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Sinclair, Neil (2008) Free thinking for expressivists. Philosophical Papers, 37 (2). pp. 263-287. ISSN 0556-8641

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Abstract

This paper replies to Zangwill’s argument that quasi-realists cannot accommodate the conceptual status of claims of moral mind-independence embedded in ordinary moral thought. I argue that this conceptual status is compatible with an ‘internal reading’ of such claims once one recognises the essential co-ordinating role of moral judgement. I also argue that an ‘external reading’ is available for an ‘essentialist’ type of mind-independence claim recently identified by Jenkins.

Item Type:	Article
RIS ID:	https://nottingham-repository.worktribe.com/output/1016184
Additional Information:	This is a preprint of an article whose final and definitive form has been published in the Philosphical Papers © 2008, copyright Taylor & Francis; Philosophical Papers is available online at: http://www.tandfonline.com/openurl?genre=article&issn=0556-8641&volume=37&issue=2&spage=263
Schools/Departments:	University of Nottingham, UK > Faculty of Arts > School of Humanities > Department of Philosophy
Identification Number:	10.1080/05568640809485222
Depositing User:	Sinclair, Dr Neil
Date Deposited:	14 Mar 2012 13:43
Last Modified:	04 May 2020 20:27
URI:	https://eprints.nottingham.ac.uk/id/eprint/1598

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