The explanationist argument for moral realism

Sinclair, Neil (2011) The explanationist argument for moral realism. Canadian Journal of Philosophy, 41 (1). pp. 1-24. ISSN 1911-0820

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In this paper I argue that the explanationist argument in favour of moral realism fails. According to this argument, the ability of putative moral properties to feature in good explanations provides strong evidence for, or entails, the metaphysical claims of moral realism. Some have rejected this argument by denying that moral explanations are ever good explanations. My criticism is different. I argue that even if we accept that moral explanations are (sometimes) good explanations the metaphysical claims of realism do not follow.

Item Type: Article
Schools/Departments: University of Nottingham UK Campus > Faculty of Arts > School of Humanities > Department of Philosophy
Depositing User: Sinclair, Dr Neil
Date Deposited: 22 Feb 2013 23:48
Last Modified: 13 Sep 2016 18:13

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