CLINGING TO A BARBED WIRE FENCE: THE LANGUAGE POLICY OF THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY IN BOSNIA-HERZEGOVINA SINCE 1995

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ABSTRACT

This study takes one aspect of the post-conflict peace-building process in Bosnia-Herzegovina since 1995 – the recognition of three official but mutually comprehensible languages – and examines the way in which the international community's approach to it has impacted on broader peace-building goals for the country. The originality of this thesis lies in the fact that it views post-conflict peace-building in Bosnia-Herzegovina through the lens of the language issue. Taking the Dayton Peace Agreement (1995) as the starting point I look at the way in which its provisions have largely dictated the international community's approach to the language issue and created the political environment in which language operates. Further, applying the concept of societal security I explain how the language issue is used by domestic elites to frustrate attempts at reconciliation by the international community; I argue that the international community's approach, based on the equality of the three languages, only feeds into the divisive ethnic politics of present-day Bosnia-Herzegovina and ultimately undermines the security and stability of the country.

I also look in detail at two very different but complimentary areas of ongoing post-conflict reform in Bosnia-Herzegovina and analyse the international community's approach to language in each: reform of the education system and defence reform. In the former the language issue cannot be divorced from the identity-formation goals of domestic elites in the education reform. The international community's approach to language in this regard has been counterproductive and has only bolstered attempts to maintain segregation in schools. In the area of defence reform the focus of language policy is not on issues of identity but on the translation and interpretation policy of the international military force which is guided by locally-hired interpreters and translators. I use narrative theory (Baker, 2006) to explain how they negotiate issues of identity, loyalty and ethics and argue that through their influence policy has been more flexible and able to adapt to the requirements of the defence reform.

Finally I contend that the international community has tended to view language as an unimportant element of its activities in Bosnia-Herzegovina. This study argues that far from this being the case the international community's approach to language holds important lessons for future peace-building endeavours elsewhere.

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

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INTRODUCTION

In an address to a conference entitled Crossing Frontiers: Languages and the International Dimension, held at Cardiff University in July 2006, Professor Hilary Footitt bemoaned the fact that consideration of languages is largely absent from international relations. According to her, 'a tradition of analysis which tends to position languages as unproblematic, as obvious' has developed which renders the issue of language and communication invisible in international contexts.[1] This thesis is intended to give visibility to the language issue in one specific context, that of the external peace-building process in post-war Bosnia-Herzegovina. In addition it is intended to demonstrate that far from being 'unproblematic' and 'obvious' language requires serious and considered attention and should therefore be seen as an important part of post-conflict peace-building endeavours.

The focus of this study will be on the role language has played in the efforts of the international community[2] to build peace in Bosnia-Herzegovina. In considering this role the study will investigate the ways in which issues of language have been approached among sections of the international community and the extent to which these approaches helped or hindered the ultimate goals of the peace-building process.

The Thesis

The thesis of this study is that since 1995 international organisations have not had a well thought-out and coordinated approach to language issues as part of their peace-building efforts in post-conflict Bosnia-Herzegovina and this has militated against overall external peace-building goals.

An important part of contemporary peace-building is about creating new identities in the post-conflict society. Ideally, in an ethnically-divided society this means developing a common identity that will transcend divisions along ethnic lines and engender a feeling of loyalty to the new integral multi-

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[1] The proceedings of the conference are available at www.llas.ac.uk/cardiff2006.
[2] This study uses the World Bank definition of the international community as 'a loose coalition of international governmental institutions, national governments and nongovernmental organizations that has bound itself to Bosnia and Herzegovina by the Dayton Accords and the period of reconstruction' (1999: 2).

ethnic state. It does not necessarily mean doing away with self-identification on an ethnic basis but 'refers to the feeling of sharing a common destiny' (Hansen, 1997:87). As a key marker of ethnic identity language can play an important role in an ethnically-divided state and as such it could be expected that consideration of language would be part of peace-building endeavours.

Instead, I contend that the international community considered language in Bosnia-Herzegovina to be 'unproblematic' and 'obvious' and therefore very little thought was given to dealing with language issues. Rather, language policy has essentially developed on an informal, ad hoc basis with no attempt to coordinate it in the major international organisations. It has thus been reactive in the sense of responding to other non-linguistic issues rather than more proactively feeding into the identity-formation goals of the peace-building process. In this sense, there has been no language policy in the international community that would bolster the creation of a Bosnian identity either as an alternative to or in parallel with self-identification on a narrower ethnic basis and encourage loyalty to the state rather than to a particular ethnic group.

The research concentrates on the period since the Dayton Peace Agreement, which brought an end to the conflict in Bosnia-Herzegovina, was signed in December 1995 as it could be said that this marks the beginning of the peace-building efforts by the international community.[3] The agreement provides the starting point for this study as its provisions shaped not only the contours of the future state but also guided the activities of a plethora of international, governmental and non-governmental organisations and agencies. It thus provided the framework for the interaction between domestic and international actors. More broadly, it is the provisions of the agreement that have to a great extent created the political environment in which language operates.

In the context of the thesis, the research questions that will be addressed in the study are:

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[3] The Dayton Peace Agreement is otherwise known as the General Framework Agreement for Peace in Bosnia and Herzegovina, available from: http://www.ohr.int/gfa/gfa-home.htm [accessed on 20 November 2007]

1. Do the international organisations in Bosnia-Herzegovina have a language policy?

2. If so, what form does this language policy take, how is it formulated and conducted and by whom?

3. If not, how has the international community approached issues to do with language in Bosnia-Herzegovina?

In order to answer these questions I look at provisions of the Dayton Peace Agreement which are most directly relevant to language issues and how they are operationalised in the political environment created after the end of the conflict. I also investigate two areas which are important for the peace-building process and in which the international community has played a significant role – reform of the education system and the defence reform. The former was chosen because of the role education plays in identity formation and the latter because the bulk of the Dayton Peace Agreement itself concerns the military aspects of the peace.

This Introduction is in three sections. The first section consists of a discussion of the key concepts of language and ethnic identity which underpin the issues dealt with in the study. The second section discusses the methods and sources I used in carrying out this study and the third section outlines the structure of the whole study with a brief description of each chapter.

Language and Ethnic Identity

Language, dialect or variant?

When the terms 'language issue' and 'language situation' are used in the study they refer specifically to the fact that since 1995 three languages have been officially recognised in Bosnia-Herzegovina. Each of these languages corresponds to each of the three main ethnic groups: Bosnian for the Bosniaks, Croatian for the Croats and Serbian for the Serbs. It was not ever thus and the present-day language situation cannot be seen in isolation from the situation prior to 1991. After World War Two and until the break-up of the former Yugoslavia, it was considered that the people of the Socialist Republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina spoke one language which was called Serbo-Croat or

Croatia-Serbian. The name Serbo-Croat or Croato-Serbian designated the language of the constituent peoples (*konstitutivni narodi*) of the Croats, Montenegrins, Muslims (in the sense of an ethnic rather than a religious group after 1974) and Serbs throughout the former Yugoslavia. Up until the 1970s this language was considered to have two variants: the eastern and the western variants. The eastern variant was centred around Belgrade and the ekavian pronunciation and the western variant was centred around Zagreb and the ijekavian pronunciation. The variants differed in several ways. There were differences, for example, in certain lexical items (thus the word for *train* in the western variants is *vlak* but *voz* in the eastern), the construction of infinitives (the root of some verbs being the same in both variants but with different endings, thus, *to criticise* is *kritizirati* in the western variant and *kritikovati* in the eastern) and the extent to which foreign loanwords were accepted. One of the most striking differences was in the inclusion or exclusion of the reflex of the proto-Slavic vowel *jat* so, for example, the word for child is *dijete* in the ijekavian or western variant as against the ekavian or eastern variant which is *dete*. Another key difference was in the use of alphabet with the Latin alphabet predominating in the western variant and the Cyrillic in the eastern although this was not a hard and fast distinction as the Latin alphabet was generally used in Montenegro and by the Serbs in the Krajina.

The binary distinction between the variants was, however, an oversimplification of the real language situation, failing as it did to take account of the characteristic speech of Bosnia-Herzegovina and Montenegro, but the 1974 Constitution did recognize four 'standard linguistic idioms (*standardni jezični izrazi*)' each of which corresponded to the speech of the four republican capitals where the language was spoken: Belgrade, Zagreb, Sarajevo and Titograd. The Bosnia-Herzegovina standard linguistic idiom was intended to denote the speech of the entire population of the republic and not just that of one of the main ethnic groups recognised in the republic. However, as the population of the former republic split into their ethnic groups during and after the war they each worked to establish their 'own' language. The Serbs and Croats were able to look to their neighbours over the border in Serbia and Croatia respectively for their linguistic standards while the language planners among the Bosnian Muslims, or Bosniaks as they began to call

themselves after 1993, took the linguistic features that had been characteristic of the Bosnia-Herzegovina standard linguistic idiom and set about creating a separate linguistic standard called Bosnian (or *bosanski*). This process of standardisation involved the compilation of a grammar, orthographic manual and dictionary for the Bosnian language, as well as its elevation in status to an official language of the post-conflict state.

The essential question here is whether the three officially recognised languages should be classified as distinct languages or as variants of one, the former Serbo-Croatian/Croato-Serbian standard language. Answering this question is problematic as there is no generally accepted definition of a language but it is nonetheless useful to apply John E Joseph's description of a language, 'In general, a language is understood to be a system of elements and rules conceived broadly enough to admit variant ways of using it' (1987: 1). This is the way in which Serbo-Croat or Croato-Serbian was conceived and, despite the best efforts of the language planners, the speech of the population of Bosnia-Herzegovina can still be seen in this way. Linguistically, the official languages in Bosnia-Herzegovina are all based on the same sub-dialect of štokavian, ijekavian,[4] and as such are part of the dialect continuum that extends from the Slovenian-Croatian frontier in the north-west to the Serbian-Macedonian and Serbian-Bulgarian borders in the south-east (Bugarski, 2004: 24). Ijekavian is the most widely spoken dialect in this region and can be found not only in Bosnia-Herzegovina but also in Croatia, Montenegro and parts of Serbia.

Being part of a dialect continuum means that the boundaries between the speech communities are 'soft' because there are no barriers to comprehensibility and 'the consciousness that they are dissimilar is not self-evident' (Škiljan, 2001: 90). An example of these soft borders can be found in an analysis that Robert Greenberg made in 1996 of two studies[5] on the speech

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[4] The name štokavian is based on the dialectal word for 'what' which is '*što*'. There are other dialects present in the area, kajkavian and čakavian which are also based on the word for 'what' in these cases *kaj* and *ča* respectively. It is štokavian which has the vast majority of speakers whereas the other two dialects are spoken only by Croats outside Bosnia-Herzegovina.

[5] 'Ikavian-Šćakavian Dialects of Western Bosnia I' (Ikavskošćakavski govori zapadne Bosne I) by Asim Peco published in 1975 which is concerned with the speech of the Muslim population and 'Western Bosnian Ijekavian Dialects' (Zapadnobosanski ijekavski govori) by Milorad Dešić published in 1976 which concentrates on the speech of the Serbian population.

of the multi-ethnic population of western Bosnia. The speech of the Croats and Muslims was found to be 'nearly identical' and it was the speech of the Serbs that was 'maximally differentiated from that of the Muslim population' (Greenberg, 1996: 412). That notwithstanding Greenberg comes to the conclusion that the differences are so minor that they 'hardly should warrant separate monographs on the dialects within the same geographic region' (1996: 412).[6]

In the same vein, E.A. Hammel suggests that 'it is virtually impossible to distinguish Serbs from Croats from Muslim Slavs by their speech, if they come from the same village or neighbourhood, unless they seek to signal their ethnicity by stressing particular linguistic features' (2000: 25). In this case linguistic similarities are regional rather than ethnic so that in small ethnically-mixed communities non-linguistic factors would distinguish members of the different ethnic groups. Family names and first names are a strong indicator of ethnic identity but it would also be known in a small community who belonged to which ethnic group on the basis of local historical knowledge or the religious festivals a person chose to observe.

Similarly, if we look at differences in accent between different parts of Bosnia-Herzegovina it could be said that it is easier to discern the area a person comes from on the basis of their accent rather than the ethnic group they belong to. So, for example, the distinctive Mostar accent will tell us that a person comes from Mostar rather than, say, Sarajevo but it would not necessarily tell us that person's ethnic affiliation.

Looking at the language situation in this way - similarities based on region rather than ethnicity - is also helpful in understanding the differences that exist within the three official languages. For example, although the Croats in Bosnia-Herzegovina look to Zagreb for their standard language and call their language Croatian they may have more in common linguistically with members of other ethnic groups in their immediate vicinity than with fellow ethnic Croats in Croatia proper, for example, the speakers of the kajkavian dialect around Zagreb. Similarly, the Serbs in Bosnia-Herzegovina do not use ekavian

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[6] Greenberg asserts that the two studies were carried out for political reasons to demonstrate that the ethnic groups in this part of Bosnia-Herzegovina were so different that they even had their own dialects (1996: 413)

which is the Belgrade norm but ijekavian. Although ijekavian has been recognised by Serbian linguists as part of the Serbian norm, in Serbia it is only spoken by Serbs in western Serbia (Greenberg, 1996: 401).[7] This means, if nothing else, that they are differentiated from fellow Serbs in Serbia by the way they sound.

If borders between dialects or variants are 'soft,' in order to increase mutual incomprehensibility, language planning is embarked upon to make these borders 'hard' and eventually create a distinctive standard language. Out of the three ethnic groups, the Bosniaks have been most active in this and they have seized upon two key features to distinguish Bosnian from Croatian and Serbian. These are the use of the phoneme /x/ and the greater presence of loanwords from Turkish, Persian and Arabic which are often called Turkisms. The phoneme /x/ is most conspicuous in everyday words such as *kahva* (coffee) instead of *kava* (Croatian) or *kafa* (Serbian) and *lahko* (easy) instead of *lako* (Croatian and Serbian). While /x/ is only found in the speech of the Bosniaks, Turkisms are not exclusive to their speech as these loanwords are also found in Serbian and to a lesser extent in Croatian (Ford, 2001: 83).

Another distinguishing feature of the languages is in the use of alphabets. Before the conflicts of the 1990s both the Cyrillic and Latin alphabets were in official use in Bosnia-Herzegovina as elsewhere in the former Yugoslavia. Famously, before the war the daily *Oslobođenje* used the two scripts on alternate pages and books published in Bosnia could be printed in either script. Vanessa Pupavac also asserts, 'Such was the previous familiarity and interchangeability of the Latin and Cyrillic scripts that students in Bosnia barely had a consciousness of whether a text was in Latin or Cyrillic' (2006: 122). Now, however, Croatian and Bosnian are written exclusively in Latin script and Serbian generally in Cyrillic. Indeed, using the Cyrillic alphabet for written Serbian is the most obvious way of distinguishing it from Croatian and Bosnian.

The foregoing discussion serves to show that there is little linguistic justification for considering the three official languages in Bosnia-Herzegovina

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[7] Ijekavian is also spoken by the Muslim Slav community in the Sandžak region of Serbia and Montenegro. The members of this community call themselves Bosniaks and their language Bosnian.

as separate languages based as they are on the same dialect and being mutually comprehensible. The language issue in Bosnia-Herzegovina goes beyond pure linguistics as it is primarily a political issue. The extent to which differences in the speech of the three ethnic groups are highlighted depends on the political circumstances prevailing at any given time and the actions of political and intellectual elites in stressing language differences to distinguish the groups. Since the early nineties the separation of the former single language of Serbo-Croat or Croato-Serbian into three official languages has been a linguistic reflection of the division of the population into their separate ethnic groups. Public and political discourse in Bosnia-Herzegovina therefore revolves around the assertion that the three official languages are separate standard languages no matter how linguistically justified that assertion is. The value of the separate languages is therefore in their symbolic function as a marker of ethnic identity. There are many such possible markers including religious affiliation, skin colour, dress, social mores and customs but in the case of Bosnia-Herzegovina, language is key. The reason for this must be sought in the German Romanticism of the late eighteenth century and nineteenth century and the idea that a nation is nothing without its own language that was first put forward by Johann Gottfried Herder in 1772. Reacting to the fear of French domination that was present in Germany at the time he made a case for considering a nation in terms of its natural boundaries designated above all by that nation's own language. It was the national language that embodied the nation's distinctive traditions, culture and historical memory. This was made explicit in 1808 by Johann Gottlieb Fichte who argued:

> The first, original, and truly natural boundaries of states are beyond doubt their internal boundaries. Those who speak the same language are joined to each other by a multitude of invisible bonds by nature herself, long before any human art begins; they understand each other and have the power of continuing to make themselves understood more and more clearly; they belong together and are by nature one and an inseparable whole (Fichte 1968 [1808]: 109-10, as quoted in Joseph 2004: 11).

These almost mystical ideas explain the emotional power that language has in individuals' identification with a given group and feeling of belonging to it. This linking of language and nation was crucial in the awakening of national consciousness in the Balkans in the early nineteenth century and this link has been an important consideration in the regulation of inter-ethnic relations in the

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region ever since. In contemporary Bosnia-Herzegovina where, politically, ethnic identity is the pre-eminent identity it is particularly significant. The next part of this section will therefore discuss concepts such as identity, ethnic group, nation and nationalism and the way the symbolic function of language is used in Bosnia-Herzegovina to bolster ethnic identity. Because of the importance of the symbolic nature of language in Bosnia-Herzegovina and the fact that the variant ways of speaking of the three ethnic groups are portrayed as separate languages by political and intellectual elites, the terms 'language' and 'official language' will be used in the rest of this study to denote the variant ways of speaking of the three main ethnic groups.

Language, ethnic identity and nationalism

Identity is what makes us who we are. It is what Ranko Bugarski describes as 'a set and continuation of essential characteristics with which a human group or individual defines themselves against others, thus ensuring their own "sameness". It is therefore a feeling of belonging to a given collective (*we*) and the consciousness of one's own personality (*I*)' (2005: 67).[8] These two aspects highlight two different definitions of identity. On the one hand identity is all about the 'I' or our own personal or subjective identity. It is how we see ourselves as individuals different from everyone else. On the other, the 'we' is our social identity and the way others see us or 'construct' us and how we relate to what is ascribed and attributed to us by other human beings (Riley, 2007: 86). The different characteristics of this 'I' and 'we' can be seen as different kinds of identity that are based on such things as our age, gender, religious belief, occupation, place of birth and political affiliation. In this sense, we all have multiple identities. Some of these identities are immutable such as gender (notwithstanding gender-reassignment surgery) but other aspects of identity such as religious affiliation, choice of profession or marital status are subject to change or construction by others.

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[8] Skup i kontinuitet suštinskih svojstava kojima se neka ljudska grupa ili jedinac definišu naspram drugih, obezbeđujući tako svoju 'samoistovetnost'. To je, dakle, osećanje pripadnosti datom kolektivu (*mi*), odnosno svest o sopstvenoj ličnosti (*ja*).

The identity that is most important for this study is ethnicity or ethnic-group identity. Scholars have found it difficult to define what an ethnic group is and to distinguish it from other concepts such as nation, tribe, nationality and race. A definition of an ethnic group pertinent to this study comes from Anthony Smith who defines ethnic groups as 'named units of population with common ancestry, myths and historical memories, elements of a shared culture, some link with a historic territory and some measure of solidarity, at least among the elites' (1995: 57). In this definition an ethnic group is clearly part of a larger population whose members are linked through a sense of shared culture and common descent associated with a given territory. According to this definition an ethnic group is based on cultural elements that bind the members together, however, one way that an ethnic group is distinguished from a nation in the scholarship is that a nation has the added element of political aspiration. Joseph, for example, stresses that a nation needs political borders and autonomy (2004: 163). The drawing of political boundaries may mean a nation has a particular status within a wider federation or confederation or it could mean that a nation aspires to having its own state. Indeed the concepts of nations and states are frequently confused. The United Nations, for example, is not an organisation of member nations but of member states. Furthermore, a nation can be defined as including 'all the people who form part legally of the territory of a sovereign state, regardless of their ethnic characteristics' (Stavenhagen, 1996: 3). The United States of America is an example of one such nation.[9]

While Smith's definition of an ethnic group is concerned with the objective criteria that may make up an ethnic group, another element that makes it difficult to define an ethnic group or nation is subjective in the sense that an ethnic group or nation can really only be defined subjectively by its members. This is clear from Hugh Seton-Watson's definition of a nation in his seminal work, *Nations and States*. For him,

> a nation exists when a significant number of people in a community consider themselves to form a nation, or behave as if they formed one. It is not

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[9] In Bosnia-Herzegovina the word *narod* means either nation or people. Even though the status of a *narod* has political significance, I have chosen in this study to use the term 'ethnic group' to describe the Bosniaks, Croats and Serbs. This is because this study deals not just with present-day Bosnia-Herzegovina but also with periods when they did not have the status of a *narod.* It also avoids confusion with Stavenhagen's cited definition of a nation.

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necessary that the whole of the population should so feel, or so behave, and it is not possible to lay down dogmatically a minimum percentage of a population which must be so affected. When a significant group holds this belief, it possesses 'national consciousness' (1977: 5).

Here, it is members of the nation itself who decide when it exists and, by extension what the criteria defining that nation, or 'elements of a shared culture', shall be. It is also the members of a nation who decide the boundaries with other groups, the 'us' as against the 'them'. In this sense a nation should be seen as a constructed entity. This is in contrast to the primordialist view that nations have existed since ancient times and that ethnic identity is something that each of us is born with and is immutable.

Robert Greenberg highlights the contingent and mutable nature of ethnic identity in the Balkans where historically members of a given ethnic group would have 'switched their ethnic allegiances over time' (2004: 7) depending on the prevailing social and political circumstances and gives the example of the changing ethnic allegiance of a Muslim Slav born in the Serbian Sandžak around 1930. In similar vein and applied to Bosnia-Herzegovina, a Slav of the Muslim faith born in the first half of the twentieth century could have changed his ethnic affiliation several times during his lifetime: During the Second World War he may have self-identified as a Muslim Croat, in Communist Yugoslavia he could have self-identified first as a Yugoslav and then as a Muslim and after 1992 as a Bosniak. Linguistically also, he may have said in the first case that he spoke Croatian, in the second Serbo-Croat and in the third Bosnian.

National consciousness, as mentioned by Seton-Watson above, is what leads the individual to self-identify as a member of the ethnic group or nation. It also forms the basis of nationalism which is a doctrine that holds ethnic identification to be an individual's preeminent identity. Much has been written about nationalism and there have been myriad attempts to define precisely what constitutes it.[10] Andrew Heywood, however, sums up the dilemma by contrasting opposing views of what nationalism is intended to achieve. As he puts it, 'On the one hand, nationalism can appear to be a progressive and liberating force, offering the prospect of national unity or independence. On the

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[10] Andrew Heywood, for example, pinpoints four types of nationalism: liberal nationalism, conservative nationalism, expansionist nationalism and anticolonial nationalism (2002: 111).

other, it can be an irrational and reactionary creed that allows political leaders to conduct policies of military expansion and war in the name of the nation' (Heywood, 2002: 111). The rise of nationalist sentiment in recent decades, especially since the end of the Cold War and the conflicts in the former Yugoslavia, mean that nationalism tends to be seen more in the sense of the second half of the quote, as an 'irrational and reactionary creed' driven by the aspiration to create from the ethnic group or nation a distinct political entity by any means necessary. It is, however, important to remember that the Romantic cultural nationalism of the nineteenth century gave the ethnic groups of the Ottoman and Habsburg empires an important 'feeling of groupness' (Edwards, 1985: 15) which meant they could identify themselves as distinct from the imperial powers. As Joshua Fishman puts it, 'Through nationalism masses of people attain and maintain a new and a constantly renewed sense of identity and purpose' (1972: 55).

As suggested by the above, then, ethnic identity can be easily manipulated and in this regard 'it is politics and politicians who clarify and emphasize the criteria of ethnic assignment as a way of mobilizing support and allocating both demands and benefits' (Hammel, 2000: 26). Here language performs an important function. It can be used as a device to circumscribe the boundaries of a given ethnic group. It provides what Joshua Fishman calls 'contrastive self-identification via language' (1972). This means that the members of an ethnic group are not only unified from within because of their use of a common language but this language also makes it possible for them to distinguish themselves from other groups. It marks the line separating Us from Them, or, as Fishman succinctly puts it: 'It is the shibboleth that differentiates friend from foe' (1972: 53).[11]

In the case of Bosnia-Herzegovina where we have seen that there is very little of substance linguistically to differentiate one language from another the shibboleths that are used are the names of the languages. Croatian historian and commentator Ivan Lovrenović has commented that when someone from Bosnia-Herzegovina is asked what language they speak they are really being

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[11] It is not always necessary for an ethnic group to have a separate language as a marker of its distinct identity. In Wales, for example, the English-speaking members of the population do not consider themselves any less Welsh because they speak only English.

asked what ethnic group they belong to (2002, paragraph 9). And even though people may not have changed their speech habits since the war they have 'ethno-linguistic' awareness of the necessity to change the label they use for their language (Bugarski, 2005: 170).

Fishman pinpoints a second function for language in ethnic identification as 'the authenticating device for finding, claiming and utilizing one's inheritance' (Fishman, 1972: 45). According to him, modern-day nationalism emphasises the importance of the ethnic past as it contains 'both the link to greatness as well as the substance of greatness itself' (1972: 44) and therefore provides an ethnic identity with authenticity. This hearkening back to the glorious linguistic past can be seen in the way Bosniak language planners stress the historicity of the language, claiming that a Bosnian language can be traced back to at least the fifteenth century. This stress on the historical nature of the language also led the Bosniaks to choose to call their language *bosanski*. This has caused controversy (which continues) because the word *bosanski* is the neutral adjectival form for Bosnia so any language called by that name should refer to the entire population and not just one ethnic group. Croats and Serbs believe that it would be better for the language to be called *bošnjački* (Bosniak) which derives from the noun *Bošnjak* or Bosniak originally meaning a native of Bosnia but now denotes a Slav of Muslim faith. They argue that using Bosniak as a designation for the language would make it clear that it was the language of one ethnic group only. They also consider that use of the designation *bosanski* implies that the Bosniaks want to deny them their own linguistic identity.

Using language as a link to the past is also a way of 'bridging immediate loyalties with transcendent ones' (Kelman, 1971: 31) and provides

> a continuity and scope without which a sense of overarching nationality could not be constructed; it provides concrete, emotionally significant products that the individual received from previous generations and will pass on to the future ones and that, in the present, link him to a widely dispersed population, most of whose members he does not, and never will, know personally' (Kelman, 1971: 31).

Another way of putting this is that the individual is part of an 'imagined community,' as Benedict Anderson (1983) has described it. The group is imagined because one member will never meet all the other members of the group but it is a community because its members are tied together by a

common language. This idea is important for understanding the dynamics of ethnic relations in Bosnia-Herzegovina. The Croats and Serbs feel that they are in an 'imagined community' with the Croats and Serbs in the neighbouring states of Croatia and Serbia and this community may transcend any kind of feeling of community they might have with non-Croat or non-Serb members of the population of Bosnia-Herzegovina. Thus, their allegiance to their respective kin states is stronger than to the unified state. In this respect, a common language functions as a way to justify the bonds with the kin states. For the Bosniaks the 'imagined community' is more limited in scope although the language still provides a link with both past and future generations. They do not have a kin state so their 'imagined community' is made up of other members of the Bosniak ethnic group in Bosnia-Herzegovina. Being part of this community allows them to have their own distinct group identity which means they cannot so easily be co-opted by the Croats and Serbs as members of their groups. This refusal on the part of the Croats and Serbs to accept the Bosniaks as a separate ethnic group has been a feature in the relations between the three ethnic communities since the nineteenth century. In this regard the Croats and Serbs argue that ethnically the Bosniaks are really Croats and Serbs who converted to Islam during Ottoman rule.

The foregoing discussion has been intended to explain the language-ethnic identity link that is crucial in contemporary language politics in Bosnia-Herzegovina. An understanding of this link is essential when considering language issues in Bosnia-Herzegovina as it is easily manipulated by local elites as a way of hampering broader peace-building endeavours and post-war reconciliation. This is the background against which any approach to linguistic matters taken by the international community plays out, and any international involvement with the contemporary language situation necessarily feeds into these efforts of the local elites. Much of the rest of this study is concerned with the interaction between the actions of the international actors and the nationalist discourse of the domestic elites in the area of language politics.

Methods

I have used a combination of sources to research the questions posed earlier on in this Introduction. In my data collection I looked at primary sources

such as official documents produced by various international organisations on subjects germane to the topics dealt with in this thesis and the domestic legislation of Bosnia-Herzegovina, as well as international legal instruments such as the European Charter of Human Rights. I also drew on primary research concerning various aspects of post-Dayton Bosnia-Herzegovina conducted by other researchers. For example, much research has been done on issues of identity in the education system in Mostar (Hromadžić, 2006; Wimmen, 2004; Owen Jackson, 2008) and I have made use of this research in Chapter 4 which looks at language issues in education reform. I also made use of newspaper articles as a source of additional evidence to verify data from other sources. Additionally, at the end of Chapter 3 I use newspaper articles for the purposes of a detailed linguistic analysis in the discussion on societal security in order to illustrate how political elites in Bosnia-Herzegovina use rhetoric to undermine societal security.

Empirical data was gleaned from interviews that I conducted mostly in Bosnia-Herzegovina, and the rest of this section will detail these and issues related to the purpose of the interviews, my choice of interviewee and my positionality. Traditionally, social researchers are expected to be 'value free and objective' (Bryman, 2008: 24) in their research. Increasingly, however, there is a recognition that the researcher 'carries personal ideas, feelings and stereotypes into the field' (Armakolas, 2001: 174) which influence the way in which data is collected, analysed and interpreted. Bearing this in mind I will start this section by explaining my own previous personal experience which has undoubtedly impacted on the course of my research.

The impetus for embarking on this study came from my own experience as a professional translator and interpreter working for various international organisations dealing with the languages of the successor states of the former Yugoslavia since 1987 and most recently as the chief of the language service of the NATO Stabilisation Force (SFOR) HQ for four years from April 2000 to June 2004. This study and its development have therefore been informed to a great extent by my previous professional experience. For example, I knew from the beginning that the research would focus on the implications of the recognition of three official languages in post-Dayton Bosnia-Herzegovina as this had been an important element of day-to-day

operations in the HQ SFOR language service and I wanted to explore the wider impact of this.

My experience as a professional linguist also meant I had an interest in how translators and interpreters deal with issues to do with working between English and three mutually comprehensible languages as is the case in Bosnia-Herzegovina. While there has been other research done on interpreters and translators working in a conflict situation in Croatia and Bosnia-Herzegovina (Stahuljak, 2000; Baker, 2009) there was nothing specifically highlighting this issue. It was therefore clear early on in the research that part of my research would involve interviews with linguists in Bosnia-Herzegovina. Moreover, because of my previous professional experience dealing with language matters I was aware that in investigating the development of the language policies of international organisations it would be necessary to interview linguists as the actors with the most direct involvement in language issues.

The bulk of the interviewees for this study can be divided into two categories: linguists working for international organisations in Bosnia-Herzegovina and experts involved in education matters at the OSCE (Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe), the OHR (Office of the High Representative) and at an international NGO. All these interviews were conducted during a research trip to Bosnia-Herzegovina that took place between 25 May and 8 June 2008. Two other interviews were conducted subsequently: one over the telephone with an interpreter living in the US who had been engaged at the negotiations that led to the signing of the Dayton Peace Agreement (3 August 2008) and the other in London on 21 October 2009 with Lord (Paddy) Ashdown who was the International Community's High Representative in Bosnia-Herzegovina from May 2002 to January 2006.

Interviews with linguists

Interviews were conducted with linguists from the Headquarters of the European military force (EUFOR) in Sarajevo (13), the OHR (four), the OSCE (one) and the Sarajevo office of the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia (one). These organisations were chosen because they each have an organised translation and interpretation service which have dealt with language matters since 1995 and even before. There have been myriad other

international organisations and agencies active in Bosnia-Herzegovina in the past 14 years but only the largest organisations have employed or employ linguists in large numbers and would therefore be most likely to have established a specific language service. As one purpose of these interviews was to investigate how language policy as it relates to translation and interpretation practices has developed since the signing of the Dayton Peace Agreement, I worked from the premise that the organisations with an actual language service would be most likely to have an established language policy.

Another reason for choosing to interview the linguists in these organisations rather than non-linguists was because of their longevity in their posts as many of them had begun their employment in 1995 or even before. They therefore had the 'institutional memory' that is lacking among other, especially international, staff who tend to spend shorter periods in post. This is especially true of the international military force whose members spend an average of six months in theatre before they are rotated out again.

The second purpose of the interviews with these linguists was to investigate their views regarding the way language usage may or may not have changed since the war. As language experts working with language on a daily basis and having to deal with three officially separate but mutually intelligible languages on a daily basis, I assumed in this regard that they would be more likely to be attuned to any change in language usage and would be more likely to have an opinion on language matters than a non-language professional. The responses to questions on these issues from the linguists at HQ EUFOR yielded useful data that was analysed using narrative theory following Mona Baker (2006) in Chapter 5 of the thesis.

Interviews with military linguists

The interviews with the linguists at HQ EUFOR threw up various issues to do with the interviewer-interviewee relationship given that all those interviewed were former colleagues of mine and, additionally, I had been their boss. This led to the question of whether I could be considered an insider or an outsider. In the strictest sense, I am not an insider because I am not from Bosnia-Herzegovina nor do I have any family ties with the country nor am I resident in the country. But nor am I a complete outsider as I worked with the

interviewees for four years and therefore have particular knowledge of their experiences. My position of a former superior, though, makes this relationship more complex because of its essential inequality and this could have meant a certain distance between us or at least a certain reserve on the part of the interviewees. If this were the case the four years that had elapsed since I left HQ SFOR may have meant I was viewed more as an equal. Finally, I hoped that the interviewees' attitude toward me would be a generally positive one because in my time I had managed to preserve their jobs from the downsizing that was going on when I arrived in post and overall I had improved their conditions of employment. On balance, therefore, I would position myself somewhere between an outsider and an insider.[12]

Labaree pinpoints four advantages to being an insider: 'the value of shared experiences; the value of greater access; the value of cultural interpretation; and the value of deeper understanding and clarity of thought for the researcher' (2003: 103). My research has benefited from all four of these values. For example, I was especially helped by having access to a large number of linguists in the international military force and because of prior acquaintance there was already an established rapport which facilitated the interviews (Keats, 2000) and trust between us. This meant that the course of the interviewing process ran smoothly.

There are, however, also pitfalls to being an insider especially as regards the question of familiarity. The risk during the interviews was that the interviewees may assume that I would automatically understand something that they meant but did not explicitly explain which might lead me to make erroneous assumptions. The only way I could see to guard against this happening was to be on alert throughout the interviews to anything I might have misinterpreted and to then ask follow-up questions. I chose to conduct semi-structured interviews as this allowed me to ask particular questions that

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[12] Tamar Hermann in her analysis of researchers in violently divided societies, mentions the category of 'involved outsider' which she describes as someone who 'is personally connected to the conflict by virtue of belonging to one of the national, religious or ethnic groups involved in it, or because of an identification with a general political stance such as anti-racism, anti-colonialism or non-violence that is relevant to the analysis of the specific conflict' (2001: 79). Neither of these definitions fits my personal circumstances although I am personally connected to the region because of my previous professional experience and current academic interests.

were focussed on the very specific issues I was interested in but it also meant that I could ask additional clarifying questions if need be. This method also gave an interviewee the opportunity to speak for as long as they wanted but within the confines of the question. This meant that the duration of the interviews ranged from 20 minutes to more than an hour.

I did not attempt to make a selection of the HQ EUFOR linguists I wanted to interview prior to the interviews as I was aware that I would be constrained by who was available on the days that I was in Sarajevo, however, I did manage to interview linguists with a range of experience and opinions.

Interviews with non-military linguists

The main issue regarding my interviews with the non-military linguists in the OHR and the OSCE was to do with access as I had been unable to contact them prior to my research trip. Access to the OHR linguists was facilitated through a friend who was employed there at the time, and I made contact with the OSCE linguist through the ICTY linguist who I also interviewed. This last interpreter was a former colleague and friend of mine from the time I was employed at the ICTY in The Hague (1994-2000).

All these linguists were very willing to take the time to talk to me and a rapport was quickly established. This may have been because they saw me as a kindred spirit because of my previous experience as a linguist in Sarajevo or because I had come recommended by others. I also gained the impression that they were glad that they were finally being asked about their experiences and opinions as linguists.

Interviews with non-linguists

The other main group of interviewees were people working in the field of education. I interviewed two staff members of the OSCE Education Department, a staff member of the OHR working on education reform, the national director of an international NGO and two staff members working in its office in Zenica. The respondents from the OSCE and the OHR were selected because these are the international organisations that have the lead role in education reform in the international community. The respondents from the NGO were chosen because this organisation has had an important role in

improving conditions in local communities since 1995. For example, it has had projects constructing homes for returnees, it is supporting community-based groups to strengthen civil society and is working on economic development with micro-finance loans to poor rural families, among other initiatives. Its focus is on children and in 2007 it assisted more than 1,500 children with clothing, shoes, basic literacy support and extra classes. The NGO also repaired six schools in neglected rural areas and gave educational supplies to 19 schools. I therefore thought that since the NGO, as a faith-based[13] organisation, was more directly involved with local communities on the ground its staff members may have a different view of the issues considered in this thesis to those held by staff members of the international organisations who are involved more with the policy-making level. This was borne out early on in the interviews with the two staff members in Zenica who talked a lot about the overt and hidden poverty experienced by ordinary people in Bosnia-Herzegovina.

I arranged the interview with one of the interviewees at the OSCE by email prior to departing for Bosnia-Herzegovina. This interviewee had published and presented several papers at international conferences on Bosnia-Herzegovina and I was able to obtain their email address through one of these. This interviewee then suggested for interview a colleague in the education department with a particular interest in language matters. The interview with the interviewee at the OHR was arranged through a contact in another department while the national director of the NGO was already an acquaintance of mine. They then suggested I interview the two staff members in Zenica.

The purpose of these interviews was two-fold. First, they were used to glean additional information about the education reform activities of the particular organisation the interviewee belonged to and to offset the information and opinions contained in official reports by these organisations as regards education reform. I considered this to be important bearing in mind that the author of a particular report always has a certain point of view that they

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[13] This NGO describes itself as: a Christian relief, development and advocacy organisation dedicated to working with children, families and communities to overcome poverty and injustice.

want to put across (Bryman, 2008: 522) so there may be alternative viewpoints. These interviews were thus a way of forming a more complete picture of developments and activities in the field of education.

The second purpose of this group of interviews was to gauge to what extent issues of language are present and considered in the work of the various organisations and specifically in an area where issues of identity-formation are important. More specifically some of the questions dealt with the effect language issues have on on-going reform of the education sector in Bosnia-Herzegovina. I also wanted to ascertain whether the interviewees, as experts in their field and with the status of 'insiders' in their organisations, would consider that the international community in Bosnia-Herzegovina had any kind of language policy in the field of education reform.

Other interviews

As I have taken the signing of the Dayton Peace Agreement as the starting point for this study since it recognises three official languages in Bosnia-Herzegovina it seemed important to attempt to ascertain the extent to which language issues were considered during the negotiations that were held at the Wright Patterson airbase which produced the agreement. In August 2008 I therefore interviewed by telephone one interpreter who had worked at the talks and was based in the United States. I had previously worked with this interpreter so it was relatively easy to gain access to this person. However, it took some weeks to finally set up the interview because for security reasons the interviewee had to first gain permission from the US State Department, which had engaged them for the negotiations, to talk to me. Permission was granted although the interpreter was not allowed to talk about anything to do with the actual content of the negotiations i.e. what a particular participant may have said on a certain issue. The interview therefore focussed on organisational matters regarding the negotiations.

My final interviewee was Lord (Paddy) Ashdown who, as stated above, was the international community's High Representative in Bosnia-Herzegovina between May 2002 and January 2006. The reason for interviewing him was a comment he made in his book *Swords and Ploughshares: Building Peace in the 21st Century* about the linguistic nationalism that he believed had been

encouraged with the recognition of three official languages in the Dayton Peace Agreement (Ashdown, 2007: 99). His comments on this seemed to suggest that he had given serious thought to the language issue in post-Dayton Bosnia-Herzegovina and its implications for stability in the country. This is in contrast to much of the writing on Bosnia-Herzegovina since the beginning of the 1990s where language issues are either completely absent or are treated in a much more superficial way (see Holbrooke, 1998 and Glenny, 1992). Access to Lord Ashdown was facilitated by Dr. Catherine Baker, post-doctoral research assistant on the Languages at War project at the University of Southampton which is researching language contacts in post-Dayton Bosnia-Herzegovina.

I did not anonymise the quotes I cite from the interview with Lord Ashdown as he was speaking in his capacity as a former High Representative in Bosnia-Herzegovina which gives weight to his comments. All other interviewees have been anonymised and no more information on them will be provided in order to preserve their anonymity.

The language of the interviews

All the interviews apart from two were conducted in English. This was particularly important for the interviews with the linguists as I interviewed them in their offices and I wanted them to think about language issues in their professional capacity as employees of an international organisation. Because of their high level of competence in English there was little danger that they would not be able to express themselves adequately.

The two interviews that I conducted in the local language were with the two staff members of the NGO in Zenica. I had been told prior to the interviews that they were unconfident about their level of competence in English and on meeting we immediately struck up a rapport speaking the local language, and this is how we continued the interviews. Because these two staff members were not employed as linguists and their interviews would not be compared with those conducted with linguists it was not imperative that the interviews be conducted in English.

Presentation of interview material

In presenting the interview material I have chosen to apply what Thompson calls a 'cross-analysis' approach where 'the oral evidence is treated as a quarry from which to construct an argument...This will normally require much briefer quotations, with evidence from one interview compared with that of another, and combined with evidence from other types of source material' (1978: 239). This means that data from the interviews are to be found throughout the study although material from interviews with the education experts is to be found mainly in Chapter 4 on education reform and the data from interviews with the military linguists are mostly in Chapter 5. Interview material is interspersed with evidence from the other sources detailed at the beginning of this section. In this sense the presentation of material is driven by the argument I want to present rather than a desire to present a series of life histories[14].

Structure of the Study

The study consists of six chapters. **Chapter 1** is a literature review related to language policy and planning in general and specifically regarding Bosnia-Herzegovina. It concentrates on the language policy and planning activities of the three main ethnic groups themselves but concludes with a review of current scholarship on the approach the international community has taken as regards linguistic matters in Bosnia-Herzegovina.

Chapter 2 provides historical background to the contemporary language politics of Bosnia-Herzegovina. It focuses on three distinct periods in the history of Bosnia-Herzegovina – the period of Hapsburg rule from 1878 to 1914, the fascist regime of the Independent State of Croatia (1941-1945) and the Socialist Federative Republic of Yugoslavia (1945-1990) – when a language planning process was embarked upon. It will analyse the historic link between ethnic identity, linguistic nationalism and language planning, drawing

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[14] In some of the interview extracts I have inserted explanatory notes between forward slashes. In some cases these notes explain something that was said or are an addition by me for the sake of clarification. In one instance where something the interviewee said was unclear from the recording I have put the words I think they said between forward slashes with a question mark in front.

comparisons among the three periods and highlighting issues that are still important for the contemporary situation.

As stated above, this study takes the Dayton Peace Agreement as the starting point for the peace-building activities of the international community so **Chapter 3** looks more closely at the provisions of the agreement. It begins with an explanation of what is meant by the term peace-building. It then analyses the state structure of Bosnia-Herzegovina to show how post-Dayton state arrangements have led to a situation where an identity based on loyalty to a particular ethnic group rather than the joint state is the dominant identity in the political system. Then focussing on language, it will look at the status of the languages in the constitutions and the impact of a 2000 decision of the Constitutional Court which led to constitutional amendments providing equal rights, including equal language rights, for all the ethnic groups. As a multi-ethnic state Bosnia-Herzegovina lends itself to analysis within the framework of the concept of societal security which in turn helps us to understand how language issues can be manipulated to undermine the integrity and stability of the state.

The next two chapters deal with two contrasting aspects of the peace-building endeavour that were treated very differently in the Dayton Peace Agreement. These are two sectors that can be expected to be the focus of any peace-building endeavour: the education system and defence reform. The education system was mentioned hardly at all in the agreement but the international community has nevertheless been involved to a significant degree in its reform. Given the importance of the education sector in identity formation, the local elites have also involved themselves in education reform in order to maintain linguistic and other distinctions between the three main ethnic groups and thereby hinder external peace-building efforts and reconciliation. **Chapter 4** therefore looks at the activities of the international community in this sector focusing on its approach to language and analyses how these activities feed into the wider efforts of the local authorities to hinder reconciliation.

In contrast, the bulk of the Dayton Peace Agreement is devoted to the military aspects of the peace. **Chapter 5** therefore looks at the way in which the international military force approached the language issue in its dealings

with the local military forces, specifically in the area of defence reform which is generally seen as one of the successes of the external peace-building effort in Bosnia-Herzegovina. In contrast to language policy in education reform, in this field it is related to the internal policy and practice of the international military force (which led the defence reform) as regards translation and interpretation. Drawing on interviews with linguists employed by the international military force the chapter will trace the way in which this language policy was formed and endeavour to assess its impact on the ultimate goals of the defence reform. It will be shown that this policy was guided to a great extent by the linguists themselves so there will also be a discussion of translator and interpreter ethics applying narrative theory as suggested by Mona Baker in her monograph *Translation and Conflict: a narrative account* (2006).

The concluding chapter draws comparisons between the two case studies – education reform and defence reform – and the way in which language was approached in the two areas. I then endeavour to answer the questions posed at the beginning and test the contention that if the international organisations in Bosnia-Herzegovina have had a language policy it has conflicted with the overall aims of the peace-building process.

Chapter 1

Literature Review

Introduction

This study is about language policy and language planning in Bosnia-Herzegovina. It is concerned primarily with investigating the language policy of the international organisations currently present in the country as part of the peace-building mission since the signing of the Dayton Peace Agreement in December 1995. There is considerable general scholarship on the activities of the international community in Bosnia-Herzegovina dealing with various aspects of the peace-building project. For example, certain scholars (*inter alia* Chandler, 1999; Bieber, 1999; Hayden, 2005; Bose, 2002) focus on the implications of the constitutional arrangements put in place by the agreement for the future stability of the post-war state and its democratic development. Others (*inter alia* Sebastian, 2009; Recchia, 2007) focus on the relationship between the institutions of Bosnia-Herzegovina and one particular international actor, such as the European Union. In contrast, very little writing has as its focus the language policy activities of the international community in post-Dayton Bosnia-Herzegovina. This literature review identifies just two scholarly works, Greenberg (2004) and Monnesland (2005), which give any consideration at all to actions by the international organisations in Bosnia-Herzegovina as regards language issues. This study is therefore intended to go some way in filling this gap in the scholarship.

The scholarship that does exist on language planning and policy in Bosnia-Herzegovina is mainly concerned with the language planning activities of the Bosniaks in standardising their language. The Serbs and Croats in Bosnia-Herzegovina have been able to look to Serbia and Croatia respectively for their own language standards and have therefore needed to take fewer steps in shaping their own linguistic identity. As a consequence there is far less written on the language policy activities of these two ethnic groups. In contrast, the Bosniaks have had to mould their own standard language by themselves,

and Bosniak language planners have been more active in establishing a distinct linguistic identity for the Bosniaks as a way of underpinning their separate ethnic identity. Much of the scholarship on these language planning and policy activities of the Bosniaks is concerned with the particular features that make up the corpus of the new Bosnian standard and distinguish it from Croatian and Serbian; discussions on these features and the extent to which they are present in the Bosnian language can be found in Ford (2001), Monnesland (2004 and 2005), Lehfeldt (2003), Völkl (2002) and Greenberg (2009). This purely linguistic aspect to the scholarship will not be dealt with in much detail in this literature review because we are primarily concerned with the socio-linguistic aspects of the language situation, that is the interaction between aspects of language and societal circumstances and developments.

Given the lack of scholarship on the specific topic of the influence of international actors on the language issue in Bosnia-Herzegovina, the greatest part of this literature review takes the general scholarship on language policy and language planning and relates it to the language policy and planning undertaken in Bosnia-Herzegovina by domestic authorities and elites. In this, it will also make use of the scholarship that is available regarding language policy and planning in Bosnia-Herzegovina. This approach provides the theoretical and conceptual context for the language planning and policy actions of the domestic authorities and elites, as well as those of the international community in Bosnia-Herzegovina, the scholarship on which will be discussed in the final section of the literature review.

Looking at the language planning and policy activities of domestic authorities and elites also provides the domestic context in which to consider the language policy actions of international organisations. The international community's approach to the language issue should not be seen in isolation from the activities of domestic language planners and elites because the actions of international organisations in this regard feed into the concerns, motivations and actions of the domestic actors. It is therefore necessary to understand the activities of the domestic language planners in order to fully comprehend the implications of the actions of the international community in addressing the language issue.

The first section of this chapter looks at what is meant by language policy and planning and gives a brief overview of the historical development of language planning and policy and the related scholarship. It will then move on to considering the language planning activities of the three main ethnic groups as they relate to this scholarship. The review focuses necessarily on the language planning activities of the Bosniaks for the reasons touched on above. The final section of this chapter looks at the only two works, (Greenberg, 2004) and (Monnesland, 2005), which deal in any detail with the activities of the international community as regards the language issue in Bosnia-Herzegovina.

What do we mean by Language Policy?

In the scholarship there is no one specific definition of language policy. Scholars use the term to describe different things and it is often used interchangeably or in tandem with the term language planning. Put at its simplest, the term 'language policy' denotes 'all forms of intervention in language' (Grin, 2003: 28). This is the broadest possible definition of the term as it gives no indication of what form a language policy takes, nor who implements it and how, nor what the possible outcomes of policy implementation might be. This lack of specificity means, however, that language policy can encompass a broad range of different activities carried out by a variety of possible actors. Many discussions of language policy place it at the national level, as something that is done by 'politicians, statesmen or policy-making bodies' (Cobarrubias, 1983: 62). However, as Robert Cooper (1989) argues, seeing language policy only in these terms rules out the activities carried out more at the grassroots, for example, activities initiated by the Women's Movement in the United States aimed at promoting non-sexist usage. Nor, according to Cooper (1989: 31), would it include the language reform efforts of individuals such as Ben Yehuda in Palestine and Samuel Johnson in England. Similarly, Björn Jernudd considers that agencies that are not governmental or national 'can obviously concern themselves with language in an orderly fashion' (1973: 18). He cites as examples of these national but nongovernmental agencies, associations of professionals who coin or spread terminology, non-national and nongovernmental agencies such as large

specialised corporations which might provide its own terminology for a specific field or encourages the use of a specific language, newspapers with their proof-reading function and the production of style guides and the writings of individual authors (Jernudd, 1973: 19). Finally, there can even be language policy at the level of the family, for example, when a family member is 'trying to persuade others in the family to speak a heritage language' (Spolsky, 2005: 2153). Thus, language policy can refer to many different kinds of decision-making as regards language use and at various levels of society.

As mentioned above, the term language policy is frequently used interchangeably with the term language planning but generally there is no consistency in the use of terminology. Sue Wright (2004), for example, puts the two terms together in her book *Language Policy and Language Planning: from Nationalism to Globalisation* and uses the acronym LPLP throughout the text. The term language planning was originally coined by Uriel Weinreich in 1957 but it was Einar Haugen who first wrote about it in his 1959 analysis of the process of language change in Norway. He described it as 'the activity of preparing a normative orthography, grammar and dictionary for the guidance of writers and speakers in a non-homogeneous speech community' (1959: 8), meaning a speech community in which more than one language is spoken. As can be seen, Haugen's original definition is a purely linguistic one focussed on the substance or corpus of a language, but over time other scholars in the field have devised different definitions to take account of other aspects of language planning. In *Language Planning and Social Change*, Cooper cites 12 of these which emphasise various aspects of the language planning process and analyses them from the perspective of 'who plans what for whom and how' (1989: 31). Cooper also advances his own definition of language planning as referring 'to deliberate efforts to influence the behaviour of others with respect to the acquisition, structure, or functional allocation of their language codes' (1989: 45). Here, Cooper has moved away from seeing language planning solely in terms of the codification of a language. He does not restrict the planners to any particular societal group nor does he specify the kind of plan that should be implemented or the goal that should be achieved. However, by including in his description the idea of 'deliberate' action he is nevertheless implying that the activity is intentional and oriented towards a specific goal.

In this thesis, language policy is used as a more general, over-arching term, as suggested in Grin's definition cited above, especially as much of the discussion in this study involves language decisions which are not part of an explicit planning process. As Spolsky points out, 'Many countries, institutions and social groups do not have formal or written language policies, so that the nature of their language policy must be derived from a study of their language practice or beliefs' (2005: 2153). The term 'language planning' is used in this thesis more specifically to focus on activities which fit more recognisably into Cooper's definition of language planning. In this regard it is important to distinguish the two kinds of planning as put forward by Heinz Kloss: status planning and corpus planning. For him the focus of status planning was on a language's 'standing alongside other languages or vis-à-vis a national government' (1969), that is to say the social status of a language, while corpus planning was defined as actions aimed at standardising the actual language itself (in line with Haugen's original definition of language planning above). Both these concepts are germane to our discussion of the language planning activities of the three main ethnic groups in Bosnia-Herzegovina and they will be explored in more detail further on in this chapter in a consideration of these specific activities. But first it is necessary to consider the possible motivations for language policy and to do this it is instructive to look at the history of language planning and language planning scholarship.

Overview of development of general language planning and policy study

Language planning and policy falls within the discipline of the sociology of language which in turn is part of sociolinguistics (Eastman 1983: 3). Joshua Fishman, who is considered to be the founding father of language planning, defines the sociology of language as including 'behaviour toward language (language attitudes, language movements, language planning) and the language concomitants of social processes large and small (including societal formation and reformation, societal interaction and societal change and

dislocation)' (1972: 269).[15] In this definition language planning is clearly linked with social influences and circumstances. Joan Rubin explains this further when she says 'language is more than an instrument to impart referential meaning. Language is a *social activity* which serves to identify the speaker and to place him in a particular relationship with the addressee' (1984: 9). In this sense language does more than just facilitate communication between speakers and therefore language planning and policy relates to not just this communicative function but also the symbolic meanings that are imparted when we use language. Carol Eastman underscores this when she highlights that language planning concerns 'center on sociologically based considerations of language (1) as a factor of ethnic identity, (2) as a marker of social class, and (3) as a reflection of status and mobility in a multilingual context' (1983: 116). In the context of this thesis, the first of these concerning ethnic identity is crucial for an understanding of the interaction between social and societal circumstances and language issues.

Language problems and attempts to address language issues have occurred throughout history: Eastman sees contemporary language planning as owing much to the establishment of language academies from the sixteenth century onwards because modern-day language planners have similar concerns to those of their ancestors, for example, language standardisation, codification and elaboration. It was not, however, until the 1960s that the academic discipline of language planning began to emerge and Eastman pinpoints the activities of Joshua Fishman as crucial to this development. At the end of the 1950s, Fishman suggested to the US Census Bureau that the language questions in the 1960 census questionnaire be revised. His interest was in collecting data on the use of non-English languages by the various ethnic and religious groups in the US which could then be used to research the language-related problems that existed in the country at that time. This in turn led to the work *Language Loyalty in the United States* which Fishman published in 1960 which Eastman says was 'one of the first works of scholarship to consider language planning as a scientific endeavour in a social context' (1983: 105). It also reflected growing interest in language issues generally as, in 1951,

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[15] For him the term sociolinguistics was inadequate as it implied just a 'kind of linguistics' and did not take account of attitudes to language.

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UNESCO had published a report entitled *The Use of Vernacular Languages in Education*. It defined ten language situations regarding language choices in multilingual societies and, according to Eastman, guided much of later language planning research in that area.

While language planning study began by considering the experiences of ethnic groups in the US, as represented by Fishman's work, as time went by there was a shift to research in the language problems of developing countries. According to Bjorn Jernudd, this was a 'reply to the mounting evidence of the need for immediate, practical solutions to the language problems of the developing countries' (1973:13). Language was seen as one element that needed to be and could be managed among all the issues involved in establishing an independent state and coincided with a 'general belief in the effectiveness' (Wright, 2004: 9) of language planning and the idea that language problems could be solved. At this stage of language planning focus was 'on the establishment and promotion of "unifying" majority (national) languages in postcolonial contexts' (May, 2003: 102) so that a language such as English would be promoted as a lingua franca in a country where there were competing minority languages and dialects. As a consequence, it was thought at this time that for a country to develop, especially economically, it was necessary for it to have as few official languages and dialects as possible (Phillipson, Rannut and Skutnabb-Kangas, 1995: 4).

Sue Wright divides up the post-Second World War period into three phases of importance for the study of language planning. The first concerns the post-colonial experiences as mentioned above. The second phase was marked by a reaction against this 'optimistic belief in progress' (Wright, 2004: 9). According to Wright, progress in the modernisation and democratisation of the new states slowed and there was a rejection of Western neo-colonialist solutions to the problems of the developing countries. In the field of language planning, the focus shifted from the linguistic aspects to the social, economic and political effects of language contact, in particular, 'issues of advantage/disadvantage, status and access' (Wright, 2004: 9). In addition, the discipline had to respond to the massive migrations of the second half of the twentieth century which produced language behaviour that was different to what had occurred in the past so that there was a rejection of total linguistic

assimilation in favour of maintaining the language of the country of origin. This in turn led to certain countries developing policies to accommodate the cultural and linguistic traditions of the new immigrants, such as, Canada and Australia (Wright, 2004: 10).

The third phase, according to Wright, is a consequence of the end of the Cold War and the spread of American dominated globalisation in all spheres. As people have become increasingly associated on a global scale the need for a universal medium of communication has been met by English. Wright says that this 'hegemony of English in political, economic, cultural and technological spheres has remained unchallenged' (2004: 11). In tandem with globalisation there has also been increased regionalisation, according to Wright, where regional supranational groups have been established, such as the European Union (2004, 11). As member states concede some authority to the centre, groups that are dissatisfied with their status within these states look to this same centre for support for their increased autonomy or even independence. Wright cites the Catalans, Scots, Flemings, Slovaks and Estonians as examples of such groups which have acquired autonomy or an independent state as part of this process in the last two decades. Both these developments have meant that in both language policy and language policy scholarship there is increasing focus on minorities and their rights and, as part of this, emphasis is placed on linguistic human rights. In this regard, if the protection of minorities is essentially about ensuring that a particular minority continues to exist by protecting and securing minority rights for it, then its language as 'one of the most important cultural core values' (Phillipson, Rannut and Skutnabb-Kangas, 1995: 7) must also be protected through the advocacy of linguistic human rights. This greater emphasis on linguistic human rights was reflected, at the end of the twentieth century, in the codification of international documents such as the United Nations Declaration on the Rights of Persons Belonging to National or Ethnic, Religious and Linguistic Minorities of 1992 and the European Charter on Regional or Minority Languages of 1992. This concern with linguistic human rights therefore represents a shift away from the focus of early language planning which was on majority languages towards contemporary ideas connected with the need for and advantages to maintaining linguistic diversity. These developments are important for the present study

because with their emphasis on linguistic diversity they not only inform the approach of the international community to the language issue in Bosnia-Herzegovina but also that of the domestic authorities and elites.

Motivations for language planning

As suggested by the variety of problems and concerns addressed in language planning and language planning scholarship since the 1960s, the motivations for language planning and policy are many and varied. Joan Rubin believes that there are three general areas of intended aims of language planning: linguistic, semi-linguistic and extra-linguistic (Rubin, 1984: 8). In the semi-linguistic category changes in language also serve social or political aims. According to Rubin, an example of this is bilingual education in the US which came after the civil rights movement and related to socio-political and economic rights as much as pedagogical improvements. Extra-linguistic aims are related to cases where there is no language problem and yet language planning is used to achieve these aims. Rubin cites the development of the Hausa language in this regard (1984: 9). In this case, at the beginning of the twentieth century when colonial rule was established in Northern Nigeria, the British High Commissioner imposed the Roman script for the written Hausa language as the language of administration. This was instead of the Arabic script that was already in use. His purely political objective was to facilitate colonial rule by creating a class of people who could read and write Romanised Hausa but were unable to speak English (Philips, 1996).

Cooper says that 'language planning is typically carried out for the attainment of non-linguistic ends such as consumer protection, scientific exchange, national integration, political control, economic development, the creation of new elites or the maintenance of old ones, the pacification or cooption of minority groups, and mass mobilization of national or political movements' (1989: 35). He argues that extra-linguistic considerations (political, economic, scientific, social, cultural and/or religious) are the *primary* (my emphasis) motivation for language planning, and definitions of language planning as the solution of language or communication problems are 'misleading' (1989: 35). This assertion is broadly true and there are numerous examples to support this such as the francization programme in Quebec in the

seventies which had the extra-linguistic aim of improving the economic and financial standing of the French population by putting more emphasis on the need for knowledge of French in the workplace but there are also some examples which seem to have been motivated by purely linguistic goals, for example the 1996 spelling reform in Germany which seems to have had the linguistic aim of simplifying the German orthography to make the language easier to learn. In the case of Bosnia-Herzegovina, however, it is the extra-linguistic considerations which are of overriding importance in the language planning activities of all three ethnic groups. As there is no communicative problem to resolve because the three main ethnic groups speak mutually intelligible languages, the motivation for language planning stems from the need to develop and maintain distinct ethnic identities for each of the ethnic groups; this is done partly through the promotion of separate language standards. While this has been easier for the Serbs and Croats who can make use of their historic, cultural and linguistic ties to Serbia and Croatia to claim ethnic difference, the Bosniaks have had to make greater effort in, for example, devising their own orthography, dictionaries, grammars and other instruments of codification in order to create a distinct linguistic identity which bolsters a separate Bosniak ethnic identity. In this they have undertaken activities that can be fitted into the categories of status planning and corpus planning which will be discussed in the next two sections.

Status planning

Over time the meaning of status planning has been extended in the scholarship to include 'deliberate efforts to influence the allocation of functions among a community's languages' (Cooper, 1989: 99). In his *Sociolinguistic Typology of Multilingualism*, Stewart elaborated ten categories of linguistic function: Official, Provincial, Wider communication, International, Capital, Group, Educational, School subject, Literary and Religious (1968: 540-541). According to Stewart, the same linguistic system could be used for more than one function. However, 'multilingual situations may be considered stable when the different linguistic systems are geographically, socially and functionally non-competitive' (Stewart, 1968: 541). For example, there may be two languages performing the same function but if they are the languages of

different local administrative units or of different social or ethnic groups there is no linguistic conflict because the use of one language does not impinge on the use of the other. A language conflict may arise if this complementary relationship is upset 'either by natural historical process or by direct administrative intervention' (Stewart, 1968: 541).

Status planning among the Bosniaks is not related to ensuring that particular functions are allocated to Bosnian as against those allocated to Serbian and Croatian but rather harks back to Kloss's original definition of status planning, that is its 'standing alongside' Croatian and Serbian. This means raising the profile of the Bosnian language so that it is on an equal footing with Croatian and Serbian. One way to do this has been to stress the historicity of the language, and especially its position in the literary history of Bosnia. This is in line with Fishman's idea about language serving as an authenticating device for nationalism as discussed in the Introduction to this study. Thus, in *Bosanski jezik*, the Bosniak language planner Senahid Halilović (1998) cites 37 examples of the use of the term 'Bosnian language' since the fifteenth century. Interestingly, the Bosnian language that is referred to in each of Halilović's examples is not necessarily the Bosnian that is spoken today or indeed a Slavonic language. For example, Halilović begins his list of references by stating that between the end of the fifteenth century and the beginning of the twentieth century there were about 300 Bosniak writers who wrote in Turkish, Arabic and Persian (1998: 22). Halilović quotes a passage from *Pregled književnog stvaranja bosansko-hercegovačkih Muslimana na turskom jeziku* (Survey of the Literary Output of the Bosnia-Herzegovina Muslims in the Turkish Language) by F. Nametak which states that at the end of Turkish rule and the beginning of Hapsburg rule some Turkish-language publications were launched in Bosnia. Halilović then states: 'In these works and journals, the language of the population of Bosnia was consistently called Bosnian'[16] (1998: 22). Moreover 'more than one hundred of these authors' (1998: 22) attach words such as Bosnavi/Bosnali/Bošnjak/Bosanac to their names as a signifier of their allegiance to Bosnia.

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[16] U tim je djelima i časopisima jezik žitelja Bosne dosljedno nazivan *bosanskim*.

Similarly, in line with the Herderian view of the importance of a language for a nation (as discussed in the Introduction to this study), Halilović also links the Bosniak nation and its language when he writes, 'It is necessary to nurture and develop a love for one's own country, one's own nation and one's own language'[17] (1998: 60). Elsewhere he connects the Bosnian language with Bosnian statehood as they both have a tradition of several centuries (1998: 38). In this respect Halilović is addressing the Bosniaks themselves and trying to raise the profile of the Bosnian language among them. In the second edition of *Bosanski jezik* published in 1998, he seems to be berating the Bosniaks for neglecting their own language when he says: 'The Bosniaks have ignored themselves, they themselves have disregarded and neglected their own language'[18] (1998: 8). He admits that the language situation of the Bosniaks is partly due to pressure from those more numerous and linguistically stronger 'but all this mirrors the lack of concern of the Bosniaks themselves for themselves, their past, present and future'[19] (1998: 8).

Monnesland (2005) considers that *Bosanski jezik*, along with *Jezik bosanskih Muslimana* by Dževad Jahić (both published in 1991) and *Rječnik karakteristične leksike u bosanskom jeziku* by Alija Isaković (published in 1992), had a great influence on the later development of the Bosnian standard language partly because of the period in which they were written. Published before the war started in Bosnia-Herzegovina they provided a linguistic status for a separate Bosnian standard which became crucial in the forming of a separate Bosniak identity as the war unfolded. For Monnesland these three works 'laid the scientific foundation for political action regarding the proclamation of a Bosnian language'[20] (2005: 484). This political action was manifested at the end of 1992, when the war had already started in Bosnia-Herzegovina, with a letter from 105 Bosniak intellectuals addressed to the Presidency of Bosnia-Herzegovina demanding that Bosnian be made one of the three official languages in the then Republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina. This political action was bolstered by a campaign by Bosniaks abroad to have

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[17] Treba njegovati i razvijati ljubav prema svojoj zemlji, svome narodu i svome jeziku.
[18] Bošnjaci su ignorirali sebe, sami su sebe, jezik svoj, zaobilazili i zapostavljali.
[19] ali u svemu tome zrcala se i nebriga samih Bošnjaka o sebi, o svojoj prošlosti, sadašnjosti i perspektivi.
[20] udarile su stručni temelj političkim postupcima oko proglašavanja bosanskog jezika.

Bosnian recognised as a separate language (Monnesland, 2005: 485). The Bosnian language finally achieved political status at the end of August 1993 when the Presidency issued a decree stipulating Bosnian as a designation for the official language in the republic: 'In the Republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina, the standard literary language with ijekavian pronunciation of its constituent peoples which is called by one of its three names, Bosnian, Serbian, Croatian, shall be in official use'[21] (*Službeni list*, 1.9.93). This was in stark contrast to the language provisions in the Constitution which had been passed six months earlier and which had continued the pre-war language policy and had as the official language of the Republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina 'Serbocroat and Croatoserbian with ijekavian pronunciation'[22]. Thus, we see that a combination of academic activity, émigré pressure and changing ethno-political circumstances on the ground led to the linguistic designation of Bosnian achieving political status. This gave impetus to the Bosniak language planners to continue their efforts to standardise the language.

The most influential language planners among the Bosniaks are scholars at the University of Sarajevo such as Senahid Halilović and Dževad Jahić who have been engaged in developing a grammar, orthography and comprehensive dictionary for the new Bosnian standard, as well as Josip Baotić and Ibrahim Čedić at the Institute for Language in Sarajevo. Whereas before 1992 the Institute for Language researched issues to do with the use of Serbo-Croat in various fields such as the media, the present-day institute deals with issues concerning the Bosnian language and Bosniak language planning only[23]. Thus, Čedić authored *Osnovi gramatike bosanskog jezika* (Basic grammar of the Bosnian language) in 2001 and most recently led the team that worked on the first comprehensive Bosnian dictionary that was published in September 2007.

At a governmental level, however, there is no one body or individual responsible for language planning. This is because the Bosniaks form a federation with the Croats so at the federal level it would be impossible to have

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[21] U Republici Bosni i Hercegovini u službenoj upotrebi je standardni književni jezik ijekavskog izgovora njenih konstitutivnih naroda koji se imenuju jednim od tri naziva: bosanski, srpski, hrvatski.
[22] Srpskohrvatski odnosno hrvatskosrpski jezik ijekavskog izgovora.
[23] Interviewee QQ who used to work at the pre-war institute noted that before the war no one spoke about a separate Bosnian language.

a body or individual dealing with the language concerns of just one of the ethnic groups. A consequence of this is that despite the fact that there is general recognition in state structures of the importance of the language/ethnic identity link, the language planners do not have automatic governmental or practical support for their activities. Indicative of this is the way in which the Institute for Language, a state institution, was forced to finance the publication of the first Bosnian comprehensive dictionary. Čedić had to literally go from minister to minister asking for funds and finally received some support from three of them. Even then the institute was forced to sell copies of the latest dictionary in advance and depend on the good will of the printers who printed the dictionary for the amount that had been raised rather than the actual, higher, printing costs (Čedić, 2007).

Corpus planning

According to Cooper, 'corpus planning refers to activities such as coining new terms, reforming spelling and adopting a new script. It refers, in short, to the creation of new forms, the modification of old ones, or the selection from alternative forms in a spoken or written code' (1989: 31). He says that corpus planning is traditionally split into three categories: graphisation, or the use of writing; standardisation (including codification), or the use of a supradialectal norm; and modernisation (including elaboration), or the development of vocabulary and forms of discourse. In Bosnia and Herzegovina, corpus planning activities among the Bosniaks have been focussed on standardisation and codification. An orthography by Senahid Halilović was published in 1996 and a number of grammars have been published since the beginning of the 1990s. The first of these was *Gramatika bosanskog jezika I-IV razred gimnazije* (Grammar of the Bosnian Language for the I-IV Grades of Grammar School) authored by Hanka Vajzović and Husein Zvrko and was published in 1994 while the war was still going on.

Alongside the aforementioned three aspects of corpus planning, Cooper proposes a fourth, namely renovation which he describes as 'an effort to change an already developed code, whether in the name of efficiency, aesthetics, or national or political ideology' (1989: 154). He considers that the renovated language does not fulfil any new communicative functions but if it

does it also contributes to the non-linguistic goals that motivated the renovation in the first place. He cites possible goals as the legitimation of new elites, the discrediting of old ones, the mobilization of political support or the raising of consciousness (Cooper, 1989: 154). The difference between modernisation and renovation is that the former allows language codes to serve new communicative functions but the latter allows language codes to serve old functions in new ways. Cooper's examples of linguistic renovation include the switches from Arabic to Latin to Cyrillic script imposed by Soviet language planners on the Turkic languages of Soviet Central Asia after the revolution; the removal of Persian and Arabic loanwords from Turkish in the 1920s; and successive efforts to reform Dutch spelling (1989: 154). To Cooper's examples of renovation we can add the corpus planning carried out by the Bosniaks. They have taken the pre-war language of Serbo-Croat and are attempting to create a separate standard by highlighting two characteristics which they consider to be specific to the speech of the Bosniaks: the phoneme /x/ and the use of loanwords from Turkish, Persian and Arabic known as *turcizmi* or Turkisms. As mentioned earlier, the new standard does not fulfil any new communicative functions so the primary aim of the renovation is to distinguish the Bosnian standard from the Croatian and Serbian standards. To sum up Bosniak language planning, we can follow Cooper and his analysis of 13 definitions of language planning and provide a definition of language planning of our own based purely on the experience of the Bosniaks. The definition would be as follows: Language planning refers to deliberate efforts to influence the language behaviour of others through corpus and status planning activities directed at an existing language code for primarily extra-linguistic aims.

Language planning models

As the field of language policy and planning has developed, several language planning models have been advanced which approach the process from different aspects. In 1970, Neustupny put forward a model based on four kinds of problem that need to be addressed: code selection, stability, expansion and differentiation. For example, if the problem is code selection (choosing between competing language varieties) the planning would focus on official policy formation by the authorities in power. In 1971, Rabin advanced a

typology based on the types of aims of the language planning activities to be undertaken and the agents who would be responsible for the activities. But the model that is most frequently applied is that of Einar Haugen which he first put forward in 1969 and then elaborated on in 1983. The model (Haugen, 1983: 275) is reproduced below:

	Form (policy planning)	Function (cultivation)
	1. Selection	3. Implementation
Society (status planning)	a. Problem identification b. Allocation of norms	a. Correction procedures b. Evaluation
	2. Codification	4. Elaboration
Language (corpus planning)	a. Graphization b. Grammatication c. Lexication	a. Terminological modernization b. Stylistic development

In describing this model, Haugen makes the point that it is 'a framework for the starting points of language planners everywhere and they are starting points only because 'they say nothing about the end points, the goals to be reached or the ideals and motivations that guide planners' (1983: 269-270).

Even though his model reflects Kloss's corpus/status planning distinction, Haugen makes the point: *'Selection* and *codification* remain mere paper exercises unless they are followed by *implementation* and *elaboration*, the former involving social status and the latter the linguistic corpus. To stay alive a language must have users for whom it performs useful functions' (1983: 272). The model illustrates that even though the corpus/status planning distinction is an important one for understanding language planning activities, it is equally important to bear in mind that language planning involves both interrelated types. This is certainly true of the language planning activities of the Bosniaks as the codification of the language through the publication of various grammars, orthographic manuals and so on raises the profile and therefore the status of the Bosnian language.

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Haugen's model seems to be the preferred one among Bosniak language planners. At the 1998 Bihać symposium on the Bosnian language, Halilović put forward a four-stage language planning model which was reminiscent of Haugen's and which Ford describes as follows: 'gathering information (*pronalaženje bitnih činjenica*); selection of features needing attention, codification (*planiranje, donošenje odluka*); implementation (*provođenje odluka*); and elaboration (*prikupljanje povratnih informacija*)' (2001: 94).

Halilović, as well as other speakers at the symposium, also cited the 10-stage language planning model advanced by Milorad Radovanović, professor of Serbian and General Linguistics at the University of Novi Sad. This model essentially elaborates on Haugen's by breaking down the stages as follows: selection, description, prescription, elaboration, acceptance, implementation, expansion, cultivation, evaluation and reconstruction (1992: 95). Radovanović conceived the language planning process as cyclical and continuous so that the stages should not necessarily be seen as happening in a consecutive sequence but rather as overlapping (1992: 97).

Curtis Ford (2001) applies Haugen's four-step scheme of language planning to the language planning activities undertaken by the Bosniaks. He says that *selection* has been 'straightforward' (2001: 128) because the Bosnian standard is based on the same neoštokavian dialect as the joint Serbo-Croatian standard. He considers selection to have begun in the early 1990s 'with the first open discussions in print of the perceived need for linguistic recognition of the Bosnian Muslim identity' (Ford, 2001: 129). *Codification*, according to Ford, has focussed on a number of features seen to be characteristic of Bosnian Muslim usage (use of the phoneme /x/ and Turkisms) and there is widespread agreement on these features among the Bosniak language planners (2001: 129).

Ford considers that the 'first steps' towards *implementation* have been taken with the publication of a number of orthographies, dictionaries and grammars (2001: 129). As for *elaboration*, Ford considered that this stage had not yet been reached as it presupposes a degree of acceptance which would lead to further activities by the language planners (2001:130). This corresponds to stage 8 (cultivation) in Radovanović's scheme. According to him, a language is cultivated through the school system, mass media and so on. As yet

it may be too early still to go on to the next stage of *evaluation* as the standard language that has been generally accepted by the Bosniaks would need to be evaluated at all grammatical levels to see if any adjustments need to be made so that the last stage of *reconstruction* may be embarked upon and the circle closed.

The next section of this literature review will look at evaluation in the language planning process in Bosnia-Herzegovina and will highlight in particular the problems connected to it.

Evaluating the results of language planning in Bosnia

Evaluation is one of the stages of the planning process which receives the least attention in practice and in the scholarship. Rubin (1984) ascribes this to the fact that the goals of a specific language planning process are 'often multiple, hidden and not well ordered' (1984: 7) and outcomes are not always specified in advance. Moreover, as mentioned above, much language planning activity is not based on a deliberate formalised plan so it is more difficult to evaluate it particularly if, as Rubin says, evaluation includes 'analysis of trends and a general monitoring system, as well as evaluation of specific aspects of a particular programme' (1984: 7). In the case of language planning by the Bosniaks it can be said that while certain recognisable language planning activities have been undertaken, there is no written language policy as such and no official governmental institution exists specifically tasked with implementing and monitoring language change. It is therefore difficult to evaluate these language planning activities in the absence of any goals or objectives stated in advance and in the absence of any established mechanisms to monitor change.

One thing that we can do, however, is look at the activities of the language planners and attempt to gauge their intentions behind their language planning activities. One important event for Bosniak language planners was the Bihać symposium on the Bosnian language which was held in September 1998 and which Ford considers to be 'the first congress for a Bosnian standard language that would be separate from its Croatian and Serbian counterparts' (2001: 350). Fishman states in his book devoted entirely to first congresses that first congresses are at 'the very beginning of the long chain of decisions and

implementations yet to come' (1993: 7) but the Bihać symposium was nevertheless held some years after the first instruments of codification had started appearing. Even so, it was the first organised attempt by Bosniak language planners to look at language issues and is a good starting point for our evaluation of language planning activities by the Bosniaks.

The symposium was organised by the Institute for Language in Sarajevo, the government of the Una-Sana Canton and the Federal Ministry of Education, Science, Culture and Sport. The participants represented a range of disciplines, not just linguistics, but also sociology, philosophy, history, religion and education, and each speaker was encouraged to approach the issues regarding the Bosnian language from their particular area of expertise. The aim of the symposium was 'to initially clarify the situation in which the Bosnian language finds itself and highlight problem issues and possibly indicate ways to resolve them'[24] (Čedić, 1999: 7). A range of views were expressed about the current state and future development of the Bosnian language. Ford distinguishes the prescriptivists from the descriptivists: the former were represented by speakers such as Senahid Halilović and Dževad Jahić, who enthusiastically advocated the development of a separate Bosnian standard. In Jahić's case, by drawing on historical and cultural factors to justify the existence of a separate standard. The descriptivists, as represented by Ibrahim Čedić and Josip Baotić, were much more in favour of a non-interventionist approach to the development of a separate standard; the latter calling for 'increasing awareness about the language union in the past, the present and even about such prospects in the future of all three Bosnian nations'[25] (1999: 94).

There were other speakers who did not fall into either of these two camps such as Mevlida Karadža who elucidated three possible options for the future development of the three standards in Bosnia-Herzegovina. The first was official status for the Bosnian language with recognition of the three variants of Bosnian, Croatian and Serbian. This would imply a common grammar, orthography and dictionary based on a highly flexible norm. The second option

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[24] početno osvjetljavanje stanja u kojem se nalazi bosanski jezik i naznačiti problemska pitanja i eventualno ukazati na puteve za njihovo rješavanje.
[25] produbljivanje svijesti o jezičkom zajedništvu u prošlosti, sadašnjosti, pa i takvim perspektivima u budućnosti sva tri bosanska naroda.

would be official status for three standard languages (Bosnian, Croatian and Serbian) each of which would develop separately from each other. The third option was the recognition of Bosnian as the single official language throughout the state with an extremely flexible standard; this approach would mean deciding on a standard based on linguistic considerations rather than political ones (Ford, 2001: 99). The first and third options were reminiscent of the language policy of the Socialist Federative Republic of Yugoslavia (SFRY) where the approach was to maintain a single language but with a degree of variation within the standard. It is significant that Karadža talks about the possibility of options for the future language situation on this occasion since the symposium was held some time after certain corpus and status planning initiatives had already been taken. A number of normative works had already been published and the Dayton Peace Agreement had named Bosnian as an official language alongside Croatian and Serbian three years previously so the course of the development of the language had already been fixed at the second option of developing separate standards and yet Karadža still obviously felt that the course of language development could be altered.

The symposium's conclusions cover both corpus and status planning issues. They begin with the unequivocal status planning declaration that 'The participants at the Symposium on the Bosnian language are unanimous in the view that the Bosnian language is a standard language which, in the family of Slavonic languages, stands alongside the Serbian and Croatian language'.[26] The conclusions then state seven future tasks to be carried out which include: the strengthening of the Institute for Language in Sarajevo and its renaming as the Institute for the Bosnian Language; the renaming of the Department for South Slavonic Languages at Sarajevo university as the Department for the Bosnian, Croatian and Serbian Language (in the singular); the provision of an international language code for Bosnian and various short-term and long-term projects to compile grammars, orthographies for school and general use and a Bosnian dictionary. Reflecting the importance of the education system and the media for language planning, the conclusions also proposed the compilation of

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[26] Učesnici Simpozija o bosanskom jeziku nepodijeljenog su mišljenja da je bosanski jezik standardni jezik koji u zajednici slavenskih jezika stoji naporedo sa srpskim i hrvatskim jezikom.

various Bosnian grammar books for primary and secondary schools and a manual for use by the media. The final conclusion related to better cooperation with education ministries to improve the teaching of the Bosnian language in schools. As Greenberg points out, these conclusions said nothing about the future standardisation of Bosnian, nor about any failings of the dictionaries and manuals already produced although some of these shortcomings had been mentioned at the symposium (2004: 154). Nor did they set any deadlines or specify the desired outcomes of the proposals. Many of the conclusions have nonetheless been acted upon: the Department for South Slavonic Languages was renamed; there is now an international language code for Bosnian, and several grammars, orthographies and dictionaries have been published.

One year after the Bihać symposium, the weekly *BH Dani* published a series of articles about the state of the Bosnian language by a number of Bosnian language scholars. In one of these, Naila Hebib-Valjevac assessed that little had changed in the year since the Bihać symposium. She said that schools were still using Halilović's orthography from 1996 which she criticises, among many other things, for its 'inadvertent emotional approach to the task'[27] (1999: paragraph 2) since it was begun in the war and completed soon after its end. Because of what she sees as its many shortcomings she blames the orthography for causing 'myriad almost irresolvable difficulties'[28] (1999: paragraph 5) in the areas of schooling, journalism and publishing. She also has a pessimistic view of the future of the Institute for Language and its chances of survival although these fears have proven to be unfounded as the institute still exists albeit with its name unchanged.

The differing views regarding the way forward for the standardisation of the Bosnian language expressed at Bihać have continued and are reflected in the various instruments of codification that have been published since then, as well as reaction to them. Indicative of this is that even though the first normative dictionary of Bosnian was published in September 2007 by the Institute for Language there are another two teams working on their own dictionaries. As can be expected from a dictionary compiled by a team led by Ibrahim Čedić, described by Curtis Ford as a descriptivist at the Bihać

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[27] nehotičan emotivan pristup djelu.
[28] mnoštvo gotovo nerješivih teškoća.

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symposium, it has an open and non-puristic approach to the lexicon. For example, it allows for the Croatian names of months. In a newspaper interview at the time the dictionary was published Čedić conceded that when another dictionary is published there may be arguments about the standard but he sums up this first dictionary as follows: 'This dictionary of ours will be more suited to those who are more democratic, those who are more sober, those who are more reasonable'[29] (Čedić, 2007: paragraph 21).

The disagreements over the Bosnian standard are not to do with the specific features of Bosnian as there is broad agreement on these, but rather they revolve around the extent to which these features are and should be present in the standard. For example, Hebib-Valjevac criticised Halilović's orthography as making the language too archaic and rural because of its emphasis on Turkisms (1999: paragraph 18). In a similar vein in another article in the aforementioned *BH Dani* series, Muhamed Filipović thought that the emerging standard contained too many archaisms and orientalisms which he considered undermined mentally, psychologically and linguistically 'the whole process of the europeanisation of our world'[30] (1999: paragraph 7). Similarly, Rašid Durić, another participant at the Bihać symposium, also heavily criticised the dictionary for schools (*Školski rječnik bosanskog jezika*) that was compiled by Dževad Jahić in 1999. According to Durić, the dictionary does not meet the three basic criteria in standardizing a lexicon, in that a lexeme must be generally comprehensible in a language community, up-to-date and widely used (2003: 68). In Durić's opinion the dictionary contains too many archaisms, orientalisms and regionalisms to be useful as a dictionary for the younger generation (2003: 68). These are harsh but valid criticisms because a standard that is perceived as being too far removed from the everyday contemporary speech of ordinary Bosniaks would not gain wide acceptance among them and would not achieve the desired status vis à vis Croatian and Serbian. This is also true of the other preoccupation of Bosnian language scholars which is the extent to which the standard is becoming too Croatianised. Okuka (1998) considers that between 1990 and 1993 there was a

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[29] Ovaj naš rječnik će više odgovarati onom ko je malo demokratičniji, ko je trezveniji, ko je razumniji. Ja mislim da je to rječnik razuma i nauke.
[30] cijeli proces europeizacije našeg svijeta.

tendency to Croatianise the language because the Bosniaks and Croats were at that time allies in the war and cites the more frequent use of Croatian names for months of the year as an example of this. After 1993 and the outbreak of the Muslim-Croat conflict, this tendency inevitably diminished and more attention was paid to the features considered to be specific to Bosnian (Okuka, 1998: 109). However, the perceived Croatianisation of Bosnian was an issue at the Bihać symposium; Muhamed Šator, in particular, criticised the increasing use in public of new Croatian words which are not original to Bosnian (Ford, 2001: 98). Similarly, the *Gramatika bosanskog jezika* by Dževad Jahić, Senahid Halilović and Ismail Palić that was published in 2000 was also criticised for its Croatian bias, most notably by Sarajevo University professor Midhat Riđanović.

In conclusion, then, although the Bihać symposium highlighted the most important issues for the Bosnian standardisation process and the future directions for language planning, the conclusions did not amount to an actual plan in the sense that Rubin describes. If we apply the flexible definition of language policy from Grin as cited above then the conclusions could still be seen as a language policy, although it falls short of the kind of language policy that Naila Hebib-Valjevac argued for at the symposium, i.e. one that was 'scientific, long-term, directed and controlled'[31] (1998: paragraph 7.0.1). As a consequence, disagreements over the standard have persisted since the Bihać symposium and are reflected in the normative works that have been authored by different scholars.

The question then is how best to evaluate the progress of the language planning activities undertaken by the Bosniaks and this will be dealt with in the next section.

How to evaluate the language planning activities of the Bosniaks?

One way to evaluate progress is to look at the extent to which language usage has changed in the media and other areas dealing with the written word in Bosnia. There have been two unpublished attempts to evaluate the progress

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[31] naučna, dugoročna, usmjerena i kontrolisana.

of the language planning activities of the Bosniaks in quantitative terms: in a PhD thesis by Curtis Ford (2001) and an MA dissertation by Milena Marić Vogel (2007). Ford looked at data concerning the distribution of a number of lexical items considered to be specific to the Bosnian language and highlighted in the then most recently published normative works. The data came from the Oslo Corpus of Bosnian Texts and samples from four periodicals. The Oslo Corpus of Bosnian Texts is a joint project of the Department for East European and Oriental Studies and the Text Laboratory of the University of Oslo and contains 1.5 million words collected from a wide range of material including fiction, essays, children's literature, Islamic texts, legal texts and newspapers and journals. The material was produced between 1992 and 1997.[32]

Ford assessed on the basis of his analysis of the Oslo Corpus of Bosnian Texts that characteristically Bosnian terms had won 'only marginal acceptance' (2001: 115). He concluded from his media analysis that the normative works for the new Bosnian standard had 'exerted no broad influence' (2001: 125) on the print media he examined. He attributed this to the fact that the works had only recently been published and not enough time had gone by for them to have taken root. He also thought that the absence of an official academy to enforce the new norm meant that journalists and editors in the print media relied on their own judgment when it came to using the newly recommended norms which meant that there was no consistency in the use of the Bosnian standard in the media.

In another study, Milena Marić Vogel (2007) analysed the language of a limited number of newspapers printed in Bosnia-Herzegovina between 1992 and 2000 and her findings broadly agree with Ford's. She found increased use of words containing the phoneme /x/ such as *lahko* (easy) instead of the Croatian and Serbian *lako* although there was low frequency of the use of Turkisms. Her findings also suggested a 'noticeable' shift in language towards use of Croatian which, given the criticisms regarding the 'Croatianisation' of the Bosnian standard mentioned above, may be attributable to the perceived Croatian bias of the hitherto published instruments of codification.

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[32] The Oslo Corpus of Bosnian Texts is available at
http://www.tekstlab.uio.no/Bosnian/Corpus.html [Accessed on 1 September 2010]

Another way to evaluate progress is to look at the present language behaviour of Bosniaks and how it has changed, if at all, since the early 1990s. There have been no scientific evaluations of such behaviour in the scholarly literature along the lines of Ford's analysis although several writers take a more subjective approach. Writing in 2004, Sarajevo University professor Hanka Vajzović observed that all Bosniaks now call their mother tongue 'Bosnian' (*bosanski*) as opposed to Serbo-Croat or Croato-Serbian as was the case before the war. However, she pointed out two phenomena in this regard: the majority of Bosniaks do not respect the recommended standard and a significant number of them do not speak Bosnian at all but some kind of in-between variant (*meduvariant*) or purely Croatian or even Serbian. She also made the point that language in Bosnia-Herzegovina continues to be differentiated 'according to established criteria (territory, social group, age, individual) rather than the criterion of the ethnic affiliation of the speaker'[33] (Vajzović, 2005: 537).

Belgrade University language professor Ranko Bugarski reached a similar conclusion in *Jezik i kultura* published in 2005. Talking about the speech of the people of Sarajevo he says that 'nothing dramatic[34]' (2005: 139) has happened and in fact the most important change has been what the language is called. He does however observe that there is a new habit that started to arise during the war whereby 'the new political and cultural elites of the three nations distinguish and stress specific ethnic markers, particularly in formal speech and writing'[35](2005: 139). He attributes this behaviour to a heightened ethno-national consciousness and the fact that 'social promotion requires or at least encourages the differentiation of the citizens of Sarajevo as Bosniaks, Serbs and Croats also as regards language'[36] (2005: 139).

Similarly, Monnesland says that in looking at the language used in the leading media, government administration and state education it is clear that there is no great difference between the Bosnian standard language and the former 'Bosnia-Herzegovina standard linguistic idiom' (2005: 510) which had

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[33] po ustaljenim kriterijima (teritorijalno, socijalno, starosno, individualno) nego po kriteriju nacionalne pripadnosti govornika.

[34] ništa dramatično.

[35] nove političke i kulturne elite triju naroda izdvajaju i naglašavaju specifična etnička obeležja, naročito u formalnom govoru i pisanju.

[36] socijalna promocija zahteva ili bar podstiče razlučivanje građana Sarajeva na Bošnjake, Srbe i Hrvate i u jezičkom pogledu.

been the official designation of the variant of the language spoken in Bosnia-Herzegovina after 1974. According to Monnesland the standard is more or less the same but it is now only used by the Bosniaks and anyone else who 'feels themselves to be Bosnians (along with another ethnic feeling)'[37] (2005: 510).

Vajzović and Bugarski's observations suggest that the progress achieved by the Bosniak language planners should be viewed in the context of the extra-linguistic aims that have driven these activities rather than in purely linguistic terms. If the basic non-linguistic aim of these linguistic activities has been to bolster a Bosniak ethnic identity then it can surely be said that this has been achieved. Although the name of the language was officially recognised in domestic legislation, as well as the Dayton Peace Agreement, the planners have nevertheless managed to consolidate the status of this designation through their activities. No more so than in 2002 when the leading language planners were among 60 intellectuals who signed the Charter on the Bosnian Language.[38] This document was a response to ongoing debates about the name of the language and, specifically, to the refusal of the government of the Republika Srpska to accept the name *bosanski* in the context of constitutional changes. Neither the Croats nor the Serbs in Bosnia-Herzegovina accept the name *bosanski* for the language of the Bosniaks, preferring the designation *bošnjački*. The word *bosanski* is the neutral adjectival form for Bosnia while *bošnjački* derives from the noun *Bošnjak* or Bosniak originally meaning a native of Bosnia. Bosnian language planners argue that *bosanski* is the name that has traditionally been used throughout the centuries to denote the language of the Bosniaks while the Serbs and the Croats consider *bosanski* to relate to the whole of the population of Bosnia-Herzegovina rather than just the Bosniaks and therefore suggests that the Bosniaks have unitaristic aspirations.

The 2002 Charter on the Bosnian Language begins with the declaration that the Bosnian language is the language of the Bosnians and all those who consider it to be theirs with that name. It then stresses that the name has been in use since the Middle Ages. Point five states that by using the name *bosanski* the Bosniaks are not undermining anyone else's rights and do not aspire to the unification and unitarisation of the territory of Bosnia-Herzegovina. The

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[37] koji se osjećaju Bosancima (uz drugo nacionalno osjećanje).
[38] Text of charter or Povelja o bosanskom jeziku available at http://www.bosnjaci.rs/

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charter also says that any imposition of the name *bošnjački* amounts to politization born of continued Serbian and Croatian paternalism and the denial of Bosniak national distinctiveness. Point seven sounds a conciliatory note, however, welcoming any linguistic or cultural research undertaken by the other ethnic groups which would 'facilitate our greater knowledge and mutual respect'[39].

Despite such efforts by Bosniak language planners, debates about the name of the Bosnian language persist. For example, in 2005, in a statement on the position of the Croatian language issued by the Croatian Academy of Arts and Sciences in Croatia the Bosnian language is denoted as follows '*bosanski (bošnjački)*' (*Izjava*, 2005). The linguist Dalibor Brozović, a Croat from Bosnia-Herzegovina, expressed the view that, 'Every nation has the right to call its own language whatever it wants. Therefore the Bosniaks have the right to call their language Bosnian if that suits them for whatever reason. But we have the right in our social and scientific practice not to accept a name for a thing that we otherwise recognise'[40] (1999: 14). The Serb linguist Branislav Brborić was even more scathing, saying, 'A language called *Bosnian* does not exist, nor can it nor must it be assigned an international code unless it is transformed into the *Bosniak language*, deprived of the aspiration to endanger Serbian and Croatian and undermine the constitutional order of Bosnia-Herzegovina'[41] (2001: 239).

In evaluating the language planning activities of the Bosniaks it can be concluded from the scholarly literature that the Bosniak language planners have made a certain amount of progress in their endeavours. They have compiled and published several normative works including a comprehensive dictionary of the Bosnian language. The problem has been the disagreements among the language planners as to the exact contours of the norm and the way forward in language planning activities. The question is, should these activities

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[39] omogućiti naše bolje upoznavanje i međusobno uvažavanje.

[40] Svaki narod ima ujedno pravo da svoj jezik naziva kako hoće. Prema tome Bošnjaci imaju pravo nazivati svoj jezik bosanskim ako im to iz kakva razloga odgovara. Ali mi imamo pravo da mi sami u svojoj društvenoj i znanstvenoj praksi ne prihvatamo naziv za objekt koji inače priznajemo.

[41] Jezika s atributom *bosanski* nema, niti ga može biti, a ne bi smeo ulaziti ni u međunarodne kodove ako se ne preoblikuje u *bošnjački jezik*, lišen pretenzije da ugrožava srpski i hrvatski a narušava ustavni poredak BiH.

be more prescriptivist or descriptivist, and should the norm look to the past for its specifically Bosniak features or should it be more open and modern in accepting the influence not just of Serbian and Croatian but also of other languages such as English and German. For some planners and commentators, such as Muhamed Filipović quoted above, this is a question that goes beyond language and encompasses ideas about the kind of state and, ultimately, the kind of future that the Bosniaks want.

It can also be seen from the scholarly literature that there has so far been little change in the language behaviour of ordinary Bosniaks although it may still be too early to judge. A survey of the language use of the first generation of school children to complete their schooling in the post-war education system would be a better indicator of the extent of language shift. The most important change and possibly the greatest language planning success has been in the naming of the language. The designation of *bosanski* or Bosnian is now generally accepted and used by the Bosniaks although the Croats and Serbs still challenge the validity of this nomination. This is also the most significant aspect of the language planning of the Bosniaks for this thesis because it means that despite debates about the content of the standard the Bosniak ethnic group nevertheless has a distinct linguistic identity at least in name and this has been recognised by the international community in its approach to language issues in the post-Dayton period.

The next two sections will deal with the language planning activities of the Serbs and Croats in Bosnia-Herzegovina. It is immediately obvious that these sections are much shorter than the previous one on language planning by the Bosniaks. This is for the simple reason that the Serbs and Croats have not had to establish their own linguistic standards and therefore have engaged in far less activity in this regard. Correspondingly, there is much less in the scholarly literature about these language activities. It is indicative, for example, that in his *Language and Identity in the Balkans: Serbo-Croatian and its Disintegration*, Greenberg does not devote any section specifically to the language of the Bosnian Croats; Svein Monnesland (2005) is really the only scholar who deals in any detail with the language policy of the Croats in Bosnia-Herzegovina.

Language planning by the Bosnian Serbs

In describing the language planning that is carried out in certain developing countries 'with their one-party states and military dictatorships,' Bamgbose uses the term 'planning by decree' (1989: 27). He cites as an example the decision by the Supreme Revolutionary Council of Somalia in 1972 to impose the Latin script for Somali and the steps taken to enforce the decisions. This term could be used to describe certain language planning activities undertaken by the Serbs in Bosnia-Herzegovina; in autumn 1993, the Bosnian Serb authorities imposed ekavian as the official pronunciation in Serb-held territories in Bosnia-Herzegovina rather than the native ijekavian pronunciation. The motivation for this decree was purely political as it was intended 'to maximally distinguish the speech of the Bosnian Serbs from that of the Bosnian Croats and Bosniaks' (Greenberg, 2004: 78), thereby demonstrating that the Bosnian Serbs were politically affiliated more with the Serbs in Serbia proper than with any other ethnic group in Bosnia-Herzegovina.

Greenberg (2004), Okuka (1998) and Monnesland (2005) all deal in detail with the polemics that immediately arose concerning this decree predominantly among linguists in Serbia. This issue went to the heart of the debate in Serbia itself on the future development of the Serbian standard, something that had been at issue since the time of the language reformer Vuk Karadžić in the nineteenth century. The decree split Serbian intellectual circles into two camps, and Okuka sums up the differences of opinion thus: 'Some saw in it [the decision] a unique opportunity to finally achieve some old national goals and tried to justify it with sophisticated arguments. Others decisively rejected it and called it nonsense'[42] (1998: 122). The first group, which Greenberg calls the status quo linguists, included well-known members of the Serbian Academy of Arts and Sciences, the historian Milorad Ekmečić and the linguist Pavle Ivić. They were in favour of allowing modern Serbian to continue its development towards ekavianisation. The opposing camp included the majority of Serbian linguists and writers, which Greenberg calls the neo-

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[42] Die einen sahen in ihm [dem Beschluß] die einzigartige Gelegenheit, endlich einige alte nationale Ziele zu erreichen, and sie versuchten, ihn mit sophistischer Argumentation zu rechtfertigen, Die anderen lehnten ihn entschieden ab und nannten ihn unsinnig.

Vukovites, and defended ijekavian as part of the Serbian standard. Typical among these was Ranko Bugarski who called the Bosnian Serb decree 'ethnic cleansing of the language'[43] (Monnesland, 2005: 491) as ijekavian had been recognised as part of the Serbian norm since the nineteenth century.

The provisions of the decree proved unworkable and opposition to it was so great that it was rescinded in November 1994 by the Bosnian Serb Assembly. This was not however the end of official efforts to favour ekavian over ijekavian and on 25th June 1996 the Law on the Official Use of Language and Script was passed in the Republika Srpska. This law specified the use of ekavian throughout all sections of society including the media and education system and it stipulates fines for failure to adhere to the provisions. As Monnesland notes: 'This is one of the rare cases in the world of punishment for the "wrong" use of language'[44] (2005: 491) but it also harks back to the fascist Independent State of Croatia, of which Bosnia-Herzegovina was a part during World War II, which also imposed fines for failure to adhere to the imposed Croatian standard language. The 1996 law was also heavily criticised and in 1998 the Constitutional Court of the Republika Srpska declared its provisions to be unconstitutional.

It is clear from the literature that there is no established language policy among the Bosnian Serbs in the sense that Rubin describes, nor are there any scholars working on language planning in the Republika Srpska. The development of the Serbian language in Bosnia-Herzegovina is essentially dependent on language developments in Serbia. Greenberg (2004) considers important in this regard the establishment of the Committee for the Standardisation of the Serbian Language in 1997 which was initiated by the Serbian Academy of Arts and Sciences, the Montenegrin Academy of Arts and Sciences and the Academy of Arts and Sciences of the Republika Srpska. It consists of 19 members, 14 of whom are from Serbia, three from the Republika Srpska and two from Montenegro. Its main purpose is 'systematic standardisation of the Serbian language with the ekavian and ijekavian pronunciations, both comprehensively and in particulars, and the formulation of appropriate documents and manuals, as well as the issuance of measures

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[43] etničko čišćenje jezika.
[44] To je jedan od rijetkih slučajeva u svijetu da se kažnjava zbog 'pogrešne' upotrebe jezika.

which would ensure the implementation of recent innovations in normative and linguistic practice'[45] (Greenberg, 2004: 84). It is thus a body with corpus planning responsibility for the Serbian standard and the potential to be highly influential in directing the future of the Serbian language. The more than 50 decisions that it has issued to date deal with a wide range of issues, from the creation and use of the feminine form of certain nouns to the name of the language in the newly independent Montenegro. It has issued two decisions (decisions 1 and 27) on the name of the language of the Bosniaks which challenge the use of the name Bosnian for their language and supports the name Bosniak instead.[46]

Language planning by the Bosnian Croats

Just as among the Bosnian Serbs, there are no official language planners among the Croats in Bosnia-Herzegovina nor any official language planning or policy. Monnesland points out that the language policy that does exist originates from the beginning of the conflict of the 1990s and the advocacy of the ruling party in Croatia, the Croatian Democratic Union, of the creation of the Croat-dominated Herceg-Bosna. According to Monnesland, the principle behind the language decisions of the Bosnian Croats was 'complete identity of the standard linguistic idiom of the Croats in Bosnia-Herzegovina and the Croats in Croatia'[47] (2005: 493) because this unity with the kin state of Croatia meant the preservation of a Croatian identity in a 'pure' Croatian language. Monnesland says that some linguists in Croatia (Stjepan Babić, Dalibor Brozović) supported this policy but generally Croatian linguists have not paid much attention to this language issue. That notwithstanding, in February 2005, the Croatian Academy of Arts and Sciences issued a statement on the position of the Croatian language in which it calls for more focus to be put on encouraging the teaching of Croatian at domestic and foreign

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[45] sistematsko normiranje srpskog jezika, s ekavskim i ijekavskim izgovorom, sveobuhvatno i u pojedinostima, i izrada odgovarajućih dokumenata i priručnika, kao i donošenje akata koji bi obezbeđivali prohodnost nedavnih inovacija u normativistici i jezičkoj praksi.

[46] Details of the committee's decisions are to be found at http://www.rastko.rs/filologija/odbor/index_c.html.

[47] potpuna istovjetnost standardnojezičkog idioma Hrvata u Bosni i Hercegovini i Hrvata u Hrvatskoj.

universities as a separate standard language. In the introduction it has this to say about a single Croatian standard:

> Even though the Croats, like other nations, speak different dialects and vernaculars, the Croatian literary and/or standard language is one single language. The Croats in Croatia and the Croats in Bosnia-Herzegovina do not have another language. Moreover, the Croats in Croatia would not have this kind of standard language were it not for the fact that it is based to a substantial extent on the speech of the Croats in Bosnia-Herzegovina[48] (*Jezik*, 2005: 41).

There has however been disagreement among Croatian scholars and commentators in Bosnia-Herzegovina (Ivan Lovrenović, Željko Ivanković, Zdenko Lešić, Mile Stojić, Josip Baotić) about the unity of the Croatian language as they consider that the language of the Bosnian Croats does nevertheless differ from the 'Zagreb' norm and the present policy of 'one uniform' language could lead to the destruction of the Bosnian Croat identity. Monnesland quotes in this regard the Bosnian Croat Zdenko Lešić who said that he would never use the word *kazalište* (the Croatian word for theatre) as this word is never used in Bosnia-Herzegovina. By the same token, however, he also said that he did not speak Bosnian as this meant 'Muslim' (2005: 494). Furthermore, there has been some concern among the Bosnian Croats that the Croatian language is being undermined generally in Bosnia-Herzegovina. At a 2003 conference in Mostar on threats to the Croatian language, which was organised by the local branch of the *Matica hrvatska* cultural society, the president Igor Zidić said that the right of the Croats to the Croatian language was being destroyed because of 'Bosniak-Bosnian unitarism'.[49] Another speaker, Musa Šimun felt that the Croatian language was being undermined in the education system, particularly in the cantons with a Bosniak majority (Monnesland, 2005: 495).

While there is no institution or individual guiding language planning by the Croats in Bosnia-Herzegovina it can still nevertheless be said that a language policy does exist among the Croats in Bosnia-Herzegovina and is concerned with ensuring that the status of Croatian in the country is equal to that of Serbian and Bosnian. Thus, certain efforts have been made to deal

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[48] Iako Hrvati govore različitim narječjima i govorima, kao i drugi narodi, hrvatski je književni i/ili standardni jezik jedan i jedinstven. Hrvati u Hrvatskoj i Hrvati u Bosni i Hercegovini nemaju drugoga jezika. Štoviše, Hrvati u Hrvatskoj ne bi imali ovakav standardni jezik da mu nisu bitnim dijelom osnovice bili govori Hrvata u Bosni i Hercegovini.
[49] bošnjačko-bosanski unitarizam.

scientifically with the language situation of the Croats in Bosnia-Herzegovina (various conferences on the Croatian language in Bosnia and the *Mostarski dani hrvatskog jezika* (Mostar days of the Croatian language) conference that is held every year at the pedagogical faculty at Mostar university) and there are on-going calls for the establishment of a television station specifically catering to the Croatian population which is seen as an important way of preserving the Croatian language.

Literature on the language policy of the International Community in Bosnia-Herzegovina

As stated earlier on in this review, there is little in the scholarly literature addressing directly the issue of the language policy of the international community in Bosnia-Herzegovina. There are two major published works on the language situation in the country but each of these deals with the international community's intervention in the language situation in a general way and in total their writing on this specific topic amounts to just a few paragraphs. The first work is *Jezik u Bosni i Hercegovini* (Language in Bosnia-Herzegovina) edited by Svein Monnesland and published in 2005. This is one outcome from the Language and National Identity project run jointly by the Institute for Language in Sarajevo and the Institute for East European and Oriental Studies in Oslo. It takes a historical approach and looks at all the literary traditions in Bosnia-Herzegovina rather than focusing on that of just one ethnic group. It has, for example, chapters on the speech of the Sephardic Jewish community and the Roma. The vast majority of contributors to the volume come from Bosnia-Herzegovina and include the language planners mentioned elsewhere in this chapter such as Senahid Halilović, Josip Baotić and Ibrahim Čedić.

Svein Monnesland himself contributes a chapter on contemporary language policy in which he looks at the language planning activities (both as regards status and corpus planning) of the three main ethnic groups in shaping their separate standard languages. In this he also recognises the contribution of the international community which he says had 'a significant influence'[50]

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[50] značajan uticaj.

(Monnesland, 2005: 488) on language policy. After a brief description of the Dayton Peace Agreement he discusses the approach the international community 'headed by the OHR'[51] (2005: 488) has taken to the language situation; this is based on the strict equality of the three languages. In this regard he mentions the role of High Representative Wolfgang Petritsch in imposing constitutional amendments in 2002 to ensure this linguistic equality. Later on in the chapter he criticises what he calls 'Daytonski jezik' or 'Dayton language' which has developed as a result of the policy of the international community to produce all official documents in three language versions. Because of the way this is done, with the translation into one language serving as the basis for the other two and the 'more or less mechanical replacement of individual words which are known to be ethnically hued'[52] (2005: 512), an artificial language is developing which 'is not real Bosnian, nor Serbian nor Croatian but an expression of the "equality" of the international community in the area of language'[53] (2005: 512).

Monnesland also deals briefly with the role of the international community in education reform and its efforts to do away with the segregation in schools which emerged during and after the war. He touches on the opposition of Croatian politicians to international efforts to stop segregation on the basis of language and briefly mentions the issue of returnee children who find themselves in a minority position in their communities. Monnesland concludes though that 'The international community is still in a dilemma about how to solve this problem – to ensure linguistic freedom, prevent majority rule, stop segregation'[54] (2005: 517). It is unclear from what Monnesland has written as to why the international community is in a dilemma other than the fact that its efforts at ending segregation in education have generally failed although Monnesland does not mention this explicitly.

Monnesland's chapter is a good introduction to the issues that need to be looked at in considering the international community's language policy. As

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[51] Sa OHR-om na čelu. The OHR or Office of the High Representative was established in the Dayton Peace Agreement to oversee the civilian aspects of the peace.

[52] manje više mehanička izmjena pojedinih riječi za koje se zna da su nacionalno obojene.

[53] nije ni pravi bosanski, ni srpski, ni hrvatski, već izraz 'ravnopravnosti' međunarodne zajednice na jezičkom planu.

[54] Međunarodna zajednica još uvijek je u nedoumici kako riješiti ovaj problem-osigurati jezičku slobodu, spriječiti majorizaciju, ukinuti segregaciju.

he suggests, its intervention in language matters must be seen in terms of its effect on domestic legislation and policy areas such as education reform, as well as on the development of each language's corpus. In this regard Monnesland enlivens the topic by reproducing three translations of a document from the website of the Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe on higher education which demonstrate the 'mechanical' way in which the translations are produced and use of slight differences to distinguish the versions.[55] As can be expected, the Serbian version is distinguished because it is written in Cyrillic and the main difference between the versions is in lexical items. For instance, the word for *century* is *stoljeće* in the Bosnian and Croatian versions but *vijek* in the Serbian version and the word for *prompt* is *pravovremeno* in the Bosnian and Serbian versions but *pravodobno* in the Croatian version. The other distinguishing feature of the Croatian version is the strict positioning of enclitics (in this case *je*) after the first word in a sentence even at the expense of breaking up a phrase. Thus, the first sentence of the text begins in the Bosnian version, *Reforma visokog obrazovanja usmjerena je ka...* (higher education reform is aimed at...) while in the Croatian text it is, *Reforma je visokoga obrazovanja usmjerena ka...* Despite these differences all three versions can be understood by the speakers of all three languages.

The other scholarly work which refers to the actions of the international community as regards the language situation in Bosnia-Herzegovina is Robert D. Greenberg's monograph *Language and Identity in the Balkans: Serbo-Croatian and its Disintegration* published in 2004. As the title suggests, Greenberg does not look solely at language developments in Bosnia-Herzegovina but also in the rest of the former Yugoslavia where Serbo-Croatian was spoken. After the introduction, the first chapter deals with the history of the language of Serbo-Croatian and each subsequent chapter focuses on the four 'successor' languages: Serbian, Montenegrin, Croatian and Bosnian. In the chapter on Bosnian, Greenberg concentrates on the language planning efforts of the Bosniaks, including the 1998 Bihać conference and the 2002 Charter on the Bosnian language, and looks in detail at the distinctive features of the Bosnian standard.

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[55] OSCE website available at http://www.osce.org/

As for the intervention of the international community, Greenberg states that the Dayton Peace Agreement gave legitimacy to the Bosnian language, and he, like Monnesland above, describes the intervention of the High Representative Wolfgang Petritsch in imposing constitutional changes in order to guarantee the equality of the three languages. Only in the chapter's Conclusions does Greenberg address wider implications of the recognition of the three standards and the role of the international community in this. He assesses that 'the emergence of the new standards has proven to be a barrier to reintegrating the country's ethnic groups into a viable and cohesive nation that would function independent of the United Nations, the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE), and the Office of the High Representative (OHR)' (Greenberg, 2004: 156). He points out further that the constitutional formulation imposed by Petritsch 'obliterates any aspirations of the non-nationalist linguists, who had proposed the adoption of the Bosnian language by all the citizens of Bosnia-Herzegovina at the 1998 Bihać Symposium' (Greenberg, 2004: 157).

Greenberg also highlights that the Dayton Peace Agreement commits Bosnia-Herzegovina to abiding by the 1992 European Charter for Regional and Minority Languages and stresses the essential problem in its practical application to the three languages in Bosnia-Herzegovina. As official languages they cannot be regarded, according to the charter, as minority languages, however, speakers of these languages are nonetheless in the minority in certain parts of the country. For example, Bosniaks and Croats in the Republika Srpska or Bosniaks and Serbs in Croat majority areas of the Federation. Greenberg suggests that these minority populations do require the protection of the charter but he concludes: 'It will be difficult to enforce a realignment of majority/minority relationships on populations still reluctant to live in an ethnically diverse society' (2004: 157). He then goes on to say that this difficulty has been especially evident in the field of education, citing education expert Aida Pašalić-Krešo (1999) who blames nationalist policies for creating 'national schools' in which the majority population tries to assimilate the minorities Greenberg, 2004: 157). He concludes this paragraph by citing the OHR's education policy which calls for the linguistic/literary heritage of

the three ethnic groups to be taught 'in a balanced and meaningful way' (2004: 158).

Although neither of these works deals with the international community's language policy in any great detail they do nonetheless indicate the areas in which the international community's approach to language is important and needs to be investigated further. These are post-Dayton policy on equality and ethnic rights, education reform and institutional translation and interpretation policy. I have therefore taken these areas and analysed them further in this study. By looking at them in much closer detail we can gain a better understanding not only of the way in which the international community's language policy is formulated and implemented but also its implications for the post-1995 peace-building project. By building on the little scholarship that already exists in this field, this study makes a significant contribution to it.

Conclusion

The basic aim of this literature review has been to consider the language planning activities being conducted in Bosnia-Herzegovina in the context of the scholarship on language planning literature in general and specifically as regards language planning in the country itself. From a consideration of the language planning and policy scholarship we can say that the language planning activities in Bosnia-Herzegovina have not been a rational, theory-driven process but rather what Cooper would call 'a messy affair – ad hoc, haphazard, and emotionally driven' (1989: 41). In this respect the activities of language planners in Bosnia-Herzegovina are no different to those of the language planners in many other settings. Of the three ethnic groups, language planning models can be applied only to the language planning of the Bosniaks who have engaged in recognisable corpus and status planning activities. However, they have been hampered in their endeavours by lack of agreement in linguistic circles over the exact form and future development of the Bosnian standard, the absence of an officially established policy and plan, the lack of a single body with primary responsibility for language policy and planning and the absence of tangible (including financial) support from the authorities for the creation of such a body.

Evidence in the literature suggests that the new Bosnian norm is not being widely used by the Bosniaks. However, the name of the language, *bosanski*, has met with wide-spread acceptance and may be the most successful outcome of the language planning activities undertaken by the Bosniaks. It is, after all, a crucial element that provides 'contrastive self-identification via language' which Fishman considers so important in nationalist language planning. The nomination of the language therefore has primary importance over its substance. Language planners may argue over the exact form of the norm and ordinary Bosniaks may not have changed their language behaviour to any great extent, but a distinct linguistic identity, as indicated by the ethnic designation of the language, consolidates a separate ethnic identity which is so crucial in the ethnic power relations of post-Dayton Bosnia-Herzegovina.

Aside from the failed attempt by the Bosnian Serbs at 'planning by decree' in 1993, the Serbs and Croats in Bosnia-Herzegovina have not undertaken any specific language planning activities. They have not, for example, felt it necessary to compile any normative works such as an orthography or grammar specifically on the speech of their respective communities in Bosnia-Herzegovina as they are able to look to Serbia and Croatia respectively for their standards. The language issue is, however, guided by extra-linguistic considerations. As with the Bosniaks, it is important for both the Serbs and the Croats to have distinct linguistic identities that allow them not only to claim difference from the other two ethnic groups but also to align themselves ethnically and politically with their kin states of Serbia and Croatia respectively. The extra-linguistic, political dimension to language is therefore the most important one for all three main ethnic groups in Bosnia-Herzegovina. From the available scholarship we have seen that the international community has played a crucial role in the language issue in Bosnia-Herzegovina by advocating the existence and equality of three separate language standards, thereby bolstering the claims to difference of all three ethnic groups. By officially recognising Bosnian in the Dayton Peace Agreement it gave legitimacy to the Bosniak ethnic group and supported Bosniak claims to an ethnic identity separate from that of the Serbs and Croats. It thereby fed into the status planning goals of the Bosniaks. Likewise, having an officially and internationally recognised language also aids the Serbs and

Croats in their claims to ethnic distinctiveness. Once ethnic distinctiveness has been established it becomes easier to keep the three ethnic groups separate using language as a tool in this.

The language policies discussed in this literature review are only the latest to deal with the issues raised by the language-ethnic identity link. These policies are conditioned by contemporary concerns and circumstances; they have been influenced not only by the conditions prevailing in a post ethnic-war environment but also by a wider international concern for respect for human rights and particularly linguistic human rights. But the approaches taken in these contemporary language policies are not the only options in using language to regulate inter-ethnic relations. Since the nineteenth century different authorities governing Bosnia-Herzegovina have recognised that the language issue can be manipulated for extra-linguistic aims and have therefore formulated different language policies in order to achieve these aims. Although this thesis takes 1995 as its starting point for considering the international community's language policy in Bosnia-Herzegovina, the country was not at that point a *tabula rasa* as regards the language situation and it is therefore crucial to examine the language policies conducted in the past for an understanding of the interplay between ethnic identity and language and language attitudes in the present. The next chapter will therefore investigate three periods of Bosnia-Herzegovina history during which the conduct of a distinct language policy can be identified.

Chapter 2

Language and Politics in Bosnia-Herzegovina in a Historical Context

Introduction

The purpose of this chapter is to put the language issues affecting present-day Bosnia-Herzegovina into a historical context. The aim is to demonstrate that the issues that are germane to the contemporary language situation are not new and that comparisons can be made between concerns governing modern-day language politics and those that were salient at different periods in the past. Examining the various language policy responses that have been made in the past to issues related to the relationship between language and ethnic affiliation also casts light on current attitudes to language issues.

The link between language and ethnicity was not made until the eighteenth century with the awakening of Romantic nationalism in the region but since then this relationship has been recognised by different ruling authorities as key to identity formation and as such these authorities have taken various approaches to utilise it for wider political ends. The chapter therefore focuses on three periods in history when a specific language policy related to Bosnia-Herzegovina was instituted in an attempt to manipulate linguistic identity to achieve specific political goals.

The first of these is the period of Hapsburg rule over Bosnia-Herzegovina (1878-1918) during which Administrator Benjamin Kallay attempted to create an all-embracing Bosnian identity as a counterweight to growing Serbian and Croatian nationalism in other parts of the empire which had started to seep into Bosnia-Herzegovina and threatened to undermine the empire as a whole. The project to nurture a Bosnian identity, known as *bošnjaštvo* or Bosnianism, required a language policy aimed at creating a common language called Bosnian (*bosanski*). The second period to be discussed is the period of the wartime Independent State of Croatia (NDH) (1941-1945) during which language policy was also part of the authorities'

wider efforts at identity formation but in this case the aim was to create a pure Croatian identity incorporating a pure Croatian linguistic identity to include not only the Croats but also the Muslims living in the NDH. The third and longest period under consideration is the post-Second World War period between 1945 and 1991. Tito recognised early on that a solution would need to be found to the national question and language policy became an essential part of the post-war Communist regime's national policy to regulate inter-ethnic relations. Rather than taking an exclusivist approach language policy was marked by a move towards a flexible standard language which would encompass the speech of all the Serbo-Croat or Croato-Serbian speakers in the country.

Before looking in more detail at these three periods, there will be a brief account of the ethno-linguistic situation in Bosnia-Herzegovina at the beginning of Hapsburg rule. During Ottoman times the key marker of identity was religious affiliation and it was not until the end of Ottoman rule that the Catholic and Orthodox communities began to think of themselves as Croats and Serbs and aligned with fellow Croats and Serbs outside Bosnia-Herzegovina. As we shall see, as ideas about identity and ethnic affiliation gradually began to change, ideas about language and linguistic difference also came to the fore.

Background to Hapsburg occupation

There were three main motivations for the Hapsburgs to occupy Bosnia-Herzegovina (Friedman 1994: 58). The first was economic: the monarchy wanted to obtain captive markets for the disposal of its industrial produce and to procure raw materials cheaply. Bosnia-Herzegovina was also rich in natural resources such as gold, silver, lead, iron ore and coal. Second, there was a need to stop their great rival Russia exerting influence in the region. Third, the Hapsburgs feared the possible creation of a large south Slav state instigated by a newly-independent Serbia. Such a state would then attract the Slav populations which were part of the empire and lead ultimately to its destabilisation.

The declaration of war on the Ottoman Empire by Serbia and Montenegro in 1876 brought the prospect of a large south Slav state closer

especially as the former had agreed to annex Bosnia and the latter Herzegovina (Malcolm, 1994: 133). In the even, Serbia and Montenegro had to be rescued from Ottoman re-conquest by Russia who declared war on the Ottoman Empire in 1877. According to Noel Malcolm there had earlier been secret negotiations between the Russians and Austrians on sharing out the Balkan lands (1994:133) and as Russian troops approached Istanbul, Russia was able to dictate terms to Austria that were favourable to itself by offering Austria occupation of Bosnia-Herzegovina in return for Austrian neutrality. Russian gains in the Russo-Turkish Treaty of San Stefano of March 1878 (notably the creation of a large Bulgarian state) were rolled back at the Congress of Berlin in July 1878 which confirmed Hapsburg occupation of Bosnia-Herzegovina while it still remained a sovereign part of an ever-weakening Ottoman Empire.

Francine Friedman characterises Bosnia-Herzegovina at the beginning of the occupation as an 'administrative nightmare' (1994: 59). There had been massive social conflict prior to the occupation because of bad agrarian conditions in the agriculture sector and there was a total breakdown of order. Moreover, Bosnia-Herzegovina was 'one of the most backward areas in Europe' (Donia and Fine, 1994: 75) and was not well placed to develop and prosper. It was a predominantly agrarian society with 88% of the generally impoverished and illiterate population engaged in agricultural activities (Donia and Fine, 1994: 76).

As elsewhere in the empire, the Ottoman rulers had organised the non-Muslim population into *millets*, or religious communities, which meant that their subjects were mostly governed by local religious leaders. Barbara Jelavich contends that this practice of using local religious officials for government duties arose because as the Ottomans took over ever more territory they found that once they had conquered an area the civil authorities would have been killed or driven out but the local religious communities would remain (1983: 48). The Ottomans were also particularly tolerant of 'people of the Book,' such as the Jews and Christians, which were given *millet* status. The status of the Catholics (the Bosnian Franciscans) was legalised by charter because the head of the church was located outside the Ottoman Empire and although they were not a *millet* they nonetheless had the privileges of one on a local level (Fine, 2002: 7). The *millets* were allowed to govern themselves with

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little interference from the Ottomans 'as long as they paid taxes and did not cause disorder' (Donia and Fine, 1994: 65) but they were nonetheless second-class citizens in comparison to the local Muslims. There were certain restrictions placed on them regarding occupation and dress and, for example, they were required to bow down to Muslims and to dismount a horse when in view of a Muslim (Bieber, 2000: 23). The non-Muslims were required to pay a head tax, unlike the Muslims, and they were also subject to the *devshirme* or child levy whereby male children were taken away from Christian families and educated as Muslims. Furthermore, non-Muslims could not bring lawsuits against Muslims and they could not give testimony in Muslim courts.

The Muslims, on the other hand, were favoured by the Ottoman authorities and, according to William Lockwood, they were considered to be and 'thought of themselves, as the establishment, and an integral part of the Empire' (2009: 4). The advantages to being a Muslim in better economic and social status were one reason for the conversions of a vast number of Christians that took place in Bosnia-Herzegovina between the fifteenth and the seventeenth centuries. Lockwood makes the point that aside from the *devshirme* the conversions were not forced by the Ottomans (2009: 2) and people chose to convert on an individual basis given their individual circumstances and the benefits they would expect to win. Aside from the benefits, the conversions can be seen in the context of an environment in which changes in religion were common, and Lockwood considers that 'the lack of a strong church organization in Bosnia-Herzegovina, either Catholic or Orthodox, made widespread conversion possible' (2009: 2). The nature of religious observance is also important here because as Noel Malcolm puts it,

> In country areas poorly served by priests, Christianity (in whatever form) had probably become little more than a set of folk practices and ceremonies, some of them concerned with birth, marriage and death, and others aimed at warding off evil fortune, curing illnesses, securing good harvests, and so on. The shift from folk Christianity to folk Islam was not very great (1994: 58).

An additional reason for conversion given by Lockwood is the prestige attached to identifying with the new authorities because 'the Empire represented the epitome of civilization, a major center of not only political and economic power, but also cultural and intellectual life' (2009: 2). Conversions were more common in towns than in the countryside because this was where

the social and economic benefits to conversion were to be had. For instance, after the early sixteenth century it was necessary to be a Muslim to have a career in the Ottoman governing structure (Malcolm, 1994:65).

The issue of conversion in Ottoman Bosnia-Herzegovina is important in this discussion because it significantly altered the composition of the population and laid the foundations for the later emergence of the Muslims as a separate ethnic group. More importantly though, from the point of view of relations between the groups, it impacted on the way in which the Croats and Serbs subsequently viewed the Muslims. A persistent element of the attitude of Croats and Serbs to the Muslims is that they are really Croats and Serbs because this is, supposedly, what they were before conversion to Islam.[56] As such they can be co-opted onto the side of either of the groups for political purposes. Furthermore, there is also the view among Croats and Serbs that the Muslims (and now Bosniaks) are not a 'proper' ethnic group because they do not have their own distinct culture and history since they are really Croats and Serbs. These views became important after the national awakenings of the nineteenth century and, as we shall see, have informed Croat and Serb attitudes towards the Muslims until the present day.[57] In research based on interviews with politicians in post-Dayton Bosnia-Herzegovina, for example, Roland Kostić cites this view voiced by a Bosnian Serb politician: 'Listen, the Bosniaks were recognised as a nation in 1993. They don't have to worry about the problem of history. Their history starts [in] 1993. Until 1971, their history was either Croat or Serb history. They have no history, save for this latest war' (2007, 100).

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[56] This view does not take into consideration that during Ottoman times the communities of Bosnia-Herzegovina were based on differences in religious affiliation and the modern national categories of 'Croat' and 'Serb' did not arise until the nineteenth century. Moreover, this is a simplistic interpretation of the development of the ethnic groups as it fails to take account of the fact that at the time of the Ottoman conquest there were three Christian denominations in Bosnia: the Catholics, the Orthodox and the autochthonous Bosnian Church which was based on the Catholic monastic system that existed in Bosnia at that time. Moreover, members of all three converted to Islam over the course of the centuries. The Bosnian Church is also the basis of the popular myth among the Bosniaks that the Muslims descended from a Bogomil Christian heresy connected with this church which converted as a group to Islam. This myth suggests that the Muslims were a distinct group before conversion (Hoare, 2007: 42).

[57] The cultural anthropologist Fran Markowitz also suggests that this idea about conversion means that Croats and Serbs associate certain negative character traits with Bosniaks as they 'tend to view them as the descendents of opportunistic and treacherous individuals who changed religion to gain social and economic advantage' (2010: 63).

In the Ottoman Empire, the Muslims were not a socially homogeneous group and there were stark differences between the Muslim landowners and the peasantry which was both Muslim and Christian. In 1878, there were 6-7,000 Muslim landowners in control of 85,000 serfs, of whom 2,000 were Muslim and the rest Orthodox (60,000) and Catholic (23,000). In addition there were 77,000 free peasants, the vast majority of whom were Muslims. There was no social mobility between the peasantry and the landed aristocracy so the Muslim peasant had much more in common with a Christian peasant than a Muslim landowner. These economic and class differences were one of the factors that meant that no group consciousness based on religion developed among all the Muslims of Bosnia-Herzegovina during Ottoman times.

The Muslim population gradually grew after Ottoman conquest until by the late sixteenth century or early seventeenth century they made up an absolute majority of the population (Malcolm, 1994: 53). By the end of Ottoman rule, however, the population of Bosnia-Herzegovina was 43% Orthodox, 38% Muslim and 18% Catholic (Okey, 2008: 8). The fall in the proportion of Muslims can be attributed, among other things, to the many Muslims who died fighting in the Ottoman Army in the empire's numerous military campaigns and the many victims of the plague which swept Bosnia in the early eighteenth century. Noel Malcolm also suggests that the Orthodox population grew naturally after the seventeenth century because a certain social stability was established as a result of a functioning local economy (1994: 96).

The differentiation of the groups according to religious community meant, as Malcolm claims, that they referred to themselves mostly in religious terms; thus the Catholics self-identified as *latinci* (Latins) or *krisčjani* (Christians) and the Orthodox called themselves *Vlasi* (Vlachs) or *hrisčjani* (Christians) (1994: 148). The Muslims, however, called themselves *Bošnjaci* or Bosniaks in order to stress their regional origins (Friedman, 1996: 43) rather than religious affiliation with the Ottoman rulers.[58] They were also called and referred to themselves as *Turci* (Turks) which was another way of

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[58] Dževad Jahić says that the word *Bošnjak* dates from the Middle Ages and replaced the word *Bošnjanin* which was used to denote members of the Bogomil church (cf. n50), as well as later religions in Bosnia-Herzegovina. He also says that during the Ottoman Empire *Bošnjak* was used to denote all the inhabitants of Bosnia-Herzegovina and not just one part of the population (1999: 46).

distinguishing themselves from the Anatolian Turks who were known as *Turkuši* (Banac, 1996: 133).

Linguistically there seems not to have been any barrier to communication between the different groups nor, indeed, any consciousness of linguistic difference between them. Socially, Donia and Fine maintain that there was 'frequent intermingling in everyday life. Catholics, Orthodox, Muslims, Jews and others shared the same marketplaces and, particularly in urban areas, were often acquainted with one another and prone to render mutual assistance and cooperation in times of need' (1994: 84). At the village level members of different faiths would attend each other's festivals. Bosnian Croat commentator Ivan Lovrenović also considers that because of the turmoil of war, violence and economic stagnation in the seventeenth century there developed between the different groups 'a cult of good neighbourliness, with its own traditional terms such as *komšiluk* [neighbourhood, neighbours] and *dosluk* [friendship] of which there are many examples in folk memory, in poetry, in written chronicles and in records of bequests: a ground-roots negation of division and particularization' (1998: 100).

The most obvious linguistic differences were in the written language which was heavily influenced by the practices of the different religious communities which were at the centre of literary activity. The Muslims, for example, developed their own script based on Arabic (*arebica*) which they used to write their mother tongue. This script was used by writers in the Alhamijado literary tradition which developed among the Bosnian Muslims between the seventeenth century and the early twentieth century. These writers also wrote in Turkish, Persian and Arabic.[59] The written language of the Orthodox population was likewise influenced by Serbo-Slavonic (*srpskoslovenski*) which was Old Church Slavonic of the Serbian redaction and *ruskoslovenski* which was Old Church Slavonic of the Russian redaction, both of which were used in the Orthodox church until the end of the eighteenth century (Okuka, 2005: 274).

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[59]As the language of the rulers, Turkish would also have been spoken although not to a great extent as the administration of the province was left to members of the local community. Turkish was necessary though for communication between Constantinople and the local authorities and all official documents were written in Turkish. Bosnians who were part of the ruling and educated elites in Constantinople would also have spoken Turkish.

The literary activity of the Catholics was focused on the Franciscans who were generally well-educated with experience of schooling abroad in Italy, Hungary and Croatia. Initially their literary activity was confined to religious works such as various prayer books, catechisms, liturgical writings, translations of the Bible and collections of sermons and they wrote both in the vernacular and Latin. Over time, the literary output of the Franciscans broadened to include monastic records, chronicles, historical works and poetry. They used mainly *bosančica* (a form of Cyrillic particular to Bosnia which was used by all three groups during the first two centuries of Ottoman rule) but from the beginning of the seventeenth century there was increasing use of the Latin script. This was despite the fact that various forms of this script were in use and it was not standardised until the nineteenth century. According to Ivo Pranjković, the Bosnian 'Franciscans obviously did not worry too much'[60] over what they called the vernacular language – whether this was *slovinski* (Slavonic), *bosanski* (Bosnian), *naški* (ours), *ilirički* (Illyrian), *slavobosanski* (Slaveno-Bosnian), *dumanski* (a local term the exact meaning of which is unclear) and *hrvatski* (Croatian) – but the important thing was that all its speakers considered it to be their mother tongue (2005: 229). This also suggests that among the Catholic community there was no consciousness of the need to settle on one linguistic designation that would be specific to that community so even though a group identity developed based on religious affiliation there was no perceived need to link this identity to a particular language.

Attitudes among the three main groups began to change in the nineteenth century under the influence of developments in neighbouring areas. The Orthodox and Catholic populations of Bosnia-Herzegovina had always maintained ties with neighbouring Serbs and Croats and they were not only very much aware of developments in these communities but also came to be directly affected by them. For the Orthodox community the Serbian uprisings of 1804 and 1815 demonstrated growing Serbian political self-confidence as the Ottoman Empire weakened and Serbian nationalism began to spread. From the 1840s, Serbian leaders, led by Ilija Garašanin, Serbia's minister of the

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[60] Franjevci se očito nisu previše brinuli.

interior, worked on plans to expand the Serbian state. Garašanin laid out his idea of a greater Serbia in a secret document of 1844 entitled *Načertanije* or Outline. For Garašanin the borders of a greater Serbia would encompass all the Serbs who spoke Serbian. This linguistic definition of a Serb was inspired by the work of the language reformer and folklorist Vuk Stefanović Karadžić (1787-1864) who considered anyone who spoke a štokavian dialect to be a Serb. This linguistic concept of Serbdom meant that religious affiliation no longer had to be the primary marker of ethnicity. As Ivo Banac puts it, Karadžić 'brought forth a modern Serb national ideology, the purpose of which was to assimilate the vast majority of Catholic Croats and all Bosnian Muslims, whose dialects were akin to the štokavian subdialects spoken by Serbs' (1984: 80).

These developments in Serbia had a direct effect on the Orthodox population of Bosnia-Herzegovina. Politically, the leaders of Serbia were interested in winning the support of the population of Bosnia-Herzegovina (including Muslims) for their Serbian national project and sent agents into the province to set up networks to support the Serbian cause (Jelavich, 1983: 350). There was even a successful attempt to set up an organisation in Bosnia to fight against the Ottomans (Hoare, 2007: 54). Linguistically, Vuk's work in two areas - collecting the folk songs of the Serbs in Serbia and Bosnia and reforming the language of the Serbs - had a powerful resonance among the Orthodox population of Bosnia-Herzegovina. He developed the first orthography for the Serbian language which was more suited to the vernacular language than the liturgy-based Slaveno-Serbian and which was based on the principle of 'write the way you speak'. The dialect he used as the basis for his new linguistic norm was the eastern Herzegovina dialect and much of the oral literature he collected came from Bosnia-Herzegovina. This meant, as Miloš Okuka puts it, that 'Vuk's language and work with the Serbs of Bosnia-Herzegovina was in fact their own language and their own cultural treasure'[61] (2005: 278).

The awakening of Serbian national consciousness in Bosnia-Herzegovina was also greatly aided by the introduction of progressive reforms

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[61] Vukov jezik i djelo kod Srba Bosne i Hercegovine bio je ustvari njihov vlastiti jezik i njihovo vlastito kulturno blago

from 1839 onwards which led to some economic development. This meant that the second half of the nineteenth century saw the emergence of a wealthy mercantile class among the Serbs especially in urban areas. One consequence of this was an increasing number of books and written materials were brought into the province from Serbia from which the local mainly urban population could imbibe romantic ideas of national awakening. In 1866, the first newspaper to be printed in Bosnia appeared, *Bosanski vjestnik* (Bosnian Herald), which 'had a decidedly Serb orientation' (Hoare, 2007: 71). Hoare considers that this 'marked the start of the process by which newspapers would be launched aimed at specific ethno-religious communities in Bosnia-Herzegovina, so that the Bosnian reading public was increasingly divided into readers of Serb, Croat or Muslim newspapers' (2007: 71).

For the Catholic community, the early part of the century saw the emergence and rise of the Illyrian movement in Croatia. It came to the fore in the 1830s and 1840s in its opposition to the authorities' endeavours to replace Latin as the official language of Croatia with Hungarian since at that time Croatia came under the jurisdiction of the Hungarian Crown. The Illyrians were initially a small group of members of the lower nobility, clergy, the professions and the army led by Ljudevit Gaj (1809-72). Because of the lack of a university in Croatia, they had studied in such places as Graz and Vienna where they had come into contact with the new ideologies and ideas popular in the rest of Europe such as German Romanticism. In order to oppose attempts at assimilation by the Hungarians the Illyrians strove to demonstrate that Croatia belonged to a much larger territory, one that included all the south Slavs and as part of this south Slav national unity it was then necessary to demonstrate that it had its own language. There were three competing dialects in Croatia – kajkavian, čakavian and štokavian – from which the Illyrians chose one as the basis for standardized Croatian. Although Gaj and his followers were kajkavian speakers they nevertheless chose štokavian as the basis for the standard Croatian language because it was not only the most widespread dialect among the Croats but also the dialect used by the Serbs. With this wide linguistic base, the Illyrians hoped that their idea of the unity of all the South Slavs would have appeal beyond the Croats in Croatia.

As we have seen above, language thus played a decisive role in the construction of both Serbian and Croatian identities. Consciousness about a shared language within each of the communities meant that different socio-economic groups could coalesce around one national identity. Similarly, awareness of linguistic commonality between the Croats and Serbs led to a promotion of South Slav unity based to a great extent on language. Thus, the activities of language reformers such as Vuk Karadžić, Ljudevit Gaj and Đura Daničić at this time were crucial in the awakening of national consciousness within these communities.

Because of these political and linguistic developments the Orthodox and Catholic communities had begun to think of themselves in ethnic terms by the end of Ottoman rule and this process was well advanced, especially in urban areas, by the time the Hapsburgs took over (Donia and Fine, 1994: 81). The Muslims were left out of this process, however, principally because of their status within the Ottoman Empire. Whereas *millet* status had allowed the religious communities to develop their own group identity, the Muslims were identified and self-identified with the Ottoman authorities. As Lockwood puts it, 'Because of the international makeup of the ruling Ottoman apparatus (including prominent Serbo-Croatian speakers), there was no official differentiation-no formalization of a Bosnian Moslem ethnic group' (2009: 4). It was only later, once Bosnia-Herzegovina was under Hapsburg occupation and circumstances had changed for the Muslims that they began to think of themselves as distinct not only from the Christian populations but also from the other Muslims in the Ottoman Empire (Lockwood, 2009: 5).

The Nature of Hapsburg Rule

According to Robin Okey, the Hapsburg authorities saw their mission in Bosnia-Herzegovina as one aimed at developing the province both economically and culturally. The framework for this was to be a European one which matched the buoyant pro-European ideas and attitudes prevalent in the Hapsburg Empire at the time. As Okey puts it,

> The later nineteenth century saw European confidence and prestige at its zenith. A century of unparalleled economic, scientific and educational progress was associated with the espousal of rationalist, increasingly secular norms and notions of constitutional government rooted in respect for civic society. In the

dawning age of imperialism the sense of European superiority was fostered by the decline of the Ottoman empire, long a feared rival (2007: 1).

The most important figure in this Europeanising project for Bosnia-Herzegovina was Benjamin von Kallay who was the Common Imperial Finance Minister and as such the administrator of Bosnia-Herzegovina from 1882 until his death in 1903.[62] His was an authoritarian approach to ruling Bosnia-Herzegovina and he controlled every aspect of policy. His first priority was the economic development of the province and he established a road and rail infrastructure that allowed for coal and iron mining to be opened up. He also developed numerous branches of industry, including forestry, paper and spirits manufacture, distilling, food-processing, carpet-making and cigarette production (Okey, 2007: 59).

In tandem with economic development, the administration worked to develop the cultural field. There was a reform of the education system that concentrated on secondary schools and was meant to bring contemporary European educational ideas and standards to the province (the illiteracy rate in 1878 was about 95% of the population). Printing presses were established and new journals and other publications were launched. Theatrical and musical performances and exhibitions were organised and libraries and reading rooms were opened (Šator, 2005: 321). A provincial museum was set up to preserve cultural artefacts from the province's past and, according to Okey (2007:70), to enhance the international cultural prestige of the province. To this end also links were established with 60 institutions in Austria and elsewhere and in 1894 a five-day conference of leading European archaeologists was held in Sarajevo.

Aside from the Europeanising project, the other major strand of Hapsburg policy in Bosnia-Herzegovina centred around fear of Serbia and the potential dangers represented by growing nationalism in neighbouring Croatia and Serbia. The Hapsburg authorities thought that the province could be drawn into a larger south Slav community and become mobilised politically on the basis of ethnic affiliation. In an effort to pre-empt these possible outcomes

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[62] This arrangement ensured that the administration would have allegiance only to the crown, thereby avoiding a constitutional struggle between Vienna and Budapest, the two competing centres of power in the Hapsburg Empire, over territory and influence in the province.

Kallay came up with his policy of *bošnjaštvo* or Bosnianism.[63] The idea behind this policy was to create an all-Bosnian, inter-confessional identity that would be attractive to all the different groups in the province as a way of identifying themselves. It was not meant to privilege one group over the others but it was hoped that the creation of this Bosnian identity would isolate the population of the province from the growing nationalisms among its neighbours. Part of the exploration of the past in the cultural sphere as detailed above was also to bolster this idea of a separate identity (Okey, 2007: 70).

The important thing about this policy is that it was first and foremost intended to protect the empire itself. Promoting a feeling of loyalty to and self-identification with the province of Bosnia-Herzegovina was intended to embed the population of Bosnia-Herzegovina in the wider empire and draw it away from ideas of affiliating with Croatia and Serbia on the basis of common ethnic ties. As Okey puts it, 'the bottom line is that [Kallay] advocated Bosnianism – a policy he latterly relaxed – as a means to smooth Bosnia's accommodation to the Habsburg state, not as endorsement of the continuity of Bosnian statehood in a modern Bosniak sense' (2007: 254). This is clear from the fact that as soon as the Hapsburgs adopted a more conciliatory approach, especially towards the Serbs, in the run-up to Hapsburg annexation of Bosnia-Herzegovina in 1908, they dropped their *bošnjaštvo* policy altogether.

Kallay's Language Policy

As an exercise in identity formation Kallay's policy of *bošnjaštvo* necessarily had to incorporate a language policy.[64] The drive for educational and cultural development threw up the issue of what to call the language spoken in Bosnia-Herzegovina. Textbooks from Croatia were being used in schools but were deemed unsatisfactory by the Hapsburg authorities because of many elements that were insulting to the Muslim and Jewish populations (Šator, 2005: 322). The provincial government then embarked on creating

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[63] Most writers on this period of Bosnia-Herzegovina history call this policy *bošnjaštvo* and only Muhamed Šator (2005) calls it *bosanstvo*. The former term is the most appropriate one as it comes from the word *bošnjak* which at that time was an ethnically-neutral term for an inhabitant of Bosnia-Herzegovina.

[64] Another element to the policy of *bošnjaštvo* was the introduction of a new flag and coat-of-arms in 1889 which were designed on the basis of historical Bosnian symbols which would distinguish them from Croatian and Serbian symbols (Hoare, 2007: 74).

textbooks specifically for Bosnia-Herzegovina which raised the question of what to call the language in the province. Šator sums up the dilemma over the designation of the language well when he states,

> In a country in which there were different cultural and traditional achievements, at a time of the awakening of national consciousness, with serious conservative attitudes and ever present national-romantic views of the past, with an education system divided by religion, a compromise solution needed to be found[65] (2005: 322).

Initially (in 1879) the Hapsburg administration had called the language Croatian but then soon changed this to the more descriptive *zemaljski* (provincial) and then *zemaljski bosanski* (provincial Bosnian). Also in circulation were the terms *srpski* (Serbian), *srpsko-hrvatski* (Serbo-Croatian) and *bosanski* (Bosnian) (Šator, 2005: 322). It was Kallay though who insisted on the language being officially called *bosanski* or Bosnian to reflect his *bošnjaštvo* policy.

To deal with the issue of which form of the language should be used in newly created school textbooks the provincial government set up a Commission for Language in 1883. The Ottoman authorities had already accepted the phonetic spelling and Vuk's reformed alphabet in 1866 and the Commission endorsed this. The phonetic spelling was favoured as it was used by the largest part of the population. This was also commensurate with what was happening in neighbouring areas. In 1850, representatives of the Serbs and Croats (including Vuk Karadžić) had signed a Literary Agreement in Vienna on unifying the language of the Croats and the Serbs on the basis of the eastern Herzegovina dialect on which Vuk had based his reformed Serbian language.[66] The choice of this dialect meant that the population of Bosnia-Herzegovina took easily to Vuk's reforms and the new joint language.

After two sessions of the initial commission, the authorities set up another Commission for Language to adopt orthographic provisions that would guide the official use of language in the administration and particularly in schools. It was made up of representatives from all three ethnic groups and met about 80 times. Little is known about the proceedings of these meetings (there

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[65] U zemlji u kojoj su postojale različite kulturne i tradicijske tekovine, u vrijeme buđenja nacionalne svijesti, sa teškim konzervativnim shvatanjima i još uvijek prisutnim nacional-romantičnim pogledima na prošlost, sa konfesionalno podijeljenim školstvom, trebalo je naći kompromisno rešenje.

[66] The text of the agreement, as well as a translation of it are to be found in (Greenberg, 2004).

are no minutes in the Archives of Bosnia-Herzegovina) but it nonetheless issued systematic provisions which established a standardised orthography in the province (Šator, 2005: 324). The existence of the commission and its work towards developing the norm indicate the importance that the provincial government and Kallay attached to language issues and particularly the standardisation process. It also demonstrates the very deliberate way in which they approached the language planning process.

Another important element of the standardisation process was the publication of the first grammar for the Bosnian language in 1890 which was controversial from the start. The author, a Croatian school teacher called Franjo Vuletić, did not want it to be called a grammar of the Bosnian language (*bosanski*) preferring instead for the language to be called Serbo-Croatian, Croato-Serbian, Croatian or Serbian or Serbian or Croatian (Ford, 2001: 64). In the event the authorities published it as a grammar of the Bosnian language without stating the author's name. The grammar provoked outrage from the Serbs and Croats especially in the media where the government and the Muslims defending the designation Bosnian were ranged against the Serbs and Croats who defended their own national designations for the language (Okuka, 1998: 55). There was also reaction in the Austrian parliament with one delegate ironically asking why Kallay had sought to create a new language (Okuka, 1998: 56).[67]

Yet Šator considers that this polarisation of opinion shows that the grammar had been misinterpreted. According to him the grammar was important because it led to stabilisation of the linguistic norms and brought together the languages that were in use in Croatia and Serbia without seeking to create a separate standard language for Bosnia-Herzegovina (Šator, 2005: 328). After all, the grammar was based on the principles put forward by Vuk Karadžić and the Serb Đura Daničić which were the same ones that formed the basis of the Croatian Orthography (*Hrvatski pravopis*) by Ivan Broz (published

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[67] Kallay brought in the Slavonic specialist and Vienna university professor Vatroslav Jagić (a Croat) who made what Okuka has called a 'chaotic speech' (1998: 56) in the Austrian parliament defending Kallay's grammar which served to enrage Croatian and Serbian newspapers and led to protests outside his apartment in Vienna. According to Okuka, Jagić explained in his memoirs years later that he had been misrepresented by Kallay as he had wanted to say in his speech that the language used in Bosnia was the same as Croatian and Serbian.

in 1892) and the Grammar of the Serbian or Croatian Language (*Gramatika srpskog ili hrvatskog jezika*) by Tomislav Maretić (published in 1899). Moreover, Šator argues that the grammar served a political purpose as Kallay wanted to distance the Serbs from the Russian Empire and bring them closer to Bosnia-Herzegovina. Making use of Vuk's principles which were of a unifying character was one way of doing this linguistically. As Šator says, 'This was essentially a way of diverting literary linguistic processes towards one centre, a common course, at a time when close but also different norms coexisted'[68] (2005: 328). Šator even puts the publication of the grammar in the context of the Hapsburgs' wider Europeanization concerns. According to him, the authorities wanted to organise Bosnia-Herzegovina 'in line with the practices of a modern European state with a unified area of communication'[69] (2005: 325). In this sense, the Hapsburgs favoured one, unifying standard language.

Another important element of Kallay's overall cultural policy was his encouragement of the print media and establishment of new journals and other publications. Government-owned publications could be expected to use the official name for the language but, according to Sreto Tanasić, there were different approaches to the naming of the language. Some did use the new official designation but others also used more descriptive terms such as *nastavni jezik* (language of instruction), *maternji jezik* (mother tongue), or *hrvatski ili srpski jezik* (Croatian or Serbian). The ethnically-based publications did not use the designation Bosnian but stuck to Croatian or Serbian. Tanasić says that the Serbian paper *Bosanska vila* which was the most important publication in Bosnia at the time always called the language *srpski* or Serbian and criticised those who tried to avoid using the designation by using more neutral terms (2005: 353). The Muslim or Bosniak papers used the name Bosnian and often continued to use it after the designation was officially scrapped in 1907.

Despite this lack of consistency in the designation of the language in the print media Tanasić does stress, however, that throughout the Hapsburg period the actual language used in all these publications developed towards the

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[68] Riječ je, u suštini o skretanju literarno-jezičkih procesa u jednu maticu, u zajednički tok, u vremenu kada su koegzistirale bliske ali i različite norme.

[69] U skladu sa uzusima moderne evropske države u okviru jedinstvenog komunikacijskog prostora.

standardised norm based on Vuk's linguistic model (2005:362). Tanasić credits these publications with improving literacy in the country and increasing the use of the norm. As evidence for this he cites the language survey that was carried out by the Hapsburg authorities in 1897. It was intended as a prelude to holding a major philological-ethnographic congress which in the event did not take place.[70] The survey was carried out by the provincial museum using brochures printed in both Latin and Cyrillic and containing 150 questions. Its aim was to form a picture of the speech of ordinary people throughout Bosnia-Herzegovina both on a territorial and confessional basis.

Although the results of the survey were never fully analysed, according to Tanasić, they do show that all of the 215 respondents had mastered the orthographic provisions of the 1890 Grammar and they all displayed common linguistic traits. As he puts it, 'It is clear from the survey that local speech could not be differentiated solely according to confession because, for example, the completed survey papers from Stolac show that a Catholic priest and a Muslim judge have almost identical answers'[71] (Tanasić, 2005: 332). This indicates therefore that the religious divisions in the population did not produce corresponding divisions in language use or in perspectives on language.

The language that was used in schools, various publications, newspapers and magazines, and generally in the public domain continued to move towards a standard language based on Vuk's principles. Šator says that at the beginning of the twentieth century it was possible to discern a higher level of literacy and more consistent use of the accepted norm in the print media (2005:333). School reforms also began to bear fruit with an increasing number of educated young people, some of whom went on to university education in other parts of Europe. Here they came into contact with ideas about nationalism which they then brought back to the province, thereby undermining Kallay's intention of isolating the population from such ideas. This was the weakness in Kallay's Europeanisation policy. He wanted the

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[70] Okuka claims that the results of the survey were so 'shattering' for Kallay that he could not go ahead with the congress (1998:58) although he does not explain why they were shattering. Gerd-Dieter Nehring says that it is not known at all why the congress was not held (2005: 310).
[71] U anketi je vidljivo da se mjesni govor ne može diferencirati isključivo prema konfesiji, jer, naprimjer, ispunjeni anketni listovi iz Stoca pokazuju da katolički svećenik i stolački kadija imaju gotovo istovjetne odgovore.

population of the province to have access to modern European ideas but he failed to appreciate that ideas connected with Romantic nationalism and linguistic identity would not necessarily lead to a greater feeling for a Bosniak identity, as he had hoped, but would in fact engender a stronger and competing feeling of loyalty to the ethnic group and its members outside the province.

Language developments continued in the same way – with an increase in the use of the norm but with continued opposition to the designation of Bosnian - until 1903 and the death of Benjamin Kallay. After his death there was no longer a strong defender of the term Bosnian and in 1907, the official name of the language was changed from Bosnian to Serbo-Croat. Vuletić's grammar was reprinted without amendment and again anonymously in 1908 and 1911 as the Grammar of the Serbo-Croatian Language (*Gramatika srpsko-hrvatskog jezika*).

Under Kallay's successor, Istvan Burian de Rajeczi, language policy became more liberal as the policy of *bošnjaštvo* was gradually abandoned. In 1907 the designation of Bosnian for the language was scrapped and the official language of the province became *srpsko-hrvatski* (Serbo-Croat) although the Muslims were allowed to use the former designation for official correspondence and school certificates (Šator, 2005: 334). Until the beginning of World War I the Serbs were also allowed to use the designation of *srpski* and the Croats *hrvatski* to describe the language they spoke. Burian's more tolerant approach generally was dictated by the preparations that the Hapsburg authorities were making to fully annex the province. In this context Burian sought fit not to antagonize the Serbs and Croats in the hope that they would not oppose eventual annexation of Bosnia-Herzegovina.

Nevertheless, the Hapsburg authorities continued with their established language policy of consolidating the standardised language according to Vuk's and Đura Daničić's principles. Thus, in 1911 they issued an order for the revision of textbooks, grammars and readers for schools, in 1912 the orthography was revised and in 1913 a conference was held on the subject of technical expressions in teaching Serbo-Croat grammar with the purpose of standardising the linguistic terminology in use in schools. Hapsburg policy changed again during World War I as the authorities clamped down on the Serbs in an attempt to prevent nationalist Serbs from joining forces with

Serbia. This meant that in 1914 all Serbian publications except one ceased publication and in 1915 the Cyrillic alphabet was banned.

Assessment

The language policy moves made by Kallay as part of his *bošnjaštvo* policy can be fitted into Einar Haugen's language planning model outlined in the Literature Review. Following his stages: Selection of the norm was logical because it built on the norm already chosen by the Ottomans and was based on the phonetic spelling and the principles of Vuk Karadžić and Đura Daničić which had in turn been based on the speech of eastern Herzegovina. The naming of the language as Bosnian was also logical for Kallay as it echoed the designation of the wider policy of *bošnjaštvo* and related to the entire population of the province.

Codification was embarked upon first with decisions on the orthography made by the Commission for Language in 1883 and then the publication of Vuletić's Grammar in 1890. There was also Implementation with the Hapsburgs' concentrating on the use of the norm in schools and the media. Evaluation was only partially achieved because even though the survey on language use was carried out its results were not fully analysed and acted upon. There was also some Elaboration with later moves by the authorities prior to World War I to revise textbooks, grammars and readers in schools.

This demonstrates that the Hapsburg authorities certainly approached their language planning project in a way familiar from modern-day scholarship so that their language policy was deliberate and considered. The results, however, were mixed. Hapsburg language policy is inextricably linked with the broader policy of *bošnjaštvo* and as an integral part of that policy it patently failed. Overall, the *bošnjaštvo* project failed to create an identity that would appeal to all three main ethnic groups in the province principally because self-identification on the basis of ethnicity was already too far advanced when Kallay started implementing his policy. It was therefore too late for a language called Bosnian to have any appeal and there was opposition to this designation from the beginning, not only from the Croats and Serbs but also from the bulk of the Muslim population. Thus the language policy failed to achieve its status planning goal but where it could claim success was in corpus planning and the

standardisation of the norm. The Hapsburgs were not interested in creating a kind of linguistic third way in order to differentiate the Bosnians from the neighbouring Serbs and Croats. They instead consolidated the trend that had begun with the Ottomans' adoption in 1866 of a phonological orthography and Vuk's reformed alphabet. Their corpus planning was therefore centred on the standardisation of the language as used by all three main ethnic groups and following Vuk's linguistic principles which had been adopted as part of the Vienna Agreement of 1850. Decisions by the Commission for Language and the publication of the Bosnian Grammar consolidated this norm. It is important here that when Vuletić's Grammar was reprinted as a Grammar of Serbo-Croat rather than Bosnian its content was not amended in any way, thus ensuring continuity in the language's codification. Looked at more broadly as part of cultural and educational policy, the Hapsburg language policy also achieved a modicum of success in helping to increase literacy rates in the province. According to Okey, by 1910 illiteracy in Bosnia-Herzegovina was 88 per cent, down from 95 per cent at the start of Hapsburg occupation (2007: 184).[72] This figure though conceals variations according to location so in Sarajevo, for example, the literacy rate was 57 per cent while in the much more rural Cazin area it stood at just 2 per cent (Okey, 2007: 220). From this we see that it was the urban population that benefited most from the drive to increase literacy. After all, Bosnia-Herzegovina remained an agrarian province under Hapsburg rule on the periphery of the Empire and, according to government statistics from 1910, 87.91 per cent of the population of the province were occupied in agricultural activities as their primary or secondary occupations (Babuna, 1996: 4).

Ironically Kallay's policy of improving the education system and encouraging the printing of books and the establishment of new journals, newspapers and various publications ultimately contributed to the failure of the bošnjaštvo policy as a whole. Improved education meant that increasing numbers of students were able to study outside the province and come into contact with new ideas about national self-determination. Through the new media the educated urban elites of the Croatian and Serbian populations were

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[72] To compare the illiteracy rate in Bosnia-Herzegovina with surrounding areas, in 1900 the rate of illiteracy in Croatia-Slavonia was 56% and in Serbia 77% (Okey, 2007).

able to access ideas from the neighbouring Croats and Serbs and were thereby able to conceive themselves as being part of ethnically-based communities which included other Croats and Serbs outside the province. As time went on these communities broadened to encompass a wider unified south Slav community that would provide a much broader identity than a solely Bosnian identity, as conceived by Kallay, ever could.

Francine Friedman considers that the experience of the Bosnian Muslims during Hapsburg occupation represented the 'political awakening' (1996: 57) of the Muslims as a distinct ethnic group although still on a religious basis. Kallay had courted the Muslim landowners in his efforts to establish his policy of *bošnjaštvo* by doing nothing to reform the agrarian sector. This section of the population, as well as the educated Muslim elite in Sarajevo, who had a privileged position in Kallay's Sarajevo-based system of government (Hoare, 2007: 74), benefited the most from the *bošnjaštvo* policy and as a consequence were its main supporters. The Muslim peasant population, on the other hand, were not attracted to the *bošnjaštvo* policy precisely because it favoured the Muslim landowners and they therefore continued to identify themselves in religious terms. It was, however, religious issues around which the conflicting concerns of the Muslim peasantry and the urban and landowning elites began to coalesce at the end of the nineteenth century. Thus, Aydun Babuna (1996) dates the start of organised Muslim opposition to Hapsburg rule to 1899 and controversy surrounding the conversion of a particular Muslim girl from Mostar. The two rival Muslim groups from Mostar that came together to protest at this incident, which they blamed on inadequate religious education, represented the beginnings of organised Muslim opposition to the Hapsburg authorities. Thus the first Muslim political party, the Muslim National Organisation, was established in 1906. Marko Attila Hoare points out that the religious nature of this Muslim political activity is demonstrated in the 'adoption of the term "Muslim" by the leading political and cultural figures of this people to describe themselves, and by all reading rooms, professional societies, youth groups and other organisations that represented the Muslims under Austria-Hungary' (2007: 76).

The *bošnjaštvo* policy also alienated the Orthodox population which opposed the government's restrictions on the activities of religious foundations

and educational bodies. The Orthodox community considered these restrictions, as well as the ban on the use of the name Serbian for the language and restrictions on the use of Cyrillic to be violations of the rights they had enjoyed under Ottoman rule (Hoare, 2007: 77). Their opposition was therefore founded on demands to restore these rights and establish autonomy over school and religious matters. As with the Muslims, the political mobilisation of the Orthodox community culminated in the establishment of the first Serbian political party, the Serb National Organisation, in 1907.

It could be argued, then, that even if Kallay had lived on after 1903 his policy of *bošnjaštvo*, which held no appeal for the vast majority of the province's population, would have eventually sunk under opposition from a population that was becoming increasingly politicised on an ethnic basis. The changing political situation in the region as a whole also required different policy responses which tolerated the expression of ethnic difference rather than sought to suppress it. To this end, at the beginning of the twentieth century, Kallay allowed the establishment of the educational-cultural societies, the Muslim *Gajret* society, the Serbian *Prosvjeta* society and the Croatian *Napredak* society (Hoare, 2007: 81) but with the rise of nationalism and political mobilisation around ethnic identity (actually facilitated by the aforementioned ethnically-based educational-cultural societies) there would have been no hope for the survival of an identity that was based on membership of a state rather than membership of an ethnic group.

Finally, though, perhaps the most enduring legacy of Kallay's *bošnjaštvo* policy and especially his language policy is that it has allowed present-day Bosniak language planners to claim historical continuity for the Bosnian language, especially as regards its name. It provides justification for their claims that the Bosnian language is not a new and artificial construct but a language that has a history that goes back at least until 1883. For example, Dževad Jahić, in discussing the importance of Kallay's language policy in his book *Bosanski jezik u 100 pitanja i 100 odgovora* (The Bosnian Language in 100 Questions and Answers) says as regards the language,

> That language was created by ethnic and national history and not by any kind of temporary policy which was after all what even Kallay's political mission in Bosnia was. Kallay's Bosnian language policy in fact represents more a proper historical reflex on the part of Bosnian culture to its past. It is an indicator of

how much that language is an unavoidable factor in the Bosnian tradition[73] (1999:100).

The next historical period to be considered will be World War II when language policy was used once again by the governing authorities in Bosnia-Herzegovina as a way of creating a specific identity. As background to that section of the chapter there will be a brief discussion of the political and language situation in Bosnia-Herzegovina between 1918 and 1941.

The inter-war period was politically and economically tumultuous for Bosnia-Herzegovina. At the end of World War I Bosnia-Herzegovina was incorporated into the newly-established Kingdom of Serbs, Croats and Slovenes and for the first few years after the war it was able to maintain its autonomy. In 1921, however, it was split into six provinces and in 1929, when King Alexander suspended the constitution, made the country a dictatorship, and renamed it the Kingdom of Yugoslavia, it was divided between four *banovine* or banates which cut across the already existing borders of the constituent parts of the kingdom. To all intents and purposes therefore Bosnia-Herzegovina ceased to exist as a territorial-administrative whole.

From the beginning there was fundamental disagreement over the nature of the kingdom: whether it should be a unitary state (the option favoured by the Serbs) or a federation (the Croats' preferred option). It came to be dominated by the Serbs and run from Belgrade which caused huge resentment among the non-Serbs, especially the Croats. This meant, according to Friedman, that 'Yugoslav political parties coalesced along ethnic lines even more rigidly than before and provoked constant turmoil during the interwar period' (1996: 95). Politically, the defining relationship in the interwar state was the bitter rivalry between the Serbs and Croats. Within this rivalry each side sought to win over the support of the main Muslim party, the Yugoslav Muslim Organisation, for their positions. The Yugoslav Muslim Organisation was, however, able to negotiate through the Serb-Croat relationship by, as Donia and Fine put it, playing out 'the historic role of the Bosnian Muslims as

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[73] Taj jezik je stvorila etnička i nacionalna historija, a ne nikakve privremene politike, kakva je uostalom bila i Kallayeva politička misija u Bosni. Kallayeva politika bosanskog jezika u stvari više predstavlja zakonomjeran historijski refleks bosanske kulture na svoju prošlost. Ona je pokazatelj koliko je taj jezik nezaobilazan faktor bosanske tradicije.

a swing group in coalition politics, typically supporting the center against centrifugal tendencies' (1994: 125).

Bosnia-Herzegovina also had to cope with social unrest because of the poor economic state of the province and problems to do with agrarian reform and the position of agricultural workers (Šipka, 2005: 411). In the thirties the whole kingdom, which was still an overwhelmingly agrarian state, suffered greatly as a consequence of the Depression (Donia and Fine, 1994: 133).

Loss of autonomy and the social, economic and political problems meant that no language policy was conducted in Bosnia-Herzegovina in the interwar years which Šipka has described as a '*gluvo doba*' or silent period for linguistic activities in Bosnia-Herzegovina (2005: 413). As a centralised state, decisions about language matters were made in the capital Belgrade and there were no linguistic experts or expert bodies in Bosnia-Herzegovina itself who could influence linguistic decisions made elsewhere. The only decision about language made in Bosnia-Herzegovina in this period was the Law on the Official Language and Script (*Zakon o zvaničnom jeziku i pismu*) that was passed by the Main Committee of the National Council of Serbs, Croats and Slovenes for Bosnia-Herzegovina just before the kingdom was established. This law proclaimed the official language of Bosnia-Herzegovina to be Serbian or Croatian (*srpski ili hrvatski*) and gave equal status to the Cyrillic and Latin alphabets (Šipka, 2005: 410). This designation was, however, changed in 1921 with the promulgation of the first constitution of the kingdom when the official name of the language was changed to Serbo-Croato-Slovenian (*srpsko-hrvatsko-slovenački*). This designation was the result of a political compromise 'in the spirit of the unitary idea of a "three-name nation"'[74] (Šipka, 2005: 412). The idea was that the single state should have a single language even though Slovene, despite being a Slavonic language, is not sufficiently close to Croatian or Serbian to be easily comprehensible to the Croats and Serbs.[75]

Šipka maintains that despite the name change the old names for the language endured throughout the kingdom so that in Bosnia-Herzegovina the language was still called Croatian or Serbian. Two orthographies were written

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[74] U duhu unitarne ideje o 'troimenom narodu'.
[75] Šipka says that various options for the name were put forward by different political parties and members of the Constituent Assembly such as srpskohrvatski, srpsko-hrvatski and hrvatski ili srpski. Slovenian would be separate but would have equal status (Šipka, 2005: 412).

– the Orthography of the Croatian or Serbian Language (*Pravopis hrvatskoga ili srpskoga jezika*), published in Zagreb in 1921 and the Orthography of the Serbocroatian Literary Language (*Pravopis srpskohrvatskog književnog jezika*), published in Cyrillic in Belgrade in 1923 - and they were both used in Bosnia-Herzegovina along with the revised orthography that had been adopted back in 1912 during the Hapsburg era. Another name change came in 1929 with the issuance of a special orthographic instruction for schools (*Pravopisno uputstvo za sve osnovne, srednje i stručne škole u Kraljevini Srba, Hrvata i Slovenaca*) by the minister of education in Belgrade. This document used the designation Serbocroatian (literary) language (srpskohrvatski [književni] jezik) throughout and Šipka says that this was applied in Bosnia-Herzegovina until the beginning of World War II. Once the Kingdom of Yugoslavia became embroiled in the war and Bosnia-Herzegovina was incorporated into the Independent State of Croatia, language once again became the subject of official policy as the wartime authorities in Bosnia-Herzegovina endeavoured to use language to manipulate the ethnic loyalties of the population.

Language policy in the Independent State of Croatia 1941-1945

Even before the inter-war Kingdom of Yugoslavia fell to Axis forces on the 17th April 1941, the Independent State of Croatia (NDH) had been set up on 10th April 1941 incorporating not just Croatia but the whole of Bosnia-Herzegovina. It was divided between a German and an Italian military zone and was governed as a fascist quisling regime by Ante Pavelić, the leader of the Ustasha movement which was an extremist organisation that had spent the interwar years underground in Italy and supported by Mussolini. After the Serb-Croat political conflicts of the interwar years the Croats saw the establishment of the NDH as an opportunity to set up their own purely Croatian state. Pavelić had compiled 17 Principles of the Ustasha movement in 1929 which guided the regime. The principles equate the Croatian nation with the Croatian state and Principle 8 makes this clear:

> The Croatian nation has the right to revive its sovereign authority in its own Croatian State in its entire national and historical area, that is to say to reconstitute a complete, sovereign and independent Croatia. This

reconstitution may be accomplished by any means, including force of arms (Pavelic papers).

There was no room in this state for any other ethnic groups such as the Serbs, Jews and Roma and the authorities set about removing them from their territory through deportation, extermination or conversion.

This policy did not, however, extend to the Muslims of Bosnia-Herzegovina who were now citizens of the NDH. Pavelić declared the Muslims to be 'the blood of our blood, they are the flower of our Croatian nation'[76] (Kisić Kolanović 2007: 67). Nor was the Muslim faith a bar to the Muslims being seen as Croats as the Ustashas considered the Muslims to be Croats who had converted to Islam during Ottoman rule. In a speech to the Croatian parliament in February 1942, Pavelić said: 'The Muslim blood of our Muslims is Croatian blood. It is the Croatian faith because on our territory its members are Croatian sons'[77] (Kisić Kolanović 2007: 68). Nada Kisić Kolanović calls this approach an 'Islamic variant of Croatian culture' which was a consequence of the Ustashas' desire to create a homogeneous greater Croatian state (2007: 68). After all, in Bosnia-Herzegovina Croats made up only 23 per cent of the population while the Muslims represented 37 per cent so by incorporating the Muslims into the NDH the Ustashas could claim the bulk of the population to be Croatian. Moreover, the Ustashas realised that they needed Muslim support in dealing with the Serbs and other groups and so demonstrated toleration of them by, among other things, allowing Muslims in the government and state apparatus, subsidising their schools and allowing mosques to be built. This approach meant that the Muslims were not treated as a separate group in society (Kisić Kolanović, 2007: 94) and therefore not singled out for eradication as the Serbs, Jews and Roma were.

The NDH's language policy should be seen as part and parcel of the process of creating a pure Croatian nation and the authorities gave language policy a high priority, passing legislation on language use only days after the NDH was established. The second of these pieces of legislation was a decree banning the use of Cyrillic whereby any violation of the decree was punishable

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[76] krv naše krvi, oni su cviet naše hrvatske narodnosti.
[77] Muslimanska krv naših Muslimana je hrvatska krv. Ona je hrvatska vjera, jer su na našoj zemlji njezini pripadnici hrvatski sinovi.

with a fine of 10,000 dinars and one month's imprisonment.[78] Other pieces of legislation dealt with individual lexical items so, for example, the Order on the Name of the Seat of the Vrhbosna County changed the spelling of Sarajevo to Sarajvo and another government order banned the use of the word *lice* meaning person where the more 'Croatian' word *osoba* was to be used instead (Šipka, 2005: 418 and 419).

Creating a pure Croatian language meant breaking with the phonological principles that had prevailed in language use in Croatia since 1892 and especially since the Vienna Agreement of 1850. Thus, in August 1941 the Decree on the Croatian Language, its Purity and its Orthography (*Zakonska odredba o hrvatskom jeziku, o njegovoj čistoći i o pravopisu*) was issued which stipulated that the phonological orthography would be replaced by the etymological '*korijenski*' orthography. According to Robert Greenberg, 'This switch away from the phonological system revealed a bias among Croat extremists. These individuals believed that only through an etymological writing system would Croatia regain its purity and authenticity, cleansing itself of the unwanted Serbian elements' (2004: 46).

Indeed, the decree also outlawed the use of words 'which do not reflect the spirit of the Croatian language, as a rule foreign words, borrowed from other, even similar languages'[79] (Okuka, 1998: 73). The foreign words mentioned here included words which could be considered to have their origin in Serbian. Ridding the language of Serbianisms mirrored the Ustashas' attitude to the Serbs generally because as the main enemy of a pure Croatian state the NDH authorities wanted not only to eliminate all Serbs from its territory but also to eradicate all Serbian influence from the language. In contrast, although the speech of the Muslims could equally have been considered foreign in a similar way to that of the Serbs, the authorities' approach was much more tolerant because having declared them to be Croats and therefore part of the homogeneous Croatian nation their speech could not be considered as foreign and impure. Consequently no special provision was

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[78] Even though the official currency of the NDH was the kuna it was not introduced until July 1941. As the legislation imposing a fine for using Cyrillic was passed in April 1941 the dinar would still have been the currency in circulation.

[79] Deshalb ist es verboten, in Wort und Schrift Wörter zu benutzen, die nicht den Geist der kroatischen Sprache widerspiegeln; das sind in der Regel Fremdwörter, die aus anderen, wenn auch ähnlichen Sprachen entlehnt sind.

made concerning the speech of the Muslims although they were expected to adhere to decrees on language usage.

Indicative of the Ustasha authorities' attitude to the language of the Muslims is the way in which they dealt with the language issue in the Handschar Division which operated in Bosnia-Herzegovina in the period 1943-1945. The establishment of this division was instigated by SS Chief Heinrich Himmler who envisaged it as a purely Muslim division which would operate in the area of northeastern Bosnia and protect Srem where German settlers were to be found. In the agreement between the SS and the Ustasha authorities on the division's formation it is stated that the language of command would be German while Croatian could be used 'colloquially and for training' (Lepre, 1997: 24). The division's newspaper was also published in Croatian and German. Although the bilingual solution was logical because the commanding officers in the division were German it was nevertheless a compromise on the part of the Ustasha authorities which had wanted the language of command to be Croatian too. The Ustasha authorities were wary about creating a military unit around which the Muslims could rally and they therefore endeavoured to ensure that the division had a clearly Croatian character (Lepre, 1997).

Okuka says that the new writing system caused 'chaos, insecurity, fear and horror'[80] (1998: 74) but the authorities did their utmost in all areas of social life to impose their linguistic norm (Šipka, 2005: 419). They set up a State Office for Language to deal with language policy in an organised way. It had responsibility for, among other things, the publication of school books such as an orthography, grammar and dictionary; giving advice to authors and publishers on works of literature and school books; the monitoring of all print material from the point of view of language; the control of language used in theatres, cinemas and radio stations and language promotion (Okuka, 1998: 72). In 1945 it published a brochure titled 'For the Correctness and Purity of the Croatian Language' which contained lists of words to be avoided and the Croatian words to be used instead (Okuka, 1998: 76). The authorities also encouraged the publishing sphere and Kisić Kolanović estimates that about 2,000 different titles covering books, brochures, magazines and so on were

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[80] Chaos, Unsicherheit, Angst und Schrecken.

published in the NDH (2007: 1n). This was an achievement in itself given the shortages and general chaos caused by the war. Muhidin Pelešić though says that the new etymological orthography was not systematically used and could be found mainly in those publications with an explicitly Ustasha orientation (2003: 237).

The NDH lasted until the end of the war in April 1945 when the Partisans had taken control of the whole territory of what was to become a Communist-led Yugoslavia. The regime continued to concern itself with purifying the language throughout the war (Greble Balić, 2009: 129) but its language policy left very little trace in the subsequent language situation. This is partly because the authorities had barely four years in which to change people's language habits and also because the NDH did not really gain purchase ideologically throughout its territory. As Emily Greble Balić puts it:

> Unlike other radical right regimes in wartime Europe, the Ustasha agenda failed to transcend the political realm and to unite society. It dominated public culture and rhetoric but never became ingrained in local mentalities. Born in the midst of a multisided war that worsened by the year, the Croatian nation-state was disorganized, decentralized and doomed (2009: 137).

Despite the short-lived nature of NDH language planning, Einar Haugen's model can still, partially, be applied to its efforts. There was Selection of a specific norm with a specific name for the language – in this case Croatian with an etymological *korijenski* orthography. Codification was attempted with the issuance of legal decrees on the orthography and, in 1942, with the publication of a new etymological orthographic manual. The NDH also endeavoured to implement the chosen language through the media and with its use throughout the school system.

The significance of the Ustashas' language policy for the present discussion though is in the way in which it attempted to use language to create a specific identity. This is exactly what Kallay had tried to do but for different reasons. Whereas Kallay wanted to create an all-embracing identity for all the ethnic groups in Bosnia-Herzegovina, the Ustashas were interested only in manipulating language in order to create a singular ethnic (Croatian) identity which was superior to all others. By creating this superior identity they could then justify the expulsion or extermination of the 'lesser' groups, especially the

Serbs. Thus, exhortations to 'cleanse' the language of Serbianisms echoed exhortations to 'cleanse' the state of the Serbs themselves.

At the end of World War II and with Croatia's incorporation into Communist-ruled Yugoslavia Ustasha ideas about language exclusivity and purity lost their prominence. They did, however, resurface at the beginning of the 1990s when Croatian language planners undertook to mould the western variant of the then supposedly common language into a 'purer' Croatian language. Among other things, this entailed introducing or reintroducing native Croatian forms and eliminating foreign borrowings. According to Greenberg, in doing the latter, they removed 'both Orthodox Slavic and oriental/Islamic elements from their language' and thereby 'differentiate their language from both Serbian, with its "Orthodox" influences, and Bosnian, with its strong Turkish/Arabic lexical components' (2004: 124). The language planners also looked to the NDH period for historic lexical items by introducing words which were emblematic of this time, such as *kuna* for the currency (Greenberg, 2004: 124) and *domovnica* meaning a document confirming Croatian citizenship. There was also an echo of Ustasha language policy in the failed attempt by the ruling HDZ to introduce a law which would levy fines for incorrect use of the language (Greenberg, 2004: 131).

The language policy of the post-World War II period saw a return to a single standard for all the Serbo-Croat speaking peoples throughout Yugoslavia with a phonological orthography as it became part of the Communists' efforts at dealing with the national question. The next section therefore looks at the impact of these efforts and how language issues played out in the new state and as it moved towards dissolution culminating with the conflicts of the 1990s.

Language Policy in Communist Yugoslavia (1945-1990)

There are two factors that are important in considering the post-World War II language policy in Bosnia-Herzegovina. First of all it must be seen in the context of the overall policy of the Communist government to deal with the national question in the federal state. Secondly, as before, language politics was dominated for much of this period by the relations between the two largest ethnic groups, the Serbs and the Croats. As part of the wider state of Yugoslavia and as a republic where not one single ethnic group was in the

majority, Bosnia-Herzegovina was perhaps most exposed when it came to developments in the area of inter-ethnic relations and, particularly in the linguistic field, in Croatia and Serbia.

Tito had recognised early on the importance of resolving the national question for the viability of the future federal state. His solution was to recognise the different national identities and allow for a certain amount of self-determination but within an authoritarian (and initially totalitarian) federal political framework under the complete control of the Communist party. As part of his national policy a hierarchy of groups was developed with six constituent, or founding, peoples (*narod*) – Croats, Muslims (after 1963), Macedonians, Montenegrins, Serbs and Slovenes - at the top of this hierarchy. Each of these constituent peoples had a home base in one of the republics.[81] Five of the six republics were named after the majority people in them (Croatia, Macedonia, Montenegro, Serbia and Slovenia) although the territorial boundaries of the republics were not coincident with the locations of the constituent peoples. Thus, members of a constituent people would be living outside the borders of their home people's republic. Despite being a numerical minority in another republic the members of a particular people would nevertheless retain the rights afforded to a constituent people and the crucial thing here was that they did not consider themselves to be a minority. Bosnia-Herzegovina was different because it had three constituent peoples none of which formed a majority of the population. Two of the constituent peoples (the Croats and the Serbs) lived outside the borders of their home republic (Croatia and Serbia, respectively) which meant that the republic was affected by any developments in relations between Croatia and Serbia.

Being at the top of this hierarchy of groups, the constituent peoples were afforded the most rights, having in this regard the right to self-determination. Important here is the distinction made between the constituent peoples and the other categories of nationality (*narodnost*), minority (*manjina*) and others (*ostali*) which had fewer rights. Nationality status, for example, was afforded to citizens who identified ethnically with a people which had a national homeland outside the SFRY. This category included Albanians,

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[81] There were also two Autonomous Provinces of Kosovo and of Vojvodina.

Hungarians, Jews, Czechs, Romanians, Ruthenians, Bulgarians, Turks and Italians who 'had guaranteed cultural rights to preserve their sense of community and its inheritance' (Woodward, 1995: 31) but not the right to national self-determination.

This national policy and the policy of creating a viable federal state both concerned the ways in which the different groups related to the state and its resources and to each other. As Francine Friedman puts it:

> This socialist vision assumed that an equitable distribution of economic resources with an emphasis on economic equality would erase the worst excesses of ethnonationalism and, indeed, eventually of national self-identification. Memories of World War II's nationalistically inspired atrocities would fade as all Yugoslav peoples dwelled in economic and political security (Friedman, 1996: 146).

This emphasis on equality meant that the federal state structure 'helped satisfy important psychological needs of the Yugoslav peoples for recognition of their national individuality, and perhaps more important, it gave each nationality the assurance, for the first time, of enjoying a truly equal status with the other national groups' (Shoup, 1968: 119). The Communists hoped 'to incorporate the emotional attachments of nationalism into the revolutionary ideology of Communism by identifying Communism with the abolition of all forms of national exploitation' (Shoup, 1968: 120). The attractions of nationalism would then be subsumed by those of an equitable and economically successful Communist state and the Communists would have thereby solved the ethnically-based conflicts that had dogged the region since the nineteenth century.

As regards the language situation, according to Milan Šipka, there was no 'elaborated and defined'[82] (2005: 422) language policy immediately after the war. This is clear from a 1944 decision of the Anti-fascist Council for the People's Liberation of Yugoslavia (AVNOJ) which stated that all the Council's decisions would be published in 'the Serbian, Croatian, Slovenian and Macedonian languages'[83] (Šipka, 2005: 421). This decision marked the end of the linguistic separatism that had prevailed in the NDH but shows that the Communists had not yet formulated a language policy that would accommodate more than just the four main ethnic groups. Similarly the first

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[82] razrađena i definisana.
[83] na srpskom, hrvatskom, slovenačkom i makedonskom jeziku.

republican constitutions passed after the war in 1946 gave different designations to the language depending on the dominant ethnic group in a particular republic: in Serbia and Montenegro it was Serbian (*srpski*), in Croatia Croatian (*hrvatski*) and in Bosnia-Herzegovina Serbian or Croatian (*srpski ili hrvatski*) (Šipka, 2005: 422). The choice of Serbian or Croatian in Bosnia-Herzegovina reflects the view of the Communists at the time that the Muslims would eventually identify themselves as either Croats or Serbs (Malcolm, 1994: 197). However, as Noel Malcolm points out, the results of the 1948 census show how deeply embedded a separate Muslim identity already was. In the census there were three categories for the Muslims to choose: Muslim Serb, Muslim Croat or Muslim nationally undeclared. In Bosnia-Herzegovina, 72,000 declared themselves as Serbs, 25,000 as Croats but the overwhelming majority, 778,000, registered as 'undeclared' (Malcolm, 1994: 197). It was therefore clear that these Muslims were not interested in identifying themselves as either Croatian or Serbian.

After the Tito-Stalin split of 1948, the Communists felt compelled to find new policies to replace the Stalinist model which would move away from a centralised model of government. Thus, the regime came up with the idea of promoting a Yugoslav identity based on class rather than ethnic affiliation and the unity of the Yugoslav state but there was still the hope that the social and economic changes would still be effective in settling national issues within a federal system and that socialist ideals would become more important than national ones. As Shoup puts it, the idea was 'to elevate the Yugoslav idea to a level of respectability which would make it an effective contender for the national loyalties of the Yugoslav peoples' (1968: 190). One way of doing this was to bring nationalities together in the cultural field and such things as inter-republican cultural exchanges were encouraged.

This policy change provides the context for the first important milestone in language developments after the Second World War. The ideas about a Yugoslav culture led the *Matica srpska* cultural foundation to carry out a survey regarding a joint language and orthography. Encouraged by the results of the survey which favoured 'a consolidation of the standard language

community of the three nations recognised at that time'[84] (Šipka, 2005: 423) (the Croats, Montenegrins and Serbs), the editorial board of the *Letopis Matice srpske* journal organised a three-day conference in December 1954 to discuss language issues which was attended by linguists, writers and cultural workers. The conference concluded with the adoption of the Conclusions of the Novi Sad Agreement which recognised the language of the Croats, Montenegrins and Serbs as one language.

The first four points of the Agreement which deal with the substance of the common language state the following:[85]

> 1) The popular language of the Serbs, Croats and Montenegrins is one language. Therefore, the literary language, which has developed on its basis around two main centers, Belgrade and Zagreb, is also a single language, with two pronunciations - ijekavian and ekavian.
> 2) In naming the language, it is necessary in official use always to state both of its constituent parts.
> 3) Both scripts, Latin and Cyrillic, are equally legitimate; therefore, it is necessary to ensure that both Serbs and Croats learn in the same manner the two scripts, a goal to be reached especially by means of school instruction.
> 4) Both pronunciations, ekavian and ijekavian, are also equally legitimate in all respects[86] (translation from Greenberg, 2004: 172).

The provisions of the agreement and their emphasis on the language of the Serbs and Croats reflect the major concern of the time which was 'to bring together and unite those two most developed and in terms of language issues most far apart centres'[87] (Šipka, 2005: 424). This explains why the agreement allows for a standard language flexible enough to accommodate two pronunciations and two scripts. It also partly explains why very little specific mention is made of any other ethnic group apart from that of the Montenegrins in the first sentence.[88] Šipka attributes the omission of Sarajevo as a centre of linguistic development also to the lack of qualified language scholars who could have represented Bosnia-Herzegovina at the conference (2005: 424)

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[84] učvršćenje standardnojezičkog zajedništva tada priznatih triju nacija.

[85] Four of the remaining six points concern the compilation of a joint dictionary, orthography and terminology.

[86] 1) Narodni jezik Srba, Hrvata i Crnogoraca jedan je jezik. Stoga je i književni jezik koji se razvio na njegovoj osnovi oko dva glavna središta, Beograda i Zagreba, jedinstven, s dva izgovora, ijekavskim i ekavskim. 2) U nazivu jezika nužno je uvek u službenoj upotrebi istaći oba njegova sastavna dela. 3) Oba pisma, latinica i ćirilica, ravnopravna su; zato treba nastojati da i Srbi i Hrvati podjednako nauče oba pisma, što će se postići u prvom redu školskom nastavom. 4) Oba izgovora, ekavski i ijekavski, takođe su u svemu ravnopravna.

[87] Približiti i ujediniti ta dva najrazvijenija i u jezičkim pitanjima najudaljenija centra.

[88] Sarajevo university is mentioned only in the point covering the membership of the commission for compiling an orthographic manual and terminology.

(among the many signatories to the agreement only three were from Bosnia-Herzegovina and all of those were Serbs: writers Marko Marković and Ilija Kecmanović and university professor Jovan Vuković).[89] This view is borne out in an article published in the *Slavic and East European Journal* in 1957 giving an overview of Slavonic linguistic study throughout the then Yugoslavia. It stresses Belgrade, Zagreb and Ljubljana universities as the most important centres for this kind of study and mentions just one publication from the University of Sarajevo (Schenker, 1957: 272-279).

Despite this apparent disregard for the language situation in Bosnia-Herzegovina manifested at the Novi Sad conference, the agreement was welcomed in the republic as its provisions actually most suited it as a multiethnic republic. The flexible norm could be applied to both constituent peoples (*narodi*) – the Serbs and the Croats. It must not be forgotten here that constitutionally there were only two constituent peoples in the republic at the time, as the Muslims were still considered to be a religious community only. Moreover, it was only once the Muslims had acquired the status of a *narod* that they could think in terms of promoting the idea of a separate linguistic identity.

The provisions of the agreement were implemented in Bosnia-Herzegovina, as were the later common norms in the orthography (Šipka, 2005: 424). In the 1963 republican constitution, for example, the language is called *srpskohrvatski* but this was corrected in the later constitution of 1974 which stipulated: 'Serbocroat and Croatoserbian with the ijekavian pronunciation are in official use in the Socialist Republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina'[90] (as quoted in Šipka, 2005: 424). Šipka says that to judge by the terminology used in schoolbooks the name of the language changed with the political climate so that from 1945 until the Novi Sad Agreement the main national subject in schools was called *srpski ili hrvatski* (Serbian or Croatian) in line with the 1946 Constitution. After the Agreement and until the publication of the joint orthography in 1960 the designation was *srpsko-hrvatski* while after this it was *srpskohrvatski* (written as one word). Finally at

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[89] Nor did the later work that was done on a joint orthography and dictionary include more than one linguistic expert from Bosnia-Herzegovina.

[90] da je u Socijalističkoj Republici Bosni i Hercegovini u službenoj upotrebi...srpskohrvatski odnosno hrvatskosrpski ijekavskog izgovora.

the end of the 1960s the designation of the language was established as *srpskohrvatski-hrvatskosrpski jezik* (Šipka, 2005: 425).

The common language started to unravel, however, in the mid 1960s. The political reforms of the fifties and sixties meant not only that more power was devolved to the republics but also there was increasing desire in the republics for more autonomy and greater readiness to express alternative viewpoints. Thus, at the Fifth Congress of Yugoslavists held in Sarajevo in 1965 there was sharp debate about the nature of the common language: was it truly a single language or were there distinct Croatian (centred around Zagreb) and Serbian (centred around Belgrade) variants? The Novi Sad Agreement was thus being challenged as it had made no mention of variants. This presaged the publication in March 1967 of the Declaration on the Name and Position of the Croatian Literary Language which was signed by 19 (almost all) of the most important Croatian scientific and cultural institutions. This declaration advocated doing away with the official designation of the language in favour of establishing four literary languages: Croatian, Serbian, Macedonian and Slovenian which would have 'clear and unambiguous parity and equality'[91] (as quoted in Šipka, 2005: 425). It also stated:

> In line with the above demands and explanations it is necessary to ensure the consistent application of the Croatian literary language in schools, print journalism, public and political life, on the radio and television whenever the Croatian population is in question, and that officials, teachers and public workers officially use the language of the environment in which they work regardless of where they hail from[92] (as quoted in Šipka, 2005: 425).

A group of Serbian writers countered the following month with their own Proposition for Consideration (*Predlog za razmišljanje*). Having in mind not only the interests of the Serbs in Serbia but also the protection of the rights of the Serbs in Croatia, they endorsed the Croats' declaration, thereby undermining its potency. The Serbian response called for the constitutions of the republics of Croatia and Serbia to ensure all Croats and Serbs had the right

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[91] Jasnu i nedvojbenu jednakost i ravnopravnost.
[92] U skladu s gornjim zahtjevima i objašnjenjima potrebno je osigurati dosljednu primjenu hrvatskoga književnog jezika u školama, novinstvu, javnom i političkom životu, na radiju i televiziji kad se god radi o hrvatskom stanovništvu, te da službenici, nastavnici i javni radnici, bez obzira otkuda potjecali, službeno upotrebljavaju jezik sredine u kojoj djeluju.

to schooling in their own language and alphabet and according to their own national programmes. The document declared the Vienna and the Novi Sad agreements to no longer be valid and also advocated the right of Croats and Serbs to nurture all forms of their national culture freely and without hindrance.

The two documents were significant in several ways. Seen in the broader context of developments in the country as a whole they reflected increasing discontent in the republics with the federal system and with the deteriorating economic situation at that time. The authorities recognised the non-linguistic implications of a dispute over language unity because if the joint language split then this could easily lead to a split in the country on other bases. Both documents called for separate recognised language standards, as well as the right to use these standards in such spheres as education, which would mean nations living alongside each other rather than in one unified community. This would therefore undermine the post-war policy of Brotherhood and Unity which the communist authorities had relied on to solve the national question and keep the country together.[93]

Linguistically, the two documents represented the logical outcome of the historical Croat-Serb debates over whether there was one or more than one language. They shifted emphasis away from language seen in territorial terms, i.e. as the western or eastern variant or centred around Zagreb or Belgrade, to an ethnic designation of language in the sense that Croatian, for example, would be linked with the whole of the Croatian nation whether its members lived in Croatia or elsewhere in Yugoslavia. This obviously had major implications for relations in ethnically mixed Bosnia-Herzegovina. Furthermore, by advocating a binary division of the language, the signatories failed to take into account the linguistic situation in Bosnia-Herzegovina and in Montenegro. Although at that time recognised only as a religious group the Muslims in Bosnia-Herzegovina had become the largest of the three ethnic groups in the republic. A two-way language split would mean that individual Muslims would have to decide if they wanted to be affiliated linguistically and

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[93] The scenario suggested by the two documents has arguably come about in parts of Bosnia-Herzegovina today where children of different ethnic groups are taught according to different curricula and in some cases in the same school but segregated from one another.

therefore ethnically with either the Croats or the Serbs. This would in turn disturb the ethnic balance in ethnically-mixed communities in Bosnia-Herzegovina and lead to the domination of one ethnic group over the other(s).[94]

The two documents therefore necessarily put Bosnia-Herzegovina in a difficult position. The first official reaction came from the Executive Committee of the Central Committee of the League of Communists of Bosnia-Herzegovina at the end of March 1967 with the publication of a statement that stressed their political implications for the country as a whole, saying 'that the Declaration and the Proposition are not only an expression of the nationalistic and chauvinistic views and attitudes of their signatories but also an attempt at a blatant political act of terrorism against the brotherhood and unity, equality and socialist patriotism of the peoples of Yugoslavia'[95] (as quoted in Šipka, 2005: 429). More specifically though, for the first time the statement called for linguistic tolerance and freedom of use of language. In this sense it supported 'the inalienable right of all citizens in Bosnia-Herzegovina to make use of the richness of the language, freely and in a completely tolerant way'[96] (Šipka, 2005: 429). This was possibly the only way the republican Communists could have reacted to the two documents. They could not come down in support of one side or the other because in a multiethnic republic such an approach would risk not only splitting the language but also the population as a whole.

Tolerance was also the main message from the Sarajevo Symposium on Linguistic Tolerance in Education held in April 1970. This was a gathering that brought together language and education experts to consider solutions to a language situation that looked increasingly as if it was moving towards polarisation. The symposium's conclusions echoed the provisions of the Novi Sad Agreement and reiterated that the name of the language in the republic was either *srpskohrvatski* or *hrvatskosrpski* and that the Cyrillic and Latin alphabets

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[94] This language split would also be problematic for those members of the population who declared themselves to be Yugoslavs. In the 1961 census these made up 8.4 per cent of the population of Bosnia-Herzegovina (Woodward, 1995: 33).
[95] Da su Deklaracija i Predlog ne samo izraz nacionalističkih i šovinističkih gledanja i opredjeljenja njihovih potpisnika, nego i pokušaj otvorene političke diverzije protiv bratstva i jedinstva, ravnopravnosti i socijalističkog patriotizma naroda Jugoslavije.
[96] Neotuđivo pravo svih građana u Bosni i Hercegovini da se koriste bogatstvom jezika, slobodno i do kraja tolerantno.

had equal status. The participants in the symposium also made it clear that they were not in favour of linguistic polarisation, stating the following:

It is unsuited to the peoples of Bosnia-Herzegovina and their culture for the literary language to be directed towards a two-variant (or two-language) polarisation or for a third, Bosnia-Herzegovina variant, to be formed because that would be contrary to our linguistic reality, hinder the free and independent development of the literary language and limit the possibility of enriching our literary linguistic expression[97] (*Zaključci*, 1969/70: 54).

Bosniak language scholar Josip Baotić considers that this symposium marked the beginning of efforts to create a language policy specifically for Bosnia-Herzegovina (2005: 444). The need for such a policy had after all become clear during the debates about the Declaration and Proposition. The concept for this language policy was formulated, however, in February 1971 by a number of party bodies[98] working in conjunction with linguistic experts in a document titled 'The Literary Language and Literary Language Policy in Bosnia-Herzegovina' (*Književni jezik i književno-jezička politika u Bosni i Hercegovini*). They came up with four basic principles which would form the foundation of a language policy. These were:

1. Acceptance of the Croato-Serbian or Serbo-Croat literary language as one language with all its diversity and differences in variants;
2. Openness towards positive cultural and linguistic influences from all republics and all cultural environments of our language area;
3. Nurturing autochtonous literary linguistic and cultural values which are the common wealth of all the peoples of Bosnia-Herzegovina and form a bridge between their cultures, that is, insistence on what connects us and brings us together;
4. Full freedom of individual choice of linguistic means of expression regardless of whether they would be distinguished as variants in other environments (*Mostarsko savjetovanje*, 1974: 209)[99].

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[97] Narodima Bosne i Hercegovine i njihovoj kulturi ne odgovara usmjeravanje književnog jezika u pravcu dvovarijantske (ili dvojezičke) polarizacije niti formiranje treće, bosanskohercegovačke varijante, jer bi to bilo protivno našoj jezičkoj stvarnosti, onemogućilo slobodan i samostalan razvitak književnog jezika i ograničilo mogućnost bogaćenja našeg književnojezičkog izraza.

[98] These bodies were the Commission of the Central Committee (CC) of the League of Communists (LC) of Bosnia-Herzegovina for the Work of the LC on Further Strengthening and Developing Inter-ethnic Relations and Inter-republican Cooperation, the Commission of the LC CC BiH for the Ideological and Political Activities of the LC in the field of Culture and Media, the Commission of the LC CC BiH for the Ideological and Political Activities of the LC in the field of Education and Science, the Secretariat of the CC of the LC BiH and the Executive Committee of the Republican Conference of the Socialist Alliance of the Working People (SAWP) of BiH, as well as other bodies of the SAWP of BiH.

[99] 1. Prihvatanje hrvatskosrpskog, odnosno srpskohrvatskog književnog jezika kao jednog jezika sa svim raznolikostima i varijantnim razlikama; 2. otvorenost prema pozitivnim kulturnim i jezičkim uticajima iz svih republika i svih kulturnih sredina našeg jezičkog područja; 3. njegovanje autohtonih književnojezičkih i kulturnih vrijednosti, koje su zajedničko blago svih naroda BiH i čine most među njihovim kulturama tj. insistiraju na onome što nas

These principles reflect well the concerns in the republic at the time. There is continued insistence on Croato-Serbian or Serbo-Croat as one language which was at variance with the support expressed elsewhere in Yugoslavia for dissolution of the joint language. The joint language is portrayed in these principles as a positive thing that encompasses the broad cultural and linguistic experience of all the groups in Bosnia-Herzegovina, and the call for freedom of choice in language use reflects an inclination towards tolerance of difference rather than the opposite as implied by the Declaration and the Proposition.

The participants in the meeting also stressed the political implications of a polarisation according to variants as this would mean that the Muslims would be forced to choose one or the other variant and 'that is again a form of national assimilation (on the linguistic and cultural plane). The acceptance of the thesis that each of our nations MUST have their own separate literary language is a direct negation of Muslim national specificity'[100](*Mostarsko savjetovanje*, 1974: 210). Ultimately, the participants recognised the far-reaching consequences of this linguistic polarisation in the political field, fearing that this 'would lead us to the disintegration and denial of the sovereignty of the Socialist Republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina'[101] (*Mostarsko savjetovanje*, 1974: 211).

The document that was adopted at the end of the meeting nevertheless introduced a new element into language policy in Bosnia-Herzegovina which was the concept of a *bosanskohercegovački standardnojezički izraz* (Bosnia-Herzegovina standard linguistic idiom or expression). Thus, while rejecting a polarisation according to variant or language, the document introduced a new category that essentially disrupted the binary split with the creation of a third linguistic option. Significant here is the use of the word idiom or expression because, in describing the speech of Bosnia-Herzegovina, it puts stress on the spoken rather than the written word (Greenberg, 2004: 39) but still keeps it within the category of the standard literary language. By using this term it could be claimed that the standard linguistic unity would not actually be

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povezuje i zbližava i 4. puna sloboda individualnog izbora jezičkih izražajnih sredstava bez obzira na njihovu varijantsku markiranost u drugim sredinama.

[100] A to je opet jedan vid nacionalne asimilacije (na lingvističkom i kulturnom planu). Prihvatanje teze da svaki narod u nas MORA imati svoj poseban književni jezik direktno je negiranje muslimanske nacionalne posebnosti.

[101] Takva politika vodila bi nas dezintegraciji i negiranju suvereniteta SR Bosne i Hercegovine.

affected. Most importantly it restored the idea of a linguistic designation tied to territory rather than to an ethnic group. The Bosnia-Herzegovina standard linguistic idiom therefore referred to the language spoken by all the inhabitants of the republic and not just one section of the population. This added nuance to the provisions of the Novi Sad Agreement which had essentially oversimplified the dialectal picture in Yugoslavia by associating the separate pronunciations of ekavian and ijekavian with Belgrade and Zagreb.[102] It was therefore specified that for official purposes the new idiom would be based on 'the ijekavian literary pronunciation and other autochtonous linguistic characteristics'[103] (*Mostarsko savjetovanje*, 1974: 214).

Seen from a historical perspective, the introduction of the Bosnia-Herzegovina standard linguistic idiom was reminiscent of Benjamin Kallay's policy. As the Bosnia-Herzegovina authorities now did he had described the language in terms of territory rather than ethnic group affiliation and had tried to impose one designation of the language on all the inhabitants of the province of Bosnia-Herzegovina. In Kallay's case though he had failed to appreciate the growing strength of ethnic feeling among the population. In contrast, the introduction of the Bosnia-Herzegovina standard linguistic idiom offered a nuanced approach which did take account of ethnic linguistic differences whilst retaining a common language.

Baotić also points out that the introduction of the new designation was not intended to 'denationalise' the Muslims, Croats or Serbs, or to allow one group to demonstrate their superiority over another or to assimilate anyone (2005: 459). The intention was to ensure that every person's linguistic capacity would be the same throughout the territory so that everyone would be equal in their use of language. Moreover, Baotić considers that there was a subtle political motivation behind this novelty:

> Nor, indeed, can the linguistic ambition be discounted of showing that a standard language, even in an ethnically non-homogeneous community and without unity of physiognomy, can function effectively nor the political

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[102] Ekavian is associated mainly with Belgrade and Serbia but ijekavian is spoken not just by Croats but also by the populations of Montenegro and Bosnia-Herzegovina and some parts of Serbia.
[103] Ijekavski književni izgovor i druge autohtone jezičke osobine.

ambition that a high degree of democracy can be attained even without splitting into ethnic variants[104] (2005: 459).

To a certain extent then, the introduction of a linguistic idiom for Bosnia-Herzegovina could be seen as an attempt not to weaken the common language but to strengthen it by allowing it to function throughout the territory of Bosnia-Herzegovina and Yugoslavia. In this context Baotić says that all language projects undertaken by the Institute for Language, which had been set up in 1972 to research language issues and to work on the new idiom, were directed at maintaining the integrity of the common language rather than creating a basis for separate rules that would differentiate the Bosnia-Herzegovina idiom from other idioms or variants.

Developments in the language field cannot, however, be divorced from other political developments inside Bosnia-Herzegovina to do with the rise of Muslim national consciousness in the 1960s and 1970s that was spurred on by changes to the structure of the state of Yugoslavia with authority increasingly being put into the hands of the republics. Policy was thus moving away from the idea of an integral Yugoslavism and towards a decentralised state structure. This liberalisation was partly a result of the fall of Aleksandar Ranković, the hard-line Serbian vice president and Minister of Interior of Yugoslavia, in 1966. His departure from the political scene also meant that Bosnia-Herzegovina political life gradually became less dominated by Serbian politicians which allowed for the rise of a small elite of Muslim Communist officials who were interested in encouraging a distinct Muslim national consciousness (Malcolm, 1994: 198).

The rise of Muslim national consciousness also coincided with Tito's foreign policy aims. Tito courted the Muslims of Bosnia-Herzegovina as they enhanced his standing in the Non-aligned Movement which included many Muslim countries. While visiting Muslim dignitaries from non-aligned states would have visits arranged to Bosnia-Herzegovina, it was useful for Tito to be able to have a diplomatic corps containing Muslims who could be sent to serve in Muslim countries. In turn the Muslims of Bosnia-Herzegovina 'were given

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[104] Ne može se isključiti, istina, ni lingvistička ambicija da se pokaže da standardni jezik i u nacionalno nehomogenoj zajednici i sa neostvarenim jedinstvom fizionomije može efikasno funkcionirati, kao ni politička-da se visok stupanj demokratičnosti može ostvariti i bez raslojavanja na nacionalne varijante.

privileges within Yugoslavia that in many ways were equal to those of the Serbs, Croats, and other nations to show that Muslims were not only tolerated but were valued. Their prestige and power within Yugoslavia grew accordingly' (Friedman, 1994: 167).

Language was important at this time in the Bosnia-Herzegovina Communist officials' endeavours to promote a separate Muslim identity. In her analysis of debates surrounding census policy in 1970-71, Iva Lučić makes the point that the Communist supporters of the idea of establishing the Muslims as a separate nation strove to de-emphasize the religious content of Muslim identity and instead highlighted other identity markers such as language. She quotes Admir Čatić, a member of the Bosnia-Herzegovina League of Communists Central Committee, speaking at a Central Committee session in February 1970,

> The ethnic substance of the Muslims, as is the case with the Serbs, Croats or Montenegrins, has historically developed within the borders of our country and under specific historical-cultural circumstances, in which the Serbo-Croatian language served as its main basis. The crucial determinant of the Muslim national identity is the language on which their whole culture is based and which connects them with the Montenegrins, Croats and Serbs and their cultures (Lučić, 2009: 21).

This quote neatly encapsulates the dilemma in pushing for Muslim nationhood at that time. For ideological reasons the Bosnia-Herzegovina Communists could not use religion to differentiate the Muslims from the other ethnic groups so they concentrated on linguistic differences. At the same time, however, they were at pains to highlight the Muslims' linguistic connection to the other Serbo-Croat speakers in Yugoslavia. This echoes the idea inherent in the introduction of a Bosnia-Herzegovina standard linguistic idiom – the importance of being different and yet the same – which was needed to allow for self-identification on an ethnic basis but within a broader identity that included other ethnic groups.

The strength of Muslim self-identification can be seen in the figures for successive censuses in Bosnia-Herzegovina. In 1961 the census allowed for the self-designation of 'Muslim in the ethnic sense' for the first time and 842,248 Bosnians registered themselves as such (Donia and Fine, 1994: 87). This is close to the figure in the previous census of 1953 for those who declared themselves as Yugoslavs (891,800) (in 1961, 275, 883 people declared

themselves to be Yugoslavs). This suggests that in the past rather than declare themselves as Croats or Serbs the Muslims of Bosnia-Herzegovina were much more inclined to register themselves as Yugoslavs but once the designation of 'Muslim in the ethnic sense' was allowed they abandoned this designation. By the time of the 1971 census, 1,482,430 people were prepared to declare themselves as 'Muslim in the sense of a nation' (as against 43,796 declared Yugoslavs). The Muslims were not recognised officially as a nation until the 1974 federal Constitution. Prior to this the 1963 republican Constitution had referred to the Muslims but did not give them the status of a nation on an equal footing with the Serbs and Croats although they were recognised as a separate nation in 1969 by the republican League of Communists Central Committee (Malcolm, 1994: 199).

The 1974 Constitution also marked the endpoint in the decentralisation of the state of Yugoslavia as it essentially turned it into a confederation with virtually all power vested in the republics and autonomous provinces. It also signalled the beginning of the end of the joint language as conceived in the Novi Sad Agreement. Where the Novi Sad Agreement had allowed for two variants based around two centres the new constitution created two more options within the Serbo-Croatian literary language: the Montenegrin standard idiom and the Bosnia-Herzegovina standard idiom. While this arrangement can be seen as accommodating the particular speech of the populations of Bosnia-Herzegovina (as discussed above) and Montenegro and strengthening the common standard it also meant, as Greenberg concludes, that with these new provisions 'the link between ethnicity, identity, and language was strengthened' and implied that each *narod* 'had the right to a home republic, a separate socio-cultural identity, and their own version of the Central South Slavic language. Thus, four embryonic successor languages were created as a result of the new constitution' (2004:57). Thus, when the state of Yugoslavia finally fell apart under the weight of competing violent nationalisms in 1991, the two variants and idioms formed the basis for the separate standards of Croatian, Serbian, Bosnian and Montenegrin. Once the Republic of Croatia had declared its official language to be Croatian and embarked on a language planning project to make it as distinct a language as possible and disassociate it from the other variants of

Serbo-Croat, there was thus less and less reason for the other nations to maintain the common standard language.

After 1991, the Bosnia-Herzegovina standard idiom began to develop into the new Bosnian language which became the language of the Bosniaks only. This is resonant of the experience of the Hapsburgs as *bošnjaštvo* and the Bosnian language really only appealed to a small section of the Muslim community. Both these cases demonstrate the difficulty of creating a new linguistic identity when there are competing linguistic loyalties. Neither the Croats nor the Serbs have need of a language or idiom that would identify them with the integral state of Bosnia-Herzegovina as they can identify linguistically with their kin states of Croatia and Serbia. It is only the Bosniaks, who have no kin state, who are in need of a distinct linguistic identity that ties them to the state of Bosnia-Herzegovina.

Conclusion

The purpose of this chapter has been to explore the language-ethnic identity link that has been crucial in identity politics in Bosnia-Herzegovina since the beginning of the nineteenth century. It has looked at the way in which language policy has been used by various previous authorities to regulate inter-ethnic relations and assessed the outcomes of their endeavours. In all three periods under review there was the recognition among ruling elites that language issues could be manipulated for wider political ends. This therefore gives credence to the idea prevalent in language planning scholarship, as outlined in the Literature Review, that decisions about language are always dictated by extra-linguistic concerns and aims. In these three episodes the extra-linguistic aims were essentially to do with security issues. For Kallay, as part of the *bošnjaštvo* project, language policy was intended to embed the ethnic groups into the Hapsburg empire so that they would not be drawn towards uniting with members of their ethnic communities outside the province and thereby threaten the integrity of the empire as a whole. The Ustashas' language policy was also a security issue as they sought to control the non-Croatian ethnic groups in Bosnia-Herzegovina. They recognised that they could not eradicate the entire non-Croatian population of Bosnia-Herzegovina

in their desire to create a pure Croatian state.[105] They dealt with the Serbs by embarking on a plan to exterminate them but to 'neutralise' the Muslims they tried to create an identity that would encompass them, as well as the Croats. The Ustashas would thus have had the bulk of the population under their control. The Communists too sought to use a unifying language policy as part of their national policy to prevent disunity among the various nations and their secession from the federal state.

Given this link between language policy and security issues we also see, again commensurate with language policy scholarship, that language policy does not operate in a socio-political vacuum and that its success or failure depends on circumstances in the wider environment which may or may not be linked directly with language issues. This is clear from the experience of the Hapsburgs in Bosnia-Herzegovina. The policy of Benjamin von Kallay failed because it was part of a wider identity formation policy that did not appeal to all the ethnic groups in Bosnia-Herzegovina. General opposition to the Hapsburg regime among all the main groups in the province meant that there was no significant commitment among the population to the imposed idea of an all-inclusive Bosnian identity. Despite the fact that Kallay made all the right moves in the sense of having a specific and well-planned language policy, he could not prevent the influence of other ideas coming from outside the province to do with affiliation to an ethnically-based community which went wider than the province's borders.

The language policy of the Communist authorities in the SFRY also fell victim to developments and events in the wider society. Decentralising efforts by the authorities to meet the demands in some republics for greater autonomy and political liberalisation failed in the sense that they led to greater nationalism in the republics so that ethnic identity became much more important than any identification based on affiliation to a given republic or even to the federal state. An all-inclusive language policy based on a joint standard rather than separate standards held no appeal for advocates of increased separation along ethnic lines.

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[105] In 1941, there were 1.7 million Serbs out of a total population of the NDH of 6.3 million (Hoare, 2007: 176).

In essence, the language policies implemented during the three periods under consideration were all about trying to create a specific identity and in two cases it was focussed on affiliation to a territory rather than to a particular ethnic group. In Kallay's case it was a question of creating an all-inclusive Bosnian identity based on attachment to the province of Bosnia-Herzegovina and therefore the Habsburg Empire rather than to one of the nascent ethnic groups. Similarly, the authorities in Communist Yugoslavia strove initially to use language policy to help create an over-arching Yugoslav identity for all the peoples of the federal state who spoke Serbo-Croat or Croato-Serbian, and after the devolution of power to the republics the authorities of Bosnia-Herzegovina moved to develop a linguistic identity predicated on identification with the republic rather than with one ethnic group. As we saw in this chapter, in both cases the broader identity lost out to the allure of the narrower ethnically-defined ones.

What then can past experience in the conduct of language policy tell us about the concerns of present-day approaches to the language issue in Bosnia-Herzegovina? The experiences detailed above have resonance in post-Dayton Bosnia-Herzegovina because the new state structure has made ethnic affiliation the dominant political identity. Political power is gained through appeals to the ethnically-based loyalty of the population and rights are vested not in the individual but in the ethnic group. There is therefore no incentive for any of the elites to nurture a broader identity based on membership of the state of Bosnia-Herzegovina rather than of the ethnic group. As we saw in the Literature Review, this is reflected in the area of language policy where the trend has been towards defining a distinct language for each of the ethnic groups rather than developing an inclusive linguistic identity that would encompass all of them. Given this linguistic separation, the fate of Kallay's language policy and that of the Communist regime prior to 1990 would suggest that any attempt now to create an inclusive linguistic identity in conditions of ethnic division would fail.

To a certain extent, the present approach to the language issue on the part of domestic language planners is to be expected in an environment where wartime ethnic differences have become entrenched in the peacetime political system. It can be viewed as having moved on from the pre-conflict inclusive

approach of the Communists towards exclusivity: the creation of separate standard languages is intended to establish linguistic difference between the ethnic groups and create a barrier between 'Us' and 'Them'. This is the essence of nationalist language planning, but it also chimes with contemporary thinking about linguistic human rights which advocates pluralism and the defence of the linguistic rights of a language and its speakers. This exclusivity is what guides the actions of the domestic language planners.

The international community has not followed the example of previous regimes in Bosnia-Herzegovina and viewed language as a security issue. It has therefore not seen language policy as a tool to achieve extra-linguistic aims, for example, aims that would be connected with the goals of the contemporary peace-building process. International organisations led by the Office of the High Representative have thus not formulated a deliberate and planned language policy. They could have followed the examples of Kallay and the Ustashas and attempted to use language policy to impose a specific linguistic identity but they have not. This is in contrast to the High Representative's actions regarding other symbolic markers of identity. For example, in a move reminiscent of similar action taken by Kallay, in February 1998 the then High Representative Carlos Westendorp, imposed a new Bosnian flag, one which avoided offending any of the ethnic groups and intended to emphasise the country's all-Bosnian identity. He thereby showed an appreciation for the importance of certain symbols in identity formation which did not extend to the symbolic significance of language in Bosnia-Herzegovina.

The international community's approach to the language issue has been conditioned on two things: the exclusivist approach of the ruling elites to language and contemporary thinking on linguistic human rights. International organisations therefore support the existence of three distinct languages and advocate their equality. This approach is different to that of Kallay and the Ustashas but is reminiscent of the post-1974 language policy of the Communists although it has moved on from this policy in recognising the equal status of different languages rather than of just variants or idioms.

As demonstrated in this chapter, the language policies that have been conducted in Bosnia-Herzegovina in the past have depended on the wider socio-political situation for their success or failure. In our consideration of

present-day language policy it is therefore necessary to look more closely at the political and constitutional environment that was created in the Dayton Peace Agreement and investigate the interplay between language issues and extra-linguistic concerns. Where we have seen that in the past, language policy was considered a way of ensuring security the next chapter will focus on what the international community's approach to language issues means for the peace-building process and the ultimate security and stability of Bosnia-Herzegovina.

Chapter 3

The Dayton Peace Agreement, Language and Societal Security

Introduction

In the last chapter I examined the interaction between the language issue and socio-political circumstances in Bosnia-Herzegovina from a historical perspective. The periods considered were those where the ruling authorities conducted identifiable language policies for the purpose of achieving essentially extra-linguistic aims which, I contend, were in large part focussed on the security and stability of the state. As I state at the end of the chapter, these policies generally did not achieve their intended aims and although this was for various reasons, the policies fell victim to developments in the wider socio-political arena. Although it cannot be said, for example, that in the period from the end of World War II to 1990 language debates were the direct cause of violent conflict, they did nonetheless both reflect wider developments that moved Bosnia-Herzegovina towards conflict and at the same time contribute to the disagreements leading to conflict. As discussed in the last chapter, from the 1960s onwards, for example, the language debates in Croatia and Serbia reflected greater tolerance for the expression of alternative viewpoints and respect for difference between the peoples of Yugoslavia while at the same time these linguistic debates bolstered claims to ethnic difference which undermined Yugoslavia as a stable multi-ethnic state and ultimately led to its destruction.

Given the salience that language issues had historically in inter-ethnic relations in Bosnia-Herzegovina it could have been expected that language would play an important role in the post-1995 multi-ethnic state. In the Literature Review I discussed the language planning activities of the three former warring sides in establishing separate linguistic identities for themselves as a way of bolstering their distinctive ethnic identities. In this chapter the focus will shift to the approach of the international community to language issues and the way it has fed into broader peace-building aims since

1995. Of interest in this chapter is the general constitutional and political environment in which language issues play out and which was created to a large extent by the Dayton Peace Agreement.

The chapter will begin with a consideration of what is meant by peace-building (which includes elements of both state and nation building) and detail the kind of state structure put in place by the Dayton Peace Agreement, as the first step in the peace-building process in Bosnia-Herzegovina. This is necessary for an understanding of a political process that is dominated by ethnic identity and ethnic affiliation. It will then go on to look at what the Dayton Peace Agreement says specifically about language as this informs the international community's subsequent approach to the language issue. One consequence of this approach was the decision of the Constitutional Court passed in 2000, but not imposed by the High Representative until 2002, which consolidated the equality of all three languages throughout the country; the implications of this decision for the international peace-building project will therefore be discussed.[106] Having seen in the previous chapter that, historically, the language issue has been seen as a security issue, the final section of this chapter will apply the concept of societal security to explain how in a political environment dominated by ethnic rivalries the language issue can be manipulated at a rhetorical level by political elites to keep their constituencies in a continuous societal security dilemma. This in turn undermines the stability of the state and throws into doubt the achievement of the peace-building aims of the international community.

What Is Peace-Building?

In June 1992, Boutros Boutros-Ghali, then Secretary General of the United Nations, issued an Agenda for Peace outlining the ways in which the UN could be more effective in preventive diplomacy, peacemaking and peace-

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[106] The Constitutional Court was established in the Constitution (at Annex 4 of the Dayton Peace Agreement) and has the task of upholding the Constitution. According to Art. VI, 3.a. it 'shall have exclusive jurisdiction to decide any dispute that arises under this Constitution between the Entities or between Bosnia and Herzegovina and an Entity or Entities, or between institutions of Bosnia-Herzegovina'. The court is made up of nine members, four of which are selected by the House of Representatives of the Federation, two by the Assembly of the Republika Srpska and three by the President of the European Court of Human Rights.

keeping.[107] This was a response to the changing role of the UN's peace-keeping operations since the end of the Cold War. The end of super-power rivalry over spheres of influence meant that the US and the erstwhile Soviet Union were no longer willing to devote military and economic resources to aiding their allies and continuing to insulate them from outside interference (Paris, 2004: 16). This meant that the UN and international organisations became increasingly involved in resolving conflicts, as well as post-conflict situations, and the Agenda for Peace was an attempt to define the UN's mission in this changing environment. In it Boutros-Ghali defines the concept of post-conflict peace-building which he sees as being related to preventive diplomacy, peacemaking and peace-keeping. For him, post-conflict peace-building is

> action to identify and support structures which will tend to strengthen and solidify peace in order to avoid a relapse into conflict. Preventive diplomacy seeks to resolve disputes before violence breaks out; peacemaking and peace-keeping are required to halt conflicts and preserve peace once it is attained. If successful, they strengthen the opportunity for post-conflict peace-building, which can prevent the recurrence of violence among nations and peoples (Boutros-Ghali, 1992: para. 21).

He also outlines what peace-building efforts may entail and says they

> may include disarming the previously warring parties and the restoration of order, the custody and possible destruction of weapons, repatriating refugees, advisory and training support for security personnel, monitoring elections, advancing efforts to protect human rights, reforming or strengthening governmental institutions and promoting formal and informal processes of political participation (Boutros-Ghali, 1992: para. 55).

He stresses though that post-conflict peace-building is intended to prevent a recurrence of conflict and states, 'only sustained, cooperative work to deal with underlying economic, social, cultural and humanitarian problems can place an achieved peace on a durable foundation' (Boutros-Ghali, 1992: para. 57).

The Agenda for Peace and the subsequent Supplement to the Agenda for Peace published in 1995 were not intended to provide a template for peace-building operations but rather guidelines as to how to proceed (Stedman, 2002:

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[107] Preventive diplomacy is defined as 'action to prevent disputes from arising between parties, to prevent existing disputes from escalating into conflicts and to limit the spread of the latter when they occur' (Boutros-Ghali, 1992: para. 20). Peacemaking is defined as 'action to bring hostile parties to agreement, essentially through such peaceful means as those foreseen in Chapter VI of the charter of the United Nations' (Boutros-Ghali, 1992: para. 20). Peace-keeping is defined as 'the deployment of a United Nations presence in the field, hitherto with the consent of all the parties concerned, normally involving United Nations military and/or police personnel and frequently civilians as well. Peace-keeping is a technique that expands the possibilities for both the prevention of conflict and the making of peace' (Boutros-Ghali, 1992: para. 20).

19) as Stephen John Stedman has pointed out, 'policies and mandates need not be guidelines for action, so much as expressions of faith, acknowledgement of virtue, and instruments of education' (2002: 19). Even so, the ideas contained in the documents have tended to inform the international peace-building operations undertaken since the end of the Cold War. An added element to these operations is that they have also tended to be predicated on the idea that the adoption of the Western liberal democratic model is the best way to reconstruct war-torn societies (Paris, 2004). Peace-building is therefore not just about stopping war and reaching a durable cease-fire agreement but also about creating a liberal democracy and establishing a Western-style market economy.[108] The drawback to this approach though is it introduces an added element of competition in a situation where former warring sides are already jockeying for position and influence and therefore risks de-stabilizing further the post-war state (Paris, 2004).[109]

As the tasks listed above suggest, peace-building contains elements of both state-building and nation-building. According to Roland Kostić, state-building refers to 'the creation of viable political and administrative institutions enabling a political entity, the state, to function efficiently as an independent unit with a capacity to provide public goods for its population' (2007: 40). Two key elements to state-building are control of the police and military forces and the creation of an effective fiscal system as the basis for a functioning legal and administrative system. In contrast, nation-building 'is one of the most widespread processes of collective identity creation with an intention to legitimize a constructed state authority within a given territory' (Kostić, 2007: 40). The two key elements to this are a unifying ideology and an integration of society which entails 'the incorporation of different groups into a common society' (Kostić, 2007: 40). Key pillars of the integration process include the

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[108] Roland Paris dates these principles back to the end of World War I and the then US president Woodrow Wilson's foreign policy. According to Paris, Wilson believed that the spread of the American market democracy model would promote peace in domestic and world affairs (2004: 40).

[109] The peace-building approach taken in this study focuses on the actions of outside actors which are considered to take the lead in the peace-building process. Another peace-building approach is peace-building from below in which 'solutions are derived and built from local resources' (Ramsbotham, Woodhouse and Miall, 2005: 222) so that the focus in this perspective is on the actions of local actors such as non-governmental organisations and other community-based organisations.

development of national communication, media and education 'in order to establish a national political and cultural dialogue' (Kostić, 2007: 40).

The nation-building process can be seen as an exercise in creating a common identity tied to the new state in order to facilitate the integration of different groups into it. Because nation-building seeks to create an integrative identity, language, as a marker of identity, is an important element in this process. If there is more than one language spoken in the new state there is a need to decide how the languages will be treated: what will the official language or languages be? Will there be a lingua franca to facilitate communication between the different groups throughout the state? For example, modern Hebrew was adopted as the language of the state of Israel in 1948 as a way of unifying different groups speaking a variety of languages into one nation and over time became a 'legitimate, daily and all-encompassing language of the Israeli nation' (Ben-Rafael, 1994: 54). The learning of modern Hebrew by new immigrants to the state can be seen as one means of constructing a new identity tied to belonging to the Israeli nation. Similarly, if one language is chosen as the official language of the new state over others the way in which these other languages are treated also impacts on the nation-building process. If the speakers of the less dominant languages feel that they have not been afforded language rights and are not able freely to use their mother tongue then their commitment to the new state and self-identification with it may be diminished.

Peace-building is taken as the framework for this study precisely because it is an over-arching concept that contains elements of both state-building and nation-building. The Dayton Peace Agreement itself was first and foremost a peace agreement that was intended to solidify the cease-fire that had come into effect three weeks before the start of negotiations at the Wright Patterson Airforce Base. The bulk of the agreement therefore concerns military aspects of the peace such as the separation and disarmament of forces and the cantonment of weapons (Annexes 1 and 1a) while a large part of the negotiations at Dayton revolved around the allocation of territory between the three warring sides (Holbrooke, 1999). As Paddy Ashdown, former High Representative in Bosnia-Herzegovina (2002-2006), has stated 'The Dayton Peace Agreement had only one purpose – to end a war. Almost no attention

was paid to creating a functioning state' (2007: 99-100). That notwithstanding, the Dayton Peace Agreement does contain state-building elements such as a constitution and a blue-print for the establishment of state structures.

There is however no explicit nation-building element to the Dayton Peace Agreement and no concern with how to tie the three former warring sides into the new integral state. In the post-war period, though, the international community has been involved in nation-building efforts with the OHR deciding on a coat-of-arms, flag, national anthem, and the design of passports and currency for the new state. Moreover, it could be argued that the Dayton Peace Agreement's focus on human rights protections may contribute to engendering a sense of loyalty to the state among the different groups in the sense that if a minority group feels that its rights are respected and being protected by the state it will have a sense of loyalty to that state and therefore self-identify with it. This therefore engenders a sense of attachment to the state. Nation-building though is important for this study because of its focus on identity formation of which language is a part.

This chapter is concerned with the mismatch between the two main elements of peace-building in Bosnia-Herzegovina and it will show that the way the state has been developed since 1995 with its emphasis on ethnic identity as the over-riding identity in the political process is at variance with the nation-building aspects if we understand those aspects as having the aim of creating an integrative identity that is tied to the new state rather than the ethnic group.

The Dayton Peace Agreement as a basis for peace-building

The Dayton Peace Agreement reflects the concerns in the Agenda for Peace. Aside from annexes on the military aspects of the peace and regional stabilisation, the agreement contains, *inter alia*, provisions related to the holding of elections (Annex 3), the establishment of a post of human rights ombudsman and a human rights chamber (Annex 6) and refugees and internally displaced persons (IDPs) (Annex 7). It also enumerates a vast array of human rights agreements that were to be incorporated into local law. It is

also clear that it follows the two basic contemporary peace-building principles of establishing a liberal democracy and a market economy. Thus the preamble of the constitution of the new state (at Annex 4 of the agreement) mentions both the desirability of democratic governmental institutions and the promotion of a market economy. Moreover, Article 1, paragraph 2 clearly states: 'Bosnia and Herzegovina shall be a democratic state, which shall operate under the rule of law and with free and democratic elections'.

Given the wide range of tasks to be carried out the Dayton Peace Agreement also made provision for the unprecedented presence of international organisations in Bosnia-Herzegovina by putting certain of them in charge of different aspects of the peace. Security, for example, was guaranteed by successive NATO forces (IFOR- Implementation Force, SFOR-Stabilisation Force) and since the end of 2004 has been in the hands of an EU force (EUFOR). The civilian aspects of the peace settlement were entrusted to such organisations as the UNHCR (refugee return), the OSCE, the ICTY (war crimes prosecution) and the World Bank (financial aspects), to name just the most influential. Annex 10 of the Dayton Peace Agreement recognises the complexity of the tasks entrusted to all these international organisations and agencies and therefore provides for the appointment of a High Representative to coordinate their activities. A Peace Implementation Council (PIC) comprised of 55 countries and agencies which support the peace process was subsequently established to oversee the overall implementation of the agreement. There is also an executive arm of the PIC, the Steering Board,[110] which provides political guidance to the High Representative.[111]

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[110] The Steering Board members are Canada, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, Russia, the United States, the United Kingdom, the Presidency of the EU, the European Commission and the Organisation of the Islamic Conference represented by Turkey.
[111] While initially the HR had more of a monitoring, coordination and oversight role, in December 1997 the PIC, frustrated with the lack of progress being made in Bosnia-Herzegovina, gave the HR the so-called Bonn Powers which greatly extended his authority. It was now possible for the HR to impose legislation and to remove from office any individual who he deemed to be obstructing the implementation of the Dayton Peace Agreement. It is these enhanced powers and their subsequent use by successive High Representatives that have led some commentators to talk about an international protectorate (Chandler, 1999) or even a European Raj in Bosnia-Herzegovina (Knaus and Martin, 2003). All these possible characterisations of the HR's role raise issues about the extent to which Bosnia-Herzegovina can be viewed as a democratic state given that the HR himself is an unelected official chosen by an unelected body (the PIC) but still has primacy in the political process. A discussion of the democratic nature of the HR or otherwise is, however, beyond the scope of this study.

While the Dayton Peace Agreement was successful in bringing to an end three and a half years of vicious conflict there is much about the state it created and the state structures it put in place that have militated against efforts to prevent a recurrence of conflict. Paradoxically, the Dayton structures have ensured that Bosnia-Herzegovina continues to be a deeply-divided state in which ethnic animosities dominate the political process.

The institutional framework created by the Dayton Peace Agreement

The agreement created the state of Bosnia-Herzegovina within the internationally recognised borders of the former Republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina and made up of the Federation of Bosnia-Herzegovina (hereinafter the Federation) (with 51 per cent of the territory) and the Republika Srpska (with 49 per cent of territory). The Federation had been set up in 1994 on the basis of the US-brokered Washington Agreement and has been vividly described by Bose as 'the troubled product of a shotgun alliance of warring Bosniacs and Croats' (2002:23). As Bose's description suggests, the creation of the Federation was to a certain extent an act of expediency as it was an attempt by the US to simplify the peace-brokering process so that it became a two-sided conflict rather than one with three warring sides. The Republika Srpska had been proclaimed in 1992 but was not internationally recognised.

The constitution of Bosnia-Herzegovina (Annex 4 of the Dayton Peace Agreement) provides only what Bose calls a 'fairly skeletal' (2002: 61) framework of common-state institutions which is based on the equal representation of the three main ethnic groups conceived as collectively defined communities, although the competencies of these institutions are limited. They have responsibility for: foreign policy, foreign trade policy, customs policy, monetary policy (in conjunction with the Central Bank), immigration, refugee and asylum policy and regulation, international and inter-entity criminal law enforcement, the establishment and operation of common and international communications facilities, the regulation of inter-entity transportation and air traffic control. In effect this creates a central government which Robert Hayden has characterised as a customs union with a foreign

ministry attached (2005: 243). All other governmental functions and powers are devolved to the entity level and in the case of the Federation as far as the canton or municipal level.[112] This means that policy on these issues is likely to be guided by the interests of the dominant ethnic group: in the case of the Republika Srpska the Serbs and in the Federation by the ethnic group dominant in a particular canton or municipality.

At the state level, the political process revolves around the representation of the three constituent peoples so, for example, the three-member Presidency of Bosnia-Herzegovina consists of a representative of each of the constituent peoples elected by the respective people. The Bosniak and Croatian members are elected from the territory of the Federation and the Serbian member from the territory of the Republika Srpska. This means that anyone who is or does not identify as a member of a constituent people, such as a member of the Jewish community, is not politically represented in either the Presidency or the House of Peoples which is the second chamber of the Parliamentary Assembly.[113] As a consequence politics is focussed on the concerns of the three constituent peoples and the power play between them without being mitigated by the interests and concerns of other groups. Moreover, this arrangement encourages the electorate to think about their voting choices solely in terms of their ethnic group and its interests rather than on an individual politician's merits or what is best for the country as a whole.[114]

The state structure also has very strong elements of a consociational democracy. This model was put forward in the 1960s by Arend Lijphart as a way to develop a common political framework for societies that were divided

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[112] According to the Constitution of the Federation (V.1.2.2), 'Each Canton may delegate functions concerning education, culture, tourism, local business and charitable activities, and radio and television to a municipality or city in its territory, and is obliged to do so if the majority of the population in the municipality or city is other than that of the Canton as a whole'.

[113] Elections to the first chamber, the House of Representatives, are based on a territorial principle and are free from ethnic considerations. The Constitutional Court is another state-level institution which has an ethnically-based composition.

[114] This state of affairs came to the fore in December 2009 with a judgment by the European Court of Human Rights in response to a submission from Jakob Finci, a member of the Jewish community, and Dervo Sejdić, a member of the Roma community, regarding their ineligibility to stand for election to the House of Peoples and the Presidency of Bosnia-Herzegovina due to not being members of any of the three constituent peoples. The court ruled that the relevant provisions of the Constitution of Bosnia-Herzegovina violated the European Convention on Human Rights and amounted to discrimination and breached their electoral rights.

along ethnic or communal faultlines and was seen as an alternative to partition[115]. According to Lijphart, every consociational democracy should be based on four principles: Government should be in the hands of a grand coalition of the political leaders of all segments of society with equitable distribution of high offices among the segments and in this regard it is essential that the elites representing the segments are willing and able to negotiate the differences between them; There should be 'segmental autonomy', that is to say, the delegation of as much decision-making power as possible to the segments; proportionality as the basic standard of political representation, civil service appointments and the allocation of party funds; and the protection of the vital interests of minorities through veto. Consociational principles are built into virtually every level of Dayton Bosnia-Herzegovina. For example, the common state-level institutions are meant to operate on the basis of parity or proportional representation while the vital interest of all three communities is guaranteed with the provision of veto rights. A veto can be invoked by any of the groups on the basis of a violation of a vital interest of that particular group although paradoxically there is no definition in the state constitution of what would constitute a vital interest.[116]

There are several factors specific to Bosnia-Herzegovina, however, which hinder the functioning of a wholly consociational democratic system. First of all, there has to be a strong desire among the segments for the particular state union to exist, and each of the segments must have a strong stake in the survival of the political system. Mirjana Kasapović (2006) argues that this would then lead to a sense of loyalty within each segment (in the case of Bosnia-Herzegovina the ethnic group) to the wider political system outside the segment. According to Kasapović this consensus does not exist in Bosnia-Herzegovina primarily because the state of Bosnia-Herzegovina was born of concession and compromise; for example, the legalisation of the Republika

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[115] A classic example of such a state is The Netherlands of the 1950s and 60s which was split along religious cleavages so that society was divided into Roman Catholics, orthodox Calvinists and secular segments or pillars. These social divisions existed in all walks of life. Each segment was represented by its own political party and had its own non-political organisations such as charity, cultural, sport and youth associations, and each segment developed its own education system and media. It was therefore possible for a member of a segment to only associate and socialise with other members of the same segment throughout their life.

[116] There are, however, very broad definitions of a vital interest in the entity constitutions.

Srpska was a concession by the international community to the Serbs to remain within the borders of Bosnia-Herzegovina against the will of the majority, and the inclusion of the Federation was also a concession to the Croats for the same purpose (2006: 65). Further, as Robert Hayden points out, because the Dayton Peace Agreement was not ratified in a popular referendum or by any elected representatives there is little identification with the state of Bosnia-Herzegovina among the general population (2005: 242).

Relevant here also are the circumstances in which the agreement was negotiated since two of the ethnic groups were not directly represented at the talks in Dayton. The Serbs were represented by Slobodan Milošević, president of the then Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, and the Croats by Franjo Tuđman, president of Croatia, both of whom were keen to reach an agreement. This meant that the Serbs and Croats in Bosnia-Herzegovina felt coerced into implementing something that they had had no input in negotiating. In his detailed account of the development of US policy towards Bosnia-Herzegovina, Ivo Daalder also considers that the Bosniaks, though represented by Alija Izetbegović, were also forced to the table by the Americans who portrayed the negotiations as their last chance for peace otherwise the US would withdraw its support from them (2000: 137). This coercion meant that there was weak support for the Dayton Peace Agreement among the political elites of all three warring sides on the ground.

Furthermore, weak support for the Dayton Peace Agreement also meant weak support for the state it created, especially as the Serbs and Croats were drawn towards their respective kin-states outside Bosnia-Herzegovina. This potentially disintegrative situation was facilitated by the Dayton Peace Agreement itself as the Constitution allows each entity to establish 'special parallel relationships with neighboring states' (Article III, paragraph 2a). This echoes the provisions in the Washington Agreement which foresaw the establishment of a confederation between the Bosnian Croats and the state of Croatia. These provisions mean that the Serbs and Croats do not have to be fully committed to the integral state of Bosnia-Herzegovina as they can legitimately forge extensive relationships with Serbia and Croatia. Moreover, it also creates a form of inequality in the collaboration and cooperation process as

there is more pressure on the Bosniaks to implement the agreement as they are the only constituent people without a kin-state to provide its support.

Another factor hampering the functioning of a consociational system is the lack of consensus among the political elites about the political system itself. A successful consociational democracy requires effective collaboration and cooperation at the level of the political elites in order to ensure that the separate segments intermesh and function jointly within an integral state. Lijphart emphasizes this as crucial for the stability of a consociational system. As he puts it, 'The leaders of the rival subcultures may engage in competitive behaviour and thus further aggravate mutual tensions and political instability, but they may also make *deliberate efforts to counteract the immobilizing and unstabilizing effects of cultural fragmentation*' (1969: 211, his italics). Such efforts are absent in Bosnia-Herzegovina because of the deep divisions that exist between the elites of the three ethnic groups in terms of their attitudes towards the state structure. According to Kasapović, the Bosniaks are the main opponents of the current constitutional structure first of all because they feel that a state divided between two entities was forced upon them by the international community and secondly because they would prefer a unitary state in which, as the majority population of Bosnia-Herzegovina overall (making up an estimated 48 per cent of the population) they would hold more sway over the Croats and the Serbs (2006: 66).[117] The Bosniaks also feel, according to Kasapović, that the incorporation of the Republika Srpska into Bosnia-Herzegovina unjustly legitimised the ethnic cleansing on which it was founded (2006: 66).

The Serbs, on the other hand, now seem to be most supportive of Dayton Bosnia-Herzegovina and oppose any revision of the agreement as the asymmetric constitutional structure allows the Republika Srpska, a unitary centralised state, to exist alongside the highly decentralised federation. According to Kasapović, the Serbs consider that the Republika Srpska was not

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[117] The figure of 48 per cent is taken from the CIA world factbook and is only an estimate from 2000. The corresponding figures for the other ethnic groups are: Serbs 37.1 per cent of the population and the Croats 14.3 per cent. There are no official figures based on the population since 1995 as no census has been conducted in Bosnia-Herzegovina since 1991 due to disputes over the content of a possible questionnaire. The CIA world factbook is available at: https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/bk.html [Accessed 8 February 2010]

created in the Dayton Peace Agreement but was only 'verified' by it and the entity cannot be scrapped just by revising the agreement (2005: 67). Moreover, because they have the status of a constituent people equal to that of the Bosniaks and Croats they know that decisions about them cannot be made by a Croat-Bosniak majority (Kasapović, 2005: 67). The Dayton Peace Agreement therefore gives the Serbs what Bose calls a 'proto-state, semi-sovereign status' (2002: 75).[118] Furthermore, the Republika Srpska is able to maintain relations with Serbia and at least act like a state in its own right. For example, in September 2009, on a visit to Bosnia-Herzegovina, Boris Tadić, president of Serbia, flew to Sarajevo but was driven directly to the Republika Srpska without meeting state-level dignitaries and spent his entire visit in the Republika Srpska. He even opened a new school in Pale which had been funded with a donation of two million Euros from Serbia.[119]

The name Republika Srpska is also significant in this regard because it suggests a higher status for the entity than it actually has and at least rhetorically allows the Bosnian Serbs to talk about the entity in terms of a republic, thus putting it on an equal footing with the neighbouring Republic of Croatia and the Republic of Serbia.[120] Up until 2002, when constitutional changes were imposed, the Republika Srpska constitution continued to refer to the entity as a state of Serbs. The name has important symbolic meaning because it also suggests that this entity is inhabited solely by Serbs and intended solely for them. This is not only important from the point of view of the equal status of the three constituent peoples in Bosnia-Herzegovina but also because of the expected return of refugees and IDPs to this entity. Having been

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[118] Although the Serbs support the constitutional and territorial arrangements in the Dayton Peace Agreement they are opposed to the continued presence of the OHR in the country.

[119]See   report   at
http://macedoniaonline.eu/index2.php?option=com_content&task=view&id=8193&p. The new school was named Srbija or Serbia.

[120] Linguistically, the name is unusual as the adjective 'Srpska' is placed after the noun even though adjectives are usually placed before them. This makes the name difficult to translate into English. Logically the translation should be Serbian Republic but this would confuse it with the Republic of Serbia. Some translators have interpreted the word Srpska as the actual name of the republic and produced the translation of "Republic of Srpska'. The practice of international organisations is to leave the name in the vernacular.

driven out of this territory during the war this name does not suggest an environment friendly to returning members of other ethnic groups.[121]

Kasapović considers that it is harder to pin down the Croats' attitude toward the constitutional structure because their fundamental political aims have never been 'clearly and consistently'[122] (2005: 67) articulated. The Dayton Peace Agreement meant that they lost the Croatian Community of Herceg-Bosna which they had set up in Croat-dominated western Herzegovina in July 1992. This was a quasi-state construct that had been integrated into Croatia so that Croatian currency, state symbols, educational curricula, police uniforms and car registration plates were used in the area and citizens had dual citizenship and the right to vote in Croatia (Woodward, 1995: 231). The decentralised federation agreed to in the Washington Agreement and in the Dayton Peace Agreement was meant to offset the loss of the Croatian Community of Herceg-Bosna as a way of getting Croats to agree to the Federation (Bose, 2002: 75). They would though have preferred to have had their own entity and there was an ultimately unsuccessful attempt to create a third entity in 2001 by uniting the cantons in the federation with a Croatian majority. No similar moves have been made by the Croats since then but a report by the think-tank, the International Crisis Group, published in March 2009 suggests that the Croatian political leadership 'remains committed to some form of territorial autonomy' (2009, 10). [123]

The structure of the Federation is though favourable to Croatian interests as it devolves decision-making authority in most policy areas to the cantonal level. The Federation is divided into 10 cantons which have 'equal rights and responsibilities': five of these have a predominantly Bosniak population (Una-Sana, Tuzla, Zenica-Doboj, Bosnian Podrinje and Sarajevo), three are predominantly Croatian (Posavina, Western Herzegovina and Western Bosnia) and two have a mixed population of Bosniaks and Croats

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[121] Acceptance of the name Republika Srpska was a concession that was forced from the Bosniak side during the negotiations. In *To End a War*, Richard Holbrooke concedes that this was more of a concession than he had first thought (1999: 363).

[122] Jasno i dosljedno.

[123] Commenting on a meeting held in Belgrade in August 2009 between Serbian President Boris Tadić, Republika Srpska Prime Minister Milorad Dodik and HDZ Bosnia-Herzegovina President Dragan Čović, the Croatian daily *Nacional* suggested that the creation of a third entity was still the goal of the Croats supported by the Serbs. Article available at http://www.nacional.hr/en/clanak/50382/hdz-bosnia-and-herzegovina-and-dodik-join-...

(Central Bosnia and Herzegovina-Neretva). The responsibilities of the Federation government mirror those of the state-level government (except for defence policy) and are therefore quite limited so all other responsibilities lie with the canton level either outright or shared with the Federation level.[124] This devolution of authority to the cantonal level is important because it means that decision-making is carried out mainly within mono-ethnic structures (except for in the three cantons where there is a mixed population) and policy is then formulated from the perspective of the interests of just one ethnic group, thus having negative implications for the members of the minority ethnic group.

In a comparison of the consociational systems of Belgium and Bosnia-Herzegovina, Florian Bieber stresses Lijphart's view that a consociational society has more chance of succeeding if there are other social cleavages to supplement the cleavage along ethnic lines. In the case of Belgium, stability is helped by the existence of cleavages along class and religious lines (Bieber, 1999: 87). In Bosnia-Herzegovina, on the other hand, 'the absence, or rather the weakness of other cleavages which would cut across national lines exacerbates the national divisions, making a consociational system more difficult to succeed' (Bieber, 1999: 84). This means that with no dilution of the cleavage along ethnic lines, ethnic identity becomes the most important political identity thereby further entrenching ethnic positions and making the consensus on which a consociational model depends for success difficult.

The above examination of the structures established by the Dayton Peace Agreement serves to demonstrate how these same structures have contributed to the continuation of the ethnic divisions present at war's end. In that respect, Ivo Daalder believes that the Dayton Peace Agreement failed to resolve the basic dilemma apparent during the negotiations as to whether

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[124] The shared responsibilities include human rights, public health, environmental policy, communications and transport infrastructure and social welfare policy. The constitution of the Federation describes quite complicated arrangements for carrying out these concurrent responsibilities but Bose points out that in practice it is the cantons which exercise most of the shared responsibilities (2002: 78). All other powers are in the hands of the cantons and these include *inter alia* 'establishing and controlling the police forces', making education policy, including decisions involving the regulation and provision of education; making and conducting cultural policy; making housing policy and policy on public services and implementing social welfare policy. The important thing to note here is that the cantons not only have responsibility for making decisions on all these matters and implementing them but they effectively control matters that fall under the concurrent list of responsibilities (Bose, 2002: 79).

Bosnia-Herzegovina should reintegrate or divide further. Partition was not an option as all the internationally-brokered negotiations that had taken place before and during the conflict were predicated on maintaining the integrity of the state of Bosnia-Herzegovina which had been recognised by the UN and admitted as a member-state in May 1992. It was thought that this approach would contain the conflict and prevent the violence from spreading to other European states (Owen, 1995: 10). Furthermore, the international community did not want to appear to be sanctioning the ethnic cleansing that had been engaged in during the war by agreeing to partition. The complex constitutional arrangements have meant though that 'By incorporating rather than resolving the fundamental disagreement among the parties about Bosnia's future, Dayton assured that its implementation would become little more than the continuation of conflict by other means' (Daalder, 2000: 180). This then is the political back-drop against which language issues play out in Bosnia-Herzegovina. I will now look at how specific provisions of the Dayton Peace Agreement impact on the language situation in Bosnia-Herzegovina.

What does the Dayton Peace Agreement say about the status of the languages of Bosnia-Herzegovina?

The Dayton Peace Agreement gives very little guidance on how the language situation should be dealt with in the future state. For example, there is no article in the constitution stipulating what the official language(s) of the new state will be. The only time the languages are named specifically is at the end of the document where it is stated: 'Done at Paris, this 14th day of December, 1995, in the Bosnian, Croatian, English and Serbian languages, each text being equally authentic'. This sentence, however, provided sufficient basis for the subsequent approach of the international organisations to the language issue. This approach was based on the full recognition of three separate and distinct languages.

The lack of an explicit designation of the official languages of Bosnia-Herzegovina suggests that there was very little or no consideration of the importance of the language issue during the negotiations at Dayton. This is not an issue that is treated in any great depth by Richard Holbrooke in his memoir

of the Bosnia-Herzegovina peace process, *To End a War,*[125] and it is mentioned not at all by Ivo Daalder in his otherwise detailed account of US involvement in the peace negotiations. Interviewee OO who was an interpreter at the talks does not recall any discussion of the issue as part of the substance of the talks. The language issue was however something that was considered by the organisers of the negotiations. For example, during the plenary sessions at the negotiations care was taken to ensure that each conference interpreter interpreted for the principal of their own ethnicity so that a Serb interpreter was assigned to Slobodan Milošević, a Bosnian to Alija Izetbegović and a Croat to Franjo Tuđman (interview with OO).[126]

There are various possible reasons why the language issue was not given any special attention either during the negotiations at Dayton or in the agreement itself. The international negotiators, and primarily the Americans, may not have recognised the importance of the language issue for post-war reconciliation so may not have raised the issue during the talks, after all there were much more obviously pressing matters at stake, such as division of territory, the military aspects of the peace and the return of refugees. Alternatively, it may have been considered a domestic issue, and therefore the international negotiators left it to those negotiating on behalf of the warring sides to deal with the issue themselves.

Another reason for this seeming lack of concern with language may be the fact that the Dayton Peace Agreement confers the status of a constituent people on the Bosniaks, Croats and Serbs, thus giving them equal rights. The category of constituent people was familiar to the representatives of the warring sides from the former state structure of the Socialist Federative Republic of Yugoslavia (SFRY). As discussed in the previous chapter, the constituent peoples were at the top of the hierarchy of groups that was developed as a way of dealing with the presence of different groups in Communist Yugoslavia. As such each constituent people had greater rights than the groups lower down in the hierarchy, including, crucially, the right to

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[125] In *To End a War* (1999), Holbrooke mentions once the fact that in the meeting room negotiators could access interpretation using three knobs marked Bosnian, Croatian and Serbian although the interpretation was the same for all three.
[126] Aside from the conference interpreters who had been hired by the organisers of the negotiations and interpreted the plenary sessions, each of the principals brought their own interpreters for other meetings.

national self-determination. Even though the Dayton Peace Agreement does not contain a definition of a constituent people, the term would have had meaning and importance for the representatives of the warring sides. For example, Susan Woodward maintains that the Bosnian Croats only signed the 1994 Washington Agreement setting up the Federation 'when its constitutional agreement guaranteed their rights as a constituent nation, declared the federation to be an alliance between two national entities, guaranteed their survival as a nation by means of confederation with Croatia' (1995: 392). Therefore, it was crucial that in the Dayton Peace Agreement the three main ethnic groups were afforded equal status and that that status was at the higher level of a constituent people.[127] Relevant here also is the link between a people and a language which, as we saw in the last chapter, was central in the language debates that took place in Yugoslavia from the 1970s onwards and which was highlighted by the political elites after 1990. By 1995, therefore, the designation of the former warring sides as constituent peoples in the Dayton Peace Agreement would imply, without it having to be stated explicitly, that they each had their own language as a marker of their separate ethnic identity and each had a right to their own language.

Despite the absence of a clear stipulation of what the official languages would be in the future state, the Dayton Peace Agreement nonetheless recognised the existence of three separate languages in Bosnia-Herzegovina. Immediately after the agreement was signed, the international organisations in Bosnia-Herzegovina adopted the practice of producing documentation in three separate language versions even though all three versions could be understood by members of all three sides. The impetus for this policy came from the local authorities themselves who demanded the appropriate language version for their particular ethnic group (interview with RR, senior translator at the Office of the High Representative). Linguistically, and as discussed in the Introduction to this study, this demand is hard to justify because of the mutual intelligibility of the three language versions. Politically, though, it is a way of consolidating the differences between the ethnic groups. However, by adopting

[127] The Constitution of Bosnia-Herzegovina does not give the constituent peoples the right to self-determination. Article X stipulates that changes to the constitution can only be made in a decision of the Parliamentary Assembly.

a policy of producing three language versions in response to the local authorities' demands the international community helped reify the language differences between the three main ethnic groups, thereby becoming part of the divisive post-war ethnic politics. The importance of such a move was highlighted in an interview for this study with former High Representative Lord (Paddy) Ashdown: 'It turns out not to be an insignificant thing because it entrenches the differences. You know, it is a physical representation of the difference. It is as much as a barbed wire fence between them, something that they hold on to and because it's there they cling onto it even harder'. This then creates a kind of vicious circle in which the former warring sides demand three linguistic versions because they can while international organisations fear the consequences if they do not provide them. Not providing a document in a language version corresponding to a given ethnic group (as perceived by that ethnic group) would risk that document not being read or signed by the recipient. In the long run, moreover, because the local authorities persist with their language demands this makes it all the more difficult for international organisations to modify their own practice and policy.

The only other guidance the Dayton Peace Agreement gives as regards language matters is in the human rights instruments that are enumerated in it. Bosnia-Herzegovina was supposed to sign up to, among other things, the 1992 European Charter for Regional and Minority Languages (ECRML) and the 1994 Framework Convention for the Protection of National Minorities. Aside from this, the Constitution at Annex 4 of the Dayton Peace Agreement stipulates that no person can be deprived of citizenship on the ground of language (Article I.7b) and no person can suffer discrimination on the ground of language (Article II.4). Both the ECRML and the Framework Convention for the Protection of National Minorities are intended to protect the rights of minorities or minority languages themselves so in theory should not apply to the three constituent peoples of Bosnia-Herzegovina. The ECRML has as yet not been ratified by Bosnia-Herzegovina.[128] It was nevertheless invoked by the

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[128] Ratification means first of all that the regional or minority language(s) to be protected by a given state would have to be named and then the state takes on certain obligations as concerns the protection of that language or languages. This involves providing services in certain areas such as education, media and cultural activities. It also means that the state opens itself up to scrutiny from the Council of Europe.

Constitutional Court in a July 2000 ruling regarding the constituent nature of the three ethnic groups which also concerned the status of the three languages and in effect consolidated their position as separate official languages.

The Constitutional Court's decision (2000) concerned a request made by Alija Izetbegović, the then presiding member of the Presidency of Bosnia-Herzegovina, in February 1998 to evaluate the consistency of the constitutions of the Republika Srpska and the Federation with the Constitution of Bosnia-Herzegovina as the constitutions of the two entities had not been brought into line with the provisions of the Bosnia-Herzegovina Constitution after 1995. Izetbegović's request revolved around the question of whether all three constituent peoples (Bosniaks, Croats and Serbs) had equal status throughout the state of Bosnia-Herzegovina. The provisions that Izetbegović regarded as inconsistent included *inter alia* constitutional provisions on the official languages of the entity constitutions. At that time, Article 6 of the Constitution of the Federation stipulated that the official languages of the Federation would be the Bosniac language and the Croatian language and the official script the Latin alphabet. Article 7 of the Constitution of the Republika Srpska stated that the Serbian language of ijekavian and ekavian dialects and the Cyrillic alphabet would be in official use in the Republic, while the Latin alphabet would be used as specified by law. These language provisions echo the constitutional provisions related to the constituent peoples of the entities. Article 1, paragraph 1 of the Federation constitution originally stated that only the Bosniaks and the Croats were constituent peoples of the Federation while Article 1 of the constitution of the Republika Srpska stated: 'Republika Srpska shall be the State of the Serb people and of all its citizens'. The linguistic provisions therefore underscore what the preferred ethnic make-up of the population of the respective entities was, according to the drafters of the two constitutions. The stipulation of the Bosniak and Croatian languages as the official languages of the Federation implies that there is no room in the Federation for any other ethnicity be it the Serbs or one of the pre-war ethnic minorities, such as the Roma. Similarly the Republika Srpska recognises only speakers of the Serbian language and in this case not just the Serbs from Bosnia-Herzegovina who use the ijekavian dialect but also those not native to Bosnia-Herzegovina who would use the ekavian dialect i.e. those from Serbia.

This establishes a linguistic relationship between the Bosnian Serbs and Serbs outside Bosnia-Herzegovina which would prefigure any attempt to reunite all the Serbs into one greater Serbia, which had been a wartime aim of extremist Serbian politicians from Bosnia-Herzegovina and Serbia alike. In the context of the joint state of Bosnia-Herzegovina, the constitutions' failure to provide linguistic equality for all the constituent peoples of the state undermines the more general constituent nature of all the three peoples, which is why the language provisions of the constitutions were included in Izetbegović's submission to the Constitutional Court.

Decision of the Constitutional Court

The final ruling of the Constitutional Court of the 1 July 2000 on Izetbegović's request found the contentious provisions to be unconstitutional as they failed to provide equal rights in both entities for all ethnic groups which had been recognised as constituent peoples in the Dayton Peace Agreement. It found that 'the express recognition of Bosniacs, Croats and Serbs as constituent peoples by the Constitution of BiH can only have the meaning that none of them is constitutionally recognized as a majority, or, in other words, that they enjoy equality as groups' (para. 59). Therefore, linguistically privileging, for example, two constituent peoples in the Federation over the third undermines the equality of the constituent peoples and is therefore unconstitutional.

Despite the fact that the Constitutional Court's decision was issued in July 2000 it was not until April 2002 that its provisions were incorporated into the respective constitutions of the Federation and Republika Srpska. Because of opposition from politicians in both entities (Greenberg, 2004: 156) they were finally imposed by the then High Representative Wolfgang Petritsch in April 2002. The language provisions were changed so that Article 6 of the Federation constitution now reads: 'The official languages of the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina shall be: Bosnian language, Croat language and Serb language. The official scripts shall be Latin and Cyrillic'. The revised wording of the Republika Srpska constitution is slightly different: 'The official languages of the Republika Srpska are: the language of the Serb people, the language of the Bosniak people and the language of the Croat people. The official scripts are Cyrillic and Latin'.

Noteworthy here is the different approaches to the naming of the language of the Bosniaks. In the amendments to the Federation constitution the name has been changed from the Bosniak language to the Bosnian language which is the designation preferred by the Bosniaks themselves although not by the other two ethnic groups. The amendments to the Republika Srpska constitution however avoided naming the language of the Bosniaks because at that time Serb politicians were opposed to calling the language of the Bosniaks Bosnian (Greenberg, 2004: 156). For the Serbs, the Bosniaks' use of the name Bosnian implies that it is the language of the entire population of Bosnia-Herzegovina thus negating the Serbs' separate linguistic identity. The neutral wording that was imposed by the High Representative therefore avoided the ongoing debate about the proper designation of the language of the Bosniaks by stipulating the name of the constituent people (i.e. the Bosniaks), about which there is no dilemma, rather than the name of the language which is controversial.

In considering the language issue, the Constitutional Court refers mainly to the European Charter of Regional and Minority Languages (ECRML). At first sight, the Charter appears to be irrelevant to the status of the languages of the three ethnic groups in Bosnia-Herzegovina as it is concerned with protecting the position of regional and minority languages. According to Article 1a of the ECRML, the charter cannot be applied to any language that is an official language of a state or a dialect of an official language. This then seems to rule out the three official languages of Bosnia-Herzegovina. This is recognised by the Constitutional Court but it cites the explanatory report attached to the charter according to which

> the term minority refers to situations in which the language is spoken either by persons who are not concentrated on a specific part of the territory of a state or by a group of persons, which, though concentrated on part of the territory of the state, is numerically smaller than the population in this region which speaks the majority language of the state (para. 58).

The Constitutional Court went on to say that

> It must thus be concluded that in the same way as the Swiss Supreme Court derived from the recognition of the national languages an obligation of the Cantons not to suppress these language groups that the recognition of constituent peoples and its underlying constitutional principle of collective equality poses an obligation on the Entities not to discriminate in particular against these constituent peoples which are, in actual fact, in a minority position in the respective Entity (para. 59).

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The Constitutional Court is clearly saying that even though members of a constituent people may have a minority position in one of the entities they should nevertheless be treated as a constituent people in that entity and not as a minority.

For an ethnic group to have a position as a minority means that that group is at risk of being either assimilated or segregated. Linguistically, in both cases a mono-lingual situation arises. So if the group is assimilated this means that only the language of the majority can be used and if the group is segregated the only language it uses is its own, thus hindering the ability of members of the group to communicate with speakers of the majority language and keeping the groups apart. The Constitutional Court decision says however that 'the accommodation of cultures and ethnic groups prohibits not only their assimilation but also their segregation' (para. 57). It goes on to say: 'Territorial delimitation thus must not serve as an instrument of ethnic segregation, but – quite contrary – must provide for ethnic accommodation through preserving linguistic pluralism and peace in order to contribute to the integration of state and society as such' (para. 57). The Constitutional Court's decision thus links linguistic pluralism not only with peace but also with the integration of state and society. This is in keeping with prevailing thinking regarding linguistic human rights and the accommodation of linguistic minorities. In linguistic human rights advocacy, 'Identification with a specific language is treated as essential to a community's identity and self-esteem, which in turn is seen as crucial to securing a community's well-being as well as fostering harmonious relations between communities and preventing violent conflict' (Pupavac, 2006: 117). This position is clearly applicable to diglossic situations where two different languages are spoken by two different communities in the same area as it allows the speakers of both languages to freely use each of their languages across the area they both inhabit. Allowing language rights for both groups essentially creates bilingualism as the non-native speakers of each language would need to learn the other language in order for intercommunal communication to be facilitated.

In the case of Bosnia-Herzegovina where there is no diglossic situation and therefore no bilingualism as the languages are mutually intelligible, the question to be asked is whether linguistic pluralism really does contribute to

the integration of the state of Bosnia-Herzegovina. That is to say, is it appropriate to deal in this way with languages that are different in symbolic terms only? The recognition of three separate languages which are mutually intelligible means that the communicative function of language has been superseded by its symbolic function but still makes possible discrimination on linguistic grounds. Discrimination does not occur on the basis of a failure to communicate between members of the ethnic groups because the mutual comprehensibility of the languages means that all the speakers of all the languages in a multi-ethnic community are able to communicate and socialise freely and easily. Discrimination occurs, however, in more subtle ways. Vanessa Pupavac cites the example of members of a particular ethnic group having their teaching posts challenged because they supposedly did not speak the right language although their colleagues with the same local accent but from a different ethnic group had no similar problems (2006: 124). In this example, supposed language difference is used as an excuse not to employ a member of a particular ethnic group so the problem is not to do with how that person sounds but with the ethnic group they belong to. Similarly, in a 2006 report on discrimination in the work place, Amnesty International found that vacancy announcements for one of the largest companies in Bosnia-Herzegovina, the Croat-owned Aluminij company in Mostar, were published in Croatian only and in media with a Croatian audience thus tacitly discriminating against members of the population of Bosniak and Serbian ethnicity.[129] Prior to the war the Aluminij company had an ethnically-mixed workforce so there is no linguistic reason why only Croats should be employed now. Language in this case is being used to filter out the potential job candidates of Bosniak and Serbian ethnicity who would not now be welcome in a Croat-owned enterprise and appears to be a more palatable means of doing so than a more blatant advertisement specifying the requirement of workers of Croatian ethnicity only.

The use of language in this way has a two-fold effect. First, it is exclusionary: it deprives the members of a minority ethnic group of the feeling of belonging to the wider ethnically mixed community and makes it more

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[129] Details of the report are available at
http://www.amnesty.org.uk/news_details.asp?NewsID=16770 [Accessed on 19 March 2010]

likely that the members of that particular group will nurture hostility to the majority ethnic group. This therefore undermines any efforts to nurture a sense of loyalty to the joint state. Secondly, it makes it more likely that the members of the minority ethnic group will nurture feelings of belonging not to the wider community but to their particular ethnic group where their particular language is recognised and respected. In the extreme case this leads to segregation. Thus, linguistic pluralism in Bosnia-Herzegovina does not necessarily foster 'harmonious relations between communities' but is used to create animosity between the communities, thereby hindering overall reconciliation and integration. This then strongly suggests that the linguistic pluralism-state integration link made in the Constitutional Court's decision is unrealistic and may indeed be counter-productive for broader peace-building aims.

The above discussion of language rights as conceived in the Dayton Peace Agreement has served to explain how the three language division came to be verified and legitimised in the post-war period by the international community, as well as the implications of this in a general context. The next section of this chapter will go on to investigate how the language issue feeds into the ethnicised political relations as created by the Dayton Peace Agreement and how the language issue can be used at a rhetorical level by political elites to mobilize support. By invoking threats to identity, and particularly linguistic identity, they can create a societal security dilemma as a way to maintain societal insecurity and ultimately undermine the stability of the state as a whole. This section will begin with a brief explanation of the concept of societal security before applying it to one specific case of a politician using the language issue to provoke a societal security dilemma between the different ethnic groups.

Societal Security

The concept of societal security was first advanced by Barry Buzan in his monograph *People, States and Fear* (Buzan 1983) and was subsequently elaborated by Ole Waever, Barry Buzan, Morten Kelstrup and Pierre Lemaitre in their 1993 book *Identity, Migration and the New Security Agenda in Europe*. The concept was initially developed as a response to the changing security agenda since the middle of the 1980s. During the Cold War, security was

viewed in the context of relations between states or blocs of states so that security threats were considered to be threats to a state's sovereignty. However, with the demise of the Soviet Union and the subsequent resurgence of nationalism and moves towards Western integration, the concept of societal security was advanced as a way of viewing security from a different perspective. In thinking about security, instead of having the state as the referent item, Buzan *et al* developed the idea of making society the referent object of security in which case societal security was concerned with relations within states rather than between them.

In elaborating the concept of societal security Waever first ponders the meaning of 'society'. He says: 'At its most basic, social identity is what enables the word "we" to be used. A "we" can vary across a wide spectrum in terms of size of the group to which it applies, the intensity with which it is felt, and the reasons that create a sense of belonging together' (Waever, 1993: 17). Waever goes on to say that social groups range in size from small ones comprising just a few people (the family, friends, sports clubs) through communities at a national level to 'civilisational and religious identities ("we Europeans", "we Muslims") numbering hundreds of millions' (1993:17). All societies contain myriad social groups but according to Waever,

> a societal identity is one that is not only robust enough in construction, and comprehensive enough in its following, but also broad enough in the quality of identity it carries, to enable it to compete with the territorial state as a political organizing principle. A societal identity is able to reproduce itself independently of the state and even in opposition to the state's organisational principle (1993: 23).

In this respect, significant ethno-national or religious groups are the two most likely social identities which become the focus of societal security. Paul Roe highlights that where the two group identities reinforce each other 'very strong identities can be formed' (2000: 140). Thus, in Bosnia-Herzegovina the Bosnian Muslims, the Catholic Croats and the Orthodox Serbs have strong dual identities (reflecting both religious and ethnic affiliation) which create three definite and recognisable societies. The robustness of the identity is important here. In traditional thinking on security where the state is the referent object the borders of that state are clear and easily identifiable but societal security relies on the vaguer concept of a society. As Linda Bishai argues 'it focuses on an abstract and contingent object. "Society" can never be concretely defined, for it

exists within and is contingent upon the perceptions of an overlapping and unknowable multitude' (2000: 157). However members of a significant ethno-national or religious group can have a sense of a collective identity tied to the group rather than to the state and feel insecure when that identity is threatened. As Waever puts it, 'Survival for a society is a question of identity, because this is the way a society talks about existential threats: if this happens, we will no longer be able to live as "us"' (1993: 25).

In Bosnia-Herzegovina the nearness of the war means that members of the ethnic groups are very conscious of the threat to their identity but, as Buzan acknowledges, it is not necessarily easy to determine when there is a threat to society and further, the threat can be either real or perceived and yet still have real consequences (1993: 43). In this respect, the elites play a crucial role in highlighting a threat and in moulding a response to that threat from the members of the group. As Srđan Vučetić puts it, 'The point is that societal threats are not objectively given but socially constructed by government and/or the elite' (2002: 75). In general terms though,

> A societal identity can be threatened in ways ranging from suppression of its expression to interference with its ability to reproduce. In concrete terms, such measures include forbidding the use of language, names and dress, through closure of places of education and worship, to the deportation or killing of members of the community (Buzan, 1993: 43).

How a society reacts to the threat, real or perceived, depends on the kind of threat it is. Roland Kostić observes that different types of measures can be used to deal with the situation, 'ranging from institutional coercion, police oppression, and restriction on immigration to the launching of preemptive strikes to defend the group's way of life' (2007: 29). More often than not a group will not have the military resources to defend itself so non-military means are adopted to strengthen societal identity. As Waever *et al* point out, 'This can be done by using cultural means to reinforce societal cohesion and distinctiveness, and to ensure that the society reproduces itself effectively' (1993: 191). This defensive approach could include 'language and religious teaching, observance of special days and rituals, maintenance of cultural symbols and dress, and suchlike' (Waever *et al*, 1993: 192).

Consideration of the different possible defensive approaches of a society leads on to the concept of a societal security dilemma. This is when

'the actions of one society, in trying to increase its societal security (strengthening its identity), causes a reaction in a second society, which in the end, decreases the first society's own societal security (by weakening its identity)' (Roe, 2000: 142). Paul Roe gives an example of this in relation to language rights which he describes as follows:

> One society (the majority group) may consider homogeneity within the state as a requirement for its societal security. Thus, the majority group may attempt to deprive the state's minority group (a second society) of its language rights by closing the second society's own language schools. This makes the second society more determined to maintain them (as it would threaten the existence of its language). In turn, this might make the first society even more determined to close them (as it continues to threaten the homogeneity of the state). Thus an action-reaction process may develop (2000: 145).

This 'action-reaction process' produces a societal security dilemma which may be self-perpetuating. In this case the different groups continually feel a sense of insecurity and in this case the state as a whole becomes unstable.

Roland Kostić, in research on the existence of a societal security dilemma in Bosnia-Herzegovina[130], concludes that there is 'ample evidence' of a societal security dilemma among the three ethnic groups in Bosnia-Herzegovina (2007: 343). According to him, 'all three communities remain highly mobilised around their ethnonational identities. In that regard, religion and language make up the key dimensions of the national boundaries separating Serbs, Croats and Bosniaks from each other' (Kostić, 2007: 343). All three ethnic groups experience societal insecurity but in different ways. The Serbs and Croats view the threat to their respective communities coming primarily from Bosniak political dominance and the imposition of a Bosnian identity, while for the Bosniaks threats to their existence are primarily experienced on the territory of the Republika Srpska as they consider that they are prevented from expressing their own identity in terms of language, education and use of symbols. Kostić concludes, 'Thus, in seeking security for their own national identity in terms of symbols, language and education, the

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[130] Roland Kostić interviewed 22 representatives of political parties in Bosnia-Herzegovina and surveyed the opinions of 2,500 members of the public. His research was focussed on three clusters of questions: societal security (the attitude of the elite and the population to group identity and threats to it, as well as the organisation of the state); external intervention (attitudes to international administrators and different elements of the peacebuilding endeavours) and reconciliation (opinions of the war, attitude to the international war crimes tribunal in The Hague and view of reconciliation between the ethnonational communities in general) (2007: 44).

three BiH nations end up mutually threatening each other, thereby perpetuating a state of societal insecurity' (Kostić, 2007: 343).

This perpetual state of societal insecurity makes it easy for political elites to manipulate the ethnic feelings of their constituencies by emphasising threats to their identity. This can be done at a rhetorical level whenever a politician feels political advantage can be gained by reminding their constituency of threats to it. To illustrate how this works I will analyse a statement that was made by Haris Silajdžić, presiding member of the Presidency of Bosnia-Herzegovina, in May 2008 just a few months before local elections were held. In it he used the language issue to remind his constituency of Bosniak voters in an oblique way that in his view the existence of three separate languages and therefore ethnic groups undermines the integrity of the state which the Bosniaks are most interested in maintaining. Thus, during an address at the Center for Strategic and International Studies in Washington DC, Silajdžić made the following comment: 'I'm sure you know that in Bosnia-Herzegovina, we speak three languages. That is official, but if you ask me, I think it is one language with three names'.[131] Even though Silajdžić went on to talk about a number of subjects concerning Bosnia-Herzegovina's integration into the EU and NATO, it was this comment that was seized upon by politicians and the media at home. This fact in itself suggests that in Bosnia-Herzegovina issues of ethnic identity are of more interest and are deemed more important than issues to do with the future of the common state that lies in membership of western alliances. Silajdžić's comment chimes with the advocacy of the Bosniak parties of a redrawing of the territory of Bosnia-Herzegovina to create a centralised state without entities. By saying that there is only one language in Bosnia he also implies that there is really only one nation in the country which does not therefore need to be split into entities. By challenging the official position of the Serbs and Croats that there are three languages in Bosnia-Herzegovina,[132] Silajdžić was at the same time challenging the existence of three separate ethnic groups, as well as the

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[131] Address available at http://csis.org/files/media/csis/events/080520_silajdzi... [accessed 3 February 2010]
[132] Kostić found that the majority of respondents from all three ethnic groups in the public opinion survey agreed that it was the same language with some small differences although a 'substantial portion' of Croatian respondents considered the languages to be separate (2007: 340).

existence of three constituent peoples. He thereby undermined the other ethnonational communities' societal security.

The Bosnian Croat party, the Croatian Peasants' Party-New Croatian Initiative accused Silajdžić of continuing to press for the majority rule of Bosniaks over the other ethnic groups in Bosnia-Herzegovina (*Dnevni avaz*, 2008). As the party considered that this aspiration was clearly being pushed in the media it called for the establishment of a separate Croatian TV channel to counter this tendency. Clearly, this Croatian party was trying to use cultural means to defend itself against the societal insecurity engendered by Silajdžić's comment. The Croats see having their own television station as a way of increasing societal cohesion, making them thereby able to more effectively defend themselves from perceived threats to their identity from the Bosniaks and Serbs.[133]

The Serbs, on the other hand, directly attacked Silajdžić's claim. For example, Rajko Vasić, executive secretary of the Alliance of Independent Social Democrats, the largest party in the RS to which the RS prime minister Milorad Dodik belongs,[134] stated that there are only two languages in Bosnia – Serbian and Croatian - and 'Silajdžić will have to understand that he speaks Serbian, that Bosnia does not exist and that the Serbs and Croats are not Bosnians nor Bosniaks and that Bosnia-Herzegovina will never be either Bosnian or Bosniak' (*Oslobodenje*, 2008b). In this one statement Vasić negates not just the existence of a separate Bosnian language but also the existence of the Bosniaks and even Bosnia itself. Vasić's words are a reiteration of the hardline Serbian position which opposes the idea of a unitary Bosnia-Herzegovina as implied by Silajdžić's statement. Moreover, his comment creates a societal security dilemma because in parrying a perceived threat to the existence of the Serbs from the Bosniaks he has riposted with a threat to the existence of the Bosniaks themselves.

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[133] Since the failure of the campaign of Croatian politicians for the creation of a third entity in Bosnia-Herzegovina in 2001, their main demand has been for the establishment of a Croatian television station.

[134] Dodik himself said that Silajdžić's comment was 'an attempt to unitarise something that should be the subject not of political but scientific debate' (*Oslobodenje*, 2008a). He also said that it was an unsuccessful attempt to create a picture internationally of the existence of one Bosnian nation.

In a commentary in the moderate daily *Oslobođenje*, journalist Mirko Šagolj accused Silajdžić of raising an issue that he was not competent to talk about in an expert way and giving it 'a serious political and ethnic dimension. And causing a new wave of assaults on the integrity of Bosnia-Herzegovina' (Šagolj, 2008). This comment implies that if the societal security of each of the ethnic groups is undermined at this rhetorical level this will lead to the entire state of Bosnia-Herzegovina being undermined and rendered unstable. The reactions to Silajdžić's comment also throw into doubt the belief that linguistic pluralism in Bosnia-Herzegovina can bolster state stability because politicians use linguistic arguments to attack the very existence of the other ethnic groups, thereby creating societal insecurity.

Šagolj went on to say that the language issue was not a new one and quoted linguists such as Josip Baotić and Miloš Okuka as saying that the difference between the three variants amounts to only five per cent of their lexicons. However, he concluded his commentary with the question: 'Should blood again be spilt in this region for the sake of this 5 per cent?!'[135] (Šagolj, 2008). With this final question, Šagolj takes the societal security dilemma present in Bosnia-Herzegovina to its logical conclusion by implying that quarrels over language could not only lead to the state falling apart but also to renewed conflict. Raising the spectre of renewed conflict indicates further that the post-war peace-building process has not created a country secure and stable enough to withstand such threats to societal security.

Thus we see a connection between societal security and state security. Because each of the three ethnic groups are experiencing societal insecurity and the actions of each of them to improve their societal security only increase the insecurity of the other groups, the state security of Bosnia-Herzegovina is undermined. As Buzan has observed,

> Unless society is secure within the state. The whole package of the state (here seen as government apparatus + society + territory) will be unstable. States in which society and government are at odds are weak as states and operate at considerable security disadvantage in the international system' (1983: 56).

Therefore Bosnia-Herzegovina would be a stronger state if the societal security (national identity) of each of the ethnic groups could be strengthened without threatening the societal security of the other two ethnic groups. The dilemma

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[135] Je li zbog tih pet posto ponovo treba na ovim prostorima da poteče krv?!

lies in how to do this. The state structures established by the Dayton Peace Agreement militate against this as they have created a political system predicated on ethnic competition without ensuring that the will to collaborate and cooperate at an elite level, on which a consociational system depends, exists. Instead, a situation develops in which politics is reduced to a zero-sum game in which a gain for one group is perceived to be a loss for one or both of the others. Thus, attempts by one of the ethnic groups to strengthen its societal security can only lead to societal insecurity in the other groups.

Approaching this dilemma from the point of view of human rights protections, current thinking on linguistic human rights would advocate the strengthening of minority language rights as a way of increasing the well-being of different groups, thereby enhancing their societal security. This is the approach taken in the Dayton Peace Agreement and in the post-Dayton period. As shown in this chapter, the problem is that emphasising language difference in an environment where the political process is dominated by ethnic interests can lead to discrimination on linguistic grounds. Moreover language difference can be used by political elites as part of their rhetoric in constructing threats to identity. In both cases the societal insecurity that may be felt by a given group is increased and the development of harmonious inter-ethnic relations is impaired.

Conclusion

Provisions of the Dayton Peace Agreement formed the basis of the peace-building efforts of the international community in Bosnia-Herzegovina after 1995. Seen in terms of the Agenda for Peace the agreement was successful in ending the conflict and in ensuring that the militaries on all sides disarmed and remained separated. Moreover, the Dayton Peace Agreement provided for the return of a million refugees and IDPs to their original homes. The external peace-building efforts have also ensured that so far, 15 years after the signing of the Dayton Peace Agreement, there has not been a recurrence of conflict. That notwithstanding the situation that prevails has been described as 'No War, No Peace' (Mac Ginty, 2006) because of the basic instability of the post-war state. The consociational arrangements put in place after the war mean that the concerns of the former warring sides to do with power and

territory have not been mitigated by the state-building aspects of the Dayton Peace Agreement. Instead ethnic cleavages have not been ameliorated and a political system has developed in which ethnic identity is the predominant identity in the political process. A situation therefore exists in which there are strong societies (represented by each ethnic group) present within the state, the security of which is dependent on the level of societal security experienced by each of these groups. If, as Kostić suggests, societal security is at a low level, a perpetual societal security dilemma is maintained which risks destabilising the state.

Given the salience of ethnic identity in the political process, language as a marker of ethnic identity will necessarily be a factor in this perpetual societal security dilemma. It is therefore important to look at how the international community's approach to language issues impacts on this. As explained in this chapter, the de facto recognition of three official languages in the Dayton Peace Agreement gave legitimacy to the idea of significant linguistic difference between the three ethnic groups. This was then confirmed in the Constitutional Court's 2000 decision. The minority language rights provisions in the Dayton Peace Agreement which were invoked in this decision were intended to limit discrimination and facilitate harmonious interethnic relations, however, because of the ethnicisation of the general political process these provisions only feed into attempts by the elites to use language as a tool to divide the members of different ethnic groups. This then hinders the creation of an environment in which these groups feel safe, thereby undermining their societal security. Furthermore, because of the potency of language as a marker of identity, the language issue can be manipulated by elites at a rhetorical level to undermine societal insecurity in the every-day political arena, as we saw in the analysis of the comment by Haris Silajdžić and the ensuing reactions to it.

The consolidation of the existence of three official languages has another consequence for people's self-identification and their commitment to the integral state of Bosnia-Herzegovina in that it confirms the one nation-one language link familiar from nineteenth century Romantic nationalism and makes it possible for an individual to self-identify linguistically not with the overall state of Bosnia-Herzegovina but with their particular ethnic group. Identification with the language of a particular ethnic group suggests that

linguistically at least individuals may not feel they have a common destiny with the rest of the population of Bosnia-Herzegovina. Their loyalty to the state may therefore be weaker than to their ethnic group or indeed to a state outside the borders of Bosnia-Herzegovina.

The discussion in this chapter has served to examine in general terms the kind of political environment created after the signing of the Dayton Peace Agreement in which language issues play out. Šagolj's comment about the possibility of renewed conflict for the sake of minimal linguistic difference also tells us something about the nature of language specifically in Bosnia-Herzegovina, especially in an atmosphere of ethnically-based political animosity. He is suggesting that language is a powerful enough marker of identity to have the potential to reignite conflict. In this sense, the language issue may have the ability to shape events just as much as it is shaped by them. This is because the languages' strong symbolic value means that they stand for much more than 'just' the ability to communicate and the facilitation of inter-communal dialogue.

The next two chapters will narrow the focus of this study and examine in more detail the language policy of the international community as regards two different aspects of the Dayton Peace Agreement. These are the reform of the education sector and defence reform which were treated in very different ways in the agreement and were subject to different approaches by the international community. The next chapter focuses on the first of these – education reform – where the concept of societal security continues to be germane. The education system is seen by the political elites as a way of transmitting group identity and ensuring its survival. They will therefore make moves to strengthen the identity of their own group through education, which then impacts on the other two, and the language issue has become an important instrument in this.

Chapter 4

International Community Language Policy in Education Reform

Introduction

In the last chapter I looked at how the language issue functions at a general political level in Bosnia-Herzegovina and how it can be used as a tool by political elites to increase societal insecurity among their constituencies and thereby undermine the stability of the state. In this chapter I look at the role of language in the specific sector of education reform and the ways in which the language issue is used to maintain the segregation that exists in this particular sector in Bosnia-Herzegovina.

The education sector is an important sector for any government wanting to instil certain values, ideas and attitudes in members of future generations. In Britain, for example, children have in recent years been increasingly taught in schools about environmental issues such as global warming, the wasteful use of natural resources and the benefits of recycling. In this way the government hopes that what is learned in the classroom will be transferred into future action outside of it in support of an environmental policy based on cutting carbon emissions and the more rational use of sources of energy. The British government has therefore recognised that future attitudes to environmental issues can be moulded in schools.[136]

Given the power education has to influence future generations, it can be expected that the education sector would be particularly crucial in a post-conflict situation. Endeavours in this sector can either support any peace-building activities being undertaken or ensure the maintenance or renewal of hostilities but under peacetime conditions. In external peace-building the education sector is one sector through which the goals of dealing with the causes of the original conflict and the creation of an identity tied to the post-war state can be achieved in the long term. This is recognised by Boutros-Ghali in the Agenda for Peace when he says: 'Reducing hostile perceptions through

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[136] See UK Government website http://www.direct.gov.uk/en/N11/Newsroom/DG_067836.

educational exchanges and curriculum reform may be essential to forestall a re-emergence of cultural and national tensions which could spark renewed hostilities' (1992: para. 56). In this sense, education has a positive effect in the peace-building process. Equally, however, it can be used to continue the original conflict but by other, peaceful means. In a post-conflict situation where societal insecurity is salient, the different groups will work to defend themselves from the perceived threat. As Kostić says: 'If ethnonational groups find themselves in a societal security dilemma, ethnonational identity is seen as vital for group existence. That is if members are prevented from maintaining their group identity and transferring group values to future generations, the group will cease to exist' (2007: 96). One vehicle for maintaining this group identity and transferring group values to future generations is through an education system that advantages a particular ethnic group so that its societal security is enhanced; this in turn may undermine the societal security of other ethnic groups and lead to a societal security dilemma. In this case, a discriminatory and divisive education system is created where the separate ethnic identities have primacy over a new post-conflict identity tied to the state. If the aim of external peace-builders, as is the case in Bosnia-Herzegovina, is to facilitate the latter over the former identity then education reform needs to be part of the peace-building process.

The two opposing uses of education reform have been summed up by Kenneth D Bush and Diane Saltarelli (2000) in the idea of the 'two faces' of education, one constructive and one destructive. They argue that whereas traditionally education has been seen as always a force for good it can nevertheless have the opposite effect, especially in an ethnicised state. For them, education can produce either a society that is 'based on tolerance and respect for difference' or one based on 'intolerance, jingoism, and a fear and rejection of difference' (2000: 6). These two faces are present in Bosnia-Herzegovina with, broadly, the international community striving to create a constructive education system and local political elites favouring a destructive one. This chapter examines these two approaches to education reform and investigates the way in which the language issue is manipulated in them. As with the previous chapter, I will begin by looking at how the reform of the education system was dealt with in the Dayton Peace Agreement, as the

starting-point for the peace-building process, and then go on to examine the activities of the international community in this regard. I will look at how international reform endeavours have fed into attempts by local authorities to consolidate segregation in the school system. There are two practices in which language plays an important role through which segregation is maintained – the existence of so-called 'two schools under one roof' schools and the group of national subjects. I will therefore analyse both of these and the role of language in them. The 'two schools under one roof' schools are to be found in mixed Croat-Bosniak areas and their maintenance is justified by the Croatian community using societal security concerns so these will also be addressed in this chapter. There will then be a consideration of experience in carrying out education reform in the Brčko District which is an area in Bosnia-Herzegovina where the education reform is deemed to have been a success by the international community; this will be followed by an assessment of the lessons from this experience that may be relevant to the rest of the country especially as regards language issues. The chapter concludes with an assessment of the role and importance of the language issue in the education reform process, making the case for language policy to be included in the education reform process in external peace-building.

What does the Dayton Peace Agreement say about education reform?

Education reform is not mentioned at all in the Dayton Peace Agreement. The right to education is one of the human rights enumerated in the Constitution at Annex 4 (Article II.3.1) and is also in the constitutions of the Federation and the Republika Srpska. In none of these constitutions, however, is there any more detail on how the responsibilities and obligations connected with this right are exercised. Adila Pašalić-Kreso, professor of education at the University of Sarajevo, argues that this imprecision in constitutional provisions has caused weaknesses and abuses in the education system and maintains that this very imprecision would make it difficult to argue that any dubious action by an education body could be deemed unconstitutional. She speculates, for example, that if a particular part of the Federation wanted to introduce school

fees it would not be possible to proclaim this act to be unconstitutional because of the imprecise nature of the constitutional provisions (2003: 4). Flesh is put on the bones of the right to education, however, by some of the international human rights documents that are enumerated in the Dayton Peace Agreement and which the future state of Bosnia-Herzegovina was meant to sign up to. Among these are the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (ICESCR) and the Convention on the Rights of the Child (CRC). Furthermore, the Constitution of Bosnia-Herzegovina incorporates the European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (ECHR) and gives it priority over all domestic legislation.

Bosnia-Herzegovina formally ratified the ICESCR in March 1992. According to the Covenant, the State has the obligation to respect, protect and fulfil the right to education, and in this respect the State is obliged to closely monitor education in order to identify any discrimination and take measures to redress any instances of this. The education system itself should also provide the following: availability, accessibility (the education system must be non-discriminatory and physically accessible to all), acceptability (the form and substance of education must be relevant and culturally appropriate to both students and parents) and adaptability (the education system needs to be able to adapt to the needs of a changing society and respond to the diverse social and cultural needs of students).

The ECHR also confirms the right to education, and Article 2 of its Protocol No.1 states: 'No person shall be denied the right to education. In the exercise of any functions which it assumes in relation to education and to teaching, the State shall respect the right of parents to ensure such education and teaching in conformity with their own religious and philosophical convictions.' The ECHR and its case law bolster this right by emphasizing that it aims 'at safeguarding the possibility of pluralism in education which is essential to the preservation of the "'democratic society" as conceived by the convention'. Case law also emphasises that the information included in a curriculum must be conveyed 'in an objective, critical and pluralistic manner' (OSCE 2005:3).

It can be seen, therefore, that the rights framework set out in the Dayton Peace Agreement firmly establishes not only the right to education but also the

rights of children and parents as regards the content of that education. Education reform in Bosnia-Herzegovina has been guided by the need to ensure the four qualities of education as cited above – availability, accessibility, acceptability and adaptability – highlighting thereby the necessity of providing pluralism in education without discrimination and taking into account the role of parents in educational choice. This role is also stressed in the CRC in its provision specifically on language: 'the development of respect for the child's parents, his/her own cultural identity, language and values, for the national values of the country in which the child is living' (Article 29 (1) of the CRC). The issues of segregation that will be discussed in this chapter touch on all four of the qualities mentioned above.

The other aspect of the Dayton Peace Agreement that has a crucial effect on the reform of the education system is the asymmetric state structure that it put in place. According to the Dayton Peace Agreement, education provision in the Federation is decentralised and is the responsibility of the 10 cantons (in line with the provisions of the earlier Washington Agreement) while in the Republika Srpska a centralised system exists and education is the responsibility of the Ministry of Education. Aside from these bodies there is a state-level Ministry of Civil Affairs, the Federation Ministry of Education and the education department in the internationally-supervised Brčko District. This means that there are 14 bodies in Bosnia-Herzegovina with responsibility for education. Such a large number of bodies requires an efficient system to work, but in Bosnia-Herzegovina, where the consociational arrangements do not function properly, it is extremely difficult to reach consensus and establish a uniform education system across the country. As Pašalić-Kreso has put it, right from the very beginning this arrangement 'virtually makes impossible even the slightest unified approach to education, the nurturing of common values and the development of patriotism and positive feelings for the state and homeland'[137] (2003: 3) (her emphasis). In the context of nation-building, this also makes it difficult to develop an identity tied to the new state.

Part of the problem stems from the fact that there is no one body with overall responsibility for the education sector at state level with the power to

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[137] gotovo onemogućava iole jedinstven pristup obrazovanju, njegovanju zajedničkih vrijednosti, a potom i razvoju patriotizma i pozitivnih osjećaja za svoju državu i domovinu.

devise and coordinate policy and, most importantly, ensure that policy changes are carried out. The state-level Ministry of Civil Affairs would appear to be the most appropriate body for this but it has limited authority. According to Article 15 of the Law on Ministries and Other Bodies of Administration of Bosnia-Herzegovina, the competences of the ministry in the field of education 'relate to defining basic principles, co-ordinating activities and harmonising plans of the Entity authorities and defining strategy at the international level'. In practice this means, for example, that while it has the authority to sign up to international commitments on behalf of the state of Bosnia-Herzegovina in the field of education, such as the Bologna Process and the Lisbon Recognition Convention, it does not have any political leverage to ensure that these commitments are met by the lower-level education ministries which have the real power in matters of education.[138]

The drawbacks to the lack of an over-arching state-level body are most obvious in the Federation where responsibility for education is devolved to the 10 cantons and in some cases to the municipality level where the majority ethnic group is different to the majority ethnic group of the canton as a whole.[139] According to the Constitution of the Federation of Bosnia-Herzegovina (III.4 (b)) the cantons have responsibility for 'Making education policy, including decisions concerning the regulation and provision of education'. How this works in practice is, once a law on education is passed, the local Ministry of Education must issue instructions on the basis of the law to schools, and school directors cannot act until they have received these instructions. In some cases the ministers will not act until the instructions have been approved by the local political party leaders (Sullivan 2004). If the local party representatives do not approve them then the process is either hampered

[138] Although not legally binding the Bologna process is a political commitment made by the ministries of education of 40 countries with the aim of creating a European Higher Education Area by 2010; its purpose is to increase the mobility of students, academics and research staff throughout Europe. The Lisbon Convention on the Recognition of Qualifications Concerning Higher Education in the European region is intended to create a system for the recognition of higher education qualifications throughout Europe.

[139] According to the Constitution of the Federation (V.1.2.2), 'Each Canton may delegate functions concerning education, culture, tourism, local business and charitable activities, and radio and television to a municipality or city in its territory, and is obliged to do so if the majority of the population in the municipality or city is other than that of the Canton as a whole'.

or stalled altogether. In addition, local politicians have significant influence on such things as the appointment of school directors and school boards choosing appointees on the basis of political affiliation rather than skills and ability. Thus it can be seen that policy made at this level is more susceptible to interference from local politicians whose concerns are more likely to be based on narrow ethnically-based party interests rather than ensuring the best possible education system for all students in their locality. Moreover, if different cantons are controlled by different ethnic groups this leads to fragmentation of the Federation's education system (Bozic, 2006: 320) as *de facto* Bosniak and Croatian educational systems with different aims are established rather than a uniform system across the Federation.

These differing aims were brought out in research conducted by Roland Kostić based on interviews with politicians of all parties in Bosnia-Herzegovina. He found that all the Serb and Croat politicians argued for an educational system that allowed pupils of each ethnic group to study their own language, history and religious tradition (as the three subject areas considered to be the most important for identity formation) with the remaining subjects making up a common curriculum (2007: 160). He considered that 'this is very much in line with the views of Croat and Serb parties on threats to their groups, as well as the need to protect their national identity against Bosniak dominance' (2007:160). The Bosniak politicians, on the other hand, were in favour of a uniform system of education throughout the country. Such a system would advantage the predominant Bosniak population, which is also in line with the attitudes of Bosniak parties regarding the state organisation of Bosnia-Herzegovina in general.

Structurally, therefore, we can see that the system of decision-making on educational matters established in the Dayton Peace Agreement hinders the achievement of some of the obligations set out in the international legislation detailed above. A fragmented education system, for example, makes difficult the nurturing of respect 'for the national values of the country in which the child is living' as foreseen by the CRC. There is thus a mismatch between the educational aspirations contained in the human rights documents that Bosnia-Herzegovina was meant to sign up to and the system of governance that was put in place in which they were meant to be achieved.

Furthermore, the Dayton Peace Agreement did not contain any specific guidelines concerning the way in which an education system that was available, accessible, acceptable and adaptable would be established or concerning the international body which would lead education reform efforts. In her comprehensive investigation of the activities of the international community in education reform until 2002, Valery Perry attributes this failure to give an education mandate to an international organisation to several factors: the international negotiators were preoccupied with more obvious issues to do with security and state-building such as military stabilisation and policing; there was no international organisation present at the negotiations which would have lobbied for education reform to be included in some way in the agreement; education reform was seen as requiring a long-term commitment that the international community was not willing to make at the time of the negotiations, after all international engagement was initially only meant to last one year until elections could be held; finally, Perry suggests that after years of centralised education policy the warring sides were keen on creating their own education systems and were not willing to give up control of the education field to outsiders and therefore did not raise the issue at Dayton (2003: 42-44). There was therefore no advocate for education reform at the Dayton talks who would have put the issue on the table.

Interviewees LA, UO and CC, all of whom work in the field of education reform, made the point that it had been a mistake to leave the issue of education reform out of the Dayton Peace Agreement. Because it was only vaguely defined as part of human rights it did not get the attention that other issues such as police reform or security received. As UO put it: 'You don't get anyone taking ownership of it'. This is important given the major problems facing the education sector in the immediate post-war period. First of all, it was necessary to physically reconstruct a large number of schools as 60 per cent of them had been damaged, destroyed or requisitioned for military use during the war (Perry 2003: 23). Moreover, the system had to deal with a shortage of teachers or potential teachers given that between 100,000 and 300,000 people were estimated to have died from a pre-war population of just over four million and one and a half million more were internally displaced persons (IDPs) or refugees. Additionally there was a need to rethink an education system that had

been suited to the requirements of the pre-war communist regime but after 1995 would have to be modernised to meet the needs of a modern, democratic and multi-party state that would eventually aspire to EU membership (Perry, 2003: 7). It was also clear that the former warring sides were working on creating their own, parallel education systems. This came to the fore in 1997, for example, when the Federation Ministry of Education circulated an instruction to all cantonal ministries of education to implement two separate curricula (Bosniak and Croat) across the Federation (Bender, 2000). It was revoked later that year under pressure from local NGOs, parents and some international organisations but this divisive action helped to concentrate minds within the international community on the need for reform (Stabback, 2004, 50).

Activities of the international community in education reform prior to 2002

Despite the lack of a lead organisation, various international organisations were involved in a wide variety of education reform efforts immediately following the signing of the Dayton Peace Agreement, and a certain amount of funding was provided by the international community for school reconstruction, training, supplies and expert assessment and consultation. The focus of these activities was on the practical reconstruction of the sector. According to Council of Europe and World Bank figures, between 1996 and 1998, a total of $172 million was spent on rehabilitating the education system with the level of funding declining in successive years ($110 million was spent in 1995/96, $49 million in 1997 and $13 million in 1998).[140] Perry points out, however, that overall these figures were 'a drop in the proverbial bucket' compared to what was actually necessary to reconstruct the devastated education system (2003: 46).

In her analysis of education reform in this period, Perry gives a detailed account of the activities of the OHR, the European Commission and other agencies in this area. There were also other initiatives taken by such organisations as the World Bank, the Council of Europe and UNICEF, as well

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[140] From the 1999 report *Education in Bosnia and Herzegovina: Governance, Finance and Administration* prepared by the Council of Europe for the World Bank.

as various NGOs which dealt with a variety of issues ranging from the establishment of a standards and assessment agency to vocational and university education reform (see Perry, 2003: 70-76 for details of individual projects). Perry characterises the education reform efforts of the international community in the first few years after the Dayton Peace Agreement was signed as 'a piecemeal approach involving many actors working on a variety of projects with varying degrees of cooperation and coordination and without a firm mandate. This created an environment in which there was much talk, but little substantive implementation and change' (2003: 44). In her opinion, the organisations were hampered by systemic weaknesses that made meaningful reform impossible, such as an unwillingness on the part of the authorities to implement agreements signed by the entities, the lack of real initiative on the part of the authorities for change and the lack of a state-level organisation with powers of enforcement. Moreover, the plethora of international organisations working on different aspects of reform with no one organisation with a coordination role meant that these organisations could not present a united front to the local authorities which would have put pressure on them to implement change.

The most notable achievement in this period was the Interim Agreement on Accommodation of Special Needs and Rights of Returnee Children which was signed by the ministers in charge of education in the Federation and the Republika Srpska in March 2002 with a subsequent implementation plan for the agreement being adopted by the education ministries of the Federation and the Republika Srpska, as well as the cantonal education ministries in November the same year.[141] The purpose of the Interim Agreement was to improve conditions in schools in potential areas of return in order to entice back refugees and IDPs to their homes. As a 2007 OSCE report on catchment areas puts its: 'People with children do not normally wish to return to places where education is biased, discriminatory, or simply inaccessible' (OSCE 2007a: 10). The return of refugees and displaced persons was identified as a priority in the Dayton Peace Agreement and although

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[141] The Implementation Plan for the Interim Agreement on Accommodation of Specific Needs and Rights of Returnee Children available at http://www.oscebih.org/documents/29-eng.pdf. [Accessed on 12 September 2010]

initially a large number of refugees and IDPs returned to Bosnia-Herzegovina in 1996 and 1997 these were mainly those returning to areas where they would be part of the majority population in their area. After 1998 the international community refocused its returns policy on encouraging returnees back to areas where they would be in a minority. The availability of an acceptable education for returnee children in a friendly learning environment was seen as an important factor in the decision-making of potential returnee parents, and the international community supported the Interim Agreement to accommodate this.

The Interim Agreement included measures to encourage the employment of returnee teachers in areas of minority return and to ensure that the ethnic composition of school boards reflected the composition of the school population. It also confirmed the right of returnee parents to request that their children be taught the so-called national group of subjects according to their ethnic group. This meant that certain subjects (history, language and literature, geography, nature and sociology and religious instruction) would be taught to pupils of different ethnic groups separately. These are subjects that are deemed to be most closely linked to cultural identity and therefore susceptible to varying interpretations and analyses. The idea was that children of differing ethnic groups could attend the same school and be taught together for most of the time but would be separated only for these more controversial subjects. Schools were required to provide lessons in the national group of subjects if there were 18 or more students from the minority population in any given year group although if there were fewer than 18 the decision on whether or not to provide these lessons was left to the competent ministry.[142]

It could be said that the national group of subjects provides for an element of pluralism in the education system, deemed as a good thing in the international human rights legislation. The provision of these subjects is intended to alleviate the fear of assimilation that returnees may feel going back to areas where they are in the minority. It therefore helps to create a friendly

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[142] The category of the national group of subjects was confirmed in the Inter-Entity Ministerial Agreement of 10 May 2000 signed by Fahrudin Rizvanbegović, Minister of Education, Science, Culture and Sport of the Federation of Bosnia-Herzegovina, Nenad Suzić, Minister of Education of the Republika Srpska, and Ivo Miro Jović, Deputy Minister of Education, Science, Culture and Sport of the Federation of Bosnia-Herzegovina.

learning environment for returnee children who would otherwise have to attend classes in which their ethnic group was ignored or even subject to bias and insult while at the same time ensuring contact between children of different ethnic groups during classes for general subjects. However, the negative side to the national group of subjects is that it creates what Gordana Bozic calls 'ethnically correct education' which refers to 'the exclusivity and ineffability of one group in interpreting a common history, a shared geography and linguistics and literature' (2006: 327). In this sense it limits tolerance for other perspectives and creates the idea of the superiority of one ethnic group over the others. So even though the national group of subjects limits segregation in schools because it reduces the time children spend in separate classes it nevertheless serves to entrench this segregation. These subjects will be discussed in more detail further on in this chapter during consideration of the different practices which maintain segregation in schools.

Activities of the international community in education reform after 2002

The international community's approach to education reform changed in July 2002 when the HR gave the OSCE the mandate to facilitate and coordinate the reform effort on behalf of the international community. The stated goal of the OSCE mission as regards education reform is

> to promote political and legislative changes so that BiH develops an education system that accommodates diversity, embraces modern educational approaches and is no longer burdened by nationalist politics. The reformed system must ensure that the state can fulfil its obligations related to the basic human rights protections for all students, while fully respecting the identity and diversity of all students (OSCE website).

A strong element of this is the encouragement of increased local ownership of the reform effort. To this end, soon after receiving the education mandate the OSCE devised an Education Reform Strategy (ERS) which was presented to entity and cantonal ministers of education for signature in November 2002 and then submitted by them to the Peace Implementation Council (PIC) later the same month.

The Education Reform Strategy (ERS) has the overriding objective 'to depoliticise education, while creating the conditions that will ensure equal access to a high-quality, modern education throughout Bosnia-Herzegovina'

(2003: 8). This sums up the concerns that are addressed in the five pledges contained in the strategy. Pledge 1, for example, immediately indicates the intention of doing away with segregation in schools when it starts with: 'We will ensure that all children have access to quality education, in integrated multicultural schools, that is free from political, religious, cultural and other bias and discrimination and which respects the rights of all children'.

Interviewee CC described the ERS as a 'really good thing' which was 'really useful' because it identified the main problems and goals in education reform. They also pointed out that even though it corresponded with the requirements and ideas of the international community it involved the participation of at least 80% of local education stakeholders. However, this interviewee saw it more as a wish list than an actual strategy because according to them it was not detailed enough; it did not have a financial plan or deadlines or distribution of responsibilities.[143]

Interviewee UO assessed that the ERS had some success in the first year of implementation and they cited the adoption of the state-level Framework Law on Primary and Secondary Education in June 2003 as evidence of this. This law sets out requirements for a common core curriculum, nine years of compulsory education, the establishment of parent and student councils and greater school autonomy. However, interviewee UO made the point that in the first year there was a lot of high-level international interest and involvement in trying to get the ERS strategy implemented with considerable pressure put on politicians by representatives of international organisations. After the first year this interest and pressure waned and therefore the reform slowed with the consequence that implementation of the strategy remains incomplete.

The ERS may actually have been superseded by other education policy documents of the Bosnia-Herzegovina authorities. This is certainly the opinion of interviewee CC as regards the document entitled Strategic Directions for the Development of Education in Bosnia-Herzegovina with an Implementation Plan 2008-2015 which was adopted by the Council of Ministers in June 2008.

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[143] This is not strictly true as most of the tasks in the ERS do have a deadline attached. However, with hindsight, given that much of the ERS is yet to be completed, these have turned out to be rather ambitious. It is true through that the ERS does not contain any financial planning for the strategy.

This document was one of the results of the EU-funded project 'Institution and Capacity Building of the Bosnia-Herzegovina Education System' in the context of EU support for Bosnia-Herzegovina's progress towards EU membership. The project was intended to facilitate the development of institutional capacities in the education sector by improving educational management and administration at all levels of decision-making. In this sense its focus is different to that of the ERS which concentrates more on curriculum development and what happens in the classroom. The Strategic Directions set out wide-ranging short, medium and long term goals for the reform of all sectors and areas of education focussing on the need to harmonise legislation, policy and practice at all levels. The document is quite detailed in the actions that need to be taken and it specifies deadlines for their completion. It is not so clear, however, on the bodies responsible for carrying out each specific task, and while it foresees the establishment of various coordination and advisory bodies and joint agencies there is still no enforcement mechanism to ensure that the lower levels of authority in education, particularly the cantons, meet their responsibilities within the set deadlines.

The Strategic Directions also deal with segregation in the school system and set the objective of the elimination of various forms of segregation and discrimination by 2010. However, the most recent European Commission Progress Report assessing Bosnia-Herzegovina's progress in meeting its EU accession requirements, published in October 2009, assessed that progress in the 'two schools under one roof' issue, for example, has been 'limited' (2009: 43).

All three education reform documents discussed above – the ERS, the Interim Agreement and the Strategic Directions – were adopted on the initiative and with the urging of the international community. This is indicative of the education reform process in general where the impetus for the majority of moves towards reform has come from the international community rather than domestic authorities. The onus for implementing education reform is however on the local education authorities themselves and indeed the authorities at state, entity and cantonal level have committed themselves to implementing these documents, as well as international commitments such as the 2002 post-accession requirements for membership of the Council of Europe

which included the elimination of segregation in schools. Implementation of these documents remains incomplete, however, primarily because there is insufficient political will at the local level to meet the objectives in them and no state-level body with sufficient influence at the local level to ensure these objectives are met. Implementation of education reform documents is where the limits of international influence on the reform process lie. Attempts to impose decisions by the HR, notably Paddy Ashdown, did not work.

Even at the micro level, at the level of a particular school, the international community seems to have no leverage. This was the experience of education expert Gwyneth Owen-Jackson during her research on international involvement in education reform in Bosnia-Herzegovina. She tells of her experience of working with an (unnamed) international organisation in a Croat-majority area to find a way of getting a group of Bosniak students accepted at a local school where the Croatian director had maintained that there was no room in the school for the few pupils this would have involved. As she puts it: 'It had been hoped that the presence of an external expert outsider [herself], presenting objective evidence, would have persuaded the school director to change his position' (2008: 86) but in the event, despite being presented with a solution the school director's opinion remained unchanged. Owen-Jackson concludes: 'The international organisation had no power or authority to take any further action' (2008: 86).

Interviewees for this study were generally pessimistic about the international community's ability to directly effect change. Interviewee UO felt that the only way now open was through the 'carrot' of membership of the EU although, as the negative assessment in the European Union Progress Report cited above suggests, even this may not be enough to ensure that segregation in schools is eliminated. Interviewee CC said that change depended on 'good will' but conceded that this did not really exist in the political system. Both these interviewees felt that for change to occur the debate about education reform would have to shift from the political elite to the level of ordinary people, as interviewee CC put it,

> It is down to people understanding that it is for bettering the future of their kids, for bettering their chances to, you know, enable them to be a model within in Europe, to enable them some sort of mobility and employability in Europe. And, I hope, you know, it takes a long time.

The above discussion of education reform activities in Bosnia-Herzegovina since the end of the war was intended to show how the international community has approached education reform in general. This was necessary as it provides the context in which the international community's approach to language must be seen. The next section of this chapter will go on to examine the particular ways in which segregation is maintained in schools and the way in which the language issue is used and manipulated in this.

How segregation works in the school system

There are two practices that are characteristic of the segregated school system in Bosnia-Herzegovina which have a significant language component: the 'two schools under one roof' system, and the introduction of the so-called national subjects in the school curriculum. This section of the chapter will look at each of these practices and analyse the role the language issue plays in them. The 'two schools under one roof' schools are mainly to be found in areas where there is a mixed Croat-Bosniak population so the discussion on this practice will also address societal security issues which are used primarily by the Croatian community to justify the maintenance of segregated schooling.

The most obvious form of school segregation are the 'two schools under one roof' schools. These are schools where the student body comprises members of two ethnic groups but the pupils are separated along ethnic lines. The creation of these schools was seen as a solution to the problem of returnee children being educated in ad hoc schools set up in non-school buildings such as private houses and restaurants and to allow for more interaction between students of different ethnic groups. In many cases the school buildings are physically divided so that the different ethnic groups use different facilities and different entrances. Alternatively, instead of being physically separated in one building pupils may be taught in different shifts during the day so that pupils from different ethnic groups do not come into contact. There is also administrative separation along ethnic lines so that there are two principals, two school boards, two staff rooms for teachers and even in some cases different drivers for the school bus.

The first 'two schools under one roof' school opened in 2000 and like the introduction of the national group of subjects was a response to the need to

make it possible for returnee parents to have their children educated in the same system as existed in their area of displacement. After all every parent has the internationally recognised right to an *acceptable* education for their children i.e. one where the form and substance are relevant and culturally appropriate (ICESCR). Returnee parents could therefore accept or reject the education offered in the area of return and the 'two schools under one roof' system was seen as a suitable way of accommodating this. These schools were initially tolerated by the international community as a way to encourage refugee return but only as a solution for one school year. After three years, however, the OSCE decided that these schools only exacerbated segregation and in 2003 the local authorities were instructed to reunify these schools. Despite repeated attempts by the international community to get these schools to reunify there are still about 54 such schools in Bosnia-Herzegovina with another two opening in Stolac (Herzegovina-Neretva canton), Čapljina (Herzegovina-Neretva canton) and Prozor/Rama (Herzegovina-Neretva canton) as late as the 2004-05 school year (OSCE website), that is after the OSCE had acted to try to do away with this type of school.

'Two schools under one roof' schools are mostly to be found in the three Federation cantons with a mixed Bosniak-Croatian population: Central Bosnia, Herzegovina-Neretva and Zenica-Doboj (there are none in the ethnically-homogeneous Republika Srpska). This is because these are the cantons covering the area where the Muslim-Croat conflict was fought in 1994 which saw the forced deportation of large numbers of inhabitants and the establishment of areas dominated by one ethnic group. In Čapljina, for example, before the war the Croats made up 54 per cent of the population but now form the vast majority of the population. These are also areas to which refugees and displaced persons have returned which means that the local authorities are supposed to meet the returnees' educational needs according to the Interim Agreement.

A 2007 OSCE report on catchment areas in Bosnia-Herzegovina makes the point that the phenomenon of 'two schools under one roof' schools is a lot more complex and widespread than would appear at first sight. It gives numerous examples where one curriculum is taught in the main school and

another in the branch schools[144] but the report also cites a local primary school in Maglaj (Zenica-Doboj canton) where the main school is entirely Bosniak but its branch schools in Bradići and Tujnica have separate schools with different curricula for Bosniak and Croat students respectively which are administered by different bodies (OSCE, 2007a: 22). So even though the student body in these schools do not appear to be as obviously split as in the 'two schools under one roof' schools based in just one location, students of different ethnic groups are nevertheless taught according to different curricula.

Interviewee UO, however, put the phenomenon of the 'two in one schools' into an even wider context of segregation throughout the school system, making the point that segregation in one form or another exists throughout Bosnia-Herzegovina:

> If you're in Sarajevo you can't get Catholic religion or Orthodox religion in the schools, it is not offered and this is the capital! So there is segregation happening everywhere. I mean, the 2 in 1s get the attention you know because for a while they each had their own entrance and their own playground and that was like an apartheid-like situation.

This is a point that bears stressing. Because Bosnia-Herzegovina is generally divided into mono-ethnic areas, the vast majority of school children in Bosnia-Herzegovina share a classroom with members of the same ethnic group and are taught according to the curriculum tailored to that ethnic group. A Bosniak child in Sarajevo, for example, would therefore most likely be taught according to the Bosnian curriculum without necessarily being taught anything about the Croatian language or about the Catholic religion.[145] Even if they were taught according to the common core curriculum the national subjects would be taught from the Bosniak perspective and not necessarily with reference to the Croatian and Serbian populations.

It was pointed out by interviewee LA that the international legal instruments detailed above are invoked by nationalist politicians, particularly Croatian politicians, as a way to justify calls for mono-ethnic education. As we saw in the previous chapter the official status of three separate languages was

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[144] A branch school is part of a main school, though in a different location, but is not a legal body and as such it does not have its own administration (definition from the 2007 OSCE report Tailoring Catchment Areas, School Catchment Areas in Bosnia and Herzegovina).

[145] In 2003 when my son attended a state kindergarten in Sarajevo the children and teachers celebrated the Muslim festivities associated with Bajram but there was no mention of Christmas, either Catholic or Orthodox, which occurred only a few weeks afterwards.

confirmed in the Constitutional Court decision of 2000 so the Croats can claim that they have their own language and they are therefore entitled to education in this language according to the provisions of the human rights documents enumerated in the Dayton Peace Agreement (see the Convention on the Rights of the Child cited above).[146] Furthermore, the ECHR stipulation of 'the right of parents to ensure such education and teaching in conformity with their own religious and philosophical convictions'(Article 2 of Protocol no. 1) provides a legal basis for establishing a mono-ethnic school system that would cater for these convictions. Finally, it can also be argued that the existence of separate schools or parts of schools offering each of the different curricula ensures the pluralism in the school system which is seen as a positive aspiration in the international legal instruments (ECHR case law). In the case of Bosnia-Herzegovina, however, this pluralism is skewed by nationalist politicians who use it to facilitate the segregation of school children along ethnic lines rather than the integration of the ethnic groups. In allowing the creation of 'two schools under one roof' schools the international community thus provided for 'a plurality of institutions, rather than plural institutions' (Gallagher, 2005: 430)[147] which in effect plays into the hands of those politicians who seek to keep the ethnic groups apart. In effect, it makes a travesty of the whole concept of pluralism in schools. As shall be demonstrated later on in this chapter in the discussion about the school system in Brčko District, it is nevertheless possible to engage seriously with the concept of pluralism in schools in an ethnically-divided community.

Societal security and segregation in schools

The survival of the 'two schools under one roof' schools can also be seen in terms of societal security; in this regard local politicians use arguments regarding threats to language to increase the societal insecurity of their constituents and thereby justify their failure to reunify these schools. For example, in 2003, the then High Representative, Paddy Ashdown, fined the

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[146] Interviewee LA also pointed out that in her experience, in private conversation many Croatian politicians would admit the absurdity of the official Bosnian Croat position on the language but politically they would stand behind it.

[147] Gallagher's comment was an assessment of schools in Northern Ireland but is no less pertinent to the Bosnia-Herzegovina context for that.

HDZ (Croatian Democratic Union) 20,000 euros for obstructing the unification process in the Central Bosnia and Herzegovina-Neretva cantons. Two years later, in July 2005, at a time when the OHR was pushing for the adoption of amendments to the Law on Primary and Secondary Education in the Federation which, among other things, would have finally unified the 'two schools under one roof' schools, the High Representative removed from office Nikola Lovrinović, the minister of education of Central Bosnia Canton, for failure to implement the amendments that had already been adopted by the cantonal authorities.[148] In both these cases, the failure to act on the part of the HDZ and Minister Lovrinović was justified by the fear that implementation of the legally-required reunification would 'destroy' the Croatian language. Speaking after Ashdown had imposed his fine on the HDZ, the party president Bariša Čolak said that cantonal HDZ personnel were afraid that unification of the school system would mean the end of the Croatian language in areas where the Bosniaks are in the majority.[149]

This claim is obviously illogical because school is not the only venue where a language is maintained; for example, the existence of Croatian-language media especially from neighbouring Croatia also plays a role in ensuring that the language does not die out. Nevertheless, the education system is seen by the Croats as the primary channel through which the Croatian language is transferred and therefore maintained (Hromadžić, 2006: 556). Therefore, by using the rhetoric of the destruction of a language Čolak's comment had a resonance that could increase the societal insecurity that Croats may feel in certain areas because the implication is that if the Croatian language is destroyed so is the Croatian nation. This then makes the Croats more protective of their language and more inclined to defend their ostensibly threatened linguistic heritage by refusing to accept any reform moves, such as

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[148] Decision removing Nikola Lovrinović from office available from the OHR website at http://www.ohr.int/print/?content_id=35013 [accessed on 2 March 2008] Several years later, in 2007, his successor, Greta Kuna, continued to support the 'two schools under one roof' schools with the justification that 'you can't mix apples and pears'. Report available at: http://chalkboard.tol.org/bosnia-and-herzegovina [accessed on 12 February 2010].
[149] See report 'Doing Away with Segregation' by Anes Alić of 1 September 2003 on Transitions Online at
http://www/tol.cz/look/BRR/tolprint.tpl?IdLanguage=1&IdPublication=9&NrIssue=1 [accessed on 3 March 2008]

the elimination of the 'two schools under one roof' schools, that would restrict education in Croatian.

The issue of the societal security of the Croats in Bosnia-Herzegovina is made more complex by the relationship between this community and the Croats in the kin state of Croatia. Here also we see how this impacts on the issue of language, or rather the issue of the purity of the language in schools. Heiko Wimmen (2004) explains the position of the Croats as one of being in a 'trapped minority'[150] in Bosnia-Herzegovina. The Croats are trapped in the sense that they are 'a segment of a larger group spread across at least two states' and 'an appendix to the fully incorporated nation-state of Croatia, and a solid majority of them feels vocal and sincere frustration about this state of affairs, making it easy for nationalist ideology to cast them in the role of a disenfranchised community on the verge of "cultural genocide" aided in that by a few Bosniak chauvinists' (Wimmen, 2004). The role of language in this is to integrate the Croats into the 'imagined community' of the mother-nation 'through performative acts of symbolic defense (securing a nationalized territory by asserting the hegemony of the language over it)' (Wimmen, 2004 – citing Anderson) but also to draw a linguistic boundary between them and the other two ethnic groups in Bosnia-Herzegovina. Wimmen takes this further with the assertion that if the borders with the other communities need to be emphasised in order to reduce the border between the Bosnian Croats and the mother-nation of Croatia, and language is the device to do this, then it is not enough just to adopt the language norms of the mother tongue but the language must also 'be *cleansed* of everything that may smack of the Other (beyond the imagined border), and intrusions or contamination by his language must also be avoided at all cost' (Wimmen, 2004). From this point of view segregated schooling whereby Croatian school children are kept apart from the school children of the other ethnic groups so that they can receive 100% Croatian-language schooling makes perfect sense. This also makes sense in the context of societal insecurity as moves to increase their proximity to the kin state would be a way of increasing their societal security although it would also create a societal security dilemma if one of the other ethnic groups felt

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[150] Following Israeli anthropologist Dan Rabinowitz's concept of a trapped minority to describe the Palestinian-Arab minority in Israel.

threatened by this. The Bosniaks, for example, may feel threatened if they interpreted these moves to undermine the integrity of the state of which they are the greatest champions.

The importance of this striving to keep the Croatian language pure was highlighted in research conducted by Azra Hromadžić regarding the integration of the Mostar Gymnasium (2008). This school is administratively unified but the mixed (Croat and Bosniak) student body are taught separately according to different curricula. Hromadžić found that opposition from the Croatian community to the integration of the school where it had originally been foreseen that Croat and Bosniak students would sit together in the same classroom was based on threats to the pure Croatian language as the Croat pupils would be exposed to influences from the speech of the Bosniak pupils. This was seen in terms of rendering the Croat pupils illiterate. Hromadžić cites the opinion of 'one of the most influential individuals in charge of education in West Mostar'[151] (2008: 557) who explained this view. In the following extracts 'M' is the education official; it should be borne in mind that Hromadžić is a Bosniak and both she and M were educated in the pre-war system:

> M: You and I are now talking *mjesanac* (mixed language) so that we can understand each other. We have to recognize the fact that both of us were educated under the old system, in the old language, Serbo-Croatian or Croato-Serbian. That is how we learned. But that was an artificial language, neither Serb nor Croat. If one were to write an essay in that language today, it would be [judged as] illiterate....We are speaking *mjesanac* now, but the children today, they'd have problems, they wouldn't understand each other.

M goes on:

> if you teach these kids a little bit in this language, a little bit in that language...use some of these words, and then some of the others,...these kids would be illiterate, because they wouldn't speak any language but a mixture of languages...and that means illiteracy (2008: 557).

This view is interesting because aside from disavowing the pre-conflict approach to language what M is saying is patently not true. Children from the two ethnic groups understand each other perfectly well and are able to socialise with each other outside school hours despite the slight differences in their speech. Moreover, illiteracy is an extreme claim to make because the differences in the languages are so slight that the use of certain ethnically-hued

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[151] The Croatian part of Mostar which since the war has been divided between Croats and Bosniaks.

lexical items or syntax, for example, would not impinge on a student's ability to master their own language. Furthermore, by invoking the risk of some kind of handicap in the form of illiteracy M is inferring that not only is there no value in a pluralist education for Croats but it puts the academic future of the Croat youth in jeopardy. Hromadžić found this view repeated by Croat students who feared that if they used words they had picked up from Bosnian speakers in their exams at Zagreb university they would fail. It should be remembered here that Croatian students from Bosnia-Herzegovina tend to go on to higher education in Zagreb or elsewhere in Croatia. As Hromadžić notes, 'possible integration is interpreted as a road to a personal failure of performing Croatness at the capital of the imagined national community, Zagreb' (2008: 558). This 'performance of Croatness' is important not only because Croat students from Bosnia-Herzegovina tend to study in Croatia but also because of the relationship between the Croats in Bosnia-Herzegovina and the Croats in Croatia. Wimmen makes the point that the latter have traditionally viewed the former as 'Croats of dubious national purity' and 'uncivilized country and highland ruffians' (2004). This has engendered a feeling of inferiority among the Bosnian Croats who now feel that they need to be more Croat than the Croats in Croatia in order to be accepted, thus their speech must be 100 per cent pure.

The idea of preserving the purity of the language harks back to the Ustasha policy during the Second World War of creating a pure Croatian nation. At that time the impetus for the creation of this pure nation of Croats came from Zagreb in a bid to create as large a Croatian community as possible; now, however, it is the Croats in Bosnia-Herzegovina for whom membership of a Croatian nation is perhaps more important because relations with the kin-state have changed since the signing of the Dayton Peace Agreement. During the war, the Croats of Bosnia-Herzegovina received significant military, political, financial and other support from the Croatian government and at the same time, hard-line Herzegovinian Croats exercised a certain amount of influence with the authorities in Zagreb. But since the end of the war and the subsequent death of President Franjo Tuđman this relationship has changed, especially as Croatia moves towards membership of the European Union. As a result, the Bosnian Croats cannot count on support from Zagreb for any moves

to change the constitutional structure of Bosnia-Herzegovina. For example, in his memoir on his time as High Representative in Bosnia-Herzegovina, Paddy Ashdown describes receiving a message from Croatian President Stipe Mesić in November 2002 offering his support in dealing 'with the Croats' in Bosnia-Herzegovina should he need it (2007: 256).

This changed relationship with Croatia may make the Bosnian Croats feel more vulnerable because as the smallest ethnic group in Bosnia-Herzegovina (making up around 14 per cent of the population of the state and 30 per cent of the Federation) they would feel threatened by any attempt by the Bosniaks and Serbs that they perceive as denying them their status as a constituent people. Hromadžić, for example, found that Croats in Mostar felt threatened by talk of the integration of the Mostar Gymnasium as they saw integration in terms of assimilation into the dominant Bosniak community and the 'related loss of ethnocultural identity' (2008: 554). She also found that once the OSCE, which was the international organisation working on this issue in Mostar, changed its vocabulary and started talking about 'reunification' or 'administrative reunification' focusing on the return of the Bosniak students to the school rather than integrated classrooms and the common core curriculum, moves to change its structure were more palatable to the local Croat population (2008: 559).

This fundamental societal insecurity felt by the Croats explains why they are so vocal in defending their linguistic rights in the schooling system. If they feel threatened by the two much larger ethnic groups and insufficiently supported by the kin state then they defend themselves by stressing their ethno-linguistic identity as much as they can. Consolidating and protecting this identity within the schooling system then means that it is preserved for future generations. In their view segregation in schools is therefore justified and desirable.

The idea of the purity of the language throws up the question of who the arbiter of language purity is in the sense of who decides whether someone is speaking pure Croatian or not. If we recall the discussion in the Introduction to this thesis about the territorial spread of dialects throughout the territory of the former Yugoslavia and the fact that a Croat in Mostar, for example, would speak slightly differently to a Croat in Zagreb, then the question to be asked is

which one would speak or at least be able to recognise 'pure' Croatian? This question raises several issues to do with the power relations between the speakers of the three languages particularly in a school setting and the person who is perceived or perceives themselves as the arbiter of language purity wields the most power. For example, Heiko Wimmen, recounts the experiences of a multi-national NGO which wanted to organise a workshop for students at the Mostar Gymnasium on reproductive health and sexually transmitted diseases. The director of the school allowed this on condition that it be held in 'proper Croatian'. The members of the NGO agreed to this and its members, who were both Croatian and Bosniak did their best to speak this Croatian. Afterwards the director criticised the 'faulty' Croatian of both the Bosniak and Croatian members of the NGO and refused to sign the acknowledgement letter required by the foreign donor organisation funding the activity (Wimmen, 2004). By rejecting the language in which the workshop was conducted the school director confirmed the linguistic barrier between the two ethnic groups for the Bosniak workshop leaders, thus reinforcing their alienation from the Croats, and at the same time implies to the Croatian workshop leaders that they have somehow failed in their 'performance of Croatness' (Hromadžić, 2008: 558) thus making them 'bad' Croats. The implication here is that by socialising with the Bosniak workshop leaders the Croats have contaminated their own language and thus failed their own ethnic group. In this respect it is the school director who wields the power in deciding not only a fellow Croat's linguistic competence but their competence to be a Croat.

This example also shows how language issues can overshadow all others. The school director seems not to have had any objections to the content of the workshop which, surely, is an important one for teenagers of all ethnic groups. By emphasising an aspect of the form of the workshop the school director detracts attention away from its actual content and undermines its importance. The implication is that it is more important to be a 'good' Croat speaking 'pure' Croatian than it is to be a sexually responsible adult.

Power relations between teachers and pupils can be disrupted in a different way over the question of the arbiter of language purity. Wimmen (2004) cites examples of Bosniak teachers having their speech openly corrected by Croatian pupils. This undermines the authority of the teacher and alters the

attitude of all the pupils to the teacher. Moreover, relations between Croatian and Bosniak teachers in a given school may be affected if Croatian teachers are seen to be more effective in the classroom than the Bosniak teachers.

The above discussion served to show how the question of the language of instruction in a school can be used as a way to keep school children apart and how this is particularly manipulated in the 'two schools under one roof' schools. The next section deals with the other way of dividing the student body using language but this time using language as a subject in the curriculum as one of the national group of subjects.

The national group of subjects

The national group of subjects appears on the face of it to be good practice because it allows pupils from different ethnic groups to at least attend school together and have some classes together. As education expert Philip Stabback has pointed out, 'in modern curriculum and school systems, these subjects are used to strengthen social cohesion, to encourage debate, to promote tolerance and understanding of students' own and other cultures, and to ensure the development of informed, critical, personal views of the world' (2004: 53). But, as Stabback goes on to say,

> It could also be argued, however, that the creation of the category of national subjects in BiH gives narrow-minded ethnic ideologues the opportunity to stifle debate, to use education to promulgate narrow 'nationalist' philosophies, and to present young people with inappropriate and sometimes inaccurate views of other cultural groups (Stabback, 2004: 53).

Thus we have the national group of subjects reflecting Bush and Saltarelli's two faces of education as both constructive and destructive.

The latter view was borne out by a 2006 study conducted jointly by the Open Society Fund of Bosnia-Herzegovina and the proMente social research agency into the content of textbooks used in primary and secondary schools throughout Bosnia-Herzegovina for the national group of subjects: language and literature (what the researchers called 'mother tongue'), history, geography and religion. The research focused on textbooks used in the fifth, sixth, seventh, eighth and ninth grade of primary school and all grades of secondary school in the 2005-2006 school year. All these textbooks had been previously approved for use by the appropriate ministries of education. The researchers

analysed the content of the textbooks, as well as their appearance, adherence to pedagogical standards and encouragement of the development of critical thinking. The study covered a total of 145 textbooks of which 61 were for language and literature.

The basic question addressed in the research was to what extent the textbooks promote social cohesion and encourage a positive attitude among pupils towards their own state (2006:11). Social cohesion and the encouragement of a positive attitude are two elements of the Education Reform Strategy and the 2003 Framework Law on Primary and Secondary Education. The study showed that the textbooks of the national group of subjects encouraged segregation because they are mono-ethnic and do not provide knowledge and skills for life in a multi-ethnic society. Moreover, the majority of textbooks do not contribute to developing a feeling of belonging to Bosnia-Herzegovina. This is hardly surprising since the study found that most of the textbooks used in Bosnian Croat schools, for example, had been adopted from Croatia and the Croatian curriculum so that the point of reference for the material in the textbooks was Croatia and the Croatian people, language, literature and cultural heritage. One example cited in the study was approved by the ministries of education, science, culture and sport of five cantons[152] even though it included the sentence:

Moja zemlja zove se Hrvatska (My country is called Croatia) (2006: 43).

The study pointed out that textbooks for the Serbian curriculum were 'borrowed' from Serbia but to a considerably lesser extent. The Bosnian curriculum also stressed only one people and language but it nevertheless highlighted belonging to Bosnia-Herzegovina. A specific element of the Bosnian textbooks, however, was the tendency to 'ijekavianise' works of literature originally written in ekavian, for example, the works of the Serbian poet Branko Miljković (2006:72). The study considered that 'This process has the consequence of impoverishing the knowledge and vocabulary of students'[153] (2006: 80). This is because this practice narrows students' experience of the world outside of their own ethnic group and implies that only

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[152] Herzegovina-Neretva, Central Bosnia, Herceg Bosna, Posavina and Western Herzegovina.

[153] Ovaj proces ima za posljedicu osiromašenje znanja i rječnika učenika.

works rendered in ijekavian are worth reading. It also creates the impression that works need to be translated from ekavian to ijekavian for the sake of comprehensibility when this is patently not true, thus bolstering the idea of separate and distinct languages.

The study concluded, among other things, that:

> through the content of textbooks ruling ideologies are actively contributing to the creation of antagonisms and the further disintegration of society. Although not present to an equal extent in textbooks in the Bosnian, Croatian and Serbian curricula these textbooks especially in the mother tongue nevertheless serve as instruments for division on a national basis[154] (2006: 184).

It can therefore be seen that the teaching of the national group of subjects does not promote social cohesion, tolerance and an identity linked to the state rather than the ethnic group but, rather, consolidates the divisions between the ethnic groups and bolsters the separate ethnically-based identities. In this sense the pledge in the ERS of ensuring education 'that is free from political, religious, cultural and other bias and discrimination' (Pledge 1) has not been met, nor has the objective in the Framework Law on Primary and Secondary Education of 'developing awareness of commitment to the state of BiH' and 'learning about others and different by respecting the differences and cultivating mutual understanding and solidarity among all people, ethnic groups and communities in BiH' (Article I.3).

An effort was made in the Framework Law on Primary and Secondary Education to cut down the amount of time that school children spent in separate classes with the introduction of a common core curriculum. The aim of this common core curriculum was to harmonise the three ethnically-based curricula as regards the non-controversial subjects to the maximum extent. This was in part intended to facilitate the mobility of school children, especially returnee children, throughout the system because if all school children were learning according to the same curriculum they could move from one part of the country to another without being educationally disadvantaged at least in the non-national subjects. It is, however, important to bear in mind that only the core of the curriculum is meant to be common for all pupils and not the whole

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[154] vladajuće ideologije kroz sadržaj udžbenika aktivno doprinose stvaranju antagonizama i daljnoj dezintegraciji društva. Iako to nije u podjednakoj mjeri prisutno u udžbenicima u bosanskom, hrvatskom i srpskom NPP [curriculum], ipak ovi udžbenici, naročito maternji jezik služe kao instrumenti za razdvajanje po nacionalnoj osnovi.

of the curriculum as the core does not include the national subjects. This means that 70-80 per cent of material is common to all the curricula but less than 50 per cent in the national subjects so even though variation in instruction has been reduced school children are still spending much of their time in separate classes or learning different things according to their ethnic affiliation. Moreover, this curriculum has not been implemented throughout Bosnia-Herzegovina as it is mainly being used in the Federation while school children in the Republika Srpska are still being taught according to the Serbian curriculum so there is still limited consistency in school instruction across the two entities.

The above discussion was intended to demonstrate the role that language issues play in the segregation that exists throughout the schooling system in Bosnia-Herzegovina. In this regard we have seen that language is an issue from the point of view of both the structure of the system in the sense of the kind of education and schools that are made available to pupils and the content of what a child learns in school once they get there. In this regard language appears to have a destructive function. This is not the case everywhere in Bosnia-Herzegovina, though. In Brčko District, for example, there has been a different approach to education reform which has generally been successful in dealing with the language issue in endeavours to create an integrated school system. The next section of the chapter will therefore look in detail at the education reform that has been carried out in the district especially as it pertains to the language issue and examine the lessons of the Brčko experience for education reform in the rest of the country.

Brčko District

Brčko is a municipality in the north-east of Bosnia-Herzegovina which covers an area of 493 square kilometres. It has rich agricultural land, as well as a port on the Sava river which provides trade links along the Danube with Belgrade (Jeffrey, 2005: 204). Prior to the war the municipality had a multi-ethnic population which was 45% Bosniak, 21% Serb, 25% Croat and 10% Yugoslav and others (OSCE 2007b: 5). During the conflict the Serbs considered it to be strategically important as a link between the two halves of the Republika Srpska and a route to the Serb Krajina region of Croatia, and in

April 1992 Serb forces occupied the municipality. At war's end Brčko had a majority Serbian population and a smaller Bosniak population with the Croats the smallest of the three main ethnic groups. During the Dayton peace negotiations the fate of Brčko was a highly contentious issue because the Bosniak and Croat delegates argued that awarding the municipality to the Serbs would be tantamount to rewarding ethnic cleansing and would also deprive them of access to the Sava River. The Serbs countered that without Brčko the Republika Srpska would be split in two and therefore would not be a viable territory (Jeffrey, 2005: 209). In the end a compromise was reached whereby Brčko was put under international arbitration for one year after which a final decision on its status would be made.

In the event it took four years to reach a final settlement. In the first year after the war, the focus of the international community was on practical issues to do with post-war reconstruction and after a year neither side could agree on a final settlement (OSCE, 2007b: 6). In February 1997, therefore, the international community set up a Brčko supervisory body to be administered by a Deputy High Representative with authority over the running of the municipality; the Supervisor was subsequently awarded the same Bonn powers as the High Representative. The Final Award issued in March 1999 established the District of Brčko as a 'condominium' whose territory was both a part of the Federation and the RS so therefore did not belong wholly to either. The international community extended the international supervisory body until such time as the District Supervisor deemed the institutions were functioning 'effectively and apparently permanently' OSCE 2007b: 6) The completion of the Final Award requirements is one of the five objectives and two conditions set by the PIC for ending the OHR mandate.

As regards reform of the education system, the international Supervisor was given a clear mandate to carry out reform in an annex to the Final Award which stipulated that 'the Supervisor will integrate the District's educational system, harmonise curricula within the District, and ensure the removal of teaching material which the Supervisor considers to be inconsistent with the objective of creating a democratic, multi-ethnic society within the District' (Annex to Final Award, 18 August 1999, point 11 as cited in OSCE report). Need for reform of the education system came to the fore though in 2000 after

riots by more than 1,000 Bosnian Serb students protesting against the introduction of multi-ethnic schooling. It is thought that these riots were not just about education reform but reflected the opposition of hardliners to integration in general in the District and their continued disgruntlement at the Final Award (Perry, 2003: 78).

The Supervisor proposed a new law on education which carefully laid out integration of both the primary and secondary school systems and established a Department of Education. The law was opposed in the District Assembly by Serb delegates but was imposed by the Supervisor on 5 July 2001.

From the point of view of language, the education law contains the principle that the students have the freedom to express themselves in their own language and should be issued school documents in the language and alphabet they or their parents request. In addition, Article 9 of the law states that, 'The Bosnian, Croatian and Serbian languages, and the Latin and Cyrillic alphabets shall be used in equal terms in realisation of curricula and facultative activities in primary and secondary schools in the District' (OSCE 2007b: 7) This provision is reflected in the Code of Conduct that the teachers who were hired to work in the new system were required to sign.[155] In signing this Code of Conduct the teachers undertake to teach using all three languages. In practice this means that each teacher is allowed to use their mother tongue in general communication but they must explain different words used and answer children with the appropriate national vocabulary. In a 2007 OSCE report on the education reforms in Brčko, the example given is that when a teacher is teaching geometry they must use two different words for the word 'angle' which is *ugao* in Bosnian and Serbian and *kut* in Croatian (2007b: 17). This was the practice in classrooms in the former Yugoslavia where students essentially absorbed the different terminology without any special attention being paid to the ethnic hue of a particular word and without separate classes for the different norms. Interviewee LB, for example, who was at school in the fifties and sixties, related how during biology lessons the pupils were taught

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[155] Teachers in the existing system were fired and then re-hired on condition that they sign the Code of Conduct and thereby commit themselves to the reforms.

two options for the word for 'cell' (*ćelija* and *stanica*) and how their biology textbooks came from Croatia and Serbia.

The equal status of the two alphabets is also reflected in practice in the classroom. In the first grade of primary school, Serbian children are taught the Cyrillic alphabet first while the Croatian and Bosniak children are taught the Latin alphabet first but then each group of children learns the other alphabet in the first semester of the second grade. According to the 2007 OSCE report, both sets of students are taught the two alphabets at the same time with the blackboard divided in half with one script on each side. Once the students have learned both alphabets teachers use each script for all subjects in alternate weeks regardless of whether the class is mixed or mono-ethnic.

This approach represents what is meant in the ECHR when it comes to pluralism in education. Teaching the three languages and two alphabets in this way means that not only do pupils have access and contact with the languages of the other two ethnic groups but they are also being taught that the languages are not dissimilar and there is no reason for segregation along ethno-linguistic lines. Moreover, they are not being taught a mono-ethnic view of the world but one that is commensurate with life in a multi-ethnic and multi-cultural state.

Another key element of education reform was the development of a new curriculum, harmonising the three pre-existing ethnically-based curricula. This was achieved through the establishment of several working groups composed mostly of teachers from Brčko, as well as other education experts, rather than with input from politicians. The basic principle behind the curriculum was that students should spend as much time as possible learning together. This means that the content of the national group of subjects is harmonised to a greater extent than in the rest of Bosnia-Herzegovina. According to the OSCE Education Officer for Brčko District, cited in the 2007 OSCE report, on average students spend less than 25-30 per cent of their lesson time separated by nationality and in some cases students spend as much as 80 or 90 per cent together. For mother tongue instruction students spend 50 per cent of their time in a mixed class and 50 per cent in separate classes (elsewhere in Bosnia-Herzegovina students would spend more than 50 per cent of their time separated from students of another ethnic group).

The new curriculum was implemented at the beginning of the 2001-2002 school year, and children of different ethnic groups began to attend school together for the first time in more than a decade. Ethnic insignia and symbols were removed from all schools before the beginning of the year and all primary schools were given new, ethnically neutral names which were numbers or geographical or vocational designations (OSCE, 2007: 8).[156] The new integrated schooling began immediately in primary schools but was introduced gradually over several years for secondary schools. By the 2004-2005 school year there were no mono-ethnic classes in schools.

Despite the successful establishment of an integrated school system in Brčko there is a percentage of students who still go to mono-ethnic schools. This is partly because in rural areas they live in mono-ethnic areas but it is also because a certain number of parents, as elsewhere in Bosnia-Herzegovina, still prefer to ignore catchment areas and send their children to a school which they consider may offer a better education or where their ethnic group is in the majority. The OSCE 2007 report argues though that the success of the integrated school system can be measured in the attitudes of the students attending the integrated schools. In interviews conducted with students it was found that 'although children still identify with a particular nationality and language, all those interviewed were very positive about integration at school and within Brčko, as well as about their futures. All said they were friends with children from other ethnic groups' (2007b:13).

The OSCE is now pushing the Brčko experience as a model for the education system in the rest of Bosnia-Herzegovina however the conditions prevailing in the district may be too specific to make the Brčko model easily applicable to the rest of Bosnia-Herzegovina. First of all, Brčko District covers less than 1 per cent of the territory of Bosnia-Herzegovina and the education department has responsibility for only 15 primary schools and four secondary schools. The question then is how easily Brčko practice could be applied in a much larger area where there are a lot more schools, teachers and students to deal with.

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[156] Only the Vaso Pelagić Gymnasium retained its name as it had not been changed during the war.

Secondly, as Perry points out, 'the Brčko Supervisor's powers have in many ways made the district an internal protectorate; an American "fiefdom" that has managed its affairs in a very different environment than that of the rest of the country' (2003: 80). The Final Award gave the Supervisor (who has so far been a US official) a clear mandate to reform the education system and the powers to impose it if necessary without seeking the agreement of local politicians.[157] He used precisely these powers when the District Assembly itself failed to pass the education law. Moreover, the 2007 OSCE report on education reform in Brčko made the point that the Brčko reform was helped by the fact that no elections were held between 1998 and late 2004 and the District was instead governed by an ethnically-balanced Assembly appointed by the Supervisor. This meant that there was no opportunity for local politicians to use education as a divisive campaign issue as has been the case in the rest of Bosnia-Herzegovina.

This suggests that the Brčko model of education reform can only be implemented in conditions that are essentially undemocratic. Although it can be argued that the imposition of relevant legislation by the international Supervisor and the absence of elections meant that the local political parties could not use education reform as a political football, thereby facilitating the smooth implementation of reform, the Brčko experience nevertheless illustrates the disconnection between the avowed aim of the Dayton Peace Agreement to create a liberal democratic state and the apparent necessity of implementing reform in a controlled undemocratic environment to ensure success.

Furthermore, the Brčko experience highlights the organisational shortcomings of the education reform in the rest of Bosnia-Herzegovina. Whereas elsewhere the international community's approach to education reform was unfocussed and ill-defined with no single organisation guiding the reform, at least initially, the reform process in Brčko was facilitated by the fact that it was led by just one body with a clear mandate for reform and with specific and defined policies.

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[157] Florian Bieber characterises the Brčko District as 'a full protectorate' in contrast to the rest of Bosnia-Herzegovina which he terms an 'informal semi-protectorate' (2005: 426). This means that there were no parallel ethnically-based power structures which would have hindered the direct interventions of the Supervisor.

Thirdly, Brčko has also benefited from a high concentration of money from the international community, as well as attention and expertise (Perry, 2003:80). For example, the policy of hiring teachers at higher salaries to those in the rest of the country required increased funds as did teacher training to ensure teacher commitment to the new curriculum and a teaching approach sensitive to the different ethnicities. Now, 15 years since the end of the war and at a time of 'donor fatigue' and the international community increasingly looking to disengage from Bosnia-Herzegovina, it would be difficult to generate the required level of financial support and interest from the international community as regards similar moves in the rest of the country. After all UO made the point above that the OSCE's Education Reform Strategy had most success in its first year when there was most international pressure on local actors to implement reform. Similarly, the OSCE 2007 report made it clear that continued pushing from the international community was crucial for the success of future reform and changes. Therefore it could be argued that any future absence of international interest in education reform in both Brčko and the rest of Bosnia-Herzegovina would impact negatively on the successes that have been achieved so far.

The interviewees for this study were generally positive about the Brčko experience although interviewee RA felt that despite the success 'there is not really anywhere which has cracked integration'. Interviewee LA was very impressed with what they saw during visits to schools in the District in a professional capacity and thought that teacher training was key to the success of the Brčko reform. Interviewees NA and RC thought that the Brčko model could be applied elsewhere in Bosnia-Herzegovina with some modifications depending on the location. NA stressed, however, that it was essential to raise awareness among ordinary people that progressive changes are a good thing. This was done at the start of the reform process in Brčko when public awareness campaigns were organised to help ensure support for the changes among the general population. Interestingly, none of the interviewees mentioned the very specific, essentially undemocratic conditions in which education reform was implemented in Brčko.

Possibly the most significant aspect of the Brčko experience is that it proves that it is possible to establish an integrated school system in a deeply-

divided state such as Bosnia-Herzegovina albeit with a high level of international funding and in conditions of a full international protectorate. It challenges the views of those nationalists who claim that multi-ethnic education leads to assimilation and loss of identity. As the OSCE's 2007 report put it, education in Brčko 'shows that children of different nationalities can commingle in schools without losing their own national identities' (2007:25). From the point of view of language the Brčko experience shows that three different languages can be accommodated in one system without the necessity of splitting the student body into their different ethnic groups and keeping them apart as much as possible.[158] It bears repeating in this regard that many of the strategies currently employed in the classroom in Brčko are similar to those used in classrooms throughout Bosnia-Herzegovina in the 1945-1990 period when policy favoured the teaching of the common language and the idea was to accommodate the needs of the different ethnic groups without resorting to segregation.

Conclusion

In this chapter we have seen that language is used in different ways to maintain the segregation that exists in schools in Bosnia-Herzegovina. Firstly, the three curricula that are used in schools – Bosnian, Croatian and Serbian – are designated according to language; language thus serves to split the student body and allows members of one ethnic group to be excluded from schools or parts of schools attended by pupils of another ethnic group. It is also a tool which political elites use to justify the existence of segregated schools and defend their failure to integrate them. Furthermore, as a subject in the curriculum and as a medium of instruction it is used to provide students with the linguistic basis for a mono-ethnic view of the society they live in and influence their attitudes to social cohesion and life in the joint state of Bosnia-Herzegovina. In short, language as it is used in the education system in most of Bosnia-Herzegovina has a destructive function. This function was brought out

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[158] Interestingly, this may not be a lesson relevant to anywhere outside the Balkans since one factor why the Brčko system works is the very closeness of the languages. It would no doubt be more complex in a school system where there are three very different languages which are mutually incomprehensible.

in the discussion of the attitudes of members of the Croatian community to integration in the case of the Mostar Gymnasium.

This destructive function of language is contrasted with the experience of education reform in Brčko District where the approach to the language issue is more constructive. All three languages are accommodated in the classroom so that all students are acquainted with not just their own mother tongue but also those of the other two ethnic groups, and although mother tongue instruction is still one of the national group of subjects students spend less time in separate classes than those elsewhere in Bosnia-Herzegovina. Thus, in de-stressing the differences between the languages and providing a view of language that encompasses all three languages, this approach more constructively bolsters the identity-formation aims of the peace-building process.

The international community's approach to the language issue stems from its approach to education reform in general. Education reform was not mentioned in the Dayton Peace Agreement as an area warranting particular international attention in the post-war peace-building process. The international community did not therefore initially have a well-conceived and coordinated approach to education reform, let alone a language policy specifically concerned with language issues in education. Rather, the international community dealt with language problems indirectly and only as they related to its other policies. Segregation in schools, for example, was addressed by the international community in the context of the return of refugees and IDPs. This was deemed to be an essential aspect of the Dayton Peace Agreement (for the first time in international legal practice refugees and IDPs were given the right to return not just to their home country but to their actual homes) and an important indicator of the success of the agreement as a whole. Therefore much international attention was focussed on encouraging people to return to the homes that they had been forced to abandon during the war. The 'two schools under one roof' schools and the introduction of the national group of subjects - two practices where language plays a crucial role in maintaining segregation - were initially approved and supported by the international community in order to facilitate this aim. It was not foreseen by the international community, however, that these initially temporary measures would become

'semipermanent' (Hromadžić, 2008:554) practices and would be subverted by local political elites in order to maintain the segregation that they were meant to help eradicate. The discussion in this chapter of societal security and attitudes to language among the Croatian community of Bosnia-Herzegovina demonstrated the emotional resonance that language and language issues have for individuals that helps these divisive practices endure.

Throughout the research for this study a question that has come to the fore is, how important is language in post-war Bosnia-Herzegovina? This was a question I put to former High Representative Lord (Paddy) Ashdown in an interview for this study in relation to education reform and specifically the 'two schools under one roof' policy. His response was:

> So language was a second tier issue in comparison with those others but it was one that we knew we would have to come to sooner or later. The first thing was to get them into the same bloody class, actually the first thing was to get them under the same roof and then into the same classroom. And then teaching to a common curriculum, what language would that have been in? All those issues are important.

At first sight Lord Ashdown seems to be suggesting that there is some kind of hierarchy of issues to be addressed when dealing with segregation in the education system and that the issue of getting pupils of different ethnic groups into the same classroom can be divorced from the question of what language they would then be taught in once they got to that classroom. I would argue, however, that the issue of language cannot be divorced from the issue of segregation and it is actually unhelpful to think of them as separate issues at different points on a list of priorities. As we have seen in this chapter, as a tool that is used to maintain segregation language is part and parcel of the segregation issue and needs to be dealt with as such. Therefore a lesson for the international community from the experience of education reform in Bosnia-Herzegovina is that in a post-conflict, ethnically-divided state where societal insecurity is salient education reform must take into account the power that language has as a marker of ethnic identity. An appreciation of the way in which language issues feed into other policies targeted at non-linguistic goals is important for understanding how language issues can affect the achievement of other policy goals. The case of Bosnia-Herzegovina shows that in the education system language can be put to many uses to help exacerbate the problems that external peace-building endeavours are intended to solve. In

such circumstances an appropriate language policy would be designed to mitigate the possible detrimental effects of language issues in the education system.

Having looked in this chapter at an aspect of post-conflict peace-building in which the interplay between language and the issues of societal security and identity formation are crucial we will now move on in the next chapter to look at the language issue from the perspective of another aspect of post-conflict reform, namely, the defence reform. Here, the issue of language is not reflected in issues to do with the international community's approach to identity formation but in the translation and interpretation practice of the international military force in its dealings with the domestic armed forces of Bosnia-Herzegovina.

Chapter 5

International Community Language Policy in Defence Reform

Introduction

In the last chapter I looked at the area of education reform in Bosnia-Herzegovina and the role of the international community in this, focussing on the impact its actions have on the interplay between language issues and broader peace-building aims. This chapter will deal with language issues as they relate to military aspects of the peace. The aim is to contrast the approach of the international community to language issues in this area of reform with its approach in the field of education reform.

There are differences in the general approaches that were taken by the international community to each of these areas of reform. For example, education reform received scant mention in the Dayton Peace Agreement and no international organisation was specifically given the mandate in 1995 for guiding it. In contrast, and as can be expected of an agreement to end a conflict, military issues are dealt with in detail in the Agreement (in annexes 1-A, 1-B and 2), with responsibility for ensuring implementation of the military aspects of the Agreement entrusted to a NATO-led Implementation Force (IFOR).[159]

Similarly, in the field of language policy, there are differences too in what the focus of such a policy would be in the two sectors. In the field of education reform because the issue of three languages feeds into issues of identity formation and nation-building, had the international community had a language policy it would have related first of all to the international community's approach to language as a significant marker of ethnic identity. It would therefore have impacted on the existence of the practices that

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[159] IFOR was succeeded by SFOR (the Stabilisation Force) in December 1996 which in turn was followed by EUFOR (the European Force) in December 2004 with the launch of Operation Althea. EUFOR initially had 6,300 members but now numbers 2,200. Members of the force come from 25 nations most of which are EU member states although a number, such as Albania, Chile and the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, are not member states of the EU.

consolidate segregation such as the 'two schools under one roof' schools and the national group of subjects. In this regard a language policy would influence the substance of the reform and therefore what the school children of Bosnia-Herzegovina are taught in the classroom. This in turn means that a language policy would touch on the concerns of a vast array of stakeholders (including local politicians, teachers and parents) who may have different attitudes and interests when it comes to identity and the protection of their particular ethnic group. For example, as argued in the last chapter, local politicians approach language as a tool to maintain the ethnic segregation in schools and hinder the peace-building process. A language policy specifically related to education would therefore have a more far-reaching impact going beyond the confines of the internal procedures of the international organisations involved in this sphere.

In contrast, the language issue has a different role to play in defence reform than in the education reform. It does not impact on the substance of defence reform in the way that it influences, for example, what is in the school curricula. Language is an issue, however, when it comes to the production of official documents and the translation and interpretation practices of the international military force in its dealings with the local military and governmental authorities and local people. In this sense language policy in the force can be seen more as an institutional language policy. However, it nevertheless revolves around the question of whether the language requirements of the three former warring sides are accommodated in the international military force's dealings with local actors, and in this sense policy is influenced by the identity politics outside the institution itself. There is therefore an interaction between an internal language policy and external extra-linguistic circumstances.

This chapter traces the development of a language policy at the level of the HQ of the international military force only. The NATO force that took over operations post-Dayton from the UNPROFOR (United Nations Protection Force) peacekeeping force was made up of about 60,000 troops from 31 nations. They were initially located in three Multi-National Divisions (MND) each of which was headed by one nation: Britain in MND-South West, France in MND-South-East and the United States in MND-North West. As time went

on and the force was reorganised and down-sized the Multi-National Divisions became Multi-National Battalions and eventually pulled out with the transformation of the force to the EU Force in December 2004 and the beginning of Operation Althea. Scores of locally-hired linguists were employed by the different nations represented in the force which had their own hiring and language practices.[160] For example, the Dutch contingent in Bugojno alone employed 62 interpreters in 2003 (Bos and Soeters, 2006: 263). The focus of this chapter is on the force HQ because this is the highest level at which negotiations on the military aspects of the Dayton Peace Agreement and the subsequent defence reform took place. Issues regarding a three-language policy would be more relevant to the linguists at this level as the HQ deals with all three main ethnic groups rather than one or two which would be the case at the lower levels.

As detailed in the methods section of the Introduction, much of the data for this chapter was collected during a field trip to Bosnia-Herzegovina in May-June 2008 and is based on interviews with 13 members of the Linguistic Service of the European military force (EUFOR) Headquarters based in Sarajevo.[161] The service has a total of 22 linguists[162] located in Sarajevo and Banja Luka. The linguists were chosen as interview subjects because a number of them have been employed by the international military since before the signing of the Dayton Peace Agreement and therefore have the 'institutional memory' as regards the development of language policy in the force. This is important in tracing the development of language practices because the military members of the force spend on average six months in theatre so few current force members would be aware of how decisions regarding language came to be made or would have taken part in the decision-making process. Moreover,

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[160] The US forces used a private contractor, TRW Incorporated, to hire linguists. Depending on the required level of security clearance these would be either locally-hired employees or hired from North America.

[161] All the linguists interviewed were former colleagues of mine. I was the chief of the language service between 2000 and 2004. The implications of this prior professional relationship with interviewees is discussed in more detail in the section in the Introduction on methods.

[162] The term linguist will be used throughout this chapter to denote any person employed primarily to translate, interpret or revise. Translation means the written conveyance of meaning from one language to another, interpretation means the spoken conveyance of meaning from one language to another and revision relates to the checking of a written translation by a senior translator to ensure *inter alia* accuracy of meaning, style and register.

because of the transient presence of the officers and the more than ten years that had elapsed since the most important decisions were made, the linguists themselves could not recall the names of the officers who had made specific decisions and, furthermore, even if they had, as a multi-national force, it would have been difficult to track down these officers in their different countries.

The chapter will begin with a brief overview of the provisions of the Dayton Peace Agreement as related to the military sphere and the role of IFOR (and subsequently SFOR and EUFOR). It will then outline the development of defence reform activities which saw a shift in focus after 2001 towards unification of the armed forces in preparation for the country's eventual membership of NATO and the EU. This overview is necessary as it provides the context in which the linguists employed by the international military force's HQ worked and an introduction to the next section which will look more closely at the translation and interpretation practices of the international military force and their development since the signing of the Dayton Peace Agreement. The discussion of how linguists have influenced language policy leads to a consideration of the motivations of the linguists for the linguistic decisions they make. In this context there will be a discussion of translator ethics. This is particularly important because of the issue of trust between members of the military and the civilian linguists. Here I draw on current thinking on translator ethics and apply narrative theory as suggested by Mona Baker in her book *Translation and Conflict: A Narrative Account* (2006). The chapter will conclude with an assessment of how language policy was formulated in the international military force in Bosnia-Herzegovina and what the experience might tell us about language policy formulation in general in an international military intervention situation.

The Military Aspects of the Dayton Peace Agreement and Defence Reform

As stated elsewhere, the Dayton Peace Agreement should primarily be seen as a peace treaty. Its basic aim was to consolidate the cease-fire agreement that had been reached three weeks before the negotiations at the Wright-Patterson air base in Dayton began. As Annex 1A, which deals with the

military aspects of the peace settlement, states, the obligations of the parties were 'to establish a durable cessation of hostilities' (Art. I, para. 2a), 'provide for the support and authorization of the IFOR' (Art. I, para. 2b) and 'establish lasting security and arms control measures' (Art.I, para. 2c). The initial task was to separate the warring sides and ensure that they remained separate. The agreement thus includes detailed instructions for this to do with the exact location of the line of separation and the inter-entity boundary line, as well as deadlines for compliance with the provisions in the Agreement.

The Dayton Peace Agreement clearly gives authority to ensuring implementation of its provisions to a NATO-led Implementation Force to be *in situ* 'for a period of approximately one year' (Annex 1A, Art. I, para. 1). The force was to be directly answerable to the North Atlantic Council (NAC) and most significantly was authorised to use all means 'including the use of necessary force, to ensure compliance' (Annex 1A, Art. I, para. 2b). The Agreement also envisaged the establishment of a Joint Military Commission (JMC) 'to serve as the central body for all Parties to this Annex to bring any military complaints questions, or problems that require resolution by the IFOR Commander, such as allegations of cease-fire violations or other non-compliance with this Annex' (Annex 1A, Art. VIII, para. 2a). It was also intended to receive reports and agree on specific actions to ensure compliance with the military provisions of the Dayton Peace Agreement and assist the IFOR Commander in 'determining and implementing a series of local transparency measures between the Parties' (Annex 1A, Art. VIII, para. 2c). The JMC was to be chaired by the IFOR Commander (or his representative) and would be composed of the senior military commander of the forces of each of the former warring sides in Bosnia-Herzegovina, as well as two civilians selected by each Party to the Annex and the High Representative or his representative in advisory roles. Although the JMC was meant to be a consultative body for the IFOR Commander the agreement nevertheless specified that all final decisions on military matters were to be made by the IFOR Commander. Over time the role of the JMC changed and 'soon became a

framework for military assistance, in particular concerning the efforts to bring BiH into PfP (Partnership for Peace)' (Vetschera and Damian, 2006: 37).[163]

Defence and military matters were not mentioned in the Constitution (Annex 4 of the Agreement) as a competence of the state of Bosnia-Herzegovina and Vetschera and Damian consider that this made it easier for the entities to claim defence as an entity matter and therefore maintain the separate armed forces that they had established during the war (2006:29). Indeed the only body given any kind of competence in the field of defence was the Standing Committee on Military Matters (SCMM) which was part of the state-level Presidency and was intended 'to coordinate the activities of the armed forces in Bosnia-Herzegovina' (Annex 4, Art. V, Para.5b). The entity split was further complicated by the existence of the Croatian Defence Council (HVO) as part of the federation forces, thus retaining the three-sided hostility of the wartime period.

Even though the cease-fire was consolidated by the end of 1996 (Cousens and Cater, 2001: 54) with the military forces having been separated and progressively demobilized and arms control had also been embarked upon, Cousens and Cater assessed in 2000 that despite these notable successes

> joint ventures between the ABiH [Army of Bosnia-Herzegovina] and HVO have gone no deeper than the surface, leaving both forces essentially separate. Each services its respective national leadership, with doctrine, capabilities, and intentions relatively opaque to one another and to the international community. There is even greater distance between them and the VRS (Army of the Republika Srpska). Thus, five years after Dayton, Bosnian territory remains clearly divided among the effective control of each of the country's three armies and related paramilitaries (2001: 64).

The international community did, however, attempt to bridge this military divide by initiating the adoption of two agreements in 1996 (an Agreement on Confidence and Security-Building Measures in Bosnia and Herzegovina between the state of Bosnia-Herzegovina and the two entities and an Agreement on Sub-regional Arms Control between all parties from Bosnia-Herzegovina and the neighbouring states of Croatia and the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia). It also set up fora to coordinate the activities of the relevant

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[163] The Partnership for Peace is a programme of cooperation between NATO and individual Partner countries. Its purpose is to "increase stability, diminish threats to peace and build strengthened security relationships between individual Partner countries and NATO, as well as among Partner countries" (NATO website at http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/topics_50349.htm [Accessed on 29 March 2010].

international organisations: in 1999 the OHR, SFOR and the OSCE established the Common Security Policy Working Group which was superseded in 2002 by the Institution Building Task Force that was set up by the Steering Board of the Peace Implementation Council.

Defence reform can be seen in the context of what Gearoid Ó Tuathail calls the OHR's 'grand strategy' for Bosnia-Herzegovina which had the twin goals of removing war and violence from political life and moving the country towards a capitalist market society (2005: 55). The framework for this strategy was provided by activities to move Bosnia-Herzegovina toward eventual membership of the EU and NATO and the starting point was the Stabilization and Association process launched in 1999. As Ó Tuathail puts it, 'Key to moving Bosnia towards Europe, as far as the OHR was concerned, was the consolidation of BiH statehood through the creation of centralized, responsive, state-level institutions' (2005: 56). This, of course, applied to the divided military institutions too and in 2001 the NATO Secretary General outlined the most important requirements of these which were the creation of an 'effective and credible state-level civil command and control structure, which would include a state-level ministry responsible for defence matters...[and] the merger of the entities' armed forces into one state army' (Vetschera and Damian, 2006: 31). In January 2003, the Presidency stated the intention of joining the European Union and Euro-Atlantic defence structures and becoming a candidate for Partnership for Peace. In this context the targets recognised that defence reform was essential and pledged to carry out the reforms necessary to establish effective state-level civilian command and control and parliamentary oversight over all defence matters (DRC, 2003: 34) As a way to move defence reform forward in the wake of the *Orao* affair[164] which weakened the Republika Srpska government, High Representative Paddy Ashdown set up the Defence Reform Commission (DRC). The DRC was made up of the Secretary General of the SCMM and his two deputies; two civilian representatives appointed by the President of the Republika Srpska and

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[164] During the *Orao* affair it was discovered that the *Orao* aircraft factory in the Republika Srpska had been selling weapons to Iraq in contravention of the UN embargo. This meant that Bosnia-Herzegovina was also at risk of sanction from the UN. As a consequence of investigations RS President Šarović was forced to resign and Paddy Ashdown took advantage of a weakened RS government to push ahead with defence reform, arguing that there had to be state control of the defence sector (Ashdown, 2007).

the President of the Federation; the two entity Ministers of Defence; one member designated by the High Representative and one delegate each from NATO, SFOR and the OSCE. It was chaired by former US Assistant Secretary of Defence James Locher III who had had experience managing legislation in the US to restructure the US armed forces in the 1980s and developing the Pentagon's special operations capabilities (Ashdown, 2007: 283).[165]

Its recommendations published in September 2003 focussed on the legislative changes needed to ensure effective civilian command and control of the armed forces while still maintaining separate entity armed forces and ministries of defence albeit more restricted in scope than hitherto.[166] Within this it recommended a law on defence which was adopted by the Parliamentary Assembly of Bosnia-Herzegovina in December 2003. The law established operational and administrative chains of command. Supreme operational and administrative command and control was assigned to the Presidency. A state Ministry of Defence was also established headed by a civilian Minister of Defence and two deputies and including a military Joint Staff. The DRC was given a second mandate in 2005 to find solutions to increase the state's authority in administrative areas and day-to-day running of the armed forces (DRC report, 2005: 1). It recommended doing away with the entity ministries of defence and military structures and the establishment of a Support Command at state level to deal with personnel management, logistics and training which would bolster the existing state-level command and control arrangements. It also recommended the full professionalisation of the armed forces (scrapping conscription, for example), the 'rightsizing' of forces to achieve active duty armed forces of 'somewhere between 9,000 and 10,000' (DRC, 2005: 8) and a new approach to organising a reserve force.

The legislation required by these recommendations was passed by the Bosnia-Herzegovina Parliamentary Assembly and the entity parliaments at the end of 2005, and in January 2006 all competencies in the realm of defence were transferred to the state level. In May 2006 components of the NATO HQ

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[165] Paddy Ashdown considered Locher to have been 'a brilliant chair with that combination of subtlety, quiet persuasive power and toughness where necessary, which made things happen in the Balkans' (2007: 283).
[166] NATO had dropped the requirement for a single state army in 2002 but still required a state-level defence ministry and a joint General Staff.

were moved to the same building as the Ministry of Defence in Sarajevo.[167] One of these is the NATO Advisory Team (NAT) whose purpose is to achieve closer cooperation between NATO and the Ministry of Defence, the Joint Staff and the Operational Command. In December 2006, Bosnia-Herzegovina finally joined the Partnership for Peace.

The above overview of defence reform activities is intended to illustrate several aspects of the defence reform process. First of all, it is clear how far Bosnia-Herzegovina progressed after the signing of the Dayton Peace Agreement in the military sphere; from having separate armed forces totalling more than 430,000 men[168] with a vast array of armaments at the end of the war the former warring sides were able to establish joint armed forces with state-level command and control and an effective and efficient structure suitable to the requirements of the PfP. The second aspect is the role of the international community in these reform moves. With a clear mandate as stipulated in the Dayton Peace Agreement the international military force was able to guide first the immediate post-war obligations of separating forces and the cantonment of weapons and then the longer-term reform requirements of PfP membership. The progress made is attributable in part to the fact that the reform process was guided by SFOR, NATO and the OSCE working together in a coordinated way. As interviewee UO put it, 'One reason defence reform succeeded was because it had NATO behind it, it had the United States embassy behind it and the UK embassy behind it and under no circumstances, under no uncertain terms, I mean, they knew what they wanted and they got it'. Along with this concerted push from the international community, progress is also attributable to a change in attitudes among the local military authorities in recognition of the stated desire of Bosnia-Herzegovina to move towards integration into the EU and NATO and the concomitant need for greater cooperation between all three components of the armed forces.

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[167] When SFOR was replaced by EUFOR in December 2004 NATO retained a 150-strong command in Sarajevo to assist the authorities in Bosnia-Herzegovina in the defence reform process and in preparing for accession to the PfP and NATO membership. It also provides operational support in counter-terrorism, intelligence and the arrest of war criminals (NATO Parliamentary Report 2006: 11).

[168] Figure from the SFOR Informer Online website available at http://www.nato.int/SFOR/indexinf/127/p03a/t0103a.htm [accessed 9 March 2010]

Finally, the overview of defence reform activities puts into a wider context the next section on the language policy of the international military force. All communication between the international military force and the former warring sides had to be mediated by an interpreter or translator. The JMCs, as the most important forum for communication between the IFOR (and then SFOR) Commander and the military authorities in Bosnia-Herzegovina, were interpreted first of all in the consecutive mode and then, much later on, simultaneously.[169] The interpretation of these and the translation of documents were provided by the linguists working at HQ IFOR and then SFOR. The interpretation and the translation for meetings of the nine working groups established within the DRC were provided by linguists from the OSCE (as the organisation administratively in charge of the commission) and HQ SFOR with the latter providing simultaneous interpretation for the plenary sessions. The linguists employed by the international military force therefore played a crucial role in the defence reform process and, as shall be shown, influenced policy regarding the language situation in the country. The next section will therefore look at how the language policy of the international military force evolved and the part played by the linguists in this.

Language policy as translation and interpretation policy

The peace-keeping operation in Bosnia-Herzegovina was the first of its kind for NATO. It was the first time that NATO countries had put so many troops on the ground in support of a peace operation and, from the point of view of language provision, it was the first time that a large number of linguists working with languages that were not official languages of NATO had to be employed. Up until 1995, language policy at NATO HQ and SHAPE level involved the provision of translation and interpretation from and into the two official languages of the organisation, English and French.[170] At the

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[169] There are basically three modes of interpretation: liaison interpretation where the interpreter interprets a short passage of speech after the speaker has spoken without the aid of notes; consecutive interpretation where the interpreter does the same as for liaison interpretation but for longer passages and with the aid of notes, and simultaneous interpretation where the interpreter interprets almost at the same time as the speaker is speaking and for this mode of interpretation a booth and other equipment is needed. Simultaneous interpretation requires a high level of knowledge and skill.

[170] SHAPE is the Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers Europe which provides the strategic command and control for NATO operations. It is based at Mons, Belgium.

subordinate HQs there are small language units with very few linguists (between one and five) working with the two official languages, as well as the language of the country where it is located. For example, at the HQ Allied Air Command in Ramstein in Germany there is one translator working with English, French and German. For the operation in Bosnia-Herzegovina which would involve extensive contacts with the local population, the individual contingents were required to provide their own linguists. Many of these were taken over from the UNPROFOR mission which ended with the arrival of IFOR but the increased extent of IFOR activities meant that more linguists had to be recruited. In part this need was met by military personnel in the contingents who already knew the local languages and could be used as interpreters or language trainers (British forces had four of these in 1992) but in general language requirements had to be met by hiring local people. The elements that made up the HQ and were located throughout Bosnia-Herzegovina were left to hire their own linguists in whatever way they wanted and as a consequence there was no HQ-wide language policy regarding recruitment procedures from the point of view of the requisite qualifications, pre-employment language testing (which was not as rigorous as during the time of UNPROFOR) or training. Thus the linguists employed by the HQ varied considerably in their level of ability, skill and knowledge.

None of the linguists employed by the HQ fitted the profile of what is generally understood to be a 'professional interpreter' by international organisations and professional bodies of interpreters notably AIIC, the International Association of Conference Interpreters. For them a 'professional interpreter' is an interpreter who has a degree in languages or interpreting and has taken certain courses in interpretation at recognised institutions and gained employment in an international organisation where they are expected to reach internationally recognised standards. These interpreters therefore have a recognised career path. In contrast, not all the linguists at SFOR HQ had university-level education. One interviewee, for example, had worked as a manual labourer before being employed as a linguist. Those who had university degrees had not necessarily studied languages and very few had any kind of interpretation experience prior to working for the international force. The

implications of employing 'non-professional' linguists will be explored later on in this chapter in the discussion on translator ethics.

In the context of this study, we are interested in language policy as it relates to the international military force's approach to the three newly-recognised official languages in its relations with the former warring sides. This was especially important at the HQ level where IFOR and then SFOR commanders had dealings with senior military and political representatives from all three former warring sides rather than with one or two which was more common in the MNDs. It is at this level that negotiations in the framework of the JMCs and the defence reform were conducted.

Adherence to a three-language policy is demonstrated in several ways: the most obvious being the production of all relevant documentation in three separate language versions, taking care to make clear distinctions between the three. Less obviously, even if a particular element of the forces uses only one version, for example Serbian in the Republika Srpska, this still implies recognition of the existence of three language versions because otherwise only one version, some kind of syncretic 'all-Bosnian' which would most likely correspond to the idiolect of the particular linguist would be used throughout the force. Likewise, attempts by an interpreter to tailor their speech according to the ethnic identity of the interlocutor also represents tacit recognition of the existence of more than one language version.

A three-language policy is more clearly manifested in translation than interpretation as it is possible to create three versions of a written text while it is almost impossible and totally impracticable to attempt to create three versions of an interpretation. Furthermore, the three-language issue is more important with the written word because the different language versions are easier to identify when they are written down than when they are expressed verbally. For example, if nothing else, the official Serbian language in Bosnia-Herzegovina is distinguished by the fact that it is generally written in Cyrillic rather than the Latin script; in this case it is immediately obvious which language version is being used. Moreover, interpreting as the oral conveyance of information possesses a certain impermanence or evanescence which means that certain aspects of the language used may not be immediately recognised (and objected to) by the interlocutors. As Michael Cronin has put it,

> In writing, the mind can concentrate on moving ahead in a linear fashion because the written text is there to remind it of what has already been said. In oral discourse, the situation is different because there is nothing to refer to outside the mind, the oral utterance vanishing as soon as it has been uttered (2006:92).

This chapter will now focus on the development of this language policy and, drawing on field interviews with linguists working for what is now EUFOR HQ, explore the influences and circumstances that moulded this approach to the three languages.

Linguists as language policy-makers

It is clear from the field interviews that both during and after the conflict there were different approaches to the issue of the three languages in translation and interpretation practice. These depended primarily on where a linguist was based both in the sense of the type of element they were in and the actual geographical location of that element. In the field, in locally-based elements in areas where just one ethnic group was represented, only one language version was used during the conflict. This was the case, for example, in the UNPROFOR liaison office in Pale in the Republika Srpska where the linguists who had worked there reported that they always used Serbian in dealings with the General Staff of the Army of the Republika Srpska and multiple language versions of translations were not required. Interestingly, in this case, the two linguists interviewed who worked in the office cannot remember using Cyrillic and thought that this was for technical reasons because they simply did not have the proper font as part of their word processing programme. What is more important, however, is that according to one of the linguists (QQ) this lack of font 'did not bother' any of the local recipients of correspondence and documentation.

On the question of whether they used ekavian (*ekavica*) as another way of differentiating the Serbian version, one of the linguists (QQ) recalls using this version in the period when it was official (September 1993 to November 1994) while the other linguist (RF) remembers things a little differently:

> RF: What we did at that time out of spite because they were, officials, and the official language on TV was started, started to be *ekavica* and then we didn't have to, it wasn't in accordance with the Constitution that we had to use *ekavica* but just for fun or out of spite we started because there were people

saying Beljina[171] for towns and we started it as a joke and it was easier, to tell you the truth. But I regret it now because I have lost the feeling for *ije* and *je*. Before we started doing that I was always, I never thought what is it *ije* or *je*, before that, and after that I had a problem, I wasn't sure any longer which one is correct every time. So that is why I regret our joke.

LA: So how long did you do that for, produce them in *ekavica*, the translations?

RF: I would say a couple of years maybe until the war finished, not later, because it wasn't the trend any more, maybe in 94 or 95, I can't remember when it happened and then we quit and started to translate into normal language.

The above excerpt shows how language decisions were left to the individual linguists in an office with no involvement from the military personnel and that these decisions could be based on notions of fun or spite. This linguist's mention of 'normal language' highlights their disdain for official attempts to impose a language that was not natural for inhabitants of Bosnia-Herzegovina.

Linguists in areas where more than one ethnic group was represented during the conflict had somewhat different concerns when it came to language. This is borne out by the testimony of interviewee AG, who worked for eight months at the beginning of the war with the French Battalion in Kakanj, which had dealings with both Bosniaks and Croats. The following excerpt is their reply to whether she had to work with three language versions during the conflict.

> Well, in the field we didn't do that, in Kakanj we didn't do that. We would just translate into whatever was our language at that time, which was Serbo-Croatian. And no one really made much fuss about it but the fact is it was in the field so you wouldn't, these translations wouldn't go up to the upper channels of the military structures who would normally complain, as they complained all the time, later when I came to work to Sarajevo at the Headquarters. But in the field it wasn't really a big issue unless you go somewhere to a headquarters or, you know, we did mostly go to HVO Headquarters in Vareš or Kiseljak etc. and then you had to speak very Croatianly /starts laughing/, so to say. You really did and I was good at pretending, you had to be and I was good at not saying my name a lot. /I would introduce myself by saying/ 'I'm the interpreter' /laughs/. Really, I mean, that was the reality.[172]

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[171] The proper name of the town is Bijeljina. By removing the ij the name is ekavianised i.e. Serbianised. Bijeljina is the second largest town in the Republika Srpska. Prior to the war, according to the 1991 census, the population was 60 per cent Serbian and 34 per cent Muslim.

[172] In Bosnia-Herzegovina a person's name is usually, but not necessarily always, an indicator of the ethnic group they belong to.

In answer to the next question whether they ever received any negative reactions from people because of their perceived ethnic affiliation, they had this to say:

> Many times, many times. Well, during the war it was a regular, a regular thing. If you did not want anyone to object to you then you would normally just try to avoid saying your name, and you were lucky if they didn't know you. If they knew you then it was a different thing. But then it's also true that once people knew you, even if you are of a different, even during the war, even if they were of a different ethnic background once they realised that you know what you are doing in terms of the language, that you really do your job, then it becomes acceptable. It surely does.

They elaborate this further:

> I think, you know, if, if even during the war if people had the chance to realise that you were only interested in what you were supposed to do and that your demeanour was professional then it worked even if you were of a different ethnic background. But that only applies really to situations where everybody is, everybody is sitting down but if it's in the field and it's some kind of trouble then you can't really count on that.

The above quotes confirm that language issues were left to the individual linguist and depended on their readiness and ability to tailor their language according to the ethnic identity of the interlocutor. But why would an interpreter in the field do this especially if they were not explicitly instructed to do so by military personnel? They would be aware that in the wartime situation of heightened tensions, an interlocutor of another ethnicity may object to the presence of someone (the interpreter) that they could perceive as being on the enemy side, even though that person is working for the international military force. In the best case, the interlocutor may question the objectivity of the interpreter in their interpretation but in the worst case the interlocutor may display open hostility to the interpreter and to the foreign military personnel. In both cases, the course of the encounter would be disrupted to a greater or lesser extent. Aware of this possibility, AG felt it necessary to tailor their language in order to reduce the risk of a negative reaction from the interlocutor. In their mind, also, not drawing attention to themselves as a member of a specific ethnic group and striving to remain neutral is connected with the issue of professionalism as they are aware that once they are seen as a 'professional' rather than the representative of a particular ethnic group the communication will run more smoothly. AG's account highlights, though, that it was not always easy to be seen as a professional and much depended on the context in

which the communication took place. The situations where everybody was 'sitting down' can be seen as what Norbert Elias in *The Civilizing Process* calls 'pacified social spaces' which in a conflict situation 'are normally free from acts of violence' (2000: 369). It is only in these 'pacified social spaces' away from the conflict that people can act in more of a non-violent way and notions of professionalism can override concerns about ethnic affiliation. Questions of neutrality and professionalism are important issues when it comes to translator ethics and a discussion of these will follow further on in this chapter.

As regards the policy at the level of UNPROFOR Headquarters there is some discrepancy in the testimony of the linguists working there during the conflict as to whether it was necessary to adhere to three language versions or not. Interviewee AG moved to work at the UNPROFOR HQ in 1994 and explained the policy thus:

> At the level of the headquarters it was always the policy. It was actually imposed by the warring factions, as they were known, and they /UNPROFOR/ simply accepted it but I really honestly at that time thought it was ridiculous. But from this point in time I think they didn't have much choice, you know. It simply was something that had to be done, unless you wanted to have, you know, unless you really wanted to have complaints all the time and then have to solve those complaints etc. But I do remember people who actually refused to do that and that worked as well. I mean, not interpreters and translators naturally but I remember officers who simply said, no, I'm not going to bother with that, if you want I'll send it to you in English and then you do with it whatever you want to do with it, and that worked as well, you know.

Another linguist, ZS, who also worked at UNPROFOR HQ from October 1994 remembers the policy differently. When asked about whether they adhered to the three-language policy they said:

> During UNPROFOR times no, we didn't. Actually we didn't even have Cyrillic, any fonts or anything that would support that and then we started actually, I think it was IFOR, when IFOR arrived, when they deployed, that they actually for political correctness, they insisted on that. And I think we actually got that font from Naples,[173] to our surprise, but they had it, so... but it, we didn't have any converters so you would need to basically retype everything and yes, at that time, it was really everyone was insisting to have everything in three languages, even if it was just the basic letter or anything.

In answer to a question about where this insistence on three languages came from at IFOR, ZS explained the situation thus:

> ZS: I think it was due to the Dayton Peace Agreement that these were officially, and then like in our constitution, three, three official languages and

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[173] Naples is where the AFSOUTH (Allied Forces Southern Europe) base was located. AFSOUTH was one of two major NATO commands in the Mediterranean area.

they insisted actually to have everything in, for political correctness, to have everything in three versions or in three local languages, I should say.

LA: So, was the insistence from the IFOR side or from the local politicians' side?

ZS: I think it was from our chain of command because they wanted to be politically correct and it was of course from the parties, the three, let's say from the local side, actually they insisted to get everything in their own language so basically they got accustomed to that and it was not only our organisation, I think it was the same throughout.

Despite the contradiction between the two interviewees regarding when the three-language policy started, it can be said that it was being implemented at least from the beginning of the IFOR mandate and it was a response on the side of the international military force to insistence from the former warring sides that their particular language be accepted and used officially, particularly after the signing of the Dayton Peace Agreement and its de facto recognition of the three languages. ZS's mention of political correctness could represent an attempt by the military forces to take the subject of language 'off the table' as it obviously had become an issue in negotiations after the end of the conflict. Doing this, however, risks reifying the slight linguistic differences that distinguish the three language versions which in turn contributes to efforts by the representatives of the ethnic groups to distance themselves from each other. Moreover, as the practice became established it was difficult to change the policy. Not only did the representatives of the three former warring sides demand separate language versions, as ZS points out, but the officers on the NATO side would also have become used to thinking in terms of three distinct languages. With successive rotations of military personnel the established practice was just reproduced and not questioned. As we will see later on in this chapter, it was not until 2001 or 2002 that the policy of providing three language versions was modified.

From the interviews with the linguists employed at the Liaison Office in the Republika Srpska – RF and QQ – it is clear that the procedure regarding translation and interpretation in the field remained the same after the Dayton Peace Agreement was signed and IFOR was set up in that only one language version needed to be produced. Likewise, linguists who were hired after the signing of the Dayton Peace Agreement and were employed in other elements outside the HQ report that there was no policy to adhere to three language

versions. The reason for this was mainly to do with the nature of the work of these offices. One linguist, ZG, was employed in January 1996 to work for Civilian Military Affairs which worked with local authorities on projects to reconstruct the country's damaged infrastructure (the water supply, the power network, roads, bridges and so on). According to them the four linguists in the office did more interpreting than translation and most of the translation was into English. He did say, however, that they would 'tailor' translations into the local languages according to who it was intended for. So a translation of a document for a project in the Republika Srpska would be in Cyrillic and the linguists would use 'their /the Serbs'/ vocabulary, their words'.

Asked about how this practice came about and whether they were told to do this by the military personnel, ZG said the following:

> No. They would basically come, the first 10 days of their deployment, they would come to us and ask us, like, how many languages do you speak? Do you speak Serbian or do you speak Croatian? And we would explain them that basically, yes, we do even though they are three different languages. And, but no one actually told us, like, you have to do this, in this way because they were soldiers, they were military personnel, they had nothing to do with interpreters or with interpretation or translation so they didn't have knowledge of that so, as I said, we did it, or speaking of myself personally, I did it because it was a proper and right thing to do, to the best of my knowledge.

Translation and interpretation policy and practice more or less remained the same until about 2001 after which there was gradually less insistence in the headquarters on having all documents in three versions and there was more flexibility in which language versions were produced. ZS explains it thus:

> I would say with SFOR, I think in 2001 or 2002 we managed to sort of convince them that if it were a technical document or if it was /?so to say/ politically sensitive or if it were not for such public distribution that we can do only one version. And now one version is widely acceptable, I would say, only if it's, yes, only if it's like official, if it's a translation like if it would be gazetted or something of the sort then yes, we would still do it in three versions but if it is, for example, a PowerPoint presentation or something of that kind, we just do one version.

Again, the above quote shows that language policy was guided by the linguists themselves as they were able to 'convince' the requester of a given translation that three versions were not necessary.

A significant development at the HQ at this time was the creation of a Linguistic Services Branch (LSB) which was formally established in November 2001. This was initiated by SHAPE with the primary cost-cutting goal of rationalising the provision of language services throughout the HQ.

This was in tandem with the general downsizing of the SFOR forces to about half their original number. The rationale behind the establishment of the branch was to centralise the services as much as possible so that the activities of the linguists could be managed and coordinated better. Up until then small groups of linguists ranging in size from two to seven members were located in different elements of the HQ with limited contact between them. With the reorganisation, many of the linguists who had been based in different offices in Sarajevo itself were placed in a central office located at Camp Butmir, the SFOR HQ just outside Sarajevo. Nineteen linguists were based there supervised by the chief and deputy chief of the branch who were both international employees with experience in translating and interpreting from and into English and the languages of Bosnia-Herzegovina. This arrangement was unusual for Bosnia-Herzegovina as the LSB was the only language service in the country headed by internationally-hired civilians who were experienced linguists and working according to recognised professional standards.

There were two other aims of the establishment of the LSB: to professionalise the service and to increase the standard of the services provided. In part, this was done through the provision of translation and interpretation training for the linguists and the establishment of a system of revision. Revision means that once a translation has been done it is looked at by a senior translator to ensure that the language of translation is used correctly, the translation conveys the correct meaning of the original text and in-house conventions as regards terminology and style are correctly applied. A system of revision is common practice in the language services of all international organisations. The revisions that are made by the reviser are either inserted by the translator themselves or by a third member of staff usually from the administrative staff. In the LSB the translators put in the corrections to their texts themselves; this was a way of improving the language knowledge and the skills of the translator as they would be able to learn from the changes. This was especially important for translations into English where the translators were working into a foreign language but the LSB also established a system of revision for the local languages with two of the best and most experienced locally-hired linguists taking on this role. In the context of the situation of three official but mutually intelligible languages these revisers have the

responsibility of deciding how the three language versions will be differentiated throughout the LSB. They do this on the basis of their own knowledge and experience of the three language versions and, especially in the case of Bosnian, the new orthographical manuals and dictionaries for the language versions. The Bosnian language version is more difficult to distinguish partly because of lack of agreement among Bosniak language planners on what constitutes the Bosnian standard language (as discussed in the Literature Review).

While some of the interviewees thought that it was relatively easy to make three language versions of a given translation, one linguist (QQ) in particular talked about the difficulties they had with producing a Bosnian version. This was a linguist who up until 2001, when they were relocated to the SFOR HQ, had worked exclusively to and from Serbian. They recalled how when producing their first Bosnian language version of a translation they had followed the advice of their colleague, who they described as 'a true Bosniak' and who had said that the language was similar to Serbian but had to be in Latin script and care needed to be taken with '-irati/-ovati' verbs (verbs ending in –irati are considered to be Bosnian or Croatian and those ending in –ovati Serbian). The linguist took the colleague's advice and sent the version for revision but when it came back it was 'totally corrected'. The interviewee explained their difficulties in the following way:

> It was easier with Croatian because it was quite, you could sense where you'd...this is going to be difficult, you will have to use quite specifically Croatian words. With Bosnian, I was never sure...I can see when I read a text I can feel somebody's intention to be different. But to know the natural difference specifically, especially between Serbian and Bosnian I'm not quite sure that I am able to feel it.

The role of the revisers in differentiating the three language versions also has implications for language policy outside the force. If three versions of an SFOR document go into the public domain they are then contributing to efforts by the language planners of the three ethnic groups to mould the three separate languages. Thus, HQ SFOR language policy not only feeds into local language politics because of the actual policy to produce three language versions but it also contributes to the corpus of the three language versions and bolsters the linguistic claims for the three standard languages.

One consequence of having a language service organised in such a way was that it increased the standing of the linguists employed by the HQ. The central office became the focal point for all matters to do with the provision of translation and interpretation services and particularly for the defence reform negotiations since, for example, it was central office linguists who provided the simultaneous interpretation for sessions of the JMCs and the plenary sessions of the DRC. The service could also call on a large number of linguists to interpret and translate for the nine working groups of the DRC. Additionally, this organisational structure acted as a kind of gate-keeper for the linguists in the central office as requesters of services did not necessarily have direct access to them and had to go through certain organisational procedures in requesting their services. Having formalised procedures meant that the branch and therefore its members were treated in a more professional way. It had been apparent during research conducted prior to the establishment of the LSB that there was a tendency for linguists to be used for activities that did not necessarily involve translation and interpretation and a tendency to ignore professionally-recognised standards as regards such things as the length of time that an interpreter can reasonably be expected to interpret for without a break.

Another factor that enhanced the standing of the linguists was having a chief who was an international employee with professional experience. An important consideration here is that both the chief and deputy chief had NATO security clearance unlike the locally-hired linguists. Having this status means that the chief and deputy chief are automatically on an equal footing with the force's military personnel and are immediately trusted by them. If the chief and their judgment is trusted then this is reflected onto attitudes towards the linguists themselves. Allied to this, is that any complaints or concerns about a particular linguist from the military can be addressed to a third party i.e. the chief.

Finally, another consequence of the establishment of the LSB was that in tracking the output of the linguists it became apparent how much time was spent on producing three language versions of documents. For example, producing the translation of a long document like a training manual in three language versions requires double the man hours, taking into account the time needed by the translator and the reviser to make and check the requisite

modifications to produce three distinct versions. The timing issue is an important one from the point of view of meeting deadlines because obviously producing only one version takes less time and the requester receives the document more quickly. The policy of producing three versions therefore had an impact on the organisation of the operations of the LSB.

By 2003 when defence reform activities were under way, there was a greater tendency to produce translations in only one version and SFOR HQ participants in the DRC decided that all working documents would be produced in only one language version while the final official documents were produced in three. This was readily accepted by all sides involved in the talks.[174] The change of attitude among both the local and the foreign military authorities can also be seen as a reflection of the changing circumstances of defence reform. After 2001 and the international community's moves to push Bosnia-Herzegovina towards EU and NATO membership the former warring sides were required to increase their cooperation with each other and the international community. This general atmosphere of cooperation would have therefore made untenable demands for separate but mutually intelligible language versions of documentation. The reorganisation of the international military force with EUFOR taking over from SFOR and the final outcomes of the defence reform process of a single ministry of defence and joint armed forces meant that language policy relaxed further. When the NAT moved to the Ministry of Defence building three linguists went with them and their interviews bear out this further change in policy.

In the following excerpt QQ explains how the three linguists at the NAT now work. The JMA that they refer to is the acronym for the old office at SFOR HQ that had primary responsibility for defence reform:

> QQ: We started working somewhat differently to what it was in JMA. We are very active and produce things that are no longer, you know, a letter that you would copy-paste, adapt, it's like Srđan will tell you, he currently translated a scenario for a war, some crisis somewhere in an imaginary country and they /Bosnian military personnel/ will work on that scenario and they will have a whole seminar on that and that is 80, 80 pages, 80 plus pages and to produce three versions would take so much time that...so we no longer produce...
>
> LA: What do you produce when you produce a translation?

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[174] This occurred at a meeting at which I was the interpreter.

> QQ: Something that we consider to be a neutral version. We use Latin script for everyone, very rarely do we use Cyrillic, very rarely, if we, you know, it's out of courtesy, if somebody is writing to a, I don't know, some, a Serb general and they want it to be in this and they specify that they would like it to be very...then we do it but very rarely now. So it's something that I would call a neutral version that's something that everyone will understand because it's now very...we are very often time-limited. There is no time to, you know, you wish to give your stuff that you've translated to somebody as soon as you finish it so we rely on feeling, on what everyone will understand and in that I think we are using something that is somewhere in between Serbian and Bosnian. And not Croatian /laughs/ I mean there is no way you can mix too much.

The above excerpt suggests that the change in policy was an initiative of the linguists themselves and the following excerpt from an interview with IR who also works with the NAT appears to confirm this. When asked if they were told to do a 'universal' version, as they called it, by anyone they say:

> I don't know. It was...I don't know. It happened recently. You know, it's a waste of time, it's a waste of paper, everybody understands it anyway. And so I guess we tried, we went for it. So, let's go for it and see if anyone minds. No complaints. OK.

It is worth here considering what it means to produce what the linguists cited above refer to as either a 'universal' or 'neutral' version. This is not a separate language version that has been officially established in the language service as an alternative to an ethnically-hued version of a translation. It is, rather, a version produced by any given translator endeavouring to remove from the translated text any characteristic that they judge might be instantly identifiable with one of the ethnically-hued versions. In this process they are doing the opposite to what they do when they produce a version for a specific ethnic group which entails stressing the written markers that characterise each version rather than minimising them. This means that there is nothing in the text that would strike the reader as inappropriate to a version specific to their ethnicity and lead them to reject it as the 'wrong' language version. In this sense the importance of the communicative function of the language is restored to the translation as it is the meaning of the text that has greater significance than the actual language version it is written in.

To a certain extent the current translation policy at the NAT is a reflection of the flexibility of the changed policy in the Ministry of Defence itself. This is clear from what QQ says below:

> We get letters from the Armed Forces or the Ministry of Defence. Their policy is that whoever drafted it, they use their own language. So we get letters in

> Cyrillic, Serbian, and I think everyone is accommodating that right of the others to use their own language. So a letter comes from Mr. Cikotić /minister of defence/ who is Bosniak and it's written, it's drafted in Serbian, Cyrillic and he signs it. That's become their own policy. Somebody in a department in the ministry drafted it for him, he just signs without...and it comes in Cyrillic. The same happened when a Serb was the Minister of Defence so people are quite flexible now.

Interviewee KM puts this down to the fact 'They work in the same office, Croats, Serbs, Bosnians, Bosniaks. They share the office, they speak the same language'. While RK suggests another reason for this change:

> It has to do with the, it also has to do with the change of the people that these letters are actually going to, because, I mean, the soldiers and the officers NATO was writing to like 6,7,8 years ago are now totally different. Most of them are gone and even now, even those that are still here have changed annually but they behave differently. No one will actually make a big fuss of a letter sent to him not being in this language or that language the way he sees, you know, he feels that language. People, I would say are trying to be more pragmatic so as soon as they get the message and understand the message they don't make a problem about that.[175]

Several things can be concluded about language policy from the above discussion of the developments in language practice in the SFOR HQ since 1995. First of all, there has been no uniform language policy across the force. The different national contingents had their own policies based on the language requirements in the location in which they were operating (they also had their own practices as regards language requirements, the recruitment of linguists, employment conditions and the organisation of the linguists' work). The situation was the same in the different elements within the HQ itself. Practice and policy were essentially left to each element until 2001 and the establishment of the LSB. It can be said therefore that there was no formalised language policy document that laid out practice and requirements as determined either at the level of HQ SFOR or SHAPE. If we view language policy in a less formalised way though it can be said that language policy was based on the decisions that were made immediately following the signing of the Dayton Peace Agreement. From the evidence it appears that once the war was over and three official languages were recognised the former warring sides demanded that their language rights be respected and they receive

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[175] Interviewee RK also said that they had heard Bosnian Serb officers using ekavian words but they thought that this was because they had been officers in the Yugoslav People's Army in which ekavian had been 'kind of the official dialect'. Serbo-Croat was the official language of the Yugoslav People's Army.

documentation in their particular language version. In response, the decision was made within HQ SFOR to produce three language versions of each document. Once this decision was made it became established practice for the next five or six years and in that sense a policy was created.

Second, policy changed in around 2001 and became more flexible as a consequence of a combination of external and internal factors. The LSB was established which provided the organisational framework within which language issues were addressed. This then made it easier for the linguists themselves to influence the approach of military personnel to the three-language version policy. In tandem with this, outside the force there was a general move towards closer relations with the EU and NATO which required closer cooperation between the three former warring sides. A consequence of this greater cooperation was a softening of attitudes towards issues of separation along ethnic lines so that a relaxation of the three language version policy on the part of SFOR HQ was accepted. After 2005 the linguists continued to be the initiators of a further relaxation of language policy as they reacted to changes in the organisation of NATO and EUFOR forces and their closer cooperation with the local forces. In this sense, the linguists are the drivers of language policy.

If the linguists shape language policy, as I am claiming, then this raises various issues to do with the position of the linguists, as locally-hired civilian employees, working in an international military force, and the power relationship between them and the military personnel. The relationship is a complex one. On the one hand, the military personnel have to trust the linguist as they facilitate communication between them and the local people and authorities. In this sense the military personnel have to trust that the linguist has the skill to be able to interpret and translate correctly and objectively. Additionally, the linguist is a repository of knowledge about the local community, local culture and past events even before a particular member of the military arrived in theatre. The military personnel are therefore dependent on the linguist for their wider insider knowledge which will hopefully facilitate the smooth course of operations. This dependence may also foster loyalty to the linguist on the part of a member of the military especially in offices where the two work closely together. So, for example, as the LSB was being set up

and there was the prospect of job losses certain supervisors did their best to justify their need for their particular linguist because they were aware of the poor chances of alternative employment outside the force should the linguist lose their job and they wanted to protect the linguist.

On the other hand, as touched upon earlier in this chapter when discussing the establishment of the LSB, there is always the risk of an element of suspicion or mistrust in the attitude of a member of the military to a linguist. As a member of the local population the linguist is in the military force but is not of it. In the eyes of the military personnel they may not share the same values or attitudes as them and their allegiance may not be wholly to the force. Thus, the linguist may be seen in terms of their ethnicity and considered to be more loyal to their ethnic group than to the force. Moreover, as a member of one of the three main ethnic groups, they may be seen in simplistic terms as representing the interests and the ideas of their particular ethnic group. This perceived loyalty to the ethnic group, as well as other issues relating to their family or local community, meant in the words of one British army language trainer who was in Bosnia-Herzegovina during the conflict and was interviewed by Catherine Baker that the linguists would 'normally bring some form of baggage [...] in terms of values, [] contacts' and as Baker explains, 'Their "baggage" might include personal conflicts, family matters, blackmail pressures or even plans for revenge' (Baker, 2010: 166). Therefore because of this 'baggage' a linguist cannot be completely trusted. Their situation is made more difficult by the fact that locally-hired linguists do not have NATO security clearance. Only a member country of NATO can give this clearance so citizens of non-NATO Bosnia-Herzegovina would not be able to obtain it. Even though all locally-hired personnel are required to be interviewed by the force's Security section every six months, this procedure falls short of full security clearance so there is still some residual suspicion of the locally-hired linguists.

Given the influence of the linguists on language policy and the complex relationship between them and members of the international military force, it is worth trying to gain a deeper insight into the motivations of linguists for the linguistic decisions they make and in the process question whether it is reasonable to essentialise the ethnic identity of a linguist. The next section will

therefore consider translator ethics. This is an issue that has been dealt with in the scholarship on translation theory particularly in the field of literary translation (Venuti, 1995; Jones, 2004; Chesterman, 2001) but nothing has yet been published about ethics in the context of translation and interpretation for an international military force in a conflict and post-conflict situation. This section therefore will go some way to fill this gap in the scholarship.

Translator ethics

As a starting point for considering translator ethics in the context of translating and interpreting for the international military force in Bosnia-Herzegovina it is instructive to look at four basic models of translation ethics put forward by Andrew Chesterman. These models can be differentiated as an ethics of representation, an ethics of service, an ethics of communication and norm-based ethics. In essence the ethics of representation is concerned with representing 'the source text, or the source author's intention, accurately, without adding, omitting or changing anything' (Chesterman, 2001: 139). The ethics of service is focussed on translation as 'a commercial service performed for a client' and in this regard 'A translator is deemed to act ethically if the translation complies with the instructions set by the client and fulfils the aim of the translation as set by the client and accepted or negotiated by the translator' (Chesterman 2001: 140). Three important aspects of this ethic are loyalty (to the client, as well as the target reader and the original writer), efficiency (the translator values the client's time and therefore meets deadlines) and the invisibility[176] of the translator (Chesterman 2001: 140). In the ethics of communication the emphasis is 'not on representing the Other but on communicating with others' and 'the ethical translator is a mediator working to achieve cross-cultural understanding' (Chesterman 2001: 141). Norm-based ethics has arisen from descriptive translation studies and norm theory and 'investigates the norms that determine or influence translation production and

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[176] Invisibility is a concept advanced by Lawrence Venuti relating to the role of primarily the literary translator. Venuti asserts that a translation is judged to be acceptable if it is deemed to read fluently i.e. 'when the absence of any linguistic or stylistic peculiarities makes it seem transparent, giving the appearance that it reflects the foreign writer's personality or intention or the essential meaning of the foreign text – the appearance, in other words, that the translation is not in fact a translation but the "original"' (1995: 1). In short, 'The more fluent the translation, the more invisible the translator, and, presumably, the more visible the writer or meaning of the foreign text' (Venuti, 1995: 2).

reception' (Chesterman 2001: 141). According to this model, 'Behaving ethically thus means behaving as one is expected to behave, in accordance with the norms, not surprising the reader or client' (Chesterman 2001: 141).

The first two models – the ethics of representation and the ethics of service – are most relevant to translation and interpretation for the international military force. They neatly encapsulate the two primary angles from which translator ethics can be viewed in the context of the international military force: fidelity to the text or utterance and loyalty to the client, that is to say, the organisation employing the linguist. In both models the linguist is expected to be invisible or 'erased,' as Zrinka Stahuljak (2000) has put it. In the former model, the importance of the message being conveyed and accuracy in the process over-rides the opinions and attitudes of the agent conveying the message, that is to say, the linguist. A major element of this invisibility for a linguist working with the international military force is the maintenance of neutrality in conveying the message. As Chesterman says, by representing the source text or source author's intention 'faithfully and truly' the linguist is acting 'like a good mirror' (2001: 140). In the latter model, focus is on the international military force as the organisation requiring the services of the linguist and setting the conditions for the provision of those services.

The question of neutrality has been linked in the scholarship with professionalism. For example, the late Danica Seleskovitch, the most well-known teacher of French-Serbo-Croat conference interpreting, formulated three prerequisites of professional interpretation, the most important of which she considered to be a professional methodology acquired through training so that a professional interpreter is 'fully aware that (s)he is a neutral mediator in someone else's communication, that mutual understanding should be prioritised and that the professional mediator's own opinion and stance should never be either evident or communicated' (Dragovic Drouet, 2007: 29).[177] This link between professionalism and neutrality is also made by AG in the quote earlier in this chapter. It is especially important for linguists working for international organisations in Bosnia-Herzegovina because they are hired locally (or to use Michael Cronin's term hired in a heteronomous system of

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[177] The other two were knowledge of the source and target languages and knowledge of the subject under discussion.

recruitment) and therefore they can be seen not just as linguists but also as members of one of the ethnic groups represented in the country. As such, their objectivity and neutrality can be questioned by either one of the former warring sides or the organisation that has employed them. There is a further link here, also touched upon by AG above, because neutrality manifested by a linguist engenders trust in the linguist's professionalism on the part of the interlocutors which in turn facilitates smooth communication between the sides.

The effects of a failure to maintain neutrality and therefore professionalism are considered by Stahuljak in her analysis of the experiences of volunteer interpreters working for the EC Monitoring Mission in Croatia in 1992 and 1993[178] who were all ethnic Croats. She ponders the motivations of those who volunteered and concludes that an interpreter does so because 'she is politically involved in the conflict. She volunteers out of *"patriotism,"* because she wants *"to do something,"* *"to help"* by using her language skills' (2000: 41). (The passages in italics are quotes from interviews with the volunteer interpreters themselves.) In the context of ongoing conflict between the Croats and the Serbs the wish to be politically involved in at least some way is understandable, but political involvement is at odds with the necessity to maintain neutrality. Other quotes from the ECMM translators illustrate how this failure to be neutral is manifested:

> 'A translator cannot and should not be just a "transmitter". One needs to have unofficial conversations.'
> 'Regardless of the official function, I try to play the role of an unofficial representative of the Republic of Croatia, I explain the situation in this part of the world to the monitors' (Stahuljak, 2000: 42).

Stahuljak sees this as the desire of the interpreter to be a witness and to be part of the process of testifying to what happened in the conflict between the ethnic Croats and Serbs even if the interpreter was not an actual eye witness to events. But in the context of neutrality the two roles of witness and interpreter are incompatible and as soon as the interpreter abandons the role of neutral intermediary the interpretation is disrupted along with the process of information gathering conducted by the ECMM monitors. Moreover, trust between the linguist and the monitors is also undermined which may have

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[178] Stahuljak bases her analysis on 24 interviews conducted by the Croatian social psychologist Ivan Magdalenić between autumn 1992 and spring 1993. Ten translators were female aged between 19 and 50 and 14 were male aged between 18 and 40.

serious consequences for the linguist, as evidenced by one linguist quoted by Stahuljak who was 'recalled from duty after *"[m]ostly translating, although I was explaining to them what was happening there"'* (2000:44).

The question of the interpreter's allegiance is a pertinent one here. If an interpreter has volunteered to work with the ECMM out of a sense of patriotism it could be assumed (as suggested by the above quotes) that their loyalty would be to the Republic of Croatia since all the interpreters considered by Stahuljak were ethnic Croats. There is therefore a danger that their interpretation would favour the Croatian side over the Serbian and the picture gained by the ECMM monitors would be skewed towards the Croatian interpretation of events. This is a particularly important issue in this context as the interpreters were interpreting in situations mainly involving ethnic Serbs. Furthermore, as volunteers, i.e. not formally employed by the ECMM and therefore not bound by any code of conduct, their allegiance to the ECMM may be rather weak and certainly less strong than to their country.

This is the situation with linguists who volunteered to work for the particular ECMM mission however there are two other aspects of the question of allegiance and how it is nurtured which are more relevant to organisations that formally employ locally-hired linguists. The first aspect is to do with the financial imperative of employment. In her general consideration of interpreting and translation issues arising from the conflicts in the former Yugoslavia from 1991 to 1999, Dragović-Drouet stresses that potential linguists were attracted to working for international organisations (as well as non-governmental organisations, media outlets and the peace-keeping forces) by the 'High unemployment brought about by the civil war, and the proffered high pay rates' (2007:33). The local economic situation is extremely important in this regard as it not only provides the linguist with the initial impetus to apply for a position with an international organisation but it also keeps the linguist locked into their employment because a linguist is fully aware that if they lose their well-paid position they may not find another one. Fear of unemployment could therefore influence the behaviour of a linguist and their adherence to certain behavioural norms expected from a professional neutral intermediary.

The other aspect to nurturing a sense of allegiance is the existence of a code of conduct that a linguist or indeed any employee is required to sign on commencing employment with an international organisation. All civilian employees, both international and local hires, of the international military force in Bosnia-Herzegovina are required to sign a declaration of loyalty such as the one below for the SFOR HQ:

> I solemnly undertake to exercise in all loyalty, discretion and conscience the functions entrusted to me as a staff member of SFOR, and to discharge these functions with the interest of SFOR only in view. I undertake not to seek or accept instructions in regard to the performance of my duties from any other authority other /sic/ than HQ SFOR. (My own document)

The first sentence of this declaration makes it clear where the allegiance, or loyalty, of the employee should lie while the second underscores the primacy of SFOR over any other authority. While this is not a code of conduct that specifically governs the activities of the linguists working with the international military force, it nevertheless chimes with Chesterman's model of ethics of service as discussed above. It is at odds, however, with the model of ethics of representation if the linguist is required to carry out their duties 'with the interest of SFOR only in view' since according to this model it is the source language and the intention of the source writer that have primacy.

In view of this ethical conflict it is worth asking where the linguist working for the international military force is therefore positioned in an interpreter-mediated situation. Their allegiance to the organisation requires loyalty to that organisation and yet this may conflict with the professional requirement of maintaining neutrality and invisibility. This conflict is drawn out by Mona Baker in her book *Translation and Conflict* which views translation through narrative theory, making use in this regard of work by the social theorists Margaret Somers and Gloria Gibson. Baker elaborates on their four kinds of narrative: ontological, public, conceptual and meta-narratives. The two kinds of narratives most germane to our particular discussion of translator ethics are the ontological and public narratives.[179]

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[179] For Baker conceptual narratives are 'the stories and explanations that scholars in any field elaborate for themselves and others about their object of inquiry' (2006: 39) and she suggests the concept of the Clash of Civilizations posited by Samuel Huntington as one of these. In describing meta-narratives or master narratives Baker quotes Gibson and Somers who see these as narratives 'in which we are embedded as contemporary actors in history...Progress,

Ontological narratives are 'personal stories that we tell ourselves about our place in the world and our own personal history. These stories both constitute and make sense of our lives' (Baker, 2006: 28). Baker points out, however, the interplay between these narratives that are focussed on the self and the collective narratives in which they are situated and on which they depend and which inform them (Baker, 2006: 29). This interplay is important because if 'ontological narratives are used to define who we are; this in turn is a precondition for knowing what to do' (Somers and Gibson quoted in Baker, 2006: 30) and the way we act naturally impacts on those around us (Baker, 2006: 31). Baker concludes: 'In the final analysis we have to negotiate our way around the various incompatibilities or conflicts between our ontological narratives and those of other individuals with whom we share a social space, as well as incompatibilities with collective narratives, in order to be believed, respected, trusted' (2006: 31).

Drawing on Somers' (1992, 1997) and Somers' and Gibson's (1994) model, Baker defines public narratives 'as stories elaborated by and circulating among social and institutional formations larger than the individual, such as the family, religious or educational institutions, the media, and the nation' (2006: 33). To illustrate these she gives examples of the public narratives concerning 11 September 2001 and the war on Iraq launched by the US-led Coalition in 2003. In the Bosnia-Herzegovina context, it could be said that one public narrative that is circulated widely is concerned with the need for each ethnic group to have its own distinct language as a marker of its identity.

If we apply Baker's ideas about narrative theory to the linguists working for the international military force we can see how different personal and collective narratives interact to dictate the behaviour of the linguists. Each of the linguists has their own personal or ontological narrative situated within, among other narratives, the collective narrative of their professional lives in which there are several important elements which may conflict. Firstly, this collective narrative dictates that a linguist should be a neutral intermediary when translating and interpreting but in conflict with this is a second element

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Decadence, Industrialization, Enlightenment, etc.' (2006: 44). Baker suggests the War on Terror as one of these meta-narratives.

which dictates a firm allegiance to the international military force over any other authority. Thirdly the professional narrative also increasingly favours a policy of producing just one 'universal' or 'neutral' language version of a translation rather than three even though this is at odds with the particular public narrative of the importance of three separate languages distinguishing the three ethnic groups.

The way the linguists interviewed negotiate these conflicting narratives can be seen in the responses that they gave to two questions - What language do you speak? and What language did you speak before the war? The responses to the first question are varied and quite convoluted in some cases, suggesting an effort to fit their own ontological narrative into the wider public narrative and to make sense of where they are situated in this public narrative:

> Linguist KM:
> LA: If somebody were to ask you what language you spoke what would you say?
> KM: Serbo-Croatian, still. Well, sometimes I say, like to foreigners, I say local language. To locals I say our language, *naš jezik*, or my language, sometimes Serbo-Croatian. I just don't feel comfortable saying I speak Serbian, I speak Bosnian. I definitely don't speak Croatian. My mother tongue should be Serbian but I live in Bosnia and it's kind of a mixture of Bosnian and Serbian, I don't know, maybe it's Serbo-Bosnian /laughs/.

> Linguist CA:
> LA: If somebody asked you what language you spoke what would you say?
> CA: Privately or professionally? Because there is a difference.
> LA: Yeh, well, tell me both.
> CA: Privately, I speak Sarajevan. /laughs/ No, yeh, the local dialect. It would be, well, heavily influenced by Serbo-Croat, definitely, because I simply don't want to spend my days and especially my time off putting in an effort. So I will speak in Serbo-Croat with a heavy, heavy influence of local, well, dialect, slang, I would say. Professionally, when I am addressing someone in local language it is always either Bosnian, Serb or Croat and I strive to be very correct. I do, I hope.

> Linguist IR:
> LA: So if somebody were to ask you which language you spoke what would you say?
> IR: Oooph. I'd say I speak the same language I spoke in 1990 so it would be Serbo-Croat /laughs/ I don't know, I guess it's the same language, it hasn't changed.
> LA: But if somebody, if a soldier, I don't know, a foreign soldier, an American you had never met and he came and asked you what language you speak what would you say?
> IR: Hmm. What would I say? The Constitution says I speak the language of Bosnian Serbs.

> Linguist LB:

LA: So if somebody were to ask you, what language you spoke what would you say?

LB: As you know, I am too old, and I was raised, I was born in something that is today in the Republika Srpska, Trebinje, but I was there until I was 5. I was, I went to school in some areas where the majority are Croats and from my early first grade in primary school until I finished university it was Serbo-Croat. We usually say s-h, just the abbreviation. And I cannot say, I don't know how someone can say that when he is 50 or over now he speaks another language. /thoughts on learning English/ I cannot just say today that I'm, my language is Bosnian, Serbian, Croat, if you divide them, or you can call it Esperanto. Anyone can name it how they would like but I am speaking Serbo-Croat.

Linguist ZS:

LA: So if somebody were to ask you what language you spoke what would you say?

ZS: I would say Bosnian.

LA: And would you say that every time? Would it depend on who was asking you?

ZS: No, I would say that each time because I don't speak Croatian, it's a different dialect and it's, I mean, the dialect that I speak is different from Croatian language and the accent and everything and I definitely don't speak Serbian so it's like I would say in between and then it is Bosnian. I am a proud Bosnian and therefore I am proud in saying that I speak Bosnian.

It can be seen that some of the interviewed linguists use various ways to avoid designating the language they speak according to one of the official languages of Bosnia-Herzegovina. In their explanations they were most likely to use the pre-war designation of Serbo-Croat despite the awareness that that designation no longer officially exists. CA illustrates well the dilemma of linguists negotiating conflicting narratives. In their ontological narrative they prefer to describe their language in terms of the city in which they live, as opposed to the ethnic group they belong to, or the town in which they were born or one of the official languages. Professionally though they strive to be 'very correct,' naming the language according to the current official designations.

Linguist ZS, as one of the linguists who unequivocally stated that they spoke one of the official languages (rather than Serbo-Croat), is also caught between narratives but in a slightly different way to CA. Having stated that they speak Bosnian it could be expected in view of the public narrative of Bosnian being the language of the Bosniak ethnic group that they would call themselves a 'proud Bosniak'. Instead they call themselves 'a proud Bosnian' meaning that they see themselves as a citizen of the country rather than a member of a particular ethnic group. This is their way of negotiating between

their own ontological narrative and the public one of the three languages designating the three ethnic groups.

In contrast to the answers given above, the answer that all the linguists interviewed gave in response to the question of which language they spoke before the war was always Serbo-Croat and given without hesitation. Such an unequivocal response suggests that before the war there was no dilemma for the linguists between their ontological narrative and the public narrative when it came to the question of the language they spoke. The public narrative was based on official government policy that the Croats, Muslims and Serbs throughout the former Yugoslavia spoke one language which was called either Serbo-Croat or Croato-Serbian and that there was no *narod*-language link. Moreover, from the point of view of the linguists' ontological narratives, calling the language Serbo-Croat did not conflict with how they felt about identifying with either their *narod* or the Republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina. The two types of narrative were therefore not in conflict.

The question of 'the right thing to do'

Now that we have looked at narrative theory as elucidated by Baker and how this can facilitate understanding of the actions of the linguists working for the international military force in Bosnia-Herzegovina we can examine the idea of courtesy and 'the right thing to do' as mentioned by the linguists in the interviews cited earlier on in this chapter. One of these was ZG who considered it 'a proper and right thing to do' to translate project documentation into the particular language of the recipient of the documentation rather than just a 'neutral' version. In doing this they are demonstrating awareness of the public narrative concerning the three official languages in Bosnia-Herzegovina and the possibility that a translation in the wrong language may be rejected by the recipient, which in turn may negatively impact on operations. This public narrative may or may not correspond to his ontological one.

Furthermore, ZG is also aware of the collective narrative of their working environment and the fact that their actions may affect how an outsider will view the international military force. If they put the translation into a 'neutral' language version the recipient may feel that the international forces are not respecting him and his rights as a member of one of the ethnic groups

and this may influence the way in which he interacts with them. Using a particular language version, on the other hand, avoids the possibility of this happening and becomes a question of respect for that person's ethnicity and thus a question of courtesy.

For the linguists working at the NAT with the newly reformed armed forces of Bosnia-Herzegovina the situation is slightly different. By producing a 'neutral' version of a translation they are respecting the collective narrative not necessarily of EUFOR but of the armed forces of Bosnia-Herzegovina which in turn does not correspond to the public narrative of three official languages. And again this may or may not correspond to the ontological narrative of the linguists themselves but they nevertheless consider that this is the right thing to do.

The purpose of the above discussion was to show how linguists working for the international military force have to negotiate varying and often conflicting narratives when making linguistic decisions in their professional lives. It is therefore simplistic to view the linguist solely as a member of a given ethnic group and therefore embedded in the public narrative of each ethnic group having its own separate and distinct language. It is more helpful to view a linguist caught between the public narrative, the professional narrative of their place of work and, additionally, their ontological narrative when considering their motivations for their actions. This therefore gives us a greater understanding of translator ethics and the motivations of linguists working in a conflict and post-conflict environment.

Conclusion

The purpose of this chapter has been to shed light on the factors that influence the formulation of language policy in the context of the international military force in Bosnia-Herzegovina. It has been shown that this policy has developed in response to circumstances outside the force. During the war little attention was paid to issues regarding the differentiation of three language versions but immediately after the signing of the Dayton Peace Agreement and its *de facto* recognition of three official languages policy changed to accommodate the demands of local military and political authorities for their language rights to be respected. Thus the decision was made by members of the

military personnel, particularly in the HQ, to produce three language versions of every document and this formed the basis of the language policy that prevailed at the force HQ until about 2000. Over time, however, it was the influence of the linguists themselves that led to a modification and relaxation of this policy. This has been a progressive change starting with the translation of long documents or conference presentations, and now it can be said that more often than not just one version of a translation will be produced. This is especially clear from the interviews with the linguists working for the NAT who work most closely with members of the Bosnia-Herzegovina armed forces.

It can be said that the initial reasons for this relaxation were pragmatic. The production of three versions is a drain on resources and is hard to justify in a practical sense. As time has gone on, however, especially within the wider context of the defence reform and establishment of unified armed forces, the practice is also a reflection of attitudes among the members of the local military and their own administrative practices. Whereas immediately after the conflict the different militaries were operating in an environment in which the ethnic groups were to be distinguished from each other as much as possible, even linguistically, after 2001 their environment gradually changed to one in which cooperation and collaboration were emphasised in striving towards the common goal of achieving NATO and EU membership. Thus language policy has been modified in line with these changed attitudes.

Although they did not make the initial decision on the three-language policy we have seen in this chapter that the linguists themselves have over time had most influence over language policy. They have also been influential in another sense. In implementing the three-language policy required by the former warring sides and the international military force they have been responsible for finding ways to distinguish the three language versions and making one language three. They have thus contributed to efforts outside the force to consolidate three distinct standard languages and thereby fed into the essentially political idea that these languages are distinct. Because the precise features of these languages are still unclear the influence of the linguists of the international military force, as well as those working for other international organisations who have the same concerns, is essential in moulding them. This

is particularly important for the Bosnian language where there is still disagreement among the Bosniak language planners over the precise profile of the language. Seen in sociolinguistic terms, the linguists have therefore contributed to both the status and the corpus planning aims of the language planners.

The experience of the linguists employed with the international military force HQ tells us much about language policy formulation. For example, a language policy does not have to be written down and formalised at the highest level. I would argue in this particular case that the fact that the process of policy formation occurred at a lower level and in an essentially *ad hoc* fashion made the policy more flexible and able to adapt to the changing outside environment. But this is perhaps only possible because it was guided by experienced linguists working on the ground rather than military personnel with little knowledge of the language situation in the country. As experienced linguists they have the 'institutional memory' to be able to put language issues in the context of past practice and experience. Moreover, as locally-hired linguists they understand perfectly well issues surrounding the mutual intelligibility of the three languages and the symbolic function of language as a marker of ethnic identity. Finally, having to negotiate complex and conflicting narratives they understand the fluidity of the language situation and implications for policy and policy change.

The experience of the international military force holds several lessons as regards language policy formulation in the context of external peace-building. First of all, it is advantageous to include the input of linguists in formulating language policy as they are the ones who are most knowledgeable about the language situation in the given conflict/post-conflict environment. Second, any language policy should be flexible enough to respond to changes on the ground especially because in a post-conflict peace-building environment the hope and expectation is that these circumstances will over time move from belligerence to conciliation. Here, again, the input of linguists who are in post for periods far longer than a six-month rotation is important. Third, it is useful to have a separate organisational structure run according to recognised professional standards in which the linguists can be employed. As shown in the SFOR HQ example this means that linguists are more likely to be trained as

professionals and treated as such and therefore taken more seriously in the policy-making process. During the conflict in Bosnia-Herzegovina, the bulk of linguists were non-professionals, recruited on an *ad hoc* basis with little regard for their level of knowledge, ability and interpretation and translation experience. Having an organisational framework in which the linguists can be employed means that they can be tested, trained and their performance assessed and evaluated. Moreover, this instils a sense of translator and interpreter ethics and enhances the professionalism of the linguists.

Finally, language policy developments in the international military force demonstrate the way in which a language policy can interact with moves to achieve wider peace-building aims. The rigid language policy established after 1995 reflected wider socio-political attitudes but did not reflect the peace-building aims of the international community but the changes since 2001 have been in tune not only with changed attitudes within the domestic military force itself but also with the defence reform goals. In this sense we can see that even though an institutional language policy may not by itself be able to effect positive change in the wider society it nevertheless reinforces the social attitudes that prevail at any given time. In that sense it can still nevertheless be used to aid the achievement of peace-building goals.

CONCLUSION

Much of this thesis has been concerned with examining the implications of language being seen as a barbed wire fence. In the original quote Lord Ashdown suggested that each of the former warring sides in Bosnia-Herzegovina clung on to this metaphorical barbed wire as a way of keeping themselves apart from the other ethnic groups. The goal of this thesis has been to investigate how the international community in Bosnia-Herzegovina has dealt with a situation where language is used almost as a weapon to achieve wartime aims in a peacetime situation. To this end, I have examined the language policy of the international community since war's end in 1995. There has been an exploration of whether the international organisations present in the country have had an identifiable language policy and, if not, what approach they have taken to language issues. This language policy has been put in the context of the peace-building process in Bosnia-Herzegovina and the study has sought to offer an answer to the question of whether the approach of the international community to language issues in the country has helped or hindered this process since 1995.

My research questions revolved around whether the international organisations in Bosnia-Herzegovina had a language policy and if so what form this took, how it was formulated and conducted and by whom. If they did not have a policy the question was how they have approached the language issue in Bosnia-Herzegovina. In order to answer these questions I looked at three areas germane to the peace-building project in Bosnia-Herzegovina where various international organisations have played a lead role. The first of these was the constitutional-political framework that was put in place in the Dayton Peace Agreement of December 1995 and has to all intents and purposes been overseen by the Office of the High Representative. Second, I looked at the reform of the education system which, since 2002, has been guided by the Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe. The third area under consideration was the defence reform that was led by the NATO Stabilisation Force. In my research I also looked at the language issue from a historical perspective because the language issues that are of concern now are not new

and different approaches have been taken in the past to deal with these. The research into all these areas threw up various issues when considering the question of the language policy of the international community which make the answer to the question of its impact on the peace-building process a complex one.

This concluding chapter will start by answering the question of whether the international community has had a language policy. The short answer to this is no. No policy document exists detailing the approach of the international community to language issues in Bosnia-Herzegovina and the intended outcomes of policy. Yet the literature review in Chapter 1 indicated that the concept of language policy (and planning) is a broad one. A language policy, for example, does not have to be a formalised policy containing rational planning goals and disseminated to the relevant levels for implementation. Rather, a language policy can be discerned in the decisions that are taken which deal with or influence language issues in some way in a given environment. Following Spolsky (2005), therefore, policy can be ascertained by looking at the actions taken by the relevant authority in language matters which directly apply to language issues. In this view, then, by investigating the actions of certain international organisations in dealing with language issues this study has revealed that the international community in Bosnia-Herzegovina has had a language policy. The first decision in this policy is readily discernible in the *de facto* recognition of three official languages – Bosnian, Croatian and Serbian – in the Dayton Peace Agreement of 1995, thus giving equal status to the three languages. My research indicated that this decision may not have been made deliberately by the negotiators at the Dayton negotiations but it was clear from the field interviews with linguists working with the NATO Implementation Force at the time that this recognition of the equality of the three languages had an immediate impact, heralding a change in attitudes both among the local military forces and, as a response to their demands, among members of the multinational military force. After the signing of the Dayton Peace Agreement, the representatives of each of the three former warring sides felt that they were entitled to have their own language respected and therefore demanded documentation in their specific language version. This initial Dayton decision affected not just the NATO force but also the other

large international organisations present in Bosnia-Herzegovina: the OSCE and the OHR, for example, both adopted the policy of providing documentation in three language versions.

The other decision contained in the Dayton Peace Agreement which can be viewed indirectly as a language policy decision is the decision to require the post-war state to sign up to international legal instruments designed to protect minority language rights, such as the 1992 European Charter for Regional and Minority Languages and the 1994 Framework Convention for the Protection of National Minorities. The significance of this is that the former was used in the 2002 Constitutional Court decision on the constituent status of the constituent peoples or *narodi* which, among other things, consolidated the status of the three separate languages and their equality. It also supported the claims of the three main ethnic groups to linguistic and ethnic distinctiveness. Furthermore, the inclusion of these international documents related to linguistic human rights in the Dayton Peace Agreement has also allowed local nationalist politicians to invoke these in order to justify, for example, their failure to do away with segregation in schools.

How is international community language policy formulated?

If the Dayton Peace Agreement marks the beginning of the language policy process of the international community, as I have suggested, then the next question is how is it developed and implemented. In order to investigate this question I focussed on the two areas of education reform and defence reform. I chose these two areas because they were treated in different ways in the Dayton Peace Agreement: education reform was mentioned hardly at all while the bulk of the agreement is devoted to the military aspects of the peace. I also thought that investigation of these contrasting sectors would highlight different approaches to the language issue and demonstrate the different implications that language policy can have depending on the sector concerned. I will consider the results of my research in these two sectors separately below.

International community language policy in education reform

We saw in Chapter 4 on language and the education reform that the international community has not dealt with language issues as issues in themselves. Rather, decisions on language issues have been made as part of other policies. The language issue is important both as a subject in the curriculum and as the language of instruction but decisions about these two aspects are made only in the context of facilitating the aims of a wider policy, for example, the policy to encourage the return of refugees and displaced persons which was a priority for the international community in the post-war period. The intention here was to create a friendly learning environment for returnee children who would find themselves in a minority position in their communities and schools. Policies in the education sector in this regard initially facilitated the establishment of 'two schools under one roof' schools and the introduction of the national subjects. Both these aspects of policy have a strong language element which has been used to frustrate the original aim of promoting integration and to maintain segregation. I argued that this is because of the emotional power that language has as a marker of ethnic identity in a state where the population experiences societal insecurity. This was demonstrated by the fact that local politicians justify their failure to do away with segregation in schools by invoking the spectre of language death and therefore the death of the nation if they do. As this research has demonstrated, where societal insecurity is salient, as it is in Bosnia-Herzegovina, such claims find fertile ground among local populations and this makes it difficult for the international community to effect change in policies which directly impact on issues of identity, such as education reform.

In the education sector language has not been the object of policy but it is nevertheless inextricably linked with education reform moves and is implicated in the achievement of education reform goals. My research suggests that the international community failed to appreciate the importance of the language-ethnic identity link for education issues and did not understand how language issues fed into the conduct of other policies. In short, the international organisations dealing with education reform failed to comprehend how

language could be manipulated to maintain ethnic segregation, thus frustrating the overall peace-building goals of the international community.

International community language policy in defence reform

Language policy decisions taken in the NATO force demonstrate a different kind of language policy. In this environment language policy relates to an institutional policy concerning the production of documents and translation and interpretation practices. It differs from language policy in the field of education reform because language was not a subject in the post-war negotiations and is therefore not implicated in the conduct of other policies as we saw in the field of education reform.

As I suggested above, policy was set in the Dayton Peace Agreement. The decisions taken immediately after it came into force were made by senior military officers. Thereafter, however, and particularly at the level of the HQ, which guided the defence reform process, language policy was left to the linguists themselves. I argue in this study that this had the consequence of making language policy more flexible than it otherwise might have been had it been guided by non-linguist members of the foreign militaries. As relations between the three former warring sides became less tense and more cooperative, especially once Bosnia-Herzegovina had declared its intention to join NATO and the EU in 2001, language policy as regards the translation of three language versions could be relaxed. The impetus for this relaxation came from the linguists advising the members of the international military force especially during the crucial work of the Defence Reform Commission. The force could then move away from the practice of producing three language versions of any given document to working increasingly with one syncretic 'all-Bosnian' language version.

Does the experience of international community language policy in the defence reform hold any lessons for the area of education reform? The research demonstrated how in the language policy process in both the defence reform and education reform language issues and social circumstances are closely intertwined. Attitudes within each area of reform are crucial for the success or

failure of each reform process in general and for language policy in particular. Attitudes in the local military forces toward ethno-linguistic issues relaxed as attitudes generally moved towards increased cooperation under the influence of endeavours to meet the criteria for closer cooperation with NATO. Had this not happened and the three former warring sides had remained separated along ethnic lines it would have been far harder to modify the language policy that was predicated on three language versions. We can contrast these circumstances with those that are germane to education reform. In education reform the language issue strikes at the heart of identity politics where the symbolic function of language has primacy. The societal insecurity felt by each of the ethnic groups means that attitudes to identity issues, including linguistic identity issues, are more rigid which in turn means there is less room for flexibility in dealing with language issues. Therefore it is more difficult to change language policy.

I pinpointed in the research that international community language policy in the defence reform could change because there was a general desire in the forces and at state level to work towards membership of NATO. In the non-military sector of education reform the international community has tried to use the carrot of membership of the EU as a way of getting local authorities to do away with segregation in schools. So far, this has remained ineffective because it is not in the interest of local politicians and elites to put the interests of the state above their own narrower political interests, and there is no state-level body that can impose this on them. Moreover, unlike the defence reform, education reform concerns a wide range of stakeholders (teachers, parents, pupils, school boards and politicians) many more than in the area of defence reform all of whom influence the reform process. Furthermore, whereas the defence reform was led by just two international organisations (NATO and OSCE) the area of education reform has been, especially before 2002, the concern of a plethora of organisations and agencies often with competing agendas. Because of these different factors, it has been difficult to create an environment where issues of identity do not override all other education issues and which would facilitate the eradication of segregation in schools.

Has international community language policy hindered the peace-building aims of the international community?

Having considered language policy in the two areas that were the focus of this research we must now address the contention put forward at the beginning of this study that the language policy of international organisations has hindered their peace-building aims.

One essential aspect of the peace-building process is the reconciliation of conflicting ethnic identities to embed the entire population into the integral post-conflict state and thereby ensure its stability. As a marker of ethnic identity, language is a crucial element in this process. In considering the historical experience of Bosnia-Herzegovina as regards language issues, this research demonstrated that since the nineteenth century past authorities have recognised the significance of language for inter-ethnic relations and have therefore conducted specific policies to manipulate this language-ethnic identity link in order to achieve wider political aims. Had representatives of the international community looked to the past, they would have realised the importance of the language issue not only for the regulation of inter-ethnic relations but also for identity formation. They would also have realised, as did the regimes in the three historical periods that were under scrutiny, that the language issue can also be seen as a security issue.

This research confirmed the finding of Greenberg (2004) and Monnesland (2005) that the language policy of the international organisations in Bosnia-Herzegovina has essentially rested on the recognition of three distinct languages and their equality. This stems from the wording of the Dayton Peace Agreement but it also reflects the policy of domestic language planners and elites as regards the language issue. It is also a reflection of current thinking on minority linguistic rights which advocates the preservation of endangered and minority languages and respect for the rights of the speakers of these languages. This policy is compatible with the idea that respect for a group's language rights increases the feeling of well-being of that group in the wider society and enhances its feeling of attachment to the wider state. This study challenges these assumptions in the case of Bosnia-Herzegovina. The research on societal security and education reform showed that the advocacy of

separate languages bolsters claims to linguistic difference which, in turn, supports the idea of ethnic difference which not only is central to the divisive ethnic politics in the country but also frustrates the creation of an all-inclusive Bosnian identity. The international community's language policy therefore only supports the idea of linguistic and ethnic difference which is manipulated by local political elites to nurture the loyalty of their constituents to the ethnic group rather than to the integral state of Bosnia-Herzegovina. This was clearly demonstrated in the chapter on education reform where local politicians and other power-holders use language divisions to hinder the integration of pupils of different ethnic groups in schools and classrooms. In such segregated environments schoolchildren do not socialise with school children from other ethnic groups and receive an education based on a mono-ethnic view of the world. This hinders not only the reconciliation of conflicting identities but also the creation of an identity tied to the state. In this sense, I would argue that the language policy of the international organisations has hindered the peace-building process.

Parts of this research can, however, be given a different interpretation. If we look at the findings regarding the language policy of the NATO Stabilisation Force since the beginning of the defence reform we might make the opposite assessment. Language policy in this area moved away from strict adherence to the production of three language versions and towards a more flexible approach that allowed for the production of just one, syncretic, version, at least for working documents. In this, language policy was adapting to the changing environment as the different armed forces in Bosnia-Herzegovina moved towards increased cooperation and unification in preparation for joining NATO and the Partnership for Peace and responding to the more flexible practice among the armed forces themselves. Given this greater spirit of cooperation it would have been inappropriate for the NATO force to continue to cling on to the linguistic 'barbed wire fence' and carry on the original policy of producing three language versions. Doing so may not have actually hindered the defence reform process but it would not have contributed to facilitating it either. In this sense, then, it can be concluded from this part of the research that ultimately the language policy of the international community has reinforced

the greater spirit of cooperation within the military and has thereby not hindered the peace-building process.

These two opposing conclusions might be construed as highlighting a limitation of the overall research in that I have compared two very different areas of post-conflict reform and ended up with a chalk and cheese situation. Another approach might have compared different international organisations or concentrated on the language policy of just one. But I would argue that looking at two contrasting areas has added to our understanding of the different forms that a language policy might take in a post-conflict environment and demonstrated the complex interaction between language issues and socio-political circumstances which is heightened in conditions of post-conflict peace-building.

Contribution to scholarship

This study contributes to knowledge in several fields of scholarship. As primarily a study about language policy it adds to our understanding of how language policy is developed in a post-conflict peace-building situation and the relationship between language policy and other policies important for the peace-building process. Within this it contributes also to scholarship in the field of linguistic human rights. Whereas current thinking and practice focus on the rights of the speakers of a minority language vis-à-vis those of the speakers of a majority language in a given community, this study investigates the implications for linguistic human rights of a specific situation where the languages in question are mutually comprehensible and have equal official status.

This study also contributes to scholarship in the field of translation studies. Little has been published hitherto on translation and interpretation in a multinational military force in a peace-building environment. Translation studies scholarship has tended to concentrate on the experiences of professional linguists without regard for the experiences of those linguists who find themselves working as translators and interpreters almost by accident. Given the sheer numbers of these heteronomous (to use Cronin's term) translators and interpreters employed by the international military force since the beginning of its involvement in the territory of the former Yugoslavia, it is important that the

scholarship addresses the particular issues raised by the employment of translators and interpreters in this specific environment. This study is particularly valuable as it draws on interviews with the linguists themselves and adds to our understanding of issues related to identity and the ethics of translators and interpreters who occupy a grey area as employees of the international military force but also as representatives of the ethnic groups that the force deals with.

Finally, little has been written in the scholarship on peace-building that directly addresses the issue of language in this process. In the extensive literature on every possible aspect of post-Dayton Bosnia-Herzegovina attention is very rarely given to the language issue in its own right. This study has attempted to rectify this by putting language at centre stage and making the case for a consideration of language issues to be part of peace-building research.

Contribution to practice

At a recent conference at which I gave a presentation on the linguistic aspects of the peace-building process in Bosnia-Herzegovina, my fellow panel members and I were accused of 'international community bashing' by a former US official who had held a senior position in the Office of the High Representative.[180] It is a shame that this kind of attitude is held by practitioners working on the ground because my intention is not to make a blanket criticism of the activities of the international community in language policy in post-Dayton Bosnia-Herzegovina but to offer insights into the lessons that are to be learned from this example for future interventions by the international community in a post-conflict situation. My research has shown that consideration should be given at some point, preferably at the beginning of the entire peace-building process, to the question of language in the post-war environment. In a different context, there may not even be a language issue as such but I would argue that there should at least be an understanding among peace negotiators and other representatives of the international community that language may need to be addressed. In this it is necessary to have an

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[180] This occurred at the inaugural conference of the Exeter Centre for Ethno-Political Studies at the University of Exeter, 'Ethno-Politics in a Globalized World,' 27-30 June 2010.

appreciation of the ways in which language issues can impact on other policies and the ultimate peace-building goals and vice versa, as well as on ways to prevent or mitigate the possible harmful effects of this. In exploring some of these issues, this study is intended to contribute in a practical sense to the understanding among non-academic practitioners of the linguistic implications of international peace-building actions.

In my interview with Lord Ashdown he explained that in his experience the international community in Bosnia-Herzegovina saw the language issue and the need to adhere to a policy of equality for all three languages as 'an irksome thing to do amongst many irksome things in Bosnia'. This attitude only minimises the importance of an issue that, as this research has shown, has far-reaching implications for the stability and security of Bosnia-Herzegovina. This study demonstrates that in an international peace-building environment language should not be seen as 'irksome' but, rather, as something deserving of a serious, deliberate and considered approach.

Appendix

LIST OF INTERVIEWEES

Interviewee	Organisation	Date of interview
RA	NGO	26 May 2008
RR	OHR	27 May 2008
LA	OSCE	28 May 2008
AG	HQ Eufor	29 May 2008
ZG	HQ Eufor	29 May 2008
CA	HQ Eufor	29 May 2008
ZS	HQ Eufor	29 May 2008
UO	OSCE	30 May 2008
KM	NATO	2 June 2008
RK	NATO	2 June 2008
QQ	NATO	2 June 2008
CC	OHR	3 June 2008
IR	HQ Eufor	4 June 2008
RF	HQ Eufor	4 June 2008
LB	HQ Eufor	4 June 2008
NA	NGO	6 June 2008
RC	NGO	6 June 2008
OO	US State Department (formerly)	3 August 2008
Lord (Paddy) Ashdown	OHR (formerly)	21 October 2009

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