Expressivism and the value of truth

Sinclair, Neil (2012) Expressivism and the value of truth. Philosophia, 40 (4). pp. 877-883. ISSN 1574-9274

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Abstract

This paper is a reply to Michael Lynch's "Truth, Value and Epistemic Expressivism" in Philosophy and Phenomenological Research for 2009. It argues that Lynch's argument against expressivism fails because of an ambiguity in the employed notion of an 'epistemically disengaged standpoint'.

Item Type: Article
RIS ID: https://nottingham-repository.worktribe.com/output/1009307
Additional Information: The original publication is available at www.springerlink.com
Schools/Departments: University of Nottingham, UK > Faculty of Arts > School of Humanities > Department of Philosophy
Identification Number: https://doi.org/10.1007/s11406-012-9372-7
Depositing User: Sinclair, Dr Neil
Date Deposited: 22 Feb 2013 22:59
Last Modified: 04 May 2020 20:22
URI: http://eprints.nottingham.ac.uk/id/eprint/1931

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