The retributive emotions: passions and pains of punishment
Holroyd, Jules (2010) The retributive emotions: passions and pains of punishment. Philosophical Papers, 39 (3). pp. 343-371. ISSN 0556-8641
It is not usually morally permissible to desire the suffering of another person, or to act so as to satisfy this desire; that is, to act with the aim of bringing about suffering. If the retributive emotions, and the retributive responses of which they are a part, morally permitted or even required, we will need to see what is distinctive about them. One line of argument in this paper is for the conclusion that a retributive desire for the suffering of the wrong-doer, and the aim to bring this about, can (contra recent arguments from Hanna 2008) be morally justified.
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