Commitment in symmetric contests

Possajennikov, Alex (2009) Commitment in symmetric contests. Economics Bulletin, 29 (1). pp. 376-384. ISSN 1545-2921

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The paper proves that in two-player logit form symmetric contests with concave success function, commitment to a

particular strategy does not increase a player's payoff, while in contests with more than two players it does. The paper also provides a contest-like game in which commitment does not increase a player's payoff for any number of players.

Item Type: Article
Schools/Departments: University of Nottingham, UK > Faculty of Social Sciences > School of Economics
Depositing User: Possajennikov, Dr Alex
Date Deposited: 14 Jun 2013 16:00
Last Modified: 26 Jun 2018 12:27

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