed funny in first place”.

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Holbrooke also said that “Turkey would be the front country of the New Europe” (Milliyet February 1, 1997).

On January 20, 1997, a Turkey-TRNC Declaration of Solidarity was signed for the military protection of the Turkish Cypriots after a Greek Cypriot order of S-300 ground to air missiles from Russia. The declaration also accentuated the sovereign rights of the Turkish Cypriots and underlined that every unilateral step to be taken by the Greek Cypriot Administration towards the EU membership will accelerate the integration process between Turkey and the TRNC.” (Turkish Daily News February 3, 1997, January 21, 1997). In July 1997, another Joint Statement announced that a special partnership between Turkey and the TRNC was established and the two states would integrate in the fields of economy, finance, defence and foreign affairs. Once again the sovereignty and independence of the TRNC was underscored (Zaman July 21, 1997).

The Imia and S-300 crisis were watershed developments that convinced the American government that there was the danger of war in the Eastern Mediterranean between the two NATO allies. This resulted in a new American bid to integrate Turkey with the EU structures by a solution in Cyprus. The American objective was to provide stability and security in regions where which major energy resources (Middle East and Transcaucasia). Within this framework, Turkey was depicted as a ‘pivotal state’ in relation to US interests as it had the ability to stabilize the Black Sea region, control the Mediterranean Sea, balance Russia in the Caucasus, offer an antidote to Islamic fundamentalism and serve as a southern anchor of NATO. According to Washington, Turkey, the largest and most powerful country in the Eastern Mediterranean, was the only country that could be integrated into Western political structures. Such integration would require the democratization of the authoritarian Kemalist regime and the setting up of peaceful relations with its neighbouring countries, notably Greece. As a result, Richard Holbrooke was appointed President Clinton’s special envoy to Cyprus in 1997 (Pericleous 2009: 21-3).
At the December 1997 Luxembourg summit, the European Council officially announced the Greek Cypriot candidacy for EU membership and excluded Turkey from the immediate enlargement process. Accession talks with the Greek Cypriots began on March 31, 1998 (Milliyet March 31, 1998; The European Council December 12-3, 1997). The Luxembourg decisions had an enduring impact on the collective consciousness of the Turks and their relationship with Europe (Robins 2003: 108-9). Ankara insisted that the decision of the summit was discriminatory and invidious and that it had been made under the influence of Athens. The inclusion of Cyprus in the first wave of enlargement was a let-down for Ankara, who saw this as evidence of the international community siding with the Greeks (Eralp 2004: 71-2).

After the Luxembourg summit, Ankara suspended its relations with the EU and announced that Turkey would integrate with the TRNC to the same degree that the EU and Greek Cypriots were to be integrated. A Joint Statement on July 29, 1998, by Turkey and the TRNC envisaged expanding the January 20, 1997 Joint Declaration by forming an economic and financial union as a response to Cyprus’ drawing closer to the EU. This was followed by a joint press conference in early September 1998 by Turkish Foreign Minister İsmail Cem and President Denktaş in the TRNC underlining a confederal solution. According to this proposal, there would be two sovereign and equal states on the island, which would form a confederation by a cooperation agreement (Interview 14 September 5, 2011).

Turkey’s alienation from Europe and its decision to ally itself with the TRNC prompted fears in the EU that it was losing any influence it had over the country, and that this would make a federal solution in Cyprus even more elusive. The EU also began to fear that it was losing its chance to influence Turkey’s domestic dynamics, including the democratization process and the harmonization of its structures with those of the EU. Seeing the unfavourable consequences of its policies towards Turkey, it reconsidered these policies between December 1997 and December 1999 (Interview 11 September 16, 2011).
On Cyprus, despite the failure of the Holbrooke bid, Washington was resolved to find a solution to the Cyprus discord to stabilize and secure the Eastern Mediterranean. The UN proposed a new string of negotiations starting from December 1999. On June 29, 1999, the UN Secretary General called for the talks. Denktas was against the bid demanding first the recognition of the TRNC. On July 20, 1999, Prime Minister Ecevit also underscored that the talks should aim to set up a confederation. Denktas was convinced by Ankara to go to New York to start the talks in December 1999 to clear the way to Turkey’s accession into the EU (Dodd 2010: 201-2).

At the December 1999 Helsinki summit, the European Council declared Turkey a candidate country. However, the Council also stressed that Cyprus would be accepted as a member even if a solution could not be found for the island. At the Copenhagen EU Council of December 2002, the Greek Cypriots obtained agreement on the entry of a divided Cyprus into the EU. This decision became an additional incentive for the Greek Cypriots to dismiss the Annan Plan due to the fact that they expect a better deal after accession (Faustmann 2011: 154-5). This decision effectively removed any incentive Greek Cypriots may have had to come to an agreement with Turkish Cypriots. As Tocci argued, once the Greek Cypriots had secured the carrot of membership, the EU lost its power to influence the leadership, which thereafter pursued its interests as it saw fit (Tocci 2007: 46).

At the Copenhagen summit, Turkey ensured a date for the commencement of its accession talks. The Presidency Conclusions of the Copenhagen Council of 2002 stated that if the “European Council in December 2004, on the basis of a report and a recommendation from the Commission, decides that Turkey fulfils the Copenhagen political criteria, the European Union will open accession negotiations with Turkey without delay” (Council of the European Union 2002).

The US strongly backed Turkey in obtaining a date for the beginning of accession talks as part of its broader foreign policy vision in the wake of the Cold War to secure the Middle East and Transcaucasia where major energy
resources are located (Pericleous 2009: 21-3). This broader vision had been laid out by Richard Holbrooke, US Undersecretary of State assigned to European and Middle East affairs, and envisioned Turkey as a “pivotal state”, stability in which would spill over to the neighboring states, thereby contributing international stability. According to this post-Cold War doctrine, Turkey not merely stabilized the Black Sea, the Mediterranean, and the Caucasus, but also provided an antidote to Islamic fundamentalism and functions as the southern anchor of NATO after the first US war against Iraq in 2003. Within this framework, Turkey, the largest and the most powerful country in the Eastern Mediterranean, was the sole country with the potential to be fully incorporated in the Western political system, the EU, and thus reverse the potential unfavorable consequences of Islamic fundamentalism by rendering Turkey a model state in the region. For this to materialize, the establishment of peaceful relations with Turkey’s neighbors, notably Greece, and settlement of the Cyprus dissension was regarded as essential (Pericleous 2009: 21-3).

This line of vision was consistent with the newly emerging EU notion of granting Turkey candidate status at the end of 1999. The EU had similar concerns to those of the US. Especially after the September 11, 2001 attacks in the US by radical Islamists, the idea of accepting Turkey as a member to the EU to stabilize the Middle East, which was considered to be the cradle of fundamental Islamism, was gaining ground. With the advent to power Schröder’s SDP in Germany in 1998 and Simitis’ PASOK in Greece in 1996, the two important leaders aspiring for a European Turkey, this new European vision was put into practice.

The main difference between the role played by the US and the EU was that while the US endeavoured to facilitate talks by supporting the UN efforts, the EU’s role, after granting Turkey candidate status, was institutionalized and thus had the potential to oblige change in Turkey’s Cyprus policy. After 1999, as an EU candidate, Turkey came under the obligation to implement the acquis communautaire to proceed with its membership process. The application of the acquis called for a solution to the Cyprus dispute. In this
sense, Turkey’s membership aspirations were directly linked with a settlement in Cyprus due to the institutionalization of the EU norms within Turkey’s legal structures.

However, the EU’s decision to grant unconditional membership to the Greek Cypriots in the name of the whole of Cyprus has been a crucial factor in the continuing deadlock. Had the achievement of a settlement been made a precondition for Greek Cypriot accession into the EU, they would have been forced to come to an agreement with the Turkish side, but as the legally recognized representatives of the whole island, this was no longer necessary. From December 1999 onwards, Greek Cypriots exploited their position to force the Turkish side to make compromises.

2.6. Turkey’s Cyprus Policy, After 2001

In General

The 21st century has seen the crystallization of a multi-centred but hierarchical international system. None of the great powers is in a position to control all aspects of the international system (Sönmezoğlu 2004: 81-2); the US may be the dominant power in military terms, but the North American Free Trade Area (NAFTA) is in fierce economic competition with the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) and the European Union (Gözen 2004: 31-2).

Turkey managed to retain its strategic weight in this new environment due to its strategic location (Sönmezoğlu 2004: 88-9). After the 9/11 attacks, the democratic-liberal transformation and globalization of the Middle East took on a higher priority for the US. As the only indigenous Muslim state with a Western orientation, a functioning democracy and a modernization agenda, Turkey therefore became increasingly important to the West (Oğuzlu 2007: 89-90).
Having spent the 1990s adapting to the changing global circumstances, Ankara spent the 2000s developing a more pro-active, multi-dimensional and diversified foreign policy which takes account of regional and global developments. Turkey retained its Western orientation, but the structural changes brought about by the termination of the Cold War gave rise to various security threats, to which Ankara had to respond.

**Turkey’s Cyprus Policy in the 2000s**

Between May 1999 and November 2002, the coalition government, composed of the Democratic Left Party (DSP), the Motherland Party (ANAP) and the Nationalist Action Party (MHP), pursued an unprecedented programme of reform in order to meet the EU’s membership criteria. In October 2001, 34 articles of the Turkish Constitution relating to fundamental rights and freedoms were amended (Özbudun 2007: 181). However, the coalition government finally collapsed when it sought to enact another significant reform package in August 2002. This package went beyond what was envisioned in the first National Programme for the Adoption of the Acquis (NPAA) and what was required by the EU (Kemal Kirişçi 2006a: 23-4 and 42).

However, despite these important reform packages, the coalition made no mention of Cyprus. This was because the coalition leadership embraced the traditional Turkish approach on the Cyprus issue and sought to sever the Cyprus question from Turkey’s accession process.

The Cyprus talks that started in New York in December 1999. After a battery of talks in 2000, Denktaş declared at the end of fifth session in November 2000 that he would not attend the next round of negotiations, scheduled to be held in January 2001. This decision was taken in consultation with Turkey after a summit in Ankara with the participation of Denktaş, the Turkish President, Turkish Prime Minister, Chief of Staff, Deputy Prime Ministers, Foreign Minister and the Minister responsible for Cyprus (Hürriyet November 23, 2000).
In November 2001, speaking to Parliament, Turkish Foreign Minister Ismail Cem, said that “in case of accession of the Republic of Cyprus into the EU, the TRNC may choose to integrate with Turkey, which will pay whatever the heavy price Turkey might have to face” (Milliyet November 3, 2001). Prime Minister Ecevit confirmed this stance, mentioning that such an integration with the TRNC could either be in the form of full annexation or autonomy (Bila November 04, 2001). Devlet Bahçeli, Leader of the Coalition Partner MHP and Deputy Prime Minister, mentioned that “accepting the Greek Cypriots to the EU was a fait accompli and Turkey would not settle for that”. (Zaman November 04, 2001).

Similar concerns were voiced by American and British diplomats as well as Günther Verheugen, the EU’s Commissioner for Enlargement. Verheugen criticised Ankara’s lack of support for the UN initiative, and stated that “Turkey has to take the necessary steps for a solution in Cyprus” (Milliyet January 17, 2002). In November 2001, Denktaş invited Clerides, who invariably reiterated that “if Denktaş would sign Annan plan, so would he”, to start to face-to-face talks. The talks started on January 16, 2002. The Turkish bureaucracy maintained its backing for Denktaş. Özkök underlined in January 2002 that “the only solution to the Cyprus question is the establishment of a new partnership between the two sovereign states” (Milliyet January 31, 2002).

By April 2002, there was no headway. Ecevit offered a ‘velvet divorce’ referring to the Czech-Slovak breakup. In late April 2002, the Turkish Cypriot side presented a ‘Draft Outline of the Founding Document for the new Partnership State of Cyprus’, which rested on the idea of two states and two peoples in Cyprus. On May 14, 2002, Foreign Minister Cem defended this position at a NATO ministerial meeting. Jack Straw, British Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, replied that these proposals would likely to lead to deadlock in the talks (Dodd 2010: 167 and 215).
In July 2002, the economic and political situation in Turkey was in a tailspin and the coalition government was unable to master it. Prime Minister Ecevit was gravely ill and the coalition was on the verge of collapse (Hürriyet July 10, 2002). In the same month, Foreign Minister Ismail Cem, who was in favour of a confederal structure in Cyprus, resigned from office and from the DSP to form a new political party. In August 2002, Şükrü Sina Gürel was appointed as the new Foreign Minister. Therefore, Ecevit, who thought that he had settled the Cyprus discord in 1974 and Gürel, who was known to be even more hardline than Denktaş on the Cyprus issue and Greek-Turkish relations, were responsible in Cyprus affairs. Annan rightfully presumed that his proposals would be dismissed out of hand by Ankara (Hannay 2005: 173-4).

The UN was blaming Denktaş for an irreconcilable approach. Further meetings in September and October 2002 provided no positive results. Ankara wanted the 2002 talks to be successful. However, Turkish officials continued to advocate a confederal Cyprus in contradistinction to a federal solution. For example, In December 2002, the Chief of Staff Hilmi Özök said that “a new partnership formed by two states” would be the basis of a solution (Dodd 2010: 217-8).

After Denktaş decided to walk out of the talks in November 2001, his confederalist policies were forcefully backed by the coalition government and the civilian-military bureaucracy in Ankara. Foreign Minister Ismail Cem, Prime Minister Ecevit and the Chief of Staff Hilmi Özök delivered speeches in 2001 and 2002 strongly supporting Denktaş’ stance on the Cyprus discord. Only TÜSİAD, which all along desired to carry through Turkey’s EU membership, announced in December 2001 that Denktaş’s intransigence was harming Turkey’s interests and blocking Turkey’s road to EU membership. Until November 2002, Ankara’s stance and the UN parameters for a solution in Cyprus were at loggerheads with each other.

In November 2002, the coalition government was replaced by the AKP. In contrast to its predecessor, the AKP’s discourse during the election campaign was based on commitment to reforms and EU membership, improvement of
relations with neighbours and settlement of the Cyprus issue (Election Manifesto of the AKP 2002: 37). The AKP looked on the Cyprus issue as an obstacle to Turkey’s membership of the EU. Prime Minister Abdullah Gül stated: “no solution in Cyprus is no solution” and “Turkey will be one step ahead”, implying that Turkey did not wish to be accused of intransigence in the conflict (Robins 2007: 298-9). The new government’s attitude on Cyprus was at loggerheads with that of Ecevit, Cem, Gürel and Özkök, all of whom believed that a confederal Cyprus was possible. On November 24, 2002, just after the advent to power of the AKP, Yaşar Yakış, the new Foreign Minister, visited Denktas, who was hospitalised in New York, to persuade him to accept the amended version of the Annan Plan (Office of the Prime Minister November 24, 2002). As a result of Ankara’s pressure, Denktas sent a letter to Annan on November 27, 2002 expressing his desire to discuss his plan.

With the advent to power of the AKP in November 2002, Ankara’s foreign policy goal in Cyprus once again changed from defence of a confederal or two-state Cyprus towards the establishment of a bi-zonal, bi-communal federal Cyprus compatible with the UN parameters. The AKP government backed the Annan Plan, first draft of which was announced in November 11, 2002. Upon the responses of the two sides the plan was amended on December 10, 2002 before the beginning of the EU Copenhagen summit in December 12, 2002.
CHAPTER III: THREE WAYS IN WHICH TURKISH POLICY ON CYPRUS HAS CHANGED

For the purposes of this study, foreign policy change is defined as a change in the programme or instruments being used to affect foreign policy; the alteration of the policy strategy, problem or goal; or a change in the political/normative foundation of the policy. This definition draws on the work of Kleistra and Mayer. A programme/instrument change is a qualitative change in the methods or means used by the policy-maker, such as a shift from military force to diplomatic negotiation. Although the instrument may change, the policy purposes do not. In the case of problem change, the decision-maker changes or even abandons the original policy goal. The instruments utilized and how they are wielded by the policy-maker may also change. In the case of normative change, the political foundation underlying the policy changes (C. F. Hermann 1990: 5; Kleistra and Mayer 2001: 392-3).

This chapter draws on the Kleistra and Mayer model to show how Turkey’s Cyprus policy has altered since 2002 and the advent to power of the Justice and Development Party (AKP). The instruments, the goals and the normative foundation of Ankara’s Cyprus policy changed under the new leadership.

The most important instrumental change in Turkey’s Cyprus policy took place in 2004 when the Turkish side authorized the UN Secretary General to set a timetable for the completion of the Cyprus talks and to act as arbitrator (Interview 15 September 27, 2011). In addition to pursuing diplomatic channels, the AKP also adopted a proactive policy for the settlement of the Cyprus discord. The AKP government also, for the first time, adopted a range of tactics such as putting pressure on the Turkish Cypriot leadership, lobbying, propaganda and sending MPs from the Turkish Parliament to persuade Turkish Cypriots to support the Annan Plan and work it up into an agreement.

The goal of Turkish policy on Cyprus also changed after the AKP’s coming to power. The AKP government approved the Annan Plan, with its bi-zonal, bi-
communal federal proposal. This represented a shift from the previous policy, which supported the idea of a confederation.

In terms of the normative foundation, Turkey’s pre-2002 approach – to be only passively involved in the Cyprus negotiations – also changed. As of 2002, Ankara favoured a policy of proactive interference in Cyprus politics and pushed hard for a settlement on the island. This change in approach arose from the AKP’s new foreign policy vision. While previous Turkish governments looked on Cyprus as a national cause, the AKP government saw it from a more pragmatic perspective. It viewed the Cyprus issue as potentially a win-win situation; the Turkish side made considerable concessions on Cyprus because it believed that a settlement would benefit both sides. The AKP’s foreign policy vision was geared towards ensuring that Turkey avoided problems with its neighbours, which it believed was best achieved through proactive engagement and preventive diplomacy, and towards changing the country’s image. This new foreign policy vision was what underlay the government’s more pragmatic and constructive foreign policy in respect of Cyprus.

The following chapter analyzes the concepts of change in policy instruments, change in the policy goals and normative changes respectively. The relevant sections also analyze these concepts in the case of Turkey’s foreign policy change on Cyprus between 2002 and 2004 and discover which of these three types of change are relevant in this case.

1. Change in Policy Instruments

An instrumental/programme change implies a qualitative change in the methods or means employed by the policy-maker to pursue a policy goal. However, although the instrument may alter, the fundamental policy purpose remains intact (C. F. Hermann 1990: 5; Kleistra and Mayer 2001: 392-3).
The AKP got actively involved in the process in order to force the Greek Cypriot side to settle the Cyprus discord. To this end, it made the key instrumental changes of granting the UN Secretary General, Kofi Annan, the right to arbitrate the dispute and accepting a calendar for the termination of negotiations. These two instrumental changes were crucial in the emergence of the Annan Plan, which was the first comprehensive settlement plan for the Cyprus dispute to be put to referenda on both sides of the island.

Since 1964, the Secretary General has been authorized by the United Nations Security Council to conduct “good offices” in regard to the Cyprus negotiations (Report of the Secretary-General on his Mission of Good Offices in Cyprus 2010). In this capacity, the Secretary General facilitates discussions and, if possible, negotiations between disputant parties. He is exclusively commissioned to lend assistance to the parties in their quest for a settlement. He is not authorized to set forth plans, proffer suggestions or impose them on the parties. Until the Annan Plan process, none of the parties in Cyprus had consented to extend the mission of good offices to include arbitration. This was finally done by the AKP government in January 2004 (Palley 2005: 5-6).

The move represented not only a quantitative increase in the AKP’s diplomatic commitment, but also a qualitative shift in the diplomatic instruments it was willing to employ, as arbitration grants the Secretary General the right to “fill in the blanks” on controversial issues. The power of arbitration is essentially different from the mission of good offices, which had failed to achieve a solution since 1967. Thus, under the governance of the AKP, the political instruments utilized by Turkey have changed significantly. The government’s move was the crucial instrument that resulted in the emergence of the Annan Plan; without it, the plan might never have come about.

The power of arbitration was granted by Erdoğan on January 24, 2004, giving the Secretary General the right to submit proposals and plans to the parties and to impose them if he saw fit (Interview 15 September 27, 2011). In this arrangement, if one of the parties rejects a plan or proposal, the Secretary
General can make this public, increasing the pressure on the reluctant party. If they do not want to seem intransigent, the parties are forced to consent to the propositions offered by the Secretary General. This was what happened when Kofi Annan asked the parties to grant him the right to fill in the gaps in the plan if no agreement could be reached (Dodd 2010: 242-3).

The Greek Cypriot side did not want to give him this right, but they were forced to concede to avoid being labelled as the intransigent party, particularly as the Turkish side had already agreed. They finally gave in, under pressure, but they continued to protest throughout the process and again in September 2008. Erdoğan’s decision to give the Secretary General the power of arbitration was the most consequential instrumental change in Turkey’s Cyprus policy and a turning point in the process. Annan filled in the gaps himself, following consultation with the parties and with his special representative in Cyprus, and the Annan Plan came into existence (Interview 15 September 27, 2011).

If this authority had not been granted to the UN Secretary General, it would have been almost impossible for the parties to reach a compromise. By changing the instruments employed in the negotiations and putting the reluctant Greek Cypriot side under international pressure, the Turkish side forced them to accept the UN plan. However, the Greek Cypriot side subsequently rejected the plan in the referendum on April 24, 2004.

The second instrumental change in Turkey’s Cyprus policy was Ankara’s acceptance of a timetable for the progress of the talks. The government felt that, without a clear timetable, the negotiation process would have dragged on indefinitely and the efforts of the international community would have failed, as they had already done several times since 1967. The parties had to be moved on through the negotiation process to the final stage of give and take and the referendum. Accordingly, it was decided that following the comprehensive settlement talks in Nicosia between February 19 and March 22 and Bürgenstock in March 2004, the UN would come out with a
comprehensive settlement document, which would be put to referenda on both sides of the island in April 2004, before the entry of Cyprus into the EU.

The third instrument change by the AKP government has been its adoption of a range of new tactics. It has put pressure on the Turkish Cypriot government and launched a propaganda campaign to persuade the public to approve of the plan. When Denktaş, President of the TRNC from 1983 to 2005, refused to cooperate with the Turkish government, it accused him of being intransigent and inflexible. Instead, the AKP backed the advocates of the plan in northern Cyprus, like Mehmet Ali Talat, who presumed that the “Annan Plan has been the most realistic proposal ever put forward for a solution of the Cyprus dispute” (Interview 16 September 6, 2011). This was unprecedented in Turkish foreign policy; previous Turkish governments had always gone along with the status quo-oriented policies of Denktaş, who was widely admired by both the military and civilian bureaucratic elite and the general public.

Erdoğan suggested that Denktaş should wage his campaign against the Annan Plan in the TRNC rather than in Turkey, and Denktaş’s demand to address the Turkish parliament was ignored by the parliament leadership for a long time. Bülent Arınç, Speaker of the Parliament, did not refer to Denktaş as the “president” and said only that “he” could come and address the parliament. Eventually, the Former Parliamentarians Union asked parliament to provide a venue for Denktaş to speak, but they too were rebuffed. Arınç’s stance finally changed when he came under criticism from the Republican People’s Party, and Foreign Minister Abdullah Gül convinced him to let Denktaş address parliament. The affair created friction within the AKP, particularly among the nationalists. Süleyman Sarıbaş, the AKP deputy from the city of Malatya, announced that he would vote against the Annan Plan if it was brought to parliament. Fuat Geçen, the AKP deputy from the city of Hatay, also expressed reservations, arguing that little information had been released about the Annan Plan (Balcı April 19, 2004).

Not content with supporting Talat over Denktaş, the AKP sent MPs from the Turkish parliament to northern Cyprus. These MPs were carefully chosen, so
MPs from Hatay, for example, were sent to those regions in northern Cyprus that were occupied by Turkish Cypriots whose families had also originally come from Hatay. These deputies urged Turkish Cypriots to vote ‘yes’ for the sake of Turkey’s EU membership, adding that if Greek Cypriots rejected the plan and Turkish Cypriots approved it, the Turkish Cypriot state would be recognized by the international community. Consequently, many Turkish Cypriots voted in favour of the Annan Plan because they believed it would clear the way for the recognition of a Turkish Cypriot state (Kılıç Yaşın 2010). (Interview 17 July 26, 2011).

2. Change in the Policy Goal

A problem/goal change comes about when the decision-maker changes or forfeits their policy goal. Not just what is done and how it is done, but the purposes of the policy-maker shift. (Kleistra and Mayer 2001: 392-3) In 2002, Turkey’s foreign policy goal with regard to Cyprus shifted from the advocacy of a confederation, which had been its position since the mid-1990s, towards a bi-zonal, bi-communal federation consistent with the UN parameters. The AKP’s 2002 election manifesto clearly set out EU membership as a political goal alongside the resolution of the Cyprus disagreement by any means (Election Manifesto of the AKP 2002: 3-4 and 37).

A pure confederation denotes the coalescence of two or more autonomous states or entities that have agreed to jointly exercise power in defined areas of government activity such as security and foreign affairs. In confederations, policies and decisions must be made jointly and each side must have the right to secede from the union. A federation, on the other hand, is when ”several states, ordinarily separate and sovereign political units, or units with the claim of sovereignty, mutually agree to coalesce to form a state with a single central government whilst keeping some level of guaranteed sovereignty”. Although there is no right of secession for the regions or states, “the central authority alone cannot decide on the presence and character of the regional (or national)
authorities”. The involvement of the regional units in central decision-making is the supreme point here. (Dodd 1999: 3-5).

The Annan Plan modified the 1960 Constitution to envision a federal state with a single sovereignty rather than a confederation comprised of two parties with equal and separate sovereignty. The term “state” in the Annan Plan denotes “province” or “county” (Ismail 2010; Uluçevik 2010). The plan refers to the Greek and Turkish Cypriot states as “constituent states”; in other words, they are like the states of the US — without sovereignty. Like the 1960 Constitution, the Annan Plan did not grant the parties the right of self-determination. In this sense, it stipulated a federal structure.

Federalism and confederalism are controversial concepts and open to interpretation. The 1960 Republic of Cyprus might qualify as both a federation and a confederation. Similarly, while some scholars regard the Annan Plan as envisaging a federation, others consider that it intended to set up a confederation in Cyprus. Yet others see it as containing elements of both. The important point is that Ankara was ready to accept the UN parameters and to give the Secretary General the power of arbitration, implying that it was willing to accept whatever settlement plan the UN proposed. It not only abandoned its maximalist position to accept a federal solution in Cyprus; it assented that this would be based on the UN parameters. The change of stance was evidence of the new government’s genuine commitment to finding a solution in Cyprus consistent with the UN parameters and an example of its new, proactive approach to foreign policy.

The nub of the Cyprus dispute remains the different attitudes of the UN, Turkey and Turkish Cypriots on the one hand and Greek Cypriots on the other towards the status of Turkish Cypriots. While the UN and Turkey argue that Turkish Cypriots should possess equal sovereign rights and share administrative power with Greek Cypriots, the latter are inclined to view Turkish Cypriots as a minority and seem not to be ready to share power with them. This is in contradiction of the founding agreement, the 1960 Constitution and the UN parameters. In his report after the Greek Cypriot
rejection of the Annan Plan in the referenda of April 2004, Kofi Annan remarked that: “the Greek Cypriots were not ready to share power with the Turkish Cypriots and he advised the international community to lift the isolations on the Turkish Cypriots in view of their cooperation in the settlement of the Cyprus dissension” (Report of the Secretary-General Kofi Annan on His Mission of Good Offices in Cyprus 2004: Article 93).

Annan pointed out that in opting for unification, the Turkish Cypriots had abandoned their long-held policy of seeking recognition for their own state (Report of the Secretary-General Kofi Annan on His Mission of Good Offices in Cyprus 2004: Paragraph 87). The UN Security Council had passed resolutions refusing to recognize the TRNC, and partition would be counter to the UN’s objectives, but to move towards recognition would now also be to go against the will of the Turkish Cypriots themselves, who had voted in favour of reunification of the island (Report of the Secretary-General Kofi Annan on His Mission of Good Offices in Cyprus 2004: Paragraph 90). Annan’s comments offer clear proof that the UN envisions a federal solution in Cyprus, does not recognize the TRNC as a state and will not grant Turkish Cypriots the right of self-determination.

As set out earlier, for all its defects, there seems no alternative to a federal settlement in Cyprus. It is not the fist preference of either side, but the Greek Cypriot desire to see a unitary state is unacceptable to Turkish Cypriots, and the Turkish Cypriot dream of a recognized, independent state is rejected by Greek Cypriots. However, the Greek Cypriot rejection of the Annan Plan calls into question the Greek Cypriot willingness to concede to the foundation of a federal Cyprus. The Annan Plan called for compromise on both sides. While Turkish Cypriots have been prepared to relinquish their dream of statehood, their sovereignty and substantial segments of their territory, Greek Cypriots seem unwilling to agree to share their power and wealth with Turkish Cypriots.
3. The Normative Change

In the early 2000s, the normative foundation of Turkey’s Cyprus policy also changed. President Turgut Özal had attempted to settle the Cyprus discord in 1991, proposing a conference to include Greece, Turkey and the two communities on the island. This was a departure from Turkey’s traditional policy of non-involvement. However, he was turned down by the Greek and Greek Cypriot sides. Prime Minister Mesut Yılmaz also seemed to be ill at ease with Özal’s endeavours, pointing out that no Turkish government was in a position to make compromises on Cyprus in defiance of the nation’s wishes. Nevertheless, President Özal continued to push for Turkish involvement in negotiations between the two parties through Akbulut, his puppet prime minister. At the end of 1991, Demirel, the new Turkish Prime Minister, resumed Ankara’s previous stance of non-involvement (Uslu 2004: 219-21). Apart from Özal’s short-lived initiative, Turkish governments avoided actively engaging in the Cyprus dispute. The domestic environment during the 1990s made it inconvenient to push for a solution in Cyprus, and Turkey had to wait until the early 2000s to see another initiative emerge (Robins 2003: 121-2).

Özal’s bid to solve the Cyprus disagreement was prompted by his liberal outlook and his pragmatic and trade-oriented approach to foreign affairs. He liberalized the Turkish economy in the 1990s, privatizing many state enterprises and encouraging the emergence of a vibrant private business sector. He was in favour of expanding Turkey’s commercial and economic bonds with its neighbours, and pursued economically oriented foreign policy to foster inter-dependency between the countries in the region (Kemal Kirişçi 2006a: 11). Özal sought a settlement to the Cyprus dispute in the hope that it would promote trade which would improve Greek-Turkish relations.

Like Özal, the AKP espoused a more liberal and trade-oriented foreign policy. Prior to 2002, Turkey had assumed a passive approach on the Cyprus question; Denktaş, a highly esteemed figure and a national hero in Turkey, had the ear of the Turkish government. Denktaş’s high national standing in Turkey
rendered him a very hard and awkward target for Turkish governments to attack (Ker-Lindsay 2005: 2-3). Ankara simply supported the negotiations between the two sides and followed a policy of non-intervention. Since 2002, the new Turkish government has embraced a policy of proactive involvement. It has taken the initiative (in the words of Prime Minister Gül: “Turkey will be one step ahead”) and intervened in the process to push the Turkish Cypriot leadership and Turkish Cypriots towards approval of the Annan Plan. The AKP ended Ankara’s policy of leaving the last word to Denktas. Indeed, Erdogan did not scruple to publicly criticize Denktas and other opponents of the Annan Plan and to back its supporters. This new approach reflected Ankara’s new foreign policy doctrine of settling Turkey’s problems with its neighbours (zero problems), adopting a conciliatory stance and seeking “win-win” solutions.

As part of its policy to ensure “zero problems with neighbours”, the new leadership sought to reduce security risks and maximize Turkey’s joint interests. As the biggest economy in the Balkans, Caucasia and the Middle East, it has followed the principles of proactive engagement and preventive diplomacy as a way of reducing the risks posed by regional instability, underdevelopment and poverty. Davutoğlu argued that high-level political dialogue, economic interdependence, a common approach to security and mutual tolerance are crucial to securing regional stability, and that simmering conflicts must be addressed before they flare up as they might have unfavourable consequences for Turkey. At the same time, foreign policy has been guided by the desire to change Turkey’s image from a hard to a soft power; it has wished to be seen as a country that is culturally inclusive, economically prosperous and militarily secure (Davutoğlu 2010).

These new norms became the driving force of Turkish foreign policy change not just in Cyprus but on the whole. The country has genuinely endeavoured to smooth out its differences with its neighbours and to stabilize its neighbourhood. The AKP government has attempted to address deep-seated issues with Cyprus, Greece and Armenia, but its initiatives have repeatedly been frustrated by the inflexible agendas of its neighbours. In the mid-2000s,
Turkey took the lead in founding a free economic zone encompassing Syria, Lebanon, Jordan and Turkey. Its efforts to liberalize the economies of these countries were again thwarted by the outbreak of anti-regime rebellion in Syria in 2011.

To sum up, Turkey’s Cyprus policy changed in 2002 in three key ways. The AKP changed its policy instruments, extending the good offices mission of the UN Secretary General to include arbitration and making the emergence of the Annan Plan possible. The government also pushed for a fixed calendar on the Cyprus talks, put pressure on the TRNC administration and campaigned for an affirmative vote for the Annan Plan in northern Cyprus. Secondly, the goal of Turkish foreign policy radically changed from advocacy of a confederal solution to support for a bi-zonal, bi-communal federation on the basis of the UN parameters. Thirdly, the normative foundations of Turkey’s Cyprus policy changed substantially. While Ankara had previously regarded the TRNC as a national cause and looked at the Cyprus issue from a security perspective, the new Turkish government adopted a more cooperative and pragmatic foreign policy approach with an eye to settling Turkey’s rifts with its neighbours.

In the following chapter, I lay out a list of potential variables that can affect foreign policy change before focusing on my theory chapter. I extracted these variables from an analysis of the literature on foreign policy alteration. The variables in the list are not exhaustive and can be expanded by exploration of other determinants. These variables help determine potential variables of Turkey’s foreign policy change on Cyprus. The list may also help scholars to determine the causes of foreign policy behaviour in other cases. After the next chapter, I focus on the theory chapter on Turkish foreign policy change on Cyprus. I draw on some of the variables from the following list to construct my model to account for Turkish foreign policy change on Cyprus.
CHAPTER IV: EXPLAINING FOREIGN POLICY CHANGE

This chapter discusses those variables which might cause a government to alter its foreign policy. The list, which is presented in Table II, has been compiled following examination of the literature on foreign policy change. It is not exhaustive and other determinants may be identified by foreign policy analysts. Each variable is briefly analysed and its relevance to the Turkish policy change on Cyprus is considered. This analysis of individual determinants is the first step to constructing a model specific to Turkey’s foreign policy change on Cyprus.
### TABLE I: Potential Factors in Foreign Policy Change

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Independent Variable (carrier for or barrier to change)</th>
<th>Factor</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>International System</strong></td>
<td><strong>International institutionalization of norms</strong> (Goldmann 1982; Rosati 1994; Kleistra and Mayer 2001; Smith, 2004)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td><strong>Structural interdependence</strong> (Goldmann 1982)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td><strong>Influential third parties</strong> (Goldmann 1982; Greffenius 1994; Kleistra and Mayer 2001)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td><strong>Major international developments</strong> (C. F. Hermann 1990; Volgy and Schwarz 1991; Gustavsson 1999)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>National Political System</strong></td>
<td><strong>National parliaments</strong> (Kleistra and Mayer 2001; Robins 2003; Kaarbo 2010; Kesgin and Kaarbo 2010; Doeser 2010)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td><strong>Dominant interest groups</strong> (C. F. Hermann 1990; Moravcsik 1993; Skidmore 1994; Kleistra and Mayer 2001)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td><strong>Democratization</strong> (T.W. Park et al. 1994; Kaliber 2005)</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td><strong>Media</strong> (Robins 2003; Öniş 2003; Oppermann 2010; Özcan 2010)</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td><strong>Economic development</strong> (T.W. Park et al. 1994)</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td><strong>Cultural change</strong> (Rynhold 2007)</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td><strong>Major internal developments</strong> (Gustavsson 1999; Müftüler Baç 2008; Eralp 2009)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Organizational System</strong></td>
<td><strong>Domestic institutionalization</strong> (Goldmann 1982; Hagan 1994; Barnett 1999; Checkel 2001; Robins 2003; Fuller 2004; Ilgıt and Özekçeci-Taner 2011)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td><strong>Bureaucratic advocacy</strong> (C. F. Hermann 1990; Volgy and Schwarz 1991; Schraeder 1994; Rosati 1994)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td><strong>Presence of alternative policy options</strong> (Goldmann 1982; Moravcsik 1993; Kleistra and Mayer 2001)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td><strong>Decision-making mandate</strong> (M. G. Hermann and C. F. Hermann 1989; M. G. Hermann 2001)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Individual Policymakers/Leaders</strong></td>
<td><strong>Preferences and interests of the leadership</strong> (Holsti 1982; Goldmann 1982; M. G. Hermann 1984,</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Numerous scholars have pointed out the multi-causal nature of foreign policy change (Holsti 1982; Goldmann 1982; C.F. Hermann 1990; Carlsnaes 1993; Rosati 1994; Gustavsson 1999; Kleistra and Mayer 2001). An examination of the literature indicates that the causes of foreign policy change can be grouped into four main categories: external causes, domestic causes, causes related to the organizational structure and causes related to the leadership. This is reflected in the table above. The following sections analyse how these determinants affect foreign policy change in general before showing how they apply in the case of Turkey’s policy on Cyprus. The main factors that prompted Turkey’s policy change – the change in leadership, international institutionalization, pressure from interest groups and changes in the nature of Turkey’s decision-making process – are analysed in the theory chapter.

1. Causes Related to the International System

Scholars agree that external factors have a significant impact on foreign policy shift (Goldmann 1982; Holsti 1982; C.F. Hermann 1990; Carlsnaes 1993; Rosati 1994; Gustavsson 1999; Kleistra and Mayer 2001). It has been argued that the dialectical interplay between state, society and the global environment affects the degree to which foreign policy changes (Rosati 1994: 221), while Goldmann suggests that foreign policy changes in response to shifting conditions or environmental circumstances as a process of adaptation to the new environment (Goldmann 1982: 247). Holsti also sees external factors as independent variables that can affect foreign policy alteration. These external factors may include military or non-military threats and the vulnerabilities and dependencies created by previous relationships (Holsti 1982b: 14).

Hermann argues that one of the primary agents of foreign policy change is external shock (C. F. Hermann 1990: 12-3), while Carlsnaes points to the
influence of the structural dimension or the international system. (Carlsnaes 1993: 19-21). Another model suggests that change may be triggered by a change in fundamental structural conditions, which are influenced by both international and domestic factors. The international factors may be political (such as inter-nation power relationships and the military aspects of national security) or economic (transnational economic transactions and their institutional circumstances) (Gustavsson 1999: 83-5). A shift in the international system may function as either a barrier to or carrier for change (Kleistra and Mayer 2001: 392). Also highlighted are the roles played by international institutionalization, interdependency, third parties and major external developments. These are discussed in further detail below.

1.1. International Institutionalization

International institutionalization is one of the international factors that may bring about foreign policy change (Goldmann 1982; Rosati 1994; Kleistra and Mayer 2001; Smith, 2004). International institutionalization refers to the treaties and agreements signed by a government, and to international commitments and expectations which affect foreign policy (Goldmann 1982: 253-4). As international institutionalization is of particular relevance to this research, it is discussed at length in the theory chapter.

1.2. Interdependence

Interdependence may be defined here as a mutual structural dependence between two states. If the two governments share a similar policy outlook, it is easier to effect a change in foreign policy. On the other hand, if one government wishes to make a change that would bring it into conflict with its partner, this might undermine their continuing interaction. This consideration may inhibit foreign policy change (Goldmann 1982: 253-4).

The impact of interdependence on foreign policy was illustrated during the Cold War. By the 1970s, Germany had become more dependent on its export
business with Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union than it was on the US. The US, on the other hand, refused to do business with its Cold War enemies. The higher degree of interdependence between Europe and the Soviet Union accounts for Europe’s unwillingness to join the US in its retributive policies towards the Soviet Union. Thus, from the US perspective, interdependence did not serve as a medium to stabilize détente, however, from the EU perspective, it helped to foster East/West détente. (Goldmann 1982: 263-4).

Similarly, Turkey’s bid to settle its differences with Armenia in the 2000s conflicted with its policy towards its ally Azerbaijan. When Armenia occupied areas of Azerbaijani territory in 1993, Turkey had closed its border with Armenia. When the Armenian-Turkish rapprochement process started in 2008, Azerbaijan opposed Turkey’s attempt to normalize its relations with Armenia as the latter had not withdrawn from its territory. Thus, Turkey’s alliance with Azerbaijan impeded the reconciliation process between Armenia and Turkey.

1.3. Third Parties

Another international systemic factor is the impact of third parties within the international system; their support or opposition can stabilize or de-stabilize a policy (Goldmann 1982: 253-4) For example, third parties had a huge influence on the Camp David negotiations of the late 1970s. Without US mediation, talks between Egypt and Israel would have been unlikely (Greffenius 1994: 214-6), but while the US served as a facilitator, the process was adversely affected by Syria and Iraq’s hostility to Egypt’s attempt at rapprochement with Israel.

The EU is the most important third party to have affected Turkish foreign policy on Cyprus. It pressured Turkey to accept the Annan Plan prior to the accession of the Republic of Cyprus into the EU. As will be explained in the theory chapter, the EU’s impact on Turkey’s Cyprus policy has become more far-reaching and institutionalized with Turkey’s accession process and the entry of the Republic of Cyprus into the EU. The power of international
institutionalization means the EU now plays a much more significant role in Turkey’s Cyprus policy.

1.4. Major External Developments

Major external developments may have an immediate impact on the policies of the affected countries (C. F. Hermann 1990: 12). Gustavsson describes such important developments as international structural factors, dividing them into two categories: international political factors and international economic factors (Gustavsson 1999: 83-4). The Vietnam Tet Offensive in 1968, the Jerusalem visit of Sadat in 1977 and the 1971 decision of the US to suspend the convertibility of dollar into gold are all examples of developments that significantly affected the policies of the countries involved (C. F. Hermann 1990: 12). Other examples are the 1973 Oil Crisis, which affected the foreign policy of many European states (Volgy and Schwarz 1991: 631), and the termination of the Cold War and its effect on the policies of most countries.

The major external development that pushed Turkey to reorient its foreign and security policy was the end of the Cold War in 1990 (Oğuzlu 2010: 672). The end of the Cold War had wide-ranging impacts on world politics; as the Soviet superpower collapsed, a power vacuum arose and a new world order surfaced. The forces of ethnic nationalism, religious fundamentalism and even terrorism gathered strength in the old Soviet regions. Turkey, which sat at the centre of these instabilities, was faced with the challenge of constructing a foreign policy to respond to the ideological/political vacuum, micro/ethnic nationalism and the growing power politics between the US, Russia and larger EU countries, who were all looking to exploit the power vacuum in Eurasia (Gözen 2004: 28-30 and 31-2).

To what extent is Turkey’s policy change on Cyprus the result of such structural issues? I would argue that they alone are not responsible; more important are the leadership’s change in outlook, the dynamics of decision-making in Turkish politics and the influence of the EU accession process.
2. Domestic Political Causes of Foreign Policy Change

Scholars also agree on the importance of the domestic factor (Goldmann 1982; Holst 1982; Hermann 1990; Rosati 1994; Gustavsson 1999; Kleistra and Mayer 2001). Factors associated with the national political system may contribute to or curb foreign policy alteration (Kleistra and Mayer 2001: 392). It has been argued that the dialectical interplay between state, society and environment leads to modification in foreign policy (Rosati 1994: 221). Holsti cites internal threats, economic conditions and political factionalization as some of the reasons why foreign policy is restructured (Holsti 1982b: 14), while Hermann identifies domestic factors as one of the main motivations for what he calls domestic restructuring (C. F. Hermann 1990: 12-3). The domestic politics of the state – what Goldmann calls political stabilizers – may also hinder foreign policy change (Goldmann 1982: 247). Political domestic factors might include electoral results, opinion polls and coalitions involving major political actors, while domestic economic factors include GDP growth, inflation rates and unemployment levels (Gustavsson 1999: 83-5). All these factors can impact upon foreign policy.

The following paragraphs explore the domestic factors operating in Turkey and their effect on the policy change on Cyprus. The literature highlights a number of possible influences including parliament, interest groups, public opinion, democratization, the media, economic development, cultural change, regime change, major internal developments and crisis situations (Goldmann 1982; Putnam 1988; Hermann 1990; Moravcsik 1993; Hagan 1994).

2.1. Parliament

The literature acknowledges that parliaments may either catalyse or inhibit foreign policy change (Kleistra and Mayer 2001: 392), but it suggests that they generally play a minimal role in decision-making on foreign policy. This is especially true in a single-party government, where individuals may be
forbidden from voting against the leadership’s decision on pain of punishment. Thus, in single-party governments, parliament might only play a marginal role in foreign policy-making (Kesgin and Kaarbo 2010: 21).

Only in exceptional situations will parliaments play a major role in foreign policy. The parliamentary opposition to the Danish footnote policy, for example, was effectively an attack on the ruling party’s pro-NATO policy. Between 1982 and 1988, the opposition majority in parliament passed a series of parliamentary resolutions on foreign policy that ran counter to the government line. Thus, during this period, the official foreign policy of Denmark was actually being formulated by the opposition (Doeser 2010: 6-7).

In the Turkish context, the Turkish Grand National Assembly has traditionally played a secondary role in Turkish foreign policy-making (Kaarbo 2010: 9; Robins 2003: 79-80). The parliament deals with domestic political issues and has only a limited interest in foreign affairs, which it conducts through the Foreign Affairs Commission. The Commission is in charge of discussing new foreign affairs bills, conducting trips abroad and receiving visiting foreigners (Robins 2003: 79). Much debate takes place in parliament, but in practice, the parties tend to follow the policies of their leaders, the government or the military. Only in exceptional cases does the Turkish parliament play a role in foreign policy decisions. One of these exceptions was its rejection in March 2003 of the government’s motion to allow US forces to use Turkey as a base in their intervention in Iraq (Kaarbo 2010: 9). Faced with a divided government, the leadership did not want to take sole responsibility for the decision. The executive did not enforce party discipline but gave MPs a free vote on the issue.

In contrast, when a government is powerful and the leadership of the governing party enforces party discipline, the role of the parliament wanes (Kesgin and Kaarbo 2010: 34). In March 2003, the Turkish Parliament demonstrated its plain backing for the status-quo in Cyprus. The communique laid out by the participation of all the political parties in the parliament read that “any solution in Cyprus should protect the political equality of the two
communities and a settlement could not be a pre-condition for Turkey’s accession into the EU.” Despite this avowed backing for the TRNC, the AKP government was able to shift Ankara’s traditional Cyprus policy (TBMM Reports Journal March 11, 2003). So it was that the Turkish parliament played no role in the policy change on Cyprus. The decisions were taken by Erdoğan alone. The AKP was the majority party in parliament and no individual within the AKP government was in a position to contest Erdoğan’s decisions.

2.2. Interest Groups

It has been posited that dominant interest groups within a country may influence its foreign policy decisions. These groups may facilitate foreign policy alteration when the government’s policies are in their interests or they may serve as a barrier to foreign policy shift if the policies of the government are at odds with their interests (Kleistra and Mayer 2001: 392). This factor is examined at length in the theory chapter as interest groups, especially business interests, were one of the key determinants in Turkish foreign policy change on Cyprus. Business interests are becoming increasingly influential in Turkey’s foreign policy decisions as Turkey emerges as a regional economic power.

2.3. Public Opinion

A number of scholars have pointed to public opinion as a factor that might have an impact on foreign policy decisions. Hermann asserts that foreign policy change is likely when constituencies, or the relationships between them, shift. A dramatic shift in a domestic constituent’s behaviour or belief may give rise to a new alignment and attract many new supporters; this new popularity may incline policy-makers towards a shift in foreign policy (C. F. Hermann 1990: 7). In this framework, public support may make it easier to alter foreign policy; conversely, public opposition can obstruct change (Kleistra and Mayer 2001: 392).
Scholars have looked at the impact of public opinion on foreign policy within three different types of domestic structure. A state-dominated structure is characterized by centralized political institutions and a polarized society with weak social organization. Societal actors/public opinion have no influence in this type of structure and coalition building is limited to the political elite. In the societal control model, on the other hand, society is likely to be homogeneous with a high degree of mobilization and weak state structures. The policy network is controlled by society and public opinion plays a key role. Finally, in the democratic corporate structure, social organizations and political institutions have comparable levels of power. In this type of structure, political and societal actors bargain to find common ground, ultimately compromising to create middle-of-the-road-policies (Risse-Kappen 1991: 486).

Public opinion matters in liberal countries and an overwhelming public consensus may well stall policy-makers. Even here, though, the public impact on foreign policy decisions is limited and indirect (Risse-Kappen 1991: 510-1). The public by and large reacts emotionally rather than rationally on foreign policy matters. When they approve they cheer; when they disapprove they boo and demand more action. Public reaction is also time-specific and contingent on the situation; it does no more than prescribe the outer limits of a leader’s action at a specific point in time. It can guide the leader’s actions, but it can also be manipulated to serve his purpose (M. G. Hermann 1988: 274-5).

Canada is one example of public opinion playing a significant role as a carrier for foreign policy alteration. Growing public sensitivity about Canada’s dependence on the US pushed Canadian leaders to reduce this dependence. The change in Canadian policy between 1972 and 1980 was a slow governmental response to growing public concern regarding American investment in Canada and the negative consequences of the country’s growing cultural, economic and policy dependence on the US (Holsti 1982a: 92-5).

The limited assimilation of the democratic culture in the Turkish political setting means that relationships between the political parties and their
supporters are shaped by clientelist bonds. Hence, Turkish foreign policy is predominantly formulated by the political elite. Since the social and economic transformation of Turkey began in the 1990s, individuals are less dependent on the state for a living, civil society has grown, and the media has proliferated. Although these all indicate the emergence of a Western European-style, liberal society (Robins 2003: 90-1), public opinion still has only a limited influence on Turkish foreign policy, and Turkish public opinion continues to be managed by the Turkish foreign policy elite (Kaarbo 2010: 9-10). The occasion described in Section 2.1, when MPs were allowed a free vote on whether Turkey should permit the US to use it as a staging post in its Iraq intervention, was a rare opportunity for the public (through its MPs) to sway foreign policy, but it was only made possible because the government was divided and the leadership did not want to take sole responsibility for the decision. Under normal circumstances, the powerful government leadership reinforces party discipline and both parliament and public opinion have little effect on foreign policy decisions. The leadership assumes full responsibility for its decisions and indeed has the power to manipulate public opinion (Kesgin and Kaarbo 2010: 19-20 and 34).

Before 2002, foreign policy decisions were made collectively by the foreign ministry, the security establishment (the National Security Council), the Prime Minister, the President and coalition leaders, depending on the situation. After 2002, the AKP, as a popular, single party government, was able to mobilize public opinion and the various interest groups in favour of Turkey’s accession to the EU. It was then able to put together a powerful coalition to change Turkey’s Cyprus policy. Thus, public opinion did have an indirect impact on the Cyprus policy change.

2.4. Democratization

The transition from authoritarianism to democracy may also have an impact on a country’s foreign policy through its effect on ideology and value systems, the state-society relationship and the regime’s political interests. The
breakdown of an authoritarian regime will be accompanied by a change in ideology and value systems. The public may have become disillusioned with the ideologies an authoritarian regime uses to legitimize its activities, such as nationalism, and with its dogmatic approach to issues such as national security, economic development and social stability. This may be accompanied by growing popular support for democratic ideals. During democratization, attitudes to national security may well be reappraised, leading the government to dramatically change its foreign policies (T. W. Park et al. 1994: 171-2).

As well as the ideology and value systems, democratization also affects the state-society relationship. This change has three dimensions. First, state control over manpower, economic activities and mass media is reduced (this may have implications for the implementation of foreign policy). Second, the state’s autonomy diminishes and the relationship between the state and the social elite becomes more complex. Previously dominant interest groups lose some of their political sway, and a larger societal interest group emerges to form new pressure groups. Third, its increased legitimacy gives the state greater power to push for its foreign policy goals. (T. W. Park et al. 1994: 174).

Since the 1990s, Turkish society has gone through a major process of transformation. The AKP could only come to power after radically moving towards the centre of Turkish politics. The political parties with strict ideologies, such as the Republican People’s Party and the Nationalist Action Party, could not mobilize public support and lost their popularity. Partly as a result of the EU accession process, the military, which has held fast to the traditional nationalist standpoint on Cyprus, lost its influence over foreign policy. Its security-oriented discourse on Cyprus lost its legitimacy and it was unable to mobilize public opinion in favour of maintaining the status quo on the island.

The AKP entirely gave up the nationalist and security-oriented standpoint of the previous coalition government. The growing democratization of Turkish
society, the pluralization of the media and the emergence of liberal intellectuals and scholars since the 1990s have all combined to foster an environment in which opinions can be freely expressed. Thus, the Annan Plan was discussed publicly in the run up to the referendum on April 24, 2004. The democratic context was therefore important in facilitating Turkey’s foreign policy change on Cyprus. However, democratization alone cannot account for the change; the mainstream political parties continue to adhere to the traditional Turkish policy on Cyprus. The key factor was the new leadership.

2.5. Media

Salience refers to the significance of an issue. In domestic politics, an issue becomes salient if it receives public attention, or if decision-makers give it importance within their political agenda (Oppermann 2010: 3-4). When a foreign policy issue is perceived as salient, policy in that area is likely to remain stable. Low salience, on the other hand, is likely to create instability in foreign policy. Low salience occurs where policy-makers are highly sensitive to the external environment and the political cost of abandoning previous policies is seen as low (Goldmann 1982: 251-2).

When the public see an issue as salient, it is more likely to influence individual voting decisions. They will only respond to a policy outcome when the issue is seen as salient. Thus, the higher the issue’s salience, the greater the public response. Media coverage of a foreign policy issue can strongly influence its perceived salience, since most of the time, the media is the public’s only source of information on external matters. The more extensively an issue is reported in the media, the more importance is attached to it by the public (Oppermann 2010: 4-5 and 6-7).

Turkish private media activity has exploded in range and volume since 1989. A broad pluralism exists in the Turkish press in terms of radio and television broadcasting. Various perspectives such as nationalism, liberalism, the secular right, social democracy and Islamism are discussed regularly on television in a
range of programmes. However, the press is probably of greater weight in terms of foreign policy. In both cases, measurement of the media’s impact on foreign policy is exceedingly difficult (Robins 2003: 80-2).

The debate on the Cyprus issue in the second half of 1992 highlighted the media’s influence. Mümtaz Soysal, an esteemed academic and then adviser of President Öæal (who wanted to settle the Cyprus problem), vigorously supported Denktas’s position in the press. Against him emerged Cengiz Çandar, a liberal columnist known to be close to Öæal. Çandar defended Öæal’s initiatives on Cyprus, claiming that they were in the national interest. In this case, the battle in the media was won by Mümtaz Soysal, who was able to win over public opinion (Robins 2003: 83-4).

In the debate over the Annan Plan, however, the tide of popular opinion began to turn. In the early 2000s, the business elite began to question the military’s strategy of retaining two separate states on the island. This time, the military was unable to enlist the support of the media, which had come under the direct control of key industrial and financial players. Reports were published criticizing the stance of the military on Cyprus and undermining its position. The media also criticized Denktas for previous financial irregularities (G. Öæcan 2010: 33). In this process, Denktas’s public image gradually underwent a radical deconstruction from a preeminent national figure symbolizing Turkish pride, heroic resistance and unyielding national will into a fallible, self-serving political leader (Anastasiou 2008: 121-2).

Eventually, the mainstream media opted to distance itself from the military on the Cyprus question. The Army Commander Aytaç Yalman’s visit to Cyprus before the referendum in 2004 was generally ignored and even criticized by some in the mainstream media. This new attitude was in stark contrast to its bellicose approach during the Syrian crisis of October 1998, which had left the Syrians feeling that Turkey could attack at any time (G. Öæcan 2010: 33-4).

In brief, the media was effectively employed by the backers of the Annan Plan, such as the TÜSİAD, in the run up to the April 2004 referendum. The
TÜSİAD, whose members owned much of the media, used it to propagate their ideas to both the policy-makers and the public (Öniş 2003: 13). The example shows that even though the media may not have a direct impact on foreign policy, it can be employed to manipulate public opinion to fall in with the interests of dominant groups.

2.6. **Economic Development**

A number of scholars have pointed out that economic development may serve as a carrier for foreign policy alteration. The nature of the relationship between the national economy and the international political economy, and the effect of international systemic change, must be taken into account. Economic growth may make a more independent foreign policy feasible, but export-led growth policies may also render such national economies more vulnerable to international economic change. For instance, their phenomenal economic growth over the last two decades has brought Korea and Taiwan face to face with the protectionist policies of the US and the European Community. These high, protectionist barriers have influenced their external economic policies and forced them to harmonize their own interests with those of others (T. W. Park et al. 1994: 174-5).

Since 1980, Turkey has espoused an export-oriented economic model. At the urging of Turkish business circles, this has entailed the integration of the Turkish economy with the world economy. Consequently, Turkey’s policy towards its neighbours has been to a great extent influenced by economic considerations; it has become interested in creating a more stable neighbourhood in order to protect and further its regional economic interests. Any Turkish government has to take account of Turkey’s economic interests. The AKP’s policy to stabilize the region and create interdependencies is in line with the wishes of the business community, which wants to see a stable business environment in the region. The pursuit of economic development does not sit easily with security-oriented policy as it implies a more
integrationist outlook based on economic interdependence. Having said this, continuing regional instability has made the policy difficult to implement.

Turkey’s economic growth has played a role in Turkey’s policy change on Cyprus in the sense that Turkey needs a stable neighbourhood to further its economic interests. Ankara desires a region in which all the economies are integrated and borders are permeable. To this end, it developed the “zero problems with neighbours” policy. However, economic development alone does not explain the change in policy on Cyprus; the previous coalition government supported economic development while continuing to pursue its traditional policy on the discord. Again, the change must be attributed to the new foreign policy vision of the AKP leadership.

2.7. Cultural Change

Cultural shift within a society may give rise to foreign policy alteration. For example, it has been argued that a post-materialist cultural shift on the liberal left was the main impetus behind Israel’s decision to participate in the Oslo peace process. In Israeli society, the class-based divide between capitalism and socialism has been redrawn along cultural lines, with liberal post-modernists opposing conservative materialists. Liberal post-modernists, who are leftist in outlook, are drawn from the well-educated middle-class, while materialist rightists represent the less affluent, less well-educated parts of Israeli society (Rynhold 2007: 419-22).

It has been suggested that the rise of post-modernism in Israel brought about a shift in the domestic power balance, giving Rabin, the leader of the Labour Party, greater political power and encouraged him to pursue a liberal foreign policy. As a new generation replaced the old, the post-modernist ideas of the liberal left started to spread through the political culture, but however, their penetration into Israel’s left-wing parties, political culture remained and foreign policy-making system remained limited. Broader domestic and international political circumstances and the opposition of nationalist and
religious parties also conspired to limit their impact. As a result, the liberal left was marginalized and the Oslo process collapsed. The cultural shift temporarily opened up a new foreign policy vision within Israel in terms of its interests and strategy, but the failure of the Oslo process shows that cultural change alone is not enough to effect real, long-term foreign policy change (Rynhold 2007: 435-6).

In the Turkish context, the right adheres to religious, conservative and nationalist values, while the left is characterized chiefly by its secularism. The party political system is dominated by the ongoing struggle between the centralized, cohesive and heavily secularized state elite and a culturally heterogeneous opposition with strong religious leanings. Centre-right parties have historically relied heavily on anti-state or anti-establishment sentiment to expand their electoral base (Öniş 2009: 36-7). Recently, Islamists have moved to the centre of Turkey’s political spectrum; they have taken a prominent role within Turkey’s Europeanization project and embraced European values and norms. This cultural shift among Islamists has been a major factor in Turkey’s foreign policy change on Cyprus – this is discussed more fully in the theory chapter.

2.8. Regime Change

A revolution or a great transformation within the political system may also be the catalyst for foreign policy change, as might a shift in the economic regime (C. F. Hermann 1990: 7 and 10-1). Hagan contends that regime change may be caused by: a change in leadership, ruling faction or coalition; the routine exchange of power between contending mainstream parties or groups (for example following elections); or a political revolution that brings to power an anti-system group or coalition. The most significant barrier to foreign policy alteration is domestic political division between competing personalities, bureaucracies/institutions, factions, parties or political groups. Dissidents within the ruling party, the military, the legislature and regional governments
may publicly oppose the regime, forcing it to make concessions to retain their support and stay in power (Hagan 1994: 144-5, 52 and 55).

The AKP’s advent to power in 2002 was an example of the routine exchange of power between mainstream parties within a democratic system. It replaced the coalition government through a general election, in accordance with regular political norms. The new government did not change the democratic-secular nature of the Turkish state. The arrival of this new leadership was a crucial determinant of Turkish foreign policy change – this is discussed further in the theory chapter.

2.9. Major Internal Developments

A shift in fundamental structural domestic conditions may also result in the alteration of foreign policy. These structural conditions may be political or economic: domestic structural political factors include the outcomes of elections, opinion polls and coalitions; while domestic structural economic factors relate to the economy’s general health, as determined by GDP growth, inflation rates and unemployment levels. An example would be Sweden’s serious economic problems in the late 1980s and early 1990s, which pushed the Swedish government to seek EU membership (Gustavsson 1999: 83).

The February-March 2001 domestic financial crisis in Turkey was a major internal economic development that pushed the coalition government to embark upon a process of economic and political restructuring (Müftüler-Baç 2008: 207). It has been argued that this economic crisis made big business as well as Turkey’s small and medium sized enterprises that the country needed an “EU anchor” to help it come through the challenges facing the economy (Eralp 2009: 5). However, although economic developments have sharpened Turkey’s desire to join the EU, the economic dimension is only one aspect of the country’s EU aspirations; it alone does not explain Turkey’s foreign policy change on Cyprus.
3. Factors Related to the Organizational Structure

Factors related to the organizational structure of a state may also have an impact on foreign policy restructuring (Goldmann 1982; Holsti 1982; C.F. Hermann 1990; Carlsnaes 1993; Rosati 1994; Gustavsson 1999; Kleistra and Mayer 2001). Holsti considers the impact of bureaucratic pressures on the policy-making process (Holsti 1982b: 14 and 221), while Rosati points to the impact of the factors related to the organizational structure (Rosati 1994: 221). Hermann identifies bureaucratic advocacy as an influential factor and advocates that a government can shift its foreign policy orientation only after a decision-making process. (C. F. Hermann 1990: 12-3). Conversely, one of the main factors inhibiting foreign policy alteration is the existence of administrative stabilizers (Goldmann 1982: 247).

Carlsnaes points to the importance of the dispositional dimension, or how a particular intention is espoused by a particular political actor (Carlsnaes 1993: 19-21). Gustavsson maintains that foreign policy change occurs at the end of the decision-making process, during the course of which individual actors attempt to persuade others to their view (Gustavsson 1999: 83-5). Organizational factors may function as either barriers to or carriers for foreign policy change (Kleistra and Mayer 2001: 392).

The following sections consider in more detail the significance of factors related to the organizational structure: domestic institutionalization, bureaucratic advocacy, the presence of alternative policy options and the decision-making mandate.

3.1. Domestic Institutionalization

Domestic institutionalization refers to the degree to which a policy is institutionalized. A high degree of institutionalization inhibits change. (Goldmann 1982: 251-2). In political terms, institutionalization determines the political norms regulating the exchanges between the ruling party and the
opposition. While leaders in democracies are highly constrained by structural norms, leaders in non-institutionalized closed polities have minimal restrictions to their behaviour (Hagan 1994: 155-7). A leadership may stick to certain ideas, principles and policies if it strongly affiliates itself with them. A leadership, with less association with these ideas and principles, on the other hand, is likely to distance itself from them. Certain ideas and principles may also spread across the society through the writing of history and educational system.

Germany’s citizenship law, dating back to 1913, emphasized the connection between citizen and nation. By mid-1990s, this understanding of identity and citizenship was still held by many Germans. German understanding of identity and citizenship was consolidated over time as the concepts were institutionalized in domestic regulations and institutions. However, this domestic institutional setting was at odds with the regional outlook of the EU (Checkel 2001: 567-8).

The institutional context determines which groups will be more influential in the political framework. However, this institutional structure is itself open to change as a result of the interaction between different individuals and groups. Normative structures determine the rules of the game and what is and is not possible, but they can be manipulated by talented strategic actors (M. Barnett 1999: 26-8).

In the Turkish context, the historical role of the military in Turkish politics was explicitly institutionalized through legislation in 1960. Up until 1960, the military played a central but covert role in politics. After the 1960 coup d’etat, the military’s influence on government and policy-making was given a constitutional framework through the establishment of the National Security Council (MGK). The military could give its opinion to the MGK on political-security related issues (Robins 2003: 75-7).

The military has been a rigid follower of Kemalist principles, which were institutionalized within the Turkish state structure during the early years of the
The six principles of Kemalism, which were a response to Turkey’s historical suffering at the hands of Western imperialist powers, first appeared in the Republican People Party’s (RPP) manifesto in 1927 and 1935 and were subsequently enshrined in the Turkish Constitution in 1937. They express a forceful anti-imperialist, nationalist stance; Article two of the Turkish Constitution stipulates that “Turkey is a republican, nationalist, populist, state socialist, secular and revolutionist state.” Thus, up until 1946, Kemalist principles were seen as an integral part of the state identity (Ilgit and Özçekeci-Taner 2012: 12).

Kemalism, which envisioned a Western orientation and democratic-laic Turkish state, determined the institutional confines for any political party operating within the Turkish political context. However, when Turkey entered its post-Atatürk period in the 1990s, this institutionalized structure started to break down. It was further undermined when the AKP party came to power in 2002. The new leadership no longer strictly adhered to the Kemalist principles of nationalism and secularism. With regard to Cyprus, the AKP deviated from the traditional nationalist discourse and successfully assumed a pragmatic approach to settle the dispute. As democratization gathered pace, boosted by the EU process, Kemalist ideology lost its legitimacy as the ruling principle of the country, and the military lost its power over the decision-making process. This change in Turkey’s domestic institutionalized structure is discussed in further detail in Chapter VI.

### 3.2. Bureaucratic Advocacy

Bureaucrats are generally conservative in nature and inclined to preserve the status quo, often because they fear that a deviation from standard operating procedures may adversely affect their career. Most bureaucrats see change as challenging the integrity of their entrenched institutional mission and few favour alterations in policy. The conservative and self-interested character of most bureaucratic institutions tends to force their members to counter change (Schraeder 1994: 118-20).
Established political groups and institutions generally seek to maintain their privileged position within government and society by protecting the legitimacy and stability of the system (Rosati 1994: 230). In this way, bureaucratic interests may impede foreign policy alteration in democracies. Any attempt at restructuring must negotiate a web of bureaucracy, which has the effect of mitigating against major shifts (Volgy and Schwarz 1991: 620). To bring about foreign policy change, the leadership will have to overcome or thwart organizational structures and processes, the inherent tendency of which is to maintain the existing order (C. F. Hermann 1990: 7-8 and 11-2).

In normal times, bureaucratic politics, conducted in the hands of civil servants, tend to prevail; foreign policy outcomes are incremental and there is little potential for policy change. However, when crisis situations erupt, the head of state gets involved in the process, moulding public opinion and providing consistency among the narrow minded separate bureaucratic policies and the worldview of the administration. In this context, the views of the head of state and their advisers gain significance and bureaucratic politics takes a back seat (Schraeder 1994: 124-5 and 33-4). Hermann argues that high level diplomacy and crisis events are two situations in which the leadership’s involvement is guaranteed (M. G. Hermann 2001: 59).

The debate over whether to accept or reject the Annan Plan in 2004 was both a crisis situation and an occasion for high level diplomacy. Accordingly, the government came to the forefront and the bureaucrats took a back seat. Since 2002, the AKP has challenged the traditional attitude of Turkish bureaucracy by adopting a more pragmatic approach on Cyprus. Far from being advocated by bureaucrats, Turkey’s foreign policy shift on Cyprus is an example of high level diplomacy being conducted in defiance of bureaucratic interests.
3.3. Presence of Alternative Policy Options

If feasible alternatives exist to a government’s existing policy, this policy is likely to be destabilized (Goldmann 1982: 250). On the other hand, when there are no feasible alternative options, the existing foreign policy is likely to endure (Kleistra and Mayer 2001: 392).

A rational government will not negotiate an agreement if there is a more desirable alternative than cooperation. A government in a position to gainsay cooperation by a simple but credible threat of non-agreement in favour of a superior alternative is in an advantageous position in terms of bargaining leverage. The more attractive a government’s alternatives, the less intense its desire for agreement and the greater bargaining power it has. Governments without attractive policy options or who have more to gain from cooperation are more likely to compromise (Moravcsik 1993: 499-500).

EU accession candidates, in principle, have much to gain by establishing closer relations with the union. This enhances the EU’s ability to exert pressure (Börzel and Risse 2012b). The EU can withhold rewards at little cost to itself; these rewards generally mean less to the EU than they do to the recipient. On the other hand, if the recipient government knows that assistance or acceptance is likely to be unconditional, any EU threat to withdraw rewards ceases to be credible. In the case of the Central and Eastern European countries’ (CEEC) entry into the EU, the interdependence between the EU and the CEEC was so asymmetrical in favour of the EU that it had little to gain from this enlargement (Schimmelfennig and Sedelmeier 2005: 14). The candidate countries were forced to comply fully with the EU’s entry criteria, leaving them few policy alternatives.

Sweden experienced similar difficulties when it was attempting to find its way out of economic crisis in 1990. When negotiations between the European Free Trade Association (EFTA) and the European Community (EC) to give
Swedish companies full access to the EC internal market failed, it had no option but to seek EC membership (Gustavsson 1999: 87-9).

In Turkey’s case, settlement of the Cyprus dissension became a de facto EU entry criterion when the Republic of Cyprus was accepted into the EU in May 2004. As an EU candidate, Turkey is obliged to recognize the Republic of Cyprus and to open its ports and airports to the Republic of Cyprus’s vessels and aircraft. Turkish ports and airports had remained open to the vessel and lanes of the Republic of Cyprus from 1974 until April 1987. Settlement of the Cyprus discord is a sine qua non for Turkey if it wants to proceed with the EU accession process (Interview 16 September 6, 2011). However, even after significant decline in Turkey’s membership prospects since mid-2000s, AKP government continued to stick its policy of a unified and federal Cyprus under the UN parameters. So, Ankara’s new Cyprus policy does not just arise from its EU aspirations; the policy change is the result of its new approach to foreign policy rather than a perceived lack of options.

3.4. Decision-making Mandate

The level of authority that policy-makers have in the decision-making process determines their decision-making mandate. Policy-makers may be the dominating actors in the policy arena or they may share a decision-making mandate with other powerful actors, which reduces their policy-making power (Kleistra and Mayer 2001: 392). This topic is analysed further in the theory chapter as one of the determinants of Turkish foreign policy change in Cyprus. I will demonstrate that only when a propitious decision-making context emerged within the domestic framework of Turkey, such a foreign policy shift became possible. The propitious decision-making setting reinforced the position of the Prime Minister and that no other political actor was in a position to thwart his decision.
4. Leadership Dynamics

Lastly, leadership dynamics may also impact on foreign policy alteration (Holsti 1982; Goldmann 1982; M.G. Hermann 1984, 1988, 1999, 2001; M.G. Hermann and C.F. Hermann 1989; C.F. Hermann 1990; Carlsnaes 1993; Gustavsson 1999; Kleistra and Mayer 2001; M.G. Hermann et al. 2001; Boronza 2008). This determinant is analysed extensively in the theory chapter as one of the cardinal determinants of Turkish foreign policy change on Cyprus.

This chapter draws on the literature to identify the key factors underlying foreign policy alteration. These factors are gathered into four main categories – external, domestic, organizational and leadership dynamics – which are then broken down into sub-categories. In Chapter V, the relevant determinants, leadership, decision-making mandate and the institutionalization of the EU norms, are used to construct a model accounting for Turkey’s 2002 foreign policy change on Cyprus. Chapter VI (leadership), Chapter VII (the EU) and Chapter VIII (decision-making mandate) are the empirical chapters that separately deal with the relevant variables in the case of Turkish policy change on Cyprus.
PART TWO: EXPLAINING FOREIGN POLICY CHANGE

CHAPTER V: A MODEL DEFINING THE CAUSES OF TURKISH FOREIGN POLICY CHANGE ON CYPRUS

The review on the literature of foreign policy change and Turkish foreign policy shows that Turkish foreign policy towards Cyprus has been influenced by three determinants, the leadership, the EU and the decision-making process from among the determinants examined in Chapter IV. While Chapter V lays out a model on the basis of these three dynamics to account for Turkish policy shift on Cyprus, Chapter VI (leadership), Chapter VII (the EU) and Chapter VIII (decision-making context) analyzes these determinants in the case of Turkish policy change on Cyprus separately.

While some authors ascribe Ankara’s Cyprus policy change to domestic considerations (Kınacıoğlu and Oktay 2006; Robins 2007), others view the AKP leadership’s new approach to foreign policy as the main determinant (M. Özcan and Usul 2010; Uslu 2011). Researchers also point to the de-securitization of foreign policy as democratization and Europeanization have taken hold (Terzi 2005; Tocci 2005; Kaliber 2005; Kirişçi 2006; Aras 2009; G. Özcan 2010). In terms of the effect the EU has had on Ankara’s Cyprus policy, some emphasize the influence of the EU accession process (Terzi 2005; Kaliber 2005; Kirişçi 2006; Aras 2009), while others suggest that Turkey’s bottom-up democratization – which has been boosted by the EU influence – has had a greater impact (Tocci 2005; G. Özcan 2010). However, none of these authors offers a detailed explanation of Ankara’s new Cyprus policy in terms of leadership and Europeanization dynamics. Accordingly, the following chapter explicates the theoretical framework of Turkey’s policy change by comparing and contrasting various theories and models.

This chapter presents the theoretical framework utilised to explain Ankara’s new Cyprus policy. I will demonstrate how various literatures in Chapter IV will be brought together in this thesis to form a new approach to explain
Turkey’s policy change on Cyprus. I will show that leadership, the EU and the decision-making dynamics are responsible for such a change. I will at the same time critique the Realism and Liberalism and demonstrate why they fail to provide a satisfactory explanation for Turkey’s new policy, while Constructivism provides the most relevant account and Rationalism has also some explanatory value. The chapter is broken into three main sections. The first part expounds why the leadership is the essential component of any foreign policy alteration. I began with a discussion of the literature on the impact of leadership on foreign-policy alteration. Then, I justify the choice of the leadership approach by comparing and contrasting it with the other approaches and theories.

This is followed by an examination of the ideational transformation of the AKP leadership by a cognitive learning process from an Islamist movement towards one with an EU-oriented policy agenda at the centre of Turkish politics. This explicates how the AKP leadership embraced a new foreign policy on Cyprus. After this, an analysis is provided of Davutoğlu’s new foreign-policy vision, which purported to settle Turkey’s problems with its neighbours and reflected the change in the mindset of the Turkish leadership towards a more constructive position in foreign affairs. Finally, the cost-benefit model is analysed with regard to its relevance to the AKP’s Cyprus policy. From this it may be concluded that while the AKP leadership was initially motivated by cost-benefit calculations in its transformation, once embarked upon, the AKP’s new, constructive foreign-policy vision never changed.

The second part of the chapter unveils the theoretical framework with regard to the effects of EU dynamics on Ankara’s new Cyprus policy. It starts by explaining the Europeanization of the Cyprus dispute that began with the EU’s pledge to accept the Republic of Cyprus as a member in 1999 even without a settlement on the island, thus compelling any EU-oriented Turkish government to assume a more pragmatic approach vis-à-vis Cyprus in order to proceed with its own accession negotiations. I argue that the Europeanization of the Cyprus question required any EU-oriented Turkish government to find a
solution to the Cyprus disagreement to proceed with Turkey’s own accession process.

While EU member states had different positions on Turkey’s accession, their stances meant less after Turkey was granted candidate status. Except for Greece and Britain, no other EU state had a preference for the type of settlement, federal, confederal or unitary, to be found in Cyprus. After Turkey’s recognition as a candidate in 1999, rather than the policies of the EU members towards Turkey’s accession, the EU Commission became the critical actor in the pre-accession process. The EU Commission evaluated Turkey’s progress on the basis of the Copenhagen and acquis criteria. As long as Turkey met the EU criteria laid out in the Commission’s Regular Reports, Turkey’s opponents within the EU had less cause to block Turkey’s progress. Turkey’s backers within the EU, on the other hand, became more voiceful in their support for Turkey’s accession (Schimmelfennig 2009, 420-1).

The third part of this chapter is on the decision-making component, which is the last element that contributes to the shift in Turkish foreign policy. In this section, I will justify the choice of this approach and show why without a propitious decision-making setting, a foreign policy shift would be unlikely.

**TABLE II Explaining Turkish Foreign-Policy Change on Cyprus**

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1. **Normative Account: The Advent to Power of a New Turkish Leadership with a New Outlook on Foreign Affairs**

One of the essential arguments of this thesis is that what changed in Turkey’s case was the coming to power of a leadership which was open to new ideas. If the decision-makers are open to change, the potential for foreign policy
alteration is more likely (Kleistra and Mayer 2001: 392). In the case of Turkish foreign policy change on Cyprus, while the coalition government (1999-2002) had internalized continuity and was resistant to change in Turkey’s Cyprus policy, its successor the AKP government was minded to shift Turkey’s Cyprus policy to clear Turkey’s road to EU membership.

In the following section, I will first give a theoretical framework as regards the role of leadership in foreign policy change and then I will justify the choice of my approach, a cognitive learning process on the part of the leadership, by comparing and contrasting it with the other models and theories.

1.1. Theoretical Framework on the Impact of Leadership on Foreign Policy

The potential for leadership dynamics to have a momentous impact on foreign-policy alteration is well understood (Holsti 1982; Goldmann 1982; M. G. Hermann 1984, 1988, 1989, 1999, 2001; C. F. Hermann 1989, s1990; Carlsnaes 1993; Gustavsson 1999; Kleistra and Mayer 2001; M. G. Hermann et al. 2001; Boronza 2008). Leader-driven change occurs when an authoritative decision-maker, usually the head of government, strives determinately to impose his own vision of foreign policy. The relevant policymaker has to have the belief, power and energy to force his government to redirect its foreign policy (C. F. Hermann 1990: 11-2).

A leader’s worldview, political style, motivation and training in foreign affairs and political socialization have an effect on his/her foreign-policy decisions (M. G. Hermann 1988: 268-74). Holsti describes the significance of a leader’s perceptions and calculations, personality factors and attitudes towards external actors in explaining foreign-policy shifts (Holsti 1982b: 14 and 221). If decision-makers internalize continuity and are resistant to change, the potential for foreign-policy change is unlikely, but if the leader is open to new ideas, an alteration in foreign policy may occur (Kleistra and Mayer 2001: 392). A change in foreign policy is also more likely when the power elite shifts its outlook, or when the composition of this elite changes (C.
F. Hermann 1990: 11-2). In this sense, the coming to power of the AKP, which had a different outlook on foreign affairs, was one of the essential determinants in Turkish policy change on Cyprus.

Carlsnaes underscores the weight of the choices and preferences of human actors in foreign-policy behaviour, suggesting that all non-agential factors, rather than directly influencing policy action, are cognitively mediated by a particular human actor (Carlsnaes 1993: 19-21). In other words, when a change happens in the ideas held by key decision-makers, foreign policy change is more likely. Since the state is merely an organizational structure without the ability of learning, analysing, or decision-making, the perceptions and decisions of the policymaker are of key significance in foreign-policy change. Decisions are made by individual decision-makers, not by organizations. The decision-making process can begin only after the beliefs of the key decision-makers have changed and they are convinced of the necessity of foreign-policy alteration (Kleistra and Mayer 2001: 392). Once this cognitive process has taken place, the individual actors can engage in a process of persuasion and manipulation aimed at getting others to share their perceptions (Gustavsson 1999: 83-5). As will be seen, the Erdoğan-Gül duo, who was convinced that a policy shift was crucial, engaged in a process of persuasion of the others to get them to their position.

A regime change that occurs with the advent to power of a new leadership may give rise to policy change in a country, if the foreign-policy orientation of the new leadership differs from the previous one. Different types of regimes have different ways of defining the severity of a foreign ‘threat’; for example, leaders in moderate regimes tend not to view the international environment as hostile in terms of national security, and they strive to cooperate with other countries to settle issues of international concern, whereas leaders in radical regimes tend to view foreign adversaries as unrelenting and immediate threats to the established international and regional order (Hagan 1994: 143-50). The perceptions of the leadership will determine the foreign policy pursued by the government, and a new regime may define the ‘national interest’ in a distinctly
different way than the previous one in terms of international position and interests.

In line with this theory, the termination of the Cold War has been presented as a result of Russian Premier Mikhail Gorbachev’s undergoing a learning process that led to his espousal of new ideas. In fact, the ideas that Gorbachev latched onto are said to have been circulating among Soviet intellectuals and think tanks for several years without having had an impact on Gorbachev’s predecessors. In the case of Gorbachev, the interaction of ideas and an agent to transmit and implement these ideas is of utmost significance. In this regard, while Constructivism stresses the weight of new ideas, a cognitive approach underlines the interaction between structure and agency (Boronza 2008: 20-1 and 26), and an account that fails to take into consideration the structure-agency dynamic will provide only a partial explanation of foreign-policy change (Carlsnaes 1992: 247; Gustavsson 1999: 87-9; Boronza 2008: 26).

Similarly, Sweden’s orientation towards the European Community became possible in 1990 as a result of cognitive shifts on the part of Prime Minister Ingvar Carlsson and Minister of Finance Allan Larsson. Perceiving and reacting to structural changes that included the end of the Cold War, the Swedish prime minister was backed by the Swedish business elite, think tanks and other influential interest groups, which contributed to his learning process. It was Carlsson and Larsson who decided to redirect Swedish foreign policy towards EC membership (Gustavsson 1999: 87-9). In short, the individual decision-makers changed their minds and embraced a new understanding of Swedish foreign policy. As was the case with Gorbachev and Russia, Carlsson’s espousal of new ideas determined the time and type of change that occurred in Sweden.

Similarly, the Erdoğan-Gül duo, after a cognitive learning process, process that brought about a pragmatic transformation, which involved giving up political Islamism and embracing an EU-oriented policy agenda, which entailed a solution to the Cyprus problem. Convinced of the need to change
Turkey’s Cyprus policy, the Erdoğan-Gül duo set about persuading other actors of their argument.

1.2. Why a Model of Leadership is an Essential Component of any Foreign Policy Change

In the following, I will review and critique the literature and justify the selection of my approach. I will outline the various theoretical approaches that have been considered for this thesis and then justify the choice of the applied perspective. I will demonstrate how the literature on leadership relates to my thesis.

I assert in this thesis that Realist, Liberal and Constructivist accounts are poor at explicating the foreign policy shift without taking into account the leadership component. Realist explanations focus on the structure of the international system, which forces the governments to respond to such systemic dynamics. Hans Morgenthau, one of the founding fathers of the realist school, claims that the fundamental actors in international relations are the nation-states and international relations is based on the study of power. "The national interest", which is defined in terms of power, is essential for the nation-states (Morgenthau and Thompson 1985). According to Kenneth Waltz, international politics functions within the anarchic international system without any overarching authority, which forces states to rely on no-one but themselves to defend their own self-interest. For this reason, Neo-realisists overlook more domestic state-based factors and focus on the international system to explain policy behaviour (Waltz 2001). Owing to their excessive emphasis on anarchy and power, realists believe that international law and international institutions are merely epiphenomenal. In other words, these institutions reflect the balance of power, but do not constrain or influence state behaviour. Realists that in the absence of any hierarchical authority in an anarchic system cooperation among states through a treaty or institution is unlikely (Mearsheimer 1994).
Major systemic developments may have an immediate impact on the policies of the affected countries (C. F. Hermann 1990: 12). According to Realists, change may be triggered by a change in fundamental structural conditions, which are influenced by both international and domestic factors. The factors may be political (such as inter-nation power relationships and the military aspects of national security) or economic (transnational economic transactions and their institutional circumstances) (Gustavsson 1999: 83-5). These structural factors are defined as military or non-military threats and the vulnerabilities and dependencies created by previous relationships (Holsti 1982b: 14). The Vietnam Tet Offensive in 1968, the Jerusalem visit of Sadat in 1977 and the 1971 decision of the US to suspend the convertibility of dollar into gold (C. F. Hermann 1990: 12), the 1973 Oil Crisis (Volgy and Schwarz 1991: 631), and the termination of the Cold War are all examples of developments that significantly affected the policies of the countries involved.

In Turkey’s case, there was no major systemic development that forced the AKP government to respond to change. This suggests that a Realist approach is too simplistic for expounding foreign policy change, which is a complicated phenomenon. My argument is therefore that if

“there was such kind of a systemic determinant, then why did it not force the coalition government in the same way as the AKP government? Although Realist accounts for foreign policy change lay out the constraints under which decisions are taken, they ignore the weight of individual decision-makers, who are responsible for actual foreign policy preferences. If major structural developments force the decision-makers to adjust their policies in line with these dynamics, then these explanations fail to account for the uncompromising stance of the coalition government, which held fast to the confederalist ideas far away from the UN parameters. It does not explain “why the coalition government resisted a foreign policy shift whilst the AKP government embraced such a policy.”

Liberal theory is based on three core assumptions. First, individuals and private groups, that is, non-state actors rather than the states, are the main
actors in international politics. Second, states are the representation of dominant groups in a domestic society and serve to their interests. Third, state behaviour across the international system is determined by the configuration of the preferences of these dominant groups (Moravcsik 1997). Doyle added a new important aspect to the liberal theory by setting forth democratic peace, which envisages the absence of war between mature liberal democracies (Doyle 1997).

Neo-liberals institutionalists suggest a win-win approach to international relations accentuating the weight of international institutions, which can be set up on jointly beneficial arrangements and compromises. While the Liberal theory agrees with Neo-realism on the anarchic nature of the international system, the central position of the state and its interests in the analysis of international relations, Robert Keohane and Joseph Nye contend that the effect of the anarchic environment has been overrated by Realists (R. Keohane and Nye 1989). Neo-liberals put emphasis on the eventuality of cooperative behaviour within an anarchic and hierarchical system, where states are the dominant actors and force is an effective tool of policy. Neo-liberals presume that even in an anarchic system of autonomous rational states, cooperation can be established on the basis of norms, regimes and institutions, which provide states with other channels of political exchange than the interstate channel advocated by the Realists. Neo-liberals also play to the plethora of agendas existing within the international system apart from power relations, such as norms and institutions, in which cooperation is possible. When complex interdependence prevails, execution of military force becomes unnecessary (R. O. Keohane 1984).

Although many scholars have emphasized the EU as the overriding determinant in Turkish foreign-policy change on Cyprus (Terzi 2005; Kaliber 2005; Kirişçi 2006; Aras 2009), this is only part of the explanation. A Liberal outlook on Ankara’s new Cyprus policy would consider the EU’s norms and institutions as the overriding driver of the policy shift and maintain that the AKP government’s policy was conducted in line with the institutionalization of the EU norms and values within the Turkish domestic setting.
It has been argued that Turkey’s changing foreign policy on Cyprus was a consequence of the Europeanization process and EU pressure to accept the solution proposed by the UN (Interview 16 September 6, 2011; Interview 3 September 8, 2011). According to this argument, obliged to harmonize its rhetoric with EU conditionality and legal requirements (Terzi 2005: 130-3), Ankara abandoned its previous securitized, isolated foreign and security policy in favour of cooperation, dialogue and ‘win-win’ solutions. The European Council’s Helsinki decision to grant Turkey candidacy status in December 1999 pushed Ankara to settle its long-standing problems with its neighbours, generating an environment that was conducive to reform and change in Turkish foreign policy. In this new setting, national security was redefined and the traditional realpolitik perspective re-evaluated. In the first few months of 2004, this new understanding was unveiled when the AKP government backed the re-unification of Cyprus over the old national security imperative (Kemal Kirişçi 2006a: 22).

This is one of the essential arguments of this thesis. However, Liberalism also has similar deficiencies as Realism in accounting for Ankara’s new Cyprus policy. For the EU institutionalization to be a dynamic of Turkey’s new policy on Cyprus there needs to be a government in Ankara, which sticks to EU membership. Thus, Liberal arguments cannot have an effect on foreign policy behavior of a state unless they are embraced by a leadership. Whereas the AKP government was eager to espouse the accession criteria of the EU and settle the Cyprus question, the coalition government was half-hearted in doing so. In this sense, the agency was of key significance in Turkey’s adoption of a new policy on Cyprus and without a EU-oriented agency the EU’s impact on Turkey’s Cyprus policy would be limited.

Moreover, the AKP government’s adoption of EU norms was not solely a consequence of the approval on the part of the party leadership of the legitimacy of the EU norms, but also a rational choice based on cost-benefit calculations of the AKP leadership. The AKP government’s ideational transformation from political Islamism towards an EU-oriented party cannot
be explained by the Liberal theory. The AKP’s ideational transformation towards an EU-oriented party and adoption of a new policy on Cyprus was a consequence of a cognitive learning process on the part of the AKP leadership. Liberal norms and institutions do not explain the cognitive process under which conditions these norms were adopted.

Constructivism is helpful in explicating the weight of this emergence of new ideas in favour of a policy shift and why such ideas were adopted by the AKP and not by any other political party in Turkey. Unless these new ideas were espoused by the agency, they would have scant explanatory value in expounding foreign policy behaviour. Constructivist insight as used in this thesis, successfully tackles the interaction between the emerging new structure and the agency.

Constructivism criticizes the commitment of Neorealism and Neoliberalism to a crude form of materialism. Wendt asserts that concepts used by both schools are not given by nature, but socially constructed by the nature of the identities and interests of the key actors in the system. Thus, these concepts may be changed by the human agents by a process of social practice and interaction. According to Wendt, even such a core realist concept as "power politics" is a social construction. Two main tenets underlie the “constructivist” approach: “shared ideas” determine the structures of human association, rather than material forces, and these shared ideas construct the identities and interests of human actors, rather than being given by nature. Rather than seeing security as a competitive system in win-lose terms, states may hold alternative ‘co-operative’ conceptions of security in win-win terms. In such an understanding, security of other states may be qualified as valuable. Likewise, social institutions do not have unchangeable meanings, but can change by a process of social construction (Wendt 1992).

Since constructivists focus on beliefs and ideology, they put special emphasis on the role of non-state actors. Constructivists underline the role of transnational actors like NGOs or transnational corporations, which act like ‘norm entrepreneurs’ to influence state behaviour in the eyes of the
constructivists. Such transnational actors affect state behavior on issues like human rights or international trade by using rhetoric, lobbying, persuasion, or shaming (Keck and Sikkink 1998). According to constructivists, international institutions are actors in their own right seeking their own interests rather than being the passive tools in the hands of the states. In this sense, constructivists regard international bureaucracies as active actors in international politics in pursuit of their own interests, e.g., free trade and protection of human rights, even contrary to the wishes of the states that generated them (M. N. Barnett and Finnemore 2004).

The holders of this view claim that Ankara’s traditional bureaucratic-authoritarian foreign policy approach (Aras 2009: 30-3) was essentially nationalist and defensive in outlook and aimed at preserving the security of the Turkish nation-state. However, as the cultural mentalities and patterns of social-economic life in Turkey were transformed, policy-makers’ understanding of what constituted the national interest also began to change. This new mindset paved the way for a new definition of the culture of national security and the culture of geopolitics (Aras 2009: 30-3).

Similarly, it has been argued that with growing democratization and Europeanization, the Turkish public has become increasingly involved in foreign policy decisions and more critical of the traditional approach to foreign policy matters. In this sense, the Turkish public has itself become a political actor opposing the bureaucratic elite. Foreign policy matters have become part of public discussion, further fostering political mobilization and the democratization of state-society relations in Turkey (Kaliber 2005: 322-9 and 33-4).

According to the holders of this view, special emphasis is placed on the role played by Foreign Minister Ahmet Davutoğlu, who is seen as the most influential foreign minister in the history of Turkish foreign policy. They point out that while Ankara’s traditional Cyprus policy was seen as a matter of national security and was therefore not open to alteration, the AKP primarily re-constructed the Cyprus issue as a stumbling block in Turkey’s relations
with the EU, membership of which is its ultimate foreign policy objective (M. Özcan and Usul 2010: 118-9 and 23).

Applied to Turkish foreign policy with regard to Cyprus, Constructivist accounts successfully grasp the cognitive component involved in foreign policy alteration. Constructivism underlines the significance of new ideas in favour of a policy shift and explains why such ideas may not be espoused by the leadership as evidently seen in the case of the failure of the coalition government to change Turkey’s Cyprus policy (Hannay 2005: 173-4; Dodd 2010, 201-2) and why they are embraced by the AKP. Such a policy alteration could merely be possible with the advent to power of the AKP leadership, which adopted the idea of a federal solution on the basis of the UN parameters to the Cyprus discord. In this case, the ideas, which were being advocated by pro-EU circles, such as TÜSİAD in Turkey, were embraced by the AKP, which in a cognitive learning process redefined its own as well as Turkey’s interests.

In accordance with “Rationalist' explanations which are adopted in this thesis and will be discussed in the following parts of this chapter (Chapter V, Section 1.3) at length, a government may opt to comply with policy change if it judges the benefits of compliance to outweigh the domestic costs of adoption (Schimmelfennig and Sedelmeier 2005: 11-2). Such an adaptation is based on an actor’s intention to maximize power and wealth; in other words, actions are motivated by expectations of consequences. Human actors assess policy alternatives on the basis of expected outcomes in relation to their personal or collective aims and values. The political order is characterised by negotiations among rational actors pursuing personal preferences and interests, with those actors possessing contradictory interests and different resources negotiating a string of ‘contracts’ to reach political integration. Foreign policy as well as individual action is taken in pursuance of expected outcomes, with the international system viewed as consisting of interacting autonomous, egoistic, self-interested maximizers. Actors’ preferences are, for the most part, considered as given, and expectations of consequences are regarded as
determined by individual bias and the state of the external world (March and Olsen 1998: 949-52).

It is maintained that, the AKP government acted as a rational actor on the basis of cost-benefit calculations. Accordingly, the reason behind the AKP’s foreign policy objectives, settlement of the Cyprus dispute and EU membership, was to come to and remain in power. The holders of this view claim that domestic power considerations were the guiding force behind Ankara’s decision to adopt a new policy on Cyprus (Kınacıoğlu and Oktay 2006; Robins 2007). Kınacıoğlu and Oktay assert that the change was a tactical compromise by the AKP government to boost its position at home. The Cyprus issue has long been a national cause for the mainstream political parties, but the AKP saw it merely as an obstacle to Turkey’s EU ambitions. Believing that Turkey’s priority should be to begin accession negotiations with the EU, the AKP endorsed the UN settlement plan for Cyprus, even though it was aware of the EU’s ambivalent attitude towards Turkey’s entry. It has been argued that the AKP remains committed to Turkey’s EU bid mainly because it sees this as a way to enhance its domestic legitimacy. Finding a settlement to the Cyprus issue would enable the AKP to counter suspicions among the secularist Turkish establishment that the party had a covert Islamist agenda, bolster its popularity abroad and prolonging its term of office at home (Kınacıoğlu and Oktay 2006: 263-4). Accordingly, shifting Turkey’s Cyprus policy was not merely a question of foreign policy, but was also a means to fortify the AKP’s position vis-à-vis the other important political actors within Turkey (Çelenk 2007: 349).

Along similar lines it is suggested that the Cyprus issue is of exaggerated significance in Turkey because of the way in which power is configured within the Turkish domestic framework. While the Turkish establishment, including the military, attaches inordinate importance to the Cyprus problem, seeing it as key to its own interests and power, the AKP government had no such vested interest. In this sense, Cyprus had become a bone of contention between the old regime, which has profited by maintaining the status quo in the island, and the new challenger. It has been suggested that part of the
AKP’s agenda in changing Turkey’s Cyprus policy is to undermine the dominance of the Turkish establishment, which has in the past exploited security-related matters such as the Cyprus discord to strengthen its own position (Robins 2007: 298-9).

Rationalism, which has explanatory value with regard to this thesis accounts for the behaviour of the AKP government. In changing Turkey’s Cyprus policy and thus clearing Turkey’s road to EU membership, the AKP government also aimed at consolidating power within Turkey’s domestic institutional context, which did not allow any Islamist party to come and remain in power and looked on the AKP as enjoying a covert Islamist agenda. Fearing the eventuality of being ousted from power or closure of the party by the Constitutional Court, the AKP viewed the EU membership as the only way to consolidate power within Turkey’s rigid framework. This led the AKP leadership to give up political Islamism and espouse an EU-oriented political agenda after a process of re-evaluation and re-construction of its interests.

From a cognitive perspective, decision-makers are not open-minded, but limited by their beliefs, perceptions and methods of information processing (Rosati 1995: 50); however, these perceptions are not fixed, but open to change. According to Goldmann, change may occur in response to negative feedback from policy as a result of a process of learning on the part of the leadership. The leadership may undergo perceptual shifts as a result of knowledge acquisition. Learning also encompasses the restructuration and modification of existing schemata, i.e. a series of mental models individuals construct in order to visualize and interpret their environment. Through a learning process, a leader restructures existing schemata by adding, deleting and merging mental models, which may in turn prompt him/her to re-define his/her goals or methods of achieving them (C. F. Hermann 1990: 12).

Identity constructions that are unsuitable within certain settings may be abandoned at a ‘critical juncture’, and a new identity may be established that is suitable to the existing framework (Risse 2001: 203). After the crisis or policy failure, identity re-construction occurs through the processes of arguing,
persuasion, social learning and redefining of identities and interests (Börzel and Risse 2003: 66). While ideational transformation may originally be motivated by a wish to remain in power or some other perceived political interest, identity re-construction outlives alterations in instrumental interests. In order words, once consensus is reached on a collective identity, it sticks (Risse 2001: 213).

Whereas the AKP government proactively pushed for a federal solution on the basis of the UN parameters, the coalition government held fast to the idea of a confederation in Cyprus. I argue that the positions of both the coalition and the AKP government are best spelled out by the “cognitive approach and the learning process” on the part of both political formations, which brings to the fore the leadership component in any decision of foreign policy alteration. As explained in Chapter VI Section 1.1, the political parties of the coalition government had forceful cognitive priors and were suspicious of the Western intentions towards Turkey, and thus failed to adopt a new policy on Cyprus. The AKP government, on the other hand, faced constant policy failures, which led to the re-definition of its interests and identity after a cognitive learning process. This re-definition of interests and identity led the AKP to espouse a more constructive and pragmatic stance on the Cyprus question. While this ideational transformation took its source in the cost-benefit considerations in first place, it outlived this pragmatic behaviour and remained in place. The AKP government, after abandoning political Islam, never questioned Turkey’s EU orientation and adhered to a solution in Cyprus on the basis of the UN parameters.

The role of the decision-makers is not merely shaped by structural dynamics as pointed by Realists. Institutions may influence foreign policy behaviour so long as the leadership is inclined to adopt its norms and values. The ideas may have an impact on foreign policy behaviour as long as these ideas are espoused by the leadership, as states are abstract entities without the power to make decisions. While the EU norms and values swayed Turkey’s foreign policy on Cyprus, this occurred only when the AKP leadership embraced EU membership and thus the settlement of the Cyprus problem as its political
objectives. The ideas circulating around for a solution in Cyprus did not have an impact on the coalition government, which held fast to the traditional confederalist line on Cyprus. Accordingly, Realist, Liberal and Constructivist approaches all ignore the weight of the leadership, without which political decisions can not be made.

1.3. “Resonance”, “Critical Junctures” and Ideational Transformation of the AKP from Islamism towards an EU-Oriented Political Party

The concepts of ‘resonance’ and “critical junctures” may help to account for the AKP’s ideational transformation from an Islamist party towards one with an EU-oriented agenda and thus Turkey’s foreign policy change on Cyprus. ‘Resonance’ is said to determine the appropriateness and legitimacy of a particular identity construction within a particular political setting. Identity constructions that are unsuitable within certain settings may be abandoned at a ‘critical juncture’, and a new identity may be established that is more suitable to the new framework (Risse 2001: 203). Such a pragmatic transformation, referred to as ‘strategic social construction’ (Checkel 2001: 562), can account for the Turkish Islamists’ renunciation of their Islamist identity and construction of a new identity compatible with the existing domestic and international framework.

‘Resonance’ occurs when there is consistency between the domestic setting of a particular identity and certain new norms, thus facilitating their adoption. Whereas some domestic settings are open to the construction of new identities, others preclude this possibility (Checkel 2005: 812-3). Change is produced by the reciprocal interplay between agential and structural factors (Carlsnaes 1993: 21-2) that generate societal transformation and continuities or shifts in social systems. Individual actors both affect and are affected by pre-existing structures; these structures continue to exist after the actions occur and may both enable and constrain these actions to varying degrees.
Resonance occurs at ‘critical junctures’, i.e. important developments that force the persuadee to redefine his/her identity and interests. Persuasion is more likely when the persuadee is in a novel and uncertain environment provoked by the newness of an issue, a crisis or a serious policy failure (Checkel 2001: 562). After the crisis or policy failure, identity re-construction occurs through the processes of arguing, persuasion, social learning and redefining of identities and interests (Börzel and Risse 2003: 66).

The ideational transformation of the AKP from an Islamist party to a pro-EU party can be explained by its social learning. Prior to the founding of the AKP, the Turkish Constitutional Court had closed down five Islamist parties in 1971, 1981, 1983, 1998 and 2001 on the grounds that they intended to undermine the secular structure of the Turkish Republic, the closure of the Welfare Party (RP) in 1998, the immediate predecessor of the AKP, within the framework of what became known as the ‘February 28 process’, which included a military crackdown on Turkish Islamists. This process, along with the European Court of Human Rights’ upholding of the decision handed down by the Turkish court, represented a critical juncture for the AKP, which came to the conclusion that political Islamism was viable in neither the Turkish nor the EU institutional contexts. Thus, policy failure gave rise to a crisis for the political Islamist identity and to the pragmatic re-construction of this identity as well as a re-definition of interests and a new policy orientation for the AKP leadership.

The idea of resonance may also help to explain other instances of national identity construction and their variations within Europe. Whereas European identity construction was inconsistent with Englishness, its incorporation into French and German political discourse was easier. In the late 1950s, while Gaullist nationalism prevailed in France, a modern Western concept of Europeanness carried the day in Germany. The difference in responses may be explained by virtue of the different domestic political and legal cultures and traditional domestic rules and institutions in these countries. In the British case, incorporation of Europeanness into the British identity was hindered by the high domestic legitimacy of rules and institutions (Risse 2001: 214-5).
Thus, Britain remained the least Europeanized country with regard to identity, and British elites, rather than framing Europe in constitutive terms, looked upon it in interest-based ones (Risse 2010: 251). In the case of Germany, EU regional and German domestic institutional settings were conspicuously at loggerheads with one another in terms of citizenship – the stiffness of Germany’s citizenship law, which dated back to 1913 and emphasized blood in connecting citizen and nation, was based on historical as well as institutional grounds – and thus complicated change for Germany (Checkel 2001: 567-8).

While ideational transformation may originally be motivated by a wish to remain in power or some other perceived political interest, identity reconstruction outlives alterations in instrumental interests. In order words, once consensus is reached on a collective identity, it sticks – as evidenced by the French Socialists’ European obstinacy in sticking with European integration and the Euro once they were adopted in the first place (Risse 2001: 213).

The transformation of French national identity is an illustration of identity transformation out of the newness of an issue, a crisis or a serious policy failure. François Mitterrand’s Socialist Party came to power in 1981 with the aim of setting up democratic socialism in France, but the plan was a washout, and Mitterrand incurred heavy electoral losses. In 1983, he had no choice but to radically change his policy in the direction of neo-liberalism in order to remain in power. This brought on a profound ideational crisis within the Socialist Party, which gradually ditched ‘socialism’ to become a modern European ‘social democratic’ party. In this case, the initial motive of remaining in power invited an ideational alteration.

The selection of successful identities from among available identity constructions may be accounted for by perceived instrumental interests (Risse 2001: 211-2 and 16) in a process referred to as ‘strategic social construction’, in which agents make exhaustive means-ends calculations, maximize their own normative commitments and strive to alter the utility of others (Checkel 2001: 559). The political elite of the French right went through a similar
process in the course of the 1990s. In this case, the ‘critical juncture’ was the end of the Cold War, which was succeeded by a French identity crisis. After the re-unification of Germany and the re-construction of the European security order, the French rightist political elite got wise to the fact that French concepts of ‘grandeur’ and ‘independence’ had been undermined. The 1992 referendum on the Treaty of Maastricht was tied to identity-related discourse with respect to the role of France in Europe. This time, EU integrationists gained the upper hand in all the main political parties. Thus, the French right also espoused a policy of EU integration, as the plurality of the French political elite came to line up with the idea of incorporating ‘Europeanness’ into French notions of ‘distinctiveness’ and subsequently began to visualize the future of the French nation-state within the European order (Risse 2001: 211-3). It should be noted that both the transformations of the French left and the French right were caused by ‘critical junctures’, which attests to Checkel’s claim that persuasion is more likely when the persuadee is in a novel and uncertain environment provoked by the newness of an issue, a crisis, or a serious policy failure (Checkel 2001: 562).

Examples of how political parties in candidate countries learned to adjust their agendas to make them consonant with EU requirements include Romania’s Social Democratic Party (PSD), the Croatian Democratic Union (HDZ) and the Bulgarian Socialist Party (BSP). All three of these parties rendered EU membership their priority and adjusted their rhetoric and agendas accordingly. Both the PSD and HDZ abandoned nationalistic rhetoric in favour of a new program based on economic reform and a more efficient state. These two formerly illiberal parties persistently complied with EU pre-accession requirements after their respective rises to power in 2000 and 2004. Similarly, the BSP underwent a major transformation after its re-election in 2005, continuing to comply with EU reforms while espousing an agenda resembling that of a mainstream European socialist party. (Vachudova 2005: 25-6).

In the same way, after facing constant policy failures and party closures, the Turkish Islamists had no alternative, but to abandon political Islamism (Taşkın 2008: 53) and espouse EU membership as their political priority and adjust
their rhetoric and agenda accordingly to enlist the EU’s backing in the face of the rigid establishment of Turkey. This generated a profound ideational crisis among political Islamists, and eventually, the newly set up AKP gave up political Islamism in favour of a new programme aiming at EU membership and settlement of the Cyprus disagreement. The AKP officials made clear that they abandoned political Islamism. Just after being elected in November 2002, Erdoğan, stated that “the AKP is not a religiously-oriented party, and he mentioned that “the Republic of Turkey was erected on the principles of “democracy, laicism, social state and rule of law” (Office of the Prime Minister November 4, 2002). Erdoğan, who had identified the EU as a “Christian club” in 1992, deviated from the traditional line of his party’s earlier Islamist predecessors as well as Turkey’s EU-sceptic bloc (Uğur and Yankaya 2008: 592). After its rise to power in 2002, the AKP, whose members were former Islamists and anti-EU, persistently complied with EU pre-accession requirements.

The leadership aspect of this model accounts for how a new leadership with a new constructive outlook on foreign affairs was able to make a radical shift in Turkey’s Cyprus policy. In contrast to its predecessor, the coalition of the DSP-MHP-ANAP, who held fast to the confederal policy line based on two sovereign states, the AKP changed this position fundamentally by accepting a federal formula on the basis of the UN parameters. While the leaders of the coalition parties had forceful cognitive priors with regard to the Cyprus question and thus viewed it as a matter of “national cause”, the AKP leadership, coming out of an ideational crisis, caused by policy failure due to the closure of the Islamists parties in Turkey several times, re-defined its identity and interests and was able to take on a more pragmatic and constructive vision on the Cyprus question, which enabled it to carry out such a fundamental policy shift.
1.4. Cost-Benefit Analysis as an Initial Impetus

Intergovernmental bargaining is one of two bargaining methods (differential empowerment of domestic actors is the other) commonly employed by the European Union to entice target countries into compliance: Intergovernmental bargaining entails a top-down process of rule adoption in which the target government directly sizes up the gains and costs of promised EU rewards. A government may opt to comply with EU requirements if it judges the benefits of compliance to outweigh the domestic costs of adoption (Schimmelfennig and Sedelmeier 2005: 11-2). Adoption of certain rules within the framework of the pre-accession process can be a result of a ‘logic of consequences’, which considers rule adoption to be a consequence of strategic instrumentality motivated by the behaviour of a rational actor, or by a ‘logic of appropriateness’, which views behaviour as rule-based and actors as motivated by internalized identities, values and norms.

The ‘logic of consequences’ is based on an actor’s intention to maximize power and wealth; in other words, actions are motivated by expectations of consequences. Human actors assess policy alternatives on the basis of expected outcomes in relation to their personal or collective aims. The political order is characterised by negotiations among rational actors pursuing personal preferences and interests, with those actors possessing contradictory interests and different resources negotiating a string of ‘contracts’ to reach political integration. Foreign policy as well as individual action is taken in pursuance of expected outcomes, with the international system viewed as consisting of interacting autonomous, egoistic, self-interested maximizers. Actors’ preferences are, for the most part, considered as given, and expectations of consequences are regarded as determined by individual bias and the state of the external world (March and Olsen 1998: 949-52).

Schimmelfennig qualifies compliance based on a ‘logic of consequences’ as ‘socialization by reinforcement,’ with the political actor weighing the outcomes of norm compliance, rather than evaluating the norm’s
appropriateness. Thus, adaptation of behaviour can occur while views, interests and identities remain unchanged. While socialization by reinforcement may eventually lead to sustained compliance and internalization of adopted norms, the initial behavioural shift comes before internalization, and compliance may endure for a certain length of time without internalization (Schimmelfennig 2005: 830-1).

According to Vachudova, compliance that occurs as a result of a behavioural shift by the target government without internalization of norms becomes ‘selective’ and ‘formal’. Within this framework, a target government may aim to selectively transpose a massive body of the *acquis communitaire* into its national legislation, while purposely shunning chief aspects of the Copenhagen Criteria with respect to the stability of institutions guaranteeing democracy, the rule of law, human rights and respect for and protection of minorities. Alternatively, illiberal governments may exhibit ‘formal compliance’, as they are persuaded, under growing pressure, to conclude formal agreements or treaties at the international level in order to enjoy the prestige of good relations with the EU, but then they fail to execute these treaties at the domestic level (Vachudova 2005: 144). This situation was witnessed in the CEEC, which formally adopted massive amounts of EU policy without properly applying or enforcing it (Börzel and Risse 2012a: 193-4). Likewise, due to their limited statehood, the Western Balkan countries have suffered from serious problems related to the decoupling of formal institutional changes from the prevailing informal institutions and behavioural practices (Börzel 2011: 8-9).

In contrast to the ‘logic of consequences’, actors governed by a ‘logic of appropriateness’ are concerned with the legitimacy of rules and the appropriateness of behaviour. In line with this logic, just as human actors evoke an identity and match the obligations of an identity to a particular situation, political actors pursue their political purposes and establish rules in line with their identities rather than by rational expectations governed by their interests. A logic of appropriateness indicates appropriate ethical action driven by whether or not an action is considered ‘virtuous’. Thus, foreign policy is
concerned with the application of the rules associated with specific identities to specific situations (March and Olsen 1998: 951-2).

The external incentives model underscores a logic of consequences that regards actors as rational, goal-oriented and purposeful. Actors aim to maximize their utility by engaging in strategic interactions on the basis of instrumental rationality (Börzel and Risse 2003: 63). Agents carefully calculate and seek to maximize given interests, adapting their behaviour to the norms and rules favoured by the international community (Checkel 2005: 809). In this rationalist bargaining model, actors exchange information, threats and promises in a bargaining process in which bargaining power is a consequence of the asymmetrical distribution of information and benefits of a particular agreement in comparison to alternative outcomes or ‘outside options’. For the most part, actors with more and better information are able to manipulate the outcome in their favour. The actors that are least dependent upon a particular agreement are in the most advantageous position to threaten others with non-cooperation, thereby forcing them to make concessions (Schimmelfennig and Sedelmeier 2005: 10). Bargaining leverage is determined by the asymmetric intensity of national preferences in terms of the relative costs and benefits of agreement. In the course of negotiations, a government able to open markets to which others desire access or to alter policies that others wish to change will be in an advantageous position. The more a government desires agreement, the greater the concessions and the effort it will be required to make to attain its goal. Similarly, the more a government stands to potentially benefit from a new policy, the weaker its bargaining position in negotiations (Moravcsik 1993: 499).

In terms of EU accession, conditionality has been rendered more effective by the ‘asymmetric interdependence’ of the EU and the aspiring states that dominate the pre-accession process. Whereas the EU is not dependent upon establishing economic and political bonds with any specific candidate country, candidates tend to look upon EU membership as a necessity for economic survival and prosperity. Thus, for example, the CEE countries, which were very strongly inclined towards membership, had very little negotiating power
vis-à-vis the EU. Out of this imbalance, the EU was able to threaten liberal-minded states balking at particular reforms with exclusion from the first round of enlargement and threaten illiberal-minded states with exclusion from the process altogether. It was within this context that considerable reforms were enacted – by Poland in 1996-7 and by the Czech Republic in 1998-9. In fact, the mechanisms of EU enlargement are not meant to civilise, democratise and stabilise target countries: Rather than coaxing and cajoling unwanted states into rendering themselves desirable, the EU requirements and the structure of the pre-accession process are designed to keep them out altogether (Vachudova 2005: 109-10).

Given that the EU does not coerce target governments into compliance during the pre-accession process, in order to have an impact, EU demands for domestic change must align with the political preferences and survival strategies of political elites (Börzel and Risse 2012a: 199-200). Governments may weigh up the potential costs and benefits of compliance and act according to their interest-based calculations, drawing on EU policies and institutions to push their own political agendas, please their constituencies, or consolidate or regain power. Thus, the EU has been used by reform coalitions to advance and legitimise their political agendas, and Turkey is not unique in this respect.

For the AKP leadership, who had split from the Welfare Party following its closure by the Turkish Constitutional Court in 1998, the EU accession process was viewed as the only instrument that could provide the AKP with the legitimacy it needed in the face of Turkey’s rigorously secular establishment. Islamist parties had been shut down by the Turkish Constitutional Court five times on the grounds that they aimed to undermine Turkey’s secular structure (Ayata 2004: 272). In such an environment, participating in the EU accession process was viewed by AKP officials as their only means of demonstrating to the Turkish establishment that the party did not have a hidden Islamist agenda (Tocci 2005: 80). By espousing an EU-oriented policy agenda, including compliance with EU demands on Cyprus, the AKP could cash in on the prestige of EU backup at the domestic level, allowing the party to broaden its base of support, damp down the political clout of the Kemalist state
establishment as well as the military, and cling to power by demonstrating its own attachment to Turkey’s secular-democratic political structure. Thus, the AKP’s EU orientation – and, within this framework, its acceptance of the Annan Plan for a settlement on Cyprus – may initially be explained by cost-benefit considerations with regard to coming to and remaining in power. In other words, the AKP’s action was initially one of an instrumentally motivated rational actor behaving on the basis of a ‘logic of consequences’. However, as Checkel notes, what starts as behavioural adaptation may, because of various cognitive and institutional lock-in effects, be followed by sustained compliance that is strongly suggestive of internalization and preference change (Checkel 2005: 809). Accordingly, after coming to power in November 2002, the AKP’s new EU orientation stuck, and the party has never reverted to its previous Islamist identity or questioned Turkey’s secular-democratic structure and Western orientation.

Thus, while a new foreign-policy vision based on the AKP’s new identity was responsible in changing Turkish foreign policy on Cyprus, this was a consequence of the AKP government’s re-definition of its interests and identity on the basis of its cost-benefit calculations (Tocci 2005: 80). Turkish policy change on Cyprus was affected by the AKP government’s bid to come to and remain in power in Turkey. However, after re-defining its identity and interests by its cost-benefit calculations, the AKP persisted with its new Cyprus policy based on the UN parameters for a solution in Cyprus, and it continues to hold this position today, never once having reverted to its previous position. Thus, the AKP’s new Cyprus policy is affected by both its cost-benefit calculations and its ideational transformation and new foreign policy vision. As a consequence of its newly adopted norms, the AKP leadership believes that a settlement on the basis of the UN parameters is a win-win solution for all the parties concerned.

A cost-benefit analysis is also capable of explaining the AKP’s compliance or non-compliance with the *acquis communautaire* and Copenhagen Criteria than its compliance with EU demands vis-à-vis Cyprus, but since these issues fall outside the main subject of this thesis, it is enough to touch upon them here.
only briefly. In fact, while the AKP complied with EU demands on Cyprus, it failed to conform to basic EU norms such as guaranteeing an independent judiciary, the rule of law, human rights and a free press. This may be explained by the fact that such compliance with the fundamental principles of human rights and freedoms would undermine the domestic power base the AKP was able to gradually establish following its advent to power in 2002. AKP compliance with the Copenhagen Criteria would have been in line with the ‘socialization by reinforcement’ described by Schimmelfennig and the ‘selective and formal compliance’ described by Vachudova (Vachudova 2005: 144) – ‘selective’ because the government, transposed into Turkish legislation huge amounts of the acquis that did not affect its power base, but shunned basic EU norms such as human rights and the rule of law, and ‘formal’ measures because treaties signed at the EU-level were unlikely to be properly executed.

The government’s non-compliance or slow pace of compliance is also related to the fact that accession negotiations between the EU and Turkey stalled with the Greek Cypriots’ rejection of the Annan Plan and the substantial waning of the credibility of Turkey’s membership perspective. With the reward of membership apparently very far away, the government’s domestic power considerations gained the upper hand, and its efforts to comply with EU criteria decelerated. In brief, the cost-benefit model explains the AKP’s compliance with the Copenhagen criteria in the sense that in Turkey, as in other candidate countries, compliance is not a smooth process in harmony with EU criteria, but influenced in large measure by the cost-benefit considerations of the target governments.

2. The EU’s Impact on Turkey’s New Cyprus Policy

The EU was the other crucial determinant in swaying Turkey’s new Cyprus policy. The Europeanization of the Cyprus disagreement left any EU-oriented Turkish government with no other option but to tackle the Cyprus dissension to proceed with its own accession process. Turkey, itself a candidate for
membership since 1999, had to remove the Cyprus barrier in its way to EU membership. In the subsequent theoretical framework, I will show why the EU element was an essential factor in Turkish foreign policy alteration on Cyprus by also examining the alternative accounts and demonstrating why they fail to explain Turkey’s new policy.

In the second section of this part (Chapter V, section 2.2) I also analyze the positions of the EU member states on Turkey’s membership and the settlement of the Cyprus question. Rather than taking the major role in the period following Turkey being given candidate status in 1999, the member states left the running to the Commission. The EU Commission thus emerged as the key actor in Turkey’s accession process, evaluating Turkey’s progress according to the Copenhagen and acquis criteria rather than political and economic considerations that were later to dominate member state attitudes. Similarly, the EU Commission did not consider the Cyprus problem as a political criterion. However, settlement of the Cyprus question was essential as it became part of the acquis criteria.

2.1. Europeanization of the Cyprus Discord

Although the EU, in fact, made the decision to accept the Republic of Cyprus as a member despite the absence of a solution in 1999, it was with the prospect of the Republic of Cyprus’s accession to the EU without a solution that the Cyprus issue was Europeanized. As a candidate country, Turkey would have to contend with the Cyprus problem within the context of the EU acquis. Thus, a solution for Cyprus became a *sine qua non* for the advancement of Turkey’s own accession process, prompting Ankara to accept the Annan Plan and then to push for another solution after the plan was rejected by the Greek Cypriots in April 2004.

The following discussion of the Europeanization of the Cyprus question begins with an analysis of the literature on international institutionalization as a factor in foreign-policy alteration. It is followed by an examination of the
relevance of the concepts of ‘democratic conditionality’, ‘acquis conditionality’ and ‘determinacy and legitimacy of conditions’ with regard to Turkey’s change in Cyprus policy. From this it may be concluded that rather than being a democratic or acquis conditionality, or a determinate or legitimate EU norm, the Cyprus issue has become a de facto criterion for the progress of accession negotiations between the EU and Turkey, requiring any Turkish government with EU aspirations to address the discord on Cyprus.

2.1.1. International Institutionalization as an External Factor of Foreign-Policy Change

International institutionalization is one international factor that may lead to foreign-policy change (Goldmann 1982; Rosati 1994; Kleistra and Mayer 2001; Smith, 2004). International institutionalization encompasses treaties and agreements signed by a government as well as customs that entail international commitments and expectations that affect a state’s foreign policy (Goldmann 1982: 253-4). International laws, norms and regimes influence the existing foreign policy of a state, which is dependent upon that state’s past alliance agreements, political engagements and commercial relationships as well as the international environment (Rosati 1994: 230). The normative regulations of a particular state may be consistent or inconsistent with international rules, agreements or norms (Kleistra and Mayer 2001: 406). If a particular country’s regulations are inconsistent with the regulations of an organization in which that particular country aspires to take part, then that country must adapt its regulations to those of the organization in question. In the case of Turkey, this organization is the EU.

Over the last twenty years, the EU has constructed an institutional framework of supranational and intergovernmental components that govern European economic and monetary policies, environmental policies, justice and home affairs and an increasing number of social policies (Risse 2010: 244). Just as European institutions influence the policies of member-states in a top-down process, member-states upload their concerns and preoccupations to the
European level in a ‘bottom-up’ process (Edwards 2006: 144). The EU is also increasingly affecting the foreign and security policies of its members. While at the first European Political Cooperation (EPC) meetings in the early 1970s only a few concrete decisions regarding foreign policy could be taken, this situation started to change gradually with the ever-increasing institutionalization of the EPC. On several contentious issues, preference-outliers within the EU were narrowed owing to the progressive institutionalization of the EPC as well as the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP). Until the EPC/CFSP system was set up, EU member states were unable to come to a common understanding on foreign-policy issues. Under the institutionalized structure of the EPC/CFSP, common behaviours are now deeply imbedded in the national practices of EU member states as a result of the intensive cooperation that has been the outcome of institution-building within the EU in general and within the EPC/CFSP in particular (M. E. Smith 2004: 121-3).

Institutionalization at the international level may take place under international organizations other than the EU and according to international norms other than those of the EU. For instance, the parties of a disagreement may sign an international agreement, thereby institutionalizing the dissension between the parties in question under international law, and, accordingly, this agreement between the parties gains international recognition.

The Oslo Peace Process exemplifies institutionalization under international law. In the process, Israel underscored the institutionalization of peace under international norms with the signing of an international agreement between the parties concerned. As a result, UN Resolution 242, which set out the ‘land for peace’ formula of the Israeli-Egyptian peace process, was applied to the process to reinforce these norms. US President Jimmy Carter worked hard for the establishment of a Palestinian state out of his commitment to the norms of human rights and a just peace. Anwar Sadat, the Egyptian leader, purposed two objectives: maintaining friendly relations with Arab nations and advancing the issue of Palestinian human rights. The durability of peace between Israel and Egypt since Oslo denotes that successful normative
institutionalization at the international level has prevented domestic political actors from creating circumstances that would pave the way for a return to the pre-1979 state of conflict and tension (Greffenius 1994: 213 and 18).

2.1.2. Institutionalization of EU Norms in the Case of Cyprus

In 1999, the EU granted Turkey candidacy status, considerably raising the credibility of EU membership for Turkey and thus making the EU the most important external determinant of Turkish foreign policy. Accession requires candidates to meet EU demands in two chief domains: First, they must meet the Copenhagen Criteria, which envisions stability of institutions guaranteeing democracy, rule of law, human rights and respect for and protection of minorities; and second, they must adopt the *acquis communautaire*, the accumulated legislative and judicial decisions that comprise the body of European Union law. Furthermore, the EU may also ask individual countries to meet certain additional conditions. In the case of Turkey, the EU asked Ankara to contribute to the settlement of the Cyprus dispute, pressuring the Turkish leadership to accept the Annan Plan.

On November 5, 2003, the EU Commission released its Regular Report on Turkey’s progress towards accession for 2003, accompanied by a strategy paper that emphasized how “failure to reach a settlement in Cyprus would be a major hindrance for Turkey’s EU prospects” (European Commission November 5, 2003). The following day, in addressing the European Parliament in relation to Turkey’s EU Progress Report and Strategy Paper of 2003, Günter Verheugen, the EU commissioner for enlargement, disclosed that a resolution on the island was not a pre-condition, but a political message inserted into the documents wittingly. According to Verheugen, the reality was that Turkey needed to take the initiative to solve the problem in line with the UN plan (*Radikal* November 6, 2003). Verheugen’s statements indicate that the EU was pressuring Ankara to contribute to the resolution of the conflict, but that as the Republic of Cyprus had not yet acceded to the EU, it lacked sufficiently powerful institutionalized tools to officially declare a resolution on
Cyprus as a pre-condition for Turkey’s own membership. It was for this reason that the EU, through the formal documents of the accession process and through Verheugen’s statements as commissioner, asked Turkey to contribute to a settlement while at the same time underscoring that a solution on Cyprus was not a pre-condition for Turkey’s accession. However, once the Republic of Cyprus acceded to the EU – without a resolution on the island, and despite Turkey’s acquiescence to EU demands that it accept the Annan Plan – the EU would be able to officially request that Ankara extend the Additional Protocol between Turkey and the EU to the Republic of Cyprus as an EU member. Failure to do so would constitute a contravention of the *acquis communautaire* and would block Turkey’s accession process. Thus, EU norms were imposed on Turkey, forcing Ankara to change its Cyprus policy and assume a more pragmatic approach with regard to the Cyprus dispute in order to promote its own accession process. In fact, Ankara’s failure to extend the Additional Protocol to the Republic of Cyprus is to a great extent accountable for the stalling of accession talks between Turkey and the EU.

### 2.2. Potential Alternatives to Institutionalization of EU Norms as an Explanatory Mechanism

In order to sufficiently evaluate the Europeanization of the Cyprus disagreement, the following discussion examines other models, namely ‘Democratic Conditionality’, ‘Acquis Conditionality’, ‘Determinacy of Conditionality’, ‘Credibility of Conditionality’, and ‘Size and Speed of Rewards’ (Grabbe 2001, 2002; Schimmelfennig and Sedelmeier 2005; Vachudova 2005; Sasse 2008; Schimmelfennig 2008; Dimitrova 2011) as alternative explanations that could possibly account for Turkey’s policy change on Cyprus. As will be seen, however, all of these models are deemed to be irrelevant.
2.2.1. Democratic and Acquis Conditionality

Article 7 of the Presidency Conclusions of the Copenhagen Summit in June 1993 stipulates the following ‘democratic conditionality’ for EU membership:

“Membership involves that the candidate country has achieved stability of institutions guaranteeing democracy, the rule of law, human rights and respect for and protection of minorities, the existence of a functioning market economy as well as the capacity to cope with competitive pressure and market forces within the Union. Membership presupposes the candidate's ability to take on the obligations of membership including adherence to the aims of political, economic and monetary union (European Council 1993: Article 7).”

At the July 1997 European Council meeting in Berlin, the 15 EU countries agreed on the European Commission’s ‘Agenda 2000’ and consonant reforms. ‘Agenda 2000’ expanded the pre-conditions for candidate countries from the ‘Copenhagen Criteria’ of 1993 to include the Council of Europe’s ‘Framework Convention for the Protection of National Minorities’ as a pre-condition for candidate countries (European Commission 1997). By 2009, 43 member states had signed ‘Agenda 2000’, and 39 had ratified it.

It is obvious that the Cyprus question has nothing to with the level of democracy, the rule of law, human rights, the existence of a functioning market economy and respect for and protection of minorities in Turkey. So, the settlement of the Cyprus question was not a democratic conditionality for Turkey.

Acquis conditionality refers to compliance with the specific rules of the *acquis communautaire*, according to which candidate countries must adjust their legislation as a precondition for EU membership. Application of *acquis* conditionality started roughly in 1995 during the course of the CEEC accession (Schimmelfennig and Sedelmeier 2005: 211). The Regular Reports
issued annually not only detail the progress and shortcomings of each state with regard to democratic and *acquis* conditionality (Vachudova 2005: 120-1), they also lay out certain conditions for the candidates beyond the boundaries of these criteria. Through these blanket reports, the EU makes clear its priorities with regard to each individual candidate.

Given that resolution of the Cyprus discord could not be associated with either democratic or *acquis* conditionality until the entry of the Republic of Cyprus into the EU in 2004 (See Chapter VII, Section 1.1), neither of these types of conditionality can be considered to be explanatory factors in the change in Turkey’s Cyprus policy.

### 2.2.2. Determinacy or Legitimacy of Conditions

The theory of determinacy presumes that rule-adoptions are more likely when conditions appear in the form of rewards. The clearer the behavioural implications of a rule, the more legalised and binding its status, the more it is determinant. Determinacy also includes an informational aspect that lets would-be adopters know what they need to do to obtain their rewards. In other words, there should be no uncertainty on the part of the candidates as to the requirements for accession (Schimmelfennig and Sedelmeier 2005: 12-3). Similarly, the theory of legitimacy presupposes clarity and expects that ambiguously and inconsistently defined rules will result in diminished compliance. A rule’s capacity to compel compliance of target countries also decreases if member countries do not accept it on the whole or apply it inconsistently, whereas a rule’s capacity to compel compliance increases if it is bound up with the community’s constitutive values and norms and the rule-making-process is legitimate (Schimmelfennig and Sedelmeier 2005: 12 and 18-9). In other words, the more determinate and legitimate the rule, the more likely it is to be adopted.

As a one-way process in which the non-members have to comply with the *acquis* in full (Schimmelfennig and Sedelmeier 2005: 18-9), the EU accession
process is ridden with legitimacy grievances. Because non-members are not involved in the rule-making process, a simple EU demand that a non-member adopt a rule creates a problem of determinacy/legitimacy. Conversely, if the EU enters into a deliberative process with a target country, bargains for its concerns and particular needs in the interpretation and implementation of the rules and ties its demands to international standards and higher principles, then the legitimacy of the rule is enhanced and any perception of imposition is diminished.

Political conditionality itself can be said to lack both determinacy and legitimacy, as the EU requires certain countries to fulfil conditions that are not included in the acquis or that are not fulfilled by some EU member-states (Schimmelfennig and Sedelmeier 2005: 32). The link between meeting certain tasks and the reception of benefits is hazy, and, it should be noted, the conditions laid out in the Copenhagen Criteria are very generic and diffuse, and having been established only in 1993, there has not been sufficient time for the criteria to be adequately elaborated (Grabbe 2001: 1025). To compensate for this, the EU clarifies its priorities through opinions issued by the Commission and through the Regular Reports issued annually for each candidate that details their progress and shortcomings with regard to meeting democratic and acquis conditionality (Vachudova 2005: 120-1).

However, measurements of progress and standards of compliance are unclear. There are no quantitative targets, requirements are complex, and the EU may eventually require applicants to undertake certain tasks that are not made clear at the start of accession negotiations. Applicant countries are also faced with contradictory instructions: whereas the EU promotes decentralization, efficiency and democratic legitimacy, it also expects fast and full implementation of the acquis. Lastly, applicant countries are unsure of the requirements expected of them because they receive different advice and signals from different EU actors – the European Council, the European Parliament, individual member-states that possess veto power over accession – who may place emphasis on different tasks to be completed. (Grabbe 2001: 1025-7).
The domain of minority protection is one in which the legitimacy problem is most evident, in that a flagrant double-standard exists between members and candidates. Whereas EU institutions assess the treatment of ethnic minorities in candidate countries with great care, they overlook the treatment of ethnic minorities in the member states themselves. Furthermore, there is no consensus among members as to whether or not minority protection should in the future remain one of the main values enumerated in Article 6 or whether, perhaps, all members should pass modest forms of minority-protection legislation (Vachudova 2005: 121-2). In short, conditionality with respect to minority rights is neither consistent – as its application varies across countries – nor credible – since non-compliance does not lead to a halt in talks (Sasse 2008: 844-5).

In essence, the demand for a settlement of the Cyprus issue cannot be considered a determinate or legitimate condition for Turkey, since it falls outside the domain of both the Copenhagen Criteria and the *acquis communautaire*. However, settlement became a *de facto* criterion for Turkey because of the need to extend the Additional Protocol to the Republic of Cyprus. This was a direct consequence of the accession of the Republic of Cyprus to the EU prior to a settlement, since, as a candidate country, under the conditions of the *acquis communautaire*, Turkey would now be required to extend the Customs Union agreement between the EU and Turkey to the Republic of Cyprus. The Customs Union Customs Union agreement between the EU and Turkey is based on March 6, 1995 decision of the EU-Turkey Association Council, which was established by the Ankara Agreement to implement a customs union between Turkey and the EU, and entered into effect on December 31, 1995.
2.2.3. Credibility of Conditionality

EU rewards must be bound up with compliance. If a candidate perceives that the EU will provide unconditional assistance or membership, then threats to withdraw rewards will not be credible, or, if a candidate perceives that the EU will stipulate additional political, strategic or economic criteria, it may strive to obtain rewards from the EU without fulfilling the criteria, or, it will not proceed with fulfilling the criteria, assuming that rewards will not be paid regardless. Any of these cases will result in the non-adoption of EU rules.

The ‘credibility of conditionality’ is enhanced by consistency, as in the decision taken by the 1999 Helsinki Summit to open accession talks with Latvia, Lithuania and Slovakia on the basis of their progress in satisfying accession criteria. In contrast, credibility was diminished by the decision to open accession talks with Romania and Bulgaria on political grounds, namely their backing of NATO’s intervention in Kosova (Schimmelfennig and Sedelmeier 2005: 14-5). Again, after 1997, geopolitical as well as domestic calculations led Germany to assure Poland that Germany would not allow Poland’s exclusion from the next round of enlargement, thereby reducing the credibility of conditionality while strengthening Poland’s bargaining position in the accession process (Vachudova 2005: 109).

Moreover, due to the absence of clear benchmarks for assessment and mechanisms of enforcement, the minority condition undermines effective conditionality and highlights the distinction between rule adoption and rule implementation (Sasse 2008: 844-8). As part of the Copenhagen Criteria, minority rights is neither credible nor consistent, because its application varies across members and candidates. Accession talks with Latvia and Estonia were opened before they fully met this criterion, and when they failed to fulfil their compliance, the talks did not stall. (The Latvian parliament ratified the Framework Convention for the Protection of National Minorities as late as May 26, 2005 after its accession to the EU.)
Regarding the EU’s stipulation that Ankara contribute to the settlement of the Cyprus dispute, this was a highly political demand that had no pertinence to either the democratic conditionality represented by the Copenhagen Criteria or the \textit{acquis} conditionality represented by the adoption of the \textit{acquis communitaire} and as such represented an inconsistency in conditionality. Furthermore, the credibility of conditionality was reduced, as any expectation regarding Ankara’s efforts vis-à-vis Cyprus lay outside the requirements of both the Criteria and the \textit{acquis}. Ultimately, Turkey’s progress was measured with regard to the progress it made towards satisfying the Copenhagen criteria, not with regard to its efforts to settle the Cyprus dispute. Had a solution in Cyprus been a consistent criterion, Ankara’s approval of the Annan Plan should have unblocked Turkey’s accession process.

\textbf{2.2.4. Size and Speed of Rewards}

As a candidate state draws closer to joining the EU, its policies and institutions become more and more harmonised with the \textit{acquis} (Dimitrova 2011: 222). However, the ultimate reward of membership remains a long way in the distance at those moments at which adoption costs are incurred. While intermediate rewards such as aid and trade liberalization exist, accession is ultimately linked to overall preparedness, and membership benefits are not partially dis-membered to reward partial readiness. Since the reward of accession comes in one fell swoop after a very long and highly politicized process, policymakers of candidate countries may find it useful to wait until the accession date draws near before making up any of their deficits. As a result, rather than acting as a scalpel that can be used to carve out individualized policies over the course of the accession process, conditionality functions more like a mallet that can be used to impose specific conditions on a candidate at specific points in time (Grabbe 2002: 263).

Upon nearing one of the critical points (‘endgames’) at which a candidate may jump from one stage to the next, such as opening accession negotiations or acceding to the EU, a candidate is more likely to face high domestic costs of
compliance, which can be balanced out by the high benefits acquired upon entering the next phase of negotiations (Schimmelfennig 2008: 931).

In December 2004, Turkey had reached an endgame, as the European Council meeting was about to decide whether or not it was ready to commence accession negotiations. At this critical stage, Ankara pushed to the utmost for a settlement on Cyprus by accepting the Annan Plan. However, rather than stepping back or slowing down, Ankara has continued to pursue a settlement on the basis of the UN parameters. Therefore, rather than the ‘size and speed of reforms’ model, by finding a solution to the Cyprus problem, Ankara tries to clear off the Cyprus barrier, which has become a “de facto acquis condition” in front of Turkey’s accession into the EU. So, the AKP’s adherence to a proactive, solution-oriented Cyprus policy even after the Greek Cypriots rejected the Annan Plan, not only indicates a broader normative mind-change from a security-oriented outlook on foreign affairs towards a more pragmatic solution-oriented standpoint, but also a requirement to clear Turkey’s road to EU membership.

2.3. The Positions of the EU Member States on Cyprus and Turkey’s EU Membership

When I discuss the EU member states’ positions on Turkey’s EU membership and the Cyprus question in the second section of the implementation chapter on the EU (Chapter VII, Section 2), my main argument is that Turkey’s eligibility for accession has been heavily based on the democratic and human rights situation in Turkey (Council of the European Union 2004).

All other criteria based on religious-cultural, economic, geographic or military-strategic grounds that shaped the preferences of members and the discussion on Turkey’s accession have been of a different order of legitimacy. Opening accession talks with Turkey rested on Turkey’s compliance with the constitutive political norms of the EU. Turkey’s compliance with the accession criteria has been the responsibility of the European Commission. It
has been rare for the Commission's recommendations to be rejected and, logically, the more Turkey complies in fulfilling the criteria, the more the pro-Turkey countries in the EU could push the EU to keep its conditional promise of membership. As progress in accession talks is bound up with compliance with the constitutive political norms of the EU, their violation (or failure to keep promises) becomes, ostensibly at least, the only, legitimate cause for the EU to suspend or cancel negotiations (Schimmelfennig 2009: 420-1). However, lack of a consensus within the EU based on various interests and preoccupations of the member states regarding Turkey’s membership rendered Turkish accession process a challenging one for the EU.

After examining the positions of the EU member states on Turkey’s accession process and Cyprus by extensively drawing on the primary sources in Chapter VII, Section 2, I demonstrate that the process of Turkey’s accession heavily hinges on Turkey’s compliance or non-compliance with the EU criteria. However, controversy within the EU as regards Turkey’s membership makes Turkish accession a rather uneasy case for the EU.

3. Emergence of a Propitious Decision-Making Context

The emergence of a propitious decision-making setting is the last component of the theory employed in this thesis. A propitious decision-making context is an essential component of any foreign policy alteration. Whereas a leadership with a new outlook on foreign affairs relates to how a particular approach was embraced, a propitious decision-making context is about how the implementation of such a new understanding by the leadership became possible within a specific decision-making setting.

In this theoretical framework, review the literature on decision-making and justify my choice of this approach. I also explain how the EU also helped the emergence of a propitious decision-making context in favour of the government by providing a focal point of cooperation and differentially empowering the domestic actors within Turkey and the TRNC. The EU’s
impact on the decision-making setting is analyzed in this section as it relates to the decision-making context. As will be demonstrated in Chapter VIII, the interest groups, such as the business sector and the military, did not have a direct say on the decision-making process to change Turkey’s Cyprus policy (Eryilmaz 2007: 42). The role of such groups was confined to their efforts to win over the leadership and public opinion through lobbying and advisory activities and organization of conferences and demonstrations. As will be demonstrated in Chapter VIII, these units did not have a direct impact on the decision to change Turkey’s Cyprus policy.

While the business elite did not have a member in the decision-making body, the military was represented by five members including the Chief of Staff, Commanders of the Land, Air, Navy and Gendarme Forces in the MGK, where Turkey’s new approach to Cyprus question was discussed extensively in an unprecedented and vibrant environment (Hürriyet April 14, 2004). However, as will be shown in Chapter VIII, Chief of Staff Hilmi Özkök, the only member of the military who played a role in the decision-making process, made clear that the decision was to be taken by the government and the military would assume a neutral stance (Çevik April 14, 2004). This was unusual given the dominant position of the Turkish military in Turkish politics.

Other actors that came to the fore during the discussion of the Annan Plan were Prime Minister Abdullah Gül, who forcefully backed the plan alongside Erdoğan (Birand, Hürriyet, April 03, 2004); President Ahmet Necdet Sezer, who opposed such a change (Dodd 2010: 240-1), Uğur Ziyal, the head of the Turkish diplomatic team for Cyprus (Birand, Hürriyet, April 03, 2004), who informed the other members of the decision-making group about the details of the plan. In such a context, Erdoğan emerged as the predominant leader who took the lead and made the decision to change Turkey’s Cyprus policy (Hürriyet, April 13, 2004).

Tsebelis uses the term ‘veto players’ to describe those individuals as well as collective actors whose consent is necessary for a change in the status quo.
According to Tsebelis, in order to understand the degree of likelihood of policy change versus policy stability, it is important to first identify existing institutional veto players by determining how many institutions are involved in agreeing to a policy change. Given that both the number and range of veto players as well as their degree of partisanship influence policy stability, it can be assumed that when a country is confronted with a major exogenous shock – e.g. a rise in oil prices, financial meltdown, prolonged social strife – a government with multiple, vehement veto players will be unable to weather the crisis and will be forced to step aside to be replaced by a new coalition. Thus, governments with multiple or broader ranges of veto players will have shorter durations (Tsebelis 2010: 3-9).

The same argument is mentioned by EU scholars as well. With regard to EU candidacy, the efficacy of conditionality is dependent upon the preferences of both government and veto players, who must agree if there is to be any change in the status quo: The more veto players exist, the more difficult to change the status quo (Schimmelfennig and Sedelmeier 2004: 674-5). Domestic consensus (a ‘winning coalition’) is harder to achieve when many actors have a say in the decision-making. For instance, in Italy, a great number of trade unions and sectoral associations readily act as veto players, clogging any reform initiative (Börzel and Risse 2003: 64-5). By contrast – and not surprising, given the asymmetrical nature of the negotiations that take place within the framework of the pre-accession process – the number of institutionalized veto players in candidate countries is few (Dimitrova 2002: 176). During the pre-accession process the EU also privileges executives over legislatures (Grabbe 2001: 1016-7). Accordingly, the candidate state’s government becomes the main target of EU conditionality, thereby enhancing the relevance of the government’s cost-benefit evaluations over those of veto players (Schimmelfennig and Sedelmeier 2004: 675).

The EU may also differentially empower other domestic actors based on instrumental rationality. Here, the aim is to empower those domestic interest groups that will profit by EU norms and weaken those that dispute such norms (Knill and Lehmkuhl 2002: 263; Schimmelfennig et al. 2003: 500;
Schimmelfennig and Sedelmeier 2005: 37). If the EU presents determinate rules and credible conditionality and distributes rewards equally, then acceptance or rejection of conditions is contingent upon the extent of the domestic adoption costs and their distribution among domestic actors. In order to benefit from this process, domestic actors weigh up the costs and benefits of different options, consider the possible behaviour of other actors and endeavour to maximize their own utility (Börzel and Risse 2003: 63-4). Thus, Europeanization may offer some actors additional resources while weakening others.

The differential empowerment of actors is based on the redistribution of power and interests among domestic actors and the defiance of the existing equilibrium rather than the prescription of the form of a new equilibrium. Differential empowerment implies that the EU contributes to changes in the domestic opportunity structures through the redistribution of power and resources between actors. However, rather than aiming to directly influence opportunity structures, the EU attempts to alter the ‘cognitive input’ into opportunity structures in order to change the beliefs and expectations of domestic actors (Knill and Lehmkühl 2002: 259-63). EU membership provides a focal point of cooperation for pro-EU domestic interest groups, and conditionality gives them a framework to work towards, helping them overcome inertia and eliminating the need to construct a broad platform for domestic political consensus (Grabbe 2002: 262-3).

In countries where governance has alternated between liberal-democratic and nationalist-populist political parties, the EU has made a decisive impact in terms of democratic reform. In these states, the prospect of EU membership provided a focal point and a common objective for opposition political forces, while criticism from the EU diminished the credibility of illiberal forces in the eyes of their electorate, who aspired to EU membership. Thus, in Romania (1997), Slovakia (1998) and Croatia (2002), illiberal governments were voted out, and reform-oriented liberal oppositions were voted in, after which they pursued a policy of pushing for EU membership (Schimmelfennig and Sedelmeier 2007: 91-2).
In the Slovakian case, the EU made it clear that a ‘governmental change’ involving removal of Slovakia’s ruling authoritarian government was a necessary prerequisite to Slovakia’s progress in the accession process. By empowering those who were constrained by the country’s exclusion from the EU, the EU position resulted in the re-structuring of the power equilibrium within the country (Schimmelfennig and Sedelmeier 2005: 37). Coming to the conclusion that Western orientation was the best alternative for their countries, disparate opposition forces were able to join together and cooperate around the focal point of a pro-EU, liberal democratic, market-oriented agenda (Vachudova 2005: 140-1). Put differently, by providing a focal point for cooperation, European framing has been able to change the beliefs and expectations of domestic veto players in such a way that they shift their positions and come to support regulatory change (Knill and Lehmkuhl 2002: 262-3).

The provision of a focal point of cooperation functioned in a similar way with respect to the Turkish foreign policy change on Cyprus. The Cyprus question was a matter of contention between the backers of the Annan Plan and the Euro-sceptics. The pro-EU Turkish domestic political opposition supported the Annan Plan, asserting that it provided a good opportunity to clear Turkey’s path to EU membership and to achieve a lasting settlement for Cyprus, whereas the Euro-sceptics emphasized that the Annan Plan was invidious and favoured the Greek Cypriot position, and they believed that even if the Cyprus issue were to be settled, Turkey would not be allowed to become a member.

The common objective around which exponents of the Annan Plan rallied was the removal of Cyprus as a barrier to Turkey’s EU membership. By backing the Annan Plan, the credibility of the plan’s opponents, such as the military and the political parties other than the AKP, faded, and they were presented as ‘anti-EU’. As part of the pre-accession process, the EU redistributed power and resources between actor coalitions and helped to change the domestic opportunity structures in Turkey in order to empower pro-EU actors. In this way, the EU helped to tip the domestic equilibrium in favour of the backers of
the Annan Plan, and the dissenters were forced to take a back seat. Thus, the EU was able to reduce the potential costs to the AKP government stemming from a policy shift on Cyprus.

In order to change the expectations and beliefs of domestic actors so as to secure their conformation with EU demands, the EU inserted a new cognitive input into the opportunity structures in Turkey, thereby affecting the reform process. EU demands vis-à-vis Cyprus were at loggerheads with Turkey’s traditional policy line and considered to be slanted towards the position of the Greek Cypriots. Although a huge gap existed between the views of the advocates and opponents of the Annan Plan within Turkey in terms of interests and opportunity structures, over time, EU policies were able to frame the expectations and interests of the dissidents. Accordingly, some of the veto players, such as President Sezer, moderated their positions and came to see favourable aspects of a settlement in Cyprus. As a result, a dominant coalition advocating for a course of action consistent with EU demands emerged. Consequently, by altering the cognitive input into existing opportunity structures, the EU influenced the process leading to Turkey’s foreign-policy change, as the unblocking of Turkey’s accession process became a focal point of cooperation among pro-EU actors to overcome resistance from the opponents of the Annan Plan.

The EU’s impact as an actor providing a focal point of cooperation is more visible in the TRNC, where there was an intransigent leader and government in power until December 14, 2003 elections. Whereas there was a compromising leadership in Ankara, which favoured a solution, the government in northern Cyprus led by Denktaş held fast to the idea of a confederation. In northern Cyprus, the possible settlement of the Cyprus discord, which would extricate Turkish Cypriots from international isolation and the prospect of EU membership, functioned as a focal point of cooperation for the Turkish Cypriots and culminated in the emergence of a large coalition and public opinion against Denktaş’s intransigent status quo-oriented policies. As accurately indicated by Christou, the December 14, 2003 parliamentary elections in northern Cyprus turned into a campaign of endorsement or
rejection of the Annan Plan and EU membership (Christou 2004: 158-9). As a consequence of this process, the ‘Turkish Republican Party’ led by Talat, the ‘Peace and Democracy Movement’ led by Mustafa Akıncı, and the ‘Solution and the EU Party’ led by Ali Erel formed an alliance on September 4, 2003, to fight on a collective goal. This was the ousting of Denktaş from the position of the negotiator and reaching a settlement on the basis of the Annan Plan that would allow a unified Cyprus to accede to the EU (Ibid). The governmental change in the north gave the AKP government the opportunity to remove the Denktaş barrier in front of a solution in Cyprus.

In this framework, in its initiative to unblock Turkey’s road to EU accession and settle the Cyprus discord, the Turkish business elite became the AKP government’s greatest advocate. (Robins 2003: 84-6). Since 1980s, as an outcome of the introduction of an export-oriented economic model and the development of extensive commercial links abroad Turkey’s foreign and security decisions have become increasingly influenced by economic calculations. Big business – the Turkish Industrialists’ and Businessmen’s Association (TÜSİAD) and the Turkish Union of Chambers and Bursaries (TOBB), in particular – have begun to play major roles, making demands to affect Turkey’s foreign policy decisions (G. Özcan 2010: 32-3)

Regardless of the country, the business sector does not directly participate in governmental decision-making. Instead, it acts as an advisory body and highlights the interests of its members. In order to make a certain level of impact on the negotiations, it is crucial for interest groups to reinforce their ties with their government institutions, since national governments are the only legitimate interlocutors and have the best communication channels with the EU. In spite of this, communication between national governments and the business sector on issues related to enlargement has tended to remain limited (Borragán 2004: 248 and 54-5). This point is confirmed in the case of Turkey by the absence of representatives of the business elite in the decision-making process.
As the decision-making bodies on EU accession policies, national executives and legislatures have become the targets of business lobbyists. In the Central and Eastern European Countries (CEEC), Business Interest Associations (BIA) were transformed, establishing committees that specialised in EU matters and setting up representative offices in Brussels. In 1998, the Hungarian Chambers of Commerce and Industry (HCCI), which actively backed Hungary’s integration into the EU, laid out an Action Plan to embolden Hungary’s accession. The HCCI embraced cooperation with the Hungarian government, passing on the views of the business interests it represented with the aim of defining Hungary’s stance on enlargement. The HCCI looked upon itself as an influential player in Hungary’s transformation process, setting up contacts with the EU executive on matters concerning enlargement, thereby attenuating the disruption in EU-related policymaking. Along similar lines, the Polish Chamber of Commerce (PCC) acted as an adviser and active agent in Poland’s transformation process by initiating sustained communication with the government and state administration while setting forth legislative bids aimed at improving the condition of the Polish business sector. BIAs with EU contacts in Brussels looked upon themselves as agents of change in their own countries, transferring their acquired knowledge and experience in consultative politics with the aim of developing a more participative political culture in their respective countries. Rather than affecting policymaking by attempting to mould legislation, business interest groups from the CEEC took on an increasingly significant role in mediating the interests of their members by engaging in lobbying and acting as advisers as well as agents of change in the ongoing transformation processes at home (Borragán 2004: 255-62).

TÜSİAD’s activities have been similar to those of the BIAs of the CEEC. (Eryılmaz 2007: 42). In spite of the fact that no institutional mechanism exists for the direct participation of Turkish business interests in the decision-making process vis-à-vis EU accession, TÜSİAD has set up representative offices in Brussels, Washington and many other capitals in order to further the interests of its members. Without becoming directly involved in Turkish policymaking, TÜSİAD has acted as an adviser, lobbyist, interest mediator and, by promoting
a participatory political culture in Turkey, as an agent of democratic transformation (Eryılmaz 2007: 42). It propounds legislative bids, lays out actions plans, organizes seminars and strives to maintain sustained communication with the government on matters related to its interests and the EU, and it has been the greatest champion of Turkey’s EU membership and settlement of the Cyprus dispute. But as it was not in the decision-making body, it did not have a direct say in the decision-making process.

Apart from business interests, Turkish civil society lacks both organizational capacity and a strong culture of civic engagement. For this reason, civil society has not been able to exert much pressure on state actors from below or persuade them to introduce reforms (Börzel and Soyaltın 2012: 15). In general, Turkish civil society is considered weak, passive and state-controlled or state-driven through corporatist structures. In Ottoman political culture as well as the bureaucratic-authoritarian early Turkish Republic, the state was treated as devlet baba, the untouchable ‘father state’, rather than as an organization needed to furnish leadership and essential services. From 1990s onwards, however, following considerable economic liberalization, Turkish civil society, such as Economic Development Foundation (İKV) and the Turkish Economic and Social Studies Foundation (TESEV) became more visible and vocal in advocating for greater political liberalization. However, compared to industrialized countries, civil society in Turkey remained less developed in areas such as membership, funding and levels of interpersonal trust (Kubicek 2005: 366-7). The weakness of civil society may be attributed to Turkey’s strong state tradition and centralized governmental structure. With regard to relations between the government and civil society, there are still instances of exceeding governmental interference in and control of civil society organizations (Öner 2012: 100-1 and 13-4), while, at the same time, the Turkish political elite and party organizations has refused to allow civil society to penetrate into party structures. Consequently, the impact of pro-EU groups has limited influence on party preferences (Çarkoğlu 2003: 188-90). In this context, the civil society also did not have an impact in changing Turkey’s Cyprus policy. Instead, they were manipulated and mobilized by the leadership in favour of a policy change.
Having discussed the role played by the business elite and civil society on Ankara’s new Cyprus policy from a theoretical perspective in the previous section, I will briefly look at the literature on the role that may be played in foreign policy by politicized militaries in general, after which I will focus on the role played by the Turkish military in the particular case of Turkey’s foreign-policy change on Cyprus.

In terms of foreign-policy decisions, it is claimed that a politically active military or another influential actor has the potential to foil government decision-making based on its veto power, which may be rooted in either law, control over key resources, or moral authority on certain issues (M. G. Hermann 2001: 61-2). The extent and manner in which the military impacts upon foreign and defence policy have substantial implications for relations with neighbouring countries and ethnic minorities and thus for regional peace and security. During the period of communist rule in Central and Eastern Europe, for example, both national and Soviet militaries were part of the *ancien regime*. In return for their subjugation to communist rule, the military was granted a high level of autonomy with respect to the development and implementation of defence policy. As highly politicized bodies with close ties to their respective national communist parties, considerable bids were made by the communist leadership to entrench its political values and institutions within the national armed forces. As one of the leading elements of communist rule, the armed forces often intervened in domestic affairs alongside or in support of authoritarian and nationalist political forces (Cottee et al. 2002: 1-2). For example, in the course of the 1991 break-up of Yugoslavia, the military’s loyalty to the idea of a ‘United Yugoslavia’, combined with the initiatives of the individual republics to set up their own paramilitary forces, played a crucial role in the subsequent conflict.

Despite their shared communist heritage, the structure of civil-military relations in the CEE countries, the circumstances under which they obtained sovereignty and the broad patterns of their post-communist development have varied considerably. In the so-called non-Soviet Warsaw Pact (NSWP) states
of Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, East Germany, Hungary, Poland and Romania, the allegiance of the various national militaries to their communist regimes was in doubt, suggesting that a democratic transition could be achieved relatively easily in these countries in comparison to Russia and Yugoslavia, where the militaries were more politicized and, in both cases, remained firmly entwined with the communist regime (Cottee et al. 2002: 2-5).

As in the case of the Soviet Union and Yugoslavia, Turkey’s military is highly politicized. It has a rigid allegiance to the safeguarding of the secular structure and territorial integrity of the country, and with its institutionalised role at the National Security Council, it is considered to be an influential actor in Turkish foreign-policy and security decision-making. Nevertheless, despite the efforts of some members of the top brass to foil Turkey’s foreign policy change on Cyprus in the course of 2002 and 2004, Chief of Staff Hilmi Özkök, who represented the newly emerging modernist vision within the military, made clear that the military would not be involved in such significant foreign policy decisions. This neutral attitude helped the government in its innovative approach (Birand April 15, 2003).

As will be shown in Chapter VIII on the decision-making process, neither the Turkish business sector nor the Turkish military were part of the decision-making unit in the case of foreign policy change on Cyprus. Their influence was confined to their efforts to bring about the emergence of a favourable/unfavourable public opinion as regards the Annan Plan. The only prominent actor from the military in the decision-making unit was Hilmi Özkök, who made clear that the decision was to be made by the government. Rather, Erdoğan emerged as the main actor in Turkey’s decision.

In terms of Hermann’s model (M. G. Hermann and Hermann 1989: 367-9; M. G. Hermann 2001: 56-7) in which foreign-policy decisions are understood to be made by an “authoritative decision unit”, Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdoğan, as the predominant leader, may be described as the authoritative decision unit in Turkey’s foreign policy change on Cyprus. Erdoğan was able to single-handedly take this decision without being thwarted by other domestic
actors because none of the actors in the Turkish political arena was in a position to defy him.

Erdoğan's position was reinforced by the EU. By virtue of conditionality and the asymmetrical nature of negotiations, the EU pre-accession process raised few institutionalized veto points in candidate countries (Dimitrova 2002: 176). Any domestic veto players – actors who incur adoption costs of comprehensive institutional and policy compliance – have been absent or considered too weak to block change (Börzel and Risse 2012a: 197-8). Consequently, governments become the main targets of EU conditionality during the pre-accession process, and it is their cost-benefit calculations that comes to the fore (Schimmelfennig and Sedelmeier 2004: 675).

Kleistra and Mayer refer to a ‘decision-making mandate’, i.e., the necessary level of authority in the decision-making process. A single policymaker might be the dominant actor in the policy arena, or s/he may share the decision-making mandate with other powerful actors; in the latter case, policymaking capacity is restrained (Kleistra and Mayer 2001: 392). Goldmann argues that if decisions are taken by a single leader or autonomous group, change is more likely; if, on the other hand, decisions are taken in a delegate decision-making context, then change is less likely (Goldmann 1982: 249-50). When more than one actor is involved in decision-making, differences among the actors involved in decision-making may emerge with respect to the appropriate main strategies to be implemented to tackle threats. For instance, with respect to substantive foreign policy issues, ‘hardliners’ may opt for confrontational approaches, whereas ‘moderates’ may favour diplomatic accommodation. In the absence of domestic political competition, a lack of controversy among actors with regard to foreign policy will allow leaders to more smoothly address themselves to new initiatives. Without political consensus at the domestic level, the government is limited to fuzzy rhetoric, which may change in intensity, but which by no means has the capacity to alter the basic structure of foreign policy (Hagan 1994: 155-6).
It is asserted that the most significant barrier to foreign-policy alteration is regime fragmentation. Domestic political divisions in the form of competing personalities, bureaucracies/institutions, factions, parties or political groups may encumber implementation of a foreign-policy shift (Hagan 1994: 152 and 55-7). If such permanent political divisions are absent or limited, then the regime is considered cohesive. The high degree of cohesiveness in authoritarian regimes allows the government to act more freely, whereas democratization generates divisions of power among various political actors and institutions, resulting in lower regime cohesiveness and, therefore, a lower level of capacity in terms of the government’s ability to institute foreign-policy change. Thus, the weight of organizational and bureaucratic factors in the foreign policy-making process increases in a democratic context (T. W. Park et al. 1994: 174).

The Israeli-Egyptian negotiation process of 1977-1979 well illustrates the constraining role of decision-making structures in foreign policymaking. In this case, inopportune decision-making structures circumscribed the smooth operation of the decision-making process. Namely, the democratic character of the Israeli decision-making structure was problematic in terms of achieving success through the Oslo Peace Process: although Egyptian leader Anwar Sadat could disregard the recommendations of his advisors without the risk of being dislodged from power, Israeli leader Menachem Begin, faced with a difficult situation domestically, had a limited negotiating position and, cognizant of the fact that he was just first among equals in the cabinet of a parliamentary-democratic system, had to take into account the views of his ministers, knowing he might have to retreat from his negotiating position or be ousted from power should he fail to convince the other Israeli cabinet members to support him (Greffenius 1994: 217-8).

According to Hermann, whose approach to decision-making will be used in this research, however, the type of regime is less important than the type of decision-making unit. An “authoritative decision unit”, in her terminology, has the capacity to commit the resources of the government in foreign matters and the power to counteract other influential actors within and outside the
government to prevent them from bluntly reversing its position (M. G. Hermann 2001: 56). Hermann posits three types of authoritative decision units: a predominant leader, a single group, and multiple autonomous actors. The type of authoritative decision unit bears no connection to the type of political regime: A predominant leader may emerge with the authority to take a decision single-handedly in a democratic regime, whereas multiple autonomous actors may be required in an authoritarian regime.

A predominant leader refers to a single individual with the authority to commit, or withhold, all the resources of the regime relevant to a particular issue, regardless of opposition. In this case, the foreign-policy machinery of the government is organized hierarchically, with one person at the top responsible for decisions. Such a leader actively participates in the decision-making process without including others (M. G. Hermann and Hermann 1989: 365-6). While predominant leaders may also arise in democratic regimes, such subsumption of authority is more characteristic of dictatorships and authoritarian regimes, which usually have predominant leaders in foreign affairs (M. G. Hermann 2001: 58-9).

If the decision unit is a predominant leader, his/her interest in foreign policy matters has to be reckoned with. At times s/he might opt not to intervene in foreign affairs; however, high-level diplomacy and crisis situations are considered to be cases in which the involvement of the predominant leader is guaranteed. Factors related to the predominant leader’s personality and socialization may also guarantee his/her involvement. For instance, a predominant leader might be highly interested in foreign affairs, or, due to his/her personality/political style, s/he might wish to be in charge of all aspects of governmental affairs, or s/he might be an expert on foreign relations, or s/he might use foreign policy as a tool to divert the opposition. According to Hermann, a leader’s foreign-policy decisions are influenced by six personal characteristics: worldview, political style, motivation, foreign-affairs interest/training, foreign-policy climate, and socialization. While worldview, political style and motivation pertain to a leader’s personality, the other characteristics relate to the leader’s experience and background (M. G.
Hermann 1988: 59 and 68). Some leaders may be very interested in foreign affairs and thus become closely involved with major issues, taking part in all aspects of foreign policymaking, opting for personal contact with other world leaders, considering all the nuances of foreign-policy problems and situations and in general straining to control every aspect of the foreign policy arena. At the opposite extreme, a leader less interested and less experienced in foreign affairs may delegate much of the power and responsibility in foreign relations to others. If a leader is highly interested, but has less training in foreign affairs, s/he would most likely take part in foreign policy decision-making, but rather than experience, s/he would rely on worldview, political style and motives in such matters (M. G. Hermann 1988: 70-2).

The second type of authoritative decision unit consists of a single group of individuals who form part of a common dominant policy group that makes decisions through the interactive participation of its members. This single group exercises final authority to commit or withhold the regime’s resources in grappling with a problem. Outside opposition is not powerful enough to alter the decisions of the single group, nor do these decisions require the approval of an external (foreign) entity (M. G. Hermann and Hermann 1989: 366-7). The Politburo in the Soviet Union and the Joint Chiefs of Staff in the United States are examples of this type of decision unit (M. G. Hermann 2001: 60).

Finally, the third type of decision unit is comprised of multiple autonomous actors, i.e., two or more separate, non-hierarchical individuals, groups, or organizations, none of whom have the sole authority to commit or withhold the regime’s resources in addressing the immediate problem and who cannot be combined into a single decision unit. If the immediate problem being addressed is not of personal interest to a predominant leader, is not a crucial issue for the well-being of the regime or the society and is not under the control of a single group, then the authoritative decision unit is comprised of multiple autonomous actors (M. G. Hermann and Hermann 1989: 367-9).
This was the case, for example, of Turkey’s 1974 intervention in Cyprus. With the exception of the execution stage, Prime Minister Bülent Ecevit cannot be considered a predominant leader, as he did not possess the authority to commit government resources to back up his decisions, which could be reversed through the Turkish political system. Both according to the constitution and in practice, groups including the National Security Council, the military and the senate had to be consulted and persuaded in such critical matters, and Cabinet decisions had to be ratified by the Turkish Parliament. Thus, in this case, the dominant decision-making unit was comprised of multiple autonomous actors, including the Cabinet, the military, the senate and the parliament (Çuhadar-Özkaynak and Özkeçeci-Taner 2004: 51-2).

Ankara’s decision to accept the EU offer for candidacy in 1999, on the other hand, involved the leaders of the three coalition parties – Bülent Ecevit, Devlet Bahçeli and Mesut Yılmaz – as well as Foreign Minister İsmail Cem and several ministry bureaucrats; Şükrü Sina Gürel, the minister responsible for Cyprus affairs; Mehmet Ali İrtemçelik, the minister responsible for Turkish-EU relations; and President Süleyman Demirel, who, along with Cem, interacted with Ecevit by phone. However, given that neither the military nor the parliament was consulted in the decision-making process, the individuals making up the authoritative decision unit must be conceived of as a single group, rather than as a coalition of multiple autonomous actors (Çuhadar-Özkaynak and Özkeçeci-Taner 2004: 59).

On the Cyprus issue, in the decision to accept the Annan Plan, the authoritative decision unit was Prime Minister Erdoğan as the predominant leader. Erdoğan, Gül and Ziyal were in favour of a solution on the basis of the Annan Plan (Birand, Hürriyet, April 03, 2004). While Özkök assumed a neutral stance, despite his opposition, Sezer moderated his position. However, on January 24, 2004, Erdoğan single-handedly empowered the UN Secretary General with the power of arbitration, which granted the latter the right to fill in the blanks in the accord where the parties could not converge. This single-handed decision by Erdoğan went far beyond the decision of the January 23 MGK meeting. Both Özkök and Sezer mentioned that “Erdoğan’s single-
handed decision was in breach of the MGK decisions, which backed the talks on the basis of the UN mission of good offices” (*Hürriyet* April 13, 2004). Such a solo decision on the part of Erdoğan was also contributed to by the EU, which rendered the AKP government the only interlocutor in the pre-accession process and demonstrated that Erdoğan had the capacity to commit governmental resources, and none of the other domestic actors within the Turkish policymaking structure was in a position to defy him (Sözen 2010a: 111). Despite the fact that the President, some segments of the civilian-military bureaucracy and all the political parties except the AKP opposed the Annan Plan, none of these veto players was in a position to countermand Erdoğan’s decision, and he was able to override all opposition to change in Turkey’s Cyprus policy. Thus, a propitious decision-making structure was able to catalyse a shift in Turkish policy towards Cypress.
CHAPTER VI: FIRST DETERMINANT: A NEW LEADERSHIP

The following three sections focus on the particular dynamics that affected Turkey’s policy shift towards Cyprus between 2002 and 2004. While Chapter VI explains the leadership’s role, Chapter VII highlights the role played by the EU. Chapter VIII discovers why a propitious decision-making framework was also a crucial component of Turkey’s policy shift vis-à-vis Cyprus.

The adoption of a particular policy by a particular leadership, and the change in the perceptions of the leadership, is the main factor bearing on Turkey’s foreign policy change on Cyprus and is embodied in the AKP’s advent to power and espousal of an EU-oriented foreign-policy agenda. Not only did it embrace an EU-oriented foreign policy agenda, following elections in 2002, the party renounced its Islamic roots and firmly committed itself to proactive settlement of the Cyprus dispute based on a bi-zonal, bi-communal federation in line with UN criteria. In this process of ideational transformation and adoption of a new foreign policy on Cyprus, cost-benefit calculations of the AKP government – the government considered this change a means of demonstrating its Western credentials to Turkey’s strictly secular establishment – and a mind-change towards an EU-oriented party on the part of the AKP leadership went hand in hand. Accordingly, the policy change on Cyprus can not be ascribed to simple cost-benefit calculation.

This empirical chapter analyses the ideational transformation of the AKP from an Islamist party towards one at the centre of the Turkish political spectrum and reveals why such a transformation entailed a new foreign-policy vision on Cyprus. It begins by explicating the Turkish institutional framework, which has viewed Islamist parties with scepticism. Following this, it offers an explanation as to why the coalition government that preceded the AKP was incapable of implementing a policy change, and then provides a detailed look at the transformation of the AKP from an historical perspective, including a
synopsis of Ahmet Davutoğlu’s new foreign policy vision, which reflects the new mindset of the AKP government. Finally, the chapter concludes with an assessment of the explanatory value of an adoption-costs model in the case of Turkish foreign policy change vis-à-vis Cyprus.

1. Normative Account: The Advent to Power of a New Turkish Leadership with a New Outlook on Foreign Affairs

1.1. The Turkish Ideological/Cultural Framework

In order to understand why the AKP was able to transform itself into an EU-oriented party with a new foreign-policy vision on Cyprus as well as the previous coalition government’s failure to do so, it is of utmost importance to examine the institutional setting in which these changes did or did not take place. The Turkish institutional environment has been historically Eurosceptical and has not readily allowed bureaucratic institutions and political parties to transform themselves into Western-style democratic entities. In essence, the persona of Mustafa Kemal Atatürk, founder of the Turkish Republic, represents the most important institution in Turkey, and the Turkish state is dominated by his political priorities and views. In contrast to other personality cults, the veneration of Atatürk – a military hero and a prescient statesman in the eyes of the Turkish people – is sincere and genuine. Kemal Atatürk is seen as the leader who saved the Turkish people from extinction and the country from occupation and subjugation, and his personality is associated with Turkish independence and sovereignty and a sense of national pride and dignity (Taşpınar 2008: 4-5). Atatürk’s presence on every wall represents the enduring influence of a mixture of nationalism and secularism in Turkey’s policy orientation. The Turkish army, bureaucracy and judiciary were still to a large extent act in consonance with Kemalist principles as late as 2002. (Cooper 2002: 126).

On account of his image as the indisputable eternal leader of the country, Atatürk’s ideology has had a perdurable effect on Turkey’s political culture,
and his legacy has been one of the most important determinants of Turkey’s foreign policy. Kemalism has found expression in a revolutionary and militant version of secularism and assimilationist nationalism (Taşpınar 2008: 4). Atatürk’s Westernization, which is influenced in large measure by the French Revolution and its anti-clerical tradition of laïcité, entailed the abolishment of the Ottoman sultanate and the caliphate, Arabic letters, Islamic education and Sufi brotherhoods. Thus, in Turkey, religion is viewed by Kemalists as a symbol of backwardness and opposition to the very existence of the republic. Whereas religion is associated with the ancien regime, obscurantism, conservatism and traditionalism, the republic refers to enlightenment, progress and modernity. The total exclusion of religion from public life has aroused harsh secular reaction regarding issues such as the donning of headscarves in public schools (Taşpınar 2008: 4-5).

The assimilationist nationalism of Kemalism is again constructed on the French model, which abnegates multi-culturalism, multi-ethnicity and multi-national cosmopolitanism. This made the policy of assimilation of Muslim minorities inevitable. Non-Muslim communities, on the other hand, were viewed as Turkish citizens, but were subjected to de facto discrimination, which included banning them from all public-sector employment (Taşpınar 2008: 4-5). The Kemalist concept of nationalism replaced the Ottoman identification with Islam and dynasty with loyalty to Anatolia and the Turkish nation. Despite this ethnic emphasis on Turkish culture, language and history, the Turkish Constitution stipulates that all citizens of the Republic of Turkey are Turks, regardless of their ethnicity (Kushner 1997: 222). All Ottoman Muslims in Anatolia – Albanians, Bosnians, Caucasians, Kurds and Laz as well as Turks – were smoothly melded into a new nation defined as a homogeneous, Turkish nation. By means of a secular state and society, the shared religion of these communities was transformed into a national identity. While all Muslim groups were equally considered to be first-class members of the nation, non-Muslim groups, on the other hand, were second-class citizens granted the official status of ‘minority’ (Çolak 2006: 591).
During the first two decades following the establishment of the Republic of Turkey, its founding fathers viewed their Ottoman past as a ‘Dark Age’ in which Turkish history and language had been ignored. The Ottomans were represented as the Turkish Republic’s ‘other’, who had suppressed the state’s Turkish identity and striven to form a new identity built on a community of Islam. Ottoman imperial heritage, expansionism, irredentism and all types of universalism, whether Ottomanism, pan-Islamism or pan-Turkism, were disowned during the course of the formation of the republic in the 1920s. This new approach facilitated the Western-orientation of Turkey’s foreign policy. Since Anatolia was the last remaining territory, a concept of indivisible and inviolable national borders was formulated. The application of Jacobin secularism excluded any Islamic identity other than the official one, and non-Muslim and non-Turkish identities were suppressed in the public domain. Turkishness increasingly came to be portrayed as referring to secular, Sunni Turkish-speakers, including Kurds (Fisher Onar 2009: 232-3).

For the Kemalists, the only way to achieve their main goal of raising the new republic to the level of contemporary civilization was to eliminate Islam from all aspects of political and cultural life. The identification with religion and its century-long role in the Ottoman Empire were inadmissible to the new Turkish identity, which was constructed on the basis of the cultural Westernization of society. The ‘otherization’ of Islam and the Ottoman past represented the only way in which the republican elite would be able to shift the basis of legitimacy from religion to nationality. Since Islam and civilization were deemed incompatible, Islam would be excluded from all aspects of political and social life. Atatürk believed the West to be synonymous with contemporary civilization, and, accordingly, the modernization of the Turkish society would take place along Western European lines and include the espousal and internalization of all aspects of Western political, social and cultural life. Through the secularization of the state and the individual, the individual’s personal identification with Islam that had existed under the Ottoman Empire came to be replaced by his/her identification with the concept of ‘Turkishness’ (Bozdağlıoğlu 2008: 60-1).
Atatürk not only believed that contemporary, civilization had found expression in Western societies, he also believed that in order for the Turkish nation to rise to their level, Turkey would have to become part of the Western world (Walker 2007: 3). Against this backdrop, the Turkish state established along Kemalist lines was firmly Western-oriented, and owing to its secularism, its approach towards Islam was sceptical, while its nationalism made it similarly sceptical mistrustful of the Kurdish ethnic movement. The rejection of religion in the state administrative structure and the formation of a new Turkish language gave Turkey a new identity, distancing it from Asian and Muslim countries, structures and institutions (Cooper 2002: 117).

The Turkish state establishment also harbours sensitivities concerning Turkey’s territorial integrity as a result of its negative historical experiences. As explained by Fuller, two centuries of Western imperialism, the loss of huge chunks of territory in the Balkans, the Middle East and the Caucasus, and the salvation of Anatolia only after an extraordinary war of resistance created an environment in which the Turkish elite had become highly sensitive on issues related to its national dignity and its national interests and wary regarding the intentions of Western powers. Historical experience has woven into Turkey’s national fabric a forceful anti-imperialist nationalism together with a lasting suspicion towards Western motives lying just beneath the surface that has from time to time fiercely erupted (Fuller 2004: 55-6).

This mistrust towards the West has been referred to as the ‘Sèvres Syndrome’, after the treaty imposed on the defeated Ottoman Empire in 1920 at the end of World War I. Signed by the Ottoman Sultan, but never put into effect, the Treaty of Sèvres rendered the Turkish-Muslim population of Anatolia into a minority, leaving them with a rump state in the centre, while the Turkish straits were put under the administration of the League of Nations, the Greeks were given extensive rights in Western Anatolia, and Armenian and Kurdish states under the mandate of the Great Powers were established in eastern Turkey. Although the treaty was never carried out, the fear occasioned by it persists to a great extent in colouring Turkish attitudes towards the West (Ahmad 2004: 9). For the Kemalists, the Treaty of Sèvres demonstrated that
Western powers could never be trusted – and led to the persuasion among the Kemalist elite that *no other state can be trusted*; thus, Turkey must be ready at any given time to fight for its territorial integrity. Kemalist circles still largely view the world from this perspective of endangerment (İlgit and Özkçeçeci-Taner 2012: 15). As Hale has commented, in the minds of the founders of Turkey, the Treaty of Sèvres was a clear statement of entente designs on Turkey (Hale 2000: 45-6), and this suspicion of the West continues to be shared by all actors in the Turkish political spectrum today: the army, Kemalist nationalists, leftists and Islamists as well as most Westernized circles in Turkey (Fuller 2004: 55-6).

Among Kemalists, the Cyprus issue is also seen for the most part from this unfavourable historical perspective of Ottoman suffering under the hands of Western imperialism, and any steps on Cyprus are rated as moves that would resume a process leading to the eventual breakup of the Republic of Turkey, just like the Ottoman Empire. For this reason, the new republic disowned its Ottoman past and Islamic identity alongside any irredentist claims on former Ottoman territories (Fisher Onar 2009: 232-3).

With regard to Cyprus, the historical context was intensified by the historical animosity between Greeks and Turks. Starting with the Greek revolution against the Ottoman Empire in 1821 and continuing to the end of the Balkan Wars in 1913, the Turks experienced a perpetual loss of territory to the Greeks. Such a historical process invited a perception among the common people as well as policymakers that Greece, a national enemy, should be kept from capturing Cyprus, another strategic island off the coast of Turkey. Thus, Cyprus became the place to halt the unremitting Greek expansionism against the Turks that had started in 1821. In this sense, the attitude of Turkish foreign policy towards Cyprus was moulded by nationalist and security considerations grounded in an historical setting (Uzer 2011: 106-7 and 48). This security culture rests on the concepts of ‘national security’ and ‘loss of territory’, as highlighted in a slogan used extensively by Kemalist circles: ‘Turkey’s defence starts in Cyprus; if any concessions are made on these matters,
Turkey’s disintegration will follow’. (‘A Turk has no friend other than a Turk’ is another common Turkish expression.)

The Kemalists consider the EU’s attitude towards the Cyprus question as unjust and favouring the Greek perspective, and they believe that if Turkey consents to EU demands on Cyprus, then other demands – such as recognizing the 1915 events as genocide – will follow. On the other hand, to a large measure, the Kemalist elite also believe that even if the Cyprus dispute is settled, Turkey will not be accepted as an EU-member. Onur Öymen, CHP deputy and a senior diplomat, reflects this outlook in his parliamentary speech. Öymen stated that

“Christian Democratic Union in Germany as well as some other parties in France and Austria publicly opposes Turkey’s membership. Some people think that if we make concessions on the Cyprus issue, the doors of Europe will be opened. This is not the case, but we act like entire Europe expects from us such concessions. For this reason, Turkey should not abandon its fundamental interests on national issues and should not make concession just to accede to the EU. Turkey should offer resistance against pressure and unfair demands.” (TBMM Reports Journal May 29, 2003).

Among these circles, the Annan Plan was viewed as an attempt to disrupt Turkish national unity, which could only be safeguarded by backing the independence of the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus (Kemal Kirişçi 2006a: 33-5). In line with this national security perspective, the cardinal objective of Turkish foreign policy became the maintenance of national independence, territorial integrity and the security and continuity of the Turkish state as a modernist, secularist national structure. In this regard, the Kemalist elite fears that Turkey’s domestic security and territorial integrity could be disrupted by demands made by the EU within the context of the Europeanization process. This mindset is not peculiar to the Kemalists, but is shared by those with other political tendencies, including nationalists, Westernists, Islamists and even internationalists (Özkeçeci-Taner 2005: 62), all of whom have traditionally categorized the Cyprus dispute as a ‘national cause’. Such a domestic framework has inhibited Turkish decision-makers,
who have been socialized under this context, from taking a more pragmatic approach on the Cyprus question. From their nationalist perspective, the decision-makers stuck to their call for a confederal solution for the island.

In addition to the EU’s stance on Cyprus, its attempts to impose its own set of parameters on Turkish identity discourse called forth disquiet among the Kemalist elite. The definition of Turkish identity and interests has been firmed up over time as a result of the institutionalization of these concepts by Turkish domestic legislation and institutions. For example, Article 3 of the Turkish Constitution states that “the country and nation of Turkey represents an inseparable union, and its language is Turkish” (Constitution of the Turkish Republic 1982: Article 3), and Article 5 notes that this article, along with Articles 1 and 2, cannot be modified, nor can their modification be proposed (Constitution of the Turkish Republic 1982: Article 5). Although there are some overlaps between EU and Kemalist internal parameters, the Kemalist definition of Turkish identity has been called into question by certain EU parameters, such as the EU’s calls for reform of Turkish political institutions and changes in Turkish political culture, including greater religious freedom and political pluralism (Lynott 2009: 11). The ‘identification’ hypothesis alleges that strong governmental identification with the EU community of countries (‘commitment to Europe’) facilitates compliance with conditionality (Schimmelfennig et al. 2003: 500). However, for all Turkey’s staunch identification with the West, as late as the early 2000s, the notion of Turkish nationalism was at variance with the pluralist notion of nationality within the EU framework. The understanding of the Turkish state defied the protection of ethnic minorities and accentuated the homogeneity, unity and indivisibility of the state, its people and its soil. Turkish Europeanization was based on the authoritarian model of modernist nationalism and uniform identity that paved the way for the establishment of a monolithic Turkish nation-state that was entirely at odds with the post-modern state that had been evolving in Europe since the early 1990s. The cachet of the post-modern state under the EU framework has been its recognition of multiple identities and promotion of minority rights (Sotiris 2008: 9).
However, the Turkish Europeanization based on an authoritarian model of modernist nationalism and uniform identity has been defied with a new definition within the EU process. In the course of the accession process, a new debate emerged between the Euro-sceptics and pro-EU actors that was grounded in the concepts of Turkey’s threat assessments, geographical determinism and overall strategic culture. Euro-sceptics, who are made up of traditionalists form the civilian-military elite, emphasize the unfavourable implications that the EU process might have in Turkey. This persuasion is rooted in the traditional security preoccupations of the Kemalist elite, who stress geo-strategic calculations and concerns over territorial disintegration and loss of land. In this discourse, the Kemalists project the ‘Sèvres syndrome’ onto the EU reform process, which is seen as entailing the adoption of regulations that could undermine Turkey’s territorial integrity and secular nature. Pro-European actors, who are comprised of business circles, civil society organizations and non-governmental actors bring to the forefront the need for a re-conceptualization of Turkey’s strategic culture and moving away from security-oriented definitions towards economic and human-resources-based approaches. They champion a reduction in military outlays and an investment in education and human resources (Aybet 2006: 544), and they have pushed hard for Turkish acceptance of the Annan Plan with the backup of the EU.

1.2. Why a Policy Change on Cyprus Did Not Take Place under the Coalition Government (1999-2002)

Whereas the coalition government’s firm adherence to the ideas institutionalized in the Turkish domestic context, based on negative historical experiences and fear of disintegration, precluded policy change on Cyprus, the AKP government, facing constant policy failures, was able to transform its Islamist identity towards an EU-oriented one and espouse a new pragmatic vision on Cyprus.
Even though the 1999-2002 coalition government had enacted several legislative packages to harmonise with the EU *acquis*, the coalition leaders – Bülent Ecevit of the Democratic Left Party (DSP), Devlet Bahçeli of the Nationalist Movement Party (MHP) and Mesut Yılmaz of the Motherland Party (ANAP) – were disinclined to change Turkey’s Cyprus policy. Even after Turkey’s recognition as a candidate for full EU membership in December 1999, Ecevit, then the Turkish Prime Minister, expressed that “Turkish Cypriots should not be concerned as the presence of the TRNC is not only inevitable for the Turkish Cypriots, but also for Turkey’s security”. Similarly, Mesut Yılmaz, then the Deputy Prime Minister, stated in March 2002 that “there are two distinct nations and two sovereign states in Cyprus” and “Turkey’s membership prospects cannot be associated with a solution in Cyprus” (Kyris 2011: 97-8).

On this issue, the coalition government was dominated by the ideas of the DSP and MHP. Prime Minister Ecevit, who had become chairman of the Republican People’s party in 1972 after İsmet İnönü, a war hero who had taken over the position from Atatürk, had believed that Turkey could employ a more assertive foreign policy independent of the superpowers of the time (Aydın 2000: 128). Thus, Ecevit did not waver in unilaterally interfering in Cyprus in July 1974 to halt a campaign of ethnic cleansing against the Turkish Cypriots by a Greek and Greek Cypriot partnership intent on *enosis*. With vested interests regarding Turkey’s relations with Cyprus and Greece, and known as a hawk on both matters (Robins 2003: 67-8), Ecevit was initially half-hearted regarding the EU’s offer of candidacy for Turkey (Robins 2003: 111-2) out of the apprehension that EU norms would undermine the territorial integrity and secular nature of the Turkish state. The MHP was similarly dubious on both the EU membership process and the EU’s approach to Cyprus by virtue of its provenance, which was grounded in nationalism and xenophobia. ANAP, for its part, was considered an internationalist party, and its leader, Yılmaz, was the driving force behind Turkey’s pro-EU reforms (Öniş 2003: 11). In spite of his EU ardour, Yılmaz, alongside Ecevit, was also a solid advocate of the TRNC. Yılmaz discounted any linkages between Turkey’s EU prospects and the Cyprus issue, and he stressed that both the
Cyprus constitution and Article 8 of the London-Zurich Agreements forbid Cyprus from joining any international organization that did not include both Greece and Turkey as members (Dodd 2010: 190-2). In brief, despite a substantial Western propensity in the ideologies of both the DSP and ANAP, all of the coalition leaders were highly sceptical with respect to the EU’s intentions in its relations with Turkey, including the Cyprus issue, and were against changing Turkey’s Cyprus policy within the context of the EU accession process.

According to the social-learning model, the coalition government’s failure to undertake a more pragmatic approach on Cyprus can be explained in relation to the notion of ‘identity’ and the difficulties of the ‘argumentative persuasion’ of political elites who hold preconceived notions that contradict the messages emitting from the EU. Not only are persuadees with fewer cognitive preconceptions more likely to be open to argumentative persuasion than others, in line with the argument that identity transformation occurs at ‘critical junctures’, persuasion is more likely to succeed when the persuadee is in a novel, uncertain environment, provoked by a new issue, crisis or grave policy failure (Checkel 2005: 812-3). Within this framework, it is understood that the coalition government’s firm adherence to the ideas institutionalized in the Turkish domestic context precluded any change in Cyprus policy under its tenure.

Filled with preconceptions vis-a-vis European designs on Turkey based on negative historical experiences and fear of disintegration, the vast majority of the Turkish political elite believed that Turkey had a rightful stake in Cyprus in order to protect the Turkish Cypriots and that it was the Greek-Greek Cypriot partnership that invited the status quo on the island by scrambling to ethnically cleanse Turkish Cypriots, whom was seen as the main impediment against the goal of “enosis” by the Greek Cypriots (Interview 5 September 29, 2011), thereby inducing the Turkish military intervention of 1974. This impression is shared by all mainstream political parties in Turkey. Socialised in an environment of doubt regarding the West’s intentions, including those relevant to Cyprus and Kurdish rights, the highly sceptical leaders of the
coalition government were unable to assume a pragmatic outlook for the resolution of the Cyprus dispute, even if it would, to a degree, clear the way to Turkey’s EU membership. Put another way, despite their identification with the West, messages emitting from the EU conflicted with their deeply rooted persuasions that some aspects of Europeanization, such as minority rights, would undermine Turkey’s territorial integrity and domestic structure (Fuller 2004: 55-6; İlğt and Özkeçeci-Taner 2012: 15). Such an understanding not only kept Turkey from adopting a new Cyprus policy, it encumbered Turkey’s rapid transformation into a post-nationalist democracy.

In comparison to previous coalition governments, the programme of the ANAP-DSP-MHP coalition gave special emphasis to domestic and external enemies of Turkey. The nationalistic ideational background of the DSP and MHP was evident in the coalition’s harsh and unprecedented reaction to the enactment of “Armenian Genocide” resolutions by France and the US (Özkeçeci-Taner 2005: 274-5), but the response was also supported by the internationalist ANAP, perhaps in a reflection of the compromise and harmony between partners with regard to the decision-making process. Similarly, the coalition only agreed to accept the EU offer of candidacy status for Turkey on the understanding that it would issue its own memorandum stating that Turkey’s accession process would be dissociated from a settlement on Cyprus.

Thus, notwithstanding their firm cognitive priors with respect to EU designs towards Turkey, from 1999 onwards, boosted by a credible membership perspective for Turkey – it was under the coalition that Turkey had finally been granted candidate status at the Helsinki Summit – the coalition government took substantial steps in complying with EU conditionality. With the EU’s credibility enhanced within Turkey, the Post-Helsinki period witnessed a genuine studiousness on the part of the coalition government, under the leadership of Yılmaz, to meet the conditions of EU membership. Turkey threw itself into an unprecedented wave of reform in an effort to comply with conditionality, passing in October 2001 a broad constitutional amendment package in line with EU criteria within the framework of the
National Programme for the Adoption of the Acquis (NPAA). The package increased the number of civilian members on the National Security Council to a majority voting position by incorporating the deputy prime minister and the minister of justice in addition to the extant prime minister, ministers of national defence, interior and foreign affairs and changed Article 118 in order to underscore the advisory nature of council decisions (Robins 2003: 75-7). Even more promising for Turkish democracy than the significant achievement of amending 34 articles of the constitution was the broad inter-party consensus in parliament regarding the passage of these reforms (Özbudun 2007: 181).

However, the coalition government collapsed when another reform package passed through parliament in August 2002 (Kemal Kirişçi 2006a: 23-4). In this second package, the coalition government carried through crucial and costly reforms on sensitive issues such as the limitation of capital punishment to terror and war crimes, in line with the European Convention on Human Rights, and the allowance of education and broadcasting in traditionally used languages and dialects in the daily lives of Turkish citizens and the relaxation of obstacles in front of their learning (Prime Ministry Secretariat General for the European Union Affairs 2007: 3-4 and 59). Interestingly, whereas the first reform package was silent with respect to EU demands such as ratifying ECHR Protocol No. 6 and lifting the death penalty, allowing broadcasting and education in mother-tongue languages and reducing the military’s influence in the political sphere, the August 2002 reform package exceeded the objectives envisioned in the first NPAA (Prime Ministry Secretariat General for the European Union Affairs 2007: 42-3). In spite of this, the legislation passed under the coalition made no mention of settlement of the Cyprus question, without which Turkey’s membership perspective was doomed to blockage.

Due to their forceful cognitive priors, the coalition government was less committed to EU reforms than the AKP, and settlement of the Cyprus question was not even on their agenda. In Ecevit’s words: “the EU goal was important, but non-realization thereof was not the end of the world. As a dynamic country, from its social structure to its economy, Turkey could find new outlets” (Office of the Prime Minister June 6, 1999). Ecevit further stated
“despite uninterrupted peace in Cyprus since the 1974 Turkish Peace Operation, the serenity on the island discomforts some circles and Turkey would not make any concessions in Cyprus” (Office of the Prime Minister June 21, 1999). Along similar lines, Hakkı Akalın, CHP deputy of İzmir, evaluated the decision of the EU to accept the Republic of Cyprus as a member in the name of the entire island as “a pre-conceived international conspiracy” (TBMM Reports Journal January 14, 2003). Bayram Ali Meral, CHP deputy of Ankara, publicly accused the AKP government of “selling out the TRNC in return for material benefits” (TBMM Reports Journal March 13, 2003). Meral also qualified “the Cyprus question and the activities of the US officials in Turkey as the most significant problems of Turkey”. He also criticized the activities of Western experts as regards the Turkish economy expressing the opinion that “Turkey’s budget is under the control of foreign experts just like the Ottoman Empire’s last days” likening Turkey’s situation to a colony reflecting the mindset of Euro-sceptic circles in Turkey (TBMM Reports Journal March 15, 2003).

Despite amendments in the Turkish constitution and legislation consonant with the EU conditionality, espousal of a more pragmatic approach on the Cyprus question was lacking under this coalition. The deeply entrenched fear among the coalition leaders regarding the scope of Western interests in Turkey and their fear of territorial fragmentation and modification of the character of the Turkish regime within the framework of the EU pre-accession process circumscribed their commitment to the process and a pragmatic policy change on Cyprus.

1.3. Ideational Transformation of the AKP from Islamism towards an EU-Oriented Political Party

In this section I will expound on the basis of a cognitive learning process why such a policy shift became possible under the AKP government, which renounced its Islamist identity and espoused an EU-oriented political agenda.
This ideational transformation on the part of the AKP is one of the crucial components of Turkish foreign policy change on Cyprus.

From the 1990s onwards, the old definition of the Turkish state started to face challenges, which culminated in the advent to power of the AKP. The AKP contested the insistence on the principles of nationalism and secularism and was disposed to redefine Turkish identity. In contrast to the coalition government, whose adherence to a traditional policy line vis-à-vis Cyprus is consistent with their firm ideological priors, the AKP government was able to embrace a new policy on Cyprus due to their weak cognitive priors and reconstruct its identity that followed the washout of Islamist politics in Turkey in the late 1990s and subsequent identity crisis within the movement.

The transformation of the AKP from political Islamism towards the centre of Turkish political spectrum (Taşkın 2008: 53) is of utmost import in terms of Turkey’s foreign policy change vis-à-vis Cyprus. For the supporters of the Milli Görüş (National View), the rigidly anti-Western, anti-EU mainstream Turkish Islamist Movement from which the AKP split, the Cyprus issue was of particular value. The Islamist National Salvation Party, had been Ecevit’s coalition partner at the time of the July 1974 military intervention, and its leader, Necmettin Erbakan, had criticized Prime Minister Ecevit for not occupying the whole of Cyprus. While the National Viewers had been major proponents of both the TRNC and long-time TRNC President Rauf Denktaş, following its election in 2002, the AKP made a sharp turn on the Cyprus issue, which included purging Denktaş, who was also a commanding figure among the Turkish bureaucratic elite and in the eyes of large segments of Turkish society (Uzgel 2009: 30). In fact, the ideological transformation of the Turkish Islamist movement is one of the essential elements of Turkey’s policy shift on Cyprus. In order to better understand this transformation, the subsequent subsections provide a historical perspective that includes a discussion of the movement’s roots in Ottomanism as well as the neo-Ottomanism of Turgut Özal, with whom the AKP shares firm affinities in terms of its own neo-Ottomanist foreign-policy vision, which envisions interdependent and good neighbourly relations in the former Ottoman territories on the basis of
commercial inter-dependencies. The AKP also adopted an EU-oriented policy agenda prior to coming to power in the 2002 elections, treating EU membership as well as settlement of the Cyprus disagreement as its foreign-policy priorities (Election Manifesto of the AKP 2002: 3-4 and 37).

1.3.1. The Ideological Background of the AKP, Ottomanism and Neo-Ottomanism

The Ottoman military defeats of the late seventeenth and eighteenth centuries pushed the Empire to acquire European technological and scientific knowledge through the introduction of a secular, positivist education system. The foundation of Western-style schools teaching engineering, medical and military science did not aim to bring Western culture or ideas to the Empire. However, in addition to Western material assets, the cultural aspects of Western life and a positivist way of thinking came to infiltrate the minds of a newly emerging secular Ottoman elite (Bozdağlioğlu 2008: 56-7).

From the 1860 onwards, the alienation of its non-Muslim communities induced the empire to promote the doctrine of Ottomanism as a means of creating a modern nation-state constructed on the basis of a multi-cultural citizenship. Thus began the many modernization and secularization initiatives that took place within the framework of the Tanzimat reforms (Kushner 1997: 219). Ottomanism was designed to lift the empire out of its crisis of technological backwardness and stem the loss of its Christian populations by constructing a common political identity that would undermine ethnic, religious and community-based affiliations by promoting unity and equality among all Ottoman citizens in a secular notion based on a new concept of minority/majority in place of Muslim/non-Muslim. However, setbacks in earning the loyalty of non-Muslim subjects and the foundation of new states on Ottoman territories in the Balkans following the 1877-78 war with Russia marked the end of this trend.
Having lost most of its Christian territories in the Balkans, Sultan Abdülhamit II strove to stall further fragmentation of the Ottoman Empire during his reign (1876-1907) by maintaining the allegiance of non-Turkish Ottoman Muslims through an Islamic universalism that underpinned a pan-Islamic construction of civilization with the Sultan as the caliph of all Muslims. At the same time, however, the new Western-educated Ottoman elite came to visualize Islam as the source of backwardness and instead started to lay claim to the Central Asian territories, with a view to uniting all Turkic people (Fisher Onar 2009: 231-2). This new generation of Westernized elite, educated in the new secular and positivist system, in 1889 founded the İttihat ve Terakki Cemiyeti, the ‘Committee of Union and Progress’ (İTC), a Turkish movement that would become known as the Young Turks. By the turn of the 20th century, although Ottomanism and Islamism were the official ideologies of the empire, most of the intellectuals came to define themselves as Turks in cultural terms, if not in political ones (Kushner 1997: 221). The Young Turks’ opposition to Abdülhamit II brought them to power in 1908, thus initiating the second constitutional era in Turkish history. The Young Turks formed modern Turkey’s national and secular official ideology and their influence still perpetuates in modern Turkey’s political life (Bozdağlıoğlu 2008: 58). By the 1910s, the Turkish nationalists got the upper hand in the Ottomanism-nationalism debate, and nationalism became the cardinal ideology among all non-Muslim ethnic communities in the Ottoman territories (Çolak 2006: 589-90).

The victory in the War of Independence in the early 1920s under the leadership of Atatürk furnished Turkey with the opportunity to carry on the reform process that had started under the İTC between 1908 and 1918. Like the Turkists, Atatürk asserted that civilization and culture cannot be separated. According to Atatürk, the failed Ottoman state and society had to be abolished, and he thus launched a sweeping reform programme to transform the state as well as the individual along secular lines in order to found a new society, a new state and a new individual with a new Western identity (Bozdağlıoğlu 2008: 59-60). The nationalistic and secular character of the
republic was more or less undisputedly perpetuated until the late 1960s and 1970s.

1.3.2. Özl’s Neo-Ottomanism

Attempts to secure a place for Islam in both state and foreign policy came to contest Turkey’s rigid secular establishment starting in the late 1960s and intensifying in the 1970s. This was reflected in the success of the Islamist National Salvation Party, which took part in several coalition governments from the 1970s onwards. This new interest in Islamic identification was strengthened by compulsory religious education in elementary and secondary schools introduced by the 1982 constitution following the 1980 military intervention (Kushner 1997: 228-9).

By the time Turgut Özal, a liberal nationalist, became prime minister in November 1989, the international environment was undergoing a drastic transformation due to the breakdown of communism (Danforth 2008: 88-9). In witnessing the dissolution of the Soviet Union and Yugoslavia – including Serbian nationalist attempts at ethnic cleansing of Bosnians and Albanians, who self-qualified as either Turk, Muslim or Ottoman – Turkey was reminded of its Balkan and Caucasian heritage. The never-ending ethnic tensions in the Balkans, the well-broadcast destruction of Ottoman architecture in addition to the atrocities in both the Balkans and the Caucasus recalled to the people of the Turkish Republic their shared historical consciousness and Ottoman heritage (Çolak 2006: 594).

Turgut Özal’s neo-Ottomanism referenced Ottoman cosmopolitanism in order to carve out a new pluralistic definition that would appeal to the country’s collective cultural memory as a solution to the growing debate on identity taking place inside Turkey. It would also serve as a means of promoting a more active diplomatic role for Turkey vis-à-vis the newly independent post-communist states of Central Asia, the Caucasus, the Balkans and the Middle
This re-construction of the past aimed to redefine Turkey’s shared history with its neighbours. From Özal’s perspective, “Turkey’s Ottoman legacy was not only a good model to be looked at for determining Turkish foreign policies towards the Balkans, Central Asia, the Caucasus and the Middle East, but also for settling internal socio-cultural tensions: the Islamic opposition to the sternly secular official policy, the Kurds, some segments of whom had questioned since the beginning of 1980s the homogeneous definition of Turkish identity; and Alevis, who disapproved of the unilateral Sunni approach of the Presidency of Religious Affairs” (Çolak 2006: 588).

Özal’s main arguments for a localized common identity resting on neo-Ottomanism were that it opposed anti-Westernism, referencing Western universalist ideals, with an emphasis on globalization, liberal democracy and a free-market economy, while at the same time defining the Ottoman past as an age when tolerance for diversity reigned and the Balkans, Caucasus and Middle East were united in economic union while retaining their political boundaries intact. The radical changes in the international sphere led Özal to adopt a new approach to foreign policy that represented a synthesis between traditional Muslim cultural forms and Western values to counterpoise the potentially unfavourable consequences of the nationalist movements emerging throughout the former Soviet-bloc countries. Criticising the traditional neutral approach of Turkish foreign policy as too passive, he believed that Turkey could be more influential in these regions only by emphasising a specifically Muslim-national identity instead of a merely national identity (Çolak 2006: 593).

During this period, Turkey’s official identity was having difficulties meeting the rising ethnic and religious demands of its own population, while the Bulgarian government was implementing policies of assimilation of its Turkish minority. Yugoslavia and the Soviet Union were also fragmenting, with new Turkic states emerging in Central Asia as a result. Against this domestic and international context of the late 1980s, Özal proposed an anti-establishment initiative to carve out a democratic system in which all kinds of differences could be expressed without any intervention by the state. Özal
propounded on the significance of cultural pluralism, relying on the Ottoman vision of Islam to enable Turkey to manage its internal identity crisis. Contrary to the Kemalist notion of Turkish identity, he put forward Turkey as a cultural and ethnic mosaic, comprised of Turks, Alevi, Arabs, Kurds, Bosnians, Albanians, Caucasians and Pomaks that was the result of massive migration from former Ottoman territories to Anatolia. Özal claimed that these groups had been forced to describe themselves homogenously under a common national Turkish identity. Now, instead of Turkishness, the shared Ottoman historical experience would serve as the basis for a new Turkey. Moreover, according to Özal, not only was the transformation of a Turkish national identity into a neo-Ottomanist imperial identity necessary to counter the national and regional tendencies that might arise as a result of the shifting global and domestic environment, such a transformation would also enable Turkey to become a regional superpower (Çolak 2006: 593).

As an anti-establishment personality, Özal defied the traditional concepts of the Turkish state and identity and strained to re-construct a new multi-culturalist Turkish identity. He took a notably pragmatic approach towards Turkey’s foreign relations in general and towards the Cyprus issue in particular, proposing that Turkey establish relations on the basis of trade and interdependence. Özal intended to address Turkey’s ossified problems with Greece, and in the early 1990s, he attempted to tackle the Cyprus dispute as well; however, neither the international nor the domestic Turkish political environment was propitious for such a drastic change at that time. When Özal pressured Denktaş to be more flexible towards a settlement, his venture was thwarted by the Turkish bureaucratic and military elite, who sided with Denktaş. In this context, the decision-making context was not propitious for pushing for change and the EU was not a dynamic.
1.3.3. From Political Islamism to Conservative Democracy: From the Welfare Party to the AKP

With 21 percent of the vote, the Islamist Welfare Party narrowly won the 1995 general elections and formed a coalition government with the centre-right True Path Party, which had obtained just under 20 percent of the vote. Thus, Necmettin Erbakan, leader of both the Welfare Party and of the mainstream Islamist movement the National View, became the first Islamist Prime Minister of Turkey (Bacık 2010: 53-4). The 1996-97 government was marked by the Welfare Party’s Özalian neo-Ottomanism with a more Islamic coloration. Like Özal, Erbakan conceived of an empire stretching from Europe to Central Asia, but with his avowedly anti-Western, anti-secular stance, he had in mind a departure from Western institutions and a slant towards the Islamic world, which, in turn was expected to generate a multi-cultural, multi-religious, multi-cultural society. During its tenure, the Welfare Party pursued a foreign policy that combined Ottomanism and Islam with the aim of rendering Turkey a regional power. This process, however, ended up in a fiasco for Erbakan, owing to the Arab rejection of Turkey as the regional leader of the Muslim world (Çolak 2006: 596). Through his mid-1996 tour of the Muslim world, Erbakan had aimed to create a “Muslim common market”; however, the trip only served to weaken him politically. In Egypt and Iran, he was criticized for Turkey’s close relations with Israel, and during his visit to Libya, Qhaddafi bluntly eulogized the PKK, the Kurdish organization waging war against Turkey, and demanded independence for Kurdistan (Kepel 2000: 545-6).

The coalition ruled by Erbakan soon began to elicit concerns among secular circles. It lost its control over the civil and military bureaucracy. The military became an outright opposition power, and joined in a powerful media campaign against the government. In the infamous National Security Council meeting of February 28, 1997, harsh measures were taken against the government, and on June 18, 1997, Erbakan, under pressure, stepped down from office. In 1998, the Welfare Party was shut down by the Turkish Constitutional Court for being the focus of anti-secular activities, and Erbakan
was banned from politics. The period from 1997-1999 was a traumatic one for the Islamists. What became known as ‘the February 28 process’ was unprecedented in that, for the first time in the history of the Turkish Republic, Islamic groups became the target of a military intervention that aimed to purge the alleged Islamic threat and went so far as to disrupt the day-to-day religious practices of devout Muslims (Bacık 2010: 53-4).

This last intervention by the military-civil secular establishment for the protection of the regime represented a crucial point in the transformation of Turkey’s Islamist movement from Islamism to conservative democracy. Turkey’s democratic and secular institutions and its historical existence within Western organizations such as the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO), the Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) and the Council of Europe (CoE) rendered it impossible for any political Islamist movement to resist the transformation towards a moderate approach (Altunışık 2008: 45). In Risse’s terms, the Turkish political setting was inappropriate for the construction of an Islamist political identity, and the latter did not resonate well within the Turkish domestic context.

The failure of their policies impelled the Islamists to espouse a new strategy that would avoid militant secular attack and carry them through the adversities they were facing. They took stock of the fact that without the necessary networks in crucial fields such as the economy, they were thoroughly unprotected against a sophisticated secular bloc. Although the military played the primary role, the Welfare-True Path coalition faced a vast and heavy opposition in what was, above all, a psychological battle. Secular women’s organizations, members of the Alevi sect, civil society groups, political parties, the urban middle classes and prominent media organizations stood out against the so-called ascending political Islam. Trade unions and business associations, save the Islamic ones, formed a ‘civilian initiative’ against the allegedly escalating Islamist threat. Within a few months of the Welfare Party’s coming to power, it was obvious that secularism, rather than simply an idée fixe for the military, was a major issue for broad sections of Turkish society (Ayata 2004: 245) The docile public reaction to the prohibition of the
Welfare Party in particular and Islamist parties in general demonstrated approbation on the part of the Turkish people for the continuation of the established democratic institutions of the state (Cooper 2002: 121).

The argument that widespread approval for the closing down of Islamist parties demonstrated popular support for the democratic regime and an aloofness to Islamist ideology is confirmed by the fact that the AKP came to power only after recanting its Islamist credentials and seizing upon an EU-oriented political agenda. Political Islam did not resonate well within the Turkish domestic political context; therefore, the AKP was constrained towards a conservative/centre-right policy line. Given that the secular military-judiciary establishment, with the public’s backing, had banned all its predecessors, the AKP needed to latch onto a more moderate stance. The February 28 process was crucial in demonstrating to prominent figures within the Islamist movement that they would come to terms with the domestic and foreign power centres in order to remain in power. Moreover, ‘Anatolian capital’ needed a political representative that was consonant with the system. Consequently, there was a need to tear loose from Erbakan, who was still inclined to maintain a Cold-War worldview in the 1990s (Uzgel 2006: 10).

Recognizing the need to generate new instrumental capacity in areas from which they had previously shied away, such as the market and the media, the Islamists adopted a new strategy that embraced concepts such as globalism, a market economy, and even democracy. Next, as a pragmatic move to stem the secular attack, they were constrained to defend the potential benefits of EU membership. After the 1999 Helsinki Summit, the transformative impact of the EU on Turkey became conspicuous by virtue of the requirement that candidate countries adopt the *acquis communautaire*. The Islamists took notice of the opportunity spaces originating from EU pressure to force the Turkish state into making radical alterations to bolster democratization and to expand freedom spaces for the Islamists, such as wearing headscarves at the universities. In other words, the Islamists discerned that the EU could offer them the opportunity to force a change in the structure of the Turkish state expanding areas of freedom for the Islamists (Bacık 2010: 54-5).
When the Welfare Party was closed by the Constitutional Court in December 1997, the Islamists established the Fazilet, or Virtue Party. However, the February 28 process had crystallized already existing divisions among the Islamist elite (Bacık 2010: 53-4), and contrary to earlier parties in which Erbakan had exercised solid control, this new formation was characterized by forceful opposition between backers of Erbakan and a new generation of ‘reformists’ who held him responsible for their failure. The Virtue Party expressed its support for accession into the EU and made democracy a political imperative. The reformists abandoned all references to Islamist ideology, which had reduced their popularity and had served as evidence of a rupture from secularism and the West. Instead, they came to view a liberal market economy and a democratic political environment as presenting the best opportunities for financial profit and political power. An Islamist ideology was unable to offer any tangible gains to discontented urban youth, who represented a potential enlargement of the power base of any political Islamist movement. Thus robbed of the backing of disgruntled urban youth, the Islamists lost their strongest asset with which to contend with the secular regime, which regarded itself as the master of negotiations and was inclined to impose its own conditions on the Islamists (Kepel 2000: 550-1).

After the closure of the Welfare Party, even prior to the AKP was established, the Virtue Party (FP), the Welfare Party’s successor, dropped its interest in an Islamist foreign policy against a Western-oriented one. In the late 1990s and early 2000s, the Islamist movements were declining in terms of power, prestige, inspiration and support base. In such an environment, the foreign-policy goal of creating an alternative Islamic foreign policy resting on an alternative Islamic world order was dropped by the Turkish Islamist movement. When such a foreign-policy objective came unstuck, the domestic project of carving out a country resting on Islamic principles also fell through. This contributed to the moderation of the Turkish Islamic movement (Ayata 2004: 272)
At the same time, Turkey’s rising Islamic capital was scrambling to integrate with the global system and was seeking representation alongside TÜSİAD, the Turkish Industrialists and Businessmen’s Association, the main organization of businessmen and industrialists in Turkey. Thus, MÜSİAD, the Individual Industrialists and Businessmen Association, was set up in 1990 as the representative of religiously-oriented businessmen. After the February 28 process, these segments began to assimilate the concepts of human rights and democracy, which they had previously ignored, and they awakened to the notion that integration with the global capitalist system involved combining with it politically. Turkish Islamic capital was already in the process of integrating with international capital (Uzgel 2006: 12), and this process expedited the re-definition of the identity and interests of the Turkish Islamists.

At the international level, the Western attitude towards political Islam was also unfavourable. The Welfare Party appealed to the European Court of Human Rights (ECHR) by the late 1990s hoping that it would reverse the Turkish Constitutional Court’s 1998 decision with respect to closure of the party. However, in July 2001, the Third Chambre and in February 2003, the Grand Chambre of the ECHR upheld the Turkish court’s decision, pointing out that “in the long-term, the RP aimed at undermining democracy and pluralism in Turkey by imposing a Muslim identity on the nation, which was against the principles of democracy.” As a result, the Turkish Islamists had to distance themselves from Islamism and assimilate a more pluralistic party identity (Lynott 2009: 41). The appeal by the Turkish Islamists also implied that they, for the first time, recognized the legitimacy of EU norms and institutions and were awakening to the idea that sticking to Islamism would not offer them much in terms of power and wealth in the 21st century in a growingly globalizing world.

The Virtue Party was eventually dissolved by the Turkish Constitutional Court in June 2001. Once that occurred, it became urgent for the Islamists to find a new ideational and political outlook. In August 2001, Recep Tayyip Erdoğan, a reformist and former mayor of Istanbul, established the Justice and
Development Party, which quickly re-identified itself as a ‘conservative democrat’ rather than an ‘Islamist’ party. The AKP’s willingness to move towards the centre of the Turkish political spectrum, their reconciliation with the secular constitutional order and their espousal of an EU-oriented political agenda rendered them the most popular party in Turkey in the 2002 general elections (Altunışık 2008: 44).

Cognizant of the need to reinforce itself against the powerful and vigilant secular forces of Turkey, the AKP government pragmatically fell back on Western values of democracy and human rights, Western institutions, governments and public opinion, rather than sticking to Islamic values, as a defence against the 28 February process (Ayata 2004: 272). This was a strategic milestone for the Turkish Islamists in that it represented the first time that an Islamic-rooted movement seized upon European values of democracy and human rights. AKP officials put special emphasis on their divergence from Islamism. Erdoğan, in a conversation with the press, stated that the AKP was not a religiously-oriented party, and he underscored that the Republic of Turkey was erected on the principles of “democracy, laicism, social state and rule of law” (Office of the Prime Minister November 4, 2002). As stated by Uğur and Yankaya, between 2001 and 2004, a mighty political innovation occurred that hinged on a stringent commitment to EU reforms and membership. Erdoğan, who had pictured the EU as a “Christian club” in 1992, not only deviated from Turkey’s EU-sceptic bloc, but also from the traditional line of his party’s earlier Islamist predecessors (Uğur and Yankaya 2008: 592).

As a result of these moves, the AKP enlisted the support of TÜSİAD as well as Anatolian capital at the domestic level and, through its contacts and messages regarding completion of the neoliberal transformation of Turkey, the backing of the United States and the European Union on the international level. The AKP spearheaded the neoliberal transformation of Turkey that had begun in the early 1980s but had stalled during the 1990s due to political and economic instability. Apart from the Customs Union, neither privatization nor the process of undermining the statist power base progressed during the 1990s. The AKP was more zealous than previous parties in this respect. Speeding up
the EU process, which bolstered the neoliberal transformation, was a move by the AKP to consolidate its position within the Turkish political framework, downgrade the clout of the military in Turkish politics and enlist the backup of the European Union for such freedoms as the repeal of the headscarf ban. In its transformation from anti-Semitism to a strong affinity with the Jewish lobby, from national development to a penchant for privatization, from demanding all of Cyprus to supporting the Annan Plan, the Turkish post-Islamists fulfilled the expectations of business circles, the EU and the US all at once (Uzgel 2006: 15-6).

In the 1990s, as well as political and economic instability, Turkey lacked a political leadership that could lead the process of Turkey’s liberal transformation and integration of Turkish economy with the global economy. When the AKP came to power in 2002, the security-oriented civilian-military bureaucratic establishment of Turkey, which had a hardline stance on the Cyprus issue, was still overly powerful. With its neo-liberal economic and foreign policy agenda, the AKP leadership was committed to completion of Turkey’s liberalization process, Turkish economy’s integration with the world economy, Turkey’s EU process and settlement of the Cyprus question. All these policy objectives were shared by the Turkish business circles and international power centres, such as the US and the EU. Accordingly, the AKP and its policies were supported by both Turkish business sector and influential international actors, which aimed at keeping Turkey within the trajectory of Western alliance.

When Risse’s “resonance” and “critical junctures” model is applied to the Turkish case, the February 28 process that culminated in the closure of the AKP’s predecessor and the subsequent unprecedented crackdown on Islamists were the “critical junctures” that demonstrated to the Islamists that political Islamism did not resonate well in Turkey’s institutional and legal context, and when the Turkish court’s 1998 decision was upheld by the ECHR in 2001 and 2003, this attested to the fact that Islamism did not resonate well within the legal and institutional framework of the EU, either. Accordingly, the AKP, sizing up the cost-benefits of persisting on Islamist politics, needed to embrace
a more moderate stance, pragmatically adjusted its party programme and identity in consonance with EU requirements, seizing upon an EU-oriented political agenda. In other words, the AKP’s social learning process was expedited by Turkey’s domestic as well as the EU’s institutional attributes and critical junctures, which evidenced the failure of Islamist politics.

This orientation towards Western standards was pragmatic in the first instance. The Islamists of Turkey took notice that in the Turkish context, the Islamist politics was doomed to failure and they had to embrace a new cause instead of accentuating Islamic values and principles that had gained them the backing of only a marginal percentage of voters. They recanted their Islamist discourse and embraced EU membership as their primary objective in order to expand their electoral base. While previously voicing their demands for Islamic freedoms within the framework of an Islamic rhetoric, they began to declaim that religious freedoms were part of European values and freedoms such as democracy, human rights and secularism, which they had avoided in the past.

Following its advent to power, the AKP perpetuated and accelerated the ongoing reforms in line with the EU pre-accession process. The AKP embraced an EU-oriented political agenda on pragmatic grounds, while at the same time transforming itself into a centrist party. An Islamist agenda had gained them only a marginal percentage of votes, and it would not keep them in power in the rigidly secular Turkish political context. Moreover, an anti-Western political agenda did not resonate well among Western circles. Accordingly, in order to come to and remain in power, given Turkey’s institutional framework, the AKP’s Islamist ideology would have to take a back seat, and a political agenda that played to EU norms and values as legitimate standards would need to come forward.

1.3.4. The AKP’s Neo-Ottomanism and New Foreign Policy Vision

In this ideological debate, it is important to understand the notion of neo-Ottomanism, which was closely intertwined with the new foreign policy
concept of “strategic depth”, developed by Ahmet Davutoğlu, who has forged the AKP’s foreign policy since 2001. This new foreign policy vision alongside the EU and decision-making dynamics was one of the key causes of Turkey’s foreign policy change on Cyprus. The National Viewers had a plainly Islamist and anti-Western stance, and they held the traditional nationalist line of Turkish foreign policy on Cyprus. The AKP not only renounced Islamism as a political purpose, they also developed a new liberal foreign-policy notion rather than sticking to a nationalist zero-sum position.

The AKP’s neo-Ottomanism differed sharply from the National Viewers’ approach to foreign policy. For the National Viewers and the Islamist-based National Salvation Party (MSP), the Cyprus issue had particular import. During the Cyprus military intervention of July 1974, the MSP was in coalition with Prime Minister Ecevit. Erbakan, the leader of the MSP, had criticized Ecevit for not occupying all of Cyprus. The AKP, on the other hand, made a sharp turn on the Cyprus issue, purging President Denktaş, who was a commanding figure in the eyes of the Turkish bureaucratic elite and large segments of Turkish society in general. Ankara, which had been carrying out its policies in line with Denktaş, pulled back its support, deciding it did not want him to run in the TRNC presidential elections of 2005. On December 14, 2003, Denktaş’s National Union Party (UBP), lost the elections obtaining 32.93% of the votes, with Ankara’s endorsement of the opposition. The liberal/leftist Republican Turkish Party won the elections by garnering 35.18% of the votes, and its leader, Mehmet Ali Talat, became prime minister in January 2004 and president in April 2005 (Uzgel 2009: 30).

In contrast to the Welfare Party, the AKP has not relied on its Islamist credentials in foreign policy. Davutoğlu’s ‘zero problem policy’ has not made any distinction between any of Turkey’s neighbours, but has aimed to bring to an end Turkey’s existing disagreements with all of them. The AKP’s initiatives to settle the Cyprus and Armenian problems and its maintenance of good relations with Georgia evidence the non-Islamic character of the AKP’s foreign policy. Moreover, Turkish officials’ incessant calls for democratization and liberalization in the Middle East region are good
examples of the AKP’s estrangement from the Welfare Party’s Islamist foreign policy (Oğuzlu 2007: 94).

Whereas Erbakan’s aim was an Islamic alliance among Muslim countries as an alternative to an alliance with the West, the AKP has not intended to Islamize Turkey’s foreign policy, but has aimed to strike a balance between Turkey’s state establishment’s over-obsession with Turkey’s Western identity and orientation by extending Turkey’s foreign-policy spectrum to former Ottoman areas of influence (Davutoğlu 2001: 552-3, 55-7 and 62). The AKP has endeavoured to make Turkey’s Ottoman and Islamic heritage visible at home and abroad. Neo-Ottomanism has not had a latent imperialist agenda abroad or an undisclosed Islamist agenda at home; rather, it has privileged a more moderate form of secularism at home, and a more activist foreign policy that has leant on Ankara’s ‘soft power’ in former Ottoman territories as well as other regions in Turkey’s foreign-policy spectrum. According to the AKP leadership, the Ottoman “Great Power” legacy has to be recalled and Turkey’s strategic and national identity have to be redefined with a view to achieving these goals (Taşpınar 2008: 14-5).

While the National Viewers accepted the idea of adopting Western technology but not its values and norms, the AKP re-constructed the movement’s Islamist identity pursuant to Western concepts such as human rights, democracy and secularism while marginalizing the radical version of Turkey’s Islamist movement, which has an electoral base of only 2-3 percent. While the Welfare Party was firmly anti-Western and anti-EU, the AKP pragmatically renounced these policies, wisign up to the facts that maintaining friendly relations with centres of power like the US and EU was crucial for coming to and remaining in power and that Turkey’s EU process was irreversible. This ideational transformation was a consequence of a learning process that originated from cost-benefit considerations, yet went in hand in hand with a virtual mindset shift on the part of the leadership.

In this sense, the AKP’s neo-Ottomanism had strong affinities with Özlal’s foreign-policy vision of the 1980s. Özal referred to universalistic ideals of the
West, globalization, liberal democracy, a free-market economy and opposition to anti-Westernism and defined the Ottoman past as an age when tolerance for diversity reigned and the Balkans, Caucasus and Middle East were united in economic union. He proposed a synthesis between traditional Islamic forms and Western values to counteract potentially unfavourable consequences of the newly emerging nationalist movements throughout former Soviet territory. (Çolak 2006: 593). Like Önal, the AKP has emphasized a cultural form of Islam, rather than a political one, and has envisioned a stable, conflict-free, trade-oriented neighbourhood for Turkey.

This re-definition of political identity found expression in Turkish Foreign Minister Ahmet Davutoğlu’s doctrine of ‘strategic depth’. Davutoğlu propounds a new paradigm for Turkish foreign policy, which would turn Turkey from a “peripheral” country towards a ‘pivotal’ country and eventually to a ‘global actor’ in the post-Cold War era (Sözen 2010a: 112). He states that until the early 2000s, Turkey had erased its cultural and historical background, which might have given it ‘strategic depth’ (Davutoğlu 2001: 552-3, 55-7 and 62). He asserts that Turkey is situated at the geographic centre of the world and the birthplace of human history; thus, Turkey cannot maintain a one-dimensional outlook on any of the international-relations phenomena it confronts. Countries such as Turkey do not have the option of shutting themselves off from the rest of the world, but must overcome their troubles by reclaiming their confidence and opening up to the outside world. Davutoğlu maintains that as one of eight empires that entered the 20th century (Davutoğlu 2001: 552-3, 55-7 and 62) comprising various geo-politic, geo-economic and geo-cultural components, Turkey has to undertake its geographical and historical responsibilities. He believes that relations with the EU are important, but Turkey has also to realize its political and economic potential in Asia to be more appealing in the eyes of the EU. (Davutoğlu 2001: 552-3, 55-7 and 62). According to Davutoğlu, while Turkey’s main strategic objective is integration with the EU, and this policy cannot be replaced with another, the Muslim World, the US and Russia cannot be ignored, as all these dimensions are complementary, rather than conflictual (Davutoğlu 2010).
Davutoğlu favours maintenance of the EU membership goal and mending fences with the Muslim world at the same time (Sözen 2010a: 112).

Davutoğlu maintains that

“Turkey's foreign policy lacked the multi-dimensional outlook it should have because of the Western fixation of the Kemalist traditional understanding. No other country in the world has Turkey’s central unique position. For instance, Germany, Russia and Iran are also central countries but Germany is far from Asia and Africa, Russia is far from Africa and Iran is far from Europe and Africa. Thus, their political effectiveness in these regions is limited by geography. Having the most optimal position in the world, Turkey has to re-claim its central position and pursue more assertive policies towards its surrounding” (Davutoğlu 2008: 78).

Much later, in 2010, in line with this new vision, Davutoğlu advocated excellent relations with neighbours by reducing security risks and maximizing joint interests and high-level political dialogue, economic interdependence, a common understanding of security and multi-cultural co-existence for the settlement of regional conflicts. Along similar lines, Davutoğlu envisioned Turkey as a rising economic power and a cultural model based on soft power, cultural inclusivity, economic prosperity and an ability to provide security in military terms (Davutoğlu 2010).

The AKP’s ‘zero problems with neighbours’ strategy reflects this new pragmatic understanding (Oğuzlu 2010: 664) and Ankara addressed all its problems with its neighbours. As Davutoğlu explained to the Institute of International and European Affairs Conference in Ireland in March 2010 in a talk on Turkish Foreign Policy and Relations with Europe, in February-March 2004, the government had worked very hard to resolve the Cyprus issue, conducting joint cabinet meetings with Greece. With respect to Armenia, Turkey undertook some unilateral gestures, such as opening Turkish airspace in 2003 to planes flying to and from Armenia, overlooking illegal Armenian workers in Turkey and, in 2005, offering to set up a historical commission to deal with the incidents of 1915. After the success of confidential negotiations, two protocols were signed between Armenia and Turkey in October 2009.
Turkey’s objective was underlined by Davutoğlu himself as “achieving a comprehensive settlement in Cyprus and normalization of relations with Armenia” (Davutoğlu 2010).

The AKP was able to create an appropriate environment for the promotion of Turkey as a soft power because of its different approach from the 1999-2002 coalition government, which had viewed the international context from a security-oriented perspective. The AKP government changed this understanding, redefining some issues as political rather than security matters. For example, the AKP government delinked terrorism, which was seen as a security problem, from the Kurdish issue, which was considered a political issue (Oğuzlu 2007: 88). Due to its shift in perceptions regarding regional threats, Ankara was able to assume a more constructive role in providing peace and stability in the region. An understanding constructed on security state apparatus was forgone and the framework for internal and foreign policy has changed. Turkey has constructed a new geographical imagination of its neighbourhood on the basis of a more constructive role for Ankara as a promoter of peace and stability in its periphery (Aras 2009: 40-1).

The evolution of the AKP from an Islamist party towards one at the centre of the Turkish political spectrum was initially motivated by the cost-benefit calculations of the party leadership. However, after this initial impetus, the AKP’s new identity stuck, and the party never reverted to political Islamism and carried on with the EU accession criteria. Accordingly, the following section touches upon how such an ideational transformation was motivated by the cost-benefit considerations of the leadership in the first place.

1.4. Cost-Benefit Analysis as an Initial Impetus

As a consequence of social learning, the ideational transformation of the AKP described above has been a lasting one; however, the impetus for the party’s initial change in orientation may be attributed to an evaluation of the adoption costs and an understanding of the benefits of change. The adoption costs
model assumes that “the more the costs for a policy change lessen for a government, the more likely that government adopts policy change” (Schimmelfennig and Sedelmeier 2005: 225). Low adoption costs are regarded as a necessary and sufficient condition for compliance with EU criteria (Schimmelfennig and Sedelmeier 2005: 49-50). Moreover, if EU demands align with the political preferences or survival strategy of the elites in a target country, the latter can use EU policies and institutions to push their own political agenda and consolidate their power, demanding domestic change and sizing up policies and institutions with a view to meeting their goals (Börzel and Risse 2012b: 11). In this regard, the role of agency in transforming EU stimuli into domestic impact has been found essential in terms of compliance to EU demands in the rule of law, for example (Noutcheva and Düzgit 2012: 61-2 and 75), which have shown that amelioration in this area comes about when EU incentives for reform align with the domestic interests of ruling elites.

Cost-benefit calculations can account for both the AKP’s initial ideational transformation from political Islamism to conservative democracy (Taşkın 2008: 53) and its adoption of a new foreign policy on Cyprus, as the new leadership in Turkey weighed up whether or not an EU-oriented policy agenda would earn them the backing of EU circles necessary to remain in power in a domestic environment that had not previously allowed any Islamist party to do so. In view of the fact that the Turkish Constitutional Court had already closed down five Islamist parties on the grounds that they had become loci of anti-secular activity, the AKP leadership, emerging from an identity crisis brought on by policy failure, made the pragmatic choice of abandoning Islamist politics in favour of conservative democracy. Notwithstanding the party’s solemn ideational transformation, the highly institutionalized secularism of the Turkish bureaucracy and judiciary prevented them from viewing the AKP as anything other than inheritors and sustainers of Islamist politics. The AKP, taking into consideration Turkey’s highly institutionalized secular framework, intended to gain legitimacy and remain in power by espousing an EU-oriented policy agenda. The AKP leadership judged that it could profit by the EU accession process to undermine the power base of the rigidly secular civil as
The AKP leadership capitalized on the Cyprus issue as a means of differentiating itself from other parties. It proactively endorsed the UN plan for the resolution of the Cyprus dispute not only in order to boost its popularity abroad, but to prolong its term in office by rooting out domestic scepticism with respect to the party’s alleged latent Islamist agenda. Recognizing that achieving a settlement on Cyprus would move Turkey forward significantly in terms of the EU accession process, even before its advent to power, the AKP pledged to settle the Cyprus dispute in order to ensure the smooth progress of Turkey’s EU membership process. The AKP’s 2002 election manifesto flatly accentuated EU membership as a political goal alongside the resolution of the Cyprus disagreement by any means necessary (Election Manifesto of the AKP 2002: 3-4 and 37). These clear policy objectives evinced the AKP’s enthusiasm for a conciliatory stance on Cyprus that would earn the party the prestige of good relations with the European Union, and, in fact, Turkey’s support for the Annan Plan was much appreciated among European and US circles and gained the AKP leadership international legitimacy.

Upon his electoral victory, Erdoğan emphasized the major weight attached to EU relations and said Turkey would do its best to obtain a firm date for commencing negotiations (Office of the Prime Minister November 4, 2002). The AKP carried on with EU reforms, and during his tour of the major EU capitals, Erdoğan pledged to European leaders that he would settle the Cyprus dispute (Kinacıoğlu and Oktay 2006: 263-4). Following a meeting with British Prime Minister Tony Blair, Erdoğan remarked that he had suggested a package for “the settlement of the ‘European Security and Defense Policy’ (ESDP), the date for initiation of EU-Turkish accession talks and the Cyprus problem” and claimed that he had told Blair that “Turkey had to be given a date for the initiation of accession talks at the 2002 Copenhagen Summit”. Erdoğan stated
that, “Everywhere they went they faced the same approach, which was that without a solution of the Cyprus dispute, Turkey cannot obtain a negotiation date at the Copenhagen Summit” *Haber Vitrini 2002*.

Meanwhile, the EU was putting pressure on Turkey to take the initiative in solving the Cyprus dispute. On November 5, 2003, the EU Commission released its Regular Report on Turkey’s progress towards accession during 2003, accompanied by a Strategy Paper that underscored how “failure to reach a settlement in Cyprus would be a major hindrance for Turkey’s EU prospects” (European Commission November 5, 2003). The next day, addressing the European Parliament over Turkey’s EU Progress Report, Verheugen pointed out that “Turkey had to take the initiative for the solution of the problem consonant with the UN plan,” suggesting that Ankara turn on the heat following the elections in the north, where Denktaş’s opponents had vowed to sideline him and push for a solution if they could win at the polls (*Radikal* November 6, 2003). Accordingly, the AKP government calculated that a solution on the island would clear Turkey’s pre-accession path and, in turn, undermine the power base of the civil-military bureaucracy.

Although the initial change in Turkey’s Cyprus policy may have been inspired by a cost-benefit analysis, such cost-benefit calculations cannot alone account for the AKP government’s ongoing pro-EU orientation and pro-active support for a settlement of Cyprus on the basis of UN parameters. In this learning process, cost-benefit calculations as well as the major ideational transformation of the AKP alongside its re-definition of Turkey’s interests and identity went hand in hand. As Risse points out, once the consensus is reached on the collective identity, it sticks (Risse 2001: 213). The AKP was established by the modernisers within the Islamist Turkish View Movement. The members of the new party predominantly believed that the project of “political Islam”, which led to the marginalisation of the Islamists and to many party closures, had to be replaced by a more pragmatic understanding defined as “conservative democracy” and they had to move to the centre of Turkish political spectrum. Therefore, the members of the newly formed AKP were predominantly in favour of EU membership and thus a policy shift on Cyprus.
The AKP did not revert to Islamist politics or call into question the secular-democratic institutions of Turkey after its advent to power in 2002, but kept up to maintain the ongoing EU reform process. The AKP’s diligence in attempting to settle the Cyprus dispute along UN parameters outlived the party’s initial pragmatic calculations and its EU proclivity in general became the new norms of a new foreign policy vision. In sum, Turkey’s new Cyprus policy can best be accounted for by the advent to power of a leadership, who, emerging from constant policy failures and subsequent ideational crisis, redefined its identity and its interests to promote EU membership as its ultimate objective on instrumental and pragmatic grounds in order to weaken the clout of the Turkish bureaucracy and military by exploiting the pre-accession process. However, after this initial phase, the AKP’s Cyprus policy was sustained out of new pragmatic and conciliatory norms laid out by the new leadership.
CHAPTER VII: SECOND DETERMINANT: THE ROLE OF THE EU

The European Union was the second crucial factor involved in the Turkish foreign-policy change on Cyprus. The AKP government also used the accession process as a means of legitimising and expediting its new Cyprus policy (Börzel and Soyaltın 2012, Börzel and Risse 2012, Kaliber 2012). In fact, the EU has never had a specific Cyprus policy of its own; rather, unable to formulate, operationalise, or implement a model to settle the strife on the island, it has been confined largely to the role of backer for the UN Secretary General’s mission of good offices in mediating between the Greek and Turkish Cypriots (Tocci 2007: 30). However, with the crystallization of Turkish and Cypriot membership perspectives in the late 1990s, the EU started to influence Ankara’s Cyprus policy. The credibility of Turkey’s membership during 1999-2004 helped to mitigate any costs that might be incurred by a policy change on Cyprus, whereas the Republic of Cyprus’s 2004 EU accession effectively required a settlement of the dispute if Turkey was to fulfill its EU aspirations. This chapter engages in separate discussions of, respectively, how the Cyprus dispute underwent ‘Europeanization’ and how this effectively required Turkey to secure a settlement on Cyprus in order to fulfil its own aspirations of EU membership.

The chapter also examines the positions of the individual member countries and the European Commission and how they interacted with each other in the course of 2002-2004. I conclude that, rather than the backing or opposition of the individual member states, the European Commission, who assumed a position in favour of Turkey’s membership after 1999 provided that it honoured the Copenhagen and acquis criteria, played the key role as the overarching actor in the pre-accession process for Turkey.
1. Europeanization of the Cyprus Issue

As numerous scholars have noted, settlement of the Cyprus dispute eventually became the greatest obstacle to Turkey’s progress in the EU accession talks (Suvarierol 2003; Çarkoğlu and Kalaycıoğlu 2009; Öniş 2010). Simple models related to conditionality or to adoption costs cannot sufficiently account for the Turkish government’s decision to back the UN parameters and active support for the plan laid out by UN Secretary General Kofi Annan. Rather, it was the entry of the Republic of Cyprus into the EU in the absence of a solution that made a solution a de facto acquis criterion of the EU’s acquis communautaire for Turkey to fulfil in order to advance its own accession process. In the following chapter, I will justify how I reached such a conclusion by evaluating the Europeanization models and demonstrating how they fall short in explaining Turkey’s foreign policy shift.

1.1. Democratic and Acquis Conditionality

As discussed at length in Chapter V, ‘democratic conditionality’ refers to the general conditions that must be met for a candidate to become an EU member, namely, “stability of institutions guaranteeing democracy, the rule of law, human rights and respect for and protection of minorities, the existence of a functioning market economy as well as the capacity to cope with competitive pressure and market forces within the Union” (European Council 1993). Acquis conditionality, on the other hand, refers compliance with the specific rules of the acquis communautaire, to which candidate countries must adjust their legislation as explicitly specified by the EU as a precondition for membership (Schimmelfennig and Sedelmeier 2005: 211). Clearly, the issue of Cyprus had nothing to do directly with either democratic or acquis conditionality.

In an address to the European Parliament regarding Turkey’s Progress Report and the Strategy Paper of 2003, Günter Verheugen, the EU commissioner for enlargement, bluntly stated that “a resolution in Cyprus was not a pre-
condition, but a political message inserted into the documents wittingly” (Radikal November 6, 2003). AKP officials also underlined that settlement of the Cyprus issue was not an accession criterion for Turkey. Foreign Minister and Vice-Prime Minister Abdullah Gül made this point at the parliament when he expressed that “a solution to the Cyprus dispute is not a criterion for Turkey’s accession into the EU. Accordingly, the only criteria that Turkey needs to fulfil are the Copenhagen political criteria. Cyprus issue is not one of these. However, we will do our best to find a settlement in Cyprus.” (TBMM Reports Journal May 23, 2003). Gül also criticized the Cyprus section of the EU’s November 2003 Strategy Paper, stating that Cyprus was not a political criterion and that Turkey had been given guarantees to this respect as far back as 1999 (Office of the Prime Minister November 5, 2003). Prime Minister Erdoğan similarly stressed that the “Copenhagen Criteria do not stipulate any obligations for Turkey on the Cyprus issue” (Office of the Prime Minister November 6, 2003).

In 1999, the EU’s Helsinki Conclusions made it clear that Turkey was a candidate for EU accession on the basis of the same criteria – democracy, human and minority rights and the rule of law – as the other twelve candidates at the time. The European Council accentuated the fact that accession preparations should focus on the EU’s political and economic criteria as well as a national programme for the adoption of the acquis (Council of the European Union 1999: Paragraph 12). The Helsinki Conclusions also stipulated that all candidate countries were participating in the accession process on an equal footing. It specified “the principle of peaceful settlement of disputes in accordance with the United Nations Charter” and urged candidate states “to make every effort to resolve any outstanding border disputes and other related issues” (Council of the European Union 1999: Paragraph 4), noting that the European Council supported the UN Secretary-General’s initiative to reach a comprehensive solution for a settlement of the Cyprus issue and the commencement of negotiations at UN headquarters in New York in 2002 (Council of the European Union 1999: Article 9/a).
At its December 2002 meeting in Copenhagen, the European Council reiterated both its decision in 1999 in Helsinki that “Cyprus would be accepted as a member even without a solution as it has completed the talks” and “Turkey is a candidate state destined to join the Union on the basis of the same criteria as applied to the other candidate states.” The 2002 summit emphasized the Copenhagen political criteria of 1993 as the valid criteria to be fulfilled by Turkey, stating that if, upon the report and recommendation of the European Commission, the European Council decided at its December 2004 meeting that Turkey had satisfied the Copenhagen political criteria, then accession negotiations would be opened without delay (Council of the European Union 2002).

In fact, the European Commission’s 2004 Regular Report conceded that Turkey had made substantial legislative progress by enacting significant legislative reform packages that included a new Penal Code as well as constitutional changes, which were mentioned as priorities in both the previous year’s report and the Accession Partnership agreement (Commission of the European Communities 2004a: 55). The decision was manifest: “In view of the overall progress of reforms, and provided that Turkey brings into force the outstanding legislation mentioned above, the Commission considers that Turkey sufficiently fulfils the political criteria and recommends that accession negotiations be opened” (Commission of the European Communities 2004b: 3). Notably, among the expected constitutional and legislative changes laid out by the European Commission as consonant with democratic conditionality, there was no mention of Cyprus.

When, in December 2004, the EU Council followed the recommendations of the Commission and offered to open accession negotiations with Turkey, it did so with the caveat that “it expects Turkey to actively pursue its efforts to bring into force the six specific items of legislation identified by the Commission” and that Ankara agrees to “sign the Protocol regarding the adaptation of the Ankara Agreement between the EU and Turkey, taking account of the accession of the ten new member states” (Council of the European Union 2004: 5). Again, the conditions propounded by the EU Council were heavily
related to the promotion of human rights, democracy and the rule of law in Turkey and the implementation of the *acquis communautaire*, not on Turkey’s fervency regarding resolution of the Cyprus question, amounting to the fact that solution in Cyprus was not a pre-condition. However, the lack of a consensus as regards Turkey’s membership among the member states based on their various interests and preoccupations rendered Turkish accession process problematic.

On July 29, 2005, Ankara signed the Additional Protocol, which meant Turkey would be required to extend the Customs Union it had signed with the EU to its ten new members, including Cyprus; thus, Greek Cypriot vessels and aircraft would be granted the right to use Turkish ports and airports. However, the third article of the protocol stressed that its signing, ratification and implementation would not amount to recognition of the Republic of Cyprus, and Ankara made clear that conclusion of the protocol would not compromise Turkey’s rights vis-à-vis Cyprus under the Treaty of Guarantee, the Treaty of Alliance and the Treaty of Establishment concluded in 1960. Moreover, the second article of the protocol bluntly stated that “the Republic of Cyprus referred to in the Protocol is not the original partnership state established in 1960.” In other words, Ankara regarded Greek Cypriot authority as valid only in the south, not over the Turkish Cypriots in the North (Declaration by Turkey on Cyprus 2005).

On September 21, 2005, the European Community responded to Ankara’s July 29 Protocol by demanding that Turkey fully and non-discriminatorily implement the EU Additional Protocol, including free movement of goods and transport, and it tied the opening of accession talks on relevant chapters to Turkey’s extension of the protocol to all new EU members, stressing that Turkey’s overall progress in talks with the EU would be affected by its failure to carry out its obligations under the Additional Protocol. The EU also noted that the accession process involves the recognition of all EU members – which by May 1, 2004 would include Cyprus (European Community 2005).
Prior to the opening of negotiations with Turkey on October 03, 2005, France, backed by Austria and Denmark proposed offering Turkey a ‘privileged partnership’ rather than full membership (Zaman December 17, 2004). Apart from the proposal of ‘privileged partnership’, the Greek Cypriot Administration attempted to set recognition of the Republic of Cyprus as a condition for Turkey’s accession. However, the Greek Cypriot demand for recognition was watered down. The European Commission emphasized that the recognition of Cyprus was not a precondition for the initiation of accession talks and the sole aim of the talks with Turkey was “accession” (Commission of the European Communities 2006: 5) Therefore, Turkey was allowed to commence accession talks on October 03, 2005. The December 2006 EU Council decided to merely suspend eight chapters and to close none until Turkey honoured its obligations under the acquis instead of suspending the talks altogether as demanded by the Greek Cypriots. The EU refrained from taking sides and urged Ankara to honour its obligations under the Ankara Protocol of July 2005. The Greek Cypriot demand for suspension of the talks with Turkey in the run up to the December 2006 EU Council was backed by Germany and the Netherlands, which desired a “privileged partnership” for Turkey. Austria called for a “breathing period” prior to Turkey’s accession, while France favoured suspension of 17 chapters with Turkey (Faustmann 2011: 161-2 and 70).

In its 2006 Progress Report for Turkey, the European Commission pointed out that “Turkey’s refusal to give access to its seaports and airports to vessels and aircraft under the flag of the Republic of Cyprus is in contravention of the Customs Union agreement and a hindrance to free movement of goods” (Commission of the European Communities 2006: 5). Once again, the European Commission emphasized that Turkey must extend the Additional Protocol to the Republic of Cyprus, as failure to do so was an infraction of the acquis communautaire. But, the Greek Cypriot demand for a suspension of the talks altogether, the French demand for suspension of 17 chapters and the demands for privileged partnership for Turkey were not accepted. Such hostility to Turkey's accession and the ambivalence of others rendered Turkish accession a controversial issue within the Council. While Turkey’s progress
was evaluated by the European Commission strictly in accordance with its implementation of the democratic and *acquis* criteria, the controversy on Turkey’s accession among the member states complicated its task. The entry of the Republic of Cyprus into the EU and Turkey’s candidate status Europeanized the Cyprus question. Because of the need for Turkey to open its ports and airports to the Greek Cypriot vessels and aircraft, a solution in the island became a *sine qua non* for Turkey as part of the *acquis* conditionality.

1.2. **Determinacy and Legitimacy of Conditions**

Was the settlement of the Cyprus discord a determinate or legitimate condition for Turkey’s EU membership? In light of the earlier discussion on the determinacy and legitimacy of EU conditionality (See Chapter 5, Section 2), it must be concluded that, in fact, settlement of the Cyprus question was neither a determinate nor a legitimate condition, but a political strategy devised by the European Union.

Determinacy is defined by Schimmelfennig and Sedelmeier as the clarity and formality of a rule: The clearer the behavioural implications of a rule and the more legalized and binding its status, the greater is its determinacy, and the more likely it is to be adopted. Legitimacy refers to consistency of rules: As a rule’s ambiguity and inconsistency increases, the likelihood of compliance diminishes. Moreover, if the rule is bound up with the community’s constitutive values and norms and the rule making-process is legitimate, then the legitimacy of the rule is boosted (Schimmelfennig and Sedelmeier 2005: 12 and 18-9). In view of these definitions, the EU conditionality vis-à-vis Turkey showed varying degrees of determinacy and legitimacy. For example, abolition of the death penalty is one of the most legitimate and determinate European human rights norms, and limiting the role of the military, although to a lesser degree than the abrogation of capital punishment, is also a legitimate and determinate EU norm, since both form part of the democratic conditionality on which EU membership is based. In contrast, the settlement of the Cyprus issue was part of neither the democratic nor *acquis* elements of
conditionality, and consequently, it was not a determinant or a legitimate condition for Turkey’s EU accession. Therefore, neither the opening nor the conclusion of Turkey’s EU accession talks could be made dependent upon a settlement in Cyprus.

So, if a settlement on Cyprus was part of neither ‘democratic conditionality’ nor ‘acquis conditionality’ – neither a ‘legitimate’ nor a ‘determinate’ EU norm to be applied to Turkey’s accession process – how, exactly, did the Cyprus issue come to affect Turkey’s relations with the EU? The problem stems directly from the accession of the Republic of Cyprus into the EU without a settlement on the island, which made it impossible for Turkey to fulfil the *acquis communautaire*. To do so would require Turkey to extend its Customs Union Agreement with the EU to the Greek Cypriot Administration, which Turkey does not recognize as the legal representative of the whole of Cyprus. As long as Turkey is unable to extend the Additional Protocol to the Republic of Cyprus, accession negotiations between the EU and Turkey will remain blocked. In this sense, a resolution on the island has become a *de facto* condition for Turkey’s progress in the accession process. In other words, Turkey was not directly judged on its contribution to the resolution process in Cyprus, but on the progress it achieved towards meeting the Copenhagen Criteria, which, within the framework of the *acquis*, required Turkey to extend the Customs Union agreement between the EU and Turkey to the Republic of Cyprus as a new EU member. Accordingly, this ‘Europeanization of the Cyprus dispute’ required any pro-EU government to tackle the Cyprus issue and force the Greek Cypriot side into a settlement.

1.3. **Credibility of Conditionality**

As described above (See Chapter 5, Section 2), the credibility of conditionality refers to the consistency of EU rules and the fact that rewards must be bound to compliance, not tied to additional criteria, not withheld if compliance is met, and not doled out until then. On the contrary, the EU’s demand that Ankara contribute to the settlement of the Cyprus dispute was highly political,
rather than pertinent to the Copenhagen Criteria or the *acquis communautaire*, and thus lacked consistency as well as credibility. In spite of the fact that the evaluation of candidate countries was supposedly based on their progress in fulfilling the criteria and the *acquis*, the Strategy Paper that accompanied the EU Commission’s November 2003 Regular Report on Turkey emphasised that “failure to reach a settlement in Cyprus would be a major hindrance for Turkey’s EU prospects.” Ankara complied with the EU’s demands on Cyprus, despite its lack of determinacy and legitimacy; however, as it was neither a democratic nor an *acquis* criteria for accession, compliance did not unblock Turkey’s EU negotiation process.

The credibility of EU incentives dropped substantially when France and Germany started to put up resistance to Turkey’s full membership even though Ankara lent its support to the Annan Plan. Debates about Turkey’s ‘desirability’ and internal inconsistencies within the EU continued to increasingly lower the effectiveness of conditionality (Schimmelfennig 2008: 931-3). Despite the EU’s equivocal stance and the low level of credibility regarding Turkey’s accession prospects, Ankara persisted in calling for a solution based on the UN parameters; thus, the credibility of conditionality, now lacking, cannot account for Turkey’s change in policy towards Cyprus. It must be mentioned, however, increased credibility would likely to boost the governmental efforts to find a settlement.

### 1.4. Size and Speed of Rewards

Domestic compliance costs for the government of a candidate country are most likely to increase as the candidate draws closer to an endgame, i.e. a critical points at which it may jump from one stage to the next in negotiations. These high costs may cancel out the benefits to be acquired upon entry into the next stage (Schimmelfennig 2008: 931). Turkey was at just such an endgame in the run up to the referendum on the Annan Plan, as the European Council was on the verge of deciding at its December 2004 meeting whether or not to commence accession talks with Turkey. At this critical stage, Ankara pushed
its utmost for a settlement on Cyprus, demonstrating that it was not the intransigent party.

Currently, although there is no endgame for Turkey looming on the horizon, Ankara has maintained its position with regard to settling the Cyprus dispute on the basis of UN parameters, making clear that Turkey’s pro-active efforts cannot be explained by the size and speed of EU rewards. Rather, its initiatives for a solution on Cyprus represent a change in the mindset of the Turkish leadership, who believe that a win-win solution on the basis of the UN parameters would be in the best interests of the Cypriots as well as the Turks, Greeks and other regional countries. Moreover, it seems that the next endgame is intertwined with the initiatives of the government to find a solution to the Cyprus dispute, rather than the other way around.

Rather than explaining the change in Turkey’s Cyprus policy, ‘size and speed of rewards’ can better explain the AKP government’s current slow pace in attempting to meet EU criteria after 2005. Far away from the next endgame, Turkey is under no immediate pressure to decide on complying with EU requirements vis-à-vis the Copenhagen Criteria or losing all the benefits of jumping to the next phase in negotiations. Instead, the AKP government’s domestic power calculations have come to the fore, as the EU accession endgame had now moved so much further away. It is possible, however, that the government’s efforts towards compliance with the Copenhagen Criteria may speed up when the next endgame approaches.

2. The Positions of the Member States and the United States on Cyprus

2.1. Introduction

In this section, I will analyze the role of the EU players as well as the US, which played an important role in the process. I argue in this section that without institutionalized norms to force Ankara to make substantial changes in
its Cyprus policy, the efforts of the individual states did not go beyond their efforts to facilitate the UN initiatives for a solution in Cyprus. The EU, on the other hand, had the institutional tools to force Ankara to shift its policy due to Turkey’s accession process. The European Commission, as the executive body of the EU, was able to push Ankara to change its position on Cyprus due to the need for Turkey to implement the *acquis communautaire* as an EU candidate state. The US, on the other hand, lacked the institutional tools to play a direct role in shifting Ankara’s Cyprus policy. The US role remained confined to its efforts to back the UN initiative.

The policy of the US towards the Cyprus question and Turkey’s membership process is examined here as its role is intertwined with the EU process and efforts to find a solution to the Cyprus question. While the US and the UK tried to facilitate the UN efforts to find a solution to the Cyprus question, the other EU members assumed varying positions on Turkey’s accession process. Except for Greece and Britain, none of the other EU member states had a particular vision for a settlement in Cyprus. After analyzing the positions of the EU actors and the US by extensively drawing on the primary sources on the Cyprus question between 2002 and 2004, I will conclude that while the US and the UK strove hard to facilitate the UN initiative, the EU Commission played a crucial role by making clear that Turkey’s accession process would keep on provided that it met the Copenhagen and *acquis* criteria.

### 2.2. The United States

In the wake of the Cold War, Washington’s Turkish policy can be summarized as seeking Turkey’s integration with the EU political system, normalization of its relations with Greece and a solution to the Cyprus discord. This was considered by Washington as the most effective way to stabilize the oil-rich and strategic Middle East and Transcaucasia. (Pericleous 2009: 21-3) The US officials qualified Turkey as a “pivotal state” and thought that if stability is achieved in Turkey, this would spill over to the neighboring states and thus contribute to international stability (Ibid). Accordingly, Turkey was
considered as a key country to stabilize the Black Sea, Mediterranean and Caucasus. Washington also thought that Turkey would also provide an antidote to Islamic fundamentalism and function as the southern anchor of NATO after the US war against Iraq in 2003 (Ibid). As the largest and most powerful country in the Eastern Mediterranean, Turkey was the sole country with the potential to be fully incorporated into the Western political system, the EU, and thus reverse the potential unfavorable consequences of Islamic fundamentalism. For this to materialize, the establishment of peaceful relations with Turkey’s neighbors, notably Greece, and settlement of the Cyprus dissension was viewed as essential (Ibid).

This US vision was shared by the EU in the later 1990s, especially with the coming to power of Schröder’s Social Democratic Party (SDP) in Germany in 1998 and Simitis’ PASOK in Greece in 1996. Social Democrats in Germany and Greece have been strong supporters of Turkey's campaign to win a date from the European Union in December for the start of accession negotiations (Mr Erdogan's Greek friend Chumminess will help August 12, 2004). After the September 11, 2001 attacks, Germany, like the US, came to believe that the best way to fight Islamic fundamentalism was to accept Turkey as an EU member state to stabilize the Muslim Middle East, which was thought to be the source of fundamentalist threat. This was a radical transformation in the positions of the EU that paved the way for the EU to grant Ankara candidate status in 1999 at the Helsinki summit.

Against this general setting, in the wake of the Cold War, in January 1996, Greece and Turkey came to the brink of war in the Aegean over the uninhabited islands of Imia/Kardak. The troops of the two NATO allies came face to face. Only a timely American intervention prevented the escalation of the crisis. Washington admonished the two countries that “the one that shoots first would be in trouble with the US” (Milliyet January 31, 1996). Another crisis broke out when the Greek Cypriots ordered S-300 ground to air missiles from Russia to be installed on the island. Again the crisis was overcome by an American intervention. The S-300 missiles were deployed to Crete, rather than Cyprus (Turkish Daily News February 3, 1997, January 21, 1997).
The Imia and S-300 Crisis were watershed developments to convince the American government that there was the constant risk of a war in the Eastern Mediterranean between the two NATO allies. This culminated in a new American bid to integrate Turkey with the EU structures by a solution in Cyprus with a view to providing stability and security in the Middle East and Transcaucasia where major energy resources were located, and thus to maintain the ability to access and control them. As a result, Richard Holbrooke was appointed President Clinton’s special envoy to Cyprus in 1997 (Pericleous 2009: 21-3).

The US strategy to integrate Turkey with the EU structures did not change during the presidency of George Bush (2001-2009). During the Cyprus negotiations of 2002-4, President Bush and Colin Powell, U.S. Secretary of State, stepped in whenever necessary to facilitate the efforts of the UN. Thomas Weston was the President’s Special Representative for Cyprus and he, alongside David Hannay, the British Special Representative for Cyprus, endeavored to facilitate the talks under the auspices of the UN without themselves initiating or pursuing a British or American solution to the problem.

The Bush administration made an extraordinary effort to ensure that Turkey got a "date" from the European Union in 2003. President Bush personally made telephone calls, and Colin Powell wrote letters to the foreign ministers of each country (Birand December 21, 2002). In the eyes of Washington, "Turkey, a country which has become all the more important strategically, should be given the closest date, that is 2003." (Ibid). With the support they enlisted from the Bush Administration, Erdoğan and Gül pressed hard for 2003. The more Washington pressed on, the tenser the EU – notably France-Germany and the Scandinavians – became. They looked upon Turkey as closer to the US-British-Italian-Spanish camp. However, the "rejection front" was unable to resist for long and the German-French proposal of 2005 was adopted rather than US-UK proposal of 2003. Had the Bush Administration not exerted that pressure, Turkey could hardly get even the "December 2004" date. Turkey
was protected mostly by Britain, Italy and Spain, countries considered to be close to US’ policies. While Germany and France, who were disturbed by the US’ Iraq policy, curbed the American offer of 2003, they still settled for a date in 2004. The Scandinavians, who were at loggerheads with the US’ stance on Iraq, strove to impede the EU from giving a date altogether (Ibid).

In the course of the talks on the Annan Plan, the Turkish government often asked for help from Washington to facilitate the talks. In March 2003, Gül called Powell and asked for effective support from the US with regard to two crucial points for Turkey, namely, the provision of legal protection for the accord and bi-zonality. Powell replied that he would talk with Annan and Straw, the British Foreign Secretary, to meet Turkey’s concerns (*Milliyet* March 29, 2003).

Washington stepped in whenever necessary to promote the parties to accept the Annan Plan. Prior to the Bush-Erdoğan meeting, scheduled to be held on January 28, 2004, in Washington, Bush, on January 21, sent Thomas Weston to Ankara to talk with Uğur Ziyal, the head of the Turkish diplomatic team for Cyprus. Weston pledged that “Washington is ready to do its best to facilitate the talks.” (*Milliyet* January 23, 2004) Weston also expressed that “President Bush wants the Cyprus discord to be settled by the NATO summit in June 2004 in Istanbul.” (Ibid). Weston also said “not giving Turkey a date to commence accession talks by the EU is unacceptable for Washington in case of a solution in Cyprus.” To relieve the AKP government Weston also mentioned that “Washington could intervene for the delay of the referenda on the plan in case a compromise is reached by the parties.” (Ibid). Bush also sent letters to Prime Minister Simitis and Greek Cypriot President Papadopolous calling for the acceptance of the Annan Plan (Ibid).

Powell also worked hard and played an influential role in convincing the parties via Thomas Weston (Birand April 03, 2004). In early April 2004, when the referendum was drawing near, Colin Powell firmly supported the Annan Plan and called on both Cypriot communities to approve the plan in the referenda on April 24, 2004. Powell asserted that "this is an historic moment
and a powerful signal of reconciliation." (Turkish Daily News April 2, 2004). Powell stated that “the US is committed to supporting full implementation of this settlement and do all we can to help in all respects." (Ibid). Colin Powell was one of the main backstage players throughout the Bürgenstock negotiations in early March 2004 and had countless telephone talks with Annan and Petros Molyviatis and Abdullah Gül, the Greek and Turkish Prime Ministers, to embolden them to reach an accord (Ibid). In June 2004, in an address at İstanbul University, Bush reiterated the US position as regards Turkey’s accession into the EU and called for the European Union to to set a date for Turkey to start entry talks into the union despite criticism by France's President Jacques Chirac that he was meddling in EU affairs. Bush said that Turkey belongs in the EU and that Europe is "not the exclusive club of a single religion" (Bush rebuff to Chirac over Turkey June 29, 2004).

Since 1996, Washington pressed hard for the solution of the Cyprus question and to achieve its eventual and broader objective of accession of Turkey into the EU to secure the Middle East and Transcaucasia. The US put pressure on the EU for acceptance of Turkey as a full member. As the date for a solution drew nearer in Cyprus in April 2004, the US’ efforts multiplied. In 1997, despite Washington’s pressure on the EU to grant Turkey candidacy status at the Luxembourg summit, the EU denied candidacy, which materialized in 1999 due to the EU’s domestic dynamics rather than the US duress. The EU changed this position in the run up to the Helsinki summit in 1999 and decided to grant Turkey candidate status with similar concerns to that of the US in mind, to stabilize its neighbourhood. When the US and the EU converged on the aim of Turkey’s accession into the EU, the EU efforts became more effective with the US’s full support for a solution in Cyprus and accession of Turkey into the EU.

However, Washington did not have the institutional tools to single-handedly force a settlement on Ankara. While the US endeavoured to facilitate the peace initiatives led under the auspices of the EU without setting forth any suggestions, the EU became the essential actor to push Turkey for a solution in Cyprus from 1999 onwards, after Turkey was granted candidate status. The
need for Ankara to find a solution to the Cyprus disagreement to proceed with its own EU accession process forced Ankara to make substantial changes in its Cyprus policy. This was due to the institutionalisation of the EU norms within the Turkish domestic legal framework. To become an EU member state, Ankara had to transpose the *acquis communautaire* into its domestic structures. This transposition also called for a solution to the Cyprus dispute. In this framework, the European Commission, as the executive body of the EU, came to the fore. As an organization functioning on technical procedures, rather than political considerations, the European Commission made clear that as long as Ankara complied with the acquis criteria, its pre-accession process would keep on.

2.3. The EU and its Member States

Except for Greece and the UK, other members of the EU paid only sporadic attention to the disagreement on the island. When they paid attention no member state has ever pushed for an active EU involvement in the dispute. Since the frozen conflict did not pose any immediate threat to regional stability and the EU members did not desire to compromise their relations with the parties concerned, they did not meddle in the dispute. Therefore, the EU had not developed a particular and independent policy towards the dispute, which was never the subject of high-level political debate and the EU never set forth a settlement formula to the dispute. The EU confined itself to backing the UN good offices mission and the mediation of the Secretary General (Prodi presses Turkey over Cyprus January 15, 2004). The EU committed itself to the independence, sovereignty and territorial integrity of Cyprus and called for the unification of the island in line with the UN Resolutions. The EU also unreservedly and outspokenly supported UN Secretary General Annan’s mediation initiatives between 2002 and 2004. (Tocci 2007: 30).

The EU’s interests with regard to the Cyprus issue are defined within its broader concerns for peace and stability in the Eastern Mediterranean. On account of the proximity of the EU to the strategic and turbulent Middle East,
peace and stability in the region is of weight for the EU. A settlement in Cyprus would also embolden normalization of relations between NATO ally and EU candidate Turkey and Greece (Tocci 2007: 28).

At the end of the 1990s, important changes took place in the international and European arena. Abiding strains in the Balkans and notably the Kosovo crisis pushed Europe towards a more geo-political approach in the Balkans, which supposed a more inclusive policy vis-a-vis Turkey. The advent to power of social democrat governments in the EU, who favoured Turkish membership, was a momentous development in Turkey’s bid for membership and the Cyprus question. In Germany Schröder’s SDP (1998-2005) and in Greece Simitis’ PASOK (1996-2004) came to power and both backed Turkey’s EU membership.

As a result of the emergence of a favourable environment for Turkey’s EU membership, Turkey was granted candidacy status in 1999. After this development, the EU Commission became the primary actor in Turkey’s pre-accession process. The high-level officials of the EU Commission outspokenly backed Turkey’s entry into the EU and a settlement in Cyprus. The Commission publicly voiced that “Turkey would be accepted as a member provided that it meets the Copenhagen and acquis criteria”. However, the ambivalent stance of some member states as regards Turkey’s accession rendered its membership controversial indicating that the accession process would not be as smooth as the other candidates even in case of a settlement in Cyprus.

The need for a solution in Cyprus was mentioned by EU officials several times. At a speech in the European Parliament on November 08, 2000, Günter Verheugen, EU Commissioner for enlargement, said that “we are still concerned about the inadequate respect for human rights and the rights of minorities as well as about the constitutionally enshrined role played by the armed forces in political life via the National Security Council.” (Strategy Paper Accession Partnership with Turkey and Progress Reports November 08, 2000). He also stated that “Cyprus will be a member with or without a
settlement, but if a solution cannot be found in Cyprus, commencement of accession talks with Turkey would put in risk.” *(Milliyet March 5, 2003).* Verheugen made clear that “in case of failure to find a solution to the Cyprus question, Turkey would be in a situation of not recognizing an EU member state” *(Ibid).* Jean Christophe Filori, Verheugen’s spokesman, qualified membership of Turkey in the absence of a settlement in Cyprus as “unacceptable” and “surrealist” *(Ibid).*

The Commission made clear in its Regular Report on Turkey’s progress towards accession for 2003, that “failure to reach a settlement in Cyprus would be a major hindrance for Turkey’s EU prospects” *(European Commission November 5, 2003).* Verheugen stated that “Nobody in Europe could imagine a situation where we would start negotiations with Turkey when the conflict in Cyprus is not resolved. It's not a condition, but we're simply stating the fact that this could become an obstacle.” *(O'Rourke November 05, 2003).* The following day, in addressing the European Parliament in relation to Turkey’s EU Progress Report, Günter Verheugen said that “Turkey needs to take the initiative to solve the problem in line with the UN plan” *(Radikal November 6, 2003).*

Speaking at the Turkish General Assembly, Romano Prodi, the President of the EU Commission, stated that “a solution in Cyprus will greatly ease the EU membership expectations of Turkey. This is not a condition, but a political reality” *(TBMM Reports Journal January 15, 2004).* Bertie Ahern, the Irish Prime Minister and holder of the EU Presidency, reiterated the same position. “Technically, it is not a condition for beginning negotiations, but is bound to play a role when the then 25 EU leaders decide at their December summit whether to approve the start of the process” *(Black January 15, 2004).* To dissipate the fears of the Turkish side to secure the bi-zonality aspect of the Annan Plan, Romano Prodi assured the Turkish government that the accord reached in Cyprus would be rendered congruous with EU law *(Zaman February 15, 2004)*.
At the Bertelsmann Forum held to promote European dialogue since 1992, Günter Verheugen indicated that “Turkey’s membership is essential for Europe’s security, in no time in Turkey’s history such consequential changes took place and Turkey must be given an EU perspective” (Zaman January 10, 2004). Verheugen, in his delivery to the German Deutschlandfunk radio, underlined that “he supports Schröder's policy of backing Turkey's membership (Turkish Daily News February 25, 2004). Verheugen said: "What lies behind this approach of Schröder are the big strategic thoughts shared by all European heads of state and governments. To have a strong and stable partner in Turkey would play a very important role in the political and economical future of Europe” (Ibid).

Verheugen also strongly backed the UN efforts and called on the Greek and Turkish Cypriot leaders to do all they can to try and persuade the population of the island. He stated that “the present plan represents the best and most balanced solution that can possibly be achieved" (Turkish Daily News April 2, 2004). To encourage the parties to endorse the plan, Verheugen said "the alternative is not this plan or another plan. The alternative is this plan or nothing, no solution at all." He added that "Turkey played a very constructive and cooperative role in the negotiations. I would like to say that expressly" (Ibid).

The EU also refrained from taking sides in the talks and declined the Greek Cypriot desire for the participation of the EU to the negotiations as a party. In his meeting with De Soto, the UN Secretary General’s Special Representative for Cyprus, Verheugen stated that “the solution of the Cyprus question is a matter of high priority for the EU. We participate in the negotiations not as a direct party, but as a contributory” (Milliyet February 18, 2004). After clarifying its impartiality, the EU made the crucial contribution to a settlement in Cyprus when Verheugen pronounced in the island in the run up to the negotiations in New York in front of the two leaders that “the emerging accord will not be breached or watered down by the EU law” (Milliyet February 21, 2004). Verheugen mentioned that “we assure that the accord to be agreed and put to referenda by the parties will be rendered a legal provision as effective as
the EU primary law by being unanimously approved by the EU Council” *(Ibid)*. By this pronouncement, the EU addressed the greatest misgiving of Ankara and the Turkish Cypriots of the accord being diluted within the EU framework by the cases to be brought by the Greek Cypriots in front of the EU courts *(Ibid)*. This move not only demonstrated the EU’s impartial and even-handed stance on the Cyprus question, but also evidenced the European Commission’s leading role in the efforts to find a solution to the Cyprus disagreement.

Verheugen also warned the Greek Cypriot side, in which the surveys showed a negative vote in the run up to the referendum on the Annan Plan, that “in case the Greek Cypriots say ‘no’ to the plan, then the Green Line separating the two Cypriot communities would be the de facto border of the EU and I would do anything I could to surmount the isolations on the north. In such a case the Turks could not be accused of occupying and dividing the island” *(Milliyet April 16, 2004)*.

In short, led by Verheugen, and Romano Prodi, the EU worked hard to find a formula satisfactory to the both sides. Prodi said Turkey was "closer than ever" to the EU *(Prodi presses Turkey over Cyprus January 15, 2004)*. Verheugen assumed a neutral position on the Cyprus question and never disappointed the Turkish side. Verheugen did everything in his power to encourage the parties to accept a solution. He not only plainly underlined that “failure to find a solution to the Cyprus question would be a major impediment to Turkey’s EU aspirations” *(European Commission November 5, 2003)*, but also warned the Greek Cypriot side for the unfavourable consequences of a no vote in the referendum. The European Commission went as far as to pronounce that the EU Council would unanimously approve the accord to be signed by the parties to render the agreement as effective as the EU primary law. This demonstrated the EU’s commitment to finding a solution to the Cyprus question and to Turkey’ membership. Therefore, the EU’s commitment and its initiatives to a settlement in Cyprus, which would clear the most important barrier on Turkey’s road to EU membership, was the most essential element, alongside the leadership and a propitious decision-
making setting in Turkey, in changing Turkey’s Cyprus policy.

2.3.1. **The UK:**

Britain was one of the important countries that has supported the UN endeavours to find a settlement in Cyprus (Kramer 1997: 16). British interests are associated with its colonial past, its strategically located two sovereign bases close to the Middle East on the island, by its role as a guarantor power under the 1960 constitution, by its permanent seat at the UN Security Council, and by its close relationship with Turkey. Since 1974, the UK has backed good offices mission of the UN Secretary General and its initiatives to induce a bi-zonal and bi-communal federation. British interests in Cyprus was pursued both via bilateral relations with the conflicting parties (through the British representative or the High Commissioner in Cyprus) or through the UN. The UK backed Cyprus’ accession into the EU, yet it adamantly opposed an EU involvement in the dispute (Tocci 2007: 28-30).

In the last UN bid to find a settlement to the conflict, David Hannay had been appointed as the British Special Representative for Cyprus in 1996, endeavoured to put more clout into the UN efforts. At no stage of the negotiations, did the UK initiate or pursue a solo British or even a UK/US approach to the problem as Britain’s remarkable but fraught relationship with all the parties concerned would have probably led to failure from the outset. Accordingly, only the UN was acceptable as a medium to lead the talks. Secondly, the enlargement of the EU was a major aim of British foreign policy which should in no way be derailed by developments in Cyprus. Thirdly, while Britain was prepared to strive to find a solution prior to the entry of the Republic of Cyprus into the EU, this could not be pursued in such a way as to jeopardize Britain’s close relations with Cyprus, Greece and Turkey (Hannay 2005: 50-1).

Prime Minister Tony Blair was one of Turkey’s most fervent proponents for accession. In British newspapers there are hardly any reports against Turkey’s
membership. During his visit to Turkey, Tony Blair agreed on cooperation between the UK and Turkey on the latter’s bid for membership into the EU and removal of the isolations on the TRNC. Blair expressed that “as in the past, the UK is one of the leading advocates of Turkey’s EU membership bid” (Hürriyet May 17, 2004).

Jack Straw, British Foreign Secretary, also played an important role. He manipulated the parties and the European capitals in favor of a solution in Cyprus and Turkey’s membership (Birand April 03, 2004). Straw on a TV programme in Turkey in March 2004, mentioned that “in case the Greek Cypriots say ‘no’ and the Turkish Cypriots say ‘yes’ at the referendum, then the Greek Cypriots will only represent the southern section of the island” (Hürriyet March 03, 2004).

Accordingly, Britain has always been one of the most ardent and significant backers of Turkey’s accession into the EU. Britain had similar concerns as that of the US: Stabilization of the region where rich oil and gas resources are located and to counter fundamental Islam by integrating Turkey into the EU structures. Cognizant of the need to reach a solution in Cyprus for progress of Turkey’s accession talks, a British Special Representative for Cyprus was appointed in the course of the negotiations of the Annan Plan to facilitate the talks. When Turkey complied with the Copenhagen and acquis criteria, Britain became more vocal in its support for Turkey’s accession. When Turkey failed to honor the criteria, however, Britain was not able to push forward Turkey’s accession process effectively (Schimmelfennig 2009: 420-1).

2.3.2. Greece:

Greece is the EU member state whose national interest with regard to Cyprus has been most closely associated with the dispute by virtue of its kin-Greek Cypriot community, its historical role in the dissension, and owing to the salience of Cyprus in the broader Greek-Turkish strife. Leaving aside the policy of enosis, Athens policy of backing the Greek Cypriot cause has
endured. For this reason, the Greek policy towards Cyprus has aimed at reunification of Cyprus under a tight federal (akin to a unitary state) structure, considerable territorial adjustments, the liberalization of rights and freedoms, and much reduced Turkish role in the island’s security arrangements. Under Papandreou’s PASOK in the 1980s and 1990s, Athens assumed a more active and hands-on stance on the issue (Tocci 2007: 55).

In February 1999, George Papandreou replaced anti-Turkish Theodore Pangalos as the Minister of Foreign Affairs. Papandreou and Simitis shifted Greek policy towards Turkey to a great extent in that Athens became one of the champions of Turkish membership in the EU, which it presumed was a more convenient setting to root out Turkish-Greek disputes, including Cyprus, rather than bilateral talks with Ankara. This would ill enable Greece to reduce its defence spending, attract foreign investment and boost cross-border trade. Greece has realised, in such a case, that a European Turkey will be a less threatening Turkey (H. Smith May 08, 2004). The Helsinki summit of 1999 that granted Turkey candidate status enhanced the distinctiveness of the EU on the Cyprus issue. It was affirmed that the prospects of EU membership for both Turkey and Cyprus would expedite a settlement. However, although the Helsinki summit made the solution of the Cyprus dispute a precondition for Turkish membership, this was not the case for the Republic of Cyprus (Eralp 2009: 6-7). Kostas Karamanlis, whose New Democracy Party won power in March 2004, pledged to actively support Turkey's EU membership, even the Cyprus dispute remained unresolved (H. Smith May 08, 2004).

After his meeting with Papadopoulos in February 2004, Prime Minister Kostas Simitis said that “Athens is ready for a solution in Cyprus under the auspices of the UN and the arbitration role of the UN does not disturb them” (Hürriyet February 9, 2004). In contrast to the previous elections, which circulated around “hostility towards Turkey”, in the March 2004 Greek general elections between Papandreou’s (Simitis stepped down in February 2004) PASOK and Karamanlis’ New Democracy Party’s “friendship with Turkey” came to the forefront. While Papandreou said that “I set up peaceful relations with Turkey”,
Karamanlis accentuated that “I have good relations with the Turkish government. I am the one that could deepen the peace” (Birand March 9, 2004). Both the Simitis-Papandreou duo and Karamanlis agreed to grant the UN Secretary General the authority of arbitration. Both showed maturity and even refrained from rendering the Cyprus issue an election material (Ibid). For the first time there was a consensus between the government and opposition in Greece on the acceptance of the UN plan to settle the Cyprus question. Moreover, the Greek government and opposition were not annoyed by granting the UN Secretary General the authority of arbitration, which proved to be the most effective medium in the hands of the Secretary General to forge a solution in the island.

Simitis and Papandreou (SP) displayed courage and vision in the run up to the election on March 7, 2004 and despite being aware that they were going to lose, they endorsed the New York agreement. Eventually, they lost the elections. Kostas Karamanlis, the leader of the newly elected New Democracy Party (March 10, 2004-October 6, 2009), did not support the uncompromising position of the Greek Cypriots in Bürgenstock. Instead, he kept a distance from them (Birand April 03, 2004).

Simitis’ accession to the leadership of PASOK in 1996 was a momentous development in Greek-Turkish relations. He removed the nationalist and anti-Turkish members from the party, such as Theodore Pangalos as the Minister of Foreign Affairs (Kemal KıırıĢçi 2006b). He redefined Greece’s interests and changed Greece’s decades-long policy of hostility towards Turkey and opposition to Turkey’s entry into the EU (H. Smith May 08, 2004). In this sense, Turkish accession into the EU was seen as a transformative process. He argued that a Europeanized Turkey as an EU member would be a better solution to the Greek-Turkish disputes in the Aegean and Cyprus and would serve Greece’s interests better (Ker-Lindsay 2007: 71). He strongly backed the UN’s last initiative to find a solution in Cyprus and warned Greek Cypriots against the unfavourable consequences for them of a “no” vote in the referendum. Simitis also did not oppose granting the UN Secretary General the power of arbitration going beyond the mission of good offices and thereby
strongly enhancing the odds of a settlement in Cyprus. Simitis’ strong leadership in favour of Turkey’s entry into the EU and a solution in Cyprus was a remarkable development in the course of 2002 and 2004 that helped Turkey’s new policy on Cyprus.

**2.3.3. Germany**

In Germany, a coalition of Social Democrat and Greens, who played to the economic-political criteria rather than religious-cultural factors as EU conditions, came to power in 1998 elections. German Chancellor Gerhard Schröder and Foreign Minister Joschka Fischer constantly backed Turkey’s membership in the EU. The Social Democrats and Greens held the view that the EU should keep its promises to Turkey to start accession talks if it fulfilled political criteria. The second reason is regional circumstances. According to them “Turkey had a unique situation in the unstable Middle East region as regards Europe’s interests” (Inal and Yeğenoğlu June 27, 2005). As an EU member Turkey would function as a model to the Muslim countries of the Middle East and would help stabilize the region. However, the Christian Democrats under Angela Merkel advocated a “privileged partnership” for Turkey. Merkel stated that “Turkey would place too much economic and cultural pressure on current EU states if it were admitted to the union” (Merkel Calls For Petition Against Turkish Membership October 11, 2004).

At the Bertelsmann Forum in January 2004, Joschka Fischer underlined that “Turkey’s membership into the EU as a democratic and Muslim country will be a good sign to the Arab countries and the EU has to keep its promises to Turkey” (Zaman January 10, 2004). Gerhard Schröder, before his visit to Turkey in February 2004, voiced that “if Turkey meets the Copenhagen criteria, the EU will keep its promise”. He also indicated that “A solution in Cyprus prior to May 1 will be a positive signal and the government’s stance on Cyprus is very important” (Radikal February 22, 2004). In Turkey, Schröder repeated the messages he delivered prior to his visit. Schröder said that “Germany’s attitude is clear and Turkey can trust German support. Our view
for Turkey’s accession is affirmative. The talks with Turkey must be initiated as soon as possible if Turkey satisfies the criteria” (Radikal February 24, 2004). Schröder also emphasized the weight of a settlement in Cyprus and praised Erdoğan’s constructive stance indicating that this stance was appreciated among the EU circles and this will make a positive impact in the decision on beginning accession negotiations with Turkey (Ibid).

Gerhard Schröder said at the Federal Parliament that,

“full membership of Turkey is a major asset for the EU’s security. Commencement of reconciliation between a non-fundamentalist Islam and Western enlightenment with Turkey’s membership is the most eventful asset for the EU. The stability in the Middle East will be attained via the accomplishment of the reform process in Turkey. This can be possible if we have the courage to say to Turkey that we will keep our promise.” (Zaman May 1, 2004).

At the Franco-German Summit in Strasbourg in October 2004, Schröder underlined the same points: "This region is remarkably not stable: Iran, Iraq, Middle-East, etc.", he pointed out. But he argued that "If we manage to establish an effective link between European values and moderate Islam, this would be something" (Strasbourg Franco-German Summit Chirac-Schröder on Turkey October 02, 2004) (Strasbourg Franco-German Summit Chirac-Schröder on Turkey October 02, 2004).

Joschka Fischer underlined that consequential reforms were undertaken in Turkey and it should not be kept outside the EU. Fischer adduced the weighty policy shift of Turkey with regard to Cyprus, which he presumed was arduous to achieve. Angela Merkel, the leader of the Christian Democrat Union, however, opposed Turkey’s membership and mentioned that “the commitments to Turkey cannot be kept” (Zaman May 1, 2004). Merkel propounded a “privileged partnership” for Turkey asserting that Turkey’s full membership would cause problems with regard to funding, free movement and integration (Milliyet February 17, 2004).
Schröder, alongside British Prime Minister Blair and French President Chirac, became one of the proponents of Turkey’s entry into the EU throughout 2002-4. Schröder said very clearly that “if Turkey fulfills the Copenhagen criteria, the negotiations would begin in the first half of 2005” (Turkish Daily News February 25, 2004). Schröder was the first European leader to speak about concrete dates for the beginning of the negotiations. Schröder travelled to Turkey just after his meeting with Jacques Chirac and Tony Blair in Berlin implying that the dates were articulated after Schröder’s debate on “Turkey’s place in the future Europe” with Chirac and Blair during this summit (Turkish Daily News February 25, 2004).

German foreign policy towards Turkey under the Social Democratic Party (1998-2005) was congruous with the American foreign policy towards Turkey. Both thought after the Cold War that the Muslim Middle East could create potential risks for the interests of the United States and the EU and had to be stabilized. Both envisioned Turkey as a model for the region. Turkey was regarded as a secular Muslim democracy and a crucial ally for the West as the eastern flank of NATO. After the September 11, 2001 attacks, Turkey continues to be a pivotal partner in the fight against al Qaeda and other terrorist groups (Phillips 2004).

For this reason, until 2005, Germany actively backed Turkey’s accession into the EU. After the advent to power of the Christian Democratic Union in 2005, the German government’s stance on Turkey’s membership changed towards “privileged partnership” rather than full membership. Throughout 2002 and April 2004, Germany’s active backing for Turkey’s membership and statements in this direction by German officials under the SDP gave Turkey’s Cyprus policy a boost and strengthened the hands of the government vis-à-vis the dissidents in search for a solution in Cyprus. Germany, under both the SDP and the CDU, refrained from actively involving in the efforts for a solution in Cyprus and rather backed the UN initiatives.
2.3.4. France

In the course of the 2002-4 Cyprus negotiations, while President Chirac supported Turkey’s entry into the EU, even his own party, the Union for a Popular Movement (UMP), was against Turkey’s entry into the EU. The Euro-deputies of the French majority party, UMP, announced at the European Parliament on April 1, 2004 that they were against Turkey’s accession into the EU. This was a rupture from France’s traditional policy of favoring Turkey’s entry (Le Monde April 4, 2004). Subsequently, the idea of a “privileged partnership” for Turkey, which has been circulating around for some time, was formally adopted by the UMP. This stance was at odds with the position adopted by President Chirac (1995-2007), who favoured full membership for Turkey in the long term (Chirac: Turkey not ready for EU membership April 29, 2004). Chirac admitted that Turkey had made considerable progress and “it should continue and intensify the implementation of democratic and economic reforms” (Chirac encourages Turkey EU bid July 20, 2004). Alain Juppé, the president of the UMP announced on April 7, 2004 in Paris the party’s refusal of Turkey’s accession into the EU, in a press conference held at the party’s headquarters (Le Monde April 9, 2004).

Michel Barnier, Foreign Minister from the UMP, expressed concerns as regards Turkey’s membership. Chirac indicated that France’s stance on Turkey’s membership process has not changed and France would act in accordance with the EU Commission’s report in December 2004 (Milliyet April 04, 2004). Abdullah Gül, in an attempt to minimize the unfavorable effects of the UMP decision for Turkey’s lack of a date for the talks, said on April 8, 2004 that “some words may be used for domestic political purposes” indicating that Turkey would persist in its efforts to get a positive report from the Commission at the end of the year (Le Monde April 10, 2004).

As the UMP was against Turkey’s accession and Chirac was alone in his support for Turkey’s accession into the EU, he put forward the idea of changing the constitution to allow a popular referendum on the issue at the end
of negotiations with Turkey to appease the UMP. Chirac was in favour of a debate on Turkey’s accession, but not a vote. Dominique Paillet, from the UMP, said that a “majority of the parliamentarians are against to Turkey’s EU membership. Debating is good, but real democracy would require a vote.” Laurent Fabius from the opposition socialists similarly pointed that “a vote on Turkey’s accession would be necessary” (French Lawmakers Debate Turkish EU Bid October 14, 2004). Public surveys in France also confirmed public opposition to Turkish accession, showing nearly 67% of the French disapproving Turkey’s membership. The reservations most commonly cited by the French voters are the risk of Turkish immigrants entering the EU job market, and the fact that most of Turkey's 70 million citizens are Muslims. (Henley December 15, 2004)

In the run up to October 2005, when the talks with Turkey was scheduled to begin, France, backed by Austria and Denmark proposed offering Turkey a ‘privileged partnership’ rather than full membership. After the commencement of accession talks, when Ankara refused to open its ports and airports to the planes and vessels of the Republic of Cyprus, Paris favoured suspension of 17 chapters with Turkey in the run up to the December 2006 EU Council. In brief, apart from President Chirac’s support for Turkey’s accession, the French attitude did not help Turkey’s policy shift on Cyprus as the UMP government favored a “privileged partnership” for Turkey rather than full membership.

### 2.3.5. The Other EU Members

In the course of 2002-4, Jan-Peter Balkenende, the EU President and Prime Minister of Netherlands and Ben Bot, Minister of Foreign Affairs, backed Turkey’s membership despite opposition from some cabinet members. Balkenende met with Schröder in Berlin to discuss the EU Council scheduled to be held on December 17, 2004 in Brussels. They mentioned that “Turkey will get a negotiation date with the aim of full membership, but the talks will be open-ended” (Hürriyet December 13, 2004). Ben Bot expressed that “the EU’s decision is not influenced by Turkey being a Muslim country. What only
matters is whether or not the Copenhagen Criteria is met.” (Doğan and Yağcı February 25, 2004). He said that “we will wait for the Commission’s report and act accordingly in Netherlands’ presidency as of June 2004.” (Doğan and Yağcı February 25, 2004). Bot also praised Turkey’s constructive stance on the Cyprus issue and underlined that “Cyprus is not a condition for membership as it is not part of the Copenhagen Criteria” (Doğan and Yağcı February 25, 2004).

In Italy, Prime Minister Berlusconi backed Turkey’s membership due to Turkey’s economic potential. In Spain, ex-Prime Minister Aznar (2000-2004) had mentioned that “the EU was not a Christian club.” (Hürriyet November 17, 2004). Zapatero, from the Spanish Socialist Workers Party, who was Prime Ministre from 2004-2011, also held to this line. King Juan Carlos also backed Turkey’s membership. There was not a polarization in society either. In Spain, both government and the opposition backed Turkey’s accession. In Poland, there was no concern among the Polish people that the Turkish membership would jeopardize a European identity. Both government and opposition presumed that Turkey’s membership into the EU would strengthen NATO. In Poland, the consolidation of the US’s position within the EU - Turkey is viewed as close to the US - is regarded as a reassurance against Russian influence. In Belgium, the social-liberal government indicated that it would back the advice of the European Commission. Ultra-rightist Vlaams Belang was against Turkey’s membership. There were grave reactions on the Flemish side. Portugal, Ireland, Hungary, Czech Republic, Finland, Estonia, Letonia, Lituania and Slovenia supported Turkey’s membership (Hürriyet November 17, 2004).

Throughout 2002-4, the Austrian Prime Minister and Minister of Domestic Affairs favoured a “privileged partnership” for Turkey. The Austrian Prime Minister Wolfgang Schüssel stated at a conference in February 2004 that “the decision about the beginning of negotiations with Turkey should be taken after the calculation of all the costs of Turkish membership” (Turkish Daily News February 25, 2004).
In Malta, Prime Minister Gonzi expressed that they would adopt the line of the Christian Union Parties in other European countries. Initially, Sweden criticized the EU’s pro-Turkish policy, but subsequently adopted it. Only the Social Democrats, who were concerned about the minority, especially the Kurdish rights in Turkey (Hürriyet November 17, 2004), criticized the opening of accession talks. Denmark regarded Turkey’s membership doubtfully for a long time. Both government and opposition were against Turkey’s membership. Slovakia and Luxembourg presumed that “the negotiations must be open-ended” (Hürriyet November 17, 2004).

In brief, throughout 2002-4, Germany, Britain, Italy, Spain and Greece backed Turkey’s membership. President Chirac in France and Prime Minister Balkanende in Netherlands supported Turkey’s accession, though they faced party divisions. While Austria and Denmark rejected Turkey’s membership, Swedish social democrats had some concerns as regards Turkey’s human rights record. Luxembourg and Slovakia expressed the view that the talks with Turkey should be open-ended. There was a propitious environment within the EU for Turkey’s membership prospect and a solution in Cyprus as the most significant actors in the EU supported Turkey and a solution in Cyprus. This situation empowered the Turkish government vis-a-vis its domestic dissidents of a settlement on the basis of the Annan Plan within Turkey.

Apart from Greece, none of the EU members had a preference for the type of a solution in Cyprus and they all backed the settlement initiatives of the UN. While France, Netherlands and Austria opposed Turkey’s accession, Britain, Italy, Spain and Poland remained advocates of Turkey’s membership. While the European Commission played the main role in evaluating Turkey’s performance in meeting the criteria in its Regular Reports, the opposition by some member states to Turkey’s accession made it uneasy for the Council to assume a clear stance as regards Turkish membership. This demonstrated that even in case of a settlement in Cyprus, Turkish accession would remain a controversial issue within the EU.
CHAPTER VIII: THIRD DETERMINANT: DECISION-MAKING PROCESS, HOW THE DECISION WAS MADE

1. Introduction

This chapter focuses on the interaction among the decision-making actors within Turkey, which led to the emergence of a new policy on Cyprus. Without such a propitious decision-making setting, a policy change on Cyprus would not have been possible. The chapter explains how such a propitious decision-making context enabled Erdoğan and Prime Minister Gül, who were convinced of the need for change, to alter Turkey’s Cyprus policy, to change Turkey’s Cyprus policy. Such a policy shift occurred after an interactive process with other actors in the decision-making structure of Turkey.

Through the differential empowerment of domestic actors in Turkey, the EU also helped to swing the domestic pendulum in favour of pro-EU actors and proponents of the Annan Plan. The EU’s differential empowerment of domestic actors within Turkey; which allowed the Turkish leadership - the AKP-led government and Erdoğan - to single-handedly implement a non-reversible change in Turkey’s Cyprus policy, will also be examined in this chapter as it is firmly intertwined with the decision making-process.

Differential empowerment refers to the degree to which the EU contributes to a change in domestic opportunity structures by redistributing power and resources between actor coalitions through the mechanism of Europeanization (Knill and Lehmkuhl 2002: 263). Within this framework, the EU empowered pro-EU actors such as the AKP and the TÜSİAD, which backed the EU process and the Annan Plan, and weakened the Euro-sceptic veto points, such as the military and other political parties in Turkey, which expedited a foreign policy change on Cyprus. Thus, the EU facilitated the emergence of a new equilibrium within Turkey that was in favour of the Annan Plan. In Cyprus, the EU stated that the progress of Turkey’s accession would be helped by a solution on the island, despite the fact that settlement was not a criteria. In this
way, the EU aimed to tip the domestic balance of power in Turkey in favour of the pro-settlement, pro-EU actors.

Rather than striving to have a direct impact on opportunity structures, the EU intends to alter the ‘cognitive input’ into these structures, changing expectations and beliefs of domestic actors in such a way as to promote domestic institutional change. European beliefs and ideas provide a ‘focal point’ of cooperation, perhaps even changing the position of domestic veto players, and thus securing the emergence of a dominant advocacy coalition consistent with EU ideas (Börzel and Risse 2003: 262-3).

With regard to Turkish foreign policy vis-à-vis Cyprus, there was no consensus among Turkey’s domestic political actors on the Cyprus issue and deviation from traditional policy did not resonate well with either Turkey’s political elite or public opinion. The overall lack of consensus allowed the EU to function as a focal point for domestic change by altering the cognitive input into existing opportunity structures, enabling the emergence of a dominant coalition advocating policy change and support for the Annan Plan. Weakened by the EU process, dissenting political actors were not equal to standing up to such a policy change. Thus, for all its reservations about the Annan Plan, the veto points remained silent.

The sensitive nature of the Cyprus issue within the Turkish domestic setting made policy change difficult. In Turkey, Cyprus was viewed as a ‘national cause’ by all the mainstream political parties and the Turkish civilian-military bureaucracy at large. The holders of this nationalist perspective believed, for the most part, that when the partnership state broke up in 1963, what emerged were two full-fledged, separate unitary states, each possessing the essential qualities of an independent nation under international law and that any pretence towards a solution on the island should be cognizant of the fact that there are two peoples on the island, each of whom is represented by a democratically elected government (Olgun 1999: 6-8). İnal Batu, CHP deputy and a senior diplomat, exemplified this mindset in a parliamentary speech. He stated that “Cyprus problem is above all a question of the right of self-
determination, social development, economic growth which is not recognised in the case of Turkish Cypriots. (TBMM Reports Journal December 22, 2003). Accordingly, advocates of this nationalist view have favoured a confederal, two-state solution rather than the federal solution contained in the UN parameters. Holders of the aforementioned viewpoint also believe that the EU has been exploiting the Cyprus issue in order to block Turkey’s accession and that even if the Cyprus dispute were to be settled, other obstacles would be placed in front of Turkey’s accession (Robins 2003: 83-4).

On the opposite side, proponents of change contend that the Annan Plan represented a balanced and just plan for the resolution of the Cyprus conflict that would unblock the road to EU accession for Turkey (Interview 16 September 6, 2011). Of the various political parties in Turkey, the AKP was the only party that rendered EU membership and a resolution on Cyprus among its leading objectives.

As will be analysed in detail, in northern Cyprus, the possibility of a settlement to the Cyprus discord, which would extricate Turkish Cypriots from international isolation and provide an EU membership prospect, functioned as a focal point of cooperation for the Turkish Cypriots and culminated in the emergence of a large coalition and public opinion against Denktash’s intransigent status quo-oriented policies on Cyprus.

The AKP’s 2002 Election Manifesto clearly expressed EU membership and solution of the Cyprus question as the party’s foreign policy priorities. Throughout November 2002 to April 2004, the Cyprus question was extensively discussed among the proponents of the Annan Plan on the one side, and dissidents of the plan on the other side. While Erdoğan, Gül, the business world and Mehmet Ali Talat were strongly pro-EU and pro-solution, Denktaş and political parties in Turkey were opposed to the acceptance of the Annan Plan. Sezer was skeptical about the plan. Özkök, on the other hand, assumed a neutral stance and declared that “it was the government to make the decision” after expressing the misgivings and concerns of the military (Birand April 15, 2003 ).
The members of the AKP, who were the modernizers and post-Islamists within the Islamist National View Movement, formed the AKP in 2001. As explained in Chapter VI in detail, the modernisers have undergone an ideational transformation as a consequence of policy failure, which led to the formation of post-Islamist AKP. The failure of the Islamists to obtain a considerable percentage of the votes and constant closure of the Islamist parties in Turkey by the Constitutional Court led the Islamists over the years to recognize the need for a re-consideration of the validity of their identity and politics. As a result, the modernizers, who were in favour of EU membership and thus were pro-settlement in Cyprus, emerged within the Islamist Movement.

I first analyze the abortive attempt by the AKP government to change Ankara’s Cyprus policy between November 2002 and March 2003 when Denktaş rejected the Annan Plan in the Hague on March 10, 2003. According to the model employed in this thesis, this policy failure was a consequence of a lack of a propitious decision-making context in this period despite the presence of components of leadership and EU dynamics. Subsequently, I move on to the successful policy shift in the course of December 2003 and April 2004 when the three components of the model in this thesis for a successful foreign policy alteration, leadership, the EU and propitious decision-making setting, converged.

1.1. An Abortive Attempt to Change the Cyprus Policy

The Copenhagen Presidency conclusions Paragraph 10 reads that Cyprus would be accepted as a member even without a settlement, the draft plan would be finalized by the parties by February 28, 2003 and it would be submitted to referenda on March 30, 2003 (Council of the European Union 2002). On February 26, 2003, UN Secretary General submitted the Annan III to the two Cypriots leaders, Papadopoulos (who replaced Clerides on February 16, 2003 after the presidential elections in the south) and Denktaş, and asked
them to decide whether to submit or not the plan to referenda and reply at the Hague meeting on March 10, 2003 (Pericleous 2009: 234-5).

To make a decision on Annan’s suggestion, a two-round summit at the Turkish President’s Palace regarding Cyprus was held and two decisions were taken. At the first round of the meeting on March 06, 2003, President Sezer, Prime Minister Gül, Chief of Staff Özkök and Foreign Minister Yaşar Yakış participated. At the second round, Denktaş and his delegation joined the first group. The final declaration of the meeting made clear that “the Annan Plan was inadequate to meet the concerns and expectations of the Turkish side and to put the plan to referendum is a decision to be taken by the Cypriot parties” (Hürriyet March 05, 2003). The declaration also underscored that “Turkey would continue to support and be in close cooperation with Denktaş in the national cause of Cyprus” (Ibid). All the influential-conservative circles in Turkey were opposed. Denktaş had the backing of the powerful military, which argued that "with this plan we cannot form a defensive line" (Birand February 28, 2003). President Sezer voiced his view that “one cannot get anywhere with this plan.” Some sections of the Foreign Ministry criticised the plan as "unacceptable" (Birand February 28, 2003).

On March 06, 2003, Denktaş addressed the Turkish Parliament and declared that “the plan will nullify the rights of the Turkish Cypriots and reduce their status into the level of the Palestinians in Israel” and advocated a confederal solution. He received a standing ovation from the Parliament, which issued a declaration giving unanimous support to Denktaş (Zaman March 7, 2003).

Erdoğan, on the other hand, backed the plan. He told the parliamentary group meeting of his AK Party that “it is natural that the document includes acceptable elements, as well as unacceptable elements but the plan aimed at soothing the worries and concerns of both sides on the island as much as possible” (Turkish Daily News February 26, 2003). He said “We are closer to an accord than ever.” He said “the UN plan is the best negotiable document ever submitted for a Cyprus deal” (Ibid). Erdoğan also underlined that “Denktaş has to remain at the negotiating table. He did not want Denktaş to be
seen as the party that rejected the plan. He said, "Let the Greek Cypriots reject it. You negotiate and seek a solution." (Turkish Daily News February 26, 2003).

Similar views were expressed by Erdoğan at his meeting with DenktAŞ in Ankara prior to the Hague meeting. At the meeting, Erdoğan indicated that “There is a problem in the island and it has to be solved. Non-solution curbs Turkey’s EU membership” (Milliyet March 7, 2003). DenktAŞ, on the other hand, mentioned that “The plan is unacceptable and imposition of it will lead to chaos”. But, he also added the “last word belongs to Turkey” (Ibid).

Erdoğan was not in a position to exert influence on the Turkish civilian-military bureaucracy. Erdoğan was not even Prime Minister due to his punishment on the grounds that he breached article 312 of the Turkish Penal Code because of a speech he delivered in Siirt in 1997. After a meeting on March 08, 2003, with Prime Minister Gül, Foreign Minister YakIŞ, Uğur Ziyal and foreign ministry bureaucrats, Erdoğan approved the decision to block the plan at the Hague (Milliyet March 09, 2003).

DenktAŞ returned from his consultations in Ankara with a free hand to pursue his confederalist policies at the Hague meeting on March 10, 2003. At the meeting while Papadopoulos conditionally agreed to put Annan III to a referendum, DenktAŞ flatly opposed, demanding recognition for the Turkish Cypriot state in the first place and thus altering the key parameters of the plan as mentioned by Annan in his report to the UNSC on April 1, 2003. To revive the plan, a new timetable was set by Annan. According to this new timetable, technical committees would complete their work by March 28, 2003. On the same day, the leaders would notify the Secretary General whether they are ready or not to hold the referendum on April 6, 2003. DenktAŞ did not accept this offer either (Hannay 2005: 216-7).

In the run up to the Hague meeting, the AKP had recently been elected to government in November 2002. Despite his persuasion that a solution was essential from the outset, Erdoğan did not feel himself powerful enough to
exert influence on the forceful Turkish civilian-military bureaucracy, which traditionally viewed Cyprus as a “national cause” and sought a “confederal settlement” in the island (Özcan 2010: 33). So, after a meeting with foreign ministry bureaucrats, he decided to go along with the Turkish bureaucracy.

According to the model employed in this thesis, despite the presence of the EU and leadership components, the decision-making context within Turkey was not propitious for the AKP government to force a policy change. Erdoğan did not want to engage in a head-on confrontation with the powerful Turkish civilian-military bureaucracy. At that stage, the AKP was a newly formed government, which was at the focus of the secular establishment. The AKP government was not powerful enough at that point to engage in a battle the Turkish bureaucracy.

Owing to the initially weak position of Erdoğan and his government, Turkey and the Turkish Cypriots missed a crucial opportunity, prior to the Hague meeting on March 10, 2003, to put substantial pressure on the Greek Cypriot side before it signed the Accession Treaty with the EU on April 16, 2003. The Annan II was rejected by TRNC Foreign Minister Tahsin Ertuğruloğlu (as Denktas refused to go to Copenhagen to negotiate the plan) on December 13, 2002 in Copenhagen and the Annan III was rejected by Denktas on March 10, 2003. With these rejections, the Greek Cypriots, outwardly reconcilable, obtained EU membership without a solution as the sole representative of the island by signing the Treaty of Accession with the EU on April 16, 2003.

1.2. Successful Foreign Policy Change on Cyprus

Upon the insistence of the AKP government to re-start the talks before the entry of the Republic of Cyprus into the EU on May 1, 2004, Annan sent a letter to the parties on February 4, 2004 to submit a fourth version of the plan in New York on February 10, 2004. At this stage, the US played an important role. Erdoğan convinced President Bush that Ankara sincerely desired a solution. Thereupon, Bush talked to Annan and voiced that “This is the great
moment for a solution in Cyprus. We will do whatever we can in our power to help find a settlement” (Milliyet February 5, 2004). Annan invited the parties to negotiations. It is argued that never before had a US President encouraged the UN Secretary General (Ibid).

After the meeting on February 10, 2004, the parties would finalize the plan by March 25, 2004 in Nicosia and if there still remained points of divergence by March 31, 2004, Annan, himself, would bridge these gaps. In contrast to the case of March 10, 2003, when Erdoğan did not push hard for the acceptance of the UN plan for Cyprus to avoid confrontation with the Turkish bureaucracy, this time, Erdoğan would be powerful enough to press for the acceptance of the Annan Plan in April 2004 after sufficiently consolidating power within the Turkish decision-making structure.

In contrast to previous talks, Denktaş did not have a free hand in New York. Newly elected pro-solutionist Prime Minister Mehmet Ali Talat (December 2003) was also a member of the negotiating team. For the first time, Ankara exerted forceful pressure on Denktaş to accept the plan. Erdoğan said that “It is out of question for Denktaş to retreat from the talks. Denktaş is given a road map. If he does not remain loyal to it, then the TRNC will pay the bill” (Milliyet February 11, 2004).

As this time both Ankara and Athens backed the initiative, Denktaş and Papadopolous, the two rejectionist leaders, grudgingly went to and committed themselves in New York to put the plan to simultaneous referenda on April 21, 2004 after a rapid negotiation process. If no agreement was reached until March 22, then Greece and Turkey would be brought into the process. If these four-party talks also do not produce the final text by March 29, Annan would fill in the blanks in the plan to be put to referenda (Anastasiou 2008: 128-9).

The talks commenced in Nicosia on February 19, 2004, but ended in failure by March 22. The talks were directed to Bürgenstock with the participation of Greece and Turkey, but again fell flat. Annan submitted the final (fifth) version of the plan on March 31, 2004 at the closing ceremony of the
Bürgenstock talks after filling the parts of the plan, where the parties could not come to an agreement. Denktas refused to go to Bürgenstock. M.A.Talat and Serdar Denktas, on the Turkish Cypriot side and Papadopoulos on the Greek Cypriot side, Foreign Ministers of Greece and Turkey, Petros Molyviatis and Abdullah Gul, the Prime Ministers of Greece and Turkey, Costas Karamanlis and Recep Tayyip Erdogan, and Kofi Annan were present. This final version of the plan was put to the vote on both sides of the island on April 24, 2004. While 65% of Turkish Cypriots accepted the plan, it was declined by 75% of Greek Cypriots.

At this last attempt to change Ankara’s Cyprus policy, all three components of the model used in this thesis converged. In the abortive initiative between November 2002 and March 2003, Erdogan, as the leader of the newly elected post-Islamist government, was not able to force a policy shift due to unpropitious decision-making setting. Between March 2003 and April 2004, on the other hand, a propitious decision-making moment emerged and enabled Erdogan to push for a policy shift on Cyprus. I will focus on how such a decision-making emerged by analyzing the positions of the decision-making actors thoroughly by drawing extensively on the primary sources.

2. The Political Actors

2.1. Erdogan and Gul

Erdogan and Gul were the primary actors in Turkey’s policy shift on Cyprus. For the first time in the history of the Cyprus problem, Denktas and his supporters appeared dissociated from Turkey’s national interests, as the AKP government was slowly in a process of re-defining its goals with regard to the opportunities provided by EU accession process. This called for regional stability, integration and peace rather than adversarial ethno-centric nationalism (Anastasiou 2008: 121).
Erdoğan was all along convinced that settlement of the Cyprus problem and Turkey’s EU aspirations were strongly intertwined. Even prior to his advent to power, he maintained that “the Annan Plan was a good opportunity for an abiding settlement on the island” and that Cyprus had become “an impediment for Turkey in all aspects” (Haber Vitrini 2002). Reading the government’s programme to the parliament right after the formation of the cabinet, he emphasised that a solution in Cyprus was a foreign priority mentioning that “the AKP government believes in the need to find a solution to the Cyprus dispute by all manner of means” (TBMM Reports Journal March 18, 2002).

In March 2003, Erdoğan laid out the government’s position publicly when he declared to the parliament that “We never support a policy of non-solution….. We are determined to find a settlement…. We find the Annan plan negotiable” (TBMM Reports Journal March 29, 2003). This new approach to the Cyprus discord was time and again repeated by Erdoğan. In December 2003, Erdoğan aired that “we sincerely believe that Cyprus question has to be settled. In this process, the mostly used concept by us has been solution” (TBMM Reports Journal December 24, 2003).

This approach was at loggerheads with the passive and status-quo oriented policies of the AKP’s predecessors. Following a meeting with British Prime Minister Tony Blair after the electoral victory of the AKP in November 2002, Erdoğan remarked that he had suggested a package for “the settlement of the ‘European Security and Defense Policy’ (ESDP), the date for initiation of EU-Turkish accession talks and the Cyprus problem”. Erdoğan also stated that, “Everywhere they travelled they faced the same approach, which was that without a solution of the Cyprus dispute, Turkey cannot obtain a negotiation date at the Copenhagen Summit” (Haber Vitrini 2002).

Erdoğan criticized the uncompromising and unconstructive attitude of the TRNC President and Prime Minister. When TRNC Prime Minister Eroğlu voiced that “the plan suggested by Annan is unacceptable” (Milliyet November 27, 2002), Erdoğan criticized him saying that “a politician’s task is not to produce problems, but rather to produce solutions” (Ibid). He underlined that the plan has to be negotiated and mentioned that “if a
politician keeps away from negotiations, then he does not have an argument” (Ibid). Erdoğan criticized Denktaş’s intransigent stance on the Cyprus issue. Erdoğan mentioned that “It is evident that there is a problem in Cyprus that has to be addressed. Turkish side should not avoid from sitting at the negotiation table and setting forth its arguments. If you advocate your interests unilaterally, you could never reach a solution” (Milliyet January 4, 2003). Finally, Erdoğan called on the UN Secretary General to re-start the talks at their meeting in Davos in January 2004. Upon Erdoğan’s urgency Annan invited the parties to re-start the talks. This process eventually led to the emergence of the final Annan Plan (TBMM Reports Journal April 06, 2004).

Besides Erdoğan, Foreign Minister Abdullah Gül backed a solution on the basis of the Annan Plan. He endeavoured to convince the public opinion and other significant foreign policy decision-making actors in favour of the Annan Plan. In a parliamentary intervention after the advent to power of the AKP, Gül underlined that the need to find a solution to the Cyprus discord as soon as possible mentioning that “the Helsinki summit of 1999 as well as Copenhagen summit of 2002 made clear that without a solution in Cyprus, Turkey would not be granted a date to begin accession talks with the EU” (TBMM Reports Journal December 17, 2002). Upon the pronouncement of Denktaş that “the Annan Plan is unacceptable”, Gül emphasized that “we will definitely negotiate the Annan Plan and there is no other way as by May 2004 we will find an officially recognized state by the EU and the TRNC will not profit by anything” (Hürriyet December 29, 2003).

Gül said that Romano Prodi, the President of the European Commission, ensured the Turkish government that the accord to be reached in Cyprus would be rendered congruent with EU law. Praising the compromising stance of Denktaş in New York in February 10, 2004, Gül stated “one day Denktaş will be the President of Cyprus” (Zaman February 15, 2004). At a parliamentary delivery, Gül publicly laid out the government’s standpoint in favour of a solution on Cyprus. Gül mentioned that “We saw that Greek Cypriot side would be a member of the EU and no one could stop this. Willingly or unwillingly Cyprus question and Turkey’s accession process into the EU has
become directly interlinked. So, settlement of the Cyprus dispute prior to the entry of the Greek Cypriot Administration into the EU on May 01, 2004 has become indispensable for the protection of the interests of Turkey and the TRNC” (TBMM Reports Journal February 17, 2004).

On the issue of Turkey’s guarantorship, one of Turkey’s overriding concerns in a Cyprus settlement, Gül stated that “our guarantorship in Cyprus continues with fidelity. We told in Switzerland that we would not make any concessions on this issue”. Gül also disavowed the allegations as regards the settlement of 100,000 Greek Cypriots in the north according to the accord (Zaman April 6, 2004).

In April 2004, speaking at the parliament to the members of his party, Gül emphasized the heavy burden on Turkey caused by the outlays for the maintenance of the TRNC economy (Milliyet April 7, 2004). In support of the Annan Plan, Gül stated that “if Greek Cypriots agree and we will also agree to the plan, we will first demand the lifting of the embargo on and later we will seek recognition for the TRNC” (Milliyet April 19, 2004).

In this sense, Erdoğan and Gül emerged as the most important actors in favour of a policy shift on Cyprus. After an interactive learning process, they managed to convince the other decision-making actors and public opinion that a policy shift was necessary. After this process, Erdoğan was able to make the decision to change Ankara’s Cyprus policy.

2.2. The Business Elite

The business world since late 1990s openly backed a solution on the basis of the Annan Plan and the position of Erdoğan and Gül on Cyprus. On the whole, the dynamic and innovative big business, principally TÜSİAD and the Turkish Union of Chambers and Bursaries (TOBB), have begun to play major roles in national politics since the 1990s. In the early 1990s, TÜSİAD was a leader in pressing for legal and institutional reforms in Turkey, with the aim of
enhancing the institutional capacity of the Turkish economy. Since then, TÜSİAD has, under the slogan ‘less geopolitics, more economics’, advocated Turkey’s integration with the international economic system and membership in the EU. The group has also become the greatest champion of the government with regard to its acceptance of the Annan Plan for Cyprus (G. Özcan 2010: 32-3).

Accompanied by other liberal institutions like the Economic Development Foundation (İKV) and the Turkish Economic and Social Studies Foundation (TESEV), TÜSİAD buckled down to lobbying Brussels to grant EU candidacy status to Turkey and strove to manipulate public opinion prior to the EU Helsinki Summit in December 1999 through the print and broadcast media as well as the internet (Eryılmaz 2007: 42). The decision taken at the summit to grant Turkey candidate status represented the genuine culmination of TÜSİAD’s efforts to firmly tie EU conditionality to democratic reforms in Turkey.

Transnational business elites, including both domestic and international investment communities, started to view EU membership as an instrument that could be used to strengthen the Turkish economy (Öniş 2003: 14-5). While the industrialists were urgently in favour of integrating the Turkish economy with the global economy, their line of thought had become increasingly at variance with that of the military. Thus, the TÜSİAD became the leading champion of the AKP government against the military, the judiciary and others in a broad Euro-sceptic opposition (Uğur and Yankaya 2008: 589-93). The AKP’s post-election program and action plan, which prioritized EU membership and settlement of the Cyprus dispute and emphasized constitutional and legal reforms in Turkey in line with EU norms, sharply contrasted with the previous half-hearted efforts of the DSP-ANAP-MHP coalition government to meet the Copenhagen Criteria. As a result, TÜSİAD viewed the AKP government as an opportunity for political stability and social transformation in Turkey, and the period between 2001 and 2004 was one of cooperation between big business and the government. The TÜSİAD backed the AKP’s initiative by lobbying and advising in favour of EU membership and a settlement in Cyprus. The
TÜSİAD organized conferences on the benefits of accession into the EU and backed AKP’s efforts largely by using the media.

With regard to Cyprus, whereas the military favoured maintaining the status quo on the basis of two separate states, from the early 2000s onwards, Turkey’s business elite had begun to question the military’s strategic calculations and unconditional support for the intransigent policies of Rauf Denktaş. In November 2001, when the Turkish Cypriot leader turned down UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan’s call for resumption of negotiations, he was avowedly criticized by TÜSİAD Chairman Tuncay Özilhan, who asserted that “the country’s destiny was blocked.” (G. Özcan 2010: 33)

In December 2001, the statement of Foreign Minister İsmail Cem that “Turkey could soon come to a point to take a "costly decision" on Cyprus and integrate the TRNC with Turkey in case of accession of the Republic of Cyprus into the EU” (Turkish Daily News January 6, 2002) stirred up a heated national debate whether or not Turkey should sacrifice Cyprus for the sake of its EU bid. When Şükrü Sina Gürel, the state minister in charge of Cyprus affairs, voiced that "There is no price Turkey could not pay for Cyprus” (Ibid), the TÜSİAD came into the battle calling on the Ankara government to stick to its EU membership bid and not to support "uncompromising Denktaş" as he was blocking Turkey’s path to the EU with his “intransigence”. It was the first time in Turkey that a prominent group was moving away from the official Cyprus policy and taxing the Turkish Cypriot leader, revered throughout Anatolia as the most trusted statesman (Ibid).

In 2002, the TÜSİAD once again fell to campaigning for settlement of the Cyprus dispute, launching a persistent media campaign that called into question the policy of maintaining the status quo and playing on the economic prospects of EU membership to convince policymakers and public opinion (Öniş 2003: 13). In December 12, 2002 and January 14, 2003, Turkish Cypriots held demonstrations in support of a settlement for the Cyprus problem. The demonstrations were backed by non-governmental organizations, including the Turkish Cypriot Chamber of Commerce, which
was in close contact with TÜSİAD (Dodd 2010: 228). TÜSİAD also laid out policy documents in favour of a new approach on Cyprus, as an array of seminars were organized and regular reports published on the issue by the Turkish Economic and Social Studies Foundation (TESEV), and several conferences on Cyprus were held at various Turkish universities. Against this background, a media debate among journalists, diplomats, generals, businessmen and others generated a convenient environment for contesting Turkey’s traditional Cyprus policy and airing new ideas with respect to a settlement (Kemal Kirişçi 2006a: 45).

During the process that led up to Ankara’s acceptance of the Annan Plan, TÜSİAD, along with TESEV and the Economic Development Foundation (İKV), were probably the most effective non-governmental organizations to influence Turkish politics, as they made use of the media to bolster political and economic reforms (Öniş 2003: 13-4). According to these groups, the risks stemming from economic instability could be much more detrimental to Turkey than the traditional military-security threats (Aybet 2006: 544-5). Furthermore, the Separate Association of Independent Businessmen (MÜSİAD), representing small and medium-sized business corporations owned by observant Muslims and dispersed throughout Anatolia, changed their former anti-EU stance in favour of integration with the EU and the global market economy, which aligned with their business interests and quest for domestic stability (Robins 2003: 86-7: Ayata 2004: 264-5). It is noteworthy that not only big business, as represented by TÜSİAD, but also smaller-scale businesses converged on the aim of EU membership. These circles were empowered by the EU’s pre-accession process to push for their own interests and consequently for a foreign-policy change on Cyprus.

At the conference on “European Security and Turkey” organized by TÜSİAD, the University of Bosphorus and University of Birmingham in Istanbul in April 2004, Ömer Sabancı, the President of the executive board of the TÜSİAD, stated that,

“we back and congratulate the political will and initiative demonstrated by the Turkish government and the Turkish Cypriot government. We
hope that a positive vote will emerge from the referendum on April 24 and the United Cyprus will accede to the EU on May 1. A solution in Cyprus is exceedingly important for Turkey’s EU process and will pave the way for growing levels of prosperity, investment and trade in Cyprus” *(Hürriyet April 03, 2004)*.

TOBB, İKV, İSO (İstanbul Chamber of Commerce), TÜSİAD, MÜSİAD and many other business institutions announced in April 2004 that,

“the Turkish Cypriots will either say “no” to the Annan Plan and remain as an unrecognized state and maintain a life politically and economically isolated from the world anxious for their future or say “yes” and become a politically equal member of the United Cyprus, protecting their sovereignty and identity, become EU citizens and find the opportunity to integrate with the world” *(Hürriyet April 14, 2004b)*.

In the course of 2002 and 2004, the Turkish business elite, composed of TOBB, İKV, İSO (İstanbul Chamber of Commerce), TÜSİAD, MÜSİAD and many other business institutions, emerged as the biggest champion of a settlement in Cyprus and Turkey’s EU membership bid. The business sector used a persistent media campaign that called into question the policy of maintaining the status quo and underlined the economic prospects of EU membership to convince policymakers and public opinion. The business elite also organized several seminars and conferences and laid out regular reports playing to the favourable aspects of a solution in the island. The business sector contributed to the emergence of a vibrant media debate on the Cyprus question among journalists, diplomats, generals, businessmen and others, which generated a convenient environment for expression of a new outlook on the Cyprus dispute. However, while the business elite was an influential actor, it helped frame the issue and create circumstances that encouraged change rather than being directly involved in the decision-making process.
2.3. The Military

Another effective political actor in the run up to the referenda on the Annan Plan was the military, which disputed a policy shift on Cyprus. For the most part, the Turkish military was highly politicized. Known to be rigorously loyal to the Kemalist principles of laicism and nationalism, it viewed itself as the guardian of Turkey’s laic structure as well as its territorial integrity. Up until early 2000s, the military had been highly autonomous of governmental and legislative control and had had a major impact on decisions related to national defence and security through its forceful presence in the National Security Council (MGK), where important decisions with regard to Turkey’s domestic and external affairs were discussed and taken. Terzi maintains that the MGK had been the chief institution involved in determining Turkish security policy as well as foreign-policy matters with a security aspect, such as Cyprus, Greek-Turkish relations, northern Iraq, Syria and Israel (Terzi 2005: 127).

Alongside its role in the Turkish decision-making structures, the Turkish military had also had a socio-historical role as a guide among the Turkish society, who treated the military as the most esteemed institution in Turkey. In this sense, its decisions on matters related to Turkey’s foreign policy and security were taken seriously by the society (Yavuz 2009: 272-3). Loyal to the ancient regime, the military held a nationalistic view with regard to Cyprus. The Turkish Armed Forces General Staff had serious misgivings as regards the protection of interests of both Turkey and the Turkish Cypriots under the Annan Plan.

However, with the acceleration of the globalization and Europeanization processes in Turkey, the military’s prominent position in Turkey’s domestic framework had begun to recede. Between the AKP’s advent to power in November 2002 and the commencement of EU accession talks in October 2005, the JDP’s democratic mandate served as a forceful motive behind the government’s eagerness to cut back the political prerogatives and tutelage of the Turkish military as part of the EU accession process (Cizre 2007: 132-3).
During this period, the Turkish high command came to understand that to perpetuate its traditional approach of wielding political sway on policy might harm its own corporate interests. Under the circumstances, the military faced two options: either to confront a highly popular government with a highly popular EU project or settle for losing some degree of its power. This pragmatic approach accounts for the military’s reticence in the face of curtailment of some level of its power (Cizre 2007: 141).

The guiding role of the military had also changed towards the new bourgeoisie. The new vanguard of transformation was the evolving bourgeoisie rather than the military. The new class of intellectuals who were sponsored by the new bourgeoisie and worked outside the state institutions redefined the political language in Turkey in pursuant to global discourses of human rights, democracy and market economy (Yavuz 2009: 272-3). Consequently, the Turkish people were no longer a subject defined by the state, but an object, who desired to define its own destiny. This new search called for a new social contract and redefinition of the role of the military in Turkish society and the rigid Kemalist public philosophy (Yavuz 2009: 272-3).

In addition to the waning sociological power base of the military, the AKP government after its advent to power in 2002 was intent on altering the epicenter of Turkish politics from the civil-military bureaucracy towards civil society (Cizre 2007: 134-5). In line with this vision, the AKP government passed the democratic package of August 2003 that tilted the civilian-military balance in favor of the civilians. The package underscored the advisory nature of the NSC decisions; increased the civilian members to a majority voting position by incorporating the deputy prime minister and the minister of justice in addition to the extant prime minister, ministers of national defence, interior and foreign affairs; cut down the number of times the NSC meets from monthly to bimonthly, allowed greater parliamentary scrutiny of the military budget, decreased the NSC’s budget by 60 percent and removed the confidentiality rule surrounding the activities of the NSC by stipulating that a
new bylaw be passed on the rules and regulations of the NSC (Cizre 2007: 137-8).

After the mid-2000s, the military came to the conclusion that an expanded role for the military, let alone military interventions, are not panacea for the ills of democracy. At least the high command under the leadership of Özkök, who replaced Hüseyin Kıvrıkoğlu as the Chief of Staff, is of the opinion that they should start having more faith in people judgement, and thus, Kemalism too should be reinterpreted in a more liberal direction (Heper 2005: 227). Özkök, was quick to realize the evolving environment within Turkey. In contrast to his predecessor Kıvrıkoğlu, who was an isolationist, Özkök was a pro-EU and democratically minded commander (Ker-Lindsay 2005: 6). He discerned that the Turkish Armed Forces had to stop expressing views on and interfering in every matter of national importance, which was eliciting growing reaction from the public opinion and had to adjust itself to the changing circumstances similar to that of a military of a European state (İlnur Çevik April 14, 2004). Despite contrary voices within the military, who held fast to the traditional confederalist line in Cyprus, and despite his own misgivings as regards the Annan Plan, Hilmi Özkök, the Chief of Staff, opted to leave the last word to the government after expressing his concerns on the plan.

Instead of the traditional military viewpoint, Özkök strove to bring a new vision to the Turkish Armed Forces in line with contemporary conditions. He showed the Turkish Parliament as the supreme power in Turkey as the elected representatives of the people and made clear that the army would not strive to interfere in areas within the remit of the politicians (İlnur Çevik April 14, 2004). He thought that “the political decisions had to be taken by the politicians and the military had to do what was required from it.” He did not talk much and did not want anybody from his headquarters to talk. He made clear that when there was a need to talk on behalf of the Turkish Military Forces it was him (Birand April 15, 2003 ) Unlike President Sezer and some other commanders, he did not dismiss the Annan Plan out of hand even if he discerned the drawbacks of the plan and voiced them. He assumed a flexible stance and focused on Turkey’s long-term interests. He preferred
reconciliation and rational approaches rather than confrontation, threats and altercation (Ibid).

This did not mean that the military in general and Özkök in particular did not have concerns regarding the Annan Plan. Özkök said in January 2003 that “acceptance of the Annan Plan will weaken the position of the Turkish Cypriots and will infer the incarceration of the Turks in Anatolia” (Milliyet January 27, 2003). In January 2003, General Aytaç Yalman, the commander of the Turkish Land Forces, visited Cyprus to demonstrate the support of the Turkish military for President Denktaş. He was criticized by Erdoğan on January 24 in Davos due to his lack of political will to settle the Cyprus discord. Yalman told reporters during a call to the office of President Denktaş that “the revised UN plan for a settlement on Cyprus could land the island in violence reminiscent of the 1963 era” (Turkish Daily News January 28, 2003). He also mentioned that “Denktaş has the confidence and full support of the Turkish nation and his handling of the Cyprus problem is appreciated” (Ibid). Yalman also underlined that “the UN plan includes unacceptable components and seriously threatens Turkey's vital interests on the eastern Mediterranean island” (Ibid).

In April 2004, Özkök stated that “for the first time there emerged a disagreement on the national cause” (Hürriyet April 13, 2004). He mentioned that “the Turkish Armed Forces expressed its views and suggestions with regard to the settlement of the Cyprus issue at the MGK meetings on January 23, 2004 and April 5, 2004 and submitted in writing on February 15, March 9, and March 28, 2004 to the Prime Ministry. This does not amount to a convergence on every matter including the decision to authorize the UN Secretary General with the power of arbitration going beyond the decision of the January 23, 2004 MGK meeting.” Özkök said that “the plan contains pros and cons and has the potential to give rise to troubles in the implementation stage” (Ibid). He said that “while having positive aspects, the Annan Plan fails to satisfy some of the demands by Turkey” (Turkish Daily News April 14, 2004). The most significant deficiency of the Annan Plan, according to Özkök, was the lack of permanent derogations on the part of the Turkish Cypriots.
Özkök stated that the derogations, which aim at safeguarding the Turkish Cypriot constituent state, should be incorporated into EU primary law. Failure to do this could imperil the presence of the Turkish Cypriots and the maintenance of bi-zonality in the island. Özkök said that “the best way to do this is the ratification of the derogations in the national parliaments of each member state” (Ibid).

Speaking for the General Staff, Özkök stated that “there are favourable and unfavourable points in the Annan Plan. We respect the view among our people that the Turkish Armed Forces should express its opinion plainly in every important matter. However, the military should not be expected to take sides and share its opinion on each matter with the public opinion. It is inappropriate for me to say yes or no for the referendum on the Annan Plan” (Hürriyet April 12, 2004).

In April 2004, Özkök talked at a special press conference on the Annan Plan and demonstrated his new vision for the Turkish Armed Forces to embrace contemporary values. He made it clear that the military was not intent on meddling in politics any more. He said that “Turkish Cypriot people will decide their fate free of any outside pressures and that the supreme power in Turkey is the Turkish Parliament as the elected representatives of the people to decide whether or not our country should approve the Cyprus solution” (İlnur Çevik April 14, 2004), showing all the traits of a commander of a democratic Western country. There was also a mentality change in the military where the new generation commanders backed reforms and progress. Özkök underlined that the military was concerned with issues related to the security, law and order in the Annan Plan demonstrating that the military had defined its areas of authority and remit and would not strive to interfere in other areas as was the case in the past (Ibid).

Özkök, as the head of the most esteemed Turkish institution, showed considerable forethought. He was cognizant of the emerging forceful civil society composed of Anatolian entrepreneurs, Kurds, Alevi, neo-Islamic movements and large segments of the Turkish society, who do not desire the
military to meddle in politics, but confine itself to Turkey’s defense against external threats. Özkök brought a new vision to the Turkish Armed Forces. He criticized the Annan Plan, but refrained from taking sides. He indicated the pros and cons of the plan and made it clear that “the military would not interfere in such a decision.” His impartial stance strengthened the hands of the government. There were rumours that the Ground Forces and Gendarmerie as well as some retired generals were resisting the plan. However, Özkök dexterously manipulated the resistance within the military. He discerned where Turkey’s long-term interests lay and worked in harmony with the government. Özkök remarked to the opposition within the military that such a “decision is to be taken by the government” and “the military should not exceed the line of expressing its views” (Birand April 03, 2004). Such a conciliatory stance on the part of the military, the most esteemed institution in Turkey, played into the hands of Erdoğan.

2.4. President Sezer

President Ahmet Necdet Sezer, who was a resolute guardian of the Atatürkist laicist state, popular with the military, and an advocate of Denktaş’ stance on the island was another weighty actor with regard to the decision on the Annan Plan. He was plainly opposed to the acceptance of the plan, but after comprehensive discussions throughout the 2003 and early months of the 2004, he was somewhat persuaded by the favourable aspects of the Annan Plan and his stance moderated.

Sezer, concerned about a policy shift on Cyprus after the advent to power of the AKP, asked the two leaders in the Parliament, Erdoğan and Baykal, in November 2002 to deliver a joint pronouncement expressing that “Cyprus could not be sacrificed in return for a date to commence accession talks with the EU” (Milliyet November 07, 2002). Sezer made another bid on December 18, 2002, and convened Denktaş, Turkish Cypriot Foreign Minister Tahsin Ertuğruloğlu, Permanent Secretary to the Turkish Cypriot Presidency Ergün Olgun, Prime Minister Gül, Chief of Staff Özkök, Foreign Minister Yaşar
Yakış and Permanent Secretary at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs Uğur Ziyal. The meeting at the Presidential Palace reaffirmed no change in Turkish position on Cyprus. The target remained to reach a 'mutually acceptable' negotiated settlement on the basis of 'two equal sovereign states'. Sezer also expressed his backing for Denktash (Turkish Daily News December 19, 2002).

President Sezer, speaking at the opening speech of the second legislative year in 2003, expressed full support for Denktash and the TRNC. Sezer applauded Denktash’s determination in protecting the equal and sovereign rights of the Turkish Cypriots. Sezer also aired that “an endurable solution is unlikely in Cyprus unless the presence of the TRNC is disregarded in the island” demonstrating his open backing for a confederal settlement in Cyprus (TBMM Reports Journal October 01, 2003).

President Sezer, in his 2004 New Year message, underlined that “a settlement in Cyprus could be achieved on the basis of the existing realities on the island, a phrasing associated with Denktash and a confederal solution, and also by benefiting from the steps taken by the Turkish Cypriot side” (Dodd 2010: 240-1), amounting to the recognition of the two states in Cyprus. On January 8, 2004, a meeting was held under the chairmanship of President Sezer with the participation of the Foreign Minister Abdullah Gül and high-level civilian and military officials. The brief statement after the meeting once again announced that a solution should take into account the realities on the island (Dodd 2010: 240-1).

Similarly, President Sezer, in his April 15, 2004 speech to the military personnel of the Turkish Armed Forces at the War Academy Headquarters in İstanbul, criticized the government, alleging that it had acted in contravention of the decision of the National Security Council of January 23, 2004 when Erdoğan agreed with Annan in Davos at the World Economic Forum on January 24, 2004 to put the Annan Plan to a referendum in the TRNC (İlnur Çevik April 16, 2004). The fact that Erdoğan was able to carry through in the face of opposition from both the president and the MGK, traditionally two of the important actors in Turkish foreign policy-making is evidence that these actors were no longer had the power to counteract the prime minister and that
MGK resolutions were no longer a priority in the government’s foreign and security policy conduct.

On April 5, 2004, in the MGK meeting that was convened for the purpose of evaluating the Annan Plan, harsh discussions had taken place between President Sezer and the military members of the MGK on one side and Prime Minister Erdoğan and the government members on the other (Şık Aralık 15, 2011). The final announcement of the meeting underlined that the presence of the Turkish population in Cyprus, Turkey’s guarantorship and bi-zonality should not be compromised and pointed to the eventual unfavourable consequences of the implementation of the plan. However, it made clear that the responsibility for the initiation of the process for the formalization of the Annan Plan is within the government’s remit (Zaman April 06, 2004).

Sezer’s earlier comments and pronouncements on the Annan Plan in 2002 reflect a more radical and uninformed stance on the Annan Plan and was a reflection of Denktaş’s position. At this stage, he unreservedly backed Denktaş’s confederalist policies in Cyprus. However, his stance started to moderate when the referendum on the Annan Plan was drawing near due to discussion of the Cyprus issue on a daily basis throughout 2003 and early 2004. As a member of the MGK meetings, Sezer became more acquainted with the various aspects of a solution in Cyprus, including Turkey’s EU accession process. Over time his speeches on the Annan Plan became more informed and sophisticated. In the later stages, instead of dismissing the plan out of hand, he rather emphasized the drawbacks of the plan, such as the safeguarding of the bi-zonality and the status of the Turkish Cypriots.

Speaking about the method of Annan’s authorization to fill in the gaps in April 2004, Sezer assumed that not only the dissidents of the Annan Plan, but also the proponents of it enjoyed good intentions. Sezer underlined the interim nature of “the limitations imposed on Greek Cypriots on property purchases and length of stay in the north” (Balcı April 19, 2004). He emphasized the temporary nature of the derogations and eventuality of dilution of the agreement by the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR) and the
European Union Court of Justice (ECJ) decisions as the deficiencies of the plan. He stated that "when the derogations end, there is the possibility of Greek Cypriot contestation of the derogations at ECJ and the ECHR" (Balcı April 19, 2004). Sezer, like Özkök, offered the ratification of the agreement by each and every EU member Parliament, in order to turn the derogations into EU primary law (Balcı April 19, 2004), which also demonstrates the mutual learning process and level of convergence among the members of the decision unit on the Cyprus issue.

Unlike Denktaş, who asserted that the Annan Plan was “diabolical and would lead to the extermination of the Turkish Cypriots” (Hürriyet April 14, 2004a), Sezer put forward suggestions to overcome the deficiencies of the plan. He offered ratification of the accord by each and every EU member Parliament, in order to turn the derogations into EU primary law rather than ruling out the plan out of hand. He stated in April 2004 that a crossroads was reached as regards the national cause of Cyprus and the issue was comprehensively discussed in an unprecedented and vibrant environment. He offered a critical and sceptical approach to the matter. Recognising the need to make compromises to reach a settlement, he also underscored that “not every goal and result is obtainable in a negotiation process” (Ibid).

This demonstrates Sezer’s learning process in interaction with other decision-making actors, who advocated a settlement on the island along the lines of the Annan Plan. Uğur Ziyal was notably important in this learning process and the emergence of a relative consensus on Turkey’s decision to accept the Annan Plan. Sezer and Özkök voiced similar concerns as regards the plan indicating the plan was extensively discussed in the MGK meetings of January 23 and April 5, 2004 and a certain degree of convergence was reached with regard to the pros and cons of the plan. This is also discernible in the moderation of Sezer’s stance in relation to the plan.
2.5. Political Parties

Alongside the president, Denktas’s position in Cyprus was backed by all the political parties in and outside the Turkish parliament, save the AKP, as well as distinguished political personalities, including former Prime Ministers Bülent Ecevit and Süleyman Demirel. The AKP government often came under criticism of the other political parties as regards its new policy on Cyprus. The CHP, the only opposition party at the parliament at the time, took the lead in this process in opposing the policies of the government. Haşim Oral, deputy of the CHP from the city of Denizli, the only party at the parliament at the time, plainly expressed the party’s opposition to the Annan Plan when he criticized Erdoğan’s backing for the Annan Plan. He aired that “we are disturbed by the fact that Erdoğan backs Annan’s plan, forces the Turkish Cypriots to a deal and puts Denktas in an uneasy situation” (TBMM Reports Journal February 26, 2003). Haluk Koç, CHP deputy from the city of Samsun, criticized the Cyprus policy of the AKP government mentioning that “with the coming of the AKP government to office, Ankara’s traditional Cyprus policy is damaged.” Koç also praised Denktas’s stance on the Cyprus question airing that “the AKP government blames Denktas, whom we have recently listened here proudly for being intransigent.” (TBMM Reports Journal March 21, 2003).

Similarly, Onur Öymen, a senior diplomat and a deputy of the CHP responsible for the foreign affairs, plainly portrayed the position of the CHP when he criticized the AKP government’s Cyprus policy at the Turkish Parliament. He accentuated that “Turkey held out in the face of pressures and embargoes for years on the Cyprus issue. But, the AKP government could not offer resistance against the divide and rule policies.” Declaring the Plan as “unacceptable”, Öyemen stated that it “could create grave security risks for the Turkish Cypriots.” (TBMM Reports Journal March 26, 2003). At a later stage of the negotiations, two CHP deputies, Kemal Anadol (deputy from the city of İzmir) and Ali Topuz (deputy from the city of İstanbul) qualified “the entitlement of UN Secretary General to fill in the parts where the parties could
not converge and submission of the plan to referenda” as acts of unilateral concession and wrong policies on the part of the AKP government (TBMM Reports Journal February 10, 2004).

Even Turkish opposition parties without representatives in the parliament lined up in demonstrations to rally against the Annan Plan. On April 15, 2004, just prior to the referendum in the TRNC, Denktaş delivered a declamation in the Turkish parliament to express his concerns regarding the drawbacks of the Annan Plan entailed for the Turkish Cypriots. During his allocution, present to support Denktaş were not only the deputies of the main opposition Republican People’s Party, but also the Nationalist Movement Party Chairman Devlet Bahçeli, Islamist Felicity Party Leader Recai Kutan and former deputies from both parties (neither of which had deputies in parliament at the time), and former Prime Minister Bülent Ecevit, chairman of the Democratic Left Party and architect of the 1974 military intervention in Cyprus, as well as former Democratic Left Party deputies (Balcı April 19, 2004).

After Denktaş’s speech to the parliament, the leaders of the political parties strongly backed Denktaş, who condemned the Annan Plan as a document cutting Turkey off from the island and paving the way to the extermination of the Turkish Cypriots. Ecevit said “Denktaş drew a very realistic picture of the situation in Cyprus and he explained the dangers the Turkish Cypriots face” (Turkish Daily News April 17, 2004). Bahçeli said that "I agree with every sentence and every word he said in his address. Denktaş is not alone. The Turkish nation is with him” (Turkish Daily News April 17, 2004). Kutan said “Denktaş explained the traps against the Turkish Cypriots, adding he hoped that Turkish Cypriots would reject the plan” (Turkish Daily News April 17, 2004). Leader of the Grand Unity Party (BBP) stated that "A possible murder to be committed by the Western world together with Greece and Greek Cypriots could only be encumbered by rejecting the plan” (Turkish Daily News April 17, 2004).

The mainstream political parties held to the old notion of foreign policy based on security considerations, and advocated the confederalist line of Denktaş.
However, they were ineffective in mobilizing the public opinion against the plan nor did they take part in the decision-making process. This was because of the fact that Erdoğan had a strong majority in the parliament. The AKP government was also empowered by the EU membership process, which also weakened the veto points, such as the military.

2.6. The Advent to Power of the CTP-DP Coalition

The election of a new conciliatory government in the TRNC on December 14, 2003 was also an important development that empowered the AKP government. The Turkish Cypriots came to believe that a settlement would extricate them from international isolation. The EU membership prospect functioned as a focal point of cooperation for the Turkish Cypriots and a large coalition and public opinion emerged against Denktas’s intransigent status quo-oriented policies on Cyprus. He was facing growing rebellion against his rule. Turkish Cypriots were tired of international isolation and wanted to be part of the EU (Ker-Lindsay 2005: 6). In December 12, 2002 and January 14, 2003, Turkish Cypriots held massive demonstrations against the hard-line policies of Denktas. The December 14, 2003 parliamentary elections in the north turned into a campaign of approval or rejection of the Annan Plan and EU membership. The Turkish Republican Party led by Talat, the Peace and Democracy Movement led by Mustafa Akinci and the Solution and the EU Party led by Ali Erel formed an alliance on September 4, 2003, to fight on a collective goal. This was ousting of Denktas from the position of negotiator and reaching a settlement on the basis of the Annan Plan that would allow a unified Cyprus to accede to the EU (Christou 2004: 158-9).

Consequently, the December 14, 2003 parliamentary elections differentiated the political forces favouring a solution to the Cyprus dissension from the secessionist nationalist forces favouring the perpetuation of the status quo. Pro-solution parties could not set up their own government nor relieve Denktas of his duties as negotiator. Nonetheless, anti-Denktas votes for the first time exceeded the 50% mark signalling a fundamental paradigm shift in
The north (Anastasiou 2008: 117-9). The liberal/leftist Republican Turkish Party won the elections by garnering 35.18% of the votes and the Democratic Party of Serdar Denktas, who was not so much against the Annan Plan, won 12.93% of the votes and pro-Annan Plan Peace and Democracy Movement got 13.14% of the votes. The Republican Turkish Party and the Democratic Party formed a coalition government.

The electoral victory of the pro-settlement moderates in the TRNC gave Erdogan important political leverage to curb opposing nationalists among the political establishment and the Turkish military, in which reformists were also gaining ground. With the advent to power of a pro-solution government in the north, the AKP government announced that it accepted the Annan Plan as a framework for a final solution of the Cyprus discord. After the December 14, 2003 elections in the TRNC, when Denktas criticized the Annan Plan, he was reprimanded by the AKP government. This open confrontation further undermined the discredited Denktas in the eyes of public opinion (Anastasiou 2008: 122).

While Rauf Denktas argued that “the Annan Plan is not compatible with the good offices mission of the UN Secretary General and places Cyprus under the Greek Cypriot rule. With limited rights given to the Turkish Cypriots, an agreement based such a plan, would over time reduce the latter’s status into a minority” (TBMM Reports Journal March 06, 2003). The newly elected coalition leaders, Prime Minister Talat and Serdar Denktas, who represented the pro-settlement forces within the TRNC, worked in harmony with each other and Ankara in the run up to the referendum on the Annan Plan. Talat amended relations with Ankara, maintained his relations with Denktas and got along well with Serdar Denktas, who also showed that he was in favor of a solution despite his wavering stance (Birand April 03, 2004).

Therefore, at a crucial phase in the run up to the referendum, the election of a pro-settlement and pro-EU force in northern Cyprus boosted Erdogan’s Cyprus policy demonstrating in the TRNC that Denktas’s policies were growingly being questioned among the public. Erdogan seized this opportunity
and persuaded Annan in January 2004 for the re-commencement of the negotiations on the Annan Plan.

3. Conclusion

Erdoğan and Gül’s stance on the Cyprus question confirmed the overriding argument of this thesis. While the leaders of the AKP’s predecessor coalition government were not open to change on the Cyprus question, Erdoğan and Gül, who were convinced that a settlement was crucial for Turkey to proceed with its EU membership process, engaged in a process of changing the viewpoints of the Turkish decision-making elite. In this process, the MGK meetings, where all the decision-making actors took part, and comprehensive discussion of the Annan Plan in the media throughout 2003 and 2004 played a significant role. Uğur Ziyal, who was a well-informed and knowledgeable diplomat, played an important role in demonstrating to the doubtful members of the decision-making unit, notably Sezer and Özkök, the favorable aspects in accepting the Annan Plan.

Against such a background, empowered by the prospect of EU membership, the AKP leadership was able to slim down in large measure the potential costs of a foreign-policy change on Cyprus and counter the resistance of the military and civilian Euro-sceptics to the Annan Plan. Thus, through the differential empowerment of domestic political actors, the EU also contributed to Turkey’s policy shift on Cyprus.

This thesis employs the “authoritarian decision unit” model to account for how the decision-making actors interacted with each other and how a policy shift on Cyprus emerged. The ‘authoritarian decision unit’ is the domestic actor(s) with a say in decisions through their participation in the decision-making process (See Chapter V, Section 2.3). Briefly, there are three types of authoritative decision units: a predominant leader, i.e. an individual who is able to stifle all opposition and make a decision single-handedly; a single group of individuals who collectively choose a course of action in consultation.
with each other; and a coalition of autonomous actors, i.e. separate individuals, groups or representatives of institutions, each of whom has the power to reverse the decision and none of whom has the power to force the compliance of the others (M. G. Hermann and Hermann 1989: 367-9; M. G. Hermann 2001: 56-7). In the case of Turkey’s change in its foreign policy vis-à-vis Cyprus, the decision was enacted by a predominant leader, Prime Minister Erdoğan.

The decision-making unit was composed of Erdoğan, Prime Minister Gül, Foreign Minister Yakış, President Sezer, Chief of Staff Özkök and Uğur Ziyal. While Erdoğan and Gül were convinced all along that a foreign policy shift on Cyprus was necessary and engaged in a process of persuasion the other members of the group, Özkök played to the deficiencies of the Annan Plan and demanded that the derogations, stipulated to protect the bi-zonality aspect of the Annan Plan and the Turkish Cypriot entity, should be rendered the primary law of the EU. Notwithstanding his sceptical stance, Özkök mentioned that the last word belonged to the government. The impartial stance of Özkök empowered the government in the face of the adversaries of the Annan Plan. Sezer was opposed to a policy change in the beginning. Nevertheless, over time, he came to be acquainted with the various aspects of the Cyprus question and began to see the favourable elements in accepting the Annan Plan, such as removing a momentous barrier on Turkey’s road to EU membership. Uğur Ziyal was an influential actor in the learning process of Sezer and amongst the other members of the group. He informed the group members on the Cyprus issue and Turkey’s EU membership prospect. The election of pro-EU and pro-settlement forces in the December 14, 2003 general elections in the TRNC further boosted the position of Erdoğan demonstrating that the Turkish Cypriots were at variance with the status quo oriented policies of Denktaş.

The emergence of this pro-EU and pro-solution coalition was reflected in the final statement of the MGK meeting on January 23, 2004. Despite the rift of opinion between the members of the government on the one side and the military officials and the President on the other side, the final statement of the MGK meeting reflected a consensus on the need and necessity of the
resumption of the Cyprus talks. The MGK statement urged the resumption of the Cyprus peace talks on the basis of the good offices mission of the UN Secretary-General and said “Ankara supports Annan's goodwill mission and is committed to exploring a solution on the basis of a Annan Plan and the "realities of Cyprus” (Turkish Daily News January 24, 2004). The next day, however, Erdoğan went beyond this decision when he met with Annan in Davos and accepted the UN Secretary General’s offer to turn his mission of “good offices” into “arbitration”, fill in the gaps where the Cypriot parties could not converge and put the Annan Plan to a referendum.

Whereas the Turkish business sector was an important pro-EU interest group, it did not have the institutionalised channel to participate directly in the foreign- and security-policy decision-making process. Accordingly, the business elite had to rely on indirect efforts such as lobbying and advising by using the media, on which Cyprus issue was discussed extensively on a daily basis. While the Turkish military was an institutionalized veto player through its presence in the MGK by five members of the top brass, only Özkok participated in the decision-making process. Some other members of the top brass publicly denounced the government’s overtures. They also paid well-publicized visits to the top brass in the TRNC and supported demonstrations in both Turkey and in the TRNC against the AKP's diplomatic moves. Nonetheless, the military was unable to enlist sufficient popular backup to successfully pressure the government into refusing the Annan Plan (Özcan 2010: 34-6).

Not only the president and some members of the top brass but also some prominent political figures as well as all political parties in and outside the parliament, save the AKP, plainly rejected the Annan Plan. However, the AKP was a single-party government. The only other political party that was in the parliament, the CHP, was not in the government. The chairmen of the CHP, the MHP, the DSP, the BBP and the SP, all declared that they were against the Annan Plan, but none of them was in the decision-making unit to have an impact on the decision.
None of these actors was able to thwart the decision of a single-party government with a highly popular leader, enjoying 365 out of 542 seats in the parliament and a prominent position in the pre-accession process. In the absence of approval by Özkök or Sezer and in contravention of the MGK decision, Erdoğan, in his meeting with Secretary-General Annan in Davos on January 24, 2004, expressed Ankara’s resolve to restart talks and single-handedly agreed to submit the Annan Plan to referenda. The Turkish public, the state bureaucracy and the political parties were divided on the matter. Nevertheless, the AKP government emphasized that the responsibility laid with the government and overlooked all criticisms. In April 2004, Chief of Staff Hilmi Özkök argued that the outcomes of the New York talks on Cyprus, in which Erdoğan made the radical proposal that the secretary-general become involved in the process if the parties failed to reach agreement, had gone far beyond the resolutions of the MGK meeting on January 23, 2004 (Balcı April 19, 2004).

In the run up to the referendum, none of the opposition – whether the dissidents members of the military, the president or any political party in or out of parliament – was able to mobilize Turkish public opinion against the Annan Plan. This lack of influence may be attributed to the dominant position of the AKP government. The EU not only helped swing the domestic equilibrium in favour of pro-EU actors in Turkey, but it contributed to limiting the position of veto players in the pre-accession process. Moreover, within the AKP, no one was in a position to rival that of Erdoğan, whose charisma and organizational skills enabled him to maintain his authority (Sözen 2010a: 111). Erdoğan was interested in becoming involved in the decisions on Cyprus, and he himself conducted negotiations and contacted the representatives of the other governments involved. No other bureaucratic or organizational body participated in the decision-making process. The military, the parliament, the Foreign Ministry, the president and the political parties had no impact; only Erdoğan, Gül and their advisers were involved, with the final say belonging to Erdoğan alone. In short, empowered by the EU pro-accession process, the AKP was able to force a policy change on Cyprus.
In the decision to accept the Annan Plan, Erdoğan was the authoritative decision-making unit as a predominant leader with the exceptional authority to commit government resources in foreign matters and the power to counteract other bodies in and out of government from bluntly reversing his decision. Against the will of some members of the top brass, the president and all other political parties Erdoğan took the decision to accept the Annan Plan, manipulating public opinion and the Turkish Cypriot government by the force provided to the AKP government through the EU pro-accession process.
CONCLUSION

This thesis contributes to the literature on foreign policy analysis, leadership and Europeanization. After summarizing the findings in these three areas, this thesis concludes by examining the relevance of the model constructed here to the current situation on Cyprus and by suggesting future areas of research that may serve to overcome the limitations of the present study.

Findings: Foreign Policy Change Theory

With regard to foreign policy analysis, this thesis shows that foreign policy change is a multi-causal phenomenon that can be explained by a combination of various factors, but that these factors vary on a case-by-case basis. In other words, there is no ready-made formulation that can account for all instances of foreign-policy alteration. Variables that have the potential to initiate changes in foreign policy may be subsumed under four chief categories, namely, international systemic factors, domestic factors, organizational factors and leadership-related factors. The list of individual determinants presented in this thesis is not exhaustive; nonetheless, it should be considered helpful in terms of forming the basis by which other scholars may forge their own models relevant to specific cases of foreign-policy change.

From the list of potential determinants of foreign-policy change presented in Chapter IV, the following model was constructed to account for the case of Turkish foreign-policy change on Cyprus in 2002:

1. Leadership with a new constructive outlook on foreign affairs
2. Europeanization of the Cyprus discord (EU Conditionality)
3. A propitious decision-making context

This model not only demonstrates the weight of the leadership factor in foreign-policy change that has been expressed by many scholars (Holsti 1982; Goldmann 1982; M. G. Hermann 1984, 1988, 1989, 1999, 2001; C. F.
Hermann 1989, 1990; Carlsnaes 1993; Gustavsson 1999; Kleistra-Mayer 2001; M. G. Hermann et al. 2001; Boronza 2008), it also substantiates the argument that foreign-policy change is a multi-causal phenomenon (Holsti 1982; Goldmann 1982; C. F. Hermann 1990; Carlsnaes 1993; Rosati 1994; Gustavsson 1999; Kleistra and Mayer 2001). However, a leadership, intent on a foreign policy shift, and a propitious decision-making context appear to be ineluctable components of a successful foreign policy alteration.

Findings: Leadership and Social Learning

Both the AKP government’s new standpoint on the Cyprus question and the AKP’s predecessor coalition government’s adherence to traditional Turkish policy can be explained by employing the social-learning model of Checkel (2001) and Risse (2001), who suggest that identity re-construction occurs as a consequence of social learning prompted by a new and uncertain environment, crisis or vehement policy failure. By applying Risse’s model to the radical transformation of the Turkish Islamist movement, it was possible to show how this movement underwent a radical ideational transformation from an Islamist political party towards an EU-oriented political party by late 1990s. Similar models have been applied to the cases of radical ideational transformation of the French Socialist Party, the French right (Risse 2001), the Bulgarian Socialist Party (BSP), the Social Democratic Party (PSD) in Romania and the Croatian Democratic Union (HDZ) (Vachudova 2006), all of which experienced major ideational transformations and adjusted their rhetoric and agendas to fit EU requirements.

In the case of the Turkish Islamist Movement, constant policy setbacks and an identity crisis brought about a solemn ideational transformation. Unable to appeal to and mobilize large segments of Turkish society (Kepel 2000), and having experienced the closure by the Turkish Constitutional Court of several representative political parties, followed by approval of these closures by the European Court of Human Rights, the Turkish Islamists eventually gave up political Islamism (Taşkın 2008: 53), moved to the center of the Turkish political spectrum and began espousing EU norms. The AKP was able to come
to power in 2002 by abandoning its Islamist identity, and while its ideational transformation was initially motivated by the desire to come to and remain in power, having constructed a new identity, the Turkish ‘post-Islamists’ never rolled back to Islamism or questioned Turkey’s EU orientation, to which they had once been vehemently opposed. In contrast, the politicians that comprised the AKP’s predecessor coalition government (1999-2002) were unable to overcome their socialization within a historical and institutional environment that had constructed foreign policy as a matter of security and Cyprus as an issue of national significance (Çuhadar-Özkaynak and Özkeçeci-Taner 2004; Özkeçeci-Taner 2005).

Drawing on Kleistra and Mayer’s description of foreign-policy change, this thesis shows how Turkey’s Cyprus policy since 2002 has undergone noteworthy alterations in terms of instruments, goals and normative foundations. The paramount change occurred at the normative level with the advent to power of a new Turkish leadership with a new mindset, who regarded foreign affairs from a more liberal vision, not only sizing up cost-benefits of such a new outlook but also undergoing an ideational transformation itself in line with the EU requirements. In contrast to its predecessors, who held fast to a confederal line in Cyprus, the AKP government not only deviated from this radical stance, but also from its Islamist predecessors, who embraced an anti-EU policy, by adopting the Europeanization process as the party’s ultimate policy objective. Within this framework, according to the new principles formulated by Foreign Minister Ahmet Davutoğlu – ‘zero problems with neighbours’, ‘proactive engagement and preventive diplomacy’ and an ‘image-change’ for Turkey (Davutoğlu 2001, 2010) – the government flung itself headlong into an initiative aimed at ironing out Turkey’s differences with its neighbours, taking a conciliatory and pragmatic stance towards a solution on Cyprus.

In addition to this foundational change, Turkey’s Cyprus policy changed in terms of instruments as well as goals. The most important instrumental change occurred in 2004, when Turkey invested the UN Secretary-General with the power of arbitration that instituted a time-bound program for completion of
the Cyprus talks (Uslu 2011). Other new instruments include pressure on the Turkish Cypriot leadership in the form of lobbying, propaganda and the sending of emissaries, i.e. AKP MPs, to induce the Turkish Cypriots to accept the Annan Plan and transform it into a final agreement. This was in line with the change in Turkey’s foreign-policy goal, namely, a settlement consonant with UN parameters envisioning a bi-zonal, bi-communal federation on Cyprus.

Findings: Europeanization and Foreign Policy Change

Although many scholars have emphasized the EU as the overriding determinant in Turkish foreign policy change (Terzi 2005; Kaliber 2005; Kirişçi 2006; Aras 2009), the literature does not offer a sufficiently thorough analysis of the role of the Europeanization process in the change in Turkish foreign policy vis-à-vis Cyprus. This thesis found that the EU contributed to the process in two very important ways: first, by Europeanizing the Cyprus discord; second, by differentially empowering the domestic actors within Turkey, the latter of which is examined in the chapter on the decision-making process (Chapter VIII) as it is firmly associated with the domestic actors within Turkey. The EU’s impact on Ankara’s Cyprus policy shift was essential not only through rendering a settlement in Cyprus a de facto condition for Turkey, but also through swaying the decision-making composition in favour of the pro-settlement actors within Turkey.

First, the EU contributed to the process by the Europeanization of the Cyprus disagreement in the form of institutionalization of EU norms within the legal framework of Turkey. International institutionalization is mentioned by many scholars as a dynamic of foreign-policy change (Goldmann 1982; Rosati 1994; Greffenius 1994; Kleistra and Mayer 2001; Smith 2004). In this sense, the foreign policy of a state is not independent of that state’s past alliance agreements, political engagements and commercial relationships. International laws, norms and regimes influence the existing foreign policies of states (Rosati 1994). The institutional setting of the EU forces its members to adapt its rules and regulations and thus becomes a significant factor in the foreign-
policy behaviour of member countries as well as candidates (M. E. Smith 2004).

The Europeanization of the Cyprus issue started with the Greek Cypriot application to the EU in 1990 and concluded with its accession to membership in May 2004. Rather than being a legitimate or determinate criterion as part of democratic or *acquis* conditionality, settlement of the Cyprus question started to become a de facto part of conditionality for Turkey, principally after 1999, with the Europeanization of the Cyprus question. The 1999 Helsinki European Council made clear that the Republic of Cyprus would be accepted as an EU member even without a solution on the island. This promise and the actual entry of the Republic of Cyprus into the EU on May 1, 2004, considerably influenced Ankara’s position on the Cyprus question (Interview 14 September 5, 2011). With Cyprus’s accession, Turkey was faced with the adversity of settling the Cyprus dispute in order to progress in its own accession process, which had stalled by the mid-2000s, to a great extent owing to its failure to extend to the Republic of Cyprus the Additional Protocol, which would require opening Turkish ports and airports to Greek Cypriot vessels and aircraft and formally recognizing the Republic of Cyprus. EU summit meeting of December, 14-5, 2006, on the basis of the EU Commission’s recommendations, suspended negotiations on eight of the thirty-four chapters of the *acquis*. Put differently, the extension of the Additional Protocol to the Republic of Cyprus became a de facto *acquis* criteria for Turkey, and progress of Turkey’s accession talks with the EU was tied to a settlement on the island.

In explicating the Europeanization of the Cyprus disagreement, the alternative Europeanization models of determinacy and legitimacy of rules, credibility of conditions and size and speed of rewards (Grabbe 2001; Schimmelfennig and Sedelmeier 2004, 2005; Vachudova 2005; Sasse 2008) used to explain EU candidate countries’ compliance with EU norms were also examined. However, these models were found to be scant to account for Turkey’s foreign-policy change on Cyprus, as the settlement of the Cyprus dispute was neither a determinate nor a legitimate condition.
The second aspect of the EU’s contribution to Turkey’s foreign-policy change on Cyprus was the EU’s differential empowerment of domestic actors within Turkey. This part relates to the decision-making process and thus incorporated in the chapter on this topic (Chapter VIII). An analysis of this factor combined the model of differential empowerment of domestic actors (Grabbe 2002; Knill and Lehmkuhl 2002) with that of veto players (C. F. Hermann 1990; Moravcsik 1993; Skidmore 1994; Kleistra and Mayer 2001; Schimmelfennig and Sedelmeier 2004, 2005; Tsebelis 2010). The mechanism of differential empowerment functions through the EU’s re-distribution of powers and interests among domestic actors and its challenging the existing equilibrium (Knill and Lehmkuhl 2002). Through this mechanism, the EU intends to alter the ‘cognitive input’ into opportunity structures to change the expectations and beliefs of the domestic actors in pursuit of EU demands, and it provides a focal point of cooperation and a common objective for cooperation among the political forces in opposition (Grabbe 2002; Vachudova 2005; Schimmelfennig and Sedelmeier 2007). By influencing the ‘cognitive input’ into opportunity structures in Turkey, the EU helped swing the debate on Cyprus in favour of pro-EU, pro-solution circles. The EU also provided a focal point of cooperation, namely EU membership. In other words, the EU weakened the dissenters of the Annan Plan and empowered its proponents by providing them with a common objective, namely removing the Cyprus barrier that remained on Turkey’s road to EU membership.

The Chapter on Europeanisation of the Cyprus discord (Chapter VII) also examined the positions of the EU actors towards Turkey’s EU membership and the Cyprus question throughout 2002–4. This section demonstrated that, apart from Greece, all of the EU members backed the settlement initiatives of the UN without having a preference for the type of a solution in Cyprus. On the whole, while Germany (CDU), France, Netherlands and Austria opposed Turkey’s membership, Britain, Italy, Spain and Poland constantly backed Turkey’s accession into the EU. The Commission evaluated Turkey’s performance according to whether or not Turkey honoured the accession criteria drawn up by the Commission in the Regular Reports for Turkey at the end of each year. This stance of the EU Commission empowered the Turkish
government vis-a-vis the domestic dissidents of a settlement in Cyprus. Yet, the lack of a consensus among the members states based on their various interests and concerns concerning Turkey’s membership rendered Turkish accession a contentious issue within the EU.

**Findings: Propitious Decision-Making Framework**

Chapter VIII on the decision-making process involves a thorough analysis of the roles and positions of the decision-making actors within Turkey in the course of 2002-2004, when the Cyprus decision was taken. This chapter showed that without such a propitious decision-making setting, a policy change on Cyprus would not have been possible. An examination of the Turkish decision-making setting showed that while Erdoğan and Gül, backed by the Turkish business sector and the EU, all along desired to accept the Annan Plan, they were unable to do so in March 2003 when they avoided a head-on confrontation with the powerful civilian-military bureaucracy at a time when the AKP government was recently elected. In such a setting, in March 2003 the decision-making context was not propitious for a policy shift on Cyprus. However, after an interactive process among the decision-making actors within Turkey, namely, Tayyip Erdoğan, Abdullah Gül, the President, the Chief of Staff, the Foreign Ministry bureaucrats, notably Uğur Ziyal, a propitious decision-making context emerged within Turkey for a policy shift on Cyprus. When all these three components, namely leadership, the EU and a propitious decision-making context, converged a new policy in Cyprus became possible for Ankara in April 2004 when the Turkish government accepted the Annan Plan.

As shown in the previous section, the EU militated in favour of an alteration in the decision-making composition in Turkey by rendering the government the main target of EU conditionality in the course of the pre-accession process, minimizing the number of institutionalized veto points (Dimitrova 2002; Schimmelfennig and Sedelmeier 2004, 2005) and facilitating a change in the decision-making composition in Turkey in favour of the government (Robins 2003; Özbudun 2007; G. Özcan 2010).
This thesis employed Hermann’s model of the ‘authoritative decision unit’, which has the capacity to commit the resources of the government in foreign affairs and has the power to counteract other bodies within and outside the government from bluntly reversing its position (M. G. Hermann and C.F. Hermann 1989; M. G. Hermann 2001). The ‘authoritative decision unit’ is significant because foreign-policy decisions can be foiled by influential actors in the decision-making process, such as a politically active military or the Catholic Church, which may have the veto power to block governmental decisions (Goldmann 1982; M. G. Hermann 1988, 2001; Hagan 1994; Kleistra and Mayer 2001). The argument that influential veto players in the decision-making process may stem foreign-policy change (M. G. Hermann 1988, 2001; M. G. Hermann and C.F. Hermann 1989; Börzel and Risse 2003; Schimmelfennig and Sedelmeier 2004, 2005; Tsebelis 2010) necessitates a thorough analysis of the actual decision-making process, the transformation of which, in the Turkish case, brought about a propitious decision-making environment for a new policy on Cyprus.

Highly politicized militaries may have a significant role in foreign and security decisions and serve as veto players in preventing major alterations in foreign-policy decisions (M. G. Hermann 2001; Cottey et al. 2002; Tsebelis 2010). As a highly politicized army, the Turkish Armed Forces falls into this category (G. Özcan 2001; 2010, Robins 2003). Against this backdrop, as well as the actors directly involved in the interactive process on the decision on Cyprus, the positions of the Turkish business sector, as the greatest proponent of the democratization process and change in Cyprus policy (Öniş 2003; Robins 2003; Uğur and Yankaya 2008), and of the Turkish military, the main opposition to a new Cyprus policy among the influential foreign-policy actors, are examined (G. Özcan 2001, 2010; Robins 2003).

This thesis demonstrated that both the business sector and the military endeavoured to tilt the power balance in favour of their position by resorting to informal tools such as advising, lobbying, organizing conferences and drawing up reports and striving to have an impact on the public opinion
without directly getting involved in the process (Robins 2003; Öniş 2003; Özcan 2010). In the run up to the Annan Plan, the military was unable to mobilize Turkish public opinion against the plan (Robins 2003, Özbudun 2007). The Chief of Staff Hilmi Özkök played a crucial role in restraining the uncompromising members of the senior Turkish military. In contrast to his predecessors, Özkök did not give unconditional backing to Denktaş. He underlined the pros and cons of the plan and made clear that “such kind of a decision was to be taken by the government, not the military.” (Birand April 15, 2003).

According to Hermann, the ‘authoritative decision unit’, who has the capacity to make a decision, may be a ‘predominant leader’, a 'single group' or ‘multiple autonomous actors’. If a single individual has the power to commit (or withhold) all the resources of the regime in an issue area regardless of opposition by others, then the decision unit is a predominant leader. The decision unit is a single group if several individuals take part in a common dominant policy group that makes decisions through an interactive process among its participants. The decision unit is multiple autonomous actors if there are two or more separate, non-hierarchical actors (groups, organizations), none of which have the authority to commit or withhold the regime’s resources in addressing the immediate problem (M. G. Hermann 1988, 2001; M. G. Hermann and C. F. Hermann 1989).

Against the backdrop of Hermann’s definition, it was concluded that Turkey’s foreign-policy change on Cyprus was discussed in an interactive process by a single group with the participation of Erdoğan, Gül, Özkök, Sezer and Foreign Ministry bureaucrats. The pros and cons of the Annan Plan were extensively discussed within this group and there emerged a relative consensus on the acceptance of the Annan Plan. Among this group, Erdoğan emerged as a predominant leader, who, as the ‘authoritative decision unit’ and after an interactive process with the other decision-making actors, was able to make the decision to change Turkey’s foreign policy on Cyprus without having his decision thwarted by another political actor within Turkey’s domestic framework. This conclusion is consonant with theories of Europeanization that
argue that given the asymmetrical nature of negotiations, the government becomes the main target of EU conditionality and the number of institutionalized veto points are minimized during the pre-accession process (Dimitrova 2002, Schimmelfennig and Sedelmeier 2004, 2005).

Limitations and Recommendations for Future Research

This study has a number of limitations, each of which in turn suggests areas in which further research may be warranted. First of all, as a time-specific study, it examines the factors involved in the change in Turkish foreign policy vis-à-vis Cyprus in 2002, but it does not purport to be an extensive historical analysis of the dynamics of Turkey’s Cyprus policy over time. Moreover, while it touches upon the causes of the Cyprus disagreement, attempts at its resolution, its legal and constitutional aspects and the role of outside powers as well as domestic Cypriot institutions, it does not delve into them exhaustively. Accordingly, the model formulated in this thesis is not necessarily applicable to the Turkish military intervention in Cyprus in 1974, in which other variables likely played key roles. Prior to 1999, when EU membership for Turkey lacked credibility, the EU had limited impact on Turkish foreign policy, and, likewise, EU influence in terms of pressure regarding compliance with the *acquis* or the empowerment of some domestic actors at the expense of others has scant explanatory merit for Turkey’s Cyprus policy today, since Ankara has already accepted a settlement in Cyprus based on the UN parameters, which the EU has also consented to as an appropriate formula for a solution. In terms of the decision-making structure, a reversion to the previous decision-making composition in which the military was inordinately powerful seems to be unlikely, given the changing institutional and socio-economic structure of Turkey. Thus, the present study may be expanded to examine not only the dynamics of Turkey’s Cyprus policy prior to 2002, but to hypothesize as to what this policy may look like in the future. Research along these lines may not only add to an understanding of Turkey’s Cyprus policy over time, but to the determinants of foreign policy in general.
Given the deep-seated nature of the transformation in the Turkish leadership’s outlook on foreign policy and Turkey’s EU prospect, Turkey’s policy vis-à-vis Cyprus is unlikely to be subject to reversal. As a result of a normative change in the mindset of the Turkish leadership, Ankara no longer views its environment from a conflictual standpoint, but strives to find win-win solutions to its problems with its neighbours. The Turkish elite and public opinion in general has also begun to evaluate the Cyprus dispute from this new, non-security-oriented, conciliatory, pragmatic perspective. Furthermore, the EU prospect for Turkey renders an uncompromising stance on Cyprus unlikely since without a settlement in Cyprus Turkey’s EU process is doomed to failure. In the event of a shift in leadership, the new government is also likely to adhere to the foreign-policy principles adopted by the AKP leadership on Cyprus, as these new norms have to a large extent gained legitimacy within the Turkish foreign-policy bureaucracy. Given the degree of institutionalization of Turkey’s new Cyprus policy, any policy alteration would be arduous for any future government.

The second limitation of the present study is that it comprises only one case, that of Turkey’s change in policy towards Cyprus under the AKP government. While the case of Cyprus offers the best opportunity for examining the dynamics of foreign-policy change within the framework of the Europeanization process, further case studies may focus on unveiling the determinants of Turkish foreign policy towards other countries including Syria, Greece and Russia during the same period examined in the present study in order to determine whether or not these cases bear out the findings of this research. However, in conducting such case studies of Turkish foreign-policy change, differences in dynamics must be considered on a case-by-case basis. For instance, an examination of the Russian Federation and the United States rather than EU as chief external actors would be more relevant to a study of Turkish foreign policy towards Armenia. Still, given the findings of the present study, it is likely that a change in foreign-policy outlook on the part of the leadership combined with a favourable decision-making environment would be found to remain among the crucial elements of any foreign-policy change.
The third limitation of the present study has to do with the impact of the EU on foreign policy in cases other than that of Turkish policy towards Cyprus. Further research may expose how the EU accession process has affected the foreign policies of the Republic of Cyprus and other EU member countries. A wider perspective that examined the EU’s transformative power over the foreign policies of its members as well as on other candidate countries may have helped to provide greater insight into the dynamics of the EU accession process in terms of its affect on Turkish foreign policy. With regard to a settlement on Cyprus, up until now, the EU appears to have been ineffectual in pushing the Republic of Cyprus towards a compromise, and it may be that rather than being influenced by the EU principles and norms, the Republic of Cyprus will exploit its EU membership to attain a preferential solution in the future.
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4. Interview 4 (September 6, 2011), Member of the Republican Turkish Party, Nicosia/Cyprus.
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6. Interview 6 (August 24, 2011), Diplomat, Turkish Foreign Ministry, Ankara/Turkey.
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