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‘Standing Accused’
Analogy and Dialogue as the Personhood of Substance

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This thesis engages the issue of personhood, arguing that persons are both analogical and dialogical beings. I look at personhood first, from the standpoint of the slandered and 'accused' person. Beginning with the scene of Christ before Pilate, I show that the logic of accusation is unassailably couched within the grammar of testimony or of bearing witness (Chapter 1). Next, I treat the Dreyfus Affair and the contrast of mystique and politique in the writings of Charles Peguy (Chapter 2). Here I turn to the 'accusation in the accusative' logic of Emmanuel Levinas, demonstrating that within an approach of radical alterity to the exclusion of other grammatico-ontological cases, the person becomes lost without some sort of original, analogical case of 'giving' (Chapter 3). In response to extreme accounts slander and of the heterogeneity of the person, this thesis, secondly, proposes that the person should be understood first analogically, and secondly, as an analogical extension, dialogically. To this end I examine the debate concerning analogy in Thomas Aquinas and the tradition that followed him. I explore both the metaphysical path of resolutio, perfection, and theological recapitulation (Chapter 4), and then look to the debate on analogy itself arguing that it is best understood as pointing toward an analogia entis that is coextensively an analogia personae (Chapter 5). Finally, I conclude with an articulation of the person as dialogical. I look first to the form of dialogue in Plato, then I conclude with three sections enacting a 'call and response' of the divine persons speaking 'to the creature through the creature', where I end with an account of persons living a dialogically ensouled life within the communio personarum (Chapter 6). I finish with a brief conclusion recapitulating the argument with a Christie entreaty toward the neighbor.
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Part I: The Person Accused
CHAPTER 1
INTRODUCTION: THE ACCOSTED PERSON

a. Who is Truth?

‘In question is the whole of man; it is not in thought alone that we must seek him out. It is into action that we shall have to transport the center of philosophy, because there is also to be found the center of life’.

- Maurice Blondel

‘We will have access to the truth of Being only if we are willing to receive it with the whole of our Being. At some point, we will be faced with a truth that asks everything of us, the whole of ourselves, without remainder. But should we be surprised? What sort of truth would it be if it did not demand, and promise, everything? If truth called on only a part of ourselves, only temporarily—what would we do with the rest? What use would it be?‘

- D. C. Schindler

‘Christ is the only one who can make his life a test for all people’.

- Anti-Climacus

It is not out of the ordinary to ask one another questions concerning truth. Is this or that pronouncement true? Nor is it alien in philosophical and theological discussions to ask such things as, ‘does this obtain?’, ‘is this state of affairs or prepositions true?’, or even, ‘what is the nature of truth?’ What, indeed, is truth?

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In this thesis I will push such a question along the lines of the notion of persons and personhood. I will suggest that there is something inherently ‘personal’ about asking questions of truth but also that the truth, to be truth, must be lived and embodied in a Life. In other words, personhood is the truth of things because a person is the truth, or put in another way, the substance of things is personal. Before proceeding with the outline of my project, I must address what is at stake in the concept of outlining the concept of personhood. Above all, this means that while this thesis is about persons and personhood, it does not intend to define persons in any comprehensive manner. The very ‘nature’ of the person in fact prohibits such an enterprise. The reason for this is double. First, because this thesis works within a conception that derives its concept of the person from an ever-greater God (in the sense of a maior dissimulatio), as Hans Urs von Balthasar says, ‘we can never catch up with him. Accordingly, we who are his “image and likeness” do not despair because of our inability to arrive at a definition; instead, we are aware of a comparative dimension: man is more than what can be included in a conceptually clear definition’. This first rejection of a conceptually clear definition is based upon the positive mystery of the person whose depth points beyond him- or herself. A second rejection stems from the ‘dignity’ of the person which prevents, in a kind of negative manner, the ability to define a person based on a set of criteria. Robert Spaemann is instructive here, for he says, ‘the independence of the person hinges on the fact that no one is allowed to decide whether or not another human being bears the fundamental features

5 Technically, these are two different questions and will be considered separately at different stages throughout this thesis. However, insofar as being is convertible with truth, goodness, and beauty, these two questions coincide.
7 For an excellent treatment of human dignity as told from a critical realist approach to personalism, see Christian Smith, What Is a Person?: Rethinking Humanity, Social Life, and the Moral Good from the Person Up (Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press, 2010), 434–90. Specifically, Smith emphasizes ‘critical realism’s concepts of stratified reality and emergence to shift the source of dignity from specific capacities operating at the middle level to emergent personhood existing at the highest level of personal being. Dignity is a proactive emergent property of personhood as a whole, not a result of the possession or exercise of some specific given human capacities’ (Ibid., 479).
of personhood’. If this were the case, just *who* would have the right and power to make such definitions? Who would judge? Before us unfolds a familiar scene.

When Christ was taken before Pilate to be prosecuted on behalf of his fellow Jews, Pilate questions them and Jesus in order to determine what sentence should be passed. Christ informs Pilate that his kingdom is not of this world and that, as a king of this kingdom, he comes to testify to the truth. Here, Pilate asks Christ the famous question: ‘What is truth?’ (τί ἐστιν ἀληθεία;) Anti-Climacus, the pseudonymous author of *Practice in Christianity*, dramatically describes the scene: ‘For what is truth, and in what sense was Christ the truth? The first question, as is well known, was asked by Pilate, and another question is whether he really cared to have his question answered; in any case in one sense his question was altogether appropriate, and in another sense it was as inappropriate as possible. Pilate asks Christ the question: What is truth? But Christ was indeed the truth; therefore the question was entirely appropriate. Yes, and in another sense, no’. To explore this latter, negative sense, Pilate’s question assumes that truth can only be a kind of neutral ‘what’ (τί) as opposed to the gendered ‘who’ (τίς). When the truth

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8 “Human Nature”, in Robert Spaemann, *Essays in Anthropology: Variations on a Theme*, trans. Guido de Graaff and James Mumford (Eugene, OR: Cascade Books, 2010), 22. Spaemann has in mind here such thinkers as Peter Singer in his well-known and controversial, *Practical Ethics*, 3rd ed (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2011). To this can be added, amongst others, Daniel C. Dennett, “Conditions of Personhood,” in *What Is a Person?*, ed. Michael F. Goodman (Clifton, NJ: Humana Press, 1988), 145–67. ‘Philosophy does not, and cannot, declare human beings to be persons. It has to recognize them because they are already persons. This is why the fact that a person is a person does not depend upon the philosopher’s insight and argumentation: personhood is an “unpreconceivably” given reality. The status of a person, he argues, is “the only status, indeed, that we do not confer, but acquire naturally [natürlicherweise].” ‘This is why the person always already has a particular dignity in Spaemann’s view’. Holger Zaborowski, Robert Spaemann’s *Philosophy of the Human Person: Nature, Freedom, and the Critique of Modernity* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2010), 55 and see 198: “Things and animals ‘are’ their nature, but persons are preceded by their nature and ‘have’ their nature in freedom.” The quotation above (Zaborowski, p. 55) comes from Robert Spaemann, *Persons: The Difference Between “Someone” and “Something”*, trans. Oliver O’Donovan (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2006), 17.

9 John 14:6. This and all following Scriptural citations will be from this translation.

10 Kierkegaard, *Practice in Christianity*, 203; Andrew T. Lincoln, *The Gospel According to St John*, Black’s New Testament Commentary (London and New York: Continuum, 2005), 129. On its face, it may indeed be the case that the question is ‘inappropriate’, but as will become apparent, that is no reason not to explore the implications of the question asked in light of the height of the drama of this scene within the narrative, just as Anti-Climacus himself does.

confronts Pilate, he does not realize that ‘Christ’s life was in fact the truth’. While Christ stands on trial in this scene, it is also Pilate who simultaneously stands accused, ‘for in questioning Christ in this way he actually informs against himself’ and thus ‘makes the self-disclosure that Christ’s life has not explained to him what truth is’—or, as I shall be arguing below in the course of this thesis, ‘who’ the truth is. For it is my contention that the \textit{person is the truth}—that the person of Christ, fully human and fully divine, is the truth. Thus, the \textit{substance of things is personal}, in the sense that ‘all things have been created through him and for him’ such that ‘in him all things hold together’. This is the great irony of Pilate’s question: that the person who stands accused before him holds all things (τὰ πάντα) together.

Pilate’s question to Christ comes at the end of a series of ‘I am’ (ἐγώ εἰμι) statements scattered throughout the fourth gospel. While many of the ‘I am’ statements of Christ employ various themes, what unites them is that they all witness to the life that Christ has in the Father. Most pointedly, these can be summed up when Christ says, ‘I am the way, the truth, and the life’ (Ἐγώ εἰμι ἡ ὁδὸς καὶ ἡ ἀληθεία καὶ ἡ ζωή). The initial emphasis that is on the ‘way’ (ἡ ὁδὸς) is a response to Thomas’ question, ‘how can we know the way?’ Christ uses this opportunity to speak not only of himself as the ‘way’, but here he also announces that he is the way of truth to life—that is the life of the living Father. As the way, truth, and life, Christ points to himself

\begin{enumerate}
\item Kierkegaard, \textit{Practice in Christianity}, 203.
\item Colossians 1:16-17; John 1:3; cf. Romans 11:36.
\item John 14:6.
\item John 14:5.
\item Ball, \textit{“I Am” in John’s Gospel}, 124–8.
\item Cf. John 11:25 where he says he is the resurrection (ἡ ἀνάστασις) and the life.
\end{enumerate}
as the person who embodies this life: ‘If you know me, you will know my Father also. From now on you do know him and have seen him’. This life is distinctly personal, and is focused on the very person of Christ. As Thomas Brodie says, connecting the terms way, truth, and life with that of ‘person’, ‘But Jesus uses [the designation ‘way’] of himself, and this indicates that, above all, it is by focusing on the human person that one discovers the reality of God. . . . Focusing on the human person is a way to the truth, and even though aspects of the truth may be frightening, the acceptance of it finally leads to greater freedom and vitality, in other words, to life’. All of these predicates are both summed up in the person of Christ as well as in the Father to whom Christ points through the Spirit.

This life of Christ in the “I am” statements recapitulates Exodus 3:14 when Moses is told by God that God himself is to be called “I am who I am” (‘ehyeh ‘ašer ‘ehyeh). This personal God who is the God of Abraham, Isaac, and Jacob, tells Moses, ‘Thus you shall say to the Israelites, “I am has sent me to you.’ Matthew Levering argues that this ‘sheer infinite existence, the one who is and who thus has the power to redeem Israel’ is not a mere metaphysical abstraction; on the contrary, not only does this name properly belong to God, but this name, as theological and metaphysical, is a name that stands to critique all of our ‘idolatrous conceptions of the divine being, a history that flows through the inspired contemplative practices of the prophets’. What’s more, Levering (following Thomas Weinandy) points out that the ‘I am who I am’ translation of the Septuagint, in signifying the fullness of God’s being, ‘does not render God immutably “lifeless,” but

21 John 14:7.
24 Exodus 3:15.
25 Exodus 3:14. Harner says that while Exodus 3:14 should be ruled out as a direct source for the “I am” sayings in John’s Gospel, they shouldn’t be fully ruled out as an indirect source. That is, John’s Gospel may have drawn on the Greek of the Septuagint renderings of the Tetragrammaton and Second Isaiah. See Harner, The “I Am” of the Fourth Gospel, 17, and 57, 60–2.
28 Levering, Scripture and Metaphysics, 65.
immutably “life-full.” It is this ‘life-fullness’ to which Christ points when in John 8:58 he says, ‘Very truly, I tell you, before Abraham was, I am’. Marianne Meye Thompson clarifies: ‘It is not until [Christ] makes the claim “to have seen Abraham,” that is, to share in an eternal kind of life, that the people react: now he is claiming to have what God alone has. Thus the link between Jesus’ statement and the divine OT “I am” is through the middle term, life. Jesus claims to share in God’s kind of existence, eternal existence, existence that does not “come into being” but that simply “is” (8:35; 1:2,2). This life he has from the living Father (6:57; 5:26; 10:18). Christ’s person is identified with the person of the God of the ‘I am’, in the life that he has in the Father. For, as Dionysius the Areopagite asks, ‘And if they do not accept that the whole Godhead is life, what truth can there be in the holy words, “As the Father raises the dead and gives them life, so also the Son gives life to whom he will,” and “It is the Spirit that gives life”? Aquinas argues that because the ‘what’ and ‘how’ (the ‘whereby’ it is) are the same in God, even if one were to abstract away all the personal properties in the Godhead then the divine nature would still be ‘subsisting and as a person’, for the Jews also

31 ‘As in [John] 13:19, the absolute ego eimi in 8:58 expresses the unity of the Father and the Son’ (Harner, The “I Am” of the Fourth Gospel, 39). Richard Bauckham highlights the repetition of the ‘I am’ statements in the Gospel of John as culminating in an emphatic climax that becomes increasingly unambiguous as the narrative proceeds. ‘More than that, they identify Jesus as the eschatological revelation of the unique identity of God, predicted by Deutero-Isaiah’. See God Crucified in Richard Bauckham, Jesus and the God of Israel: God Crucified and Other Studies on the New Testament’s Christology of Divine Identity (Grand Rapids, MI: William B. Eerdmans Publishing Company, 2008), 1–59, here at 37–40. Additionally, see the illuminating discussion in Thomas Joseph White, OP, “‘Through Him All Things Were Made’ (John 1:3): The Analogy of the Word Incarnate According to St. Thomas Aquinas and Its Ontological Presuppositions,” in The Analogy of Being: Invention of the Antichrist or the Wisdom of God?, ed. Thomas Joseph White, OP (Grand Rapids, MI: William B. Eerdmans Publishing Company, 2011), 246–79 at 261–4, where White, following Aquinas’ commentary on the Gospel of John, shows that these “I am” statements in John 8 also serve to distinguish the kind of being Jesus Christ shares with the Father as one who is ipsum esse, in distinction to creation, who has its existence by participation.  
consider God in this way, as one personality. For both Christians and Jews alike, then, God is seen as a person, and never as an abstract, unreachable unmoved mover, unconcerned with Creation and its continued existence.

Christ stands accused, both by his fellow Jews, and also by Pilate. Yet, ‘the one who is on trial is at the same time the real judge,’ for the way, truth, and life of the living Father stands before them, placing all of their conceptions of truth and life into question. The issue here is not whether there is a truth ‘about’ or ‘concerning’ the person of Christ, nor is the issue whether Jesus ‘has’ life; rather, the person of Christ is the truth, placing all of our truths into question (similar to the bracketing of a phenomenological epoche), and this same person is the life of the Father given for the life of the world, unashamedly in servant form. When Pilate, Christ’s fellow Jews, and us as the reader of these Scriptures arrive at the scene of Christ before his imminent

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33 ST, III, q. 3, a. 3 ad 1–2.
36 This would lapse into ‘onto-theology’, a phrase often used by Heidegger but coined by Immanuel Kant. On this see Martin Heidegger, “The Onto-Theological Constitution of Metaphysics,” in Identity and Difference, trans. Joan Stambaugh (Chicago, IL: University Of Chicago Press, 2002), 42–74. For Kant’s coinage where he differentiates cosmotheology from ontology under the header of transcendental theology, see Immanuel Kant, Critique of Pure Reason, trans. and ed. Paul Guyer and Allen W. Wood (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998), 584. Cf. Conor Cunningham, Genealogy of Nihilism: Philosophies of Nothing and the Difference of Theology; Radical Orthodoxy (London: Routledge, 2002), 134., where, discussing Heidegger, Cunningham remarks, ‘For the starting point of the metaphysical (ontotheological) question is “what”? This reduces Being to a matter of thinghood and so excludes any possibility of articulating a “why” is there Being’. This thesis attempts to reformulate a Heideggarian approach by re-introducing theology into such a debate by virtue of pushing toward the ‘who’, albeit not in a univocal sense, but considered analogously. This will be explored in detail in chapters 4 and 5 below.
37 Although of course Christ ‘has’ life, but only because and insofar as he is this own life (ισός), the one who is ipsum esse.
38 Cf. 1 Corinthians 8:23 and 1:23. This does not mean, contra many theologians writing today, that we must replace all reason with a kind of dialectical evacuation of all thought with a desire to erase all humanly reason; instead, all our reason only is and can be articulated insofar as it participates in the very λόγος of the the Son. Only because of Christ’s person (who is reason) can we have any reason at all. Stanley Grenz seemed to take this route in his very instructive (but flawed due to its being overdetermined by an Heideggerian analysis) analysis in Stanley J. Grenz, The Named God and the Question Of Being: A Trinitarian Theo-Ontology (Louisville, KY: Westminster John Knox Press, 2005).
39 Matthew 12:18; Matthew 20:26-28; Mark 10:45; Philippians 2:6-7.
trial, we find out that the truth and life of the Father are this incarnation, fully human, fully divine, and it is only in this person that truth and life begin at all. Because the person of Christ recapitulates (ἀνακεφαλαίωσις) all human and divine truths in himself and does so in a triune ‘personal’ way as he witnesses (μαρτυρεῖν) to the Father in the giving of the Spirit who is also truth and life — the ‘effect’ of this truth upon creation is that we now must experience and conceive of truth and life not only first and primarily as the person of Christ, but also of the human person first and perfectly revealed in the person of the absolute paradox, as Kierkegaard (as Climacus) called him. For if God reveals true humanity to men and women, then analogously, the second person of the Trinity must also therefore reveal to us persons what it means to be a person. As the second Adam, Christ reveals himself in his recapitulatory logic to be the first Adam; the last will be first and the first shall be last.

43 Matthew 19.30, 20.16; Mark 10.31. See the excellent discussion of this in Conor Cunningham, Darwin’s Pious Idea: Why the Ultra-Darwinists and Creationists Both Get It Wrong (Grand Rapids, MI: William B. Eerdmans, 2010), 392–400. See also the illuminating discussion of Irenaeus on this point in Peter C. Bouteneff, Beginnings: Ancient Christian Readings of the Biblical Creation Narratives (Grand Rapids, MI: Baker Academic, 2008), 77–85, esp. 81–82, where Bouteneff comments, “In the divine scheme of things, Christ comes first, then Adam. This is not to be mistaken for another assertion that the ‘preexisting Logos’ was the agent of the creation of the cosmos, including Adam. In effect, the crucified and risen Lord comes first, and Adam is made with reference to him. The nature of the recapitulation, which puts Christ at the center of the human trajectory from creation to salvation, is therefore such that Irenaeus can speak of Adam as being made in the image of the incarnate Christ (AH 4.33.4)."

b. The Plan of this Thesis: The Contested Person

An exploration of the person and the personal truth of things in modernity’s (and post-modernity’s) wake faces severe challenges. No longer does the term
‘person’ refer to a subsistent reality possessing of a rational nature (not that such a designation is sufficient); but furthermore, no longer is the person even seen as a dialogical reality wherein one relates to others and others relate to the self precisely because the person possesses an incommunicable dignity. Michel Foucault’s comments on the disappearance of man are well-known. The person has seemingly disappeared, and in its wake are, on the one hand, various Romantic existentialisms (e.g., Jean-Paul Sartre) where one must create oneself ex nihilo, or, on the other, what is left in the disintegrated aftermath is the tragic embrace of persons as ‘nothing but’ a mere collection of atoms, processes, or psychological drives. The following passage from Philip Roth’s novel *The Counterlife* deserves to be quoted at length, for it captures this tragic spirit:

There is no you, Maria, any more than there’s a me. There is only this way that we have established over the months of performing together, and what it is congruent with isn’t “ourselves” but past performances—we’re has-beens at heart, routinely trotting out the old, old act. What is the role I demand of you? I couldn’t describe it, but I don’t have to—you are such a great intuitive actress you *do* it, almost with no direction at all, an extraordinarily controlled and seductive performance. Is it a role that’s foreign to you? Only if you wish to pretend that it is. It’s *all* impersonation—in the absence of a self, one impersonates selves, and after a while impersonates best the self that best gets one through. If you were to tell me that there are people, like the man upstairs to whom you now threaten to turn yourself in, who actually do have a strong sense of themselves, I would have to tell you that they are only impersonating people with a strong sense of themselves—to which you could correctly reply that since there is no way of proving whether I’m right or not, this is a circular argument from which there is no escape.

All I can tell you with certainty is that I, for one, have no self, and that I am unwilling or unable to perpetrate upon myself the joke of a self. It certainly does strike me as a joke about *my* self. What I have instead is a variety of impersonations I can do, and not only of myself—a troupe of players that I have internalized, a permanent company of actors that I can call upon when a self is required, an ever-evolving stock of pieces and parts that forms my repertoire. But I certainly have no self—

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44 Michel Foucault, *The Order of Things: An Archaeology of the Human Sciences* (New York: Vintage Books, 1970), 342: “It is no longer possible to think in our day other than in the void left by man’s disappearance. For this void does not create a deficiency; it does not constitute a lacuna that must be filled. It is nothing more, and nothing less, than the unfolding of a space in which it is once more possible to think.”
These words from the character Nathan Zuckerman admit not only to a ‘circular argument’—and thus the entire mood is self-consciously question-begging—but these words also betray a sense of constant collection of ‘pieces and parts’ that reduces one to ‘nothing more than a theater’ where what is played out is *anything but* the life of a person. It is fashionable to reduce the human person to ‘merely’ this or that, ‘only really’ this, or ‘nothing but’ some smaller part. This approach has become so wide-spread that those who offer more unifying accounts of the person such as G. K. Chesterton, C. S. Lewis, and Donald McKay have disparaged this reductionism—and rightly so—as ‘Nothing Buttery’.46

The truth is that there never was a stable and universally-agreed-upon conception of the person, as its meaning was always worked out amidst struggles with competing theologies and philosophies. We cannot simply defend the integrity of the person with trite formulae, as such an endeavour would itself be a reduction of the person. Nor can we *simply* point to the person of Jesus as a pat answer; a fuller Christological account is needed,47 which takes into consideration the life of the Trinity as manifested in the person of Christ within a Creation that is held together in and through the same person without which nothing was made.48 Such a challenge is articulated in the following remarks made by Graham Ward: ‘beginning with the human body, even if it belongs to Jesus of Nazareth, capitulates, to some extent, to modern individualism’. Even taking the person of Jesus Christ as one’s theological and philosophical starting point does not grant one a free pass to overcome this individualism, for, ‘[t]o focus...simply on Christ isolates once more this body as the object under investigation and prevents an understanding of the body as multiple, the body as belonging to, and

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46 I owe the discovery of this designation to Smith, *What Is a Person?*, 37 and 37n.15.
47 See, e.g., the work of Aaron Riches, *Christ, the End of Humanism* (Grand Rapids, MI: William B. Eerdmans Publishing Company, 2013). Much of the present thesis is indebted to the insights of Riches’ research.
48 John 1:3.
participating in, numerous corporations, the body as enacted within a diverse range of scenarios, each of which stages different meanings and values that transcend the modern atomized individual who is set adrift on a sea of choices. Ward refers here to the human person's idea of the self shaped in the aftermath of a whole host of modern thinkers who isolate the person from its participation in realities beyond itself. Truly, the modern conception of the self is one that is no longer 'porous' but what Charles Taylor has called the 'buffered self'.

Similarly, from a systematic theological perspective, Karl Rahner in his work *The Trinity* has raised similar concerns regarding the use of 'person' as a sufficient designation for the Father, Son, and Holy Spirit of the Trinity. Rahner notes that when today we use the word 'person', it is always to designate 'several spiritual centers of activity, of several subjectivities and liberties'. While this is not the place just yet to get into a detailed examination of language used to refer to the persons, hypostases, or, as Rahner proposes, 'distinct manners of subsisting', the crux of the issue for Rahner is that previously, before the 'anthropocentric turn', 'person' used to mean the particular subsistence (primarily) of a rational nature (secondarily), whereas now 'modern times requires that the spiritual-subjective element in the concept of person be first understood'. Accordingly, as Lewis Ayers notes, 'Modern notions of personhood ... do not simply introduce too much division into the Trinity, they run the risk of corrupting the basic pro-Nicene sense of the mysterious and incomprehensible union of the Godhead'. Abuse does not constitute use, and so Rahner, wisely, does not want to jettison the use of person completely. He thus realizes it needs to be defended from

52 Ibid., 106.
53 Ibid., 110-11.
54 Ibid., 108.
misunderstandings but also continually clarified in light of the above challenges.\footnote{Rahner, \textit{The Trinity}, 108–9.}

While Rahner’s concerns are merited, the situation is far worse than that of an opposition between modern subjectivism on the one hand and classical persons-as-subsistent-entities on the other. In fact, the levels of antipathy towards entire groups of persons has reached a feverish peak in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries with a number of horrific genocides, and while racism and war are nothing new, the sheer numbers of the dead in the wars from the twentieth century seem to surpass anything that has come before. Persons of all types do not stand merely accused, but they all too often fall under the very real threat of slander: one is told, ‘you are \textit{merely} your genes’, ‘you are \textit{nothing but} your race’, etc.

In light of this situation, in Chapter Two below, I take a look at an account of accusation regarding the status of the person in recent history. This involves the case of Alfred Dreyfus and the subsequent ‘Dreyfus Affair’ that took place in Paris in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. At issue here are two kinds of accusation: the first against Dreyfus, but also the logic of accusation in that leveled by Emile Zola’s ‘J’Accuse...!’ article. There I attempt to untangle the deeper form of accusation at work in both of their cases. The affair proves enlightening on multiple levels for the purposes of this thesis. First, it shows the stark reality of the slandered person of Alfred Dreyfus in light of his attackers. He was reduced to his Jewish race in such a way that his personhood was cast aside. Secondly, the importance of this case also reveals a deeper nuance in the logic of accusation itself—that of testimony. For accusation itself may not always be synonymous with slander (as in the situation of Zola). In light of the Dreyfus Affair, therefore, I also look at the writings of Charles Péguy, whose language of ‘\textit{mystique}’ in contrast to that of ‘\textit{politique}’ provides the beginnings of the analogical shape of this thesis: that of an animated, life-full existence suspended between the temporal and the eternal.
Chapter Three substantially explores the ethics of accusation in Levinas, for he alone in the twentieth century has so closely tied a personal ethic of alterity (of 'the Face') with that of accusation of the other. Levinas ties his claim of the Other that accuses to the grammatical case of the 'accusative' in such a way that it escapes Being (which for him is anything in the 'nominative' case). I unpack the moves that Levinas makes with reference to his grammar and ontology, where I close by contrasting him to the thought of Franz Rosenzweig and Michel Henry, who also make uses of the accusative case, not by disavowing Being, but by radically affirming it. Here I show how the 'accusative' that Levinas inscribes into persecution does not of necessity entail the radical rupture that he intends it to, but, when considered rightly, actually witnesses to a further, primary truth, remarkably similar to the logic of testimony traced out from the chapter on Dreyfus.

If rupture and radical heterogeneity vis-à-vis 'the other' characterize the path of modern and post-modern metaphysics, then it will be argued that a proper response to this will not involve a retreat into personal identity as such, for this would be to oppose equivocity with univocity; rather, in Part II, I will be arguing that persons are inherently analogical. Chapter Four begins by summarizing a crucially-missing aspect of the proper understanding of adequation in Levinas and then begins the process of a constructive analogical account of the person. Before turning to the debate surrounding analogy itself in Chapter Five, this fourth chapter is devoted to the path of the analogical act of judgment: first, I proceed philosophically in the path of resolution (resolutio) in order to arrive—simultaneously—at Being and the person in a reflexive moment of judgement that views the latter as the primary analogate of the former; second, the person as we understand it cannot be accounted for univocally in God, and so here I take a look at the analogical distance between human and divine persons in the latter's highest perfection; lastly, I turn to the logic of recapitulation as articulated in St Irenaeus of Lyons, for it is here that we can finally 'arrive at the arrival' of the person. Thus the shape of the chapter proceeds first philosophically, but as such, the act of analogical judgment affirms in faith that the person is revealed truly and utterly first as the person of Christ.
Chapter Five turns to the much disputed question of analogy in Thomas Aquinas, who is covered in the chapter’s first two sections. In the third section of the chapter I turn to the work of Erich Przywara. In detail, the chapter is as follows: Section a) outlines the logic of analogy in Thomas with regard both to being and to the person. Analogy provides not only a middle way to articulate persons, but also shows that, properly conceived, there can ultimately be no other way as creatures to speak about persons. Section b) of this chapter is substantially a response to the critiques of the Eastern Orthodox philosopher Christos Yannaras against the notion of analogy in Thomas Aquinas and ‘the West’. Here I show that Yannaras’ polemics, while appropriate when aimed at certain forms of neo-Scholasticism, fall flat when Thomas’ work is properly understood as involving an analogy of judgment—not that of concepts. The final section of this chapter turns to Erich Przywara and his work on the Analogia Entis. Przywara extends and updates Thomas’ logic for the twentieth century in ways that complement the existential rhythms of the creaturely. I do not go into the literature concerning the debate between Przywara and Karl Barth, but instead, the scope of this section is to show that Przywara’s Analogia Entis, and especially his later work, are not only Christologically- and Incarnationally-focused, but finally come together as coextensively an analogia entis and an analogia personae. Revealed here is a concomitant focus upon the form of service, both in the philosophical adequation to the object, but also and more primarily in its theological shape as affirmed in the person of Christ.

The sixth and final chapter of this thesis extends the analogy of the person into the dialogue between the person, creation, and the Triune God, which culminates in that claim that, by analogy to the inter-personal nature of God, persons are inherently dialogical beings. The argument of this chapter is not aimed primarily at the level of ‘conversation’, but that of the personal form and constitution of humans as dialogical persons who themselves exist in and through (dia) the logos of Christ (the Logos), and that of creation who acts as the second term in the dialogue. The chapter first outlines the Socratic-Platonic form of dialogue which answers the question, ‘Why did Plato write dialogues?’ The dialogical form bears witness to the shape of reason in that
the truest form of reason is that which is Life. In this respect, the next section looks at the dilemma of *aporia* in the Socratic dialogues, confronting the impasses that arise not only in the Socratic dialogue itself, but in the work of Heidegger and Derrida, the latter of whom makes especial use of the aporetic. Derrida's aneconomic use of the *aporia* serves as the backdrop for his guiding logic behind the gift, friendship, and hospitality, but here I look at his *aporia* of death and contrast it with that of Soren Kierkegaard’s discourse ‘At a Graveside’ in conjunction with the theology of the Eastern Orthodox theologian John Behr to show that the truest *aporia* is the earnest life following the path of the crucified Christ—that is, living a ‘life in death’. The final sections of this chapter proceed into an analogy of ‘call and response’ in three sections. The first looks at the work of Jean-Louis Chrétien and Johann Georg Hamann to illustrate the call of beauty to the creature enacted in the beginnings of a dialogical response in and through creation. Next, before attending to the ‘response’, I illustrate how Christos Yannaras’ account of dialogue as *dia-logos* provides an analogy for the ‘reflexive reversal’ of the metaphysical *via resolutionis* of the analogical act of judgment. Finally, the response of the person, which comes too late, is itself a response to the person of Christ. These final pages show that a continued struggle against univocity—here described as ‘monologue’—remains a perpetual temptation in providing an account of the person as dialogue. Hans Urs von Balthasar, Mikhail Bakhtin, and Karol Wojtyla/John Paul II provide crucial resources in this regard toward the fruitfulness of a *communio personarum*.

This thesis provides a look at the person as primarily analogical and dialogical. As accused and slandered amidst the mob, or amidst the attempts to account for humans within the logics of radical heterogeneity, to that end I claim that such attempts ultimately *bear false witness* to the person. In other words, they are complicit in a *lie* about who persons are and the depth of the mystery that is each one of us. To the extent that one upholds the logic of the person in its richness, one may still be ‘accused’, but they would be accused only insofar as they still bear truthful witness to the person of Christ. Bearing truthful witness to the person of Christ requires patiently tarrying with the richness of the person in all its analogical and dialogical splendor. But, I argue
below that, in order to do so, this journey, in order to be truthful, must affirm that the prime analogate of Being is the human person. As *Gaudium et Spes* puts it, ‘all things on earth should be ordained to man as to their center and summit’. Moreover, without the person as ordered to the *Logos* that calls him or her, one is left amidst the babble of monological boredom.

A dialogical existence in Christ must, therefore, participate in the same event of the person of Christ in his life, death, and resurrection. Human persons thus ‘stand accused’ by participating in the same Passion of Christ during Holy Week. Yet, ‘standing accused’ is not the final resting place of Christ (for this is at the right hand of the Father), but in these pages I show that the logic of analogy and dialogue illustrate the beauty and manifold truth in the original gift of the Son in which we analogically participate by faith in in which human persons become sons and daughters of God through adoption. To bear witness to the truth of the Son is a risk, for mere human language alone does not have the same power and authority that Christ himself possessed in his divine-human ability to testify to himself. We meet Christ in the ‘accusative’, and participate in Christ’s own testimony, in the dialogical regard for the neighbor, not only outside the city gates, hung on a tree to die, but more truly in the *communio personarum*. It is here where we look back toward the life, death, and resurrection of Christ, nourished; thus may we look forward in anticipation toward an analogical participation through him in the Father by the gift of the Spirit.

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57 *Gaudium et Spes* §12 in Flannery OP, *Vatican Council II*, 913.
CHAPTER 2
THE SLANDERED PERSON AND THE MYSTIQUE OF THE DREYFUS AFFAIR

'I swear on the head of my children that I am innocent. If I were shown the incriminating items, I might perhaps understand. For eleven days, I have been kept in secrecy, and I still don't know of what I am accused.'

- Alfred Dreyfus

'I argue this from the fact that though I am accused of something, I cannot recall the slightest offence that might be charged against me. But that even is of minor importance, the real question is, who accuses me?'

- Joseph K. in The Trial

'If we put bits into the mouths of horses to make them obey us, we guide their whole bodies. Or look at ships: though they are so large that it takes strong winds to drive them, yet they are guided by a very small rudder wherever the will of the pilot directs. So also the tongue is a small member, yet it boasts of great exploits. How great a forest is set ablaze by a small fire! And the tongue is a fire.'

- James 3:3-6

a. The Dreyfus Affair and Bearing Witness

The case of Alfred Dreyfus and the larger and explosive 'Dreyfus Affair' is instructive for our purposes of further delineating the stakes and grammar of

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4 Lindemann attempts to temper assumption that the Affair was a universal French phenomenon: 'Recent scholarship has ... shown rather conclusively that the Dreyfus Affair has been over dramatized, its long-rage significance exaggerated. Its immediate impact throughout France was less extensive than once believed. Captain Dreyfus's story has been too tempting, too appealing to the popular vulgarizing kind of historian, and too appealing to various political agendas, such as those Zionist interpretations of modern history that emphasize European decadence, ineradicable Jew-hatred, Jewish self-hatred and inauthenticity, and the need for the Jews to leave Europe. Intellectuals have been especially
the debate which follows. In December 1894 in Paris, Captain Alfred Dreyfus, a Jew of Alsatian descent, was falsely convicted of treasonously betraying military secrets to Germany and was soon thereafter sentenced to life on Devil’s Island. The entire Affair was constructed on myriad false premises, and over the course of the ensuing years, Dreyfus’s family, the public, and members of the military would be fighting for both his innocence (the ‘Dreyfusards’) and his guilt (the ‘anti-Dreyfusards’). Despite the fact that the real culprit of the crime was Major Ferdinand Walsin Esterhazy, the Parisian General Staff, backed by a largely anti-Semitic public, did their best to promote Dreyfus’s guilt at all costs.

While anti-Semitism is most likely not to blame for the initial suspicions around Dreyfus, it is clear that it became not only a major factor in his incarceration but in Dreyfus’s subsequent public dishonouring and the events that followed over the course of the next decade. In the dishonouring before a large blood-thirsty and anti-Semitic public, Dreyfus’s insignia were torn from his uniform and his sword broken. The crowd shouted cries of ‘Death! Death to the Jew!’ ‘Death to Judas!’ and ‘Coward! Judas! Dirty Jew!’ Written accounts of the event reveal the utter dehumanization on display: ‘Meanwhile, he approached, between his guards, a walking corpse, a zombie on parade, frail to all appearances, but magnified by the overwhelming shame and hatred that he evoked. Not far from us, he managed to find the energy to cry out “Innocent!” in a toneless and precipitous voice. And there he was before me, at the instant of passing, his eyes dry, his gaze lost in the past, no doubt, since the future had died with his honour. He no longer had an age, a name, a complexion.”’ Léon Daudet and especially Maurice Barrès both emphasized drawn to the story; it has been hard for them to accept that most people in France, who were not intellectuals, in spite of the unusual prestige of intellectualism in parts of the country, were not as drawn to the Affair as much as they. Recent studies have shown how little the peasantry and the population of small towns, still a majority of the population of France, were touched by the Affair’ (Lindemann, The Jew Accused, 125). While Lindemann’s warnings are sound, I see no reason to assume that the Affair need be totally widespread in France for it to be at least instructive, let alone of utmost continuing importance.

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1 See Lindemann, The Jew Accused, 125.
2 See the account in Bredin, The Affair, 4-5.
3 Léon Daudet, “Le châtiment,” Le Figaro, January 6, 1895, cited in Bredin, The Affair, 5-6. This is echoed by other reports: ‘Dreyfus is no longer a man; he is a number in a chain gang’ (on the pages of Le Petit Journal, January 6, 1895, cited in Bredin, The Affair, 109). And also the anti-Semitism of Maurice Barrès: ‘Dreyfus is the representative of a different
Dreyfus’s ‘foreign physiognomy’ and Barrès would even go so far as to announce: ‘That Dreyfus is capable of treason I deduce from his race’. These racist remarks continued to pepper the public landscape throughout the Dreyfus Affair. France was obsessed with not only the constant threat of treason, but now that it was able to direct its energies on a chosen culprit, it was evident that ‘[t]he obsession with treason was inseparable from the thirst for revenge’.

By most accounts, the height of the Dreyfus Affair took place with the publication of Emile Zola’s “J’Accuse...!” on 13 January 1898. Three days earlier, the real author behind the sole piece of evidence entitled the ‘bordeau’ that was used to convict Dreyfus—Major Esterhazy—was taken to trial and acquitted. In Zola’s ‘J’Accuse...!’, he set out to correct the public record regarding the Affair, which culminated in a litany of ‘I Accuse’ (J’Accuse) statements against all those who were at fault in the fiasco. The final litany turned out to be so incendiary that Zola himself stated in the final paragraphs of the piece itself that he knew full well that he was committing the crime of libel. Bredin, a historian of the Affair, describes the ‘entire text of J’Accuse [as] an indictment of the forces and virtues of traditional France, its religious species...The problem of race has been raised’ (Maurice Barrès, Scènes et doctrines du nationalisme [Paris: Felix Juven, 1902], 130, cited in Bredin, The Affair, 296).

9 Bredin, The Affair, 42.
10 Published in Le Aurore, which, on that day, had a circulation of over 300,000, ten times the normal distribution. This fact alone provides some evidence against Lindemann’s warning cited above in fn. 4. See Emile Zola, “Letter to M. Félix Faure, President of the Republic (‘J’Accuse’), Le Aurore, 13 January 1898,” in The Dreyfus Affair: “J’Accuse” and Other Writings, ed. Alain Pagès, trans. Eleanor Levieux (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1998), 43–53, for the full English text.
11 As both Bredin and Pagès note, there were in some items that Zola got wrong in his accusations, but based on the information available to him, he could not have known otherwise, and did not deter from the overall point he was making. Pagès lists these as ‘the excessive role attributed to du Paty de Clam, whereas [Commandant] Henry is not mentioned, and the unduly heavy accusations leveled at de Pellieux and the handwriting experts’ (Alain Pagès, ‘Introduction’ in Emile Zola, The Dreyfus Affair: “J’Accuse” and Other Writings, ed. Alain Pagès, trans. Eleanor Levieux (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1998), xxxiv). Bredin, The Affair, 249, adds: ‘[Zola] minimized the role of General Gonse. He did not see the essential responsibility of General Mercier. ...He was mistaken about the hierarchy of their roles’.
12 ‘In making these accusations, I am fully aware that my action comes under Articles 30 and 31 of the law of 29 July 1881 on the press, which makes libel a punishable offence. I deliberately expose myself to that law’ (Zola, “‘J’Accuse...!’”, 53). And Bredin, The Affair, 247 states, ‘Zola knew the risks he was taking. He saw the crimes and misdemeanors in writing his text and also the hatred and resentment it would unleash’.
passion, military spirit, and hierarchies, which required Dreyfus's conviction and then Esterhazy's acquittal'.

The forces in question that Zola put to the fire were the strong tendencies to abstraction which subjects the truth to utilitarian ends and at its worst dehumanises people for the aims of bloodlust and revenge. In a piece written prior to 'J'Accuse...!', Zola made the following astute observation: 'Captain Dreyfus was convicted of the crime of treason by a court martial. From that instant he ceased to be a man and became The Traitor, an abstraction embodying the idea of the fatherland slain and delivered over to a conquering enemy. He stands not only for present treason and future treason but for past treason as well, for our old defeat is blamed on him by those who stubbornly cling to the notion that only because we were betrayed were we beaten'. Zola clearly saw, in a kind of pre-Girardian analysis, that Dreyfus was no longer simply a man, being reduced to any number of abstractions to hide their own insecurities and failures. In an effort to turn the tables on the debate, Zola, in his numerous newspapers articles and pamphlets, recast the terms of the Affair as one that announced: 'It is anti-Semitism itself that is on trial'. When Zola published 'J'Accuse...!', in reprimanding the General Staff for sending an innocent man to prison as a traitor, he remarked, 'Truth itself and justice itself have been slapped in the face'. Zola's personification of truth and justice

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13 Bredin, The Affair, 251.
14 'The truth! What do you think the truth can be in an affair such as this, which is shaking an entire venerable organization to its very foundations? Do you suppose the truth is some simple object that you can carry about at will in the palm of your hand and casually place in other people’s hands, like a little stone, an apple?’ Emile Zola, ‘“The Minutes”, Le Figaro, 5 December 1897,” in The Dreyfus Affair: “J'Accuse” and Other Writings, ed. Alain Pagès, trans. Eleanor Levieux (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1998), 25.
17 Zola, ‘“The Minutes”,’ 24, emphasis mine.
18 Zola, ‘“J'Accuse...!”,’ 43.
19 Indeed, on the other side of the debate, as Griffiths notes, ‘As the passions of the Affair became even more heated… the words ‘justice’ and ‘vérité’ in public pronouncements became increasingly terms of abuse in themselves. From concern at the supposed deformation of the concepts, the anti-Dreyfusards arrived at the hatred of the words themselves’. Richard
make the vivid point that the trial of anti-Semitism and hatred must commence, and, with the publication of ‘J’Accuse...!’ itself becoming the apogee of the Affair’s drama, Zola would even go so far as to incriminate himself libellously—all this for the sake of the tarnished face of truth and justice.

It is at this point that it is opportune to analyze the ‘logic’ of personhood in light of the logic of accusation.

Alfred Dreyfus is wrongfully accused as a traitor and subsequently, continually tarred as a ‘Judas’ and dehumanized in an overtly racist manner. While the angry mob took to the streets and committed mass acts of violence all over France20 and in the violent rhetoric in the newspapers, the minority of Dreyfus’s defenders had to resort to a few newspaper editorials in his defence and through means outside the courts.21 Thus filled with righteous anger, Zola publishes ‘J’Accuse...!’ two days after Esterhazy’s acquittal, whose tone is that of a ‘scarcely contained fury’.22 The level of passion might have attained to the same heights as the rhetorical violence in the other newspapers, but the logic at work in Zola’s ‘J’Accuse...!’ bears witness to the truth from within an economy of veracity that should not be lost sight of amidst these passions.

Zola accuses the perpetrators of the Affair, one after the other, for their various misdeeds and conspiracies, and, for the most part, he is correct.23 Hearkening back to our earlier conversation, does not Zola implicate himself in the economy of accusation? We know he does, and he admits to his crimes of libel. But who is Zola accusing? Zola answers, ‘As for the persons [gens] I

21 Hannah Arendt, The Origins of Totalitarianism, 2nd ed. (Cleveland and New York: Meridian Books, 1962), 115: ‘The disturbing thing about the Dreyfus Affair is that it was not only the mob which had to work along extraparliamentary lines. The entire minority, fighting as it was for parliament, democracy, and the republic, was likewise constrained to wage its battle outside the Chamber. The only difference between the two elements was that while the one used the streets, the other resorted to the press and the courts. In other words, the whole of France’s political life during the Dreyfus crisis was carried on outside of parliament’. Arendt’s large point here is correct, but seems to miss the continual racist and vitriolic drumbeat sounded in the anti-Dreyfusard press by the likes of Maurice Barrès and others.
22 Griffiths, The Use of Abuse, 136. Griffiths even seems to lament that Zola had resorted to the same level of dirty polemics as those of the anti-Dreyfusards; see Ibid., 141.
23 See fn. 11 above.
have accused, I do not know them; I have never seen them; I feel no rancour or hatred towards them. To me, they are mere entities, mere embodiments of social malfeasance. And the action I am taking here is merely a revolutionary means to hasten the explosion of truth and justice'. Anti-Semitism is on trial, Zola tells us earlier, so it is in keeping with this sentiment that he accuses the people involved in the cover-up of truth and justice. Yet Zola's goal is not to condemn them personally, but ultimately to show how these people serve as stand-ins or 'entities' that embody this 'social malfeasance' of anti-Semitic hatred. At this juncture it appears that Zola, however, may be guilty of personal abstraction as well—and this is just what some anti-Dreyfusards alleged. Are Zola and the anti-Dreyfusards employing the same logic of dehumanization and reduction?

While the difference may at first seem negligible, the fact that Zola is 'right' in his Dreyfusard stance while the accused are 'wrong' in their anti-Dreyfusard vitriol—this fact does not suffice to legitimate Zola's 'correct' stance in the end, in and of itself (suspending for a moment that such an 'ends justifying the means' methodology would ever be acceptable). Rather, there is actually a correctness of means as well at work in Zola's accusatory logic. To make sense of what is at work in Zola's accusations, we note here that the logic of accusing is in fact not diabolical in and of itself, viz., diabolical (διάβολος) in the sense of slandering and thus falsely accusing. It is true that the word for the devil in the Old Testament is the Hebrew word for accuser (שָׁטָן), but the word for 'accuser' in the New Testament has a wider semantic range, instead referring to the devil by the specific terms διάβολος a total of 37 times and σατανᾶς 36 times. Only once in the New Testament is accuser used in its Greek equivalent to mean the same thing as that in the Old

24 Zola, ""J'Accuse...!"," 53. I have modified the translation to read 'explosion' [l'explosion] rather than the given 'revelation', as explosion works more coherently with the previous statement in 'J'Accuse...!' which reads, 'if the truth is buried underground, it swells and grows and becomes so explosive that the day it bursts, it blows everything open along with it. Time will tell; we shall see whether we have not prepared for some later date, the most resounding disaster' (Ibid., 52).

25 'The intellectuals supporting Dreyfus's case were dividing France and in judging "everything abstractly," understood nothing of the true nation: "I am not an intellectual," proclaimed Barrès, "and I desire above all that people speak in French."' Bredin, The Affair, 296 citing Barrès, Scènes Et Doctrines Du Nationalisme, 40ff.

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Testament, found in Revelation 12:10. In John 5:45-7 we see 'accuser' used in a different sense than that of devil or slanderer: that of one who accuses rightly. Here the figure of Moses acts as the 'accuser' of Christ's fellow Jews. Christ says, 'Do not think that I will accuse you before the Father; your accuser is Moses [ὁ κατηγοροῦν ὑμῶν Μωϋσῆς], on whom you have set your hope. If you believed Moses, you would believe me, for he wrote about me. But if you do not believe what he wrote, how will you believe what I say?' For the Scriptures testify [μαρτυροῦσα] on behalf of Christ (John 5:39), and it is within their testimony that Christ says they will be found accused. In sum, such an accusation falls within the economy of bearing truthful witness.

True, the scribes and Pharisees who accused the woman caught in adultery in John 8:2-12 were consumed with accusations of the diabolical, but for this reason: they had forgotten that they were just like her, that is, not without sin [Ὁ ἀναμάρτητος]. They had reduced her to a 'not other' and ultimately not to a someone but a something. Thus, the accusers had to put down their stones—both literal and figurative—for love itself had stooped down in order to erase her sins by writing in the sand. The logic of the accusation at work here is one that removes oneself from the economy of implication. (The irony here is that the only one even 'allowed' to accuse the adulterous woman because he had no sin—the Jewish God-man—in fact forgives the woman, and the rest of us, all together.) To provide a summary of such a logic of accusation which ultimately bears the form of slander, it would be that such a reduction bears false witness to the truth of Christ, and in turn, to the truth of the human person. At odds, therefore, are two different kinds of bearing witness, or testifying.

The previously-mentioned kind of accusatory logic which does implicate oneself in the economy of sin and wrong is a kind of 'symbolic' accusation in the literal sense of a 'bringing together' of the desired ends of personhood. Moses can act as an 'accuser', as one who also testifies to the person of Christ.

(John 5:39); that is, Moses stands in as one who ‘accuses’ only to testify to the truth, as one who calls for those in question to be truer persons themselves by realizing that their own Scriptures have written about and testified to the true human and true God in one person of Christ. Moses does not accuse for the sake of tearing down, but for that of building up – yet the building up involves a moment of judgment as well within the economy of grace. Moses and the Law ‘accuse’ because they are not focused upon convicting the people in question, for that is not Moses’ final target: in witnessing to the truth of the person of Christ (and Christ himself in turn witnesses to the truth of himself and the Father in the Spirit, as in John 18:37 where he is standing before Pilate), Moses implicates and includes Christ’s fellow Jews by pointing to Christ himself.

With this logic of symbolic accusation in mind, implicating as it does Christ’s fellow Jews in and through its act of testimony, we can see now how Zola operates within an analogous framework. Zola’s real aim is, in putting anti-Semitism on trial, to ‘hasten the explosion of truth and justice’, and, as he says at the end of ‘J’Accuse...!’, ‘I have but one goal: that light be shed, in the name of mankind which has suffered so much and has the right to happiness’. The ‘light’ in ‘the name of mankind’ can be read as an invitation to the truth of personhood which the anti-Dreyfusards have been at pains to deny not only in the person of Dreyfus himself, but also the other French Jews, as well as Protestants, Masons, and other targets of this hateful nationalism. Zola implicates himself in his accusations, knowing he has committed libel: ‘Let them dare to summon me before a court of law! Let the inquiry be held in broad daylight!’ Of course, Zola knew that by implicating himself, the details

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27 Richard Bell makes a similar link between the Law and the accuser. See Richard H. Bell, Deliver Us from Evil: Interpreting the Redemption from the Power of Satan in New Testament Theology, WUNT 216 (Tübingen: Mohr Siebeck, 2007), 239-41. But Bell on pp. 240-1 also quotes George Caird who says, ‘Provided that the law is understood in relation to God’s purpose of grace, Paul is prepared to ascribe to it a positive value. ...But when the law is isolated and exalted into an independent system of religion, it becomes demonic. This corruption of the law is the work of sin, and in particular the sin of self-righteousness’ (George B. Caird, Principalities and Powers: A Study in Pauline Theology [Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1956], 41).


29 Ibid.
of the Dreyfus case would have to be reviewed again in court, and so his own act of self-implication was to testify not only to the truth of Dreyfus's innocence, but also to the truth of the dignity of the French Jewish people.

The anti-Dreyfusards, beginning as they did with the kind of slanderous approach described above, are far afield from truthfully testifying to the dignity of the person. Indeed, it is their own accusatory logic which testifies against them in their self-removal from any implication that they too are at fault. On the contrary, by implicating himself in his 'symbolic' accusations, Zola is calling for all of France, and especially all those involved in the Affair to become more realized persons by testifying to the dignity of Dreyfus and, I would argue, secondarily to Dreyfus's innocence, even though this is of course just as important for Zola as for us after him. Just as Moses can testify to Christ and secondarily accuse Christ's fellow Jews for not paying heed to this testimony, we see also how Zola aims to testify to truth and justice and thus must also resort to accusations in order to build others up toward this truthful and just explosion.

b. Péguy and the Mystique of the Person

To conclude this analysis, I turn to Charles Péguy, who was very active as a socialist Dreyfusard during the Affair, and continued to write about the crisis for the rest of his life—including after his conversion to Christianity—until his death in the First World War. Péguy helps us clarify the terms of the debate by employing the designations of ‘mystique’ and ‘politique’. Mystique stands for

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30 Although the General Staff was intent upon only focusing on Zola himself, constantly appealing to les raisons d'état to make the case that whatever the court had previously decided was sacrosanct. At first, Zola's verdict would be overturned on 2 April 1898, but then he was retried on 18 July. Zola would be found guilty of libel and sentenced to one year in prison. However, he fled to London for eleven months to wait out his sentence. Bredin, The Affair, 301 and 321.

31 Zola's own writings seem to testify to this wider logic insofar as 'J'Accuse...!' is not the first but the sixth public writing in a series of newspaper editorials and pamphlets which from the beginning aimed to defend the humanity of the accused, both in Dreyfus and in defending the rest of the French Jews. See Emile Zola, "A Plea for the Jews", Le Figaro, 16 May 1896," in The Dreyfus Affair: "J'Accuse" and Other Writings, ed. Alain Pagès, trans. Eleanor Levieux (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1998), 2-7. And see the rest of the articles and interviews leading up to ‘J'Accuse...!' in Ibid., 8-42.

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a kind of fervent mysticism which gives life to all politics and lives on a kind of suspended plane as distinct from the devices of politique. Mystique is lived and embodied and, even though its origin is the eternal, mystique is not opposed to the temporal and is its very possibility. As Péguy says in ‘Memories of Youth’, explaining that the religious movement of the Dreyfusards embodied something ‘essentially Christian’, ‘The Justice and the Truth that we loved so much, ... to which we gave ourselves completely during the whole of our youth, were not an abstract, conceptual Justice and Truth, they were not a dead justice and a dead truth, the justice and truth found in books and libraries, a notional, intellectual justice and truth, the justice and truth of the intellectual party; they were organic, Christian, in no sense modern, they were eternal and not temporal only, they were Justice and Truth, a living Justice and Truth’. It is because of this that the Péguy scholar Hans A. Schmitt gets everything backwards: ‘Péguy’s eyes are riveted on Dreyfus, who emerges in his prose as an ideal rather than as an existence’. Schmitt fails to understand the logic of suspension in the writings of Péguy on la mystique. The ‘mysticism’ that Péguy writes about is ultimately a kind of mystique of the person, the one entity that cannot be pinned down and abstracted in any way whatsoever, for persons are each unique, unrepeatable, and uncommunicable in ways that can never be traded nor can be dealt with by way of propositional or utilitarian logics: this, however, is the ambit of politique.

Marjorie Villiers describes politique thus: ‘By politique [Péguy] meant the sacrifice of the [moral] absolutes [of mystique] to les raisons d’état, the compromises made to secure power or maintain it by an individual, a class, a party, an institution, in their own interests or even in those of the nation itself, if these were seen outside the context of the interests of humanity’. The immediate price exacted from all such sacrifice is one of abstraction. Because the State is the ultimate reality in the case of the anti-Dreyfusards, those

33 Ibid., 39–40.
arguing within the logic of \textit{politique} are able to denounce Dreyfus as a ‘Jew’, a ‘Judas’, or ‘traitor’ and therefore reduce him to these things, preferring not to acknowledge his humanity. Against the parsimonious nature of \textit{politiques}, Péguy argued that \textit{mystiques} are far less inimical to each other than \textit{politiques}, and in quite a different way. ...Because unlike \textit{politiques}, they do not invariably have to divide the temporal world, temporal matters, limited temporal power, between themselves.\textsuperscript{36} There is thus a liberality at work in \textit{mystiques}, one that allows for dialogue, and can even work within the confines of the State, as Péguy saw himself doing.\textsuperscript{37} \textit{Politique}, when taken on its own, is all too quick to sacrifice everything to abstractions and to see all as abstractions in kind; a self-enclosed \textit{politique} abhors the concrete. Rowan Williams sees a similar logic at work in the diabolical logic of the Devil in Dostoevsky’s writings: ‘the demonic always “de-realizes” or “disincarnates,” distracts us from the body and the particular’.\textsuperscript{38} \textit{Politique} on its own would rather not have the incarnate, so its ethos at every turn is deracination and disincarnation: all enemies within the State are no longer persons at fault, but they are now merely ‘traitors’, de-rooted and alienated.

One can see this abstraction in play enacted in the use of the epithet ‘Judas’ which was leveled against Dreyfus. Beyond the literal connection to Judas Iscariot as the person who betrayed Christ, the slander functions here as an ‘anti-type’ (not to be confused with ‘antetype,’ \textit{viz.}, prototype, but rather understood with the connotation of a “contrasting” type)—but this only ironically so. It is an anti-type in contrast to the kinds of symbolic typology where Christ is spoken of by Paul as a ‘type’ (\textit{tύπος}) of Christ.\textsuperscript{39} That is, Dreyfus is not spoken of in his dignity as a person, but rather is reduced in an antitypic representative in the sense of the diabolical mode of accusation discussed above. What’s more, at least as far as the Christians who engaged in this derogatory practice are concerned, they reveal their own betrayal of Christ as in this slanderous speech act, the betrayer is abstracted away from the very

\textsuperscript{36} Péguy, “Memories of Youth,” 30.
\textsuperscript{37} ‘We were the last generation with a Republican \textit{mystique}. And our Dreyfus Affair will have been the last operation of the Republican \textit{mystique}’ (Ibid., 7).
\textsuperscript{38} Rowan Williams, \textit{Dostoevsky: Language, Faith and Fiction} (London: Continuum, 2008), 82.
\textsuperscript{39} Cf. Romans 5:14.
person in whom the betrayal is made both simultaneously intelligible and unintelligible. In other words, without the innocent One there could have been no betrayal, but those engaged in this economy of accusation miss both the dignity of the person as well as the One in whom such dignity is found—and hence the irony.  

This logic also ‘de-names’ the person, as we saw above when Daudet remarked that Dreyfus, in his public humiliation, ‘no longer had... a name’.  

Maurice Blanchot remarks that within an abstract universal, all particular thoughts and wills apart from this abstraction fall under suspicion, and that what is truly frightening is that ‘being suspect is more serious than being guilty (hence the seeking of confession)’. But Blanchot also adds that ‘[t]he suspect is this fleeting presence that does not allow recognition,’ for it seems that such suspicion (i.e. of the traitor) within an abstraction disincarnates by first de-naming, by refusing to recognize the person without even realizing that they de-name within a abstracting logic that also therefore de-names themselves as well.  

Politique therefore lends itself much more readily to diabolical accusation within such presumed abstraction, and is carried out unilaterally, without seeing oneself implied within one’s own accusations.  

For to disincarnate, to de-name, and to therefore no longer recognize one who has a name involves a prior naming and recognition itself; in other words, how does one know that one is first disregarding a person if they do not first acknowledge at some prior level that they are in fact a person? Why not suspect inanimate objects? Even the most genocidal of logics involves a prior  

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40 I am indebted to John W. Wright for these points regarding Judas and Christ.  
43 For a fascinating metaphorical account of this logic inscribed into the very constitution of a city itself, see China Miéville, The City & The City (London: Pan Macmillan, 2009) where the citizens of Besźel must “unsee” the citizens and architecture of Ul Qoma (and vice versa), even though they often share the same “cross-hatched” geography.  
44 For an analogous case, see Gillian Rose on what she calls ‘Holocaust piety’ in Gillian Rose, Mourning Becomes the Law: Philosophy and Representation (Cambridge University Press, 1996), 41–62. We can see one 19th-century attempt to circumvent these inclinations in the work of Soren Kierkegaard who says, ‘Most people are subjective toward themselves and objective toward all others, frightfully objective sometimes—but the task is precisely to be objective toward oneself and subjective toward all others’ (Journals and Papers IV 4542 [Pap. VIII A 165] n.d., 1847).
acknowledgement of personhood, and thus a prior testimony to truth’s personhood.

Where *politique* inscribes itself within monological logics, *mystique*, on the other hand, lends itself always to the dialogical. The dialogical is animated by living forces and persons, whereas the monological, as we have just seen, is the (faceless) face of de-realization and disincarnation and thus, death. Something akin to this is found in Péguy’s comments on the Dreyfus Affair when he remarks, ‘It lived by its *mystique*. It died of its *politique*’. Mystiques will always give rise to politiques, as they always need mechanisms to keep certain parts of its life going—an accountant or managers to keep track of and pay the bills, for example. But Péguy was passionate that these things maintain a certain ordering, or else the *mystique* will die from a kind of managerialism or utilitarianism: ‘Everything begins as a *mystique* and ends as a *politique*....The important point is not that such and such a *politique* should triumph over another such and such, and that one should succeed. The whole point (what matters), the essential thing, is that in each order, in each system, THE MYSTIQUE SHOULD NOT BE DEVOURED BY THE POLITIQUE TO WHICH IT GAVE BIRTH’. Péguy saw this devolution and devouring again and again throughout the Dreyfus Affair, and especially embodied in Action Francaise and the efforts of his one-time friend Jean Jaurès. Actual evolution, movement, repetition, and dialogue are enabled within a *mystique*. Therefore, because its logic is one of openness, suspension, and action, it is by its nature a personal *mystique*. Or again, following the logic we are setting forth, because a *mystique* is personal, it has a nature at all.

45 Péguy, “Memories of Youth,” 33.
It is for these reasons that Schmitt's critique about Péguy's idealism falls far short of the mark. Péguy's description of mystique is the utmost concretization of the logic of the person, of the ineffable mystery of personhood and therefore why all of Dreyfus's detractors stand accused by their own words. The personal mystique of the Dreyfus Affair convicts because it discerns, keeping truth at the level of the personal and not at the abstracting, disincarnating level of politique.

It may be objected that pointing to the person in making a truth claim such as this is an attempt at positivism: we know what the person is, and this is the end of the story, one might say. If this were the case, then the person would fall prey to all sorts of positivistic criteria which actually evacuates and ultimately abolishes the person, for this is not how we approach persons in the every day, nor how the theological tradition to which I will look addresses personhood. Indeed, the only way many have pinpointed the person is to 'nail' the person down to the point of not being a person at all. That is, there

48 See Timothy Chappell, "On the Very Idea of Criteria for Personhood," *The Southern Journal of Philosophy* 49, no. 1 (March 2011): 1-27. Chappell asks, 'When we come across any being we have never met before, are we supposed to first see whether it satisfies our criterion for personhood, and then, if it does, start treating it as a person?' (p. 5) And Chappell rightly shows how the criterialist approaches of, e.g., Singer, et al., actually treat people very inhumanly. By beginning with Donald Davidson's 'principle of charity' (p. 10), Chappell convincingly allows for persons to withdraw from the need to fulfill a 'complete' set of criteria: 'all persons are incomplete and impure in their agency. No one ever does everything she could with her own nature (partly, of course, because there are just too many things she could do). In one way or another, all of us are less than fully free to pursue happiness; everyone is wounded or damaged or limited or compulsive, or just plain ill, in some respect' (p. 22). However, the goal of this thesis is not merely to point to group membership as constitutive of personhood—although this is a good beginning—but that in pointing to a very particular confession of the person of Christ, the human person is only starting to see the truth of her or his participation in this person who is truth itself. Robert Spaemann is clear: 'Belonging to the human family cannot depend on empirically demonstrated properties. Either the human family is a community of persons from the word go, or else the very concept of a person as “someone” in his or her own right is unknown or forgotten'. Spaemann, *Persons*, 240.

49 To take one famous recent example, Thomas Metzinger, *Being No One: The Self-Model Theory of Subjectivity* (Cambridge, Mass: MIT Press, 2003), 1., says, 'no such things as selves exist in the world: Nobody ever was or had a self. All that ever existed were conscious self-models that could not be recognized as models. The phenomenal self is not a thing, but a process—and the subjective experience of being someone emerges if a conscious information-processing system operates under a transparent self-model'. For a condensed version of Metzinger's argument, see Thomas Metzinger, "The No-Self Alternative," in *The Oxford Handbook of the Self*, ed. Shaun Gallagher (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2011), 279–96. While I will not disagree that a process is involved in being a person, process is not all that persons are. See Norris Clarke's critique of being solely constituted by relationality in W. Norris Clarke, "Person, Being, and St. Thomas," *Communio* 19, no. 4 (1992): 601–18; W.
is a desire of certainty and possession which ironically disposes of the subject matter. Accordingly, Hannah Arendt remarks that ‘the most radical and the only secure form of possession is destruction, for only what we have destroyed is safely and forever ours’. The aim of this study, on the contrary, is to mark out an alternative path: we do not know what the person is at all, but the Christian tradition has continually borne witness to the mystery of the person as bearing truth—if not the truth itself personified in Christ—such that perhaps we can now finally begin to speak of truth at all.

As an example of a prefiguring of the Christian, the case of Socrates is instructive. We have his self-conscious ignorance (‘I know that I do not know’) in contrast with his Sophist interlocutors, but Socrates’s self-avowed ignorance is not the end of philosophy, but the possibility of its beginning. The irony is that it is the Sophists, all too-eager to provide ready-made and pure answers (at a fee, no less) who foreclose on inquiry. Because the Sophists already possess the answers, there is nothing left to investigate. Socrates, on the other hand, owed his own skills and gifts to others, so he admitted that he


51 See *Apology* 21d.

52 On this see the excellent D. C. Schindler, “Why Socrates Didn’t Charge: Plato and the Metaphysics of Money,” *Communio* 36, no. 3 (Fall 2009): 394–426. On the ‘purity’ of one’s answers, witness the analogous case of J. G. Hamann criticizing Immanuel Kant: ‘The other [Kant] would like to play the role of universal philosopher and competent Warden of the Mint just as Newton did. No part of analytical chemistry is more certain than that which has been invented for gold and silver. Hence, the confusion in regard to coinage in Germany cannot be as great as that which has crept into the textbooks which are current among us. We do not have proper conversion tables to determine what alloy content an idea may have it is to pass for truth, and so forth’ (James C. O’Flaherty, *Hamann’s Socratic Memorabilia: A Translation and Commentary* (Baltimore, MD: John Hopkins University Press, 1967), 141). Dickson provides the following helpful gloss on this passage: ‘One of Newton’s tasks as Warden of the Mint was to test the alloy content of the coins. This aspect of “criticism” or “critique” however, is the one which is the most discriminating and developed; what we lack is a critique of ideas that has advanced to a comparable level. It is then a Warden of this “Mint” that Kant presumably seeks to be: one who can tell us whether an idea is pure and unalloyed, and weighty enough to be considered a truth. This observation is a striking one, coming as it does twenty-two years before the publication of the *Critique of Pure Reason*’ (Gwen Griffith Dickson, *Johann Georg Hamann’s Relational Metaschematism*, Theologische Bibliothek Töpelmann 67 [Berlin and New York: Walter de Gruyter, 1995], 36). The idea here is thus that in becoming the Warden of the Mint himself in regard to truth, Kant himself has determined what is pure and impure, yet, as he would later do in his first *Critique* and beyond, Kant’s purification process tends to evacuate language and the person completely. On this see Johann Georg Hamann, *Writings on Philosophy and Language*, trans. and ed. Kenneth Haynes, Cambridge Texts in the History of Philosophy (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2007), 210–11. See also Cunningham, *Genealogy of Nihilism*, 74–99, esp. 90–94.
proceeded on a philosophical mission in service to the god,⁵³ that he learned his dialectic from Diotima, and so because the truth was not capital to be traded, did not charge to teach or philosophize. Socrates saw himself not as dispensing answers, but being in service to one whose answers possessed him in a sense.⁵⁴

For our purposes, it is the person of Christ who will ultimately guide our study. It is here also that we can only point, gesture, or in the tradition of Nicholas of Cusa, make conjectures. Because the 'nature' of the truth of Christ’s person is one we can never possess or grasp, as we will continually articulate throughout this study, it is in fact Christ’s person who possesses us.⁵⁵ Our personhood only is as it participates in the one person (in two natures, fully human, fully divine) of Christ. To speak of the one who speaks us, and to attempt a theology of the truth of the person of Christ in whom the truth, goodness, and beauty of all human personhood is revealed is never to articulate the logic of finality. The human person, in being confronted with the revelation of the person of Christ, is now tasked with learning how to begin. In other words, the person is not the end of inquiry, but the very mystique of its beginning.

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⁵³ Apology 21a-22a, 23b.
⁵⁴ Cf. The daimon in the Phaedrus 242b-d.
⁵⁵ Similarly, Pope Benedict XVI has recently remarked that ‘we never have the truth; at best it has us’. Pope Benedict XVI, Light of the World: The Pope, the Church, and the Signs of the Times: A Conversation with Peter Seewald, trans. Michael J. Miller and Adrian J. Walker (San Francisco, CA: Ignatius Press, 2010), 50.
CHAPTER 3
STANDING ACCUSED: GRAMMAR AND ONTOLOGY

'Without ever having done anything, I have always been under accusation: I am persecuted.'

- Emmanuel Levinas

'May my accusers be clothed with dishonour; may they be wrapped in their own shame as in a mantle.'

- Psalm 109: 29-31

'Come to terms quickly with your accuser while you are on the way to court with him, or your accuser may hand you over to the judge, and the judge to the guard, and you will be thrown into prison. Truly I tell you, you will never get out until you have paid the last penny.'

- Matthew 5:23-26

'For really, contrary to what unbelief unceasingly maintains with empty and prideful obstinacy, the name is not sound and smoke, but word and fire.'

- Franz Rosenzweig

In the first two chapters I have approached the concept of the 'accused' from different theological and historical perspectives: Christ standing accused before Pilate and his fellow Jews; the accusations leveled against Alfred Dreyfus by the anti-Semitic military, public, and press of late 19th-century Paris; the logic of Emile Zola's 'J'Accuse...!'; and what I called the 'symbolic' accusations of Moses that stand within a prior account of testifying to the person of Christ. One final, but substantial note on the 'accused' is in order. What I have thus far been exploring with regard to the logic of accusation concerns a certain juridical concept of accusation, but also that of slander. Such slander betrays a truly diabolical logic that desires destruction before all else, including the denial of entry into any economy of law—that is, if such slander had its way. This chapter expands upon the examination of the

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slanderous denial, but this time with reference to the accusatory denial of being itself.

Now, I want to address a slightly different kind of accusation that, on the one hand, is related to the accusation of accusing another person, but on the other hand, also relates to the grammars and ontologies that structure the person in language, and the ontologies and grammars in which persons inhabit and create for themselves. Any theologically playful turning of the logic of accusation need also pay heed to the various attempts made in philosophy in the twentieth century that also consider the accusative case, all of which find themselves amidst a continual ‘linguistic turn’ to language. However, the turn to language that I will explore in the figures below should not be considered to be of a piece with the realm of late 19th- and 20th-century epistemology and logic, which attempts to carve up of all reality only in terms of what one can ‘know’.

Namely, for our purposes here, I will be addressing the thought of Emmanuel Levinas in his Otherwise than Being regarding the language of the ‘accusative’. In addition, I will turn to the issues he raises regarding the concepts of Creation and of asymmetry to the other with reference to the thought of Martin Buber and Jacques Derrida. Exploring the topic of Creation will serve as a way to address the nature of created existence itself, whereas looking at Levinas will serve as an inroad into discussions of relationality, incommunicability, particularity, law, and ethics. In other words,

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3 See the essay ‘The Linguistic Turn as Theological Tum’ in Milbank, The Word Made Strange, 84–120 which argues that the linguistic turn was first made in the 18th century in, e.g., the work of J. G. Hamann.


5 Emmanuel Levinas, Otherwise Than Being: Or Beyond Essence, trans. Alphonso Lingis (Pittsburgh, PA: Duquesne University Press, 1998). I will also initially be referring to the text of the earlier essay entitled ‘Substitution’. Levinas himself describes this as the central chapter upon which Otherwise than Being is based (this article originally appeared as Emmanuel Levinas, “La Substitution,” Revue Philosophique De Louvain 3 (August 1968): 487–508). More than mere suggestions of the kind of substitutionary and accusatory thought are already found in Emmanuel Levinas, Totality and Infinity: An Essay on Exteriority, trans. Alphonso Lingis, Duquesne Studies. Philosophical Series 24 (Pittsburgh: Duquesne University Press, 1969). However, Levinas radicalizes this thinking in very traumatic (literally) ways in Otherwise than Being. Jacques Derrida seems to get the impression of accusatory thinking when he says, commenting upon Totality and Infinity, ‘And if we must, for once, have faith in him who stands most accused in the trial conducted by this book, the result is nothing without its becoming’ (Jacques Derrida, “Violence and Metaphysics: An Essay on the Thought of Emmanuel Levinas,” in Writing and Difference, trans. Alan Bass, 2nd ed. [London: Routledge, 1978], 84).
these topics act as routes toward issues of nature and grace, of the humanity and divinity that ultimately make up a person. Finally I will offer brief corrective accounts of the issues raised by reference to the writings of Jean-Luc Marion, Michel Henry, and Franz Rosenzweig.

a. *Levinas and the Accused in the 'Accusative' from the Very Beginning*

To begin, I will briefly mention Levinas' thematic" of the 'accusative' and then provide a short grammatical primer in order to get up to speed with what Levinas is doing before turning back to a fuller treatment of his thought. Levinas is primarily focused upon the Other (*Autrui*), and the radical otherness of the Other in all its heterogeneity. In *Otherwise than Being*, Levinas works his argument around this alterity by concerning himself with an ethics opposed to ontology, or as he puts it, a 'Saying' opposed to a 'Said'.' All synchrony of a structuralism is thwarted by the 'absolute diachrony' of the (non-intentional) thought of the Other. The absolute diachrony, however, unwittingly becomes the synchrony of the abyss, as I will show below. For Levinas, the alterity of the Other can never be thematized, and so Levinas attempts to proceed always *an-archically*—against an αρχή (*archê*) that includes both a meaning of beginning and of ruling. Moreover, Levinas’

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6 Of course, however, Levinas endlessly reminds us that this is unthematisable. Just one example: 'Here what is essential lies in the refusal to let oneself be domesticated or subdued by a theme' (Levinas, "Substitution," 80).


8 Levinas, "Substitution," 89. ‘When, against the structuralist’s stressing of synchrony, Levinas emphasizes diachrony, he means that every moment of the recollectable time of my going forward toward my own death is cut through (dia) by the interlocution of other mortal human beings’ (John Llewelyn, "Levinas and Language," in *Cambridge Companion to Levinas*, ed. Simon Critchley and Robert Bernasconi [Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002], 136). The ‘dark diachronicity’ that Edith Wyschogrod speaks about clearly seems, while still having undergone trauma (which to some extent is inescapable for everybody), to intend a more healing gesture: ‘the dark diachronicity of saintly life circumvents time’s arrow and time’s cycle even if, superficially, it appears to fall on the side of time’s arrow. Saintly existence ... differs within itself, is fissured by a lapse and loss that are “structurally” rather than contingently irrecoverable by memory. Saints are also expert in “reversing” time’s arrow in phenomena such as apology and repentance’ (Edith Wyschogrod, *Saints and Postmodernism: Revisioning Moral Philosophy*, Religion and Postmodernism [Chicago and London: University of Chicago Press, 1990], 108).
argument culminates in a chapter entitled ‘Substitution’ which, because of an ultimate responsibility, places the human person on the side of the accused. The Other obsesses over the ‘Same’ in a persecution which reconfigures how the self is constituted:

Obsessed with responsibilities which do not result from decisions taken by a “freely contemplating” subject, consequently accused of what it never willed or decreed, accused of what it did not do, subjectivity is thrown back on itself — in itself — by a persecuting accusation. Concretely, this means to be accused of what others do and to be responsible for what others do. It is to be pushed to the limit, responsible for the very persecution undergone. Subjectivity is subject to the limitless passivity of an accusative that is not a mere declension derived from a nominative. Everything here begins in the accusative. Such is the exceptional condition — or noncondition — of the Self (even in our Latin grammars).

The logic of accusation, the play upon the accusative case, and the theme of ‘Illeity’ dominate the rest of Otherwise than Being. Before exploring Levinas’ thought further on this matter, however, the terms used regarding the nominative and accusative case requires a brief grammatical excursus which will help illuminate what is at issue in Levinas’ thought, but I will explore the grammar also for the sake of my own argument in an attempt to disentangle a different kind of ‘accusative’.

Most English speakers do not need to concern themselves with becoming accustomed to case in language. Modern English as an Indo-European language is a syntactically accusative language, as are about three-quarters of the world’s languages (although many others like German, Latin, and Greek do explicitly use the other cases). Aside from such pronouns as him, her, them, and whom however, Modern English no longer pays attention to case systems, using primarily word order and prepositions to indicate linguistic function, in contrast to Anglo-Saxon, which was a case language but whose

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9 Levinas calls this chapter the ‘genn’ of the book. See Levinas, Otherwise Than Being, 193–4n.1.
11 Ibid., 88.
case forms we no longer use. So, in the sentence, ‘The girl kicked the football,’ ‘girl’ is the nominative or subject of the sentence, and ‘football’ is in the accusative position as the direct object of the verb ‘kicked’. In languages such as Greek and German, the case of the words (or articles) themselves change according to their nominative or accusative attribution, but in English, as mentioned, we generally indicate meaning by word order. Thus, in languages with a richer case system such German, Greek, and Latin, the cases used are the nominative, accusative, genitive, and dative. Barry J. Blake describes case as stemming from the ‘Latin cásum, which is in turn a translation of the Greek ptósis “fall”. The term originally referred to verbs as well as nouns and the idea seems to have been of falling away from an assumed standard form, a notion also reflected in the term “declension” used with reference to inflectional classes. Regarding the nominative, Blake says, ‘The nominative was referred to as the orthē “straight”, “upright” or eutheia “straight”, “direct” form and then as the ptósis orthē, ptósis eutheia or later ptósis onomastikē “nominative case.” Latin translations of oblique cases are as follows: genikē for the genitive; dotikē for the dative; and aitiatikē for the accusative. However, the label ‘accusative’ is a mistranslation into Latin ‘of the Greek aitiatikē ptósis which refers to the patient of an action caused to happen (aitia “cause”). While genitive primarily functions as the case of possession, elsewhere Blake says regarding the dative that it ‘was the ptósis dotikē, the “giving” case, because it encoded the recipient of the verb didōmi “to give”. In fact the dative had a variety of functions including a locative function, though mostly when governed by a preposition, and marking the

15 Latin also has the ablative case, which does not exist in Greek but whose directionality is covered by the genitive.
17 Ibid.
18 Ibid., 19. Blake adds that ‘Varro (116 BC-27?BC) is responsible for the term and he appears to have been influenced by the other meaning of aitia, namely “accusation” ’ (Ibid). He follows Robins and Calboli here: R. H. Robins, A Short History of Linguistics, Longman’s Linguistics Library (London: Longmans, 1967), 35; Gualtiero Calboli, La Linguistica Moderna E Il Latino: I Casi, Testi e Manuali Per L’insegnamento Universitario Del Latino 10 (Bologna: R. Pàtron, 1972), 100. This notion of accusative in its original, causal sense will be explored in depth below.
complement of various verbs indicating aid, trust, pleasing, and the like.”\(^{19}\) Notably, the aforementioned mistranslation of ‘accusative’ from the original Greek causally-inflected \textit{aitiatikē} as a grammatical (let alone metaphysical) point never seems to arise in Levinas, nor in his commentators such as Derrida and Marion. Instead, the Latin mistranslation comes into play providing Levinas grist for his juridical mill of accusation. He never appears to take notice of this ancient mistake.

This grammatical background can now help us to decode what is at work in Levinas’ remarks on what he calls ‘obsession’. He says, ‘Obsession is a total passivity, more passive still than the passivity of things’.\(^{20}\) Within the world of ‘things’, every-thing is under the reign of the logos as ‘prime matter’. It is underneath this logos that things ‘fall’, and, recalling the discussion of case \textit{(ptōsis)} as fall above, Levinas states, ‘This fall (or case), this pure submission to the logos, without considering the proposition whereby the thing becomes a narrative to which the logos belongs, \textit{is the essence of the accusative}’.\(^{21}\) However, because obsession is anarchic and does not therefore fall under the rule of the \textit{άξιον}, obsession ‘accuses me on the hither side of prime matter seized by the category’.\(^{22}\) Thus, the accusation of obsession is ‘transformed into an absolute accusative’ and this constitutes the subject ‘in the accusative, without recourse in being, expelled from being, that is to say, \textit{in itself}’.\(^{23}\) The subject is therefore held responsible for all, and finds itself in a situation where it must substitute itself for all other persons: ‘The word “I” means to be answerable for everything and for everyone’.\(^{24}\)

When Levinas says, as quoted above, ‘Subjectivity is subject to the limitless passivity of an accusative that is not a mere declension derived from a nominative’\(^{25}\), he plays on this ‘undelinability’ as an ‘inability to decline’ a


\(^{21}\) Ibid., emphasis mine.

\(^{22}\) Ibid.

\(^{23}\) Ibid., 88. See also Levinas, \textit{Otherwise Than Being}, 196n.21.

\(^{24}\) Levinas, “Substitution,” 90. Further, ‘It is this responsibility for the creature that constitutes the “self”’ (Ibid., 94). Also: ‘To be a “self” is always to have one degree of responsibility more’ (Ibid., 91).

debt preceding a loan from the obsessive persecution of the Other.  

On the one hand, grammatically Levinas is referring to the fact that personal pronouns do not ‘decline’ in most languages: whereas the Greek accusative for human declines as ἀνθρώπος from the nominative ἀνθρώπος, in nearly all languages it does not work like this for pronouns (also especially the irregular verb ‘to be’). For example: the nominative ‘I’ in contrast to the accusative ‘me’. They do not look like each other at all, being ‘irregular’, and here for Levinas, indeclinable grammatically, and undeclinable ethically. From this grammatical point of departure Levinas derives his ethics of obsession, which for him means that the obsession of the other is undeclinable, that is, inescapable. The self is always constituted by the responsibility for the Other and thus must substitute itself for the Other. There is nothing ‘behind’ this transcendental substitutability, for it is the condition of all selfhood.  

For Levinas, inescapability stems from a radical passivity before all freedom: ‘Substitution is not an act; it is a passivity inconvertible into an act, the hither side of the act-passivity alternative’ where ‘the distinction between being accused and accusing oneself’ is effaced.  

In sum, Levinas appears to isomorphically derive his ethics of accusation as ‘indeclinable’ from the fact that the personal pronouns in the accusative case do not ‘decline’ from an original nominative. The nominative ‘I’ exists only insofar as it is addressed—accused—as a ‘you’ or a ‘me’. While Levinas is conscious enough of the Greek ptōsis to work a ‘fall’ into his metaphysics, there is no conscious reference to the original Greek meaning of the case of the aittiatikē, that is, ‘the patient of an action caused to happen’.

26 Levinas, Otherwise Than Being, 112, 121.
28 Levinas, Otherwise Than Being, 117.
29 Ibid., 125.
b. *The Passivity of Creation*

What's more, Levinas ties this transcendental accusatory-substitution to the passivity found in concept of creation itself. Arguing against a Western philosophy that only knows the eternality of a preexisting matter, Levinas contrasts the idea of creation which entails an 'absolute passivity, this side of activity and passivity.' The noninstant of creation itself, in its absolute diachrony further suggests 'the total passivity of the self...[which] is a recurrence to the self, on this side of the self.' In fact, the accusation of subjectivity is a heightened sense of the responsibility for creation: 'The self, the subjection or subjectivity of the subject, is the very over-emphasis of a responsibility for creation'. For Levinas, however, this aspect of creation should neither be seen as a mistake inherent to creation nor as a fall; on the contrary, he states, 'The self involved in the gnawing away at oneself in responsibility, which is also incarnation, is not an objectification of the self by the ego. The self, the persecuted one, is accused beyond his fault before freedom, and thus in an unavowable innocence. One must not conceive it to be in the state of original sin; it is, on the contrary, the original goodness of creation'. The goodness of creation thus entails persecution, accusation, subjection, trauma, obsession, and being held hostage—indeed, no light claim to make.

In this situation of being held hostage in persecution, which Levinas insists is 'good', the accused self stands bare, stripped of its imperialistic ego, and announces (in the accusative): 'Here I am' (*me voici*). 'The subjectivity of the subject, as being subject to everything, is a pre-originary susceptibility, before

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30 Such a claim must, of course, insist on refusing to acknowledge the 'Western' philosophy written by Christians themselves from the very beginning of Christianity, not to mention such Jewish thinkers as Philo.

31 Levinas, "Substitution," 87–8. Levinas clarifies this: 'in the concept of creation *ex nihilo*, if it is not a pure nonsense, there is the concept of a passivity that does not revert into an assumption. The self as a creature is conceived in a passivity more passive still than the passivity of matter, that is, prior to the virtual coinciding of a term with itself' (Levinas, *Otherwise Than Being*, 113–14).

32 Levinas, "Substitution," 89. For a further analysis that takes Levinas' passivity to a further extreme, making the Other even more anonymous than perhaps Levinas himself intended, see Thomas Carl Wall, *Radical Passivity: Levinas, Blanchot, and Agamben* (Albany, NY: State University of New York Press, 1999), 31–64, esp. 40–46.

33 Levinas, *Otherwise Than Being*, 125.

34 Ibid., 121, emphasis Levinas'.
all freedom and outside of every present. It is accused in uneasiness or the unconditionality of the accusative, in the "here I am" (me voici) which is obedience to the glory of the Infinite that orders me to the other'.

Levinas goes on to cite Dostoyevsky in *Brothers Karamazov*: 'Each of us is guilty before everyone for everyone, and I more than the others'.

This is the final place that Levinas leaves the traumatized subject in *Otherwise than Being*, uttering 'me, that is, here I am for the others, to lose this place radically, or his shelter in being, to enter into ubiquity which is also a utopia'.

It is precisely a u-topia, a no place, because, as Edith Wyschogrod says in commenting upon these passages, 'To say me voici in this context is not to designate spatial coordinates but rather to place oneself at the disposal of another'.

c. Radical Asymmetry

Before moving onto my attempt to make sense of Levinas on the accused and the accusative, I turn to Levinas' account of the radical asymmetry of the person. From the very beginning, because Levinas' 'ethics' come from the Platonic 'Good beyond being' in a way that strictly opposes any ethics to be found within being whatsoever, at the very heart of his project beats a radical heterogeneity always lurching against, disturbing, and unsettling the 'Same'.

Levinas began his asymmetrical ethics-before-ontology in *Totality and Infinity* first as a critique of the Husserlian ego which he saw as a Hegelian totalizing of the Same of every other ego as an 'alter ego' within its own analogy of apperception.

This is because, as Levinas asks, 'how can the same, produced

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35 Ibid., 146.
36 Ibid. The Dostoyevsky reference is to *Brothers Karamazov*, Book VI, Ila. Levinas in a footnote cites Isaiah 6:8: "'Here I am! Send me." Isaiah, 6:8. "Here I am!" means "send me" (Ibid., 199n.11).
37 Levinas, *Otherwise Than Being*, 185.
as egoism, enter into relationship with an other without immediately divesting it of its alterity? Indeed, Western philosophy for Levinas is entirely constituted of introducing a neutral *tertium quid* into the relationship between the ‘other’ and the ‘same’ for the sake of comprehension. Thus for Levinas, ‘Philosophy is an egology’. Against such an egology which subsumes and sublates (*Aufheben*) all otherness into itself, Levinas argues for an asymmetry on two accounts: the first being the plain experience of intersubjectivity (i.e. ‘the radical impossibility of seeing oneself from the outside and of speaking in the same sense of oneself and of the others’), and the second being the theme of alterity itself in the I’s relation to the Other, which is always a ‘more’ or a ‘less’ in response to the orphan and the widow. With regard to seeing the I as ‘more’ than the Other (this is given less emphasis, and hence the asymmetry), this stems from the resources found within oneself to be true to his or her responsibility to the other; and with respect to seeing the I a ‘less’ than the Other, this is rooted in the obligation and judgment placed upon the I by the face of the Other, which emphasizes the transcendent ‘height’ of the Other’s alterity. Because the height of the Other is a transcendence and not an oppositional immanence, the Other for Levinas can appear as a stranger and not an enemy.

In *Otherwise than Being*, Levinas, as with all his (‘non-’)thematics, pushes the heteronomy further. Levinas qualifies and goes beyond Heidegger’s being-toward-death and displaces the ‘in each case mine’ (*Jemeinigkeit*) of *Dasein* with an originary substitutability: ‘In proximity the other obsesses me according to the absolute asymmetry of signification, of the-one-for-the-other: I substitute myself for him, whereas no one can replace me, and the substitution of the one for the other does not signify the substitution of the other for the one. The relationship with the third party is an incessant

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40 Levinas, *Totality and Infinity*, 38.

41 Ibid., 43.

42 Ibid., 44.

43 Ibid., 53.

44 See the section entitled ‘The Asymmetry of the Interpersonal’ in Ibid., 215–16.
correction of the asymmetry of proximity in which the face is looked at’. 45 Indeed, as Paul Davies says, ‘The relation of asymmetry in which I find myself always already opened to the Other is written, in Otherwise than Being, in such a way that it can never be undone or reappropriated by a higher or more fundamental intersubjectivity’. 46 Asymmetry is never secondary to an original symmetry; on the contrary any possible symmetry between persons (if there is any at all) is only made possible by this fundamental, anarchic, asymmetry of the accusation: the commonplace moral reciprocal relations are founded in a metaphysical asymmetry 47 because ‘no matter which reciprocal relations I can discern between others and me, it is to me that these relations are presented as such’. 48 To help illustrate this asymmetry in the form of an imperative, Jean-François Lyotard thus remarks that the whole discourse of Levinas can be expressed in the following meta-prescriptive command:

‘That I Thou shalt never be / I!’

d. Relating Asymmetrically or Symmetrically?

‘All the classical concepts interrogated by Levinas are thus dragged toward the agora, summoned to justify themselves in an ethico-political language that they have not always sought—or believed that they sought—to speak, summoned to transpose themselves into this language by confessing their violent aims’.

-Jacques Derrida 49

In this section, regarding the issue of a radical asymmetry, I will address the issues Levinas raises with reference to the work of Jacques Derrida and

45 Levinas, Otherwise Than Being, 158. This is essentially the same kind of Levinasian move that Simon Critchley makes against Heidegger in Simon Critchley, ‘Originary Inauthenticity: On Heidegger’s Sein und Zeit’, in Transcendence and Phenomenology, ed. Peter M Candler, Jr. and Conor Cunningham (London: SCM Press, 2007), 21-49.
47 Levinas, Totality and Infinity, 53.
Martin Buber. As the issue here concerns the modality of relationality around the theme of personality incommunicability, Thomas Aquinas will be brought in briefly as well to shed a light on the mode of this communication. If, as Derrida states in the epigraph above, Levinas drags classical concepts to the agora\textsuperscript{30} in order to confess their violence, I propose here to summon classical concepts—as well as Levinas' own ethics—to see the face of the 'other' in the wider traditions of the gathering of the ekklēsia (both inside and outside, before and after).\textsuperscript{31} This assembling of 'wherever two or three are gathered' compels not just an upholding of the economy of relationality, but it also draws upon the reality of the mystery of personal encounter such that where we speak of the name of the other, we do not capture them in a concept, but point one another toward the more original gift of their very being, ultimately to the 'name above all names'.\textsuperscript{32} What I will show below is that, in approaching personhood's truth, there is an intuitive, surface 'sense' in which Levinas is correct regarding the passivity of creation and the 'accusative' status of persons; however, to the extent that he inherits these concepts from others in the tradition of thought he speaks truly, but to the extent that he abandons the truths of the tradition and inscribes the Other within an utterly heterogeneous, an-archic, and traumatic alterity as the 'goodness' of Creation and persons themselves, he completely loses and therefore abandons the person altogether within a radical equivocity.

Levinas' ethical hyper-asymmetry poses two problems (at least). The first are its own logical and ethical implications, and the second regards the loss of the person itself. To the first, the logical and ethical implications of Levinas' radical anarchic heteronomy are as follows: because the other always places an accusatory claim and obligation upon any self (the 'Same'), in order to understand this (i.e. 'obey'), one must never interpret Levinas in the same way

\textsuperscript{30} Is there not a further exchange of capital implied in Derrida's mention of the agora? For this was not a place of confession but a place of speaking publically in the political sphere and also an open area for the marketplace. On related themes critiquing Derrida's understanding of capital and writing, see Catherine Pickstock, After Writing: On the Liturgical Consummation of Philosophy, Challenges in Contemporary Theology (Oxford: Wiley-Blackwell, 1998), 7–33.

\textsuperscript{31} That is, I will be appealing to philosophers and theologians, Atheist, Christian and Jewish, the latter of whom represent both a 'before' the Church temporally as well as an eschatological 'after' indicated by the language of 'grafting' found in Romans 11:23-24.

\textsuperscript{32} Matthew 18:20; Philippians 2:9, respectively.
that he intends. Indeed, throughout *Otherwise than Being*, he constantly expresses his worry that he is still using the language of the 'Said' to give expression to the 'Saying', as he perceives that he is always under the threat using 'ontology' to talk about 'ethics' (this, of course, being a bad thing for Levinas). So, if Levinas is philosophy's Super-Ego of alterity, should we not become obedient by continuing to interpret him otherwise? Lyotard wonders the same thing: 'The more, as aliens to Levinas, we speak of Levinas, the more we conform to his precept—and also, the more Levinas will be bound to welcome the commentary'.

Lyotard goes on to look at what an alterity-as-first-principle entails, and comes to the conclusion that this rule 'necessarily authorizes retortion, enabling the same to be drawn from the other and the other from the same. If this amounts to persecution, it is the fault of the persecuted alone; he suffers only from his own law and refutes himself'. Or, put another way, Levinas invites a kind of belligerent misunderstanding of his own text in order to fully command a respect for the other's desire not to be reduced to the same. In his book *The Differend*, Lyotard phrases it this way: 'The irony of the commentator easily goes as far as persecution: the less I understand you, he says to the Levinassian (or divine) text, the more I will obey you by that fact; for, if I want to understand you (in your turn) as a request, then I should not understand you as sense'. The misunderstanding cannot even be seen as a mere implication here, for Levinas is always arguing within the contours of a command, being indebted to a Kantian imperative, and thus Lyotard argues that we 'should' misunderstand him.

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54 Ibid., 276.
57 Aside from all the language of 'imperative' which shares a fairly explicit connection to the Kantian *Sollen*, Levinas says as much at the end of his chapter on substitution: 'we would think here of Kantism, which finds a meaning to the human without measuring it by ontology and outside of the question “What is there here...?” that one would like to take to be preliminary, outside of the immortality and death which ontologies run up against. The fact that immortality and theology could not determine the categorical imperative signifies the novelty of the Copernican revolution: a sense that is not measured by being or not being; but being on the contrary is determined on the basis of sense' (Levinas, *Otherwise Than Being,*
Consequently, such an originary heteronomy will inhabit a perpetual equivocity, forming a subject, a person that is always divided and torn by a traumatic and heteronomous command. Commenting on this aspect, Simon Critchley benignly remarks, ‘the subject is also divided by this demand, it is constitutively split between itself and a demand that it cannot meet, but which is that by virtue of which it becomes a subject. The ethical subject is a split subject.’58 In an earlier essay, Critchley goes further to say that the Levinasian ‘ethical subject is a traumatic neurotic’.59 William Desmond deduces that such an equivocity stems ‘generally [from] a tendency to dualistic thinking in Levinas, for example, ontology versus metaphysics, being versus the good’.60 Desmond goes on to describe how this dualism and inherent equivocity works...
against his own best intentions regarding the irreplaceability the self. For, if the self is irreplaceable, Desmond asks, 'how can the irreplaceable be substituted? There cannot be a replacement for the non-substitutable, nor a substitute for the irreplaceable. The concept of hostage carried the idea of equivalence: one for the other, a tooth for a tooth. But the concept of equivalence is impossible without the idea of identity, and Levinas's whole discourse of the irreplaceable claims to be prior to the idea of identity and its cognate concepts like equivalence'. Desmond does not intend some kind of static identity here, but on the contrary, he is gesturing toward an analogous logic which founds the difference between one or more in an originary way towards a prior similarity of a 'towards one' (πρὸς ἕν)—otherwise substitution would be impossible against a ruptured 'irreplaceable' self. This brings me to the recognition of a prior mutuality and reciprocity found in the constitution of persons, most poignantly expressed in the work of Martin Buber.

For Buber, his seminal I and Thou is based upon a priority of relation that—even though it did not attempt to denigrate the particularity and singularity of individual persons in any way—is a relation that is always symmetrical. 'Relation is mutual. My Thou affects me, as I affect it. We are molded by our pupils and built up by our works. ... We live our lives inscrutably included within the streaming mutual life of the universe'. Relation's symmetry is made possible not by a primal heteronomy, but by the very fact that it is relation which founds everyone and everything. In a sentence that Levinas himself seemed to overlook, Buber says, 'In the beginning is relation—as category of being, readiness, grasping form, mould for the soul; it is the a priori of relation, the inborn Thou'. If there was not

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61 Desmond, "Philosophies of Religion: Marcel, Jaspers, Levinas," 115 emphasis in original. Desmond continues: 'This is a logical problem with substitution, but it points to a tension that is not merely logical. If we privilege the irreplaceable, there must be a limit to human substitution; by contrast, if we privilege substitution, we compromise the absolute singularity of the irreplaceable. How then can we affirm substitution and the irreplaceable both together? Put this way: Job's second set of children seemed to be replacements for the first dead children, they seem to be substitutes. But the whole thrust of Levinas's thought must be that there can be no replacement for the first irreplaceable children; there are no human substitutes' (ibid).


63 Ibid., 28, emphasis in original. For Levinas' main critique of Buber outside of the scattered references found in Totality and Infinity, see Emmanuel Levinas, "Martin Buber and the Theory of Knowledge," in The Philosophy of Martin Buber, ed. Paul Schilpp and Marucie
this equivalent basis for relation, how could Levinas say that we are even able to substitute for one another if, as Desmond reminds us, Levinas points to the irreplaceability of the self? Even if we grant some sort of degree of absence of the other or even an inability to say ‘Thou’ for any number of reasons (what Levinas and Derrida call the ‘trace’), is it not the case that because the other, while unique and incommunicable, is also ‘just like me’ and someone to whom I may give myself?64 Instead, Levinas is bent on making assertions such as the following: ‘It is thus the B/being in me, the fact that I exist, my existing, that constitutes the absolutely intransitive element, something without intentionality or relations’.65 ‘Utterly to the contrary’, objects Lorenz Puntel, who rightly argues that ‘the most radical and fundamental “element” that I share with others is precisely my Being/existence’.66 No matter how different each member of the community may be from one another, ‘the simplest fact is that every member in the community nevertheless shares at least one thing, namely his own existence/Being, with other human beings’.67 When Buber

Friedman, Library of Living Philosophers 12 (La Salle, IL: Open Court, 1967), 133–50; reprinted in Emmanuel Levinas, “Martin Buber and the Theory of Knowledge,” in The Levinas Reader, trans. and ed. Seán Hand (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1989), 59–74. For Buber’s response see Martin Buber, “Replies to My Critics,” in The Philosophy of Martin Buber, ed. Paul Schilpp and Marucie Friedman, Library of Living Philosophers 12 (La Salle, IL: Open Court, 1967), 689–744. On this topic and Levinas’ relationship with Buber’s thought, including Buber’s own responses to Levinas, see the following helpful article: Robert Bernasconi, “‘Failure of Communication’ as a Surplus: Dialogue and Lack of Dialogue Between Buber and Levinas,” in The Provocation of Levinas: Rethinking the Other, ed. Robert Bernasconi (London and New York: Routledge, 1988), 100–135. The crux of the matter regarding Levinas’ rejection of the symmetry found in Buber’s thought comes down to Levinas assimilating Buber into trends in recent thought, ‘specifically Husserl and Heidegger, where the substantality and independent reality of the self is denied’. Bernasconi continues, ‘Had Levinas read Buber’s 1957 Postscript to I and Thou—or indeed had he been more attentive to the third part of I and Thou instead of focusing largely, like most readers, on the first part—he might not have gone on to ask whether Buber had been aware of “the logical originality of relation”. Appealing to the notion of an absolute Person, Buber had in the Postscript explicitly embraced the contradictory nature of the relation as arising out of the supra-contradictory nature of God. This contradiction is met by the paradoxical designation of God as the absolute Person, that is one that cannot be relativized’ (Ibid., 111).

64 Cf.: ‘All suffering is unique—and all suffering is common. I have to be reminded of the latter truth when I am suffering myself—and of the former when I see others suffering’ (Henri de Lubac, Paradoxes of Faith [San Francisco, CA: Ignatius Press, 1987], 171).
67 Ibid.
therefore says, ‘Between you and it there is mutual giving: you say *Thou* to it and give yourself to it, it says *Thou* to you and gives itself to you,’ Buber is making an implicit connection between the nature of creation—‘in the beginning was relation’ which engenders ‘the mutual life of the universe’—and the very nature of the human persons themselves who have a share in this Being to which we have a relation. In other words, it is not accidental that we bear an intrinsic relation to one another within ‘the heavens and the earth’ whose essence it is to relate; on the contrary, our inner relation to one to another within creation is the very nature of things.

Derrida’s essay ‘Violence and Metaphysics’—his first response to Levinas’ work in general and to *Totality and Infinity* in particular—provides an occasion to critique Levinas’ asymmetricality in relation to Husserl in light of what we have said regarding Buber. Derrida mainly restricts his criticisms to Levinas’ interpretation of Husserl, but he does offer some brief comments regarding Levinas’ conceptual relationship to Buber—namely, that Levinas opposes ‘the magisterial height of the *You* to the intimate reciprocity of the Me-Thou’ and then goes on to show how Levinas offers up a philosophy of the ‘*He (II)*’ which, while it would seem at first glance to be impersonal, Derrida sees this as the transcendence of the personal Other which absconds in absence. While the description of this Other as personal is wholly debatable, for now I will confine my line of exposition to what is at hand in Derrida’s defense of Husserl.

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69 Martin Hägglund argues that Derrida’s thought is inherently violent and atheistic, especially as he draws out his argument in dialogue with various thinkers, including Levinas. On this see the chapter ‘Arche-Violence: Derrida & Levinas’ in Martin Hägglund, *Radical Atheism: Derrida and the Time of Life*, Meridian, Crossing Aesthetics (Stanford, CaA: Stanford University Press, 2008), 76–106. While I would tend to agree with this kind of reading, Steven Shakespeare does in fact raise some important points in response in *Derrida and Theology*, Philosophy and Theology (London and New York: T & T Clark, 2009), 204–8.

70 Derrida, “Violence and Metaphysics,” 105. Also, see Ibid., 314n.37. Derrida goes on to say in this footnote, ‘Levinas, in substance, reproaches the I-Thou relationship (1) for being reciprocal and symmetrical, thus committing violence against height, and especially against separateness, and secretiveness; (2) for being formal, capable of “uniting man to things, as much as Man to man”; (3) for preferring preference, the “private relationship,” the “clandestine nature” of the couple which is “self-sufficient and forgetful of the universe”’.

71 For more on this, see below where I examine the extent to which ‘personal’ for Levinas is actually otherwise than personal, against his own intentions.
In question here is Levinas' critique of Husserl’s ego in the fifth of his *Cartesian Meditations*. Levinas rejects the Husserlian ego precisely at the point where Husserl discusses the recognition of other egos within the analogical apperception, seeing others as ‘alter egos’. Graham Ward notes here that Levinas’ rejection of Husserl is actually a *reversal* of Husserl’s analogy of apperception: ‘the Ego is now a modification of the infinitely other’ which gives rise to the radical dissymmetry. As Levinas himself sees it, the ego in Husserl’s version of the analogy of apperception goes awry because the ego acts in a Hegelian fashion, totalizing and sublating all other egos into itself, such that all other egos are really a modification of my own ego, similar to a kind of Spinozistic modification of the one same substance. According to Derrida, however, this is exactly the opposite of how Husserl actually expresses the analogical apperception. For,

If the other were not recognized as a transcendental alter *ego* [in Husserl], it would be entirely in the world and not, as ego, the origin of the world. To refuse to see in it an ego in this sense is, within the ethical order, the very gesture of all violence. If the other was not recognized as ego, its entire alterity would collapse. Therefore, it seems that one may not suppose that Husserl makes of the other an other like myself (in the factual sense of the word), or a *real* modification of *my life*, without misconstruing his most permanent and openly stated intentions. If the Other was a real moment of my egological life, if ‘inclusion of an other monad within my own’ (*Cartesian Meditations*) was real, I would perceive it *originality*. Husserl does not cease to emphasize that this is an absolute impossibility.

Likewise, Ward remarks that ‘[w]ithin Husserl’s thinking there is no room for an absolutely other that can be recognized as such’. Because the other has an ‘egoity’ about which I can speak, similar to how I speak of and understand my own ego, this allows me to speak of him or her as an Other—at all—as opposed to a table or a stone. This allows for recognition within the economy

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73 Derrida, “Violence and Metaphysics,” 125. Bernasconi makes an astute observation at this point: ‘There is some curiosity in finding Derrida, albeit in 1964, apparently according a special privilege to whether an author recognizes himself in an interpretation of his works. Did Levinas recognize himself when he read Derrida’s interpretation and would it have posed a problem for Derrida’s reading had he not done so? Did not Derrida himself in the same place insist on the difference between Levinas’s “intentions” and his “philosophical discourse”?’ Bernasconi, ‘“Failure of Communication as a Surplus,”’ 107.
of the transcendental ego. Derrida emphasizes that '[d]issymmetry itself would be impossible without this symmetry, which is not of the world, and which, having no real aspect, imposes no limit upon alterity and dissymmetry—[it] makes them possible, on the contrary'. 75 While Derrida would later go on to critique most forms of thought and being that fall within an economy, 76 here he defends this dissymmetry as 'an economy in a new sense; a sense which would probably be intolerable to Levinas'. 77

Particularly enlightening is Derrida's next statement: 'Despite the logical absurdity of this formulation, this economy is the transcendental symmetry of two empirical asymmetries'. 78 The complexity of this statement notwithstanding, what I want to argue is that Derrida is correct to argue this, for it seems to accord with everyday experience. For example, a common expression, often uttered in a semi-cynical tone, goes like this: 'You are unique...just like everybody else!' The 'just like everybody else' refrain is most often added as if to take back with the left hand what the right hand has given, as if to say, 'actually, because you are unique just like everybody else, that makes you not very unique after all!' But, to consider the original phrase for a moment ('you are unique just like everybody else'), this is exactly what the advent of describing the incommunicability of the person is supposed to intend in the first place. 79 Thomas Aquinas expresses the exact same logic in the  Summa Theologica  when he is asked whether the term 'person' is common to all three persons of the Holy Trinity: for it would seem that, following Richard of St Victor, because persons are incommunicable, all three could not be persons. Thomas responds, saying, 'Although person is incommunicable, yet the mode itself of incommunicable existence can be common to many'. 80 If the mode of incommunicability was not common to all, then the consequence of this would be that there could only be one person in existence,

75 Derrida, "Violence and Metaphysics," 126.
77 Derrida, "Violence and Metaphysics," 126, emphasis in original.
78 Ibid., 126, emphasis mine.
80 ST, I, q. 30, a. 4 ad 2.
just like Spinoza's one substance with many modifications. In this case there would be only one person of the Trinity, and what then are the rest of us humans? To this, as Adrian Pabst remarks in a strikingly similar way to Derrida above, 'there is an asymmetrical relation between unity and diversity which is grounded in a symmetrical relation within the triune Godhead and which provides the foundation for peaceful practicing relations across creation'.

How would we appear to each other and how would we ever recognize ourselves without some sort of Husserlian analogy of the ego—or some other philosophically and theologically worthy equivalent?

Because Levinas rejects the analogous vision of Husserl, what in fact happens is that the person in Levinas' ethics actually vanishes altogether. And it does this by precisely falling prey to his own critique of Husserl with the following logic: the only real person is the Other who accuses us from the hither side of being, beyond essence, and this Other we never actually encounter at all in any particular way, so, we are thus left to be accused violently on this side of being. That is, the real self is really the Illecity of the third (whom we never meet), and because Levinas denies the analogy, which implies that we can never recognize the Other (for anytime we speak of content this falls into that which is 'thematizable' and the 'Same' for Levinas), let alone ourselves. Even though Levinas almost inchoately accepts the analogy when he says, '[a]lturity is only possible starting from me,' and even

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82 W. Norris Clarke, "The 'We Are' of Interpersonal Dialogue," in Explorations in Metaphysics: Being—God—Person (Notre Dame, IN: University of Notre Dame Press, 1994), 31–44. Here Clarke makes a similar argument to my own except Clarke is responding to the anti-Realism found in Kant and his heirs. In this enlightening article, he helpfully compliments Thomas's esse commune with the existential findings of Twentieth-century phenomenologists. Clark moves from the aspect of epistemologically perceiving others as "like me" (p. 38) to the recognition of a metaphysically-shared, and common existence of the "we are" (p. 40) Additionally see John Crosby, "The Empathetic Understanding of Other Persons," in Personalist Papers (Washington, D. C.: Catholic University of America Press, 2003), 33–63. For an account which critiques what he considers analogical reasoning, see the chapter 'The Perception of Other Minds' in Max Scheler, The Nature of Sympathy, trans. Peter Heath (New Brunswick, NJ: Transaction Publishers, 2007), 238–64. Crosby, in the chapter mentioned above, offers a critique of Scheler. I would add that it seems that because Scheler is operating under the assumption that such 'meditation' is a bad thing, that is is misunderstanding the real kind of personal analogy which Thomas Aquinas argues for, and for which I am arguing in this thesis which does not subsume two things (or people) to a third concept.
83 Levinas, Totality and Infinity, 305.
though Bettina Bergo insists that '[t]he encounter with a face is inevitably personal,' though there is a real problem here, as David Bentley Hart avers: 'the other—to remain truly other—cannot in any way actually appear: neither by way of phenomenology's analogies and reductions, nor by way of any prior understanding of being and beings, nor within the reach of simple recognition (in every case, one remains within the confines of the Same). Rather, alterity is intimated solely in moments of rupture or discontinuity; the otherness that makes demands of us is alien to us, from beyond the totality'. The Other never actually appears in Levinas because he continually denies context, place, any sort of features whatsoever. Besides 'the countenance,' says John Llewelyn commenting in a positive fashion on Levinas, 'the face has no features or properties or substance, no ousia. The significance of the face is abstract [emphasis mine], but its abstractness is prior to the abstractness defined by the structuralist as the separability of the intersubstitutability of propositional signs from a given empirical embodiment'. How does one recognize an abstract significance of the face, let alone anything or anyone at all that possesses no substance? When Hart remarks that 'the other is always the same, always nothing but the infinite orientation of my ethical adventure, my flight of the alone to the alone, secure in my purity of intention,' what he is indicating here is that the denial of the analogy—an analogy which can only be the form of charity—means that Levinas' real person in the (non-)form of the Other is only one, same, un-communicable person. How would the Other

86 Llewelyn, "Levinas and Language," 120. To this kind of thinking, Hart, "Response to James K. A. Smith, Lois Malcolm and Gerard Loughlin," 616. says, 'At least, in the thought of Levinas and the later Derrida, "others" are nowhere to be found. Instead, one encounters only the Other, who—as far as I can tell—is obligingly devoid of an identity, a faith, an address, or any stated opinion regarding the designated hitter rule (a reference I fear only American readers will understand). In fact, the most attractive quality of the Other, I suspect, is his or her or its absolute purity from any of the obnoxious traits of others: convictions, prejudices, and customs; passions, discontents, and aspirations; and so on'.
87 Hart, The Beauty Of The Infinite, 82.
even know how to recognize the Same to accuse him or her if there was not some way to charitably say, 'This person seems like another person, although they're obviously not me, but because I recognize that they are like me, then they must be an other person'?

With an absolute accusation, an absolute an-archic heteronomy which means that asymmetry comes first and foremost as rupture, Levinas could only ever say within the boundaries he has set for his ethics: 'The obsessing Other is unique'—full stop: not like everybody else, at all. Buber, in his reply to Levinas' criticism of his own emphasis on the symmetry of relation, rightly said, 'The asymmetry that wishes to limit the relation to the relationship to a higher would make it completely one-sided: love would either be unreciprocated by its nature or each of the two lovers must miss the reality of the other'. By its nature, the accusation of the obsessive Other must remain unreciprocated, for if it was reciprocated, it would seem that Levinas would lose all 'height' of the Other. But Levinas cannot conceive of a transcendence that is not purely negative, and thus this 'height' always shows itself as alienating. On this matter, Puntel remarks, 'Real, genuine transcendence is within the sphere of (subjective genitive!) absolute infinity, not outside of it. God as the absolutely transcendent, as the “absolute Other” in Levinas's sense, is a relativized God, a God who stands in a negative relation to an X, i.e., finite being(s). This is the most central error in Levinas's conception of God as absolutely transcendent'. Buber and Derrida correctly perceive that beginning from an originary asymmetry with the Other beyond Being simply cannot work, for this presumption loses the other person either by command (as Lyotard saw), or it brings one to a contradictory standstill of not knowing whether one can substitute oneself for another because they are originally 'irreplaceable' (as Desmond showed), or it denies all commonsense


89 Puntel, Being and God, 299, emphasis in original.
relationality to Being and to one another (Buber and Puntel),\(^90\) or finally, as I have just demonstrated, altogether persons are lost in that they miss the reality of each other. If there is more than one person at all, there must be something—or someone—that makes this analogy subsist.

e. Persons: Communing in the Accusative of Creation

To conclude this exploration of the accusative, I return now to the focus upon the nature of the ‘accusative’ with reference to the grammatical-ethical-ontological insights of Jean-Luc Marion, Michel Henry, and Franz Rosenzweig in order to help illuminate what is at stake for gesturing towards a fuller account of the human person. Above, I have shown that the otherness of persons requires some sort of ‘symmetry’, a transcendental something (someone?) that makes all of our radical uniqueness possible in the first instance; that is, the necessity for some kind of ‘analogy’ has emerged.\(^91\) In the grammatical sections before that, I showed how the grammar of the accusative in Levinas’ thought functions, on the one hand, in relation to the persecution by the Other, and on the other hand, in relation to the passivity of creation which also appears to exist in the accusative. It is true, as J. Aaron Simmons and David Wood comment, that ‘[w]hen Levinas distinguishes between the vocative (accusative) and the constative (nominative) elements in language, he

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\(^90\) While it is outside of the scope of this analysis, Puntel also highlights another crucial error in Levinas: ‘Levinas falls victim to an absolutely elementary confusion—one between knowledge and a practical attitude or practical act. He fails to find in knowledge something that belongs not there, but instead in the domain of practical behavior and action. When he maintains, “The most audacious and remote knowledge does not put us in communion with the truly other; it does not take the place of sociality,” he reveals his deep confusion. It is of course the case that “the most audacious and remote knowledge does not put us in communion with the truly other,” if the sense of communion in question is one that belongs in the domain of practical action. Knowledge is not practical action, is not (practical) recognition of the other, is not (practical) respect of the other, is not real love of the other, or anything of the sort. But on the theoretical level the other is known, is articulated, precisely as the other. It is of course the case that sociality does not have the same structure that knowledge has. That Levinas does not see this as obvious reveals the depth of his confusion’ (Ibid., 287).

\(^91\) To be sure, Levinas himself constructs a kind of analogy between the other (l’autre) and the Other (l’Autre), but what is gestured toward here in his thought still remains within a kind of radical heterogeneity which always arrives violently.
does so with an eye toward human relationships and not simply a concern for the philosophy of language.

While this may have been Levinas' intent, as I have shown above, not only do relationships become impossible within such a radically asymmetrically heteronomous ethics, but moreover, the person itself disappears into a Spinozan One which is not immanently and pantheistically here, but somehow lives 'beyond essence' on the hither side of being (even Buber, who originally disallowed any kind of mediation in his original I-Thou schema recognized the importance of an original, analogous 'Absolute Person'). Yet at the same time, Levinas' grammatical focus also intends to say something ontological about the passivity of creation. Levinas is actually correct to argue that creation is passive in the accusative sense and that at times we can be accused, and even stand accused in front of our Creator, but this is not the last, nor especially the first word. To emphasize the accusative and turn the pun of the accusation by the Other into the primary way that the self can exist is in fact an extremely impoverished way to approach not only language, but also the mutuality of existence itself. The grammar here is important, as it indicates and signifies realities beyond mere descriptive grammars and 'thick descriptions,' however much these grammars may be helpful as limiting prolegomena to analogical speech.

92 J. Aaron Simmons and David Wood, "Introduction: Good Fences May Not Make Good Neighbors After All," in Kierkegaard and Levinas: Ethics, Politics, and Religion (Indianapolis, IN: Indiana University Press, 2010), 2. To be precise here, however, the vocative is actually a separate case than the accusative, one which would come 'before' the accusative in the dative sense of giving, address, and supplication.

93 See the afterword at Buber, I and Thou, 101.

94 Although, of course, he would reject the designation of the 'ontological', opting instead (in Totality and Infinity) for 'metaphysics'.

95 For example, that of Clifford Geertz and some within the theological sensibility dubbed 'Post-Liberal' associated with George Lindbeck and Hans Frei of the Yale School. However, it must be noted that the arguments of Lindbeck in The Nature of Doctrine: Religion and Theology in a Postliberal Age (London: SPCK, 1984) have often been misconstrued in an over-excitement to focus upon the "grammar" aspect forgetting that this can only be made sense of within Lindbeck's original ecumenical concerns. For more on this, see chapter 3, "I Pray That They Might Be One as We Are One": An Interview with George Lindbeck' of John W. Wright, ed., Postliberal Theology and the Church Catholic: Conversations with George Lindbeck, David Burrell, and Stanley Hauerwas (Grand Rapids, MI: Brazos Press, 2012).

96 These concerns can be seen most astutely in the work of David Burrell, C.S.C., who follows the insights of Ludwig Wittgenstein and Victor Preller to construct a 'Wittgensteinian-Thomism'. See Victor Preller, Divine Science and the Science of God: A Reformulation of Thomas Aquinas (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1967); David B. Burrell, Analogy and Philosophical Language (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1973); David B. Burrell, Aquinas: God and Action (Scranton and London: University of Scranton Press, 2008), 63-81, 97-100, e.g., "determine what must be stated grammatically, so that we can
The grammatical preliminaries in the previous sections were necessary for my argument, because at stake here is what it means to ‘stand accused’: standing accused always means standing within a further witness to the truth, and thus the grammar here also indicates that the accusative only ever makes sense within an originary dative, a giving, a vocative calling of Creation out of nothing and giving the gift of existence and redemption itself. To exist as a person means always to first be given (dative) that personhood, standing under (hypostasis) the relation of the First Person in which all of creation itself is held together (Col 1:17). But it also means that being a person is to be at the same time one who is named.

Derrida had similar misgivings of reducing everything to the accusative at the expense of all else, as early as his ‘Violence and Metaphysics’ essay. Wondering what the encounter with the absolutely-other actually entails, he says, ‘the concept (material of language), which is always given to the other, cannot encompass the other, cannot include the other. The dative or vocative dimension which opens the original direction of language, cannot lend itself to inclusion in and modification by the accusative or attributive dimension of the object without violence’. For Derrida this is in fact an inescapable violence, but it is the only way to precede (in contrast to Levinas’ later Gnostic attempt to escape all being). So for now, in the meantime, Derrida insists on not speaking of the other in the accusative, as this in fact makes the other an object. Rather, as Derrida intones, ‘I can only, I must only speak to the other; that is, I must call him in the vocative, which is not a category, a case of recognize what sort of things cannot be asserted of God” (Ibid., 97); and the essays in Jeffrey Stout and Robert MacSwain, eds., Grammar and Grace: Reformulations of Aquinas and Wittgenstein (London: SCM Press, 2004).

97 Robert B. Gibbs, “Substitution: Marcel and Levinas,” in Emmanuel Levinas: Critical Assessments of Leading Philosophers, ed. Claire Katz and Lara Trout, trans. Jeffrey L. Kosky, vol. 3: Levinas and the Question of Religion (London and New York: Routledge, 2005), 159–60, originally printed in: Philosophy & Theology 4 (Winter 1989): 171-85: “Absolute passivity taken grammatically is being absolutely in the accusative case, to be the object. This allows Levinas the pun on an indeclinable case—one which cannot be declined through the cases to become a subject of action (nominative), nor an indirect object (dative), nor a possession (genitive).” The problem with passages like this is that it overlooks that the dative does not merely act as indicating a direct object, but comes primarily, as stated above, from giving, which then can also include other functions as indicating a direct object, or the subject to whom one addresses or gives supplication.

speech, but, rather the bursting forth, the very raising up of speech'.\textsuperscript{99} That is, the least violent way one can call upon the other is by calling (vocative) the name of the other. The name itself need not be a totalizing ‘theme’ as Levinas constantly insists, but rather, it is the spring of language itself, and more importantly, the only truly personal way to address other persons.

Giving also implies, one may always hope, a welcoming, a reception. Jean-Luc Marion, writing on very Levinasian themes in an essay entitled ‘The Final Appeal of the Subject,’ also gives voice to the fuller picture of the canvas of language.

It is no longer a question of comprehending this giving according to the nominative case (Husserl) or according to the genitive case (of Being: Heidegger) nor even according to the accusative case (Levinas), but rather according to the dative case—I receive myself from the call or appeal which gives me to myself. It would almost be necessary to suppose that this strange dative case was not here distinguished from the ablative case (as in Greek), since the myself/me accomplishes, insofar as it is the first gift which derives from the appeal or call, the opening of all other donations or gifts and particular givens, which are possibly ethical. As a given dative, an ablative giving, one might say that the myself/me is played out in the manner of the ablative. Receiving itself from the call or appeal which summons it, the myself/me undergoes an interlocution—defining the fact of its pure donation—by reducing every other possible phenomenon to pure donation according to interlocution. Interlocution thus marks the ultimate phenomenological reduction.\textsuperscript{100}

More cognizant of language’s own reciprocity, Marion appears here to reduce Levinas’ absolute accusative (and obsessive accusation) to the ‘interlocutionary’. By itself this move allows for reciprocity, the give-and-take of gifts and the mutual supplication expected of one another (i.e. ‘I expect to

\textsuperscript{99} Ibid., 103.

tell you when I am wrong'), but it also allows for the very receiving of one's own personhood in and through the other, the interlocutor. A feast, a communion, can only be possible in such a picture of reception. Yet, because Levinas excludes this from the start with a wholly anonymous other, it seems that there can be no feasting: 'The relationship with the other is not an idyllic and harmonious relationship of communion, or a sympathy through which we put ourselves in the other’s place...the relationship with the other is a relationship with a Mystery'.

While it is true that relating to the other is relating to a mystery, Levinas' assumptions concerning this relation are entirely negative; that is, on the flip side, there is still a possibility that positively, the person is both a mystery and that moreover, a relationship of communion may very well be possible precisely because the other still has a name—the nominative need not be ruled out. Simply because the person is a mystery does not mean that one cannot relate to them, unless, of course, from the start one rules out the assumption that the other might be 'like' me, in the sense of a simile or an analogy.

I will address one further attempt that has been made to soften the terrorizing language of Levinas. Robert Bernasconi has written an essay connecting Levinas with Augustine entitled 'The Truth that Accuses: Conscience, Shame, and Guilt in Levinas and Augustine'. In some ways his attempt to connect Levinas and Augustine are very laudable, and the connection is more than implicit. For example, Bernasconi finds evidence to compare Levinas with Augustine playing on an ambiguity between a truth that also calls one into question: 'In this lecture [called “Notes sur le sense”] from 1979, that was first published in 1981, and reprinted in a revised version in De Dieu qui vient à l'idée the following year, Levinas offered two translations of the phrase veritas redarguens. It is both the truth which accuses and the truth which puts in question.'

The effect of this historical connection is an attempt to temper the connotations of legal accusation and moreover, against a

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101 Levinas, *Time and the Other*, 75; cited in Hart, *The Beauty Of The Infinite*, 78.
103 Ibid., 26.
daily legalism of telling one to do this and that.  

The conscience that Levinas describes, beyond making one guilty—for this is what an accusation implies—is meant to induce shame as well as a kind of anxiety. But the primary argument that Bernasconi makes is that by subordinating the ontological order to the ethical in this way, ‘it points to his attempt to free ethics from its dependence on a legalistic model’.

At first blush, this is an extremely odd claim to make. Is not the opposite exactly the case? Is it not the pure imperative of the ethical that comes before any consideration of the beauty, truth, and goodness of existence the very basis for the worst legalisms? Moreover, does not the reduction of all personal address to the accusative sound like the most juridical nightmare? That is, to constantly be told that ‘You are to blame’, ‘You are the one who did this’, etc.—how is this accusation not legalistic, let alone condemning? As mentioned, Levinas does tell us that alterity begins from a ‘me’, and that his ethical response is to announce (always in the accusative) a denuded-by-the-other ‘Here I am’ (me voici). But as Marion and the early Derrida have pointed out, this cannot be primary. One must first give the gift of the other by calling upon their name, even if in the worst turn of events you are guilty for any number of wrongs. The supplication to forgive always first responds back in the dative calling upon a nominative in the vocative, that is, an address to someone with a name in the mode of address; otherwise, responding in the accusative in kind is what leads to escalation and ultimately, against all of Levinas’ intentions, to war.

For a positive account of the accusative within the larger economy of the giving of creation, I now turn to the thought of Franz Rosenzweig and Michel Henry. These two thinkers have extremely divergent approaches to thinking and constellations of thought in which they inhabit. That is, Rosenzweig is

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104 Ibid., 29.
105 Ibid., 34.
106 Ibid.
107 One can think of any number of arguments one has had or witness where two people constantly exchange an accusatory You. Forgiveness never begins here. Another kind of ‘You’, similar in kind to Buber’s ‘Thou’, is found in the thought of Eugen Rosenstock-Huessy. On this more unifying and revelatory dimension of the soul, see Gibbs, Correlations in Rosenzweig and Levinas, 64–7, esp. 66.
largely responding to the idealism of the ‘all’ in Hegel,\(^{108}\) and Henry is articulating his philosophy to a great extent by reacting against Heidegger’s\(^ {109}\) concept of the manifestation of truth.\(^ {110}\) Both thinkers, however, share an attentiveness to language that includes significant references to the accusative aspect of grammar, not merely for grammar’s sake, but to indicate a deep ontological aspect of the person and of creation.

Rather than primarily structuring his work around grammatical cases, Rosenzweig traces the contours of his theological concepts around grammatical moods, and around the concepts of the call.\(^ {111}\) Particularly, he orders the concepts of Creation, Revelation, and Redemption respectively around the three moods of the indicative, the imperative, and cohortative, which themselves correspond to the three tenses of past, present, and future. While I will not explore the details of these grammatical moods here,\(^ {112}\) I will address his work insofar as it does refer to the same cases of grammar addressed above.

Under a threatening Idealism that attempted to sublimate all particulars into an ‘all’ without language, Rosenzweig, much like Kierkegaard and especially Hamann before him, turned to language to embrace the particular.\(^ {113}\) One of

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\(^{108}\) His main work being *The Star of Redemption.*

\(^{109}\) For a helpful comparison of Heidegger and Rosenzweig, see Richard A. Cohen, “Selfhood in Heidegger and Rosenzweig,” *Human Studies* 16, no. 1/2 (1993): 111–28. While they share many concerns, one of their main differences is that Rosenzweig upholds the notion of the soul [*Seele*] in his thought (see pp. 121-3).


\(^{111}\) The point of departure for [Eugen] Rosenstock-Huessy’s grammar is that the second person (the “you”) is originary: a child begins to become conscious of itself through the commands addressed to it; and a person becomes a person by responding when addressed and thereby discovering the “I” of the first person. The “you” is the experience of being called; the “I” of answering; the ‘he, she, it’ of what cannot give an answer, and therefore of what cannot be addressed. The soul thus becomes aware of itself first from outside, finding itself something other. The child discovers its “I” as the ability to answer, to say “yes” or “no”, to that call from the other’ (Ibid., 64; citing Eugen Rosenstock-Huessy, “Angewandte Seelenkunde,” in *Die Sprache Des Menschengeschlechts*, vol. 2 [Heidelberg: Verlag Lambert Schneider, 1963], 754). For more on the connection between Rosenzweig and Rosenstock-Huessy, see Gibbs, *Correlations in Rosenzweig and Levinas*, 59, 62–7.

\(^{112}\) For an overview on this, see Gibbs, *Correlations in Rosenzweig and Levinas*, 67–79. For Rosenzweig’s own grammatical introduction to book II, see Rosenzweig, *The Star of Redemption*, 118–21.

Rosenzweig’s tactics was to emphasize the named quality of language, something with which German Idealism could not cope: ‘for even if everything in it [Idealism] could be translated into the universal—there remained the fact of having a first and last name, the most personal thing in the strictest and narrowest sense of the word, and everything depended precisely on that personal reality, as the bearers of these experiences asserted’.

Idealism cannot ultimately account for the particular of the name for, if it is especially of the Hegelian type of Idealism which begins bathed in the aether of Spinozism, then the subjectivity of the person tends to get lost. Michael Mack points out that the immanent production of transcendence in Idealism is really that of an ‘anti-creaturely theology’, which for Rosenzweig means that it does ‘away with its contingent, “bodily” foundation’. If Idealism does away with bodily realities, then what, or more precisely who is saved in a theology of redemption? Rosenzweig’s describes his approach: ‘From Creation, we had sought the path to Revelation’.

Mack articulates the movement of the argument thus: ‘Rosenzweig ... affirmed the independence of God, world, and man, only to prepare the ground for their correlation, in which, thanks to the distance between these three entities, love of one for the other becomes possible’.

The call of the proper name, for Rosenzweig, opens the world of Revelation up into genuine dialogue, and like Buber’s I-Thou in contrast to the I-It relation, ‘a breach is opened in the fixed wall of thingliness’. What’s

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114 Rosenzweig, The Star of Redemption, 13.
115 ‘When one begins to philosophize one must be first a Spinozist. The soul must bathe itself in the aether of this single substance, in which everything one has held for true is submerged’ (Hegel, Werke XX, 165, as cited in Frederick C. Beiser, ‘Introduction: Hegel and the Problem of Metaphysics’, in Cambridge Companion to Hegel, ed. Frederick C. Beiser [Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1993], 5).
117 Rosenzweig, The Star of Redemption, 202–3. ‘Von der Schöpfung hatten wir den Weg zur Offenbarung gesucht’ (Franz Rosenzweig, Der Stern Der Erlösung [Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp, 1990], 209).
118 Mack, German Idealism and the Jew, 121.
119 Rosenzweig, The Star of Redemption, 201. This is not to overlook the disagreements between Buber and Rosenzweig. On debates concerning issues of translation and the law, see respectively, Leora Batnitzky, Idolatry and Representation: The Philosophy of Franz Rosenzweig Reconsidered (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2000), 105–41; idem,
more, as in the case of Adam naming the creatures in Genesis, 'The proper
name lays claim to names beyond itself'. That is, Adam is not merely
naming by his own human fiat, but is himself taking part in the reception of
revelation, of uncovering. There is an analogy to be drawn here to Balthasar's
understanding of truth: 'truth is always an opening, not just to itself and in
itself, but to further truth. It dis-covers being and thus the rich coherence of
being. It opens up the prospect of hitherto unknown territory. It contains
within itself a movement toward further truth'. This means that for
Rosenzweig, the experience that is lived personally shares in existence with
others in a particular place, which 'demands being founded in Creation
[...]'). The warp and woof of language can only be woven into a particular
place in Creation, for it is the very clay that grammar molds, and only in such
a place does language move and have its being. Thus, it is in such a place that
Rosenzweig describes the cases of grammar:

It is only as object that it travels through the "cases"; as nominative in
a passive sentence, it is only a camouflaged accusative or, in any case
and more accurately: a prediction of the subject still veiled in the form
of the object. In the genitive, the possessive form, there flows together
a double current that came from the nominative and the accusative;
after the confluence, they assume, in the dative, their own name and
their own direction. But the dative, the form of belonging, of offering,
of thanking, of both surrendering and making an effort, goes beyond
the mere object and the mere point of departure; in the dative, subject
and object meet.

Because he is not fearful of Creation, of Being, Rosenzweig is able to think
the full fabric of being, and express its full texture with an entire grammar. He
does not reduce everything to the accusative like Levinas, but can still use it to
describe Creation. Moreover, divine and human freedom are never at odds in
his thought, for the grammar seems to give a way to freely talk about these
two agencies: 'The nouns of this chapter, due to the fact that God alone takes
the place of the active subject, are objects in the accusative, objects created by

"Revelation and Neues Denken - Rethinking Buber and Rosenzweig on the Law," in New
120 Rosenzweig, The Star of Redemption, 201.
121 Hans Urs von Balthasar, Theo-Logic: Theological Logical Theory: Truth of the World,
123 Ibid., 140, emphasis mine.
God; or again, as things become, in the passive nominative case: “the” heavens and “the” earth. The ‘otherwise’ of which Levinas speaks can only result in a non-place, a ‘world [that] remains in the night of the absence of names’. There is no need for the rupture of the nominative by the accusative in Rosenzweig’s thought, because his use of the nominative case need not be ‘thematizing’ in a totalizing sense, for Rosenzweig is also against such Hegelian totality. Names can be ‘in’ the nominative, but also the accusative, and they signify not themes but persons. Spoken more precisely, the name (nominative) reveals a person in that it names a person.

The nominative and accusative are never rigid in Rosenzweig, because of the fact that they only refer to a person who experiences life but may also refer to the Creator. Here he speaks of ‘two kinds of subjects, two kinds of nominatives; likewise that which he possesses and that which he sees is separate from that which the world possesses and sees; these are two kinds of objects, two kinds of accusatives’. And because the one to whom the creature gives thanks is not an ‘object’ in the strict sense but is ‘the very one to whom the whole world gives thanks’, this signifies the reality of the lived relation which he describes as the dative:

In the dative, which transcends all, there are hidden the voices of the hearts separated here below. The dative is that which joins, that which gathers together; he who receives, for example the act of thanks as is the case here, does not for this reason become the property of what is given to him; he remains beyond the one who gives, and because he remains beyond the singular giver, he can become the point where all can be united; the dative which truly joins can be that which truly unties every bond knotted beyond the truth, every inessential bond, can be that [which] re-deems—let us give thanks to God.

Commenting upon Rosenzweig’s understanding of the dative, Robert Gibbs remarks, ‘the dative case structures the unity of the cohortative singing of

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124 Ibid., 164.
126 Rosenzweig, *The Star of Redemption*, 250.
127 Ibid.
beloved and world; it represents the recipient of the gift, the person who is neither simply the subject of the action (the giver) nor the object acted upon (the gift). The dative contains the original Yes to the world, the giving of Creation, as well as the receiving in itself of this gift.

It is now for the first time in this chapter that we can situate ourselves within the original ‘causal’ sense (aitia) of the ‘accusative’, before its Latin mistranslation. The unifying and thanks-giving aspect of the dative, which Rosenzweig highlights, brings this causal aspect to the fore: ‘Every act of thanks is concentrated in the dative; the act of thanks gives thanks for the gift; when giving thanks to God, one confesses the origin of the gift in him, one recognizes in him the one who answers the prayer’. To acknowledge that Creation is a gift, and that one is a gift within this prior gift of Creation, is to acknowledge the original giving of the gift by the Creator—the original ‘real order’ of giving which we have been calling the ‘dative’. Yet, if it is true that creatures can only know their Creator by the effects of the Creator (although this is not exhaustive), then we can now see that the ‘accusative’ represents that ‘order of knowledge’ as perceived by creatures; in other words, the ‘accusative’ represents that reasonable intuition that recognizes one’s status as an ‘effect’ from an original cause, that is: ontologically, to ‘stand accused’ means to be caused, or rather, created. The ‘two kinds of accusatives’ of which Rosenzweig speaks above are the ‘real’ order and the order that comes ‘by way of creaturely knowledge’: God creates God’s Creation, speaks

128 Gibbs, Correlations in Rosenzweig and Levinas, 76.
129 ‘The Yes is the beginning’ (Rosenzweig, The Star of Redemption, 34–5).
130 Ibid., 250, emphasis mine.
131 Thomas Aquinas, Summa Contra Gentiles, ed. Joseph Kenny OP, trans. Anton C. Pegis et al. (New York: Hanover House, 1955), I, c. 11, n. 4; II, c. 15 (hereafter ScG); Aquinas, ST, I, q. 1, a. 7 ad 1; q. 2, a. 1; q. 2, a. 2; q. 12, a. 8, etc.; cf. De Ver., q. 2, a. 14, where Thomas says that God’s effects are mediated by secondary causes.
132 ST, I, q. 2, a. 2 ad 2; I, q. 12, aa. 11–12; De Ver., I, 7.
133 These are similar to, but should not be confused with the ‘real’ versus ‘conceptual’ or ‘intentional’ orders of relation between creation and God, where here ‘real’ = ‘by creaturely knowledge’ and ‘intentional’ = ‘real’. I have chosen the former designations for clarity. This comes from the fact that while creatures are really related to God, God is intentionally related to God’s creatures. This somewhat confusing designation (to the modern mind) is meant to foreclose against two possibilities of thinking: 1) any necessity in God being related to Creation, that is, it upholds a Creation as a free gift, and 2) any ‘real’ change on God’s part who, as the plenitude of all perfection, is the efficient cause of creation. On this see ST, I, q. 45, a. 3 ad 1; I, q. 6, a. 2 ad 1; III, q. 2, a. 7. For a discussion regarding the misunderstanding of Process Theology on this matter, see Burrell, Aquinas: God and Action, 97–100. A further
(vocative) and thus gives (dative) it into being as a gift, which exists as seen in the ‘real order’ of things; but the ‘by knowledge’ order consists of this experience that describes the following reality as seen from the side of creatures. As Thomas Aquinas articulates it: because ‘God is not known to us in His nature, but is made known to us from His operations or effects, we name Him from these...; hence this name “God” is a name of operation so far as [it] relates to the source of its meaning’.134 While creation itself cannot be reduced purely to causality and also has an entire—and no less co-extensive—participatory aspect,135 for now the above argument suffices to show that the accusative bears within it an older, more properly causal determination which sheds light on our discussion of grammar at a deeper ontological level.

distinction Thomas makes is that the Triune Persons are not logically related to one another, but are really related to one another (ST, I, q. 28, a. 1 ad 3). It is for this reason that W. Norris Clarke makes the following suggestion: ‘For it is precisely in the intentional order of knowledge and love that interpersonal relations are located. This whole domain of being simply escapes or transcends the entire set of Aristotelian categories of change, immutability, and real relation. Hence I believe we can truly say that without doing violence to his own basic metaphysical positions St. Thomas could and should say that God does have authentic mutual personal relations with all created persons, even though he himself would not call these by the strong technical term of “real relation”’ (W. Norris Clarke, ‘What Is Most and Least Relevant in the Metaphysics of St. Thomas Today’, in Explorations in Metaphysics: Being—God—Person [Notre Dame, IN: University of Notre Dame Press, 1994], 26). Clarke does not pursue this defense of Thomas on Thomas’ own technical terms, but makes a brief attempt (Ibid, 26-7) to sort out this dilemma by redefining immutability, which he then expands upon in idem, ‘A New Look at the Immutability of God’, in Explorations in Metaphysics, 183-210. Immutability here is ‘controlled’ against static Greek (not to mention Cartesian and Lockean variants of substance) by an analogical notion of personhood gained by the Judeo-Christian concept of a personal God of love (Ibid, 207-8).

134 ST, I, q. 13, a. 8. The logic at work here mirrors the inverse directionality explicated in the difference between res significata and modus significandi. On this see Ibid., I, q. 13, aa. 1, 3, 6; ScG, I, c. 34, n. 6. Compendium Theologiae, trans. Cyril Vollert, SJ (St. Louis, MO & London: B. Herder Book Co., 1947), I, 27 (hereafter Comp. Theol.): “as regards the assigning of the names, such names are primarily predicated of creatures, inasmuch as the intellect that assigns the names ascends from creatures to God. But as regards the thing signified by the name, they are primarily predicated of God, from whom the perfections descend to other beings.” For a detailed discussion, see Gregory P. Rocca, Speaking the Incomprehensible God: Thomas Aquinas on the Interplay of Positive and Negative Theology (Washington, D.C.: Catholic University of America Press, 2004), 334–52. Aaron Riches, “Being Good: Thomas Aquinas and Dionysian Causal Predication,” Nova Et Vetera 7, no. 2 (2009): 443: “For Denys and Aquinas, knowledge of God and naming God are tightly tied to the reality of the causal ontology of creation as such. If creation and signification are linked, then being is already a kind of predication. The act of existence mediates the cause of creation, and this mediation of God in creation makes predication of God possible.”

135 ST, I, q. 13, a. 6; Thomas Aquinas, De Potentia, trans. English Dominican Fathers (Westminster, MD: The Newman Press, 1952), q. 7, a. 7 (hereafter De Pot.). Hampus Lyttkens, The Analogy Between God and the World: An Investigation of its Background and Interpretation of its Use by Thomas of Aquino, Uppsala Universitets Årsskrift 1953:5 (Uppsala: Lundequistska bokhandeln, 1953), 290–2: “If our names were merely expressing the pure causality of God, our denominations would be of the kind which, generally speaking, approach extrinsic designations.” This will be explored more fully in the next chapter.
To conclude this chapter, I turn to Michel Henry, whose thought provides further resources for considering the existence of persons in the accusative, doing so within an transcendence-within-immanence of Life’s auto-affection. For Henry, ‘auto-affection’ refers to the ‘[a]ffection by [the] self’ that is an ‘immediate experience of the self’.\(^{136}\) The way that Henry translates auto-affectivity’s mere philosophical ambit into a simultaneously theological register is within a phenomenology of truth within a study of the person of truth in the Gospel according to John. Therefore, truth reveals itself to itself, as in: the person of Christ who is the truth (John 14:6), comes to testify to the truth (John 18:37). Thus, Henry states, ‘Only Truth can attest to itself—reveal itself in and through itself’.\(^{137}\) Due to the interchangeability of Life, Truth, and Way, Henry applies this logic to Life: ‘what Life reveals is itself’.\(^{138}\) Within this immanent auto-affectivity and auto-revelation of Life, the self is given over to itself. ‘Life engenders itself as me’.\(^{139}\) This causes the Self to be passive with regard to not only itself and its modalities of life, but primarily, ‘the Self is passive with respect to the eternal process of Life’s self-affecting that engenders it and never ceases to do so. This passivity of the singular Self within Life is what puts it into the accusative case and makes of it a “me” and not an “I”, this Self that is passive about itself only because it is passive to begin with about Life and its absolute self-affection’.\(^{140}\) Attendant to our discussion of the causal nature of the accusative case above, Henry’s emphasis on passivity reflects the self’s createdness; the self-affection of the ‘me’ attests to the primary ‘I’ of Life who gives it unto itself. Additionally, the reason that the Self is constantly in the accusative case for Henry ‘is because it holds fast to its own experience, which is not that of being affected but of being constantly self-affected, within itself, in a self-affection that is independent of

\(^{136}\) Henry, *The Essence of Manifestation*, 189, 462, respectively. Furthermore, auto-affection is also the co-extensivity of being with time such that ‘time [is] itself under the form of the pure horizon of Being’. Michael O’Sullivan comments that Henry’s purpose for bringing this co-extensivity to the forefront is because the self’s auto-affection must include ‘both the individual’s self-awareness and her being in time, [which] distances Henry from Husserl’s use of this term which Derrida critiques for its forgetting of time’ (Michael O’Sullivan, *Michel Henry: Incarnation, Barbarism and Belief: An Introduction to the Work of Michel Henry* [Bern: Peter Lang, 2006], 34n.6).


\(^{138}\) Ibid., 29.

\(^{139}\) Ibid., 104.

\(^{140}\) Ibid., 107, emphasis mine.
external affecting or any relation with the world'. The Self affects itself within a ‘pathētik’ auto-affection, which entails a kind of suffering of the flesh—but this suffering is not tragic, for it is the very fragility of Life itself which is the condition of being blessed: the joy experienced in the description, ‘blessed are those that suffer’.

How does this differ in kind to Levinas’ ethics of accusation, which in a real sense ultimately amounts to a self-accusation? First of all, there is no joy in Levinas, only obsession and insomnia. Perhaps the greatest difference, again, is that while Levinas eschews an analogy of apperception with a transcendental ego (as found in Husserl and the early Levinas), Henry fully embraces the transcendentality of the ego, but locates this within what he calls the Ipseity of the ‘Arch-Son’:

‘Before Abraham was...Me, I am’. These words signify that no transcendental living ‘me’ is possible except within an Ipseity that it presupposes—an Ipseity co-generated in the self-affection of absolute Life and whose phenomenological effectivity is precisely the Arch-Son. The First Born within Life and the First Living, the Arch-Son holds the essential Ipseity in which life’s self-affection comes to be effective. But it is only within this Ipseity, and on its basis, that any other Self, and thus any transcendental ego such as ours, will be possible. Thus, the Arch-Son holds in his Ipseity the condition of all others sons.

The Arch-Son here acts not only as the transcendental condition for all other egos, much like Husserl’s analogy of apperception, but here Henry

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141 Ibid., 108.
142 ‘[I]n any effective living, for it to be so, to suffer and have joy are joint and contemporaneous modes of pathētik self-affection’ (Ibid., 202).
143 Ibid., 200–1: ‘Suffering and Joy are linked by an essential affinity, which refers back to a primitive unity: the absolutely primitive original unity of Suffering and Rejoicing. Suffering appears to be the path that leads to enjoying, and thus its condition. It is only in experiencing oneself in the “suffer myself” that the life of the living Self comes into itself, such that suffering is veritably a path and a way. It is the test that life must pass so that, in and through that test, it attains itself and comes into itself in that coming that is the essence of any life, the process of its self-revelation... “to suffer” dwells inside “to rejoice” as that which leads to joy in as much as it dwells within it, as its internal and permanent condition’.
145 Henry, I Am the Truth, 110.
personalizes this aspect: the transcendental condition is not an impersonal concept, but is the ‘First Born within Life’, the one who said, ‘Before Abraham was, I am’. (Also of import is that Henry inserts the accusative ‘me’ in front of this ‘I am’ statement, indicating the regard the Father has for the Son.) ‘The Self can only enter into Life in the [Arch-Son’s] Ipseity and in the originary Self that belongs to him, ...by making of [each self] a “me”—never come to him except by making of him a “me”—this transcendental “me” that I myself am. “Before Abraham was [but this means ‘before any transcendental “me” whatever, whether it be Abraham’s or David’s’], I am.” 146 Henry goes on to say later that the Self must pronounce its own ‘me’ in the accusative and not the nominative case because of ‘the fact that it is engendered, not bringing itself into the condition that is its own, not experiencing itself as a Self, and not having this experience of self, except in the eternal self-affection of Life and of its original Ipseity’. 147 The self-experience of the self puts the self into the accusative ‘me’, which signifies that ‘for each me, its ipseity does not come from it, but inversely, it comes from its ipseity’. 148 This mirrors the order set out by Thomas that ‘Creation is like God, but God is never (positively) like creation’. 149 That is, every self comes from an Ipseity which is not its own. To reach itself, and to reach all others, the transcendental Self must pass ‘under the triumphal Arch, through this Door that is Christ in the parable of the sheep reported by John. It is in the very movement ... in which I reach myself and am given to myself through my transcendental birth, that I also reach, eventually, the other—since I identify myself with such movement and coincide with it’. 150 Heeding the astute warnings of theologians wary of

146 Ibid., 111, the text in brackets here are Henry’s.
147 Ibid., 135.
148 Ibid., italics are Henry’s.
149 Sent. d. 35, q. 1. a. 4 ad 6; De Pot. 7. 7. 3 ad contra; De Ver. 2. 11 ad 1. Citing Lyttkens, The Analogy Between God and the World, 284.
150 Henry, I Am the Truth, 255. Comparing Barth to Levinas Graham Ward says, ‘Levinas’s self recognises in the hungry and the destitute its own sonship, its own ipseity, its own state of being a hostage to God and responsible for others. And Levinas describes this condition in terms of recognising the Suffering Servant. Barth describes this condition in terms of recognising the death of Christ. But whereas for Levinas each is called to be the Suffering Servant pouring out her life for others, for Barth the believer only enters “the form of the death of Christ”. No human being approximates to the uniqueness of Christ, they only approximate to the “form” of such uniqueness. Another way of putting this would be to say that sonship is a mode of being, an existential condition for Levinas. The sonship of believers for Barth is living in the form of a mode of being, living as a figure of a person whose own
turning God into a merely transcendental concept,\textsuperscript{151} Henry, in his later \textit{Words of Christ} ably transforms these insights into a God who speaks his word in Christ: ‘Life only becomes itself in the Self of the First Living Being whom it generates in itself as its Word [\textit{Verbe}]. Each living being in turn only experiences itself in the Self of this Word [\textit{Verbe}]. This is how the prologue puts it: “All things came into being through him, and without him not one thing came into being” (John 1:3)’.\textsuperscript{152}

In order to become a self, a person that can offer itself to others, one must first ‘pass through Christ’, who is the ‘original’ person. Moreover, Christ also stands as the ‘I am’ prior to Abraham, arriving amidst Creation paradoxically therefore as the lamb slain before the foundation of the world (Rev 13:8), yet also as the one who enters this world through a virginal birth. Henry shows us that all personhood has its beginning in the Arch-Person of Christ; to be a self, to have one’s personhood\textsuperscript{153} is always to have it more primarily in the first Self—what Henry calls \textit{Ipseity}—who testifies to himself as the Truth. Levinas’ ethics fail not merely for its terrorizing violence, but primarily and precisely because (obsessive, slanderous) accusation is not primary: a self-gift that finds itself created within the gift of Creation is more original. Levinas says that responsibility to the other comes too late and thus we are always guilty,\textsuperscript{154} but here he speaks all too soon because he misses that any (causal)

living is original and proper. There is, therefore, a secondariness, a level of mediation in Barth that is absent from Levinas’. Graham Ward, “The Revelation of the Holy Other as Wholly Other: Between Barth’s Theology of the Word and Levinas’s Philosophy of Saying,” in Emmanuel Levinas: Critical Assessments of Leading Philosophers, ed. Claire Katz and Lara Trout, vol. 3: Levinas and the Question of Religion (London and New York: Routledge, 2005), 328. At the same time, Levinas’s construction of the ‘third’ that he names ‘illeity’ is not a mediating, common ‘third’ but a rupturing, non-thematizing ‘thirdness’ which makes the other itself different. On illeity in Levinas, see Levinas, \textit{Otherwise Than Being}, 147–50; for Ward’s commentary, see Barth, \textit{Derrida and the Language of Theology}, 144–6. \textsuperscript{151} If God is thought within the human context as a lingual being, but initially apart from the word in which he is, the danger of a transcendental concept of God looms anew, that concept which led into the aporia of the unthinkability of God’. Eberhard Jüngel, \textit{God as the Mystery of the World: On the Foundation of Theology of the Crucified One in the Dispute Between Atheism and Theism}, trans. Darrell L. Guder (Grand Rapids, MI: William B. Eerdmans, 1983), 230n.3. I do, however, reject Jüngel’s own rejection of the Dionysian and Thomist apophaticism aluded to here. Cf. Hart, \textit{The Beauty Of The Infinite}, 248n.103, for Hart’s remarks against transcendentalism. \textsuperscript{152} Michel Henry, \textit{Words of Christ}, trans. Christina M. Gschwandtner (Grand Rapids, MI: William B. Eerdmans Publishing Company, 2012), 110. \textsuperscript{153} For creatures, their status as person will only ever be ‘had’ by participation, and not by essence. \textsuperscript{154} ‘In an approach I am first a servant of a neighbor, already late and guilty for being late. I am as it were ordered from the outside, traumatically commanded, without interiorizing by
accusative is always first and foremost *given* within the dative of the vocative, of calling creation into existence, and of breathing life into the dust to make humanity. If obsessive accusation is always primary, then there would be no way to know otherwise, which is why the kind of 'accusative'-accusation Levinas commands can only be intelligible if there is a primary gift, and also if the accusative is reconfigured along more coherent 'causal' trajectories involving creation. True, such a reconfiguration would not bear much resemblance to Levinas any longer, but his traumatic and torturous ethics exact a high price. And, because Levinas wants to escape being, it is difficult to see how one can take seriously his pronouncements concerning the goodness of creation, let alone the fact that it is difficult to know who is accusing me because of the feature-less, character-less anonymity of the Other within his thought.

Names and naming are so important within the Jewish and Christian traditions for this reason: they signify a primary mystery whose ineffability is still one we may encounter. The prior testimony to the truth, to the name of God, is also what makes possible the beginning of the response of the human person, and also to God. To quote Rosenzweig one more time, commenting upon God’s call to Adam in the Garden: ‘To God’s question: “Where are you?” the man still remained a You, as a defiant, obstinate Self; when called by name twice, with the strongest fixity of purpose to which one cannot remain deaf, the man totally open, totally unfounded, totally read, totally—soul, now answers: “I am here.”’

155 The true ‘I am’ as revealed in the Person of Jesus Christ—who, as the Adam now becomes first—stood before Pilate in accusation. The slander directed at him by the crowd, and the confrontation with Pilate himself looks different when we realize that in their (diabolical) accusation, this very person was (and is) their judge and their creator. In the person of Christ, slander ends and redemption begins, because when Christ himself stands accused it means that Christ is the maker and cause of the same representation and concepts the authority that commands me’ (Levinas, *Otherwise Than Being*, 87). See also Levinas, “Substitution,” 93.

forces that crucified him—and yet he forgives them. Perhaps this is why after the jeremiad of the Grand Inquisitor, Christ simply kisses him on the cheek.  

In the following chapter, I explore the personal distance that has unfolded through the analysis of this chapter. If the preceding standpoint of Levinas (and along with him Modern and Post-Modern thought which tends to prioritize becoming over being, the flux over any kind of stability) assumes a radical heterogeneity that arises from an ontological equivocity, then what follows will not be its reactionary opposite—that of univocity—but of the created distance manifest in the person under the rubric of analogy. 

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PART II: Persons, Analogically
CHAPTER 4
ARRIVING AT THE PERSON’S ARRIVAL:
RESOLUTIO AND RECAPITULATION

From Creation, we had sought the path to Revelation.

—Franz Rosenzweig¹

The starting point of metaphysics is so charged with life that it can never be left behind, but, like a fruitful seed, it contains, and has the power to unfold out of itself, the whole of metaphysics. Any extension of the initial problem is always at the same time an intensification of the original question that, rather than developing away from the origin, develops into it and thus becomes ever more original.

—Hans Urs von Balthasar²

In the preceding chapter, we saw the consequences of the ethics of radical heterogeneity from the standpoint of an originary accusation as embodied in the work of Emmanuel Levinas. This standpoint worked from a set of assumptions which, to our mind, is untenable. The set of assumptions seems to be as follows: 1) all phenomenological intentionality must be rejected because it ‘totalizes’ the other into itself in an Hegelian fashion; 2) typical notions of Being as such also lie within this totalizing gaze and therefore any ethics of the self must be constituted from the ‘hither side’ of being (i.e., otherwise than, beyond, etc.) in the form of a un-declinable accusation which puts the violent ‘I’ into not a nominative form, but its accusative form of ‘me’; 3) therefore, all selves are constituted asymmetrically in such an Ur-alterity that rejects all forms of analogy, especially that of the analogy of apperception of Husserl’s transcendental ego, which also falls within the same narrative that everything within ‘Being’ is totalizing. The only option that Levinas is left with is one of extreme dialectics and rupture. In this sense, the violent rhetoric found in Levinas’ writings follows naturally.

¹ Rosenzweig, The Star of Redemption, 202–3. ‘Von der Schöpfung hatten wir den Weg zur Offenbarung gesucht’ (Franz Rosenzweig, Der Stern Der Erlösung [Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp, 1990], 209). According to Michael Mack’s slightly modified translation in German Idealism and the Jew, 121.
But the structure of being does not have to be this way, all protestations of the Heideggerian narrative of metaphysics to the contrary. For example, knowing other things and other persons within the act of being need not be violent at all, but can exhibit a self-giving aspect. This is indeed how the classical definition of truth and knowing understands it, as exemplified by Thomas Aquinas. Lorenz Puntel remarks in response to Levinas, ‘Because knowledge has to do with truth, its essential point is precisely not the assimilation of things, of “the other,” to the subject; rather, it is the diametrically opposite: the assimilation of the knower to what is known’. It seems like most of the violence that Levinas sees in classical accounts of ontology is reduced to this simple misunderstanding.

We see this misconstrual most clearly in how Levinas understands ‘Western philosophy’ where the entirety of the tradition is re-read through the idealism of Berkely and most notably the Husserlian/Heideggerian understanding of Being. His two main texts, Totality and Infinity as well as Otherwise than Being, state his historiography clearly. The latter text, Levinas describes logos within what he calls an ‘amphibology’, which means that ‘identification at any level implies the temporalization of the lived, essence’. ‘Essence’, as Levinas defines it, ‘is the very fact that there is a theme, exhibition, doxa or logos, and thus truth’. What this means is that, within this space of identification, ‘to be’ is the nominalizing force which not only temporalizes everything, but it also ‘designates’ all entities within the ‘Said’ of Being, thus preventing them from ‘resounding’. ‘The birthplace of ontology’, Levinas says, ‘is in the said. Ontology is stated in the amphibology of being and entities’. Accordingly, in Totality and Infinity, Levinas singles out ‘mediation’ (‘characteristic of Western philosophy’) and phenomenological mediation, ‘where the “ontological imperialism” is yet

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4 Puntel, Being and God, 287, emphasis in original. Thomas states in De Ver., q. 1, a. 1: “True expresses the correspondence between being and the knowing power, for all knowing comes about through the assimilation of the knower to the thing known.” This is restated in ST, I, q. 16, a. 2.
5 Levinas, Otherwise Than Being, 42.
6 Ibid., 39.
7 Ibid., 42.
more visible.\textsuperscript{8} This is the prioritization of Being over existents found in Husserl and Heidegger: ‘To affirm the priority of Being over existents is to already decide the essence of philosophy; it is to subordinate the relation with someone, who is an existent, (the ethical relation) to a relation with the Being of existents, which, impersonal, permits the apprehension, the domination of existents (a relationship of knowing), subordinates justice to freedom’. Levinas thus concludes that this primacy of freedom over ethics ‘marks the direction of and defines the whole of Western philosophy’.\textsuperscript{9}

On the contrary, according to Thomas’ vision of metaphysical adequation, the assimilation of the knower to the things known is in a sense a ‘passive’ assimilation, and not at all as the actively ‘intentional’ act which ‘totalizes’ all things unto itself.\textsuperscript{10} This is because Thomas has such a strong tendency to always emphasize reality, not statically, but as esse, the verb of being in its act.\textsuperscript{11} In this sense, as creatures we only have our knowledge as it ‘is received from things, and, by its nature, comes after them’.\textsuperscript{12} Oliva Blanchette remarks that there is some wisdom in maintaining the ‘traditional description of truth as an adequation of intelligence to [a] thing rather than as a static conformity between subject and object. Object suggests an opposition that cannot be overcome, a gap that cannot be bridged, which clearly is not the case where there is truth. Thing, which still can be opposed to intelligence, as that which takes its stand in being rather than just in intelligence, is not defined by this opposition. It is defined rather by what it is as it stands in being and as it presents itself to be represented, as that with which representation has to compose in the exercise of judgment’.\textsuperscript{13}

\begin{footnotes}
\item[{8}] Levinas, \textit{Totality and Infinity}, 44.
\item[{9}] Ibid., 45.
\item[{10}] ‘Knowledge received from things known consists in a passive assimilation by which the knower is assimilated to objects of knowledge previously existing’ (De Ver., q. 2, a. 8 ad 2). The issue in this question in De Ver. concerns itself with whether or not God knows non-beings. God is infinitely unique in this case because, likened to that of an artist, God is also the cause of all knowledge as the artist is to his or her artwork; whereas we only know things after they already exist. This echoes the same logic of the ‘passive nominative’ that Rosenzweig discusses when he comments upon “the” heavens and “the” earth’ (Rosenzweig, \textit{The Star of Redemption}, 164).
\item[{11}] Rocca, \textit{Speaking the Incomprehensible God}, 159–64 at 164.
\item[{12}] \textit{De Ver.}, q. 2, a. 8.
\end{footnotes}
exhibits this oppositional subject-object dichotomy such that the ‘gap’ about which Blanchette speaks is always a distance of violence instead of the distance crossed in giving one’s own intellect over to the thing as it presents itself in an act of judgment. As Blanchette concludes, ‘There is no gap to bridge between intelligence and being. There is simply knowing of being to begin with. Intelligence is already one with being from the very beginning of reflection and, as finite or limited in its understanding, it has only to make itself adequate to the being with which it is somehow one’. If the latter half of the previous chapter explored how, in a sense, Being has no intrinsic Goodness for Levinas, we now also can see that neither does Levinas have the philosophical resources to be able to judge it to be True, either. It is not so much that Truth is a correspondence to us as it ‘is that which we must correspond to in speaking’. Truth, therefore, has a relational, and even analogical character.

In order to understand the Goodness and Truth of Being, however, one must have an understanding that these differences are already contained within Being. ‘Being actually contains its differences’, Blanchette says, ‘and cannot be known fully apart from these differences’. This does not mean one will ever know Being fully, but only through a clarification by way of the differences within Being. Yet, Levinas’ so-called alterity is one that assumes

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14 Zaborowski, Robert Spaemann’s Philosophy of the Human Person, 216–17: “Spaemann criticizes the supposition that the epiphany of the ‘other’ comes from ‘beyond Being’; for ‘Levinas understands “being” in a modern sense as objectification’. In contrast to Levinas, Spaemann retrieves what he considers a more fundamental notion of Being, one which goes beyond the distinction between the subjective and the objective and so overcomes the modern dialectic of spirit and nature.”

15 Blanchette, Philosophy of Being, 76.

16 Ibid., 54, emphasis mine.


19 Such an understanding paves the way for the possibility of all scientific endeavours (cf. ibid., 141); however, it is another question as to just how such an investigation is pursued, viz., under the aegis of controlling nature on the one hand, or of discovering being’s differences via a respectful scientific stewardship on the other.
that Being possesses no intrinsic difference within itself, much like the same way that Francisco Suárez defines being as that abstracted from all difference, omitting all reference to actuality (and thus serves as one of the originators of modern essentialism). Thus, Levinas has to regard all possibility of difference as 'otherwise' than Being, 'beyond essence', but in so doing, and in so removing any potential for analogy, the other ends up becoming the most self-same, univocal concept of all, always doing the same thing: accusing, obsessing, causing trauma, in an endless repetition of the same, much like the boring and monotonous cottage industry of film horror sequels. Despite all of the best intentions to maintain alterity, it is here that supposedly equivocal basis is truly seen for what it is: a metaphysical univocity. Without Being's fecundity displayed in all its difference, it only makes sense that Levinas' 'Other' remains featureless and anonymous.

How then can one speak of the manifold difference of Being? As the previous chapter showed through the various proposals of Franz Rosenzweig's emphasis on the giftedness of creation (who, along with the early Derrida, identified this gift with the 'dative' case) and Michel Henry's focus upon the Arch-Son whose Ipseity holds 'the condition of all other sons', the notion of the 'accusative' was expanded and redefined—albeit inchoately—to include both a new understanding of a causal relationship to the other as well as an affirmation of the difference of the other as contained within a higher 'Arch-Person'. It is this Arch-Person who acted as the primary analogate for the possibility of all other persons. Thus, to speak of Being's difference with the utmost of respect to its own dignity—that is, in order to adequately one's own intellect to the Goodness, Truth, and Beauty of Being—necessarily involves the use of analogy, not only in reference to Being qua Being, but also in speaking about Persons.

In this chapter I will expand upon these insights by exploring the ways in which analogous speech is the only appropriate way to refer to persons, which


21 Henry, I Am the Truth, 110.
will be unfolded in three sections. The first attempts to answer the question, ‘Why the person, and how is it “picked out” ’? This is accomplished through an act of metaphysical resolutio, which is the following of the path which culminates in the affirmation the the human person is the primary analogate of being. The second part examines the problem of the person itself as a perfection term. At issue is whether or not the person is itself sufficient alongside the divine unity of other well-known perfection terms such as ‘goodness’, ‘one’, ‘wise’, ‘truth’, etc. The third and final section of this chapter completes the metaphysical path by moving beyond the transcendental affirmation to the transcendent itself in the arrival of the first person who comes last: Jesus Christ, the one who recapitulates the world and person in himself in his life, death, and resurrection.

a. Resolutio, or Beginning at the End

The previous chapters have worked under the presumption of the person as the causal and analogical ‘key’ to untangling the issues that surrounded accusation, the accusative, and the person’s status as ‘accused’ within the created order. But, how does one arrive at this presumption? Asked in another way: how does the person arrive?22 As will become clear, this one question asked in two distinctly different ways is an integral part of the way one articulates the order of human and divine things. For now, it suffices to express the questions of arrival in a way that mirrors, although is not identical to, the impulse behind Thomas Aquinas’ description of knowledge of God. He

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22 This question shares a common ancestor with a similar question asked regarding ontological origins under the heading of “arrival of the fittest” vs. the “survival of the fittest” in Cunningham, Darwin’s Pious Idea, 108-17. Also relevant here is the concept of ‘emergent personhood’ as developed along the lines of the critical realistic account of personhood in Smith, What Is a Person?, 25-89. ‘Human persons are proactively—not responsively—emergent realities. Persons are not subsequent products of purely physical processes, the final outcomes of a temporal series of events governed by other agents at the end of which persons emerge. To the contrary, ontologically, personhood adheres in the human from the start—even if in only the most nascent, densely compacted form possible—acting as the causal agent of its own development’ (Ibid., 87-8, emphasis in original). That is, persons are proactively emergent in that not only do they ‘emerge’ from the physical, chemical, and biologically lower levels and capacities (42-49), but as emergent, they are ‘centers’ of self-transcendence (Ibid., 61-3) and thus enact their own downward causality on these capacities in their freedom as persons.
says that we know at least in a confused and distorted way that God exists, but we do not absolutely know, 'just as to know that someone is approaching is not the same as to know that Peter is approaching, even though it is Peter who is approaching'. One can know that God exists, but outside of revelation, one will not be able to discern just what kind of God this is, that is, just who this God is. We can never know the essence of God perfectly, but we can only know God from God's effects, whether this knowledge is by means of nature or by way of grace. Throughout the remainder of this chapter, the relationship between theology and philosophy, while distinct, will be treated in a mutual way; that is, the philosophical discussion will assume a theological end, while the theological will, in turn, rely on philosophical assumptions not as one over against the other, but in the relationship of water turned into wine, of grace assuming and perfecting nature.

What effects, then, are 'available' (so to speak) for picking out as fitting analogates? Thomas selects certain transcendentals such as being, one, truth, goodness, beauty, and otherness (aliquid), which cannot be understood outside of the long tradition of divine naming that he inherits from Dionysius. In this vein, W. Norris Clarke speaks about choosing 'stretch

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23 ST, I, q. 2, a. 1 ad 1.

24 This is first stated in ST, I, q. 1, a. 7 obj 1 in reference to John Damascene, De Fide Orth. i, iv: 'It is impossible to define the essence of God'. Thomas clarifies this in regard to knowing God from God's effects in ST, I, q. 1, a. 7 ad 1; q. 2, a. 1 corpus; q. 2, a. 2 ad 3, etc; ScG, III, cc. 51–6.

25 See ST, I, q. 1, a. 8 ad 2; q. 2, a. 2 ad 1.


27 Likewise, Rudi A. Te Velde, Aquinas on God: The “Divine Science” of the Summa Theologiae, Ashgate Studies in the History of Philosophical Theology (Aldershot: Ashgate, 2006), 102: “Analogy should not be treated in isolation from the whole of the analysis of divine names.” Specifically, Te Velde is referring to aa. 5–6 of ST I, q. 13, which itself is a consideration of the divine names (divinorum nominum). For an account of Thomas' indebtedness to Dionysius, see O'Rourke, Pseudo-Dionysius and the Metaphysics of Aquinas.
terms’ and putting them through a ‘stretch’ procedure in order to discern whether or not they may be fittingly used, that is, ‘open’ enough. It is important to use wisdom in judgment in determining the term’s ‘proper’ from its ‘abusive’ extension (in the sense of the Cajetan’s use of abusio, not to be confused with typical English connotations of abuse). Such prudent judgment includes the recognition that a term’s original meaning and etymology are not always key to its ratio of understanding. Instead, sometimes the excellence of a term, despite its origin, must be considered. Clarke has two ways of speaking about the malleability of these terms. One way is to indicate the upper and lower limits of these expansive terms, those terms ‘having a floor but no ceiling: intellectual knowing, love, life, joy, etc’. and those terms ‘having neither ceiling nor floor: the all-pervasive “transcendental properties” applicable across all levels of being, such as being, activity, unity, power, intelligibility, goodness (in the widest sense)’. Elsewhere, Clarke delineates these two types as ‘relatively transcendental properties’ and ‘absolutely transcendental properties’, respectively. The relatively transcendental properties are those which Clarke describes as ‘so purely positive in meaning


29 Joshua P. Hochschild, The Semantics of Analogy: Rereading Cajetan’s De Nominum Analogia (Notre Dame, IN: University of Notre Dame Press, 2010), 123.

30 Hochschild speaks in a similar way to Clarke: ‘Terms become analogical by a process of extension; they are extended from one, original signification to cover another, new signification. Some of these extensions are more fitting than others. What determines the fittingness or “propriety” of such an extension is not only the original meaning of the term, or its etymology, but the similarity of what is signified in what is originally denominated by the term to what is signified in that which the term is stretched to denominate’ (ibid., 124, emphasis mine).

31 ST, I, q. 29, a. 3 ad 2.

32 W. Norris Clarke, “Analogy and the Meaningfulness of Language About God,” in Explorations in Metaphysics: Being—God—Person (Notre Dame, IN: University of Notre Dame Press, 1994), 132. While the two kinds of terms mentioned here have more ontological and ‘active’ connections, Clarke precedes these with two other terms possessing a more ‘ontic’ flavour, but just as important in their own right: ‘(1) those having a ceiling but no floor (no lower limit) in their application: terms like physico-chemical activity, whose upper limit is biological activity, or perhaps consciousness, but that extend downward to unknown depths of matter still hidden from us and perhaps very strange indeed compared with what we know; (2) those having both a floor and a ceiling, say, biological activity, or sense knowledge, limited by the non-living or unconscious below and intellectual knowledge above’ (ibid.).
and so demanding of our unqualified value-approval that, even though they are not co-extensive with all being, any being higher than the level at which they first appear must be judged to possess them—hence a fortiori the highest being—under pain of being less perfect than the being we already know, particularly ourselves.33 To the above-mentioned earlier list of knowledge, love, life, and joy, Clarke here adds freedom and 'personality, at least as understood in Western cultures'.34 The absolutely transcendental properties are 'those attributes whose meaning is so closely linked with the meaning and intelligibility of being itself that no real being is conceivable which could lack them and still remain intelligible'.35 For our purposes, it seems that the notion of 'person' fits within Clarke's category of 'relatively transcendental properties'. It would seem, however, that considering the above-considered priority of the person in our investigation, that this may pose a problem for my thesis. How can a 'relative' property have 'absolute' significance?

This question becomes all the more pressing with the recognition that Thomas has a priority of Being (ens) in his list of the transcendentals. Jan Aertsen emphasizes this priority: 'Being, “that which is,” is the Archimedean point of Thomas's thought'.36 Being retains a certain priority because of the fact that that all other conceptions resolve toward Being (ens).37 Thus, to even ask the question, 'What is Truth?' for Aquinas, first requires the acknowledgment that what we first conceive of is Being, yet Being is not

33 Clarke, The Philosophical Approach to God, 57.
34 Ibid. Clarke has in mind here the lack of a 'substantial' self as implied in the person-less philosophy of Buddhism, which tends to reduce everything to its relations. On this see Clarke, Person and Being, 17, 58–60, which also applies to existentialist-phenomenologist accounts inspired by Nietzsche such as Heidegger, et al. Instead, for Clarke, to be is to be a ‘dyadic’ substance-in-relation (ibid., 15). See a full account of this in W. Norris Clarke, “To Be Is To Be Substance-in-Relation,” in Explorations in Metaphysics: Being—God—Person (Notre Dame, IN: University of Notre Dame Press, 1994), 102–22. For an account which emphasizes relationality as more constitutive (but not at the expense of substantiality, but rather because of the nature of substance), see Adrian Pabst, Metaphysics: The Creation of Hierarchy (Grand Rapids, MI: William B. Eerdmans Publishing Company, 2012). Christian Smith argues for a more mutually reciprocal account, stating that 'Relations need substances and substances need relations'. Smith, What Is a Person?, 232, more generally 230–3. For a brief and helpful account that locates 'personality' not at the level of the person, but at the level of the 'soul' as 'something attributable to the “person,”' see Rowan Williams, ““Person” and ‘Personality’ in Christology,” The Downside Review 94, no. 317 (October 1976): 253–60, here at 257, emphasis in original.
35 Clarke, The Philosophical Approach to God, 57.
36 Aertsen, Medieval Philosophy and the Transcendentals, 84.
37 De Ver., q. 1, a. 1.
contained within a genus, that is, Being is not itself a category of thought. Rather, ‘As what falls first in the understanding, being is that in the light of which everything is understood’.

Establishing the priority of Being (ens), Thomas says that ‘what the true adds to being [is], namely, the conformity or equation of thing and intellect’.

We have these other predicates such as True, Good, One, Beauty, otherness (aliquest) that we first recognize when we call something ‘true’, ‘good’, etc., but they all are referred to, and thus ‘resolve’ in the process of resolution (resolutio) to Being (ens). According to Thomas, this is exactly what ‘metaphysics’ is, in that movement ‘after’ (μέτα) physics, or as he puts it in the prologue to his commentary on Aristotle’s Metaphysics, ‘inasmuch as it considers being and what follows upon it—for these transphysical things are discovered in the process of resolution (in via resolutionis) as the more common after the less common’.

The method of resolutio, ‘[t]he “way of resolution” is always directed to a terminus which in a certain respect is first’. Being is what falls first in the intellect, but arriving at Being is that which comes last in this process. The process begins in the apprehension of physical things in their composition as possessed within a unitary whole which is most common to them, reduced to the most simple principles.

In his commentary on Boethius’ De Trinitate, Thomas describes the via resolutionis in two ways. The first likens the relationship of physics to divine science as to that of ‘reason’ to the ‘intellect’, the latter of which is that ‘non-discursive mode of knowing proper to the immaterial substances’. Reason participates in the intellectual process in that the intellect both begins and serves as the end of the rational process, according to the way of composition or discovery (secundum viam compositionis vel inventionis), ‘insofar as reason gathers one simple truth from

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38 Blanchette, Philosophy of Being, 72.
39 De Ver., q. 1, a. 1.
40 Blanchette, Philosophy of Being, 7–8.
42 Ibid., 408.
43 Te Velde, Aquinas on God, 55.
44 Here I am following the helpful work of Aertsen, “Method and Metaphysics,” 410–11. See also the summary in Aertsen, Medieval Philosophy and the Transcendentals, 133–35, 157. Aertsen is commenting on In Boethii De trinitate 6, 1, 211, 11. 15–19. Cf. De Ver., q. 15, a. 1.
many things'. Thomas says that 'according to the process of resolution, all consideration of reason in all the sciences terminates in the knowledge of divine science'. The progression of reason in the sciences to its terminus in the intellectual knowledge of the divine science can take place on two levels, secundum rationem and secundum rem. The first, secundum rationem is the process described above from De Veritate I, 1 where one proceeds according to the intrinsic causes of a thing, leading back to the most universal, that of Being (the opposite being by composition where one attains to the particular via the universal). The second, secundem rem, proceeds according to a demonstration 'made through extrinsic causes or effects by composition when we go from causes to effects, by resolution when we proceed from effects to causes. The ultimate term of this resolution is attained when man arrives at the highest causes, which are the immaterial substances'. Both of these resolutions have an 'intellectual' end in divine science which treats of both kinds of intrinsic and external causes. On the one hand, we have the intrinsic resolution to Being (secundum rationem), and on the other the cause of Being itself (secundum rem). As Aertsen notes, there is an intrinsic connection between these two resolutions: 'The reduction terminating in being, in that which is transcendental, goes together with the reduction terminating in the transcendent cause'. Thomas elaborates on this connection in a brief history on the question of being given in ST I, q. 44, a. 2: 'Finally some thinkers advanced further and raised themselves to the consideration of being as being. And they assigned a cause to things, not only according as they are these or such, but according as they are beings'.

Keeping the relationship of these two ways of resolution both distinct and rightly ordered is not only crucial to properly understanding the logic of arrival, but also important in order to avoid error. One error to avoid is the conflation of the two orders, an error which Thomas attributes to the

46 In Boethii De trinitate 6, 1, 212, 11. 1-2. As quoted in Aertsen, 'Method and Metaphysics', 410.
47 Although, Thomas treats them in the reverse order as I do here.
48 Aertsen, "Method and Metaphysics," 411, emphasis mine.
49 Ibid., 416.
50 For a helpful commentary on this article of Thomas', see Te Velde, Aquinas on God, 132–8.
‘Platonists’. The Platonists confuse the predication of the universal with many things—an appropriate activity—with the predication of a cause from an effect, which is impossible, for the very reason that a cause is not directly available to reason, but only is apprehended later through the way of resolution. Thomas makes a distinction between the ‘first in commonness’ and the ‘first in causality’. The ‘first in commonness’ is first apprehended as transcendental by the intellect, whereas the ‘first in causality’ is the transcendent God, and therefore not directly accessible. ‘The first in the order of our intellectual knowledge is not transcendent, but transcendental’. It is important to remember that there is no identity between these two ‘ways’, but a relation of causality: God is the cause of Being. For Thomas, ‘the first cause of things is not the first known, but the final end of the human desire to know’.

That which is arrived at ‘last’ in the resolution is connected to the first in a circular movement. ‘This resolution has a “reflexive” structure in the sense that “that which was the first becomes the last.”’ Likewise, this is only possible because ‘the last has become the first’, or as Thomas describes it, it is only natural to proceed ‘from the sensible to the intelligible, from the effects to the causes, and from that which is later to the first’. The path of the resolutio leads to a real change in ‘relationship of thought to the object, constitutive of a science, thus a change in the perspective from which reality is considered in a certain science.’ Again, we see the pattern of truth as that of the adequation of the intellect towards the object; the way of resolution in metaphysics is one of the key ways in which one’s intellect apprehends not only the truth of Being, but the truth of its created reality by its cause, the God who creates out of nothing.

51 Commentary on the Metaphysics of Aristotle, trans. John P. Rowan (Chicago, IL: Henry Regnery Co., 1961), X, 3.1964 (hereafter In Meta.). Thomas also notes that Plato errors in a similar way in conflating the order of knowledge with the separable forms (ST, I, q. 84, a. 1).
52 Aertsen, Medieval Philosophy and the Transcendentals, 168.
53 Ibid., 393–94.
54 Aertsen, “Method and Metaphysics,” 416. Aertsen contrasts Thomas with Bonaventure for whom “the most pure being, the divine being, is the first known” (ibid).
55 Ibid., 417.
56 In I Sent. 17, 1, 4. As quoted in Ibid.
57 Te Velde, Aquinas on God, 55.
Thus far, however, the *via resolutionis* has only given us those 'absolutely transcendental properties' about which Clarke spoke. The names such as true, good, one, being, etc., have a 'transgeneric' sense, common to all reality.\(^{58}\) Personality, or rather, that contained in the analogical, 'transcendental' reality of the person does not exist in the same way that these 'absolute transcendental properties' exist. While it may have no 'ceiling', it does, however, have a 'floor', as Clarke puts it. More precisely, all created reality does not exist and have goodness, truth, beauty in the same way that a person does; all being does not shine forth its aspect of truth such that all of Being also has an 'aspect' of personhood. That is, all of Being is not, following Aquinas and Boethius, an 'individual substance of a rational nature' (*naturae rationalis individua substantia*).\(^{59}\) 'For', as Boethius says, 'if every nature has person, the difference between nature and person is a hard knot to unravel'.\(^{60}\) It is clear that the Person enjoys a privileged place in Being, but Persons do not share the same status as 'absolute' due to the fact that the very definition of a Person (whether Boethian/Aquinan or even more recent personalist accounts) implies distinction,\(^{61}\) which thus assumes being and is something that not only exists *within* being but is that existent substance who *has* its own being.\(^{62}\) Nor

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\(^{58}\) Ibid., 110.

\(^{59}\) *Contra Eutychen*, ch. 3 in Boethius, *The Theological Tractates*, trans. H. F. Stewart, E. K. Rand, and S. J. Tester, Loeb Classical Library (Cambridge, MA and London: Harvard University Press, 1973), 84–5. For Aquinas, see *ST*, I, q. 29, a. 1; *De Pot.*, q. 9, a. 4. Aquinas slightly modifies the formula to say 'that which subsists in an intellectual nature' (*subsistens in natura intellectuali*) in Ibid., q. 9, a. 3 ad 1. However, the sense remains the same, as subsistence refers to what exists in itself and not another, and thus for Aquinas 'person' indicates the same reality (*ST*, I, q. 29, a. 2 ad 2) considered under the genus of rational substances (*ST*, I, q. 29, a. 2; *De Pot.*, q. 9, a. 2). Lastly, Aquinas also accepts 'hypostasis of rational nature' as equivalent (Ibid., q. 9, a. 2 ad 7). For an account of Thomas' taking up of Boethius' definition, see Horst Seidl, "The Concept of Person in St. Thomas Aquinas: A Contribution to Recent Discussion," *The Thomist* 51 (1987): 435–60 at 435–40.

\(^{60}\) Boethius, *The Theological Tractates*, 82–3.

\(^{61}\) '[T]he meaning (ratio) of person implies distinction in general and hence is abstracted (abstrahere) from every mode of distinction', Thomas Aquinas, *Scriptum super libros Sententiarum* I, d. 25, q. 1, a. 2 ad 5 as cited in Rocca, *Speaking the Incomprehensible God*, 147.

is the person merely a collective bundle or ‘succession of experiences but that which (successively) has them. And this is no other than what is meant by substance’. How then, can that which has a ‘floor’ and not exist ‘everywhere’ be of equal importance?

Presently, there does not seem to be a way to make personhood more ‘general’ to fit the measure of ‘absolute’ in the same way that being and the other transcendentals are absolute. Nor would one want this, either, for the very nature of persons are their distinct incommunicability as persons. To reduce persons to a more ‘general’ understanding would in fact do away with persons altogether. Moreover, Rude Te Velde has posed a special challenge to any account of analogical naming that attempts to ‘read off’ some particular thing in nature and apply this to God, as if God could be addressed as some particular reality, the highest and first in the order of essences. God is not a being among others who is merely higher and more perfect than everything we know of. God cannot be approached in the line of “more of the same”—that is, the same as the perfections we encounter in the world of creatures, such as life, intelligence, goodness, and so on—but then enlarged to its maximum and purified from its imperfections. Analogy is often taken to be a sort of procedure of abstraction and sublimation by which finite perfections are purged of their material flaws and defects and then extended to their ultimate limit in God. In this way, however, the focus of thought remains somehow restricted to the order of essences and is still, what Thomas would call, “physical” in its way of conceiving reality. In my interpretation, analogy is not a matter of picking out some properties (perfections) belonging to one domain in order to apply them in a more perfect and purified form to another domain—the “domain” of God—since this view presupposes a conception of a hierarchy of essences which tends to regard God as the highest essence instead of being itself. Metaphysically, the reason this approach is impossible is because the process of analogical naming involves the transfer of a name from one genus to another such that the limits of one domain are transcended by referring to another domain. ‘But in the case of the analogy of divine predication it is the whole of all categorically distinct things as such (as being) which is

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It is a reality of substances and subjects and, in its highest form, the reality of persons who freely ‘have’ their nature (Robert Spaemann’s Philosophy of the Human Person, 42).


Te Velde, Aquinas on God, 117.
transcended towards something existing *extra omne genus*.\(^\text{65}\) That is why certain names do not count as appropriate for analogous divine predication, but still remain apposite for metaphorical use, such as ‘lion’ or ‘stone’, predicated of God.\(^\text{66}\) The primary problem with this approach, even if it were to make the predication into the most sublime realm of particular beings, is that in the end, it makes God just another being among beings (thus falling into the ontotheological trap), and so, on Aquinas’ terms, falling into the error of predicated things of God univocally.\(^\text{67}\) The *via resolutionis* cannot be followed in order to speak analogically of divine persons in the same way we speak of Being. Why? Because persons, as distinct, cannot be reduced to the analogical unity of being as persons. The procedure of *secundum rationem* and *secundem rem* does not seem to work here, for it involves that resolution of all intrinsic causes from its effects into the commonness of being, and then refers this being to its extrinsic creator as cause. Analogy, thus far, seems to only apply metaphysically to Being. Thomas seems to reaffirm this emphasis on Being when he says in *De Potentia* that ‘Being...signifies the highest perfection of all (*omnia perfectissimum*), and is thus also ‘the actuality of all acts, and therefore the perfection of all perfections (*perfectio omnium perfectionum*)’.\(^\text{68}\) Because analogy, for Te Velde, is not that picking out of a higher ‘this’ amongst a univocal series of essences, he concludes therefore that ‘[a]analogy is meant to articulate the commonness of effect and cause: the effect is *differently the same* as its cause, precisely insofar as it is being’.\(^\text{69}\)

The preceding may adequately suffice for an analogy of *being* as far as it goes,\(^\text{70}\) but arguably for Aquinas, *being* is not the only ‘thing’ picked out analogously; nor is being *qua* being the only criteria for what counts as the ‘highest’ term. There is a temptation to assume that that which is ‘absolute’ is that which is the ‘highest’, ‘best’, or the entity spoken about most analogously.

\(^{65}\) Ibid.

\(^{66}\) *De Pot.*, q. 7, a. 5 ad 8; *ST*, q. 13, a. 3 ad 1.

\(^{67}\) *ST*, I, q. 13, a. 5, sc. & co.

\(^{68}\) *De Pot.*, q. 7, a. 2 ad 9. Similarly: *ipsum esse* is the most perfect of all things (*perfectissimum omnium*), for it is compared to all things as that by which they are made actual; for nothing has actuality except so far as it exists’ (*ST*, I, q. 4, a. 1 ad 3; and *ScG*, III, c. 66, n. 5).

\(^{69}\) Te Velde, *Aquinas on God*, 117-18, emphasis in original.

\(^{70}\) The specific practices named the ‘analogy of being’ stemming from the debate surrounding Przywara will be considered below in section c) of the next chapter.
In one sense, this is of course true; but in another, it is incomplete. Te Velde would not disagree with what follows, as he himself makes similar points in a separate, later article;\(^{71}\) nonetheless, his challenge above does serve as a useful proofing ground for any such analogical enterprise engaged in naming God. In order to complete this understanding we will consider absolute versus relative terms, the idea of perfections, and finally, how this enables one to understand the person as the ‘prime analogate’ of being.

b. The Person Perfected

Before continuing to answer this question, something must first be kept in mind regarding the terms ‘absolute’ and ‘relative’. In Aquinas, what is ‘absolute’ and what is ‘relative’ do not necessarily denote one thing that is ‘higher’ and another that is ‘lower’, especially if one is referring to God, due to divine simplicity (although this of course is true when referring to creatures in relation to God). Instead, denoting what is ‘absolute’ is to refer to that which is essential in God, and this is why persons cannot share the same absolute status: ‘nothing that is said of God absolutely can be understood as distinguishing and constituting the hypostases in the Persons, since what is predicated of God absolutely conveys the notion of something essential’\(^ {72}\). That which is ‘relative’ does not indicate imperfection, but only what is distinct.\(^ {73}\)

With this clarification out of the way, in De Potentia Thomas devotes an entire article (q. 9, a. 3) to the question ‘In God Does the Term ‘Person’ Signify Something Relative Or Something Absolute?’ In varying degrees, there are eighteen objections listed attempting to argue that the person actually signifies the essence\(^ {74}\) and not the relation.\(^ {75}\) In the three sed contra statements,

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\(^{72}\) De Pot., q. 8, a. 3.

\(^{73}\) ‘[I]n the Godhead nothing that is predicated absolutely, but only what is relative, can be distinct’ (Comp. Theol., I, 61).

\(^{74}\) De Pot., q. 9, a. 4 args 1–3, 5–6, 10, 13–14.
Thomas first adheres to Boethius in noting that "every term that refers to the Persons signifies relation." Now no term refers to the persons more than person itself. Therefore the word person signifies relation." Next, the terms Father, Son, and Holy Spirit are shown to signify relation, and as they are the three divine persons, it follows that person therefore signifies relation. Lastly, because nothing essential or absolute is divided in God, and persons are divided, therefore, the persons are relative. Thomas' given answer is as follows: 'I answer that the term person in common with the absolute names of God is predicated of each Person, and does not in itself refer to anything else, and in common with the names signifying relation it is divided and predicated of several: wherefore it would seem that person admits of both significations absolute and relative. How the name person can admit of both significations has been explained in various ways. 'Person' opens up to contain both relative and absolute significations, the latter of which admits of essential predicates like truth, goodness, and wisdom which apply to all three divine persons, as they share the same nature. Additionally, 'person' also legitimately refers to the relation in a 'semi'-absolute way (i.e., directly so) such that, as Thomas said in a previous question, in God relation can be something besides being merely relation, 'for it is God's very substance in reality: wherefore it can constitute something subsistent and not merely relative'. The status of 'person' as an absolute term comes from 'its mode of signification: and yet it signifies a relation'. The absolute modus of signification refers to the 'substantive' nature that the term signifies in its formal aspect, which makes plural designation possible. Thomas illustrates

75 De Pot., q. 9, a. 4 args 4, 6–18.  
76 De Pot., q. 9, a. 4, s.c. 1.  
77 De Pot., q. 9, q. 4, s.c. 2.  
78 De Pot., q. 7, a. 3 co.; q. 9, a. 7 ad 2; esp. q. 9, a. 8; ST, I, q. 3, a. 7; ScG, I, c. 42, n. 16; I, c. 58.  
79 De Pot., q. 9, a. 4, s.c. 3.  
80 De Pot., q. 9, q. 4.  
81 For truth, see De Ver., q. 1, a. 7; ST, I, q. 16, a. 5. For goodness, wisdom, etc., see De Pot., q. 7, a. 5; ST, I, q. 6, a. 3; q. 13, a. 2.  
82 De Pot., q. 8, a. 3 ad 8.  
83 De Pot., q. 9, a. 6 ad 2.  
84 De Pot., q. 9, a. 6. Accordingly seeing that person is a substantive the possibility of its being predicated in the plural depends on the form signified thereby. Now the form signified by the word person is not the nature absolutely, for in that case man and human person would mean the same thing which is clearly false: but person formally signifies incommunicability or
the substantive designation in the following illustration: 'What? queries not only the essence but also sometimes the supposite, for instance: What swims in the sea? Fish. And so the answer to what? is the person'.

The remainder of Thomas' detailed response to the various ways in which person can admit of both relative and absolute significations is as follows: first, Thomas considers two (insufficient) opinions for how this is so, and then he offers a more satisfying response. The movement of the article first considers the equivocal option, then what appears to be the univocal, and finally what I argue is the analogical solution. The first option considers those who 'say that person signifies both [essence and relation], but equivocally'.

'Person' signifies the essence absolutely in both the singular and the plural, 'like the name “God,” or “good” or “great”: but that owing to the insufficiency of names employed in speaking of God, the holy fathers in the Council of Nicaea accommodated the term “person” so that it could be employed sometimes in a relative sense, especially in the plural, as when we say that Father, Son, and Holy Spirit are three Persons, or with the addition of a disjunctive term as when we say: “One is the Person of the Father, another of the Son,” or: “The Son is distinct from the Father in person.” Furthermore, when ‘person’ is predicated absolutely of the singular, it may also signify either the essence or the relation, e.g., ‘The Father is a person’, or, ‘The Son is a person’. The essence is signified absolutely, therefore, usually when referring to the singular, and then only relatively when referring to the divine persons in the plural—except in this latter, equivocal case where the Son is named as a person. But this proves unsatisfactory for Thomas because the wisdom of the Church Fathers chose the name ‘person’ (hypostasis), in response to heretical opinions, precisely because it did not signify the essence absolutely, but signified what was distinct, that is, the subsistent relations

individuality of one subsisting in a nature, as we have clearly explained. Since then there are several properties which cause a distinct and incommunicable being in God, it follows that person is predicated of God in the plural, even as it is predicated of man on account of the manifold individualizing principles' (ibid.).

85 De Pot., q. 9, a. 4 ad 1. Also STI, q. 29, a. 4 ad 2.
86 De Pot., q. 9, a. 4.
87 Ibid.
revealed in Scripture as Father, Son, Holy Spirit. In either case, to allow the essence to be signified directly as a person—even if 'equivocally' so—is inadmissible for it ultimately admits tritheistic conceptions to enter into the understanding of God.

The second, insufficient option under consideration admits of different aspectual versions of what appears to be univocal emphases on different aspects of the person. They both amount to signifying one thing directly (in recto) and the other indirectly (in obliquo), but neither of them equally. The first option in this group is the opinion that 'person' expresses the essence directly and the relation indirectly. Thomas elaborates on this in the parallel question in the Summa Theologica where he says: 'forasmuch as “person” means as it were “by itself one” [per se una]; and unity belongs to the essence. And what is “by itself ” implies relation indirectly; for the Father is understood to exist “by Himself,” as relatively distinct from the Son'. But this cannot be allowed for the same reason stated above, that is, that one cannot predicate the essence absolutely of the divine persons in a plural manner without lapsing into the notion of three 'Gods'. The other view is the converse of the same idea where ‘person’ signifies the relation directly but the essence or nature indirectly. While Thomas still rejects this view in De Potentia, in the Summa Theologica he grants that, in contrast to the first, those who holds this view ‘come nearer to the truth’. The reason why this option still fails (at least in De Pot.) is because although the relation is signified directly, ‘it should not be predicated absolutely, or of each Person’. Again, this is impossible because a relation by virtue of its definition is not ‘absolute’ because that is how the nature is signified. Moreover, some even attempt to say that ‘person’ signifies both directly, and some of those even say that it signifies them directly and equally. Thomas, too, rejects this approach as ‘unintelligible’, following Aristotle’s dictum that every term signifies (at least)

88 Ibid. The parallel text in ST I, q. 29, a. 4 has the same reference to the Church Fathers response to heretical opinions.
89 ST, I, q. 29, a. 4.
90 Ibid.
91 De Pot., q. 9, a. 4.
one thing in one sense, thus, that which does not signify something signifies nothing.\footnote{Ibid. Thomas is referring to Aristotle's \textit{Metaphysics} 4.4.1006b7, where this concept is tied to the principle of non-contradiction. For Thomas' commentary on this in \textit{In Meta.}, IV, 7.613–615. E. J. Ashworth, "Signification and Modes of Signifying in Thirteenth-Century Logic: A Preface to Aquinas on Analogy," \textit{Medieval Philosophy and Theology} 1 (1991): 50n.48, points out that "a word had to have at least one significate, but that others were not ruled out." See also Michael L. Ross, "Aristotle on 'Signifying One' at Metaphysics \Gamma 4," \textit{Canadian Journal of Philosophy} 25, no. 3 (September 1995): 375–393.}

Thomas does not describe these two mirrored approaches as 'univocal', however, these unintelligible approaches are devoid of sense precisely because of the conceptual confusions which betray univocal presumptions. In the first example above, the divine persons are individuated by their subsistent, absolute essences in the plural, in the same way as human persons are individuated. Hence, each of the divine persons are thought of as more 'absolute' versions of each of us,\footnote{See Te Velde's concerns on this matter expressed above, from his \textit{Aquinas on God}, 117–18.} and could easily give rise within modernity of admitting, e.g., three psychological centres. But we know this is impossible because there is only one, shared, 'consubstantial' essence amongst the divine persons. In the second example (which is somewhat closer to the truth for Thomas), the relation is put on the same plane as that of the essence in order to be signified directly, which he fears will be signified absolutely, and each person cannot be 'absolute' for that is not how these terms work for the Church Fathers who fashioned these words over the years of the Church councils.

Before coming to his final answer,\footnote{Thomas also remarks: 'Hence others said that it signifies relation as affecting the essence: but it is difficult to see how this is possible inasmuch as relations do not determine the essence in God. And so others said that the relation does not express the absolute, i.e. the substance which is essence, but the substance which is hypostasis, since this is determined by a relation. This is indeed true, but does not make us any wiser, seeing that the meaning of hypostasis or subsistence is less clear than that of person' (\textit{De Pot.}, q. 9, a. 4), but these remarks do not much add to Thomas' case (nor our own).} Thomas first provides an account of how signification works in order to better grasp just how 'person' refers to the relation. He follows Aristotle such that 'the proper definition of a term is its signification'.\footnote{\textit{De Pot.}, q. 9, a. 4. Thomas' reference is to \textit{Metaphysics} 4.} Thomas' aim is to understand how something may be 'included in the meaning of a less common term, which is not included in the
more common term'. The example referred to is that of 'animal' and 'man': to refer to an animal doesn’t necessarily entail signifying man, as it may be any sensible animate substance whether cat or man; but when referring to man, it is always assumed that a man is a rational animal per its definition, and thus ‘animal’ is included in the designation as an indeterminate term falling under a common designation of a more determinate term. Thomas says, ‘it is one thing to ask the meaning of this word “person” in general; and another to ask the meaning of “person” as applied to God’. Thomas distinguishes here between formal and material significations.

Formally, ‘person’ will apply, analogously, to humans, angels, and divine persons, as individual substances of a rational nature. As Robert Spaemann articulates it, ‘To be a person is the form in which “rational natures” exist’. Likewise, ‘man’ applies to that which is composed of a rational soul and the body. Furthermore, the person is a term relating to a genus, that of substance as it is applied to human persons being rational animals, so one formal differentiation is to be made here, that is: God is not contained in a genus. But Thomas quickly dispatches with this by saying that God ‘belongs to the genus of substance as the principle of the genus’. Materially, human persons are individuated such that it is a particular human nature which has this flesh, these bones, and this soul. The material designation of ‘person’, outside of the incarnation and the sense which implies incommunicability in the subsistent nature, is not fitting for designating a divine person. What

96 ST, I, q. 29, a. 4.
97 Ibid.
98 In ST, I, q. 29, a. 4 ad 4, Thomas flatly denies that person is spoken of in either an equivocal or univocal way of human persons, angels, and divine persons. For an account of the analogical extension involved in Boethius’ definition of the person which makes Thomas’ own application possible, see Simpson, “The Definition of Person: Boethius Revisited,” 218–19; Seidl, “The Concept of Person in St. Thomas Aquinas,” 435–60 at 450–8.
100 ScG, I, c. 25; ST, I, q. 3, a. 5; Comp. Theol., I, 12–13.
101 De Pot., q. 9, a. 3 ad 3.
102 ST, I, q. 29, a. 4; cf. q. 29, a. 2 ad 3.
103 ST, III, q. 5, a. 2, where Aquinas affirms the material flesh and bones of the human body, although it is not through these parts that the assumption occurred (ST III, q. 6, a. 5).
104 ST, I, q. 29, a. 3 ad 4.
105 ‘It is accidental to person as such that it is composite, because the complement or perfection required for personality is not to be found at once in one simple thing, but requires a combination of several, as is to be observed in men. But in God together with supreme simplicity there is supreme perfection: wherefore in him there is person without composition.
individuates in humanity is the individual matter, but what individuates in the
divine nature is relation of origin,\textsuperscript{106} which is due to the fact that for Thomas,
matter is not the first cause of individuation.\textsuperscript{107} Concomitantly, what
distinguishes human from divine persons is that divine persons are self-
subsistent, whereas human persons, because they are materially composed, are
not self-subsistent.\textsuperscript{108} When referring to the divine person, because of the self-
subsistence of each hypostasis, referring to a divine person signifies the nature
fully existing as identical in the divine personal existence. Whereas for the
human person, the lack of self-subsistence means that to refer to human
nature, it does not directly involve the act of existence as identical with this
nature; thereby, for the human, '[t]he person adds to the nature the very act of
existing'.\textsuperscript{109} In each case of differentiating the human person from the divine
person, when speaking about the divine we have to transcend the \textit{modus
significandi} because no created reality is identical with \textit{ipsum esse}.\textsuperscript{110}

Thomas' answer is thus simply, 'the term "person" signifies nothing else
but an individual substance of rational nature'.\textsuperscript{111} Just as the determinate 'man'
assumes the indeterminate 'animal' nature, so also the substance, whether of
human or divine nature, is assumed under the name 'person' as it is an

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As to the parts which combine to make the definition of person they do not argue composition
in person except in material substances: and individual, being a negation, does not imply
composition through being added to substance. Hence the only composition that remains is
that of individual substance, i.e. hypostasis with the nature: which two in immaterial
substances are absolutely one and the same thing' (De Pot., q. 9, a. 3 ad 4).
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\textsuperscript{106} Likewise, while the material aspect cannot individuate what is proper in God, neither can a
purely formal aspect individuate what is proper for the created human: 'For a thing may be
understood to distinguish and constitute the hypostasis in two ways. It may be taken for the
principle whereby the hypostasis is formally constituted and distinguished; as man is
constituted by humanity, and Socrates by "socrateity": or it may be taken for the way as it
were to distinction and constitution: thus we might say that Socrates is a man by his
generation which is the way to the form whereby he is constituted formally. It is clear then
that a thing's origin cannot be understood as constituting and distinguishing except in
reference to that which constitutes and distinguishes formally: since if humanity were not
produced by generation, never would a man be constituted by generation' (De Pot., q. 8, a. 3).

\textsuperscript{107} ScG, II, c. 40.

\textsuperscript{108} De Pot., q. 9, a. 3. ad 5. Cf. \textit{ST} I, q. 39, a. 1 ad 1.

\textsuperscript{109} Gilles Emery OP, \textit{The Trinity: An Introduction to Catholic Doctrine on the Triune God},
trans. Matthew Levering (Washington, D. C.: The Catholic University of America Press,
2011), 105–6, emphasis in original.

\textsuperscript{110} Ashworth, "Signification and Modes of Signifying in Thirteenth-Century Logic," 59. For
Thomas see De Pot., q. 7, a. 2 ad 7; q. 7, a. 5 ad 2; ScG, I, c. 30; \textit{Scriptum super Sent.}, I, d. 22,
q. 1, a. 2 ad 1.

\textsuperscript{111} De Pot., q. 9, a. 4.
individual and incommunicably distinct from others. Thomas concludes, saying,

seeing that this [designation of a person as an individual substance of a rational nature] can be nothing else but a relation or a relative being, it follows that in its material signification it denotes a relation or a relative being. Hence it may be said that it signifies a relation by way of substance not \textit{qua} essence but \textit{qua} hypostasis, even as it signifies a relation not \textit{qua} relation but \textit{qua} relative: e.g. as signifying \textit{Father} not as signifying \textit{paternity}. For in this way the signified relation is included indirectly in the signification of the divine Person, which is nothing but something distinct by a relation and subsistent in the divine essence.\footnote{Ibid.}

That is, a divine person is a subsistent relation in the divine nature. Despite eschewing the mode of direct/indirect (\textit{in recto/in obliquo}) in \textit{De Potentia}, in the \textit{Summa} Thomas allows for this language, saying that ‘it is true to say that the name “person” signifies relation directly, and the essence indirectly; not, however, the relation as such, but as expressed by way of a hypostasis’.\footnote{ST, I, q. 29, a. 4.} The direct/indirect language is maintained throughout Thomas’ discussion of the divine persons.\footnote{Cf., e.g., ST, I, q. 34, a. 3 ad 1; q. 41, a. 5.} What he disallows is signifying the relation \textit{absolutely}, for as a term signifying the essence, this makes no sense. The hypostasis is that ‘individual substance’, that supposit that refers to the relation (in God) or individual matter (in humans). With, therefore, the understanding of the term person ‘by force of its own proper signification’,\footnote{Ibid., I, q. 29, a. 4.} one can now also say that ‘person’ signifies the essence directly, and the relation indirectly, ‘inasmuch as the essence is the same as the hypostasis: while in God the hypostasis is expressed as distanced by the relation: and thus relation, as such, enters into the notion of the person indirectly’.\footnote{Ibid.} This latter point is explained more fully later in the \textit{Summa} with regard to divine simplicity: in God the essence and hypostasis are really the same, but are distinguished according to our way of thinking\footnote{ST, I, q. 39, a. 1. Cf. ‘In each divine hypostasis we speak of something that is absolute: this belongs to the essence, and in our way of thinking precedes the divine relations. Yet that which we conceive as absolute, since it is common, does not regard the distinction of the} and thus the creaturely limitations of our mode of signification.\footnote{ST, I, q. 39, a. 1. Cf. ‘In each divine hypostasis we speak of something that is absolute: this belongs to the essence, and in our way of thinking precedes the divine relations. Yet that which we conceive as absolute, since it is common, does not regard the distinction of the}
Despite this clarification, the fact remains that 'person' signifies, analogously, an individual substance of a rational nature which is the relation *qua* hypostasis. Since the divine relation is its own subsistent reality, 'relative predication' becomes now possible in speaking about divine persons.\footnote{For a parallel account which provides commentary on Boethius' *De Trinitate*, see Pabst, "The Primacy of Relation over Substance and the Recovery of a Theological Metaphysics," 553–78 at 574–5.}

After considering the various opinions, Thomas rests on this simple solution, and it proves to not only be the most fitting, but it also proves to be the most analogous solution. This is due in part to the fact that the nature is analogously spoken of, whether of human, angelic, or divine persons, but it is also due to the very *perfection* of a person. It is true that Being is the 'perfection of all perfections' in God, but it should be noted that this is not because of its most 'general', or 'common' aspect; rather, in the places where Thomas speaks of being (*esse*) or being itself (*ipsum esse*) as the most perfect (*perfectissimum*),\footnote{Emery says, 'in our language about God, we signify the essence as if we were referring to a form: we *signify* "that through which" God is God, even though, in the divine reality itself, the divine essence is nothing other than the person (there is in God none of that composition of form and supposit which characterizes corporeal creatures). And we *signify* the person as the concretely existing subject or subsistent, even though the person has no other reality than the divine essence itself. Our words cannot do any better than this. The different ways of signifying the essence and the person follow from this. For this reason, because of the mode in which it is signified in our speech, the essence cannot take the place of the person: that which properly belongs to the person is thus not attributed to the essence'. Gilles Emery OP, *The Trinitarian Theology of St Thomas Aquinas*, trans. Francesca Aran Murphy (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2010), 146–7, emphasis in original.} the reference is to *esse* as the most perfect because it is the most actual. That is, being as act is perfect because it does not admit of any potency, for 'act is always more perfect than potentiality'.\footnote{De Pot., q. 7, a. 2 ad 9; ScG, I, c. 28, n. 10; ScG, III, c. 66, n. 5; ST, I, q. 4, a. 1 ad 3.} Coextensive with this is God's perfection not as the material cause (as this would admit of potentiality), but the most perfect efficient cause (*causae efficientis*) of all created reality.\footnote{De Pot., q. 7, a. 2 ad 2; ScG, I, c. 28, n. 10.}

There is an order at work here of act determining potentiality, and not the other way around, 'since in defining a form we include its proper matter instead of the [potential] difference: thus we define a soul as the act of an hypostases: so that it does not follow that we must conceive the hypostasis as distinct before we understand its relation' (*De Pot.*, q. 8, a. 3 ad 5).
organic physical body'. Whereas univocal terms have no ordering and are abstract ('human' is as true of Søren Kierkegaard as it is of Michael Pedersen Kierkegaard, despite the latter being the father of the former), analogy entails a concrete unity of order. An analogous term, according to Blanchette, 'always implies an order among the analogates, at least with reference to the primary analogate, and it cannot be understood apart from this order'. Therefore, the ordering within the via resolutionis, while it is true to its logic to 'resolve' to the most common and perfect of all—being—it is just as appropriate to recognize the concrete ordering of things, and recognize with Thomas that "Person" signifies what is most perfect in all nature (persona signifícát id quod est perfectíssínum in tota natura)—that is, a subsistent individual of a rational nature'. Te Velde puts it well: 'Where "being" is found in the highest degree, entailing subsistence and intelligence, there must be "person" as well'. And, Jean-Louis Chretien renders the signification of 'what is most perfect' beautifully: 'the place where the world transforms its light into song'. This resounds the same truth reflected in the following statement from Gaudium et Spes, which says that 'all things on earth should be ordained to man as to their center as summit'. Thomas also calls the person that which 'is of all natures the most exalted' or 'most worthy' (est omnium naturalum dignissima). The person's own dignity comes from its specifically metaphysical designation as existing through him- or herself.

Perfectíssínum, a superlative describing that which is 'most perfect', relies on the logic of completion, that is, of that which reaches its complete end in

123 De Pot., q. 7, a. 2 ad 9.
125 ST, I, q. 29, a. 3.
126 Te Velde, "The Divine Person(s): Trinity, Person, and Analogous Naming," 365.
129 De Pot., q. 9, a. 3.
Because of its 'ends'- or 'completion'-orientated signification, Thomas says 'that perfection cannot be attributed to God appropriately if we consider the signification of the name according to its origin; for it does not seem that what is not made (factum) can be called perfect (perfectum)'. All that comes to be is brought out of non-being to being, from potency to act when it is made. 'That is why it is rightly said to be perfect, as being completely made, at that moment when the potency is wholly reduced to act, so that it retains no non-being but has a completed being. By a certain extension of the name, consequently, perfect is said not only of that which by way of becoming reaches a completed act, but also of that which, without any making whatever, is in complete act'. When Thomas refers to Matthew 5:48 which says, 'Be perfect as your heavenly Father is perfect', the Greek for 'perfect' here as τέλειός also shows its signification to be one of the completion of an end—which we see most starkly in the crucified person of Jesus Christ on the cross when he utters in John’s Gospel, 'It is finished' (Τετελεστα). When Thomas explains the reasoning behind the use of 'nature' (natura) and not 'essence' (essentia), one witnesses a similar logic of perfective completion at work. It is objected that 'essence' should be used in the definition of the person such that a person is an individual substance of a rational essence, because of the fact that, according to Aristotle, nature is the principle of motion and rest, and this cannot apply to God (or angels) in whom motion does not exist. To this, Thomas replies that the principle is an intrinsic one that can be applied both formally or materially to apply to any kind of movement. That is,

the essence of anything is completed by the form; so the essence of anything, signified by the definition, is commonly called nature. And here nature is taken in that sense. Hence Boethius says (De Duab. Nat.)

131 For a recent account of the history of this concept, see Anthony D. Baker, Diagonal Advance: Perfection in Christian Theology, Veritas (London: SCM Press, 2011).
132 ScG, I, c. 28 n. 10.
133 Ibid., I, 28.10; cf. ST, I, q. 75, a. 5 ad 4; q. 54, a. 1; q. 4, a. 1 ad 3.
134 ST, I, q. 4, a. 1, s.c.; ScG, I, c. 28, n. 10.
135 Amongst numerous examples, see John 4:34, which reads, 'Jesus said to them, “My food is to do the will of him who sent me and to complete [τελειωσε nut] his work.”'
136 John 19:30.
137 ST, I, q. 29, a. 1 obj 4.
that, “nature is the specific difference giving its form to each thing,” for the specific difference completes the definition, and is derived from the special form of a thing. So in the definition of “person,” which means the singular in a determined “genus,” it is more correct to use the term “nature” than “essence,” because the latter is taken from being, which is most common.¹³⁸

Not only does the specific difference of nature complete each thing in the received form of an act, but here Thomas shows that a perfection does not always follow from what is the most common. Instead, the perfection of a person is within a nature because of its distinction as a completed form, the most perfect in all of nature. In addition, this particular form of the person is part of an intrinsic teleological order such that all other natures—even the most cosmic—are ordered to it. Spaemann and Löw remark, ‘If the human is understood therefore generally as the purpose of nature, then he or she must be understood as the telos of all other natures, including the stars, which are the conditions of generation’.¹³⁹ That is, the whole generation of the cosmos is ordered toward the human person as its end.¹⁴⁰

Arriving at the choice of the person as the prime analogate (or analogand) happens in multiform fashion. Oliva Blanchette’s writing on analogy in his book Philosophy of Being is instructive here. Blanchette observes that, given a differentiation between lower and higher forms of being, it is befitting to begin with a ‘higher form of being as the primary analogate in order to arrive at a more comprehensive science of being as a whole, for the higher forms encompass the lower in a way that the lower cannot encompass the higher, just as the human form of being encompasses the lower forms, such as the sentient, the living, and even the nonliving, in a way that the nonliving cannot encompass living or sentient forms, let alone rational forms’.¹⁴¹ Persons are in this sense ‘more’ than their own nature, and because of this dignity, persons

¹³⁸ ST, I, q. 29, a. 1 ad 4.
¹⁴⁰ S:G, III, c. 22, nn. 8–9.
¹⁴¹ Blanchette, Philosophy of Being, 134. And see Te Velde, Participation and Substantiality in Thomas Aquinas, 248, 251–3, where Te Velde speaks about how a “more perfect form allows a thing to participate more perfectly in being” (here p. 251). This logic can be found as early as Dionysius, who, concerning the angelic orders in his On the Celestial Hierarchy, ch. 5, states, ‘in every sacred rank the higher orders have all the illuminations and powers of those below them and the subordinate have none of those possessed by their superiors’ (Pseudo-Dionysius: The Complete Works, 159 [PG 3:196b–c]).
can therefore encompass and recollect their own nature in ways that other substances cannot.¹⁴² Encountering being at its most replete does not occur in the encounter with ‘being’ as such, but always, through particular beings. Similarly, one does not encounter other forms first as mathematical equations nor as chemical compounds, but first as whole beings and other selves, including our own person in the presence of and among other persons.¹⁴³ Blanchette’s own resolutio does not only involve resolving reality into its most common term ‘being’ as if it was ‘some abstract entity or some lowest common denominator that would be found in all this plurality and diversity of beings as a ground apart from the plurality and diversity’.¹⁴⁴ This is because plurality and diversity are themselves real and the diversity and plurality of being, which includes these differences. At the height and perfection of these differences within being the person is found, encountered in oneself and in others in and amongst interpersonal relations,¹⁴⁵ as that particularly ‘unifying entity’ which is ‘adequate to the analogy of being as it presents itself in experience without reduction and without monopolization, for the higher identity of the human being leaves ample room for the lesser identity of lower beings, thus allowing for the differences of being not only within one and the same being but also between different kinds of being’.¹⁴⁶ It is only with the person as the primary analogate of being that, as its summit and perfection, we can account for being in all its difference.¹⁴⁷ Jan Aertsen sums up this nicely when he says, ‘The movement of egress and regress is characteristic of the entire created reality. But only man is able “by the way of resolution” to tend explicitly to God as end’.¹⁴⁸

In answering the question, ‘how does one arrive at the person?’ above, I have sought to explain how Te Velde’s concerns regarding analogous terms referring to God, while of utmost importance and most definitely not incorrect,

¹⁴² Spaemann, Persons, 98.
¹⁴³ Blanchette, Philosophy of Being, 135; cf. Clarke, “The ‘We Are’ of Interpersonal Dialogue.”
¹⁴⁴ Blanchette, Philosophy of Being, 140.
¹⁴⁵ Clarke, The Philosophical Approach to God, 91.
¹⁴⁶ Blanchette, Philosophy of Being, 138–9.
¹⁴⁷ Ibid., 139.
they were, however, incomplete. In every way, Thomas shows how the term 'person' is 'malleable' enough to include both human and divine persons, the latter of which are able to shed the 'physical' and univocal way that Te Velde warns against, turning on issues of formal signification and perfection. In exploring how one arrives at choosing the person as the prime analogate of Being, it is important to recognize that, in arriving at this juncture, one cannot conflate this with the person's arrival, however much these two questions are related.\textsuperscript{149} Blanchette reminds us that even in choosing the person as the primary analogate of being, one is still speaking \textit{secundum esse}, that is, making designations within being and not yet necessarily to God.\textsuperscript{150} That is, just like the metaphysicians' arrival at being \textit{qua} being, one must note that Thomas did not stop there, but connected this to the metaphysicians' realization that there is a further step to make: the transcendent cause of (the transcendental) being.\textsuperscript{151} Te Velde calls this a 'reflexive reversal' where, in tracing the movement from effect to cause, 'the cause is understood formally as cause, thus as positing through itself the effect'.\textsuperscript{152} In like manner, the \textit{resolutio} of the person must also go under its own shift in recognizing the eminent \textit{personal} cause of creation,\textsuperscript{153} including the cause of the person, that is, where creation's perfection is found in humans and preeminently in the divine persons. In order to examine this person as such, we must now look at the arrival of the person itself, but this shift cannot be done merely through looking at the biological emergence of the person as this would still be too ontic, too physical; in other words, the arrival of the true person would still be just a bigger projection of our own self. Therefore, this investigation must attend to the perfect form of the God-man which also takes up and redeems

\textsuperscript{149} Thomas ascribes this error of conflation to the Platonists. \textit{In Meta.}, X, 3.1964; Aertsen, \textit{Medieval Philosophy and the Transcendentals}, 168.

\textsuperscript{150} Oliva Blanchette, "Analogy and the Transcendental Properties of Being as the Key to Metaphysical Science," \textit{The Saint Anselm Journal} 2, no. 2 (Spring 2005): 1-23 at 10. And see Jeremy D. Wilkins, "Human Being as Primary Analogate of Being: Reflections on Blanchette’s ‘Key to Metaphysical Science’," \textit{The Saint Anselm Journal} 2, no. 2 (Spring 2005): 24-34, who attempts to supplement Blanchette’s work with further, theological resources.

\textsuperscript{151} That is not to say that the power to create belongs to any one of the divine persons, as creating for God belongs to the entire Godhead, as explained in \textit{ST}, q. 44, a. 2. Certain appropriations, however, are allowed to specific persons (see co. and ad 2).

\textsuperscript{152} Te Velde, \textit{Aquinas on God}, 130, emphasis in original, and see p. 107; idem, \textit{Participation and Substantiality in Thomas Aquinas}, 138.

\textsuperscript{153} \textit{ST}, I, q. 45, a. 6.
materiality (and not the other way around).\textsuperscript{154} This shift is helpfully explained by the logic of recapitulation as expounded by St Irenaeus of Lyons.

c. Recapitulation: All Things Gathered up in the Person of Christ

'Every good endowment and every perfect gift is from above, coming down from the Father of lights'. But there is something more. Inspired by the Father, each procession of the Light spreads itself generously toward us, and, in its power to unify, it stirs us by lifting us up. It returns us back to the oneness and deifying simplicity of the Father who gathers us in.

—Dionysius the Areopagite\textsuperscript{155}

All things came into being through him, and without him not one thing came into being.

—John 1:3

Proceeding to talk about the arrival of the person entails a slight reconfiguration of perspective. In understanding the cause as cause, that is, in understanding the arrival of the person as the arch-person requires the reflexive reversal that can only be enacted in the event of recapitulation. The method of \textit{resolutio} described above is, according to Thomas, more akin to that of the philosopher as opposed to that of the approach of the believer; that is, as Matthew Kostelecky puts it, 'In philosophy the first consideration is of creatures and the last is of God; in the teaching of the faith the consideration of God comes first, that of creatures comes afterwards'.\textsuperscript{156} However, as we have seen in exploration above, this was an approach from the creaturely realm that was informed by faith. The shift from seeing the cause as cause of all, of the arrival of the person who is truth, will always therefore be a

\textsuperscript{154} Cf. ST, III, q. 2, a. 1.
recognition that is informed first by revelation. For the theological logic of recapitulation, we turn to the work of St Irenaeus of Lyons.

Recapitulation (ἀνακεφαλαιώσις) is itself not a single, univocal concept. Eric Osborn states that its complexity is a formidable one, combining at least eleven ideas: 'unification, repetition, redemption, perfection, inauguration and consummation, totality, the triumph of Christus Victor, ontology, epistemology and ethics (or being, truth and goodness)').\(^{157}\) I will not be treating all of these concepts, nor do I hope to unfairly limit myself to only one of these at the expense of the others; that is to say, for my purposes, epistemology and ethics are not crucial aspects here, although they are not unimportant.\(^{158}\)

The word ‘recapitulation’ itself, as John Behr points out, originally stems from literary and rhetorical usage. The Roman rhetorician Quintillian remarks: ‘The repetition and grouping of the facts, which the Greeks call ἀνακεφαλαιώσις [recapitulation] and some of our own writers call enumeration, serves both to refresh the memory of the judge and to place the whole case before his eyes, and, even although the facts may have made little impression on him in detail, their cumulative effect is considerable’.\(^{159}\) Behr comments on this, saying, ‘recapitulation summarizes the whole case, presenting a restatement of the case or story in epitome, bringing together the whole argument in one conspectus, so that, while the particular details made little impact, the picture as a whole might be more forceful. Recapitulation provides a résumé which, because shorter, is clearer and therefore more effective’.\(^{160}\) Thus, Paul comments that the commandments are ‘summed up in this word (ἐν τῷ λόγῳ τούτῳ ἀνακεφαλαιοῦται), “You shall love your neighbour as yourself.”’\(^{161}\) The summing up is also a gathering, as Paul writes in Ephesians: ‘With all wisdom and insight he has made known to us the mystery of his will, according to his good pleasure that he set forth in Christ,


\(^{158}\) E.g., ibid., 232–48.


\(^{160}\) Ibid.

\(^{161}\) Romans 13:9.
as a plan for the fullness of time, to gather up (ἀνακεφαλαίωσασθαί) all things in him, things in heaven and things on earth'.

Inspired by Paul’s theology, for Irenaeus, recapitulation means primarily to join up again, gather up, and unite. This happens primarily and uniquely in the person of Christ, but it involves the whole event of the life of Christ in the passion and resurrection as well. Humanity is recapitulated in Adam, who we are told by Paul is a type (τύπος) of the one to come. For Irenaeus, ‘Adam is God’s image because he has been fashioned after the physical form of the Son’s future incarnation, and because the life visible in his person is the life of God.’ It is important to note that Irenaeus takes the Epistle to the Colossians quite seriously here which states that Christ ‘is the image (ἰκών) of the invisible God, the firstborn (πρωτότοκος) of all creation’. Irenaeus is not merely glossing Genesis 1:26-7 but, in response to the various mythologies of Ptolemy and Valentinus, is displaying Christ’s cosmic significance. Humanity is created after (secundum) the likeness of God and Christ after (ad) the image, which was not revealed in its fullness until the person of Christ became flesh. The human person is created after the prototype of the Son (God’s image), and the Son thereby serves as ‘man’s antetype, the model or pattern after whom man was formed, at the time when he was created from the

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162 Ephesians 1:8-10.
163 Gustav Molwitz, De ANAKEΦΑΛΑΙΩΣΕΩΣ in Irenaei Theologia Potestate (Dresden: B. G. Teubner, 1874), 3; cited in Osborn, Irenaeus of Lyons, 103-4.
167 For an excellent discussion of the background to this, see Matthew C. Steenberg, Of God and Man: Theology as Anthropology from Irenaeus to Athanasius (London: Continuum, 2009), 29–41.
169 AH, V.16.2.
170 Steenberg, Irenaeus on Creation, 138.
dust of the earth’. Later, and in the same vein, Thomas Aquinas will say that humanity is made ‘to the image of God’ (*ad imaginem Dei*).172

The logic of recapitulation is such that the first (Adam) becomes last, and the last (Christ) becomes first.173 Perfection is imparted to humanity by joining the end to the beginning, linking humanity to God.174 This linking is done through God’s economy (*oikonomia*), who, in the person of Jesus Christ, recapitulates the long development of mankind in himself.175 ‘As one who perfects the human race, Christ must be a member of that race, and as first of all creatures and first-born from the dead he can bring humanity to perfection’.176 This linking the end to the beginning also means that the end of the law of Christ is joined to the beginning.177 Indeed, Irenaeus’ protology is so deeply rooted first in Christology that John 1:3 serves as the lens through which Genesis 1:1 and the creation of humanity is to be read: ‘All things came into being through him, and without him not one thing came into being’—otherwise, the Genesis account alone remains partial.178

This work of perfection effected in the Incarnation is of a ‘higher’ kind of perfection than the perfection of nature that we have learned to call the person, after Thomas’ designation stated above.179 Wingren states, ‘There is in the Incarnation something that is essentially different from what we find in Creation, even when Creation is at its most perfect. That which became a reality in the Incarnation is not present even as a potentiality in man. He is

172 ST, I, q. 93, a. 1; cf. ScG, I, c. 29, nn. 3–6.
177 AH, IV.12.4.
178 Steenberg, *Of God and Man*, 27.
179 ST, I, q. 29, a. 3.
destined to be like God, but he has never been destined to be God’. This Creator-creature distinction is important to remember, for as Osborn reminds us, for Irenaeus, recapitulation does not merely describe Christ’s work as the head, chief, or ‘summit’ of things (although he is these things as well), but as the one who perfectly ‘unites a vast plurality’ and is thus the ‘unity of all things’. Human nature is united in this or that particular person; but for the one through whom all things came into being, he unites all of being, all natures, not just in the here and now, but for all time until the eschaton. Lest we reduce recapitulation to a nominal saving of particular persons only up until the present time, it cannot be forgotten that recapitulation in the person of Christ ‘covers the whole of the period from the birth of Jesus to the eschatological perfection’. The full likeness of man to God will also only be fulfilled ‘in the participation in Trinitarian glory which is the promise of the eschaton’. The difference between these two kinds of ‘perfections’, that is, of the difference between the work of creation enacted in and through the second person of the Trinity in contrast to the perfection in created nature in the form of the human person, is also the difference between the primary analogate and its analogue in creation. The chasm here is, on the one hand infinite, but on the other hand the image and likeness still must be held together; in other words, the distance is enacted by the gift of participation in the body of Christ in the Eucharist. Otherwise, to hold that only the image alone, or only the likeness alone can be saved is to fall into the error of the Gnostics according to Irenaeus, for this sunders spirit from the body. On the contrary, ‘by sharing in the body of Christ, which is the church, man can grow in the image and likeness of God’.

With the arrival of the true person who recapitulates all of reality, one can affirm now the co-primacy and coextensive reality of both God’s oneness and God’s triunity in three persons. What is common (God’s esse) is distinct—but

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183 Steenberg, *Irenaeus on Creation*, 138. In speaking about the distinction between ‘image’ and ‘likeness’, Thomas designates two kinds of ways in which they are related, the first being a kind of ‘preamble’ and that which is more common in things; and the second being of the type described here which is the likeness being the perfection of the image (*ST*, I, q. 93, a. 9).
not divided—from what is proper, just as it is true to say that the Father is the same thing as God, but ‘he is not common as God is, but proper (sed proprium)’.\footnote{De Pot., q. 8, a. 3.} It is for this reason that one must always hold these two together in a kind of reduplication (redoublement), as Gilles Emery often puts it, against a one-sided ‘personalism’ on the one hand or an ‘essentialism’ on the other.\footnote{Gilles Emery OP, “Personalism or Essentialism in the Treatise on God in Saint Thomas Aquinas?,” The Thomist 64, no. 4 (2000): 521–63, esp. 527–36; idem, The Trinitarian Theology of St Thomas Aquinas, 44–8; idem, The Trinity, 86; idem, “The Doctrine of the Trinity in St Thomas Aquinas,” in Aquinas on Doctrine: A Critical Introduction, ed. Thomas G. Weinandy, OFM, Cap, Daniel A. Keating, and John P. Yocum (London and New York: T & T Clark, 2004), 67–89 at 50–1. Emery’s goal is to show, contra myriad unnuanced readings of Thomas, that the designations of what is ‘common’ and ‘proper’ to God follow in that order, not because Thomas is an ‘essentialist’ and persons are for him only an afterthought, but that this is due to the historical shape taken in responding to the heretical positions of Arianism and Sabellianism.} It is in this sense that a truly theological analogy of being will only be adequate insofar as it is also simultaneously an analogy of persons. In a similar fashion, Aaron Riches remarks, ‘the analogia entis—though conceived in terms of what is one in God—arrives, nevertheless, in terms of the relationality of personhood: as a gift from someone. And what is personal and relational in God is Father, Son, and Holy Spirit’.\footnote{Riches, “Being Good: Thomas Aquinas and Dionysian Causal Predication,” 473, emphasis in original.}

Above I have shown how the path of resolutio blossoms in a ‘reflexive reversal’ towards an affirmation of a cause of creation, not only in its beginnings, but in its end as linked to the beginning in the recapitulation through the person of Christ. The image of the human person is taken up through its participation in the Eucharist towards the eschatological completion of its likeness in Christ. Yet, this only offers a philosophical and theological justification for determining the person as a valid primary analogous term (which ‘stretches’ unto the eschaton). What about how analogy itself is said to operate? In the next chapter I will continue to extend my discussion of analogy. However, I will not be turning to the debate about analogy itself with regard to the classical issue of the analogy of being alone; on the contrary, what I will now show that when the analogy of being is investigated in detail, it finds its fulfillment and completion within a coextensive analogia personae.
CHAPTER 5
THE PERSONAL LOGIC OF ANALOGY

For from the greatness and beauty of created things we may, by analogy [ἀνάλογως], contemplate their Creator.

—Wisdom of Solomon 13:5

Manuduction is the form of theosis.

—Peter M Candler, Jr

To reach God, man must go through all of nature and find him under the veil where He hides Himself only to be accessible. Thus the whole natural order comes between God and man as a bond and as an obstacle, as a necessary means of union and as a necessary means of distinction.

—Maurice Blondel

In this chapter I aim to show how the philosophical and theological use of analogical speech can refer to God not only in an ‘essential’ way, but also a proper or personal mode as well. This stems from the recognition that the human person is the most fitting as the primary analogate of Being as indicated in the previous chapter; moreover, it is rooted in the way in which analogy also functions as a distinctly personal enterprise. This chapter can be thought of as one answer to Lewis Ayres’ critique of ‘relational ontologies’, whose proponents fail ‘to offer an adequate account of analogy’. I share in Ayres’ critique of said theologians (e.g., Metropolitan John Zizioulas), primarily because their accounts of the person strongly tend toward speaking

1 ἓκ γὰρ μεγέθους καλλονῆς καὶ κτισμάτων ἀναλόγως ὁ γενεσιουργὸς αὐτῶν θεωρείται. ἀναλόγως is also often translated as ‘corresponding’ here, or classically as ‘proportionably’.
2 Peter M. Candler, Jr., Theology. Rhetoric. Manuduction. or Reading Scripture Together on the Path to God, Radical Traditions (Grand Rapids, MI: Wm. B. Eerdmans Publishing Company, 2006), 44.
3 Blondel, Action (1893), 410.
of human and divine persons in a univocal manner, and hence do violence to
the notions of nature and freedom in an unnecessarily dialectical way. It
should be noted, though, that adding a personal dimension to the analogical
discourse does not ensure any kind of certainty (as this would strive after
univocity), just as in the same way persons themselves can never fully be
grasped or defined, and then even only as analogical gestures such as we find
in Boethius and Aquinas. Yet at the same time, the reality of the person is
more concrete than any generic notion of ‘relationality’ can provide on its
own. As I hope to show, the reason why persons and analogical talk about God
(whether ‘common’ or ‘proper’) never succeed in comprehensive certainty
resides in the fact that both God and human persons are themselves ultimately
mysteries. Put in another way, the practice of analogical speech participates in
the same reality which escapes definitional structure. While human persons
share in this ultimate likeness of the mystery of the Triune God, this difference
is analogical, that is, the mystery of God remains in an ‘ever greater’
dissimilarity from God’s creatures.

The plan of this chapter is as follows: I will first layout the fundamentals
of the debate concerning analogy and how it operates following Thomas
Aquinas and the relevant literature with respect to its connection to causality
and participation; next, I will consider what is at issue in the discussion
surrounding the ‘analogy of the concept’ versus ‘analogy of judgment’ as a
response to the writings of Christos Yannaras; finally, I will turn to the issues
surrounding the analogia entis, Erich Przywara, and how they shed light on
the analogical perfection of the person. Additionally, with the help of Hans
Urs von Balthasar, I show how the shape of analogy is orientated to that of
service. The previous chapter assumed a great deal of the logic and practice of

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5 This is the astute argument of Douglas Farrow, “Person and Nature: The Necessity-Freedom
Dialectic in John Zizioulas,” in The Theology of John Zizioulas: Personhood and the Church,
of dialectics as they oppose the peaceableness of paradox, see John Milbank and Slavoj Žižek,
The Monstrosity of Christ: Paradox or Dialectic?, ed. Creston Davis (Cambridge, MA: MIT
Press, 2009); and the forthcoming work: Rustin Brian, Covering Up Luther: How Barth’s
Christology Challenged the Deus Absconditas That Haunts Modernity, Veritas (Eugene, OR:

what I will explore below, but in doing so, I hope to shed light on some of the issues that animate what is at stake in gesturing toward persons as analogical.

a. The Work of Analogy between Univocity and Equivocity: Causality and Participation

The recent literature on the debate concerning analogy used in theological speech about God has been vast. In the twentieth century, the controversy overlapped with and surrounded the two figures of Karl Barth and Erich Przywara, SJ under the heading of the *analogia entis* (this debate will be partially attended to in Part C below). Discussions of analogy have their beginnings in the Ancient Greeks including Plato and Aristotle, and its influence has been so pervasive that western European metaphysics cannot be

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thought without it. In this regard, analogy’s origins are concerned with mathematical proportionality, but also, for Plato it involved the proportion between the four elements as well as the four forms of knowledge (knowledge: opinion :: thinking: imagining). Aristotle restricted his use of analogy to more logical, semantic concerns. Theologically, the practice of analogy takes most of its cues from the different writings of Thomas Aquinas as its point of departure on the one hand, and as a ‘doctrine’ as such, from the work of Cardinal Cajetan in his De Nominum Analogia. To a large extent, most of the writing around analogy in the middle of the twentieth century was attempting to sort through the Cajetanian legacy. Most accounts (Ralph McInerny and David Burrell) tend to argue that Cajetan attempted to ‘systemetize’ Aquinas along the lines of a ‘procrustean’ analogy of proportionality (analogia proportionalitatis) and thus in effect unwittingly turn analogy into a formalized univocity; additionally, a recent account by Joshua Hochschild attempts to defend Cajetan as responding to a different set of concerns than Aquinas’ own.

Much of the literature concerns the metaphysical issues involved in such analogical designation, but Thomas cannot also be understood outside of his

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9 Puntel, Analogie Und Geschichtlichkeit, 4.
11 Respectively, see Timaeus, 32c and Republic, 534a.
12 ST, I, q. 13, aa. 5–6; De Pot., q. 7, a. 7; ScG, I, c. 34; Lyttkens calls these three passages “decisive” in The Analogy Between God and the World, 286. For a more comprehensive list of sources in Thomas, see the two indices in Klubertanz, St. Thomas Aquinas on Analogy, 157–302.
context of thirteenth century logic and semantics.\textsuperscript{16} It is, of course, following Aquinas, best to keep these two concepts together, but \textit{ordered} such that metaphysics comes first followed by its logical, semantic use as a science, for the latter depends on the former, and not vice versa. The reason that this is important to keep in mind is that both McInerny and Burrell claim that analogy is only a logical or semantic concern.\textsuperscript{17} Burrell will go so far as to say that what is primarily operative for Thomas is an epistemology such that ‘Aquinas’ metaphysics presupposes an epistemology’.\textsuperscript{18} In one sense this appears to be true insofar as Aquinas’ method is one that admits that we cannot know what God is, but rather what God is not.\textsuperscript{19} But this is to assume that theology’s ‘object’ (i.e. God) only concerns knowledge and that there is no aspect that the endeavor also includes a real (i.e. ontological) participation in its end. In response to these epistemological sensibilities, Conor Cunningham rightly notes analogy’s manuductive aspect: ‘In terms of theology, analogy is part of a metaphysical doctrine, and so it is cosmological, rather than epistemological, and only as such can we appreciate its position


\textsuperscript{18} Burrell, \textit{Analogy and Philosophical Language}, 127.

\textsuperscript{19} \textit{ST}, I, q. 3, prologue.
and function; a function which is also more pedagogical than epistemological.\textsuperscript{20}

Lawrence Dewan has shown just how limiting and misleading this approach is in response to Ralph McInerny’s mature work on the matter.\textsuperscript{21} McInerny, as a logician, claims that analogy in Thomas is only ‘logical’, yet Thomas himself clearly speaks about analogy both from the position of the logician and the metaphysician. Thomas speaks of a situation (which McInerny ignores)\textsuperscript{22} where the logician will see only univocity in naming and the metaphysician will recognize analogy. This is because the real diversified content of being demands such careful, metaphysical discernment.\textsuperscript{23} It is the metaphysician, not the logician, who actually goes about defining genus, species, and the analogue involved in analogous speech, and, in turn, it is the logician who benefits from the metaphysician’s discernment, not the other way around.\textsuperscript{24} Moreover, as Klubertanz points out, the logician is not concerned with ‘the way in which perfections are in being but only the way in

\textsuperscript{20}Cunningham,\textit{ Genealogy of Nihilism}, 181.


\textsuperscript{22}Dewan, “St. Thomas and Analogy: The Logician and the Metaphysician,” 90.

\textsuperscript{23}The text at issue is from Thomas at \textit{In I Sent.}, d. 19, q. 5, a. 2 ad 1. Cf. \textit{De Pot.}, q. 7, a. 7, s. c. 1. See Dewan, “St. Thomas and Analogy: The Logician and the Metaphysician,” 87ff. ‘The metaphysician incorporates into the meaning of the name of the thing differences in the mode of being of the things given the common name’ (Ibid., 92).

\textsuperscript{24}Dewan, “St. Thomas and Analogy: The Logician and the Metaphysician,” 83–4, 94. Cf. Thomas Aquinas, \textit{Aquinas On Being and Essence: A Translation and Interpretation}, ed. Joseph Bobik (Notre Dame, IN: University of Notre Dame Press, 1965), 100 (c. 39). Here Thomas speaks about how the oneness of a genus is signifying its form and not its content, to which it is indifferent. Te Velde remarks: ‘The unity of a genus is a unity of signifying, not a unity of what is signified. For instance, the genus of animal signifies the essence of animal as one and the same in all its different species, hence in an indeterminate manner. The genus does not deny the existence of the differences, it does not consider them; its way of signifying is indifferent to what is not indifferent in the thing signified’ (\textit{Participation and Substantiality in Thomas Aquinas}, 195–6).
which they are conceived'. There is, therefore, an unnecessarily parsimonious view that the logician tends to take here: the logician tends to deny that there is a metaphysical aspect involved in the judgment of naming; whereas, the metaphysician will allow for both the metaphysical and the logical aspects to operate not just in tandem, but in their own proper order, for, as Klubertanz remarks, 'both the mind and the things are concerned' when analogy arises.

It will not suffice to settle for the following remarks of David Burrell: 'the "analogical use of language" refers both to the linguistic structures which make such usage possible, as well as to the quality of consciousness which guides the way we actually proceed'. Using language analogously is only part of the procedure. The reason we employ language analogously in the first place is because the reality involved is so expansive that the ratio of our concepts cannot contain them in adequate ways; on the contrary, by their very definition these realities are impossible to contain in any genus, such as being, or God. There is, of course, nothing wrong with focusing on the analogous use of language, and so there is also nothing wrong per se with taking inspiration from Wittgenstein's emphasis on use and following examples—indeed, it can be very helpful. However, if we are to allow Thomas to lead us by the hand, we cannot stop short at the Aristotelian-inspired emphasis on the grammar of language itself, for being led in a faithful manuductio will also reveal the Neoplatonic logic at work in Thomas' own words, even when those words themselves use Aristotelian categories. The Neoplatonic aspect comes out

25 Klubertanz, St. Thomas Aquinas on Analogy, 114.
26 Ibid.
especially with regard to the vertical dimension of the relationship of cause to
effect.\footnote{31} If one is to be led by Aquinas’ hand in the practice of analogy, one
needs to pay attention to both the horizontal and the vertical aspects of this
leading, for it is only in this way will one also heed the order of arrival
explored in the previous chapter—otherwise we are only left with the
philosophical \textit{resolutio} and never make the theological step of recognizing
God as the (uncaused) cause of Being itself.\footnote{32} This particular path of
philosophical-theological discovery must always be maintained for the
following reason given by Thomas: because we cannot know directly God’s
essence, we only know God from God’s effects as mediated by secondary
causes.\footnote{33} Therefore, while in the strictest sense we do not have any conception
of God, Thomas sheds light on a faithful approach that allows us to begin to
come to an understanding of who God is. Thus, Thomas’ aim is to avoid
idolatry and not mistake created things for God. Accordingly, Te Velde says,
‘The formula \textit{ipsum esse subsistens} signifies God as he is knowable to us on
the basis of his “reflection” in the world’.\footnote{34} Analogical language appears to
hold a privileged place in Thomas’ account of language of God, for it points
toward this similarity-in-difference that the creature shares with its creator in
such a way that the relationship between the two retains its faithful dignity,
and he does so without collapsing the one into the other, or putting them
asunder.

For Thomas, above all, analogical language is a part of, and not to be
separated from, language about God—namely, under the rubric of ‘The Names

\begin{footnotesize}
\begin{enumerate}
\item \textit{Being—God—Person} (Notre Dame, IN: University of Notre Dame Press, 1994), 89–101; John
\ F. Wippel (Washington, D. C.: Catholic University of America Press, 1984), 117–58; Te
\ Velde, \textit{Participation and Substantiality in Thomas Aquinas}; and the chapter entitled
“Platonism and Aristotelianism in Aquinas” in John F. Wippel, \textit{Metaphysical Themes in
Thomas Aquinas II}, Rev. Ed, Studies in Philosophy and the History of Philosophy 47
\item Lyttkens, \textit{The Analogy Between God and the World}, 71, where it is shown that this begins in
Proclus. More directly, as I will show below, this Proclean dimension is inherited from
Dionysius.
\item Cf. Ibid., 346. In this sense, we would only end up at a transcendentalism and never arrive at
the transcendent.
\item \textit{ScG}, I, c. 11, n. 4; II, c. 15; \textit{ST}, I, q. 1, a. 7 ad 1; q. 2, a. 1; q. 2, a. 2; q. 12, a. 8, etc.; \textit{De
Ver.}, q. 2, a. 14.
\item Te Velde, \textit{Participation and Substantiality in Thomas Aquinas}, 120.
\end{enumerate}
\end{footnotesize}
of God’, which is the title of question 13 of the *Summa Theologica*. The name of this question hearkens back to the tradition of divine naming stemming back to Dionysius. In keeping with this Dionysian tradition, Thomas begins Article 1 of Question 13 with a reference to the *triplex via* method of naming also employed by Dionysius. That is, because we cannot know God’s essence, ‘we know God from creatures as their principle (*secundum habitudinem principii*), and also by way of excellence and remotion’. Although the order here is not exactly the same (the second two being reversed), this corresponds to the three steps of *per causalitatem, per remotionem, and per eminentiam*, whereby God is 1) first recognized as the cause of the perfection name in question, 2) then through negation in the sense that God is ‘not’ at all like the way in which we understand the perfection because 3) God is the transcendent source of the perfection in a most excellent way (although the ordering of the *triplex via* varies with the context for Thomas). The way of eminence is emphasized in Article 2 where Thomas discusses substantial predication of God. Words such as ‘good’ can be attributed to God, not merely because God is the cause of Goodness, but because whatever goodness we attribute to God pre-exists in God and ‘in a more excellent and higher way’. Article 2 responds to the issue of speaking literally of God, offering the classic distinction of the *res significata* and

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35 Te Velde, *Aquinas on God*, 102.
38 *ST*, I, q. 13, a. 1. Dionysius says in *On the Divine Names*, ‘we cannot know God in his nature, since this is unknowable and is beyond the reach of mind or of reason. But we know him from the arrangement of everything, because everything is, in a sense, projected out from him, and this order possesses certain images and semblances of his divine paradigms. We therefore approach that which is beyond all as far as our capacities allow us and we pass by way of the denial and the transcendence of all things and by way of the cause of all things [ἐν τῇ πάντων αδιαφορείᾳ καὶ ὑπεροχῇ καὶ ἐν τῇ πάντων αἰτίᾳ]. God is therefore known in all things and as distinct from all things. He is known through knowledge and through unknowing’. (Pseudo-Dionysius, *Pseudo-Dionysius: The Complete Works*, 108–9 [PG 3:869D–872A]).
40 *ST*, I, q. 13, a. 2.
modus significandi.

That is, perfection terms *can* literally (which is not to be confused with 'univocally') apply to God so long as the following procedure is followed: 'As regards what is signified (*quod significat*) by these names, they belong properly to God, and more properly than they belong to creatures, and are applied primarily to Him. But as regards their mode of signification (*modum significandi*), they do not properly and strictly apply to God; for their mode of signification applies to creatures'.

Such designations include perfection terms as 'being', 'good', 'living', and, I would add, 'person'. Before turning to the issue of analogy, Aquinas also refutes (in Article 4) that these names of God are not synonymous and therefore redundant because of the fact that their manifold diversity represent the divine simplicity *from the side of creation* in an imperfect way. The one simple reality of God that these names signify are considered under different aspects.

Thomas turns to analogical predication in the fifth article, but does so first as a response to univocal predication. All three of the objections assume a univocal predication between creatures and God, but Thomas replies that this is impossible because of the nature of causality when a divinely simple God creates. Elsewhere, Thomas quotes Isaiah 40:18, 'To whom then have you

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41 *ST*, I, q. 13, a. 3. For other place in Aquinas see ScG, I, c. 34, n. 6; *Comp. Theol.*, I, c. 27. For discussions of the distinction see Ashworth, "Signification and Modes of Signifying in Thirteenth-Century Logic" (for historical background); Lyttkens, *The Analogy Between God and the World*, 294, 350, 376–81, 468–71; Rocca, *Speaking the Incomprehensible God*, 334–52; Long, *Speaking of God*, 174–7. Critically: John S. Morreall, *Analogy and Talking About God: A Critique of the Thomistic Approach* (Washington, D. C.: University Press of America, 1978), 114, calls the distinction "bogus." Ashworth remarks, 'while the distinction between *res significata* and *modi significandi* is central to Aquinas's theory of religious language, it is in no way central to his theory of analogy (insofar as he has a general theory). It places no role in his explanation of the use of such words as *sanum* and *ens*' ("Signification and Modes of Signifying in Thirteenth-Century Logic," 60; idem, "Analogy and Equivocation in Thirteenth-Century Logic," 122). This assumes falsely that analogy lies outside of Thomas' 'religious language', as if Thomas was not using the analogy of health (*sanus*) to talk analogously about how we refer to God. Oddly, Burrell, *Analogy and Philosophical Language*, 116–17, 178–80, says that the res/modus distinction is more "at home" in John Duns Scotus than in Aquinas, for it assumes a univocal core. Rocca, *Speaking the Incomprehensible God*, 349n.46, points out that John Wippel has absolved Thomas of this. See John F. Wippel, *Metaphysical Themes in Thomas Aquinas*, Studies in Philosophy and the History of Philosophy 10 (Washington, D. C.: Catholic University of America Press, 1984), 238.

42 *ST*, I, q. 13, a. 3.

43 *ST*, I, q. 13, a. 3 ad 1.

44 *ST*, I, q. 13, a. 4 ad 3 puts it succinctly: 'The perfect unity of God requires that what are manifold and divided in others should exist in Him simply and unitedly. Thus it comes about that He is one in reality, and yet multiple in idea, because our intellect apprehends Him in a manifold manner, as things represent Him'. *Cf. De Pot.*, q. 7, a. 6.
likened God?"\(^{45}\) Echoing the arguments outlined above in Article 4, God as the efficient cause possesses all perfections within himself,\(^{46}\) but because the effect of creation is not an 'adequate result of the power of the efficient cause, [it] receives the similitude of the agent not in its full degree, but in a measure that falls short, so that what is divided and multiplied in the effects resides in the agent simply, and in the same manner'.\(^{47}\) Applying the term 'wise' to the human person and to God can in no way be univocal, for wise is an accidental attribute of the human and distinct from his or her essence, whereas in God it is identified with the essence.\(^{48}\) Nor can we name creatures and God in a purely equivocal way either, for 'it follows that from creatures nothing could be known or demonstrated about God at all'.\(^{49}\) As an answer to navigating this dilemma, Thomas proposes that these names are said 'in an analogous sense, i.e. according to proportion (secundum analogiam, idest proportionem)'.\(^{50}\)

Interpretive difficulties have plagued the remainder of the article ever since Cajetan. While I will not sort through all the subsequent history including figures such as Sylvester of Ferrara and Francisco Suárez,\(^{51}\) below I will provide exegesis with reference to the recent relevant accounts that bring out what I hope to show is Aquinas' own emphasis in the matter.

Thomas proceeds by saying that analogous names are used in two ways, the first of which tarries primarily on the predicative level, while the second, to which Thomas gives more emphasis, operates at the transcendental level. The first example Thomas gives is when many things are 'proportionate to one

\(^{45}\) De Pot., q. 7, a. 7, s. c. 3.
\(^{46}\) ST, I, q. 4, a. 2.
\(^{47}\) ST, I, q. 13, a. 5.
\(^{48}\) Cf. De Pot., q. 7, a. 7, s. c. 5. 'Now God's relation to being is different from that of any creature': for he is his own being, which cannot be said of any creature. Hence in no way can it be predicated univocally of God and a creature, and consequently neither can any of the other predicables among which is included even the first, being: for if there be diversity in the first, there must be diversity in the others: wherefore nothing is predicated univocally of substance and accident' (De Pot., q. 7, a. 7, co.).
\(^{49}\) ST, I, q. 13, a. 5. While he does not mention it in this article, in De. Pot., q. 7, a. 7 Thomas names Moses Maimonides as an example of one expressing 'pure equivocation'. For a further account that contrasts the two, see David B. Burrell, Knowing the Unknowable God: Ibn-Sina, Maimonides, Aquinas (Notre Dame, IN: University of Notre Dame Press, 1987), esp. 47; Rolnick, Analogical Possibilities, 153-69 comments on this saying that Burrell becomes less "apophatic" when confronted with analyzing Maimonides' extreme equivocal predication.
\(^{50}\) ST, I, q. 13, a. 5.
(proportionem ad unum)' as when 'healthy' is 'predicated of medicine and urine in relation and in proportion to the health of a body, of which the former is the sign and the latter the cause'. To avoid confusion with this translation which seems to indicate that the former [as medicine] is the sign and the latter [as urine] is the cause, the end of the corpus of this article, as well as other places in Thomas, explicitly states that the urine is the sign, while the medicine is the cause. This we find hearkens back to Aristotelian pros hen (πρός ἑν) analogy, where what is analogous is common to several and, despite there being no single truth toward which these analogates point toward, there is still some nature (φύσις) towards which it refers. Thus, following Aristotle, analogical unity for Thomas is defined by the ad unum relation, which he explicitly emphasizes further in the sixth article with reference to the per prius and per posterius designation. That is, names are predicated of many with an analogical reference to some one thing, which 'must be placed in the definition of them all'. In so doing, names are 'applied primarily (per prius) to that which is put in the definition of such other things, and secondarily (per posterius) to these others according as they approach more or less to that first'. Thomas refers back to the sanus example to explain that the 'one' thing to which urine and medicine relate is the 'health of the animal'. Despite Cajetan's analysis, Thomas does not care to analyse whether or not these terms are more 'intrinsic' or 'extrinsic' here, for what is

52 ST, I, q. 13, a. 5. The type of analogy here is a kind of equivocation, but a deliberate equivocation (as opposed to equivocation by chance, a casu), or aequipvoca a consilio. Thomas includes analogy within equivocation broadly conceived in Ibid., I, q. 13, a. 10 ad 4; Ashworth, "Analogy and Equivocation in Thirteenth-Century Logic," 108n.74. The conception dates back to Boethius and Simplicius is broken down into similitude, proportion, from one (ab uno), and to one (ad unum), as explained in Ibid., 101–2; McInerny, Aquinas and Analogy, 92–3. Aquinas only focuses on the last of these two, however his division of analogy into many-to-one and one to another as cause and effect do not fit isomorphically within this distinction (Ashworth, "Analogy and Equivocation in Thirteenth-Century Logic," 122–23).


56 In Meta., VII, 4.1337; Montagnes, The Doctrine of the Analogy of Being According to Thomas Aquinas, 44; Rocca, Speaking the Incomprehensible God, 139–41.

57 ST, I, q. 13, a. 6.

58 Ibid.
at issue is the degrees ('more or less') of the relation of the things to the one, primary instance.

It is important to recognize what Thomas is not saying here. Despite these examples having three things (health of body, medicine, and urine), one should not be confused with his statements elsewhere which speak about a relation of two things to a third, as in De Potentia and the Summa Contra Gentiles. In these examples, Thomas is explicitly rejecting this model of analogy, and in the Contra Gentiles, he actually rejects the model outlined above when stated in the following way: ‘with reference to one health we say that an animal is healthy as the subject of health, medicine is healthy as its cause, food as its preserver, urine as its sign’. Thomas rejects this particular formulation because it assumes that one is—univocally—positing something prior to God under which the two subjects have a relation. Rather than rejecting this option tout court in the Summa Theologica, Thomas instead reconfigures it along the lines of participation (i.e. 'more and less') and especially causality, as will soon be clear.

This second example states that things are said analogically 'as one thing is proportionate to another, thus “healthy” is said of medicine and animal, since medicine is the cause of health in the animal body'. In the same way, because we only name God from creatures, analogy provides logic of the 'reflexive reversal' such that 'whatever is said of God and creatures, is said according to the relation of a creature to God as its principle and cause, wherein all perfections of things pre-exist excellently'. Analogy, Thomas adds, is a ‘mean’ between pure univocation and pure equivocation. Accordingly, analogous speech is the way in which creatures can speak about

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59 De Pot., q. 7, a. 7; ScG, I, c. 34, nn. 3–4.
60 ScG, I, c. 34, n. 2.
61 ScG, I, c. 34, n. 4; similarly in De Pot., q. 7, a. 7. Cf. De Ver., q. 23, a. 7 ad 10.
62 ST, I, q. 13, a. 5, my emphasis.
63 Ibid. Cf. ‘To avoid complete equivocation, then, it becomes necessary to rely upon the relation binding each effect to cause, the only link enabling us to make an accurate ascent from creature to creator. This relationship St. Thomas calls analogy, that is to say, proportion’ (Etienne Gilson, The Christian Philosophy of St. Thomas Aquinas, trans. L. K. Shook [Notre Dame, IN: University of Notre Dame Press, 1994], 106).
God as cause of all, as the *agens analogicum*, the analogical agent.\(^{64}\) Indeed, earlier when speaking about perfections in God, Thomas states that the likeness of a creature to God is not based on agreement of the form of genus or species, but according to a certain analogy.\(^{65}\) The analogy is not one of proportionality in the sense of A:B::C:D, but of being *proportioned* as effects to their cause.\(^{66}\) Commenting on *ST* I, q. 13, a. 5, Lyttkens remarks, ‘the fundamental ontological condition underlying the analogy between God and creation is the likeness of the effect to its cause’.\(^{67}\) This is because, as Lyttkens concludes, ‘All St. Thomas’ analogies between God and the world are ultimately based on the relation of cause to effect. The likeness of an effect to its cause is the prerequisite of our knowledge and designations of God, and likewise of our conceiving creation as in relation to God. Ontologically, the analogy between God and the world is accordingly the likeness of effect to cause’.\(^{68}\)

Both the predicative and transcendental analogies are founded not upon the univocal, but by the creatures’ *analogical* relation to God just as an effect is proportionally like its cause. The basis for all analogy in Thomas is this causal relation, which is what the oft-quoted dictum ‘analogy is analogous’ is attempting to articulate. This locution does not have the same intention as speech being metaphorical ‘all the way down’ as one may find in Derrida’s infinite deferral of the ‘becoming-space’ of *differance*,\(^{69}\) but it is an example of *analogy itself* being ordered toward one (*ad unum*), as when McInerny rightly states, “‘analogy’ has several meanings one of which is privileged and

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\(^{64}\) *ST*, I, q. 13, a. 5 ad 1. This is because creation is only real for us but logical for God, what Thomas calls a mixed relation where one term is logical while the other is real (Ibid., I, q. 13, a. 8). For more on this see Conor Cunningham, “Being Recalled: Life as Anamnesis,” in *Divine Transcendence and Immanence in the Work of Thomas Aquinas*, ed. Harm Goris, Herwi Rikhof, and Henk Schoot, New Series XIII (Leuven: Peeters, 2009), 59–80, esp. 61–7.

\(^{65}\) *ST*, I, q. 4, a. 3 co. and ad 3.


\(^{67}\) Lyttkens, *The Analogy Between God and the World*, 287.

\(^{68}\) Ibid., 244. ‘In other words, as soon as it is realized that the world is created by, and has received its *esse* from, God, the causal relation follows as a matter of course’ (Ibid., 267).

explanatory of the others'. (In contrast to Derrida's *différence* we may name analogy rather the 'ordering-space' which gives intelligibility not within a static designation but is closer instead to Levinas' 'resounding' of the existents without the violence of rupture that both of these thinkers advocate.)

Similarly, Lyttkens remarks that, despite Cajetan's (and his followers) protestations to the contrary, the analogy between God and creation is in fact 'always intrinsic, not only in analogies of attribution, but also when *analogia unius ad alterum* is characterized as an analogy of relations. The same real relation—the likeness of effect to cause—is described all the time, although from different logical aspects'. This is what analogous speech attempts to do in all cases when referring to God: somehow to talk about that which is beyond all genera, to gesture therefore 'transgenerically' to the God who creates out of nothing, to the point where one realizes that even 'to create' in this sense can only be understood—*analogously*.

The type of causality here is not just formal, but also efficient and final: since every agent brings about something similar to itself (*omne agens agit sibi simile*), causality cannot be merely the thought of as the creation of an imperfect copy imitating its prototype. Because Cajetan and his followers placed too much emphasis on the Thomas of the *Sentences* and *De Veritate*—that is, the early Thomas—we get a picture of Thomas who seems to advocate the analogy of proportionality, especially so in *De Veritate*, q. 2, a.

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70 See the chapter ""Analogy" is Analogous" in McInerny, *Studies in Analogy*, 95–104 at 95. McInerny's conclusion is as follows: ""Analogy" means (1) a determinate relation between quantities; e.g. double, triple, equal; (2) any relation between things, a determinate mode of which is the relation of effect to cause; (3) the relation between several meanings of a common term where all the meanings are ways of signifying the same *res significata* and one way of signifying the *res* is privileged because it enters into the explication of the others, e.g. "healthy," "being," analogy" (ibid., 103). My argument, following Lyttkens, Klubertanz, and Montagnes et al., is that of the three, McInerny's (2) is the normative, prime analogous instance of this which orders the other ones. For McInerny, the phrase goes as far back as McInerny, *The Logic of Analogy*, 4.


73 In *IV Sent.,* d. 1, q. 1, a. 4 ad 4; *ST*, I, q. 3, a. 3, obj 2; q. 4, a. 3; q. 6, a. 1; q. 19, aa. 2, 4; *De Pot.,* q. 7, a. 1 ad 8. See the following insightful study: Philipp Rosemann, *Omne Agens Agit Sibi Simile: A "Repetition" of Scholastic Metaphysics* (Leuven: Leuven University Press, 1996), esp. 221–352 on Aquinas.


11 where the formulation is exactly of this kind. However, as Montagnes (and Lyttkens and Klubertanz) have pointed out, not only was this an early formulation of Thomas, but he never again returns to it in his mature writings. In these early formulations, Montagnes observes that ‘Thomas accepts the same formalist conception according to which the principal relation of beings to God is that of imitation, but he grasps the danger that it presents: more or less to confuse the creature with the creator and to succumb to the univocity to which our conceptual processes incline us’. Obviously, Thomas would not flee towards equivocity to solve this dilemma and thus sunder the predicative and transcendental ability to speak about God. Instead, the solution rests in the fact that he

had to conceive being no longer as form but as act, and causality no longer as the likeness of the copy to the model but as the dependence of one being upon another being which produces it. Now this is exactly what efficient causality implies: exercised by a being in act, it makes a new being exist in act, which being is not confounded with the first, since the effect and the cause each exist on its own account, but which communicates with it in the act, since the act of the agent becomes that of the patient. At the same time the act is that which the effect has in common with the cause and that by which it is not identified with it. Thus, it is by a veritable communication of being that God produces creatures and creative causality establishes between beings and God

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76 ‘Consequently, it must be said that knowledge is predicated neither entirely univocally nor yet purely equivocally of God’s knowledge and ours. Instead, it is predicated analogously, or, in other words, according to a proportion. Since an agreement according to proportion can happen in two ways, two kinds of community can be noted in analogy. There is a certain agreement between things having a proportion to each other from the fact that they have a determinate distance between each other or some other relation to each other, like the proportion which the number two has to unity in as far as it is the double of unity. Again, the agreement is occasionally noted not between two things which have a proportion between them, but rather between two related proportions—for example, six has something in common with four because six is two times three, just as four is two times two. The first type of agreement is one of proportion; the second, of proportionality’ (De Ver., q. 2, a. 11). In this regard, Puntel sees Thomas as following Aristotle’s definition and maintains that proportionality has the final word in Thomas, and so he sees the work of Montagnes and Fabro as contradictory to what he himself sees in Thomas. See Analogie Und Geschichtlichkeit, 16, esp. 287–91. This is due to Puntel’s emphasis on the ‘logic’ in ‘analogic’, for, as he says, metaphysics without logic is unthinkable (Ibid., 5). I maintain, however, that Lyttkens, Klubertanz, Montagnes et al. have rightly shown that while this formulation does show up in Thomas (see references in the next footnote), that it should in no way be held as normative.


78 Montagnes, The Doctrine of the Analogy of Being According to Thomas Aquinas, 78. For a fuller account by Montagnes, see pp. 63-77.
the indispensable bond of participation so that there might be an analogy of relation between them.\textsuperscript{79}

Te Velde describes this kind of causality such that 'the effect itself has the dignity of a cause'.\textsuperscript{80} In the \textit{De Potentia} text, Thomas describes this causality in terms of the art to the artist, or, according to his example, as the material house akin to the house in the mind of the builder. Cunningham helpfully comments on this example, saying that 'we are, in effect, left thinking causality more in terms of artistic intention. This does afford us a greater knowledge of causality, but we are left comprehending it less—since efficient causation cannot now be simply imagined in terms of power, for it is conjoined with finality, the more ultimate reason for causation'.\textsuperscript{81} Provided with the analogy of an 'artistic intention of an end', Cunningham remarks that only a deliberate effect of the artist created in love is able to sustain creation in an intimate way to give creatures the dignity of secondary causality. Naturalistic modes of causation—that is, univocal causality—do not bestow the dignity of freedom, for they cannot also think the final cause as loving such that the creature is unified (yet \textit{distinctly} so, unconfusedly) to the Creator in the artistic end known as the beatific vision.\textsuperscript{82} In this way, Thomas says that 'the nature of being patient, moved, or caused must always have an order to the agent or mover, seeing that the effect is always perfected by its cause and dependent thereon: so that it is ordered to it as the cause of its perfection'.\textsuperscript{83} Causality where the 'act of the agent becomes that of the patient' is articulated in terms of the participation that the patient has in the agent, that is, the effect's dignity as it participates in the cause.

Participation is inherently linked to causality in Thomas. 'Even where participation is not explicitly defined in terms of causality, a relation to a cause is normally implied'.\textsuperscript{84} Participation, taking a 'part' of something,\textsuperscript{85} names not

\textsuperscript{79} Ibíd.
\textsuperscript{80} Te Velde, \textit{Participation and Substantiality in Thomas Aquinas}, 161.
\textsuperscript{81} Cunningham, \textit{Genealogy of Nihilism}, 187.
\textsuperscript{82} Ibíd., 187–8.
\textsuperscript{83} \textit{De Pot.}, q. 7, a. 10.
\textsuperscript{84} Te Velde, \textit{Participation and Substantiality in Thomas Aquinas}, 92n.1 and 95fT.
\textsuperscript{85} In German this is readily apparent etymologically as \textit{die Teilnahme}. For Aquinas's discussion of participation, see \textit{Expositio libri Boetii De Hebdomadibus}, lect. 2, n. 24. In translation: Thomas Aquinas, \textit{An Exposition of the "On the Hebdomads" of Boethius}, trans.
a quality as much as a *qualification* of being, that is, of having one's being in a different way than God 'has' being. For God's *esse* is God's very nature (*per essentia*); whereas creature's have their being *per participationem*. For God to be *ipsum esse subsistens* means that, as subsistent being itself, all perfections are included in God as *actus purus* while creatures are subjects-in-potency who participate in that which is pure act. Hence, according to Montagnes, 'the primacy of act and the priority of efficient causality go hand in hand. Exemplarity does not disappear; it is subordinated to efficiency. In sum, participation is presented as the communication of act to a subject in potency'. Creatures in potency have a share in being, which means not only do they have their being by participation, but they are also good by participation in the first cause which is the Good. Thomas highlights this notion of participation in the first cause when speaking about God as the analogous cause (*agens analogicum*). God cannot be the univocal cause of everything, for then a univocal cause would only be the cause of itself (since it is contained in the species), but must therefore be a non-univocal agent such that, as it causes all things analogically, creatures are placed underneath this cause in the same way that individuals participate in the species. This is not to be understood as the less universal participating in the more universal, but as the participation of the concrete in the abstract.

A crucial point must be made here regarding the level of participation: creation does not participate directly in the essence of God, for nothing can know or participate directly in God's essence, as is clear in Thomas. What

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66 David Burrell articulates this as, 'to be God is to be to-be'. Burrell, *Aquinas: God and Action*, 25-6.

67 ST, I, q. 4, a. 3 ad 3; q. 3, a. 4; q. 3, a. 8, q. 44, a. 1; *De Pot.*, q. 3, a. 5; ScG, I, c. 33; c. 22; Lyttkens, *The Analogy Between God and the World*, 256.


69 Aquinas, *ST*, I, q. 6, aa. 1–2; q. 6, a. 3 s. c. and co.; q. 5, a. 2; q. 6, a. 1 ad 2; Te Velde, *Participation and Substantiality in Thomas Aquinas*, 33–4, 64–5.

70 ST, I, q. 13, a. 5 ad 1.

71 In *De Heb.*, lect. 2, n. 24 (p. 21); Te Velde, *Participation and Substantiality in Thomas Aquinas*, 79–80.

72 ST, I, q. 1, a. 7 ad 1; q. 2, a. 1; q. 2, a. 2 ad 3, etc.; ScG, I, c. 11, n. 5; c. 12, n. 7; III, cc. 51–6, etc.
participates is being itself, not directly in God, but in the divine similitude, which precisely as similitude is distinguished from the divine essence itself, and consequently in itself distinguished into a multitude of distinct "similitudes" according to the differences of being (differentia entis). However, this does not mean that there is a double participation or double creation in God. Rather, as Te Velde puts it:

the divine cause expresses itself in its effect as distinguished from itself and in each distinct creature the divine cause is distinguished from itself in a distinct way in accordance with the appropriate idea of this creature. So the negation in the effect of the identity of essence and esse in God is included in the likeness each creature has of God. This is exactly the reason of calling the likeness between God and creatures "analogous": since it is not in spite of their difference that they are similar in a certain respect. They are different from one another in what they have in common, the one has being in identity with its essence, the other has being as distinct from its essence.

Thus, the language of participation communicates the degrees of ontological diversity that creation has a share in with its relationship to its Creator. One way to express this is that participation reveals the 'difference in unity' or 'identity in difference' of this relationship. Another facet of this is expressed most clearly when speaking of the divine perfections, for just as all the perfections are contained simply and perfectly in God, 'the nature proper to each thing consists in some degree of participation in the divine perfection'.

Human persons themselves stand in a privileged place within creation due to the possession of an intellect which has the capability of reflecting the divine intellect. So those who have more charity 'will have a fuller participation in the light of glory' for the reason that the increase of charity signals the increase of desire, 'and desire in a certain degree makes the one desiring apt and prepared to receive the object desired'. That is, there is a 'longing of the effect back to its cause' which stems from the desire and need for salvation.

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93 Te Velde, Participation and Substantiality in Thomas Aquinas, 29.
94 Ibid., 115–16.
95 Ibid., 116, emphasis in original.
96 Ibid., 206, 280, respectively. Or: ‘differently the same’ (Te Velde, Aquinas on God, 102, 118).
97 ST, I, q. 14, a. 6.
98 ST, I, q. 12, a. 6. We also see degrees of wisdom spoken of in ST, I, q. 9, a. 1 ad 2.
motivated by the desire for the Good as beginning and final end.\textsuperscript{100} Causality now exhibits not only its efficient character, but its final mode as well.

The end of creation is found in its beginning, expressed analogically in terms of a real participation in the divine similitude of Being in God. This is afforded by the unity found in the concept of being, but also, states Montagnes, in "the real unity of the Principle of being. Hence, the structure of analogy and that of participation are rigorously parallel: they correspond to each other as the conceptual aspect and the real aspect of the unity of being."\textsuperscript{101} With reference to the real diversity of beings, the analogy of being is not meant to act as a ‘stand-in’ the proportional unity of a concept, for this would subsume God ‘under’ a concept (in Thomas’ language, ‘genera’ or ‘species’); rather, “[the analogy of being] is supposed to reproduce the unity of order which ties beings up with their Principle. Thus and thus only does the realistic and critical character of the theory of the analogy of being show up within Thomas’s philosophy".\textsuperscript{102} ‘Critical’, because analogous speech paves its way between untenably univocal speech on the one hand and impossible, hyper-fallibly equivocal speech on the other; equally ‘realistic’, because such speech gestures toward the real aspect of created reality itself as having a participated ‘share’ in the Triune God. It is this latter aspect that will always be egregiously missing from the cry of the logician aiming to assert that analogy is ‘purely’ or ‘only’ semantic.\textsuperscript{103} Again, both disciplines need each other insofar as they recognize the order of things themselves in the reflexive reversal of knowledge which we have called analogy.

So far in this chapter I have spoken about the analogy of being with regard to Thomas and the analogously ordered ways in which it functions in his primary texts. We know, however, that the way in which Thomas uses the

\footnotesize\textsuperscript{100} Te Velde, Participation and Substantiality in Thomas Aquinas, 30–1.
\textsuperscript{101} Montagnes, The Doctrine of the Analogy of Being According to Thomas Aquinas, 91.
\textsuperscript{102} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{103} Similarly, Rocca says that regarding the conclusions that Aquinas comes to as to why predication cannot be univocal between creatures and God, ‘The conclusion is epistemological and semantic, but the reasons themselves are various ontological truths about God that Aquinas has previously established to his own satisfaction’ (Rocca, Speaking the Incomprehensible God, 176). Moreover, the reason why predication cannot also be purely equivocal follows the same logic: it would destroy both epistemological and ontological reason (ibid, 176-80).

129
Boethian ‘definition’ of the person is also analogous, speaking of angelic, human, and divine persons all as ‘individual substances of a rational nature’. But does Thomas actually speak this way explicitly about the person itself as predicated analogously? In a much-overlooked passage in his commentary on the Sentences, we see that in fact Thomas’ logic is consistent: ‘Person is said of God and creatures neither univocally nor equivocally but analogously; and so far as to the thing signified it is said primarily (per prius) of God than of creatures, but as far as the mode of signification it is said the other way around (e converso [i.e. per posterius]), as it is also of all the other names which are said to be of God and creatures by analogy’.104 We see here the common themes spoken of above regarding the per prius et per posterius designation tied up with discussion of the res significata with respect to creaturely modi significandi, and in this respect we see that E. J. Ashworth is quite incorrect to argue that these designations are not part and parcel of Thomas’ teaching on analogy, considering the fact that Thomas makes an explicit connection in this passage.105 Moreover, because ‘person’ is said neither univocally nor equivocally of God and creatures, this is because the analogical order of things indicates that the three divine persons are ‘most real’ such that they are spoken of primarily (per prius), even though in the order of knowledge we come to know our biological parents (per posterius) as the first persons whom we encounter. God is the primary analogate regarding esse, viz., God is ipsum esse subsistens while creatures have their esse by participation; but we also see co-extensively that the divine persons are primarily analogous for human and angelic persons as well. The Thomistic analogia entis is thus always already an analogia personae.

104 In I Sent., d. 25, q. 1, a. 2, co., translation mine. The text reads: ‘Respondeo dicendum, quod persona dicitur de Deo et creaturis, non univoce nee aequivoce, sed secundum analogiam; et quantum ad rem significatam per prius est in Deo quam in creaturis, sed quantum ad modum significandi est e converso, sicut est etiam de omnibus alis nominibus quae de Deo et creaturis analogice dicuntur’.

105 Ashworth, “Signification and Modes of Signifying in Thirteenth-Century Logic,” 60; idem, “Analogy and Equivocation in Thirteenth-Century Logic,” 122. Aquinas also would contradict Ashworth’s reading in Comp. Theol., I, c. 27. Here is another place where Aquinas speaks of analogy where the thing signified (rem significatum) points primarily (per prius) to God, but the order is different to that of creatures. ‘Modi significandi’ is not explicitly stated here, but it appears to be assumed with the God-creature distinction made.
We have come a long way from the previous discussion of the accusative and accusation. In that discussion we saw that Levinas' rejection of what he saw as Being's 'totalizing' aspect, coupled with his rejection of persons as analogous (with regard to Husserl's transcendental analogy of apperception), piled upon misunderstandings of the tradition of metaphysics—all led to a violent reality where, in order to respect the alterity of the person, the person seemed to disappear altogether in unavailable anonymity. Accordingly, 'standing accused' was thus transposed into a different key: the accusative case is more properly thought of as the causative case where that which is 'in the accusative' is the patient of a (causal) agent. To stand accused is to be, in word, caused. But the causality spoken of in Thomas is not univocal or material, but analogous, which is not simply a word used to invoke 'not univocal' as much as it clarifies and contains many analogous meanings within itself, just as St Irenaeus' use of 'recapitulation' served to encapsulate at least eleven meanings (indicating its own kind of analogous usage).

As a summary of this section, to be caused analogously refers to the following: 1) the order of knowledge versus the real ontological order, which, when led by the hand in the way Thomas teaches, upholds the dignity of the otherness of God in that we cannot know God's essence in itself; 2) a radical expansive broadening of causality to include its intimate efficient and final modes, indicating God as the first and final Good who motivates and calls us toward God's own delight; 3) the participatory reality that analogous speech refers to such that God is primary while creatures secondarily participate in this subsistent ipsum esse, the 'I am who I am'; 4) lastly, the fact that as

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107 Cf. ST, 1, q. 13, a. 11 ad 2: "This name 'good' is the principal name of God in so far as He is a cause, but not absolutely; for existence considered absolutely comes before the idea of cause." But from the standpoint of creatures (which of course is inescapable, thankfully), the following must always be kept in mind: 'The attribute "being" does not name God prior to the distinction between infinite and finite being. It signifies God as the cause of the being [of] all things, as finite beings are not intelligible unless their being is understood as derived from one who is its being. God is known as being on the basis of the intelligible relation between cause and effect, a relation in which the common factor cannot be abstracted from the distinction between cause and effect' (Te Velde, *Participation and Substantiality in Thomas Aquinas*, 194).
108 While Jamie Smith initially provides a critique of "participation" language in response to Catherine Pickstock here: James K. A. Smith, *Speech and Theology: Language and the Logic of Incarnation* (London: Routledge, 2002), 170–6; the following essay tends to place the stress in the wrong place regarding Plato: idem, "Will the Real Plato Please Stand Up?: Participation
cause, we actually know nothing about analogous causation in the way that creatures know causation because God is eminent as the uncaused cause of all out of nothing. Following here upon Thomas' and Dionysius' reliance on the triplex via, we cannot rest with speaking of causality as we think of it, which is typically material; rather, to stand accused as a person means to radically participate in God's Being which is simultaneously a Triunity of persons, each subsistent in the one nature. There is no way to derive the three from the one or the one from the three (except through faith in the revelation of the persons), but both must be thought in a reduplication (redoublement), and it is in this sense that we have a co-extensive analogy of being and analogy of the person. Our own personhood only is insofar as it participates in this

Versus Incarnation," in Radical Orthodoxy and the Reformed Tradition: Creation, Covenant, and Participation (Grand Rapids, MI: Baker Academic, 2005), 61–72. This is understandable, however, in light of the fact that Pickstock and Milbank themselves tend to overstate Plato at times, even though they fully acknowledge it is more of the neo-Platonism that Thomas Aquinas inherited that is what is more at stake. That being said, Smith has admitted (in personal correspondence) that he has changed his mind on the issue of participation, primarily influenced by the following two works of Hans Boersma: Nouvelle Théologie and Sacramental Ontology: A Return to Mystery (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2009); Heavenly Participation: The Weaving of a Sacramental Tapestry (Grand Rapids, MI: Wm. B. Eerdmans Publishing Company, 2011). The first place in print this change has been noted can be found in James K. A. Smith, The Fall of Interpretation: Philosophical Foundations for a Creatioal Hermeneutic, 2nd ed. (Grand Rapids, MI: Baker Academic, 2012), 19n.14. So in that sense, the forthcoming article may already be out of date: Brendan Peter Triflett, "Processio and the Place of Ontic Being: John Milbank and James K. A. Smith on Participation," Heythrop Journal (forthcoming 2013), accessed online: http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/j.1468-2265.2012.00770.x/abstract.

Notwithstanding, I am sympathetic to the accounts of the ‘New Plato’ that Smith is reacting against (see esp. the recent account self described as a ‘third Plato’ in D.C. Schindler, Plato’s Critique of Impure Reason: On Goodness and Truth in the Republic, [Washington, D. C.: The Catholic University of America Press, 2008]). Regarding Radical Orthodoxy, it would have been more fair for Smith (in his ‘Will the Reali Plato Stand Up?’ essay) to have also referenced Cunningham, Genealogy of Nihilism, 181–8, or any of the other works on Thomistic analogy which develop the usage along Neoplatonic contours, to which those sympathetic to recent reconstruals of of a more Neoplatonic-Aristotelian Thomas are indebted. E.g., Cornelio Fabro, La Nozione Metafisica Di Partecipazione Secondo S. Tommaso d’Aquino (Torino: Società Editrice Internazionale, 1950); Cornelio Fabro, “The Intensive Hermeneutics of Thomistic Philosophy: The Notion of Participation,” trans. B. M. Bonansea, The Review of Metaphysics 27, no. 3 (1974): 449–91; L.-B. Geiger, La Participation Dans La Philosophie De Saint Thomas d’Aquin, 2nd ed. (Paris: Vrin, 1953); Clarke, “The Meaning of Participation in St. Thomas.” Recently, the following article has proved crucially helpful: D. C. Schindler, “What’s the Difference? On the Metaphysics of Participation in a Christian Context,” The Saint Anselm Journal 3, no. 1 (Fall 2005): 1–27. The main idea here is that many, many centuries after Plato, these ideas were transformed via Proclus, Dionysius, and then Thomas so that it was never a matter of contrasting ‘incarnation’ to ‘participation’, but the creatures' non-competitive participation in the Incarnate one has been achieved in an entirely orthodox Christian manner.

109 To clarify, this is not a ‘proper’ name of God, but a description of God through God’s effects similar to Thomas’ second way (ST, I, q. 2, a. 3). The most proper name of God is, of course, ‘I am who I am’ (ST, I, q. 13, a. 11).

110 ST, I, q. 32, a. 1.
fullness of this ever-greater reality, but our participation in this analogous cause is not like that of billiard balls and falling dominoes, but like that of art in the mind of the artist. God alone contains the fullness of being and the fullness of persons as Father, Son, Holy Spirit.

b. Analogy of the Concept?: An Analogy of Judgment in Reply to Christos Yannaras

Despite what I have written above, a recently-translated work entitled Person and Eros by Eastern Orthodox philosopher Christos Yannaras would claim that the exact opposite is the case for Thomas Aquinas. Based upon a much-expanded 4th-edition of Yannaras’ doctoral thesis with the title of ‘The Ontological Content of the Theological Notion of Personhood’, this work develops a very intriguing blend of Eastern Orthodox tradition (Dionysius, Maximus, Palamas) with such recent European existentialists as Jean-Paul Sartre and especially Martin Heidegger. While this is not the space to provide a detailed exegesis of this highly interesting and provocative work, what interests us are Yannaras’ comments in a chapter called ‘On Analogy and Hierarchy’. The main thrust of the work is to combat the ‘conceptualization’ of ‘the West’, and in every case, what comes from ‘the East’ by way of Orthodoxy has the right tools to supplant Western ideas which Yannaras argues lead to Atheism. Despite the all-too-tidy division of what is ‘East’ versus what is ‘West’, and despite his reliance on such obviously Western figures as Heidegger into whose form Yannaras injects the content of

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114 Yannaras, Person and Eros, 201–20 (§§70–4).
Orthodox voices, the primary constructive heart of the book is laudable and helpfully articulates a 'theological personalism' that cannot be dismissed. In this section I will provide a summary of Yannaras' argument on analogy and hierarchy and then illustrate not only how he misreads Thomas Aquinas, but also how much of the internal debate amongst Thomists would very much agree with Yannaras' central insights which we will consider under the aspects of 'analogy of the concept' versus 'analogy of judgment'.

Rowan Williams remarks that Yannaras' project, 'like any attempt to explicate the relation of finite to infinite, is inevitably an essay in analogy'. That is, the issue is: how do we speak of divine persons when we only initially know other human persons? For Yannaras, the issue comes down to personal existence: for God it is total presence (παρουσία, parousia) while for human persons our situation is one of absence (ἀπουσία, apousia) until that eschatological time when we become "all prosōpon"—"all person." The person is primarily a relation, to the extent that all talk of nature or essence (ousia) must be denounced as 'essentialist' and therefore 'rationalistic'; instead, he proposes existential categories of presence (parousia) and follows Heidegger such that the person 'ek-sists', standing outside one's nature in ecstasy toward the other.

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115 Rowan Williams remarks: 'as to the use made of Heidegger's system and terminology throughout, one may be forgiven for wondering whether it is perhaps a little uncritical: it is reminiscent of the use made of Hegel by Russian theologians at the end of the 19th and the beginning of the 20th century' (Williams, "The Theology of Personhood: A Study of the Thought of Christos Yannaras," 426). As one example, Yannaras follows Heidegger completely when he quotes him to the effect that Hegel's 'concept', Nietzsche's 'eternal return of the same', and Thomas Aquinas's actus purus are all physicalistics such that 'metaphysics steadfastly remains physics'. While this is true for Hegel and Nietzsche, this is of course fallacious with regard to Thomas. Yannaras, Person and Eros, 225 (§75); citing Martin Heidegger, Einführung in Die Metaphysik (Tübingen: Niemeyer, 1958), 14.


117 Williams helpfully puts it this way, ibid.

118 Yannaras, Person and Eros, 293 (§95).

119 Ibid., 5–6 (§1).

primarily personal: space is personal absence (apousia), time is personal presence (parousia), and objects or things are personal deeds (pragmata).  

According to Yannaras, the Orthodox understanding of analogy begins in its preference for Plato over Aristotle. While Aristotle’s conception of analogy is a comparison of quantities, dimensions, proportionality of arithmetical relations, and the measurable aspect of relations, for Plato analogy ‘represents the logos of the fitness of the eyes to receive light or the fitness of the mind to recognize the good. Plato’s understanding of analogy... is an iconic relation, a relation between image and that which is depicted, and the knowledge of this relation is a dynamic fact which presupposes the mind’s aptitude for cognition and the mind’s participation in that which is depicted through its image’. Fast-forwarding to the Middle Ages, Yannaras follows an article by Gottlieb Söhngen to the effect that all medieval scholastics defined analogy in the a:b::c:d formula, as in 2:3::4:6. In this case, if 6 were the unknown quantity, simple algebra could be used to determine its value. ‘Thus the relation between beings and Being, and between Being and God, may be expressed according to the Scholastics with the precision of mathematical analogy: beings : Being = Being : x, where x, represents the Cause of Being, namely, God. In this case, the analogical participation of beings in Being is the key for understanding the analogical participation of the Being of beings in its divine Cause, and God, the Cause of Being, is defined analogously in relation to Being, the cause of beings’. The Scholastics thus exhaust being because they have not an experiential analogy, but a transcendent analogy which operates and is purely confined to the predicative ‘intellectual extension’ of ‘unity’, ‘goodness’, ‘truth’, etc. Put bluntly, ‘Scholastic analogy ignores the personal existence of God, the Triad of the divine persons, the mode of existence of the divine essence, which is

121 These concepts are repeated all throughout, but the central loci, respectively, are found in Yannaras, Person and Eros, 105–28 (§§36–45), 129–55 (§§46–55), 35–39 (§12).
122 Ibid., 204–6 (§70).
125 Yannaras, Person and Eros, 209 (§70), emphasis Yannaras'.
126 Ibid., 209–10 (§70).
personal'. This is because the Scholastics turned God into a transcendent 'object', 'accessible only through the subject’s ability to rationalize', leaving the 'existential problem untouched', matter ontologically unexplained, and 'the origin or principle of what exists was transferred to the necessity of the things that determined essence, not to the freedom of the person, not to triadic love as the self-determination of the mode of existence'.

Unsurprisingly, Yannaras applies this analysis of all of the ‘Scholatics’, *mutatis mutandis*, to Thomas Aquinas as well. Before moving on with my exposition, it should be noted that Yannaras is no doubt influenced here on the one hand by Lossky’s inability to see moments in Dionysius which pushes beyond the kataphatic-apophatic dialectic into the *via eminencia* (in this sense Lossky has waged that ‘the West’ is ‘kataphatic’); and on the other hand Yannaras is completely remiss to see Thomas’ very clear and pervasive indebtedness to Dionysius who takes up these three ways, especially regarding language about God and thus ontological, causal analogy, not to mention the fact that Thomas cites Dionysius as a trusted guide over 600 times in the *Summa Theologica* alone, let alone Thomas’ own commentary on Dionysius’ *The Divine Names*. But Yannaras will not acknowledge any of this, seeing

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127 Ibid., 211 (§70), emphasis Yannaras’.
128 Ibid., 210–11 (§70).
Thomas along with the rest of the Scholastics as guilty of ‘contemplation of an impersonal absolute, which precisely because it is impersonal permits no solution other than pantheism or agnosticism’.\textsuperscript{131} Furthermore, due to these shared set of assumptions, the ‘West’ is guilty of a kataphaticism which he sees as synonymous with extreme rationalism, and in this sense is a theological nihilism\textsuperscript{132} that is to blame for modern atheism.\textsuperscript{133} What, then, is Yannaras’ alternative?

Yannaras’ proposes instead what he calls a Byzantine version of analogy that ‘refers, as a cognitive method, to the possibility that existence can be led by the call to personal relation to the actual realization of the relation. That is to say, it refers to the analogical grades of the power of existence to participate wholly (not only intellectually) in truth’.\textsuperscript{134} Following Dionysius’ \textit{On the Celestial Hierarchy}, Yannaras takes up the idea of ‘analogical similarities as dissimilarities,’\textsuperscript{135} which enables him to hold that analogy in this schema functions not ‘quantitatively-measurably’, but ‘qualitatively-iconically’.\textsuperscript{136} The upshot here is that this introduces a dynamism which transposes the cognitive focus on objective attributes into the unique mode of the existence of personal otherness which cannot be known definitively, ‘since its “definition” is its otherness, its unique, dissimilar and unrepeatable character’; in other words, it can only be ‘depicted’ iconically.\textsuperscript{137} If the analogical similarities involved in this approach do not indicate the possibility of personal relation, then they remain as ‘empty intellectual predicates’.\textsuperscript{138} At this point, those familiar with debates around the \textit{analogia entis} will wonder: but doesn’t the Fourth Lateran Council of 1215 say that there cannot be a likeness posited between the Creator and creature without there being an ‘ever greater dissimilarity’ \textit{(maior...}


\textsuperscript{131} Yannaras, \textit{Person and Eros}, 212 (§71).

\textsuperscript{132} Ibid., 23 (§7).

\textsuperscript{133} Ibid., 248 (§82).

\textsuperscript{134} Ibid., 212–13 (§72).

\textsuperscript{135} \textit{See On the Celestial Hierarchy}, 2.4, in \textit{Pseudo-Dionysius: The Complete Works}, 151 [PG 3:141c; 144a, c; 145a].

\textsuperscript{136} Yannaras, \textit{Person and Eros}, 213 (§72).

\textsuperscript{137} Ibid.

\textsuperscript{138} Ibid., 214 (§72).
dissimiltudo) between the two? In response to such an objection, Yannaras rejects this doctrine because, according to him, ‘even in this statement dissimilarity does not refer to the otherness of the personal mode of existence. Dissimilarity coexists with similarity in a quantifiable-measurable relation. The analogy of similarities, which presupposes at the same time even greater dissimilarities, does not cease to represent objective predicates, or to constitute a quantitative comparison of objectified magnitudes’. 139

Despite the fact that the precise context of this statement from the Fourth Lateran Council is exactly the relationship of the persons of the Trinity in relation to human persons in light of the analogical distance between the human and divine persons (in condemnation of Joachim de Fiore), Yannaras rejects this formulation nonetheless. Joachim de Fiore insisted that, rather than understanding God as a Trinity of divine persons who simultaneously, mysteriously is the one God in a shared, consubstantial essence between them (and in this regard Joachim thought there was a ‘fourth thing’ in God), instead, he considered the Trinity as a kind of collective of persons, just as three human people form a group—all of which quickly lapses into a ‘tritheism’. Against this impetus, Erich Przywara is instructive, and deserves to be quoted at length:

The point of departure for the council’s verdict is thus the greatest, most profound, and most intimate mystery of revelation: the mystery of deification through “participation in the divine nature,” as children of the Father, con-formed [mit-förmig] to the Son, in the Spirit of the Holy Spirit;—the mystery of the redemption of the “unity” of the church as a unity with the Father who sends, in unity with the Son who is sent, and thus in unity with the Holy Spirit understood as the unity of the Father and the Son;—and hence the most proper mystery of God as the mystery of the self-communication of the tri-personal life in the personal life of the “children of God” as “members of the church.” And yet this is precisely the point of departure into the “ever great” mystery of the “ever greater dissimilarity” between the “creator” [emphasis added]—understood as the “Incomprehensible and Ineffable One Highest Something” [Unbegreiflichen und Unsagbaren Einen Höchsten Etwas] (whose intimacy to itself is that of “Father, Son, and

139 Ibid., 214–15 (§72).
Holy Spirit)—and the “creature,” which in itself is “one people of many persons, and one church of many believers.”

That is, precisely where the Triune God is communicated as personal, from the creaturely standpoint, this is where the ‘ever greater dissimilarity’ arises. Przywara puts it even more starkly in a work written fifteen years later on the Old and New Covenants [Alter und Neuer Bund]:

The inner-divine rhythm [Rhythmus] of the “opposition of relations” wherein the Father is called “Father” “in regard” [im Bezug] to the Son, the Son is called “Son” “in regard” to the Father, and the Holy Spirit “Spirit” “in regard” to the Father and Son,—this unfathomably incomprehensible rhythm [Schwingen] of the entire “in regard [to]” in the mystery of the Godhead is the depth behind the entire rhythm of the “in regard” in the material “regard” between the Old and New Covenants, and in this the formal “regard” between “no matter how great a similarity” and the “ever greater dissimilarity” between Creator and creation in this material relation [Bezug] (and in any possible relation generally).

The reality of God as coextensively—and mysteriously—one and personal underlies, logically, the real relation between creatures to their creator, always within a finite regard of ‘ever greater dissimilarity’. Yannaras, however, overlooks this full context and debate involved between the rejection of Joachim and the affirmation of Peter Lombard’s position by the Fourth Lateran Council.

Instead, Yannaras confronts what he sees as necessarily ‘impersonal’ in the ‘West’ with, as just mentioned above, what he calls the ‘Byzantine’ version of analogy. In this he draws support from Dionysius the Areopagite. Thus, according to Yannaras, the Byzantine version of analogy takes ‘the objective similarities themselves as real dissimilarities. That is to say, it refers the dissimilarity to the otherness of the personal mode of existence, to the priority which existence has in relation to the understanding of objective essences’.

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142 Yannaras, Person and Eros, 215 (§72).
Analogy in this vision is therefore a ‘hierarchy of cognitive-existential powers and perfections’, which is always registered in an existential—not ‘static’, i.e. ‘Western’—key. Indeed, Yannaras labels his understanding of Byzantine analogy as the very difference which separates itself from the West, ‘in the contrast between the objective-quantitative understanding of analogy and the understanding of analogy as hierarchy—a difference between two cultures, whose consequences for human life we are only just beginning to evaluate’. Hierarchic analogy designates a real, universal way of transmitting knowledge, whose comprehensive ‘sacred order’ involves raising up in proportion (analogos) each personal existence in imitation of God. Additionally, this sacred, analogical order involves real participation. Citing On the Celestial Hierarchy, Yannaras states, ‘The “beauty befitting god” is “simple,” good” and moreover “teletarchic,” which means “transmitting to each, according to their merit, a share of his own light.” This is because Dionysius ‘sees all beings as participating in the hierarchic unity of communion with the Godhead, in proportion, or analogously, to the mode of existence which each one embodies’. For the Areopagite, living beings participate in the divine life-giving power and energy bestowed dynamically to them as an energetic manifestation of ‘divine wisdom, dynamically summarizing the whole hierarchic arrangement of the world in the immediacy and unity of personal relation between created and uncreated’. What Yannaras adds to Dionysius here, not found in the text itself, is the later Palamite emphasis on the essence-energies distinction. Hierarchic participation is a participation in the personal energies of God, which Yannaras highlights as another failure of the West, including now, since the fourteenth century, a failure to understand theosis.

143 Ibid., 216 (§§72, 73).
144 Ibid., 220 (§74).
145 Ibid., 217 (§73).
147 Yannaras, Person and Eros, 219 (§74); Pseudo-Dionysius, Pseudo-Dionysius: The Complete Works, 156 [PG 3:177c].
148 Yannaras, Person and Eros, 219 (§74); the reference is to On the Celestial Hierarchy, 4. 1, in Pseudo-Dionysius, Pseudo-Dionysius: The Complete Works, 156 [PG 3:177d].
149 Yannaras, Person and Eros, 52–70 (§§19–23). See especially: ‘The problem of the essence-energies distinction set the seal on the differentiation of the Latin West from the
To begin my response to Yannaras' articulation of hierarchic analogy as his response to 'Western essentialist' renderings of analogy, it is crucial to be allowed a brief but necessary excursus on the all-too-neat 'East' versus 'West' divide. Not only does Yannaras espouse this line in his works ad nauseum, but many other Western Twentieth-century theologians (both Protestant and Catholic alike) have, to my mind, falsely adopted this misleading division as well. In order to illuminate what follows, I will be using the research of Michel René Barnes and Kristen Hennessy as helpful guides out of this misleading and unnecessarily polemical morass.\(^{150}\)

The often uncritically assumed position is as follows: the Eastern church, or at the very least the Cappadocians and therefore the 'Greeks' have 'always begun' with articulating the divine persons first, and then goes on to articulate the divine nature/substance, while it is the 'West' or 'Latins' who have 'always begun' with the 'nature' or unity of the 'One God' first, and then speaks of divine persons. This, it is thought, explains why those in the West seem to rarely speak of the divine persons (Karl Rahner perpetuates this narrative to some extent),\(^{151}\) and thus also it becomes manifestly no surprise

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\(^{150}\) Rahner famously says, 'We must be willing to admit that, should the doctrine of the Trinity have to be dropped as false, the major part of religious literature could well remain virtually unchanged' (Rahner, *The Trinity*, 10–11).

why thinkers such as Lossky, Yannaras, and most recently, John Zizioulas speak much about personhood, to the chagrin of the ‘West’.

The consequences of deviating from this ‘Cappadocian’ emphasis have bequeathed a long history of decline into ‘essentialism’, ‘rationalism’, and thus Modernity and atheism, themes which we see repeated above in Yannaras’ chapter on analogy and hierarchy.

These readings of ‘East’ versus ‘West’ and its misleadingly rigid characterizations stem from what Michel René Barnes has dubbed ‘de Régnon’s Paradigm’. In fact, as Barnes and Hennessy in particular have shown, this ‘paradigm’ is at best not de Régnon’s; at worst, this paradigm’s mutation is incredibly false, for a variety of reasons. First, de Régnon’s designation of ‘Greek’ actually encompasses writers of the first four hundred years of Christianity, and this term actually includes patristic theologians writing in both Latin and Greek. ‘Latins’ for de Régnon signify scholastic theologians, and as Hennessy points out, Saint Augustine is not among them as its representative. Instead, while still counted among the ‘Greeks’, Augustine does serve as a ‘bridge’ to later scholastic thought. As Hennessy

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Kristin Hennessy shows that Sarah Coakley has added the following theology textbooks to Barnes’ list: G. L. Prestige, God in Patristic Thought (London: S.P.C.K., 1952); Kelly, Early Christian Doctrines; Edward Hardy and Cyril Richardson, eds., Christology of the Later Fathers (London: SCM Press, 1954); Maurice Wiles, The Making of Christian Doctrine (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1967). For Coakley’s article, see “Introduction—Gender, Trinitarian Analogies, and the Pedagogy of The Song,” in Sarah Coakley, ed., Re-Thinking Gregory of Nyssa (Malden, MA: Blackwell, 2003), 1–13 at p. 2ff. Remarking on Brown and LaCugna, Barnes says that both ‘embrace the paradigm and develop it fruitfully in order to critique the Augustinian component, but both scholars seem unaware that the paradigm is not embedded in the original texts’ (Barnes, “De Régnon Reconsidered,” 55).


155 Hennessy, “An Answer to De Régnon’s Accusers,” 189–90. For another account defending Augustine along similar lines, see Pabst, Metaphysics, 74–9.
puts it, 'By accentuating the scholastic debt to Augustine, de Régnon subtly
argues for the scholastic debt to the Greek Fathers who had such an impact on
Augustine's thought'\textsuperscript{156} – the point here being that Augustine himself is
counted among the 'Greeks'. The second and more important point that
Hennessy draws out of de Régnon's work is that while he does indeed
distinguish between 'Greek'/patristic and 'Latin'/scholastic theologians, 'he
most emphatically does not oppose them'.\textsuperscript{157}

Hennessy illustrates that de Régnon's motives are two-fold. The first
stems from the context of the neo-Thomist revival that he had been
experiencing in the aftermath of Leo XIII's \textit{Aeterni Patris} encyclical.\textsuperscript{158} For
these neo-Thomists, the entire tradition was summed up in St Thomas and
reified so that instead of being a part of the tradition, Thomas was the
tradition. The neo-Thomist rigidity led de Régnon to engage in his own kind
of \textit{ressourcement} of the more varied and richer tradition.\textsuperscript{159} In light of the
emerging 'monologism'\textsuperscript{160} of the neo-Thomist school, de Régnon's second
motive was, via a 'retour aux sources,' to show the diversity of the voices of
the tradition so that it can 'allow us to draw near to the divine mystery along
two inverse paths, to approach this mystery from two opposing sides'.\textsuperscript{161}
Hennessy makes it clear that in no way does de Régnon want to elide the

\textsuperscript{156} Hennessy, "An Answer to De Régnon's Accusers," 190. One could add to this the
enormous influence of the Greeks upon Thomas Aquinas such as Pseudo-Dionysius the
Areopogit, St John Chrysostom, St John Damascene, Origen, St Cyril of Alexandria, St Basil
of Caesarea, St Athanasius, St Gregory of Nyssa, et al. For more on this topic see Gilles
Emery OP, "A Note on St. Thomas and the Eastern Fathers,” in \textit{Trinity, Church, and the
Human Person}, Faith & Reason: Studies in Catholic Theology & Philosophy (Naples, FL:
Supientia Press of Ave Maria University, 2007), 193–207; Ignaz Backes, \textit{Die Christologie Des
III. Thomas Von Aquin Und Die Griechischen Kirchenväter} (Paderborn: Schönning, 1931).

\textsuperscript{157} Ibid., 183–6.

\textsuperscript{158} Ibid., 185. The irony here is that by returning
to the wider tradition, de Régnon makes the more catholic move whereas the neo-Thomists, by
attempting to enforce a kind of \textit{sola Thomisticum}, end up with a kind of one-sided
'protestantism' in their approach to the tradition.

\textsuperscript{160} See Bakhtin's discussion of this principle in Mikhail M. Bakhtin, \textit{Problems of Dostoevsky's
Poetics}, trans. and ed. Caryl Emerson (Minneapolis, MN: University of Minnesota Press,
1984), 79–83; Mikhail M. Bakhtin, \textit{Speech Genres and Other Late Essays}, ed. Caryl Emerson
and Michael Holquist, trans. Vern W. McGee (Austin, TX: University of Texas Press, 1986),
161–3; Mikhail M. Bakhtin, \textit{The Dialogic Imagination: Four Essays}, trans. Michael Holquist,

\textsuperscript{161} Theodore de Régnon, \textit{Études De Théologie Positive Sur La Sainte Trinité} (Paris: Victor
differences between the ‘Greek’/‘Latin’ duality that he describes, but instead he intends to act as a moderating voice, commending his readers to take both approaches as necessarily related and complementary, both valid and mutually corrective sides of the same triune mystery. In this light, simply returning to the sources one finds that both ‘sides’ are as rich and varied as the other, which is why it would come as no surprise to find that Dionysius talks about the contemplation of the intellect toward conceptual things, or the cherubim and seraphim engaged in ‘triply luminous contemplation of the one who is the cause and the source of all beauty,’ or even therefore to find St Maximus the Confessor saying the following completely devoid of any ‘geographical’ polemic: ‘We are to think of both of these distinctly, as was said, first one way, then the other: one, single, undivided, unconfused, simple, undiminished, and unchangeable divinity, completely one in essence and completely three in persons, and sole ray shining in the single form of one triple-splendored light.’ All of these designations in both traditions are, in fact, quite porous. Moreover, those in the Roman Catholic ‘West’ themselves saw these problems with certain encrustations of their own tradition and attempted to ameliorate the problems through various attempts at ressourcement.

Regrettably, in addition to following John Romanides’ polemic against ‘the West,’ it is precisely this strawman that Yannaras adopts from Lossky’s

162 Hennessy, “An Answer to De Régnon’s Accusers,” 196.
163 On the Celestial Hierarchy, 2.4, in Pseudo-Dionysius: The Complete Works, 151 [PG 3:144a]: “Now when we apply dissimilar similarities to intelligent beings, we say of them that they experience desire, but this has to be interpreted as a divine yearning for that immaterial reality which is beyond all reason and all intelligence. It is a strong and sure desire for he clear and impassible contemplation of the transcendent. It is a hunger for an unending, conceptual, and true communion with the spotless and sublime light, of clear and splendid beauty.”
164 On the Celestial Hierarchy 7.2, in Ibid., 163 [PG 3:208c]. Furthermore, these highest angels ‘are founded next to perfect and unfailing purity, and are led, as permitted, into contemplation regarding the immaterial and intellectual splendor’ (ibid., 164 [PG 3:208d]).
166 George E. Demacopoulos and Aristotle Papanikolaou, “Augustine and the Orthodox: ‘The West’ in the East,” in Orthodox Readings of Augustine, ed. Aristotle Papanikolaou and George E. Demacopoulos (Crestwood, NY: St Vladimir’s Seminary Press, 2008), 11–40 at 28–33. Yannaras follows Romanides’ in locating the fault in Augustine’s supposed heretical rejection of the essence-energies distinction. On this see Christos Yannaras, Elements of Faith: An Introduction to Orthodox Theology, trans. Keith Schram (Edinburgh: T & T Clark, 1991), 154–5; Yannaras, Orthodoxy and the West, 16. Demacopoulos and Papanikolaou remark, ‘The question must be raised, however, whether Romanides and Yannaras were judging Augustine anachronistically through a hesychastic framework. It might also appear
Yannaras' own formulation of this misleading paradigm contrasts what he calls the 'apophaticism of essence' with the 'Eastern' 'apophaticism of the person'.

Paul Gavrilyuk notes, however, that this is a historically unsupportable distinction, which 'is at odds with the Palamite insistence that it is the essence (or unnamable “super-essence”) of God, not the divine persons, that is absolutely incomprehensible'. There are, therefore, alternative readings of the two traditions, such as Erich Przywara, who sees precisely the opposite in a Greek Orthodox 'East' whose over-emphasis on participation leads to an essentialism on the one hand while an Augustinian, Lutheran 'West' on the other hand leads toward a 'theology of opposition' and thus existentialism (the latter of which would explain why the secularized versions of this theology in the West were themselves atheistic existentialisms in Nietzsche, Sartre, et al.). Additionally, regarding analogy in the ‘West’, Gavrilyuk remarks, ‘Yannaras mistakenly, but confidently, reduces all forms of Western apophaticism to the method of correcting the limits of analogical predication in natural theology’. That is, Yannaras sees a misreading of analogy as the root of the ‘West’s failure to account for a properly apophatic approach to

that they were injecting neo-scholastic-manual understandings of theological epistemology and salvation, albeit in their filtered, imitative Greek form, into Augustine’ (Demacopoulos and Papanikolau, “Augustine and the Orthodox,” 35).

Yannaras, Person and Eros, 298–9n.26, he cites Lossky’s citation of de Régnon: “Latin philosophy first considers the nature in itself and then proceeds to the person; Greek philosophy first considers the person and afterwards passes through it to find the nature. The Latins think of personhood as a mode of nature; the Greeks think of nature as the content of the person”; citing de Régnon, Études De Théologie Positive Sur La Sainte Trinité, 1:433. In light of the research of Barnes and Hennessy exposited above, this can only be read now as a highly selective and context-less choice, and thus incredibly misleading.

Yannaras, Person and Eros, 20–3 (§7).


See Eric Przywara, “Die Reichweite der Analogie als katholischer Grundform” in Analogia Entis, 3:289–90. Moreover, Barnes notes that in contrast to English language patristic scholarship that unconsciously accepted de Régnon’s paradigm, ‘French language scholarship makes it clear that his is de Régnon’s own paradigm, and that he may be wrong’ (Barnes, “De Régnon Reconsidered,” 56). Part and parcel of this French debate is that ‘the criticism that Greek trinitarian theology is not only nature-based but improperly nature-based because of the Greek attachment to the term homousios. According to these same scholars, Latin trinitarian theology, by which they mean Augustine's trinitarian theology, is person-oriented, and not nature-oriented, as de Régnon would have it, because Augustine's theology is based on psychology and not physics’ (ibid, 55 and the sources listed on p. 72).

God—a misreading stemming from tarrying too close to natural philosophical assumptions about God, i.e., a hardened Aristotelianism as pagan rationalism. (What’s more, while Yannaras affirms analogy but critiques the form it takes in ‘the West’, Zizioulas rejects analogy altogether under the assumption that it is merely linguistic, offering instead an ‘ontological’ connection, clearly passing over so many transparently ontologically-replete accounts of analogy.¹⁷²)

Nevertheless, when Yannaras makes the following assertion: ‘That is why there is no reference in the Summa Theologiae to the personal God of existential relation: there God is the object of rational inquiry, an abstract intellectual certainty, an ontic essence absolutely in actuality, an impersonal and existentially inaccessible motive cause—¹⁷³—this may easily be dismissed as an unnecessary fabrication not only of Thomas himself, but also of much (but not all, understandably) of the Thomist tradition. But how can this be, if Thomas is so ‘essentialist’?¹⁷⁴ The answer to this¹⁷⁵ is found by looking at the

¹⁷³ Yannaras, Person and Eros, 56 (§20).
¹⁷⁴ ‘Essentialist’ here is not to be taken in the usual contrast of God’s essence being the same as God’s existence as Thomas articulates it, although Yannaras is clearly aware of this dictum; rather, ‘essentialist’ for Yannaras is usually a cipher for a (false) historical legacy of ‘beginning with the one God’, etc., in other words, another way of reifying de Régnon’s so-called paradigm. David Bentley Hart, remarking upon the analogia entis against certain dialectical rejections of it as ‘essentialist’, says: ‘the analogia entis is quite incompatible with any naïve “natural theology”: if being is univocal, then a direct analogy from essences to “God” (as the supreme substance) is conceivable, but if the primary analogy of is one of being, then an infinite analogical interval has been introduced between God and creatures, even as it is affirmed that God is truly declared in creation (for God is, again, infinitely determinate and is himself the distance—the act of distance—of the analogical interval). Thus the analogia entis renders any simple “essentialist” analogy impossible’ (Hart, The Beauty Of The Infinite, 242).
¹⁷⁵ Amongst other approaches that deflate such overwrought claims, which Rahner also perpetuates to some extent in response to Thomas’ Summa Theologica, see Herwi W. M. Rikhof, “Authority in the Contemporary Theology of the Trinity,” in Aquinas as Authority. A Collection of Studies Presented at the Second Conference of the Thomas Instituut Te Utrecht, December 14-16 2000, ed. P. van Geest, H. Goris, and C. Leget (Leuven: Pectors, 2002), 213–34. Rikhof argues that Rahner’s take on Aquinas as introducing a rift between the ‘on the one God’ and “on the Triune God” is in fact a misdiagnosis of the problem due to the fact that such language never actually appears in the original version of Aquinas’ Summa. Instead, over the course of time in translation (which is always a form of interpretation), section headers and new terminology were introduced. ‘So a new terminology is used, and with it, associations and assumptions are introduced, apparently without a conscious decision and awareness of the connotations involved and without a clear argument in favour of such a decision. Since it seems that the type of terminology belongs to a later period, it means that
recent tradition of ‘existential’ Thomists in the line of Étienne Gilson\textsuperscript{176} (with whom Yannaras is clearly familiar but whose points appear to have fallen flat).\textsuperscript{177} That is, for Thomas, God is not ‘essence’ (although God is the simple divine unity of \textit{essentia} and \textit{esse}), but is most properly considered to be subsistent \textit{existence} (\textit{esse}, ‘to-be’) itself, echoing the most proper name for God, ‘I am who I am’. In this regard, W. Norris Clarke is instructive:

St. Thomas’ point is not that existence belongs necessarily to the divine essence, conceived as already the plenitude of perfection in its own right as essence. It is rather that the entire essence itself of God is \textit{nothing else than} the pure unlimited Act of Existence (\textit{Ipsum Esse Subsistens}), which of itself by “nature” contains, at least equivalently, all possible perfections. This is not a reduction of existence to essence, as in the other traditions, but just the opposite: a reduction of essence to existence. This is the truly daring aspect of the doctrine, and the one that has made it difficult for those in other traditions even to grasp, let alone accept.\textsuperscript{178}

Conjoined with, and crucial to this understanding of the primacy of \textit{esse} is the aspect of form, which Gilson states is ‘the act by which the matter is made to be the matter of such or such a determined substance. The proper role of form is, therefore, to constitute substance as substance’.\textsuperscript{179} The act-of-being (\textit{ipsum esse}), therefore, is akin to the act itself with respect to the form itself, as Thomas says.\textsuperscript{180} In this way, form ‘achieves substance’ as the principle of existence (\textit{principium essendi}),\textsuperscript{181} and as such Gilson lays the groundwork for Clarke’s quotation above, saying that ‘[t]o assert that the act-of-being has the bearing of an act with regard to form itself...is to affirm the radical primacy of existence over essence’.\textsuperscript{182} Hence, ‘the act of existing lies at the very heart, or if one prefers, at the very root of the real. It is therefore the principle of the principles of reality’.\textsuperscript{183} Language is at its creaturely limit here, for Thomas is attempting to point toward the ultimate unity of subject and verb, essence and

\textsuperscript{177} Yannaras, \textit{Person and Eros}, 299n.28, 310n.36, 362n.31, etc.
\textsuperscript{179} Gilson, \textit{The Christian Philosophy of St. Thomas Aquinas}, 32.
\textsuperscript{180} \textit{ScG}, II, c. 54, n. 5.
\textsuperscript{181} Gilson, \textit{The Christian Philosophy of St. Thomas Aquinas}, 33.
\textsuperscript{182} Ibid., 34.
\textsuperscript{183} Ibid.
existence, or as Clarke puts it, 'that which is and the act of ising'.\textsuperscript{184} And if it could be possible for one term in Thomas to 'win out', it would indeed be the verb, for Thomas chooses esse to express the subject in God, and not essentia.\textsuperscript{185}

Persons—angelic, human, and divine—are articulated within this act-of-being. Again, Yannaras says here that persons come 'after' the essence as an afterthought and therefore have no real existential reality for articulations from 'the West'. But for Thomas, this to once more misunderstand the radical nature of the fullness resplendent within the ipsum esse. That is, for Thomas, to be a person (or anything else) means that one is a particular subject in that, within the perfection of the act-of-being, essence becomes the limiting principle, the inner limit to this subject.\textsuperscript{186} Te Velde emphasizes here that in Thomas, it is not usually a limiting 'by' (per) the essence, but nearly always a limiting 'to' (ad) a subject by determinate essence. Significantly, this emphasizes that 'a nature is not so much a pre-existing subject which is already determined in itself, but that the specific nature is the determinateness being acquires in that in which it is received'.\textsuperscript{187} But, aside from a very qualified sense regarding the divine persons who are subsistent and who all share the same perfect act-of-being consubstantially with each other only being differentiated by their relations of origin—none of this applies to God, for God is simple ipsum esse subsistens. We know creatures as 'this' subject as a particular limited essence received in 'that' form in the act-of-being; in God, however, there is no limitation, and no way to 'map out' conceptually the essence-esse distinction, because it is only 'real' from the side of creation and 'logically' the same in divine simplicity in God. Gilson remarks that the very way the real distinction itself is articulated is so often done in a way that it makes it seem as if 'existence were itself an essence—the essence of the act-of-being'. But, continues Gilson, 'if this is to treat an act as though it were a thing'.\textsuperscript{188} It is understandable that Yannaras has misunderstood this distinction


\textsuperscript{185} Ibid., 26.

\textsuperscript{186} Ibid., 35-7; and especially idem, “The Limitation of Act by Potency in St. Thomas”; idem, “The Meaning of Participation in St. Thomas.”

\textsuperscript{187} Te Velde, Participation and Substantiality in Thomas Aquinas, 152.

\textsuperscript{188} Gilson, The Christian Philosophy of St. Thomas Aquinas, 35.
in the aftermath of a rigid Neo-Scholasticism, but a clearer way to understand the problem of the distinction as a formulation is to understand that it only becomes a problem for those whose essence is not to exist, i.e., creatures.

When Yannaras argues, therefore, that 'the West' is guilty of turning analogy into a measured concept, this attack does find purchase only insofar as various Thomists have misread Thomas in assuming that all versions of analogous predication reduce to the analogy of proportionality—the very articulation which gives rise to the most schematized, conceptual mapping. In the literature, this is the version of analogy that introduces the following schematic:

\[
\begin{array}{c}
\text{Human's } \textit{essentia} \\
\hline
\text{Human's } \textit{esse}
\end{array}
= 
\begin{array}{c}
\text{God's } \textit{essentia} \\
\hline
\text{God's } \textit{esse}
\end{array}
\]

However, with even a modicum of reflection, one will quickly see that such an arrangement of proportionality is, in the words of David Burrell, a 'bag of tricks,' despite the legacy it has had and continues to hold to some degree since Cajetan's De Nominum Analogia. The reason that proportionality fails is due to three key factors. First, the right side of the above diagram is not two 'things' or 'proportions' in God because of God's divine simplicity which expresses that God's essence is God's act-of-being (esse). Accordingly, Te Velde avers, 'Being is not said analogously of God and creature because there exists a similarity between the way God relates to his esse and the creature to its created esse. On the contrary, there is a radical diversity in [the] way they both relate to being'. Secondly, taken as a schema itself, this kind of relation can only express the utmost of the radical diversity between creature and God, for we only know in some sense how the two proportions on either side relate to themselves (either simply by itself in God or by participation in the creature), but not, however, between the two sides of the proportionality. For this reason, Eberhard Jüngel misreads Thomas through a Kantian lens and

190 For two defenses of the analogy of proportionality, see Anderson, Reflections on the Analogy of Being; and most recently, Steven A. Long, Analologia Entis: On the Analogy of Being, Metaphysics, and the Act of Faith (Notre Dame, IN: University of Notre Dame Press, 2011).


191 Te Velde, Participation and Substantiality in Thomas Aquinas, 97n.
concludes that in Thomas there can only be a pure apophatic silence regarding this relation. That is, Jüngel reads Thomas not as espousing analogy, but as proffering equivocation, but this reading is far afield from displaying a measured degree of fairness to Thomas' texts. And thirdly, as indicated in

192 Jüngel also locates Thomas' apophaticism within a Socratic, Dionysian, and Damascene-inspired legacy which he seems to argue comes merely from a pagan spirit of the ineffable distance of God to creation (Jüngel, God as the Mystery of the World, 232–45). At every turn, however, Jüngel misses that the references to these other thinkers, or the thinkers themselves (if they are Christian), are directly inspired by Scripture, e.g., Exodus 33:20; John 1:18; 1 John 4:12; 1 Timothy 6:15-16.

193 Rolnick, Analogical Possibilities, 191–240, 285–6; Hüttner, “Attending to the Wisdom of God — from Effect to Cause, from Creation to God,” 209–12, 240–5. Hüttner shows that oddly, Pannenberg comes out on the opposite pole and accuses Thomas of univocation. For two accounts that defend Jüngel, see Archie J. Spencer, “Causality and the Analogia Entis: Karl Barth’s Rejection of Analogy of Being Reconsidered,” Nova Et Vetera 6, no. 2 (2008): 329–376; Ry O. Siggelkow, “The Importance of Eberhard Jüngel for the Analogia Entis Debate,” The Princeton Theological Review 15, no. 1 (2009): 63–76. Spencer too attempts to shoe-horn Aquinas anachronistically (but also spuriously on the level of metaphysics) into the Kantian framework. For a response to Spencer, see Thomas Joseph White, OP, “How Barth Got Aquinas Wrong: A Reply to Archie J. Spencer on Causality and Christocentrism,” Nova Et Vetera 7, no. 1 (2009): 241–70 and 241 and 242n.3 where he briefly, but decisively casts aside the Kantian shackles that Spencer and Jüngel have placed upon Aquinas. Siggelkow, however, is guilty of what he charges John Betz with: he claims Betz has overlooked Jüngel and mischaracterized Barth by overlooking twenty-five years of Barthian scholarship, but Siggelkow himself has not shown he understands the analogia entis debate from the Catholic perspective, let alone paid any careful attention whatsoever to the multitude of scholarship on Thomas, analogy, and participation from the last sixty years (indeed, Siggelkow does not cite Thomas once). The most egregiously false assertion of Siggelkow’s is: ‘For Aquinas, God the Creator is always understood as the highest essence and first cause of all that exists in the created order’ (p. 71). Siggelkow displays his confusion in that, this account of Thomas, while false, is actually asserting that Thomas’ ontology is a univocal series of essences, yet Siggelkow is wont to agree with Jüngel that Thomas actually possesses an equivocal project (i.e., as too ‘apophatic’). Joseph White detects the same misunderstanding at work in Spencer’s claims, betraying a confused ahistoricism (White, ‘How Barth Got Aquinas Wrong’, 247). Showing no citational support to any of Thomas’ texts, let alone any scholarship on the matter, Siggelkow simply follows Jüngel’s account unquestioningly. The present chapter and section of this thesis should, I hope, dispel all such caricatures of Thomas as being an ‘essentialist’. Moreover, Siggelkow also does not realize that Przywara himself continued to clarify his own project on the analogia entis over the years, to the point that, as Kenneth Oakes shows, ‘Przywara’s later work itself reflects that the subject and object of theology is not primarily being but the analogia fidei and the commercium, and thus the center of theology is always and irreducibly the work wrought by the God-man Jesus Christ upon the cross for the sake of creation. It is still Przywara’s contention, however, that to speak of the Creator and creation well, we will need to be mindful of analogy, and of the analogia entis. Once again the analogia entis, according to Przywara, ever and only reflects and radiates the glory of Jesus Christ, the incarnate God’ (Kenneth Oakes, “The Cross and the Analogia Entis in Erich Przywara,” in The Analogy of Being: Invention of the Antichrist or the Wisdom of God?, ed. Thomas Joseph White [Grand Rapids, MI: William B. Eerdmans Publishing Company, 2011], 147–71 here at 170). Oakes’ essay is commendable not only for its breadth, but also for its ability to extend the discussion to the whole Przywara, and not to only focus upon the analogia entis of 1932 as Siggelkow narrowly does, despite his laudable efforts to promote Jüngel’s work. Lastly, Betz himself has shown his willingness to learn from Oakes’ work, and has accommodated and adjusted accordingly. John R. Betz, “After Barth: A New Introduction to Erich Przywara’s Analogia Entis,” in The Analogy of Being: Invention of the Antichrist or the Wisdom of God?, ed. Thomas Joseph White (Grand Rapids, MI: William B. Eerdmans
the previous section regarding an analogy of two things to a third, this schema
does the same thing in that it subordinates humans and God to a higher
concept, that is, the concept of the proportionality itself.\textsuperscript{194} God is not merely
some \textit{`x'} to solve in an algebraic equation, and in this sense, Yannaras is right
to reject the Neo-Scholastic forms of conceptualism that attempt to determine
God within such a schema. As Hans Urs von Balthasar rightly remarks, \textit{`The
analogia entis forbids the erection of any overarching third that includes both
God and the creature; God cannot fall under any concept.'}\textsuperscript{195}

If anything, the recent literature on the analogy debate shows how one
cannot simply rely on the etymology of words to make an all-determining
case, as Cajetan did regarding the Greek \textit{analogon}, usually translated as
\textit{`proportion'}.\textsuperscript{196} When one actually follows what Thomas says regarding
language about God, proper proportionality is actually \textit{not} one of the methods
he follows, especially when one understands that this can in no way apply to
God as \textit{ipsam esse}. Indeed, as Ashworth remarks, \textit{`Where Cajetan went wrong
was not in focusing on ontology but in his gratuitous introduction of the
analogy of proportionality'}.\textsuperscript{197} In this regard, the Creator-creature relation is
here not a four-element analogy, but a two-\textit{`element' participatory analogy:}\textsuperscript{198}
God is subsistent act-of-being itself, whereas creatures have their esse by participation, that is, only 'in part', and therefore borrowed.  

Addressing the famous three-fold division of analogy found in the Sentences commentary (upon which Cajetan uses to over-determine the rest of Thomas' use of analogy), even here one must be forced to address the role of the metaphysician as one that guides the discourse, as shown by Lawrence Dewan in the previous section. The first division is according to intention alone and not according to esse, and here Thomas refers to the famous health in body, urine, and medicine example; the second division is according to esse alone and not intention, and so the logician will univocally predicate 'body' on multiple subjects where the metaphysician and natural philosopher will see a real difference; and the third division, as it refers to those perfections in God such as truth and goodness, is according to both intention and esse. 'When we focus on words,' states Ashworth, 'we focus on the one intentio corresponding to each word. When we focus on natures, we focus on their esse or being.' The third division, therefore, while it requires both the skills of the logician and the metaphysician, must place a priority upon the metaphysician because, as stated above, the priority of God as ipsum esse—the reality of the act-of-being—must guide our discussion here, and not, pace Cajetan and his followers (and even some of his critics like McInerny), according to intrinsic and extrinsic modes of predication within a scheme of proportionality.

As previously stated, Yannaras' polemic is not without a basis when applied to the Neo-Scholastic attempts to turn analogy into a conceptual enterprise, as in Cajetan and his followers. It is for this reason that Gilson articulated analogy as transferred not to the plane of concepts as Duns Scotus attempted to do with the doctrine of the univocity of being, but the real divergence between Thomas and Scotus stems from the fact that the former

199 This is not to be confused with the impossible logic of taking a piece or 'part of' God. On 'borrowed existence' see Cunningham, "Being Recalled," 59–80 at 59–61.
200 In I Sent., d. 19, q. 5, a. 2 ad1.
transferred analogy instead to the plane of judgment." The reason for this is two-fold. On the one hand, it has to do with how being (esse) is articulated, that is, it is not a concept or contained within a genus, and ‘[i]f being is not a concept, then the unity of being cannot be a concept. If, therefore, there is to be any unity of being in knowledge at all, there remains only the judgment’. On the other hand, it is because all of the ‘attributes’ of God turn out to be not attributes at all, because, as Gilson says, one must continually repeat that God is esse, the ‘I am who I am,’ who is all of these attributes, not in a composed manner, but simpliciter. Even Joshua Hochschild (who we have already mentioned as one who has written a recent defense of Cajetan’s ‘semantics of analogy’), takes Gilson, et al.’s point about analogy requiring judgment, arguing that one finds this working in Cajetan as well, as he too pays attention to judgment, ordering his concepts underneath this usage.

To explore this idea further, it will be fruitful to recall the discussion at the beginning of the previous chapter concerning Levinas’ misunderstanding of the truth of knowledge. There we saw that for him, Being is always static and

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203 Klubertanz, St. Thomas Aquinas on Analogy, 116. For a more nuanced account, however, Rocca says, ‘Thomas can be read both ways on the question of whether the concept of being is the root of all judgments or the fruit of some of them, that is, whether the concept of being is an independent, essentialist, and primal concept of the mind’s first operation, or a quasi-essential concept that is the product and, as it were, the residue of even more primary existential judgments: he opts for the former in those texts where he is quoting Avicenna and allowing some of the Avicennian vocabulary’s essentialistic themes to shape his own thought, but he implies the latter if we combine the texts that derive ens from esse with his understanding of judgment as the way to knowing esse’ (Rocca, Speaking the Incomprehensible God, 165–73, here at 172–3). Analogy, however, always follows the latter course.


206 Hochschild, The Semantics of Analogy, 58–64, 124, 174–5. Hochschild contends that the critique is appropriate against Scotos, not Cajetan. This is not the place to offer a critique of Hochschild, but see Philip Rolnick’s review of his book: “The Semantics of Analogy: Rereading Cajetan’s De Nominum Analogia—By Joshua Hochschild.” Modern Theology 28, no. 1 (January 2012): 141–5. If Hochschild is correct regarding his treatment of Cajetan, then perhaps the simplest critique of Cajetan was that his judgment did not go far enough.
totalizing, and operates within a strict subject-object dichotomy which elicits an account where the object is always violently subsumed under the subject's gaze. Like Yannaras, this criticism only holds water when one is only operating at the level of concepts. However, for Thomas and the tradition that followed, truth is not the correspondence of objects to the 'subject' as such; rather, truth 'happens' when one corresponds one's intellect towards reality, to the matter at hand, and this is what Thomas calls the act of judgment. In this respect, Thomas says, 'when the intellect begins to judge about the reality apprehended, then its very judgment is something proper to it which is not found in the reality outside the soul; and this judgment is said to be true when it corresponds to the external reality'.

The only reason that the intellect has pride of place in this order at all is not because it is an ego that sublimates everything to itself, but because the intellect is the only faculty capable of making such judgments with regard to nonintellectual reality. As such, the distance between the intellect and the reality outside the soul is not merely parallel nor a unity in a Hegelian sense, but is itself a distance of proportioned analogy; it is an opening where the things are revealed to themselves in teleological fruition not only for the things themselves, but also uniquely for the intellectual soul of the person. The relation between the two is real, which includes both an interest in the integrity of the thing for its own sake in its own beauty, but also involves a dialogical, reciprocal mutuality. Catherine Pickstock helpfully clarifies: 'Intellection, then, is not an indifferent speculation; it is rather a beautiful ratio which is instantiated between things and the mind which leaves neither things nor mind unchanged. This means that one must think of knowing-a-thing as an act of generosity, or salvific compensation for the exclusivity and discreteness of things'. Analogy as judgment, which Rocca calls 'analogy-in-the-act rather than analogy-after-the-fact,' is therefore an act which takes concepts and necessarily transcends them because the dignity of the realities themselves command such respect.

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207 *De Ver.*, q. 1, a. 3; as cited in Rocca, *Speaking the Incomprehensible God*, 161.
208 Rocca, *Speaking the Incomprehensible God*, 164.
210 Ibid.
is why we can have a ‘concept’ of a person as an individual substance of a rational nature, but one never actually meets this concept; rather, they encounter persons, for persons themselves are in no way concepts! What’s more, the activity of dialogue can be now considered as a personalized act of analogical encounter, not only with other persons, but also with non-human entities, as when one attends to the grain of the wood in the craft of woodworking, or in the slow, deliberative enjoyment of an aged whisky, which itself took years to become what it is.

To Yannaras’ critique that analogy must be a hierarchical understanding and not conceptual, Thomas Aquinas would only nod in approval. In fact, when one reads Thomas and does not ignore the manifold passages on participation and its degrees, as well as his long treatise on angels in the *Summa Theologica* which itself is heavily indebted to Dionysius’ *On the Celestial Hierarchy*—indeed, it could not have been written without it—then one realizes that analogy in Thomas has been attempting to articulate a real, ‘sacred order’ all along. While the examples of Thomas’ use of Dionysius’ *On the Celestial Hierarchy* abound, two will suffice as illustrations for our purposes. First, Thomas relies on this analogical order found in Dionysius to defend not only the impossibility of seeing the essence of God, for, ‘According to Dionysius a man is said in the Scriptures to see God in the sense that certain figures are formed in the senses or imagination, according to some similitude representing in part the divinity’.

Secondly and more relevant to the topic at hand, in the first question on angels in the *Summa*, Thomas’ very first authority quoted is Dionysius to illustrate the hierarchic order of the angels as they enlighten one another. But Thomas does not stop there, for in the corpus of this article he illustrates how truth itself is an analogical reality, participating and intensifying in different orders of one level of the hierarchy enlightening the next. ‘All that is

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212 For an extended account on dialogue as dia-logos, see the next chapter.
214 *ST*, I, q. 12, a. 11 ad 1. Thomas cites *On the Celestial Hierarchy*, 4.3, Pseudo-Dionysius: *The Complete Works*, 157 [PG 3:180c]. To this, Thomas adds that the levels of participation include the degrees of prophecy (*ST*, II–II, q. 174).
made manifest is light,' as it says in Ephesians 5:13. This reality is communicated through the manifestation of intellectual light as each is illumined with the known truth.216 The illumination occurs in degrees of intensity: one degree of illumination occurs according to the strengthening of intellectual power caused by being ‘in the neighborhood’ of a superior angel, just as fire makes those things nearest it hot; a second degree of illumination occurs through communication of likeness according to the degrees possessed by the higher angels as they are able to propose to the lower angels. Thomas concludes the corpus of this article by citing _On the Celestial Hierarchy_ accordingly: ‘Every intellectual substance with provident power divides and multiplies the uniform knowledge bestowed on it by one nearer to God, so as to lead its inferiors upwards by analogy’.217 Even in the angelic realm, illuminative knowledge is achieved by way of manuduction, by a leading of the hand upwards toward God. Moreover, this activity of leading is also eminently _personal_, as angels themselves are part of this hierarchy not merely as immaterial beings, but precisely as persons.

The main difference for angels is found in their nature: they are purely immaterial, of an intellectual nature,216 not subsisting in a material, human nature, but still existing _as creatures_ as distinct in their intellective knowledge from their _esse_.219 For human persons, the manuductive act must respect the physical order of things, which means therefore that they must be involved an act of _resolutio_ on the path to God. This reflexive reversal into the metaphysical ordering of things names God as the analogical cause of participated Being, and thus intuits the real logical order of things—that is, respecting the order of a true _metaphysics_. Angels, Thomas says, because they ‘are utterly free from bodies, and subsist immaterially and in their own intelligible nature [must] consequently...attain their intelligible perfection

216 Thomas cites Ephesians 3:8: ‘To me the least of all the saints is given this grace...to enlighten all men, that they may see what is the dispensation of the mystery which hath been hidden from eternity in God’.
217 _ST_, I, q. 106, a. 1. The citation is to _On the Celestial Hierarchy_, ch. 15, in _Pseudo-Dionysius: The Complete Works_, 185 [PG 3:332b], which, however, loses the sense of analogical lifting or analogous “anagogy.” The Greek reads, ἡ καταδεστέρας ἁναγωγή ὁμορριν ἀναγωγίαν, τὴν διαφορομενην αὐτῇ πρὸς τὴν ἑνεξεν υπο τῆς θεωτέρας ἔνεξεν νόημαν προοιμικὴν δυναμεί διωμεν καὶ πλήθεις, πρὸς τὴν τῆς καταδεστέρας ἁναγωγικήν ἁναγωγίαν’.
218 _ST_, I, q. 41, a. 3 ad 2.
219 _ST_, I, q. 54, aa. 1–3.
through an intelligible outpouring, whereby they received from God the species of things known, together with their intellectual nature. In this sense, knowledge is not attained through deduction as it is for human persons, for the proper objects of the angelic intellect are intelligible substances, '[w]hereas the proper object of the human intellect, which is united to a body, is a quiddity or nature existing in corporeal matter'. In sum, both human and angelic persons in Thomas participate in an analogical sacred order, each according to their own mode of personal existence which determines the way in which their intellects come to bring each other to teleological fruition.

One wonders, after such an investigation, whether Yannaras could really be talking about Aquinas at all, but of course Yannaras' polemic (as well as Levinas') will indeed continue to be of some relatively minor use, or at least as a sound warning for those intent on making Thomas' teaching on analogy into a rigid theory. As mentioned, it is often remarked that Thomas has no 'general treatise on analogy', or that, as far as logic is concerned, 'Aquinas offers no theory of analogy'. Yet there are those like Montagnes who claim that in Thomas there is 'a coherent and unified theory of the analogy of being'. How can this be the case? Burrell is absolutely right to emphasize that Thomas' comments on analogy cannot be 'systematized', if that means that it is turned into an absolutely formulaic enterprise, and especially if one is attempting to locate a 'univocal core' in his analogous usage. Analogy cannot be univocity, otherwise it would not be analogy, as by definition it is the middle path practiced between univocation and equivocation. True, there is no single question devoted to analogy, nor does he set out to even explain analogy in the same way when he does give different accounts of its usage. But, the fact that there are many articles spanning Thomas' many works, as

220ST, I, q. 55, a. 2.
221ST, I, q. 60, a. 2.
222ST, I, q. 84, a. 7.
223Respectively, Klubertanz, St. Thomas Aquinas on Analogy, 105; Burrell, Analogy and Philosophical Language, 170 and see also 124, 198, 242, 263, 267.
224Montagnes, The Doctrine of the Analogy of Being According to Thomas Aquinas, 72.
226Ibid., 13.
227ST, I, q. 13, a. 5.
well as the fact that Thomas himself employs analogy all the time, even when he does not say, 'and now I am speaking of esse analogously', shows that it is a mediating logic and economy that guides most of his work. Indeed, whenever he speaks of persons, whether divine, angelic, or human, he always applies or assumes Boethius' definition, analogously ordered to the divine persons as the prime analogates, the most perfect subsistent personal realities by which all other persons are measured. There is thus no 'plain doctrine' of analogy, no single core, nor a univocal 'logic', but that does not mean that Thomas does not still actually have a teaching on analogy. This teaching contains similar, ordered logics of affirming a middle path between univocation and equivocation with terms signifying different levels of proportioned participation in a higher, subsistent reality which is the cause of and simplicity itself of whatever perfection terms are under examination—and one can still affirm this without making the same mistake as assuming that it always happens in the same way in every case. For example, truth is participated in analogously, but this is distinct from participating in Beauty or Goodness, despite the fact that these transcendentals are convertible with one another. Likewise, to be a human person will always be spoken of in an analogous way differently from any of the transcendentals, and because human nature itself is different than the angelic nature, they will, in turn, participate in God differently according to their own diverse modes of creaturehood.

It is for this reason that Burrell highlights Thomas’ locution of ‘analogously speaking’ (analogice loquendo) in contrast to discussions of ‘analogous concepts’. There can be no such thing as an ‘analogous concept’ in and of itself, as ‘a concept cannot but be univocal’, which runs contrary to the attempts of William of Ockham and Duns Scotus. For Thomas, this lack of formulation is therefore not a failing, but more about ‘showing’ or pointing toward where the truth lies as opposed to a formalized ‘saying’. Therefore,

228 Burrell, Analogy and Philosophical Language, 121.
229 Ibid., 191.
230 Ibid., 197-9. This strong division seems analogous to Levinas’ divide between ‘Saying’ and the ‘Said’, or Barth’s discussion of the dialectic between the Word and words. For more on the similarities between these two thinkers on precisely this point, see Ward, Barth, Derrida and the Language of Theology, 147–70.
Burrell states that this analogous usage points not to the disembodied logic of semantics as it points 'from language to the language user. Or rather they speak of language as emanating from a person with aims and purposes'. He continues:

And of course this is the context of language—human life and life’s concerns. It is the language arising therefrom which forms the matrix for logic. To call attention, then, to those aspects of our linguistic comportment which are neither susceptible of a rigorous account nor in need of logical justification is not to spurn logic. It is to preserve its integrity. Indeed it is not logic so much as an excessive demand for clarity which stands in the way of the proposed account. To require that ‘similar to’ be explicated by way of ‘identical with,’ for example, reflects an attitude, not a theory.

Not only does Burrell highlight the personal use of analogy, but Janet Soskice makes a similar remark regarding metaphorical usage: ‘For it is not words which refer but speakers using words’. Here she follows Hilary Putnam who says, ‘The realist explanation, in a nutshell, is not that language mirrors the world but that speakers mirror the world [...]’. Burrell, Soskice, and Putnam’s insights rightly point to the dimension of personal usage as it is an exhibition of why analogy itself is a personal enterprise. Analogy is analogous precisely because it is individual persons themselves engaging in analogical naming over space and time. As the primary analogates of Being, persons all illuminate the distance between themselves and the world as they both relate to their source in the Triune God. Usage itself requires that language and the things themselves be properly used, and so in this regard, analogous usage does at least have some loose parameters or ‘guard rails’ to guide the person on this path. Furthermore, the reason that analogy has a privileged understanding as personal stems from the very fact that all of the

232 Ibid., emphasis in original.
234 Hilary Putnam, “Realism and Reason,” in Meaning and the Moral Sciences (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1978), 123, emphasis in original. The sentence continues: ‘i.e. their environment—in the sense of constructing a symbolic representation of that environment’. This part of his formulation is somewhat imprecise for representationalism poses problems of its own, but it is outside of the scope of this thesis to address Putnam’s work.
transcendental terms and perfections are understood primarily as coinciding in a supremely personal God.

The distance between the Father and Son in the person of the Spirit is one of pure, overflowing love. The Son as sent by the Father in the Spirit is the very Word of the Father, the image of the invisible God; for us then, Christ becomes the 'prime analogate' of the Godhead. But one has to be careful here because there is not an element of participation here between the divine persons in the same way that we participate in God: for, because of divine simplicity, not only is the entire Godhead a Trinity of three persons, each consubstantial with the other existing distinctly by relation, but each person contains the entire Godhead at once as well, for there are no 'degrees' of analogous distance here either. Therefore, for Christ to be revealed to us is to also have the full revelation of the Father and the Spirit, supremely personal, yet paradoxically one. The logic of analogy is thus personal not because human persons are the primary analogate of Being, but it is personal precisely because of the advent of the revelation of the divine Logos in whom human persons have their being. The 'logic' of the ana-logic is Christ. Faith then becomes as much an ana-logical witnessing to the personal God in the sense of the upward motion implied in ἀνά and ἀνω as it is always already a being anagogically lifted up into higher participation of the eminently personal God.

c. Personal Service: Przywara & Balthasar on the Analogia Entis & the Analogia Personae

In the final section of this chapter, I turn to the work of Erich Przywara and the debate surrounding the analogia entis, or the 'analogy of being'. Przywara's work in particular updates and sharpens the question of analogy in three ways. First, writing in the early twentieth century affords him the position of being able to reflect on much of the analogical tradition that has

235 On the logic of ἀνά involved in analogy, see Przywara, Analogia Entis, 3:103-4.
transpired since the initial debates surrounding Thomas Aquinas. Second, related to the first point: as Przywara read widely in the theological as well as philosophical traditions—both ancient and contemporary—he is able to provide his own flavour of ‘updating’ to the literature on analogy as he incorporates aspects of not only Aristotle, Plato, and Augustine to Thomas’ teaching on analogy, but also Goethe, Nietzsche, Simmel, Troeltsch, Scheler, Newman, Kant, Hegel, Kierkegaard, Husserl, and Heidegger. Finally, Przywara confirms the central point of this thesis: the *analogia entis* is fulfilled and completed in an *analogia personae*, itself upheld and united in the person of Jesus Christ. While Przywara’s primary *Analogia Entis* text itself was always Christ-focused (especially in its final pages), in this chapter I employ the recent work of Kenneth Oakes who shows us that in the later writings of Przywara, the *analogia entis* is primarily about Christ crucified.

Like the history of analogous usage in Thomas, this particular debate surrounding Przywara’s *Analogia Entis* has generated its own set of issues within the correspondingly extensive array of literature. Below I will provide a brief summary of Przywara’s *analogia entis* in what it adds to Thomas’ notion of analogy, but also distinctly how it refers to the person as its prime analogate. Additionally, I will refer to the work of Hans Urs von Balthasar who also takes up Przywara’s task and expands it in certain ways. I will not be exploring the debate revolving around Karl Barth, Gottlieb Söhngen, Eberhard Jüngel, or Hans Urs von Balthasar, except as needed to clarify Przywara’s position.

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236 These are the figures that Przywara mentions in the Preface to the First Edition of *Analogia Entis*.


The text of Pryzwara’s *Analogia Entis* is broken up into two main sections, the first entitled ‘Metaphysics As Such’ [*Metaphysik Überhaupt*], and the second labeled ‘Analogy Entis’. The first section begins by examining the rhythm that abounds in philosophy itself. This is exhibited by tracing the movement of different types of philosophical approaches that, on the one hand, begin by way of an *a priori* method, concerned with essences, which he labels the ‘meta-noetic’. Examples of this type are Plato, Descartes, Kant, (the late) Husserl, and especially Hegel. On the other hand are the kinds of philosophies as ‘existence philosophies’, concerned with an *a posteriori* method, focused on concrete existence and practice. Emblematic here are such thinkers as Aristotle, Kierkegaard, Schopenhauer, Nietzsche, Heidegger, and Sartre. Both approaches, however, live within a polar tension such that each implies the other. For example, a meta-noetics will, as a noetics, always refer

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For a more detailed account of these approaches, see Erich Przywara, “Essenz- Und Existenzphilosophie: Tragische Identität Oder Distanz Der Geduld,” *Scholasitik* 14 (1939): 515–44; reprinted in *Analogia Entis*, 3:213–46. Here Przywara also connects these approaches to a desire to relocate the religious dimension of the tragic into a collapsed immanent domain in an effort to be unified with the Absolute, whereas the Christian account of the tragic is itself overcome in the crucified Christ, expressed within the distance of patience from the believer. See the recent and commendable Tomáš Halik, *Patience with God: The Story of Zacchaeus Continuing In Us*, trans. Gerald Turner (New York: Doubleday Religion, 2009). Przywara’s essay could very well be read as a reversal of Nietzsche in a reconfigured ‘The Crucified against Dionysios’. For a similar account from another angle, see Girard, *I See Satan Fall Like Lightning*, 173–6.
towards and assume categories of existence.\textsuperscript{240} Niels Nielsen remarks, ‘The analogia entis confirms that the knowing consciousness is directed beyond itself to being in the very act of knowledge. ..... As the fundamental principle of all speculation and reflection, the analogia entis signifies that philosophical inquiry is directed to a real object of knowledge in being’.\textsuperscript{241} We see here the logic spoken of above in the previous sections where the intellect ‘adequates’ itself toward Being, as Thomas Aquinas remarks at the beginning of De Veritate. Contrariwise, the a posteriori also tends toward the a priori; in other words, the existential standpoint will find itself directed toward the essence of things, as in Aristotle. But Przywara warns, ‘We pose our either-or not between a meta-noetics and a meta-ontics, but between a meta-noetics that provides the point of departure for a meta-ontics and a meta-ontics that finds its reflection, at the last, in a meta-noetics’.\textsuperscript{242} Posed in this way, the question of a pure opposition fades away. As such, the movement of the ‘meta-ontic moves backward in self-critique, reflexively, towards the meta-noetic’.\textsuperscript{243} Moreover, such a construction of meta-ontics itself presupposes an epistemology. ‘The epistemology that this method in practice employs is one that presumes a complete adequation between knowledge and being: so complete, in fact, that knowledge is nothing other than being brought to expression—indeed, being manifesting itself to itself’.\textsuperscript{244} Both movements thus imply and interpenetrate one another.

From the standpoint of finitude, however, ‘an account of the act of knowledge ... manifestly precedes any account of the objects of knowledge’.\textsuperscript{245} Even in a case of an extreme meta-ontics (i.e., existentialism, dialectical materialism), ‘the meta-noetic point of departure is unavoidable. According to its own formal structure, therefore, metaphysics must begin from

\textsuperscript{240} Przywara, Analogia Entis, 3:23–8. ‘Even Kant’s pure categories of judgment bear the form of ontological categories: quality, quantity, modality, etc. Even Hegel’s retreat to the inner and most formal species of judgment runs up against an expression proper to ontology: identity and opposition. Even the most formal comportment of consciousness as such—relation (that between act and object)—has an ontological shape’ (ibid, 26).
\textsuperscript{241} Nielsen, Jr, “Przywara’s Philosophy of the ‘Analogia Entis’,” 609.
\textsuperscript{242} Przywara, Analogia Entis, 3:24–5.
\textsuperscript{243} Ibid., 3:25.
\textsuperscript{244} Ibid., 3:26.
\textsuperscript{245} Ibid., 3:25 emphasis in original.
the problem of the act'. The reason for this is that Przywara is following the Thomistic order of discursive reasoning which we explored above when delineating the ‘arrival’ of the person: we first know God from God’s effects, from the effects of grace and from other creatures, and we then engage in the act of a reflexive reversal in realizing the proper, logical order of things—this itself is what we called the analogical act of judgment. Thus, in Przywara’s terms, the meta-ontic is ‘objectively prior’ while the meta-noetic is granted ‘methodological priority’. He calls the difference between the two approaches a ‘suspended tension’ (Spannungs-Schwebe), an existential tension which indicates that the formal principle of the analogia entis is itself part and parcel of a ‘creaturely metaphysics’. Like the Thomistic insight that regards creatures as creatures in distinction from God in that they do not have their own existence (esse) in the same, identical way that God has in God’s simplicity, Przywara formulates the creaturely ‘composition’ where it is not their nature to be esse as: ‘essence in-and-beyond existence’ (Sosein in-über Dasein). John Betz notes that the difference between Aquinas and Przywara on this point consists in the latter’s emphasis not only on the ‘tension’ of the essence ‘in and beyond’ existence, but upon the fact that the ‘creaturely being is “in becoming” (in fieri), or that it only “is” as becoming, specifically as a “coming to be” of essence’. This is indebted to the Augustinian emphasis on the nature of the creature as that which both “is” and “is not” (est non est), with a stress on what the creature is ‘not yet’, as in 1 John 3:2 which says, ‘what we will be has not yet been revealed’.

Tracing the movements in both a priori and a posteriori approaches to metaphysics, Przywara highlights that when considered as an a priori and a posteriori metaphysics in act, both tend toward one another, just as in the mutually interpenetrating moments of the meta-noetic and the meta-ontic. The a priori metaphysics of the act bears the character of a ‘superhistorical’

246 Ibid., 3:26-7.
248 Ibid.
249 Ibid.
251 Ibid., 15.
252 Przywara, Analogia Entis, 3:36-60.
(übergeschichtlich) system, which as supercreaturely, attempts to reconcile impasses (aporai) and tends toward an absolute dialectic of historical progress. Here we see the transition from a Kantian to an Hegelian approach. On the other hand, an a posteriori metaphysics of the act bears the form of intrahistoricity (Inner-geschichtlichkeit). In this method, truth is derived from history: ‘truth is known to the degree that the eye that surveys the universality of the intrahistorical turns its gaze upward to contemplate superhistorical truth.’ A dilemma immediately arises here because either one takes this as an idealism, or, one attempts to collect the various traditions within history to form a common denominator, itself leading toward an historical aporetics. The reason for this, according to Przywara, is that when taken strictly, this approach always leaves historical remainders. The reciprocal relationship between these two approaches must be where the truth lies, for, taken absolutely, the vantage point from either end is only truly permissible from a truly divine perspective. As Przywara puts it:

For the creature, only something similar (although precisely for this reason essentially dissimilar) is possible: firstly, moving “with” the current, which is to say, maximally, giving oneself up to it;—secondly, moving “in” the current, which is to say moving in the conscious awareness that even the most vigorous attempt to move “with” the current never grasps the whole of it (because both its past as well as its coming possibilities always loom out of the reach of any attempt, concomitantly, to grasp it), but is instead ever more deeply grasped by it. Seen thus, all “comprehension” must know itself, consciously and from the first, as a “being comprehended.” In the course of this work itself, we shall see how the theme of the Analogia entis takes such a method as its own proper mode of operation—how, that is, it formalizes itself in such a method: in every “comprehending of something” (and therein union with it) there is the greater “above-and-beyond” of “being comprehended by it” (and therein the increasing distance that transcends all unity).

The analogical tension between ‘comprehension’ and ‘being comprehended’ results from the ‘gift character of being’ itself such that, as St Paul remarks,
we only know when we love God such that we are in turn known by God.  

We thus do not exist in ourselves, but have the locus of our existence primarily in another.

It is within this trajectory that Przywara formulates the theological within an immanently philosophical metaphysics. Within this ‘in between’ (Zwischen) within being, the question of the ‘in itself’ as the ‘ground-end-definition itself’ (Grund-Ziel-Sinn) comes to light. That is, from the focus upon the ‘between’ comes the ‘ground-end’ of this between such that one finds that at the heart of this ‘end’ within the pure a priori, from the above to the below, ‘is a certain relation between God and creature: namely, a oneness with a God of the “Ideas” and of “Truth,” to the point of reenacting the groundedness, directedness, and determinateness of all reality from this God’. Likewise, in a pure a posteriori from the metaphysics of the object or the act, the reverse moment is seen from the below to the above. This problem as distinctly a creaturely problem exhibits the ‘formal fundamental form of “God beyond the creature.”’ Either side of this dilemma strives toward the absolute, whether it is an absolute ‘ideal’ or absolute ‘universal’, and thus at its core, these ‘are questions concerning the innermost rhythmic beat between God (as the absolute) and the created (as what is grounded, directed, and determined by the absolute), in that they are concerned with the innermost beat of becoming (between essence and existence) in the creature’.

Between the idea of being and the actuality of being: this is the remit of the ‘intra-creaturely’, which is the common plane of the problem—not that between God and creature, where there can be no univocity. The relation between God to the creature, however, does not fall between the aforementioned rhythms of a priori and a posteriori aporetics (except analogically as an intensification of the dissimilar in the similar), but the relation can only be characterized as one

257 1 Corinthians 8:2-3. Regarding Balthasar’s adoption of this rhythm, see Schindler, Hans Urs Von Balthasar and the Dramatic Structure of Truth, 249, 368; Aquinas, De Ver., q. 1, a. 2 and q. 2, a. 14.
258 Schindler, Hans Urs Von Balthasar and the Dramatic Structure of Truth, 96.
259 Przywara, Analogia Entis, 3:60-1.
260 Ibid., 3:61.
261 Ibid., 3:63.
262 Ibid.
263 Ibid., 3:81.
of gift, or 'complete “gratuity” (völlige «Ungeschuldetheit»)". This complete gratuity is expressed in the knowledge of God as an unknowing, an approach which explodes any ability to comprehend God in concepts. To quote Przywara:

“above-and-beyond” here really means what I Corinthians says about the relationship between revelation and thought: “scandal” and “folly” in the sign of the “cross.” “Pure thought” is “routed,” forced to flee undecidably either to “necessity without actuality” or to “actuality without necessity.” And precisely thus is it philosophy: participation in the truth, which is God. For the one metaphysics, theology is the ἐντελέχεια ...—that is, its ultimate life-giving form—in that it appears...to be the στέρησις of philosophical thought—that is, its blasting open to the point of a hollowing-out: “life in death.” In that, as Thomas says, the relationship of the theological to the philosophical is one of excedere (the “blasting open” in the “above and beyond” to the point of a “hollowed-out abandonment”), it is one of per-ficere (of a “thorough crafting-to-the-end” to the point of “perfection”).

This perfecting rhythm is that which is ‘suspended “between” absolute identity and absolute difference, and finally, “between” nothing and the Creator who creates out of nothing. Such is the complexity of the matter, and it is precisely in the intersection of these two “analogies”—the “immanent” and the “theological”—that Przywara locates the analogy of being.

Locating the analogia entis is not the same as securing its foundation as a positive given, however; rather, locating the analogy of being is to articulate the contours, rhythm, and perfection of the human person’s experience of the depths of God, who remains ‘ever greater’ distinct. This is why even Barth, as Balthasar notes, affirms that the analogia entis is itself a distinctly “formal principle”, however much the former continued to reject it throughout his work. Philosophy’s movement into theology—and hence its perfection—is a passage which, in its completion, still affirms the difference between the two and hence their dignity, yet without creating a tertium quid, that is, no ‘third thing’. This motion itself as the non-univocal movement of philosophy into theology mirrors the theological logic of the analogy of being. To reuse a

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265 Ibid., 3:83, emphasis in original.  
266 Betz, “Beyond the Sublime (pt. 2),” 22.  
quotation from Balthasar: ‘The *analogia entis* forbids the erection of any overarching third that includes both God and the creature; God cannot fall under any concept’.

In addition to Barth, Przywara even chides his ‘dear friends’ Gottlieb Söhngen, Theodor Haecker, and Balthasar for not understanding that *analogia* in Aristotle is a ‘proportion between two X’.

He further clarifies: ‘Should an “*analogia entis*” (which Barth reckoned as Mariology) be the “fundamental Catholic principle”, then it is not a mere “principle” but a “constant structure of that which is purely and clearly factual.” Then, as I have always stressed, it stands as a “suspended middle” between the absolutely transcendent God of Calvin, Kierkegaard, and Barth, and the absolute immanence of the God of Schleiermacher, Ritschl, and Harnack. – “Analogia” as a genuine relation between two X, eradicates from the root every “derivation”, whether deductive or inductive.

Such a derivation would *itself* be the logic of the ‘third’, which is eschewed from the beginning in the rhythm that Przywara articulates (which, as ‘two relating to a third’, Aquinas also rejected as we saw above).

How, then, does Przywara articulate the approach to God if not via some other logic that guides the Creator-creature distinction? This striving after a ‘third’ is only attained in the following: ‘the “third” is a possibility that is fulfilled solely in the measure that “God is all in all,” and is thus ever more greatly beyond every grasping and comprehending by way of concepts. Not in the measure that the mystery becomes a concept, but in the measure that the concept is overcome in the mystery.’

Przywara locates this ‘so-called “third”’ (*sogenanntes «Drittes»*) as within an ever greater realization within the theological itself, that is, in the inter-personal, Trinitarian life of God.

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270 Erich Przywara, *In Und Gegen. Stellungnahmen Zur Zeit* (Nürnberg: Glock und Lutz, 1955), 278. For commentary on this aspect in Przywara, see Mechels, *Analogie Bei Erich Przywara Und Karl Barth. Das Verhältnis Von Offenbarungstheologie Und Metaphysik*, 31–4. It is a kind of ‘balanced measure’ (*Ausgleichs im Maß*) (ibid, 34) of the Aristotelian law of contradiction which finds itself within the creaturely space between transcendence and immanence. Here the logic of in-and-beyond (in-über) is shown as an ‘immanentizing transcendent’ (*immanierende Transzendent*) and a ‘transcending immanence’ (*transzendierende Immanenz*), (ibid, 34-7).
272 ScG, I, c. 34, n. 2.
274 Ibid., 3:88.
other words, Przywara’s ‘third’ is akin to the via eminentia of the path of theology as espoused by Dionysius and Thomas. The relationship therefore between ‘concept’ and ‘mystery’ is one that is experienced as a reductio in mysterium: ‘the “concept” arises here anew out of the “mystery”: as a “being comprehended” (einbegriffen sein) by the “mystery”: just as the night unveils its countenance only so far as the light has faded’. The mystery seizes us ‘in order to com-pre-hend us (um uns ein-zu-be-greifen). It leads us in order to lead us back into itself’. Przywara refers to 1 Corinthians 8:2-3 and remarks that its full significance is ‘not simply a sinking away of philosophical “knowing” (γνώσεως) before a theological and conceptual determination provided by definite revelation (εις ὁρμήν τῶν θεόν, οὕτως εἰς ὁμοιότητα ύπ’ αὐτοῦ). In other words, even the concept of “defined truth” leads into the mystery’. Likewise, Balthasar, who owes an intellectual debt to Przywara, says, ‘in its act of self-possesion, the worldly subject understands that it is already possessed and comprehended, that the eternal prius of being known is the intrinsic form of knowledge’. The truth is apprehended in nearly identical terms to that of Przywara’s own: ‘In the first experience, the subject wraps itself around the object, in the sense that when something is grasped, it finds itself inside the person who grasps it (comprehensively). In the second experience, however, the subject is introduced, initiated even, into the mysteries of the object; it explicitly lays hold only of a fraction of the object’s depth and richness, albeit with the promise of further initiation to come’. In

275 Ibid., 3:89.
276 Ibid.
277 Ibid. While Przywara goes on to say that his real target here is Hegel (ibid), the shape of the argument against which Przywara is critiquing is one not too dissimilar to certain Heideggerian- and Levinasian-inspired readings of theology in which metaphysics must be completely ‘evacuated’ to make room for faith (the assumption being: metaphysics per se are seen as wholly pagan and outside of God’s capacity to save them and rightly direct them). Both Marion and Westphal follow this path. See Jean-Luc Marion, God Without Being: Hors-texte, trans. Thomas A. Carlson (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1991); Merold Westphal, Overcoming Onto-theology: Toward a Postmodern Christian Faith, Perspectives in Continental Philosophy 21 (New York: Fordham University Press, 2001).
280 Ibid., I:40.
both Przywara and Balthasar, the contour of veracity traced out is that of a first encounter, deepened by a second movement of a more original truth which is the mysterious depth, a depth which itself has us in possession, and not the other way around as our post-Kantian assumptions might lead us to believe. We do not fundamentally possess the truth as much as the truth is that which possesses us.¹²¹ Indeed, as David Bentley Hart states, ‘Analogy is a discourse of truth that has disabused itself of the notion that truth is a thing only to be grasped’.²⁸²

Przywara brings the first part of Analogia Entis to a close by highlighting the impulses of the Catholic church against Hegelian movements within it that seek to conflate and thus confuse philosophy with theology. Citing the Vatican I document De fide et ratione, Przywara emphasizes the council’s decision to maintain the distinction between faith and reason.²⁸³ However, the borders of faith and reason are not set at odds, but are in service to the one truth in God, stemming from the ‘submission to the church [as] a being-formed-in-Christ, who as the Eternal Son of the Father is the Logos, the Intellectus Sui within the intra-divine life. Thus, what might look like “disciplinary cowardice” is actually a noetic mysticism of participation in the intra-divine procession of Eternal Truth’.²⁸⁴ The achievement worked out is not a half- or semi-philosophical and semi-theological compromise but instead, it finds its completion in a union where the two totally interpenetrate as ‘one in the one God of the one truth’.²⁸⁵ Instead of violating the independence of philosophy and theology, this interpenetration in the rootedness of divine truth in fact establishes their very integrity. Philosophy, like a nature upon which grace builds, becomes the ‘groundwork’ for theology; theology, though, ‘comes to be, formally, the inner liberation of the act of philosophy’.²⁸⁶ Against both a rationalistic positivism on the one hand and a rationalistic fideism on the other is a single reductio in mysterium: ‘The reductio in mysterium (which is also

²⁸¹ Benedict XVI likewise says, ‘we never have the truth; at best it has us’. In Benedict XVI, Light of the World: The Pope, the Church, and the Signs of the Times: A Conversation with Peter Seewald, 50.
²⁸² Hart, The Beauty Of The Infinite, 317.
²⁸⁴ Ibid., 3:93.
²⁸⁵ Ibid.
²⁸⁶ Ibid.
and precisely the church’s final word) is thus a way into the mystery “in” the concept and “beyond” the concept—which is, at the same time, the answer to Hegel’s attempt to grasp the mystery “as” concept (in “absolute knowledge”), in that it is primarily the concept which appears “as” mystery (namely, as the “self-concept” of a Trinitarian dialectical God). Przywara’s summary, therefore, is as follows: ‘The “in-and-beyond” has shown itself to be the fundamental formal relation within our principle of metaphysics as such—that is, understood precisely as a ‘creaturely metaphysics’.

Thus ends our exposition of Part I of Przywara’s Analogia Entis which he calls ‘metaphysics as such’ (Metaphysik überhaupt). Before moving on to the conclusion of the section in looking at Part II entitled ‘Analogia Entis’ of the same work, it will be noteworthy to pause and examine the nature of truth contained within such a ‘creaturely metaphysics’. In this regard, Hans Urs von Balthasar’s Theo-Logic (vol. 1): The Truth of the World acts as a kind of refashioning of Part I of Przywara’s Analogia Entis. The first thing to note is that the structure of worldly truth itself, because it bears this ‘in-and-beyond’ quality, is inexhaustible in the same way that a deepening into mystery leads not to more certainty, but further into the mystery itself. The reason why ‘truth is always an opening, not just to itself and in itself, but to further truth” is contained in the following: ‘[T]ruth begins to unfurl its inexhaustible plenitude—which only goes on becoming more and more inexhaustible—in the course of long familiarity with it. ...[I]t is obvious from the outset that truth, as a property of being, is at bottom no more susceptible of, or accessible to, an exhaustive definition than is being itself. [...] Definition is the determination of a generic concept by the addition of a specific difference. However, being itself is not a genus, because all the differences of being are themselves being’. Creaturely reality, therefore, ‘must always remain richer than any cognition of it and ... the truth even of the lowest level of being contains a richness that so utterly eludes exhaustive investigation that it can continue to engage inquirers until the end of time yet never ends up as a heap

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287 Ibid., 3:94.
288 Ibid., 3:97.
290 Ibid., I:26.
of unmysterious, completely surveyable facts'. While non-human things are clearly not ‘persons’, they still possess an analogous ‘personal’ quality of an incommunicability, that is, an intrinsic value that is a ‘being-for-themselves’ as a unique gift given to them alone.

The relationship described here, however, is not one of pure subjectivity found everywhere (i.e. panpsychism), as there is still a subject-object relation, albeit not that of an oppositional dichotomy as Levinas assumed the nature of metaphysics to inhabit. Here again, just as Puntel remarked in regard to Aquinas, Balthasar also speaks of an ‘adequation’ of the subject to the thing as it really is, but in the sense that the person ‘lets [him- or herself] be determined and measured by the thing [object]’. That is, ‘[a] proportion has to be achieved between subject and object, and the decisive measure of the proportion lies with the object’. Objects exist for subjects, not violently in a mere utilitarian sense, but in the way that the subject exists for the object as one who judges the truth of the object, an act of measuring which is a free, spontaneous, achievement in creativity. Human persons engage in a ‘balancing act’ of receiving the measure in ‘consenting self-abandonment [Hingabe]’ while simultaneously judging and measuring, put another way, creaturely truth is experienced in a polarity of both observant theoria [Θεωρία] and creative poesis [ποίησις]. Truth, realized as a personal adequation to the object in giving oneself over in self-abandonment, as well as with the simultaneous self-abandonment of the object to the subject, reveals truth precisely as

291 Ibid., I:85.
292 Ibid., I:81.
293 Ibid., I:41, emphasis mine. Similarly, Balthasar later says, ‘the foundation of the good does not lie primarily in the seeker but in being itself, which is the object of seeking (bonum est principaliter in re)’ [The Latin translated by Adrian Walker reads: ‘the good is principally in (extramental) reality’] (Ibid., I:222).
295 Ibid., I:42.
296 Ibid., I:43.
297 Ibid., I:70–1.
298 Ibid., I:112–13. Jörg Disse, without much elaboration, takes issue with this aspect of Balthasar’s thought insofar as he sees this conversation to be a ‘strange anthropomorphism’ stemming from the fact that ‘there is no person to whom [the subject] is related’ in this subject-object relation. See his “Person und Wahrheit in der Theologie Hans Urs von Balthasars,” in Gott Für Die Welt. Henri De Lubac, Gustav Siewerth Und Hans Urs Von Balthasar In Ihren Grundanliegen. Festschrift Für Walter Seidel, ed. Peter Reifenberg and Anton van Hoof (Mainz: Matthias-Grünewald-Verlag, 2001), 367–84 here at 373–4. Disse
creaturely truth. And, as Balthasar says, ‘To recognize creatureliness as creatureliness means to recognize God immediately within it. To perceive the limit of worldly truth means to apprehend concomitantly and tacitly what lies beyond it’. In this recognition, true knowledge begins to flourish for the first time.

True knowledge is established within this suspended middle between receptivity and the creative activity of personal adequation—a knowledge whose character is distinctly realized as service. Balthasar states, ‘Knowledge is, in the very act of its origination, service, because it begins when the subject, without being consulted, is conscripted into the world’s labor force and attains judgment only at the end’. Service, therefore, comes after the careful discernment of the world’s objects to the degree that it serves the truth precisely insofar as it is a service to love itself. That is, worldly truth is further grounded in the service of God, who is in-and-beyond creation. It is here in the context of personal service that all of the themes come together in Przywara’s definition of the analogy of being. For Przywara, ‘Service is never simply a discrete act of charity,’ Brian Dunkle says, as ‘it is rather the activity that characterizes the creature qua creature, related analogically to the Creator’. Furthermore, as David L. Schindler has shown, the person cannot be merely reduced to its empirical objectivity either, as, in light of the reduction placed upon the person in light of the Enlightenment, it overlooks apparently fails to see that what is at work in Balthasar is not unnecessary anthropomorphism, but rather a consistent ‘meta-anthropology’. On this see Martin Bieler, “Meta-anthropology and Christology: On the Philosophy of Hans Urs Von Balthasar,” Communion 20, no. 1 (Spring 1993): 129-46. 299 Balthasar, Theo-Logic, 2000, I:252. 301 Ibid., I:68. 302 Ibid., I:256. For a helpful account of the history of Przywara’s account of the God who is ‘in us and beyond us’ as he draws this out from Augustine, see Kenneth Oakes, “Three Themes in Przywara’s Early Theology,” The Thomist 74, no. 2 (2010): 283–310 at 284–94. 304 On this topic, see the following helpful article: Brian P. Dunkle, “Service in the Analogia Entis and Spiritual Works of Erich Przywara,” Theological Studies 73, no. 2 (2012): 339–62. 305 Ibid., 343–4.
the gift-based character of the creature whose nature is seen most truly in service and adoration.\textsuperscript{306}

Before reconnecting with Przywara’s emphasis on service, I will quickly trace the movement in Part II of his \textit{Analogia Entis} that provides the basis for his analogical rhythm—indeed, it is precisely \textit{movement} that characterizes this second part of Przywara’s work as we shall see. Within the creaturely metaphysic outlined in Part I, Przywara draws out that being’s rhythm itself has an ‘order’, or as he puts it, an ‘ordering order’.\textsuperscript{307} Analogy balances the confusion between the divine idealist ‘logic’ and the worldly defiant ‘dialectic’ and sets up a properly creaturely logic. Przywara refers to the grammar of ‘analogy’ as ordering both ‘according to an orderly sequence’ in the sense of the Greek \textit{\alpha\nu\alpha} and as ‘up above’ as from \textit{\alpha\nu\omega}.\textsuperscript{308} When seen under this aspect, the analogical movement between creature and Creator takes a decidedly anagogical shape: ‘In its \textit{\alpha\nu\alpha}, then ..., the \textit{\alpha\nu\alpha\lambda\omicron\gamma\iota\zeta\epsilon\sigma\theta\alpha\iota} of analogy says that thought, as a distanced obedience to the Logos (\textit{\alpha\nu\alpha} in the sense of “according to” an “above”), is the pervasive working of the Logos in all things (\textit{\alpha\nu\alpha} in the sense of an “above that orders”).\textsuperscript{309}

The upward movement is grounded not in pure logic, nor in a dialectical ascent as in Hegel, but in analogy which is itself grounded in the \textit{principle of non-contradiction}. It is here, based upon Aristotle’s principle, that the noetic and ontic forms, and thus the meta-noetic and the meta-ontic, interpenetrate.\textsuperscript{310} In \textit{nuce}, this principle states that something cannot simultaneously both ‘be’ and ‘not be’ at the same time.\textsuperscript{311} Both the logic of identity, and the Hegelian dialectical logic, attempt to radicalize contradiction to the extent that ‘the world is the rhythm of its dialectical unfolding. This is to say that the noetic-ontic principle of identity remains determinative in the background (however much Hegel, against Fichte and Schelling, seeks to decommission it), but

\textsuperscript{307} Przywara, \textit{Analogia Entis}, 3:99.
\textsuperscript{308} Ibid., 3:103–4.
\textsuperscript{309} Ibid., 3:104.
\textsuperscript{310} Ibid., 3:104–5.
\textsuperscript{311} Aristotle, \textit{Metaphysics}, XI, 5, 1061b-1062a (in English translation: \textit{Metaphysics}, 328).
works itself out in the absoluteness of contradiction’.\textsuperscript{312} Pure logic and dialectical logic ultimately amount to the same thing, that is, the final form is that of identity.\textsuperscript{313} Analogy, in contrast to these logics, works itself out in the principle of non-contradiction in a dynamic synthesis, serving as the ‘minimum’ but also within the movement itself. ‘That is to say’, Przywara clarifies, ‘it is not something “from” which one can make deductions; rather, it itself is simply the basis for a back-and-forth debate, whose dynamic is every again renewed. It is the ever renewed \textit{debate} that takes place between \textit{Heraclitus and Parmenides}.\textsuperscript{314} Analogy takes place in the principle of non-contradiction in that it is a measured equilibrium in the midpoint between Heraclitean ‘all is movement’ and the Parmenidean ‘all is rest’.\textsuperscript{315} Furthermore, this equilibrium is dynamically orientated in that ‘the foundation of analogy [is] understood as an \textit{immanent dynamic middle directed to an end}. For the “middle” (understood as the back and forth of \textit{ένεργεία} between \textit{δύναμις} and \textit{έντελέχεια}) grounds the rhythm of analogy. The “end-

\textsuperscript{312} Przywara, \textit{Analogia Entis}, 3:108. Hegel says as early as his ‘Difference’ essay, ‘Life eternally forms itself by setting up oppositions, and totality at the highest pitch of living energy is only possible through its own re-establishment out of the deepest fission’ (G. W. F. Hegel, \textit{The Difference Between Fichte’s and Schelling’s System of Philosophy}, trans. H. S. Harris and Walter Cerf [Albany, NY: State University of New York Press, 1977], 91). Most eminent of all Hegel’s explicit reliance on contradiction is his clear statement: ‘everything is inherently contradictory, and in the sense that this law in contrast to the others expresses rather the truth and the essential nature of things. …[C]ontradiction is the root of all movement and vitality; it is only in so far as something has a contradiction within it that it moves, has an urge and activity’ (Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel, \textit{Science of Logic}, trans. A. V. Miller [Amherst, NY: Humanity Books, 1969], 439, emphasis in original). Or in the first volume in the \textit{Encyclopaedia of Logic}: ‘There is in fact nothing, either in heaven or on earth, either in the spiritual or the natural world, that exhibits the abstract “either-or” as it is maintained by the understanding. Everything that is at all is concrete, and hence it is inwardly distinguished and self-opposed’ (Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel, \textit{The Encyclopaedia Logic: Part I of the Encyclopaedia of Philosophical Sciences with the Zusätze}, trans. T. F. Geraets, W. A. Suchting, and H. S. Harris [Indianapolis, IN: Hackett Publishing Company, 1991], 187f|\textsection 119 A2). Accordingly, Charles Taylor calls contradiction the ‘motor’ for Hegel’s dialectic. Charles Taylor, \textit{Hegel} (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1977), 119–20, 227, 276–7, 280–2, 304. Lastly, see the important work: Songsuk Susan Hahn, \textit{Contradiction in Motion: Hegel’s Organic Concept of Life and Value} (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2007).

\textsuperscript{313} Przywara, \textit{Analogia Entis}, 3:109. Przywara adds, ‘The Hegelian “contradiction” has been radicalized in the Heideggerian “Nothing.” But this Nothing, as Nothing, is the fundamental principle determining and producing all things. This “productive Nothing” utters the ontic-netic “I am who I am” of the principle of identity’ (Ibid.). Cf. the comments on the One in Plotinus as it produces nothing, as well as the plenitude of nihilism in Cunningham, \textit{Genealogy of Nihilism}, 5–9, 178–9.

\textsuperscript{314} Przywara, \textit{Analogia Entis}, 3:109–10, emphasis in original.

\textsuperscript{315} Ibid., 3:112.
directedness," on the other hand, shows the "measure from above" (which lies in the ἀνω of ἀνά). The reason that the foundation is led beyond itself stems from the 'boundlessness' (Grenzenlos) of the purely formal character of the 'all is movement' and 'all is change' formulations when seen as the defining, ideal ontic forms. On the contrary, that which is bounded is characterized by the qualitative-material aspect of the (energetic) unity of ontic and defining form. Thus, here, for the first time, a certain transcendence is mixed into what till now has been immanence. It is not simply that—as it has been to this point—the principle of non-contradiction signifies (both noetically and ontically) a rhythmic middle. It is rather that there is a stress upon "end-directedness," which becomes more clearly an "end towards which..." The changing movement of the creature is (both noetically and ontically) not only like the surging back and forth of the sea's same ultimate elements (the πτων understood as οὐσία-μορφή), but also, and precisely, like the turbulent infinity of the sea governed by the everlasting stars (the πτων understood as εἴδος). The principle of non-contradiction thus has a stress toward the principle of identity, but in such a way as to be "directed" towards it, not equated with it. It is not identity that holds sway between them, but analogy itself: an analogy from the moving earth of the creature to a "heavenly identity." Analogy, therefore, becomes a relation between the ontic and noetic such that ontic being itself is related to truth and beauty noetically such that the latter is in-and-beyond the former. As Przywara puts it: 'analogy is established as a participatory being-related-above-and-beyond' [es begründet sich Analogie als teilnehmendes Über-hin-aus-bezogen-sein]. That which is 'beyond' bears a relational priority to that which is 'below' as the archetype is to the image. As this relation is opened up and described by Przywara, he relies upon Augustine and Thomas Aquinas to show that their accounts of causality

316 Ibid., 3:116, emphasis in original.
317 Ibid.
318 Ibid., emphasis mine.
319 Ibid., 3:118.
320 Ibid., 3:120.
represent a ‘decisive reversal of Aristotelianism’. Metaphysics within such a strict Aristotelian framework cannot think change outside of potentiality nor act as total act which excludes potentiality. But within the suspended middle of analogy, there exists now an ‘active potentiality of an unlimited “service to God.”’ The creaturely potentiality is taken to its utmost extreme in the potential oboedientialis which expresses the coinerence of ‘beyond nature’ and ‘in nature’; in extremis it is the most negative as the most positive of potentialities: ‘a positive potentiality so bold as to journey into the nature of God himself.’ This pathway bespeaks a “fruitful possibility” (potential activa) that is not pure passivity but is a “free gift from above,” by virtue of the nothing of “powerlessness” being summoned to “service.” In this way it realizes the Augustinian notion of being liberated by God (gratia liberatrix) for free service (libera servitus). At the highest peak of potentiality, our passivity is a beckoning toward action. However, ‘far from constituting an emancipari a Deo—as Augustine calls Pelagianism—the deed of free action is an indication of the most incisive potentiality: the distance of the servant from the Lord’. Przywara notes that the ‘crown’ of this Augustinian achievement is the Thomistic notion of secondary causality: ‘the doctrine that the creaturely “is (valid)” is so very much something produced from the divine Is (Truth, etc.) as to have its own power of operation’. Secondary causality, therefore, as a non-competitive understanding of creaturely activity in relation to God’s own divine act, is itself an analogous relation of the creature to God as a relation of service.

The core of Przywara’s Analogia Entis gathers these themes together in the doctrine set forth by the Fourth Lateran Council (1215) statement which says, ‘between Creator and creature no similarity can be noted, however great, ...

321 Ibid., 3:133.
322 Ibid.
324 Ibid., 3:134. Przywara cites Augustine, Serm. CLXXIV, ii, 2 and In Ps. XCIX, 7.
325 Ibid. The citation to Augustine is to Opus Imperf. In Jul.
326 Ibid. ‘Out of the eminence of its goodness, the first cause gives to other things not only their existence but the power also to be causes themselves (prima causa ex eminencia bonitatis suae rebus aliis conferit non solum quod sint, sed etiam quod causae sint)’ (De Ver., q. 11, a. 1).
without having to note a greater dissimilarity between them'.\(^{327}\) This statement captures the rhythmic movement of analogy in the following way: first, in the analogy of attribution (*analogia attributionis*), which is the 'positive relationship' between God and creatures 'however great'; but secondly, negatively in the 'ever greater dissimilarity' as it overcomes the positive attribution, that is, 'by virtue of the ever new above-and-beyond of God, beyond even the greatest possible proximity to Him—in an illimitable “suspended” analogy (*analogia proportionis secundum convenientiam proportionalitatis*)'.\(^{328}\) To be sure, in at least two places beyond the *Analogia Entis* text, Przywara explicitly states that analogy is precisely this same formulation: In the text *In und Gegen* he states, ‘*Analogia entis* is an abbreviated way of stating what the IV Lateran Council—and thus a Christianity that was still one—defined in 1215’;\(^{329}\) and the essay entitled ‘The Scope of Analogy as a Fundamental Catholic Form’ (‘Reichweite der Analogie als katholische Grundform’) is entirely devoted to expositing the council’s response to Abbot Joachim of Fiore’s doctrine of the Trinity.\(^{330}\)

Joachim’s doctrine of the Trinity resulted in a tritheism\(^{331}\) based upon the fact that the triune persons were not truly united in ‘a true and proper (veram et propriam) unity’ but instead in a kind of ‘collective and by similitude (quasi collectivam et similitudinariam), just as many persons are called one people, and many believers one church’.\(^{332}\) Moreover, the Joachimite formulation, in that it posits the ‘Spirit as goal and end’, amounts to an extension and development of Origenism: ‘since, for Origen, the way of salvation is one of increasing spiritualization—even to the point of an ideal dissolution of the

\(^{327}\) First stated in full in Przywara, *Analogia Entis*, 3:138. The Latin reads, ‘*inter Creatorem et creaturam non potest tanta similitude notary, quin inter eos maior sit dissimilitude notanda*’ (Denziger, 432).

\(^{328}\) Ibid., 3:139.

\(^{329}\) Przywara, *In Und Gegen*, 278.

\(^{330}\) Przywara, “Reichweite der Analogie als Katholischer Grundform”; as reprinted in Przywara, *Analogia Entis*, 3:247–301. Also in this essay, Przywara comments upon the Fourth Lateran Council (directed as it is against Joachim), stating that “analogy” appears not so much as a principle or as the form of a new theological possibility, but rather as the *self-expressions of the position of the church as regards all possible theologies* (ibid, 274, emphasis in original). Przywara footnotes another article by himself here: “Neue Theologie” in *Ringen Der Gegenwart*, vol. 2 (Augsburg: Filser, 1929), 669ff.


\(^{332}\) Denzinger, 431; as cited in Przywara, “Reichweite der Analogie,” in Ibid., 3:251.
visible forms of the New Covenant into "pure spirit." Hegel, as we saw earlier, continues in this same vein, developing a dialectical process of spiritualization that ends in pure identity. Przywara is to the point: 'Analogy is thus posed against identity, which "theopanizes" God and "pantheizes" the creature.' The council, therefore, sided with Peter Lombard’s formulation and thus ultimately Thomas Aquinas represents this position in that they emphasize the ultimate distance between God and creation. That is, 'the mystery of unity with and in the tri-personal God (as the greatest and most profound mystery of the supernatural and of redemption) becomes the site of the most formal manifestation of the distance between God, the creator, and the creature.'

Yet Balthasar also warns against this distance when it is expressed as having its locus defined by the creature and not by God. There is a temptation to locate the dissimilarity in the wrong place: that is, 'by saying that "nature" simply denotes the moment of dissimilarity (that aspect of creation that makes it "not God"), while grace bespeaks the moment of similarity (of participation). But that would be a dangerous oversimplification, and indeed it would lead us right back to Baius. The creature is not dissimilar to God because of its nature as a creature. Rather it is similar to the God who is always ever dissimilar'. Similarly, Balthasar shows that the reason why service must be the primary act of knowing the truth is because it locates the truth outside the subject—recall the priority of the object—in contradistinction to making the subject's own appetite or striving the site of definition; whereas, focusing upon the striving or appetite for truth defines truth not only by what is lacking in the subject, but it thereby places undue emphasis on the subject in

333 Przywara, "Reichweite der Analogie," in ibid., 3:255–8, here at 257. Przywara adds, 'though as of yet without the explicit distinction of the three stages proposed by Joachim' (ibid).
334 Similarly, David Bentley Hart remarks that the tragic 'dualism' haunting Platonism gives rise 'so naturally to the tragic "monism" of Plotinus—for dialectic and identism are finally the same' (Hart, The Beauty Of The Infinite, 246). And, William Desmond also shows how dialectic tends towards univocity in his Being and the Between (Albany, NY: SUNY Press, 1995), 131–75.
335 Przywara, "Reichweite der Analogie," in Analogia Entis, 3:293.
338 Balthasar, The Theology of Karl Barth, 286, emphasis in original.
a way that does not respect truth's true path of discovery in the subject's self-abandonment in freedom to the object, but also the object's freedom to the subject. To exercise a Thomstic diagnosis, in one sense these approaches ultimately confuse the 'logical' and 'real' relations between creatures and God by defining everything from creation's real relation to the creator. Put another way, it is the failure to think analogously, to perform the 'reflexive reversal' in thought toward the God-directed logical order of things. Analogy articulates the formal trajectory of this task in that it is the human person who is capable of serving this true order of analogical participation in the Triune God. It is for this reason that service is the primary path toward knowledge of the truth: worldly truth is revealed within the act of service, shown to us in that God, revealed in Christ, says to us: 'I live among you as one who serves'.

For Przywara, then, the Fourth Lateran Council's formulation puts the ground of the service of truth within the 'ever greater' divine foundation of the tri-personal God, who is 'ever more exalted, beyond everything creaturely, ontic or noetic'. As we saw above, Przywara moves through the positive 'attributive' analogy, to the negative of the 'ever greater', but this also involves a third rhythm analogous to the via eminentia of Dionysius that is a greater positivity of the Deus semper maior. In the following quotation, note that Przywara also shows how this analogical logic makes the reflective reversal in the two orders (creaturely/real/below-to-divine/logical/above). As he puts it:

The illimitable "suspended" analogy (analogia proportionis secundum convenientiam proportionalitatis) establishes a new "attributive" analogy (analogia attributionis), but one that proceeds not, as in the first moment, from below to above, but rather from above to below: from the Deus semper maior, the creature's "realm of service" is "attributed" to it. The "ever greater dissimilarity" (maior dissimilitudo) here has a positive sense: that of the delimitation of a positive realm

339 See Balthasar, Theo-Logic, 2000, 1:257. D. C. Schindler remarks, 'the object knows that it receives the strength to realize its being only from the subject's confidence; if the object has come to be what it is, it owes everything to the subject. The "place" of this realization is the being of the subject as freedom, but it is only because it has put itself wholly at the service of the object, that is, because it is objective. Thus, this act of knowledge is creative because it is objective, and it is creative because it is creative' (Schindler, Hans Urs Von Balthasar and the Dramatic Structure of Truth, 214).
341 Przywara, Analogia Entis, 3:139.
into which the creature is "sent forth" for the "performing of a service."\textsuperscript{342}

The performative aspect of the service highlights the secondary causality (\textit{viz.}, active, positive potentiality) of the creature as it analogically participates in the same activity of the God who is above-and-beyond: "the mysticism of rapture is humbled by the distance between Lord and servant."\textsuperscript{343} It is for this reason that, as an exemplar of scholastic ecclesial theology, Thomas Aquinas is held to be "the most adequate theologian of this theology of analogy."\textsuperscript{344} In his writings, "the order of the positive difference between God and creature is preserved—the difference, namely, between God's complete sovereignty and the creature's active "exercises"."\textsuperscript{345} Formulated in Thomas' thought from the development of the Fourth Lateran Council's insights is the vision "that God's surpassing greatness is manifest precisely in that he establishes the creature's independence from himself—endowing the creature with its own proper being, its own proper agency, and its own proper providence."\textsuperscript{346} The human person adequates him- or herself in being towards the God who is in-and-beyond creation in an adequation proper to their agency as service: a posture of ontological genuflection which also bears the patience of overcoming the impatiently tragic by participating in the patience of God, that is, the one whose incarnate form arrives in the "form of a slave."\textsuperscript{347}

If it has not already become apparent, Przywara's \textit{Analogia Entis} is as much an "analogy of being" as it is an "analogy of the person", the latter specifically located in the person of Christ incarnate, crucified, risen, and ascended at the right hand of the Father. Despite the debates that arose around this text, Przywara himself always made this fairly explicit, in the original text

\textsuperscript{342} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{343} Ibid., 3:139–40.
\textsuperscript{344} Przywara, "Reichweite der Analogie," in ibid., 3:296.
\textsuperscript{345} Przywara, "Reichweite der Analogie," in ibid., 3:297.
\textsuperscript{346} Przywara, "Reichweite der Analogie" in ibid.; Przywara cites in this regard \textit{De Ver.}, q. 9, a. 2; q. 11, a. 1.
\textsuperscript{347} Philippians 2:7-10. This is the conclusion of Przywara's essay "Philosophies of Essence and Existence," which shows how the philosophies of essence and existence (both ancient and Modern) are based in an impatience which demand either immediate identity or tragic disintegration. See "Essenz- und Existenzphilosophie" in Przywara, \textit{Analogia Entis}, 3:245–6.
itself, but even more so in his later writings. David Bentley Hart, himself indebted to Przywara, rightly says, 'It is Christ, the Logos and measure of all things, who calls analogy forth, who shows... the bounty of creation in [its] truest light'. In Przywara’s *Analogia Entis* text, he sets up this measure first by looking at the order of creation in its real relation to God and finds that it is the human person who is the ‘immanent middle’ between the purely material and the purely spiritual; however, as a ‘border as transition’ seen from above and below it ultimately finds its form in pure spirit which, although it is a ‘connecting middle’, is still within the universe as such. This is because it is still confined to the opposite pole of pure corporeality and thus pure spirit is still mutable, whereas with God there remains an infinite distance: *Deus in infinitum distat ab Angelo*, ‘God is infinitely distant from the angel’. Przywara states, ‘Thus it is God who is the “middle”: as the one in whom alone all multiplicity and all correlated antitheses are one’.

For Przywara, on the one hand, all forms of the ‘middle’ within the creaturely are replete with God as the middle in God’s own descending revelation. And this applies even and especially in the case of the human person. ‘On the other hand, however, all of these revelations of God as middle fall short of the personal revelation of God as middle in “the mediator.” Christ appears as the reality of the way in which God-the-middle takes up the All: as the “infinity that assumes” (*infinita virtus assumentis* [the infinite virtue of the one assuming]) he is the unifying head of everything from the invisible to the visible, not only of all persons of every age, but also of pure spirits’. In this sense, however much the human person may share in this likeness, God is ‘formally beyond all creaturely forms of a middle’ in that ‘the form of its

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349 Hart, *The Beauty Of The Infinite*, 317. On the very next page Hart connects the analogy of beauty in Christ to the arrival in the form of a servant.


351 Ibid., 3:196; citing ST, I, q. 56, a. 3 ad 2.


353 Ibid., 3:198, emphasis Przywara’s. He cites here the following four texts from Thomas Aquinas: *A Disputed Question: Concerning the Union of the Word Incarnate*, trans. Jason Lewis Andrew West, n.d., a. 2 ad 15, http://www4.desales.edu/~philtheo/loughlin/ATP/index.html; ST, III, q. 8, a. 6; a. 3; a. 4.

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uniqueness is the uniqueness of God himself: the “All in one” of the mediator figuring as the immediate visibility of the oneness of God’. The mystery of the unique incarnation reaches its apogee in the question about Christ’s being: ‘for, on the one hand, the one divine Person, as one substance, also stipulates the one divine esse of Christ (unum esse simpliciter propter unum esse aeternum suppositi)’, but, on the other hand, the reality of Christ’s humanity at the same time includes the being of his humanity as an esse secundarium, though not accidentale, in the mode of a nova habitudo esse personalis praeexistentis ad naturam humanam. Przywara states that analogy in Thomas culminates in the analogia entis such that ‘the entis signifies so great a separation between God and creature that there is no common genus whatsoever between them...—but even so, it is precisely here that, at the root, a radically positive unity is declared’. This is because for Thomas the matter of the ‘perfecting border’ (confinium as perfectio) intends in every case a ‘going beyond’: ‘from man as middle to spirit as middle to God as middle. But it is precisely this that makes it the phenomenon of “perfection,” since the “middle of creation” is constituted by God in the God-man, and this not merely as a human middle, but rather (in the “scandal of the cross”) a human middle within the all-too-human, and as such—in this way—a middle that brings all things to perfection’.

It is here in the focus upon the perfection found in the scandal on the cross that Kenneth Oakes has shown that Przywara’s ‘theology is wholly a theologia crucis’. Earlier, in response to Yannaras, it was shown the Fourth Lateran Council’s statement in response to Joachim de Fiore was wholly and explicitly

354 Przywara, Analogia Entis, 3:198.
355 De Unione, a. 4. Trans by Betz and Hart: ‘one simple being on account of the one eternal being of the supposition’.
356 Ibid. For an account of the esse or ‘is’/‘to be’ of Christ, see the following two excellent works: Thomas G. Weinandy, OFM, Cap, “Aquinas: God IS Man: The Marvel of the Incarnation,” in Aquinas on Doctrine: A Critical Introduction, ed. Thomas G. Weinandy, OFM, Cap, Daniel A. Keating, and John Yocum (London and New York: T & T Clark, 2004), 67–90; and the forthcoming Riches, Christ, the End of Humanism, chap. 3.
357 Przywara, Analogia Entis, 3:201, emphasis Przywara’s. The final Latin citation is from ST, III, q. 17, a. 12. Betz and Hart translate it: ‘a new relation of the pre-existent personal being to human nature’.
358 Przywara, Analogia Entis, 3:201, emphasis Przywara’s. Przywara cites ST, I, q. 4, a. 3.
359 Przywara, Analogia Entis, 3:201–2.
both a point about the *being* of God with respect to creatures precisely as it was about the ever greater distance between creatures and the three *persons* of God who is one. Likewise, Oakes points out that Przywara’s indebtedness to the Council’s formulation consists of upholding ‘decisions that have their primary location in the doctrine of the one God, who is Father, Son, and Holy Spirit, who is “unity” and “perfection” “by nature.” Przywara’s *analogia entis* is thus mindful of the particularity of this God who is Father, Son, and Holy Spirit from all eternity’.

While the Christological center was the final, perfecting end of Przywara’s *Analogia Entis*, Oakes shows that especially in his much neglected later works, Przywara’s theology is even more focused upon the crucified Christ.

Following the afterword to Przywara’s late work *Alter und Neuer Bund*, Oakes points to comments made about the difference between the *analogia entis* and the *analogia fidei* which highlight the specificity of Christ crucified. In order to proceed, it will first be helpful to quickly differentiate Przywara’s *analogia fidei* from that of Barth’s. For ‘Przywara intends by the term *analogia fidei* the far more traditional sense of the practice or art of reading Scripture in light of Scripture, a practice first given its postapostolic expression in the works of Origen and encouraged by the First Vatican Council’.

This is in contrast to what Przywara dubs ‘the now fashionable pseudo-*analogia fidei*’ which ‘Barth and, following him, Haecker, Söhngen, together with their disciples, erroneously call an “analogical knowing in faith” an “*analogia fidei*.”’

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561 Ibid., 155.
562 Ibid., 160.
563 Przywara, *Alter und Neuer Bund*, 11; cited and trans. in Oakes, “The Cross and the *Analogia Entis* in Erich Przywara,” 160. In what follows, all translations from *Alter und Neuer Bund* are Oakes’. At the end of his ‘The Scope of Analogy as a Fundamental Catholic Form’ essay, Przywara makes an additional clarification against Barth and Söhngen’s attempt to make theology autonomous: ‘Thus the attempts of Barth and Söhngen to pose an “*analogia fidei*” over against an “*analogia entis*”—or, as the case may be, to supplement the latter with the former—contain their own riposte. By the phrase “*analogia fidei*,” which is taken from Rom. 12:6, what is meant—in the context of this verse and in connection with 1 Cor. 12—is the most authoritative regulation of the personal *charisma* of “prophecy” by the “analogy of faith,” as it is worked out in the unity of the *one* body through the “measure of faith” that “God has given” (12:3): “if a man’s gift is prophecy, then let him use it according to the measure (analogy) of faith.” This “analogy” is thus something objectively authoritative that is given by God, standing above the subjective religious experience of “prophecy”: and thus it clearly points towards the “ecclesial theology of analogy,” as we developed it above. It is thus
The reading of Scripture for Przywara comes through the interpretation of the *analogia fidei* between the Old and New Testaments. Specifically, Przywara focuses upon Galatians 3:13-14 which says, ‘Christ redeemed us from the curse of the law by becoming a curse for us—for it is written, “Cursed is everyone who hangs on a tree”—in order that in Christ Jesus the blessing of Abraham might come to the Gentiles, so that we might receive the promise of the Spirit through faith’. Przywara describes the interplay between the two curses between the two testaments as an ‘energetic correspondence’: a dynamic that, as it ‘affects both Jew and Gentile, has only one name and one place: “the cross is the exclusive and sole place and execution of the ‘energetic’ from the old to the new covenant. Within it alone are the deadly oppositions between promise and law overcome, the curse of the law carried and borne away in and by and through Jesus Christ.”’

The two covenants, as Przywara remarks, are ‘nailed together’ by ‘the nails of the cross’, forming a unity which is the glory of the Lord God. Oakes pinpoints the crucial center of Przywara’s theology: ‘Inasmuch as Przywara understands the *analogia fidei* to be the practice of reading the Old and New Testament together, we can state that it is Jesus Christ crucified who is at the very center of the analogy of faith’.

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not an “actual *analogia fidei*” found within the event of actual “proclamation,” as Barth conceives the “*analogia fidei*”: for such “actuality” is precisely the actuality of “prophecy,” which is to be measured according to an objectively enduring “analogy of faith.” Nor does it suffice to articulate an “objective *analogia fidei,*” understood as the whole harmonious complex of the particular truths of the faith, as Söhngen would have it: for what is ultimate in the living “body” is the living “authority” of the head, the “mystery,” that is, “of the (authoritative, positiving) will,” which according to the letter to the Ephesians is the final form of the church. Thus only one “authoritative *analogia fidei*” remains, i.e., the form of “ecclesiological Christological theological authority,” as we unfolded it above. –Viewed from the perspective of the Fourth Lateran Council, however, the “*analogia entis*” is regarded solely and exclusively as the “final form” of the unity of supernature and nature itself. –Which goes to say that there is no duality between an “*analogia entis*” and an “*analogia fidei,*” but rather that one and the same “*analogia entis,*” directed in its double form both “above” and “below,” is in the response of the fourth Lateran Council the “metaphysical structure” of one and the same “authoritative *analogia fidei*” (Przywara, “Reichweite der Analogie,” in *Analogia Entis*, 3:298n.1).

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analogia fidei: 'The scandal of the cross and of God is the essence of the analogia fidei between the old and the new covenant'.

The scandal of the cross as the locus of the analogia fidei opens up the rhythm of the analogia entis, for as Oakes states with regard to the analogia entis, it 'is not the final word concerning God and creation, for it too is contained within a yet greater rhythm: that of the triune life in itself'. The formal rhythm of the analogia entis reaches its culmination in the Fourth Lateran Council formula: 'that in the yet-so-great of the similarity of the “Trinity in us” (of the “that they may be one like us and in us” from John 17) there arises the supra-transcendence of the ever greater of the dissimilarity of the “Trinity in itself” (to the every yet-so-great of every unity in the Trinity)'. What is described here is the rhythm of an ‘analogia fidei in-over the analogia entis’, in that ‘the analogia fidei resides “in” the rhythm of the analogia entis, for even here Creator remains Creator and creature remains creature, and yet the analogia fidei remains “over” and in no way reducible to whatever we may wish to say regarding Creator and creature through the analogia entis’. Furthermore, Przywara expands upon this rhythm in the exchanges of the ‘commercium’ between law and promise, slavery and freedom. The center for these exchanges is Christ on the cross, the place where the sins and curse of the world are taken up and 'might participate and share in the divine holiness, blessedness, freedom, goodness, righteousness, wisdom, love—in the fullness of majesty'. All the relationships between God and the world come together and are recapitulated in Christ. As Oakes

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371 The crucial work here is Przywara, Logos, Abendland, Reich, Commercium. Again, I am following the helpful work of Ken Oakes. See Oakes, “The Cross and the Analogia Entis in Erich Przywara,” 165–9.
says, ‘The commercium is, then, the name for the relationship between and the history of Creator and creation, and as such it only has one true and proper name: Jesus Christ.’ To this end, Oakes remarks that it is unfair for Balthasar to say that ‘it is no accident that Przywsara never produced a Christology’. Oakes concludes his remarks on Przywara, noting that Jesus Christ crucified stands at the center of the analogia entis, the analogia fidei, and the commercium.

The analogia entis, the ever greater dissimilarity between Creator and creation, is uniquely revealed in the person of Christ crucified on the cross, for this is the ever greater dissimilarity of God to creation: that God was made man, the Creator made creation, without thereby ceasing to be God and without creation ceasing to be creation, that the infinite source and fountain of life and perfection was made a life, and was cursed and crucified by the very creation he made, taking upon himself and bearing away the sins of those that sinned against him. O admirabile commercium.

Hans Urs von Balthasar, despite his remarks quoted above, does affirm Przywara’s work as Christological, and affirms the philosophical and theological rhythms summed up in the analogia entis in light of revelation. He says, ‘In his major work, Deus semper maior, Przywara relentlessly reduces all aspects to a single focal point: God in the crucified Christ in the crucified Church. He draws every direct statement about the relationship between God and man into his dialectic of intersecting cross-beams, where the “crossing” of a positive statement by a negative one imitates the true Cross (and as such is the only form of negative theology).’ Rearticulating the logic of the Fourth Lateran Council by focusing upon the person of Christ in the proportion opened up by the Trinity in-and-beyond us, he offers the following summation of this analogy:

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376 Ibid., 168.
we must begin with a primary attributio [attribution] of all things to the Logos, who, being the ground and end of the creation, himself exemplifies prototypically the right proportio [proportion] between God and the creature and, through the Spirit, communicates it to creation. Yet this proportion transcends every human concept. Consequently, despite all appropriation (attributio) to Christ and all graced “participation in the divine nature”, it remains a proportionalitas, a “proportional relation between proportional relations”, that is, between the relation of difference between God and creature and the relation of difference between Father, Son, and Spirit.378

We see here not the ‘analogy of proportionality’ spoken about above where the schematic shows that creatures relate to their own esse as God relates to God’s own esse—a formulation which, as we have been arguing, subsumes God under a third concept and ultimately ends in agnosticism; on the contrary, because Christ himself is this distance, he does not exposit God’s ‘being’ or esse in relation to that of God’s essence, nor does Christ exposit his own humanity (however much we affirm in faith that Christ is both fully divine and fully human), but instead, Christ the Son exposit the Father in the Holy Spirit.379 We can know—primarily through first being known—this proportionality in the very person of Christ who spans the infinite distance, revealed in history as the concrete universal.380 The truth of the world is held together in the second person of the Trinity (Col 1:17), ‘which in turn presupposes that the analogia entis is personified in him, that he is the adequate sign, surrender, and expression of God within finite being’.381

To conclude, in this chapter I have outlined the logic of analogy in Thomas Aquinas as one that is both one of an analogia entis just as much as it is coextensively an analogia personae. Then, taking the example of Christos Yannaras’ critique of what he sees as ‘Western’ analogy, by way of a response to his polemics I have offered an account not too unlike his own, one of an ‘existential’ analogy which finds its footing in the pure act of the God who is ipsum esse subsistens, not an ‘essentialist’ understanding, but when analogy is understood as an act of personal judgment, we affirm a tri-personal God in

379 Ibid., II:312.
whom we ontologically participate. Lastly, turning to the work of Przywara, I have sketched the movement of his *Analogy of Entis*, a text that is a welcome updating of the rhythms of the formulae of Thomas Aquinas and the Fourth Lateran Council’s statements against Abbot Joachim regarding the ‘ever greater’ distance between creation and Creator. What I have hoped to accomplish in this chapter is that, at every turn, the ‘analogy of being’, as it is always already an ‘analogy of persons’ of the tri-personal-yet-one God, is seen most clearly as it comes together primarily and truly in the person of Jesus Christ. Christ is not only the prime analogate of all creation, but it is in him where all creation is held, maintained, and redeemed. The revelation of God in Christ by the Spirit is not the ‘end of analogy’ according to some,\(^\text{382}\) but is analogy’s ‘end’ only insofar as it finds its *telos* in the person of Christ who *is* the analogy of being personified. Without Christ there can be no analogy, for as John Betz says, the *analogy entis* is ultimately grounded ‘in the hypostatic union of Christ, *in whom* the creature discovers the entire breadth of the analogical interval’.\(^\text{383}\)

Along the way in these chapters, a concomitant thread that has been spun is the encounter of being as supremely personal, contra the work of Emmanuel Levinas. As I have shown, his own philosophy misunderstands the adequation of the truth of being as one that is always violently in favour of the subject. On the contrary, in elaborating upon the depth and breadth of the Christological focus of the analogical interval, the very form of Christ is one where adequation, both philosophically and theologically, is not that of egoism, but that of *service*. The contours of analogy have not a shape of ‘accusation in the accusative’ but of a gift of the person of Christ as he reveals the gift of creation in its most personal depths in himself by the Spirit as they reveal the Father. What we previously saw as the accusative dimension is here shown to be the trajectories of creation itself, the philosophical *resolutio* of being until it is enacted, by personal judgment, into the theological affirmation of arriving at the arrival of the person as revealed in the person of the Logos. There is no

\(^{382}\) See the interesting, but misguided essay: Bruce D. Marshall, “Christ the End of Analogy,” in *The Analogy of Being: Invention of the Antichrist or the Wisdom of God?*, ed. Thomas Joseph White (Grand Rapids, MI: William B. Eerdmans Publishing Company, 2011), 280–313. There is not the space or the scope to go into the issues with this article here.

\(^{383}\) Betz, “Beyond the Sublime (pt. 2),” 20, emphasis in original.
accusative without the prior dative of giving; that is, there is no creation without the Creator who gifts it. The slander we experience as accusation is no longer a reality that we need obsess over, even if it would want us to think that it obsesses over us. On the contrary, the person of Christ is the one in whom that slander, that curse, is exchanged in the scandal of the cross for our very redemption. Analogy is the opening of the personal communication of the tri-personal God in whom we live, move, and have our being. Without Christ, there is only tragic equivocity and equally tragic univocity where impatience reigns—yet with Christ’s patient servitude to the Father in the Spirit, this tragedy has no power over us. Analogy is that ever-greater rhythm to that ever-greater loving, personal reality.
CHAPTER 6
THE DIALOGICAL PERSON: THE ANALOGICAL POSSIBILITY OF COMMUNION

Am I really all the things that are outside of me?
Would I complete myself without the things I like around?
Does the music that I make play on my awkward face?
Do you appreciate the subtleties of taste, bud?

— ‘Taste’, by Animal Collective

The cosmos is a kind of dialogue.

— Anonymous commentator on Plato

As you, Father, are in me and I am in you, may they also be in us, so that the world may believe that you have sent me. The glory that you have given me I have given them, so that they may be one, as we are one, I in them and you in me, that they may become completely one, so that the world may know that you have sent me and have loved them even as you have loved me.

— John 17:21-3

a. Introduction: Dialogical Beginnings, and What Dialogue is Not

In the previous two chapters, it was established that the person is primarily understood as an analogical reality. That is, the human person exists and is therefore to be understood as that existent reality which participates proportionately (i.e. analogically) first and foremost in the person of Christ who, for however great there may be a similarity to Christ (the directionality is important here), there is always an ever greater dissimilarity between the two. Moreover, human persons reflect this analogical similarity in and through

personal service which itself is ‘derived’ analogically from Christ who comes in the form of a servant. Analogy helps us to understand that there is a proper ordering here, both an ordering towards and upward anagogically to the person of Christ who reveals the truth of their very person to him- or herself. Because persons are analogically-understood and spoken of, ‘person’ can also apply just as fittingly to angelic persons as to human persons, but most appropriately spoken of with regard to the three divine persons in one God from whom all reality owes its creation.

In this final chapter, I attempt to offer a further exercise in extending the analogical discourse by focusing on the person as dialogical. The word itself has a variety of meanings, and I will show that reducing it to the mere encounter of two people speaking (which would in fact be more properly described as a ‘duologue’) is not sufficient for beholding the resplendent dialogical reality that persons themselves are. A ‘duological’ reduction is ultimately an unmediated and univocal—that is monological—encounter that either ends in a deadlock or dialectical sublation (in either case the end is univocal). Hegel’s own logic of contradiction works in a similar fashion: because contradiction and division are the heart of Geist empowering all forward movement, everything is split with itself and hence ‘reconciliation’ is offered not as polarity and paradox (as in Goethe and Kierkegaard, respectively), but as the sublating (i.e. suspending and cancelling) ‘third’ which prioritizes identity (e.g., the identity of identity and difference).

The order of the chapter will be as follows. First, I will look to the originator of the dialogical form: Plato, as the writer of Socrates, that philosopher who engaged dialogically with his interlocutors in the pursuit of truth. Secondly, as an expansion of the dialogical practice I will look at the perplexing place of ‘aporia’ in the Socratic dialogues. That is, what is the reason that so many of the Socratic dialogues end in a perplexing impasse? Connected to this, I will look briefly at Heidegger’s and Derrida’s account of aporia wherein being’s aporia is revealed within one’s own death (the impossibility of the possible). In response to their accounts, I look back to Kierkegaard’s account of death in his Upbuilding Discourse entitled ‘At a Graveside’. Thirdly, after this dialogical prolegomena, I will analogically re-
enact the metaphysical ‘reflexive reversal’ through the dialogical motif of ‘the call and the response’, articulated well in a book by the same name by Jean-Louis Chrétien.\(^3\) This will set up the discussion in the same way that the metaphysical via resolutionis tilled the soil for the analogical judgment affirming the arrival of the person. The fourth section is itself an attempt at a ‘reflexive reversal’—that moment between the call and the response where one’s understanding deepens, in faith, toward what is more ultimate. Here Christos Yannaras’ understanding of dialogue as dia-logos becomes explicit both as an encounter with Creation, but also its Creator. The fifth and final part of the chapter deals with the ‘response’ of the person—but once again, this is not merely the response of words as if two people are having a conversation (although it includes that as well, but secondarily); rather, human persons are themselves the response within creation as ‘what is most perfect within all nature’.\(^4\) Weaved throughout this final section is the work of Mikhail Bakhtin, who I argue compliments the discussion towards a richer understanding of dialogue. Exploring the dialogical response of the person entails, firstly, the recognition that our own response has arrived late, but, thankfully, it has been preceded by the response of Christ which makes our own answerability possible. Next, I attend to the limits of dialogical understanding, for there remains a monological temptation to make human dialogue univocally constitutive of divine dialogue. Hans Urs von Balthasar proves helpful in this regard, pointing us to the analogy of ‘fruitfulness’ and the emergence, through the I—thou relationship, of a dialogical we relationship. Finally, I look to the work of Karol Wojtyła / Pope John Paul II in an effort to articulate the shape of this we in the communio personarum, a place where persons engage in participatory dialogue with one another toward the greater good.

What these various resources provide is an understanding of human persons as dialogical. Before getting into the rest of the chapter, however, a brief note about what this claim does not mean, in a series of repudiations of what being dialogical does not ‘merely’ mean. First, as a descriptive measure,


\(^4\) Aquinas, *ST*, I, q. 29, a. 3.
to be a dialogical person does not *merely* mean that humans exist in conversation with one another as the constitutive act of their being—although it does *also* mean that this act is crucial and inescapable to a large extent (*viz.*, necessary but not sufficient). Too much an emphasis upon being ‘dialogically constituted’, when taken in the sense of being constituted ‘relationally’ may tip the scales too far toward a conception that overlooks the substance of the person him- or herself, that is, their human dignity.\(^5\) Once again it does well to heed Lewis Ayres’ challenge to provide an account of analogy—which emphasizes the person as a substance-in-relation who participates in the reality of the *Logos*—before leaping head-first into talk of ‘relationality’.\(^6\) Second, as a prescriptive warning, to be dialogical does not entail that one need *merely* to engage in dialogical, many-voiced encounters. Such situations alone will not solve the human person’s dialogical yearnings; in other words, sitting around with friends within a plurivocal discussion does *not* reveal the true nature of dialogue, nor exhaust its richness, even though this is very much also a form of necessary dialogue that remains, however, insufficient in and of itself. And, as word of caution: I am *not* saying that dialogue must end—how could it?—nor am I arguing for a view which would dictate the course of human life (which would be a kind of patriarchal monologism). My aim is to simply bear witness toward the way.

Lastly, in these introductory remarks I also want to distance myself from accounts of speech which aim to remove the dialogical principle altogether. Specifically, I have in mind thinkers such as Jean-François Lyotard, who reduces conversation and speech acts to ‘the domain of the *agon* (the joust) rather than that of communication’.\(^7\) Against the Habermasian notion of

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5 As Hans Reinders shows, such an over-emphasis on relations also misses that one’s human dignity must come first, for the kinds of relations we intend usually assumes a certain kind of capability of response, and would thus exclude people with profound intellectual disabilities. Instead, Reinders offers an account of the inherent relationality of the person of Christ ‘toward’ human persons in a single act of love and friendship, regardless of their physical or rational capabilities. See Hans S. Reinders, *Receiving the Gift of Friendship: Profound Disability, Theological Anthropology and Ethics* (Grand Rapids, MI: William B. Eerdmans Publishing Company, 2008), 286–7.

6 Ayres, “(Mis)Adventures in Trinitarian Ontology,” 130–45 at 133.

7 Jean-François Lyotard, *The Postmodern Condition: A Report on Knowledge*, trans. Geoff Bennington and Brian Massumi, *Theory and History of Literature* 10 (Minneapolis, MN: University of Minnesota Press, 1984), 88.n34. John Milbank remarks that, along with Gilles Deleuze, Lyotard has also ‘advocated an embracing of the “neo-capitalist” *agon* in all its
'consensus', Lyotard asserts that every language game (following Wittgenstein) really amounts to a situation where 'every utterance should be thought of as a “move” in a game'. As he summarizes it: 'to speak is to fight, in the sense of playing, and speech acts fall within the domain of a general agonistics'. However, as John Milbank points out, Lyotard's approach suffers from a fatal flaw: '[Lyotard] cannot pass off [the claim that an infinite diversity of language-games must be primary] as liberal pluralism, because nothing, in his philosophy, in principle renders illegitimate the infinite expansion of one language-game at the expense of others, nor the capture and manipulation of many language-games by a single power'. Even more damningly, Lyotard 'fails to come up with any convincing reasons as to why the ontology of difference is detachable from fascism, or a politics of the mythical celebration of power'. In the last analysis, the 'differend', as an inherently violent principle, has no other foundation than its own heteronomous logic itself, and in this sense it is less than coincidental that it shares in a similar kind of agon to Levinas' own violent neurotic obsession made by the other. If every speech act is a violent 'joust', what is stopping a speech act from being accusatory and filled with slander? Wouldn't such an act be just another 'move' within somebody's (or the Nation State's) language game? With regard to the discussion of Alfred Dreyfus in Chapter 2 above, I ask: on Lyotard's terms, was his fault that he was merely 'playing' the wrong 'game'? One can quickly see that there is no way to adjudicate what would be

9 In a parenthetical comment, Lyotard states ‘language games, of course, are what this is all about’ (Lyotard, The Postmodern Condition, 15). For Wittgenstein's comments on 'language games' (Sprachspiele), see Wittgenstein, Philosophical Investigations, 14–15 (§23).
10 Lyotard, The Postmodern Condition, 10.
11 Ibid.
12 Milbank, Theology and Social Theory, 317.
‘wrong’ here in the first place, if ontologically the ‘differends’ between these discourses really cannot make a decision except to be merely different.14

In line with Lyotard’s approach, we also see Jacques Rancière taking up this agonistic mantle in his collection of essays entitled Dissensus, which similarly argues against the idea of consensus.15 For Rancière, ‘The aim of consensual practice is to produce an identity between law and fact, such that the former becomes identical with the natural life of society. In other words, consensus consists in the reduction of democracy to the way of life or ethos of a society—the dwelling and lifestyle of a specific group. Consensus is the process underlying today’s continual shrinkage of political space. The latter only ever emerges in the very gap between the abstract literalness of the rights and the polemic over their verification’.16 More to the point, contrary to the fact that the word ‘consensus’ is supposed to extol the ‘virtues of discussion and consultation’, in reality it means precisely its opposite for Rancière: ‘consensus means that the givens and solutions of problems simply require people to find that they leave no room for discussion, and that governments can foresee this finding which, being obvious, no longer even needs doing’.17 Dissensus, on the other hand,

is the demonstration (manifestation) of a gap in the sensible itself. Political demonstration makes visible that which had no reason to be seen; it places one world in another—for instance, the world where the factory is a public space in that where it is considered private, the world where workers speak, and speak about the community, in that where their voices are mere cries expressing pain....Political argumentation is at one and the same time the demonstration of a possible world in which the argument could count as an argument, one that is addressed by a subject qualified to argue, over an identified object, to an addressee who is required to see the object and to hear the argument that he ‘normally’ has no reason either to see or to hear. It is

14 To this end, there continues to be a lineage of radical heterogeneous accounts to the words of Saussure: ‘Everything that has been said up to this point boils down to this: in language there are only differences. Even more important: a difference generally implies positive terms between which the difference is set up; but in language there are only differences without positive terms’. Ferdinand de Saussure, Course in General Linguistics, trans. Wade Baskin (London: Fontana, 1974), I20, emphasis in original.


16 From the essay ‘Who is the Subject of the Rights of Man?’ in Ibid., 72, emphasis in original.

the construction of a paradoxical world that puts together two separate worlds.\textsuperscript{18}

Both accounts presume that the space of discourse is one of \textit{agon}, so even in the case of Rancière’s account of dissensus, persuasion toward a good end does not seem to be a part of the picture, which is why he must resort merely to ‘demonstration’. In a real sense, Rancière’s approach has its merits (and is clearly preferable to the pure agonistics of Lyotard’s account). His task is to provide a constant study of the ‘dividing line’ that separates communities and allegiances\textsuperscript{19}—it is this space in-between where dissensus happens. Davide Panagia sums up Rancière’s emphasis on the ‘partition’ or ‘distribution of the sensible’ (\textit{partage du sensible}) as ‘the site of political contestation directed at the subjugating criteria that impart propriety, property and perception and that structure a society’s common order’.\textsuperscript{20} At the very least, the voices of the marginalized, the worker, and especially the poor are brought to the foreground of discussion—especially because those of privilege would prefer that the poor would remain invisible as they are seen to hurt Twenty-first Century tourist economies.\textsuperscript{21}

Yet even for Rancière, as for Lyotard’s ‘jousting’ speech act, the ultimate concern of politics is based purely upon the notion of a \textit{heterology}, which is the purely formal opening to the Other.\textsuperscript{22} To be sure, Rancière clarifies his position and says, ‘There is not one infinite openness to otherness, but instead many ways of inscribing the part of the other’.\textsuperscript{23} But doesn’t this amount to simply moving back the goalposts one notch so that the Other is still inscribed within the \textit{agon} of each language game’s heteronomous constitution? Are we not back to a \textit{mere} heteronomy? Despite the attempt to place himself between

\textsuperscript{18} From the essay ‘Ten Theses on Politics’ in Rancière, \textit{Dissensus}, 38–9.
\textsuperscript{22} See “Does Democracy Mean Something?” in Rancière, \textit{Dissensus}, 59.
\textsuperscript{23} Ibid., 60, emphasis in original.
Levinas and Derrida, Rancière’s logic of heteronomy lacks any account of just who these ‘others’ are, not in the sense of naming them as ‘poor’ or ‘workers’, but with regard to providing an ontological gesture of just who these people are as persons in themselves. He appears to mirror Levinas’ flight from the nominative into the accusative, assuming that any such account amounts to denying ‘the law of heteronomy’ that is synonymous with the pernicious dreams of Enlightenment liberation which caused the Nazi genocide. It is true that totalitarian logics will always tend towards such horrors, but it remains absolutely unconvincing that every account of the whole or of its persons need be so grim, especially considering the fact that there is often a tendency (e.g. in Levinas) to react against autonomy with a ‘dominating heteronomy’. Dialogue need not be Hegelian-inspired consensus as in Habermas, nor need it be reduced to a kind of non-dialogue of ‘demonstration’ (as in Rancière) or strategically violent language-game posturing (as in Lyotard). To reduce speech and dialogue to what seems to be the polar dualism of ‘agreement’ versus ‘disagreement’ says nothing inherently about the dignity, freedom, and incommunicability of the human person, although one side or the other will stress one or more of these capacities at the expense of the others. To take an example: the heterological approach clearly reduces humans to an incommunicable level, and one is wondering in the end just how free or dignified such a person could be if one is left so bereft of any kind of ability to analogically relate to another person. In fact, what happens is that the person is ironically evacuated to make room for the person, as we showed above in Chapter 3 in the discussion of Levinas and the accusative. In addition, not only is there no recognizable person, but these deconstructive accounts and practices of dissensus amount to a form of ‘dialectic unaccompanied by the insight that there is a Whole—hence the great emphasis placed by the critics of reason on fragmentation, partiality,

24 Rancière does this by clarifying that his proposed form of democratic practice is conceptualized ‘as the inscription of the part of those who have no part—which does not mean the “excluded” but anybody whoever’ (Ibid.).
25 Ibid., 59–60.
27 Similarly, John Crosby makes the connection in Levinas to an emphasis on incommunicability. See his essay ‘A Neglected Source of the Dignity of Human Persons’ in Personalist Papers, 14.
dissolution, difference, otherness, nonbeing. It is Socratism without the Good.  

In sum, the accounts based on a primary ‘heterology’ rely upon an underlying logic which cannot ultimately account for both the dignity of the person and their incommunicability because it relies on the mere fact of the difference of the other. It is not the job of ‘personalism’, according to Emmanuel Mounier, to replace the reduction of accounting for persons ‘according to type’ by instead taking ‘their shades of difference into account’.  

For the merely different can easily be accommodated and re-conditioned by armies of doctors and psychologies into a grand, well-oiled machine as in Aldous Huxley’s Brave New World. In such a machine, ‘everything in it is contrived, nothing is created and no one engages in the adventure of responsible liberty’. Such an alienating world is the complete antithesis of a personal cosmos.

It is the claim of this chapter, therefore, that human persons are such that they exist through dialogue both in themselves, with others, but more primarily in and through (dia) the Word (Logos) of Christ. This is what a true dialogue (dia-logos) amounts to: the affirmation of the goodness of creation that is held together in the second person of the Trinity. But how does such an account of ‘dialogue’ arise in regard to the person? Joseph Ratzinger remarks that the concept of the person itself ‘grew out of the idea of dialogue, more specifically, it grew as an explanation of the phenomenon of the God who speaks dialogically’. The Triune God is the God who ‘speaks in the plural or speaks with himself (e.g., “Let us make man in our image and likeness,” or

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30 Ibid.

31 This idea of dialogue as dia-logos comes from Christos Yannaras, which will be covered below.

God's statement in Genesis 3, "Adam has become like one of us," or Psalm 110, "The Lord said to my Lord" which the Greek Fathers take to be a conversation between God and his Son). Ratzinger summarizes: 'The idea of person expresses in its origin the idea of dialogue and the idea of God as the dialogical being. It refers to God as the being that lives in the word and consists of the word as "I" and "you" and "we." In the light of this knowledge of God, the true nature of humanity became clear in a new way'. Existing in and through the Word, therefore, provides the analogically real basis for the human person as dialogue.

b. The Living Form of Dialogue

In this section I will look to the Socratic form of dialogue as handed down to us by Plato. In the form of dialogue as embodied in the person of Socrates—as well as the written dialogue itself—we see the beginnings of a vital form of existence which ecstatically points to a deeper rhythm within creation. This section will thus proceed first, by offering an answer to the question, 'Why did Plato write dialogues?' and secondly and more substantively, by looking at the nature of the Socratic dialogue itself.

Plato's venture into the art of writing dialogues is not without its ambiguities, for he himself tells us in his Letters a couple of things that make answering the question 'Why did Plato write dialogues?' less straight-forward than it seems. Namely, in the Seventh Letter, Plato says in response to whether he has ever written down his philosophy, that 'I certainly have composed no work in regard to it, nor shall I ever do so in [the] future, for there is no way of putting it in words like other studies'. Moreover, language itself bears within it a kind of inadequacy, such that 'no intelligent man will ever be so bold as to put into language those things which his reason has contemplated, especially not into a form that is unalterable—which must be the case with what is

33 Ratzinger, "Concerning the Notion of Person in Theology," 441.
34 Ibid., 443.
35 Seventh Letter 341c.
expressed in written symbols'. And finally, Plato sums up these remarks with the statement that the mark of a 'serious man' is one who does not put his (or her) most serious concerns into writing but into activity. The example that Plato follows is in the communication of a circle, and all four of the means of communication are deemed inadequate: naming (onoma), explanation (logos), example (eidolon), and knowledge or insight. None of these provide certainty for attaining the object in question.

These comments of Plato seem perplexing, especially for one so well-known for initiating the art of dialectic and dialogue. Does this entail that the dialogue form itself is ironically undercut by Plato himself? On the contrary, Plato explains these remarks cogently in the wider context of the letter. As Kenneth Sayre points out, Plato (in both the Seventh Letter and in his famous remarks against writing in the Phaedrus) is not disparaging writing as such, but the inadequacy of language itself, both its written and oral forms. Hans-Georg Gadamer concurs, saying that Plato repeatedly emphasizes 'that each of the four means [naming, explanation, example, and insight] has a tendency to bring a reality of a specific sort to the fore instead of the reality of the thing itself.... [...] The word circle is not the circle itself, [etc.] Plato's thesis is this: all these means assert themselves as whatever they are, and in pushing them to the fore, as it were, they suppress that which is displayed in them'. Even oral speech bears this inadequacy, as it cannot properly represent the contemplated idea of the soul for the reason that even names, descriptions, physical

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36 Seventh Letter 343a.
37 Seventh Letter 344c.
38 Following a host of post-structuralist thinkers, this appears to be the conclusion reached in Max Statkiewicz, Rhapsody of Philosophy: Dialogues with Plato in Contemporary Thought (Pennsylvania, PA: Pennsylvania State University Press, 2009). Statkiewicz argues that rhapsody mediates the apparent 'duologue' into a more 'anarchic' dia-logos.
40 Hans-Georg Gadamer, "Dialectic and Sophism in Plato's Seventh Letter," in Dialogue and Dialectic: Eight Hermeneutical Studies on Plato, trans. P. Christopher Smith (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1980), 93–123 at 105. Otherwise, 'The assumption that a perfected instrument of designation exists by which everything that one means and thinks precisely could be designated—and this would be the ideal logical language—is a nominalistic prejudice, the untenability of which has in my view been convincingly demonstrated in Wittgenstein's logical investigations' (Ibid., 108–9; Gadamer cites Ludwig Wittgenstein, Schriften, vol. 2 [Frankfurt: Suhrkamp, 1960], 289ff).
instances/examples, and scientific knowledge still bear an ‘involvement with sense experience’.

What, then, is the fuller context that Plato provides for his account of writing? The key point has already been mentioned: the serious person becomes ‘serious’ not in their writing, but in his or her activity. Rosemary Desjardins says, ‘[t]he dialogues...communicate through words and deeds; what is more (and more subtle) they communicate through the actual interplay of these two aspects, which constitute, respectively, the discursive and dramatic elements of a dialogue’. Such a dramatic, dialogical enterprise is ‘one that repeatedly involves the reader in the dialogue that it portrays’, as Gadamer puts it. That is, immediately after Plato’s famous comments about having never composed a work of his own philosophy, he says: ‘Acquaintance with it [philosophy] must come rather after a long period of attendance on instruction in the subject itself and of close companionship, when, suddenly, like a blaze kindled by a leaping spark, it is generated in the soul and at once becomes self-sustaining’. The practice of philosophy—whether in oral or written form—consists of wholistically unifying one’s words and deeds within an ‘ensouled’ life. It is not an instant knowledge, but may be obtained ‘instantaneously’ only after an ‘acquaintance’ that comes ‘after a long period of attendance’. This adheres well with what Gadamer says in his commentary on Plato’s Lysis. That is, the reason for the ensuing aporetic perplexity, which causes the interlocutors to walk away not knowing what ‘friendship’ is, stems from the fact that Socrates’ dialogue partner was too young; in other words, they had not properly become acquainted with one another over a long

period of time to have become true friends. In sum, philosophy entails a ‘close companionship’ with its subject because reason itself reflects a degree of personhood: friendship can only be defined in the activity of becoming friends; philosophy can only be known in its performative and dialogical act of question-and-answer; justice can only be defined by the just person in being just; etc. All of this does not mean that writing and orality are useless images of the active person, but that they must be seen to be only useful insofar as they are images. Notably, Kevin Corrigan and Elena Glazov-Corrigan, remarking on the Symposium and the Socratic dialogue in general, state that ‘for the first time in the history of thought, a new genre emerges, which is conscious of its function as an image, as of its special representative powers, and of its difference from all other literary and rhetorical genres, which turns thought into living speech and character in an open-ended, inclusive way’.[48] To the question ‘Why did Plato write dialogues’, the answer is found in creating a necessary (but not sufficient) image for recreating the dialogical activity or deed (ergon) of the inquiring person. For now this will suffice for addressing the issue of writing dialogues, and I will turn to the nature of dialogue itself.

In his dialogue with Theaetetus, Socrates states that the essential structure of reason is dialogical in nature. Thinking itself takes place ‘as a discourse that the mind carries on with itself about any subject it is considering’.[50] Likewise,

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47 For a literary and philosophical look at this form within the context of what is known as ‘reception theory’, see Hans Robert Jauss, Question and Answer: Forms of Dialogic Understanding, trans. and ed. Michael Hays, Theory and History of Literature 73 (Minneapolis, MN: University of Minnesota Press, 1989); and see the earlier work, idem, Toward an Aesthetic of Reception, trans. Timothy Bahti, Theory and History of Literature 2 (Minneapolis, MN: University of Minnesota Press, 1982).


50 Theaetetus 189e-190a. See Schindler, Plato's Critique of Impure Reason, 255n.89; cf. p. 34.
the Stranger tells Theaetetus in the *Sophist* something similar: "thinking and discourse are the same thing, except that what we call thinking is, precisely, the inward dialogue carried on by the mind with itself without spoken sound".\(^{51}\) This stems from the fact that persons are interiorly 'plurivocal', as William Desmond puts it, for there is a doubling of the self in the same person even in a soliloquy or monologue: that of the speaker and the listener.\(^{52}\) If reason itself is inescapably dialogical—universally so—then the form of dialogue is not just ubiquitous for humans, but seems to be the living shape of thought itself, one that requires a vigilant attentiveness. On this note, D. C. Schindler says that the 'dialogue form intends the reader's *active participation* because it presents ideas that are themselves still *alive*—or 'ensouled' as Plato puts it in the *Phaedrus*.\(^{53}\) To clarify, this does not mean that dialogues present encapsulated philosophical truths—i.e. a truth that is stable because it has been killed—but as 'living speech', active dialogues such as these 'teach others how to philosophize'.\(^{54}\) An excavation of 'method' reveals an understanding of truth that tends toward 'definition' and 'division', as in the approach of Peter Ramus, intent on reducing real dialogue to mere pedagogical method.\(^{55}\) Yet, there is also a fine line between the 'search for method' and that of a manuduction—the latter of which is an ensouled leading by the hand of a teacher with his or her student. Therefore, it must be admitted that Socrates was not concerned about his own 'method' at the 'meta-level' by any stretch of the ancient imagination.\(^{56}\) Such heavy pre-occupations are those of the

\(^{51}\) *Sophist* 263e. For more on the nature of this dialogical aspect of reason, see Ronald Hathaway, "Explaining the Unity of the Platonic Dialogue," *Philosophy and Literature* 8 (1984): 195–208, esp. 204.

\(^{52}\) Desmond, *Being and the Between*, 392n.13.

\(^{53}\) Schindler, *Plato's Critique of Impure Reason*, 36, emphasis mine. See *Phaedrus* 278a.


sixteenth century and beyond.\textsuperscript{57} For the sake of scholarly convention, I will refer to the Socratic approach in general as the ‘elenchus’. However, I am more concerned with the overall aim of this way of dialogue.\textsuperscript{58} In other words, I am not limiting myself to the (intermediate) goal of truth statements (i.e., ‘What is F?’ questioning).

Gregory Vlastos defines the Socratic elenchus as ‘a search for moral truth by question-and-answer adversary argument in which a thesis is debated only if asserted as the answerer’s own belief and is regarded as refuted only if its negation is deduced from his own beliefs’{59} With a slightly different focus, Richard Robinson defines the elenchus as ‘examining a person with regard to a statement he has made, by putting to him questions calling for further statements, in hope that they will determine the meaning and the truth-value of his first statement’.\textsuperscript{60} While both Vlastos and Robinson agree on the definition

\textsuperscript{57} See Ong, Ramus, Method and the Decay of Dialogue.


of the elenchus as searching and examination,\textsuperscript{61} where they differ sharply is on their emphasis. Vlastos seems to stop at the idea that the elenchus is merely the discovery of 'truth in the moral domain'\textsuperscript{62} and then attempts to trace out the formal, analytic contours into which the greatest number of dialogues can fit.\textsuperscript{63} Moreover, Vlastos claims that there is a progression in Plato away from elenchus due to his enrapture with arithmetic formal statements. This is claimed by arguing that the \textit{Lysis}, \textit{Euthydemus}, and \textit{Hippias Major} dialogues 'euthanise' the adversarial form of Vlasto's (own) definition of the elenchus, and that they serve to 'disengage' Plato from this explicit form—except, that is, for its reappearance in the \textit{Meno} which becomes the ground for an essay into the theory of recollection.\textsuperscript{64}

Against what I would argue are very odd interpretive gymnastics on Vlastos' part, I would argue instead that the elenchus constitutes a philosophical 'way of life'. For example, Robinson offers two interpretive analyses which I think clarify the Socratic elenchus toward a direction which is more amenable to Socrates' mission. First, in the \textit{Meno} for example, Robinson suggests that the elenchus is 'a method of teaching, of instilling intellectual knowledge in other persons. It does not, however, actually increase knowledge, but only prepares the ground for it'.\textsuperscript{65} This paves the way for Robinson's analysis of the \textit{Apology} where he brings out the well-known declaration that Socrates' mission is to make people concerned about the welfare of their souls.\textsuperscript{66} The elenchus described thus far by Robinson is therefore less a propositional tool and more of a paradoxical way of \textit{knowing less}. Because Robinson's narrative points more toward the thematic pronouncements of Socrates during his defense instead of toward the mathematics and recollection themes of the \textit{Meno} (which I would not discount in themselves by any means but would nonetheless not allow to be the

\textsuperscript{61} See \textit{Apology} 29c, 28e, 41b.
\textsuperscript{62} Vlastos, "The Socratic Elenchus," 5.
\textsuperscript{63} Ibid., 11–29, and see the final formulations of this on pp. 25–9 in his "[A] and [B]" formulations.
\textsuperscript{64} See footnote 58 above.
\textsuperscript{65} Robinson, "Elenchus," 84.
\textsuperscript{66} Ibid., 86. \textit{Apology} 29d-30b.
thematic telos of a ‘progression’ in Plato), Robinson is able to remind us of the
way of living in which Socrates comes to realize that the only true knowledge
is to know that one is devoid of it.67

Secondly in regard to Robinson’s interpretation of the elenchus, he remarks
that its very nature ‘is a very personal affair, in spite of Socrates’ ironical
declarations that it is an impersonal search for the truth’, because in the end,
the answerer must be convinced of the conclusions,68 even if the conclusion
leaves one in aporia. Robinson comments upon the Gorgias, stating, ‘Whereas
in law-courts you have to convince a third party, namely the judges, in the
Socratic elenchus you have to convince your opponent himself. Hence the
witnesses who are so effective at trials are useless here. The only true witness
and authority is the answerer himself; and if he does not admit the fact it is
irrelevant how many others do. The result depends not on a majority of votes,
but on the single vote of the answerer (471e-472c, 474a, 475e).69 What is
more, Robinson adds that ‘[b]y addressing itself always to this person here and
now, elenchus takes on particularity and accidentalness’.70 In sum, it appears
that the third party of the law courts—the impersonal—is actually where
Vlastos’ definition appears to reside, whereas Robinson’s definition of the
way of the elenchus resides more within the remit of the personal. Robinson,
unfortunately, does appear to share the same narrative of the rigid chronology
as Vlastos in the end,71 but against Vlastos’s championing of ‘method is all’,72
for Robinson the method of the elenchus is put in its rightful place as a helpful
tool and guide for a more primary, personal, and divine concern.

67 Apology 29b.
69 Ibid., 88–9. There is a parallel to be drawn here between this logic and the continual mission
of Søren Kierkegaard to speak to ‘that single individual’. See Søren Kierkegaard, The Point of
View, trans. and ed. Howard V. Hong and Edna H. Hong (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University
Press, 1998), 9–11, esp. 37, and passim.
70 Robinson, “Elenchus,” 89, emphasis mine. The sentence continues: ‘...which are defects. In
this respect it is inferior to the impersonal and universal and rational march of a science
axiomatized according to Aristotle’s prescription. Plato might urge, however, that elenchus is
the means by which the irrational and accidental individual is brought to the appreciation of
universal science, brought out of his individual arbitrariness into the common world of reason’
(Ibid.). Robinson is arguing, much like Schindler does in his Plato’s Critique of Impure
Reason, for relativizing these ‘defects’ within the larger whole which in turn still gives them
integrity bestowed upon them by the whole, or the Good.
72 This is the subtitle of Vlastos’ essay.
A number of commentators have remarked on the fact that Socrates embodies philosophy in such a way that it is exemplified as a ‘way of life’. Perhaps most notably, Pierre Hadot observes about Socrates, ‘The real problem [of philosophy] is...not the problem of knowing this or that, but of being in this way or that way....Socrates practiced this call to being not only by means of his interrogations and irony, but above all by means of his being, by his way of life, and by his very being’. Richard Kraut concurs with this observation regarding the life of Socrates, adding in his own way another voice to answer the question, ‘Why Dialogue?’ when he notes that Plato’s encounter with the ‘remarkable man’ of Socrates is an event to be remembered: ‘Since Socrates is above all someone who enters into dialogue with others, and not a propounder of systematic doctrine, the dialogue form is the perfect medium for the expression of his life and thought’. The dialogue has been seen as both an expression of the life of Socrates as well as an embodiment of the very nature and structure of reason itself, one that demands attentiveness, companionship, and a long acquaintance in order to finally see this philosophical life ‘set ablaze’. In the next section I will address the Socratic tool of aporia that is very closely connected to the elenchus, and will attempt to show how the Truth that this way points to is one that is Life.

c. Aporia: Life in Death

In this section I start by examining the Socratic logic of aporia (ἀπορία) and then turn to recent accounts of the aporia of death in Heidegger and Derrida. I show that, even at the end of the dialogical encounter where we

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75 *Theaetetus* 189e-190a.
often find ourselves in perplexity and at an impasse, that there is still a personal economy at work beckoning us on toward further life—not the problems of death as such. In this regard, Søren Kierkegaard proves helpful as one who, not only understood the Socratic spirit, but also as one who uses the ‘aporia’ of death to spur us on toward earnestness of life. At the end of our perplexities, therefore, we constantly find an inescapably loving, personal presence.

Vasilis Politis begins his study on this topic with the following: ‘It is typical of Socrates in a number of dialogues...to lead the interlocutor towards a state of aporia, a mental state of perplexity and being at a loss, about some ethical subject—courage, piety, temperance, virtue’. Politis discusses two uses of aporia in Socratic dialogues. The first use is the more familiar function of Socratic aporia as catharsis which causes a mental state of perplexity and being at a loss. In providing a summary of the character of this use of aporia, Politis notes that the meaning of the term signifies a ‘lack of resourcefulness’, or even to focus on its etymology, ‘lack of passage’, ‘lack of a means of advance’, or ‘impasse’. Likewise, Gillian Rose has pointed out that a literal etymology of the word aporia (απορία) means ‘without a ford’ or ‘without a path’. The use of the cathartic aporia aligns with Socrates’ goal in administering it in the Apology (21b): ‘it is to test whether people really know what they think they know and lead them to the recognition that they do not, thus cleansing them of the belief in their own knowledge’.

The second use of aporia that Politis treats is one that signifies puzzles and problems, and here he highlights its ‘zetetic’ function. Here the more familiar translation of ἀπορία is evidenced as ‘puzzle’ or ‘problem’, but in the zetetic

77 Ibid., 92–6. Politis examines Laches 194a-c and 196a-b; Euthypro 11b-d; and Meno 80a-b and 72a.
78 Ibid., 96.
79 See Gillian Rose, The Broken Middle: Out of Our Ancient Society (Oxford: Blackwell, 1992), 166, 201, 256. She connects this with death, which will be explored below.
81 Ibid., 97–105. Politis studies: Apology 21b; Charmides 167b-c; Protagoros 324d-e and 348c; and Meno 80c-d, 84a-c.
function ‘the term ἀποφαίνω can refer just as much to what one is puzzled about as to the puzzlement itself’. The example given is not always about what something is—say, virtue—but the question raised in relation to it, e.g., ‘can virtue be taught?’ The way in which this latter zetetic form of aporia is connected to the elenchus is in Politis’ definition of its function: ‘to generate particular searches, defined and directed by the puzzle and problem at hand’. Politis’ conclusion about this second use is that these very problems help direct the higher aim of coming up with definitions in a ‘dialectical search’. What is most striking about Politis’ ensuing conclusion is that even though he has been at pains to differentiate these two uses of aporia, in the end he notes their porosity: ‘No doubt the two kinds of aporia are not sharply separate states of mind; rather, there may be a continuous path from the one to the other. Thus a person may at first experience the encounter with Socratic dialectic as confusing, bewildering, and simply a cause of perplexity and being at a loss; but gradually he may come to think that the cause of his perplexity is particular puzzles and problems that he may try to articulate and solve’. Politis admits that there is ‘nothing obvious’ or ‘inevitable’ about this transition, saying that it is in fact a ‘real innovation’. In a word, Politis is revealing that such a transition must in fact be narrated (as he himself has done in a performative way). Correspondingly, Charles Kahn remarks that the literary device of the aporia is employed ‘for reinterpreting the Socratic elenchus as the preparation for constructive philosophy. The reader is to accompany the interlocutor in the recognition of a problem. But the more astute reader will also recognize some hints of a solution’. Glossing Politis’ analysis in light of my discussion in the present chapter, we find that the nature of aporia is analogous to the logic of the way of truth: an encounter with a bewildering question or answer can in fact provide the very direction

82 Ibid., 105.
83 Ibid.
84 Ibid., 107, emphasis mine.
85 Ibid., 108–9.
86 Ibid.
87 Ibid., 109. As an alternative to his own account, Politis contrasts the work of Gareth B. Matthews, Socratic Perplexity and the Nature of Philosophy (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2004), 111.
88 Kahn, Plato and the Socratic Dialogue, 100.
and path (πόρος) deeper into the question itself (and as we will see later, the questioner). The sun, though blinding, illumines our daily activities.

For the remainder of this section on *aporia*, I will address another but related aspect of the question of Socratic perplexity within a contrast between Socrates and Kierkegaard on the one hand, versus the Heideggian legacy of death on the other. While it is not within the scope of this chapter to enter into a full discussion of the gift, for the purposes of this section, I will briefly address Heidegger and Derrida—perhaps the two philosophers of *aporia* par excellence of the twentieth century. From Heidegger's *es gibt* of Being (co-terminous with time) that comes from nowhere and nobody yet still somehow 'gives', to Derrida's unilateral thinking of the gift which begins in, through and with *aporia* (indeed, Derrida explicitly bases his account of the gift upon the shoulders of Heidegger's *es gibt* in his own *il y a*), these two thinkers are the gift's most aneconomic expounders. And, I would argue that ultimately there is no coincidence that these same aneconomic thinkers are also so primarily focused and concerned with death as a real determining event within their thought, despite the fact that there appears to be an initial paradoxical logic at work within their discussions of death.

For Heidegger, death is the 'the possibility of the absolute impossibility of Da-Sein [die Möglichkeit der schlechthinnige Daseinsunmöglichkeit]. Thus death reveals itself as that possibility which is one's ownmost, which is non-relational, and which is not to be outstripped [unüberholbare]'. Earlier, Heidegger states that the constitution of Dasein (the human existential defined

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93 Heidegger, *Being and Time*, 294, emphasis in original.
as Being-there, or Da-Sein) is the following: ‘Dasein is the possibility of Being-free for its ownmost potentiality-for-Being’. The directionality of Dasein, it’s own ‘thrownness’ distinguishes its own ‘dying’ as a kind of death to be distinguished from mere perishing as well as the concept of one’s own demise. Therefore, when Heidegger says, ‘With death, Dasein stands before itself in its ownmost potentiality-for-being’—what emerges is the idea of death as the limit at a border.

Commenting upon Heidegger’s understanding of limit, Derrida notes that Heidegger’s aporia of death is indebted to the Greek conception of the ‘limits of truth’ whose boundaries ‘must not be exceeded’. Death as aporia means to abide ‘in the very place where it would no longer be possible to constitute a problem, a project, or a projection’. At this stage, those familiar with Derrida’s writing on the ‘Gift’ will recognize the transposition that he makes of Heidegger’s work. Derrida changes Heidegger’s ‘possibility of the absolute impossibility of Da-Sein’ into the ‘paradoxical possibility of a possibility of impossibility: it is possibility as impossible’. More specifically, this transposition is perceived ‘as an impossibility that can nevertheless appear or announce itself as such, an impossibility whose appearing as such would be possible....an impossibility that one can await or expect, an impossibility the limits of which one can expect or at whose limits one can wait’. Derrida aims to de-Hellenize Heidegger here in the wiping away of borders within his own radical possibilization of impossibility. By

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94 Ibid., 183.
95 Ibid., 295.
96 Ibid., 294.
97 Derrida, Aporias, 1.
98 Ibid., 12, emphasis in original.
99 See, e.g.: ‘For this is the impossible that seems to give itself to be thought here: These conditions of possibility of the gift (that some “one” gives some “thing” to some “one other”) designates simultaneously the conditions of the impossibility of the gift’ (Derrida, Given Time, 12). It should be added that Derrida is not saying that gifts are impossible, but that, ‘if there is a gift’, then the gift ‘as such’ (he particularly emphasizes the ‘as such’) exists through an impossibility. On this see Derrida’s responses in ‘On the Gift’ in God, the Gift, and Postmodernism, 59–60. In Aporias, Derrida also emphasizes the ‘as such’ in that ‘[e]verything thus lies in this enigma of the “as such” and of the appearing that at once marks and erases the three types of limits that we have described: (1) the (anthropologico-cultural) borders; (2) the delimitations of the problematic closure, and (3) the conceptual demarcations of this existential analysis’ (Derrida, Aporias, 73, emphasis in original, and see 75).
100 Derrida, Aporias, 70, emphasis in original.
101 Ibid., 73.
doing away with the notions of border, closure, and demarcation, Derrida hopes to unravel this braid, leaving it frayed and 'without end'.

Derrida's concluding words on aporia itself read: 'The ultimate aporia is the impossibility of the aporia as such. [...] Death, as the possibility of the impossible as such, is a figure of the aporia in which "death" and death can replace—and this is a metonymy that carries the name beyond the name and beyond the name of name—all that is only possible as impossible, if there is such a thing: love, the gift, the other, testimony, and so forth'.

Entailed within this 'possibility of the impossible as such' is the endless exercise of waiting in expectation for...?

In light of our previous analysis of dialogue and its frequent end in aporia, Heidegger's and Derrida's focus upon death can only be seen as radically impersonal ways to narrate such a perplexity. While it is true to say that the power of death is a non-relationality in and of itself, the truth of the experience of death is not one that we experience only by ourselves, nor is death encountered only as a pure 'possibility as impossibility'. Death itself is not the factor that determines personal incommunicability; the person himself already possesses this unique quality, something that defines us and that we all share. Because our existence is that which is first shared by us all (in similarly different ways, i.e., analogous), the diversity of being already bears within it a kind of 'incommunicability' which finds its perfection in the human person. The experience of death is, therefore, shared differently: both similarly in that we all share in the same humanity, as well as uniquely in that each person undergoes its own experience. The aporia of death is thus not so much a puzzling, radically heterogeneous distinguishing force as it is the differently shared point along the path of shared lives together.

In contrast to this Heideggerian-Derridean legacy of death, I propose a Socratic-Kierkegaardian alternative which creates a real opening, a path not into death as an impasse as much as it is a focus upon the way of personal

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102 Ibid., 78, emphasis in original.
103 Ibid., 78-9, emphasis in original.
life. In the *Phaedo*, Socrates exemplifies primarily a way of life in preparation for death. One can see that the Socratic way of leading interlocutors into *aporia* does not *per se* mean that one is left literally without a way; rather it can well mean that the paths thought to be so certain were in fact dead ends ‘all along’ and therefore one’s entire trajectory (or at least aspects of it) need to be rethought. As Desjardin’s puts it, ‘This kind of *aporia*—meaning literally “no passage,” “no way out,” “no exit”—is intended, of course, not as an end but rather as a *beginning* [...]’. Similarly, Drew Hyland also states that the aporetic dialogues of Plato aim precisely to ‘drive the reader beyond the dialogue itself’.  

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105 Importantly, see the following corrective article which argues against the regnant Nietzschean view that Socrates despised life: Laurel A. Madison, “Have We Been Careless with Socrates’ Last Words?: A Rereading of the *Phaedo*,” *Journal of the History of Philosophy* 40, no. 4 (2002): 421–36.


With this in mind, while it is true that Heidegger often plagiarizes and then secularizes Kierkegaard’s thought, Kierkegaard’s own thought about death as outlined in his eponymous discourse ‘At a Graveside’ turns out to be a radically different approach altogether. Paradoxically, even though the whole discourse seems to be about death, it turns out not to be about death at all. Death is neither defined by equality nor inequality; on the contrary, death is simultaneously certain and uncertain which is an earnestness (or ‘seriousness’) that compels us to admit that death is wholly inexplicable. In the end, ‘we should not be overhasty in acquiring an opinion with regard to death’. Kierkegaard’s discourse on death, in the final analysis, is really concerned with the earnestness of life, preparing for the ‘final examination’, the transforming of one’s life, and the caring for one’s soul. In a sense, even though ‘At a Graveside’ is an upbuilding discourse and thus delivered in a direct, apostolic mode of address with his ‘right hand’, Kierkegaard has kept his poetic left ‘hand’ slightly raised—because his authorship is a single

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111 Ibid., 95.

112 ‘Seriousness’ is how George Pattison renders the Danish word *alvor* that the Hongs translate as ‘earnestness’. See, e.g., George Pattison, *Kierkegaard’s Upbuilding Discourses: Philosophy, Literature, and Theology* (London: Routledge, 2002), 115. See also George Connell, “The Importance of Being Earnest: Coming to Terms With Judge Williams’ Seriousness,” in *Stages on Life’s Way*, ed. Robert L. Perkins, International Kierkegaard Commentary 11 (Macon, GA: Mercer University Press, 2000), 113–48. Connell points out: ‘The Hongs translate the Danish *Alvor* sometimes as “seriousness,” but more often as “earnestness,” parallelling the German translation of the word as *Ernst*. Where “serious” is etymologically associated with heaviness and weight (Old English *swær* = heavy; also related to Greek *herma* = ballast), “earnest” carries connotations of battle (Old English *eornest* = combat or duel). In contrast, the Danish *Alvor* signifies complete, unalloyed truth. (*al* = all; *vor* = truth, related to the Latin *verus* and the German *wahr*)’ (Ibid., 115–16).


114 Ibid., 100.

115 Ibid., 102.

breath"—mirroring the logic of the Socratic aporia such that we are left not having any idea what death is in the end. For Kierkegaard, the person is commended who has the rare talent of what he calls ‘practicing in his life the earnest thought of death’. Notably, the ‘earnestness of life’ promoted by Kierkegaard’s reflections here on a subject that leaves him perplexed (death), are similar to something that G. K. Chesterton was to say some years later: ‘what we suffer from today is humility in the wrong place. ...The old humility was a spur that prevented a man from stopping; not a nail in his boot that prevented him from going on’.

Accordingly, as a spur to thought, ‘the thought of death gives the earnest person the right momentum in life and the right goal toward which he directs his momentum’. This forward-moving, goal-directed movement has its basis in the Christian life which John Behr calls ‘a continual practice of death, or rather, of life in death’. Behr bases his approach on the following well-known statement from Kierkegaard’s journals: ‘We only understand life backwards, but we must live forwards’. Theologically, therefore, the heart of Behr’s work is showing that Christ is only recognized after his Passion, crucifixion, and exaltation, and the disciples ‘did this by turning back to the scriptures’. The identity of Jesus as the Son of God, and the life history of the Church itself only makes sense at all—in light of the occasion of a death. Behr remarks that the divine economy of salvation, much like Kierkegaard’s retroactive power prompted by the earnest thought of death, is ‘known only retrospectively from the Cross’. Behr sums up his project by aligning this insight with his own work: ‘So here we stand, “straining forward to what lies ahead” and pressing onwards in response to “the upward call of God in Christ Jesus” (Phil 3.14), being drawn out of ourselves by the coming Lord, all the

117 Kierkegaard, The Point of View, 6.
120 Kierkegaard, ‘At a Graveside’ in Three Discourses on Imagined Occasions, 82-3.
123 Behr, The Mystery of Christ, 22. These ‘Scriptures’, which are spoken about in the Creed, are in fact the Old Testament.
124 Ibid., 142.
while looking *backwards* to the Cross as the last publicly visible image of him in this world*.125 Similarly, Hans Urs von Balthasar remarks upon the 'martyrial existence' of St Paul where he says, 'So death is at work in us, but life [of the resurrection] in you' (2 Cor 4:11-12). Balthasar comments: 'Paul is a witness, a *martys*, because the death and resurrection of Jesus give form to his entire life'.126 Paul refuses, therefore, to reduce his mission to that of mere words, but proclaims Christ crucified in his own deeds as well. It is in Revelation 1:5 where *martys* becomes a 'blood witness', however, which then remains the dominant (but no less true) connotation of 'martyr'. 'Throughout the history of the Church', says Balthasar, 'the concept of the “martyr” will remain associated with this life-concluding testimony, even though Pauline theology, which understands the *life* of the witness as molded by the dying and rising of Jesus, contains a more comprehensive concept of martyrdom'.127

Thus on my account, the occasion of *aporia* is not one that stops one in their tracks, nor is it simply a perplexing puzzle that enters dialogue; on the contrary, within the ensouled activity of a non-identically-repeating dialogue, life itself is constantly spurred on by the earnestness with which it takes the foundation of its own reality: the life, death, and resurrection of the person of Jesus Christ. It is a kind of *aporia* because the resurrected life of a *crucified* person confronts us all, a life that is sometimes experienced as a stumbling-block and foolishness.128 On the Socratic account, dialogue aims towards the sparking of knowledge—wisdom alone; when this is transposed into the Christian key, however, Christ as the *Logos* of the dia-logue (*dia-logos*) is one whom all of our own reasons (*logoi*) refer, that is, 'Christ the *power* of God and the *wisdom* of God'.129

The conclusion I propose to this section in light of these deliberations on *aporia* is that one only is 'on the way', when one is orientated *toward life*. Being lead into *aporia*, or attempting to figure out an *aporia* (of a particular puzzle or problem) is not in and of itself lacking, because as Politis has shown,

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125 Ibid., 145, emphasis mine.
127 Ibid., emphasis in original.
128 1 Corinthians 1:23.
129 1 Corinthians 1:24.
such problems often have within themselves a transitioning element or power that, despite all appearances, do in fact continue to lead one on a path of further discovery, as long as one maintains that these searches and examinations are part of one’s ‘way of life’. On the other hand, *aporia* does have the potential to run about aimlessly when it forbids a personal giver and personal way of life (as in the explicitly non-relational *es gibt*, or an ever-expectant impossibility as possibility of death). As such, this kind of *aporia* will find that it is only shadow-boxing\(^{130}\) within its own impasse of denying all forms of economy. Derrida’s *aporia* of death ‘as such’, in moving beyond the apparent limits and borders of Heidegger’s own being-toward-death, only amounts to an endless ‘giving’ of a content-less ‘possibilization’ of impossibility. Indeed, there is a deep inability to ‘construct a grammar of giving’ in Derrida.\(^{131}\) One cannot see where such an endlessly frayed braid is supposed to lead, nor to whom it might lead when the ‘metonymy that carries the name beyond the name and beyond the name of name’\(^{132}\) is a seemingly name-less goal-less ‘goal’—let alone whether this expectation can ever describe a life lived vibrantly, even if tragically. The addendum of ‘love’ to Derrida’s line of reasoning cannot but seem like an afterthought to such an impersonal reflection. As D. C. Schindler notes, because Derrida’s *differance* lacks love (in the form of *erōs*) and thus any kind of goal, it is only ever ‘on the move’ while the Christian-Socratic elenchus—the dialogue—is always ‘on the way’.\(^{133}\) In the final analysis, the aneconomics of *differance*, the gift and especially the *aporia* ‘as such’ are revealed to be inherently blind when they are situated within a ‘Socratism’ without the light of the—and here I would add *personal*—Good.\(^{134}\)

Only a personal—that is, a *named*—reality can truly make life possible for others, and likewise, it is only a personal Other that can draw me unto its life

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\(^{130}\) Cf. 1 Corinthians 9:24-7.


\(^{134}\) Griswold, Jr., “Plato’s Metaphilosophy,” 155. It is not within the scope of this thesis to also argue for the Good as personal, but D. C. Schindler has done this in a most excellent fashion already, for he argues that Socrates is a stand-in for the Good. See his *Plato’s Critique of Impure Reason*, 179–87. See also Jacques Maritain, *The Person and the Common Good*, trans. John J. Fitzgerald (Notre Dame, IN: University of Notre Dame Press, 1972), 28–30.
in the hope of a real expectation, whether it be a personal God or the embrace of a friend. It is also the risk and fragility of such a reality that can let us down on a creaturely interpersonal level, and as such, what becomes the (non-)space of the truly ‘impossible’ is to renege on a promise (promising being a capacity that only persons have). That is: to tell a lie. When one acts in such a way or harnesses language in order to bear false witness, disappointment, sadness, betrayal, and slander reign. The real space of the ‘impossible’ is thus not even an aporia, but impossible—full stop—precisely because it does not want to go forward; it deceives and desires to cut away or distinguish life. A lie, as that which is impossible, admits of no ‘spur’ to life, nor a beyond, but merely atomistic solitude: the utter lack of any relation, which amounts to the nothingness of death. To tell the truth, to promise, and thus to bear truthful witness is the risk, based in hope, of an involvement in personal dialogue founded upon a prior reality that calls us toward itself. What makes any of this possible in a seemingly ‘impossible’ way—as the real aporia or scandal—is Christ crucified who says: ‘For those who want to save their life will lose it, and those who lose their life for my sake will save it’. Or as Dietrich Bonhoeffer puts it, ‘When Christ calls a man, he bids him come and die’. It is towards the beginnings of that call to which I now turn.

d. The Call: An Aesthetical Analogy


136 For an interesting, yet flawed, account of the connection between language and lying, see China Miéville, Embassytown (London: Macmillan, 2011). This otherwise brilliant novel rests upon the assumption that language’s manifold ability to refer to a myriad of things with a single word is not due to its richness, but instead a lack. Thus the fact that ‘that’ can refer to ‘this’ or ‘that’ particular thing is seen in this construction as a lie, as opposed to many referential instances being multiply true.

137 See Yannaras, Person and Eros, 273–4 (§88).


This section begins by following the path of personal dialogue through the same trajectory outlined in Chapter 4 above: a metaphysical *resolutio*. That is, in order to ‘arrive’ at the personal response of dialogue, we must first acknowledge the personal call that bids the human, the call which is first resounded in and through creation.

If one follows the anonymous commenter on Plato and acknowledges that ‘the cosmos is a kind of dialogue’, one may expect to find that creation itself contains voices in conversation. The very definition of dialogue implies at least two voices: one of a speaker and a listener existing through *(dia)* speech *(logos)*. If one assumes that humanity is one voice amidst creation, what is the other voice? Is it creation that speaks to itself? Unless creation is ‘schizophrenic’ at its base, then the soliloquy of creation is merely synonymous with the form of monologue. The dialogue of the cosmos must ultimately not be with itself primarily—although when this does happen such dialogues exist between different existents on the creaturely level; rather, the dialogue of the cosmos is primarily between creation and the call of something other than creation. And yet if the call is merely wholly other, then it would not be heard at all, for how can a completely ‘other’ sound be heard if not with one’s ears as it picks up the vibrations of air we call sound?

The call must be sensed, at the very least—‘heard’ in some fashion. But if the call is to be heard—let alone responded to—where exactly will the call be located? The entirety of the created cosmos is dialogue, but if everything is calling and the call is located everywhere, the call may not be discerned and will go unnoticed, as in the way that we only feel differences of temperature around us when the surrounding air is distinct from the temperature of our own skin. Accordingly, the call, if undifferentiated, cannot be heard. Below I will use the works of Jean-Louis Chrétien and Johann Georg Hamann to address the location and differentiation of the call. I will begin by providing an exegesis of the first chapter of Chrétien’s *The Call and the Response*. Afterward, I will connect Hamann’s Christological aesthetics to this

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141 This paragraph suspends for a moment Desmond’s idea of the interiorly plurivocal account of the person as discussed above. See Desmond, *Being and the Between*, 392n.13.
discussion in an effort to highlight the dialogical acoustics of the call that shines forth within creation.

Chretien locates the call of the dialogical cosmos within the transcendental of beauty. Following a tradition started well before him in Plato’s *Cratylus*, Chretien affirms the etymological connection between the Greek *kalon*, ‘the beautiful’, and *to kaloun*, ‘that which calls’.

What Socrates discovers in this dialogue is not particular instantiations of beauty, but ‘the very source of beauty as such. The origin of the word “beautiful,” *kalon*, does not constitute an etymology among others, but is the very origin of language. The word *kalon* is the name of naming: it names that which, in speech, calls’. The connection is thus that it is the beautiful that calls, but more than this, both descriptions given above of the beautiful and of the call exhibit a kind of ‘archê’ function where, just like beauty as a transcendental is not merely a bundle of beautiful things, the naming itself in the call also exhibits an ‘originating’ call.

These ‘originary’ or ‘founding’ aspects of the call are evident in Chretien’s tracing of the aspects of the call of beauty. I will outline four of these aspects, the first being the characterizing direction of the call. Following Proclus, Chretien states, ‘what characterizes the call of the beautiful is that it calls us toward itself’. In fact, this call is so originary that we find that it precedes every decision to respond to it in a ‘prevenient’ manner. ‘Whenever we start to answer the call, we have already answered; when we embrace it as a call, it has already embraced us and circumvented us’. Via Philo of Alexandria and Dionysus the Areopagite, Chretien quickly connects the call of the beautiful to God such that God is the beauty that calls all unto himself. Philo transposes the listening response ‘from one kind of listening to another’, to a listening

143 Ibid., 7.
146 Ibid., 12.
that exceeds hearing with all of the senses.\textsuperscript{147} Dionysus draws upon the same etymology of \textit{kalon} in his \textit{Divine} names but transposes beauty beyond the impersonal Platonic conception to making God ‘superessential beauty, \textit{huperousion kalon}, beyond being’.\textsuperscript{148} To counteract the Levinasian interpretation of ‘beyond being’ as being separated from being, in commenting upon the Good (which is convertible with Beauty as a transcendent), Adrian Pabst rightly states: ‘The idea that the Good is “beyond being” (\textepsilon\textpi\textepsilon\textkappa\epsilon\texti\nu\alpha \tau\varsigma \omicron\upsilon\sigma\iota\alpha\varsigma) expresses its superabundance and plenitude, not its separation from being. As such, the Good governs all forms and actualizes all particulars’.\textsuperscript{149} With this in mind, ‘God makes each and every being participate in the beauty that he originates’.\textsuperscript{150} Chrétien points out that because Dionysus makes the origin of the call the creator God, ‘neutrality vanishes [because] the origin is the Word himself’.\textsuperscript{151}

The second aspect of the call is its infinite excess. There is always an infinite excess of the call over every response and every decision, analogous to the excess described by Blondel between the ‘willing will’ over the ‘willed will’.\textsuperscript{152} One always falls short in one’s actual response, in the action done in response to the original call (or the willing will in Blondel’s case). For Chrétien the excess of the call over the response is due to the fact that we are being called as particular persons (not abstract beings) in a chorus of voices.\textsuperscript{153} We can never measure up to the call, but it would be foolish to think that we were ever meant to initially measure up on our own. There is an inherent incommensurability in our response, for we will never correspond perfectly,

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\textsuperscript{149} Pabst, \textit{Metaphysics}, 44; Pabst also makes this statement in idem, “The Primacy of Relation over Substance and the Recovery of a Theological Metaphysics,” 553–78 at 563–4. Desmond, \textit{Ethics and the Between}, 5, 9, 158 speaks about the good as an “overdeterminate source.” In the \textit{Republic} VI, 509b, it says that the Good is ‘not only the author of visibility in all visible things, but of generation and nourishment and growth’.
\textsuperscript{150} Chrétien, \textit{The Call and the Response}, 15.
\textsuperscript{151} Ibid., 16.
\textsuperscript{152} See Blondel, \textit{Action (1893)}, 134.
\textsuperscript{153} Chrétien, \textit{The Call and the Response}, 19.
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and this very incommensurability is indeed part of the very call itself,\(^{154}\) one which indicates its nature as ‘the immemorial’.\(^{155}\)

The third and fourth characteristics of the call are that every call is a recall (‘each kalein is anakalein’\(^{156}\) and that the response of the call is only a response by non-identically repeating the call. Every created word is a repetition of the divine Word, attempting to repeat itself towards the one to whom it is recalled; the recall is a call toward the beauty of one doing the calling, the Word. Repeating the call is never merely a re-stating or identical repetition, for we do not have access to the pure beginnings of the call that is not mediated and that is thus not itself a repetition via tradition.\(^{157}\) Furthermore, the very excess of the call and of the call over our response is what causes us to enact a repetition: ‘the excess of the call relative to any possible response or to any act of hearing is precisely what parts my lips again and again in order that I may sing what shatters my voice, what makes me fail to hear the unheard-of that calls us’.\(^{158}\)

The voice is discerned not only by hearing, but by sight as well, which Chrétien goes on to formulate in his short chapter entitled ‘The Visible Voice’.\(^{159}\) The encounter with the beautiful is furthered in a face-to-face encounter. Despite the move to the visual metaphor, Chrétien emphasizes that this encounter still resounds as a dialogue. ‘Visible beauty becomes properly visible precisely when it speaks to us and we question it. It must speak to us in order for us to see it as beautiful’.\(^{160}\) It is here, at the questioning of beauty,

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\(^{154}\) Ibid., 23.

\(^{155}\) Chrétien names the immemorial as that which mirrors the logic of the excess of the call: ‘...the immemorial has for me something excessive about it, an excess that founds me, that senses me and destines me, and is known to me only obliquely, in the excess of being. It is not directly thematized’. From Chrétien, *The Unforgettable and the Unhoped For*, 16 and see 11–12.


\(^{157}\) See Ibid., 25.

\(^{158}\) Ibid., 31. The ‘excess of the encounter with things, other, world, and God’ lie at the heart of Chrétien’s *The Unforgettable and the Unhoped For*, 121 (emphasis in original).


\(^{160}\) Ibid., 35.
that I want to supplement this discussion by the introduction of Johann Georg Hamann’s own creative response and focus upon his *Aesthetica in Nuce*.  

Hamann writes: ‘Speak, that I may see you! - - This wish was fulfilled by creation, which is a speech to creatures through creatures; for day unto day utters speech, and night unto night shows knowledge’. The response to this ancient wish to speak reveals Hamann’s own ‘aesthetics in a nutshell’, viz., God’s own speech is communicated to creatures through creatures in which ‘the whole of creation is united in a relationship of dialogue and revelation’. Creatures, as part of creation, make up one of the two ‘books’ given to us by God. The other book is that of the covenant as witnessed to in Scripture:

The book of creation contains examples of general concepts which GOD wished to reveal to creatures through creation. The books of the covenant contain examples of secret articles which GOD wished to reveal to man through man. The unity of the Author is mirrored even in the dialect of his works — in all of them a tone of immeasurable height and depth! A proof of the most splendid majesty and of total self-emptying! A miracle of such infinite stillness that makes GOD as nothing, so that in all conscience one would have to deny his existence, or else be a beast. But at the same time a miracle of such infinite power, which fills all in all, that we cannot escape his intense solicitude!

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163 On the history of the ‘Speak, that I may see you!’, see Betz, *After Enlightenment*, 126n.52.


165 See also the helpful discussion in Bayer, *A Contemporary in Dissent*, 67-86, esp. 70-78. Hamann speaks of the books of ‘nature’ and of ‘history’ as parallel texts: ‘Nature and history are...the two great commentaries on the divine word, and this word is the only key to unlock a knowledge of both’. Smith, *J. G. Hamann, 1730-1788: A Study in Christian Experience, with Selections from His Writings*, 166; cited in Bayer, *A Contemporary in Dissent*, 70.

166 Hamann, *Aesthetica in Nuce* in *Writings on Philosophy and Language*, 75.
Indeed, Hamann adds, 'Nature and Scripture, then, are the materials of the beautiful, creative, and imitative spirit'. These 'materials' are not on equal footing, however, as Hamann indicates in the quotation above: the book of creation is more general whereas the book of the covenant, or Scripture, is more specific. There is a movement toward more specificity, or rather, to the concrete singular in the Word. The creative spirit that unites these two books together is 'the spirit of prophecy [that] lives in the testimony of the ONE NAME' of Jesus Christ who saves, who is above all other names, and who is the one to whom we should all bow and confess as Lord, the creator God. As John Betz comments, 

For Hamann, then, Christ is the key to nature and Scripture, such that when one is “in Christ” these “books,” which previously had little or nothing to say...suddenly begin to speak (cf. 2 Cor. 3:15). What is more, their speech begins to reveal the same dialect—the same “style”—by which creation was first spoken, Scripture was written, and to which Christ’s entire life is one dramatic testimony: one “dialect,” which is essentially a “coincidence of opposites,” of majesty and abasement, glory and kenosis.

Likewise, Oswald Bayer states, ‘In the mediation effected by Jesus Christ, the “exegete” of God, nature and history speak as creation. Jesus Christ is the mediator of creation’. There is, then, a continuum of sorts between these two books, but not within a univocal series, but analogously mediated by the prime analogate of existence, Jesus Christ.

Nevertheless, Hamann blurs the boundaries between nature and Scripture when he remarks, ‘Every impression of nature in man is not only a memorial but also a warrant of fundamental truth: Who is the LORD. Every reaction of man unto created things is an epistle and seal that we partake of the divine nature, and that we are his offspring’. Nature itself cannot point the way toward its author, but as Hamann shows, there seems to be no nature by ‘itself’

167 Hamann, *Aesthetica in Nuce* in Ibid., 85.
168 Cf. Blondel, *Action* (1893), 410: “The true infinite is not in the abstract universal, it is in the concrete singular."
171 Bayer, *A Contemporary in Dissent*, 75.
but always a nature within the human creature that participates in the divine nature (Hamann footnotes 1 Peter 2:4). Gwen Griffith Dickson concurs that there is not a sharp distinction between the two books in Hamann’s Aesthetica in Nuce, but instead, ‘creation and revelation are coextensive’. In light of the previous chapter’s account of analogy, such a statement needs to be clarified; that is, for every ‘coextensivity’, there is an ever greater ‘discontinuity’. The point of analogy is to pave a middle way between univocity (continuity) and equivocity (discontinuity), with an emphasis upon the latter due to the infinite plenitude of the Triune God. Notwithstanding, at every juncture, at every sensate experience, Hamann shows that the call is always there, beckoning the creature through (coextensive) nature toward the (discontinuous) beauty of itself, to recall the very identity of oneself by confronting the call of: ‘Who is the LORD’.

While Hamann does not appear to explicitly acknowledge the etymological tradition of connecting beauty (kalon) with that which calls (to kaloun), his own aesthetics reflect the very same logic. One can witness this grammar at work in the following quotation: ‘This analogy of man to the Creator endows all creatures with their substance and their stamp, on which depends fidelity and faith in all nature. The more vividly this idea of the image of the invisible GOD dwells in our heart, the more able we are to see and taste his loving-kindness in creatures, observe it and grasp it with our hands’. The substance, stamp, and image is the prevenient call in the very creatureliness of our being, which Hamann seems to say we experience in a sensible way—to use Chrétien’s language, to see the visible voice uttered to us. To take an analogous example à propos of this discussion, Michel Henry remarks that the abstract paintings of Kandinsky, which possess dynamic, impressionist, and ‘pathetic’ subjectivities, constitute the cosmos precisely ‘inasmuch as they are

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173 Dickson, Johann Georg Hamann’s Relational Metaschematism, 145–6. See also Betz: ‘the key to these two books is Christ, who shows them to be intimately related “texts.” Indeed, not only do both speak to the senses (in the way, for example, that the Bible similarly speaks through figures and parables); more importantly, both point to Christ, witnessing formally to the same “dialect” and hence to a common, ultimately triune authorship’ (Betz, After Enlightenment, 134).

This sensate nature, "whose essence is Life", is communicated within the dialogical dynamism and emotion of things, such that "every concrete object is ultimately a cosmos". As Betz brilliantly remarks, "In Christ, ... who renews the analogy between God and human beings, we are enabled once again to hear the Logos in the visible work of creation—as though perception were meant to be, from the beginning, a synaesthetic religious experience, and all art were meant to be an innovative poetic response to it." Hamann's "aesthetics in a nutshell", therefore, when seen in light of Chrétien's own work on the call of beauty, also "repeats" the very dialogical drama of the cosmos, which is revealed—indeed, spoken—"to the creature through the creature".

e. Reflexive Reversal: Personal dial-ogos

In the previous chapter, I outlined the ways in which Yannaras' work falls short in appreciating the Thomistic of analogy. In fact, Thomas' expression of analogy is not antithetical to Yannaras' own articulation. Additionally, I provided a brief look at how Yannaras' polemic against 'the West' is far from accurate (although it does hit its mark in certain neo-Scholatic encrustations of the tradition). In this short section I aim to positively appropriate his efforts as taken from the same work, Person and Eros. Building upon the above dialogical insights about the cosmos in light of Chrétien and Hamann, the work of Christos Yannaras is instructive, for he brings together the notions of beauty with the inherently personal dimension of the world enacted precisely through the dialogical act. Moreover, it is through following this path that one can arrive at a 'reflexive reversal': that analogical act of judgment which, after having heard the call 'to creation through creation', one may now respond to this call—for the first time—as the dialogical person.

176 Ibid., 138 and 142, respectively.
177 Betz, After Enlightenment, 134, emphasis in original.
178 Yannaras, Person and Eros.
Yannaras, in remarking upon the incommunicability of the person, names beauty as the category which 'presupposes the experiential cognition and valuation of the mode by which the reality of the world exists'. That is, 'beauty reveals the mode by which the world is, the how' of its reality.

Beauty is first experienced not as possession through abstract proofs, but in the context of being related to that which is beautiful. For the same reason that one cannot 'prove' beauty, one also cannot 'prove' the reality of a person, for each and every person possesses an incommunicability which is their own, yet communicated relationally in the personal distance between each and every encounter. As Yannaras puts it:

This mode of the “personal” uniqueness of beings is beauty, [and] is the reality of nature as “cosmos.” [...] “Cosmos,”...is the appearance of the personal universality of Being, of the mode by which beings are the disclosures of a personal uniqueness and decorum, as presences of beauty. The truth of beings is witnessed to as beauty, as the principle of a personal uniqueness and dissimilarity, which presupposes and discloses a personal creative presence and energy.

Entailed within the ‘cosmopoeic energy’ is the beauty that manifests itself as the principle of the world’s decorum (kosmoiotēs), which cannot be cognitively exhausted, ‘but is encountered by human reason (logos) within the context of a personal dialogue (dia-logos), a fact of personal relation’.

Human persons do not encounter semantic definitions and formulas in the world, let alone other persons. True, concepts can be useful, but as Yannaras rightly says, this in no way exhausts the truth of beings, for inherent in such truth is the experience of personal reality. This reality saturates the universe such that, like Balthasar, there is even an ‘incommunicability’ inherent to things in the beauty expressed within the distance of their own appearing.

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179 Ibid., 75, emphasis in original.
180 Ibid., emphasis in original. Yannaras adds that beauty is ‘not the what’, but I would argue that a fully participatory account as his own should recognize that the ‘what’ participates in the ‘how’. Alas, his persistent anti-'Western' polemic drives such assertions, for he cannot help but see any affirmation of nature whatsoever as somehow 'purely' substance-driven and thus, for him, 'essentialist'. For the sake of argument, I will be leaving out such further clarifications as I believe I have already addressed this issue in the previous chapter.
181 Ibid., 81.
182 Ibid.
Approaching the truth of the world, therefore, arises not only from a particular attitude to the world, but also ‘a mode of life and use of the world: the world is the second term and logos of a dialogue (dia-logos), a personal relation directed towards the realization and disclosure of the onefold truth of Being’. According to Yannaras, within the constellation of such a relation, ‘which refers to the basic requirements of human life (the taking of food, the use of matter, art, technology and economics), the human person is in dialogue with the world, respecting, studying, and highlighting the logos of existing things’. The personal encounter qua personal does not impose utilitarian demands (which would therefore be impersonal), for such an imposition would deny the logos of creation: it would deny the personal truth of the world and the human person, mutilating nature and humanity, denying both their own perfection and end. To deny the logos of the world would, in a word, be a world without relation. It would be a world where relation to the other would be horrific: Sartre’s ‘Hell is – other people! (L’enfer, c’est les autres)’ bespeaks of the ontological condition where the ‘original fall is the existence of the Other’. Instead of personal ecstasy—going outside of oneself in love for another—such a relation-less existence knows only the shame inflicted by the other in a ‘tragic loneliness of my existential self-containedness, my inability to relate to the “other,” and consequentially the irrationality of my existence, the impossibility of dialogue, my incapacity to express love’.

Where love abounds, however, and where perfect love drives out such fear and shame, recognition and reception of the world’s logos indicates ‘the experience of a personal relation. It reveals the world’s logos as the second

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184 Yannaras, Person and Eros, 96.
185 Ibid.
186 Ibid., 96–7. To this effect, Yannaras cites Saint Maximus Confessor who says, ‘For nature does not produce perfection through art when it has been mutilated, and when what belongs to it from God on account of the logos of creation is cynically regarded’ (To Thalassius 55 [PG 90:756b], cited in Ibid., 97).
189 Yannaras, Person and Eros, 267–8.
term of this dialogue-like relation, which can be experienced only as personal communion, a communion of ecstatic-loving reciprocity'.

Dialogue is thus a two-fold dia-logos: first as an encounter with and through (dia) the logos of the world as the second term in a relation; and secondly—and this is where the analogical reflexive reversal is enacted in a moment of judgment and faith—dialogue is a discerning of the divine Logos in creation which itself is contained and held in and through the Logos who was 'in the beginning'. This logic runs analogous to the logic traced out by Thomas Aquinas in Chapter 4 above where, after one follows the via resolutionis to Being from the vantage point of the primary analogate of being—the person—one then makes an analogical judgment of affirming that transcendent Being itself grounded in a transcendent cause. As the stewards of Creation, human persons respect the logos of created beings in a relational encounter which both upholds the dignity of Creation precisely as created in and through the Logos, without whom nothing was made.

f. The Response: The 'We' of Dialogical Personalism

The matter of the dignity of the human person is always more of a call and a demand than an already accomplished fact, or rather it is a fact worked out by human beings, both in the collective and in the individual sense.

—Karol Wojtyła/John Paul II

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190 Ibid., 172.
191 1 Colossians 1:14-17; John 1:1
193 John 1:3.
194 From the essay “On the Dignity of the Human Person” in Karol Wojtyła, Person and Community: Selected Essays, trans. Theresa Sandok (New York; Berlin; Bern; Frankfurt/M.; Paris; Wien: Peter Lang, 1993), 179.
The final section of this thesis attends to the dialogical response of the person. While I will not be tracing-out the already well-trodden path of providing a history of the notion of the person, I will be exploring different avenues of what has been known as ‘personalism’, the thinkers of dialogue, and ‘dialogism’ (the latter of which is associated with Mikhail M. Bakhtin).

This section will be actively re-translating some of the work of members from the above group, notably that of Bakhtin. Before laying out the plan of this chapter, a few words are in order to explain how the inclusion of Bakhtin helps shed light on the relationship between monologue and dialogue—what we have so far been naming ‘univocity’ and what emerges within the ‘ordering-space’ of analogy.


While Bakhtin’s writings at least formally apply to the genres of the novel and speech, his own work, by his own admission, ‘must be called philosophical’.\textsuperscript{198} Thus, Bakhtin’s work will allow for more ‘stretch room’ within his concepts, many of which have no apparent conflict with theology in the first place.\textsuperscript{199} The re-translation of these dialogical and personalist thinkers is necessary for this project exactly where they may fail to be properly analogically-orientated. It would be unnecessary at this stage to nudge each thinker in every case closer to the analogical judgment of ‘for however great a similarity, there is an ever greater dissimilarity’. That is, in some cases the presupposition concerning theological dialogue will be one of a more univocal bent between God and the human person; in other cases the concern may not necessarily be theological at all (and therefore may be more ‘equivocal’), but will still maintain their usefulness in this study. For now it will suffice to remember that the dialogical personalism I am advocating is only possible as an analogical quest; in other words, there is much more that could be said and other avenues to follow as possible analogues, but in the meantime, this attempt, however much it may bear marks of the divine, may very well fail.

In earlier chapters (especially Chapter 3 and in the introduction to the present chapter) I considered the temptations toward radical equivocity in the writings of Levinas, Lyotard, and Rancière; however, I would argue that the primary theological-philosophical temptation is that of univocity. I locate this original temptation in the first temptation offered to Adam: ‘and you will be

\textsuperscript{198} Mikhail M. Bakhtin, “The Problem of the Text in Linguistics, Philology, and the Human Sciences: An Experiment in Philosophical Analysis,” in \textit{Speech Genres and Other Late Essays}, 103. Bakhtin says it is philosophical ‘mainly because of what it is not: it is not a linguistic, philological, literary, or any other special kind of analysis (study). The advantages are these: our study will move in the luminal spheres, that is, on the borders of all the aforementioned disciplines, at their junctures and points of intersection’ (ibid.).

like God, knowing good and evil'. 200 The Promethean temptation ethically is, as a metaphysical desire, the longing for such a univocity; it is also, simultaneously and paradoxically, to desire one's place in creation as radically sundered from and apart from God 201 in a moment of equivocity, and in this case we see that without a proper analogical account, violent dialectics of univocal-equivocal oscillations arise. The univocal-Promethean desire (i.e. sin) seems primary. It may be for this reason that in the locus classicus of the question on analogy in the *Summa Theologica*, Thomas Aquinas spends more time thwarting the claims of univocity. 202 Therefore, in the light of the horrors of the twentieth century attempts to become like God, many of the philosophical and theological responses to personhood have tended in the opposite (and thus reactionary) direction of radical equivocity, radical heterogeneity, and the like. Having more fully attended to the equivocal response of Levinas in Chapter 3, the present chapter will thus devote more of its critique to that of univocity, or for this discussion, that of monologue.

The 'monologic world', Bakhtin says, is where an idea is forcibly placed in the mouth of the hero, the place where the idea 'gravitates toward some impersonal, systemically monologic context'. 203 Moreover, because everything is reduced to a single voice, the monological temptation means that the world itself becomes 'a voiceless object of that deduction'. 204 In other words, both the person and the world become lost within the univocal logic of personal 'monologic'. 205 Yet monologue itself can be a wolf in sheep's clothing. Martin Buber warns against 'monologue disguised as dialogue, in which two or more men, meeting in space, speak each with himself in strangely tortuous and circuitous ways and yet imagine they have escaped the torment of being thrown back on their own resources'. 206 And this he calls the 'sterling quality of "modern existence"'. 207

200 Genesis 3:5.
201 Cunningham, *Darwin's Pious Idea*, 403.
202 See *ST*, I, q. 13, a. 5.
204 Ibid., 83, emphasis in original.
205 For other places where Bakhtin outlines the 'monological', see Bakhtin, *Speech Genres and Other Late Essays*, 161–3; Bakhtin, *Dialogic Imagination*, 342–6.
207 Ibid.
The plan of this section will be as follows: I will examine 1) the lateness of the response; 2) the limitations of dialogue in relation to truth in conversation with Balthasar, Thomas Aquinas, and Bakhtin; and finally, 3) the the dialogical possibility for the *communio personarum*.

1) To begin, we must note that the response of the person arrives 'too late'. That is, as human persons, God has already enacted this response through God’s Word, ‘to the creature through the creature’ of the divine word made flesh, to recall Hamann. Hans Urs von Balthasar says, ‘A response that always comes too late because the deed God carried out in Christ, the bearing away of my sins, has already taken place, before any response was possible, before a response could even be considered’. Accordly, St Paul tells us, ‘God shows his love for us in that while we were yet sinners Christ died for us....while we were enemies we were reconciled to God by the death of his Son’. The response of Jesus Christ as the Father’s Word in the Spirit is that which both ‘surpasses and anticipates us’. It is Christ’s own ‘response’ alone, therefore, that ‘can at once be and bear witness to the truth, because he is the only one who comes from the Father, is sent by him, and “exposits” him (Jn 1:18)’. Moreover, this bearing witness is more than that which is contained within words: ‘it includes a personal commitment, a personal answerability for what one declares to be true’. Thus the personal work of the Son in this act of bearing witness is every much as a part of this act as is his own verbal testimony.

The answerability of the human person—this cannot be emphasized enough—always falls, therefore, within the prior answer of the Word-made-flesh. Our own truthful words participate in the living Word (Logos), and our own deeds participate in the life of this living Word. Our answerability thus analogically participates in that of Christ’s own testimony. What’s more, the

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209 Romans 5:8, 10.
213 See Ibid., II:18–19.
response of the person is itself within Creation which itself is held together in this same Word (Col 1:14-17).

With this in mind, in a short piece entitled ‘Art and Answerability’, Bakhtin inveighs against ‘mechanical’ understandings of the whole, which cannot properly account for the ‘answerability’ of one’s life. The mechanistic approach attempts to de-unify the whole person externally in an effort to defer responsibility, as ‘answerability entails guilt, or liability to blame’. For it is ‘only in the individual person’ that an integration of science, art, and life can be achieved in the ‘unity of answerability’. Similarly in Karol Wojtyła’s Person and Act, he argues against both empiricists and idealists, stating that the unity of the person is not found in the body itself or in the psyche, but in the locus of moral action. Without this unity, the mechanistic approach externalizes the connection by disassociating life from art and art from life: one flees from one’s own life into art and makes excuses (and vice versa). In response to this escapist mode of life, Bakhtin says, ‘The individual must become answerable through and through: all of his constituent moments must not only fit next to each other in the temporal sequence of his life, but must also interpenetrate each other in the unity of guilt and answerability’. Commenting upon this aspect of answerability in Bakhtin, Michael Holquist states, ‘the uniqueness of the place I occupy in existence is, in the deepest sense of the word, an answerability: in that place only am I addressed by the world, since only I am in it. Moreover, we must keep on forming responses as long as we are alive’.

Our response comes ‘too late’ indeed, but this should not hinder our responsibility to answer in the particular situatedness of our location, which is

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214 Bakhtin, Art and Answerability, 1–3.
215 Ibid., 1.
216 Ibid.
217 Translated from the Polish Osoba y czyn into English as The Acting Person. This title, by all accounts, is misleading as it over-looks the tension in the subject-act polarity in the original title. For more on this as well as the generally unreliable status of the English translation, see Kenneth L. Schmitz, At the Center of the Human Drama: The Philosophical Anthropology of Karol Wojtyła/Pope John Paul II (Washington, D. C.: Catholic University of America Press, 1993), 59–60.n.6; and the note that spans George Weigel, Witness to Hope: The Biography of Pope John Paul II (New York: Cliff Street Books, 1999), 174–5.
219 Bakhtin, Art and Answerability, 2.
220 Holquist, Dialogism, 30.
both wholly embodied\(^{221}\) and gendered. ‘Life by its very nature is dialogic’, Bakhtin says. ‘To live means to participate in dialogue: to ask questions, to heed, to respond, to agree, and so forth. In this dialogue a person participates wholly and throughout his whole life: with his eyes, lips, hands, soul, spirit, with his whole body and deeds. He invests his entire self in discourse, and this discourse enters into the dialogic fabric of human life, into the world symposium’.\(^{222}\) To answer the call not only enlivens the world around us (even giving ‘voice’ to it), but doing so faithfully also recognizes the community of persons, multiple associations, and networks which also inform each and every one of us. But more on this below.

2) Dialogue cannot be *constitutive* of Revelation, otherwise it would betray the univocal logic of the ‘two relating to a third’, which we showed in the previous chapter to not be properly *analogue*.\(^{223}\) Rather, dialogue itself must remain analogue, or as Holquist puts it, ‘dialogism is dialogic’\(^{224}\) in the same way that we have argued that ‘analogy is analogous’.\(^{225}\) That is, dialogue, just like analogy, must be properly ordered to a primary analogate. Revelation, and therefore *truth itself* as the person of Christ, contra process theology, does not ‘happen’ in the encounter between Christ and the world\(^{226}\) (aside from, of course, the communication of idioms of the humanity and divinity in the person of Christ); as Balthasar puts it, ‘There is nothing between God and the

\(^{221}\) Mounier, *Personalism*, 10-11.

\(^{222}\) Bakhtin, *Problems of Dostoevsky's Poetics*, 293.

\(^{223}\) This is to be distinguished from other kinds of ‘mediating’, suspending thirds which do not sublate toward a moment of impersonal univocity. Two forms of this are 1) Buber’s ‘eternal Thou’ and Bakhtin’s ‘superaddressee’ and 2) the third emerging in a fruitful *we* beyond the *I*—*thou*, both of which are attended to below.

\(^{224}\) Holquist, *Dialogism*, 181.


\(^{226}\) To take just one example out of many, see Catherine Keller, *On the Mystery: Discerning Divinity in Process* (Minneapolis, MN: Fortress Press, 2008). I would easily affirm most of the first chapter (‘Come, My Way: Theology as Process’) but not ultimately the conclusions of the second chapter (‘Pilate’s Shrug: Truth as Process’). For careful accounts of God’s divine impassibility, see Thomas Weinandy, *Does God Change? The Word’s Becoming in the Incarnation* (Petersham: St. Bede’s Publications, 1985); David Bentley Hart, “No Shadow of Turning: On Divine Impassibility,” *Pro Ecclesia* 11, no. 2 (2002): 184-206; Paul L. Gavrilyuk, *The Suffering of the Impassible God: The Dialectics of Patristic Thought* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2006). Hart puts it well: ‘No: love is not primordially a reaction, but the possibility of every action, the transcendent act that makes all else actual; it is purely positive, sufficient in itself, without the need of any galvanism of the negative to be fully active, vital, and creative. This is so because the ultimate truth of love is God himself, who creates all things solely for his pleasure, and whose act of being is infinite’ (Hart, “No Shadow of Turning,” 195).
creature that might correspond to the “interpersonal milieu” of the dialogicians, for God does not need man to speak to him in order to be an I'.

While worldly truth is indeed in process, it only is so insofar as it participates in the replete fullness of the Triune life which sustains it in and through the second person of the Trinity. Contra Hegel, God does not need the world to be God (‘ohne Welt ist Gott nicht Gott’ in Hegel). Recognizing this allows Creation to be the full gift it really is, without pagan necessity.

What is required is the space of analogical distance, for without it, one veers too close to a flat identification between the world and God. Paul Fletcher, in a critical account of Alastair McFadyen’s work on dialogical personalism, shows that McFadyen, too, assumes a tidy, direct identity between human persons and the divine persons. As Fletcher rightly remarks,

There is not here any concession to the doctrine of creation and, accordingly, to the fact that the structure of divine-human dialogue might be understood as a gift that maintains a distance between God and humanity while, at the same time, enigmatically marks the immediacy of God. The distance and closeness of God is, of course, analogous to intersubjective dialogue but this analogy must incorporate the manifest dissimilarity of relations because of the status of the participants. In this sense, the commitment to the distinction between immanent and economic Trinities provides something more than a heuristic device: it offers something like the co-ordinates by which the earthly pilgrimage can be negotiated.

It is for this reason that David Bentley Hart also says that the distinction between the immanent and economic Trinity must itself be the distance of analogy.

At a more technical level, Balthasar elaborates why dialogue cannot be understood univocally within the dialogical principle. ‘Human beings share a common language, even if each person can leave his own creative stamp on it. But between God and man—when it is a matter of genuine personal self-

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228 For God is likewise the finite and I am likewise the infinite; God returns to himself in the I as what sublates itself as finite, and he is God only as this return. Without the world God is not God’. G. W. F. Hegel, Lectures on the Philosophy of Religion: Vol I: Introduction and the Concept of Religion, ed. Peter C. Hodgson (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2008), 308n.97, emphasis in original.
229 Paul Fletcher, Disciplining the Divine: Toward an (Im)political Theology (Surrey: Ashgate, 2009), 92; commenting upon McFadyen, The Call to Personhood, 275. I am indebted to John W. Wright for bringing Fletcher’s helpful text to my attention.
disclosure and not just a vague, closed knowledge about the other—the only language possible is the Word of God, and this language is possible only if God freely chooses to make himself intelligible to man in his Word by interpreting to him the Word that he speaks'.

Again, this hearkens both to Hamann’s dialogue of ‘to the creature through the creature’ and Yannara’s account of dia-logic. The failure of the above dialogical (or even ‘process’) accounts is that they assume that ‘the reciprocal revelation in love becomes coextensive with the understanding we can achieve on the basis of nature’.

In other words, contrary the intention of the dialogicians’ attempt to uphold the status of the person, their unrecognized univocal presuppositions flatten out the difference between divine and human persons.

Christologically speaking, to ascribe such a flat personalism between Christ and human persons would be to analogously repeat the heresy of monophysitism, which assumes that there is only one ‘nature’ in Christ and thus the union of the Son happens at the ‘level’ of nature. A proper Christian personalism, therefore, would uphold with Thomas Aquinas and the tradition that the union took place in the person of Christ. But again, one must be careful and not reduce this to a ‘pure’ personalism outside of the analogical interval, for even the person of Christ in the incarnation does not assume a person or a man, but the nature of humanity. Otherwise the errors of Eutyches and Dioscorus (one nature ‘out of’ two natures as opposed to two natures ‘in’ one person) or Nestorius and Theodore of Mopsuestia (separating persons of God and man) lead to there being two ‘persons’ in the person of Christ. Both cases, and that of the anthropological reductive tendencies of the dialogicians (at least the Christian ones like Ebner according to Balthasar) cannot fully account for the truth of the person because of a

232 Balthasar remarks that Hamann and Kierkegaard were among the few ‘witnesses’ who did not reduce the reception of the Word of God to mere subjectivity (Balthasar, Love Alone Is Credible, 48).
233 Ibid., 47.
234 Cf. ST, III, q. 2, a. 1.
235 ST, III, q. 2, a. 2.
236 On not assuming a person, see ST, III, q. 4, a. 2; on not assuming a man, see ST, III, q. 4, a. 3.
237 ST, III, q. 4, a. 2 s. c.
238 ST, III, q. 2, a. 6; q. 4, a. 2. For a thorough accounting of the heresies relating to these figures see Riches, Christ, the End of Humanism.
misunderstanding of the analogical ordering contained within the relationship of one's nature to their unified personal center. Thomas says that a suppositum and nature really differ in that which possesses matter and form, which means that one would commit an error to say that 'this man is his manhood'. But in the divine person of Christ, the nature and suppositum are the same (but different 'only in our way of thinking'); although 'person' still has a different meaning from 'nature', for, insofar as human nature does not exist separately on its own, it was assumed 'in something more perfect, viz. in the Person of the Word'. A person reduced to its subjectivity or reciprocity is still a reduction to a nature, which is unacceptable both for the human and for the divine person of the Logos, the latter of which is the filial relation of the Son to the Father as the single, unified, person of Christ. To flatten out nature and person in God, therefore, would amount to modalism. Dialogue happens at the level of the relation, that is, the person who 'has' a nature.

What the above amounts to for Balthasar, is that the dangers of thinkers such as Franz Rosenzweig, Martin Buber, and Ferdinand Ebner ultimately 'slide into a mere two-way monologue (with a religious background, to be sure)—this impulse itself stemming from an either/or decision of the excluded middle. A dialogue will never continue on as a dialogue if it persists as a relation between two 'points of reference'; that is, dialogue is never a mere duologue.

239 ST, III, q. 2, a. 2.
240 Ibid. Likewise, see Balthasar's comments: 'This relationship is the reason that it is, on the one hand, “impossible to think of a hypostasis without a nature” and that no nature, on the other hand, can simply coincide with its hypostasis. Both concepts necessarily exclude one another, even in God'. Balthasar, Cosmic Liturgy, 223; quotations are from St Maximus Confessor, Opuscula, [PG 91:246a]. Karol Wojtyla remarks that in the early centuries of Christianity, 'what was especially needed was a concept of person and an understanding of the relation that occurs between person and nature'. See his 'Thomistic Personalism' in Person and Community, 165–75 at 166.
241 ST, III, q. 2, a. 2 ad 3.
242 ST, I, q. 40, a. 1 and ad 1.

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What is missing, therefore, is a better analogy of personal dialogue which Balthasar locates in the paradigm of ‘fruitfulness’. It is in fruitfulness that he sees ‘a moment of genuine imago Trinitatis’. As Balthasar puts it, ‘On the intellectual plane, the dialogicians content themselves with reflecting on the original distance and relation between man and woman..., without attending to the organic and personal fruitfulness of the two’. Emmanuel Levinas helpfully articulates this reality as one of fecundity, which is what he calls our ‘relation with such a future [that is] irreducible to the power over possibles’. Fecundity names the adventure where the discontinuity engendered from the fruitful third remains nonetheless a part of one’s own future, one’s shared search and desire.

More attention should have been paid, for Balthasar, to the fruitfulness in the Logos’ involvement with personal encounter. It is the kind of fruitfulness that Catherine Pickstock sees prefigured in an analogous sense in Plato’s Symposium, in the emergence of the third which moves beyond the deadlock of a binary reciprocity: ‘What any two desire in desiring a union is not merely this union, but always also the fruit of this union in whatever sense, something that is both them and neither of them: a baby, a work of practice or understanding, a new ethos that others may also inhabit’. Levinas adds: ‘That infinite being not be a possibility enclosed within the separated being, but that it be produced as fecundity, involving, therefore, the alterity of the Beloved, indicates the vanity of pantheism’. The infinity of the other in this dialogical we is what Levinas Moving beyond the realm of pure self-reference (of αυτός) into that of the self-donative love of the person involves,

247 Ibid., II:60–1, emphasis in original.
248 Levinas, Totality and Infinity, 267.
249 Ibid., 268. In this sense, Levinas is more properly ‘analogue’ when speaking about the fruitfulness of fecundity.
251 Levinas, Totality and Infinity, 269.
252 Kenneth L. Schmitt, “Selves and Persons: A Difference of Loves?,” Communio 18, no. 2 (1991): 183–206. The article explores the tension between the two, suggesting that we are
therefore, a reference to the interpersonal we of dialogue. In light of the outward mission of fruitfulness, Balthasar speaks of the child as the personal gift of the parents as born in mutual love. 'In this sense the child can be seen as an image of the Holy Spirit, the “We” of the ever-greater fruitfulness of the love of the Father and the Son. In one place, Balthasar speaks of the Holy Spirit as the “We, the eternal dialogue of the Father and the Son”.'

To be sure, in Balthasar there are multiple analogies for the person and understanding his or her analogical place within the whole. Not only is Balthasar’s anthropology self-described as a ‘meta-anthropology’ where the person both ‘sums up the world and surpasses it’, but he also employs the similarly ‘fruitful’ analogy of ‘person as mission’ or ‘vocation’ in his Theo-Drama (and here Buber is seen in a more positive light, where ‘all revelation is vocation and mission’). Like Thomas’ identification of the divine persons with their relations, for Balthasar, ‘in Jesus, his Person is one with his mission—within the reciprocal relationship he enjoys with the Father who sends him and the Holy Spirit who fosters communication between them’.

Due to the infinite fecundity of the fruitfulness of the Trinity, in the created sphere there are countless images of such human transcendence which ‘burst[s] the closed model’, and so much more could be said about Balthasar’s emphasis on mission. In a statement with which Balthasar would surely agree, Levinas says, ‘Fecundity is part of the very drama of the I’.

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For now I will close this section with a summary of his own thoughts on the matter: 'Participation in the mission of Christ [...]—that would be the actual core of the reality of the person'. That is, to be devoted to one's role to such an extent that one enters it and 'become[s] absorbed in it', which happens in a paradoxical rhythm of both being and becoming. It is in the person of Christ wherein the 'I'-name of the I and Thou relationship is 'uniquely and ineffably one', not merely by earthly means, but in an ever-greater way. Based upon the analogical participation of the 'One in whom person and mission are identical', they live out their being within creation by living out their 'personalizing mission' so that 'they may fulfill their election; thus they can become what in God's sight they always are and always have been'.

3) In this final section, I turn to the vocation of the human person within the 'called' body of human persons. I will be primarily following the thought of Karol Wojtyła / Pope John Paul II in his articulation of the communio personarum. The main point of reference is the Vatican II document Gaudium et Spes §24, which points to Christ's prayer of unity in John 17, which states that the prayer 'has opened up new horizons closed to human reason by implying that there is a certain parallel between the union existing among the divine persons and the union of the sons of God in truth and love'. The fruitfulness of divine persons must always be affirmed as unified in one God in the love that God is, which itself is communicated to us from the Father to the Son in the Spirit. The human person, therefore, can only discover the truth of him- or herself in an act of self-donation. The greatest commandment to

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265 Weigel points out that there is an 'intense focus on the human person, evident in both Dignitatis Humanae and Gaudium et Spes' (Weigel, Witness to Hope, 171).
266 Flannery OP, Vatican Council II, 925.
love God and one’s neighbor thus entails that ‘God desired that all men should form one family and deal with each other in a spirit of brotherhood’.  

The final sentence of §24 states: ‘man can fully discover his true self only in a sincere giving of himself’. Wojtyła finds inspiration in this, remarking that this provides the core of how one is involved in an act of self-determination by paradoxically giving oneself away. He says, ‘it is precisely when one becomes a gift for others that one most fully becomes oneself’. When the person, as a ‘suppositum that experiences itself as incomplete’ then takes action by transcending oneself in a giving of him- or herself over in morally good actions, they ‘become good’ and find their own self-fulfillment in this act. As Kenneth Schmitz remarks, ‘Only in transcendence do we go beyond ourselves toward the promise of each one’s unique humanity. Part of our fulfillment consists in a horizontal transcendence, that is, in our going out to the things around us, in coming to know them, in interacting with them and being affected by them. But such horizontal transcendence is only a condition of our fulfillment: it is not its key’.

That is, the horizontal transcendence of the interpersonal, self-donative relation is only made possible by the ‘third’, which is in fact not a third, but first: the vertical transcendence of the person of the Logos within all of our encounters. Peter Slater provides commentary on this logic in the work of Bakhtin: ‘The interlocutory third is not a numerical third any more than dialogue need be only between two people. What is “third” in every dialogic process, in addition to authors and readers, or speakers and hearers, is most often in the background. It is not a dialectical third correlating two parties to make one composite party. It is a consummating third fulfilling those encountering each other historically in their differences as well as their commonalities’. This third, contrary to Hegel, is not synthesizing, but is a consummating divine third who ‘does not merge or absorb the dialogue partners. It “overshadows” us physico-spiritually, sustaining and respecting

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267 Ibid.
268 Ibid.
270 Wojtyła, ‘The Person: Subject and Community’ in Ibid., 233.
272 Schmitz, At the Center of the Human Drama, 86.
our differences'. 274 At the same time, it is a consummating third who is kenotically self-donative, even when grace for ourselves is lacking and our self-fulfillment is therefore wanting. Bakhtin says: ‘God is now the heavenly father who is over me and can be merciful to me and justify me where I, from within myself, cannot be merciful to myself and cannot justify myself in principle, as long as I remain pure before myself. What I must be for the other, God is for me’. 275 Failing our own ability to respond even to ourselves, God has already answered, making our own answers possible, akin to Buber’s ‘eternal Thou’ 276 or Bakhtin’s ‘superaddressee’. 277 In this sense, God’s paradoxical continuous-yet-ever-greater in-breaking into our lives shows us the patience needed both to overcome our own alienation from ourselves, but also our alienation from others. What is required, and what stands in contrast to alienation, is personal participation. 278

It is not enough to be a member of one’s communities, as if common interests were enough to maintain cohesive unity; 279 what is needed, on the contrary, is an emphasis on the other as neighbor and friend. Wojtyla says, ‘To participate in the humanity of another human being means to be vitally related to the other as a particular human being, and not just related to what makes the other (in abstracto) a human being. This is ultimately the basis for the whole distinctive character of the evangelical concept of neighbor’. 280 Participating in the humanity another person necessitates a porous regard for the other and for oneself in a way that one also sees oneself as a neighbor. What this means is that, insofar as we participate in each other’s humanity, we must recognize that we cannot subsist on our own in an autonomous, self-constructing way. Bakhtin’s concept of ‘transgredience’ (or ‘extralocality’) is helpful here:

274 Ibid.
275 Bakhtin, “Author and Hero in Aesthetic Activity” in Art and Answerability, 56.
276 Buber, I and Thou, 14, 61, 64, and passim.
277 Bakhtin, “The Problem of the Text” in Speech Genres and Other Late Essays, 126. ‘The aforementioned third party is not any mystical or metaphysical being (although, given a certain understanding of the world, he can be expressed as such)—he is a constitutive aspect of the whole utterance, who, under deeper analysis, can be revealed in it’ (Ibid., 126–7). For an account comparing Buber and Bakhtin, which points this connection out (amongst others), see Maurice Friedman, “Martin Buber and Mikhail Bakhtin: The Dialogue of Voices and the Word That Is Spoken,” Religion & Literature 33, no. 3 (Autumn 2001): 25–36.
278 Wojtyla, ‘The Person: Subject and Community’ in Person and Community, 238. See also idem, ‘Participation or Alienation?’ in Ibid., 197–207.
279 Schmitz, At the Center of the Human Drama, 88.
280 Wojtyla, ‘The Person: Subject and Community’ in Person and Community, 237, emphasis in original. For a brief discussion of participation, see Weigel, Witness to Hope, 176.
‘What enables us to cross boundaries is our answering others and addressing them in specific contexts resonant with myriad ramifications.’

What ‘transgredience’ refers to is that we cannot see ourselves without another’s perspective: we cannot see the back of our head when getting a new haircut (without the second mirror being held up behind us), we cannot notice all of our insecurities or lack of empathy for each other (‘Doctor, you really showed no regard for the patient after the surgery’), in other words, we do not exist *sub specie aeterni* to ourselves, to repeat Kierkegaard. One cannot be ‘transgredient’ to themselves, as Clark and Holquist put it. It is not, therefore, that we merely let each other know about the piece of fuzz sticking humorously to their hair, or that we need just point out one another’s flaws in an effort to ‘inform’ them (‘just so you know...’), which itself easily slides into insulting pedantry; but constructively, in the sense of an upbuilding, that which is transgredient has ‘the function of consummating’. A single consciousness of one person does not suffice: ‘Aesthetic activity *proper* comes into effect with the moment of creative love for the content (the life) which has been co-experienced, i.e., of that love which brings forth an aesthetic form for the co-experienced life that is transgredient to that life’. Participating in the humanity of the other builds each other up by respecting the freedom and dignity of each person such that their gifts are recognized and their capacity to flourish is upheld. Examples which beautifully reflect this reality are the L’Arche communities (as started by Jean Vanier), the writings on disability and friendship by Hans Reinders, and the Economy of Communion as

283 Clark and Holquist, *Mikhail Bakhtin*, 79.
284 Bakhtin, ‘Author and Hero in Aesthetic Activity’ in *Art and Answerability*, 26–7, emphasis in original.
285 Bakhtin, ‘Author and Hero in Aesthetic Activity’ in Ibid., 86, emphases in original.
287 Reinders, *Receiving the Gift of Friendship*. I am indebted to Kenneth Oakes for bringing this important book to my attention.
begun by the Focolare movement. In providing a gift to one in need, forgiving a sin, loving the other, no matter how stubborn they may be on any particular issue: what all these having in common ‘is, on the one hand, the transgredient gift bestowed upon a recipient of the gift, and, on the other, the profound relation which this gift bears to the recipient: not he, but for him. Hence, the enrichment in this case is formal, transfigurative in character—it transposes the recipient of the gift to a new plane of existence'. The call of the other in such a relationship is answered kenotically but also therefore emergently: the conjoining of the two, three, or more in dialogue creates something new – ‘wherever two or three are gathered in my name’.

The particular community of people that makes up such a reality cannot be a mere multiplicity; only a community which participates in each other’s humanity is thus under a ‘specific unity of this multiplicity’: What is connected within this community of many, as mentioned above in our discussion of ‘fruitfulness’, ‘is no longer a relation to a thou but a relation to a we, although it can easily be resolved into a number of relations to thou’s’. The communio personarum is that community which unites the I—thou relationship in an abiding ‘mutual affirmation of the transcendent value of the person (a value that may also be called dignity) and confirm this by their acts’. Following St Paul, we become incorporated into becoming sons and daughters ‘by adoption’ through the filial relationship of the Son to the Father who breathes the Spirit upon the Church. But it is precisely ‘the Incarnation which makes the human family a “we” at the deepest level. From the beginning, the Incarnation is a work of reuniting what was divided. Christ bears all men within himself. When the Word became flesh, it did not simply take on a body; as Saint Hilary said, the Incarnation is a concorporatio, a

289 Bakhtin, ‘Author and Hero in Aesthetic Activity’, in Art and Answerability, 90, emphasis in original. Bakhtin is speaking about the ‘hero’ here, but it is clear that these elements transcend themselves into other contexts beyond the novel.
290 Matthew 18:20.
292 Wojtyla, ‘The Person: Subject and Community’ in Ibid., 242, emphasis in original.
293 Wojtyla, ‘The Person: Subject and Community’ in Ibid., 246, emphasis in original.
294 Romans 8:15-23.
taking on of all flesh'. United in and through the Word, the *communio personarum* partakes of the mutual en-fleshment of Christ by the gift-giving and truth-advocating act of the Spirit who, in an out-pouring upon believers, causes the following to ignite: ‘All who believed were together and had all things in common; they would sell their possessions and goods and distribute the proceeds to all, as any had need’. A new communal dialogue is born at Pentecost. Holding things ‘in common’, therefore, entails the notion of a ‘common good’ where ‘many ℱ’s are related to a single value’. Not only does Christ come in the form of a servant, but we see here that the Spirit emboldens believers to engage one another in an act of personal service as well (we recall here the ‘dative’ grammatical case of giving).

The concept of the common good is itself a reality that functions analogously (the ‘analogy of proportionality’ applies well here), bringing a different realization of the *we* in the common goods within marriage, a nation, and humankind in general. Moreover, in dialogue with the common good, each *we* becomes even ‘more fully expressed and more fully actualized’. Wojtyła voices a word of warning here: the idea of community should not be used univocally, since it may be applied to different kinds of realities, for even between the *I—thou* relationship and a *we* there remains ‘a difference of profiles that seems to extend to the very roots of the two relationships’. That is, there can be many *I—thou* relationships within a single *we*: students and teachers within a Church; a priest visiting a sick parishioner within the same congregation; this same parish within the larger body of Christ; etc. Furthermore, even though the profiles of the *I—thou* and the *we* ‘are distinct and mutually irreducible to one another, in the experience and development of communal life they must permeate and mutually condition one another’. Different communities with overlapping and mutually reciprocal relationships may therefore (ideally) arise: dialogically, *viz.*, with the common good in

299 Wojtyła, ‘The Person: Subject and Community’ in *Person and Community*, 250.
300 Wojtyła, ‘The Person: Subject and Community’ in Ibid., 252.
301 Wojtyła, ‘The Person: Subject and Community’ in Ibid., 254.
sight, the *communio personarum* participates in and through (*dia*) the infinite dialogue of the Word (*Logos*) in the love that the Father has for the Son as communicated and given by the Spirit. Therefore, the *communio personarum* recapitulates the cases of the ‘nominative’ (through the vocative address of naming), accusative (regarding oneself as created and as other), and ‘genitive’ (sharers of being), all of which is upheld by the gift of creation in the ‘dative’. Such a community of human persons does exist here—but not fully quite yet, for even the *I—thou* relationship ‘does not exist in us an already accomplished fact’.\(^{302}\) But, these relationships are a risk worth taking, and it is worth weathering the long journey of a road that, although in its earthly form it remains incredibly broken, it is still a beautiful road, for even now, it is coloured by a world of persons, each made toward the image and likeness of God. As a beautiful reality, it is worth remembering with Plato that ‘all that is beautiful is difficult’.\(^{303}\) Christ crucified finally consummates this as true.

In this chapter I have traced the form of dialogue from its pre-Christian beginnings in Plato to its reception and transfiguration in the form of a theological call and response, itself understood as an analogical exercise. I have shown that human persons themselves are dialogical as analogically ordered to the ever-greater, tri-personal God. The analogy of *I—thou—we* in part reflects the fruitfulness of the triune life, although it mirrors it only very dimly, refracted by sin and death. And yet, while ‘properly human action in its true nature is action-in-response’,\(^{304}\) our response arrives on the scene late, but it does not come too late: Christ’s prior response makes our own response possible to a call that bids us, in a ‘life in death’, toward the true dialogue of the Father, Son, and Holy Spirit.

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\(^{302}\) Wojtyla, ‘Participation or Alienation?’ in Ibid., 203.

\(^{303}\) Plato, *Greater Hippias* 304e.

\(^{304}\) Schmitz, *At the Center of the Human Drama*, 119.
Conclusion: An Entreaty

This thesis has been an exercise in martyrdom. Mere human language has within it a powerlessness which has the capability to bear false witness, to lie: the tongue, a small thing, can turn large ships like a rudder and spark evil fires. Yet it also has the ability to participate in bearing truthful witness. Specifically, this thesis has wrestled with the issues of telling the truth about persons, both human and divine, via the path of analogy and dialogue. To be a witness to truth (a martyr), while it is a gift from God, it is also a task—a task which I hope I have begun to make gestures toward in this project.

The first part of this thesis considered three ways in which the human person has been denounced falsely under the heading of slander and accusation. Christ stood accused before Pilate (the angry mob is us), yet the real judge is Christ, who is the only one who can testify to himself in the truth because he is the truth, the way, and the life. Secondly, turning to the Dreyfus Affair, I took a closer look at the logic of accusation. There is, first, the kind of slander leveled at Alfred Dreyfus; then, there is the kind of accusation made famous in Emile Zola’s ‘J’Accuse…!’; a kind of accusation which, while it implicates people under its banner, in fact is seated within a deeper witness to the truth. Moses writes about and testifies to the truth: the Pharisees stand accused beneath its testimony. On the heels of the Affair, Charles Péguy reflects fervently about the mystique of the Dreyfusards. This serves as the beginnings of an analogical, ‘middle-voiced’ logic which suspends the person (not conceptually nor reducing it to a politique) in all his or her dignity. Chapter 3, thirdly, proceeds by completing the analysis of accusation by looking closely at the logic of accusation ‘in the accusative’ in the writings of Levinas. His philosophical work serves both as a warning against forms of hyper-alterity which evacuate the person to save the person, as well as an occasion to reconfigure the discourse along more original forms of speech in that of the gift (the dative). The logic of the gift (the ‘dative’), therefore,

1 See Henry, I Am the Truth, 6–9.
2 James 3:3.
serves as the impetus for the distance articulated within the tradition of analogous theological speech.

The primarily constructive work of the thesis takes place in second half (Part II), which begins with an articulation of the person as analogical. Chapter 4 begins with a metaphysical reduction to being, the *via resolutionis*, which is discovered to be simultaneously the event of the discovery of the person as the primary analogate of being. This affirmation is made as an act of judgment known as a 'reflexive reversal', one that I attend to throughout the remainder of the thesis: *viz.*, the path of knowledge gives way to the real metaphysical order of things such that the former, while first in our knowledge, becomes affirmed last in the logical order of Creation. In order to 'arrive at the arrival' of the person, therefore, we showed how the person is a legitimate 'perfection term' in the work of Thomas Aquinas, untangling the braid of absolute/relative terms, as well as the metaphysical knot of the formal/material constitution of the person. In order to 'arrive' at the person, I look at the logic of recapitulation in St Irenaeus of Lyons, for it is in this logic where we see the true person revealed and incarnated in the God-Man of Christ. It is in this one person, arriving 'later' than the first Adam, who himself becomes 'first'. Every answer to the human question of, ‘Who is the person?’ is thus preceded by the answer of the person of Christ who reveals ‘man to himself’.5

The concern of Chapter 5 is to go deeper into the analogical logic of the person and the question of the *analogia entis* is shown to be co-extensive to the *analogia personae*. I first take a look at the myriad issues surrounding analogy in Thomas Aquinas, paying careful attention to how one ‘arrives’ at analogy, affirming that the teaching on analogy is *both* epistemological and metaphysical, with an emphasis on the metaphysical reality giving way to the gnoseological. To understand this movement is also to affirm that the ‘dative’ case referred to above also transposes the ‘accusative’ into a new key: the key of relationality, or put more precisely, of being first related analogically to God in and through the person of Christ who recapitulates the truth of the human person. This is because analogical speech, as part of the theological

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5 *Gaudium et Spes* §22 in Flannery OP, *Vatican Council II*, 922.
tradition of naming God, is not merely about speech, but ultimately about somehow analogically speaking of a real God. The logic of analogy itself has been under debate among Thomists, so in this regard I show primarily three things: 1) that the analogy of proportionality does not speak for Thomas; 2) that analogy is based ultimately on the notion of causality, and therefore 3) on participation. The middle section of this chapter counters Christos Yannaras’ polemic against what he sees as ‘Western’ forms of analogy. I show, following various Thomists from the last century (primarily the work of W. Norris Clarke) that, in fact, the Thomist tradition has the same deep participatory logic that is based not upon a rationalist ‘essentialism’, but upon the tradition which says that God is the subsistent act of being itself (ipsum esse subsistens). The emphasis falls here upon existence, or the esse of God as ‘to-be’. The last section of the fifth chapter provides a look at the Analogia Entis of Erich Przywara. While I do not contrast the analogia entis with the analogia fidei in the well-known debate with Barth, instead I show constructively how the analogia entis, as co-extensive with an analogia personae, is ultimately grounded in an understanding of the primary task of the person to be that of the ‘dative’ case of service.

It is from within the understanding of the adequation toward being as an act of personal service that provides the framework for the conclusion on the final chapter on dialogue. In Chapter 6, I extend the analogy of the person by framing the person as ‘dialogical’, that is, as existing primarily through a logos both with the logos of Creation, but ultimately and primarily in and through the Logos of the second person of the Trinity (this move pushes once again the logic of the ‘reflexive reversal’). The first two sections look at the form of dialogue itself, founded first in Plato. The form reflects the shape of reason as a ‘conversation’ or internal dialogue, but more crucially, it reflects the active, personal form of the person of Socrates. Yet, the Socratic dialogues are known for their perplexing, aporetic endings. To that end, I examine the function of aporia, leading, by way of Kierkegaard, Heidegger, and Derrida, to a discussion of death. What matters is not that the aporia is a puzzle, an impasse, or the occasion to ruminate about the possible impossibility of one’s being-toward-death; rather, the Christian form of dialogue is always involved
in a moment of ‘life in death’, looking back toward the crucified Christ in order to live forward in a non-identical repetition of service in the life of the Church.

The last three sections of this chapter follow the dialogical contours of ‘the call and the response’. I follow both Jean-Louis Chrétien and Johann Georg Hamann in an aesthetic encounter with Creation, moving in the next section toward a dialogo with Creation inspired by the work of Yannaras, pushed toward a ‘reflexive reversal’ toward the Christic dia-logos. The final section attempts to articulate the response of the person, constructively and lived-out concretely. But again, following the logic of recapitulation, the person of Christ responds first for us, despite the fact that for us chronologically he was not ‘first’. The remainder of the chapter thus interweaves two important dialogical thinkers through its tapestry: Martin Buber and especially Mikhail Bakhtin. The interaction is not extensive, but what I hope to have shown is that there are some real resources here that remain, despite the appropriate hesitations from Hans Urs von Balthasar which I highlight. For, Balthasar helps us to remember the properly analogical logic of dialogue: it must stay ordered within a causal relationship to a primary analogate; otherwise, to assert that the truth of Christ itself is dialogical is to fall into a reductive, univocal trap. Following Balthasar and Karol Wojtyła / Pope John Paul II, finally, I look at the analogy of dialogue considered under the paradigm of ‘fruitfulness’. In Wojtyła, this becomes an emphasis on the communio personarum, a community of human persons engaged in dialogue both with each other in an I—thou profile, but also in the fruitful blossoming of a new, emergent ‘we’. This community emerges through the mutual participation in each other’s humanity through the service, primarily, of giving oneself over to the other in love.

This thesis began with the claim that, while my project will be devoted to the articulation of the person, it is also deeply committed to in no way defining the person. It is my claim that the logics of slanderous accusation and the group of thinkers devoted to a ‘radical’ heterogeneity of the person have actually gone the farthest to pinpoint the person. The first group reduces the person to ‘nothing but’ any number of non-human things while the second
group ironically tidies up the person by never having actually to meet one. Perpetual deferral can be useful as an ontic, analogical principle—and this is why Bakhtin remains theologically astute: he respects these logics as created logic,\(^6\) and only speaks about them as a potential first principle by speaking analogously about a ‘third’ voice who does not accuse in closing off the narrative, but loves in open-ended responsibility for the other.\(^7\) However, when never-ending deferral becomes ontologized, despite the claims toward ‘openness’, it becomes precisely its opposite. In sum, the use of analogy begins a constructive counter-project in that it founds the person not in a definition, but in the Creator who the ultimate, ever-greater three-personed God. Moreover, the truth of persons—both divine and human—is enlightened by paying attention to the real dialogical way in which they relate. But again, the analogical interval must be maintained: to reduce human dialogue to the divine dialogical triune life is ultimately a monological move. One bears witness to the truth of the person by first bearing witness to Christ, who is himself the concrete analogia entis, but who lives perichoretically in the Triune life by regarding his Father in the gift of the person of the Spirit.

To conclude this thesis, one last concrete example is necessary. Christ entreats us to follow him in a particular way in the Gospel of Matthew, recapitulating the themes outlined above. He says that on the day of judgment, we will be judged by how we have treated him: ‘I was hungry and you gave me no food, I was thirsty and you gave me nothing to drink, I was a stranger and you did not welcome me, naked and you did not give me clothing, sick and in prison and you did not visit me’.\(^8\) Christ was then asked, ‘Lord, when was it that we saw you hungry or thirsty or a stranger or naked or sick or in prison, and did not take care of you?’\(^9\) And Christ responds, ‘Truly I tell you, just as you did not do it to one of the least of these, you did not do it to me’.\(^10\) Thomas Rourke and Rosita Chazarreta Rourke show that in this passage, we see that ‘Jesus Christ is the ultimate “You” (in the accusative) to whom all

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\(^6\) Likewise, Przywara refers to the metaphysics as ‘creaturely’ and the analogia entis as a ‘creaturely principle’. E.g., see Przywara, Analogia Entis, 3:45–6, 206–8.

\(^7\) Cf. the chapter ‘The Last Word?: Dialogue and Recognition’ in Williams, Dostoevsky, 111–50.

\(^8\) Matthew 25:42-3.

\(^9\) Matthew 25:44.

\(^10\) Matthew 25:45.
love and failure to love is ultimately directed'.\textsuperscript{11} There is no ‘as if’ here, and their response deserves to be cited in full:\textsuperscript{12}

No, the statement is more radical asserting that the “You” of Christ is present in each and every person and is the “term of every act of love or every refusal to love.” The real point of Matthew 25 is to declare that we touch Jesus personally in all of our contact with other human persons. This is the “ontological core” of the command to love our neighbor. As [Jean] Galot summarizes, “The presence of the ‘You’ of Christ within each human person, with the right to be loved, is an ontological presence.” What Matthew 25 also underlines is that, as a relational being, Jesus is never indifferent to any human suffering; it is the “You” of Christ who is crying out for help. This ontological presence of Christ is not simply in his disciples and friends who heed his call. The emphasis is rather on his presence wherever there is human suffering. Moreover, not even evil behavior changes the profound respect owed to every human person as a true presence of Christ in the world. Even those who are in prison for crimes they have committed bear this presence within them, and Jesus bids us to go and comfort them as well (Matthew 25:43).\textsuperscript{13}

We end, therefore, with an example of Christ in the ‘accusative’ of the ‘You’. To answer this call of Christ in us is to ‘stand accused’ with the same Christic ‘you’ in each one of us, and especially in our neighbor. In so doing, we participate in the same ‘I’ of Christ so that we may be one in Christ, however analogically, in the splendor of an eschatological we. To engage in the works of mercy—both spiritual and especially here with respect to the corporeal—inhabits the lived-out, analogical dialogue of an encounter with Christ where ‘standing accused’ with Christ is no longer contained within the worldly logics of accusation and slander, but is a faithful opening to bearing witness to the way, truth, and the life of the one God who is in three persons.

\textsuperscript{11} Rourke and Chazarreta Rourke, \textit{A Theory of Personalism}, 31.
\textsuperscript{13} Rourke and Chazarreta Rourke, \textit{A Theory of Personalism}, 31; the Galot citation is to Galot, \textit{The Person of Christ}, 90, emphasis in original.
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