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NEGOTIATING THE ‘RACIAL’ AND ETHNIC BOUNDARIES OF CITIZENSHIP: WHITE SOUTH AFRICAN MIGRANTS IN THE UK AND THEIR SENSE OF BELONGING

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Abstract

This PhD thesis is based on a qualitative interview study of white South Africans who have migrated to the UK in the post-apartheid era, focusing on their sense of belonging and ‘racial’/ethnic boundary-processes in society. With the increasing South African emigration in the post-apartheid era, the UK has been South Africans’ primary destination. Nevertheless, this migrant group has received relatively little scholarly attention. It could seem as though South Africans have been considered less interesting for research purposes, as their typical status as white and relatively privileged migrants appears to have made them better perceived by the British state apparatus and public than many ‘non-white’ and other disadvantaged migrants (Crawford 2011).

By investigating migrants’ sense of belonging, this thesis complements the traditional preoccupations with the formal rights and duties of citizenship (e.g. Marshall 1998 [1963]). Moreover, the analytical insights of ‘intersectionality’ can rectify the one-dimensional conceptualisations (e.g. Kymlicka 1995) which run the risk of labelling all members of an ethnic minority or migrant group as equally disadvantaged without considering how social categories like gender and class might position them differently in particular ‘social hierarchies’. ‘Intersectionality’ – as typically applied to reveal intersecting categorisations/oppressions affecting multiply disadvantaged groups such as black women – can therefore be employed also when demonstrating how members of relatively privileged groups may be situated differently according to ethnicity, class, gender, and so on. Noticeably, varying forms of inclusion and exclusion can be negotiated simultaneously depending on the social categories being underscored (Yuval-Davis 2011a). The psychosocial concerns affecting even relatively privileged migrant groups – as migrants in a new context – are evidenced by the ways in which white South Africans negotiate away boundaries of exclusion by drawing on the more privileged aspects of their group status in order to distinguish themselves from disadvantaged groups in British and South African society.
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1. Introduction

1.1 My Argument

This PhD thesis is based on a qualitative interview study of white South African migrants who have migrated to the UK in the post-apartheid era – from 1994 onwards. The increasing South African emigration in the post-apartheid era can partially be explained by the formal end of the white apartheid regime and the opening up of South African borders. The UK has been the primary destination for South Africans with roughly half of all South African émigrés in the world residing in the country (Andrucki 2010: 359). The 2011 Census for England and Wales shows that South Africans make up the 8th largest group of non-UK born residents (Office for National Statistics 2012).\(^1\) Figures on the ‘racial’ backgrounds of South African migrants to the UK, however, may well reveal a ‘racial’ bias in British immigration and citizenship policies. Although the end of the structurally racist apartheid regime has allowed an increasing amount of ‘non-white’ South Africans to leave South Africa, as many as an estimated 90% of South Africans in the UK can be classified as white (Sveinsson and Gumuschian 2008: 1). This is in marked contrast to the population make-up in South Africa itself, whereby the white population makes up less than 9% of the total population (Statistics South Africa 2012).\(^2\) Against this backdrop, this thesis will focus on how white South Africans negotiate citizenship as reflected in their sense of belonging and the associated ‘racial’ and ethnic boundary-processes in British and South African society. The thesis will argue that white South Africans in the UK,

\(^1\) One might claim that South Africans make up the joint 7th largest group with Nigerians, as both groups have a count of 191,000 when the numbers are rounded up. However, looking at the numbers in more detail, it would appear that Nigerians make up a slightly larger number at 191,183 as opposed to 191,023 for South Africans (Nomis 2013).

\(^2\) Numbers from the 2011 population census in South Africa show that the main population groups in the South African population were distributed thus: black people (79.6%), ‘coloured’ – people of mixed ‘racial’/ethnic origins – (9.0%), white people (8.9%), and Asian – with an Indian majority – (2.5%) (Statistics South Africa 2012).
as a relatively privileged migrant group, maintain ‘racial’/ethnic boundaries to preserve their privileges as a response to the experienced or perceived challenges towards their group status. Briefly, the ‘privileges’ that white South African migrants are perceived to possess – putting them at a relative advantage in the socio-political structures in which they operate – include: their ‘whiteness’; education and socio-economic status in the global transnational employment market; colonial ties as associated with the UK’s tiered immigration/visa and citizenship system; language proficiency; and socio-cultural background (Sveinsson and Gumuschian 2008).

Of course, however, it is important not to make wide generalisations of a particular group. Each agent will possess a different degree of each of these privileges and, therefore, individual participants’ amount of privileges, in contrast to any disadvantages, will be determined by their social positions in various categories. In order to facilitate sensitivity to what precisely can be said to make white South Africans more privileged than other groups in different circumstances, as well as the internal variations of how certain white South Africans are more privileged than other white South Africans, I shall apply an intersectional approach. This entails borrowing the insight that has primarily been associated with gender theory; that is, the importance of analysing how different social categories might intersect with each other. Traditionally, ‘intersectionality’ was introduced by black feminist activists who understood black women as doubly/multiply disadvantaged due to the criss-crossing effects of both gender oppression and racism, owing to their social locations as both female and black. This provided an important corrective to identity politics, such as earlier versions of feminism, that tended to ignore other social categories such as ‘race’ in their exclusive focus on gender (McCall 2005). This ‘intersectional insight’ has informed the present study in arguing that white South Africans seek to preserve their privileges, which is a response to the experienced or perceived challenges towards their group status. This is because an intersectional approach enables us to specify how the disadvantages that white South Africans experience or perceive with regard to certain categories – such as their migrant status and/or perceived loss of privileges after the transition from apartheid to post-apartheid – can be counteracted by their more privileged status in other categories – such as the cultural repertoires attached to their ‘whiteness’ and/or relative socio-
economic affluence. An intersectional approach can in this sense help us to consider through which categories migrants make investments when negotiating ‘racial’ and ethnic boundaries, pointing us to “the amount of leeway variously situated subjects have to deploy particular components of their identities in certain contexts” (Nash 2008: 11). In essence, an intersectional approach is shown to have a methodological and practical function as a tool that has guided my analysis in comprehending the complexities of the white South Africans’ reproductions or constructions of ‘racial’ and ethnic boundaries, as well as making a theoretically informed contribution with regard to its obligation to analyse citizenship through its multifaceted identity dimensions rather than as a single status (Cherubini 2011).

1.2 Research Questions and Rationale

The research questions which have shaped this study should be seen in conjunction with the qualitative methodological framework. Although other data materials such as historical analysis, policy documents and field notes have been collected, the main data material consists of 30 qualitative and semi-structured interviews lasting around one hour to as long as two hours each with participants in London and a few other British locations. The interviews enabled relatively rich data material, as participants have been encouraged to talk about matters that concern them within some pre-defined parameters developed in tandem with the research questions. Thus, the main research questions that I address are:

- How do white South Africans come to terms with and negotiate the experience of migrating from South Africa to the UK and, potentially, facing immigration and citizenship policy restrictions?
- In negotiating certain aspects of immigration and citizenship policies, do white South Africans feel that they belong in British society and, if so, in which ways? To what extent might a sense of belonging to South Africa be retained?
- How are ‘racial’ and ethnic boundaries reproduced or crossed in this negotiation process, and what might this imply for ‘racial’/ethnic relations and
related processes of socio-economic inequality in British as well as in South African society?

The first research question revolves around how white South Africans come to terms with and negotiate immigration and citizenship policies. As such, it is important to remind ourselves of the continued salience of politicians representing the state in devising immigration and citizenship policies which include some, while excluding others, from the particular state’s territory (Brubaker 1992). The state has retained this power over its population despite the fact that explanations of the decline of the state (e.g. Soysal 1994) might look rather appealing in a globalising climate with intensified international flows of communication, information, goods and people across national borders (Bauman 1998). The consequences for the migrant if denied legal entrance to and residence on the territory of a particular state should not be underestimated, particularly when considering the large psychological and material investments that migrants put into migrating to a different society with the possible aim of making it their new home (Bellamy 2008: chap. 3). In terms of British immigration and citizenship policies, Mark Israel (1999: 86) argues that white South Africans have generally benefited from a greater variety of routes into the UK than ‘non-white’ South Africans, either through legislation or by having a vantage point with their white skin colour in benefitting from the discretionary power of immigration officials and negotiating citizenship rights.

However, recent policy restrictions in the UK have also affected certain white South Africans (Crawford 2011; McGhee 2009). As South African migrants may be classified as ‘non-EEA nationals’, all South Africans irrespective of skin colour who cannot secure access through other visa and citizenship routes, now have to go through the stricter criteria of the new points-based migration system (Wray 2009). In tandem with this, the working holiday visa – previously a popular visa route for South Africans – has been phased out for any prospective South African migrant under the stipulations of the points-based migration system (Crawford 2009; 2011). Although such developments imply that legal access will increasingly be granted only to those South Africans with adequate ancestral ties, or with enough education and work experience to pass through the points-based migration system – both groups overrepresented by white South Africans
we can, nonetheless, suspect that a stricter immigration and citizenship policy environment has not passed unnoticed by even those white South Africans with relatively secure immigration statuses. In this sense, it must be clarified that the first research question shall be less concerned with how precisely the different routes to legal access in the UK might be tapped into by white South Africans, as I believe that more interesting sociological data can be yielded by paying closer attention to how white South Africans come to terms with and make sense of these recently implemented policy restrictions. In any case, before elaborating on the interview accounts of the white South African participants in *talking about* such restrictions, the relevant background information will first be provided in Chapter 2 in order to sketch out the legal and contextual ramifications of the policy restrictions.

The first research question provides a crucial link to and is strengthened by the second research question on the sense of belonging to various locations amongst white South African migrants in the UK, or where they perceive their ‘home’ to be (Yuval-Davis 2006; 2011a). Indeed, citizenship – as a central concept running throughout this thesis – does not merely concern the legal or formal aspects embedded in the relationship between an individual and a particular state, as some liberal scholars would seem inclined to think (e.g. Rawls (1998 [1985]). Citizenship also concerns ‘belonging’, a realisation which makes citizenship a ‘thicker’ concept than it traditionally has been defined. Hence, belonging “is not just about membership, rights, and duties, but also about the emotions that such memberships evoke” and “[b]elonging is a deep emotional need of people” (Yuval-Davis 2004: 215). Analysing white South Africans’ negotiations of citizenship through the more informal aspects evoked by their sense of ‘belonging’ entails that it is not only white South Africans with British citizenship status that have been included here, but also white South African who are not currently in possession of formal British citizenship and/or have no desire to obtain this in the foreseeable future.

It must be confessed that the concept of ‘belonging’ closely resembles and significantly overlaps with that of ‘identity’ and that I have, at times, used the two concepts interchangeably. Having said that, I would like to claim that my research departs from some of the current ‘identity research’ in which, according to Brubaker and Cooper (2000), identity comes to mean virtually everything and is
not necessarily tied to anything of greater essence. In this research, however, South Africans’ sense of belonging/identity is tied to the potential impact of immigration/citizenship policies and how these policies might construct certain ‘racial’/ethnic boundaries in society. Therefore, it will frequently be reminded that the need to ‘belong’ amongst ordinary people is often exploited by dominant politicians representing the socio-spatial formations of specific nation-states, as encapsulated in Yuval-Davis’ (2006; 2011a) concept of ‘the politics of belonging’. Rather than accepting the complex and multiple ways in which people can belong to different spaces and places, it is worrying that politicians in various European states have increasingly accommodated the ethnic majority at the expense of ‘outsiders’ by promoting national citizenship as a significant value for ‘social cohesion’ and the integration of immigrants and ethnic minorities into mainstream society (Però 2011; 2013). In the British context, the White Paper Secure Borders, Safe Haven insists that “those seeking to settle here develop a sense of belonging, an identity and shared mutual understanding [with British citizens]” (Home Office 2002: 27).

Because of their skin colour, coupled with the fact that some white South Africans have British ancestral ties and many more have been exposed to the colonial influence that Britain exerted in South Africa (Epstein 1998), dominant political voices might assume that white South Africans would feel that they ‘belong’ in British society. This is an assumption that is perhaps best reflected in the fact that that the majority of South Africans who have been welcomed in the UK are white. Such a positive reception vis-à-vis ‘non-white’ migrants possibly makes white South Africans feel more ‘British’. However, this cannot be taken at face value, as having British ancestral ties, for example, does not mean that the South African in question immediately settles into British society. Indeed, the South African in question might have grown up in South African society and never set foot in the UK before (Tsuda 2009). In tandem with stricter immigration policies, there is also evidence of hardened and re-emerging anti-immigration sentiments in Western European countries whereby even migrants with deep attachments to a particular nation are deemed as ‘not belonging’ (Skey 2011: Introduction). It is perhaps of particular concern that the UK ranks as the country in which the population is most anxious about immigration, amongst all of the eight countries in Western Europe and North America that have taken part in a
relatively recent Transatlantic Trends survey (2010). As belonging can be as much about how other ‘groups’ perceive one’s own ‘group’ as it can be about how the members of this particular group perceive themselves (Jenkins 2008: chap. 3), a sense of belonging to South African society might prevail amongst my participants as a response to certain elements of an anti-immigration climate in British society. However, a sense of belonging to South Africa can also be negotiated alongside a sense of belonging to British society, when bearing in mind research showing that migrants are very much capable of negotiating a transnational sense of belonging including their home as well as their host society (see e.g. Nagel and Staeheli 2008). Yet again, we cannot ignore how a relatively positive reception by the majority of people in the UK – owing to certain characteristics deemed to be ‘desirable’ such as their skin colour and cultural attachments to the UK – could render a stronger sense of belonging to British society. Such considerations have thus been kept in mind in the spirit of my second research question.

With regard to the third and final research question on how ‘racial’ and ethnic boundaries are reproduced or crossed, it should now be clear that belonging might not only relate to territorial affiliation to a nation-state, but also to the formations and maintenance of social ‘groups’. Indeed, “[c]onstructing boundaries and borders [including along ‘racial’ or ethnic lines] that differentiate between those who belong, and those who do not, determines and colors the meaning of the particular belonging” (Yuval-Davis 2004: 216). In this sense, an interesting take on ‘whiteness’ and the ‘racial’/ethnic boundary-processes amongst South Africans emerge in the analysis of those who have migrated to the UK. Bearing in mind the history of apartheid, it is interesting to explore whether and to what extent white South Africans who have migrated to the UK in the post-apartheid era hold similar or different attitudes towards other ‘racial’ or ethnic groups than suggested by their exposure to – or for some perhaps even explicit implications with – the apartheid regime in South Africa. Although a number of studies have considered the experiences of white South Africans and how they have come to terms with the changes from white apartheid rule to democracy in South African society (see e.g. Durrheim and Dixon 2000; Steyn 2001; Wale and Foster 2007), Melissa Steyn stresses that “[r]elatively little work has been done on white diasporas, which, besides being of intrinsic interest in themselves, also can
throw light on racial dynamics within the center [the UK in this case]” (2001: xxxi). Addressing the ‘racial’ dynamics prevalent in the UK through the lenses of white South Africans could help us to discern how white people in this particular context have been rendered ‘invisible’ by political projects justifying or concealing the appropriation of resources by white people in general at the detriment of ‘racial others’ (Dyer 1997). Coming from a numerical minority status in South Africa, white South Africans now find themselves in a British society in which the numerical majority is white (Steyn 2001: xxv). This fact possibly renders white South Africans ‘invisible’ as opposed to more disadvantaged and ‘non-white’ migrants whom, in turn, may be more frequently singled out as ‘others’ simply due to the colour of their skin. By also considering white South Africans’ relationship with South African society from their UK locations, I also hope to throw light on ‘racial’ and ethnic boundaries in post-apartheid South Africa through the case of white South Africans who have left the country for a shorter or longer period, rather than merely focusing on those remaining in South Africa as previous studies have done (see e.g. Durrheim and Dixon 2000; Steyn 2001; Wale and Foster 2007).

We cannot proceed without establishing that ‘race’ and ethnicity – albeit often interchangeable – will at times be understood in a different sense. Whereas ‘race’ refers to South Africans of white, ‘mixed race’, black, or Asian background – by using the population groups that the South African census operates with – ethnic group will refer to the multitude of ethnic groups that exists within these main categories of people from different ‘racial’ backgrounds. Thus, the two main ethnic categories of white South Africans taking up the main attention in this thesis are commonly presented as white English-speaking and white Afrikaans-speaking South Africans (Statistics South Africa 2012). English-speaking white South Africans originate from Britain as well as other European countries, whereas Afrikaans-speaking white South Africans are people of Dutch descent including some other European influences. These labels refer to the main

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3 The official term used is ‘coloured’, which is a term invented by the white colonial establishment in South Africa, but which is still used as an identity marker by ‘coloured’ people themselves (Statistics South Africa 2012).
language that the two groups of white South Africans have been taught in while at school, meaning that English-speaking people have primarily been taught in English, whereas Afrikaans-speaking people have primarily been taught in Afrikaans. This does not exclude, however, the fact that both people from the English-speaking and the Afrikaans-speaking groups have also been taught in the other group’s primary language as their secondary language at school. In total, Afrikaans-speaking people make up about 60% of the white population in South Africa, while English-speaking people comprise the remaining 40% of the white population in the country (Griffiths and Prozesky 2010: 25-6).

It must be stressed that I have put inverted commas around ‘race’ throughout this thesis, as I am not accepting ‘race’ as a fact of life, or as a concept in the manner in which it has been used in racist ideologies to refer to the essentialist and erroneous view that a specific ‘racial group’ consists of people with significant biological differences from other ‘groups’ (see Eia and Ihle 2011: chap. 8). Ethnicity can, of course, easily slip into such racist ideologies itself by, at times, being related to ‘race’ in some political and populist understandings. However, I have not put inverted commas around ethnicity, as this concept is usually better perceived in the academic world as a reference to the various cultural influences affecting different ethnic groups within a specific ‘racial’ category (Lutz et al. 2011). This is, for example, evidenced in the distinction between English-speaking and Afrikaans-speaking white South Africans as being influenced by different cultural practices in the form of the main language being taught at school. Nonetheless, it is important to acknowledge that ethnic, as well as ‘racial’, categories are in their very essence socially constructed categories. What constitute ‘race’ and ethnicity, respectively, can change according to different understandings of various political and social actors, and might depend on the specific context(s) that we are referring to (Yuval-Davis 2006; 2011a).

Furthermore, it is demonstrated that an intersectional approach can best distil white South Africans’ reproduction or construction of ‘racial’ and ethnic boundaries. Recognising that my approach to intersectionality is only one of many different ways of doing and theorising intersectionality (see McCall 2005), I adhere to the view that intersectionality should not be considered as a single theory with only one possible definition that rigidly dictates how intersectionality should be applied in all circumstances (cf. Anthias 2012). In intersectional
research, I would claim that we need to prioritise certain categories that fit our research questions, or we would risk falling into the trap of attending to all sorts of endless categorical differences and thereby lose our main focus of analysis (Luft 2009). In the particular intersectional approach adopted here, it will be recognised that boundaries of ‘race’ and ethnicity may be influenced by class and gender positions, for example, and the societal assumptions that are attached to these. Nevertheless, the focus has stayed on the negotiations of ‘race’ and ethnicity in relation to such other categories and not, say, how class or gender is negotiated in isolation from ‘race’/ethnicity.

1.3 The Intersectionality of Privileges/Disadvantages

The type of privileges that white South Africans are deemed to possess, to varying degrees, were briefly listed at the beginning of this introduction. However, it is important to define what is meant by ‘privileges’ in a theoretical sense as well. According to Wale and Foster, “[p]rivilege exists when one group has something of value that is denied to another group simply because of their group status and not because of anything they have done or failed to do” (2007: 49). In order to understand this operation of privileges, the ‘racial’/ethnic identities of individual migrants are carefully reflected upon, as well as the effects of their positions within societal structures and wider power relations. This is done with the acknowledgement that intersectional research has been criticised for limiting its focus merely to describe agents’ different identities, at the expense of also accounting for the importance of the potential impacts of broader structural relations (see Hulko 2009; Walby et al. 2012 for this critique). The awareness of the structural/contextual meanings of ‘race’ and ethnicity and other intersecting categories, then, provides a means of analysing the spatial- and time-contingent nature of categories in the way in which they have been applied by powerful actors in the particular societies – with reference to the UK and South Africa. This research may help in highlighting how the categories under investigation are “emergent rather than given and unchangeable, located in the operations of power” (Anthias 2012: 6). Stressing the importance of categories as politically constructed and reflective of power relations is furthermore of essence
insofar as we are to comprehend how categorisations “affect beliefs about what is possible or desirable and define the contours of individuals’ opportunities and life chances” (Cole 2009: 173), or what Pred has referred to as “the intersection of individual paths with institutional projects occurring at specific temporal and spatial locations” (1984: 282).

It would seem relevant to draw attention to, in more detail, the various structural and contextual conditions which might render white South Africans privileged in relation to certain other groups. As it has been mentioned that the majority of South Africans in the UK can be classified as white even though white South Africans only make up a small minority of the South African population in South Africa itself, it is clearly the case that a sizeable number of white South Africans have been enabled to draw upon British or other European ancestral ties to gain legal access and residence status in the UK. Even for white South Africans without such ties, the legacy of apartheid and the associated socio-economic inequalities in the post-apartheid era – in general working to white South Africans’ advantage⁴ – have facilitated their move to the UK in a policy environment privileging more affluent and educated migrants (Sveinsson and Gumuschian 2008). Their socio-economic status is perhaps especially reflected in the British labour market, “where South Africans generally appear to fare well, on a par with migrants from high income countries rather than developing countries” (Sveinsson and Gumuschian 2008: 14).⁵ Although the situation may have worsened for South Africans too with the recent ‘financial crisis’, white South Africans do not invariably seem to suffer the same level of ‘de-skilling’ that more disadvantaged migrant groups generally report when migrating to a different country (cf. May et al. 2007). Indeed, it appears that a number of white South Africans are employed in higher-paid sectors in the UK such as finance and IT, or

⁴ Numbers referring to 2005/6 show that: white people’s share of household income was strikingly 5 times their share of the population; for Indian/Asian people it was almost twice their population share; for ‘mixed race’ people it was closely aligned to their population share; whereas for black people it was only half their population share (Statistics South Africa 2008: 34).

⁵ Yet, South Africa is classified as a ‘developing country’ according to a classification based on different world region areas in the Labour Force Survey (Data Management and Analysis Group 2005: 94).
have set up their own businesses or enterprises (Sveinsson and Gumuschian 2008). In London, where the majority of South Africans in the UK are concentrated, the representation of South Africans in the ‘business activities’ sector is 30% when compared to the 16% average for developing countries, while in the ‘financial intermediation’ sector their representation accounts for 13% as opposed to the mere 5% average for developing countries (Data Management and Analysis Group 2005: 68-70). Another revealing statistic is that South Africans in London have an employment rate (84%) that is considerably higher than that for the total London-population (73%) (Data Management and Analysis Group 2005: 40).6

Owing to such statistics, South Africans – whom here need to be specified as white South Africans in particular – conceivably qualify as a relatively privileged migrant group even in the light of recent policy restrictions for migrants (see McGhee 2009). Indeed, such restrictions seemingly qualify those South Africans who are able to pass or circumvent them as people with more pertinent resources at their disposal than South Africans who are unable to do so. Even by being able to travel to and possibly make the UK their new ‘home’, South Africans who are coming all the way to the UK can already be seen as more privileged than the majority of people that are unable, for various reasons, to leave South Africa if they so wish (see e.g. Bauman 1998 for his argument that ‘mobility’ constitutes a privilege in our globalised world). Of course, also certain white South Africans are incapable of leaving South Africa in this sense (see e.g. Simpson 2013); however, the statistical evidence confirms that the majority of those struggling in conditions of poverty and relative ‘immobility’ in South Africa are ‘non-white’ people owing largely to the apartheid legacy (Statistics South Africa 2008: 34). Once in the UK, the importance of the underlying ‘racial’ connotations favouring white South Africans as opposed to ‘non-white’ migrants in a white majority context such as the UK, should not be dismissed lightly. Their exposure to the English language and the cultural/colonial ties to Britain that many white South Africans can draw upon appear to constitute further advantages

6 All the numbers referring to South Africans in this paragraph also include some ‘non-white’ South Africans, but the numbers would nevertheless be significantly overrepresented by white South Africans (see Sveinsson and Gumuschian 2008).
to their integration in British society (Sveinsson and Gumuschian 2008). Researching white South Africans in the UK as a group that has received surprisingly little academic attention compared to other migrants, thus questions the taken-for-granted correlation that is oftentimes being drawn in migration research, according to Kynsilehto (2011), between a status as migrants and a status as inevitable victims of the host societal structures.

Although providing this corrective to migration research, it shall nonetheless be demonstrated that it is vital to apply an intersectional approach in order to distil in which sense white South Africans in the UK can be said to be privileged, as there are certain factors that can put a privileged status at some considerable ‘risk’ (Spencer 2006: chap. 7). These factors do not necessarily constitute a real threat as such, but can relate more realistically to a perceived threat as participants feel that privileges that previously were taken-for-granted due to the preferential treatment that they received within a certain category, such as their ‘whiteness’ during the apartheid era, have now come ‘under siege’. In the South African context it has been well-documented how some white South Africans, despite still being in the most socio-economic privileged positions as a group, have struggled to come to terms with the fact that the white apartheid state has been dismantled and that formal democracy has been introduced in a country in which white South Africans make up a small minority (see e.g. Durrheim and Dixon 2000; Steyn 2001; Wale and Foster 2007). However, those white South Africans who have migrated to the UK not only have to adapt to the significant historical changes that occurred back in South Africa, but also have to navigate a new socio-spatial context as they go through their everyday lives in British society. Furthermore, despite benefitting from a relatively positive reception – as opposed to various other migrants – white South Africans are not necessarily considered as part of the ‘British nation’ in all circumstances. This discrimination may occur in subtler ways than may be evident with regard to other migrants in that their white skin colour does not immediately mark them as ‘different’. Yet, white South Africans may, for instance, be singled out because of their ‘South African accent’. This points to the internal boundaries of ‘whiteness’ (Garner

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7 However, a few notable exceptions include Andrucki 2010; Crawford 2009; 2011; Israel 1999; Sveinsson and Gumuschian 2008.
suggesting that the modern nation-state project of distinguishing ‘natives’ from ‘foreigners’ is so important to some members of the white British majority that even white migrants seen in a comparatively positive light can become excluded (McGhee 2009).

An important lesson that can be learned, then, is that inasmuch as they are part of a relatively privileged group, a privileged status is never secured once and for all even for white South Africans in the UK. To be sure, there are valid reasons to claim that it is easier for white South Africans to engage in such negotiations of citizenship when allowing for the possibility that certain structural conditions enable them to draw on vaster cultural resources than more disadvantaged groups. However, internal differences do of course occur within the white South African population in the UK according to lines of ethnicity, class, gender, and so on, that would need to be considered through an intersectional lens. White South Africans would, moreover, still have to ‘tap into’ the varying levels of individual resources at their disposal (see Bourdieu 2004 [1983] for a theoretical exposition of various forms of ‘capitals’ that ordinary people can employ; see Erel 2010 for an empirical illustration with regard to migrants). I will thereby recognise that it would always require at least some negotiation and agency on the part of individuals perceived to belong to the particular group, if they are to secure their own individual claims to the privileges that the group status may confer upon them (Wale and Foster 2007). With this recognition, it is indicated that “[t]he boundaries between ethnic groups are not only symbolic, but they may be material as well” and that “[o]ne’s location within a specific ethnic group may shape one’s access to these material resources” (Ryan 2010: 361). It is therefore in the process of such negotiations that it can become especially relevant for some white South Africans to draw certain boundaries to secure their privileges amidst any threats to these. Thus, white South Africans’ relatively privileged social locations within certain categories – such as their white skin colour and socio-economic status – can be ‘activated’ and utilised in order to cancel out the challenges to their privileges that they are reporting with regard to other categories – for example, their status as migrants in the UK and/or the perceived loss of privileges for white South Africans in the post-apartheid era.

By demonstrating in an intersectional way that migrants can be carriers of both privileges and disadvantages at the same time – depending upon which
social categories are made salient – I also hope to contribute to a more nuanced picture than do intersectional scholars who *exclusively* focus on the intersecting *disadvantages* that are affecting certain migrant and ethnic minority groups (see Nash 2008: 8-10 for this critique). An inclusion of *both* privileges and disadvantages as experienced and negotiated by migrants could provide us with a stark reminder that identities are not only multiple and intersecting, but that there are also important power relations and competition for resources in terms of the amounts of privileges – contra the disadvantages – that are attached to various, and hierarchically ordered, identity positions in society. Or as Patricia Hill Collins would phrase this, to be committed to the study of society as an unequal playing field we should recognise that “[e]ach individual derives varying amounts of penalty and privilege from the multiple systems of oppression which frame everyone’s lives” (1993: 621).

As substantiating my argument, I will not only follow the traditional preoccupation of intersectional research in looking for differences, but also the instances in which – despite white South Africans’ different ethnic, class or gender positions – they may *imagine* themselves as a unified ‘group’. We should not underestimate, for instance, the cultural resources and linguistic repertoire of white South Africans situated in lower class positions as they, too, might claim membership to a relatively privileged group such as that of white South Africans in the UK. The intersectional approach can thus reveal that, in some circumstances, it might be perceived as more important for some white South Africans than for others – for example those in relatively disadvantaged positions within the white South African group – to establish their belonging to this particular group and, by extension, their access to any associated privileges attached to being members of the group. This internal unification process may, in addition, bolster South Africans’ group status externally in the sense that “members of groups, while being highly differentiated internally, may engage in an essentializing and to some extent a standardizing of their public image, thus advancing their group identity in a simplified, collectivized way” (Eide 2010: 76). Hence, although ‘essentialism’ is a highly contested concept, we should not ignore how ordinary people still reproduce essentialising ideas originating, for instance, from dominant political rhetoric. The intersectional approach adopted here is sensitive to the instances in which such essentialising and possibly
'unifying’ notions may take precedence over any internal differentiations amongst South Africans.

Being sensitive to commonalities in participants’ accounts, however, is of course not to say that a clear-cut and unanimous representation of a South African identity would necessarily be constructed by participants in all instances. Indeed, we should embrace the potential value of qualitative interviewing in enabling us to extrapolate relatively rich material with the representation of the various nuances and ambiguities that exist in people’s accounts (see e.g. Creswell 2009: chap. 9). To illustrate, it is shown that most participants express a deep national sense of pride of being part of a post-apartheid South African identity that is inclusive of people from all ‘racial’ and ethnic backgrounds, as most famously encapsulated in the politically-generated notion of the ‘rainbow nation’. Yet, a closer inspection sometimes reveals that the legacy of apartheid – with the underlying ‘racial’ animosity towards ‘non-white’ people – has not vanished completely. This is demonstrated by the way in which participants would celebrate certain aspects of their South African identity which are perceived to put them in a positive light – such as the ‘rainbow nation’ construction – but then distance themselves from or confront other aspects of their South African identity that they would not like to be associated with and which, sometimes, take on ‘racial’ or ethnic connotations. For instance, it might be deemed necessary to avoid any associations with dominant Western narratives depicting South Africa as ‘developing’, ‘conflict-ridden’ and ‘black’ by critiquing, implicitly or more explicitly, conditions in post-apartheid South Africa as opposed to conditions during apartheid. Perhaps to maintain privileges against any challenges to their attainment of these privileges, participants may also be unable or unwilling to go into details about how their current position of relative privileges in the UK originates partially from illegitimate means through the historical injustices that white South Africans as a group have inflicted upon ‘non-white’ people.

Obviously, we are right to read white South Africans’ various negotiations of citizenship as a response to the psycho-social concerns that they experience in dealing with the momentous historical transformations back in South Africa, and for leaving ‘their’ country behind to resettle in a different society in which they may not feel fully accepted as such (Geschiere 2009; Yuval-Davis 2011a). Responding to their psycho-social concerns, some white South Africans would
possibly see no other way than to direct adverse attention to other groups in South African and British society in order to neutralise any concerns towards their own group status. As expressed by Stephen Spencer, “[t]he maintenance of boundaries through the use of stereotyped images [of other groups] is an activity central to one's own identity and security in a recognisable social world” (2006: 175). It would need to be specified, however, that I am not saying that the white South Africans would necessarily act on certain negative attitudes towards other ‘racial’ and ethnic groups, as similar research shows that it is often the case that “tension and suspicion between the groups is deeply ingrained, but rarely voiced openly” (Spencer 2006: 179). Thus, my interviews with the white South Africans have possibly enabled them to voice their opinions about other groups that normally would not have been expressed openly – particularly if any members of the mentioned groups had been present during the interviews. To some extent, this could also provide a partial reason as to why my white Norwegian background was only occasionally and subtly opposed by the interview participants, who would rather point to other groups if blame of any kind was distributed.

Having said this, a more comprehensive explanation is perhaps provided by also accounting for the ways in which potential racist attitudes might be ‘hidden’ and more likely to affect groups that, generally speaking, are considered to be significantly lower down in the perceived ‘social hierarchies’ in South African and British society than white Norwegians would normally seem to be. This would also speak to how racist attitudes can be more difficult to detect nowadays by not only affecting people of a different skin colour like during apartheid. As such, racist attitudes often retain cultural connotations and become ‘commonplace’ by adopting the seemingly more accepted language of the assumed ‘inferiority’ of other groups’ cultural traits and practices – as, for instance, in the manner in which lower-skilled Eastern European migrants are frequently blamed for coming to the UK solely to ‘live off the dole’. Such ‘hidden’ or cultural assumptions can, however, contribute to justify socio-economic inequalities in society (Lentin and Titley 2011a). As a matter of fact, “[i]nequality is constructed and maintained when enough discursive resources can be mobilized to make [certain] practices ... legal, natural, normal, and ‘the way we do things’ “ (Wetherell 2003: 13, inverted commas in original).
An intersectional approach reveals, therefore, the asymmetrical power relations not only between different white South Africans in terms of power and resources according to lines of ethnicity, class, gender and so on, but also between different groups in society according to the respective group members’ most common social positions in various categorical parameters (see Cole 2009). Although these processes will primarily be seen through the lens of white South Africans based in the UK, inter-group relations are never far away from the picture as we can only understand white South Africans’ ‘racial’ and ethnic boundary-constructions by teasing out the references that they make to other groups in society. This will involve the analysis of boundary-processes in the ways in which white South Africans might mobilise aspects of their identities that they believe put them in a more ‘desirable’ light compared to certain other groups. Cole (2009) asserts that the prioritisation of certain groups as more interesting and worthy of social scientific research than others can create an imbalance insofar as we are also interested in the ways in which social and material inequalities between different groups in society are sustained. Without denying the crucial contribution of the vast amount of research within the academic field of migration and belonging that concentrate on more disadvantaged groups, I therefore believe that a study of a relatively privileged migrant group such as white South Africans in the UK can complement these studies.

Indeed, the neglect of studies on white South African migrants can have larger theoretical and policy significance beyond this particular group. Andrea Smith (2002), for instance, argues that there is a general tendency for migration scholars to ignore white migrants. Whereas white migrants become ‘invisible’ people assumed to unquestionably fit into the European host societies which they arrive to – thus deemed unnecessary to research – ‘non-white’ migrants are ‘visibly’ identified as the ‘quintessential immigrants’ and a potential problem for integration in the fashion in which a number of researchers single them out for research purposes. In doing so, argues Smith, “social scientists may be unwittingly reaffirming the popular racialization of the social category ‘immigrant’ ” (2002: 22, inverted commas in original). Indeed, the relative lack of research on white South Africans in the UK seems to indicate that scholars feed into and give substance to political and popular notions deeming white South
Africans as more assimilable than ‘non-white’ groups merely due to the colour of their skin and cultural connections to the UK. The common decision to pick ‘non-white’ migrants as research subjects rather than white South Africans, for example, feeds into Richard Dyer’s observation that “to say that one is interested in race has come to mean that one is interested in any racial imagery other than that of white people” (1997: 1). Although there are often valid reasons for the preoccupation with ‘non-white’ migrants – with the clear possibility that these migrants are more likely to be exposed to active or covert racism due to their skin colour – we must as researchers, nevertheless, be wary not to ‘fetishize’ physical appearance. Indeed, Smith asserts that by putting ‘non-white’ migrants invariably in the spotlight rather than tackling racist attitudes head-on, for instance, scholars “could give some people further reason to believe that their immigration ‘problem’ has less to do with their own attitudes and more to do with the new arrivals and their difference” (2002: 23, inverted commas in original).

By extension of this observation, I am also aware of the objection that has been levelled against the term ‘non-white’ people, especially that it runs the risk of using white people as a reference point and inadvertently homogenises all people who are not ‘white’, in spite of all the differences that exist between them (Gunaratnam and Lewis 2001). I am still retaining the concept ‘non-white’ here, however, to denote how Western and apartheid ‘racial’ ideologies have discriminated against people simply because they have not been seen as being ‘white’ enough. This is neither to gloss over the fact that the treatment of people not seen as ‘white’ has been different, with for example a hierarchisation entailing that ‘mixed race’ people generally were less discriminated against than black people during apartheid in South Africa. Yet, I think it is indicative of the power that white people have historically and globally exerted over people that they have chosen not to label as ‘white’, that even ‘mixed race’ people were kept at a considerable distance and discriminated against by white South Africans during apartheid (Steyn 2001).

Despite the general preoccupation with ‘non-white’ migrants in much of the recent citizenship and migration research as identified above, it is important to acknowledge that there are certain white migrant groups that recently have received more attention than white migrants, generally speaking. However, these white migrants can be categorised as relatively disadvantaged compared to white
South Africans. Perhaps the most notable example is the recent proliferation of studies on Eastern European, and particularly Polish, migrants in the British context. These migrants are perceived as an interesting case of study as they are white, yet subject to discrimination because of their communist background and alleged incompatibility with dominant understandings of the British ‘national culture’ (see e.g. White 2011). This could, indeed, be similar to the experience of white South Africans from an apartheid background, yet it seems as though the British colonial influence in South Africa, as well as British ancestral ties amongst some, might put white South Africans in a more favourable light in this regard. Also, Eastern European migrants are usually relegated to the lower echelons of the British labour market, which is contrary to the general experience of white South Africans (Sveinsson and Gumuschian 2008). However, it is shown here that even for relatively privileged migrant groups such as white South Africans, there is no automatic mechanism that invariably ensures that they necessarily ‘fit’ into British society in the views of members of the host population. On the contrary, many of the white South African interviewees in this study would, apparently, see the need to ensure that any of their privileges are secured, and would guard against boundaries of exclusion that might even affect them as a migrant group in a British policy climate with anti-immigrationist elements.

1.4 Previous Research on South Africans in the UK

It is necessary to point out that although a relative lack of research on South African migrants in the UK has been identified when compared to other migrant and ethnic minority groups in the UK, I am aware that a small number of significant studies have been conducted on this specific population as well. Qualifying the necessity of conducting the present study on white South Africans in the UK, I therefore see it as important to briefly overview these previous studies in order to explain what insights can be drawn from them, as well as how the present study can expand some of their insights and also throw light on issues not covered in them.
A point of departure is Mark Israel’s (1999) book *South African Political Exile in the United Kingdom*, which revolves around a narrative study of South African migrants living in the UK during the apartheid era – an era that was initiated in 1948 in South Africa. This study tells an important story of the number of opponents of the apartheid regime that saw no other option but to leave South Africa. As with the migration in the *post*-apartheid era, Israel points out that the majority of those South Africans who arrived in the UK during the apartheid era were white, “containing only a small though politically important group of perhaps two to three thousand black and around the same number of South Africans who would have been considered Indian or Coloured under apartheid” (Israel 1999: 2). As a partial explanation, Israel highlights the influence of British immigration and citizenship policies in favouring white as opposed to ‘non-white’ South Africans. Another insight drawn from Israel’s study is that there was no specific or unison ‘South African community’ in the UK despite the common struggle by some of the apartheid defectors in the UK – whether white or ‘non-white’ – against the apartheid regime. Furthermore, many of the South Africans who had left South Africa mainly because of the apartheid regime did not choose to return when apartheid ended in 1994 and it was seemingly safe to return ‘back home’. Israel observes that many South Africans had been living too long in the UK, and had thus put down too many important roots in British society to leave it behind all of a sudden (Israel 1999).

What Mark Israel’s study does not consider – but that the present study will account for – is the experiences of South African migrants who have arrived in the UK in the *post*-apartheid era. However, there are two noteworthy studies that specifically deal with South African migrants who have arrived in the UK after apartheid. One of these studies is Robert Crawford’s (2011) overview of South Africans in the UK from 1994 to 2009 in his recent book *Bye the Beloved Country?* Noting that the migration to the UK can be classified as more pragmatic in the *post*-apartheid era in that South Africans might be seeking ‘greener pastures’ and a better life rather than fleeing persecution by the apartheid regime, Crawford points out that there are also political reasons in the *mind-sets* of some South Africans who have migrated to the UK in the *post*-apartheid era. For instance, some white South Africans cite leaving South Africa because of the post-apartheid state’s implementation of affirmative action policies for black
South Africans. The reasons for migration and staying in the UK rather than South Africa can therefore take on ‘racial’ connotations. Another crucial insight that will influence this study is Crawford’s focus on how ‘being white’ is perceived by white South Africans to be an advantage relative to many other migrant groups in the British context, as well as how cultural understandings of white South Africans’ supposed assimilability in British society build on the historical relationship and colonial ties between Britain and South Africa (Crawford 2011).

Crawford, therefore, makes many insights that are of significance for this study. However, it seems to me that the main drawback of Crawford’s study is that Crawford perhaps does not build enough on theoretical insights to situate and analyse his data material. Rather, Crawford works on the assumption that “this book’s fundamental purpose is to outline the situation concerning South African emigration to the UK between 1994 and 2009” (2011: 11, my emphasis). As a consequence, Crawford’s book should perhaps be evaluated on his decision of outlining his field of study, or of adopting a more descriptive than theoretical stance. To a large extent, this is done by contextualising the political situation in South Africa and building the data material on South African migrants’ letters in various newspapers and other outlets. Crawford’s descriptive approach can, in this sense, be valuable in itself by considering the experiences of a migrant group that has been neglected in much academic research – which is an underlying aim of my study as well. I would object, however, that Crawford’s rich and revealing data material could have been further improved in an academic context by saying something more on how this data material might be interpreted in the light of various theoretical concepts and wider academic debates. I have attempted to rectify this, then, by situating and considering my qualitative interview accounts of white South Africans in the UK against the backdrop of existing academic literature, particularly in the fields of migration, citizenship, belonging, ‘race’ and ethnicity. The thesis also considers the British political context alongside the South African political context, contrary to Crawford’s main preoccupation with the latter political context (Crawford 2011).

The other and final study on South African migration to the UK in the post-apartheid era that should be mentioned is Kjartan Páll Sveinsson and Anne Gumuschian’s (2008) qualitative interview study of white South Africans in the
UK – of Jewish background in particular – entitled *Understanding Diversity – South Africans in Multi-Ethnic Britain*. This project makes a significant contribution to research on migrants and multicultural relations in Britain by considering a range of pertinent issues in the identity formations and the ‘racial’ and ethnic boundary mechanisms of white South Africans in the UK. However, my thesis will be more expansive in its sample population by considering a wide range of white South Africans and will not, as Sveinsson and Gumuschian’s study, be limited to a focus on white South Africans with a Jewish affiliation in particular. This is of importance as it must be remembered that Jewish white South Africans are typically part of the English-speaking white South African group. An exclusive focus on Jewish white South Africans would, therefore, fail to include Afrikaans-speaking white South Africans as well as other English-speaking white South Africans that do not consider themselves as Jews. In addition, although the majority of South Africans interviewed for my study are white, a few ‘non-white’ South Africans in the UK of ‘mixed race’ and black classifications were also interviewed to approach a more comprehensive understanding of the white South Africans’ responses. Including at least a few ‘non-white’ South Africans’ voices in a study of white South Africans might be important when bearing in mind the history of apartheid and the ‘racial’ and ethnic oppression inflicted upon ‘non-white’ South Africans by the white apartheid regime. There might be a certain dynamic in the relationship between white and ‘non-white’ South Africans which otherwise would not have been captured if I were to interview white South Africans only.

### 1.5 Thesis Structure

The structure of this thesis will now be briefly outlined.

The chapters following this introduction – Chapters 2, 3 and 4 – will provide the relevant background in order to situate and interpret the findings of this research. Chapter 2 outlines and discusses the main theoretical/analytical frameworks that have informed this study. This will involve conceptualising how key concepts such as ‘citizenship’, ‘belonging’, ‘race’, ‘ethnicity’ and ‘intersectionality’ are understood and employed. Chapter 3 then considers South
African migration to the UK in a historical perspective. The emphasis is on recent policy constructions and migration patterns from South Africa to the UK, accounting for the apartheid and post-apartheid era in South Africa and the post-Second World War era in Britain up until present times with focus on the immigration and citizenship policy restrictions in the last decade in particular. Chapter 4 overviews the methodological decisions that have been adopted to generate the data material in this thesis, going through the different stages of data collection, sampling and analysis, as well as the application of researcher reflexivity and ethical guidelines.

Having provided the relevant background information for the study, the empirical chapters – presenting and discussing the most important findings of this research – are covered by Chapters 5, 6 and 7. Chapter 5 shall concentrate on how white South Africans negotiate access to the UK. Noting that formal aspects of citizenship can very much interrelate with more informal aspects of citizenship, this chapter will put great emphasis on the informal ways in which access to the ‘British nation’ is negotiated by white South Africans through the rhetorical constructions of talking about and making sense of access-negotiations in their interview accounts. The second empirical chapter, Chapter 6, deals with the community formations amongst white South Africans in British society. This will entail accounting for how participants speak about and make possible the formation of communities in British society and the ways in which these are seen as important for them. Chapter 7 investigates whether the white South Africans taking part in this study consider returning permanently to South Africa one day. It will do so not by attempting to answer resolutely whether the participants actually will return to South Africa, but rather by looking at what the reasons for either remaining in the UK or contemplating on a return to South Africa can reveal about the (re)construction of ‘racial’ and ethnic boundaries in society.

Finally, the conclusion shall wrap up the thesis in Chapter 8. It will summarise with a focus on the main argument and some larger theoretical ramifications that possibly can be drawn from the study within citizenship and migration studies. In this regard, it should be noted that the sub-discipline of citizenship and migration studies would draw upon different disciplinary traditions (see Favell 2008a) – despite the fact that sociology, more broadly conceived, is the overarching, or umbrella, tradition that my study can be said to
fall within. Then the conclusion turns to the normative and policy implications of the study, before suggesting some avenues for further research.
2. Citizenship, Belonging and Intersectionality

In this chapter, I will provide a snapshot of the main theoretical/analytical perspectives which have informed this research. A central concept running throughout this thesis is that of ‘citizenship’. There are a range of studies that have recently employed this concept – either by way of emphasising philosophical reflections (see e.g. Bellamy 2008; Shafir 1998), empirical adaptations (see e.g. Nyamnjoh 2006; Reed-Danahay and Brettell 2008), or, as this study hopes to achieve, a balanced combination of these two approaches. Marston and Mitchell thus note that “[e]veryone seems to be talking about citizenship these days” (2004: 93). However, it is necessary to remind that citizenship has not always captured the same amount of interest from researchers. As Castles and Davidson (2000) would claim, it is only quite recently that a broader interpretation of the concept has been allowed to take place in social scientific research. Whereas previously being conceived of as a ‘commonsense’ notion, involving “rights like that of voting and obligations like those of paying taxes, obeying laws, jury duty, and, in several European countries, serving in the military” (Castles and Davidson 2000: 1), the rise of citizenship studies in the 1990s has generated new understandings and forms of citizenship (see also Kymlicka and Norman 1994). Henceforth, while first acknowledging the continued salience of citizenship in a legal sense as a status and as rights and duties, this chapter also accounts for the blurred boundaries between legal citizenship and the more informal negotiation of citizenship in everyday life. The chapter will then draw upon the growing awareness that citizenship relates to the concept of ‘belonging’, including an assessment of the possibility for a ‘multicultural citizenship’. Furthermore, it will explain how the (re)production of ‘racial’ and ethnic configurations in society is being interpreted, which in turn might ‘intersect’ with other significant social categories such as gender and class, which, I would argue, call for an intersectional sensitivity in citizenship and migration studies. This chapter will, overall, provide a valuable theoretical/analytical grounding to my main argument of the importance of analysing a relatively privileged migrant group such as white South Africans and the strategies that they adopt in negotiating citizenship.
2.1 Citizenship as a Legal Framework

In outlining citizenship as a legal framework in the nation-state, an appropriate point of departure is to consider how citizenship has been traditionally conceived by liberal theorists. There are many different approaches within a liberal understanding of citizenship; however, it could be claimed that liberal theorists have certain general assumptions in common (see e.g. Gray 2007; Tinker 2006: 19-21 for overviews). The basic premise of liberal theorists has historically been the conception of citizenship as a legal status that secures a social contract between individuals, or the citizens, and the particular state. A universal application of citizenship is thus suggested, in which every citizen is equal before the law and should ideally share the same legal rights and duties as everyone else (Shafir 1998: 6-9). Although it departs somewhat from his later work in which a universal approach is less identifiable (see Gray 2007; Tinker 2006: 19-21), the universalist inclination of liberal theorists is illustrated in John Rawls’ (1998 [1985]) *Justice as Fairness in the Liberal Polity*. Rawls suggested in this publication that when the social contract is to be written between the citizens and the state authorities, the best way to ensure a fair society is that the citizens take their position behind a ‘veil of ignorance’ where they are unaware of the social locations which they will occupy – for example, whether they will be rich or poor, part of the ethnic majority or minority etc. This ‘veil of ignorance’ is justified on the assumption that “the conditions for a fair agreement on the principles of political justice between free and equal persons must eliminate the bargaining advantages which inevitably arise within background institutions of any society” (1998 [1985]: 62). Thus, a relatively neutral stance is to be taken by state authorities in Rawls’ proposition of the preconditions for a just society, as the active privileging of a way of life over another by such authorities would supposedly compromise the individual freedom of the citizens to live the life they would like to within ‘reasonable’ limits. As such, citizens are free to choose their own way of life without interference from the state – as long as this way of life does not infringe on any other citizens’ freedom to lead their ways of life. Within this framework, even socio-economic inequalities are to some extent accepted; however, Rawls seems willing, at least, to allow for the adequate support of “the least advantaged members of society” (quoted in Shafir 1998: 7).
Rawls’ liberal conceptualisation of citizenship is a normative position that presents the hope for an idealistic society in which individual rights and greater equality are valorised by its members. Therefore, this theoretical intervention should perhaps be seen as an important contribution in the way in which it can provide us with some valuable clues as to what a better future looks like. However, the obvious critique is that it presents a utopian society that cannot, conceivably, correspond with the present realities as such. John Gray (2007) is perhaps the most prominent commentator critiquing Rawls on these grounds. Gray highlights how “political life is dominated by renascent particularisms, militant religions and resurgent ethnicities” (2007: 2) – arguably compromising Rawls’ utopian hope that people are readily prepared to abandon any consideration as to the bargaining power that they exhibit, due to their social locations, while writing the citizenship contract. The idea of citizens resorting to a position behind a ‘veil of ignorance’, as suggested by Rawls, simply does not hold much practical promise in the light of citizenship as experienced differently by individuals who, in the process of negotiating citizenship, co-construct a melange of boundaries and occupy a range of different spectres of the ‘social hierarchy’. It is in this sense that an intersectional approach, as elaborated below, is better equipped to operate with a more comprehensive scope of the complexities of contemporary society, than what a liberal presupposition of a universal consensus – resting on some Western notions from the Enlightenment project of transcending particularism and imposing universalism – could possibly envisage (Gray 2007: chap. 1). As elaborated by Gray, the category of the person in liberal notions à la Rawls is “a cipher, without history or ethnicity, denuded of the special attachments that in the real human world give us the particular identities we have” (2007: 6).

It is necessary to remember that there are also those liberal scholars who are, apparently, more willing to base their arguments on less abstract foundations than Rawls. It would therefore seem necessary to highlight other liberal conceptions of citizenship that are, admittedly, more contextually based and historically grounded. In the British context, attention should be paid to T. H. Marshall’s (1998 [1963]) conceptualisations in the 1940s and 1950s of the historical development of citizenship and the emergence of the British ‘welfare state’ in the post-Second World War era. Although highlighting that citizenship
carries with it certain duties that citizens or would-be-citizens of a particular nation-state would be expected to fulfil in order to obtain certain rights – including a variety of activities such as paying taxes and participating in compulsory military service – it was nevertheless on the right-bearing dimensions of citizenship that Marshall seemed to put his main energy. Thus, Marshall divided citizenship rights strictly into three main types which emerged at different historical epochs in the UK and subsequently have expanded to a wider spectre of the citizenry (1998 [1963]). Marshall delegated the origin of civil rights – “the bundle of rights necessary for individual freedom” (cited in Shafir 1998:14) – to the first epoch in the eighteenth century. Thereafter, the emergence of political rights that “guaranteed participation in the exercise of political power as voter or representative” (cited in Shafir 1998:14), was delegated to the second epoch in the nineteenth century. Finally, social rights of citizenship entered the stage primarily in the twentieth century according to Marshall, “mak[ing] possible the attainment of a modicum of economic welfare and security” (cited in Shafir 1998:14).

Marshall’s schema of the development of different types of rights bestowed by the state has been criticised for painting a rather deterministic picture of a situation under which social progress inevitably follows suit as rights are gradually expanded to the citizenry. Related to this critique, and although explaining the expansion of rights partially through class struggle, Marshall’s theory of citizenship has received criticism for its liberal assumptions of a top-down distribution of universal individual rights to a citizenry that is merely ‘co-opted’ as their class struggle has seemingly ended (see Shafir 1998: 15). Admittedly, it is interesting how Marshall (1998 [1963]) understood social rights as a way of ‘neutralising’ any resistance from the citizenry due to the injustices caused by the individual pursuit of capitalism. At the same time, however, it could be said that Marshall understood citizens, to some extent, as passive recipients of rights without accounting fully enough for how citizens may respond to and negotiate citizenship differently in their everyday lives (see Però 2011).

With his reliance on the nation-state, furthermore, Marshall failed to account for a fourth type of rights. More precisely, this can be labelled as the ‘cultural rights’ that gained significance relatively shortly after the time of his writing in the latter part of the twentieth century, coinciding with intensified globalisation processes and more international migration across national borders (Stevenson 2003: 6-7).
However, Marshall cannot merely be excused on the grounds that he was writing in a different time and, by extension, that he was necessarily out of sync with more recent developments. As Isin and Turner (2007) observe, Britain’s reliance on the Commonwealth’s migration and labour, which had been initiated at Marshall’s time of writing to secure the post-Second World War recovery of Britain, is not reflected in Marshall’s theory as he was evidently more preoccupied with class than ‘race’ or ethnicity. What is more, Marshall also neglected the achievements made by feminist advocates and the gradual distribution of citizenship rights to women against the backdrop of a citizenship that had been more or less the exclusive privilege of men of a certain social standing (see e.g. Pakulski 1997). It must be recognised that citizenship status in a country is no guarantee of protection from prejudice as people may be discriminated against because of a variety of factors, including their class as implied by Marshall, but also the intersecting effects of their particular ‘race’, ethnicity, gender, sexuality, disability or some other factors. Indeed, the value of citizenship is different for people even in relatively prosperous countries such as the UK, thus the term ‘second-class’ citizens for those marginalised within the legal framework of citizenship (Stasiulis and Bakan 2003). I would therefore claim that Marshall’s theory is not as suitable as an intersectional approach in conceptualising citizenship in the arguably more multi-layered fashions in which it is currently being experienced and envisaged. Indeed, Marshall “took the definition of citizen for granted, whereas contemporary theories of citizenship have been primarily concerned with rapidly changing identities: who is the citizen?” (Isin and Turner 2007: 8).

Another tradition within citizenship studies that perhaps can provide a better framework than liberal theories in that it critiques much of the legal language of rights deployed by liberalists, is the communitarian tradition. A communitarian notion of citizenship is broadly conceived to derive its inspiration from the citizenship ideal of the Greek polis in ancient times, during which citizenship was enacted by the search for ‘the good community’ as ordinary people, in the romanticised vision, came together in the public sphere and made democratic deliberations face-to-face (Shafir 1998). This is contrasted with liberal understandings of legal citizenship as a more rigid status and, therefore, “resembl[ing] in their individualistic accent and legalistic framework the Roman
imperial conception of citizenship” (Shafir 1998: 10). Communitarian approaches thereby seek, at least implicitly, to rescue some of the positive virtues that citizenship presumably consisted of in previous times in the Greek polis. This can be achieved, as is often suggested by communitarians, by striving for a common understanding of the ‘good society’ in which the particular community’s consensus on such a society works as a yardstick against which different ways of life are evaluated. The liberal idea of a ‘neutral state’ is thus rejected, as the authorities should take a more active role in encouraging ways of life that are conducive to the accepted ‘common good’, while discouraging ways of life that are conceived to be working against this normative ideal (see e.g. Shafir 1998: 10-3; Tinker 2006: 21-2 for overviews). Rather than being isolated individuals connected primarily though our universal rights, as implied by liberalists, communitarians would therefore argue that “we are social beings and that our identities are bound up in the communities in which we live” (Tinker 2006: 21).

Although providing a salient exposition of the ways in which individuals feel the need to belong to certain communities – as my study also seeks to understand – some of the normative implications of communitarian writing should, nonetheless, be subject to suspicion. This is revealed in the suggestion by the communitarian philosopher Michael Walzer that for the sake of the ability to secure the overriding principle of the ‘common good’ of the particular community – the preservation of which is seen as necessary in order to counteract individual alienation and even the dislocation of the community – “states are simply free to take strangers in (or not)” (1983: 61, brackets in original). Granted, the right to exclude people from a national community is to be constrained in certain ways, of which Walzer, for instance, mentions the obligation to allow territorial access to the very worst off. Nevertheless, I would here be inclined to agree with those scholars (see e.g. Gray 2007; Tinker 2006: 22) that warn that communitarians should be careful that their pursuit for a ‘common good’ does not lead to a repressive society where any possible divergences from this ‘common good’ and individual freedom, generally speaking, are not tolerated. This may relate to communitarians’ possible repression of any ‘external challenges’ as seen in the limited acceptance of ‘strangers’ in the community’s territory, but also to the perceived ‘internal challenges’ such as particular citizens’ ways of life that diverge from the supposed normal order.
The legal aspects of citizenship cannot be ignored when accounting for migrants, whom have not necessarily acquired the status of citizen of the particular host society. Therefore, I will not only depart from the abstract and limited applicability of legal citizenship as theorised by some liberal scholars, but also from the scant attention that some communitarians pay to the legal positions on the wide continuum between undocumented non-citizens, on the one hand, and full citizens, on the other, and how these positions may determine migrants’ opportunities to participate in the ‘common good’. James Holston thus stresses that while some measures exercised by states to control their populations are noticeably drastic – such as slavery, forced migration and genocide – the most common and seemingly humane measure in the world today is in fact the legal application of “a citizenship that manages social differences by legalizing them in ways that legitimate and reproduce inequality” (2008: 3-4). The relationship between immigration and citizenship/integration policies is captured by Christian Joppke, who notes that “[b]ecause admission into the state is ineluctably dual – firstly into the territory and only secondly into the citizenry – immigration policy is citizenship’s perpetual gatekeeper” (2010: 150). In addition, even though migrants’ negotiations to secure residency or citizenship status in the UK have been fulfilled, this might not be secured once and for all. Lydia Morris (2003), for example, argues that we need to consider how access to residence statuses, or eventually full citizenship, are stratified. Non-citizens may in this sense move up the stratified layer by negotiating for their improved status, but at the same time may also fall down the ladder in that residency and corresponding rights for non-citizens, or indeed for some citizens, could be withheld or reversed at any time by the state. To provide an example of what might affect a change in status for South Africans, the introduction of a new points-based migration system has increasingly compelled applicants who have entered the UK ‘for employment’ to demonstrate a continuous employment history to be eligible to remain legally in the country (Wray 2009). Migrants of different statuses, then, may be more or less forced to conform to the host-nation’s alleged ‘values’ without necessarily receiving the appropriate rights in return.

Although different types of residence permits or citizenship status do not invariably deliver the rights and life standards that such statuses may appear to promise, inequalities can still be (re)produced by the sole ease of – or more
complicated – access to different residence permits or citizenship status. In the case of citizenship policies, the fact of the matter is that the family one is born into (following *jus sanguinis* principles), or the territory which one is born in (following *jus soli* principles), decide which citizenship status one is conferred at birth (Joppke 2010: 34). A timely contribution to recent citizenship debates in this respect is Ayelet Shachar’s (2009) aptly entitled book, *The Birthright Lottery*. In this, she eloquently links access to citizenship to development issues by arguing that the particular citizenship(s) that a person possesses – and we could here add permanent, if not temporary, residence permits – may have a significant impact on the life chances and well-being of that person, especially bearing in mind the North/South divide in global inequalities. Such a consideration directs attention to the persisting power that the state can exert over people, possibly running counter to the proclamations by some scholars that the increased pressures of globalisation now have rendered the state ‘dead’ (cf. Ohmae 1995).

However, although much attention will be paid to the involvement of the state in negotiations of this kind, this is not to say that the state has exclusive bearing on white South Africans’ negotiations of citizenship. Explanations of the decline of the state (e.g. Soysal 1994) might look appealing in a climate with intensified international flows of communication, information, goods and people across national borders. In contrast to the emphasis on ‘national citizenship’ by some scholars – including representatives from both liberal and communitarian traditions – ‘postnational’ scholars such as Soysal (1994) argue that increased globalisation in the last few decades has given rise to the importance of extragovernmental rights. Although Soysal acknowledges that citizenship can still retain some significance in the way it can be applied as a tool for nation-building by states, she argues that non-citizens usually benefit from more channels to claim rights through than was previously the case, most notably in the form of international human rights conventions that have been incorporated into the constitutions and laws of countries. Having said this, I would like to claim that the

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8 A person without the ‘proper’ ties may, however, be allowed to naturalize as a citizen in another country by following the country’s citizenship regulations with regard to, amongst other things, a certain number of years of legal residency in the state’s territory (Joppke 2010: chap. 2).
‘national’ may have more significance than ‘post-national’ scholars such as Soysal seem to suggest. This is, of course, not to deny the normative potential of a ‘post-national’ model as perhaps providing us with a tool that enables us to think beyond a more narrow-sighted national logic of thinking (cf. Stevenson 2002; 2003). What I am primarily objecting to is rather the legal assumptions of ‘post-national’ scholars such as Soysal (1994) that the old model of ‘national citizenship’ and state sovereignty have been so extensively, and perhaps even to some extent irrevocably, eroded by developments such as human rights and other international conventions that non-citizens’ rights are increasingly secured. However, to the extent that a ‘post-national’ model of legal accommodation of non-citizens’ rights is prevalent, I would rather like to make the important modification, as provided by Wang (2004), that this ‘post-national’ model would primarily be applicable for more privileged migrants – whether defined in terms of ‘race’, ethnicity, class, gender and so on, or an intersection of such criteria. The preferential treatment of certain migrants at the expense of others has particular credence in an immigration and citizenship policy climate that arguably has become increasingly ‘neo-assimilationist’ in the last decade, as it will be shown in the next chapter on South African migration in relation to the British policy context and a ‘backlash against multiculturalism’ (see e.g. Grillo 2007; Vertovec and Wessendorf 2010).

2.2 Citizenship as Negotiated in Everyday Life

Having sketched out the legal salience of citizenship above, it is still unclear as to the precise degree to which the state as the main gatekeeper of citizenship may affect ordinary people’s understandings and negotiations of citizenship as they go about their everyday lives. In investigating the everyday lives of white South Africans in the UK in this particular research, I will demonstrate that the legal aspects of citizenship may very much influence and overlap with the more informal aspects of citizenship in the sense that ordinary people in their everyday life might internalise or resist the dominant notions portrayed by the state. This can occur despite the fact that it may not always be equally clear for social actors themselves, or even for external observers, how precisely the political dimensions
of their everyday lives come to matter in various situations (Karner 2007). In providing a working definition of ‘everyday life’, I am therefore influenced by the contrasting notions of everyday life as interpreted by Berger and Del Negro, both of which entail a high degree of political significance; whether “disparaged as the domain of tedious, uncreative repetition [and] a place where power relations are mindlessly reproduced”; or, conversely, when “viewed positively as a realm of authentic, productive labour and celebrated as a site of resistance” (2004: 12).

Viewed in either of these ways, the everyday internalisations or negotiations of citizenship would work as an important corrective to lay assumptions – occasionally also being adopted for certain research purposes, as noted by Brubaker (1992) – which contend that citizenship solely retains its significance through its capacity to connect people at times of major national events. A conceptualisation of citizenship that rather takes everyday life as its point of departure thus fits squarely with the notion of ‘banal nationalism’ developed by Michael Billig (1995). This concept refers to the ways in which the constant repetition of national symbols and activities such as the waving of flags at various occasions and media coverage of national sports teams can be more significant than they might seem at first glance due to their subliminal or taken-for-granted appearance or performance by social actors. In some contrast to Billig’s preoccupation with the ‘mindless’ everyday reproduction of nationalism, however, there has been growing academic recognition that migrants’ identities can be of a transnational nature which is influenced by and, in turn, influences both the migrants’ host and home society (see e.g. Brettell 2008). Of course, this does not entail that this is the inevitable outcome, as even migrants may draw upon separate national understandings originating from their home as well as their host society, respectively, which do not necessarily merge into something ‘transnational’ and ‘emancipatory’ as such (Skey 2011). Nonetheless, as researchers we should make our assessments by having in mind the very possibility that we live in “a world where identities are increasingly coming to be, if not wholly deterritorialized, at least differently territorialized ... [and that] migrants ... are perhaps the first to live out these realities in their most complete form” (Gupta and Ferguson 1992: 9-10).

An analytical tool that I found helpful in making more sense of the potential relationship between ‘the state’ and its ‘subjects’, is the ‘anthropology of
policy’ approach (Shore and Wright 1997; Shore et al. 2011; Wright 1995; Wright and Shore 1995). This approach makes the case that researchers have tended to neglect the potential influence of policy upon people by buying into taken-for-granted assumptions that portray the field of policy as uninteresting, owing in large part to how policies are often cloaked in ‘neutral’ language and have, as a consequence, been deemed as a legitimate means of power. The advocates of the ‘anthropology of policy’ approach, however, perceive the field of policy as worthy of closer attention in order to reveal the extent to which policy disguises its (re)production of inequalities in society, noting that

policy has become an increasingly central concept and instrument in the organization of contemporary societies. Like the modern state (to which its growth can be linked), policy now impinges on all areas of life so that it is virtually impossible to ignore or escape its influence. (Shore and Wright 1997: 4, brackets in original)

Thus, the ‘anthropology of policy’ approach builds on Michel Foucault’s (2006 [1991]) idea of the ‘governmentalisation of society’. With this conceptualisation, Foucault wanted to demonstrate how the modern state now controls more and more aspects of the everyday lives of people residing on its territory, with different state actors at different levels working in its name. Ultimately, this entails that no clear-cut distinctions could possibly be made between the realms of ‘the state’ and ‘society’ as such. What is noteworthy about this approach is that it departs in important respects from the ideas of Max Weber (1968), who operated with a more clear-cut notion between ‘the state’ and ‘society’ in which the former had the monopoly of legitimate violence or sovereignty over the latter. In contrast, Foucault (2006 [1991]) speaks of the way in which the modern state from the eighteenth century no longer needed to exert the physical power as outlined in Weber’s thesis. It was discovered that a more effective means of control was by way of affecting the moral belief of its entire population through various disciplinary mechanisms in society put in place by the state, such as education and health systems, in order to make people internalise certain notions and rather govern themselves – so-called self-government. As expressed in Foucault’s own terms:
This form of power applies itself to immediate everyday life which categorizes the individual, marks him by his own individuality, attaches him to his own identity, imposes a law of truth on him which he must recognize and which others have to recognize in him. It is a form of power which makes individuals subjects. (1982: 781)

Whether this assertion of state power reflects the actual nature of how South African migrants in the UK have internalised immigration and citizenship policies, is open for debate. In the chapters dealing with the findings of my thesis, however, it will be revealed that the internalisation of policy as envisaged by Foucault might hold true also in this case study. However, a slightly different notion of how individuals approach policy that would deserve some more attention – as also encapsulated by the ‘anthropology of policy’ approach (Shore and Wright 1997; Shore et al. 2011; Wright 1995; Wright and Shore 1995) – holds that immigration and citizenship policy can be resisted in the everyday lives of migrants. It should therefore be clarified what I refer to when speaking of the everyday resistance of migrants in this study. As it will seen in the methodology chapter, this thesis is adopting a strong emphasis on the meaning-making and interpretations of South African migrants in the UK through the use of qualitative semi-structured interviews that enable the participants to relate to their own experiences. In other words, the form of resistance to policies exerted by South Africans will, on the occasions that it presents itself, largely revolve around the rhetorical strategies of my interview participants in dealing, for instance, with British immigration and citizenship policy restrictions. As such, I adhere to the notion that it can be revealing to study “actors that ‘simply’ resist policy [in everyday talk] without necessarily laying claims to create policy or to become formally involved in the process of governance” (Però 2011: 261).

It will also be shown, furthermore, that the boundaries between the internalisation and the resistance of policies can be rather fleeting in the sense that the interviewed white South Africans might not see the need to resist policies in all circumstances, as they are perhaps content with the way that the system generally may work in their favour as opposed to certain other migrants. Skrentny et al. (2009) maintain that one area that has been neglected in research on migration is the role that more privileged migrants play in maintaining the status quo because it benefits them and their interests in significant ways. As such, I have kept an open mind by building upon Davide Però’s (2011) investigation into
how policy is ‘received’ by migrants, attuning me to the multifaceted ways in which migrants internalise and resist policy, as well as the positions that fall in between these two ‘extremes’. This approach enables the analytical sensitivities of intersectionality to be employed, as it would help us understand how the constraining nature of various categorisations dictated by policy influence differently, or similarly, the particular migrants’ mind-sets. The approach also sensitises me to the instances whereby influences other than policy must be accounted for, such as influences stemming from transnational identity processes or other, but somewhat interconnected, institutions to the political nation-state structure such as the media.

Some might claim, nevertheless, that by largely using state policies as some form of reference point – whether when we are referring to people that internalise notions dictated by the state, but also when we are referring to how people are preoccupied with trying and resisting such notions – we are drawing a deterministic picture of ‘the state’ viewed as an entity inevitably impacting upon its subjects’ mind-sets. And, related to this critique, some might ask; is not an all-embracing understanding of ‘the state’ potentially harmful and somewhat deceiving by attaching too much power to it? (Sharma and Gupta 2006). It is certainly the case that we need to keep in mind that ‘the state’ is a political invention rather than an actually-existing entity, and that the state can also gain its legitimacy in the way in which researchers treat ‘the state’ as something ‘real’, or make it appear in this way by climbing on the bandwagon and making frequent, uncritical and exaggerated references to it (Abrams 1988). Aihwa Ong criticises academic literature that is restricted to the significance of the state sector of “ignoring civil institutions and social groups as disciplinary forces in the making of cultural citizens” (1996: 738). Having recognised this potential critique, however, I would contend that it still goes without saying that with no reference whatsoever to the state, it would be difficult for us to capture the potential power that politicians representing the state possess over individuals’ negotiating citizenship in everyday life. And, in the process, our quest to analyse the state as a gatekeeper of the immigration and citizenship policy field and producer of inequalities in society could be seriously compromised without this state-reference. Sharma and Gupta (2006) thus acknowledge that ‘the state’ can, with some precautions, be analysed in the way in which it reproduces itself as an
abstraction or institutional form. One of Sharma and Gupta’s main precautions dictate that such an analysis of the state should refrain from underpinning its legitimacy, but should instead make strenuous efforts to keep an appropriate distance in order to expose ‘the state’ for what it really is – a political invention. Another main caveat offered by Sharma and Gupta is that the state should be analysed in a transnational framework. This would not necessarily imply buying into the hypothesis that a ‘post-national’ model might be gaining increased momentum over the ‘autonomous’ construction of policies by particular nation-states (cf. Soysal 1994), but entails acknowledging the potential ramifications of globalisation processes upon local power-dynamics within the respective nation-state structures and territories. Sharma and Gupta suggest that

[one way to approach these processes of transnational governance is to examine migration, to ask why people move, who moves, from where, and to where. Human migrations are not only articulated to the needs of global capitalism, they are also transforming how we think about the nation, citizenship (or belonging, more broadly), and the state. (2006: 25, brackets in original)]

2.3 Citizenship and Belonging

Having established the importance of the legal framework of citizenship and migrants’ negotiations of citizenship in everyday life, I will turn to look specifically at my use of the concept of ‘belonging’. The recent emphasis on belonging in academic writing (see e.g. Geschiere 2009; Nyamnjoh 2006; Yuval-Davis 2006; 2011a) makes an important contribution to the academic field of citizenship studies. Apart from a few contributions such as that of Simone Weil (2002 [1952]), as will be noticed below, this aspect of citizenship was previously not acknowledged; the legal framework of citizenship as status and as rights and duties rather took precedence (Castles and Davidson 2000). The concept of belonging connotes the psychosocial components of citizenship, recognising the vital significance that belonging to a geographical location or a group might imply for the individual. Being based on the anxieties that people experience in terms of the prospect of being excluded from or subjugated in society, much academic literature of a social psychological nature has demonstrated the desires
and needs of most individuals to belong to particular groups, as well as observing how individuals’ interactions in society vary according to whether they feel that they belong or not to particular groups (see e.g. Billig 1976; Tajfel 1982). It is important to recognise that there are several ways that people can belong and that there may be divergences – as well as parallels – between self-ascribed feelings of belonging and the ways that other actors perceive a particular individual or group (Yuval-Davis 2006; 2011a). Nira Yuval-Davis would argue that “identities are not just personal ... and that collective identity narratives provide a collective sense of order and meaning” – in spite of the fact that such a ‘collective order’ might not exist in reality as “the production of identities is always ‘in process’, is never complete, [but] contingent and multiplex” (2011a: 14, inverted commas in original). With a conception of belonging as an on-going and relational process which is negotiated over time and graduated with different degrees rather than any clear-cut division between belonging and not-belonging (Yuval-Davis 2006; 2011a), one begins to understand the value of qualitative research in teasing out the subtleties and potential ambiguities of ‘belonging’. The semi-structured variant of interviewing adopted in this research, as shown in Chapter 4, has encouraged the participants themselves to describe their migration to the UK, their encounters with people in British society and, finally, reflect upon to which locations and groups they might feel like they belong to and the circumstances during which they, yet, may feel excluded from these very same locations/groups.

Moreover, belonging may be highly associated with ‘the political’. Francis B. Nyamnjoh has noted that in the world today, “there is a growing preoccupation with belonging” (2006: 3). In spite of this supposed novelty of belonging as a political and popular obsession – which has been increasingly assessed by recent scholarly writing (see e.g. Geschiere 2009; Nyamnjoh 2006; Yuval-Davis 2006; 2011a) – we should not ignore how earlier commentators also recognised how ‘belonging’ has been a fundamental human condition throughout time and space. Writing during the time of the Second World War, for instance, Simone Weil (2002 [1952]) developed a long and detailed list of the various needs of the human soul that can be said to relate significantly to the extent to which the respective human being feels that he or she belongs to a particular location or group. Similarly to the existence of physical human needs, such as hunger, Weil notes that
[t]here are others [human needs] which have no connexion with the physical side of life, but are concerned with its moral side ... They form, like our physical needs, a necessary condition of our life on this earth. Which means to say that if they are not satisfied, we fall little by little into a state more or less resembling death, more or less akin to a purely vegetative existence. They are much more difficult to recognize and to enumerate than are the needs of the body. But every one recognizes that they exist. (Weil 2002 [1952]: 7)

National belonging, as Weil (2002 [1952]: 98-182) furthermore reminds us, has been exploited by politicians representing the modern nation-state ever since its formation with the political centralisation processes during the time of the Renaissance – which replaced the fragmented, localised and overlapping feudal authorities with nation-state borders covering vaster territories and larger populaces. What is novel about the recent configuration of national belonging, however, is its connection to profound and unparalleled global developments occurring in the last few decades. Part and parcel in response to intensified globalisation – with its spread of the world economy into spheres previously acting as the state’s remit and the increased international movement of people – politicians are inclined to exploit their power by evoking people’s emotions and dispersing cultural ideas of who belongs and who does not belong to the particular nation. This is often interpreted by scholars as a means of last resort by politicians in keeping the nation-state’s power intact amidst perceived threats to its legitimacy (see e.g. Geschiere 2009; Nyamnjoh 2006; Yuval-Davis 2006; 2011a). John Crowley’s description is telling in this regard, as he describes this political endeavour and the obsession with belonging as “the dirty work of boundary maintenance” (1999: 30). Such boundary maintenance has not only been witnessed in political statements requiring migrants to integrate and develop a sense of belonging to Britain, but these informal requirements have also been stipulated in immigration and citizenship law. A notable example is the recent introduction of various tests requiring non-EEA migrants – including certain South Africans – to demonstrate their knowledge of ‘Life in the UK’ in order to ‘earn’ their right to indefinite leave to remain in the UK. These tests could also become applicable for migrants with a passport from another EU/EEA country insofar as naturalisation into the British citizenry is at stake (McGhee 2009).
A concept that I have found persuasive in trying to grasp the contemporary obsession with belonging is the ‘politics of belonging’ as developed by Nira Yuval-Davis (2006; 2011a). For Yuval-Davis, the politics of belonging is concerned with

the boundaries of the political community of belonging, the boundaries which … separate the world population into ‘us’ and ‘them’… The politics of belonging also include struggles around the determination of what is involved in belonging, in being a member of such a community … It becomes articulated, formally structured and politicized only when it [belonging] is threatened in some way. (2011a: 10, 20, inverted commas in original)

What constitutes a threat to someone’s sense of belonging has been interpreted differently by politicians depending on the particular historical contexts. Advocators of political projects of belonging differ, ranging from state actors to relatively low-key actors such as certain political dissidents. Many different political projects of belonging can exist at the same time, with relatively similar agendas, or pulling in different directions. However, it must be pointed out that the political projects of belonging that retain dominance in society are usually those performed by the most powerful actors such as dominant state politicians. This is not to say that no opposition exists to the most dominant political projects, but such opposition tends to be somewhat side-lined by these more dominant forms (Yuval-Davis 2006; 2011a).

The politics of belonging delve right into the core of the debate revolving around the supposed conflation of ‘the state’ and ‘the nation’. Anthias and Yuval-Davis (1992) make the case that there is, more often than not, a presumed overlap between the boundaries that encompass the majority of the citizens of a state and those who are perceived to be included as ‘true’ members of the ‘imagined community’ or ‘nation’ (see also Anderson 2006 [1983]). A world order has been enabled with “a quality of simplicity and clarity that almost resembles a Mondrian painting. States are marked by different colors and separated from each other by black lines” and this “modern political map marks all places inhabited by people as belonging to mutually exclusive state territories” (Bauböck 1997: 1, quoted in Shachar 2009: 9-10). It thus appears “axiomatic that everyone ought to have citizenship, that everyone ought to belong to one state [only]” (Brubaker 1992:
Against this backdrop, Anthias and Yuval-Davis (1992) argue that it is essential to make an analytical distinction between ‘the state’ and ‘the nation’, as the presumed overlap between the two concepts might foster a notion of a homogenous nation within the state’s territories which is discriminating against migrant, but also ethnic minority, groups. Yet, this is not to argue that the instances in which ‘the state’ intersects with notions of ‘the nation’ are irrelevant, as Yuval-Davis (2006; 2011a) also advocates that we should uncover the instances in which this appears to be the case in order to challenge such constructions. What I would like to stress, nevertheless, is that it cannot be automatically presumed that there will always exist an overlap between ‘the state’ and ‘the nation’ in the imaginations of ordinary people, perhaps particularly when bearing in mind the case of migrants who could be shaped by political projects of belonging in their home as well as their host societies. In this sense, it is Yuval-Davis’ (2006; 2011a) contention that ‘belonging’ amongst ordinary people should be distinguished, at least at the analytical stage, from the ‘politics of belonging’ as such.

Privileging migrants’ sense of belonging is a different approach than what certain other citizenship scholars would advocate. It should be recognised that there is another strand of studies, in addition to the focus on ‘belonging’, that answers pertinent questions of citizenship by also reflecting upon how citizenship is negotiated in everyday life by citizens and non-citizens alike. This strand of studies is usually more oriented towards citizenship practices as reflected in individuals’ and groups’ participation in appropriate political spheres, rather than primarily understanding citizenship through the lens of the psycho-social dimensions entailed by belonging (see Bloemraad et al. 2008: 156). This is reflected in Seyla Benhabib’s (2004) contribution, The Rights of Others: Aliens, Residents, and Citizens. Benhabib is especially concerned with and tries to resolve the pressing normative tension inherent in liberal democratic states between “sovereign self-determination claims” and “adherence to universal human rights principles” (2004: 2). Benhabib’s constructive account becomes visible and interacts with her focus on the legal aspects of citizenship through her understanding of politics as constituting ‘jurisgenerative processes’; that is, “a democratic people, which considers itself bound by certain guiding norms and principles, engages in iterative acts by reappropriating and reinterpreting these,
thereby showing itself to be not only the subject but also the author of the laws” (2008: 49). Highlighting this different approach to citizenship studies, then, does not mean that I will take no interest in the normative appeal of the questions as raised by authors such as Seyla Benhabib, but that these aspects of citizenship will be analysed through the lens of white South Africans’ sense of belonging rather than their political participation as such.

Besides, some approaches that have impacted somewhat on my thinking helpfully merge an emphasis on political participation with that of belonging. Departing from the preoccupation with national belonging in recent political developments in Western European countries, it is worthwhile to consider the discussions as to what extent migrants and ethnic minorities might be accommodated by ‘multicultural’ policies that facilitate their political and socio-economic participation, while at the same time encouraging a multicultural form of belonging. Scholars such as Will Kymlicka (1995) and Charles Taylor (1991) represent some of the early political philosophers of and protagonists for a ‘multicultural citizenship’. For instance, Will Kymlicka (1995) takes a liberal position in his intellectual pursuit for the implementation of a ‘multicultural citizenship’ in response to John Rawls’ (1998 [1985]) more conventional liberal position of ‘universal citizenship’. Kymlicka (1995) proposes that a just and stable implementation of citizenship rights in a liberal democracy should include both Rawls’ universal citizenship, as well as the recognition and accommodation of national/ethnic minorities and other disadvantaged groups by distributing group-differentiated or minority rights in order to protect them against majority decisions. Kymlicka admits, however, that many liberal thinkers would be concerned that by offering such group-differentiated rights to disadvantaged groups in society, universal rights or the rights of the individual could be significantly compromised. This concern particularly stems from the assumption amongst some liberals that by granting group-differentiated rights, these rights could be exploited by minority communities for the purpose of policing dissident and cultural resentment towards other groups in society (cf. Rawls 1998 [1985]). To these concerned voices, Kymlicka (1995) replies that group-differentiated rights should still be implemented alongside universal rights, as group-differentiated rights can be more appropriately seen as offering external protection for minority communities against the ethnic majority rather than
leading to an internal restriction of universal individual rights as such. Ultimately, Kymlicka argues that the top-down political distribution of group-differentiated rights creates a conducive environment for the recognition of diversity in encouraging the ethnic majority to become more receptive of minority communities (see also Taylor 1991) – a condition that Kymlicka sees as unlikely if the implementation of individual rights is the exclusive preoccupation of the particular state.

Although at first glance perhaps appearing to be offering a reasonable proposition, the thoughts of Kymlicka and other scholars sharing some of his views (e.g. Taylor 1991) have been subject to a great deal of criticism. Perhaps the most prominent critique offered by various scholars (see e.g. Modood 2007; Parekh 2006; Stevenson 2002) is the identification of the rather questionable nature of Kymlicka’s conceptualisation of ‘culture’. It is contended, in particular, that Kymlicka operates with fixed or static notions of culture in that the distribution of group-differentiated rights are exclusively supposed to occur along, and thereby not across, cultural lines. This can, arguably, reinforce cultural divisions rather than open up for “the intermixing of cultures, hybridity and intercultural communication” (Stevenson 2003: 51). The multicultural policies envisaged by Kymlicka would also seem to operate with predefined notions of ‘cultures’ that brush over differences even within these ‘cultures’, by seeing the respective ‘cultures’ as homogenous entities. These are internal differences that, I believe, an intersectional approach would be more sensitive to take appropriate account of. Furthermore, Kymlicka sees some ‘cultures’ as more eligible for protection than others, particularly by interpreting migrants as having less legitimate claims to multicultural rights than ‘national minorities’ because migrants have, supposedly, made a voluntary decision to leave their ‘natural’ home (see Stevenson 2002). In some relation to this ‘ranking’ of different groups, scholars such as Sartori (2002, cited in Grillo 2007) advocate the arguably dangerous proposition that some migrants are easier to integrate than others because of certain characteristics and a closer ‘fit’ with the ethnic majority population, as well as claiming that a society’s ‘tolerance threshold’ can be exceeded by bestowing citizenship upon too many ‘non-integratable’ persons, potentially leading to ‘social disruption’. As it will be seen in the next chapter on the British policy context, this is an argument that is mirrored in some of the
recent hostility towards the implementation of state-sponsored multiculturalism. Another problem that will also be evidenced in the next chapter, is that multicultural policies have often been less developed and deep-rooted than what some of the British media and political critics of multiculturalism will sometimes have us believe when they portray the multiculturalism of the past as a supposedly coherent ‘state doctrine’ (Lentin and Titley 2011a; 2011b).

Scholarly critics of multiculturalism do not necessarily reject the value of multiculturalism in protecting minority cultures against the power of the majority population, but may rather put forward the persuasive argument that the particular nation-state needs to re-imagine itself to make the idea of a multicultural/cosmopolitan society more commensurate with cultures as fluid and changing constructions in meaningful dialogue with each other. In important respects, this conceptualisation of a multicultural society as most appropriately achieved through the facilitation of dialogical encounters between different ‘racial’ and ethnic groups, provides a link between the potential multicultural accommodation by the host society’s structures and a sense of belonging that goes beyond the exclusively national (see e.g. Modood 2007; Parekh 2006). The extent to which this becomes a reality, however, is unclear and would largely depend upon structural and contextual circumstances opening up or closing off the opportunity for the crossing of ‘racial’ and ethnic boundaries.

2.4 The (Re)Construction of ‘Racial’ and Ethnic Boundaries

When referring to the relevant issues of belonging for this thesis, I will assess the extent to which my South African participants adopt or resist top-down notions of ‘race’ and ethnicity. Significantly, certain social categories such as ‘race’/ethnicity are ascribed particular value by political actors in certain historical and socio-political contexts (Yuval-Davis 2006; 2011a). In this sense, I adhere to the view that ‘racial’ or ethnic groups are social constructions with historical and cultural variations (Lutz et al. 2011). As mentioned earlier, I use the concepts of ‘race’ and ethnicity interchangeably at many points in this thesis; however, I will also recognise that the concepts can be understood and defined differently in an academic sense. The following theoretical distinction between
‘race’ and ethnicity retains some value, though it would still need to be applied with some corrections which shall be explained and justified below.

‘Ethnicity’ can be used as an academically ‘neutral’ term, which suggests an apparently equal, multicultural juxtaposition of cultures which tolerate and respect each other, whereas the concept of ‘Rasse’ [or ‘race’] is associated with the history of immanent contempt, hierarchisation, and inequality on both sides of the ‘colour line’, the privileging of white and the disadvantaging of black positions. (Lutz et al. 2011: 12, inverted commas in original)

One may wonder whether the view of ethnicity presented here – as ‘cultures which tolerate and respect each other’ – would also not need to add another dimension in order to make it more operational for research purposes. Indeed, what may be left out when the concept of ‘ethnicity’ or ‘culture’ is presented exclusively in a positive light relative to ‘race’, is how racism(s) can also take on cultural elements. Particularly since the 1980s there has been a rise in Western European countries of ‘the new racism’ (Barker 1981) that has not necessarily employed biological markers such as ‘race’ as its main fault line, but which nevertheless has rested upon “different cultures, religions and traditions which were seen as threatening to ‘contaminate’ or ‘overwhelm’ the cultural ‘essence’ of ‘the nation’“ (Yuval-Davis 2011a: 99, inverted commas in original). Moreover, another corrective that needs to be provided is that ‘racial’ identifications are not invariably negative – contrary, indeed, to what seems to be suggested in the above-comparison of ‘race’ with ethnicity. Some prominent examples of affirmative ‘racial’ identifications could be cited, of which one is the African American civil rights movement that struggled from 1955 to 1965, in particular, for the rights of African-Americans who were enduring severe ‘racial’ segregation and discrimination in the US (Hill Collins 1998: 77-8). Acknowledging the potential for affirmative ‘racial’ – or for that matter ethnic – identifications amongst minority groups fighting discrimination, it would seem as though this aspect is more applicable for some ‘non-white’ South Africans, especially insofar as ideas of ‘race’ and ethnicity can rather be loaded with negative connotations in the way in which it is ordering the world in a hierarchical fashion for some of my white South African participants (see also Gunaratnam and Lewis 2001; Lutz et al. 2011).
It is important to approach an understanding of how ‘race’/ethnicity is constructed by powerful actors in both the home and host nation-state of the specific migrants. Diana Mulinari (2008) argues that migration research has put emphasis on migrants’ experiences in the ‘receiving society’, thus failing to give sufficient attention to how their experiences in the ‘sending society’ may also contribute to shaping people’s specific trajectories and attitudes towards other people. Although Mulinari mainly applies her argument to a gender perspective in her research, the argument could effectively be extended to include the need to consider how migrants’ current attitudes towards other ‘racial’ or ethnic groups may also have been influenced by their conditions before – and, therefore, not merely after – their migration to the receiving society. This would facilitate a more comprehensive understanding of the potential impacts of not solely British political projects of belonging as pertaining to ‘race’/ethnicity, but also South African political projects of belonging – in the past and in the present.

The legacy of the white apartheid regime in South Africa, then, is not to be ignored. As ‘racial’/ethnic groups were physically and mentally segregated by being confined to different geographical and social spaces, ‘race’/ethnicity very much permeated all aspects of everyday life in apartheid South Africa (Steyn 2001). Although the white apartheid rulers argued that this was a ‘natural’ arrangement that would help ‘non-white’ communities develop ‘on their own terms’ without any interference from the white community, it is necessary to point out that there was nothing ‘natural’ about this arrangement. It was by and large a construction on the part of the white rulers, whereby “the state formalized the category of ‘white’ and classified those individuals who were light-skinned and straight-haired and had European ancestors as ‘white’ ” (MacDonald 2012: 61, inverted commas in original). Yuval-Davis (2006; 2011a) points to two types of boundaries that are usually created by political projects of belonging, namely physical and symbolic. In terms of the physical boundaries that Yuval-Davis is referring to, these therefore took an extreme ‘racial’ manifestation in apartheid South Africa. More commonly, however, we evidence the subtler and more symbolic boundaries separating the world population into ‘us’ and ‘them’ – sometimes presented in a language that appears less exclusionary than it actually is. For instance, the notion amongst some British politicians that we are living in a ‘post-racial’ society with no significant ‘racial’ inequalities anymore and that, as a
consequence, multicultural policies should be deemed redundant (see e.g. Cameron 2011a), should be seen as a misplaced notion and perhaps written off as mere political rhetoric (see e.g. McGhee 2009; Rattansi 2007). At least this seems to be the view of David Theo Goldberg, as he has convincingly argued in his book *The Racial State* that “[r]ace marks and orders the modern nation-state, and so state projects, more or less from its point of conceptual and institutional emergence” (2002: 4).

What a notion of a ‘post-racial’ society should be exposed as pointing to, is the different ways in which white people have been enabled, on a global scale, to disguise their appropriation of power and privileges at the expense of ‘non-white others’. This insight owes credibility to the emergence of ‘whiteness studies’ in contemporary academic debates. ‘Whiteness studies’ have their origin in a highly ‘racialised’ and polarised American society, but have recently made a stronger impact in European societies such as the UK (Garner 2006; Jackson 1998). We should, however, take seriously the objection that has been levelled against ‘whiteness studies’ for the fact that “[t]he majority of the writers included within this body of work would also appear to be white” (Byrne 2006: 7). Yet, I believe that ‘whiteness studies’ can perform a vital role in exposing unequal ‘race relations’ in the ways in which white individuals, in general, have remained privileged in society due to the unmarked or invisible representation of their identity, as opposed to the manner in which the identities of ‘racial’ and ethnic minorities are construed as visible and ‘problematic’ (see Bonnett 2004; Dyer 1997). This has serious implications, for “[a]s long as race is something only applied to non-white peoples, as long as white people are not racially seen and named, they/we function as a human norm. Other people are raced, we are just people” (Dyer 1997: 1). The (re)construction of ‘whiteness’ may not be perpetuated in a conscious or malicious manner as such, clarifies Dyer (1997), but ‘whiteness’ has nevertheless managed to reproduce itself in that the power of white skin colour has been taken-for-granted and seen as representing ‘normalcy’ in society. Since the privileges attached to the status of ‘white’ are often concealed, the issues at stake may be cloaked in the seemingly more ‘neutral’ language of nationality, such as ‘Britishness’ (Jackson 1998: 102). Yet, although ‘Britishness’ is not expressed in explicit ‘racialised’ terms, the ‘racialised’ consequences are evident inasmuch as being British, or the narrower identity of
being English, is a status primarily associated with people with certain features such as ‘white’ skin colour (see Runnymede Trust 2000).

Garner (2006) also points to some other ways that ‘whiteness’ can appropriate its power than merely through an unmarked identity. Particularly two of these seem relevant for the present study. The first of this shows how ‘whiteness’ can be employed as a resource. Thandeka (1999), for instance, has challenged the assumption of ‘whiteness’ as some kind of ‘natural’ category unworthy of critical scrutiny, eloquently bringing attention to the ways in which ‘whiteness’ is a psychic state and learned practice that has been instilled in white people from an early age in a highly ‘racialised’ American society. As a result of this socialisation, Thandeka shows that it can be difficult for white people – despite their class or gender positions – to evade from this expected ‘racialised’ position even in their adult lives. Melissa Steyn (2001), in her book Whiteness Just Isn’t What It Used To Be, confirms that something of a similar process has unfolded in post-apartheid South Africa. Despite the rhetoric of the ‘rainbow nation’ and ‘racial equality’ advocated by the post-apartheid government, Steyn argues that white South Africans may still be drawing on the repertoire of ‘white talk’ – brought into play by the old apartheid government – in order to ensure, to a greater or lesser extent, the reproduction of their privileged ‘racialised’ position.

The other variant of ‘whiteness’ outlined by Garner (2006) which is worthy of attention here, challenges the trap that ‘whiteness studies’ might fall into by constructing white people as some kind of monolithic entity. In the context of this study, the insights that there can also be gradations of ‘whiteness’ rather than only one form of it – that some white people are seen by society to be more eligible to enjoy the privileges of ‘whiteness’ than other white people – prove particularly useful (Dyer 1997: chap. 1; Garner 2006). As the data analysis chapters of this thesis will show, white South Africans may be seen as less securely ‘white’ than white Britons in British society, by virtue of being immigrants and coming from a country labelled as a ‘third world country’ much lower down in the perceived ‘hierarchy of nations’ than the UK. However, white South Africans may be positioned higher up in the perceived ‘hierarchy of whiteness’ in the British context than certain other white migrants – such as Eastern Europeans – who may lack the same socio-economic status and colonial/cultural ties to the UK. Furthermore, individuals, including white South
Africans, are situated differently in terms of power and resources even *within* their respective groups – thus not only in contrast to other groups – according to boundaries of class, gender, age and so on (Garner 2006). It is thus argued that

[a] shifting border and internal hierarchies of whiteness suggest that the category of whiteness is unclear and unstable, yet this has proven its strength. Because whiteness carries such rewards and privileges, the sense of a border that might be crossed and a hierarchy that might be climbed has produced a dynamic that has enthralled people who have had any chance of participating in it. (Dyer 1997: 19-20)

### 2.5 Towards an Intersectional Approach

Based on the above-observations, this research adopts an intersectional approach to consider how boundaries along the lines of ‘race’ and ethnicity might intersect with other significant social categories. It is therefore important to sketch out what is meant by ‘intersectionality’.

‘Intersectionality’ was brought to life as an academic term by Kimberlé Crenshaw in 1989 (cited in Crenshaw 2011). This was not the first attempt to grapple with “the relationship among multiple dimensions and modalities of social relations and subject formations”, as Leslie McCall (2005: 1771) defines research adopting an intersectional approach. Floya Anthias points out that this research endeavour, although not named as ‘intersectionality’ as such, “arguably constitutes the very foundation of classical sociological theory” (2012: 2). However, the importance of accounting for more than one social category gained increased significance with its articulation by some black feminist activists, who shortly preceded and paved the way for Crenshaw’s introduction of the term. These activists (e.g. Combahee River Collective 1977/1982; hooks 1981) put forward the persuasive argument that feminist research had concentrated on the oppression of white women as if it applied to all women and, thereby, left aside the oppression of black women and the ways in which they may experience the criss-crossing effects of both gender oppression and racism. Crenshaw’s introduction of the term ‘intersectionality’, then, was significant in that it helped to put intersectionality on the academic agenda, at least within women’s studies and feminist research, by “releas[ing] energies that made it [increasingly] possible to advance from an intersectionally conceived starting point” (Lutz et al. 2011: 2).
This initiated a more extensive use of other analytical categories than merely ‘race’ and gender in such research, of which class has been the most commonly employed in the popular trilogy of ‘race’, gender and class (Gimenez 2001). Nevertheless, more recent categories in the academic vocabulary, such as sexuality, have also been analysed intersectionally in relation to the above-mentioned categories (see e.g. Bredström 2005). The inclusion of a greater variety of social categories is based on the important observation that although it is possible for people to identify predominantly with one category only, their identities will also be influenced by other and intersecting social divisions. Hence, one of the main purposes of intersectional research is to examine predominant systems of inequalities along lines of ‘race’, ethnicity, gender, class and so on as mutually constructing each other, rather than examining them on a stand-alone basis as in much of the previous citizenship research as sketched out above (Hill Collins 1998).

The increased popularity of intersectionality as an analytical concept, particularly in gender research, can be explained by the vague and open-ended nature of the concept, which “promises an almost universal applicability, useful for understanding and analysing any social practice, any individual or group experience, any structural arrangement, and any cultural configuration” (Davis 2008: 72). However, as Davis (2008) reminds us, for a concept to become popular it must promise more than applicability; it must also promise to help the concerned scholars to address and tackle a problem that they have been wrestling with for some time. For feminist scholars, intersectionality has particularly been helpful in enabling them to speak for all women, thereby counteracting some of the earlier critique pointing to how only women of white skin colour and from a higher social class were usually included in their emancipatory projects (Crenshaw 2011). Yet, objections have been raised against the overuse of intersectionality in identity research and particularly in research that adopts a gender lens. In this regard, it has been considered as a ‘fast travelling concept’ that is merely mentioned in order to gain legitimacy for the particular study (Knapp 2005), and a ‘buzzword’ that is uncritically applied by an increasing number of social scientific researchers merely because it is seen as fashionable and what one ‘ought to’ do (Davis 2008). This reported over- and misuse of the term may cause confusion as to what ‘intersectionality’ actually is and, by
extension, repel certain scholars from becoming engaged in constructive debates about intersectionality, or from employing the term for their own research purposes. However, it can be argued that precisely because intersectionality is such an ambiguous and contested term, it can at the same time be seen as a relatively flexible term that is well-equipped to be applied with the particular scholar’s own interpretations and elaborations (Davis 2008). The purpose is therefore, in my view, to identify the particular ways of applying intersectionality that suit the particular research.

A challenge regarding the design and implementation of an intersectional approach, however, is the question as to the potential number and characteristics of the social categories to be included in the analysis. Accounting for more than one category – as presupposed by an intersectional analysis – arguably introduces more complexity into the research (McCall 2005). The metaphor of a road intersection is illustrative here, “with an indeterminate or contested number of intersecting roads depending on … how many social divisions [or categories] are considered” (Yuval-Davis 2011a: 6). With this in mind, it is surprising that there seems to be so few intersectional studies that endeavour to demonstrate in further detail the methodological decisions involved in the process of defining the categorical parameters of the particular study (McCall 2005).

In this study, then, an intra-categorical variant of intersectionality has been adopted, according to Leslie McCall’s (2005) schema of the different types of intersectional research. This variant of intersectionality entails that the researchers are less preoccupied with the overarching relationships between all different types of imaginable social categories, than with the more in-depth analysis of the different boundaries of and meanings within certain social categories as they are played out in society – especially those pertaining to ‘racial’ or ethnic groups here, however those may be defined in different circumstances (McCall 2005). This variant of intersectionality has enabled me to focus primarily on the ‘racial’ and ethnic boundary-mechanisms amongst white South Africans, while any boundaries pertaining to other social categories have been of interest only insofar as they have impacted upon or intersected with these ‘racial’ or ethnic boundaries. This approach can, essentially, help us to explore the social construction of certain categorical boundaries – primarily ‘race’ and ethnicity here – and how these boundary-constructions may, or may not, intersect with
other social categories such as class and gender that are of significance in the particular instances. Although I am aware that with this social constructive focus it was difficult to define, before I had commenced on the study, the precise influence of other social categories that would intersect significantly with ‘racial’/ethnic boundaries, I believe this rather to be a strength of my approach. This is because I did not set out with a stubborn preconception as to which categories would co-exist most significantly with the ‘racial’/ethnic boundary-processes amongst white South Africans, but rather that this would be uncovered in the accounts of the participants themselves as I progressed with the research. In fact, this very strategy is consistent with the assertion that “the degree of association between social categories is a variable to be measured empirically” (Banton 2011: 1249).

Moreover, analysing a relatively privileged group such as white South Africans through an intersectional lens is of some significance. This is especially so because intersectionality as an analytical tool has typically neglected the analysis of “identities that are imagined as either wholly or even partially privileged, although those identities, like all identities, are always constituted by the intersections of multiple vectors of power” (Nash 2008: 10). In relation to a potential neglect of how structural elements of inequality operate in society, intersectional researchers have typically only been interested in addressing the experiences and intersectional identity constructions of more disadvantaged groups – with black women as the most paradigmatic example (Nash 2008). It is undeniably of significance to reveal the circumstances that black women might suffer under, due to the multiple and criss-crossing axes of oppression of both gender discrimination and racism (Crenshaw 2011). However, as Walby et al. remind us, “[i]t is important not to focus only on the disadvantaged people since this obscures the role of the [more] powerful within sets of unequal social relations” (2012: 230). In my research, I have therefore operated with the assumption that intersectionality should operate with a wider concern than merely the identity constructions of the most disadvantaged, inasmuch as it is also interested in how the identity constructions and social positioning of the relatively privileged can reproduce and sustain inequalities in society as a whole.

It is hoped that adopting a constructive approach to intersectionality will facilitate an understanding of social categories as dynamic and consisting of
boundary-work in practice rather than as static entities. This thereby challenges intersectional work which operates with categories as ‘given’ or ‘static’ entities which just happen, allegedly, to intersect at particular points in time irrespective of the power relations and human agency imbued in the construction of these categories (see Anthias 2012 for an overview here). All the same, I have still taken seriously the instances in which my participants operate a static and fixed imagination of the reality regardless of the much more complex world that actually surrounds them. Cole (2009) has urged intersectional researchers not to merely be attuned to ‘differences’ – as they normally have – but also to appreciate points of similarities or convergences across categories. In our ‘risk society’ (Beck 1992) or ‘runaway world’ (Giddens 2002), we should therefore be aware that some people seek comfort in and buy into particular policy attempts to “naturalise, collectivise and essentialise social relations” (Anthias 2012: 8). Looking for similarities, however, does not only entail the imagined similarities that essentialise differences within a particular ‘group’ such as that of white South Africans, but it can also have a more emancipatory potential as regards, for example, to instances in which white South Africans come together with other migrants across ‘racial’/ethnic boundaries due to their common status as migrants in the UK. Looking for similarities is an endeavour that feeds into the constructive approach to intersectionality that I am adopting, in that it

entails viewing social categories as reflecting what individuals, institutions, and cultures do [or imagine], rather than simply as characteristics of individuals. This shift opens up the possibility to recognize common ground between groups, even those deemed fundamentally different by conventional categories. (Cole 2009: 175)

Related to this challenge to conventional categorisation, we should also keep in mind the caveat that the structural locations on which people are situated cannot always be equated with their views. This opens up the possibility that, in certain cases, “it is not enough to construct inter-categorical tabulations in order to predict and, even more so, to understand people’s positions and attitudes to life” (Yuval-Davis 2011a: 7). This caveat can be seen as giving some room for manoeuvre in that hierarchical and essentialist notions of different ‘racial’, ethnic or cultural groups – or however politicians and other powerful actors define them – are not always internalised and can, in more or less significant respects, be
resisted and negotiated by ordinary people. All the same, it must be emphasised that such resistance and negotiations often entail some degree of ambivalence as politically imposed notions will more often than not, as Patricia Hill Collins underscapes, “remain the received wisdom to be confronted” (1998: 65). Such ‘received wisdoms’ can have greater bearing upon people in certain societal positions – whether in a positive or negative way depending on the amount of power and resources that their specific positions may grant them (Yuval-Davis 2011b). In this sense, when considering the meanings and boundaries of ‘race’ and ethnicity – however those might be defined in gender or class terms, for example – it becomes necessary to follow Anna Bredström’s suggestion of “investigat[ing] how and when ethnic and racialised notions are ‘brought into play’ ” (2009: 59, inverted commas in original).

Careful consideration should also be given to other ways of conducting intersectional analysis that depart somewhat from my intra-categorical approach to the study of ‘racial’ and ethnic boundaries. The insights from a strand of intersectional analysis that focuses on the deconstruction of social categories warrant some space here. McCall refers to this approach as anti-categorical, in that scholars within this strand “render suspect both the process of categorization itself and any research that is based on such categorization, because it inevitably leads to demarcation, and demarcation to exclusion, and exclusion to inequality” (2005: 1777). Rather than notoriously employing fixed categories such as ‘race’ and ethnicity and, thereby, risk reproducing the very inequalities they are fighting, it is argued that researchers should strive to deconstruct these categories to capture the ways in which social life is much more complex at both a structural and more subjective level (Villa 2011). To illustrate an example of the anti-categorical approach, Paula-Irene Villa (2011) concentrates on Argentine tango as an example of a social activity which is far more complex than any categories would suggest. Her vivid portrayal of this particular dance provides the backdrop against which she argues that the social and embodied practices situated in-between categories can never be fully captured by slavishly following the classical trilogy of the categories of ‘race’, gender and class, for instance.

Yet, a critique of some identity research of a deconstructive nature is that it has tended to privilege the biographies and multiple identity constructions of ordinary people at the expense of also incorporating broader understandings of the
political categorisations and related structural inequalities – or the ‘politics of belonging’ in the context of my research – that might influence these identity constructions (see e.g. Nash 2008 for this critique). In terms of intersectional research that seek to deconstruct categories, it should come as no surprise that this strand of research has gained its appeal in recent times as it promises to represent identity constructions in the individualised, nuanced and multifaceted fashion that has become a pejorative of much identity research (Davis 2008). This research development can be explained by the ‘cultural’ or ‘postmodern’ turn in the social sciences occurring in the last few decades in particular, in which multiple identities and individual differences have, seemingly, been given priority over structural elements of inequality in the attempt to challenge any meta-narratives and represent reality as fragmented (see Brubaker and Cooper 2000). Although it is now commonplace to talk about *multiple* identities and this must be celebrated as “an improvement on previous discourses of identity” (Brah 2007: 144), Brubaker and Cooper (2000) warn that social scientific researchers – in their relentless endeavours to critique any fixed or ‘hard’ notions of identity – might, consequentially, employ too ‘weak’ or ‘soft’ concepts of identity/belonging instead. Brubaker and Cooper specify that

[i]n their concern to cleanse the term of its theoretically disreputable ‘hard’ connotations, in their insistence that identities are multiple, malleable, fluid, and so on, soft identitarians [deconstructive researchers] leave us with a term so infinitely elastic as to be incapable of performing serious analytical work. (2000: 11, inverted commas in original)

Turning the attention specifically to the category of ‘race’ employed in my case study, there is heated debate as to whether this category is legitimate for research purposes at all. In the British academic context (Lutz et al. 2011: 11), but even in South Africa with the memories of apartheid still fresh in the mind (Steyn 2001), ‘race’ has been retained as a concept – albeit not without some opposition (for academic opposition, see e.g. Miles 1982; for political notions that we live in a ‘post-racial’ society, see e.g. Cameron 2011a). German-speaking countries, but also countries such as Norway that were not affected by larger-scale immigration until recently due to the relative lack of the number of colonial ties that countries such as Britain possess, provide perhaps the most noteworthy examples of contexts within which a more widespread reluctance to employ the term ‘race’
amongst social scientists is evident. In the German context, this phenomenon can be traced back to how the German word ‘Rasse’ was invented by colonial and Nazi ideologies to classify ‘groups’ according to a hierarchical logic, which fostered socio-economic inequalities and eventually paved the way for the systematic mass-murder of Jews and other groups seen as inferior in the Holocaust during the Second World War. As a result of this difficult legacy, German social scientists have tended to avoid the term rather than trying to problematise it or utilise it in other ways (Lutz et al. 2011: 10-13).

This, of course, begs the question as to whether it is possible to talk about racism in an effective manner without an explicit reference to ‘race’. It is noteworthy that conceptualisations of racism in Germany and some other contexts have tended to be restricted to ideology and violence perpetrated by extreme right-wing groups (Lutz et al. 2011: 10-13). This reluctance to use ‘race’ in a broader perspective suggests that a more thorough analysis of other and more ‘hidden’ forms of everyday racism perpetuated by people normally perceived as more ‘reasonable’ than right-wing extremists might be hindered (see e.g. Gunaratnam and Lewis 2001). I would like to stress here that a concept of ‘race’ that only considers “the work of the relatively small number of hard-core ‘racists’ “ (Ignatiev 1997: 613, inverted commas in original), is regrettable in that it runs the risk of failing to account for the role that mainstream institutions play in producing and reproducing different forms of racism. This would not only concern the political facilitation of racism in its extreme and violent forms, but perhaps more predominantly in its more ‘hidden’, but arguably more pervasive, cultural forms of everyday racist attitudes that ordinary people seem more willing to support (Essed 1991). Based on this understanding, I would claim that social relations of power and everyday racism might not be fully captured if the deconstruction of categories, such as ‘race’, takes complete precedence in the specific research. Indeed, Stuart Hall (1996) would suggest that since there are currently no better concepts that would enable us to describe and effectively challenge the issues under investigation – or racism in this case – a concept such as ‘race’ and the related concepts of ethnicity, culture and identity could still be used in an academic setting. However, Hall would simultaneously employ such concepts only ‘under erasure’– an insight that is shared by the present study. This means that because certain concepts have become so ‘discursively entangled’
through politically- and media-generated rhetoric, they must be treated as potentially ‘dangerous’ concepts which cannot be employed uncritically. As formulated by Hall himself in terms of the application of these concepts, “there is nothing to do but to continue to think with them – albeit now in their detotalized ... forms [or intersectional forms as applied to my own research], and no longer operating within the paradigm in which they were originally generated” (1996: 1).

On the opposite end of the spectrum to anti-categorical scholars, we might find those who point out that I run the risk of under-researching the extent to which social categories other than primarily ‘race’ or ethnicity relate to each other and structure white South Africans’ attitudes towards and interactions with other people in British society. These scholars belonging to the inter-categorical stream of research, to follow McCall’s (2005) overview, make strenuous effort to assess various relationships of inequality along lines of ‘race’, gender, class and so on amongst different social groups in society. As I understand it, an implicit assumption of an analysis of this kind would be that we should give the same degree of attention to different types of inequality. The question then emerges as to how many other social categories should be analysed as main categories of investigation on an equal playing field with ‘race’/ethnicity – i.e. being granted more thorough attention than merely with regard to their input into the (re)productions of ‘racial’/ethnic boundaries, like they have been considered in this study. There is clearly some inconsistency regarding an answer to this question, as everything from two categories (e.g. Essed 1991), to as many as sixteen categories (e.g. Bunch 2001), have been included for various research purposes. Moreover, some scholars simply use the rather vague expression ‘et cetera’ to indicate that other social categories might also have significance for the particular group(s) being investigated (Yuval-Davis 2011b).

What can be stated with some certainty, nevertheless, is that “no single project, no matter how broadly it may be conceived, can do justice to all dimensions of the concept of intersectionality simultaneously” (Lutz et al. 2011: 10). There is the considerable risk that as more categories are given equal significance in the specific investigation as suggested by the inter-categorical approach, the main focus of the inquiry is lost in the researcher’s attempts to cram all significant aspects of the unit of analysis into the research and the final report. Rachel Luft (2009) refers to this phenomenon as ‘flattening difference’ and, in my
study, this would imply that the main topic under investigation – the (re)constructions of ‘racial’/ethnic boundaries – would not be given the specific focus and thorough examination that it arguably deserves. Luft is worried about “the universally applied, uncritical practice of intersectionality”, referring specifically to the ways in which “intersectionality becomes the new standard among progressives [that] is increasingly operationalized across the board in ways that neutralize the specific projects of … antiracism” (2009: 100-1). This is not to disregard the political significance of the fight against other forms of discrimination and inequalities, but should be read as an attempt on my part to strengthen the research on its own terms by focusing on the political importance of comprehending the particularities of the (re)drawing of certain ‘racial’/ethnic boundaries – however those might be defined in relation to other social categories. In sum, then, whereas anti-categorical approaches to intersectionality may be too deconstructive insofar as reluctance to conceptualise ‘race’ renders the ways in which notions of ‘race’ can foster ‘racial’ inequalities unexplored, inter-categorical attempts to give equal attention to an unlimited number of categories may result in other categories taking the attention away from the importance of accounting fully for the various meanings and boundaries of ‘race’/ethnicity.

However, it could be claimed that the social categories to be given primary attention should be replaced with ones other than ‘race’/ethnicity. Along the lines of such an argument, advocating for class as the most significant category in social life, we find scholars with a Marxist orientation such as Martha E. Gimenez (2001). For Gimenez, class should be the dominant and guiding category around which to construct an intersectional approach, as “[c]lass relations ... are of paramount importance, for most people’s economic survival is determined by them” (2001: para. 14). Gimenez claims that whatever identities are constructed by ordinary people in the ethnic or gender department, employers will in any case have the power to disregard such identity claims and construct their employees, or ‘subordinates’, according to their own definitions that produce and reproduce the power that they exert over them. Thus, a primary attention to class in an intersectional approach reveals that a ‘politics of recognition’, in terms of identity claims, may not be matched by a ‘politics of redistribution’, in terms of any realistic prospects of material equality across class boundaries in the work place and in everyday life (see also Fraser 1995). This leads Gimenez to conclude
that “the underlying basic and ‘nameless’ power at the root of what happens in social interactions grounded in ‘intersectionality’ is class power” (2001: para. 14). In response to Gimenez, I would argue that insofar as the particular intersectional approach works with the assumption that one or two categories should guide the intersectional investigation, the selected categories would depend upon the research questions and foci of the particular study. Therefore, if I were to analyse white South Africans’ interactions in the labour market or political participation, for instance, I would perhaps be better-advised to follow Gimenez’ recommendation of employing class as the focal point. However, as my study revolves around the sense of belonging amongst white South Africans in the UK, a more appropriate point of departure for an intersectional analysis would seem to me to be the categories of ‘race’ and ethnicity. This is especially true because, as I have highlighted above, it is important to approach an understanding of how the modern nation-state privileges certain ‘racial’ and ethnic groups by (re)producing the notion that some groups would more ‘naturally’ belong within its territories.

Having delineated the theoretical/analytical insights that this study draws upon, I will now consider the structural and contextual influences that the white South Africans have been exposed to in South African and British society. This will be commensurable with my commitment to an intersectional approach, as prominent intersectional scholars (e.g. Anthias 2012; Walby et al. 2012) claim that it is important, as a prior step in an intersectional analysis, to identify the historically changing and structural conditions that could impact upon the current negotiations of citizenship amongst the population(s) under investigation.
3. South African Migration to the UK

In pursuing the main argument of the thesis – that white South Africans have vested interests in safeguarding the particular aspects that construct them as a relatively privileged group – it is necessary to contextualise the extent to which white South Africans, as opposed to ‘non-white’ South Africans, have been favoured by policies in South Africa as well as in the UK. Various patterns of South African migration to the UK cannot be seen in isolation from different types of South African and British policies, affecting emigration from South Africa and immigration to Britain, respectively. As Wedel et al. aptly put it, we should attempt “to draw out how policy aids the state in shaping, controlling, and regulating heterogeneous populations through classificatory schemes that homogenize diversity, render the subject transparent to the state, and implement legal and spatial boundaries between different categories of subjects” (2005: 35).

Shore and Wright (1997) point to the importance of taking into account the present-day construction of policy against the backdrop of previous policies and other contextual factors – whether as a radical break with previous patterns, a continuation with only minor changes in the policy outcomes, or somewhere in-between the two. In relation to this, James Holston (2008: 33) argues that history can work as an argument about the present in the sense that political and social actors might struggle over the meanings of history and that history, as a consequence, is not necessarily relegated to the past but can very much continue to structure the present.

Although I am primarily concerned with people who have migrated from South Africa to the UK in the post-apartheid era (from 1994 and after), to grasp a more comprehensive understanding of migration patterns we need to trace the significant political and social changes in both South Africa and the UK back to the years following the Second World War. Concentrating on the post-war era does not imply that I ignore the history of previous contact between the two countries, including the history of British colonisation in South Africa, and its potential impact on post-war migration from South Africa to the UK. I thereby acknowledge that while international migration in appearance primarily consists of rational economic decisions by individuals pulling them to countries with more
attractive economic prospects, the fundamental origin that directs migration flows between two particular countries might only be fully appreciated by also taking into account the history of past political/economic interactions and their effect on current power asymmetries within and between the countries in question (Portes and Böröcz 1989: 611). By keeping this insight in mind, I shall now outline the South African and British contexts in turn to attempt to discern some of the circumstances under which South African migration to the UK has taken place, with particular focus on the post-war era and recent times.

3.1 The South African Context

When the British and other ‘white colonial powers’ from 1652 begun their settlement on the territory that is today South Africa, the indigenous Bushmen and Khoisan people and migrants from other parts of Africa had already been present for many centuries, especially the indigenous people. After years of devastating wars between white and ‘non-white’ groups, the white settlers took control and commenced on their colonisation of the territory. However, ensuing wars between different white groups – primarily between the English-speaking and Afrikaans-speaking groups – meant that the British English-speaking settlers could not celebrate an uncontested colonisation of the territory. In fact, the Afrikaners were in a slight majority amongst the white people on the territory. For this reason, the end of the Anglo-Boer\(^9\) war in 1902 sparked attempts by British-originating politicians to attract more immigrants from English-speaking groups to South Africa, particularly from Britain. However, a lower migration rate from Britain to South Africa than to countries such as Canada, the USA and Australia – which were seen as more attractive by British people because they consisted of white majorities as opposed to the black majority that comprised the South African population – meant that the numerical majority amongst the white population in South Africa remained in favour of the Afrikaners. Part of the explanation can also be attributed to the apartheid government – which was mainly constructed

\(^9\) ‘Boer’ is Afrikaans for ‘farmer’ (Griffiths and Prozesky 2010: 25-6).
and controlled by Afrikaners – and its fear that a ratio in favour of English-speaking groups would threaten Afrikaners’ claim to power. When it became obvious from the mid-1960s that English-speaking groups also supported the Afrikaner apartheid government and its policies – as they too could enjoy the privileges being conferred to white people in general at the expense of ‘non-white’ and particularly black groups – immigration from Britain was seen in a more positive light as a measure to increase the proportion of white people in the total South African population (Van Rooyen, 2000: 9-10). In spite of this, the ratio of South Africa’s white community still remains in Afrikaners’ favour to this date; at 60% as opposed to 40% for the English-speaking group (Griffiths and Prozesky 2010: 25-6).

As one would expect, there were also people going the other way by emigrating from South Africa and the apartheid regime to other countries around the world. The repressive and militaristic nature of the apartheid government, nevertheless, prevented a large number of people from leaving South Africa in the first place. The movement of ‘non-white’ groups, black people especially, was so severely restricted that they were even denied access to certain areas within South Africa itself, the so-called ‘white areas’, by being confined to their own ‘homelands’ designated by the apartheid state to separate different ‘racial’/ethnic groups. It was not exceptional that the only times these people were allowed to enter ‘white areas’ were for work purposes to be exploited by white business interests, before they had to return to their own ‘homeland’ on the same day after the workday had ended. To secure that they did not attempt to escape the country, stringent border controls were run by the apartheid military, and ‘non-white’ people were often stripped of their South African passports. In spite of such draconian measures, some ‘non-white’ people still managed to escape and rally around the anti-apartheid struggle from outside South Africa’s borders. The fact that some people from the strong internal opposition against apartheid escaped the country was sometimes viewed favourably by the apartheid government, as they believed that this would relieve some of the opposition against them in South Africa itself. As for white people, it would obviously seem that they generally had more interests in staying in South Africa because of the preferential treatment and privileges they received in all spheres of society. Yet, it is also important to stress that some white people stood up against the apartheid regime; sometimes because
of altruistic views, while other times as a means to avoid the obligations of the apartheid state like the compulsory military conscription for white males between 18 and 55 – one of the few aspects of the apartheid regime that put a considerable burden on white South Africans. Some of these white apartheid resisters were eventually in such danger from the apartheid state’s repressive measures – actual or perceived – that emigration was seen as the only alternative. Alternatively, they were allowed to leave while being derided as ‘cowards’ and ‘betrayers’ of their country in political rhetoric and by the apartheid-owned media (Israel 1999). This is not to say that the lamenting of emigrating South Africans was an exclusive enterprise of the apartheid state; even well-respected and prominent politicians such as previous President Nelson Mandela have complained about emigrating South Africans in the post-apartheid era (Van Rooyen 2000: 124).

Although some people left South Africa for other reasons than fear of the repercussive actions of the apartheid regime – for example the established route of Britons who had economic interests in migrating and working in South Africa before returning back to Britain (Israel 1999: 87) – it is noteworthy that emigration rates from South Africa in the apartheid era was relatively erratic and tended to increase in the aftermath of major political upheavals. In this regard, Johann Van Rooyen (2000: 11) speaks of no less than four major emigration waves. The first wave begun in 1949 and lasted until 1951, largely as a response to the apartheid government and its structurally racist policies that had been introduced in 1948. The second wave then occurred in 1960-61, coinciding with the Sharpeville massacre in 1960 in which the apartheid police opened fire against black apartheid-protesters. This was followed by the Soweto uprising in 1976 with further casualties and killings of black people by the apartheid police. Finally, the fourth wave in the period 1985-87 should be seen in relation to the ‘state of emergency’ declared by the apartheid regime and the increased clamping down on black resistance (Van Rooyen 2000).

Keeping in mind these four emigration waves or peaks in emigration from South Africa in the apartheid era, much emigration from South Africa was nonetheless prevented. This is perhaps best illustrated by the way in which the end of apartheid and the introduction of formal democracy in South Africa opened up borders and facilitated emigration. Even in 1993, one year before the democratic elections in 1994, emigration had already started to increase
considerably with the positive changes and the peace process that had been initiated in the country. In the post-apartheid era, South Africa has actually experienced years with net emigration instead of net immigration for the first time in the country’s history. Whereas the numbers of emigrants in the apartheid era were rather counted in tens of thousands annually, the total number of South Africans who have left the country in the post-apartheid era may now have exceeded beyond a million people, predominantly white but also an increasing number of ‘non-white’ South Africans (Israel 1999; Van Rooyen 2000; Sveinsson and Gumuschian 2008). This increased number of South African emigrants is due to a number of factors, including the opening up of South African borders as the authoritarian apartheid regime fell, the lifting of international sanctions imposed on South Africa that had been upheld during apartheid, as well as the fact that the commencement of the post-apartheid era in 1994 coincided with a time of increased globalisation and international mobility (Nyamnjoh 2006: chap. 1).

There is, however, some inconsistency in terms of the precise numbers of emigrants from South Africa as estimated by different sources, and the total number could in reality be higher or lower when allowing for how emigration from South Africa has been a highly charged and emotional issue (Crawford 2011: Introduction). At one end of the spectrum, some tend to view emigrants as ‘victims’ driven out of the country by the high crime rate and the lack of economic opportunities in South Africa vis-à-vis the ‘greener pastures’ that can be found in countries in the Global North (Crawford 2011: chap. 2). Arguably falling into this camp, Johann Van Rooyen describes the link between the fear of crime in South Africa and emigration in the following way:

[H]undreds of thousands leave because they fear for their lives in a country infested with crime and lawlessness. Crime has reached such epidemic proportions that it extends way beyond what is acceptable and bearable to ordinary citizens. Crime has taken the country into a state of anarchy with the highest or second- and third-highest rates of rape, murder, car hijackings and violent crime in the world. (2000: 73)

This understanding does not properly take into account the ‘racial’ aspects of emigration, however. Although there is evidence that there has been an increase in black and other ‘non-white’ South Africans leaving the country, the largest share of emigrants in post-apartheid South Africa have remained white.
Some South African politicians and ordinary people would therefore be more inclined to view emigrants as ‘chicken runners’, or ‘scared white racists’ (Crawford 2011: Introduction). This relates to how violent crime, such as that depicted by Van Rooyen above, has ‘racial’ connotations of, allegedly, being perpetrated solely by black South Africans on white South Africans. Actual numbers reveal, however, that black South Africans themselves are more likely to be the victims of violent crime (Altbeker 2007). Moreover, the demise of the apartheid state has been viewed with concern by some white South Africans who have been suspicious of giving government power to black South Africans in the form of the African National Congress (ANC). However, such reasons for emigrating are hardly grounded in the reality, as the socio-economic inequalities between white and ‘non-white’ South Africans have increased in the post-apartheid era with the ANC’s introduction of neo-liberal policies securing property rights for white South Africans, some of which were even acquired by force during apartheid. The relatively high emigration numbers of white South Africans – despite constituting a clear numerical minority in the country – can therefore to some extent be correlated with the resources that they possess. Although there of course exist poor white South Africans too, the overwhelming majority of South Africans struggling in acute poverty and related problems remain ‘non-white’ like in the apartheid era, many of whom have few prospects or intentions of migrating because of their limited resources (Nyamnjoh 2006: chap. 1). On the other hand, limited resources can work as a push factor for emigration too, but to my knowledge research does not give a conclusive indication as to the extent to which this is the case in the South African context. What is important, nevertheless, is that we should not tap into polarised political and popular debates by only labelling South African emigrants as either ‘chicken runners’, at the one extreme, or ‘victims’ of the post-apartheid constitution, at the other extreme, as this would brush over other and more nuanced reasons that South Africans might have for emigrating (Crawford 2011: chap. 1).

Turning to the relatively low number of affluent ‘non-white’ South Africans, only a selected few ‘non-white’ South Africans with the right connections have benefited from the introduction of affirmative action in the post-apartheid era that is promoting the recruitment/advancement of historically oppressed groups in the labour market. Some of these ‘non-white’ South Africans
have taken their skills with them to other countries by emigrating alongside their white peers. Generally speaking, it is therefore of great concern to the country that many of the emigrating South Africans – whether white or ‘non-white’ – appear to be well-educated and highly-skilled, especially if they are positioned in economic sectors that are precarious for the country like, for example, doctors when considering the high occurrence of HIV/AIDS in South Africa. This apparent depletion of human resources is commonly referred to as the ‘brain drain’ in the academic literature (Crush et al. 2000; Sveinsson and Gumuschian 2008). Robert Crawford, however, wonders whether

the fear[s] of a brain drain are perhaps exaggerated. While the movement of professional South Africans is certainly an important issue, the increased migration of non-professionals to the UK indicates that the outflow of labour from South Africa and its ramifications are in need of reconsideration. (2011: 10)

Yet, as Crawford himself later admits, the tightening of immigration policies in many Western countries that has been witnessed recently, including in the UK, could pose a serious challenge to the outflow of non-professional South Africans in the foreseeable future. A high degree of ‘skills’ is often demanded nowadays to gain legal entry into these countries, providing that the prospective immigrant does not have the adequate ancestral ties to draw upon (Crawford 2011). This should lead us to consider in more specific detail the implications of the British policy context, in particular, for South African migration to the UK.

3.2 The British Context

The above-account of the South African context and emigration from the country does not tell us a great deal about where the South Africans in question eventually have decided to seek their ‘good fortunes’. Although ‘white settler countries’ such as Australia, New Zealand, Canada and the USA have been amongst the most popular destinations (Botha and Baxter 2005: 6), statistical evidence reveals that the UK has been the primary destination for South Africans – dating back long before the post-war era and largely explained by the colonial ties between the two countries which the other above-mentioned destinations lack (Israel 1999: 87;
Sveinsson and Gumuschian 2008: 8). Numbers indicate that since the increase in emigration from South Africa after the end of apartheid, approximately 25% of South African emigrants have opted for the UK (Van Rooyen 2000: 51). In addition, even though some South Africans saw the opportunity to return to South Africa with the end of apartheid and introduction of formal democracy, many also decided to remain in the UK as they had lived there for so many years and put down too many important roots (Israel 1999; Sveinsson and Gumuschian 2008).

The exact numbers of South Africans in the UK vary according to different sources. However, it is revealing of an increase of South African migrants in the UK that the 1991 census included around 68,000 South Africans living in the UK, the 2001 census about 140,000 (numbers quoted in Crawford 2011: 2), while the most recent census numbers from 2011 count 191,023 non-UK born South African residents in England and Wales (Nomis 2013). Based on these official numbers, South Africans comprise the 8th largest foreign national group in the UK to date – only a fraction behind the number of people of a Nigerian nationality. The number of South Africans in the UK might even be higher than these official numbers suggest, as analyst Robert Crawford guesstimate that the number of South Africans in the UK probably had reached as high as 550,000 as early as in 2008 (quoted in Sveinsson and Gumuschian 2008: 3).

A high number of South Africans leaving for the UK, however, does not automatically imply that white and ‘non-white’ South Africans have been welcomed to the same extent and treated equally once in the country. That the majority of South Africans coming to the UK during the apartheid era were white, might come as a surprise. One might wonder whether there would not be more ‘non-white’ migrants coming to the UK when considering that they were persecuted during apartheid, in contrast to most white South Africans who enjoyed the benefits carved out by the white apartheid state. In this regard, Mark Israel (1999) reminds us that even some white South Africans were persecuted by the apartheid state, perhaps most notably those who refused to serve in the military forces. Some of these managed to escape to the UK, amongst other locations. In addition, we must remember that ‘non-white’ people were generally barred from leaving South Africa – especially black people – as they were controlled through pass laws and segregated from the white population in separate homelands in South Africa. If they attempted to leave South Africa, then, an
easier option for ‘non-white’ people was to escape to neighbouring countries and facilitate the anti-apartheid struggle from there rather than from the UK. Moreover, in the case of those ‘non-white’ South Africans contemplating on and having the means to migrate to the UK, they usually encountered more difficulties in negotiating British immigration and citizenship policies than white South Africans, generally speaking (Israel 1999).

It is striking that even though the number of ‘non-white’ South Africans in the UK has recently appeared to be rising (Crush et al., 2000: 1-2; Sveinsson and Gumuschian, 2008: 3) – having only been at around two to three thousand in comparison to the tens of thousands of white South Africans in the UK during the apartheid period (Israel 1999: 2) – it is still a matter of fact that the overwhelming majority of South Africans in the UK are white. Around 90% of South Africans who reside in the UK are classified as white according to the 2001 British census (cited in Sveinsson and Gumuschian, 2008: 1), though white South Africans make up less than 9% of the population in South Africa itself (Statistics South Africa 2012). Although the most recent numbers from the 2011 British census do not yet reveal an official ‘racial’ breakdown of South Africans in the UK, we can suspect that the percentage of white South Africans in the UK has remained pretty constant. For instance, amongst all of the South African respondents to a 2007 survey conducted by the organisation advocating for the ‘homecoming’ of South Africans abroad – the Homecoming Revolution – 88% of the respondents were white (cited in Crawford 2011: 52).

Within the white South African population in the UK, it also appears that the overwhelming majority consists of English-speaking South Africans, a group which is more likely to possess British ancestral ties than the other main group of white South Africans, namely Afrikaans-speaking. Although it is suggested that the number of white Afrikaans-speaking South Africans in the UK has grown in the post-apartheid era, a recent survey of South Africans in London reveals that “20% identified themselves as Afrikaans speakers, 70% identified themselves as English speakers, and the remaining 10% identified themselves as [both] Afrikaans and English speakers” (quoted in Crawford 2011: 52).

The above-observations demand not only an explanation in terms of the ‘racial’ configuration of the apartheid state, but a consideration of British immigration and citizenship/integration policies. Although political upheavals in
apartheid South Africa had some impact on the numbers of South Africans arriving in the UK during the apartheid era (Israel 1999: 86), I believe that a consideration of the different stages that British immigration and citizenship/integration policies have gone through in the post-war era can shed further light on notions of the ‘British nation’ and who have been included or excluded as a consequence. As Robert Crawford pertinently asks,

[w]hat made the pastures in the UK more appealing than those in the USA or Australia? In addition to reflecting an individual’s desires, the destination also reflects one’s capacity to meet the host nation’s immigration criteria. This, of course, attracts or prescribes a specific type of emigrant. (2011: 10)

Indeed, it can appear that white South Africans, especially if belonging to the English-speaking group with closer ancestral connections to the UK, have historically benefited from some type of preferential treatment compared to other migrant groups. A notable manifestation of this is found in the relatively high number of South Africans possessing a British passport. According to the numbers from the most recent population census for England and Wales in 2011, there were as many as 117,302 South Africans with a British passport amongst the 191,023 non-UK born South Africans that the census had counted (Nomis 2013). A sizeable number of the South Africans with a British passport would have secured dual citizenship – South African and British – upon birth to at least one British parent, while others would have gone through the naturalisation process to become British citizens. Also, some of the South Africans currently present in the UK have gained legal access by holding a passport from another EU/EEA country after the agreement of free movement within the EU/EEA region (see Nomis 2013). And although the number of white South Africans who have secured access via ancestral visa is significantly lower than those arriving on dual/multiple citizenships, the applicant would only need at least one British-born grandparent to obtain this visa as per contemporary immigration laws (Crawford 2011: 43). The above-numbers therefore give legitimacy to Israel’s (1999: 86) claim that white South Africans have historically benefited from a greater variety of routes into the UK than ‘non-white’ South Africans – either through formal legislation, or by having a vantage point with their white skin colour in benefitting from the discretionary power of immigration officials in cases where
approval of immigration status have been subject to some scrutiny. Furthermore, we must include into this equation that many white South African newcomers have been enabled to draw upon the support of the greater number of white than ‘non-white’ South Africans already present in the UK (Crawford 2011: chap. 4).

Before taking a more in-depth historical perspective and illustrating the ways in which British policies have seemed to attract white South Africans, it can be useful with a short note on the slightly different implications of immigration and citizenship/integration policies first. Whereas the former deals with state measures to restrict or manage immigration to a country, the latter normally deals with how to integrate immigrants and minorities already present in the given society as well as prospective newcomers. Although in the British context it is noteworthy that the two forms of legislation have at certain times worked according to contradictory logics (Favell 2001), the two sets of policies can also overlap with each other and attempts to distinguish between the two can thus become blurred (Giguère 2006: 24). I have therefore chosen to only discuss their respective particularities when I see it as pertinent to do so.

3.2.1 Post-War Legislation: 1945 - 1990

I begin the historical account of South African immigration to the British context by considering what has been described as a positive, indeed cornerstone, legislation in the immediate aftermath of the Second World War. Under the provisions of the British Nationality Act of 1948 passed by the Labour government of the time, migrants from the former British colonies were allowed access into the UK and granted citizenship rights – including South Africans irrespective of their skin colour (Kymlicka 2003: 201). The government justified the Act with the labour shortage that the country suffered from after the war and the need to counteract this by drawing on a surplus population from countries with colonial and cultural ties to Britain. Insofar as this was the main rationale behind the Act, it was certainly not inconvenient for British politicians that this relatively lenient immigration policy also could be viewed as an expression of guilt for the past wrongdoings of the British Empire and the need to undo this somehow by accommodating people from countries that the Empire had
previously subjugated and colonised (Israel 1999: 93). The importance of the Act in encouraging migration from previous colonies and curbing labour shortage in the UK, however, did not deter some politicians to voice their concerns over increased immigration from previous colonies:

During the 1950s, crude ideas of black inferiority, primitiveness and criminality were reworked within political and popular white discourses to present black people as a threat to British culture and ‘whiteness’. According to this discourse, British supremacy was being threatened in the outposts of Empire, while in the streets of the mother country the black migrant was endangering core national values. (Israel 1999: 99, inverted commas in original)

Such sentiments took root in government legislation once it had become more widely realised in political circles that not solely white people, but also ‘non-white’ people from previous colonies exercised the right to migrate to and settle in the UK as stipulated in the 1948 Act (Kymlicka 2003: 201). It was not before in 1958 with the attacks on the ‘non-white’ population in London and Nottingham, nonetheless, that the political debate got more heated. However, rather than tackling head-on the problem of racism that the 1958 ‘race riots’ clearly revealed, the misguided political concerns at the time centred around immigration and the need to limit this to avoid further ‘social disruptions’ (Favell 2001). The ruling Conservative party of the time passed the Commonwealth Immigrants Act in 1962, putting some restrictions on the immigration of ‘non-white’ people from previous British colonies – or the New Commonwealth countries that had gained membership following the Second World War. At the same time, the Act largely allowed the continuation of immigration of white people – believed to be less likely to spark ‘social disruptions’ – from the old foundations states of the Commonwealth such as the previous British dominions of Australia, Canada, New Zealand and South Africa (Israel 1999: chap. 4).

In the specific case of migration from South Africa – a country with a ‘non-white’ majority – some special provisions were passed in the 1960s and 1970s in the wake of South Africa’s withdrawal from the Commonwealth in 1965, which came as a consequence of the mounting international pressure against the apartheid regime. Given Britain’s status as head of the Commonwealth and world power, politicians wanted to set an example by sanctioning South
Africa for its non-allegiance to the Commonwealth’s values, and had to make numerous decisions as to how the withdrawal of South Africa from the Commonwealth would affect South African immigration to the UK. Different Acts were passed, where the ruling Conservative government responded to the political opposition by giving the impression that it was taking a strong stance to shun any associations with apartheid, whereas beneath the surface it would appear to be supporting apartheid’s ‘racial’ rhetoric by giving preferential treatment to the migration of white as opposed to ‘non-white’ South Africans. It is therefore not surprising that the political opposition to the Conservative government was keen to stress the very immorality of giving preferential treatment to white South Africans with their entanglements in the apartheid regime, at the same time as the immigration of New Commonwealth people was being severely restricted, let alone that of ‘non-white’ South Africans (Israel 1999: chap. 4). The special provisions for South Africa that were passed “disproportionately affected non-white South Africans, as South Africans of British descent could still ‘return’ [to Britain] and those with enough money to migrate received special dispensation” (Israel 1999: 97, inverted commas in original).

In addition, the implementation of the British Immigration Act of 1971 implemented by that time’s Conservative government has been described as a “legislation that fell just short of an explicitly racial classification scheme” (Cohen 2006: 88). The Act introduced the notion of ‘patriality’ that clearly favoured white people from the UK and the colonies by primarily bestowing citizenship on “those whose birth, adoption, parenthood or grandparenthood made them citizens through descent (overwhelmingly a white category)” (Cohen 2006: 88, brackets in original). In contrast, only a small number of ‘non-white’ people from the UK or colonies were qualified through the condition of having resided in the UK for five years or more, and by acquiring citizenship through naturalization or registration (Cohen 2006). This was solidified by the British Nationality Act 1981 implemented by Margaret Thatcher’s Conservative government, paving the way for a citizenship constructed further along ‘racial’ lines by placing even more emphasis on descent (jus sanguinis) at the detriment of birth on British territory (jus soli) in determining access to citizenship. This is highlighted by the specification that, if born in Britain, at least one of the child’s parents had to be a British citizen or permanent resident to make the child eligible for British
citizenship, as opposed to earlier when any child born in the UK was eligible regardless of the parents’ nationalities (Solomos 1993: 71).

One prominent explanation for the unfair nature of much of Britain’s post-war immigration and citizenship policies, lies in Britain’s and other Western European countries’ reluctance to accommodate the unprecedented number of immigrants in the post-war period as opposed to in previous times. This has distinguished the migration experience of Western Europe from that of the classic countries of immigration such as Canada, the USA and Australia, which have been shaped by a much longer history of large-scale immigration and have carried out some positive structural changes to their countries. As a consequence, Western European countries like Britain have been much more uneasy and tended to respond in a more reactive manner to the larger-scale immigration taking place in the post-war era (Rodríguez-García 2010: 265). Indeed,

it could be argued that whereas immigration, in part, has caused classical countries of immigration ... to view themselves as being in continual evolution, each territory in Europe tends to be viewed almost as though it were an already-constructed society with predetermined ethnic boundaries – that is, a fixed ‘socio-cultural nucleus’, into which one simply has to insert oneself. (Rodríguez-García 2010: 265, inverted commas in original)

This understanding points to elements of assimilation as a government strategy to integration. Assimilation has in the academic literature been described as an integration strategy which has more or less forced minority groups to become indistinguishable from the majority population in the given society (Brochmann 2005: 371). On this score, the perceived assimilability of white South Africans into the white British majority population has been constructed on some prefixed notions that essentially have equated white skin colour with being ‘British’. ‘Non-white’ people, in contrast, have been seen as less compatible with such notions, depicted as inevitably ‘incompatible’ with the white majority population and excluded by immigration policies before they have been given a chance to conform in the first place (Israel 1999).

Over the course of the 1980s and into the 1990s, however, a distinction should be made between immigration and integration policies in some British legislation. Whereas the application of immigration policies had previously been and continued to be a means to which to prevent and deter migration –
particularly of ‘non-white’ people – the introduction of certain ‘multicultural’ integration policies appeared, at least, to be more accommodating of those migrants and ethnic minorities who were already established in the UK. This latter development mirrored similar developments in other Western European countries at the time (Però and Solomos 2010: 4-5). It seemed to be a notable departure from the virtually explicit use of racist criteria differentiating between people who allegedly belonged or not in the UK, which Enoch Powell – a Conservative politicians and the Shadow Secretary of State for Defence at the time – had most infamously introduced in his ‘rivers of blood’ speech in 1968 (Solomos 1993).\(^{10}\) The parallel workings of strict immigration policies and more lenient integration policies most noticeable in the 1980s and into the 90s might, at first sight, seem rather contradictory. Adrian Favell (2001), however, points out that this was a deliberate strategy on the part of British politicians and that the two sets of policies often worked in tandem towards the same ‘instrumental’ end. In specific words, while strict border controls were put in place to limit the number of ‘undesirable’ (read: ‘non-white’) migrants, multicultural integration policies were intended to ensure that the ‘non-white’ migrant and minority groups already present in the UK felt sufficiently included for ‘social harmony’ to prevail.

The appropriateness of multiculturalism in the UK was seen in conjunction with the high ethno-cultural diversity in the population – which can be contrasted to the relative ethno-cultural homogeneity that is more characteristic of some other countries such as Italy and Spain (Però 2008: 74). Thus, politicians apparently presumed that Britain’s ‘racial’ and ethnic diversity needed to be ‘contained’ with measures of equal opportunity in order to facilitate ‘social order’; however, “not because it expresse[d] some deeper constitutive or moral equality of persons” (Favell 2001: 117). Nevertheless, with the Race Relations Act 1976 (amended in 2000) paving the way for attempts to foster ‘racial equality’, evidence reveals some positive developments in the aftermath of the introduction of such legislation, such as a curbing of the worst types of

\(^{10}\) In this speech, Enoch Powell had predicted that ‘rivers of blood’ would be floating in the streets of Britain if the immigration of ‘non-white’ Commonwealth migrants was not limited (Solomos 2013).
discrimination at the workplace and an enhanced service provision for migrants and ethnic minorities. Essentially, however, such legislation was mostly concerned with direct forms of discrimination that had to be ‘proven’ by the victims themselves in the individual cases, rather than also tackling widespread forms of more ‘hidden’ discrimination in society (Runnymede Trust 2000: 264-5).

3.2.2 Recent Developments: 1990 – present

A consideration of recent developments in British immigration and citizenship policies is crucial for a more comprehensive understanding of the policy environment under which most of my participants have migrated from South Africa to the UK in the post-apartheid era.

Intensified globalisation processes since the early 1990s have resulted in an increase in immigration to Britain. Although it is worth noting that “two-thirds of all immigrants coming to settle permanently [in the UK] … are white, most often from the Old Commonwealth [including South Africa], Europe or the United States” (Favell 2001: 205), there has nevertheless been a diversification of countries of origin. Many of the ‘new’ immigrants no longer come from former British colonies – as was overwhelmingly the case from the 1950s to the 1970s – but also originate from a multitude of countries around the world with no special historical relationship with the UK (Vertovec 2007a: 1028-9). A discomfort with and reaction to this diversity is notable in the stringent British refugee and asylum politics that were implemented over the course of the 1990s. British politicians claimed that asylum seekers – people fleeing oppression in a country and seeking asylum and refugee status in the UK – are not necessarily fleeing oppression but rather seeking a better standard of living and must, thus, be lumped into the same category as other economic migrants as ‘undeserving’ of any special protection. We have observed, then, a higher number of rejected asylum applications from the 1990s (see Israel 1999: 104-9). These discriminatory practices arguably contradict the overarching political tradition of toleration and moderation that Britain prides itself upon (Malik 1996), as well as the more specific measures of the international human right laws that Britain has signed and ratified in its own legislation. However, it has been argued that Britain is a prime example of a
nation-state which sets to find its own solutions rather than letting international bodies intervene on its sovereignty, prioritising the consequences of its policies rather than its moral obligations (see e.g. Favell 2001).

Looking through the lenses of South African migrants, Israel (1999) argues that during the apartheid era South Africans tended to apply for refugee status only in cases where all other routes to settlement in the UK had been exhausted. It is therefore fair to speculate whether the stricter asylum and refugee policies in the 1990s have worked against ‘non-white’ South Africans in particular, with generally fewer routes to settlement in the UK than what is normally the case for many white South Africans with either ancestral ties or more financial resources to draw upon. A related factor is the increased difficulties for ‘non-white’ South Africans to claim that they are refugees and have been oppressed in South Africa with the introduction of formal democracy in 1994 and the apartheid state long gone. Yet, there are indications of increased pressure from British politicians directed even against white South Africans. During his visit in South Africa in 1999, the then Prime Minister Tony Blair made clear that white South Africans are not unconditionally welcome in the UK. Addressing the increased migration from South Africa to the UK in the post-apartheid era and presumably talking to prospective emigrants in possession of British passports, he underlined his admiration for the ‘South African miracle’ of transition from apartheid to formal democracy – thereby encouraging South Africans to stay in South Africa to build up their country rather than to flee its problems (Van Rooyen 2000: 40-1).

As an explanation to the further intensification of immigration and citizenship restrictions that we have witnessed into the twenty-first century, the ‘multicultural’ integration policies that appeared to emerge from the 1980s, and continue into the 1990s, have been subjected to heightened criticism. Although multicultural policies have not invariably been abandoned at the local level in the British context, it is particularly state-level support of multiculturalism that has been fiercely contested (Grillo 2010). In addressing this increased hostility towards immigration and state-multiculturalism in Britain, which parallels similar developments in other Western European countries, many commentators claim that we have been witnessing a ‘backlash against multiculturalism’ in recent times (see e.g. Grillo 2007; Vertovec and Wessendorf 2010). This is not only confined
to political and media opposition against immigration and multiculturalism, when taking into account the academic commentators who also have been voicing their concerns over the outcomes of multiculturalism as a state policy. Critical standpoints against multiculturalism as advocated by some scholars such as Sartori (2002, cited in Grillo 2007) have somewhat been mirrored by those British politicians who have contended that multiculturalism has ‘gone too far’ – quite contrary to previous assertions that multicultural rights could keep migrant and ethnic minority groups ‘happy’ enough to defuse ‘social disruptions’. Thus, multicultural rights have allegedly enabled migrant and ethnic minority groups to segregate themselves from mainstream British society and fostered a climate of ‘parallel lives’ (see Home Office 2001). According to this narrative, too much emphasis on multicultural rights without a corresponding requirement on the part of migrants and ethnic minorities to integrate into British society, could stir tension and put the ‘native’ population at ‘risk’ (see Vertovec and Wessendorf 2010 for a comprehensive assessment of the ‘backlash against multiculturalism’ discourse).

With the White Paper Secure Borders, Safe Havens in 2002, the Labour Government of the time hoped to restore public faith in the immigration system by remedying the past ‘risks’ that it allegedly had exposed the British public to by letting immigrants into the country ‘unchecked’. The White Paper’s proposed solution was to secure that migrants and ethnic minorities were sufficiently integrated into British society (Home Office 2002). This proposition came at a time when the social disturbances between different ‘racial’ and ethnic groups had just unfolded in Bradford, Burnley and Oldham in 2001, which can be characterised as the most significant events leading to the integration of migrants and ethnic minorities being a predominant strategy of the Home Office (McGhee 2005). This is consistent with the observation that “many of the debates that have emerged across Europe with regards to ‘race relations’, immigration and citizenship in recent years have coalesced around ‘events’ specific to each country” (Fekete 2004: 18, paraphrased in McGhee 2009: 58, inverted commas in original). In this regard, it was not an insignificant ‘event’ that would occur later; more precisely, during the London 2005 bombings in which ‘home-grown’ ethnic minority Britons were identified as responsible for the attacks. This event has been taken up and cited excessively by politicians as a convenient scare-scenario
to remind the public of what could supposedly happen if migrants and ethnic minorities are not sufficiently integrated into British society (McGhee 2009). Analysing the responses to such events by dominant British politicians, Davide Però makes an interesting observation of Britain as a context that

is one of the European countries in which the national identity debate has been the most significant and its transformations the most remarkable. In fact, after decades of multiculturalism, when national identity had almost been redefined around it in 2000 ... Britain has undergone a sort of neo-assimilationist U-turn. (2013: 1242)

Indeed, it must be stressed that even prominent sectors associated with the political left or centre, and not merely right-wing politicians as one might presume, have participated in this apparent rejection of multiculturalism as a government policy. This is perhaps best reflected by the implemented policies and statements from leading Labour politicians at the governmental level. Through a critical examination of immigration and citizenship policy in Britain since 2001, Derek McGhee (2009) shows how the former Labour governments under the leaderships of Tony Blair and Gordon Brown, respectively, have placed an increased emphasis on migrants’ duties to Britain rather than on their rights under a situation coined by some as a ‘neo-assimilationist turn’ (e.g. Però 2008; 2013). However, it could be argued that the future looks even grimmer with the change in the power structure following the 2010 general election and the new Coalition government’s intensified attack on state multiculturalism. Conservative Prime Minister David Cameron claims that “[u]nder the doctrine of state multiculturalism, we have encouraged different cultures to live separate lives, apart from each other and the mainstream ... we need a lot less of the passive tolerance of recent years and much more active, muscular liberalism” (2011a). Perhaps particularly illuminating the Coalition government’s harsh attitude to migrants and ethnic minorities, but also reflecting a long-standing political dissatisfaction with Britain’s membership in the EU, we have witnessed propositions of further limitations on the rights of EU/EEA migrants to claim benefits in the UK, especially if coming from ‘poorer countries’ such as Romania and Bulgaria (Wintour 2012). As it will be elaborated later on in this chapter, this development reflects the institutionalisation of cultural discourses as even certain white migrants can become scapegoated as potential threats to the social fabric of
the ‘British nation’ – and not exclusively ‘non-white’ migrants as in earlier post-war rhetoric that arguably centred more directly on ethnic minorities’ and migrants’ ‘race’ (see McGhee 2005: chap. 3; McGhee 2009).

Remarkably, however, even the Labour Party opposition to the government has not seriously challenged assumptions about the supposed ills of the state-sponsored multiculturalism of the past (cf. Però 2013). In explaining this pattern of a turn towards the political right, Daniele Conversi argues that “the political spectrum of majoritarian systems has shifted further to the right as the centre-right [and to some extent even the centre-left] has adopted many of the populist and ultra-nationalist themes, legitimising them while increasing both their overall appeal and the number of seats thus captured by ‘an expanded right bloc’ “ (2013: 9-10, inverted commas in original). Davide Però (2013) helpfully situates the current environment – which is marked by some form of competition of who can appear to be ‘toughest’ on multiculturalism and immigration – within the state’s attempt to gain legitimacy amongst the electorate in a time when some of the state’s legitimacy has been threatened by global economic forces. British politicians have frequently pitted the ‘native’ population against migrants through various signifiers of the ‘native’ population’s entitlements as opposed to ‘undeserving’ migrants. This is arguably part of a coping strategy that is being activated in the hope that a national framework of ‘us’ against ‘them’ can override any attention on class – or the way in which the state tends to ignore the material and economic needs of much of its working-class electorate (Però 2013).

Thus, it should be made evident how the attack on state-sponsored multiculturalism – including the rights of migrants and ethnic minorities – is a convenient political construction that is not based on the realities as such. In fact, according to Lentin and Titley the multicultural policies that have been on offer in countries around Western Europe, including in the UK, “have never amounted to more than piecemeal affairs, and a coherent, normative multiculturalism has never been uniformly incorporated into policy” (2011b: para. 4). At best, Grillo (2007) is only willing to characterise multicultural policies in the UK as ‘weak’; that is, the tendency to primarily recognise cultural diversity in the private sphere only. In institutional public spheres like the workplace and the education system, on the other hand, an environment has prevailed where individuals have the duty to assimilate into mainstream society for the sake of ‘social cohesion’. British
legislation intended to promote equal opportunities and the abolition of ethnic-
‘racial’ discrimination has been more concerned with individual rights than any
particular minority culture’s rights and has, therefore, not been strong enough to
protect minorities against the pressures of assimilation (Grillo 2007). In relation
to this, it has been claimed that the supposed focus on “hard-core anti-racist
concerns of ‘institutionalised racism’ and visible discrimination” (Favell 2001:
216, inverted commas in original), has gradually given way to a focus on the
preservation of “cultural practices to be … safely consumed as cultural spectacles
by others … [such as] saris, samosas, and steel drums” (Kymlicka 2010: 33).
Therefore, argue Lentin and Titley (2011a), the typical political attacks on
multiculturalism as a ‘failed state-strategy’ are misguided, as multiculturalism has
never really been applied as a serious state-strategy in the first place. Even though
politicians would typically present it as a ‘necessary’ and ‘reasonable’ debate
about different integration strategies, Lentin and Titley suspect that what
politicians are really trying to tackle when they are lashing out on
multiculturalism are the unfounded concerns of members of the electorate with
regard to immigration. The ‘backlash against multiculturalism’ can, on this
reading, be seen as an attack on lived multiculture – or the presence of a more
noticeably ‘super-diverse’ environment in the British and other Western European
contexts owing to postcolonial and globalised migration (Vertovec 2007a).

As notable policy implementations reflecting the ‘backlash against
multiculturalism’ discourse, we are compelled to consider the recent
implementations of a new points-based migration system and civic integration
tests in the UK. Since these may affect different categories of South African
migrants in the UK, it can be useful to clarify which policy categories the two
different legislations normally will fall into. Whereas the points-based system is
an immigration policy that may grant temporary/permanent resident permits to
would-be immigrants or deny them this privilege, civic integration tests are more
associated with integration policies in the sense that politicians would claim that
such tests exhibit the intention on the part of migrants to learn about and become
part of British society. It could thus be objected that my focus on the points-based
migration system as a reflection of the ‘backlash against multiculturalism’
discourse is somewhat misplaced, as this is an immigration policy. Arguably,
integration policies have more to do with the ‘backlash against multiculturalism’
than immigration policies, in that they suggest alternative ways of integration than that of multiculturalism. Derek McGhee (2009), however, points out the possible connection between the points-based migration system and the ‘backlash against multiculturalism’ discourse. More specifically, the points-based migration system can be interpreted as a device that also attempts to improve the supposed likelihood that future migrants will integrate into British society by selecting non-EEA migrants that are socio-economically ‘desirable’ enough to come to Britain. The combined role of British immigration and integration policies is thus an attempt of “maximizing the economic gains of immigration while simultaneously trying to diminish the possibility of the immigrant work-force acquiring a [‘threatening’] social and political presence in Britain” (McGhee 2009: 52).

The new points-based migration system, then, grants temporary/permanent resident permits to would-be immigrants from non-EEA countries, or denies them this privilege. It was officially discussed throughout the 2000s, introduced in 2006 and fully implemented from 2008. This new points-based system implies that non-EEA migrants who apply for entrance and residency in the UK – including South Africans without the adequate ancestral ties to the UK or not in possession of an EU/EEA passport – are required to prove their economic value to Britain by ‘earning’ enough points based on factors such as previous education and work experience, as well as English language qualifications. An assessment of the current skills shortage in the UK will also be made to establish the necessity of bringing in certain types of ‘skills’ to boost the economy. Such an emphasis has been seen as a necessary strategy in order to redress the shortage of workers in certain sectors due to the ageing of the British population, just like in other Western European countries (Favell 2001). The British points-based migration system is to some extent built on the Canadian model, and Andrew Geddes (2003) argues that the Canadian model has been relatively successful. Geddes traces some positive developments in the UK as well, for example that some labour migrants who obtain a sufficient amount of points are allowed to enter the UK without a job offer for the first time in many years. And, by considering previous British post-war legislations which have favoured white South Africans at the expense of ‘non-white’ South Africans, the points-based system can perhaps be seen as a legislation that at least subjects both white and ‘non-white’ South Africans to the same regulations. Confirming this notion is perhaps the anecdotal
evidence suggesting that there has been an increase also in ‘non-white’ South Africans coming to the UK after South African borders opened up with the end of apartheid (Crush et al. 2000: 1-2; Sveinsson and Gumuschian 2008: 3).

However, it is also the case that the increase in ‘non-white’ South Africans in the UK could be more related to recent globalisation processes, in tandem with drastic changes in South Africa with the demise of the apartheid regime and its restrictions of movement for black people in particular, rather than some notion of equal treatment under the banner of the new points-based system. Besides, the large majority of South Africans in the UK remain white (Sveinsson and Gumuschian 2008: 1), despite white South Africans being a minority in South Africa itself (Statistics South Africa 2012). Rather than accommodating for ‘non-white’ South Africans, there are therefore signs that the points-based system has restricted access, in general, for any South African without the sufficient amount of ‘points’ or any other visa or citizenship routes to benefit from. Contrary to showing any signs of abating, tougher restrictions have been imposed with the new Coalition Government’s endeavour to make the points-based migration system even more selective with regard to non-EEA migrants. The Coalition government has put forward ideas of an annual immigration cap (Roche 2010), and David Cameron has argued for “a hard-headed selection of genuinely talented individuals based on our national interest … an approach that imposes tough limits, not weak minimum thresholds” (2011b).

Added to this, it was previously the case that those arriving on working holiday visas “constitute the largest identifiable proportion of South Africans arriving in the UK” (Crawford 2009: 15), making the consequences of the scrapping of this visa in 2009 – under the provisions of the new points-based migration system – all the more worrying. Because South Africa has no reciprocal agreement for British citizens wanting to come to South Africa for work, no replacement for the working holiday visa has been set up under the provisions of the points-based migration system. Although the working holiday visa favoured white South Africans who generally are in possession of more financial resources than their ‘non-white’ peers by stipulating that applicants had to support themselves without receiving any public funds, it can be presumed that the scrapping of the working holiday visa will have an impact on South Africans of all skin colours. The visa previously allowed Commonwealth citizens between 17
and 30 – which included any South African following South Africa’s readmission into the Commonwealth after the end of apartheid – to be employed in the UK for a maximum of 12 months within a two year’s period of legal residency in the UK. After this period, employers were allowed to sponsor the South African working holidaymakers with a work permit to stay legally in the country (Crawford 2009; 2011; Sveinsson and Gumuschian 2008).

Seen in conjunction with the significance of global economic forces, a stricter assessment of the potential economic contributions of migrants to the British economy has arguably been incorporated in recent immigration policies (Kostakopoulou 2010: 836). However, this intersects, of course, with a preoccupation with migrants who can benefit Britain “as much socially and culturally as ... economically” (Brown 2008). It is therefore doubtful that those white South Africans with ancestral ties to Britain or another EU/EEA country will be hit by the recent policy restrictions on South Africans as outlined above. The scrapping of the working holiday visa is more worrying in the sense that it has been the only available route to the UK for those white South Africans without the ‘valid’ ancestral ties, for example many white Afrikaner and most ‘non-white’ South Africans. We should also acknowledge how the legacy of apartheid would presumably make it easier for certain white South Africans at the detriment of ‘non-white’ South Africans to obtain the right amount of ‘skills’ (Nyamnjoh 2006). For example, Tier 1 of the points-based system welcomes ‘highly-skilled’ immigrants with the necessary financial power and possession of ‘valuable skills’ to the UK (Sveinsson and Gumuschian 2008: 9-10). The potential significance of Tier 1 can be read in an estimate which showed that 26% of all South Africans who migrated to Britain had professional qualifications; a category overrepresented by white South Africans – though not all white South Africans in the UK would be classified, of course, as ‘professionals’ (cited in Van Rooyen 2000: 51).

As a notable integration policy implementation reflecting the ‘backlash against multiculturalism’ discourse, we should note the introduction of so-called civic integration tests from 2005 for would-be British citizens, and from 2007 also extended to non-EEA migrants wishing to become permanent residents in the UK. Civic integration tests are commonly associated with the testing of applicants’ knowledge of ‘Life in the UK’, but can also include English language tests and
the requirement to undertake English language classes for applicants who are deemed as not possessing an adequate standard of English. The underpinning idea is that without knowledge of British society, as well as the necessary English language proficiency, migrants will be inhibited from participating as ‘active citizens’ in important institutions such as the labour market (Kostakopoulou 2010). Moreover, with the Borders, Citizenship and Immigration Act 2009, we witnessed proposed extensions of the naturalisation conditions “from five to eight years for highly skilled and skilled workers, refugees and persons granted temporary protection, and from three to five years for the family members of British citizens and permanent residents” (cited in Kostakopoulou 2010: 835). Indicative of the emphasis on compelling migrants to be ‘active citizens’, it was also suggested that migrants seeking naturalisation could ‘earn’ their citizenship earlier than this by being ‘active citizens’:

The qualification period could be reduced to six and three years respectively for those who demonstrate ‘active citizenship’ – engagement with the wider community – provided that they retain ‘qualifying immigration status’ throughout the period, that is, are self-sufficient, in subsisting family relations and – for refugees and other protected persons – in need of protection. (cited in Kostakopoulou 2010: 835, inverted commas in original)

This ‘earned citizenship’ agenda of the previous Labour government did not come into force in 2011 as planned, since the present Coalition government announced that it was “too complicated, bureaucratic and ... ineffective” (UKBA 2010). However, the Coalition Government has nevertheless put in motion their own plans to make it more complicated for migrants to move from temporary residence to permanent settlement (UKBA 2010). This builds on the idea, as carried forward from preceding governments, that certain restrictions must be put in place in order to secure a “clear sense of shared [British] national identity” (Cameron 2011a). It has been claimed that without migrants who are committed to ‘contribute’ to British society, it is difficult to promote a patriotic ‘Britishness’ based on some distinctive values that everyone can agree on for the sake of ‘community cohesion’ in Labour’s parlance (Home Office 2001), or the ‘big society’ for David Cameron (2011c). A more detailed indication as to what the shared and distinctive values that ‘Britishness’ might consist of, can be obtained
from an earlier Life in the United Kingdom Advisory Group report. In this report, it is stated that to be ‘British’ cannot be precisely defined, but is generally “to respect those over-arching specific institutions, values, beliefs and traditions that bind us all, the different nations and cultures, together in peace and legal order” (quoted in McGhee 2009: 60). According to Christian Joppke (2004: 253), the British case can on this reading be celebrated as yet another European liberal democracy which recently has managed to ‘de-ethnicise’ its national identity, implying that Britain no longer claims to represent any particular cultural norms. The emphasis of Joppke’s argument is therefore that ‘Britishness’ is now based on some shared and distinctive values – or what in the academic literature is termed as a ‘civic’ conception of nationalism – rather than a more particularistic and exclusionary ‘ethnic nationalism’ (see Bellamy 2008: chap. 3).

However, Derek McGhee (2009) argues that this obsession with ‘British values’ – which must be exhibited on the part of certain migrants in order for them to claim residency and citizenship – has worked in tandem with the managed approach of recent immigration policies. That is, the ultimate aim of British politicians has been to shore up both immigration and citizenship policy and to ensure that ‘undesirable’ migrants are excluded – whether defined in cultural or economic terms. There is the further implication in that talk about ‘Britishness’ might come to represent ‘white’ British in the mind-sets of people, thereby not only excluding migrants, but also ‘non-white’ ethnic minorities that very well may identify themselves as ‘British’ (Però 2013: 1247). The report popularly referred to as The Parekh Report, chaired by Bhikhu Parekh (now Lord) and published in 2000 as an investigation into The Future of Multi-Ethnic Britain, thus asserted that “‘[w]hiteness nowhere features as an explicit condition of being British ... [however] it is widely understood that Englishness, and therefore by extension Britishness, is racially coded” (Runnymede Trust 2000: 38). It is striking how ensuing British media debates picked up and challenged this assertion that ‘Britishness’ is ‘racially’ coded, even though this was mentioned only briefly in the report. Hence, all of the other important contributions and suggestions of the report to promote a multicultural society in Britain were effectively overshadowed, which would seem to demonstrate some of the difficulties in putting racism on the mainstream British agenda (Stevenson 2003: 53-4). Indeed, it can seem as though some type of consensus has been reached in
which racism is no longer seen as a ‘big issue’ and that it is unnecessary to discuss such issues in the public sphere. This relates to political/media rhetoric and its encouragement of a common perception that depicts that Britain has, at least, managed to move away from the more explicit institutional and popular racism based on skin colour in the immediate post-war years (Favell 2001).

Ali Rattansi points out, nevertheless, that “racism can thrive in a whole variety of guises under the surface … racism is multidimensional, with varying degrees of cultural, colour and other physiological coding” (2007: 159). Based on such an understanding, Rattansi suggests that it could be plausible to talk about institutional racialisation as an alternative to an exclusive focus on institutional racism, as this would open up our investigation to “articulations and complexity, rather than being nudged to closure by a focus on a singular disadvantaging operational feature [i.e. ‘race’]” (2005: 290). Indeed, it is indicative of how racism(s) can be disguised and fester under the cloth of ‘culture’ that the policy emphasis on supposedly ‘innocent’ British values can lead to a situation under which “ ‘host’ peoples attempt to preserve their way of life, standard of living and/or identity” (McGhee 2005: 68, inverted commas in original). Being a way of speaking which still can acquire racist undertones from earlier assumptions of inherited biological differences – in that ‘cultures’ may be ordered according to a similar hierarchical logic – it is worrying that such cultural references appear to enable ordinary people to employ the seemingly more ‘acceptable’ language of ‘cultural habits’ (see McGhee 2005: chap. 3). Ralph Grillo (2010), then, draws attention to the way in which the aftermath of the 9/11 terrorist attacks in the US and the post-7/7 London-bombings political and media climate have intensified a form of cultural racism which has revolved around people’s faiths and/or other cultural markers. This has mostly been aimed at Muslim people or those perceived to be of a Muslim faith, but not exclusively as other groups have also been affected. Grillo warns, nevertheless, that it is important to recognise that cultural racism has not replaced other forms of racism, but has developed alongside and is significantly intertwined with the more ‘traditional’ forms of biological racism that have singled out black and other ‘non-white’ people because of physical attributes such as their skin colour in particular.

To conclude this chapter, it has considered the varied structural and contextual factors that have influenced South African migration to and settlement
in the UK with a particular eye on the prevailing policy frameworks in the respective countries. In this sense, the chapter provides an important historical grounding of the various structural and contextual influences that might shape the strategies that white South Africans currently adopt when negotiating citizenship – some influences which will be referred back to when presenting my findings. Before outlining my findings in more detail, however, it is necessary to understand and situate these findings within the methodological considerations that have shaped this research.
4. Methodology

Thus far, I have concentrated on the theoretical insights that the thesis is drawing upon, before I then outlined the backdrop against which South African migration to the UK has occurred by inspecting the particularities of and relationship between the South African and the British contexts. The focus now turns to the methodological decisions that I have taken, attempting to bring a stronger acknowledgement of South Africans’ human agency to the fore while not underestimating the impact of the potential structural constraints. This helps situating the thesis’ main argument – that white South Africans seek to preserve their relatively privileged status – within the reciprocal influence of structural conditions and the role of human agency in shaping white South Africans’ negotiations of citizenship. In this manner, this methodology chapter delineates the research parameters under which my emerging research data in the remaining chapters have been interpreted and analysed. Essentially, the chapter overviews the methodological decisions that have been adopted to generate my data material, going through the different but overlapping stages of the adaptation of a methodological framework, the data collection, the sampling procedures and the data analysis. It will also be deliberated on, through a reflexive account, how my findings must be interpreted in the light of the fact that any qualitative interview data is socially constructed in the encounters between the researcher(s) and the participants. The considerations that have been made in ensuring that the study has followed required ethical standards will then be discussed in the final part of this methodology chapter.

4.1 Methodological Framework

The overarching methodological approach in this study is qualitative, with the main provider of data being semi-structured interviews with South Africans in the UK. Nevertheless, to facilitate a thorough approach, I have been influenced by Vertovec’s claim that researchers investigating citizenship and migration should
take account of no less than a range of contextual constraints (including socio-economic conditions, state policies and public discourse), historical trajectories, group variables, institutionalized practices and possible paths of individual or collective action and how these mutually frame each other. (2007b: 969, brackets in original)

In the previous chapter, I attempted to ground the research in the background contexts of both South Africa and the UK, as this is important when later trying to make sense of the issues that my South African participants are raising in the interviews. Taking account of the historical backgrounds and policy contexts of South Africa and the UK does not mean that I will inevitably fall into the trap of ‘methodological nationalism’, referring to the conflation of the nation-state’s interests with the objective of social research (Wimmer and Glick Schiller 2003). Però and Solomos argue that “this conflation has resulted in the question of migrants and politics having traditionally been interpreted in terms of migrants as objects rather than subjects of politics” (2010: 7). In the context of this research, I will therefore resist the temptation to understand migrants as mere objects who are imprisoned by policies and given no room for their own say on their situations. As such, I shall emphasise the experiences and voices of South Africans themselves by adopting a qualitative approach. This will feed into Eric Neumayer’s (2006: 82) claim that the usually ‘broad-brush’ quantitative analyses of the legal aspects of citizenship need to be supplemented by more qualitative research that accounts for the perspectives of the involved social actors.

Hence, although I will still take into account the impact that immigration and citizenship policies have upon South Africans’ everyday lives, I will also, in keeping with the qualitative methodological approach’s emphasis on elucidating social actors’ point of view, understand South Africans as subjects who are capable of – implicitly or more explicitly – negotiating citizenship/immigration policies. This is consistent with important insights advocated by the ‘anthropology of policy’ approach (see Shore and Wright 1997; Shore et al. 2011; Wright 1995; Wright and Shore 1995). This approach – as introduced in Chapter 2 – recognises the significance of the field of policy in structuring the lives of ordinary people. Contrary to some anthropological/ethnographic studies that merely ‘study down’ on a supposedly homogenous group that is represented as though it was dislocated from wider historical and political contexts (see Nader
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1972 for this critique), the ‘anthropology of policy’ approach calls for social scientific research that ‘study up’ or ‘through’ by taking into account both the impact of policies as well as people’s view of policies. Thus, the present study considers both how policies impact upon South Africans as well as how policies might be ‘received’ by the particular migrants in their negotiations of citizenship. In so doing, I will operate with a broad definition of policies. When referring to immigration and citizenship policies, I am not solely talking about policies as legal documents that have been ‘set in stone’, or already implemented in law. I shall also consider as policy the manner in which dominant politicians bring up certain issues in speeches and so on. This focus is consistent with the recognition that dominant political projects of belonging (Yuval-Davis 2006; 2011a) can be advanced by politicians also in a more informal capacity than merely through the law. As John Crowley contends, “to say, credibly and from a position of authority, ‘you are not welcome here’ is, at one level, quite literally made through by saying it” (1999: 23, inverted commas in original).

The accounts that have emerged from the interviews with South Africans reveal my emphasis on how social actors talk about, make sense of, give meaning to and justify the claims that they make, and how this might be influenced by policies – whether originating from South Africa or the UK, whether in the past or in the present. Hence, focusing on social actors can throw valuable light on structural and societal relations in two different contexts. This is not without some significance, as Andrea Smith (2002) remarks that it is not always the case that the study of postcolonial relations – or the transition from white authoritarian apartheid rule to formal democracy in South Africa in this study – are considered alongside a study of a post-war European society and a segment of its immigration population – or the UK seen through the lenses of white South Africans here. This is not to imply, of course, that some resistance to such dominant nation-state structures cannot also be exerted. Davide Però (2011) suggests that social actors may be capable of influencing the implementation of certain policies through individual or more collective strategies which may somewhat challenge – however may also reproduce – the prevailing power dynamics and inequalities in society. I believe that South Africans in this respect could provide us with an illuminating example of a case study that “open[s]
windows onto larger processes of political transformation”, just like advocated by Shore and Wright (2011: 12).

4.2 Data Collection

An analysis of official documents published by the South African and the British state was undertaken to provide me with the necessary background knowledge when commencing on the fieldwork of this study, which is mainly represented by qualitative semi-structured interviews. In considering John Scott’s (1990) criteria for assessing the quality of documents, the documents I have selected can be said to be authentic – referring to whether the documents are of unquestionable origin – as I have ensured that they have all been collected from trusted websites providing official documents released by representatives from the South African and the British state. Turning to credibility – to what extent the contents of the documents can be said to be ‘biased’ or not – this is not a major issue because precisely by identifying the ‘biases’ inherent in the documents, it may be easier to reveal the actual intentions behind the South African and British state’s respective politics (Bryman 2004: 387). Representativeness, on the other hand, can pose a challenge if it implies that the documents I will consider should be “representative of the totality of relevant documents” (Scott 1990: 24). However, representativeness is not necessarily a requirement when conducting qualitative research, especially in my case where the documents are interesting to analyse in their own right as their official status makes them unique (Bryman 2004: 387). Finally, to discover the meaning and significance of documents, it is important to be immersed in the context in which the documents have been produced (Scott 1990: 31), which I have already gone some way towards doing in the previous chapter on South African migration to the UK.

I realised soon, however, that this form of documentary analysis did not give me the unique window into how South Africans in particular experience the impacts of British immigration and citizenship policies, for instance, but rather a more general overview of the potential impacts of the policies on any non-EEA migrant who is encompassed by such policies. Policies should besides, as Shore and Wright (2011: 1) correctly put it, not be exclusively confined to text or
documents. As such, it has arguably been more revealing to consult South Africans themselves through interviews. The documentary analysis outlined here has therefore been employed mainly with the intention of giving me the necessary background knowledge when preparing for interviewing, and has provided me with some valuable resources which I have referred back to when the interviewed South Africans have brought up issues relating to these documents.

Thus, the main collection of data was provided by qualitative semi-structured interviews, which enabled me to discover how policies not only impact on South Africans, but also how these policies are ‘received’ by South Africans in their negotiations of citizenship. The interviews were conducted individually and face-to-face with participants in their preferred location – whether in their home or workplace, or in a coffee shop near their home or workplace – in order to establish closer rapport with them. An interview guide was initially written, with some subsequent amendments as the fieldwork progressed and it was realised that certain questions, for example, needed to be excluded while others were included (see Appendix 1 for the final interview guide). The main interview topics set out in the interview guide were, however, followed throughout the fieldwork. These overarching topics pertained to participants’ previous life in South Africa (and in any other countries) before migrating to the UK, the dynamics of the migration process and the negotiation of immigration and citizenship policies, the participants’ everyday lives in the UK, as well as their sense of belonging. Within these general topics, some of the questions asked to participants had been pre-conceived in the interview guide. Yet, questions often varied as I asked follow-up questions pertaining to what the particular participant wanted to talk about within the pre-defined interview topics. The strength of this form of semi-structured interviewing is, thus, that it enables people to answer the questions more on their own terms than with regard to more structured forms of interviewing, while at the same time permitting a more comprehensive structure to compare differences and similarities in the participants’ responses than would do interviews of a more unstructured nature (May 2001: 123-4).

In enabling some comparison, I would necessarily attempt to direct participants ‘back on track’ by posing questions more in tune with the interview topics insofar as participants talked about issues not of immediate interest to these general topics. Yet, as far as possible, I allowed participants to raise and expand
on issues of interest to them by posing the introductory questions of the respective interview topics in a relatively open-ended and non-directive manner. For example, after having introduced the main aim and purpose of the study for the participants, I started off each interview by asking the participants to tell me about their childhood in South Africa. Thus, I did not ask specifically what aspects of their childhood I was interested in straight away, but rather enabled participants to take the initiative to tell me about the aspects of their childhood that seemed most important to them. Sometimes, of course, participants were unsure as to where to begin and asked me, for example, what aspects of their childhood I was specifically interested in. As a backup strategy, I would then ask them where they grew up and where they were raised as a point of departure for further and more specific accounts with regard to their childhood. In most cases, nonetheless, participants were keen to start talking about certain aspects of their childhood without asking me for further clarification. Throughout the interviews, I was attentive to what participants told me and tried, to the best of my ability, to pick up on this by later asking follow-up questions relating specifically to their own respective stories and senses of reality (May 2001: 123-4).

It could therefore be said that the choice of a semi-structured variant of interviewing encouraged participants to talk about issues that they were preoccupied with, some of which I, as the interviewer, probably would have been unaware of if a more structured and enclosed approach to interviewing had been adopted. Arguably, allowing participants to expand on issues of their own concern gave me richer and more detailed data material as to how the various descriptions of their circumstances and the interpretations and meanings attached to these have been reflected in the interview accounts. Even a certain degree of ‘rambling’, or talking about whatever presented itself off the top of the participants’ heads, was therefore encouraged with this in mind (May 2001: 123-4). This flexible approach, which has put the interviewees’ accounts at centre stage within some set research parameters, was facilitated by my use of a digital audio-recording device to capture the interviews. The audio-recordings of the interviews were subsequently stored on a password-restricted computer and fully transcribed verbatim. The interviews usually lasted around one to two hours each, reflecting the willingness to which most of my participants opened up and were interested in expanding on the issues at stake.
Moreover, I was also allowed, with my participants’ consent, to intermingle with them and engage in some informal conversations before and after the interviews in order to generate richer data material. This might be classified as a form for occasional participant observation. Judith Okely (1994: 23) claims that participant observation can in some instances be more conducive than interviews, since the former usually enables the researcher to be more immersed in individuals’ everyday practices and contexts than the latter. It must be said, though, that I was not immersed in the field to the extent that researchers such as Judith Okely have been. I used ‘participant observation’ only to supplement my interviews and it only occurred on an occasional basis before and after the interviews. This is similar, although perhaps not as extensive in its reach, to Mark Israel’s (1999: 13) approach of visiting some meeting points for South Africans and mix socially with them now and then. By interacting with South Africans in their everyday lives before and after the interviews, I did come across ‘naturally-occurring’ talk and conversations that in some cases threw further light on issues that were touched upon in the interviews. I therefore believe that these informal conversations, which involved talk about everyday matters that concerned the participants in order to ease their interactions with me, have fostered a different perspective to my data. It could also be speculated whether they have added data more in accordance with participants’ meanings, especially when contrasted to the possibly ‘obtrusive’ setting of the audio-recorded interviews in spite of my best intentions to keep the recorder out of my participants’ sight. The informal conversations were remembered to the best of my ability, and the most important aspects which emerged from them were written down as field notes immediately after I had left the participants (Fangen 2004: 141-9).

4.3 Sampling and Negotiation of Access to Participants

Turning to issues of sampling of interview participants, it should first be specified which groups of South Africans I identified as catchment population for this research. Altogether 30 interviews were conducted, involving 36 South African participants. The higher number of involved participants than the number of
interviews reflects the fact that although it was indicated that the interview was supposed to be held individually, or one-on-one, with the particular South Africans, some preferred to have their South African partners, and in one case even their adult son, participating alongside them during the interview. In Appendix 2, there is provided some basic background information on each of the 36 South Africans who participated in the interviews that have guided the present study (in alphabetical order by the pseudonyms that they have been given). As evidenced from Appendix 2, the biographical distribution of the 36 South African participants can be summarised as follows: 20 are female, while 16 are male, and they occupy a wide spectre of different age groups (ranging from 18 to 63) as well as socio-economic backgrounds. In terms of the ‘racial’ and ethnic distribution, 16 are white English-speaking South Africans, 14 are white Afrikaans-speaking South Africans, while the six remaining participants are of a ‘non-white’ background – including three ‘mixed race’ and three black South Africans – in order to enable comparisons with the responses of the white South Africans taking up the main focus of the study. The interviewed South Africans have, with two exceptions, migrated to the UK in the post-apartheid era from 1994 to the present times.\(^\text{11}\) This timeframe has been consciously selected to try and capture some of the dynamics of the greater number of South Africans who have made their way to the UK after apartheid, in conjunction with the stricter immigration and citizenship policies which have arguably been implemented in the UK during the same time period. It could also help participants to better recall the events being investigated here, as the time period covers relatively recent times.

Although I am looking at issues of citizenship, this does not mean, as already being stated, that the South Africans in question have to be British citizens. It is indeed important that some South Africans with less secure immigration statuses also can have their say on the issues being considered here. Nevertheless, to limit the scope of the study, the study has not included South Africans who are currently studying in the UK – apart from two participants of

\(^{11}\) Although the peace process was initiated in 1990, many scholars assert that the transition from apartheid to democracy did not come to a formal end before the first democratic elections in 1994 were being held (e.g. Neocosmos 2006: 20). References to the post-apartheid era in South Africa will here mean from 1994 and onwards as well.
whom one was the sole interviewee in her interview (Zarah, 21, white Afrikaans-speaking), whereas the other (Gareth, 18, white Afrikaans-speaking) is the child of another participant. The reason for including these two participants, despite being students, has to do with the fact that they had both arrived in the UK as children and were intending to remain in the UK for an unspecified time also after their studies. Otherwise, I have excluded students in the context of this research primarily because students may only be in the UK for the limited time period which their studies last and, in addition, may have other considerations more specifically in relation to their studies than broader issues of British citizenship and belonging to the UK. Thus, the assumption has been that students might return to South Africa upon graduation – although, of course, this is not always the case. However, an important criterion in the investigation of immigration and citizenship policies in the British context has been that all of the participants have settled, or were planning to settle, in the UK for a more or less extended period.

It could be argued, nevertheless, that non-student South Africans who have only migrated to the UK on short-term work visas, for example, also ought to be excluded from this study in the same manner as South African students. Having said that, a distinction could be made in that non-student South Africans who have migrated to the UK on short-term work visas are likely to have been more directly involved in the negotiation of immigration and citizenship policies. For example, this could relate to their experiences of having to fulfil a wider array of criteria in the points-based migration system, as well as the fact that they might work in the UK and, for this reason, perhaps put down more ties and stay longer if they get the chance to do so after having worked in the country for a while. I am aware that this separation of the migration motives of students and people on short-term visas is not clear-cut and, therefore, open for discussion. Nevertheless, I have worked with this distinction as I think it is more conducive to separate South Africans who are in the UK to work or equivalent from those who are there mainly to study, than it would have been to separate South Africans on longer-term visas from those on short-term visas. Indeed, if this latter separation had been carried out instead, it would certainly have caused some major confusion as to where to draw the line between short- and longer-term visas, especially given the wide range of various visa types that different South Africans in the UK are in possession of (see Crawford 2011: chap. 2). For a similar reason, I interviewed
adults – whether in the UK by themselves or with others – as I was interested in their first-hand migration experiences from South Africa to the UK in relation to immigration and citizenship policies, and it was therefore made an assumption that children/youth would not have the same degree of experiences with this.

Having such considerations of my target population in this study clarified, I have benefitted from different sampling techniques which hopefully have attracted participants of varying personal characteristics in order to reflect the diversity of the South African migrants. In the initial stages of the recruitment process, South African friends or acquaintances of mine were contacted – most of whom had been fellow student colleagues when I had undertaken an exchange semester at the University of KwaZulu-Natal in South Africa as part of my BA degree at the University of Oslo (Norway). Although living in South Africa themselves, it is remarkable how easily some of these contacts were able to procure the details of South Africans in the UK willing to partake in the study, which could be evidence of the fact that many South Africans living in South Africa would know or be related to certain co-nationals who currently live in the UK. A snowball sampling strategy was then adopted. The idea of a snowball sampling strategy is that the initial contacts I made with South Africans led me to other potential participants, whom in turn led me to other potential participants and so on (Blaikie 2000: 205-6). All the participants were therefore asked, after their respective interviews, whether they could direct me to any other potential interview participants.

A number of South Africans were also recruited through a call for participants on the ‘walls’ of different Facebook groups for South Africans living in the UK. I believe that this latter strategy is an interesting strategy that deserves some attention, as using the internet for sampling purposes – particularly a social networking site such as Facebook – has been frowned upon within more ‘traditional’ approaches to research (Miller 2011). Although taking a much broader approach than me when bearing in mind that I have used Facebook solely with the aim of locating potential research participants, Daniel Miller’s justifications for an ‘anthropology of Facebook’ is illustrative as it calls into question the reluctance to use social networking sites such as Facebook within much social scientific research, illustrated with the example of anthropology:
anthropology has always treated people as part of a wider set of relationships. Indeed, prior to the invention of internet, it was the way the individual was understood in anthropology that might have been termed a social networking site. So a new facility actually called a social networking site [Facebook] ought to be of particular interest. (2011: x)

I believe that the sampling strategies outlined above have helped me locate a diversity of different participants. However, there are some implications with a snowball strategy that needs to be addressed, especially since snowball sampling might be classified as a form of ‘convenience sampling’ (Bryman 2008). Thus, although other and intersecting factors such as gender, age, class and so on have also been considered in this study – as reflected in the diversity amongst the 36 participants with regard to a range of different variables within such social categories – it has proven particularly difficult to gain access to people from different ‘racial’ backgrounds with a snowball sampling strategy. This is not to fall into the trap of exclusively referring to ‘racial’ or ethnic groups when talking about ‘diversity’, as there are a range of other factors, as I have mentioned, that constitute diversity and have therefore been considered in this study in their potential intersections with ‘race’/ethnicity. However, as I am interested in everyday social relations between different ‘racial’/ethnic groups, the apparent difficulty of recruiting ‘non-white’ South Africans in particular would need to be addressed in some more detail. Israel (1999: 12), for example, reflects on how his application of a snowball sampling strategy caused his sample to be skewed towards white and Indian South Africans – whom he had most contact with – but away from black South Africans – whom he had limited contact with. Such implications are compounded by the fact that the large majority of South Africans in the UK (around 90%) are white (Sveinsson and Gumuschian 2008: 1), arguably increasing the probability of finding white at the expense of ‘non-white’ South African participants. The issue of recruiting participants with precarious immigration statuses, perhaps related to the issue of recruiting ‘non-white’ South Africans insofar as they are more likely to be discriminated against within the legal framework of citizenship, has also caused some challenges.

Owing to such potential limitations of a snowball sampling strategy, it was supplemented by a theoretical sampling strategy in an attempt to widen my sources of contacts and enable a better correspondence between my sample and research questions. A theoretical sampling strategy entailed that I have recruited
some participants with particular characteristics until I believed that the research questions that I operated with, and the emerging themes that my participants brought up, had been sufficiently covered, or theoretical saturation had been reached in the sense of “the size of sample that is able to support convincing conclusions” (Bryman 2008: 462). This has helped me identify a few ‘non-white’ South Africans willing to participate in the research, especially through specific requests to interviewees as to whether they knew and could refer me to any ‘non-white’ South Africans living in the UK who presumably would be willing to partake in my research. I believe that although a low number of interviewed ‘non-white’ as compared to interviewed white South Africans, the total number of six interviewed ‘non-white’ South Africans – including three ‘mixed race’ and three black – is still a satisfactory number for this study’s purposes. That is, the study is investigating issues of ‘whiteness’ as related to ‘racial’ and ethnic dynamics and, thus, white South Africans’ interpretations of such dynamics when bearing in mind the legacy of apartheid, as well as their everyday lives in British society.

Notwithstanding, it could still be argued that I have not identified a satisfactory number of white or ‘non-white’ South Africans with relatively precarious immigration statuses. This could reflect how South Africans with such immigration statuses might be more reluctant to participate in research when considering any perceived consequences of this research for their continued stay in the UK. It should be stressed that some migrants with an insecure immigration status would presumably, and quite understandably when given their circumstances, avoid contact with anyone seen to represent any form of ‘authority’ such as, perhaps, researchers. The employment of a theoretical sampling strategy has, nevertheless, given me an incentive to search for informants who are willing to tell stories on behalf of other South Africans with more complicated immigration statuses, or who have been denied access to residence permits in the UK altogether. Some respondents also told me about their own complicated journeys when they had migrated to and applied for legal status in the UK. A white Afrikaans-speaking participant, for instance, was convinced that with the recent immigration restrictions of the points-based migration system and the Coalition government’s further clamping down on migrants, it would have been impossible for him to have gained legal access if he were to arrive in the UK today rather than when he actually arrived as early as in 1998.
Furthermore, the theoretical sampling strategy has given me a particular incentive to recruit potential participants from London because of the city’s great diversity of South Africans in terms of different social categories such as ‘race’, ethnicity, class, age and so on. It is conducive for sampling purposes that over half of the South Africans living in the UK can be found in the south-eastern region of the UK, with a high concentration in London with as many as 44% of National Insurance registrations by South Africans in the UK coming from London in the time period 2005-2007 (cited in Crawford 2009). However, although there is limited information on the exact distribution of South Africans broken down by location in the rest of the UK, this has not precluded that South Africans from a few other locations in the UK than London have been interviewed, as some of the other participants guided me to them. After all, it was not my intention to turn down potential interviewees just because they were not from London. Rather, accepting interviewees from anywhere in the UK was seen as consistent with my focus on immigration and citizenship policies as powerful state measures that could possibly manage and influence migrants residing anywhere on British territory. The fact that the interviewed participants from non-London locations were from places that were less diverse than a global and ‘super-diverse’ city such as London (Vertovec 2007a), might throw comparative light on whether living in London or in less diverse locations would have any impact on South Africans’ sense of belonging and interactions with people from different ‘racial’ and ethnic groups in British society.

Exactly when a theoretical sample is large enough to reach theoretical saturation is open for interpretations and depends on the specific research. A rule of thumb is that the broader the scope of the study, the more interviews normally need to be conducted. As this study took a relatively broad approach by focusing on South Africans with different backgrounds, I was therefore compelled to conduct more interviews to reach theoretical saturation than if a narrower scope had been adopted. I initially settled for an approximate number of 30 interviews that would need to be conducted to enable a broad enough scope for the study’s main purposes. This seemed to be about right, as I had begun to feel that I had a broad enough scope of South Africans with different biographies as I was getting closer to the approximate target of 30 interviews, and many of the main themes that had initially emerged were repeated by participants interviewed at a later
stage. As an objection to this, it could be claimed that I am unable to represent the entire population of South Africans in the UK with 30 interviews. The very idea of a coherent South African population in the UK, however, is disputable as the number of South Africans in the UK constantly changes as South Africans move in and out of the UK. Moreover, concerns about the ability to generalise from a sample to a population normally feature less prominently in qualitative studies than they do in quantitative studies (Bryman 2008). In this study, rather than claiming to represent generality in the rigid fashion that is often adhered to in quantitative studies, I have kept with the qualitative approach’s emphasis on capturing richness and details in participants’ accounts, including some of the diversity of experiences amongst South Africans who have arrived in the UK during the post-apartheid era from 1994 to the present (Thagaard 2003: 187-8). In any case, as Judith Okely eloquently puts it, “[i]t may require only one remark, one individual’s example to unravel the elusive intelligibility of the group or context. People's beliefs, values and actions are not necessarily revealed by head counting” (1994: 25). Of course, including Okely’s statement does not imply that I have only conducted one interview – as 30 have been conducted – but it points to the fact that, when taking theoretical saturation into account, I have been more preoccupied with the richness and details in the interview accounts than any obsessive counting of the number of interviews. If my findings could be generalised in any way, therefore, it would be as a case study of (white) South Africans in the UK to provide comprehensive information on how certain migrants – however not all – might be affected by and respond to policy in their negotiations of citizenship (Thagaard 2003: 187-8).

4.4 Data Analysis

In coding the data material in this study, I adopted a ‘thematic framework approach’ (Ritchie et al. 2003) that facilitates rigorous and transparent data management and analysis. In Ritchie et al.’s (2003) ‘thematic framework approach’, attention is paid to the ‘themes’ or topics that are brought up by the data material or the participants, as particularly facilitated by the adoption of a semi-structured form of interviewing in this study. In order to determine relevant
themes for answering my research questions, I gave reference numbers in the margins of relevant policy documents and the interview transcripts, as well as in the field notes of the interactions with my participants that had occurred before and after the interviews. These reference numbers were carefully pinpointed so that I could appropriately label all the different phrases, sentences and paragraphs in all sources of data. The reference numbers would refer to particular categories and subcategories, so that data material with similar content or properties were located together to facilitate the data analysis. The categories and subcategories had been given short descriptions close to the participants’ language to refer to the emerging themes. It was not uncommon that a certain passage from the data was included in more than one category/subcategory, but this was not seen as a problem as it sometimes indicated some relationships between different themes that made for some interesting analyses at a later stage of the research (Ritchie et al. 2003). The analytical framework of intersectonality that is adopted in understanding how ‘racial’ and ethnic boundaries might intersect with other significant social boundaries – as more carefully outlined in Chapter 2 – is indeed supportive of themes that may overlap with other themes in the analysts’ data material, as this could indicate that the themes are intersecting in some significant ways. As an analyst, it is therefore important to be alert to themes that could overlap with other themes in the data material. For example, Gunaratnam (2003) points to how issues of ‘race’/ethnicity were on many occasions produced in conjunction with other themes for her study in a hospice in the UK. Gunaratnam elaborates this by referring to one of her anonymised participants, Patricia:

> How I got to this interpretation of the meanings of ‘race’ in Patricia’s accounts was by following initially the narrative traces of ‘race’ embedded in the way Patricia talked about what being positive meant to her. By examining these meanings in different interview extracts, I was able to identify particular narrative connections between talk about being positive and religious beliefs, Patricia’s family background, and ‘race’. (2003: 128, inverted commas in original)

Thus, to better capture the relevance of themes, the initial naming of the range of categories and subcategories to indicate the emerging themes often needed some refinement over the course of my research. Categories and subcategories had to be added, submerged, divided up further to indicate
distinctions between themes, and some even had to be collapsed altogether. With regard to the collapsing of categories and subcategories, however, it must be stressed that categories/subcategories should not be dismissed lightly as data material that at first sight may appear to be irrelevant may, as indicated above in Gunaratnam’s (2003) research on the dynamics of ‘racial’ and ethnic boundary-processes, become pivotal at a later stage of the research. Nevertheless, in order to facilitate my identification of the potential importance of themes and their corresponding categories/subcategories, I started my analysis of the data early on when the data was still fresh in my mind, for example after each individual interview. I believe that this strategy also helped me to refrain from a situation in which an enormous amount of data had to be analysed in ‘one go’, for example if the analysis had not commenced before nearly all the data had been collected (Ritchie et al. 2003).

To strengthen the analysis further, I transcribed all the interviews myself to bring me closer to the data as this, indeed, compelled me to listen attentively to the audio-recordings to make out and type down every single word that was told (Fangen 2004: 148). However, rather than a more detailed transcription of the interview encounters as advocated by some conversation analysts with various techniques for indicating the precise length and formulation of all words or phrases (see e.g. Kvale and Brinkmann 2009: 181-2 for an illustration), I have only seen it as necessary to convey a limited sense of the tonal characteristics of the respective interviews by, for example, putting words in italics to indicate that they were emphasised by the particular participants. This was a conscious decision on my part, as I did not set out with any determination to focus on language in isolation from its broader ramifications. In other words, I did not pay closer attention to the exact linguistic and grammatical formulations in the manner in which some conversation analysts would base virtually all of their findings on what is uttered by people and immediately available to the researcher (see Kvale and Brinkmann 2009: chap. 13; Wetherell 2003 for overviews). The focus has instead been on the ‘meanings’ of participants’ statements – or the broader ramifications of what they wanted to achieve by saying or avoiding to say something. It would then be easier to clarify whether what participants said or avoided to say would somewhat correspond, or not, with the discourses or
meaning-makings inherent in the language of the various policy contexts – primarily the South African and the British – of which they have been exposed to.

By paying attention to meanings, it must be specified that I have not looked for the one and only ‘real’ or ‘authentic’ meaning underlying or guiding all of the individual experiences and statements of the respective participants. This is because there may exist no such pre-determined, single and all-encompassing meaning in the respective participants’ mind-sets. Since the everyday circumstances that the interview material is trying to communicate are “composed of different perspectives that do not always coalesce” (Creswell 2009: location 4200), it is more fruitful to view meanings as social constructions that are dependent upon the various contextual and circumstantial influences through which they have been generated. Yet, some quantitative researchers (see Creswell 2009: chap. 9 for a critique) would still insist on interpreting any degree of variability in interview accounts as a ‘measurement error’ due to badly-constructed research or interview designs. These researchers may suggest that the ‘problem’ can be overcome by following stricter rules for interview standardisation. This must be done, it is argued, so to be able to capture the ‘real’ opinions of people with limited disruptive or intervening elements. However, the impossibility and futility of searching for the ‘real meaning’ of people become apparent inasmuch as it can be translated to “a belief in the existence of some basic meaning nuggets stored somewhere, to be discovered and uncovered, uncontaminated, by the objective techniques of an interviewer understood as a miner digging up precious buried metals” (Kvale and Brinkmann 2009: 217).

As opposed to the more standardised and enclosed forms of much quantitative research, I have therefore opted for the flexibility and relatively open-ended nature of qualitative interviewing in order to better capture how different participants hold diverging views and how, in fact, the very same participant can look at particular issues with nuanced and even contradictory assessments. In terms of the thematic framework approach, consideration of variability within the interview material has open up the possibility that the various themes emerging from my data have not needed to be represented in a single-fashioned manner, but rather with the multitude of voices and viewpoints that comprise the particular themes. This open-mindedness has arguably brought a more multifaceted flavour to the research and made it less one-sided than if any tensions in the interview
material were completely ignored and/or not allowed for. Having said this, recognising that there is no universal ‘truth’ to be uncovered has not, of course, entailed that I have been inattentive to the manner in which some participants might believe their accounts to be representing the one and only ‘truth’. It is of importance to recognise that perceptions of the ‘truthfulness’ of their accounts and, correspondingly, any reluctance on the participants’ part to amend their views on some significant issues, might in essence contribute to (re)produce boundaries and inequalities along ‘racial’/ethnic lines in society (Hill 2008: chap. 2; Kvale and Brinkmann 2009: chap. 12).

It must furthermore be specified that although the data material I have explored has generally moved my research forward, I have also taken the academic literature seriously by revisiting relevant academic literature explored at an earlier stage, as well as looked up unexplored academic literature relevant for the emerging themes. The academic literature was given reference numbers that corresponded to the categories and subcategories that had emerged when referencing the passages in the analysed policy documents, interview transcripts and field notes. However, to prevent that the academic literature merely spoke for or overshadowed participants’ accounts, it was important that the academic literature was separated from the data material when classified in the different categories/subcategories. This separation was thus, in crucial respects, implemented with the following caveat by Kvale and Brinkmann in mind:

Interview research involves the danger of an ‘expertification’ of meanings where the interviewer as ‘the great interpreter’ expropriates the meanings from the subjects’ lived world and reifies them into his or her theoretical schemes as expressions of some more basic reality. (2009: 218, inverted commas in original)

Apart from speaking to the importance of not imposing academic theory on participants’ accounts, this caveat also points to the difficulty in distilling the precise extent to which participants’ statements can be attributed to the unconscious, sub-conscious or a more conscious level. Indeed, “[i]t should not be overlooked that the implicit, or unconscious, meaning attributed to interviewees may often simply be the explicit and conscious theories of the expert interpreter” (Kvale and Brinkmann 2009: 218). A distinction based on different psychological
states or levels of consciousness as attributed to the different participants and their various statements has, therefore, been abandoned in this study.

Nonetheless, a significant remark regarding the analytical separation of the academic literature from the participants’ accounts in my classification of themes, is that this strategy should not be viewed as though I have not been steeped thoroughly enough in the academic literature before, during and after my interviews. Being steeped in the relevant academic literature is often a necessity in order to recognise important patterns in the interviews. As indicated in earlier chapters, the formulation of my research questions entailed some overarching and broad theories or analytical frameworks that have guided my research in a certain direction in order to answer my research questions. However, what is of importance is that the currently identified theories or analytical frameworks were not set in stone before I commenced on the fieldwork, as the theoretical/analytical concepts that I have been working with have been constantly reviewed and, in some instances, even replaced by other theoretical/analytical perspectives that I have deemed to be more appropriate in explaining the emerging themes in my data material. In other words, my participants’ accounts have not been automatically and uncritically blended in with certain theoretical perspectives when I have been referencing the passages from the interview transcripts, but have rather received their fair share of academic scrutiny on their own to try and establish at a later stage whether they may fit in with other theoretical perspectives instead, or perhaps are not as easily classified into any existing theories at all. This has enabled some theoretical refinements on my part by using my data material to demonstrate the possibility for variability or further ‘flexification’ within particular theoretical perspectives (Thagaard 2003: chap. 8).

Finally, but not least, I have benefitted from MAXQDA software package for qualitative data analysis to divide the data material from the policy documents, interview transcripts and field notes, as well as the relevant parts from the academic literature, into different categories and subcategories. I recognise that determining which parts to put into which categories/subcategories and the analysis of the data itself cannot be carried out by any software package, and these tasks were still carried out by me as the researcher. The main advantage of using a software package such as MAXQDA, however, is that it has facilitated the process of looking through and collecting information under different
4.5 Reflexivity

While certain steps were taken to attempt to enhance the methodological rigour of this study, by for example following Kvale and Brinkmann’s (2009) guidelines for how to improve interviewer skills, I still acknowledge that interviews are social encounters that inevitably are affected by how both the interviewer and the participant experience and treat each other in the given interview situation (Heaton 1998). It is therefore important for researchers to reflect upon, or be reflexive about, any potential effects that their presence might have exerted upon the research. This entails being reflexive not only after the interviews have been conducted and as the thesis is being written, but also having in mind that interviews are socially constructed when preparing for the interviews and during the interviews. Critiques of the ‘detached’ or ‘objective’ role of the researcher that has been implemented in some quantitative studies (see Hammersley and Atkinson 1995: 16 for a critique), have stressed that researchers must be careful not to reproduce a positivistic stance. This is especially so, since the ‘value-free’ science advocated by positivist thinking is rendered suspect when increased allowance has been made in the social sciences for the fact that the gaze of any researcher is always situated in structural and subjective positions (Hammersley and Atkinson 1995).

It is worth contemplating whether my personal biography might have placed me in a position as an ‘insider’ or an ‘outsider’ in the view of my research participants. Being an ‘insider’ denotes a circumstance under which the researcher is perceived to share certain characteristics with the particular participant to such an extent that the participant considers the researcher to be immersed in his or her social world, if not even part in some way or another of the participant’s ‘group’ or ‘community’. Being an ‘outsider’, on the other hand, denotes a situation under which the participant considers the researcher as somewhat outside of the participant’s social circles. The former position is often seen as an advantage in terms of data generation, especially in qualitative research, while the latter is
often perceived as a more difficult situation in qualitative research as regards to negotiating access to participants and extrapolating rich interview accounts. Of course, in the social world there is not always a strict division between ‘insider’ and ‘outsider’, as there is a wide-spanning continuum between these extremes and a researcher can be considered as both an ‘insider’ and an ’outsider’ during the same interview depending on the precise situation. It is also important to note that being an ‘insider’ does not always guarantee that the research participant will open up, as this might seem unnecessary for the participant as it is taken-for-granted that the ‘insider’-position of the researcher would entail that he or she knows everything about the participant’s ‘group’ or ‘community’ in any case. Conversely, being an ‘outsider’ can sometimes be an advantage in terms of data generation, as a situation under which the participant explains everything in more detail than s/he normally would, might be fostered given his or her presumption that the researcher’s status as an ‘outsider’ entails a limited familiarity with the life world of the participant (Blaikie 2007: 11).

To discuss how my personal biography might have been perceived by the participants in more specific terms, it should be pointed out that I can be classified as ‘white’. Discourses of ‘whiteness’ can be presumed to be particularly relevant in the view of some participants given their exposure to the white apartheid regime’s ‘racial’ classification. Indeed, Robert Crawford (2011: 110) points out that the white South Africans he had researched tended to seek commonalities with other white people in the British context in order to alleviate difficulties associated with migration and negotiate inclusion in a British society that consists of a white majority. Some interviewees might therefore have included me as an ‘insider’ as part of their conceptualisations of white people, potentially being less hesitant in opening up about their attitudes towards other ‘racial’ groups in the sense that they perhaps assumed that I would uncritically share such views merely by being ‘white’ myself (see Gallagher 1999 for a similar assumption amongst his white participants with regard to his ‘whiteness’). Of course, this presented itself as an uncomfortable situation for me as the researcher, but nevertheless revealed some interesting data. This is, however, not to say that all white South Africans reproduced such notions. Furthermore, it could be perceived that the discourses of ‘whiteness’ circulating in South African and British society would have a restraining effect on the accounts of the ‘non-white’ South Africans being
interviewed by me as a white individual. But, again, this could also have worked to the contrary in that some ‘non-white’ South Africans perhaps were eager to challenge such discourses during the interviews and welcomed the fact that although I am white, I am non-South African and, as such, perceived to be less implicated with apartheid than a white South African might have been presumed to be.

In terms of my Norwegian nationality, this could have had some bearing upon how participants perceived me. By being a non-South African, then, the association with apartheid that a South African researcher might have encountered would not have been as significant in my case, presumably helping the participants to open more up to me – white and ‘non-white’ South Africans alike. The fact that Norway has gained a good reputation for consisting of a relatively strong welfare state and ranking high on the Human Development Index (HDI) for many consecutive years as one of the best countries in the world to live in, were also noticed by some respondents. The fact that discourses of ‘whiteness’ and everyday forms of racism very much exist also in Norway – a supposedly ‘liberal’ country especially when being contrasted with South Africa and its legacy of apartheid – would therefore seem to matter less for participants insofar as they had rather bought into the political and media rhetoric camouflaging these realities by portraying Norway in a positive light on the international stage (see Brochmann 2005). On the other hand, my Norwegian nationality also presented some resentment on the part of some participants, especially those who had experienced the recent immigration policy restrictions on non-EEA migrants. It was therefore the impression amongst some that with Norway’s membership in the EEA I ‘had it easier’ with my visa-free access to the UK. This is interesting data in itself, but there are reasons to speculate whether this resentment prevented some participants from opening up in other situations during the interviews.

It should be mentioned that I stayed in South Africa as an exchange student in 2007. It was during my student exchange semester in South Africa that I developed my interest in the empirical aspects of the South African context, as well as the theoretical issues of citizenship, ‘race’ relations and inequality. Subsequently, I decided to continue my studies on South African society to an MA level with focus on the transition from apartheid to post-apartheid, resulting in studying the present PhD on the topic of South African migration to the UK.
Having said this, it should nevertheless be noted that my student exchange semester in South Africa lasted only for about four months and that it is, therefore, likely that I was still considered as an ‘outsider’ by many participants in this sense. Indeed, I was more often than not reminded that I was a non-South African and, as a consequence, a potential ‘outsider’ in the South African respondents’ view. These reminders did not manifest in any hostile confrontations on the part of the respondents. Rather, they were presented more carefully and subtly, as for example when some respondents wondered, before I initiated my respective interviews with them, as to why a Norwegian was interested in researching South Africans in the UK. This would clearly seem to represent a national logic of thinking that entails that only a South African, or an ‘insider’, can be considered as having the privileged knowledge that is required to ever be able to understand another South African (see Skey 2011). However, this assumption that I, as a Norwegian, cannot possibly have the required background knowledge to fully grasp the South African context, or the lived experiences of South Africans, has even been bought into and reproduced within certain academic circles. Especially some autoethnographic/autobiographic research techniques, in which the researcher is supposed to use his or her own personal biographies in making better sense of the research unit(s), would advocate that information about national groups is predominantly accessible if the researcher is from the same national group that he or she is researching (see Chang 2008 for an overview and critique).

As indicated above, however, being considered as an ‘outsider’ should not always be seen as a disadvantage, as it would seem as though some participants actually felt more obliged to ‘teach’ me everything they could about South Africa because of this. One participant, in particular, keeps sending me e-mails with South Africa-relevant information even long after I conducted my interview with her. This points to Hylland Eriksen’s (1998: 31) insight that feeling like an ‘outsider’ and, thus, acting a bit awkward in the research situation, is an advantage in itself in certain instances in that it can reveal how participants would typically respond to ‘outsiders’ and, as such, qualify as interesting data in and of itself. With this insight in mind, though, I would still see it as important to put the participants at ease and not let any comments or interactions that revealed my ‘outsider’-status derail my endeavour to extrapolate meaningful data.
Nonetheless, emotions are always a part of interview encounters. This also includes emotions on the part of the researcher – no matter how well prepared (but see Kvale and Brinkmann 2009 for the various techniques as to how qualitative interviewing can be learned as a ‘craft’, some of which I attempted to adopt). Owing to this power of emotions in human interactions, then, it may be the case that any ‘outsider’-status reminders from participants put me off guard to such an extent that they subsequently made me act and pose my interview questions in a different manner. For example, it could be the case that I did not ask certain questions about South Africa – that I otherwise would have asked – merely due to the fear that they would seem unnecessary and somewhat naive as taking part of some ‘South African commonsense knowledge’ and, thereby, further highlight my ‘outsider’-position in participants’ view. However, it could also be the case that I asked certain questions in a more assertive and, possibly, leading manner, for example with regard to the South Africans’ impressions of other ‘racial’ and ethnic groups in British society in anticipating that there would be some resentment to such groups given their very reactions to me as a non-South African.

Having pointed out some of the potential consequences of being perceived as an ‘outsider’, however, this ‘outsider’-position seemed to easily shift to become an ‘insider’-positions on many occasions. In particular, I believe, the fact that I shared status with the white South Africans as a non-British white migrant was embraced by most of the interviewees, who seemed to indicate being at ease with my presence by opening up and talking about their lives for as long as two hours in some cases. Yet, we must also acknowledge that a more relaxed atmosphere, as presupposed by an ‘insider’-position, could make me as the researcher more easily forget the task at hand. I therefore tried to remain concentrated on my questions regardless of the atmosphere – lest the interviews would have become too informal to generate valuable data.

Finally, it is important to stress that my ‘race’ and/or nationality do not necessarily trump the other aspects of my personal biography in terms of participants’ impressions of me. I have focused mostly on the ‘racial’ and national aspects of ‘insider’ and ‘outsider’ statuses here, as these aspects are closely in tune with the main research concerns of this study. Yet, as I am also committed to an intersectional sensitivity to the these ‘racial’ and ethnic aspects, it must be

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opened up for the possibility that my status as a PhD student/researcher, my age (in my late 20s) and my gender (male), amongst other factors, could have been considered more important by some of my participants. It is recognised that such aspects of my identity may have been intersecting in various ways with each other in determining participants’ impressions of me, and that there also could have been various cases in which one or two social categories were seen as more important than other aspects of my identity as interpreted by the participants. These various evaluations may have, ultimately, made interviewees open up more with regard to certain issues or, conversely, become more protective and said certain things in a different manner than they otherwise would, or even avoided saying these things altogether.

4.6 Ethical Issues

We also need to consider the ethical implications that I, as the researcher, have not dismissed lightly for the sake of my participants’ well-being – not only during the interviews, but also in relation to the sampling and the ways in which the participants have been represented in this thesis. There are a range of issues that have been considered as the nature of this research has potentially thrown up sensitive issues relating to ‘race’/ethnicity or adverse experiences from apartheid, racism, precarious immigration statuses and so on. This is precisely why I aimed to interview the respondents individually/separately and face-to-face to enable a more secure environment with limited influence from others if the respondents wanted to raise potentially sensitive issues. The interview location was also chosen by the respondents in order to facilitate a safe environment for them to raise potentially sensitive issues – providing that any noise in the background on their preferred location would not make it too complicated for me to make sense of what had been said when trying to analyse the audio-recorded interviews afterwards. Furthermore, if meeting in a coffee shop, for example, I tried to put the participants at ease as soon as possible by offering to buy them anything to eat or drink. Precautions were also taken by establishing prior contact to limit any concerns on my or the participants’ parts when meeting up for the interviews. I ensured that I followed all the ethical guidelines recommended by the British
Sociological Association and any other institutions or gatekeepers. This means that I provided detailed and adequate information about the nature and potential consequences of participating in my project before commencing on any interviews. In addition, participants were given informed consent forms, and their anonymity and confidentiality were respected. This entails that the real names and any other identifiable details of the participants were anonymised, and that they were given the opportunity to withdraw from the project at any time if they wished to do so and, if necessary, be signposted to a therapeutic service or support group. Also, I was careful with the wording of my questions in order to mitigate any potential distress caused by my questions, trying as best as I could to avoid that any of my questions appeared confrontational. At the beginning as well as at the end of each interview, I offered the participants the opportunity to express any issues of concern and to ask me any questions (Blaikie 2000: 19-20).

The ethical issues of the research can particularly be discussed in relation to one of the participants, Gregory (62, white Afrikaans-speaking, retired). Although it is unclear whether he was the only one who at some point during the interviews was adversely affected by my research, he was the one who most openly expressed his discomfort to me. To be more specific, he openly started to cry when explaining his decision to move to the UK with reference to his conviction that black politicians in post-apartheid South Africa have ignored the needs of white South Africans with the introduction of affirmative action policies. This statement must also be seen in relation to his claim that the post-apartheid government is not doing enough to protect white Afrikaner farmers who, according to his views, are the main targets of violent crime (see a more elaborate discussion of the realities and constructions of violent crime in South Africa in Section 7.3). When this participant started to cry, I immediately stopped the recorder and asked if he wanted to take a break from the interview, which he then confirmed that he wanted to. After a while, he indicated that he was happy to continue the interview. Immediately I felt bad and felt that I had ‘betrayed’ this participant – who had kindly offered his time to discuss his entire life story with me – by perhaps taking the interview in a certain direction that the participant was not fully prepared to pursue. However, on a second reading of this encounter, it is interesting to speculate whether the interview still worked as a form of ‘therapeutic’ encounter for this respondent, as he after the interview expressed
that it had been good for him to let his emotions out. Indeed, most of the respondents indicated somehow that they had perceived the interview as a rare, but welcome, opportunity to talk about their lives and issues that concerned them (see also Birch and Miller 2000 for the notion of the ‘therapeutic interview’). In the process, it is hoped that this perhaps enabled some of them, if not all of them, to make more sense of themselves and their various decisions as South African migrants in the UK.

Drawing on the insights from Max Weber (1968), the choice and delineation of theoretical perspectives in this thesis are bound to be somewhat influenced by my own political values and beliefs since there is no such thing as ‘value-neutral’ research. This has meant that my own perspectives on certain issues, for example my general opposition to the policies of apartheid, have at times contradicted the perspectives of the participants – although I did not set out to confront them with this fact during the interviews. Yet, it is interesting to speculate whether the perspectives I have offered in this finalised thesis can reveal structures – such as apartheid with its lingering effects on South African society – and how these structures might be shaping some interviewees’ understandings without them necessarily being aware that they might be participating in everyday forms of racism by reproducing such structural thinking. The above-mentioned participant who started to cry might not, indeed, have realised that the fact that he started to cry when complaining about the supposed neglect of white South Africans by black politicians in post-apartheid South Africa could, on one reading, be interpreted as a form of ‘everyday racism’ (see Essed 1991 for further elaboration of this concept). In this sense, it is hoped that my research could somehow provide an opportunity for participants to make sense of and reflect upon why they might be thinking and acting along certain lines. The point is, thus, not to ‘demonise’ individual participants for their statements. It is rather to place them within the larger structures which might under certain circumstances affect their attitudes in a certain way and thereby we, as social scientists, could be able to offer our research subjects an opportunity to understand social issues from a different perspective than what is currently on offer in much rhetoric as controlled by powerful political and media actors in society (Fangen 2004: 230-1). This is not to say that my research will necessarily have an emancipatory effect in all instances. Although most participants indicated
an interest in reading the finalised thesis, there is no guarantee that they actually will read it and, even if doing so, participants’ beliefs are possibly so strongly held that it would take more than a thesis to alter them. Moreover, I am not saying that all respondents necessarily are holding ‘xenophobic’ views, as there is also scope for individual agency (see e.g. Karner 2007). Especially some of them demonstrated that despite the history of apartheid and possibly being affected by strict policies in their negotiations of immigration and citizenship status in the UK, they were also somewhat capable of thinking outside of ‘racial’/ethnic or nation-state ‘boxes’ of thinking.
5. Negotiating Access: The Significance of (White) South African Background and ‘Attributes’

5.1 Introduction

Presented here is the first out of the three empirical or findings chapters of this thesis, which will look into the ways in which South Africans draw upon their South African background and ‘attributes’ in their negotiations of access to the UK (see also Halvorsrud 2012). By access to the UK, I am referring both to access in its legal sense of access to British territory and its more informal sense of access to the ‘British nation’. The main priority will, nonetheless, be given to informal access as this is arguably more interesting from a sociological and psycho-social point of view in terms of processes of belonging and ‘racial’/ethnic boundary mechanisms. By drawing on Calder and Seglow’s insights, “while the first [the legal sense] might be categorized in black-and-white terms – through the meeting of designated requirements – the second [more informal access negotiation] is more slippery to identify, or establish” (2010: 156, inverted commas in original). The legal immigration and citizenship environment encountered in the UK for South Africans in general has already, in any case, been considered in further detail through a historical overview in Chapter 3. What is more, both the legal and informal forms of access have also been shown before – in a theoretical sense in Chapter 2 – and will again be shown below – in a more empirical sense – to be interrelated. Indeed, ordinary people in British society working on various levels as ‘gatekeepers’, as well as South Africans themselves, might be influenced by the laws and the corresponding rhetoric that are dictated by politicians in the immigration and citizenship policy domain.

It will be shown, in accordance with my argument of the importance attached to the maintenance of a relatively privileged position, that negotiations of legal as well as more informal access can be effective in the specific case of white South Africans. White South Africans’ experiences with and perceptions of British immigration and citizenship policies thus provide an interesting point of departure to consider how a relatively privileged migrant group positions itself in
relation to what is, arguably, an increasingly restrictive policy environment (see Chapter 3). The extent to which white South Africans negotiate their inclusion by drawing on the prevailing rhetoric adopted in political and media rhetoric in order to argue that they are more ‘deserving’ of territorial and more informal access to the ‘British nation’ than certain other groups, can shed illuminating light on the influence of policies in shaping migrants’ rhetorical strategies, or the ways in which “beliefs, values and ideas are reproduced … in the everyday discursive activity of ordinary people” (Durrheim and Dixon 2000: 107). However, the chapter will also show that although certain structural conditions enable a relatively privileged migrant group such as white South Africans to draw upon vaster cultural resources than more disadvantaged groups, even for white South Africans conditions in the host society might complicate their access negotiations. This goes some way towards approaching an understanding as to why certain of my participants seemed so keen to highlight the supposed positive aspects of their South African identity as opposed to other identity positions, trying to divert attention away from any negative aspects of their South African identity in the mind-sets of others.

To provide a brief overview of the themes that will be covered, the chapter will begin by delineating the advantage that their ‘whiteness’ can grant white South Africans in the British context. In terms of an intersectional consideration – keeping my eyes open to the extent that social categories of significance might intersect with each other or not – it seems that their ‘whiteness’ would relatively frequently override any other social categories such as ethnicity, class and gender in the white South Africans’ access negotiations. However, the significance of ancestry will then be shown; that is, that ideas of ancestral ties to Britain do not only bar most ‘non-white’ South Africans from access, but also enable internal boundaries of ‘whiteness’ in which those who can ‘prove’ such ancestral ties, even amongst white South Africans, are in some sense more privileged than those white South Africans who cannot. Still, even immediate ancestral ties to Britain do not guarantee access, at least not in the informal sense. Boundaries of exclusion might be erected by some members of the British host population that portray South Africans as essentially ‘non-Britons’ and ‘immigrants’ who do not have sufficient ‘roots’ in British society compared to ‘native Britons’, according to the protagonists of such discourse. It is thus somewhat understandable that
most of the white South Africans would emphasise that they at least should be considered as culturally assimilable into British society; a strategy that presumably will restore some of their access amidst any accusations that they are not British ‘enough’. What should be of concern, however, is the way in which this discourse is applied to argue that white South Africans are more culturally assimilable than certain other migrants. It will also be shown that with the emphasis on being culturally assimilable, white South Africans prioritise the practical aspects of participating in British society rather than being preoccupied with assimilating into a British identity as such, as virtually all my participants – with a few exceptions – still expressed that they are considerably proud to be South African. In the next theme concerning their focus on English language proficiency, it is shown that this theme interrelates with culture and expresses practical matters much rather than how speaking English might be conceived as part of a British identity. In fact, the accent discrimination experienced by some South Africans would rather prove to manifest in the retention of their ‘South African accent’ as part of a celebration of their identities as South African. Finally, the theme of ‘contributing’ to the British economy reflects political concerns of the economic duties of migrants in general. Yet, this concern might also be employed to argue for the economic contribution of South Africans in particular – especially if white – at the detriment of certain other migrant and ethnic minority groups as well as disadvantaged fractions within the British ethnic majority such as ‘working class’ members.

5.2 Inclusion through ‘Whiteness’

Addressing ‘whiteness studies’ and the preoccupation with discourses of ‘whiteness’ that are reproduced and circulated in society, Max Andrucki complements these studies by contending that “the material arrangement of where bodies can be is as important, if not more so, than how racialized identity is mediated through discourse” (2010: 361, emphasis in original). Andrucki illustrates his point by referring to the demographic profile of Western countries as being frequently the outcome of discriminatory material processes, perpetuated by immigration/citizenship laws which grant white people some form of ‘passport
of privilege’. In the specific case of South Africans seeking legal access to the UK, British immigration and citizenship policy “constitutes a machine that attracts and repels bodies, and that whiteness emerges out of the workings of this ‘visa whiteness machine’ ” (Andrucki 2010: 361, inverted commas in original). As previously indicated, this description is apt in the UK with the large majority of South Africans being white, while white South Africans make up only a relatively small numerical minority in South Africa itself.

Having made this crucial point, we can neither ignore how this point intersects with the power of the rhetoric that, once white bodies have secured their presence in a particular geographical location, legitimises their stay there and, thus, reproduces the power of ‘whiteness’ in that particular location as well as more generally on the global stage. Irrespective of any underlying tensions with respect to differential access to visas and passports amongst white South Africans of different ethnicities that will be elaborated below, it is therefore necessary to stress that references to their own ‘whiteness’ – in whatever form it took – still seemed to unite a number of white South Africans. In response to Steyn’s (2001) argument that white Afrikaner South Africans’ cultural background and stronger implication with apartheid make them more predisposed to engage in ‘white talk’ than English-speaking white South Africans in the South African context, Crawford points out that a shift of analysis to the British context reveals that “Steyn’s work has perhaps overlooked the broader conceptualisations of whiteness that are shared by Anglophones and Afrikaners alike” (2011: 108). The interview findings presented below support Crawford’s claim that reference to their ‘whiteness’ is part of a strategy amongst some of the white South Africans in the South African context, of both an Afrikaans- and English-speaking background to establish common ground with the white British majority and, thus, ensure their own inclusion as migrants. In facilitating such inclusion into the ‘British nation’, it appeared that the stricter immigration and citizenship policies facing some white South Africans might have exacerbated a perceived need amongst the participants to represent white South Africans as ‘deserving, white migrants’. Nevertheless, it is also shown below that this negotiation process often created boundaries between themselves as white South Africans and certain other groups.

In terms of white South Africans’ reception in British society, we would therefore be well-advised to first and foremost recognise how their white skin
colour is viewed in a favourable light by some white members of the British population and, possibly, facilitated white South Africans’ sense of belonging in British society. For example, one participant suggested a form of inclusion of him as white South African through his assumption that “[m]ost in the UK pretty much here are white” (James, 26, white English-speaking, researcher in the financial sector). In the same breath, he expressed that he had not noticed any significant divisions in British society based on ‘race’. One interpretation of this assertion is that the participant perhaps was contrasting the arguably more overt ‘racial’ segregation that occurred in South Africa during apartheid with British society. By using apartheid South Africa as a reference, the persisting ‘racial’ inequalities in British society might be harder to detect for this participant. In tandem with this, the assertion could be a reflection of the way in which Western societies, represented here by the UK, have managed to divert attention away from the significance that white people’s ‘race’ plays in bestowing them certain privileges and shaping their life trajectories (Dyer 1997). As Bridget Byrne (2006) remarks, we should be aware of how the concealment of the power that ‘whiteness’ possesses is a common feature of contexts whereby whites constitute the majority, as ‘whiteness’ more easily passes as ‘normalcy’ and is thereby left unchallenged. Indeed, before conducting her research on white mothers and their ‘racial’ identities in a British context, Byrne was recommended by some of her participants that ‘race’ had nothing to do with them and that it would be more interesting to study this phenomenon ‘out there’ in the ‘extreme cases’ in which whites constitute a minority and exercise extreme power such as in South Africa with its apartheid legacy. Thus, ‘whiteness’ may have been normalised to such a degree in political and media rhetoric that certain individuals, like some of my own participants, have been genuinely rendered ‘blind’ to the significance of their own ‘whiteness’ in Western contexts such as the British one (Flagg 1997). Notions of a ‘post-racial’ society, which I pointed to in Chapter 3, have arguably contributed to this process.

Others of my white South African interviewees, nevertheless, appeared to be more willing to construct a clearer-cut divide between themselves as white South Africans and ‘non-white’ groups – whether ethnic minorities or migrants – by insinuating that white South Africans should be deemed as more assimilable into the social fabric of the ‘British nation’ due to their skin colour. A participant
stated that because of her white skin colour, “I don’t feel like I look any different to other people”, before adding that “I think if you’re not white, your colour immediately gives you away” (Zarah, 21, white Afrikaans-speaking, student). Clearly, the participant might here be pointing to the persistence of institutional and popular racism(s) in British society (see Runnymede trust 2000 for an overview). In light of the overt ‘racial’ discrimination that occurred during the apartheid years in South Africa, however, we might wonder whether any legacy of the apartheid mind-set is still evident in some participants’ accounts. Another possible reading of the above-participant’s distinction between the different receptions of white and ‘non-white’ people in the British context, therefore, is that the participant takes comfort in being white in a British society with a white numerical majority as opposed to being a numerical minority in a post-apartheid South Africa “without the many layers of unearned protection and privilege which they automatically had under a series of apartheid governments” (Harper 1998, cited in Crawford 2011: 41). The fact that white South Africans, in general terms, are still socio-economically privileged in post-apartheid South Africa would thus seem to matter less for some white South Africans if they believe strongly enough that such privileges have been lost (Steyn 2001). Although presenting a distorted view of the realities in South Africa, the power of the imagination was brought most clearly to light by a white Afrikaans-speaking participant (Gregory, 62, retired) who openly started to cry when explaining the decision to move to the UK with reference to his conviction that black state politicians in post-apartheid South Africa have ignored the needs of white South Africans. This participant then went on to appreciate the way that he supposedly had been welcomed with more open arms as a white individual in the British context as opposed to in the post-apartheid South African context.

Although, as we will see below, it would seem more appropriate to characterise the racism that participants seemed willing to engage in as falling under the rubric of the ‘new’ cultural racism variant that has become more prevalent in political and media rhetoric, this cultural variant of racism can nonetheless at times be overridden by the ‘old’ biological form of racism which
perhaps apartheid South Africa is the classical example of.\textsuperscript{12} It can be observed that while it may be more taboos attached to ‘old-fashioned’ biological racism, it can very much be still alive in different locations and forms. This is not to say that participants would necessarily have biologically racist ideas about ‘race’, even though most of my participants had been considerably shaped in their formative years by the ‘racial’ rhetoric of the white apartheid state. It is neither to say that a biological form of racism is more punctuating than the ‘new’ cultural forms. Indeed, it will be shown later on how we perhaps should be particularly careful of the rhetoric employed in the ‘new’ cultural racism, in that it can be more persuasive in influencing the mind-sets of ordinary people by not necessarily appearing to be as racist as its biological ‘forefather’ and that it, thus, can be harder to identify as racism as such (Rattansi 2007). Moreover, the same participants in my research could engage in different types of racism virtually at the same time or at different parts in their interview accounts. As observed by Ali Rattansi (2007), the distinctions between cultural racism, on the one hand, and biological racism, on the other, should in certain circumstances be considered as scholarly exaggerations as the reality might reveal a much more blurred boundary between the two forms of racism than what appears at first sight. Yet, this blurring of the boundaries between the two forms of racism is not to minimise the importance of alluding specifically to the traces of biological racism that, on closer interrogation, perhaps could be pointed to in some of my interviewees’ accounts.

To make this claim about participants engaging in biological racism, we must however be careful not to jump to any rapid conclusion, but first consider

\textsuperscript{12} The observant historian might object to the statement that a form of strict biological racism was perpetuated by the apartheid regime. In fact, the main justification for establishing separate structures between different ‘racial’ and ethnic groups was to enable them to develop on their ‘own’ due to the supposed cultural incompatibilities between groups. However, it is undeniable that such cultural racism also took a biological turn in its consequences by disproportionately disadvantaging ‘non-white’ people in the manner in which apartheid law paved the way for systems of oppression distinguishing people solely based on their skin colour (Matsinhe 2011: 45).
more carefully what characterises biological racism. The best way to approach this, I believe, is to draw on Ali Rattansi’s definition in which he states that

[s]trong racism [or biological racism] can be defined as the belief that separate, distinct, biologically defined races exist; that they can be hierarchically ordered on the basis of innate, and thus unalterable superior and inferior characteristics and abilities; and that hostility is natural between these races … Each element on its own is a necessary but not sufficient condition for the identification of ‘strong racism’. The racism can be said to be stronger the greater the number of such beliefs it combines. (2007: 94-5, inverted commas in original)

A separateness based on assumed biological differences was hinted at in the conversation below between a white South African wife and her husband:

Wife: One thing I’ve never understood is that why the African people couldn’t go through, couldn’t accept the change [from apartheid to post-apartheid].
(Judith, 61, white English-speaking, unemployed)

Husband: My darling, it’s exactly the same as why men don’t understand how women think, exactly the same.
(Kenny, 63, white English-speaking, parcel driver)

Indicated in this conversation is thus that black people and white people cannot possibly understand each other, which we could claim that is partially attributed to perceived biological differences in that the husband employs a supposed incompatibility in understanding between women and men as his reference point. It could be argued, of course, that participants are not necessarily assuming that white people are superior to black people, but only that white and black people cannot possibly, or ‘naturally’, understand each other. By considering this particular participant’s description of ‘non-white’ people as his wife went to apply for immigration visas and eventually a British passport, however, we could at least speculate whether a biological notion of ‘non-white’ people as supposedly ‘all the same’ provides the undertones of his understanding, as he states that “she [his wife] was the only white face in the room [and] the rest were all Bangladeshi or Pakistani” (Kenny, 63, white English-speaking, parcel driver). A cultural element was also interwoven with this statement when he later made unjustified insinuations that people from the mentioned nationalities cannot
speak English properly. However, what is interesting for the time being is how the other applicants’ nationalities as ‘all Bangladeshi or Pakistani’ seem to be randomly guessed at based on their skin colour, without taking into account the many other nationalities that people applying for British visas and passports comprise of. As a contrast to this, his wife as allegedly ‘the only white face in the room’ (a statement that in itself cannot be taken at face value) is not lumped together with others in the husband’s description, but rather given agency on her own as a ‘white individual’. This is a common feature of discourse of ‘whiteness’; ‘non-white’ people are not seen as individuals, but rather to be all of a similar ‘stock’ that is ‘different’ and ‘inferior’ to whites (Rogstad 2001). The participant’s inference would seem to be that a white individual, by retaining his or her agency, or indeed ‘humanity’, can more easily appropriate the status as ‘deserving’ migrant in a context such as the British where white people hold numerical and institutional power. In this sense, it is therefore perhaps the misplaced and exaggerated political and media rhetoric of Britain as allegedly being ‘swamped’ by ‘hordes’ of ‘non-white’ migrants that the above-participant is playing on (Skey 2011) – hoping to place white South Africans in a more favourable position based on their common skin colour with the white ethnic majority population in the UK.

5.3 The Meaning of ‘Ancestry’

Despite being camouflaged under a more ‘progressive’ language than it previously was, Joppke and Rosenhek (2009) observe that the enduring preoccupation with ancestral ties in immigration and citizenship policies might push certain migrants to ‘prove’ their ethnic affinity to the host nation. This has arguably led to the occurrences in which ideas of ‘race’ as discussed above do not only relate to skin colour as such, but are also determined in the mind-sets of various social actors – whether more or less powerful – according to whether the person in question can be said to possess the ‘adequate’ ancestral ties to a particular nation. It must here be pointed out how the determination of who does and who does not possess the ‘adequate’ ancestral ties in various contexts and in various situations can, of course, intersect significantly with the physical
attributes of the individual in terms of his or her skin colour. Patricia Hill Collins (1998) demonstrates that popular beliefs about the nation-state have related to the presumed common ‘blood lines’ amongst its members – or the supposed primordial status of the nation-state – which more often than not have not been established by state and other social actors in the host nation according to arbitrary physical attributes such as skin colour. Although references to a ‘primordial, biological status’ of the nation-state might seem tempting in the way in which it can, in the imagination of some, presuppose the ‘natural’ and ‘self-evident’ logic of blood lines and family ties, it is important to recognise that “[e]ven in its most stable ‘primordial’ forms, however, belonging is always a dynamic process, not a reified fixity – the latter is only a naturalized construction of a particular hegemonic form of power relations” (Yuval-Davis 2011a: 12, inverted commas in original).

Pointing to the flawed legitimisation of ancestral, family or blood lines – or however a primordial status is defined – is not to deny the real consequences that the circulation of any undercurrents of such notions in British society can have, which in the present case undoubtedly put ‘non-white’ South Africans at a disadvantage versus white South Africans. Moreover, this does not tell the story in its entirety; there are also reasons to believe that there exist internal boundaries of ‘whiteness’ even within the white South African migrant group in the UK pertaining to whether or not they are seen as possessing the ‘sufficient’ ancestral ties to Britain. Specifically, it will be shown below that the more common presence of British ancestral ties amongst English-speaking than Afrikaans-speaking white South Africans, might put them at some advantage in their negotiations of access to British territory and, in turn, the ‘British nation’. Notwithstanding, it will be shown that even the possession of British ancestral ties amongst certain South Africans might not be deemed sufficient by some members of the host population, whom might still label them as ‘immigrants’ at the end of the day. This can reveal that even for relatively privileged white migrants with ancestral ties such as some white South Africans possess, boundaries of exclusion might in certain circumstance be erected by the host population in the currently restrictive immigration and citizenship policy environment in the UK.

To demonstrate first the ways and instances in which ancestral ties benefitted certain white South Africans, a point of departure is to consider the
legal easiness that the proof of ancestral ties may grant. Although it was expressed by an applicant for British ancestral visa that the British immigration officials “wanted a lot of documentation, like I had to have all the original birth certificates of my grandparents and my parents”, she also considered this process to be “very actually hassle-free, I didn’t expect it to be that easy” (Christina, 29, white English-speaking, travel agent). If any significant problems presented themselves for applicants for a British ancestral visa – those with at least one grandparent of British nationality – the immigration process was, needless to say, even easier for those who arrived on a British passport. For example, James had acquired dual citizenship already upon birth – South African and British – as his British parents migrated to South Africa before he was born in South Africa. He therefore had visa-free access to the UK and did not have to go through any residency or citizenship tests. As he states, “in terms of legal status, it was pretty simple. We didn’t even have to sign forms, it was, you just get on a plane and you join the British passport queue in Heathrow and walk in” (James, 26, white English-speaking, researcher in the financial sector). The visa-free access also enabled James to arrive in the UK at a convenient time in that his parents came with him when he was 16 and still young enough to get into the later stages of the British education system, arguably equipping him with a competitive edge in the labour market. Below, James reflects on the consequences of this strategic move – arguably facilitated by his British family ties – on his sense of belonging in British society:

I have moved to London and had different jobs … I also think time makes you get used to all. So the thing that I miss about South Africa, which was quite painful when I left, that pain numbs off for a while. And of course there are things I miss about South Africa, but those have been replaced by other things over time. (James, 26, white English-speaking, researcher in the financial sector)

This quote shows that the length of residency – 10 years in his case – has helped James settle in and generate a sense of belonging to British society, in addition to his lingering attachments to South Africa. Dora Kostakopoulou (2010) demonstrates that migrant incorporation usually takes place as migrants go on with their everyday lives and become enmeshed in the social life of the host society in various ways by developing interdependent relationships with others.
This process should therefore be recognised by politicians, argues Kostakopoulou, as migrants’ ability to incorporate themselves in the host society is not necessarily a lengthy process unless, of course, they are being prevented from initiating and pursuing this process by the host society’s legal structures. Hence, the British nationality of James’ parents that had granted him status as a British citizen long before he had set foot in the UK, may have enabled him to devote more time and energy on settling in to British society, rather than having to deal with the potential obstacles and anxieties of migration law procedures. Although James’ account might somewhat exaggerate the significance of immigration/citizenship policies in facilitating or preventing a sense of belonging to British society, it can at the very least demonstrate how the first hurdle to the development of a certain sense of belonging – in the form of legal obstacles – can be more easily surpassed by some white South Africans than others. Perhaps to a certain extent, the differential access to visas and passports could also create some friction between South Africans in the UK:

I think it’s not a harsh resentment, but it’s with South Africans here, when you’ve got an easy passport. I mean, a lot of South Africans can’t afford the passport, they have to work very hard to get it. It gets very expensive for them to always keep renewing their visas and that sort of thing. So, y’know, I think that they get quite envious. (Mario, 31, white English-speaking, accountant for an investment bank)

Although some possess sufficient ancestral ties to Britain or another EU/EEA country granting them legal access to the UK, it is important to note the additional challenge that might present itself for Afrikaans-speaking white South Africans – let alone for most ‘non-white’ South Africans – by way of not usually having the same immediate ancestral ties to Britain like a number of English-speaking white South Africans. This would normally put them at a disadvantage, unless they of course can gain relatively easy access by being in possession of the right qualifications that generate them enough ‘points’ through the stipulations of the points-based migration system. It appeared that for at least a few of my participants without immediate British ancestral ties, it had taken up a lot of time and energy to prepare the right documents and to argue their case for their legal access to British territory. For a white Afrikaner respondent arriving in the UK as late as in 2008 (Jacob, 27, health and safety employee), his initial difficulties with
the visa application surfaced prominently in his account, as well as a strong feeling of resentment to the entire migration system. He did eventually manage to extend his stay in the UK on a spousal visa as a cohabitant to a white South African with British ancestral ties, but the amount of paperwork which had to be prepared to prove that she was his cohabitant, and that he was not just claiming so to get access to the UK, was clearly stressful for him. The inference that we can make here is that because the person that this particular participant had gained his visa through was not seen to be of his ‘blood’ – by virtue of ‘only’ being his cohabitant – this very relationship status probably resulted in an added layer of scepticism on the part of the British migration authorities (Hill Collins 1998).

The issue cannot be approached thoroughly enough by only considering the potential legal obstacles, as these might intersect with the adverse reception that some South Africans without the ‘adequate’ British ancestry can receive in British society, even if white. We should not ignore the potentially damaging effect on a sense of belonging to Britain that can be attributed to the stereotypes that are aimed at white South Africans who are without, or are believed to be without, British ancestral ties. I believe that this issue can be best approached by considering the circumstances under which Afrikaner white South Africans – by lacking the same type of assumed connectivity to Britain – are more easily subjected to cultural stereotypes than their English-speaking white South African peers. The potentially adverse treatment of Afrikaans- as opposed to English-speaking white South Africans might be prevalent despite the fact that, contrary to the typical pattern, there are still certain members of the former group who very well may possess close ancestral ties to Britain, while at the same time certain members of the latter group would lack such ties.

A common theme running through my various interviews with both groups of white South Africans was that Afrikaner white South Africans often were constructed as ‘masculine subjects’. Related to this was the assumption by a white English-speaking female on a British ancestral visa that “the South African culture is still very, very masculine” (Felicia, 30, web developer). The participant may here be pointing to the legacy of the apartheid state and the manner in which it was highly patriarchal in its orientation and, as a consequence, constructed ‘masculine subjects’. A specialist on the apartheid history writes that “[t]he apartheid state’s response to objectors drew from constructions of hegemonic
white masculinity in South Africa and from powerful cultural discourses that defined white nationalism in virile, militaristic and defiant terms” (Conway 2007: 427). Due to the pervasive influence that the apartheid regime had in South Africa, the above-participant was willing to admit that the notion of South Africans as being ‘masculine subjects’ could apply to all South Africans irrespective of their ‘racial’ or ethnic background.

With regard to white South Africans, however, it must be noted how the participant particularly referred to the alleged ‘masculine’ or even ‘aggressive’ behaviour of some Afrikaner men. The implication when they migrate to the UK, as evidenced from my interview data, is that white Afrikaner South Africans are typically being labelled as more ‘racist’ than English-speaking white South Africans. People falling into the latter category may also on some occasions be associated with the apartheid regime simply by virtue of being white South Africans, but the interview data indicated that they seemingly had the benefit of being portrayed as somewhat more ‘liberal’ and ‘tolerant’ than their Afrikaner counterparts. As stated by the above-quoted English-speaking white South African, “I think it’s probably even worse for Afrikaans white South Africans, cause I think they’re immediately judged to be racist and ignorant … luckily as an English white South African, we are thought of as more the liberals” (Felicia, 30, web developer). Such notions have been given credence by the fact that the rulers of the apartheid government mainly consisted of people with Afrikaans background – even though, of course, it must be stressed here that the main fault line during apartheid was drawn between white and ‘non-white’ people and that white people in general were privileged vis-à-vis ‘non-white’ people (Neocosmos 2006).

The implicit assumption amongst some people that Afrikaners are less liberal than English-speaking white South Africans, clearly troubled the following white South African respondent with Afrikaner origins and no immediate ancestral ties to Britain:

So yeah, being Afrikaans is quite different to being a normal English person. Afrikaans people are quite proud of their heritage. I know a lot of people who are like ‘the Afrikaans and apartheid’ and all that stuff, but it’s not really about that. Anyone should be proud of what their ancestors were or did, the heritage at the end of the day. And most Afrikaans South Africans, a lot of them are labelled in a bad light, especially with the
whole racism thing and stuff like that. I think it’s just each to one own really. If I’m proud of it, then you shouldn’t really look down on me for being proud of my heritage. If you’re English or British or whatever, you gonna be proud of that. (Jacob, 27, white Afrikaans-speaking, health and safety employee)

That some people automatically and uncritically associated being an Afrikaner with being a racist and sympathiser with the apartheid regime, saddened Jacob as he felt that he should be allowed to be proud of his heritage. Although his affinity with his Afrikaner heritage may have been challenged by some people, it seemed obvious that he was determined not to let any such assumptions disrupt or alter his attachments. What this seems to suggest is that ethnic attachments can become more urgent for some if they are “threatened in some way” (Yuval-Davis 2011a: 10). The perceived threat articulated by Jacob derives from many years of tension between English-speaking and Afrikaans-speaking groups in South Africa (see Cornell and Hartmann 2007:135-146 for a historical overview). Although respondents were frequently keen to label the resentment that existed between Afrikaner and English-speaking white South Africans in the UK as only minor, and that their common identity as South Africans was more important in a ‘foreign’ environment, we can nevertheless suspect that the tension between the two groups has heightened in Jacob’s view after facing the possible anxieties of relocating from South Africa to the UK. This may specifically be the case since he possesses no immediate British ancestral ties, as supposed to a number of English-speaking white South Africans in particular. Indeed, he legitimates his own ethnic pride by going on to suggest that he would also expect ‘English’ or ‘British’ people13 – however he defines them – to be proud of ‘their’ alleged ethnic attachments. By stating it as such, this participant is perhaps attempting to reassure that even though he feels strongly about his ‘own’ heritage, he expects English/British people to be proud of ‘their’ heritage too. In this sense, he signals that he is not intending to threaten English/British people’s presumed identity in any way, despite the persistence of his strong Afrikaner attachments.

13 Showing also the uncritical equation that is often being made between ‘English’ and ‘British’ people, despite the three other nationalities than England that Britain also constitutes (Skey 2011).
What comes to mind here is therefore Chris Rojek’s (2007) theoretical distinction between ‘nationalism light’ and ‘nationalism strong’. The former refers to the way in which people feel attachments to a nation through ‘instrumental’ needs or as part of their life choices. This would possibly relate to Jacob’s comfort of being in British society and, thus, the expression of his appreciation of the presumed identity of English/British people in order to minimise the perceived conflict caused by his own presence and different identity. This ‘nationalism light’, however, can develop alongside his ‘nationalism strong’ in terms of his white Afrikaner identity, which is arguably more deeply felt and would in this case seem to represent a form of emotional attachment that “requires individuals and groups to be ready to sacrifice tooth and claw for the [Afrikaner] nation” (Rojek 2007: 206).

In light of the strong emotional attachment in terms of their ancestry that was, in fact, evident in most of my Afrikaner participants’ accounts, it is undeniable that some white Afrikaner South African men may hold certain views due to the particular structural circumstances that they have been previously exposed to. Nonetheless, we should pause for a second and refrain from the lure of reconstructing the common notion about them as inevitably racist (Gallagher 1999; Garner 2006). An intersectional sensitivity could help us to discover and explain how notions about white Afrikaner South Africans as more ‘masculine’ and ‘racists’ were indeed initiated – stretching back in time even before the apartheid era – by the intersection of ethnic and class differences between the two main groups of white South Africans. Cornell and Hartmann (2007: 135-146) demonstrate that it was not inevitable that the main division line was to be drawn between ‘whites’ and ‘non-whites’ in apartheid South Africa, as it might as well have been based on the class differences that historically have persisted between the two groups of white South Africans. Briefly put, as the Afrikaner colonisers pursued a life style oriented around self-sufficiency and farming, they were put at a disadvantage with the changes in agriculture and the industrialisation of the economy initiated by the British colonisers in the early twentieth century. This forced Afrikaners to migrate to the cities to find employment as ‘unskilled’ workers. For their part, white South Africans with British connections were, in general, wealthier as they already dominated trade and commerce in the cities. Disguised in this privileged position, a number of them were able to claim part as
representatives of the British Empire and take up the position as, supposedly, ‘noble liberals’ responsible for the development of South Africa (Cornell and Hartmann 2007: 135-146). To some extent regardless of their class or gender background, such historical notions and connections to Britain may work to the advantage of white South Africans with certain British ties insofar as they are negotiating informal access to the ‘British nation’.

Yet, or so it would seem, informal access to the ‘British nation’ is not guaranteed even for white South Africans with British ancestry, including for those who have qualified directly for British citizenship without having to ‘naturalise’ as a citizen first. This claim is grounded in the observation that most of the white South African respondents reported – irrespective of their ethnic connection to Britain – that they, at least initially, had experienced some difficulties in their attempts to settle into British society and were, at least to some extent, made to feel unsure whether they ‘truly’ belonged there. The main reason for this seemed to be the unwelcoming reception that they had felt from certain members of the British host population, despite generally being perceived in a better light than other migrants lower down in the perceived ‘social hierarchy’. An English-speaking white participant with English grandparents stressed that “[a]lthough this is where we [her grandparents] originate from … people are very unfriendly. People are actually hostile here” (Tracey, 46, unemployed). This type of actual or perceived hostility could foster some sort of ‘reactive ethnicity’ (Portes 1999), which might have affected the outlook even of the British-born South African wife of a participant: “my wife … she’s born here [in the UK]. [However,] if you ask here, she tells you she’s South African” (Gregory, 62, white Afrikaans-speaking, retired).

The perceived importance of drawing boundaries to make it absolutely clear that white South Africans are, after all, considered to be ‘different’ from the white British majority, is perhaps a response from some Britons to the belief amongst some white South Africans that they should be seen as indistinguishable from the white British majority. Elias and Scotson (1994) have demonstrated that it can become all the more important for members of the dominant group – or particularly white Britons in this case – to establish and mark their difference from an ‘outsider’ group in the instances in which the ‘outsider’ group would appear to be too similar for comfort for certain members of the dominant group.
In the following account by an English-speaking white South African who arrived on a British ancestral visa, this would seem to have been the case as she reflects on a conversation that she recently had with a white British taxi driver:

[H]e was like ‘oh, where are you from again?’, thinking I was British. And when I mentioned that I was South African ... it’s like his tone just changed. And then he was almost like … ‘so what are you doing and what is your job?’ , really interrogating me. And I’ve often got that and I feel that I have to defend myself, like actually I’m not here just living off the dole. I’m actually here now work as a web developer and like I’m not like taking your job or anything. And I’ve found that it’s happened for me about two or three times where I had to sort of defend myself. (Felicia, 30, white English-speaking, web developer)

It is interesting to note that the taxi driver first assumed that the participant was British because of her skin colour and that he, therefore, treated her nicely purely based on this perception, before then changing his attitude towards her when it was revealed that she was originally from South Africa. It is thus pertinent to point out Takeyuki Tsuda’s (2009) research, which identifies some of the common challenges for people who have migrated to a country they have an ethnic affinity with, but which they nevertheless may never before have set their foot in. Tsuda finds that despite expectations that these migrants’ presumed ethnic affinity with the host society will facilitate their social integration, they could be ethnically excluded as foreigners in the host society due to the different cultural influences they have been exposed to while living abroad in a different society. Ultimately, this could have some bearing on notions of who belongs and who does not belong to the ‘British nation’. Tsuda writes that

[b]ecause both migrants and hosts anticipate that the diasporic return of co-ethnics will be less problematic than other types of immigration, the mutual ethnic and social alienation that results is all the more disorienting, forcing both migrants and hosts to fundamentally reconsider their ethnic identities. (2009: 7)

We could also posit that the rhetoric claiming that migrants are ‘stealing’ from the ‘native’ population – which the taxi driver seemingly had adopted even against a migrant with an ethnic affinity to the host nation – is part of the dominant political view that divides the world into ‘us’ versus ‘them’. We can see how notions of entitlements supposedly preserved for the ‘native’ population at
the expense of migrants may have been instilled in people by the modern nation-state project of demarcating national borders and drawing boundaries between ‘insiders’ and ‘outsiders’. Peter Geschiere (2009), in his book *The Perils of Belonging*, warns about the potentially devastating consequences of the development of such exclusionary nationalist notions. Geschiere identifies the phenomenon of *autochthony*\(^{14}\) in order to explain the processes under which members of specific groups are readily available to put forward the argument that they are the legitimate owners of a particular territory purely because past members of their own group were, supposedly, on that territory first. It does not matter for the protagonists of such discourse that the group they consider themselves as part of also arrived on the particular territory through migration many years back in history, or that this migration had violent consequences by subordinating or even wiping out the indigenous populations that were, in fact, on the land before them. These past realities are indeed easily forgotten, as the main concern is to argue that their ancestors were, at least, on the land of ‘their’ country long before migrants who have arrived more recently. Geschiere argues that this process has gained added force by the consequences of intensified globalisation with the spread of neo-liberalism and associated insecurities across the world, in addition to the recent increase in international migration that some host populace members feel that they must guard ‘their’ resources against. An important point in Geschiere’s argument is therefore the outlining of ‘the global return to the local’, as global processes have, ironically enough, led to upsurges of local emotional attachments in various countries across the globe. It is not only in African countries we have witnessed this process, which some media portrayals would rather have us believe with the flashing images from African countries, such as the Ivory Coast, showing the violent attacks on certain ethnic groups that are believed by other groups in the very same country to be *allogène*.\(^{15}\) Hence, it is important to stress that also in Western European countries, such as the UK, we have recently been witnessing the development of this process with the rise of far right groups like the English Defence League (Geschiere 2009).

\(^{14}\) Meaning ‘to be of the soil’ in Greek (Geschiere 2009).

\(^{15}\) Antonym to *autochthón*, thereby implying to *not* be regarded as of the soil, or the territory of the particular nation-state (Geschiere 2009).
5.4 ‘Culturally Assimilable’ South Africans

The emphasis on ancestry that potentially excludes South Africans as ‘foreigners’ in the British context, could be surpassed to a certain degree by members from both of the two main groups of white South Africans – thus even by white Afrikaners with generally less British ancestral ties to point to. Of course, I have underscored earlier on that their white skin colour can work in the favour of all white South Africans in a British context where the ethnic majority is white. However, it also seemed important for some participants to emphasise their supposed cultural assimilability in British society, lest white South Africans even with British ancestry possibly are considered as not ‘truly’ belonging by virtue of being labelled as ‘non-Britons’ without sufficient roots in the UK.

It is thus poignant to make the observation that the claims to be ‘worthy’ of presence and resources on a national space are amendable according to the particular circumstances and would largely depend on the relationships between different groups. Therefore, claims for territorial presence and resources are not under the sole custody of the self-constructed ‘native’ group of the national territory, but are elastic and can be tapped into by groups not necessarily thought of as rightful claimers by others. An example of this is when certain South Africans would claim that their cultural assimilability to the UK is sufficient enough to make them ‘worthy’ members of the ‘British nation’ – despite any voiced objections from members of the white British majority population that would suggest otherwise (Geschiere 2009). Nira Yuval-Davis (2011a: 99-102) thus interprets Geschiere’s (2009) conceptualisation of the notion of being a ‘deserving’ autochthon of the specific land as, essentially, surpassing that of ethnicity. According to Yuval-Davis, ‘ethnicity’ is a more restricted term than ‘autochthony’ by virtue of being associated with the particular name of the ethnic group as well as consisting of an account of its history. These are criteria that ‘autochthony’ does not need to adhere to, as it can gain its appeal by comprising a more empty category that allows its users simply to put forward the crude argument that ‘our ancestors were here first’, or – in the case of South Africans – opens up the possibility for references to the colonial and cultural influence of Britain in South Africa that construct South Africans as culturally prepared for British society (Yuval-Davis 2011a: 99-102). It is perhaps particularly telling of
how references to cultural assimilability can be employed as rhetorical strategies to suit the particular groups’ needs in negotiating inclusion that Jacob – the white Afrikaner discussed above in terms of his perception that being of Afrikaner ancestry was different to having closer ancestral ties to Britain – would nevertheless refer to previous British colonialism as having influenced all South Africans in becoming more culturally adaptable to British society. In his own formulation, “I think maybe a lot of South Africans are sort of like British people because it is of being in this colony” (Jacob, 27, white Afrikaans-speaking, health and safety employee).

The relational dimension of the claim to their legitimate presence in British society was brought to play by those white South Africans who argued that they, at the very least, ought to be considered as more ‘deserving’ migrants than certain other migrants who allegedly lack the same cultural assimilability to British society as themselves. These other migrants were occasionally named by their ethnic group, but not always. It is noteworthy that participants would typically speak in cultural terms rather than referring to other migrants’ ‘race’. Although some ‘racial’ undertones could obviously be present when other migrants were preconceived as less assimilable into a British society mediated by ‘whiteness’ discourses, this talk nonetheless tended to retain a cultural language in the majority of cases as other migrants were often perceived as being less capable or willing to adopt so-called ‘British values’. The construction of cultural ‘insiders’ and ‘outsiders’ is demonstrated in the following quote:

I mean, obviously, you’ve got some people who go and live with their families … they live in some suburb in Birmingham or wherever. And they just carry on with their lives as it used to be before that. Whereas I feel as a South African here, we add, we mix with the people, we play in their cricket clubs, we go to their pubs, we become part of popular culture, so to speak. (Frederick, 35, white Afrikaans-speaking, teacher)

Indicative of the inclination to focus on the cultural dimension of other migrants’ and ethnic minorities’ perceived lack of assimilability rather than on their ‘race’ as such, is especially the fact that it was not only ‘non-white’, but also other white migrants such as Eastern European migrants, who were excluded from some of the white South Africans’ perceptions of who would classify as ‘deserving’ migrants in the UK. These rhetorical exclusions even of other white
people would seem to run counter to what one might expect given participants’ exposure to the apartheid regime that constructed a relatively clear-cut divide between ‘white’ and ‘non-white’ people (Sveinsson and Gumuschian 2008: 7). The preoccupation with migrants’ cultural assimilability arguably speaks to the shift in the political discourse of racism in the 1980s and 1990s in Western European countries from being centred upon “a discredited biological basis to one that took culture as its object” (Lentin and Titley 2011b: para. 9). By extension, protagonists of cultural racism make the fallacy of “insist[ing] on racism as being tied to skin colour and phenotype, a flat reduction that positions any other grounds for discrimination as not-racism” (Lentin and Titley 2011a: 52). Worryingly, then, cultural racism is not named for what it actually is – racism – in the sense that it is seen as only ‘commonsense’ that different cultures are ‘incompatible’.

It must also be acknowledged how cultural discourses are somewhat associated with and can, in fact, occasionally slip into a more biological form of racism (Rattansi 2007: 99-101). By curious extension of a cultural discourse, even other white migrants in the UK could be ‘racialised’ as looking ‘different’, which was particularly expressed by one white South African participant with reference to white Eastern European migrants:

I think a lot of Europeans look very similar. But ... I can still sometimes look at someone and go ‘they’re Polish, or they’re from an Eastern European [country] or something’. (Zarah, 21, white Afrikaans-speaking, student)

The targeting of Eastern European migrants, in particular, corresponds with the adverse political and media attention that this group has been exposed to in the British context (Fox et al. 2012). Usually, the tapping into this rhetoric related to the assumed ‘cultural incompatibilities’ of Eastern European migrants in the British context as opposed to white South Africans, and not necessarily skin colour per se as was referred to more blatantly in the interview-snapshot above.

Some respondents also perceived residency and citizenship tests – which have been introduced recently to test migrants seeking legal residency and/or British citizenship on their knowledge of and presumed adaptability to British
culture/society – as necessary initiatives in order to filter out migrants seen as less culturally assimilable:

I can understand why they do it, yeah, like I get really resentful when I see foreigners coming and they don’t like … they keep to their culture group and they don’t take anything on that’s British. And they don’t, they’re not interested at all in the culture … And I think that’s, I think that’s wrong. Like if you go to a country, you’re there to live there and you should make your roots there. And you should take on part of their culture … I don’t think it’s wrong for a country to require that when people are applying to come and work there and be there. (Zarah, 21, white Afrikaans-speaking, student)

Curiously, however, this was a statement by an Afrikaner participant who at the same time expressed that she was proud of her Afrikaner heritage. Thus, to legitimate her own affiliations, it would seem necessary for her to acknowledge that different groups can retain their own identities despite being part of British society: “I don’t think it’s wrong to have your culture groups and still be involved in that, because I think it’s good to keep your heritage. And it’s good to keep your roots alive”. Nevertheless, she was quick to add that “at the same time, they [other migrant and ethnic minority groups] should at least make an effort to take on the culture around them” (Zarah, 21, white Afrikaans-speaking, student).

The above-illustrated scapegoating of certain other migrants builds upon the recent preoccupation of politicians with migrants’ willingness to integrate into British society in order to pave the way for the development of a common ‘British identity’ and, supposedly, greater ‘social cohesion’ (Wetherell et al. 2007). The residency and citizenship tests take part of the ‘culturalisation of citizenship’, or “the search for a more pregnant formulation of the cultural consensus that forms the basis of citizenship and must be subscribed to by new citizens as proof of their ‘integration’ ” (Geschiere 2009: 24-25, inverted commas in original). However, I would argue that it is impossible to force a ‘British identity’ upon migrants through tests. As thinkers like Etzioni (1997) would presumably argue, more or less forcing migrants to comply with a set of core ‘British values’, as opposed to making the migrants genuinely believe in such values instead, can have a counterproductive effect. In addition, it is unclear whether civic integration tests “reveal the depth of a migrant’s knowledge of the country and its history and norms, rather than his/her ability to memorise facts about the country in order to
pass an exam” (Kostakopoulou 2010: 842). It is also remarkable that although the stipulated ‘British values’ are quite general and elusive Westernised criteria such as respect for the rule of law and democracy, it is nevertheless emphasised that these criteria constitute a particular British identity that migrants must comply with to prove that they are British enough (Coutin 2006). The nature of the questions commonly found in British civic tests is, as a result, often confusing and unfair since most people could experience difficulties in answering the questions correctly – even if people born into British citizenry were to take the tests. Testimony to this is, for instance, the following sample selection of questions that may appear in the knowledge of British life test: “How many young people are there in the UK? Do many children live in single-parent families or step-families? When do children leave home? What sort of work do children do?” (cited in Rojek 2007: 201).

For the South Africans who had gone through a civic integration test, it was often seen as an unnecessary burden given that they had already stayed in the UK for quite a while due to the certain number of years non-citizens need to remain officially in the UK before qualifying for the relevant tests. Relating this to their own beliefs that they were culturally assimilable already at their time of arrival in the UK due to the British colonial/cultural influence in South Africa, would seem to add to the frustration that some of my participants reported. The below-quoted interviewee, however, offered a solution. She asserted that residency and citizenship tests should be constructed with the aim of further developing their practical applicability to British society and ensuring that prospective and actual migrants could be better prepared to take advantage of the opportunities offered by Britain. This assertion seemingly points to the way in which citizenship has become perceived as a tool to fulfil more ‘instrumental’ needs nowadays, rather than necessarily being associated with a deep-rooted national feeling to the country of the particular citizenship (see Rojek 2007). This participant thus wanted residency/citizenship tests to

[a]sk things that’s gonna make you understand British life better, or British society or, y’know, ask things that’s going to help you be, become a better British person … So that you better value, you can add value to the British society. Ask questions that would add value. Not ask questions about Henry V and how many wives he had, or bloody, y’know, some footballer … I don’t care about that and nobody else does. So whoever
made the test didn’t think about it, because none of that proved that I was a better person, or that I would add to your society in this country. (Caroline, 36, white Afrikaans-speaking, credit management)

Yet, it was seen as important for some to demonstrate that, despite not necessarily agreeing with the questions or the necessity for them as white South Africans to take the tests, they had still taken them and proven that they are no ‘cultural threat’ to the social fabric of the ‘British nation’. This could partially be based on the realisation on some participants’ part that for some Britons, as for people of other nationalities, “[national] identities are terribly important to individuals, and that individuals protect these identities even if they have no realistic meaning” (McLaren 2008 :6). In the below-quote, it became pivotal to reveal for their British neighbour that they had gone through civic integration tests, as the neighbour was so surprised and he went ‘oh, I thought everybody can just come in, you don’t fill anything in, you don’t have any tests’. And they were quite surprised and I found there were a few people like our neighbour and things, that couldn’t believe that we went through all of that, because. And they were pleased, cause they thought, erm, people just come in to the country and they don’t get checked, or they don’t – and certainly you do have to be checked and all of that. (Karen, 43, white Afrikaans-speaking, unemployed)

In this sense, we can here see the contours of how the protection of a country’s borders has become equated with the protection of its national identity or culture. As such, it is argued along these lines that without the adequate testing a country runs the risk of ‘losing’ its very identity (Shorten 2010). This argument was given added force, or so the below-participant presumably believed, by trying to evoke my supposed emotive attachment to the preservation of my ‘own’ country’s borders and, by supposed extension, its national identity:

I mean, you have to protect your own country, right? Don’t you think? Well, you wouldn’t want Norway to be flooded with too many people, because the country loses its identity. I mean, as it is, I don’t think Britain really knows what it is anymore. (Eloise, 42, white English-speaking, quantity surveyor)
Although I did not fall for this participant’s strategy, the very assumption that she was seemingly making that I would in fact be likely to do so, speaks volumes to the ‘self-evident’ and ‘commonsensical’ nature that the alleged connection between borders and national identities has acquired in the mind-sets of many people in the contemporary world.

A strong emphasis on a British sense of identity, however, was not commonly encountered in my interviews. It seemed as though the emphasis would usually be more on how being part of a British identity fulfilled certain practical needs of the interviewees as migrants in the UK, and not usually so much with regard to the preservation of any ‘primordial British identity’. For instance, for a couple that did perceive that the British citizenship test and ceremony had bolstered their sense of being ‘British’, this was mainly perceived in this way because they felt that, by having gone through this test and the ceremony, they would become more accepted as part of British society:

You do sometimes get people – you don’t want to think that people maybe have something against you – but you don’t always feel like you belong. And it’s not always easy. And when we did that [passed the British citizenship test and ceremony] it just made you feel a bit more that you’re of, y’know, you’re, you do belong a bit more. (Karen, 43, white Afrikaans-speaking, unemployed)

Henceforth, the acquisition of British citizenship through naturalisation by the couple, which the wife represented in this quote, was not necessarily an indication that they fully identified as Britons insofar as their Afrikaner and South African identity still seemed to be prioritised. It is noteworthy that their acquisition of British citizenship had enabled them to easier travel around and experience Europe, which was one of the main reasons for coming to the UK in the first place – thus, not necessarily to re-connect with or bolster a British colonial/cultural identity. Consistent with this emphasis on the practical rather than the emotive aspects of citizenship acquisition is Susan Bibler Coutin’s (2006) research on the reasons for naturalisation amongst El Salvadorians in the US. Coutin finds that the state’s emphasis on moulding the El Salvadorians’ sense of identity to become more ‘American’ through citizenship tests and ceremonies might be contradicting these people’s reasons for naturalising as American citizens, which can have more
to do with ‘instrumental’ needs such as improving their situation in the face of
‘racial’ and ethnic discrimination in American society.

The potential ‘racial’ dimensions of seemingly ‘neutral’ civic integration
tests should be clarified in the case of South Africans. With respect to how ‘non-
white’ South Africans were treated by white South Africans during apartheid –
the latter group including a significant number of people with British ancestry –
there might be particular credence in the observations that “[s]ome ex-colonial
immigrants may resent having to express loyalty to their former masters”, while
“[o]thers may resent the implication that they need to be resocialised into British
culture, given the fact that they were born and raised in societies whose legal,
political and educational institutions were designed by their British imperial
masters” (Kymlicka 2003: 200). Commenting on the civic integration tests, a
‘mixed race’ South African was clearly disappointed:

Oh my word … I just thought ‘what nonsense is this?’ I think, why do you
have to learn about life in the UK? … I didn’t set up to live here. I mean,
indefinitely or permanently. I settled, I came here before, I just wanted to
see and have an adventure. So applying for the indefinite leave wasn’t part
of my – I thought it was degrading, I thought it was, um, an insult the test
that I had to take asking me about a home visitor as if in Africa we don’t
have home visitors. Asking me about, um, traffic lights and roundabouts.
It’s like, well, we are educated, y’know. (Jennifer, 42, ‘mixed race’, social
worker)

This review, of course, does not cancel out the hassle and sense of being
controlled that white South Africans also might experience if obliged to conform
to British legislation in the form of civic integration tests, as touched upon above.
Yet, Chris Rojek (2007: 203-4) considers the claim that Britain offers equal
opportunities for everyone regardless of ‘race’, as stated in the Home Office
primer for civic integration tests, as mere ‘humbug’ that ultimately may offend
aspiring citizens coming from more disadvantaged sections of British society. It is
therefore telling that it appeared that the ‘non-white’ participants in the interview
sample were a bit more reluctant to draw upon the colonial/cultural relationship
between South Africa and the UK than was the case amongst the white South
African participants. Evidently, references to this colonial/cultural relationship
were further in-between and more difficult to locate in the ‘non-white’
participants’ interview transcripts. This could suggest that because of their skin
colour they are excluded from a consideration as partakers of a ‘British cultural image’ in the first place, which might be controlled through ‘whiteness’ discourses that are more accessible for white South Africans (see Skey 2011).

5.5 English Language Proficiency

Language is a cultural element that needs to be protected in some social actors’ logic. The argument for the protection of the national language builds on the assumptions of an ‘existential threat’ that predicts that “if substantial numbers of incoming migrants (and their descendants) refrain from adopting the national language as their own, then this may have long-term implications for ongoing national distinctiveness” (Shorten 2010: 108, brackets in original). However, for my participants the emphasis seemed, in a similar fashion as with regard to their presumed cultural compatibility with Britain, to be more on the practical matters of language rather than the protection of anything ‘British’ that is supposedly represented by the English language. Participants’ emphasis on the practical aspects of English could relate to the fact that although expressing that they were good English speakers, even white South Africans could be derided in British society because of their assumed ‘South African accent’, as it will be seen below. Thus, even some white South Africans are presumably made to feel that they are not in a position to argue for the preservation of anything ‘British’ through their use of the English language, as opposed to their more pronounced emphasis on the practical aspects that their English performs in getting their messages across in everyday life in British society.

To illustrate the ways in which their knowledge of English was emphasised by participants as enabling them to participate in British society, it is important to remember that this emphasis very much intertwined with their emphasis on cultural assimilability in British society. I discuss the importance given to language on its own, however, as it deserves attention on its own right when bearing in mind that language has been deemed a significant requirement in Britain for whether to accept migrants or not through proof of English language proficiency or the successful completion of specific language tests. For the white South Africans, it thus seemed important to stress that they had no issues with
communicating fluently in English, “cause we already have English, like everybody learns English as a second language anyway in South Africa” (Zarah, 21, white Afrikaans-speaking, student). The notion that they were capable of communicating effectively in English applied to both English-speaking and Afrikaans-speaking participants, as revealed in this quote. Many of the white South Africans in this study had English as their mother tongue by virtue of coming from the English-speaking white South African population group. Moreover, Afrikaans-speaking white South Africans may also be equally fluent in English despite Afrikaans – a language more closely relating to Dutch – being their mother tongue (Griffiths and Prozesky 2010: 25-6). Although differences might occur in English language fluency between the two groups, as well as within the respective groups related to class status, the Afrikaans-speaking participants I interviewed had all received education in English in South Africa, at least as a secondary language. By extension, any language tests for South Africans were typically seen as an unnecessary obstacle in the same fashion that knowledge of ‘Life in the UK’ tests were usually viewed, as South Africans ‘already speak English well’ according to this notion.

What should be of concern, however, is the way in which some participants distanced themselves from other groups thought to be less fluent in English. Although not necessarily representative for all my participants’ view, the below-quote is an illustration of a participant who firmly believes in the superiority of South Africans’ English language skills as opposed to those of certain other migrants and ethnic minorities:

You’ll get like a Pakistani that can’t speak a word of English … And I’m like, if you phone, most of the people can’t understand what you’re speaking of. I’m like ‘you are in Britain, English is the first language, you can’t speak English to a decent level’. I don’t say that you have to speak Queen’s English, but some of the people cannot speak English at all. How are they living here, how do they get here, what, you know what I mean? (Jacob, 27, white Afrikaans-speaking, health and safety employee)

The consequence of a perception that other migrants’ and ethnic minorities’ language skills were not adequate enough to communicate and participate in British society, could manifest in a call for stricter immigration policies based on language testing:
They’re not interested at all about the language – if they can get away with it, they won’t even learn the language … you should at least learn the language like properly … I definitely think the language needs to be done to a good standard. And people should be tested on language, because I think people get resentful when people aren’t interested and aren’t willing to branch out once here kind of thing. (Zarah, 21, white Afrikaans-speaking, student)

It is worth mentioning Richard, an interviewee who also believed in language tests to determine who should be allowed and who should be excluded at ‘the border’. Richard is an interesting case as he appeared to demonstrate a relatively great awareness of global inequalities that could be disproportionately affecting prospective ‘non-white’ migrants from the Global South in their home countries, as well as barring many of them from access to potential host destinations in the Global North such as the UK. He was therefore, or so it would seem at first sight, advocating for fewer immigration and citizenship restrictions in order to facilitate the process of migration to the UK. In spite of this, however, he was nevertheless clear on the point that language testing was a necessary restriction:

It’s the case of the one restriction I do believe in. And, y’know, if someone’s immigrating to Norway, surely a pre-requisite would be that you learn Norwegian, as a kind of basic entry level thing, proficiency in Norwegian … Why is not one of the criteria for admittance that you pass a proficiency test in English? … not when you have arrived and are two years down the line, before you arrive … it should be a very simple restriction, should be very simple for immigrants – ‘can you speak English, can you work in a profession?’ ‘Yes?’ ‘Welcome. National insurance number, tax code, welcome, make your living’ – it should be that simple, because doing that would mean that you get people who enrich the country, who bring something to it … if you made it extremely simple and straightforward – okay, granted English is not the simplest language to learn – but if you made the criteria straightforward, what you would do is thin out an underclass of illegal immigrants, people who are not contributing to society and instead you would get people who want to be here, people who can contribute to British society. (Richard, 27, white English-speaking, freelance journalist)

I have quoted this participant at length because it provides a good starting point for discussion. Firstly, it should be noted how this participant was also trying to strike an emotional chord in me by referring to what could supposedly
happen to ‘my own’ country – Norway – in order to make his case sound more convincing in terms of the portrayed similarity of conditions in Norway with the case of the UK. Then, it is worth noting that he does not believe in any language testing that is undertaken after migrants have lived for a certain period in the UK, by implying that such tests should rather be implemented even before prospective migrants are allowed to enter the UK. The practical limitations of this suggestion are obvious, as it is rather difficult to determine who might be a prospective migrant to the UK before they have even entered the country. It would also seem difficult to determine what would qualify as sufficient language skills to grant a prospective migrant legal access. What is more, the interviewee’s statement is quite surprising, as not allowing non-citizens even to stay in the country for a while and not offering them language courses to improve their English language skills, would certainly reproduce the very global inequalities in the access to education and other resources that the interviewee seems to be acknowledging in other parts of the interview. The final remark that needs to be made is that it is assumed that if migrants cannot speak English to a sufficient level – however that is to be determined – they will not be able to partake fully in British society and are, by way of this assumption, ‘undeserving’ insofar as it is here predicted that they cannot ‘enrich’ society. In response, I would like to draw on Shorten and claim that “in the case of language, migrants have made rich, unique and creative contributions to both everyday vernaculars and literary canons” (2010: 107) – effectively reversing the above-participant’s argument by demonstrating that it is rather his proposition of linguistic authoritarianism heralded by the English language that will lead to a condition wherein society is not ‘enriched’ anymore.

As a counterbalance to Richard’s preoccupation with the English language, however, we should mention the participant who seemed more sympathetic towards migrants who might encounter some difficulties with the English language requirements in British immigration and citizenship policy. She was inclined to acknowledge that “I reckon they must make it even more difficult for people who can’t speak English, like very difficult” (Tracey, 46, white English-speaking, unemployed). To approach a more comprehensive understanding as to why this particular participant would seem to take the side of migrants encountering difficulties with language requirements, there are reasons to speculate whether she has come to hold this view because she has experienced
some resentment herself from Britons because of her ‘South African accent’. However, it must also be stressed that this was not an uncommon experience amongst many respondents – both from an English-speaking and an Afrikaans-speaking background – providing us perhaps with an explanation as to why some of them seemed so keen to stress that, despite of their ‘accent’, they knew English well and were able to communicate in this language in British society. It is noteworthy that accent discrimination as reported by participants bears resemblance to the adverse experiences of other white migrant/ethnic minority groups, such as some Irish people in the UK. But also some people with certain distinctive and regional ‘English accents’ experience such discrimination, reflecting perceived or actual class differences working to the disadvantage of people presumed to come from certain parts of Britain (Runnymede Trust 2000: 61).

Apart from a few exceptions, then, the majority of the participants spoke of having been asked ‘where their accent was from’. At first glance, this might not appear to be a noteworthy issue; however, a closer inspection gives greater cause for concern. Research shows that seemingly innocent endeavours, such as pointing out someone’s difference in accent, are often easier to partake in for people, as it is seen as being more acceptable than direct forms of confrontation (see e.g. Davis and Nencel 2011). Questions or comments relating to people’s accents, for example, could always be justified by claiming that it was ‘only out of curiosity’ or ‘only a joke’. By justifying it as such, blame may then be distributed to the receivers of such questions or comments for being too ‘sensitive’, rather than to those asking the questions or making the comments. Although sometimes intended to involve people in conversation about their background, we should thus be wary of how paying attention to someone’s accent could be quite detrimental in its effects by making those on the receiving-end more self-conscious of their language. In the process, and especially if such statements or questions are repeated, this might even exclude people from the conversation and heighten a feeling of not belonging to a particular place (Davis and Nencel 2011).

Indeed, reports of accent discrimination were given by Tracey (46, unemployed) – the above-mentioned English-speaking white South African who sympathised with other migrants that might be facing difficulties with the English
language requirements in immigration and citizenship policy. In fact, Tracey was so self-conscious of her ‘South African accent’ that she did not want to speak during the initial period of her stay in the UK. As a consequence, she made strenuous efforts to avoid any social situations in which engaging in a conversation with someone would be expected of her, preferring instead to stay in the comfort of her own circle of South African family members and friends. The extent to which this was a reaction to utterances from people, or had more to do with a concern that people would not understand her accent, was unclear. It nevertheless illustrates that some of the research subjects felt that they do not quite belong in the UK because their accents might establish them as ‘different’ in the view of some. For a participant proud of his Afrikaner heritage, it bothered him “when you speak to someone and you try and, y’know, like they get that look in their eyes and they kind of turn their heads like this [indicates with head] as if you’re speaking in another language” (Frederick, 35, white Afrikaans-speaking, teacher). He was, nevertheless, determined on the point that he would never change on his accent just to ‘please’ certain Britons, since his accent was viewed as part of his Afrikaner identity. Such retention of their accents was also part of the identity of other participants from the different ethnic groups of white as well as ‘non-white’ South Africans. Attempts from members of the British population to deny informal access for South Africans based on their accents could, in this sense, be neutralised partially by ignoring these attempts. We could therefore claim that South Africans’ retention of their accents constitutes an ‘act of resistance’ on their part (Isin and Nielsen 2008).

5.6 ‘Contributing to the Economy’

At a time when immigration policies in Western European countries have arguably become more restricted for non-EEA migrants in particular, we would be well-advised to also consider the differential treatment that migrants from different socio-economic groups receive by the host country. Whereas the majority of prospective migrants from non-EEA countries coming from disadvantaged backgrounds face insurmountable restrictions to their legal entry, a selected few non-EEA migrants of higher socio-economic backgrounds are
encouraged to arrive and stay. This can be seen in conjunction with how it would appear that immigration and citizenship policies in most Western European countries, in addition to the persisting focus on culture, have been geared towards certain international economic interests and pursued elements of a neo-liberal agenda (cf. Shachar 2006). In Britain, we observe how politicians have introduced a ‘managed’ migration policy, emphasising a desire to attract migrants that will work for Britain and are ‘skilled’ enough, filtered through the recently-implemented points-based migration system. There have also been significant undercurrents of an emphasis on migrants who, once settled in the UK, must ‘earn’ their right to citizenship status and, as one important aspect of this, perform work-related duties that allegedly would benefit British society (McGhee 2009).

It will be shown below that the British policy environment – with its emphasis on migrants that ‘contribute’ to the British economy, while in the same breath preferring ‘highly-skilled’ over ‘low-skilled’ migrants – provides ample incentives for a relatively privileged group such as white South Africans to emphasise their intrinsic value to the British economy. I will demonstrate how this policy preoccupation has facilitated the development of a ‘hard working’ rhetoric, in which white South Africans emphasise their supposed tough upbringing in South Africa as having equipped them with a hard working ethic and demarcate themselves from other groups perceived to be less driven by such an ethic. It will thus be shown that assumed differences in the economic contribution of various groups – contrary to some assumptions that this predominantly refers to ‘material’ issues (see e.g. Gimenez 2001) – can also be given a ‘racial’ or ethnic spin. This is because some respondents perceive themselves to be possessing cultural qualities deeming them more ‘desirable’ than certain other groups against the backdrop of the emphasis on migrants’ economic contributions.

The notion that South Africans are ‘hard workers’ was represented in virtually all of my white South African participants’ accounts. It could take on different forms and it was expressed to a varying degree with some participants being more explicit than others that South Africans are hard workers. The below-participant has here been quoted because she came up with a long list of what being ‘hard working South African’ possibly could entail:
I think that there’s a lot that makes us special as South Africans … we’re always fighting, y’know, like we’re always fighting for a job or fighting for our rights … we’re passionate people, y’know, and we’re ambitious and we’re competitive and we’re opportunist and, um, we also have a lot of initiative, y’know like we’re proactive. I think that’s only really good attributes … I think they’re things that we can be proud of and, ja, I like being South African. (Felicia, 30, white English-speaking, web developer)

As indicated in this quote, the participant takes pride in being South African as she perceives them to be hard working and possessing a number of valuable skills. Various participants offered various explanations as to why South Africans could be perceived to be hard working. A number of the participants would be inclined, at least partially, to offer a cultural explanation which postulated that a strict upbringing in South Africa has allegedly attuned them to and exhibited them with a good work ethic. This is reflected in the following interview-snapshot:

We just, y’know, we’re hard workers and we have a good work ethics, y’know, you. I think, and that is about your, the history. I mean, South Africa isn’t an easy country to live in. And that’s the example of our parents, y’know, they just had to work very hard to, y’know, build things up. And we don’t have anything in South Africa like benefits or, y’know, free health care or – nothing. Y’know, any, everything you have there you have to work very hard to get. So that’s also the example that we had as children growing up and it was quite important for you to always be at school, you don’t take, go off sick, y’know, you study hard, y’know, there’s no second chances if you fail exam, next time you pay yourself. Y’know, it was a really strict upbringing. And I think that’s how it reflects in our work, we have really strong work ethics. (Esther, 35, white Afrikaans-speaking, occupational doctor)

According to Chiswick’s (1986) theory of country-specific human capital, an individual’s acquisition of certain work-related mentalities and skills would to a considerable degree be dependent upon the specific country in which the individual has received his or her education and, possibly, work qualifications, in addition to the dominant work norms and customs that apply there. At first sight, Chiswick’s theory would therefore provide an adequate explanation to the notion amongst many interviewees that the cultural prerequisites that they had been exposed to while growing up in South Africa have equipped them with a good work ethic. What would sometimes seem to be represented implicitly in such accounts, nevertheless, is that white South Africans have supposedly encountered a particularly tough upbringing in South African society, thereby failing to clarify
that ‘non-white’ South Africans have historically been exploited by white South Africans. In the case of the persisting ‘racial’ inequalities in South Africa, the recently released South African census data from 2011 can in fact reveal that “[t]he income of white South African households is six times higher than black ones” (BBC News 2012). It should be mentioned that one of the interviewed white South Africans, in particular, seemed to demonstrate more awareness than others of the continuing existence of ‘racial’ inequalities in South Africa. Stating that “the majority of South Africans in the UK are from a white background, privileged background” (Richard, 27, white English-speaking, freelance journalist), he recognised that his background had enabled him to come to the UK in the first place and possessed him with qualifications preparing him for the British labour market, whereby he was working as a journalist at the time of the interview.

However, we should take a closer look at the ‘colour-blindness’ that was more persistent amongst a number of the participants, which is brought into sharp relief in the account below. This participant takes comfort in situating his achievements in the UK within the hard working ethic that he claims to have acquired as a consequence of the tough conditions in South Africa that are, seemingly, generalised to apply to South Africans of all ‘racial’ and ethnic backgrounds:

I came here [to the UK] with no university education, with no contacts … And I battled, I absolutely battled. But my motivation was there, and it was to such a degree that nothing was gonna stop me … if you want it bad enough, you will be successful. That’s why I think a lot of South Africans have been successful over here [in the UK], because in South Africa, if you don’t work, you don’t eat. (Patrick, 35, white English-speaking, affluent entrepreneur)

In quoting this participant, it must first be stated for the sake of clarity that I am not denying that he may in fact have struggled to get where he is today; he had worked his way up from a working class background in South Africa to become a relatively well-off entrepreneur in the UK. However, I want to underscore that many in my sample – from all socio-economic backgrounds, but perhaps especially pronounced in the accounts of those currently occupying relatively affluent socio-economic positions such as the above-participant – go to great
lengths to emphasise their ‘tough’ background in South Africa as having equipped them with a ‘can-do-mentality’ in the UK. At first sight, this may seem like a legitimate claim. But what I think is worrying is that, at the same time, some of the same participants avoided references to how socio-economic inequalities in South Africa deriving from apartheid have paved the way to ‘success’ for white at the detriment of ‘non-white’ South Africans. Arguably, the above-quoted participant bought into a neo-liberal rhetoric portraying success as determined by individual attributes such as motivation, in that we saw him stating that ‘if you want it bad enough, you will be successful’. The sense of pride of supposedly having been able to ‘pull himself up’ amidst the reported difficulties that he had encountered in South Africa, takes precedence. In this manner, the participant runs the risk of glossing over and brushing under the carpet the pervasive structural and socio-economic conditions working against people from more disadvantaged groups (see Wale and Foster 2007). By not mentioning the deeper socio-economic foundations paving the way for his relatively privileged position, his position can remain unchallenged. This is a classical example of how ‘whiteness’ discourses hide the unfair historical inequalities that are favouring white people while disadvantaging ‘non-white’ people (see Dyer 1997).

In other instances, a ‘racial’ vocabulary seemed to be more explicitly evoked, but not necessarily in order to talk about the ‘racial’ inequalities that are working at the detriment of ‘non-white’ South Africans. Rather, many perceived the affirmative action policies that have been introduced in post-apartheid South Africa in order to redress the ‘racial’ inequalities generated by apartheid as now compromising white South Africans’ opportunities in South Africa. We therefore need to interrogate how the perception of South Africans as hard working could take on ‘racial’ connotations as supposedly being reserved for white South Africans and, thus, not available for ‘non-white’ South Africans. This assumption is perhaps most blatantly voiced in the following account:

Apartheid should never ever have happened. It was cruel and barbaric and everyone can speak to you like that. That infuriates me; how it was carried out. But saying that, since apartheid’s fallen Mandela came into power. He decided that ‘right, we need to educate the people because they haven’t been. So they need education in order to get the jobs that the majority of the white men have now’. Fair enough. So we built a lot of schools, free education to them, trying get them up to the levels to get the good jobs –
which I agree with. But most of the mentality was ‘I don’t want to work for it, I want it now’. And we thought ‘well, hang on, we’ve always had to work for everything that we’ve got. You’re getting free schooling, we’ve never had free schooling, we’ve always had to pay’. (Shannon, 29, white English-speaking, dental practice manager)

Moreover, rather than making such insinuations that ‘non-white’ South Africans are favoured by affirmative action policies to the extent that they do not need to or want to work anymore, some would view affirmative action policies as misplaced because ‘non-white’ South Africans are supposedly not ‘skilled’ enough:

You gotta have people who understand business, you’ve gotta have people who can understand how to run a country and provide the, y’know, investing in your natural services, in your services, so your police force, your education and medical. You need to be able to cover those things. People want work, that, they’re not too lazy to work. They’ve got families to support. And you need to have people there in the right positions that are gonna drive the country forward. And unfortunately, I think the people they’ve got in there at the moment are not those kind of people. (Patrick, 35, white English-speaking, affluent entrepreneur)

The potential implication of the various assumptions of affirmative action and ‘non-white’ South Africans’ unsuitability in the workplace is aptly captured by Thomas Ross. Ross (1997) maintains that affirmative action discourse might serve two main purposes for the communicator of such discourse: firstly, the representation of the ‘innocent white victim’ immediately evokes the opposite image of the ‘defiled black taker’; and, secondly, these contrasting images then work to question whether the ‘non-white’ individual in question is actually, contrary to white South Africans, the ‘true’ victim as presupposed by the affirmative action policies. We can perhaps see how notions of ‘non-white’ South Africans as being unfairly privileged by affirmative action policies, and as having it easy compared to white South Africans, have been internalised by some ‘non-white’ South Africans themselves. In this way, ‘non-white’ South Africans are made to believe that they are responsible for their own disadvantage rather than trying to identify the main reasons for their disadvantage as more realistically reflected in structural and socio-economic constraints and oppressions working against them (see Weil 2002 [1952]). For instance, a black interviewee looked with envy on the hard working ethic of other African migrant groups in the UK.
instead, believing that black South Africans did not possess such work ethic and skills in their encounters with the British labour market:

I’ve been working and socialising, you meet other people from other countries that have done well, y’know, people from Zimbabwe … seem to do well. It would be interesting to see a South African – black South African – achieving with the same level of success … you see not just business, but in other sort of high-profile posts, you see a lot of Ghanaians, Ugandans, Nigerians, y’know, people who tap into opportunities and make the best out of them. That’s, I don’t, I passionately hope that is us, y’know. And for our family to go for the sort of the goal and break the mould of – I mean, sort of ‘the laid-back’, ‘no need to’, y’know, ‘status quo’, y’know, ‘we don’t want to do that’. (Nigel, 28, black, property maintenance)

By ignoring recent statistical evidence clearly suggesting otherwise (BBC News 2012), the notion that ‘non-white’ South Africans are ‘having it easier’ than white South Africans would then be further cemented by those who indicated that they had emigrated from South Africa chiefly because of affirmative action. In the words of one white South African choosing to accuse affirmative action, “if things were different … we probably would have never needed to leave South Africa” (Tara, 41, white Afrikaans-speaking, admin in a company). By providing South African society and affirmative action policies as reference points, there was a sense amongst a significant number of the interviewees that their hard working ethic and other work-related skills were being recognised to a greater extent in the UK. This assumption was attributed to the prevalence, in the participants’ understanding, of a more ‘meritocratic’ society in Britain. Comparing the supposed preoccupation with skin colour in the selection and promotion processes of the South African labour market, the British labour market was viewed favourably as offering white South Africans a fairer shot and providing more equal opportunities for people of different ‘racial’ backgrounds. It would seem pertinent to mention Dora Kostakopoulou’s observation that migrants’ “exposure to a different history, political system and civic culture at

16 Though, it must be said, some others would express seemingly more noble prime motives for their migration, such as the close proximity to other European countries and the opportunity to travel that Britain offered.
home equips them to make comparative political judgements and … reflections on the institutions and traditions of the host society” (2008: 93). This is, of course, not to say that these political judgements would necessarily be correct as such; Kostakopoulou’s insight is merely cited to point out that the participants in my study at times tried to indulge in comparative reflections of what they perceived to be the political climate in South Africa and Britain, respectively, based on their experiences and opinions. As suggested by a respondent, “obviously the sort of pulling factors are more career options here, better paid, so on and so forth [in the UK]. And the pushing factors were all the affirmative action thing [in South Africa]” (Lucas, 31, white Afrikaans-speaking, affluent entrepreneur).

However, although apparently believing that the UK is a more ‘meritocratic’ society than South Africa, some participants were simultaneously conscious of the fact that their white South African identity provided them with a comparative advantage relative to many other migrants in the UK. This acknowledgement relates to the advantages that the white skin colour could bestow upon white South Africans in ensuring that they are more likely to elude the ‘racial’ discrimination in the British labour market which ‘non-white’ migrants and ethnic minorities are typically subjected to. Furthermore, this does not tell the story in its entirety, as intersecting with the advantages of their white skin colour there was also a belief that white South Africans are perceived in a particularly good light because of the commonly held stereotype amongst members of the British population that South Africans are hard workers:

Brits like South Africans, I think. I don’t, I don’t think we’re seen as, y’know, difficult people to deal with … there’s always this cliche about you’ll very easily get a job in the UK for South Africans, because South Africans are viewed as hard working … there is this sense that South Africans contribute to British society … Brits are quite cool with us, I don’t think they have a problem with us being here … there was a job that I got because I was South African … the guy just said ‘I had employed South Africans before that have been pretty good, you seem all right, you’re South African?’ ‘Yeah’. ‘Come and work for me’. (Richard, 27, white English-speaking, freelance journalist)

The white South Africans I interviewed were more often than not prepared to capitalise on this stereotype of white South Africans as being hard workers in the British context, perceived in the majority of cases as a positive stereotype:
If you would pick a stereotype to be pervading, it might as well be that your country is hard working, right? … the majority of Brits seem to have this idea of South Africans as being very hard working, which we capitalise on. (Richard, 27, white English-speaking, freelance journalist)

It can be postulated that this quote would be particularly well received by researchers within the rationale choice tradition of ‘racial’ and ethnic relations (see Malesevic 2004: chap. 7 for an overview and critique). Researchers within this tradition might interpret, according to a cost-benefit calculation, that participants’ willingness to capitalise on the stereotype of white South Africans as hard workers stems from their perception that they would gain on doing so. It is held within this particular research tradition that ‘racial’/ethnic group membership is bolstered when enough individuals perceived to be members of the particular group participate in the reproduction of certain imagined group characteristics, which might, to various degrees, be embraced by another group. The fact that members of the other group in this case – Britons – presumably retain easier access to vital resources by being members of the host society population, would according to rational choice theorists make the white South Africans’ preoccupation with their hard working credentials all the more understandable in that it could facilitate their own access to such resources. This was seen above when the participant was hired purely, or so it was believed, because of his white South African identity. The precaution that needs to be made, nevertheless, relates to the manner in which a hard working rhetoric might retain more negative connotations amongst certain members of the British population and, thus, would not necessarily be beneficial for particular white South African individuals to make investments in. This relates partially to structural and contextual conditions that rational choice theorists have been criticised for being less able to capture than their preoccupation with individuals’ motives for partaking in certain ethnic groups (Malesevic 2004: chap. 7). More precisely, I refer here to white South Africans of particular backgrounds as possibly being seen less favourably in the British context, for instance Afrikaners as indicated in more detail earlier on in this chapter.

A white Afrikaans-speaking male at retirement age, moreover, was inclined to believe that rather than ethnic differences in the reception of white
South Africans by British people, it was more a case of generational differences: “there were a lot of young guys, young girls coming here … drinking, partying and that sort of thing. So I think there’s certain people that got a bit fed up with South Africans” (Gregory, 62, retired). It would appear that this participant was rather nostalgic about the ‘old days’ during apartheid; he is speaking of the younger generations of South Africans as having other things on their minds than hard work – presumably referring to those that would be too young to having been influenced significantly by the apartheid regime. Longing back to the authoritative rule and work ethic supposedly more evident in the older generations of South Africans shaped by the apartheid regime, the above-participant is arguably engaging in ‘white talk’. This is a form of talking amongst some white South Africans in order to ensure the reproduction of their relatively privileged position involving the use of the rhetoric brought into play by the old apartheid government (Steyn 2001). In the context in which it is used – the UK – this talk can also serve the purpose of rescuing some of his pride of being ‘hard working South African’ by claiming that the negative sentiments that some South Africans receive do not necessarily apply to him as a member of the older generations.

Negative sentiments from members of the British population aimed at white South Africans – whether explained in ethnic, generational or some other terms – were counteracted by negative sentiments that were more or less unisonally applied by white South Africans – irrespective of ethnic, generational or other background – against British people. To approach a more comprehensive understanding of the existence of this phenomenon, it is worthwhile to consider it as a form of ‘retaliatory rhetoric’ (see Matsinhe 2011). That is, having been exposed to ridicule, some white South Africans’ mind-sets have been affected to such a degree that they are motivated to ‘pay back’ and let the perpetrators of the ridicule ‘taste their own medicine’. In turn, this endeavour can work as a form of redemption and boost the self-esteem of the members of a particular migrant group as a response to the potential discrimination that follows from the host group’s ridicule (Matsinhe 2011: 127-33). More often than not, participants were keen to highlight their impression that British people are more likely to claim welfare benefits than themselves. Interestingly, this reverses the type of rhetoric that is usually employed by the ‘native’ population against immigrants in general, as it appears to be more often the case that the former group blames the latter
group for ‘feeding’ off the state and ‘stealing’ from the ‘native’ population rather than the other way around. Turning anti-immigration notions completely around, then, the following white South African, amongst other participants, blamed the ‘native’ British population instead:

Coming from an impoverished country like South Africa, where you all had to work, y’know, to succeed – I don’t have a huge tolerance for people that aren’t willing to work and yet, y’know, survive and live amongst society. So I think that’s a bit of a bug-bearer of mine … here, there’s people that blatantly won’t work and yet they still get a hot meal at the end of the day. It’s really strange. (Mario, 31, white English-speaking, accountant for an investment bank)

As eloquently formulated by Mennell, “[i]t is a general principle that one group’s ‘we-image’ is defined in large measure in relation to its ‘they-image’ of another group or groups” (2007: 19, italics and inverted commas in original). Seen in this light, the construction of British people as less willing to work and more likely to ‘sign off the dole’ and claim benefits from the state, is employed as a convenient strategy in order to enhance the perception that they as South Africans are ‘not like them’, but rather driven by a much stronger work attitude. By building on Elias and Scotson’s (1994) insights of ethnic group dynamics, an effective yet distorted contrast is enabled when the white South Africans would appear to strategically select and compare those conceived of as the ‘minority of the best’ – in terms of some South Africans’ hard working ethic – with a ‘minority of the worst’ – in terms of some Britons’ alleged refusal to work. These contrasting images of South Africans and Britons are employed to work as supposed representations of the entire groups in question – though they are in reality, of course, only selected aspects of the respective groups which are employed with the sole intention of portraying one’s own group in a better light than the opposite group. We could presume that there is a class element involved here. The white South Africans are perhaps tapping into the heavier felt presence of a class discourse in the British context as opposed to in the South African context – of which, in the latter context, ‘race’ seems to be more of a concern. We may be witnessing, then, the reproduction of the type of distorted political and media rhetoric in the UK that has been unfairly attached to the British working class in particular for allegedly being ‘chavs’ and ‘scroungers’ feeding off the
state (Jones 2012). This image is then bought into and heightened in the sense that it comes to represent *the entire* British population in the mind-sets of some of my interviewees.

The neo-liberal undertones of such language are also evident, as the overriding emphasis seems to be on the notion that one, as an individual, ‘ought to’ work, pay taxes and ‘contribute’ to the British economy irrespective of any structural and socio-economic constraints that might prevent the individual in question from so doing. Such neo-liberal language was not the sole prerogative of the male participants in my sample, but was also internalised by many of the female participants – even though a neo-liberal institutional formation and the inequalities it produces can be said to have originated from a patriarchal world order (see Epstein 1998). A possible interpretation of this phenomenon is that aspects of a white South African identity that are perceived to put them in a supreme position as regards to their contribution to British society, are deemed so important that female participants would not significantly challenge these, but rather reproduce them even though this activity might eventually be counterproductive for greater gender justice in society (cf. Anthias 2012). What is more, the reproduction of neo-liberal notions amongst participants from both gender backgrounds – but perhaps particularly pronounced amongst a few male participants – can even slip over into rhetoric along the lines of ‘the survival of the fittest’ (see Williams 2005 [1973] for a more comprehensive overview). We might say that the undertones of such rhetoric were observable in the earlier-quoted account, especially since it was clearly stated, to reiterate, that this respondent did not have ‘a huge tolerance for people that aren’t willing to work and yet, y’know, survive and live amongst society’. The longest account whereby such undertones entered the scene, is the below-account during which the participant is prepared to defend his view of the potentially adverse implications of the perceived goodwill of the British ‘welfare state’. This is a ‘welfare state’ believed to be well alive in the sense that the recent and prolonged neo-liberal attacks on this state form in the British context (see Schierup et al. 2006: chap. 5) appear to be remarkably absent from the account:

If something is given to you, if you don’t have to work over here, okay, if I don’t have to work over here, why would I work? If I can sign on the dole, and get given stuff every month, where is my motivation to work? …
you look back through history when nations have got that big and that strong and people don’t have to work that hard for things anymore, life becomes quite easy. But that’s just before they fall. You look at Rome, Rome was powerful for 500 years, but they were, things became too big and too crazy and you could start seeing it in people. People become overweight, they become complacent. Now, in South Africa we’ve got a saying that ‘the fat lion doesn’t eat’. Okay, the fat lion is too fat to go and catch its own food, you won’t eat, you’ll starve, okay, or lose weight and then catch up again …you don’t get a lot of fat people in developing worlds, y’know, if that makes sense? I don’t wanna be stereotypical here, but it’s basically in developing countries you’ve gotta be able to go out and work. Here, if you don’t have to work, where is the motivation for people who don’t have the self-esteem to go out and work? (Patrick, 35, white English-speaking, affluent entrepreneur)

At the same time, interestingly enough, it was uttered that although Britons were conceived of as lacking a hard working mentality – and in spite of any tension and challenges in getting along with certain Britons – participants nevertheless perceived Britons in a positive light in the way in which they seemed, at least, to be more welcoming of white South Africans than certain other migrants. Thus, a number of the interviewees were keen to stress that they were, at the end of the day, still ‘grateful’ to some degree for the opportunity that Britons supposedly had offered them by letting them stay and integrate into British society. For instance, this respondent uttered that “I feel comfortable here, I do, I don’t feel I’m any threat … I never speak badly of it [Britain] … I don’t go talk to other English people anything negative about Britain, never” (Gregory, 62, white Afrikaans-speaking, retired).

It follows that many of the white South Africans that I spoke to were under the impression that they ‘ought to’ receive preferential treatment because – unlike certain other mentioned migrants – they were not claiming any benefits, but rather working hard and ‘contributing’ to British society. This opinion is illustrated below:

[I]t irritates me that you see people coming in here [to the UK] … they can live off the dole … it’s so much easier for other nationalities to come in when, y’know, we [South Africans] have to work. Obviously we don’t mind working. But we have to work and pay all this money to, y’know, apply for citizenship or just to stay in the country. (Christina, 29, white English-speaking, travel agent)
When asked to give any concrete examples of the ‘other nationalities’ that she was loosely referring to as abusing the British welfare system, the above-quoted participant responded: “Without offending? Eh, Polish” (Christina, 29, white English-speaking, travel agent). This answer indicates that she is clearly resentful of migration from certain parts of Europe, as their EU/EEA membership may give visa-free access to the UK that some South Africans are excluded from (Geddes 2003). Eastern European migrants such as Poles may be a particularly convenient target, as the majority of them are employed in lower paid employment than many white South Africans (Fox et al. 2012). Some participants may therefore be buying into the myth that because of the position that many Eastern Europeans occupy in the British labour market, they are not ‘contributing’ as much as they should be doing to the British economy. Various studies effectively challenge this myth, however, by demonstrating that “the majority of immigrants … tend to contribute more to the public sector than they actually use” (Chomsky 2007: 39), including so-called ‘lower-skilled’ migrants.

But what about white South Africans who are situated in the lower echelons of the British labour market themselves, it might be wondered. Interestingly, the interview data indicated that some white South Africans thus situated engaged in the scapegoating of Eastern Europeans. This can be explained by pointing to Liah Greenfeld’s assertion that nationalism draws its attraction from the fact that all self-defined members of a specific nation – irrespective of their class locations – are made to believe that they can “partake in its superior, elite quality” which work-related skills might represent in the South African case (1993: 7). It would thus seem to matter less that they are in a low class position insofar as they are part of a nation (South Africa) higher up in the imagined ‘hierarchy of nations’ than Eastern European countries would be in the British context, especially when given the lack of British colonial/cultural connections of the latter countries in comparison to South Africa. Michael Banton (1998: 144), for instance, argues that the persistence of discrimination of certain groups in the host society opens up the possibility that more privileged groups can tap into and indeed profit from such discrimination of less privileged groups. The advantage of being white South African in the British context would therefore appear to be particularly important for those in lower class positions who have less other resources to draw on than white South Africans situated in higher class positions.
It can be assumed that because white South Africans usually escape the adverse representations that Eastern Europeans are subject to in political and media rhetoric, white South Africans in lower class positions would be especially interested in contributing to the stereotypical notions of Eastern European migrants in order to perpetuate this form of discrimination rather than getting any distorted attention on South Africans during the present ‘financial crisis’ (see Sveinsson and Gumuschian 2008).

However, some participants were more inclined to perceive other migrant and ethnic minority groups in a positive light than would some of my other participants. The below-dialogue between a white South African husband and wife, for instance, includes an acknowledgment of the hard working ethic of other migrant groups as well:

Wife: In construction a lot of the jobs go for the Polish people, because they work hard as well [such as South Africans].
(Esther, 35, white Afrikaans-speaking, occupational doctor)

Husband: Eastern European. And that’s why all of them got work, cause they wanna work … The Brits doesn’t wanna work. That’s, unfortunately, that’s the way it is.
(Billy, 35, white Afrikaans-speaking, construction manager)

The formation of a common migrant identity between South African and Eastern European migrants – as forged through hard work in opposition to the perceived lack of work ethic amongst Britons – indicates that the general policy climate in the UK can somewhat dictate how belonging to Britain is supposed to be embraced in its economic sense, if not necessarily in its ‘racial’ or ethnic sense as discussed before. As demonstrated by Kjartan Pall Sveinsson’s research on different groups in British society,

for those born in the UK, allegiance to Britain was taken as a given. New migrants, however, were under no illusion that belonging needed to be earned. In this sense, belonging was often formulated in terms of contribution, and many interviewees would stress how they work hard, pay their taxes, do not access benefits, play an active part in the local community and wider society, and do not break the law. (2010: 16)
5.7 Conclusion

To conclude, this chapter has evidenced the need to investigate the ‘racial’ and ethnic negotiations of a relatively privileged migrant group, with a comprehension of the ways in which white South African migrants negotiate access to the UK. In speaking to my argument, the chapter has provided an analysis of how such access negotiations may be employed with the intention of preserving a relatively privileged status amidst any actual or perceived threats to the white South Africans’ privileges in the British context. In understanding access negotiations, the chapter has noted that formal aspects of citizenship can very much interrelate with the more informal aspects of citizenship. The chapter has, nevertheless, put most of its emphasis on the informal ways in which access to the ‘British nation’ are negotiated by white South Africans. Thus, ancestral ties may not only enable some white South Africans relatively unproblematic legal access to the UK, but may also facilitate their participation in British society according to participants’ experiences. However, even for white South Africans without such ancestral ties, the deployment of the advantages of being white, their cultural proximity to Britain and/or relatively high socio-economic status, are other available strategies in negotiating inclusion in a British context whereby the emphasis is currently put on the cultural as well as economic ‘desirability’ of migrants. The extent to which the white South Africans are successful or not in such negotiations of their own inclusion in British society is not always clear, however. An intersectional sensitivity has enabled me to reveal that depending on their social positions within the white South African group and in British society, the white South Africans have different amount of leeway to draw upon various aspects of their biographies that could secure their inclusion or not. Thus, a potential threat to their inclusion in British society, despite being members of a relatively privileged migrant group, is the discrimination that some of them experience for being marked as migrants due, for instance, to their ‘South African accent’. However, such threats to their status can be negotiated away by emphasising that, at the very least, the white South Africans should, according to their own logic, be considered as more ‘desirable’ than certain other groups. Attempting to inject force into references to the relative ‘desirability’ of their South African background and ‘attributes’, some respondents – however not all – would see the
need to contrast the supposed positive aspects of their identities with the supposed ‘undesirable’ characteristics of certain other, and often more disadvantaged, groups in society.
6. Establishing Communities Abroad: Multicultural Facilitation or ‘Neo-Apartheid’ in British Society?

6.1 Introduction: Defining ‘Community’

The previous chapter suggested that references to their South African background and ‘attributes’ were important for a number of the white participants when negotiating access to British territory and nation. However, this begs the question as to whether this rhetorical emphasis on their South African background and ‘attributes’ manifests in everyday practices of citizenship in British society with the establishment of some form of a ‘South African community’. This chapter overlaps somewhat with the previous chapter in that migrants’ access is never secured once and for all; it is always negotiated against the backdrop of an immigration and citizenship policy environment – for example, with the support of other migrants through the establishment of communities as will be highlighted here. Yet, while the former chapter focused more explicitly on rhetorical strategies of the participants in justifying their presence in British society amidst immigration and citizenship restrictions, this chapter can be distinguished in its emphasis on South Africans’ everyday encounters in British society as reflected in whom they socialise with and what they do together, or their community relations. It must be noted that even this chapter, nonetheless, will take up such discussions against the backdrop of what my participants told me during the interviews.

The chapter will argue, along the lines of the main argument in this thesis, that who the white South Africans prefer to socialise with and who they are less likely to socialise with in British society might follow certain patterns that appear to secure a relatively privileged group status. It is, for instance, notable that white and ‘non-white’ South Africans appear to have relatively little substantial contact despite being abroad in British society – thus, away from South African society with its apartheid legacy being arguably more omnipresent and inhibiting of certain forms of contact. A number of the participants, if not necessarily part of any strictly defined ‘white South African community’ as such, seem to stick
together with other white South Africans – sometimes mainly with other members of their respective Afrikaans-speaking or English-speaking white South African groups – rather than initiating more substantial relationships with ‘non-white’ South Africans in the UK.

A consideration that needs to be made before delving into the specific findings of this chapter is how ‘community’ is to be understood and defined. This needs to be contemplated especially when bearing in mind the vast amount of attention that this concept has received in the British political and media context in the last decade. In large parts concurrent with the ‘backlash against multiculturalism’ discourse that was outlined in Chapter 3, we have witnessed the introduction and emphasis on promoting ‘shared values’ between different groups in British society as encapsulated by the term ‘community cohesion’. The term was brought to life as a suggested solution and remedy to the disturbances in northern towns of England in the summer of 2001, characterised by the then head of the government's Community Cohesion Review Team, Ted Cantle, as being infused with aggravations between different ‘racial’ ‘groups’ or ‘communities’ (see e.g. Karner and Parker 2011; Spencer 2011 for overviews). Thus, the government investigation into these disturbances, commonly known as The Cantle Report (Home Office 2001), did not pay much attention to the root causes in the persisting discrimination and socio-economic inequalities working against the members from the ‘non-white’ minority communities that were being dragged into clashes with white Britons – the latter group including members of whom themselves were in a disadvantaged position relative to other white Britons. Rather than considering the paramount influence of such structural causes, the primary blame in The Cantle Report was overwhelmingly left with members from ‘non-white’ minority communities – victims of the 2001 incidents – for supposedly not being integrated enough into British society by living ‘parallel lives’, or ‘self-segregating’ themselves from the larger British society in ‘isolated communities’. While the emphasis was initially put on ethnic minority groups, this has later been extended to migrants with the simplistic assumption that the increased diversity that more migration might bring will further complicate the ‘community cohesion’ agenda. Thereby, further migration has somewhat been deterred for the sake of ‘community cohesion’, rather than initiating more ground-breaking measures to improve the socio-economic standing of ethnic minority and
migrant groups that are present in the UK. The ‘community cohesion’ agenda has operated with obvious ‘racial’ undertones in that ‘non-white’ ethnic minority and migrant groups have been deemed to have more difficulties in taking part in and belonging to British society due to their skin colour that marks them as ‘different’. Rather than looking at institutional and popular forms of racism that have excluded ‘non-white’ groups in this sense, then, the emphasis has been put on these groups’ alleged inherent ‘incompatibilities’ or ‘unwillingness’ to integrate into mainstream British society (see Spencer 2011).

It may be wondered whether this ‘community cohesion’ agenda has any significant bearing on a white migrant group such as the white South Africans in my sample; whether they self-segregate or not would presumably go more unnoticed by owing to their skin colour and, as such, the probability that they are considered as ‘blending in’ with the white ethnic majority in British society. Yet, this does not mean that we can ignore the possibility that the pressure of the ‘community cohesion’ agenda would also have some bearing on them as a migrant group. It must be stressed that the idea of community presented in the ‘community cohesion’ agenda, nonetheless, is seriously flawed. Social scientific research of a seminal nature has demonstrated that the idea of a ‘homogenous, self-contained community’ must be questioned; there are significant divisions even within respective migrant and ethnic minority as well as majority communities of all different perceivable sorts and sizes and in a multitude of different contexts (Finney and Simpson 2009). This fact is also witnessed below in the case of the material non-existence of any strictly defined form of a ‘South African community’ in the UK, as this can be divided along lines of ‘race’, ethnicity, class and so on and so forth depending on the specific circumstance. However, social scientific research has not only challenged the idea of a ‘homogenous, self-contained community’, but has also reproduced this understanding of community at various points and to various degrees. I am thinking here of the romanticised account of community that perhaps is most notable in Tönnies’ classical account of Gemeinschaft as characterising a ‘traditional, familiar and face-to-face community’, which is contrasted to Gesellschaft as characterising a ‘modern’, larger-scale and more distant form of society (cited in Clarke and Garner 2010: 155). As noted by Hoggett, in response to the ‘traditional and romanticised community’ as exemplified by Gemeinschaft,
“[i]t is not even clear that community means much to the ordinary man or woman in the street these days” (1997: 1).

Having pointed out these caveats, however, it seems clear to me that we risk at our own peril to ignore the value that community still plays in the mind-sets of ordinary people, perhaps especially amongst migrants who have been ‘uprooted’ and subsequently re-socialised in a different society than their home society. As such, they might find remarkable comfort in the idea of living in a particular migrant community abroad – irrespective of whether such a ‘community’ actually exists (Clarke and Garner 2010: chap. 8). This is in large measure pointing to Benedict Anderson’s (2006 [1983]) idea of the ‘imagined community’, but, as it will be shown in this chapter, this community might not only be imagined per se, but also attempted to be realised in various ways through the everyday socialisation patterns of migrants. In this vein, Reed-Danahay (2008) urges us to consider ‘communities of practice’ (see also Lave and Wenger 1991) as complementing – however not substituting – the emphasis on ‘imagined communities’ in migration research. The concept of ‘communities of practice’ captures how socialisation processes amongst communities, “just like a nation, may select its members based on their seeming ‘fit’ with its image of itself, it may patrol its borders, and it may exclude some while including others” (Reed-Danahay 2008: 95, inverted commas in original). An important insight in Reed-Danahay’s (2008) overview is that although sometimes perceived in the singular, there can also be different types of communities being practiced, as well as imagined, simultaneously by the same actor or by different actors. We should therefore pay careful attention to how dominant political – but also some sociological – ideas of community as a romanticised notion can very well be reproduced, but at the same time challenged, by ordinary people in their everyday socialisation patterns and the various meanings that they ascribe to them.

In outlining the themes that will be covered in this chapter, I shall first show that although there is no strictly defined ‘South African community’ in the UK – as an intersectional analysis would reveal that South Africans might be divided along lines of ‘race’, ethnicity and so on – the South Africans I have interviewed might still gravitate towards the ‘familiar’, or what they perceive to be ‘South African’. In the other sub-sections of this chapter, I will then open up the discussion and reflect upon two different ways in which white South Africans,
through their socialisation patterns in British society, might be welcoming of South Africans of different ‘racial’ and ethnic backgrounds as well as non-South Africans. This will first involve considering the inclusionary potential of the concept of the South African ‘rainbow nation’, before assessing whether a multicultural city environment such as that of London can have a transformative impact vis-à-vis less diverse places in the UK. In following the thesis’ main argument, it will be shown that although the sense of a ‘rainbow nation’ and the possibility of multicultural contact in London must be added into the equation, it nevertheless appears that these factors cannot in all instances mitigate against the perceived need amongst some white South Africans of maintaining certain ‘racial’ and ethnic boundaries and entrenching their relatively privileged societal positions.

6.2 Facilitating a ‘Home Away from Home’?

When taking account of the various forms of community establishments amongst South Africans in the UK, an obvious point of departure is to consider the role that informal social networks provide in my participants’ views and experiences. By taking this emphasis, I will be building on the assumption that such informal networks are often more frequent and significant than more formal and organised forms of networks (Putnam 2000: chap. 6) – a finding which is replicated in the particular case of South African migrants in the UK by Robert Crawford’s (2011) study in the post-apartheid period from 1994. With the end of apartheid, the more organised political networks established in the UK to fight the apartheid regime have disappeared and, partially as a consequence, there appears to be no umbrella organisation encompassing all South Africans in the UK – if there ever has been one before. Although formal organisations of various sorts do exist, these are often dispersed and divided along lines of ‘race’, ethnicity, class, gender and so on to a greater extent than during the apartheid era when the political struggles against apartheid occasionally managed to unite a larger number of South Africans in the UK (Crawford 2011). In this political vacuum, the informal social networks sought out and sustained by South Africans can be revealing of the (re)-constructions of boundaries along ‘racial’ and ethnic lines in British society.
It should first be noted that the literature on community formations confirms the vital importance of co-national friends or acquaintances in assisting migrants upon their arrival and, subsequently, in facilitating their settlement in the particular host society which they might be making their new home (Alexander et al. 2007). Not unsurprisingly, then, South African migrants in the UK appear to be no exception from this general pattern. The presence of other South Africans in the UK constituted a support system for this participant and her family:

You have like, you feel like you have a support system. Being away [from South Africa], like I said me and my family are very, very close … South Africans tend to trend towards South Africans, they tend to find them and then make friends with them. My mum’s quite anti-social in most cases, so she doesn’t really mix with British people at all. She tends to stick to South African people. But not because she – she does have English friends, but she socialises more with South Africans. And I’m kind of, I have appropriated more British people now, especially since university. (Zarah, 21, white Afrikaans-speaking, student)

This example is indicative of the way in which a co-national South African support system can be more important for some migrants than others, as this participant implies that her mother has struggled more with the transition from South African to British society. Consequently, her mother has found more support in sticking with other South African people in the UK than she has herself. An age dimension is perhaps illuminating, as growing up in British society and taking part in the British education system have clearly facilitated the participant’s appropriation of British friends in contrast to what appears to be the case for her mother.

Having pointed this out, it should nevertheless be made clear that there exists no simple dichotomy between being from a younger or older generation when it comes to whether one chooses to stick predominantly with other South Africans or not. Participants of all ages expressed gratitude of being able to socialise with other South Africans in the UK. In fact, the participant who perhaps most explicitly stressed his appreciation of the opportunity to socialise with other South Africans, and in this way establish a ‘home away from home’ in the UK, is a young adult. However, it could be argued that because he had arrived relatively recently in the UK in 2008, he would not have been given sufficient time to network with a larger number of non-South African people yet. Nevertheless, it
should be pointed out that even for some other participants who had stayed considerably longer in the UK, there seemed to be a preference for other South Africans in terms of who they socialised with. It is worthwhile to quote the mentioned young adult’s rationale for socialising with other South Africans at length, as it demonstrates the strong appeal he is trying to make for his choice of friends:

You sort of, I think when anyone comes to a new country, they’re sort of out of their depths. You gravitate towards things you know. So when I came here I was like ‘oh, I know my friends live here so I go and live there and end up seeing them and hanging out with them’. You’ve sort of taken your life in South Africa and put it onto a different country, cause you’re still hanging around with the same people, the same people you knew back home, friends of friends that are back home. You sort of just create your own community here and you live in this little South African community. You go to South African pubs, you sort of make a home away from home ... Because that’s what you’re comfortable with and that’s where your comfort zone is. So you don’t really wanna be put out of that. (Jacob, 27, white Afrikaans-speaking, health and safety employee)

The creation of a ‘home away from home’ that the respondent highlights, is a telling illustration of the importance of home-making – of feeling safe – as a potential strategy to counteract the uncomfortable sensations and ‘uprooting’ of one’s previous societal position that might come along with the process of migrating to and settling into a different society than one’s ‘home society’ (see Duyvendak 2011; Yuval-Davis 2011a). The fact that South African migrants constitute such a sizable migrant group in the UK – particularly in London where this migrant is based – enables socialisation with ‘friends of friends that are back home’, as he puts it. The presence of South African pubs, as an example offered by the respondent, further heightens his mental image of being at home despite being physically abroad in the UK, or physically away from South Africa. According to these observations, everything seems rather idyllic and rosy in the sense that my South African participants are able to replicate their previous interactions with South African friends and perform ‘South African activities’ from their locations in the UK.

This representation, however, cannot end at this point without due consideration of the ways in which, as Jan Willem Duyvendak frames it, “one group’s ability to feel at home comes at the expense of other groups” (2011: 5).
At first glance, indeed, one could wonder whether the settlement patterns of South African migrants in London are reflective of the preference not only for other South Africans in general, but also more specifically of South Africans who are of the same ‘racial’ background, and more narrowly-defined even if of the same ethnic background as oneself. Sveinsson and Gumuschian identify a pattern amongst South Africans in London in which “English speakers are concentrated in the south west (Putney, Wandsworth and Wimbledon), Afrikaners in the north east (Leyton and Leytonstone), black Africans in the east (Hackney) and Jews in the north east (Muswell Hill, Kilburn, Highgate)” (2008: 7, brackets in original). By pointing this pattern out, I am not intending to feed into the earlier-cited political portrayals of migrants who would necessarily choose to ‘self-segregate’ and the dangers that this supposedly causes for the prospect of the ‘community cohesion’ agenda. We must be mindful of the fact that structural causes might come into play, as the above-outlined residency pattern could also be a reflection of the socio-economic status of the different groups – as perhaps best reflected in the relatively affluent areas that white English-speaking South Africans tend to concentrate in (e.g. Wimbledon) as opposed to black South Africans (e.g. Hackney) (see also Crawford 2011: chap. 3). At the same time as socio-economic inequalities must be brought to the fore, we should neither ignore the fact that South Africans – even if white and relatively well-off – can experience discrimination in British society, and that clustering in certain areas of London can offer them an opportunity to mitigate such discrimination by mobilising within ‘their own’ groups (Finney and Simpson 2009: 177-192). Although some interviewees would report relatively positive relationships with Britons – for example in the workplace that other migrants such as the Polish could miss out on because of lower social positions in the employment structure (Ryan 2010) – it is still a matter of fact that a considerable part of my white South African sample was under the impression that Britons are not invariably open and welcoming to them.

As indicated from the onset of this chapter, it is too often the case that researchers ‘looking for community’ are solely preoccupied with explaining such communities from a ‘racial’ or ethnic perspective without proper attention to the ways in which these communities might also be divided along lines of other crucial social indicators (Finney and Simpson 2009). Thus, we should perhaps be
careful of not falling into the trap of interpreting divisions within the ‘South African community’ as merely having to do with ‘racial’ and ethnic divisions because of South Africa’s apartheid legacy. Take for example class, as indicated above with the different residency patterns of different South African groups in the UK, but which also can be an important attribute for relationships across the different ‘racial’ and ethnic groups. One participant pointed out that “I play for the local rugby team and I guess I play with loads of working class guys. We’ve a great time, but there isn’t so much I would have in common with someone from a working class background” (James, 26, white English-speaking, researcher in the financial sector). The observant reader might be quick to point out here that this participant is feeding into the political and media discrimination of British working class members as ‘chavs’ (Jones 2012) that was identified in the previous chapter, and that this participant is therefore not pointing to any internal divisions within the ‘South African community’ as such. Yet, the possibility that socio-economic status could also be significant for the types of acquaintances that were sought out amongst South Africans in the UK, was perhaps most blatantly revealed by this white Afrikaans-speaking participant: “if you work in banking, then obviously you’re gonna mingle with banking level people with banking level salaries” (Lucas, 31, affluent entrepreneur). In terms of gender relations, we can note that there seemed to exist an implicit gendered flavour to some of the interactions between the white South Africans in the sense that sports gatherings, for instance, sometimes took a more traditionally perceived ‘masculine’ role through the popularity of the South Africa men’s national rugby team.

Having offered the above-caveats, we would nevertheless risk overlooking some interesting data if we do not account sufficiently for how an understanding of community as inherited from their apartheid past might still inform white South Africans’ formations of communities through informal social networks (Clarke and Garner 2010: chap. 8). Participants were not necessarily aware that they might be reproducing an apartheid-segregation logic by virtue of an ‘innocent’ matter such as who they socialise with in British society – at least if we are to judge by some of the interviewees’ accounts and the relatively few times their socialisation patterns in British society seemed to be equated with any form of segregation. The lack of references to segregation could, of course, also have to do with the fact that some of the interviewees reported mostly experiencing
positive relationships with people from other ‘racial’ and ethnic groups in British society. Yet, this does not rule out those participants who also seemed to express concern that they perhaps interact too much with other white South Africans in British society, especially when bearing in mind the historical baggage from apartheid that they had brought with them from South African society. All the same, it cannot be distilled with any profound certainty whether it was primarily their apartheid past from South Africa which informed the participants’ various understandings of segregation, or rather the more recently disseminated political/media representations in the UK of migrants and ethnic minorities as supposedly segregating themselves (Spencer 2011). Albeit the segregation during apartheid South Africa of course occurred in a much more systematic and forced manner – being celebrated as a desirable outcome as opposed to how segregation is warned against in the current political context in the UK – the two respective portrayals of segregation nonetheless seem to share an implicit assumption that segregation between different ‘racial’ and ethnic groups might proceed as a ‘natural’ outcome of human behaviour (Durrheim and Dixon 2000).

An interesting, but worrying, justification for segregation is therefore seen in the following account. In this, the white Afrikaans-speaking participant partially distances himself from the forced nature of segregation during apartheid, but then goes on to give legitimacy to the very logic behind apartheid by expressing the view that different ‘racial’ and ethnic groups ‘ought to’ be segregated in order to give way for a ‘natural’ development route:

I think that is ridiculous and sort of the segregation of the community [during apartheid]. Because even though we don’t like to admit it, people sort of segregate themselves anyway. When South Africans moved to the United Kingdom, the majority of them live in Wimbledon and down these areas, south-west area. And that’s just how it is. A lot of, I know there’s a big Asian and Chinese community in Morden. It’s a massive sort of Polish, a lot of Eastern Europeans that live up in Finsbury Park. We all just, you sort of just gravitate to where you know your friends live or stuff like that. And I sort of think that most countries do that as well, cause in any country you’ll go and there’ll be an area that’s predominantly white or predominantly black or predominantly Asian. In any country you go to in the world, they have that. But I just think because the [apartheid] government sort of put a label on that, it was, yeah, seen in a bad light. I think that if they had just left it, they would have sort of done that anyway. Not being mean, but people wanna live where their friends are. (Jacob, 27, white Afrikaans-speaking, health and safety employee)
It is pertinent to bring into the picture here, as a response to this particular justification for segregation between different ‘racial’ and ethnic groups, the research conducted by Durrheim and Dixon (2000) on white South African holidaymakers in post-apartheid South Africa. In their study, these scholars identify a cultural discourse amongst white South Africans in justifying their selection of historically ‘white areas’ for holiday purposes, as well as when clustering in specific areas of the beach in a similar way to the ‘racial’ segregation of beaches during apartheid. The cultural discourse which is employed by some of Durrheim and Dixon’s participants in justifying their various segregatory practices, might avoid scrutiny by appearing on the surface to ‘rationalise’ their behaviour in a comparable fashion to the above-account by my own participant. The theoretical contribution of Durrheim and Dixon’s (2000) study is that we must be attuned to how the rationale behind the socialisation mechanisms of ordinary people might now be taking the cues from a cultural discourse of ostensibly ‘natural’ and ‘reasonable’ patterns of human behaviour. This cultural discourse, to reiterate a point made in my previous chapter on South Africans’ access negotiations to the UK, touches upon various levels of abstractions from ‘older’ biological discourses which are still carried on alongside the ‘new’ cultural racism (Rattansi 2007). Although it might seem perfectly legitimate that someone like my above-participant justifies his choice of friends through the co-‘racial’ or -ethnic bonds that he ostensibly shares with them, the fact that this preference-driven socialisation possibly paves the way for segregation patterns that solidify the ‘old’ segregation during apartheid might remain unaccounted for. This phenomenon is given a sophisticated theoretical consideration by Durrheim and Dixon with reference to American society – a society with a history of ‘racial’/ethnic segregation that shares similarities with that of South Africa:

Whereas the old segregation arose through a deliberate project to create and protect segregated spaces, the new segregation functions simply to conserve historical patterns of segregation. In place of legally enforced separation, the new segregation is achieved by exercising personal preferences – for this school, neighborhood, job, and so forth, not that. Like neo racism, the new segregation avoids all-encompassing biological constructions of racial inferiority and thus does not defend monolithic arrangements of blanket racial segregation. Instead it is assiminationalist and class-based, allowing its adherents to claim non racism. Nevertheless,
this preference-driven practice of segregation reproduces historical patterns of specifically racial segregation. (2000: 95, emphasis in original)

Again, it might be tempting to point out that any ‘preference-driven practice of segregation’ amongst my own participants stems from, and is an inevitable outcome of, the fact that many white South Africans who come to the UK have been influenced by the apartheid structures that insulated them from ‘non-white’ people. What is overlooked by making this broad-brush statement, however, is how white South Africans might also be influenced by the ‘racial’ configuration and attitudes in British society. Research on British society has, indeed, shown that white people are more isolated from other ‘racial’/ethnic groups than what ‘non-white’ people normally are, contrary to the common perceptions that the latter group of people is more likely to ‘self-segregate’ than white people (Finney and Simpson 2009: 177-192). Therefore, the precise impact of the various influences from the South African context versus the British context is unclear; it is probably a mixture of both contextual influences in most of the cases. Nevertheless, the consequence seems to be the same in that ‘non-white’ South Africans are not necessarily included as part of the socialisation patterns and everyday practices of the white South African interviewees. As suspected by a black South African interviewee, no significant boundary-crossings between South Africans of different ‘racial’ groups existed in British society:

Your white people here and your black people are like this [indicates separation with his hands] … And again, it’s that apartheid system that’s causing that. It is that thing that is still causing that here. You find here, [white South Africans] doing their own thing, they are staying in certain areas. They are opening these bars and they’re calling them all sorts of names … there’s a bar called Zulu Bar. And you, if you go – I’m a Zulu myself – and you would think that if it’s called a Zulu Bar, then I would find other people like myself. You go there, you find you are the only one of this pigmentation. And people still look at you as if you are lost – you should be going somewhere. Which would have been the case then [during the apartheid era]. (Thulasizwe, 59, black, civil servant for a South African organisation in the UK)

Some might point out that because around 90% of the South Africans who reside in the UK are classified as white (Sveinsson and Gumuschian 2008: 1), it is only ‘commonsense’ that a white South African would be more likely to locate
another white South African due to this numerical majority in the UK and that, correspondingly, ‘non-white’ South Africans would be harder to locate. This also formed the perception of most of my white South African participants, such as in the following example:

I actually haven’t met a non-white South African here yet … you don’t see too many, um, and again to remember how do people get here in this country, to live here. It’s either heritage or a line where you can apply … I don’t have a problem sitting next to a black man. I don’t have a problem, I’ve got black friends in South Africa. (Gregory, 62, white Afrikaans-speaking, retired)

This account shows an awareness of the ways in which immigration and citizenship policies exclude the majority of ‘non-white’ South Africans through ancestral policies – as also explored in greater detail in the previous chapter. The respondent is, moreover, quick to stress that he does not have a problem sitting next to a black man. This rhetorical strategy arguably adds legitimacy to his argument that it is purely because of their numerical minority that he has been unable to socialise with ‘non-white’ South Africans in British society, thus not because he is ‘racist’ in case anyone would suspect him of being so due to his upbringing in apartheid South Africa.

By counterpoising this statement with another white South African’s response to the same question about socialisation with ‘non-white’ South Africans in British society, however, we might begin to question the extent to which the relative low number of ‘non-white’ South Africans is the only reason for the lack of contact with ‘non-white’ South Africans. In fact, there might be an element of selection of the ‘appropriate’ friends involved in the picture as well, which deeply puzzles and frustrates this particular white South African:

If I’m going to be very brutally honest, the friends that I have over here – or whilst in South Africa – almost all white. I wish it was another way, but it’s not. I’ve asked myself many times of why this is the case, why I hang out with them – I mean, I hang out with them cause they’re cool people, but you know what I mean. Whether the fact that they are of the same race and background as me, as why I hang out with them. And I honestly don’t know … what I mean to say is that race and background are not a problem for me – if you’re cool I will hang out with you. But it frustrates me and puzzles me that people I choose to hang out with – almost all the time –
are white South African and of the same background as me. (Richard, 27, white English-speaking, freelance journalist)

6.3 Celebrating the ‘Rainbow Nation’

An emerging theme which seems to contradict any traces of a form of ‘neo-apartheid’ in British society amongst the South Africans who are living there, is the emphasis that most participants would put on the post-apartheid project of establishing a ‘rainbow nation’. Although this term was not explicitly used by all participants, the idea behind this term was captured in various parts of the interview accounts. This came alongside a sense of being remarkably proud of being South African, which therefore could more than anything be a reflection of the post-apartheid state’s project of unifying South Africans of all ‘racial’ and ethnic groups following apartheid and the ‘racial’ injustices inflicted upon ‘non-white’ South Africans. There is a common perception that South Africa has come far by distancing itself from its apartheid past, and that South Africans of all ‘racial’ groups and ethnicities are now working together as echoed in the notion of a ‘rainbow nation’ as first coined by Nelson Mandela. In specific detail, the ruling party the African National Congress (ANC) and its well-praised and internationally-renowned president of South Africa from 1994 to 1998, namely Mandela, devised various strategies to inculcate a universal sense of national unity in the deeply diverse and conflict-torn South African population (Matsinhe 2011). In 1996, for example, then-president Mandela urged that “[n]on-racialism is one of those ideals that unites us. It recognises South Africa as citizens of a single rainbow nation, acknowledging and appreciating diversity” (quoted in Wesemüller, 2005: 76).

Mandela’s words point in large measure to the theoretical contributions and philosophical underpinnings of political philosophers such as Charles Taylor (1991). The essence of Taylor’s ideas is that the best way to foster and build an inclusive sense of national belonging within a particular nation-state is to find ways to “work together to build a society founded on deep diversity” (quoted in Kymlicka 1998: 183). With this suggested form of nation-building, the presumption that diversity is eroding a sense of belonging in the particular nation-state – an agenda being aggressively advocated in Britain and beyond – is
reversed by arguing that diversity can actually bolster a national sense of belonging if correctly devised. In other words, it is stressed that we should attempt to challenge the exclusionary ‘racial’ and ethnic boundaries that are ingrained in the very nation-state structure of contemporary societies. A way to counteract such tendencies is to bring sufficient attention to how such exclusionary boundaries intensify ‘racial’ and ethnic antagonisms in society. This can be done with the introduction of redemptive multicultural-orientated policies in order to highlight the value of diversity in the face of narrower and insular forms of nationalism. The very decision by dominant politicians to adopt more multicultural policies than those currently on offer in the political landscape in Western European societies, as is suggested by Taylor (1991) and similar thinkers (see Banting and Kymlicka 2006), could therefore have a symbolic effect and unite people in a collective national project that is, at least in a rhetorical capacity, inclusive of everyone regardless of their background. The assumption is that people might come to enjoy and feel proud of taking part in this national project, which would mark their society as a ‘progressive’ and ‘tolerant’ society that in important respects distances itself from a more authoritarian and exclusionary past (Banting and Kymlicka 2006; Taylor 1991).

Similar ideas are reflected in other political philosophers’ thinking, as shown in Chapter 2 with the discussion of Kymlicka’s (1995) ideas. As with Kymlicka’s ideas, it shall be seen below that Taylor’s (1991) theories might not be as fruitful as they would appear at first glance. Amongst my own participants, a celebration of deep diversity, or the ‘rainbow nation’, was sometimes contrasted with a British national sense of belonging which, according to the English-speaking white South African below, lacks the same foundations of diversity as a South African national sense of belonging. Although this way of deeming one nation as superior to another nation will be open for critical discussion later on, the deep pride that this participant takes in feeling part of a supposed South African ‘rainbow nation’ should first be given its warranted attention:

People are in South Africa, happy to talk about, or comfortable to be talking about a lot more than what I see in the UK … I went to a party with South Africans on Saturday night. So we were quite comfortable talking, y’know, are you Indian and Black and are you Coloured, or whatever it is. And a lot of [non-South African] people in this situation were a bit, um, they were uncomfortable with the discussion going on.
Whereas for us it doesn’t make a difference, we can talk about culture, we can talk about ways of life and different ways of doing things. And we can stereotype a lot easier and more comfortably and have a laugh about it … And I think although the UK seems to be democratic, I think there’s some undertones. My perception is, y’know, so it’s kind of people want to be seen as being accepting of other cultures or democratic and that kind of thing. Whereas in South Africa, I think it’s more real … We had a barbeque … and I was just looking around the room … we had an Indian South African, we had an Afrikaans-speaking white South African, we had me and my husband, who are, erm, y’know, second generation European South Africans … We had a Jewish South African in the same room … There was, erm, there was just such a mixture of people from very diverse backgrounds … My mother is Italian and my father is Portuguese, I was born in South Africa, but I’m living in the UK. And they’re all like, y’know, ‘that’s very different’. But in South Africa it’s quite normal to have all these different backgrounds and mixes of people and things. (Roxanne, 30, white English-speaking, senior manager in the IT-sector)

Certainly, Taylor’s (1991) thinking is fruitful to the extent that deep diversity as represented by the ‘rainbow nation’ has enabled Roxanne to ‘talk about culture, we can talk about ways of life and different ways of doing things’. Whether the celebration of diversity as represented in this quote has the more groundbreaking potential of mitigating, to a considerable degree, the segregatory legacy of apartheid is, however, open for debate. Certainly, by inspecting the quote more meticulously, it would seem to me that if the true essence of the ‘rainbow nation’ is so that ‘we can stereotype a lot easier and more comfortably and have a laugh about it’ – then the historical injustices of apartheid seem to have been partially subdued in the matter of a relatively short period of time in the post-apartheid era. This is also the main charge that I believe can be aimed at the rhetoric of the ‘rainbow nation’; the very idea of a ‘post-racial’ society that is implied in this term whereby the ‘racial’ and ethnic inequalities of the past, which also continue to structure the present, are too easily brushed under the carpet (Lentin and Titley 2011a). A crucial characteristic of the sustainment of national sentiments of any kind, as Benedict Anderson (2006 [1983]) has reminded us with his thorough historical analysis of the development of modern nationalism, is the ability to suppress and reconstruct certain damaging historical events, as much as it is to selectively remember ‘prouder’ moments that come to define the particular nation. Of course, Nelson Mandela and other prominent South African politicians have been acutely aware of the importance of remembering the horrors of the
colonial and apartheid past, while at the same time building a ‘new nation’ founded on deep diversity (Matsinhe 2011). Yet, it seems that the redistributive element of the ‘rainbow nation’ has been replaced by a supposed ‘post-racial’ society in which everything entailing ‘race’, even for the highly necessary and corrective purposes as advocated by affirmative action policies in order to rectify ‘racial’ inequalities in society, is now being dismissed as (reverse) racism.

There is the related caveat to the possibility of building a South African ‘rainbow nation’ that must be discussed in further detail. This caveat picks up on the above-participant’s conception of a moral superiority of the South African ‘rainbow nation’ as opposed to British, or perhaps English, national elements. Surely, the participant is rightly pointing to the empty rhetoric that is often being employed by British politicians to claim the moral superiority of the supposed ‘democratic’ institutions of the UK (McGhee 2009). The claim enables the participant, furthermore, to distance herself from any associations with apartheid and construct herself as more ‘enlightened’ than British national elements – thereby responding in an assertive manner to the discrimination that some white South Africans experience for being associated with apartheid as shown in the previous chapter. Nonetheless, it is worrying how this participant, in addition to some other participants, turns around the argument of ‘who is most racist’ so much that the construction of a supposedly superior nation still takes a significant part of the account. The only difference is that any claims from Britons to the superiority of British national elements are replaced by the South African ‘rainbow nation’s’ alleged superiority and, correspondingly, Britain’s alleged inferiority as a ‘less enlightened nation’. Indeed, research has corroborated that although the ‘rainbow nation’ is inclusive in its rhetoric of all South Africans regardless of ‘race’, it still excludes non-South Africans. This is because non-South Africans are deemed unable to partake in this national celebration as they cannot in any possible sense, or so the argument goes, understand the sentiments of South Africans as they do not ‘share’ the same historical experiences (see e.g. Habib 1996; Nyamnjoh 2006).

Hence, when Charles Taylor (1991) made his plea for a national framework built on deep diversity, what he did not give equal attention to is the fact that even a national framework thus conceived might essentially come to
exclude those perceived as non-nationals or ‘outsiders’ to the particular nation.

Consider this white South African’s account:

You need a shared history. If I meet another South African, that person immediately knows my whole history I’m coming from. But if I meet someone new, I have to explain to you the whole, y’know. And people – if you make friends – you know they have all these questions and; ‘where you the one discriminating against the other people?’ So, y’know, it’s very political … it takes lots of energy to invest in a relationship with someone and first you have to give them that 40 years of history first. Where other South Africans know, share that with you. That’s something I realised here it’s a big thing – if someone don’t share. If I lived in Britain all my life, they share a history. It’s just something, I think that’s why if you met another South African – doesn’t matter the colour – it’s that history that immediately makes us family in a sense here in London. (Ragiela, 43, white Afrikaans-speaking, freelance journalist)

What Ragiela could be referring to here, is the conviction that despite white South Africans being the beneficiaries of apartheid, they nevertheless share their history with the ‘non-white’ victims of apartheid in that apartheid is interpreted as a historical event within the same ‘South African nation’. Thereby, the significance of the white apartheid state’s enforced removal and segregation of ‘non-white’ groups in their own territories is partially downplayed. This shows the power of national rhetoric in influencing people; the comfort of living in a South African ‘rainbow nation’ now makes participants recreate the horrific events of apartheid as part of a shared national history that is so powerfully seen as their own that it could, conceivably, only concern South Africans and not ‘non-South Africans’.

An explanation as to how the apartheid era structures current debates and understandings in South Africa is found in the following academic deliberation:

When speaking about a common past I would like to emphasise that although apartheid was experienced differently – all South Africans will remain confronted with the recent history of repression and inhumanity for a long time. Even future generations that never experienced apartheid, nor have any personal responsibility for past injustices, will have to face up with this legacy. Authoritarian regimes might develop sophisticated methods of torturing, killing and making people disappear, but they never can succeed extinguishing their deeds ... The apartheid past will not disappear as a common topic of debate. In a society where former victims and beneficiaries live ‘next door’, everybody will be forced to relate to the apartheid past, a past which transcends personal experience. (Theissen 1999: 4, inverted commas in original)
Yet, the way in which participants related to the apartheid past is, as we have seen, at times questionable. There seems to be too little of the engaging and constructive multicultural dialogue involving all concerned stakeholders that Bhikhu Parekh (2006; 2007) is perhaps the strongest protagonist for. Parekh contends that every culture has its limitations and benefits from a dialogue with others. Such a dialogue alerts it to new visions of human life, expands its imagination, enables it to look at itself from the standpoint of others, adds to its self-knowledge, and creates the conditions of human freedom and rationality. The dialogue requires that different cultures should both be respected and brought into a creative interplay. (2007: 131)

Rather than fulfilling this normative ideal, it appears that white South Africans have appropriated the terms under which the past should be re-created, thus cancelling out any protests from ‘non-white’ South Africans about their experiences as the oppressed part. This agenda on the part of certain white South Africans might look like this: although they are, to varying extents, aware that apartheid did actually happen and horrible events unfolded, they believe that the apartheid history nevertheless has the potential of providing a reference point for uniting all South Africans as ‘we are all distancing ourselves from that horrible thing now’. In this sense, what happened during apartheid, and its enduring legacy in the prolonged socio-economic and ‘racial’ inequalities in South African society, is somewhat brushed under the carpet under the illusion of one big South African family as most famously preached by the ‘rainbow nation’. Thus, while the ‘rainbow nation’ construct has the rhetorical capacity of uniting all South Africans in spite of apartheid, such unification does not necessarily contain more deep-rooted practical consequences for the eradication of ‘racial’ inequalities. Added to this, it is notable that the national flavour of the ‘rainbow nation’ construct enables white South Africans to employ it as a means also to cancel out any ‘external challenge’ from purportedly ‘ignorant’ non-South Africans wanting to engage in meaningful dialogue about apartheid.

All the same, perhaps we should not entirely dismiss the normative appeal that is encompassed by the ‘rainbow nation’. By normative appeal, I am referring to the way in which the principal idea of a ‘rainbow nation’ at the very least can
cognitively construct a society which provides perhaps the sharpest possible contrast to the segregatory and racist logic of the vestiges of the apartheid structures. Or perhaps Nick Stevenson’s words are instructive in this respect, as he points out that in order to create a better society “we have to start somewhere” (2003: 154). This might entail being able to imagine a better society first and foremost before the process of generating it can actually take place. Furthermore, the celebration of something distinctively ‘South African’ can generate positive sentiments forming a vital coping strategy as migrants in the UK. In the case of white South Africans, they might not have much else to construct their identity around insofar as they are pre-judged in the views of some to be similar to white Britons due to their shared white skin colour (Nagle 2008). Although it was highlighted earlier that their white skin colour is typically seen as an advantage by white South Africans in terms of ‘blending into’ British society, this does not mean that they would not be willing to celebrate their ‘difference’ as South Africans afforded to them by the ‘rainbow nation’ construction. As indicated, this affords South Africans a remarkable opportunity to be proud of themselves, a fact which I believe should not be condemned as long as this ‘proudness’ does not come at the expense of South Africans of certain other backgrounds, or inflicts upon non-South Africans’ ability to feel proud of themselves as well, as discussed above. As many participants were also keen to highlight, coming to the UK may have made some of them even more proud of being South African. This is perhaps because their identity as South African was more taken-for-granted in South African society, whereas now it has become more ‘challenged’ or ‘threatened’ as they have possibly dealt considerably with immigration and citizenship policies and moved to a different society (Yuval-Davis 2011a). This observation could prove consistent with Benedict Anderson’s (1998: 58–74) theory of ‘long-distance nationalism’. With this concept, Anderson theorises how a longing for one’s perceived roots can intensify by the very fact of being abroad for a sustained period, and whereby the positive sides of one’s home community are imagined and heightened at the expense of any negative sides of it.

There is also a time-dimension involved here. In some of my respondents’ accounts, it is indicated that they were now allowed to embrace and celebrate their various ‘South African sentiments’ in the UK to a greater extent than during
apartheid with the negative label that the apartheid regime attached onto white South Africans. This is clearly expressed in the account below:

I think in the early years we didn’t feel that we could be proud of where we came from … we wouldn’t have walked around in a Springbok rugby jersey or sort of advertised where we came from. We wouldn’t have had a flag on the back of our car or something like that. Whereas now, as persons like Mandela came into power … I’m proud to wear a Springbok rugby jersey, or to support my country, or to have the flag on the back of my car, or whatever. (Sandra, 45, white English-speaking, admin in a children’s centre)

The advent of the post-apartheid government, with its first president Nelson Mandela as the internationally-renowned figurehead for his reconciliatory approach and attempts to unite different ‘racial’ groups, appears to be celebrated by this participant as it has allowed her to be more proud of being a white South African in the UK. Although she went on to claim that there were still some negative sentiments associating her with apartheid merely because she was a white South African, she claimed that the outlook towards her was not as hostile as before. ‘South African whiteness’, in this sense, may have escaped some of the criticism of the past. Without denying the significance of any discrimination experienced abroad, we must still be conscious of the fact that attempts to claim a victim status – that white South Africans are ‘really’ the ones who have been oppressed because of negative sentiments from others brought upon them by the apartheid past – can also work to undermine the much more severe discrimination inflicted upon ‘non-white’ people by the apartheid regime (Steyn 2001).

6.4 Multicultural London

If the notion of a ‘rainbow nation’ does not inevitably generate ‘racial’ and ethnic boundary-crossings amongst all white South Africans, perhaps residing in a global and multicultural city with London’s character can facilitate such boundary-crossings to a greater extent than it would have in other British locations. In my interview sample, most of the people resided in London and surrounding areas, so this is a valid point of consideration. This object of inquiry finds its inspiration in the fact that London has for a long time exerted a
considerable pull factor on individuals from all over the world, finding perhaps its best expression in Robert Crawford’s (2011) reference to ‘the lure of London’. This has to do with how London constituted the epicentre of the British Empire and that it is entangled in global networks of different sorts – perhaps most significantly in global economic networks which have created a polarised city with deep socio-economic divides between the super-rich and the poor in recent times (Sassen 2005). The city also has a long history of immigration and asylum to point to, which has been further sustained by the encouragement of post-colonial migration from Britain’s previous colonies in certain periods of the post-Second World War era, as well as by more recent labour migration. In companionship, this has facilitated a multicultural setting in London (Favell 2008b). By a multicultural setting, I am not so much referring to a genuine multicultural environment at the national policy level when keeping in mind that the pursuit of multicultural policies of a more groundbreaking, systematic and redistributive nature in favour of ethnic minorities and migrants have, to a considerable extent, been discouraged by various political voices in the UK during the last decade in particular. However, by a multicultural setting I am more inclined to refer to a lived multiculture of people from many different cultural backgrounds living in close proximity to each other in the international environment provided by London (Lentin and Titley 2011a). Steven Vertovec (2007a) uses the term ‘super-diversity’ to capture the essence of how diversity not only has to do with a diversification of ‘racial’ or ethnic backgrounds, but from the 1990s has also increasingly come in other forms such as in terms of nationality, immigration or citizenship status, spatial distribution, age, gender, class background and so on and so forth. According to Mica Nava (2006), this facilitates an environment whereby differences of all sorts – including any ‘racial’ and ethnic markers of difference – may now be seen as ordinary and commonplace in London.

Despite certain South Africans apparently concentrating in specific areas of London, the potential multicultural influence of London could provide the quintessential contrast to the deep ‘racial’ segregation of apartheid South Africa, or any of its legacy feeding into the post-apartheid period. Even the above-quoted participant who blatantly contested any form of ‘neo-apartheid’ between South Africans – rather indicating a ‘rainbow nation’ founded on a deep diversity that
Britain allegedly lack – would admit that London might be unique for its diversity compared to other places in the UK. Specifically, after having made her comparison of South Africa and Britain, she was asked to confirm whether she believed it to be more diverse in the South African context. Her response is quite revealing of the condition that London puts on her construction of South Africa as more diverse than Britain: “Erm, maybe, y’know, in a sense [it’s more diverse in South Africa]. But I think London is quite diverse, y’know” (Roxanne, 30, white English-speaking, senior manager in the IT-sector). Other interviewees would also highlight how London’s diversity has enabled them to come in contact with people from non-South African backgrounds. For example, a participant seemed disinterested in interacting with other South Africans altogether, and instead chose to benefit from the freedom and multi-ethnic character of London in order to more actively engage and even socialise with people from other cultural backgrounds:

I’ve met people from all over, y’know, I socialise with them all … Which is good because you get to learn about different cultures and the way people are; totally different to the way I was brought up sometimes, y’know. So it’s a lot better. (Christina, 29, white English-speaking, travel agent)

It is indicated in this account that the multi-ethnic climate of London has opened Christina’s eyes to other cultures to a greater extent than before, bearing particularly in mind the segregation of ‘racial’/ethnic groups that she had experienced first-hand with her upbringing in South Africa during apartheid. Others of my participants would report that London had a similar effect as an eye-opener for the possibility of intercultural bridging. What is more, this characterisation of London is not unique for my South African sample, as we can draw parallels to research on white migrants from Poland who report a similar perception of London as providing pockets of multi-‘racial’ and -ethnic mixing unlike what they had experienced in their home society. Based on this finding with regard to Poles, Eade et al. conclude that “multicultural London provides migrants with social and cognitive skills for pragmatically managing cultural difference in everyday interactions” (2007: 40). From my own data material, it also appears that a number of the London-based South Africans report that such intercultural bridging would only be possible in London and not in any other
places in the UK. This points to the perception that other places in the UK possibly are less accepting of migrants because of the relative lack of population diversity in these places when compared to London. It is perhaps indicative that a ‘non-white’ South African respondent took particular comfort in being in London rather than in any other place in the UK, as she unambiguously asserted that “a nice thing about London [is] that you don’t feel like you are like an outcast or anything, because there are so many different cultures” (Beatrice, 36, ‘mixed race’, massage therapist). Nina Glick-Schiller’s (2008) claim that scholars need to consider the geographical scale when researching identities therefore gains some purchase in relation to the current discussion of the relative merits of London as opposed to less diverse places, as Glick-Schiller asserts that too much emphasis has previously been given to the ‘racial’ or ethnic ‘group’ in isolation from the geographical scale on which the people we are interested in can be located.

Furthermore, it is important to note that establishing a form of ‘South African community’ in the UK did not imply that participants were completely on their own and not at all influenced by non-South African people. Perhaps surprisingly, this seemed to be the case even for the white Afrikaner participant who expressed most strongly that he mainly interacted with other white South Africans, mostly other Afrikaners:

Like even though you do only stick around with South Africans, every day you’re bumping into different people from different backgrounds, from different countries, from different everythings. So even though you might not hang out with them, those influences are always like subtly put onto you, so they sort of influence you even though you might be subconscious – you saw something or you heard something. (Jacob, 27, white Afrikaans-speaking, health and safety employee)

We should be careful, however, that we do not merely assume that all of the participants actually enjoy partaking in the cultural exchanges which are portrayed. It must be remembered that the above-quote is from the earlier-discussed participant, Jacob, who in other parts of the interview constructed segregation of communities along ‘racial’, ethnic and national lines as something ‘natural’ and even ‘desirable’. This example thus demonstrates that the possibility for contact between groups as provided by London does not necessarily mean the automatic flourishing of meaningful relationships between individuals from
different groups (Valentine 2008: 326), despite the fact that some scholars advocating a ‘contact hypothesis’ would seem to suggest so. Those scholars advocating a ‘threat hypothesis’ instead would be quick to point out, in response to the ‘contact theorists’, that an increasing number of people from different ‘racial’ and ethnic groups could rather foster perceived threats of inter-‘racial’ and inter-ethnic competition, in tandem with increased prejudice and conflict between certain groups (see Hewstone et al. 2007 for an overview of the ‘contact’ and the ‘threat’ hypotheses).

Although having some validity, I believe that a ‘threat hypothesis’ must also consider whether the general policy environment supports or discourages meaningful multicultural contact (McLaren 2008: 9). In the UK at the macro or national level, the value attached to multicultural contact has, in fact, been viewed somewhat ambiguously in the recent decades. Although multicultural policies catering for the special needs of particular minority groups have been considerably discouraged as noted earlier, the previous Labour government’s implementation of the ‘community cohesion’ agenda – as carried forward under the guise of the ‘big society’ by the current Coalition government – has still encouraged some multicultural contact in order to handle the alleged problem of segregation. As indicated above, however, this multicultural contact is only to proceed under the specific stipulations set up in the policy regulations. This has implied that what has been primarily sought is the imposition of an overarching and common British identity that is supposed to supersede any particularistic ethnic, religious or other identities of ethnic minorities and migrants (Spencer 2011). In addition, I would like to take issue with the assumption implicit in the ‘community cohesion’ agenda which suggests that mere contact between people from different ‘racial’ and ethnic backgrounds is sufficient enough to generate a deep-seated common identity and mutual respect between these people. As observed by Gill Valentine, “many everyday moments of contact between different individuals or groups in the city do not really count as encounters at all” as the city streets might, on occasions, be operating as “spaces of transit that produce little actual connection or exchange between strangers” (2008: 326). Indeed, Sara Ahmed (2000: 32–37) has used the term ‘stranger danger’ to capture how everyday forms of racism in the urban setting are enabled by political and media constructions through which the ‘other’ is imagined as a ‘threat’ or a
‘burden’ to a particular community. Hence, everyday racism becomes legitimised through the conviction that ‘others’ or ‘strangers’ as defined in ‘racial’/ethnic terms, but also in some other terms, constitute figures whose very presence in the streets represents a danger inasmuch as more substantial contact was to be initiated with them. Hegemonic ideas about ‘insiders’ and ‘outsiders’ can slip into everyday practices and affect the socio-spatial arrangements of the ‘mundane’ urban spaces that ordinary people occupy, as the city is cognitively mapped into separate spaces constituting ‘our’ and ‘their’ space, respectively (Ahmed 2000; Simonsen 2008; Valentine 2008). Although it is true that “[e]thnic borders cut through the city in all directions” (Simonsen 2008: 155), some of these would tend to be more dominant and affect everyday interactions to a greater extent.

What a policy climate applying relatively sporadic multicultural contact on the streets as the litmus test for mutual respect could miss, then, is the fact that certain individuals might prefer to socialise with their ‘own’ ‘racial’ or ethnic group despite the apparent possibility for more substantial and meaningful relationships with people from other groups. This could eventually imply the pursuit of monoculturalism even within a multicultural space of London’s magnitude. The de facto multicultural backdrop provided by London can in this manner be somewhat deceiving in that it makes some people claim that they are partaking in ‘multicultural’ encounters merely by ‘bumping into’ people of other backgrounds – though their role in these encounters might be of a rather peripheral nature as it was demonstrated with regard to Jacob above (Semi et al. 2009: 80). Moreover, in terms of any inter-‘racial’ and inter-ethnic contact with other migrant groups in London, it is noteworthy that white migrants from other ‘white settler countries’ such as Australia and New Zealand would seem to constitute my white South African interviewees’ most popular contacts. Apart from this observation, it is perhaps most notable that some participants who in Chapter 5 talked about Eastern Europeans as not possessing the same positive ‘cultural traits’ as white South Africans, would still state that they sometimes socialise with Eastern European migrants in British society. For instance, one of the participants who accused Polish migrants in particular of abusing the British welfare system, still acknowledged that she had friends from Poland. Hence, she stated that her friends are “from all over … some are Italian, Polish” (Christina, 29, white English-speaking, travel agent). This finding contradicts a version of the
‘contact hypothesis’ that shows a statistically significant relationship between the number of friends an individual has from an ‘outgroup’ and the individual’s perception of that group – i.e. the more friends the individual has from the particular group, the more positive his or her sentiments tend to be towards that group (McLaren 2008: 8). It could therefore be that white South Africans in the UK constitute a particular characteristic of migrants that can represent an exception to this rule.

Yet, a more plausible explanation might be found in the potential power of a restrictive immigration and citizenship policy environment in shaping migrants’ rhetorical strategies and perceived need to negotiate their inclusion in the UK. Gill Valentine’s (2008) research has found that although some individuals in general report instances of positive social encounters with communities or individuals perceived as different from themselves, they may still have vested interests in preserving prejudiced views towards these very same ‘racial’ or ethnic groups. As translated to my case study; although having friends from certain backgrounds, white South Africans may still see the need to justify themselves as more ‘deserving’ than these other migrants, as also witnessed in Chapter 5. This might particularly be the case within the current British context with its emphasis upon migrants’ contributions, whereby some migrants can be expected to ‘earn’ their right to stay legally in the UK and, possibly, to claim British citizenship. Once various British immigration and citizenship requirements have been fulfilled and one might find oneself relatively securely settled in the country, furthermore, we must also consider the potential impact of the earlier-mentioned socio-economic inequalities generally working in favour of white South African at the expense of Eastern European migrants in British society. Such socio-economic inequalities would be in the interest of some white South Africans to retain, as it could be the close proximity to other groups such as Eastern Europeans in London, “which often generates or aggravates comparisons between different social groups in terms of perceived or actual access to resources and special treatment” (Valentine 2008: 327). In sum, these observations would go some way towards indicating that without addressing more deep-seated issues of inequalities in society, the ‘community cohesion’ agenda will not succeed with its implicit insistence that multicultural contact alone is a sufficient factor for better community relations. Moreover, it is not entirely clear how frequent and
substantial the white South Africans’ interactions with other migrant and ethnic minority groups in British society would essentially be. This would, as indicated earlier, partially depend upon the extent to which the biography of the particular white South African individual would encourage such boundary-crossings, as there were different socialisation patterns reported by the white South Africans. Nevertheless, the one thing that they all appeared to have in common, whether residing in London or not, was their socialisation with other white South Africans in British society – despite the extent of this socialisation pattern varying somewhat too.

What should also be commented upon is that considerable ambivalence presented itself when some of the white South Africans were talking about London in contrast to other British locations. Almost all respondents seemed to accept the fact that London is more diverse – as I have exemplified above – but it is noteworthy that this was not necessarily seen as favourable by those who were seriously contemplating moving out of London to another British location that promised them more ‘space’. Not unlikely, this preference for space might be part of a nostalgic consideration in which their childhood and past in South Africa – with all the space that the apartheid regime carved out for white South Africans – come to retain some significant undertones:

We’re used to, we’re used to having, I think, ja, something we’ve struggled with living in London is that everywhere is so, y’know, everything’s a lot more compact and smaller and we’re, y’know, we’re used to having more space [in South Africa]. So we’re used to having gardens … and like growing up we’re used to just build forts in the back of our gardens out of like, y’know, whatever we could find, I mean, rubbish we could find. We were just, y’know, running around. Here I don’t think you can really do that in the city, when you have like residential areas and stuff. (Helen, 26, white English-speaking, charity worker)

A consideration to move from London might not only come down to the discomfort of living alongside non-South African people as such. It could also pertain to living alongside a certain amount of people in general, irrespective of their background, as perhaps suggested in the quote above when London is referred to as ‘a lot more compact’ than what they are used to. However, the presumption that they can replicate South African society and find more space to
an easier degree in less populated places in the UK than in London, speaks volumes to the perceived safety for migrants in the preservation of the way of life ‘back home’. Particularly for the white South Africans with children, it seemed to be a common consideration to move to somewhere else in the UK, so that their children could grow up with the supposed safety and comfort of more space around them like they had experienced themselves while growing up during apartheid South Africa. This is perhaps a way of counteracting the feelings of anxiety associated with living alongside many non-South African people in a diverse environment such as in London, particularly in terms of some parental and protective ‘instincts’ for their children (Hewstone et al. 2007). In *Gender and Nation*, Nira Yuval-Davis (1997) talks about some of the paternal and maternal values which are interwoven with certain nationalist attitudes and which might retain some relevance here in the preference for ‘spacious’ locations.

### 6.5 Conclusion

This chapter, then, has dealt with the community formations amongst white South Africans in British society. The question posed here was whether the emphasis on their (white) South African background in negotiating access to British society also had implications for the socialisation patterns that white South Africans attempted to initiate and sustain in British society. It was shown that although there is no strictly defined ‘South African community’ in British society – as it is divided along lines of ‘race’, class and gender, and even of ethnicity in terms of divisions between English-speaking and Afrikaans-speaking white South Africans – this did not necessarily mean that participants would not express an interest in creating such a community. This is, for example, eclipsed in the idea of a South African ‘rainbow nation’ inclusive of people from all different backgrounds. Another potential ‘racial’ and ethnic boundary-crosser considered in this chapter was that of residing in a multi-ethnic environment such as London. However, we can pose the question as to whether a form of ‘neo-apartheid’ is facilitated in British society, owing particularly to the limited contact with ‘non-white’ South Africans on the part of a number of the white South African participants in this study. This can, of course, be attributed to the relatively low number of ‘non-
white’ South Africans in British society as opposed to the number of white South Africans – meaning that they are more difficult to ‘locate’ for some of the white South Africans interviewees. Yet, there are also reasons to speculate whether there is a selection process in the picture, in which it was easier for some of the interviewed white South Africans to gravitate towards other white South Africans because this is what they are most comfortable with in a ‘foreign’ environment like the UK. In the process, it is possibly the case that ‘joining forces’ with fellow white South Africans is perceived as a convenient socialisation strategy in upholding, to a greater or lesser extent, their relatively privileged group status.
7. The Question of Return: Looking Back to South Africa


The two previous chapters looked into white South Africans’ negotiation of access and sense of community in the UK, respectively. A common thread throughout both chapters is that white South Africans, with a few conditions, feel considerably proud to be South African. This sense of belonging to South Africa did, interestingly enough, not only benefit some of my white South African participants when facilitating South African communities in the UK, but also in negotiating access to the ‘British nation’. However, this begs the question as to whether being ‘proudly South African’ would necessarily entail that participants are willing to return permanently to South Africa. What I will attempt to do in the current chapter, then, is to draw on my data to discuss various justifications that participants have given me for remaining in the UK or returning to South Africa one day. This could give a more balanced picture as to their sense of belonging, as expressing their wish to physically relocate to South Africa again, despite its reported challenges, would suggest some form of yearning for South Africa. Conversely, an intention to stay in the UK and never settle permanently in South Africa again, would perhaps reflect that, in spite of being ‘proudly South African’, they would nonetheless prefer to remain in the UK for various reasons. It must quickly be specified that a potential sense of belonging to Britain and a potential sense of belonging to South Africa need not be mutually exclusive. They can very well work in tandem with each other, contrary to some political perceptions which hold that people should show their allegiance to one nation-state only (see Chapter 3 for the case of South Africa and Britain, respectively). The discussion below should, in other words, not be read as though I am feeding into such political rhetoric by opposing belonging to Britain with belonging to South Africa.

This chapter will feed into the main argument of this thesis. As there are various ways that a migrant group might be more or less privileged – owing to political constructions in the home and host country – the thesis argues that white
South Africans in the UK seek to protect the aspects of their privileged position that feel important for them to secure amidst any actual or perceived threats. In analysing the responses to whether return migration to South Africa was seen as a viable option, it must be remembered that I will not be interested in weighing up precisely or systematically comparing all the different factors involved in the participants’ contemplations on whether to return or not. Thus, in following my argument, I am more interested in teasing out the possible impacts on their belongings and the ‘racial’ and ethnic boundaries that might be associated with some of the main justifications for remaining in the UK or returning to South Africa. As it is important in an intersectional analysis to understand how beliefs and attitudes can be shaped by different contextual influences (Hulko 2009), this chapter shows that any celebration of a South African ‘rainbow nation’ in the British context as illustrated in the former chapter, might quickly be replaced by the negative images of South Africa once the question of ‘return’ is posed. This would also remind us of the time-contingent nature of intersectionality (Hulko 2009), as their ‘whiteness’ no longer feels like an insurance policy insofar as the post-apartheid era are contrasted with the ‘better’ conditions that they, allegedly, grew up under during apartheid. For these participants, it would seem that their ‘whiteness’, and the privileges this has bestowed them, has come so much ‘under siege’ in the South African context that they would no longer see a future there. Remaining in a Western and white majority context such as Britain would therefore appear to be a preferable option for certain interviewees – in spite of any challenges that they potentially are encountering in British society as reported in various parts of this thesis.

The first theme to be explored in this chapter, then, looks into the construction of the post-apartheid South African political order as ‘failing’, and that the South African government ‘needs to sort itself out’ before a return is considered. A discussion will be presented on the extent to which this construction merely points to a dissatisfaction with the government per se, or whether there are deeper ‘racial’ issues involved in that white South Africans are complaining about the government as a ‘black government’ allegedly not catering for the needs of white South Africans anymore, in contrast to the ‘white government’ during apartheid. The next theme continues this line of thought in that the post-apartheid South African state has frequently been criticised for not
adequately controlling the crime situation in the country. Participants would therefore use the issue of crime, and *violent* crime in particular, to argue that the crime rates in South Africa ‘needed to drop’ before they would seriously consider returning to South Africa. The potential implication, when interviewees are talking about crime in South Africa, is that a link between crime and black people might be hinted at. In the next theme, participants constructed themselves as South African ‘ambassadors’ who help South African society from abroad, thus not needing to return as they are ‘contributing’ to South African society – even though they have been badmouthed from various South African sources for leaving South Africa behind as soon as apartheid ended. Whether their role as South African ‘ambassadors’ from abroad actually ushers in any transformative effects on South African society, or whether it must rather be considered as a rhetorical strategy that positions participants in a better light in the face of critical voices back in South Africa, is debated. The final theme then considers those respondents who have expressed a realistic desire to return to South Africa, showing the ways in which they would construct their experience in British society as an advantage when returning ‘back home’. This enables participants to claim that they are counteracting the so-called ‘brain drain’ on South African society – much rather than contributing to it as often claimed by voices back in South Africa that accuse emigrating South Africans of taking their skills with them to other locations. The truthfulness in this claim will not be assessed in detail, but it will be noted that this construction might also work as a convenient strategy amongst white South Africans in constructing themselves as more ‘noble’ than some of their harsher critics back in South Africa would have it.

7.2 ‘The Government Needs to Sort Itself Out’

With the end of apartheid marking the introduction of formal democracy and political rule being symbolically bestowed to the black majority in the form of the ANC, expectations were running high in the South African population – most fathomably amongst the ‘non-white’ population, but also amongst more ‘liberal-minded’ white South Africans. It was seen as a major achievement that any larger-scale conflicts were avoided given South Africa’s recent past, and that the
country’s first free and fair democratic elections could be held throughout the country in 1994. Along these lines, it was expected that the new political arrangement would cater for all South Africans, including white South Africans, with Nelson Mandela’s aforementioned promise of building a ‘rainbow nation’ inclusive of all ‘racial’ groups. Indeed, the ANC reassured all concerned voices from the opposition, especially from the white minority who feared some form of retaliation from the horrors of apartheid, that it did not intend to replicate the one-party rule with unchecked presidential power occurring in some other African countries after independence (Pottie and Hassim 2003: 62).

All the same, as shown in other parts of this thesis, the introduction of affirmative action policies to help redress the ‘racial’ injustices generated by apartheid has more often than not been rebuked by interviewees for perpetuating a form of ‘reverse apartheid’. It is clear that the dissatisfaction with affirmative action policies constitutes a significant part of and feeds into a general dissatisfaction with the ANC’s role as the ruling political party in the successive South African governments in the post-apartheid era. The political make-up of South Africa was seen with great concern by the majority of the white participants when contemplating whether to return to South Africa one day. Voicing their mistrust in the South African government, forms perhaps a convenient strategy in claiming that they are happy to remain in the UK in contrast to the ‘political chaos’ in South Africa. For this white South African, amongst others, the great expectations in the aftermath of apartheid have not been matched by the performance of the various post-apartheid South African governments:

I feel very let down by the new governments … I feel that we all dreamt of a better future and the government’s not giving that to people … I feel most sorry for poor black people in South Africa. I feel they are by far the most let down by the new government … the elite at the top are filthy rich … But then you’ve got the vast majority of people, who still, I mean, hardly has an education, haven’t got running water … I think that they [South African politicians] have lost the plot completely. Not because they’re black or anything, just because they have. (Frederick, 35, white Afrikaans-speaking, teacher)

Admittedly, this snapshot is a representation of one of the more ‘liberal’ views being taken with regard to the assessment of the post-apartheid governments’ overall performance. The quoted individual is mindful of the fact
that the socio-economic inequalities in South Africa, which are working mainly against the black majority, have not been rectified by politicians. Contrary to many of the other accounts, this interview-snapshot simultaneously evidences less preoccupation with depicting affirmative action policies as constituting a form of ‘reverse apartheid’. Yet, I would like to point to his perceived need to make it absolutely clear that he does not believe that South African politicians in the post-apartheid era have lost the plot just ‘because they’re black or anything’. I interpret this statement on the assumption that he wants to distance himself from any accusations that he is criticising South African politicians only because he is a ‘racist’ white South African who cannot handle seeing black people in political power after years of white minority rule. Nonetheless, the possibility of such accusations seemed to bother him less when he later described South African politicians – presumably black politicians in the way he had seemed to associate South African politicians with black people – as being involved in “[I]lots of corruption and mismanagement and wastage, y’know, money gets, it’s a, it’s becoming a typical African country” (Frederick, 35, white Afrikaans-speaking, teacher). This is not the only possible example of the adverse images of black South African politicians subscribed to by a considerable part of the white South African sample, as well as being internalised amongst some of the ‘non-white’ representatives in my sample. The reference to South Africa ‘becoming a typical African country’ speaks of the general fear that South Africa will “‘descend’ into the ‘African pattern’ of one-party rule and uncurbed presidential power” (Pottie and Hassim 2003: 62, inverted commas in original).

Some participants were particularly worried, having witnessed how the political situation in the neighbouring country Zimbabwe had unfolded, that South Africa could soon turn into ‘another Zimbabwe’. More specifically, this attitude built on the scare-scenario that white South Africans could be driven away from their South African land patches in a forced nature similarly to what had happened in Zimbabwe under the infamous land reform policies of President Robert Mugabe (AFP 2009). Reflecting this attitude, an article in The South African – a newspaper for South Africans living in the UK – had reported, before Nelson Mandela’s sad death in late 2013, that Facebook pages had been set up predicting that “Mandela’s death will trigger mass killing of whites in SA” (The South African 2012). It is pointed out in the article that the organisers of these
Facebook pages believed that the unitary symbol that Nelson Mandela represents is the only thing that is holding South Africans of different ‘racial’ groups together. The article identifies the contributors to these Facebook pages as perpetuating a form of scaremongering that is “[r]eminiscent of pre-1994 hysteria in South Africa” (The South African 2012) – referring to the hysteria being expressed by some fractions of the white South African population in association with the end of apartheid and the introduction of majority rule in the country. Similar sentiments, if not necessarily being identically replicated, could therefore be found amongst some of my own participants with references to the possibility that South Africa could turn into ‘another Zimbabwe’. We can speculate on the extent to which such references took part of a deliberate strategy in trying to evoke feelings of sympathy for their situation as white South Africans who cannot possibly return to South Africa under these portrayed political conditions.

At any rate, the participant’s response below to my question of whether she ever considered returning permanently to South Africa one day, might provide us with some clues as to the lengths that some participants would go to in portraying black South African politicians in an unfavourable light:

No, no … There’s no future there for us white people … It’s an African continent … And they’ll exploit it until it’s no natural resources or anything left … the African will just take the money because it’s a short-term solution … I don’t believe that they are producers, I think that they are consumers … I don’t think that there’s any consideration for future, I think it’s the here and now; consume … Let’s just take a small example of aid – foreign aid. From Norway they were great at donations, or foreign aid … was it Norway, or Sweden, or one of them? Sure it was Norway. And this whole drive to bring the message across and so much money was invested and where did the money go? It went to the back pockets of a few greedy politicians … And it’s rife, it’s in every single sector of government that grants from municipal level to the government … And, y’know, there’s only so much that eight million tax payers can do for a nation of 45 million, or whatever it is now – maybe it’s 55 million because of all the illegal immigrants … And there’s eight million people working and actively participating and actively paying tax supporting … And 30 million people that have nothing … the balance is just not there … I would far rather pay my taxes to a transparent government like David Cameron’s than to a corrupt government like Jacob Zuma’s. (Tracey, 46, white English-speaking, unemployed)

There are a number of observations to be made in response to this rather lengthy quote. Firstly, classifying the current South African government of President
Jacob Zuma as corrupt obviously stems from the corruption allegations that have been made against him (Rice 2009). Featuring that into the analysis, however, does not justify the way in which ‘the African’, or black South African, is generalised in this quote as a ‘money-hungry consumer’ craving short-term solutions. This is contrasted to ‘producers’ – a status that ‘the African’ cannot possibly occupy according to the participant’s account. By making this division between ‘consumers’ and ‘producers’, the participant is at the same time implicitly saying that white South Africans are more likely to be ‘producers’ – a status which is constructed as something desirable in this quote. With the contrasting image of black South Africans as supposed ‘consumers’ instead, she is therefore worried about returning to South Africa as black politicians might ‘exploit South Africa until it’s no natural resources or anything left’. This clearly brings associations with the fear that whites will be driven out of their lands such as in Zimbabwe.

I will intervene and point out the cultural forms of racism that this example can be said to represent, similar to other cultural forms of racism previously evidenced throughout this thesis. Worryingly, even some academic work would seem to implicitly support this participant in her construction of ‘the African’ in a culturally essentialist manner. I am thinking especially of Oscar Lewis’ (1966) hypothesis of a ‘culture of poverty’. With this hypothesis, Lewis claimed that certain persistent and patterned ‘traits’ in members of a certain cultural setting were mainly to blame for poverty – thereby blaming the victims for their own sufferings rather than accounting for unequal structural conditions. It might be objected here that the above-quoted participant speaks of well-off politicians rather than poor individuals. Nevertheless, she postulates that black politicians will ‘exploit everything’ – thereby running the risk of provoking their own downfall because they are ‘naturally consumers’ like other black South Africans who, along these simplistic lines, can be associated with poverty due to ‘undesirable’ cultural traits. Thus, it is worthwhile to reflect upon how the ‘culture of poverty’ thesis implies that cultural groups that are indulging in ‘undesirable’ cultural patterns would not necessarily lose their alleged cultural characteristics even if poverty was to end (Lewis 1966). This is, indeed, mirroring the participant’s assumptions that since black people are historically poor and disadvantaged in the South African context, the few black politicians who have
been enabled to increase their economic standing in the post-apartheid era would still be unable to distance themselves from the ‘culture of poverty’ they are believed to be inherently part of as black South Africans.

The respondent, furthermore, uses the construction of black South African politicians to claim that she would not return to South Africa as this would imply that her tax money would support the consumer patterns of these politicians, rather than spending her money more wisely, in her perception, on a more ‘transparent’ government like that of David Cameron’s Britain. However, one might ask anyone affected by the Coalition government’s cuts in various sectors of the British economy whether David Cameron’s government is as ‘transparent’ and worth spending one’s tax money on as depicted by this respondent (see Wintour 2013). Nevertheless, the claim that she would not go back to South Africa because it would entail paying tax to a ‘consuming’ and ‘corrupt’ government that cannot even take advantage of foreign aid, has a wider significance. Hence, being ‘proudly South African’ – which this respondent labelled herself as in various other parts of the interview – does not necessarily foster stronger support for the redistribution of wealth in South African society. This observation seems to contradict David Miller’s (2000) assertion that being patriotic about or sharing a certain national identity is by itself a sufficient factor to generate the adequate trust and solidarity, or ‘we-feeling’, required for social cooperation in a specific national society.

Moreover, the notion that only white people are contributing to South African society – as epitomised in the reference to the ‘eight million’ whites she believes to be working in South Africa – significantly underplays the important contribution of ‘non-white’ people – whether South Africans or migrants, and whether working in the formal sector or the relatively widespread informal sector in South African society (Gelb 2008). Her various assumptions can also be believed to find their inspiration in hearsay, as perhaps best reflected in the unrealistically high number that she comes up with of ‘ten million illegal immigrants’ living in South African society (Mngxitama 2008). The final remark that I would like to make is the manner in which Norway is again used as a reference. This time Norway is referred to in order to provide a sharp contrast between the alleged noble motives of the foreign aid that she believes Norway sent to South Africa, and the portrayed misuse of this aid by black South African
politicians. Presumably, it was hoped that this favourable view of Norway would trigger a sympathetic reaction from me as a white Norwegian with regard to the hypothetical situation that she would be facing if she were to return permanently to South Africa one day.

Although everyone did not necessarily express it as ‘extremely’ as the above-participant did, references to the natural resources of South Africa, and examples of how these had been exploited by politicians, were not uncommon amongst the research subjects. Undeniably, South Africa is rich in natural resources, possessing valuable minerals and is an important tourist destination (Binns and Nel 2002). This was highlighted in the interview below:

If you look at South Africa itself, like, and it’s so rich in, I mean, y’know, it’s got a really good tourist, like so many tourist attractions and so many national resources. And what frustrates me is that in my mind South Africa could be a first world country, but it doesn’t have the government to take us there … It really is a beautiful country, it has so much to offer. And it’s just, it boils down to the government, who aren’t doing enough about crime and poverty and things like that. (Helen, 26, white English-speaking, charity worker)

Rather than the government’s handling of pertinent issues such as poverty and crime, let alone the potentially undemocratic nature of the unprecedented power that the ANC has recently acquired (Harding 2012), here I will focus on the rhetorical strategy of claiming that with a better political arrangement in the post-apartheid era, South Africa could have been a ‘first world country’. In this manner, the participant is positioning South Africa as a ‘third world country’ instead, perhaps a valid claim by some significant measures when considering the deep socio-economic inequalities and high levels of poverty in South African society (Nyamnjoh 2006). Notwithstanding, what I find interesting in this quote, as well as in others, is how the representation of the ‘richness’ of South Africa’s natural resources provides a convenient backdrop against which to highlight the alleged injustices of South African post-apartheid politicians for allegedly ‘wasting’ these resources. The apparent worry amongst some white participants that South Africa might still be a ‘third world country’ in ‘developing black Africa’ (Matsinhe 2011) and, as a consequence, not worthy of being associated with in all circumstances, or indeed for them to return to, can be quite illuminating. Being ‘proudly South African’, then, does not necessarily mean that
the living standards of a supposed ‘first world country’ such as Britain will be given up easily for a supposed ‘third world country’ such as South Africa.

Individual differences did, of course, occur in the interview sample. Some other participants, it should be remembered, were not as damning in their criticism of conditions in South Africa. The following quote is included to show that some were more seriously contemplating returning to South Africa one day, as well as the attempts of mitigating the assumed adverse reputation of some white South Africans in the UK:

I intend to return to South Africa, I intend to make my life there. I get very irritated and very, very angry when I hear people say ‘I’m not going back to South Africa, the country is falling apart, y’know, they are taking over the country’. I get really, really angry – that’s not true. And it’s very frustrating to hear someone talk about my country that way. (Richard, 27, white English-speaking, freelance journalist)

7.3 ‘The Crime Rate Needs to Drop’

Interconnected with the theme urging the present South African government and politicians to ‘sort themselves out’ before any consideration of returning to South Africa can be made, was the interview accounts of the prevalence of the statistically high levels of crime in South African society (Altbeker 2007: chap. 3). Post-apartheid South African governments have received no insignificant amount of criticism for their poor handling of the crime situation in the country (Altbeker 2007: Preface), as also read between the lines of some of the quotes above. I will present the theme of crime as a potential push factor from South Africa on its own, however, due to the significant implications it can have for interviewees in contemplating whether to return to South Africa one day. Again, I will not be so much concerned with assessing the crime situation in the country as I will be with considering the rhetorical constructions of crime amongst participants as potentially deterring them from returning to South Africa one day. In terms of the statistics, it suffices to acknowledge that South Africa has one of the highest crime rates in the world for countries that publish such statistics, and that the relatively many incidences of violent crime in the country are of particular concern to many South Africans – whether white or ‘non-white’. A common
phenomenon is that countries that have undergone a transition from an authoritarian to a more democratic regime – such as South Africa – risk high levels of crime (Altbeker 2007).

Thus, it is perhaps not surprising to find that there was often a perception amongst participants that moving to the UK had enabled them to live in a safer environment than what they had experienced in South Africa, or what they expected to experience if they were to return permanently to South Africa. Such perceptions were justified with personal experiences of crime in South Africa, whether it had involved themselves as victims of crime, or family members or friends in South Africa whom they were in regular contact with. Some of the stories were indeed shocking, with quite vivid descriptions of the violent nature of some of the criminal incidents reported by participants. Migrating to the UK was viewed in a positive light in the sense that, for example, “I’m just a far happier, more peaceful person here. And I’ve lost all the anxiety that I was living with, I’ve lost all that fear. So I’m not on anti-depressants anymore, I’m sleeping well at night” (Tracey, 46, white English-speaking, unemployed). Related to this relief of apparently being in a relatively safe place like the UK, according to many participants, was the response that they would not return to South Africa because they believed that it simply would not be safe enough for them. In particular those with children in the UK were quite clear that they would not risk bringing their children with them to live in South Africa. Although both male and female participants expressed virtually the same level of fear of crime during the interviews, some gendered impact may also be relevant in the particularly high number of rapes in South Africa (Altbeker 2007: chap. 3). If belonging is here understood as where you feel at ‘home’ or ‘safe’ (Yuval-Davis 2006; 2011a), then the relative safety of the UK in the participants’ perceptions would appear to matter a great deal for some form of belonging to the UK. However, we must still be careful not to jump to any conclusions here. Sometimes the respondents somewhat contradicted themselves in their accounts by saying that they might consider going back to South Africa one day after all. Yet, in terms of crime, this was typically on the one condition that the prevalence of crime in South Africa would drop significantly.

Notwithstanding the obvious fears and traumas that can be associated with crime, particularly of the violent nature which is so prevalent in South Africa with
one of the highest rates of murder and rape in the world (Altbeker 2007: chap. 3), the ‘racial’ connotations that are sometimes brought into play in talks of crime in South Africa should not be ignored. This was evident in the following account, as the participant went on Google Earth to find a ‘suitable’ place to live when returning to South Africa:

I’m only looking at moving to where there is the security … I’ve walked Google Earth … if you see black people hanging about, then you think: ‘Well, hang on, why are they there? Are they looking to break in?’ So when I Google Earthed, I thought ‘well, there’s nobody there’. And I thought ‘well, that must be a good sign then, because there’s nobody hanging about’. (Eloise, 42, white English-speaking, quantity surveyor)

The essentialist and narrow-sighted notions linking black people with crime in this participant’s view, are all too apparent. She later admitted that it perhaps was a ‘stereotypical thing’ to link black people with crime. However, that moment of awareness on her part had clearly not prevented her from exploring Google Earth to investigate, for ‘security’ reasons, whether there were any black people ‘hanging about’ in and around the location in South Africa she was looking to move to. In addition, some participants were willing to construct the apartheid years as ‘safer’, more ‘orderly’ and ‘civilised’ than conditions during the post-apartheid era – thereby failing to mentioning the oppressive nature of how ‘non-white’ people were constantly being harassed, persecuted and killed for no reason by the apartheid police (Altbeker 2007: chap. 1).

The assumption that things were more peaceful when the apartheid state was still in place would seem to run counter to some participants’ insistence – as reflected in the previous chapter – that apartheid belonged to the past and could therefore no longer structure white South Africans’ mind-sets. Nevertheless, what the emphasis on the preference for the ‘orderly’ conditions of apartheid as opposed to a crime rate that has ‘spiralled out of control’ in the post-apartheid era can reveal, then, is the deeply felt sentiments of nostalgia for the past amongst some of the white South Africans. This was also hinted at in the previous chapter when I discussed some participants’ preferences for more space than what London could afford them, as they were used to more space in the reportedly ‘controlled’ and ‘orderly’ environment of their apartheid past. As apartheid is no longer officially in place in South Africa, such expressions of nostalgia reveal that
the concerned white South Africans are less inclined to return to South Africa since things are much more ‘uncontrollable’ now – with the crime rate as a convenient reference point. The concept of ‘hurt pride’ might be conveniently applied to describe the mixed emotions that some white South Africans express in this regard. That is, although being ‘proudly South African’ – as virtually all white South Africans in this study expressed – they may still try and come to terms with the changes that have occurred since the apartheid era and feel hurt that they are no longer, in their view, in control of this situation. Thus, the concerned white South Africans construct themselves as trying to be as proud as they possibly can, but that this ‘proudness’ is being seriously tested by the challenges of the current situation as perhaps most visibly represented by the crime rate (see Steyn 2001). In essence, Paul Ricoeur (1986) has reminded us that narratives about the past can work as a form of ‘therapy’ that helps us escape from the present situation, which in this case can be seen as offering white South Africans an opportunity to venture back into the past in order to limit the possible psycho-social injuries caused by the current crime situation in South Africa. In so doing, this ‘therapeutic endeavour’ can also offer the concerned white South Africans images of a better future, in their view, that is being (re)created based on their past experiences. Identifying this as a ‘therapeutic endeavour’ should, of course, never detract us from analysing the potentially damaging effects its application can have on South African ‘race’ relations, to the extent that the apartheid past is glorified and black people are mainly blamed for crime.

Other white South Africans were more careful when linking ‘race’ to crime – typically avoiding associations of crime with black people in the manner that above-quoted Eloise and some others did, or at least accounting more carefully for how the apartheid legacy of socio-economic inequalities and poverty is largely to blame for pushing some black South Africans into crime. Even for these participants, however, talk about crime in South Africa might slip into the quintessential narrative of the ‘innocence’ of white people – who have ‘escaped’ to the UK – as opposed to black people as the ‘natural suspects’ of crime (see Ross 1997). One respondent, for example, stated, “I think lots of black people in South Africa are raised with resentment towards white people, because of the history that they’ve had” (Zarah, 21, white Afrikaans-speaking, student). This could seem quite plausible at first glance, but we must bear in mind that what is
not acknowledged in this statement is the fact that black people – not white people as implicitly suggested here – are more likely to be the victims of crime in South Africa (Mngxitama 2008: 204).

One prominent reason that black people are overrepresented amongst victims of crime is that most white South Africans have more financial means than black people in South Africa and invest more resources into private security companies. Thus, they are enabled to physically insulate themselves in their guarded houses, or so-called ‘gated communities’, away from ‘the poor black masses’ in South African society (Mngxitama 2008: 204). Of course, the legacy of segregation during apartheid has some enduring impact, but the presence of ‘gated communities’ can also be seen in relation to how the post-apartheid state apparatus has implemented neo-liberal policies facilitating increased privatisation of many of the state’s typical functions such as personal security. This has contributed to ‘black-on-black’ crime amongst the ‘have-nots’ – predominantly South African and immigrant blacks who have largely become responsible for their own security – whereas the ‘haves’ – predominantly whites, but also the comparatively few ‘non-white’ middle- and upper-class members – have been encouraged to invest in private security companies and hide behind their walls from the outside realities (Sharp 2008). The result is an environment far from the ideal of active citizenship in the Greek polis in ancient times, where individual possessions were supposed to be left behind in the private sphere so that people could emancipate themselves to meet others face-to-face in the public sphere and come to common agreements (Shafir 1998).17

It is no wonder that the palpable presence of security measures has provoked some commentators to employ the label ‘neo-apartheid’ instead of post-apartheid South Africa, recalling the similarities with the overt segregation during apartheid (Mngxitama 2008: 204). This form of segregation in contemporary South African society is compounded by the fact that white South Africans typically have more realistic prospects than ‘non-white’ South Africans to

17 Having pointed out this, it is questionable whether this ideal still has much potential in the considerably larger nation-states of our times compared to the Greek polis in ancient times (Castles and Davidson 2000: 33).
insulate themselves even further from crime in South Africa by, ultimately, staying abroad in other countries like the UK conceived as being less ‘crime-ridden’. The present analysis is not meant to be a damning criticism of white South Africans for staying abroad. It is necessary to remind that some of them have perfectly valid reasons to do so – including some white South Africans who have cited crime as having caused rather adverse experiences and serious traumas. What I am rather pointing to, then, is the general situation in which ‘non-white’ South Africans are rendered less resourceful and mobile than a sizeable number of white South Africans – often having no other options but to remain in South Africa despite being disproportionately affected by violent crime and other everyday challenges.

Despite these realities, the following white Afrikaner was still of a strong conviction that white South Africans, particularly Afrikaners, are deliberately and systematically being targeted by black South Africans:

> You wanna wipe out a whole nation, that is classed as genocide … The genocide has started off small; I think there’s more than 4,000 [white Afrikaner] farmers and their family being murdered brutally [in South Africa] in the last few years now, five years or whatever it is. Which is unheard of anywhere else in the world. (Gregory, 62, white Afrikaans-speaking, retired)

Before we can comment on this quote in some more detail, it is important to contextualise the ‘farm attacks’ that the participant classifies as a form of ‘genocide’. The reason why it is perceived so important to contextualise properly before jumping to any conclusions on this matter, is because we are dealing here with relatively sensitive issues with regard to the nature and consequences of violent crime, the use of specific terms to describe this type of crime and the ‘racial’ connotations that might be associated with such descriptions. Proper contextualisation is, indeed, an important means to ensure that certain ethical standards are adhered to (see Section 4.6 on ‘Ethical Issues’ earlier on in this thesis, but also consider this section alongside Section 4.5 on ‘Reflexivity’ where I have accounted for how the participants might perceive me and the potential effects on this study). Kvale and Brinkmann would emphasise, then, that “[a]s qualitative researchers are involved in actual issues with particular people at particular places and times, they need to master an understanding of these
concrete particulars in order to be morally skillful” (2009: 79). Correspondingly, these scholars would also assert that, on the other hand, “[l]ooking at a situation in a ‘snapshot,’ outside its temporal and social narrative context, will ... make it hard to judge and act morally” (2009: 78, inverted commas in original).

By way of integrating some fundamental reflections when contextualising the ‘farm attacks’ in post-apartheid South Africa, it might first be acknowledged that these attacks have, as Gregory indicates above, particularly affected white Afrikaner South Africans when taking into account the large share of the farming industry that this group comprises. Furthermore, as also indicated by Gregory, the attacks can be considered as a phenomenon of the post-apartheid era and should be seen in relation to the general increase of violent crime in this period. The extent of the attacks might become even clearer if we delve into the statistics and look at some key numbers. For instance, it is shown that in the immediate years after the end of apartheid – between 1994 and 1999 – around 800 farmers were killed and that this number averaged 11 murders per month. Moreover, there were reported 1400 violent attacks on farmers from 1994 to 1997 (Van Rooyen 2000: 83). It appears that this particular form of violence has not declined in a significant way, inasmuch as we account for the numbers showing that “[t]here used to be 60,000 white farmers in South Africa. In 20 years that number has halved” (Simpson 2013). One might wonder, nevertheless, the extent to which this newspaper report might contain elements of journalistic ‘sensationalism’ in the sense that the reduction of white farmers cannot solely – and possibly not even primarily – be attributed to murder when considering that other factors such as mass industrialisation and the merging of smaller farms have impacted on the numbers. Yet, the phenomenon of ‘farm attacks’ must still be considered as a serious issue and talking point, as perhaps best reflected in the South African media’s regular reports of recent farm incidents (see e.g. Reuters 2012).

Therefore, the fact that such ‘farm attacks’ have occurred to some considerable extent in the post-apartheid era cannot, and should not, be denied. In the South African media, these attacks have frequently been portrayed as constituting an example of black people ‘taking matters into their own hands’ and seeking retribution from the apartheid years by attacking those perceived to comprise the main protagonists of apartheid, namely white Afrikaners (see e.g. Reuters 2012). It has been claimed in terms of the violent nature of some of the
‘farm attacks’ that “[w]hile it is understandable that a destitute and desperate man might need to steal to feed his children, this does not explain the extent of violent crime and the large number of needless murders that often accompany housebreak-ins” (Van Rooyen 2000: 88). Consequently, we could speculate on the extent to which the above-participant – Gregory – gains his inspiration from certain media voices in classifying attacks on white Afrikaner farmers as ‘genocide’. Indeed, this or related terminology has been employed by some relatively highly-ranked journalists writing on this issue (see e.g. Simpson 2013).

What we must be aware of, nevertheless, is how the construction of white Afrikaners as ‘victims’ – by media commentators or as tapped into by some white South Africans like Gregory above – could be perceived as deflecting of the realities of ‘white power’ as appropriated through the history of colonialism and apartheid in South Africa (Schönfeldt-Aultman 2009). Furthermore, we should be wary of how characterising the ‘farm attacks’ on white Afrikaners as constituting ‘genocide’ might somewhat undermine statistics which overwhelmingly conclude that black people most commonly are the victims of violent crime in post-apartheid South Africa – insofar as we include all types of violent crime, and not only ‘farm attacks’ (Altbeker 2007: chap. 3). Schönfeldt-Aultman therefore asks us to consider “whether living conditions and crime in South Africa constitute whites as victims”, before adding the important point of whether living conditions and crime constitute whites as victims or not, “rhetorically, the claiming of victim status ... ultimately work[s] to align crime, anarchy, and death with blackness and ‘ordinary’ and ‘normal’ with whiteness” (2009: 120-1, my emphasis, inverted commas in original). This relates to the essence of negotiating the boundaries of the post-apartheid South African ‘nation’ which, despite the rhetoric of a diverse South African ‘rainbow nation’ in which ‘race’ allegedly does not matter anymore, can become internally fractured. This, moreover, teaches us a crucial lesson with regard to the composition of ‘nations’ in general:

While the members of the nation are usually constructed as belonging to one or another nation, the membership body of the nation is never perceived as homogeneous: it is composed of and encompasses differences in terms of gender, generation, class and usually also other perceived social divisions that ... are constructed as encompassed within its boundaries, such as ability, sexuality and – particularly relevant to the point here – of ethnicity and race. (Yuval-Davis 2011a: 97)
By returning to Gregory and investigating his biographical background in closer detail, we can approach a more contextualised account as to why some white South Africans might be influenced by and reproduce an ‘us’ and ‘them’ view in terms of ‘racial relations’ back in South Africa. By pinpointing the position from which Gregory is speaking from, we can be sensitive to his background and situate his current statements within this background rather than merely ‘demonising’ him for the views that he might be holding. In so doing, I am not intending to legitimise his views, but rather to better understand them on the basis of his own life world and perceptions. Indeed, it is worth noting that Gregory is 62 years old and come from the older generations in South Africa who have grown up and been influenced by the apartheid regime to a greater extent, generally speaking, than the younger generations. This, combined with the fact that Gregory served for some time in the apartheid military, has perhaps moulded his mind-set to the extent that he has come to hold the view that, when compared to during the apartheid years, “it’s going backwards, without a doubt” with South African society. Gregory himself seems partially aware of the possibility that his upbringing during apartheid might have had this adverse effect on his views, as he reflects on whether “I was protected by the government of the day, to think that it’s better to have a white government than a black government. I don’t know”. We might ask then, by returning to the earlier-discussed concept of ‘white talk’ as introduced by Melissa Steyn (2001), whether Gregory and other white South Africans in my sample with similar views are trying to retain some of white people’s power that is now perceived to be lost. Schönfeldt-Aultman confirms that “it is not uncommon to hear white voices claiming victim status after they lose privileges they formerly had at the expense of others” (2009: 129). Without denying the seriousness in Gregory’s claim that the attacks on white Afrikaner famers in the post-apartheid period must be given their appropriate attention, we should simultaneously provide a contextual understanding of such accounts – perhaps especially as social scientists when bearing in mind South Africa’s specific history – by asking ourselves the pivotal questions of “who says what, where, when, and with what goals” (Van Dijk 2002: 149).

Thus, when contextualising the above-discussion within the main preoccupations of my research of the negotiations of ‘racial’/ethnic boundaries, as well as the present chapter’s focal point of the question of return to South Africa,
it is noteworthy how the term ‘genocide’ seems to be employed in order to argue that white South Africans, especially white Afrikaners, should be granted refugee status in the UK or elsewhere. Article 1 of the UN Convention Related to the Status of Refugees might retain some purchase here. Specifically, this Article emphasises that refugee status can be granted in the host society if there is convincing evidence that migrants risk persecution because of their ‘race’, amongst other social categories, in their home society (UNHCR 2007: 16). However, the ‘racial’ implications and controversy of granting white South Africans refugee status became clear in a case in Canada in which a white South African was initially granted refugee status in 2009. This case is, as far as I am aware, the only time a white South African has been granted refugee status in recent times in a Western country. The white South African making the case for his asylum application argued that he was not safe in South Africa because of the possibility of violent crime from black people in particular, which he argued that the South African government was unable or unwilling to protect him from (Austen 2009). The Canadian immigration authorities’ initial decision to grant this white South African refugee status in 2009 – because he would supposedly “stand out like a ‘sore thumb’ due to his colour in any part of the country” [South Africa] (quoted in Austen 2009, inverted commas in original) – was obviously a very contentious decision that sparked a heated debate in Canada as well as in South Africa. Representatives of the South African Government in Canada objected strongly to this decision on the grounds that “[t]his is a smack in the face of a country that’s trying to move ahead with racial issues” (quoted in Austen 2009). It was therefore with some relief for many that the decision to grant this particular individual refugee status was overturned by Canadian immigration authorities about a year later in 2010 (Austen 2010).

The white South African, however, confronted Canadian authorities by arguing that he had been a victim of a ‘politically correct’ regime allegedly preoccupied with accommodating for ‘non-white’ individuals and, correspondingly, ignoring the needs of white individuals (Humphreys 2011). In sharp response to this accusation, it suffices to point out that blaming politicians for being too ‘politically correct’ resonates with a common rhetorical strategy in the ‘backlash against multiculturalism’ discourse. This rhetorical strategy, as here employed by the white South African asylum seeker, is often used as a means of
last resort to weaken any opposing debaters with the sweeping, but unfounded, assumption that “the ‘politically correct’ refuse to talk about real issues and social problems; they are therefore untruthful” (Vertovec and Wessendorf 2010: 13, inverted commas in original). Employing this rhetorical strategy, therefore, enabled the white asylum seeker to argue that he ‘dared’ to speak the ‘truth’ about the plight of white South Africans in the face of the Canadian authorities who, purportedly, stifled any such debates with their ‘politically correct’ agenda.

Finally, although in no way at all denying the pertinence of the crime situation in South Africa, we should perhaps end this discussion on crime by questioning whether some of the respondents might contribute to painting too bleak a picture of the situation, particularly when bearing in mind the potential ‘racial’ connotations as referred to above. At least this was indicated by Kenny, who warned about the potential stigmatising effects by the British media in terms of its reporting of crime in South Africa: “In other words, if my son [in South Africa] says to me that crime is bad and this and that, I believe him. But if I read an English newspaper about crime in South Africa; sorry, I won’t read it” (Kenny, 63, white English-speaking, parcel driver). Another participant – who expressed a realistic desire to return to South Africa in the foreseeable future because she was not as worried about crime as some of the other participants – told of how she had not experienced any sort of crime in South Africa at all, whereas when she came to London she had immediately found herself as the target of a criminal incident:

In all my years I’ve been there [in South Africa], I’ve never had a problem. And I lived there for – well, I moved here [to the UK] when I was 23 years ... My first year living here I had my bags stolen. I never had that in 23 years of living in South Africa. (Christina, 29, white English-speaking, travel agent)

Including this quote is not to deny that crime is statistically more prevalent in South Africa than in the UK, but rather to show that individuals have different experiences with crime that might come to shape their different perceptions. As the majority of participants had been – unlike this participant – somehow affected by crime, it is perhaps unsurprising that the majority of them had a bleaker outlook on the crime situation in South Africa.
7.4 South African ‘Ambassadors’

Some white South Africans have experienced considerable tension from various sources in South Africa for leaving South Africa not long after the end of apartheid for the supposed ‘greener pastures’ in Western countries: “Of course, a lot of people did say that the whites were running away because the blacks were now in power. And so they couldn’t see that the fact that, y’know, somebody – a black person – would be in power” (Beatrice, 36, ‘mixed race’, massage therapist). Nelson Mandela himself has derided those who have left the country and ‘abandoned’ their responsibilities of building the new South Africa, questioning whether they are ‘real South Africans’: “Let them go. In that process we are convinced that real South Africans are being sorted out” (Cape Times 24 September 1998, quoted in Van Rooyen 2000: 124). Perhaps partially as a response, for virtually all the participants – and perhaps particularly those unable or unwilling to return to South Africa for different reasons – it seemed important to stress that although they presently were living abroad, they were still proud of being South African and giving something back to South African society by promoting South Africa from abroad as some kind of ‘ambassadors’. Although the word ‘ambassador’ was seldom employed, a sizeable number of the participants still talked as if they had taken on a role as a South African ‘ambassador’. As one participant commented on South Africans in the UK, “everybody you come over that’s from South Africa has a sense of they’re representing the country” (Richard, 27, white English-speaking, freelance journalist). Arguably, this can be read as an attempt to mitigate any potential criticism from politicians, the media and ordinary people in South Africa for their decision to emigrate, ensuring that they could stay abroad with some dignity.

The following white South African lamented the way that white South Africans were occasionally represented as giving up on the country, calling for more recognition of the important contribution to South African society that they can be making from abroad:

We do still now and then hear people say back home ‘oh, y’know, South Africans who are overseas are people who give up, have given up on the country’ … I’ve never got it personally, but you do hear about it all the time. And that’s not the point of being abroad … [they should] give South
Africans who live overseas a chance to give something back to SA … we’re all overseas for economic reasons and career reasons … But we also wanna be back home, so [we wanna] give back abroad with the various projects that we do. (Lucas, 31, white Afrikaans-speaking, affluent entrepreneur)

The dilemma of being abroad is captured well by this interviewee, as he recognises that South Africans might be in the UK for economic and career reasons, while at the same time they still want to be ‘back home’ in South Africa. According to him, this dilemma can be reconciled by facilitating and allowing for the possibility that South Africans can be giving something back to South African society in the various projects that they are involved in from abroad. The next participant talks about the possible nature of some of these projects as, in his profession, involving charity and business projects:

I’m involved with a few charities I work with … And obviously heavily involved with promoting South African businesses to the UK. So there’s a lot of businesses we’re outsourcing. Okay, like the guy who does maintenance on my websites, he’s all based down in South Africa. Um, and I promote businesses I attend as well. (Patrick, 35, white English-speaking, affluent entrepreneur)

What I would like to discuss in relation to the charity and business projects that this participant talks warmly about, is whether these projects might render the involved white South Africans less negative towards affirmative action policies in South Africa. This discussion builds on the assumption that certain charity and business projects might be initiated with the intention of transforming the socio-economic inequalities working against ‘non-white’ people in South African society. This potential transformative effect is, thus, similar to the potential transformative effect of the affirmative action policies in South Africa that had, paradoxically enough, been lamented by most of my white South African respondents.

The concept of ‘guilt’ could prove informative in approaching a better understanding of the issues raised above. The ‘guilt’ or ‘trauma’ that white South Africans possibly experience for being individuals who benefitted from the structurally racist policies of the apartheid regime, could still be an underlying emotion that presents itself in their mind-sets despite, at the same time, actively downplaying the significance of apartheid through the myth of the ‘rainbow
nation’ as presented in the previous chapter. A feeling of guilt could be applicable even for those white South Africans who committed no personal atrocities during apartheid, as academic work on collective guilt finds “that by acknowledging their membership in a group, people may experience specific emotional reactions as a result of the actions of that group, even if they personally have not behaved in an objectionable way” (Doosje et al. 1998: 873). As was also indicated in the previous chapter, this collective guilt might not be recognised as guilt as such in that participants would refrain from talking in specific details about the atrocities of the apartheid regime and how they have benefitted from this as white South Africans. Yet, when discussing white South Africans’ involvement in various South African projects, we would be well-advised to also note that theoretical writing on guilt recognises that “[a]lthough guilt is an unpleasant emotion to experience, it can result in socially desirable outcomes” (Powell et al. 2005: 509). Henceforth, underlying sentiments of guilt could, to some extent, be driving some of the initiatives of white South Africans in trying to help ‘develop’ South African society from their UK-base.

However, a less cheerful reading on the potential transformative influence of the involvement of the white South African ‘ambassadors’ living abroad, can be provided. Research has proposed that feeling sympathy for another group of people – which for white South Africans engaging in transnational projects from the UK might involve feeling sympathy for poor ‘non-white’ South Africans – serves the self-interests of one’s own group to a greater extent than the interests of the group one appears to be helping. In terms of a development or human rights discourse, Makau Mutua (2001) has compellingly argued that this discourse serves the needs of the Western world, or whites, in claiming moral superiority. This is facilitated by establishing a relationship whereby the poor ‘non-white’ ‘victim’ is constructed as “weak, powerless, prone to laziness, and unable on his own to create the conditions for his development” (Mutua 2001: 232), thus in perceived need of being ‘rescued’ by ‘noble’ white individuals. Possibly taking their cues from this observation, Powell et al. (2005) argue that focusing on the suffering of ‘non-white’ individuals diverts attention away from the ways in which white people themselves might pave the way for this suffering by benefitting from socio-economic inequalities. Powell et al. perceive that the benefits of dominant status are rarely made salient by being taken-for-granted as
part of white individuals’ everyday lives, whereas the sufferings of ‘non-white’ individuals do not present itself as frequently in white people’s everyday lives. In this sense, when instances of ‘non-white’ suffering actually do present themselves for them, they are more likely to capture their attention by “represent[ing] a smaller part of the psychological field for Whites [which] will therefore be perceived as figural” (2005: 518).

It is worthwhile noting that there could be related reasons for white South Africans to be diverting their gaze from their relative wealth to the suffering of ‘non-white’ South Africans instead. The sense of ‘guilt’ for white South Africans’ involvement as a group in the production and reproduction of socio-economic inequalities in society, might be too much to bear for certain individuals. A gaze that concentrates on the suffering of ‘non-white’ South Africans in South Africa rather than on the privilege of white South Africans in the UK is thus quite convenient. Or as Powell et al. formulate it, a more predominant framing of whites’ privileges is presumably shunned as it “leads Whites to express relatively higher levels of guilt (an aversive emotion) and to distance themselves from their racial group, which is indicative of harm to their social identity” (2005: 518, brackets in original).

Departing from this overall trend was of course those interviewees who seemed more aware of the privileged background that they came from, such as the white South African who confessed that his viewpoints were “very privileged … coming from a very particular background” (Richard, 27, white English-speaking, freelance journalist). I also think it is important to clarify that the points raised above are not meant to discourage the various projects that white South Africans in the UK are involved in – these projects might indicate a strong desire to help South Africans in need rather than being a motivational strategy per se for diverting attention away from white people’s relative wealth. However, what I am hoping to bring attention to here is the way in which some ‘development’ projects initiated from the West have less noble motives than what appear at first sight. Furthermore, it cannot be taken-for-granted that the various projects that some white South Africans are involved in from the UK would automatically have a transformative effect on South African society. Again, this is not to discourage in any way these projects, as they might contain a considerable potential for transformation and act as an important first step in raising awareness of pertinent
development issues in South Africa. Having said that, though, there is some evidence suggesting the limited impact that South Africans located in the UK, as well as in other Western locations, would seem capable of mustering upon the development prospects of South African society. In a recent study conducted by Jonathan Crush (2011), it is found that in comparison to income, the South African diaspora outside of Africa [including in the UK] contributes with less money in remittances than the African diaspora in South Africa itself sends back to other African countries. While “[t]he contribution of the [African] diaspora in South Africa to the development of their countries of origin is clearly sizable” – even to the extent that “[t]he Lesotho and Mozambique economies would be hard-pressed to even exist without migration and remittances” – the South African diaspora outside of Africa is characterised by “only limited development engagement with South Africa” (Crush 2011: 18). This finding might come as a surprise to some. However, it illustrates the implications of the neglect of the African diaspora in various African countries, as the South African diaspora outside of Africa has received far more research attention for their ‘development potential’ merely because these migrants “tend to be wealthier, better-educated and more organized [and we could add white]” (Bakewell 2009: 3).

Yet, in keeping it squarely within the research parameters of this study, we still ought to be asking whether white South African ‘ambassadors’ in the UK cannot help South African society in some important respects merely through their strong sense of belonging to the ‘South African nation’. Indeed, Jonathan Crush (2011: 16) admits that the South African diaspora outside Africa, including in the UK, is perhaps best conceived as offering a development potential through various cultural affiliations such as the marketing of South African products, as well as in the form of return visits to South Africa and as representatives for the tourism industry. By taking the example of the South African tourism industry, one participant, amongst others, was therefore keen to point to the importance of this industry. It must be remembered that this participant was working as a travel agent in the UK, but that she also seemed so dedicated to South African tourism that she was willing to extend her job well beyond her working hours:

I love taking people back to South Africa that have never been, like I’ve taken quite a few friends from here that are not South African, y’know, to show them the country. And, y’know, we’re very proud to do that and to
promote it … And I promote my country all the time. All the time. (Christina, 29, white English-speaking, travel agent)

The importance of the tourism industry for the South African economy cannot be denied. In a country with staggering unemployment rates of around 25% according to official numbers,\(^{18}\) it is well worth noting that the tourism industry allegedly “supports one in every 12 jobs in South Africa” (SouthAfrica.info 2012). Yet again, we are right to question whether the tourism industry has a significant transformative effect in distributing wealth evenly between different ‘racial’ groups in South African society. It appears to me that tourism, as with business and charity projects, does not challenge the socio-economic inequalities in South African society sufficiently enough to retain the transformative salience that some of the participants implied. Similarly to the focus that cultural artefacts and food have retained in a prevailing ‘multicultural imagination’ in the Western world (Kymlicka 2010: 33), studies have demonstrated that tourism may primarily touch upon such cultural representations for the ‘satisfaction’ of the relatively well-off, white and Western tourist – thus excluding more substantial issues such as socio-economic justice (see e.g. Shaw and Williams 1994).

7.5 ‘Counteracting the Brain Drain’

Related to the condemnation that emigrating South Africans have received from various South African voices, is the worry that these are relatively highly-skilled people who take the skills with them for the benefit of wealthier countries rather than investing them in a developing country like South Africa which sorely needs these skills. It has been emphasised that because South Africa has invested significantly in its citizens – by for example financing schools to educate them –

\(^{18}\) However, this percentage can be expected to be higher in reality, as the statistics on unemployment prioritise those who have sought a job – thus not accounting for those who are not registered as taking ‘active steps’ to find formal employment (Posel et al. 2013).
it is morally wrong for South African citizens to migrate to another country and enable that country, which has not invested anything in these people, to reap the ultimate awards of the investment that South Africa has made in them. This phenomenon is commonly referred to as the ‘brain drain’ to indicate that South Africa is ‘losing’ its brains – whether referring to white or the comparatively few ‘non-white’ emigrants that are departing for more ‘attractive’ destinations (Crawford 2011: chap. 3). Clearly, much has been written and said about the ‘brain drain’, both in general as being negative to the Global South and in particular as being negative to South Africa (see Nyamnjoh 2006: 69-74 for an overview). It is perhaps with special concern for South Africa, as well as for other developing countries, that “[p]ublic services – particularly the health and education sectors – have suffered great strain from the loss of a large number of doctors, nurses and teachers who can earn up to double their wages in Europe, Canada, the US, Australia or New Zealand” (Sveinsson and Gumuschian 2008: 18). Although South African politicians have gradually begun to take a more positive stance, hoping to attract South African emigrants to return ‘back home’ with their skills (see Sveinsson and Gumuschian 2008), negative voices have arguably made their lasting mark in South African political discourse (see e.g. Daley 1997) and media discourse (see e.g. Ndenze 2007), as well as in the academic literature (see e.g. Crush 2002). It is not my intention, however, to discuss in detail the possible magnitude and ramifications of the ‘brain drain’ here. Rather, it is more interesting for the purposes of this study to consider how participants were aware of and constructed their own solutions of counteracting the ‘brain drain’. As far as I am aware, such a consideration of one of the accused parts in the ‘brain drain’ debates – the migrants themselves – has seldom been made in the academic literature, which is usually more preoccupied with quantifying the precise magnitude and ramifications of the ‘brain drain’ (e.g. Kaba 2004; Meyer et al. 2000).

It is necessary to remember that some participants would evaluate a British education or work experience in a less favourable light than a similar South African education or work experience, while some others reported that some level of ‘de-skilling’ had taken place in which their South African skills were not properly recognised in British society, at least at an initial stage. Having pointed out these caveats, this section will now turn to the ways in which some of
the white South African migrants constructed going abroad to the UK as being an advantage rather than a ‘brain drain’. A number of the participants, for example, were keen to express that they could counteract the ‘brain drain’ on South African society with the very experience of being abroad and any skills that they had acquired in the process. This knowledge transfer was made possible by the fact that these migrants were already planning, or had a deep desire, to return to South Africa one day with the skills they had previously acquired in South Africa and while residing in the UK. The quote below illustrates this argument:

liv[ing] in a different country ... you get to see how things work in other countries and, um, you get ideas, you gain new skills – especially working like in my industry. Ja, I work with some digital, and working in digital in the UK is just like, it’s the best place to be … there’s so much happening here. And I can get that knowledge and I can take back home [to South Africa]. And I can start my own company, take that knowledge to other industries within South Africa. (Felicia, 30, white English-speaking, web developer)

Amongst some interviewees, the experience that London could offer as a global city and central hub in the world economy (Sassen 2005), was accredited particular value. When asked whether it was important for her to settle into a job when first arriving in London, Christina concurred:

Yeah, that was, I had to get a job … I wanted to get more experience. I thought when you get back to South Africa, if they see you’ve been working in London, they take [you] cause you’ve had all that experience, you’ve dealt with people from around the world. And you’ve learnt about other destinations, not only about your own country. (Christina, 29, white English-speaking, travel agent)

Christina also told me about her plans to return to South Africa in the immediate future and take this experience with her. She had arrived in London in 2005 and had been working as a travel agent ever since. Moreover, Christina believed that it was a normal practice for anyone coming to London – including some of her South African friends that she mentioned – to take advantage of the experience that the city could offer and then go ‘back home’: 
And other people that you meet, they go back home. It’s very like, I think a lot of people don’t settle here, they just use it … to like get some experience. (Christina, 29, white English-speaking, travel agent)

Christina is highlighting the value of what has been termed ‘circular migration’ in the academic literature (see Vertovec 2007c). This concept holds that migration is a pattern of mobility that has always existed throughout time and around the world, whether referring to domestic or international migration. This would also imply that domestic migrants – for example when members of the British host population come to London for work opportunities and then return to a rural setting in the UK for their retirement – are as much migrants as are international migrants. The only difference is that the latter category of people needs to provide the adequate papers when crossing international borders, which essentially constitutes a political construction on the part of the modern nation-state (Vertovec 2007c: 5). I therefore believe that Christina implicitly questions, in response to any possible critics, as to why she cannot come to London and gain the relevant experience there, just like domestic migrants are allowed to. Any such hypothetical denials of her rights to migrate to London would, indeed, seem especially harsh according to the construction of ‘the London-experience’ as having the potential of counteracting the ‘brain drain’ in South Africa upon her return there. If this is a correct interpretation of this interview, I very much agree with Christina’s claim that she should be allowed to benefit from the experience of being in London. If in any doubt by now, it should be clear that I am in favour of steps towards less regulated and more open borders for migrants. What is of concern, however, is when it would appear that the borders are systematically being opened wider for one particular group of people – white South Africans – as opposed to another group of people – ‘non-white’ South Africans. Furthermore, the participant’s *construction* of ‘the London-experience’ is of interest as it would seem to achieve certain objectives on the participant’s part. This construction conceivably provides the participant with a valuable means of responding to any South African ‘brain drain’ critiques, by essentially arguing that going abroad does not necessarily imply that she is perpetuating the ‘brain drain’ in South Africa.

It must be specified that the interviewees were not invariably sheltered from the fact that by going abroad they were, according to voices in the ‘brain
drain’ debate in South Africa and beyond, possibly having an unfavourable impact on South African society. For Richard, being abroad had seemingly caused him a moral dilemma in the manner in which he distanced himself from South Africans who are ignoring pertinent development issues back in South Africa: “South Africans in the UK are a funny bunch. We are very, a lot of us are very critical of what’s going on back home without necessarily doing anything about it” (Richard, 27, white English-speaking, freelance journalist). As this quote indicates, Sveinsson and Gumuschian’s reflection that for their white South African interviewees, “motivations to deal with the developmental challenges facing South Africa were, for many, secondary to individual motivations for emigration [or remaining in the UK]” (2008: 19), appears to retain some considerable purchase. Indeed, for the majority of my own participants, returning to South Africa was frequently dependent on the condition that the opportunity presented itself to them, especially in terms of a concrete financial/employment opportunity, or the prospect of their increased safety when bearing in mind the worry about crime.

Contrary to any sweeping representations that would seem to suggest that all emigrating South Africans contribute an equal extent to the ‘brain drain’ in South Africa, it is also noteworthy that an intersectional consideration can illuminate that some participants conceived that they might have quite different roles and impacts on the ‘brain drain’ pertaining to their socio-economic status. Eloise, for example, maintained with some confidence that her skills had such an importance and were so much recognised in South Africa, that the job which she had been offered upon her permanent return to South Africa was of an even higher status than was her previous job in the UK:

Interviewer: When you’re going back to South Africa in February, how are your prospects in terms of jobs?

Participant: Right. At the moment I’m an intermediate QS [quantity surveyor]. I have been offered jobs as senior QS, so I would skip QS-stage, go straight to senior QS. (Eloise, 42, white English-speaking, quantity surveyor)

Eloise’s quote can then be contrasted with the account of another respondent, who happened to be close friends with Eloise owing to the fact that I adopted a
snowball sampling technique as part of my strategy to recruit participants. In this quote, it is suggested by the respondent that she might not have been equally involved in the ‘brain drain’ as had her friend Eloise while both of them had been residing abroad in the UK, as she does not have the same qualifications as her:

Eloise could probably go back to South Africa and get a fantastic job, because she’s qualified – she’s got an education … But my problem is I don’t have any qualification. (Tara, 41, white Afrikaans-speaking, general admin in a company)

It is, however, worthwhile to remark that this latter participant was quite resentful towards the affirmative action policies in South Africa. This would compel us to probe the possibility that she is rather blaming affirmative action policies for giving her a ‘problem’ if returning to South Africa, than because of the fact that she does not have the adequate education. This would perhaps indicate that this participant is putting the blame on affirmative action policies for causing the ‘brain drain’, as she predicts that she would not be recognised in the South African labour market despite reporting that she has worked hard and gained valuable experience in the UK. Arguably, this would work as a convenient strategy on the participant’s part in critiquing the post-apartheid governments for implementing affirmative action policies, thereby diverting attention away from any involvement that white South Africans may have in the ‘brain drain’ by leaving South Africa for ‘greener pastures’.

7.6 Conclusion

In this chapter, I have investigated whether the white South Africans taking part in this study, whom had largely been in consensus that they are proud of being South African, would valorise this ‘proudness’ to such an extent that they would consider returning permanently to South Africa one day. The chapter investigated this not by attempting to answer resolutely whether the participants actually would return to South Africa. It rather focused on what some prominent reasons for either remaining in the UK or contemplating a return to South Africa could reveal about the maintenance of ‘racial’/ethnic boundaries and the related
protection of their privileges amidst any conceivable threats to these. In this regard, the chapter accounted for how the notion that the government in South Africa ‘needs to sort itself out’ is one prominent condition for some interviewees to rather remain in the security of the UK, as black state politicians in the post-apartheid era were blamed for not keeping control of the country. This provided a contrast to what was seen as more ‘civilised’ conditions during the white apartheid rule, according to some interviewees. The crime situation was also at times reported as being ‘out of control’ in the post-apartheid era, and some would also highlight – often in an implicit rather than in an explicit manner – that crime is mainly being perpetrated by black people. These, and other reasons, give some white South Africans bargaining power in claiming that it is ‘impossible’ for them to return to South Africa under such conditions. This would seem to legitimise and secure their ‘privileged option’ to remain in the UK, compared to most ‘non-white’ people left behind in conditions of poverty and immobility in South Africa. Responding to critical voices in South Africa that they are ‘racist cowards’ who left once apartheid ended and would not help building the country because black people have gained political power, interviewed white South Africans claimed that they can still help South African society from abroad through various projects and other means. Arguably, this is a convenient strategy of claiming that they do not have to return in order to help South African society, as they can very well do this from abroad as some kind of South African ‘ambassadors’. Alternatively, perhaps as a response to accusations that South African emigrants are causing a ‘brain drain’ on South African society by taking their skills abroad, some participants indicated their willingness to return to South Africa and that their experience in British society would, purportedly, benefit South African society upon their return. However, we must here be wary that those white South Africans who engage in such talk might be speaking from a position of relative power, in the sense of being in possession of certain skills due to the education and socio-economic possibilities that they have acquired from the apartheid legacy.
8. Conclusion

I shall now conclude the present study on white South African migrants in the UK. In order to address how my arguments/findings can be interpreted in the light of wider academic debates, I will first devote this conclusion to emphasising the most pressing theoretical contributions that I believe the study can give to the sub-discipline of citizenship and migration studies. The sub-discipline of citizenship and migration studies draws upon different disciplinary traditions (see Favell 2008a) – although sociology, more broadly conceived, is the overarching, or umbrella, tradition that my study has fallen within. Following this section, I will explicate the potential normative and policy implications of my study. This conclusion shall then end by highlighting the way forward, or some suggested avenues for further research in the field of South African migration, in particular, and the broader academic debates on citizenship, migration and belonging, in general.

8.1 Contribution to Citizenship and Migration Studies

In this thesis, an intersectional approach has been adopted and contributed to advancing my argument with regard to the manner in which white South Africans in the UK seek to retain their relatively privileged group status as a response to any actual or perceived threats to this status. As there are many ways of doing and theorising ‘intersectionality’ (McCall 2005) – one of which has been demonstrated here – I have refrained from understanding intersectionality as a single theory as such (Anthias 2012). I believe that intersectionality should, rather, be viewed as a flexible concept and an analytical tool that can be adapted to the aims of the particular study and would, therefore, not need to be followed slavishly. This potential for a varied applicability of intersectionality is not a problem, in my view. Rather, I would be inclined to see this as an advantage of intersectionality in that the role of the social sciences should not be to end the discussion once and for all, but to facilitate a constructive dialogue as to the usefulness and applicability of particular concepts (Davis 2008). In my particular
case, an intersectional lens has guided me through this research by sensitising me
to the social categories that influence and intersect with the (re)constructions of
‘racial’ and ethnic boundaries amongst white South Africans in the UK. This has
not only pinpointed me to the nuances of individual identities, but has also,
through my contention that intersectionality must also look at questions of power,
enabled an analysis as to the broader ramifications of who might be
included/excluded as ‘citizens’ and members of particular ‘nations’ at the behest
of powerful and other social actors. With this understanding, intersectionality
“initiates a process of discovery, alerting us to the fact that the world around us is
always more complicated and contradictory than we ever could have anticipated”
(Davis 2008: 79).

In terms of the possible contributions that an intersectional approach of the
kind employed in this research can make to citizenship and migration studies,
there are some concluding observations to be made. Earlier notions of citizenship,
such as Marshall’s (1998 [1963]) theorisation of the development of citizenship
rights in the post-Second World War British ‘welfare state’, emerged at a
different time when society was arguably less complex than it currently is. I
would therefore, alongside some prominent academic voices (e.g. Castles and
Davidson 2000; Vertovec 2009; Yuval-Davis 2011a), advocate for updated
understandings of citizenship that incorporate the most recent transformations in
Western as well as non-Western settings. Social scientists should strive to
recognise the significance of citizenship as a concept whose explanatory power
can help us to comprehend and grapple with the prevailing dynamics in our
contemporary societies as a whole (see Susen 2010). In assisting this endeavour, I
believe that the analytical insights of intersectionality can facilitate the study of
citizenship in its present conditions. Rather than lamenting the difficulties of
analysing the complexities of the current situation, the adaptation of an
intersectional lens could encourage social scientists to embrace the challenge of
understanding citizenship in its multifaceted forms. This would be consistent with
the claim by John Gray that “we shall turn to our best advantage the opportunities
our present historical circumstances allow us” (2007: 229).

Indeed, although societies have always been diverse and complex
throughout human history (see Goldberg 2002: Introduction), it could be argued
that we are living in a time that is marked by an increasingly diverse and complex
social structure in the department of international migration and citizenship. This is perhaps particularly the case in the main destinations of international migration, such as the UK, that have experienced a ‘diversification of diversity’ due to intensified globalisation processes (Vertovec 2007a). This reality of contemporary life has contributed to cultural fragmentation and hybridisation processes. Diversification, moreover, has unfolded “not just in terms of bringing more ethnicities and countries of origin, but also with respect to a multiplication of significant variables that affect where, how and with whom people live” (Vertovec 2007a: 1025). All this has potentially challenged the traditionally conceived, or the more exclusively national, frameworks of citizenship in terms of people’s belongings – without rendering the powers of the state to devise policies as ‘dead’ as such, like some commentators would seem to have us believe (e.g. Ohmae 1995). Responding to and attempting to tackle the increased de facto diversity, then, the political management of migration in the host society has sought to increasingly homogenise its ‘native’ population as ‘one nation’ only and created a distinction between ‘us’ and ‘them’ (Yuval-Davis 2006; 2011a). What is also worrying is that the host state management has simultaneously – in order to serve its economic needs in a neo-liberal world order, but also its cultural needs by favouring more ‘assimilable’ migrants that supposedly reduce the potential for social conflict – been responsible for adding further layers of complexity by facilitating different legal categories of migrants and employed accompanying political rhetoric influencing notions of who is more or less entitled to ‘belong’. As part of the picture, the migrants in question have come from a different society in which the predominant political categorisations and associated citizenship constellations might also have affected, to a considerable degree, their predominant identity formations and perceptions of other groups in society (Cherubini 2011). Both in a legal and more informal sense, therefore, it would seem right to claim that it must be recognised that “citizenship is no longer a single status but rather a multiplicity of memberships” (Shafir 1998: 24).

Increased complexity, it should be stressed, is not necessarily fostering more solidarity across hierarchical fault lines according to socially constructed lines of ‘race’, ethnicity, class, gender, and so on, that are permeating the societal structure (Castles and Davidson 2000: chap. 10). An intersectional sensitivity to the multifaceted nature of these fault lines reminds us that by romanticising the
present conditions of complexity without accounting for hostilities from the host population or from other migrants themselves to such complexity, we would lack some significant explanatory power (Bastia et al. 2011). In describing how our present societies are “full of unresolved tensions” (Shafir 1998: 24) – stemming from processes by which “groups are stratified into a set of roughly concentric circles, from core to periphery, that constitute a hierarchical and fragmented citizenship structure” (Shafir and Peled 1998: 252) – it is pivotal that social theorists keep up to date with the current developments. I have shown that it is no longer feasible to analyse social life through one-dimensional perspectives as regards, for instance, to the liberal scholars who refer to “an abstract individual ... not bound to any ascribed or hierarchically arranged group” (Toffin 2010: 28, my emphasis), or the communitarians who may risk focusing too much on their conception of the ‘good society’ to be able to incorporate the range of alternative attachments that diverge from this ideal (see Shafir 1998: 10-3; Tinker 2006: 21-2 for overviews). The process of negotiating citizenship is clearly much more varied and imperfect than a relatively narrow conception of citizenship captures.

Of course, however, this does not indicate that any approach to intersectionality is a feasible corrective to previous approaches. Following McCall’s (2005) observations, it is therefore necessary, to an increasing extent than intersectional researchers have done to date, to point out the precise formulation of ‘intersectionality’ that will be adopted and how it will contribute to the study of, say, citizenship. In this particular intersectional study, I have assumed that to enable a sufficiently authoritative and concise study, we must sometimes limit our analyses to one or two categories of particular significance to the specific research questions. Although I have prioritised ‘race’ and ethnicity over other social categories, as in accordance with my research questions, it must be emphasised that I have also recognised that insofar as significant diversities and contestations of citizenship are to be captured, the particular researchers must also open up the possibility that the main categories of investigation intersect with other social categories. Such intersections can occur at the personal level with regard to categories that co-constitute the particular biographies, life chances and identities of individuals, but also at the more structural level in the ways in which dominant notions of ‘race’ and ethnicity intersect with other categories in fostering unequal social relations. In adopting a constructivist and relational
perspective, I have consequently been interested in the underlying processes and situations by which different social categories are experienced, internalised and/or resisted as part of drawing ‘racial’ and ethnic boundaries amongst white South Africans in the UK (Cole 2009). As such, it should be stressed that I have not accepted categories as ‘natural’ entities or pre-determined facts of life – even though they may be imagined in this sense by my participants. Categories, or the group-formations that these categories may sustain, are ultimately fluid; “they come into being and may fade away” (Young 1989: 260).

In sum, I hope to have demonstrated how intersectionality can be “a powerful analytical tool, capable of grasping the increasingly stratified and unequal dynamic of contemporary citizenship” (Cherubini 2011: 120). In fact, the observations I have made regarding the intersections of other social categories with ‘race’ and ethnicity might not have been uncovered, to the same degree, had I only been interested in ‘race’ and ethnicity in complete isolation from other categories. My particular approach to intersectionality has ultimately enabled valuable insights of the ways in which members of relatively privileged migrant groups such as white South Africans seek to maintain their privileged social locations within certain categorical parameters vis-à-vis more disadvantaged groups. White South Africans in the UK are, rather surprisingly, a migrant group that has received relatively little academic attention. This is, presumably, because their integration into local communities in the UK has not been perceived as a ‘problem’ by politicians to the same extent as with regard to more disadvantaged and ‘non-white’ migrant groups (McGhee 2009). As such, white South Africans in the UK have possibly not be seen as ‘interesting’ or ‘exotic’ enough for research purposes. However, it has been argued that it is illuminating to pay attention to white South Africans’ endeavours to secure the qualities of their group status that enable them to be labelled as a privileged group compared to other groups in British and South African society. As a privileged status may not be secured once and for all, then, it has been shown that white South Africans can be attentive to different forms of perceived or actual threats to their status, which they might attempt to negotiate away. Hence, in order to best distil which social categories migrants can make investments in contra the categories they disinvest in when negotiating ‘racial’ and ethnic boundaries, an intersectional approach
sensitises researchers to the complexities of contemporary aspects of citizenship, migration and belonging.

In Chapter 5 – the first empirical chapter – we saw how a relatively privileged status within certain categorical parameters – such as white skin colour, British ancestral and/or cultural ties and a relatively secure socio-economic position – was employed with the explicit or more implicit purpose of helping the white South Africans in question to negotiate informal access to the ‘British nation’. These favourable aspects of being white South Africans – according to many of the participants’ notions – are seen as necessary to invest in, at least in a rhetorical and emotional capacity, so as to ensure that they can most effectively cancel out the perceived or actual challenges to their access negotiations that they face as migrants in what is arguably an increasingly anti-immigrationist British environment. In relation to this, Chapter 5 also showed that members of relatively privileged migrant groups such as white South Africans can, perhaps surprisingly to some, internalise the current political anti-immigration rhetoric in the British context despite being migrants themselves. This demonstrates how some migrants – who are usually the targets of anti-immigration rhetoric themselves – tap into such rhetoric in arguing that they should be considered as more ‘deserving’ than certain other migrant groups, but also that they supposedly ‘add more value’ to British society than certain members of the host population such as working class Brits. The circumstances and the ways in which white South Africans – some of whom are in possession of British ancestral ties – attune themselves to political notions delineating those who are included from those who are excluded from the ‘British nation’, are interesting cases in point. Too often, I believe, migrants have been represented in the academic literature as defenceless objects who are automatically seen as ‘prisoners’ of the policies that are devised by the dominant political actors representing the host nation-state (see e.g. Janoski 2010; Neumayer 2006; Torpey 2000). However, this is not to say that migrants are always interpreted as having no voice of their own. Indeed, more and more studies have recently considered how disadvantaged migrant groups are also subjects and capable of processing and acting upon the policies and surrounding rhetorical constructions that politicians propagate and circulate in society (see e.g. Sharma and Gupta 2006 for the ‘anthropology of the state’; Shore and Wright 1997 for the ‘anthropology of
policy’). This does not always mean that migrants are resisting policies, as they might also internalise the underlying assumptions of policies. The point is, notwithstanding, that migrants are active interpreters of policy, rather than neutral bystanders who do not reflect upon or negotiate the implications of policy (Stasiulis and Bakan 2003). The academic incorporation of studies that consider migrants as subjects rather than as objects of policy should therefore be celebrated.\(^{19}\)

However, I believe that it is now time to also include, to an increasing extent, migrant groups who are relatively or partially privileged, such as white South Africans, into these discussions of migrants as potential subjects of policy. This can show, as this study has hoped to demonstrate, that these migrant groups do not necessarily have the same interests as more disadvantaged migrant and ethnic minority groups might have in opposing the dominant political and media discourses in the host society. Indeed, these relatively privileged migrant groups can even benefit, in certain circumstances, by adopting such discourses in constructing themselves as more ‘desirable’ than disadvantaged groups in society. To be sure, disadvantaged groups would at times also tap into and use the available immigration rhetoric in the host society in attempting to construct themselves in a better light – for example, when they can argue that they are ‘hard workers’ in a policy climate favouring migrants that work hard (Sveinsson 2010: 16; see also Lopez Rodriguez 2010 for the specific case of Polish migrants). However, such strategies would, presumably, not be seen as equally credible when adopted by migrant groups that are usually perceived in a more negative light in the host society. This is because they might face severe forms of discrimination based on skin colour, for example, possibly overriding any of their other access negotiations to a greater extent than for a white and relatively affluent migrant group such as white South Africans (Erel 2010). I believe, therefore, that being attuned to the varying bargaining powers of the access negotiations of migrants situated differently in the socially constructed ‘hierarchical orders’ in the host society according to intersecting categorical

\(^{19}\) An earlier appreciation of the voices of disadvantaged groups, however, is the beautiful account by James C. Scott (1987) entitled *Weapons of the Weak.*
parameters such as ‘race’, ethnicity, class and gender, is an insight that should provide grounds for further discussions and take a stronger part in future research endeavours (see also Smith 2002 for a similar observation).

Although intersectionality has traditionally been interested in points of intersections, I have also been attuned to the instances in which an intersection at the individual and/or structural level may be less pronounced. This has, for instance, been shown in the cases in which white South Africans’ ‘whiteness’ seems to retain comparatively greater significance than other social categories – as regards to some of the observations made in Chapter 6 on ‘South African community’ formations in British society. As reflected in Chapter 6, then, geographical insights into the arrangement of space in urban areas can show us that the decision of where to locate and whom to socialise with in everyday life, is often a decision that is marked by routine patterns of behaviour in which members of a particular group get drawn to what, or to whom, they are most familiar with. This becomes particularly prevalent in situations in which people develop a strong sense of anxiety, as with regard to a migration situation and a resettlement into a new society (Jackson and Everts 2010). Seeking other white South Africans in British society, therefore, becomes a probable coping strategy inasmuch as white South Africans feel a need to reconnect with associates from South Africa as a response to any exclusionary mechanisms that they experience in British society – despite their ‘whiteness’ and relatively privileged status. As migrants also tend to organise space in ways they are familiar with from their home societies, coming to an everyday multicultural setting like London does not necessarily impact upon the cognitive maps of where and with whom white South Africans want to socialise with when bearing in mind the overt segregation that benefitted them during apartheid (Merry 1981).

It must be recognised that when it comes to notions of segregation, however, this might also be influenced by the British policy context of seeing segregation between white and ‘non-white’ people as something ‘natural’ – if not necessarily as ‘desirable’ as it was seen during apartheid South Africa. The British policy environment – blaming ‘non-white’ groups for ‘sleepwalking to segregation’ – should also be sensitive to the fact that segregation is more likely to be caused by socio-spatial patterns of ‘racial’ discrimination leading white people away from areas stereotyped as ‘dangerous, non-white ghettos’ in the UK.
(Finney and Simpson 2009). Of course, there are important exceptions to the observations of the ‘segregatory’ tendencies of white South Africans. This thesis has shown that some white South Africans would reach out to and socialise with ‘non-white’ South Africans as well as other migrant groups in British society. This can be a reflection of how migrants spatially come together due to their common status as ‘outsiders’ in the host society, and points to how common ground between migrants can be sought despite the intersectional insights of the potentially adverse and divisive influence of various migrants’ different social locations within certain categorical parameters (Castles 2002). However, it is not always equally clear in my white South African participants’ accounts as to how frequent and substantial these contacts with members of other migrant groups might be. As Gill Valentine has argued in response to writing about cosmopolitanism and ‘new’ urban citizenship, some of this literature is “laced with a worrying romanticization of urban encounter and to implicitly reproduce a potentially naïve assumption that contact with ‘others’ necessarily translates into respect for difference” (2008: 325, inverted commas in original).

The insight extrapolated from Chapter 7 is that white South Africans’ sense of indignation for presumably having lost their privileged position after the political transformations in South Africa, shows how members of certain groups can feel oppressed because they compare their present situation with a romanticised image of their social location within a category in the past (Hulkoski 2009). This pertains to how their ‘whiteness’ no longer feels like an insurance policy against any potential challenges in South African society, possibly resulting in the phenomenon that many white South African migrants want to stay in a white majority context such as the UK rather than return to South Africa. An intersectional sensitivity to the dynamics of privileges/disadvantages enables us to understand the self-acclaimed position of ‘oppression’ amongst white South Africans as a linguistic strategy to cope with their perceived loss of their previously entrenched position in apartheid South Africa. Understood primarily as a linguistic strategy, however, their ‘oppression’ is incomparable to the oppression, in the actual sense of the term, that many ‘non-white’ South Africans might experience on a daily basis. When considering the intersecting privileges as white, English literate and with a relatively secure socio-economic status, a considerable number of the white South Africans in the UK hardly qualify as
‘oppressed’ when compared to the many ‘non-white’ South Africans that are stuck in acute poverty and harsh conditions back in South Africa. This is, of course, not to imply that there are no white South Africans that can be more oppressed than certain other white South Africans, as it, indeed, has been demonstrated through an intersectional perspective in this thesis. Notwithstanding, it could be said with some certainty that white South Africans in the UK are, as a group, considerably more privileged than most ‘non-white’ South Africans in general terms.

In this sense, Chapter 7 was implicated with what the answer to the question of whether the white South African participants considered returning permanently to South Africa one day would seem to imply for ‘racial’ relations and development in South African society. However, it must be recognised that this would not seem to fit neatly in with the conventional considerations of development. Indeed, development studies within a conventional structural orientation have mostly been interested in measuring the tangible effects on the development progress or regress of a society, for example through some numerical indicators on the economic growth of the national economy of the society under consideration (see Potter et al. 2004 for an overview). It is some cause for concern that, on this particular economic measure, South Africa would score relatively high compared to many other developing countries, despite the deep socio-economic inequalities within the South African population (Žižek, 2008: 10-2). Of course, more recent developmental approaches have recognised the importance of also understanding the attitudes amongst different groups in the specific society as constituting a potential barrier to development (De Haas 2008 is a notable example). It is, therefore, within this latter form for development studies that the insights in Chapter 7 can primarily be associated with. This is mainly so, since we have seen that even the more ‘noble’ rhetorical constructions of some of the white South African participants as being South African ‘ambassadors’ helping South African society from abroad, may not always constitute substantive involvements that have a deeper transformative effect on the profound ‘racial’ inequalities in South African society.
8.2 Normative/Policy Implications

I have presented some reflections above as to the potential theoretical contributions of this study. These have pointed primarily to the importance of intersectionality as an analytical device that has considerable descriptive and explanatory power in enabling us to make better sense of the complex nature of how citizenship is currently institutionalised and practised. Framing the present circumstances through descriptive and explanatory accounts potentially has wider significance for how key players in society might approach and handle the central dynamics or tensions of citizenship. However, some social scientists would assert that this might not be enough. These social scientists (e.g. Kemp 2012; Susen 2010) would be inclined to argue that to ensure with more confidence that a more viable and lasting contribution could be extrapolated, social scientific research would also have to make further efforts towards making certain normative claims as to how specifically the particular study could make an impact beyond academia for the benefit of society as a whole. In the words of one scholar, there should be a commitment both towards “the critical study of social reality and to the pursuit of the question of how this reality can, or should, be changed” (Susen 2010: 274). Such normative suggestions can, in crucial respects, inform the configuration and implementation of the appropriate policies that are needed in facilitating positive societal transformations. As a red thread throughout this thesis, I hope that it has been noticeable that my arguments/findings not only have the potential of becoming involved in wider theoretical debates, but can also assist in making some normative suggestions with regard to predominant policy debates. However, in order to more precisely pinpoint and clarify what these suggestions might be and how they might look, it is appropriate to outline what I believe to be the most important suggestions that can be extrapolated.

I will firstly address perhaps the most usual charge from citizenship scholars with a relatively pronounced normative agenda (e.g. Benhabib 2004; Young 1989); that is, that the present-day realities of differentiated and hierarchical citizenship – as described above through an intersectional lens – would also need to be complemented by a more normative-oriented framework that envisages possible ways in which we can facilitate communication across differences. Iris Marion Young sums up the dilemma between the increased need
to recognise differences, on the one hand, and the continued salience of commonalities as a traditional foundation of citizenship, on the other, that seems to be troubling citizenship in the contemporary nation-state:

In a heterogeneous public, differences are publicly recognised and acknowledged as irreducible, by which I mean that persons from one perspective or history can never completely understand and adopt the point of view of those with other group-based perspectives and histories. Yet commitment to the need and desire to decide together the society’s policies [ideally] fosters communication across differences. (1989: 258)

Yet, there is the ever-present challenge from top-down categorisations and rhetoric employed by dominant politicians, which have the potential effect of making any form of inter-group solidarity more unlikely. This thesis has shown that, in combination with legal restrictions to access, there are also a number of barriers to access and full integration in society perpetuated by politicians in the manner in which they talk about migration and related issues – rhetoric which might also circulate in the media and be appropriated by ordinary people. In this sense, this thesis has spoken to the ways in which British politicians – despite applying a seemingly neutral language in which ‘race’ is not spoken of anymore – can still encourage anti-immigration hostilities and everyday forms of racism in British society through the employment of different cultural codes to represent and describe the nation-state in exclusionary terms. It can be said that dominant British state politicians employ symbolic and subtle boundaries separating the world population into ‘us’ and ‘them’, which is often presented in a language that appears less exclusionary than it actually is. The recent emphasis on ‘British values’ as an attempt to include more liberal criteria – seemingly favouring migrants’ allegiance to the state, rather than as subscribing to the racist undertones that more explicitly defined Britain as a ‘white nation’ in the past – should therefore be subject to closer interrogation (Yuval-Davis 2011a: 21-6). As Yuval-Davis eloquently puts it,

[e]mancipatory and political values can be transformed, under certain conditions, into the inherent personal attributes of members of particular national and regional collectives (Britain, the West) and, thus, in practice, become exclusionary rather than permeable signifiers of boundaries. (2011a: 25, brackets in original)
Such exclusionary mechanisms designed from the macro level of dominant politicians might affect certain migrants to a greater extent than other migrants, as they are seen to possess characteristics that are less in line with the illusionary values of the host nation. On the whole, it has been shown in this thesis that white South Africans seem, as a group, to be less subject to such adverse representations than many other migrant groups in the British context due to a number of factors, but perhaps primarily because of their white skin colour and cultural connections to Britain. This shows that our attention should not only be paid to the ‘obviously racist’ cases such as apartheid South Africa, since racism as institutionally defined also takes root in nation-states that pride themselves on being more ‘liberal’ such as the UK. We should also remember that despite the prevailing rhetoric of the ‘rainbow nation’ in post-apartheid South Africa – which in rhetorical terms is inclusive of people from all different ‘racial’ and ethnic backgrounds – such political constructions cannot guarantee that all ‘racial’ and ethnic boundaries from apartheid suddenly have been eradicated. This has been seen in this thesis with regard to the underlying racism evident in some of the white South Africans’ accounts, whom in certain instances appear to reproduce the rhetoric perpetuated by the white apartheid regime rather than wholeheartedly relishing the ‘rainbow nation’.

However, some might object to the role that politicians have in fostering a racist environment and take up the metaphor of whether the chicken or the egg came first, wondering whether it is not rather the public, or society, that might influence the behaviour of ‘the state’ rather than the other way around. It is, for instance, speculated whether restrictive politics and political expediency that affect certain disadvantaged groups in society unfavourably are a result of politicians responding to a ‘racist public’ and catering for their wishes, rather than such political endeavours having the main responsibility for shaping the public in a negative, possibly ‘racist’, direction in the first place (Statham 2003). I am of the contention that the state apparatus should, notwithstanding, not be relieved of any of its responsibility by claiming, as is often done by politicians, that they are ‘only’ doing the right thing and responding to the supposed wishes of ‘the public’. Rather, it would seem more appropriate that the state apparatus takes responsibility and is held more accountable for the potential impacts of its actions, as it certainly would be the case that politicians would, at least to some extent,
have the capacity to make a positive difference instead by devising a more accommodating stance towards disadvantaged groups in society (Skey 2011). For instance, Paul Statham has researched the anti-asylum rhetoric that intensified in Western Europe in the 1990s in response to political anxieties about increased globalisation and immigration. Focusing on the British context, in which asylum seekers’ rights have been limited at the same time as politicians have scapegoated asylum seekers as making unrealistic demands on the British welfare system, Statham reaches the conclusion that

the perceived government policy position sets the normative limits of public understandings of asylum and immigration issues … [It] simply legitimates xenophobic sentiments … and provides the public with cues for seeing problems in a distorted and exaggerated way. (2003: 174-5)

Statham’s research thereby identifies the potential power of words that politicians use when talking about issues relating to migration. Indeed, it is often the case that “if a negative image – no matter how untrue – is persistently directed at something or someone, even after its correction a certain amount of enduring damage is done” (Vertovec and Wessendorf 2010: 27). Furthermore, although one particular group was identified as being particularly targeted in Statham’s research – asylum seekers – Statham (2003) warns that this can easily transfer to other migrant and ethnic minority groups in society, as the public does not necessarily see the difference between different categories of migrants. This can create a hostile environment towards migrants in general, in which even more privileged migrant groups such as white South Africans themselves tap into such sentiments against certain other migrants. Arguably, this is in order to try and ensure that they are not put together with other migrant groups perceived, amongst some members of the British public, to be lower down in the ‘social hierarchy’. However, even if they achieve to retain their relative high group status in the UK, this is not a guarantee of white South Africans escaping, at the end of the day, any adverse attention as migrants and supposed ‘outsiders’. There are those white South Africans that are less affluent, of course, but even allowing for the fact that white South Africans in general constitute a relatively well-off group, this fact would not invariably be deemed as good enough by certain elements in the British host population. Slavoy Žižek thus points out, in illuminating how
easily migrants get the blame no matter what they do, that “in the racist perspective, the 'other' is either a workaholic stealing our jobs or an idler living on our labour, and it is quite amusing to note the ease with which one passes from reproaching the 'other' with a refusal to work to reproaching him for the theft of work” (1990: 54, inverted commas in original). According to such logic, even white South Africans qualifying as ‘highly-skilled’ migrants could get blamed, for instance, for ‘stealing’ ‘native’ Britons’ jobs – a notion that perhaps becomes especially potent in the current times of economic recession.

Interwoven in this thesis, however, there have been indications of the numerous ways in which ‘racial’ and ethnic boundaries can still be crossed to a considerable extent. For example, certain instances have been identified in which migrants may come together through their common struggles in an environment with anti-immigration elements. The question then remains as to whether belonging as formulated in terms of migrant solidarity can constitute any hope for the future, let alone whether such migrant solidarity will also be embraced by disadvantaged parts of the British host population in an attempt to generate a common voice for greater equality and justice in society. It is necessary to remember, however, that in the comparative case of white South African and Eastern European migrants that has been highlighted in this thesis, the two groups are usually positioned in quite opposite socio-economic echelons of the British labour market. This creates a distance in some of the everyday forms of language employed by white South Africans at the detriment of other migrant groups, as observed in this thesis. Presumably some of this rhetoric is employed by the participants in this study in order to retain this distance and, thereby, preserve their privileged positions at the expense of more disadvantaged migrants. Those who believe that more privileged migrants such as white South Africans would give unconditional support to more disadvantaged groups in their struggles to advance in the particular ‘social hierarchy’, might therefore be disappointed. Again, this is of course not to say that white South African migrants in the UK are not disadvantaged in any sense, as a number of the participants I interviewed were in fact unemployed at the time of the interview. However, it is to claim that the ‘national hierarchies’ (Tsuda 2009) partially created by the differential treatment that migrant groups receive in their negotiations of immigration and citizenship policies – whether based on cultural, economic or some other factors – might
drive a wedge between different migrant groups in addition to the more traditional divide between the ‘native’ population and migrants. This observation reminds us that even though it could be encouraging and politically fruitful to look for points of convergence between different migrant groups, we must always keep an eye out for the inequalities and social divisions that exist between different groups. These realities possibly make any common resistance against discrimination amongst variously situated migrants all the more complicated – though not impossible – to realise.

Although other factors could have some plausible bearing – for instance, it could be posited that grievances would nevertheless run higher in the current times of economic downturn in Britain and beyond (Kessler 2001; Mayda 2006; Scheve and Slaughter 2001) – the implicit message portrayed in this thesis is that politicians can make a positive difference by devising more accommodating policies for all migrants than those currently on offer (Statham 2003: 174). Certainly to some extent, a restrictive policy environment has fostered some underlying tension between migrant groups in the everyday struggles to obtain legal access and become informally included in British society. Hence, I hope that this thesis has helped to supplement the many studies that consider how the host nation discriminates against migrants, but which nevertheless fail to acknowledge that the structural conditions in the host society also provide incentives for some migrants to tap into the pre-existing discrimination of certain other migrant and ethnic minority groups, as well as of socio-economically disadvantaged sections of the ethnic majority population (Banton 1998: 166). A reason for this paucity in research is perhaps that it is uncomfortable to talk about how migrant and ethnic minority groups – who may face severe discrimination themselves – might feel compelled to feed into the available political boundaries in the host society in order to contribute to the exclusion of more disadvantaged groups rather than risking any adverse attention on themselves. However, this research has demonstrated that it is important to highlight the ways in which stricter immigration and citizenship policies, for example, possibly encourage and exacerbate tension between different groups in society. Contrary to taking on-board the political rhetoric warning of all the ills to society that supposedly would be generated if migrants and ethnic minorities were given too many rights and privileges without corresponding duties on their part to integrate in society, my
thesis hopefully demonstrates that it is rather the governmental clamping down on migrants’ and ethnic minorities’ rights that should be of main concern for any future prospects of ‘social cohesion’ (McGhee 2009).

8.3 The Way Forward

Finally, I shall suggest some further avenues for research that may arise from this thesis. These research avenues are suggested in the hope that the thesis might have sparked the interest amongst other researchers to such an extent that there would be interest in exploring certain threads – which have not been fully accounted for here – in further detail elsewhere.

Firstly, to discuss how research on white South Africans in the UK can follow this research, I would like to open up the potential that more can be said about the material consequences of white South Africans' different class and gender positions in society. This is not to say that such issues have been ignored in this study. As it has been advocated in this thesis, an intersectional approach can help us consider how other significant social categories such as gender and class might intersect with ‘race’ and ethnicity. However, this has been facilitated within the parameters of this research’s focus on the sense of belonging amongst white South Africans in the UK, and not so much on their material situations in British society per se. Of course, it has been indicated that their material situation in British society can impact upon their sense of belonging, and vice versa. Yet, there has been less focus on the myriad of ways that their material situation may actually be improved or suffer setbacks as they go through their everyday lives in British society, than the stronger consideration on the linguistic strategies in negotiating citizenship that has obviously preoccupied me here. Similarly, as belonging has been the defining aspect of citizenship under investigation, less emphasis has been put on other aspects of citizenship that are of importance such as political participation and the enactment/claim-making of various legal rights. What can also provide an interesting opportunity for other researchers to explore in further detail, is the experiences of second-generation white South Africans in the UK – whether in terms of their belonging, or some other aspects of particular interest to the researcher. Mainly, the current study has concentrated on the first-
generation of white South Africans who have migrated to the UK in the post-apartheid era from 1994 and after. A closer consideration of the second-generation could therefore provide fruitful grounds for a comparative study with the first-generation of white South Africans in the UK.

Some of the findings that have been made in this study can be expected to be replicated in studies of other migrant groups. It seems like this would particularly pertain to other white and relatively privileged migrant groups. However, this should be considered in more detail, perhaps revealing some illuminating discrepancies in the (re)production of ‘racial’ and ethnic boundaries between the different groups. The fact that white and relatively privileged migrant groups seem to have been neglected in much social scientific research, would make this type of research and comparisons all the more pertinent. It would also be interesting to distil the ways in which less privileged migrant groups position themselves in relation to white South Africans in the construction of ‘racial’ and ethnic boundaries in society. Perhaps these relatively disadvantaged groups work with some of the same assumptions as white South Africans and/or adopt some other strategies within the parameters of their relatively limited ‘political opportunity structures’ (Però and Solomos 2010). In the case of these groups potentially sharing the same strategies as white South Africans, interesting research has recently been conducted on the experiences of Eastern European migrants in the UK – a group which is also classified as white and, thereby, employs some of the same rhetorical strategies as white South Africans in preserving the privileges that their ‘whiteness’ might afford them in various circumstances (see e.g. Fox 2012; McGhee et al. 2013; Ryan 2010). However, as with white South Africans, there are potential threats to these privileges that constantly need to be (re)negotiated, perhaps particularly since Eastern Europeans are normally to be found in ‘lower-skilled’ and lower paid employment than white South Africans in the British labour market (Fox et al. 2012). As a response to these anxieties, Fox (2012) has identified the rhetorical devices that Eastern European migrants might deploy with regard to the claims that they, at least, should be considered as more entitled to ‘belong’ to British society than even more disadvantaged groups such as recently arrived asylum seekers. Added into the equation could be research that demonstrates how racism from the host societal structures and members might activate hostilities between different
groups in the first place, by creating the foundations for an everyday ‘battle’ between different migrant and ethnic minority groups to become accepted and ‘belong’ to particular national spaces (e.g. Skey 2011). Such comparisons between different groups – while bearing in mind the insights of intersectionality that not all members of the specific groups are equally privileged or disadvantaged – could steer us clearer towards an understanding as to how members from other groups might also adopt similar attitudes and behaviours as those of some of my white South African participants. This could help clarify that white South Africans are not an exceptional or a particularly ‘xenophobic’ group as such, despite any remaining traces of the history of apartheid in which they were enabled to segregate themselves in privileged enclaves. In general, this would enable us to more conclusively verify Michael Skey’s statement, for example, that increased levels of social angst and inter-‘racial’ and -ethnic tension “is a problem for society as a whole and should not be simply laid at the door of particular groups” (2011: 167).

Yet, it would also seem important to differentiate instances in which ‘racist’ discourses, partially because of their implication with the apartheid regime, are adopted by and work to benefit white South Africans as opposed to members of other groups. This is not to fall into the trap, of course, of saying that all white South Africans would necessarily be building on and benefitting from such rhetoric. It is, however, to point to how structural conditions that white South Africans have been influenced by in their past circumstances in South Africa can still have a bearing on current relations with other ‘racial’ and ethnic groups. However, it has been complicated to differentiate precisely the influence of these previous structural conditions, as opposed to the way in which the contemporary immigration and citizenship policy climate in the UK also has a significant bearing upon some of the participants’ inclination to perceive certain other ‘racial’ and ethnic groups in a less favourable light. The interview accounts that this research has built upon have shown the overlapping, fleeting and shifting nature as to how varying cultural understandings are drawn upon – not necessarily making it possible for me as the researcher to resolutely pinpoint participants’ statements in the light of the predominating contextual influences of the particular statements. However, this should not invariably be interpreted as a weakness of the current study, as it is rather indicative of the fact that the white South African
participants’ sense of belonging is not set in stone, but needs to be constantly negotiated amidst the transition from apartheid to democracy in South Africa and their relocation to British society.

Nevertheless, an objection that perhaps would be made is that, in understanding this negotiation process, this study has foregrounded instances in which white South Africans’ sense of belonging has been constructed in opposition to other ‘racial’ and ethnic groups. It might be said that in so doing this study has overemphasised the potential for social conflict at the expense of generating a stronger focus on instances in which ‘racial’ and ethnic boundaries are crossed. In my defence, however, I would like to point out that this study has also attempted to discuss such instances of boundary-crossings, showing that although the potential for boundary-crossings is there, this potential is not always realised. Much would ultimately depend upon individual agency and the capacity for the specific white South African to step out of any pre-existing societal norms which suggest that certain ‘racial’ and ethnic boundaries should not be crossed. Even though some instances of such individual agency have been demonstrated in this research, then, the emerging analysis has evidently revealed the potentially constraining nature of certain pre-dictated ways of thinking that operate in South African and/or in British society. I believe that clarifying the potential grip that these contextual understandings can exert on ordinary people is important for the sake of fulfilling our common responsibility of imagining and working towards greater social justice. Without an understanding of the contextual nature of much of the thinking governing notions of ‘race’ and ethnicity – particularly when exhibited from the relatively privileged position of certain white individuals – it would seem more difficult to tackle head-on the root causes of everyday forms of racism (Essed 1991). Thus, it is not the particular individual that should get the sole blame for holding certain attitudes towards ‘racial’ and ethnic ‘others’. This is, of course, not to say that by partially blaming structures for racist attitudes, we withdraw the individual responsibility that social actors ought to be holding for reproducing racism in everyday life. Indeed, a withdrawal of individual responsibility for racist attitudes should not be advocated even if the perpetrators of racism are migrants themselves and, thus, in a potentially challenging structural and contextual situation fostering such attitudes. Having pointed out this caveat, however, it would still seem that in approaching a better understanding of the
assumptions under which our contemporary society operates, it is important for critical ‘race’ and migration scholars to situate racist attitudes within certain structural and contextual conditions. I hope that this thesis has been able to show that such structural/contextual conditions might originate both from traditionally perceived ‘xenophobic’ contexts such as South Africa, as well as societies proclaiming their ‘liberal mindedness’ and ‘innocence’ such as the UK.
Appendix 1 – Interview Guide

By Kristoffer Halvorsrud
PhD Sociology Candidate, University of Nottingham

The following interview guide is primarily meant as a guide to the topics I need to prompt and probe on before I can close off the interviews, so the exact wording and sequence of the questions will be amendable to the individual interviews.

1. Introduction

- The following will be said to all participants by way of introducing the interviews:

‘Thank you for agreeing to take part in this study. I am a PhD student undertaking a research project at the University of Nottingham. I am looking at South Africans in the UK and their experiences with immigration/citizenship policies, everyday lives in the UK and connections to South Africa. As part of the project, I am carrying out interviews. The interview is confidential in the sense that it will be anonymous, so I can assure you that nobody will know your name or any identifiable details. As you can probably imagine, it would be difficult for me to take notes at the same time as I am concentrating on what you say, so would it be okay for you if I tape-record the interview? I can assure you that I am the only person who will listen to the tape. Also, I was wondering if you have any time limitations which need to be considered before starting the interview? The interview should take about an hour. Do you have any other questions or comments before we start? I was wondering if you could please read and then sign this informed consent form if you agree with this? (show participant informed consent form). It is for my university to show that I have informed you what the interview is for and that you have agreed to take part in it’.
2. Life in South Africa (Prior to Emigration)

- maybe you can start off by telling me about your childhood in South Africa
- family situation (emotional and economic)
- which schools attended, when left school/any further education
- whether worked, how long
- how old were you when apartheid ended, memories of apartheid
- what is different in SA now compared to the apartheid era
- do you think SA is a more democratic society now or not

3. Dynamics of Migration

- when left South Africa/when come to the UK
- reasons for leaving South Africa/reasons for coming to the UK
- went straight to the UK or other country/ies first
- migrated alone or with others
- preparations
- feelings (own and what people in South Africa thought/think)

4. Immigration/Citizenship Policies

- current immigration/citizenship status
- which routes taken to gain entry into the UK: whether this helped to stay longer
- experiences of application procedures/encounters with immigration officials
- how met conditions:
  - personal resources
  - informal sources of help
  - formal sources of help
- whether still working to maintain or improve formal status: aspirations for the future
- how would judge immigration/citizenship policies based on your experiences
- how immigration/citizenship policies for South Africans compare to immigration/citizenship policies for other migrant groups
5. **Everyday Life in the UK**

- what other locations in the UK, how long lived in current location (+ housing)
- if family members and/or partners/close friends also present: consequences for situation
- what doing at the moment in current location (how got to know about opportunity)
- who mainly socialise with (national/ethnic background, including what ‘race’/ethnicity if other South Africans)
- where socialise and what doing together
- which channels use to contact people in British society
- relationship with other South Africans in the UK
- how people react when you say or they realise that you come from South Africa
- whether certain types/categories of people not socialise with
- how is your interaction with people in the UK similar to/different from previous interaction with people in South Africa
- do you think that everyone has the same opportunities in the UK or not
- whether noticed any divisions in British society: ‘race’, ethnicity, social class or any other forms of divisions

6. **Sense of Belonging**

- do you feel that you belong in British society (+ what role, if any, ancestral ties play in this)
- has the way you see yourself in British society changed since first settling in the UK: what has impacted upon this
- have your experiences in the UK met your expectations so far
- transnational connections to South Africa: people, travel, news, other
- any plans to return to South Africa
- what would impact upon decision to stay in the UK or return to South Africa
- whether want to go to any other countries
7. **Additional Background Information (if not covered yet)**

- age
- ethnicity
- if partner, when and where got together/married
- age, gender, location and school/university/occupation of children, partner and siblings

8. **Ending**

- anything else want to add or any questions
- reiterate ethical issues
- whether can refer me to other potential participants
- thank you
## Appendix 2 – Participants’ Profiles

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Age</th>
<th>Gender</th>
<th>Ethnicity</th>
<th>Level of Education</th>
<th>Current Occupation</th>
<th>Arrived the UK</th>
<th>British Immigration Status</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>35</td>
<td>female</td>
<td>white Afrikaans</td>
<td>dropped out of high school in SA, and took third year of degree at university in the UK</td>
<td>construction manager</td>
<td>2001, student visa</td>
<td>citizenship by naturalisation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>36</td>
<td>female</td>
<td>‘mixed race’</td>
<td>finished undergrad. in SA, and took alternative therapy courses in SA</td>
<td>health worker</td>
<td>2002, spouse visa</td>
<td>indefinite leave to remain</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>29</td>
<td>female</td>
<td>white English</td>
<td>dropped out of high school in SA, and took third year of degree at university in the UK</td>
<td>construction manager</td>
<td>2004, spouse visa</td>
<td>citizenship by naturalisation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>35</td>
<td>male</td>
<td>white Afrikaans</td>
<td>commenced on studies in the UK with student visa</td>
<td>travel agent</td>
<td>2003, highly-skilled visa</td>
<td>citizenship by naturalisation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>33</td>
<td>female</td>
<td>‘mixed race’</td>
<td>two years at college in SA</td>
<td>massage therapist</td>
<td>2002, spouse visa</td>
<td>indefinite leave to remain</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>32</td>
<td>male</td>
<td>white Afrikaans</td>
<td>two years at college in SA</td>
<td>travel agent</td>
<td>2004, spouse visa</td>
<td>indefinite leave to remain</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>36</td>
<td>female</td>
<td>‘mixed race’</td>
<td>finished undergrad. in SA, and took alternative therapy courses in SA</td>
<td>occupational therapist</td>
<td>2002, spouse visa</td>
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<td>female</td>
<td>white English</td>
<td>one-year degree at college in SA</td>
<td>travel agent</td>
<td>2000, spouse visa</td>
<td>citizenship by naturalisation</td>
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<th>Gender</th>
<th>Ethnicity</th>
<th>Level of Education</th>
<th>Current Occupation</th>
<th>Arrived the UK</th>
<th>British Immigration Status</th>
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<td>six-year medical degree in SA, MA in the UK</td>
<td>occupational doctor</td>
<td>2003, highly-skilled visa</td>
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<td>Eloise</td>
<td>42</td>
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<td>white English</td>
<td>one-year degree at college in SA</td>
<td>quantity surveyor</td>
<td>2000, spouse visa</td>
<td>citizenship by naturalisation</td>
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<tr>
<td>Christina</td>
<td>29</td>
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<td>four years at college in SA</td>
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<td>2005, ancestral visa</td>
<td>citizenship by naturalisation</td>
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<tr>
<td>Caroline</td>
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<td>female</td>
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<td>student visa/working holiday visa</td>
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<td>massage therapist</td>
<td>2002, spouse visa</td>
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<tr>
<td>Billy (Esther’s husband)</td>
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<td>Angela</td>
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<td>health worker</td>
<td>2001, student visa</td>
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<tr>
<td>Andrew</td>
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<td>male</td>
<td>white Afrikaans</td>
<td>two years at college in SA</td>
<td>travel agent</td>
<td>2004, ancestral visa</td>
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<th>Current Occupation</th>
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<td>white Afrikaans</td>
<td>commenced on studies in the UK with student visa</td>
<td>construction manager</td>
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<td>‘mixed race’</td>
<td>undergrad. in SA, and took alternative therapy courses in SA</td>
<td>health worker</td>
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<td>Andrew</td>
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<td>Angela</td>
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<td>researcher (financial sector)</td>
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<td>two BAs from SA universities (the last by distance learning from the UK)</td>
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<td>student</td>
<td>2008</td>
<td>indefinite leave to remain</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>18</td>
<td>male</td>
<td>white</td>
<td>offered place at university in the UK</td>
<td>child</td>
<td>2000</td>
<td>indefinite leave to remain</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>62</td>
<td>male</td>
<td>white</td>
<td>went to a school in SA</td>
<td>retired</td>
<td>2000</td>
<td>indefinite leave to remain</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>15</td>
<td>male</td>
<td>Afrikaans</td>
<td>recruited by apartheid army at 17</td>
<td>supply teacher</td>
<td>2008</td>
<td>indefinite leave to remain</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>30</td>
<td>female</td>
<td>English</td>
<td>BA at university in the UK</td>
<td>student</td>
<td>2008</td>
<td>indefinite leave to remain</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>18</td>
<td>female</td>
<td>English</td>
<td>BA at university in the UK</td>
<td>student</td>
<td>2008</td>
<td>indefinite leave to remain</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Jennifer (Kenny’s wife)</td>
<td>Judith (Mateus’ husband)</td>
<td>Karen (Judith’s husband)</td>
<td>Kenny (Judith’s husband)</td>
<td>Lucas (Roxanne’s husband)</td>
<td>Mario (Karen’s husband)</td>
<td>Mateus (Norberto’s wife)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>----------------</td>
<td>-------------------------</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Age</strong></td>
<td>42</td>
<td>61</td>
<td>43</td>
<td>63</td>
<td>31</td>
<td>31</td>
<td>45</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Gender</strong></td>
<td>female</td>
<td>female</td>
<td>female</td>
<td>male</td>
<td>male</td>
<td>male</td>
<td>male</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Ethnicity</strong></td>
<td>‘mixed race’</td>
<td>white</td>
<td>English</td>
<td>white</td>
<td>Afrikaans</td>
<td>white</td>
<td>English</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Level of Education</strong></td>
<td>BA from university in SA</td>
<td>left school in SA at 15</td>
<td>high school in SA</td>
<td>school in SA, not acknowledged when left</td>
<td>BA part time in SA, finished degree in the UK</td>
<td>four-year degree in SA, but finished in six years</td>
<td>various courses at college in SA</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Current Occupation</strong></td>
<td>social worker</td>
<td>unemployed</td>
<td>unemployed</td>
<td>parcel driver</td>
<td>affluent entrepreneur</td>
<td>accountant (bank)</td>
<td>printing engineer</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>British Immigration Status</strong></td>
<td>indefinite leave to remain</td>
<td>citizenship by naturalisation</td>
<td>citizenship by naturalisation</td>
<td>citizenship based on birth in the UK/parentage</td>
<td>indefinite leave to remain</td>
<td>EU/EEA-national</td>
<td>citizenship by naturalisation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Name</td>
<td>Age</td>
<td>Gender</td>
<td>Ethnicity</td>
<td>Level of Education</td>
<td>Current Occupation</td>
<td>Arrived the UK</td>
<td>British Immigration Status</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Patrick</td>
<td>35</td>
<td>male</td>
<td>English</td>
<td>high school in SA</td>
<td>affluent entrepreneur</td>
<td>1998, British passport</td>
<td>citizenship based on parentage</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Richard</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>male</td>
<td>English</td>
<td>BA from university in SA</td>
<td>freelance journalist</td>
<td>2007</td>
<td>would not discuss</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Roxanne (Mario’s wife)</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>female</td>
<td>white</td>
<td>postgrad. Honours degree from university in SA</td>
<td>senior manager (IT)</td>
<td>2007, Italian and Portuguese passports</td>
<td>EU/EEA-national</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sandra</td>
<td>45</td>
<td>female</td>
<td>English</td>
<td>BA from university in SA</td>
<td>admin. (children’s centre)</td>
<td>1987, applied for British passport when in the UK</td>
<td>citizenship based on parentage</td>
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<tr>
<td>Shannon</td>
<td>29</td>
<td>female</td>
<td>English</td>
<td>college course in SA, left at 19</td>
<td>dental practice manager</td>
<td>2002, British passport</td>
<td>citizenship by naturalisation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tara</td>
<td>41</td>
<td>female</td>
<td>Afrikaans</td>
<td>high school in SA</td>
<td>admin. (company)</td>
<td>2000-1, spouse visa (husband of British ancestry)</td>
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<td>Thulasizwe</td>
<td>59</td>
<td>male</td>
<td>black</td>
<td>BA from university in SA</td>
<td>civil servant for SA org. in the UK</td>
<td>2004, spouse visa (on wife’s work permit)</td>
<td>temporary skilled workers’ visa</td>
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<tr>
<td>Tracey</td>
<td>46</td>
<td>female</td>
<td>English</td>
<td>BA from university in SA</td>
<td>unemployed</td>
<td>2000, spouse visa (ex-husband British national)</td>
<td>indefinite leave to remain</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Zarah</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>female</td>
<td>Afrikaans</td>
<td>in her last year of BA at university in the UK</td>
<td>student</td>
<td>1999, dependant on father’s highly-skilled visa</td>
<td>citizenship through territorial principles and parents’ naturalisation</td>
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</table>
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