Common reasoning in games: a Lewisian analysis of common knowledge of rationality

Cubitt, Robin P. and Sugden, Robert (2014) Common reasoning in games: a Lewisian analysis of common knowledge of rationality. Economics and Philosophy, 30 (3). pp. 285-329. ISSN 0266-2671

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Abstract

Abstract: We present a new class of models of players’ reasoning in non-cooperative games, inspired by David Lewis’s account of common knowledge. We argue that the models in this class formalise common knowledge of rationality in a way that is distinctive, in virtue of modelling steps of reasoning; and attractive, in virtue of being able to represent coherently common knowledge of any consistent standard of individual decision-theoretic rationality. We contrast our approach with that of Robert Aumann (1987), arguing that the former avoids and diagnoses certain paradoxes to which the latter may give rise when extended in particular ways.

Item Type: Article
Additional Information: Copyright Cambridge University Press.
Schools/Departments: University of Nottingham UK Campus > Faculty of Social Sciences > School of Economics
Identification Number: https://doi.org/10.1017/S0266267114000339
Depositing User: Cubitt, Professor Robin P.
Date Deposited: 07 Dec 2014 23:03
Last Modified: 19 Sep 2016 23:16
URI: http://eprints.nottingham.ac.uk/id/eprint/27776

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