Implementing Social Security Programmes in Post-conflict Iraqi Kurdistan Region:
The Case of ‘Social Safety Net’ and ‘Rights and Privileges to Families of Martyrs and Genocide Survivors’ After 2001

By

Muslih Irwani

(BA, MA)

Thesis Submitted to the University of Nottingham

For the Degree of Doctor of Philosophy

February 2014
## Abbreviation List of Names

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Abbreviation</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>KRG</td>
<td>Kurdistan Regional Government</td>
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<tr>
<td>RPFMGS</td>
<td>Rights and Privileges to Families of Martyrs and Genocide Survivors</td>
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<td>MoMA</td>
<td>Ministry of Martyrs and Anfal Affairs</td>
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<tr>
<td>MoLSA</td>
<td>Ministry of Labour and Social Affairs</td>
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<tr>
<td>SPF</td>
<td>Social Protection Fund</td>
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<tr>
<td>FPF</td>
<td>Family Protection Fund</td>
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<tr>
<td>SSN</td>
<td>Social Safety Net</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>KDP</td>
<td>Kurdistan Democratic Party</td>
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<tr>
<td>PUK</td>
<td>Patriotic Union of Kurdistan</td>
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<tr>
<td>KNA</td>
<td>Kurdistan National Assembly</td>
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<tr>
<td>IKF</td>
<td>Iraqi Kurdistan Front</td>
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<tr>
<td>UNSC</td>
<td>United Nations Security Council</td>
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<tr>
<td>OFFP</td>
<td>Oil-for-Food Programme</td>
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Abstract

By drawing on the hegemony of politics over the administration and social policy in the Kurdistan Region, researching the implementation of social security programmes is critically important for understanding the outlook of the Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG) towards social policy. This research broadly examines policy implementation theories within the context of this politically underdeveloped region, taking into account the social security programmes of the KRG as a case study. Primary questions could be asked here, such as what are the critical factors in the implementation of social security in the KRG? Why has the KRG not adopted and implemented an effective social policy with its developmental programmes since its relative economic growth in 2001? My focused question in the current research is: why has the KRG implemented its two main social cash transfers (‘Rights and Privileges to Families of Martyrs and Genocide Survivors’ and ‘Social Safety Net’) differently? Exploring these cases would favour understanding of the extent to which the political conditions of the Kurdistan Region have influenced the implementation of social benefit schemes of the KRG. Experiencing its national struggle in the past, intra-Kurdish civil war during the 1990s and partisanship afterwards has formed the KRG.

As for the theoretical framework of this research, I have used two sets of literature: policy implementation and clientelism. Having employed qualitative semi-structured interviews with forty-six individuals and six focus groups from implementers of the aforementioned programmes in the region, this research discusses the critical factors in the implementation process of social security programmes in the KRG. In contrast to almost all policy implementation theories and models, which lay emphasis on the role of top officials (top-down approach), bureaucrats and implementers (bottom-up
approach), I argue that the political character of the programme and its beneficiaries is potentially a determinant actor in the policy implementation success. The KRG deals with social cash transfers in accordance with the profile and socio-political status of beneficiaries. In this regard two types of clients could be distinguished: high value clients treated within a preferred programme (RPFMGS) and low-value clients treated within a neglected programme (SSN). The profile and status of beneficiaries of social security schemes play a decisive role in the salience given to the social programme, and in the effectiveness of its implementation.

Both aforementioned social security programmes are implemented at a ministerial level. However, the performance of the two programmes appears to be complicated and evidently different. The main difference between both programmes is that the first programme, RPFMGS, serves a population who are characterised as ‘political victims’, while the second programme, SPF, covers ‘socio-economic victims’. Labelling beneficiaries based on their socio-political status will primarily explain the reason why the KRG deals with each social security programme very differently. The first programme is highly prioritised politically, while the second is neglected politically.
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Acknowledgements

My greatest intellectual debt is owed to those involved in the supervision of this research: Stephen Cope and Tony Fitzpatrick. Without their thoughtful guidance, instructions and continuous support, and most importantly patience, this work would have not seen realisation.

I would also like to thank those who helped me in the process of data collection and finding relative data and sources relevant to my research: Adbulrazaq M. Mustafa for providing me with some unpublished documents of KRG’s social policy documents, and Dler Anwar, Nadir Rusti and Goran Mustafa for providing me with limited published sources and documents about researched programmes.

I also give my appreciation to Dr Zahir Schwanni for providing me with a great deal of assistance to make my travel and early stay in the UK easy. My thanks and appreciation go to my friends, Dilshad Khidhir and Seevan Saeed for translating some interview transcripts from Kurdish into English. I must specially thank my friend, Samuel Okyere, for patiently proofreading the drafts of some chapters, and for his helpful comments and corrections on them. Finally, I also offer my regards to my friends Diane Trusson for reading chapters 3 and 7 and Warren Pearce for reading chapter 2 of my thesis. Their comments and corrections were useful.
CHAPTER ONE: INTRODUCTION

1.1. Journey of the Research

Living in a house with my mother and several younger siblings, without my father, during my childhood did not make me understand the reason for my mum’s tears and silent sorrows. I was always seeing my mum at midnight crying, after the younger children were asleep. I thought she was thinking of my father or had news about him. Perhaps she was upset by missing my father in the genocide campaign. Only after I became old enough to understand did my mum reveal that the secret of her tears was her deep concern as to whether her children would die of hunger altogether or one after another. For me, it is still a big puzzle and mystery how we survived. My family and all other Kurdish people, affected by war and genocide (Anfal), were left without any means of life or any choice of how to live. For them, there was no work, no income, and no support from government after the campaign.

Almost all those genocide-attacked families had lost their breadwinners and resources of life. The survivors were either children or illiterate women with no skills of work outside their villages. Despite all these extreme difficulties, they made their lives, survived and their children grew up. Nearly two decades later, with the self-ruling Kurdish government in Iraq, those people are at least financially served and some are even in high political, government or party positions. However, we are still seeing mothers and fathers in the Kurdistan Region shedding tears.
Previous disadvantaged people were labelled as ‘political victims’ of the war and displaced families due to the atrocities of the former regime in Iraq on them. However, current disadvantaged people are politically and economically different from war and genocide-affected people. They are unable to find a ‘political’ trait (as the first group advantaged to be identified with) for themselves to be served with their livelihood by the Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG). They are just poor and cannot afford a decent life for themselves in the recent, rapid economically developing Kurdistan Region. In contrast to the 1980s’ political victims, the voice of the present needy people is heard but mostly on the television screens as advertisement materials. On one side, opposition parties and non-government local media try to show the scene of needy people and their suffering as images of dysfunction of the KRG in the area of public services. On the other side, those people are being put in different scenes, with senior officials treating them. The KRG and its senior officials show how people’s demands are met and use this as political propaganda within their clientelistic practices. This thesis aims to critically analyse how two types of social security programmes, covering the two above-mentioned groups of people, operate. It also discusses the bases for this and why one programme is prioritised while another programme is neglected by the government in the Kurdistan Region. In order to do so, I have employed the implementation theory and clientelism as theoretical frameworks for the research.

This research methodologically focuses on the implementation process and its actors. However, it does not take claimants of the social security programmes as its participants. It is not even involved in any kind of comparison between the previous Iraqi regime and what the KRG has implemented as Kurdish self-ruling after 1992. I have clearly demonstrated in the background chapter, Chapter 3, that the former Iraqi regime practised the discrimination as part of its genocide operation against those Kurds not showing any loyalty to the Ba’athist ruling party.
I drew on my experience to later explain how difficult it is when a government identifies, differentiates and implicitly discriminates politically against the population in terms of taking care of their needs and providing public benefits, although the condition that disadvantaged people experienced under the previous regime, including discrimination and exclusion difficulties, is in no way comparable with the experience of a difficult financial life under the KRG. However, I always remember my mother’s tears every time I now see television programmes focusing on the plight of poor people when they are asking for help or when sometimes they are visited by senior officials to show the generosity of government and party leaders. These scenes have raised many questions in my mind. I always wondered why, in spite of the economic and financial growth of the KRG and legal framework to serve disadvantaged people in an institutionalised way, the government has been so cold-minded at all times and has not played its role in helping its people.

As mentioned, this thesis is about two social security programmes that the KRG is committed to implement. The first is the ‘Rights and Privileges to Families of Martyrs and Genocide Survivors’ (RPFMGS) administered by the Ministry of Martyrs and Anfal Affairs (MoMA). This programme provides monthly salaries and non-cash benefits to beneficiaries identified as family members of Kurdish liberation fighters, survivors of the genocide campaign and chemical attacks, and other war victims. The second programme is the Social Safety Net (SSN); its name has been changed from the Social Protection Fund (SPF) in 1992, then to the Family Protection Fund (FPF) between 2001 and 2009, and recently changed to the SSN. This programme consists of means-tested benefits administered by the Ministry of Labour and Social Affairs (MoLSA). In the SPF, a wide variety of population are targeted, based on their financial situation including people with very low or no income, the disabled, the widowed, married full-time students with a very low income, orphans and the elderly people.
This thesis is devoted to exploring the implementation of the two aforementioned social security programmes. Both social security programmes are implemented at ministerial level. However, the performance of the two programmes appears to be different. The main difference between both programmes is that the first programme, RPFMGS, serves a wide range of population, namely, as I prefer to call them, ‘political victims’; while the second programme, SSN, covers ‘socio-economic victims’. Labelling beneficiaries based on their socio-political status primarily explains the reason why the KRG deals with each social security programme very differently, amounting to ‘double standards’. Although both the RPFMGS and SSN are based on a similar legal framework in the KRG, the first programme is highly prioritised politically, while the second is politically neglected. Though the SSN dates back to the early 1990s and the RPFMGS was established later, in the mid-2000s, in their implementation they have taken very different directions.

The relative economic development and the rapid increase in general budget has led to a development in formation and implementation of the KRG’s social security programmes. However, there are still thousands of families who are living in desperate conditions. Although they are treated within so-called social cash transfer programmes, the government does not take alleviating the living conditions of poor people as seriously as the rights of ‘political victims’ to social protection. I argue that the KRG implements its social protection programmes in a double standard, clientelist way. This research looks at the implementation of social security programmes in connection with clientelism. This clientelist-driven implementation in social policy seems to be controversial in terms of the way and the methods of contributions to equality and appropriate public welfare system.
1.2. Research Aims and Questions

The aim of this research is to find out what are the critical factors in implementing social security in the Iraqi Kurdistan Region, and why these factors are critical. It is concerned especially with the politico-administrative conditions of the implementation of social security programmes in the KRG.

The main objective of this research is to explore the critical implementation factors of social security programmes in the Kurdistan Region and the rationale behind these factors. To this end, the following research questions have been adopted in this research.

1. To what extent do political conditions affect the implementation process?
2. Why does the KRG prioritise some social security programmes over others? What bases are there for a social security programme to be prioritised while another is neglected by the government in the Kurdistan Region?
3. How and why are social security programmes used for political party interests in the Kurdistan Region?
4. How do different groups in the policy implementation process perceive policy implementation?
5. What are the implementation gaps in the field of social security and what accounts for these?
6. How plausible are the key theories/models of implementation in a politically and economically under-developed region? What lessons can be drawn from social security programme implementation in developing countries in light of the research findings?
1.3. The Significance of the Research

The significance of this research can be briefly discussed from the following perspectives. First, most research on the policy implementation has focused on developed countries (Nakamura & Smallwood, 1980; Barrett & Fudge, 1981; Elmore, 1985; Lester et al., 1995; Parsons, 1995; O’Toole, 2000; Barrett, 2004). Exploring policy implementation in developing countries is neglected, though some limited research has been undertaken in the last decade (see Chapter 2). The main emphasis of implementation literature in both developing and developed countries is placed on the relations between policy making and policy implementation, policy actors, implementation problems, and how and why the performance of the programme matches or deviates from the policy. Implementation literature has given little attention to exploring policy implementation within the policy context-content debate. In other words, in addition to emphasising the relations between policy actors, this research takes another step in implementation research that looks at the policy performance within a broader politico-administrative context. In other words, this research focuses on the contextual factors; that is, the political and administrative environment of the post-conflict Kurdistan Region. It argues that policy implementation in politically less developed entities cannot be understood without taking into account the broader politico-administrative system of the country/region. Drawing on evidences from the implementation of social security programmes in the Iraqi Kurdistan Region, this research explains the political factors, i.e. political regime, instability, and corruption, which drive the implementation of social protection programmes in the KRG.

The literature review of the thesis discusses experiences of Iraq (excluding the Kurdistan Region), Iran, Venezuela, Mexico, Turkey, and Israel in relation to social policy provisions. Common political characters of social policy implementation in
developing countries will be highlighted in order to compare those experiences with those of the Kurdistan Region. Those countries have been selected based on their political condition. Iraq and Iran have experienced a long-term war and are highly politicised. Venezuela, Mexico and Turkey have a deep tradition of clientelism. The Israeli government has also practised discrimination and clientelism against non-western Jews in terms of providing public services. These case studies have been employed as selective examples to support one of the main arguments of the research. This would help to elaborate how and why the clientelism is being practiced in the design and implementation of social policy programmes (see Chapters 2, 3 and 7).

Another distinctive contribution, which has been addressed by the research, is the focus placed on the status of beneficiaries as significant actors in policy formulation and implementation. This research did not interview social security claimants, but implementers (especially in the case of employees of the MoMA) who are in the main time beneficiaries of the programme itself. This study is one of the first of its kind to investigate the role and status of beneficiaries in policy formulation and implementation in developing countries. In policy implementation research, the role of service users is researched mostly as recipients of a policy programme, yet such research has not charted their status as significant actors in the process of policy formulation and implementation. Policy research largely considers actual actors rather than potential actors. In this sense, policy implementation research includes a wide range of individuals such as executive directors, programme managers, supervisors and other staff members. The potential status of service users in the implementation process is often ignored because the focus tends to be on implementers rather than beneficiaries.
This research has drawn on ‘prioritising a social programme over another’ (from one of the research questions). I have interviewed some ‘programme implementers as actual beneficiaries’; especially employees of the RPFMGS programme, who are mostly from families of martyrs and genocide survivors. As for the second programme (SSN), the status of beneficiaries has been analysed from the perspective of officials and implementers. This research explores why one social security programme has been prioritised by the KRG over others. For that, the research examined corruption, non-transparency and sufficiency in the social benefits.

Apart from the endeavours made in this research to explain the top-down/bottom-up debate in light of research findings, this research seeks to fill a gap in implementation theory by exploring the significant impact of the broader politico-administrative context on policy implementation by examining the political and policy preferences and the public welfare system of the region. In other words, despite the internal organisational procedures, the politico-administrative structure can place a determinant ‘external’ influence upon the content of social security programmes.

This thesis focuses on social security in the post-conflict Kurdistan Region. It concerns the misuse of social security programmes on the KRG for political party interests. Within the political context of the Kurdistan Region, the research has identified a clientelistic use of social security programmes in the KRG. It explores how social security programmes of the KRG are used as a cash transfer to consolidate party loyalties. Using social funds to buy votes is extensively researched in developed countries (Dixit & Londregan, 1996; Robinson & Verdier, 2003; Brusco, Nazareno & Stokes, 2004; Calvo & Murillo 2004; Penfold-Becerra, 2007). This thesis researched the social security programmes as they have been utilised by government and the ruling party as a financial reward to people for their political/electoral backing.
1.4. Thesis Structure

In Chapter 2, I review the key literature and theories employed by the research. This thesis examines two sets of literature. The first is policy implementation. The mainstream theories and models of implementation in developed countries will be discussed. Thus, I will discuss the top-down, bottom-up and synthesis models of policy implementation.

I also address some existing literature on policy implementation in developing countries, especially those that have highlighted the impact of political and administrative processes on policy implementation. Although, most of the policy implementation theories and models have been conceptualised and tested in the context of the developed world, attempts have been made to test and articulate these implementation theories in the developing world. Chapter 2 also refers to key policy-relevant concepts such as policy salience, policy content and policy context.

The second theoretical framework of this research is clientelism and clientelistic practice in social policy/programmes. I will use all theories and literatures for two purposes. On one side, it will be used as a theoretical-conceptual framework for my research; and on the other side, theories will be applied to seek understanding of the implementation of social security programmes in the Kurdistan Region.

Chapter 3 is a contextual analysis of the politics, socio-economy and administration of the Kurdistan Region. The main focus, first, is placed on the development of the political condition that emerged in the Kurdistan Region as a special administration case amongst post-conflict developing country/regions. It starts by drawing upon the background and current political and socio-economic conditions, and then it provides a general overview of the current social security programmes of the KRG. These backgrounds need to be presented and analysed in order to capture the context which influences the social policy and its implementation. As I argue in this
thesis, the social policy process in a less developing country/region cannot be clearly understood without taking into account how the politico-administrative system operates.

As a result, Chapter 3 presents a brief history about the Iraqi Kurdistan Region, highlighting some events such as the displacement, marginalisation, deportation, genocide and civil war. I have discussed key events in the history of Iraqi Kurdistan that explain the conflict and uncertainty, plus their socio-economic consequences on the region. There then follows an argument that, due to a repressive policy that the state has followed against Kurds in Iraq, the Kurds have become politically repressed and socio-economically vulnerable.

A section in Chapter 3 is devoted to analysing the establishment of the Kurdistan National Assembly (KNA) and the KRG and the way they both operate. It starts from the period when the Iraqi Kurdistan Front (IKF) took over the local administrations from the three Kurdish governorates of northern Iraq. For the first time in the Iraqi Kurdistan Region, free elections were held which followed the establishment of the KNA and KRG in May 1992. These events are always referred to as an optimistic period in the history of the Kurdistan Region. However, it did not take long for signs of pessimism to emerge. The intra-Kurdish civil war, ‘fratricide’, started between the two major political parties, the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan (PUK) and the Kurdistan Democratic Party (KDP).

In the background chapter I will argue that the forms of Kurdish political struggle and partisanship in Iraq have continued to maintain the Soviet-style regime of political parties with their ultimate domination over parliament and government. What attributes this type of party-controlled government is the clientelism that followed while delivering social funds. The ‘fratricide’ between 1994 and 1998 consolidated even more the party interference in the institutions of the KRG. The third chapter
also highlights political and socio-economic opportunities that the KRG embraced after the invasion in 2003. It is also explained how the oil-based economy of the Iraqi Kurdistan Region has been double-edged. On the one hand, it has fuelled rapid socio-economic growth and prosperity; and on the other hand, due to lack of effective checks and balances, the Kurdistan Region fell into a state of institutionalised nepotism and corruption. This discussion presents a politico-administrative context for social welfare provision in the region. In the last section of Chapter 3 I will present an overview of the development of social security policy and programmes of the KRG.

In Chapter 4, an overview of the methodological approaches will be provided. It also outlines specific procedures that have been followed to conduct this research. Chapter 4 has been divided into six sections. After discussing the development of research aims and questions, it discusses how a pilot study led to a revised research approach of the research. The chapter also discusses why this research has adopted a qualitative methodology with a comparative case study approach. Furthermore, it justifies how and why a certain type of case study (multiple-case study) design was selected for this research. The two main methods of data collection in this research were semi-structured interviews and focus groups. The findings gathered from interviews were also supplemented with documentary data. As for data analysis, a thematic analysis of research findings was undertaken; this analysis appears in subsequent data analysis chapters. Chapter 4 also discusses the issue of accessibility of the case and data, sampling, and key characteristics of the research participants.

Chapters 5 and 6 present an analysis of research findings gathered from interviews with implementers of both social security programmes, the ‘Rights and Privileges to Families of Martyrs and Genocide Survivors’ (RPFMGS) and the Social Protection
Fund (SPF), which later changed to the Social Safety Net (SSN). These two chapters also include an analysis of official documents and media reports about the implementation of the social security programmes. Chapter 5 is devoted to the RPFMGS programme and the Ministry of Martyrs and Anfal Affairs (MoMA). After outlining the legal and organisational framework of the programme, the chapter analyses four key themes. The first theme is the preference of the programme and its beneficiaries by ruling parties and senior government officials, and its impact upon the implementation process. This theme has been pursued to demonstrate how the implementation process of social security in a post-war country has been influenced by political characteristics and interests that the social security programme and its beneficiaries have conveyed. As shown in this thesis, the implementation success of social security programmes widely depends on the political importance of the programme and its beneficiaries to those in power. In this context, relevant sub-themes are discussed about the extent to which the political conditions have impacted on the eligibility criteria and entitlement procedures. It is also shown that the government and its ruling parties prioritised the MoMA. Both political parties, KDP and PUK, have the most beneficiaries from this scheme. Another key theme is how beneficiaries’ involvement as employees and staff within the MoMA has impacted on the implementation of the RPFMGS programme. The third theme discussed in Chapter 5 is how the beneficiaries are likely to become policy makers. This point has been examined in light of the bottom-up model of implementation. The last theme is the prospect of the clientelistic use of the RPFMGS programme as a social cash transfer for maintaining and consolidating party loyalty among beneficiaries.

Chapter 6 looks at the implementation process of the Social Protection Fund (SPF) programme which later on changed to the Social Safety Net (SSN). As is discussed, this programme has been subject to changes in form, objective and name. These
changes have consequently created uncertainty and confusion among the implementers of the programme. I argue that the ambiguity of the programme’s objectives and the instability in its practice have impacted on its implementation.

This chapter examines key aspects such as the objectives of the programme perceived by implementers and the policy deviation made from a top-down tendency. More importantly, some themes such as clarity in defining the social security programmes, a lack of transparency in social cash transfers (specially in the Special Salary sub-scheme), a lack of priority of beneficiaries by government, and a lack of social welfare vision in the programme will be explored.

Chapter 7 analyses the research findings and key themes in a comparative perspective. Having presented the research findings in Chapters 5 and 6, some of the themes that are central to this thesis are discussed. This chapter aims to compare and contrast the two social security programmes in terms of their implementation problems, and to examine the plausibility of two sets of theories: the implementation theory and clientelist politics. In Chapter 7, the discussion focuses on some of the critical questions surrounding the implementation of social security programmes in the KRG. Three issues in particular have been highlighted: political factors, the status of social security beneficiaries, and the lack of social welfare vision in the KRG. It also discusses the ambiguity and contradictions evident in the formulation and implementation of the KRG’s social security programmes. In Chapter 7, a section is also devoted to the issue of political interference in the implementation of these social security programmes from senior government officials and party leaders. In this regard, two attitudes have been distinguished. On the one hand, interference from the top could support the implementation success. On the other hand, party leaders and government officials intervene in the programme to pursue their political interests by shifting the programme from social cash transfers to a patronage system.
Comparing the beneficiaries of both programmes, two different groups of beneficiaries with different profiles and statuses have been distinguished. Based on the two types of interference and beneficiaries that have been identified, I have introduced and will try to substantiate my contribution to the policy implementation theory. I examine the implementation of social security programmes of the KRG based on the degree of salience the government attaches to the programme of cash transfers based on the political influences of beneficiaries. Having distinguished two types of beneficiaries, high-value and low-value, a contradiction in perception and implementation of social security programmes in the KRG has been highlighted. The research findings reveal that the government deals with the programmes based on the political value of beneficiaries. Bringing evidence from my research findings, two types of treatment by the KRG towards implementation of social security programmes have been compared. The first one is characterised as political/nationalistic and thus important, and the second as public and consequently neglected. This discussion will be justified through understanding the degree of importance attached to the beneficiaries of the MoMA and SPF programmes. From this point, a clientelistic benefit from these social cash transfers is explored.

Chapter 8 concludes the thesis by summarising the research findings and by applying and providing a critique of policy implementation theories with reference to the relevant literature. It also addresses the contribution of the thesis to implementation research in politically less developed countries, with the focus on the post-war Kurdistan Region. Finally, perspectives for future research on the implementation problem of social security programmes in developing country/regions will be presented.
CHAPTER TWO: THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK:
POLICY IMPLEMENTATION AND CLIENTELISM

Introduction

The thesis’s main aim is to explore the critical factors in implementing social security in the Iraqi Kurdistan Region and the ideas behind these factors. This research also explores clientelistic practice in social security programmes of the KRG. Thus, this chapter addresses two different sets of theories which will be employed by the thesis: implementation theory and clientelism.

This chapter has been divided into four sections and the first addresses the terms ‘implementation’ and ‘implementer’ within the policy literature. Section two explores some of the key literature and theories on policy implementation. The third section of the chapter reviews policy implementation literature in developing countries. It also explores implementation of social security programmes in terms of their consistency with, or deviation from, policy regulations. The last section then discusses the relevant research literature on clientelism and clientelistic practice in social policy.
2.1. Implementation: The Emergence of Concept and Research

Implementation has been defined as actions directed at the accomplishment of goals set within a policy decision (Van Meter & Van Horne, 1975: 447). In the same vein, Pressman and Wildavsky, adopting Webster and Roget’s definition of the word, used this concept to describe a stage following the policy formulation (Pressman & Wildavsky, 1984: xxi). Hall and Irving have also presented a traditional, yet important definition of implementation by arguing that it is about what happens between policy expectations (goals) and programme results (outcomes) (Hall & Irving, 2009: 76). Therefore, implementation constitutes the ability to achieve the predicted consequences after the initial conditions have been met. It involves both organisational systems and processes, and actions of implementers. Implementation research should include policy goals, structures (organisation or programme), regulations (law, guidance, and instructions), policy actors (implementers) and their practice.

As for the implementers, they refer to officials who have the responsibility to implement programmes in a specific area of public policy. This group of individuals is frequently in touch with top officials on the one hand and, on the other hand, “beneficiaries of public policy programmes” (Grindle, 1980: 97). Implementers are therefore considered as multifarious individuals who work at different levels of policy implementation. It is also argued that implementers are more diverse than those who scholars such as Grindle have grouped under this name. Operationally, throughout my research, implementers are ranked in several government positions, such as frontline staff, programme managers, executive directors and also ministers at the top of implementation agencies. Therefore, they are classified according to their ‘position’ in the policy delivery process and ‘interaction’ with higher or lower agents, or clients.
Usually, senior officials are taken into account either as policy makers at the central government and ministerial level, or selected party leaders who stay beyond the government and influence policy decisions. They directly and indirectly, as in the cases of some developing countries, run the administrative and governmental organisations (Cheema & Rondinelli, 1983). In the case of the KRG, ministers are located, on the one side, in the policy-making level; on the other side, they play their role in the highest position of policy implementation.

Implementation studies are found at the intersection of social policy, public administration, organisational theory and political science research (Schofield & Sausman, 2004). This field was previously covered under the heading of public administration. Public administration studied the policy implementation process with a more descriptive approach.

Having looked at the policy implementation literature, it appears that almost all theories, models and approaches have been drawn from the context of the developed world. Regardless of their political contexts, they have been conceptualised, theorised, and tested in most democratic countries. Although researches have been conducted in the developing world (Grindle, 1980; Hadden, 1980; McClintock, 1980; Quick, 1980; Rothenberg, 1980; Sussman, 1980; Temple & Temple, 1980; Scott, 1987; Bello-Imam, 1999; Hanekom & Sharkansky, 1999[1994]; Jain, 1999; Lane, 1999; Mahler & Craig, 1999; Wollmann, 1999; Yuksel, 1999; Makinde 2005), the same developed-based models of implementation have been tested and articulated. More importantly, only a few of them emphasise the impact of political and administrative processes on policy implementation (Jain, 1999; Lane, 1999). Hence, their explanatory power might be limited and insufficient to apply to different political environments, particularly those in developing countries. In essence, as many researches highlighted (Hill & Hupe, 2009), policy implementation cannot be studied
in a context-free manner. Hill and Hupe discussed the notion of implementation as governance and stressed the importance of political context. The political and administrative conditions within which they are set must also be taken into account.

Policy-making research has itself for long been at the centre of public policy studies; however, implementation research emerged in the last quarter of the twentieth century. In comparison to policy making, studying policy implementation was almost neglected until 35 years ago. There have been significant publications since the classical work of Pressman and Wildavsky, *Implementation* (1984), which is mostly seen outside the field of social policy, suggesting that implementation research has become multidisciplinary and dispersed. Policy implementation prior to the 1970s was not considered as an important case for study. In the last century, following Pressman and Wildavsky’s classical investigation, few disciplinary researches were found in policy implementation (O’Toole, 2000: 263-4).

Numerous authors have presented and assessed implementation literature (deLeon, 1999; O’Toole, 2000, 2004; Schofield, 2001; Hill and Hupe, 2009). Schofield (2001) pointed out that understanding by whom, how and why policy is put into effect could be conceptualised under the heading of implementation theory (Schofield, 2001: 249). Policy implementation as a term was used for the very first time by Pressman and Wildavsky in 1973 during their study on job creation schemes in Oakland, California, considered as the first attempt to examine policy implementation explicitly (Pressman & Wildavsky, 1984). This study emerged as a reaction to growing concerns over the effectiveness of large-scale reform programmes. Until the end of the 1960s, it had been taken for granted that political mandates were clear and administrators were implementing policies according to the intentions of decision makers (Hill & Hupe, 2009: 42). The process of “translating policy into action” (Barrett, 2004: 251) attracted more attention, as policies seemed to fall below expectations.
Implementation cannot succeed or fail without a goal (policy), against which it will be judged. Therefore, studying the process of implementation includes the setting of goals towards which implementation is directed (Pressman & Wildavsky, 1984: xxiv-xxv). According to the processed view, a perspective which looks at implementation as a process, implementation is considered as *policy becoming action through programmes* (Pressman & Wildavsky, 1984: xxii-xxv; Schofield, 2004: 284). However, this process will not be well defined without placing and taking it within an administrative and legal context. Pressman and Wildavsky (1984) argue that what is needed before implementation is regulation and finance. In order to secure the predicted outcomes, the regulations need to be passed and finances committed before any step is taken towards implementing the policies.

Implementation “is the ability to forge subsequent links in the causal chain so as to obtain the desired results” (Pressman & Wildavsky, 1984: xxii-xxiii). The linkage between policy and implementation has also been well analysed by Hogwood. He argued that the implementation stage can also contribute to the making of policy (Hogwood, 1987: 161). This can be explained within the mechanism of feedback. As we look at the implementation phase, it will be expected to explain why policies are as they are and why they have the effects that they do. This is a question towards the ‘effectiveness’ of a policy.

In the history of implementation research, three generations have been distinguished. The first generation of implementation studies, which had dominance during the 1970s, was characterised by a pessimistic attitude. This pessimism was fed by a number of case studies that represented clear examples of implementation failure. The studies of Derthick (1972), Pressman and Wildavsky (1973), and Bardach (1977) are amongst the most influential. Pressman and Wildavsky’s work, *Implementation* (1973), had an important impact on the development of implementation research, as it
helped to inspire a great list of literature. Hill and Hupe (2009: 18-27) point out that, prior to the 1970s, implementation research was conducted under different headings. Nevertheless, the most noteworthy achievement of the first generation of implementation researchers was to raise perception of the issue in the wider scholarly community and in the view of the general public.

While theorisation was not a central duty of the first generation of implementation studies, the second generation began to put forward a whole range of theoretical frameworks and hypotheses. This period was marked by debates between what was later named the top-down and bottom-up approaches to implementation studies. The top-down approach was represented by scholars as, for example, Van Meter and Van Horn (1975), Nakamura and Smallwood (1980) and Mazmanian (in his shared work with Sabatier, 1983), who conceived of implementation as the hierarchical execution of central policy intentions. Scholars belonging to the bottom-up faction, such as Lipsky (1980) and Elmore (1980), instead emphasised that implementation consisted of the everyday problem-solving strategies of “street-level bureaucrats” (Lipsky, 1980).

The third generation of implementation research tried to bridge the gap between top-down and bottom-up approaches by incorporating the insights of both groups into their theoretical models. At the same time, the self-proclaimed goal of third generation research was “to be more scientific than the previous two in its approach to the study of implementation” (Goggin et al., 1990: 18). Third generation researchers thus put much emphasis on specifying clear hypotheses, finding proper operationalisations and producing adequate empirical observations to test these hypotheses. However, as observers such as deLeon (1999: 318) and O’Toole (2000: 268) noted, by the end of the last century, only a few studies had followed this approach.
2.2. A Review of Policy Implementation Theories

Implementation is considered as one of the most important elements of policy process. It begins once policy is made to target a social problem or issue, starting somewhere in the later stage of the policy process. The start point in the policy process is a problem which compels politicians and high officials to come up with their agendas to deal with it (see Figure 1). Thus, officials formulate policy (policy-making stage) to overcome social and public issues. In that sense, implementation can be considered as part of the post-policy-making stages. In this section, after presenting an overview of contributions made to policy implementation research, I will discuss the key theoretical approaches of policy implementation.

Figure 1 Social Policy Process

The three generations of implementation research have led to three distinct theoretical approaches to the study of implementation. These three implementation models can be characterised as theories that identify how policy is translated into action by various actors in the policy process. Implementation models have been diverged according to whether assessments are developed from the perspective of the initial policy makers (centre), field-level implementing officials (periphery), or private individuals to whom the policy is directed (target group) (Mazmanian & Sabatier, 1981: 12). It might be taken for granted if I argue that policy process mostly
starts from a policy problem and seeking to resolve it. This will explain how various
policy actors are involved in a policy and how they influence the implementation and
the policy outcome through the process of interaction.

2.2.1. Top-Down Model

This is when emphasis is placed on policy formulation and the ability of decision
makers to produce explicit policy objectives. This model started from the assumption
that policy implementation starts with a decision made by central government.
Parsons argues that these studies were based on a “black box model” of policy
process inspired by systems analysis (1995: 463). Top-downers assumed a direct
causal link between policies and observed outcomes and tended to disregard the
impact of implementers on policy delivery. They essentially followed a prescriptive
approach that interpreted policy as input and implementation as output factors. Due to
their emphasis on decisions of central policy makers, deLeon (2001: 2) describes top-
down approaches as a “governing elite phenomenon”. The following authors are
considered classical top-down scholars: Pressman and Wildavsky (1973), Van Meter
Pressman and Wildavsky’s original work followed a rational model approach. They
started from the assumption that policy objectives are set out by central policy
makers. In this view, implementation research was left with the task of analysing
challenges on the way of achieving these objectives. Hence, they saw implementation
as an “interaction between the setting of goals and actions geared to achieve them”
(Pressman & Wildavsky, 1973: xv). Implementation therefore implied the
establishment of adequate bureaucratic procedures to ensure that policies are
accurately executed. Furthermore, implementing agencies should have sufficient
resources at their disposal, and their needs to be a system of clear responsibilities
and hierarchical control to supervise the actions of implementers. Pressman and Wildavsky’s *Implementation* highlighted the importance of the number of agencies involved in policy delivery. They argued that effective implementation becomes increasingly difficult if a programme has to pass through a huge number of “clearance points”. As different agencies and actors were involved in implementation settings, especially in the US, the main idea of their analysis was rather doubtful as to whether implementation could work at all (Pülzl & Treib, 2007: 91).

The American scholars, Van Meter and Van Horn (1975), offered a more elaborate theoretical model. They were concerned with the study of whether implementation outcomes corresponded to the objectives set out in initial policy decisions. Their model included six variables that shape the relationship between policy and performance. These six variables are as follows (Van Meter & Van Horn, 1975: 464-72). Firstly, policy standards and objectives provide concrete and more specific standards for assessing and evaluating the policy performance. The second is the resources and incentives made available, while the third variable is the quality of inter-organisational relationships, which organise the linkage between national and local implementation agencies, and also formal and informal relationships within the policy-making body. The fourth variable is the characteristics of the implementation agencies, such as organisational control and inter-organisational issues being an avoidable variable to address while studying policy implementation. In the fifth, they argue that the economic, social and political environment is of great importance to consider in the relationship between policy and performance. Finally, the disposition or response of the implementers should also be considered in the implementation research. This point also involves three elements: implementers’ recognition (their knowledge and understanding) towards the policy; the direction of their response to the policy (acceptance, neutrality, rejection); and the strength of those responses.
While many of these factors had to do with organisational capacities and hierarchical control, the authors also highlighted two variables that slightly departed from the top-down perspective. They suggested that the extent of policy change had a crucial impact on the likelihood of effective implementation and also that the degree of consensus on goals was important. Hence, significant policy change was only possible if consensus among actors was high. Unlike other representatives of the top-down perspective, the model of Van Meter and Van Horn was less concerned with advising policy makers on successful implementation than with providing a sound basis for scholarly analysis.

Sabatier and Mazmanian are also among the core authors of the top-down approach. Like Van Meter and Van Horn (1975), Sabatier and Mazmanian started their analysis with a policy decision that was made by governmental agencies. Therefore, they proposed a clear separation of policy formation from policy implementation. Their model also lists six criteria for effective implementation (Sabatier & Mazmanian, 1979: 489-92, 503-4): (1) policy objectives need to be clear and consistent; (2) the programme should be based on a valid causal theory; (3) the implementation process should be structured adequately; (4) implementing officials should be committed to programme goals; (5) interest groups and (executive and legislative) sovereigns are supportive; and (6) there should be a condition with no detrimental changes in the socio-economic framework. Although Sabatier and Mazmanian acknowledged that perfect hierarchical control over the implementation process was hard to achieve in practice and that unfavourable conditions could cause implementation failure, they argued that policy makers could ensure effective implementation through adequate programme design and a clever structuration of the implementation process.

Although each classical top-down scholar has their own approach to deal with policy implementation, they all define implementation in terms of the relationship with policy
as laid down in official documents. From this perspective, my research on the implementation of social security programmes analyses programme activities. It also examines the extent to which leaders of dominant political parties and government officials control and influence the direction of policy performance. It also explores the implementation of social security programmes in terms of its consistency with or deviation from policy regulations. Additionally, I argue that regulations and specific standards are not the only elements to direct policy performance. A number of elements are also involved in this process, for instance, implementers’ discretion, politicians’ intentions and dominant party agents’ interests. The role of non-statutory factors is inevitable in the policy implementation process.

2.2.2. Bottom-Up Model

In the bottom-up model the focus is on the role that middle actors play in policy implementation. It looks at local bureaucrats as main actors in policy delivery and conceives of implementation as negotiation processes within networks of implementers. Bottom-up theories emerged in the late 1970s and early 1980s as a critical response to the top-down approach.

Several studies showed that political outcomes did not always sufficiently relate to original policy objectives and that the assumed causal link was thus questionable. Studies belonging to this part of research typically started from the ‘bottom’ by identifying the networks of actors involved in policy formulation and delivery. Bottom-up researches rejected the idea that policies are defined at the central level and that implementers need to obligate themselves to these objectives as neatly as possible. Instead, the availability of discretion at the stage of policy delivery appeared as a beneficial factor as local bureaucrats were seen to be much closer to the real problems than central policy makers. Proponents of this model include Lipsky (1971,
Lipsky (1971; 1980) analysed the behaviour of public service workers (e.g. teachers, social workers, police officers and doctors). In his influential article, ‘Street Level Bureaucracy and the Analysis of Urban Reform’, which was first published in 1971, Lipsky argued that policy analysts need to consider the direct interactions between social workers and citizens. Street-level bureaucrats are also considered to have substantial autonomy from their employing organisations. The main source of their autonomous power derives from the considerable amount of discretion that they are given.

He also addressed policy relationships between top officials and implementers on the one hand, and on the other between implementers and beneficiaries. However, what is missing from his analysis on policy networks is the real or potential relationship between beneficiaries and top officials.

According to Hill and Hupe (2009: 52-3), Lipsky’s work has been misinterpreted as he did not only highlight the difficulties in controlling street-level bureaucrats’ behaviour. More importantly, Lipsky showed that street-level policy making created practices that enabled public workers to deal with problems encountered in their everyday work. The importance of Lipsky’s work lies in the fact that his approach was used as justification for methodological strategies that focus on street-level actors. His work also showed that top-down approaches failed to take into account the fact that hierarchical chain of command and well-defined policy objectives are not enough to guarantee successful implementation.

It could be argued that bureaucrats’ autonomy is more arguable and deeply restricted by political regime. In countries with poor experience of democracy, mid-level bureaucrats’ powers and their discretion are threatened by over-centralised power in
the top-level. Top-downers give a special concern to explore implementation success or failure. This usually has been done using a quantitative method. In this perspective the policy outcome was evaluated to show the extent to which its impacts are consistent with prior policy decisions.

Reversing top-downers’ outlook, the bottom-up model considers local bureaucrats as the main actors in policy delivery and conceives of implementation as negotiation processes within networks of implementers. This model ignores the role of individuals outside the implementing agencies who might have a profound impact on the implementation process.

Lipsky’s contribution to implementation research comes from his analysis of the behaviour of public service workers, or “street-level bureaucrats” as he calls them. He argues that “the decisions of street-level bureaucrats, the routine they establish, and the devices they invent to cope with uncertainties and work pressures, effectively become the public policies they carry out” (1980: xii).

I agree with Lipsky that public policy is not best understood as made by legislatures or from top-floor suites of high-ranking administrators. The influence of the latter could be seen in idea initiatives, policy advice and, more importantly, policy delivery. However, as discussed later, it could be argued that top officials have ultimate and undeniable impact on policy performance in developing countries.

Street-level bureaucrats often seem to have a great deal of discretion and autonomy (Lipsky, 1980: 76). For Lipsky, the implementation of policy is basically about street-level bureaucrats with high service ideals exercising discretion under intolerable pressures. He also emphasised that street-level workers face uncertainty about the personal resources necessary for their jobs. They find that work situations and outcomes are unpredictable, and they face great pressures due to the insufficient time in relation to unlimited needs. On the whole, control from the top to fight failures of
street-level workers involves the intensification of these pressures (Hill & Hupe, 2009: 52).

Lipsky’s street-level approach includes several points which I intend to examine within my research framework. Policy implementers, as non-elective officials, work in, and maintain jobs that enable them to accumulate experiences and skills, whereas top-level officials are devoid of such experiences and skills. All they have is ‘power’ to compel implementers and lower-level workers to perform on their respected direction.

Describing street-level bureaucrats as civil servants who have substantial knowledge in the execution of their work is appropriate where they have authority to do what they want without constraints or annoyance. The political system, at least in the context of developing countries, is a determinant factor in this case. What Lipsky conveys is true in more democratic and less centralised administration. The political system, what I call in this research ‘political context of policy implementation’, indicates whether street-level workers have a major impact on the actual direction and outcome of social policy or not, whether they can make the policy choices or just do what they are commanded. Political context may facilitate or constrain policy implementation in the way implementers intend to practise.

What is implicitly understood from Lipsky’s theory is that he views policy implementation process as real policy making, and implementers as actual policy makers, a view which seems to contain only a relative truth due to its contextually constrained applicability. His perspective has been critically assessed in developed contexts. Furthermore, in a politically less-developed context, within which social policies have been highly politicised, it is very difficult, if not impossible, to implement without endorsement of power. Street-level bureaucrats are important to the extent that they can attract top officials’ approval and support for a policy to be implemented. In this way, they play a mediation role between top officials and policy clienteles. This
is in terms of making political leaders well-informed of social problems and people’s needs on the one side, and managing and delivering policies on the other side.

From another perspective, the main concern of Elmore (1980) was how to study implementation. Instead of assuming that policy makers effectively control implementation, his concept of “backward mapping” suggested that analysis should start with a specific policy problem followed by an examination of the actions of local agencies to solve this problem. Elmore’s valuable contribution is also treated in the light of mixed theory of implementation.

Given the main points of Lipsky’s approach, we can understand the context in which frontline workers participate in policy making and actively implement policy ideas. The implementer’s approach can help to show how government employees make sense of their work, take action, and interact with managers in their organisation, their clients and their superiors. By exploring these procedures, this approach will help to scrutinise whether they are active or passive, autonomous or compelled.

Exploring the policy implementation process is mostly about the role of implementers as significant actors (e.g. implementation officials, managers, professionals and frontline workers). Equally it concerns the organisational and political contexts of implementation. In other words, the concept of policy implementation refers to both the performances and the politico-administrative and institutional context. Therefore, in my research on the implementation of social security policy, both spheres are taken into account.

In order to overcome the divide between the other two approaches, some elements of top-down, bottom-up and other theoretical models were incorporated. Researchers such as Elmore (1985) and Sabatier (1986) tried to propose a hybrid model by combining elements of both approaches in order to avoid the implications of a single-dimension approach.
2.2.3. Hybrid Theories

As I mentioned earlier, Elmore was known as a member of the bottom-up camp, but in his later work (in 1985), *Forward and Backward Mapping: Reversible Logic in the Analysis of Public Policy*, he became one of the pioneers of the hybrid theory in implementation research. Elmore combined the concept of ‘backward mapping’ with the idea of ‘forward mapping’. *Forward mapping* is the traditional top-down view of the implementation process. The approach is based on the assumption of power at the top. In this view, highest-level policy makers have ultimate control over the political, organisational and technical factors that influence the implementation. By proposing *backward mapping*, Elmore tried to supplement the analysis of policy process. In the backward mapping analytic approach, the centre of the point turned to service delivery, where implementers and clients meet each other (Williams, 1982: 2). He argued that success of a programme depends upon both elements. Policy makers should therefore start by considering policy instruments and available resources for policy change (forward mapping). In addition, they should identify the incentive structure of implementers and target groups (backward mapping) (citing from Pülzl & Treib, 2007).

In the same way, Sabatier (1986), backing away from his earlier theoretical contribution with Mazmanian, gave an account of a different theoretical approach to policy implementation. In his influential article on implementation research, he argued that failure to distinguish between policy making and implementation would disqualify the study of policy change and evaluation research.

The self-proclaimed founders of the ‘third generation’ of implementation research, Goggin, Bowman, Lester and O’Toole (1990), tried to bridge the gap between top-down and bottom-up approaches. Like top-downers, they continued to accept the perspective of a centrally-defined policy decision to be implemented by lower-level
actors. Their goal of developing a general theory of implementation on the basis of exact methods also owes much to the top-down perspective. However, their conception of the implementation process included the fact that implementers are political actors and that the outcome of this endeavour involved complicated negotiation processes between implementers and central authorities.

In sum, the hybrid theories of policy implementation recognise that policies are made within a dialectical relationship between top-level and lower-lever actors. Policy implementation does not occur in separation from policy making; they are both related. Consequently, policy implementation cannot be analysed without looking at the policy formation process.

The mixed approach can to a large extent be developed to include two themes: the dynamic network of top officials, implementers and recipients on the one hand, and on the other the politico-administrative context which explicitly makes quite an impact on the implementation process. Almost all approaches and generation models of policy implementation emphasise the role of actors or groups of actors during the implementation process (Schofield, 2001: 255). As demonstrated in the policy implementation literature so far, the role of service user has been researched as that of a recipient or person affected by programme outcome, as opposed to being a significant actor in the process of implementation. Policy implementation research considers actual actors rather than potential actors. The potential role of a service user in the implementation process is often ignored because the focus tends to be on implementers rather than beneficiaries. I argue that beneficiaries of social programmes should be considered in policy implementation research.
2.2.4. Salient Policy, Political Preference and Control

There are many concepts that pave the way of discussion in this research. In many places of this research I have repeatedly emphasised an argument that considers the political context is of great importance for understanding policy implementation in developing countries. It needs to be said that the policy context is in a dialectical relation with policy content. In other words, the policy implementation process needs to be examined as occurring within a political structure where there are established relationships, powers, norms and interests, which are being held by policy actors (mainly policy makers, policy implementers, and target groups).

The power may control the policy implementation by changing the current policy through a process justified by securing better benefit for clienteles. Two kinds of instruments are used to control implementation agencies by power. First, legal instruments, which include administrative procedures and official directives, are available to policy decision makers to control implementation agencies, either for facilitating effective implementation and monitoring to evaluate their performance and programme outcomes, or constraining it through a number of procedures such as the reduction of budgets. The second is political instruments, which could be observed when party politicians and top government officials intend to interfere in the policy implementation process, directly or indirectly, seeking particular political interests.

Political party leaders, apart from making policies and monitoring how they are being implemented, may interfere in the policies to steer them in their own favour. Having looked at their political interests, they prioritise policies according to their political interests. They may prefer policies in which their beneficiaries have a political characteristic and value (salient policy or programme), as opposed to those with lower political priorities (negligent policy or programme).
To elaborate more, the policy implementation process is influenced by two series of binary concepts: importance (salience) and negligence. This dichotomy will be used in this research to elaborate the degree of policy preference that would be given to different policy programmes based on the specific political norms and interests.

In this framework, the concept of ‘policy position and salience’ proposed by Rene Torenvlied (2000) will be useful. Torenvlied (1996, 2000, and 2003 with Thomson) employed the concept of ‘salience’ in implementation research. Although he used this term in the sense of decision making in organisations, it also implies norms which reflect explicitly on the policy preference in the implementation process. In his proposed ‘positive model of policy implementation’, the relative salience of implementation agencies for policy decisions has been taken into account (1996: 26).

Torenvlied in his book, *Political Decisions and Agency Performance* (2000), has discussed the political decision model of implementation. He highlights the concept of ‘norm’ of bureaucratic loyalty as compelled by political control. He argues that this bureaucratic norm emerges whenever a group of individuals are required to perform a specific action which they would not perform in the absence of that norm, for instance, the loyal implementation of a political decision, or special concern to politically important clienteles (Torenvlied, 2000: 30). This norm would give higher priority to one policy over others. In my research I will examine the norm or norms which have been embraced by political KRG leadership.

The operation of norms can offer an important explanation for the paradox of compliance. Neo-classical models doubt the existence of information advantage. They argue that political decision makers are apparently able to observe implementation agencies’ behaviour perfectly, to monitor, and to sanction (Torenvlied, 2000: 32). No one can disprove the argument that implementers have an information advantage.
What constrains their ability to realise knowledge, particularly in the case of developing societies, is political interference and control.

According to Weingast and Moran (1983) policy makers and government officials use two instruments to control policy implementation: selections and sanctions. Although their model was developed from economic law, they lay the foundations for a theory which integrates economic and political behaviour of industries. Selection occurs through competition between implementing agencies for budget, and also when officials are being appointed to monitor implementation agencies (Weingast & Moran, 1983: 769). On the other hand, sanctions are used by top officials in several ways, such as budgetary cuts, temporary and permanent suspension, demotion of agency members, judicial proceedings, and public humiliation (Torenvlied, 2000: 35).

The political control over implementation will be realised by the implementation agencies through materialising the degree of salience attached to social policy programmes by government officials and ruling party leaders. As this research claims to examine, adherence to the norm of administrative loyalty is compelled more seriously and strongly in relation to the programmes to which are attached more salience by top officials.

A number of studies have examined political control and administrative supervision over policy implementation and behaviour at the frontlines of service delivery (Matland, 1995; Van Meter & Van Horn, 1975; Lane, 1999; Lazin, 1999; Torenvlied, 2000). These studies support the well-defined approach to implementation research; the translation of political decisions into street-level actions. However, these studies provide little explanation of the importance of political and administrative structures in the implementation process. Most of the studies that explain political/administrative impacts on implementation practices mainly suggest that they play unimportant roles (May & Winter, 2007: 454).
I call on conceptualisations about key models of implementation as well as political and administrative control in formulating hierarchical models for examining the influence of political decisions and administrative actions on the performance of implementation agencies. I argue that interference and political control over social policy programmes would produce an uncertain policy condition. Power may control policy implementation by changing current policy through a process justified as the way to renew or adjust policies. A fundamental question which could be raised regarding the differences between policy as laid down in regulations and politicians’ intention is whether actions of implementation agencies are congruent with those laid down in regulations and policy documents, or that they follow politicians’ intentions.

2.3. Policy Implementation Literature in Developing Nations

As I mentioned earlier, most policy implementation theories, models and approaches have been drawn from developed world contexts. However, attempts have also been made in the developing world to apply, test and articulate these same models of implementation. For the purpose of my research, special emphasis has to be put on political and administrative grounds of policy implementation (Grindle, 1980; Temple & Temple, 1980; Torenvlied, 1996; 2000; 2003 (with Thomson); Lane, 1999; Lazin, 1994; 1999; Makinde, 2005). This is because policy implementation cannot be studied in a context-free manner. Thus politico-administration conditions need to be considered in order to develop implementation theories in a developing context.

This section addresses the importance of political context for implementation research and offers selective contributions to policy implementation research in developing nations.
2.3.1. Content and Context of Policy Implementation

Grindle (1980), in his edited book *Politics and policy implementation in the third world*, addressed two broad questions about implementation. The first is concerned with the extent to which the content of social policy has an impact on its implementation process. The second is about context. By this, he discusses how the political context of administrative actions affects policy implementation processes (Grindle, 1980: 5). The contributors of his volume, which consist of several case studies, all share these two perspectives: *content and context of policy implementation*.

Implementation, as defined by Grindle, is "an ongoing process of decision making by a variety of actors, the ultimate outcome of which is determined by the content of the programme being pursued and by the interaction of the decision-makers within a given politico-administrative context" (Grindle, 1980: 5-6). He argues that the content of policy affects programme actions. Some programmes that seek to introduce changes in social, political and economic relationships encourage considerable opposition from those whose interests are threatened by them. For instance, landowners are against agrarian reform in Mexico (Grindle, 1980: 8). Other programmes might exacerbate conflict and competition among potential beneficiaries and may be difficult to implement as intended. In the differentiation of programmes, providing desirable benefits such as housing from those delivering collective benefits, such as water and light, the second will always be readily implemented in the developing countries. Due to that, Grindle asserted that some social programmes require considerable behavioural adaptation and participation on the part of recipients (Grindle, 1980: 9).

I widely refer to the concept of ‘context’ in this research. It refers to a broader ‘politico-administrative context’, which will be discussed in more detail later in this chapter and will be explained with the particular example of the Kurdistan Region in the following
chapter (Chapter 3), as well as a legal and organisational setting (policy context). The context of programme or policy is often a critical factor because of the real or potential impact it may have on a given (social, political and economic) setting (Grindle, 1980: 10). However, I argue that the policy context determines the policy content and its administrative process. This is because of the impact it may have on the legal and organisational framework of the policy. Therefore, it is necessary to consider it as a determinant factor.

Several case studies in Grindle’s edited book (1980) indicate that the implementation process may vary considerably depending on whether the political system is authoritarian or open. Both regimes acquire elements of responsiveness and compliance in their social policy making and implementation. They are to a certain degree responsive. While responsiveness in an authoritarian system is low and mostly depends upon clientelistic politics, in an open regime, elections impose a greater degree of responsiveness on high officials.

Based on case studies from Asia, Africa and Latin America, Grindle argues that the process of implementing public policies is a focus of political participation and competition. This is true because of the characteristics of the political systems themselves such as the remoteness and inaccessibility of policy-making processes to most individuals and the extensive competition engendered by widespread need and very scarce resources (Grindle, 1980: 15). In developing nations, while participation is often limited to policy making, there still exists a great desire among citizens to affect the outcome of governmental decision making because such outcomes affect them vitally and personally (Grindle, 1980: 17). This is in spite of the fact that patron-client linkages are frequently the basis of political activities in some developing nations and these can influence the policy formulation and implementation (Grindle, 1980: 18). As I have demonstrated in data chapters, this political participation is apparent in two
ways. First, some beneficiaries are already in a political-partisan relation with policy makers. They have a great influence on policy formulation and the implementation process. These groups are provided with high services as a reward for their contribution to the Kurdish national movement and political parties (beneficiaries of RPFMGS). Secondly, other groups try to influence the decision of policy makers by showing their affiliation and loyalty to ruling parties (beneficiaries of Special Salary in SPF).

Stephen Quick (1980: 40-63) in his research *The Paradox of Popularity: “Ideological” Program Implementation in Zambia* investigated how the political environment (in his case-study political impetus) given to a programme of agriculture cooperative influenced the way the programme was initially defined. The failure of the political elite to specify priorities in Zambia has been highlighted in his research as a case of *non-choice making* with extensive consequences for the capacity of administrative agencies to carry out programme activities. He carried out his research on a case against policies extensively promoted but poorly defined. The policies that received extensive political support and limelight at the decision-making stage failed to achieve any development because of the ambiguity of the goals pursued.

Grindle asserted that there are important strategic choices made for programme activities which determine the success and failure of the implementing process. That is to say, how programme goals will be pursued, which organisation is to be responsible for implementation, the extent of programme coverage, the speed with which programme results will be sought, and finally the mechanisms for establishing reporting and accountability within bureaucratic agencies. Decisions made on the basis of the above strategies clearly affect the outcomes of the programme implemented. These strategic choices are often made based on political reasoning or in response to political pressures (Grindle, 1980: 25).
In a case study about political constraints on rural development in Mexico, Grindle studied how the choices made during the implementation process affected the output of particular programmes. He was concerned particularly with two considerations: the influence of regime type and the impact of politics in the determination of who will have influence over resource allocation processes (Grindle, 1980: 197-223). He explored the interactions at local level between administrators, politicians, recipients and elite groups.

While dealing with political inputs into administrative decisions on the local level, several studies explore why government allocation decisions are not generally responsive to the low-income population in authoritarian regimes. They indicate that there is a persistent structure in which it is embedded and to which it is responsive (Grindle, 1980; Temple & Temple, 1980). They also suggest that the conflict engendered by the content of redistributive policies may have a significant impact on allocation decisions. The relationship of regime type and local politics to implementation highlights the problem of compliance and responsiveness (Hadden, 1980; McClintock, 1980; Quick, 1980). In some case studies on rural development and urban poverty in Latin America, it has been revealed that low-incomers such as farmers or urban residents are able to influence government policies. However, Grindle argued that in general the authoritarian regimes adopt bureaucratic procedures responsive more to the regime itself rather than concerning low-income clienteles (Grindle, 1980: 31). He asserted that the resources that are allocated to specific programmes might be redirected towards other programmes serving their support groups (Grindle, 1980: 201). In spite of principal implementers, Grindle highlighted that the clients of government programmes are also involved in the implementation process. The capacity of low-status clienteles to benefit from government policies in developing countries to a large extent depends on the congruence of their needs with broader political goals (Grindle, 1980: 223).
Temple and Temple (1980) conducted a research on public housing in Kenya. They analysed why this government programme had not responded to the needs of low-income earners in Nairobi; instead it had served middle or high-income people. The government of Kenya built a large number of housing units to let and sell at an affordable price to the poorest among the population. At the end, the groups that benefited the most from this policy were political and economic elites or those with close ties to the government, instead of the original target groups. Temple and Temple’s research findings are quite compatible with those of mine, especially in the case of Special Salary in SPF. Party-affiliated people are being integrated into social benefits, though the criteria of eligibility are not applicable to Special Salary beneficiaries.

Taiwo Makinde (2005) identified some implementation problems taking two examples from Nigerian social protection programmes: the Better Life Programme and the Family Support Programme. In his research, he highlights three problematic factors such as corruption, lack of continuity in government policies, and inadequate human and material resources. He argues that Nigerian public officials and administrators, such as those of developing countries, misappropriate funds allocated to social programmes. Makinde also indicated that indiscipline in the continuity of the named social programmes was also a cause of its failure. The indiscipline occurs when originally planned projects are abandoned without justifiable reason thus resulting in policy deviation.

2.3.2. Politico-Administrative Context of Policy Implementation

For researching the crucial factors in the implementation of government social security programmes in the KRG, I argue that political context is the most important independent variable. The political environment of administrative actions affects policy
implementation. Van Meter and Van Horn (1975: 466) were the first to take the political condition into account as a constraint rather than as a policy resource. Another attempt in this regard has been made by Richard Matland. In his evaluation of the characteristics of policy, he distinguished two types of policy: ambiguity and conflict (1995: 155-9). His contribution in analysing the policy condition is clearly seen when he distinguished four types of policy implementation: administrative, political, experimental and symbolic. He argues that different factors determine policy outcomes in various political conditions. In administrative implementation the outcomes are determined by resources (1995: 160), while in political implementation outcomes they are decided by power (1995: 163). However, in the experimental implementation, ‘contextual condition’ is likely to be important, which means the environmental influences on policy outcomes (1995: 166).

In this research, political context will be treated as a condition which facilitates or constrains policy implementation. Of interest here is the degree to which the political condition of the Kurdistan Region is relevant in understanding the adaptation, prioritisation and implementation of policies. The region has entered a period of political transition and, during the last decades, it has lived and experienced a very difficult situation of conflict and relative peace. It must also be added that this region can be considered as unstable. This instability is at both regional and national (Iraqi) levels. With regard to the internal-regional level, although there have been free general elections, actual power still remains within the circles of the main political parties. They obtain and maintain power as part of their revolutionary legacy. Thus, the elected people are always in a lower position of political power in comparison with senior party politicians (mainly politburos). This will allow us to name the political system of the Iraqi Kurdistan Region as semi-democratic.
In addition, despite the Kurdish presence and contribution in the federal government in Baghdad after the 2003 invasion, there are still ongoing disagreements between the KRG and the Baghdad government about issues related to the Iraqi constitution and KRG’s power. These disputes often become evident when their respective authorities oppose each other, especially about utilising oil wells and revenues, and the Kurdish armed forces (Peshmerga). This unstable political condition has had its own impact on the strategic choice of the KRG regarding policy implementation.

Administrative directions are frequently changed and adjusted rapidly, causing great uncertainty. One could argue that the reasons why uncertainty is endemic to policy making and implementation in developing countries is not solely due to severely limited recourses, as some would argue (Caiden & Wildavsky, 1974; Lazin, 1999). Rather, weak political institutions, limited capacity for policy making and, more importantly, the level of political commitment in public administration are also variables which indicate uncertainty in governance. Lazin (1999) points out how political and administrative institutions of particular countries affect their domestic policy implementation process. The three major questions addressed in his book *The Policy Implementation Process in Developing Nations* are: firstly, to what extent can the developmental status of a particular country be taken into account for understanding its policy implementation process? Secondly, do the studies of policy implementation in developing countries, in their methodological aspects, favour top-down or bottom-up, or a synthesis model? He also asked whether the dichotomy of policy formulation and implementation is helpful or is it preferable to be considered as one ongoing process?

Jan-Erik Lane (1999) argues that policy implementation problems in developing countries are intertwined with basic economic and political conditions. He suggested that, while development requires economic growth, the reduction of poverty requires
political stability. Thus, both economic development and political stability are necessary conditions for effective policy implementation (Lane, 1999: 11-12). In a case study about public policy implementation in India, R. B. Jain argued that bureaucracy has no predominant role in policy-making processes (1999: 25). He points out an assumption that, once a policy has been formulated, it will not necessarily be implemented in the case of less developed countries (Jain, 1999: 28). Jain asserts that government policy is the outcome of a continuous interaction between political executives, senior level bureaucrats and other government as well as non-government actors.

Fredrick Lazin in his book *Politics and Policy Implementation: Project Renewal in Israel*, addressed several characteristics of political constitution in Israel which asserted great influence over implementation. First, the Israeli governmental system has been characterised by coalitions comprising several independent oligarchical parties. Although the coalition parties committed to serve national interests, ruling party leaders can also use high officials and ministers in government to benefit party interests (Lazin, 1994: 3). Secondly, as a result, coalition politicians have dominated the ministries. Even from the beginning of the state, the Israeli government has lacked a tradition of natural professional civil servants. In other words, partisans from major coalition parties have controlled the public sector. Party leaders in Israel are in a position to appoint key bureaucrats, including the director-generals of ministries and heads of Jewish Agency departments. From this, Lazin suggested that, in the case of Project Renewal, ministers and agency professionals at the highest position are likely to be sensitive to party considerations (Lazin, 1994: 4).

The third politico-administrative characteristic that Lazin mentioned was the fragmentation of national government and lack of unity of governmental performance in the public sector (1994: 4). He referred to the Jewish Agency which has served as
an unofficial government. Although strongly influenced by the government’s coalition parties, the agency has maintained considerable independence through its control over the funds raised by two major overseas fund-raising organisations for Project Renewal: the United Jewish Appeal in the United States and the Keren Hayesod elsewhere (Lazin, 1994: 5).

Fourthly, the Israeli government has a centralised hierarchical system. This demonstrates a degree of vertical fragmentation that delegates authority from the national to municipal levels of government. The standing of municipalities varies, with some having more influence than others on ministries and their policies. In general, ministries’ influence and domination refers to the socio-economic and political situation of the particular municipality. As a rule, the more powerful those communities have been, mostly in central Israel, are those whose residents are veteran settlers of European origin and their children. The weaker are those communities on the periphery whose residents are more recent Jewish immigrants from Arab countries (Lazin, 1994: 6).

Finally Lazin stated that, despite the near absence of ethnic parties, ethnicity has always been a factor in Israeli politics and social policy. “Every government since 1948 has used the distribution of public resources to win the votes of various immigrant groups” (Lazin, 1994: 6). He declared that the ethnicity influenced the implementation of Project Renewal. Municipalities of some ethnic backgrounds have been of less concern to the Israeli government.
2.4. Clientelism and Implementation of Social Policy in a Developing Context

Social security programmes can be looked at from the perspective of clientelism. This section discusses the second part of the research theory framework. It covers the relevant research literature on clientelism and the clientelistic practice in social policy. The existing literature suggests that the use of social funds and social policy in general is a phenomenon mostly found in developing countries and will increase, particularly in the context of politically instable and administratively less developed countries. I added ‘politically’ here as a prefix to focus on the political dimension of the developing or less developed world. After offering a definition for the concept of clientelism, this section will discuss the clientelistic practice of social funds in researched cases in Latin America, Africa and the Asian countries.

2.4.1. Clientelism

Magaloni (2007: 4) has defined clientelism as “expenditures in divisible excludable goods delivered to individuals or to organised groups … examples of clientelistic transfers include selective scholarships, credit, granaries, and livestock, among others”. The concept of clientelism refers to the distribution of social benefits to individuals or selective groups in exchange for political backing.

In political exchange theory, the term ‘clientelism’ is defined as a form of personal, mutual exchange usually characterised by a sense of obligation and often also by an unequal balance of power between the sides involved (Eisenstadt and Roniger, 1984: 48-9). Eisenstadt and Roniger used this term within the context of unequal, hierarchical exchange characteristics of feudal society, in which patrons and clients were tied to durable relationships by a powerful sense of obligation and duty.
However, this old form of clientelism has been reshaped in the modern era in both developed and developing counties.

2.4.2. Clientelism and Social Programmes

Michael Penfold-Becerra, in a research under the title ‘Clientelism and Social Funds: Evidence from Chavez’s Misiones’, investigated how the government used social funds on a clientelistic basis (2007). By exploring Chavez’s Misiones programmes, he declared that social funds can be strategically manipulated for electoral purposes. Bringing empirical evidences on the distribution of resources for the different misiones at the sub-national level, he indicated that those programmes were politically directed. Although it was claimed that these programmes were targeted at poverty alleviation, in reality they were also explicitly used to buy votes among Chavez’s supporters and voters at the local level.

Penfold-Becerra argues that politicians tend to promote clientelism among a lower income sector of the population. In this case, the Venezuelan government was able to buy votes through the distribution of funds to the poorest. Conversely, there were other programmes implemented based on political and geographical considerations. Municipalities loyal to Chavez were prioritised. In turn, the government wanted to make sure that voters would support Chavez in exchange for social benefits. This practice effectively consolidated the clientelistic network of Chavez’s government.

Numerous studies have been conducted to explain the clientelistic use of social funds in Latin America. Some researchers have argued that social cash transfers can be used in a neo-populist manner by presidents who follow a neoliberal approach to promote their claimed reforms (Roberts, 1995; Weyland, 1999). Through targeting low-income groups, votes can be targeted and support can be bought. Poor people are deemed to be more responsive politically to these types of rewards (Penfold-
Becerra, 2007: 68). Some researches indicate that low-income voters are more likely to be subjected to a clientelistic practice than those on a higher income (Dixit & Londregan, 1996; Robinson & Verdier, 2003; Brusco et al., 2004; Calvo & Murillo, 2004).

The research literature on clientelism and social funds in Latin America has clearly indicated that politicians start using social funds in a clientelistic manner to boost their political support. This mainly occurs when there is a lack of strong institutional constraints. In other words, under certain institutional conditions, social funds can be allocated on the basis of a political rationale instead of social or economic considerations. Since 2000, Chávez in Venezuela has been able to accumulate all legislative and executive powers in his presidency office and keep a close grasp on the parliament and the judicial branch. Given these weak institutional constraints and the electoral competition of 2004 for recall referendum, the government had great motivation to manipulate politically the allocation of resources for the political agenda (Penfold-Becerra, 2007).

Traditionally, clientelism involves hierarchical patron-client relationships, “the patron providing clients with access to the basic means of subsistence and the clients reciprocating with a combination of economic goods and services” (Mason, 1986: 489). However, the patron-client relationship could be reversed. The clients may fulfil their parts of obligation, seeking the government’s turn to reward them.

The importance of clienteles of social programmes is highlighted in a variety of literature conducted on clientele politics, especially in developing countries (Poitras, 1973; Wantchekon, 2003; Vicente & Wantchekon, 2009). The social and political condition of citizens would unavoidably be translated into their inclusion within an informal network. In this sense it is important to state that implementers play roles as brokers in the clientelistic network. They facilitate a condition to use social cash
transfers for a political purpose. Social funds could be politicised and subjected to clientelistic practices. This appeared in two aspects. Firstly, high government officials and party leaders control the public administration. Directors of the programmes, middle-ranked and even frontline staff are being appointed or simply dismissed by party leaders. Secondly, social funds could be used to encourage party backing.

2.4.3. Clientelistic Implementation and Policy Preference

The main perspective in policy research tries to test the explanatory power of stages heuristic, in which it looks at policy implementation as entirely normatively subordinate to policy formulation. However, this research does not follow this tradition. As discussed earlier, political and administrative actors deal with and support social policy programmes on the basis of the importance they attach to them. This is true when the focus is on social security programmes in the poor welfare systems.

Social security policy, which contains cash transfers, attracts politicians’ concern because they may feel that such programmes can be used and exploited for their political interests. These concerns encourage them to interfere in and control these programmes. This policy salience is inspired by political norms of senior politicians and high administrative officials. The hegemony of politicians is entirely visible in both policy formulation and implementation process. Winning political parties run the government and work behind the government by exerting influence on the decision makers. On the other hand, they impose their control upon implementers to accomplish their goals.

The politicians deal with social policy programmes in two different ways:

a. political leaders and top government officials give an importance and attach a high salience to policies according to the preference that they give to those policies and
interest groups concerned. In this notion, policy implementation would be interfered with by politicians and high government officials. They may attempt to support and monitor the way the policy is implemented so as to preserve clients' interests. The programmes are implemented better within which the interest of beneficiaries and political parties are intertwined. The political interest and status of target groups are crucial factors that need to be monitored in order to understand how and why this style of implementation is encouraged by political leaders and pursued by implementation agencies. Clientelism puts forth the idea that important clienteles deserve an important programme which implies that the clients are political subjects, and the policy related to them should be as salient as they are.

This style of policy implementation appears to follow a bottom-up approach. It takes into consideration the implementer’s potential discretion and initiatives only on the condition that they do not discard political decisions made by policy makers. In other words, the implementers might be consulted or they may play their mediation roles between beneficiaries and policy makers, which are equally acting as agents translating policy into action, although the perspective in which the programme is being preferred from is mainly that of policy makers. However, due to the consideration put on the status of beneficiaries and the extent to which their needs and demands are being reflected in policy formulation and implementation, this style of policy preference can be considered as a mixed or a bottom-up model.

b. The second style of policy implementation can be realised in a less important programme and tends to follow a top-down model. This is a passive style of policy implementation, which is followed in a context that its beneficiaries, certainly for politicians, are not considered as a significant group. Policy negligence is linked to policies that are politically marginalised and administratively constrained by top government officials. In this style of implementation, it appears that not only clienteles
but also implementation actors are neglected. They might neither be consulted in the policy formation nor supported in the policy implementation. More certainly, the policy negligence style is more close to the top-down model.

**Conclusion**

This chapter introduced implementation theory and clientelism as a combination of two series of literature and theoretical framework for investigating implementation of social security programmes in a developing region of Iraqi Kurdistan. It addressed mainstream implementation approaches to social policy processes by looking at three generations of implementation theories, and the classical top-down/bottom-up debate in implementation research.

The inherent idea of classical approaches in conducting policy implementation is “drawing distinction between decision-making and policy performance” (Mazmanian & Sabatier, 1989). The initial top-down and bottom-up models thus emerged from the heart of a debate to explain this relationship, and to understand how to make policy and who is in charge of transforming it into practice. Each model has tried to trace policy to its actual decision makers. Scholars of the top-down approach have endeavoured to explore how implementation starts with a decision by top officials in the central government. From this perspective, implementation becomes an output factor to achieve the outcome of policy goals set out in initial policy decisions. The effectiveness of implementation, achieving policy objectives, is one of the central factors which direct this type of research strategy.

In response to this approach, the bottom-up model emerged, shifting the focus from top officials to middle and lower actors in the policy process. The bottom-up model considers local bureaucrats as the main actors in policy delivery and conceives of
implementation as negotiation processes within networks of implementers. This model ignores the role of top individuals outside the implementing agencies who might have a great impact on the implementation process, despite and behind their role as decision makers.

The bottom-up model rejected the idea that policies are defined and formulated at the top level and that programme implementers need to unite themselves neatly to these objectives. Instead, bottom-up scholars emphasised the discretion available at the stage of policy delivery, which equips the implementers with an autonomous power. This perspective looks at local bureaucrats as closest policy actors to the real social issues. Bottom-up type of studies showed that policy outcomes did not always sufficiently relate to original policy objectives and that the assumed causal link, as top-downers are more involved in, was thus questionable. Studies belonging to this type of research typically started from the ‘bottom’ by identifying the networks of actors involved in policy formulation and delivery. Mainstream models of policy implementation address policy relationships between top officials and implementers on the one hand and on the other hand between implementers and beneficiaries of the programme. However, what is missing from implementation analysis on policy network is the real or potential relationship between beneficiaries and top officials.

Though only top-officials are involved in policy making, political conditions could influence policy implementation. This means that, despite policy regulations and instructions, political interests of ruling parties might improve, maintain or suspend social programmes and services. In this respect, policy implementers’ discretion and information have a lesser impact. From this perspective, a mixed model has to be adopted. In the mixed approach, two themes could be developed: the dynamic network of top officials, implementers and recipients, and the politico-administrative context that explicitly influences the implementation process.
As demonstrated in the literature on policy implementation, service users have been mostly considered as recipients of programmes rather than as significant actors in the process of implementation. Policy implementation research considers actual actors rather than potential actors. In this sense, it includes target groups and recipients as the population affected by social programmes not potentially involved in policy process.

The autonomy of policy implementers seems to be more uncertain and deeply restricted to the political regime. In countries with little experience of democracy, their discretion could be threatened by over-centralised power. At the same time, the programme beneficiaries should be taken into account in the process of policy formulation. I assert that policy formulation should be differentiated from decision making. The first refers to a broader process in social policy, while the latter implies a stage of policy making. In this perspective, my research on the implementation of social security programmes analyses programme formulation and activities.

This chapter also discussed the concept of “policy position and salient” proposed by Torenvield (2000). I have added a concept of policy negligence to employ them as a dichotomy to examine the degree of policy preference that would be given to different programmes based on specific political norms and interests, and the status of recipients.

Policy implementation research in developing countries should examine the extent to which the leaders of dominant political parties and government officials control and influence the direction of policy performance. There is also the need to explore implementation of social security programmes in terms of their consistency with or deviation from policy regulations. However, specific standards and regulations are not the only elements to direct policy performance. A number of other elements are also involved in this process, for instance, politicians’ intentions and dominant party agents’ interests. The role of non-statutory factors is inevitable in a policy implementation
process. I argue that the policy environment or context determines the policy content and its administrative process because of the impact it may have on the given social, political and economic setting. Therefore, it is necessary to consider it as a determinant factor.

The last section of this chapter covered clientelism and clientele politics. It discussed the relevant research literature on clientelism and clientelistic practice in social policy. This appears be a widespread tradition in developing countries, particularly in the context of politically unstable and administratively less developed countries. The importance of clienteles of social security programmes introduced me to a variety of literature conducted on clientele politics, especially in developing countries. Implementers play roles as brokers in the clientelistic network. They use social cash transfers for a political purpose. Social funds could be politicised and subjected to clientelistic practices. This appeared in two aspects. Firstly, high government officials and party leaders control public administration. Directors of the programmes, middle-ranked and even frontline staff are appointed or simply dismissed by party leaders. Secondly, social funds could be used to encourage party backing.

The application of the implementation theory suggests that three approaches should be followed. Firstly, policy implementation should be studied, taking into account the politico-administrative context. Secondly, the content of the policy, including political norms, interests, objectives and compliance, will determine the degree of policy preference, and consequently policy success and failure. Finally, the role and status of beneficiaries within the policy network defines whether a top-down or bottom-up approach has been followed while the policy is formulated and implemented. Both styles of implementation found in the implementation of the two researched programmes, the preferential style of implementation in RPFMGS and the neglected style of implementation in SPF, fit with bottom-up and top-down approaches respectively.
CHAPTER THREE: POLITICAL, ADMINISTRATIVE, AND SOCIO-ECONOMIC BACKGROUND AND SOCIAL SECURITY PROGRAMMES OF THE KURDISTAN REGIONAL GOVERNMENT

Introduction

This chapter provides a contextual analysis of the political, socio-economic and administrative aspects of the Kurdistan Region. It focuses on the politico-administrative context that locates the Kurdistan Region as a case of a post-conflict developing country/region. In addition to this political overview, the chapter equally draws on reviews of current social security programmes of the KRG. The chapter’s analysis is crucial in understanding the framework which influences social policy and its implementation in the country. Indeed, social policy in most countries is closely linked to the prevailing political and administrative system (Van Meter & Van Horn, 1975; Matland, 1995).

The chapter is organised as follows. The first section offers a brief history of the Iraqi Kurdistan Region, highlighting the displacement, marginalisation, deportation, genocide and civil war which has characterised its past. The second section analyses the establishment of the KNA and KRG and the ways in which they operate. That
section also highlights key political and socio-economic strategies embarked upon by the KRG after the American invasion in 2003. The concluding section of the chapter offers an overview of current social security policy and programmes of the KRG.

3.1. Political Background of Iraqi Kurdistan Region

Many historians and political scientists trace the beginning of the Iraqi Kurdistan Region and its political struggle to the First World War (McDowall, 2004; Stansfield, 2006). Historically, Kurds have been politically and socially victimised, and it is through such repression that political parties emerged. The development of Kurdish political parties consequently had a revolutionary legacy and embedded a Soviet style of politburos. When the KRG was established in 1992, it was a party-controlled administration in which nationalist figures and party members were prioritised. The repression, war and genocide experienced by Kurds in Iraq resulted in extreme political instability and social vulnerability. Kurdish political parties exploit this suffering by labelling themselves as freedom fighters or war victims as a political credit. Exploring the political past ultimately explains how, in the time of the ‘revolutionary party-controlled KRG’, instead of adopting a public welfare system, a prerogative system for party-affiliated people and political victims (war and genocide) was created.

3.1.1. A Historical Overview: Kurds as Stateless Nation

The Kurds inhabited the areas located in the border regions of Turkey, Iraq, Iran and Syria (see Figure 2). After the First World War, with the carving out of new states from the territories of the Ottoman Empire, Kurdistan was incorporated into Turkey, Iraq and Syria, in addition to the eastern part of Kurdistan that was a part of the Gajar Empire in Iran (Stansfield, 2006: 1). The partition of the Kurdish nation by
Allied forces in the 1920s was an unfortunate event in the process of nation building and self-determination of the Kurds. Although under the Treaty of Sèvres in August 1920, provision was made for an independent Kurdistan state to be shaped out of areas called Kurdistan within the territories of the defeated Ottoman Empire (Treaty of Sèvres, Section III, Articles 62-64), the Treaty of Lausanne signed between Allied forces and Turkey in 1923 reneged on promises made to the Kurds (McDowall, 2004: 137-143).

Figure 2 Kurdish Inhabited Area (Great Kurdistan)

© Source: Library of Congress, Geography and Map Division Washington, USA.
Since the formation of the state of Iraq in 1920 until 2003, the Kurds have always lived in constant struggle. There has been no period in the modern era of Iraq (and other countries with a Kurdish population in the Middle East) in which Kurds have experienced peace. They have had to fight successive Iraqi governments in order to get their voices heard. Their resistance was because they did not see themselves as partners since their ethno-national identity was never ‘practically’ considered in the Iraqi constitution.

The 1958 Iraqi Revolution, similar to the post-World War One political re-alignment, made unfulfilled promises to the Kurds. When Abd Al-Karim Qasim (1914-1963) seized power by coup d’état in 1958, he announced that the new Iraqi government was to comprise all stakeholders of the territory of Iraq: Sunni, Shi‘ite and Kurds. For the first time, the Iraqi constitution 1958 declared that Iraq consists of two main nations (Arab and Kurd) and other ethno-religious minorities. The Arabs and Kurds never shared power in Iraq until 2003. Protests by Kurds were met with oppression and violence by successive Iraqi governments. In 1961, Mustafa Barzani (1903-1979), the leader of the KDP led a revolt against the Iraqi central government and, after eventual negotiations, for the first time in the history of Kurds in Iraq, an official agreement was reached. The 11 March 1970 Accord assured cultural, political and self-ruling rights to Kurds in Iraq (McDowall, 2004: 327-28).

According to the agreement, after a period of four years, Iraqi Kurdistan would become autonomous. Between 1970 and 1974 there were so-called liberated areas under the control of the Kurdish forces, so-called peshmarga in Kurdish. These provinces, notably Erbil, Sulaimaniya and Dohuk were seen as de facto autonomous Kurdish territories and were governed by Kurds (see Figure 2). In addition, five Kurds were also appointed to the cabinet by the Iraqi government (Stansfield, 2006:
4). However, this arrangement did not last long due to mistrust between the Ba’ath party and the Kurdish national movement.

3.1.2. Displacement and Destruction: Kurds Population as Victims of War and Genocide in Iraq

The conflict between the Kurds and the Iraqi government resulted in political victimisation and social casualties. McDowall (2004) argued that the Iraqi Kurds depended entirely on Iranian support in terms of military equipment, food and other basic needs (McDowall, 2004: 337-8). Iran supported the Kurds due to its own land disputes with the Iraqi administration. However, when the matter was resolved with the Algiers Agreement of 6 March 1975 Mohammad Reza Pahlavi (then Shah of Iran) cut all support to the Kurds. With no further support, the subsequent collapse of the Kurdish revolution led to many casualties. Over 210,000 Kurds sought refuge in Iran between 1974 and 1975, and in 1978 about 1,400 Kurdish villages wererazed by the Iraqi administration. Approximately 600,000 people were forced into Mujama’at (collective settlement camps), so they could be monitored. Over 300,000 Kurds were also driven away from the south-west and centre of Iraq or made homeless (for more details see McDowall, 2004: 338-9).

Following this long-term civilian massacre and displacement of Kurds, every Kurd’s experience, including my own, shows that it is quite rare to find a Kurdish family in Iraq that has not been affected by displacement, the war or impacted by the genocide which occurred. Indeed, as a result of being constantly displaced, collective camps have emerged as a model of settlement and lifestyle among the Kurdish population in Iraq.
Nonetheless, though the Ba‘ath regime repressed Kurdish civilians, they did not necessarily exclude them from basic needs. Indeed, another strategy of the regime was to attract people’s loyalty by awarding privileges to them. The Iraqi government offered services and basic needs, free study and job opportunities, but people who were deemed disloyal were excluded. Social welfare, health services and employment were provided primarily to Arabs, although the richest oil fields of Iraq are in Kurdish areas, including Kirkuk. However, instead of recruiting from the indigenous, local Kurdish population, initially Arabs were being employed.

Throughout the Iraq-Iran war in the 1980s, Kurdish civilians in Iraq were most vulnerable. Any movements of *peshmarga* on borders or inside Iran affected the situation of Kurds inside Iraq. Both Iraq and Iran supported Kurdish parties against each other during the war, but the *peshmarga* found themselves fighting alongside the forces of Iran. Facing resurgent Iranian/Kurdish activity in the north of Iraq, Saddam Hussein adopted severe measures to permanently remove the threat posed by the rebellious Kurds to his regime. On 31 July 1983 and months later, up to 8,000 males over 13 years old of Barzani tribes were removed from their families in collective camp settlements of Qushtapa, Diyana, Harir and Bahirka. They were taken to Baghdad and, months later, executed in south Iraq (Human Rights Watch, 1993: 41). The survivors were illiterate females and their children with no skills, jobs or any other source of income. The government left them on their own, cutting off water, electricity and other basic needs.

The most catastrophic event however was the Anfal (genocide) campaign authorised by Saddam Hussein in 1988 against the Kurds. This was a plan for systematic depopulation of rural Iraqi Kurdistan in order to remove Kurdish rebellious forces’ presence from the region and to cut all facilities needed for resurrecting and maintaining the *peshmarga* (Anderson & Stansfield, 2004: 169).
The campaign was pursued with enthusiastic brutality by Saddam's cousin Ali Hassan Al-Majid, who became known as 'Chemical Ali' due to his infamous activities such as the chemical attack on Halabja, which destroyed approximately 4,000 Kurdish villages (McDowall, 2004: 360).

The Iraqi government justified these campaigns on the basis of political and religious reasons. Iraqi Kurds were portrayed as rebels, 'traitors' and 'collaborators with the enemy', because the PDK and PUK had sided with Iran, the 'enemy' of Iraq. The Iraqi regime also justified the Anfal campaign as religious excommunication (takfir) (Rogg & Rimscha, 2007: 828).

It was not only villagers who were targeted in the campaign; indeed, the most well-known mass killing during the campaign was in the city of Halabja on 16 March 1988. Within a matter of hours, chemical weapons had been used to kill approximately 5,000 civilians (McDowall, 2004: 357-8). In essence, over the last century the Kurds of Iraq have been subjected to full-scale discrimination, violence and constant displacement. Attempts to change their situation, either through arms or negotiations have always been defeated by mistrust, and lack of compromise by successive governments, eventually leading to genocide.

3.1.3. From 'North of Iraq' to 'Kurdistan Region': Uprising in 1991 and the Establishment of Self-Administration

The Persian Gulf War in 1991 was a turning point in the status of the Iraqi Kurdistan Region. The Allied coalition war led by the US created complete conditions for Iraqi Kurds in the North (and Shi'a in the South) to start a new uprising against Saddam Hussein's government. Within a period of two weeks, almost all Kurd-populated areas had been liberated. The people's celebrations lasted a very short time,
however, when they realised that the US and its allied forces were not happy to see Iraq broken up. Saddam Hussein had also come to this realisation and had regrouped his army for an advance into Kurdistan.

With memories of previous brutalities still fresh on their minds, after the collapse of the 1991 uprising (*Rapareen*), thousands of Kurds fled their towns and cities to escape Saddam’s vengeance. They entered into hiding in the mountainous border regions of Iran and Turkey where many died as a result of freezing conditions and hunger (Galbraith, 2005: 268-269). Hundreds of those who stayed behind were captured and killed by Iraqi forces. The *peshmarga* of most Kurdish parties at that time confronted the Iraqi army advancing towards liberated areas, and many died on both sides (Lawrence, 2008: 51-52).

The only obstacle to Saddam’s forces advancing into liberated areas in Kurdistan was the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) Resolution No.688. Under Operation Provide Comfort (OPC), which formed part of the resolution, a safe zone had been carved out to provide security and humanitarian aid to refugees who had fled to Turkish and Iranian borders. In this same context, a safe haven and no-fly zone had been implemented in Kurdish-populated areas. Through the OPC, the US and its allies persuaded people who fled from Iraqi forces to go back to their homes where they could be better supplied with basic needs. More than a million Kurdish refugees began returning to their cities and towns in May 1991. The Iraqi army and local administration were ordered to withdraw from these areas of Kurdistan except Kirkuk city. This gave way for the IKF to become the main legitimate (Kurdish) authority in the area. The IKF comprised several major Kurdistan political parties and controlled three main Iraqi Kurdistan provinces: Erbil, Sulaimania and Dohuk (Galbraith, 2005: 269).

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1 Interview with Chnar Saad, former minister of MoMA, 28 March 2011.
Before the 1991 uprising, the Kurdistan Region under the command of the Ba’athist regime had the lowest proportion of public services in the country (Natali, 2010: 3). After the uprising, as Natali argues, international humanitarian aid and protection as regulated in UNHCR 688 helped to establish the KRG:

[It] permitted international non-governmental organisations (INGOs) to secure basic needs for local populations, and commence [the] rehabilitation processes. External aid also unintentionally advanced Kurdish nationalism by offering new forms of external patronage, semi-legitimacy, and internal sovereignty to the region. During this period the Kurdish elite took advantage of international support by commencing institution-building projects and creating a Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG) (Natali, 2010: xxiii).

The new condition confirmed the right of the Kurdistan Region as an autonomous region with self-government. Since 1991, the region has taken a different path of political development from Iraq. It was no longer seen as an integral province of Iraq as in the past. The KRG administration considers that it owes a great deal, its very existence, to national liberation and families of those who fought to uphold their sovereignty over the years. Consequently, this is reflected in social security provision and welfare programmes of the KRG. It created a style of distribution of privileges and benefits among the population based on political loyalty instead of needs. The implementation and provision of social welfare and security programmes is closely linked to the extent of one’s socio-political status and not necessarily on the basis of need. In the conflict-prone and volatile situation in which they live, the government prioritises social programme recipients over others on the basis of their contribution to the revolution and other political values.
3.2. Kurdistan Regional Government: Claims, Opportunities and Challenges

‘Kurdistan Region’ as a term has not been used in this research as a geographical area in northern Iraq, but rather as an area under the jurisdiction of the KRG (see Figure 2). This means that Kurdish cities such as Kirkuk, Khaniqin, Shangar, Makhmour and other disputed districts currently under the control of the Iraqi central government are excluded.

Figure 3 Map of the Kurdistan Region (including disputed territories)

Due to the vacuum created following the withdrawal of Iraqi forces and bureaucrats from more than half of Iraqi Kurdistan areas, the IKF tried to fill the gap and oversee public administration in the area. Schools and hospitals were still running despite the overwhelming obstacles due to infrastructural damage and shortage of basic supplies. In 1992, elections were held to choose a substantive government for the Kurds. Only residents of that part of Iraqi Kurdistan were allowed to choose members for the 105 seats of the KNA. These seats were hotly contested between the KDP and PUK and, at the end, there was a deadlock. Following negotiations, both sides agreed to share power and a council of ministers, 50:50 from PUK and KDP and five from the Christian minority, was subsequently sworn in at the assembly (Stansfield, 2003: 146).

Saddam’s isolation of the region from the rest of Iraq turned to a positive consequence for the Kurds. However, the power-sharing deal between the two major parties in the assembly did not resolve other prevailing and long-lasting disputes. The disagreement led to a civil war in 1994 which lasted until 1998 (for more details see Gunter, 1999; Anderson and Stansfield, 2004; McDowall, 2004; Galbraith, 2005).

The civil war did not cease entirely until the 2003 invasion of Iraq. With the rebuilding that followed the war, feuding parties in the Kurdistan region also came to an agreement that they could also replace internal conflict with cooperation and development. Even when the US mediated between both parties in 1998 (known as the Washington Agreement) to agree a ceasefire, they did not step further to unify the two one-party administrations.

In essence, several factors helped to transform the Kurdistan Region into an area distinct from Iraq and also improve the status of KRG as a semi-autonomous
administration. First, the United Nations Security Council Resolution (UNSCR) 688 condemned Iraq for the brutalities visited upon the Iraqi civilian population in the North (Kurds) and the South (Shi’a) in the aftermath of the 1991 uprising. The resolution secured a no-fly zone in the Kurdish areas in the north and it was the first time since the division of Kurdistan that a high-ranking organisation such as the UN had recognised the Kurds in the north (McDowall, 1996: 373-75). Second, under UN Security Council Resolution 986 adopting the Oil-for-Food Programme (OFFP) in 1996, Kurdistan was formally recognised as a separate area from Iraq. The OFFP allowed the Iraqi government to export an agreed amount of oil in order to import basic needs for people under the supervision of the UN Office of Iraq. Thirteen per cent of this oil export revenue was earmarked for the Kurdistan Region. Thirdly, the KRG was also recognised as an official Kurdish administration by the Transitional Administration Law (TAL) on 8 March 2004 within the framework of adopting federalism as the basis for the system of government in Iraq (Stansfield, 2005: 197), a very significant step for Kurds in Iraq. Fourthly, the Kurdistan Region with its current borders was consolidated in the permanent Iraqi Constitution (backed by 78 per cent of Iraqi voters in a referendum held on 15 October 2005). The new Iraqi Constitution openly confirmed that they “recognise the region of Kurdistan, along with its existing authorities, as a federal region” (Article 117). Since the adoption of a new constitution, the KRG has gained legitimacy as a constituent state in the pluralistic democratic federal Iraq. An equally significant event was the integration of both Erbil and Sulaymaniya administrations and the reunification of the KRG on 7 May 2006.

Analysis addressing the political development of the Kurdistan Region evaluates the establishment of the KRG as the most important event in the history of Kurds in Iraq. Many argue that the formation of the KRG provided a unique opportunity to Iraqi Kurds to consolidate their jurisdiction and therefore refer to the region as a semi-state,
de facto dependent state or de facto state (Gunter, 1993; Galbraith, 2005; Natali, 2010).

3.2.1. The Profile of the Kurdistan Regional Government

The above historical background was needed in order to understand how the Kurdistan Region has become a de facto state, and the KRG consolidated its entity. Geographically, the Kurdistan Region comprises three governorates, Erbil (the capital), Suleimaniya and Duhok, and covers an area of 40,643 square kilometres. According to the KRG website (2010), nearly 4.7 million people live in the Kurdistan Region (Kurdistan Regional Government, 2010; Khidhir, 2011). These populations dwell in 33 cities and districts and 136 towns (Kurdistan Region Statistics Office, 2011). Despite the fact that the Kurdistan Region has an increasing urban population, the rural areas were re-inhabited and reconstructed gradually in the early 1990s after being systematically destroyed by Iraqi governments between the 1970s and 1990s.

In terms of the political life there is a pluralistic system approved by law. In the main time, the structure of political parties is similar to that of a soviet-communist style. According to KRG’s Ministry of the Interior, 29 political parties are licensed in the Kurdistan Region, with 21 more awaiting formal licences (Kurdistan Region’s Party Spectrum in Rudaw, 2011). However, the ruling parties, KDP and PUK are still dominant inside and outside government.

In the 2009 general elections, other political parties stepped in to the parliament after removing the threshold of seven per cent of votes as a minimum to enter. The 111 MPs in the Kurdistan Parliament represent the following political lists and parties (see Table 1 on the next page).
The Kurdistani List Coalition has won the last two regional elections (2005 and 2009). It has made up this cabinet together with other parties. The current coalition government consists of the Kurdistan Democratic Party (KDP), Patriotic Union of Kurdistan (PUK), Kurdistan Islamic Movement (KIM), the Chaldean Assyrian Council, Turkmen representatives, Communists and Socialists. There were 42 ministers in the fifth cabinet (2006-2009); however, this number reduced to 19 after the sixth cabinet formed by Barham Salih in 2009.

### Table 1 List of Political Parties and Represent People in Kurdistan Region Parliament

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Name of party of lists and parties</th>
<th>Number of MPs</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Kurdistan List: (Kurdistan Democratic Party and Patriotic Union of Kurdistan)</td>
<td>59</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Change List</td>
<td>25</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Reform and Services List: (Kurdistan Islamic Union, Islamic Group in Kurdistan, Kurdistan Socialist Democratic Party, Future Party)</td>
<td>13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Islamic Movement List</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Freedom and Social Justice List: (Kurdistan Communist Party, Kurdistan Toilers Party, Kurdistan Independent Work Party, Kurdistan Pro-Democratic Party, Democratic Movement of Kurdistan People)</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Turkoman Democratic Movement</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Turkoman Reform List</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Turkoman Erbil List</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chaldean Assyrian Council (Christian)</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Al-Rafidain List (Christian)</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Armenian independent MP: Aram Shahin Dawood Bakoyian</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td><strong>111</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Source: Adopted from the website of Kurdistan Parliament 2012, and the website of the KRG.*

Given the region’s history, the KRG saw it necessary to expand social assistance to cover war victims and adult students, as well as poor, low-income households and disabled people. Therefore, in the first two years of office, the Kurdistan Parliament amended a number of laws and regulations, including the social welfare law, to reflect this need. However, due to lack of sufficient budget for the first cabinet of the KRG, no step was taken to implement these social programmes. Most importantly, the major political parties developed party-based foundations to provide services to their party members and their families killed either in the war with the Iraq government or in intra-Kurdish conflict.

With increasing unemployment and suspension of the food ration programme by the central government in Baghdad, the first, second and third cabinet of the KRG did not allocate any funds to operate social security programmes, i.e. pension scheme and SPF. In the absence of state welfare assistance, humanitarian relief was provided by external aid agencies as a source of the region’s social fund (Natali, 2010: 30). The external aid provided some basic needs in the form of food and services to the Kurdish population, while the KRG had another source of income generated from border revenues with Turkey and Iran: the fact is, that has always been a reason for disagreement and conflict between the KDP and PUK. The civil war during 1994 and 1998 not only impeded the delivery process of external aid, but also crumbled the newly-emerged local government. This will be explained in more detail.

The KDP and PUK have had long disputes over leadership and revenue linked to the Khabur border gate. Issues regarding the division of revenue generated from the gate have even resulted in physical confrontations amongst the two parties. The
KDP and PUK have been the main actors in the political life of Kurdistan from the 1991 uprising onwards. The relation between both major parties has, in one way or another, always been strained. Their cooperation and opposition have marked the Kurdish national movement and government. The KDP was founded in 1946 as an uneasy alliance between two different social groupings. The first was characterised as tribal based under the leadership of Mustafa Barzani and the second was representing the intelligentsia and educated groups under the guidance of Ibrahim Ahmed and his young protégé, Jalal Talabani (current Iraqi President and leader of PUK). Despite the differences in their political views and ideology, both groups gathered around one political party. However, the interfusion broke in 1964 and the KDP split into two wings. The first group is best known as a leadership wing led by Barzani and the second as a political bureau wing led by Ahmed-Talabani. The rivalry ended with the success of Barzani in gaining the March Accord 1970 (McDowall, 1996: 315-320). After the collapse of the Kurdish revolution in 1975, the division appeared again. The KDP reorganised under the leadership of Idris and then Masoud Barzani (sons of Mustafa Barzani), while Jalal Talabani formed a new party from mostly moderate and leftist-minded nationalist groups (Stansfield, 2005: 197).

When the results of the 1992 elections were revealed, the PUK with 43.6 per cent of the vote did not accept its marginal defeat versus the KDP with 45 per cent of the vote (McDowall, 1996: 381). Again, it did not agree to take on the role of opposition party, as proposed by the deputy-leader of the PUK, Nawshirwan Mustafa Amin. After tensions and negotiations between major parties, they adopted a plan which satisfied both sides. According to the plan, the KDP and PUK equally divided the 100 seats (in addition to five seats reserved for the Christians) of KNA between them. Executive positions were also divided equally in a deal which became known as the 50:50 power sharing system (Stansfield, 2003: 146; Stansfield, 2005: 200).
Yet, power sharing did not dissolve the mistrust and dispute which has already existed between them since 1964. Indeed, despite sharing power, partisan conflicts continued in the mountains and other areas outside the central government control. The rivalry and antipathy between party leaders was deepened and transferred to cities until the civil war, known by Kurds as Birakuji (Fratricide) restarted in 1994. Since then the Iraqi Kurdistan Region has been divided politically and geographically between KDP and PUK regions. Erbil and Dohuk is a KDP dominated region, and Sulaimanyia and Garmian is a PUK dominated region (see Figure 4).

Figure 4 KDP and PUK Controlled Administrative Zones

Source: Kermanshahi, Wikipedia, April 2012.
This division created extreme instability and uncertainty in the socio-political life of the Kurdistan Region. During the civil war, people were asked to show their loyalty, and were threatened, arrested, tortured and even killed when proved that they were loyal to the opposite party. No official statistics on all casualties have been published; however, more than 2,000 Kurds were killed until the half-term of the civil war before the US brokered peace in 1995 (Plotz, 1996). This division was strictly enforced to the extent that party members were forbidden from visiting provinces outside of their party’s control. With regard to internal refugees, the KDP estimated that 58,000 of its party members and supporters had been expelled from the PUK-controlled region between October 1996 and October 1997, while the PUK asserted that 49,000 of its party members and supporters were expelled from the KDP-controlled region between August 1996 and December 1997 (Global Security, 2007).

The condition of tension and conflict continued even after several mediations from Iran, Turkey and the US, and a solution was found under the terms of the Washington Agreement in 1998 (Anderson and Stansfield, 2004: 177). In 1998, the KDP and PUK ended their conflict; however, they did not manage to wholly overcome it. Interrogation and expulsion of each other’s party members continued. It took nearly seven years of normalisation, negotiation and coordination until they managed to reunite their two administrations.

The intra-Kurdish civil war raised the profile of the party and affiliated people to a high level. Both parties were competing in delivering better services to their party supporters to keep their support. For instance, the first public housing project (Sarwaran) in the period of the Kurdistan Region was constructed for martyrs of the KDP and those who fled from the control of the PUK to Erbil in 2002.
3.2.3. Particracy, One-Party Administration of KDP and PUK, and Power-sharing

Another factor that determined the operation of the KRG is the political party interference in government. Here, I will explore how the major parties controlled and obstructed the government’s function. This will help to explain the research claims on how and why the major political parties have pursued a clientelistic practice through implementation of government social security programmes.

Not only were the executive positions of the KRG affected by the 50:50 power-sharing system, but the social life was politicised and defragmented as well. Until the 2009 elections, there was very little space for independent associations or an active public sphere outside the parties. Almost every political party in the Kurdistan Region acted as mini cabinets in their own right. For instance, the two ruling parties, KDP and PUK, had a student union, women’s organisation, teacher association and security apparatus within their structures (Bruinessen, 2005: 66). Although there were KRG offices and the KNA as parliamentary bodies, they acted more as party organisations than a regional government. Natali argues that the KRG and KNA are actually operated by officials who also act as functionaries for political party leaders (Natali, 2010: 11-12). Politburos and party leaders are the main and only reference of power rather than the KNA itself, to the extent that the Kurdistan Region’s MPs and other government officials have limited power of decision making and have little discretion to behave independently. They are selected among lower level party members in order to compel them to comply with top party leaders’ commands. Top party officials have not passed authorisation to their lower party members in the government. Party monopolisation of politics, government and society limited the extent to which an independent (non-party-based affiliation) public service could emerge. Civil servants’ loyalty to the political elite and parties remained critical.
The legacy of favouritism in recruitment has a long tradition in the Kurdistan Region, which can be dated back to the Iraqi regime. Partisanship and partisocracy has been deepened in Iraq as a whole and the Kurdistan Region in particular. Recruitment and employment is tightly owned and controlled by both parties in power. This is what can be called partisocracy in administration, which appeared in imposing party power over the Kurdistan Parliament and KRG. In practice the party should stand behind every decision made by parliament or government executives. In some cases, it is very difficult to clearly distinguish government offices from party ones. For instance, Masoud Barzani, when first elected as president of the Kurdistan Region in 2005, built the Presidency Office near his home and his party presidency office in Sari Rash, 40 km (25 miles) north-east of the capital Erbil and located approximately 7 km (4.5 miles) close to his party political bureau. Going to an example from my research, due to the weakness in government organisations and the clientage attitude of parties, in 2001 and 2002, the KDP offices in Erbil were in charge of registering lists of people’s names eligible for social protection benefits instead of the relevant regional directorates.

Coming back to the power-sharing system, in each KRG office the deputy or assistant enjoyed the same power and influence as the minister or director; each needed the support of the other to plan policies and implement programmes, and each possessed a veto. This arrangement existed throughout the governmental structures, from the cabinet to the town councils, and also included schools, hospitals and internal security positions (Stansfield, 2005: 201). Sitting on the top of the whole structure were the political bureaux of the KDP and PUK, led by Barzani and Talabani respectively.

The emergence of two party-controlled zones in the region divided the KRG into two separate administrations, KDP-controlled KRG administration in Erbil and Dohuk provinces and PUK-controlled KRG administration in Sulaymaniyah. Each
administration was entirely controlled by one party with limited participation of their smaller allied parties. Although the unified KRG was announced following the strategic agreement between both major parties, potentially they had not been completely integrated up to the time of drafting this thesis. Even though there have been ongoing negotiations between the KDP and PUK, with constant criticism from opposition parties, the three ministries have not yet been merged, including the Ministry of Interior, the Ministry of Finance and Economy, and the Ministry of Peshmarga.

The source of power has been practised beyond the government, and parliament has no power to investigate the (lack of) transparency in government offices. For example, as will be addressed in more detail later in this chapter, before the Presidency Order in 2011 to carry out investigation in corruption, the parliament and judicial power had not followed a single corruption case in the region. The decision-making process is unofficially directly in the hands of politburos or leadership of dominant parties. They regularly interfere in the administration process of the KRG. Major political parties obviously shape the government, but they assume an undisputed role due to the weakness of government institutions.

Having merged the two one-party administrations, the power sharing system returned to KRG and continued but this time between the more powerful KDP and the weak PUK, especially after the cleavage that happened to the PUK, and the Gorran Movement (Change Party) emerged. This will be explained in more detail later in this chapter.

Rather than bringing the Kurds together, the power-sharing arrangements acted as a catalyst to intensify competition between the KDP and PUK as they struggled to coexist within a unified government to the point where even slight disagreements could accelerate the conflict again (Stansfield, 2005: 201). However, the political
instability became more apparent after the KDP and PUK made their ‘Strategic Agreement’ in 2005, under which Talabani and Barzani agreed to unify the two northern KRGs in order to help Kurds make the best of changes and developments in post-Saddam Iraq.

The fundamental principles of the strategic agreement between KDP and PUK are as follows: (1) participating in the Iraqi and regional elections with a unified list; (2) all government positions in either Iraq or KRG will be shared by the two parties (KDP-PUK) and both will support each other’s members, not only in Erbil but also Baghdad. Moreover, the PUK and KDP will share power in the cabinet for four years, with each party holding the prime ministerial position and controlling the cabinet for two years each. Under exceptional circumstances and upon the request of PUK leader Jelal Talabani, the first two-year period of the Nechirvan Barzani (from the KDP) cabinet was extended to four years after his term ended (Semin, 2012). After the 2009 election, Barham Salih held the post of Prime Minister for the first two years until January 2012, after which he relinquished his position to Nechirvan Barzani.

3.2.4. From Economic Embargo to Economic Growth

As I argued earlier in this chapter, the first decade of the free Kurdistan Region lived under a condition characterised as a deteriorated infrastructure and economic blockade. However, due to the lack of vision and priority for an effective social welfare system, and also because of civil war, the KRG did not allocate any funds for social security programmes. This area, as it now relatively suffers from the same problem, gets less attention in the government’s priorities. During the 1990s, it was up to international NGOs, or party-based organisations, to deliver such services. It has always been suggested that the economic blockade and lack of funds prevented the KRG from providing adequate social security and other public
services during the 1990s. Yet, the same negligence prevailed even after an increase in revenue. The last section of this chapter will present some figures for public expenditure on social security.

Before the Gulf War and emergence of the semi-autonomous entity of Kurdistan in 1991, the Iraqi government had intentionally neglected the Kurdish areas. Despite the destruction caused to agricultural economy and infrastructural facilities as a result of displacing the rural population from nearly 4,500 Kurdish villages, the Iraqi government had set up rare industries, which would have offered a good job opportunity for forcibly-relocated rural and urban populations.

In addition to all the repression and destruction mentioned earlier in this chapter, the Kurdistan Region and Iraq were affected by the Gulf War and its aftermath. However, at the time of regime change in Iraq, Leezenberg (2003: 149) argued that, despite its political conditions since 1991, the Kurdistan Region has experienced moderate economic prosperity. He pointed to some distinctive elements of the Kurdistan Regional economy during the first decade of Kurdish ruling experience (1992-2003), such as: continuing to use the older ‘Swiss print’ Iraqi Dinars, while in the rest of Iraq new, locally-printed banknotes became the official money; the role of foreign funded NGOs; the revenues of the transit trade in oil were an enormous source of wealth, as was the Oil-for-Food Programme (OFFP) of the UN, which from 1997 onwards allocated 13 per cent of Iraqi oil revenue to the Kurdistan Region (Leezenberg, 2003: 149; Leezenberg, 2005: 631-8). However, due to an on-going insurgency in Iraqi Kurdistan, deliberate ignorance and even destruction of thousands of villages and several larger cities by the Iraqi government badly damaged the infrastructure and left an enduring mess in Kurdish-populated areas (Natali, 2010: 39). It seems that the Kurdish administration was incapable of doing anything to recover from the destruction. The dynamic actors were rather international, Islamic and regional aid
organisations that played a great role to prevent the region from extreme scarcity in the early 1990s. In that period almost two-thirds of external aid funds in Iraq were allocated to the Kurdistan Region (Natali, 2010: 30).

Despite external aid, internal sources of income in the Kurdistan Region during the 1990s came from illegal transit trade in petrol products from Iraq to Turkey, which became a point of dispute between both major parties. Iraqi oil was illegally going through the Ibrahim Khalil checkpoint under the control of the KDP. As part of the UN sanctions imposed on Iraq, oil exports were forbidden, but it was still encouraged by Iraq, the Kurdistan Region and Turkey. Smuggling of other items such as cigarettes, alcohol, food, and luxury and household appliances over the Khabur border crossing (and the other cross-border trade with Iran) also generated substantial amounts of money. It was revealed that at the Iraqi Kurdish-Turkish border only, the KRG earned approximately US$750 million annually (Stansfield, 2003: 51; Natali, 2010: 44). However, instead of causing disagreements, this source of income should have encouraged the Kurdistan Region to thrive. “Disagreement over the division of these revenues was one of the main causes of Kurdish infighting” (Leezenberg, 2005: 638). At the beginning, the revenue was shared between the KDP, PUK, and the government. However, when the disputes arose, the latter was excluded. Although those in the Kurdistan Region were living under cruel conditions, if there had not been a civil war, and lack of transparency, the region could still have fared better.

To better understand the deterioration of economic life of Kurds in Iraq, one also has to trace the two economic blockades imposed first by the UNSC and second by the Iraqi government on the Kurdistan Region in the 1990s until the collapse of the regime in 2003. The UNSC issued Resolution No. 661 on 6 August 1990 to ban Iraq from all trade, economic and financial activities abroad.
This blockade had an immediate impact on food availability in Iraq, which imported 70-80 per cent of its food. The shortages increased food prices ranging from 200 to 1,800 per cent between August and November 1990 (Provost, 1992: 584-86). To reduce the double impact of scarcity and inflation, the Iraqi government introduced a food rationing system in September 1990; basic food items such as flour, oil, sugar, tea, rice and baby milk were provided on a monthly basis at very low prices (Alnasrawi, 2001: 208-9). However, the blockade evidently left its effects on all parts of Iraq as, in a testimony before the US Senate Committee on Foreign Relations on 5 December 1990, it was reported that it had effectively “shut off 90 per cent of Iraq’s imports and 97 per cent of its exports and produced serious disruptions to the economy and hardships to the people” (New York Times, 6 December 1990, A16, cited from Alnasrawi, 2001: 209).

In April 1991, Resolution No. 661 was replaced by the much-detailed Resolution No. 687 sanctioned by the UNSC. In addition to the international sanctions regime, an internal blockade was imposed by the Iraqi government on the Kurdistan Region in the aftermath of its withdrawal from the three northern Kurdish populated areas (internationally by the UN and internally by Iraq) increased the high rate of unemployment that already existed in Kurdistan (Natali, 2010: 47), particularly among the young generation. This fact compelled many to involve themselves in fraternal fighting for one of the major parties in order to secure an income for themselves and, in most cases, for their family members.

When the UN OFFP came into effect, a change occurred in the economic situation of the Kurdistan Region. The OFFP entitled everyone to a ration regardless of need. Although it provided satisfactory aid, it failed to contribute in capacity-building that would bring about an effective social security policy. The programme only offered short-term relief, not long-term development. As Natali (2010) stated, the OFFP
reinforced the culture of dependency and people’s expectation of the role of government based on the distribution of food and social services. “It strengthened the notion that had emerged during the Ba’athist social welfare state that people should receive goods and revenues without work” (Natali, 2010: 63). Although corruption was noted about the OFFP (Volcker, Goldstone and Pieth, 2005: 149-62), there was still little space for exploitation of the programme by political parties in power.

By 2002 about 60 per cent of the population of the Kurdistan Region lived below the poverty line, gaining an average monthly income per person of about US$5, or about US$280 annually for a family of five. Twenty per cent lived in extreme poverty earning less than US$200 annually per family (FAO, 2002: 21, cited from Natali, 2010: 70).

In order to measure the collapse of the Iraqi economy, since 1980 the GDP per capita had regularly declined from US$4,083 to $627 by 1991 (Alnasrawi, 1994: 123). However, the trend reversed straight after the overthrow of the Ba’athist regime in Iraq. As Ali Sindi, the Minister of Planning – KRG declared, the per capita income in the region for 2012 had reached US$4,000 compared to US$300 in 2003 (Aswat al-Iraq, 2012).

The most effective steps in economic development started after the invasion of Iraq in 2003. Nevertheless, since the overthrow of Saddam Hussein in 2003, the Kurds now receive 17 per cent of the Iraqi national budget, compared with 13 per cent from the OFFP. Unlike the rest of Iraq, the KRG has succeeded in stabilising the security situation in Kurdistan, and paved the way for relative economic development. Foreign investors have started doing business in the region and this has helped establish direct communication channels with regional and Western countries.

According to statistics recently published by the Board of Investment, from August 2006 to May 2012, over 450 licensed investment projects have been conducted across the region. These projects are divided between sectors such as housing,
industry, tourism, trading, agriculture, health, communication, education, finance and sports, and performed by national, foreign and joint venture companies (Board of Investment-KRG, 2012). Since the invasion, despite the KRG’s share in central petroleum revenue, regularly increased to ten times by 2012, it has its own regional taxation and customs revenue generated by investment, transit and external trade.

Furthermore, in recent years, the public sector in the Kurdistan Region has become the major user of public resources and the single main source of employment. Indeed, with 1,500,000 people working in the public sector, it employs one-third of the country’s population (USAID/IRAQ, 2008: 15; Khidhir, 2011). There has been a tradition in Iraq and the Kurdistan Region that the government should recruit all university and college graduates every year in the public sector. It is very rare to find a household with no payment from a real government job or a fraudulent one (Mucha Khori bin diwar). The KRG’s focus on trade and investment has encouraged private sector employment. Since its fifth cabinet in 2006, the KRG has stepped back from unplanned recruitment in order to lighten the load on the public sector, encouraging people to find job opportunities in the private sector. The government has launched a plan for public sector employment; however, a new form of nepotism has cropped up and party affiliated people still have chance to be employed outside announced job application procedures.

In other areas, the KRG has made efforts to provide official guidelines on investment activities in the region. The new Investment Law from July 2006 is aimed at creating conditions for promoting investment in the Kurdistan Region. It refers to both national and foreign capital sources and removes legal obstacles to investment. The KRG has also been very keen to improve the law in parallel with its implementation (Law of Investment, 2006; Heshmati, 2010: 253). Particularly from August 2006 to May 2012, the KRG Board of Investment approved more than US$21.5 billion worth of
investment projects, mainly in sectors such as construction and housing, industry, tourism, and trading (see Figure 5). Companies from Turkey, Iran, Jordan, Egypt, the USA, Germany, Sweden, Canada and South Korea can be counted among those doing business in the Kurdistan Region at present (Board of Investment-KRG, 2012).

Figure 5 Number of Investment Projects in the Kurdistan Region’s Three Provinces by Sectors 2012

Source: Department of Information and Studies, Investment Board, KRG.
With its vast resources, especially the oil revenue from the Baghdad central government, the KRG assumed a leading role in promoting economic development. With the slogan of ‘Kurdistan is open for business’ the Prime Minister, Nechirvan Barzani (2006-9) emphasised private sector development by supporting and assuring potential investors in their business (Natali, 2010: 86). The Kurdistan Region Investment Law was also helped by his initiative, through facilitating tax-free, minimal payments of land rent and the free transfer of money (Law of Investment, 2006).

In terms of oil revenue, the Kurdistan Region has been receiving its 17 per cent after the regime change, which for the year of 2011 only was IQD 11,180,000,000,000 (US$9,474,000,000). With other regions’ sources of revenue from custom, Petro-Dollar and electricity it reached IQD 12,386,000,000,000 (US$10,496,610,000) (Kurdistan Region Government’s Budget, 2011). For 2012, officials estimated that the Kurdistan Region would get IQD 15,245,797,000,000 (approximately US$13 Billion) from the federal oil revenue (Iraqi Kurdistan Parliament/Act of Budget No. 8, 2012a).

After 2003, revenues have been increased but structural changes did not occur in the social security system of KRG. The issue of poverty in the Kurdistan Region has been one of the major challenges over the past two decades, though very little has been done to address this issue. In spite of the large developmental achievements over the past few years, many challenges and obstacles still threaten the social security system of the Kurdistan Region. The results of surveys and field studies of Iraq – including the Kurdistan Region – indicate that about 22.9 per cent (6.9 million in the whole of Iraq) of the population of federal Iraq are below the poverty line. The poverty line in the Kurdistan Region and the whole federal government of Iraq has been measured as IQD 76,896 (US$61) per person monthly (Ministry of Planning MoP/KRG, 2012: 171-2).
3.2.5. Corruption: Non-transparency and Party-Affiliation-Based Privileges

For overall understanding of the implementation of social security in the KRG, the hidden and institutionalised corruption that exists in the administration and economic development of the KRG is noticed. Exploring issues of transparency and nepotism will explain how public funds are being used in favour of ruling parties. I argue that the shortage in budget is not due to lack of public funds for social welfare services, but rather due to lack of transparency and favouritism.

Leezenberg believes that in the ‘post-civil war society’ of the Kurdistan Region, the heritage of domestic conflict has strengthened and institutionalised patronage relations. The party members persistently attempt to monopolise, and indeed institutionalise, clientelistic networks (Leezenberg, 2005: 640). The dominant parties divided the population based on their loyalty. This tradition was transferred and has taken new forms in later political economy of the Kurdistan Region. If in the period of conflict financial incentive was used to mobilise people to fight in the civil war, in the post-conflict era people in turn have been seeking their privileges.

Ultimately, all administrative procedures in the Kurdistan Region remained linked with nepotism and not meritocracy. This kept most of the public sector grounded in party-based affiliation (Natali, 2010: 41). Both ruling parties have always manipulated public budget for their own benefit and for that of their patrons. There have been debates on the extent to which the KRG has fallen into corruption. As has been reported by local, regional and international media, even after the unification of both Kurdish administrations in the Kurdistan Region, the budget of the KRG was distributed between the KDP and PUK unfairly (Kate Clark, Radio BBC Radio4, 2008). Both of the major parties make monthly or occasional payments to very active party members, particularly those who advertise for and defend the party. Anyone who aims to secure his or her interests is obliged to cooperate with the KDP and PUK, because
these parties control all employment and education opportunities (Natali, 2010; Wilgenburg, 2011). As Heshmati stated, the “high profitability of imports [in the Kurdistan Region] owned and operated by decision-makers” (Heshmati, 2010: 247).

In the last decade, both parties have been criticised for not being transparent with public income and budget (Gorran- Economic Research Unit, 2012). For instance, Sayid Akram, former director of the Ibrahim Khalil security department from 2000-2006, claimed that customs revenue was not being transferred to the treasury of the KRG; rather, the funds were being channelled to the personal office of Nechirvan Barzani, deputy of the KDP and current PM. Following Akram’s claim, 50 MPs, mostly from opposition parties, and 11 MPs from the majority Kurdistani Bloc, signed a petition demanding transparent accounting of the revenue generated from Ibrahim Khalil.

Their efforts were, however, undermined by the head of parliament, who reacted against the formation of an investigative committee, according to various newspapers (Ahmed, 2011). Indeed, often, instead of pursuing and exposing corruption cases, the Kurdistan Parliament tries to cover them up or deliberately ignore them. Following the mass protests of 17 February 2011 in Sulaimania, Masud Barzani, the President of Kurdistan, promised to form a ‘reform committee’ to investigate the government’s flaws. After nearly 11 months of investigating KRG ministries and offices, the Reform Committee finalised a long report on suspected sectors involved in corruption, such as health, land, public and administrative recruitment, bureaucracy, watchdog institutions, government tenders, budget, investment, housing, and other sectors (Kurdistan Region Presidency, 2012). Despite pointing out many corruption cases, no one was sent to court. Leaders of the major political parties put obstacles in the way of investigating corruption cases. Those cases have been safe from penalising due to the two-administration before 2005 and the Strategic Agreement of the two dominant
parties. Even those who are deemed culpable are not dismissed for fear that they may be recruited by the other side.

The endemic corruption in the region has also been noted by foreign investors and governments who have criticised the KRG authority for poor transparency and corruption. US diplomats advised the KRG to act on “divesting the government of conflict-of-interest business dealings, enforcing new codes of conduct for government officials, and prying the party away from the workings of government” (Salih, 2011). Despite launching the ‘Good Governance and Transparency’ strategy by the KRG in 2009 (Kurdistan Regional Government, 2009b), it seems that the government is too weak to oppose party interference.

As a response to the mass demonstrations of February 2011, The Presidency of the Kurdistan Region set up the Reform Commission (KRRC) in March 2011. After 11 months of investigation, the committee published a report within which it acknowledged that “there has been widespread corruption and mismanagement in several branches of the government, paying particular attention to malpractices found in the health sector, the allocation of public property to businesses, government job opportunities, administration and government bureaucracy, the tendering of public projects, budget transparency, investment policies, public housing projects, agricultural lands, market monopolies, and fuel and domestic energy” (Kurdistan Region Presidency, 2012). It was expected that a high number of corruption cases and people involved in them to would be disclosed. According to the report, among the 174 cases submitted to the commission for investigation, only 110 cases were pursued. Around 95 KRG lower and middle officials were identified as engaging in corrupt practices and were removed from their jobs. However, this investigation never reached high officials from both parties and government sides. The suspected cases followed were from the sectors of health, land and housing development, and
tendering of contracts. The oil sector was kept out of all investigations; the sector that was criticised most by non-government journalism and opposition parties.

A number of people in the health sector involved with importing expired and low-quality medicines were referred to judicial authorities. The Commission determined that excessive administrative red-tape in some KRG institutions is a main motivation for people to seek favours and resort to bribery in trying to process applications.

The Commission also described the process of the tendering for contracts (in building and supplying contracts) as sometimes very underhanded, corruption-ridden, and lacking in transparency. A high number of government officials who have their own companies are awarded contracts (Kurdistan Region Presidency, 2012).

The misuse of public budget to consolidate the hegemony of the ruling party has not been hidden from the public eye. It has always been a point for criticism and protest by a disadvantaged population, civil society workers, intellectuals and opposition parties. The dissatisfactions arose when people saw that the social inequality between poor and rich has been largely widened and the government continued practising clientelism in dealing with social funds. The argument was mobilised by less-advantaged political parties, especially when a new opposition movement (Gorran) emerged.

Although opposing parties existed before the general elections in 2009, they always compromised for party privileges. The presence of a large number of Kurdish political parties in political life largely started with the uprising in 1991. Despite the diversity in their social orientation and political ideology from nationalistic to Islamist and from communist to more liberal, there has not been an active political opposition system in the Kurdistan Region. The 50:50 power-sharing system of the early 1990s eliminated any chance for an opposition system to manifest itself. Civil war therefore took the
Kurdistan Region far away from what is experienced in a stable pluralistic atmosphere.

The Kurdistan Islamic Union (KIU) tried to play a role of opposition; however, it suddenly decided to participate in the election as part of a broad Coalition of Kurdistan List with both major parties between 2001 and 2005. The KIU’s decision to participate in a coalition with major parties minimised its popularity. Thus, it decided to withdraw from the coalition with ruling parties who were seen to be corrupt. Instead the KIU stuck with the role of opposition and formed an electoral coalition under the name of Service and Reform List with an Islamic Group in Kurdistan, the Kurdistan Socialist Party and the Future Party for the 2009 election. The KIU has been known by its reformatory slogan and approach, but the majority of people and its supporters were unconvinced, and demanded more pressure on the ruling parties to accomplish real reform in the KRG.

The voices of protest against inequality, corruption and lack of public services were formed in a quasi-left movement under the name of the “Gorran” Change Movement. This is the reform party founded by Nawshirwan Mustafa Amin in 2009. Amin had resigned from his post as the number-two man in the PUK in December 2006 and eventually set up his own political movement. The new party was organised as an open movement instead of having a solid party structure and it intensively opposed corruption and nepotism. Gorran (Change Movement) advocated for transparency in all aspects of public life: party, government, and business versus corruption, a professional civil service against nepotism and clientelism, reform in election law, control of major parties and a large reduction of the public sector. Largely at the expense of the PUK, Gorran won almost 24 per cent of the vote and 25 seats in the Kurdistan parliamentary elections held on 25 July 2009. Thus, Gorran now has become the first real opposition party in the Kurdistan Parliament (Gunter, 2011: 105-
Gorran, instead of reform, put real change in the political system in the canon of its agenda and mobilised the unsatisfied population, especially the younger generation of Kurdistan, around promises of a peaceful regime change, as it believes that the current system is no longer able to make any reform in its bodies. They argued that the entire political system in the Kurdistan Region is corrupt and non-reformable; the only way out is to change it. Mustafa, the Kurdish opposition leader, claims that “the priority of our movement is to change the political system and not the personnel” (Mustafa, 2012, Official website of Gorran Movement, 16 January 2012).

Since public protests in Kurdistan started in February 2011, the Kurdistan President Massoud Barzani suggested that parliament discuss early elections, as a measure to calm the anti-government protesters who are angered by high unemployment, economic and political corruption and lack of basic services. These demonstrations have put extensive pressure on the KRG and its ruling parties to act in response to people's demands.

3.3. An Overview of Social Security Policy in the KRG: Opportunities and Reality

Having examined the administrative experience in the last two decades, we can argue that the KRG has not given social security programmes (except for the RPFMGS programme) any kind of priority. The Kurdish political question has attracted the most attention of Kurdish leaders. The priorities of the KRG have been determined by political consideration. As mentioned earlier in this chapter, during the 1990s the provision of social welfare was left to international and regional aid agencies. The Kurdish Parliament and government devoted numerous general directorates,
ministerial bodies and regulations dealing with social protection and community care for individuals and families.

In this regard, the aims that have been highlighted are to recover and improve the family functionality and its continuity. It has been ensured to encounter problems and crises, which threaten disadvantaged people. One of the most important ministerial bodies that comprise government social funds is the Ministry of Labour and Social Affairs (MoLSA). The KRG has devoted several ministry bodies and directorates, and adopted a number of regulations through which it delivers services and care to population in general and poor families in particular. The government aims to recover and develop the life of disadvantaged people through numerous social security programmes. These programmes have not been limited to merely cash transfers, but operated as parallel schemes comprising social care and awareness too.

In this regard, the FPF, the older version of SSN, provided social assistance to poor and low earners, through allocating a monthly salary to each of the families and individuals having eligibility. It also provided social awareness to the family, in order to develop their capacity and potential, and protect them from breakdown (Qadir, 2006: 78). Despite an efficient representation of the needs of the poor in ministry regulations, the fact that the MoLSA determined to commit itself to serving disadvantaged people, the implementation process can be impeded by many factors.

With the UNSC economic embargo imposed upon Iraq as a sanction against Iraqis as a result of occupying Kuwait in 1990, it rapidly impacted on Iraq and the Kurdistan Region as the population and government were not prepared for such a sanction.

An efficient social protection system has been adopted by the KRG for the poor through rectifying the SPF and other social cash benefits. The government wants to distinguish, though, between those who are included in permanent social protection allowances (disabled people, widows, older people, etc.) and those who are
temporarily in need of financial support until their condition changes. The social protection policy should observe the two important aspects of the poverty rate and social gap, the first being the standards defining the amount given as an allowance (MoP/KRG, 2011: 175-177).

3.3.1. Legal Context: Social Welfare Law and Regulations

The root of the social security programmes of the KRG can be traced back to the Ba’athist regime in Iraq. Although there has been a welfare state embodied in social insurance law and its implementation agencies in Iraq since 1956, none of the government social services took shape in Kurdish provinces until 1980. For the first time, the FPF was founded when the Iraqi authorities issued The Iraqi Social Security Law No. 126 in 1980 (Ghafur, 2003). This law was a considerable step forward with the aim of building a comprehensive social insurance and care system based on the ‘socialist’ ideology of the Ba’ath Party in Iraq. This law subsequently helped to establish numbers of government programmes working for social assistance and development. With this new approved law, all directorates of the MoLSA at that time were revised and new programmes, including Family Protection (Re’ayat Al-Ursa), were established, whereby a monthly salary was assigned to individuals and households simply described as needy, poor and of low income. The focus of this programme was on supporting the family as a significant social unit. FPF was considered as a means to support the family from disintegration and other social problems (Qadir, 2006: 2).
3.3.1.1. MoLSA Social Protection Programme

After the uprising and when the KNA and KRG were established, local authorities became the heir to the remains of Iraqi government offices. In its early meetings, KNA revised the former Iraqi social protection regulations. Initial remedies appeared in the KNA’s protocols within the law of the Ministry of Health and Social Affairs (MoHSA) (KNA, 1993: 256-260). Apart from including cases like survivors of genocide and martyrs of Kurdish national freedom and their family members, or the married students on very low income, other cases were also claimed to be covered, i.e. widows, disabled people, and orphans. Although potential changes and enlargement were proposed to the programme by KNA, in practice there was no trace of its implementation. The first cabinet of the KRG did not include a specific ministry for social affairs. All directorates of social protection and social care were integrated within the MoHSA. For the first time in the PUK controlled administration of the KRG in 2001, a ministry was devoted to administer governmental social programmes.

When the new law for the MoLSA, Law No. 34 was issued in 2004 (Kurdistan Region Parliament, 2004), it confirmed some general goals, none of which have been well supported in the ministry’s social organisations. The Iraqi Kurdistan Parliament (IKP) amended this law, in law No. 12, 2007 (MoLSA, 2007), which in Act (2) mentioned the general points below:

First: (Act 2, Section 2): The ministry endeavours to cover all workers in its social insurance scheme, and to provide social protection to them and their families.

Second: (Act 2, Section 8): Paying attention to families of genocide and chemical weapon victims, and providing social and psychological care to them.

Third: (Act 2, Section 11): Providing financial assistance to poor and those incapable to work and who have no income sources (MoLSA, 2007).
At the time of drafting the thesis, a social insurance scheme has not been put into effect. All MoLSA’s social programmes’ fund goes to the SSN which, as presented in Chapter 6, cannot effectively cover the living cost of its claimants. With regard to the second point, although the MoLSA regulations tried to cover war and genocide victims, they have been better treated in separate government programmes. These regulations were followed by some instructions issued by the Ministry of Finance and Economy, which implied the intention to implement the SSN: an advanced programme which seemed to be more developed to merge all MoLSA social cash transfer programmes and open to cover new clients (MoFE, 2011). The change, implementing the new SSN, occurred after the February 2011 mass protests for public services and the criticism of parliamentary opposition parties about corruption in government social funds. The SSN programme instructions clearly address providing financial assistance to widows, divorcées, married students, families of imprisoned people, females with no breadwinner or income, disabled people, elderly people and orphans (MoFE, 2011).

3.3.1.2 MoMA’s Social Benefits

The MoMA was first established in May 2006 with the fifth cabinet (unified cabinet) of the KRG. Before that time, each political party – especially the two major parties, the KDP and PUK – had its own Foundation of Martyrs to serve martyrs’ surviving dependants. Both party-based foundations were merged to form a newly-created ministry, which was authorised by Law No. 8 (2006) issued by the Iraqi Kurdistan Parliament.

The IKP issued the Law No. 9 of the RPFMGS in 2007 to define the beneficiaries of the MoMA social benefit programme. The RPFMGS identified its beneficiaries as heirs of Kurdish liberation fighters, genocide survivors, chemical attacks and other war
victims. The family member or closest relative of mentioned groups are entitled to receive a monthly salary and other non-cash benefits.

Law No.9/2007 of RPFMGS defines the martyr as “anyone who lost his/her life in battlefields or during political struggles in the national liberation movement against the brutal regimes of Iraq or in mass murder crimes or in any wars made against the Kurdistan people” (Iraqi Kurdistan Parliament, Law No. 9, 2007). Within this definition, three types of martyrs have been defined: Battlefield Martyrs, those to have lost their life in a fight with the Iraqi regime or were killed while in a political position; Genocide Victims, people who were missing and died in Anfal and other genocide operations between 1963 and 2003; Citizen martyrs, ordinary people killed in wars and terror attacks, during the time of uprising 1991 or afterwards during the forced exodus from cities to borders with Turkey and Iran. Political prisoners were added to these three categories of beneficiaries (MoF/KRG 2009).

3.3.2. Humanitarian Aids and Social Protection

As mentioned earlier in this chapter, during the 1990s when the Kurdistan Region lived in extreme famine and the KRG was incapable of implementing social cash transfers, external aid became the main source of social security provision. While there was no viable social security programme in the region, international aid, in the form of food, cash and good services, was the only source available for the public.

International aid to the Iraq and Kurdistan Region was an urgent response to the humanitarian crisis which resulted from the Gulf War and uprising. Indeed, the conditions and needs of Kurds, as victims of state repression and conflict, secured a short-term relief in the form of food and goods, which did not contribute in any way to establish an effective social security. As Natali argues, humanitarian aid commenced
as a replacement to public welfare assistance and became the most important source of income in the region (Natali, 2010: 30).

Several international non-governmental organisations (INGOs) including the UN, Red Cross and Red Crescent organisations, the US Agency for International Development (USAID), US Office of Foreign Disaster Assistance (OFDA), and World Food Programme (WFP), provided food, shelter and non-food items, but not cash (USAID, 2003). The International Islamic Relief Organisation was one of the few charities that provided cash in the region to orphans and families with no breadwinners.

When the UN OFFP came into effect, the economic lives of the population changed. According to the OFFP, everyone was entitled to rations (food and household cleaning supplies). It provided a satisfactory non-cash programme, but more or less it did not contribute in an effective social security policy for the Kurdistan Region. All it provided was short-term relief, not an institutionalised social protection. Neo-patrimonial politics ultimately obstructed the effective implementation of relief programmes and potential private sector initiative (Natali, 2010: 41).

3.4. Social Security Programmes of KRG

I have selected two government social security programmes, SSN and RPFMGS, as case studies about which to conduct my research. These two programmes are considered as the largest government cash transfer programmes at the present time. Although the government recently discussed the proposal of social insurance to be put into practice, it has not yet been fully implemented. There is also a public pension scheme implemented; however, the research data are very limited for the last two programmes.
3.4.1. Social Safety Net

The only social cash transfer programme of the KRG approved by parliament in the 1990s was the SPF, which before 2009 was called the FPF, and recently in 2011 became the SSN. Although there were guiding regulations and instructions related to social protection, the KRG did not put them into effect. The SPF was suspended after the withdrawal of the Iraqi government offices and the administrative vacuum in the Kurdistan Region.

In addition to the economic blockade, which had put the region into a high-risk condition, there was also the lack of vital resources, i.e. sufficient funds and skilled staff, which thoroughly paralysed the newly established government from being able to adequately provide public services. A large majority of citizens were living with high vulnerability and risk, facing a lack of basic needs for everyday life. As mentioned before, the only organisations performing in the region were international aid agencies. The threatening socio-economic situation continued until 2001, when the economy of the Kurdistan Region was getting relatively better. Only by then was the SPF revived.

Four periods in the development of the programme are observed in the KRG era (Qadir, 2006; MoLSA/KRG, 2009; MoLSA/KRG, 2011): Family Protection Fund (FPF) 1992-2002; Family Protection Fund (FPF) 2001-2009; Social Protection Fund (SPF) 2009-2011; and Social Safety Net (SSN) after 2011.

a. Family Protection Fund (FPF) before 2002: The FPF in the early stage of this period, as captured earlier in this chapter, was almost dysfunctional and not being implemented. In this phase the programme existed just by name in ministerial regulations and as part of a marginal directorate which belonged to the MoHSA. However, in 2001, with the initiative of the deputy minister of social affairs, FPF was reactivated. The idea of implementing the programme came from a shared project
between MoHSA and the United Nations Children’s Fund (UNICEF) as a result of research which had been conducted on child labour in Erbil. The FPF started with 600 beneficiaries (Interview with Dler Anwar, worked in the FPF since its reactivation, May 2011).

b. Family Protection Fund (FPF), between 2001 and 2009; which has been referred to throughout this thesis as a combined financial and social awareness programme. In its early stages, each beneficiary was receiving monthly IQD 200 in previously used currency (which after 2003 was replaced with the new Iraqi Dinar). This amount was close to that received by an unskilled employee in full-time work at that time. Although, in the middle of this period, a sufficient endeavour, time (one year and a half) and a large amount of money was spent to set up the SSN programme at the national level in Iraq between 2004 and 2005, the KRG refused to operate the SSN as a better alternative to the SPF. There was until recently an ongoing controversy between the Iraqi Federal Government and the KRG as to whether the funds should be supplied from Baghdad separately or should be paid from the 17 per cent share regional budget of the KRG. Therefore, the SSN as an Iraqi social programme was frozen before being implemented.

The period of FPF was attributed to a combination of social cash transfer and social awareness programme. Social workers/visitors had been appointed to help beneficiaries with social, health and psychological advice and consultation. Implementing the programme through social workers/visitors was to ease the process of intervention into families. Every social worker/visitor was responsible for a number of families that had to be visited monthly. In this period the number of programme beneficiaries increased to 8,000 in 2003, then in 2005 it reached 12,699 in the province of Erbil and 400 in Duhok.
c. Social Protection Fund (SPF), between 2009 and 2011: In this round cash transfer minus social support (social awareness) began following a ministerial command to dismiss all social workers/visitors without prior notice and eliminate regular visits to households from the programme. One reason was to cut the cost of social workers/visitors which was thought to be worthless and the social awareness scheme was not considered as part of the social security programme. Another reason was to avoid any manipulation with beneficiaries’ money by social workers/visitors, in which in couple of cases happened. The number of beneficiaries in Erbil remained the same, while in Sulaymaniyah it was about 20,925, and in Duhok it was 9,302, which by the end of this period in total reached 42,926 beneficiaries in all three provinces of the Kurdistan Region.

d. Social Safety Net (SSN) after 2011: The SSN was proposed as a joint project by the Iraqi central government and the World Bank. The programme was now being implemented as an alternative to SPF. In fact it emerged from a combination of social protection programmes, such as Disabled Allowance, Blind Allowance, as well as SPF, which altogether would have about 180,000 beneficiaries. The SSN needed new regulations and eligibility guidance in order to be implemented.

What accelerated the implementation of SSN was the mass protest of 17 February 2011 in the region. It was expanded to cover a wider eligible population and the amount paid as social assistance was five times higher than was paid during the SPF programme. It can be argued that the SSN was used as a response to calm down protestors after 17 February. The SSN programme provides financial assistance to widows, the divorced, married students, families of imprisoned people, females with no breadwinner or income, disabled, elderly and orphans (MoFE/Financial Instruction, No.24, 2011). The new eligibility criteria came into effect following instruction No.22 which announced the increase of the SSN monthly salary by 500%, from IQD 30,000
(US$25) to IQD 150,000 (US$125), retrospective with effect from 1 January 2011 (MoFE/Financial Instruction, No.22, 2011). This programme had a budget of IQD 399,211,000,000 (US$319,368,800) for the year 2012 (Gorran – Economic Research Unit, 2012).

3.4.2. RPFMGS Programme in the MoMA

Another large social security programme is the RPFMGS implemented by MoMA, though it is not necessarily considered as a purely social security programme. Despite the social protection aspect of the RPFMGS programme, it is always highlighted that the MoMA will request compensation for all human and material losses and disadvantages resulting especially from genocide operations (Iraqi Kurdistan Parliament, Law no. 9, 2007).

After the 1991 uprising, the practice of providing families of martyrs with services was developed among all political parties, particularly the PUK and KDP. Almost all political parties in the Kurdistan Region had offices dedicated to the affairs of martyrs. The MoMA was first established in May 2006 with the fifth cabinet (unified cabinet) of the KRG. However, before that time, each political party had already started serving the family members of martyrs and surviving dependants. Before a government ministry assumed this role, located within the cabinet, there were two foundations within each spilt Kurdish administration in Erbil and Sulaymaniyah provinces. Those two Foundation of Martyrs were devoted to recording the names of all martyrs within their jurisdictions so that cash benefits and limited housing services could be offered to them all, for the first time regardless of political affiliation (MoMA Law, No. 9, 2007). Alongside the Foundation of Martyrs, there were also several Anfal Foundations in the region working mostly as non-governmental organisations to provide financial assistance periodically to families of genocide victims. The government combined all
those organisations and agencies into one governmental body to unify and improve service provision.

The MoMA provides the families of martyrs and genocide victims with spiritual and material support and the means of a decent life. In most government statements and ministerial documents as well as in the media, this programme is referred to as ‘Martyrs and Genocide allowance’. The programme provides regular monthly cash benefits in addition to health, education, housing and other social services. Due to the involvement of health and housing services for the victim survivors of wars and genocide and in some other aspects of financial reparation, it can be described as a compensation scheme.

About 83,500 families of martyrs and genocide victims and families of political prisoners receive monthly payments from MoMA. The government equally offers them health, educational, social, and housing services (see Table 2).

Table 2 Numbers of Families of Martyrs and Genocide Victims, Benefiting from Services (2007-2009), by Service Types

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Types of Services</th>
<th>2007</th>
<th>2008</th>
<th>2009</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Health</td>
<td>46215</td>
<td>32932</td>
<td>65945</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Social Services</td>
<td>882</td>
<td>411</td>
<td>8672</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Education</td>
<td>490</td>
<td>3146</td>
<td>601</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Housing (Lands, Residential Units)</td>
<td>---</td>
<td>2713</td>
<td>1780</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>47587</td>
<td>39202</td>
<td>76998</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


99
Essentially, social security schemes are defined according to the functions, which are reflected in social security objectives. MoMA programme beneficiaries are not determined on the basis of need, rather selection is based on the experiences of war and genocide. This means that the MoMA programme is neither targeting those with insufficient income, nor is it a pension-based scheme. Nonetheless, we can argue that the scheme still caters for those on low income because most war victims were breadwinners in their families, and to give compensation to their living relatives cannot be deemed misplaced.

3.4.3. Pension Scheme

The Council of Ministers-KRG in 2003 decreed that all employees and workers should be covered by a public pension scheme. According to the decree the employer has to contribute to the fund an amount equal to twelve per cent of the basic salary of the workers every month, and the employees have to contribute five per cent of their basic monthly salary. Public sector employees have been automatically covered by the scheme. However, employers in the private sector try to avoid the contribution and workers have not been familiar with their rights to the social security. As per the decree, any company, factory, shop or organisation that has three or more workers or staff should be covered by a public investment fund under the name of the Employment Protection Network. However, apart from public sector employees, people in the private sector have little knowledge about the scheme and are not willing to register with it. It seems that time is needed for public sector employees to believe in the scheme.

The pension is a contributory-based scheme. The funds are kept by the MoLSA-KRG to protect the rights of labourers and to become a financial support for them in case they become unemployed or retired. The benefits that workers get from this
fund include the ability to transfer their years of working (contributions) from one organisation to another, as well as the ability to withdraw all the money they and their employers contributed to the fund when they lose their jobs. However, some employers do not want to pay their 12 per cent share of the contribution, “therefore, they try to keep the worker uninformed about their rights” (The Kurdish Globe, 2012).

The decree was replaced by a wider law passed by parliament on 5 June 2012. Law No. 4, the Law of Pension and Social Insurance, came into force to cover all employees equally. Now it is compulsory for all private sector employees to be registered.

3.4.4. Social Insurance

As mentioned earlier in this chapter, the Law of MoLSA addresses social insurance. Section 2 in Act No. 2 explicitly declares “the ministry endeavours to cover all workers in its social insurance scheme, and to provide social protection to them and their families” (MoLSA Law No. 12, 2007). Although a directorate general in MoLSA is devoted to social insurance (Directorate General of Labour and Social Insurance, DGLSI), until 2011 there had been no place for a social insurance scheme in the social benefit system of the KRG. Most activities of this directorate focused on work-related training. The main part of the DGLSI, the social insurance scheme, has not been activated yet.

In mid-2011, the MoLSA decided to reactivate and amend its ‘Law of Pension and Social Insurance’. However, as a response to mass protests held earlier that year, the MoLSA adopted a temporary scheme called ‘Social Insurance For Graduates’. This scheme was designed for a maximum period of six months, from September 2011
until the end of February 2012, through which accordingly an amount of IQD 150,000 (approx. US$120) was paid monthly to unemployed graduates of university and higher education institutions who were below the age of 36 years. In the first phase, more than 16,000 claimants applied for this benefit (MoLSA/KRG, 2011: 22-3). The KRG did not have a comprehensive social insurance system until the Kurdistan Parliament passed Law No. 4 on 5 June 2012. This law was the first in the history of the KRG and was based on the Law of Pension and Social Insurance No. 39 in 1971. According to this law, for the first time all private- and public-sector employees should be covered (Kurdistan Parliament, Law No. 4, 2012b).

The law now is in force, but little information has been disseminated amongst people to familiarise them with their rights. In spite of that, until now not all the employers and companies working in Kurdistan have been registered with the relevant directorate to pay the social security contributions for their staff. A large number of workers in the private and public sectors are not aware of their rights guaranteed by this law, and social security officials argue that the employers should be interrogated (The Kurdish Globe, 2012).

Conclusion

Conducting research on social policy in the Kurdistan Region needs some historical, political and socio-economic elements to be drawn on. These backgrounds are necessary to understand the influence of political parties on the Kurdish administration in general and implementation of its social policies in particular. This chapter started to capture past and current political and socio-economic conditions, which I argue have determined the politico-administrative structure of the KRG. Without this background it was impossible to draw upon the framework of the KRG on the one hand and, on the other hand, its current social security implementation.
I have argued that social policy process in the Kurdistan Region cannot be well understood without information on how its politico-administrative system operates. In the first section of this chapter I offered a brief history of Iraqi Kurdistan Region, with a special focus on state repression, genocide, and Kurdish fratricide. I have used these events to underline the fact that repressive state policy against Kurdish civilians in Iraq led to the creation of a nation politically victimised and socio-economically vulnerable. Under the command of the Ba’athist regime the Kurds had the lowest proportion of social benefits in Iraq.

Having brought up the ‘Kurdish issue in Iraq’ in the last century shows that, despite the huge price the Kurds have paid with their blood to obtain self-sovereignty in the northern part of Iraq, they have rarely been able to taste their power even for a short period until the uprising in 1991. Afterwards, although for the first time a Kurdish parliament and government were established, it failed to implement any convincing social programmes. The unemployment rate was high and the populace suffered even more when food rations from the Iraqi central government were also suspended and yet the KRG still failed to allocate any funds to operate social security programmes, including pensions and social protection programmes, against these hardships.

The Kurdistan Region was suffering from an extreme shortage in budget and broken public services. As a result of sanctions and a double embargo on the Kurdistan Region, the population continued to live in most disadvantaged circumstances. Although international aid and OFFP slightly eased these hardships, during the 1990s, the government’s own failure to act persisted. Perhaps an even more debilitating factor was the civil war between the region’s two major parties. This created a division of the KRG into two one-party administrations, in Erbil and Sulaymaniyah. The Kurdish fratricide also consolidated a welfare tradition inherited
from the Ba'athist regime and already existed on the nature of Kurdish political partisanship, which I can call ‘party-affiliated welfare provision’. This type of party-controlled governance of the KRG can be explained within the theory of clientelism in social funds. This means that the KRG and the ruling parties favour some groups over others, while delivering public services. In the war-prone society like the Kurdistan Region, which is still driven by revolutionary party-driven governments, distribution of public funds by government often tends to be on the basis of loyalty rather than need.

Despite the political and socio-economic opportunities that the KRG embraced after the invasion in 2003, the KRG has developed a double standard. On one side it has facilitated rapid socio-economic growth, and on the other due to clientelistic practices it has ushered the KRG into institutionalised corruption. However, as discussed in this chapter, the emergence of opposition parties after the 2009 general elections and the mass protests in February 2011 awakened the government to endeavour to promote a degree of transparency in administration. In this respect the government initiated some plans for socio-political development.

After decades of deprivation, an overall socio-economic progress in Kurdistan is appearing. The development is generated by the political stability the Kurdistan Region gained after Iraq was invaded in 2003. The oil-based revenue generation on the one side and foreign investment and trade-based economy on the other promoted a livelihood, however, and consequently increased inequalities in the society.

I argue that there is no shortage in budget that caused the lack of public funds for social welfare services, but rather it is the issue of transparency and favouritism. In the last decade, the KRG has achieved a dramatic economic development. Economic development figures for 2004-2008 reveal that GDP at current prices (Table 3) increased from IQD 2,419.6 billion in 2004 to IQD 20,954 billion in 2008 at current prices, at a total increase rate of 110% and a compound growth rate of 68.9
per cent for 2004-2008, reflecting remarkably on per capita GDP which increased from IQD 524,426 in 2004 up to IQD 1,976,673 in 2007, and IQD 4,740,000 in 2008. This is expected to increase annually by 10 per cent (MoP, Regional Development Strategy for Kurdistan Region 2013-2017, 2011: 28). With this financial measure, the Kurdistan Region is now considered as a high-middle-income region. However, favouritism and not preferential practice have deepened social inequality. All administrative procedures in the Kurdistan Region remain linked with nepotism and not meritocracy and this has kept much of the public sector grounded in personality and party-based affiliation. Both ruling parties have always utilised public funds for their own benefit and that of their patrons. In other words, political parties make economic interests; in turn the financial incentives stimulate party affiliation, loyalty and intensive political engagement. In this respect, both major parties set monthly or occasional payments to their own parties, persistently to those who actively advertise for and defend the party.

What relatively decreased party interference in all spaces of society and government institutions was the emergence of opposition parties and the strong presence in parliament. The KRG and ruling parties were compelled to respond to the mass protests after February 2011 by increasing social benefits and salaries.

The chapter finally argued that the KRG has created a welfare system which overlooks the disadvantaged sections of the population in favour of those loyal to their political parties. This double standard appears when one compares the benefits delivered to beneficiaries of RPFMGS with those of the SPF or SSN. In terms of law and regulations, social protection programmes enjoy the same status. However, the legal framework of the KRG’s social protection programmes does not necessarily result in an equal treatment by government. The data collected from both programmes (Chapters 5, 6 and 7) proves that there is a preferential treatment
practised in the implementation of KRG’s social security. The RPFMGS and its beneficiaries are preferentially treated, while the SSN has been ignored. Having looked at both programmes, one could argue that, despite supportive regulations and instructions, their implementation and output are markedly different.
CHAPTER FOUR: METHODOLOGY, DATA COLLECTION
AND ANALYSIS

Introduction
This chapter provides an overview of the methodological approaches used and
addresses specific procedures that have been followed to conduct this research. It
has been divided into six sections. Section one addresses the development of
research aims and questions. It also discusses how a pilot study might result in the
revision of the entire approach of the research. Section two is devoted to discussing
the research design and methods. This research has adopted a qualitative
methodology with a comparative approach. As for that, it has been justified how and
why a certain type of case study (multiple-case study) design has been chosen for
this research. Section three addresses the accessibility issue, sampling and
characteristics of participants of the research. Section four is about accessibility of the
case and data, sampling issues and key characteristics of the research participants.
The fourth section also discusses the methods that have been employed and
procedures of data collection. The two main methods of data collection in this
research were semi-structured interviews and focus groups. The data set gathered
from interviews was also validated with documentary data. As for the data analysis,
thematic analysis has been applied. Section five addresses ethical considerations,
informed consent and anonymity.
4.1. Research Objective

During the first year of conducting this research, its theoretical framework, the research field and research sample were all subject to change. This is indeed a normal part of the research process because one usually starts from a broad topic. However, meetings with supervisors and further enquires about the topic might reveal that the approach being adopted is wrong or that the entire topic needs to be discarded. The first critique and comment which the researcher faces is ‘go and think more about your topic and try to focus on one element’, or ‘try to narrow down the topic’. This might be considered as time wasting but in retrospect it becomes evident that it is exactly this process which helps to create a more focused and proper research framework. I experienced all of these, one way or another.

4.1.1. Early Development of the Research Project

In the early stage of this research project, I aimed to cover four social security and assistance organisations in the Kurdistan Region as a case study. I visited the region and did some pilot interviews with people working in public and charitable organisations which I had randomly selected. The programmes were from two government ministries (MoMA, and the SSN, and the charitable organisations Nanakaly Charity Organisation and Hewa Project for Talented Students). At that time, I found enough reasons to justify the inclusion of these four bodies in my research. However, in a second visit to the Kurdistan Region, certain theoretical aspects of my research had changed following consultations with my supervisors and some colleagues. Consequently, all of the organisations I had initially selected were no longer necessarily useful to the enquiries I had set out to make. Essentially, for reasons explained later, I decided to remain with only the two government agencies.
4.1.2. Pilot Interviews and Finalising Research Context

It is often advisable to conduct a pilot study prior to the research fieldwork. This is not only beneficial for testing and revising the research instruments (Bryman, 2008: 247-8), but it also guides researchers to review their research questions. Marshall and Rossman (2011: 95) state that pilot studies are not only employed to test your proposed research strategy, but also to underpin the rationale for style and strategy of the research. In this research, conducting pilot interviews helped, to an extent, to ensure that the data I was eventually coming back to collect were going to be useful to the study. I could return to the field knowing that my journey was no longer going to be purely speculative.

I visited the Kurdistan Region twice prior to finalising the research context. Two pilot interviews were conducted over a combined period of five months (the first pilot study of eight interviews in spring 2009 and the second of eleven interviews in autumn 2009). Though I was asking the selected participants to agree to an interview at these points, I also informed them that I may re-interview them in the main data collection process. For some of these early interviewees, this turned out to be the case.

Feedback obtained from these pilot studies proved helpful in rethinking the appropriateness and representativeness of the research sample. Although this research does not involve any grounded theory approach, capturing the participants’ reflections prior to the final version of research questions was useful in selecting the two government social security programmes. In addition to the supervisors’ comments and feedback on interviews and research questions, I felt it was also necessary to get the participants’ own reactions to the topic and questions. The pilot interviews enabled me to make the interview questions less leading and allow interviewees to talk and explain more openly, rather than putting them in a
judgemental position by just focusing on advantages and disadvantages of the programme.

As a result of the pilot study, the entire approach of the research was revised. At the start, my research objective was to make a comparison between government and non-government organisations working within the area of providing social security and assistance. However, following the testing phase, this objective was found to be ill-suited to the field in which the research was to be conducted. It was unsuitable to compare these two sectors, especially in terms of organisational structure, coverage and delivering the services. There would have been a methodological defect if I had proceeded without the pilot study.

For example, in terms of coverage and the size of the programme, government agencies are not comparable with non-government agencies because the latter mostly caters for locals and with 3,000-4,000 beneficiaries it does not cover all areas of the region. However, both government social security agencies on which I eventually focused covered all provinces of the region. Also, due to the nature of SSN, its entitlement procedures and service delivery have more similarity with the non-government programmes such as Nanakaly, both of which have nothing to do with war and genocide victims. Both programmes, SSN and the Nanakaly Charity Organisation, target the poor and low-income families. On the other hand, the criteria of entitlement of Martyrs and Anfal families’ victims as a government programme are totally different and are based on loss of a member or members of family in wars and genocide campaigns. This is regardless of the fact that the beneficiary is not necessarily in need of financial support.

The inappropriateness of conducting a comparison between government and non-government agencies is due to the nature of their programmes. Although a comparison has still been made, this time it was within government social
programmes in terms of performance, priority and the importance given by high officials and politicians to them, and the way they deal with beneficiaries. Some pilot interviews were excluded from the data set, such as the Nanakali Charity Organisation, because a radical change occurred in the case study and its units. However, other pilot interviews, including all those conducted with participants from SSN and MoMA, were used when I realised they would contribute to the research findings, even though the research strategy and the focus were changed slightly (Ritchie & Lewis, 2003: 135).

The first visit was made while I was still thinking of a different theoretical framework, structuration theory, which was found inappropriate and changed to implementation theory. Having changed my theoretical approach and literature review, the research interview questions were changed accordingly. Conclusively, the pilot interviews helped me to relate the interview questions to implementation research. The pilot study also provided me with advice to step into this exploratory study, reformulating research questions and to be more confident in relation to the accessibility to data and forthcoming participants responding.

4.1.3. Research Question and Purposes

Policy analysis is designed to supply information about complex social and economic problems and to assess the processes by which a policy or programme is formulated and implemented (Yanow, 2000: 2). The main objective of this research is to explore the critical implementation factors of social security programmes in the Kurdistan Region and the rationale behind these. To this end, as they are illustrated in Table 3, the following research questions were adopted to follow numerous primary purposes.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Research Questions</th>
<th>Purposes</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1 To what extent do political conditions have an impact on the implementation process?</td>
<td>To examine the impact of the political setting in the region on the policy implementation process</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2 Why does the KRG prioritise some social security programmes over others? What bases are there for a social security programme to be prioritised while another is neglected by the government in the Kurdistan Region?</td>
<td>To explore the relationships between policy makers and policy implementers To explain norms, reasons, factors and conditions leading to this policy prioritisation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3 How and why are social security programmes used for political party interests in the Kurdistan Region?</td>
<td>To understand implementers’ perception of the policy and their performance</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4 How do different groups in the policy implementation process perceive policy implementation?</td>
<td>To understand implementers’ perception of the policy and their performance</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5 What are the implementation gaps in the field of social security and what accounts for these?</td>
<td>To explore critical factors (i.e. actors, conditions) and problems (i.e. conditions) in the implementation of researched programmes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6 How plausible are the key theories/models of implementation in a politically underdeveloped context? What lessons can be drawn from social security programme implementation in developing countries in light of my research findings?</td>
<td>To test the applicability of main theory/models of implementation on the data set gathered for the case of social security programmes of the KRG To understand the characteristics of social security implementation in the Kurdistan Region within the broader developing countries/regions</td>
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</table>
4.2. Research Methods and Design

In view of the research objective and questions, a case study was selected as part of an overall qualitative mode of research. As Creswell (2007) asserts qualitative researchers should rely on a few cases and many variables (Creswell, 2007: 38-9). After addressing multiple-case study design used in this research, this section will demonstrate how the types of research objectives, purposes and questions inevitably led the researcher to adopt qualitative and comparative methods.

4.2.1. Multiple-Case Study (Embedded) Design

Creswell (2007: 73) states that case study is used to understand an issue or a problem using ‘case’ as a specific illustration. It involves the extensive study of a phenomenon through one or more cases within a bounded system (i.e. a context, a setting). As Yin (2008: 8) indicates, making a decision on a sound research strategy is always affected by three key factors.

1. The type of research question.

2. The extent to which the researcher has control over events.

3. The level of focus on contemporary rather than historical events.

Yin suggests that, when there is no control over events, case studies are the preferred strategies. In this type of research strategy, how and/or why questions are asked about a contemporary set of events over which the researcher has little or no control (2009: 9). Given the research questions addressed earlier, the case study seems to be the most appropriate research method, providing an in-depth approach to the data collection and analysis.
The question about how and why a programme follows a top-down model and another follows a bottom-up one in their policy formulation and implementation needs to specify a multiple-case study or a single-case with two or more case study units. The unit of analysis in the case study determines whether a single-case or multiple-case study method needs to be chosen. For instance, there may be a single unit within a single case in one context (holistic design) or multiple-units of analysis (embedded) chosen within a context. The number of units of analysis determines whether the case study is holistic or embedded. It would also be possible to choose cases in different contexts, either with single-unit or embedded units of analysis (Yin, 2009).

A unit of analysis in a case study is the kind of event to which the variables, themes or subjects under study as well as the research problems refer, and about which data have to be collected. Units of case study analysis can be individuals (such as policy actors, implementers), a programme or scheme (social security, policy), events or processes (implementation) (Huberman & Miles, 2002; Collis & Hussey, 2003). Yin (2003, 2008) believes that evidence from multiple cases is often considered more compelling, as it provides more insights and raises the validity of the research. This study has adopted a multiple-case (embedded) design to gain more insights and robust understanding of the perceptions of the implementers towards the social security programmes in the Kurdistan Region.

One advantage of case study research design is that it allows for obtaining an understanding and providing pertinent answers to how and why questions about the event of process under investigation (Creswell, 2007; Yin, 2009). Furthermore, due to the complexity and sensitivities of the issue targeted, and due to the research’s association with intangible perceptions, as advised by Yin (2003), case studies are
suitable research designs, which provide an in-depth approach to data collection and analysis. They are also useful for theory testing.

4.2.2. Qualitative Research Approach

Qualitative research was deemed appropriate because the research questions could not be answered by figures but by the words, views, opinions and realities of the participants. Instead of figures, which act as measures to explain underlying concepts, the qualitative approach in policy analysis is rather interpretative and focuses on the meanings of the policy and values; beliefs and feelings of policy actors could be taken to interpret policy actors and values (Yanow, 2000: 8). Implementation of social security programmes involves implementers at different bureaucratic levels. Their knowledge, perspectives and concerns relating to programme performance and relevant issues are an important part of understanding implementation in a given context. The exploratory nature of this research and its questions led me to follow qualitative research. Therefore, the qualitative approach meets the purpose of this study, concentrating on the comparative analysis.

The policy implementers’ experience, perception and relations cannot be observed in closed or open-ended questionnaires, as used in quantitative research. The qualitative approach to research holds that character that cannot be subsumed within numerical classification. It places emphasis on the validity of multiple meaning structures and holistic analysis, as opposed to the criteria of reliability and statistical categorisation (Burns, 2000). As noticed from the research questions, and in order to obtain knowledge on the implementation process of social security programmes, qualitative interviews were most appropriate in providing insights into policy practice and relations involved in the social policy organisations. To make sure that the potential participants had an understanding of the processes used by the social
security organisations, I targeted people in different levels of implementation. Essentially, how policy is viewed, understood and experienced, however, only appears once programme employees attempt to implement policy. In this regard, qualitative research reveals nuanced understanding of policy that could lead to more focused and in-depth investigations of policy implementation.

Using qualitative inquiry for policy implementation research is mostly preferred in the areas of education (Guba & Lincoln, 1989; Brigitte, 2003), health (Castellani, 1992), social care (Clark, 1997), housing development (Lazin, 1994), and organisational performance (Elmore, 1978; Torenvlied, 2000). Brigitte offered some empirical evidence to substantiate how qualitative research can be used to study policy implementation, generally in the case of education in developing countries and South Africa in particular. He used an interpretive, qualitative framework to design his study and present some empirical evidence to respond to the stated research question.

I argue that qualitative research of social programmes offers substance and deeper understandings of the complexities at the levels of policy implementation. My qualitative research is based on an investigation into the experiences and perceptions of different levels of implementers in two government social security programmes in the Kurdistan Region. Having chosen two government social security programmes, and the nature of research purposes and questions encouraged me to explore and explain the differences in the way they are implemented.

4.2.3. Comparative Method

The comparison applied in this research is neither cross-national, as is usually seen in international policy research, nor between two or more sectors in a country, but it is
rather between two government programmes in one region. This type of comparison is rarely found in policy implementation research. I intended to employ a comparative method in order to explore the reasons for the differences in the implementation of the two programmes though they are both government-funded.

My aim in utilising comparison is to explain why these similarities and differences exist between two government programmes in terms of the following themes.

1. To understand how different policy actors perceive the performance and functionality of their programmes.
2. To explain how different levels of policy actors in both researched programmes experience the implementation of the policy.
3. To explain the degree of importance and priority given to both programmes by government and high officials.
4. To show the relation between high officials, implementers and recipients in the formulation and implementation process.
5. To highlight the factors that attracted politician’s and government officials to employ double standards in dealing with social security programmes.
6. To explain how and why programme A follows a top-down model and programme B follows a bottom-up model in the formulation and implementation of the policy.
7. To explain the implementation problems/gaps in each programme.
8. Finally, the research findings are comparable in cross-regional or cross-national levels; though conducting such a comparison has not been emphasised, or given as much importance as the above themes in this research.

Having selected two government social security programmes that provide services to two different groups of the population is a good reason to follow such a comparative policy analysis. To ensure comparability, both researched programmes are government social security programmes implemented within the frame control of two
ministerial bodies. The SSN is a directorate which operates within the MoLSA. It is specially designed to provide cash transfer to poor, low-income and disabled people. However, the RPFMGS is the main social fund programme of the MoMA, which delivers cash transfers to families of the war victims and genocide survivors. This provides for people who have lost their family members, in most cases their breadwinners, and through these means are entitled to a monthly salary. This research adopted a comparative analysis to explain the similarities and differences in the implementation of both programmes. This method is also important to unfold the differences in the administrative and financial support provided by government and ruling party leaders to both programmes. Through utilising this method, it has been shown that, based on the socio-political status of beneficiaries, each programme is treated differently by government and high officials.

4.2.4. Researching Social Policy in Context

Matland (1995) stated that in experimental implementation, contextual condition is likely to be important, which means the environment influences policy outcomes. As I affirmed in the theoretical background, this research concerns itself with political, administrative and organisational contexts of implementation. For researching the implementation of social security policy, contextual aspects are taken into account as determinant factors to understand how social security programmes work in particular political, administrative and organisational conditions. Implementation research in developing countries needs to put a great emphasis particularly on politico-administrative settings that explicitly influence the implementation process. The ultimate outcome of policy implementation is determined by the interaction of decision makers within a given politico-administrative context (Grindle, 1980). The political
context may facilitate or constrain policy implementation in the way implementers intend to practise.

What I mean by political context of policy implementation in the KRG is the political structure of the Kurdistan Region that has been developed from a nationalist perspective. It also implies a party-government relation, which is characterised by control of the former over the latter. The KRG is strictly directed by the ruling parties. Top party leaders and politburos are the only groups involved in the decision-making and administration. Attitudes of government and high officials towards the researched programmes cannot be understood without taking into account these contextual aspects. As I argued earlier in this thesis, in the politically under-developed Kurdistan Region, within which social policies have been highly politicised, it is very difficult, if not impossible, to implement a programme without the endorsement of power.

Taking all these into account, the policy action (here being implementation or programme performance), their meanings and values can only be best understood when placing and looking at the policy implementation within the broader politico-administrative framework.

Another contextual element is the organisational aspects of the social programmes. This means that the way the programme and relevant organisation are structured and administered has influence on the programme performance. In other words, the concept of policy implementation refers to both the performances and the politico-administrative and institutional context. Therefore, in my research, both spheres have taken into account some differences in the implementation of both programmes that could also be explained through this research approach.
4.3. Accessibility, Sampling and Characteristics of Research Participants

The issues which the researcher needs to consider as part of his/her research design are accessibility to data and good sampling. During the last visit to the Iraqi Kurdistan Region, I checked the readiness of the participants of my research. I suspected that some of the participants, especially those working in government agencies were going to be less likely to cooperate with me. Obtaining information and data from government offices by press and newspapers is still restricted. There is a view – and in some cases probably a reality – which is stated among journalists that the government does not collaborate with investigators and researchers in terms of giving information and data, especially when the research matter relates to budget and money. I turned the interview strategy and interview questions to involve less of these matters, unless the heads of offices and ministers agreed to conduct interviews with their employees.

I had made contacts and arranged appointments before leaving the UK. Although I worked under pressure, as I was doing three to four interviews some days, I could make proper use the whole time of my being in the research field. Being in contact with my fieldwork in the last one-and-a-half years was helpful to get to the participants easily.

4.3.1. Sampling

This research proposes to investigate the implementation of social security schemes in the Iraqi Kurdistan Region delivered by government agencies. For the purpose of obtaining such understanding and to answer research questions, two government social security programmes have been chosen to conduct this research:
(a) Social Safety Net which was first founded under the name of the Family Protection Box, then later changed to the Social Protection Fund, and recently, since 2011, has been changed to the Social Safety Net. This works as a directorate of the Ministry of Labour and Social Affairs.

(b) Rights and Privileges to Families of Martyrs and Genocide Survivors in the Ministry of Martyrs and Anfal Affairs.

As the research focuses on the implementation policy it needs to involve the administrators who perform social security programmes in the region. For the purpose of achieving that, a purposive sampling strategy has been used. In the next section about methods of data collection and analysis I will outline specifically my sample for each method and from each programme.

From the SSN programme 22 interviews were conducted across the whole region (provinces of Erbil, Sulaymaniyah and Duhok), including the MoLSA, general directors of Social Protection and Development in each province, managers of SSN in all main cities, ministry advisors and senior officers, and frontline staff members of the SSN programme in all directorates in the Kurdistan Region. In the RPFMGS programme, 23 interviews were conducted, including the former Minister of MoMA, general managers of MoMA in all three provinces, managers of Martyr Affairs in all three provinces, managers of Anfal Affairs in all three provinces, managers of Legal Affairs in all three Provinces, and the rest were frontline staff members of the programme who were in direct contact with beneficiaries.

In choosing those two programmes – and on the basis of the research questions – several factors have been taken into account.

a. Coverage: I had intended to focus on large agencies with a large number of beneficiaries as these have the most impact on social security in the region.
b. Diversity: agencies that held various objectives and criteria of coverage to appoint their programme’s beneficiaries were also taken into account.

c. Types of Agencies: two slightly different types of government agencies have been selected as a sample in my research.

4.3.2. Research Participants

In each programme, four types of participant will be classified for methodological purposes.

1. Lower office workers (civil servants or frontline staff): this includes lower level officers dealing with the recipients and their applications and cases. Before transforming the payment method to banks, they were distributing benefits and services to beneficiaries directly.

2. Middle officials (senior officers, programme managers and directors): these people are either promoted because of their skills and obtained work experiences or appointed. They are in direct contact with beneficiaries on one side and high officials. During my fieldwork I realised that this group contains the most experienced workers in the social programmes. Most of them have been in the business for a long time.

3. High officials (general directors and ministry advisors): they are high advisors or directors in the general directorate. Due to their position, they play an administrative role in managing programmes and assuring the transformation of policy into action and service delivery.

4. Ministers and Members of Parliament: ministers of the two ministries that are in charge of two of the social programmes and are mainly representing their political parties as they are appointed by their leaders that have direct power over them in taking any decision with regards to their governmental tasks. The only member of the
parliament that I interviewed is the head of the Social, Children and Family Affairs Committee in parliament. More details of all individual and group interviewees are listed in Appendix (1).

4.4. Methods of Data Collection and Analysis

Having taken my proposed sample and participants, which will be illustrated in more detail in the forthcoming sections, I met above 95 per cent of proposed interviewees for a relatively short period of time. All interviews were conducted after an informed consent form had been filled by participants and signed by the researcher. Forty-five people out of forty-six individual interviewees and all participants of the six focus groups agreed to have their names identified in the research. So anonymity was not provided as it was not a problem for most of the research participants.

The only person on my list of proposed participants who declined to take part in the interviews was the current minister of MoMA. I had made contact with his office two weeks before travelling to the Kurdistan Region and visited the office thrice on my arrival. However, they did not understand (or maybe did not want to understand) what I needed. I sensed from his secretary that there was the suspicion that I was a journalist, although I had a letter from the University of Nottingham confirming my identity, and the relevant contact details were provided to verify the authenticity of the letter. I had also made a copy of the letter available in the Kurdish language. It was only at the end of the fieldwork that I received positive feedback from the office; even then, I was informed that the minister had passed the list of interview questions to his advisors to reply.

As I had done with the minister’s office, I made contact with most participants and arranged appointments with them before leaving the UK. This was very necessary
because the Kurdistan Region has not been well researched and I aimed to avoid any last minute disappointments. During the fieldwork I also collected items from newspapers, administrative documents and projects, and web pages. Undoubtedly, secondary research on reports and journal articles are fundamental. However, to the best of my knowledge, there is no published research or report on the issues I had set out to explore.

The field of my research in the Kurdistan Region has not been previously researched. Hence, despite employing semi-structured interviews as the main tool for collecting data, this research will solely deal with primary documents (newspapers, administrative documents and projects, and web pages). Undoubtedly, secondary research on reports and newspaper articles are fundamental; however, according to my knowledge there is no published research or report around this topic in my research field already stated.

4.4.1. Interviewing: Semi-structured Interview and Focus Group

With regard to the methods that I used to collect research data, the qualitative semi-structured interviews and focus groups were seen to be suitable. The main method of data collection used in this research was interview. As the nature of the research and the types of research questions require, semi-structured interview is the best technique for collecting data on policy implementation research. As Silverman suggests “interviewing provides a way of generating empirical data about the social world by asking people to talk about their lives. In this respect, interviews are special forms of conversation” (Silverman, 2004). On the other hand, Flick et al. believe that there are “different types and procedures of qualitative interviews” (2004: 204). However, what most matches my purpose is Zhang and Wildemuth’s description of interviews, as the tools by which researchers access “people’s experiences and their...
inner perceptions, attitudes, and feelings of reality” (Zhang and Wildemuth, 2009: 222).

The individual interviews lasted between 30 and 90 minutes, except one, which exceeded two hours, and two interviews took less than 30 minutes. All interviews were conducted in the Kurdish language, except for one which was done in Arabic. Essentially, we spoke any language of the participants’ preference in order to give them room to express their knowledge, experience, opinion and feelings more fluently and confidently. The fact that I, as an insider/researcher, spoke the same language, made it easier for me to do the fieldwork. In addition to that, as a genocide survivor, I had some experience of the services provided by MoMA. Despite the fact that I already personally knew many of my interviewees and was in constant contact with the research participants, the sampling design used was snowballing. They were, especially lower and middle level officials, knowledgeable, responsive and very cooperative with my research project. However, I made sure that my familiarity did not affect the interview responses.

As for the focus groups, sampling for group discussion requires more careful thought than regular interviews. Ethical issues are important and need to be considered. Sometimes this technique is used in order to access views and attitudes of participants (Barbour, 2008). Hence, focus groups are useful to bring to light on how they view, assess and regard a process. I used focus group discussions because it seemed to me that this method could facilitate my understanding of policy implementation processes. As Barbour argues, focus groups allow researchers to invite recipients to ‘problematis’ taken-for-granted assumptions (2008: 133-134). In my experience, focus group discussions helped to save time and to avoid temperamental views because I found that participants were more accurate and accountable in public, though it is also true that some were reluctant to express their
true opinions in front of others. In some cases, just after the group interviews, some interviewees contacted the researcher and started adding some more information which they hesitated to say in front of others, but they did not mind including into the actual data set. Nonetheless, it was also found that the interactional atmosphere of focus group discussions encouraged the participants to share and exchange information, which made for the collection of rich data at the end of the day.

Before starting my first focus group, and as I was not feeling very confident to use this technique, I did a pilot focus group with seven students from the Department of Sociology at Salahaddin University. I requested from colleagues to select me to join a group of students sharing a problem; this helped me to expect what I had to do in a group interview, in terms of time managing, keeping a balance between all participants and encouraging them to participate. Finally, for the purpose of obtaining that, six focus groups, three per province for each programme, were held. Each focus group contained five to eight people from selected frontline staff and programme managers. The six focus groups were also recorded, translated and dealt with in the same way as individual interviews.

All but a few of the interviews and focus groups were carried out in the participants’ offices. They were all digitally recorded. However, some participants (6) added specific information and comments, and requested to be off the record, so I tried to make as many notes as I could after the interview-recorded conversations. All participants preferred to speak in Kurdish, except one in Arabic. I usually asked them to speak in whatever language they felt confident with, which allowed them to express their knowledge, experience, opinions and feelings more fluently. Thus, the research involved translation from Kurdish into English, which obliged me to be selective with transcripts for translation. Most individual interviews (42) ranged in duration from 30 to 90 minutes, except one which exceeded that time and two which were less than that. I
found a lot of irrelevant over-talking in some recorded interviews which wasted my time during transforming them into text. Another problem of the translation was with the idioms and expression, which perhaps most researchers conducting interviews other than the language of research/writing have experienced.

4.4.2. Documentary Data Analysis

Documents as a source of data, such as official documents deriving from the government and non-governmental sources, mass media outputs, and other textual and virtual outputs, are not considered as research materials to a particular study. Those documents have not been produced specifically for the purpose of social research (Bryman, 2008: 380-1). As Silverman states “documents are ‘social facts’, in that they are produced, shared and used in a socially organised way. They are not, however, transparent representations of organisational routines, decision-making processes or professional diagnoses. They construct particular kinds of representation using their own conventions” (2008: 58).

In addition to the interviews as the main data set of the research, I have been observing news, public and official statements, reports published in newspapers and online sources. My research will draw upon two types of documentary data: official documents (policy proposals, parliamentary regulations, and public and policy statements by politicians, executives and relevant people) and media outputs (textual and virtual, and news reports).

The rationale for using such a method is that there is no secondary research published in the area of my research in the Iraqi Kurdistan Region. In spite of that, in this kind of source, one could have access to official correspondence, annual reports and mission statements. The reason for reviewing documents was to corroborate the
information gathered at the interview stage (Tellis, 1997; Yin, 2003). Integrating documentary data into interviews will be useful for validation, testing and further investigation of what has been said in an interview data set. It has also been used to follow updates and progress on the cases (programmes) under research.

4.4.3. Data Analysis

For the analysis of the interview and focus group data, thematic analysis was applied, which is exploratory and aims to understand rather than knowing the data (Mark & Yardley, 2004). The themes identified and categorised after the interviews are based on the answers obtained from interviewees and on research/interview questions. The process of data analysis was conducted after the main data collection (interviews); however, it has always been developed with the secondary data set (documentary data). Different sub-themes were categorised under topics and themes generated from the data sets; they were then used as the basis for coding the transcripts. It has to be said that the initial coding was conducted before transcription. As I mentioned earlier, I have been selective with the interview data and only those contents have been transcribed, translated and used for analysis purpose, which related to the themes and sub-themes.

4.5. Ethical Considerations and Informed Consent

In terms of ethical considerations, certain formal arrangements were also considered. I first filled-in the research ethics form which was approved by my school, Sociology and Social Policy at the University of Nottingham. Although my research did not involve any serious ethical issues and harm to participants however, certain arrangements were also considered. Interviewees agreed to contribute to the
research on a voluntary basis and gave written consent for the interview to be undertaken.

Civil servants and government officials of the KRG had, and currently have, concerns towards leaking information to newspapers in the Kurdistan Region. I had to reassure the participants that the data would not be used outside the academic and research purposes. All research participants agreed and signed for their names to be revealed and their sayings to be used as quotes in this thesis, except three, who I kept anonymous in the research data analysis and the list of participants. The participants were given the informed consent form with key interview questions attached (see Appendices 2 and 3, which include the Kurdish and English version of informed consent and key interview questions) prior to making any decision. As the decision was made to take part in the interview, they were also given the right to terminate or withdraw their speeches during or after the interview.

**Conclusion**

The six sections of this chapter draw attention to the fact that a multi-methodology of qualitative case study and comparative policy analysis have been followed. Policy analysis is designed to supply information about complex social and economic problems and to assess the processes by which a policy or programme is formulated and implemented (Yanow, 2000: 2). The main objective of this research is to explore the critical implementation factors of social security programmes in the Kurdistan Region and the rationale behind them.

After addressing the multiple-case study design used in this research, this section will demonstrate how the types of research objective, purposes and questions inevitably led the researcher to adopt qualitative and comparative methods. This study has
adopted a multiple-case (embedded) design to gain more insights and robust understanding of the perceptions of the implementers towards the social security programmes in the Kurdistan Region.

Implementation of social security programmes involves different levels of implementers. Their knowledge, perspectives and concerns relating to programme performance and relevant issues are an important part of understanding implementation in a given context. The exploratory nature of this research project and its questions led me to follow qualitative research. Therefore, the qualitative approach meets the purpose of this study, concentrating on the comparative analysis. Besides this, in exploring the implementation of social security policy, contextual aspects are taken into account as determinant factors to understand how social security programmes work in particular political, administrative and organisational conditions.

Implementation research in developing countries needs to put a great emphasis particularly on politico-administrative and institutional settings.

As for the methods of data collection, this chapter proposes the use of documentary data as supplementary sources to interviews in policy research, which contribute to the validity of the research data.
CHAPTER FIVE: REFERRAL SOCIAL SECURITY PROGRAMME: THE RIGHT AND PRIVILEGES TO FAMILIES OF MARTYRS AND GENOCIDE SURVIVORS

Introduction

Based on an analysis of the data collected from research participants working in various positions in the MoMA, I argue that the effectiveness of the implementation of a social security programme depends highly on the political characteristics of the programme and the status of its claimants. This chapter initially explains why the cash transfer programme implemented by the MoMA has been given priority by the KRG. Again, as noted many times throughout the chapter, the extent to which the government commits itself to the implementation of the programme depends on the political significance of the claimants. High officials and political parties in power have constantly highlighted the profile of beneficiaries by honouring martyrs and offering assistance to their surviving dependants.

Therefore, another aim of this chapter is to understand the political nature of the social security programme and the way in which it has been put forward by the KRG. The chapter begins by first explaining the background of MoMA, showing its roots as traceable to the Foundation of Martyrs, and how and why the change has taken place. It also analyses the objectives of the programme from regulating social protection to compensation. The discussion then moves on to the preference that the KRG put on the implementation of the programme. Another point of the discussion is devoted to
the political consideration of recruiting staff members, and how they deliver the services. At the end, the chapter will examine the strengths and the weakness of the MoMA programme.

5.1. Institutional Settings of MoMA and RGFMGS Programme

This section discusses the legal and organisational framework of the MoMA and its social benefit programme, the RPFMGS. It examines the implementers’ perception of the programme and its organisational setting in accordance with the regulations of the programme. The section also addresses the development of the programme from what was a party-based activity into a government body and the reasons which led to this transformation. The section will equally refer to institutional settings from Iranian experience to show how the provision of special services to families of martyrs and war victims has actually been borrowed from others’ experience.

5.1.1. Definition and Institutional Setting

Prior to introducing the institutional setting of the RPFMGS programme and the MoMA, it is necessary to define two concepts: social security and the beneficiaries of the RPFMGS programme: martyrs.

It is not entirely fitting to describe the services being delivered by MoMA as merely social security. Section 2 in the MoMA Law No. 8/2006 clearly describes the services that the ministry obliged itself to provide as financial and incorporeal support to meet family survivors’ needs and to assure a decent life for them. In order to define social security we have to distinguish between the social security system and social security provisions. The first refers to the full set of social security provisions operative within a country/region (Walker & Wong, 2005: 21). The social security provisions involve
various forms of contributory and/or non-contributory cash and non-cash distribution. Having adopted a rent-seeking system, the KRG takes responsibility for funding social assistance programmes. The RPFMGS is a non-contributory government-funded scheme for war and genocide survivors. Although the contribution in social security is limited to cash, I can argue that the contribution that is being made is for a victim's life and the suffering inflicted on their families. The KRG uses both social benefits and a broader concept of social services for the RPFMGS programme. It appears that the recipients have not been categorised based on their particular financial circumstances and family situation, but what is considered in this regard is the status or position of the victim within the hierarchy of the party and the case or the way the loss has happened (see Appendix 7: Financial Instruction No. 10, 2010).

The term 'social services' has been used when the political and legal (compensations) aspects are taken into account. However, it has been confusing for both policy makers and implementers as to whether the services are considered as a social cash transfer, social protection or compensation. The main social service provided involves a cash transfer. Nonetheless, when the programme is judged on the basis of how the RPFMGS is defined, there is no doubt that it counts as a social protection scheme. However, the benefit (as it is recognised as rights and privileges) indicates elements of compensation to the loss occurred: losing a family member in wars with the former Iraqi regime, civil wars and genocide campaigns. In most cases they were the breadwinners of the family. Taking into consideration the fact that martyrs and genocide victims’ families have lost someone, the survivors are victims too. The loss has occurred to victims’ families (claimants of the RPFMGS programme). As Chnar Saed, former minister of MoMA said: “We are dealing with people that are considered as victims”.

Martyr and genocide victims are used frequently in this thesis to refer to victims of wars in general, Shahidy Hawlaty (citizen martyrs), and particularly to those who lost
their life in Kurdish national liberation activities such as Shahidy Sangar (battle martyrs). Law No.9/2007 of ‘Rights and Privileges to Families of Martyrs and Genocide Survivors’ defines the martyr as “anyone who lost his/her life in battlefields or during political struggles in the national liberation movement against brutal regimes of Iraq or in mass murder crimes or in any wars made against Kurdistan people” (RPFMGS Law No. 9, 2007). Within this definition, three types of martyrs are identified: firstly, battlefield martyrs, whose lives were lost in battles against the Iraqi regime or while they were in a political position. The second group is genocide victims (including chemical attack victims), people who went missing or died in Anfal and other genocide operations between 1963 and 2003. The third group is citizen martyrs, which are ordinary people killed in wars or terror attacks during the 1991 uprising or the forced exodus from cities to the areas bordering Turkey and Iran. Under the definition offered by the RPFMGS Law No. 9/2007, a total of 150,000 people can be classified as martyrs (here including Anfalised people). Of this number, there are many who have no surviving relatives (consequently no claimants). As a result, the registered number of martyrs and Anfal survivors who claim the RPFMGS benefits amount to no more than 69,000 families. Political prisoners were also later added to these three categories of beneficiaries (Political Prisoner’s Allowance Instruction, No. 24 in 2009). Although these were all seen as martyrs or victims, the benefits each of these groups receive differ on the basis of the position held by the deceased or missing person in the political parties (MoFE-KRG: Financial Instruction No. 10, 2010). In this regard, Chnar Saad, former minister of MoMA (2006-2009), described the necessity of establishing the MoMA as follows:

*Ministry of Martyrs and Anfal Affairs was established as an umbrella through gathering and re-organising both party belonged organisations.*² [MoMA-D1]

² Referring to Foundation of Martyrs belonging to both KDP and PUK.
The above quote indicates that the KRG created a ministry in its structure specifically to deal with the programme at a national level and also to make it the obligation of the government to support these beneficiaries, instead of other non-governmental organisations.

Nadir Rosti, the Director of Research in MoMA, summed up the objectives and duties of the ministry as follows:

- Work extensively on collecting as much data as possible about martyrs, genocide and chemical attack victims, [former] political prisoners, their families and inheritors, and the losses incurred by surviving relatives in the aftermath of the genocide and fighting against the Iraqi government.
- Secure the livelihoods and well-being of survivors by providing them with a monthly allowance as well as housing units and health services.
- Support victims’ dependants with the cost of their studies.
- Build the capacity of survivors through training and skills provision and help them find jobs.
- Offer psychological consultation and advice in case of trauma and psychiatric diseases.
- Prepare for the trial process of the perpetrators of Anfal and all other genocide campaigns, through a legal committee in MoMA.
- Compensate all human and material losses and disadvantages.
- Return the bodies of those killed in genocidal operations from the south of Iraq to their home in Kurdistan. [MoMA-B1]

In one way or another, all these points are mentioned in the ministry laws Nos. (8) and (9) and, apart from cash transfers, all other proclaimed services are being provided either temporarily or on an irregular basis. One of the most important projects undertaken since the establishment of the ministry was the conduction of a

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3 I have used ‘national’ throughout this research, not as it refers to population of a territory (state), but as an identity by which accordingly an ethnic group distinguishes itself from others. Despite this differentiation and running its autonomous government, the Kurdistan Region is still considered as part of Iraq. Whereas, being Kurds in Iraq has not let Kurds feel integrated into one nation with a dominant Arab population in Iraq since this part of Kurdistan was linked forcefully to Iraq in the 1920s (more detail has been addressed in Chapter 3 of this thesis). The term ‘national’ and ‘nationalistic’ are preferred use for describing the political aspects of MoMA and the PRFMGS programme.
comprehensive survey on martyrs and genocide victims and their surviving dependants. This survey was carried out for the following purposes.

First, to know the number of victims and the damages caused by these wars and genocide campaigns [quoted from participant MoMA-B1]. Collected information helped the MoMA to attain the most accurate data on the number of human casualties of the national liberation movement. This consequently resulted in reviewing and refining the list of claimants. During the instable period of the Kurdistan Region in the 1990s many fraudulent names had been added to the list of beneficiaries, especially, as explained later in this chapter, in the pre-ministry period.

The second aim is to prepare a national archive on victims of the Kurdish national movement, especially in the case of genocide, so that the information can be documented for historic purposes and also to internationalise the case [quoted from participant MoMA-C1].

The third aim of the survey is to provide and deliver the best possible services to survivors and those disadvantaged by these events [quoted from participants MoMA-B1 and MoMA-C1]. Despite this, in the amount allocated monthly to beneficiaries, the size of the family and the physical damages inflicted on their properties have not been considered by the programme. Although the human and physical damages were relatively reflected in the survey, the monthly salary is fixed and the amount devoted is equally distributed to all of them. The only element that varies the amount of the money is in the case of battle martyrs and is based upon the position of the victim in political parties or the government before death (martyrdom). In the case of Anfal, all claimants get the same amount. The amount is varied between IQD 500,000 (US$417) and IQD 1,186,800 (US$989).
Table 4 The Salary of Martyrs’ Families Based on the Position of the Martyrs

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Salary Grade</th>
<th>Army Grade of the Martyr</th>
<th>Salary</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>Immortal Barzani Friends (General)</td>
<td>IQD1,186,800</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>US$ 989</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>General (Liwa)/High Commander</td>
<td>IQD 1,092,500</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>US$ 910</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>Director</td>
<td>IQD 1,055,700</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>US$ 880</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>Brigadier (Amr Hez)/Member of Legion/Army</td>
<td>IQD 1,012,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>US$ 843</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>Lieutenant Colonel (Amr Batalion, Jegr Hez)</td>
<td>IQD 977,500</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>US$ 815</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6</td>
<td>Kadri serbazi u Siyasi Peshkawtoo-2</td>
<td>IQD 920,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>US$ 767</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7</td>
<td>Major/Kadri serbazi u Siyasi Peshkawtoo-3</td>
<td>IQD 862,500</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>US$ 719</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8</td>
<td>Captain/Kadri serbazi u Siyasi Peshkawtoo-4</td>
<td>IQD 805,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>US$ 671</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9</td>
<td>First lieutenant (Sarliq)</td>
<td>IQD 750,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>US$ 625</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10</td>
<td>Second lieutenant (Sarpal)</td>
<td>IQD 687,500</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>US$ 573</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11</td>
<td>Deputy Officer (Grade 1)/Farmanday Farmandayyee/Amr Fawj</td>
<td>IQD 662,600</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>US$ 552</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12</td>
<td>Deputy Officer (Grade 2)/Farmanday Lashkr</td>
<td>IQD 637,500</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>US$ 531</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>13</td>
<td>Deputy Officer (Grade 3)/Jegry Farmanday Lashkr</td>
<td>IQD 625,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>US$ 521</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>14</td>
<td>Deputy Officer (Grade 4)/Farmanday Hez</td>
<td>IQD 612,500</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>US$ 510</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>15</td>
<td>Deputy Officer (Grade 5)/Jegry Farmanday Hez</td>
<td>IQD 600,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>US$ 500</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>16</td>
<td>Deputy Officer (Grade 6)</td>
<td>IQD 587,500</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>US$ 490</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>17</td>
<td>Deputy Officer (Grade 7)/Farmanday Teep</td>
<td>IQD 575,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>US$ 480</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>18</td>
<td>Deputy Officer (Grade 8)</td>
<td>IQD 562,500</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>US$ 469</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>19</td>
<td>Dead of Sergeant (Jegry Fawj)</td>
<td>IQD 550,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>US$ 458</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>20</td>
<td>Corporal (Areef)</td>
<td>IQD 537,500</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>US$ 448</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>21</td>
<td>Deputy Corporal (Naib Areef)</td>
<td>IQD 525,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>US$ 438</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>22</td>
<td>First Soldier</td>
<td>IQD 512,500</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>US$ 427</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>23</td>
<td>Peshmarga</td>
<td>IQD 500,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>US$ 417</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


Table 4 shows the amount of salary allocated to each hierarchical category of martyrs and Anfal survivors. The position of martyrs needs to be verified by a political party, the Ministry of Peshmarga (Army) or the government – if the martyr had worked for the government (MoFE, Financial Instruction No. 10, 2010).
The salary of a civil martyr is IQD 180,000 (US$150). As for the Anfal family survivors, the amount of IQD 600,000 (US$500) is allocated for each claimant.

5.1.2. From Party-based Foundations to Government Body

The change was first made from a party-based foundation (established in 1993) to a government institution in 1999, then to a government ministry in 2006. After the 1991 uprising, the practice of providing families of martyrs with services emerged among all political parties, particularly the PUK and KDP. Almost all political parties in the Kurdistan Region had offices dedicated to the affairs of martyrs. Before a government ministry assumed this role, located within the 6th cabinet of the KRG in 2006, there were several foundations within each spilt Kurdish administration in Erbil and Sulaimaniya provinces. As mentioned earlier, both the Foundation of Martyrs and other foundations of genocide were devoted mainly to recording the names of all victims within their specialities in their jurisdictions so that cash benefits and limited residential units could be offered to their surviving family members and close relatives (MoMA Law, No. 9, 2007). Both major parties attached most of their internal organisations, including Foundations of Martyrs and genocide victims, to the government. This was because, firstly, they intended to lighten the financial burden on their parties and, secondly, they wanted to develop and regulate the programme and its services.

It was confirmed by participants of the focus group in Duhok that the change in the Foundation of Martyrs to a government body (but prior to being formed in a ministerial body) was made for just two reasons. On the one hand, this change was made to organise the programme officially in an administrative form. It also relatively purified the list of beneficiaries from unreal names. Jiyan Tahi, Director of Martyrs Affairs in Duhok said:
Before the establishment of MoMA, anyone who had an intermediary or a relative [who] works in [the] Foundation of Martyrs could easily put his or her name on the list of beneficiaries. Even some people might have begged from employees and convinced them to have their name listed as a beneficiary. However, supported by the ministry law, we formed an investigation and filtering committee. I was on the committee and we took out about (2,000) names from the list of beneficiaries in Duhok province. [MoMa-B6]

Another reason was that the parties were unable to afford it. The political parties in power came to the idea of establishing a government cash transfer scheme especially for martyrs and Anfal-survivor families to lighten the financial load on the parties [Focus group, Duhok Office of MoMA]. The martyrs’ families were paid first by the party that the martyrs belonged to and, due to the financial crises in that period (as explained in the background chapter), it was not easy for the parties to allocate funds to the party martyrs’ foundations.

The MoMA was first established in May 2006 after the unification of two foundations, the Foundation of Martyrs and the Foundation of Martyrs of the Kurdish Nation. These two groups belonged to the two ruling political administrations in Erbil and Sulaimaniya respectively. The political parties – especially the two major parties, KDP and PUK – had their own Foundation of Martyrs to serve surviving dependants of martyrs who belonged to their parties. The integration of their martyrs’ benefits groups, in addition to those of other parties into the MoMA, was authorised by a parliamentary regulation (Iraqi Kurdistan Parliament, 2006). At the time, the argument was that the MoMA would implement the programme and offer assistance to martyrs’ relatives, and claim those monies back from the Iraqi government through a compensation scheme for the human and material losses through genocide operations (MoMA Law No.9, 2007).

From the above, it is clear that this social security scheme operates on the basis of being a surviving relative of a genocide victim, rather than being in need. This means
that the MoMA programme is targeting neither those with insufficient income nor with a pension-based scheme. Nonetheless, an argument could be made that the scheme still caters for those on a low income because most war victims were breadwinners in their families, and to give compensation to their living relatives cannot be deemed misplaced.

To support the idea of being entitled to this scheme, the Ministry’s Regulation No.9, which was passed by the KNA in 2006, has clearly confessed that:

\[ \text{Before the ministry, there was a regulation at the parliament for existing these two foundations, but there was neither any definition of martyrs and Anfalised people nor regulations to organise financial support and services to victim survivors. [MoMA-D1]} \]

Unifying all benefits was one of the challenges that this government ministry encountered at the beginning of reorganising administrative regulations and procedures. In each city and town, and according to their cases, the martyrs and genocide victim survivors were treated and served differently. With this unification, all different benefits and services were joined and amended in the new ministry regulations.

In most government statements and ministerial documents, and even in the media, this programme is called either the ‘support allowance’ or ‘martyrs and genocide victim families’ salary’. The latter is the most used and accepted term in formal and legal documents (Legislation No.9, 2007, RPFMGS). Looking at the ministerial legislation and the ways that wide ranges of population have been entitled to benefits under the cash transfer scheme, led us to assert that the name of the programme can be translated under the title of ‘allowance for war and genocide victims’ families’.
5.1.3. Policy Change

The idea of devoting a special government body to serve surviving relatives of martyrs, genocide and chemical gas attack survivors can be traced back to experiences in neighbouring countries, especially Iran. As mentioned by the Director General of Social and Health Services in Erbil Directorate, Rasool Hamad, devoting a special organisation to provide services to war victims relates to a similar experience in Iran:

After [the] uprising [in] 1991, the idea of providing services to families of martyrs was raised by all political parties in general and [the] PUK and KDP in particular. Almost all political parties in [the] Kurdistan Region had an office within their organisations for martyrs’ affairs, which is, to a certain degree, inspired by Iranian experience in this regard. We tried to get a benefit from what Iran had invented as the experience of Foundation of Martyrs, which was helpful for establishing a similar foundation and later on a government body at a ministerial level. [MoMA-B5]

High officials and politicians of the Kurdistan Region are explicitly inspired by the Foundation of Martyrs and Veterans in Iran, which is devoted to the provision of services to families that lost one or more members during the 1978-79 revolution and later during the eight-year war with Iraq.

The Iranian Martyrs Foundation (Bonyad Shahid) was founded when the spiritual leader of revolution, Ayatollah Khomeini, in 1979 ordered an organisation to be established with an aim to provide support and services to families of those killed in fighting with the former regime. A year later, the (First) Persian Gulf War began between Iraq and Iran lasting eight years. After the ceasefire, the Iranian government proposed to merge the Martyrs Foundation with two other bodies in charge of providing support for veterans and ex-prisoners of the Iran-Iraq war. The Foundation of Martyrs and Veterans Affairs (Bonyad Shahid va Janbazan) was founded as a new organisation in May 2004.
Before the establishment of MoMA, each major political party had its own Martyrs Foundation to serve the family members of their martyrs and surviving dependants. Until these programmes were taken over by a government ministry, they existed as two separate foundations within Erbil and Sulaymaniyah districts. Those two Martyrs Foundations were devoted to collecting all martyrs’ names and providing cash benefits to them. With the changes, however, for the first time this was being carried out at the level of the entire Kurdistan Region, regardless of party affiliation (Iraqi Kurdistan Parliament, 2007). Indeed, running alongside this programme, there were also several Anfal Foundations in the region. These were also working mostly as non-governmental organisations to provide financial assistance periodically to genocide (Anfal) victims’ families. The government combined all those organisations and agencies in one governmental body to unify and improve service provision.

5.2. Programme Objectives of the RPFMGS

The change of the programme from party-related foundations to a government-funded ministry favoured political parties and claimants. On the one side, it saved political parties from financial deficit. On the other side, it made the cash and non-cash benefits available to beneficiaries in a more regular and improved way. This section will discuss the three objectives of the programme laid down within the MoMA.

5.2.1. Regulating Benefits

Following the passage of the MoMA Law, the Kurdistan Parliament issued Law No. 9 of the RPFMGS in 2007 to regulate social benefits to beneficiaries of MoMA. The RPFMGS programme identified its beneficiaries as heirs of Kurdish liberation fighters, genocide survivors, chemical attacks and other war victims as its beneficiaries.
According to Law No. 9, survivors or closest relatives of the mentioned groups are entitled to receive a monthly cash transfer and other non-cash benefits. In this section, I shall discuss further the content of the RPFMGS programme.

The MoMA provides families of martyrs and genocide victims not only with material support and means of a decent life, but also spiritual support. In most government statements and ministerial documents as well as in the media, this programme is referred to as ‘Martyrs and Genocide Allowance’. The programme provides regular monthly cash benefits in addition to health, education, housing and other social services. In essence, it is a true compensation scheme. Currently, about 83,403 families of martyrs and genocide victims and families of political prisoners receive monthly payments from MoMA (MoP-KRG, 2012: 174).

When the party-based foundation was established in 1993, a little monthly salary was allocated to martyrs’ family members. But the government transformed it to a more legalised programme, and improved the services. The government linked it to a Council of Ministries and for the first time issued law and regulations for it in which the government was found committed to provide the benefits. This was why on 1 September 1999, the foundation transformed to a government body related directly to the Council of Ministries in Sulaymaniya. For the first time a categorisation was made for beneficiaries and their benefits according to instructions.

Karwan Ammed, Director of Anfal Affairs in Sulayimaniya, said the regulations have not addressed all issues with regard to beneficiaries and their benefits. Sometimes employees of the RPFMGS programme take action based on their discretion:

*We sometimes work based on our discretions, because some cases are very complicated, and we decide on them only with our discretion and judgement. Otherwise they could not be sorted out by regulations and guidelines.* [MoMA-B9]
Generally the programme is adequately designed. However, due to the complexity of the cases, the staff, especially the director of legal departments of MoMA, experience difficulties with the framed law while dealing with the cases involving bequeathing. In some cases, especially in the cases of Anfal or a martyr married to two different women, it is not easy to find the right person/s eligible for the benefit. It is not always possible to find out who is/are the real inheritors of the victim. There are many cases of martyrs in which the martyr’s parents are alive and the martyr has brothers, sisters, wife and children. The Ministry Acts and Instructions have not sensibly expected and considered these cases. In such complicated cases, the staff would intervene according to their discretion.

5.2.2. Non-means Tested Benefits for Political Victims

The nature of the programme and eligibility criteria of entitlement indicate that the family situation and income do not play a role in the cash transfer of the programme.

Samal A A, Director of Martyrs in Sulymaniya, describes the situation of families of martyrs and why they should be entitled in such a programme:

*The families of martyrs are the most losing sects of society psychologically and financially, because the one whom they lost (who most of the time was the breadwinner) was the beloved one as well.*

[MoMA-B11]

Victims’ families make up a significant number of the population of the Kurdistan Region. However, both previous Martyrs’ Foundations had no clear regulations to define who was covered in this scheme. There were no terms and norms for entitlement. However, the RPFMGS programme has been designed specifically to cover a target population, comprising those people who are considered eligible for
benefits because they have lost a member/members of the family regardless of their income or dependants within the family.

The Law (No. 8) of the MoMA takes the inheritors of the first two groups as well as the third group as its beneficiaries. The family or closest relative is entitled to receive benefits, which are paid as a monthly salary. According to the Act (8: 2007), the salary is paid to the victim’s partner; her/his child/children in case s/he was married and has a child; her/his parent or brother and sister if s/he is single.

Evidently, under this social security scheme, eligibility is not based on social security considerations alone. The RPFMGS programme determines its beneficiaries based on the loss of a family member through wars or genocide operations. This means that the RPFMGS scheme is not an income-based social security, which targets a population with insufficient income. Nonetheless, the RPFMGS scheme has some elements of income support because, as argued earlier, most war victims are breadwinners of their households. Therefore, their deaths left many of the target relatives in severe financial distress.

In view of the above, the level of payments made were still highly criticised by most of the research participants. Ahmed Jameel, Legal Advisor in MoMA, said:

>This Act does not answer the question as to who needs to get benefits. If daughters and sons of a martyr or genocide victim got to the stage that they could stand on their own feet and be able to earn an income, why do they still need to receive benefits? If we help them in their whole life, implicitly we are incapacitating them. [MoMA-B2]

The recipients of RPFMGS are not entitled to the benefits based on their income or needs. In other words, the RPFMGS is not considered as a means-tested benefit, but rather for most of its current recipients it is an extra salary.

Izzat, General Director in Duhok Province of MoMA, pointed out some entitlement defects as follows:
A daughter of a martyr or an Anfal when she marries, she or her husband, or both, might be working but she has the right to get a third salary as a family member of a martyr or an Anfal. Nowhere in the world does someone who is over the legal childhood and youth age still benefit from their previous entitlements. If someone is in a good financial situation they should not be given the same financial entitlements as someone who is in a rather bad financial situation. For me, this is a negative point of this programme. [MoMA-C2]

It appears that the MoMA as a ministerial body is established for two aims. Firstly, after the repression experienced by Kurds, the KRG aimed to make a record of material and losses of life incurred by wars and genocide operations to Kurds in Iraq. Through this record, the KRG and its leaders have endeavoured to introduce Kurds as victims to the Iraqi central government and international community. In front of Iraq, by showing the losses, the Kurdish leaders want to send a message to Iraq as a statement that what Kurds have inherited from Iraq are only damages and human suffering. On the other side, the KRG find it essential to remind the international community of what Kurds have experienced and to make preparations for Anfal so as to internationally recognise the genocide against the Kurdish nation (Barzani, 2008: 12).

The second aim is to provide the best possible services. Devoting a ministerial body to delivering services allowed the KRG to make a special deal for these target groups. Forthcoming sections of this chapter will unpack the extent to which the services are delivered in the best way.

A distinctive character of the RPFMGS is the idea of lifetime income support, which was criticised by some research participants. Ahmed Jamel, Director of the Legal Department in MoMA, made this statement:

Who needs this government’s benefits? I think that all daughters and sons of martyrs should arrive at the stage that they could be able to stand on their feet and earn enough money to afford their lives; there is no need for such a ministry or programme to support them. If they get financial support during their whole life, they will steadily get lazy and useless. This
The above quote shows a negative point in the programme. When the benefit is conveyed from a social assistance scheme to a long-lasting permanent benefit, it affects negatively on the population and encourages dependency instead of productivity in society. Under no circumstances would the RPFMGS benefits be terminated unless the claimants died. Another fault of the programme is that the non-conditionality of the benefit facilitates a patron-client relationship. The benefit is provided, as a promise has been made by political parties to their affiliated population.

5.2.3. Compensation

The Iraqi High Criminal Tribunal’s final ruling in the Anfal case mentioned victims’ rights and the right of those who suffered losses as a result of the crime to claim their legal rights in civil courts. Also the Iraqi Parliament’s decision number 26 of 2008, which considers “what happened to the Kurdish people in Iraqi Kurdistan from slaughter to mass killings amounts to genocide” (International Conference on Genocide Against Kurdish People, 2008: 14-15) embodies this right and emphasises on the perpetrators’ responsibilities for their genocide operations.

The genocide committed by the Iraqi state against Kurdish civilians inflicted great harm on their well-being and property. This was the result of the use of chemical and biological weapons and the execution of the infamous Anfal operations and mass execution, destruction and plunder. Therefore, the Iraqi state must undertake a process of reparation for the loss caused to the victims, including restitution (returning the situation to its original state), damages, rehabilitation and recognition (such as
recognising the victims and public announcement of the harm they suffered) and taking measures that guarantee non-repetition of genocide.

Goran Mustafa, the Minister’s Office Administrator, addressed the compensational scheme of MoMA:

*It is the Regional government’s major responsibility to secure compensation – not compensating them itself. This securing of compensation (I don’t go in to the legal side of it) as for the Anfal case, it is [to establish] who is responsible for it; the Iraqi Government, the companies or those foreign countries which gave Saddam weapons? It is not my job to follow the legal side of it but, from its political side, it is very important; this is a responsibility on the part of government to take on. It’s important to secure compensation for the victims. [MoMA-C1]*

A Strategic Planning Committee has been established in the ministry to pursue the extent to which they can make financial, psychological and environmental reparations for damages caused by genocide. According to general rules of state responsibility in national and international laws and particularly the law of the Iraqi High Criminal Tribunal and the Iraqi civil law, the Iraqi Government is responsible to recompense those people by law (KRG-MoMA, 2009, 14).

**5.3. High Profile Programme**

There is a common agreement among all high and lower officials of MoMA that the beneficiaries deserve more than what government is providing. Almost all research participants argued that beneficiaries of the RPFMGS programme are ranked higher than other benefits-receiving populations, and that MoMA itself is the most important social security scheme.

The KRG seeks interest in the recipients of RPFMGS, and this is evident in the emphasis laid on their socio-political status. As will be discussed repeatedly, the nationalistic character of beneficiaries of MoMA has resulted in a great interest to
ruling party leaders and government. When it is compared with the SSN beneficiaries we can realise that they are lacking any political privilege. We can use these two statuses and interests in the dichotomy of nationalistic versus public. In this dichotomy, the implementation of social security programmes in the KRG has always been off-balance.

With regard to the salience attached to MoMA, Samal, the director of Martyrs Affairs in Sulaymaniya, said:

> Although our ministry is just a service organisation, it has a very high status in the Council of Ministries. [MoMA-B11]

Kamaran Ameed, director of Anfal Affairs in Sulaymaniya evaluated the importance given by the KRG to the programme as follows:

> Given the importance to the RPFMGS programme and MoMA by the Council of Ministries, Parliament and political leaders [...] in all their speeches and public meetings, senior officials and political leaders praise the martyrs and genocides’ families. So far, they have done everything they could to serve these people. [MoMA-B9]

It has been evidently pointed-out in every speech of political leaders that it is KRG’s duty to honour the martyrs and serve their dependents. In this regard, an officer from the Director of Martyrs Affairs in Erbil said:

> There have been no speeches made by regional leaders without referring and respecting martyrs; they are always remembered. [MoMA-A1]

Such dutiful attention is not limited to martyrs and genocide victims, but includes, and has been transferred to, their family members. Kurdish political leaders always remember ‘martyrs, genocide victims and their surviving members’ in public speeches (Barzani, 2006; 2009; 2010). Having paid such high attention to martyrs and genocide victims and constantly giving promises by political leaders to their family members
have raised expectations. The Director of Anfal Affairs in Erbil, Fars T. Mho, talked about expectations of the target groups of RPFMGS as follows:

*We are dealing with a group of people that have the highest expectations from the government (KRG) to better treat them. The government has lived up to most of their expectations.* [MoMA-B3]

The MoMA services are not limited to the monthly cash transfer. The claimants of the RPFMGS programme are benefited by other services, such as housing units, part-scholarships, and financial support for marriage to sons and daughters of martyrs and genocide victims. Despite that, these services have not satisfied the programme staff members. Chnar Saed, former Minister of MoMA, expects more from the KRG and criticises the leaders who deal with the programme as follows:

*In the political level and as a slogan, all politicians and high officials always promise to support these vulnerable people, but when it comes to the reality only 50 per cent transferred into practice.* [MoMA-D1]

Other staff members were also not fully satisfied with allocated services. For example, the research participants thought that the 50 per cent exemption of RPFMGS beneficiaries in study costs in private schools and universities is not enough. They were also demanding full cover of the marriage cost for family members of beneficiaries.

Zahir Joiukhin, Director of Social Services in the Directorate General of Martyrs and Anfal Affairs in Erbil, created a good expression in regard to the importance of the MoMA:

*This is the home of the martyr, for serving relatives of the martyr.* [MoMA-B8]

Beneficiaries of RPFMGS are characterised as high-profile clients. They are not just ordinary citizens, but they acquire a political character. Most of them might financially
live in a low position, as the families of martyrs and genocide have in most cases lost their breadwinners; however, they are not classified and served based on their needs. Even the categorisation of RPFMGS beneficiaries is done based on the way the victim has lost his/her life, or the victim’s status in the hierarchy of positions in the Kurdish forces’ peshmarga and political parties. Being a high or middle-ranked member of the party (see Table 4), especially the major ones, brings a privilege to the family in the case of loss of life, even in the case of natural death.

5.3.1. Clients’ Representation in Policy Making and Policy Implementation Processes

The service improvements are made by the government to gain the full ‘satisfaction’ from beneficiaries. Most of the MoMA staff members are at the same time beneficiaries of the programme too and, consequently, they are zealous defenders of the RPFMGS programme. The former Minister of MoMA, Chnar Saad, is the daughter of a martyr. She lost her father, Saad Abdullah, in the Erbil headquarters of KDP on 1 February 2001 in a terrorist attack. Not only at the ministerial level, but also in higher policy-making positions, the RPFMGS beneficiaries have representatives. Both Masoud Barzani (uncle), the president of the Kurdistan Region, and Nechirvan Barzani (nephew), the Prime Minister of the KRG, have 38 close family members lost in genocide campaigns.

The RPFMGS programme follows a bottom-up model of policy implementation. Policy makers and policy implementers are at the same time programme beneficiaries. They request more and more benefits for claimants of the RPFMGS programme, participate in policy making, implement by themselves, and get the benefit. Eventually other claimants can take their share from the services. In the MoMA the beneficiaries play a significant role in the policy-making and implementation process.
5.3.2. Victimisation

As all participants of the focus group in the Directorate General of Martyrs and Anfal Affairs in Duhok Province stated, the KRG has an interest to serve these target groups for the future:

*The KRG always considers to serve this group for the future. This is for the future if our nation fell into a war, there should be some people ready to sacrifice themselves to protect this political entity. [Focus Group, Duhok]*

The idea of serving people to drive them to be motivated to fight for Kurdayeti (Kurdish national movement) also implies the clientelistic intention. The below quote shows the use of RPFMGS benefits in order to encourage people for future struggles the Kurdistan Region might face:

*Many things should be done for martyrs and genocide survivors ... If not, how would people ever be motivated to sacrifice themselves? When they see the way those families are treated, everyone would have peace of mind for after to sacrifice. [MoMA-A1]*

Honouring the sacrifices made by martyrs and victims of genocide in Kurdistan has always been one of the main objectives of the Ministry. Prime Minister Barzani stated, “[we] all have to make the memory of our sacrifices a driving force to encourage us to build a prosperous, stable, and bright future. We must be confident that the lives of tens of thousands of victims were not lost in vain” (Barzani, 2008: 19).

5.4. The Ministry Regulations and High Officials’ Interferences

As noted in the previous section, this ministry was formed as a combination of all martyrs and genocide victims’ foundations. Samal, Director of Martyrs-MoMA in Sulaimaniyah Province, who was involved in writing the MoMA law and designing its
operating framework, described the transition from the foundations to ministry as follows:

*The ministry’s law relied heavily on the law, which was there at both institutions. It was set up on their basis but in a more progressive and inclusive form ... we only made some changes, which were important, then gradually, to alter it from a narrow partisan form to a governmental and legal subject to include all the nation.* [MoMA-C5]

The Foundations of Martyrs considered martyrs as the party’s possession and fortune. This was true for their family members. They were treated as party clients, and there were political parties that are most proud of them. One of the changes which occurred in the period of the ministry was that the MoMA treats the beneficiaries in a broader national context, regardless of their party connection. The martyrs are now considered as symbols of national glory.

But this transition did not eliminate politicians’ and higher officials’ power as admitted by a former minister, Chnar Saeed. She was assigned as a first minister and was also part of the creation of MoMA:

*[in the early period of MoMA] The lack of a regulation, which would have a parliamentary power, had eased to political party interferences, personal prerogatives and moods. Therefore, some ineligible people had been penetrated into the scheme illegally and we found them as beneficiaries without having any reason to be eligible to this scheme. This had caused unfairness and inequality.* [MoMA-D1]

Social security policy, which comprises cash transfer, attracts politicians’ attention. They may be more inclined to intervene in and control these programmes. As many participants argued, political and administrative actors deal with and support social security policies according to the salience they attach to the policy programmes. The hegemony of politicians is entirely visible not just in the process of policy formulation, but also in the implementation process.
Faris Tahir, Director of Anfal in Erbil addressed that:

*The partisanship and personal relationship have [a] huge impact in administrating the RPFMGS programme.* [MoMA-B3]

The former Minister of MoMA, Chnar Saed, also highlighted the party interference into the performance of the MoMa and the RPFMGS programme as follows:

*Both parties belonged [to] Foundations of Martyrs, which exist[ed] before the ministry, but were [lacking] clear regulation[s] to define the beneficiary and eligibility criteria of entitlement. As a result of such a law being passed through parliament, [it] eased the interference from party leaders in power and personal relationship in locating quite a large number of ineligible people within the MoMA programme.* [MoMA-D1]

The transition from foundations to the ministry brought all fraudulent names of claimants into the MoMA. The MoMA succeeded in taking away those names from the list of RPFMGS beneficiaries, but as some research participants argued there are still some fraudulent names that exist within the list of beneficiaries.

There was also the point that party leaders or high officials, especially those in the two dominant political parties, misuse the programme. For instance, Hama Haji Mahmood, the Kurdistan Socialist Democratic Party (KSDP) leader, pointed out in a TV interview an issue that dominant parties play with the programme to attract people’s loyalty:

*Many of our martyrs’ families have been persuaded to transfer the name of their martyrs into their lists. They have been promised [a raise to] their salary if they do the list transformation.*

What caused and eased the interference from political parties are the entitlement procedures, especially in the case of martyrs. Every martyr has to be approved and supported by a political party to be entitled to the cash transfer programme. This interference is being done just by dominant political parties by exerting influence on
the decision makers. They equally impose their control upon implementers to accomplish their goals.

The interference can be turned in favour of the programme, as it has reflected on the services provided for RPFMGS beneficiaries. But at the same time, it has put obstacles in the way of applying the regulations and instructions to influential clients.

5.5. Implementers: an Emotional Consideration of Recruitment

5.5.1. Personal Motivation

The personal consideration is more important than administrative procedure in MoMA directorates. Samal, Director of Martyrs in Sulaymaniyah believed:

_We do not do our job merely with an administrative mood but work with a career-emotional sentiment. We consider beneficiaries of our programme as our family members. Those people have a weak feeling. So, for us ‘the respect’ is more important than purely ‘bureaucratic and administrative’ procedures._ [MoMA-B11]

The staff members of MoMA showed their desire for their jobs. They perform as if they devoted their life to the case of martyrs and genocide victims (missing and survivors). Research participants always repeated that the government should do everything for the wellbeing of RPFMGS claimants.

It seems that this deep engagement with the job and beneficiaries is dominant in all offices of MoMA. All participants expressed their direct engagement with their job and contact with RPFMGS beneficiaries. For example, Abdulkarim Halladni, Director General of Martys and Anfal Affairs in Sulaymaniyah showed his motivation towards the MoMA programme as follows:

_I have obliged myself to work for the case of genocide and serving the victim families. If I were in my position here or not, I would continue being with them._ [MoMA-C3]
Fars T. Mho, Director of Anfal Affairs in Erbil expressed his feeling towards the RPFMGS programme as follows:

*Two reasons explain my motivation to choose, move and serve here. Apart from not being happy with my previous job, the emotional impact strongly encouraged me to make this decision. Not merely the financial wage, but the emotional wage most influenced me to come here.* [MoMA-B3]

Fars T. Mho also said that:

*I was a manager in the only official TV broadcasting of the KRG, Harem TV. I decided to change my job, choosing this ministry because two of my brothers are martyrs of the national liberation movement.* [MoMA-B3]

National motivation has strongly attracted many people to seek to work in the MoMA. The MoMA, since its establishment in 2006, has kindly welcomed people with high motivation to work on the case of martyrs and genocide. Despite that, most of the unqualified employees of former Foundations of Martyrs and anfal survivors were merged into MoMA. The former Minister of MoMA showed this:

*You rarely found people with psychology, administration, finance and social work qualifications amongst employees of MoMA. Most of them were those working in [a] previous Foundation of Martyrs. We were not able to dismiss those folk of unqualified employees. However, I tried to pick up new people with law, administration or financial certification to be employed in MoMA.* [MoMA-D1]

### 5.5.2. Political Account in Staff Recruitment

As described in an earlier section of this chapter, most of the MoMA employees have been chosen on the basis of whether they have a martyred or a genocide victim among their family members or not. However, this is not enough for them to be recruited into the MoMA. They should be party members of or at least loyal to KDP or PUK.
In support of this, the former minister of MoMA said:

Those who are recruited to work in government offices have been chosen (appointed) based on factors mostly not related to job description or qualification. In fact, other external factors have always played a role in assigning others and me here. Qualification, skills and professionalism have played fewer roles in this regard. Loyalty to political party sought to play crucial role. [MoMA-D1]

This ministry has not been founded based on bureaucratic procedures, but based on political consideration. Other research participants also confirmed this claim. For example, the Director of Anfal Affair in Erbil said:

The only condition that [was] taken into account [staff recruitment] is their party belongings and personal relationship, of which the latter is also influenced by political party relationships. [MoMA-B3]

On the day that this person has chosen this fate, s/he has not expected any reward. S/he has not expected that one day someone will take care of her/his children, or even s/he has not been sure what is going to happen to them.

5.5.3. Service Provider as Service User

As I noticed from research participants, almost all employees from frontline to minister are chosen from families of martyrs or genocide survivors. Some participants asserted that the appointment in MoMA should not be made based on educational qualifications. As Nadir Rusti, Director of Research Unit in MoMA said:

Recruitment should not be made based on certificate. In all offices of the MoMA the situation of employees themselves determined whether they could understand and feel [for] martyrs and genocide victim families. Heirs of martyrs are the best to be employed here. [MoMA-B1]

Fars T. Mho, Director of Anfal Affairs in Erbil also confirmed the above point:
If the employees (specially frontline staff) come from victims’ people: (1) they better deal with clients and understand their sufferings; (2) their situation will not be weak while dealing with clients who get angry and impatient; and (3) this will reassure clients that the members of staff have a total understanding of their situation and will respond to their demands. [MoMA-B3].

When I visited my research participants of RPFMGS in their office to conduct interviews, I noticed that they were highly motivated to work and passionately attached to their duties towards the claimants. I especially noticed this when I visited the three Director Generals of MoMA in the three governorates of the Kurdistan Region. They accepted my request for an interview, but did not agree with the condition I requested for our interview: not to be disturbed by others. They continued to deal with people’s requests while answering my questions. We were interrupted several times during these interviews. Their office door was open to all, and people were walking in for their papers to be signed. The Erbil General Director of MoMA had no secretary in his office.

Recruiting implementers from service users or victim families has its benefits. As Karwan Ameed said:

Whenever a genocide survivor and relatives of victims come to my office, and when they tell the story of their son, husband, sister or wife, I go back to the time and situation of genocide operations as it is now happening. [MoMA-B9]

5.5.4. Vulnerability of Service Providers

Employees of MoMA, from the minister to an ordinary staff member, are directly in contact with claimants. The minister has a day every week to see the claimants that request a meeting. In other words, all employees of MoMA work as frontline staff members. The frontline staff are passionate to follow beneficiaries’ papers urgently, because they share the claimants’ suffering. In addition to that, when you see the
implementers benefit from the programme, it is quite reasonable that they would support other beneficiaries, the same as they try to for themselves. The shared suffering of beneficiaries and implementers has a negative emotional reflection on later. Although the implementers work tirelessly, they are psychologically exhausted due to listening to claimants’ tragedies every day. The personal stories of families of martyrs and genocide survivors have an impact on the personal lives of employees of MoMA. As an officer in the Directorate of Martyrs Affairs – Erbil expressed:

Those who are working in MoMA offices every day see cases of tragedy and trauma, which no one can embody in a movie scene. No one can draw a picture of moments of the life of those families. [MoMA-A1]

Working with martyrs and genocide cases involves emotional aspects of the life that people suffered. The staff members hear touching stories and cases, which result in depression and distress. This is true more for those working with genocide survivors’ cases. As the Director of Anfal Affairs in Erbil said:

Believe me or not, employees of MoMA offices experience depression and tragedy in their everyday work. [MoMA-B3]

He also continued to say that:

Before I started this job, I was working for the Ministry of Education among people who were always coming to the office wearing suits and French perfume, and always smiling. When I came to work here everything was different. I found myself in a totally depressive atmosphere. I should admit that this has had an impact on my personal and family life. You have to deal with people who have become older, mentally ill or suffered severe oppression and pain, and are consequently impatient. I was always coming to my office as before, but going back home psychologically tired. This even influenced my life at home as well. [MoMA-B3]
Most of the research participants asked for a kind of injury allowance on the top of their salary as they get injured psychologically every day at work. As Director General of MoMA in Sulaimaniya, Abdulkarim Haladini, stated:

_We are meant to be more compassionate rather than legal in dealing with beneficiaries and their cases._ [MoMa-C2]

### 5.6. Other Implementation Gaps

Although the RPFMGS Law No.9 identified the beneficiaries of MoMA programmes, entitlement is still one of the legal issues in the implementation of the programme, especially in the case of Anfal. The complexity of cases and high interference have created constraints in some of the implementation processes.

Samal, the Director of Martyrs in Sulaymaniya, criticised the eligibility criteria of the programme as follows:

_There is a kind of patriarchy, centralism in MoMA, in which no one consults with lower level staff. For example, they cut the children’s allowance without asking our view on that. That decision was totally wrong. How should a single person get the same amount of money as a family with six children? This is unfair._ [MoMA-B11]

### Conclusion

I can conclude from the research that the implementation process of the social security policy in the post-war country is strongly influenced by political characteristics and interests, which the social security programme has conveyed. As this chapter has shown, the relative success of the programme largely rests on the political importance of its beneficiaries to power.

In this context, a question can be raised about the extent to which political conditions equally impact on the implementation process.
This ministry is prioritised by the government, which is led by the two biggest political parties. It is supported and prioritised because both political parties, the KDP and the PUK, have the most beneficiaries from this scheme. A region that has faced a genocide, national struggle and war is in dire need of such a programme to rehabilitate and compensate and support those people.

However, the terms and conditions of entitlement are confusing. There are legal issues in the MoMA programme which have not been resolved so that the programme can be implemented sufficiently and equally.

Non-means-tested benefit does not involve any sort of testing of the claimants’ income. Claimants can come to claim benefits with high capital resources, and the tests tend to focus on the criteria of the political victim (wounded veteran or prisoners) or first degree family member of the victim (family members of martyrs and genocide victims). No testing is done on the income of financial conditions.

The amount paid as a monthly salary never replaces the emotional and psychological damage to families of victims. It has been highlighted that the socio-political situation of families of martyrs and genocide survivors has always been used for political interest by ruling parties. The parties in competition always show their interest in the beneficiaries of RPFMGS. Especially in the times leading to the elections, political parties in power are greatly attracted towards this group.
CHAPTER SIX: DOUBLE STANDARDS IN THE IMPLEMENTATION OF SOCIAL SECURITY PROGRAMME: THE CASE OF SOCIAL SAFETY NET

Introduction

This chapter examines the researcher’s journey into the field of a social security programme whose implementation has faced many changes and constraints. In the last two decades, the SSN programme in the Kurdistan Region has been subjected to changes in its form, objective and name. These changes have consequently created uncertainty and confusion among the programme’s implementers. The inconsistency in the programme’s objectives and the instability in its practice have impacted on its implementation.

The previous chapters have already illustrated the peculiar political and administrative context within which social security programmes are implemented by the administration of the KRG. The factors, which have led to the placing of the SSN on the backburner by administration, were also explored.

This chapter looks at some aspects such as the objectives of the programme perceived by implementers and the policy deviation made from a top-down tendency. More importantly, some critical missing factors such as clarity in defining the social programme, priority of comprehensive social protection system, and lack of continuity in the implementation have been evaluated. But first, a very brief development of the programme is presented.
6.1. Background and Development: From SPF, FPF to SSN

Throughout this research several names have been used, which all refer to one programme. Different names have been put on it at different times. The name of the programme changed from the SPF to the FPF between 2002 and 2009, but subsequently the old name was reinstated, adding ‘development’ to the name of the Directorate which administers the Social Protection programme. After 2011 the name of the programme changed to the SSN after broadening the programme to include several cash assistant programmes, i.e. Disabled People’s Allowance and the Blind People’s Allowance.

The SPF programme was first established when the Revolutionary Command Council, the ultimate decision-making body in Iraq between 1968 and 2003, issued The Iraqi Social Treatment Law No. 126 in 1980 (Ghfour, 2003). This law aimed to build a comprehensive social care and assistance system based on the ‘socialist’ ideology of the Ba’ath Party in Iraq. It helped to establish a number of government programmes geared towards social assistance and development. Under the law, all directorates under the MoLSA at that time were revised and new programmes including Family Care (Re’ayat Al-Usra) were established. The most significant impact was that a monthly salary was assigned to individuals and households deemed needy, poor and/or on a low income. The focus of this programme was on supporting ‘the family’ as a significant social unit.

The early stages of this programme (between 1980 and 1991) are skipped in this account simply because the programme is not the research’s main focus of enquiry. Besides, data on the programme during these stages are quite sparse. The focus from here on will be on the period after the Iraqi Government lost its political hegemony and withdrew its administrative control over the Kurdistan Region after 1991.
The SPF was suspended after the withdrawal of Iraqi Government offices due to the administrative vacuum which affected all levels of administration and the provision of public services. Even where political leaders had taken over, due to their unpreparedness to provide public services they were unable to make any meaningful impact.

When the KNA and KRG were established, local authorities took over the running of the previous Iraqi Government offices. In its early meetings, the KNA revised the former Iraqi Law of Social Affairs. Initial remedies appeared in the KNA’s protocols within the law of the MoHSA\(^4\) (KNA's Protocols, Vol. VI, 1993: 256-260). These included new cases such as the existence of tens of thousands of families' survivors of genocide and martyrs of Kurdish national freedom, and the situation of married students.

Although potential changes and enlargement were proposed and made to the programme by KNA, they were not implemented. This can be partly attributed to the double economic blockages imposed first by the UNSC over the whole of Iraq and second from Iraqi Central Government on the Kurdistan Region, which led to a lack of sufficient funds and skilled staff. Consequently the newly-established government was not able to provide public services adequately to citizens. As illustrated in the background chapter, Chapter 3, a large majority of people lacked the basic needs for everyday life. The only organisations that were capable of providing a meaningful amount of support in the region were international aid agencies, as illustrated in Chapter 3. This socio-economic situation continued until 2001, when the economy of the Kurdistan Region began to improve. It was at this time that the SPF was revived.

\(^4\) The first cabinet of the Kurdistan Regional Government did not include a specific ministry for social affairs. This ministry was integrated within the Ministry of Health and Social Affairs. For the first time in the PUK-controlled administration of the KRG (2001) a ministry body was devoted to manage governmental offices of social affairs.
Recalling what has been mentioned in Chapter 3 about the development of the SPF after its idle period, this research covers only the last two periods, after being reactivated in 2001, as follows.

The first is the FPF, between 2002 and 2009, which was referred to throughout Chapter 3 as a combined financial and social awareness programme. In the early stages of this phase, each beneficiary was receiving monthly IQD 200 in previously-used currency (until it was replaced by the new Iraqi Dinar). This amount was nearly as much as that earned by an unskilled employee per month.

Although a large amount of money was spent to set up the SSN programme at the national level in Iraq between 2004 and 2005, the KRG opposed switching from SPF to SSN. According to the Iraqi version of the SSN, claimants’ circumstances needed to be revised and considered, and the minimum payment increased from IQD 300,000 to IQD 100,000. There has been until recently an ongoing controversy between the Iraqi Federal Government and the KRG as to whether this fund should be supplied from Baghdad or from the 17 per cent share of the regional budget paid to the KRG. Therefore, the SSN was almost terminated before being implemented.

The second period started after 2009 when the name of the programme changed to the SPF. In this round, cash transfer minus social (public awareness) support began following a ministerial command to dismiss all social workers/visitors without prior notice and eliminate regular visits to households from the programme.

6.2. Programme Objectives

It is useful to examine implementers’ understanding of the programme and the manner in which they attempted to meet its objectives. This section clarifies the objective settings of the public policy the government has already set. Any social
programme could be set to pursue more than one objective, and also more than one reason could be found behind its implementation. What is expected to happen here is that the implementers and frontline staff are supposed to be totally aware of clear goals set for the programme.

Understanding the thinking behind policy leads to an understanding of the policy itself and how it is to be implemented. Participants of the research were therefore asked to explain the rationale behind the programmes. A surprising outcome of this was that implementers of the SSN perceived the programme and its ends differently. A wide range of conceptions was highlighted; some explained the SSN as a social awareness programme, while others focused on the social cash transfer aspect. Some of the research participants also suggested that it was a regular public service which should be run as a government-funded programme. Others equally explained that the SSN was a scheme which should be operated as the right of people to social security. As will be explained later, none of these objectives has been targeted sufficiently. The differences in implementers’ perceptions indicate the expectations that they have from the programme, in which it may contradict with what one can see from the outcomes of the programme implementation. It does not necessarily infer that the objectives have been followed adequately.

6.2.1. Right to Social Protection

The SSN programme targets poverty in the Kurdistan Region. Considering the cash transfer programme as people’s right to social protection has been clearly considered in the human rights declaration. The Universal Declaration of Human Rights (1948) states that “everyone, as a member of society, has the right to social security” (Article 22). The Declaration refers especially to the right to medical care and social services; to security in the event of sickness, disability, widowhood, old age and unemployment
(Article 25). The International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (1966) similarly recognises “the right of everyone to social security, including social insurance” (Article 9). These texts represent statements of intent on behalf of the United Nations member countries to extend social security to all residents. Various conventions adopted by the International Labour Office have sought to specify and operationalise the content of such obligations. The most important of these is the Social Security (Minimum Standards) Convention 1952 (No. 102). It identifies nine social risk areas with a corresponding demand for social security: medical care, benefits in case of sickness, unemployment, old age, employment injury, disability, family circumstances, maternity and surviving a provider (Overbye, 2005: 305).

The concept of human rights in social protection literature entails a government’s obligation to implement social transfers (Künemann & Leonhard, 2008: 5). When it comes to implementers of the SSN, this goal should be stated as a point of concern in dealing with recipients. In the case of the SSN programme I asked research participants what aim they could find in the programme and how they see the way the target is being sought. Human rights – or in some cases, people’s rights – was one of those terms that they mentioned. Respondents started from the point that the government has the obligation to care for the poor. However, this is not reflected in the content of the services provided. The SSN beneficiaries receive much less than what is needed to cover the minimum level of the recipients’ consumption. The programme policy claims a minimum right to welfare (not a privilege, as in the case of the RPFMGS programme); however, the policy has been violated on two levels. First, the right should be granted for all eligible people in society. This should not be restricted to a limited pre-registered population. The design of the programme does not include new claimants except in very rare cases. When a claimant is dead or no longer eligible for the benefit, only in this case can his/her name be replaced with a new claimant.
All research participants of SSN suggested that the programme should be seen as the fulfilment of human rights, yet they added that resources were not being distributed fairly. Indeed, other participants also shared the same view as the last-mentioned quote as, at times, due to this unfairness, they as implementers feel embarrassed when dealing with recipients.

Abdulrezaq Mustafa, the former director of the programme in Erbil, who was at his post when big changes and expansion were made to the programme between 2002 and 2005, made this observation:

*Although the amount that beneficiaries would get each month is very low, it’s their right. I have always advised my frontline staff to treat and speak with beneficiaries respectfully and not as if they have sympathy for them.* [SPF-B1]

This quote shows that the employees of the SSN are not satisfied with the allocated amount of payment to claimants. Research participants agreed that what has been achieved from the programme is the right to get paid whatever the amount is. The extent to which the benefit is sufficient is another matter. It was also observed that the frontline staff found the stated right questionable as to how the right to adequate benefit has been achieved.

Mrs Asos Najib Abdullah, the Minister of Labour and Social Affairs, also expressed her idea towards the SSN programme as follows:

*[It] is being given to poor and low-income households as their right for minimum well-being, households [for] whom their breadwinners [are] incapable of work due to their particular circumstances ... It is [the] government’s responsibility to take care of those people and provide basic needs for them in the best way.* [SPF-D1]

However, she also admitted that there is a fault in the policy of the programme, especially during the SPF period. A family with eight persons gets the same amount
as a couple gets from the SPF [SPF-D1]. Another senior officer who worked in the directorate of the FPF for more than two decades made this observation:

The SPF, which is a social assistance scheme, [in practice] is considered as 'pity or sympathy' to the people rather than as part of their 'right' – a situation which the implementers feel embarrassed about and [see an] internal contradiction in. [SPF-B8]

A quote from an interview with the director general of the programme in Sulaymaniyah further buttresses this claim:

What is being given to beneficiaries of SSN is not social protection. We cannot call this scheme as 'social' in any kind of it just because of involving cash transfer. Adding to that, it doesn't take into account people’s rights and demands at all. [SPF-C3]

6.2.2. Cash Transfer to Eligible People or Assistance for Poor

When it comes to the functionality of the SPF, another duality in the objectives of the programme appears. Cash transfers under the SPF were potentially categorised under social assistance programmes. Indeed, the programme is highlighted as an aim to secure an adequate standard of living for all people in the region. As asserted by some research participants, cash transfers are for those under the poverty line. Yet, in practice the programme does no more than provide enough to cater for the needy for only a couple of days per month. One of the main objectives of social protection is to approach poverty reduction in payments of direct income transfers. Effecting a change in the life of the recipients is one of the conditions for making the social protection system work effectively.

This programme covers a wide range of the population in the Kurdistan Region who are distressed. A former programme director of the SPF describes the conditions of eligibility:
This programme covers those who are low-income or have no source of income for their livelihood. [SPF-B1]

The most distressed group is widows as a result of past wars. For the same reason, a huge number of orphans could be found in the community. We all face the same, obvious, dilemma – age or die. The family might treat their spiritual and psychological needs, but not always their financial needs. The SSN programme covers older people in poor families in order to safeguard them financially within their family. Most importantly they need this benefit to avoid feeling that they are a burden to their family.

However, there is an ambiguity in applying the eligibility criteria. Those with low incomes are seen as those with jobs or a source of income, but who cannot cover their expenses without assistance from the government. The following two quotes show us that the SPF is not being implemented on the basis of need. A social worker in the directorate of Social Protection and Development in Sulaymaniyah described the SPF as follows:

SSN is a government body for providing social service to all households living under the poverty line, or in a bad financial condition, which need government intervention. [SPF-A7]

But, afterwards, he expressed his view on the implementation of the programme:

The amount of cash given to beneficiaries is just an aid, not social insurance. Who can survive a month with only IQD 30,000 (US$25)? Social insurance is something else. [SPF-C4]

Unsurprisingly, many of the participants were quite negative about the real impact of the programme. Below is a quote from a programme manager in the town of Semel:

Social Protection benefit is merely an aid to cover a very limited need of the poor people. [SPF-B9]
Other research participants also asserted that there is a contradiction in counting the SPF as a social cash transfer. Below is a quote from a senior social worker:

When you look at the eligibility criteria of the SPF, you see that it considers families who are unemployed, and with no income at all. It looks like the government would look for families dying of hunger and then want to make them survive with IQD 30,000 (US$ 25). These are very tough and unreasonable conditions, so why were these eligibility criteria never implemented effectively? [SPF-GE2]

Almost all research participants mentioned that despite the claim that the SPF is a social cash transfer, the reality is different. Cash transfers must reduce the extreme income inequalities, which affect a great number of people in less-developed societies. Hence, social cash transfers need sufficient funds to be run. The extent to which the SPF can become effective depends on whether sufficient budgetary resources are put into this programme or not. However, the whole experience of the SPF proves the opposite. Beneficiaries of SSN need full social security not assistance.

6.2.3. Social and Human Development

The variation in defining the SPF continues to the concept of social awareness for a particular end: social and human development. The idea of social development in the programme is traced back to 2001 when the programme was reactivated and reshaped in the FPF. The former Deputy Minister of Health and Social Affairs, Mr Abdullah Salih (1999-2003), was the first to argue that the programme should extensively include social awareness and this should be implemented with the assistance of social workers. Social awareness in the programme designated the social, health, education and psychological advice to families of SPF claimants. Besides distributing salaries, social workers would also educate the families on social awareness. The central thrust of the plan was that every appointed social
worker/visitor was to be responsible for a number of families and was required to visit them on a monthly basis to check on their well-being.

In the FPF (2001-2009), cash transfer (social assistance) was basically seen as a tool to reach poor families and in the meantime give social, health and psychological advice. The Directorate of Social Protection and Development during the second cabinet of the KRG adopted the idea of empowering poor people using cash transfers. However, overcoming poverty is not just a matter of social security, it is also about promoting social development through raising social awareness.

In this stage of the SPF, cash benefits were therefore combined with social awareness (social, health and psychological advice), and the programme was called the FPF. Besides the change in name, the programme was also functioning differently, as noted by the manager in charge at the time:

In this way social workers/visitors got access to a number of very good cases for them to work on. For instance, there were families who had taken their children out of school for years to help the family earn some money, but they were returned to education through this programme. Even family issues between wife and husband and their misunderstanding have been solved, either through personal mediation or in court processes. [SPF-B1]

The aim behind reactivating the FPF programme in 2001, after been suspended for a decade, was not merely because some people were in desperate need of cash for their livelihood, but the main aim was human development in society. Those people were in need of social awareness and rebuilding their personality rather than only financial needs. Putting the idea of social-human development into the political agenda of the KRG in the post-war Kurdistan Region was just an appropriate scheme at the right time. Priority should have been given to poor families, as they were more likely to be vulnerable to adverse health, educational, psychological and other adverse consequences from the wars and other social upheaval.
Within this context, we can understand how senior officers of the FPF have thought of employing such a programme for social modernisation:

*Most people, for instance, bring about a religious justification so as to not practise birth control. Step by step through our programme (cash besides awareness) these understandings were changed. We saw plenty of examples, which show that this has resulted in reality. We could convince some of our family clients to practise birth control. Our aim was twofold. In addition to health reasons for the woman, this birth control was affecting their financial situation as well.* [SPF-B10]

All research participants were satisfied with the process and outcome of the social awareness scheme in the programme. According to the plan, social workers/visitors had to make regular visits to beneficiaries. No data could be found, but cases were referred to by research participants which indicate what the raising social awareness achieved with regard to returning poor families’ children to school, fertility and family problems. Despite the declared aims, the SPF was rather being used to pursue another target: raising public awareness as a part of social modernisation and development.

### 6.3. Inequality in Distribution: Political and Social Clients

During the field visit to the Directorate General of Social Protection and Development in Sulaimaniya I found that a large number of beneficiaries under the name of Special Salary had been attached to the SPF programme. Although they get paid within the same programme, the benefit rate of Special Salary is in no way comparable with that of regular SPF claimants.
6.3.1. Ignored Programme for Neglected Beneficiaries

One of my interview questions was the extent to which the SPF is seen as an important social security programme by high officials in government. The answers I got during interviews, especially with middle and lower rank employees, imply that the programme has been largely neglected by the KRG.

A senior social worker in the SPF – Erbil expressed the view that the government does not show any interest in implementing the programme:

> Despite changing in socio-economic life, the number of recipients remained the same. This indicates that the government has no plan for enhancing the SPF. I can confirm that the government (and the minister) have ignored it. [SPF-A5]

Dler A Nuradden, a former senior employee of the SPF and currently Director of the Research Division in MoLSA, pointed to a reason why the government does not give enough attention to the programme:

> I see that the government looks at the importance of services in a sequential manner. The issue of education, health, electricity, roads, these are priorities everywhere. These are services for all, not for a particular group. [SPF-B3]

This neglect is also linked to the situation and status of a service user: the recipient. In the case of the SPF or SSN I prefer to use the term ‘recipient’ instead of ‘beneficiary’, because taking the cash received by the eligible every month, and the outcome of this cash transfer cannot be seen as benefit. Almost all research participants agreed that, since a fixed monthly allowance (IQD 30,000) has been assigned to recipients, without any consideration of family situation or how many dependent children they have got, the programme has not played its financial role. With the benefit rate of IQD 30,000, the monthly payment covered only 10 per cent of monthly needs of a family of two people. Under the SSN this amount was increased to IQD 150,000 but still is less than what an unskilled worker can get for ten days' work. Interestingly,
during the early period of the FPF (2001-2003) the amount was relatively higher. A senior employee of the SPF with nine years’ experience compared the amount that was paid under the FPF in 2001 with current cash payments in the SPF, as follows:

In 2001, when I had four years’ working experience in this ministry, I was getting a bit more than what was being paid to beneficiaries of this programme. But now the lowest salary of an unskilled employee is more than what beneficiaries of SPF (not during SSN) receive every month by 15 times. [SPF-A5]

Another senior member of staff of the SPF expressed his view on why the beneficiaries of the SPF are not being taken seriously into account:

The people who get these benefits are poor, so why are they useless and lack any value in the view of high officials? The government does not care about them. If they had any interest in them, they should have taken them seriously and provided a good service to them. [SPF-B4]

Here I can highlight one of the research arguments: the view that the government ignores the programme because it sees no political value in the beneficiaries, the programme and its implementation. A civil servant in the Directorate of Social Protection and Development – Sulaymaniyyah made an interesting point in relation to this:

Unlike other groups, beneficiaries of the SPF haven’t got an advocate. Others have got their organisations and societies to protect their rights, but who will fight for an old lady? [SPF-GS4]

Although the programme covers a total of 39,363 families in the region [excluding another 23,000 recipients of Special Salary attached to the SPF in Sulaymaniyyah province] it has no significant place in government policy. In the absence of an effective social security programme, SPF recipients are not viewed with genuine concern by the government. Contrarily, as will be discussed in Chapter 7, beneficiaries of RPFMGS are treated much better, and a high level of importance is
attached to that programme. Recipients of other programmes have been able to fight for an increment in their benefits through organisations and societies to which they are affiliated. Their voices have always been heard and have forced the government to respond. For instance, recipients of other benefits, such as disabled people, blind and deaf people, political prisoners and people with Thalassemia, forced the government to issue new regulations and revise their monthly benefits through demonstrations and street protests. The benefit rates of these groups of claimants were increased earlier, in addition to other benefits they receive, such as housing units.

There have been some improvements to the SPF since the fieldwork was conducted. Beneficiaries embarked on demonstrations and protests in February 2011, which have compelled the government to increase payments. With the implementation of the new SSN programme, the aftermath of demonstrations of February 2011, the benefit was gradually increased up to five times (from IQD 30,000 to IQD 150,000). The modalities of the SSN are being worked out; its regulations and eligibility criteria and guidance are yet to be determined.

6.3.2. Special Benefit Just For Special People

In 2005, the PUK and KDP formed the unified cabinet in 2005 and they attempted to integrate many of their own party institutions into government. The reason was to reduce the financial load on the party, placing these burdens on the government. The Secretarial Office of Jalal Talabani, Secretary General of PUK and current President of Iraq, was one of the party arms which benefitted from and was involved in this integration. In its first step, the Secretarial Office of Jalal Talabani attached a department called Special Salary from its office to the Directorate of Social Protection and Development in Sulaymaniya province. The Special Salary department mostly covered influential persons and tribe leaders and special party followers. This scheme
was used to keep the loyalty of recipients for the PUK. The eligibility criteria of the SPF have never been applied to beneficiaries of Special Salary, yet it is implemented as part of the SPF. Around 32,000 claimants are getting benefit from the SPF under the name of Special Salary, while they are not eligible to any kind of social security benefits. They are not in need of any financial or income help. They all have other sources of income, and some are in a very high financial position. Most of the beneficiaries of the Special Salary do not visit the Directorate of Social Protection and Development – Sulaymaniyah personally to receive the benefit. Instead they send a person or representative to collect the payment.

We can argue that abandoning SSN from 2005 to 2011 was related to politics more than fund, an excuse which was made by the KRG that due to lack of sufficient funds the government could not afford it. However, the PUK was mostly against the implementation of SSN.

In a focus group carried out with employees of the SPF in Sulaymaniyah, four people asserted that in Special Payment, even the staff get twice as much as any other employees of the SPF get in the same position. [SPF-GS4], [SPF-GS3], [SPF-GS1], [SPF-GS2]

This process of integrating party organisations into government can in no way be confused with the notion of transparency in the party institutions. The Special Salary has always been hidden from public eyes, especially journalists. The only reason behind the integration was to put financial burden of the party on the government.

This may explain the reason why the KRG, which has in the last two decades been controlled by the two political parties, KDP and PUK, has not made any attempts to operate the SSN. In the process, the names of recipients of Special Salary (nearly 32,000 recipients) would have been exposed; the fact that they avoid it is because most of them are high profile people.
6.4. The Presence and Role of Implementers

The FPF was always approved by lower and middle ranked employees of the programme. The involvement of social workers/visitors in the implementation of that programme, in both cash transfer and other social services, has always been respected. A social worker in the Directorate of Social Protection and Development – Erbil made this submission:

*Within this cash transfer a social sphere had been created. It was like a network, whereby the social workers/visitors were in a constant relationship with the recipients for both cash transfer and social awareness provision. This relation had even exceeded the work relation. It involves sharing personal matters with the social worker/visitor, consultation in personal or family issues, and even occasional telephone calls and greetings.* [SPF-A5]

All research participants of MoLSA and the SPF regretted the dismissal of social workers/visitors in the process of implementing the programme, except Phicri Khoshnaw, who had worked as a coordinator in the social programmes with coalition forces in Iraq after 2003. He criticised the massive presence of social workers in MoLSA’s programmes as follows:

*MoLSA is full of social workers, while this programme does not need just them. There is a lack of competent administrative staff and IT officers, for which the programme needs their work.* [SPF-C2]

Social workers are considered key staff in the assessment procedures and delivery of social security benefits. However, they are not the only people that the programme can depend on to run it. People with other specialities, such as accountants, IT specialists and administrators, are also key people in order for the programme to be operated.
6.4.1. Service Providers Welcomed into Households Only When the Cash is in Their Hands

Social workers of FPF were very welcomed by claimants to visit their house in order to conduct regular assessments, provide social advice and deliver the payment. In the case of having problems, families of claimants would be more inclined to share their problems with the social worker, if they found they were in a position to assist. The cash payments were therefore meant to smooth the process of intervening in claimants' families.

The reason behind choosing this method for 'visit and pay cash in hand' was to enable the social workers/visitors to work with the families easier. If a family had a problem, they would be more inclined to share it with the social worker. Ordinarily, most people will not put their private issues or problems before others if they do not feel that they are in a position to assist or that they have no interest in the matter. The amounts paid to beneficiaries were therefore meant to smooth the process of intervening in their families.

A senior member of staff of the SPF, who had supervised one of the six areas of Erbil, mentioned the role of social workers in the SPF:

*This programme was getting implemented through social workers without having a specific place or office in order for the social worker/visitors and the people to meet outside the home, especially when there was a problem. Everything was reliant on the social worker’s capability; he would provide social (non-financial such as health, social and psychological) services to the family inside their home according to his own knowledge and experience.* [SPF-B3]

A senior officer who worked as a social worker during the SPF period, made her comments on the job she did with families of recipients through visits:

*Even we, as social workers/visitors, were intervening in cases of misunderstanding between wives and husbands. Most of the time, we were following family issues in a financial situation. Our role was to help*
them to not make prompt decisions about their family relations or to think of separation. [SPF-B10]

Recruiting social workers/visitors cost a monthly allowance of IQD 90,000 for each member of staff, on top of their salary. This money was provided by the UNICEF in collaboration with MoLSA. Although the amount paid to them was very small, the staff were highly motivated to the work and enjoyed the experience. A social worker in MoLSA-Erbil also expressed how much humanitarian motivation was involved in this programme:

*The amount that we were getting for doing this job [visiting households] was very small [IQD 50,000 per month plus 40,000 for transportation]. However the humanitarian motivation was very powerful to keep doing so.* [SPF-A5]

6.4.2. Dismissing Social Workers/Visitors from the Programme

The FPF had assigned a great role for social workers/visitors in its implementation. Many achievements have been pointed out with regard to their role. Yet, after dismissing them, nothing was done by the government to enhance and develop the programme. The measure can therefore be seen as a step backwards from a relatively satisfied period of the SPF programme.

When social workers/visitors were in the FPF programme, they had the discretion and power of decision in cases. However, these powers were taken away under the SPF. Even the General Director of Duhok province faulted the social security system of the Kurdistan Region for not giving people in his position the authority to add or take off a single beneficiary:

*We have no authority to add one single eligible person to the list of recipients.* [SPF-C1]
The government until then had no shortage in their budget, and no cut in public expenditure had been announced to explain the government's action towards dismissing social workers from the programme. Social workers' salaries did not need a huge budget to make it unaffordable for the government. Indeed, most of the social workers/visitors got their jobs and salaries from the MoLSA or the Ministry of Education. The only logical explanation for their dismissal was that the government did not see the 'social awareness' of the scheme and the role of social workers in the programme as necessary.

The reason why a social worker/visitor was dismissed from the programme, and a step taken backwards in the programme to the theme of providing a small amount of cash to the beneficiaries through banks, was to:

- avoid extra, unnecessary expenditure which was thought not to be part of social security policy;

- avoid any manipulation with beneficiaries’ money by social workers/visitors, which happened in a couple of cases.

The above two points are found as unreasonable justification by almost all middle- and lower-ranked employees in the programme. UNICEF was paying social workers’ and visitors’ salaries. When this was stopped, the government cut and dismissed social workers/visitors from the programme.

6.4.3. Consultation and Decision Making

Most middle- and lower-ranked employees of the programme also complained about the lack of meetings or any kind of relation between top officials and lower-ranked employees. All decisions (including changing the programme, dismissing social workers/visitors, transforming the delivery of benefits by social visitors to a committee
in MoLSA and then banks, and implementation and suspension of SSN) were made at the top without the involvement of social workers, advisors or even directorates of the programme.

The SSN staff members blamed the high officials of MoLSA for not referring to them at all for consultation prior to making any decision. Most of them asserted that they neither had meetings with nor had been visited by senior officials of the MoLSA to discuss their problems or share their experiences.

6.5. Interference in Implementing the Programme

Despite the claim that the programme is ignored, it has not been safe from intervention by high officials and politicians. The intervention has been made to insert ineligible claimants into the programme, mostly by politicians. The Deputy General Director of Social Protection and Development in Duhok acknowledged that she has experienced cases of intervention by top officials:

On occasions an influential public figure in an area demanded that a number of his relatives be included on the beneficiaries list. If we rejected that because they have reached the upper ranks within the party and administrative bodies, he tried to convince us with a number of justifications to dismiss our decision as unjustified and illegal in order to change our decision. [SPF-C5]

Azad Hamad, Deputy Director of the SPF in Erbil mentioned obstacles made by high officials, as follows:

Often you see that there are interventions and they don’t let the programme go its own way. There are officials who have sometimes hampered and intervened in the working of this programme. [SPF-B1]
Political parties make the interference as a practice of nepotism for people to show loyalty to them. The former Director of the SPF in Erbil expressed that:

*It happened in some cases when influential persons have requested to put the name of their relatives and close people into the beneficiaries’ list. If we did not respond to them, they would try to go to politicians and high officials and ask for help. They do not give up until they are ensured that something has been done for them.* [SPF-B1]

As many frontline staff mentioned, SPF services were misused by high officials to gain recipients’ loyalty to a political party. When social workers take money to a family, they are asked to pass the high officials’ message to the family that Nechirvan Barzani, the Prime Minister at that time, was behind this financial aid. This point was reiterated by a social worker, Farhad, as follows:

*We were asking recipients to bear in mind the fact that a political leader was behind the sums,[…], this was very normal.* [SPF-GE3]

Another senior social worker, Ayub A Husein, with six years’ experience in the SPF noted:

*This has always been used as a political advert in favour of the political party in power.* [SPF-GE2]

Even the former programme director of the SPF in Erbil admitted:

*We were always mentioning to beneficiaries that Nechirvan Barzani (PM) has provided this fund.* [SPF-B1].

### 6.6. Implementation Gap: Critical Factors still Missing

To reiterate a central argument of this chapter, it is important to see how much priority is given towards the running of the social programme. As the research has pointed out, the political value of beneficiaries has a significant impact on the importance and
priority attached to the programme by high officials in government. Powerless recipients get less attention and less service than politically powerful recipients. Some critical factors in the implementation of the SPF could be analysed as follows.

6.6.1. A Deadlocked Programme in Changing Socio-Economic Situation

There was not a continuous professional mechanism which was capable of self-innovation suitable to various time periods. Clearly, the mechanism through which the programme was working in 2004 was the same as that of 1998-1999. Yet the economic and social condition of the public had seen substantial changes. The concrete nature of the system on which the programme was working resulted in limiting the output of the implemeneter and led to further shortcomings. Jyan M Taher, Deputy Director General of the SPF in Duhok, describes the inflexibility of the programme:

_We cannot register anybody else. The higher tap is closed. We have to wait for someone to die or become no longer eligible. Then we can replace them with someone else. It cannot be guaranteed that only true beneficiaries will benefit. Within the existing programme, because it is not related to the network that connects all government departments, it is not known who has what. Besides, when someone is on a low income they are not going to be like this forever. [SPF-C5]_

A mechanism of updating claimants’ data should be applied to follow up changes in claimants’ circumstances. When claimants’ situations change, their living gets better and they get a well-paid job, they are not necessarily reporting to relevant people in the programme to cut their benefits. This has very rarely happened in the SPF programme. This programme has to observe and reassess the claimants’ situation regularly in order to avoid fraud.

This mechanism is necessary to purify the beneficiaries’ list. Only in this way could the programme be able to cut the benefit of ineligible claimants and let eligible people
benefit from the programme instead. Because it has not been updated, many beneficiaries are found in the list though they do not fit the eligibility criteria, for instance, those who needed the service at a particular period because they had young children. These children are able to work when they grow older; yet, due to the lack of update, there is no mechanism to take their names off in favour of those who now need the service. Consequently, there are people who are eligible for the programme, but cannot benefit from it; yet, even in these situations, as noted earlier, even the minister is not authorised to take off or add a name.

The Deputy Director General of Social Protection and Development in Duhok, on several occasions, pointed out the immobile state of the programme:

> This programme has not progressed, but it has fallen behind. In the last eight years, apart from some minor cuts and additions, no activities have happened in it. For example, ten years ago the amount of cash which was set up for a beneficiary was more than the salary of an ordinary employee, but today it does not last them for two days. [SPF-C5]

Despite the rapid economic changes in the last decade, the programme has not revised the benefits so as to reflect inflation and the high cost of living. As a senior social worker in Erbil stated, the programme is dead now. Because it has not been updated in parallel with the changes that have occurred:

> It is not able to meet basic demands of the poor. Its existence or non-existence is the same, not at all important, as it has lost its functionality. [SPF-A5]

No one has been registered in Erbil and Duhok provinces since the higher tap was closed. Sulaymaniyah has had a different case, which will be discussed later. New eligible persons have to wait for someone to die or become ineligible, before they can go on the list. Unless SSN is implemented it cannot be guaranteed that only true beneficiaries will benefit. Only SSN can control eligibility criteria.
Jiyan T Taha, Deputy General Director of the programme in Duhok mentioned problems relating to the lack of organisational network between KRG’s ministries and how this has affected the implementation of the programme:

*Besides, when one is on a low income they are not going to be like this forever. A mechanism should be implemented to follow up changes in claimants’ circumstances. When a claimant’s situation changes, their living gets better and they get a well-paid job; they are not necessarily coming to us to stop their payment. This has happened, but very rarely. This programme has to control these things by itself. The SSN would control this to a great extent. [SPF-C5]*

Despite the changes occurring in the name of the programme in the last decade, and maximising the number of beneficiaries in each stage of the programme, the static condition of the programme has negatively affected the process of filtering the claimants.

A question could be raised about why did the KRG carry on implementing a deadlock programme rather than implementing the newly-designed SSN? It has been declared by the KRG that the reason is the budget shortage. In a question to the Minister of Labour and Social Affairs, “After your evaluations and reviews, will you expect the KRG to give enough financial and spiritual support to develop the SPF or to implement the SSN programme?”, she answered as follows:

*I will spend all my efforts for that to be implemented. Obviously there is an issue on the financial side of it. Our budget in the Kurdistan Region depends on Baghdad; the fund which central government allocated for us from Iraqi oil revenues. But I believe this time we can operate the programme. Last month I obtained the Council of Ministries’ agreement to recruit (32) IT officers to help us in operating the SSN programme. Firstly, the technical site of SSN should be reorganised. Then for its implementation, which needs a big amount of a fund, we might be able to implement it. [SPF-D1]*
The Minister of MoLSA gave some details about KRG’s attempt to implement SSN:

_A month after I took the ministry office I asked the Council of Ministries to operate the Social Safety Net (SSN) programme [exactly on 15 December 2009]. Just recently, a high committee (The Salary and Benefits Review Committee-MoLSA) has been founded for that which includes members from three ministries: Labour and Social Affairs, Planning, and Economy and Finance. We have to come to a decision on SSN by May 2010. [SPF-D1]_

However, this did not happen in the time stated. Going back to the time of implementing SSN (March 2011), we can argue that what pushed the government to activate SSN was demonstrations. Research participants also stated that:

_What is now there in the process I don’t know; what justification does the government have for it? Is it budget shortage or other things? [SPF-C6]_

A senior advisor in MoLSA highlighted some obstacles in the way of implementing the programme which delayed the implementation of SSN, as follows:

_I think it there is technical, economic (finance) and political obstacles. All relevant officials say we are trying to operate it, but it’s not easy to find the main switch to turn it ON. [SPF-C2]_

_The Minister of Labour and Social Affairs with all her power tries to operate it, but constraints will start to appear when the official papers get to the Ministry of Finance. Even the Prime Minister is interested in the programme to be operated. The issue is the Ministry of Finance does accept orders from the President of Kurdistan Region but not from the Prime Minister! [SPF-C2]_

Most research participants are not convinced about MoLSA’s excuse for not implementing SSN. A Senior Advisor in MoLSA, Phicri Khoshnaw, also asserted that:

_I do not believe that the problem is finance (lack of funds). I have very accurate statistics about the money that MoLSA is spending on the five programmes [Disability Protection Allowance, Income Generation Fund, Social Protection Fund, others not found in the MoLSA programme; he might have meant to name all three types of disabled ‘blind, mental disorder and disabled people’ as separate programmes] is more than the fund required to operate SSN even after combining all previous
programmes as intended together within the SSN. Especially the administrative expenditure will be decreased dramatically, as you no longer need five general directors as it will be decreased to one, and no longer need five managers of finance and so on. [SPF-C2]

As the above quote indicates, integrating all social security programmes of the MoLSA in SSN decreases the administrative expenses.

Another defect I found was that there are still two KRG administrations. I noticed that almost all MoLSA’s benefits were being distributed differently. They are being implemented in Sulaymaniya in one way and in Erbil and Dahok in another way:

What politics has done to this should have been stopped after the budget bill was approved. All three provinces of the Kurdistan Region should implement social programmes similarly. One of my duties in these four years of the sixth cabinet is to unify benefits at regional level. [SPF-D1]

6.6.2. Adequacy of the SSN Benefit

The way SSN benefit has been designed and implemented does not seem to achieve equality and does not serve the notion of social security for all needy people in the Kurdistan Region. If there is any point to be pursued in the programme it is the extent to which it responds to minimum standards of the livelihood of poor, not merely as small amounts of cash specified to be delivered to people entitled to the SPF. Contrary to the claim that it is recipients’ rights to be covered by the government, it was also evident from some responses that the programme’s implementation was characterised by sympathy as opposed to rights. None of the research participants asserted that the programme meets beneficiaries’ rights. Their rights would not be met by just respecting them as human beings but by considering their circumstances temporarily or permanently as poor. In accordance with SPF instructions, eligible families or individuals were provided with benefits amounting to IQD 30,000 (approximately US$25) per month, which did not cover the life of an individual for
more than 4-5 days. This amount is less than 10 per cent of the monthly salary of an unskilled worker. During the SSN period, the amount increased to IQD 150,000 (US$125). Having considered the recent rise in the cost of living and the increase in the salaries of government employees, the SSN benefit is less than one-third of the minimum wage of an unskilled worker.

Some research participants consider the SSN system as a cash transfer policy in name, but something else in practice. The Director of Research Division in MoLSA with eight years’ work experience in SSN described this ambiguity:

_It is something in the system while something else is seen practically. [SPF-B3]_

The eligibility criteria set for the SPF indicates that proper cash transfers are being made. For instance, SPF recipients should not have received any sources of income or property. However, as noted earlier, it is hard to consider payments under the SPF as a viable source of income or even as an alternative for the household. The poverty line has been defined as the eligibility criterion for a person to be entitled to social cash transfer. This is set at an income of less than US$30.00 per month. Yet even in very low-income countries this quantitative criterion is problematic. It is therefore no surprise that in a middle-income region like Iraqi Kurdistan, US$30.00 does not cover a single person’s needs for even a week. As stated earlier, recipients of SPF payments are mostly families between two and eight persons, and yet they all receive only IQD 30,000 (US$25) per month between them. In essence, the amounts paid under the SPF are actually less than the target which marks absolute poverty in the region (US$30). Thus, the SPF cannot be seen as an alternative income source for poor people.
The following quote from a member of staff of the SPF in Erbil Directorate explains what implementers expect the programme to be and what it represents:

*I can mention that the aim of this programme is social economy. This is the main objective of the SPF programme … This programme aims to relieve the financial situation of low-income families. But if we ask to what extent this aim has been met or even an attempt has been made to accomplish it, I can tell another story.* [SPF-A4]

A question raised here is how a social protection system could become an instrument for social awareness dissemination, and how social awareness dissemination would become a tool for the implementation of a social security programme. In reality the decision to transform the programme into the FPF in 2001 has actually not been officially completed. There are no official documents to prove that the programme has been changed. Rather, this change in direction has been engineered by the MoLSA, with no written agenda.

With the change in direction of the programme, an emphasis was placed on raising a social awareness scheme for beneficiaries. The ‘social awareness’ element was to support people with their lifestyle (health, i.e. birth control) and everyday life problems due to their financial situation. However, as noted in the previous section of this chapter, there were actually no procedures laid down or guidelines on how this was meant to be done.

6.6.3. Overloading Social Awareness to the Social Security Programme

The period during which social cash transfers were combined with social awareness was found by implementers of the programme to be the most effective in terms of self-satisfaction. Middle- and lower-ranked employees in particular found themselves capable of making effective inputs into the programme. A senior officer who had
worked for the FPF/SPF for eight years, explains his achievements as social adviser in the programme:

Despite encouraging boys to leave work and attend school, we contributed to making a change in the dominant stand towards girls to go to school – as implied in the statement “girls do not need to go to school”, especially in peripheral neighbourhoods of cities and remote villages. People in those districts were giving more priority to boys, while due to cultural reason girls were discouraged to pursue their study. But we did change their views towards gender-based discouragement of children attending school. [SPF-B10]

A senior social worker in Duhok, Salah Usef, also pointed out that social workers/visitors in the period of FPF played crucial roles:

For me the theme of social awareness was the best and unique point in the FPF programme. Even advice was given to parents by social workers/visitors appointed particularly for them on how to bring up their children, what are the problems in bringing up their children, and finally what are the right ways of doing so. [SPF-B10]

It can be argued that integrating a social awareness scheme into a cash transfer programme has the potential to overload the main contents of the programme. Yet, as many participants intimated, the public awareness aspect has been much more effective than the social cash transfer side of the programme.

What has been discussed in this section implies that a deviation has occurred in the programme. Rather than focusing on the key objective, it was in a certain sense put aside or minimised in favour of the social awareness scheme. This was not necessarily out of the ordinary for certain reasons, as subordinate functions have always been inserted into the programme:

Some cases to which we drew the attention of the government, like providing housing units, have been done by the mayor, and it was beyond the capacity of this programme to provide this service by itself. [SPF-B1] (Former Director of FPF in Erbil)
6.6.4. Policy Deviation as Uncertainty

The lack of clarity and identity of the social security scheme of the KRG could be traced to persistent changes and deviations to the programme from the top.

Payments were not made on a regular monthly basis as proposed. This made recipients’ lives uncertain and unstable:

*I don’t consider myself guilty of anything as I don’t have a smallest decision in my hand in this directorate, even in my job. If things are not running in a good manner, if the clients have complaints, it is not me who is guilty.* [SPF-A3]

6.4.5. Contradictions

Some participants, while working in different sites of the programme, found no point in the implementation of the SPF. Social cash transfer is expected to meet minimum standards of living in the region; although, on paper, the eligibility criteria for the programme are quite stringent and the programme’s implementation was without any meaningful ambition of improving or changing recipients’ livelihoods. This was evident in the account of the programme’s deputy director general in Duhok:

*Someone would be eligible for this programme who in most cases had no other income from the government. But in turn the government [the programme] does not think about their needs, even if the cash being given is much too small to provide a minimum level of livelihood.* [SPF-C5]

The only aspect of the programme of which the majority of participants were proud was social awareness. This is understandable when the outcome of the programme is considered. The SPF has not played a proper role in social cash transfer due to not contributing in household incomes in any way. In contrast, many examples were mentioned by implementers in all different ranks that illustrate the positivity of the social awareness scheme of the FPF.
Conclusion

The household was the focal point of this social security programme. The idea behind upgrading the FPF was to meet public awareness and social modernisation. This seems far away from being considered as a mere security programme.

SPF guidelines and eligibility criteria have changed many times during the last decade, but this has not resulted in improvements to the programme. This will only happen by providing a reasonable financial capacity to operate the SSN. The KRG has not dedicated adequate resources (financial and human: funding and recruiting sufficient numbers of staff) for the programme.

The aim of social security is to assure a minimum well-being for needy people in society. It seems that the SSN programme is implemented as a bureaucratic procedure without paying much attention to the objectives that any social security programme is designed for. The concept of human rights was not taken into account in the drafting of the SPF or in its implementation officially. Indeed, there is no clear social security policy by the KRG on which a social security programme can be based. Without a solid social security objective, people's right to an adequate livelihood cannot be guaranteed. What is noticed in the case of the SPF is that it is not being implemented as a public right to social security. Rather, it is mostly provided as charity by the authorities. Besides this, the programme has experienced an inconsistency between policy and practice. Despite the rapid economic changes in the last decade, the programme has not revised the benefits so as to reflect the inflation and high cost of living.

It has been discussed that the real problem is not necessarily due to lack of funds, rather it is the programme's lack of importance to high officials.
The SPF has experienced a total ignorance by government, until the demonstrations that occurred in the Kurdistan Region on 17 February 2011. This suggests that the KRG does not attach any importance to social protection programmes unless there is political value placed on beneficiaries. A high proportion of people were entitled to the SPF, but this fact has not attached any salience to the programme and has not been prioritised in the social security system of the KRG.
CHAPTER SEVEN: POLITICS AND POLICY CLIENTS

IN THE IMPLEMENTATION OF

SOCIAL SECURITY PROGRAMMES – KRG

Introduction

Having presented the research findings in the last two chapters, some of the issues that are relevant to this thesis can now be discussed. This chapter aims to compare and contrast two social security programmes in terms of their implementation problems, and to examine the plausibility of two sets of theories: implementation theory and clientelist politics.

Beginning with a comparison between the two social security programmes of the KRG, the SPF/SSN and the RPFMGS, the discussion firstly focuses on some of the critical questions surrounding the implementation of social security programmes in the KRG. Three issues in particular have been highlighted: political factors, the status of social security beneficiaries, and the lack of social welfare vision in the KRG. The second section of the chapter is about the ambiguity and contradiction present in the formulation and implementation of the KRG’s social security programmes. A section is also devoted to the issue of intervention in the implementation of these social security programmes from high government officials and party leaders, interference as support from the top for successful implementation and interference as policy deviation from
those seeking to turn the programme from the agreed objectives. In this context the issue of corruption and non-transparency in the implementation of social security programmes will be discussed.

In view of the two different profiles of beneficiaries and interference that have been identified, I have introduced and will substantiate in this chapter an implementation model: a preference model of implementation. This model will be examined based on the degree of salience the government attaches to beneficiaries of social cash transfers. Having distinguished two types of claimants, high-value and low-value, a contradiction in perception and implementation of social security programmes in the KRG has been highlighted. Bringing evidence from my research findings, two types of treatment by the KRG towards implementation of social security programmes have been compared. The first one is characterised as political/nationalistic and thus important, versus the second as public and consequently neglected. All these discussions have been justified through understanding the degree of importance attached to both RPFMGS and SPF programmes. From this point, a clientelistic benefit from these social cash transfers will be explored. Finally the research findings need to be examined in light of the policy implementation theories.

7.1. Comparison Between the SPF/SNN and RPFMGS Programmes: Contradictions and Ambiguity

Throughout the last two chapters of research finding analysis, Chapters 5 and 6, it has been shown that the two researched programmes, RPFMGS and SPF, could not be considered purely as social security schemes. Not only in terms of their functionality, but also the declared regulations (especially in the case of RPFMGS) articulate an ambiguity. In addition to the social assistance-based duty of both
programmes, they have both been, in all or some stages of their development, loaded with a wide range of services such as health cost assistance, social housing, studentship support, and social and psychological counselling.

The programme objectives of SSN are not consistent. Policy changes do not always entail improvement. In the case of the RPFMGS, changes are directed in favour of the programme beneficiaries, while in the case of the SSN, changes are much more in the way of considering the beneficiaries or something to more effectively implement the programme.

We can argue that the RPFMGS programme has been effectively implemented, while the SPF/SSN has failed to be so. SPF/SSN and RPFMGS are both the broadest social cash transfer programmes of the KRG. The first is run by the MoLSA, while the second comprises a big part of the MoMA services. The sources of funds of both programmes are non-contributory and fully funded by the government. The SPF/SSN covers people on low incomes, disabled people, widows, orphans and married students with very low incomes, while RPFMGS targets families of martyrs, genocide survivors, chemical attack victims and prisoners detained by the former Iraqi Ba’athist regime. We can describe beneficiaries of SPF/SSN as people with particular socio-economic situations. As for the RPGFMS, the beneficiaries are victims of wars (including intra-Kurdish civil wars) and their families that are characterised as political figures by the government.

The funds and services that the KRG make available for the SPF/SSN are very limited. In some cases, especially until 2011, the fund was provided seasonally every three months. However, the government generously treats the RPFMGS programme with sufficient funds. For example, the government paid monthly only IQD 30,000 to claimants of the SPF which increased to IQD 150,000 in the SSN period after 2011. While beneficiaries of the RPFMGS get much more based on their categories (see
Table 4). The minimum payment provided within the RPFMGS programme starts from IQD 180,000 for civil martyrs, to IQD 600,000 for genocide survivor families, and up to IQD 1,186,800 for high-ranked martyrs. That is in addition to the housing units and scholarships in private universities, and limited tax exemption (see Table 5).

Table 5 Comparison Between the Social SPF (and SSN) and RPFMGS Programmes

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Comparison</th>
<th>SPF/SSN</th>
<th>RPFMGS</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Conditions and criteria of eligibility</td>
<td>No income or very low income, disabled people</td>
<td>Victims of war and genocide operation, former veterans</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Target groups</td>
<td>People on a very low income or no income; Disabled people; Widows; Orphans; Married students on very low-income</td>
<td>Martyrs' family members; Genocide survivors and their family members; Political prisoners attained by previous regime; Chemical attack victims</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Resources</td>
<td>Non-contributory; regional budget</td>
<td>Non-contributory, regional budget</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Services</td>
<td>Limited monthly cash</td>
<td>Decent monthly cash; Help with health costs; Exemption from tax; Housing unit; University fees support for their children</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Types of benefit</td>
<td>Means-tested benefit</td>
<td>Non-means-tested benefit</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Level of benefit</td>
<td>Income support</td>
<td>Additional salary</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Coverage</td>
<td>Limited: fixed number of beneficiaries, if maximum number is reached</td>
<td>Open-ended; accept new clients</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Feature</td>
<td>Public; Neglected</td>
<td>Nationalistic; Preferred</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Administration</td>
<td>MoLSA</td>
<td>MoMA</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Models of Implementation</td>
<td>Top-Down</td>
<td>Bottom-Up</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Achievement</td>
<td>Failed</td>
<td>Effective; Successful</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: adopted from research findings of the two social security programmes.

7.1.1. Social Security as Compensation

The idea of devoting a special government body to serve inheritors of martyrs, genocide and chemical gas-attacked families is traced back to several non-governmental foundations belonging to political parties. The KRG adopted the idea
since the sixth cabinet of the KRG in 2006 after combining several government and non-government organisations and merging them in a ministerial body; the MoMA.

The RPFMGS, implemented by MoMA, gives cash (plus service) benefits for war victim families and genocide survivors of the Kurdistan Region. The programme provides regular monthly cash transfers plus other services to the eligible population. Perhaps what appeared to be ambiguous is that the programme regulation (RPFMGS Regulation no.9, 2007) is translated to a total compensation for the life-loss that occurred. The social security documents indicate that the compensation is a financial reparation, not a social benefit. Consequently it cannot be categorised under social security programmes.

As research findings revealed, the RPFMGS programme is not implemented merely as a needs-based programme. The monthly salary is not specified based on the financial situation of the needy but rather implemented based on the status the victims and their families have had in the wars, national liberation movement, and Kurdish political parties. For instance, if the beneficiaries of the RPFMGS are categorised as ‘war martyrs’, ‘civil martyrs’, and ‘genocide victims’, then we are faced with implementing a programme which functions to reward the families of victims.

7.1.2. Social Safety Net for Non-income Poor

The SPF has been subjected to many alterations since its reactivation in 2001. During this period it has experienced several expansions. Despite being implemented mainly as a cash transfer scheme, in some phases of the development of SPF/SSN it has also been added with social awareness to the families. When it comes to the SSN’s function, a contradiction could be realised in the implementation of the programme.

The SPF/SSN is potentially defined as a social assistance programme which aims to secure an adequate standard of living for all people in the region. The type of benefit
in the SPF/SSN programme is means-tested and is considered as income support (see Table 4), while in the case of the RPFMGS programme the entitlement to benefit is not means-tested and considered as additional salary to beneficiaries’ privilege.

Taking into account the amount paid monthly to recipients, I have come to the conclusion that the implementation of SPF does not make any change in the life of its recipients. This programme covers those who are low-earners or have no source of income and are not recipients of any government benefits. Here an ambiguity appeared in implementing the eligibility criteria. A low-incomer is someone who has a job or a source of income, but cannot afford his/her life expenses without getting help from another source. However, the amount being paid monthly in no way covers even the very basic needs of a person.

Within the framework of SPF/SSN, Special Salary is delivered to certain individuals selected as party patrons directly by party offices and mostly by the PUK General Secretarial Office. None of the SPF eligibility criteria could be applied to them, yet the amount of the cash paid is more by many times those of SPF’s ordinary beneficiaries.

7.1.3. Social Policy Provision: National versus Public

These research findings have revealed that the KRG is dealing with social security programmes discriminately. As argued, the discrimination has resulted from the differentiation that the government puts between social security beneficiaries. The duality of the KRG’s interest in social programmes is evident in this differentiation between the clients, based on their socio-political status. As has been repeatedly emphasised, the national character (as was conceptualised in Chapter 2) of beneficiaries of RPFMGS has resulted in a great interest to ruling party leaders and government. When it is compared with the SPF beneficiaries, we realise that they are
lacking any political privilege. We can use these two statuses and interests in the
dichotomy of national versus public.

In the dichotomy of national versus public, the implementation of social security
programmes in the KRG has always been off balance. The research results
presented earlier show the extent to which the social security policy implemented in
the KRG is far from serving the public, and to what extent the concept of public policy
has occupied a central place in the KRG’s agenda. As the research findings
explained, social security programmes have been used as a tool in the hands of party
leaders to expand the patronage system in the region.

7.1.4. Policy Designer, Policy Maker and Policy Implementers

One of the points that notably deserves to be highlighted here is the revisiting on
concepts of policy designer, policy maker and policy implementer. As the research
findings show, the actual designers of both programmes are middle- and lower-ranked
officials. However, the designed programme does not bring full power over the
programme implementation. Policy designers come from selected middle-ranked
implementers, but they are free from possessing any power of decision making behind
the top officials. They are aware of the programme and its legal and service provision
framework more than top officials and ruling party leaders. Middle- and lower-ranked
officials prepare everything about the programme. They are the ones who come with
initiations. Designing policy is always done between middle-ranked implementers and the
government.

But for a programme to be implemented, it has first to be approved by the government
and parliament. During the process of approval and authorisation, the Council of
Ministries can verify, ask for revisions or refuse the policy draft before passing it to the
parliament. It should finally be met with the government’s approval. The Council of
Ministries’ duty is to give a prior approval on the draft before sending it to parliament, and endorsing and authorising to implementers afterwards. Thus, the role of the parliament comes peripheral to the government.

After the programme regulation is approved and redirected to the relevant institutions, it is not the competency and discretion of implementers that guarantees the programme to be implemented successfully. The constant support and financial resources allocated by government are critical. More importantly, the high salience attached to the political implication of the programme is crucial too. Therefore, the policy-designing and decision-making processes should be separated. As the research found, the potential policy designers are mid-lower ranked officials. However, after the programme has been approved by parliament, they are not able to implement the programme accordingly. The top officials control the implementation process. They drive the programme in their preferred direction. The whole administration procedures should run according to ruling party leaders’ and top officials’ preference.

The suggestions proposed to revise and renew a programme are usually made by middle- and low-ranked officials. The way a policy is structured is different from how a programme is designed. The structuration of policy is more complicated than the explicit process of designing and making policy. The structure of social policy, despite including the regulation which clearly defines target groups, objectives and procedures to implement the programme, involves power and interests. The programmes of social security should obtain top officials’ and politicians’ acceptance and support for implementers to be able to conduct satisfactory performance in light of programme objectives. As for the case of RPFMGS, implementers could not have achieved any relevant results from the RPFMGS programme if they had not already been victims, or had special support from ruling party leaders. They are representative guarantors of RPFMGS target groups.
Having looked at the position of implementers and policy makers as beneficiaries, the RPFMGS follows a bottom-up style in its implementation process. The case of the SPF/SSN programme indicates that all decisions are made from the top. The role of implementers in SPF/SSN has been neglected, and implementers have left with little discretion.

### 7.2. Critical Factors in Social Security Implementation

As in the early stage of the study, I started examining critical factors that influence the implementation process of the government social security system in the Kurdistan Region. This has been a central topic throughout the research journey. In a post-conflict developing region like Iraqi Kurdistan, social policy takes a particular form which is different from those of developed and even stable developing countries. In developing countries, arguably social policy suffers mostly from insufficient financial resources and lack of the government’s capability (Lane, 1999; Karshenas & Moghadam, 2006). However, in addition to this common factor, in the case of the KRG, three other critical ones have been identified. These are first, political consideration, second the role of beneficiaries of the social security programme, and the third is the poor social welfare system in the KRG.

#### 7.2.1. Political Consideration

In order to understand how politics influence and direct the implementation of social cash transfers, it is necessary to consider the political and administrative conditions and social politics of the Kurdistan Region. Following the civil war and two economic blockades during the 1990s and early 2000s, the Kurdistan Region has not managed to establish a stable social welfare system. Current research findings in the case of the Kurdistan Region, like most “case studies in the Middle East and South Africa
show that social policies are shaped by political objectives” (Karshenas & Moghadam, 2006: 20). Hanekom and Sharkansky (1999) confirm the relationship between political uncertainty and policy implementation. They chose South Africa and Israel as case studies in their research and, by referring to past events, they emphasised that political uncertainty has a close linkage with characters of politics, policy making and policy implementation in the two countries. The political uncertainty of the Kurdistan Region is that, firstly, it faced constant threats from the Iraqi regime until 2003; secondly, it lacks formal recognition by the international community; and thirdly, it has also experienced a civil war. All of these factors diminished and maintained the Kurdistan Region as a weak and vulnerable political and administrative entity (see Figure 6)

**Figure 6 The Determinant Political and Administrative Factors in Implementation of the Social Security Programmes in KRG**

![Diagram showing the determinant factors of political and administrative conditions in the Kurdistan Region.](image)

*Source: adopted for analysis of research findings.*
The findings of current research presented in the last two chapters indicate that party politics determines the performance of social policy. Taking into account the historical background of the Kurdistan Region, a socio-political circumstance has been created by the former Iraqi regime, which has influenced the social life and party politics in Iraq in general, and the Kurdistan Region in particular. The Kurdistan Region inherited depressed social and economic conditions caused by the intentional ignorance of socio-economic life and programmed repression of the Kurdish population by the Ba’athist regime in Iraq. Furthermore, as elaborated in the second chapter, the Kurdish civil war during the mid-1990s doubled the burden of Kurdish society and government. It seemed that the claim for social service provision in general, and social security in particular, during the intra-Kurdish war was entirely useless. Despite the limited financial sources of the KRG, the budget of the government was controlled almost entirely by the two warring factions, the KDP and the PUK.

The civil war also weakened government institutions in favour of party institutions. Party leaders had ultimate control over resources generated from border imports and exports and limited tax revenues. These finances were spent without any accountability. Often, public administration and expenditure were the last to be catered for; party affiliation was also the basis on which social cash transfers were made, and even ordinary war victims who did not belong to either of the warring factions were excluded. In other words, the region’s income was owned and controlled by the ruling and, later, fighting parties who spent the income on themselves and only on others affiliated to their parties.

The civil war ended in 1998 but these conditions continued until the US and Allied forces invaded Iraq in 2003. Although the Kurdistan Region saw relative economic growth as a result of the implementation of UNSCR no. 986, the OFFP started to reconstruct its social programmes and the KRG still continued in the direction of partiality in the implementation of social programmes. The party cash transfer
programme, like the Foundation of Martyrs, was embodied into government but, instead of integrating into the rest of the government’s social programmes, it was directly attached to the Council of Ministries in both KRG administrations, Erbil and Sulaymaniyah. In 2006, the unified government announced all foundations of martyrs, genocide victims and veterans were to be merged into the RPFMGS within the MoMA. Only after the MoMA was set up were non-party victims covered by the programme.

As for the other programme, SPF/SSN, which at the beginning of its re-activation in 2001 was called the FPF, the offices of two major parties were in charge of making a list of eligible people. For instance, the first, essential list of (8,000) FPF benefit recipients was made by the KDP in its party offices in Erbil. This list formed the basis for later development of the programme. The political party offices were in charge of registering people instead of relevant directorates of social security programmes; the point which led to misusing FPF and later SPF. In other words, party leaders and high government officials continued to exploit the cash transfer programme, turning it into a reward system for loyal party members and supporters. As confirmed by almost all past FPF staff members interviewed for this research, the payments handed to beneficiaries were always accompanied by a verbal massage from senior officials indicating that such payment was a gift from the prime minister and ruling party [SPF-B1; SPF-GE3; SPF-GE2]. They admitted that the party was seeking clientelism in the implementation of the programmes.

Another critical factor is the issue of institutionalisation. Despite constant claims by high officials to the contrary, the KRG’s civil services lack neutral public administrators. The party controls the administration, and politics has overshadowed the citizen-based social policy services. This has consequently resulted in lack of sufficiency in provided benefits.
Allocating a special government body to serve inheritors of martyrs, genocide and chemical gas attack survivors on the one hand and neglected existing government social programmes on the other hand, indicates unbalanced interests in the implementation of social security programmes. Instead of integrating the RPFMGS programme into other social security programmes within the MoLSA, the KRG devoted a different ministerial body to do so. This placed a huge burden on the KRG’s general budget and it was also a lost opportunity to put together both the Foundation of Martyrs and other government social transfer programmes. The two Foundations of Martyrs belonging to the party had 15 years of experience inside and outside the government. The MoLSA, as the only specialist ministry in providing social services, had the same but richer experience. I believe there are two reasons why the RPFMGS did not merge with MoLSA. One reason was that a high number of ministers agreed on a coalition government between the KDP and PUK. Increasing the number of ministries was to allow the allocation of posts to more party candidates in high-ranking positions in the government, an action that was widely criticised. Therefore, in the sixth cabinet of the KRG, some ministries were merged and the number decreased to 19. However, the MoMA has remained as a ministry.

The second reason why the MoMA was retained as a separate ministerial body could be found in the importance of the RPFMGS programme and other services of the MoMA. The KRG looks at MoMA as a high nationalistic institution (Law No.8, Ministry of Martyrs and Anfal Affairs, 2006), and does not intend to mix MoMA’s programmes with other social services.

It is worth noting here that incompetence is one of the administrative characteristics of KRG. Until the sixth cabinet of the KRG was formed in 2009, those who had been recruited to work in government offices were not recruited based on job description or qualification. In fact, other external factors have always played a role in recruitment in the public services. Since loyalty to the political party, as opposed to experience or
qualification, formed the basis of recruitment, it is unsurprising that the capability of
administrators and employees was very poor (Heshmati, 2010). Once in office, these
employees were compelled to obey the party rather than commit to administrative
guidelines.

The KRG and major parties not only misused staff recruitment, but also both social
programmes. The Kurdistan Region is not the only developing region with this
exploitative welfare provisioning in place. The former ruling party of Tunisia equally
used the welfare state in a clientelist way and as an instrument of power (Karshenas
& Moghadam, 2006: 21). The use of social programmes for clientelistic purposes is
explored further in the next section.

7.2.2. Particracy and Patronage: Clientelistic Use of Social Programmes

The strategic coalition agreement between the KDP and the PUK helped to create a
unified government. However, traces of dual administration still remain, creating
resultant constraints for independent civil servants. As I have emphasised at various
points in this thesis, due to the party political system of the Kurdistan Region, party
agendas have dominated ministerial and managerial offices. This condition has
produced and continued a system which consolidated the power of the party over
government offices. Employees who are loyal to the party are guaranteed their jobs
and get promotions. This ensures that they will remain committed to follow party
interests in every step of their work. For instance, the FPF, a programme run during
the fourth cabinet of the KRG, was used to attract the loyalty of recipients to ruling
parties. So, in the Kurdistan Region, social security programmes are implemented
entirely at policy makers’ will.

Such control over the implementation of social security programmes has resulted in
ultimate corruption. In Sulaymaniyyah province, for instance, there was a list of 26,000
beneficiaries treated within the SPF programme under the sub-scheme of Special Salary. The amount paid monthly as Special Salary varied between IQD 30,000 (approx. US$26) and IQD 1,500,000 (approx. US$1,250), though it is not transparently revealed to public media and researchers. This benefit is not dependent on the recipients’ need; rather it is simply to show their privileged status as people affiliated to a ruling party or political leader, especially with the office of Jalal Talabani, General Secretary of the PUK. The highest leaders of the PUK also have the authority to send a list of up to 4,000 people to the General Directorate of Social Protection and Development in Sulaymaniya to be included in the SPF programme. Although the eligibility criteria and guidelines of the SPF are not applied to beneficiaries of the Special Salary, the government is increasingly adopting it for the patronage system that the major parties want to continue for the interest of selected yet constant party members and closely affiliated to political leaders. As a consequence, the patronage system of the Kurdistan Region has encouraged an inequality. This inequality can be seen while looking at the way the KRG’s social security programmes deal with target groups. On the one hand, the KRG discriminatively divides social cash transfer recipients, prioritising those of high political value to parties and are consequently better treated. On the other hand, ordinary people with low incomes and the poor are paid less attention. Party-affiliated people who have been covered in the SPF programme under the scheme of Special Salary are also provided with better benefits in comparison with other SPF claimants. Even besides the social cash transfers, there are many people who are without work but simply enjoy the privileges of party benefits. It is difficult to obtain any information about the amount paid from public budget to members of political parties.
7.2.3. Claimants Do Matter: High- and Low-Value Clients

In tracing the effective implementation of social security programmes in the KRG, I was introduced to the concept of preference of target groups in the eye of politicians and top officials. As I emphasised earlier in this chapter, the implementation process of social security policy in the post-war Kurdistan Region is influenced strongly by political interests and administrative characteristics, which the implementation of social security programme has conveyed. As has been shown in Chapters 5 and 6, the relative success of the social security programme largely depended on the importance of their beneficiaries from the political perspective of people in power.

Almost all approaches and generation models of policy implementation emphasise the role of actors or groups of actors during the implementation process (Schofield, 2001: 255). In the policy implementation research, the role of the service user has been researched as merely a recipient of the programme, yet very few researches have charted recipients as significant actors in the process of implementation (Lipsky, 1980). Policy research considers actual actors rather than potential actors. In this sense, policy implementation research includes a wide range of individuals such as executive directors, programme managers, supervisors and other staff members. The potential role of service users in the implementation process is often neglected because the focus tends to be on implementers rather than beneficiaries.

The view that identified implementation actors as those forward policy processes towards specific goals is quite naïve because, although those groups are pointed out as implementers, my research identified potential actors that, directly or indirectly, influence the implementation performance: they are beneficiaries. This does not mean that all beneficiaries of the RPFMGS programme in the Kurdistan Region are actual policy implementers. However, the vast majority of RPFMGS employees are selected from families of RPFMGS target groups. As this research has highlighted, due to the
absence of sufficient social security policy in the Kurdistan Region, as well as due to its political considerations, the social security recipients are seen as separate. Some, as in the case of martyrs and genocide survivor families, have been well served, and some, as appeared in the case of FPF/SPF/SSN, have been given little attention. The first group and their programme have been given high attention while the second group and their programme have been mostly ignored.

Although I was aware of the differences in the nature of both the SPF and the RPFMGS programmes, at the start I did not intend to carry out a comparison of the implementation of both programmes. I did not ask how and why different social security programmes of the KRG treat their recipients differently. However, the findings about the performance of the RPFMGS and SPF/SSN programmes showed that possessing administrative experience and competency does not necessarily imply that a programme would bring about adequate outcomes. Taking into account the constant implementation of the SPF since 2001 shows that it has not made its implementation more successful than the RPFMGS, which potentially started as government social transfers in 2006. The data collected from both programme implementers produced different findings which enabled me to emphasise that what mostly determines the implementation process (either success or failure) of a social security programme is the politicians’/administrators’ perception of the status of the beneficiaries. Both programmes have been approved by parliamentary legislation. However, the RPFMGS is more privileged than the SPF/SSN.

Another advantage of MoMA is that in its staff recruitment policy it gives priority to, and to a high extent depends on, relatives and family members of martyrs and genocide survivors. As research participants declared, the vast majority, if not all, of employees of MoMA have been recruited from RPFMGS programme beneficiaries. As emphasised by high officials of the MoMA, recruiting MoMA civil servants from the victims’ family members has two advantages. First, it gives a job opportunity to the
victims and their family members, as it is already one of the ministry policies. Second, as has been claimed by different participants of my research, these are the best people to comprehend what martyrs and genocide families need and consequently they can treat them better while delivering services or dealing with their paperwork.

In the post-conflict Kurdistan Region, the implementation of policy has inevitably been a distinctive departure from that of developed countries. The conflicts and wars of the last three decades have resulted in large-scale poverty and victimisation. In the case of RPFMGS, I have realised that, in staff recruitment, the priority is always being given to victims and their relatives. Beneficiaries’ influence in the implementation process appeared when the implementers became programme beneficiaries at the same time. Hence, they can benefit from their relationship with party leaders and provide the best services for themselves as client-oriented implementers.

In the party-political system of the Kurdistan Region, the concept of ‘public’ has not been well formulated, to an extent that the government finds itself responsible for people’s needs, as can be seen in the case of social policy in developed nations. In developed democratic countries, from right to left, the social welfare (either state welfare or private sector welfare) focuses on the public. Social policy is a government’s response to public needs. In the Kurdistan Region with its underdeveloped party political system and administratively less competent government, social programmes are not targeted at all people in the same way. The KRG’s social security programmes reflect the party politics rather than public welfare. Both researched programmes, SPF and RPFMGS, have been developed and implemented in the interests of the dominant political parties and for their clients’ benefit.
From this perspective, the beneficiaries of the KRG’s social security programmes can be divided into two groups based on their profile (Figure 7).

First, the group covered by RPFMGS programmes are *high-value beneficiaries*, and are characterised as high-profile clients of social cash transfers. MoMA beneficiaries are not just ordinary citizens, they also acquire a political character. Most of them might live in a financially low condition, as the families of martyrs and genocide have in most cases lost their breadwinners; however, they are not classified and served based on their needs. Even the categorisation of RPFMGS beneficiaries is done based on the way the victim has lost his/her life, or the victim’s status in the hierarchy of positions on the Kurdish forces’ *peshmarga* and party. Being a high- or middle-ranked member of the party, especially the major ones, brings a privilege to the family in the case of loss of life; even in the case of natural death, it means being entitled to cash transfer programmes of the MoMA. What can be inferred from research findings is that not all RPFMGS beneficiaries are provided with decent services. Although the MoMA recently tried to equalise the salaries of beneficiaries based on their category, the differences mostly appeared in non-cash services, such as the provision of housing and health services. Beneficiaries in some areas are prioritised over others.
This refers to the contest which still exists between the KDP and PUK, and what each of them does for the people in their area of influence.

What I found was that RPFMGS beneficiaries were properly treated. In the SPF also there are numerous beneficiaries who have been entitled to a Special Salary, which is implemented with an ultimate lack of transparency. Although the employees of this project are officially related to the SPF and the Directorate of Social Protection and Development in Sulaymaniyah, there is also a difference between payments of Special Salaries’ employees and other SPF employees. The salience of the beneficiaries is transferred to the programme and its implementers.

The second group of beneficiaries is low-value beneficiaries. Simply being poor, disabled or older does not offer the same privileges as those related to martyrs, war victims or genocide survivors. Politicians and policy makers are less concerned about the implementation of the SPF programme.

As the importance attached to RPFMGS beneficiaries was transformed to the high profile programmes and implementers, neglect of the SPF resulted in the marginalisation of the programme and its implementers. It was only after civil protests started on 17 February 2011 that the KRG announced that it was going to look back at the poor and disadvantaged population. Under pressure from the demonstrators, the government promised to increase benefits of SPF five-fold, from IQD 30,000 to IQD 150,000 (through implementation of SSN). Despite this improvement, the discrimination has served as a basis for favouritism and preferentialism by KRG.

7.2.4. Missing Public Welfare Vision

Despite the case of RPFMGS, which has been increasingly supported by political leaders, others social programmes, such as disabled benefits (deaf, blind and physically handicapped), pension benefits, and unemployment insurance for
graduates, have recently gained attention from the authorities. However, only few of them succeeded to obtain the government’s response. Some of these groups have unions to protect their rights, such as the Deaf Society and Blind Society. Other recipients have been paid attention to after the pressure of the recent mass protests.

The Kurdistan Region has been altered rapidly in the last decade. New economic opportunities have been adopted, but no coherent vision of social policy development is yet in place. Having taken the economic, political and administrative experiences of the Kurdistan Region in the last two decades, little attempts could be found for the establishment of institutionalised welfare policy. The inaugural speeches of the last three KRG’s Prime Ministers presented in the Kurdistan Parliament (Barzani, 2006; Salih, 2009; Brzani, 2012) evidently uphold that until recently social policy has not been given any priority in the KRG’s agenda.

Another example of the KRG’s negligence towards social security, if not generally the social policy, is the way ministries delivering public services are treated by political leaders. For instance, some of the ministries, such as the MoLSA, Ministry of Health and Ministry of Electricity are subordinate to others, such as the Ministry of Interior, Ministry of Finance and Economy or Ministry of Oil and Natural Sources. What clarifies the importance of the last three ministries more is that the KDP is not ready to exchange these ministries with its weaker strategic alliance, the PUK. Even persons working at the top level of the ministry (minister, deputy minister, and director generals) have not been replaced by newer members from the same party in the last three cabinets of the KRG. Economic development does not always bring an effective social policy provision. The lack of a well-designed social programme has permitted corrupt agents from government and political leaders to manipulate the programme.

As mentioned in Chapter 2, policies and decisions are made upon the agreement behind parliament by the two dominant parties in the region: KDP and PUK.
Ideologically, the KDP and PUK hold the same nationalistic liberation thoughts, which explains the reason behind their concern towards the implementation of a social programme such as the RPFMGS. Since both parties and the KRG feel they owe the national liberation and civil war victims a great deal for their loss and sacrifice, they prioritise the implementation of the RPFMGS programme to reward them. I can conclude that what has been prioritised in the government's agenda is not a social welfare provision, but a social cash transfer with a political/nationalistic character in support of major parties' clientelistic practice. An adequate system of welfare needs to be adopted in order to expect an equivalent interest in all government social programmes.

In my view, the KRG's failure in launching a sufficient welfare system is not due to an absence of financial and administrative capacity; rather, by and large, the KRG has not been taking the issue of public welfare provisioning seriously. As mentioned earlier, administrative incompetency is one of the obstacles that prevented the implementation process from being systemised, but cannot be considered as a determinant factor for unsuccessful policy implementation. Competency can be built or adopted. Nonetheless the government officials and politicians have not been determined to truly put social welfare into their agenda. Textual analysis of the government's agenda stated in the inaugural speeches of the last three KRG cabinets proves that social welfare in general and social cash transfers in particular have less space within the government's priorities. For instance, the fifth cabinet's agenda in May 2006, known as the administrative unification and reconstruction (speech by the KRG Prime Minister N. Barzani, 2006), focused largely on providing security, reconstruction and development via investment. The government successfully provided security and took massive steps towards domestic and foreign investments. The safety continued to develop foreign investment successfully (Kurdistan Board of Investment, 2014). In the sixth cabinet of the KRG, known as renewal and
reconstruction, despite the promise to continue on the former cabinet’s path, one of the main programmes that the government initiated was renewing the higher education system and implementing the scholarship programme, the Human Capacity Development Programme, that aimed to develop human capacities in the Kurdistan Region in the field of higher education, and later transferred it to all government offices and ministries for building and developing government civil servants’ capacities (MoP, 2012). Therefore, among all these, what is missing and ignored is the Kurdistan Regional social welfare.

7.3. Interference and Deviation

Social programmes cannot be diminished in mere words on the law and regulation documents. They should take the forms of practice to be seen. The process of transforming words into practice in the case of social security programmes of the KRG has always been associated with interference from ruling party leaders and high officials. In this regard, it can be argued that policy practice rather reflects the intention of politicians and dominant party rather than the population’s needs, as clearly stated in policy documents.

I have explored the extent to which the actions of the implementation agencies are congruent with that laid down in law or policy documents. When the delivered policy actions differ from the promises of a decision, deviating implementations would be identified.

It is top politicians who have a great impact on the implementation process. This is not in contrast with other stated views about the position of programme recipients, while beneficiaries’ character is a most important factor in policy making as well as in the policy implementation processes. As has been addressed earlier, the effectiveness of
policy implementation entirely depends on beneficiaries’ status within the political system of the less-developed Kurdistan region.

As the research findings revealed, in the process of implementation, specified objectives might be diverted according to the high official’s intent. They never compromise on social security implementation.

The party leaders’ interference occurred for several intents, which can be summarised in two main directions: interference to demonstrate the salience of the social programme and interference to deviate the programme from its stated aims.

7.3.1. Interference to Demonstrate the Salience of the Social Programme

Social security policy, which comprises the cash transfers, attracts politicians’ concerns. These concerns encourage them to interfere and exercise control over these programmes. In this regard, we have seen how the implementation of social security programmes of the KRG have always been a point of misuse by high officials and party leaders belonging to the two major political parties, the KDP and the PUK. Ruling parties manipulate the programme to attract people’s loyalty (Mahmoud, 2012).

The interference is always being done by dominant political parties that run and work behind the government through exerting influence on decision makers. On the other hand, they impose their control upon implementers to accomplish certain goals.

One side of the interference could be interpreted as being implemented by top officials in order to highlight the effectiveness of the programme. Perhaps this could be seen in the forms of constant support, supplying financial sources, and facilitating the cooperation for the programme within the network of high offices of the KRG. The sovereigns (high politicians, legislative, and executive) are only supportive to implement a programme when they find political values in the programme or programme beneficiaries are attached with a political character.
7.3.2. Interference as Policy Deviation

The interference from top officials has not always benefited the programme and its beneficiaries. In the case of this research, interference has two purposes. First, interference as the means to deviate the programme from its stated objectives produced the implementation failure, especially in the case of the SPF. As it has experienced in the last decade, the SPF has been subjected to constant reduction in its functions, though at times the expansion might be seen as a positive deviation, especially when the SPF was combined with a social awareness scheme.

The second is interference for utilising social security programmes. The social security programmes have been subjected to exploitation by top officials for the purpose of fulfilling particular intents. Research findings show that social security programmes were manipulated in order to insert ineligible clients. Consequently, these programmes have been misused as a tool to attract and maintain clients’ affiliation to ruling political parties.

7.4. Policy Implementation Theory in Light of Politically Less Developed Kurdistan Region

This research draws on two sets of theories: policy implementation theories/models and clientelist politics. For the first one, I have used mainstream policy implementation approaches to read the implementation process of social security programmes in the KRG. Despite the problematic feature of applying developed social implementation theories in a less-developed region, and in a region still in the process of its politico-administrative consolidation, the case of social security in the Kurdistan Region should be studied within the implementation models of developing countries. The
second part of the theory is clientelism, which is useful to understand the misuse of social security programmes in support of the political patronage system.

7.4.1. Policy Implementation Approaches in Light of Research Findings: Top-Down, Bottom-up Model

Implementation models diverge according to whether evaluations are developed from the perspective of the initial policy maker (centre), field-level implementing officials (periphery), or private individuals to whom the policy is directed (target group) (Mazmanian & Sabatier, 1989: 12). My research participants include mostly the implementing officials and some policy makers. However, in the case of RPFMGS I found that almost all frontline staff, programme implementers and higher officials are at the same time actual programme recipients. Due to the high political profile of beneficiaries of MoMA and particularly the RPFMGS programme, they are actual policy designers too. As I discussed earlier, beneficiaries of the RPFMGS programme have influence on high decision-making points of the Kurdistan Region. They are victims, yet belong to political parties. Ruling political parties owe their survival and power to those who “sacrificed their life for the victory of Kurdistan Region and parties in power” (quote from MoMA-C3). However, the case of SPF tells another story. Implementers of this programme have nothing in common with their programme recipients. And, due to being low-profile beneficiaries, clients of the SPF are considered as politically low value; this has been the reason behind the forgetting of the programme by government.

As Mazmanian and Sabatier state, the inherent idea of policy implementation research is to draw a distinction between decision making and policy performance (1989: 7). The initial top-down and bottom-up models emerged from the heart of a debate to explain this relationship. Each model has tried to trace the policy to its
actual decision makers. Empirical findings from the RPFMGS programme indicate that policy implementers are at the same time beneficiaries of the programme. Due to their political character, beneficiaries have influence on policy makers in order for their needs to be responded to. Implementation does not necessarily start with the decision made by top officials in the central government. Having looked from this perspective, implementation is an output factor to achieve policy intentions. The case of RPFMGS shows that party network and political interest have eased the relationship between all players in the policy process. When the character of the decision maker and policy implementer all exist in a person entitled to the programme benefits, it is clear that the programme would be implemented effectively. The case of the RPFMGS reveals that some beneficiaries play a double role as implementers and indirectly as policy makers. The RPFMGS chooses its staff members from those entitled to its programmes. Again, due to having high-ranked party members as its beneficiaries, the policy process in RPFMGS programmes traces a bottom-up approach. The policy of the RPFMGS cannot be abridged in merely official documents; its performance is not directed by specific standards. A number of elements have also been found to be involved in this process, for instance, implementer’s discretion, politicians’ intentions and dominant party agent’s interests. The role of non-statutory factors is high in the policy implementation process of RPFMGS programmes.

Implementers of the RPFMGS are the main actors in policy delivery with having one foot in the beneficiaries’ zone and the other in high officials’/politicians’ zone. In contrast, in the case of SPF, top officials have ultimate and undeniable impact on policy formation and performance. Until recently, beneficiaries of the SPF were seen as politically less important clients and therefore the programme had been forgotten, with a fixed number of recipients having been served poorly within the programme since 2006. The fundamental policy change occurred after the mass protests of Sulaymaniyah on 17 February 2011. The government’s first reaction was to increase
the benefit to 250 per cent and promised to operate the SSN; after a year the benefit increased by 500 per cent.

What differentiates the top-down from the bottom-up model is not the matter of control over implementation. It is the position, discretion and autonomy of policy actors in the implementation stage. Implementers of the SPF programme have less chance to practise their discretion and autonomy. As non-elected officials, implementers of the SPF have worked and maintained their jobs, accumulating experiences and skills, but they lack power; whereas top-level officials are devoid of such experiences and skills but have all the power to force lower-level workers to perform according to their own direction. Based on the fact that top officials are the main and only determinant actors in the formation and implementation of the SPF, we can see a top-down approach followed in the implementation of the SPF programme.

Describing implementers as street level bureaucrats or as civil servants who have substantial knowledge in the execution of their work, as Lipsky (1980) does, is appropriate where they have the authority to do what they want without constraints or annoyance. The political system, at least in the context of developing countries, is a determinant factor in this case. What Lipsky (1980) conveys is true in a more democratic and less centralised administration. The political system (what I call in this research political context of policy implementation) indicates whether street-level workers have a major impact on the actual direction and outcome of social policy or not, whether they can make policy choices or just do what has been advised. Political condition may facilitate or constrain policy implementation in the way implementers intend to practise.

What is implicitly understood from Lipsky’s theory of street-level bureaucrats is that he views the policy implementation process as real policy making, and implementers as actual policy makers, a view which seems to contain only a relative truth due to its
contextually constrained applicability. His perspective has been critically assessed in developed contexts. Furthermore, in a politically less-developed context such as the Kurdistan Region, within which the policies have been politicised, it is very difficult, if not impossible, to implement without endorsement of power. The street-level bureaucrats are important to the extent that they could attract top officials’ approval and support for a policy to be implemented. In this way, they play a mediation role between top officials and policy clientele in terms of making political leaders well informed of social problems and people’s needs on the one side, and managing and delivering policies on the other side.

Given the main research findings, I can assert that we cannot simply apply top-down or bottom-up approaches to understand the world in which frontline workers actually participate in policy making and actively implement policy ideas. The implementer’s approach can be used to know how government employees make sense of their work, take action, and interact with their managers in the organisation, clients for whom they are responsible and top officials whose obligations they are under. By exploring these procedures this approach will help to examine whether they are active or passive, autonomous or compelled by high officials.

Exploring the policy implementation process, on the one hand, is mostly about the role of implementers as significant actors (e.g. street level bureaucrats, managers, professionals and frontline workers), and on the other hand it concerns the politico-administrative condition of implementation. In other words, the concept of implementation refers to both the performances and the institutional context. Therefore, in our research on the implementation of social security policy in the Kurdistan Region, what has been acknowledged is how social security programmes work under a particular political and administrative condition. In this sense, the focus has shifted from implementers to beneficiaries. As affirmed throughout this research, the status, value and profile of beneficiaries are the determinant factors. Having
looked at the importance of implementing the RPFMGS, it is evident how beneficiaries of the programme can become focal actors in the implementation process. It is understandable that every social security scheme targets certain recipients. Therefore, I can assert that within KRG’s social policy context the benefit rates of social security schemes are varied and being distributed based on the socio-political status of recipients, not on their socio-economic conditions and needs. The government and ruling parties assess and divide the population based on their political character and value.

7.4.2. Implementation Process in Less Developed Kurdistan Region

Lazin (1999) points out how political and administrative institutions of particular countries affect their domestic policy implementation process. The developmental status of a particular country could be taken into account to help understand its policy implementation process. In other words, less developed nations are not feasible to become subjects to conduct comparison with more developed nations in terms of their policy implementations. With its political instability and rent-seeking party administration, the KRG has not sufficiently implemented social security programmes. Although elections determine who will run the government in the Kurdistan Region, the political party system does not allow for a representative bureaucracy to be established.

A dramatic economic growth is being taken place in the Kurdistan Region. However, most of the emphases have been put on investments in the oil sector and infrastructure (Kurdistan Board of Investment, 2014). As Jan-Erik Lane (1999) argues, policy implementation problems in developing countries are intertwined with basic economic and political conditions. He suggested that, while development requires economic growth, the reduction of poverty requires political stability. Thus, both
economic development and political stability are necessary conditions for effective policy implementation (Lane, 1999: 11-12). Inequality and poverty reduction have no place in KRG’s strategic development plan (Ministry of Planning/KRG, 2012).

7.4.3. Political Decision Model of Implementation

Torenvlied, in his book *Political Decisions and Agency Performance* (2000), has discussed the political decision model of implementation. He highlights the concept of ‘norm’ of bureaucratic loyalty as compelled by political control. He argues that this bureaucratic norm emerges whenever it is needed that a group of individuals presents a specific action which they would not present in the absence of that norm (Torenvlied, 2000: 30); for instance, special concern towards politically important clienteles or the loyal implementation of a political decision. This norm would give a higher priority to one programme (RPFMGS) than another (SPF), through attaching a high salience to it.

The operation of norms can offer an important explanation for the paradox of compliance. Neo-classical models have doubt about the existence of information advantage. They argue that political decision makers are apparently able to observe implementation agencies' behaviour perfectly, to monitor, and to sanction (Torenvlied, 2000: 32). It is not easy to claim that implementers have no information advantage. What constrains their ability to realise the knowledge, particularly in the case of developing societies, is the political interference and control. They will be very lucky if their information advantage fits with politicians’ desires.

As Weingast and Moran (1983: 769) state, political control over social security programmes would be practised within two conditions. First, policy makers should possess sufficient instruments of power which can be used to sanction implementation agency. Second, policy decision makers should attach sufficient
salience to the policy programme, and then they should make this visible to the implementation agencies. Adherence to the norm of bureaucratic loyalty will be compelled more seriously and more strongly in relation to policy programmes to which are attached more salience by policy makers.

A number of studies have examined political control and administrative supervision over the policy implementation, and behaviour at the frontlines of service delivery (Torenvlied, 2000). These studies support the well-defined approach to implementation research which focuses on the translation of political decisions into street-level actions. However, these studies provide little explanation of the importance of political and administrative impacts on the implementation process. Most of the studies that explain the political/administrative impact on implementation practice mainly suggest that political/administrative conditions play less important roles (May & Winter, 2007: 454).

Power controls policy implementation by changing current policy. This is justified as the way to renew and develop or constrain policies. In the Kurdistan Region, the representative body and ministers, and high administrators are legally authorised to make and adjust policy decisions. However, non-elected people have controlled the administrative and legislative bodies. They even have control over elected officials.

7.4.4. Where is the Gap: Clientelistic Practice in Social Policy Implementation

Traditionally, clientelism involves hierarchical patron-client relationships, “the patron providing clients with access to the basic means of subsistence and the clients reciprocating with a combination of economic goods and services” (Mason, 1986: 489). However, in the case of MoMA, the patron-client relationship is reversed. The clients have already fulfilled their parts of obligation, and it is now the government’s
turn to do so; compensate the clients’ sacrifice for the lives of their partners, beloved persons or family members.

Clientelism is defined in political exchange theory as a form of personal, mutual exchange usually characterised by a sense of obligation and often also by an unequal balance of power between the sides involved (Eisenstadt & Roniger, 1984: 48-9). Eisenstadt and Roniger use the term within the context of unequal, hierarchical exchange characteristics of feudal society, in which patrons and clients were tied to durable relationships by a powerful sense of obligations and duty. However, this old form of clientelism has been reshaped in the modern era in both developed and developing counties. The unequal balance of social security provision implemented by the KRG has been informed by this new form of clientelism.

The main empirical findings of this research indicate that the programme beneficiaries are potentially significant actors that have impact on policy makers. This in the case of the RPFMGS has attracted high officials’ attentions to the programme. However, the case of SPF/SSN indicates that, when beneficiaries are not politically important, less attention and support will be given by the government to the programme.

In contrast to almost all policy implementation theories and models, which focus on the role of top officials (top-down approach), bureaucrats and implementers (bottom-up approach) or both (integrated theory), I have found that the profile (character) of beneficiaries of social programmes has a decisive role in the salience given to social security programmes, and in the effectiveness of their implementation.

The importance of clienteles of social programmes introduced me to a wide range of literature conducted on clientele politics, especially in developing countries. Social and political exclusion of citizens would unavoidably be translated into their inclusion within an informal network. In this sense it is important to state that implementers play roles as brokers in the clientelistic network. They facilitate a condition to use social
cash transfers for a political purpose. Penfold-Becerra (2007) conducted a research on clientelism and social funds in Latin America. He argues that, in Latin America, social funds can and have been diverted by political interest. He presents evidence that, under certain political circumstances, social transfers help either for election purposes to buy votes, or can be used to build political constitutions that strengthen support for a ruling party (Penfold-Becerra, 2007: 63).

My research findings revealed that social funds could be politicised and subjected to clientelistic practices. This appeared in two aspects. Firstly, high government officials and party leaders have controlled the recruitment procedures. Directors of the programmes, middle-ranked and even frontline staff are still being appointed when recommended by ruling parties. Secondly, these social security programmes have been used to encourage party support.

Clientelistic practice also influences the entitlement procedures. As mentioned earlier, clientelism involves a political exchange. In the case of SPF programmes, on the one side the only source available to the clients is their vote and potential loyalty to a party. On the other side, there are politicians and high officials that possess and control government finance. The RPMGF is being used to maintain party affiliation of victim families. As for the case of the FPF programme, while it provided a decent benefit to its recipients, it was being used to anchor the clients to ruling parties.

7.5. Preference Model of Policy Implementation

The model of implementation that I am trying to introduce here is called the preference model of policy implementation. This model starts from a public/nationalistic dichotomy in social welfare provision (see Figure 8).
According to this dichotomy, social programmes and their target groups are categorised based on their profile. The first is public/ordinary people that are characterised as low-profile clients. They are the ordinary poor and needy and are treated under a needs-based benefit. As they are seen and served as insignificant clients by party leaders and high government officials, they and their programmes are neglected. Despite having a decent legislative framework, the SPF has in reality never been adequately implemented. From the perspective of all employees of the programme that have been interviewed for this research, SPF has failed to meet its targets.

In contrast, there is a social programme with a political/nationalistic character. This programme covers high-profile clients because, from the perspective of party leaders
and high government officials, these clients are seen to be more deserving of privileges. Due to the political character of the programme and the socio-political status of its beneficiaries, the programme is therefore of high priority on the government’s agenda. For instance, there is a constant dynamic in the implementation of the RPMGF programme. By all means this programme has been successful in meeting the programme objectives.

Party leaders and high administrators deal with social security policy according to the salience they attach to the policy programmes. This policy salience is inspired by political norms of senior politicians and high administrative officials. The hegemony of politicians is entirely visible in both the policy formulation and implementation process. Ruling political parties run the government but they also work behind the government by exerting influence on the decision makers. They therefore impose their control upon implementers to accomplish their own goals. The preference model of policy implementation is followed in a discriminative social policy system.

The politicians deal with social policy programmes according to their political preferences. The politicians and top government officials attach importance to policies on the basis of the preference they give to those policies and interest groups concerned. In this model, policy implementation would be interfered with by politicians and high government officials under the pretext of supporting and monitoring the way the policy is implemented; in reality, they are preserving their clients’ interests.

Political clientele is considered as a crucial factor in the preference model of policy implementation. From the political preference model of policy implementation, important clienteles deserve and are treated with an important programme. This implies that the clientele is a political subject, and the policy related to them should be as significant as they are. Social and political exclusion of citizens would be unavoidably interpreted into their inclusion within informal networks. High officials
could not dismantle the SPF programme as it has a ministerial regulation background and support and could only be resisted by law.

This model of policy implementation takes into consideration the implementer’s potential discretion and initiatives only on the condition that they do not discard political intentions of policy makers. In other words, the implementers might be consulted and play remarkable roles in both processes of policy formation and implementation.

In the shadow of this preference model of policy implementation, there are social security programmes deliberately neglected. Some programmes are passively implemented in a condition whereby their policy beneficiaries, certainly from the political perspective of politicians, are not considered as a significant group, and these policies are politically marginalised and administratively constrained by top government officials. Not only clienteles but also implementation actors are neglected. They might neither be consulted in the policy formation nor supported in their performance.

**Conclusion**

This chapter critically discussed and analytically compared the research findings. It started by analysing three critical factors that have determined the implementation process of social security programmes of the KRG: politico-administrative factor, the importance of beneficiaries within the process of policy formation and implementation, and finally the impact of lacking an adequate social welfare system on the implementation failure in the less developed Kurdistan Region.

The implementation process of social security in the post-war Kurdistan Region is influenced strongly by its political characteristics. This political feature has been
inherited from the political structure of the Kurdistan Region. In this context, I
examined the relationship between top officials and beneficiaries. I argued that this
relation is defined by political interest, and can be traced to party politics. It is also the
patronage system embraced by both sides. The deserved place of implementers in
this relation is only as potential beneficiaries or party patrons.

Due to wars and the two economic blockades during the 1990s and the early 2000s,
the Kurdistan population was devastated and all government social programmes were
suspended, and available resources were either spent on war or agents. This
situation has endured even after the reconstruction and economic boom in the early
2000s. The environment and political context in which policy has been made and
implemented should therefore be taken seriously in any attempt towards policy
process in general and implementation in particular.

Comparing the two programmes, I also pointed to the ambiguity and contradiction
embodied in the formulation and implementation of the KRG’s social security
programmes. The programmes are implemented in an ambiguous manner and often
contradict programme guidelines. In comparing the research findings from both
programmes, it is revealed that there is no balance in the services delivered between
the SPF/SSN and RPFMGS. The SPF declined in service until the February 2011
protests, while in the case of the RPFMGS services have continuously increased for
the target groups. The attention given to both government programmes is also
incomparable. Deposited resources of MoMA are enough to cover the clients’ needs
and accomplish all sub-schemes. What is driving the implementation is the politicians’
vision for a national-public programme. Programmes associated with victims of the
national liberation movement and wars are better treated than those for the ordinary
population. The issue of interference was also highlighted to understand how policy
deviation might influence the implementation process of the social programmes.
In light of the two different profiles of beneficiaries and two methods of interference, I have discussed the implementation preference model. This style of implementation is best understood by taking into account the prioritised policies in the KRG’s agenda. There are many obstacles which bother the government to not have a sufficient social agenda. Firstly, all issues have been politicised. In other words, the politicians and governors give priority to the political issues, and at the same time the social issues are marginalised.

A linkage between the clientelistic type of political mobilisation and social security provision has been discovered. Some programmes, such as MoMA, have always been used in a political relationship to maintain the loyalty of party-affiliated people. In other cases, such as the FPF, SPF and SSN, they are used either to prevent the protests against ruling parties, or to anchor the clientele to the party. The SSN programme follows a top-down approach in its implementation. The policy change occurred when people raised their voice against authorities and government.

RPFMGS implementers are representatives of programme beneficiaries. They represent the RPFMGS beneficiaries, as they have almost all been chosen from families of martyrs and genocide survivors; target groups of the programme. In this position they can make requests and their voices are heard better than any other groups in society.
CHAPTER EIGHT: CONCLUSION

Introduction

This chapter concludes the thesis by covering the following points, and is divided into four parts. The first part summarises the research findings. It also focuses on the application and critique of policy implementation theories with reference to the relevant literature. The second section of this chapter concerns itself with the contribution of the thesis to implementation research in politically less-developed countries, with a focus on the post-war Kurdistan Region. Section 3 of the chapter discusses the limitations of research in a politically/administratively less-developed context. Section 4 highlights some areas for further research. Finally, concluding remarks will be presented.

8.1. Summary of the Research Findings

This thesis addresses the implementation of government social security programmes in the Iraqi Kurdistan Region. It investigates what the existing programmes are and how they are implemented. The research aims to examine the extent to which the politico-administrative conditions affect the implementation process. It explores why the KRG tends to prioritise one programme, for example RPFMGS, over another, including the SSN. This research question led to investigating sufficiency and corruption in social benefits. From the perspective of implementers, this research
aimed to address implementation gaps in the field of social security provision. The thesis tries to test key theories/models of implementation in a politically under-developed Kurdistan Region. It also aims to understand what lessons can be drawn from social security programme implementation in developing countries in light of the research findings.

With regard to the literature, this research is grounded on policy implementation and clientelism in social security policy. Having discussed the mainstream theories of policy implementation, I argue that policy implementation research should consider the politico-administrative context highly. Policy implementation research in developing countries should examine the extent to which the political parties and government officials control and influence the direction of policy performance. There is also the need to explore implementation of social security programmes in terms of their consistency with, or deviation from, policy regulations. However, policy implementation does not necessarily follow regulations and instructions set by policy makers. In this regard, a number of elements, for instance, politicians’ intentions and dominant party agents’ interests, also need to be taken into account. The role of non-statutory factors is inevitable in a policy implementation process.

Having discussed the stagist model of policy process in the theoretical background on this research, we can conclude that in politically less-developed contexts there is not a clear sequence of stages through which social policies proceed, and which therefore constitute the ‘policy process’. As the research evidences of the two programmes illustrated, the policy process starts with agenda setting. However, it does not necessarily portray policy proceeding through a logical, yet traditional, sequence of stages. Consideration of options and agreement on the most suitable option has not been reflected in the policy process of the two researched programmes. Moreover, societal demands are processed inside the political interests of ruling parties; they play an unchallenged role in the formation/implementations process of public policies.
should agree with the criticism raised towards the explanatory power of the stagist model in providing an accurate account of how policies are made. In reality, the policy process is rather less clear-cut and straightforward. Intervention is one of the ways that diverts the policy from its clear and established settings. However, I still believe that model can provide useful insights into some of the ways in which social policies are made.

Employing theories/models of policy implementation and clientelism would be of benefit for understanding the efficiency and corruption in policy delivery. Chapter 3 presented two main theoretical approaches to the research. First, most models of policy implementation, such as top-down and bottom-up models, with specific focus on literature related to less-developed countries have been critically examined. Clientelism and clientage politics have also been presented to understand the exploitation of social security programmes in the Kurdistan Region. Literature on clientelism and clientelistic use of public funds provided some useful guidance to analyse corruption in cash transfer programmes of the KRG.

As shown in Chapter 2, the research asserts that studying social security in the KRG would be incomplete were the country’s politico-administrative background not taken into account. Chapter 3 therefore provided an overview of the region’s political background. It highlighted the fragile administration of the KRG from the first Gulf War in 1991 coupled with civil war, reconstruction and recent economic and political developments. I argue that, without considering how the politico-administrative system of the Kurdistan Region operates, we cannot understand the clientelism, corruption and insufficiency in the implementation of the KRG’s social security policy.

In the 1990s the Kurdistan Region was suffering from an extreme shortage in budget and lack of public services. When the two major political parties started the civil war, the KRG was divided into the two zones of the KDP-controlled administration and the
PUK-controlled administration. The government budget was also split and went into warring parties’ pockets. The hegemony of party politics over the government was established.

Since the establishment of the unified KRG in 2006, the division still appeared in the two zones of the KRG administrations. However, apart from the Special Salary sub-scheme in Sulaymaniyah, no significant differences have been observed in the performance of the directorates of MoMA and MoLSA. We can still see public funds and social security programmes in both zones being equally utilised for political purposes by ruling parties.

Chapter 4 presented the methodological procedures that were employed in the data collection and analysis. It explored how political events such as a general election and tension between political factions might have impacted on the process of data collection, and the difficulties of building relations of trust relationships with research participants in this context. Two government social security programmes in the Kurdistan Region were selected as case studies. Chapter 4 discussed the rationale for employing a multi-methodology of a qualitative case study and comparative policy analysis. After addressing the multiple-case study design used in this research, the chapter explained how the types of research objective, purposes and questions inevitably led the researcher to adopt qualitative and comparative methods. This study has adopted a multiple-case (embedded) design to gain more insights and robust understanding of the perceptions of the implementers towards the social security programmes in the Kurdistan Region. Chapter 4 explained the reason for selecting only the two programmes. The RPFMGS and SSN are the major social security programmes of the KRG covering a wide range of the population. The RPFMGS programme provides cash transfer (plus housing units, health cost support, studentships and tax exemption) to families of martyrs, genocide and chemical-attack survivors and former political prisoners. The SSN programme
provides cash transfers to people on low incomes, disabled people, older people, widows, orphans, and poor married students. Other social security programmes, such as unemployment insurance and a pension scheme were excluded in this research, because the first one has not yet been fully activated, and the latter was difficult to cover. The pension scheme in the Kurdistan Region covers only government employees and is not implemented as a unified programme. Government offices implement their own pension schemes separately, which are almost unreachable and difficult to take as one programme.

As for the methods of data collection, semi-structured interviews and focus groups were found suitable with the purpose of the research. Chapter 4 also proposed the use of documentary data as supplementary sources to interviews in policy research, which contributed to the validity of the research data.

Chapters 5 and 6 presented and analysed the data collected from research participants. Chapter 5 is devoted to the prioritised programme, RPFMGS, which is administered by the MoMA. This ministry is also prioritised by the KRG. It is supported and prioritised because both political parties, the KDP and the PUK, have the most beneficiaries from this scheme. Although the RPFMGS programme is provided with sufficient funds and is successfully implemented, it faces difficulties in some cases of illegibility and entitlements. In some cases of claimants, especially those of genocide survivors, it is very difficult to decide who in the family should inherit the benefit.

The RPFMGS programme does not involve any sort of testing of the beneficiaries’ income. Beneficiaries of this programme can claim the benefit even if they earn a high salary or have capital resources. This programme is not a means-tested benefit. In other words, the tests tend to focus on the criteria of the political victim (wounded veteran or prisoners) or first-degree family member of the victim (family members of
martyrs and genocide victims). Due to their characters, beneficiaries of the RPFMGS are highly valued and prioritised.

In the case of MoMA, beneficiaries play a significant role in policy making and the implementation process. However, this characterisation is seemingly problematic. Neither are all policy makers beneficiaries of the programme nor does every single claimant play an equally significant role. The vast majority of policy makers and policy implementers of the RPFMGS programme are at the same time programme beneficiaries. Therefore, this programme follows a bottom-up model of policy implementation. As expected, due to the position of beneficiaries in the policy-making and implementation process, their demands can be easily heard, responded to and reflected in the programme.

Chapter 6 is devoted to the second programme, FPF/SPF/SSN. All three names stand for the same programme but in different time periods. Having examined the development of the programme, the guidelines and eligibility criteria of the programme have been subjected to many changes during the last decade, but this has not resulted in improvements to the programme. The financial source available to the programme remained steady, and consequently the maximum coverage of the programme was restricted. The SSN programme has failed to meet its targets which are poverty reduction and inequality. It has been discussed that the real problem is not necessarily due to lack of funds, rather it is the programme’s lack of importance to high officials.

In terms of the programme objectives, SSN is implemented as a bureaucratic procedure without paying much attention to the aim of the social security programme: to assure a minimum well-being for needy people in society. What is noticed in the case of the SPF is that it is not being implemented as a public right to social security. Rather, it is mostly provided as charity by the authorities. Besides this, the programme
has experienced an inconsistency between policy and practice. Despite the rapid economic changes in the last decade, the programme has not revised the benefits so as to reflect inflation and the high cost of living for the poor.

The programme negligence continued until the mass demonstrations that occurred in the Kurdistan Region on 17 February 2011. This suggests that the KRG does not attach any importance to social protection programmes unless there is political value placed on beneficiaries.

After presenting the research findings in Chapters 5 and 6, Chapter 7 was devoted to making comparison between the two cases of the research and further analysis of the research findings. Contradictions were found and discussed in the definition and functions of social security programmes. The RPFMGS is not implemented merely as a needs-based programme. The way the MoMA defines RPFMGS beneficiaries indicates that the programme conveys the idea of compensation for the loss that occurred. The RPFMGS benefit is not specified based on the financial circumstance and family situation of the target group but rather implemented based on the status the victims and their families have had in the wars, national liberation movement, and Kurdish political parties. For instance, the claimants of the RPFMGS are categorised as ‘war martyrs’, ‘civil martyrs’, and ‘genocide victims’, which indicates that the programme functions to reward the families of victims.

This is not the case in the SSN programme. The SSN provides cash transfers to an ordinary disadvantaged population. The list of beneficiaries is not open to all eligible people, and it is not transparently implemented. Due to the financial limitation that the programme has experienced in the past until now, the programme cannot accept new claimants. However, the Special Salary scheme, within which a high amount is paid to party clients within the SSN programme, has been excluded from the financial
limitation. The list of Special Salary sub-scheme beneficiaries has also been opened to cover new claimants.

Chapter 7 also discussed three critical factors that have determined the implementation process of social security programmes of the KRG: politico-administrative factors, the importance of beneficiaries within the process of policy formation and implementation, and finally the impact of lacking an adequate social welfare system in the implementation failure in the less-developed Kurdistan Region. Throughout this research I examined the relation between top officials, service providers and beneficiaries in the programme implementation stage. What drives these relations is political interests; through this fact has emerged a patronage system which has been embraced by both top officials and beneficiaries. The implementers have a place in this relation either as potential beneficiaries or party patrons. This research also found that there is high intervention in social security programmes by the KRG and major ruling party leaders.

8.2. Research Contributions

This section aims to discuss and justify my research’s contribution to the existing body of knowledge and literature concerning policy implementation research in developing countries. The key contributions of this research can be presented in three areas. First the contribution to implementation literature; second the contribution to research on corruption in social security programmes; and third the contribution to research on the KRG.
8.2.1. The Contribution to Implementation Literature

The main contribution of this research is to implementation literature. I have examined the mainstream top-down, bottom-up models of policy implementation. As for social security programmes being described as following a top-down or bottom-up approach, to a large extent this does not merely relate to the administrative centralism attributed to the developing countries. My research proves that, in addition to a mainstream top-down approach in the public service structure, there is the possibility for a bottom-up model within an administrative centralism controlled by party politics. This, to a large extent, depends on the value of a government programme, among others. It is also the government that empowers the implementation agencies to practise their discretion. The basis of this empowerment is a direct result of the socio-political status of the beneficiaries of social programmes. The significant role of the programme beneficiaries in an implementation process, especially in the case of the RPFMGS programme, is also one of the distinct contributions.

8.2.1.1. Considering the Status of Beneficiaries of the Programme in Policy Implementation Research

There is very sparse literature or studies concerning the crucial role of programme claimants in the policy implementation. Throughout this thesis, I have observed that most existing policy implementation studies have focused on either implementers or high officials as key actors in the implementation process (Schofield, 2001: 255). Policy research, therefore, mostly considers actual actors rather than potential actors. What I mean here by potential actors in policy implementation is those who are not necessarily involved directly in the policy design or have positions in the Ministries of MoMA and MoLSA. The political influence of claimants has also to be considered in policy implementation research, especially in the case of less-developed contexts.
Implementation research therefore places emphasis on the role of claimants only as benefit recipients rather than as significant actors in the implementation process.

Having looked at the significant actors in the implementation of social security programmes, I have demonstrated how beneficiaries of the programme can become focal actors in the implementation process. It is understandable that every social security scheme targets certain recipients. Therefore, I can assert that, within the KRG’s social policy context, the benefits of social security schemes are being distributed based on the socio-political status of recipients, not on their socio-economic conditions and needs, as the case may be elsewhere. This division of programme target groups is made based on their political character and value. In this way I have found two groups of beneficiaries that are consequently treated differently by social security programmes. The first consists of high-value beneficiaries, characterised as high-profile clients of social cash transfers, due to their positions in families of victims of wars and party-affiliated people. The second is made up of low-value beneficiaries, as ordinary low income, poor, disabled and older people. They are not provided with the same privileges as the first group. The improvement in service delivery to the second disadvantaged group of beneficiaries was seen only after they showed their political influence in events of mass protests that occurred recently in most Middle Eastern countries including the Kurdistan Region. Highlighting beneficiaries of social security programmes as a central factor in implementation success is one of the contributions of this thesis to implementation literature.

8.2.1.2. Preference Model of Policy Implementation

The main implication of the preference model of implementation can be summarised as follows: first, the government commits itself and deals with social security programmes based on a dichotomy of political/national versus public. The RPFMGS
programme represents a political/national programme which is devoted to service people who enjoy a high profile and are considered important by political parties, while the SPF/SSN represents a programme which has been designed to serve ordinary people defined as needy and poor. Beneficiaries of the RPFMGS are considered as political actors who have contributed with their life in the national struggle against the former Iraqi regime. Hence the RPFMGS programme is prioritised by the KRG. As claimants of SPF/SSN lack any political attributes, the government neglects their programme. The funds allocated to the RPFMGS programme are incomparably greater than those which have been available to other social cash transfer programmes.

The second and main area to which my research contributes is that of the implementation model. This research introduces a preference model of policy implementation, which can help to explain policy implementation in less-developed countries. This model of implementation is discriminatory because the government pays attention to social security programmes in a selective manner. Under this model, social programmes and their target groups are categorised based on their characters. Some are characterised as low-profile clients by party leaders and government officials. They and their programme are therefore insignificant, neglected and have consequently failed. By comparison, the other social security programme covers high profile clients (again from the perspective of party leaders and government officials), and these clients are therefore seen to be more deserving of privileges. Hence, due to the political character of the programme and the socio-political status of its beneficiaries, the programme would be of high priority on the government’s list of social welfare provision.
8.2.2. The Contributions to Research on Corruption in Social Security

My research makes two particular contributions to social security research. Firstly, it demonstrates how social security programmes function in a post-conflict and newly-established political entity. Secondly, it shows how social security programmes are used for a clientelistic practice of ruling parties. In terms of clientelism and clientele politics too, this research provides a series of findings that are relevant to the corruption, lack of transparency and insufficiency in social security programmes.

8.2.3. Kurdistan Regional Government: Administration, Politicisation of Social Programmes and Particracy

The primary aim of this thesis is to make a contribution to policy research in a developing political entity. In English language research literature, very few researches have been done on social policy in the Kurdistan Region.

In the party political system of the Kurdistan Region, the concept of ‘public’ has not been well developed to an extent that can compel the government to take responsibility towards people’s needs. Social welfare is a government’s response to public needs. It emphasises the concept of public. In the Kurdistan Region with its underdeveloped party political system and administratively less competent government, social programmes are not targeted at all people in an equal manner. Social security programmes of the KRG reflect party politics rather than social welfare.

In the nationalistic versus public dichotomy, the implementation of social security programmes in the KRG has always been off-balance. My research results show the extent to which the social security policy implemented in the KRG is far from serving the ‘public’, and to what extent the concept of public policy has occupied a marginal place in the KRG’s policies.
Finally, my analysis contributes to methodological issues by demonstrating the political consideration of policy research in the time around general elections.

8.3. Limitations of the Research

Looking back on various stages of the research, I faced many obstacles that should have been considered. Having chosen a policy-related topic for research in the Iraqi Kurdistan Region, it has not been without difficulties. I will address these difficulties in two stages. The first is the lack of previous studies about the case of study or around the research area. One of the limitations of this research was lack of academic research on the topic of social security and policy implementation with special focus on the Iraq and/or Kurdistan Region. To the best of my knowledge, no specific research on social policy, social security, or policy implementation in the Kurdistan Region has yet been conducted. Even the cases I have chosen for my research, MoMA and SPF, have not been subjected to any policy research, in either the English language, Kurdish, Arabic or other languages. My research will be the first in the area of social security implementation in the Kurdistan Region. This benefits the study in terms of originality and significance; however, it also created difficulty in the sense that there were no other works in which comparisons could be made in order to effectively identify all research gaps and to place my research into it.

The second limitation was methodological. Conducting policy research around times of general elections and political tensions has its difficulties. The participants of my research consisted of forty-six individual interviews and six focus groups. Although I managed to meet almost all proposed interviewees during a relatively very short period of time, they were not carried out without difficulties. All interviews were done after obtaining permission from the first senior officials of directorates and offices to conduct my interviews and completing informed consent forms by participants and
signed by me. Between the pilot interviews and actual data collection, in autumn 2009 and spring 2010, a political change had occurred in the Kurdistan Region, and a dynamic political opposition emerged which constantly put the KRG into the position of responsibility. In this context any endeavour for data collection or conducting research on government offices was easily linked to attempts against the government and ruling parties.

During the interviews with my research participants, in many cases, I felt that some interviewees are trying to prevent themselves from exposing facts and information. In a few cases, especially at a ministry level, I faced questions about whether I was doing this research for opposition parties or not. The same suspicion resulted in the minister of MoMA not being cooperative with the research, and he did not agree to be interviewed.

8.4. Direction for Future Research

The following avenues can be identified and recommended for further research in the areas of policy implementation, social security and the KRG. The current research has focused on the implementation of social security programmes in a less-developed context. There are numbers of potential extensions to this topic. In this research, while the impact of the politico-administrative context on policy implementation process is examined, it will be necessary to conduct a research comparing case studies between developed and developing countries. This kind of research is concerned with policy implementation in different political structures. In this framework, the linkage between sufficiency in social policy and representative bureaucracies can be examined.

Another research avenue would be to look at the outcomes of policy implementation evaluating the policy delivery from the perspective of programme recipients. This type
of research will make contributions to claimant-focused policy implementation research.

It is worthwhile to study clientelism and transparency in governance. In addition to confirming the success of the RPFMGS programme, I have also explored how the programme has been used by major political parties (the KDP and the PUK) for pursuing a client-patron relationship. There are also other ways of using public funds for political purposes in the region. Corruption in developing countries has been widely studied. However, the focus has been less definitive on the area of social cash transfers.

The research findings presented in Chapters 5 and 6 of this thesis provide a rich new data set which might be explored from a variety of different theoretical frameworks. The relation between social policy and nation-building can be suggested for study. The preference model of policy implementation addressed in my thesis can be justified by the KRG as to how the politics, including consolidating the current situation of the Kurdistan Region and the idea of nation building, might be of priority over social services provision.

**Concluding Remarks**

While studying social security programmes comparing two social cash transfers of the KRG I have explored corruption and sufficiency in the implementation of social security programmes. This thesis has placed particular emphasis on the politico-administrative context of policy implementation. Having said that, the political interests of dominant political parties are a determinant factor in the implementation of a programme to be a success or failure.
The thesis also explored the reason behind the importance attached to a programme by the government and political parties. The programme that provides services to people who are characterised as politically important, mostly party-affiliated people, has been prioritised by ruling parties. What drives me to believe that beneficiaries play a role in this regard is the fact that, even within a neglected programme of the SPF/SSN, claimants of the Special Salary sub-scheme are served significantly better than other ordinary claimants of the SPF/SSN. What the beneficiaries of the Special Salary have in common with beneficiaries of the RPFMGS programme is the political character. Having applied the top-down/bottom-up models of policy implementation, it was of benefit to examine the policy implementation approach followed by each of the social security programmes of the KRG. Recalling the research findings, I can argue that the SPF/SSN programme follows the top-down model in its implementation, while the RPFMGS programme follows a bottom-up model. Having considered the importance that the government attached to, and the priority it gives to, a programme and its beneficiaries, I discovered a preference model of policy implantation. According to this model, beneficiaries of the social security programmes can be distinguished based upon their profile.

The KRG has created a sort of welfare system which less targets a disadvantaged population in favour of people with party-nationalistic characters. This double standard has appeared when one compares the benefits delivered to beneficiaries of RPFMGS with beneficiaries of SPF/SSN. In terms of law and regulations, social protection programmes enjoy relatively the same status. However, the legal framework does not necessarily result in equal treatment. Having looked at the two programmes, I can argue that, despite supportive regulations and instructions, policy implementation would be varied. It is also revealed that the services delivered are off-balance between MoLSA and MoMA, because the attention given to both government programmes is incomparable.
Ruling political parties exploit social security programmes for political backing. Clientelism gave me an opportunity to explore the corruption and misuse of public funds for ‘buying’ people’s loyalty. I can conclude that what has been prioritised in the government’s agenda is not a social welfare provision, but a social cash transfer with a political/nationalistic character in support of major parties’ clientelistic practice. An adequate system of welfare needs to be adopted in order to expect an equivalent interest in all government social programmes.
Appendix 1: List of Research Participants (Interviews and Focus Groups)

1. List of Individual Interviews – Social Protection Fund

1.1. Lower Level Office Workers (civil servants and frontline staff)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Code</th>
<th>Sex</th>
<th>Position</th>
<th>Relevant Work Experience</th>
<th>Date of Interview</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>SPF-A1</td>
<td>Male</td>
<td>Civil Servant (Social Worker)</td>
<td>10 years</td>
<td>21/4/2010</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SPF-A2</td>
<td>Male</td>
<td>Accounting</td>
<td>12 years</td>
<td>21/4/2010</td>
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<tr>
<td>SPF-A3</td>
<td>Male</td>
<td>Employee (Social Worker)</td>
<td>4-5 years</td>
<td>25/4/2010</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SPF-A4</td>
<td>Male</td>
<td>Senior Employee (Social Worker)</td>
<td>5 years</td>
<td>11/4/2010</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SPF-A5</td>
<td>Male</td>
<td>Senior Employee (Social Worker)</td>
<td>9 years</td>
<td>19/4/2010</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SPF-A6</td>
<td>Male</td>
<td>Social Worker</td>
<td>5 years</td>
<td>5/5/2010</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SPF-A7</td>
<td>Male</td>
<td>Social Worker</td>
<td>5 years</td>
<td>15/5/2010</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

1.2. Programme Managers and Directors (lower officials), and Senior Social Workers – SPF

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Code</th>
<th>Names</th>
<th>Sex</th>
<th>Position</th>
<th>Relevant Work Experience</th>
<th>Date of interview</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>SPF-B1</td>
<td>Abdurezaq M Mustafa</td>
<td>Male</td>
<td>Director – Erbil Province Office (former)</td>
<td>4 years (2002-2006)</td>
<td>19/4/2010</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SPF-B2</td>
<td>Aziz Hamad</td>
<td>Male</td>
<td>Deputy Director</td>
<td>7 years</td>
<td>4/5/2010</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SPF-B3</td>
<td>Dler A Nuradden</td>
<td>Male</td>
<td>Director of Research Unit MoLSA</td>
<td>8 years</td>
<td>15/4/2010</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SPF-B4</td>
<td>K. O. A.</td>
<td>Male</td>
<td>Senior Supervisor</td>
<td>8 years</td>
<td>19/4/2010</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SPF-B5</td>
<td>Ali Saeed Merza</td>
<td>Male</td>
<td>Director – Duhok Province Office</td>
<td>3-4 years</td>
<td>26/4/2010</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SPF-B6</td>
<td>Nahro Abdullah Ali</td>
<td>Male</td>
<td>Director – Sulaymaniyah Province Office</td>
<td>6 years</td>
<td>13/5/2010</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SPF-B7</td>
<td>Abas Bra Hama</td>
<td>Male</td>
<td>Programme Manager – Sulaymaniyah</td>
<td>20 years</td>
<td>3/5/2010</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SPF-B8</td>
<td>(N)</td>
<td>Female</td>
<td>Programme Manager – Erbil</td>
<td>17 years</td>
<td>9/5/2010</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SPF-B9</td>
<td>Khalid Suleman Khalili</td>
<td>Male</td>
<td>Programme Manager – Semel, Duhok</td>
<td>5 years</td>
<td>26/4/2010</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SPF-B10</td>
<td>Salah Usef</td>
<td>Male</td>
<td>Senior Social Worker (Family Protection Fund)</td>
<td>8 years</td>
<td>27/4/2010</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
### 1.3. Middle Level Officials (general directors and senior advisors)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Code</th>
<th>Names</th>
<th>Sex</th>
<th>Position</th>
<th>Years of Experience</th>
<th>Date of Interview</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>SPF-C1</td>
<td>Hussein Ali Asad</td>
<td>Male</td>
<td>General Director of Social Protection and Development – Duhok</td>
<td>2 years</td>
<td>26/4/2010</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SPF-C2</td>
<td>Phicri Khoshnaw</td>
<td>Male</td>
<td>Senior Advisor</td>
<td>? years</td>
<td>2/5/2010</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SPF-C3</td>
<td>Kawa</td>
<td>Male</td>
<td>General Director of Social Protection and Development</td>
<td>7 years</td>
<td>4/5/2010</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SPF-C5</td>
<td>Jiyan M Taha</td>
<td>Female</td>
<td>Deputy General Director of Social Protection and Development – Duhok</td>
<td>13 years</td>
<td>26/4/2010</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### 2. List of Individual Interviews – MoMA

#### 2.1. Lower Level Office Workers (civil servants and frontline staff)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Code</th>
<th>Gender</th>
<th>Position</th>
<th>Relevant Work Experience</th>
<th>Date of Interview</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>MoMA-A1</td>
<td>Male</td>
<td>Civil Servant</td>
<td>3 years</td>
<td>14/4/2010</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MoMA-A2</td>
<td>Female</td>
<td>Civil Servant – Duhok</td>
<td>5 years</td>
<td>26/4/2010</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MoMA-A3</td>
<td>Male</td>
<td>Civil Servant – GDoMA, Erbil</td>
<td>18 years</td>
<td>29/4/2010</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MoMA-A4</td>
<td>Female</td>
<td>Civil servant – GDoMA, Sulaymaniyah</td>
<td>6 years</td>
<td>5/5/2010</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MoMA-A5</td>
<td>Female</td>
<td>Civil servant – GDoMA, Sulaymaniyah</td>
<td>6 years</td>
<td>5/5/2010</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
### 2.2. Programme Managers and Directors and Senior Officers

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Code</th>
<th>Names</th>
<th>Gender</th>
<th>Position</th>
<th>Relevant Work Experience</th>
<th>Date of Interview</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>MoMA-B1</td>
<td>Nadir Agha</td>
<td>Male</td>
<td>Director of Research and Survey – MoMA</td>
<td>4 years</td>
<td>12/4/2010</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MoMA-B2</td>
<td>Ahmad Jamel</td>
<td>Male</td>
<td>Director of Legal Department – Erbil</td>
<td>6 years</td>
<td>14/4/2010</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MoMA-B3</td>
<td>Fars Tahr Mho</td>
<td>Male</td>
<td>Director of Anfal Affairs – Erbil</td>
<td>4-5 years</td>
<td>20/4/2010</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MoMA-B4</td>
<td>Barzan Abduobakr</td>
<td>Male</td>
<td>Director of Martyrs Affairs – Erbil</td>
<td>19 years</td>
<td>20/4/2010</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MoMA-B5</td>
<td>Rasool Hamed</td>
<td>Male</td>
<td>Director of Social and Health Services Provision – GDoMA – Erbil</td>
<td>10 years</td>
<td>20/4/2010</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MoMA-B6</td>
<td>Jiyan Tahr</td>
<td>Female</td>
<td>Director of Martyrs Affairs – Duhok</td>
<td>13 years</td>
<td>27/4/2010</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MoMA-B7</td>
<td>Jiyan Saeed</td>
<td>Female</td>
<td>Director of Legal Affairs in GDoMA – Duhok</td>
<td>8 years</td>
<td>28/4/2010</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MoMA-B8</td>
<td>Zahir Joukhin</td>
<td>Male</td>
<td>Erbil</td>
<td>7 years</td>
<td>29/4/2010</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MoMA-B9</td>
<td>Kamaran Ali Ameen</td>
<td>Male</td>
<td>Director of Anfal Affairs – Sulaymaniyah</td>
<td>11 years</td>
<td>3/5/2010</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MoMA-B10</td>
<td>Shadan sadiq Hassan</td>
<td>Female</td>
<td>Director of Legal Affairs – GDoMA – Sulaymaniyah</td>
<td>11 years</td>
<td>4/5/2010</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MoMA-B11</td>
<td>Samal A A</td>
<td>Male</td>
<td>Director of Martyrs Affairs – GDoMA – Sulaymaniyah</td>
<td>5 years</td>
<td>5/5/2010</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### 2.3. Middle Level Officials (general directors and senior advisors)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Code</th>
<th>Names</th>
<th>Gender</th>
<th>Position</th>
<th>Relevant Work Experience</th>
<th>Date of Interview</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>MoMA-C1</td>
<td>Goran Mustafa</td>
<td>Male</td>
<td>Director of Minister's Office</td>
<td>3 years</td>
<td>20/4/2010</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MoMA-C2</td>
<td>Ezet</td>
<td>Male</td>
<td>General Director of Martyrs and Anfal Affairs – Duhok</td>
<td>4 years</td>
<td>28/4/2010</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MoMA-C3</td>
<td>Abdulkarim Halladni</td>
<td>Male</td>
<td>General Director of Martyrs and Anfal Affairs – Sulaymaniyah</td>
<td>6 years</td>
<td>5/5/2010</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MoMA-C4</td>
<td>Ismail Abduobakr</td>
<td>Male</td>
<td>General Director of Martyrs and Anfal Affairs – Erbil</td>
<td>12 years</td>
<td>10/5/2010</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
### 3. List of High Officials Interviewed (Ministers and a Member of Parliament)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Code</th>
<th>Names</th>
<th>Gender</th>
<th>Position</th>
<th>Relevant Work Experience</th>
<th>Date of Interview</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>MoMA-D1</td>
<td>Chnar Saad Adbulla</td>
<td>Female</td>
<td>Minister of Martyrs and Anfal Affairs (former)</td>
<td>4 years (2006-2009)</td>
<td>17/4/2010</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SPF-D1</td>
<td>Asos Najib Abdullah</td>
<td>Female</td>
<td>Minister of Labour and Social Affairs</td>
<td>7 months in current position</td>
<td>2/5/2010</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MP-1</td>
<td>Abdulsalam Barwari</td>
<td>Male</td>
<td>Member of Parliament, Head of Social Affairs Committee</td>
<td>9 months – current post</td>
<td>4/5/2010</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### 4. List of Focus Groups

#### 4.1. Focus Group with Employees of SPF (MoLSA) – Erbil

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Code</th>
<th>Gender</th>
<th>Position</th>
<th>Relevant Work Experience</th>
<th>Date of Interview</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>SPF-GE1</td>
<td>Male</td>
<td>Social Worker</td>
<td>3 years</td>
<td>8 May 2010</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SPF-GE2</td>
<td>Male</td>
<td>Social Worker</td>
<td>6 years</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SPF-GE3</td>
<td>Male</td>
<td>Social Worker</td>
<td>8 years</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SPF-GE4</td>
<td>Male</td>
<td>Social Worker</td>
<td>6 years</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SPF-GE5</td>
<td>Male</td>
<td>Social Worker</td>
<td>4 years</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

#### 4.2. Focus Group with Employees of SPF (MoLSA) – Sulaymaniyah

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Gender</th>
<th>Position</th>
<th>Relevant Work Experience</th>
<th>Date of Interview</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>SPF-GS1</td>
<td>Female</td>
<td>Civil Servant</td>
<td>14 years</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SPF-GS2</td>
<td>Female</td>
<td>Civil Servant</td>
<td>30 years</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SPF-GS3</td>
<td>Male</td>
<td>Civil Servant</td>
<td>24 years</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SPF-GS4</td>
<td>Female</td>
<td>Civil Servant</td>
<td>8 years</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SPF-GS5</td>
<td>Female</td>
<td>Civil Servant</td>
<td>9 years</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SPF-GS6</td>
<td>Female</td>
<td>Civil Servant</td>
<td>13 years</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SPF-GS7</td>
<td>Female</td>
<td>Civil Servant</td>
<td>8 years</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
### 4.3. Focus Group with Employees of SPF (MoLSA) – Duhok

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Code</th>
<th>Gender</th>
<th>Position</th>
<th>Relevant Work Experience</th>
<th>Date of Interview</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>SPF-GD1</td>
<td>Male</td>
<td>Social Worker</td>
<td>7 years</td>
<td>5 May 2010</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SPF-GD2</td>
<td>Male</td>
<td>Social Worker</td>
<td>4 years</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SPF-GD3</td>
<td>Male</td>
<td>Social Worker</td>
<td>15 years</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SPF-GD4</td>
<td>Male</td>
<td>Accountant</td>
<td>7 years</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SPF-GD5</td>
<td>Male</td>
<td>Social Worker</td>
<td>1 year</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SPF-GD6</td>
<td>Female</td>
<td>Officer</td>
<td>1 year</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SPF-GD7</td>
<td>Female</td>
<td>Legal Officer</td>
<td>5 years</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### 4.4. Focus Group with Employees of MoMA – Erbil Province

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Code</th>
<th>Gender</th>
<th>Position</th>
<th>Relevant Work Experience</th>
<th>Date of Interview</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>MoMA-GE1</td>
<td>Female</td>
<td>Officer</td>
<td>12 years</td>
<td>7 May 2010</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MoMA-GE2</td>
<td>Male</td>
<td>Officer</td>
<td>5 years</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MoMA-GE3</td>
<td>Male</td>
<td>Social Worker/Director</td>
<td>5 years</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MoMA-GE4</td>
<td>Male</td>
<td>Officer</td>
<td>3 years</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MoMA-GE5</td>
<td>Male</td>
<td>Officer</td>
<td>5 years</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MoMA-GE6</td>
<td>Female</td>
<td>Not Provided</td>
<td>10 years</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MoMA-GE7</td>
<td>Male</td>
<td>Legal Officer</td>
<td>4 years</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### 4.5. Focus Group with Employees of MoMA – Sulaymaniyah Province

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Code</th>
<th>Gender</th>
<th>Position</th>
<th>Relevant Work Experience</th>
<th>Relevant Work Experience</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>MoMA-GS1</td>
<td>Female</td>
<td>Director</td>
<td>3 years</td>
<td>2 May 2010</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MoMA-GS2</td>
<td>Female</td>
<td>Legal Officer</td>
<td>9 years</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MoMA-GS3</td>
<td>Female</td>
<td>Accountant</td>
<td>5 years</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MoMA-GS4</td>
<td>Female</td>
<td>Officer</td>
<td>5 years</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MoMA-GS5</td>
<td>Female</td>
<td>Legal Officer</td>
<td>5 years</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
### 4.6. Focus Group with Employees of MoMA – Duhok Province

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Code</th>
<th>Gender</th>
<th>Position</th>
<th>Relevant Work Experience</th>
<th>Date of Interview</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>MoMA-GD1</td>
<td>Female</td>
<td>Accountant</td>
<td>5 years</td>
<td>5 May 2010</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MoMA-GD2</td>
<td>Male</td>
<td>Social Worker</td>
<td>13 years</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MoMA-GD3</td>
<td>Male</td>
<td>Administrator</td>
<td>3 years</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MoMA-GD4</td>
<td>Female</td>
<td>Director of Anfal</td>
<td>3 years</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MoMA-GD5</td>
<td>Female</td>
<td>Accountant</td>
<td>1 year</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MoMA-GD6</td>
<td>Male</td>
<td>Legal Officer</td>
<td>3 years</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MoMA-GD7</td>
<td>Male</td>
<td>Legal Officer</td>
<td>1 year</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Appendix 2: Interview Topic Guide and Consent Form

University of Nottingham
School of Sociology and Social Policy
Research Student: Muslih Irwani
Mobile No.: +964 750 000 00 00
Email: lqxmi1@nottingham.ac.uk

Dear Participants:

I am doing a doctorate research on ‘Implementation of Social Security Policy in a Politically Less Developed Country’ and have chosen ‘Social Protection Fund’ and ‘Ministry of Martyrs and Anfal Affairs’ as a case study. You, as an employee of one of the above government organisations have been selected to conduct a semi-open interview, which might take 45 to 90 minutes. Some questions have been attached as general outlines for our interview.

There no right or wrong answer, so I offer a very open atmosphere to talk about your experience and to the best of your knowledge express your opinion about the nature of the organisation you are working for.

Your participation is much appreciated and will contribute in understanding and enhancing the social policy in the Kurdistan Region.

Consent Form:

1. Do you agree that your name can be announced in my research? YES ( ) NO ( ).
2. If the answer is YES, please, next to your name in Kurdish put the English spelling of it as you want.

Name of the Participant: (in Kurdish):…………………… (in English):………………

3. If your answer is NO, please put a symbol/symbols …………………

I hereby confirm that I will commit to the above points and use your words and information only for academic purpose in my research, and will not do otherwise. Participants have the right to withdraw their consent at any time.

Signed by Researcher: Muslih Irwani Date: / /2010
‫‪Kurdish version of Interview Topic Guide and Consent Form‬‬

‫زاﻧﮑﯚی ﻧﯚﺗﯿﻨﮕﮫﺎم‬
‫ﺑ‪#‬ﺷﯽ ﮐﯚﻣ‪.#‬ﻨﺎﺳﯽ و ﺳﯿﺎﺳ‪#‬ﺗﯽ ﮐﯚﻣ‪%#‬ﯾ‪#‬ﺗﯽ‬
‫ﻗﻮﺗﺎﺑﯽ دﮐﺘﯚرا‪ :‬ﻣﻮﺳ)ﺢ ﺋﯿﺮواﻧﯽ‬
‫ﻣﯚﺑﺎﯾﻞ‪00964 750 448 51 57 :‬‬
‫ﺋﯿﻤ‪#‬ﯾﻞ‪lqxmi1@nottingham.ac.uk :‬‬
‫ﺳ‪5‬رﭘ‪5‬رﺷﺘﯿﺎراﻧﯽ ﺗﻮ‪8‬ﮋﯾﻨ‪5‬وە‪ :‬ﺳﺘﯿﭭﻦ ﮐﯚوپ و ﺗﯚﻧﯽ ﻓﯿﺘﺰﭘﺎﺗﺮﯾﮏ‬
‫ﺑ‪$‬ﺷﺪارﺑﻮوی ﺑ‪$‬ڕ"ﺰ‪:‬‬
‫ﺋ!ﻣ! ﺗﻮ‪2‬ﮋﯾﻨ!وەﯾ!ﮐﯽ دﮐﺘﯚراﯾ! ﺳ!ﺑﺎرەت ﺑ! " ﺟ‪4‬ﺒ‪$‬ﺟ‪4‬ﮑﺮدﻧﯽ ﺳﯿﺎﺳ‪$‬ﺗﯽ ﮐﯚﻣ‪)$‬ﯾ‪$‬ﺗﯽ ﻟ‪$‬و و)ﺗﺎﻧ‪$‬ی ﻟ‪ $‬ڕووی‬
‫ﺳﯿﺎﺳﯿﯿ&وە ﮐ&ﻣﺘﺮ ﭘ)ﺸﮑ&وﺗﻮون؛ ﺑﯚ ﺋ!م ﻣ!ﺑ!ﺳﺘ! ﺑ‪%‬رﻧﺎﻣ‪%‬ﮐﺎﻧﯽ ﺋﺎﺳﺎﯾﺸﯽ ﮐﯚﻣ‪.%‬ﯾ‪%‬ﺗﯽ ﻟ‪ %‬ﺣﮑﻮﻣ‪%‬ﺗﯽ ھ‪%‬ر‪#‬ﻤﯽ‬
‫ﮐﻮردﺳﺘﺎن وەک ﻧﻤﻮوﻧ!" وەرﮔﯿﺮاون‪ .‬ﺑ'ڕ=ﺰﺗﺎن وەک ﮐ'ﺳ)ﮏ ﮐ' دەورﺗﺎن ھ'ﯾ' ﻟ' ﺋﯿﺪارەﮐﺮدﻧﯽ ﭘ)ﺸﮑ'ﺷﮑﺮدﻧﯽ‬
‫ﺧﺰﻣ‪#‬ت ﺑ‪ #‬ﺳﻮودﻣ‪#‬ﻧﺪەﮐﺎﻧﯽ ﺳﻨﺪوﻗﯽ ﭼﺎود>ﺮﯾﯽ ﮐﯚﻣ'<ﯾ'ﺗﯽ دەﺳﺘﻨﯿﺸﺎﻧﮑﺮاون ﺑﯚ ﺋ'ﻧﺠﺎﻣﺪاﻧﯽ ﭼﺎوﭘ‪#‬ﮑ'وﺗﻨ‪#‬ﮑﯽ‬
‫ﻧﯿﻤﭽ& ﮐﺮاوە ﮐ& ﻟ&واﻧ&ﯾ& ﻣﺎوەی ‪ 45‬ﺗﺎ ‪ 90‬ﺧﻮﻟ‪$‬ک ﺑﺨﺎﯾ‪$‬ﻧ‪8‬ﺖ‪ .‬ﺋ‪$‬ﻣ‪$‬ی ﺧﻮارەوە ھ‪$‬ﻧﺪێ ﭘﺮﺳﯿﺎرن ﮐ‪ $‬ﺗ‪$‬وەرە‬
‫ﺳ"رەﮐﯿﯿ"ﮐﺎﻧﯽ ﭼﺎوﭘ‪0‬ﮑ"وﺗﻨ"ﮐ"ﻣﺎن ﻟ"ﮔ"ڵ ﺑ"ڕ;ﺰﺗﺎن ﭘ‪0‬ﮏ دەھ‪0‬ﻨﻦ‪ .‬ﺟ‪0‬ﯽ ﺑﺎﺳ" ﮐ" و‪,‬ﻣﯽ ڕاﺳﺖ و ھ"‪ "#‬ﻧﯿﯿ!‪ ،‬ﺑﯚﯾ!‬
‫داوا ﻟ! ﺑ!ڕ‪4‬ﺰﺗﺎن دەﮐ!م ﻟ! ﮐ!ﺷ‪.‬ﮑﯽ ﮐﺮاوەدا ﺑﺎس ﻟ! ﺋ&زﻣﻮون و ﮔﻮزارﺷﺖ ﻟ! ﺑﯚﭼﻮون و زاﻧﯿﻦ و ﭘ‪%‬ﯾﻮەﻧﺪﯾﯿ‪%‬ﮐﺎﻧﯽ‬
‫ﺧﯚت ﺑﮑ‪ .#‬ھﺎوﮐﺎرﯾﺘﺎن ﺟ‪,‬ﯽ ﺳﻮﭘﺎس و ﭘ‪,‬ﺰاﻧﯿﻨﯽ ﺋ‪,‬ﻤ‪#‬ﯾ‪ #‬و ﺑ‪#‬ﺷﺪارﯾﮑﺮدﻧ‪ #‬ﻟ‪ #‬ﻧﺎﺳﯿﻦ و ﭘ‪,‬ﺸﺨﺴﺘﻨﯽ ﺳﯿﺎﺳ‪#‬ﺗﯽ‬
‫ﮐﯚﻣ‪3.‬ﯾ‪.‬ﺗﯽ ﻟ‪ .‬ھ‪.‬ر‪-‬ﻤﯽ ﮐﻮردﺳﺘﺎﻧﺪا‪.‬‬

‫ﺑ*ر ﻟ* ﺋ*ﻧﺠﺎﻣﺪاﻧﯽ ﭼﺎوﭘ‪,‬ﮑ"وﺗﻦ ﺗﮑﺎﯾ" ﻧﯿﺸﺎﻧ"ی )×( ﻟ' ﺑ'راﻣﺒ'ر ﺋ'و ھ'‪5‬ﺒﮋاردە داﺑﻨ‪ -‬ﮐ' ﻟ'ﮔ'ڵ ﺑ'ڕ‪%‬ﺰﺗﺎن‬
‫دەﮔﻮﻧﺠ"؟‬
‫ﻧ‪$‬ﺧ"ﺮ ) (‬
‫ﺑ‪( ) &'$‬‬
‫‪ .1‬ﺋﺎﯾﺎ ڕازﯾﺖ ﻟ‪/‬ﻧﺎو دﮐﺘﯚراﮐ‪/‬دا ﻧﺎوت ﺑﮫ&ﻨﺮ‪#‬ﺖ؟‬
‫‪ .2‬ﺋ‪$‬ﮔ‪$‬ر و‪C‬ﻣ‪$‬ﮐ‪$‬ت )ﺑ‪(@A$‬ﯾ‪ ،$‬ﺗﮑﺎﯾ‪ $‬ﻟ‪ $‬ﭘﺎڵ ﻧﺎوەﮐ‪$‬ت ﺑ‪ $‬ﮐﻮردی‪ ،‬ﺑ‪ $‬ﺋﯿﻨﮕﻠﯿﺰﯾﺶ ﺑﯿﻨﻮوﺳ‪ $‬ﺑ‪$‬و ﺷ*ﻮەﯾ‪$‬ی ﮐ‪ $‬ﺧﯚت‬
‫‪Name:..........................‬‬
‫‪/‬‬
‫دەﺗ&و‪%‬ﺖ‪ :‬ﻧﺎو‪......................:‬‬
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Appendix 3: Interview Questions

1. Can you tell us about this government organisation, I mean how you look at the (Family Protection Box) or (Ministry of Martyrs and Anfal Affairs)?

2. How you can describe your position and work within this programme?

3. Can you tell me a bit in detail about the objectives of implementing this programme?

4. I would like to ask your opinion about the extent to which this service has been delivered and has met its objectives?

Or, according to your experience during work in this organisation, how can you evaluate the implementation of this programme?

5. To what extent do you think there is sufficient professional/administrative efficiency available for implementing this policy?

6. Can you talk a bit more about your relations with staff, your seniors or inferiors, in this organisation?

7. To what extent do you think this programme has been taken into consideration as an important scheme by government and political leaders?

8. Do you think a sufficient budget has been allocated for this programme?

9. To what extent do you think the emergence of opposition in party politics and the parliament has affected, or you think will affect, the implementation of social security programmes?

10. To what extent is your opinion taken into account for making, amending or revising the decisions made?
برسیارکانی چاوپکوتن

1. دەتوانی لەبارەی پێکەنەی و فەرکەکەی نەوە دەگەیەکی کاری تەبە دەکەی و هەروەها رۆڵی تەوە تەوە?

2. تا چ رادەیەکی نەمە بەرناوەکەی حکوومەتەکەیەوە بەشێوەیەکی باش چێییە دەگەیەکەی بەسی لایە؟ بەسەرکەوتوو و ناسەرکەوتوەکانی لەشەکەیەکان بکەی؟

3. دەتوانی بەسەر نامانەکانی (بەرناوەکەی چاوپکێیە خیزان/ بەرناوەکەی ماف و نەمێیەوەی بەنەمەڵەی شەوەی و نەمێتاوەکان) بۆ بکەی؟

4. تا چنەن لیهاتووری یەبەری و ویژەیی بێوێست مەیە بو چێیەکەردنی نەوە نامانجە؟

5. دەگەیەکی هەندێکی قەسمەن بۆ بکەی لەسەر پەیوەندیەکە بە نەتوانی دیکەیە لەو بەرناوەیەدا کار دەگەیەن. چە لە گوێت بەسەرەوە یان خوارەوە؟

6. هەست ئەڵەیەکی سەرچاوەی دارایی بێوێست لە لایەن حکوومەتەکە دابێنی دەگەیەکی بو چێیەکەردنی نامادی بەرناوەی چاوپکێیە خیزان/ نەمێیەوەی بەنەمەڵەی شەوەی و نەمێتاوەکان؟

7. تا چنەن هەست ئەڵەیەکی گرێگیژیانەی بێوێست مەیەنیهە لە لایەن بەرپرسکەن لە سەرەوە بەو بەرناوەیە؟

8. ئەست ئەڵەیەکی بەرناوەکەی وەژەرەخکەیەکان وەک بێوێست چێیەکە دەگەیەک؟

9. تا چ رادەیەکی پێتوایە سەرەکەیەکی مەوارەیە بە مێبەنێی سیاسی و پەڕەڵەن کاریگەرزی دەبێت لەسەر چێیەکەردنی بەرناوەکانی ناسراوی کومە لایەنی حکوومەتە؟

10. بەسەر لەوو چێیەکەردنی بەرناوەکەی کومە لایەنی چ پەرەخکەیە؟

11. چ پەێوەندکەکە دەبینی لە نیوان دارشتنی بەرناوە و سیاسەتەکان و چێیەکەردنەکاندا نا؟ تا چەند لەوە ئەکەوەیە پە دارشتنی بەرناوە و سیاسەتەکان، دەگۆڕەنەوە بۆ نەزمەوە و شارەزاری کادیرەکانی خوارەوە؟ دەگەیە لەوە بەرەوە نمووەنەوە بۆ بەشینیەوە؟
Appendix 4: Request Letter for Permission to Conduct

Interview with MoLSA Employees

A translation of my letter to the Minister of Labour and Social Affairs asking for permission to conduct research interviews:

7th April 2010

To Minister of Labour and Social Affairs
And Ministry of Martyrs and Anfal Affairs

RE: Permission and Support for Research Interviews

Hello,

My name is Muslih Irwani. I am a PhD student at the University of Nottingham in the United Kingdom. As part of my research, I am planning to conduct about 25 interviews with employees of directorates of Social Protection and Development-Social Protection Fund in all cities and provinces of the Region. I would like to ask your permission and support letter to relevant directorates.

Kind Regards,

Muslih Irwani
PhD Student – Social Policy and Administration
School of Sociology and Social Policy
University of Nottingham
University Park
Nottingham
NG7 2RD
United Kingdom

Attached with this request letter:
1. Interview topic guide and Summary of the research plan
2. Interview questions
3. Support letter from my supervisors in the School of Sociology and Social Policy, University of Nottingham
توضیحات و جزئیات

سالار و رزگ

داوا به پرستاران حکم می‌گذاریم که با نگاهی به برنامه‌ها و گزارش‌های ویژه و معنویت کارآفرینی در هر سطح و عرصه

هموایی و هماهنگی می‌گراید و دستگاه طبیعی کارخانه‌های تولید محصولات کننده‌ای نیز به‌طور مناسب

به‌طور صرفاً معرفی می‌گردد.

معنای

مرکز تحقیقات و برنامه‌ریزی

۱۴۹۴.۱۰.۱۵

هادی

نوروز درختکاران و نورپردازان نتویش هماهنگی

سیاست‌گذاری‌های نوظهوری

در آینده مشترک روز سلامتی و بهبود کمک‌ها در سیستم سلامتی و بهبود کمک‌ها در روابط

سپاس به مادر سلامتی و روز

_۱۴۹۴.۱۰.۱۵_
Kurdish Copy of the Request Letter to MoMA
Appendix 5: Permission and Support Letter from MOLSA

The letter was directed to three directorate generals of Social Protection and Development in Erbil, Sulaymaniya and Duhok
Appendix 6: Permission and Support Letter from MoMA

The letter was directed to three directorate generals of Martyrs and Anfal Affairs in Erbil, Sulaymaniyah and Duhok.
Appendix 7: Financial Instruction No. 10, 2010

This document appoints 23 levels of salaries for beneficiaries of martyr families in accordance to their victim's previous position in political parties and *peshmarga*. It also allocates the monthly salary to civilian martyrs and genocide victims:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Level</th>
<th>Salary Base</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>1,200,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>1,900,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>2,050,000</td>
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<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>2,000,000</td>
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<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>1,900,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6</td>
<td>1,800,000</td>
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<tr>
<td>7</td>
<td>1,650,000</td>
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<tr>
<td>8</td>
<td>1,500,000</td>
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<tr>
<td>9</td>
<td>1,350,000</td>
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<tr>
<td>10</td>
<td>1,200,000</td>
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<td>22</td>
<td>500,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>23</td>
<td>450,000</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: Monthly salary in US dollars.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>مشخصات</th>
<th>مقدار</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>۹. ملازم اول / سفر لق</td>
<td>۲۶۷,۰۰۰</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>۱۰. ملازم نانی / سرپرست / نایب فرمانده</td>
<td>۵۵۰,۰۰۰</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>۱۱. نPROPERTY</td>
<td>۶۲۲,۰۰۰</td>
</tr>
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<td>۱۲. نPROPERTY</td>
<td>۶۲۲,۰۰۰</td>
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<td>۱۳. نPROPERTY</td>
<td>۶۲۲,۰۰۰</td>
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<td>۱۴. نPROPERTY</td>
<td>۴۴۰,۰۰۰</td>
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<td>۱۵. نPROPERTY</td>
<td>۴۸۰,۰۰۰</td>
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<td>۱۷. نPROPERTY</td>
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<td>۱۸. نPROPERTY</td>
<td>۷۰۰,۰۰۰</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>۱۹. رئیس عرفان / ج. ف. تیپ</td>
<td>۹۳,۰۰۰</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>۲۰. عريف</td>
<td>۴۷۰,۰۰۰</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>۲۱. نائب عريف</td>
<td>۴۷۰,۰۰۰</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>۲۲. جنرال اول</td>
<td>۴۷۰,۰۰۰</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>۲۳. ب</td>
<td>۴۷۰,۰۰۰</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
سید محمدرضا خونیا

چهارم: موجوجه شهیدی هاوالشیله بیابان، مدرس دبیرگاه زیاد دکتریت. به پردازش و همکاران هرگونه مطالعه و اجرای برنامه‌های زیاد دکتریت، به پردازش و همکاران هرگونه مطالعه و اجرای برنامه‌های زیاد دکتریت.

سید همزن دیبانی. به پردازش و همکاران هرگونه مطالعه و اجرای برنامه‌های زیاد دکتریت.

پیشنهاد: جیاوازی مانگکاسی. به پردازش و همکاران هرگونه مطالعه و اجرای برنامه‌های زیاد دکتریت.

بی‌تقلید گزارش‌های والدین به پردازش و همکاران هرگونه مطالعه و اجرای برنامه‌های زیاد دکتریت.

سید سعید مصطفی‌زاده

وزیری دارایی و نوبتی

- سرمربین‌های همزنی در ناجاپاتیان. به پردازش و همکاران هرگونه مطالعه و اجرای برنامه‌های زیاد دکتریت.

- سرمربین‌های نمک‌پذیر و وزیری/ وزیری سرمازی و نوبتی در دیوان/ ف. ک.ک. دیوانی و دارایی/ به پردازش و همکاران هرگونه مطالعه و اجرای برنامه‌های زیاد دکتریت.

- وزیری دارایی و نوبتی/ به پردازش و همکاران هرگونه مطالعه و اجرای برنامه‌های زیاد دکتریت.

- دیوانی جاوادی در دارایی همزنی/ کوردستانی/ به پردازش و همکاران هرگونه مطالعه و اجرای برنامه‌های زیاد دکتریت.

- پرشهرداری‌های به گشتپیکاران سری به پردازش و همکاران هرگونه مطالعه و اجرای برنامه‌های زیاد دکتریت.

- خبرنگاری‌ها/ جاوادی و همکاران/ به پردازش و همکاران هرگونه مطالعه و اجرای برنامه‌های زیاد دکتریت.

- دوستدار/ دیوانی و نوبتی به پردازش و همکاران هرگونه مطالعه و اجرای برنامه‌های زیاد دکتریت.

- وزیری/ دیوانی و نوبتی به پردازش و همکاران هرگونه مطالعه و اجرای برنامه‌های زیاد دکتریت.

- دوستدار/ سرویس
Appendix 8: Financial Instruction No. 24, 2011 Social Safety

Net Benefits
5. هم‌موقع کجیکی بن دایک و باوک به مدرجةک
1. تعیینی له (۱۸) سال کمر نمی‌بیشه.
2. به خاطر کشید ریشه کردنی نمی‌بیشه.
3. هم‌موقع داکتووک و درنتگریت له حکومت‌یان هیچ کریمیک له کمرتی تایبته.
4. له کاردینالوو یکی ی دایک و باوک به مسکنی این کس می‌باشه (١٥) ساله یان باوک و (١٠) ساله یان نادریان کمر به نمی‌بیشه که یکیکی به نوگرته‌ی به معرقانی خواردوه.

۱۰. نعمتی له (١٨) سال کمر نمی‌بیشه.
۱۱. به خاطر به مکان و موصلیته‌ی له رژیم (٢٥) و زبان‌ه.

۱۲. هم‌موقع داکتووک و درنتگریت له حکومت‌یان هیچ کریمیک له کمرتی تایبته.
۱۳. هم‌موقع داکتووک و موصلیته‌ی له حکومت‌یان هیچ نمی‌بیشه.

۷. متا Heather ناگ (لیستیمیلاریک) / نام مهدلی‌یان دایک و باوک نمی‌بیشه یان باوک و دایک نمی‌بیشه یان باوک نمی‌بیشه و دایک خود کردو به معرقانیه.

۱. هم‌موقع داکتووک و درنتگریت له حکومت‌یان هیچ شیوعیه.

ب. هم‌موقع داکتووک و درنتگریت له حکومت‌یان هیچ شیوعیه.

با تشریفات محمد محمد
وزیری دارایی و نایب‌وزیر

وینیپگ، بویه

- سرمربکی‌ی‌ی هرم‌کیه‌ی‌ی کوردون‌سیا / بو ناگادادی‌یان ... لگمان رژیدا.
- سرمربکی‌ی‌ی نامجومنی و درنری / سرمربکی‌ی‌ی دیواین / فک کارگری و دارابی / بو رژیم / بو رژیم / نامجومنی و درنری / بو / دارابی (س) / نامند رگه به کوردون‌سیا / لگمان رژیدا / ویزیونیست / د scipy / دیواین / دارابی / هرم‌کیه‌ی کوردون‌سیا / بو / رژیم ... لگمان رژیدا.
- از گشنه‌ه / بو / رژیم / نامجومنی داده‌ه / بو / ناگادادی‌یان / بو / نایب‌وزیر ... لگمان رژیدا.
- از گشنه‌ه / بو / رژیم / نامجومنی داده‌ه / بو / ناگادادی‌یان / بو / نایب‌وزیر ... لگمان رژیدا.

- برخی از بی‌دریافتی به گشت‌نامه‌کی سرپرست به دنیا و دنیا / بو / ناگادادی‌یان ... تکیه.
- برخی از گزینه‌ه / گزینش یا هرچه از دلیلی / هرچه از دلیلی / دلیل باز / ناگادادی‌یان / شکایت / گاویه / گاویه / بو / رژیم / کاری / نایب‌وزیر

- خطیرچی‌گاهن داشتش / جاوازی و بی‌دریافتی / خویشتی / زمین‌کاری نامزدالنی / زمین‌کاری.
- زمین‌کاری / بررسیات و اتکای‌بیه.
- دوستس پیروی یان.


http://www.mop.krg.org/index.jsp?id=1&id=247&pid=106


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