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CAPITALIST SPATIALITY IN THE PERIPHERY:
REGIONAL INTEGRATION PROJECTS IN MEXICO AND TURKEY

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Capitalist spatiality in the periphery: regional integration projects in Mexico and Turkey

ABSTRACT

This work aims to provide an alternative analysis of the regional economic integration and development projects of two peripheral capitalist spaces – Mexico and Turkey – within the specific spatiotemporal conditions in which their modern peripheral capitalist spatiality has been conditioned and restructured. Both Mexico and Turkey undertook very similar regional integration projects that emerged almost simultaneously and, more significantly, in conjunction with the neoliberal restructuring processes that unfurled during the early 1980s. In the Central American region, Mexico initiated the ‘Plan Puebla-Panamá’ which subsequently evolved to the ‘Proyecto Mesoamérica’, now including Colombia, aiming to ‘create’ an integrated region with a high level of economic development on the basis of procuring sustainable and orderly functioning free market economies. With strikingly similar objectives, Turkey planned and materialised regional integration projects such as the organisation of the ‘Black Sea Economic Cooperation’ in the Black Sea and Trans-Caucasus region and other sub-regional projects such as the ‘Levant Project’ in the East Mediterranean.

This work argues that these regional integration projects have to be defined and analysed within the multiscalar neoliberal restructuring processes, in which the global capitalist spatiality has been re-territorialised – and resisted – on different socio-spatial scales. The uneven geographical development and its constant reproduction is recognised as the determinant factor of these regional integration projects, in which the Mexican and Turkish peripheral capitalist spatiality was first reconfigured and integrated into the centre through their incorporation into the NAFTA and European Customs Union. Subsequently, conditioned by the current neoliberal rescaling of the peripheral capitalist spatiality, the peripheral capitalism extended towards the ‘marginal’ spaces in their immediate geographies in the form of sub-regional integration and development projects. Therefore, this work presents the examination of the specific spatiotemporal processes as the only meaningful theoretical framework to analyse these regional integration projects, in which the uneven
development of the peripheral capitalist social relations in Mexico and Turkey have been formed, reconfigured and extended.
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Introduction: Inter-national relations or Inter-spatial relations on the national scale?

‘Mankind’s “socio-economic” formation (as Marx calls it) simply has too many aspects, exhibits too many differences and goes on at too many levels to be treated by a single discipline. The economist, the psychologist, the demographer, the anthropologist, all have their contributions to make. And the sociologist as well’.


This thesis aims to provide an alternative conceptualisation of the regional economic integration projects in Mexico and Turkey by examining the processes of production and reproduction of the specific socio-spatial conditions of the peripheral capitalist spatiality within the contemporary spatiotemporal context of the worldwide reconfiguration of neoliberal capitalism. In that sense, it can be argued that it raises two major proposals: a specific spatiotemporal conceptual framework for the analysis of the formation of the peripheral capitalist space in Mexico and Turkey, and the analysis of the regional integration and economic development projects of Mexico and Turkey in terms of the transformation of the socio-spatial conditions. The theorisation of the specific spatiotemporal processes in which the peripheral capitalist spaces in Mexico and Turkey have been formed, consolidated and transformed is materialised by linking the spatially and historically specific concepts of Luxemburg (1951; 1977), Trotsky (1936; 1970a; 1970b) and Gramsci (1971). This conceptual framework is based on the dialectical materialist understanding of the social reality whose foundations were laid by the works of Marx and Engels and later on elaborated in the
conceptualisation of the production and transformation of the space by Henri Lefebvre. Therefore, it is possible to claim that this work establishes the theorisation of the peripheral capitalist spatiality and its historical formation, consolidation and transformation processes in dialectical terms by building upon this Marxist tradition.

The second major point raised and analysed in this thesis is the contemporary transformation of the peripheral capitalist space in a stage of expansion which is defined as neoliberal rescaling or reconfiguration. In his later works where Lefebvre conceptualised the ‘state mode of production’, this process of neoliberal re-territorialisation of the social space was located and analysed. This has also been followed by numerous other works that further theorised the subject (Soja et al. 1983; Massey 1985; Brenner 1997a; Brenner 1997b; Brenner 1998; Swyngedouw 2000; Brenner and Elden 2001). This study argues that the regional integration projects of Mexico and Turkey need to be analysed within this global neoliberal rescaling process in which the peripheral sociospatial organisation channels the conditions of the neoliberal spatiality to the ‘marginal’ or reserved spaces. It has been observed that these regional integration projects aim to incorporate these regions by establishing the necessary legal/institutional framework and physical infrastructure that the neoliberal capitalist social relations of production can expand towards these regions. It is important to emphasise that these processes of re-territorialisation are not mechanical or deterministic processes but dialectical and that they encountered significant resistance and contestations on different social scales.
Through the analysis of these two peripheral capitalist spaces both in terms of their formation and transformation/expansion periods, this thesis aims to further the conceptualisation of the capitalist social space in the specific peripheral configurations of the social relations of capitalist mode of production. Mexico and Turkey are identified as two peripheral capitalist spaces in the neoliberal rescaling of the world capitalism rather than ‘two nation-states in the globalising world’ which provides a better starting point for the analysis of the underlying conditions of social change. These two countries which are geographically located in completely different parts of the world, with different morphologies, climates, natural resources, territorial sizes and populations followed a strikingly similar spatiotemporal path of social development and initiated very similar integration and economic development projects in their regions recently. This thesis argues that only a spatiotemporal analysis can present a comprehensive answer for the subject matter and thereby presents a better reading of the formation, consolidation and transformation of the peripheral capitalist space in Mexico and Turkey by unravelling the specific, constantly changed and reproduced structural conditions underlying this peripheral capitalist spatiality. In other words, this work aims to provide a comprehensive analysis of the changing capitalist spatiality in Mexico and Turkey with a historical materialist conceptualisation of these processes, rather than reducing them to the mere historical events that are irrelevant for a descriptive investigation of the past formation and present transformation of the sociospatial organisation.

In this respect, this section will define the main objectives and foundations of the work and identify the main features of a spatiotemporal analysis that is presented in this thesis. Therefore, firstly the problematic of space and the
aspatial social sciences will be considered. This will be followed by the identification of the relationship between the social space and social relations of production. Thirdly, space in a multiscalar world and the ‘incorporated comparison’ in the analysis of this multiscalar totality will be discussed. Lastly, a structural layout of the thesis will be presented.

**Space and social sciences**

As it has been stated above, this work aims to present a spatiotemporal analysis of the regional integration projects in Mexico and Turkey. Although such an aim necessitates a persistent trespassing on the well established borders of the history, geography, economy and political theory, this type of violations are perceived as the integral and necessary aspects of the work. The separation and compartmentalisation –and subsequent hierarchisation- of the social sciences into strongly defined and institutionalised disciplines that operate within the self-defined and uncontested borders is in fact the reflection of an epistemological preference that privileges the ‘simultaneous’ and ‘synchronic’ over the ‘historical’ and ‘diachronic’. To put it differently, it is a product of the conventional focus on the short time-span rather than the longue durée movement of the social reality. Fernand Braudel defined this separation as the general crisis that the sciences of man are facing today and urged for the adaptation of a common language, i.e., ontology, for the social sciences. In this sense, he identified three common languages for a collective work; the mathematics, the longue durée and the space –the space which he later refers to as the necessary reduction of the all social reality that occupying it (Braudel 1958/2006: 34). Concurrent with Braudel’s call, this work rejects the crude compartmentalisation of the social sciences and adopts a spatiotemporal analysis as the essential way of observing the complex,
differentiated and unfixed forms of social reality and investigating the processes where the social reality has been dialectically formed, negated and transformed on multiple scales and levels.

The hierarchical and institutionalised separation of the social sciences into different disciplines has been based on the separation of time from space which subsequently permitted the stabilisation of time and space into separated, fixed and immediate dimensions that the social reality takes place within (Massey 1999: 262). The separation of time from space had two immediate implications for the social sciences; adopting the ‘Newtonian model’ that establishes a symmetry between the past and present in which the differences between past and future disappeared and dissolved within an eternal present and the ‘Cartesian dualism’ that fundamentally separates nature and humans, being and consciousness, subject and object (Wallerstein 1996: 2). On these two premises, firstly, an ahistorical history had been developed which disregards the multiplicity of social times where in fact the short time-span continually and infinitely opposes the long time-span (Braudel 1958/2006: 3) and privileges the instant ("l'histoire événementielle") over the structural time ("longue durée") (Braudel 1958/2006: 17; Wallerstein 1988: 290; Wallerstein 1996/2000: 165). Thereby, flattened and reified the timeless history served as a deductive source to collect data and validate theoretical assumptions for the ahistorical social research (Hobden 2002: 47; Hobson 2002: 5-10; Hobson et al. 2010: 7).

Secondly, an ahistoric and spaceless Cartesian perspectivalist cartography has triumphed within the discipline of geography which perceives the space as the taken for granted ‘platforms’ or ‘containers’, hence, unproblematic, and
underscores any non-descriptive spatial variation between the ‘homogenous blocks of territorial spaces’ (Agnew 1996: 1929; Taylor 1996: 1918). This notion of space resulted in the ‘despatialised’, ‘spaceless’ or ‘aspatial’ social sciences where the essential multiplicities are disregarded and became the subject of a clearly and objectively periodised temporal sequence (Massey 2005: 82). However, the spaceless social sciences do not necessarily exclude geography; but utilise it extensively into account as in the state-centric approaches which laid the ahistorical spatial ontology as the foundations of its conceptualisation of the territorial organisation (Brenner 1999: 45; Wallerstein 2001: 3). In mainstream geography and the other branches of the social sciences, the space has been defined as a perfect neutral fixity and stripped off from its historical and social qualities, perceived as self-evident and self-explanatory, hence, something that does not require a theory (Smith 1992: 61; Wallerstein 1996: 26). While the positivist turn elevated geography as the ‘science of spatial’ which had been focusing on the modelling of the space on the basis of objective spatial laws and spatial processes devoid from the social (and temporal) content, the radical critique of such an understanding of space focused on the importance of the differences and particularities of places and the social processes that the conditions of this distinctiveness has been produced and reproduced (Massey 1985: 10, 19; Massey 2005: 92).

This separation which defined ‘science’ as the search for universally applicable laws of nature that are valid for all time and space first separated and hierarchised the natural sciences and philosophy and, later, further established multiple disciplines of social sciences concerned with different aspects of the social reality (Wallerstein 1996: 7). By the end of the 19th century, these different disciplines were mostly stabilised and institutionalised within the
university system as structures that were designated to produce new knowledge on the basis of empirical findings and reproduce professional scholars who would be capable of undertaking such systematic researches on the separate spheres of social activity: history, economics, sociology, political science, and anthropology (Wallerstein 1996: 13-14; Wallerstein 2001: 19).

Nevertheless, overcoming this rigid separation through a simple process of interdisciplinary dialogue does not provide a convincing solution. As Wallerstein (2000) pointed out that the interdisciplinary work would not necessarily aim to impair the positivist logic and the organisational apparatus of the separation of disciplines, but it might even deepen this separation through strengthening the borders of each category. After 1945, the area studies attempted to present a multidisciplinary approach but its practice only showed how artificial the institutional separations between the idiographic and nomothetic social sciences are, that a multidisciplinary perspective cannot overcome (Wallerstein 1996: 39). Therefore, the solution to this problem necessitates a rather profound methodological and epistemological stance which can concretise the social reality within its complex temporal/spatial specificities.

The complexity of the social reality emanates from the fact that it is inherently subject to constant transformation and re-formation, thus, there is no general abstraction to be found that is not bounded by the limitations of time. The mainstream approaches that reify the social phenomena are unable to grasp the constantly changing nature of the social reality (Wallerstein 1984/2000: 119). In that sense, focusing on space within its concreteness rather than the formal/institutional appearances of the territorial organisations emerges as
the key feature of the analysis of the ever transforming social reality—which is the capitalist space in Mexico and Turkey—in this work. As Marx argued, a thing should be understood in its motion (Nicolaus 1973: 30), and therefore, social reality needs to be comprehended in the movement of its becoming. Nevertheless, the ahistorical social science treats the social reality as self-evident, fixed, a priori entity that exists independently and thus can be measured and compared as reified units of a *prima facie* totality (McMicheal 1990: 385; Emirbayer: 1997: 287).

During the last four decades, the absolutist separation of time and space and their definitions as static, fixed and self-evident categories has received serious criticisms. The (re)unification of time and space as an open-ended and dynamic social category appeared as the first crucial step for the analysis of the social totality and particularly for the conceptualisation of the configuration, transformation and reconfiguration of the ‘territorial organisation’ (Soja 1980: 209; Wallerstein 1988: 292; Massey 1999: 263). As a result of the rejection of the Cartesian and Newtonian (and in a different way Kantian) theorisation of time and space; the complex and variable relational nature of time and space unity has received much attention, particularly to analyse the continually changing spatiotemporal relations between different social entities (Urry 1985: 27; Hobson and Hobden 2002: 280). And as Soja argued, the only possible alternative that can grasp the inseparability and multiplicity of spatiotemporal processes is historical materialist analysis of the social reality, which could theorise the social production of the space through perceiving the spatiality simultaneously in terms of the substantial forms that it assumes and as the dynamically changing set of social relations (Soja 1985: 92).
Space and the social relations of production

In dialectical materialism, the social space is theorised as a concrete abstraction, both material (hence, needless to say, social) production of the social relations and, at the same time, a relation itself (Gottdiener 1993: 130). Such a conceptualisation of space -in its abstract concreteness- puts an emphasis on the dialectical processes in which the social space has been constantly produced and reproduced. On these premises, the social phenomena can be analysed relationally in its motion and the theorisation of the territorial organisation on different scales can be built upon. In this way, the complexity of the social phenomena and its dialectical movement which does not permit any claim of autonomy or historic determinism can be identified and analysed through the specific spatiotemporal conditions expressed in the corresponding historical structures (Wallerstein 1974: 343; Wallerstein 1988: 293; Wallerstein 2000: 134; Emirbayer and Goodwin 1994: 1414; Emirbayer 1997: 298).

Therefore, in the analysis of the social-geographical organisations, it is an indispensable necessity to start from this dialectical point that neither perceives the space as an isolated neutral object nor a homogenous ideational aspect of human life. Space cannot be sealed off from ideology and politics and the production of the material life. Thus, the analysis of any spatial problem needs to focus on the spatial contradictions within the society and social practice in which the social space is conditioned, produced and contested (Lefebvre 1976: 30, 31). Needless to say, these contradictions stem from the material premises of the production of human life; in other words, from the dialectical relationship between the nature and human beings. Hence, the
relationship between man and nature was defined as ‘metabolic’ by Marx; while man transcends himself in nature, he transcends the nature in himself (Lefebvre 2009: 106). This dialectical relationship is the abstract concreteness that the social space has been produced and reproduced. With positioning the nature as the integral element of the human subjectivity, the production of man by himself in and through nature becomes the principle of the production of space. This relationship between human beings and nature overdetermines the relations between different spaces on different scales, and particularly on the national scale (Pijl 2007: 16).

Thus, the social space as a social product and the expression of the social relations of production emerges as the most convincing unit of analysis in understanding the inter-spatial relations on the national scale rather than the mainstream state-centric approaches based on the Cartesian epistemology. Historicised and spatialised – in dialectical terms- space can grasp the various configurations of state power and social relations of production that underpin these diverse socio-economic formations (Lefebvre 1964/2009: 53). The socio-economic formation historically and spatially takes different forms and thereby cannot be conflated with the nation-state (Wallerstein 1974: 389, McMichael and Myhre 1991: 86, Wallerstein 1975/2000: 108, McMichael 2001: 203). The dialectical theorisation of the social space is the reliable alternative that avoids this conflation. Thus, the focus of this work moves away from the nation-state

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1 Pijl (2007) uses overdetermination in order to refer a deeper determination which functions behind a relation that is perceived as rather simple. Different from the multi-causal approach that focuses on the interconnectedness of empirically verified phenomenon, he states overdetermination refers to a ‘complex process of causality which functions in a contradictory whole, composed of the multiplicity of distinct, but internally related and mutually constitutive, practices having a tendency –because of their spatio-temporal separation within complex social formations- to drift apart’ (Pijl 2007: 16). In this sense, the dialectical relation that determines the production of space is a contradictory and open ended movement rather than a deterministic linear process.
as a self-evident, self-explanatory unit of analysis towards the (social) space as a (socially) specific configuration on the national scale which comprises a dynamic totality of the dialectical movement between the productive forces and the social relations of production. This dynamic totality is continually contested and transformed as it will be observed in the Mexican and Turkish cases.

The establishment of the (social) space as the focal point of the analysis of the formation and transformation of the socio-spatial organisation inevitably necessitates the identification of its social and uneven processes of production, reproduction, consolidation, and its historical transformation, along the continual struggle between the hegemonic and counter-hegemonic spatial forces. The hierarchically stratified morphology of the space further expands these questions on an inter-related, interdependent multiscale level, particularly in the context of contemporary neoliberal rescaling -i.e., reconfiguration, re- and de-territorialisation, reorganisation- of the capitalist space (Brenner 1997a: 273; Brenner 1997b: 136; Brenner 1999: 43; Swyngedouw 2000: 64).

Lefebvre had substantially contributed to the conceptualisation of the social production of space ‘in and through’ the human activity and defined the social space in terms of the reproduction of social relations, thus, not as a fixed material entity but as an ensemble of social relations (Brenner 1997b: 140; Unwin 2000: 18). For Lefebvre, the continuous social production and reproduction of the capitalist spatiality is a truly dialectical process where each of the ‘three great moments’ of Marxist dialectics - expressed in the notion of ‘dialectique de triplicité’- have a crucial role. According to Lefebvre, in the
Marxist dialectics, each dialectical moment needs to be comprehended as flowing, rhythmic, manifold and complex due to the deconstructing role of the third term on the previous two moments (Gottdiener 1993: 130; Unwin 2000: 14; Elden 2001: 812). Therefore, the social space has not been mechanically determined by the mode of production but continuously produced through the dialectical movement between the productive forces (the economic element) and the social relations of production (the political element) (Lefebvre 1964/2009: 59; Swyngedouw 1992: 418, 428). Any conceptualisation of the social space and the geographical institutions attached to that space as a specific scalar configuration must base itself on this notion of abstract concreteness that is subject to a multiscalar dialectical process of formation, stabilisation and transformation. Such a conceptualisation differs itself from the substantialist, instrumentalist, formalist/economist positions which perceive the state as a mere reflection of the economic sphere, composed of fixed elements and attributes that are determined by a specific mode of production (Poulantzas 1980: 15).

**Space in a multiscalar world and incorporated comparison**

For Lefebvre, this continual development of the space has been the crucial starting point for the theorisation of the notion of state space (*l’espace étatique*) as a historically specific scalar configuration where the different ‘waves’ of capitalist accumulation built upon²(Brenner 1997b: 277; Brenner

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² Ernest Mandel has successfully forecasted the inevitable dissolution of the post-war Keynesian economic structure on the basis of his theorisation of ‘long waves’ in terms of the changes of the rate of profit and the rise in the organic composition of capital. He defined this process as the rise of neo-capitalist uneven growth as an organic development of monopoly capitalism, surely with its inner contradictions (‘which had superimposed themselves on the general contradictions of capitalist mode of production that either have not had been eliminated’) in ‘The Economics of Neo Capitalism’, Socialist Register, (1964); ‘Explaining long waves of capitalist development’, Futures, (1981).
The contemporary crisis of the capitalist world economy has led to the dissolution of the post-war Keynesian socio-spatial structure and a worldwide process of restructuring (i.e., reconfiguration, rescaling, and re-territorialisation) of the social and spatial relations of production (Soja et al. 1983: 196, 199). Lefebvre captured and conceptualised this contemporary process in his notion of ‘State Mode of Production’ (le mode de production étatique -SMP) as a qualitative transformation of the state power (Lefebvre 2001: 773). In the SMP, the weight of state—which is deeply contested in every scale of social reality- in the matter of the production and reproduction of capitalist space increases, particularly in three areas; the production and control of energy, the information sector, and the mediation of the relations between the domestic and world market (Lefebvre 2001: 777). The ever deepening uneven geographical development within and between national scale -a longue durée dynamic of reconfiguration and configuration of capitalist spatiality- finds its contemporary expression in this recent re-territorialisation (Brenner 1999: 42; Brenner 2001: 799). In this historically specific phase, the national scale becomes worldwide (le mondial; second nature) and covers the earth (la terre; first nature), without abolishing the local, but through strengthening the unevenness between scales, hence, at once homogenising, hierarchising and fragmenting them (Lefebvre 1978/2009: 243). The concept of ‘mondialisation’ captures this current phase of the extension of the capitalist spatiality within the constantly transforming relationships between different scales, thereby highlights and links the present processes of capitalist transformation in Mexico and Turkey with the worldwide rescaling of the capitalist spatiality. It also captures the actualisation of the capitalist mode of production as a totality on the
worldwide scale within the longue durée of human history which is the history of ‘continual making and remaking of worldwide relations’ (Brenner and Elden 2009: 23, 25).

The second significant aspect embedded to these multiscalar worldwide restructuring processes is the simultaneous ‘intensification’ and ‘extensification’ of the capitalist spatiality (Soja et al. 1983: 199). While the organisation of capital-labour relations have been significantly restructured, the incorporation of the new markets – spatial expansion – through the production of the necessary conditions of the capitalist accumulation gave rise to many regional and sub-national scales of governance (Soja et al. 1983: 202; Swyngedouw 1992: 426; Brenner 1998: 427). The analysis of the regional integration projects of Mexico and Turkey will be identified within this contemporary neoliberal rescaling process. The spatiotemporal analysis of these two cases aids to locate, define and analyse the specific structural conditions which determine the specific socio-spatial forms of this neoliberal extension in the periphery that appeared as the regional integration projects.

Therefore, the analysis of the contemporary regional economic integration projects of Mexico and Turkey necessitates a comprehensive investigation of the successive stages of formation, consolidation, transformation and expansion of the peripheral capitalist spatiality in terms of their historically and spatially specific conditions. It is worth noting that the comparison of those two cases is not a mere juxtaposition of cross-societal similarities/differences of two cumulative processes with a thin historical perspective in order to provide a Weberian ideal type that could constitute a middle ground to reach historically limited generalisations (Ragin 1981: 114; Ragin and Zaret 1983:
On the contrary, the aim of this thesis is to employ an enhanced incorporated comparison through analysing the processes of formation, consolidation, transformation and expansion of the peripheral capitalist spaces in Mexico and Turkey. Incorporated comparison aims to give substance to the historical process by comparing its parts without reifying an a priori totality or reifying the instances that dialectically comprise this totality. Therefore, the comparison becomes the substance of the inquiry rather than its framework (McMichael 1990: 386; McMichael 1992: 359). McMichael defined two requirements for such a strategy. First, the units of analysis are historical, therefore fluid, and second, the units of analysis that are employed comparatively are neither subordinated parts of the totality nor independent from it. The parts of the totality reveal and realise the changing whole, in that sense the whole cannot be seen as an empirical premise that can be discovered through the analysis of the mutually conditioning parts (McMichael 1990: 391).

In this type of comparison strategy, the units are not comparable units as such, but comparable as systemic units, thereby compared as the manifestations of systemic processes rather than a priori nation-states that can be applied in the cross-national analysis (McMichael 1992: 359). In that sense, incorporated comparison presents an alternative method of comparison since it recognises the comparable social phenomena as differentiated moments of a historically integrated process, thereby avoids treating the social phenomena as parallel cases (McMichael 1990: 392). From this point of view, the historicised and spatialised social reality can be analysed through its underlying structural conditions and processes that are interrelated in terms of social change (McMichael 2000: 671).
McMichael defined two forms of incorporated comparison. The multiple (diachronic) form of incorporated comparison ‘analyses a cumulative - historical - process through time and space differentiated instances of a historical singular process’ while the singular (synchronic) form of incorporated comparison analyses ‘variation in or across space at an historical conjuncture’ (McMichael 1990: 392-393; McMichael 1992: 360). The spatiotemporal conceptual framework employed in this thesis, which focuses on the particular processes of social transformation in two specific socio-spatial units in a multiscalar way, combines these two forms of incorporated comparison, and thereby presents an enhanced comparative method (McMichael 1990: 393).

In that sense, this work argues that the formation of (or transition to) the capitalist space in Mexico and Turkey during the ‘long’ 19th century – which built upon the already existing uneven exchange relations with the centre during the mercantilist world economic development- positioned these countries within the periphery of the international division of labour. The peripheral positioning of these capitalist spaces refers to their dependent nature on the centre in terms of the emergence, maintenance and furthering of the capitalist productive forces. This process eventually culminated in a phase of revolution/restoration of the peripheral capitalist spatiality strengthening the peripheral position within the international division of labour through the passive revolutions. The weak national bourgeoisies took the responsibility of the dependent capital accumulation and development of productive forces when the developing capitalist social relations within the existing social formation led to the transcending of the existing socio-spatial form. The bourgeoisie-in-formation eliminated the old regime of uneven and combined development and established its hegemony by incorporating the
reactionary social forces and, thus, produced a new form of political authority (Gramsci 2007: 106, 107; Morton 2003: 632).

With the institutionalisation of the passive revolution parallel to the consolidation of the peripheral capitalist space, the uneven relationship with the core has been deepened with the acceleration of the capitalist accumulation in the form of the Import Substitution Policies (ISI) within the post-World War context. This period of consolidation of the peripheral capitalist space was marked by a significant advance on the fixed capital as well as the considerable expansion of the productive forces with the intensive industrialisation as a result of the etatist policies. With the exhaustion of the foreign dependent ISI expansion of the capitalist productive forces starting in the 1970s, Mexico and Turkey reached to the limits of the capitalist accumulation via strong state presence in the economy. The economic stalemate determined the conditions of the transformation of the peripheral capitalist state to the neoliberal spatiality with the trade liberalisation and structural adjustment programmes during the 1980s. In this last period of worldwide capitalist reconfiguration, the Mexican and Turkish capitalist forces completed the integration with the centre. The North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) and European Customs Union (ECU) marked the current stage of economic integration of Mexico and Turkey with the North American and European economic structures in which both countries incorporated their productive forces into the demand and production patterns of the centre. In this last stage, the peripheral capitalist spaces entered a phase of expansion towards their own periphery within their regions in order to reproduce uneven exchange relations and incorporate ‘marginal’ spaces into the world market within the worldwide processes of the neoliberal re-territorialisation.
Therefore, the analysis of the contemporary positioning and inter-spatial relations of Mexico and Turkey within the neoliberal international division of labour should be defined on the basis of a spatiotemporal analysis of the longue durée movement that comprises the moments of formation, consolidation, transformation, and expansion processes of the peripheral capitalist space where the unevenness has been perpetuated in these specific socio-spatial configurations. It should be noted that the perpetuation of the unevenness within the development of the capitalist spatiality and its constructive relation to the contemporary specific socio-spatial organisation of Mexico and Turkey receives the utmost emphasis throughout this work.

The analysis of these dialectical processes of formation, consolidation, transformation and expansion of the peripheral capitalist space necessitates a profound conceptualisation of social space. In that sense, this work starts with the definition of the general abstractions that underpin the social space in general, which allow the further theorisation of the capitalist space and the peripheral capitalist space. With the establishment of this spatiotemporally specific conceptual framework, the particular analysis of the various processes that emerged within the capitalist spaces throughout history and geography could be identified. Therefore, a relational methodology that moves from the abstract to the concrete processes will be employed in the analysis of the regional integration projects of Mexico and Turkey where the two different cases that had been juxtaposed manifest the same specific socio-spatial patterns of formation and transformation since they are exposed to the similar spatiotemporal conditions that overdetermine these dialectical processes. In the analysis of the concrete processes of the formation and transformation of the peripheral capitalist space in Mexico and Turkey, historical and
contemporary economic and statistical figures will be used and, where it is necessary, will be calculated based on data drawn from the ‘Instituto Nacional de Estadística y Geografía’ (National Institute of Statistics and Geography – INEGI) and the ‘Türkiye İstatistik Kurumu’ (Turkish Statistical Institute –TÜİK).

Structure of Thesis

This thesis has been organised in five interrelated chapters. Chapter one directly engages with the ontological and epistemological conundrums of the mainstream international relations and foreign policy studies. As it has been argued above, the mainstream understanding of foreign relations derived from the Cartesian logic which confines the social sciences into separated disciplines with clearly defined and institutionalised borders. The international relations and foreign policy studies had positioned the Cartesian perspectivalism as the normative and integral part of the analysis. The unquestioned acceptance and incorporation of the positivist ontology should be seen as the raison d'être of international relations and foreign policy analysis as separate, self-defined and institutionalised disciplines that would operate within a framework composed of objectively conceptualised themes and categories. The relations between different social entities have been exclusively comprehended from the standpoint of self-explanatory nation-state apparatuses even though it has been claimed that foreign policy needs to be understood as a multi-factorial, multi-level and multi-causal processes. However, this claim of multi-causality has found its response in the inclusion of empirically verified ahistoric categories and hence, did not change the picture in any substantial way, rather than enlarging the scope of the analysis by continually calling for an ‘interdisciplinary’ dialogue.
Therefore, it is important to engage with the mainstream conceptualisation of the nation-state and international relations to manifest its ahistoric and spaceless nature and inability to grasp the social space on the national scale and the interspatial relations between those social spaces. Without observing the positivist limitedness of the existing themes and borders of the international relations, an alternative historical materialist conceptual framework cannot be built. The engagement with the themes and categories of the mainstream international relations and foreign policy studies by no means refers to a re-conceptualisation or redefinition of those main concepts. It rather aims to deconstruct these themes and categories in order to manifest how the Cartesian epistemology has been systematically instilled into mainstream spatial thinking. In Wallerstein’s words (2001), this engagement aims to ‘unthink’ these misleading and self-evident assumptions. In that point, the contribution of the critical geography and critical geopolitics studies needs to be taken into account. Critical geography and critical geopolitics studies have been intensively focused on the processes where the geographical knowledge had been produced and established as a priori reality. The subjective fragmentation, hierarchical division and labelling of space which became the quasi-scientific basis of the ahistoric and spaceless geography and geopolitics has been significantly criticised and perceived as the integral part of the modern statecraft. In the genealogical investigation of the production of spatial knowledge it has been shown that the separation of time and space is directly linked with the ocularcentric epistemology that conceptualised by the intellectuals of statecraft in order to create a panoptic vision of the world and the subjects that populate it. In that sense, the critical geopolitics has successfully manifested the relationship between power and the spatial
representations and the inadequacy of the mainstream geography and geopolitics to locate and identify this social complexity.

Nevertheless, these critiques have failed to differentiate the existence of physical, social and mental spaces and rather confined themselves within the discursive area. Furthermore, they underscored any possible theorisation efforts of the spatiality by arguing that any such aim of conceptualisation would collapse in the reproduction of the similarly fixed and taken for granted categories of the positivist thinking.

Rejecting that, chapter two theorises an alternative conceptualisation for the analysis of world politics by defining inter-state relations as the inter-spatial relations on a national scale and by recognising the dialectical analysis of social space and spatiality as its crucial premise. As it has been stated above, the dialectical understanding of the production and transformation of the capitalist space in the periphery is the foundation of the analysis of the regional integration and economic development initiatives in Mexico and Turkey which links the continually transforming peripheral socio-spatial conditions with these regional integration projects. The dialectical analysis of the social space and its different forms on various scales should be established upon the Marxist dialectical materialist theorisation of the relationship between Man and Nature. Through defining the relationship between Man and Nature as metabolic, Marx recognised the production of the human consciousness as an integral part of the production of material life. Further treatment of this simultaneous process as a dialectical becoming -rather than Hegelian static perception of the unity of thought and reality which finally resolves in the Absolute Idea– necessitates this totality to be perceived as a
moving unity. In this conjuncture, it is important to note two points; first, although this dialectical totality predates capitalism, it corresponds with the historically and spatially specific configurations that became dominant during the unfurling and the continual transformation of the capitalist social relations since the industrial revolution. Secondly, the production of social space that configured upon uneven geographical development has been sharpened and appeared as the necessary condition of the reproduction of the capitalist spatiality where the state power emerged as its specific scalar configuration. This scalar configuration received much attention on the current rescaling process where the capitalist spatiality domestically ‘intensified’ and regionally ‘extensified’. Lefebvre, conceptualised these two points and hence, laid down the general and particular premises of the contemporary inter-spatial relations.

Following the establishment of the conceptual framework of the production of space and spatiality, chapter three focuses on the processes of the peripheral capitalist space formation in these two specific socio-spatial cases – Mexico and Turkey. The processes of the capitalist space formation in Mexico and Turkey started from the early 19th century and shared the same structural dynamics which conditioned the peripheral capitalist spatiality in both countries. In the analysis of these processes, three concepts have been linked to each other to provide a spatiotemporal analytical tool for the analysis of the formation of peripheral capitalist spatiality; the ‘introduction of commodity economy as the prerequisite of primitive accumulation and as a part of the enlarged reproduction’ (Luxemburg), ‘uneven and combined development’ (Trotsky), and ‘passive revolution’ (Gramsci). The common feature of these three concepts is their spatiotemporally specific origin; analysing the transition to
capitalism in the periphery in a particular historical period. By focusing on different aspects and stages in the examples of Poland, Russia and Italy, Luxemburg, Trotsky and Gramsci conceptualised the socio-spatial conditions of the development of the capitalist productive forces in the periphery as a result of the expansion of the capitalism which transformed the existing social relations of production in these late-comer countries in the 19th century. Therefore, linking these three theories provides a spatially and temporally specific conceptual framework in the analysis of the production of the peripheral capitalist spatiality in 19th century Mexico and Turkey. As it has been stated above, defining the specific conditions of the production of the peripheral capitalist space in Mexico and Turkey is a crucial step in the analysis of the contemporary expansion of this peripheral spatiality towards the marginal spaces in the form of regional integration projects.

The expanded reproduction of capitalist social relations in the industrialised capitalist world in the phase of enlarged reproduction necessitated the integration of the peripheral non-capitalist geographies in the early 19th century through replacing the local production structures by the introduction of cheaper consumer goods to the periphery. This incorporation into the international capitalist division of labour had started to dissolve the traditional spatial relations in Mexico and Turkey throughout the 19th century and resulted in the liberal and constitutionalist movements in order to reform and catch up with the development of the capitalist production forces of the centre by establishing the necessary legal/institutional framework and physical infrastructure for the expansion of the capitalist productive forces. However, a meaningful expansion did not materialise until the dictatorships of General Porfirio Díaz (1876-1910) and Sultan Abdul Hamid II (1876-1909) which
brought political stability and unprecedented formation of a centralised state apparatus on the national scale. Under foreign economic and military pressure, both countries needed to undertake such a centralisation parallel to the uneven and combined development of the capitalist productive forces. While the foreign direct investment and international loans had significantly developed the capitalist productive forces and the necessary infrastructure (particularly railways, ports, manufacture for the domestic consumption and financial structures), the doomed to perish pre-capitalist forms of production existed side by side, thus, defining the modern underdevelopment within the capitalist spatiality. These processes of uneven and combined development culminated in the ‘passive revolutions’ of Mexico (1910-1920) and Turkey (1908-1925) where the dependent peripheral capitalist spatiality had been strengthened with the establishment of the bourgeois hegemony as a result of the dialectical passive revolutionary process that laid down the conditions of consolidation during the post-passive revolutionary period. Passive revolutionary process combines the progressive and reactionary elements that end with a ‘revolution-restoration’ or ‘revolution without revolution’ where the emergent bourgeois could act and dissolve the ‘blocked dialectic’ by mobilising the subaltern classes (Buci-Gluckmann 1980: 315; Morton 2007: 66 Morton 2010: 319). These passive revolutions, directed by the weak national bourgeoisies of Mexico and Turkey, established the conditions for the industrial expansion which deepened the dependency on the developed capitalist spaces and strengthened the peripheral positioning of Mexico and Turkey within the international division of labour through furthering the dependent development of productive forces.
Chapter four and five continue from this specific development of the peripheral socio-spatiality in Mexico and Turkey with a closer look, aiming to reach a meaningful analysis of the contemporary processes of rescaling. In the case of Mexico, the consolidation of the peripheral capitalist spatiality was materialised after the Mexican passive revolution which ended the Porfiriato, i.e., Pax Porfiriiana. Following the elimination of the old regime and its contradictions, the post-passive revolutionary period institutionalised the passive revolution through the consolidation of the peripheral capitalist spatiality in which the limited national bourgeois furthered its precarious hegemony. This period witnessed the expansion and deepening of a different form of capitalist unevenness through the strengthening of institutional and political framework which was the necessary condition for the dependent ISI based economic growth. The post-passive revolutionary period was marked by the demobilisation of the popular movements through certain compromises such as ‘the great land reform’ where the centralisation of the state power has ensured the control of every social scale and social mobilisation. Following the institutionalising wave of the Mexican passive revolution in the form of peripheral capitalist spatiality, the role of political organisation on the expansion of the capitalist forces of production became more crucial. In the post-World War context the ISI development policies emerged as the only viable strategy for the maintenance of the capitalist accumulation in the peripheral capitalist geographies. However, the ISI oriented capitalist development did rather deepen the dependency of Mexico on the capitalist centre –primarily to the North American economic structure- since it has been indirectly financed by foreign loans and investments regarding the limited capacity of agricultural exports to finance the imports of necessary machinery.
and intermediate goods. The ISI development had significantly expanded the Mexican manufacture industry particularly in the production of capital goods. However, the exhaustion of this first stage of ISI development and the necessary expansion of industrial production towards the production of durables led to the deeper problems in balance of payments. The continually deteriorating dependency on foreign financial sources during the 1970s both in the form of international loans and direct investment led to the stalemate of the economy and forced the Mexican economy to transform to the export-oriented structure through undertaking series of structural adjustment prescriptions and trade liberalisation policies backed by the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and World Bank (WB). Mexico’s integration with the NAFTA in 1994 was a very significant point as the culmination of the long-lasting uneven relationship between North American economic structure and marked the structural transformation that Mexico had undergone during the neoliberal rescaling period. It is not a coincidence that the first interests in the valorisation and commercialisation of the South and Southeast Mexico and the Central American region emerged during this period of transition.

The first projects that aimed to integrate and incorporate those ‘marginal’ regions were proposed during the Presidency of Ernesto Zedillo (1994-2000). In this period, comprehensive plans were proposed for the construction of superhighways in order to facilitate the transit transportation of resources, goods and services, the creation of a unified energy market and, the establishment of a Central American Biological corridor in order to increase the agro-exports of the region and to encourage the introduction and cultivation of non-traditional, exotic, genetically engineered and medicinal agricultural products. However, the most consistent and, concrete plan for the integration
of the region was proposed during the presidency of Vicente Fox in 2001 as the Plan Puebla-Panamá (PPP). PPP initially covered nine South and Southeast states of Mexico and seven Central American States: Guatemala, Belize, Nicaragua, El Salvador, Honduras, Costa Rica, and Panama. The project had proposed several initiatives on a wide range of areas but in particular the attention has been paid to the construction and modernisation of the transportation facilities including highways, ports, railways, and airports; the expansion of maquila industry in order to fight with the unemployment; and unifying the energy market under one administration by construction of several interconnections between countries and hydroelectric dams which will build the channels for the extension of the neoliberal rescaling by establishing the necessary institutional frameworks and infrastructure for the development of the capitalist productive forces.

The plan received significant opposition from different groups and particularly from the local communities and indigenous movements. After a long period of inertia, the plan has been re-launched with a new name; ‘Proyecto Mesoamérica’ (Mesoamerican Project -PM). Now including Colombia as well, the PM significantly adopted and incorporated the objectives of the PPP but in a more realistic and concrete way with a better institutional framework.

In the case of Turkey, a similar socio-spatial formation, consolidation, transformation and expansion processes of the peripheral spatiality can be detected. The product of the institutionalisation of the Turkish revolution (1908-1925) was the centralised Turkish nation-state organisation where the peripheral capitalist spatiality has been consolidated. The inevitable etatist

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3 Puebla, Veracruz, Guerrero, Oaxaca, Chiapas, Tabasco, Campeche, Quintana Roo, Yucatán.
period following the Independence War followed by the years of ISI development until the balance of payment crisis reached an unsustainable level between 1977 and 1978. Different than Mexican experience, Turkey’s transformation towards the neoliberal spatiality was achieved after two years of civil conflict followed by the military coup d’etat in 1980. The military coup cleared the way for the structural adjustment and trade liberalisation of the Turkish economy and Turkey had been restructured towards the export-oriented industrial development. Once again, Turkey’s integration with the European Customs Union (ECU) marked a significant moment for the reproduction of the uneven relationship between European economic structure and Turkey. Similar to Mexico, Turkey’s interest on the regional integration and development projects had sprung simultaneously to the neoliberal rescaling and export orientation of the economy. In that sense, during the 1990s Turkey has initiated the establishment of the ‘Black Sea Economic Cooperation Organisation’ (BSEC) in order to accelerate and facilitate the transition of the Black Sea region countries to free market economies. However, it can be argued that the most ambitious and concrete projects of infrastructure and economic integration projects took in place in the Caucasus region with Georgia and Azerbaijan, and in the Middle East with Syria, Jordan and Lebanon. Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan (BTC) oil and gas pipeline, Nabucco gas pipeline, and the Kars-Tbilisi-Baku railway construction had been planned or/and materialised during the 2000s. More recently, the East Mediterranean Four (EMF) had been initiated between Turkey, Syria, Jordan and Lebanon under the ‘Levant Project’ in order to harmonise and standardise the interregional trade between these four countries.

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4 This plan has been suspended due to the recent conflicts in Syria and as a result of Turkish
In both cases, the regional economic integration and development projects should be analysed in terms of the transformation and expansion of the capitalist space within the historically specific context of intensifying and extensifying neoliberal capitalist spatiality in the periphery. In that sense, this work defines a spatiotemporal framework to understand the specific conditions where the formation of the peripheral capitalist spatiality and spatial relations have been structured. By tracking the formation of the specific socio-spatial organisations and locating them within the structural conditions of uneven geographical development, the regional economic integration and development projects of Mexico and Turkey could be interpreted as the contemporary expression of the configuration and reconfiguration of the capitalist spatiality.

Lefebvre (1964/2009) argued that the knowledge of state is a crucial point for the political action. And the knowledge of state can only be gained if the structural dynamics underpinning the capitalist space and its perceptions can be explained:

'It is impossible for socialist thought to accept, ...not only the existence of this current society with its tendencies and its capitalistic orientation, but the sparkling appearance that it gives itself, which must be first destroyed to arrive at the underlying truth of relations of production...To understand the current reality we must depart from

government’s critical position towards the Syrian government, and it should not be expected that it would be re-initiated in the short term period. However, Turkish administration’s willingness to criticise the Syrian government and encouragement of the regime change should be seen as an indicator of a long term tendency of the expansion of the peripheral capitalist spatiality.
Marxist thought and tear off a veil of appearances that is no less colourful, nor less coarse than a century ago (Lefebvre 1964/2009: 64).

Therefore, this work aims to provide a comprehensive spatiotemporal analysis of the regional economic integration and development projects of Mexico and Turkey which could explain the specific expressions and forms taken by the global restructuring process that can strengthen the production of the counter-hegemonic spatialities on different scales. Furthermore, this work provides empirical evidence for the conceptual framework of analysing the varied formation and transformation of the capitalist spatiality by comparing two spatiotemporally specific processes where the peripheral capitalist spatiality has been built upon the uneven geographical development. Linking the spatially and temporally specific concepts of Luxemburg, Trotsky and Gramsci for the explanation of the specific socio-spatial organisation of capitalism in the periphery should be perceived as a significant element of this theorisation. And, lastly, this work shows that it is possible—and necessary—to engage with the contemporary space formation strategies on the national scale without falling into the reproduction of the state-centric themes and categories but through establishing a spatiotemporal analysis of varied multiscalar formations and transformations of the social space.
Chapter 1: The problematic of analysing the inter-spatial relations on the national scale

‘Since the Young Hegelians consider conceptions, thoughts, ideas, in fact all the products of consciousness, to which they attribute an independent existence, it is evident that the Young Hegelians have to fight only against these illusions of consciousness....[they] in spite of their allegedly ‘world-shattering’ phrases, are the staunchest conservatives’


In the German Ideology, one of the issues that Marx and Engels focused on was the premises where the mainstream thoughts and ideas become given, objective, and a priori categories through the systematic and exclusive engagements of the philosophers with those concepts. This was an effort to demystify the German philosophy by locating and disclosing it as the product of the German petty-bourgeoisie conditions (Marx and Engels 1998: 473). In their assault on the Young Hegelian bastions, Marx and Engels directed their criticisms both to the pure idealistic understanding of the concepts which give an independent existence to those notions that delinked from their material premises, and the reproduction of those concepts upon an exclusively materialist understanding of the social reality -as in Feuerbach- which collapses in the same non-dialectical course. The solution that Marx provided was the dialectical materialist understanding of the social reality which will be evaluated in the chapter two. This chapter will be focusing on the concepts and categories that had been produced by the mainstream international
relations within the self-claimed discipline of foreign policy studies for the analysis of the inter-spatial relations on the national scale.

This engagement with the mainstream concepts and categories is a necessary step in order to proceed with a dialectical materialist analysis of inter-spatial relations without aiming to simply reconceptualise or reproduce those ahistoric and spaceless notions of space from the political economy perspective but instead aiming to simultaneously ‘unthink’ those misleading concepts and categories (Wallerstein 2001: 2). Therefore, it is very important to focus first on the mainstream foreign policy themes to show the inherent limits to their underlying Cartesian understanding with its ahistoric and spaceless ontological and epistemological nature. This engagement seeks to explain why it is necessary to reject their themes and concepts, and their epistemological and ontological foundation, in order to rule out any attempts of modification of these themes which would only reproduce different ahistoric and spaceless categories that confining the complex socio-spatial reality within the borders of formal/institutional appearances. In that sense, it is argued that the Cartesian perspectivalist paradigm, which the foreign policy and international relations themes and concepts had been built upon, needs to be “untaught” and the ever transforming social phenomena need to be located and analysed within the spatiotemporal processes of formation and transformation.

Therefore, this chapter proceeds by taking two steps. Firstly, the concepts and categories that have been produced and reproduced within the international relations and foreign policy theorisation will be reviewed in order to clear the ground for the deconstruction of these ahistoric and spaceless themes which
limits the formation and transformation of the social phenomena within the borders of the nation-states and governmental institutions. By doing this, secondly, this chapter will be deconstructing those themes and concepts by problematising and rejecting the ontological foundations of the taken for granted categories. These two steps enable the theorisation of a spatiotemporal analysis that offers a dialectical materialist understanding of the inter-spatial relations which will be conceptualised in the next chapter.

The critical geopolitics allows us to undertake the deconstruction of these mainstream foreign policy theories even though it does not conceptualise an alternative way of analysing the social phenomena. In that sense, this chapter aims to undertake the necessary process of unthinking of the mainstream foreign policy concepts and categories, and thus, firstly focuses on the conceptualisation of these themes and later the deconstruction of them through critical geopolitics studies in order to provide a historical materialist analysis based on the theorisation of the spatiotemporal processes of formation and transformation of the social space.

The conceptualisation of the spatiotemporal analysis of the regional integration projects in Mexico and Turkey will be based on this simultaneous attempt of unthinking of the mainstream concepts and the alternative examination of the processes of production and reproduction of the peripheral capitalist spatiality within the context of worldwide reconfiguration of neoliberal capitalism. The foreign policy theorisation quintessentially designated the scope of foreign policy research as the analysis of the short-time span activities of the clearly defined entities (spaceless spaces) on the international scale. Therefore, from the institutionalist and systemic
approaches to the political psychology analyses, the epistemological progression had been articulated on the same trail of conceptualisation that takes the nation-state as the container or platform of the social phenomenon. In that sense, since a re-conceptualisation of these notions would be a futile reproduction, the crucial aim of this engagement is to manifest the organic relationship between the independent existence of the mainstream conceptualisation and the conditions in which the mainstream themes and categories have been produced and reproduced by the ‘intellectuals of statecraft’ (Ó Tuathail and Agnew 1992: 193).

Therefore, as stated above, the first section will directly focus on the mainstream theorisation of foreign policy by outlining its general features and limitations and disclosing its commitment to the Cartesian ontological and positivist epistemological premises. Critical geopolitics studies played a significant role in challenging the positivist knowledge produced within the mainstream foreign policy studies through deconstructing those themes and concepts, particularly space and geography itself, to unravel the relationship between the established Cartesian epistemology and the forms of authority and power relations. Thus, the second section will be evaluating these criticisms. Nevertheless, the critical geopolitics studies fail to go beyond this reflection and restrain itself to the critique of the language and phraseology of the oppression. The last section briefly builds on this point and provides the general abstractions for the dialectical materialist analysis of the inter-spatial relations which will be elaborated in the next chapter.
1.1. Engaging with the positivist foundation and the Cartesian theorisation of the foreign policy studies

This section aims to engage with the theorisation of foreign policy studies as a mainstream and self-defined field and unravel its general ontological and epistemological foundations on which the existing themes, categories and notions have been produced and reproduced. It is important to note that it is not desired to regenerate or reconceptualise the main themes and central problems of the mainstream foreign policy studies from a ‘historical materialist point’ which in fact is inescapably condemned to produce a generic foreign policy conceptualisation with an economic concern. On the contrary, in this work it is aimed to deconstruct these taken-for-granted a priori themes and concepts in order to deny their relevance for the analysis of the inter-spatial relations.

The unchanging problematical ontological foundations set by the prominent currents of international relations studies can be traced back to the tendency to model an a priori and objective knowledge of social reality which has been inscribed in the Western epistemology. The crude realist approaches that are mainly concerned with international security issues had been transformed towards a rather multi-factorial and multi-disciplinary foreign policy tradition since the 1960s, but the (nation)state-centric agency, themes and assumptions remained very much intact. Contemporary foreign policy studies have been shaped and limited by the same institutionalised ontological assumptions but varied in the emphasis on the different aspects of the foreign policy making process, in different epistemological stances or in using different methodologies. However, the majority of the mainstream work in the field shares the similar problematic perceptions, features and borders.
The general categories and themes of contemporary foreign policy studies are relatively systematised and indisputable. Although there is a certain level of discussion on the thematic limits of the study, the scope of foreign policy studies has been well defined according to a ‘conventional wisdom’ on what should and what should not be included in the analysis (Webber and Smith 2002: 3). Therefore, from the very beginning the foreign policy studies locate themselves within the positivist ontology by recognising a normative position drawn by a ‘conventional wisdom’ or a common sense.

Hill defines (2002) foreign policy as ‘the sum of external relations conducted by an independent actor in international relations’. According to Hill, foreign policy exists in a space which is created by states and their actions are (somehow) limited. State is functioning as a mediator between external and internal demands and the effectiveness of this mediation reflects the effectiveness of the foreign policy (Hill 2002: 31). It can be argued that one of the main concerns of foreign policy studies is to understand and to model the behaviour of nation-state in a multi-causal way that takes numerous factors into account at various levels of analysis (Breuring 2007: 163).

Another definition made by Webber and Smith (2002) points out that foreign policy includes the goals, decisions and actions that had been sought and made by states on behalf of their people who organised themselves as national societies in terms of external relations. Whilst it has been argued that the contemporary state system should not be seen as monolithic, the main factor that creates the difference between the units of observation is considered as having a western style democracy or an autocratic regime. Thus, ideally a ‘democratic’ country will base its foreign policy in achieving economic growth
and stability which directly can be interpreted as the common good (Webber and Smith 2002: 10-11). When it comes to the analysis of ‘non-western, less developed’ states’ foreign policy behaviour, a different analytical approach should be adopted than analysing the foreign policies of the Western developed states (White 1989: 9).

It can be argued that, particularly in the period following the Cold War, there was a transformation from the strictly state-centric realist analysis of foreign policy that was oriented by ‘national security’ concerns with a broad distinction between ‘low and high’ foreign policy issues (Cooper 1972: 19) towards a more complex and multidimensional study of state behaviour. Nevertheless, the main focus of foreign policy studies remained on three aspects of these external relations; ‘decision, decision maker and decision making processes’ (Breuring 2007: 164). The overwhelming inclination is to perceive the nation-state as the machinery which processes the inputs and produces outputs that will subsequently feed the milieu back where the inputs had initially emerged. Inevitably, the main driving force of studying foreign policy is to describe the dynamic, constantly changing adapting system as a whole with its interdependent components to understand the foreign policy behaviour in a complex and multi-factorial manner (Clarke 1989: 29). This exclusive focus which defines the unchallenged borders of the research area straightforwardly declares the foreign policy studies as a study of short-time span rather than the longue durée in which the nation-state appears as the non-problematic container of the social activity holding the monopoly of the legitimate use of physical power (Hobden 1999: 257; Hobson 2002: 27). This focus has been the driving force of the first, second and the third generation foreign policy studies. Nevertheless, while the former two aspects of foreign
policy relatively remained clearly defined and non-controversial, the question of how to understand the decision making process has been the main area of discussion in the theorisation of foreign policy studies.

More recently, it has been acknowledged that the foreign policy of a nation-state is a complex and multidimensional process which includes an open interplay between different factors (Cordell and Wolff 2005: 7). In that vein, it has been pointed out that there are six hallmarks of foreign policy analysis which are defined as being ‘multi-factorial, multilevel, interdisciplinary, integrative, agent-oriented and actor-specific’ (Hudson 2005: 3). Similarly, Hill (2002) highlights the main points of foreign policy analysis as being ‘comparative, conceptual, interdisciplinary and integrative’, and thus, it can encompass the decision making process as a whole multi-factorial system.

In that sense, three broad focuses can be located within the contemporary foreign policy studies which directly emanate from its positivist epistemological foundations that separates, fixes and immobilises time and space. The first focus is in identifying the multiple factors that influence the process of decision making in the domestic and international arenas. Despite the argument that a foreign policy scholar should ‘perceive the decision making system as a whole’, in fact, foreign policy studies are inherently based on several superficial separations such as domestic and foreign, national and international or political and economic. These separations are essential to maintain the research of foreign policy as a meaningful and coherent discipline. Hill (2002) defined the nation-state as a self-maximising mediator of the external influences and flows on the domestic sphere in the pursuit of the national interest. While the nation-state is the main entity that provides
security to its own subjects through separating anarchic ‘outside’ from the orderly ‘inside’, the borders of the extent that nation-state allows the ‘external’ to influence the ‘internal’ remained as an unidentified subject for foreign policy studies (Hill 2002: 31).

In an ‘ideal’ western style democracy, the processes of foreign policy decision making have been perceived as a ‘two-level game’ that through national governments to maximise the interests of its nation while minimising the adverse threats to the ability of the nation-state to satisfy those needs (Putnam 1988: 434; Webber and Smith 2002: 45). Nevertheless, the second generation foreign policy studies started to recognise that there are different non-state actors and concerns emanating from both domestic and international arenas influencing foreign policy behaviour even though the ontological dogma that locates the nation-state as the central concern of the analysis have been preserved. Foreign policy studies claimed that those influences had to be channelled through a political structure or a government that ‘identifies, decides and implements’ the foreign policy decisions as an ‘ultimate decision unit’ (Hermann and Hermann 1989: 362) while the external factors and agents within these processes needed to be incorporated. Therefore, the contemporary foreign policy theorisation attempts to identify those external factors and agencies that have been involved, sources of influences and the decision-makers themselves within the process of decision making (Bicchi et al. 2006: 3).

It is important to note that the third generation foreign policy studies claim that the traditional separation of national and international spheres or the common neglect of the domestic factors are not valid anymore, and
contemporarily, foreign policy is perceived as a two-level game (Starr 2006: 4-5; Grove 2007: 2). Kenneth Waltz’s (1979) prominent neorealist theorisation drew much of the criticisms in this matter. Indeed, Waltz conceptualised a clear distinction between the hierarchically ordered domestic political structures and intrinsically anarchic –and conflict prone- international political system where all the units had been positioned with a specifiable relation to others (Waltz 1979: 81, 99-101; Waltz 2000: 10). While in the anarchic realm these units tend to increase their capabilities by seeking clear ends, they meanwhile create interdependence within the hierarchical domestic realm where the agents are integrated for a common good (Waltz 1979: 104-105).

Another point that Waltz received criticism over was his underscoring of the economic factors by arguing that the economic aspects should be conceptualised as pure factors distinct from the social and political realms (Waltz 1990: 22). The third generation realist approaches alongside the other foreign policy perspectives had criticised this notion of the nation-state as a ‘black box’ which blurs the domestic factors and claimed that the foreign policy theorisation should drive for a ‘greater methodological sophistication’ (Taliaferro et al. 2009: 18-19).

What, in fact, the contemporary foreign policy theorisation aims to achieve is a refining of the crude version of the positivist understanding of the social reality into a research area that focuses on the construction of complex and multi-causative models that can explain different factors in issue areas (Starr 2006: 2). While ‘neoclassical realists’ put more emphasis on the domestic area by taking the social group formation as their starting point on the basis of *metus hostilis* principle, the constructivist and political psychological perspectives incorporated the international norms and human rights as a product of
cognitive process of political practice, and hence, as a part of the national-interest (Brown 2001: 22; Macdonald and Patman 2007: 2; Brysk 2009: 31).

In the same vein, neo-institutionalist/neo-functionalist perspectives focused on the links between those two spheres by claiming that there is a link between micro level developments and macro level transformations which should be processed and incorporated into foreign policy conceptualisation and analysis. Rosenau (2006) argued that following the unprecedented progress of the communicational and informational technologies, the capacity and talents of the individuals considerably increased. He defined this development as the ‘skill revolution’; people are more mobile and well equipped, therefore, they compose a more active and effective civil society in influencing the foreign policy decision making (Rosenau 2006: 12). Rosenau argued that the widespread use of the internet promoted several social initiatives which led to an increase in the number of social activities or in the creation of civil organisations. The ‘organisational explosion’ needs to be seriously taken into account in order to grasp the new international realities. Subsequently, he argued that the traditional authority of the nation-state has been disaggregated after those informational and organisational revolutions. The authority in the national society has been dispersed and it is not concentrated in large hierarchical organisations such as the nation-state anymore. The disaggregation of the authority led to a multi-centric world system and foreign policy studies need to focus on the links, channels and interaction between those units comprising this multi-centric system (Rosenau 2006: 18). Within the same neo-realist institutionalist spectrum one can find the perspectives that give more importance to the rational choices of the nation-state organisational frameworks and sociological institutionalist
perspective where the states and national/transnational institutions have been perceived mutually constitutive (Larsen 2005: 15).

Another issue area, or level of analysis, that the foreign policy studies have been increasingly focusing on is the factors that influence foreign policy decision making in terms of the environmental conditioning of the decision maker himself. In their seminal work, the Sprouts have emphasised that the setting (i.e., stage, arena or environment) is a determining factor of the political behaviour of human decision makers. According to ‘human ecology’ and ‘cognitive behaviouralist’ perspectives, a human being, perceived as a unified entity with his/her environment who consciously reacts to his/her surroundings (Sprout and Sprout 1965: 118).

The central argument of the Sprouts’ thesis was reinforced by the idea that it is possible to locate, evaluate and explain the human and non-human environmental factors which play a significant role in human decision making process. These conditionings have been perceived, sensed and taken into account by the individuals unconsciously. The milieu is able to influence, affect and shape the human values and preferences, moods and attitudes, choices and decisions (Drury 2005: 3; Grove 2007: 4; Stein 2008: 104-105). On the other hand, the links between environmental factors and outcomes of the undertakings may have different dimensions. Environmental factors are able to limit the execution of undertakings cognitively in terms of both material and ideational perceptions. Therefore, the psychological perceptions of individuals are not necessarily the resource of the limitative power of human ecology. According to the Sprouts, human ecology has been influential in human
decision making process even when they have not been perceived simultaneously by the individuals (Sprout and Sprout 1965: 12).

The Sprouts further problematised the role of human perception in decision making process by emphasising the subjective characteristic of the perception of the environment; a person never fully perceives everything present in the milieu. However, unperceived factors can possibly effect the outcomes of the decisions. They argued that values, taboos, and other norms can be determinative factors on individuals for being more alert and responsive to certain features of the milieu than other individuals (Sprout and Sprout 1965: 131, 133).

According to the Sprouts’ ecological perspective\(^5\) in foreign policy draws attention to (1) the psychological behaviour of individuals; (2) undertakings which mean planning the best ways to be advantageous or successful; and (3) the outcomes or the results of applied undertakings. They claimed that the ecological perspective contributed to a better understanding of the link between the human decisions and outcomes (intended or not intended behaviours and outcomes) and the milieu (Sprout and Sprout 1965: 8).

However, the Sprouts also argued that there must be a clear explanation of the relationship between the determinism of the structure and free will. At the same time, the terms of being multi-disciplinary should be outlined. Therefore, they suggested a categorisation of concepts through a differentiation of the notions and terms of foreign policy analytically; as cognitive and non-cognitive.

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\(^5\) Sprouts define the human ecology as the relationship between individuals, groups and organisation and also with the nonhuman settings. In human ecology the reference of analysis is the relationship between the human and his surrounding nonhuman conditions (Sprout and Sprout 1965).
This distinction involves further analytical differentiations between individual behaviour and state affairs and between undertaking and achievement (Sprout and Sprout 1965: 10). Nevertheless, behaviouralist approaches do not question ontological fixities but attempt to explain them through reproducing them from a different perspective. According to the Sprouts’ analysis, while human beings are seen as individuals acting within a formal/institutional structure, their material and ideational environment is perceived as external to them by positioning it as a system that provides ‘inputs’. And it has been claimed that this machinery can be objectively modelled in terms of political rationality.

On the other hand, the relationship between the human decision maker and his/her environment is a less problematic aspect of Snyder et al.’s work which represents another strand within the foreign policy studies theorisation. This perspective places an emphasis on the clearly defined decision making process itself. The structure is positioned as the ‘setting’ or the ‘organisational context’ in the analysis of foreign policy and defined as a cluster of values that possess a potential to affect state behaviour (Snyder et al. 2002: 60, 76). Therefore, the unit of observation is exclusively the organisational system which the decision makers act within and accordingly. And the ‘decision’ itself is an intention of creating a particular state of affairs which motivates the decision makers by a perception of an outcome or an achievement. The motivation may be generated by both internal and external setting and the decision making process combines this motivation with a process of selection of one scheme from a limited number of alternative projects (Snyder et al. 2002: 78).

While the different levels of analysis had been taken by the institutionalist, political psychological and the rationalist choice theorisation of the foreign
policy, it is possible to argue that, in reality, they bring different aspects of the rationalist modelling of the foreign policy together. Hudson argued that moving from a strict state-centric focus towards to a foreign policy analysis that can incorporate different aspects of the decision making process, and particularly the incorporation of the human decision maker into the study, is important in three ways. Firstly, the recognition of the human decision makers, as a point of theoretical intersection between the decision and the decision making process, allows the analysis to adopt a more complex and realistic conceptualisation of the nation-state. In addition, it makes it possible to take the cultural and social factors into account. Secondly, by positing the human decision maker as the representative of the nation-state, it has been argued that foreign policy theories have clarified the agent of the foreign policy analysis. Consequently, it reinforced more satisfactory explanations than the traditional, natural law-like generalisations since it anticipates a psychological and cognitive approach (Hudson 2002: 6-7).

These different stances on various units of analyses and levels on diverse issue areas do not draw a conflicting picture in foreign policy studies but on the contrary, a complementary one. Foreign policy is perceived as an objective that sought by a Janus-faced foreign policy decision maker who is located on the intersection between the international and national spheres (Lobell 2009: 43), and whose capacity to take rational choices and efficient decisions was affected –limited or enhanced- by numerous factors and causes at various levels6 (White and Clarke 1989; Hill 2002; Smith et al. 2008). While some

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6 Breuring (2007) summarised some of these factors as ‘leader personality and worldview, perceptions, problem representations, the use of analogies, and reasoning; the role of advisors, group decision making, and the impact of institutional arrangements; domestic
variables are considered to be independent (culture, resources or idiosyncratic leaders etc), some others have been considered as intertwined (economic wealth, psychology of decision makers, etc). Additionally, within the decision making process, the interplay between cognition and emotion; personal relations and trust; the role of speeches and policy entrepreneurs in the policy process; perceiving opportunities; and the role of time constraints in policy making should be considered in the analysis (Chollet and Goldgeier 2002: 165).

The task of the foreign policy theorisation is defining this complex multi-factorial and multi-causal political conduct with an ‘effective and explicit’ conceptualisation of the system and clarifying the methodology to approach it (Hay 2002: 60). This conceptualisation must be based on easily replicable, testable and clear analytical tools, models, and sets of data which will ensure that the foreign policy studies will meet the ‘operationality, predictivity and efficiency’ criteria (Snyder et al. 2002: 25-29).

As has been argued before, the ontological and epistemological progression within foreign policy studies followed this positivist track. The homogenised, neutralised and separated understandings of time and space have been inscribed in the themes, concepts and categories produced by the conceptualisation of foreign policy studies. Foreign policy theories conceptualised a multi-factories model that focuses on the decision, decision making process and the decision makers to analyse short-span activities of the ahistoric and spaceless Cartesian space. Simultaneously, these central ahistoric and spaceless concepts and themes which are defined as the foundation of the discipline such as state and states system perceived as static, homogenous and
non-problematic, thus, remained under-theorised and unable to explain social change (Hobden 1998: 4; Hobden 1999: 268; Hobson et al. 2010: 11). Therefore, foreign policy study could be seen as the organic extension of the bourgeois ideology, hence, its self-claimed borders, levels of analysis and the issue areas need to be unravelled and rejected.

Among numerous mainstream international relations and foreign policy studies journals, think tank working papers and various other publications, such an ‘organic’ production of foreign policy knowledge on Mexico and Turkey can be located in two significant journals; ‘Revista Mexicana de Política Exterior’ (Mexican Journal of Foreign Policy) and ‘Perceptions’. Funded and published by the foreign ministries of Mexico and Turkey, these two journals provide an important ideational space for the mainstream academics mainly working on the foreign policy issues of Mexico and Turkey, and were later followed and emulated by several other journals published by the think tank and ‘strategy research centres’. One of the most salient features shared by the publications in these journals is their ahistoric focus on the short-term span issues. Another significant characteristic of these works is the strong commitment to the positivist conceptualisations of nation-state, national interest and security and states system that takes short-span bilateral relations between homogenous agencies as its central focus.

These works strongly argued that, thanks to the processes of economic integration and market liberalisation of the 1990s, more open and export-oriented Mexico and Turkey were promoted from the developing countries league to the group of ‘emergent countries’ and thus became more vocal and proactive in the international politics. These works have claimed that the
membership of Mexico to NAFTA and OECD in 1994-and its seceding from the
G77 same year-signalled the changing international role of Mexico. While the
‘international cooperation for development’ became a central objective for
Mexican foreign policy, the transformation of economic institutions to achieve
more comprehensive integration with the global markets emerged as a
significant process that shaped foreign policy strategies (Sánchez 2010: 11). As
the ‘Ley para la Cooperación Internacional para el Desarrollo’ (the act of
International Cooperation for Development) was enacted in 2010, it has been
argued that Mexico increased its influence in the international arena on the
issues of narco-trafficking and organised crime with the ‘Merida Initiative’, on
climate change with its constructive role in the ‘Climate Change Forum’, United
Nations and on the regional development through the ‘Proyecto Mesoamérica’
(Mesoamerican Project–PM) (Sánchez 2010: 12). These works argued that the
Plan Puebla Panama (PPP) which transformed to PM in 2007 is one of the main
columns of these international cooperation for development strategies giving a
strong foreign policy instrument to Mexico in maintaining the privileged
relationship with Central America and Colombia (Ascencio 2008: 16). The
mainstream works praise the increasing multilateralism in Mexican foreign
policy in various areas such as prevention of illegal migration and human
trafficking as a national security issue (Alarcón 2010: 36), participation in the
regional and international mechanisms for the development of the strategic
aerospace technologies (Vázquez 2010: 77), expanding and deepening the
bilateral economic and strategic relations with the countries that possess great
potential like Brazil, Russia, China and European Union (Fernández 2010;
Álvarez 2011; Hijuelos 2010). It is important to note that while the mainstream
foreign policy works praised the ‘new’ multilateralist turn in the Mexican
foreign policy, they defended that the main axis of the Mexican foreign policy should be maintained as expanding and deepening the regional integration and cooperation with the two other NAFTA countries, United States and Canada (Studer 2009: 18-19).

Not surprisingly, the mainstream works in Turkish foreign policy analysis have been reaching strikingly similar conclusions. These works also identified a new era in the Turkish foreign policy starting in the 1990s when Turkey started to play a more prominent and proactive role in regional and global politics with the help of Turkey’s European Union membership candidacy that was granted in 1999. Keyman (2010) argued that in the new global context, Turkey, as a consolidated democracy and multicultural modern country with a large Muslim population, should maintain the ‘economically, politically, historically and geographically constructed relations of deep integration’ with the European Union as the main axis of its ‘proactive, constructive and multi-dimensional’ foreign policy (Keyman 2010: 15). In a similar vein, Dinç (2011) claimed that Turkey increased its regional power significantly in the last ten years through strengthening its relationship with Syria, Iran, Egypt, Saudi Arabia and other countries in the region. It has been argued that the democratisation process and the growth in the economy that was significantly taken forward under the government of ‘Adalet ve Kalkınma Partisi’ (Justice and Development Party – AKP) are the two dynamics behind this new formulation of Turkish foreign policy, moving the foreign policy making from the security-orientated strategies to the constructive foreign policy on the basis of regional economic cooperation and international multilateral initiatives (Ünay 2010: 40; Dinç 2011: 63). These works univocally claimed that during AKP rule, Turkey has repositioned itself within the new world order by putting an emphasis on
interdependency, regional integration, economic cooperation and proactive foreign policy. These works also argued that Turkey not only tried to deepen the relations with the countries in its region such as Syria, Iraq -and more strongly with the Kurdish Regional Authority-, Georgia, Azerbaijan, but also sought to establish relations with the countries located in the traditionally neglected regions like Africa and East Asia or to normalise relations with Armenia (Özcan 2010; Aras and Akpınar 2011; Özkan 2011).

As it has been mentioned before, this work argues that mainstream foreign policy studies are unable to present any meaningful insight on the international politics in general and spatial relations of Mexico and Turkey, in particular. It will be shown in the next section of this chapter that the ontological foundations of these works cause the constant production and reproduction of the ahistoricism that perceive the society as a static, discrete and homogenous entity and lead to the unquestioned use of vague and superficial concepts such as national interest, national security and national economic growth, etc. As a result of this, almost in a journalistic way, these works have been focusing on the short-time span developments that are unable to identify or analyse the processes in which the social reality dynamically transformed. It will be observed in the fourth and fifth chapters of this work that only a spatiotemporal analysis of the social change that focuses on the historical processes of formation and transformation of the social reality can identify and explain the underpinning conditions of social change, and thereby provide a meaningful analysis of the contemporary capitalist space and spatial relations in Mexico and Turkey on different scales.
1.2. Reconsidering the ahistoric and spaceless notion of geography

In order to analyse the inter-spatial relations between different spaces on the national scale, it is essential to define the specific conditions in which the multiscalar and dialectical processes of the production and transformation of social space emerge. The definition of these conditions also signals the production of the hegemonic representations of space where the dominant spatial conceptualisation formed and transformed accordingly. In mainstream foreign policy studies, it has been argued that the nation-state officially and institutionally materialises and formalises sets of aims and actions based on vague, subjective, and an informal and simultaneously widely unchallenged appreciation of the supposedly objective geographical conditions. In that sense, geopolitics can be seen as the content of the foreign policy studies or, in other words, as the hegemonic content of the relations between different spaces which shape the behaviours of the nation-states in international politics. Foreign policy theorisation aims to model the space and spatial relations exclusively on the homogenous, fixed, and self-defined spatial scales within the short-time span (therefore, timelessly, ahistorically) through the geopolitics which is based on Cartesian geographical knowledge. Appealing to Marx and Engels in the German Ideology once again, it is possible to locate this hegemonic content as the product of the capitalist spatiality.

However, a historical materialist account of the inter-spatial relations on the national scale cannot be built on those ontological foundations of the mainstream conceptualisation of the spaceless geography and geopolitics. Furthermore, any attempt that aims to develop an alternative Marxist theoretical framework to understand inter-spatial relations on the national scale needs to be aware of the possibility to reiterate and reproduce neo-
Weberian notions of geography. Reinstating the Marxist dialectics in the analysis plays a crucial role in this point. The absolute historicist approach of Gramsci offers a robust appreciation of dialectics which is beyond a simple emphasis on the material conditions that the ideas were generated within (Morton 2007: 29). The dialectical relationship between the object and subject, between the form and content, is the key point that has to be reinvigorated in the analysis of the social phenomena, and inevitably in the analysis of the social space and the geographical notions. From a Gramscian point of view, the ‘ideational’ has a constitutive role in the construction of hegemony which was produced by the intellectuals of the statecraft. In that vein, Cox (1985) argued that institutions and conceptualisation of the other social phenomena might be seen as a collective response of human beings to a particular material condition in a particular time and space. In this matter, Cox appealed to Vico in formulating how objective realities were constituted by inter-subjective ideas (Cox 1985: 52). According to Cox, historical structures are simple representations of a certain social practice and an expression of a tendency. They provide a logically coherent form (a concept) to understand complex social realities and tendencies. Therefore, Cox’s historical structure shares the same meaning with Vico’s ‘Cosa’. ‘Cosa’ generates a material character of the social phenomena which shows a coherency and persistency in a particular time and space. It is significant to note that ‘cosa’ or historical structure cover both ideational and material aspects of the social reality (Cox 1995: 29). Therefore, state, national and international institutions and other transnational organisations perceived to be composing and maintaining their existence both on a material and ideational base that subject of a continual transformation. Within this transformation, persistent patterns of the inter-
subjectively constituted entities can be detected, deconstructed and conceptually fixed but an analyst has to acknowledge its limitedness in the particular time and space with its normative nature (Sinclair 1995: 10).

Critical geopolitics studies give a strong account of the ideational base of the mainstream geographical knowledge in this dialectical production process. From the critical geopolitics perspective, the production of geopolitical representations is significant in understanding the production of the hegemonic geographical knowledge and this function is mainly performed by the Western intellectuals and scholars. Therefore, this section argues that the evaluation of the challenges posed by the critical geopolitics to the dominant conceptualisation of the social phenomena is a necessary step in the dialectical materialist understanding of the inter-spatial relations. It is a better way to start to the conceptualisation of the historical materialist space rather than following the uneasy path suggested by Callinicos (2007) which was infamously defined as the necessity of a ‘realist moment’ through the integration of the geopolitical logic into the historical materialist understanding of social phenomena. An attempt that aims to ‘rethink’ the mainstream issues, such as ‘geopolitical competition in the contemporary inter-state system’, as Callinicos tried to conceptualise, through incorporating realist themes within the Marxist categories, would intrinsically limit the analysis within the ahistoric and spaceless borders of the social inquiry. However, with the simultaneous unthinking of the mainstream themes and categories and the reinvigoration of the dialectical materialist understanding of the social space, the non-historical materialist tendency towards positivism within the analysis of the inter-spatial relations disappears without falling to the neo-Weberian multi-causality trap or to the crude materialist interpretations of Marxism.
For the ones who engage with the notion of geography from a critical point of view, the term of geopolitics expresses more than a set of political evaluations based on certain heuristic values of terrestrial morphology. Geographical notions have been perceived neither as a simple objective abstraction of the ‘real’, nor an ingenuous representation of nature in general, or in a particular landscape. On the contrary, its borders or its resources -the sum of unquestioned content of the foreign policy studies that are usually taken for granted- are questioned and deconstructed. For critical geopolitics, modern geographical knowledge and geopolitics are rather systems of imagination, structures of the (mis)representation of the real, sets of signifiers and signified that were generated within the discourse. It has been argued that mainstream geopolitics is dividing, labelling and spatialising the terrestrial space on the basis of a quasi-scientific hierarchical interpretation of knowledge. In order to see and govern the world as a totality, this endeavour –representing the space and the place purged from the reality- was seen as a crucial necessity for the modern statecraft (Agnew 1998: 2). Thus, mainstream geopolitics is an engagement with geography which ultimately works against the genuine geographical knowledge.

Ó Tuathail, and other leading critical geopolitics scholars, located the modern geographical knowledge within the 16th century European imperialist expansionism which had required new forms of geographical power/knowledge structures to govern, delimit and discipline the space as homogenous, one-dimensional and uni-cultural (Ó Tuathail 1996: 12, 53). With the Enlightenment, the Western world emerged as the universal model and gauge for social progress and civilisation. ‘The Other’ has been used as a cement-like element in the production of the Western identity which is based
on a dichotomy of civilised-uncivilised or modern-traditional in an antagonistic way (Slater 1993: 421).

This production of modern geographical knowledge claimed to comprise three aspects. The first aspect is the ‘surfaces of emergence’ which refers to the spaces that the geographical knowledge has been produced. The second aspect is the intellectuals of the statecraft who produce that knowledge in order to aid and facilitate the operation of the modern state machinery. And lastly, the systems of specifications that the geographical representations become a part of the geopolitical discourse (Ó Tuathail 1996: 113). Critical geopolitics studies challenged all these geographical representations by focusing on the spaces of (re)production of the geopolitical reasoning in particular and geographical knowledge in general and by questioning how these discourses are dispersing and permeating from aspects of the everyday life to world politics. In order to do that, critical geopolitics disclosed the relationship between the universalist and objectivist understanding of knowledge and its ontological foundations within the Cartesian Perspectivalism (Agnew 2007: 138).

The state understood in the critical geopolitics as a specification, a boundary drawing geopolitical act which reduces the plurality of space by drawing on a dichotomy of secure ‘in’ and anarchic ‘out’ (Ó Tuathail and Dalby 1998: 3). This spatial division lies in the core of the Western thought and ultimately conveys a moral division between ‘good’ and ‘bad’, ‘civilised’ and ‘civilised-to-be’. However, these dichotomies share the same psych-space and this condition makes the geographical representation fragile (Sparke 1998: 205). Therefore, the struggle over the hegemonic geographic representations are seen not only
as a matter of material resistance to the Western Cartesian imaginary of the physical topographies but also a matter of resistance to the discursive separation of the benign Self and the malign Other (Ó Tuathail 1996: 15).

Critical geopolitics questions and deconstructs the mainstream deviation of the genuine geographical knowledge and has posed fundamental ontological and epistemological challenges for almost two decades. Furthermore, it aims to deconstruct everyday practices of geopolitical representations (re)produced by politicians, state officials, academicians and media. For critical geopolitics, the objectivist and the reductionist (mis)representation of the geography as an allegedly transhistorical abstraction of the ‘real’ is problematic and needs to be challenged.

In fact, it is not critical geopolitics which challenged the Cartesian perspectivalism first. Heidegger’s questioning of the meaning of being was one of the very first challenges to the foundations of the traditional philosophical thinking which related profoundly with the ‘site’. Heidegger proclaimed a ‘crisis of meaning’ caused by the failure of grasping the differentiated presencing of being (Radloff 2007: 4). Therefore, he rejected a universally dominant ‘planetary’ thinking; the technical organisation and exploration of the world which found its essence in the Western thought (Radloff 2007: 36).

In his elaboration of ‘planetary thinking’ Heidegger gave an account of the period which he calls the planetary epoch. In this particular era, the positivist perspective that takes the globe monolithically and as a homogenised entity that has been prevailed and promoted an undifferentiated dimension (Radloff 2007: 40). This uniformed dimension generated the dominant Western ontology and epistemology which underpinned universal, nature-like scientific
laws and conformity of the technical norms of productivity. The being of beings in this epoch is understood in terms of the ‘objectivity’ and ‘functionality’. Uniformity inevitably reinforces ‘the statecraft’ with its developed structures for the management of the resources and the structures of coordination (Radloff 2007: 47). The significant observation that Heidegger made was the fact that during the capitalist modernity the hegemonic ideology of modern capitalist statecraft universally and uniformly triumphs over the different forms of social space.

With a similar concern, Foucault puts a special emphasis on space in the development of the Western epistemology. Foucault (1986) claimed that the tendency to ‘establish an ensemble of relations’ through space has a particular history in Western thought. The hierarchical categorisation of places during the middle ages, based on conflicting dichotomies between sacred and profane or protected and open-exposed places, created the medieval space as a ‘space of emplacement’ (Foucault 1986: 22). He argued that giving significance to the contemporary space is still valid; however, contrary to the medieval space, it is highly desanctified as a result of the new technologies that had been developed in the appropriation of space. Furthermore, parallel to this desanctification, the centrality of the ‘prince’ who takes his power from God in the art of government transformed into the material conditions since the emergence of ‘the population’ discarded the model of ‘family’ and replaced it with the notion of population (Ó Tuathail 1996: 8).

Therefore, Foucault explained the contemporary ‘siting’ in terms of demography. He argued that demography should not be understood as a simple projection of counting –counting individuals in a certain space- but as
the classification and distribution of human elements for achieving a given aim (Foucault 1986: 23). Thus, the relationship between the population in a certain space and the authority can be identified in terms of the concurrency of that population to the norms of being productive and being obedient to norms of the technology.

In that sense, the sovereignty, discipline and governing are the aspects that form the ‘triangle’ of the modern state authority with its primary focus on the population on a certain space. State institutions such as the security apparatuses that generalised at a certain moment of time are very significant for the enforcement of this triangle (Foucault 1980/2007: 178; Agnew 2005: 439). However, it is important to note that it has been argued that the use of territory for political authority has developed throughout history. Thus, territoriality does not appear always as the necessary condition for the existence of political authority (Agnew 2005: 441). Therefore, for critical geopolitics, the relationship between the modern authority and space should be further explained in order to understand the development of the Western epistemology and territorialisation of space as ‘state’.

Ó Tuathail neatly undertook a genealogical investigation of space through a problematisation of the Cartesian division nested in Western thought. He argued that since Plato, the active sense of seeing was replaced by the passive recording of the external world. Descartes codified this Cartesian separation of the subject from the object and the positivist insulation of the knowledge from the impact of any subjectivity (Ó Tuathail 1996: 98).

The separation of the subject and object leads to a perception of knowledge as a commodity which is independent from any cultural or sociological —or
spatiotemporal- constraints or effects (Agnew 2007: 139). In particular, geographical knowledge has not been perceived within a different paradigm; moreover, it became central in the positivist understanding of the social phenomena. Privileging the sense of sight promoted the ‘simultaneous and synchronic over the historical and diachronic’ and this tendency in the Western epistemology subordinated the history to the space (Ó Tuathail 1996: 24, 80). Ocularcentrism had flattened the time and privileged the (spaceless) space alongside the short-time span. This has a teleological characteristic and finds its best expression in the production of the geographical knowledge. The criticism of the generalising Platonic tendencies can be found in Heidegger’s notion of contemporary ‘planetary thinking’ which creates a postmodern image of the world as a picture or as a ‘simulacrum of the earth’, as Baudrillard described (Ó Tuathail 1996: 71; Radloff 2007: 41).

In a Foucauldian sense, the modern geography is an effort to create a panoptic vision of the world. World has been enframed and spatialised into a quasi-totality where the complexities and heterogeneity melt down through an institutional gaze on the subject populations (Foucault 1980/2007: 178-179; Ó Tuathail 1996: 27, 50, 79). Monocular eye which has been used for the universalisation of space is not a simple and passive visualisation of the world but an objective and active seeing which includes the division of space into places in a normative and hierarchical sense (Ó Tuathail 1996: 21). An inherently fluctuating and transhistorical feature is attributed to the geographical knowledge due to the perception of the world as a Euclidean surface (Agnew 2007: 140).
Therefore, locating and understanding the production of geographical knowledge parallel to the development of Cartesian perspectivalism can be the starting point for challenging the ocularcentric production and separation of time and space as the unchallenged base of Western epistemology. In this dominant thinking, the specifications of the political world are taken for granted (Dalby 2008: 415). The notion of primordial, fixed and homogenous national culture(s) is one of these taken for granted specifications (Rygiel 1998: 107). Particular geographies have been territorialised and fixed in time and different identities have been eliminated in order to maintain a legitimate authority of the sovereign that concentrated in the official identity (Rygiel 1998: 119). It is important to note that ‘national’ culture has been defined and received a meaning in the context of political culture. It is the political culture that draws the boundaries of the national culture by ignoring different localities within the limits of a certain territory occupied by the modern nation-state (Bonura 1998: 87).

Dalby (2009) argues that the creation of an ideological space in accordance with the legitimate claims of ‘sovereignty’ depends on a series of state security discourses which tries to exclude and delegitimise other security discourses; in other words, security discourses are produced as a result of competing claims of sovereignty over territorialised spaces (Ó Tuathail 1996: 179). In fact, those security discourses are very inadequate, contradictory and fragile due to their leaning on the narrow liberal understanding of the state as a rational and static actor (Dalby 2009: 405). By tracing the functionality of the discourse of security, Dalby exposes the power structure in the development of those perceptions and knowledge that has been generated by security discourses (Dodds and Sideway 1994: 518).
Cartesian perspectivalist thinking posited the geographical and geopolitical knowledge as purely scientific and objective form of knowledge that cannot be challenged. In fact the studies of geography and contemporary geopolitics are rather discursive practices; thus, permanently receptive to change and criticism. The modern mainstream geographical knowledge is an abstraction of the reality which rejects the diversity and complexity of the space and place; and in fact it is anti-geographical (Ó Tuathail and Agnew 1992: 190). Therefore, as was stated before, the mainstream geography and geopolitics works against the genuine geographical knowledge. As any kind of subjective knowledge, knowledge of world politics cannot be seen as a commodity which does not possess any sociological and cultural elements and, thus, any claim of universally commensurable and intelligible geographical representation is invalid since the values and norms cannot be separated from the historical and cultural circumstances (Dalby 1991: 267; Agnew 2007: 140). By rejecting the Western logocentrism that separates the visual from the textual, and, dismissing the relationship between the sight, site and cite and between the subject, object and the text led the critical geopolitics to assign an irreducible textuality to all concepts and terms and claimed that the social themes are meaningful in the systems of concepts which make concepts in general paradoxical entities that can only be used in their own contextuality (Ó Tuathail 1996: 66).

In the study where they have proposed a re-conceptualisation of geographical knowledge and geopolitics in terms of discourse, Ó Tuathail and Agnew (1992) draw a categorical distinction between practical and formal geographical knowledge. Practical geographical knowledge mainly based on ‘common sense and unremarkable’ perceptions of the space. On the other hand, formal
geographical reasoning depends more on highly formalised descriptions (Ó Tuathail and Agnew 1992: 194). However, it should be noted that both of these geographical elements are not exclusive concepts but are, rather, overlapping. This theorisation resonates with the distinction drawn by Foucault between the juridico-political (such as territory and domain) and economic-juridical notions which he defined as ‘geographical metaphors’ and where the archipelago appears as the only true geographical notion (Foucault 1980/2007: 176). Dodds (2007) sketched a tripartite schema which has another third form of geopolitics; popular geopolitics. While practical geopolitics included policy-oriented geographical representations and formal geopolitics derived from the self conscious efforts of intellectuals, popular geopolitics is a product of media and popular culture (Dodds 2007: 45).

Critical geopolitics also argued that the study of geopolitics conducted by the ‘intellectuals of statecraft’ who use and produce geographical and geopolitical knowledge to facilitate and maintain the operation of the state machinery (Ó Tuathail and Agnew 1992: 193). In that sense, the dominant geopolitical discourses are based on the geographical representations created and promoted by the intellectuals of the core western countries. These dominant geopolitical discourses shape and determine the key issues and themes of international politics. Like geographical knowledge, geopolitical knowledge was also disseminated from economically, politically and culturally powerful and privileged locations of the globe (Routledge 1998a: 245), and critical geopolitics had claimed to deconstruct these representational practices of foreign policy elites (Dodds and Sideway 1994: 518). Therefore, the effort of critical geopolitics is post-colonial; which is also gender-sensitive, since it
directly attacks white patriarchal heterosexist representations of space (Dalby 1998: 297).

Since the geographical notions produced on the basis of an antagonistic binary thinking, the contemporary geopolitical reasoning of the Western thought constantly drew a line between the space of the Self and the space of the Other. The territorialisation and the discourses of the Cold War can be seen as a very typical example of this binary thinking. The term of ‘Iron Curtain’ itself created a sense of material barrier between the Western liberal democracies and the Eastern autocratic and controlled societies (Dodds 2007: 6). Kaldor (1989) argues that the language that we use to describe the space shapes our decisions to act; therefore, the Cold War -based on this kind of exclusion-, was always an overwhelmingly discursive process. She argues that Atlanticism and post-Stalinism were actually not two conflicting ideologies of the organisation of production but rather they were complementary or necessary for each other’s existence (Kaldor 1989: 33; Sideaway 1998: 225). The division of the space into ‘our’ and ‘their’ place is the essential moment of the geopolitical discourse (Dalby 1991: 275). It has been argued that those dichotomies belong to each other; it is impossible to understand the normal without extreme since the norm(al) is saturated in the extremity (Doel and Clarke 1998: 41).

In this conceptual context, it is not surprising that the dissolution of the Soviet Union created a vertigo among the Western elite in defining the Self and the Other and opened a gap within the discursive legitimisation (Kaldor 1989: 35, Ó Tuathail 1986: 225). This vertigo meant a crisis particularly for the U.S. in defining and maintaining the ideational integrity of its own geographical borders and a crisis for the Western security community in general (Dalby
The strength of the Cold War geopolitics was coming from its simplicity in the creation of a noncomplex antagonism and from its ability to reduce the exclusion of the Other in a perpetual way (Ó Tuathail and Dalby 1998: 1). When this pervasive political rhetoric was diminished a new geographical representation has needed to give a meaning to the contemporary geopolitics. In the post-Cold War period, alternative sources became crucial in drawing boundaries and for giving coherence to series of traditional geographical representations (Sharp 1998: 152).

The geopolitical vertigo also ‘coincided’ with the conditions of the post-modernity where the traditional state structures were eroded parallel to the transformation of the national Fordist production structures that became increasingly redundant. The intellectuals of the statecraft responded to these de-territorialising tendencies with an attempt to re-territorialise the space (Ó Tuathail 1996: 227). In this vein, Stephenson (1998) argued that the Cold War was actually a geographical representation of the West, particularly the imagination produced within the United States. When this superfluous antagonism was challenged by the deconstruction of its main components, it appears that it was not a determining periodisation but a process that evolved and reshaped around the relations between two similar blocs (Stephenson 1998: 64, 65).

In that sense deconstructing the modern geographical knowledge to disclose the relationship between the political power and geographical notions and themes emerges as the focal point in the critical geopolitics. Geography is not produced by nature itself but it has been produced by an active occupation, division and subjugation of space by an authority. The expansion of the
political authority created a necessity to visualise the population in terms of regions and districts. In Foucauldian terms, governing the space required permanent –and dynamic- bureaucratic technologies. Therefore, the forms of power/knowledge structures operate geographically; and the production of geographical knowledge are bounded with those power/knowledge structures (Dodds and Sideway 1994: 516; Ó Tuathail and Agnew 1992: 195; Bonura 1998: 93). The growing dependency on surveying the subjects created a need for ‘mapping’ and the articulation of an ideology which is based on the unity of centralised space and society (Häkli 1998: 134). Therefore, geographical knowledge is not an innocent and objective knowledge but an ‘ensemble of techniques of power’ which concerned the governing and ‘management of territorial space (Ó Tuathail 1986: 7). The map is a subjective abstraction of the real, a subjugation of the thin superficial description over the thick analysis (Der Derian 1998: 263; Lacoste 1973: 620).

To sum up, it is appropriate to claim that the post-structuralist perspectives provide a significant critique of the mainstream analysis of the social phenomena and particularly of the foreign policy studies where the spatial concepts and notions seen as a priori categories and unanimously taken for granted. However, at the same time, an exclusive focus on the discourse leads to the failure to address the relationship between these notions and the conditions in which these concepts have been produced. In other words, the development of the material life separated from the formation of the socio-spatial organisation (Bieler and Morton 2008: 106). The next section will be demonstrating why the non-positivist/non-dialectical approaches cannot provide a viable foundation for the analysis of the interspatial relations, and hence, why a dialectical materialist framework is needed.
1.3. Towards a dialectical materialist understanding of the inter-spatial relations on the national scale

As it has been noted before, the post-structuralist critical geopolitics theorisation can expand spatial understanding by further exploring the discursive realm with the exclusive focus on language. Banura (1998) demonstrated how the spatial practices and representations of space are contingent through an exclusive focus on the political culture studies which aimed to provide objective and analytical accounts of the adaptation of the political forms and norms by the modern nation states. Sovereignty of the state is not an overarching, transcendental and transhistorical phenomena but a product of the linking narratives of the constitutive and perceptual aspects of the sovereignty (Banura 1998: 88). He identifies ‘an irreducible ontological core’ in political culture studies which is located at the centre of national sovereignty within a particular spatial entity (Banura 1998: 92). State sovereignty implies an exclusive jurisdiction claim of a central political authority which has strictly settled in a fixed territory (Agnew 2005: 437). Ó Tuathail (1998) argued that it is necessary to adopt ‘geopolitics from below’ and resist to the ‘geopolitics from above’ which imposes particular geopolitical representations in order to maintain the prevailing order. In this resistance, it is very important to locate and problematise the sources of the hegemonic geographical representations and the articulations of the dominant geopolitical discourses to be able to create alternative non-fixed diverse notions of space and place.

In that sense, Dalby even locates (1991) an emancipatory function of critical geopolitics, underlining how it shows the limits of the certain modes of production of knowledge which leads to think different ways to deconstruct
the hegemonic discourses. The intellectuals of statecraft both in hegemonic core and in peripheral social formations play an important role to ensure the consensual aspect of the hegemony (Ó Tuathail 1996: 18-20). Besides the intellectuals of statecraft, the media and film industry are also significant means for the dissemination of the dominant geographical representations and geopolitical reasoning. In an industrial society, certain geopolitical discourses derive from existing thought and social practices and prevail by using various means. In different contexts, the same binaries have been constantly produced and reproduced (Sharp 1998:155). Dodds (1998) argues that media does not read the visual material passively but creates an iconography that the icons and symbols use to represent world politics. Mass media represents the world in a certain ideological way by projecting the geographical clichés and dominant images (Lacoste 1973: 620). And these geographical imaginations that are constantly (re)produced become crucial components of the foreign policy discourses. Through the means of mass culture industry a Western narrative is disseminated and permeated all over the globe is based on several dichotomies. These dichotomies tended to create a sense of belonging and an identity based on the binaries of masculine, moral and orderly home and feminine, immoral and chaotic outside (Sharp 1998: 160).

It is also important to note that the informational revolution shaped an ‘informational superhighway’ (Infobahn) where an alternative space and virtual life are created and in which the mobility of the atom was replaced by the mobility of information (Luke 1998: 274). The emergence of Infobahn brought the question of who will be responsible for the boundary making practices in this post-atomic virtual life (Luke 1998: 276). Luke claimed (1998)
that a new wired elite has emerged which controls and articulates a sense of info-power which he defines as info-graphql. While the info-graphql societies are still bounded strongly with the physical infrastructure, it can also be a battleground for challenging the dominant geographical representations (Luke 1998: 280). The critical geopolitics draws attention to these developments and alternative means of resistance in the virtual space and media alongside the occupation and resistance in the physical space such as in the EZLN movement (Routledge 1998b: 254) which become an important element of international politics.

However, even though the critical geopolitics studies disclose those links between the modern geographical knowledge and geographical thinking which comprises the unchallenged foundation of the international relations and the Cartesian epistemology, it does not appear as the viable theoretical basis for the analysis of the multiscalar inter-spatial relations. While critical geopolitics present a very detailed genealogical account of the production and functioning of the geographical knowledge, it fails to locate the dialectical relationship between the modern geopolitical thinking and the material life itself. While the transformation of the spatial representations had been successfully located by post-modernists like Foucault, they failed to define the material conditionings behind this majestic spatial transformation in its totality -such as the transformation from the sacred space (feudal) to the desanctified (capitalist) space. Therefore, critical geopolitics could not go beyond the deconstruction of the mainstream framework where the knowledge of space has been produced and reproduced by the intellectuals of statecraft; neither did present a meaningful explanation of the changing mainstream representations of space.
It is important to express those weaknesses before the dialectical materialist theorisation of the inter-spatial relations in the next chapter (chapter two).

It is possible to locate an almost static stance and ahistoricism within the critical geopolitics. For instance in his engagement with the notions of the territoriality and sovereignty, Agnew (2005) identified four heuristic - and loosely descriptive- types of sovereignty systems. The first one is the classical sovereignty which state territoriality consolidated and the centralised state authority became stronger. This regime has been in place since the Treaty of Westphalia until the 19th century and was followed by the second type; the globalist sovereign system where the state centrality still remained strong but the territoriality became more open. The third type of the sovereignty is the integrative sovereignty in which the state was territoriality consolidated but the central state authority became weaker. Lastly, in the imperialist system of sovereignty, the use of territory by the state for the political, social and economic ends became more influential and the central state authority evolved to a less powerful entity (Agnew 446: 2005). The problem of this type of typology is not only its inability to give a strong and detailed periodisation of the transformation of the representations of space but its failure to locate the spatiotemporal processes that are produced, transformed and rescaled the socio-political organisations transformation of the notion of territoriality. The failure to grasp the dialectical nature of the formation and transformation of the social phenomena led critical geopolitics to collapse to the separation of time and space through a static understanding of a passive space and its almost contingent dynamic representations in the language. In that sense, it can be argued that while a critical geopolitics perspective could detect the superficial, isomorphic and ahistoric character of the mainstream analyses that
praising the ‘new proactive and prominent multilateralism’ in the contemporary Mexican and Turkish foreign relations, it would fail firstly to conceptualise the material structure that conditions these ideas and, secondly, would retain itself by presenting an alternative theorisation and analysis that would focus on the spatiotemporal processes in which these spatial relations can only be unravelled.

Agnew (2007) argued that one of the central focuses of critical geopolitics is exposing how certain geographical representations and geopolitical discourses of the hegemony are spatially diffused and became universally powerful. However, these historically specific ‘discoveries’ and the representation of the new blank space(s) can only be fully understood through the expansion and the development of the capitalist spatiality through the 19th and 20th centuries. Understanding the production of space cannot be separated from the analysis of the production of the material life, the development of the dominant mode of production and the formation of the capitalist productive forces. At the same time, any explanation of this capitalist development which is not aware of the dialectical creation of the structures of discourse and exclusionary representations are based on Cartesian perspectivalism would lack a substantial dialectical ‘moment’ between the ‘ideational’ and ‘material’ and would continue to (re)produce the similar binaries in a different phraseology with a drive for objective scientificism from a Western ocularcentric standpoint.

The ontological cul-de-sac of the critical geopolitics is derived from its post-modern stance that rejects any claims of universality or limited conceptualisation. In that sense, while the positivist treatment of time and
space can be detected, a dialectical spatiotemporal analysis of the social phenomena is undesired or not even mentioned at all. Ó Tuathail (1996) argued that since the critical geopolitics cannot transcend the power/knowledge networks as well; it is a part of the relations of power itself. However, he argues that this limitation should not allow the critical geopolitics to problematise the occularcentric system of knowing based on Cartesian perspectivalism and take the contextuality of the geographical knowledge as an overarching aspect (Ó Tuathail 1996: 145). Therefore, it has been noted that there is a possibility to take geopolitics in both material and discursive terms (Dalby 1991: 273) without underestimating the fact that the socio-spatial and techno-territorial circumstances of development create different variations and uses of geopolitics and geopolitical knowledge (Ó Tuathail and Dalby 1998: 7).

It has also been argued that the discourse-centred understanding of geopolitics blurred the geographical knowledge due to its treatment of geopolitics both as a specific foreign policy discourse and as the geopolitical reasoning of the statecraft. Secondly, the functioning of this discursive practice has not been specified yet (Ó Tuathail 1992: 978). Therefore, a possible conceptualisation of spatiality is based on a non-excluding and non-universalist theorisation of space without any claims of commensurability or modelling perceived highly necessary but at the same time unlikely. Furthermore, some rejected any kind of attempt to develop a comprehensive account of geopolitics from the very beginning. It has been argued that the simultaneous deconstruction and re-conceptualisation of the geopolitical discourses should rather be seen as an open-ended project (Dodds and Sideway 1994: 515, 520).
The way forward in the analysis of the continually produced and reproduced, contested and consolidated space, spatiality and the multiscalar inter-spatial relations reinstate the dialectical materialist understanding of the social reality. Dialectical materialist analysis can first present a better understanding of the hegemonic representations of the space by manifesting the dialectical link between the simultaneously transforming representations of space and the spatial practices without reducing any of them to one another. Secondly, and more significantly, only dialectical materialist understanding can provide a spatiotemporal analysis of the production and reproduction of the social space, which has been claimed and presented in this work in the particular case of peripheral capitalist space.

In the first matter, Lefebvre pointed out that the Cartesian logic gave a divine attribution to space and takes it as absolute and within the Kantian thought which turned the space into a part of a priori realm and isotropic (Lefebvre 1991: 14). However, this Cartesian logic cannot be challenged without exploring the links between mental and social realms. Therefore, Lefebvre suggested a unified theory of logico-epistemological space which does not separate the physical, mental and social fields, similar to the call of Braudel, mentioned in the very beginning of this work. The knowledge of the material world applies to the theories of energy, space and time which cannot be treated as isolated categories (Lefebvre 1991: 12). The concept of hegemony plays a significant role in understanding this relation. The knowledge of space is produced dialectically by the dominant class through its organic intellectuals, establishing wider frameworks of thought in conformity with the conditions of the material structure (Bieler and Morton 2008: 117-122). This type of
knowledge/savoir is a direct manifestation of the involvement of the hegemonic class in the production of the knowledge (Lefebvre 1991: 10).

Therefore, the existing space can be read and decoded but its development and production cannot be exclusively limited to the conceptual level. The formation, transformation or alteration of certain formal/informal code systems can be explained by exposing the dialectical relationship between the subject and its material conditions (Lefebvre 1991: 18). The inability of the critical geopolitics to grasp this dialectical relationship led to a language fetishism that inevitably collapsed into a reductionist and ahistoric –thus spaceless- analysis of space. Therefore, any analysis of the relations between different spaces has to start from the dialectical relationship between human beings and nature in terms of the processes of the production of space and the production of a multiscalar inter-spatial system with a particular emphasis on the national scale.

The relationship between human beings and nature can be transferred to the direct relationship between human beings and geography in terms of formation of dwelling. Lefebvre (2003) refers to Heidegger’s comment in this underemphasised aspect:

‘Heidegger cleared the way to a restoration of the term when he commented on the forgotten (or misunderstood) words spoken by Hölderlin: “Poetically man dwells...” This means that the relation of the ‘human being’ to nature and its own nature, to ‘being’ and its own being, is situated in habiting, is realised and read there (Lefebvre 2003: 82).’

The relation of human beings with the imaginary, that is to say, the relation between his sensuous world and his intuition, is the precondition of habiting
and dwelling. Locating this relation in transcendence or immanence rather than the ‘real’ premises of human life is a futile attempt that reminiscent of the Young Hegelianism as will be shown in the next chapter. Lefebvre correctly locates this crucial relation in action and concreteness, ‘the dialectical movement between habitat and habiting’ (Lefebvre 2003: 85). This concreteness will be the starting point of the dialectical analysis of the social space which will allow an articulation of the specific spatiotemporal processes that have been formed and transformed the peripheral capitalist spatiality in Mexico and Turkey and conditioned their current regional inter-spatial relations.

1.4. Conclusion

The Cartesian separation of time and space into homogenised, fixed and definable categories laid the ontological principles of the contemporary geographic/spatial knowledge. This contemporary geographical knowledge became the foundations of the mainstream foreign policy studies within the international relations and has been challenged by the critical geopolitics studies through the disclosure of the links between geographical knowledge and state power. In this respect, critical geopolitics was successful in delivering a process of unthinking of the mainstream categories and themes in international relations.

However, in terms of understanding these links and relations between the geographical knowledge and state power, what has been defined as a coincidence (Ó Tuathail 1996: 227) for the critical geopolitics is, in fact, a structural condition that determines the capitalist spatiality in its totality with the ideational and material elements. The critical geopolitics almost gives a
perfect Young Hegelian theorisation where the idea (or geographical notion) assumes an independent existence within the realm of consciousness rather than representing a dialectical becoming based on the dynamic relationship between the form and content.

Foucault’s engagement with the ‘geographical metaphors’ shows this Young Hegelian resemblance. He rightly pointed out that the individual is not a pre-existing entity seized by the exercise of power. However, rather than defining the human being in his dialectically emerging material and ideational conditions, he positioned the human consciousness as a product of a relation of power that is exercised over bodies, desires and forces (Foucault 1980/2007: 180). In this sense, ‘power’ emerges as an independent notion which pre-exist the human being itself, and pre-conditions the identity and characteristics possessed by him. However, on the contrary, a dialectical materialist understanding would posit the production of the material life as the source of the human subjectivity; and would argue that the ethnologic, linguistic and cultural aspects are all derived from the various types of relationships between Human and Nature which culminates in the totality of the continually changing social space. This allows a historically and spatially specific analysis of the social reality which positions the dynamic processes of production and reproduction of the social phenomenon on the centre of the inquiry. In that sense the spatiotemporal analysis aims to unravel the general and particular processes which constantly condition and transform social structures. The next chapter will be defining these dialectical processes in order to lay the foundations of the conceptualisation of the specific spatiotemporal analysis of peripheral capitalist spatiality of Mexico and Turkey.
Chapter 2: Dialectical understanding of space and the conceptual foundations of the peripheral capitalist spatiality

‘...the real production of life appears (in the idealist conception of history) as non-historical, while the historical appears as something separated from ordinary life, something extra-super terrestrial. With this the relation of man to nature is excluded from history and hence the antithesis of nature and history is created...

[The idealists] have consequently only been able to see in history the spectacular political events and religious and other theological struggles, and in particular with regard to each historical epoch they were compelled to share the illusion of that epoch.’


The central contention of this thesis is that the regional integration projects in Mexico and Turkey should be analysed through a spatiotemporal analysis which examines the dialectical processes of production and reproduction of the capitalist peripheral spatiality. In keeping with the previous chapter, this focus will now be extended in the current chapter by defining the general and specific conditions of the processes in which the social space has been dialectically conditioned and transformed. As has been argued previously, the contemporary geographical knowledge is based on the Cartesian separation of time and space that privileged the ‘simultaneous’ and ‘synchronic’ over the ‘historical’ and ‘diachronic’. This leads to the immobilisation of space as a neutral and objective entity which passively contains the social activity and de-socialise time by eliminating multiplicity of the social time. On the other hand, Marxist dialectical thought overcomes this separation through defining the
subject and object –human consciousness and being- as a unity which is in constant motion, in other words in the infinite dialectical process of \textit{becoming}. Hegel did overcome the Kantian dualism permanently where consciousness and being are opposed to each other by formulating the contradiction between the thought and being as a moving unity (Jakubowski 1976: 16). Therefore, for Feuerbach Hegel was the only sober one among the philosophers of nature. However, as Feuerbach pointed out, Hegel’s unity of thought and being was flawed, since it was a ‘formal’ or ‘apparent’ unity rather than real and, since with the principle of ‘thinking spirit’ the fundamental element –namely being- was perceived as secondary, while the secondary element –thought- was posited as the principal one (Feuerbach 1991a: 33, 35).

For several reasons which will be briefly explained later on, Feuerbach failed in establishing the real unity of thought and being but laid down the foundations that Marx and Engels built their dialectical logic on where the Hegelian dialectics have been demystified and revolutionised (Jakubowski 1976: 21; Stern 2009: 2).

This chapter focuses on this Marxist critique of Hegelian and Feuerbachian dialectics and claims that the dialectical materialism provides the most convenient formula to analyse the social space in a spatiotemporal way. It is possible to argue that the dialectical materialist unity of thought and being (or in other words the form and content, subject and object, nature and man) conceptualised by Marx and Engels is the most important and continual principle in the conceptualisation of space by Lefebvre even though his later works got much attention regarding his comprehensive theorisation of space. Furthermore, his solid engagement with Marxist dialectics should be seen as the unshakeable foundation of his later conceptualisation of the social space.
The multiscalar production of the social space corresponds to the dialectical production of human life and its recreation on different social levels generating different social relations. This chapter puts an emphasis on Lefebvre’s early work ‘Dialectical Materialism’ and his later work ‘The Sociology of Marx’ where he reclaimed Marxist dialectics by positing the crude materialist interpretations as antithetical to the dialectical materialism.7

In that sense, while the first section of this chapter will be examining the main features of the dialectical processes that conditions and transforms the social reality in general, the second section focuses on the theorisation of the dialectical production of the social space in particular. Identifying the dialectical materialist movement as the transhistorical principle of the continually transforming multiscalar social space is a crucial step for the further focus on the conceptualisation of the peripheral capitalist spatiality in particular. With the establishment of this principle in the second section, it becomes possible to form the specific spatiotemporal theory of the peripheral capitalist space and spatial relations in particular contexts of transformation.

Thereby, in the third section this chapter concludes with linking three spatiotemporally specific theories of Luxemburg, Trotsky and Gramsci and

7 It should be noted that, reclaiming dialectical materialism by putting an emphasis on the critique of Hegelian and Feuerbachian dialectics by Marx and Engels has two theoretical results. Firstly, it eliminates the erroneous claims of economic determinism or crude materialism by establishing the equity between the ‘human consciousness and being’ in a truly dialectical way. Secondly, it makes redundant the questions on how to make historical materialist account of the international politics. Some Marxists argued that historical materialism has difficulties to explain the horizontal fragmentation of the state system; thus, superimpose the intra-societal categories to inter-societal phenomena (Callinicos and Rosenberg 2008: 79). In order to overcome this problem some even suggested to reach a ‘partial reconciliation’ with realism to formulate a neo-Weberian-proof of Marxist geopolitics which avoids both economic reductionism and multi-causal analysis of state (Callinicos 2007: 542). However, these claims of quasi-necessity of a geographical emphasis or liberation from the crude materialist interpretations of Marxism which supposedly dissolves the differences between national and international become meaningless if the dialectical relationship between the production of human consciousness and the nature for itself would be reasserted in the analysis of space.
claims that these theories provide a profound theoretical and conceptual framework in understanding the peripheral formation, consolidation, transformation through the integration to the centre and finally expansion towards the periphery through the regional integration projects of the capitalist space in Mexico and Turkey.

2.1. Dialectical relationship between human consciousness and nature

From the Platonic/Aristotelian rationalism to the realist empiricism of Locke and Hume, the relationship between human intuition and sensation, the process of gaining the knowledge of matter and understanding the conditions of the relationship between subject and object had been interlinked problems of philosophy. While Plato located the being within the intuition that transcends the sensual world, Aristotle attempted to link form and content on an epistemic level (Agar 2006: 9).

It was first Kant who reversed the Cartesian logic which assumes that the human representations of the object follow the object-in-itself and who revolutionised the overall perception of this long lasting antimony (Agar 2006: 73). Instead, he was inspired by the Copernican revolution in the explanation of the planetary motion that differs from the traditional understanding of the problem of the unidentifiable movements of the planets.

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8 The separation of the human intuition and sensation has been rejected by Spinoza who argued that human mind and body constitute a unity rather than antimony. Spinoza’s conception of nature based on this assumption should be seen as a prefiguration of Marxist conception of nature. Spinoza effectively perceived the nature and the human beings identical and dismissed pre-human questions of space (Balibar 2008: 69). He rejected the idea that the human beings are cut off from the rest of nature and while he recognised its reflexive power –human mind- he argued that the human mind is also a product of the nature. In his metaphysics the human perception defined as a psycho-physical activity and not a passive perception of ‘lifeless images’. Therefore, human nature and human mind cannot be separated (Hampshire 2005: 62).
Similarly to that, for Kant, the cognition of mind-independent objects was, in fact, the cognition of appearance of matter or, in other words, the cognition of the object-for-us rather than object-in-itself (Agar 2006: 73). The mind does not passively receive the object which exists independently of our perception as Locke and Hume put it (Ayer 1980: 16). Kant defended that the mind is actively involved in the construction of reality; in other words, in the process of knowing.

However, Kantian dualism established a concrete distinction between the internal and external nature, and hence, separated the human consciousness from being. Therefore, according to Kant, the being that exists independently from the human consciousness can be perceived objectively and the nature was positioned as an external entity which needs to be confronted and mastered (Smith 2008: 12, 17). Being can either be absolutely true or absolutely false and the Reason can be found outside the real, in the realm of human thought (Lefebvre 2009: 13). This Kantian formal logic shaped the traditional conceptualisation of nature in terms of an internal/external dualism and dissolved the human history within the nature (Smith 2008: 12).

The refutation of Kantian dualism by Hegel was the refutation of defining the synthetic a priori judgements as objective forms uprooted from their contents. According to Hegel, the course that synthesis follows is not an immobilised process but a sequence of opposition and resolution between the Being and Nothingness (Lefebvre 2009: 18-19). Contrary to formal logic, the finite-negative object and the infinite-ideal subject are not disconnected; they are intrinsically related opposites (Agar 2006: 120).
In his Introduction to the ‘Science of Logic’, Hegel systematically criticised the Kantian transcendental logic where the content existed in and for itself independently and outside of the realm of thinking. The form coming from outside gains a content and, in that way, becomes a real knowledge. Kantian logic assumed that this abstraction is sufficient to presuppose that the thought and subject matter are related components. However, Hegel argued that in this logic since the thinking is only ‘informing’ the material, thought is not transcending it as its opposite and remains possessed by it which confines the Being within the thing in itself, that beyond the human consciousness (Hegel 2010: 25, 41). Instead, Hegel defined the relationship between the two through the positive negation, the negation of a particular content not to a nullity or abstract nothingness, but a negation that creates a new concept (third term) which is higher and richer than the preceding since the new concept contains the unity of itself and its opposite (Hegel 2010: 33). In that sense, the opposition between the being subjectively existing for itself and the being objectively existing as such has been overcome as a true being. Hegel located those two moments within the transcending movement of Becoming; as distinct but inseparable moments that create a concrete unity (Hegel 2010: 39).

As Lefebvre put it, Hegelian dialectics did not abolish the Kantian logic but transcended it through furnishing the identity with a content (Lefebvre 2009: 25-26). And with this Hegelian revolution, the Becoming—which is in a continuous, not indefinitely rectilinear development—was recognised as the unity of multiple and contradictory moments (Lefebvre 2009: 32).
However, while Hegel eliminated the Kantian dualism and defended the unity of thought and Being in a dialectical manner, he posited the nature as a deviation against the Idea. For him the Absolute Idea had an a priori superiority. Thus, man turned into an aspect of self-consciousness rather than possessing it (Jakubowski 1976: 20). Hegel’s Mind supersedes the Being, transcends the immediate, modifies the object, and thus his metaphysics enclosed and limited the content and reduced it to thought or human consciousness (Lefebvre 2009: 36-39). Therefore, defining the contradictory unity of thought and being was failed and the Becoming enclosed in a circle as a fulfilment of Mind (Lefebvre 2009: 45).

Feuerbach discovered that the essence of the Hegelian logic was transcendental thinking which can be defined as human thinking which is located outside the human being (Feuerbach 1991b: 63). He rejected the speculative philosophy and reduced it to the level of theology and argued that Hegelian philosophy was the last shelter of theology. Feuerbach argued that the beginning of philosophy needed to be the being while the being cannot be separated from the consciousness. Thereby, the only real becoming for Feuerbach was the becoming within the time and space (Feuerbach 1991b: 67). In that sense, Feuerbach’s materialism went beyond Hegelian metaphysical logic through discarding the mystical part of it; through linking the Absolute spirit to the human quality (Schmidt 1971: 25).

Feuerbach argued that nature and human being belong to each other and the only distinction between the two is that the human being can distinguish himself from the nature through his consciousness which is also determined by nature (Feuerbach 1991b: 73). Therefore, for him the new philosophy needed
to be re-linked to the natural sciences and, the anthropology needed to be established as a universal science including physiology where man—and nature—becomes the unique, universal and highest object of philosophy (Feuerbach 1991b: 75; Feuerbach 1991c: 136). It is important to note that Feuerbach clearly based this new philosophy on the critique of the Hegelian philosophy by claiming that the new philosophy would be the simultaneous realisation and refutation of the Hegelian philosophy (Feuerbach 1991c: 101).

Marx and Engels built the dialectical materialism on these two great foundations; the critique of Hegelian Idealism and the critique of Feuerbach’s materialism. As Engels stated in ‘Ludwig Feuerbach’, they were Hegelians that became Feuerbachians at once. In the ‘Economic and Philosophical Manuscripts’, Marx stated that one of the great achievements of Feuerbach was the discovery of the Hegelian reduction of philosophy to the level of religion through the confinement of the Being within the bounds of thinking or, in other words, positing man and human life as the self-consciousness (Marx 1969: 171, 178). Even though Hegel recognised labour as man’s self-creating act this conception remains abstract and formal since the human nature was treated as merely ‘abstract, thinking nature’ (Lefebvre 1968: 9; Marx 1969: 189). Nevertheless, Feuerbach failed in defining the concrete conditions of human consciousness; therefore, his conceptualisation of man was abstractly philosophical (Jakubowski 1976: 24). Very similar to Hegel, he understood nature as an ahistorical substratum.

Feuerbach’s understanding of nature was confined to the mere appearance of the sensuous world or sensuous reality rather than conceiving it as practical, human-sensuous activity (Marx 1998: 573). He subordinated man to the
natural conditionings of life by positing man within the sensuous world which he perceived as a pre-given thing (Marx and Engels 1998: 45). Thereby Feuerbach’s man is ahistorical and an isolated individual (in other words, not social), and the unity of man and nature that he established his theory upon is in fact an under-defined presupposition (Lefebvre 2009: 55).

Marx’s rupture from Feuerbach’s materialist understanding of man is clear in the ‘German Ideology’ and in the ‘Theses on Feuerbach’ where man is strictly posited as historical and social rather than an abstraction and individual. For him, man can be confined neither to world of thought nor to the sensuous world, as he noted in the Manuscripts;

...man is not merely a natural being; he is a *human* natural being. He is a being for himself, and therefore a *species-being*; and as such he has to express and authenticate himself in being as well as in thought. Consequently, *human* objects are not natural objects as they present themselves directly, nor is *human sense*, as it is immediately and objectively given...as everything natural must have its *origin* so *man* has his process of genesis, *history*, which is for him, however, a conscious process and thus which is consciously self-transcending (1969: 183).

In that sense, dialectical materialism takes first the content –the real Being which determines thought - ‘to analyse its various forms of development and to discover its inner laws’ and analyse the total movement of this content (Lefebvre 2009: 74, 90). From this analysis of the given reality, it is possible to conceptualise the ‘general abstract relations’; the abstract categories that enable us to recover the concrete totality (Lefebvre 2009: 75). The dialectical unity of thought and Being achieved through the equalisation of the nature
and consciousness which have not been reduced to an idea but realised concretely (Lefebvre 2009: 98). Lefebvre summarises this by saying for dialectical materialism, ‘the true subject of the Becoming is living man, yet around and above him the abstractions acquire a strange existence and a mysterious efficacy’ (Lefebvre 2009: 85).

Therefore, Marx’s concept of man which is historical and social never ceased to belong to the Nature even though its true existence comes with the formation of his consciousness that alienates the human being from the rest of nature. In this way Marx inseparably united the crude material existence (the Hegelian first nature that comprises the world outside the man) and the objective Spirit (the second nature that includes the state, law and society). The second nature should be considered within the first nature since the former still is in the same stage with the latter within the movement of transcending it (Smith 2008: 33).

In the *Manuscripts of 1844*, Marx concentrated on the links between the human consciousness and the production of the physical human life and defined nature as man’s inorganic body and posited the link between man’s spiritual and physical life to Nature as the link of Man to itself. The appropriation of matter by human beings is the general and universal condition even its concrete form changes and transforms through history from different mode of productions to one another (Smith 2008: 35). The production of human life is a socio-historical process; it is a continual dialectical movement of the transcending of Being by the human Mind. Therefore, the Hegelian assumption of the human mediation of things-in-itself by Subject through synthetic a priori categories created by a superior power (Absolute knowledge) has been replaced by defining human beings in terms of
their productive force and as a component of the real Becoming (Schmidt 1971: 28, 31). In other words, the production of material life and its recreation is a socio-historical act and the beginning of the formation of all social relations; primarily, the creation of family (Marx and Engels 1998: 46-48). This principle is the premise where the production of social space as a multiscalar and relational totality is conceptualised and analysed within particular spatiotemporal processes.

To sum up, it is sufficient to claim that the historical materialist understanding of Being is a relation between nature and human consciousness rather than a focus on the sensuous world itself (Smith 2008: 32). However, it is not a simple relationship; it is a dialectical relationship of becoming of the social reality (Schmidt 1971: 16). Marx’s conception of nature is internal to society; it is the mediation of nature through the society. Nevertheless, nature and society are not identical; they are mediated through each other (Smith 2008: 33). In that sense, Marx’s metabolic approach to nature went beyond the mainstream conception of nature produced by the Enlightenment and presented a new philosophy in understanding the social reality, its formation, its relations with the other social entities and its inner dynamics (Stanley 1991: 652). This formulation paves the way to a vast field for the sociological analysis to historicise various dynamic spatiotemporal processes of formation and transformation of the social reality on different scales and, in particular, socio-spatial conditions which will be detailed in the next section.

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9 Similar to Lefebvre, Schmidt (1971) argued that Marx’s materialist conception of nature has not been dealt with or simply misinterpreted almost in a neo-Kantian sense by dividing his theory into two parts, philosophical and historical part rather, than locating the continual dialectic relationship between the two. Therefore, the Second International Marxism failed to grasp the connectivity between his conception of history and philosophical materialism (Schmidt 1971: 19).
2.2. The multiscalar production of the capitalist social space and interspatial relations

As has been argued above, in the *German Ideology*, Marx defined the real premises of human life as the foundation of the materialist conception of history. These real premises are the material activity of man, its physical organisation and the development of the means of human existence which are consequently and directly interwoven with the production of conceptions, ideas and consciousness (Marx and Engels 1998: 42). Neither the human consciousness has a super-terrestrial quality nor the creation of the human material life is a crude material process but it is the production of history which depicts the relation of man to man and man to nature in its totality (Marx and Engels 1998: 61); and the mode of production of the material life conditions and determines the human ‘subjective’ (Marx 1996: 160). The real cannot be seen as the pure product of thought, and thus, can only be grasped through the definition of an abstract category which will end as the ‘concrete’ in Mind. The Hegelian illusion that realises the real by deducing it from the thought failed to locate the real act of production of human life as the crucial source of the conceptual thinking (Marx 1973: 101). Therefore, the nature that is taken as abstractly *for itself* and is separated from the human subject, does not mean anything for the human and, hence, for human history (Marx 1969: 193). On the contrary, it needs to be perceived as a concrete abstraction which is a complementary, distinct and contradictory unity of the content and form (Lefebvre 1968: 22; Kipfer 2009: 19).

This problem can be identified as the difficulty of descending from the world of thoughts to the actual world of things. For instance, for the Young Hegelians, the real basis of all concepts and ideas is the property relations; even their
expressions in the immediate language appear to have an independent existence (Marx and Engels 1998: 385, 473). Similar to that, the concept of nation-state is also perceived to have an independent existence over the real social premises which in fact needs to be analysed and defined through the simultaneous production of actual life and consciousness; the social space. Therefore, international relations and its sub-fields took the timeless and spaceless morphological immediate as the starting point of their investigation. However, that kind of analysis of the immediate morphology which appears as the concrete and objective beginning is unable to explain social relations structuring the historical processes of formation and transformation of the social reality but only masks the underpinning dynamics (Lefebvre 2003: 47).

Production of man (in terms of his physical and spiritual existence) and the production of the social space is a simultaneous process during which the physical and spiritual, objective and subjective dimensions of the existence have been created at the same time. Although human labour determines the human consciousness, consciousness is not a mechanical reflection of the material conditions but an inherent part of the human-nature metabolism (Kipfer 2009: 23). It is important to note that the dialectical becoming of human and nature -which creates the social space- is a moving unity; rather than a Hegelian static and contradictory unity of thought and reality which is resolved in an Absolute Idea. Its existence is historical and relational; thus, its becoming needs to be understood within this dialectical movement, in its motion of transcending (Fromm 1969: 12).

While the Cartesian notion of space perceived the space as an objective container that can be grasped with a simple intuition, Marx demonstrated that
space is a social practice; it is a social product. Thus, since the act of producing has a certain abstract universality, the social space created by labour has a universal existence as a concrete abstraction. Social space is not an abstraction that confronts the individual; it is the space that human beings realise themselves as social beings by the power of their own labour. The human existence is directly linked to this social condition even in the cases that the social life does not manifest itself directly (Marx 1969: 130). And the organisation and the division of labour becomes the eventual outcome of the production of social space. These are the social relations that lay the foundations of the social space as the set of social relations that emanate from production (Lefebvre 1991: 83).

Lefebvre pointed out that perceiving space ‘in itself’, as a container or a frame, rather than as a social morphology that lives in experience and is bound up with function and structure is a common error which fetishises the space. Instead, the social relationships that are inscribed in a certain form of space need to be elaborated to understand the becoming of space (Lefebvre 1991: 90, 94). Thus, the production of the (social) space as the (social) product is the starting point in understanding the spatiality and the relations between different social spaces. Once the social space has been identified according to its production\textsuperscript{10} through the development of its productive forces, then it would be possible to locate its role in the international division of labour and

\textsuperscript{10} It is important to note that this identification is not mechanical. As Lefebvre pointed out although each mode of production has its own political form where the social relations of production have been systemised and perpetuated, the characteristics of space cannot simply be reduced neither from the general characteristics of the mode of production and its social relations nor from the ideologies, forms of knowledge and culture as Gramsci put it (Lefebvre 1978/2009: 234). In other words each mode of production corresponds to a certain space but it is a complex and spatiotemporally specific corresponding rather than a general identification.
the nature of its relationships between other social spaces in the inter-national level.

It is important to note that space does not refer to a closed totality or system in stasis but it is always dynamic and open (Massey 1999: 264; Brenner 1997a: 276, 299; Brenner 1997b: 140) since it is structured by the dialectical unity of the social relationships and forces of production and the development of these productive forces is both embedded in the space but it also proceeds through the transformation and re-territorialisation of space (Swyngedouw 1992: 416, 419; Gottdiener 1993: 130).

Lefebvre (1991) pointed out that the forms of relationship between social spaces are subject to change in association with their specific functions and structures. The function of a certain social space manifests itself as a contradiction between different geographies that are positioned differently within the division of labour of capitalist production. With the emergence of capitalism, the changing structure of production brought the division of labour that subsequently created the contradiction between the town and country. It is this division of labour which can be defined as the historical expression of geography in the historical materialist conception of human development. The division of labour breaks up the material and intellectual production and the city that ‘parasitically’ depends on the country to only then become the source of production itself (Lefebvre 1968: 43). The contradiction between these two different social spaces could have only been existed within the framework of private property and the ownership of productive forces which divides the population into two great classes (Marx 1998: 73).
The further extension of division of labour brought the separation of production from the intercourse, and formed a class of merchants. As much as the commerce flourished, the accumulation of movable capital in the town increased so the manufacture within the town could broken the chains of the guild system. Marx pointed out that the most extensive division of labour in the era of capitalism was materialised when the large-scale industry started to enjoy a unified world market and structured uneven growth (Marx and Engels 1998: 81). Civil society emerged from these property relations and gradually organised itself as a state domestically and a nation-state externally. The evolvement of social organisation was directly shaped by the production and the intercourse which formed the basis of the capitalist state (Marx and Engels 1998: 98).

As Lefebvre mentioned, the creation of the market economy on the basis of exchange-value was followed by commercial capitalism, industrial capitalism and financial capitalism and these three epochs correspond to a concrete totality where each of these linked together and transcended (Lefebvre 2009: 83). He continues by saying that each of these categories are identified by a new degree of economic objectivity where the capitalist social relations become more real and apparent while simultaneously masking the underpinning conditions.

The capitalist social space had superimposed itself upon the pre-capitalist forms of social spaces such as the town that penetrated and subordinated the country on the national level. When commerce transforms from the exchange of excess to being an inherent part of the production, the social space of the town organises itself on the national level domestically (Marx 1973: 408).
Although the geographical barrier could be overcome through the organisation of the nation-state it is only the first step in the expansion of capital. Every other geographical limit is a barrier to overcome for capital, hence the tendency to create a world market is inscribed into capital itself by its nature. Thus, the spatial barriers in front of the circulation necessitate the annihilation of space by time with the creation of the physical conditions of exchange (Marx 1973: 524, 539). And this tendency unfurls on all spatial scales and conditions them in different forms (Smith 1992: 74). In the ‘Grundrisse’, Marx affirmed that ‘the constant continuity of the processes of capitalist production, circulation and consumption and ‘the unobstructed and fluid transition of value’ are much more fundamental for the capitalist mode of production than the previous forms of production (Marx 1973: 535).

The political form of modern state is the inevitable and necessary product of the capitalist economic accumulation in which the nation-state becomes the institutional mediator of uneven geographical development (Lefebvre 1964/2009a: 57; Brenner 1998: 459), though this political form is not static since it is subject to constant transformation. Therefore, it is possible to argue that the capitalist social space (and its political form) and capitalist spatial relations are significantly different from the pre-capitalist social spaces and spatial relations. The international division of labour which trans-historically springs from the geographical differences and conditions the structure of the material and ideational exchange, takes its most structured and exploitative form in the era of capitalism (Polanyi 1945: 51). The contrast and the

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11 However, the word of annihilation should not be taken in its literal meaning. Massey (2005) misunderstands the concept and argues that contrary to the Marx’s ‘prophecy’ space cannot be annihilated by time (2005: 90-98). Marx’s use of annihilation of space by time in the Grundrisse is in fact represents a contradiction, rather than defining an outcome, which continually drives capitalism to lay down the necessary spatial foundations of the circulation.
unevenness that are created by the capitalist space and the social and spatial organisation are sharper and more pervasive in the capitalist space while simultaneously the underpinning conditions of this relationship has been veiled (Soja et al 1983: 198). It has to be noted that the uneven geographical development is an essential condition of the capitalist space (Soja 1980: 211; Soja 1985: 95) due to the contradiction of equalisation and differentiation in the organisation of the capitalist space (Hadjimichalis 1984: 337). In that sense, since the contradictions within the capitalist space under the global capitalism are stronger, the spatial forms such as nation-states, regions and sub-regions are constantly in a process of reconfiguration, rescaling and re-territorialisation (Brenner 1997a: 275). Therefore, while capitalist development expands towards the marginal spaces, it does not unify the world into ‘a homogenous capitalist milieu’ (Mandel 1970: 22). Different social spaces overlap and condition each other but the multiplicity of these socio-spatial networks does not disappear, ‘the global does not abolish the local’ (Brenner 1997a: 278). Rather than eliminating the periphery, the dominant space, namely core or centre, hierarchise the global space by ‘fashioning’ the peripheral space (Lefebvre 1979/2009: 190; Lefebvre 1980/2009: 215).

It has been argued above that the constant reorganisation of the social space through the reproduction of the uneven geographical development in different forms is one of the characteristics of the capitalist spatiality. The term of

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12 In his theory of ‘geographical transfer of value’ (GTV) Hadjimichalis (1984) demonstrated that the simultaneous and opposing capitalist tendencies to equalise the profits and spatial homogenisation on the one hand and the counterbalancing tendency of differentiating the rate of profit on the other explains the uneven regional development of capitalism. These contradicting tendencies operate throughout the unevenly structured spaces and condition the reproduction of dominant social relations at different scales. He also argued that the GTV takes place in the sphere of circulation and exchange but determined in the sphere of production. Thus, while the production posited as the determinant sphere, it had been located within the dialectical unity with the circulation (Hadjimichalis 1984: 342).
globalisation corresponds to a new sociospatial reconfiguration process as a response to the global capitalist crisis where the relationships between centre and periphery have been reformulated (Brenner 1999: 44; Swyngedouw 2000: 65). The modern state is the political form assumed by the capitalist social relations, a historic resolution of the contradictions of the capitalist society (Lefebvre 1964/2009b: 84). Thereby, the neoliberal form assumed by the modern state corresponds to a periodic crisis and a qualitative transformation in the capitalist spatiality (Lefebvre 1979/2001: 773; Brenner 1999: 58). Since the dissolution of the post-war Keynesian capitalist accumulation, the neoliberal capitalism brought a new era of restructuring which now domestically intensifies the neoliberal capitalist social relations and extensifies outwardly towards the marginal spaces (Soja et al 1983: 199; Brenner and Elden 2009: 21). The regional integration projects of Mexico and Turkey will be elaborated within this spatiotemporal context of neoliberal reconfiguration of the capitalist spatiality in chapters four and five and will be defined as the reproduction of the uneven processes of peripheral capitalist space formation in different socio-spatial forms; thus, presenting a better understanding of the particular aspects of the capitalist spatial relations.

Therefore, the modern capitalist space needs to be analysed in terms of the contradictions - and the transcending of these contradictions - that has been produced in the neoliberal capitalist society. These contradictions manifest themselves on every social scale as transformation and restructuring following interrelated but distinct socio-spatial tracks. Referring to Lefebvre, Brenner argued that all geographical scales needs to be conceptualised in terms of three intertwined conditions that determine its historical formation, its provisional stabilisation and its possible rupture or transformation (Brenner
In that sense, the next section constructs a dynamic and spatiotemporally specific theory of the formation and transformation of the peripheral capitalist space in order to provide key conceptual themes in understanding the conditions that have determined the formation of capitalist peripheral spatiality in Mexico and Turkey, its consolidation and transformation, and finally its expansion towards the marginal spaces as a part of worldwide neoliberal restructuring of capitalist spatiality in the form of regional integration projects.

2.3. Linking Luxemburg, Trotsky and Gramsci: the spatiotemporal conceptualisation of the peripheral capitalist space

As Wallerstein (1974b) argued, the central and peripheral economies do not correspond to two separate social spheres but identify two complementary units of the capitalist economic system. Therefore, the formation of the peripheral capitalist space is in fact a necessary process of the development and expansion of the capitalist space on a worldwide scale. In that sense, the spatiotemporal movement of the peripheral capitalist space and spatiality needs to be located within the constantly transforming international division of labour.

As it has been argued before, the spatiotemporal analysis of the capitalist space identifies specific historical periods to define the development of different socio-spatial organisations on different scales. Therefore, the historic conditions that produced the peripheral capitalist space in 19th Mexico and Turkey require a specific conceptual framework. This work claims that linking the three conceptual frameworks established by Luxemburg, Trotsky and
Gramsci provides a spatiotemporally particular theory to analyse the formation of the 19th century peripheral capitalist space in Mexico and Turkey.

It is possible to argue that these three theories coalesce in their attempt to conceptualise the historical conditions of the capitalist accumulation in the peripheral capitalist geographies in the 19th century. Luxemburg, in her doctoral thesis, analysed the industrial development in Poland and in her later work, the ‘Accumulation of Capital’, she linked the processes of enlarged reproduction in the central capitalist countries with the introduction of the commodity economy and primitive accumulation in the periphery. Similarly, Trotsky theorised the uneven and combined development by taking the case of the late industrial development of Russia. Uneven and combined development outlined the spatiotemporally specific conditions that transformed the agriculture-dominated Russian economy into one of the prominent industrial powers. Finally, Gramsci’s concept of passive revolution which was applied to another late-developer industrial power, Italy, presents a theory of provisional stabilisation of the peripheral capitalist space through a late bourgeois revolution based on the mobilisation of the subaltern classes in eliminating the old regime. Additionally, this thesis defines a post-passive revolutionary period where the fragile bourgeois rule was institutionalised and structured. Throughout the 19th century, the bourgeoisie-in-formation in Mexico and Turkey gradually got the upper hand within the traditional society parallel to the exogenous and rapid development of the capitalist social relations of production. The post-passive revolutionary period can be seen as the climax of the exogenous process of the adaptation and consolidation of the ‘bourgeois mode of production’ which started with the extinction of the old-established industries with the expansion of the capitalist market conditions, furthered by
integrating it with the world market as the new zones of commodity and raw material production and laid the physical and legal foundations of its constant development and improvement (Marx and Engels 2008: 38-39).

It is important to note that these three examples – Poland, Russia and Italy– could differ significantly in terms of their subsequent socio-spatial evolutions. However, the general features of their exogenous late capitalist development manifested that there are substantial structural conditions which determined the historical formation of the peripheral capitalist spaces even though these three cases further differ from Mexico and Turkey in terms of the geographical proximity to the centre. Therefore, these concepts will be linked to each other in order to provide a spatiotemporally specific conceptual framework in the analysis of the formation and consolidation of the peripheral capitalist space in Mexico and Turkey. In Mexico the spatiotemporal analysis will be starting from the Bourbon Reforms to the liberal and constitutionalist movements during the Restored Republic period, to the dictatorship of the General Porfirio Díaz and the 1910 Revolution. And in Turkey, it will be starting from the Sultan Selim III and Sultan Mahmud II Reforms, to the Islahat and Tazminat regimes with the 1876 Constitution and to the authoritarian Sultan Abdul Hamid II period that ended with the Young Turk Revolution in 1908. This analysis will define the historic conditions of the formation of capitalism in Mexico and Turkey which positioned these two spaces within the periphery of the international capitalist division of labour.

In the analysis of the formation of the peripheral capitalist spatiality, one of the most important contributions of Luxemburg’s theory of enlarged
reproduction is its emphasis on the inevitable and necessary\textsuperscript{13} stage of the surplus-value realisation in the capitalist centre —its expansion towards the periphery- and its relation to the production of the material (and ideological) elements of constant capital in the periphery through the circulation, namely international trade (Wallerstein 1974a: 393). With the advances of the technology and labour productivity, the capitalist production assumes a decisive universal domination. This means an enormous expansion of the consumer goods production where the products mainly consumed in the non-capitalist strata would replace the ‘natural’ economy with the commodity economy and the commodity exchange (Luxemburg 1951: 349, 352, 363). The conditions and concessions created by the free trade or favourable tariff systems during the mercantilist era were the foundations for the structured uneven exchange relations between the centre and the periphery in the 19\textsuperscript{th} century. The enforced transformation of the periphery towards the capitalist modernity was ‘foreign and poisonous’ and lacked the social connection with the natural development of the economy and brought an acute necessity of reorganisation and restructuring of the traditional state and state-society relationship (Luxemburg 1977: 87).

Thus, capitalism expanding from Europe to its immediate periphery in the 19\textsuperscript{th} century had a difficult task to annihilate every kind of historical form of natural economy which obstructed its development (Luxemburg 1951: 369). In Poland, Luxemburg argues that the introduction of the \textit{Code Napoléon} in 1808 was a legal structural requirement of the bourgeois economy which did not abolish the property relations of the feudal economy (that is mainly in the land

\textsuperscript{13} It is important to note that the necessity of the expansion of the capitalist social relations is not an absolute necessity since there is no absolute necessity in the dialectical materialist understanding of history.
ownership) at once but hurried its disintegration and laid down the legal standards for the commerce and commercial courts (Luxemburg 1977: 85, 86). This political change is in fact a product of the introduction of the commodity economy which restricts the agriculture to a single sphere while simultaneously forces it to mechanise, to cultivate the agro-industrial commodities and to be oriented by the export demands (Luxemburg 1951: 396).

This expansion in the industry through the introduction of commodity economy towards the non-capitalist strata had two significant impacts. Firstly, the capitalist industries in the centre supplied the materials and finance for the construction of the railways which was one of the first conditions for the inauguration of capitalist production (Luxemburg 1951: 353). Secondly, within the course of capitalist development, an international division of labour would be created where the developed capitalist economies would be concentrating more on the production of machinery while gradually leaving the manufacture of consumer goods to the late developing countries (Luxemburg 1951: 319-320).

Luxemburg states that public loans and railway construction accompany all stages of the accumulation of capital in the peripheral capitalist space. Public loans, firstly, converted the non-capitalist forms of wealth into the money form and provided funds for the consumption; secondly, financed the railway construction; and finally, diverted the capital to the newly industrialising countries (Luxemburg 1951: 420). It is important to note that the foreign financed railway construction helped the industrialisation of the agriculture by connecting the inner lands to the coast and, thus, integrated with the world.
markets and brought the formation of heavy industry such as iron, steel and coal production which also provided physical stimulation for the other manufacturing industries, either foreign or state owned.

The theory of uneven and combined development conceptualised by Trotsky to provide an explanation to the different paths and levels of economic and social development processes of the Russian society and Western European nations overlaps significantly with Luxemburg’s thesis in many aspects. Trotsky first defined the historic and spatial conditions which retained Russian people to develop their productive forces (Trotsky 1936: 26). The natural environment that the Russian people were habituated on and the powerful external pressure coming from the Crimean and Nogai Tatars in the east and from Lithuania, Poland and Sweden in the west accelerated the formation of an organised system of estates as an economic formation (Trotsky 1970a: 40). Therefore, he claims like the Russian economy, the Russian thought, science, state absolutism, rules and regulations etc. have all been artificially formed through an uneven relation with the societies which had already developed a higher level of economic and social organisation (Trotsky 1970b: 42).

Two significant aspects particularly deserve to be emphasised in Trotsky’s theory in terms of defining the historic-spatial conditions of the formation of the peripheral capitalist space. Firstly, Trotsky claimed that the geographical conditioning of the Russian people – gigantic and austere plains which are open to winds bringing short and dry summers and cold and long winter, etc- played an important role in the development of the social relations of production and its subsequent contradictions that suppose to establish the foundations of the social progress. Therefore, during the Middle Ages when the western towns
developed their productive forces at an unprecedented velocity, the Russian
town stayed dependent on the country where the manufacture and
craftsmanship remained attached to agricultural production (Trotsky 1970a:
47). In that sense, Trotsky clearly linked the geographical conditions with the
historical conditions of the development of the socio-spatial organisation.
Secondly, the unevenly developed Russian economy was forced to skip stages
in the 19th century in order to resist the external pressures coming from the
industrialised countries. Skipping stages in economic development through
external pressure rests entirely on the uneven development of the productive
forces (Trotsky 1970a: 241).

It is important to note that Trotsky distinguished the pre-capitalist and
capitalist uneven development by pointing out that ‘the entire history of
mankind is governed by the law of uneven development’ and particularly
capitalism manifests the sharpest version of this law in human history in an
unprecedented way while every nation perceives capitalism in a different stage
of development (Trotsky 1970b: 19). The process of uneven and combined
development brings the industrialization and urbanisation which transforms
the backward country from its pre-existing mode of production to the
conditions of the modern capitalist economy (Davidson 2009: 15).

Therefore, the uneven relationship does not necessitate a passive submission
but on the contrary forces the underdeveloped space to skip stages and
develop its own productive forces. However, in the backward countries –who
have a slower tempo in terms of developing their productive forces due to the
spatial conditioning- the proletarianisation of the whole population and the
complete domination of the large enterprises in the economy cannot be
envisaged because of the combined nature of the capitalist development in a peripheral country (Trotsky 1970: 87). In that sense it is hard to argue that the uneven relationship between capitalist and pre-capitalist societies is similar to the uneven relationship between town and country (which is universal and transhistorical) since the unevenness and combinedness of the development of capitalism in peripheral geographies are inseparable aspects for a historically specific period that continue until the capitalist mode of production sweeps all the previous forms of the pre-capitalist forces and social relations of production and the corresponding socio-economic formations. Although the backward mode of production was compelled to be annihilated and to be assimilated by the capitalist productive forces, the development of the productive forces concentrates regionally in an uneven way and, thus, created an amalgam where some segments of society put pressure on the marginal regions to integrate with the capitalist economy (Trotsky 1936: 31). Therefore, in the processes of uneven and combined development of the capitalist forces the domination of the capitalist social relations of production does not manifest itself as vividly as in an industrially developed country but it gradually and irrevocably constructs the legal and physical conditions of its decisive domination.

The uneven and combined development of the capitalist productive forces and social relations starkly resembles the period of the Italian Risorgimento which was defined by Gramsci as the progressive modification of social forces that was linked to economic development (Gramsci 2007: 109). This process of ‘trasformismo’ can be read as the summary of the late 19th century social and economic changes in Mexico and Turkey particularly after the ruling classes’ determination to bring progress and development during the period of
Restored Republic and Tanzimat Regime in order to respond to foreign economic and militaristic pressures. These liberal political programmes were materialised during the authoritarian and highly centralised regimes of General Porfirio Díaz (1876-1910) and Sultan Abdul Hamid II (1876-1908) -similar to the Gramsci’s definition of the progressive Caesarisms (Buci-Glucksmann 1980: 311-312). Therefore, the uneven and combined development of capitalist space appears as the structural condition of the passive revolution where these social relations ‘either instituted and/or expanded, resulting in both a ‘revolutionary’ rupture and ‘restoration’ of social relations’ (Morton 2010: 316).

In that sense, Gramsci’s concept of passive revolution gives a significant explanation in understanding the spatiotemporal formation of the modern capitalist state structures of Mexico and Turkey. Gramsci argued that the French revolution was the only example of an active reaction in the European history where one system of social relations was eliminated by the other one at the end of a violent intervention. Following the French Revolution, the other old systems corresponding to the pre-capitalist social relations underwent the processes of passive revolution through a regime of ‘reformist corrosion’ conducted by the traditional classes (Gramsci 2007: 119).

Gramsci presented two significant principles that the concept was built upon; firstly, a social formation will be changed with a progressive movement created by the productive forces that developed within the existing social formation and secondly, those progressive relations of production will never appear before they have been matured enough (Gramsci 2007: 106-107). This means that when the capitalist social relations face a moment of crisis, it might
overcome the crisis through incorporating the reactionary elements to further consolidate its power by reproducing itself in a new form of authority (Morton 2003: 632).

The dialectical combination of the progressive and reactionary elements within the conditions of passive revolution results in a ‘revolution-restoration’ or ‘revolution without revolution’ in the societies which could not develop the progressive bourgeois forces in a more natural exercise of hegemony over the whole society to constitute an organic equilibrium (Morton 2007: 66). In a moment of such equilibrium the emergent bourgeois could act and dissolve the ‘blocked dialectic’ by mobilising the subaltern classes (Buci-Gluckmann 1980: 315; Morton 2010: 319).

In conclusion, it is possible to argue that these three concepts comprise a spatiotemporally specific theorisation of the dialectical processes of formation of the peripheral capitalist spatiality. The enlarged reproduction which is an inherent process of the capitalist accumulation that creates and resolves the inner contradictions of the development of the capitalist space in the centre, structures the uneven and combined development of the capitalist social forces in the periphery that culminated in the passive revolutions that consolidated the peripheral socio-spatial organisation in a different political form, in a particular spatiotemporal context. Luxemburg, Trotsky, Gramsci highlight and unravel the interlinked and overlapping processes without establishing an ahistoric, spaceless and deterministic conceptualisation of the changing social reality. As it will be shown in chapter three, the dialectical processes of spatial formation in Mexico and Turkey depended on the same characteristics of being exogenous, uneven and continually contested. And
these three concepts directly point out the underpinning dynamics of this movement and change in the social relations by showing how the industrial production and financial investment from the developed industrialised centre has fashioned the peripheral capitalist space, initiating a dialectical process of becoming.

In the theorisation of the conditions of the formation, consolidation and the transformation of the peripheral capitalist spaces this work adds a post-passive revolutionary period where the revolution becomes institutionalised and the political hegemony of the bourgeoisie established significantly. Following the violent passive revolutions of Mexico (1910-1920) and Turkey (1908-1925), the political and institutional framework had been established where nationalism appeared as the common denominator underpinning the legitimacy of the newly established hegemony of the limited national bourgeoisie. Therefore, the bourgeoisie found a stable ground to build its ideological hegemony by promoting a constantly reproduced myth of ‘glorious revolution’ which accomplished to unite the whole society through annihilating and transcending the differences of class, ethnicity or gender, hence creating a completely equal society.\(^1\) In other words, while the bourgeois hegemony resolved the contradictions of the uneven and combined development within the nation-state, it laid down the foundations of new contradictions within the course of peripheral industrialisation. It is important to emphasise that the post-passive revolutionary periods in Mexico and Turkey were marked by a historically

\(^1\) It can be observed that these ideological aspects of the passive and post-passive revolutionary periods are engraved and reflected in the art, literature and in the public monuments. The ‘\textit{Monumento a la Revolución}’ (Monument for the revolution) and the UNAM’s central library murals that made by Diego Riviera in Mexico, and the ‘\textit{Memorial Tomb}’ (\textit{Anıtkabir}) or the ‘Monument of the Republic’ in the Taksim Square Turkey are impressive examples where the ‘representations of space’ successfully combined the ideology and knowledge within a socio-spatial practice, within the monument (Lefebvre 1991: 45).
conditioned form of peripheral capitalist accumulation which is the import substitution based industrial development (ISI). Wallerstein defines (1974b) the ISI development as a response from the periphery to the balance-of-payments problems caused by the global economic crisis of the 1930s. During these economic contractions the prices of the primary goods –mainly raw material and agricultural products- decreases more rapidly than the prices of the technology intensive products (Wallerstein 1974b: 10). Therefore, the peripheral economies faced significant balance-of-payment difficulties due to the exhaustion of the capabilities of the raw material and agricultural exports in producing a surplus-value which in return would be expected to compensate the import of the machinery and manufactured goods. In that sense, with the Great Depression in 1929 and the Second World War, some of the peripheral economies responded to the economic contraction by using industrial planning and protective tariff systems (Baer 1972: 96-97; Alavi 1996: 3; Bruton 1998: 910-911). As a result of this situation, in the peripheral capitalist economies the ISI policies initiated a period of industrialisation which ushered an expansion particularly in the manufacture of the consumer products and in the production of the intermediary and capital goods.

Therefore, the ISI policies of Mexico and Turkey which started in the 1930s should be analysed as the structural response to the 1929 depression corresponding to their socio-spatial positioning within the international division of labour. As will be showed in chapters four and chapter five of this work, the ISI development of Mexico and Turkey did, in fact, reproduce the uneven relations with the centre by expanding and deepening them and thereby laid the new contradictions of the peripheral capitalist spatiality which culminated in the 1980s’ neoliberal restructuring and reorientation of the
economy. The ISI dominated industrial production became the basis of the export-oriented industrial (EOI) development which more closely integrated those two peripheral spaces with the capitalist centre. Both Mexico and Turkey liberalised their capital accounts and international trades, standardised and harmonised their industrial production with the North American and European economic systems through NAFTA and European Customs Union (ECU), and their nationally oriented capital became highly internationalised. While this wholesale restructuring transformed the capitalist spatiality of Mexico and Turkey significantly it hardly changed their peripheral positioning in terms of their uneven relations with the centre. Having established this, the two most apparent characteristics of the transformation of the peripheral capitalist space can be recognised as first, the domestic intensification of the neoliberal capitalist social relations and, secondly, the outward expansion towards the ‘marginal spaces’ in their immediate geographies through the production of the necessary legal and physical conditions of the expansion of the capitalist productive forces. These two characteristics of the neoliberal transformation of the peripheral capitalist space appears as the structural dynamic behind the regional integration projects of Mexico and Turkey that have been formulated and undertaken parallel to the neoliberal structuring in the last thirty years in which the uneven relations between central and peripheral capitalist spaces have been reproduced in different socio-spatial forms.

2.4. Conclusion

As Lefebvre put it, Marxist dialectics enable an elaborate analysis of the socio-economic formation of mankind in all its historicity (Lefebvre 1968: 31). By going beyond the Hegelian system, Marx took the abstract representations of the social and political entities and unravelled them through explaining their
relation with the concrete human beings (Lefebvre 1968: 137). Therefore, the abstract philosophical thought became meaningful when their historic conditions were clearly established.

In that sense, this chapter defined the social space through the dialectical processes of its production and reproduction and identified the spatiotemporal conditions and features of the specific processes of production and reproduction of the peripheral capitalist space. It has focused on the conceptualisation of these historical conditions, starting from the ontological foundations of dialectical materialism and the general principles of the formation of the capitalist space and ended defining the specific spatiotemporal conditions of the peripheral capitalist space and spatiality. Firstly, it has been argued that dialectical materialism gives the most comprehensive method in the relational analysis of the social reality—the conditions of its material existing and its realisation through human consciousness. The contradictory relationship between the form and content that built upon the sensuous world explains the conditions which dialectically determine the historical formation and transformation of the social space.

From this point of view, it becomes possible to analyse the specific features of a particular social space on different scales through focusing on the main determinants of the corresponding mode of production which is also subject to the rules of dialectical formation. Thereby, capitalist social space appears as the spatiotemporal product of the capitalist social relations and the nation-state ceases to be a meaningful unit of analysis in understanding the long durée movements and relations between different social spaces on different scales. In that sense, international relations and the international state system
stand as self-limited, self-identified and void conceptual frameworks that are insufficient for a meaningful social inquiry.

Finally, this chapter has conceptualised a spatially and temporally specific theory of peripheral capitalist space formation. It is claimed that the historic conditions which determined the peripheral capitalist spatiality in Mexico and Turkey can be analysed through examining the spatiotemporal interlinks between the theories of ‘enlarged reproduction’, ‘uneven and combined development’ and ‘passive revolution’. These conceptual tools which defined the 19th century expansion of the capitalist social relations towards the non-capitalist periphery can also be employed for the analysis of the historic movement –formation and transformation- of the peripheral capitalist spaces in Mexico and Turkey which will be dealt with in the next chapter (chapter three) of this work. With the aid of this conceptual framework, six spatiotemporally specific characteristics can be identified in these dialectical processes. First, as it was explicitly identified by both Luxemburg and Trotsky, the formation of the peripheral capitalist forces was an exogenous process since it was dependent on the foreign financial and foreign direct investment (Luxemburg 1951, 1997; Trotsky 1970b; Bukharin 1976). This uneven and dependent feature is continually reproduced throughout the consolidation and transformation processes of the peripheral capitalist spatiality and finally emerged as one of the crucial components of the expansion of the peripheral capitalist space in the form of international financing of the regional integration projects in the periphery of Mexico and Turkey.

Second, strongly related to the previous feature, the establishment of the necessary physical conditions for the capitalist accumulation by the foreign
investment appeared as another significant component of the formation of the peripheral capitalist space. Both Luxemburg and Trotsky emphasised the vital role of railway construction in the development of the capitalist forces in the periphery. As will be observed in chapters four and five, the regional integration projects of Mexico and Turkey prioritised the construction of the physical infrastructure – construction of superhighways and motorways, renovation of ports and docks, rehabilitation and construction of railways-which would be financed by international financial sources.

Third, it can be observed that the expansion of the raw material production in the periphery is another characteristic of the formation of the peripheral capitalist space. Throughout the 19th century, foreign capital heavily invested in the raw material extraction in the periphery which, in return, partially financed the foreign dependent development of the peripheral capitalist forces. In that sense, the effective utilisation of the natural resources in these reserved geographies appears as a necessary condition of the peripheral capitalist space formation.

The fourth characteristic captured by this conceptual framework is the export-orientation of agriculture for the international markets that moved away the traditional agricultural production from the self-subsistence oriented production.15 Within these regional integration projects, the limited finance of the development of the capitalist forces and capitalist accumulation through the mass agricultural production for the international markets was

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15 In this point, Luxemburg (1951) gave the example of the transformation of agricultural production in Egypt in the late 19th century through unprecedented mass cotton production for the world markets and its subsequent collapse. Luxemburg showed the interlinked processes of uneven and combined of productive forces, the development of the physical infrastructure, international loans and raw material and agricultural production for the world markets which appear as the underpinning processes of the peripheral capitalist spatiality (Luxemburg 1951: 429-438).
reconstituted where the agro-product exportation transformed to the export-oriented cultivation of the non-traditional agro-products, seed production, and genetic engineering in the reserved social spaces.

Fifthly, the foreign direct investment in the 19th century initiated the production of manufactured goods particularly in the production of consumer goods for the domestic market, thereby further dissolving the traditional guild system in the periphery. Contemporarily, the industrial production in Mexico and Turkey -which was expanded through the production of the capital intensive goods with the ISI policies and transformed by the EOI strategies during the neoliberal restructuring- extended the labour intensive export-oriented manufacture industry towards their peripheral geographies, taking advantage of the cheap labour costs.

Since the formation of the peripheral capitalist space is a dialectical process, the contestations within these processes should be noted as the final characteristic of the formation of the peripheral capitalist spatiality. One of the main sources of the contestation in the 19th century was the existing social relations of the pre-capitalist mode of production which was threatened and dissolved by the unfolding social relations of the capitalist modernity. While the conditions of the formation of the peripheral capitalist space have been reproduced in different socio-spatial forms within the processes of the worldwide neoliberal restructuring of the capitalist spatiality, the reactionary or counter-hegemonic spatial contestations to these processes of re-territorialisation would also perpetuate on multiple-scales.

To sum up, these key features will be operationalised in the spatiotemporal analysis of regional integration projects in Mexico and Turkey. While in the
next chapter the processes of formation and consolidation will be elaborated, in chapters four and five where the regional integration projects of Mexico and Turkey are being investigated, it will be pointed out that these key characteristics of the formation of the peripheral capitalist space are being reproduced by these projects in order to establish the necessary conditions of the capitalist accumulation in the reserved social spaces. Furthermore, it will be argued that these key characteristics of the formation of the peripheral capitalist spatiality are being reconstituted as a part of the ‘intensification’ and ‘extension’ processes of the neoliberal capitalist spatiality, incorporating the marginal spaces into the international capitalist division of labour through the expanding Mexican and Turkish peripheral capitalist spaces in the form of regional integration projects.
Chapter 3: A tale of Two Spaces: The production of the peripheral capitalist spatiality and the nation-state formation in Mexico and Turkey

‘Les podrá resultar extraño el empleo de dos gobernantes tan diferentes como el sultán Abdul Hamid y el presidente Porfirio Díaz para establecer un paralelo histórico entre sus métodos de gobierno y, como bien escribió un talentoso periodista, entre sus técnicas de dominio. Sin embargo, si me prestan atención no sólo les mostraré cómo es que sus sistemas son fundamentalmente lo mismo, sino que también sus trucos, sus engaños, su diplomacia innata y hasta sus características personales.’


This chapter aims to provide a brief analysis of the historical conditions in which the social spaces in Mexico and Turkey have been transformed from the pre-capitalist backwardness to the modern peripheral underdevelopment during the 19th century - the ‘longest’ century in the entire history of Mexico and Turkey. Having established the conceptual framework in the previous chapter (chapter two), this section will demonstrate how the capitalist social relations had unfurled and altered within the existing space and spatial relations, and determined the political forms that have been assumed throughout the course of modern nation-state building processes of Mexico and Turkey which present a striking similarity to each other.

16 ‘The use of two different rulers such as Sultan Abdul Hamid and President Porfirio Díaz might be strange for you to establish a historical parallel between their methods of ruling and between their techniques of control, as a talented journalist wrote it properly. However, if you give me attention, I would not only show how their systems are fundamentally the same, alongside their tricks, their deceptions, their innate diplomacies and even their personal characteristics.’ Carlo de Fornaro presented this text in June 1909 in New York and published on a newspaper in the US. Reprinted by Antonio Saborit in ‘Díaz, zar de México’, (2010) México D.F.: Debolsillo.
As has been argued before, the main dynamic behind this rapid transformation was the expansion of the capitalist modernity from the industrialised capitalist countries towards their immediate geographical vicinities. This dynamic should be recognised as the key specific spatiotemporal condition and aspect of the capitalist development and peripheral positioning of Mexico and Turkey within the capitalist international division of labour. In the 19th century, the backward economies of Mexico and Turkey, which were mainly based on the production of agricultural goods for the domestic consumption and limited production of raw materials for the world market, had become exposed to the conditions of the changing international world market via the introduction of capitalist social relations expanding from the developed capitalist economies. During the last quarter of the century, weak, unsettled, conflictual state structures were replaced by stronger, centralised, stable and modern nation-state systems imitating the examples of the core capitalist countries in the North. More interestingly, both of the new nation-states achieved this while they were lacking an essential component of the modern nation-state, a meaningful presence of the national bourgeoisies that would be the flag-bearer of the state formation processes.

There are two important contradictive aspects that did condition the uneven and combined development of the peripheral capitalist space. Firstly, as it has been argued before, the expansion of capitalism required the incorporation of the non-capitalist spaces into the capitalist international division of labour by penetrating those markets through replacing the local production with the cheap consumer commodities (Luxemburg 1951: 416). The integration of those pre-capitalist spaces with the capitalist international division of labour dissolved the traditional structure of property relations and initiated the
primitive accumulation which later gradually became strong enough to proceed with a coerced but limited and dependent industrial development. Thereby, secondly, this uneven relationship initiated the primitive accumulation of capital, created an incipient national bourgeois, and started the formation of a modern, strong, centralised nation-state as the political articulation of the limited bourgeois class.

This work analyses this process under three historical periods. In the first stage, both countries simultaneously became more exposed to the economic pressures and military aggressions from the developed capitalist countries. These pressures led to an era of economic and political instability and a series of reform attempts as a response to the disintegration of the traditional property relations and aiming to increase the revenue from the rent of the land in order to meet the expanding state expenditure. In this period, as Luxemburg defined, the natural economy came under attack from the ‘introduction of commodity economy’ as a result of the enlarged reproduction in the capitalist centre (Luxemburg 1951: 349, 352, 363). While the traditional forms of property relations – particularly landed property – gradually eroded, a liberal legal framework was created such as the Civil Code and commercial courts which would facilitate the primitive capital accumulation while establishing and recognising the capitalist social property relations. These processes could be identified as the periods of the liberal and constitutionalist movements with the independence and during the ‘Restored Republic’ period (1810-1876) in Mexico, and the ‘Islahat and Tanzimat Regimes’ and the Constitutionalist movement (1838-1876) in the Ottoman Turkey.
During this stage, it is possible to argue that the uneven and combined relations of capitalist development between the core and the periphery emerged and expanded. As both Luxemburg (1951) and Trotsky (1970a) argued, the replacement of the natural economy by the commodity economy brought primitive accumulation to the periphery and significant developments were initiated in the manufacturing industry. However, for the sake of a healthy development of the capitalist economy, an authoritarian regime has needed to ensure the political stability by defeating both progressive and reactionary forces through gaining the conditional support of different segments of the society. This situation—in which both the progressive and reactionary forces failed to construct an organic equilibrium and were heading for a catastrophe, and thus defeated by a ‘great’ heroic personality—described as Caesarism where an authoritarian force either leads the progressive forces or the reactionary forces to political power (Gramsci 2007: 219-223). It expresses a particular solution to a political impasse which can take either progressive or reactionary form. If this intervention brings the progressive forces to power with some compromises to reactionary forces, it takes a progressive form where the capitalist social relations will further predominate the reactionary aspects (Gramsci 2007: 219). During the Caesarist period in Mexico and Turkey, the rate of economic development increased in an unprecedented level and the modern centralised state structure was formed. This economic and political advance could have only been possible through the influx of external capital particularly in the construction of the infrastructure like railways and in the production of capital goods. In that sense, the progressive Caesarsisms of the authoritarian regimes under the Porfirio Díaz (1876-1910) and Sultan Abdul Hamid II (1876-1908) could be identified as this
second historic stage of the formation of the peripheral capitalist space in Mexico and Turkey. Both Profirian Mexico and Hamidian Turkey sought to ensure a balance in their relations with the competing capitalist powers in order to maintain political stability to avoid further territorial dissolution and to sustain the continuity of the foreign capital investment.

Finally, the third period marks the consolidation of the peripheral capitalist spatiality and the uneven capitalist development by the replacement of the authoritarian regime when it becomes an obstacle to the economic development itself. This period can be defined as the passive revolutionary period during the Mexican Revolution (1910-1920) and the Young Turk Revolution (1908-1925) in which the ancien régime had been eliminated and the peripheral positioning of the capitalist space was provisionally stabilised. The main characteristic of this period is the support of the subaltern classes and particularly the support of the peasantry in the formation of the bourgeois hegemony. Thereby, passive revolution laid the foundations of the institutionalisation of the political power which fundamentally changed the social and political structure of the peripheral capitalist space in order to maintain and further the accumulation of capital through the uneven development of productive forces.

In June 1909, Carlo de Fornaro – an Italian-Swiss descendant American caricaturist and writer- organised a conference in New York called ‘Abdul Hamid y Porfirio Díaz’ as a part of a campaign against the Díaz regime and claimed that the characteristics of his political system is the same with another hated political figure of the time, the Sultan of the Ottoman Turkey Abdul Hamid II. In his speech, Fornaro argued that both Sultan Hamid and Don
Porfirio created a dictatorship of fear by using massacres and reforms at the same time and controlling the whole society through the gendarmerie or rurales. While Sultan Hamid thought there would be calamity after him, Porfirio thought it would be the Yanqui (Fornaro 1910/2010: 255). Both increased the external debt to Western powers (France in Turkish, England in Mexican case); while increasing the incomes of the treasury due to the heavy taxation, both suspended the constitution, both suppressed the press, both created a very developed system of espionage (Fornaro 1910/2010: 256). Furthermore, Fornaro predicted the fall of Don Porfirio in his speech by stating that as all efforts of Sultan Hamid could not stop the liberal Young Turks to terminate his thirty-two years old oppressive rule, the Mexican liberals will also succeed to topple the Díaz regime sooner or later (Fornaro 1910/2010: 258).

While it should be acknowledged that Fornaro presented an impressive comparison between these two distinct cases, this comparison was based on a thin conceptualisation and a superficial description of the historical facts in both countries and it does not give any insights on the spatiotemporal conditions in which Porfirio and Abdul Hamid’s oppressive regimes were structured. Therefore, the aim of this chapter is to provide a meaningful analysis of the similarity between these two periods by defining the spatiotemporally specific conditions in which the peripheral capitalist social relations have emerged and the specific political and social forms assumed by those relations correspondingly. Hence, the historical movement of the space will be linked and located in the 19th century history of Mexico and Turkey.

17 ‘The sultan and the dictator’.
3.1. The enlarged reproduction and the introduction of the commodity economy in the periphery: the reforms, the replacement of the natural economy and the 19th century liberalism in Mexico and Turkey

This section will examine the reform periods in Mexico and Turkey which laid the conditions of the primitive accumulation and uneven and combined development of Porfirian Mexico and Hamidian Turkey. In this period, the enlarged reproduction in the capitalist centre gradually increased the pressure on the natural economies of Mexico and Turkey which eventually dissolved it with its corresponding social relations. This evolvement of the peripheral social space is reflected in the simultaneous processes of the formation of the capitalist productive forces and the rise of liberal programmes and constitutionalist movements in both countries.

It is very significant to engage with these historical processes in order to unravel the spatiotemporal conditions in which the peripheral capitalist spaces in Mexico and Turkey have been structured. As it has been argued before, the continually transforming capitalist spatiality can only be analysed through investigating the historic and structural dynamics which progresses within a dialectical process. Therefore, the dialectical formation of the capitalist space is a resolution of a previous social contradiction, a product of a dialectical process itself. In that sense, this chapter analyses first the spatiotemporal conditions of the formation of the peripheral capitalist space and then proceeds with the dialectical processes of formation of these capitalist peripheral capitalist spaces.
3.1.1. The Bourbon reforms, liberal and constitutionalist movements and the Restored Republic

The Spanish Empire and its colonial rule in New Spain entered into the 18th century in a state of crisis. The economic structure established by the Spanish conquistadores had a dual character based on the despotic-tributary and feudal-mercantilist socio-economic organisation. While the agrarian indigenous communities were subjected to the despotic-tributary structure, the royal bureaucracy and Church on the centre and the estate owners (estancia), hacendados, artesans, workers and mine owners on the periphery comprised the latter (Semo 1973; Semo 1982a: 29; de la Peña 1984: 24-26).

The surplus that produced by the indigenous communities was extracted through the tributes, thus, in fact, the Spanish rule was simply replacing the role of Aztec Empire\(^{18}\) in the despotic-tributary system and conserving the old indigenous community structure while simultaneously constructing the essential foundations of a feudal system through establishing encomienda and repartimiento\(^{19}\) as the basis of the landlord/aristocratic form of rent (Semo 1982b: 49; Knight 2002a: 183). In that sense, Semo claimed that the feudalism in New Spain was rather a superstructure than a mode of production (Semo 1982b: 50). In the early 1600s, the repartimiento system came under the direct

\(^{18}\) During the Aztec period (1200-1500) the Valley of Mexico was developed very significantly in terms of population and agricultural production and a warrior aristocracy was evolved simultaneously to this development. While the population of the Valley was reaching to one million, a highly developed bureaucratic structure was developed in the central city Tenochtitlán which was able to undertake considerable hydraulic works, flood barriers and causeway projects that linking the fertile chinampas (mud gardens) to the mainland. This developed political and economic structure in the Valley became gradually very prominent in the whole Mesoamerican region in the 15th century subordinated these communities to a tributary system not through heavy military presence or imperial administrative organs but with the extremely developed network of pochtecas (merchants) and calpixtlis (tax collectors) (Knight 2002a: 165-169, 176).

\(^{19}\) Colonial grant of land and native inhabitants to the Spanish settler, and the system that was granting a land to the conquerors where the indigenous labourer was forced to work but not owned directly by the fief holder.
pressure of the town, mine and hacienda which were dependent on voluntary wage labour rather than forced labour (Knight 2002b: 90-93). With the further consolidation of the colonisation, the mining sector became the most significant source of economic surplus for the Crown and dominated the socio-economic development until its stagnation in the 17th century (Semo 1982a: 31; Semo 1982b: 50). Hacienda remained as one of the main pillars of the New Spain’s economy providing a less risky alternative outlet for investment but with considerably low annual returns (Knight 2002b: 159, 163). Following the conquista, with the discovery of silver and mercury mainly in the north of Mexico City, the cities such as Zacatecas, Guanajuato and San Luis Potosí had been founded where the population had progressively increased parallel to the growing economic activity created by the establishment of new mining areas (Lira and Muro 1988: 420).

In the final phase of its exhaustion, the despotic-tributary/feudal mode of production and its pre-capitalist social relations were in plain recession (Semo 1987: 68). The capacity of the despotic-tributary mode of production to generate surplus for the Crown was significantly reduced while its previously vital role in the organisation and administration of New Spain’s economic activities had been eroded (de la Peña 1984: 33). This meant an end for a period of economic growth that was defined as introverted development (desarrollo hacia adentro) which was stimulated by the endogenous factors such as population growth, rising demand, falling wages and expanding towns and trade. However, the exogenous factors, mainly global demand for Mexican exports such as silver, leather, cochineal and certain foodstuff began to put pressure on the New Spain’s economic development (desarrollo hacia afuera) especially during the 18th century (Knight 2002b: 204).
Furthermore, Castilian Spain’s monopoly in the control of the Colonial territories in America had been challenged, starting in the late 16th century by the English, French and Dutch tradesmen who were interested in the Atlantic trade and gradually became more involved in the silver trade and later on in the smuggling of leather, tobacco, cotton and, most importantly, sugar and its side products (Izard 1984: 162). On the other hand, the Colonial economic organisation and administration of the New Spain established strict controls on the production through the private and royal monopolies, prohibited the commercial activities with the international markets and also inhibited the interchange between different Colonies in America - a leading factor in increasing smuggling and piracy - and imposed multiple taxes on commerce, transportation and production of goods (de le Peña 1984: 63). The Chamber of Commerce in Mexico City was even prohibited the cultivation of some agricultural goods since it was importing them from the Peninsular Spain (Semo 1982b: 48). The Colonial exploitation of the New Spain was in fact strengthening the obstacles in front of the capitalist development by sustaining the feudal and rentier character of the Spanish bourgeoisie (Semo 1982a: 31).

These external pressures led to an expansion in the military expenditure of the Bourbon Spain which increased the significance of the already waning revenues from the Colonies. Initially, Bourbons aimed to reorganise the Castilian hacienda in order to ‘rationalise’ the tributary system to increase the rent on the land (Garcia-Zuñiga 1993: 309). This was followed by a series of more comprehensive reforms in the administration and organisation of the socio-economic structure of the New Spain which Pietschmann called the proto-liberalist era, led by the principles of European Enlightenment.
(Pietschmann 1991: 199). Without sharing that enthusiasm, it is possible to
define the Bourbon reforms as a structural response to the administrative and
economic decadence of the New Spain—and the Spanish Colonial rule in the
rest of America—on the eve of the wholesale assault of the capitalist social
relations during the 19th century.

The administrative reforms of the Bourbons—Carlos III, in particular—aimed to
restructure and simplify the administrative organisation of the New Spain and
clearly define the division of labour and the hierarchical framework between
the administrative and judicial offices in order to make it more effective
(Pietschmann 1991: 185). The reforms initiated under the visitador José de
Gálvez after his arrival to New Mexico in 1765 were destined to achieve this
administrative reorganisation and centralisation of the Colonial authority,
thereby, reinstalling and consolidating the Crown’s control over the economic
and political mechanisms (Garner 1978: 571; Izard 1984: 156; Pietschmann
1991: 183). With his proposals as the ‘minister of Indies’ a new province code
accepted in 1786 (La Real Ordenanza de Intendentes – the Royal Provincial
Law) that created 46 intendentes (province) and a Super-intendente General, a
court of audit (Tribunal de Cuentas), the Superior Committee of the Royal
Hacienda besides the provincial committees (Junta Superior de Real Hacienda,
Juntas Provinciales), general and local treasuries (caja real) (Mansilla 1985: 68;
Pietschmann 1991: 182). The hierarchical relationship between the newly
established institutions was also clearly defined.

These administrative reforms were followed by the reorganisation of the
economic life in order to increase the Colonial revenue. The economic reforms
the Bourbon rule can be divided into reforms and reorganisation attempts in mining, agriculture and reforms in commercial and fiscal areas.

In the second half of the 18th century, silver production in the New Spain witnessed an unprecedented expansion from 5 million pesos in 1702 to 26 million pesos in 1804 (Brading 1970: 665; Brading 1985: 61). The discoveries of new mines and increasing demand on silver have been dismissed as the possible causes of this expansion (Brading 1970: 666). Before the reforms of Gálvez, the Crown’s control of the mining industry was recognised as the main cause of the stagnation of the production of the precious metals. Firstly, the Colonial authorities had been levying a heavy tax on silver production. Secondly, the distribution and production of mercury which is a significant element in the refining process of silver was heavily monopolised by the Crown (Brading and Cross 1972: 561). Bourbons reduced the price of mercury from 187 pesos (for a quintal which is 50 kilos) first to 82 pesos in 1750 and then to 62, and finally to 41 pesos in 1778 (Semo 1982b: 53). This reduction in the price of mercury –and also the price of gunpowder- was a great stimulus for the mining sector since both the production and refinement processes of silver necessitated significant amounts of capital investment (Brading 1970: 668; Brading and Cross 1972: 550). A new mining code was also introduced in 1783 (Brading 1970: 668; Brading and Cross 1972: 562) and miners sporadically received extraordinary fiscal assistances, tax rebates and reductions in drainage duties from the Colonial officials (Brading 1970: 671).

The Bourbon reforms in the mining sector increasingly drove the mercantile capital into direct investment in mining which led to a sharp increase in the production of silver during the 1770s (Brading and Cross 1972: 577). The
mining bonanza also had a great impact on the other sectors of the economy in the mining regions. During this period only in Guanajuato, the mining centre of the Bajío region, fourteen hundred mules were employed for the transportation of silver which created a huge demand for grain and maize to support the workforce which developed an intensive and mercantile agricultural production in the region (Semo 1982b: 56; Brading 1985: 61).

During the 16th and 17th centuries agriculture in the colonial Mexico was heterogeneous both comprising the estates and ‘ganaderas’ that were given to Spaniards by the Crown as a fief, using the indigenous labour as the main source of workforce and the self-substituting indigenous communities owning and using the communal land. By the 18th century, this heterogeneous structure became gradually dominated by the haciendas -due to the decay of the silver mining in the 17th century and the inevitable contraction of the New Spain’s commerce caused by the lack of silver- where the land was completely owned by the Lord (hacendado) and the workers of the hacienda were direct subjects of him (Semo 1982c: 73). In some cases, hacendado held such powers de jure through occupying a formal office but generally enjoyed a de facto socio-economic power over his people (Knight 2002b: 97-98). Hacienda and its peons were controlled by the hacendado through the ‘tienda de raya’ which was able to provide all sorts of necessities for living of its peons including food and clothing, available even during times of famine or crop failure. In the distant geographies where the relation between town and country was not existent, the hacienda became the only source of security to maintain the life of indigenous communities (Semo 1982c: 78). In that sense, especially for central Mexico, a dynamic relationship was established between the hacienda and the indigenous communities (Bornemann 1989: 204).
During the reign of Carlos III, the Bourbons aimed to increase agricultural production and helped the producers to obtain the necessary equipment and instruments. The authorities also encouraged the cultivation of agricultural products which were not cultivated in Europe and on high demand in the international markets (Izard 1984: 155; Florescano and Sánchez 1988: 510). Furthermore, the colonial officials sought to maintain a balance between the Creole domination in the central Mexico with haciendas, particularly in cereal production and the mestizo access to the land possession for the production of grain, cotton and cattle graze (Hamnett 1970: 56). As a result of these reforms, the volume of agricultural production in the New Spain was tripled in the last quarter of the 18th century (Bornemann 1989: 203).

Bourbon reforms also eliminated the prohibition of the inter-colonial trade in 1789 which led to a significant increase in commercial activities (Semo 1982b: 52). Among the new commercial policies of the Bourbons there was the elimination of the monopoly of the port of Cádiz and the extra-economic privileges that had been given to some of the tradesmen (Semo 1982b: 53). In order to reorganise the real caja, the personnel of these local treasuries had been significantly increased and a rather complex administrative mechanism was created after 1782 (Garner 1978: 545; Mansilla 1985: 73). Therefore, the annual revenues of the local treasuries steadily grew during the period (Garner 1978: 553). The Bourbons were very keen on orderly taxation which created a conflict with the Church when the Crown wanted to install a royal accountant who would be responsible for the collection of the ‘royal ninth’ (dos novenas) tax on the Church tithe in 1774. While the Church strongly opposed any intervention from the Crown bureaucrats in the administration of tithes, the
main aim of raising additional revenue from this source remained (Brading 1994: 214).

Bourbon reforms were successful in increasing the Colonial revenues by significantly eliminating the despotic-tributary and feudal elements from the economy and by loosening the extra-economic control of the Crown. These reforms allowed the formation of mercantilist capital and the creation of a new class of ‘bourgeoisie-in-formation’ below the ruling class attached to this processes of accumulation (Guardino and Walker 1992: 19). These economic conditions in the New Spain started to change when the transition to capitalism began, through being exposed to the first effects of the industrial revolution in the beginning of the 19th century (Izard 1984: 165; Semo 1987: 60). The industrial revolution in Europe did ruin the artisan industry of Puebla and Querétaro since the ‘Mexican weavers were simply unable to compete with the power driven machines of Lancashire’ (Brading 1973: 179). As was mentioned in the previous chapter, the arrival of these products to Mexico initiated the long process of the peripheral capitalist accumulation, which was defined by Luxemburg, where the natural economy producing for the self-subsistence has been replaced by the commodity economy producing for the market (Izard 1984: 165). As a result of this, the traditional guild structure in the production of silk, canvas, linen and other textile products rapidly entered into a phase of decadence. Simultaneously, the production and commerce of raw materials such as cotton expanded on an unprecedented scale with the help of the increasing investments of the commercial capital (Bazant 1964: 505-506). While the woollen products that had been imported from Britain were cheaper, the price of the raw material was increasing (Bazant 1964: 508).
Mexican ‘bourgeoisie-in-formation’ – mainly Creole- and the artisanal, agricultural, and commercial little bourgeoisie became the flag-bearers of the Mexican liberalism formed a progressive force that determined to eliminate the remaining feudal elements and obstacles in front of the economic activities. This force adopted a bourgeois economic programme and positioned itself against the high clergy, Crown bureaucracy and the merchants of Mexico City (Bazant 1960: 228; Semo 1987: 69). In that sense, it was not surprising to see that the Independence movement first appeared in the highly commercialised Bajío region where the mining, textile and agricultural production was intensive and the hacendados were very strong (Guardino and Walker 1992: 26). Bazant (1960) and Semo (1979; 1987; 2012) argued that the revolution of Independence in 1810 headed by Hidalgo against the Colonial rule and the following insurgency was in fact a conflict between the Mexican ‘bourgeoisie-in-formation’ and the alliance of the little bourgeoisie, the Colonial and Peninsular bourgeoisie and the high bureaucracy of the Crown. Lacking a unified industrial bourgeoisie, the ‘bourgeoisie-in-formation’ led the liberal front with broad alliances of diverse groups in order to destroy the pre-capitalist obstacles in front of the capitalist development which was a continuously unfolding process (Semo 1979: 140; Guardino and Walker 1992: 13, 18, 27). After Independence, it can be said that the Catholic Church, hacienda and indigenous communal land were the remaining obstacles in front of the capitalist development. The Church was a significant economic player, having accumulated vast amounts of property, enjoying extra-economic legal privileges and controlling education and, thereby, it was at the centre of the struggle during the Reform period. Hacienda was already doomed since the end of the 18th century with the replacement of the natural economy with a
commodity economy. Nevertheless, following the fall of the colonial rule, hacienda witnessed its golden age during the 19th century by uniting two contradictory systems; a modern economic entity within the capitalist market and a semi-feudal form of production inside (Semo 1982c: 79, Semo 1988: 3-4). The expansion of hacienda meant an assault on the Indian communal land which reached its climax during the Porfiriato when the hacienda became the central figure of the uneven and combined development of the capitalist agricultural production by incorporating 82 percent of the agrarian population into this structure (Carbó and Sánchez 1983: 201, 215).

It is possible to argue that while the ‘proto-liberalism’ of the Bourbon Reforms initiated the peripheral process of the capitalist space formation by eliminating the monopolistic economic structure, the Independence from the Crown and the following liberal reforms laid the foundations of its further development through uneven and combined development during the last quarter of the 19th century. However, immediately after Independence, the Bourbonist mercantilist interventionism assumed the political form of reactionary conservatism, allied itself with the Church and threatened the liberal programme (Brading 1973: 160; Gracida and Fujigaki 1983: 74). The ‘Plan de Iguala’ in 1821 which established the independent Mexico was a compromise between the 1810 independence and the conservative block and, thus, secured the old property relations (Gracida and Fujigaki 1983: 77). Therefore, the post-independence politics remained as a struggle between the social groups that confronted each other during the 1810-1821 insurgency. Conservatives consisted the formal centres of power; high clergy, former officers of the colonial army and the merchants of the Mexico City against the
liberal block of peripheral hacienda owners, provincial merchants, and the professionals (Guardino and Walker 1992: 33).

The economic programme of the conservatives was not significantly different from the liberal economic programme in terms of industrial development. The conservatives defended a strong government structure to establish a modern industry without transforming the existing traditional agricultural structure (Argüello 1983: 101). In that sense, during the conservative rule, the ‘Banco de Avío’ was founded in 1830, aiming to create public funds to import necessary machinery for the investments in manufacturing, particularly for a mechanised textile production (Potash 1953: 268; Bazant 1964: 509; Brading 1973: 160).

In this period of power struggle between the liberals and conservatives Mexico could hardly be seen as a modern state establishment, able to react against foreign military interventions as a unified political entity. One of the most traumatic losses of the newly independent Mexico was the independence of Texas which was backed by the United States in 1836. This was followed by the war with France in 1838 and finally two years of conflict with the United States between 1846 and 1848. During the conflict with the U.S., only seven federal states had contributed to the national defence while Indian tribes were revolting and the cast war was raging intensively in Yucatan. The cost of the conflict with the U.S. to Mexico was losing the half of its territories including Alta California and New Mexico, and 15 million pesos of reparations (Vázquez 1994: 816). In 1853, during the first months of the presidency of Santa Anna, Mexico was practically forced to sell the southern part of Arizona to its northern neighbour when it became clear that Mexico would not be able to repel the U.S. aggression (Bazant 1991: 29).
The reaction of the liberal elite to these territorial losses was a common belief in an urgent need to reform and restructure the state. The conservative reactionary incursions of Santa Anna in a sense helped the radical and moderate liberals to reach a level of cohesion after the 1850s (Brading 1973: 144; Guardino and Walker 1992: 33). The liberal elite believed that if the sources of backwardness of the Mexican economy could not be eliminated the administrative structure and political authority would never be consolidated. They also believed that, without a modern administrative system, it would be impossible to bring economic growth and progress; hence, the very future of Mexico as a nation state would be in danger (Katz 1991: 49).

In that sense, it is possible to claim that the ‘Revolution of Ayutla’ (1853-1855) which started the liberal reform era in Mexico was a response to the reactionary conservatism that was trying to reinstall the extra-economic measures of the Colonial era such as *alcabala*²⁰, or the *capitación* (head tax). This period of liberal reforms laid the foundations for the consolidation of the liberal Mexican state (Guardino and Walker 1992: 35).

Knight (1985) argues that from the Plan of Ayutla (1854) to the end of Porfiriato, three different streams can be differentiated within the Mexican liberalism. The first group consisted of the constitutionalist liberals who were the flag-bearers of establishing the universal civil rights and democracy in Mexico. The second group was the institutionalists who held a strict anticlerical position and who defended the implementation of more radical changes. *Ley Juárez* (1855) which ended the ecclesiastical privileges and *Ley Lerdo* (1856) that declared the ecclesiastical and communal lands illegal were the major

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²⁰ The internal custom system which puts a duty tax on the commodities that transported between different regions within the country.
attacks of institutionalist.radical liberals on the obstacles in front of private property which was seen as detrimental to economic progress (Brading 1973: 149; Knight 1985: 60). The appropriated ecclesiastical properties with the Ley Lerdo later had been sold which strengthened the landowner elite (Bazant 1966: 209). The last group of liberal stream was based on the idea that for the sake of stability and development, the violation of civil rights and constitutional practices should be permitted. This strand of liberalism which envisaged a strong government and authoritarian regime was seen as the only way that the Mexican nation could use its rich resources and progress (Knight 1985: 60, 61). Nevertheless, all three groups were determined to implement a strong liberal political reformation of state power which would lay the foundations of the economic development. The main obstacle that they needed to confront was the conservative reactionism which would be resolved during the Porfiriato.

3.1.2. The early reforms of the Sublime Port, the Islahat and Tanzimat regimes

A common feature of the Marxist assumptions about Ottoman Turkey’s economic structure is its so-called ‘Oriental despotic’ character created by the ‘Asiatic Mode of Production’. And the major problem of this formulation of the Asiatic Mode of Production is its ahistorical character which dismisses specificity by taking an essentialist position towards the Ottoman society and economy rather than analysing its historical development (İslamoğlu 1987: 18). Therefore, it is crucial to analyse the spatiotemporal conditions of the development of the Ottoman economy more closely in understanding the formation of the peripheral capitalist spatiality in Turkey.
The pre-capitalist economic activities in the Ottoman Empire can be characterised by its concentration on commerce due to its dependency on the constant flow of western silver (İnalçık 1974: 56) and the persistence of the independent peasantry (İslamoğlu 1991: 57). Particularly during the era that the Ottoman Empire reached to its largest territorial strength, the local and foreign merchants enjoyed a privileged position in the Ottoman economy over the agricultural producers and craftsman and became subjected to a distinct code of regulations which was far more favourable than the regulations for the manufacturing sector. Merchants were assigned to maintain a constant flow of the raw materials to the town. İnalcık (1974) argued that the logic behind this economic structure was a principle that gives priority to the steady stream of goods within the domestic market in order to ensure that the people and craftsman in the cities would not suffer from a shortage of consuming goods and raw materials. In that sense, the domestic trade and manufacture were strictly controlled and regulated to eliminate speculators and avoid scarcity21 (İnalçık 1970: 217). Therefore, through the 15th and 16th centuries, the Ottoman authorities sought to discourage exports—in some cases through banning export of an item completely—and welcomed importation which consequently resulted in a gradually growing trade deficit and retained the local manufacturing and production from developing further (İnalçık 1974: 57). Therefore, similar to the Russian town described by Trotsky, the Ottoman city

21 However, some cities like Istanbul, Bursa, Edirne, Thessaloniki, Aleppo and Alexandria need to be seen as exceptions of this situation. Those cities especially during the 15th and 16th century became commercial centres of the international silk production and trade alongside the trade of species, silver, iron, timber, indigo etc. In these cities the development of the international trade transformed the traditional guild system and eventually paved the way to a limited manufacture system backed with a large-scale financial speculative capital created by the external demand and interregional raw material trade (İnalçık 1969: 116).
developed as an urban centre of commerce and consumption but not a centre of production.

The classical Ottoman economic structure was based on the tributary agricultural production to which the military organisation was linked strongly. Ottoman land regime, in theory manifested patrimonial characteristics by recognising all cultivated lands as the property of the state and by controlling its ownership very strictly (Heper 1980: 83). However, in practice the Ottoman administration was respectful to the local property relations even though the land ownership was continuously supervised in order to prevent the formation of large estates and the development of feudal rights while simultaneously discouraging the further division of the Çiftlik²² units into very small units. In the classical period, the liberty of the peasantry on the land was almost nonexistent. In the cases of leaving land uncultivated for 3 years, the peasant faced either losing the land or needed to pay a high compensation (İnalçık 1955: 224). The Ottoman fief system (timar) gave the responsibility to fief-holder to control the peasants to keep cultivating their lands and paying the taxes. However, the fief-holders were never allowed to possess or inherit the land nor assume any administrative or political powers on the peasantry (Heper 1980: 84). Therefore, the land system did not allowed the emergence of a landed aristocracy. Even though with the decline of the fief system, the numbers of the private ownership of bigger çiftliks were increased particularly in Western Anatolia and the Balkans, these plots were not large-scale export-oriented farms until the end of the 18th century (Zürcher 2004: 17).

²² A plot of land that does not exceed approximately 1000 square meters.
There are two important developments that have to be considered in the late 17th and 18th century transformation of the traditional structure of the Ottoman society. Firstly, starting from the 17th century, the volume of trade between Ottoman Turkey and Austria and the other West European countries grew considerably with the gradual penetration of the development of the already existing French, Venetian and Genoese trade dominating the Levantine trade in the eastern Mediterranean (Eldem 2006: 284). Secondly, the Ottoman treasury was facing financial difficulties that were rapidly deteriorating with the wars and territorial losses. In order to overcome these financial difficulties, the Ottoman authorities considerably increased the taxes on the peasantry which led to the notorious Celâli peasant revolts both in Anatolia and the Balkans, thus decreasing the power of the central government and leading to the emergence of the feudal Lords (beylerbeyi or âyan) and notables (Akdağ 1970: 244-245; Ahmad 2003: 19; Zürcher 2004: 16). While the military defeat in Vienna in 1683 and the increasing role of the French, Dutch and English merchants in the Mediterranean was initially compensated through the monopolistic control of the commerce and shipping in the Black Sea, opening this major economic base to Russia’s influence after the 1768-1774 Russo-Turkish War with the ‘Küçük Kaynarca treaty’ in 1774 deprived the empire of one of its major incomes (Quataert 2005: 41). The territorial losses of the Ottoman Empire continued with the Russian takeover of Georgia and Dniester (1792), and Egypt was invaded by Napoleon’s armies in 1798 (Zürcher 2004: 20).

The predominance of Western Europe in the Levant trade during the 17th and 18th century became the foundations of a rather stronger and more profound unequal exchange after the maturation of the industrial revolution in Western
Europe (Eldem 2006: 285). As much as the Ottoman economy was incorporated to the world economy through Western penetration, the local textile production faced competition from the cloth imports while the prices of raw silk mainly provided from Iran was increasing by growing English and Italian demand (Faroqhi 2006: 359; Eldem 2006: 306). Similarly, the woollen cloth industry in Thessaloniki collapsed due to the increase in wool prices created by Western demand (Faroqhi 2006: 360). The silk and cloth production in the Bursa region rapidly declined due to the broadcloth import from Britain. Inevitably, the production pattern in these textile producing urban areas have changed from producing silk-cloth for the European markets to the production of raw silk for export (İslamoğlu 1987: 21). Therefore, the Ottoman exports were reduced to agricultural commodities and raw materials and the domestic manufacture faced fierce competition with the cheap European consumer goods. In the other textile centres such as Shkodër (Albania), Tarnovo (Bulgaria), Baghdad and Aleppo the weaving activities were almost collapsed due to this trade (Karal 2004b: 239-240). This can be seen as a continuous trend from 1850 to 1914, when the trade balance of the empire deteriorated considerably and became greatly favourable to Europe (Karpat 1972: 246).

Similar to the Bourbon reformers in Mexico, the response of the Ottoman administration to these military and economic pressures was to implement a series of administrative and military reforms which started during the reign of Sultan Selim III (1789-1807) and Mahmud II (1808-1839) that can be periodised as the first phase of the reforms (Findley 2006: 79; Findley 2008: 12). These initial administrative reforms were concentrated in the reorganisation of the failing military system and restructuration of the central government. The key accomplishment of these reforms implemented under Sultan Selim III was the
establishment of a new army in 1794 called ‘Nizâm-ı Cedid’ (the new order) outside the existing failing army structure which was based on the Janissaries and Sipahis (feudal cavalry), and the reorganisation of the navy. The new system of training and education of the new army was handed over to foreign officers, instructors and advisers who were mainly French (Zürcher 2004: 22). The increasing military expenses led to attempts to increase the tax revenues by reforming the inefficient taxation system which left the tax increases, debasing the coinage and confiscation as the only sources of increasing revenues. The reorganisation of the central administrative institutions by eliminating the chronic overstaffing, favouritism and corruption within the government offices also failed (Zürcher 2004: 23). The naval academy was established with the engineering academy which introduced the western technological innovations in shipbuilding such as copper-sheathing, new navigational instruments, mast machines and the first steam engines were commissioned from Britain for the evacuation of water from the dry-docks (Zorlu 2008: 45). The reorganisation of the navy furthered the shipbuilding technology, with the help of Western shipbuilders and engineers, the Ottoman engineers succeeded in producing ‘handier and superior’ steel and, constructed new ground gun-stocks by imitating the English-made mechanical cranes (Zorlu 2008: 48).

However, similar to the high clergy, high bureaucracy and royal army alliance in 18th century Mexico, a conservative reactionary alliance between the Janissaries and ‘ülema’ (‘high clergy’ in the Ottoman society which was in charge of judicial affairs and education and enjoyed a privileged social and economic status) was formed against the implementation of these reforms and

While the new army was disbanded and Selim III was murdered, the local notables (âyans) headed by the âyan of Ruse (Ruşçuk –Bulgaria) Alemdar Mustafa Pasha marched to Istanbul, suppressed the revolt and installed Sultan Mahmud II – a known partisan of the ‘New Order’ (Zürcher 2004: 28). The new Sultan was forced to sign a charter called ‘Senedi-i Ittifak’ (Charter of Alliance) in 1808 in which the status of âyans was recognised and their relations with the central government were regulated (İnalcık 1955: 225). This charter was accepted as the first document limiting and defining the executive’s authority in Ottoman Turkey (Özbudun and Gençkaya 2009: 7). The administrative and military reforms continued during the reign of Sultan Mahmud II, particularly after the violent elimination of the Janissary corps in 1826 (‘Vaka-i Hayriye’ – the Auspicious Incident). The elimination of the Janissaries left the ülema and the other powerful sources of the conservative reactionary alliance without military power which paved way for the triumph of Ottoman liberalism that reached its climax during the Tanzimat regime (Shaw 1968: 32). Furthermore, the religious holdings of the religious foundations called evkaf were brought under the administration of the state by the establishment of a separate directorate which stripped the ülema of its economic powers (Zürcher 2004: 40).

Following the elimination of the conservative opposition, Sultan Mahmud II was focused on the restructuring of the central administration. The key features that would shape all the 19th century Ottoman reforms were laid in this period; aiming to achieve an agricultural revolution that would give a
purchasing power to compensate the imports from Europe; a fiscal revolution by establishing a fair and efficient tax system that would eliminate the arbitrary and uncertain tax-farming; and the elimination of the extra-economic limitations on the non-Muslim population (Cunningham 1968: 254). The foundation of the ‘Meclis-i Vükelâ’ (the Assembly of Representatives) as a modern cabinet and executive body had established the ministerial government system and defined the division of labour between these ministries (Karal 2004a: 117, 123-125). The head of ülema, the ‘Chief Mufti’ was given a bureau within this system; thereby his activities were limited to advisory and consultative functions (Ahmad 1993: 25). The establishment of the ‘Meclis-i Valayi Ahkâm-ı Adliye’ (Supreme Council for Judicial Regulations) in 1837 was a significant step in terms of the formation of a legislative body that could provide the necessary codes and regulations for the implementation of the reforms (Karal 2004b: 120; Zürcher 2004: 42).

The most significant outcome of these reforms was the establishment of the new administrative and legal structures which then enabled the liberal bureaucracy – servants of the state, not of the Sultan- to launch the reform and reorganisation programmes during the regime of Tanzimat (Cunningham 1968: 250; Ahmad 1993: 25; Zürcher 2004: 43). The Grand Viziers such as Mustafa Reşit, Keçecizâde Fuat and Emin Âli Pashas and their associates formed a ‘revolving inter-ministerial elite’ that dominated the political system and the reforms (Findley 2008: 13). The ‘firman23 of Tanzimat’ (literally; the decree of Re-organisation) was declared in 1839, read by the Grand Vizier Mustafa Reşit Pasha. The political ideology underpinning the decree was mainly derived from

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23 Firman means governmental edict. The firman of Tanzimat was read by the Grand Vizier Mustafa Reşit Pasha in the park of Gülhane in Istanbul, thus, it was also called as the ‘Gülhane Hatt-ı Hümayunu’.
the Western positivist tradition which enshrines the individual rights as the only path towards the general wellbeing of the society. Naturally, this can be best achieved by a state which respects to its citizens’ rights and constructs a direct and identical relationship with them as individuals (Heper 1980: 92). The decree was explicitly related the decay of the Ottoman Empire with the administrative deficiencies and then defined the ‘security of life, property and honour’; just and equal taxation; and regularised military recruitment as the indispensable aspects of a strong, prosperous and peaceful society (Kili and Gözübüyük 2000: 21-22).

The decree envisaged strong measures to protect the peasantry against the landowners among the other economic measures to bring economic development and progress. The French land code had been translated and codified, and several amendments had been made. The rigidity and complexity of the land legislation had been seen as the one of the major obstacles in the way of the liberalisation and progress of the Ottoman economy. The corveé had been abolished, the tax-farmers’ activities had been eliminated and the taking of fees and remunerations by state officials under different titles had been forbidden. In the capital cities of the sancaks, upper councils, and in the counties, local councils had been formed (İnalçık 1976: 6). Following the suggestion of the edict, the Ottoman Bank was founded and owned by foreign interests in order to protect the value of the newly established paper currency which failed quickly (Karpat 1972: 258). After the Crimean War in 1856, a more liberal land code had been legislated in 1858; the inheritance rights and the private ownership of land had been extended although eventually the main beneficiaries of this new code became the landowners themselves (İnalçık

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24 Ottoman administrative division.
Aytekin (2009) argued that the 1856 Land Code was a product of the uneven development of the social relations of production in the Ottoman Empire and, therefore, an expression of the 19th century developments in the Ottoman agriculture which brought the agricultural production more in line with the capitalist production. The new land law’s prohibition of registration of land to any collective body was directly connected with the process of constituting the individual as the sole subject of law which eliminated the non-bourgeois and altruistic forms of property ownership (Aytekin 2009: 937).

The ‘decree of Islahat’ (the decree of Reform) was declared in 1858, furthering the liberal legislation of the Tanzimat and proposed a financial reform programme which expected to complete the modernisation and liberalisation of the Ottoman economy through opening particular sectors like mining and agriculture to the Western investors and encouraging foreign direct investments (Ortaylı 2006: 114). Although the decree recognised the progress made by the Tanzimat reforms, it was stated that there was a need to take further steps. The Islahat decree particularly focused on the minority issues and explicitly stated the equality of all Ottoman citizens regardless of their religion, sect, language and gender (Kili and Gözüburyük 2000: 25; Findley 2008: 18). As a result of this, the decree eliminated all the limitations for the non-Muslim population in acquiring governmental positions and conducting commercial activities while the compulsory military conscription also became compulsory for the non-Muslim citizens (Kili and Gözüburyük 2000: 26-27).

In that line, a modern Civil Code (Mecelle) was prepared in 1869 (though only finished in 1876) which would be an equivalent to Code Napoléon, covering the most areas of the civil law. This was replacing the French origin Penal Code
of 1858 which was a replacement for an initial Penal Code of 1840 (Findley 2008: 20). Although the substance of the code was based on the Hanefist Islam tradition this type of Code was non-existent in Islam and, furthermore, it also incorporated the other legal opinions of the time and applied to all citizens of the Empire regardless of their religious and ethnic origin (Şimşirliğil and Ekinci 2008: 50-51, 55). The ‘Commerce Law’ was also legislated in 1850, based on the 1807 French Code, regulating the relations between firms and companies and between their members. This was followed by the establishment of the Ministry of Commerce in 1860 and the ‘Commerce Statute’ in 1861 (Ergüder 2011: 98).

The Ottoman Imperial Land Code of 1858 was the most radical step in terms of the relations of landholding by establishing individual ownership on land (İslamoğlu 2004: 279-280; Aytekin 2009: 936). The obstacles to the free circulation of the land had been eliminated through the facilitation of the sales, mortgages and other commercial activities related to the land (Aytekin 2009: 938). In 1861, the new ‘Mining Code’ (Maadin Nizamnamesi) was accepted, liberating mine searching, allowing the landowners to freely establish and operate mines on their land, and enabling both individuals and companies to apply for mining licences (Karal 2004b: 247). The domestic customs for the agricultural products were abolished and with the 1867 adjustment to the Land Code, foreigners were allowed to buy and sell land. Following these legal changes, numerous English and French companies established cotton and tobacco plantations and vineyards particularly in the Izmir and Adana regions (Baskıcı 2009: 78). This increasing foreign investment in the agricultural production intensified the mechanisation of agriculture during the 1880s. As discussed in the previous chapter, foreign financial flow
created the conditions for an export-oriented agricultural production. Although the small peasantry was far from being able to buy and bear the costs of maintaining the modern machinery, the Ottoman government, from time to time, bought the necessary machinery and distributed it to the villages for communal use (Baskıcı 2009: 83). At the same time, the Land Code protected the peasantry by banning the formation of çiftliks on land used communally by the peasantry (Karal 2004: 225; Pamuk 2009: 66).

Both the Civil Code of 1876 and the Land Code of 1858 manifested that the introduction and deepening of the capitalist social space in the periphery is an uneven and combined process, as it was defined by Luxemburg and Trotsky. As a result of the enlarged reproduction, the natural economy in the periphery transforms and simultaneously, the capitalist social relations dissolve the traditional social relations and gradually become dominant. However, at the same time, it does incorporate the local or customary practice for a period of time. This incorporation poses a peripheral contradiction which can finally be resolved through passive revolution with the further dialectical development of the capitalist peripheral spatiality.

In that sense, the ‘Anglo-Turkish Commercial Convention’ of 1838 was in line with the Tanzimat liberalism and was a further step in the process of what Luxemburg recognised as the ‘enlarged reproduction’ in the capitalist centre replacing the natural economy in the periphery. The convention permitted the foreign merchants to engage directly with the internal market (Ahmad 1993: 27). It gave an unprecedented advantage and superiority to Great Britain

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25 Following the increasing use of the machinery in the Ottoman agricultural production, the Western agricultural machinery companies had started to open their branches in Ottoman Turkey particularly in the beginning of the 20th century (Baskıcı 2009: 79).
against domestic manufacturers and led to the collapse of the cloth manufacturing industry throughout the Empire. Similar agreements and concessions had been signed with other West European countries between 1838 and 1841 which turned the Ottoman Empire into an exclusively raw material exporter country. The convention reduced the export taxes to 5 percent for the English exports while there were still regional duties up to 8 percent for the domestic producers (Karal 2004b: 215-216; Zürcher 2004: 47). As a result of this, the volume of trade between Ottoman Turkey and Europe rose to 12.2 million in 1845 from 2.9 million in 1829, to 54 million in 1876 and 69.1 million in 1911 (Karpat 1972: 246). While the Ottoman trade deficit was 8 million sterling in favour of England in 1825, it gradually increased to 42 million sterling in 1835 and 44 million sterling in 1838 (Ortaylı 2006: 106). The Commercial Convention of 1838 had secured the uneven trade relationship between England and Turkey which was already the case since the beginning of the 19th century until being challenged by the German-Austrian economic forces.

One of the outcomes of this constantly increasing trade rate was the regional differences. Some regions of the Ottoman Empire became economically more incorporated to global capitalism – particularly in the Balkans, Western Anatolia and the eastern Mediterranean cities such as Aleppo and Beirut- than the other regions of the Empire and created the local bourgeois which was mainly composed of the non-Muslim citizens. This newly emerging class became the flag-bearers of nationalism and regime change in those regions (Karpat 1972: 247). Thus, the regions which had not been open to the influence of the world economic system kept the pre-capitalist form of production and exchange while the cities in Western Anatolia and the Balkans transformed into the
centres of urban production (Pamuk 1984: 35). In the regions that were geographically closer to the European economic and military pressure, the classical guild system was dissolved, particularly in textiles, tawery, porcelain, paper and brick production in the 19th century (Ortaylı 2006: 206). Meanwhile, even rather underdeveloped the Ottoman town was linked to the central bureaucratic system with the construction of the governorship buildings, schools, courts, modern police and mail-telegraph offices (Findley 2008: 24). In that sense, similar to Mexico, the liberal programme triumphed in Ottoman Turkey but eventually failed to further the economic and institutional development due to its precarious rule which was only stabilised during the reign of Sultan Abdul Hamid II.

3.2. The uneven and combined development in Mexico and Turkey: the progressive Caesars General Porfirio Díaz and Sultan Abdul Hamid II

Even though the liberal programme was triumphed within these interrelated processes of enlarged reproduction in the centre and the introduction of the commodity economy and uneven and combined development of the capitalist forces in the periphery, political instability prevented a meaningful deepening in the uneven and combined development of the peripheral capitalist spatiality. In Mexico and Turkey, this stalemate was dialectically resolved during the oppressive regimes of Porfirio Díaz and Sultan Abdul Hamid II, in a similar way to what was defined by Gramsci as progressive Caesarism. This section will examine these dialectical processes in which the formation of the peripheral capitalist space reached its highest stage.
3.2.1. Porfiriato: Uneven and combined development and building a centralised nation-state in Mexico

The economic programme of Juárez –the father of Mexican liberalism- was based on the modernisation of the Mexican society through the capitalist development ‘with its railways, machines and banks’ (Bazant 1960: 232). Porfiriato can be identified with this developmentalist ideology; a pyrrhic triumph for the 19th century Mexican liberalism, which drove its legitimacy from the economic development and from the rapid progress in the administrative structure that achieved through the integration of the Mexican economy into the international markets (Knight 1985: 67). The legal and material conditions of the development of a peripheral capitalist industry had been created during the period of restored republic under the presidency of Juárez but the industrial expansion remained limited (Argüello 1983: 149; Ortega 2010: 25). The ‘Constituent Congress’, aspiring significantly from the bourgeois ideals of the French revolution, established the liberal principles within the 1857 Constitution which separated the state and church, restricted the executive’s authority and acknowledged the individual as the citizen who is a member of the Mexican nation, who possesses undeniable civil rights and who are equal in front of the rule of law (González 1981: 103-105; Covo 1988: 69, Gutiérrez 1999: 527). The constitution was formed to ensure the implementation of both politically and economically progressive measures which would make the elite able to realise the liberalisation of the economy. The 1857 constitution paved way to the division of communal lands, to the dismantling of non-productive properties, reform the tributary system through the abolition of alcabalas, and implementation of policies to decrease the
major grievances within the society (Díaz 1994: 835). However, the biggest advance in the formation of a bourgeois society materialised during the Porfiriato with an unprecedented industrial expansion and economic growth which doubled the national income by a 2.3 percent annual growth rate (Coatsworth 1978: 81; González 1981: 107).

The uneven and combined development of the Mexican industry and capitalist economy was based on this liberal programme which drew support from the Mexican bourgeois comprised of textile manufacturers, agiotistas and the foreign entrepreneurs as well as from the popular middle classes like rancheros, local merchants and low-level government employees (Katz 1991: 52). The implementation of the liberal programme and reforms depended on the political stability which had finally materialised with the pacification period during the dictatorship of General Porfirio Díaz between 1876 and 1910 (González 1981: 107-108; González 1994: 934).

The ‘progressive Caesarism’ of the General Porfirio Díaz (1876-1910) was an era of consolidation of the capitalist social relations both in terms of economic growth and the concretisation of the capitalist social relations within the legal establishment. Although Porfirio suspended the constitution, important administrative regulations were created such as the ‘Code of Penal Procedures’ (1880), ‘Commercial Code’ (1881), ‘Mining Code’ (1884), ‘Code of Colonisation and Vacant Land’ (1893), ‘Military Code’ (1893) and, ‘Stamp Revenue’ (1902) alongside the other legal institutions (Villegas 1963: 82). The ‘Civil Code’ of 1870 which was influenced by Code Napoleón and secured the private property and individual rights was consolidated with the legislation of the new ‘Civil Code’ in 1884 (Prati 1985: 98). The Porfirian strategy –which was
practically continued intact during the González interregnum between 1880 and 1884 is significant in demonstrating the essential role of foreign capital investment in terms of the production of the modern capitalist space in the periphery. Three important principles can be located in this strategy. Firstly, generous concessions were given to the foreigners to maintain the foreign investment which was the primary driving force of the economic growth. Secondly, the Porfirian administration made an enormous effort to end Mexico’s isolation through re-establishing the relations with the European countries in order to end the monogamous relationship between Mexico and U.S and, thus, balance the heavy presence of the United States in the Mexican economy (González 1994: 939). In order to achieve that, the Porfirian administration re-established diplomatic relations and signed commercial agreements with Germany, Portugal and Britain, followed by France in 1880, after being cut by the Júarez and Tejeda administrations since 1867 (Riguzzi 1988: 139). Thirdly, the political stability –Pax-Porfiriana- had to be maintained at any price (Katz 1991: 70). To ensure this political stability, Don Porfirio used different tendencies and took advantage of divisions between cliques and factions, and did not show any mercy to any kind of insurgency (Meyer 2010: 38). Díaz silenced the long running conflicts between the church and state and between the liberals and conservatives which had been hindering the economic development since Independence (Knight 1985: 61).

As it has been observed in the previous chapter (chapter two), the foreign capital either in the form of international loans and financial speculation or in the form of direct investment in the infrastructure or manufacture is paramount in the exogenous processes of the peripheral capitalist space formation. And during the Porfiriato, the generous concessions given by the
Porfirian administration to the foreign entrepreneurs were the indispensible source of the development of the capitalist productive forces in Mexico. In 1910, the total foreign investment was reaching to 1.200 million dollars, of which 750 million dollars was invested in mines and petrol, 200 million in railroads, 150 million in electricity production and 100 million in agriculture and livestock (Ortega 2011: 28). The foreign financial capital became very dominant during the Porfiriato. After the foundation of the ‘Banco Nacional Mexicano’ (Mexican National Bank) through a joint venture of French and Mexican capital, it received the concession of minting the silver money and became the unique bank of emission (Ludlow 1990: 985). The bank received significant attention from the international capital in its establishment, including the directors of the ‘Banque de Paris et Pays Bays’ and ‘Comptoir d’Escompte’, who invested in the initial capital with the Ottoman securities (Ludlow 1990: 985). The ‘Barcelonette’ group who came to Mexico in the 19th century from the Barcelonette province of France was particularly active in the creation of the financial sources. In 1900, Banque de Paris et Pays Bays and a consortium of Swiss Banks established the ‘Société Financiere pour l’Industrie

\[26\] At this point, it is important to recall Bukharin’s (1976) work on the internationalisation and concentration of the finance capital in the hands of trusts which then had to be invested in the ‘national economies’ as the necessary condition of the reproduction of the processes of concentration and centralisation of the capital on a world scale in the 19th century. He noticed the role of Banque de Paris et Pays Bays within the multinational finance trust which invested in enterprises in the periphery, both in South America and in Ottoman Turkey. It was the same Banque de Paris who was the part of the ‘Consortium Constantinopol’ that established in Brussels for the purpose of financing the enterprises in Istanbul with the participation of German, French and Swiss capital (Bukharin 1976: 59). The foundation of the Banco Nacional Mexicano was materialised during the French Prime Minister Jules Ferry’s efforts to expand the French capital’s role in the world market which was successfully invested in the railway and banking operations in Italy and Turkey (Ludlow 1990: 983). Even though the majority of the capital invested in the establishment of the Banco Nacional Mexicano was owned by French investors, the representatives of other strong international banking institutions such as the ‘Banque Française de Commerce et Industrie’, ‘Franco-Egyptienne’, ‘Hélèneique de Crédit General’, ‘Société Générale de Crédit Industrielle et Commerciale’ and prominent multinational ‘financial houses’ who did financed the construction of the Panama Canal were also among the investors (Ludlow 1990: 986-987).
du Mexique’ in collaboration with the Barcelonette group which invested in many industrial enterprises such as ‘Cervecería Moctezuma’ (brewery) and ‘la Compañía Papelera San Rafel’ (paper) and many textile companies (Hamilton 1998: 56). Following the establishment of the Nacional Mexicano, a ‘completely national bank’, ‘Banco Mercantil Mexicano’, (Mexican Commercial Bank) was established which eventually fused with the former (Ludlow 1990: 1007).

With the aid and stimulation of foreign capital investment, it is possible to say, the exogenous uneven and combined development of the capitalist economy during the Porfiriato can be observed with the unprecedented growth in four main interrelated sectors; railway construction, raw material extraction, export-oriented agricultural production and the manufacture of consumer goods as it was outlined in the conceptualisation of the formation of peripheral capitalist space.

As both Luxemburg and Trotsky put an emphasis on the railways in a backward economy, the construction of railways had significant impact on the capitalist development of Mexico, both in terms of unit savings in transport costs and the quantity of passengers and freight that could be carried (Coatsworth 1979: 943, 947). Gilly (2007) stated that the vertiginous development of the railways in Mexico during the last quarter of the 19th century was the most salient aspect of the capitalist expansion in the periphery (Gilly 2007: 30-31). In 1877, Mexico had 640km of railway track, of which 114km employed mules rather than steam engines. The boom started after 1880 although the first concession for the railway construction was issued in 1837 due to the political instability (Coatsworth 1979: 940). By 1910, at the end of the Porfiriato, the total length
of the railway tracks comprised 19.204km (Coatsworth 1981: 37). The Mexican railways had created an increase in demand but this demand was directly derived from the expansion of the world market towards Mexico. Thus, the construction of the railways in Mexico should be seen as the product of the industrial development rather than its initiator (Coatsworth 1981: 77-78). The railway development induced a massive foreign investment in the production of export goods which made possible the rapid economic growth during the Porfiriato. Between 1877 and 1910, the exports of Mexico increased nine-fold (Knight 1985: 68). Export-oriented production was encouraged, and even less freight fares were charged by the rail companies if the goods were designated for exportation (Coatsworth 1979: 959; Coatsworth 1981: 124). Briefly, the impact of railway construction funded by foreign capital on the development of capitalist forces was enormous, stimulating other sectors, primarily mining and agriculture (Coatsworth 1979: 940). With the railways, developed urban areas – particularly Mexico City- emerged and expanded where the metropolitan areas linked with the other districts through railways and electrified trams (Garza 2006: 112).

While the construction of railways during the Porfiriato had a significant impact on the export boom by connecting Mexico’s productive regions with the world market, the impact was not exclusively on this aspect; it also had a very crucial function in the formation and consolidation of the internal productive and commercial activities by integrating certain regions in the country more strongly into a unified market (Ficker 1995: 40, 64). Although, principally the railway freight was dominated by the transportation of raw materials for export, with the further development of the capitalist social forces it has been observed that the goods for domestic consumption—such as
food products and construction material did gradually become an important part of the total shipments (Ficker 1995: 49). Ludlow also argued that the construction of the railways increased the confidence of the foreign investors (primarily North American) in the Mexican economy leading to ‘a euphoric environment to make business’ (Ludlow 1990: 981).

Besides railway construction, oil production, refinery industry, textile and other small industries had became the other main sectors which received the massive surge of foreign investment. Until the end of the century, the majority of the factories were producing consumer goods for the domestic market; liquor, beer, food products, soap, oil, matches and textiles (Cárbo and Sánchez 1983: 218). These sectors were mainly located in Mexico, Puebla, Guanajuato, Jalisco and Veracruz and mining was located in the Northern Mexico where the number of industrial proletariat reached to 800,000 workers in the beginning of the 20th century (Katz 1991: 105). While the number of people working in textile was 8,000 in 1877, in 1910 there were 150 factories with 82,000 workers (Ortega 2010: 42).

Among the proletariat, the highest income was in the mining sector which was reaching approximately to 100,000 men at the end of the Porfiriato. The main reason for that was the considerable concessions given to the mining companies and the very low tax rates. The ‘1884 Mining Code’ established the maximum tax rate as 2 percent while the State was renouncing its rights on the mines after selling the land where the mine was located (Cárbo and Sánchez 1983: 223). Within the total foreign investment in this sector, the United States was dominant with 61.7 percent of the investments followed by French and English capital with 21.8 and 14 percent respectively while 77 percent of the
exports were destined for the U.S. in the same period (Cárbo and Sánchez 1983: 224).

As it has been mentioned before, the 19th century was the golden age for the haciendas and the Porfiriato was the climax of this golden age. However, the traditional paternalistic hacienda where the hacendado forms a ‘fictive kinship’ (compadrazgo) with peasant families (Knight 2002b: 97) was replaced by the modern hacienda (Meyer 1986: 484). Starting in the early 19th century, the increase in the international demand on the agricultural products had a significant impact on the cultivation of tropical goods such as sugar and henequen which led haciendas especially in the costal tierra caliente -in Guerrero, at the Pacific coast of Jalisco and Colima, tropical Veracruz and in the south of Mexico, such as Yucatán- to extend their lands in order to increase the production (Cárbo and Sánchez 1983: 203). Combination of high demand, increasing population, rising land values and falling real wages increased the incentives to invest in profitable agricultural production and the capital from mining and commerce flowed to haciendas. This led to the expansion of the hacienda, not only in terms of cultivated land, but also in rights to wood, water and pasture as well (Knight 2002b: 222). The sharp increase in the demand of agro-products can be explained first by the increase in the population during the Porfiriato, and secondly, by the development of railways which had connected the international markets with the plantation regions located in distant geographies. In central Mexico, mainly maize, wheat, pulque and sugar cane production had increased significantly. The construction of the railway between the American South West region and Mexico was completed in 1884 and increased the demand for cattle and industrial metals in the Northern Mexico (Katz 1974: 32). The economic boom in the South of Mexico was
almost completely dependent on the exports of agro-products. In Yucatán, production of henequen and sisal, in Tabasco and Chiapas rubber and coffee underwent an unprecedented expansion. However, production in those plantations was completely dependent upon world market conditions (Katz 1991: 80). Thus, it can be said that the agricultural production was significantly transformed though integrating with the world markets, becoming one of the significant financing sources of the peripheral capitalist development.

The extension of the hacienda accelerated the process of the dispossession of the indigenous villagers from their lands and dissolution of the communal lands in the benefit of private ownership. During the Porfiriato, the assault on the communal land reached its peak since the colonisation of Mexico by Spaniards (Coatsworth 1974: 70; Katz 1974: 39). Díaz pressured the local governors to implement the regulations -which were legislated during the liberal Reform- to divide the communal lands between the individual owners (Jiménez 1973: 521). The usurpation of free village lands created a workless labour force which was ready to migrate to cities or to work in the other haciendas who dearly needed workforce, such as the cotton plantations in the Laguna region of Northern Mexico as they were facing fierce competition from the mines and other industries which were also demanding labour (Coatsworth 1981: 179).

It can be claimed that the economic boom during the Porfiriato created the conditions for the emergence of the effective and powerful Mexican state and nation (Córdova 1979: 65). Public spending in the metropolitan cities in health-care, sewage and water infrastructures and the number of positions in the
state bureaucracy had substantially increased (Garza 2006: 113). *Rurales*\(^{27}\) as the local police force had become an important mechanism for the maintenance of order and the authority of the central government in the country (Katz 1991: 85). Before Díaz, the liberals of the reform did attempt to eliminate one of the most profound threats to the public order – the widespread insecurity of human life and private property – by establishing a police force which consisted of 800 men in 1861. Gradually, this police force was expanded to 3000 men and became an integral part of the government which widened the central authority to the rural areas (Vanderwood 1972: 39). In the area of education, ‘*escuelas normales*’ for the professional training of the primary school teachers were founded while the free and secular primary education became obligatory for all Federal District residents in 1891 (Jiménez 1973: 525). The influence of the central government on the education system had been strengthened through the federal governments (Jiménez 1973: 543).

However, this centralised and strengthening nation-state’s economic development was dependent on the foreign capital in an unprecedented level. Firstly, almost all non-agricultural sectors of the Mexican economy, such as banking, mining, textile and other industrial production and transportation\(^{28}\) was in the hands of foreigners and therefore the development of the capitalist forces was an exogenous process. This characteristic of the formation of the peripheral capitalist space was conditioning another characteristic as it has been agued in the previous chapter; secondly, the economy was mainly

\(^{27}\) ‘*La policía montada Rural de México*’ (the rural mounted police of Mexico).

\(^{28}\) Although the railways had gradually nationalised after 1900, the major beneficiaries of the ‘Mexicanisation’ of the railways by the National Railways were the foreigners who owned railway bonds that now been secured by the government. Furthermore, the low freight tariff for the exported goods had been maintained thus, the expropriation of the railways did not have a negative impact on the foreign investments (Coatsworth 1981: 175).
oriented towards the production of raw materials to satisfy the needs of North American industrial markets (Katz 1991: 81). It is possible to argue that the Porfiriato was an era of ‘progressive Caesarism’ in which the Mexican economy more strongly integrated into the world markets, positioned in the periphery within the international division of labour and furthered the development of the capitalist forces of production which transformed Mexico from the pre-capitalist backwardness to a modern underdeveloped capitalist nation-state.

3.2.2. Sultan Abdul Hamid II: uneven and combined development of the peripheral economy and the Ottoman foundations of the modern Turkey

Karpat (1968) points out that the Tanzimat reform attempts of the bureaucratic elite in order to reorganise the state were actually evidence of the modernisation of Ottoman Turkey since those attempts were not the initiators of a certain social transformation but the result of it. As it was highlighted above, the disintegration of the traditional state land system after the middle of the 16th century which was caused by the growing uneven commercial exchange with Europe brought decentralisation of the Empire when the capitalist development necessitated a strong central government and a modern administrative system. This led the Tanzimat liberalism that culminated in the Constitution of 1876 (Karpat 1968: 71). The Ottoman reformers led by Midhat Pasa deposed the Sultan Abdul Âziz in 1876, who was a pro-reform sultan but resistant to the declaration of the constitution and installed Sultan Murad V, who was also deposed in the same year to install Sultan Abdul Hamid II who had promised to promulgate the constitution. The First Constitution, declared in December 1876 was based on the Belgian constitution of 1830 but included authoritarian traits which were modelled on the Prussian constitution of 1850 (Zürcher 2004: 74).
In the official modern Turkish historiography, while the Tanzimat (1839-76), the Young Ottoman constitutionalist movement (1876-78) and the Young Turk (1908-18) movements had been praised as modernist and progressive, the reign of Sultan Abdul Hamid II (1876-1908) was defined as despotic and regressive. However, it was actually in this period when the Tanzimat attempts at the reorganisation of the empire as a centralised state could finally reach its fulfilment. Thus, Sultan Abdul Hamid II’s reign needs to been seen as the equivalent of the Porfiriato in Mexico, an era of progressive Caesarism which was the natural product of the Tanzimat reforms that aimed to centralise the state and foreign dependent uneven and combined development of the capitalist forces through the establishment of political stability.

Unable to pay its debts in 1875, the Empire was financially bankrupt when Abdul Hamid II ascended to power in 1876, and, a year later, Russia declared war against the Ottoman Empire which ended with the Russian victory in 1878. During the war with Russia, Abdul Hamid II indefinitely dismissed the parliament after its members accused him of mismanagement of the war (Fortna 2008: 47). By dismissing the parliament and signing the peace treaty with Russia, Abdul Hamid II turned his attention to the reorganisation and centralisation of the Empire. Like Porfirio Díaz, Abdul Hamid II maintained the political stability at any price and, therefore, the parliament and the free press needed to be suppressed.

The most urgent problem in front of the Empire was the debt payments. Starting from the Crimean War, the Ottoman government appealed to the foreign loans in order to materialise the reforms in the economy, the reorganisation of the administration and the modernisation of the army and
the education system. However, while the total amount of the foreign loan between 1854 and 1874 commissioned was 5.3 million francs, the actual amount that entered to the treasury was 2.3 million francs since the average interest rate for Ottoman Turkey was between 15 and 20 percent (Ergüder 2011: 109). Foreign loans were expanded with the rapid expansion in the foreign trade and were facilitated by the establishment of the Imperial Ottoman Bank in 1863 which created an additional channel of integration into the European financial markets (Eldem 2005: 437). While in the period between 1854 and 1865, the Ottoman government took 40,470,000 lira loan, in the period between 1865 and 1874 the foreign loan of Ottoman Turkey increased to 204,460,000 liras (Yıldırım 2001: 319). Eventually in 1875, the Ottoman treasury was forced to declare that it could not pay more than half of the foreign loans which led to the establishment of the ‘Ottoman Public Debt Administration’ with the ‘Decree of Mouharrem’ in 1881 handing the administration of the Ottoman loans to the foreign lenders (Landen 2006: 585; Ergün 2011: 111).

While the modern Turkish historiography marks the establishment of this institution as one of the most tragic events in the Ottoman history, the foundation of the Ottoman Public Debt Administration played a significant role in the modernisation of the Ottoman financial system and in the increasing state revenues. The foreign-dominated administration employed thousands\(^{29}\) of locals and trained them in line with the modern financial regulations. Furthermore, due to the successful conduct of the Administration, European capital found it easy, secure and very profitable to invest in the construction of

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\(^{29}\) The staff of the Ottoman Public Debt Administration was reaching to 5,633 people in 1906 (Landen 2006: 593).
railways, public utility companies and banks in Ottoman Turkey (Landen 2006: 585-586). When the administration unified all the foreign debt of the Ottoman government the remaining debt decreased from 239.5 million liras to 125.5 million liras and the annual interest rate fell from 3.9 percent to 1.4 percent making the new loans less burdening (Yıldırım 2001: 320). Furthermore, the Administration encouraged and financed the modernisation of the textile production in some regions, introduced steam-powered mills and organised large-scale reeling factories in Bursa (İslamoğlu 1987: 21).

In that sense, especially after 1881, it can be claimed that all the sectors in the Ottoman economy were significantly integrated into the European capitalism (Ergün 2011: 112). Similar to the formation of the capitalist space and its positioning in the periphery of the international division of labour in Mexico, alongside the state loans, another important foreign source of the uneven and combined development of the capitalist forces that had reached to its golden age during the Hamidian era was the construction of railways. The share of the railroads in the total foreign investment (excluding the foreign debt) was increased from 41.1 percent in 1890 to 63.1 in 1914 (Pamuk 1982: 143).

The first railway constructions in the Ottoman Turkey were dominated by French and British companies aiming to connect the main ports with the hinterland of the country where the agricultural products had been produced. The first railroad construction concession was given to a British company in 1856, for a track to be constructed between Izmir and Aydin which was completed in 1866. In the same year, another line was completed between Izmir and Kasaba, again with the British capital (Ozturk 2009: 53-54). This line was later purchased by the Ottoman government in 1890 under the Anatolian
Railway Company. The line between İzmit and Haydarpaşa (located in the Asian side of Istanbul) was opened in 1873 as the Bursa-Mudanya line. In the 1880s and 1890s, these first few hundred miles railway tracks which connecting the fertile inlands with the ports were increased to thousands of miles. The French and British companies constructed the railways connecting the inlands with the Syrian and Palestinian coasts after 1888, Macedonia connected with Istanbul, and the Haydarpaşa-İzmit line reached to Ankara in 1892, to Konya in 1896 (Zürcher 2004: 77). This line of the Anatolian railway expanded to Baghdad and Basra with the construction of the Baghdad Railway by German capital when Deutsche Bank gained the concession in 1903 (Özen 2008: 83). In 1911, Ottoman railways were transporting 16 million passengers and 2.6 million tonnes of freight on 6.485km tracks employing 13,000 persons (Quataert 2005: 123-125). In total, the total railroad tracks that had been constructed under the Ottoman Turkey reached to 8.619km in 1922 (Onur 1953: 122).

The rapid development of the modern transportation in the Hamidian era was not limited with the railway construction. The sea transportation significantly transformed both in quantitative and qualitative terms by the increase in the numbers of the steamed vessels. During the 1860s, the numbers of the steamed vessels visited the port of Istanbul was outnumbered four times by the sailing vessels while by 1900, 95 percent of the vessels visiting the port of Istanbul were powered by steam engines. At the same time, this five percent of sailing vessels were representing more sailing vessels than in any preceding year which shows the unprecedented expansion in the volume of shipping (Quataert 2005: 120). It is important to note that similar to the railway
companies, 90 percent of the total tonnage was owned by the foreign steamship companies (Zürcher 2004: 78).

The increasing connectivity and the reduction in the transportation costs had a great impact on the agricultural production for the international markets (Ergün 2011: 113). By linking the inner parts of the country to the coast, many cultivators moved to produce export-oriented agricultural goods (Quataert 1977: 158). When the railways were built in such areas, market agriculture rapidly developed, producing in unprecedented quantities because the products -mainly cereals- could be sold at competitive prices (Quataert 2005: 122). The agricultural revolution imagined by the Tanzimat reformers which expected to finance the industrial development was partially accomplished in this period. Furthermore, with the supportive policies sought by the government in the agricultural sector the volume of agricultural production increased significantly. By 1900, tens of thousands of iron ploughs, reapers and combines were in use throughout the country (Quataert 2005: 134). Thus, between 1888 and 1911, the cereal production increased by 51 percent, tobacco production increased by 191, fig production increased by 122, hazelnut production increased by 217, floss production increased by 122, and the cotton production have increased by 472 percent. It is important to note that this increase in the agricultural production was oriented by importation to the international markets. The share of the agricultural products in the total exports of Ottoman Turkey increased from 18 percent in 1889 to 22 percent in 1907 and reached to 27 percent in 1913 (Yıldırım 2001: 315).

There was also limited but growing development in the manufacturing industries for the domestic consumption. Although during the 1830s and
1840s, the Ottoman government did already start to import significant amounts of machinery to establish factories mainly in Istanbul, Izmir and Adana in order to meet the needs of the Ottoman army, the significant increase in the volume of manufactured goods was achieved during the 1880s. During the years between 1888 and 1896, the foreign direct investment increased unprecedentedly, one-third of it was in the manufacturing sector. The main production areas included woollen and silk cloths, garment, yarn, food, oil, cement, brick and other construction materials (Pamuk 2005: 225). The electricity production, breweries, and carpet production were among the other industries that were established (Zürcher 2004: 85).

During the reign of Abdul Hamid II, importance was also given to the education and the administration was keen on the implementation of the French inspired ‘Public Education Regulation’ of 1869 by building an imperial infrastructure (Fortna 2008: 51). The number of secular elementary and lower secondary schools and students doubled throughout the Empire in this period and, the schools of Finance, Law, Fine Arts, Languages, Commerce and Engineering were opened in Istanbul between 1879 and 1884. Moreover, some reforms involved direct implementation of the European systems to ensure the harmony to facilitate the trade relations. For instance the decimal system of measurement introduced in 1881 and the ‘Chamber of Commerce’ was established in Istanbul in 1882 to give necessary help and education to the Ottoman trade and businessmen (Kuran 1970: 129).

To sum up, the Hamidian Ottoman Turkey in 1908 represented a modern underdeveloped capitalist space where the conditions of the centralised nation-state were materialised, but yet to be institutionalised and the
contradictions that were created by this uneven and combined development would be resolved by a social explosion – by the passive revolution of the Young Turks. Understanding this dialectical process of the formation of the peripheral capitalist space unravels the spatiotemporally specific conditions that underpin the peripheral capitalist spatiality in Mexico and Turkey as it was conceptualised previously.

3.3. Passive revolutions of Mexico and Turkey: The consolidation of the modern peripheral capitalist space

It would be useful to briefly recall here the key features of the concept of passive revolution which were outlined in the previous chapter (chapter two) and linked with the other spatiotemporally specific concepts of Luxemburg and Trotsky. These three concepts were linked to each other in order to explain the peripheral capitalist state formations in Poland and Russia as a result of the uneven development of the capitalist productive forces. Passive revolution is a dialectical process that combines the progressive and reactionary elements in the society and represents a ‘revolution-restoration’ or ‘revolution without revolution’ where the emergent bourgeoisie could act and dissolve the ‘blocked dialectic’ by mobilising the subaltern classes rather than being able to build an organic hegemony (Buci-Gluckmann 1980: 315; Morton 2007: 66 Morton 2010: 319).

It is important to underline two key principles that had been presented as fundamental by Gramsci in which the concept of passive revolution was derived. Firstly, Gramsci argued that a social formation would not disappear if it did not exhaust the conditions of furthering the productive forces. And, secondly, a new social formation does not appear sporadically, but it arises
from the same historical conditions of the social formations which it arises to eliminate (Gramsci 2007: 106). These two principles in which Gramsci derived the spatiotemporally specific concept of passive revolution, are in fact, general principles of social formation taken from Marx’s ‘Preface to The Critique of Political Economy’ where Marx stated:

‘At a certain level of their development the material productive forces of society come into contradiction with the already existing relations of production, or in what is merely a legal expression for this, with the property relations which they had previously functioned...Then an epoch of social revolution commences.

...A social formation never comes to an end before all the forces of production which it can accommodate are developed, and new, higher relations of production never come into place before the material conditions their existence have gestated in the womb of the old society. Hence humanity only sets itself such problems it can solve, for on careful consideration one always finds that the problems themselves arise where the material conditions of their solution are known to be on hand or at least in the process of development’ (Marx 1859/1996: 160).

There are two implications of these principles in the understanding of the concept of passive revolution. Firstly, these two general principles show that the transformation of the social formations is a dialectical process. Thus, passive revolution is a dialectical process in which the capitalist social relations consolidate its hegemony by reproducing itself in new forms of authority (Morton 2003: 632).
In that sense, the passive revolution does not initiate or precondition the establishment of capitalism but is a product of that process; representing a spatiotemporal process of resolution of the contradictions that had been created by the uneven and combined development of capitalism in the periphery. This leads to the second implication; while it is conditioned by the uneven and combined development of capitalism, it also produces a new social formation which would consolidate and further this dependent development.

The continuity between the reform and reorganisation periods and the rapid industrial development during the authoritarian regimes of General Porfirio Díaz and Sultan Abdul Hamid II is crucial in the analysis of the dialectical processes of formation of the peripheral capitalist space and the transformation of Mexico and Turkey from the pre-capitalist backwardness to a modern capitalist underdevelopment. As it was explained before, the oppressive regimes of Díaz and Sultan Hamid were the products of another dialectical process defined as ‘Caesarism’ by Gramsci. Gramsci defined the modern Caesarist regimes as the social forms that achieve further development and organisational development by the domination of the – mostly- progressive forces within an authoritarian regime that end the catastrophic political equilibrium between the progressive and reactionary forces (Gramsci 2007: 222). Certainly, while the oppressive regime resolves a dialectical contradiction and furthers the particular socio-spatial form, it proceeds on a dialectical track, laying down the foundations of a different contradiction. The dynamic underpinning this formation was the uneven and combined development of the productive forces which emanated from the material conditions created by the enlarged reproduction in the core capitalist
countries and structured the passive revolutions in early 20th century Mexico and Turkey.

This section analyses the passive revolutions of Mexico (1910-1920) and Turkey (1908-1925) that had completed the formation of the modern nation-states where the limited bourgeoisie assumed power with a vanguard state party that institutionalised the revolution by using the ‘nation’ as the common denominator to incorporate the masses. They inherited a fully-developed state structure and bureaucracy besides the liberal ideology of reform and progress from the previous ruling classes. In both countries, the modern Leviathan strengthened and perfected by the process of political centralisation and furthered the capitalist development which had already begun under the previous regimes. Therefore, it is important to focus on these dialectical processes in which the old regimes have been eliminated for the sake of the development of the peripheral capitalist forces which structured the other dialectical process of transformation of the peripheral capitalist spatiality by reproducing the uneven relations with the industrialised capitalist spaces but in different political forms.

3.3.1. The Mexican passive revolution (1910-1920) and the consolidation of the peripheral capitalist space in the form of revolutionary Mexican state

The Mexican Revolution posed great difficulties in terms of analysing the actual processes of the political mobilisation as well as its outcomes (Morton 2011: 39). Moreover, in the words of Camín, the Mexican Revolution ‘has been a powerful ideological instrument of domination, a uniting fetish of meanings and rhetoric, a continually dividing and continually inaccurate phantom that generates its own confusion and its inexhaustible hermeneutics’ (Camín 1979: 39).
This continual reproduction of the revolutionary heritage adds more controversy to the analysis. Semo (1979) argues that the Mexican bourgeois is sui generis in Latin America and takes its legitimacy from a revolutionary origin. According to Gilbert and Nugent (1994), there are three different currents which can be located in the historiography of the Mexican Revolution: the orthodox, revisionist and the neo-populist/post-revisionist accounts. The revisionist accounts of the Mexican Revolution challenged the initial orthodox understanding of the Mexican Revolution which defined it as the heroic struggle of the agrarian masses who eventually overthrew the despotic Porfirian regime along with the local caciques and broke with the feudal past (Miller 1985: 77; Gilbert and Nugent 1994: 5). This interpretation, that was codified by the ruling elite, was challenged by the revisionist and post-revisionist accounts which proposed a class based analysis of the revolutionary process by underlying the role of different groups and popular movements both in the political mobilisation and in its institutionalisation (Gilbert and Nugent 1994: 6-9). Womack (1991) pointed out that the Mexican revolution was actually a struggle between the same elements within the middle and upper classes which derived from the frustration of unfavoured middle and upper class elements. The involvement of the masses to this struggle was a natural result of the dissatisfaction amongst the general population caused by the economic burden of the capitalist development during the Porfirian regime (Womack 1991: 128).

Nevertheless, as Gilly (1979) noted, the central motor of the political mobilisation during the revolution was the gigantic fight of the peasantry for land. The social base of the three major revolutionary armies of Álvaro Obregón, Francisco Villa and Emilliano Zapata was peasantry. However, this
physical presence of the peasantry did not automatically turn the outcome of the uprising to a popular revolt of the masses or to a social revolution of the people (Gilly 1979: 22). While the ‘Obreganismo’ was desiring to transform the state, ‘Zapatismo’ aspired to an irreducible autonomy for the peasantry from the bourgeois state, and ‘Villismo’ was situated between Madero and Zapata; his aim was ‘tierra y libertad’ but within the limits of the capitalist relations of production (Gilly 1979: 23; O’Malley 1986: 87).

As was observed before, the rapid economic development during the Porfiriato combined two different modes of economic development in the same era which, actually, in the early industrialised countries emerged during different centuries; the intensive accumulation of land and the intensive accumulation of capital. The main beneficiaries of this accumulation were the foreign direct investors and the limited Mexican bourgeoisie-in-formation while the peasantry who were extremely pauperised and lost its traditionally owned land were the net loser of this uneven and combined development of capitalist social relations (Rosado 1963: 362-363; Gilly 1979: 24-25). The urban petty bourgeoisie was also affected by the exogenous character of the peripheral capitalist development and added it to the joint front of dissidents breaking from the former cooptation with the Porfiriain regime (Gilly 1983a: 47).

The economic burden of the rapid and foreign directed capitalist development which strongly linked to the fluctuating international markets gradually culminated to a point of explosion in the last years of Porfiriato, particularly during the years of 1907-1908’s global capitalist crisis (Gilly 1983b: 306). Meyer (2010) stated that during the last 15 years of the Porfiriato regime, the living conditions among the general population had deteriorated significantly.
Between 1895 and 1910 the salaries of the agricultural workers had dropped by 17 percent. The real wages of the industrial workers fell considerably as well and the industrial unemployment had risen, particularly in the textile sector where the numbers of the textile workers fell to 20,000. The deterioration of the purchase power of the workers accounted for the cause of half of the strikes and above all in the textile industry, railway workers and tobacco producers, the strikes increased sharply after 1905 (Navarro 1956: 202). As a result of the global economic contraction between 1900 and 1907 the agricultural production in Sonora, Sinaloa and Chihuahua dropped by 40 percent while thousands of industrial workers were laid off (Gilly 1983a: 58; Meyer 2010: 26-27).

In 1910, Francisco I. Madero, a member of the landowner family from San Luis Potosí in the North of Mexico became the head of this dissident movement opposing the re-election of General Porfirio Diaz. Madero was representing a faction of the bourgeoisie—the urban petty bourgeoisie- who in fact did not pose any realistic threat to the mighty Porfirian army at that time. At that point, the peasantry was called to arms in the ‘Plan of San Luis’ which included a clause stating that all of the arbitrary usurpation of the peasant and indigenous land will be revised (Gilly 1983b: 307; Womack 1991: 130). This promise attracted the peasantry headed by Zapata in Morelos and Francisco Villa in Chihuahua, joining the broad and heterogeneous movement around Madero (Gilly 1983a: 60; O’Malley 1986: 41, 88). By early 1911, the insurrection was already spread around the country which forced General Diaz to step down and go into exile (Meyer 2010: 55). Up to this point, it is possible to argue that the revolution was not consumed yet; the old regime and the
social contradictions that were represented with this regime had been eliminated.

After an interim government, led by Porfirista León de la Barra, Madero took office and shelved the peasant demands for revising the hacienda usurpations which led to the Zapatista insurgency. Meanwhile the economy started to show signs of improvement particularly, in oil and steel production and exports (Womack 1991: 136). In November 1911, Zapata declared the ‘Plan of Ayala’ and denounced President Madero for being a traitor of the revolutionary movement. The plan aimed to retrieve the land, forestry and waters that had been usurped by the big landowners and haciendas (Gilly 1983b: 321; Meyer 2010: 59). Madero could not suppress the Zapatista insurgency and, he was deposed and murdered in 1913 and replaced by General Huerta. However, the constitutionalist army headed by another Northern landowner Venustiano Carranza, included Villa and his army, the ‘División del Norte’ and the army of Obregón defeated the Huertistas and retrieved political power (Gilly 1983b: 346).

However, at this point, the peasantry under Zapata and Villa appeared incapable to articulate its military power in the state structure on a national level, thus enabling the bourgeois and petty bourgeois to organise its hegemony with the ‘Constitution of 1917’ (Gilly 1979: 41; Meyer 2010: 85). Finally, once necessary mobilisation of the agrarian masses was terminated, the bourgeois hegemony was established after uniting the reactionary and progressive elements in the society. The masses were converted into a significant factor of power in disintegrating the old regime but lacked sufficient
material elements to determine the modern reorganisation of Mexico (Córdova 1979: 60).

In that sense, the Mexican revolution represents a perfect example of a passive revolution that was defined by Gramsci, a significant process in the formation of the peripheral capitalist spatiality (Gramsci 2007: 106-107; Morton 2011: 34). This work argues that the passive revolution is the concrete historical process where the bourgeoisie-in-formation established its hegemony through institutionalising a legitimate political power on the basis of national identity and the compromises that were given to the subaltern classes. It is not a precondition of the formation of the capitalist space or the bourgeois hegemony but a direct product of the dialectical process of uneven and combined development of the capitalist social forces, namely the capitalist productive forces and the bourgeoisie-in-formation striving to take control of the capitalist accumulation and to eliminate the obstacles in front of it. For this reason, the Mexican revolution did not derail the peripheral capitalist development even though it was mainly materialised through the mobilisation of the subaltern classes, did not proceed with a comprehensive agrarian reform\(^{30}\) or share the political power through the meaningful representation of the interests of peasantry or the working classes, and did not take a critical stance against the foreign capital. However, it was in the post-passive revolutionary period -which will be examined in the first section of chapter four- that the main borders of the bourgeois hegemony were drawn with the consolidation of the peripheral capitalist social relations.

\(^{30}\) The land distribution with the Constitution of 1917 and its meaning will be discussed in the next chapter.
With the establishment of the hegemony of the limited Mexican bourgeoisie-in-formation, the national bourgeoisie assumed the responsibility of the capitalist accumulation which changed the course of the uneven and combined development. The main difference between the uneven and combined development of the capitalist space and the post-passive revolutionary dependent capitalist development lays in this point; in the former, the main agents of the capitalist accumulation were the great foreign monopolies and a small group of enriched Mexican men of commerce while, in the second, the limited national bourgeois was transformed to dominate the state and reoriented it (Semo 1979: 141). Therefore, it is possible to say that observing this process where the blocked dialectic was resolved by the consolidation of the existing social relations does explain a very significant stage in the formation of the peripheral capitalist space.

3.3.2. The Kemalist revolution or the Young Turk passive revolution (1908-1925)? The consolidation of the peripheral capitalist space in the form of Turkish nation-state

The difficulties posited in the analysis of the Mexican Revolution also emerge in the scholarly analysis of the Turkish Revolution. It is important to highlight the reasons behind this common distorted way of interpretation of these two revolutions. Both Mexican and Turkish revolutions were used (and, to a degree, are still being used) as a point of legitimisation of the political authority and an instrument of domination by the bourgeois hegemony. After the foundation of the republic, the ruling elite that organised under the ‘Cumhuriyet Halk Partisi’ (Republican People’s Party –CHP) assumed the role of a vanguard party which became an integral part of the state structure and limited the interpretation of the revolution to the Independence War (1919-
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(1922), thus the revolution has been defined as exclusively Kemalist, post-
Ottoman and Republican which confined the national identity within the
existing state structure and eliminated any other referrals to Pan-Turkism or
the role of the ‘Speech’ (Nutuk) given by Mustafa Kemal in 1927 during the
first party Congress of the CHP in the production of this orthodoxy which was
later on published by the ‘Türk Devrim Tarihi Enstitüsü’ (Institute for the Study
of the Turkish Revolution) for the Ministry of Education and millions of copies
had been published and translated to different languages ever since. In his
‘Speech’ Atatürk claims to ‘explain how a great nation, which was thought to
have come to the end of its national existence, had gained its independence
and had founded a national and modern state based on the latest principles of
science and technology’ and starts his explanation from 1919, the year when
he joined to the national resistance in Asia Minor. Zürcher argues that
Atatürk’s own interpretation has been accepted as the objective truth in the
Turkish historiography which was inevitable in a country where he is still
perceived as the liberator and the founder of the Republic and a law banning
defamation of Atatürk is still in force (Zürcher 2010: 10).

The orthodox interpretation of the formation of the modern Turkish state has
been produced and reproduced by the official state history writing efforts
which immediately started after the foundation of the republic as an essential
part of the nation building process. This orthodox version has been rarely
challenged within the mainstream historiography while in all levels of the
primary, secondary and higher education became a compulsory subject under
the title of ‘İnkılap Tarihi’ (history of the revolution). This powerful ahistoric
orthodoxy bounded with the paradigms of the Kemalist establishment and as
an integral part of the bourgeois ideology dates the economic, political and social modernisation of Turkey to the foundation of the Republic in 1923, ignoring the economic and social changes within Ottoman Turkey which had a profound impact on the formation of the modern Turkish state (Karpat 1972: 243; Kansu 1997: 5).

Nevertheless, this distorted definition of the revolution by the Kemalist historiography as the phoenix that rises from its ashes, leaving behind its oriental and backward past and being an example of the other oppressed nations of the world was became rapidly a crucial part of the national identity. These interpretations need to be seen as part of the hegemony of the bourgeoisie-in-formation to create a collective identity where the nation appears as the common denominator in a society that overcomes the class differences. This project also paved way to the ‘Turkish Historical Thesis’ and the ‘Sun Language Theory’ during the second decade of the republic that claimed the Turkish race and the Turkish language as the father of all civilisations which had been discarded quickly by the Kemalists themselves (Hrischler 2001: 147-148). The main reason for the swift trivialisation of these theories but the constant reproduction of the Turkish revolution mythology signals the effective use of the revolution within the bourgeois project.

Even though the orthodox historiography in the Turkish revolution has been challenged, a spatiotemporal analysis and theorisation of it is yet to be done. One of the main problems in the analysis of the Turkish revolution is the separation of the Young Turk revolution from the national resistance which obscures the structural dynamics underpinning this particular process that was conditioned by the uneven and combined development of the capitalist forces
during the old regime. Understanding how the Young Turks were successful in mobilising Turkish masses against the throne and subsequently became the dominant political power in 1913, and later take the form of Kemalism during the national resistance necessitates a class based analysis which would locate this political mobilisation of subaltern classes within a framework of the social and economic transformation in the 19th century Ottoman Turkey as a spatiotemporal process rather than a single historical event.

The periodisation of The Young Turk revolution differs significantly regarding to the various paradigms reinforced in the analysis of the process. The dominant orthodox view defines one historical event and one revolution; the Young Turk uprising of 1908-1909 that overthrew Sultan Abdul Hamid II and established the ‘Second Constitutional Period’ though ultimately failed to rescue the Empire from disintegration. The real revolution was the Kemalist revolution, covers the Independence War of Turkey, when the nation rose up against and defeated the occupying forces, deposed the Sultan and abolished the Sultanate, and established the modern Turkish Republic. This orthodoxy had first appeared in the thirties, further strengthened during the forties and fifties and became recognised and popular in the Western mainstream historiography during the same period (Zürcher 1992: 238). The revisionist perspectives abandoned the Kemalist romanticism, but failed to link those two events under one dialectical process that was conditioned by specific spatiotemporal dynamics. Yalman pointed out that the main source of these interpretations is the theorisation of the Ottoman/Turkish state in terms of contrasts with ideal-typical forms. These concepts neither problematise the state nor provide a specific explanatory tool, thereby attest a superficial particularity to the Turkish state formation (Yalman 2009: 119).
However, a close analysis of the structural conditions, processes and outcomes shows that the Turkish revolution is a passive revolution, where the limited national bourgeoisie-in-formation successfully mobilised the masses to disintegrate the ancien régime - in which the capitalist development was dominated and controlled by the foreign capital - and established its contested hegemony by reaching the highest degree of its cohesion under a one-party regime and reorganising and reorienting the state. As it was in the Mexican passive revolution, this dialectical process signals a significant step in the consolidation of the peripheral capitalist spatiality.

The Young Turk movement can be traced back to 1889 when a group of students of the military medical college in Istanbul founded the Ottoman Unity Society (İttihaî Osmani Cemiyeti) which later on attracted many political exiles and dissidents against Sultan Abdul Hamid II and turned to an underground resistance network under the name of Ottoman Committee of Union and Progress in 1896 (Ramsaur 1965: 19; Zürcher 2010: 98). In 1902, the ‘First Congress of Ottoman Opposition Parties’ held in Paris, to unite all different factions in order to overthrow the Hamidian regime and reinstall the constitution and the parliament (Hanioğlu 2001: 8; Zürcher 2010: 98). However, the congress further divided the opposition into two blocks as ‘Les Jeunes-Turcs républicains and Les Jeunes-Turcs midhatistes’; the ‘Society of Ottoman Liberals’ led by Prince Sabahaddin and the ‘İttihad ve Terakki Cemiyeti’ (Committee of Union and Progress – CUP) led by Ahmed Rıza (Hanioğlu 2001: 9-10). In 1907, CUP merged with an underground organisation founded in Thessaloniki in 1907 the ‘Osmanî Hürriyet Cemiyeti’ (Ottoman Freedom Society - OFS) which allowed the CUP to expand its membership base among the army and bureaucracy in Macedonia (Hanioğlu 2008: 64). The
ethnic and geographic origins of the revolutionary leaders was similar to the ‘Northerners’ of the Mexican Revolution; they were from Ottoman Balkans, the capital Istanbul, and from the north-western Anatolia—the regions where the industry and commerce developed on a much higher degree than the other regions of the empire (Zürcher 2010: 100).

Although Mardin (1971), Trimberger (1972) and Hanioğlu (2008) had argued that the Young Turk revolution did not have a popular support it is difficult to defend this position when the pre-revolutionary socio-economic situation has been analysed closely. The general dissatisfaction among the peasantry in the country and also the frustration of the artisans and shopkeepers in the town due to the increasing burden of taxes caused series of local uprisings in different regions of Anatolia between 1906 and 1907. The purchasing power of the workers deteriorated with the worldwide economic crisis in 1907 which affected most of the countries that were dependent on foreign capital investment and agricultural exports. Preceding July 1908, the increase in the prices of all consumer goods and the widespread food shortages led to the protests in both the urban and rural areas of the country (Quataert 1979: 1149, 1161). In the town, the real wages of the labourers fell dramatically because of the periodic depression that was hitting the Ottoman agriculture during this period, that led to hundreds of strikes by workers who believed the constitution would ameliorate their situation (Ahmad 2003: 50). In 1905, and later in 1906 the Muslim and non-Muslim inhabitants and the guild wardens in the province of Kastamonu revolted, refusing to pay the poll tax and demanding the change of the local governor. The first demonstrations in the province of Trabzon started in 1906 and continued until 1908 where the population refused to be enlisted to army regiments destined for Yemen. The
demonstrations against the local Kurdish governor in Diyarbakır started in 1905 and in Van in 1907. The most important rebellion in the Eastern Anatolia was in the city of Erzurum and started against the poll tax and the tax on domestic animals. The local governor lost control of the city to the Muslim and non-Muslim dissidents in 1906 who formed a de facto local government. This local committee was finally dispersed in 1907 with the help of the additional government forces (Hanioğlu 2001: 104-114).

Those local revolts were widely used as a means of propaganda by the CUP members and the popular grievances articulated into the political programme of the restoration of the constitutional order (Kansu 1997: 53). This pre-revolutionary resistance period eventually was transformed into a popular uprising via agitation by the Unionists who also achieved to mobilise the army through eliminating the rank and file order through the Young Turk officers (Kansu 1997: 73).

The continual unrest in Anatolia and Macedonia severely damaged the regime’s power in tackling any challenge with the traditional repressive measures, and soon Istanbul joined the centres of protests showing the dissatisfaction to the Sultan’s authority. Although the liberals were organised themselves in a rival group to CUP under the ‘Society for Decentralisation and Private Initiative’, they also joined to the unrest actively, but the main revolutionary organisations were the nationalist CUP and the ‘Armenian Revolutionary Federation’ (Kansu 1997: 78). In that sense, it is possible to claim that while the revolution in 1908 was generated by the military officers, they were dependent on the dissident urban and rural masses, and the middle-class
civilian bureaucrats who were formed and maintained the constitutional regime at least until 1914 (Ahmad 1966: 305).

In July 1908, several Young Turk officers from the Second (Thracian) and Third (Macedonian) Army took all other troops in the Empire under their command, demanding the immediate reinstatement of the constitutional order. Sultan Abdul Hamid II, who was left without any military power, restored the constitution regime which received great popular backing in Macedonia and Anatolia. Following the counter-revolutionary movement in 1909, the Young Turk officers from the Third and Second Armies formed a force called ‘Action Army’ (Hareket ordusu) led by Mahmud Şevket Pasha and occupied the capital; meanwhile, the Senate and the Chamber of Deputies formed a ‘National Assembly’ which deposed and exiled Sultan Abdul Hamid II under the banner of ‘Liberty, Equality, Fraternity and Justice’ (Ahmad 2003: 53; Zürcher 2004: 97-98; Hanioğlu 2008: 65).

In the following period, although lacking a strong party discipline, the CUP dominated the chamber and tried to consolidate the constitutional regime by codifying the necessary legislation and eliminating the restrictions on the social movements that were legislated during the Hamidian regime. This led to a proliferation of political activities, demonstrations, strikes and boycotts, feminist movements and, most importantly, publishing of the numerous newspapers and magazines (Hanioğlu 2008: 67). Despite the grim political strife, the revolutionaries managed to undertake administrative reforms that increased the revenues of the treasury by almost 30 percent which were even praised by the Ottoman Public Debt Administration (Ahmad 2003: 56). Liberals reorganised under the ‘Hürriyet ve İtilâf Fırkası’ (Party of Freedom and Accord)
in 1911 uniting all other anti-CUP opposition (Zürcher 2004: 102). After the fraudulent elections of 1912 -which was named as ‘the elections with the stick’- the CUP once again dominated the chamber but could not form the government (Akşin 2003: 38). This led to a formation of a neutral ‘Great Cabinet’ pushing CUP to the opposition and out of the political authority. The defeat in the Balkan Wars aided the CUP in organising a coup d’état in 1913 and they returned to power which they retained until the end of the World War (Zürcher 2004: 109-110).

While during this period CUP started to institutionalise the Young Turk revolution, by practically eliminating the opposition, joining the World War I and the defeat interrupted this process. During the World War the CUP abolished all capitulations and economic privileges that had been given before to the Western countries and increased the duty fees accordingly. However, following the Ottoman Army’s defeat and surrender at the end of the World War, the main figures went into exile and the party cadres were dissolved or arrested and put on trial in Malta during the Allied Forces occupation. This led to a re-emergence of the political opposition even though the CUPist nationalism was quickly marginalised. The re-emergence of the opposition during the national resistance following the occupation of Turkey by the Allied Forces could only be eliminated by 1925, with the re-organisation of the CUPist cadres in a different political form but defending the same nationalist bourgeois project.

Therefore, similar to the Mexican revolution the Turkish revolution which was started with the Young Turk revolution and ended with the establishment of the hegemony of the bourgeoisie-in-formation by the Kemalist administration
in 1925, should be defined as a passive revolution where the old regime was eliminated alongside its contradictions that have been produced within the dialectical process of uneven and combined development of the peripheral capitalist social relations. The establishment of the bourgeois hegemony did secure and consolidate the peripheral capitalist spatiality and paved way to its deepening throughout the post-passive revolutionary period where the uneven relations were reproduced in different political forms. This period, in which the exogenous and dependent capitalist social relations have been expanded and furthered by the ISI strategies, will be analysed in chapter five which will allow a better understanding of the dynamics behind the contemporary peripheral positioning of the capitalist space in Turkey and its expansion towards its geographies within the worldwide neoliberal re-territorialisation processes.

3.4. Conclusion

This chapter provides the historical background of the peripheral capitalist spatiality of Mexico and Turkey by redefining the material conditions of their transition processes to capitalism. It is possible to claim that the conceptual framework provided by Luxemburg, Trotsky and Gramsci presents a significant analytical tool in understanding this spatiotemporally specific process of peripheral capitalist transformation of Mexico and Turkey from the precapitalist backwardness to the modern capitalist underdevelopment. The main reason for that is the power of this conceptual framework in analysing the complex dialectical process of the formation of the peripheral capitalist spatiality by unravelling the interrelated spatiotemporal features of it. Each of these three theories that have been operationalised in the previous chapter (chapter two) –enlarged reproduction, uneven and combined development
and passive revolution - reveal different but overlapping historical conditions that structure the other aspects of this dialectical process.

The pre-capitalist social relations in Mexico and Turkey were rapidly dissolved during the 19th century due to 'enlarged reproduction' in the capitalist centre and led to the capitalist expansion towards the pre-capitalist periphery replacing the natural economy. Therefore, it should not be surprising to see that the economic programmes of the Bourbon reformers and the Sultan Selim III and Sultan Mahmud II were not substantially different to the political aims of the Mexican liberals of the Restored Republic like Júarez or Ocampo and the Ottoman statesmen of the Tanzimat like Fuad and Áli Pashas were not different, since neither the cotton weavers of Guanajuato and Queretaro nor the silk producers of Bursa and Aleppo were able to compete with the modern machines in the mills of Lancashire (Brading 1973: 179). In other words, the assault of the capitalist economy on the natural economy and its replacement with the primitive capitalist accumulation were the historic conditions in which the capitalist social relations were unfurled and determined the peripheral capitalist spatiality.

As Trotsky argued, the uneven and combined development of the capitalist forces necessitated a progressive Caesar’s authoritarian regime which was materialised under the regimes of General Porfirio Díaz and Sultan Abdul Hamid II. During this period, the peripheral capitalist space reached a different stage, where the capitalist forces developed very rapidly through the unprecedented involvement of the foreign capital transforming the society and setting new contradictions. These contradictions were resolved by the passive revolutions that established the hegemony of the limited national bourgeois
yet to be consolidated and institutionalised. The next two chapters will elaborate the processes of post-consolidation and transformation of the peripheral capitalist spaces in Mexico and Turkey which will provide a meaningful analysis of their current phase of expansion towards the marginal spaces in the form of regional economic integration projects.
Chapter 4: Peripheral forms of the worldwide restructuring/rescaling of capitalist spatiality: the regional economic integration projects of Mexico

‘Places are arranged unequally in relation to centres, which are themselves unequal...Space regulates and perpetuates the relations of domination. It accomplishes this by subordinating simple reproduction (of the labour force) to the more complex reproduction of the relations of production, and by subordinating the latter to the relations of domination incorporated into space...A space that is dominated may itself be dominant over another space’.


This chapter aims to locate and define the contemporary regional economic integration projects of Mexico with the Central American states through analysing the interlinked processes that the peripheral capitalist space in Mexico was transformed and expanded. In that sense, the regional projects of Mexico are recognised as the structurally conditioned initiatives aiming to establish the physical and social conditions of the capitalist development. Furthermore, these projects will be located within the contemporary processes of the neoliberal rescaling of the capitalist spatiality where the social relations of capitalism globally intensify on the national scale while simultaneously extending towards the marginal spaces. It will be observed that within this neoliberal re-territorialisation process, the uneven relationship between the centre and the periphery is reproduced and extended in different regional and sub-regional forms. Peripheral capitalist spaces like Mexico and Turkey that already integrated with the centre assume a spatiotemporally specific role

within this global process of neoliberal rescaling by channelling and establishing the material and social conditions of capitalist accumulation.

Previously (chapter two), the social space has been defined and established as the totality of the social relations of production without conflating these relations with a particular dominant mode of production and the key features of the formation of the peripheral capitalist spatiality have been conceptualised through the spatiotemporally specific theories of Luxemburg, Trotsky and Gramsci. It was also explained that the relationship between the social formation and the general material conditions in which this social formation being produced, consolidated and transformed, is not a mechanic relationship; therefore, while each mode of production has its space, the characteristics of a social space cannot be directly reduced from this mode of production (Lefebvre 1976: 32; Lefebvre 1978/2009: 234). This point enables us to identify various specific spatiotemporal processes of formation, consolidation and transformation of capitalist spaces on multiple scales without delinking these processes from the continual production and reproduction of the uneven relations underpinning the global capitalist spatiality. Therefore, the configuration of the contemporary capitalist social relations on the national scale which has been continually contested, transformed and consolidated within a dialectical process is directly linked with the production of the capitalist spatiality on the global level. As a result of this continually transformed and reproduced relationship, the social space on the national scale has been positioned within the international division of labour. Thus, the inter-spatial relations on the national scale are conditioned by the position of the social space within this international division of labour.
Thus, it has been argued in the previous chapter (chapter three) that the modern peripheral capitalist space in Mexico and Turkey is direct product of this process of uneven and combined production, consolidation and transformation of the peripheral capitalist spatiality. The centralised and the institutionalised social formation in the peripheral geographies was preconditioned by the uneven unfurling of the capitalist development which gradually dissolved the traditional social relations of production and property relations and ultimately consolidated by the passive revolutions in the beginning of the 20th century. Therefore, the specific spatiotemporal formation of the capitalist spatiality had been determined by the geographical positioning of Mexico as it had been well captured in the words that are attributed to General Porfirio Díaz; “¡Pobre México! ¡Tan lejos de Dios y tan cerca de los Estados Unidos!”32.

The consolidation process of the peripheral capitalist space was commenced in Mexico and Turkey during the post-passive revolutionary period after the national bourgeois-in-formation -which itself, in fact, is the direct product of the uneven capitalist accumulation- overthrew the ancien régime. This limited national bourgeoisie established a precarious hegemony which was dependent on the national consensus where the nationalism appeared as the common denominators and the étatisme as the main instrument of the political legitimacy. Through the passive revolution the national bourgeois assumed the responsibility for the capitalist accumulation and the economic growth taking only a step further from the previous pattern of capitalist development (Morton 2011: 63). In that sense, the passive revolution in the periphery became the mobilisation directed by the national bourgeois as an intermediary

32 ‘Poor Mexico! So far from God and so close to the United States’ (Garner 2001: 137).
of the process of the capitalist accumulation through a social-democratic compromise (Lefebvre 1964/2009: 59-60).

Therefore, in the first section, the post-passive revolutionary period of institutionalisation and economic growth which has consolidated the peripheral capitalist space will be analysed as the second and more complex stage of the uneven development of the productive forces. As Lefebvre pointed out, it was a historic process that the ruling class gradually ‘marked, modelled and built’ a society where the economic development became necessary but insufficient—in other words where the uneven and combined development of productive forces reached a degree of exhaustion—through seizing the existing institutions and creating the other necessary ones for the maintenance of the capitalist accumulation (Lefebvre 1980/2009: 217). In this post-passive revolutionary process, the contradictions which had conditioned the passive revolution was eliminated by achieving a social consensus between the ruling class and the wider segments of the society (particularly peasantry) via giving compromises in the form of the agrarian reform, by maintaining the uninterrupted capitalist accumulation with the foreign dependent ISI based economic growth and by reshaping the social structure with a political programme of institutionalisation where the common denominator appeared as nationalism.

However, the dependent feature of the ISI policies to the foreign finance brought the economy to a point of stalemate during the 1970s and 1980s. The ISI development had two important impacts on the particular nature of the economic growth in Mexico. Firstly, the forty years of foreign dependent ISI development laid the foundations of an industrial production which gradually
reached to a level that the productive forces would be integrated more closely to the North American productive forces, sharing similar production and demand patterns with the North American industry and capital. Secondly, the exhaustion of the capabilities of the ISI development in maintaining the capitalist accumulation enforced a premature and rapid reorientation of the economy through the deregulation of the market rules and liberalisation of the international trade. Therefore, the crisis of the ISI development was followed by a rapid and profound process of neoliberalisation and deregulation of whole economy and society which is again conducted by the State helping to regulate the integration of the national economy to the world markets (Lefebvre 1979/2001: 777). The second section will focus on this process in which the Mexican peripheral capitalist space was transformed and rescaled within the neoliberal international division of labour.

By revealing the specific spatiotemporal conditions that have structured the dialectical processes of formation, consolidation and transformation of the peripheral capitalist space in Mexico in the chapter three and this chapter, the third section will analyse the contemporary reproduction of these uneven relations of capitalist development. The expansion of the capitalist space towards the immediate geography of Mexico which appears in the form of regional integration projects such as Plan Puebla Panama (PPP which is currently called as Proyecto Mesoamerica -PM) will be analysed from a standpoint of the exhaustion of the ISI development as a tool of uninterrupted capitalist accumulation in an era of neoliberal rescaling. Concurrent with Lefebvre, the state once again appeared as the agency for the creation of the necessary spatial conditions of the production and reproduction needed for the capitalist accumulation, but this time on an international scale.
The PPP-PM was initiated, as a part of the global neoliberal rescaling of the capitalist spatiality, in order to create the necessary spatial infrastructure for the expansion of capital and facilitate the capitalist accumulation by creating the conditions of a unified, harmonised and standardised market in the Central American region which has been marginalised and relatively isolated from the international markets. Thus, by integrating its own periphery to the international markets, Mexico reproduces an uneven, asymmetric relationship of economic development, a similar process to the enlarged reproduction and uneven development that was previously defined by Luxemburg and Trotsky. In other words, after being integrated to the international division of labour and securing this positioning irreversibly with its membership to NAFTA, now it becomes the mediator of the integration of Central America into world markets through PPP-PM.

4.1. The post-passive revolutionary transformation of the peripheral capitalist space in Mexico: the institutionalisation of the Mexican Revolution

Lefebvre accurately captured the role of the state in the formation and maintenance of the uninterrupted capitalist accumulation. He emphasised the role of state in the capitalist development by assuming the responsibility of the production and reproduction of the necessary spatial infrastructure for the productive forces and for the organisation of the everyday life. Furthermore, and very significantly, Lefebvre underlined the dialectical –thus, continual, not fixed- nature of this process of capitalist accumulation which interacts with and transforms the political element (Lefebvre 1964/2009: 59).

Parallel to the global economic crisis of 1929, the way which the hegemony of the national ruling class did maintain and further the capitalist accumulation
during the second phase of uneven development was the implementation of the Import Substitution Industrial development (ISI) policies and the creation of the necessary spatial practices for the industrial and economic growth. Therefore, in this period, the state did not just implement the import substitution policies but actively engaged with the infrastructural development such as energy production and in the creation of financial bodies to maintain the resource flow to finance the expansion of the productive forces. Simultaneously, as a part of the social-democratic compromise, the ruling class declared the end of class differences and immobilised the society, either violently repressing it or by incorporating with consent. The whole process of this post-passive revolutionary uneven capitalist development should be seen as a very complex and comprehensive formation/consolidation of the nation-state. And the main features of this process have been determined by the quantitative growth that was mediated by the national ruling class (Lefebvre 1966/2009: 139). Cardoso and Faletto (1979) make a similar conclusion by explaining the relationship between the periods where the productive forces were controlled and expanded by the enclave types of foreign capital or national bourgeoisie -which was still dependent on the foreign financing. It is possible to argue that the exogenous character of the peripheral capitalist space has been reproduced throughout this post-passive revolutionary process and, therefore, this section will unravel the conditions that transformed and maintained this dependency.

The product of the Mexican passive revolution was a peripheral capitalist nation-state yet to be institutionalised. With the triumph of the constitutionalists over Victoria Huerta and the old revolutionary allies Zapata and Villa, Carrancist politics elevated itself on the one hand from the social
forces of the old regime and on the other hand from the already mobilised peasantry and working class and represented the vision of the middle class particularly within the urban and rural areas that had developed during the Porfiriato. By 1916, the popular armies of Carranza and Obregón did completely seize the political and military power but, ironically, a national state structure was non-existent (Leal 1975: 51). Therefore, the task in front of the revolutionaries was the institutionalisation of the new socio-economic relations through establishing the foundations of the new centralised nation-state. In that sense, the power struggle between this new institutional and administrative organisation and the foreign oil companies, the church and the organised labour – particularly with the ‘Confederación Regional Obrera Mexicana’ (the Regional Confederation of Mexican Labour -CROM) and the ‘Confederación de Trabajadores de México’ (The Confederation of the Mexican Workers -CTM) - did have a significant impact on the formation of this new capitalist nation-state (Meyer 1991: 202).

The ‘hybrid’ Constitution of 1917 drew the lines of this struggle. Article 123 was adopting a very liberal labour law inspired by the labour law of Britain that restricted monopolies, a liberal education system with Article 3, reiteration of the separation of the Church and the State with Article 130; all were defining the legal framework of a bourgeois society. However, simultaneously Article 27 declared the whole nation as the ultimate owner of the subsoil wealth of the country. With this article, the expropriation of land for the public use by the means of indemnity was acknowledged (Herzog 1994: 104-105). Therefore, the constitution was recognising and protecting the capitalist social relations of production and property relations but, at the same time, establishing a strong federal government who would control and restrict it (Hamilton 1986a: 73).
Although, for the first time in Mexican history the uncleanness and homogeneity has been eliminated on the landowning rights and more importantly the inequality on landowning has been recognised in the constitution and the state has been assigned precisely to act for the sake of the society considering the benefits of the majority of the people with the 27th article- a rigorous agrarian reform did not take place (González 1989: 67). The vision of the revolutionary leaders did not include a meaningful redistribution of land; thus, the land distribution became a compromise dependent on the conjuncture (Ginzberg 1997: 56). The assassination of Carranza in 1920 did not change the structural conditions for the prioritisation of the establishment of the institutional framework for the political domination of the ruling class and the restructuration/restoration of the economy with the protagonist national bourgeoisie (Meyer 1994: 1186).

The main characteristic of the new consolidated capitalist state was its determination to restore political order and to guarantee the economic development at any cost. It was determined to eliminate the opposition or criticisms in order to maintain the process of reorganisation - such as the Yaqui Indians of Sonora, striking workers that organised under the anarcho-syndicalist union of the ‘Confederación General de Trabajadores’ (General Confederation of Workers – CGT), the Communist Party when it ceased to collaborate and the Catholic peasants. The agency of this political programme reached its highest degree of cohesion with the establishment of the ‘Partido Nacional Revolucionario’ (the National Revolutionary Party – PNR) in 1929 which formed a political bureaucracy that could control the federal state and eliminate the multiple centres of authority like caudillos and revolutionary generals (Leal 1975: 52; Meyer 1991: 203). PNR emerged as the main
instrument to control the ambitious revolutionary generals as well as the local
governors and regional leaders who were trying to establish a local political
base within the already mobilised regional power structures of the peasantry
and workers. At the same time, PNR resolved the problem of the orderly
transfer of the political power by finally institutionalising the presidential

It is possible to analyse this post-passive revolutionary
restoration/reconstruction process in two interrelated yet distinct periods.
During the first period, Mexico had witnessed the reestablishment of the
federal authority over regionalism, the institutionalisation of the political
power, and implementation of a profound economic and social programme.
This period, which has its roots in Carranza’s presidency until his assassination,
can be roughly identified with the presidency of Álvaro Obregón (1920-24) and
the presidency of Plutarco Elías Calles (1924-28) and between 1928 and 1934
when the political power of Calles remained as the ‘Jefe Maximato’. The
reorganisation headed by the ruling class with an offensive strategy on the
class differences in this period was based on a triangular consensus between
the army, trade unions and the ‘agraristas’ where nationalism appeared as the
common denominator. The second and last phase of the great reforming
period of the Mexican passive revolution represented by the rise of
‘Cardenismo’; the continuity of the nation-state building, corporatism through
the compromises of the ruling class and the capitalist development but in a
different manner. With the conditions of the great depression, the corporatism
of the ruling class took the shape of étatism (Knight 1991: 245). Therefore, in
these two distinct but interrelated periods, it can be said that the Calles
administration had begun to institutionalise the revolution and the Cárdenas administration had completed the process (Meyer 1991: 218).

With the Constitution of 1917, the state was assuming the function of the ‘Supreme Arbiter’, independent from the social classes which later on strengthened with the establishment of tripartite organs such as the ‘Labour Relations Board’, ‘National Commission on Minimum Wages’, ‘National Commission for the Participation of Workers in Company Profits’ that were in charge of conciliating different class interests (Leal 1975: 55). These organs and the arbiter role of the state in return served to immobilise the working class that gradually turned into the bases of popular support. In 1931, a new labour code ‘La Ley Federal Trabajo’ (Federal Labour Law) was accepted with the encouragement of the CROM. The law regulated the article 123 of the constitution and established very restricted and ordered labour-employer relations where the trade unions assigned to help in finding the ‘permanent formula for class peace’ by making the relations between the worker and employer ‘harmonious, just and orderly’ (Delarbe 1976: 138).

During the presidencies of Álvaro Obregón and Elías Calles and the following Maximato, the reorganisation and restructuring of the state as a ‘businesslike’ mechanism which creates the necessary conditions for the economic development were based on a nationalist programme that aimed for a systematic expansion of the productive forces. The centralisation and re-institutionalisation of the state by laying down the administrative foundations of the state intervention was the necessary condition for the accumulation of capital and started as early as Carranza’s presidency by the foundation of the ‘Secretaría de Industria, Comercio y Trabajo’ (the ministry of industry,
commerce and labour) in 1917. The role and the authority of the state was significantly expanded by the creation of other administrative instruments such as ‘Comisión Nacional de Caminos’ (National Highway Commission), the ‘Comisión Nacional de Irrigación’ (National Irrigation Commission), and the ‘Comisión Nacional de Fuerza Motriz’ (National Power Commission) during the presidencies of Obregón and Calles (Middlebrook 1995: 24). These institutions enabled the construction of the basic infrastructures through public investments which significantly increased the total cultivated land and the network of highways enhanced the production and productivity in general (Mier y Terán and de la Mora 1988: 555). As a fundamental infrastructural necessity for the industrial growth, the ‘Comisión Nacional de Riego’ was established to construct hydroelectric dams for the energy production (Hamilton 1988: 83).

With the help of these governmental bodies, a four year plan of building ten thousand kilometres of road networks was undertaken and materialised, and the construction of the South Pacific railway from Nogales (Arizona) to Guadalajara was completed. It is important to note that the construction of dams and canals between 1925 and 1928 accounted for 6.5 percent of the national budget which manifests the role of state in the formation of the necessary conditions of the economic growth (Meyer 1991: 220).

Parallel to the administrative re-organisation, the state emerged as the primary financial source and the controlling mechanism of the capital accumulation, allocation and investment. The Constitution of 1917 gave the responsibility for determining the monetary and credit policies exclusively to the federal government and with the article 73 and 28 entrusted it to legislate,
establish and control the credit institutions and the central bank (Navarrete 1967: 115). In 1924, the ‘Comisión Nacional Bancaria’ (National Banking Commission) was created alongside the ‘Banco de México’ (1925) as a central bank with an initial 50 million pesos capital and other financial institutions such as ‘Banco Nacional de Crédito Agrícola’ (National Bank of Agricultural Credit) (1926) had been set up as the main sources of capital distribution (Middlebrook 1995: 25). The establishment of the ‘Banco Nacional Hipotecario Urbano y de Obras Públicas’ (National Bank of Urban Mortgages and Public Works – BANOBRAS - 1933), ‘Nacional Financiera’ (NAFINSA - 1934), and the ‘Banco Nacional Comercio Exterior’ (National Bank of Foreign Commerce - 1937), significantly increased the role of the state in the financial system. While 80 percent of the banking sector financing was private in the beginning of the 1930s, it was decreased to 38 percent in 1939, with the Central Bank holding 34 percent and the other national banks financing 28 percent of the banking sector (Tamayo 1988: 685). In that sense, the state became the most substantive credit source of the capitalist accumulation process. However, it has to be noted that the ‘state as a financing source’ did not change the exogenous character of the peripheral capitalist accumulation since this financing was also dependent on the foreign financial sources in different forms; international loans, investments and aids or the overvaluation of the national currency. The reconstruction of the banking system was very crucial for the success of the national bourgeoisie to have the sufficient support in order to carry out the continual economic growth and furthering the expansion of the capitalist productive forces (Morton 2011: 99).

Meanwhile, under the Calles administration, the ‘Secretaría de Hacienda y Crédito Público’ (the Ministry of Hacienda and Finance) was strengthened and
became the body in charge of the centralisation of the financial control of the federal government. The ministry of finance also became responsible for the supervision of the emission of the national currency. While technically the central bank was independent from the state, five of the nine members of the directive board were appointed by the ministry of finance; thus, in practice it was ensured that the policies of the bank would be compatible with the federal governments’ aims to speed up economic development (Beteta 1967: 73). Thus, the state emerged as the main promoter and mediator of the conditions of the capital accumulation that became, in time of necessity, able to canalise resources to the favoured sectors (Hamilton 1998: 84).

Therefore, at the end of the 1920s, the state appeared as the body that was providing guarantees to the modern sectors of the national bourgeoisie and to the foreign capital. The direct investments of the foreign capital on the railway operations, mining and electricity production had expanded and increased in value. It is worth noting that during this period the North American capital strengthened its dominant position in the Mexican economy. The U.S. origin foreign capital was reaching 80 percent in the mineral production and 95 percent in the oil production. Meanwhile, the U.S. had become the main foreign trade partner of Mexico. Mainly composed of minerals and agricultural products the U.S. was the consumer of 65 to 85 percent of the Mexican exports while also the main importer of the Mexican economy by selling iron and steel, machinery, tools, automobiles and construction materials which constituted 75 percent of the total imports of Mexico (Hamilton 1998: 77).

Calles also sought to maintain the balance between the social forces that were being forcibly incorporated into the political establishment. While Obregón
had focused on giving compromises to the peasantry by paying off Zapatistas and other peasant groups in Morelia and Guerrero and distributed one million hector ejidal land in four years, Calles considerably slowed this process of land distribution. He took the leader of CROM, Luis N. Morones, into his cabinet and hence gained a strong popular support among almost one million organised workers (Meyer 1994: 1189). CROM which was tied to the state from its very origins played a very significant role for achieving Calles’ aim to reconcile capital and labour under the supervision of state and demobilise the working class (Delarbe 1976: 135; Meyer 1991: 229).

At the end of the reconstruction of the economy and institutionalisation of the political power the conditions of the post-passive revolutionary period became more apparent in the rise of Cardenismo within the context of the great depression. As a strong centralist, Cárdenas believed in the federal state as the utmost national authority and acknowledged that the private capital would play the most significant role in the reform process while some corporatist components -that have strongly controlled and linked to the national body- would also be existing and benefiting (Ginzberg 1997: 84). In that sense, the last profound reforming process of the Mexican revolution was, in fact, representing a continuity of a dialectical process of state-building, corporatism and capitalist development (Knight 1991: 245).

For a great comparison between two agrarista governors Adalberto Tejada and Lázaro Cárdenas who governed Veracruz and Michoacán between 1928 and 1934 see Eitan Ginzberg (1997) ‘Ideología, política y la cuestión de las prioridades: Lázaro Cárdenas y Adalberto Tejada, 1928-1934’, Mexican Studies/Estudios Mexicanos, 13(1), pp. 55-85. Ginzberg demonstrated the differences between Tejada and Cárdenas in terms of forming a popular front based on a radical and decentralised peasant movement in the former –and failed in the presidential elections- or on a centralist movement that brings peasantry, working class and the bourgeois together in the latter.
Knight (1991) directly explained the differences of Cardenismo—in terms of the agrarian reform and the manner of the state interventionism—from its predecessors’ strategies with the impact of Great Depression. The economic contraction was already a reality since 1926 but, in 1932, the Mexican foreign trade fell by two thirds and the import capacity of Mexico fell by almost fifty percent. The falling exports brought great distress to the export-oriented regions like Yucatan and Laguna and many agricultural lands remained uncultivated (Knight 1991: 257). Thus, the hacienda which played a significant role during the primitive capitalist accumulation and the uneven and combined development of the capitalist forces throughout the 19th century had gradually became an obstacle to the ‘peaceful’ development of the capitalist social relations, and was now ready to be eliminated with the great Agrarian reform of Lazaro Cárdenas.

By 1940, Cárdenas had distributed 18 million hectares of land, thus, making 47 percent of the cultivated land ejidal property and the total number of recipients reached to 800 thousand peasants which doubled the ejidal population of 1930. Therefore, organised under the ‘Confederación de Campesinos Mexicanos’ (the Mexican Peasants Confederation -CCM), the peasantry mobilisation was taken under control by the state, once and for all. The National Bank of Ejidal Credit (Banco Nacional de Crédito de Ejidal – established in 1937) became the main financing source of the agrarian reform and the modernisation of the agricultural production and undertook ambitious projects of irrigation, road construction and electrification of the rural areas—a process which eventually the private sector was benefited mostly from it (Knight 1991: 261).
A parallel process was occurring within the working class movement. With the establishment of the ‘Confederación de Trabajadores de México’ (the Mexican Workers Confederation -CTM) as the biggest working organisation both including vertical and horizontal unions, the working class was turned into an organised mass movement under the state aegis consolidating the government authority. The popular politics of Cárdenas needed such an organised and independent labour movement which is loyal to the government (Delarbe 1976: 139). Therefore, Cárdenas continually appealed to the unconditional support of the organised labour and peasantry either for the implementation of his ‘Six-Year Plan’ and reforms or the expropriation of railways and petroleum (Delarbe 1976: 141). This support was not generated by the general sympathy towards Cárdenas but, rather, it was a product of the concrete benefits offered by the Cardenista policies to the oil workers or to the ejidatarios of the Laguna (Knight 1994: 80).

The expropriation and fundamental reorganisation of the railways in 1937 and petroleum in 1938 under the ‘Petróleos Mexicanos’ (PEMEX) did not change the situation and the workers’ administration that had been established in these companies became an appendix of the state bureaucracy gradually (Knight 1991: 279). Furthermore, the expropriations did not have an impact on the Mexican economy while the foreign investment and the North American credits remained channelled on mines, steel, paper, cement and chemical production and hydroelectric power projects (Knight 1991: 306).

Therefore, when the great reformation process of the Mexican passive revolution finally ended, the Mexican capitalist accumulation and industrial development -which had its roots in the colonial period and reached its climax
during the Porfiriato (1876-1910) and which was characterised in the previous chapters by its exogenous character and limitation to the uneven exchange of primary products—was not changed by the revolutionaries but, in fact, institutionalised and mediated through the concessions of the state to the peasantry and the working classes. However, the fundamental change in the structure of the Mexican economy was the consolidation of the industrial expansion which moved from the production pattern of the exportation of primary goods to an economy that the capital accumulation mainly based on the development of the import substitution industries (Smith 1991: 323). The development of the manufacturing industry starting from the 1940s within the context of increasing demand on Mexican products during the war period laid the foundations of the industries and capital that re-oriented for the exportation in 1980s trade liberalisation.

4.2. Neoliberal restructuring and trade liberalisation as the conditions of the export-oriented positioning of Mexico

Villareal’s (1976) periodisation distinguishes two distinct stages in the import substitution-oriented economic growth and industrial expansion of the Mexican economy. During the first stage (1939-1958), the intermediary goods and capital were needed for the domestic production of the consumer goods which created a structural demand in the importation of these factors while the exportation remained limited with the primary goods and manifested a sluggish growth which was mainly dependent on the international demand. However, gradually the capability of the exportation of the primary goods to finance the expansion of the industrial growth was decreased in the post-war era (Fujii 2000: 1008). The export of this limited number of primary goods was a significant condition of the successful functioning of the import substitution-
oriented economic programme in terms of financing the imports of the necessary intermediary goods and the machinery. In the absence of a substantial growth of these sectors, appealing to the short term foreign financial loans eventually becomes inevitable. In this first stage, thanks to the war time demand created by the U.S. and UK for the Mexican goods and additionally with government support a significant expansion of the industrial production was materialised. Furthermore, the Mexican governments had used the devaluation as a financial tool in order to control the balance of payments and to limit imports. Nominal devaluation in the Mexican peso was approximately 78 percent in 1948, 1949 and 1950, coupled with these external conditions and the growth of the Mexican imports (8.2%) lagged behind the substantial growth of the exports (Ramírez 1988: 41). Meanwhile, the foreign investment reached to 1.134 million dollars of which 505 million dollars constituting the foreign debt that used as a way of short-term financing of the ISI development (Villareal 1976: 11).

In the second more complex and advanced stage of the import substitution-oriented policies (1959-1970), the production pattern of the Mexican economy moved to the manufactured commodities, particularly to the production of the intermediary goods. Although during this stage the capacity and the diversity in the production of the manufactured goods increased considerably, the impact of this structural change on the exports remained limited due to the overvalued rate of exchange rates. During this period, while the growth of the importation of goods dynamically expanded to 6 billion dollars in 1976 from 2 billion dollars in 1959, the growth of the exports did not catch the same pace and only increased to 3.35 billion dollars from 772 million dollars during the same period (NAFINS A 1978: 388). Thus, gradually the deficit in the balance of
payments increased from 152 million dollars in 1959, to 1.115 million dollars in 1970 and to 3.692 million dollars in 1974 even the exports of goods and services grew more than three-fold. The disequilibrium in the payments of the Mexican economy was also accentuated by the increasing payments of imported services particularly caused by the foreign investment returns and debts payments (Villareal 1976: 13; Table 4.1).

Table 4.1. Macroeconomic Performance of Mexico during the first half of 1970s

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<tr>
<td>GDP growth</td>
<td>3.4</td>
<td>7.3</td>
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<td>5.9</td>
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<td>5.7</td>
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<tr>
<td>Inflation rate (WPI) (%)</td>
<td>5.4</td>
<td>4.9</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>23.7</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>12</td>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Current Account Balance*</td>
<td>-1.115</td>
<td>-718.9</td>
<td>-1.303.1</td>
<td>-2.399</td>
<td>-3.633</td>
<td>-4.331.7</td>
<td>-14.493</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Balance of liquidity</td>
<td>-1.651</td>
<td>-1.174.9</td>
<td>-799.1</td>
<td>1.554</td>
<td>3.010</td>
<td>-3.643.4</td>
<td>-10.840</td>
</tr>
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*million dollars.

The exhaustion of the stabilised growth model, which leaves the financing of the industrial and infrastructural expansion mostly to the private sector, led the Echeverría administration (1970-76) to substantially increase the public expenditure to revive its deteriorating legitimacy, and thus, raising the aggregate demand and accelerating the ISI policies by substituting the capital goods production (Morton 2011: 113). This led to a considerable increase of the money supply and put a significant pressure on the exchange rate, and gradually the reserves of the Banco de México deteriorated (Ramírez 1986: 52).
As it has been argued above, the last significant ISI period during the presidency of Echeverría ended with the 23 percent devaluation of the peso in 1976 after 22 years of stable currency policy (12.5 peso/dollar). Furthermore, talks with the IMF commenced and a three-year austerity programme was initiated which was envisaged trade liberalisation and a substantial reduction of the public deficit through the reduction of public employment. However, the discovery of the 40.194 billion barrels oil reserves in 1978 had altered the macroeconomic perceptions and started a period of ‘petrolisation’ in which the commitments for the reduction of public deficits had been largely disregarded (Ramírez 1986: 54; del Castillo 1996: 28). At that point, there were two main sources that were financing this increasing public spending; the money supply and borrowing from private sector which made the dependent and exogenous character of the peripheral capitalist accumulation more salient. The rate of money supply soared from 33.2 percent in 1980 to 61 percent in 1982 while the foreign debt grew from the 29 percent of GDP in 1979 to 61 percent of GDP in 1982 climbing from 3.2 billion dollars to 100 billion dollars (Ramírez 1993: 117; Otero 1996: 6). In that sense, Mexico had exhausted all foreign dependent ways of financing the ISI strategies – agriculture, oil revenues and foreign debts- and was forced to reorient its economy very rapidly towards another form of foreign dependent economic growth (Otero 1996: 7).

The overvaluation of the peso resulted in the heavy speculation against the currency by the end of 1981 which drove the Mexican foreign exchange market into a severe crisis. In 1982, the Mexican bankers and the external financial resources pulled their money out of Mexico -repeating the capital flight of 1976 and 1977- which drained the Banco de México’s foreign
exchange reserves, making it unable service its foreign debt. This led to the 90-day moratorium of the foreign debt servicing and the nationalisation of the Mexican-owned commercial banks (Marois 2012: 71). These draconian measures had been recommended by the IMF under the name of an economic adjustment and stabilisation programme (*El Programa Imediato Reordenación Económica*) which was implemented by the administrations of de la Madrid (1982-88) and Salinas de Gortari (1988-94). The programme envisaged a very sharp reduction in public spending accompanied by the complete reorientation of economy by liberalising the domestic and foreign trade regimes (Ramírez 1993: 181).

Although the increasing oil prices helped Mexico to generate foreign currency – which was reaching 70 percent of the foreign currency generated by the total exports- the disequilibrium of the balance of payments continued (Fujii 2000: 1011). From 1982 to 1986, the annual growth remained 0.3 and the GDP decreased by 2.4 each year. When the international financial markets closed the capital flow to Mexico starting from the beginning of 1980s, the Mexican economy found itself being forced to open its economy and transform towards an export-oriented economy starting in 1987. In this respect, the pace of economic liberalisation accelerated when Mexico entered into a General Agreement on Tariffs and Traders (GATT) in 1986, accompanied by the extensive cuts in the public spending (Gates 1996: 47).

It can be claimed that although the ISI policies had been successful between 1940 and 1970 in achieving a 6.5 percent annual economic growth and in expanding the industrial production up to a significant level which later on became the basis for the EOI development in the 1980s, the overprotection,
overregulation and indiscriminate generic stimulation created an uncompetitive and inefficient economic environment where the monopolies could take advantage of the continual appreciation of the value of the peso (Vellinga 2000: 294; Villareal and Villareal 2001: 777). Therefore, the trade liberalisation and re-orientation of the economy for the exportation of manufactured goods was seen as the only option for tackling the balance of payment crisis. In fact, since the first oil shock, the replacement of the planned economy with an export-orientated liberal economy was being defended in order to avoid the inevitable economic stalemate. However, a transition period was envisaged for this wholesale transformation which would start with the realisation of the foreign exchange rates. This short-term monetary policy would be followed by the adaptation of a model of export orientation that necessitates devaluation of the peso, stabilisation of the public spending (thus balance of payments) and the liberalisation of trade (Villareal 1976: 205).

Under the presidency of Salinas, these features of the neoliberal restructuring were implemented very rapidly and vigorously. While the extensive deregulation and tax reform procedures were undertaken, 800 public enterprises either sold or closed down which not only increased the role of the private sector in the economy but also accumulated 23.7 billion dollars of revenue between 1989-1993, and the traditional ejidal was system exposed to the national and -unconstitutionally- North American capital’s assault with the ‘Plan Nacional de Modernización del Campo’ (National Plan of Rural Modernisation) between 1990-1994 paving way to the liberal NAFTA system of agribusiness (Dussel 1996: 65; Gates 1996: 51).

The transformation of the Mexican economy from an ISI based economy to an economy to an export-oriented industrial growth (EOI) based on the
exportation of manufactured goods brought an expansion of both maquiladora and non-maquiladora industries and between 1989 and 1997 the total exports grew by 13 percent annually. In this respect, as it was a central aspect of the ISI strategies, the manufacturing sector and its shift towards a ‘flexible specialisation’ model continued to be a significant element of the macroeconomic liberalisation of Mexico (Dussel 1996: 64-65). The expansion of the maquila industry gradually became a very significant aspect of the EOI based neoliberal reorganisation and, by 2001 the maquila industry reached a size of 3600 firms employing 1.3 million workers (26 percent of the industrial employment; in 2004, 24.5 percent) responsible for 50 percent of the total exports that spread to all of the other regions where the maquila is not traditionally developed (Harris 1993: 164; Biles 2004: 521).

Initially designed with the ‘Programa de Industrialización de la Fontera Norte de México’ (Border Industrialisation Programme) in 1965 for the absorption of the 200,000 Mexican seasonal workers that had returned to Mexico in 1964 following the United States’ unilateral termination of the ‘Bracero Programme’ that had permitted the Mexican workers to work in the U.S. temporarily, the maquila was gradually tailored to meet the needs of the peripheral economy in the neoliberal economic system (South 1990: 551). The production in maquila is based on the tax exempt importation of the primary materials and components to assemble and finalise the production and export back to market of the parenting company – the United States. The maquila manufacturing is mainly motivated by cheap labour and its flexibility in terms of location/relocation options and precarious labour relations.
The maquila programme during the 1970s and 1980s did formalise and liberalise the maquila manufacturing and the territorial restrictions that limited the maquila industry to a 20 km strip south of the U.S. border and the limitations on the access to the domestic markets for the maquila outputs were lifted (MacLachlan and Aguilar: 1998: 317). During the early 1990s maquiladoras were perceived as the ‘key strategy’ in the overall restructuring of the Mexican economy towards neoliberalism and free trade. In the example of the state of Yucatán, the abundant workforce which had been created by the collapse of the henequen industry in the 1970s and the decreasing employment capacities in mining and agriculture created appropriate conditions for the maquila expansion. The maquilas in the Yucatán state became more profitable since the average wages are 30 percent less than the Northern border maquiladoras. The ‘Henequen Zone Restructuring Programme’ that was implemented by the government in 1984 to achieve a ‘balanced and sustainable regional development’ has played a significant role in its expansion in the region. The export-oriented maquiladora industry first located and concentrated in the capital city Mérida and then expanded towards the rural areas where the wages are even cheaper (Biles 2004: 526).

The liberalisation of the maquiladora rules and the devaluation of the Mexican peso in 1982 and 1995 played a significant role in the expansion of the maquiladora industry and maquila employment in the interior parts of Mexico even though the border cities such as Juárez, Tijuana and Matamoros still accounted for almost half of the total maquila employment. This should be seen as the initial phase of intensification of the neoliberal capitalist relations of production towards the relatively underdeveloped regions of the periphery. In the long run the inner states like Durango, Jalisco and Yucatán utilised the
comparative advantage in ensuring lower wages than the northern cities, and thus became more attractive for the maquilas who continually aims to find cheaper unskilled labour. Therefore, while the low-technology labour-intensive clothing and textile production is minor in the North, it composed the 40 percent of the production of the maquilas in the inner states by 1995 (MacLahan and Aguilar 1998: 320).

However, this rapid growth in both maquila and non-maquila manufacturing did not change the balance of payments problem since the Mexican imports showed high levels of elasticity which had been increasing due to the expansion of the exports of the manufactured goods. In other words, Mexico needed to import the components of the manufactured goods to be exported and consumed in the domestic market. In the 1994 peso crisis, the trade deficit that was financed by the volatile portfolio capital reached 68.5 billion dollars which led to the subsequent devaluation of the peso (Fujii 2000: 1012). The nationalisation of the banking system in 1982 until the conclusion of the reprivatisation of the banks in 1992 left the biggest corporate conglomerates temporarily deprived from the financing of the necessary technological modernisation of the industries in order to respond to the pressures of the export-orientation which had been intensified after NAFTA membership. In 1996, the imports of heavy machinery and equipment from the U.S. reached 15.3 percent (611 million dollars) of the total exports from this country and increased to 21.2 percent (1.026 million dollars) in the following year (Vellinga 2000: 302). Under the NAFTA conditions, the big business (grupos) had not only found itself enforced to internationalise in the technomanagerial field but also encountered channels to establish co-investments and partnerships with the North American companies both in Mexico and abroad (Vellinga 2000: 302).
During the Salinas administration, the export initiatives were significantly limited to the modernisation of custom rules, ports and railways in order to maintain the exogenous variables of the liberalisation. The automotive, computer and pharmaceutical industries remained as exceptions where the investments dominated by the transnational companies enjoyed import-duty free inputs or valued-added tax reimbursements (Dussel 1996: 71).

The rapid liberalisation of the markets and the international trade regime by reducing the tariffs accompanied by the overvaluation of the peso (around 30 percent), which stimulated the export-oriented industry to develop on a pattern that requires importation of the intermediate goods. Mexico, in a very short time, became one of the most open and liberal economies in the world in terms of its integration to the international trade and financial markets (Villareal and Villareal 2001: 778). However, this rapid and ambitious integration led to the cycles of expansion of economic output-appreciation of national currency-rising importation-depreciation of the national currency (Díaz 2001: 234). With the liberalisation of the foreign investment regulations, the foreign investments became the main financing source of the EOI model and the current account deficit. However, it is important to note that the share of the foreign direct investment in the manufacturing sector in the total foreign investments fell from 54.4 percent in 1988 to below 30 percent in 1993, making the exogenous character of Mexico’s peripheral capitalist spatiality more dependent on the volatile portfolio investments. In 1990, the Salinas administration took advantage of the privatisation of the nationalised banks to further liberalise the financial system through amending Articles 28 and 123 of the Mexican constitution to permit full private ownership of the commercial banks (Marois 2012: 81). In addition to foreign direct and portfolio
investment, the dependency on the external debt in the form of private borrowings and dollar denominated government bonds that were called ‘tesobonos’ were increased significantly (Dussel 1996: 68-70). This uncontrolled expansion of the foreign debt eventually resulted in the 1994 debt crises which once again drained foreign exchange reserves and pushed the interest rates high (Marois 2012: 96). In this respect, the dependency of the peripheral capitalist space on the external finance has been reproduced and perpetuated through the neoliberal reforms and restructuring processes as well.

Thus, it is possible to claim that suffering from the lack of technological and financial competitiveness, the prematurely and very rapidly liberalised peripheral economy finds itself structurally forced and capable to expand towards its own periphery and create the conditions of an uneven development with those ‘marginal’ spaces within the processes of neoliberal territorialisation. The expansion of the maquiladora industries towards inner and southern Mexico and from there towards Central America is one of the significant indicators of this expansion and integration process of the neoliberal capitalist production patterns. This process of expansion has been followed by the increasing formalisation and normalisation of the very exploitative maquiladora system and the inevitable unification with the non-maquiladora industries. In this process of ‘maquilization’ of industry, every manufacturing plant in Mexico was expected to resemble the maquiladora yet they would be free from maquiladora regulations (MacLachan and Aguilar 1998: 329). Thus, in the long term the unionised, higher waged and regulated manufacturing industry would be replaced by flexible, non-organised, and precarious and underpaid forms of production which completely rely on the
foreign—mainly U.S.—demand and supply. Four industries that accounted for 75 percent of the U.S. owned maquiladoras; apparel, electronic accessories (including computer parts and electronic circuitry) electronic machinery (including television sets and other small domestic appliances), and transport equipment and parts (primarily motor vehicles) are the industries that can easily be separated from the R&D, component production and final assembly, which creates a further dependency on the parent country and thus a high level of sensibility in terms of the employment volatility (Bergin et al. 2009: 1666).

In that sense, parallel to the neoliberal restructuring and adjustment of the Mexican economy which resulted in the integration of Mexico with NAFTA and relocated the Mexican economy within the new international division of labour through changing the production patterns and structures. Since the neoliberal restructuring and its membership to NAFTA, the exports of Mexico increased unprecedentedly from 61 billion dollars to 350 billion dollars in 2011 (Table 4.2).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Exports</th>
<th>Imports</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1990</td>
<td>40.62</td>
<td>41.48</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1991</td>
<td>42.6</td>
<td>49.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1992</td>
<td>46.04</td>
<td>61.87</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1993</td>
<td>51.79</td>
<td>65.31</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1994</td>
<td>60.82</td>
<td>79.39</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1995</td>
<td>79.45</td>
<td>72.57</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1996</td>
<td>95.55</td>
<td>88.77</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1997</td>
<td>110.16</td>
<td>109.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1998</td>
<td>117.35</td>
<td>125.36</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1999</td>
<td>136.01</td>
<td>141.46</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2000</td>
<td>166.25</td>
<td>174.23</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2001</td>
<td>158.8</td>
<td>168.42</td>
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<tr>
<td>2002</td>
<td>160.51</td>
<td>168.17</td>
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<tr>
<td>2003</td>
<td>164.69</td>
<td>170.44</td>
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<tr>
<td>2004</td>
<td>187.49</td>
<td>195.75</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2005</td>
<td>214.19</td>
<td>221.94</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Year</td>
<td>2006</td>
<td>2007</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>------</td>
<td>------</td>
<td>------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>250.01</td>
<td>271.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>256.25</td>
<td>281.53</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Source: INEGI. Banco de Información Económica (2012).*

It has also been observed that labour-intensive manufacturing is replacing itself with the production of the high value added manufacturing and service sector in the north and central Mexico while labour-intensive manufacturing of capital goods would be reallocated in the south and southeast of the country, reproducing the conditions of the uneven development both domestically between the regions of Mexico that exacerbated the social polarisation and externally between Mexico and the other members of NAFTA by making Mexico more dependent in its international trade (Otero 1996: 3; Torres 2006: 48). By 2011, the share of North America in the total exports of Mexico reached 81.6 percent of the total exports while the total exports to the Central American countries expanded more than three-fold from 1.8 billion dollars in 2002 to 5.5 billion dollars in 2011 (Table 4.3). This North American dependent structure of the Mexican economy is the product of the neoliberal rescaling that was undertaken during the 1980s which led to the total incorporation of Mexico into the North American economic structure through the NAFTA. In this respect, for Mexico, the NAFTA membership meant more than a comprehensive free trade agreement but a significant step towards securing the wholesale incorporation of Mexico into the global market through entering the liberalised trade regime in North America (del Castillo 1996: 29). While this process transformed the Mexican peripheral capitalist space by intensifying
the neoliberal capitalist production relations domestically, it gradually reached a level of expansion in the form of regional integration projects.

The territorial scale is under a new process of flexibilisation and its qualitative expression on the configuration of different industrial sectors has increased the importance of the maquila in the periphery correspondingly. In this respect, the EOI turn of Mexico’s industrialisation gave a significant importance to the transnational corporations in linking Mexico to the global markets integrating Mexican subsidiaries with the transnational parent companies. This process was consolidated with the NAFTA which established tight transnational linkages between the U.S., Canada and Mexico in capital-intensive, high-technology industries (Gereffi 1996: 96). Therefore, it is possible to argue that the maquiladora is a form of industrial production that corresponds with the neoliberal rescaling of the capitalist spatiality in the periphery which bases itself on the use of cheap workforce in the production of labour-intensive products that rely on the importation of the input and capital goods even though the focus on the cheap workforce for ensuring the comparative advantage globally threatens the labour and environmental standards and opens the way for abuses (Horowitz 2009: 679). Nevertheless, the maquila gradually transformed to the level of export manufacturing industry with the elimination of the tariffs on the manufactured goods between U.S. and Mexico in 2001 under the NAFTA agreement and, thus, formally will be disappeared but will remain expanding towards the south-southeast regions and Central America as a part of the extensification process of the neoliberal capitalist spatiality towards the marginal spaces.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>2002</th>
<th>2003</th>
<th>2004</th>
<th>2005</th>
<th>2006</th>
<th>2007</th>
<th>2008</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total Exports</strong></td>
<td>161,045,980</td>
<td>164,766,436</td>
<td>187,998,555</td>
<td>214,232,956</td>
<td>249,925,144</td>
<td>271,875,312</td>
<td>291,342,595</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>North America</strong></td>
<td>144,888,989</td>
<td>147,335,147</td>
<td>167,813,533</td>
<td>187,797,317</td>
<td>216,975,603</td>
<td>229,624,214</td>
<td>240,625,085</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Canada</strong></td>
<td>2,991,332</td>
<td>3,041,792</td>
<td>3,291,546</td>
<td>4,234,478</td>
<td>5,176,222</td>
<td>6,490,957</td>
<td>7,102,354</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>United States of America</strong></td>
<td>141,897,658</td>
<td>144,293,358</td>
<td>164,521,988</td>
<td>183,562,840</td>
<td>211,799,379</td>
<td>223,133,256</td>
<td>233,522,733</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Central America</strong></td>
<td>1,832,416</td>
<td>1,899,029</td>
<td>2,085,884</td>
<td>2,864,278</td>
<td>3,415,679</td>
<td>4,304,187</td>
<td>4,922,797</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Costa Rica</strong></td>
<td>372,915</td>
<td>352,472</td>
<td>387,256</td>
<td>420,683</td>
<td>521,797</td>
<td>687,219</td>
<td>919,724</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>El Salvador</strong></td>
<td>291,688</td>
<td>286,372</td>
<td>317,243</td>
<td>471,601</td>
<td>496,913</td>
<td>518,341</td>
<td>801,084</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Guatemala</strong></td>
<td>548,187</td>
<td>590,096</td>
<td>672,465</td>
<td>863,711</td>
<td>935,444</td>
<td>1,152,403</td>
<td>1,385,105</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Honduras</strong></td>
<td>155,669</td>
<td>160,607</td>
<td>182,054</td>
<td>239,608</td>
<td>284,529</td>
<td>382,401</td>
<td>457,749</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Nicaragua</strong></td>
<td>92,954</td>
<td>130,696</td>
<td>150,590</td>
<td>324,123</td>
<td>522,378</td>
<td>730,367</td>
<td>372,810</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Panamá</strong></td>
<td>303,861</td>
<td>319,778</td>
<td>315,774</td>
<td>463,340</td>
<td>567,665</td>
<td>730,616</td>
<td>864,157</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Other Central American countries</strong></td>
<td>67,140</td>
<td>59,009</td>
<td>60,501</td>
<td>81,214</td>
<td>86,951</td>
<td>102,840</td>
<td>122,167</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>South America</strong></td>
<td>2,903,092</td>
<td>2,760,876</td>
<td>4,047,352</td>
<td>5,846,878</td>
<td>7,977,818</td>
<td>10,909,379</td>
<td>13,840,148</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Source: INEGI -Dirección General de Contabilidad Nacional y Estadísticas Económicas (2012).*
It is also important to recall that the processes of social transformation and change are dialectical processes and, in that, respect the neoliberal rescaling of the peripheral capitalist spatiality in Mexico which culminated in the incorporation of Mexico into the North American economic structure through the NAFTA needs to be understood in these dialectical terms. The rebellion of the ‘Ejército Zapatista de Liberación Nacional’ (The Zapatista National Liberation Army –EZLN) in January 1994 in Chiapas should be located within this process of neoliberal re-territorialisation. The restructuring of the traditional agricultural production by subjecting it to the global market conditions through NAFTA directly threatened the livelihood of the small-scale producer indigenous communities in Chiapas and in the rest of rural Mexico which translated into the EZLN rebellion (Harvey 1996: 188). One of the main instruments of the neoliberal re-territorialisation of the countryside in the periphery is the conversion of the rain-fed small scale agricultural production to cash crop cultivation which will be observed in the next section as a key strategy of the agricultural policies of the Plan Puebla-Panama. The liberalisation of the international trade regime of the agricultural products and the removal of the government subsidies comprised the other component of the neoliberal restructuring of the agricultural sectors. In this respect, as the largest maize and coffee producing state, the indigenous communities in Chiapas felt the direct effects of this process starting from the administration of de la Madrid (Harvey 1996: 193). These communities became the social base of the EZLN and the ‘Convencion Nacional Democratico’ (National Democratic Convention) which was held in August 1994 and brought many different indigenous groups from Chol, Tojolabal, Tzeltal, Tzotzil and Zoque people together against the neoliberal restructuring by demanding the withdrawal of
the modifications made to Article 27 to accommodate the NAFTA rules, land redistribution and recognition of the autonomy of the indigenous communities (Stephen 1995: 95). These counter-hegemonic movements did emerge in different scales in different political forms and comprised a significant dialectical moment and, thereby, should not be ignored even though they are either violently eliminated or incorporated/watered down within the process.

4.3. Plan Puebla-Panama/Proyecto Mesoamerica: the expansion of the capitalist spatiality towards the Central American region

The central proposition of this section is that the neoliberal rescaling of the peripheral capitalist space in Mexico has structured the expansion of the peripheral capitalist spatiality towards the marginal spaces in the form of regional integration projects, reproducing the features of the formation of the peripheral capitalist spatiality that was discussed previously (chapter two). The centre/periphery relations, in other words the contradictions between the centre and the periphery results in the fashioning of the dominated space by the dominant space as Lefebvre put it (Lefebvre 1979/2009: 190). However, this fashioning should not be seen as a wholesale submission but also as a process of development and centralisation of the peripheral social space; rapid in some regions and sectors of the social practice and sluggish in the other numerous ones -which can be identified as the uneven development of the capitalist social space. This unevenness can be located in the differences between the levels of economic development between different regions in Mexico. By 2010, the total share of net GDP in the six states among the thirty-two states of Mexico accounted for 49.1 percent of the total GDP (8.369 billion pesos) of Mexico even though there is no oil production in these six states (Table 4.4).
Table 4.4. The Net GDP changes of some states between 2003 and 2010 (on the basis of 2003 prices).

In 2010, the GDP of the Federal District reached to 1.440 million pesos (18%); State of Mexico: 748 million pesos (8.9%); NL: 605 million pesos (7.2%); Jalisco: 521 million pesos (6.2%); Veracruz: 395 million pesos (4.7%); Guanajuato: 344.3 million pesos (4.1%); Puebla: 299 million pesos (3.6%); Chiapas: 158.2 million pesos (1.9%); Quintana Roo: 130 million pesos (1.5%). Source: INEGI - Dirección General de Contabilidad Nacional y Estadísticas Económicas (2012).

Although it is an ongoing process, the fashioning of the Mexican peripheral capitalist space eventually resulted in the integration with the centre as a structural part of it, and thus, in reproduction of an uneven centre/periphery relations with its own periphery by extending the neoliberal rescaling towards these marginal spaces. The ‘Plan Puebla-Panamá’ is a concrete example of the capitalist mode of production that realising itself; as a totality that absorbs the Central American ‘marginal’ spaces where those social relations of production
were not unfolded and consolidated properly and are still posing obstacles to its deepening (Lefebvre 1980/2009: 218-219). The representation of the ‘region’ on the basis of the reinvention of an old geographical term – Mesoamerica- is directly determined by these structural conditions.

It has been observed in this work (chapter one) that unlike the mainstream foreign policy studies, Mexico’s foreign relations with the Central American countries needs to be analysed within this spatiotemporal processes of transformation that is conditioned by the ongoing neoliberal rescaling of Mexico within the capitalist, international division of labour. While the Mexican economy has been re-orientated towards an export-oriented industrial structure in the last thirty years, its foreign relations with the countries in the region were transformed correspondingly, reflecting this structural change. This is the first dynamic behind Mexico’s initiatives to establish closer relationships with the Central American countries which culminated in the ‘Plan Puebla-Panamá’ (PPP) and its successor plan, the ‘Proyecto de Integración y Desarrollo de Mesoamérica’ (Mesoamerican Integration and Development Project- PM).

The second dynamic behind the PPP-PM is the long term process of the expansion of the capital towards rather marginalised or ‘reserved/protected’ spaces. The investment for the creation of the necessary conditions of the capitalist expansion in the neoliberal era directly produces and reproduces an uneven relationship by creating a regional international division of labour. Torres (2006) argued that space continually faces a dynamic of devaluation, valorisation and revaluation within the process of the expansion of capitalism. Resonating with Lefebvre’s concept of ‘mondialisation’ –which is different to
the concept of globalisation- Torres argued that in the contemporary level of
the development of the productive forces, the expansion of capitalism that
emerges on the scale of the nation-state appears as a vigorous delocalisation
and re-localisation of the productive forces, particularly in the reserved spaces
in an asymmetric way. The peripheral spaces that had already reached a level
of development of the productive forces via being incorporated into the
international capitalist system now would establish the channels of neoliberal
expansion towards the new economic spaces within the country – south and
southeast Mexico- and towards the Central American countries by the
valorisation and integration of those spaces (Torres 2006: 23).

The third dynamic behind the PPP is related to the limited level of capital
accumulation within the Central American countries. The twenty years of
steady growth (1950-1970) through the excessively foreign oriented import
substitution policies had resulted in the concentration of the wealth in the
hands of a small portion of the population and, during the 1970s, the
indebtedness, inflation and budget deficits began to affect all Central American
economies. From the late 1970s the monetary instability and devaluations
started to emerge and, during the early 1980s, the Central American
economies entered a fully fledged economic crisis, where the immediate
response to this crisis was structural adjustment and trade liberalisation (Delfín
2006: 130). The Central American Common Market (Mercado Común Centro
Americana -CACM) which had been formed in order to foment the economic
growth started to receive criticism for closing the market while the solution to
the crisis was defined as the complete insertion of the region in the
international markets through the agro-industrialisation and the diversification
of exports on the basis of a ‘new’ form of regional integration (Gorostiaga and Marchetti 1988: 121).

However, in the neoliberal era, the uneven expansion of the productive forces are even more complex than the previous pattern. The comparative advantage and competitiveness cannot solemnly be attributed to the cheap labour force anymore and to attract foreign capital and direct investments the existence of the infrastructural conditions to produce cheaper and better commodities and services becomes a significant aspect. In that sense, the state appears as the responsible agency for the creation of a favourable economic environment by providing the basic infrastructure and the mechanisms for the development of technology, education and health to promote investment and economic development. In terms of the market potential, resources, and its geographical location, the region of PPP-PM manifests attractive assets for the integration with the international markets such as the Isthmus of Tehuantepec, the arc of the Mexican Gulf, the Yucatán peninsula which is seen to possess an enormous and almost completely ‘underutilised geo-economic potential’ (Marín 2004: 143; Torres 2006: 57).

PPP-PM first emerged as a part of the ‘Plan Nacional de Desarrollo’ (National Development Plan) in 2002 in which a regional framework divided the country into five sub-regions; ‘northeast, northwest, centre-west, central and south-southeast’. The ‘Development Programme of the Northern Border’, the ‘Development Programme of Nautical Network’, and the ‘Grand Vision Project’ were the other regional development projects that had been initiated with the PPP. The common objective that had been shared by all these projects was achieving economic growth through extending the global market conditions
towards the marginalised spaces by heavily investing on infrastructure, and
thus, creating the necessary conditions for the expansion of the export-
oriented manufacturing industry, particularly maquila industry where the
capital can take advantage of the cheap labour force (Zamora 2006b: 88).

However, it is possible to state that the PPP-PM was not the first development
project that had been considered for the region. In 1958, five countries in the
region -Guatemala, Honduras, El Salvador, Nicaragua and Costa Rica- signed an
agreement for the creation of a common Central American market which
resulted in the formation of ‘Mercado Común Centroamericano’ (MCCA) in
1960. With this agreement, it was decided to harmonise the tariffs with the
third countries for the protection of the incipient ISIs and traditional export
products; liberalise the intraregional trade; and the establishment of the
‘Banco Centroamericano de Integración Económica’ (the Central American
Bank of Economic Integration -BCIE). Mexico favoured this regional formation,
and argued that this sub-regional integration should fuse itself with the wider
perspective of the ‘Latin American Free Trade Zone’ in which Mexico could play
a bridging role (Luna 1974: 20).

During the presidency of Gustavo Díaz Ordaz (1964-1970), the interest of
Mexico on the economic integration with the Central American countries
became official. The Díaz administration insisted that it was not the Central
American economies that would open their economies to Mexican products
which would further exacerbate the disequilibrium in the foreign trade, but
Mexico who would increase the imports from those economies. Nevertheless,
when the BCIE took 5 million dollars of debt from Mexico in 1966, 70 percent
of the loan was designated to use in the purchase of Mexican products (Luna
1974: 22). This manifests that the uneven expansion of the capitalist accumulation towards the Central American states was already conditioned by the high level of industrial development of the Mexican economy compared to other Central American economies due to the three decades of ISI policies.

The first free trade agreement was signed between Mexico and Costa Rica in 1994, which was followed by Nicaragua in 1997, and with Guatemala, Honduras and El Salvador (*Triangulo del Norte*) in 2000. These trade agreements are complete replicas of the NAFTA even in adopting the certain aspects of the failed ‘Multilateral Agreement on Investment’ (Palacios 2004: 212). The multiple FTA’s in the region were recently replaced by the unified FTA in December 2011 and, therefore, this market between Mexico and five Central American countries which represents 150 million people and where the bilateral foreign trade had reached to more than 6.5 billion dollars by increasing 3.6 times in the last 10 years has been harmonised under one trade regime (El Universal, 2011). The region also represents the fourth destination for the Mexican investments in Latin America reaching 5.2 billion dollars, where Costa Rica takes the first place and the Guatemala received the least.

Since the export-oriented neoliberal restructuring of the Mexican economy commenced, the interest towards the south-southeast of Mexico and Central American countries gained a considerable momentum. The valorisation and commercialisation of the Isthmus of Tehuantepec -one of the most reserved and deprived spaces but yet seen as strategically significant -has been at the centre of attraction since López Portillo’s presidency (Alejo and Mora 2007: 71). The ‘Proyecto Alta-Omega’ (1978), the ‘Programa de Desarrollo Integral del Istmo de Tehuantepec’ (1996), and lastly the ‘Proyecto del Corredor
Biológico Mesoamericano’ (the Project of Mesoamerican Biological Corridor - MBC) which has been supported by the World Bank were the initial projects that were initiated in the region (Zamaro 2006b: 90, 91). MBC was created as the ‘Forest Life Corridor’ in 1993 under the auspices of ‘Paseo Pantera Project’. Marín argues (2004) that it is possible to observe in the several documents published by the Inter-American Development Bank (IADB) and World Bank that the MBC is recognised as the central aspect of the PPP. These projects targeted environmental conservation but through the profitable management and strategic privatisation of the biological wealth of the Central American region (Marín 2004: 139-140). Additionally, during the presidency of Ernesto Zedillo (PRI), a plan for the construction of major transportation corridors that would integrate the south-southeast Mexico with the centre of the country by the construction of super highways and ports and thereby would facilitate the exchange of commodity and resources has been designed, particularly by the sub-secretary of the ministry of finance, Santiago Levy, who then became the director of the IMSS (Social Security) during the presidency of Vincente Fox (PAN) in 2000 (Carou et al 2007: 10). This plan was published in 1996, as a part of the ‘National Urban Development Plan, 1995-2000’, which envisaged the integration of one hundred major metropolitan areas mainly by the construction of continental trans-modal land bridges (Marín 2004: 145-146).

In the evolution of the PPP-PM as a comprehensive Central American project the summits of Tuxtla (13 summits between 1991 and 2011) played a considerable role. In 1991, the head of states of Mexico and the Central American countries met for the first time in Tuxtla Gutiérrez (Chiapas) and formed the ‘Mechanism of Tuxtla’ (Mecanismo de Diálogo y Concertación de Tuxtla or Cumbres de Tuxtla- Mecanismo Tuxtla). The economic development
of the region was declared as the central occupation of the mechanism (Cruz 2007: 149). Following its NAFTA membership, Mexico became a primary proponent of this regional mechanism and in the summit of Tuxtla II (Costa Rica 1996), these summits gained a concrete institutional framework which constituted the ‘*Mecanismo de Diálogo y Concertación entre México y Centroamérica*’ (The mechanism of Dialogue and Coordination between Mexico and Central America) including the presidents of Panama and Belize, the foreign ministers’ reunion, and high and sub-commissions (Carou and Valencia: 2007: 29).

The PPP was launched in the extraordinary summit of 2001 following the Tuxtla IV (Guatemala 2000) by the initiative of President Vincente Fox incorporating two strategies: (1) the strategy for the development of the south-southeast of Mexico, and (2) the strategy for the transformation and modernisation of Central America for the 21st century (Table 4.5). With these two strategies, one general objective and eight specific projects constituted a mega-project that covered nine south-southeast states of Mexico (Puebla, Guerrero, Veracruz, Oaxaca, Campeche, Quintana Roo, Tabasco, Yucatán and Chiapas) and seven Central American states (Guatemala, Belize, Honduras, El Salvador, Nicaragua, Costa Rica and Panamá). The levels of the integration to the world markets, the adaptation of the technological innovation mechanisms and the infrastructure of transportation and communication facilities are the aspects which, in fact, defined the borders of the PPP region as reaching to 2,175,342 km² with a population of 110 million\(^\text{34}\) (Alejo and Mora: 2007: 73).

\(^{34}\) With Colombia which has been included to the project since 2006.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Initiative</th>
<th>Objective</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Mesoamerican Initiative for Sustainable Development</td>
<td>Promoting the conservation and sustainable management of the natural sources and ensuring the participation of the local communities, particularly in the environmental management</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(Coordinator country: Nicaragua)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mesoamerican Initiative for the Human Development</td>
<td>Decreasing the poverty, facilitating the access of the vulnerable segments of the society to the basic social services and contributing to the full development of the Central American nations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(Coordinator country: Mexico)</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Mesoamerican Initiative for the Prevention and Mitigation of the Natural Disasters</td>
<td>Reducing the risks of natural disasters as a strategic transversal centre, also developing instruments and capacities for establishing criterion and indicators for the identification and reduction of the risks of natural disasters in the urban planning.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(Coordinator country: Panamá)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mesoamerican Initiative for Tourism</td>
<td>Stimulating the tourism for the integration and development of the Central American countries, promoting the conservation and sustainable management of the natural resources, decrease the weaknesses against the natural disasters, recognise and respect the ethnic, cultural diversity and including both private and social participation for the achievement</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(Coordinator country: Belize)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mesoamerican Initiative for the Facilitation of Commerce and Increasing the Competitiveness</td>
<td>Contributing to speed up the commercial exchange in the Central American region and increase the levels of competitiveness of the manufacturing sector by the means of leading actions to reduce intra-regional commercial exchange costs.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(Coordinator country: Honduras)</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Initiative</td>
<td>Description</td>
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</table>
| Mesoamerican Energy Initiative  
(Coordinator country: Guatemala) | Promoting the economic and social development of the Mesoamerican nations by the means of more extensive and better electrical services and forming the electrical markets to attract private sector participation. |
| Mesoamerican Initiative of the Integration of the Telecommunication Services  
(Coordinator country: El Salvador) | Promoting an authentic Mesoamerican society of information by the means of connectivity and using the Information and Communication Technologies (ICT) as the modern tools for development. |
| Mesoamerican Initiative of Transport  
(Coordinator country: Costa Rica) | Promoting the physical integration of the region for facilitating the transportation of persons and goods and by that reducing the costs of these activities. |

*Source: PPP official website via Carou and Valencia (2007), 33.*

The main objective of this mega-project has been officially defined as encouraging the human and ecological richness of the Mesoamerica within a framework of development which would respect and promote the cultural and ethnic diversity, create employment, increase productivity and, achieve economic growth by utilising the biodiversity in a sustainable way. However, Carou and Valencia (2007) argued that the PPP is a ‘geopolitical tool’ that would integrate Central America to the NAFTA and United States through Mexico, particularly by the construction of the mere physical infrastructure and by the harmonisation of rules and standardisation of goods and services under a unified market. With the inclusion of Colombia in 2006 the PPP extended towards the Andean region, forming a pro-CAFTA (Central America...
Free Trade Agreement) and pro-FTAA (Área de Libre Comercio de las Américas-ALCA) union in the heartland of Latin America that would play a significant role in the integration of the whole continent into a unified economic area (Palacios 2004: 212; Coronado and Mora 2006: 26). As Solís (2004) clearly stated, the main concern of the PPP is not eliminating the uneven relationship between the north and south or decreasing the asymmetries that had been strengthened and augmented since the implementation of the trade liberalisation programmes but constructing the necessary structural conditions for the good functioning of the CAFTA and the ALCA. The CAFTA not only eliminated tariffs and barriers on foreign trade between the US and Central American economies but also accelerated the processes of privatisation and structural adjustment in these countries by enabling the North American capital to invest in those key industries that were traditionally owned by the public sector (Solís 2006: 111). However, the lack of the certain infrastructure hampers further integration. That is the reason why the priorities of the programme are defined as the construction of the energy interconnectivity, the integration of the communication services and, lastly, the integration and modernisation of the transportation infrastructure via constructing superhighways, highway hubs, and inter-ocean connections and the rehabilitation of ports which would increase the productivity and enable the influx of capital and investment (Solís 2004: 285).

It is possible to notice an emphasis on the development of the physical conditions in order to increase the ‘rentability’ of south-southeast Mexico through the expansion of manufacturing, agro-industries, tourism, etc., and the role of state in this process. In the famous study ‘The South Also Exists: An Essay on Regional Development in Mexico’ -which was written by some of the
most important ideological fathers of the neoliberal reforms in Mexico during the 1990s under the banner of Salinismo- Dávila et al. (2002) claimed that Mexico needs to integrate the south to the centre and the north through substantial public investment in the transportation and hydroelectric infrastructure to utilise the rich natural resources in the region. This team which was in office during the presidency of Zedillo and then during the presidency of Fox argued that the public policies against poverty in the region should be separated from the regional development objectives and the state should only eliminate the obstacles that were inhibiting the economic potential. The state’s presence in the oil extraction, production of petrochemicals and distribution and marketing of electricity along the communal ownership of land, water and subsoil resources were perceived as the main sources of backwardness (Bartra 2004: 36-38). PPP-PM reflects this understanding of neoliberal re-territorialisation; rescaling the periphery and incorporating the reserved backward spaces into the international markets though establishing the necessary conditions for the formation of peripheral capitalist spatiality.

The propositions of the PPP for the incorporation of the region within the world markets through profitable utilisation of its resources with the establishment of the necessary conditions of the uneven capitalist accumulation cover several areas. The region represents one of the richest and highest levels of biodiversity in the world –and the richest in genetic diversity- yet unexploited. The World Bank had initiated the ‘Mesoamerican Biological Corridor’ (MBC) project that was incorporated into the PPP. It aimed to ‘promote innovative forms to manage the biodiversity of the region, including its sustainable exploitation’ (Delgado 2003: 14). This project was in line with
the neoliberal elimination of state support from the agricultural sector in Mexico, leaving the technological support of the agricultural activities to the private biotechnology sector dominated by the transnational corporations that aim for global profit maximisation (Poitras 2008: 130). The Zedillo administration incorporated all the ‘Protected Natural Areas’ of Quintana Roo, Campeche, Yucatan, Tabasco and Chiapas into the MBC and, during the Fox administration, the area which would be subjected to commercial exploitation extended beyond Los Chimalapas of Oaxaca (Navarro and Carlsen 2004: 341). MBC became the administrative unit of PPP for the environmental projects, including the investments in the circulation of the animals and seeds and for the trade of greenhouse gas emission reductions (Peregrina 2003: 107).

In this respect, in the agricultural issues, the PPP stands as much problematic as in the other issues. The export-oriented agricultural production remained the primary source of revenue in the foreign trade for all other Central American countries and south-southeast Mexico is also demonstrating the same structural pattern. Although agricultural production is the principal economic activity in the region, all those economies are also net importers of agro-products, primarily grain, cereals and corn (Delfín 2006a: 133). Mexico was the second largest importer of U.S. corn which accounted for 24 percent of the total corn consumption in 2000 while the share of US corn in the total Mexican corn consumption was 14 percent in 1994. In accordance with the NAFTA regulations, Mexico removed the price support mechanisms in the corn production and, thereby, the Mexican corn producers were forced to converge with the international markets very rapidly, while they simultaneously faced fierce competition from the genetically modified corn and cereal producing transnational corporations and large-scale farmers who enjoyed significant
government subsidies (Fitting 2008: 139). Furthermore, the agricultural production structures of these economies are not complementary but similar. Thus, the further integration, and the harmonisation of the rules and standards would not bring any solution to the contemporary problems of the agricultural sector but would worsen with the incorporation of these highly unique regions into the profit schemes that introduce genetic banks, seeds, exotic plants and plantations which will be dominated by the transnational companies, eliminating the subsistence and small-scale commercial agriculture (Marín 2004: 153; Delfín 2006b: 131). In this respect, the neoliberal rescaling of the agricultural sector in the periphery induced the rural migration that providing the necessary flexible labour in the periphery in maquiladora work or in the United States in illegal work sending remittances to Mexico which reached 25 billion dollars in 2005 (Fitting 2008: 147-149). The PPP aimed to extend this trend towards the Central American region, thereby to reproduce the specific conditions of the formation of the peripheral capitalist spatiality, as it was discussed previously.

In relation to that, another area that the PPP had great interest in was decreasing the unemployment by stimulating the export-oriented manufacturing sector. Thus, it incorporated the ‘Programa Marcha al Sur’ (March towards the South Programme) which aimed to expand the maquila production in the south-southeast of Mexico and further extend this expansion towards the Central American states. The extension of the north-south road connection and the cheap labour and energy costs expected to aid the further development of the maquila industry in the region since the daily industrial wages change between 2 dollars (Nicaragua) to 10 dollars (Belize) while the average wage in a Mexican maquiladora is between 15 and 20 dollars per day
The investors would receive a series of subsidies such as free land to establish an investment, tax discounts and financial support (Hernández and Hernández: 2004: 8).

In the PPP, the most important part of the investment was envisaged to be diverted to the construction of the infrastructure, building highways, airports, ports and railways. The constructions of the Gulf, Pacific and Transismic highway corridors and the creation of 16 highway hubs, the modernisation and construction of railways between Chiapas and Mayab and in the Isthmus of Tehuantepec were among the proposed projects. The 85% of the financial sources were destined for the construction and modernisation of the highways and 11% of the sources were reserved for the creation of the electrical connections, mainly between Belize, Guatemala and Mexico in the first phase which will be followed by the dam building projects between Chiapas and Guatemala (Marín 2004: 196-208; Zamaro 2006b: 121). Therefore, as it was observed in chapter two, the construction of the infrastructural conditions appeared once again in the formation of the peripheral capitalist spatiality in terms of the neoliberal rescaling processes.

For the objective of connecting the energy markets in the region, the ‘Sistema de Interconexión Eléctrica para los Países de América Central’ (System of Electrical Interconnection for the Countries in Central America- SIEPAC) - which was established in 1998 for the unification of the electricity services- has been incorporated into the PPP. It has been decided that under SIEPAC the existing line would be extended with 1.802 km of new lines which will be connected to south-southeast Mexico and the area from Guatemala to Panama would be operated under one electrical system (Bolaños 2006: 199).
The primary financial sources of the PPP has emerged as the World Bank, ‘Banco Centroamericano de Integración Económica’ (Central American Bank of Economic Integration - BCIE), ‘Banco Interamericano de Desarrollo’ (Inter-American Bank of Development - BID), ‘Comisión Económica para América Latina y el Caribe’ (Economic Commission for Latin America and Caribbean - CEPAL), the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) and the funds that will be established by the national governments. During the Tuxtla Summit in San Salvador, an ‘Executive Commission’ was formed, ‘Grupo Técnico Interinstitucional’ (Inter-institutional Technical Group - GTI) which has been assigned as the executive organ that coordinates the funds from the BCIE, BID, CEPAL, SICA, and UNDP (Delfin 2006: 149). In this respect, as it will be observed in the next chapter (chapter five) as well, it can be argued that the regional integration projects reproduce the dependency on foreign finance, thus extend the uneven and exogenous characteristics – similarly defined by Luxemburg and Trotsky in the explanation of the 19th century formation of the peripheral capitalist spatiality- of the capitalist spatial relations towards the marginal spaces.

The opposition of the local communities and the long term inactivity associated the PPP with inefficiency and apathy. Nevertheless, the PPP helped to institutionalise the Tuxtla Mechanism in initiating and conducting the regional projects in Central America and draw the attention of the international financial sources to these regional infrastructural projects (Ascencio 2008: 11-12). At that point, in 2008, the tenth summit of Tuxtla Mechanism decided to consolidate and reaffirm the dedication of the member states to the objectives of the PPP, and renamed the project as ‘Proyecto de Integración y Desarrollo de Mesoamérica’ (The Mesoamerican Project of
Integration and Development – PM). At the same summit, the institutional framework was renewed (Sánchez 2010: 28).

It is appropriate to claim that the PM adopted the same agenda of as the PPP, though exclusively focused on three areas and significantly concretised the proposed projects. Firstly, in the area of transportation the ‘*Red Internacional de Carreteras Mesoamericanas*’ (International Network of the Mesoamerican Highways – RICAM) - that covers 13.132 km highway in total- has been established (PM 2009: 10). For the projects that will be undertaken in 2012, 422.6 million dollars credit had been guaranteed from the BID, and BCIE by Panama, Costa Rica, Guatemala, Belize and Honduras. The project of the ‘*Corredor Pacifico*’ (Pacific Corridor – CP) which planned the construction of 3.244 km of ‘five star’ superhighway from Mexico to Panama between 2015 and 2020 has been formally defined as one of the priorities of the project (PM 2011: 8). Furthermore, the implementation of a unified system of transit transportation of goods has been completed from Mexico to Nicaragua which substantially decreased the amount of time spent on the border in the commercial freights through the harmonisation of the rules and procedures (PM 2011: 11).

Secondly, the creation of a unified energy market received special interest in PM as it was in PPP. In order to establish the ‘*Regional Electricity Market’*, the construction of the interconnection infrastructure has been accelerated with the participation of foreign capital investments. SIEPAC has completed the electrical connection between Mexico and Guatemala and the interconnection between Panama and Colombia is expected to be operational in 2014. Furthermore, as a part of the ‘Mesoamerican Programme of Biofuels’, in 2010
a biodiesel plant was established in Chiapas which has three additional plants in El Salvador, Honduras and Colombia (PM 2011: 18).

Lastly, the interconnection and integration of the telecommunication services infrastructure became the third area that the PM had been focusing on. Within this objective, the ‘Central American Network of Fibre Optic Cables’ (REDCA) is incorporated into the electrical interconnection programme and the construction of the network has been 90 percent completed by the end of 2011. It has also been decided that following the completion of the last phase, the REDCA will be opening to the market for the participation of the private enterprises (PM 2011: 22).

To sum up, it is right to claim that a meaningful analysis of the PPP and PM is only possible by locating and observing the PPP and PM within the specific spatiotemporal processes where the peripheral capitalist space in Mexico was transformed and structurally conditioned to expand towards the marginal spaces by incorporating these spaces into the international markets, thereby establishing the conditions of the capitalist accumulation or, in other words, producing new peripheral capitalist spaces. These processes also need to be identified within the global rescaling of the capitalism in which the neoliberal capitalist relations of production intensified and extended through the reproduction of the exogenous features of the peripheral capitalist space formation through the uneven relationship between the centre and marginal spaces in the form of regional integration projects. Only such an analysis can unravel the underpinning dynamics of the formation of these specific socio-spatial forms of neoliberal capitalism.
4.4. Conclusion

This chapter has analysed the spatiotemporal processes in which the peripheral capitalist spatiality in Mexico were transformed and expanded. The passive revolution was institutionalised during the post-passive revolutionary period while the limited bourgeois-in-formation changed the conditions of uneven and combined nature of the development of capitalist productive forces and the social relations of production, by gradually establishing its political hegemony within the newly reorganised nation-state. By assuming the political power, the limited national bourgeois also assumed the mediatory role of maintaining the capitalist accumulation and uneven development of economy and, thus, further consolidated the peripheral positioning of the Mexican capitalist space through the reconstruction and reorganisation of the state and society.

The global economic depression aided the national bourgeois to further its hegemony by expanding the industrial production through protectionism and state-planned and financed ISI development. However, although the import substitution policies that had been implemented in Mexico between 1939 and 1982 had succeeded in expanding the manufacturing industry and installed the infrastructure for the further capitalist accumulation, with the changing global capitalist environment these policies gradually lost their ability to create employment, concentrated the investment in some particular public sectors, and generated an unsustainably dependent growth on foreign financing (Villareal 1976: 7). This dependency on foreign financing and investment of the ISI development lead to the contraction of the economy and subsequent crisis of liquidity in 1980s.
In this period of transformation, the Mexican economy underwent a wholesale reorganisation in terms of trade liberalisation and deregulation. The rapid trade liberalisation led to an ongoing process of profound structural change in the production patterns of the Mexican economy by orienting it towards the export of manufactured goods. This structural transformation became irreversible with the incorporation of Mexico into the North American economic structure through the membership of the NAFTA which reproduced and rescaled the uneven relationship between Mexico and the North America in a different political form.

It has been observed in this chapter that the neoliberal rescaling of the Mexican peripheral capitalist space had started to reproduce similar processes of uneven relationship with its immediate geography by channelling the neoliberal rescaling towards these marginal spaces in the form of regional integration projects. These processes recall the characteristics of the formation of the peripheral capitalist space in Mexico and Turkey which has been detailed previously (chapter two) in terms of its exogenous features in the establishment of the necessary conditions of the peripheral capitalist development. Therefore, it is important to identify these dynamics within the processes of global restructuring of the neoliberal capitalism. Starting as early as from the presidency of Salinas Gortari, the construction of the necessary infrastructural and institutional framework in Central America which would enable the incorporation of the region within the neoliberal international division of labour became the main focuses of the Mexican government in the formulation of its relations with the Central American states.
From this reading, the common features of the PRIst five-year plans during the early 1980s and the Plan Puebla-Panama which has been introduced by the PANist President Vicente Fox and transformed into Proyecto Mesoamerica during the presidency of Felipe Calderón is seen as a continuity which has been conditioned by the dialectical processes of neoliberal capitalist rescaling in the periphery. The PPP-PM is an expression of a process that capitalism realises itself through the subordination and integration of the marginal spaces with the global markets within the neoliberal capitalist division of labour. Therefore, this process needs to be analysed in terms of these specific spatiotemporal conditions which are part of a wider process and subject to constant change and transformation.

In the next chapter (chapter five), the same specific spatiotemporal processes of consolidation, transformation and expansion of the capitalist social space in the periphery will be explained in the case of Turkey. Determined by the same structural conditions the peripheral capitalist space in Turkey followed a similar path of development and transformation which strengthens the spatiotemporal specific conceptual framework for the production and reproduction of the peripheral capitalist space that was presented in the previous sections (chapter two) of this work.
Chapter 5: Peripheral forms of the worldwide restructuring/rescaling of capitalist spatiality: the regional economic integration projects of Turkey

‘Spaces broken down in the homogenous are placed in a hierarchy...the distinction between the strong points of space and centres and the peripheries. The domination of centres over the dominated spaces guarantees the homogenous character of space...The centres link up the peripheries, coordinate them, submit them to global strategy of the State’.


This chapter aims to locate and analyse the regional economic integration and development projects of Turkey within the worldwide processes of neoliberal restructuring and/or rescaling of capitalist spatiality and spatial relations. As it has been argued in the previous chapter (chapter four which focused on the regional economic integration projects of Mexico), this chapter also underlines the specific spatiotemporal processes in which the particular socio-spatial configurations (peripheral capitalist space) on different scales have been unfurled and re-territorialised. Before undertaking such an analysis, two important aspects of these regional projects should be recalled. Firstly, this specific scalar configuration of the peripheral capitalist spatiality should be clearly exposed by the analysis of the processes of production, consolidation and transformation of the peripheral capitalist space. Secondly, the regional integration projects that had been initiated and

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implemented through these peripheral socio-spatial organisations needs to be evaluated within the worldwide neoliberal restructuring of the capitalist spatiality. In this re-territorialisation process, the capitalist spatiality is ‘intensified’ and ‘extended’ through the mediation of the state power (Soja et al. 1983: 199).

The first aspect has been delivered in chapter three with the specific conceptual framework that has been presented by linking the concepts of Luxemburg, Trotsky and Gramsci for the analysis of the formation and consolidation of the peripheral capitalist spatiality. This allows the definition of the specific socio-spatial conditions which determine the processes of neoliberal rescaling of the marginal spaces through the regional integration projects in Mexico and Turkey.

As it has been defined previously and analysed in the Mexican case, while the passive revolution unclogged the blocked dialectical process of formation of the peripheral capitalist space in Mexico, during the post-passive revolutionary period the passive revolution had been institutionalised through the establishment of the bourgeois hegemony within the newly formed political and economic structures. Thereby, the peripheral development of the capitalist forces is further consolidated and deepened and paved the way to its transformation by expanding this exogenous process. Similarly, the post-passive revolutionary period in Turkey has been marked by a process of rapid urbanisation parallel to the expansion of industrial production on the basis of ISI development strategies. This period of ISI development in the post-World War context should be seen as the deepening of the uneven development of the capitalist space in which Turkey
has been positioned within the periphery of the international division of labour. The government-led industrial expansion was formulated by the five-year government development plans and had been directly and indirectly financed by foreign—particularly European—capital during the post-World War Keynesian economic structure which eventually transformed into a different structural form of the uneven capitalist relationship between centre and periphery. In this type of industrial expansion, the state institutions and financial sources played a significant role in the organisation and allocation of both public and private investment through maintaining the exogenous features of the peripheral capitalist development.

However, the limits and unsustainable nature of the ISI development became more evident during the course of the worldwide neoliberal restructuring of the capitalist spatiality. This led to a significant reorientation and reterritorialisation of the peripheral capitalist space in Turkey in terms of the Export Oriented Industrial (EOI) development model of industrial restructuring. It is important to note that the restructuring of the capitalist spatiality in the periphery through the reorientation of the industrial structure throughout the late 1970s and 1980s is built upon the institutionalised and concretised, in other words, matured, uneven relationship between centre and periphery during the post-passive revolutionary period, as explained before.

This transformation period of the peripheral capitalist spatiality of Turkey from the limited capitalist accumulation through an economy dominated by the production of agricultural and raw material goods towards a largely industrialised peripheral economy can be defined as the emergence of the
peripheral spatiality in a new form which is more strongly integrated to the capitalist centre that later on culminated in the securing and ‘upgrading’ of this integrated relationship by the membership of Turkey in the European Customs Union (ECU). Conjoining the periphery strongly with the centre in the context of worldwide restructuring of the capitalist spatiality led the peripheral capitalist space to channel (extensification as Soja puts it) and expand these forms of capitalist spatial relations both inward and outward towards the marginal spaces.

Therefore, this chapter will be focusing on these two processes; in the first section the process where the peripheral capitalist spatiality deepened with the industrial expansion that has been materialised by statist ISI strategies during the post-passive revolutionary period (1930-1980); and the process in which the industrial structure has been reoriented towards EOI development strategies that led to the regional economic integration projects of Turkey during the 1980s will be elaborated. In the second section, the regional economic integration projects of Turkey will be evaluated in three areas; the initiatives for the creation of the institutional conditions of the free market economy through the Black Sea Economic Organisation comprising the ex-Soviet bloc countries in the Black Sea region and Balkan countries including Turkey and Greece, the initiatives for the construction of necessary commercial infrastructures such as Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan oil and gas, Nabucco gas pipelines or Trans-caucasus rail and highways, and finally the ‘Levant Project’ between Turkey, Syria, Lebanon and Jordan which combines the strategies presented by the previous two. These projects will be analysed through emphasising the specific spatiotemporal process in which they have
been conditioned as part of the worldwide restructuring/rescaling of the capitalist spatiality.

5.1. The post-passive revolutionary transformation of the peripheral capitalist spatiality: the institutionalisation of the Young Turk ‘Revolution’

As it has been argued before (chapter three), Gramsci’s concept of passive revolution successfully captures the specific socio-spatial configuration of the peripheral positioning of Turkey within the capitalist international division of labour and the historical conditions of the development of capitalist spatiality. Hence, by linking Gramsci’s theory with the theories of Luxemburg and Trotsky, a specific approach to the analysis of the peripheral capitalist spatiality was presented. It was argued that in the spatiotemporal analysis of the peripheral capitalist space formation these three theories are complementary; while Luxemburg’s and Trotsky’s theories of enlarged reproduction and uneven and combined development unravel the dialectical formation of the peripheral capitalist spatiality through highlighting its exogenous and uneven conditions, Gramsci disclosed a historical moment within this dialectical process. This spatiotemporally specific approach that was previously conceptualised places an emphasis on the particular spatiotemporal processes in which particular socio-spatial configurations have formed and transformed the capitalist space in the periphery. The neoliberal restructuring is the last and ongoing phase of this specific spatiotemporal process and the contemporary expansion of the peripheral capitalist spatiality towards the marginal spaces is conditioned by it.

The concept of passive revolution firstly draws attention to the moment when the developing capitalist social relations within the existing social
formation lead to the transcending of the existing socio-spatial form and consolidate itself by incorporating the reactionary social forces and, thus, produce a new form of political authority (Gramsci 2007: 106, 107; Morton 2003: 632). This new political form is comprised of a dialectical combination of the progressive and reactionary social forces and becomes the ultimate expression of a ‘revolution-restoration’ or ‘revolution without revolution’ since the peripheral bourgeoisie could not achieve an organic equilibrium by establishing its hegemony over the whole society which causes interruptions to the development of capitalism (Gramsci 2007: 53; Morton 2007: 66). Hence, the concept of passive revolution refers to a crucial stage of the modern state formation – particularly in the periphery – which is a precondition of the establishment and further consolidation of capitalism (Morton 2011: 34). As it has been argued before, the passive revolution of the Young Turks eliminated the old regime and its systemic contradictions by establishing a precarious hegemony of the national bourgeoisie. The period that follows the passive revolution defined in this work as post-passive revolution where the national bourgeoisie institutionalise the passive revolution and strengthen its hegemony by the reorganisation of the state and society and ensure the economic growth.

The period between the 1908 Young Turk revolution and the 1925 ‘Law on the Maintenance of Order’36 (Takrîr-i Sûkûn Kanunu) when the follow up of

36 In November 1924 a dissident group within the Republican People’s Party formed an opposition party that was called Progressive Republican Party (Terakkîperver Cumhuriyet Fırkasi -TCF) who defined liberalism and popular sovereignty as their primary objectives. Kemalists received this opposition as a counter-revolution and when a Kurdish rebellion broke out in February 1925, this extraordinary law has been enacted which gave an absolute power to the government for the next two years. In accordance with that law, in June 1925 the Progressive Republican Party was dissolved which brought political stability first time in seventeen years and marked the end of Young Turk passive revolution with the triumph of liberals (Ahmad 1993: 56-58).
the CUP (Committee of Union and Progress) Kemalist movement did establish its complete authority was an example of such a passive revolution where the bourgeois ideology reigned by leaning on the masses composed by the incipient working class and peasantry (Ahmad 1993: 79; Zürcher 2004: 176). Kemalists increased their influence on the peasantry through the establishment of the Republican People’s Party (Cumhuriyet Halk Partisi – CHP) where the local notables assumed a significant role in the mobilisation and support of the peasantry around a strong and central government in Ankara. Since the predominant majority of the Turkish peasantry was land-owning – except in southeast Anatolia where the proportion between the large and small landholders was vice versa- there was no significant demand of land reform similar to the Mexican case. The tithe was eliminated in 1925, the ‘Office for Soil Products’ (Türkiye Ziraat Mahsulleri Ofisi -TMO) was founded in 1932 which secured the purchase of the agricultural products at a fixed price and, thus, eliminated the intermediary merchants and linked the small farmer directly to the market production (Keyder 1987: 110; Zürcher 2004: 198). These offices also supported the falling prices of agricultural products or tried to generate foreign exchange by encouraging the expanded cultivation as was the case for wheat after the onset of the Great Depression (Birtek 1985: 412). Completing the TMO policies, rural cooperatives were established which then became subject to credits that were allocated by the Agricultural Bank (Atasoy 2005: 58). By 1925, it was possible to complete what the Young Turk revolution of CUP had commenced but not achieved; replacing the ancien régime with a new liberal social and political order where a territorial understanding of the ‘Turkish nation’ – claimed to be not

Although political stability was established for the first time since the 1908 Young Turk revolution and 12 years of continual fighting, the war-torn Turkish economy found an unfavourable international economic environment for an economic recuperation and development. Like its predecessor, CUP, the Kemalists were strong believers in market economy principles such as private entrepreneurship and property rights and particularly the necessity of foreign investment.\(^{37}\) In that sense, the institutionalisation of the Young Turk passive revolution by the Kemalists has been materialised through the consolidation of the market economy in which the state played a mediating role and the establishment of the orderly transfer of the political power where the state institutions and the Republican People’s Party became completely congruent.

In the political spectrum, the ‘Law on the Maintenance of Order’ remained in force until 1929 and any political organisation outside the state party had been disbanded. It had been claimed that since the party achieved to transcend the class differences there was no necessity to form any other political party which would aim to undermine the social unity. In accordance with that, a legacy from the Young Turk nationalism, the ‘Turkish Hearths’ association (Türk Ocakları) was closed down in 1931. This association was founded by the CUP in order to disseminate the nationalist ideology and to

\(^{37}\) In the ‘First Turkish Economic Congress’ that held in Izmir in February 1923, it has been argued that the development of the national industry is an indispensible necessity for the national independence. Nevertheless, it is also recorded that the development of a ‘national’ Turkish economy, the private investment and foreign capital would play a significant role while the state also takes the responsibility of major investments (Ahmad 1993: 94; Zürcher 2004: 195).
entrench the reforms such as the new Family Law that was to give women greater rights, bringing the judicial system under the secular control, and creating the necessary conditions for girls’ education, and when it was closed the association was reaching 32000 members in 267 branches (Szyliowicz 1966: 270; Keyder 1987: 99; Zürcher 2004: 180). In turn, it was replaced by ‘People’s Homes’ in 1932 (Halk Evleri) in towns and by ‘People’s Rooms’ in large villages in 1939 where they were run to and act as the local branches of the party (Karaömerlioğlu 1998a: 69; Ahmad 2008: 230; Zürcher 2004: 180). With the establishment of the ‘Village Institutes’ (Köy Enstitüleri -1937), this institutional framework became the backbone of the process of establishing political authority through reaching the ‘hearts and minds’ of the nation and ‘motivate and transform’ the ordinary people parallel to the programme and principles of the Revolution which now had been concretised within the Party (Szyliowicz 1966: 273; Karaömerlioğlu 1998a: 71; Karaömerlioğlu 1998b: 49).

The Turkish Women’s Union which had been founded in 1924 by women who were active in the national resistance was also dissolved since the party claimed its aim to give equal rights to Turkish women had already been achieved (Zürcher 2004: 180). While a new press law allowed the government to close any newspapers and magazines that ‘conflict with the general policies of the country’, another organisation which was closely affiliated with the Young Turks, the ‘Turkish Masonic Society’ was outlawed in 1935, and with the ‘reform’ of the Istanbul University (Darülfünnun), two-thirds of the non-Kemalist teaching staff had been expelled and substituted by the German scholars and scientists who started to leave Germany after Hitler came to power (Keyder 1987: 99; Zürcher 2004: 181; Ahmad 2008: 231). Therefore, there was no political organisation or activity left to mobilise
people and challenge the one-party state structure which allowed the State to place an emphasis on the national unity and solidarity that denies class conflict and differences (Zürcher 2004: 186). In this sense, it can be argued that the Young Turk passive revolution was successfully institutionalised.

However, the aim of the consolidation of a working market economy in accordance with a substantially growing national industry faced significant difficulties. Firstly, the departure of the majority of the non-Muslim population which dominated the manufacturing and commercial sectors in the Ottoman Empire meant a substantial economic loss, both in terms of financial capital and in the numbers of the manufacturing labour force for Turkey (Atasoy 2005: 52). The second difficulty was the disadvantaged import tariffs which had remained at the pre-war level until 1929 due to the Lausanne treaty (Zürcher 2004: 196). Nevertheless, the deteriorating international economic environment that culminated in the world recession during the 1930s gave a relative freedom to the Kemalist regime to develop local industry (Aydin 2005: 26). The Young Turk etatism remained limited even though in 1913 the ‘Law for the Encouragement of Industry’ was enacted and simultaneously the pre-war tariffs and the right of issuing paper money which had been previously restricted to the French-British owned Ottoman Bank was legislated (Keyder 1981: 9). In 1927, the ‘Law on the Encouragement of Industry’ which was built on the previous 1913 law was passed, bringing tax exemptions, land grants, permissions to import investment goods without payment of duties, reductions of freight fares and subsidise public purchases (Keyder 1981: 58; Zürcher 2004: 196).
The 1927 ‘Encouragement Law’ did not exclude foreign capital; hence, until the world recession the foreign capital heavily invested particularly in the merchant capital, production of raw material and goods for domestic consumption. Foreign investment was concentrated mainly in the banking sector, trading companies and insurance, alongside the mining, cement manufacture and food processing sector where mining and manufacturing accounted for two-thirds of the total foreign investments. In this respect, the role of foreign financial sources that, observed previously in chapter two kept its significance in the process of consolidation of the peripheral capitalist space. This manifests the exogenous and uneven patterns in the relationship between the centre and the periphery, maintained and deepened by the gradual expansion of the foreign capital investment towards the production of exportable goods that concentrated in the particular parts of the country (Keyder 1981: 62). Foreign capital had also invested in the joint ventures such as in textile and electricity production (Atasoy 2005: 55).

Nevertheless, this laissez-faire orientation was not contradictory to the State’s presence in the economy; the state intervened where there was a need for major investment or in order to channel resources for private investments. One of the major public investment areas was the railway construction (Aydin 2005: 27). During the last quarter of the 19th century, Turkish railway construction –financed and operated by European capital– was concentrated geographically in the Balkan region and Western Anatolia; hence, during the 1920s, 800 km of track has been built in order to connect the Eastern parts of the Asian Minor with the West. In 1924, the government decided to buy the foreign owned railway companies and, by 1930, 3000 km of track was bought in total. The remaining 2400 km of foreign owned tracks
were bought by the State eventually and more railway construction was undertaken during the 1930s (Keyder 1987: 104; Zürcher 2004: 195). The expropriation of the railways and the construction of the new tracks served as the infrastructural element for the etatist programme and also allowed the state to use and control the resource flows and their direction (Birtek 1985: 412).

Another major state investment during the late 1920s was the nationalisation of the foreign owned monopolies in a number of sectors such as tobacco, alcohol, sugar, matches, salt, gasoline and explosives, and the expropriation of the foreign companies delivering public services such as electricity, tram and water companies, particularly after the elimination of the restrictions envisaged by the Lausanne treaty in 1929 (Keyder 1987: 105; Zürcher 2004: 196, Atasoy 2005: 54).

Naturally, parallel to this level of state presence in the economy, the control and the constitution of the financial institutions in order to create credit or money supply for the economic development was a necessity. The financial development was a significant characteristic of the 19th century concentration and centralisation of capital on a world scale which enthusiastically participated in the formation of the capitalist forces in the periphery through the multi-national financial bodies and trusts (Bukharin 1976: 96-103). In the Ottoman Turkey, there had been individual bankers and lenders and it was not until 1845 that a bank supported by the government - the Banque de Constantinople- was established as a foreign currency regulating agency. The creation of this semi-official bank was a necessity following the introduction of paper money (1839) and the adoption of bi-
metallic decimal standard (Eldem 2005: 436). In 1856, the Ottoman Bank was
established—although registered in London—and in 1863 it conceded the
status of a state bank and changed its name to ‘Imperial Ottoman Bank’ by
undertaking the responsibility of issuing paper money while continuing to
function as a commercial bank and as an intermediary of the British and
French investments in the Ottoman Empire (Keyder 1981: 102; Eldem 2005:
437). The first Turkish bank, the Agricultural Bank was founded in 1888 as
the central institution of the Hamidian agricultural reforms, but remained
limited in satisfying the needs of the agricultural producers as a credit
institution (Quataert 1975: 211). The Young Turk revolutionaries took
advantage of the war circumstances to force out the British and French
financial institutions, replacing them with Turkish banks both through
founding banks in Istanbul and local banks in Anatolia, where the ‘National
Credit Bank’ (İtibar-i Millî Bankası) that established in 1917 appears as the
most significant (Zürcher 2005: 196). This policy of creating the necessary
financial resources had been continued by the Kemalists, alongside the
return of the Allied origin banks such as the ‘American Express Company’,
‘Credit Lyonnais’, ‘Banque de la Seine’ and ‘Banco di Roma’, while the
‘Deutsche Bank’ and ‘Deutsche Orient Bank’ had deepened its operations in
the joint ventures and direct investments (Keyder 1981: 102-105).

In order to ensure the continual creation of credit sources and the money
supply that would fuel the industrial investments and economic
development, the ‘Business Bank’ (İş Bankası) was established in 1924 which
then merged with the National Credit Bank in 1927. Simultaneously, the
former Agricultural Bank was reconstituted and strengthened in financial
terms, the ‘Bank of Industry and Mines’ (1925), the ‘Bank of Real Estate and
Orphans’ (1926), the ‘Industrial Credit Bank’ (1930) and finally the ‘Central Bank’ (1933) were established (Keyder 1981: 106-107; Zürcher 2005: 196; Atasoy 2005: 57).

While the agricultural exports were the major source of revenue during the short period following the war, the limits of the agricultural exports to cover the imports of machinery and other industrial inputs for the expansion of the consumer-good producing industries and other manufactured products (Atasoy 2005: 52) and the falling prices of the agricultural goods with the world crisis gradually decreased its importance in the economy. In that sense, it is possible to argue that the domination of the economic expansion by the increasing industrial production -dependent on the foreign financial resources and machinery- was spatiotemporally conditioned (Birtek 1985: 408, 410) and led to a qualitative change of the position of Turkey within the capitalist international division of labour by moving her away from the generation of surplus primarily through the agricultural exports -which was successful for a historically specific period of the capitalist spatial development (Keyder 1981: 12).

The world depression had significantly affected the merchant capital and agricultural production while the manufacturing sector had benefited most from the protectionist economic environment, the steady moving away from the free trade policies and the state’s more active role in the formation of the necessary political and economic infrastructure for the capital accumulation besides its encouragement and financial support of the private investment (Keyder 1987: 103; Aydın 2005: 27). The etatist response of the periphery to the Great Depression reached its climax in 1934, when the first Five-Year
Industrialisation plan - which was inspired greatly by the First Soviet Five-Year Plan (1929-1933) - was launched mainly for the production of textiles and intermediary goods such as copper, steel, ceramics, glass, chemicals, paper and food processing (Fry 1971: 306; Pamuk 1981: 26; Birtek 1985: 408; Keyder 1987: 106). Under this Five-Year plan, two large holding companies were established: Sumerian Bank (Sümerbank) was concerned with the financing, construction and operation of state enterprises in the industrial area and the Hittite Bank (Etibank) was responsible for the mining of coal, sulphur, copper, chrome and iron ore (Okyar 1965: 101; Birtek 1985: 413; Zürcher 2004: 198). Although the implementation of a second five-year plan which defined the intermediate and capital intensive goods production as its priority was interrupted during the Second World War (Fry 1971: 306; Altunışık and Tür 2005: 69), as a result of the continuing industrial investments of the government the annual growth in the industrial sector reached 10 percent of the GNP while the annual growth remained much lower than the agricultural production throughout the 1930s (Togan 1994: 2).

The period following the Second World War witnessed a new stage of integration with the world economy by positioning itself within the international division of labour through its incorporation to the Marshall Aid Programme. In the same way, Turkey became a member of the IMF and the World Bank (WB) in 1947 and the other major international economic organisations such as ILO, GATT and OEEC (Organisation for European Economic Cooperation). Particularly the financial support from the WB was conditioned by Turkey’s compliance to its policies that advocating economic reorientation on the basis of the comparative advantages which were determined as the agricultural production in case of Turkey (Aydin 2005: 28-
Coupled with the increasing problems of financing the existing state owned enterprises (Birtek 1985: 414-415), government led industrialisation plans had been pushed away in favour of the policies that aimed for an expansion in the agricultural production and the other primary goods (Celâsun and Rodrik 1989: 620).

As a result of this, and with the stimulation of the high post-war demand, the agricultural output began to increase more rapidly in the immediate period following the Second World War and stabilised until the 1980s with a 3 percent annual growth (Pamuk 2008: 292). However, this drastic change in the agricultural output was a product of the rapid mechanisation of the Turkish agriculture which started in 1948 with the tractors, tractor drawn equipment, combine harvesters and trailers imported from the United States and, later, from European countries purchased by farmers under liberal credit terms provided by state owned banks (Aktan 1957: 276). Even though the new government ‘Democratic Party’ (Demokrat Parti) defeated CHP in 1950 with an anti-etatist and pro-private investment economic programme, the Turkish economy significantly remained dependent upon public investments and financing. In the first half of the 1950s, the economy expanded rapidly through this sharp increase in the agricultural output and the substantial increase in the agricultural exports due to the worldwide post-war expansion (Okyar 1979: 335; Çeçen et al 1994: 38).

However, it is very important to note that this increase in the capacity of the capital accumulation through agricultural exports was very specific in the post-war context, and thus, was exhausted rapidly in the first half of the 1950s and the economy entered a phase of foreign exchange shortage with
the falling prices of agricultural products in the global markets. The high inflation rates—which appears as a characteristic of the peripheral capitalist spatial development in the form of étatism—put a pressure on the debt servicing, which started to consume the large part of the export earnings with the liberal international trade regulations and the free market economic structure (Togan 1994: 20, Aydin 2005: 32). In that context, the anti-étatist DP government increased the public expenditure with inflationary forms of financing which led to the implementation of price and credit controls that is, in fact, a very short termed and inefficient policy in a high inflationary economic environment (Okyar 1965: 104; Fry 1971: 307). Eventually, the government was forced to devalue the Turkish lira from 2.8 to 9.0 to a dollar in 1958 and simultaneously agreed with the OEEC and IMF on a stabilisation programme including debt restructuring and foreign financial assistance which also subsequently failed to rehabilitate the balance of payment crises in the following two years (Hershlag 1968: 147; Kazgan 1999: 101).

The high inflation, economic instability and political unrest culminated in the 1960 military coup d’état and the reversal to the étatist policies were officially accepted but this time in a more institutionalised form. The ‘State Planning Organisation’ (SPO) was established and became the central institutional organ which was entrusted with the preparation and implementation of five-year development plans in the new constitution of 1961 (Fry 1971: 308; Aydin 2005: 34). The first five-year development plan aimed for 7 percent annual growth by giving a significant emphasis to the State Economic Enterprises (SEEs) and perceived the private sector as the

38 Although the first five-year industrialisation plan was implemented in 1934, the first five-year plan that launched by the SPO was also called first.
complementary part of the planned economy (SPO 1962: 2-3). This reversal to the planned economy should be seen as a product of the spatiotemporal conditions of Turkey’s peripheral capitalist spatiality rather than a political decision. The industrial growth became the determinant sector in the economic expansion and on the development of the agriculture and service sectors (Bairam 1991: 1279) while its maintenance and development remained highly dependent upon foreign financial input. This structural condition which determines Turkey’s –and as it has been shown Mexico’s- peripheral capitalist spatiality became more apparent in the period of planned economy and its liquidation through the 1980s neoliberal restructuring.

The implementation of the five-year development plans led to a rapid expansion within the manufacturing and service sectors in contrast with the limited growth before the 1960s. During the implementation of the three successive five-year plans, the GNP increased by 6.4 percent between 1963 and 1967, 6.7 percent between 1968 and 1972 and 7.2 percent between 1973 and 1977. Parallel to the positive expansion of the manufacture sector, the share of agriculture in total output declined from 38.4 percent in 1962 to 23.3 percent in 1977, and the share of industrial sector increased from 22.3 percent to 31.5 percent in the same period. This rapid structural change towards the expansion of the industrial production and accelerated capital accumulation had been heavily dependent on the public investments that channelled through the SEEs which particularly focused on inward-looking import substitution for the domestic consumption (Fry 1971: 313-314; Çeçen et al 1994: 39; Pamuk 267-273).
Meanwhile, this unprecedented increase in the public investments in the manufacturing sector through SEEs led to the emergence of a highly capital-intensive manufacturing sector (Bayar 1996: 777). In this first stage of expansion of the import substitution oriented industrial development, the cost was financed mainly by the domestic savings and the increasing immigrant workers’ remittances which is another feature peculiar to peripheral spatiality. The purchasing power created by the immigrant workers’ remittances for the goods produced by the SEEs was striking and it reached its climax during the early 1970s (Pamuk 1981: 29). The share of the workers’ remittances in the finance of the balance of payments reached 109 percent in 1972 and 154 percent in 1973. However, while the volume of the foreign exchange inflow through the remittances constantly increased after 1973, the portion of the workers’ remittances that compensated the balance of payments decreased significantly due to the continual substantial increase of the imports (Artukoğlu 2005: 21).

The increase of the imports can be explained with the transformation of the industrial production structure during the 1970s when the import substitution started to move towards more complex patterns of industrial production such as consumer durables, intermediate and capital goods. As it was previously observed in the Mexican case, in this inescapable stage of the ISI production the reliance of the peripheral capitalist space on the foreign financial resources substantially increases. Meanwhile, in the case of Turkey as it was the case for Mexico, the total factor productivity had continually increased and increased more in the public manufacturing sector than private sector which indicates a technological change was undergoing in the industrial production led by the SEEs. However the Turkish governments’
import substitution policies which had been based on an unrealistic, effective exchange rate, import restrictions and unreal interest rates received the first shock with the first oil crisis in 1973 when the favourable international economic environment ended (Çeçen et al 1994: 44).

In the period between 1973 and 1978, Turkey’s balance of payments deteriorated significantly up to a point of stalemate. The sharp increase in the value of the Turkish imports was caused directly by the oil price increase in 1974. While the economic expansion was heavily dependent on the foreign credits, the long term discouragement of the exportation of the SEE products and the lack of direct foreign investments led to the rapid erosion of the foreign exchange reserves and eventually to the sharp increase in the external debt (Saraçoğlu 1987: 122-123). As Table 5.1 shows while the public investments increased continually, the domestic savings remained stagnant, causing an increasing need for foreign financial resources (Rodrik 1990: 3). During this period, the government kept subsidising the prices of the commodities that produced by the SEEs as well as the energy prices while the real exchange rate and real interest rates were allowed to appreciate. This led to the complete reliance of SEEs on public financing through the central bank and acquiring short term foreign loans which resulted in a rapidly climbing inflation and a deep payment crisis that forced the government to suspend the foreign exchange transfers for imports in February 1977 (Saraçoğlu 1987: 123; Şenses 1991: 212).
Inflation rose to 24.1 percent in 1977 from 15.6 percent in 1976, and to 36 percent in the last quarter of 1977. Simultaneously, as a result of the increasing public spending the short term loans had risen to 6.146 million dollars in 1977 from 229 million dollars in 1974 (Okyar 1983: 534). These macroeconomic conditions (Table 5.2) forced the recently elected central-left government of Bülent Ecevit to sign a stand-by agreement with the IMF in April 1978. This programme aimed to decrease the balance of payment deficit to 4 percent in 1978 from 7 percent through an expected expansion of the exports following the 23 percent devaluation of the Turkish lira (Çeçen et al 1994: 44). The IMF conditioned the release of the envisaged SDRs with the ability of the Turkish government to comply with the limits that had been established for the public sector borrowings that were financed by the central bank, the limits for the contracting new external debts, not introducing new schemes of multiple currency practices, payment or import restrictions and entering to the new bilateral agreements with the fund members (Okyar 1983: 535; Kazgan 1999: 132).
Table 5.2. Macroeconomic Performance of Turkey during the 1970s

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Real GDP Growth</th>
<th>Inflation Rate (WPI) (%)</th>
<th>Current Account Balance (million %)</th>
<th>Investment (% of GDP)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1972</td>
<td>6.0</td>
<td>18.0</td>
<td>47</td>
<td>20.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1973</td>
<td>4.1</td>
<td>20.5</td>
<td>534</td>
<td>18.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1974</td>
<td>8.8</td>
<td>29.9</td>
<td>-662</td>
<td>20.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1975</td>
<td>8.9</td>
<td>10.1</td>
<td>-1.889</td>
<td>22.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1976</td>
<td>8.9</td>
<td>15.6</td>
<td>-2.286</td>
<td>24.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1977</td>
<td>4.9</td>
<td>24.1</td>
<td>-3.431</td>
<td>25.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1974–77 average</td>
<td>7.3</td>
<td>19.9</td>
<td>-2.067</td>
<td>23.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1978</td>
<td>4.3</td>
<td>52.6</td>
<td>-1.595</td>
<td>18.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1979</td>
<td>-0.6</td>
<td>63.9</td>
<td>-1.203</td>
<td>18.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1980</td>
<td>-1.0</td>
<td>107.2</td>
<td>-3.304</td>
<td>21.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1978–80 average</td>
<td>0.9</td>
<td>74.6</td>
<td>-2.034</td>
<td>19.4</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Celalısun and Rodrik 1989: pp 630

However, it was already unrealistic to expect an ISI oriented peripheral economy to decrease imports while the expansion and running of the economy is dependent on the import of raw material and machinery. Therefore, the macroeconomic conditions deteriorated extremely; the high rates of inflation and the stringency of foreign exchange led to widespread shortages of basic goods such as sugar, cooking oil and petroleum. Although the Turkish government successfully appealed to the OECD for an emergency aid, it was conditional on reaching another stand-by agreement with the IMF. The IMF approved the new stand-by agreement in June 1979 with a stabilisation programme which included the devaluation of the Turkish lira by 43.7 percent, and strictly limited the central bank financing of the public sector deficits. The unprecedented increase in the volume of the money in circulation eventually flamed the inflation from 51 percent to 81 percent in 1979, while the value of exports had further decreased from 2.288 million...

The failure to achieve any macroeconomic upturn and the widespread urban armed conflict between right and left wing political groups led to the colossal defeat of the governing centre-left CHP in the local elections which caused the resignation of the government. CHP cadres were firmly believed to the virtues of the national economic independence and supported the strong state intervention in the economy, thus, they were reluctant to eliminate public financing of SEEs. Under those conditions, a minority government was formed by the centre-right leader Demirel, in November 1979, who was determined to strictly implement the stabilisation programme of the IMF. However, within the current worldwide rescaling of the global capitalist spatiality it was apparent that the Turkish economy needed to be restructured and repositioned within the international division of labour rather than reassuring the good functioning of the SEEs which was continually dependent on the foreign financial resources. The key themes of this neoliberal restructuring narrative were trade liberalisation with the deregulation of the terms of international trade and the limitation of the state presence in the economy with the extensive privatisation of the SEEs in accordance with the reorientation towards the export promotion strategy. It has to be noted that these two main themes had several implications varying from the deregulation of the domestic market to a militant policy of repressing wage incomes (Yeldan 1989: 274). The next section outlines this process of neoliberal restructuring of the peripheral capitalist spatiality of
Turkey in terms of these aspects and their further implications as part of the worldwide rescaling of the capitalist space where the capitalist social relations had been ‘intensified and extensified’ during the 1980s.

5.2. Neoliberal restructuring and trade liberalisation as the condition of the export-oriented positioning of Turkey

The main aim of this section is analysing the underpinning dynamics of the spatiotemporal processes where the peripheral capitalist space in Turkey was conditioned to expand towards its immediate periphery in the form of regional integration projects as a part of the global rescaling of the neoliberal capitalism. In this respect, it will be analysed first the structural conditions where the import substitution oriented economy reached its limits and faced a crisis and was forced to be restructured towards export-oriented industrial growth.

5.2.1. The crisis of the ISI and the conditions of the neoliberal restructuring of the Turkish Economy

Following the failure of the 1978 and 1979 stand-by agreements, it became clear for the foreign financial sources –particularly for the IMF- that the Turkish economy needed to undertake a drastic structural adjustment programme which would have long-term implications while simultaneously completing the short term monetary measures to ameliorate the macroeconomic conditions. In accordance with that, the Demirel government installed a new economic team headed by the ‘undersecretary to the prime minister’ Turgut Özal and introduced a major economic stabilisation package on January 24, 1980, that marked the starting point of the entire
The structural adjustment programme received immediate pledges of financial support from the IMF, the World Bank, OECD, EEC, European Settlement Bank and Islamic Development Bank which would enable the government to successfully make the external transfers and regain its creditworthiness (Candemir 1994: 110). However, the programme received a great deal of political opposition within the parliament which weakened the hands of the minority government and the measures were completely rejected by the very strong and militant trade unions (Şenses 1991: 214).

The programme was informally negotiated with the IMF before its presentation, and thus, it was in line with the similar stabilisation and structural adjustment programmes orchestrated by the international financial organisations in other peripheral economies, particularly in Latin America. The main objectives of the January 24 stabilisation programme were; eliminating the inflationary cycle; solving the unsustainable pressure on the balance of payments; ensuring the price stability; liberalisation of foreign trade and payments in order to shift the production patterns towards the export orientation; a complete privatisation of economic life through decreasing the role and presence of the state in the economy and relying on the forces of the deregulated free market (Şenses 1991: 215; Ertuğrul and Selçuk 2001: 6).

In order to ameliorate the foreign exchange account and the conditions for foreign trade, the January 24 measures devaluated the Turkish lira by 48 percent. Moreover, the government subsidised agricultural export goods
became subjected to a levy and subsidies on the agricultural inputs such as fertilisers decreased significantly. The government also reduced the stamp duty of the imported goods to 1 percent and moved to a more flexible exchange rate to increase the transfer of savings of the workers’ remittances and the competitiveness of the Turkish export products (Kaynak and Erol 1989: 212). In order to liberalise the internal market, it was decided to decontrol the prices in the private sector and increase the administrated prices of goods and services in the public sector. Therefore, the ‘Committee for Price Control’ was abolished and the commodities produced by the SEEs were subjected to substantial price increases. A new economic organ called ‘Money and Credit Committee’ was also established under the control of the undersecretary to the prime minister to eliminate the role of ministers in the coordination of the monetary and credit policies. The economic policy making authorities that had been previously divided among the ministries of Finance, Industry, and Commerce and the SPO were unified and attached to the prime minister’s office (Okyar 1983: 544-545; Kaynak and Erol 1989: 212).

The support of the international financial institutions for the January 24 measures was unprecedented. The IMF made 1.7 billion dollars available (which is almost 9 times of the Turkish quota) as special drawing rights (SDR) between 1980 and 1985 and the World Bank released 1.6 billion dollars during the same period as a part of structural adjustment loans (Saraçoğlu 1987: 128). Nevertheless, there were two significant concerns of the IMF on the high real wages and on the nominal determination of the interest rates by the government which was causing high negative real interest rates. It was agreed that the nominal rates would be increased gradually to the level of
positive real interest rates and a committee was established to be responsible for the wage settlements (Çeçen et al 1994: 45).

However, the implementation of these draconian and highly inflationary macroeconomic measures, that were aiming to restore economic stability and international creditworthiness, was in danger since it had received very strong opposition from different sections of society and particularly from the organised labour with the growing wage demands (Şenses 1991: 216).

Throughout the 1980s, the head of the economic team and the architect of the stabilisation programme, the undersecretary to the prime minister Turgut Özal, had expressed that there was little prospect for the implementation of the austerity measures in such an improper political climate (Ahmad 1985: 7).

Since the 1978 stand-by agreement, the IMF had already been mentioning the ‘negative’ influence of the increasing real wages due to the wage settlements obtained by the trade unions, particularly within the SEEs (Okyar 1983: 547).

The future of the programme was secured when the Turkish army took over power and dissolved the parliament in September 12, 1980, while Demirel’s minority government was preparing for a general election to gain a majority in the parliament which was expected to further hamper the implementation of the austerity measures. The immediate measures and laws enacted by the military junta through the ‘National Security Council’ (NSC) and the new constitution which was voted and accepted in 1982 ensured the political requirements for the implementation of the economic programme including laws and amendments that were put into practice to eliminate three major resisting forces within the society; political parties, strong trade unions and
the universities. Since the 1961 constitution allegedly democratised Turkish politics, it had been seen as a major cause that behind the political anarchy and economic collapse between 1978 and 1980 the military junta dedicated itself to bringing stability to the country by depoliticising the society (Ahmad 1981: 6, Ahmad 1985: 214). All political parties had been outlawed, one of the two main labour confederations, the ‘Confederation of Revolutionary Labour Unions’ (DISK), had been disbanded and the leaders were jailed; all strikes and collective bargaining over wages had been suspended. In December 1980, the ‘High Arbitration Council’ was established in order to determine wage increases. With the ‘Higher Education Law’ in 1982, the universities were overly-centralised and many respected professors and academic staff were dismissed (Öniş and Webb 1992: 18). The military Council appointed Özal as the deputy prime minister in charge of economic affairs. Apart from the sixteen months of interregnum in 1982-1983, he remained in charge of economic affairs throughout the 1980s until his Motherland party lost significant popular support in the 1987 general and 1989 popular elections. Hence, the neoliberal rescaling of the Turkish economy and society was identified with Özal’s name, as it was identified with ‘Salinas’ in Mexico (Rodrik 1990: 5).

In this period, the efforts to implement short term stabilisation measures went hand in hand with the long term structural adjustment policies. The deregulation and decontrolling of the internal market paralleled and completed the policies towards the liberalisation of the international trade. The quota list for imported goods abolished in 1981, advanced deposit requirements on industrial imports was reduced, export credits had been introduced and the export licensing requirements were eliminated while the
the capital account had been liberalised by ‘depolicising’ the exchange rate (Saraçoğlu 1987: 125-126; Çeçen et al 1994: 46; Dibooğlu and Kibritcioğlu: 2004: 46). The reform of the SEEs went beyond the removal of the price subsidies and tax preferences towards the complete elimination of the central bank financing of the public enterprises. The monopolies of the SEEs were abolished in commodities like tea, tobacco and airlines and the privatisation of the public enterprises were legally authorised in 1986 (Saraçoğlu 1987: 130-131; Şenses 1991: 218).

Simultaneously, the government adopted an ambitious programme of export incentives that included tax rebate schemes, duty free imports of the intermediates and raw materials, and exemption from VAT for those commodities, foreign exchange allocations and exemptions from corporate income tax (Togan 1994: 74). These incentives created a significant increase in the exports of the manufacturing sector while the growth in the agricultural production remained limited which indicated the acceleration of the already decreasing role of agricultural sector in the production of surplus and the increasing role of export-oriented manufacturing (Yeldan 1989: 275).

Throughout the 1980s, the depreciation of the Turkish lira continued in order to slow down the import and give momentum to the export of manufactured goods. Thus, the exports of Turkey rose to 11.7 billion dollars in 1988 from 2.9 billion dollars in 1980. Manufactured products of the SEEs such as textiles, glass, iron and steel also shared a significant role in the increase of exports (Şenses 1991: 224). The annual rates of growth during 1981-1983 were 4.0 percent, during 1984-1985 were 5.5 percent and during 1986-1987 were 7.8 percent. Even with the depreciation of the lira the import of
consumption goods continued to increase. The international trade liberalisation and a superior export-led growth was successfully achieved and creditworthiness was re-established; meanwhile, the real wages continued to decrease, the income distribution deteriorated and the external debt grew significantly (Kaynak and Erol 1989: 213-214; Çeçen et al 1994: 51).

Although, the January 24 package enjoyed relative success in terms of ameliorating the macroeconomic aspects and creditworthiness, it failed to control inflation and could not achieve a sustainable fiscal balance. Starting in 1987, the macroeconomic imbalances once again reappeared; public sector requirement increased above 10 percent of the GDP again. Akyüz and Boratav (2003) argued that one of the main reasons for the failure of the macroeconomic stability efforts was the premature liberalisation of the domestic financial markets before achieving the fiscal discipline and control of inflation. Deregulation of the interest rates eventually made the public borrowing extremely difficult. The response was the 1989 liberalisation of the capital accounts which aggravated the situation (Akyüz and Boratav 2003: 1551). Furthermore, after the ban on the senior political figures was lifted in 1987, the popular support behind Özal’s Motherland Party, which had been enjoying a majority within the national assembly and single-party government, ceased and, in the 1991 general elections the era of coalition governments re-started even though the neoliberal consensus remained intact (Yalman 2009: 11).

In the coalition government between a centre-right and a centre-left party, the implementation of the anti-inflationary policies based on monetary tightening and controlling the interest rates without reducing the public
sector borrowing or adopting an ambitious privatisation programme was a difficult task. Therefore, trade imbalances started to increase with the real appreciation of the Turkish lira which brought major economic crises and recessions in 1991 and 1994. The crisis in 1994 was followed by a considerable devaluation of the Turkish lira attached to a comprehensive stabilisation programme (April 5 programme) and another stand-by agreement with the IMF. However, the real appreciation of the Turkish lira continued and consumed the 1994 devaluation which eventually had an upward impact on the interest rates, making it difficult for the government to follow debt-financing policies (Ertuğrul and Selçuk 2001: 11).

The failure of the 1999 IMF backed disinflation programme which envisaged economic growth with a fixed exchange rate policy and a substantial control of the inflation while the privatisation process accelerated (Alper 2001: 60) reinforced the anti-state discourse by mainly attributing the failure of the programme to the public sector for not maintaining the austerity targets set by the IMF. Therefore, in the post-crisis period, the neoliberal orthodoxy found a fertile environment to complete its anti-statist hegemonic agenda which was started and successfully implemented under Özal’s rule with military backing but was then interrupted during the 1990s due to the re-emergence of the distributive demands channelled through political parties and interest groups with the end of the military rule (Yalman 2002: 20; Yalman 2009: 237-254). The neoliberal hegemonic discourse of privatisation, flexible labour markets, flexible exchange rate regimes, financial de-regulation and fiscal austerity were represented as the necessary structural reforms and dominated the popular and political mind (Cizre and Yeldan 2005: 392).
In this context, a new economic programme was launched in the spring of 2001 which combined those structural reforms and long term macroeconomic policies aimed at stabilisation and economic growth through the expansion of the export-oriented industrial sector. The continuity and the coherency of the fiscal policy which aimed to keep the public debt under control and to achieve sustainable economic growth had been seen as the crucial part of the programme to ensure the creditworthiness of Turkey (Airaudo et al 2004: 4). The architect of the programme was Kemal Derviş who was appointed as the minister of economy, was pointed out that the quality of the fiscal policy depended on its support to the economic growth (Derviş 2005: 181). However, the three-party coalition government had lost its credibility in terms of the implementation and the continuity of the economic programme and the political vacuum was filled by the victory of the Justice and Development Party (Adalet ve Kalkınma Partisi -AKP) in the general election of 2002 which gave the AKP the parliamentary majority to form a single-party government. The AKP government had successfully implemented the three-year economic stabilisation programme of Derviş with the electoral support and with consensus on the anti-state discourse of the neoliberal orthodoxy and, thus, finally emerged as the unique agency that was able to institutionalise the neoliberal restructuring process (Bedirhanoğlu and Yalman 2010: 111). Three aspects of this further entrenchment and concretisation of the neoliberal hegemony were; the self-regulating financial markets, privatisation and the export-oriented industrial growth.

In terms of the first aspect, the supervision and regulation of the banking system was already introduced in 1985 with the law on banking regulations
as a part of the ongoing neoliberal restructuring process that gives an ultimate authority to the treasury in the supervision and regulation of the banking system. The Özal administration initially advocated a rapid deregulation of the finance and banking sectors but the uncontrolled financial market quickly resulted in the collapse of the brokerage system in 1982. Therefore, in 1983, the Saving Deposit Insurance Fund (Tasarruf Mevduatı Sigorta Fonu) was founded to guarantee the bank deposits and, in that way, to increase the faith in the banking sector which was followed by the 1985 Banking Law (Marois 2012: 106). However, since the increasing reliance of the private banks on the income coming from the purchases of government securities facilitated the debt financing, the treasury gradually faced a dilemma between the regulation of the system and the maintenance of the government security sales. Furthermore, the lack of autonomous decision making capability of the treasury politicised the regulatory apparatus particularly in the period during the 1990s when the political authority was divided between multiple parties forming unstable coalition governments (Alper and Öniş 2003: 10).

In 1999, the IMF and World Bank –and, up to a level, the EU- urged the Turkish government to form a banking regulation apparatus within the framework of the economic programme. Thus, the ‘Banking Regulation and Supervision Agency (BRSA)’ was established with the 1999 Banks Act. The new institution aimed to rehabilitate and improve the performance of the banking sector and to undermine the capacity of politicians to influence the banking system. The autonomous position of the BRSA was strengthened after the liquidity and banking crisis of 2000-2001, due to the IMF’s powerful position in the post-crisis period (Alper and Öniş 2003: 21). Therefore, AKP
inherited a well regulated, stabilised and strengthened banking system when it assumed power in 2002.

It can be argued that the privatisation process of the SEEs was sluggish throughout the structural adjustment. Alper (2001) argued that the delays and postponements in the privatisation process, such as the privatisation of Turk Telekom and 51 percent of Turkish Airlines, deprived the government of a substantial income and became one of the financial factors that caused the banking crisis of 2000-2001. Following the establishment of the Istanbul Stock Exchange in 1986, it was attempted to channel the privatisation operations through this emerging capital-market institution but soon this type of privatisation process was found to be risky for capital market development (Öniş 1991: 170). Therefore, the privatisation of the SEEs remained very limited until the AKP victory in the 2002 general elections which made it possible to form a single party government and undertake block privatisation of the SEEs. As it is shown in the Table 5.3, during the AKP rule, the privatisation income had reached an unprecedented level and ended the role of the state in the economic activity completely.
5.2.2. The neoliberal rescaling of the peripheral capitalist space through the reorientation of the Turkish economy

The transformation of the Turkish economy from ISI development to EOI based growth is the third aspect of the structural adjustment of the peripheral capitalist relations within the context of worldwide ‘intensification and extensification’ of the capitalist spatiality. Turkey signed the ‘Association Agreement’ with the ‘European Economic Community’ (Ankara Treaty) in September 1963 which assigned preparatory and transitional stages for the eventual accession of Turkey to the community as a full member. In the beginning of the transitional period, an additional protocol was signed between Turkey and the EEC which envisaged that Turkey should be a member of the customs union before her full membership to the ECC (Celâsun and Rodrik 1989: 622; Arat 1995: 589).

Source: Republic of Turkey Prime Ministry Privatisation Administration (2011).
Following the preparatory period, Turkey and the EEC signed the Supplementary Protocol to the Ankara Treaty in 1970. With the protocol, the EEC eliminated all custom duties and charges on manufactured goods from Turkey from 1973 while some exceptions were made regarding some oil products and, in particular, textile products and, hence, the trade relationship between Turkey and EEC entered a new phase which brought a strong stimulation for the Turkish industrial production (Elveren and Kar 2005: 5), even though Turkey did not reduce duties on some products until she committed to decrease the rates during the 1989-1992 period (Togan 1994: 27). Turkey further simplified its tariff policies in 1993 by setting only two tariff rates as one for the EU/EFTA products and one for the imports from other countries (De Santis 2001: 115).

By becoming a member of the Customs Union in 1996, Turkey was required to adopt all of the preferential trade agreements of the EU by 2001 and harmonise its national regulations and standards with the EU to avoid technical barriers to the trade of the Turkish industrial products (Togan et al 2005: 94). Turkey also required harmonising its quality certification infrastructure with EU accreditation, certification, inspection and operation of standardisation rules. Gradually, Turkey harmonised its technical legislation, both in vertical and horizontal levels, which gave a comparative advantage in industrial products (Togan et al 2005: 108). By 2001, Turkey reduced the nominal protection rate on the industrial commodities to 1.34 percent from 22.14 percent in 1994, and eliminated all ad valorem duty or quota applied in agricultural products, excluding hazelnuts and tomato paste (Togan 2000: 7).
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Years</th>
<th>EU</th>
<th>North Africa</th>
<th>Near and Middle East</th>
<th>Turkic republics</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2010</td>
<td>46.2</td>
<td>6.1</td>
<td>20.4</td>
<td>3.44</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2009</td>
<td>46</td>
<td>7.2</td>
<td>18.7</td>
<td>3.32</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2008</td>
<td>48</td>
<td>4.43</td>
<td>19.2</td>
<td>2.83</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2007</td>
<td>56</td>
<td>3.75</td>
<td>14.05</td>
<td>2.67</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2006</td>
<td>56</td>
<td>3.62</td>
<td>13.22</td>
<td>2.31</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2005</td>
<td>56.2</td>
<td>3.46</td>
<td>13.86</td>
<td>1.91</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2004</td>
<td>57.9</td>
<td>3.48</td>
<td>12.54</td>
<td>1.89</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2003</td>
<td>57.97</td>
<td>3.33</td>
<td>11.56</td>
<td>1.90</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2002</td>
<td>56.6</td>
<td>3.51</td>
<td>9.53</td>
<td>1.71</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2001</td>
<td>55.9</td>
<td>3.66</td>
<td>10.26</td>
<td>1.77</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2000</td>
<td>56.3</td>
<td>3.91</td>
<td>9.26</td>
<td>2.01</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1999</td>
<td>58</td>
<td>5.05</td>
<td>9.65</td>
<td>2.15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1998</td>
<td>54.9</td>
<td>5.58</td>
<td>9.93</td>
<td>3.09</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1997</td>
<td>51.1</td>
<td>3.73</td>
<td>10.74</td>
<td>3.45</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1996</td>
<td>54</td>
<td>4.26</td>
<td>11.47</td>
<td>3.21</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Source: Turkish Statistical Institute (2011)*

This comprehensive incorporation of the Turkish economy into the European economic structure had both a qualitative and quantitative impact on Turkish exports. While the share of the EU countries fell from 54 percent in 1996 to 46.2 percent in 2010 in Turkey’s overall exports, the volume of this trade increased almost five-fold from 12.5 billion dollars to 52.6 in the same time period. At the same time, the volume of trade with the EU countries increased more than four-fold (Table 5.5).
Table 5.5. Turkey’s Exports (volume) between 1996-2010 in million dollars

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Years</th>
<th>EU</th>
<th>North Africa</th>
<th>Near and Middle East</th>
<th>Turkic republics</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2010</td>
<td>52,685.304</td>
<td>7,025.168</td>
<td>23,294.873</td>
<td>3,921.072</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2009</td>
<td>47,013.415</td>
<td>7,415.776</td>
<td>19,192.808</td>
<td>3,999.485</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2008</td>
<td>63,390.419</td>
<td>5,850.262</td>
<td>25,430.395</td>
<td>3,749.451</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2007</td>
<td>60,398.502</td>
<td>4,029.683</td>
<td>15,081.322</td>
<td>2,874.467</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2006</td>
<td>47,934.746</td>
<td>3,096.665</td>
<td>11,315.751</td>
<td>1,981.603</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2005</td>
<td>41,364.962</td>
<td>2,544.398</td>
<td>10,184.230</td>
<td>1,409.257</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2004</td>
<td>36,580.859</td>
<td>2,203.356</td>
<td>7,921.284</td>
<td>1,194.307</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2003</td>
<td>27,393.762</td>
<td>1,576.974</td>
<td>5,465.810</td>
<td>889.114</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2002</td>
<td>20,415.034</td>
<td>1,266.596</td>
<td>3,439.789</td>
<td>619.345</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2001</td>
<td>17,545.567</td>
<td>1,149.647</td>
<td>3,261.099</td>
<td>557.362</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2000</td>
<td>15,664.421</td>
<td>1,087.400</td>
<td>2,572.846</td>
<td>572.451</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1999</td>
<td>15,424.238</td>
<td>1,343.558</td>
<td>2,566.397</td>
<td>573.617</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1998</td>
<td>14,809.293</td>
<td>1,506.038</td>
<td>2,680.645</td>
<td>834.983</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1997</td>
<td>13,434.739</td>
<td>980.157</td>
<td>2,821.084</td>
<td>907.834</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1996</td>
<td>12,563.345</td>
<td>991.085</td>
<td>2,595.420</td>
<td>747.290</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Turkish Statistical Institute (2011)

It is possible to argue that this process of incorporation is determined by the neoliberal rescaling of the capitalist spatiality. The structural adjustment programme eliminated all obstacles and paved the way for the full integration of the Turkish economy with the international markets through the European economic structure (Çeçen et al 1994: 52). The rapid integration of the Turkish economy to the international capital markets in the 1990s increased the role of the capital-account channels over the traditional import-export account flows and, thus, played a significant role in the banking and liquidity crisis of Turkey in 2000-2001. Although it was not the
only cause behind the crisis, the increase in the strength of the U.S. dollar against the euro deteriorated the current account deficit of Turkey since while the key imports of Turkey were carried out in U.S. dollars, the majority of the exports were made in euros. This proves that the Turkish economy has been structurally attached more to the European economic system and became more vulnerable in terms of international financial fluctuations (Alper 2001: 75). When Turkey completed the liberalisation of its capital account through the recognition of the full convertibility of the Turkish lira and the de-regulation of all capital movements in its balance of payments transactions in 1989, a massive inflow of short term capital inflow led to the appreciation of the real exchange rates and a long term increase in the interest rates. This trend gradually flamed inflation and made it difficult for the public sector to finance its debts. In this respect, the central bank lost its control and independence over the financial markets and, thereby, the short term capital inflow dependency increased external fragility and creditworthiness while the financial and real sectors became disassociated from each other (Balkan and Yeldan 2002: 8). However, in the Turkish case, this process seemed to be a transitional one since once the creditworthiness in the international financial markets had been re-established with the existence of a strong political authority, the real sector recuperated to its pre-crisis position within the international division of labour, transformed and benefited from the neoliberal trade liberalisation and financial deregulation which facilitated the access to domestic and international markets.

Since joining the European Economic and Monetary Union (EMU) has been accepted as a part of the Acquis Communautaire, Turkey was also required to
fulfil the convergence criteria that includes price stability, interest rate convergence, meeting the limits on budget deficits and government debt, and exchange rate stability (Togan and Erel 2005: 14). As the Euro Zone economic policies had been sterilised from the political and distributive pressures of interest groups and political parties, Turkey needed to fully integrate with this system where any short term policy that would result in inflationary effects or cause budgetary imbalance would be avoided. The main macroeconomic figures show that throughout the implementation of the 2001 IMF stand-by agreement, Turkey either had reached or got close to the general macroeconomic conditions set by the EU in order to join the EMU (Table 5.6).

Table 5.6 Turkey’s Macroeconomic compatibility with the European Economic and Monetary Union Criteria

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Inflation rate (%)</th>
<th>Budget* Deficit (% of GDP)</th>
<th>Interest rates**</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2002</td>
<td>29.7</td>
<td>9.03</td>
<td>41.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2003</td>
<td>18.4</td>
<td>5.55</td>
<td>32.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2004</td>
<td>9.3</td>
<td>2.38</td>
<td>25</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2005</td>
<td>7.7</td>
<td>-2.23</td>
<td>16.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2006</td>
<td>9.7</td>
<td>-2.1</td>
<td>19.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2007</td>
<td>8.4</td>
<td>-1.9</td>
<td>17.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2008</td>
<td>10.1</td>
<td>-0.4</td>
<td>22.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2009</td>
<td>6.5</td>
<td>2.9</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2010</td>
<td>6.4</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>8.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2011</td>
<td>5.5***</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>11****</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Consolidated budget. **Weighted Average Interest Rates for the Bank Loans (Turkish Lira - Commercial). ***Expected figure. ****September.
It is worth noting that public sector borrowing requirements also continually fell after the second half of 2001 from 12 percent to -2 percent in 2006. Due to the unfavourable external economic factors, this ratio increased to 6 percent recently but still remained under the 10 percent threshold (Table 5.7).

Table 5.7 Public Sector Borrowing Requirement/GDP ratio

![Graph](image)

Source: Central Bank of the Republic of Turkey (2011)

In a political environment where the traditional central-bourgeois parties lost their electoral support, the AKP emerged as the only political power that could maintain the hegemonic programme of the neoliberal orthodoxy that links the maintenance of the sustainable balance of payments account (export-oriented long-term economic growth), elimination of the government ownership (privatisation) and banking system regulation (growth supporting financial system supported by a coherent fiscal policy) without
being overwhelmed by the democratic pressures of different interest groups.

It is very important to note that the processes of the peripheral restructuring of the capitalist relations – where the economic structure had been reoriented towards EOI growth – through the establishment of the unrivalled neoliberal hegemony is well explained and defined in the literature (Yalman 2002; Yeldan 2007; Yalman 2007; Yalman 2009; Bedirhanoğlu and Yalman 2010). However, locating this particular moment within the peripheral spatiotemporal processes which manifest the continuity in the uneven relationship between the centre and periphery needs to be clearly posited. Otherwise, as it can be noted in the existing literature that there is a danger of overemphasising a specific stage and leaving out socio-spatially specific structures conditioned by the hierarchising, homogenising and fragmenting processes of the neoliberal capitalist social relations. The regional economic development projects of Turkey and Mexico (chapter four) are structurally conditioned by the transformation and subsequent expansion of the peripheral spatiality within the global neoliberal rescaling, and thus, need to be analysed within this spatiotemporally specific context where capitalist social relations have been intensified domestically and extended towards the marginal spaces.

5.3. Regional economic integration projects of Turkey in the Black Sea, Caucasus and the East Mediterranean regions: the expansion of the capitalist space and social relations

This section analyses the expansion of the peripheral capitalist spatiality towards the marginal spaces in the context of the worldwide neoliberal rescaling of capitalist social relations in the case of Turkey. As it has been previously shown in the case of Mexico’s neoliberal rescaling and its regional
integration projects, this multiscalar process of neoliberal reconfiguration of the capitalist spatiality gave rise to many regional and sub-national scales of strategies where the State power underwent a qualitative transformation (Lefebvre 2001: 773; Soja et al. 1983: 202; Swyngedouw 1992: 426; Brenner 1998: 427). Furthermore, as it has also been argued in the Mexican case, it will be observed that through the contemporary regional integration projects of Turkey, the previously conceptualised (chapter two) exogenous and uneven features of the formation of the peripheral capitalist space have been reproduced in new socio-spatial forms. In this respect, the analysis of the expansion of the peripheral capitalist spatiality through the regional and sub-national scales of strategies of Turkey, three different forms of regional integration strategy will be examined. The initiative that led to the establishment of the ‘Black Sea Economic Organisation’ (BSEC) which aimed for the creation of the necessary legal and institutional conditions for the expansion of the capitalist development through integrating and incorporating the ex-Soviet bloc countries in the Black Sea and in the Balkans is the first strategy that will be analysed. The construction of the physical conditions for the expansion of the capitalist accumulation by building up the necessary infrastructure such as the Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan oil line, Nabucco gas pipelines and Transcaucasus railway and highways will be the second strategy in which the capitalist spatiality expanded towards the marginal spaces. Finally the ‘Levant Project’ between Turkey, Syria, Lebanon and Jordan which combined the previous two strategies –creation of necessary legal/institutional and physical conditions- will be observed. These projects will be analysed through emphasising the specific spatiotemporal processes in which they have been
structurally conditioned as a part of the worldwide restructuring/rescaling of the capitalist spatiality.

Two arguments have been put forward to explain Turkey’s recent regional integration efforts through mainstream approaches in the self-claimed fields of Europanisation, European integration and Turkish foreign policy studies. The first group of arguments suggested that Turkey’s contemporary regional policies should be seen as the natural side-products of Turkey’s political convergence with the European Union and, by ‘being a part of the team’, Turkey plays a role complementing the European Union’s interests in the region (Müftüler 1995: 85; Emerson and Tocci: 44; Aydın and Açıkmeşe 2007: 265). This argument gained support among the mainstream studies after Turkey gained EU membership candidate status in 1999 and started candidacy negotiations in 2004. However, currently it has been replaced by another mainstream argument that claims these projects are a reflection of Turkey’s ‘new geographical vision’ lying in the proper utilisation of its unique geographical position (Davutoğlu 1998: 9; Davutoğlu 2008: 36; Aras 2009: 3-6).

It has also argued that Turkey started to assign areas of influence parallel to its geopolitical frontiers and started to put an emphasis on the surrounding sub-regions to increase the economic interdependency as an undeclared regional hegemony (Murinson 2006: 952; Davutoğlu 2009: 19) by ‘re-integrating’ regions that were in fact historically united (Larabee 2010: 160)39.

Both of these very limited and superficial arguments do share the same thin conceptualisation that boils down the rational choice of the political actors for

39 This type of rhetorical re-creation of a region on the basis of an assumption that these divided sub-regions were in fact historically unified is strikingly similar to the case of re-invention of the Mesoamerican geographical imagination which had been promoted by the Plan Puebla-Panama – PM.
the sake of national interests. Neither of them questions the continuity between those policies during the whole period of neoliberal restructuring, nor do they provide a meaningful analysis of the characteristics of these projects in depth. In other words, rather than focusing on the longue durée conditions, these studies focuses on the short time span in a journalistic way and, thus, fail to provide a meaningful analysis of these regional integration projects.

In 1992, the six Black Sea nations, Bulgaria, Georgia, Romania, Russia, Turkey and Ukraine, as well as five other countries in the immediate neighbourhood of the Black Sea region, Albania, Armenia, Azerbaijan, Greece and Moldova, signed the agreement which formed the ‘Black Sea Cooperation organisation (BSEC)’ in Istanbul. This multi-lateral cooperation programme was planned by Turkey during the Özal administration and found a fertile ground for its initiation after the dismantling of the Soviet Union (Manoli 2007: 8). One of the initial objectives of the formation of the BSEC was to create a ‘free trade zone’ in the region but gradually the emphasis was given to economic cooperation which would facilitate the process of transition to the market economy structures in the former Soviet economies of the region (Dikkaya and Orhan 2004: 64). In its founding declaration, the BSEC defined its aim as ‘identifying, developing and carrying out’ concrete projects in the areas of ‘transport and communications, including their infrastructure; informatics; exchange of economic and commercial information, including statistics; standardization and certification of products; energy; mining and processing of mineral raw materials; tourism; agriculture and agro-industries; veterinary and sanitary protection; health care and pharmaceuticals; and science and technology’ (BSEC 1992: 2). Among these areas, laying regional and trans-regional fibre optic cables, energy transportation projects and a transportation infrastructure
integrated with the European networks were defined as the special priorities of the organisation (BSEC 1996: 4-5).

BSEC member states defined the organisation as a part of the European architecture and therefore, gave a special importance to the process of economic integration with the European Union (BSEC 1996: 1). The aim of economic integration with the EU claimed to be achieved through the trade liberalisation and harmonisation of the foreign trade between the member states, and also with the EU countries (BSEC 1998: 1). According to the BSEC Istanbul Declaration, the member countries were committed to reduce or eliminate all kinds of obstacles before the expansion of the mutual trade in goods and services. The obstacles refer mainly to the structural barriers including tariffs and legal frameworks (BSEC 2002, Tsardanidis 2005: 367).

However, the economic characteristics of the BSEC countries reveal that Greece, Russia and Turkey have the greatest percentages of the service sectors and the lowest percentages of agriculture overall in their GDPs (Dikkaya and Orhan 2004: 68). This means that among BSEC countries, these three countries would benefit most from trade liberalisation and the harmonisation of foreign trade. Another important positive aspect would be for the biggest energy importing economies of Greece and Turkey from other members of the BSEC, Russia and Ukraine (Dikkaya and Orhan 2004: 73).

The BSEC defined the private sector as the driving force of the consolidation of the BSEC process, so it aimed to encourage the maximum involvement of the private enterprises in the BSEC projects. In that sense, the participant countries agreed to create a favourable ‘business environment’, facilitating the free movement of businessmen and ensuring appropriate conditions for
investment, capital flows and economic cooperation, particularly by eliminating the double taxation (BSEC 1992: 3). The BSEC also assumed responsibility for the consolidation of the democratic institutions ‘towards a united Europe’, where the free market economy was perceived as the necessary part of a ‘democratic and open society’ (BSEC 1998: 1-2; BSEC 2002: 65).

In 1994, the Black Sea Trade and Development Bank (BSTDB) was established in Thessalonica, Greece, with one billion dollar SDR ‘to assist the intra-regional trade, especially of capital goods, to finance common regional projects and enterprises, cooperate with the international financial institutions, establish and operate Special Funds for specific purposes and to promote investment in economic and social infrastructure projects by way of guarantees, participations and other financial arrangements’ (BSTDB 1994: 3-4; Micu 1996: 1). While the BSTDB increased its financial capacity, it envisaged increasing its role as the financial arm of the BSEC, financing the projects in ‘physical infrastructure and related services; social infrastructure; renewable energy; power generation, transport and distribution; municipal services; and environmental protection’ (BSTDB 2009: 11). In that sense, the BSTDB put an emphasis on supporting the banking, finance and energy sectors and transport initiatives such as the ‘Extension of Motorways of the Sea in the BSEC Region’ (MSBR) and the ‘Black Sea Ring Highway’ (BSRH) (BSTDB 2009: 14). Therefore, it can be argued that, in a sense, the BSEC aimed to establish the necessary conditions of the neoliberal rescaling of the capitalist space, reproducing the exogenous and uneven character of the peripheral capitalist spatiality.
The institutionalisation agenda of the BSEC later went beyond the establishment of the financial conditions. The BSEC undertook initiatives in terms of security issues such as terrorism, drugs, organised crime and illegal immigration (Tsardanidis 2005: 370). In 2001, the ‘Black Sea Naval Cooperation Task Group (Blackseafor)’ founding agreement was signed by the officials from Black Sea countries in Istanbul to form an emergency force that could be tasked with missions of search and rescue, humanitarian aid, de-mining measures, environmental protection and training operations (Emerson and Tocci 2004: 12).

The BSEC also developed inter-regional collaborations and coordination meetings with other regional organisations such as the Adriatic-Ionian Initiative (AII), the Danube Cooperation Process (DCP), the Southeast European Cooperative Initiative (SECI), the Council of Baltic Sea States and the Nordic Council of Ministers (Tsardanidis 2005: 379). Establishing a closer economic cooperation between BSEC and EU is one of the most emphasised objectives since the foundation of the organisation in 1992. The 1999 ‘EU-BSEC Platform for Cooperation’ document envisaged such a strategy which underlined the development of network infrastructure in transport, energy and telecommunication as one of the priority areas (Tsardanidis 2005: 381). Also, the BSTDB established strong financial partnerships with Austrian (Oesterreichische Entwicklungsbank -OeEB), German (Kreditanstalt für Wiederaufbau -KfW Banking Group) and Dutch (Nederlandse Financierings – FMO) development banks (BSTDB 2009: 13-14).

Therefore, it can be argued that the rescaled and export-oriented Turkey played a significant role in the initiation of the BSEC facilitating the re-
territorialisation processes of the former COMECON economies to the free market economies and integrated them with the European economic structure. The BSEC became one of the platforms that through the neoliberal rescaling can be channelled towards the marginal spaces, and capitalist peripheral spatiality can be extended through Turkey in the form of the development of the necessary infrastructure and institutions for the establishment of the market economy (Bocutoğlu 2005: 2). These projects were financed and supported significantly by the European capital through the development banks. As the financial arm of the BSEC, in 2010, the BSTDB financed or co-financed wind farms, airport construction, industry parks, private financial institutions and small and middle enterprises (SMEs) in the member states (BSTDB 2010: 21).

Therefore, Turkey’s successful initiative in the foundation of the BSEC should be seen as a structurally conditioned project within the global rescaling of the capitalist spatiality where the neoliberal social relations of capitalism extends towards the marginal spaces within the periphery of the peripheral capitalist space, establishing the conditions of the capitalist accumulation both in terms of institutional framework and physical infrastructure. The peripheral capitalist space which is already integrated with the centre in a different form of uneven relationship assumes a spatiotemporally specific role in this global rescaling process by channelling the neoliberal re-territorialisation and reproduction of

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40 As an example of these financing operations, in 2010, the BSTDB operated and co-financed with the Dutch FMO a 105 million dollar project to support the growth strategy of a Turkish bank called ‘Alternatifbank’ who wanted to expand its portfolio by extending the credits available to the small and medium size enterprises (BSTDB 2010: 27). This shows what extent the neoliberal capitalist rescaling can be channelled from a multi-national development bank to a SME manufacturer without establishing a direct link between the two.
different forms of uneven relationships between the centre and the marginal spaces.

The creation of the physical conditions of the capitalist accumulation in the Caspian and Trans-Caucasus regions should be elaborated as another area that the neoliberal capitalist rescaling has been channelled by Turkey to its region. It can be argued that there are two major factors which condition Turkey’s initiatives to create an energy hub in the region in which the major regional oil and gas pipelines will be connected. Firstly, the Turkish economy is dependent on imported energy supplies; 65 percent in its total energy consumption and this dependency is expected to increase to 75 percent in the next fifteen years. The energy problem of Turkey deepened with the UN Security Council resolution in 1990 which closed the Kirkuk-Yumurtalik oil line that used to transport Iraqi oil to the Turkish port of Ceyhan by creating more dependency and causing huge loss of revenues (Baran 2005: 104). Currently, the Russian Federation supplies 60 percent of Turkey’s gas need, and with the crude oil in total, Turkey’s energy imports amount to around 30 billion dollars every year (Barysch 2007: 2).

The second aspect of Turkey’s oil and gas pipeline construction efforts is the dependence of the EU economies on the energy supplies in the Caspian Sea and Central Asia regions. EU economies have a strong dependency on the Russian Federation since 30 percent of the crude oil and 50 percent of the natural gas are imported from this source while six of the EU economies receive all of their crude oil from Russia (Baran 2007: 132). The immediate economic implication of this reliance is high tariff rates of the Russian pipelines and an increase in energy costs (Kalicki 2001: 123). Therefore, the EU
Commission planned to strengthen the existing infrastructure besides investing in new physical capacities with the financial support from the ‘European Investment Bank’ (EIB), the ‘European Bank for Reconstruction and Development’ (EBRD), and the ‘Neighbourhood Investment Fund’ (Tekin et al. 2010: 47). In that sense, the ‘Greater Caspian Sea’ (GSC) region appeared as a potential alternative energy route and resource for the European markets (Biresselioğlu 2011: 62).

In 1994, a group of oil companies headed by British Petroleum (BP) signed an agreement with the Azerbaijan state oil company (SOCAR) for the production of oil in the Azeri-Chirag-Gunashli (ACG) offshore oil fields in the Caspian Sea which contains an estimated 5.4 million barrels of oil reserves. Today, the participating companies of the ACG operations are conducted by the British Petroleum (BP)-led Azerbaijan International Operating Company (AIOC) which consists of many major multinational oil companies; BP (operator – 35.78%), Azerbaijani SOCAR (11.65%), American Chevron (11.27%), Japanese INPEX (10.96%), Norwegian Statoil (8.56%), American ExxonMobil (8%), Turkish TPAO (6.75%), Japanese ITOCHU (4.3%), American Hess (2.72%) (Babalı 2005: 31).

With the increasing production capabilities, the transportation of this oil to the western energy markets became an attention grabbing issue (Tekin and Williams 2010: 149). As an alternative to the insufficient Baku-Supsa line, the Turkish state-owned Petroleum Pipeline Corporation (BOTAS) and the AIOC played a significant role in the initiation and construction of the Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan (BTC) oil pipeline to transport crude oil produced by Azerbaijan and Kazakhstan to world markets via a pipeline through Azerbaijan, Georgia and Turkey. In 1999, Turkey, Azerbaijan and Georgia signed an Intergovernmental
Agreement for the construction of the BTC in Istanbul. The BTC became a multi-international consortium, with the shareholders being BP (30.1%); AzBTC (25.00%); Chevron (8.90%); Statoil (8.71%); TPAO (6.53%); ENI (5.00%); Total (5.00%), Itochu (3.40%); INPEX (2.50%), ConocoPhillips (2.50%) and Hess (2.36%) (Babali 2005: 48).

In 2005, the first oil was pumped from Baku and the first oil reached the port of Ceyhan in 2006. The importance of the BTC has been defined as being a significant part of the emerging ‘East-West Superhighway’ which includes upgraded highways, pipelines, railroads, ports, ferries, fibre-optic lines, electricity transmission lines that will make it easier to trade for the Central Asian and Caucasian economies, not with the West but with the world market (Cornell et al. 2005: 21). In other words, the BTC is a project that aims to integrate and locate the economies and resources in Central Asia and the Caucasus within the international division of labour. Both the AIOC and the BTC consortiums are clear examples of expansion of the capital as a result of structural determinants rather than initiatives taken by certain political agents.

Parallel to the BTC the Baku-Tbilisi-Erzurum (South Caucasus Pipeline -SCP) natural gas pipeline became operational in 2007 and carries 10-15 billion cubic metres of natural gas from the Caspian Sea to Europe, 2.1 percent of Europe’s total natural gas import (Tekin and Williams 2009: 346). Thus, a project of constructing a natural gas pipeline from Turkey to Austria has been proposed which will carry 31 billion cubic metres of natural gas from Turkmenistan and, possibly, in the future, from Iraq as well with a pipeline connection under the Caspian Sea to the SCP. Although this huge infrastructure project –Nabucco- would be very costly, it has been argued that the immediate economic impacts
would be quite considerable since the construction of the line would ease the monopoly of the Gazprom in the gas price designation (Barysch 2010: 7). In the recent European Commission reports on Turkey’s progress on the membership process, Nabucco has been mentioned as among the priority projects of the EU and, thus, Turkey should pursue an effort to support it (Tekin and Williams 2009: 351, Tekin and Williams 2010: 163-164).

Besides the oil and gas pipeline construction projects, Turkey also worked for the further integration of the Central Asian and Caucasian economies to the west European and world markets through other infrastructural projects. As part of the Eurasian Rail Network and the Transport Corridor Europe the Caucasus-Asia programme (TRACECA) was launched in order to construct and rehabilitate the TransCaucasus railway network. Turkey completed the railway construction between Tbilisi and Kars which connected the Asian and European railway networks and cut the freight distance from Europe to Asia by 50 percent (Gorshkov and Bagaturia 2000: 47).

To sum up, as in the BSEC case, Turkey’s efforts to create the physical infrastructure that would integrate the marginal spaces located on her periphery to the world markets should be analysed within the context where the neoliberal capitalist spatiality has been re-territorialised globally. Turkish investments in these infrastructure projects in its periphery is directly conditioned by the reorientation of its peripheral capitalist spatiality towards an EOI based economic growth that necessitated the inclusion of the peripheral spaces through the reproduction of an uneven relationship and the features of peripheral capitalist space formation (chapter two), locating those
spaces both as the potential markets for the manufactured goods and, at the same time, as the raw material and energy sources.

Another recent regional initiative undertaken by Turkey is the Levant Project which aimed to increase the trade relations between four ‘East Mediterranean’ countries: Turkey, Syria, Lebanon and Jordan. The project defined 14 issue areas which cover themes such as logistic infrastructure, financial services, regional investment, free movement of persons and commodities, tourism, infrastructure projects financing, research and development and the trade relations with third countries (DEIK 2011). The ‘Foreign Economic Relations Board’ (DEIK) which is an autonomous government agency established a forum between the Turkish, Syrian, Lebanese and Jordanian Chambers of Commerce in order to realise the aims of the project.

Since the 1990s, Turkish officials put an emphasis on the openness policy through ensuring a visa-free movement of people between her neighbouring countries while, with the increasing commercial links, this policy gradually became realised. The ‘Levant project’ aims to achieve two objectives. Firstly, it aimed to substantially harmonise and integrate the legal and physical conditions of trade between the four countries (DEIK 2011). Since Turkey has already substantially harmonised its legal framework of trade within a European framework, harmonising the legal framework for the foreign trade means Syria, Lebanon and Jordan can adopt the legal framework of the European Union and harmonise with it. In this matter, adaptation of one language and a united system of customs has been highlighted as a matter of focus (DEIK 2011).
The second objective of the project is the upgrading of the physical and financial infrastructure and institutions in order to facilitate the international trade between those four countries. In that sense, Turkey will upgrade the railways and existing highways for the better transportation of goods and services and the bank branches will be opened for connecting and facilitating financial transactions (Interview 3, 2011).

The ‘Levant Project’, however, has been terminated due to the current political turmoil in Syria although it aimed to integrate economically underdeveloped regions with the world markets through standardising and harmonising the financial and commercial institutions and legal frameworks, thereby establishing the necessary conditions for the uneven development of the peripheral capitalist space. Thus, it can be argued that the ‘Levant Project’ is a project that would reproduce uneven relationships within the context of global neoliberal rescaling where the capitalist spatiality is intensified and extended.

5.4. Conclusion

This chapter focused on the specific spatiotemporal processes in which the centre-periphery relationship had been produced, reproduced and consolidated while the peripheral capitalist spatiality simultaneously formed, transformed and expanded. In order to analyse these processes, this chapter pointed out that each stage of this spatiotemporal process is equally significant in understanding the specific forms of socio-spatial configurations.

It is observed in this chapter that the post-passive revolutionary period -where the peripheral capitalist spatiality of Turkey had been consolidated- was marked by the ISI developmental form of capitalist accumulation which has been spatiotemporally conditioned. The limited national bourgeoisie based its
hegemony on the nation-state consensus which assumed the responsibility of the economic growth and the industrial expansion. Therefore, the legitimacy of the bourgeois hegemony linked with the maintenance of the capitalist accumulation. Since the ISI development was heavily dependent on foreign financial resources while the capitalist accumulation has been furthered during this period, it did also deepen the uneven relationship between the centre and the periphery. The exhaustion of the ISI based strategies during the 1970s marked the diminishing legitimacy of the bourgeois hegemony which resulted in the 1980 military coup d’état. The 1980 coup d’état did pave the way for the recuperation of the bourgeois legitimacy through the restructuring of the capitalist spatiality.

The deepened unevenness manifested itself more concretely during the worldwide neoliberal rescaling of the capitalist spatiality where these peripheral spaces - and Turkey - underwent very drastic transformation processes of structural adjustment and re-reorientation of the industrial structure. This reorientation of the industrial structure culminated in Turkey’s incorporation into the European economic structure through the ECU, which repositioned Turkey’s peripheral location within the neoliberal international capitalist division of labour.

This chapter echoes the similar rescaling process that had been discussed in the previous chapter (chapter four) on the restructuring of the Mexican peripheral capitalist spatiality and argued that the regional economic integration and development projects of Turkey need to be evaluated as a part of the worldwide neoliberal restructuring process where the marginal spaces had been incorporated into the capitalist periphery. Turkey plays a significant
role in the reproduction of the uneven relationship through the extending the peripheral capitalist spatiality towards those spaces in the form of regional integration projects. It has been observed in this section that the regional integration initiatives of Turkey are establishing the necessary conditions for the expansion of the capitalist social relations and therefore channel the neoliberal rescaling processes to its immediate geography through reproducing the exogenous and uneven features of the peripheral capitalist space formation.

In this respect, the regional integration projects that have been initiated in Turkey during the late 1980s and the more recent and ambitious projects undertaken by the AKP government were analysed within the same spatiotemporal process where the peripheral capitalist spatiality was extended towards the ‘unutilised’ marginal spaces. Therefore, as the previous chapter examined the underpinning spatiotemporal conditions of these regional integration projects and defined them as the incorporation of the marginal spaces into the international division of labour within the context of neoliberal re-territorialisation, this chapter also identified the same spatiotemporal conditions which are being reproduced in the immediate periphery of Turkey and located these projects as a part of the same global process of transformation of the capitalist spatiality.
Conclusion

‘The question whether objective truth can be attributed to human thinking is not a question of theory but it is a practical question. Man must prove this truth, i.e., the reality and power, the this-worldliness of his thinking in practice. The dispute over the reality or non-reality of thinking which isolates itself from practice is a purely scholastic question’.


‘The understanding of space cannot reduce the lived to the conceived, nor the body to a geometric or optic abstraction. On the contrary this understanding must begin with the lived and the body, that is, from a space occupied by an organic living and thinking being.’


This work proposes an alternative analysis of the regional economic integration and development projects of Mexico and Turkey through presenting a spatiotemporal analysis of the processes of formation, consolidation, transformation and expansion of the peripheral capitalist spatiality. It is argued that the existing ahistoric and spaceless themes and categories which have been produced and reproduced by the conventional social sciences where time and space are separated into fixed, self-evident and measurable units on the basis of the unquestioned Newtonian and Cartesian premises are incapable of providing a meaningful analysis of the constantly transforming social reality. Therefore, this work employed an incorporated comparison (McMichael 1990; McMichael 1992) in providing
the spatiotemporal analysis of the regional integration projects of Mexico and Turkey which defined and explained those projects in terms of the temporally and spatially specific dialectical processes that conditioned the contemporary expansion of the peripheral capitalist spatiality.

This section aims to give a brief summary of the thesis, present the central propositions and contribution of the work, and discuss its limitations. In order to do that, first it will point out the central propositions and the contribution of the thesis. This will be followed by the discussion of the major limitations of the thesis which can be considered and elaborated in a further inquiry. In the last instance, the issues that are intertwined with the social research but go beyond it will be briefly stated.

Central propositions and contribution

In the first chapter of this work, a critique of the mainstream approaches in international relations and foreign policy studies are presented and it is argued that these approaches are unable to provide a meaningful analysis of world politics and its change. It is observed that one of the main reasons for this inability is the dependence on the disciplinary parameters and borders of international relations as an institutionalised, self-defined and uncontested field of social research. The positivist epistemology separated and compartmentalised the social sciences into disciplines that would operate within the mostly self-defined and uncontested borders which lead to the creation of an ahistoric and spaceless social inquiry that privileges the simultaneous over the historic and the immediate over the distant. While between the past and future a symmetry is established, the present time became the main focus of the social sciences as the source of ‘episodic
history’ which gives the primary and objective data to construct or validate a social theory. In this respect, the positivist foundations of the mainstream international studies lead to the descriptive analysis of world politics which takes the space as the neutral container of the social life. Thereby, the mainstream works on the international relations mainly focused on the formal institutional explanations that ultimately fail to provide structural and systemic examinations of the social reality and social change. In that respect, it has been argued that a broader understanding of the social reality and social change is necessary which grasps the social space in its historicity.

It is important to reinstate that this broader understanding does not mean an interdisciplinary work in the analysis of the world politics. An interdisciplinary approach which operates within the borders of the positivist ontology would only bring new issue areas into the analysis and reproduce the same ahistoric and spaceless notions through the incorporation of a ‘different’ aspect to the existing categories and concepts. As Wallerstein argued, a simple interdisciplinary approach that does not ‘unthink’ the positivist epistemological foundations that rigidly separates the social sciences into different disciplines would not only fail to transcend this institutionalised separation but also strengthen these self-claimed disciplinary borders (Wallerstein 1996: 38; Wallerstein 2001: 2). Therefore, an alternative analysis needs to be built upon different conceptual foundations from the positivist understanding of the social reality.

In this respect, this work presented an alternative conceptual framework for the analysis of the regional integration projects in Mexico and Turkey by locating those projects within the dialectical processes of the formation and
transformation of the peripheral capitalist spatiality. It is important to note that this alternative framework is directly established on the principles of inseparability and relativity of the social time and space. The unity of time and space rejects the positivist themes and categories produced through the ahistoric and spaceless history and geography which are the two main Newtonian and Cartesian premises that the mainstream international relations studies are built on. It is also argued in this work that the unity of time and space in the analysis of the social reality and its constant transformation can be established through the Marxist dialectical materialist method. Marxist dialectics defined and unravelled the complex and continually changing processes of the production of the social reality through the examination of the mutual realisation of the being and human consciousness, the creation of the physical and ideational world of human beings. On these premises, this work conceptualised and presented a spatiotemporally specific analysis through the incorporated comparison of the dialectical processes of the constant production and reproduction of the capitalist spatiality in Mexico and Turkey.

Features of the exogenous formation of peripheral capitalist space

The key feature of this spatiotemporally specific conceptual framework proposed in this thesis is the peripheral conditioning of the capitalist spatiality in Mexico and Turkey. Therefore, the work first aimed to explain and unravel the structural conditions and features of the peripheral capitalist spatiality which have been produced and reproduced constantly. In order to do that, the spatiotemporally specific theories of Luxemburg, Trotsky and Gramsci are linked to each other in a novel way in chapter two. By linking
these theories to each other, a strong conceptual tool is presented in the explanation of the interrelated processes of the development of peripheral capitalist spatiality during the 19th century. Examining the development of the capitalist productive forces and social relations in Poland, Luxemburg demonstrated that the development of the capitalist spatiality in periphery is an integral part of the processes of the accumulation of capital in the industrialised centre through her concept of ‘enlarged reproduction’. Enlarged reproduction is a necessary phase in the capitalist accumulation conditioned by the internal contradictions of capitalism which induces capitalist expansion. Building on this point, she examined the transformation of the traditional social relations in the periphery in the case of Poland parallel to the replacement of the natural economy and the initiation of the primitive accumulation which gradually evolved into the foreign operated development of capitalist forces. And the point that Luxemburg left, Trotsky continued. Trotsky focused on the rapid development of the Russian capitalist productive forces during the 19th century which was retarded previously due to the geographical positioning of the country. This type of foreign induced rapid industrial development in the periphery was identified as the uneven and combined development of capitalism by Trotsky in which some sectors in society flourished and transformed swiftly while the others remained sluggish and even, up to a degree protected the pre-capitalist forms. Explaining the Italian Risorgimento, Gramsci emphasised the limited development of the national bourgeois in Italy conditioned by this rapid, exogenous, peripheral development of capitalism. His theory of passive revolution highlights a significant historical moment that the blocked dialectic in the process of capitalist development had been unclogged and
laid down the conditions for the consolidation of the peripheral capitalist spatiality. In that sense, it is a moment that the limited bourgeoisie resolves the contradictions of the uneven and combined development and establishes its hegemony by driving support from the popular forces. The national bourgeoisie then consolidates the peripheral capitalist spatiality during the post-passive revolutionary period by reorganising the state and society in a revolutionary manner but without changing the capitalist social relations and economic structure. These three theories allowed the conceptualisation of the dialectical formation and movement of the peripheral capitalist spatiality and, therefore unravelled the temporally and spatially specific features of the complex and contested processes of peripheral capitalist space formation in Mexico and Turkey. And on these premises, the post-passive revolutionary consolidation, neoliberal transformation and expansion of the peripheral capitalist space in Mexico and Turkey has been built upon (Table 1).

Therefore, the spatiotemporally specific conceptual framework that is constructed and employed in this work is a crucial part of the incorporated comparison of the regional integration projects of Mexico and Turkey. It has been observed that since they were structured by the same spatiotemporal conditions these two social spaces followed strikingly similar processes of development and transformation of their peripheral capitalist spatiality even though they are located in different geographies with different morphological and cultural characteristics, natural resources, in different size and populations. In this respect, contrary to the mainstream social sciences, this work focused on the interrelated dialectical processes rather than the reified ahistoric and spaceless units of analysis. It is important to note that this dialectical approach does not perceive these spatiotemporal processes as
linear and deterministic developments or in terms of historical necessity but, on the contrary, identifies them as dynamic processes of production and reproduction of the uneven development of social space which is continually contested and reshaped.

*The production of peripheral capitalist space in Mexico and Turkey*

In chapter three, the analysis started from the period when, for the first time, the impacts of the industrial revolution began to be felt in the pre-capitalist geographies. The gradually developing unequal relationship led to the reform attempts of the Bourbons in Mexico and the *Nizam-ı Cedid* reforms of Sultan Selim III and Sultan Mahmud II in Ottoman Turkey as can be seen in the first column of Table 1. These reforms were limited in the sense of bringing substantial social reorganisation by remaining in the area of the administrative and military restructuring and exclusively aiming to increase the state revenues by the efficient and orderly taxation of the production in land. However, the further maturation and expansion of the capitalist centre towards these peripheral spaces replaced the natural economies in Mexico and Turkey with the capitalist commodity economy, thus gradually dissolved the traditional social relations of pre-capitalist production, particularly the property relations of land. This was quickly translated into the liberal political programme comprising the recognition of private property, individual rights and constitutionalism which struggled with the traditional social forces in the form of reactionary conservatism. It was during this period that the modern administrative apparatuses were introduced, the first penal codes were adapted from the Code Napoleón and the first commercial courts were established, etc. Parallel to the further development of the capitalist
spatiality, both in Mexico and Turkey, the capitalist social relations succeeded in eliminating these traditional social relations and their reactionary forces. In Mexico, independence was gained from Spain in 1820, the extra-economic control of the Church and the colonial bureaucracy was defeated with the 1857 constitution. In Ottoman Turkey, the high clergy lost its military power when the Janissaries were eliminated in 1826 and reactionary conservatism remained limited throughout the Tanzimat regime.

Both during the Restored Republic in Mexico and the Tanzimat regime in Ottoman Turkey, the capitalist social relations continued to unfurl but the rapid uneven and combined expansion of the capitalist productive forces only materialised during the authoritarian regimes of General Porfirio Díaz (1876-1910) and Sultan Abdul Hamid II (1876-1909). During this period, the railways and other necessary infrastructure for the capitalist accumulation were constructed, the extraction and exports of the raw materials increased considerably, the agricultural production was integrated with the world markets and was thereby oriented parallel to the needs of the international demands, and the manufacture of the commodities for the domestic consumption was expanded. This process was directly induced by foreign capital investment either through the direct investments in the railway constructions, mining or agricultural plantations or through the public loans which substantially increased due to the expanding and strengthening central state apparatuses. The foreign financial institutions became the dominant economic actors during this period in both countries enabling the investments in the industrial expansion and in the infrastructural development. Parallel to this economic development, the state structure and the political power reached its highest level of centralisation, both through
the improved means of transportation and through the enhancement of the administrative and military power of the central government. Ironically, the aims of the 19th century economic programme of the Mexican and Ottoman liberals were achieved during the progressive Caesarist periods of the Porfirian and Hamidian administrations which suspended the constitutional processes and maintained the political stability through eliminating any kind of opposition to the central authority.

*Post-passive revolutionary consolidation*

It is argued in this work that the contradictions accumulated through the uneven and combined development of the capitalist forces led to the passive revolutions of Mexico (1910-1920) and Turkey (1908-1925) which eliminated the old regime and replaced it with the precarious hegemony of the limited national bourgeoisie in the political form of Mexican and Turkish nation-states. The peripheral capitalist space was consolidated and institutionalised during the post-passive revolutionary period which allowed the national bourgeoisie to reorganise the state and society through deepening the legitimisation of its hegemony. In the context of the global economic contraction, the national bourgeoisies in Mexico and Turkey found fertile ground to achieve the economic growth through the dependent industrial expansion materialised by the ISI strategies (Table 1). With the implementation of these policies, the government appeared as the supreme arbiter of the ‘classless’ society and an important economic actor, in terms of allocating financial resources, planning and establishing public economic enterprises and continuing the construction of the necessary infrastructure for the exogenous capitalist accumulation. ISI was a historical and foreign
dependent response to the balance of payment problems in the periphery during the global capitalist contraction but simultaneously facilitated the expansion of the domestic industries in the manufacture of capital intensive goods for the consumption in the national markets.

The neoliberal transformation

However, the limited and exogenous nature of the ISI policies for achieving sustainable industrial expansion and economic growth became a significant problem for both Mexico and Turkey in the post-War period. During the worldwide rescaling of neoliberal capitalism both economies underwent significant restructuring processes which reoriented the industrial production patterns towards an export-oriented growth strategy. This neoliberal restructuring of the peripheral capitalist spatiality eventually incorporated Mexico and Turkey into the centre through the NAFTA and European Customs Union while simultaneously creating the necessary conditions to extend itself towards the ‘marginal’ spaces in the form of regional integration projects. In this respect, this work located and defined these projects as a part of the contemporary worldwide rescaling of the neoliberal capitalist relations and the reproduction and extension of the uneven development of the capitalist spatiality on the sub-regional scale.

Contemporary expansion of the peripheral capitalist space

It is observed in this work that the regional integration projects that have been initiated in Mexico and Turkey are structurally conditioned rather than strategically decided by an institutional/official or personal/political agency. These projects aim to establish the necessary institutional framework and physical infrastructure for the expansion of the neoliberal capitalist social
relations towards the marginalised spaces through incorporating those regions into the international division of labour (Table 1). In the case of Mexico, the Plan Puebla-Panama (PPP) has been initiated in order to integrate south-southeast Mexico and Central American countries with the international markets. It is important to note that this project did not start with the political initiative of the President Vicente Fox but emerged much earlier in different forms parallel to the neoliberal restructuring of Mexico during the 1980s and particularly following Mexico’s own incorporation into the North American economic structure. The plan envisaged major infrastructural development projects which would enable the expansion of the maquiladora industry, exploiting the cheap labour force and valorising the extremely rich and ‘underutilised’ natural resources and biodiversity of the region. This aim corresponds with the worldwide neoliberal rescaling process where the reserved spaces will be integrated with the international markets and utilised.

Structured by the same spatiotemporal conditions, Turkey initiated several regional integration projects parallel to the export-oriented neoliberal restructuring of its economy which culminated in its incorporation into the European economic structure through the European Customs Union. Following the dissolution of the Soviet Union, Turkey initiated the Black Sea Economic Corporation (BSEC) to facilitate the transformation of the socialist economies into the capitalist market economies. The BSEC was later transformed into a regional cooperation organisation which finances the local infrastructure projects and invests in small and medium enterprises. Turkey has also been the primary proponent of the other regional infrastructure projects that would increase the commercial connectivity and
industrial productivity in the region. In that sense, Turkey energetically sought the completion of the projects like the Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan gas and oil pipeline, the NABUCCO gas pipeline and the Trans-Caucasus railway which were projects that the multinationally financed and operated. Recently, the ‘Levant Project’ between Turkey, Syria, Lebanon and Jordan was initiated by Turkey in order to establish the necessary physical and legal conditions for the development of capitalist social relations in the East Mediterranean region.

Therefore, this work presented a spatiotemporally specific analysis which has argued that the regional integration projects of Mexico and Turkey are structurally conditioned by the expansion of the peripheral capitalist spatiality where the conditions of the global rescaling processes of the neoliberal capitalist spatiality have been channelled to the marginal spaces (Table 1). These regional integration projects aim to incorporate those marginal spaces into the global neoliberal economic structure through the establishment of the necessary conditions for the expansion of the capitalist productive forces and social relations which reproduce the uneven and exogenous features of the peripheral capitalist state formation processes.

It was also empirically shown that the transition to capitalism follows different dialectical tracks in the centre and in the periphery and takes different socio-spatial forms. These different socio-spatial forms are also subject to continual transformation comprising interrelated processes in which the social space has been produced, contested and reproduced -or ruptured- on multiple social scales. In that sense, the conceptual framework that had been presented in this work can be used in the exploration of similar
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dialectical processes and in examining similar and different aspects of the formation and transformation of the peripheral capitalist spaces that had been structured by the same spatiotemporal conditions. Furthermore, it was argued that all other inter-spatial relations in the form of regional integration and economic development projects should be evaluated from a spatiotemporally specific context which would enable to explore the underlying social relations behind social change on different scales.

Critical self-reflections

It is important to emphasise the dialectical nature of the process of formation and reproduction of the capitalist spaces since the production of social space needs to be seen as a dynamic and contested process rather than a deterministic subordination of the periphery to the centre. This aspect can also be considered as one of the limitations of this work. The resistance to the expansion of the neoliberal capitalist productive forces and social relations has not been examined through in-depth analysis in this work. Nevertheless, the reactionary/revolutionary contestations and resistance will be a determinant factor in the upcoming resolution of the contradictions that have been cultivated by the neoliberal capitalist social relations in the modern society and its contemporary extension towards the marginal spaces. The indigenous resistance movements in the south-southeast Mexico and in the further south, in the Maya region, the momentous student movement of ‘YoSoy132’ against the presidential candidate of PRI -Enrique Peña Nieto- who is associated with Salinismo, or the rise of democratic and Christian socialist movements in the wider Central American region can be seen as the initial responses to the expanding neoliberal social relations. The neoliberal
rescaling and extension of the peripheral capitalist spatiality deteriorated even more with the constant pauperisation and dispossession of the local and indigenous communities in the region who lived under the assault of the capitalist expansion in the last two centuries. It is also possible to observe that sporadic and disconnected forms of resistances are gaining momentum in Turkey for the first time in thirty years after the military coup of 1980 even though the ruling neoliberal AKP party enjoys the climax of its political power. The TEKEL workers’ long term resistance against the privatisation of the public cigarette company, the contracted teachers’ movement and the several environmentalist anti micro-dam initiatives received very harsh reactions from the state authority which shows the seriousness of the counter-hegemonic capabilities of these groups. In the immediate geography of Turkey, the response to the neoliberal expansion can be seen as the increasing aspirations for the adaptation of a liberal programme which would eliminate the extra-economic measures of the existing autocratic regimes and would guarantee the political and economic rights.

The dialectical nature of the global processes of neoliberal re-territorialisation of capitalist spatiality which were channelled in the periphery through the spatial expansion of the neoliberal practices and the counter-hegemonic resistances to these processes is perfectly captured in Lefebvre’s notion of autogestion. Autogestion or self-management is defined as a site and stake of constant struggle which is born spontaneously from the capitalist mode of production (Lefebvre 1966/2009: 149; Lefebvre 1979/2001: 779). It appears from the zones of weakness of the capitalist society and could turn it to the strong counter-hegemonic points (Lefebvre 1966/2009: 144). The 1871 Paris Commune was a good example of the
counter-hegemonic spatial practice of autogestion where the weakest point of the French bourgeois was seized by the working class and turned into the strongest site of the revolutionary struggle. Marx emphasised the dialectical nature of this struggle by defining the Commune as the direct antithesis of the French Empire. In this respect, he argued that the working class cannot emancipate itself by simply seizing ‘the ready-made state machinery and wielding it for its own purposes’ (Marx 1966: 64). The emancipation of the working class was due to the antagonism of the Commune against the State power and functions which was materialised through the establishment of the true democratic institutions (Marx 1966: 70).

Therefore, autogestion cannot coexist with the State since it is the antithesis of it and, in that way, it reveals the contradictions of the contemporary society. Whether the resistances mentioned above would culminate in a moment of autogestion or will degenerate to co-gestion (co-management) is a further question. Nevertheless, it is possible to argue that the counter-hegemonic space and spatiality which was defined as ‘space of difference or differential space’ by Lefebvre will be built upon with the same contradictions laid by the neoliberal restructuring (Lefebvre 1978/2009: 248). Therefore, the zones of weakness -in which the contradictions of the neoliberal processes of intensification and extension will be most salient and where the most contested, repressed and humiliated sectors of the society can be find- will be the sites of capitalist tensions ready to be unclogged by a strategy of autogestion can be these peripheral spaces conditioned by the contemporary re-territorialisation (Lefebvre 1966/2009: 142).
It is also important to consider that the capitalist spatiality comprises many other social aspects and dimensions which would significantly expand the scale of the work. Transition to the capitalist spatiality and its transformation has a substantial impact on the society on many different scales; from the material surroundings, to art and daily life. This includes the formal and informal representations of the space in urban planning, monuments and other social spaces where the official and non-official discourses are produced and reproduced parallel to the processes of reproduction and transformation of the capitalist spaces. These representations differ in a multiscalar way, and take different forms and make different impacts on the national, regional and local scales. This research mainly focused on the transition and transformation of the social space on the national scale which can only outline the more complex and conflicting processes on other scales. Therefore, a future work can explore the transformation on the scale of the ‘subordinated’ which could be the main site of the concrete struggle or the source of autogestion where the weak points of capitalist state power and the contradictions laid and maintained by it would be confronted (Lefebvre 1978/2009: 250).

Beyond the research

As Lefebvre pointed out, the analysis of the contemporary state -the neoliberal capitalist state to be precise- is an essential part of the resistance and political action. The analysis of the state enables a political agenda that unravels the mysteries of the capitalist state which is constructed and maintained by the ideological hegemony of the bourgeois and the revolutionary politics can benefit from this analysis by first destroying the
‘sparkling appearance’ of the neoliberal capitalist society that blurs the truth of the underlying social relations of production, as Lefebvre put it (1964/2009: 64). Therefore, locating, analysing and defining the global rescaling processes of capitalism where the neoliberal social relations of production have been intensified and extended is equally crucial for the textile workers in the maquiladoras of Tehuacán-Puebla and for the peasants of the East-Anatolian mountains who struggle against the micro-dam constructions that valorise the ‘underutilised’ subsoil resources. Since the neoliberal spatiality is not confined in one region or locality, the vitality of the analysis of its expansion is relevant on all other social scales as well. In that sense, the dispossessed urban proletariat and the displaced or forcibly incorporated peasant communities are the subjects of the same process of capitalist transformation. Therefore, it is possible to claim that a meaningful contestation of the existing process can only be formulated with the active participation of the revolutionary working class and through the unification of different strategies that confront the neoliberal rescaling on different scales, on a broader front enlightened by a profound analysis of the spatiotemporal dynamics underlying this multiscalar process of transformation.
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