The pretensions of moral realism

Sinclair, Neil (2012) The pretensions of moral realism. Analytic Philosophy, 53 (2). pp. 158-179. ISSN 2153-960X (Unpublished)

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Many philosophers argue that the face-value of moral practice provides presumptive support to moral realism. This paper analyses such arguments into three steps. (1) Moral practice has a certain face-value, (2) only realism can vindicate this face value, and (3) the face-value needs vindicating. Two potential problems with such arguments are discussed. The first is taking the relevant face-value to involve explicitly realist commitments; the second is underestimating the power of non-realist strategies to vindicate that face-value. Case studies of each of these errors are presented, drawn from the writings of Shafer-Landau, Brink and McNaughton, and from recent work in experimental metaethics. The paper then considers weak presumptive arguments, according to which both realist and non-realist vindications of moral practice are possible, but the realist vindications are more natural. It is argued that there is no sense of ‘natural’ available that can make these arguments work. The conclusion is that all extant presumptive arguments for moral realism fail.

Item Type: Article
Additional Information: This is a pre-submission draft of a paper which subsequently appeared, in revised form, as: Moral realism, face-values and presumptions. Analytic Philosophy 53(2), 158-179, June 2012. The definitive version is available at:
Keywords: Meta-ethics; Moral realism; Moral expressivism; Presumptive Arguments for Realism
Schools/Departments: University of Nottingham, UK > Faculty of Arts > School of Humanities > Department of Philosophy
Identification Number:
Depositing User: Sinclair, Dr Neil
Date Deposited: 14 Jun 2012 14:58
Last Modified: 04 May 2020 16:33

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