Two kinds of naturalism in ethics

Sinclair, Neil (2006) Two kinds of naturalism in ethics. Ethical Theory and Moral Practice, 9 (4). pp. 417-439. ISSN 1386-2820

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Abstract

What are the conditions on a successful naturalistic account of moral properties? In this paper I discuss one such condition: the possibility of moral concepts playing a role in good empirical theories on a par with those of the natural and social sciences. I argue that Peter Railton’s influential account of moral rightness fails to meet this condition, and thus is only viable in the hands of a naturalist who doesn’t insist on it. This conclusion generalises to all versions of naturalism that give a significant role to a dispositional characterisation of moral properties. I also argue, however, that the epistemological and semantic motivations behind naturalism are consistent with a version of naturalism that abandons the condition.

Item Type: Article
Additional Information: The original publication is available at www.springerlink.com
Schools/Departments: University of Nottingham UK Campus > Faculty of Arts > School of Humanities > Department of Philosophy
Depositing User: Sinclair, Dr Neil
Date Deposited: 14 Mar 2012 13:49
Last Modified: 14 Mar 2012 13:49
URI: http://eprints.nottingham.ac.uk/id/eprint/1599

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