

**The Eastern Crisis 1875 -1878 in British and
Russian Press and Society**

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Abstract

This thesis of 84,616 words uses the Eastern Crisis of 1875-78 to consider the Press in Great Britain and Russia. 5 case-study chapters consider respectively the reaction to the Bosnian and Hercegovinian revolt of 1875, the Bulgarian 'Atrocity Campaign' of 1876, the outpouring of public sympathy in Russia for the cause of the Serbs in 1876, the involvement of Greece in Eastern crisis, and the British 'Jingo' movement. For each case study, the relationship of the mass activity to the newspaper and periodical press is considered, as well as tracing the interplay between government and Press, and examining whether the Press was able to act as an intermediary between people and government. As this is a comparative study, these movements are considered not only through their own national Press, but through that of the other nation. A recurring theme throughout, is the running current of suspicion existing between Britain and Russia throughout this period, which is analysed in some detail, and shown to have been a highly significant factor in much of what was undertaken by both governments and individuals in Britain and Russia at this time.

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Note on definitions and terminology

Throughout this thesis, the term “Eastern Question” will be used to refer to the general perception in eighteenth and nineteenth Century Europe that the Ottoman Empire was in a state of terminal decline, and the dilemma thus faced by European politicians as to what or who should fill the void it left. The term “Eastern Crisis” will be used to refer to the flare-up in the Balkans between 1875 and 1878 that occupies the primary attention of this thesis.

The term ‘Britain’ will be used through this work, including in translation of the Russian ‘*angliia*’ which, despite being literally ‘England’ was used to refer to the political entity represented by Disraeli, Gladstone or any other of Victoria’s Ministers. This is consistent with the common usage by British politicians of the time, as shown by the example of Gladstone who once, during a speech in Scotland paused to ‘correct’ himself for having said England, then within two or three lines had lapsed back into saying ‘England’ again.¹ Stapleton, following the example of Grainger, also argues that for this period the terms ‘English’ and ‘British’ are essentially synonymous.² Although many historians would dissent from this view, it is one which will be adopted for the purpose of this thesis.

The names of Russian publications and titles of articles therein will be given in English, accompanied by an appropriate transliteration of the Russian on their first appearance, and in isolation thereafter. Quotations will appear in English only, except where a reference to the Russian is needed to illustrate a linguistic nuance.

Many place names in the nineteenth Century were rendered differently from today. For the Balkan Principalities, the older forms ‘Servia,’ ‘Roumania’ etc, will be retained only in direct quotations, with the more modern ‘Serbia’ and

¹ D.W. Bebbington, *The Mind of Gladstone: Religion, Homer & Politics*, (Oxford, 2004), p.275.

² J. Stapleton, ‘Political thought and national identity in Britain, 1850-1950,’ in S. Collini, R. Whatmore & B. Young (Eds.) *History, Religion and Culture: British Intellectual History, 1750-1950*, (Cambridge, 2000), p.245.

‘Romania’ used otherwise. ‘Constantinople’ will be used throughout, rather than ‘Istanbul.’

The names of the Romanov Tsars will be translated into their familiar English equivalents, ‘Nicholas,’ ‘Alexander’ and so forth, rather than the transliterated ‘Aleksandr,’ ‘Nikolai.’ However, for other personal names, transliteration will be used according to the Library of Congress system, so ‘Tolstoi,’ ‘Dostoevskii,’ rather than the more archaic forms- ‘Tolstoy’ ‘Dostoevsky,’ (the exception of course being direct quotations from or references to English-language publications which are using the older form.) The feminine form of Russian surnames ends in –a. However, for the Russian expatriate in London, Olga Novikova, the form ‘Novikov’ will be used to minimise confusion for English speakers, as this is the form used in the vast majority of the (principally English) secondary works which refer to her, as well as her own writings.

Imperial Russia in the nineteenth century was still using the Julian calendar, placing it roughly twelve days behind Europe. All dates referred to in the main body of the text will be according to the Gregorian calendar, but quotations from the Russian Press will contain both dates in the footnote, with the Russian date appearing in brackets (this is the reverse of how the date appeared in publication, where the Russian date was given prominence and the Gregorian-style date was given only in brackets for reference. However, such an approach seems both inappropriate and likely to cause confusion in a comparative piece).

Some of the articles discussed and referenced here, were printed in British journals anonymously. These have been cross-referenced with the Wellesley Index to Victorian Periodicals for the probable identity of the author, and this information has been added in a footnote where appropriate.

Introduction and Literature Review

This study seeks to consider Britain and Russia during the period 1875-1878 and, using their actions and reactions around the flare-up of the Eastern Question, examine the relationship between the Press, society, and government. The precise publications to be considered will be detailed below,¹ but broadly speaking, the focus will be on daily newspapers as well as literary and political journals and periodicals. This study will be concerned with how mass social movements were represented in the Press, and to what extent it is possible to observe a role being played by the Press either in creating these public movements, or in mediating between public and government at this time. As the so-called 'Great Eastern Crisis' is the focal point, the exact time-scale will be from the spring of 1875 when the Hercegovinian revolt first broke out until the summer of 1878, when the various European Powers concluded their agreements at the Congress of Berlin. Evidently, neither of these events were truly delineated epoch-changers, the Hercegovinian revolt was initially little-regarded as just one in a long series of disturbances, and the Congress of Berlin had consequences and ramifications over a wide-ranging time-period. Medlicott for example argues strongly that the dividing point between significant events comes before the Berlin Congress, at the time when the various powers agreed to convene, and that the crisis did not truly end until 1881.² However, as he himself notes, the diplomats involved believed at the time that the Question had been solved at Berlin, and given that this is largely to be a study of public perceptions, the Berlin Congress does indeed provide a suitable watershed for concluding the study, for the sake of convenience and practicality.³

This introduction will begin with a review of the existing state of the many historiographical fields with which this study intersects, and establishing the contexts in which this work belongs. This will begin with the broader notions of 'Society' and ideology. Secondly, it will consider 'the Press' in the nineteenth

¹ See below, p54.

² W.N. Medlicott, *The Congress of Berlin and After: A Diplomatic History of the Near Eastern Settlement 1878-1880*, (London, 1963), pp.ix-xii.

³ Medlicott, *The Congress of Berlin and After*, p.138.

century. Having done this, I will gradually focus in on Russia and Great Britain; looking at politics and foreign policy in Britain and at Pan Slavism in Russia. Finally there will be an overview of the tangled history of what became known as the Eastern Question, including a specific focus upon the involvement of Britain and Russia prior to 1875. Once this background has been established, the following chapter will then outline the primary sources to be considered in this thesis, and the methodology to be used in examining them, along with an evaluation of the principal methodological issues when dealing with this type of source. Finally, a broad structure of the thesis as a whole will be given.

Literature Review

The unique nature of this study lies within the fact that it is considering events from such a breadth of sources and perspectives. There have been many past studies of The Balkan Crisis, of the Eastern Question broadly, of Russian Civil society, of Russian governance, of Gladstone and Disraeli. However, these studies have generally considered these various elements in isolation from one another. This study, by nature of being comparative, will be the first to draw upon them all together in a meaningful way, and thereby to show what discoveries in one of these areas can illuminate about another.

Society

As this is to be a study of the activities of society and the public at this time, it is necessary to consider more precisely what is meant by these terms. The differing natures of the Russian and British states mean that it is clear that there will not be an identical 'society' in the two states. Great Britain has notoriously taken a considerable pride in its history of parliaments and in the limitations placed upon Royal rule. Indeed, it was described in 1865 by John Bright as 'the mother of Parliaments,' a phrase which had already passed into vernacular before the end of the nineteenth century.⁴ This said, it would be wrong to imagine that Britain at this time was a democracy as the term would be understood today. The most recent piece of relevant legislation before the period covered in this study, was the Representation of the People Act (1867), which increased the electorate from around 1 million to just over 2 million, namely all urban Male Householders.⁵ However, this still accounted for barely half of adult males, with all women being excluded from the ballot for at least another 50 years. Russia by contrast, lacked an elected legislative body, and the nearest that most citizens, even those of the

⁴ H.W. Horwill 'The Referendum in Great Britain,' *Political Science Quarterly*, Vol 26, No.3, (Sep 1911), p.427; M. Lewis, 'Speech to the Unionists of South Edinburgh,' LSE selected Pamphlets, 1890, p.11.

⁵ R. Saunders, 'The Politics of Reform and Making of the 2nd Reform Act, 1848-1867,' *The Historical Journal*, Vol50, No.3, (Sep, 2007), pp.571-591. For a fuller discussion see his more recent book: R. Saunders, *Democracy and the vote in British politics: the making of the second Reform Act*, (Farnham, 2011).

educated classes, could get to such a thing, was through the Zemstva.⁶ The Zemstva were elected district councils, appointed by a broader franchise, but with heavy weightings in place to disproportionally emphasise the views of the nobility.⁷ More to the point, it was not able to legislate, merely to organise regional activities, with no national congress of the Zemstva ever being held. The Tsar of all Russians was very much the initiator of policy and government, whereas the Queen of Great Britain, although influential, merely signed her assent to legislation initiated, debated and enacted by parliament. Despite these fundamental contrasts at the highest level of the state, an attempt will be made now to sketch some of the basic commonalities of 'society' as a concept, before focusing in on the specifics of Great Britain and Russia at the time.

Civil Society is something Keane has identified as a concept that was popularised in the eighteenth century, but which was fading by the end of the nineteenth century.⁸ This places it as a concept clearly relevant to our time period, but does little to help define what is meant by the term: there are as many definitions of Civil Society as there are writers about it, and the aim here will be to draw some of these diverse writings together, in an attempt to identify some of the key features. For Hobbes, although society reflected the common good, it was fundamentally artificial, borne out of a love of ease, or a fear of oppression.⁹ This, Smelser and Warner have argued, was the reason that eighteenth century philosophers such as Rousseau were forced to construct their notions of society within a framework of 'the nation.'¹⁰ Melurri argued for the importance of 'invisible networks' in Civil Society implying a genuine existence, but a degree of difficulty in perceiving the gradual changes made to people's assumptions.¹¹ Significantly, Konrad asserted that in Autocratic or Totalitarian regimes, it was necessary to have at best a weak or unconfident Civil Society, due to State suspicion of independent activity on the part

⁶ Zemstva is the plural of zemstvo.

⁷ G. Hosking, *Russia: People & Empire 1552-1917*, (London, 1997), p.325.

⁸ J. Keane, *Civil Society and the State*, (London, 1993), p.1.

⁹ T. Hobbes, *Leviathan*, (London, 1651), pp.161-163.

¹⁰ N.J. Smelser & R.S. Warner, *Sociological Theory: Historical and Formal*, (Morristown, 1976), pp.19-20, 27.

¹¹ Cited in Keane, *Civil Society & The State*, p.12.

of individuals.¹² For this reason, I will now examine Russia, to see whether there is a similar correlation.

Recent decades, in particular the 1990s, saw a significant amount of research in Late Imperial Russian history, which focused upon the question of 'the middle' in the final decades of Empire. The majority of current scholarship seems largely convinced that the ultimate demise of the Romanovs was inevitable, and that 'the state's rejection of society's attempts to become involved in Russian governance doomed it to failure.'¹³ However, whilst the general principle can be posited, for this thesis to be proven, it is necessary to show evidence for, on the one hand, a broad range of activities by citizens seeking to become involved in governance, and on the other, a failure of the government to allow this. For Engelstein, this was expressed in a paradoxical attempt on the part of Alexander II to 'reinforce the basis of traditional autocratic rule by controlled application of its opposite principles.'¹⁴ In this vein, there have, in recent years, been a multiplicity of case studies examining those elements thus introduced, and the associated specific groups in Russian society who fell between the elites of the Royal family and their inner circles on the one hand, and the lowest tier, the workers and the peasantry, on the other.¹⁵ Although not necessarily the biggest group of these studies, perhaps the most pertinent for this study, given its methodological focus, is the question of the press, and therefore this will be discussed separately below.¹⁶ Other key examples of this fresh work are considerations of the specific roles of students, women and teachers, although the list continues through more specific categories such as statisticians, to cover a seemingly endless variety of microscopic areas.¹⁷

¹² Cited in Ibid. p.4.

¹³ S. Badcock, 'Autocracy in Crisis: Nicholas the Last,' in I. Thatcher (Ed), *Late Imperial Russia: Problems & Prospects*, (Manchester, 2005), p.10; C. Read, 'In Search of Liberal Tsarism: The Historiography of Autocratic Decline,' *The Historical Journal*, 45, (2002), pp.195-210.

¹⁴ L. Engelstein, 'The Dream of Civil society in Tsarist Russia: Law, state and religion,' in N. Bermeo & P. Nord, *Civil Society before Democracy: Lessons from Nineteenth-Century Europe*, (Oxford, 2000), p.27.

¹⁵ Detailed below.

¹⁶ See below, pp.18-23.

¹⁷ S.K. Morrissey, *Heralds of Revolution: Russian Students and the Mythologies of Radicalism* (New York, 1998); B. Alpern Engel, *Mothers and Daughters: Women of the Intelligentsia in Nineteenth-Century Russia* (Cambridge, 1983); C. Ruane, 'The Vestal Virgins of St. Petersburg: Schoolteachers and the 1897 Marriage Ban,' *Russian Review*, Vol.50, No2, (1991), pp.163-182.

Another significant development in recent years has been the acquiring of a regional focus, with case studies being carried out that venture beyond the traditional confines of Moscow and St Petersburg.¹⁸ Unsurprisingly, these works paint an increasingly diverse picture of Russia, increasing the need for clarity in other research about whether the subject is 'Russia' in any meaningful way, or merely St. Petersburg.

Whilst there has been a positive shift in the nature of the material considered, there are still many difficulties with the interpretation of the findings. One significant reason for this, is the gulf between Russia and the West in terminology. Western writers considering Russia often resort to discussing the rather ambiguous 'middle' in order to avoid the possible misconceptions inherent in the other common terms. Lohr advocates the use of 'Civil Society' in relation to Russia, arguing the only alternative is 'autocratic citizenship,' something he rejects as being oxymoronic.¹⁹ For Gramsci, the omnipresence of the Russian state meant that Civil Society could never be more than 'primordial and gelatinous,' lacking a superstructure to support the state in its times of weakness.²⁰ This 'classic' statement has been recently argued to be 'both right and wrong' by Engelstein, who sees the state as stiflingly powerful, yet asserts the need for the Tsars to 'contend with public opinion, if only on a limited scale.'²¹ Others, such as Kassow have shown the self-contradictory way in which the state attempted this, for example in asking the Universities both to create a new Russia and to preserve the traditional society at the same time.²² Indeed, he has gone further, questioning whether there was even 'room for a nation alongside the autocratic state.'²³ Bradley has questioned whether Civil Society is a standard and a universal

¹⁸ L. Häfner, "'The Temple of Idleness': Associations and the Public Sphere in Provincial Russia: A Case Study of Saratov, 1800-1917," in S. P. McCaffray & M. Melancon (Eds.), *Russia in the European Context 1789-1914: A member of the family*, (New York, 2005), pp.141-149; B. Eklof & S. Frank (Eds.), *The World of the Russian Peasant: Post-emancipation Culture and Society* (London, 1990).

¹⁹ E. Lohr, 'The Ideal Citizen and Real Subject in Late Imperial Russia,' *Kritika*, 7, (2006), p.173.

²⁰ A. Gramsci, *Selections from The Prison Notebooks of Antonio Gramsci*, (Ed & Trans. Q. Hoare & G.N. Smith), (London, 2001), p.494.

²¹ Engelstein, 'The Dream,' pp.23-24.

²² S. D. Kassow, *Students, Professors and the State in Tsarist Russia*, (Berkley, 1989), p.387.

²³ *Ibid*, p.1.

alternative to state power, or whether it is a purely western construction.²⁴ A significant contributing factor to this uncertainty is the difficulty of providing direct translations for the relevant terminology. Of primary concern for those interested in the issue of Civil Society in Imperial Russia, is the term *obshchestvennost'*, which can be translated simply as 'society' but has stronger political overtones than the standard Russian translation for 'society' - *obshchestvo*. Hosking offers a broad range of definitions including variously 'educated society' 'politically aware society' and perhaps the greatest stretch 'public opinion.'²⁵ Although the term *obshchestvennost'* was initially coined in the late eighteenth century, it was not popularised until the mid-nineteenth century when, Shepherd and Kelly argue, it was used to emphasise a break with earlier traditions of society and to assert a more radical outlook.²⁶ For Hosking it was more explicitly a *zemstvo* term, for a self-appointed 'alternative establishment.'²⁷

The key question at this juncture, is what exactly the nature of *obshchestvennost'* was. Tsarist Russia both historically and legally divided its citizens into *Soslovie*, classifications which were both stronger, and far more long-lived, than the class structures of Europe at large, perhaps more resembling an Indian caste system.²⁸ In an autocratic society, in which superficial attempts at Western-style legality inevitably lacked the institutions necessary to implement them, this means of legally defining the status of various groups of the populace was crucial.²⁹ Gleason has argued that distinctions between the various social classes were the nearest thing Russia had to a social contract, and that this was therefore something the state strove actively to preserve.³⁰ In this context, the question of *obshchestvennost'* becomes particularly significant, especially if we regard it as

²⁴ J. Bradley, 'Subjects into Citizens: Societies, Civil Society and Autocracy in Tsarist Russia', *The American Historical Review*, 107, (2000), pp.1094-95.

²⁵ Hosking, *Russia: People & Empire*, p.325.

²⁶ C. Kelly & D. Shepherd, *Constructing Russian Culture in the Age of Revolution: 1881-1940*, (Oxford, 1998).

²⁷ Hosking, *Russia: People & Empire*, p.325.

²⁸ G.L. Freeze, 'The Soslovie (Estate) Paradigm and Russian Social History,' *The American Historical Review*, 91, (1986), p.11-36.

²⁹ R. Wortman, 'Russian Monarchy and the Rule of Law: New Considerations of the Court Reform of 1864,' *Kritika*, 6, (2005), p.149.

³⁰ A. Gleason, *Young Russia: The Genesis of Russian Radicalism in the 1860s*, (New York, 1980), p.13.

being somehow distinct from a conscious class, and instead 'an informal yet authoritative presence of educated Russians determined to work for the common good, for progress.'³¹ For, whilst nineteenth Century Russia was largely a peasant state, with minimal standards of literacy,³² it has been argued that many of the Russian people developed conceptions of class consciousness, long before the emergence of clearly defined social classes themselves.³³ In fact, Monas goes so far as to argue that the primary reason for the lack of a self-conscious bourgeoisie in Russia was that the term was regarded as being too radical by the elites, yet too crude by the intelligentsia.³⁴ Owen challenges this view, although he does support the notion that a bourgeois consciousness was lacking in Russia, by asserting instead that what was lacking were the necessary elements to form a coherent class, namely a shared set of ideas or beliefs, the means of communicating and sharing these ideas, and a means of acting on them.³⁵ The 'middle' in Imperial Russia then becomes simply a catch-all term for any who failed to fit into the existing *soslovnia*, a kind of incoherent succession to a set of traditional definitions rapidly declining in relevance. This, Wagner argues, poses a significant problem for what he perceives as traditional historiography, namely the notion that the middle classes always support liberalism and ultimately parliamentary democracy.³⁶ In Russia it becomes necessary to seek a far narrower social grouping, something which is defined by activity and is significant because it at least aspired to create the common liberties that Russia lacked.³⁷ As Engelstein puts it, although the attempts to create elements of civil society spawned both 'desire' and 'frustration,'

³¹ E. W. Clowes, S. D. Kassow, J. L. West (Eds.), *Between Tsar and People: educated society and the quest for public identity in late imperial Russia*, (Princeton, 1991), p.3.

³² The earliest Russia-wide statistics are from 1897, at which point in time 21% of the population was listed as literate. Brooks asserts the rapid rise in literacy in the last half-century of the empire, and the fact that literacy was highest amongst the young. Given that in our period 21% of new recruits into the army could read and write, the national figure at this time would seem likely to be far lower. J. Brooks, *When Russia Learned to Read: Literacy and Popular Literature 1861-1917* (Princeton, 1985), pp.3-4.

³³ T.C. Owen, 'Impediments to a Bourgeois Consciousness in Russia,' in Clowes, Kassow, West, *Between Tsar and People*, p.88.

³⁴ S. Monas, 'Twilight Middle Class of nineteenth Century Russia', in Clowes, Kassow, West, *Between Tsar and People*, p.28.

³⁵ Owen, 'Impediments to a Bourgeois Consciousness,' p.76.

³⁶ W. G. Wagner, 'Ideology, Identity, and the Emergence of a Middle Class', in Clowes, Kassow, West, *Between Tsar and People*, pp.149-150.

³⁷ J. Bradley, 'Voluntary Associations, Civic Culture', in Clowes, Kassow & West, *Between Tsar and People*, p.148.

it is the desire that is key, 'a case of wishful thinking embodying the wish.'³⁸ This then, is the *obshchesvennost'* and in Russia, this must be the point of examination when seeking to establish the existence and nature of Civil Society. Perhaps the best summary of these various tenets to be sought in Russia when looking for a civil society is a series of extra-state activities that are 'ordered, nonclandestine and collective.'³⁹

Society in Victorian Britain was of course a very different matter, the local and social independent activities which must be sought so carefully in Russia were clear for anyone to see with groups meeting freely and regularly in schools, chapels or pubs.⁴⁰ Joyce sees the Victorian period as the time when 'social' activities outgrew their traditional parameters, and although he considers Civil Society to have been born in the eighteenth century, it only reached its fullest form in the nineteenth.⁴¹ For Thompson, the crucial change in the nineteenth century as regards the political activity of society, was the tactic adopted by Earl Grey in framing the Great Reform act, namely to 'associate the middle with the higher orders of society.'⁴² This, he argues, moved the government from having all sections of society united in disgruntlement to having the vast majority of middle class heads of household enfranchised and thus associated with the system rather than outside it.⁴³ This is perhaps reflected in the concern of many of the middle classes in the Victorian period to 'improve' the lower orders, and indeed their surprise at the ability of working people to conduct themselves respectably, for example at the Great Exhibition of 1851.⁴⁴ However, Thompson argues that this does not mean that the Victorians should be seen as simply 'cleaning up a rough and raw society,' rather they were 'fashioning the elements of a new society in step with the appearance of

³⁸ Engelstein, 'The Dream,' p.24.

³⁹ Bermeo & Nord, *Civil Society*, pxiv.

⁴⁰ J.M. Golby & A.W. Purdue, *The Civilisation of the Crowd: Popular Culture in England, 1750-1900* (Revised Ed.) (Stroud, 1999), p.120.

⁴¹ P. Joyce, *Democratic Subjects: The self & the social in Nineteenth Century England*, (Cambridge, 1994), p.15.

⁴² F.M.L. Thompson, *The rise of respectable society: a social history of Victorian Britain 1830-1900*, (London, 1988), p.16.

⁴³ Ibid, pp.14, 19.

⁴⁴ Golby & Purdue, *The Civilisation of the Crowd*, pp.116, 137-8.

its material and human components.’⁴⁵ Thus it is important to recognise that when considering Civil Society in Victorian Britain, we are dealing with groups who had an evolving sense of their own identity.

Although Joyce feels that ‘class’ has lost its primacy as a category of historical explanation, for this period, it still seems both an informative and a useful shorthand for identifying the ‘middling’ sections of the population who were outside of the highest aristocratic circles, yet provided the literate electoral opinion of which the government needed to be mindful.⁴⁶ Furthermore, the multiplicity of studies of everyday life in the nineteenth century which have appeared in recent decades invariably delineate their area of study by class, or in some other fashion make class a key element.⁴⁷ Inevitably, given the sources used to consider opinion, this study will shed greater light on a middle-class than a working-class perspective of the Crisis.

Although they are not the primary focus of this thesis, no consideration of social elements within Late Imperial Russia would be complete without an appreciation of the nature of ‘The People.’ This is the form generally used to translate the Russian ‘*Narod*,’ although other forms such as ‘common folk’ are also to be found, and has a meaning loosely equivalent to the German ‘*volk*.’⁴⁸ Whilst in a literal sense, the term could be used simply to refer to the masses of the Russian population, the rural peasantry, in reality it was generally used far more emotively and evocatively than this. The educated and literary classes of Russia seem to have felt entirely confident about assigning views, ideals and opinions to ‘The People,’ variously a kind of noble purity uncorrupted by the influence of the West which was so inevitable in the metropolitan areas, or a backward savagery bypassed by the recent steps of progress. Furthermore, although Russia was a state whose borders

⁴⁵ Thompson, *The rise of respectable society*, p.29.

⁴⁶ Joyce, *Democratic Subjects*, p.2.

⁴⁷ There are, of course, numerous examples of this e.g. J. T. Smith, *A Victorian class conflict? Schoolteaching and the parson, priest and minister, 1837-1902*, (Brighton, 2009); P. Ingham, *The Language of Gender and Class: Transformation in the Victorian novel*, (London, 1996); H. McLeod, *Piety and Poverty: workingclass religion in Berlin, London, and New York, 1870-1914*, (New York, 1996).

⁴⁸ N. Stone, S. Podboltov, M. Yasar, ‘Russians and the Turks: Imperialism and Nationalism in the Era of Empires,’ in A. Miller & A.J. Rieber (eds.), *Imperial Rule*, (Budapest, 2004), p.32.

were defined by military rather than ethnic factors, it was generally believed that nationality lay with 'the people.'⁴⁹ The actions and views which the Press, and indeed historians since, have claimed for 'the People' at this time will be of considerable significance for this study, although not for what they tell us about 'the People,' per se, but more for what they tell us about those who thus discerned these views and attitudes.

The Press

The nineteenth century has been cited as the period when newspapers not only grew in number but, according to Jones, became 'embedded in the culture.'⁵⁰ Therefore, the historiography of the press is a crucial topic for anyone concerned with popular events of that period and in particular for a study using the press as a window onto the period. However, Jones' comments were made only in reference to the role of newspapers in England, and therefore their status in Russian society needs separate examination. Before considering the historiography of the Press in the two nations separately, it is necessary to first consider the works of the German theorist Jurgen Habermas, who has been highly influential on theories of the Press and its role as an intermediary between Public and Private. Habermas's *The Structural Transformation of the Public Sphere* first appeared in German in 1962, only being translated into English in 1989.⁵¹ In it, he traces from the Middle Ages the changing relationship between public and private, focusing not upon 'Civil Society,' but upon the more ambiguous 'Public Sphere,' and the related concept "Public Opinion."⁵²

Although providing considerations of Germany and France, Habermas focused primarily upon Britain as he traced the development of the Press from being simply a means of keeping contact between an increasingly broad coffee-house discussion culture, through a mercantile position as purveyors of News as a commodity, to an

⁴⁹ Miller & Rieber, *Imperial Rule*, p.2; Stone, Podbolt & Yasar, 'Russians and Turks,' in Miller and Rieber, *Imperial Rule*, p.32.

⁵⁰ A. Jones, *Powers of the Press: Newspapers, Power & the Public in Nineteenth Century England*, (Cambridge, 1996), pxi.

⁵¹ J. Habermas, *The Structural Transformation of the Public Sphere*, Trans T. Burger, (Cambridge, 1989).

⁵² *Ibid.*, pp.5-30.

ideological role as the partisans of a particular political cause.⁵³ The last stage pertinent to this study, he diagnosed from the mid-1830s, as being the time when the Press returned to being 'primarily a business.'⁵⁴ Habermas has not been without his critics, and Hampton in particular accuses him of 'slippage' in his definitions, failing to state conclusively whether the 'public sphere' is a 'historical entity' or a 'normative idea.'⁵⁵

There is a clear sense in Habermas's work that the growth of the Press led to a decline in public criticism, and he defines most modern forms of society as having in common the increased 'abstinence from literary and political debate.'⁵⁶ However, he is very assertive about the direction of cause and effect here, in a manner that sits uneasily with Jones' observation of the continued puzzle, in Britain at least, during the nineteenth century as to whether the press reflected or created public opinion.⁵⁷ Indeed, although Hampton has observed a marked shift in educated opinion in nineteenth century Britain from the view that readers rationally evaluated material to the idea that they passively accepted it, this seems to be more strongly linked to the so-called 'New Journalism' of Stead and others in the 1880s and beyond.⁵⁸

The fullest consideration of the role of the press in nineteenth century Russia is Louise McReynolds' *The News under Russia's Old Regime*.⁵⁹ The methodological approach adopted by McReynolds will be considered below in discussing the methodology of this study. As regards her work more generally, she relies heavily on Habermas, and particularly the notion of a 'bourgeois public sphere.'⁶⁰ In the view of McReynolds, the public sphere was a more obtainable goal than the more ill-defined 'Civil Society' or democracy. She highlights the views of the American media magnate Walter Lippman, who felt that the connection between economy

⁵³ Ibid., pp.21, 42-3, 59-60.

⁵⁴ Ibid, p184.

⁵⁵ M. Hampton, 'Liberalism, the Press and the Construction of the Public Sphere: Theories of the Press in Britain, 1830-1914,' *Victorian Periodicals Review*, Vol37, No1, (Spring, 2004), p.74.

⁵⁶ Habermas, *Public sphere*, p163.

⁵⁷ Jones, *Powers of the Press*, pp.87-88.

⁵⁸ Hampton, 'Liberalism' pp.73, 77-79.

⁵⁹ L. McReynolds, *The News under Russia's Old Regime*, (Princeton, 1991).

⁶⁰ J Habermas, *The Structural transformation of the Public Sphere: an enquiry into a category of Bourgeois society*: trans. Thomas Burger, (Cambridge, Mass, 1989).

and politics forged by the press linked the growth of the 'fourth estate' inexorably to the rise of democracy.⁶¹ There are of course numerous objections to Lippman's theories, for example observations such as those of Parsons and White, who have highlighted the use of the press (amongst various forms of mass media) by totalitarian regimes as instruments of propaganda and control.⁶² For McReynolds however, the flaws in Lippman's arguments are dealt with by Habermas' focus upon the pre-commercial rather than simply the commercial Press.⁶³

Although some of her theoretical structure may be called into question, McReynolds' work remains invaluable to the scholar of the Russian press in this period, as it offers the most detailed accounts available of the key events in the development of the most significant elements of the mass-circulation press and the individuals behind it. Other key texts in the existing historiography of the Russian Press include various articles compiled by Deborah Martinsen on journals, Joan Neuberger's work on the St. Petersburg popular press, or so-called boulevard newspapers, and Daniel Brower's work on the penny press.⁶⁴ Due to the broad nature of the press, and the specific focus of these works, there is often little interaction between them, although a degree of overlap does start to become apparent when the Press is considered more indirectly, yet still in considerable detail, in works such as Daniel Balmuth's volume on censorship, and Jeffrey Brooks on the growth of Russian literacy.⁶⁵ Brooks' primary concern is with the *liubok* literature that was popular amongst the urban lower classes in the latter part of the century, but he reveals the educated attitudes to the growth in mass literacy, primarily characterised by 'disdain and dismay' at the standard of the material being read.⁶⁶ This is a commonality with much of the literature for Britain at the

⁶¹ McReynolds, *The News under Russia's Old Regime*, p.11.

⁶² T. Parsons, and W. White, 'The Mass Media and the Structure of American Society' *Journal of Social Issues* 16, (1960), p.67-77.

⁶³ McReynolds, *The News under Russia's Old Regime*, p.12.

⁶⁴ D.A. Martinsen (Ed.), *Literary Journals in Imperial Russia* (Cambridge, 1997); J. Neuberger, 'Stories of the Street: Hooliganism in the St. Petersburg Popular Press', *Slavic Review*, 48, (1989), 177-194; D.R. Brower, *The Russian City between tradition and modernity 1850-1900*, (Oxford, 1990).

⁶⁵ D. Balmuth, *Censorship in Russia. 1865-1905*, (Washington D.C., 1979); Brooks, *When Russia Learned to Read*.

⁶⁶ Brooks, *When Russia Learned to Read*, p.295.

time.⁶⁷ Despite the obvious links between ideological groups and the press, little has been produced in the way of detailed studies of how they interacted, despite assertions such as those of Suslov who argued that in an autocracy, a truly free press was vital as an expresser of alternative opinions, without which an autocrat would become so isolated as to be rendered practically impotent: in the words of the Slavophiles ‘the people offer opinions, the tsar – decisions.’⁶⁸

The literature for the British Press of our period is rather more substantial than for the Russian, perhaps a reflection of the greater number of legal papers. Koss notes the significance of the abolition between 1854 and 1855 of the advertising and stamp duties that had kept prices high and thus limited the growth of the daily Press.⁶⁹ No less significant a factor than stamp duties for the Press in Nineteenth Century Britain, were the Paper Duties, against which Gladstone campaigned so vigorously in 1861-2. Shannon notes how this campaign against ‘the greatest of the “taxes on knowledge”’ cost Gladstone a series of unprecedented political defeats before ultimately becoming law.⁷⁰ This reduction in commercial obstacles, combined with the increased demand for overseas news caused by the outbreak of the Crimean War in 1853, led to nearly five hundred new papers being established in the next decade, almost as many as in the entire century up to that point.⁷¹ Indeed, this proliferation of independent titles, combined with the influence held by some of the larger papers, has led Chamberlain to assert that this was the period in which ‘public opinion’ and ‘press opinion’ were at their closest.⁷² As far as the influence of the press goes, Koss in his highly comprehensive *The Rise and Fall of the Political Press in Britain* shows confidently that it was *The Times* of London which came closest to being the paper of record insofar as politicians and educated readers were concerned. Indeed he cites Abraham Lincoln as saying of the paper “I

⁶⁷ Hampton, ‘Liberalism,’ p.84; Jones, *Powers of the Press*, p.7.

⁶⁸ M. Suslov, ‘Slavophilism is True Liberalism: The Political Utopias of S.F. Sharapov 1855-1911,’ *Russian History*, 38, (2011), p.287.

⁶⁹ S Koss, *The Rise and Fall of the Political Press in Britain: Vol1. The Nineteenth Century*, (London, 1984,) pp.68-69.

⁷⁰ Shannon, *Gladstone, God and Politics*, pp.136-140.

⁷¹ Jones, *Powers of the Press*, p.23.

⁷² M. E. Chamberlain, *Pax Britannica? British Foreign Policy, 1789-1914*, (London, 1988), p.14.

don't know anything which has more power except the Mississippi."⁷³ Historians seem generally agreed that the 1870s was a period of particular good health for the British Press, and Lee characterises it as a decade of optimism.⁷⁴ This optimism should not necessarily be taken at face-value, however. Brown argues that although the late-Victorian Press took great pride in its supposed independence, it was in reality heavily dependent upon both Politicians and its readership.⁷⁵ In his view, the Press existed in a complex web of patronage, exchanging coverage for information with leading political figures, at the same time as bending to the perceived public mood regarding what should be written. However, he also notes that this never appeared to shake the British Press's belief in its own incorruptibility, nor the confidence which others placed in it.⁷⁶

Whatever their own desires, be they commercially or politically motivated a newspaper editor's ability to publish on a given topic was always constrained by the law. For Russia, the limitation clearly came most strongly from the behaviour of the censor. In his early years as Tsar, Alexander II carried out extensive reforms to the all-pervasive state censor that had grown under his father to the point where the number of censors exceeded the number of books being published.⁷⁷ However, in the 1860s, there was a sharp reaction against this, as responsibility for censorship was shifted to the notoriously reactionary Ministry of Internal Affairs and, in 1865, a series of 'temporary regulations' were issued that ultimately lasted for 38 years.⁷⁸ In 1868, the censor was given the power to forbid retail sale of newspapers (the selling of individual copies rather than regular deliveries to subscribers) and in 1873 a decision was taken to 'prohibit discussions in the press of any social or political issues.'⁷⁹ Whilst this does not present a particularly encouraging portrait of the journalistic landscape, McCombs and Shaw have argued that the Press was still to a

⁷³ Koss, *The Rise and Fall of the Political Press*, p.129.

⁷⁴ A.J. Lee, *The Origins of the Popular Press in England 1855-1914*, (London, 1976), p.62.

⁷⁵ D. Brown, 'Morally transforming the World or spinning a line? Politicians and the newspaper press in mid-nineteenth century Britain,' *Historical Research*, 83, 220, (May 2010), p. 342

⁷⁶ Ibid., pp.325, 342.

⁷⁷ W.B. Lincoln, *The Great Reforms: Autocracy, Bureacracy and the Politics of Change in Imperial Russia*, (Illinois, 1990), p.121.

⁷⁸ A. Polunov, *Russia in the nineteenth Century: Autocracy, Reform and Social Change 1814-1914*, (London, 2005), p.121; Lincoln, *The Great Reforms*, p.132.

⁷⁹ Polunov, *Russia in the nineteenth Century*, p.121.

certain extent able to set the agenda of what was discussed even if they were more limited regarding the line they took on it.⁸⁰ Brown has argued that any Press which reported or summarised a selection of news, rather than simply printing verbatim what it was told to by its political masters was, in fact, in a position of significant influence.⁸¹ Indeed, although questions of audience and censorship (which will be discussed more fully in Chapter 2) may mean having to qualify any conclusions we may be able to draw from it, the fact remains that all the available data indicates an increasingly diverse press at this time, and one which was able to exercise a reasonable degree of freedom from simply proclaiming state doctrines.⁸² In fact, much of the Soviet scholarship on the Russian Imperial press, despite setting out to discredit the journalists as being unduly influenced, or even controlled, by bourgeois capital, shows admirably that it was not.⁸³

Whilst the British Press did not have to deal with a militant censor, there were still legal considerations for the Victorian Press in terms of what they could publish. Perhaps the most significant moment in this respect had come at the end of the Eighteenth Century with Fox's Act or, more properly, The Libel Act (1792). This had taken decisions regarding libel suits out of the hands of judges, and had placed them instead under the charge of juries. Harling has shown how in the early decades of the Nineteenth Century, Libel had still been used as an instrument of repression by Tory administrations, but had ultimately been abandoned as simply ineffective in light of the new legislation.⁸⁴ Whilst this did not, of course, mean an end to libel as a concept, it did accord the Victorian Press a certain degree of protection from the legal exercise of political vindictiveness.

⁸⁰ M.E. McCombs & D.L. Shaw, 'The Agenda Setting Function of Mass Media,' *The Public Opinion Quarterly*, Vol.36, No2, (Summer, 1972,) p.176

⁸¹ Brown, 'Morally Transforming the World,' p323.

⁸² C.A. Ruud, 'A.N. Bokhanov,' *Slavic Review*, 44, (1985), p.544; See Below, pp.56-57.

⁸³ A.N. Bokhanov, *Burzhuaznaia pressa rossii i krupnyi kapital, konets XIX V.-1914 G.* (Moscow, 1984).

⁸⁴ P. Harling, 'The Law of Libel and the Limits of repression, 1790-1832,' *The Historical Journal*, 44, 1, (2001), pp.107-134.

Politics and Foreign Policy in Victorian Britain

Although this is partially a study of the involvement of Russia in the Balkans, it is also a study of Victorian Britain.⁸⁵ Much has been written about the political events and intrigues of this period, as well as about the specific merits of differing traditions of foreign policy in Great Britain. Chamberlain, amongst others, has asserted the essential continuity of British Foreign policy for much of the nineteenth century, asserting that all the major players in British Foreign Policy from 1812 to the death of Palmerston laid claim to the legacy of Pitt the Younger, making it difficult to know where best to begin a consideration of the themes and values which informed their policies.⁸⁶ This difficulty is compounded by Chamberlain's assertion that 'everyone assumed that everyone else knew the underlying principles [according to which Foreign Policy was conducted]' and thus they were rarely stated explicitly or written down.⁸⁷ However, others have offered a different summary of Foreign Policy in the nineteenth century. Wilson noted the lack of 'consensus as to what British foreign policy should be,' and this apparent uncertainty can be seen leading to very different practical attitudes being adopted by the intermittent Conservative governments of the mid-nineteenth century from their Liberal predecessors and successors.⁸⁸ This apparent disagreement is perhaps best explained by Brettle, who describes how the 'Conservative' ideology upheld by Castlereagh and his followers, strove to keep Foreign Policy 'above parties and factions,' to such an extent that this became in itself a factional policy.⁸⁹ In essence, it is argued, the Conservatives felt that British foreign policy could best achieve respect abroad through consistency, and that this was in turn best accomplished by transcending factional interests. Examples of this are cited by Hicks who describes the mid-century Conservatives as frequently attempting 'to mend fences that

⁸⁵ The actual primary research conducted will also be almost universally "English," but within the already given caveats, the Press of London is probably no worse a representation of "Britain" than it is of the entirety of "England."

⁸⁶ Chamberlain, *Pax Britannica?* p.12.

⁸⁷ Chamberlain, *Pax Britannica?* p.8.

⁸⁸ K. Wilson, *British foreign secretaries and foreign policy: From Crimean War to First World War*, (London, 1987,) p.3; G. Hicks, *Peace, War & Party Politics: The Conservatives and Europe 1846-59*, (Manchester, 2007), p.11.

⁸⁹ A. Brettle 'The Enduring Importance of Foreign Policy in Mid-Nineteenth-Century Politics' in W. Mulligan and B. Simms (Eds.) *The Primacy of Foreign Policy in British History, 1660-2000: How Strategic concerns Shaped Modern Britain*, (New York, 2010), p.156.

Palmerston had torn down.⁹⁰ He notes particularly the efforts made by Malmesbury and Derby to remove the 'suspicion' and 'alienation' that had characterised relations with Austria, but which they felt were alien to the traditions of British Foreign Policy.⁹¹ Beyond the simple desire to maintain cordial relations, Chamberlain has herself betrayed the inadequacy of notions of continuity by noting the fundamental disagreement regarding the settlement of 1815.⁹² Conservatives regarded this as a positive event in history, and as time went by they were able to point increasingly to the decades of comparative peace it had brought Europe.⁹³

The alternative to the Conservative view, was the Whig or 'Canningite' position most fully developed by Palmerston, that the first goal of Foreign Policy was 'eternal vigilance in the protection of the hard-won liberties of the British people.'⁹⁴ Chamberlain notes the way in which Palmerston exploited a populist desire to feel important and influential, repeatedly telling the British people that Britain was able to be a power-broker in Europe.⁹⁵ However, she attributes this to a remarkably modern understanding of political realities and the need for the support of the electorate over and above the king, rather than to political cynicism.⁹⁶ Whatever Palmerston's motives, it is certain that he pursued an active Foreign Policy, which to his opponents was the worst kind of meddling.⁹⁷ For his supporters, Parry contends the crucial factor was the nuanced yet significant difference between 'non interference' and 'non-intervention.'⁹⁸ Too much of the history of nineteenth century British Foreign Policy, he argues, has been written without sufficient regard for the commonly held-perception amongst the British that Great Britain was not only the greatest nation ever seen, but one made great by Providence, along with certain expectations quid pro quo.⁹⁹ Thus, the notion of inactivity was an affront to

⁹⁰ G. Hicks, *Peace, War & Party Politics*, p.13.

⁹¹ Ibid, pp.75-79.

⁹² Chamberlain, *Pax Britannica*, p.5.

⁹³ Hicks, *Peace, War & Party Politics*, p.13.

⁹⁴ Brettle 'The Enduring Importance of Foreign Policy' in Mulligan & Simms, *The Primacy of Foreign Policy*, p.155.

⁹⁵ Chamberlain, *Pax Britannica*, p.7.

⁹⁶ Chamberlain, *Pax Britannica*, p.14.

⁹⁷ Hicks, *Peace War & Party Politics*, p.13.

⁹⁸ J. Parry, *The Politics of Patriotism: English Liberalism, National Identity & Europe, 1830-1886*, (Cambridge, 2006), p.148.

⁹⁹ Ibid, p.387.

British patriotism at large as well as to the particular moralism of the Liberal Party. Whilst this view may seem to put excessive emphasis on public involvement with Foreign Policy, something highlighted by Mulligan who argues that 'public opinion' only ever acted in reaction to Foreign Policy, rather than pre-emptively, this is not necessarily so.¹⁰⁰ In fact, as Howe has noted, a moralistic approach to foreign policy had considerable breadth of appeal amongst those on the Liberal side of politics, from Internationalists like Cobden all the way to more Whiggish tendencies.¹⁰¹ Perhaps then, the strongest commonality than can be traced through the practice of British foreign policy in the nineteenth century, is a determination to uphold British prestige and honour. As has already been noted, the Conservative tradition saw Britain as being respected for the unstinting, unchanging nature of its activities abroad, whilst the Liberals remained equally focused on the need to 'project a confident and influential presence on the European stage.'¹⁰²

The decade or so immediately before the period of our study saw a series of major shifts in the foundations of British Foreign Policy. For Mulligan, the most significant came in 1870-71 with the creation of a united Germany.¹⁰³ The reason for this he asserts is that Prussia's victory over France vindicated the cause of power-politics, over Cobdenite internationalism.¹⁰⁴ Perhaps more significant however, is Lieven's assertion of the constant concern of both British and Russian Foreign Policy makers of a power trying to dominate Europe from the 'Carolingian Core.'¹⁰⁵ The rise of Bismarck's Germany made this a possibility in a fashion that had not been a serious consideration since the time of Napoleon. Indeed, Parry finds this such a game-changer for the international scene, that he holds it primarily responsible for the 'spectacular' implosion of Gladstone's first Liberal government.¹⁰⁶ The key point, he

¹⁰⁰ W. Mulligan, 'Gladstone and the Primacy of Foreign Policy' in Mulligan & Simms, *The Primacy of Foreign Policy*, p.183.

¹⁰¹ A. Howe, 'Radicalism, Free Trade & Foreign Policy in Mid-Nineteenth Century Britain' in Mulligan & Simms, *The Primacy of Foreign Policy*, p.167.

¹⁰² Parry, *The Politics of Patriotism*, p.6.

¹⁰³ Mulligan, 'Gladstone and the Primacy of Foreign Policy' in Mulligan & Simms, *The Primacy of Foreign Policy*, p.182.

¹⁰⁴ Ibid.

¹⁰⁵ D. Lieven 'Empire on Europe's Periphery: Russia & Western Comparisons,' in Miller & Rieber *Imperial Rule*, p.134.

¹⁰⁶ Parry, *The Politics of Patriotism*, p.276.

argues, was that whereas before German unification international assertion and domestic retrenchment had been perfectly harmonious themes for government policy, it was now necessary to make a choice between preserving a small budget or investing in defence in order to rival Germany.¹⁰⁷ The impact that this had on the Liberal cabinet need not concern us here, but the impact on the pragmatics of British Foreign Policy should be clear.

Another factor was the death of Palmerston (1865), the man who had dominated British politics for so long. Steele notes how Palmerston dominated the Foreign Office when he was Prime Minister, an example of a broader phenomenon noted by Chamberlain, whereby the British public, she asserts, maintained a keen awareness of who they perceived to be the driving force in Foreign Policy, whether it be a Prime Minister like Pitt the Younger, Gladstone or Disraeli, or a Foreign Secretary like Castlereagh or Canning.¹⁰⁸ Hicks notes that Disraeli was unique amongst this list as a figure who meddled in Foreign Policy whilst holding the office neither of Prime Minister nor of Foreign Secretary, but of Chancellor. The most significant example he gives is in late 1858, when Disraeli sent his own envoy directly to Napoleon III seeking certain naval reassurances in exchange for British neutrality in an imminent Italian conflict.¹⁰⁹ A third significant change affecting British Politics around this time was the decline of the coalitions and minority governments that had dominated the mid-century. The parliamentary system which had been blurred by resentments and clashes of personality began to crystalise into something resembling a coherent two-party system in the 1860s. The nature of the Liberal movement with the various Whig and Radical factions makes it somewhat difficult to define their exact status, with Matthew on the one hand asserting that 'even in Gladstone's day, the Liberals were not a party' whilst Parry feels able to talk meaningfully about the Liberals as a single grouping as early as the 1830s.¹¹⁰ What is certain, is that all of the Conservative-led administrations from the fall of

¹⁰⁷ Ibid, pp.277-281.

¹⁰⁸ E.D. Steele, 'Palmerston's Foreign Policy & Foreign Secretaries 1855-1865' in K.M. Wilson (Ed.) *British Foreign Secretaries and Foreign Policy: From the Crimean War to the First World War*, (London, 1987), p.25; Chamberlain, *Pax Britannica*, p.12.

¹⁰⁹ Hicks, *Peace, War & Party Politics*, pp.217-218.

¹¹⁰ H.C.G. Matthew, *Gladstone 1809-1874*, (Oxford, 1986), p.191; Parry, *The Politics of Patriotism*, p.34.

Peel in 1846 to the end of the 1860s were minorities and several commentators have noted the limitations placed upon them by their inability to rely upon an absolute majority in the House of Commons.¹¹¹ For Hicks, the securing of the first majority in decades was the reason that Disraeli was 'canonised' in history by the party that had regarded him as a 'necessary evil' in his own life.¹¹²

The wealth of material written both about and by William Ewart Gladstone and Benjamin Disraeli is staggering, with Gladstone's diaries running to fourteen volumes, and Disraeli's society novels filling a shelf on their own.¹¹³ Although this may, to an extent, be curtailed by a focus upon the late 1870s and the Eastern Question, the strong personalities of both men and their reputations both in their lifetimes and since make it impossible to adequately consider either of their activities at this time in isolation from the historiography of their careers more broadly. For both men, there are detailed and authoritative biographical accounts, Shannon and Blake being the most comprehensive accounts for Gladstone and Disraeli respectively, although Blake's work on Disraeli is now noticeably dated.¹¹⁴ Parry proclaims confidently that '20th Century professional historians have demolished the pious partisan idealism with which Gladstone & Disraeli were regarded by their late Victorian supporters, and replaced it with a sophisticated scepticism.'¹¹⁵ This however seems questionable, particularly in regard to Disraeli. Whilst Blake offers what is in many respects a very rounded depiction of Disraeli, blending personal, literary and political activities in a manner that is perhaps more convincing than some more traditional approaches to biography which treat political life as a hermetically sealed entity, he fails almost entirely to take account of his Jewishness. Wohl decries the mere three sentences in eight hundred pages

¹¹¹ Brettell, 'The enduring Importance of Foreign Policy' in Mulligan & Simms, *The Primacy of Foreign Policy*, p.158; Hicks, *Peace, War & Party Politics*, pp.151-152.

¹¹² Hicks, *Peace, War & Party Politics*, p.14.

¹¹³ Gladstone's Diaries were published between 1968 and 1994 in 14 volumes edited by M.R.D. Foot and H.C.G. Matthew. Disraeli's literary catalogue includes the novels, *Contarini Fleming*, *Vivian Grey*, *Sybil: or the Two Nations*, *Coningsby: or the new generation*, and *Tancred*. For an in-depth discussion of them, see R. Blake, *Disraeli*, (London, 1969).

¹¹⁴ Blake, *Disraeli*; R. Shannon, *Gladstone: God and Politics*, (London, 2007).

¹¹⁵ J.P. Parry, 'Disraeli & England,' *The Historical Journal*, Vol43, No.3, (September, 2000), p.700.

devoted to anti-Semitism.¹¹⁶ However, given Blake's assertion that 'it is not so much the Jewish as the Italian streak in Disraeli that predominated,' it seems unlikely that further discussion by Blake would have filled the historiographical void Wohl laments.¹¹⁷ Wohl himself highlighted the anti-Semitism Disraeli faced as Prime Minister, noting it to be more sustained and more virulent than that which had dogged him at hustings throughout his life.¹¹⁸ There has been a recent move towards reassessing the impact of Disraeli's background and personality upon his life, beginning with Smith's *Brief Life*, as well as Endelman and Kushner's recent volume on Disraeli's Jewishness and Kuhn's polemic on the more hedonistic interplay of his private and political life.¹¹⁹ For Gladstone, recent writers have emphasised anew the deep religious basis for so much of what he did, most notably Shannon's *Gladstone: God and Politics*.¹²⁰

The strong divisions in feeling regarding the two men continue to the existing literature on the Eastern Crisis. Millman, whose account of the period is widely regarded as one of 'the best diplomatic' histories, strongly censures Gladstone in this crisis as a wielder of 'irresponsible' rhetoric.¹²¹ By contrast, Shannon's account of the crisis, focusing on the "Bulgarian Atrocities" campaign, depicts him as some kind of latter-day messiah who 'became a popular leader against his will.'¹²² This view is substantiated with accounts of early 'articulation' for the agitation coming from figures such as Bishop Fraser, Henry Liddon & Edward Freeman, none of whom were at this time connected with Gladstone.¹²³ Saab's view of the crisis is also profoundly sympathetic to Gladstone, as betrayed by her title '*Reluctant*

¹¹⁶ A.S. Wohl, 'Dizzi-Ben-Dizzi: Disraeli as Alien,' *Journal of British Studies*, Vol34, No5, (Jul, 1995), p.375.

¹¹⁷ Blake, *Disraeli*, p.49.

¹¹⁸ Wohl, 'Dizzi-Ben-Dizzi,' p.377.

¹¹⁹ P. Smith, *Disraeli: a Brief Life*, (Cambridge, 1996), T.M. Endelman & T Kushner (Eds.) *Disraeli's Jewishness*, (London, 2002); W. Kuhn, *The Politics of Pleasure: A Portrait of Benjamin Disraeli*, (London, 2006).

¹²⁰ R. Shannon, *Gladstone: God and Politics*.

¹²¹ Wohl, 'Dizzi-Ben-Dizzi,' p.385; R. Millman, *Britain and the Eastern Question 1875-78*, (Oxford, 1979), p.184.

¹²² R. Shannon, *Gladstone and the Bulgarian Agitation 1876*, (London, 1963), p.10. See further discussion in chapter 4.

¹²³ Shannon, *Gladstone and the Bulgarian Agitation*, p.49.

Icon.¹²⁴ He is depicted as having tremendous oratorical appeal (something attested to by many at the time) and as providing the 'reasons & justifications' for a pre-existing public outburst.¹²⁵ However, whereas Shannon depicts the gradual evolution of Gladstone's interest in the agitation as he awaited both 'significant manifestation of moral sentiment on a popular level' and 'clear and responsible evidence' of the true facts of the crisis, Saab seems determined to go further.¹²⁶ For her, Gladstone is portrayed as impassively resisting various demands for his involvement, all couched in political platitudes, before finally succumbing to a personal request from the chair of the Hackney Workmen's Committee, as if overwhelmed by the faith of the simple folk.¹²⁷ Totally lacking from her account is any reference to the impact of Gladstone's Bulgarian activities on the Liberal Party itself, an aspect of the crisis viewed as highly significant by Swartz, who feels that Gladstone exploited the Bulgarian crisis to reconstruct the Liberal party and secure his own return to the leadership of the party and government in 1880.¹²⁸ It seems a significant limitation of the existing literature that many of the accounts of the crisis, whilst giving plentiful attention and varying assessments of Gladstone's activities, are curiously silent about any inner motives held by Disraeli. This is of course understandable for those concerned primarily with mass movements rather than high politics, nonetheless, this study will seek to integrate more of the personal insights given in biographies about Disraeli into the narrative of his activities during the crisis. A helpful corrective to the established trend, is Kovic's recent work, *Disraeli and The Eastern Question*, which seeks to trace Disraeli's thinking on eastern matters from his youth, travels, and novel-writing, right up to his death.¹²⁹

Although not widely available, the work of Cunningham on this period deserves a mention due to its general significance. His articles 'Jingoism in 1877-78' and 'The language of patriotism 1750-1914' are well-known, but both draw from and offer

¹²⁴ A. P. Saab, *Reluctant Icon: Gladstone, Bulgaria and the Working Classes, 1856-1878*, (Cambridge, Mass., 1991).

¹²⁵ Saab, *Reluctant Icon*, pp.94, 97-98.

¹²⁶ Shannon, *Gladstone & The Bulgarian Agitation*, pp.92, 106.

¹²⁷ Saab, *Reluctant Icon*, pp.76-78.

¹²⁸ M Swartz, *Politics of British Foreign Policy in the Era of Disraeli & Gladstone*, (London, 1985), p.43.

¹²⁹ M. Kovic, *Disraeli and the Eastern Question*, (Oxford, 2011).

development of specific sections of his far broader work, an unpublished DPhil Thesis *British Public Opinion and the Eastern Question 1877-1878*.¹³⁰ Despite dating back to 1969, many of the topics explored and considered by Cunningham in this work have not received popular consideration more recently, thus making the text invaluable for this study. These works will be properly considered in chapter seven of this study, which deals more fully with the phenomenon of Jingoism.

Panslavism

Any full understanding of nineteenth Century Russian foreign policy, or to a lesser extent internal activity would be impossible without an appreciation of the forces at work within the movement known as 'Panslavism.' If the nineteenth Century was the era of Nationalism, a movement of considerable significance for this study, it was also a distinctly fertile time for Pan-national movements, and whilst Pan-Germanism is often accorded the most attention, producing as it did the unified Germany in the 1870s, and influencing the course of European politics for decades after, Pan-Slavism is, in its way, no less deserving of the scholar's attention. In Russia at least, Pan-Slavism seems to have grown out of the Slavophile movement, a belief that, at its most basic, held that Russia was the last refuge of all that was pure, and that Europe by contrast was 'the other from which Russia must be saved.'¹³¹ The Slavophiles were one half of a long-standing intellectual debate within Russia, the other half of which was the 'Westernisers.' The practice of Westernisation began in Russia with the reign of Peter I 'the great,' 1682-1725. Hughes asserts that he was not a Westerniser and that he rather exhorted his countrymen that "it is good to build anew, but the old which is good should not be thrown away."¹³² Whatever his intentions may have been, though, it was in Peter's footsteps that the future Westernisers believed they trod. Regarding Russia somewhat contemptuously as backward and corrupt, Peter and his ideological

¹³⁰ H. Cunningham, 'Jingoism 1877-78,' *Victorian Studies*, 14, 4, (Jun 1971), pp.429-453; H. Cunningham, 'The Language of Patriotism 1750-1914,' *History workshop Journal*, 12, 1, (Autumn 1981), pp.8-33; H.S. Cunningham, *British Public Opinion and the Eastern Question, 1877-1878*, (Unpublished Phil Thesis, University of Sussex, 1969).

¹³¹ S. Rablow-Edling, 'The Role of "Europe" in Russian Nationalism: Reinterpreting the Relationship between Russia and the West in Slavophile thought', in McCaffray and Melancon, *Russia in the European Context*, p. 99.

¹³² L. Hughes, *Russia in the Age of Peter the Great*, (New Haven, 1998), p.467.

successors argued that Russia needed to become more like the West in order to thrive. It was the second quarter of the nineteenth Century when the debate reached its most vocal and contested, as Russia came down from the euphoric high it had enjoyed as self-perceived saviour of Europe from the Bonapartist menace, and was brought back to reality with a failed Palace coup for modernisation and liberalism, and instead experienced the reactionary reign of Nicholas I. In 1836 a retired guards' officer named Chadaev published an article in which he declared that Russia had fallen between Europe and Asia and 'borrowed nothing fruitful from either.'¹³³ Although Chadaev paid for his outburst by being incarcerated in an asylum, he had provoked perhaps the most significant ideological debate to happen during the reign of Nicholas I, and as such the Slavophile-Westerniser polemic has attracted a great deal of scholarly attention, most significantly Walicki's *The Slavophile Controversy*, which focuses upon the ideology, and the theoretical premises of the movement.¹³⁴ For a more personal approach to Slavophiles Peter Christoff has produced a four-volume series on some of the key figures in the Slavophile movement, the first volume of which is particularly helpful in outlining the broader social contours into which his subject fits.¹³⁵ Suslov has recently highlighted the historiographical debate as to whether Slavophilism was intrinsically liberal or illiberal: despite highlighting the work of Engelstein, who painted the movement as illiberal due to its nationalist, isolationist and anti-semitic trends, Suslov has offered as a counter-point the activities of individuals such as Sharapov and the other 'neo-Slavophiles' who added systems of self-government and principles of law to their ideology, in a way which he argues links strongly to Habermas's ideas of the public sphere, as well as giving 'us insight into the development, or rather underdevelopment, of the public sphere in Russia.'¹³⁶

¹³³ Hosking, *Russia: People and Empire*, pp.270-271.

¹³⁴ A. Walicki, *The Slavophile Controversy: History of a Conservative Utopia in Nineteenth-Century Russian Thought*. Trans. Hilda Andrews-Rusiecka (Oxford, 1975).

¹³⁵ P.K. Christoff, *An Introduction to Nineteenth-Century Russian Slavophilism, A study in ideas. Volume I: A.S. Xomjakov* (The Hague, 1961). See also, v.2 I.V. Kireevskij, (1972), v.3 K.S. Aksakov, (1982), & v.4, I.F. Samarin, (1991).

¹³⁶ Suslov, 'Slavophilism is True Liberalism,' pp.282, 284-5; L. Engelstein, *Slavophile Empire: Imperial Russia's Illiberal path*, (Ithica NY, 2009), for more on Sharapov, see below, ch3 [FULL REF TO FOLLOW]

However, in order to track the progression of ideas from the Slavophile-Westerniser debate to the more pertinent question of Pan-Slavism, it is necessary to look elsewhere, most significantly to Michael Boro-Petrovich's *The Emergence of Russian Pan-Slavism, 1856-1870*.¹³⁷ Although Boro-Petrovich's now rather aged work stops a few years short of the period that will be of concern to this study, it still offers perhaps the best introduction to the topic. Perhaps the first and most crucial thing that Boro-Petrovich offers those seeking to understand Pan-Slavism is a definition, namely 'the historic tendency of the Slavic peoples to manifest in some tangible way, whether cultural or political, their consciousness of ethnic kinship.'¹³⁸ Evidently, this was a highly diverse concept which ranged over many lands and centuries, thus necessitating a rather narrower focus here, which shall be the Great Russian political face of Pan-Slavism. Some have argued that Russian Pan-Slavism could be traced back a very long way, with O'Brien claiming to find 'incipient' traces as early as the late seventeenth Century.¹³⁹ However, this seems to be stretching the point, and there is perhaps more to be said for the notion that Pan-Slavism (in the Russian form at least) was 'forged in the flames of burning Moscow,' this rude awakening to the hostility of France leading as Tolstoi has noted to a revival of spoken Russian amongst the aristocracy, and a general reappraisal of attitudes.¹⁴⁰ If it is possible to talk of a founder of Russian Pan-Slavism, then Walicki is probably correct in assigning this title to Mikhail Pogodin, the Russian historian who argued strongly for the Normanist theory of Russian origins, and who contributed significantly to the official nationality policy, famously summed up by Uvarov, as 'Orthodoxy, Autocracy, Nationality.'¹⁴¹ The Pan-slav cause was then taken up in the 1850s by Konstantin Aksakov and A.S. Khomyakov. With the Crimean conflict already looming on the horizon for those inclined to see it, these men led a cry to

¹³⁷ M. Boro-Petrovich, *The Emergence of Russian pan-Slavism 1856-1870*, (New York, 1956).

¹³⁸ Ibid., pix.

¹³⁹ C.B. O'Brien, 'Russia and Turkey 1677-1681: The treaty of Bakhchisarai,' *Russian Review*, 12, (1953), p.263

¹⁴⁰ Boro-Petrovich, *Russian pan-slavism*, p.36., L. Tolstoy, *War & Peace*, [St. Petersburg, 1869, Penguin Popular classics edn.], (London, 1997), p.826.

¹⁴¹ Walicki, *The Slavophile Controversy*, p.495. The 'Normanist' theory held that the Russian aristocracy was at least partially descended from the family of a Viking Nobleman named Rurik whom the ancient Rus' had invited to come and be their ruler. See L. Kochan and J. Keep, *The Making of Modern Russia*, (London, 1997).

initiate a 'Holy War' against Turkey for the liberation of all Slavs and all people of Orthodox faith.¹⁴² Aksakov was to die shortly after this, but it was his brother, Ivan, who was to become the most significant figure of Russian Panslavism. I.S. Aksakov first rose to prominence in 1858, when he took over the editorship of *Russkaia Beseda*, which was thereby to become the first organ of the Panslavist popular press. This stood in stark contrast to the very academic forums to which Panslav discussions had previously been confined. It also seems probable that this, combined with the establishment in 1861 of the periodical *Den'* (Day), also a Panslav organ run by Aksakov, was responsible for more moderate publications, such as the semi-official *Sankt Peterburgskaia Vedomosti* starting up their own Slavonic sections.¹⁴³ In the first decades after The Crimean War, much of the Panslavism that was advocated in Russia was of a rather vague nature, and it was only in the 1860s that the work of V.A. Cherkasskii was able to beat a clearer path of thought and, more crucially, make Panslavism and the Eastern Question synonymous in many people's minds.¹⁴⁴

Beyond the vague sense of common identity that many cited and few defined, the strongest case for Slavonic unity was two-fold, namely linguistic and religious. The proximity of the Slavonic languages to each other led many to assert that the Slavs were united by a common language. However, whilst this position certainly had a greater coherence than if it were applied to, say, the Romance peoples, it was still incomplete without this supposed common-language being identified. Proto-Slavonic had never been committed to writing, and the Pan-slavs were over a century too early to resort to Slovianski or Slovio.¹⁴⁵ Perhaps the best claim to be a universal Slavonic language was held by Old Church Slavonic, the language used by the Orthodox Church throughout much of Eastern Europe. However, the use of an ecclesiastical language for day-to-day purposes was deeply problematic, due to its narrow, religious vocabulary, and crippling complex grammatical structure.¹⁴⁶ The

¹⁴² Walicki, *The Slavophile Controversy*, p.496.

¹⁴³ Boro Petrovich, *The Emergence of Russian pan-Slavism*, p.121.

¹⁴⁴ Boro-Petrovich, *The Emergence of Russian pan-Slavism*, p.244.

¹⁴⁵ <http://steen.free.fr/slovianski/> [accessed 12/01/2011]; <http://www.slovio.com/> [accessed 12/01/2011].

¹⁴⁶ Boro-Petrovich, *The Emergence of Russian pan-Slavism*, p.153.

only remaining choice then, at least in the minds of Russian Pan-slavists, was the Russian language itself, and this led to a concerted effort on the part of many to belittle the various Slavonic vernaculars as simply contaminations or denigrations of Russian. This leads us back to the already noted tension prevalent in the nineteenth Century between pan-national movements such as Pan-Slavism, and the more localised nationalistic movements that were to form the nation-states of the 20th Century. Whilst the Russian Pan-slavs were trying to diminish the characteristics of other Slavonic languages, figures such as Vuk Karadzic in Serbia were carrying out significant linguistic reforms designed to energise literary Serbian, such as the creation of new Cyrillic letters designed to represent sounds unique to Serbian.¹⁴⁷ Whilst tensions between ideologies are hardly uncommon, this difficulty between the Russian Pan-Slavs and their supposed brothers, Slavonic intelligentsia trying to arouse a sense of patriotic identity, caused serious damage to the various claims of fraternity that were being advanced.

Aside from language, another supposed commonality of the Slavonic peoples was that of religion. More specifically, the Russian Pan-Slavs saw Moscow as the 'third Rome,' the true home of Christianity after the fall of Constantinople in 1453.¹⁴⁸ However, this view, whilst perhaps useful for arguing a case against Muslim Turks, had proved decidedly problematic when dealing within Europe, with other Slavs. With the whole of Europe at this time being notionally Christian, it became ever clearer that the supposed bond of the Slavs was specifically that of the Eastern, Orthodox rite of Christianity. This however had little resonance with many of those Slavs who had long lived under Hapsburg rule, and followed the teachings of the Catholic Church. Poles, Czechs and Croats, for example, were all largely under the sway of the Church of Rome, and were thus religiously disinclined to switch their allegiance to Moscow. Furthermore, although most of the predominantly Orthodox nations were Slavs, this generalisation failed to take account of others, such as the Romanians, and most significantly of all, the Greeks, who were not only Orthodox,

¹⁴⁷ S. K. Pavlowitch, *Serbia: The history behind the Name*, (London, 2002), p.35.

¹⁴⁸ B. Jelavich, *Russia's Balkan Entanglements 1806-1914*, (Cambridge, 1991), p.36.

but who laid claim to the Patriarch of Constantinople, ostensibly the highest, or at least the most prestigious, office in Orthodox Christianity.

With these tensions lingering, the Pan-Slavs still needed some kind of method through which to operate, and aside from the actions of individuals, perhaps the most useful case for the historian to consider, is the activities of the various Slavonic organisations. The foremost of these was the Moscow Slavonic Benevolent committee, established in 1858, apparently with 'full approval' from Prince Gorchakov.¹⁴⁹ The Moscow Slavonic committees have been considered in great depth by S.A. Nikitin.¹⁵⁰ However, the high level of geographical fragmentation amongst the Slavonic committees makes it very difficult to transpose his findings onto any of the other groupings. For example, the St Petersburg arm of the Slavonic committee, Russia's other capital and a city well-connected to Moscow both in terms of information and transport, remained entirely ad-hoc until 1877, the height of the crisis which this study will be considering.

Being the largest of the Slavonic peoples and indeed one of very few able to lay claim to a sovereign state, Russian Panslavs (as has already been seen with regard to language) often behaved in a rather paternalistic fashion, aiming at best to aid their less fortunate brethren, and often simply to patronise them. Furthermore, the application of Panslavism in practice was rarely devoid of self-interested pragmatism. Even before Panslavism proper, in 1711, Peter the Great had first posited the idea of inciting Orthodox Christians in the Balkans to rise up against their Muslim overlords, both as a means of distracting and reducing the effectiveness of the Turkish forces, and as a way of increasing Russian influence in the region.¹⁵¹ The significance has already been noted of the idea of Moscow as 'the third Rome' and the final new home of 'true religion'. This statement received its first and most explicit statement in 1510 in a letter to Grand Duke Vasili III of Moscow, father of Ivan IV, stating 'two Romes have fallen. The third stands. And there will not be a fourth. No-one will replace your Christian Tsardom.'¹⁵² Whilst

¹⁴⁹ Boro-Petrovich, *The Emergence of Russian pan-Slavism*, p.132.

¹⁵⁰ S.A. Nikitin, *Slavianskie komitety v Rossii v 1858-1876 godakh* (Moscow, 1960).

¹⁵¹ Kochan and Keep, *The Making of Modern Russia*, p.87.

¹⁵² B. Jelavich, *Russia's Balkan Entanglements 1806-1914*, (Cambridge, 1991), p.36.

Russia was not a theocracy, it has been widely argued that Russia did keep religious concerns in mind, especially when dealing with Turkey, forming what Schönle has termed 'a geopolitical argument rooted in religious hostility.'¹⁵³ It is always difficult to determine exactly how much government policy is genuinely influenced by religious conviction. Nonetheless, it does seem that Russian Tsars retained a belief in the divine right of Kings, long after Locke and Rousseau had made such ideas unfashionable in the west.¹⁵⁴

The Eastern Question

The Balkan Background

Much of what has occurred in the Balkans in recent decades has shown the presence of long, if often selective, collective memories. The conflict in the former Yugoslavia in the early 1990s was often conducted with reference to fourteenth-century battles and Empires, and twelfth century coronations. Whilst these are obviously beyond the scope of this current work, it does highlight the difficulty of compartmentalising the conflicts of this region.

Broadly speaking, the Balkan Peninsula following the arrival of the Slav peoples in the early seventh century witnessed a fluid host of kingdoms, principalities and empires, as various peoples, often sharing a name with a modern-day ethnic group, attempted to assert their authority over the neighbouring regions. In the course of the next seven hundred years or so Bulgars, Serbs, and Croats (amongst others) enjoyed periods of success ruling territories historically claimed by the Greeks or which provided the core of their latter-day nation-states. In the thirteenth and fourteenth centuries, however, these Slavonic Princlings were gradually eliminated by the ascendancy of the Ottoman Empire, which was reaching the height of its power. For 500 years or so, practical notions of independent statehood for the Balkan Slavs were extinguished.

¹⁵³ A. Schönle, 'Garden of the Empire: Catherine's Appropriation of the Crimea,' *Slavic Review*, 60, (2001), p.1.

¹⁵⁴ B. Jelavich, *Russia's Balkan Entanglements*, p. 32; J. Locke, *Two Treatises of Government* [London, 1689], P. Laslett (Ed.) (Cambridge, 1988); J.J. Rousseau, *the Social Contract*, [Paris, 1762], trans Maurice Cranston (Harmondsworth, 1968).

Despite this, however, the Ottoman system of rule, the so-called 'millet,' allowed many of the subject peoples to keep their religion and to retain at least their language as a peasant vernacular; indeed Shaw has argued that the millets provided the Christian subjects of the Ottoman Empire with 'the requisite conditions for developing their own culture.'¹⁵⁵ There is a growing body of work on the exact nature of the millet system, and its proper place within Quranic law. A system which allowed the infidels to contribute to the Imperial treasury, and simultaneously provided them with an exemption from military service which helped to ensure the security of the harvest, was of course highly significant. However, it remains unclear as to whether this should more properly be seen as a benevolent and far-sighted, legitimate approach, or an 'expediency' of dubious legality, providing servitude where death was the prescribed punishment.¹⁵⁶ Whilst the Empire remained strong, this linguistic concession provided little difficulty. However, as the power of the Sultans stagnated and began to wane, this act of convenience on the part of the Ottomans returned to haunt them, as there emerged figures from within these nationalities keen to seek a fresh lease of independence.

Much of the impetus for the creation of these new independent territories came from the Napoleonic era. Although the map of Europe was far from static at the best of times, the French Revolutionary wars destroyed many of the apparent geographical certainties of the time. Although keen not to overplay the significance of the French Army and the declarations of rights that it carried with it, Okey sums up neatly the fact that 'Napoleon had brilliantly set the national question before the minds of his contemporaries.'¹⁵⁷ Military victories over Austria in 1805 and 1808 had given France access to Balkan territories, and Napoleon's establishment in 1808 of the 'Illyrian provinces,' comprising Dalmatia, Istria, much of modern-day

¹⁵⁵ S. J. Shaw, 'The Aims and Achievements of Ottoman Rule in the Balkans,' *Slavic Review*, 21, 4, (Dec, 1962), p.618.

¹⁵⁶ G. Lewis, *Modern Turkey*, (London, 1974), pp.33-34; S.A. Somel, *The A to Z of the Ottoman empire*, (Lanham, 2010); F.M. Gocek, 'Ethnic Segmentation, Western Education, and Political Outcomes: nineteenth Century Ottoman Society,' *Poetics Today*, 14, 3, (Autumn 1993), p.526; S.F. Dale, *The Muslim Empires of the Ottomans, Safavids, and Mughals*, (Cambridge, 2010), pp.82-84.

¹⁵⁷ R. Okey, *Eastern Europe 1740-1985: Feudalism to Communism* (2nd Ed), (Warwick, 2001), pp.59-60.

Slovenia, and the western half of Croatia, provided perhaps the first separate south-Slav state in centuries.¹⁵⁸ Obviously, a state which failed in an attempt to standardise the local south-Slav vernacular and was ruled over by a French Marshall did not provide instant fuel for the cause of Slav nationalism.¹⁵⁹ However, the creation of the Illyrian provinces, like the remarkable success of the broadly contemporary first Serbian revolt led by 'Black' George Petrovic, a pig-farmer, despite its ultimate failure, did 'give new impetus both to the memory of medieval Serbia and to the tradition of defiance and defeat.'¹⁶⁰

Ironically, and perhaps unfortunately for the south-Slav advocates of national liberty, the nineteenth century world in which many of them began to make their bid for independence was a massively transformed place from the medieval world in which their ancestors had laid claim to Empires. The former Barbarian kingdoms of the Western Roman Empire had largely emerged as the so-called 'Great Powers' of the nineteenth Century: Britain, France and Austria, joined by Russia from the East, and Germany (replacing Prussia) in the latter half of the century. In a manner that would have been unthinkable at the point when the Balkan Slavs last enjoyed political independence, any question of establishing new states within Europe now fell very much within the spheres of interest of all of these powers, something which the Ottoman Slavs were aware of, but not always able to adequately act according to. The example of Karadjordjevic's rebels during the first Serbian revolt of 1804-13 is a good one; they began by approaching Tsar Alexander, Emperor Ferdinand, and Napoleon, reasoning that 'only another emperor could deal with the ruler of an empire.'¹⁶¹ However, despite a brief war between Russia and Turkey, the peace treaty failed to mention the Serbs, and when Napoleon invaded Russia the Serbs ceased to receive even encouragements, a turn of events regarded as typical

¹⁵⁸ N. Malcolm, *Bosnia: A Short History*, (Oxford, 1996), pp.87-88. There had been a 'Kingdom of Serbia' under Austrian rule between 1718 and 1739, but this occupation under martial law lacked even the limited autonomy given to the Illyrian Provinces; T. Judah, *The Serbs: History, Myth and the Destruction of Yugoslavia*, (Yale, 2000), p.50.

¹⁵⁹ Okey, *Eastern Europe*, p.60.

¹⁶⁰ S. Pavlowitch, *Serbia, The History behind the name*, (London, 2002), pp.29-31. For a detailed analysis of the First Serbian Revolt, see M.B. Petrovich, *A History of modern Serbia, 1804-1918 Vol.1*, (New York, 1976).

¹⁶¹ Pavlowitch, *Serbia*, p.30.

of Russo-Serb relations by Judah who asserts that 'The Serbs have always been conscious that there is no real love lost between the two countries.'¹⁶²

The Congress of Vienna in 1815 largely restored the geographical status quo from before the wars, leaving the south Slavs to brood over their brief flirtations with autonomy and independence. When not distracted by a major war with each other, the European powers showed differing degrees of interest in various regions of Europe. Russia was by far the most involved in Balkan affairs, playing at least some role in all of the significant periods of diplomatic activity in that area during the nineteenth Century. Great Britain by contrast tended to be less involved, although significant exceptions were made such as the war of Greek Independence (1821-1832) and the Crimean War (1853-6). Although not a conflict waged in the Balkans, its causes were inextricably entangled with Balkan events.

Russo- Turkish Relations Before Crimea

To consider very broadly the development of relations between Russia and Turkey will be essential in illuminating the context of events. They first clashed over the Khanate of the Crimea, a nominal Turkish vassal state that found itself being increasingly drawn into the Muscovite sphere of influence. These initial tensions crystallised into a more clearly defined Russo-Turkish problem in the late seventeenth Century, with the signing of the treaty of Bakhchisarai in 1681.¹⁶³ The treaty was linguistically rather condescending towards the Russians, yet as O'Brien has noted, it was in fact of crucial importance for Russia, as it provides a case-study of the rapid Russian expansion into European space.¹⁶⁴ Furthermore, it made provision for Muscovite Tsars establishing separate treaties with the Porte, and for the recognition of at least some Russian territorial claims.¹⁶⁵ This issue of tone of language within Ottoman treaties with Christian Powers is an interesting one, as it

¹⁶² Judah, *The Serbs*, p.52.

¹⁶³ This was not actually the first treaty between the two states, but being the first one to strongly favour Russia, it tends to feature more strongly in Russian accounts of the relations between the two, Lord Kinross, *The Ottoman Centuries: The Rise and Fall of the Turkish Empire*, (London, 1997), pp.338-342.

¹⁶⁴ A.N. Shebunin, *Rossia na Blizhnem Vostoke* (Leningrad, 1926), p. 3; O'Brien, 'Russia and Turkey,' p.259.

¹⁶⁵ O'Brien, 'Russia and Turkey', pp.266-8.

may be the case that Ottoman insistence upon linguistic superiority masked the relative power-shift away from Turkey and towards Europe during the early-modern period.¹⁶⁶ Russia continued to expand against Turkey in the late seventeenth and early eighteenth Century, as Peter the Great captured Azov, before suffering defeat on the Pruth in 1711.¹⁶⁷ The key date prior to the dawn of the nineteenth Century, however, was 1774, when a series of Russo-Turkish conflicts, initiated by Potemkin's seizure of the Crimea, was brought to a conclusion by the now notorious treaty of Kuchuk Kainardji (Küçük Kaynarca in Turkish). Although some, such as Figes have tried to downplay the significance of Kuchuk Kainardji in the late nineteenth century, given that it was explicitly nullified by the Treaty of Paris in 1856, this is to wilfully ignore the tremendous impact the treaty made upon Russian perceptions of the Balkans, which is why it has been justly described as 'one of history's great shifts in power relations.'¹⁶⁸ The crucial point of Kuchuk Kainadrji, was that it contained a Turkish promise to 'protect constantly the Christians' religion and churches' and rather more nebulously, allowed 'Ministers of the Imperial Court of Russia to make, upon all occasions, representations' if this was not done.¹⁶⁹ The treaty was from its outset a major source of contention in terms of how it was to be interpreted, with the Turks perceiving the Russian right to be purely and simply that of 'making representations', whilst many Russian politicians interpreted it as allowing them to intervene directly in Turkish internal affairs if they perceived Ottoman Christians to be at risk.¹⁷⁰ The multi-lingual nature of the treaty did little to help clarify the situation, and Davison notes that the Russian government felt the need to issue an 'official' French translation, in which all contentious words had been resolved in Russia's favour.¹⁷¹ This did little to convince the Turks, who continued to deny the validity of the clause, right down to the Crimean War. However, whatever the initial intention, the fact seems clear

¹⁶⁶ Kinross, *The Ottoman Centuries*, pp.204-5; Dale, *The Muslim Empires*, p.84.

¹⁶⁷ G. Hosking, *Russia and the Russians: From Earliest Times to 2001* (London, 2001), pp.194-195.

¹⁶⁸ O. Figes, *Crimea: The Last Crusade*, (London, 2010), pp.432-433; R.H. Davison, "'Russian skill and Turkish imbecility': The treaty of Kuchuk Kainardji reconsidered', *Slavic Review*, 35, (1976), p.463.

¹⁶⁹ Jelavich, *Russia's Balkan Entanglements*, p.4.

¹⁷⁰ M.S. Anderson, *The Great Powers and the Near East 1774-1923* (London, 1970,) p.9; P. Miliukov, C. Seignobos, & L. Eisenmann, *History of Russia*, trans. C.L. Markmann, 3 Vols. (New York, 1968-69), Vol.2, p.111.

¹⁷¹ Davison, 'Russian Skill and Turkish Imbecility', p.475.

that, by the mid-nineteenth Century, the language used by almost all European diplomats seemed to implicitly acknowledge some expectation of Russian intervention within Turkey in times of crisis.¹⁷²

Whilst few would doubt that Russia perceived itself as being entitled to interfere within Turkey, a more pertinent question is whether her desires stretched any further in that direction. For many, the actions of Tsar Ivan III 'The Great' in the fifteenth century made strong symbolic claims to the heritage of Christian Byzantium, adopting for Russia the double-headed eagle, and marrying the niece of the last Byzantine emperor. This symbolic behaviour carried on throughout the centuries, for example in the naming of Catherine the Great's grandson 'Constantine.' However, whether this was ever seriously expected to translate into anything more substantial is a matter of considerable debate. Jelavich sees evidence that there was a genuine expectation amongst Russian elites, citing a conversation between Catherine II and Joseph II of Austria about a revived Byzantine Empire under the aforementioned Constantine.¹⁷³ In the time of the Great Eastern Crisis, writers such as Dostoevskii felt able to write with confidence that 'Constantinople must one day be ours,' and one of the final acts of the Imperial government was to sign the secret Constantinople agreement in the spring of 1915, pledging continued war support for the allies in return for Constantinople and the northern shore of Anatolia.¹⁷⁴ For others, such as Polunov, these claims fail to present the political realities that inevitably tempered the aspirations of people in Russia, and as an example they cite Nicholas I's unambiguous warning to Nesselrode 'we do not want Constantinople ... that would be the most dangerous conquest we could make.'¹⁷⁵ However, Lieven attempts to move beyond this disagreement, treating the Russian obsession with Constantinople as simply a consequence of Russian geography. Russian expansion brought her an ever greater number of landlocked seas, and the Black Sea was useless without the Bosphorus

¹⁷² Jelavich, *Russia's Balkan Entanglements*, p.121.

¹⁷³ Ibid., p.5.

¹⁷⁴ F. Dostoevsky, *A Writer's Diary, Translated and Annotated by K Lantz*, V.2, (Evanstown, 2000).

¹⁷⁵ A. Polunov, *Russia in the Nineteenth Century: Autocracy, Reform, and Social change, 1814-1914*, (London, 2005), p.71.

and the Dardanelles.¹⁷⁶ This argument is borne out by the repeated attempts by Russia to constrain the Turkish navy, one of the most extreme of which came in 1769, when a detachment of 16 ships was sent all the way from the Baltic to the Mediterranean to harass the Turks.¹⁷⁷

Anglo-Turkish Relations before Crimea

British contact with the Turks was less frequent and, generally speaking, less tense. Britain was a long way from Turkish domains, and Britain only began to have serious designs on Ottoman territories comparatively late in the lifetime of the Empire. Even then, it was often concern about Russian or French intentions that proved the primary motivating factor. However, whilst much of the existing historiography has tended to focus on these *realpolitik* concerns, Robbins and Fisher have recently noted that in the nineteenth century, it was 'impossible not to conceive of the United Kingdom as a Christian country,' and have asserted that this played a significant role in Foreign Policy, especially when dealing with non-Christian powers.¹⁷⁸ However, whilst religious factors undoubtedly influenced remarks such as Gladstone's comment that Turkey's flaw was 'Mahometanism compounded with the peculiar character of a race,' it seems that most of the religiously motivated statements regarding Ottoman Turkey were from those who wished to see "the cross [once more] elevated at St. Sophia."¹⁷⁹ Indeed, the conviction that a conquering army entering Constantinople would have as its first priority the holding of a mass calls to mind the enthusiasm of Great War British officers for a meal in Berlin, accompanied by Captain Blackadder's comment that 'I

¹⁷⁶ Dominic Lieven, *Empire: The Russian Empire and its Rivals from the Sixteenth Century to the present* (London, 2003), pp.141-142.

¹⁷⁷ Comm. A. Courtney, 'The Background of Russian Sea Power', *International Affairs* 30, (1954), pp.16-17.

¹⁷⁸ K. Robbins & J. Fisher, *Religion and Diplomacy: Religion and British Foreign Policy, 1815 to 1941*, (Dordrecht, 2010), p.2.

¹⁷⁹ Gladstone, *The Bulgarian Atrocities and the Question of the East*, (London, 1876), cited in J. Charmley, 'Britain and the Ottoman Empire, 1830-1880,' in Robbins & Fisher, *Religion and Diplomacy*, p.65; Sir Archibald Alison, cited in *Ibid.* p.66.

hope the cafes are well-stocked, everyone seems determined to eat out the moment they arrive!’¹⁸⁰

Chamberlain identifies the first British involvement in the Eastern Question as being the Ochakov incident in 1791. Although British pressure regarding this fortress on the Black Sea had little success, she regards it as significant for being the first instance of British intervention in a Russo-Turkish dispute, motivated by concerns for trade routes.¹⁸¹ Despite this brief disagreement at the diplomatic level, the first serious intervention by British politicians in the internal affairs of Ottoman Turkey was when Napoleon Bonaparte led his army to Egypt in 1799. Although the expedition was ordered by Talleyrand, the purpose was made clear a short while before the expedition in a comment made by Napoleon: “The time is not far distant, when we shall feel that, in order to destroy England once and for all we must occupy Egypt.”¹⁸² In many respects, this provides a quintessential example of the type of event likely to engage British attention. Although the conflict superficially involved simply the two protagonists, Turkey and France, it was felt in Whitehall that a Napoleonic success, would have allowed France to threaten British communication with India at a time when commercial enterprise under the East India Company was being rapidly replaced by administrative Imperialism under the Wellesley brothers. This was sufficient to convince the British to intervene on the Turkish side of the conflict and, despite Napoleon’s initial victories on land, Nelson’s triumph at the battle of the Nile left the French stranded and ensured the ultimate defeat of the expedition.¹⁸³ Napoleon was, of course, one of the French who returned unscathed from the Egyptian campaign, and Chamberlain argues that it was his words at Tilsit in 1807 that first prompted fears of a Russian threat to India, one of the most significant factors in sustaining British interest and concern in the Near East throughout the nineteenth century.¹⁸⁴ Doubtless encouraged by the ease with which their masters had been defeated in the field by the French, various

¹⁸⁰ J. Lloyd, R. Curtis, B. Elton, R. Atkinson, *Blackadder, the Whole Damn Dynasty*, (London, 1999), p.451.

¹⁸¹ Chamberlain, *Pax Britannica*, p.25.

¹⁸² R. Harvey, *War of Wars: The epic struggle between Britain and France: 1789-1815*, (London, 2006), p.249.

¹⁸³ P. Kennedy, *The Rise and Fall of British Naval Mastery*, (London, 1976), p.124.

¹⁸⁴ Chamberlain, *Pax Britannica*, p.36.

Ottoman provincial Pashas began to make life difficult for their masters in the coming decades, none more so than Egypt's Mehmet Ali Pasha and his son Ibrahim. Mehmet Ali had initially been sent as part of the Ottoman re-occupation after the French withdrawal, but swiftly established himself as pre-eminent in Egypt. In Charmley's view, he made himself master of Egypt 'by a mixture of intrigue, ruthlessness and sheer ability.'¹⁸⁵ The appeal of Mehmet Ali to the west was that he seemed to offer a positive answer for the age old question of whether the 'timeless Orient' could be modernised successfully.¹⁸⁶ However, his true impact on both the Ottoman Empire and on Britain was not to make itself felt for several years yet.

The next major event for British involvement with the Turks came in 1820, with the outbreak of the Greek revolt. Whilst the Sultan was distracted with another unruly vassal, this time the Albanian Ali Pasha, Greek revolutionaries decided to take advantage.¹⁸⁷ Led by a former aide-de-camp of Alexander I named Alexandros Ypsilantis, the 'Philiki Etaireia' society staged a brief uprising in the Danubian Provinces.¹⁸⁸ Despite the strategic and religious reasons in favour of intervention, Alexander I decided that his greater loyalty lay with the Holy Alliance, created in 1815 for the promotion of Christian values, but more frequently used as a bulwark against revolution and secularism, and thus did not act in support of the Greeks.¹⁸⁹ Britain likewise declared that it would not intervene, and the Sultan was therefore ultimately forced to call upon Egypt for assistance, and troops under the command of Ibrahim Pasha, (son of Mehmet Ali) landed in 1825.¹⁹⁰ The Egyptian troops achieved considerable success, undermining the military gains that the Greeks had made in the previous five years, and were doubtless largely responsible for the joint Russo-British declaration, in April 1826, of an intention to work together for the

¹⁸⁵ Charmley, 'Britain and the Ottoman Empire,' in Robbins & Fisher, *Religion and Diplomacy*, p.69.

¹⁸⁶ Ibid.

¹⁸⁷ M. Hatzopoulos, 'From Resurrection to insurrection: "sacred" myths, motifs, and symbols in the Greek War of Independence,' in R. Beaton & D. Ricks, (Eds.) *Making of Modern Greece: Nationalism, Romanticism, and the uses of the past*, (Farnham, 2009), p.81.

¹⁸⁸ B.M. Jankovic, *The Balkans in International Relations*, (Trans. M. & B. Milosavljevic) (London, 1988), p.64.

¹⁸⁹ T. C. Prousis, *Russian Society and the Greek Revolution*, (DeKalb, 1994), pviii.

¹⁹⁰ Janvokic, *The Balkans in International Relations*, p.65.

establishment of a Greek tributary.¹⁹¹ This in turn led to the creation of a joint Anglo-Russo-French naval force which successfully confronted and destroyed an Egypto-Turkish force at Navarino the following year.¹⁹² Once all three Powers were committed to the Greek cause, the outcome was fairly certain, and Beaton argues that the most crucial aspect of Greek success was the achievement by Greeks in the eighteenth century of attaching the rhetoric of restoration rather than innovation to the issue of Greek independence.¹⁹³ Whilst Chamberlain's assertions that the revolt was broadly misunderstood in the west as 'Homer and Pericles' rising against the Turks seems perhaps a little strong, Beaton does have a strong point about the ideological unlikelihood of Nicholas I, Charles X of France and the Duke of Wellington sitting down together to sign into being a new state at the expense of an established and legitimate state.¹⁹⁴ The fact that the new Greece was established by a treaty of the European Powers, rather than by a bilateral Greco-Turkish agreement was lost neither on the new Greek government, nor on more recent historians. Despite their short-term success, the minimal size of the new state and the expansionist aims of those given it were to ensure the continuation of British intervention for much of the following decades.¹⁹⁵ Although Navarino had effectively marked the end of one conflict, it was only the beginning of another; Mehmet Ali had lost his fleet in the battle but 'consolated himself with the prospect of the governorships of Syria and Crete which the Sultan had promised as his reward' for silencing the Greeks.¹⁹⁶ Although the Sultan was accurate in his assessment that Mehmet Ali's help had not actually brought about victory against Greece, he turned out to be extremely ill-advised in refusing the governorships, which Mehmet Ali decided to take anyway. Between 1831-32, Ibrahim's forces swiftly occupied Acre, and announced the annexation of Syria. Many feared that Ali

¹⁹¹ D. Dakin, 'The Formation of the Greek State, 1821-33' in R. Clogg (Ed.) *The Struggle for Greek Independence: Essays to mark the 150th anniversary of the Greek War of Independence*, (London, 1973), pp.172-173.

¹⁹² J.S. Koliopoulos & T.M. Veremis, *Greece: The Modern Sequel, from 1831 to the Present*, (London, 2002), p.12.

¹⁹³ Beaton, 'Introduction,' in Beaton & Ricks, *Making of Modern Greece*, p.5.

¹⁹⁴ Chamberlain, *Pax Britannica*, p.67; Beaton in Beaton & Ricks, *Making of Modern Greece*, p.3.

¹⁹⁵ T.A. Couloumbis, J.A. Petropoulos, & H.J. Psomiades, *Foreign Intervention in Greek Politics: An Historical Perspective*, (New York, 1976), pp.19-22.

¹⁹⁶ Charmley, 'Britain and the Ottoman Empire,' p.69.

Pasha's desires stretched even further, and the British agent at Alexandria reported that he suspected the ultimate goal was to install Ibrahim as Sultan with Mehmet Ali confirmed as Viceroy in Egypt.¹⁹⁷ Despite offering vague reassurances to the Sultan, the British government, occupied with a Reform Act at home, failed to provide any concrete support, leading in 1833 to the Sultan's fateful decision to seek help from Russia and 'as a drowning man clutches at a serpent,' sign the Treaty of Unkiar Skelessi.¹⁹⁸ This treaty of mutual protection was viewed by Palmerston as both the first step to Turkey becoming a Russian protectorate, and the 'greatest mistake' a British cabinet had ever made in Foreign Policy.¹⁹⁹ This has generally been seen as being the major impetus behind much of subsequent British involvement in Turkish affairs, and calls into question Parry's assertion that 'it is misleading to reduce the story of British attitudes to Europe to notions of "Russophobia" or "Francophobia."' ²⁰⁰ Whilst his warning against over-simplification must stand, so too must the basic notion of Russophobia as a guiding principle for Britain in the nineteenth century. Gleason has asserted the fundamental compatibility of British and Russian aims, but believes that the sheer scale of Russian expansion in the nineteenth century made their (honest) claims unbelievable in Whitehall.²⁰¹

Despite these specific flare-ups, it is important to re-stress the significance of economic factors in British consideration. Throughout the nineteenth century, Britain had the largest share of Ottoman trade, and three quarters of all British exports to the Middle East (including Egypt), went through Anatolia.²⁰² According to Bailey, Turkey was identified early in the century as an ideal market due to its low tariffs, and the outperforming of Russian merchants by their British counterparts was a significant factor in causing the two governments to seek political leverage

¹⁹⁷ Ibid., p.70.

¹⁹⁸ F.E. Bailey, *British Policy & the Turkish Reform movement: A Study in Anglo-Turkish Relations, 1826-1853*, (Cambridge, Mass., 1942), p.40.

¹⁹⁹ Charmley, 'Britain and the Ottoman Empire,' in Robbins & Fisher, *Religion and Diplomacy*, p.70.

²⁰⁰ Parry, *The Politics of Patriotism*, p.14.

²⁰¹ J.H. Gleason, *The Genesis of Russophobia in Great Britain: A study of the interaction of policy and opinion*, (Cambridge, Mass., 1950), pp.2, 86.

²⁰² D.Quataert, 'The Age of Reforms, 1812-1914,' in H. Inalcik & D. Quataert (Eds.) *An Economic History of the Ottoman Empire 1300-1914*, (Cambridge, 1994), pp.830-3.

over the situation.²⁰³ Thus, any major political or territorial change in the region would have had direct and tangible effects on British merchants.

The Crimean War

The root cause of the Crimea conflict stemmed, at least in part, from the suspicion and misunderstandings which punctuated international diplomacy in the nineteenth Century. Warner has concluded that 'after a series of acts which the Russians thought were legitimate defensive moves, and which the Turks, French, and British thought were blatant examples of aggression, Turkey, France and Britain declared war on Russia on 28 March 1854.'²⁰⁴ The initial point of conflict in the chains of events that led to the Crimean war came in the early 1850s, when Louis-Napoleon of France sought recognition from the Sultan as protector of the Holy Places, and specifically the keys to the church of the Nativity in Bethlehem.²⁰⁵ The fact that this was accepted by Sultan Abdulmajid I caused a fierce reaction in Russia and set in motion a complex diplomatic wrangle concerning who could have keys, use doors, hold services, and even fix the roof.²⁰⁶ Seeing these French claims as a violation of the terms of Kujuk Kainardji, Jelavich asserts that the Russian government was forced by honour 'to regard the defence of treaty rights as a duty.'²⁰⁷ However, despite this noble sentiment she espouses, it would be naive to suggest that Nicholas I's concern was not at least partially with the prospect of Republican France transforming itself into both Imperial France and into the dominant European Power at the Porte.²⁰⁸ Jelavich once again tries to assert Russia's moderation, noting that Menshikov was dispatched to the Porte seeking only a re-iteration of those rights which Russia already claimed (i.e. that of intervention in the affairs of Ottoman Christians.)²⁰⁹ However, others have noted

²⁰³ Bailey, *British Policy and the Turkish Reform Movement*, pp.79, 114.

²⁰⁴ P. Warner (Ed.), *Letters Home From the Crimea: A Young Cavalryman's campaign from Balaklava and Sebastopol to victory*, (Moreton-in-Marsh, 1977), p.4.

²⁰⁵ J.A.S. Grenville, *Europe Reshaped: 1848-1878* (2nd Ed) (Oxford, 2000), p.170.

²⁰⁶ For a full and very detailed discussion of the Holy Places dispute, see D.M. Goldfrank, *The Origins of the Crimean War*, (London, 1994), esp ch4-10.

²⁰⁷ B. Jelavich, *Russia's Balkan Entanglements*, p.33.

²⁰⁸ As Grenville notes, the 2nd Republic had been Republican 'only in Constitutional form' even before the proclamation of the 2nd Empire. However, this did little to diminish Russian suspicions of France. Grenville, *Europe Reshaped*, p.141.

²⁰⁹ B. Jelavich, *Russia's Balkan Entanglements*, p.118.

that the Tsar's choice of diplomat left a great deal to be desired if he was genuinely intent on holding negotiations and resolving the Holy Places dispute, not simply provoking a war.²¹⁰ Goldfrank provides a meticulously detailed study of the diplomatic to-ings and fro-ings leading up to the outbreak of the Crimean conflict, and is ultimately unable to move far from the simple assertion that the blame must lie with Nicholas I, in a fashion that seems improbable as late as the mid-nineteenth century, when so much of international relations was taken out of the hands of Royals and delegated to professional diplomats.²¹¹ Britain, it must be remembered, always maintained a healthy degree of suspicion towards all foreigners, and given that the dispute over the Holy Places coincided with the decision by the French ruler to proclaim himself 'Napoleon III' (thus claiming to be both the heir of Bonaparte and the legitimate continuation of an Imperial dynasty headed by the four year-old King of Rome after Waterloo,) Nicholas set himself a not insignificant task when he decided to push Britain into the arms of the French and in opposition to himself.²¹² Goldfrank asserts that Nicholas had repeated opportunities to back down, claim victory, or even simply avoid being on the receiving end of a multi-power military coalition, but that he repeatedly lacked realism and was ultimately 'too angry to cut his losses.'²¹³ It was not even a matter of losing prestige, simply a need to accept reality and be prepared to compromise.

Russian decisions to cross the Danube deeper into Turkish territory, and to sink much of the Turkish fleet at Sinope, ensured the arrival of Anglo-French forces in the Black Sea. Wary of being outflanked by Austria, Nicholas withdrew his forces to the Crimea. However, it was Naval Power that counted and the prospect of leaving the Black Sea under sole Russian control ensured that the war would not end when Russian troops left Turkish soil. Nicholas of course continued to assert that 'Russia is fighting for Christian truth and the defence of its co-religionist brothers,' and this is the very right, however dubiously held to begin with, that she unequivocally lost.²¹⁴ Following a dismal military showing by the Russians, and a campaign that could not

²¹⁰ W. Baumgart, *The Crimean War 1853-1856*, (London, 1990), pp.13-14.

²¹¹ Goldfrank, *The Origins of the Crimean War*, p.271.

²¹² Grenville, *Europe Reshaped*, p.149.

²¹³ Goldfrank, *Origins of the Crimean War*, pp.214, 231, 250, 262.

²¹⁴ Polunov, *Russia in the Nineteenth Century*, p.72.

even be turned around by allied blunders such as the Charge of the Light Brigade, or the siege of Sevastapol, Russia found itself on the receiving end of the Treaty of Paris.²¹⁵ The Treaty provides a fascinating insight into the mentality of the Russian diplomatic Corps in the nineteenth Century. Broadly speaking it was a massive defeat and a loss of prestige for the Tsar, with protection of Turkish Christians being moved definitively from Russia to the European Powers as a whole (although the tension between this 'protection' and Ottoman sovereignty remained unresolved). Furthermore, the Black Sea was demilitarised in its entirety, another major blow to Russia, although at least preferable to the alternative, which would have been opening the straits to international warships, and allowing the Royal Navy to extend British influence there.²¹⁶ That all this was a major blow to Russia is beyond doubt. However, even in this new treaty, there was ambiguity as to how exactly Turkey would treat her Christian subjects, and this ambiguity was brought once again under the spotlight in 1875, with the outbreak of the Hercegovinian revolt. Crucially, despite the explicit repudiation of the Kuchuk-Kainardji provisions in the treaty of Paris, Russia still acted as if they provided her framework for action in the 1870s. It was still Russia that saw herself as the 'natural' protector of the Slavs, and there seemed to have been no lessons learned from the debacle that was Crimea.

The Great Eastern Crisis 1875-1878

There has been a considerable volume of scholarship relating to this topic, and although much of it is now decidedly dated, the sheer detail which was included ensures that much of it remains useful today. The majority of the works written between the wars focused on the diplomatic aspect of events, perhaps labouring under the misapprehension identified by Chamberlain that diplomacy was an activity that if sufficiently well studied could be mastered in order to prevent a future war.²¹⁷ The chief example of this is B.H. Sumner's epic *Russia and the Balkans 1870-1880*, which delivers a blow-by-blow account of almost all of the conferences,

²¹⁵ Why the Franco-British forces decided to besiege rather than storm Sevastapol remains a mystery. Baumgart, *The Crimean War*, pp.121-124.

²¹⁶ Goldfrank, *Origins of the Crimean War*, p.292.

²¹⁷ Chamberlain, *Pax Britannica*, p.1.

discussions and intrigues between the Great Power politicians of the time.²¹⁸ Sadly, Sumner's work is very limited in its broader utility by his two central assumptions, namely that there were no events of significance outside the military or diplomatic sphere, and that it is unnecessary to translate any quotation first made in French. The first of these limitations is shared by Stojanovic's slightly briefer account, which is nonetheless a good guide to the general contours of events.²¹⁹ After these two giants of the 1930s, the historiography did not receive much in the way of fresh attention until the 1960s and 1970s when there was a sudden proliferation of works from authors such as Jelavich and MacKenzie.²²⁰ MacKenzie's work offers detailed consideration of the St. Petersburg and Belgrade press of the time, as well as on the internal political wrangling in Serbia on a level that has yet to be duplicated. However, he fails to adequately locate his work within the context of the nineteenth century more generally and, being concerned primarily with Serbs, mentions the Bulgarian aspect of the uprising only insofar as it distracted attention or support from Serbia.²²¹ Jelavich continued working on the area into the final years of the 20th Century, but generally speaking, the collapse of Soviet Power in Eastern Europe distracted scholarly attention onto more immediately relevant areas of study. Her last significant work, *Russia's Balkan Entanglements* is particularly valuable for the broad contextualisation it provides of the 1875-78 Crisis within the broader context of Russian involvement in the Balkans, although this gain in breadth means a loss of depth and she adds little on this occasion to the scholarship of the crisis itself.²²² Works considering the crisis from a more explicitly British perspective have already been discussed above in the examination of the historiography of Victorian Britain. Recent years have seen a limited revival of attention to this period, including the informative yet error-strewn works of Jelena Miloković-Djurić, and the Russian-language work of Viktoriia Khevrolina on Russian

²¹⁸ B.H. Sumner, *Russia and the Balkans 1870-1880* (Oxford, 1937).

²¹⁹ M.D. Stojanović, *The Great Powers and the Balkans, 1875-1878* [Cambridge, 1939], (Cambridge, 1968).

²²⁰ B. Jelavich, *The Ottoman Empire, the Great Powers, and the Straits Question, 1870-1887* (London, 1973); D. MacKenzie, *The Serbs and Russian Pan-Slavism*, (New York, 1967); W.N. Medlicott, *The Congress of Berlin and After, A diplomatic History of the Near Eastern Settlement 1878-1880*, 2nd Ed. (London, 1963).

²²¹ See e.g. MacKenzie, *The Serbs and Russian Pan-Slavism*, pp.168, 269.

²²² Jelavich, *Russia's Balkan Entanglements*.

politics in this period as well as a recent biographical work on Ignatiev, and a consideration by Kovic of the role of Disraeli in the Eastern Question.²²³ Additionally, various new broader histories, for example of the various countries involved in events, have also been forthcoming, and these have helped to return the spotlight to the perspectives of the many groups involved in the crisis.²²⁴ However, as these are mostly survey works, there is (to date) little in the way of truly new revelations coming from this direction. The last, but by no means least, valuable source of scholarly research on this topic can be found in some of the previously detailed volumes concerned with Panslavism.

In the last few years, some new works have emerged on the Eastern Crisis, including Kovic's *Disraeli and the Eastern Question*, mentioned above, and Hakan Yavuz's *War and Diplomacy: The Russo-Turkish War of 1877-78 and the Treaty of Berlin*, which appeared just as this thesis was being completed, too recently to be incorporated into this work.

²²³ J. Milojković-Djurić, *The Eastern Question and the Voices of Reason: Austria-Hungary, Russia, and the Balkan States 1875-1908* (New York, 2002); V.M. Khevrolina, *Revoliutsionno-demokraticheskaia mysl' o vneshnei politike Rossii i mezhdunarodnykh otnosheniakh*, (Moscow, 1986); V.M. Khevrolina, *Rossiiskii diplomat graf Nikolai Pavlovich Ignatiev* (Moscow, 2004); Kovic, *Disraeli and the Eastern Question*; M. H. Yavuz, *War and Diplomacy: The Russo-Turkish War of 1877-78 and the Treaty of Berlin*, (Utah, 2011) appeared too late for consultation in this thesis.

²²⁴ See for example, R.J. Crampton, *A Concise History of Bulgaria*, (2nd Ed), (Cambridge, 2005), Judah, *The Serbs*, Pavlowitch, *Serbia*.

Chapter 2: Methodology

This thesis is composed of a series of case-studies, each one considering a separate 'popular movement.' These movements are: the campaign for aid to the Bosnian and Hercegovinian rebels and their families, the 'Bulgarian Atrocity' campaign, the Russian popular movement in support of the Serbs against Turkey, the campaign for greater Greek involvement in the Crisis, and the British 'Jingo' movement. Although most of these movements have been examined elsewhere, they have rarely been treated fully as an integral part of a wider issue. Popular action provides an ideal medium through which to consider the public and society. For each case study, two questions will be asked: was there indeed a popular movement? And if so why it was that this issue seemed to have succeeded or failed to have captured the popular imagination? Once these two questions have been dealt with the portrayal of the movement in the Press of the time will be considered, as well as any significant impact which it made upon those few social and political elites whose views can be readily accessed. From this evidence base the thesis will explore the ways in which the Press acted, or did not act, as an intermediary between these elites and the mass movements, as well as between the events in the Balkans and their readership.

The 'how' of this study is only of limited use without the 'what?' This study will seek to trace the interaction of society and press, press and government. It will seek to draw comparisons between the way that a 'modern liberal democracy' such as Great Britain and a bureaucratic autocracy such as Russia were able to use the media and the popular mood to their own ends. In contrast, it will also consider the extent to which either state was able to pursue a course of action unhindered by considerations of wider public sentiment as mediated through the Press. Although this will mostly be achieved in macrocosm, on the British side of events, there is a fascinating opportunity to examine the very personal battleground of William Gladstone who recorded copious amounts on this topic and was both an instrument of mass propaganda and a politician and statesman of the highest order in Victorian England.

The Press

The primary research of this thesis focuses upon an examination of the literary press of this period. For Russia, the daily newspaper *The Voice (Golos)* will be examined, along with a series of periodicals, most specifically *The Messenger of Europe (Viestnik Evropy)*, *The Orthodox Observer (Pravoslavnoe Obozrenie)* and *Notes of the Fatherland (Otechestvennie Zapiski.)*¹ For the British side, the primary focus will be upon *The Times* of London but drawing on a broad selection of publications, as and where appropriate. Principal examples include *The Edinburgh Review*, *The Quarterly Review*, *The Contemporary Review*, and *Nineteenth Century*.² It is important to be clear about the sample of the press used. Firstly, when examining the press, it is necessary to bear in mind Rieber's considerations of the methodological difficulties involved, chief amongst which is the need to be selective in order to stand a chance of dealing with the sheer volume of source material available.³ Indeed, in his study of Constantinople, a city of particular interest to this study, Mansel notes the overwhelming volume of documentary sources which confront a scholar tackling just the media sources of that locale.⁴ It is also important to be clear about what a press study can and cannot tell us. Reading a paper can only provide, with any degree of certainty, the opinions of the writer and the editor of that publication. Although the readership of the educated, Liberal press may, under certain circumstances, be roughly equated with 'educated society' it is never the same thing as 'the public.'

The Messenger of Europe was a relatively young publication, having been founded in 1866 by M.M. Stasiulevich, a former history professor of St Petersburg University. Initially a dry, serious and scholarly publication, within a few years it had expanded to include literature and politics, and become in certain eyes 'the quintessential

¹ *Otechestvennie Zapiski* is sometimes translated as *The National Annals*, see V. Terras, *A History of Russian Literature* (London, 1991), p. 289.

² Now known as *Nineteenth Century and Beyond*.

³ A.J. Rieber, 'review of L. McReynolds, *The Russian Press under the Old Regime*,' in *Slavic Review*: 52, (1992), p. 278.

⁴ P. Mansel, *Constantinople: City of the World's Desire, 1453-1924*, (London, 1995), p.135 ff.

Russian thick journal of the second half of the nineteenth century.⁵ It was edited by the liberal literary historian Aleksandr Pipin, who gave it a broadly 'liberal' intelligentsia tone.⁶ Certainly, its circulation figures made it the most popular publication of its kind of the period.⁷ *The Notes of the Fatherland*, by contrast, was a much older publication. It had been established in the first half of the century by A.A. Kraevskii, a self-styled 'literary tycoon,' and arguably the founder of Russia's commercial press, together with V.F. Odoevskii (the author of *Russian Nights*), in the first half of the century.⁸ From these 'liberal' beginnings, the journal had been sold to the radical poet Nekrasov, in 1866, who, despite the marked shift in tone he effected in the newspaper, managed to bribe the censors sufficiently well to be listed in 1869 by the censor Lebedev as a 'progressive liberal' publication.⁹

There are a number of reasons why these particular publications are valuable case studies, the first of which is their ethos. Jones has noted the dangers of being too dogmatic about the supposed 'political stance' of a paper, noting that such a position would be composed not simply of the editor's viewpoint, but also of individual sentiments expressed by journalists, and even the choice of advertising.¹⁰ *The Voice* is described by A.J. Rieber as having 'faced the major socio-economic issues of its day by gambling that facticity by itself would carry a progressive political message.'¹¹ In slightly simpler terms, *The Voice* appeared neither to toe the line in the way that papers such as the *Saint Petersburg News* (*Sankt Peterburgskaia Vedemosti*) were wont to do, nor to abandon itself entirely to a cause in the manner of such extreme papers as the Panslavist *Russian World* (*Russkii Mir*.) The reports of the censors illustrate this, showing *The Voice* receiving occasional raps on

⁵ A. Pogorelskin, 'The Messenger of Europe', in D.A. Martinsen, (ed.), *Literary Journals in Imperial Russia* (Cambridge, 1997), p. 129.

⁶ N. Knight, 'Was the Intelligentsia Part of the Nation', *Kritika*, 7, 4, (2006), p.753.

⁷ D. Balmuth, *Censorship in Russia*, (Washington D.C., 1969), p.63.

⁸ K Dianina, 'Passage to Europe: Dostoevskii in the St. Petersburg Arcade', *Slavic Review*: 62, 2, (2003), p.251; L. McReynolds, *The News under Russia's Old Regime: the Development of a Mass-Circulation Press* (Princeton, 1991), p.30; N. Cornwell, 'A History of Russian Literature by Victor Terras', *Modern Language Review*, 89, (1994), p. 269.

⁹ Terras, *History of Russian literature*, p.289; Balmuth, *Censorship in Russia*, p.65.

¹⁰ A. Jones, *Powers of the Press: newspapers, power and the public in nineteenth century England*, (Aldershot, 1996), p.140.

¹¹ Rieber, 'Louise McReynolds,' p. 819.

the knuckles, but largely avoiding any extreme censure.¹² The most notable exception to this came at the outbreak of the Russo-Turkish war in 1877, when Kraevskii poured scorn on the 'rumours' of war on the very day that the Tsar issued a formal declaration of hostilities.

The second reason for choosing these publications is their audience. The precise 'who' of the audience is, alas, unknown given that there is essentially no survey data available for the period in question.¹³ Although we cannot state with any confidence who exactly might have read the daily press, or indeed the thick journals, economic data can be used to give some clues – a man would seem unlikely to spend all he earned in a week on newspapers. Furthermore, it is known that *The Voice* had subscriptions of around twenty-two thousand by the mid 1870s.¹⁴ Its comments therefore reached a significant proportion of St. Petersburg educated society. Furthermore, *The Voice* was described by Dostoevskii as 'the mouthpiece of public opinion' which, although a subjective judgement, came from a strong opponent of the paper's editor, suggesting that it is likely to contain more truth than flattery.¹⁵ *The Times* by 1877 had a circulation of almost two hundred and fifty thousand copies, up fifty thousand from the start of the decade.¹⁶ This suggests that not only were its articles and arguments widely read, but that they were reaching fresh audiences, rather than relying on habit for sales, another indication of the paper's significance. A measure perhaps of both the significance and the limitations of *The Times*, can be seen in a dispute occurring between Disraeli and Andrassy, the Austro-Hungarian foreign minister, regarding a *Times* editorial urging Bosnian autonomy: the very fact that Andrassy was both aware of, and angered by, a piece in *The Times* must give some indication of its reach, but this

¹² In the period 1863-1877, the paper received 11 warnings, 3 temporary suspensions, and was deprived of retail rights 11 times. For a fuller discussion, see Balmuth, *Censorship in Russia*, p. 64, N.M. Lisovskii, 'Materialy dlia kharakteristiki polozheniia russkoi pechaty', *Vsemirnyi Viestnik* 8. (1908), p. 50., and V.Rozenburg & V. Iakushkin, *Russkaia pechat' i tsenzura v proshlom i nastoiashchem* (Moscow, 1905), pp. 231-232, both cited in Balmuth.

¹³ McReynolds, *The News under Russia's old regime*, p.9.

¹⁴ A.J. Rieber, 'Russian Imperialism: Popular, Emblematic, Ambiguous', *Russian Review*, 53, 3, (1994), p.333.

¹⁵ V.G. Bazanov & G.M. Fridlender, *Dostoevskii i ego vremia* (Leningrad, 1971), pp.17-30; Dianina, 'Passage to Europe' p.256.

¹⁶ S. Koss, *The Rise and Fall of the Political Press in Britain*, (London, 1981), p.203.

must be counter-balanced by Disraeli's angered response to the situation that 'they [i.e. Andrassy] think they [i.e. *The Times*] indicate the English public! They indicate the policy of stockjobbers and idiots!'¹⁷

A further point about *The Times* must be taken from the work of Cunningham, who has considered the domestic aspect of this period in considerable detail. Drawing upon the official *History of the Times*, he notes that with Delane, the editor of *The Times* ill throughout much of the crisis, his influence upon his paper was much reduced.¹⁸ Firstly, this is significant due to Delane's belief that it was the obligation of his paper always to present the voice of 'governing opinion.'¹⁹ More significant however is what followed in his wake: he was replaced in the autumn of 1877 by a stand-in-editor, before a permanent replacement arrived in 1878. The overall effect of this, Cunningham argues is that *The Times* 'meandered' through the crisis, unable to impose a strong editorial will on the paper.²⁰ This should not be seen as a drawback for the purposes of this study. Indeed, it suggests, if anything, that *The Times* might be more reflective of changes in public mood, as it was less closely bound to an editorial line.

It seems somewhat reckless to make the considerable leap that McReynolds and Brower have made, of simply trying to guess who the audience of the papers and journals are by reading back from their content.²¹ This study will adopt the more cautious approach of being content with the knowledge that these publications were widely read as attested to by their circulation figures, and that the readership was broadly the educated classes, as demonstrated by their cost.

Broadly, then, it can be seen that there is a rough equivalency between the Press sources for Britain and Russia: for each country there is a single Daily Newspaper, and a selection of journals. All of the publications considered were noted for

¹⁷ M. Kovic, *Disraeli and the Eastern Question*, (Oxford, 2011), p.91.

¹⁸ H.S. Cunningham, *British Public Opinion and the Eastern Question*, (DPhil, University of Sussex, 1969), p.17.

¹⁹ D. Brown, 'Morally Transforming the World or spinning a line? Politicians and the newspaper press in mid Nineteenth-century Britain,' *Historical research*, 83, 220, (May 2010), 329.

²⁰ Cunningham, *British Public Opinion*, pp.17-18.

²¹ Daniel R. Brower, *The Russian City between Tradition and Modernity 1850-1900* (Berkeley, 1990); McReynolds, *The News under Russia's Old Regime*, p. 9.

holding relatively moderate views most of the time, although that certainly did not mean that they were entirely free of controversy, nor of political disputes between them. The most obvious example of this can be seen in *Nineteenth Century*, a journal set up as a result of a dispute with the editors of the *Contemporary Review*, itself established as a counter to the *Fortnightly Review*.²²

Having established which papers will be considered, it is important then to make clear the way in which they will be looked at. I shall confine myself to a consideration of the content of the papers, namely the topics of discussion and what was said in those discussions. This methodology follows McReynolds in largely leaving out issues of economics and censorship, and indeed goes further, by leaving out any new study of the lives and careers of the individuals who shaped the papers.²³

As is inevitably the case with any comparative piece, this work will be affected by the variation in the amounts of evidence and source material available for the two sides of the study. Firstly, the differing nature of the two societies under consideration has impacted the amount of information that has been left to posterity. Furthermore, the manner in which this information has been stored or distributed will impact significantly upon the ultimate landscape which can be reconstructed. Broadly speaking, the British side of the study will at times be faced with an embarrassment of riches, whilst the Russian side remains shrouded in mystery.

It is also important to keep in mind the true significance or otherwise of source material. Where only a single newspaper article exists upon a given topic, there is an inevitable temptation to read too much into its contents, and to extrapolate from a small and inconsequential piece a broad world-view where no such thing existed. On the other hand, an absence of significant amounts of reportage on a particular topic, event, or issue is, in itself, significant, as it shows the inability or

²² S. Lee, 'Knowles, Sir James Thomas (1831-1908),' rev. H.C.G. Matthew, *Oxford Dictionary of National Biography*, (Oxford, 2004: online edn, Sept 2010) [<http://www.oxforddnb.com/view/article/34353>, accessed 19 July 2011].

²³ G. Marker, 'L. McReynolds, The News under Russia's Old Regime', *Russian Review*, 52, (1993), p.111.

unwillingness of the editorial decision makers to formulate an explicit statement on that topic. This should not be ignored, but nor should we stray too far in claiming to know the reasons behind these decisions and omissions.

Within the broader category of 'the Press,' journals provide certain particular challenges of their own. Whereas articles in *The Times* or *The Voice* would be published within a day of the information being received by the editor, and generally within a week or two of the actual event taking place in the Balkans, the process of producing journal articles was far slower. Many journal articles would often be informed by the newspaper reports and thus could not be written ahead of the daily coverage. Journals would be published monthly, or even quarterly, meaning that sometimes the very quickest an event could be responded to would be three or four months after it had happened, by which time the situation would be much changed. For this reason, it is necessary to be particularly wary when commenting upon the absence of articles on a given topic in the journals, as all sorts of unknowable factors may have prevented an opinion reaching the page in a timely manner. This said, it is still possible to draw comparisons and to suggest, for example, that a journal which published six articles on Bulgaria and only one on Serbia was showing a greater interest in Bulgaria.

Literature

Although the Press is the primary medium through which this study will engage with expressed opinions and actions during the Eastern Crisis, consideration will also be made of the engagement with major events made by contemporary literature. This of course provides its own series of methodological challenges and issues.

Whilst the literary studies can provide some interesting insights into certain thoughts and ideas in circulation at the time, or even provide a full debate as in the case of the contrasting views of Tolstoi and Dostoevskii, they do not, in any meaningful way, provide a picture of popular views. As with the Press, figures of circulations and readership may perhaps suggest an interest in the broad topics under discussion, but they certainly do not indicate agreement with the arguments

being put forward. Indeed, even such questions of interest must be treated carefully, as the very fact of Tolstoi or Dostoevskii's authorship would, as much as the title of *The Times*, be sufficient to sell a certain number of copies, regardless of whether the topic being considered was of particular interest.

It is also important to consider the breadth of the literary genre. Whereas journals and newspaper articles have a reasonably narrow function, the literary sources which will be considered here are far more varied in nature. For the consideration of Russian literature, the main texts which will be examined will be Dostoevskii's *Writer's Diary*, and Tolstoi's *Anna Karenina*, (most particularly, the final section).

Fyodor Dostoevskii, who had been exiled to Siberia in 1850 for his involvement in the Petrashevtsy conspiracy, had returned in 1854, and immediately upon the outbreak of the Crimean War had begun sending 'jingoistic' poems to the Tsar and other senior figures at the court.²⁴ By the mid-1870s, despite often being forced to write in order to pay gambling debts and retain the rights to his own works, his star had risen further, and Pobedonostsev, whom Dostoevskii first met in 1871, ensured that the Imperial Family read his *Writer's Diary*.²⁵ The *Writer's Diary* was a genre-defying work, which has been described by scholars as 'Dostoevsky's boldest experiment with literary form' and which contained variously short-stories, abstract philosophy, and a consideration of the Russian Society for the Protection of Animals.²⁶ First launched in 1873 and stretching to fifteen undated articles, the *Diary*, which in form perhaps most closely resembles a modern 'blog,' was revived in 1876 with a stricter and more explicit chronology, and after a few months in the old vein, began to shift towards the Eastern Question. In the second section of his June Diary, Dostoevskii launched into a full-scale discussion of the Eastern Question with the observation 'Again a tussle with Europe ... again in Europe they are looking mistrustfully at Russia.'²⁷

²⁴ Dostoevsky, F., *The House of the Dead*, (London, 2003), p.7; Brooks, J., 'How Tolstoevskii pleased Readers, and Rewrote a Russian Myth,' *Slavic Review*, Vol64. No3. (Autumn 2005), p.548. For more on the term 'Jingoism,' and its anachronistic use, such as here, see chapter 5 p.178.

²⁵ R.F. Byrnes, *Pobedonostsev: his life and thought*, (Indiana, 1968), p.98.

²⁶ F. Dostoevsky, *A Writer's Diary, Translated and Annotated by K Lantz*, v.1, (Evanstown, 2000).

²⁷ Dostoevsky, *Writer's Diary*, vol.1, p.515.

Tolstoi's *Anna Karenina* is of course one of the best known works of Russian literature. The vast majority of the book appeared in seven parts in the journal *The Russian Messenger* between 1875 and 1877. However, the final section of the novel was deemed by Katkov, the journal's editor, to be so vehemently anti-Panslav that he refused to publish it for fear of the censors.²⁸ The chapters in question feature a depiction of Russian volunteers bound for the Balkans to fight alongside the Serbs, along with a discussion of the pro-Slavonic 'movement' of 1876 by some of the principal characters of the novel. This section, which will be considered in detail in chapter 5, never had a serialised publication as the earlier parts of the novel had, but instead appeared for the first time in the full novel publication, which was published in the late spring of 1877. In some subsequent editions, such as Natan Zarkhi's edition of 1967, which ends with the death of the eponymous heroine, they have been omitted altogether.²⁹

The styles of these two texts are distinctly contrasting: aside from the difference in when they were written, it is important to remember that Tolstoi provided a one-off snapshot in his novel, whereas Dostoevskii's work, being a monthly (or often bi-monthly) publication, allowed for a more graduated portrayal of the writer's opinions. It was also, as a piece of non-fiction, able to engage with *Anna Karenina* in a fashion that the novel was ill-able to counter. This is, perhaps, particularly ironic given Curtis's assertion that not only did Tolstoi's literary style evolve significantly as a result of the author's reading habits, but that *Anna Karenina* was the 'transitional point' in Tolstoi's work and the moment at which it became fully 'Dostoevskian' in its use of metaphor and contrast.³⁰ The significance of *Anna Karenina* as a window onto the Eastern Question in Russia at that time was recognised by Dostoevskii, who dubbed the novel 'a fact of special importance' in the history of Russia.³¹ Furthermore, Dostoevskii draws his readers' attention to the fact that he had, in the opening of his Diary, expressed a desire to avoid literary criticism. What though, he asks his readers, can he do when his own 'feelings' on a

²⁸ Brooks, *Tolstoevskii*, p.543.

²⁹ Brooks, *Tolstoevskii*, p.545.

³⁰ J. M. Curtis, 'Metaphor is to Dostoevskii as metonymy is to Tolstoi,' *Slavic Review*, Vol61. No1 (Spring, 2002), p.111.

³¹ Dostoevsky, *Writer's Diary*, Vol2., p.1067.

topical matter happen to relate to a piece of literature?³² As Morson has observed, much of Dostoevskii's literature is fuelled by paradox and it is perhaps the case that he felt the need to highlight the same here.³³

Structure of this work

This thesis is structured around a series of more specific and focused case-studies. As this is to be a study of public interest and action, each chapter will focus around a particular event of public interest, or indeed non-interest. The opening case-study will consider the 'forgotten' revolt of firstly Hercegovina, and then of Bosnia, beginning in the spring of 1875. It will examine the way in which these events were reported, and consider why it was that this period received so little popular attention, yet continued to bubble along, paving the way for the more spectacular events which were to occur later.

The second case-study will focus on the aspect of the crisis perhaps most familiar to British historians, that of Gladstone and the 'Bulgarian Horrors.' Both the events and the complex manner of the reporting of this event will be considered in order to attempt an understanding of how one event, sadly far from unique, was able to energise the 'Grand Old Man,' produce one of the most widely-read pamphlets of the nineteenth century, lead him to the momentous step of writing long-hand entries in his diary, and eventually provide the momentum that led to the successful Midlothian campaign of 1880 and his second term as Prime Minister.

The third case-study will focus most closely upon Russian perspectives on the crisis, and consider the impact of the Serbian War and then the Russo-Turkish war upon Russian society. Examination will be made of the popular myths which have grown up surrounding events of this time, particularly the notion of the entire Russian nation up in arms. An attempt is made to define what exactly the Russian people thought of events, utilising both their own contemporary accounts, and the manner in which they were reported by the British Press at the time. The significant impact

³² Dostoevsky, *Writer's Diary*, Vol2., p.1063.

³³ G. S. Morson, 'Paradoxical Dostoevsky,' *The Slavic and East European Journal*, Vol44, No3, (Autumn 1999), p.471.

of the campaign upon the Russian literary world will also be considered, along with the reciprocal impact of literary engagements with the crisis upon popular perceptions of events.

The fourth case-study will focus on the role played by the Greeks in the crisis. As the Balkan minority which most closely allowed its policy to be guided by Great Power (and particularly British) advice and insistence, Greece warrants particular consideration. Despite their relative inactivity, the Greeks received considerable attention, much of it positive, at least in the British press. The reasons for this will be analysed, including a consideration of the personal role of Gladstone, and a contrast with the Russian press at the time, which maintained a relative degree of silence regarding Greece and essentially limited comment on Greece to its role as an aid of the Slavs.

The final case-study will consider some of the darker aspects of this period on the home front, looking particularly at the period before the Congress of Berlin in which the British and Russian governments came close to war with each other over the fate of Constantinople and the Ottoman empire more generally. This section will contain an examination of the broad sweep of Russophobia within Great Britain in the nineteenth century, as well as Anglophobia within Russia as a necessary background to these events. Following this, a particular focus will be given to 'Jingoism,' the aggressive pro-war counter agitation of 1878, as well as to the related opposition to Gladstone's atrocities campaign. All the Jingo activities opposed Gladstone, but not every event opposed to Gladstone should properly be considered part of Jingoism. This section will also provide an insight into the conflict between ideological moralism and practical pragmatism in both the public and the government's understanding of events.

Finally, a concluding chapter will recapitulate the various findings which have been uncovered in the case-studies and consider how the discoveries in the different chapters relate to each other, primarily by means of linking them back to some of the larger questions raised by this thesis. This will be followed by a reflection of

possible future uses of the discoveries made here, or directions for subsequent study.

Boundaries of this work

This is principally a study of the Press. It will also make significant use of printed diaries and some correspondence in order to shed a contrasting light on the events being discussed in the Press. Furthermore, there will be reference to some government documents as a proof of the actions which the Press variously did or did not attest to. It is not, however, a diplomatic history of the crisis, a task which has already been accomplished on a number of occasions and thus will not provide a blow-by-blow account of the diplomatic exchanges, intrigues, deals and conferences. For this reason, an existing familiarity with the broad chronology of the crisis and its significant political landmarks is assumed, and will not be recapitulated. Nor is it a biographical history of the principal characters involved in the crisis. Thus, the question of whether the press subjected Benjamin Disraeli to a tide of anti-Semitic abuse is relevant as it concerns the press and the public, but the question of whether Lady Derby was betraying secrets to the Russian ambassador is not.³⁴ As with any study of this nature, a significant limitation is linguistic: there will therefore be no real consideration of the Turkish perspective upon events, except where these have been re-stated by others in English, nor will any use be made of the Press or other Documents originating in German.

An important factor to keep in mind, easily forgotten by those accustomed to the Press of the twenty-first century, is that newspapers published in St. Petersburg or London in the nineteenth century were very much publications of that city, rather than of the nation as a whole, and that regional papers were much more prominent. Indeed, Lee has stated that in Britain in 1870, there were no national papers, but that *The Times* was the closest thing.³⁵

To sum up, the principal questions of this thesis are as follows:

³⁴ For Disraeli and anti-semitism, see below, pp.188-190; For Lady Derby, see R. Millman, *Britain and the Eastern Question 1875-1878*, (Oxford, 1979), p.10.

³⁵ A.J. Lee, *The Origins of the Popular Press in England 1855-1914*, (London, 1976), p.34.

- To what extent can popular feeling or activity be shown to have existed on a specific issue?
- What factors led to this popular activity?
- How was each type of activity dealt with by the Press?
- Did the Press seem primarily to be leading or following the crowds?
- How did the government relate to these public movements via the medium of the Press?

Chapter 3 – The Forgotten Revolt: Hercegovina and Bosnia

In 1874, the peasant farmers of Turkish Hercegovina suffered a crop failure, which left them unable to pay the harsh tax demands imposed on them at the turn of 1875. After an appeal to the authorities produced only threats of violence, a large number of them fled across the border into Montenegro on February 20th. After a few quiet months, many of the villagers returned, having been promised an amnesty by the Turkish authorities. However, in the village of Nevesinje they were attacked by local Muslims, an action which was acquiesced in by the authorities. The population of Nevesinje armed in self-defence and demanded substantial reforms. Dervish Pasha the local governor refused to negotiate whilst they were armed, and after a further round of violence by the Muslim populace in early July, large numbers of the men of the province fled, armed, into the mountains, now in open revolt against the local administration.

Over the coming months, crude and violent attempts by the authorities to crush this rebellion served only to fuel it, and the expanding blaze ultimately threatened to engulf much of Europe in war. By the end of 1878, two major European Powers, Russia and Turkey, had fought a war, and a third, Great Britain, had almost joined them. Three countries, Serbia, Bulgaria and Romania, had gained independence, and sizeable popular movements had arisen in both Britain and Russia in response to the events which inflamed the Balkan Peninsula.

Yet, despite all of this, both at the time and since, the initial events in Hercegovina and then in neighbouring Bosnia have remained a dark spot. No significant popular movement arose to champion their cause, little has been written about them, and the details of what happened are forgotten by all but the most specialist interest. This chapter will revisit the Bosnian revolt, consider the way in which it was regarded (and, indeed, reported) at the time, and seek to establish just why it is that these events have been forgotten. It will also consider the way in which the slowly-growing Press coverage and small but devoted agitation at this time laid the foundations for the much larger public movements of the following years.

Background to the Revolt

Although the chronology of the above narrative is broadly agreed upon, it is worth considering in more detail the exact causes of the uprising. It is worth noting that some, such as Millman, have argued that despite a multiplicity of theories by various scholars, the true cause of the revolt remains beyond the grasp of the modern historian.¹ However, whilst this may be true, it still behoves scholars to examine some of the theories which have been advanced: Harris has argued that, despite the contemporary belief of the international consuls that it was taxation that provided the spark, misery is insufficient to start a revolt.² Rather, he argues, it is necessary also to have some kind of animosity existing between the rebels and the authorities, memories of a better past, and a precedent of revolt.³

The precedent of revolt is an easy case to argue, and as will be discussed below, the frequency of revolts against Turkish rule were probably a significant factor in the lack of attention initially given by the press to this crisis. A previous major insurrection had occurred in 1868, as well as frequent other minor revolts dotted around European Turkey over the previous quarter century. The notion of hatred existing between the Christian Rayah and the Turkish authorities is also amply testified to by the events of the crisis. Finally, the question exists as to whether the peasants had any memories of a better alternative to Turkish rule. Obviously no individual in Hercegovina in 1875 had been alive centuries earlier when the Slavic Princes were last independent. However, the folklore in the region was well-known for providing stories of powerful medieval empires latterly subjugated by the Turk. An interesting question would be, to what extent these peasants perceived themselves as Serbs, Montenegrins, Bosnians, or Hercegovinans. Malcolm notes that the Medieval Kingdom equivalent to the latter-day Hercegovina was that of Hum, linked to Bosnia by marriage between their ruling family and Bosnia's Ban Kulin, but separated by the Orthodox Christianity, unlike Bosnia's Catholicism.⁴ This

¹ R. Millman, *Britain and the Eastern Question, 1875-78*, (Oxford, 1979), p.13.

² D. Harris, *A Diplomatic History of the Balkan Crisis of 1875-1878: The First Year*, (Stanford, 1936), p.17.

³ Ibid.

⁴ N. Malcolm, *Bosnia: A short history*, (London, 1994), pp.14-15.

level of historical awareness was doubtless beyond the average Bosnian or Hercegovinian peasant in the 1870s, but the strength of religious identity in the Balkans should not be underestimated, as shown by Judah in his observation that 'In an age before nationalism Serbs would just as often identify themselves as Orthodox and Croats as Catholic; and in cases where their ethnic origins may have been neither Serb nor Croat but rather Vlach it was this religious identity which eventually made them Serbs and Croats.'⁵ Of course for the intelligentsia of the great European capitals, 1875 was not part of an 'age before nationalism,' but whether the same can be said for rural Bosnia is another matter. This issue becomes still more complicated when it is borne in mind that, although the medium-term causes of the revolt largely involved the Orthodox population, there was in June of 1875, a brief outbreak of unrest by Catholic villagers in the Gabela and Hrasno districts, a group more traditionally identified with the neighbouring Croat population. Sumner attributes this Catholic rising to the murder of a local priest, although this does not fit particularly well with some contemporary accounts which see the death of Prior Kavaula as marking the end of organised Catholic activity against the authorities.⁶

The Opening Stages

There is both much, and at the same time very little, to say regarding the fashion in which the early stages of the revolt were covered by the Press. For a considerable period of time, events in the Balkans were almost entirely ignored by the press outside of the area, which on the one hand provides us with little to analyse, but on the other speaks volumes for the significance attached to these events by outsiders.

The initial migration of the villagers into Montenegro failed to register with the European press, likewise the initial return and violence in June. Whilst it is of course possible that the Press remained universally oblivious to events, it seems more

⁵ T. Judah, *The Serbs: History, Myth and the Destruction of Yugoslavia*, (2nd ed.) (Yale, 2000), p.43.

⁶ B.H. Sumner, *Russia and the Balkans 1870-1880*, (Oxford, 1937), p.139. Kavaula's murder was noted by a *Times* correspondent as having 'so intimidated' the local monks that when the area's Catholic Bishop was forced by the Turkish authorities to undertake a mission of pacification, he found the local population already well on the way to meeting this viewpoint: *The Times*, 'The Insurrection [sic] in Herzegovina,' 15/12/1875, p.4, Col.E.

likely that the nearest correspondents simply deemed these events of sufficiently little import that they did not report on them to their superiors, or that if they did, their dispatches were not deemed worthy of the column inches they would have required. This is of course fully understandable; the inefficient, despotic, and even barbaric nature of Turkish rule throughout its European provinces was something of an accepted maxim in the latter part of the nineteenth century. Some months into the crisis, when the press began to make more rounded evaluations of the situation, an editorial in *The Voice* asserted that Turkey was nothing more than a “sick man” and that this rebellion was merely the tip of the iceberg, with almost universal discontent simmering beneath.⁷ Around the same time, in London, the ongoing success of the rebellion was being attributed to the fact that the Turks were too lazy and inept to do anything about it.⁸ Even more than this, the Turkish authorities consistently denied or dismissed reports of rebellious activities against them, either claiming that reports of violence were total fabrication, or at least asserting that the revolt was a mere trifle and would be suppressed within days. In mid-July *The Voice* described a report from the *London Standard*, which attested to ‘many attempts to reduce awareness’ of the revolt.⁹ Likewise, the very first words that *The Times* had to say on the matter of the revolt contained a disclaimer that the reports coming from the region were ‘very much exaggerated.’¹⁰

As the revolt continued, accounts of Turkish denials were published with increasing degrees of ridicule and incredulity, the correspondent for *The Voice* describing the whole affair as a ‘remarkable curiosity’ for the way in which it was ignored by the Turkish government.¹¹ *The Times* was initially more matter-of-fact, simply stating that the Constantinople press was reporting many successes, but an underlying scepticism as to the veracity of official reports escalated to the point that, by the turn of the year, a *Times* correspondent was so moved as to say ‘I doubt if anything so ridiculously and uselessly mendacious has been perpetrated, even in China, as

⁷ *The Voice*, ‘St Petersburg,’ (28/8) 9/9/1875, p.1, Col.B.

⁸ *The Times*, ‘The Herzegovina,’ 21/8/1875, p.6, Col.A.

⁹ *The Voice*, ‘Foreign News,’ (12) 24/7/1875, p.3, Col.D.

¹⁰ *The Times*, ‘The Herzegovina,’ 14/7/1875, p.5, Col.E.

¹¹ *The Voice*, ‘Foreign news,’ (26/7) 7/8/1875, p.4, Col.B.

Shefket Pasha's reports of his military operations.'¹² In light of all this, then, it does not seem particularly remarkable that reports of the initial flight of the villagers, or of their violent reception upon their return home, were sufficiently subdued and suppressed to have seemed largely insignificant to those British or Russian reporters who might have encountered them. To an extent, questions were raised a few months later as to whether this initial dismissal was somewhat disingenuous, and the *Notes of the Fatherland* painted a colourful picture of the 'Turkofile press' of Europe trying to convince its readers that 'the uprising was a mere trifle.'¹³ However, it seems more probable that this was simply the result of genuine obliviousness, rather than anything more sinister.

The point at which silence could no longer be maintained, was when an entire province went into armed revolt. The initial reporting of this was cagey, but seems to have begun around the same time across the daily Press. *The Voice* reported a few days after the event, in a reprint of a *London Standard* article, that on the eighth of July there had been an uprising near the village of 'Drachovo,' a settlement near the Austrian border.¹⁴ This report also attested to waves of unrest spreading outwards into Bosnia and Albania.¹⁵ The same day, *The Times* reported violence 'around Metkewitch,' although it did so only briefly, and with little importance attached to it at this stage.¹⁶ Over the following weeks, there were intermittent accounts of skirmishes in the area, and reports that the Hercegovinan commissioners were requesting troops be sent by the Porte to deal with the matter.¹⁷ *The Times* even made a preliminary attempt to explain the causes of the uprising, noting that the principal grievance was against 'tax-gatherers.'¹⁸ Thus it can be seen clearly that however silent the press may have been on the medium-term causes and on the lead up to the revolt, once open violence broke out on a large-scale, they were aware of it, reporting it, and in a position to continue

¹² *The Times*, 'The Herzegovina,' 6/8/1875, p.5, Col.A; 'Herzegovina,' 27/12/1875, p.4, Col.C.

¹³ *Notes of the Fatherland*, 'The Uprising in Hercegovina and Bosnia,' November 1875, p.122.

¹⁴ *The Voice*, 'Foreign News,' (2) 14/7/1875, p.3, Col.E.

¹⁵ *Ibid.*

¹⁶ *The Times*, 'The Herzegovina,' 14/7/1875, p.5, Col.E.

¹⁷ *The Voice*, 'Foreign News,' (11) 23/7/1875, p.3, Col.B; *The Times*, 'The Herzegovina,' 20/7/1875, p.5, Col.B.

¹⁸ *The Times*, 'The Herzegovina,' 19/7/1875, p.5, Col.G.

providing updates upon it. All of this is significant, as it undermines any claim that the Hercegovinan revolt had somehow simply slipped under the radar. The stagnation of coverage in the popular press, and the significant focus upon the diplomatic wrangling of the Powers at the expense of covering the activities of the peasants were all the result of definite actions, and thus may be seen as part of editorial policy, despite the fact that it remains uncertain to what degree this was an attempt to curtail public interest in the revolt, and to what extent the papers were simply responding to a general lack of public interest.

The period in which the revolt received the most attention, at least in *The Voice*, was the early autumn. Although often lacking in detail there were numerous reports around this time of troop movements, the mood of the rebel camp, or the activities of some of the more charismatic and distinctive insurgent leaders.¹⁹ Only intermittently did the commentary run beyond this to offering anything approaching a considered opinion on events, mostly towards the end of this period such as in mid-October, when a *Voice* correspondent opined that whatever the cause, 'the uprising must be worse' than the grievances it set out to tackle.²⁰ As late autumn wore on, however, the rebels gradually faded from the pages. Logistics were sometimes blamed, such as the report of early November which simply attested that it was 'too cold' for any news from the mountains, but largely their disappearance went unexplained.²¹ The picture coming from *The Times* is similar. In September, they carried an account of a general meeting of the insurgents, from a correspondent who had made repeat visits to their camp.²² Likewise, they found ample space to report the activities of Ljubobratich. Meaning 'brotherly love,' this ironic moniker was the nom de guerre of one Mico Ballardic, a colourful figure who was often depicted trying to put himself at the head of the rebellion, despite having the firm loyalty of only a small band of brigands more intent on looting and pillaging than on fighting a reasoned campaign against the Turks.²³ After briefly disappearing

¹⁹ *The Voice*, 'Foreign News,' e.g. (3) 15/9/1875; (16) 28/9/1875; (23/9) 5/10/1875; (2) 14/10/1875.

²⁰ *The Voice*, 'St Petersburg,' (21/10) 2/11/1875, p.1, Col.B.

²¹ *The Voice*, 'Foreign News,' (5) 17/11/1875, p4, Col.A.

²² *The Times*, 'Herzegovina,' 13/9/1875, p.5, Col.B.

²³ *The Times*, 'Herzegovina,' 14/9/1875, p.6, Col.A; 'Herzegovina,' 16/10/1875, p.10, Col.A; 'The Insurrection [sic] in Herzegovina,' 15/12/1875, p.4, Col.E.

from view when he fell from his horse in the autumn and broke his arm, Ljubobratich's involvement in the uprising was finally brought to an end the following spring, when he strayed onto Austrian territory, and was picked up by the authorities who had him locked up where he could do less harm. The loss to the insurrection was questionable, but to the media it was palpable.²⁴

Generally speaking though, by the middle of the autumn of 1875, Press interest in the rebels was beginning to wane. The Great Powers of Europe were gradually stirring and becoming ever-more active in seeking a solution (or at least suppression) for the conflict, and at the end of November, Britain suddenly became pre-occupied with the purchase of the Suez canal shares, an act deemed 'both bold and original, in keeping with the qualities popularly ascribed to Mr. Disraeli, from whom the country expected some departure from the commonplace.'²⁵ Although still part of the Eastern Question as a whole, the precise issue of the Suez purchase is generally beyond the remit of this present study

The Arrival of the Powers

One of the most striking things about the coverage of the Hercegovinan insurrection, as has already been noted, is the manner in which the acts and intentions of the Great Powers of Europe were repeatedly given more column inches than the events of the actual insurgents themselves. Whether or not, as Millman has argued, it was the Sultan's decision to agree to an international consultation which kept the revolt alive, it certainly seems that it was the preparation for just such international involvement which kept the Press's attention active.²⁶ However, whilst the truth of this is evident to anyone who has glanced over the papers of that period, it is not the case that this was so from the outset. It was towards the end of August 1875 that *The Voice* first began to address the question of the broader international situation, with an article which noted with surprise that the Powers seemed to be more favourable to the Turks than they

²⁴ *The Times*, 'Herzegovina,' 8/11/1875, p.5, Col.G; 'Herzegovina, 15/3/1876, p.5, Col.C.

²⁵ 'The Great Canal at Suez: its Political Engineering and Financial History,' *Quarterly Review*, 142, 284, (Oct 1876), pp.429-430.

²⁶ Millman, *Britain and the Eastern question*, p.19.

were towards the rebels.²⁷ This comment is particularly surprising, given the fact that they had just a day or so earlier described how the Northern Powers were to supervise negotiations towards reform.²⁸

From here on in, there was a steady accumulation, with an editorial a week later asserting that the revolt was symptomatic of the more general condition of the 'sick man' and that it would not long remain isolated.²⁹ *The Times*, by contrast, was some way ahead of its Russian counterpart, and from the beginning of August had been following carefully the conversations between Belgrade and Vienna, as Prince Milan first began to find himself torn between bellicose advisers and ministers on the one hand, and a neighbouring government determined to prevent an escalation on the other. Indeed, his warning to Vienna that he was having difficulties restraining the population was announced in *The Times* on the same day as the revelation that the Austrian government would not allow any further collections to be made for the insurgents.³⁰ As far as *The Times* was concerned, in August 1875, Austria was indeed the only concerned Power. In light of the various assertions that many rebels and supporters were repeatedly crossing and re-crossing the Austrian border with supplies or simply to join the fight, this is relatively unsurprising.³¹ It was stated explicitly in an article on the twelfth which pondered the reason for the relative inactivity in Russia. Turkey, it argued, was bound to collapse eventually, so why worry about the details?³² This thesis was gradually expanded upon by *The Times* during the autumn, with great significance being attached to every action (or inaction) by the Russians.

When the consular commission set out for Hercegovina at the end of August, the Russian consul was declared to be 'too ill' to attend, something which was noted as heavily damaging for the mission, as even if it were true, it was likely to be seen by the rebels as conscious encouragement.³³ The unilateral activities of the Russian

²⁷ *The Voice*, 'Foreign News,' (22/8) 3/9/1875, p.3, Col.A.

²⁸ *The Voice*, 'Foreign News,' (17) 29/8/1875, p.4, Col.B.

²⁹ *The Voice*, 'St Petersburg,' 28/8/1875.

³⁰ *The Times*, 'The Herzegovina,' 5/8/1875, p.5, Col.B.

³¹ *The Times*, 'The Herzegovina,' 6/8/1875, p.5, Col.A.

³² *The Times*, 'The Herzegovina and Turkestan,' 12/8/1875, p.10, Col.A.

³³ *The Times*, 'The Herzegovina Insurrection,' 28/8/1875, p.3, Col.B.

consuls in the region earlier in the crisis had already attracted considerable comment, and this did little to reinforce the picture of multi-Power cooperation.³⁴ Furthermore, it was Russian failure to cooperate with Austria that was blamed for the reform proposals presented to the Porte by the Dreikaiserbund, that is the Conservative alliance of Russia, Austria and Germany, being severely watered-down, to the point where they were unlikely to satisfy the rebels.³⁵ This resolute inactivity was still being noted at the end of September when a correspondent declared that Russia still regarded the rebellion as inopportune, and thus a nuisance, but that they were firmly resolved to ensure that whatever the ultimate solution, it was not a turn of events that most benefitted Austria.³⁶ The logical conclusion to this line of argument appeared at the end of September, when *The Times* announced boldly that the Russian press was beginning to 'withdraw the veil': Russia, they argued, was waiting for Turkey to collapse of its own accord, and had no intention of stirring up trouble before that time. Austria, by contrast, had incited this whole rebellion to shift the course of events onto a path more to her suiting.³⁷

The actions and motivations of the Vienna government are, of course, beyond the scope of this present study. However, the motives attributed to them by the British and the Russian press are not, and thus this accusation warrants some further consideration. A first question is what form exactly this lifting of 'the veil' took. A few days before the *Times* article, *The Voice* had remarked upon the futility of escaping the Turkish yoke only to fall under the rule of Austria.³⁸ However, in translation, *The Times* had somewhat watered-down the assertions being made by *The Voice*, attributing to them a reluctance to 'spend money and men.'³⁹ In fact, *The Voice* had put the matter rather more vividly; putting the words in the mouths of the insurgent south Slavs themselves, they condemned not the wasting of

³⁴ Millman, *Britain and the Eastern Question*, p.16.

³⁵ *The Times*, 'The Herzegovina Insurrection,' 31/8/1875, p.3, Col.B.

³⁶ *The Times*, 'Herzegovina,' 18/9/1875, p.8, Col.A.

³⁷ *The Times*, 'Herzegovina,' 23/9/1875, p.8, Col.B.

³⁸ *The Voice*, 'Foreign News,' (5) 17/9/1875, p.3, Col.D.

³⁹ *The Times*, 'Herzegovina,' 23/9/1875, p.8, Col.B.

money, but the spilling of blood in a futile cause.⁴⁰ Whilst it is tempting to attempt to read into this mis-translation some kind of politically motivated attempt to downplay and demotivate the Russian cause, it is equally possible that it was a simple transcription error, and thus nothing can truly be inferred from it.

This was far from being the end of what *The Voice* had to say on the matter. A few days later, they issued a substantial editorial, considering the various conflicting interests of the Powers, and the attendant difficulty in resolving the Eastern Question. Austria, it asserted, could not preside over autonomous Slav states, and 'Muslim culture obviously can never identify with Christian.'⁴¹ Whilst the remark about the unsustainable nature of 'Muslim' government is hardly surprising, and of the flavour of the times, the other comment, rounding off the sentiments presented in the previous piece, is a significant one. Up to this point, much of the diplomatic initiative had been at least in the name of the three 'Northern Powers' or Dreikaiserbund.⁴² The tensions in this alliance, particularly between Russia and Austria, had already been noted in *The Times*, as discussed above, but the fact that they were now being openly voiced in the Russian Press marks a significant change.

It might seem logical, then, to expect that this hardening of words would coincide with a changing of attitudes by the Russian government. *The Times* certainly portrayed the activities of Russian Press and Government as if they were part of one large, carefully orchestrated plan.⁴³ However, this does not seem to have been the case: firstly, the change in position was not nearly as cut-and-dried as it might at first seem. Although his daily paper, *The Voice*, had altered its tone slightly, Kraevskii's journal, *The Notes of the Fatherland* was, in November, still arguing against the argument presented in the German press that Russian and Austrian interests in the Balkans were too diverse to permit any kind of long-term accord.⁴⁴ Harris asserts that, as late as the end of October, Jomini, the Russian diplomat, was prepared to accept Andrassy's plans for reform, not because of any merit they may

⁴⁰ *The Voice*, 'Foreign News,' (5) 17/9/1875, p.3, Col.D.

⁴¹ *The Voice*, 'St Petersburg,' (10) 22/9/1875, p.1, Col.E.

⁴² e.g. *The Voice*, 'Foreign News,' (1) 13/9/1875, p.4, Col.B.

⁴³ *The Times*, 'The Herzegovina,' 6/8/187, p.5, Col.B.

⁴⁴ *Notes of the Fatherland*, 'The Uprising in Hercegovina and Bosnia,' November 1875, p.121.

have had themselves, but because of a genuine concern for the likely impact upon Austro-Russian relations if he did not.⁴⁵ Furthermore, although the Russian ambassador to Constantinople, Ignatiev, sent a report to the Tsar in early November stating that the Austrians were moving unexpectedly away from joint action, he also stressed that the rumours of an impending Austrian occupation were greatly exaggerated. Furthermore, Alexander hand-wrote a note in the margin, commenting that it was the 'entente a trois' (alliance of three, clearly a reference to the Dreikaiserbund) which secured Austria's position.⁴⁶ It hardly seems, then, like the articles in *The Voice* were paving the way for a sharp volte-face by Russian policy-makers. Indeed it adds weight to the generally accepted view that it was the errors of Andrassy which proved the undoing for any scheme of reforms initiated solely by the Dreikaiserbund.⁴⁷

Russophobia

It seems, then, that as Press perceptions of events in Bosnia and Hercegovina moved away from the idea that the crisis was simply an internal matter, or else one with which only Austria need be concerned, the amount of coverage it received increased. However, it also seems that the actions of the Russian government do not seem to bear out the notion that the Press was being used to prepare the ground for a substantial change of policy. It is necessary, then, to consider the relationship between Britain and Russia at this time, in order to attempt to determine what might be the reason behind such a strong conviction on the part of *The Times* that Russia was indeed up to something.

During the autumn of 1875 the diaries of Lord Derby, the British foreign secretary at that time, depict the then Russian ambassador, Schuvalov, as repeatedly trying to paint himself as the model statesman. The word 'moderation' is conspicuous by its

⁴⁵ Harris, *A Diplomatic History of the Balkan Crisis*, p.154.

⁴⁶ 'Report from N.P. Ignatiev to Alexander II on the position in Hercegovina and on the rumours regarding Austro-Hungarian preparations for the occupation of Bosnia,' Rossiiskaia akademiia nauk: institut slavianovedeniia, *Rossii i vosstanie v Bosnii i gercegovine 1875-1878: dokumenty*, [Russian Academy of Scholarship: Institute of Slavonic Studies, *Russia and the Uprising in Bosnia and Hercegovina 1875-1878: Documents*], (Moscow, 2008), p.156.

⁴⁷ See e.g. Sumner, p.152, Harris, p.183 &c.

recurrence, and there are repeated assertions that any international settlement must be one that is imposed by all the Powers.⁴⁸ Despite recording all of the ambassador's words, Derby also added his own illuminating commentary on the matter: when Schuvalov insisted that the Tsar simply wanted his moderation to be appreciated, Derby noted his suspicions regarding the cause of such moderation, implying it to be out of character for the Russians.⁴⁹ Perhaps the most telling remark of all came in early November, when Schuvalov paid Derby a call to provide reassurances that Russia only sought peace and quiet, to which Derby noted in his diary 'who can trust a foreign diplomatist, and who can trust a Russian?'⁵⁰ It is in this light that all other pronouncements on Russia by Derby must be treated. It is, of course, important to note that suspicion and antipathy between Russia and Great Britain at this time went both ways. Although the irked remarks made by *The Voice* against Disraeli primarily belong to later chapters, there were editorials describing his speeches on Turkey as 'sooner harmful than useful.'⁵¹ A little more subtly, perhaps, the Russian Press sought at times to disparage British activities elsewhere, such as an article in *Notes of the Fatherland*, in late 1875, which deemed the best analogy for the position of the Hercegovinian Rayah to be that of the Irish peasant under British misrule.⁵² It is important, of course, not to read too much into a few newspaper articles and the odd diary entry from a politician; indeed Gleason, who has provided the most substantial study on nineteenth-century British Russophobia to date, asserts that the latter half of the century was a period of diminished tension between the two Powers.⁵³ Perhaps the most useful contribution he makes to this present study is his assertion that British and Russian policies were compatible, but that Russian professions of intent were not believed by the British.⁵⁴ It is certainly possible to detect a current of mutual suspicion in the depictions and discussions of each other in the British and Russian Press at this

⁴⁸ J. Vincent (Ed.) *A selection from the diaries of Edward Henry Stanley, 15th Earl of Derby (1826-93), between September 1869 and March 1878*, (London, 1994), Hereafter "Derby Diaries," pp. 245, 251, 254, 258.

⁴⁹ *Derby Diaries*, pp.244-245.

⁵⁰ *Derby Diaries*.

⁵¹ *The Voice*, 'St Petersburg,' (8) 20/11/1875, p.1, Col.C.

⁵² *Notes of the Fatherland*, 'The Uprising in Hercegovina and Bosnia,' November 1876, p.110.

⁵³ J.H. Gleason, *The Genesis of Russophobia in Great Britain*, (? , 1950), p.276.

⁵⁴ Gleason, *Russophobia*, p.2.

time. However, this is far from the most acute instance of such tensions during the 1875-78 Crisis, and the topic will therefore be considered in greater detail in the later chapters of this thesis.⁵⁵

The Refugees

To the modern mind, a key feature of this period, which would have been expected to attract considerable attention, was the plight of the thousands of people, mostly the elderly, women and children, who fled Herzegovina when the violence began. In *The Times*, these figures were referred to simply as “fugitives”, a term striking by its neutrality rather than the more obvious “refugee.” Although language has, of course, changed in the intervening period, it is certainly not the case that the word refugee was unknown to *The Times* in the nineteenth century, as can be seen by repeated uses of the term to refer to the Irish at the turn of the century, Spaniards displaced by Napoleon, and various others right up to the Boers.⁵⁶ Closer to the scene of events, *The Times* had reported as recently as 1873 discussions between Austria and Turkey designed to stop the flow of “refugees” across the Dalmatian border.⁵⁷ In this light, then, it becomes a matter worthy of some consideration that the term refugee should be so scarce in the *Times* reportage.

To be precise, the displaced of Hercegovina were referred to in *The Times* as refugees on six occasions between the start of 1875 and the end of 1876. Of these instances, four were direct quotations, one from ‘a Consul of the Powers’ one from the Russian telegraph agency, a third from Mr. Weselitsky, the chairman of the committee for the refugees, and the last in a telegram addressed to Mr. Weselitsky by the insurgent leaders.⁵⁸ It also seems reasonable to suppose that some significance might be attached to the timing of these references, coming as they do, almost exclusively in the spring of 1876. Thus, during the autumn, when these

⁵⁵ See below, pp.178-183.

⁵⁶ *The Times*, ‘London,’ 23/9/1814, p.3, Col.C; ‘French Papers,’ 15/10/1814, p.2, Col.E; ‘The Boer Republics,’ 16/1/1900, p.3, Col.C.

⁵⁷ *The Times*, ‘Austria and Turkey,’ 11/11/1873, p.12, Col.A.

⁵⁸ *The Times*, ‘The Insurrection [sic] in Herzegovina,’ 15/12/1875, p.4, Col.E; ‘Herzegovina,’ 10/4/1876, p.5, Col.D; ‘Herzegovina and Russia,’ 20/4/1876, p.10, Col.B; ‘Herzegovina,’ 25/4/1876, p.7, Col.B; ‘Bosnia and Herzegovina,’ 27/5/1876, p.7, Col.A; ‘The Eastern Crisis,’ 21/7/1876, p.12, Col.A.

people first left Bosnia and Herzegovina for Austria or Montenegro, their depiction as “fugitives” did little to distinguish them from those who had taken up arms against the Turks and who now hid out in the mountains, only descending for occasional raids. By contrast, in the spring the pressure was being increased by the Porte on these people to return to their homes, with the carrot of amnesties being offered in conjunction with the stick of confiscation of lands for those who did not return. At that point, *The Times* can be seen increasingly allowing the idea of ‘refugee’ to permeate their coverage, and this fits well with the repeated attestations in their articles that those fleeing were unable to return due to the profound distrust which existed between them and the Turks whose broken promises they had trusted once too often. The Imperial *firman* offering an amnesty to anyone who returned to their home within four weeks was first reported in *The Times* in February 1875.⁵⁹ Although this initial announcement was very brief and came with next to no elaboration, it was followed the next day by an assertion that the Porte’s announcement put the ball firmly in the rebels court, and that the Turks had little optimism as to the likely result, as shown by their decision to call up a further 40,000 troops to the area.⁶⁰ Despite the initial time-frame being stated as four weeks, this seems to have been a very elastic period of time and, after the initial announcement, little more was said about it. Instead, *The Times* shifted its attention to the Austrian authorities, who were clearly tiring of the presence of the Bosnians and Hercegovinians on their soil, and were starting to move more decisively towards moving them away. At the end of March, the Austrian governor of Dalmatia, Rodic, held a meeting with the Turks, in which he tried to secure further guarantees and concessions regarding the returning population; this meeting, *The Times* reported, ended in failure.⁶¹ Despite this, Austria continued apace to urge repatriation, culminating in early May with an announcement that they had decided summarily to terminate all aid being provided to the refugees.⁶² Although this order was countermanded almost immediately, and an announcement appeared three days later that aid would in fact continue, the very

⁵⁹ *The Times*, ‘Bosnia and Herzegovina,’ 24/2/1876, p.5, Col.D.

⁶⁰ *The Times*, ‘Herzegovina,’ 25/2/1875, p.5, Col.D.

⁶¹ *The Times*, ‘The Herzegovina,’ 29/3/1876, p.7, Col.C.

⁶² *The Times*, ‘Herzegovina,’ 8/5/1876, p.7, Col.C.

issuing of such an order in the first place must be a telling insight into the general levels of tension and anxiety present at the time.⁶³ In this light, it becomes far more understandable that *The Times* might start to employ language that would engender a greater degree of sympathy amongst its readers for the displaced than the mildly pejorative 'fugitive' that had been employed thus far. However, whilst the activities of Austria are a noteworthy factor, it is also necessary to turn our attention to activities closer to home for *The Times*, namely the organisation and agitation conducted on behalf of the rebels in Great Britain. It is certain that there were, at least in a limited degree, activities in Britain, but what is not clear is whether their most prolific periods preceded or followed this softening of language in *The Times*. The organisation responsible for carrying out most of the campaigning, speech-making and fund-raising on behalf of the insurgents and their displaced families was the League in Aid of the Christians of Turkey and their activities will be examined below. However, much of the activity of the League was foreshadowed to the activities of the former Liberal Prime Minister, Lord John Russell.

Lord John Russell and The League in Aid of The Christians of Turkey

Lord John Russell's role in this crisis was doubtless a significant one, although it would be entirely forgivable to be unaware of this fact, given the dearth of information provided by Russell's biographers: Prest, for example, devotes no more than two pages to the 1870s, and does not make any reference to his involvement with the league whatsoever.⁶⁴ Likewise, Walpole has nothing to contribute on the matter.⁶⁵ Gooch does note that the insurrections and the related 'reopening of the Eastern Question' were 'the last of the public controversies in which he [Russell] took an active part.'⁶⁶ However, Gooch does not include any of Russell's correspondence on the matter, simply noting that Russell's 'mind had travelled far

⁶³ *The Times*, 'Herzegovina,' 11/5/1876, p.5, Col.B.

⁶⁴ J. Prest, *Lord John Russell*, (London, 1972), 419-421.

⁶⁵ S. Walpole, *The life of Lord John Russell*, (London, 1889).

⁶⁶ G.P. Gooch (Ed.) *The Later Correspondence of Lord John Russell 1840-1878*, vol. II, (London, 1925), p.355.

since the Crimean War.⁶⁷ Any letters Russell may have written on the matter are also absent from the Russell collection in the National Archive at Kew, and thus it will only be possible to comment here on those letters which appeared in *The Times* or which have been published elsewhere as part of collections on their recipients.

Russell's first public involvement in events came in late August 1875, when he wrote a letter to the editor of *The Times*, stating his intention to donate £50 to the insurgent cause.⁶⁸ This, he asserted, was a repetition of the gesture he had made towards Greek insurgents 'many years' earlier.⁶⁹ Although this letter was printed with little comment at the time, it gradually made an impact on the wider consciousness, being reprinted in Scottish papers two days later, and prompting a response to *The Times* from Henry Drummond Wolff.⁷⁰ Within the Conservative Party, Wolff was considered to be an authority on Eastern matters, having done large amounts of work on the transfer of the Ionian Islands to Greece during his time in the Foreign Office, and he would later be called upon by Disraeli to speak supporting the Suez Canal purchase.⁷¹ Despite asserting that he would not venture 'to comment on the acts of so distinguished a statesman,' Wolff criticised Russell for having drawn comparisons with the Greeks. Contemporary Turkish Christians, he argued, were protected by the European Powers under the Treaty of 1856 which, despite lacking an explicit right of intervention for the signatories, had an implicit right by its very existence. This, Wolff argued, was not the case at the time of the Greek rising, and as such the fact that Russell had formerly chosen to offer assistance to insurgents unprotected by international conventions gave him no right to do the same for those within the sway of treaty obligations.⁷²

Russell's letter does not appear to have received much further public discussion at this time, but there is no doubt that it made a definite impression on the consciousness of at least the most politically aware classes. Lord Derby noted in his

⁶⁷ Ibid., p.355.

⁶⁸ *The Times*, 'Lord Russell on the Insurrection,' 28/8/1875, p.7, Col.G.

⁶⁹ Ibid.

⁷⁰ *The Times*, 'The Herzegovina,' 1/9/1875, p.9, Col.G.

⁷¹ M. Pugh, 'Wolff, Sir Henry Drummond Charles, (1830-1908),' *Oxford National Dictionary of Biography*, Oxford University Press, 2004; online edn. May 2009

[<http://www.oxforddnb.com/view/article/36990>, accessed 22 Dec 2011].

⁷² Ibid.

diary the initial appearance in *The Times*, calling it ‘a strange letter,’ and adding that ‘his letters to me were not at all in the same sense.’⁷³ The diary makes no mention (at least in its printed form) of these other letters, and thus their exact content can only be guessed at, although it is not hard to spot Derby’s subtext that the distinguished parliamentarian, now in his eighty-third year, was going senile. Indeed, he even goes so far as to assert that ‘I imagine ... he has now very little recollection of what he may have said or done even a few weeks ago.’⁷⁴ This harsh judgement was not shared by all, however, and awareness of Russell’s involvement continued to spread. By the end of the month, it was known to figures no less unlikely than Garibaldi, who identified Russell as the ‘true representative of the generous English nation.’⁷⁵ Furthermore, one of the first reports on the activities of what would become ‘The League in aid of the Christians of Turkey’ described them simply as ‘The committee which has been formed to consider the subject dealt with by Earl Russell’s letter in *The Times*.’⁷⁶ The fact that Russell’s actions impacted upon at least a few key individuals can be seen by the fact that J. Lewis Farley chose to dedicate his book *Turks and Christians: A solution of the Eastern Question* to Russell. In Farley’s words, the outbreak of the Bosnian revolt was ‘a little cloud [which] appeared on the horizon of Eastern Europe.’ This cloud failed to attract any great notice or attention ‘save by a few, and amongst these, your Lordship [i.e. Russell] was the first to predict a storm.’⁷⁷

The League in Aid of the Christians of Turkey

The League in Aid of the Christians of Turkey was an organisation founded in December 1875. As an organisation, its purpose was fairly obviously communicated by its name, although a fuller statement of its ultimate aims may be gleaned from the eponymous collection of documents generated by the organisation, which were published in 1878.

⁷³ *Derby Diaries*, (London, 1994), p.239.

⁷⁴ *Derby Diaries*, pp.239-240.

⁷⁵ *The Times*, ‘Herzegovina Sympathisers,’ 22/9/1875, p.7, Col.G.

⁷⁶ *The Times*, ‘The Herzegovina,’ 8/9/1875, p.7, Col.F.

⁷⁷ J. L. Farley, *Turks and Christians: A Solution of the Eastern Question*, (London, 1876), piii.

The objects of the League are to aid the Christians of Turkey in obtaining their freedom from Mussulman oppression, and to assist in relieving the distress arising out of the war. The League was the first to arouse sympathy in this country for the oppressed Christians of Turkey, by placing their condition in its true light before the British public. It was also the first to send relief to the sick and wounded in Servia, as it was also the first to send relief to the sick and wounded Russian and Roumanian soldiers. Much permanent good has been achieved, but much more remains to be done. Even after peace is made, there will still be some millions of Christians in European Turkey, as well as in Asia Minor and Syria, whose interests require to be efficiently represented. The work which has been done is evidence of what may be accomplished in the future, and the Council earnestly appeal to those friends who have already shown their practical sympathy, as well as to everyone who desires the advancement of liberty and civilization.⁷⁸

Although somewhat long, and evidently written at a far later point in the Crisis, rather than simply as a foundational document, this gives us a clear insight into the stated aims of the League. It also shows their sense of having made significant achievements during the course of the crisis. It is important to note the general attitude implicit within the statement. Throughout the period of the Eastern Crisis, those advancing the cause of the South Slavs framed their arguments in moral terms, as seen here by the reference to 'liberty and civilization.'

The League held public meetings in both Manchester and Birmingham at the very beginning of April, as well as a further gathering in London at the end of July. The April meetings particularly would provide an example of the sort of outside pressure looked for above that might have influenced the *Times* in its increased use

⁷⁸ League in Aid of the Christians of Turkey, *Letters, etc. Relating to the Operations of the Society*, (London, 1878), p.46. This final document is missing from the recent Bibliolife re-print of the collection, but can be found in the electronic version of the University of California Library copy-available at <http://www.ebooksread.com/authors-eng/league-in-aid-of-the-christians-of-turkey.shtml> [accessed 31/1/2012]

of the term 'refugee.' These meetings generally featured long speeches by various figures, elaborating the state of play in Hercegovina (from a Slavonic perspective), reading letters of support, and voting various resolutions. Lord Russell appears not to have personally attended any of the meetings, but sent letters and resolutions to the Manchester and Birmingham meetings, as well as an explicit statement, read out at the London meeting that he had 'great sympathy with the objects of the meeting' and that he would have liked to have attended in person but that 'the delicate state of his health prevented him from being able to do so.'⁷⁹ Unfortunately, the accounts of the public meetings do not provide any detail as to how many attendees were present. The Manchester meeting apparently had its resolution carried 'amid much applause,' which certainly suggests more than a dozen or so assembled, but whether the crowd was dozens or hundreds is entirely unclear.⁸⁰ Likewise, the account of the Birmingham meeting lists the most important ten or so speakers, but does little to indicate whether they spoke to a sea of enthusiastic listeners, or whether the rapturous applause which their words invoked was borne out of an audience's embarrassment at being outnumbered by those addressing them.⁸¹ In each case, the account of the meeting has not been penned simply for the benefit of the League's archivist, but is a reprint from a newspaper; *The Times* in the case of the Manchester and London meetings, and the *Birmingham Daily Post* for the Birmingham meeting. This adds a degree of veracity to the accounts, although it also makes it harder to determine whether a lack of reference to the number of people present at the meetings is most likely to suggest a high or a low turnout.

Perhaps a better indication of the significance of the League, at least in the higher echelons of British politics, can be seen from its deputation to Lord Derby in July 1876. Once again, only nine figures are named 'among those who took part' but of these, seven were MPs.⁸² Thomas Bazley, Samuel Morley, P.A. Taylor and E. Jenkins were all Radicals who association with this sort of cause was unsurprising; the

⁷⁹ League in Aid of the Christians of Turkey, *Letters*, pp.12, 23.

⁸⁰ *Ibid*, p.12.

⁸¹ *Ibid*, pp.13-17.

⁸² *Ibid.*, p.19.

backgrounds of the remaining members of their party, C.J. Monk, and E. Collins remain rather more obscure. In this light, it suggests that the movement did have a significant if not necessarily influential following.⁸³ By the time of the London meeting at the end of July, almost thirty individuals were identified by name, in addition to 'many others' who were once again cheering.⁸⁴ With their activity never in doubt, and evidence of their numbers growing through the spring and the summer of 1876, it seems plausible that the League could well have been a significant force. Whether it was or not, however, is a different matter. The account chosen by the League in its collection of letters comes from *The Times* on July fifteenth 1876, describing the visit of the delegation to the Foreign Secretary the day before. Derby makes only a brief note in his diary as to having received a 'Deputation on the eastern question' that day, headed by John Bright.⁸⁵ Interestingly, the League's own accounts list Jacob Bright amongst the delegates, but not John.⁸⁶ John Bright's Diary confirms Derby's comment that he was indeed present, and the editor notes that this marks 'the first allusion in the diaries to the Eastern Question.'⁸⁷ Whether his brother was also present is unclear, but surely of only secondary importance.

Derby's comments on the delegation are revealing, as he noted that he gave a reply that was 'decidedly a success as far as the audience was concerned: what it may be to the public I don't know.'⁸⁸ This shows that at least in the Foreign Secretary's mind those petitioning on behalf of the Slavs remained a factional interest, and could not be assumed to speak for the populace. Bright likewise asserted that the speech was 'memorable' and 'gave much satisfaction,' although he does not say to whom.⁸⁹

One of the most prominent figures in the League in Aid of the Christians of Turkey at this time was J. Lewis Farley. A banker by trade, Farley had written extensively on

⁸³ The seventh MP was J. Bright, as discussed below.

⁸⁴ Ibid, p.22.

⁸⁵ *Derby Diaries*, p.309.

⁸⁶ League in aid of the Christians of Turkey, *Letters*.

⁸⁷ R.A.J. Walling (Ed), *The Diaries of John Bright*, (London, 1931).

⁸⁸ *Derby Diaries*, p.309.

⁸⁹ *Diaries of John Bright*.

the near east, having spent considerable periods of time working there.⁹⁰ Prior to the crisis of 1875-78, he had not been known as a particular advocate of the Balkan Christians, a point which was made much of by his detractors during this period.⁹¹ Farley's biographer attributes the apparent shift in his attitudes to his former closeness with Fuad Pasha and Ali Pasha, and the fact that they had fallen from power and then died with their legacies abandoned.⁹² Farley himself, however, refused to concede even this much, asserting that his position had remained consistent, but merely that the Turkish administration had fallen beneath contempt, and that his long-held convictions about the material wealth and untapped potential of the Turkish lands was now the legacy of the Balkan Christians.⁹³ Whatever his motivations, a significant contribution made by Farley at this time was his book *Turks and Christians: a solution of the Eastern Question*. In it, Farley sought to remove the 'disinterest' of the British public, by depicting in clear terms the many ways in which the Ottoman Empire was 'bankrupt both in character and in means.'⁹⁴ In many respects, the book was an unremarkable work, combining the sort of sweeping and casual racist remarks that are commonplace to works of this era, such as his assertion that 'the poorer the Turk, the better he is.'⁹⁵ Perhaps the most significant thing that can be gleaned from Farley's book is the matter of what exactly he assumed were people's misconceptions regarding Turkey. The first of these, was the matter of the population of Turkey: in Farley's estimation, there was a 'popular belief' that European Turkey was inhabited by Turks, and that although 'some persons have a faint ideal that there are Christians in Turkey,' none realised that barely a tenth of the population of European Turkey were Turks or, put another way, that the three million Muslims were massively outnumbered by

⁹⁰ G.B. Smith, 'Farley, James Lewis, (1823-1885),' Rev. E. Bagnet, *Oxford National Dictionary of Biography*, Oxford University Press, 2004; online edn. May 2006 [http://www.oxforddnb.com/view/article/9164, accessed 22 Dec 2011].

⁹¹ These detractors were not merely on the anti-Slav/ anti-agitation side of the public debate. Lady Strangford, who did substantial amounts of work with the Bosnian refugees during this period, was singled out by Farley in his book as being one of his most vocal critics; J.L. Farley, *Turks and Christians: a solution of the Eastern Question*, (London, 1876), pp.vii-viii.

⁹² G.B. Smith, 'Farley,' *Oxford DNB*.

⁹³ Farley, *Turks and Christians*, p.viii.

⁹⁴ Farley, *Turks and Christians*, pp.6, 14.

⁹⁵ Farley, *Turks and Christians*, p.28.

eleven and a half million Orthodox Christians.⁹⁶ Far more notable than his book, Farley's name often appeared in the columns of *The Times* in connection with the fund-raising activities which he organised on behalf of the Bosnian Refugees at this time, and although he had clearly failed to impact upon the consciousness of the Foreign Secretary, his name should at least have been well-known to the readers of *The Times*.⁹⁷

Aside from their coverage in the British media, the League in Aid of the Christians of Turkey also made an impression rather further afield. The collection of letters included correspondence, most of it favourable in tone to Farley or other members of the committee, from the Archbishop of Serbia, Jovan Ristic (the Serbian Prime Minister), and even the secretary of the Russian Tsarina on behalf of his employer. Perhaps even more significant, as an indication of how wide-spread the league's fame had become, were the articles mentioning the League which appeared in the Russian Press, namely the *Journal de St. Petersburg*. These reports, however, only appeared much later, in the autumn of 1877. In general, then, it seems as if the League made an impact on the consciousness of those small circles already concerned with events in the Balkans or with international politics, without making any significant discernable contribution on public opinion at large. However, whilst the hardening attitude of the Turkish and Austrian authorities has already been noted above as a probable factor in the increasing use of the term 'refugees' by *The Times* in preference to 'fugitives,' it is possible that another factor may be found closer to home. Given that all the League's major public meetings were reported in the Press, it is highly plausible that the editor of *The Times* felt uncomfortable publishing accounts of significant charitable gatherings in aid of the refugees and other victims, whilst at the same time dismissing those people as merely fugitives. It is in this context then that the impact of the League should be seen, not making a striking impact on headline stories, but subtly increasing the pressure on organs of the Press to alter or moderate their terminology, and otherwise subtly adapt their

⁹⁶ Farley, *Turks & Christians*

⁹⁷ Farley was a member of the deputation to Lord Derby described above, and his presence was reported in *The Times*. For his activities in fund-raising for refugees see e.g. *The Times*, 'Notices,' 1/9/1875, p.6, Col.C; 'Notices,' 9/12/1875, p.8, Col.B.

coverage in a manner which would provide much more fertile ground for the far larger Bulgarian Atrocities agitation the following year.

The Journals

Although much has already been said about the way in which the revolt was treated by the Daily Press this was, of course, not the only form of print media reacting to and recounting the events in the Balkans. A significant role in public awareness was also played by the Russian 'thick' journals and the literary and political review journals of Great Britain.

The Russian journals were considerably quicker off the mark, in terms of incorporating material on Balkan events into their pages, than the British Publications considered. Although *The Quarterly Review* ran an article entitled 'England and Russia in the East' in the spring of 1875, this must be regarded as merely coincidental, rather than prescient.⁹⁸ The following four issues of the publication failed to address the Eastern Question in any shape or form, with the matter only being picked up again in the autumn of 1876, with an article regarding the Suez Canal and a piece misleadingly entitled 'Parliamentary Papers on Turkey,' but which actually concerned itself primarily with the history of diplomatic relations between Turkey and the European Powers, and only briefly considered the present crisis in its closing sections.⁹⁹ Scarcely less engaged was the Edinburgh review, which managed to stir itself into life in the summer of 1876, with a review of Klaczko's *Les Deux Chancellors* (The Two Chancellors), a comparative biopic of Bismarck and Gorchakov.¹⁰⁰ Given the contemporary climate, it was scarcely possible that such a discussion could fail to touch on the current diplomatic activities of Europe, and indeed the final page delivered the verdict that all the deeds of the Chancellors, however cunning or skilful, had consistently been conducted without any kind of reference to Britain, and that this was their fatal undoing. Indeed, the writer went so far as to attribute the failure of the Andrassy

⁹⁸ 'England and Russia in the East,' *Quarterly Review*, 138, 276, (April 1875), pp.568-608.

⁹⁹ 'The Canal at Suez, its political engineering and financial history,' *Quarterly Review*, 142, 284, (Oct 1876), pp.429-457; 'Parliamentary Papers on Turkey,' *Quarterly Review*, 142, 284, (Oct 1876), pp.480-512.

¹⁰⁰ 'Les deux Chancellors,' *Edinburgh Review*, 144, 295, (July 1876), pp.203-231.

Note, The Berlin Memorandum and ‘the intrigues’ of Russia to the arrival of the British Fleet in Besika bay.¹⁰¹ This does, of course, give a very particular interpretation to events, but it does little to convey a groundswell of interest.

Moving to the Russian publications, there is an immediate contrast when we examine *The Herald of Europe* which, being a monthly publication, was obviously able to respond to events more swiftly than a quarterly journal could hope to do so. However, the fact remains that before the British journals in our study had devoted a single word to the crisis, the *Herald* had written three articles, in the February, March and May issues.¹⁰² *The Notes of the Fatherland* had been even swifter to deal with the rebel cause and, as early as November 1875, had published a substantial article which considered in some detail the position of the Bosnian and Hercegovinian Christians.¹⁰³ This piece began in a tone that was most striking for the way in which it resembled an apologia for Islam, although the Turks would doubtless have considered it little more than a backhanded comment when it made observations such as the fact that, whilst the Koran may well have encouraged violence, this was no reason to assume that all Muslims were murderous, as the Bible encouraged peace and humanity, yet still managed to produce Catholics!¹⁰⁴ Broadly speaking, the article said little that was remarkable, it detailed the conditions in Hercegovina, criticised poor-quality administration, and asserted that the “paper” efforts of the diplomats were doomed to fail because the rebels would only be convinced by practical changes.¹⁰⁵

An initial point that can be made about almost all of this coverage, whether it be the opening remarks from the Russian journals, or the rather later comments from the British, is that it focused heavily upon the ‘High Political’ end of the issues, rather than on the insurgents themselves. The most significant exception to this came in March 1876, when the *Herald* asserted that the question of how to end the

¹⁰¹ ‘Les deux Chancellors,’ p.231.

¹⁰² ‘Foreign Politics: Europe and the Herzegovinian Question,’ *The Herald of Europe*, (Feb 1876), pp.814-822; ‘Foreign Politics: Diplomatic Decisions regarding the Herzegovinian Question,’ (March 1876), pp.384-390; ‘Foreign Politics: The Eastern question and a European War,’ (May 1876), pp.409-419.

¹⁰³ ‘The Uprising in Hercegovina and Bosnia,’ *Notes of the Fatherland*, (Nov 1875), 110-126.

¹⁰⁴ *Notes of the Fatherland*, ‘The Uprising,’ (Nov 1875), pp.110-111.

¹⁰⁵ *Notes of the Fatherland*, ‘The Uprising,’ (Nov 1875), p.114, 122-123, 125.

revolt was already becoming easier to solve as the flow of volunteers over the border in Hercegovina was decreasing, and without them, the disturbance would soon peter out.¹⁰⁶ The inaccuracy of this statement was doubtless something of an embarrassment for a serious publication, and perhaps the difficulty of getting information on events that was both sufficiently up-to-date and sufficiently accurate goes some considerable way towards explaining the reluctance to accord it too much interest in the remainder of the press coverage. By May the *Herald* was being far more circumspect, noting that the revolt, (whilst not huge) was not yet fading, and urging reforms to quench it.¹⁰⁷ Indeed, they noted, why shouldn't the rebels demand guarantees as to the earnestness of the Turkish reform proposals?¹⁰⁸

Conclusion

Broadly speaking then, it can be seen that although it has now rather faded from the consciousness of the world, the Hercegovinian revolt of 1875 and 1876 did not go entirely unnoticed at the time. That said, it undeniably lacked the attention given to the Bulgarian uprising which came shortly after it, and other similar movements.

The first reason for this, as has been seen, was the general level of unrest often associated with Turkey in Europe at this time; it appears that the Press, and most likely the politicians and the public too, took a while to be convinced of the reality and significance of the events that were taking place. This was combined with reluctance, particularly on the part of the governments, and Powers such as Russia and Austria, but also noted in the press, to 'reopen the Eastern Question.' For this reason, the two areas in which Press coverage can be seen increasing notably are when a perception was allowed to develop that another, potentially hostile Power had already 'opened' the question, or else when the issues were focused upon something far more grass-roots, which transcended politics, such as the question of refugees.

¹⁰⁶ *The Herald of Europe*, 'Foreign Politics,' (March 1876), p.388.

¹⁰⁷ *The Herald of Europe*, 'Foreign Politics,' (May 1876), p.415.

¹⁰⁸ *The Herald of Europe*, 'Foreign Politics,' (May 1876), p.411.

By the second quarter of 1876, the coverage of events in the Balkans had reached a level which showed recognition of the significance of what was transpiring there. Unfortunately, perhaps, for the cause of the insurgents, by the time this came about, their attempt to claim something for themselves, which had long been overshadowed by the political activities of Europe's most senior diplomats, was about to be completely engulfed by a war between Serbia, Montenegro and Turkey, not to mention the massacre in Bulgaria that would so grip the British. However, the slow head of steam that had been built up would not be without effect in the coming months. As will be shown in the following chapters, the fact that many figures were already active within Britain, championing the cause of the Balkan Christian, would allow a far more immediate response to future events, whether they came in the form of 'Bulgarian Horrors,' or perceived government callousness. Freeman would later lament that 'for the obscure affairs of Herzegovina and Bosnia we could find but few hearers': that would all change when the focus of events shifted to Bulgaria.¹⁰⁹

¹⁰⁹ E.A. Freeman, 'The English People in Relation to the Eastern Question,' *The Contemporary Review*, 29, (February 1877), p.498.

Chapter 4 – The Bulgarian Horrors

If the revolt in Bosnia and Hercegovina was little regarded at the time, and forgotten swiftly by history, the fate of the Bulgarians the following year could hardly have been more different. Indeed, there was a time when every British schoolchild knew of Gladstone and the Bulgarian Horrors. The so called ‘Bulgarian Horrors’ were a series of attacks and massacres made by Turkish irregular troops on Bulgarian civilians in 1876. They were met initially with silence or derision by British politicians, until the spread of detail about events, largely through the popular press, led to an outpouring of public dismay on an almost unprecedented level. In the words of Grosvenor, ‘the atrocities touched the g-spot of Victorian morality.’¹

This chapter will examine the events of 1876, the manner in which information reached the British public, and the way in which this grew into a popular movement. It will also examine the role of Gladstone and his writings at this time, attempting to delve into the motivations and the effects of his actions. Consideration will be made of the manner in which interest and activity in Bulgarian affairs built upon the ‘proto-agitation’ of the previous year with regard to the Bosnian revolt. Finally, It will compare the early silence and later outburst in Britain, with the steady yet understated reaction in Russia, calling into question the motives behind the Russian creation of a ‘Big Bulgaria’ at San Stefano, and indeed the necessity of the reaction to that treaty which came from the remainder of the European Powers.

The Bulgarian Background

The massacres in Bulgaria in early 1876 were far from unique in the history of the Ottoman Empire, even in the nineteenth century. Saab cites similar actions in Lebanon in 1860, and upon Crete in 1866-69, which were also well reported in the Press, but failed to generate any kind of mass movement comparable with what

¹ B. Grosvenor, ‘Britain’s “most isolationist Foreign Secretary”: The Fifteenth Earl and the Eastern Crisis 1876-1878, in G. Hicks (Ed.) *Conservatism and British Foreign Policy, 1820-1920: The Derbys and their World*, (Farnham, 2011), p142.

happened in 1876.² It is necessary, then, to consider the specifics of the build-up in Bulgaria, to examine what exactly it was about this particular confluence of events which prompted such widespread outrage.

Soviet historians tended to stress the long-term economic factors in the build-up to the Bulgarian uprising of 1876, with repeated references to 'feudal oppression' and the 'Turkish yoke.'³ However, whilst the poor economic situation of late nineteenth-century Bulgaria is not to be denied, this perspective is very much a victim of its historical location, and more recent studies have increasingly stressed the importance of cultural factors in stimulating the Bulgarian uprising, specifically a sense of national revival.⁴

National revival amongst Bulgarians was a broad phenomenon, stretching back about a century before this period, and increasing in its intensity as the period progressed. Combining literary, social, and political elements, some writers have sought to place its roots in areas as unlikely as folklore.⁵ However, the more convincing argument seems to be that of Crampton who identifies the general awakening as deriving from contact with the outside world, such as the French Revolution.⁶ Although the political changes to the map of Europe, such as Napoleon's creation of the Illyrian Provinces, did not directly impact the Bulgarians, they do nonetheless seem to have been influenced by the Nationalist activities of their neighbours; firstly the Serbs, whose first bid for independence was launched in 1804, and then the Greeks who secured their independence from Turkey in the 1820s.⁷ The broad phenomenon of Bulgarian cultural awakening was known as the 'Vuzrazhdane,' literally reawakening. Anastasoff traces the beginning of the

² A. P. Saab, *Reluctant Icon: Gladstone, Bulgaria and the working classes* (Cambridge, Mass., 1991), pp.24, 28-29.

³ L.I. Narochnitskaia, *Rossiia i natsional'no osvoboditel'noe dvizheniie na Balkanakh 1875-1878gg*, (Moscow, 1979), pp.6, 11; S.A. Nikitin, *Ocherki po istorii luzhnykh slavian i russko-balkanskih svyazey v 50-70e godi XIXv*, (Moscow, 1970), p.68.

⁴ For example, M. Todorova, *Bones of Contention: The Living Archive of Vasil Levski and the Making of Bulgaria's National Hero*, (New York, 2009).

⁵ C. Silverman, 'The Politics of Folklore in Bulgaria,' *Anthropological Quarterly*, Vol56, No2, (Apr, 1983), p.56.

⁶ R.J. Crampton, *A Concise History of Bulgaria*, 2nd ed. (Cambridge, 2005), p.48.

⁷ M. Glenny, *The Balkans 1804-1999: Nationalism, War and the Great Powers*, (London, 1999), pp.1, 6, 13.

Vuzrazhdane to the end of the eighteenth century, and a book written by Paisi, entitled *History of the Bulgarian People with an account of their Tsars and Saints* (1762).⁸ Paisi, a monk from Mount Athos, urged the Bulgarians to 'know your own nation and language and study in your own tongue!'⁹ Anastasoff argues for the immediate impact of Paisi's work, as the inspiration of a national literary revival.¹⁰ However, Crampton points to his significance more in having provided a '*post facto* explanation' arguing that the work did not become widely known until much later, by which time nationalist feeling had been generated by the global factors already mentioned above.¹¹ Regardless of the order and significance of events, it is clear that (by the 1870s) there existed a far greater sense of Bulgarian identity than had been the case before. The Bulgarian church, noted through the crisis as having played a central role in the lives of the Bulgarian peasantry, had been created as an independent exarchate in 1872, following an Imperial firman of two years earlier, and in defiance of the Greek Patriarch at Constantinople. Meininger, in his detailed examination of the various factors leading up to this event, notes the particular significance of the Church for Ottoman peasants due to the manner in which their lives were governed by the millet system.¹² It was into this context that the events of Bosnia and Hercegovina began to filter in the latter half of 1875.

Revolutionaries and the Revolt

There had been elements of Russian societies active in Bulgaria over the previous decades, a fact which was made much of both by the Turkish authorities and by some elements within England.¹³ However, they seem not to have played a particularly significant part in the insurrections of 1876. Botev and Karavelov, the two leading figures in the Bulgarian revolutionary movement at the time, had both spent time in Russia, but had been expelled from the country after involvement

⁸ C. Anastasoff, 'Bulgaria's National Struggles,' *Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science*, vol232: A Challenge to Peacemakers, (1944), p.102.

⁹ Crampton, *A Concise History of Bulgaria*, pp.45-46.

¹⁰ Anastasoff, 'Bulgaria's National Struggles,' pp.102-103.

¹¹ Crampton, *A Concise History of Bulgaria*, p.48.

¹² T.A. Meininger, *Ignatiev and the Establishment of the Bulgarian Exarchate 1864-1872: a study in personal diplomacy*, (Madison, 1970), p.19.

¹³ *The Times*, 'Leader,' 9/10/1876, p.9, Col.B.

with the Narodniks and a run-in with the Okhrana.¹⁴ Although Russian state interest in Bulgaria at this time is undeniable, Russian foreign policy still fell under the remit of Gorchakov, the Russian chancellor, rather than the more unilateral and aggressive attitude later adopted by Pobedonostsev. Aleksandr Gorchakov, the Russian chancellor at the time of the Eastern Crisis, is a figure who has risen to prominence since the collapse of the Soviet Union, with the rise of a so-called gorchakovist tendency within Russian policy, demonstrated by the elaborate commemorations of the 200th anniversary of his birth, as well as the creation of a 'Gorchakov medal.'¹⁵ Gorchakovism is broadly defined as a policy of non-confrontational revisionism, seeking to arrest Russia's evident decline in status in the aftermath of the Crimean War, whilst simultaneously being very careful to avoid conflict, or even the impression of conflicting interests with the Great Powers.¹⁶ An example of this approach can be seen in Gorchakov's letter to Lord Derby, written prior to the Russian declaration of war against Turkey in the spring of 1877, asserting that the Tsar did not want to take possession of Constantinople, and re-stressing the fact that Alexander recognised the fate of Constantinople as a question of 'common interest' which needed a 'general understanding' and which could not belong to one European power.¹⁷

This position did not universally dominate Russian foreign policy – Russia was after all an autocracy and ultimately subject to the decisions of the Tsar – the general influence from the government at this time was a moderating and stabilising one, unlike the regime which would follow it when the throne passed to Alexander III and much political influence passed to his former tutor, the nationalist reactionary, Pobedonostsev.¹⁸ The most assertive advocate of an active Russian policy in Bulgaria at this time was Ignatiev, the Russian Ambassador to Constantinople, and a man whose Panslavist beliefs and strong influence with many Turkish ministers led

¹⁴ Crampton, *A Concise History of Bulgaria*, pp.77-78.

¹⁵ F. Splidsboel-Hansen, 'Past and Future meet: Aleksandr Gorchakov and Russian Foreign Policy,' *Europe-Asia Studies*, 54, 3, (May, 2002), pp.377-378.

¹⁶ *Ibid*, pp.378-380.

¹⁷ Cited in O. Novikov, *Is Russia Wrong?* (London, 1877), p.55.

¹⁸ M.C. Wren, 'Pobedonostsev and Russian Influence in the Balkans, 1881-1888,' *The Journal of Modern History*, Vol19, No2, (Jun, 1947), p.132. For more on the role of Pobedonostsev, see chapter 5, p.148.

his enemies to associate him with every coup, intrigue or plot in Turkey. Despite the common suspicion, however, Meininger has demonstrated that although Ignatiev's personal opinions may have been influenced by his political beliefs his, and therefore Russia's, actions were limited by the caution of his superiors, and by practicalities.¹⁹ Although agencies within Russia had long attempted to influence Bulgarians, their successes were limited, and the cultural impact they sought to provoke did not materialise.

A key example of the manner in which Bulgarians resisted Russian influence can be seen in the decision, taken in the 1870s, to retain the 'post-substantive definite article' in the new written form of the Bulgarian language, despite the fact that this implied considerable practical difficulties when communicating with Russians.²⁰ Although much would change in the coming few years, with the emigration of figures such as Bobchev, and their involvement in Panslavist circles in Moscow, much of this change was brought about only during the period of Russian occupation during the Russo-Turkish War of 1877-78.²¹ In fact, it has been argued by Pundeff that 'articulate political radicalism' amongst Bulgarians prior to 1878 was found only in those who were residing abroad, thus precluding their involvement in the planning of the insurrection.²² That said it is important to bear in mind that Pundeff was writing at the height of the Cold War, when the question of genuine grass-roots Marxism and activism had a far sharper edge to it than mere academic debate.

Whilst the Bulgarian revolt was not the Russian conspiracy that the Porte might have liked people to believe, it is true that it was planned entirely from Romania by émigrés.²³ Crampton has described it as a 'disastrous shambles' noting the utter

¹⁹ Meininger, *Ignatiev and the Establishment of the Bulgarian Exarchate*, esp. pp.61-62 and 195.

²⁰ Modern Bulgarian also lacks most of the case endings common to the vast majority of Slavonic languages, despite a significant group in the early nineteenth century who urged that they should be retained in order to demonstrate greater commonality with other Slavs; Crampton, *Bulgaria*, pp.61-62; B. Comrie & G.G. Corbett (Eds.), *The Slavonic Languages*, (London, 2002), pp.188-189, 202-203, 234.

²¹ J.F. Clarke, 'Bobchev and Bulgaria,' *Slavonic and East European Review. American Series*, Vol.2, no1, (Mar 1943), pp.189-190.

²² M. Pundeff, 'Marxism in Bulgaria before 1891,' *Slavic Review*, Vol30, no3, (Sep, 1971), p.526.

²³ R. Daskalov, *Making of a Nation in the Balkans: historiography of the Bulgarian Revival*, (New York, 2001), p.201.

failure of the revolutionaries in several districts to convince their countrymen to join in.²⁴ This fact is confirmed by Daskalov, who gives events a more sinister colouring, by asserting that the very plan of the conspirators was to provoke the Turks into bloodshed in order to undermine their authority and to provoke external sympathy.²⁵ Although he later qualifies this assertion, suggesting that the extent of the backlash was unexpected, his historiographical discussion is mostly in reference to Bulgarian-language texts, and any detailed analysis of it remains beyond the scope of this project. The theatrical manner in which the uprising was launched is well-attested, with a letter being sent from the town of Koprivshitsa to 'Bulgaria' at large, signed in blood.²⁶ This initial theatricality failed to attract the attention of the British press, but it did receive coverage in the Russian Press, and throughout June *The Voice* carried intermittent reports, describing how the Bulgarian revolt was growing by the day, and describing the 'years of being robbed' which had prompted the call "to arms!"²⁷ The tone of this reportage, then, was broadly favourable towards the Bulgarians, but was far from containing any significant degree of popular feeling.

Regardless of the intent of the revolutionaries who planned the coup, what happened next is fairly broadly agreed upon. Determined to suppress the revolt, the Turkish authorities sent troops into the area, and unable to send troops from the regular army, (who were occupied fighting a war against Serbia and Montenegro) they sent irregulars, known as Bashi-Bazouks.²⁸ Anyone who had participated in the rebellion was dealt with swiftly and mercilessly, and large areas were then subjected to reprisals, whether as a deterrent to future activity against the state, or simply as the result of irregular, blood-thirsty troops being given too much freedom of action. Whole villages were destroyed, with the men, women and children of the area being killed. For the Russian press, relaying these events to the public flowed naturally enough from their existing coverage, which had from the

²⁴ Crampton, *Bulgaria*, p.78.

²⁵ Daskalov, *Making of a Nation*, p.205.

²⁶ M. MacDermott, *A History of Bulgaria 1393-1885*, (London, 1962), p.254.

²⁷ *The Voice*, Foreign News,' (21/6) 3/7/1876, p.4, Col.B; (28/5) 9/6/76, p.3, Col.F.

²⁸ The fact that irregular troops were used is seen by many as one of the central facts of the entire crisis, e.g. R. Millman, *Britain and the Eastern Question 1875-78*, (Oxford, 1979), p.38.

very beginning noted the presence in the region of Bashi-Bazouks, and that the rebels were in considerable trouble.²⁹ In early July, *The Voice* first noted that the rebels were being silenced very firmly, and this picture grew in detail over the following weeks as concerns were raised about the presence and actions of Tatars in Bulgaria.³⁰ Although the outbreak of war between Serbia and Turkey did occupy the majority of the paper's attention for a few weeks, there still remained a certain amount of activity trickling along until the very end of July when the editor of *The Voice* felt sufficient confidence to publish an editorial estimating as many as twelve thousand Turkish dead.³¹ However, despite all of this recounting of the events in Bulgaria, the focus at this time seems to have been primarily upon Serbia. Whilst this is of course understandable given that war between Serbia and Turkey had just broken out, it does add an interesting dimension to the consideration of views and opinions in Russia at this time. Bulgaria was perfectly acceptable as a further example of the misdeeds of the nefarious Turk for those who sought to argue in favour of Russian intervention against Turkey, but it seems exclusively to have been Serbia which was viewed as the means for Russian involvement.³² The Russian journals would not begin devoting significant amounts of attention to Bulgaria and the Bulgarians for another eighteen months or more; that is to say, long after a Russian army had occupied the area.³³

The *Daily News* and the Breaking of the Story

The first that the general public of Great Britain knew about the massacres in Bulgaria came in June 1876, when the *Daily News* began printing reports from A.J. MacGahan.³⁴ The first of these reports was not picked up by *The Times*, and indeed it was not until the beginning of August that *The Times* began devoting whole articles to 'The Atrocities in Bulgaria.'³⁵ By this time, questions had already been

²⁹ *The Voice*, 'Foreign News,' (17) 29/6/1876, p.3, Col.C; 22/5/1876, p.3, Col.D.

³⁰ *The Voice*, 'Foreign News,' (17) 29/6/1876, p.3, Col.C; 25/6/1876, p.4, Col.A.

³¹ *The Voice*, 'St Petersburg,' (29/7) 10/8/1876, p.1, Col.A.

³² The nature of this Russian involvement and the extent to which it constituted a broad popular movement will be discussed below in chapter 5, esp. pp.130-134.

³³ A.N. Pipin, 'Bulgaria and the Bulgarians Before the War,' *The Messenger of Europe*, (March 1878) pp.281-320; (April 1878), pp.699-732.

³⁴ Millman, *Britain and the Eastern Question*, p.123.

³⁵ 'The Atrocities in Bulgaria,' *The Times*, 1/8/1876, p.5, Col.B, Millman, p.128.

asked in parliament regarding the matter, and it seems that many significant figures in British public life had already formed their own opinions on the matter, including the important question of whether or not the reports could be regarded as trustworthy.

Lord Derby's awareness of the allegations being made is hard to determine, on account of the seeming indifference he protested towards it all. In early July, when questions were first put to the government, he dismissed it as 'no business of importance.'³⁶ However, two days earlier he had noted that the British press was 'beginning to take sides' in the Eastern conflict, and had described the *Daily News* as 'violent for the insurgents.'³⁷ This, combined with the letter that he received from Ponsonby, Queen Victoria's private secretary, on the ninth indicating the Queen's displeasure at the Turkish usage of Bashi-Bazouks, makes it seem overwhelmingly likely that he was aware of the broad nature of the reports in the *Daily News*, but simply regarded them as insignificant.³⁸ Whether he also considered them fictional is harder to determine. Gladstone, the British politician most immediately associated with the Bulgarian Atrocities, was even more reticent in his diary than was Derby. In late June, he began to write to Stratford de Redcliffe, the former British ambassador to Constantinople, as well as to Hartington, the Liberal leader in the Commons, and Forster, also a prominent front-bench Liberal, on 'Turkish Matters,' but beyond this he remained silent until later in the year.³⁹ The Gladstone Papers have none of the correspondence referred to here, nor any replies which he may have received, so his thoughts at this time remain dark. Whatever Derby's original thoughts may have been, his views changed rapidly, and by the eleventh, he was noting anxiously his nervousness at having to speak that Thursday as 'The Liberal papers, D. News in particular, are beginning to work the so-called "Mussulman atrocities"... We have no news on which it is possible to rely.'⁴⁰ The uncertainty exhibited by Derby shows the failure of British government

³⁶ J. Vincent (Ed.) *A selection from the diaries of Edward Henry Stanley, 15th Earl of Derby (1826-93), between September 1869 and March 1878*, (London, 1994), Hereafter "Derby Diaries," p.308.

³⁷ *Derby Diaries*, pp.307-308.

³⁸ *Derby Diaries*, p.308.

³⁹ M.R.D. Foot, & H. C. G. Matthew, (Eds.) *The Gladstone Diaries*, (Oxford, 1968-1994), v.ix, (1986), pp.136-137.

⁴⁰ *Derby Diaries*, p.309.

intelligence to keep pace with the media, and certainly put the government in something of an embarrassing position. This shortfall is particularly surprising when we consider the letters sent by the British assistant consul in Bourgas. His letters to Elliot, the British ambassador in Constantinople, had, as early as May, been warning of the arrival of Bashi-Bazouks in the region and the looting of five 'peaceable' Bulgarian villages.⁴¹ A few days later, he wrote again of a further village being 'stormed' after the men of the village refused to hand over their arms or to send away their families.⁴² Interestingly, it was only after making these confident statements that the consul issued the slightly unusual disclaimer that 'constant reports reach me of atrocities committed by Bashi-Bazouks, but although I fear they are only too well founded, I do not like to mention them to your Excellency until I can be certain of the details.'⁴³ This suggest that the consul did not regard the previously described actions as atrocities, and it is unclear whether he made the same judgement about the 'general massacre' ordered by Shefkhet Pasha in a letter a fortnight later.⁴⁴ What is clear however is that adequate information had been given to the British ambassador regarding at least the broad contours of what was going on in Bulgaria, and that his failure to convey this information swiftly to his superiors in London was to place them in a rather uncomfortable position.

A More Expeditious Manner

When the stories from the *Daily News* first began to spread in Britain, Disraeli's government was keen to downplay any suggestions of veracity regarding the articles. In June, Disraeli derided the allegations as being a targeted anti-government attack.⁴⁵ The most significant statement from the Prime Minister, however, came in July 1876 when he was pressed more specifically on the question of torture. Although, on this occasion, he conceded 'proceedings of an atrocious character,' he continued to deny that there was any evidence of torture and dismissed the possibility, commenting instead that 'Orientals' 'seldom resort to

⁴¹ The National Archives (TNA), *Foreign Office Papers*, FO 860/2, Letter E6, 27/5/1876, pp.123-125.

⁴² TNA, *Foreign Office Papers*, FO 860/2, Letter E7, 3/6/1876, pp.133-134.

⁴³ TNA, *Foreign Office Papers*, FO 860/2, E7, p.135.

⁴⁴ TNA, *Foreign Office Papers*, FO 860/2, Letter E9, 14/6/1876, pp.144-145.

⁴⁵ R. Blake, Disraeli, (London, 1969), p.593.

between the original report and the Prime Minister's letter. The following year, one of Disraeli's most vocal opponents at the time, E.A. Freeman, would note in an article for *The Contemporary Review*, that one of the few significant effects of the crisis upon the government, had been to teach Disraeli that massacres were not a subject for 'jaunty and airy merriment.'⁵⁴ Although there are no detailed records available to confirm or deny this, it seems reasonable to suspect that at least some part in this may well have been played by the League in Aid of the Christians of Turkey. Still holding public meetings throughout the summer, the League had, by the autumn, incorporated the events in Bulgaria into their existing repertoire of criticism for the Turkish government.⁵⁵ Furthermore, although they generally spoke in respectful terms of government politicians, they were not slow to condemn the non-interventionist policies of the government when they felt that these ran contrary to moral imperatives.⁵⁶

Turning Turk

The British daily publication being used for this study is, as has been stated, *The Times*. It makes sense, then, that any known shifts in the editorial policy of *The Times* will have a significant bearing on the remainder of this study. Much has been made in the secondary literature of *The Times* 'turning Turk' in the summer of 1876. Shannon describes this as a major policy shift, and dates it precisely to the 7th of August.⁵⁷ However, it is somewhat unclear as to what forms the exact basis for this assertion. *The Times* of that day contained a variety of articles relating to events in the Balkans, including a piece entitled 'Russia and the Slaves' [sic], half a page on the war between Serbia, Montenegro and Turkey, and a piece entitled 'A Turkish apology.'⁵⁸ However the tone of these articles was rather more mixed than anything else. 'Russia and the Slaves' re-printed an article from *The Voice*, and asserted from it that the Russians were intent on establishing a Slav federation that

⁵⁴ E.A Freeman, 'The English People in Relation to the Eastern Question,' *The Contemporary Review*, 29 (February 1877), p.510.

⁵⁵ The League in Aid of the Christians of Turkey, *Letters, etc., Relating to Operations of the Society*, (London, 1878), pp.27-29.

⁵⁶ *Ibid*, p.23.

⁵⁷ R. Shannon, *Gladstone and the Bulgarian Agitation 1876*, (London, 1963), p.55.

⁵⁸ *The Times*, 7/8/1876.

torture but generally terminate their connexion with culprits in a more expeditious manner.⁴⁶ This was apparently greeted by 'silence and unease' in the House, although other reports later cited incidences of laughter.⁴⁷ Although Blake defends this remark as being simply 'one of those typically orotund phrases to which he [Disraeli] had latterly become addicted,' contemporaries were not prepared to let the Prime Minister off so lightly, and it was swiftly regarded as not only a joke, but one in decidedly poor taste.⁴⁸ *The Times* reported these events; that is to say, the comment by Disraeli and the ensuing 'laughter' from the House, twice, both in its normal coverage of the proceedings of the House of Commons, and in the round-up of the political events of the day, but in both instances did so without adding anything in the way of additional comment.⁴⁹

However, this was not the end of the matter. Many have felt that Disraeli was damaged by these remarks and that, as a result, 'his popularity plummeted rapidly.'⁵⁰ He also did himself no favours by remarking again a few weeks later that the tales of the atrocities were no more than 'coffee house babble.'⁵¹ The prolonged repercussions of these remarks are most amply attested to by the fact that Disraeli himself felt compelled some two months later to write a letter to the editor of *The Times*, asserting that 'I hope the misplaced laughter of another is no proof of the levity of your obedient servant.'⁵² Further insight is given by the fact that this letter from the Prime Minister was accompanied by a note from the editor of *The Times* recounting the fact that the quotation, as reported in *The Times* on July eleventh, had also appeared on page twenty-four of Gladstone's highly successful pamphlet.⁵³ Regardless of the original intent of Disraeli, the fact seems clear that the statement acquired a notoriety and significance that far exceeded all initial explanations. It is also evident that *The Times* was not the medium through which the outrage against Disraeli's remarks was achieved, given the silence

⁴⁶ Blake, *Disraeli*, p.593.

⁴⁷ M. Kovic, *Disraeli and the Eastern Question*, (Oxford, 2011), p.129.

⁴⁸ Blake, *Disraeli*, p.593.

⁴⁹ *The Times*, 'House of Commons, Monday, July 10,' 11/7/1876, P.6, Col.C; 'London, Tuesday 11th July, 1876,' 11/7/1876, p.8, Col.F.

⁵⁰ Kovic, *Disraeli and the Eastern Question*, p.130.

⁵¹ Grosvenor, 'most isolationist Foreign Secretary,' p144.

⁵² *The Times*, 'The Turkish Atrocities,' 7/9/1876, p.9, Col.F.

⁵³ See below, p107 and after.

would naturally look to Russia 'for support and defence, even without a formal alliance,' and that it was highly unlikely that Russia would go to war for the Slavs.⁵⁹ A slightly more anti-Slavonic note could be found in some of the war coverage, including the dispatches from Belgrade which detailed how the Serbs were claiming to have defeated a sizeable Turkish force, along with the note that 'the amount of spurious intelligence from the seat of war baffles conception.'⁶⁰ However, whilst the Serbs could scarcely have been flattered by such accusations of spuriousness, if this was the worst that *The Times* could direct against the enemy of their supposed new allies, it does not suggest a particularly strong conviction. The final piece of the day on Turkish matters did attempt to portray at least one Turkish official as a reasonable and humane character, but only did this by recounting how he had publically admitted at least some of the horrors alleged against the Turks, even though the overall result was that 'he makes (indirectly for the most part) a few admissions and many accusations.'⁶¹

It is interesting to contrast this edition of *The Times* with those which immediately preceded and followed it. The following day, *The Times* announced that the Porte had declared 'all discussion in public or private meetings of subjects connected with those Constitutional reforms' which had been announced but not yet defined to be "High Treason."⁶² Even given the accompanying clarification that this was due to the complexity of the legal process and the need to ensure decision were taken correctly and without any undue influence, it hardly seems a ringing endorsement. Of course, to argue this may be to view the matter too much from a twenty-first century perspective which places a far higher value on freedom of speech than would have been the case in 1876. Indeed, towards the end of the article, the correspondent does commend the proposed constitution for guaranteeing 'the privileges of inviolability of person, domicile and property.'⁶³ However, whilst this one article may speak, at least in some measure, for the Turks, only a matter of pages later, the lead article of the day was advising the readers of *The Times* to

⁵⁹ *The Times*, 'Russia and the Slaves,' 7/8/1876, p.4, Col.D.

⁶⁰ *The Times*, 'Latest Intelligence: The war,' 7/8/1876, p.5, Col.B.

⁶¹ *The Times*, 'A Turkish apology,' p.8, Col.C.

⁶² *The Times*, 'Turkey,' 8/8/1876, p.3, Col.D.

⁶³ *The Times*, 'Turkey,' 8/8/1876, p.3, Col.E.

brace themselves for 'there can be little doubt that we are on the verge of revelations surpassing anything that imagination of civilised men could have conceived.'⁶⁴

A quick glance backward in time does, perhaps, show the Turks having been previously portrayed in a more negative light, with the Sultan having been dismissed the previous Saturday as 'the mere shadow of a sultan.'⁶⁵ Equally, however, being called a 'mere shadow' would hardly be the harshest charge to have been laid against Murad V during his 93 day reign at the end of which, he was deposed on grounds of mental illness. It may then simply be the case that these remarks stemmed purely and simply from a genuine low opinion of that particular Sultan.

As a parallel to the articles of these few days, a glance at the same period one year later shows a similar degree of ambivalence, which contrasted differing types of articles: firstly, those in which the Turks were portrayed as the more reasonable party, desirous of peace, whereas the Russians are depicted as seeking vengeance and recompense for their loss.⁶⁶ Secondly, and in sharp contrast, the military correspondent, reporting from the Shipka Pass, began a long and invective article with the chilling words; 'tonight we have supped full of horrors, and I pray those who still favour the Turks to read attentively what I now write.'⁶⁷ This is the opening for a series of tales of Turkish treachery, 'abominable tricks ... worthy only of untutored savages' and 'savage expression[s] of perfect rage and hatred.'⁶⁸ As the week wore on, *The Times* continued to lavish criticism upon both parties in the war, with the edition of Wednesday eighth carrying reports both of the suffering caused by previous Turkish destruction and of fresh Russian atrocities.⁶⁹

If then, *The Times* did indeed 'turn Turk' in the summer of 1876, it did so in a fairly moderate and measured fashion, and continued to provide ample coverage of anti-

⁶⁴ *The Times*, 'Leader,' 8/8/1876, p.7, Col.B.

⁶⁵ *The Times*, 'The Sultan,' 5/8/1876, p.5, Col.C.

⁶⁶ *The Times*, 7/8/1877.

⁶⁷ *The Times*, 'In the Shipka Pass,' 7/8/1877, p.8, Col.A.

⁶⁸ Ibid.

⁶⁹ *The Times*, 'War Victims,' 8/8/1877, p.5, Col.A; 'Atrocities,' 8/8/1877, p.5, Col.B.

atrocitarian (and thus anti-Turkish) meetings and activities for at least a further year. The topic of Bulgaria or the Bulgarians featured in 144 articles in September 1876, more than any other month of the year, with 122 in October. Of these, 138 and 116 respectively made direct reference to atrocities, a figure which fell only as far as the nineties in November and December. Obviously, not all articles were as strong as the letter 'Atrocities in Bulgaria,' which appeared at the beginning of September, and derided the 'incoherent shrieks' of those who denied the atrocities, and clung to a position dictated by 'the duties laid upon England by her "Imperial positions"'.⁷⁰ Still, there were repeated discussions of the extra pieces of information being received from the Balkans, as well as leading articles such as that of September sixth which described the government's position over the summer as being utterly indefensible on the hustings.⁷¹ Indeed, even when the paper did try to defend the government, it did so at the expense of the Turks, noting that 'it is unfair and unjust to make the misdeeds of Turkey a ground of attack on the Ministry.'⁷² All in all, then, there was hardly a strong pro-Turkish sentiment being clearly communicated to the readership.

The Commission

One topic which occupied a significant amount of the Press coverage on Bulgaria was the commission sent by the British government to investigate the truth of the stories regarding the massacres in Bulgaria, and the general conduct of Britain's overseas representation in Turkey. The individual sent to Bulgaria to investigate the truth of the reports was Walter Baring, described by *The Times* as the 'secretary of the British embassy' in Constantinople, but elsewhere referred to as a consul.⁷³ Baring was accompanied on his journey of enquiry by his father-in-law, Mr Guarracino, acting in the capacity of interpreter. Mr Guarracino was evidently not a well-known figure at the time, as can be seen by the conflicting reports that were sent to *The Times* regarding him. In July a rather complimentary description was sent of him, extolling the various services which he had performed for the British

⁷⁰ *The Times*, 'Atrocities in Bulgaria,' 5/9/1876, p.4, Col.B.

⁷¹ *The Times*, 'London,' 6/9/1876, p.7, Col.A.

⁷² Ibid.

⁷³ *The Times*, 'News in Brief,' 20/7/1876, p.5, Col.E.

government over a period stretching back to the Crimea. However, in mid August, *The Times* carried a report of a constituency meeting in Notting Hill, in which the Liberal MP Charles Dilke read out a letter that he had received from Bulgaria, denouncing Guarracino as a man 'bearing a very undesirable reputation.'⁷⁴ The letter went on to denounce him, not simply as a 'Turkophile' but moreover as a man who 'hates and despises the Bulgarians' and 'cannot speak Bulgarese [sic].'⁷⁵ Combined with the large presence of Turkish officials accompanying the commission every step of the way, doubts had to exist as to the comprehensiveness of the report produced. This theme was picked up again in a report two days later, which insisted that Baring's earnestness and sincerity was completely undermined by his lack of linguistic skills, and that Guarracino was too Turkophile for any information filtered through him to retain any credibility.⁷⁶ Indeed, the article argued, the only 'civilised beings' capable of finding the truth were the American missionaries who were long established in the area and thus familiar with both the language and culture of the Bulgarians, without any taint of pro-Turk bias.

Whilst the Commission may not have had a particularly profound impact upon public perceptions of Bulgaria at this time, it is possible in Dilke's speech to determine already something of a crystallisation of the dilemma that seems to have presented itself to British people in 1876. Dilke was notably a champion of *realpolitik*, and like his political ally Joseph Chamberlain, opposed what he saw as the 'sentimental generalities' of Gladstone which were to become so prominent in the autumn.⁷⁷ Thus it was that he was able to reduce the Eastern Question at that time to a simple dichotomy of sympathy on one hand for the Bulgars and other victims of Turkish atrocities, versus suspicion of Russian activity on the other, whether it be the perceived revolutionary agitation which had prompted the April uprising, or the military conflict which the Russian army now pursued by proxy in Serbia. This was not a distinction which only affected the masses; in November,

⁷⁴ *The Times*, 'The Atrocities in Bulgaria,' 16/8/1876, p.6, Col.A.

⁷⁵ *Ibid.*

⁷⁶ *The Times*, 'Servia and Bulgaria,' 18/8/1876, p.10, Col.A.

⁷⁷ R. Jenkins, 'Dilke, Sir Charles Wentworth, second baronet, (1843-1911)', *Oxford Dictionary of National Biography*, (Oxford, 2004, online edn, 2008), accessed 15/6/2011. For more on Dilke, see D. Nicholls, *The Lost Prime Minister: A Life of Sir Charles Dilke*, (London, 1995).

when discussing the decision to send Salisbury, the Secretary of State for India, to the Constantinople conference instead of the Derby, Foreign Secretary, Gladstone received a letter from Lord Granville, his former foreign secretary and the Liberal leader in the House of Lords which posed the question as to 'which would be his [i.e. Salisbury's] prevailing bias – sympathy with the Xtians, or jealousy of Russia.'⁷⁸ As far as balancing these two positions goes, rather than denying the Turkish atrocities, or pleading ignorance (however real or imagined), Dilke sought instead to compare the actions of the Turks in Bulgaria with those of the Russians in Poland or the British in Ireland.⁷⁹ This highlights neatly the most interesting contrast between the British and Russian positions on the Bulgarian crisis; namely that in Britain sympathy for Bulgarians was seen as running counter to British interests (where these were deemed to be a significant factor) whereas in Russia the two urged action in the same direction - that is to say against Turkey.

Gladstone, *The Bulgarian Horrors, and the Question of the East*

Despite the obvious fame of its author and the topicality of its theme, there is still something remarkable about Gladstone's pamphlet of late summer 1876, *Bulgarian Horrors and the Question of the East*.⁸⁰ Published on the sixth of September, it was filled with rhetoric that Millman has derided as 'irresponsible' and sold for 6d a copy.⁸¹ Within a month, sales had topped 200,000 in a time when, Saab claims, similar pamphlets could scarcely expect circulation figures much in excess of 6,500.⁸² Such an important source clearly warrants some more detailed examination, both in terms of its content and its context.

It was the last week of August when Gladstone wrote to his friend and associate Lord Granville, observing 'I am in half, perhaps a little more than half, a mind to

⁷⁸ A. Ramm (Ed.) *The Political Correspondence of Mr Gladstone and Lord Granville 1876-1886*, (Oxford, 1962), v.1, p.19.

⁷⁹ *The Times*, 'The Atrocities in Bulgaria,' 16/8/1876, p.6, Col.A.

⁸⁰ An active link to contemporary politics was never a bad thing for a nineteenth century writer, something testified to admirably by Longman's unprecedented £10,000 advance offered to Disraeli (sight unseen) for *Endymion*, the first novel written by a sitting British Prime Minister: Blake, *Disraeli*, p.734.

⁸¹ R. Millman, *Britain and the Eastern Question 1875-1878*, pp.179, 184; Right Hon W.E. Gladstone M.P., *Bulgarian Horrors and the Question of the East*, (London, 1876).

⁸² Saab, *Reluctant Icon*, p.133.

write a pamphlet: mainly on the ground that Parliamentary action was all but ousted.⁸³ This opening statement offers little in the way of insight into the deeper motivations guiding Gladstone at this time, and his diary entry of the previous day offers little improvement, with the simple statement 'worked on a beginning for a possible pamphlet on Turkish Question.'⁸⁴ Given the ultimate impact that the publication of *The Bulgarian Horrors* and the subsequent campaign was to have on Gladstone's later political fortunes, some historians have sought to portray the pamphlet as having been primarily a means to an end; namely, a return to public prominence and a stepping stone towards the Liberal Leadership.⁸⁵ However, despite that fact that this is what ultimately occurred, the idea that it was in some sense premeditated seems to be little more than wishful thinking. Staunch supporters of the Liberal party might well have had cause to complain at times concerning the way in which Gladstone created difficulties for the party, but this is not the same as seeking to subject and direct it to his own ends. In early October, Gladstone wrote to Granville 'I have not your responsibilities to the party, but I have for the moment more than your responsibilities to the country.'⁸⁶ Later in the same letter he described himself as simply 'an outside workman, engaged in the preparation of materials.' Coming from a piece of personal correspondence to one of his closest political colleagues, this hardly reads like the words of a man intent upon a leadership challenge. Indeed, Shannon and Saab have both argued that Gladstone's involvement in the crisis was carried out in a thoroughgoing spirit of reluctance and that he 'became a popular leader against his will.'⁸⁷

Chamberlain has tried to argue for the inevitability of Gladstone's ultimate return following his resignation of the Liberal Leadership in the aftermath of the 1874 general election. Her central basis for this seems to be the informal nature of the new leadership which she describes as an unclear mess, in which Granville acted as the 'social centre for the party' as well as being the leader of the Liberals in the

⁸³ Ramm, *Mr Gladstone and Lord Granville*, p.3.

⁸⁴ *Gladstone Diaries*, v.ix, p.150.

⁸⁵ T.A. Jenkins, *Gladstone, Whiggery and the Liberal Party 1874-1886*, (Oxford, 1988), pp.56-57.

⁸⁶ Ramm, *Mr Gladstone and Lord Granville*, p.13.

⁸⁷ Shannon, *Gladstone and the Bulgarian Agitation*, p.10; Saab, *Reluctant Icon*, pp.76-78, 82.

Lords, whilst Hartington or possibly Forster led in the Commons.⁸⁸ However, regardless of what the implications of such a state of affairs might be, she clearly overstates the degree of ambiguity present, and Parry notes a party meeting held at the Reform Club on February 3rd 1875, at which a 'reluctant' Hartington was elected as leader in the Commons.⁸⁹ Indeed, it was only in the aftermath of the 1880 election, itself still some four years away that Gladstone's refusal to serve under Hartington in the cabinet led to any revisitation of the question of the official leadership.

Much of the difficulty in assessing Gladstone's motives comes from the broad disagreement regarding the nature of his personality. Jenkins depicts Gladstone as almost entirely opportunistic in his actions, and cites an article written in the *Quarterly Review* in 1866 by Lord Cranborne (later Salisbury) which asserted that Gladstone was not only 'completely' guided by ambition, but did so in a perfect state of 'self-deceit ... without the faintest self-consciousness or self-suspicion.'⁹⁰ A more apt viewpoint, however, might be found in the quotation often attributed to Alexandre Auguste Ledru-Rollin: "There go the people. I must follow them, for I am their leader." Ramm has noted in her analysis of the Gladstone-Granville correspondence, the manner in which the electorate increasingly occupied the principal role in Gladstone's decision-making, filling a space that had previously been occupied by Granville.⁹¹ Thus, however derisively Jenkins may describe Gladstone as 'following public opinion, rather than forming it,' it is instead clear that he remained a man of conviction, but spoke most vocally on the matters in which the electorate, and the populace more broadly, had, he believed, already expressed a clear interest.⁹² Were Gladstone to have been simply following sheep-

⁸⁸ M.E. Chamberlain, 'Gower, Granville George Leveson-, second Earl Granville (1815-1891),' *ODNB*, accessed 15/6/2011.

⁸⁹ J. Parry, 'Cavendish, Spencer Compton, marquess of Hartington and eighth duke of Devonshire (1833-1908)', *ODNB*, accessed 15/6/2011.

⁹⁰ Jenkins, *Gladstone*, pp.20-22.

⁹¹ Ramm, *Mr Gladstone and Lord Granville*, (1962), pxvi.

⁹² Jenkins, *Gladstone*, p.26.

like the tide of public opinion, then the spring of 1878 would have seen an abrupt volte-face, far from the reality which manifested itself, as will be shown below.⁹³

Perhaps it is also helpful to have a broader understanding of what may have fuelled and inspired the pamphlet, and this may come from Matthew who asserts that 'the inner force of a Gladstonian pamphlet was always religious,' a factor inevitably likely to increase the strength of the tone.⁹⁴ This notion is supported by Derby who noted in his diary on the day after publication that the pamphlet was 'a fierce and violent denunciation of the Turks ... in which religious zeal appears plainly under the guise of sympathy for the oppressed races.'⁹⁵ This, however, is the only reference which he makes to the pamphlet, despite the following weeks of his diary being heavily occupied with the Eastern Question generally. *The Times* carried mention of the pamphlet every day or two throughout September, although these tailed off rapidly in October and November with only a few references being made in each month.⁹⁶

Returning to Millman's notion of the content of the pamphlet as 'irresponsible,' it is necessary to consider directly the text itself. *The Bulgarian Horrors* began with a commendation of the behaviour of the British public, and the manner in which they were able to trust to the superior knowledge and instincts of their government; hardly the most subversive opening available to Gladstone.⁹⁷ Obviously, however, the purpose of *The Bulgarian Horrors* was not to heap praise on the government, and the congratulation of the public was coupled with a lamentation of the way this trust had been forced to 'subsist' without any information, or discussion of Bulgarian matters prior to the end of July.⁹⁸ Indeed, Gladstone was prepared to assert that deliberate obstacles had been placed in the way of discussion, including

⁹³ See below, chapter 7, esp. Pp.183-186.

⁹⁴ H.C.G. Matthew, *Gladstone 1807-1874*, (1986), p.13.

⁹⁵ *Derby Diaries*, p.324.

⁹⁶ There were a total of 11 references to the pamphlet in *The Times* during September, 5 in October, and just 1 in November. E.g. *The Times*, 'Mr Gladstone on the Bulgarian Atrocities,' 7/9/1876, p.10, Col.A; 'The Atrocities in Bulgaria,' 12/9/1876, p.10, Col.E; 'The Government and the Eastern Question,' 22/9/1876, p.8, Col.C; 'The Eastern Question,' 10/10/1876, p.9, Col.A; 'After diplomacy has said its last word and failed,' 19/10/1876, p.9, Col.B; 'Parliament out of Session,' 2/11/1876, p.11, Col.A.

⁹⁷ Gladstone, *Bulgarian Horrors*, p.7.

⁹⁸ *Ibid.*, p.7.

the brevity of the parliamentary session, which necessarily constricted the amount of time in the House available for discussion.⁹⁹ Evidently, this sort of accusation defies any real degree of investigation, as the lack of time evidently did place a mechanical limit on the debating time available, but there appears to be no evidence available of a deliberate curtailment of the session on the part of government - Derby for example is notably silent on any such conspiracy should it have occurred.

Where Gladstone can be called more closely to account, is in his conclusion as to what was ultimately revealed once the government's delaying tactics were exhausted, and Britain and its agents were revealed as being guilty of 'moral complicity with the barest and blackest outrages upon record within the present century, if not within the memory of men.'¹⁰⁰ This outrage, he concluded, had been perpetrated by the Turks, 'the one great anti-human specimen of humanity.'¹⁰¹ At this point, it is clear to see that Gladstone is allowing emotion and literary style to trump clear-headedness. In sharp contrast to Saab's notion that Gladstone furnished the atrocities campaign with 'reason and justification,' at this point he seems to be carried away by emotion.¹⁰² Indeed, Shannon asserts that Gladstone was 'never less in control' than at this point in time.¹⁰³ Broadly speaking, the pattern shown above seems to dominate the pamphlet throughout; beginning with careful reasoning, Gladstone would periodically erupt into violent invective, before arriving at a decidedly moderate conclusion. In one section, Gladstone was able to provide a detailed blow-by-blow account of the reporting of the crisis, and the questions asked and answered (or not) within the House, concluding with the simple assertion that the presence of the British fleet in Besika Bay needed to be publicly explained as humanitarian in purpose, rather than military.¹⁰⁴

Perhaps the most famous line of the pamphlet, and one which deserves some attention, is the famous 'bag and baggage' quotation, part of a passage which

⁹⁹ Ibid.

¹⁰⁰ Ibid., p.8.

¹⁰¹ Ibid., p.9.

¹⁰² Saab, *Reluctant Icon*, p.97.

¹⁰³ Shannon, *Gladstone and the Bulgarian Agitation*, p.112.

¹⁰⁴ Gladstone, *Bulgarian Horrors*, p.23.

shows once again the apparent incompatibility of Gladstone's rhetoric and his demands:¹⁰⁵

Let the Turks now carry away their abuses in the only possible manner, namely by carrying off themselves. Their Zaptiehs and their Mudirs, their Bimbashis and their Yuzbachis, their Kaimakarns and their Pashas, one and all, bag and baggage, shall, I hope, clear out from the province they have desolated and profaned. This thorough riddance, this most blessed deliverance, is the only reparation we can make to the memory of those heaps on heaps of dead; to the violated purity alike of matron, of maiden, and of child; to the civilization which has been affronted and shamed; to the laws of God or, if you like, of Allah; to the moral sense of mankind at large.¹⁰⁶

In the face of such a colourful, emotive, moralising passage, it can hardly be considered a surprise to learn that many readers simply missed the fact that what Gladstone demanded in conclusion to this tirade, was an end to Turkish *executive* power - that is to say, the granting to Bulgaria of autonomy.¹⁰⁷ Gladstone's ultimate conclusions in his pamphlet were decidedly moderate in both their nature and their tone: an end to 'anarchical misrule,' preventative measures against a recurrence of the atrocities by removing Turkish administration from Bosnia and Bulgaria, and by these steps, to 'redeem' the good name and reputation of Britain.¹⁰⁸ However, the manner in which he framed these demands was bound to provoke a stronger reaction than this simple restatement would suggest they perhaps warranted. Indeed, it led Disraeli to remark in a note to his private secretary, Corry, that Gladstone was 'quite mad: really devilish man; possessed by an evil spirit of envy.'¹⁰⁹

¹⁰⁵ Shannon notes that the 'bag and baggage' line was actually a quotation from Stratford de Redcliffe, although one which Gladstone used divorced from its original context. Shannon, *Gladstone and the Bulgarian Agitation*, p.110.

¹⁰⁶ Gladstone, *Bulgarian Horrors*, pp.61-62.

¹⁰⁷ *Ibid.*, p.63.

¹⁰⁸ *Ibid.*, p.26.

¹⁰⁹ Kovic, *Disraeli and the Eastern Question*, p.148.

The Atrocities Campaign

Across Britain in the second half of 1876, there were many public meetings, assemblies, speeches and the like, calling upon the government to be more active in regard to events in Bulgaria, or simply expressing a collective dismay at what had transpired. Gladstone and his pamphlet were closely associated to this mass outpouring of activity.¹¹⁰ However, despite many attempts, both at the time and since, to link them, it seems clear that the atrocities campaign was not simply a Gladstonian movement, and it is necessary to consider what exactly the movement was, in order properly to appreciate the manner in which it was depicted in the Press.

Wohl and Feuchtwanger have both seen anti-Semitic prejudice as a key element of the British atrocity campaign, almost to the point of reducing it to nothing else.¹¹¹ By contrast, Shannon viewed this as a thoroughly superficial aspect of what happened, seeing it as a growth out of the 'proto-agitation' carried out the previous year on behalf of the rebels and refugees in Bosnia and Hercegovina, which ultimately grew into the "significant manifestation of moral sentiment on a popular level" that Gladstone required prior to getting involved.¹¹² For Saab, it was overwhelmingly a working-class mass movement, although, along with Shannon, she confirms the significance of W. T. Stead's Darlington *Northern Echo* which often provided fresh information from Bulgaria and led the call for action.¹¹³ Stead's action was over a broad range of activities, from using the *Northern Echo* to organise public meetings, to leading a campaign for a national 'day of atonement' for Bulgaria.¹¹⁴

Stead would in time become known as a staunch supporter of the Radical Liberal agenda, and achieve significant prominence as a campaigning journalist. Baylen identifies this involvement with the atrocities campaign as a breakthrough point in

¹¹⁰ Shannon, *Gladstone and the Bulgarian Agitation*; Saab, *Reluctant Icon*.

¹¹¹ A.S. Wohl, "'Ben Juju' representations of Disraeli's Jewishness in the Victorian political Cartoon," in Endelman & Kushner, *Disraeli's Jewishness*; E. Feuchtwanger, "'Jew Feeling' and Realpolitik: Disraeli and the makings of Foreign and Imperial Policy," in *Ibid*.

¹¹² Shannon, *Gladstone and the Bulgarian Agitation*, pp.37, 92.

¹¹³ Saab, *Reluctant Icon*, pp.77, 102.

¹¹⁴ Shannon, *Gladstone and the Bulgarian Agitation*, pp.75, 138.

making *The Northern Echo* 'one of the most renowned north country dailies.'¹¹⁵ *The Northern Echo's* involvement with the atrocity campaign is also linked closely to its future support for Gladstone's Midlothian campaign of 1880, which have been seen as instrumental in securing Gladstone's landslide victory.¹¹⁶

Prior to the publication of his pamphlet, Gladstone had in fact been largely silent on the subject of Bulgaria. Gladstone explicitly stated in his correspondence with Granville that 'I have tried and shall try to avoid speaking: but if I do not speak I must write.'¹¹⁷ Perhaps more significantly his pamphlet, appearing as it did on sixth September, came too late to have been a significant factor in many of the public meetings which were held during the first few weeks of September 1876. There is ample documentary evidence of these meetings, as most of them concluded with a resolution to send a copy of the motions passed to Lord Derby.¹¹⁸ For the most part, the motions were forwarded by the mayors or guilds of small cities and large towns condemning the massacres, with examples appearing from Nottingham, Canterbury, Middlesbrough, Bodmin, Whitby, Darlington and Exeter to name just a few.¹¹⁹ Amongst these run-of-the-mill declarations from public meetings, there are, a few which are notably different, coming not from towns as a whole, but from more specific interest groups (often occupying a broader geographical area, such as the expression of 'horror and indignation' sent to the Foreign Secretary by the Baptist Union of Wales).¹²⁰ It seems difficult to ascertain why exactly such organisations felt the need to send their own messages, separately from the towns and cities in which they lived, and logistically it is almost impossible to determine whether the signatories also attended more geographically defined meetings.

The widespread nature of the public meetings made a significant impact upon Derby, who felt the change in the mood of the country to be 'remarkable', commenting: 'meetings are being held daily in the provinces' to urge the

¹¹⁵ J. O. Baylen 'Stead, William Thomas, (1849-1912),' *ODNB*, [accessed 3/2/2012].

¹¹⁶ *Ibid.*

¹¹⁷ Ramm, *Mr Gladstone and Lord Granville*, p.13.

¹¹⁸ The first volume of these covers barely the first eleven or twelve days of September yet stretches to the best part of 450 pages; TNA, Foreign Office Papers, *Atrocities in Bulgaria*, vol.1 (1-13 Sep, 1876). FO 78/2551.

¹¹⁹ *Atrocities in Bulgaria*, vol.1, pp.1-19, 24-44.

¹²⁰ *Atrocities in Bulgaria*, pp.20-21.

government against aiding the Turks.¹²¹ He was also clear about what he perceived as being the causes and nature of these meetings, adding 'To a considerable extent, these meetings are got up for party purposes, being generally attended by Liberal MPs and nonconformist preachers: but they undoubtedly represent also a large amount of genuine popular feeling.'¹²² Although clearly annoyed by his political difficulties, it is noteworthy that Derby here testifies to an underlying general opinion. This comes in stark contrast to his remarks noted earlier when he was petitioned on behalf of the people of Bosnia and Hercegovina, and had noted that as excitable as the delegation might be, 'what it may be to the public I don't know.'¹²³ This clear development in the foreign secretary's views was recorded on second September, before the motions would fully have begun to reach him, and implies that his reaction was prompted by more than simply an overflowing in-tray. It is important, then, to consider what it was that had led Derby to change his mind in this way, and the best way to do this will be to consider the manner in which these meetings had been covered in the contemporary press, and how Derby responded to this reportage.

Derby was far from complimentary towards the agitation movement when he noted in his diary, again on second September: 'The outcry is so far inconvenient that it weakens our hands abroad, & strengthens those of Russian statesmen, but it is not unnatural, and at this time of year can do little harm.'¹²⁴ This last point is presumably a reference to the fact that Parliament had dissolved in early August until the following year and thus the chances of MPs feeling obliged to ask questions on behalf of an aroused electorate was reduced. Sadly, his diary does not contain any comment on the petition, also in the Foreign Office compilation of this time, addressed by the Mayor and Aldermen of Penzance directly to the Queen, urging a recall of Parliament for the explicit purpose of discussing the Bulgarian

¹²¹ *Derby Diaries*, p.323.

¹²² *Derby Diaries*, p.323.

¹²³ For fuller discussion of this, see above pp.84-86; *Derby Diaries*, p.309.

¹²⁴ *Derby Diaries*, p.323.

Question.¹²⁵ Interestingly, there does not seem to have been any corresponding press campaign, at least in *The Times*, for an early recall.

Later Press portrayals of Turkey

The manner in which Turkey was regarded in the media in the latter part of 1876 is important. In the October edition of the *Quarterly Review*, there appeared an article claiming to be an 'examination of the conduct of the Ministry and the chiefs of the opposition in reference to the Eastern Question.'¹²⁶ However, it was over twenty pages before the contemporary British government was even mentioned (for a paragraph or two), with the majority of the article being devoted to an analysis of the historical place of Turkey within Europe. In this context, the country was depicted as 'threatening,' and European attempts at improving and reforming Turkey were dismissed as little more than 'carving on rotten wood.'¹²⁷ In this light, it is unsurprising that the article fails to contain strong endorsements of Turkey or to urge backing for the Sultan's government. However, it is somewhat unusual, given the climate of the time as just described, that the argument is framed not in favour of the Bulgarians, but specifically against the Turks, asserting that both in fact and in the utterances of Derby, it was clear to see 'the utter impossibility of any English Ministry proposing active measures in support of the current *regime* in Turkey to the generation of Englishmen who had heard and believed the stories of the Bulgarian massacres.'¹²⁸ Whilst this remark would doubtless have found popular support, it seems strange that the suggestion is even being made as, at this point, few besides the Turkish ambassador were calling upon the government to make any such steps.

A more significant point lies in the *Quarterly's* opinions regarding what British interests and duties did dictate in regard to Turkey, analogising the United Kingdom to a physician who saves the life of a sick man only for that man to go on to commit murder.¹²⁹ The author of the article ultimately argues in favour of multi-Power

¹²⁵ *Atrocities in Bulgaria, Vol1*, p.444.

¹²⁶ 'Parliamentary Papers on Turkey,' *Quarterly Review*, 142, 284, (Oct 1876), p.480.

¹²⁷ 'Parliamentary Papers on Turkey,' pp.480,483.

¹²⁸ 'Parliamentary Papers on Turkey,' p.503.

¹²⁹ *Quarterly Review*, 'Parliamentary Papers on Turkey,' p.504.

intervention to guide the Sultans and to reform the Turkish, largely because any removal of that state would lead to 'an amount of European disturbance which no-one could contemplate without horror.'¹³⁰ This is hardly a 'bag and baggage' endorsement of the removal or curtailment of Turkish power to commit excesses of the kind which even the most sceptical were prepared to concede had occurred.

If the *Quarterly's* views were somewhat surprising, the views of the *Edinburgh Review* remained opaque. In the final issue of 1876, the *Edinburgh Review* carried its only notable article on Eastern affairs of that year; a lengthy review article which considered both a travelogue based on experiences in Bosnia the previous year and the blue book *Correspondence respecting Bosnia and Herzegovina*, presented to parliament that July. Granville noted in a letter to Gladstone, that the tone was so supportive of the government that it 'might have been, and perhaps has been dictated by Derby.'¹³¹ Certainly, the article focused rather more on the revolts as 'the harbinger of brighter and better days,' rather than on the sufferings inflicted by Turkish reprisals.¹³² This fits a more general theme of October being a quiet period for coverage of Bulgaria, with *The Times* only managing a single article solely devoted to the topic.¹³³

The opening months of 1877 saw something of a renewal of media interest in the Eastern Question, due in no small part to the launch of the journal *Nineteenth Century*. *Nineteenth Century* was founded by Sir James Knowles as a 'platform from which men of all parties and persuasions might address the public in their own names.'¹³⁴ Knowles was moved to found *Nineteenth Century* as a result of a dispute with the new owners of *The Contemporary Review* which he edited until January 1877.¹³⁵ The *Contemporary* itself had been established as a more explicitly religious counter to the outspokenly secular *Fortnightly Review* in 1866. During the second half of 1876, the *Contemporary* had, on average, carried one or two articles a

¹³⁰ *Quarterly Review*, 'Parliamentary Papers on Turkey,' p.505.

¹³¹ Ramm, *Mr Gladstone and Lord Granville*, (1962), p.14.

¹³² *Edinburgh Review*, 'On Foot Through Bosnia,' p.535.

¹³³ *The Times*, 'Turkish Justice in Bulgaria,' 28/10/1876, p.9, Col.F.

¹³⁴ S. Lee, 'Knowles, Sir James Thomas (1831-1908),' rev. H.C.G. Matthew, *ODNB*.

[<http://www.oxforddnb.com/view/article/34353>, accessed 19 July 2011].

¹³⁵ *Ibid*.

month on Eastern matters, from a variety of authors. Yet, after Knowles' departure, it published only three articles for the rest of the year, all of them coming from the pen of the self-confessed 'atrocities-monger' Edward Freeman.¹³⁶ *Nineteenth Century* by contrast produced a broad gamut of articles appearing with regularity on a variety of aspects of the Eastern question. However, whilst the turn of 1877 saw a renewal of journalistic attention on the matter of the Eastern Question, much of what was written concerned itself with the question of British interests and the appropriate nature of British foreign policy at this time.¹³⁷

As a comparison, it is perhaps worth noting at this point that the actions and the fate of the Bulgarians occupied far less of the attention of the British journals at this time than did the Suez Canal purchase.¹³⁸ The precise details of Disraeli's actions regarding Suez do not belong here, nor the Press reaction, as it was far removed from being a public movement. However, it is interesting to see that even when such a large-scale movement as the Atrocities Campaign was underway, many still preferred to focus their energies on the questions of High Politics and the actions of statesmen. Beyond this, it is also necessary to bear in mind Gladstone's own assertion that those who had been actively involved in the atrocities campaign 'may well experience a sense of relief when the scene is shifted from Bulgaria, or from Constantinople, to Egypt.'¹³⁹ Gladstone's weariness of Bulgaria by this point in the proceedings is understandable. However, he was somewhat unclear as to why exactly it was that he found discussion of Egypt evoked an atmosphere so 'free and almost fragrant.'¹⁴⁰

Despite the avoidance in some quarters, and the delays in others, it would be a mistake to think that the Atrocities Campaign entirely failed to impact the British journals. Although 1876 had seen few take advantage of the short period of time

¹³⁶ F. Barlow, 'Freeman, Edward Augustus (1823-1892)', *ODNB*, [http://www.oxforddnb.com/view/article/10146, accessed 19 July 2011].

¹³⁷ See below, pp.183-186.

¹³⁸ E.g. Anon, 'The Great canal at Suez: its Political Engineering and Financial History,' *Quarterly Review*, 142:284, (October 1876), pp.429-457; E. Dicey, 'Our Route to India,' *Nineteenth Century*, 1, 4, (Jun 1877), pp.655-685.

¹³⁹ W. E. Gladstone, 'Aggression on Egypt and Freedom in the East,' *Nineteenth Century*, 2, 6, (August 1877), p.149.

¹⁴⁰ *Ibid.*

they had, 1877 did see a number of articles considering the movement on a mass level. This was the clear aim of Freeman's article of February 1877, 'The English People in Relation to the Eastern Question.'¹⁴¹ As noted above, Freeman was a prominent figure in the Atrocity Campaign, and his article was in keeping with this tone, arguing strongly the case of the Bulgarians. More significant, however, is how he related the question to the people of Britain. He asserted that since before the Great Reform Act of 1832 (at least) 'there has been no such general stirring of the national heart and the national conscience as that which was wrought when the people of England first heard in all its fullness the true tale of Turkish doings in Bulgaria.'¹⁴² Clearly intent on making his point, Freeman noted how the British were 'stirred' or how people 'shuddered' repeatedly in the opening section of his article.¹⁴³ He asserted that the movement was without parallel in its spontaneity and universality, before launching into a detailed consideration of how the various strands of opposition to the movement had sprung up, claiming that the Conservative 'headquarters' had incited a previously ambivalent party, whilst others had opposed the national movement simply 'because it is national.'¹⁴⁴ As far as Freeman was concerned, Christianity and freedom, of which he proudly proclaimed himself a long-standing partisan, largely unaffected by the recent upsurge of support, were both 'unfashionable' causes, which had been enough to incite opponents against them.¹⁴⁵ Despite all this, he still asserted that the movement was truly a popular one, as it was not confined to a single class, sect, or party, and because it had an impact upon the government.¹⁴⁶ The existence of this article is useful insofar as it shows clearly that *The Contemporary Review* was willing to allow the opinions of the Atrocity Campaign to be voiced explicitly on their pages, something which it appears the *Edinburgh Review* was not.¹⁴⁷ However, it tells us almost nothing about the wider receptions these sentiments received.

¹⁴¹ E.A Freeman, 'The English People in Relation to the Eastern Question,' *The Contemporary Review*, 29 (February 1877), pp.489-514.

¹⁴² *Ibid.*, p.489.

¹⁴³ *Ibid.*, pp.489-491.

¹⁴⁴ *Ibid.*, pp.490, 501, 503.

¹⁴⁵ *Ibid.*, p.505.

¹⁴⁶ *Ibid.*, p.510.

¹⁴⁷ *Ibid.*, p.503.

Conclusion

All in all, then, there were a multiplicity of factors surrounding the Bulgarian uprising and the subsequent massacres, which account for the level of public attention generated. The long decades that Britain had supported Turkey, seeking to reform it along Western lines had failed to produce tangible results, and the slow but steady stream of information stemming from the previous year's revolts in Bosnia and Hercegovina had forced many to begin questioning what exactly was being gained from these reform attempts, and how much more time the Turks should be given.

From a Russian perspective, Bulgaria received only limited attention, and then, only insofar as it added weight to the case being already made for the enlargement of Serbia. In this context, the notion that San Stefano and the resultant 'Big Bulgaria' were part of a long-standing and well-established Russian plan seems to hold little water: nothing had been done to establish the notion in the minds of the Russian public, an action which could hardly have been beyond the scope of the Tsar's ministers and agents had it been sufficiently desired. In Russia, friendship with Turkey was never an issue, and the only issues of relevance were whether sizeable portions of the Slavonic population of Turkey could be given autonomy, or liberated from Turkish rule altogether, without causing excessive disturbance to the peace of Europe. This lack of obvious vested interest is perhaps the major factor in accounting for the scant interest which Bulgaria did receive in the Russian Press: the apparent dichotomy between morality and interest simply did not exist. It also probably helped prevent the occurrence of a situation such as in Britain whereby the laconic correspondence of the ambassador at Constantinople left the government uninformed, in exactly the area where it might appear to have something to hide.

Had the Cabinet been properly informed in June, it seems plausible that Disraeli might have been more careful in his remarks to the House, or at the very least that Derby would have ensured that a more clearly and moderately stated summary of the government's position was made. In this case, it is probable that the key

movers in the agitation movement might not have felt that they had so much with which to contend and that the whole business would have passed relatively calmly into the history books. This, certainly, is the position which Freeman adopted, asserting that both the Liberals and the Conservatives had 'sinned' in the past regarding Turk and Slav, but that the failure of Derby and Disraeli was that they had not 'atoned' for their actions; if they had, then they would have been 'equally welcomed' by the pro-Bulgarian campaigners, as could be seen by the fact that no-one had said a bad word about Salisbury who was just as much a Tory as they were.¹⁴⁸ Nonetheless, the mass activity of September 1876 is undeniable. The rapidity with which it followed the publication of Gladstone's *Bulgarian Horrors* shows that it cannot simply have been inspired by the pamphlet, but that it was the result of a prolonged building of public feeling and activity based on actions such as the proto-agitation for the Bosnian and Hercegovinan cause the year before. That said, the rhetoric of Gladstone, aside from the bare fact of his involvement, helped propel the atrocities movement to a degree of exposure which it could not otherwise have hoped to obtain.

¹⁴⁸ Ibid., pp.495, 499-500.

Chapter 5 – The Russians March to War

In the summer of 1877 Lev Tolstoi published the final section of his epic *Anna Karenina*, in which one of the novel's major protagonists, Count Vronskii, departs for the Balkans, intent on fighting for the Serbs against their Turkish overlords and not expecting to return with his life. Koznyshev, half-brother of the novel's hero Levin, watches the volunteers depart, accompanied by the professor Katavasov. Koznyshev reminisces on how 'the heroism of the Serbs and Montenegrins, fighting for a great cause, aroused in the whole nation a desire to help their brothers not only with words but by deeds.'¹ The figures whom Katavasov and Koznyshev encounter are generally unimpressive, being described variously as 'effeminate, spoilt and delicate,' a 'drunkard and a thief whom no one would employ any longer' and other caricatures who collectively produce 'a disagreeable impression.'² However, it is Koznyshev's first recollection that has stuck, and the literary picture painted by Tolstoi has become the popular recollection, indeed the accepted version of events for most scholars not re-considering the Eastern Crisis itself.³

This chapter will examine the reaction of the Russian public to events in the Balkans in the summer of 1876, and consider the extent to which there was a meaningful public 'outcry.' In order to further our appreciation of how significant the Russian reaction was, parallels and contrast will be drawn with the contemporary British press and reactions within the United Kingdom. Furthermore, the chapter will examine the relationship between what actually occurred in Russia at this time, and the literary perceptions and portrayals, notably the manner in which this singular notion of a people, collectively inflamed on behalf of a particular cause, has gained such lasting currency. Overall, it will be shown that the vague references to 'activity,' 'enthusiasm' and the like can only really be verified or quantified when

¹ L. Tolstoy, *Anna Karenina: Translated by L & A Maude*, (London, 1992), p.909.

² Tolstoy, *Anna Karenina*, pp.914-915.

³ For example, Knight asserted that public opinion 'drew the regime into a war that it would likely have otherwise avoided' - N. Knight, 'Was the Intelligentsia Part of the Nation?' *Kritika*, 7, 4, (2006), p.736; 'the government was obliged by the people to officially declare war.' - S. Lure, 'Rossiiskaia gosudarstvennost' i russkaia obshchina' in S. Lure, *Metamorfozy traditsionnogo soznaniia*, (St Petersburg 1994) cited in S. Kaspe, 'Imperial Political Culture and Modernisation in the Second Half of the Nineteenth Century,' in J. Burbank, M. Von Hagen, A. Remnev, (eds) *Russian Empire: Space, People, Power, 1700-1930*, (Indianapolis, 2005), p.482.

they intersect with financial collections taken up for the South Slavs. These collections were the only truly reliable indication of what ‘people’ really thought and did in Russia at this time.

Orthodox Accounts

Although Russian actions elsewhere have already been considered at some length, this chapter will focus on Russia itself during this period. Alexander II reigned as Tsar of Russia from 1855 until his assassination in 1881. He was already into the final quarter of his reign when the people of Bosnia rose against their Turkish overlords and re-ignited ‘the eternally insoluble Eastern Question’ in 1875.⁴ The early part of his reign had been marked by sweeping legislative changes known as the ‘Great Reforms’ and, for the most significant of these, the emancipation of the Serfs in 1861, he had earned himself the epithet ‘the Tsar Liberator.’ More than this, Alexander II is seen by some as having ‘for the first time opened the door to public participation in political affairs.’⁵ By these latter years, however, he is generally regarded as having taken a more reactionary outlook; angered by the Polish revolt, and only a horse’s nostril away from being assassinated by a Polish revolutionary, he became affected by a ‘tenseness.’⁶ He increasingly exhibited a general hostility to calls for more reform or social innovation and appointed the conservative scholar and academic C.P. Pobedonostsev as tutor to his son and heir Alexander Alexandrovich.⁷ Geyer, whose work has done much to emphasise the inseparable nature of Russian foreign and domestic policy, notes that Alexander exhibited an instinctive aversion to reform demanded from below, and that he regarded public opinion of any kind as destructive, referring to it as ‘gazetobolezn’ – literally, newspaper sickness.⁸ As noted above, Alexander made assorted changes to the role and status of the official state censor, but not in a fashion which

⁴ F. Dostoevsky, *A Writer’s Diary, Translated and Annotated by K Lantz*, (Evanstown, 2000), vol.1, p.522

⁵ L. Engelstein, *Slavophile Empire: Imperial Russia’s Illiberal Path*, (Ithica, 2009), p.46.

⁶ W.G. Moss, *Russia in the Age of Alexander II, Tolstoy and Dostoevsky*, (London, 2002), pp.125-127.

⁷ R. F. Byrnes, *Pobedonostsev, his life and thought*, (Indiana, 1968), p.33.

⁸ D. Geyer, *Russian Imperialism: the interaction of domestic and foreign policy, 1860-1914*, (Leamington Spa, 1987), p.29.

provided firm encouragement for either reactionaries or reformists.⁹ Broadly speaking Alexander's reign was thus characterised by a mixture of Zhukovsky's liberalism and his father's militarism, but lacking the will and persistence of either.¹⁰

A vast number of contemporary accounts almost universally attest to the existence of a mood of popular enthusiasm for the Serb cause in Russia at this time, yet little is done to define or substantiate this argument. *The Times* in England expressed a strong belief that the movement was never particularly widespread and that it rarely extended far beyond Moscow and Kiev.¹¹ This contrasts sharply with the view of the Parisian *Journal des débats*, which offered the following bold assertion in the autumn of 1876:

We knew that Russia was marvellously organised for those great national agitations which, beginning at the top, rapidly spread among all classes, pass from Court to aristocracy, aristocracy to army, from army to bourgeoisie, and gradually extend to the populace, but the unanimity of sentiments, yearnings and hopes now displayed by her exceeds all that we had seen of the like of late years.¹²

Whilst other sources were perhaps less confident about the manner in which this expression of 'sentiment' had come about, this is the tone which was to be found across Europe.¹³ By June, Turgenev was convinced that Russia 'cannot avoid war' due to the strength of the manifest feeling.¹⁴ At the same time, Pobedonostsev was expressing concern at the likely direction of what he viewed as an overwhelming 'wave of nationalism.'¹⁵ This view has traditionally been upheld by historians; Polunov describes an 'upsurge of public activity of a sort that Russia had scarcely seen since the Napoleonic invasion,' and MacKenzie talks of a 'unanimous

⁹ See above, pp.22-23.

¹⁰ Polunov, *Russia in the Nineteenth Century*, p.92.

¹¹ *The Times*, "Russia," 30/11/1876, p.5, Col.B.

¹² *Journal des débats*, 20/9/1876, p.1, Col.B.

¹³ E.g. 'Russian Wars with Turkey,' *Edinburgh Review*, 146, 229, (July 1877), p.259.

¹⁴ N. Zekulin, 'Turgenev's 'kroket v Vindzore (« Croquet at Windsor »),' in P. Waddington, (Ed.), *Ivan Turgenev and Britain*, (Oxford, 1995), p.195.

¹⁵ Byrnes, *Pobedonostsev*, p.123.

outburst.’¹⁶ Although the apparent unanimity of these views must, of course, lend them some weight, these varied sources all have in common, not only their shared belief in the Russian ‘movement’ of 1876, but an equally common lack of any concrete reasoning behind this attitude. MacKenzie undermines his own assertion by conceding that ‘the bellicose views of the Russian press reflected only a vocal, educated minority in the principal cities.’¹⁷ Beyond this, a certain healthy scepticism towards claims for an ‘enflamed public’ is probably best retained.

Cherniaev and Kireev

Keeping in mind a certain degree of hesitancy in accepting the various accounts of the public furore that surrounded the reporting of the Serbo-Turkish war in Russia, it is important to consider why exactly it was that Russian interest became so focused on this conflict. It has already been shown that the ‘Bulgarian Horrors’ provided significant impetus to educated opinion in Great Britain, and that previous interest in Bosnia had been minimal.¹⁸ Russia, by contrast, had been remarkably disinterested in both conflicts, with Press interest instead being focused on events in Serbia. One reasonable explanation that presents itself, is the involvement of Russians in this campaign. Whilst it should not be overstated, there is no doubt that both the media and their readership often took greater interest in events which they could relate more directly to themselves.

This section will consider the cases of two particularly prominent figures, Mikhail Cherniaev and Nikolai Kireev, before discussing the larger numbers of Russian volunteers who involved themselves in the Serbo-Turkish conflict. Many, such as MacKenzie, have argued that a little-regarded conflict in the Balkans took on a significant new dimension when a Russian officer, named Cherniaev, was appointed a general in the Serbian army. General Mikhail Grigorovich Cherniaev was already something of a minor celebrity in Russian society at this time, having famously

¹⁶ Polunov, *Russia in the nineteenth Century*, p.167; D. MacKenzie, *The Serbs and Russian Pan-Slavism, 1875-1878*, (New York, 1967), p.115.

¹⁷ MacKenzie, *The Serbs & Russian Pan-Slavism*, p.99.

¹⁸ See above, pp.90, 120.

captured Turkestan in 1865, despite being under orders to retreat.¹⁹ By the middle of the 1870s, he had left the military and was the editor of the Panslavist publication *Russian World (Russkii Mir)*, a post which he occupied right up until the point where he left Russia, and appeared in Belgrade to offer his services to Prince Milan. *The Voice* had previously published little on the Eastern Question.²⁰ He was not an entirely unknown figure to informed Britons either, although the extent to which the readers of *The Times* would have recalled a man mentioned ten times in the 1860s, and once earlier that decade, in 1873, is questionable.²¹

Beginning with the paper's announcement of Cherniaev's arrival in Serbia and his subsequent appointment to a Serbian command on twenty-first May, there seems to have been a veritable flurry of journalistic activity.²² Whereas in the first third of the year, *The Voice* had produced little more than a few editorials noting how concerned the Russians were for the fate of Balkan Christians and how peaceful Russia had been since the Crimean War, they suddenly began to offer regular updates from the Balkans.²³ *The Times*, referring to him as Tchernayeff, also noted his imminent departure from St. Petersburg and his arrival in Belgrade, describing him as a 'well-known Slavophil officer and writer.'²⁴ Cherniaev has certainly been cited by many, both at the time and since, as being the key factor in the change of public attitudes, with MacKenzie describing him as having been 'unquestionably the most popular man in Russia.'²⁵ Dostoevskii, despite giving him the dubious epithet of 'most naive of heroes,' did note that 'since his departure for Serbia he has acquired remarkable popularity in Russia.'²⁶ In fact, one of the few to raise his voice openly against Cherniaev seems to have been Turgenev, who commented to a friend that he thoroughly 'loathed' the man.²⁷ An aspect of Cherniaev's voyage to

¹⁹ D. MacKenzie, 'Panslavism in Practice: Cherniaev in Serbia (1876),' *The Journal of Modern History*, Vol36, No3, (Sep, 1964), p.280.

²⁰ L. McReynolds, *The News under Russia's old Regime: The Development of a Mass-Circulation Press*, (Princeton, 1991), p.30.

²¹ *The Times*, 'Russia in Central Asia,' 21/1/1873, p.7, Col.A.

²² *The Voice*, 'Foreign News,' (21/5) 2/6/1876, p.3, Col.D.

²³ *The Voice*, 'St Petersburg,' (1) 13/1/1876, p.1, Col.A, and (8) 20/4/1876, p.1, Col.B.

²⁴ *The Times*, 'Herzegovina,' 11/5/1876, p.5, Col.B; 'The Berlin Conference,' 20/5/1876, p.9, Col.A.

²⁵ MacKenzie, 'Panslavism in Practice,' p.279.

²⁶ Dostoevsky, *Writer's Diary*, vol1, pp.601, 610.

²⁷ Zekulin, 'Turgenev's Kroket v Vindzore,' p.200.

the Balkans which was not considered to any notable degree by the Russian press, but which did receive at least a brief consideration in *The Times* was the ambiguity of having a semi-retired Russian general occupying a military post in a conflict Russia was not part of. At the very end of May, *The Times* noted briefly that Cherniaev was still technically a Russian Officer and remained on half-pay in that capacity, before delving deeper into the matter in the early part of June. They described the lengths gone to by the Russian consul-general to have Cherniaev shunned by Prince Milan, as well as the Serbian decision to grant Cherniaev Serbian nationality in an attempt to minimise the embarrassment and potentially ensuing anger experienced by Russia as a result of the whole affair.²⁸

The widespread claims of Cherniaev's great and enduring popularity are hard to substantiate. As has already been noted, *The Voice* did provide fairly regular updates on the general's activities and whereabouts; however, little in their tone suggests that they were particularly partisan in his favour and (by and large) the reports were simply bland, factual descriptions of what he and his men had been doing. Worse still, when the paper did dedicate an editorial to Cherniaev, it was to deride him for his foolishness in giving orders in Russian which, unsurprisingly, aggravated the Serbian troops, and generally for quarrelling with the Serbian government.²⁹ This at-best lukewarm coverage is particularly notable given that the editor of *The Voice*, Kraevskii, was a long-time supporter of Cherniaev in his central Asian campaigns, and has been described as the 'standard-bearer of the Russian mission in Asia.'³⁰ If even Kraevskii's publication did not lionise Cherniaev, then it seems a puzzle as to who did. *The Times* provided scarcely less coverage than the Russian Press, and referred to Cherniaev by name over two hundred times during the crisis. By and large, this was confined to factual descriptions of the movements of his troops, or of the proclamation he issued urging all the Christians of the Turkish lands to rise up.³¹ On occasion, he was singled out for his 'boldness' or his 'hot-headedness' which was part of the 'reputation' that was drawing recruits to

²⁸ *The Times*, 'News in Brief,' 26/5/1876, p.5, Col.B; 'Servia,' 1/6/1876, p.5, Col.C.

²⁹ *The Voice*, 'Foreign News,' (27/9) 9/10/1876, p.4, Col.B, (2) 14/10/1876, p.4, Col.A.

³⁰ A. J. Rieber, 'Russian Imperialism: Popular, Emblematic, Ambiguous,' *Russian Review*, 53, 3, (summer 1994), p.333.

³¹ E.g. *The Times*, 'Latest Intelligence: The War,' 7/7/1876, p.5, Col.A; 10/7/1876, p.7, Col.A.

the Serbian cause.³² Generally, however, the articles were less emotive and more descriptive, no doubt aided by the fact that Cherniaev's bold opening thrust of the campaign soon stalled into what could at best be described as masterful inactivity.³³

Perhaps the strongest words of praise that *the Times* put his way, was when reference was made to 'the gallant Tchernayeff,' although this was in a letter from Archibald Forbes, reprinting a letter he had sent to the editor of the Serbian newspaper *Istok (The East)* and which appeared in *The Times* to repudiate a charge of plagiarism.³⁴ Perhaps the reason for the large amount of coverage Cherniaev received in Britain can be seen in the *Times* article of October 1876 which expressed a firm belief that he had been 'sent on a sort of semi-official mission by the Russian war Office' and that 'there reigns complete harmony between Tchernayeff and the Russian military authorities.'³⁵ The notion that Cherniaev headed a clandestine Russian participation in the war will be discussed later in this chapter, whilst the attention paid by the British Press to Russian diplomatic schemes will be considered at greater length in chapter 7.

Although perhaps not as well known as Cherniaev, Nicholas Kireev was another volunteer with a particularly significant impact upon the course of events at this time. The particular significance of Kireev's contribution was two-fold. Firstly, he performed the ultimate service to the cause of publicity by dying in battle; fiercely outnumbered, and against an enemy commander who refused to release his body.³⁶ Secondly, he had a very eloquent and energetic sister, Olga Novikov, who, although primarily active in England, was prompted by her brother's untimely demise to embark on an epic bout of correspondence and agitation to argue the Slavonic cause, and the Russian one more generally.³⁷ The demise of Kireev has

³² *The Times*, 'Latest Intelligence: The War,' 11/7/1876, p.5, Col.A; 'The War in Servia,' 12/7/1876, p.9, Col.E.

³³ *The Times*, 'Servia and Turkey,' 24/7/1876, p.6, Col.A.

³⁴ Forbes makes it clear that he refers to the Serbian *Istok*, and not to any Russian publication of the same name which would, of course, be translated *The Source*. *The Times*, 'English Correspondents in Servia, (Letters to Editor), 2/10/1876, p.10, Col.C.

³⁵ *The Times*, 'The Eastern Question,' 21/10/1876, p.5, Col.A.

³⁶ W. T. Stead, (Ed), *The MP For Russia: The Reminiscences and Correspondence of Madame O. Novikov*, (London, 1909), p.206.

³⁷ Stead, *The MP For Russia*, pp.236-238. For more on the actions of Novikov during this crisis see below, pp.131, 140, 193.

been widely regarded as a major catalyst to public interest in Russia at the time. As I.S. Aksakov, the chairman of the Moscow Slavonic Benevolent Committee and leading voice of Pan-slavism in Russia, put it in his address to the July 1876 meeting of the Moscow Slavonic Committee when eulogising Kireev; 'he was one of us.'³⁸ *The Orthodox Observer* (*Pravoslavnoe Obozrenie*) was a publication that had previously confined itself to considering the religious aspect of the Slavonic question, or to appealing for 'exclusively monetary' donations to the Slavonic cause.³⁹ However, in the July edition of 1876, the *Observer* published a brief account of Kireev's memorial service (it was described as a funeral both in the *Orthodox Observer* and *The Times*, but this seems unlikely given that the Turkish army still had possession of his body), following which the editor of the journal stood up and addressed the assembled crowd.⁴⁰ In his address, the editor described Kireev's death as 'the first Russian sacrifice' of the Serbo-Turkish war and called Kireev a 'Crusader' who took up arms to protect 'faith, homeland and freedom.'⁴¹

Dostoevskii noted in his July diary that 'the People' 'have heard and prayed in church for the repose of the soul of Nikolai Alexeevich Kireev, who gave his life for the cause of the People.'⁴² The impact of Kireev's death in Russia was also attested to further afield: Captain Salusbury, a companion of Cherniaev's, claimed that when the news reached Russia, it prompted many more to enrol.⁴³ A British historian at the time went still further, claiming ambitiously that 'the phantom of the young Kireef [sic] ... proved even perhaps more powerful than the sentiment for the Holy Shrines.'⁴⁴ Whilst the potential significance of Kireev's death seems clear, it is important to temper this with a consideration of the manner in which it was reported and described at the time. The funereal speech given by the editor of the *Orthodox Observer* did not conclude with an appeal for all Russians to follow Kireev's example directly. In fact, despite calling Kireev's decision to go to war both

³⁸ 'Meeting of the Slavonic Committee, 14th July,' *Orthodox Observer*, (August 1876), p.801.

³⁹ 'From the Moscow Slavonic Committee', *Orthodox Observer*, (May 1876), p.192.

⁴⁰ 'A word on the funeral of N.A. Kireev,' *Orthodox Observer*, (July, 1876), pp.599-600.

⁴¹ 'Funeral of Kireev,' *Orthodox Observer*, p.599.

⁴² Dostoevsky, *Writer's Diary*, vol.1, p.557.

⁴³ P. H. B. Salusbury, *Two Months with Cherniaev*, cited in Stead, *The MP for Russia*, p.209.

⁴⁴ i.e. the supposed cause of the dispute which led to the outbreak of the Crimean War. A. W. Kinglake, *The Invasion of the Crimea*, 6th Ed, (London, 1877), p.4.

'heroic' and 'loving,' the editor instead asserted explicitly that not all needed to take up arms and leave the country, and urged them rather to consider other ways in which they might serve the cause.⁴⁵

This coverage occurred at a significantly more involved level than that of the British Press where (it seems) Kireev's death was also reported. It would be easy to miss the significance of the brief note in *The Times* on July twenty-eighth that Ristic, the Serbian Prime Minister, had sent a telegraph to the Russian press informing them that he had 'been attending a funeral service in honour of M. Kiregeff, a Russian officer killed in the Servian ranks.'⁴⁶ Furthermore, the inability of the British Press (at this time) to transliterate consistently or coherently many less familiar Russian names precludes any real degree of certainty about their activities.

As interesting as the cases of these two individuals are, the primary concern of this study is not to consider these individuals per se, but how they were represented in the Press, and thence how this presentation impacted the consciousness of the social elites whose views can be accessed with any degree of certainty. In the case of Cherniaev, the level of coverage seems to suggest a relatively low level of interest, and there is little to suggest that this coverage would either reflect or precipitate a wide-spread case of popular interest.

Volunteering and Fund-raising

More broadly-based voluntary activity did take place. Evidently less-known figures will have attracted less coverage, but nonetheless enough of a picture can be constructed to demonstrate whether we are dealing with the sort of minority, factional activity that might be found for any cause, or whether there is evidence of the Press depicting a genuine mass movement. One of the earliest Russians to volunteer to fight in the Balkans of whom anything much is known was S.F. Sharapov. Sharapov was a student at the St. Petersburg Engineering College between 1873 and 1875, and spent much of his time composing constitutions and anonymous petitions to the Tsar. This came to an abrupt end in October 1875,

⁴⁵ 'Funeral of Kireev', *Orthodox Observer*, p.600.

⁴⁶ *The Times*, 'Latest Intelligence: The War,' 28/7/1876, p.5, Col.A.

when he illegally crossed the border and headed south to join the rebels. He is later noted as giving a speech in support of 'a young Yugoslav democratic republic,' and became a coordinator of partisan activity before he was captured by the Hungarian authorities in the spring of 1876.⁴⁷ However, Suslov, the only scholar in recent years to turn any serious attention to Sharapov, cites police reports for these dates, not press articles.⁴⁸ He seems to have been isolated and ignored, both at the time and since, and this helps us to place Sharapov's activities, however valiant, firmly in the category of factional action.

Whilst the Press gave little attention to Sharapov and his comrades, this is not, of course, the same as asserting that there were no volunteers marching from Russia to Serbia in the summer of 1876. It does, however, remain questionable as to whether they went in any appreciable numbers. The exact number of volunteers to depart is a rather difficult figure to arrive at, due to the sometimes rather sensationalist reports and highly differing numbers given by various sources. Consequently, there is a clear disagreement regarding the number of volunteers who went: MacKenzie claims that there were no more than around 5,000, a figure echoed by Jelavich.⁴⁹ This contrasts sharply with the contemporary reports of *The Times*, which claimed in October 1876 that 50 or 60 Russians marched to war every Saturday, adding to the 20,000 Russians already under arms in Serbia, a figure which could rise as high as 100,000 by the following spring.⁵⁰ Novikov in her pamphlet *Is Russia Wrong?* contested the figure of 9,000, implying that this was a common claim in London at the time, but she insisted that it was far lower, and that sufficient funds were only ever raised to send 4,000.⁵¹

As far as reportage from the Russian Press is concerned, the picture was almost always vague. *The Voice* did report on groups or individuals departing for Serbia, but rarely with any amount of detail being supplied, even so far as numbers of

⁴⁷ M. Suslov, 'Slavophilism is the true Liberalism: The Political Utopia of S.F. Sharapov (1855-1911),' *Russian History*, 38, 2, (2011), pp.285-6.

⁴⁸ Ibid.

⁴⁹ MacKenzie, *The Serbs and Russian Pan Slavism*, p.122; B. Jelavich, *Russia's Balkan Entanglements 1806-1914*, (Cambridge, 1991), p.170.

⁵⁰ 'Russia and the Russians' *The Times*, 24/10/1876, p.4, Col.B; 'Russia,' *The Times*, 10/10/1876, p.3, Col.E.

⁵¹ O. Novikov, *Is Russia Wrong?* 2nd Ed., (London, 1878), p.26.

people involved.⁵² At other points in time, *The Voice* felt more able to talk authoritatively about the number of medical personnel going to Serbia than about combat volunteers, on one occasion providing a moderately detailed description of a 12,000 rouble medical unit that was about to depart the capital.⁵³

Perhaps a better means of considering mass support is to examine the question of fund-raising. Substantial amounts of money were raised during the period 1875-1878 for a variety of causes and organisations connected to the Eastern Question. Determining what was raised by whom, however, and indeed how discerning the public were in allocating their gift is problematic. Stead cites Aksakov's claim that Cherniaev first sought to go to Serbia in September 1875 but that it took the Moscow Slavonic Committee until March 1876 to raise the necessary 6,000 roubles required to send him. However, it is also worth keeping in mind MacKenzie's assertion that Cherniaev's September 1875 attempt to raise a regiment failed due to lack of volunteers.⁵⁴ However, MacKenzie, following Nikitin's view on the matter, puts the figure raised by the Slavonic Committee up until the Spring of 1876 at a significantly higher 70,000 roubles.⁵⁵ This, surely, cannot have been devoted solely to the travel costs of Cherniaev. Documentary evidence for the levels of giving available is, somewhat paradoxically, both excessive, and insubstantial at the same time. *The Voice* ran a series of reports, in a miniscule font which almost defies legibility, quite literally listing donations given to various funds, sometimes stating explicitly what the fund was, and sometimes providing little more than a line such as 'for the victims of the conflagration.'⁵⁶ There were also occasions where multiple lists of donations appeared in the press on the same day, one of which might simply be 'collections from the readers of *The Voice*,' whilst another was a publication of the wider fund-raising by the St. Petersburg section of the Slavonic Benevolent Committee.⁵⁷ In addition to these lists, published in the daily Press, there were also accounts published in the August 1876 edition of the *Orthodox Herald*, which

⁵² *The Voice*, 'Foreign News,' (19/6) 1/7/1876, p.4, Col.C.

⁵³ *The Voice*, 'Internal news,' (27/8) 8/9/1876, p.2, Col.E.

⁵⁴ Stead, *The MP for Russia*, p.229; MacKenzie, *The Serbs and Russian Pan-Slavism*, p.58.

⁵⁵ MacKenzie, 'Panslavism in practice,' p.281.

⁵⁶ *The Voice*, 'Home News,' (25/6) 7/10/1875, p.3, Col.2.

⁵⁷ *The Voice*, 'Home News,' (9) 27/11/1875, p.2, Col.B.

reported from the July meeting of the Moscow Slavonic committee, giving a particular eye to the financial details of the society.⁵⁸

Time Period	Funds Raised (in roubles)	Monthly Average (in roubles)
September – December 1875	68,834	17,209
January – May 1876	54,123	10,825
June 1876	28,496	28,496
Total (To end June 1876)	151,453	15,145

Table 1: Fund-raising totals for the Moscow Slavonic Benevolent Committee: Sep 1875 – June 1876⁵⁹

As the secretary to the committee noted, these figures represented a steady income through the autumn, averaging a little over 17,000 roubles per month, which dropped by 35% as a monthly average for the opening few months of 1876. It was June 1876 in which the donation figures truly exploded, with a startling 28,496r 41 kopeks being received in the course of a single month.⁶⁰ *The Voice* first began to publish donation figures at the end of summer 1875. These reports came in the ‘Home News’ section, often as the last item, appeared in a small type-face, and generally lacked an introduction. By the end of September, the St Petersburg branch of the Slavonic Benevolent committee had raised around a thousand roubles, whilst a week or so later, *The Voice* itself had raised just over two thousand roubles directly.⁶¹ A more detailed picture of the accounts of specific organisations, such as the Slavonic Benevolent Committee, has been considered by Nikitin.⁶² However, the figures used here are an indication of what was publically available in the Press at the time. Indeed, this is the problem with assertions such as those of MacKenzie that, even at the beginning of 1876, ‘almost 360,000 roubles had been sent to Hercegovina,’ from across the Empire. He does not explain how this figure

⁵⁸ ‘Meeting of the Slavonic Committee, 14th July’ *Orthodox Observer*, (August 1876), pp.798-803.

⁵⁹ All figures taken from ‘Meeting of the Slavonic Committee,’ p.801.

⁶⁰ Ibid.

⁶¹ *The Voice*, ‘Home News,’ (17) 28/9/1875, p.2, Col.D; (25/9) 7/10/1875, p.3, Col.B.

⁶² A.S. Nikitin, *Slavianskie komitety v Rossii v 1858-1876 godakh*, (Moscow, 1960).

was arrived at, nor whether anyone at the time would have been aware of the amount.⁶³

Aside from the purely monetary aspect of the donations, they illuminate other aspects of popular support. Although certain organisations or individuals are listed giving large lump sums, many of the donations reported in *The Voice* are from much smaller groups or individuals, and for smaller amounts. Thus it seems possible, albeit within the narrow category of newspaper-reading St. Petersburg society, to assert the existence of a genuine, popular interest in Balkan events. Even in the reduced type-face adopted for these announcements, the lists of donors, typically appearing at monthly intervals, took up multiple columns of the paper. Given that half of *The Voice's* eight pages were typically given over to advertising - a proportion that was, presumably, fixed for commercial viability - the devotion of as much as half of the remaining four pages represents a significant investment by the editors. Reproducing the same information at full-size would have taken up significantly more room at a time when there was a flurry of activity on the international political, diplomatic and even military scene, all clamouring for attention. Furthermore, there seems to have been little more than convention requiring the publication of these lists, and thus the very fact that *The Voice* organised the collections implicitly entailed an acceptance of the responsibility to publically acknowledge those who had contributed.

Slavonic Fraternity

Aside from simply reporting fund-raising figures, it has already been remarked that *The Voice* initially adopted a somewhat lukewarm attitude towards the events in the Balkans.⁶⁴ There was a significant amount of reportage regarding the Serbo-Turkish war and the build-up to it, but this had generally taken the form of straightforward description, rather than detailed analysis or editorial comment. From the summer of 1877, however, it did begin to contribute to the media aspect of the Slavonic movement in others ways. Perhaps the key figure in the development of this reportage was the law professor and historian A.D. Gradovskii.

⁶³ MacKenzie, *The Serbs and Russian Pan Slavism*, p.73.

⁶⁴ See above, pp.125-127.

Very much a man of Alexander II's era, Gradovskii considered the Russia which emerged after the 'Great Reforms' of the 1860s to be a more nationally united state in which the former Slavophil – Westerniser debates had no place.⁶⁵ In his writings, he generally held to a strong nationalistic line, attributing the decline of Kievan Rus' to an influx of too many foreigners.⁶⁶ This said, he should not be taken for a violent racist, at least by the standards of his time. For example, he criticised Dostoevskii's particular brand of nationalism, accusing him of attempting to appropriate solely for Russia, 'virtues which were European, or even universal to mankind.'⁶⁷ Gradovskii's main contribution at *The Voice* was to pen a series of appeals 'for the Slavs.'⁶⁸ These were editorial style pieces in which Gradovskii freely used terms like 'historic mission' to describe Russia's place in the unfolding series of events.⁶⁹ He also claimed a place of expertise for Russia, such as in his 'letter to Disraeli' which portrayed Russia as the one who 'knew the Slavs.'⁷⁰ Although he never reached Dostoevskii's heights in asserting Russia's right to seize Constantinople, he provided a strong note of Slavonic conviction in an otherwise decidedly less than tub-thumping publication, throughout the summer of 1876.⁷¹ Aside from the activity he urged upon others, Gradovskii also attested to the amount of activity already taking place, asking rhetorically, if so much had been done already just because of a 'rumour of war. What on earth would happen in the event of an actual war?''⁷²

Unsurprisingly, the Slavonic theme, and particularly the idea of fraternity between Russians and other Orthodox peoples, enjoyed a period of popularity in the religious journals. *The Orthodox Observer* produced a series of pieces entitled 'Slavism and Orthodoxy' in the autumn of 1876.⁷³ Even bearing in mind the

⁶⁵ H. Rogger, 'Nationalism and the State: A Russian Dilemma,' *Comparative Studies in Society and History*, Vol4, No3, (April, 1962), p.261.

⁶⁶ J. W. Slocum, 'Who, and When, were the Inorodtsy? The Evolution of the category of "aliens" in Imperial Russia,' *Russian Review*, Vol57, No2, (April, 1998), p.184.

⁶⁷ H. Kohn, 'Dostoevsky's Nationalism,' *Journal of the History of Ideas*, Vol6, No4, (Oct, 1945), p.411.

⁶⁸ *The Voice*, 'For the Slavs,' (8) 20/7/1876, p.1, Col.A, and afterwards.

⁶⁹ Ibid.

⁷⁰ *The Voice*, (3) 15/8/1876.

⁷¹ See below for Dostoevsky, p142.

⁷² *The Voice*, 'For the Slavs,' (8) 20/7/1876, p.1, Col.A.

⁷³ 'Slavism and Orthodoxy,' *The Orthodox Observer*, (November 1876), pp.523-538.

limitations of timing suffered by journals versus newspapers, it still seems that the *Orthodox Observer* was lagging somewhat behind the conventionally accepted timeframe for the peak of the Slavonic movement.⁷⁴ It must be noted that this was not the first time that the journal had published on the Slavonic question, with appeals for aid having been a regular feature throughout the spring.⁷⁵ However, the autumn does see a discernable change in the nature of the articles which were published, hence the importance of timing. The October edition of the publication saw a recounting of the farewell speech given by Archbishop Platon of the Don to a group of Don Cossacks about to set off for Serbia.⁷⁶ Aside from standard words of well-wishing and a warning of the misfortunes and privations these volunteers were likely to see, the Archbishop's address is most notable for his attitude to their future activities. He issues to the volunteers a strict reminder that 'you are not going to fight with Turks and kill them, but to help and protect your brother Slavs.'⁷⁷ Whilst an attempt to limit violence by a man of the cloth is hardly unsurprising, the fact that he spoke to volunteer soldiers with an exhortation that 'if you must clash with the enemy' be brave and noble, should at least be of interest.⁷⁸ The *Slavism and Orthodoxy* articles were significant in that they marked a change from short pieces recounting events of the Slavonic Committee or speeches by leading clergy, and moved for the first time towards a more extended, editorial-style piece.

As far as the content of the articles go, the first at least is largely unremarkable, alternating between deriding the Turks for their behaviour, and the West for approving of the Turks' acts.⁷⁹ Turkish behaviour in the war, the author claimed, went well beyond the simple horrors of contemporary warfare, and instead the troops conduct themselves 'with all the terrors of the barbarians.'⁸⁰ After further noting a comment from a Turkish writer that 'the true believer must not let slip an opportunity to kill an infidel,' the author then turns his attention to the West,

⁷⁴ See above pp.54-59 for a consideration of the relative characteristics of journals and newspapers.

⁷⁵ 'From the Slavonic Committee' *Orthodox Observer*, (February 1876) pp.397-398, (May 1876), pp.191-193, (July 1876), pp.598-599.

⁷⁶ 'Speech to the Don Cossacks, departing for Serbia', *Orthodox Observer*, (October 1876), pp.406-408.

⁷⁷ *Ibid.*, p.407.

⁷⁸ *Ibid.*, p.407.

⁷⁹ 'Slavism and Orthodoxy', *Orthodox Observer*, (November 1876), pp.523-538.

⁸⁰ *Ibid.*, p.528.

questioning how they are able to remain deaf to all the horrors which unfold?⁸¹ For the most part, the article does not venture beyond simple criticism of others and a representation of the Orthodox world as embattled. A few significant points are made, however, such as the assertion that what goes on in Serbia is every inch Russia's problem, not because Russian blood has now been spilt there, but because they are co-religionist brothers.⁸²

Moving beyond the printed world, there was of course other activity at this time, albeit often harder to pinpoint and to define. Various sources attest to soirees thrown by the great and the good of Russian society at the time, in order to raise funds for the Slavonic cause. Many have noted the significance of the Tsarevich, the future Alexander III, during this period: a figure whose interest in the crisis is often remarked upon, and is generally seen as having provided important support for the Slavonic cause.⁸³ Despite this, his involvement has rarely been considered in detail, and his personal papers have been neglected by specialists until Astankov's recent work.⁸⁴ Astankov concedes that it is difficult to determine the role of Alexander Alexandrovich at this time, whether it be as an active participant in a movement, or as the leader.⁸⁵ It is known that one of the most significant of the various pro-Slavonic soirees of this period was held at Petergof, the Imperial Palace a few miles outside St Petersburg, in August 1876. This party, hosted by the Tsarevich, not only raised an estimated 80,000 francs, but also witnessed various readings of Turgenev's *Croquet at Windsor*, despite that fact that this piece had been refused publication by the censor.⁸⁶ Furthermore, Alexander Alexandrovich's correspondence shows an acute awareness of the political position at the time, as he wrote to his uncle the Grand Duke Mikhail Nikolaievich, and to Ignatiev (the ambassador in Constantinople) urging that war be declared as soon as possible.⁸⁷ The Empress, Maria Alexandrovna, was at this time patronising the Russian Red

⁸¹ Ibid., pp.529, 531.

⁸² Ibid., p.523.

⁸³ MacKenzie, *The Serbs and Russian Pan-Slavism*, p.93.

⁸⁴ V.A. Astankov, 'Naslednik tsesarevich Aleksandr Aleksandrovich v period vostochnogo krizisa 1875-1878 godov,' *Rossiiskaia Istorii*, 3, (May/June 2011), p.127.

⁸⁵ Astankov, 'Aleksandr Aleksandrovich,' pp.127-128.

⁸⁶ Zekulin, 'Turgenev's kroket v Vindzore,' pp.196, 198-199.

⁸⁷ Astankov, 'Aleksandr Aleksandrovich,' p.129.

Cross, and as such receiving donations of money, clothes and medicine for the sick and wounded, not only from St Petersburg society, but also from sources as far-flung as J. Lewis Farley and the League in Aid of the Christians of Turkey.⁸⁸ This activity provides a sharp contrast with Alexander Alexandrovich, who was confiding to his closest confidantes his fears and anger at his own inability to shape policy and occasionally allowing his anger to spill over into racist diatribes against the non ethnic-Russian members of his father's government, such as when he told his wife that eighty million Russians wanted war, but not the finance minister Reutern, adding 'the Devil take that foul German!'⁸⁹ All in all then, the evidence from within Russia does seem to be pointing towards a significant amount of activity, albeit often of an unquantifiable nature.

Russia in the eyes of the World

A fuller discussion will now follow of European, and specifically British, views of Russia's involvement in the crisis. Although the theme has already been touched upon to an extent, this direct consideration of how the British Press portrayed Russia at this time raises certain questions of the cultural context.⁹⁰ However, for the moment it must be recalled that there was a substantial current of Russophobia within many elements of articulate British society, and that British reportage of Russia during this period must therefore be viewed with this in mind.

As already noted, *The Times* gave figures for the numbers of volunteers which considerably exceed those given by many modern-day historians. Indeed, they felt able to talk of 'the Russo-Servian army' when describing the Serb armed forces.⁹¹ This line, that the Serbian army was substantially comprised of Russian subjects, and indeed, as was noted above, the notion that Russia was in effect carrying on a war by proxy, was not a position held solely by *The Times*. In early 1877, Lord Derby echoed the sentiment himself in the House of Lords, an action sufficiently provocative to draw a letter from the pen of Cherniaev himself. The letter, written

⁸⁸ League in Aid of the Christians of Turkey, *Letters etc., Relating to Operations of the Society*, pp.37-39.

⁸⁹ Astankov, 'Aleksandr Aleksandrovich,' pp.130-131.

⁹⁰ For a fuller discussion, see below, p178 and after.

⁹¹ 'Russia' *The Times*, 10/10/1876, p.3, Col.E.

in French, was published, untranslated, in its entirety. In it, he expressed his 'surprise' at Derby's assertion that the Serbian army was 'almost entirely' Russian and that, as such, Russia was indeed participating in the war although not formally.⁹² As a riposte, Cherniaev asserted that he had, under his command, a mere 1,806 soldiers and 646 officers who were Russian volunteers and that he could provide the paperwork for all of them. Indeed, he claimed, his entire force only numbered 28,000, scarcely allowing for the thousands upon thousands of Russian volunteers ascribed to him.⁹³ There are, of course, problems with this argument; Cherniaev himself asserts that the troop figures he gives are for 'the present moment' allowing for a somewhat higher number who had previously joined but had since been killed, invalided out of action, or simply changed their minds. Furthermore, the fact that he can provide paperwork for some soldiers does nothing to prove the absence of other soldiers. However, none of this is sufficient to assert positively the existence of a larger corps of volunteers, simply to conclude the insufficiency of Cherniaev's rebuttal.

Aside from Cherniaev himself, *The Times* also made regular reference to the presence of Russian volunteers in the Serbian army, often in tandem with their articles regarding the location and activity of Cherniaev himself. However, these references were generally too abstract and brief to permit any meaningful discussion, or any conclusions to be drawn from them about the extent of the Russian presence within the Serbian forces. The notion of Russians as part of the Serbian military had begun to permeate the consciousness of educated British society, as can be seen by the way in which Russia was talked about by those considering the Balkans at this time.

An interesting case in this respect is Gladstone. Although very much an inhabitant of the milieu described above, with all its attendant Russophobe propensities, Gladstone himself was not one of these figures. In one of the earliest speeches he made on the Eastern Question at this time, he harked back to the Crimean War and made reference to the 'designs dangerous to the peace of Europe which it was

⁹² *The Times*, 'General Tcherniaeff on the Servian Army,' 24/2/1877, p.7, Col.F.

⁹³ *Ibid.*

believed were entertained by Russia,' a belief which he implicitly did not share.⁹⁴ In fact, perhaps the most significant observation which can be made about Gladstone's attitude to Russia is the fact that it was a further year before he made any significant reference to Russia in his speeches, rising once again to address the House and mocking the notion that a grand conspiracy was unfolding, (masterminded by the formidable foursome of Bismarck, Alexander II, Gladstone and Disraeli), to unseat the Sultan, and replace him with the Duke of Edinburgh.⁹⁵ Whilst this notion was laughable, if only for the supposed partners in crime it proposed, the more significant fact would seem to be that Gladstone had managed to lead his entire 'atrocities campaign' against Ottoman Turkey and the violence being carried out in Bulgaria, with scarcely a mention of Russia.

Gladstone had been in correspondence throughout much of this time with Olga Novikov, the outspoken advocate of the Russian cause living in London. They first met in October of 1876 and exchanged letters throughout much of the winter of 1876-77.⁹⁶ Given that this was the same period in which Novikov began her correspondence with the English Press, defending Russia and culminating in the publication of her pamphlet *Is Russia Wrong?*, it seems incredible that Gladstone can have been so oblivious to the widespread suspicion with which Russia was regarded in Britain, or of the degree to which Russia was viewed as being inseparable from the Eastern Question.⁹⁷ Novikov's pamphlet attempted to address some of the issues which had seemingly passed Gladstone by: the opening chapter cited a piece of advice from Salisbury urging the British people to buy large-scale maps in order to see the distance between Russia and India.⁹⁸ Consequently, it is possible to discern a strengthening current of suspicion (or worse) towards Russia in the latter part of 1876 and into 1877.

In the opening months of the crisis, publications such as *The Times* had been more concerned with Russian activities in Turkestan than the Balkans, and confident that

⁹⁴ Gladstone to the House of Commons, 9/2/1876, Gladstone Papers, Add.Ms.44664.

⁹⁵ Gladstone to the House of Commons, 17/2/1877, *Ibid.*

⁹⁶ Foot & Matthew, (Eds.), *Gladstone Diaries*, vol IX, pp. 164-166, 168, 169, 172, 175, 183.

⁹⁷ Stead, *The MP for Russia*, p.303, 327, 400.

⁹⁸ Novikov, *Is Russia Wrong?* p.19. More detailed consideration will be given to Novikov's work in chapter 7, pp. 189, 193.

these posed no particular threat to British interests.⁹⁹ However, as events progressed, the assertions of Russian intentions to comply with international consensus became more and more scarce, giving way to incredulous examinations of Russian policy and disbelief at the words her actions belied.¹⁰⁰ Increasingly, Russian denial was seen as 'unconvincing,' and her military activity and sabre-rattling were the principal 'obstacle' to peace being secured.¹⁰¹ Considering the Russian perspective along with the British, it is possible to be a little more precise about what was happening and the nature of the enthusiasm for the movement.

The whole idea of Slavonic fraternity and, more specifically, the intense activity which supported that idea, seems to have been primarily a Moscow activity, which only later spread to St Petersburg in force. This can be seen in various forms, such as the simple fact that although St Petersburg was the capital of Russia at this time, it was consistently the Moscow Slavonic Committee which was the prime mover in important events. The St Petersburg branch of the Slavonic Committee only really became a significant organisation during this crisis, and although its fund-raising was not insubstantial, it was always dwarfed by the activities of its Moscow counterpart. It is a considerable leap, however, to move from this confidence that the movement spread (however slowly) from Moscow to Petersburg, to drawing any real conclusions as to whether this spread towards the capital mirrored a similar spread in opinion and influence from the people towards the government.

One major factor which undermines any notion of a government swept along by the inflamed masses is noted by Dostoevskii: all Russians at this time who wished to leave the country were required to apply for a specific passport for that very purpose. Therefore, Dostoevskii questioned how the government could have been coerced, or even taken unawares, by the floods of volunteers, when they themselves had openly issued the passports which made the very expedition possible.¹⁰² Even if we accept at face value MacKenzie's assertion that when

⁹⁹ Letters to the Editor, *The Times*, 9/7/1875, p.8, Col.B; 13/7/1875, p.12, Col.B; 21/7/1875, p.11, Col.B; 23/9/1875, p.4, Col.A; 25/9/1875, p.4, Col.G; 18/12/1875, p.8, Col.C.

¹⁰⁰ E.g. 'The Eastern Problem', *The Times*, 29/12/1876, p.4, Col.F.

¹⁰¹ 'Russia' *The Times*, 4/12/1876, p.5, Col.B, 'The Protocols', *The Times*, 22/3/1877, p.9, Col.A.

¹⁰² Dostoevsky, *Writer's Diary*, vol2, p.1085.

Cherniaev left Russia, his visa was for a visit to Palestine and that Alexander II had already instructed the 3rd section that he was not to be allowed to join the Hercegovinan rebels, it is clear that this concern on the Tsar's part apparently did not extend to the thousands of volunteers who later embarked to join him.¹⁰³

Russian Literature and the Eastern Question

The links between the Eastern Crisis and Russian literature are strong, both in terms of the impact that the Crisis had upon Russian writers at the time, and in terms of the impact that their literary writings have had upon perceptions of the crisis since. Tolstoi is far from the only significant literary figure in Russia to have turned his attention to the Eastern Question, and his views were not shared by all: In the second section of his June Diary, Dostoevskii launched into a full-scale discussion of the Eastern Question with the observation 'Again a tussle with Europe ... again in Europe they are looking mistrustfully at Russia.'¹⁰⁴ This makes it all the more remarkable that the words of the passage should have had such an impact, both in terms of the relative paucity of their exposure, and in terms of the context in which the characters are depicted. This was not the first time that a work of Tolstoi's had accomplished such a feat; indeed Lieven has noted that '*War and Peace* has had more influence on popular perceptions of Napoleon's defeat by Russia than all the history books ever written.'¹⁰⁵

The other notable member of the Russian literati to concern himself with the events of the crisis was Ivan Turgenev who produced the short, highly political poem, *Croquet at Windsor*. Turgenev's poem has been described as a particularly remarkable piece by Zekulin, who notes that it is unusual both as a poem from a novelist who 'despised his own poetry' and as a political piece from a man who habitually 'subordinate[d] politics to his arts.' It was also adopted as the anthem of the Panславists yet the author 'rejected categorically' Panславism.¹⁰⁶

¹⁰³ MacKenzie, 'Panslavism in Practice,' p.282.

¹⁰⁴ Dostoevsky, *Writer's Diary*, vol.1, p.515.

¹⁰⁵ D. Lieven, *Russia against Napoleon: The battle for Europe, 1807 to 1814*, (London, 2009), p.525.

¹⁰⁶ Zekuklin, 'Turgenev's kroket v Vindzore,' p.194.

The writings and attitudes of the three writers differ widely. Although he would later discuss the flow of cash and volunteers to the peninsula, Dostoevskii's discussion is framed in terms of foreign hostility to Russia. For Dostoevskii, his interest in the Slavs of the Balkan Peninsula is natural, because Russia is the 'protector and guardian' of Orthodoxy.¹⁰⁷ Count Tolstoi, the historian of 'the placid, middle-stratum Moscow landowning family,' offers a more self-absorbed consideration of the motives and feelings of the Russian populace, which depicts many characters from Moscow society bustling round on behalf of the Slavonic cause, something which he does not seem to be doing simply to publicise the movement, given the popular antipathy which he attributes to it.¹⁰⁸ Indeed, Countess Vronskaya remarks to Koznyshev that her chief fear for her son in his Balkan adventure is that the whole enterprise 'is not very favourably regarded in Petersburg.'¹⁰⁹ Lastly, Turgenev directs a stream of furious invective at Great Britain, and specifically at Queen Victoria, for British passivity over the humanitarian crisis in Bulgaria.¹¹⁰

An interesting comparison can be drawn from the differences between the writers' differing accounts of the volunteers' departure for Serbia. Although Tolstoi's account seems, from the perspective of nearly 150 years, to be virtually contemporary, in fact there was almost a year between the events fictionalised and their publication. This time period is significant, both in terms of the apparent mood of the country, and in terms of the direction of official policy. In the Summer of 1876, the Slav cause in the Balkans focused on the Serbo-Turkish conflict and, at least in Tolstoi's view, whilst it may have had some support among the People, it 'ce n'est pas tres bien vu a Petersburg.'¹¹¹ By the spring of 1877, on the other hand, Russia was undertaking a full-scale military invasion of Turkey which would eventually be stopped only a few miles from the outskirts of Constantinople and required a full-scale Congress of the Great Powers to fully pacify.

¹⁰⁷ Dostoevsky, *Writer's Diary*, vol.1, p.529

¹⁰⁸ Dostoevsky, *Writer's Diary*, vol2, p.851.

¹⁰⁹ Tolstoy, *Anna Karenina*, p.918.

¹¹⁰ Zekulin, 'Turgenev's kroket v Vindzore,' p.197.

¹¹¹ "Is not very well viewed in Petersburg" the line was written in French in the original Russian version of the novel, and remains so in many translations. Tolstoy, *Anna Karenina*, p.918.

Therefore, whilst Tolstoi was only able to provide a single sketch of the volunteers and to depict them as personalities (not particularly endearing personalities, as has already been noted), Dostoevskii is able to return on various occasions to the issue of the volunteers, and to offer his rebuttals to those who claimed that they were little more than 'lost souls who had nothing to do at home.'¹¹² Turgenev, busy with Queen Victoria's nightmares, had nothing to say in his poem about Russian volunteers, despite noting privately that, were he younger, he would himself go and fight.¹¹³ This was a far from uncommon theme amongst the artistic community at the time, with the writer Vsevolod Garshin and the painter Vasily Polenov both serving in the Balkans.¹¹⁴ Garshin was not, technically, one of the volunteers as he was refused a visa to travel on account of his liability to serve in the Russian army, a liability which was invoked and ultimately saw him fighting in Bulgaria with the Russian army.¹¹⁵ However, his outspoken comments on the fact that 'the Turks have butchered 30,000 defenceless old men, women and children' before the war and his string of invective pieces afterwards, which were censored as 'tendentious, harmful and anti-patriotic,' leave no doubt as to his opinions.¹¹⁶ Sadly, little of what has been written on Garshin has concerned itself with his involvement in the Russo-Turkish war, most writers concerning themselves instead with the mental illness which afflicted the writer and characterised the fan cult which surrounded him in his later years.¹¹⁷

In the light of Dostoevskii's decision to engage with the novel on this topic, it next needs to be established how exactly the two texts can be considered. The crux of the argument between Dostoevskii and Tolstoi here (at least in Dostoevskii's eyes, as it was he who chose to frame the argument), concerns 'the People,' as noted in

¹¹² Dostoevsky, *Writer's Diary*, vol1, p.600.

¹¹³ Zekulin, 'Turgenev's Kroket v Vindzore,' p.200.

¹¹⁴ Polenov, *Russia in the nineteenth Century*, p.167.

¹¹⁵ P. Henry, *A Hamlet of his Time: Vsevolod Garshin: the man, his works and his milieu*, (Oxford, 1983) p.37.

¹¹⁶ *Ibid.*, pp.37, 52.

¹¹⁷ R.D. Wessling, 'Vsevolod Garshin, the Russian Intelligentsia, and Fan Hysteria,' in A. Brintlinger and I Vinitzky, *Madness and the Mad in Russian Culture*, (Toronto, 2007), p.75.

chapter 1 and this is what we see played out here between Dostoevskii and Tolstoi.¹¹⁸

In the final chapters of *Anna Karenina*, Koznyshev (ineptly aided by Katavasov) confronts Levin whilst, at the same time, stepping back a level, Dostoevskii confronts Tolstoi (whose views he sees largely articulated in the words of Levin). Koznyshev's argument is the well-known position, that 'the movement' of the summer of 1876 was a genuine one and that the People, as a whole, were making 'an expression of human, Christian feeling.'¹¹⁹ Levin, by contrast, was angered at the notion of Christian feeling expressing itself through violence, something which would doubtless resonate well with the former British Prime Minister Lord Russell, who was quoted in *The Times* in October 1876 advocating 'Christian precepts more than Christian Faith.'¹²⁰ Levin felt that, if there was such violence, it could only come during a war and asked sarcastically, "who has declared war on Turkey? Ivan Ivanich Ragozov and the Countess Lydia Ivanovna, assisted by Madame Stahl?"¹²¹ This naming of figures identified with the Slavonic Committees was evidently a sarcastic gesture, but the fact remains that, for Levin, and it seems for Tolstoi, war is an action beyond the jurisdiction of the individual, confined to the competence of the state.

Dostoevskii countered this, both with the observation that war had, of course, been declared by Milan of Serbia and Nicholas of Montenegro and, more pertinently, that 'the Great Russian and general cause' was a human one, not a political one.¹²² Whilst Dostoevskii's observation that the volunteers were merely contributing to an existing war, not starting their own private conflict, probably deals more directly with Levin's question, Tolstoi opts, instead, to have him answered by Katavasov who asserts that 'when the Government does not fulfil the will of its citizens, then society announces its own will.'¹²³ This provoked a further debate between the various parties regarding the question of whether or not the People truly

¹¹⁸ See above, p17.

¹¹⁹ Tolstoy, *Anna Karenina*, p.949.

¹²⁰ 'Lord Russell on Russia and Turkey,' *The Times* 6/10/1876, P.7, Col.F.

¹²¹ Tolstoy, *Anna Karenina*, p.948.

¹²² Dostoevsky, *Writer's Diary*, vol.2, p.1082.

¹²³ Tolstoy, *Anna Karenina*, p.949.

understood the matters at stake and whether they could thus be considered to have an opinion on things. Levin seizes upon the nebulousness of the term 'People' and asserts:

Clerks in district offices, schoolmasters, and one out of a thousand peasants, may know what it is all about. The rest of the eighty millions, like Mikhaylich, not only don't express their will, but have not the least idea what it is they have to express it about! What right have we then to say it is the will of the People?¹²⁴

For Tolstoi, this is largely where the argument ends, with Levin having the final say, alone in the safety of his head. For Dostoevskii, however, it was necessary to consider Russia's long history of Crusades and Pilgrimages, arriving at a conclusion that although the vast majority of Russians were doubtless ignorant of the intricate details of what went on in Serbia or Bulgaria, they nonetheless knew that 'the holy places and all the Eastern Christians who live in them have long been under the rule of godless Agarians, Mohammedans and Turks.'¹²⁵ More to the point, it was because of the knowledge that they 'feel afflicted at heart,' that Dostoevskii was able to assert that the outpouring of emotion of the previous summer was genuine.¹²⁶

Perhaps the weakest point in Tolstoi's case, and undoubtedly the moment at which Dostoevskii is convinced he stumbles, is when he has Levin say 'there is not, and cannot be any immediate feeling of compassion for the oppression of the Slavs.'¹²⁷ As Dostoevskii points out, this statement was written and published at a time when the various atrocity reports from the Balkans had largely been established in the public eye as both accurate and shocking.¹²⁸ Thus, for a father such as Levin to deny even the possibility of compassion, on hearing of children having their fingers cut-off one-by-one in front of their parents, or being deliberately blinded by needles,

¹²⁴ Ibid., p.951.

¹²⁵ Dostoevsky, *Writer's Diary*, vol2., p.1088.

¹²⁶ Ibid., vol2., p.1088.

¹²⁷ Tolstoy, *Anna Karenina*, p.949.

¹²⁸ See above, esp. pp.98-102.

comes across as positively baffling.¹²⁹ It would seem, then, that it is possible to conclude that Tolstoi (or at any rate Levin) goes too far when he dismisses any possibility of the existence of a feeling of compassion for the Slavs on the part of the Russian People. However, it is worth pondering who exactly Tolstoi and Dostoevskii are referring to; Levin seems to be making a categorical statement, inclusive of all people, but based on his observations of his own *obshestvo*. By contrast, Dostoevskii is clearly speaking of the *narod*, or at least of his own romanticised notions thereof, when he asserts that there is genuine feeling, and that the people are more than simply 'inert, drunken taxation units.'¹³⁰ To an extent then, the two writers are talking at cross-purposes referring to different sections of society, but each using their chosen section as shorthand for the whole.

The chronology of the crisis (in terms of how it was perceived in Russia) is particularly significant as an insight into the contrasting ways in which the two writers related to it. Dostoevskii claims, in March 1877, that the previous June had been 'an impassioned and a glorious time,' a statement which perhaps implies that such heights of ecstasy had already been decidedly lost.¹³¹ As has already been noted, the spring of 1875 seems to have been a particularly lucrative time in terms of the amounts of funds raised for the Slavonic cause, our most reliable barometer of interest. However, the question of what happened later is more of a grey area. In February 1877, Dostoevskii was insisting that, although the movement had been 'denied' by some during the winter, it had nonetheless continued unabated.¹³² However, this contrasts with an apparent stagnation of donations, volunteers, and (generally speaking) activity in the Balkans.

The Shape of Government Policy

Having considered a selection of the various forms of public activity in Russia on the part of the Slavonic cause, as well as the ways in which it was presented in the Russian Press at that time, it is worthwhile briefly considering Russian government

¹²⁹ Dostoevsky, *Writer's Diary*, vol2., pp.1094-95

¹³⁰ Ibid., Vol2, p.932.

¹³¹ Ibid., vol2, p.889.

¹³² Ibid., Vol2, p.852.

policy in an attempt to discern how far it was affected by these various influences. Regardless of what public opinion might do in Russia, the key figure in all policy-making remained the Tsar. An example that is often called to mind when considering Alexander II and public opinion is his widely-publicised comment at the time of the emancipation, that it would be better to abolish serfdom from above than to wait for it to be abolished from below.¹³³ This would seem to suggest that Alexander might have been induced to act if he genuinely believed that a loss of law and order was imminent. In this vein, we can see that some key figures in the government seem to have regarded the movement in 1876 as having been (at least potentially) a genuine threat to government stability. Pobedonostsev, a man who was far from being fond of popular movements, urged the government in October 1876 to 'seize the leadership of this wave of nationalism and direct it against a foreign enemy, or face the likelihood that the movement would turn against the state, first in distrust and then in enmity.'¹³⁴ The notoriously autocratic Alexander III once remarked to his foreign minister that 'public support for the regime's foreign policy was politically crucial.'¹³⁵ Likewise, at the height of this crisis, the future Alexander III received a letter of warning from his close advisor Pobedonostsev, which asserted that so much excitement had already blown up, that if 'failure and shame' were to result abroad, then the anger would turn inwards against the government.¹³⁶

The important question, then, is to what extent these views were allowed to actually influence the government's policy. Before any factors can be identified in affecting the position of the government, it is first necessary to identify what the government's position was. As early as August 1875, Alexander II had authorised a collection for the population of Bosnia and Hercegovina, at the request of the Petersburg Slavonic Committee.¹³⁷ This was followed in September by the

¹³³ Polunov, *Russia in the nineteenth Century*, p.92.

¹³⁴ Byrnes, *Pobedonostsev*, p.123.

¹³⁵ D. Lieven, *Empire: The Russian Empire and its Rivals from the Sixteenth Century to the Present*, (London, 2003), p.282.

¹³⁶ Astankov, 'Aleksandr Aleksandrovich,' pp.129.

¹³⁷ Rossiskaia akademiia nauk, Institut Slavianovedeniia, *Rossia i Vostanie v Bosnii i Gercegovine 1875-1878: dokumenti*, (Moskva, 2008), p.151. – Russian Academy of Sciences, Institute of Slavonic Studies, *Russia and the Uprising in Bosnia and Hercegovina 1875-1878: Documents*, (Moscow, 2008).

allocation of an impressive thirty thousand roubles for the provision of bread to refugees.¹³⁸ Thus, although these efforts are entirely humanitarian, it is clear that from the outset the government was acutely aware and actively involved in the events of the crisis. Furthermore, in mid-October, Mezentsov, the head of the 3rd section, sent the Tsar a letter saying that it was felt by 'many serious people' that the continued activities of the Slavonic committee would give rise to the impression in Western Europe that despite her official policy of non-interference, Russia was providing the materials to prolong the insurrection.¹³⁹ This should provide, if it were needed, clear evidence that both the Tsar and the senior figures around him were well aware that their actions might lead others to question the sincerity of their formal pronouncements regarding Russian neutrality.

It is also possible to see clearly that both the Tsar and Chancellor Gorchakov remained well aware of the political goings on in the Balkans well into the following spring, an example of which can be seen in a Telegram received by Gorchakov from Kartsov in Belgrade, detailing a Serbian proposal for Bosnia to be placed under Serbian control and Hercegovina under Montenegrin.¹⁴⁰ The surviving copy of this telegram carries a margin note from Alexander II expressing his personal agreeability to the idea, coupled with doubts regarding its practicality.¹⁴¹ From these few snapshots, a picture forms of a government that was engaged with the crisis; if not before factional interests such as the Slavonic Committee, then certainly long before the Eastern Question supposedly became a mass phenomenon in the summer of 1876. What there is not, at this stage, is any indication that Russian politicians regarded war as a likely occurrence.

With the outbreak of the Serbo-Turkish war in 1876, the correspondence continued to flow thick and fast between Russian diplomats and, once again, the pen of the

¹³⁸ Ibid., p.151.

¹³⁹ 'Report notes from the representatives of the 3rd section from chancellor N.V. Mezentsov to Alexander II about the takings donated to the Moscow Slavonic committee for the uses of the families of the insurgents in Bosnia and Hercegovina' - *Russia and the Uprising in Bosnia and Hercegovina*, p.151.

¹⁴⁰ Telegram from Kartsov to Gorchakov on the request from Serbian Prince Milan Obrenovic on the possibility of transferring Bosnia to the control of Serbia, and Hercegovina to Montenegro, *Russia and the Uprising in Bosnia and Hercegovina*, p.281.

¹⁴¹ Ibid., p.281.

Tsar can be spotted agreeing, for example, with suggestions that Beust had stirred up the Vienna press towards an 'English' attitude.¹⁴² Far more significant, however, is a telegram from Ignatiev to Gorchakov, sent in October 1876, (precisely the time when even Dostoevskii would have to concede a wide-spread 'denial' of the popular movement in the public sphere.)¹⁴³ It is in this telegram, coming at a quiet point in the general hubbub about the Slavonic question, that Gorchakov first urges the necessity of Russian mobilisation.¹⁴⁴ This mobilisation, he argues, will be necessary regardless of the outcome of any talks in Constantinople, in order for the Russians to secure their interests in Bulgaria. Furthermore, it comes not as part of a plan for the liberation of all Slavdom, but with a ready acknowledgement of the practicalities of international politics: 'us in Bulgaria, and if necessary, the Austrians in Bosnia.'¹⁴⁵ However necessary this admission may have been in the world of diplomacy, it provides a clear indication that the first call for engaging the Russian military, approved by Alexander, was not the act of a government buckling, or even acquiescing, to the mob, but a cold political calculation. It is around this time, (i.e. the late autumn of 1876) that Russia began to make the logistical preparations necessary for a campaign in the Balkans, setting two separate organisations to work on preparing the telegraph and postal links which would be required.¹⁴⁶

Despite assertions by figures such as Geyer that the government exhibited an 'increasing desire not to resist society during this time of crisis' there is little to suggest that this was in fact what the government desired.¹⁴⁷ Whilst there is probably much to be said for the view, articulated in *The Times*, that Russia had largely 'stumbled' into war step-by-step, even a slight scratching of the surface shows clearly a government that was involved in the events of the crisis

¹⁴² 'Report from E.P. Novikov to A.M. Gorchakov on the attitude of J. Andrassy regarding the Austro-Hungarian refusal to fight in the Balkans and his satisfaction with the Reichstadt agreement,' in *Ibid.*, p.298.

¹⁴³ Dostoevsky, *Writer's Diary*, Vol2, p.852.

¹⁴⁴ Telegram from Gorchakov to Ignatiev about government measures to announce mobilisation and an agreement with the Vienna cabinet on joint action, *Russia and the Uprising in Bosnia and Hercegovina*, p.323.

¹⁴⁵ *Ibid.*, p.323.

¹⁴⁶ O.A. Pokov, 'Pochta i telegraf vo vremia rossiisko-turetskoi voiny 1877-1878gg na Balkanskom poluostrove' – 'Post and Telegraph in the time of the Russo-Turkish War 1877-1878 in the Balkan Peninsula,' *Canadian American Slavic Studies*, 42, 4, (Winter 2008), p.406.

¹⁴⁷ Geyer, *Russian Imperialism*, p.72.

throughout.¹⁴⁸ Although the Russians had not completely abandoned themselves to blind fate, many figures (such as Milyutin) were prepared to pronounce solemnly that 'Russia's honour forbids us to stand about any longer with lowered guns just for the sake of peace.'¹⁴⁹

Conclusion

Although the popular imagination seems to draw rather more from Tolstoi and rather less from fact than is to be recommended, it does seem that there is enough evidence to conclude that a genuine public movement on behalf of the Slavonic cause did exist in Russia in 1876. In many respects, this movement experienced a far more moderated depiction in the contemporary Russian Press than has often been implied, with much of the enthusiasm being reported through the newspapers of rival nations such as Britain, where there was a specific political interest in suggesting the notion of an active and well-planned Russian scheme for Balkan hegemony. Indeed, once again, it is possible to see the far broader spectre of Russophobia in Britain influencing the depiction of events at the time, and thus the perception passed down to history.

This cause was no doubt helped by partisans of the Slavonic movement lauding the outbreak of the Russo-Turkish war in 1877 as a victory for 'The People' over Petersburg 'insensitivity,' but it should not be assumed that the Russian government had been in any way coerced.¹⁵⁰ In fact, the Russian government seems to have had a clear policy throughout, which was consciously and aggressively pursued in the face of an adversary who proved more stubborn than anticipated. Alexander had more faith than Reutern, his minister of finance, in the efficiency with which a war could be prosecuted, and assisted by a Chancellor notoriously ignorant of geography, they regarded war with a perhaps ill-advised lack of apprehension.¹⁵¹ Whilst it is true that Gorchakov made reference to the pressure from public opinion when in discussions with other diplomats, it seems

¹⁴⁸ 'Russia, Austria, and Turkey,' *The Times*, 27/12/1876, p.3, Col.D.

¹⁴⁹ Geyer, *Russian Imperialism*, p.77.

¹⁵⁰ MacKenzie, *The Serbs and Russian Pan-Slavism*, p.196.

¹⁵¹ Polunov, *Russia in the nineteenth Century*, p.137.

clear that this was simply a manoeuvre to strengthen his own hand and that, ultimately, the power of public opinion had no more effect on the activities of the Russian army than Lt. Kizhe.

Chapter 6 – Greece and the Eastern Crisis

The historiography of the Eastern Crisis of 1875-1878 has tended to dismiss the role of Greece as small: the Greek army never entered a formal state of war with Turkey, no large scale rebellion seriously threatened public order, and repeated reassertions were made in both Athens and Constantinople of the good relationship prevailing between the two states.¹ However, this attitude is in sharp contrast with many contemporary opinions and at many points during the crisis, the British Press seemed convinced that at any moment, the Sons of Achilles would rise up and shake off the shackles of Turkish domination. As an editorial in *The Times* noted in August 1877:

Their fathers had the Gods for their friends and were not overburdened by the claims of their companionship. There needs but one example, and it cannot be delayed, to lift up the sons to the level of their sires.

Historians have also pointed to a revitalisation of Philhellenism in Britain at this time: although less well-known than his activities regarding Bulgaria, the articles and speeches of Gladstone were of particular significance, leading Kofos to assert a resemblance between this expression of sympathy with Greece and the Bulgarian Atrocities Campaign.² At the opposite end of the spectrum from this kind of mass activity, Kovic also asserts ‘the reinvigoration of philhellene sentiments within British public opinion.’³ However, he attributes this upsurge less to the activities of Gladstone and more to those of the Prince of Wales, whose wife Alexandra was sister to George I of Greece. Hionidis goes so far as to discern in 1878 ‘a dramatic change in British attitudes and an implicit reversal of the country’s [i.e. Greece’s] image in Victorian Britain.’⁴ This chapter will examine whether the notion of popular Philhellenism can be substantiated, and consider why exactly it was that so

¹ *The Times*, ‘Greece and the Eastern Question,’ 22/5/1877, p.10, Col.D.

² E. Kofos, *Greece and the Eastern Crisis 1875-1878*, (Thessaloniki, 1975), p.199; Gladstone also had a strong interest in Classical Greece, which undoubtedly fed his interest in the contemporary Greeks, see H. Lloyd-Jones, *blood For the Ghosts: Classical Influences in the Nineteenth and Twentieth Centuries*, (Oxford, 1982), pp.110-125.

³ M. Kovic, *Disraeli and the Eastern Question*, (Oxford, 2011), p.252.

⁴ P.I. Hionidis: *The Greek Kingdom in British Public Debate 1862-1881*, (London, 2002), p.197.

much attention, often containing confident predictions, was expressed in the British Press, before moving on to consider why it was that these predictions failed to translate into action. It will also contrast this with the more reserved and occasionally downright hostile portrayals evident in the Russian Press.

Background: Greece in the Concert of Europe

The history of Greece's gradual removal from the Ottoman sphere of influence, its attempts to establish independence, and its seemingly inevitable embroilment in the dealings of the Great Powers during the nineteenth century, is a long and complex one. Greece was the first of the Balkan nations to be given an independent state, despite not having been the first to stage a concerted revolt against the Turks.⁵ Furthermore, the new Greek state was not established by a treaty between the new Greece and their former rulers Turkey, but by a convention of the European Powers.⁶ This marks Greece out as having been, from its outset, a matter of significant interest for the European Powers. This interest becomes particularly unusual when bearing in mind that the signatories of the 1830 convention included the notoriously Conservative figures of Tsar Nicholas I, Charles X of France, and the Duke of Wellington.⁷ Beaton has pointed to the identification with classical ideas as a crucial factor in this recognition, allowing the Greeks to portray the creation of a national state as a restoration, rather than an innovation.⁸ However, this notion is somewhat problematic. Koliopoulos and Veremis note that there had never been a historic state of 'Hellas' and that Ancient Greece was always primarily a cultural rather than a political entity.⁹ This left the exact nature of the "Greekness" that was being re-established decidedly vague: in 1872, the Metropolitan of Caesarea spoke lamenting the 'passing of the ancient Greek glory,' and made it clear that, by this, he meant the demise of the Greek language as the educated tongue of Asia

⁵ R. Beaton, 'Introduction,' in R. Beaton & D. Ricks (Eds.) *Making of Modern Greece: Nationalism, Romanticism and the uses of the Past (1797-1896)*, (Abingdon, 2009), p.1.

⁶ T.A. Coulombis, J.A. Petropoulos & H.J. Psomiades, *Foreign Interference in Greek Politics: An Historical Perspective*, (New York, 1976), p.19.

⁷ Beaton, in Beaton & Ricks, *Making of Modern Greece*, p.3.

⁸ Ibid, p.5.

⁹ J.S. Koliopoulos & T.M. Veremis, *Greece: The Modern Sequel, from 1831 to the Present*, (London, 2002), p.1.

Minor.¹⁰ For others, the historical or literary aspects were more significant. Aside from the ambiguities in definition, there were also practical difficulties in the nineteenth century, and Hatzopoulos cites the Greek claim of Classical identity as being the main element in alienating Hellenes from Slavs within the rather grandiosely-described 'pan-Balkan Orthodox World.'¹¹ Kitromilides sees the Greeks as having put themselves in a position where their 'self-definition was based primarily on a historical connection with ancient Hellenism.'¹² Koliopoulos & Veremis argue that the difficulty the Greeks created for themselves was that, by adopting Western ideals of Classical Hellas as their foundation myth, they thereby lost any indigenous basis for the establishment of their state.¹³

Aside from Greece and Turkey themselves, Britain and Russia had long been the two most active and significant external Powers to affect the continuing struggle for increased Greek liberation. Indeed, Soviet historiography was keen to claim sole credit for Russia's part in the liberation of the Greeks. This can be seen in the work of Narochnitskaia, who attributed the establishment of Greek independence solely to the Russo-Turkish war of 1828-29; an argument backed up with a quote from Engels.¹⁴ However, few would still subscribe to this theory, and the root of British involvement is traced by many, such as Dakin, to the 1825 'Act of Submission' - a document in which the Greeks requested the sole protection of Britain.¹⁵ It was also a primarily Anglo-Russian naval force that confronted the Egypto-Turkish one at Navarino in 1827, laying the military groundwork for the establishment of a Greek State.¹⁶ For Russia, there was also a strong religious link and Obolensky has asserted the existence of an Orthodox 'Commonwealth' in pre-Ottoman Europe, which

¹⁰ H. Exertzoglou, 'Metaphors of Change: "tradition" and the East/West discourse in the late Ottoman Empire,' in A. Frangoudaki and C. Keyder, (eds) *Ways to Modernity in Greece & Turkey: Encounters with Europe, 1850-1950*, (London, 2007), pp.47-49.

¹¹ M. Hatzopoulos, 'From resurrection to insurrection: "sacred" myths, motifs and symbols in the Greek War of Independence,' in Beaton & Ricks, *Making of Modern Greece*, p.81.

¹² Cited in I.A. Tassopoulos, 'Constitutionalism and the Ideological conversion to National Unity under the Greek Constitution of 1864,' in Frangoudaki & Keyder, *Ways to Modernity in Greece*, p.14.

¹³ Koliopoulos & Veremies, *Greece: The Modern Sequel*, pp.263-4.

¹⁴ L.I. Narochnitskai, *Rossia i national, no osvoboditel'noe dvizheniie na Balkanakh 1875-1878gg*, (Moscow, 1979), pp.5, 9.

¹⁵ D. Dakin, 'The Formation of the Greek State, 1821-33,' in R. Clogg (Ed.) *The Struggle for Greek Independence: Essays to mark the 150th anniversary of the Greek War of Independence*, (London, 1973), p.171.

¹⁶ Koliopoulos & Veremies, *Greece: The Modern Sequel*, p.12.

united the lands of Byzantium, the Balkans and Russia.¹⁷ Prousis argues that this phenomenon extended well into the Ottoman era and was only shattered by the rise of nationalist rivalries in the nineteenth century.¹⁸

Beyond vague notions of religious or cultural affinity, the first Russian Tsar to actively pursue links with Greece was Catherine the Great, who dreamed of restoring the Byzantine Empire under the reign of her grandson Constantine.¹⁹ Prousis argues that Catherine's talk of protecting the Greeks was merely a pretext for Russian expansion, but the fact remains that links between Greeks and Russians were actively sponsored by official Russia from her time onwards.²⁰ Tensions between Britain and Russia also fed directly into the way in which the two Powers related to the Greek War of Independence in the 1820s, with Figes arguing that British support for Greek independence (as opposed to simple autonomy) stemmed from a fear that any autonomous region would simply become a Russian satellite, whereas an independent kingdom could be brought more into the British sphere of influence.²¹ Whilst all of this is significant, it is still some way from showing a link between the political elites of Britain, Russia and Greece, and establishing any kind of grass-roots link between the peoples. Prousis asserts that 'the prospect of Greek liberation aroused sympathy within nearly all sectors of the Russian public.'²² However, he offers little elaboration on this notion. Likewise, Milori asserts a British Philhellenism as derived from the perceived cultural superiority of Greece over Rome, but does little to explain how it manifested itself.²³ The extent to which Greek matters received coverage in the Press during our time-period provides an important insight into the extent of Philhellenism in Britain and Russia.

¹⁷ Cited in T.C. Prousis, *Russian Society and the Greek Revolution*, (DeKalb, 1994), p.3.

¹⁸ Ibid, pp.3-4.

¹⁹ O. Figes, *Crimea: The Last Crusade*, (London, 2011), pp.13-14.

²⁰ Prousis, *Russian Society and the Greek Revolution*, p.5.

²¹ Figes, *Crimea*, p.41.

²² Prousis, *Russian Society and the Greek Revolution*, p.26.

²³ M. Milori, 'Europe, the classical polis and the Greek nation: Philhellenism and Hellenism in nineteenth century Britain,' in Beaton & Ricks, *Making of Modern Greece*, p.65.

The Silent Minority of the Balkans

Although Greece was not mentioned significantly alongside Bosnia and Hercegovina in 1875, the issue of Greek behaviour, and the fact that many Greeks wanted, or even expected, something from the ongoing situation was not a fact which escaped the British Press. In the spring of 1876, *The Times* first carried a report of a statement issued by Greece, pointing out to the world their peaceful attitude thus far, and expressing a hope that it would be 'reciprocated by a really friendly policy' on the part of the Turks.²⁴ This was followed in June by a rather more detailed letter to the editor of *The Times* from 'An Athenian,' which considered the Greek situation in more detail.²⁵ The correspondent cited active Turkish colonisation of the Hellenic Provinces by Circassian immigrants and Bashi-Bazouks as a principal source of friction between the two nations, and cast Ignatiev as a major disruptive force in the situation, constantly striving to prevent any kind of long-term settlement of the Graeco-Turkish question, as it provided a 'useful source of antagonism.'²⁶ Although it had not been made a particular issue in the Press, this was, of course, not the first time that Ignatiev had been involved in the Greek aspect of the Eastern Crisis. Indeed, as early as January 1876, Derby had noted in his diary that the Russian Ambassador to the Porte had been doing his best to stir up the Greeks against both the Turks and the British, although he consoled himself with the note that 'Russia is now very unpopular in Athens.'²⁷

An idea which also began to gather momentum as time progressed was the manner in which Greece had behaved itself during the crisis, not resorting to violence like the nations around them. In conversation with a rather frank Turkish ambassador, who had confided that 'the loss of a province or two would not be utter ruin' for the Turks, Derby had been led to wonder just how long Greece would remain content if they saw Bosnia being given independence.²⁸ Rather in tune with this

²⁴ *The Times*, 'Greece,' 22/4/1876, p.7, Col.C.

²⁵ *The Times*, 'Greece and Turkey,' 7/6/1876, p.10, Col.D.

²⁶ Ibid.

²⁷ J. Vincent (Ed.) *A selection from the diaries of Edward Henry Stanley, 15th Earl of Derby (1826-93), between September 1869 and March 1878*, (London, 1994), Hereafter "*Derby Diaries*," 18/1/1876, p.271.

²⁸ *Derby Diaries*, 13/4/1876, pp.290-1.

train of thought, the 'Athenian' correspondent to *The Times* concluded with the observation that the Greeks had thus far kept remarkably quiet under significant provocation, without resorting to violence in the manner of the Slavs, and asserted that this required some kind of recompensary support on the part of the Powers.²⁹ The timing of this letter is particularly interesting, as it falls between two meetings held by official representatives of Greece with the British foreign secretary. Derby noted that, on May 30th, he had met with Gennadius (the Greek charge d'affaires), who 'wanted to know what Greece was to get as a reward for behaving so well,' and then on July seventeenth with the King of Greece who 'said naively that he thought his people would be discontented if they got nothing for their good conduct.'³⁰ On both occasions, Derby was non-committal in his replies and somewhat dismissive in his diary, assuring the Greeks that extra lands were 'not mine to give.'³¹ This gives rise to the question, as to whether the 'Athenian' correspondent was more than simply an inhabitant of the Greek capital, and perhaps occupied some official position in the Greek bureaucracy, possibly even the charge d'affaires himself.³²

These early articles pose something of an interesting question regarding the attitudes of the British Press towards Greece at the time. On the one hand, the very fact that they were printed suggests a certain level of support for the Greek position. After all, the updates from Greece were not in and of themselves 'news' unless some kind of change in the position of Greece was expected. On the other hand, the articles (at this stage at least) did not contain any kind of strong warning against violence on the part of Greece. Nor did they receive any follow-up or exhortation to the Powers to take up the case of Greece, posing the question as to what exactly was expected to be achieved by them. After these initial articles, there was barely any significant mention of Greece throughout the summer months and only intermittent updates during the autumn of 1876.³³

²⁹ *The Times*, Greece and Turkey, 7/6/1876, p.10, Col.D.

³⁰ *Derby Diaries*, 30/5/1876, p.299; 17/7/1876, p.310.

³¹ *Ibid.*, 17/7/1876, p.310.

³² Investigation has been unable to verify whether or not this is the case.

³³ E.g. *The Times*, 14/8/1876, 29/8/1876, 4/10/1876, 10/10/1876.

In the summer of 1876, the debate about Greece began to take on an additional dimension, as the role of Russia was raised explicitly for the first time. A reminder was given of the influence of Russia in the establishment of the Bulgarian Exarchate, and the bad-feeling that this had caused amongst many Greeks, including much of the church hierarchy, who regarded the Bulgarians as schismatic.³⁴ *The Times* correspondent put this in very stark terms, asserting that 'as Russia has abandoned Greece, Greece has abandoned Russia, and awaits the appearance of a new protector.'³⁵ In Russia, *The Voice* was also being more explicit in regard to Greece, with a *St Petersburg* editorial column lamenting the continued neutrality of the Greeks.³⁶ However, aside from this chastisement for not being more active and throwing their lot in with the Slavs, the Greeks received little attention in the pages of the Russian Press during the summer of 1876. It is interesting to note that, for *The Times*, the question of Greece was regarded as a flash-point in the antagonism brewing against Russia, whereas for Russia, the Greek question only related to their attitude towards the Slavs, and the behaviour of the British was instead looked at askance in regard to Bulgaria and Serbia.³⁷

Heroic Greece: The Burden of the Legacy

The Heroic mythology of ancient Greece was alluded to repeatedly in the descriptions of Greece during this period. One of the earliest uses was made by Garibaldi in an open letter to the insurgents, which lumped all the Christians of the Balkans together, before urging them onto heroism with the reminder that 'Among you were born Leonidas, Achilles, Alexander, Scanderbeg and Spartacus. And today, even among your robust populations, you may still find a Spartacus and a Leonidas.'³⁸ Canaris, the new head of the Greek government from 1877 was also compared to Leonidas by a *Times* columnist.³⁹ *The Times* talked of the ancient gods of Classical Greece, whilst Milan of Serbia's appeal describing them as the

³⁴ *The Times*, 'The Kingdom of Greece,' 29/8/1876, p.9, Col.A. For more on the Bulgarian Exarchate, and the significance of Russian involvement, see T.A. Meininger, *Ignatiev and the establishment of the Bulgarian Exarchate 1864-1872: a study in personal diplomacy*, (Madison, 1970).

³⁵ *The Times*, 'Kingdom of Greece,' 29/8/1876, p.9, Col.A.

³⁶ *The Voice*, 'St Petersburg,' 10 (22)/8/1876, p.1, Col.B.

³⁷ E.g. *The Voice*, 'St Petersburg,' 27/1 (8/2)/1878, p.1, Col.B.

³⁸ *The Times*, 'Herzegovina (by telegraph),' 13/10/1875, p.5, Col.A.

³⁹ *The Times*, 'The Greek Coalition Ministry,' 22/6/1877, p.4, Col.A.

descendents of Themistocles and Botzaris was repeated and circulated within the press.⁴⁰ Indeed, Gourgouris asserts that, in the West, 'Greece's modernity was never articulated independently of its antiquity.'⁴¹ In this light, it seems almost striking that when Gladstone's new work on Homer was reviewed in *The Times* in March 1876, it was not used as an opportunity for drawing parallels and contrasts with the contemporary population of Greece.⁴² Nor did this work attract any attention from the major review journals at the time, such as *The Quarterly Review*, or *The Edinburgh Review*. *The Contemporary Review*, which would later publish Gladstone's major political article on the role of the Greeks in the Eastern Crisis did also carry a piece entitled 'Homerology' by Gladstone. However, this was once again a purely scholarly piece, concerned with Greek adjectives and the relationship of deities within the Greek Pantheon, which at no point transcended the boundary with contemporary politics.⁴³ It seems, then, that whilst there was often interplay, particularly in terms of the language between modern and Classical Greece, Hionidis is right to insist that, by the 1860s, 'British understanding of modern Greece constituted a distinct and well-defined entity.'⁴⁴

The most interesting aspect of this use of language is the notion that these heroic comparisons may ultimately have acted against the Greeks in terms of how they were perceived by their contemporaries. A *Times* correspondent in the summer of 1877 recalled how the Greeks were being disparaged by English opinion for mismanagement of their finances and of behaving badly towards their creditors.⁴⁵ However, he asserted, were Greece to be measured against Turkey, she would be judged far more favourably; the problem lay in the excessive expectations placed upon them: 'instead of comparing them with the Achaeans of Homer or the Hellenes of Thucydides,' he asked, 'why should we not contrast their present condition with

⁴⁰ *The Times*, Editorial, 23/8/1877, p.7, Col.B; 'The War,' 5/7/1876; Greece and the War, 10/10/1876, p.8, Col.C.

⁴¹ S. Gourgouris, *Dream Nation: Enlightenment, colonisation, and the institution of modern Greece*, (Stanford, 1996), p.73.

⁴² *The Times*, 'Mr Gladstone on Homer,' 3/3/1876, p.4, Col.C; Gladstone actually published twice on Homer in 1876, firstly his *Homeric Synchronism: an Enquiry into the Time and Place of Homer*, and then a short volume, simply entitled *Homer*, Lloyd-Jones, *blood for the Ghosts*, p.115.

⁴³ W.E. Gladstone, 'Homerology,' *The Contemporary Review*, 28 (Jul 1876), pp.282-309.

⁴⁴ Hionidis, *The Greek Kingdom*, p.10.

⁴⁵ *The Times*, 'Greece for the Greeks,' 14/6/1877, p.5, Col.A.

that of their fathers or grandfathers.’⁴⁶ This issue of questioning the standards by which the Greeks were judged would arise again in due course, when the issue of what the Greek state had achieved was contrasted with the fact of what it had had to work with.⁴⁷ Where the Greeks were not derided for failing to match the standards of their heroic forebears, it seems that they were, at times, simply ignored, and Lloyd-Jones notes that Gladstone was somewhat unusual in being a devotee of Homer and Classical Greece who also ‘showed strong sympathy with his Greek contemporaries.’⁴⁸

Gladstone’s Greek Campaign

In December 1876, an article by Gladstone appeared in *The Contemporary Review*, entitled ‘The Hellenic Factor in the Eastern Problem.’⁴⁹ Given the significance of Gladstone’s writings for other aspects of the crisis, this article is worthy of some analysis, both in terms of what it said, and in terms of the degree of public reaction it was able to provoke.

Gladstone was well-known as a classical scholar and had already written various pieces on Greek antiquity even during the short period of the Eastern Crisis.⁵⁰ Up until this, however, he had not spoken on the subject of contemporary Greece despite being urged since 1875 as ‘a Philhellene and a Philanthrope’ to write something in support of the Greek cause.⁵¹ In October 1876 he had spoken out loudly against ‘Judaic sympathies,’ an action which had provoked little beyond widespread confusion, but nonetheless an act which was believed to be motivated by ‘admiration for, and sympathy with, the Greek church.’⁵² The article for the *Contemporary*, Gladstone claimed, was prompted by a public gathering in Athens, shortly before he wrote, of over 10,000 people. This claim has, however, been questioned by those who see a more political motivation to the article, and believe

⁴⁶ Ibid.

⁴⁷ See below pp.172-176.

⁴⁸ Lloyd-Jones, *Blood for the Ghosts*, p.113.

⁴⁹ W.E. Gladstone, ‘The Hellenic Factor in the Eastern Problem,’ *The Contemporary Review*, 29, (Dec 1876), pp.1-27.

⁵⁰ *The Times*, ‘Mr Gladstone on Homer,’ 3/3/1876, p.4, Col.C.

⁵¹ Hionidis, *The Greek Kingdom*, p.208.

⁵² *Derby Diaries*, 13/10/1876, p.333.

that the timing of the article was due to the fact that, in December 1876, Gladstone felt that he could use Greece as an example of 'the successful implementation of liberal principles to the conduct of British policy abroad.'⁵³ This argument is supported by the fact that, having written his first article, Gladstone was silent on Greece until the summer of 1878 when Greece was once again an ideal topic with which to attack Disraeli's conduct of foreign policy.⁵⁴

Even if we accept Gladstone's assertion regarding his motivation for writing, the exact meeting to which he refers is difficult to identify with any degree of certainty. One such meeting took place on the twelfth of November, and was noted very briefly in *The Times*, as a gathering of around 7,000 people.⁵⁵ However, In Russia, *The Voice* published a brief series of reports, also noting that there had been protests in Athens, but about a month earlier.⁵⁶ In fact, at the beginning of October, *The Voice* had noted two separate gatherings within a day or so of each other: firstly a public meeting of around 5,000 people, and then a further meeting of nearer 8,000, including various professors and respected Athenian academics.⁵⁷ This meeting was described by *The Times* as a gathering of 'fugitive Cretans resident in Athens,' and received only a brief mention towards the end of an article more concerned with Greece's relation to Serbia's war.⁵⁸ On the other hand, the November meeting received little more attention and attracted no detailed commentary, nor an elaborating article from any special correspondent, and concluded with the observation that 'Perfect order prevailed.'⁵⁹ All in all, the October meeting is probably the most likely one, given the fact that it concluded with a resolution to send a note expressing 'heartfelt thanks to those Englishmen who have taken the lead in the vindication of the cause of the Christians of the

⁵³ Hionidis, *The Greek Kingdom*, p.209.

⁵⁴ Ibid, p.214.

⁵⁵ *The Times*, 'News in Brief: Greece,' 14/11/1867, p.6, Col.F.

⁵⁶ *The Voice*, 'Foreign News,' 1(13)/10/1876, p.4, Col.B.

⁵⁷ *The Voice*, 'Telegraphs,' (21/9), 3/10/1876, p.3, Col.E.

⁵⁸ *The Times*, 'Greece and the War,' 10/10/1876, p.8, Col.C.

⁵⁹ *The Times*, 'News in Brief: Greece,' 14/11/1867, p.6, Col.F.

east,' which was to be sent directly to Gladstone himself, as 'the representative of the English nation.'⁶⁰

This scant coverage in the Press demonstrates an attitude in sharp contrast to Gladstone's excitement that 'the silence of the Pnyx at Athens was broken ... by the stir of an assembly,' an event more momentous in that it was occurring 'for the first time during two thousand years.'⁶¹ This attitude was continued in *The Times*, with a comment published on the release of Gladstone's article, which downplayed any likely impact (at least by comparison with *The Bulgarian Horrors*), as 'the subject is not one that excites popular passion.'⁶² However, Gladstone's excitement is, perhaps, more likely to have found its origin in the changes he perceived within Greek society. Tassopoulos has argued that Greece was unusual in that it developed formal and theoretical democracy before it developed popular associations, and views the 1860s and 1870s as a vital period in the reconciliation between Nationalism and Liberalism in the Greek nation.⁶³ Therefore, whilst the gatherings were unremarkable, in the contemporary European context, they marked a vindication of those who had previously expressed confidence in the Greeks as being suitable material for building a modern nation.

In Gladstone's eyes, the purpose of the meeting was to advance a claim 'on behalf of the Hellenic provinces still in servitude,' for 'an equal share in the emancipation,' that the Balkan Slavs were hoping was about to be administered by the Great Powers at a conference in Constantinople in early 1877.⁶⁴ His language here is significant, as he refers to the 'Hellenic provinces,' a term which immediately implies the affinity of those regions with Greece, and which similarly downplays the significance of any Muslim or Slav elements therein, who might harbour ambitions of political unity with the new Slavonic states about to be expanded or created, or even to remain an integral part of Turkey. Gladstone also talks as if the activity and the initiative came from the provinces themselves, and that the residents of Athens

⁶⁰ *The Times*, 'Greece and the War,' p.8, Col.C.

⁶¹ Gladstone, 'The Hellenic Factor,' p.1.

⁶² *The Times*, 'London, Friday December 1, 1876,' 1/12/1876, p.9, Col.A.

⁶³ Tassopoulos, 'Constitutionalism and the Ideological conversion to National Unity under the Greek Constitution of 1864,' in Frangoudaki and Keyder, *Ways to Modernity in Greece & Turkey*, p.14.

⁶⁴ Gladstone, 'The Hellenic Factor,' p.1.

were simply proxies exercising their greater freedom to act. By contrast, *The Times* had described the meeting as having agreed to found a 'Fraternity club ... for promoting military preparations and political unity among political parties.'⁶⁵ Although the ultimate objective was perhaps the same - namely the addition of Thessaly and Epirus to the Greek kingdom - *The Times* frames the matter far more in terms of the expansionist ambitions of the Greek state, rather than the liberation of the oppressed, as per Gladstone.

The amount of interest which Gladstone's involvement in the Bulgarian atrocities campaign had generated invites the question of whether his contribution to the Greek question would have any significant impact on the amount which appeared on Greece and the Greeks in the British Press. Kofos sees the article as having been the key to a revival in British Philhellenism.⁶⁶ However Hionidis, whilst noting a brief marked increase in Press interest in Greece in the wake of the article, believes that 'the Press was roused more by the weight of the article's author than by the subject as such.'⁶⁷ Shannon has noted in regard to *The Bulgarian Horrors*, that had the pamphlet been more original and informative, then it would also have been less effective.⁶⁸ This seems to be exactly the phenomenon observable here: rather than being lead by the public mood, Gladstone had tried to innovate and the result was anti-climactic. In the opening quarter of 1877, there was broadly the same amount of attention given to Greece in *The Times* as there had been in the final quarter of 1876.⁶⁹ Obviously events provided fluctuations in the precise tone and the detail of what was written about Greece, but the overall picture remained the same; disinterested mentions, but nothing amounting to a coherent programme regarding Greece. For a fuller and more sustained period of interest in Greece, on the part of the British Press, it would require the significant events that were to occur in the Balkans in the opening months of 1878, namely the brief Graeco-Turkish conflict, and the military defeat of Turkey by Russia, both of which will now be discussed.

⁶⁵ *The Times*, 'News in Brief: Greece,' 14/11/1867, p.6, Col.F.

⁶⁶ Kofos, *Greece and the Eastern Crisis*, p.199.

⁶⁷ Hionidis, *The Greek Kingdom*, p.213.

⁶⁸ Shannon, *Gladstone and the Bulgarian Agitation*, p.110.

⁶⁹ 175 articles containing the word 'Greece' or 'Greeks' for October - December 1876, 190 for January - March 1877, the proportion of these taken up by scholarly articles on antiquities or other matters unconnected to the Eastern question was about the same in each period, *The Times*.

Greece and Turkey in Conflict

Perhaps the most significant moment in the Eastern Crisis, from a Greek perspective, came in February 1878, when the Greek Army crossed the border into Thessaly, a Turkish province, but one with a high Greek population, and the area which was regarded as the most incontestably 'Greek' of the Turkish provinces by Greek expansionists and Philhellenes. A declaration issued a day later (February second 1878) assured the Powers that this was both a temporary and a defensive occupation in order to preserve the general peace. It seems evident that the Greek decision to march into Turkey relied heavily upon the assumption that the Turkish army would be too pre-occupied dealing with the, now mobile, Russian forces. However, on the third day of their occupation, the Greek government learnt that Turkey and Russia had, in fact, signed an armistice and the preliminaries of peace on January thirty-first. This led to a certain degree of panic, and a swift countermanding of their orders, meaning that the troops were back on their own side of the border by the ninth of February.

It seems clear from those records which afford us a behind-the-scenes view of events that this mobilisation was far from unexpected. Derby recorded a series of meetings and conversations during the autumn of 1877 in which Greek representatives were 'talking big' about their various plans.⁷⁰ He also dismissed claims by Greek ministers and even the King that the Greeks had no plans to make war, dismissing one denial from an official as 'so gross a fiction that I wonder he thinks it worth telling.'⁷¹ However, despite all this, there was little in Press activity to suggest the imminence of military activity. As far as the mobilisation itself is concerned, the manner in which these activities were regarded in Britain and Russia differs significantly. *The Times*, despite having previously offered a reasonable amount of commentary on Greece, was remarkably reticent on this particular topic. The outbreak of the insurrection in Thessaly was reported in late January, along with a note a few days later that the insurgents were reporting early successes.⁷²

⁷⁰ *Derby Diaries*, 11/11/1877, p.452.

⁷¹ *Derby Diaries*, 14/10/1877, p.445; 3/12/1877, pp.458-9.

⁷² *The Times*, 'Greece,' 21/1/1878, p.5, Col.E; 'War Excitement in Greece,' 30/1/1878, p.5, Col.B.

However, far more emphasis was placed upon the general state of discontent in Athens, with the populace apparently sensing the imminence of peace, and the *Times* correspondent asserting that 'the consciousness that Greece has established no claim to be considered, caused here feelings of great bitterness, especially against the late ministry.'⁷³ This comment provides a fairly explicit explanation for what may be considered the actual motives for the Greek border-crossing a few days later, but *The Times* appears to have been reluctant to infer the link. February began with articles providing wider context for likely Greek actions, including a piece from the Athens correspondent entitled 'Hellenism.' In this, he stated the ambitions of Hellenists as being 'liberating and unifying with the present kingdom of Greece the peoples and territory of Turkey in Europe situated south of the Balkans and the river Scumbi in Albania, and along the coast of the Black Sea from Cape Emineh to the mouths of the Danube.'⁷⁴ He further described this instinct as being common to all the people of Greece and as being 'the natural and most powerful opponent of Panslavism.'⁷⁵ This last assertion, perhaps, provides the explanation for the significant gulf in perspectives between the Russian and the British Press. Whereas the Athens correspondent of the *Times* was prepared to take the Greek side on the question of whether the Powers had created an impossible situation by liberating one half of the Greek people and not the other, *The Voice* adopted a far less approving attitude towards them.

Somewhat behind *The Times* in its news-gathering, *The Voice* printed a telegraph on February fifth stating the Greek government's assertion that their troops were going to Thessaly to prevent Greeks there from being attacked.⁷⁶ The first article as such appeared a few days later and essentially just recounted the fact that *The Times* had already announced the crossing of the border by between twenty five and thirty thousand Greek troops.⁷⁷ The fact that *The Voice* was unable to provide any original reporting of its own, and instead made do with recounting the prior observations of *The Times* might, in part, be attributable to the fact that there was,

⁷³ *The Times*, 'War excitement in Greece,' 30/1/1878.

⁷⁴ *The Times*, 'Hellenism,' 1/2/1878, p.3, Col.E.

⁷⁵ *The Times*, 'Hellenism,' 1/2/1878.

⁷⁶ *The Voice*, 'Telegraphs,' (24/1/1878) 5/2/1878, p.4, Col.E.

⁷⁷ *The Voice*, 'Military Department,' (26/1/1878) 7/2/1878, p.3, Col.B.

at the time, an unusual atmosphere in Athens, rife with rumour, and devoid of clear and reliably accurate information. Indeed, the correspondent for *The Times* had even gone so far as to say that 'the fiction and unreality which dominate in an Eastern town when momentous events are passing in its neighbourhood had already begun to assert their sway.'⁷⁸ However, given the rather broader paucity of *The Voice's* reporting from Athens, it seems more likely that they simply had not deemed the area of sufficient interest to have a man on the ground full time.

At the same time as *The Voice* was reporting the Greek army's crossing of the border, it also carried a report that the Turkish fleet was in the Aegean, preparing for a bombardment of Piraeus, the port of Athens. This had apparently provoked widespread panic, leading the Greek government to appeal to the Powers for protection, and to consider withdrawing the fleet.⁷⁹ The lack of detail in their reports up to this point makes it difficult to predict the likely attitude which would have been adopted by *The Voice*, let alone by Russian opinion generally, had the Greeks persevered with an ultimately successful military campaign against Turkey. What is certain is the degree of antipathy which they evoked by their decision to withdraw. On February the eighth Greece was, for the first time in this period, the subject of the lead article in the paper, an editorial which asserted that the Greeks had long ago decided to launch hostilities and mocked them for having waited until peace talks were imminent.⁸⁰ It went on to conclude that the Greeks had clearly never intended to wage a sustained campaign, as shown by the way in which they had so easily been scared off. Instead, the Greeks simply wanted a share of the spoils.⁸¹ This argument was taken to its logical conclusion a week later in a report from *The Voice's* special correspondent (for some reason stationed in Vienna) who produced a vitriolic report, deriding the Greeks as the 'natural enemies' of all Slavs, and laughing at those who had expected their help six months earlier, when all the time their sole aim was to 'Hellenise the Slavs.'⁸² Perhaps more ominously, the reporter finished by turning his attention to Lord Derby and arguing that, whilst

⁷⁸ *The Times*, 'Greece and the War,' 7/2/1878, p.4, Col.C.

⁷⁹ *The Voice*, 'Telegraphs,' (26/1/1878) 7/2/1878, p.4, Col.D.

⁸⁰ *The Voice*, 'St Petersburg,' (27/1/1878) 8/2/1878, p.1, Col.B.

⁸¹ *Ibid.*

⁸² *The Voice*, 'Foreign News,' (3) 15/2/1878, p.4, Col.D.

Derby might claim he was seeking international protection for the Greeks from the Turks, it was in fact the Slavs from whom they needed protecting, those who had fought, who opposed Hellenism, and who now 'wanted their dues.'⁸³ The fact that *The Voice*, a Russian newspaper which, if not excessively nationalistic, knew which way the readership was likely to think in a time of war, sided with the Slavs and against the Turks is hardly surprising. What is more significant is the fact that this was the point at which they spoke out definitively, perceiving the conflict to have crystallised. It is impossible to establish how the reaction might have been different had the Greeks acted earlier.

Greeks and Slavs: a Conflict of Interests?

The purported conflict of interests between the Greeks and the Slavs was a point which received decidedly varied amounts of attention during this period. At the very start of the Hercegovina revolt, Kofos identifies significant hostility to the Slavs in the Greek press.⁸⁴ Having already alluded to it on a few occasions, *The Times* raised the issue specifically in October 1876, when their Greek correspondent asserted that 'the one thing of which Greece stands in dread is the slow extinction of their race beneath Slavic expansion.'⁸⁵ This antagonism seems to have been relatively recent in origin and events like the establishment of the Bulgarian Exarchate in the 1860s are probably central to it. Although Meininger tries to depict the creation of an independent Orthodox church as being primarily a defensive measure against the rise of Uniate churches and the associated shift from Russian to French influence, this does not seem to have been a message that reached the majority of Greeks.⁸⁶ Given the manner in which Ignatiev had pressurised and intimidated a succession of Patriarchs in order to have the exarchate established, the arousal of Greek hostility, even from the outset, is understandable. This becomes even more the case when the issue of territory is raised. For Meininger, the schism in the Orthodox Church was only caused by the sabotage of extremists.⁸⁷

⁸³ *The Voice*, 'Foreign News,' (3) 15/2/1878, p.4, Col.E.

⁸⁴ Kofos, *Greece and the Eastern Crisis*, p.44.

⁸⁵ *The Times*, 'Greece and the War,' 10/10/1876, p.8, Col.C.

⁸⁶ Meininger, *Ignatiev and the Establishment of the Bulgarian Exarchate*, p.22.

⁸⁷ *Ibid.*, p.174.

However, he himself admits that Bulgarian attempts to include Macedonian territory in their exarchate were 'provocative,' and this seems to be something of an understatement.⁸⁸ By the early 1870s, there was a clear perception amongst Greek nationalists that, in the event of continued Turkish retreat from the Balkans, there would ultimately come a point at which Greek, Bulgarian, and possibly Serbian, interests would find themselves in direct conflict, most probably around the area of Macedonia. This theme seems to have been a fairly common sentiment amongst the Greeks in 1876, and was periodically noted in the British Press, but never seems to have registered in the Russian media.⁸⁹

The greater awareness of the British (rather than Russian) Press of Greek concerns perhaps helps account for the fact that, in early 1877, it was to *The Times* that Alexander Byzantios, the editor of a Greek journal *Imera* chose to write. Byzantios complained in a long letter, printed in the original French, that the special privileges to be accorded to the Slavs by the Constantinople Conference would inevitably place a heavier burden of Turkish activity upon the Greeks.⁹⁰ Along with Byzantios's letter in this edition, there was also an editorial commending the letter as 'deserving respectful consideration,' and expanding upon the argument implicit in the letter.⁹¹ Although the editor felt that Byzantios stopped short of highlighting properly the likely sufferings of the Greeks as a result of the additional protections likely to be given to the Slavs, he felt confident enough to summarise the situation as it appeared, stating: 'attempts have been made for many months past to din into our ears the truth that the Trans-Balkan provinces of Turkey are not the only parts of the Ottoman Empire which suffer from misgovernment.'⁹² However, the ultimate conclusion which this article drew was not, in fact, one of conflict, but that reform for the Bulgarians would lead inevitably to the same reforms for Greeks. Thus, the

⁸⁸ Ibid., p.156.

⁸⁹ E.g. *The Times*, 'Greeks and Slavs,' 26/9/1876, p.9, Col.A; 'The Eastern Question,' 23/10/1876, p.5, Col.A.

⁹⁰ *The Times*, 'Greek and Slav,' 5/1/1877, p.3, Col.D.

⁹¹ *The Times*, 'Lead Article,' 5/1/1877, p.9, Col.C.

⁹² Ibid.

Greek was encouraged to celebrate his neighbour's fortune, as it would 'be his tomorrow.'⁹³

An interesting example of the Graeco-Slavonic hostility can be seen in the person of Prince Milan Obrenovic of Serbia. Serbia had first made demands on Macedonia in 1869, and was thus, in Greek eyes, just as much of a threat to their interests as a hypothetical Bulgaria.⁹⁴ However, Serbia's ruler, at least publically, viewed the Greeks rather more as potential allies than as eventual enemies. Various appeals were made by the Serbian ruler, often in colourful language, as can be seen in the *Times* report of his call to 'the glorious descendants of Themistocles and Botzaris,' to join him in his war against Turkey.⁹⁵ However, Kofos believes that these appeals for Greek action only served to undermine the government, which at that time was broadly against war, and to strengthen the opposition.⁹⁶ It was around this time that Russian interest in Greece began to reach a noticeable level, with *The Voice* reporting at the beginning of October 1876 that Graeco-Turkish relations were deteriorating.⁹⁷ This has been seen by Kofos as a reaction to the fact that Serbia was on the verge of collapse in its war with Turkey.⁹⁸ Whatever the cause, the late autumn of 1876 marked a moderate flurry of journalistic activity in terms of Greece. *The Voice* carried an article reasserting the Greek desire for assistance from the Powers.⁹⁹ This demand came in the form of a note sent by the Greek government to the powers, stating that 'the opinion of society strongly demands the improvement of the condition of Greeks in Turkey.'¹⁰⁰ Perhaps the more ominous aspect of this note, however, was the fact that it also contained the warning that if the Powers did not act to aid the Greeks of Turkey, then the Greek government would itself 'take the necessary measures to bring about this aim.'¹⁰¹ Furthermore, it seems that these were not simply empty words, given that Athens itself was, at this time,

⁹³ Ibid.

⁹⁴ Meininger, *Ignatiev and the Bulgarian Exarchate*, p.109.

⁹⁵ *The Times*, 'Greece and the War,' 10/10/1876, p.8, Col.C.

⁹⁶ Kofos, *Greece and the Eastern Crisis*, p.67.

⁹⁷ *The Voice*, 'Foreign News,' (24/9)6/10/1876, p.4, Col.D.

⁹⁸ Kofos, *Greece and the Eastern Crisis*, p.74.

⁹⁹ *The Voice*, 'Foreign News,' (27/9)9/10/1876, p.6, Col.A.

¹⁰⁰ Ibid.

¹⁰¹ Ibid.

experiencing demonstrations in favour of war against Turkey.¹⁰² However, it was not until the very end of 1877, and into 1878, that the potential for Graceo-Slavonic conflict began to be fully explored in Britain.

The eventual fall of Plevna in December 1877 and the subsequent advance of the Russian army south towards Constantinople changed the atmosphere for many of the discussions which had been going on regarding the future of the Balkan Peninsula. Up until this point, whilst the conflict of interests between Greeks and Slavs had been alluded to in Britain, it had not properly been 'probed into.'¹⁰³ The belief amongst many, after the fall of Plevna, that Turkey-in-Europe had ceased to exist and that the only question now was as to the nature of the replacement, profoundly altered people's thinking. Kofos notes that rumours were rife of the Greek army rising to demand war against Turkey for a larger share of the spoils and it was in this atmosphere that many in Britain began to see the Greeks as the obvious solution to Slavonic, and thereby Russian, hegemony in the Balkans.¹⁰⁴ In this vein, a *Times* leader of early March asserted 'it may be a wise policy to promote the development of the Greek power as a counterbalance to the new Principality of Bulgaria.'¹⁰⁵ Indeed, Hionidis sees a profound re-shaping of the portrayal and perception of Greece in Britain at this time, borne out of a positive comparison with Russia as viewed from a narrow British, Russophobe perspective.¹⁰⁶ Although the failures of the Greek Kingdom had become an accepted commonplace, these were now played down as the Press began to emphasise the liberal, modernising qualities of the Greeks as opposed to the reactionary nature of Russia.¹⁰⁷ However, whilst this idea retained a certain degree of plausibility, it quickly faded from view once the possibility of war between Britain and Russia began to loom large, with the Press taking the unsurprising view that a war involving Britain would be of

¹⁰² Kofos, *Greece and the Eastern Crisis*, p.74.

¹⁰³ Hionidis, *The Greek Kingdom*, p.223.

¹⁰⁴ Kofos, *Greece and the Eastern crisis*, p.141; Hionidis, *The Greek Kingdom*, pp.212-13.

¹⁰⁵ *The Times*, 'London,' 7/3/1878, p.9, Col.A.

¹⁰⁶ Hionidis, *The Greek Kingdom*, pp.226-7. The broader nature of British Russophobia will be discussed in the following chapter, pp. 178-183.

¹⁰⁷ Eg. *The Times*, 'Vacation speeches,' 16/1/1878, p.6, Col.A.

greater interest to their readers than the question of which group of Balkan Christians was to receive the most favourable territorial settlement.¹⁰⁸

Greece and the Congress of Berlin

Greece was not, ultimately, admitted to the Congress of Berlin as a full member, although it did receive some additional territory, albeit far less than most Greek nationalists had demanded. Both of these matters were noted in *The Times* and the British Press more generally, albeit with differing amounts of attention. The article 'Preparations for the Congress' on June tenth 1878, observed that Greece 'like Servia and Roumania' would be represented by her Foreign Minister, as opposed to the larger delegations representing the Powers, and noted the slightly unusual nature of this comparison, considering that Greece 'as an independent kingdom is regarded in Athens as in a different position from that of Roumania, Servia and even Montenegro.'¹⁰⁹ However, when, a few days later, *The Times* published a full list of the delegates attending the conference, Greece was not only missing, but without any comment that this was the case.¹¹⁰ Their omission hardly seems surprising when it is borne in mind that Disraeli's correspondence from the autumn of 1877 all the way up to the spring of 1878 generally sees Greece absent from his comments and thoughts regarding who was to get what when the European settlement was ultimately made.¹¹¹ Olga Novikov, in a letter to *The Northern Echo* described Greece as a 'poor little state,' which had trusted Britain, but had its trust betrayed.¹¹² However, whilst this is not the sole instance of such an opinion being expressed, there is nothing to suggest that it represented a wide-spread or ardently held belief.

The second aspect of Greek disappointment at the Congress was the fact that, having not been given full admittance to plead their case, the decisions made in their absence went largely against them. This was also noted briefly by the official reporters of *The Times*, and with considerable gusto by those who wrote letters to

¹⁰⁸ Hionidis, *The Greek Kingdom*, p.230.

¹⁰⁹ *The Times*, 'Preparations for the Congress,' 10/6/1878. P.5, Col.A.

¹¹⁰ *The Times*, 'Latest Intelligence,' 13/6/1878, p.5, Col.A.

¹¹¹ M. Kovic, *Disraeli and the Eastern Question*, (Oxford, 2011), pp.225, 239.

¹¹² O. Novikov, *Friends or Foes? A sequel to 'Is Russia wrong?'* (London, 1878), p.3.

the editor. In June, there were two letters published regarding Greece particularly. The first of these came from the pen of a Mr. W.J. Codrington, who cited arguments from the papers of his ancestor, Admiral Codrington, compiled for the 1827 treaty on the Greek borders, and argued strongly in favour of the extension of Greece as far as was possible.¹¹³ The other letter relied less upon the accumulated papers of bureaucratic opinion and instead championed the cause of Greece from a moral standpoint. The author, identified only as 'E.H.,' argued that although Greece had been given its independence, this had in fact been a cruel trick by the powers, who had provided it with insufficient land to sustain itself, leaving the wealthiest and most naturally productive areas inhabited by Greece in the hands of the Turks.¹¹⁴ Long-term survival for Greece, it was predicted, was only possible if the Powers made the territorial extensions necessary to counteract this imbalance.¹¹⁵ The moral argument more generally was a popular one at this time, with *Times* reporters emphasising the significance of the Powers 'promising to bring forward the Hellenic question,' as the main reason for the termination of the Greek advance into Turkey, and downplaying the significance of a Greek fear of military annihilation following the conclusion of the Russo-Turkish armistice.¹¹⁶ This, then, was a return to the idea previously popularised in *The Times* that Greece had acted with restraint brought about by the good advice of the Powers, (chiefly Britain), rather than by fear, indecision or lack of military infrastructure. It behoved the Powers to make good on the promises which had accompanied this advice, namely that the Greek cause would be advanced more than it would have been by force of arms. As already noted above, whilst this viewpoint was not necessarily one which was rejected as the crisis progressed, it was one which quickly found itself crowded out. A full congress of the Great Powers of Europe and a redrawing of the map of the Balkans and the Caucasus produced far more topics of interest than simply the fate of Greece.

¹¹³ *The Times*, 'The Boundaries of Greece – W.J. Codrington, Letters to the Editor,' 11/6/1878, p.7, Col.F.

¹¹⁴ *The Times*, 'Greece and the Congress – E.H. Letters to the Editor,' 18/6/1878, p.4, Col.F.

¹¹⁵ Ibid.

¹¹⁶ *The Times*, 'Preparations for the Congress,' 10/6/1878. P.5, Col.A.

This was even more the case in the Russian Press. On July eighth, *The Voice* devoted the entirety of its opening page to an editorial on the settlement that had been reached at Berlin, in which Greece barely received a mention. Instead, on page four, somewhere in the depths of the 'Foreign News' section, there was a brief note on the fact that Turkey was being encouraged to reach an agreement with Greece over their mutual border.¹¹⁷ Whilst there is no denying that the result of the Congress was both a disappointment to the Greek nationalists, and less dramatic than the fates of Bulgaria, Serbia or others, the gulf between what had been expected (or at least demanded) by partisans of the Greek cause, and what had been given in reality would surely have provoked considerable amounts of comment from a publication more concerned with Greece's fate. Interestingly, however, the silence of *The Voice* does seem to have been borne solely out of indifference. This contrasts strongly with the British situation, where one reader of *The Times*, Mr John Trevor Barkley, wrote a letter to the editor, denouncing in the strongest terms the complaints made on Greece's behalf. 'Why?' he asked, did everyone insist that Greece was being treated so badly, when she was in fact to receive a total of five and a half thousand square miles of additional territory, an area the size of Yorkshire. This was more than any other nation except Russia had received, not only more than Romania or Bulgaria, but more than Serbia and Montenegro combined!¹¹⁸

The issues with the viewpoint advanced here are, of course, multiple. First and foremost, as Kofos has noted, the frontier negotiations between Greece and Turkey did not begin until the seventeenth of July, and were not concluded until the following year, so the notion that Greece was assured an additional parcel of territory of any set size was rather fanciful.¹¹⁹ More significant, however, is the question of how representative Barkley's views were: however inaccurate they may be, if they could be identified as encapsulating popular sentiment, they would still be highly significant for us to consider. However, this does not seem to be the case.

¹¹⁷ *The Voice*, 'St Petersburg,' (26/6) 8/7/1878, p.1; 'Foreign News,' p.4, Col.C.

¹¹⁸ *The Times*, 'What Greece is to get – John Trevor Barkley, Letters to the Editor,' 22/7/1878, p.8, Col.C.

¹¹⁹ Kofos, *Greece & the Eastern Crisis*, p.255.

Whilst Barkley followed the pattern of thought noted above in attributing Greece's gains to its 'deferring to England's advice during the war,' his letter otherwise remains almost entirely isolated.¹²⁰ He acknowledged in his opening paragraph that 'nine men out of ten' sympathised with Greece and there seem to have been no other letters or reports penned by representatives of the tenth.¹²¹ Thus, however interesting a contrast he is able to provide, he does not seem to represent anything that could legitimately be described as an alternative current of public opinion, at least on the evidence available from *The Times*.

Aside from this discussion in the letters column, the fate of Greece at the Congress of Berlin also prompted an article in *Nineteenth Century*, penned by Stratford de Redcliffe, formerly Stratford Canning, long-time British ambassador to the Porte and a diplomat who had been extensively involved in the original discussions leading to Greek independence. His article, 'Recollections of the Revival of Greek Independence,' was historical in character, but made it clear from the outset that this topic was 'closely connected with the interests of that country in its present and prospective state.'¹²² Redcliffe wrote quite prolifically for *Nineteenth Century* during this period, including a two-part 'bird's eye view' of Turkey in the summer of 1877, and a further piece in the autumn on the general state of International Relations at the time.¹²³ However, this was the only piece in which he focused upon the Greek issue. The Greek article itself said little of note, aside from offering further examples of mutual hostility and suspicion between Great Britain and Russia, and copious self-congratulation on the part of the author.¹²⁴ The main body of the article was a long account of events around the British Embassy in Constantinople and the ambassador's journeys across Europe to various other courts many years earlier.¹²⁵ However, the conclusion was particularly interesting,

¹²⁰ *The Times*, 'What Greece is to get.'

¹²¹ *Ibid.*

¹²² S. De Redcliffe, 'Recollections of the Revival of Greek Independence,' *The Nineteenth Century and after: a monthly review*, 4, 18, (Aug 1878), p.377

¹²³ S. De Redcliffe, 'Turkey,' *The Nineteenth Century and after: a monthly review*, 1, 4, (Jun 1877), pp.707-728; 1, 5, (July 1877), pp.729-752; S. De Redcliffe, 'International Relations; and How they may be maintained for the best interests of mankind,' *The Nineteenth Century and after: a monthly review*, 2, 8, (Oct 1877), pp.471-487.

¹²⁴ De Redcliffe, 'Recollections,' pp. 379-381.

¹²⁵ *Ibid.*, pp.382—390.

as it stated confidently that the Congress of Berlin had now 'set at rest' the question of Greece's boundaries.¹²⁶

Whilst de Redcliffe may have felt that the question of Greece's boundaries had been set at rest, the general feeling of the Liberal party seems to have been the exact opposite. After the Congress of Berlin, Hionidis presents a portrait of a diverse group of Liberal politicians with contrasting views on the fate of Greece, but united in their conviction that the government had acted incorrectly.¹²⁷ The most significant figure in this regard was probably Charles Dilke, the Radical MP who had previously been estranged from much of his party, due to his deep-rooted and racially conceived antipathy to the Russians and, by extension, the south-Slavs.¹²⁸ Furthermore, Dilke, like Chamberlain, simply found Gladstone too much of a moraliser to ally with him, at a time when Gladstone's morally-based Liberalism was such a prominent stream within the Party.¹²⁹ Hionidis presents the discovery of the Greek cause as something of a revelation to Dilke who found in it an ideal solution for the difficulty presented by a Radical opposition to Turkey and a racial opposition to Russia and the South-Slavs.¹³⁰ Although Dilke's biographer skims over his involvement with Greek matters, it does seem that his advocacy of the Greek cause was to have significant influence on his political career, pleasing the Party leaders by finding a clear way to oppose the government on Foreign Policy with reference to British Interests, rather than to morals.¹³¹

Conclusion

It seems that whilst Greece did attract some attention from the British and Russian Press during the period, and whilst that attention was often couched in language reminiscent of Classical mythology, there does not seem to have been the kind of public excitement shown in Great Britain for the Bulgarian Atrocities, nor in Russia

¹²⁶ Ibid., p.392.

¹²⁷ Hionidis, *The Greek Kingdom*, pp.231-2.

¹²⁸ Ibid., pp.238-239.

¹²⁹ R. Jenkins, 'Dilke, Sir Charles Wentworth, second baronet (1843-1911)' *Oxford Dictionary of National Biography*, Oxford, 2004; online edn, May 2008, [http://www.oxforddnb.com/view/article/32824, accessed 5 Jan 2012.]

¹³⁰ Hionidis, *The Greek Kingdom*, p.239.

¹³¹ Jenkins, 'Dilke'; Hionidis, *The Greek Kingdom*, p.244.

for the fate of the Balkan Slavs. Whilst the Greek Government acted with restraint, it was commended by diplomats and educated British opinion. When it chose to act, it was firstly encouraged by the Russian press and then condemned for its self-interested timing and the attendant failure to come to the aid of the Slavonic cause. By and large, Greece seems to have remained a subsidiary aspect of the revolt for almost all parties concerned. For Russian journals like *The Herald of Europe*, it was sufficiently minor to be denied even a single article during the crisis, whilst topics like 'The Magyars and the Eastern Question,' were given space.¹³² Ultimately, though, Greece seems to have been utilised in an expedient fashion by various groups for their differing ends. Those partisan to the Slavonic cause saw Greece in terms of the support it could offer to the Slavs, whilst others like Gladstone looked for the re-awakening of cultural ideas and traditions lost for thousands of years. Even Gladstone, it appears, valued Greece more for the political end to which he could work it, and saw little in the way of a popular movement to be engaged with through advocating the cause. For his fellow Party members, Greece was simply a stick with which to beat Disraeli's government. Few, if any, occupied themselves with thoughts of the Greek people of their own day. Whilst this incorporation of Greece into the partisan political debates of the British Parliament distract slightly from the fact, it is interesting to note that, once again, a situation and a people in the Balkan Peninsula came to the fore in the British Press by means of their relationship to Russian aims and desires.

¹³² *The Herald of Europe*, 'The Magyars and the Eastern Question,' September 1877.

Chapter 7 – But by Jingo if we do...

We don't want to fight but by Jingo if we do
We've got the ships, we've got the men, we've got the money too.
We've fought the bear before, and while we're Briton's true,
The Russians shall not have Constantinople.¹

Whilst this thesis has thus far focused on popular and Press reactions in Russia and Great Britain to the events in the Balkans between 1875 and 1878, it has time and again found their attentions focused rather more on each other than on the Balkan crisis. This was particularly the case in the final part of 1877 and into 1878, when a strong reaction grew up in Britain against Gladstone and the atrocities campaigners who had urged action on behalf of the Slavonic Christians. Instead, these campaigners, known popularly as 'Jingoes', clamoured for a British military intervention on the side of Turkey, and against Russia. Although the military campaign was not forthcoming, their success in impacting public consciousness was such that their shadow is cast back across previous Anglo-Russian events, and scholars will talk of the 'Jingoistic rhetoric of the Crimean War.'² The 'Jingo' movement marked one of the high points of a deep-rooted antipathy between elements of Russian and British society that continued across two hundred years or so. This chapter will consider the portrayals and manifestations of this Russophobia in Britain and the corresponding Anglophobia on Russia's part, both generally and in this crisis in particular. Within this period, it will also examine the role played by the Press in each.

Background: Russophobia and Anglophobia

Despite the longevity and significance of Russophobia in Great Britain, this topic has generated a limited historiography. Gleason's *The Genesis of Russophobia in Britain* (1950) provides an invaluable introduction to the topic, but stops in the middle of the nineteenth century, before the outbreak of the Crimean War. In justifying his

¹ By G.H. MacDermott, 1878. See K. Baker (Ed.) *A Children's English History in Verse*, (London, 1999), p.207.

² M Baker, 'One Man cannot an "Eastern Europe" make, but he can certainly try: Charles Fredrick Henningson and the ideological construction of Eastern Europe,' *Ab Imperio*, 1, (2003), p.549.

decision to do so, he makes an interesting point that a study which ended at Crimea would imply the inevitability of war, whereas his decision to cover only the period up to the end of the 1840s emphasises the long-term possibility of peace.³ Moving to more general works, many studies of the colonial 'little wars' of the late nineteenth century make brief reference to the topic, as do studies of the Crimean War, the attitudes of Britain to the Russian Revolution, the Cold War, and even recent diplomatic disputes between Britain and Russia in the early twenty-first century, but none provide a comprehensive overview of the topic.⁴

There is increasing scholarly agreement that Europe's perception and fear of Russia largely stemmed back to 1812 when the seemingly invincible armies of Napoleon had not only met their doom in the frozen Moscow winter, but had been driven all the way back to Paris.⁵ The most significant contribution of recent years on the Russo-French conflict was made by Lieven, whose detailed study of the 1812-1814 campaigns includes references to the intimidation of Austria by Russian military Power, as well as the British observer Stewart who 'combined admiration with alarm' at seeing the Russian army cross the Rhine.⁶ This demonstration of might by a largely unknown state, and one which had only recently been on the opposite side to Britain, was enough to provoke a significant degree of disquiet amongst the British. Gleason, however, has stressed the significance in the early nineteenth Century of the personal antipathy towards Russia on the part of key diplomats such as Canning and Castlereagh.⁷ The figure who most obviously sat as the focal point for British Russophobia was Nicholas I, self-proclaimed 'gendarme of Europe.' The interventionist implications of this title were only strengthened decades later when he sent Russian troops into the Hapsburg Empire to put down the Hungarian uprising of 1848. However, it also seems that Russophobia was more than simply a political factor. Gleason goes on to argue that a combination of Russia's prolific rate

³ J.H. Gleason, *The Genesis of Russophobia in Great Britain, a study of the interaction of policy and opinion*, (Cambridge, Mass., 1950), p.276.

⁴ E.g. O. Figes, *Crimea: The Last Crusade*, (London, 2010); B. Farwell, *Queen Victoria's Little Wars*, (Ware, 1973).

⁵ Eg. Figes, *Crimea*.

⁶ D. Lieven, *Russia against Napoleon: The battle for Europe 1807-1814*, (London, 2009), pp.461, 477.

⁷ Gleason, *The Genesis of Russophobia*, p.32.

of territorial expansion and the propaganda of individuals such as David Urquhart led to Russophobia becoming a mainstream factor in British society.⁸

Although his death in 1877 prevented him from making a particularly significant impact upon the Eastern Crisis of 1875-78, it is nonetheless worthwhile pausing to consider David Urquhart and the significance of his activities during the mid-nineteenth century. A former diplomat and Turcophile who had spent much time working for the British government in the Ottoman Empire and its vicinity, Urquhart was dismissed from the Foreign Service by Palmerston when an attempt at baiting the Russian Navy backfired, an action of which Urquhart always swore Palmerston had full knowledge.⁹ Urquhart's personal bitterness at Palmerston and his Turcophilia gradually fuelled a hatred of Russia, and a strenuous attempt to reshape the entire nature of the way in which British Foreign Policy was made. Although he was ultimately unsuccessful in this attempt, he did nonetheless exert considerable influence over certain minority groups and individuals who would later be active in the so-called 'Jingo' movement.

Ultimately, his influence on mainstream politics seems to have been limited, and even his biographer concedes that he was 'dismissed as something of a crank by most of his political contemporaries.'¹⁰ Clearly, then, the fact that Urquhart was able to establish Russophobia as a mainstream current of opinion does not mean that it is possible to argue a general hatred for Russia and Russians amongst the British masses. However, it is still a point of significance and a nod to the notion that 'it is articulate sentiment that counts.'¹¹ Furthermore, whilst he 'distanced himself' from the more vocal elements of this Russophobia, Disraeli did on occasion 'cooperate' with Urquhart in the first half of the nineteenth century.¹² By the latter half of the century, it seems to have become an accepted commonplace that British and Russian interests were fundamentally incompatible, a notion that would

⁸ Ibid., pp.86, 180, 200-204.

⁹ M. Taylor, 'Urquhart, David (1805-1877),' *Oxford National Dictionary of Biography*, (Oxford, 2004), [<http://www.oxforddnb.com/view/article/28017>, accessed 14 Nov 2011].

¹⁰ Ibid.

¹¹ Gleason, *Russophobia*, p.279.

¹² M. Kovic, *Disraeli and the Eastern Question*, (Oxford, 2011), p.44.

remain in circulation into the twenty-first century.¹³ Some felt that the perception stretched beyond this and the Atrocity campaigner E.A. Freeman went so far as to assert in an article in *The Contemporary Review* that 'Englishmen have been brought up in the belief that it was the first national duty of every Englishman to hate Russia with a blind hatred.'¹⁴ Freeman's remarks came at a time when criticism of Russia was being used to undermine the Atrocity Campaign, so the strength with which he states his case is unsurprising. However, the fact remains that he clearly felt strongly that there was a negative attitude towards Russia inherent in much of British thinking, regardless of whether that was actually the case.

Despite all these repeated perceived incompatibilities of policy and notions of inevitable conflict, we must keep in mind the fact that Crimea was the only significant occasion in the nineteenth Century where Britain and Russia were actually at war. Obviously, there is a seeming paradox between prolonged and often high tensions on the one hand, and ninety six years of the century spent formally at peace on the other. The explanations for this are multiple, and doubtless economic and political factors played their part. However, the most significant reason was, perhaps, logistical, summed up in Bismarck's wry observation that 'it is not easy for an elephant to battle with a whale.'¹⁵

In terms of real activity on behalf of Russia, Meininger highlights the contrast epitomised in a figure such as Ignatiev, the long-serving Russian ambassador to the Porte and a notorious Pan-Slav. Although his own views were strongly political, in crises such as the creation of the Bulgarian exarchate in the late 1860s and early 1870s, Ignatiev allowed himself to be ruled by practicalities.¹⁶ This, however, is seen not simply as an example of Realpolitik, but as an awareness of the Russophobe attitudes of the rest of Europe and the consequent difficulty of Russian

¹³ The notion of British and Russian foreign policy interests as being fundamentally incompatible has a long history of being contested as simply a matter of perception see e.g. W. T. Stead (Ed.), *The MP for Russia: Reminiscences and correspondence of Mme. Olga Novikoff*, (London, 1909), pviii., through to Prof. J. Ridley's comments on BBC2's 'Royal Upstairs Downstairs: Hughenden,' Broadcast 9/11/2011.

¹⁴ E.A Freeman, 'The English People in Relation to the Eastern Question,' *The Contemporary Review*, 29 (February 1877), p.491.

¹⁵ Gleason, *Russophobia*, p.289.

¹⁶ Meininger, T.A., *Ignatiev and the establishment of the Bulgarian Exarchate, 1864-1872: a study in personal diplomacy*, (Wisconsin, 1970), p.195.

unilateralism on Slav matters.¹⁷ This notion of Russian activities or motives being perceived as somehow dark or duplicitous has recently received consideration in the work of Brown, who re-examines Said's *Orientalism*. Brown describes Said's classic work as having shown 'how an obtuse and prejudiced ideational construct of the Orient became hegemonic in Western thinking.'¹⁸ He then goes on to show how the corruption of analysis by artificially narrowed parameters of observation affects not only Western consideration of 'the East,' but also of Russia.¹⁹ For western scholars, it is argued, the Russian *volksgeist* of 'sloth, drunkenness and laziness' is regarded as sufficiently universal that all considerations of Russia become viewed through this prism.²⁰ Although the nineteenth century seems to have attributed rather more sinister characteristics to Russia than laziness, the idea that a thoroughly flawed way of thinking can exist on the part of an entire historiography, makes it unsurprising that individuals or even a society might exhibit similar tendencies.

If the historiography of British Russophobia is patchy and politicised, the history of Anglophobia in Russia, in English-language publications at least, is perhaps even more obscure. Figes asserts that it had a 'long tradition' in Russia and cites Russian drunkards in the 1850s who had run out of everyday insults yelling "Palmerston!" and "Napier!" at each other as if they were worse than the devil.²¹ However, beyond this, there is little detail given. Anglo-British contact can be traced back as far as the reign of Ivan IV, but there is little in these early years to suggest great antipathy. Indeed, the Tsar seems to have had plans to marry England's Elizabeth I, albeit plans that were never entertained seriously by the English court and which only received such moderated answers as they did in order to ease the position of British merchants trading in the White Sea.²² Peter I, of course, famously visited Britain during his grand tour of Europe in 1698 and took many ideas and impressions from his visit back to Russia with him. However, a visit between the

¹⁷ Meininger, *Ignatiev and the Bulgarian Exarchate*, p.62.

¹⁸ J.D.J. Brown, 'A Stereotype, wrapped in a cliché, Inside a caricature: Russian Foreign Policy and *Orientalism*,' *Politics*, Vol30(3), 2010, p.149.

¹⁹ *Ibid.*, pp.152-156.

²⁰ Neuman cited in *Ibid.*, p.153.

²¹ Figes, *Crimea*, p.315.

²² H. Troyat, *Ivan the Terrible*, trans. J. Pinkham, (London, 1984), pp.86, 137-141.

two countries is far from a guarantee of a good relationship and the case of Nicholas I shows the potential dangers of personal meetings between sovereigns in an era when the pragmatics of politics and diplomacy were generally conducted by lower-level functionaries. Indeed, Figes asserts that Nicholas I felt he had reached an understanding with Queen Victoria over their future relations, during his visit to Great Britain in 1844. When events and policy did not play out along these lines, Nicholas perceived this as a personal slight and a great deal of the antipathy generated in later years stemmed from this sense of 'betrayal.'²³

Although the relationship between Britain and Russia was a long-established one, the Crimean conflict is a particularly significant moment between the two countries. Whilst Russia had always been something of an outsider to Europe, Crimea marked the first time that a country like Britain had openly sided with the Turks, a non-European, Muslim power, against Russia.²⁴ It is in this light that Figes has tried to portray the growth of Panslavism in Russia as a reaction to the Crimea. Although the Moscow Slavonic Benevolent Committee had existed for several years before the war, the St Petersburg and Kiev branches were only launched in the 1860s and were both a sign of (as well as a further contribution to) the growth of Slavonic sentiment amongst the urban well-to-do.²⁵

Foreign and Domestic Policy

In both Britain and Russia, foreign policy was often driven by a consideration of domestic concerns.²⁶ Indeed, Swartz attributes the breach between Disraeli and Derby during the eastern crisis to the fact that 'Derby, unlike Beaconsfield, did not conceive of the Russo-Turkish war primarily as a domestic political challenge.'²⁷ At the simplest level, the link between Foreign and Domestic affairs may be something as simple as avoiding a war because the domestic economy cannot foot the bill.

²³ Figes, *Crimea*, p.69.

²⁴ One could of course argue that this was not strictly true, given the case of Sweden under Charles XII. However, this represents more of a direct and local power-struggle, and the British case is still a qualitatively different one.

²⁵ Figes, *Crimea*, pp.487-490.

²⁶ D. Geyer, *Russian Imperialism: the interaction of domestic and foreign policy, 1860-1914*, trans Bruce Little, (Leamington Spa, 1987).

²⁷ M. Swartz, *Politics of British Foreign Policy in the Era of Disraeli and Gladstone*, (Oxford, 1985), p.62.

However, of far greater relevance for this study, is the question of how a government's Foreign Policy is perceived by its own electorate or, where an electorate was absent, the influential and politically aware and articulate classes. Britain in the nineteenth century often justified its international actions in reference to its eternal and ill-defined 'interests.' The extent to which a politician was perceived to be acting for or against those interests could have a significant impact upon their fortunes. Undoubtedly, the British politician in the nineteenth century best able to assume the mantle of patriotism was Palmerston. His death in 1865 left something of a void in British politics and it was only in the later 1870s that Disraeli was able to claim the perception of the Conservatives as 'the patriotic party'. Interestingly, although Cunningham has asserted that Disraeli did, indeed, steal the 'language of Patriotism' from Palmerston, Parry believes that he tried and failed, being undermined by popular anti-Semitism at the time.²⁸ How exactly he was able to do this forms a significant part of this chapter. Kovic notes that Disraeli and Palmerston alike both strove to 'resist' public opinion as a concept yet were prepared to 'use patriotism in a demagogic manner.'²⁹ In one sense, Disraeli's positioning during the Eastern Crisis was made possible by Gladstone's decision to stand so firmly on the side not only of the Bulgarians who had suffered in the attacks, but also of the Russians. The extent to which the two causes were synonymous, is of course debatable. For the Russian Press and the literary classes, it was self-evident that the moral cause, and the one most in accord with Christian values, was the Russian one; an assumption which seems to remain underlying even when writers find themselves, or their abstracted notions of 'the people,' in opposition to the government.³⁰ By contrast, the question of an ulterior motive for Russian activity was constant upon the pages of the British Press and, although Gladstone did not defend the Russians with the ferocity that he attacked the Turks, he nonetheless aligned himself with them to a sufficient extent for Disraeli to oppose them simultaneously.

²⁸ J. Parry, *The Politics of Patriotism: English Liberalism National Identity & Europe, 1830-1886*, (Cambridge, 2006), p.324.

²⁹ Kovic, *Disraeli and the Eastern Question*, p.45.

³⁰ F. Dostoevsky, *A Writer's Diary, Translated and Annotated by K Lantz*, (Evanstow, 2000), vol.1, e.g. pp.524, 531; *The Voice*, 'St Petersburg,' 4/5/1876, p.1, Col.B.

Disraeli's comment after Berlin that he had brought back 'peace with honour' identifies neatly the way in which he perceived both his own accomplishments and his objectives at Berlin. Nor was this a viewpoint which he held surreptitiously; on the death of Palmerston, Disraeli gave a speech in which he declared '[I] trust that the time will never come when the love of fame shall cease to be the sovereign passion of our public man.'³¹ Many historians have attested that the likelihood of a European war was all but gone by the time the diplomats assembled for the Congress of Berlin.³² However, Disraeli's principal concern was that the agreement, which would doubtless be reached, would be one that was most visibly in keeping with Britain's honour and, indeed, was one that would be well regarded at home. Gladstone would, of course, have questioned rather strongly his definition of 'honour' and more significantly, perhaps, some historians have questioned the extent to which Disraeli aided or ultimately hampered the cause of the British negotiating team at Berlin. Seton-Watson describes the fears of the rest of the British negotiating team at Disraeli's insistence on leading the negotiations on Batum as they were convinced he had 'never seen a map of Asia Minor.'³³ Sumner has described how Disraeli was the only delegate present who did not speak fluent French, but insisted on conversing in this language anyway, rather than be seen to be ignorant. This led to his agreement that the clause regarding this major Russian Black Sea port be changed from 'exclusivement commerciel' to 'essentiellement commercial' as Disraeli was assured that the two were essentially the same thing.³⁴

Nor was this an isolated incidence of Disraeli's Foreign Policy leaving itself open to the classic 'style over substance' accusations. Eldridge cites the Suez Canal share purchase of 1875, often hailed as a major success of Disraeli's during this period, as a largely pointless gesture, noting that the British government only acquired a 44% stake in the canal, the voting rights of which had already been mortgaged. Furthermore, given that passage of the canal was guaranteed by international

³¹ Kovic, *Disraeli and the Eastern Question*, p.68

³² W.N. Medlicott, *The Congress of Berlin and After: A Diplomatic History of the Near Eastern Settlement 1878-1880*, 2nd Ed. (London, 1963).

³³ R.W. Seton-Watson, *Disraeli, Gladstone and the Eastern question: a Study in Diplomacy and Party Politics*, (London, 1962), p.454.

³⁴ B.H. Sumner, *Russia and the Balkans 1870-1880*, (Oxford, 1937), p.544.

treaty, there was no tangible benefit to the share acquisition whatsoever.³⁵ It is also worth bearing in mind that one of the most credulous believers in the notion that Russian advances in the Balkans somehow threatened British links with India was Queen Victoria herself. During Disraeli's Premiership, she involved herself in policy far more than any other British monarch of the century. In the winter of 1877, she even visited Disraeli at Hughenden to urge him not to falter in pressing the cabinet to adopt a warlike posture towards Russia. Many have also attested to the Queen's personal role in the Imperial Titles Act of 1876 which styled her Empress of India. This was, perhaps, a response to the advice of Major C. David, who had observed earlier that year that only a 'discontented' India would be at all difficult to defend if by 'extraordinary strokes of strategy' an enemy got there at all.³⁶ Indeed, Kovic has argued that Disraeli felt that the title was an 'ideological weapon' which would be highly significant and do much to improve Indian loyalty.³⁷

Russia and Britain in each other's Press, 1875-1878

Moving from the more general aspects of Russo-British relations in the nineteenth century, to the more specific coverage of our period, 1875-1878, it is possible to discern certain trends and patterns in the manner in which events were reported. One of the most significant of these, is the fact that in *The Voice*, Great Britain, or even individual members of the cabinet (most commonly Disraeli but occasionally Derby or Salisbury) were singled out by leaders and editorials as being the figures responsible for the precise state of affairs in Europe at that point in time. This was generally done in the manner of blame, rather than praise. Examples of this can be seen in the spring of 1876, when various last-ditch diplomatic efforts were being made to forestall the outbreak of war between Serbia and Turkey. *The Voice* opened with a front-page condemnation of Great Britain, stating that the British government was opposing 'the whole of Europe,' and that it was nonsense to send the British fleet to the Sea of Marmara purely on the suspicion that current diplomatic activity 'would not achieve its goals.'³⁸ A week or so later, they

³⁵ C.C. Eldridge, *Disraeli and the Rise of a New Imperialism*, (Cardiff, 1996), p.46

³⁶ Major C. David, (Indian Army), *Is a Russian Invasion of India Feasible?* (London, 1877), p.29.

³⁷ Kovic, *Disraeli and the Eastern Question*, pp. 85, 103.

³⁸ *The Voice*, 'St Petersburg,' (19) 31/5/1876, p.1, Col.E.

portrayed the whole of Europe as stuck in limbo waiting for a British decision, something they portrayed as the only practical solution to the 'uncertain political atmosphere of Europe.'³⁹ Throughout the period of the crisis, there was rarely, it seems, any attempt made on the part of the Russian press to distinguish in any way between the British government, press, or people. Indeed, the entirety of Britain could quite easily have been seen by the Russian reading public as a completely homogenous mass, with the sole exceptions of William Gladstone and John Bright.⁴⁰

This trend was taken still further with articles or communications addressed directly to British politicians. An obvious example of this is the 'Letter to Disraeli' which appeared in *The Voice* in August 1876.⁴¹ Despite appearing on the front page of a Russian newspaper, printed in St Petersburg, and unlikely to come immediately to Disraeli's attention, the piece was nonetheless laid out as an ordinary letter, addressed to 'the Minister of Queen Victoria of Great Britain, and Empress of India,' and signed off from A. Gradovskii, 'professor of St. Petersburg University, and perhaps also, unknown to you.'⁴² However, this structure was somewhat undermined by the opening line 'you understand, of course, that this letter to you is not, in reality, a letter.' After a short discussion of literary technique and the reasons for his self-contradiction, Gradovskii moves on to the reason for writing his letter, namely the British refusal to endorse the Berlin Memorandum. This, he argues, was a significant moment, as Disraeli 'brought light to that place, where previously darkness had reigned.' This rather over-the-top phraseology is used to convey the clarity with which Disraeli's actions (Gradovskii seems either unwilling or unable to distinguish between the personal activities of Disraeli and the acts of the British government) have shown 'exactly what Russia can expect from Europe' when there is a conflict between the cause of persecuted Christians and perceived 'national interests.'⁴³ When the crisis began, Gradovskii concedes, the British and the Germans were the first to show enthusiasm for the rebel cause, and certainly

³⁹ *The Voice*, 'St Petersburg,' (29/5) 10/6/1876, p.1, Col.B.

⁴⁰ *The Voice*, 'Foreign News,' (8) 20/1/1878, p.4, Col.E.

⁴¹ *The Voice*, 'Letter to Disraeli,' (3) 15/8/1876, p.1, Col.A.

⁴² *The Voice*, 'letter to Disraeli', p.1, Col.E.

⁴³ *Ibid.*

more actively than the Russians. However, this quickly turned cold, with many German publications already denouncing the rebels and the British government ensuring a terrible fate for the South Slavs, by virtue of their policy of non-interference.⁴⁴ The superficial assertion of the article is simple: that Russia is the true friend of the South Slavs, and that Britain, personified by Disraeli, has acted immorally by failing to support the Slavs and by allowing their 'interests' to dictate policy.

However, there are still some questions about the article which need to be addressed: Given the immediate admission that the letter is not really a letter, it seems highly unlikely that Gradvskii's genuine intention was to alert Disraeli regarding his feelings and to affect a change in British governmental policy. In that case, the assumption must be that Gradvskii's true target audience was the actual readers of *The Voice*, a section of the educated, newspaper-reading classes of St. Petersburg. In this context, it becomes highly significant that Disraeli, and more generally Great Britain, is the 'other' against which he chooses to define himself and, by implication, Russia. Russia's actions (or at this point, more pertinently, inactions) are justified by reference to the behaviour of Great Britain. Passive inactivity is shown as being superior to the measured inactivity of Great Britain, as it offers hope for some kind of ultimate activity to emerge.

As a brief aside, it is worthwhile considering to what extent, if any, the choice of Disraeli is significant. Why not an open letter to 'the British people,' 'the British government,' or even Queen Victoria? There are a number of possible answers to this: one is that Disraeli, by virtue of his previous politics was seen as a recognisably anti-Russian figure within the British establishment, and was thus an ideal choice for a negative personification of Britain. It is also possible however, that Disraeli was singled out due to his ancestry. Disraeli was, of course, the most prominent Jew in the Eastern Crisis, and it is worth considering for a moment whether this was a significant factor in the decision being taken to single him out for particular vilification? Until recently, there has been a decided paucity in the amount of attention given to Disraeli's Jewishness, particularly in relation to his Foreign and

⁴⁴ Ibid.

Imperial policy.⁴⁵ However, it seems that there may well be a case for arguing both that Disraeli's targeting during the Eastern Crisis was, in some measure, anti-Semitic, and a case for re-considering the belief that has been perpetuated ever since the 1870s that Disraeli's apparent Russophobia may in some way have been fuelled by his Jewishness. The most obvious instance of a Russian fixating upon Disraeli's Jewishness can be found in 1878, when Olga Novikov compared the Prime Minister to a notorious Biblical infanticide, claiming that even Disraeli recognised that there was room enough in Asia for Russia and Britain, so why did the anti-Russian campaigners try to 'out Herod Herod?'⁴⁶

It is difficult to discern the sentiments of the Russian Press on this matter. Unlike *The Times*, *The Voice* did not publish a regular selection of readers' letters and few opportunities were given for these individuals to express their views. The editorial stance of *The Voice* overall does not seem to suggest any particular invective against the Jews; they were often mentioned anecdotally, but rarely as a target of anger. Likewise, Dostoevskii, whose writer's Diary has been heavily criticised during this period for the strong anti-Semitic sentiments it expressed, was, in fact, ethnically speaking, a model of courtesy when it came to Disraeli.⁴⁷ In June 1876, asserting that Russia would act honourably, but that England would not, he referred simply to 'England's prime minister,' hardly an abusive form of address by anyone's standards.⁴⁸ In the September of the same year, Dostoevskii returned to Disraeli and spent several pages denouncing him as a *piccola bestia* and generally as a dissimulating cad. However, once again, he is relatively moderate in his language. He notes, perhaps needlessly, that Disraeli is 'an Israelite by birth,' but otherwise

⁴⁵ Endelman and Kushner's recent volume has considered a broad sweep of aspects of Disraeli's life which were impacted by his Jewishness, and Wohl has shown the degree to which he often found himself subjected to anti-Semitic prejudices. Endelman and Kushner also note that Blake ignored Disraeli's Jewishness entirely and disparaged Shannon for his dismissal of anti-Semitism in the atrocities movement as 'prominent but superficial.' T.M. Endelman & T. Kushner (Eds.), *Disraeli's Jewishness*, (London, 2002); A.S. Wohl, "'Dizzi ben Dizzi': Disraeli as Alien," *Journal of British Studies*, (July, 1995), pp.375-411; for an example of the sort of anti-Semitic material appearing about Disraeli at this time, see 'Dizzi-Ben-Dizzi; or, The Orphan of Baghdad,' in M. Partridge & R. Gaunt (Eds.), *Lives of Victorian Political Figures 1: Volume 2 Benjamin Disraeli (Part 1)*, (London, 2006), pp.361-372.

⁴⁶ O. Novikov, *Is Russia Wrong?* 2nd Ed., (London, 1878), p.112.

⁴⁷ G.S. Morson, 'Introductory Study: Dostoevsky's Great Experiment,' in Dostoevsky, *Writer's Diary*, p.37.

⁴⁸ Dostoevsky, *Writer's Diary*, p.524.

refers to him simply as 'Viscount Beaconsfield,' 'Mr. Beaconsfield,' or just plain 'Beaconsfield' after the title which Disraeli adopted, on elevation to the House of Lords in August 1876.⁴⁹ Once again, these are moderate words, given that Dostoevskii was in the habit of referring to Jews simply as 'Yids.'⁵⁰ Given Morson's assertion that the 'fanatic anti-Semitism' which characterised the 1877 *Writer's Diary* was uncharacteristic of Dostoevskii, and influenced by millenarian excitement, Disraeli seems to have been remarkably decently treated in the writer's diatribes.⁵¹

However, whilst Disraeli may have escaped the worst excesses of racial slur from the Russian press, the same could not be said in Britain. Wohl cites Stead, who claimed in his *Northern Echo*, that Disraeli's foreign Policy amounted to a declaration of 'death to the Christians!'⁵² This came in addition to a large number of cartoons, in magazines such as *Fun*, and *Punch*, which played strongly upon Disraeli's ethnicity, caricaturing him as Shylock or even the Devil. More measured, and perhaps more considered, attacks could be found within the assertions in the *Fortnightly Review* to Disraeli's 'Jewish Blood' as being the key to his Foreign Policy.⁵³

It appears that, at least in elements of the St Petersburg Press, Russian morality was being framed in terms of reference to British action. Interestingly, this does not seem to have been the case to the same extent in the literary 'thick' journals, which focused their energies instead upon the Crisis more directly. By contrast, the British Press of this period did little to suggest that British morality was defined in reference to Russian activity. However, this is certainly not to say that there were no elements within British society who articulated the view that any action which opposed Russia was inherently a positive one. As noted above, one of the most

⁴⁹ Ibid., p.608.

⁵⁰ This is the habitual translation of the Russian word 'Zhid,' which some have argued should not be equated exactly with the (supposedly) more offensive English word 'Yid.' However, the very fact that Dostoevskii feels the need to justify his use of the word shows that even in Russia in 1877, the word was not free of connotation or controversy; Dostoevskii, *Writer's Diary*, vol.2, p.902.

⁵¹ G.S. Morson, 'Introductory Study: Dostoevsky's Great Experiment,' in Dostoevsky, *Writer's Diary*, p.37.

⁵² Wohl, 'Ben Juju,' p.117.

⁵³ Wohl, 'Ben Juju,' p.106.

vocal critics of Russia in British Society, particularly when the Russian gaze fell upon Turkey, had long been David Urquhart. Urquhart's death in 1877 precluded his particular brand of vocal action in the latter stages of the crisis, but the Foreign Affairs committees which he had set up in the decades before still served as rallying points for those supporting a belligerently pro-Turkish foreign policy.⁵⁴ *The Times* carried only a short obituary for Urquhart, but in doing so, they not only acknowledged how many people he had won to his cause, namely 'constant war in the region of opinion against the designs of Russia,' but perhaps more significantly how, 'his ideas seem to have transformed themselves into some powerful organs of English opinion, so that in listening to the *Pall Mall Gazette* and the *Morning Post*, we often seem to be hearing the very utterances of Mr Urquhart.'⁵⁵ Although the *Times* article is typically moderate, it is still possible to detect here a note of concern that the mainstream press is representing such extremist views. Urquhart's name would continue to be used by those discussing the crisis for the following year or so. About a month after the obituary, Vernon Harcourt labelled the 'Russo-phobist journals' of the 'alarmist press' as the 'legitimate heirs of the late Mr David Urquhart's mantle,' and derided the nonsensical and patronising attitude adopted by a supposedly 'intelligent Press ... to an educated people.'⁵⁶ Given that Harcourt was a former cabinet colleague of Gladstone and had been a vocal atrocities campaigner the previous year, the fact that he talks disapprovingly of Urquhart is hardly surprising.⁵⁷ However, the fact that such a figure continues to be invoked after his death offers some testament to the notoriety he had achieved.

Despite Harcourt's assertion, there were others writing at this time who also appeared to be laying claim to Urquhart's mantle; few more energetically so than Augustus Daly. An otherwise little-known figure, Daly published two titles in 1877, both containing virulent attacks against Russia. The first, *The duty of Civilised Europe on the Settlement of the Eastern Question: or the Warning Cry to Russia*

⁵⁴ M. Taylor, 'Urquhart, David (1805-1877),' *ODNB*. [accessed 10 Nov 2011].

⁵⁵ *The Times*, 'The Late Mr David Urquhart,' 28/5/1877, p.11, Col.C.

⁵⁶ *The Times*, 'British Interests' (Letters to the Editor), 16/6/1877, p.12, Col.B.

⁵⁷ P. Stansky, 'Harcourt, Sir William George Granville Venables Vernon (1827-1904),' *Oxford National Dictionary of Biography*, (Oxford, 2004), [<http://www.oxforddnb.com/view/article/33693>, accessed 10 Nov 2011].

contrasted the 'far-seeing and unswerving' Disraeli with the 'uncharitable' 'embarrassment' Gladstone as the latter allowed himself to be taken in whilst the former saw through the disguise that Russia was the true 'aggressor.'⁵⁸ The second work, *Greater Lessons in Massacre: a reply to the right honourable W.E. Gladstone M.P.* was a more personal piece in nature which opened with a strong defence of its own lack of vindictiveness and a concern for brevity, conceding that it had been 'unwillingly compelled' to 'strong' language by the need to offer a reasoned counter to those who had 'spoken so forcibly in favour of the Russian cause, and so harshly, and unjustly, against that of Turkey.'⁵⁹ The two publications shared some traits, blaming Russia for a diverse list of crimes of varying plausibility, including oppression in Poland, the lack of reforms in Turkey, starting the Bosnian revolt, and knouting prisoners to death.⁶⁰ However, it was the second publication which was clearly the more enraged of the two, being littered with half-page sentences, assertions that Gorchakov's father was almost certainly the devil, and bold pronouncements that in all international disputes the 'criminals are the RUSSIANS' who, wherever they encountered other races, 'BUTCHERED THEM IN COLD BLOOD.'⁶¹ Indeed, he even went so far as to compile a list of the greatest villains of history: Tiberius, Caligula, Nero, Domitian, Carracalla, Ivan the Terrible, and Ignatius Loyola. A fearsome group no doubt, but none were as bad as Alexander II!⁶² At this time, it was also possible to find in London documents such as the (conveniently) anonymous *Russian Intrigues: Secret despatches of General Ignatiev and Consular Agents of the Great Panславic Societies*.⁶³ This collection offered, its preface explained, proof of Russia's guilt in the great conspiracy which had been so long suspected, by means of a series of documents purchased by a Turkish ambassador in Vienna from a corrupt Russian official. The conclusion of this piece was that the

⁵⁸ A.A. Daly, *The duty of civilised Europe on the settlement of the eastern question or the Warning Cry to Russia*, (London, 1877), pp.1-2.

⁵⁹ A.A. Daly, *Greater Lessons in Massacre: a reply to the right honourable W.E. Gladstone M.P.* (London, 1877).

⁶⁰ Daly, *Warning Cry to Russia*, pp.13, 18; *Greater Lessons in Massacre*, pp.10, 40-42.

⁶¹ Daly, *Greater Lessons in Massacre*, pp.3, 19, 21, 27, 31.

⁶² *Ibid.*, p.35.

⁶³ *Russian Intrigues: Secret despatches of General Ignatiev and Consular Agents of the Great Panславic Societies*, (London, 1877).

very word ‘Russophobic’ was now meaningless as the guilt had been proven.⁶⁴ It is, of course, difficult to assess what impact these publications may have had at the time – they certainly did not warrant review in *The Times* – but, nonetheless, they provide an insight into some of the more extreme opinions which were at least finding their way into print at this time.

An earlier chapter has already mentioned the actions of Olga Novikov, the Russian ex-patriot resident in London whom Disraeli once dubbed ‘the MP for Russia.’ Having seen some of the materials that were being directed against the Russian point of view at this time, this is an appropriate point to consider in more detail her pamphlet *Is Russia Wrong?*⁶⁵ Written in defence of Russian aims at the height of this crisis and its attendant anti-Russian atmosphere, it provides an insight into the charges being levelled against Russia from the perspective of a Russian who was in far closer contact with Britain than most of her compatriots. The pamphlet is a collection of letters all of which go some way towards providing an answer, (in the negative) to her book’s eponymous title. At its worst, the pamphlet hawks the lazy stereotypes that were the bane of the Crisis on all sides, such as the question ‘why do the Russians hate the Turks? – because they know them.’⁶⁶ By and large, however, the pamphlet offers reasoned defences of particular actions, and seeks to undermine the foundation of ignorance upon which she argues Russophobia was built – an example of this can be seen when she highlights Tennyson’s attempt to condemn Russia for use of the knout, fifteen years after it had been illegalised.⁶⁷ Ultimately, though, however measured the majority of her arguments were, it is difficult to discern what impact the pamphlet actually had. It quickly ran to a second edition, but even this news was only communicated to the world via a tiny announcement in the ‘classified’ section of *The Times* and, once that had failed to generate interest, a follow-up a week or so later.⁶⁸ Whilst the pamphlet was doubtless read keenly by Gladstone and other like-minded individuals, but this must

⁶⁴ Ibid., pp.iv-vi, 69.

⁶⁵ Mentioned above, pp.131, 140.

⁶⁶ O. Novikov, *Is Russia Wrong?* 2nd Ed., (London, 1878), p.69.

⁶⁷ Ibid, pp.81-82.

⁶⁸ *The Times*, ‘Classified Advertising,’ 17/1/1878, p.15, Col.E; 22/1/1878, p.15, Col.D.

largely be seen as a case of preaching to the converted.⁶⁹ Dealing with the question of poor behaviour on the part of some of the Slavs demanding liberation, she adopted the familiar approach that this was due to the Turkish mis-rule they had suffered and that, in the words of Lord Russell, 'it would indeed be a hopeless case for mankind if despotism were thus allowed to take advantage of its own wrong.'⁷⁰ However, there is nothing, either here or elsewhere, to suggest that she reached or convinced anyone who had not been similarly swayed already by Russell's original pronouncement.⁷¹

It is important to keep in mind the degree to which perspectives have changed between the time at which these events in the Balkans were happening and the present day. Modern accounts of the Treaty of San Stefano invariably paint it as a picture of excess, as contrasted with the more moderate arrangement created by the Congress of Berlin.⁷² Novikov's work however, offers a fascinating insight into the brief period between the two treaties, when the San Stefano treaty did not have the Berlin settlement to be compared with. In *Friends or Foes*, the sequel to *Is Russia Wrong?* Novikov cited San Stefano as the ultimate vindication of Russia's long-held claims of disinterest regarding territory in the Balkans, feeling that the treaty showed 'a magnanimity which is almost criminal' in having left European Turkey in existence.⁷³ Indeed, the original letter to *The Northern Echo* had expressed a confidence that the European conference which was in gestation was bound to expand upon and improve the 'humble half-measure,' which was followed in the printed compilation by an angry footnote remarking that the situation had only been made worse.⁷⁴ The attitudes expressed to the treaty at this time were, of course, varied, and it would be unsurprising to discover that 'the Pan-Slav

⁶⁹ Gladstone did not make any direct reference in his Diary to the pamphlet, but did repeatedly note meetings and correspondence with Novikov during this period.

⁷⁰ Novikov, *Is Russia wrong?* p.119.

⁷¹ See also above, pp.80-82.

⁷² Glenny, *The Balkans*, p.133.

⁷³ O. Novikov, *Friends or Foes, A sequel to 'Is Russia Wrong?'*, (London, 1878), p.8.

⁷⁴ *Ibid.*, pp.8-9.

temptress' was expressing a thoroughly different perspective from the British mainstream.⁷⁵




Figure 2: 'Bulgaria according to the Treaties of San Stefano and Berlin.'⁷⁶

Beyond the general attitudes expressed towards Russia in the British Press, and the reactions to the people who expressed them most strongly, it is interesting to consider how the British Press at this time dealt with the military noises emanating

⁷⁵ R. Millman, *Britain and the Eastern Question 1875-78*, (Oxford, 1979), p.238.

⁷⁶ http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/File:Bulgaria_San_Stefano_Berlin_1878_TB.png [accessed 9/2/2011.]

from Russia. The opinion of *The Times* is perhaps best summed up in an article of August 1876, entitled 'Russian Opinion on the War.' This article reprinted a fairly large section of text from *The Voice* in which the demand for autonomy for the Christian provinces of Turkey was made and, perhaps more pertinently, the fact was noted that a failure to realise this would inevitably lead to Russian military intervention against Turkey.⁷⁷ However, whilst the article was discussed, and deemed to be both a significant and an 'authentic announcement of [Russian] views and opinions' the ultimate conclusion was that 'this sensational article is, after all, no more than a fortissimo accompaniment to a much more moderate diplomatic campaign.'⁷⁸ In other words, although the Russian Press might have gone beyond the government in terms of what they were prepared to state, demand and threaten publically, the contemporary view, at least in *The Times*, was that they were still simply providing an 'accompaniment,' to the official line, not pursuing their own course of action, or advancing a programme beyond that intended by the Russian state. Furthermore, the characterisation of the Russian diplomatic campaign as 'moderate' suggests that whilst *The Times* may well not have shared the political conclusions or aspirations of Russian Foreign Policy at this time, they were a long way from condemning Russian diplomacy out of hand, or from dismissing it as a mere smoke-screen.

We know for certain that Britain had been considering, from as early as the autumn of 1876, whether military action would be necessary to prevent a Russian domination of the Turkish principalities, although it is unclear to what extent the logistical implications of this were ever followed through.⁷⁹ Likewise, the Russia government would not have been idle in considering the implications of alarming Britain. Indeed, Jelavich and Jelavich note that in May 1877, before the Russo-Turkish War even broke out Shuvalov, the Russian Ambassador to London, had returned to St Petersburg in order to impress upon his superiors the dangers

⁷⁷ *The Times*, 'Russian Opinion on the War,' 2/8/1876, p.4, Col.F.

⁷⁸ Ibid.

⁷⁹ TNA, War Office Records, *The Steps which Russia would take should she determine to occupy the Principalities in the Spring*, (Section D, Intelligence Branch, 1876), WO 33/28.

inherent in British suspicion of Russian intentions.⁸⁰ At a time when the Russian Press was talking vaguely about the preparedness of 'all layers of society' to make sacrifices for the War, and had barely begun to speculate on what the war would bring, Russian diplomats were already well aware, not only of plans closely resembling the Treat of San Stefano, but also the sort of consolations Britain was likely to require, in order to accept them.⁸¹ However, such activities were insufficient to quell the fears of all elements within British society, and thus there remained a significant portion who were prepared to voice loudly their opposition to Russia and its Balkan policies.

Jingoism

Perhaps the most significant group of Russophobes in Britain, at this time, were the 'Jingoes,' taking their name from the lyrics of a popular music-hall song by G.H. MacDermott, cited at the start of this chapter.

The juxtaposition of 'true' and 'Constantinople' as a rhyme suggests that the song's popularity was not derived from its musical merits and thus it seems that the boisterous renditions which it enjoyed stemmed largely from sympathy with the sentiment it expressed. However, whilst this song is often cited in accounts of the time, Eldridge downplays its significance, citing an 'anti-Jingo' song which often shared the same bill and was sung with equal gusto.⁸² However, the song remains thoroughly obscure and any attempt to track it down is far more likely to turn up MacDermott's original. Furthermore, 'the Great MacDermott' as he was increasingly known after this period is regarded as having 'become a household name' on the back of this significant commercial success and would later produce a further war song, and a pair of eulogies to Disraeli, both of which strengthened the Liberal accusations that he was in the pay of the Conservative Party. No such claims

⁸⁰ B. Jelavich C. Jelavich (Eds.), *Russia in the East 1876-1880: The Russo Turkish War and the Kuldja Crisis as seen through the letters of A.G. Jomini to n.K. Giers*, (Leiden, 1959) pp.36-37

⁸¹ *The Voice*, 'Home news,' (30/5) 11/6/1877, p.2, Col.B; Jelavich and Jelavich, *Russia in the East*, p.37.

⁸² Eldridge, *Disraeli and the Rise of a New Imperialism*, p.69.

can be made about the anonymous author of Eldridge's alleged riposte.⁸³ Although the song is clearly the source of the term, the first use of it to refer to the 'rowdy supporters of a strong foreign policy' who made up the movement, was in a letter by G.J. Holyoake to *The Daily News* in March 1878.⁸⁴ The term has since spread far beyond the Music Hall to refer to any zealous advocate of a militaristic foreign policy, but here we shall be concerned simply with the original group to whom the name was given.

The most significant body of research produced on the subject of Jingoism, in its original sense, is that of Hugh Cunningham, whose work is unique in focusing upon the Jingoists themselves, rather than those they came into conflict with. Aside from the core studies of the atrocity campaign noted above, Laity's work on the British Peace movement is perhaps the best example of this, viewing the Jingoists through the eyes of those whom they attacked.⁸⁵ It is indicative of the level of attention which the birth of Jingoism has received, that Cunningham's work consists primarily of a journal article and that the fuller consideration of the topic can only be found in his unpublished DPhil thesis.⁸⁶ Cunningham cites Holyoake, who described the Jingoists as being broadly derided by members of respectable society as those 'habitués of the turf, the tap-room, and the low music halls, whose inspiration is beer, whose politics are swagger, and whose policy is to insult foreign nations.'⁸⁷

Although the term 'Jingo' is perhaps anachronistic before March 1878, public protest against Russia, against the Atrocities campaign, and against any calls for a peaceful solution to Europe's problems more generally, had been observable long before this. Laity notes that, even as far back as November 1876, there had been instances of hecklers at Peace Society meetings shouting their 'rowdy cheers for Beaconsfield.'⁸⁸ Nor is it truly possible to pinpoint the moment at which this early enthusiasm crystallised into the Jingo movement: as might be expected of a

⁸³ D. Russell, 'MacDermott, Gilbert Hasting, (1845?-1901),' *Oxford National Dictionary of Biography*, (Oxford, 2004), [<http://www.oxforddnb.com/view/article/34697>, accessed 10 Nov 2011].

⁸⁴ H. Cunningham, 'Jingoism in 1877-78,' *Victorian Studies*, Vol. 14, no.4, (Jun 1971), p.429.

⁸⁵ See above, pp.28-30.

⁸⁶ H.S. Cunningham, *British Public Opinion and the Eastern Question*, (University of Sussex, Unpublished DPhil thesis, 1969).

⁸⁷ Cunningham, 'Jingoism,' p.430.

⁸⁸ P. Laity, *The British Peace Movement 1870-1914*, (Oxford, 2001), p.70.

movement named for a song, by a letter to a newspaper, Jingoism itself never actually existed as a formal entity. However, this is not to say that there were no official organisations which could be associated with the Jingo movement. Laity identifies Maltman Barry as one of the key figures of Jingoism and notes that, through him, the Manhood Suffrage League, of which he was secretary at the time, became heavily involved in the agitation, although this proved a sufficiently unpopular course of action that it ultimately led to the untimely collapse of the League.⁸⁹ Furthermore, the very fact of Barry's leadership of, at least elements of, the movement has led some to dismiss its significance.⁹⁰ Formerly a Marxist, and indeed a personal friend of Marx, the 1870s saw Barry's hatred of the Liberals drive him ever-closer to the Tories before the Eastern Crisis saw him reach a pinnacle of Russophobia and led to the foundation of the 'National Society for the Resistance of Russian Aggression and the Protection of British Interests in the East.'⁹¹ Cunningham notes that the National Society was formed in August 1877 but that, despite the best efforts of the 'notorious' Barry, it attracted no meaningful degree of public attention until December, when the fall of Plevna (combined with the news that Parliament was to be recalled) bestirred the public imagination.⁹² Independent of Barry, Laity also highlights links between Jingoism and the Turkish Defence Association as well as, more improbably, the Polish society of the White Eagle.⁹³

The Jingo movement seems throughout the period 1877-78 to have been characterised by violence and disorder, beginning with little more than anarchic attempts to disrupt meetings of the atrocity campaign by sheer volume of noise. In February and March of 1878, they turned their attentions more violently and deliberately towards Gladstone, three times attacking his house. Auguste Schluter, maid to Gladstone's daughters, described them on February second as a 'dreadful

⁸⁹ Laity, *The British Peace Movement*, p.71.

⁹⁰ Cunningham, *British Public Opinion*, p.114.

⁹¹ R. McWilliam, 'Barrie, Michael Maltman (1842-1909),' *Oxford National Dictionary of Biography*, (Oxford, 2004), [<http://www.oxforddnb.com/view/article/42331>, accessed 4 Nov 2011], Born 'Barry' the adoption of the alternate form 'Barrie' occurred sometime in the 1880s and thus 'Barry' will be used in this work.

⁹² Cunningham, 'Jingoism,' p.431.

⁹³ Laity, *The British Peace Movement*, pp.??; see below, pp.202-204.

crowd of people ... groaning and lifting their fists towards our windows.'⁹⁴ Gladstone himself noted in his diary on February twenty-fourth that the house had been attacked and that the windows had been broken amid 'much hooting.'⁹⁵ The windows were smashed again in early March, an action Laity has suggested may even have been urged upon the mob by Tory headquarters.⁹⁶ By contrast, Cunningham implies that this may simply have been a general outburst of anti-Gladstonian feeling, claiming that Charles Stuart Parnell and his sister were amongst the crowd of window-breakers.⁹⁷ The Workmen's Peace Association dismissed the Jingoists as not being 'artisans and mechanics' like themselves, but 'swells and roughs.'⁹⁸ Interestingly, Gladstone himself seems to have been reasonably untroubled by the March attacks, noting in his diary that the crowd had been 'held off by police.'⁹⁹

Of course, in a study of Press portrayals, the most important question to consider is the extent to which, and indeed the manner in which, these Jingoists were reported upon by the British Press at the time. The answer to this appears to be 'surprisingly little.' *The Times* did show a certain, limited, awareness of the phenomenon, recounting during their lengthy report on the vote of credit in February 1878 how The Liberal MP, William Lawson had asserted that 'Her Majesty's Government seemed to have been animated by the spirit of the song...'¹⁰⁰ That same April, they also recounted a speech by the Earl of Rosebery, which referenced 'the "By-Jingo" cries of the London music-halls and the metropolitan agitation,' and in May a cry of 'The Jingoists' was recounted as having been uttered by an anonymous heckler during a speech on the Eastern Question by Jacob Bright.¹⁰¹ However, the phrase did not appear directly from the pens of any of their reporters. This is not to say that the activities of the pro-war protestors went entirely unmentioned or unnoticed, merely that the term with which they have become synonymous in the

⁹⁴ M. Duncan (Ed), *A Lady's Maid in Downing Street 1877-1896*, (London, 1922), p.21.

⁹⁵ *Gladstone Diaries*, v.ix, p.293.

⁹⁶ Duncan, *A Lady's Maid in Downing Street*, p.21, Laity, *The British Peace Movement*, p.72.

⁹⁷ Cunningham, 'Jingoism,' p.442.

⁹⁸ Laity, *The British Peace Movement*, pp.

⁹⁹ *Gladstone Diaries*, v.ix, p.297.

¹⁰⁰ *The Times*, 'House of Commons, Thursday January 31,' 1/1/1878, p.6, Col.E.

¹⁰¹ *The Times*, 'The Eastern Question,' 25/4/1878, p.5, Col.E; 'The Eastern Question,' 1/5/1878, p.12, Col.A.

historiography was one which appears to have had little currency for contemporaries.

In the dying hours of 1877, *The Times* carried a report on an attempt by the National Society for the Resistance of Russian Aggression and the Protection of British Interests in the East to stage an anti-Russian demonstration in Trafalgar Square.¹⁰² The meeting has been described since as a 'fiasco' and the report was quite unequivocal in its attitude towards the Society, describing the result of their attempts as 'a display of unseemly ruffianism and a decided demonstration of feeling against any interference on the part of England in support of the Turk.'¹⁰³ This, it will be remembered, is the newspaper which had supposedly 'turned Turk' earlier in the Crisis, and should supposedly have been encouraging exactly the sort of thing which this demonstration was campaigning for.¹⁰⁴ *The Times* went on to describe how the Society, led by Lord Stratheden and Campbell, had placarded London with 'pretensions' that the movement had sprung organically from the working classes, an affront which had prompted public meetings in Finsbury, Southwark and West London, to organise a counter-protest, far more effective than the original. This counter-protest was summoned by a handbill which demanded 'Will you allow the Tories and Turcophiles to sacrifice on the altar of their ambition another 100,000 of your fellow-workers' lives and another 200 millions of your hard earnings, in order to maintain in Europe the abominable tyranny of the unspeakable Turk?'¹⁰⁵ The reporting of this event was highly significant, as although the demands and speeches of the anti-Russian society were reported by *The Times*, it was in an article which lambasted them as ruffians, questioned their integrity, and also stated the objections of their opponents. In sharp contrast, the very next column reported a meeting of the Workmen's Peace Association, characterised by little more boisterousness than 'warm cheers' and which stated their aim in a

¹⁰² *The Times*, 'Trafalgar Square Demonstrations,' 31/12/1877, p.6, Col.E.

¹⁰³ Cunningham, 'Jingoism,' p.431, *Times*, 'Trafalgar Square Demonstrations.'

¹⁰⁴ See above, p102.

¹⁰⁵ *The Times*, 'Trafalgar Square Demonstrations.'

fashion entirely likely to evoke, if not sympathy with, at the very least respect for, this organisation and its goals.¹⁰⁶

Cunningham sees the end of 1877 as coinciding neatly with the end of this first phase of the agitation, and the movement towards a broader based campaign, inspired by the 'more potent' forces of 'anti-Gladstonism and Conservative nationalism.'¹⁰⁷ The 'turning point' in his mind came in Sheffield at the very end of January 1878 when, he says, a public meeting refused to let the Liberals (who had organised the meeting) speak and instead passed an amendment in favour of the government. *The Times* coverage of the meeting offers far less indication that anything significant had transpired and, despite noting that the 'proceedings throughout were of a disorderly character,' they printed the Liberal motion that was proposed: one in favour of peace, and then simply noted that an amendment was successfully carried, favouring peace 'if it can be done consistently with the honour and the interests of the British Empire.'¹⁰⁸ This was a visible defeat for the Peace Movement, but was not regarded as significant, judging from its placement in the second half of an article near the bottom of page ten. Cunningham does, however, regard them as the spark that kindled a series of further meetings which provided the core of the Jingo campaign.¹⁰⁹

Returning to the formal organisations who participated in the Jingo meetings, the Polish Society for the White Eagle received scant coverage on the pages of *The Times*. In October 1877, sandwiched between a report on the weather the Prince of Wales was experiencing in Scotland and a list of the following day's preachers at St. Paul's, *The Times* noted 'we are asked to state that the Anglo-Polish society of the "white eagle" is now collecting funds to equip a complete ambulance train to be attached to the Turkish army.'¹¹⁰ Aside from noting that this medical enterprise was to be staffed entirely by Polish individuals, and providing an address for those wishing to send contributions, this was the full extent of the article and permits

¹⁰⁶ Ibid., p.6, Col.F.

¹⁰⁷ Cunningham, 'Jingoism,' p.432.

¹⁰⁸ *The Times*, 'England and the War,' 30/1/1878, p.10, Col.C.

¹⁰⁹ Cunningham, Jingoism, p.437.

¹¹⁰ *The Times*, 'The Prince of Wales,' 13/10/1877, p.5, Col.F.

little in the way of further comment. A few months later, the head of the society, Major Wierzbicki, published an announcement in *The Times* which shed a little more light on the nature of the organisation, consisting as it did of an acknowledgement from the Porte of a message of goodwill and 'of the sympathy of the society for the Ottoman Empire in its struggle with the common enemy.'¹¹¹ Once again, this article is simultaneously unremarkable and yet quite significant, the first for showing that a group of Polish exiles regarded Russia as 'the enemy,' the latter for the fact that, despite this latest article being an expression of animosity and belligerence towards another Power with whom Britain was still at peace, *The Times* still chose to carry it, albeit for only a few column inches near the bottom of page ten.

The third and final time that *The Times* reported upon the activities of the society of the 'White Eagle,' during the crisis, came on the occasion of a public meeting in February 1878. This time, there was an element of conflict once more to the proceedings, as the 'Anti-Russian' meeting clashed with the 'peace' meeting, both being held simultaneously in Hyde Park.¹¹² The article, moderately lengthy, described in some detail the course of the various meetings: broadly speaking an anti-Russian meeting, the beginnings of a Peace meeting, the arrival there of the first meeting, a general melee, and then a march through the streets of London by the anti-Russian faction, ultimately arriving at Downing Street, where they presented the resolutions of their meeting, via a number of intermediaries, to Lord Beaconsfield. Again, the tone of the article is broadly plain and descriptive, although a few hints may be glimpsed as to the possible sympathies of the author. Great attention is given to the various individuals who made up the crowds and the anti-Russians are seen to be split between 'very respectable people, including some well-dressed young men in organised bodies,' and 'roughs.' By contrast, the peace movement is depicted as containing 'many working men's leaders.' Although the greater social respectability of at least the first part of the anti-Russian group is made clear, and would doubtless have been more a note of commendation to a

¹¹¹ *The Times*, 'Poland and Turkey,' 12/10/1877, p.10, Col.C.

¹¹² *The Times*, 'The Hyde Park Meeting,' 25/2/1878, p.10, Col.A.

nineteenth century audience than to a modern-day one, the contrast between the 'working-men's leaders,' on the one hand, and the 'roughs,' on the other, must be considered, even amongst Victorian educated society, to have given clear implications as to which group of people was best qualified to speak on behalf of 'the people' of Great Britain, as both attempted to do. Aside from the nameless masses, there were individual spokespersons for both sides, namely Lt. Armit, Colonel Coope, Major Durrant and 'Mr Bartlett' on the anti-Russian side and 'The Hon. Auberon Herbert, Mr Bradlaugh, and the Rev. Mr Staunton of St. Albans.' Obviously it was a matter of personal opinion which of these groups of figures is considered to be the more impressive: the Peace movement would doubtless have looked dubiously upon the opinions of three commissioned officers regarding the avoidance of war, much as the anti-Russian party would have questioned the place of a Vicar to speak on matters of Foreign Policy. None of the officers appear to have impacted upon the historical consciousness beyond this meeting, although Sir Ellis Bartlett would be rewarded by Disraeli with the 'pocket borough' of Eye a few years later for his vociferous anti-Russian activity at this time.¹¹³ Indeed, Cunningham notes how Bartlett wrote to Montagu Corry, Disraeli's private secretary, detailing the assistance that he had provided at this time.¹¹⁴ The Peace movement had probably the higher-profile team of speakers, although something of a contrast in terms of their respectability; in Herbert a former Nottingham MP, drawn out of retirement by this particular issue, and in Bradlaugh a Radical Freethinker who had only avoided prison the previous year on a technicality, following his collaboration with Annie Beasant to republish an 'obscene' pamphlet on birth-control.¹¹⁵

However, despite the contrasting ways in which the two movements are portrayed, the most overwhelming sentiment which the *Times* article conveys, is general indifference. This may seem somewhat bizarre as an observation in reference to a

¹¹³ J.P. Anderson, 'Bartlett, Sir Ellis Ashmead (1849-1902),' rev. H.C.G. Matthew, *Oxford Dictionary of National Biography*, (Oxford, 2004), [<http://www.oxforddnb.com/view/article/30627>, accessed 10 Nov 2011].

¹¹⁴ Cunningham, 'Jingoism,' pp.439-440.

¹¹⁵ M.W. Taylor, 'Herbert, Auberon Edward William Molyneux (1838-1906),' *ODNB*, [<http://www.oxforddnb.com/view/article/33828>, accessed 10 Nov 2011]; E. Royle, 'Bradlaugh, Charles (1833-1891),' *ODNB*, [<http://www.oxforddnb.com/view/article/30627>, accessed 10 Nov 2011].

gathering attended by over sixty thousand people. However, early on, the author notes the presence of a large number of 'the general public who had come to look on for amusement.'¹¹⁶ Later, this idea is reinforced with the more detailed comment:

'the melee now became almost general, for all classes of persons had got mixed up together, and in the struggles of those who wanted to pass out of harm's way an extraordinary scene was presented. There must have been 60,000 or 70,000 people, but only a very small number was inclined to take an active part in the proceedings.'

This presents a very odd picture of indifference in the face of mass presence at a meeting. Although some of the worst violence associated with the Jingoists was yet to come, such as the Gladstone windows incident described above, we have already seen how at the end of 1877, the Jingo movement had become synonymous with 'roughs' and, in this light, it seems remarkable that so many would have turned up, simply out of idle curiosity at an opposed pair of meetings with such great potential to explode into violence.

The lack of enthusiasm being demonstrated by the writer is clear, but the motives of the crowd are not. On the most basic level, it seems clear that there must have been a certain degree of popular interest in proceedings, as demonstrated by the fact that there were 60,000 or more people present. Even if most of these were not, as *The Times* stated, 'inclined to take an active part,' it is likely that they would have had a preference for one side or the other, felt a greater affinity with either the 'peace' meeting or the 'anti-Russian' one.¹¹⁷ Whilst it is not possible to delineate the more passive supporters of the two groups from one another, the very fact that so many people turned out despite an atmosphere of Press dismissal only adds to the evidence that people attended out of genuine interest, rather than simply being sucked in by any hype.

¹¹⁶ *The Times*, 'The Hyde-Park Meeting.'

¹¹⁷ *Ibid.*

The opinion of *The Times* however, remains elusive. It might be possible to speculate that the paper did in fact have a stronger opinion on the matter than it ever made explicit, but that it feared the commercial implications of taking such a definitive stance, and opted instead to simply downplay the significance of the events, in an attempt to make the problem go away. However, there is nothing to explicitly support this notion. Furthermore, given Cunningham's observations on the way the movement quickly degenerated into 'fiasco' and farce, it is unsurprising that *The Times* would feel the need to offer sustained comment.¹¹⁸ As he concludes 'it may be of course that Beaconsfield had many silent supporters. But silence was equally likely to have indicated indifference.'¹¹⁹

Anglophobia in Russia before the Congress

Given the number of people who were clearly involved in some capacity or other in the campaign against Russia in Britain at this time, it seems pertinent to consider the attitude of the Russian Press and people towards Britain in the opening months of 1878. Understandably, there were many articles regarding the generally confused international situation, the war, and what was to follow. However, there does not seem to have been any particular preponderance of strongly anti-British sentiment amongst this. In January 1878, *The Voice* noted the relief emanating from Vienna that a cease-fire had been signed, and towards the end of the month, it expressed a fear that rumour, confusion and a lack of clear objectives would lead to further conflict.¹²⁰ However, at this point, mentions of Britain were fairly infrequent, and even-tempered. In February, *The Voice* noted that the Turks were stalling over the peace treaty in the hope that the British would weigh in, but Gradovskii's article of the same day, 'Peace with Turkey' directed its anger more at the Russian leaders who were prepared to 'leave empty-handed' than the British for thwarting Russian plans.¹²¹

¹¹⁸ Cunningham, 'jingoism,' p.445.

¹¹⁹ Ibid, p.451.

¹²⁰ *The Voice*, 'St Petersburg, 15 (27)/1/1878, p.1, Col.B; 'St Petersburg,' 19 (31)/1/1878, p.1, Col.D.

¹²¹ *The Voice*, 'Military News,' 21/1(2/2)/78, p.2, Col.C, 'Peace with Turkey,' 21/1(2/2)/78, p.2, Col.F.

Gradually however, the mood against Britain in the pages of *The Voice* began to harden. In mid-February, an editorial noted that 'English ministers never give up hope of taking over the Bosphorus,' and a few days later the same column asserted that if the Porte truly wanted peace they needed to allow the Russians to occupy the Dardanelles as a guard against British incursions.¹²²

The interesting thing about these editorials is that they do not seem to have been paralleled by any significant public expression of feeling against Britain. When editorials in *The Voice* talked about Russian suspicion of British actions or motives, they did not do so with reference to public expressions of sentiment. Nor did the 'Home News' sections report protests against Britain on the streets of Moscow or St Petersburg in a fashion comparable to the 'anti-Russia' meetings in Hyde Park. All in all, then, it seems that Russian hostility towards Britain at this time was expressed very differently from British hostility towards Russia. However, this does not necessarily mean that there was no hostility towards Britain. The darkening tone of reports in *The Voice* has already been seen and the positioning of the British government as the benchmark for unsporting action is well-established. Indeed it might well be that the reason Russia lacked public vocalisations of disapproval against Britain was that there was no public movement advocating a strongly pro-British policy, against whom such protests could be directed.

Conclusion

This chapter has seen that the tensions between Britain and Russia which lingered throughout the nineteenth century were particularly heightened during the Eastern Crisis of 1875-1878. Furthermore, it has been shown how, in Russia, at least within sections of the Press, the entirety of Foreign Policy was able to be defined in terms of contrast to British actions. However, it has also been shown that the strongly anti-Russian agents in Britain were able to dominate the noise making, but rarely became the majority element in terms of mass activity, and certainly in terms of respectable, articulate opinion. The question of the extent to which the strength or weakness of the Jingo movement was responsible for the amount of military

¹²² *The Voice*, 'St Petersburg,' 2(14)/2/1878, p.1, Col.D; 'St Petersburg,' 4(16)/2/1878, p.1, Col.B.

posturing practised by Britain or the ultimate decision to remain at peace is unclear. Derby's resignation from the Cabinet early in 1878 demonstrates the level of discord within the senior echelons of British politics, but it also deprives us of the useful source of a diarist privy to the inner goings-on.




Figure 1: 'Europe after the Congress of Berlin.'¹²³

¹²³ <http://www.worldmapsonline.com/europeaftcongberlin.htm> [accessed 9/2/2011.]

Conclusion

The years 1875-78 were of great significance in a number of ways: Firstly, British Foreign Policy and its relationship to popular politics entered a new era.¹ Although this was not the first point in time that Conservative and Liberal foreign policy had been seen to be different, nor the first time that Gladstone and Disraeli had been cast in such diametrically opposed roles, it saw the crystallisation of party foreign policy into the broad positions which they would occupy for a significant period after, and which would shape the course of subsequent British politics.² Secondly Serbia, Bulgaria and Romania became independent states, facts which are often treated with only superficial levels of details in their own national histories, with attention tending to concentrate instead upon first attempts to eke out a measure of autonomy, or upon later events.³ Thirdly, Russian popular feeling was enshrined in literature in a powerful way.⁴ As has already been seen, the debate between Tolstoi and Dostoevskii was not confined to the literary world of the 1870s, but has permeated popular perceptions ever since.⁵

However, despite all of this, this study has shown that many of the most sweeping conclusions drawn by historians, novelists and casual observers about the period simply do not stand up to scrutiny. Although particular interest groups were very active at this time and were able, on occasion, to mobilise significant amounts of the populace in activities related to their cause, the notion of genuine popular support remains difficult to substantiate.

It does seem that, in both Britain and Russia at this time, there were considerable numbers of people taking an active interest in events in the Balkans and that they were able to raise sums of money, organise collections of aid, and distribute petitions. This is evident in the extensive lists of donations published in the Press, as

¹ H.S. Cunningham, *British Public Opinion and the Eastern Question*, (Unpublished DPhil thesis, University of Sussex, 1969), p.340.

² See above, pp.183-186.

³ For example, Judah makes only two very brief references to the congress of Berlin in his entire history of Serbia; T. Judah, *The Serbs: History, Myth & the Destruction of Yugoslavia*, (Yale, 2000), pp. 56, 67; see above Figure 2, p.195..

⁴ See above, pp.142-147.

⁵ See above, p.122.

well as the sizeable volume of letters and petitions held in the Foreign Office collections.⁶ However, their impact upon the Press seems to be decidedly limited. In Russia, the majority of their achievement seems to have been to secure space for donations and collections to be printed and reported.⁷ In Britain, the picture is more mixed, but despite the appearance of occasional letters touching upon Eastern matters, and of reports on the agitation, at no point does an overwhelming impression of Press enthusiasm appear.

Of course, the sample of the Press considered here is a small one, and is not to be considered a definitive guide – other studies make it clear that there were some organs of the Press which were prepared to make a considerable amount of noise on behalf of whichever aspect of the cause they had aligned themselves to.⁸ *Russian World (Russkii Mir)* remained a loud voice for the Pan-Slav cause throughout this period, continuing to call for greater levels of intervention to aid the Balkan Slavs against the Turks (or British, Austrians, or whichever other people were deemed to be a threat at that time). Likewise, Stead's *Northern Echo* proved to be an ardent supporter of the 'atrocities campaign' both long before it rose to national prominence, and significantly after it had faded from the central spotlight. However, to have focused upon these would have been to show too much attention to simply partisan activities. The publications considered here, as representatives of more moderate and mainstream aspects of the Press, show that the overall picture was, as expected, rather more mixed.

This overall ambivalent picture of the Press as a mouthpiece for certain metropolitan elites calls into question the broader notion of how, if at all, the Press was used as a medium of interface between the upper echelons of civil society and the political rulers of the states considered. It is, of course, possible on various occasions to find examples of governments using popular support to justify a preferred policy, citing it as an excuse, or trying to create reports to begin with. However, there is far less to indicate that either the British or the Russian

⁶ See above, pp.113-116, 130-133.

⁷ See above, p.134.

⁸ R. T. Shannon, *Gladstone and the Bulgarian Agitation 1876*, (London, 1963), pp. 67, 71.

government, in this period, was at any point forced into an activity that it did not want to participate in by popular or by Press pressures. Examples have been seen of governments adjusting their rhetoric or even altering their timing in order to find the path of least resistance to perceived opinions, such as the softening of language by the British government about the Turkish atrocities in Bulgaria in the wake of the reaction against Disraeli's infamous 'coffee-house babble' remarks.⁹ But the fact that Britain neither went to war against Turkey in the winter of 1876-77 nor for Turkey in the spring of 1878 show that the government operated according to its own rules and values, not those of the Hyde Park protestors.

At the same time, it is also clear that the Hyde Park protestors were not themselves subject to the whims of the government. Gladstone's *Bulgarian Horrors* pamphlet was able to reach an incredibly wide audience and become synonymous with a public movement that operated on a truly mass scale.¹⁰ However, the contrasting fate of his article *The Hellenic Factor in the Eastern Problem* has been shown to be a case in point of how his earlier pamphlet derived its success from following, rather than leading public sentiment.¹¹ Prominent figures like Gladstone were able to achieve much publicity and popularity when they articulated existing sentiments, but could not generate large-scale movements ex nihilo.

Evidently, whilst public activity could not simply be whipped up by the pens of men such as Gladstone, neither did it emerge spontaneously from nowhere. The reporting of events in a manner which was perceived as sufficiently reliable to be trustworthy, yet laced with enough indignation and scandal to demand a moral response was crucial to this. Whilst the loudest demands for action and declarations of how to interpret the evidence inevitably came from the more partisan elements of the Press, more moderate sections such as *The Times*, still played a significant role in the formation of opinion, by supporting the factual claims of the other publications, yet presenting them in an apparently more matter-of-fact fashion.

⁹ See above, pp.101-102.

¹⁰ See above, pp.107 and after.

¹¹ See above, p.164.

One theme which has recurred time and again throughout this study is that of the hostility between Russia and Great Britain. Although there seems to be little to suggest that Russian and British Foreign Policy aims were in any meaningful way incompatible during this period, it certainly does appear that there was a growing perception amongst diverse elements of the population that this was the case. For this reason, it is possible to see increased periods of Press interest and indeed of reported public activity within that same Press at whichever point a particular Balkan issue, or even a population group began to be viewed differently through the prism of perceived hostile activity on the part of the rival Power. This has already been seen in the case of Greece: for the British Press, Greece was of greatest interest when it could serve as a counter-weight (or a bulwark) to Russian ambitions, a role traditionally fulfilled by Turkey. For Russia, by contrast, Greece was to be praised when aiding and abetting the general good of dismembering Turkey, but to be condemned when it followed British advice.¹² Likewise, the various Slav populations of the Balkans could also trace trends in the amount of interest shown in them which owed more to the relative movements of Lord Derby and Chancellor Gorchakov than to anything happening within the Balkans itself.

The fact that Britain and Russia did not, ultimately, go to war during the Eastern Crisis of 1875 – 1878 is of course due to a multiplicity of factors, Sumner and Stojanovic amongst others have shown this, with detailed examination of official papers and documents, as well as with the diaries of the politicians occupying the highest offices.¹³ This study however, has taken a fresh look at the more public aspect of the points in time when war seemed the most likely, and shown that there was not at any point in time a clearly articulated mass desire for armed conflict. Individual columnists in Russia expressed a desire for Russia to be rewarded for her efforts, and crowds gather in Hyde Park ostensibly to protest against Russia grabbing too large a portion of the Balkan settlement, but these expressions of demands failed to prove a necessity of war. In some instances, they did not demand it, and in others, such as sections of the Jingo movement, when

¹² See above, pp.166-171, 176-177.

¹³ B.H. Sumner, *Russia and the Balkans, 1870-1880*, (Oxford, 1937), M.D. Stojanovic, *The Great Powers and the Balkans, 1875-1878*, [1939], (Cambridge, 1968 Edn).

they did, it was in such a fashion as to fail to impress the necessity of conflict upon the masses, let alone upon the government. Despite all of this, it has also been shown clearly here that had a war come between Russia and Britain (from the deeds of Tsars and Ministers), there would have been ample pre-existing sentiment in the Press which was hostile to the new enemy, sentiment which the Press certainly believed reflected the popular mood.

Further Study

As a study of the Press, this work has, inevitably been constrained by the relatively narrow number of publications that have formed the basis of the sample. However, whilst the addition of new metropolitan titles might help to flesh-out in some places the journalistic picture, it seems that the future for research in this area might more profitably lie in a different direction. As has already been noted, this work is unique in combining primary source research into both the British and the Russian side of the crisis. This has allowed a direct comparison between the moods being expressed in the educated press of the two countries for the first time.

This study has also drawn upon existing research carried out in a number of specific areas, such as MacKenzie's study of the Serbian Press.¹⁴ However, many areas remain ill-illuminated. The Balkan Christians whose fate aroused so much interest, and to an even greater extent their Turkish neighbours, overlords and opponents remain in the realm of English-language historiography on the Eastern Crisis, merely objects. No comparable consideration of the Constantinople Press exists, and if it did, the addition of this new dimension would add significantly to our understanding of the position of the Press as an intermediary between society and government. Furthermore, as has been noted, these studies have been primarily if not exclusively metropolitan in their focus, and can offer little information on the position of events outside of London, Moscow, or St. Petersburg.

With the growth in recent years of more regional studies, and particularly of the current within the historiography of Russia for considering the attitudes of minority

¹⁴ D. MacKenzie, *The Serbs and Russian Pan-Slavism 1875-1878*, (New York, 1967).

populations, there is doubtless an opportunity here.¹⁵ Whilst the Ottoman Empire is, of course, instantly recognised as an Islamic Power, it is often neglected that Russia and Great Britain also governed two of the world's largest Muslim populations. Although the British Imperial Muslim population particularly was separated from the metropolitan population by many thousands of miles, India particularly formed so central a part in any British Imperialist's thinking that no right-minded politician would have wanted to risk a pronouncement which he generally believed could have aggravated the Indian situation to the detriment of British rule. Whilst this remains a moderately unexplored area, despite significant recent positive steps,¹⁶ the significance of Russia's Muslim population has been an area of considerable interest for scholars in recent years.¹⁷ Whilst thus far, the focus has primarily been upon Russian attempts to colonise the Caucasus and Central Asia, it would not require a great leap for the views of these figures to be considered with regard to the Eastern Crisis.¹⁸ Perhaps the most significant addition to the views advanced in this thesis would be affected by an inclusion of the perspective of Turkish Muslims on the crisis. Whilst there have been attempts within this work to relate the study to some of the existing historiography on the Ottoman Empire there has, it appears, thus far been no English language study of the Eastern Crisis during the 1870s, nor of the Eastern Question during the Nineteenth Century, which has been written primarily, or even substantially, from a

¹⁵ The regional studies of Russia are numerous, for example, see S. Badcock, *Politics and the People in Revolutionary Russia: A Provincial History*, (Cambridge, 2007); A.B. Retish, 'Creating Peasant Citizens: Rituals of Power, Rituals of Citizenship in Viatka Province, 1917,' *Revolutionary Russia*, 16, 1, (2003), pp.47-67; The study of minority populations within Russia has formed a major strand of the work of the journal *Ab Imperio* since its launch in 2000, dedicated to 'studies of New Imperial History and Nationalism in the Post-Soviet Space.' [<http://abimperio.net/cgi-bin/aishow.pl?state=contents&idlang=1>] Last accessed 22/2/12.

¹⁶ E.g. K. Robbins & J. Fisher, *Religion and Diplomacy: Religion and British foreign policy 1815 to 1941*, (Dodrecht, 2010); J. Parry, *The Politics of Patriotism: English Liberalism, National Identity and Europe*, (Cambridge, 2006); S. Collini, R. Whatmore & B. Young *History, Religion and Culture: British Intellectual History, 1750-1950*, (Cambridge, 2000).

¹⁷ E.g. N. Breyfogle, 'Enduring Imperium: Russia/Soviet Union/Eurasia as multiethnic, multiconfessional space,' *Ab Imperio*, 1 (2008), pp.79-107; R.D. Crews, *For Prophet and Tsar: Islam and empire in Russia and Central Asia*, (Cambridge, Mass, 2006).

¹⁸ 'Russia Unbound: historical Framework and the Challenge of Globalism,' *Ab Imperio*, 1 (2010), p.68.

Turkish and/or Muslim perspective.¹⁹ Such a work would provide considerable amounts of fresh perspective for the historiography of this topic.

Whilst this work has already brought an unprecedented degree of breadth to a consideration of the Eastern Crisis, there is also further scope for incorporating other factors into the study of this topic. An issue given only brief consideration in this thesis, as well as in the recent work of Kovic, is the question of Jewishness and anti-semitism in relation to the Eastern Crisis.²⁰ Whilst Disraeli's Jewishness is, of course, a subject which has received a significant amount of scholarly attention, the existing work seems to exist in its own academic ghetto, and has thus far had little to no impact upon general histories of the Eastern Crisis.²¹

In all then, it seems that despite significant steps forward in recent years, there remains a continuing Christian/Slav-centric perspective to most studies of the Eastern Question, where Jewish or Muslim perspectives could provide fresh and more meaningful categories of exploration.

¹⁹ See above, e.g. pp.37-38; M.S. Saracoglu, 'some aspects of Ottoman governmentality at the local level: the judicio-administrative sphere of the Vidin county in the 1860s and 1870s,' *Ab Imperio*, 2, (2008), pp.224-253.

²⁰ M. Kovic, *Disraeli and the Eastern Question*, (Oxford, 2011).

²¹ See e.g. T.M. Endelman & T. Kushner (Eds.), *Disraeli's Jewishness*, (London, 2002).

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