

**GLOBALISATION, THE EUROPEAN UNION AND TURKEY:
RETHINKING THE STRUGGLE OVER HEGEMONY**

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Abstract

The research approaches Turkish membership question to the European Union as an open-ended struggle among social forces. It aims to address whether there is a hegemonic pro-membership perspective and if any, which social forces are supporting it. Is there any alternative contesting and resisting membership and neo-liberal restructuring? Can disadvantaged groups from globalisation form a united struggle, and if not, how can we account for the lack of an alternative? At the theoretical level, it dismisses mainstream integration theories as debate is mainly stuck to the dichotomy between membership or not (form of integration), that in return is a non-debate. It introduces Gramscian historical materialist framework that paves the way to account for socio-economic content and power relations underpinning ongoing integration process. The argument proceeds by delving into a debate on theoretical coordinates regarding hegemony in Gramscian analyses and the theory of discourse introduced by Laclau and Mouffe in the *Hegemony and Socialist Strategy*. Ultimately, it dismisses theory of discourse and conceives class struggle in relation to discipline of capital over society within social relations of production. The empirical data relies on semi-structured interviews conducted with capital and labour, political parties, state officials and women rights/feminist groups and human rights groups. Additionally, particular sectors, textile, automotive and agriculture are examined in parallel with Gramscian historical materialist coordinates on intra-class struggle.

I shall argue that pro-membership perspective, whose socio-economic content is consolidation of neo-liberal restructuring, is hegemonic. It is pioneered by internationally oriented capital and conveyed as the means to stimulate competitiveness and economic growth and to consolidate democracy. It draws support from nationally oriented capital analogous with delocalization of production and integration to transnational production via outsourcing and contract manufacturing. Yet, it is possible to identify two rival class strategies that contest neo-liberal pro-membership project, neo-mercantilism that is supported by nationally oriented labour, nationalist political parties, centre-left political parties and Ha-vet (No-Yes) that is underpinned by internationally oriented labour, social democratic fraction among the Left, particular women rights groups and human rights groups. On the one hand, position of social forces underpinning neo-mercantilism is weakened in economy and ideas that echo import-substitution policy under Keynesian welfare state regime and developmentalist state in periphery are defeated analogous with globalisation and neo-liberal restructuring. The only criticism of neo-mercantilist project remains on national sensitivities. Put bluntly, the critique is anti-imperialist though not anti-capitalist. At the final analysis, membership is interpreted in relation to modernization and westernization with a populist discourse. On the other hand, although social forces within Ha-vet read European Union as a capitalist economic integration model, they conceive internationalisation of labour and European Social Model as the only viable mechanism to struggle against globalization and transnationalisation of production. Moreover, European integration is received positively as a democratization project. Ultimately, neither neo-mercantilism that supports 'membership on equal terms

and conditions', nor Ha-vet that adopts the motto of 'another globalisation and Europe is possible', stands as an overall alternative.

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Abbreviations

ABGS	Secretariat General for EU Affairs
AKP	Justice and Development Party
ANAP	Motherland Party
BDP	Peace and Democracy Party
Birleşik Kamu-İş	Confederation of United Public Workers' Unions
Birleşik Metal-İş	United Metal Workers' Union
CEECs	Central and Eastern European Countries
CEPS	Centre for European Policy Studies
CHP	Republican People`s Party
CUP	Committee of Union and Progress
ÇYDD	Association in Support of Contemporary Life
Disk	Confederation of Progressive Trade Unions
DP	Democrat Party
DPT	State Planning Organization
DSP	Democratic Left Party
DTP	Democratic Society Party
DYP	True Path Party

EDP	Equality and Democracy Party
EEC	European Economic Community
ESDP	European Security and Defence Policy
ERT	European Roundtable of Industrialists
ETUC	European Trade Union Confederation
EU	European Union
FDI	Foreign Direct Investment
GDP	Gross Domestic Product
GNP	Gross National Product
Hak-İş	Confederation of Turkish Real Trade Unions
ILO	International Labour Organisation
IMF	International Monetary Fund
ISI	Import-Substitution Policy
İHD	Human Rights Association
İKD	Progressive Women Association
İKV	Economic Development Foundation
İSO	İstanbul Chamber of Commerce
Ka-der	Association for the Support and Training of Women Candidates

Kesk	Confederation of Public Employees Trade Unions
KKTC	Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus
KOSGEB	Small and Medium Enterprises' Development Organization
Memur-Sen	Confederation of Public Servants Trade Unions
MHP	Nationalist Action Party
MÜSİAD	Association of Independent Industrialists and Businessmen
NATO	North Atlantic Treaty Organisation
OECD	Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development
OSD	Automotive Manufacturers Association
ÖDP	Freedom and Solidarity Party
Öz Gıda-İş	Real Trade Union for Workers in Food and Tobacco and Beverages Industry
Öz İplik-İş	Real Trade Union for Workers in Weaving, Knitting and Garment Industry
Öz Tarım-İş	Real Trade Union for Workers in Agriculture, Land and Water Industry
PCI	Italian Communist Party

PKK	Kurdistan Workers' Party
PSI	Italian Socialist Party
SAK	Central Organization of Finnish Trade Unions
SMEs	Small and Medium Sized Enterprises
Tarım Orman-İş	Agriculture and Forestry Union
Tarım-İş	Turkish Forestry-Soil Water, Agriculture and Agricultural Workers Trade Union
Teksif	Textile, Knitting and Clothing Industry Workers' Union
Tekstil-İş	Textile Trade Union
TESEV	Turkish Economic and Social Studies Foundation
TİM	Turkish Exporters' Assembly
TİP	Workers Party of Turkey
TİSK	Turkish Confederation of Employer Associations
TKP	Turkish Communist Party
TNCs	Transnational Corporations
TOBB	Union of Turkish Chambers and Stock Exchange
Türk-İş	Confederation of Turkish Trade Unions
Türk Kamu-Sen	Confederation of Unions of Public Employees of Turkey

Türk Tarım Orman-Sen	Union of Public Employees in Agriculture and Forestry of Turkey
Türkiye Kamu-Sen	Confederation of Unions of Public Employees of Turkey
TÜRKONFED	Turkish Enterprise and Business Confederation
TÜSİAD	Turkish Industrialists' and Businessmen's Association
TÜTSİS	Turkish Textile Employers' Association
TZOB	Union of Turkish Chambers of Agriculture
WB	World Bank
WEU	Western European Union
WTO	World Trade Organization

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Chapter 1 - Introduction

The main purpose of this thesis is to consider Turkey's bid to become a member country of the European Union (EU) within the structural dynamics of globalisation and neoliberal restructuring. I will consider this as an open-ended struggle between social forces, the outcome of which can only be determined by class struggle. Turkey stands at the periphery of Europe and its trajectory of liberalisation and neoliberal restructuring should not be read independently from the processes surrounding its integration to European structures. Turkey liberalized trade in relation to the completion of the EU Customs Union whilst in the last decade the EU has been defined as an anchor consolidating macroeconomic restructuring and financial liberalisation. However, existing literature does not read Turkey's integration into European structures against the background of globalisation and neoliberal restructuring. I argue that treating globalisation and European integration as independent and autonomous processes is a standing that consolidates neoliberal restructuring, presenting the relationship between Turkey and the EU as operating only in one direction, whereby the EU provides protection from globalisation. This overlooks its role in consolidating neoliberal restructuring. To correct this, I follow one of the core premises of Gramscian historical materialism and work from an understanding that the political economy of Turkey should not be approached as independent from nor determined by the European integration process. The central question of this thesis draws on and contributes to debates in European integration and enlargement, hegemony, political subjectivity, and alternatives to globalisation.

The trajectory of Turkey's membership question is puzzling, and differs from previous cases of EU enlargement. Turkey formed an association partnership with the European Economic Community (EEC) through the Ankara Treaty that was signed on 12 September 1963. Following this, Turkey signed an association agreement but was not incorporated in the successive waves of enlargement that followed. Although it applied for membership on 14 April 1987, it was not included in the list of candidate countries at the 1997 Luxembourg European Council, when the EU committed itself to enlargement towards Central and Eastern European countries (CEECs). It was, however, declared as a candidate country at the Helsinki summit on 12 December 1999. Meanwhile, Turkey completed the Customs Union on 31 December 1995 and remains the only country to have completed the Customs Union prior to membership. Accession negotiations began on 3 October 2005 and were suspended the following year. The process was defined as a 'train crash' by Enlargement Commissioner Olli Rehn due to Turkey's refusal to grant trade privileges to Cyprus. The EU interprets extension of trade concessions to all member states (thus including the Republic of Cyprus) as a natural condition of the Customs Union. Turkey, however, does not recognize the Republic of Cyprus as representative of the whole island due to its policy *vis-a-vis* Turkish Cypriots. The negotiations halted and the EU froze eight chapters over thirty-five areas and decided not to close any chapter until a resolution is reached. To date, only the Science and Research chapter is completed. What is even more puzzling is the current stance of the Justice and Development Party (AKP) Government that endorses reforms outside the framework of membership status. Its commitment to reforms without necessarily the end state of attaining

membership status is well-received in society. The future trajectory is uncertain as the EU left the outcome of negotiations open ended. France and Austria have declared that they will hold national referendums on Turkey's entry. There are proposals for a special status of privileged partnership for Turkey – these had the endorsement of former French President Nicolas Sarkozy and German Chancellor Angela Merkel. The EU reserves permanent derogations on agricultural/structural funds and free movement of workers for Turkey's enlargement. There are talks on absorption capacity of the EU with references to its enlargement fatigue. The current economic crisis even further complicates the picture.

In light of this context, this research does not structure the debate around the *form* of Turkey's integration. Rather, it focuses on the *content* of Turkey's integration to global production structure via the EU as a regional integration model. It aims to study the Turkish membership question as an 'open-ended struggle'. Its main concern is to present an analysis of the current struggle over Turkey's relationship with the EU among Turkish social forces. At the theoretical level, following Cox that 'theory is always for someone and for some purpose' (Cox, 1981: 128), it questions the social purpose underpinning current literature on Turkey-EU relations. In debating hegemony and political subjectivity behind alternatives to globalisation, this research delves into a debate between Gramscian historical materialism and the theory of discourse of Laclau and Mouffe (1985). Does Gramscian historical materialism necessarily constrain the debate on Turkish membership around economic classes, constituting a form of economic determinism and class reductionism that

excludes struggles around new social movements? Regarding the empirical research, it asks whether there is a dominant pro-EU hegemonic project that pioneers membership and the ongoing reform processes. And if so, which social forces support it? Is there an alternative historical bloc, opposing and resisting membership and neoliberal restructuring in Turkey? If any, which forces are behind this counter-hegemonic project and can they form a united front? And if not, how can we unravel the reasons behind the lack of an alternative to neoliberal restructuring?

There is a large amount of literature on Turkey-EU relations. Some conclusions can easily be drawn from the current state of the relevant literature. First, the bulk of research focuses on the prospects of attaining membership (Avcı 2003; Balkır and Williams 1993; Buzan and Diez 1999; Çarkoğlu and Rubin 2003; LaGro and Jorgensen 2007; Park 2000; Rumford 2000; Uğur and Canefe 2004), or the compatibility of Turkish politics with Europe from a variety of perspectives such as security and foreign policy (Müftüler Baç 2000; Buzan and Diez 1999; Cizre 2004, Tank 2001); the economy (Hiç, 1995; Hoekman and Togan 2005); and specific policies such as migration (Kirişçi 2003) or human rights (Dağı 2001; Hale 2003). Public opinion in Turkey's bid for membership is also examined (Canefe and Bora 2003; Çarkoğlu 2004). A common problem with this literature is that it is mainly concerned with the form of integration. This, in my view, is a non-debate as Turkey's integration with European structures is an ongoing process that cannot be explained through a focus on the end-state of negotiations (the question of whether Turkey will become a member or not). It fails to consider the socio-economic

content of the ongoing integration process, and critique the power relations underpinning it. Moreover, this research aspires to pinpoint areas of incompatibility, whose social purpose is endorsing membership perspective. Thus, this body of literature overlooks the struggle in society among social forces. The way opposition to membership is debated is even more problematic. Opposition is identified with conservative and nationalist groups - often with 'reluctant' Kemalist elites that struggle to come to terms with pluralism - who object to membership due to national concerns regarding the dismemberment of Turkey (e.g. Narbone and Tocci, 2007: 237; Canefe and Bora, 2003: 120; Rumford, 2003: 379). As a result, resistance to membership is seen as conservative and anti-democratic, and is defined as a 'threat' that needs to be 'carefully addressed' (Çarkoğlu: 2004, 41-43). Implicit in this argument is that the membership perspective is read as a universally progressive process facilitating the adoption of international rules/norms, and democratic reforms. Thus, it hides the agency that lies behind the membership project and presents it on a universal terrain as if it is not open to class struggle. By the same token, dissent is understood solely as belonging to nationalist and conservative groups. This tendency stems from reading European integration as a process independent and autonomous from globalisation. As a result, there is no space to debate alternatives among disadvantaged groups as a result of the negative repercussions on welfare that have followed from the integration of Turkey with globalisation through the European project. It is a truism that one fraction of opposition is conducted on nationalism that is regressive. However, monopolising opposition to national/conservative groups has the social purpose of silencing opposition among disadvantaged groups from neoliberal

membership perspective. In my view, this reading is itself undemocratic, contradicting its stated aim of improving democratic standards.

Few studies embark on a particular theoretical perspective in approaching Turkey-EU relations. Indeed, most of the literature is atheoretical (e.g. Avcı, 2003; Çarkoğlu and Rubin 2003; Rumford, 2000; Tekeli and İlkin, 1993 and 2000; Uğur and Canefe 2004). However, the assumptions of works that do have an explicit theoretical framework are problematic. A group of studies utilises mainstream European integration theory - neofunctionalism and intergovernmentalism. For instance, Macmillan (2009) draws on neofunctionalism to explain why there has not been a rupture in relations between Turkey and the EU with spill-over behind an economic rationale. However, the trajectory that Turkey is gradually becoming closer to the EU behind an economic rationale can hardly be taken for granted. Indeed, there are various ups and downs in relations. Moreover, neofunctionalism is unable to elucidate timing of enlargement. Why does Turkey – an associate member that began to develop functional links in 1963 - lag behind CEECs? Neofunctionalism also overlooks why these functional economic links do not generate political integration (this criticism will be further developed in Chapter Two).

Özen (1999) draws on intergovernmentalism to posit that Turkey-EU relations started with concerns over foreign and security policy during the Cold War

rather than economic functional links contrary to neo-functionalism assumptions. Yet, intergovernmentalism – which conceives of enlargement as inter-state bargaining - cannot offer insights into why Turkey has agreed to open its market to European competition without getting anything in return from the EU. Moreover, it cannot explain the commitment of the current AKP Government to reform process without necessarily attaining the membership status behind a cost-benefit analysis of inter-state bargaining. More importantly, this debate between neo-functionalism and intergovernmentalism constrains Turkey's membership question to the end-state of negotiations: the form of integration. They fail to situate Europe within the structural dynamics of globalisation. They frame membership in relation to political decisions made by governmental actors and overlook transnational actors. The role of labour and trade unions is completely omitted. The question of alternatives to membership is ignored or debated in relation to the 'form' of integration such as privileged partnership.

The Europeanisation perspective has dominated the theoretical literature on Turkey-EU relations in the last decade. These works suggest that after Turkey was declared as a candidate at the 1999 Helsinki European Council, the EU's credibility through political conditionality has increased to stimulate change at the domestic level. The Europeanisation of Turkish politics is studied in a number of diverse but related issues including civil-military relations, political parties, human rights, the rule of law and foreign policy (Aydın and Açıkmüş 2007; Aydın and Keyman 2004; Derviş et. al. 2004; Diez et. al. 2005; Heper

2005; Kubicek 2004 and 2005; K ulahçı 2005; M ft ler-Ba 2005;  niş 2003; Rumelili 2003 and 2004; Tocci 2005; Schimmelfennig et. al. 2006).

In my view, the Europeanisation literature is also unsatisfactory for four reasons. First, it over-emphasizes the role of Europe in discussing transition, ignoring structural factors. European integration is conceived of as a structure, though Europe is equally an actor embedded within the global structure. Second, this body of literature presents Turkey's 'slow' record of membership as an outcome of its reluctance to consolidate its democracy. Hence, its social purpose is to stimulate reform process. Third, it operates within neoliberal knowledge and thus presents the relationship between state and society on the one hand and economics and politics on the other as one of separate and autonomous spheres. This is related to its subscription to the 'strong state' literature in political science on Turkey (e.g. Buğra 1994; Heper 1985; Keyder 1987), which presents the main struggle in society as one of state elites versus the public; or within the contours of centre-periphery cleavage (Mardin 1973). Hence, the withering away of the state is seen to be progressive, and to open up space for civil society. This standing, in my view, serves to consolidate neoliberal restructuring by veiling the class struggle against globalisation. Moreover, it presents civil society as progressive; overlooking the 'fortresses and earthworks' (Gramsci, 1971: 238) in consolidating hegemony of the ruling class. It is due to this assumption on the 'strong state' that the Europeanisation literature paradoxically ends up conceiving of a 'state' elite – the Kemalist bureaucracy and military - as both the dominant power bloc and a force in opposition resisting Europeanisation. This is an outcome of the tradition of

'strong state', which, to quote Gramsci, believes in '[e]verything within the State, nothing outside the State, nothing against the State' (1971: 261), denies class struggle and contributes to neoliberal restructuring. Fourth, there is an embedded Orientalism in Europeanisation literature, which presupposes Europe to be a progressive and superior model to which candidate countries have to catch up.

A final category in theoretical literature draws on constructivism. Here, the focus is on rule adoption in the Turkish case and the membership movement is explained in relation to constructivist ideational factors (Schimmelfennig et. al., 2006). Constructivist approaches equally consider identity issues, such as the 'Europeanness' of Turkey and; stands for probable contributions of Turkish membership in creating a multicultural European identity (Grigoriadis, 2009; Rumelili, 2008). In my view, the constructivist research agenda constrains the debate by focusing on whether enlargement can be explained using ideational factors (the logic of appropriateness) or rational calculations (the logic of consequences); and arguing in favour of the former. This (supposed) binary ignores the material conditions. Turkey's status as a country short of full membership is explained as the outcome of Turkey's inability to comply with certain European norms and standards (Schimmelfennig et. al., 2006). Moreover, the social purpose behind social constructivist research is presentation of the EU as a 'civilian power' hiding its imperialist and expansionist policies. This advances an understanding of imperialism autonomous and independent from economics; and plays into a reductionism that equates imperialism with military intervention. Finally, there is an

embedded Eurocentric bias, through which Europe is presented as an ideal case in terms of its record on human rights and democracy.

To combat these problems, this research adopts Gramscian historical materialism to study the Turkish membership question. Gramscian historical materialism conceives of integration as a market-oriented, neo-liberal hegemonic project (Bieler and Morton 2001; Bieling 2003; Cafruny and Ryner 2003a; Gill 1998 and 2001; Overbeek 2004; van Apeldoorn 2000 and 2002; van Apeldoorn et. al. 2009; van der Pijl 1998 and 2006); and of enlargement as the expansion of neo-liberal restructuring (Bieler 2000; Bohle 2006; Holman 1996 and 1998; Shields 2003 and 2004). There are four merits to adopting this framework. First, as integration is embedded within globalisation and neoliberal restructuring, it enables the questioning of the socio-economic content and the power relations that underlie the current state of integration of Turkey to European structures without being stuck to the 'form' of integration. Framing the research question around the prospects of Turkey becoming a member is a non-debate as the process is open-ended and ongoing. For instance, Turkey continues to adopt *acquis* - even for those chapters that are blocked - and the AKP Government is committed to the reform process outside the membership status.

Second, it conceives of membership process as an open-ended struggle among social forces, the outcome of which can be determined through class struggle. Rather than positing automaticity of integration as lying behind the economic

rationale, this approach unravels agency behind the ongoing integration and reform process, and ultimately opens floor to consider alternatives. The role of labour in the struggle is integrated in the analysis, something that is completely absent in the mainstream literature (an exception is Yıldırım et. al. 2008). Moreover, analogous with Bieler, 'due to the diversity of the way production is organised, there are rarely two homogenous classes opposing each other in capitalism' (2006: 32). Accordingly, there is an emphasis on intra-class struggle based on functional – productive capital and money capital - (van der Pijl, 1998) and/or geographical fractionation – a struggle between national, international and transnational forces of capital and labour (Bieler 2000, Robinson 2004, van Apeldoorn 2002). Moreover, the enlargement outcome that is established by the class struggle varies from country to country: such as a pro-membership hegemonic project in the case of Austria and a pro-EU alliance in the case of Sweden (Bieler, 2002: 586-587); and an alliance between state elites and transnational capital – that is read as a passive revolution - in the case of Central and Eastern Europe (Bohle, 2006: 75).

Third, it situates the membership process within the structural dynamics of globalisation; and the transnationalisation of production and finance. The transnationalisation process is differentiated from internationalisation as it goes beyond geographical expansion to encompass the organisation of production on a global scale through processes of 'fragmentation and decentralization of complex production chains' and centralisation of command in the economy into the hands of transnational capitalist class (Robinson, 2004: 9, 10, 14 and 15). Accordingly, it can grasp transnational class formation in which the

transnational sphere can be scrutinised in its specificity (van Apeldoorn, 2002 and Bieler 2000). This in turn paves the way to debate ways and means of integrating Turkey's production structure to the transnational production structure and transition in the positions of labour and capital in this process.

Finally, this approach does not treat state and society relations as one of exteriority. Analogous with Gramsci's conception of the integral state and the ethical state (Gramsci, 1971: 263) and Cox's analyses of 'forms of state' (Cox 1987), it conceives of state-society relations as a social relation (Morton, 2007a: 120). This in turn avoids state centrism and fetishising the state as a black box beyond human agency and an equally problematic treatment of civil society as monolithically progressive; a conception that is autonomous and independent from the economy and political society. Such a standing not only captures the role of the capitalist state *per se* in the struggle over hegemony, but unravels mechanisms of hegemony of the ruling class within civil society.

Following Cox's argument that 'production creates the material basis for all forms of social existence...including the polity' (1987: 1), this analysis takes social relations of production as a starting point. From this, analyses are embedded in three spheres in the debate of the struggle over hegemony: the social relations of production, forms of state and the world order - none of which has a one-way determinant relationship (Cox 1981, 1987). Different configurations of state/society complexes engender different forms of state, which are understood in the plural sense (Cox, 1981: 127; 1987: 147-148). The

ruling class projects its hegemony internationally, in turn shaping the world order and rendering particular social forces structurally privileged in their struggle over hegemony at the national level.

The analysis starts with establishing the main pattern of Turkey's integration into the global production structures by comparing Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) and foreign trade. I argue that Turkey's economy is integrated via trade as FDI is still negligible. Thus, drawing on Bieler (2006: 65), I argue that it constitutes a case of internationalism rather than transnationalism. Accordingly, intra-class struggle is examined in relation to internationally and nationally oriented capital and labour. The following hypothesis is tested in the Turkish membership question: the transnationalization of production and finance has generated a new division between international social forces of capital and labour; and national oriented capital and labour. The former can be expected to be in favour of liberalisation and support regional integration to stimulate exports (in the case of capital) and to struggle at the international level to regain its power that is lost at the national level in tandem with transnationalisation of production (in the case of labour). On the contrary, national social forces of capital and labour will be more critical about European integration and open economy as they will increasingly be exposed to pressures of competitiveness in the global market and they would expect protection from state (these claims further draw on the work of Bieler, 2000: 48; Bieler, 2005a: 465; Bieler, 2006: 38).

Yet, a word of caution is necessary here: this hypothesis does not presuppose a positivist epistemology. It is not the purpose of this thesis to verify or falsify these assertions. Rather, its function in the empirical design is to help analytically laying out the position of social forces in the open-ended struggle. Thus, it is the empirical research that ultimately determines the position of social forces in the class struggle. I am, however, careful to note occasions where empirical data does not correspond to the hypothesis.

Methodologically, particular sectors are selected to enable me to consider intra-class struggle. The textile and automotive industries are analysed as internationally oriented as they are the pioneering sectors in Turkey's export-promotion strategy, and so have a privileged position in foreign trade. To analyse nationally oriented industry, I look at Small and Medium Sized Enterprises (SMEs) and the agricultural sector that produce for the domestic market. The agricultural sector is still protected and has not been subjected to the Customs Union. Public employees are also interviewed as they also constitute a category disadvantaged by the welfare and social cuts that form part of neoliberal restructuring. Political parties constitute the second category; I consider these through the Gramscian concept of the 'modern Prince' - 'an organism, a complex element of society... the first cell in which there come together germs of a collective will tending to become universal and total...' (Gramsci, 1971: 129). Third, state institutions are integrated into the research design following Cox's argument on internationalisation of state – that internationalisation of production engenders a process through which the state is internationalised via an intra-state compromise that adjusts national policies

on the basis of the needs and requirements of international production, and a transition in state structures that empowers ministries related to the economy in transmitting the global consensus to the national level (Cox, 1981: 146; 1987: 253-254). Finally, class struggle is interpreted as resistance against the discipline of capital in social reproduction (van der Pijl, 1998). Accordingly, struggles around patriarchy, environment and human rights (identity politics, in short) are included in debating alternatives to neoliberal membership project as an instance of class struggle.

The thesis employs qualitative techniques, utilising case studies and semi-structured interviews. In total, eighty interviews were conducted in İstanbul and Ankara across two research trips of two months each. In order to fill the gaps in the empirical data primary sources were gathered from libraries and documentation centres of these institutions. A variety of primary resources were also collected directly from the interviewees. The validity of information was cross-checked through the information from other interviews as well as the consultation of further primary and secondary printed sources. It is possible to come across with a variety of primary resources published by representatives of capital that reflects their position in relation to economic issues but also social policy, democratisation and foreign policy reflecting their endeavour to transcend their vested economic interests by presenting membership perspective on a wider terrain. For the political parties, interviews are cross-checked and supported by election manifestos. Additionally, academic articles, research papers and/or books of particular organic intellectuals that are either employed in institutions or effective in shaping their policies are assessed. The

working reports from the general assembly's or conference proceedings of trade unions are also utilised in examining the position of labour.

However, the bulk of data is generated by interviews. Interviews provide the opportunity to obtain information that is not recorded elsewhere (Richards, 1996: 200). Moreover, in general interviews have the advantage of providing an insight into the internal decision-making process of an organisation in contrast to policy documents, which only state the outcome of a debate. The first empirical step was to map a list of research participants into one of six categories: representatives of capital, trade unions, particular industrial sectors, political parties, state institutions and alternative subjectivities. It is often stated that getting access and arranging the interview is not an easy process with an elite group (Burnham et. al., 2004: 208). Most of the interviewees were contacted via email although a few of them responded. However, this provided me leverage - in my second attempt on the phone - to convince them to conduct the interview. The research questions were sent in advance upon request. Most of the interviews were digitally recorded though in some cases the interviewee preferred not to be recorded and I took notes during the interview. Interviews lasted between forty-five to ninety minutes. All interviewees were guaranteed anonymity in advance and that no direct quotes would be attributed to them. They were guaranteed to receive the transcript of the interview upon request if they would prefer to check and/or amend. Harvard style references to the interviews are included in the text to indicate where particular points are drawn from which specific interview. There is an issue regarding the subjective nature of the information gathered through interviewing (Richards, 1996: 201).

Though this research does not adopt a positivist stance searching for the truth, it was important to gather information on the position of institutions rather than individual opinions. In some cases, interviewees clearly stated whether a particular opinion was reflecting their personal view or position of the institution; where there was doubt I asked for clarification. I have avoided incorporating personal views in the presentation of my empirical analysis.

The interviews were conducted with members of each of the six categories noted above. As the interviews were semi-structured, the format of the interview was guided by a list of themes and questions posed to each category of actors. It is notable that particular themes were more salient for particular categories of actors during the interview process. Indeed, the flexibility provided by semi-structured interviews (Bryman, 2008: 437) enabled me to adjust the emphasis depending on the category of actor being interviewed. As an example, questions on the effects of globalisation and transnationalisation of production were more salient for industrial sectors and trade unions, whilst political issues were more pre-eminent for groups involved in struggles against the discipline of capital. However, in principle all questions were posed to all interviewees. For instance, feminist activists were questioned about the effects of globalisation and flexible labour on women rights and the struggle over patriarchy; whilst questions regarding the way in which democracy should be defined were put to trade unionists.

The interviews commenced by questioning of the social base of institutions,

though the question used for this purpose varied according to the category of actor being interviewed. For industrial sectors, an emphasis was placed on understanding whether they operate in national and/or international markets; and whether they primarily operate in the private or public sector. For political parties and/or alternative subjectivities, I asked who the group they aspired to represent/articulate the views of is. This was conducted to map the position of respective social forces in the social relations of production and intra-class struggle. Considering that the primary critique of Gramscian historical materialism is that mainstream literature fails to embed European integration and enlargement processes within structural dynamics of globalisation and neoliberal restructuring (that is further examined in the following chapter), interviews proceeded by interrogating the effects of globalisation and neoliberal restructuring on: the particular industrial sector in which they operate, the production process, trade unionist strategy and/or struggle against patriarchy. This method paved the way to debate membership within the context of globalisation.

Following this, emphasis was placed on uncovering the rationale behind their particular stance in tandem with the major focus of research into the socio-economic content rather than the form of integration. Particular themes were selected according to their standing *vis-a-vis* EU membership, including: the probable economic implications of participating in the Internal Market and Euro-zone; any additional economic implications of membership beyond the Customs Union; social policy, mechanisms of unionist struggle *vis-a-vis* globalisation (a focus in particular for trade unions); whether the European

Social Model based on social partnership constitutes a viable model for industrial relations; repercussions of the membership process on Turkish foreign policy and nationally sensitive issues such as the Cyprus problem; the relation between membership and democracy; and the impact of ongoing reform process to human rights, women rights, minority rights and rule of law. At the end of each interview, emphasis was placed on understanding the organic links with other social forces in society by questioning whether the interviewee's institution endorsed common projects and acted jointly with other social forces at the national and international levels in shaping the membership debate. This question is related to the theoretical coordinates of forming relations of force in the struggle over hegemony. An additional set of questions was posed for representatives of alternative subjectivities, who were asked about conceptions of emancipation and relations of force with other actors on the left of the political spectrum.

One limitation that arose from the selection of interviewees was the tendency for them to direct me to people who are employed in European divisions and/or departments inside the institution. This occurred particularly frequently in state institutions considering that a European fraction inside bureaucracy is endorsed. This limited my ability to obtain a holistic picture of the position of particular institutions on globalisation and membership – a concern related to 'generalisability' of data. However, in these cases the data is supplemented and cross-checked with primary resources. The issue of sampling is not raised as a major concern for elite interviews (Richards, 1996: 200). Yet, rather than a concern on representative sampling, bringing the interview process to an end –

putting boundaries - was an issue considering that Gramsci was a theorist of capillary power (Morton, 2007a: 88). In the literature, it is often stated that saturation point is an answer to the problem of when to stop (Burnham et. al., 2004: 207-208). Indeed, during the interview process there was a point when interviews started to repeat themselves that is taken as a sign for data saturation.

This research seeks to contribute to the literature in three main areas. First, it seeks to re-think the concept of hegemony by engaging in a debate between Gramscian historical materialism and the theory of discourse. The attempt to address the questions posed by Laclau and Mouffe to Gramsci regarding revolutionary subjectivity, class reductionism and economic determinism has previously not been engaged in greater scrutiny (an exception is Bieler and Morton 2008). This debate has political significance as it can articulate ways and means of forming a united struggle between labour and struggles around women's liberation, the environment and human rights in civil society.

Second, there is a growing body of literature that endeavours to develop a critical political economy reading of integration and enlargement. The Turkish membership question has not been analysed using the tools provided by a Gramscian historical materialist perspective (an exception is Ataç and Grünewald, 2008, though they mention the probable merits of debating Turkish enlargement using Gramscian historical materialism, but they fail to do so). In this sense, it aims to contribute to this growing body of literature. It does

this by debating the merits of embedding the membership question within globalisation and discussing the relation between regionalism and globalisation; analysing the mechanisms of integration of a peripheral country into the transnational production structures; and the way social forces are integrated with the process of transnational class formation; and by discussing alternatives and the potential for a counter-hegemonic historical bloc in Turkey – a country that stands at the periphery of Europe and whose trajectory of integration provides space to develop an alternative, given that the current state of integration is to the benefit of capital and the process is uncertain (particularly given the declining attraction of the EU within the context of current economic crisis and cuts in social benefits).

Finally, the literature has – until now - largely remained limited to analyzing political decisions. It thus lacks empirical research into the positions of social forces in Turkey regarding the membership question, such that the position of labour is almost completely ignored. Alternatives to membership are even debated in relation to alternative forms of integration, rather than in reference to its socio-economic content. The position of disadvantaged groups in society from globalisation is overlooked. There is a gap in the literature for questioning alternatives to membership in society due to the failure of other approaches to read the process as an instance of class struggle.

The structure of this thesis will be as follows. I open the thesis by engaging critically with European integration theory and reflecting on its social purpose

in cultivating a particular knowledge regarding Turkey's membership process. Three categories of literature are reviewed: classical integration theories, comparative political approaches, and social constructivism. Each sub-section briefly introduces and critically assesses these categories and then examines the way enlargement is explained. This is followed by a discussion on their reflections and shortcomings in the case of Turkey's enlargement. The next stage of the chapter proposes a Gramscian historical materialist framework to fill the gap in the literature and outline its merits followed with operationalising theoretical framework.

The third chapter focuses on an engagement between Laclau and Mouffe and Gramscian scholars on hegemony. In the *Hegemony and Socialist Strategy*, Laclau and Mouffe criticize Gramsci for economic determinism and class reductionism (1985: 69). Can it be said with Laclau and Mouffe that Gramsci is a class reductionist and/or an economic determinist? To what extent Gramscian historical materialism overlooks social movements confining agency for a counter-hegemonic strategy to trade unions and political parties? The debate over hegemony is particularly important in Turkey's membership question. It is a peripheral country within uneven development of capitalism, and a country where populist politics are salient in the struggle over hegemony. Additionally, following the completion of the Customs Union, political issues began to prevail and the struggle for membership was also shaped by identity politics around democracy, human rights and/or the Kurdish problem. It is also of relevance in relation to debating alternatives to membership and in developing an analysis of contemporary fractions of the Turkish Left.

There are two main tasks behind this engagement. First, it re-thinks hegemony (and the idea of the counter-hegemonic historical bloc) by drawing on the work of Gramsci and Laclau and Mouffe. I analyse the disagreements before moving on to develop my own position in the debate. I disagree with Laclau and Mouffe and raise five key objections relating to their understanding of materialism, state/society relations, the role of the international sphere, historicism and agency-structure. In so doing, I will state why I adopt Gramscian historical materialism to analyse social movements. However, I modify this in addressing the critique of Laclau and Mouffe on integrating social movements into the research design, by utilising the work of van der Pijl. He conceives of resistance as operating against the ‘discipline of capital’ and the ‘exploitation of the social and natural substratum’ (van der Pijl, 1998: 36 and 47). This stance opens floor to conceive of struggles around patriarchy, human rights and environment as an instance of class struggle in debating an alternative historical bloc *vis-a-vis* neoliberal membership project in the seventh chapter. Hence, the second task behind this additional theoretical engagement is to clarify the conceptual framework regarding political subjectivity behind a counter-hegemonic strategy.

Chapter four provides the historical background by presenting a reading of the political economy of Turkey. It does so with the help of Gramscian concepts and Cox’s analysis based on three levels: the social relations of production, the forms of state, and the world order (Cox 1987). This chapter is structured into two distinct historical periods: the import-substitution industrialization policy in the Fordist period of the 1960s and 1970s; and the neoliberal turn in the

1980s. At the end of each sub-section, Turkey-EU relations are analysed in accordance with the pre-eminent social relations of production and world order. It is expected that internationally oriented capital will pioneer membership perspective to stimulate exports and consolidate market economy model whilst nationally oriented capital will oppose membership as it will be exposed to pressures of competitiveness by participating to the Internal Market.

The next three chapters present my empirical data. My main concern in chapter five is to examine the position of capital, with an emphasis on intra-class struggle. It considers whether there is a pro-European hegemonic project and, if so, can the ruling class transcend its vested interests to present arguments in favour of membership so that they can operate on a 'universal terrain' within civil society? To address these issues, chapter five lays out the configuration of social forces in relation to capital and examines how different fractions of capital debate membership within the context of their position in globalisation and transnationalisation of production. I will examine the textile and automotive sectors as internationally oriented capital as they have a privileged position within export-promotion strategy since 1980s. The SMEs and agricultural sector will be observed as nationally oriented capital. Agriculture sector is still a sheltered sector producing for the domestic market. Moreover, agriculture is not included in the Customs Union except processed agricultural products that in turn will be affected by participation in the Internal Market.

Chapter six examines the position of labour *vis-a-vis* the EU membership question, which is debated within the context of the transnationalisation of production and viable mechanisms of struggle against globalisation. I will test the hypothesis that - in the Turkish case - trade unions that organise workers in international/transnational production sectors (sectors that have already been economically integrated with the Internal Market via the Customs Union) support membership, as they will conceive of regional integration as a mechanism providing protection from globalisation (incentive for positive integration); whilst trade unions organising workers employed in nationally oriented sectors (which rely on national protection) will adopt a more critical stance due to concerns over de-industrialisation and de-unionisation; and concerns that they will be increasingly exposed to the pressures of competitiveness and losses in welfare (these claims further draw on the work of Bieler, 2000: 48; Bieler, 2005a: 461; 2006: 42). Internationally oriented labour is examined in relation to textile and automotive industries, and Confederation of Progressive Trade Unions (Disk) and Confederation of Turkish Real Trade Unions (Hak-İş). Nationally oriented labour is analysed in relation to the agriculture sector, public employees, and Confederation of Turkish Trade Unions (Türk-İş) - that is primarily organizing public economic enterprises producing for national market. The chapter ends by summarizing the reasons for the failure of labour to form a united front in opposition to neoliberal restructuring through the process of EU membership.

Chapter seven extends the debate among social forces to political and civil society. Throughout the research, I criticise the conception of civil society and

the state as two separate and autonomous entities. Therefore, the chapter begins by establishing the contours of approaching state institutions, political parties and identity struggles, conceiving of them as operating in an extended sphere of social reproduction. I then analyse the position of state institutions within the neoliberal form of state. I draw on Cox's analysis of the 'internationalisation of [the] state' (Cox, 1981: 146 and 1987: 253-254), and expect institutions linked to the economy to develop a supportive stance regarding the membership process, whilst state institutions that develop policies for the segments of society disadvantaged by globalization to be sidelined in the struggle. I then observe the position of political parties. The governing AKP is analysed as the right-wing political party carrying the neoliberal project and pro-membership perspective whilst I consider whether opposition parties espouse alternative views. Finally, the last section of chapter seven integrates struggles against the discipline of capital in society (the struggles of women's rights/feminist groups, environmental groups and human right groups) and analyses the reasons for their apparent failure to form a united front with labour against globalisation. Finally, I present alternatives to the pro-membership project around two rival class strategies: neo-mercantilism and Ha-vet (Yes, No). Ultimately, I argue that they do not constitute an alternative *per se*, a conclusion I develop further in the conclusion.

The next chapter looks at European integration theory. It considers how Turkey-EU relations are studied in the literature in more detail. It summarises the relevant literature in three categories – classical integration theory, comparative politics and constructivism - and critically assesses the reflections

of each on Turkey-EU relations literature. It problematizes the knowledge that is produced following the mainstream and questions its social purpose. It then introduces Gramscian historical materialism as an alternative to fill the gap in the literature and concludes by operationalising it in relations to the main pattern of Turkey's production structure to globalisation.

Chapter 2 - A Critical Assessment of European Integration Theories: Merits of Gramscian Historical Materialism

2.1) Introduction

This chapter critically assesses European integration theories and their approaches to enlargement, with a specific focus on contemporary research considering Turkish membership of the EU and its social purpose. I argue that there is a gap in the literature to embed membership question to the structural dynamics of globalisation and neoliberal restructuring, meaning that Turkish membership is treated as an issue autonomous from wider forces of globalisation. Moreover, much contemporary research remains wedded to the results of negotiations: the form that Turkey's integration into the EU will take is considered.

In order to rectify this, I introduce a Gramscian historical materialist framework that paves the way to question the underlying power relations and the socio-economic content of Turkey's integration into European structures, without being wedded to debates on the form of enlargement. Moreover, the membership question is treated as an open-ended process, the outcome of which is not explained behind an economic rationale, but rather determined by class struggle.

The main premises of integration theories are summarised and critically assessed in separate sub-sections. I then turn to discuss these theories in relation to Turkey-EU relations, followed by a critical assessment of their shortcomings. I consider classical integration theories: neo-functionalism and intergovernmentalism; comparative politics; and social constructivism. Following this, I introduce Gramscian historical materialism - with an emphasis on its analyses of integration and enlargement - and explain the rationale of employing a Gramscian framework to study the question of Turkish membership of the EU. This is followed by an introduction of the Turkish production structure and formulation of the main hypothesis that will lay out contours of intra-class struggle.

2.2) Classical Integration Theories

2.2.1) Neo-Functionalism and Intergovernmentalism: A Reflection of Neoliberal/Neo-Realist debate in European integration

Early theoretical approaches to European integration were influenced by debates between idealism and realism within the discipline of international relations. Federalism and functionalism both debated the best methods of preventing another war in Europe, believing it was important to transcend the nation state. Federalism emphasises supranational mechanisms and posits the creation of a 'union of states and citizens' through a sudden transformation with

constitutional change (Burgess, 2000: 15). Functionalism, meanwhile, seeks to transcend the nation state through the stimulation of functional links by decentralisation, technocratic cooperation and international administration (Mitrany, 1943).

Haas drew on functionalism to develop a Europe-specific theory, which became known as neo-functionalism (Haas 1958). This assumed that integration that starts in key 'functional sectors' of the economy generates further integration in order to fully obtain the advantages of integration. This, he believed, would ultimately cultivate a political community (Haas, 1958: 11-19). Neo-functionalism was seen both as an approach to – and a guide for – the stimulation of further integration, following the notion of 'spill-over' (also known as the 'Monnet method'). Tranholm-Mikkelsen distinguishes three forms of spill-over: functional, political and cultivated. At the core of functional spill-over lies the assumption that integration that starts in a technical sphere will automatically spill-over to other sectors due to their interdependence to each other. This will spill-over to the political sphere as integration entails a learning process for national elites that in turn will create a political impetus for further integration. Integration will be accompanied with institutionalisation in the form of cultivated spill-over through creation of supranational institutions such as the European Commission (Tranholm-Mikkelsen: 1991: 4-6).

By the mid 1970s, the crisis of Fordist accumulation was well developed. The European economy faced crisis and integration stagnated following the Empty

Chair Crisisⁱ. This prompted an intergovernmentalist backlash focussed on 'spill-over' in the integration process (Hoffmann, 1966; Milward, 1992). Intergovernmentalists accused neo-functionalists of normative bias for adopting a 'moral mandate' in seeking to prevent another war in Europe. Against this, they sought to study the 'realities' of integration. They claimed that integration is the outcome of negotiations among national actors operating at the lowest common denominator, and note that the state has either endured or survived (Hoffmann, 1966: 889); or been rescued (Milward, 1992). For instance, Hoffmann disagrees with the functional logic of spill-over. He contends that as the logic of diversity progresses, nation states are not superseded but still remain the basic units of analysis and action (Hoffmann, 1966: 863). In a similar vein, Milward criticises the existing approaches for conceiving of supranationalism as the antithesis of the nation-state. Accordingly, he reads integration as 'an act of national will' and a strategy in the post-war reconstruction of nation state. Building on this, he asserts that the European Community was a means for nation states to regain the loyalty of their citizens and to provide social welfare provisions. The European Community was the means for the rescue of the nation state in Europe (Milward, 1992: 12, 18 and 44).

The neoliberal turn of 1980s galvanized European integration that is captured by works revisiting functional logic and intergovernmentalism (Müster, 1989; Tranholm-Mikkelsen, 1991). Schmitter aspires to revise the legacy of neo-functionalism in a 'neo-neo' version, though he criticises the self-reflexive logic of neo-functionalism and states that 'any comprehensive theory of integration

should potentially be a theory of disintegration' (Schmitter, 2005: 47). On the contrary, Moravcsik argues that nation states remain 'in charge' of the integration process. In his theory of liberal intergovernmentalism, he develops a multi-causal/trilateral model, combining rationalist institutionalism, economic interests and inter-state bargaining. For him, integration is the outcome of 'rational choices made by national leaders', determined by commercial interests, macro-economic preferences and conditions of asymmetrical interdependence in the anarchical international system (Moravcsik, 1998: 5-18).

The debate between neo-functionalism and intergovernmentalism can be situated within the neoliberal/neo-realist debate in the discipline of international relations. Hence, although neo-functionalism and intergovernmentalism posit differing approaches to integration, they are situated within the same paradigm. They share similar weaknesses and can be criticised on similar grounds. I will now turn to consider six of these criticisms.

First, both neo-functionalism and intergovernmentalism are preoccupied with the transfer of sovereignty from the national to the supranational level. Hence, debates relate solely to the institutional 'form' of integration, with the social content and social purposes underpinning European integration ignored (Apeldoorn, 2000: 158). Second, both theories operate in the positivist tradition and share an individualistic and utilitarian ontology. They believe that decisions regarding integration are taken by rational, utility maximising actors

operating in their economic self-interest (van Apeldoorn et. al, 2003: 18; Bieler and Morton, 2001: 13). As they assume 'explicitly or implicitly that market forces are expressions of an inner rationality of universal human nature that is held to be the essence of the realm of freedom in political affairs', they fail to problematize structuration of power relations in the social sphere (van Apeldoorn et. al, 2003: 18). Third, neo-functionalism is ahistorical. It fails to question the reasons why integration emerges during specific historical periods but not during others, and overlooks the background transformations of capitalism and the responses of the capitalist class (Cocks, 1980: 1-2 and 4). This means that the wider structures of globalisation and neoliberal restructuring – within which European integration is embedded – are not considered. Hence, both theories fail to consider structural change, as they fail to question existing social and power structures (Bieler, 2005b: 76; Bieler and Morton, 2001: 14; van Apeldoorn et. al. 2003). The fourth criticism of neo-functionalism and intergovernmentalism comes from the fact that they overlook state-society dynamics (Risse-Kappen, 1996: 57). The intergovernmentalist approach treats states as monolithic and fails to account for different state forms, meaning that 'the state' is seen as a 'black box' beyond human agency. Moreover, it over emphasises state's security and military capabilities whilst underestimating economic issues (Bieler, 2000: 6). Fifth, intergovernmentalism is interested solely in inter-state relations and denies the transnational sphere; whilst neo-functionalism fails to assign an autonomous role to transnational actors (van Apeldoorn, 2000: 158) – seeing transnational forces only in the context of national state-society configurations (van Apeldoorn et. al., 2003: 24-26; Bieler and Morton, 2001: 16). Sixth, although

liberal intergovernmentalism takes state-society relations into consideration with its focus on national preferences and interest groups, it draws on an individualist conception of state-society relations based on rational choice, overlooks structural inequalities and role of the transnational sphere and transnational actors that transcend national boundaries (van Apeldoorn et. al, 2003: 24-26). Finally, both approaches fail to account for the role of ideas and ideology in forming the European order (van Apeldoorn, 2000: 158).

2.2.2) Classical Integration Theory, Enlargement and Turkish Membership

Question

Enlargement remains under theorised in the classical approaches to integration. Indeed, neo-functionalism does not have a theory of enlargement at all, although Schmitter contends that functional logic assumes that countries with functional links to the EU would join earlier than those without. However, he admits that such an approach cannot explain why Switzerland has not joined the EU (Schmitter, 2005: 70). Burgess explains enlargement from a federalist perspective. Here, the main concern is the probable effects of enlargement on the EU's institutional structure (Burgess, 2005: 39). Moravcsik and Vachudova, meanwhile, apply liberal intergovernmentalism to enlargement in Eastern Europe and argue that enlargement is the outcome of inter-state bargaining based on rational calculations. They argue that the core states prevail through enlargement, whilst candidate countries occupy a weaker position in accession negotiations due to their poorer economic conditions (2003: 45-46). Thus,

candidate countries make short-term sacrifices from agricultural and structural funds, and bear the cost of rapid adjustment to liberal trade policies in return for the imagined long-term benefits of membership (Moravcsik and Vachudova, 2003: 46-48).

There are a number of studies seeking to explain Turkey-EU relations using functional or intergovernmental logic. Macmillan claims that intergovernmentalism cannot explain why relations between Turkey and the EU have proceeded despite opposition from various member states and turns to neo-functionalism to understand how 'spill-over' can help explain the move towards Turkish membership within the EU (2009: 789). Contrarily, Özen argues that neo-functionalism is incapable of explaining Turkey-EU relations, as relations began with security considerations during the Cold War and progressed into the economic sphere, an operation contrary to neo-functional logic (Özen, 1999). Müftüler-Baç and McLaren and Öniş apply liberal intergovernmentalism to explain the EU's shifting position, from the 1997 Luxembourg Council when Turkey was not given candidacy status, to the 1999 Helsinki European Council when the EU declared Turkey as a candidate country (Müftüler-Baç and McLaren, 2003; Öniş, 2000b and 2003). A common theme of these studies is that they seek to explain the shift on the part of the EU through changes in the policies of Greece and Germany. Thus, they take a state-centric approach to enlargement. A further group of studies do not directly apply intergovernmentalism, but are similarly informed by realist assumptions. They approach Turkey-EU relations either from the perspective of security, or by emphasising international relations – with a particular

emphasis on the Cyprus issue and Turkey's relationship with Greece (Buzan and Diez, 1999; Cizre, 2004; Oğuz, 2004; Öniş, 2000a; Park, 2000; Tank, 2001).

I argue that classical approaches fail to adequately explain the operation of Turkish integration thus far. Functional approaches are incapable of explaining Turkish enlargement, as Turkey has already been closely integrated into the European economy through the Customs Union, and this has not led to political integration. Furthermore, it cannot explain the timing of enlargement, giving no explanation for the fact that a bid for accession which began in the 1960s and has proceeded via a process of economic integration has not been resolved, to such an extent that Turkey's accession has taken far longer than the Eastern European countries that started to form 'functional links' in the 1990s. They do not consider the approach of the current Turkish government (which, as I argue in Chapter Four, constitutes a hegemonic formation controlled by the AKP), which seeks to maintain the reform process without necessarily pushing for full membership status. These failings result from the fact that neo-functionalism ignores state-society dynamics and fails to situate enlargement within the structural dynamics of neoliberal restructuring.

Intergovernmentalist approaches, meanwhile, construe of Turkey's relations with Europe as foreign affairs issues rather than through the lens of integration *per se*, and frequently frame the debate in relation to security concerns. Thus, an intergovernmentalist analysis based on inter-state bargaining has limited

explanatory power with regards to Turkey's decision to open its market to European competition without gaining any concessions from the EU (such as membership status or the receipt of benefits from structural funds).

Crucially, the two classical perspectives confine the debate to the 'end-state' of negotiations: they focus on the 'form' of integration at the expense of analysing its socio-economic aspects and power relations. In the case of Turkey, this results in a non-debate, as the integration of Turkey into European structures is an ongoing process. They frame membership in relation to political decisions made by governmental actors and overlook transnational actors. The role of trade unions is completely omitted, and 'privileged partnership' is the only alternative to membership considered. The perspective of those disadvantaged by the integration process is thus ignored, meaning that critique is absent from studies using classical approaches.

2.3) Comparative Politics and Integration Theory

2.3.1) European Union as an Internal Political Arena

The 1990s witnessed the rising influence of various comparative approaches to European integration, with a variety of studies focusing on multi-level governance, network governance and Europeanisation. Hix claims that the EU has been transformed from a platform of inter-state bargaining into an 'internal

political arena', and argues that international relations scholars consider integration as an instance of supranationalism or intergovernmental cooperation. Against this, he claims that comparative politics offers a more convincing account of European Community 'politics' (Hix, 1994: 22-23). The 'institutionalist turn' in the United States during the 1980s and 1990s further stimulated political scientists' engagement with the EU (Jupille and Caporaso, 1999: 430).

Three variants of institutionalism can be identified: rational-choice, historical and sociological, each of which has different assumptions (Pollack, 2005b: 137-138). Despite their differences, all three aspire to study how and why institutions matter by examining the role of institutions in social and political behaviours and outcomes (Hall and Taylor, 1996: 936-37). The rational-choice model posits a strategic and rational actor with fixed interests and preferences. Institutions are explained in relation to their capacity to perform functional needs and are defined 'thinly', as constraining the behaviour of agents (Hall and Taylor, 1996: 942-45). In the context of European integration studies, the model examines the role of the Commission (understood as the executive), the European Court of Justice (the judiciary) and the European Parliament (the legislature) (Pollack, 2005b: 141-48). Sociological institutionalism proceeds from a 'thick' definition of institutions, in which institutions do not simply constrain actors but also 'constitute' them (and their interests). According to Hall and Taylor, sociological institutionalism has three specificities: its broader definition of institutions, which blurs the distinction between institutions and culture; valuing the constitutive effects of institutions over agents' preferences

and identities; and a reference to the logic of 'appropriateness' in explicating how institutions develop (Hall and Taylor, 1996: 946-49). Checkel typifies this approach, arguing that the dynamics of learning and socialisation impel agents to act not on rational calculations but through the 'logic of appropriateness'. He defines social learning as a process of interaction within an institutional context, through which actors acquire new interests and preferences (Checkel, 2001: 51 and 53). Finally, historical institutionalism rejects the ahistorical and functional explanations of other forms of institutionalism, and emphasises the effects of institutions on politics over 'time', by asking how and under what conditions historical events affect politics (Pollack, 2005b: 139-141).

In the debate between approaches from international relations and those informed by comparative politics (Jupille and Caporaso, 1999; Hix, 1994 and 1998), it is argued that 'governance approaches' can explicate the complex multilevel institutional configuration neither as an international organization nor a domestic political system, but as an emerging 'governance without government' (Pollack, 2005a: 380; Scharpf, 2001: 3-4). This new governance model conceives of the EU as a unique system of regulatory governance relying on 'unique set of multi-level, non-hierarchical and regulatory institutions, and a hybrid mix of state and non-state actors' (Hix, 1998: 38-39; Marks and Hooghe, 2003). In other words, governance approaches ask 'what kind of a political order' is emerging through European integration by studying issues such as democratic legitimacy; the governance capacity of the EU; and the distribution of authority between nation-states and supranational or sub-national actors (Pollack, 2005a: 368). In addressing these questions, the

approach emphasises three factors: the existence of actors at different levels such as the supranational, the national and the subnational; declining state authority resulting from decentralisation and the regionalisation processes; and the interconnectedness of the political in the national, supranational and transnational spheres (Hooghe and Marks, 2001: 1-4).

These studies have also been criticised, however. Hix is critical about the tendency of new governance approaches to conceive of the EU as *sui generis*. He questions to what extent it is plausible to have a specific theory for European integration (Hix, 1998: 46), and believes that attempting to develop one hinders integration theories in order to benefit from existing understandings of institutions, behaviour and democracy (Hix, 1998: 54-55). For Jachtenfuchs, meanwhile, the governance literature reveals a tendency towards problem-solving and ignores questions around political power and rule. Moreover, the studies are based on case studies and lack a coherent theoretical framework (Jachtenfuchs, 2001: 258-59).

2.3.2) Comparative Politics and Enlargement

Studies on enlargement which draw upon comparative approaches problematise the effects of enlargement on EU institutions and governance in applicant countries (Friis and Murphy, 1999; Jachtenfuchs and Kohler-Koch, 2005: 112-113). Jachtenfuchs and Kohler-Koch focus on effects of enlargement in Central and Eastern Europe on aspects of EU governance

including the heterogeneity of the economic development level, the EU's administrative structures and capacities, political ideas, party systems, and constitutionalism. They argue that enlargement decreases the likelihood of political unanimity within the EU and results in more flexible governance (2005: 112). In a similar vein, the rational choice institutionalist model addresses the probable effects of enlargement on the formal structure of institutions, decision-making and voting patterns (Pollack, 2005b: 153).

Schimmelfennig and Sedelmeier develop a research agenda focussing on the impact of Europeanisation and conditionality on the domestic policies of CEECs (2005b). This body of literature is designed to analyse how, which and to what extent rules of the EU are transferred to the candidate countries. They measure rule adoption and the institutionalisation of EU rules at the domestic level (2005b: 7), developing three models: the 'rational choice external incentive' model, the 'constructivist social learning' model, and the 'lesson-drawing' model. The 'external incentive model' follows the logic of consequences and measures rule adoption on the basis of external rewards and sanctions at the EU level, and by undertaking cost/benefit calculations for adopting states. It posits that a government adopts EU rules if the benefits of doing so exceed the domestic costs of adoption (2004: 663; 2005b: 10-17). The social learning model rests on the constructivist logic of appropriateness and Checkel's analyses of international socialisation. It explains adoption in relation to the desire of CEECs to identify with the values and norms of the EU (Schimmelfennig and Sedelmeier, 2004: 667-68 and 2005a: 18-20). The lesson-

drawing model argues that adoption provides remedies to the domestic needs and challenges of candidate countries (Schimmelfennig and Sedelmeir 2005b: 8-10).

In the last decade, Europeanisation perspective dominates the literature on Turkey-EU relations. This operates under the assumption that the credibility of the EU stimulates change at the domestic level, and that this increased after Turkey was declared as a candidate at the 1999 Helsinki European Council. In a nutshell, it is argued that ‘the more that Turkey-EU relations have gained “certainty” over time, the more Turkish politics have come to terms with the fact that democracy is the only game in town’ (Derviş et. al, 2004: 14). Literature on the Europeanisation of Turkey covers a number of diverse but related issues, including civil-military relations, political parties, human rights, the rule of law and foreign policy (with a particular focus on Turkey's policies on the Cyprus problem and its relationship with Greece) (Aydın and Açıkmeşe, 2007; Derviş et. al. 2004; Diez et. al., 2005; Heper, 2005; Kubicek, 2004 and 2005; Külahçı, 2005; Müftüler-Baç, 2005; Öniş, 2003; Rumelili, 2003 and 2004; Tocci, 2005; Schimmelfennig et. al., 2006). These studies argue that the Copenhagen political criteria contribute to a consolidation of democracy in Turkey, and leave it increasingly plural and multicultural (Aydın and Keyman, 2004). The main focus is on the nature of EU conditionality and its impact in consolidating democracy (Usul, 2011). Implicit to these approaches is that full EU membership will follow if Turkey complies with political conditionality. It is argued that main obstacle to membership can be found in the remnants of the

Kemalist and statist tradition, which is not open to political liberalism (Grigoriadis, 2009: 4).

The Europeanisation perspective provides an unsatisfactory analysis of Turkey-EU relations, however. This results from four main failings. First, it over emphasises the role of Europe and fails to clarify whether the causal mechanisms behind change are stimulated by global-structural factors or regional-European factors (e.g. Aydın and Keyman, 2004; Derviş et. al, 2004; Müftüler-Baç, 2005). European integration is conceived of as a structure, though Europe is equally an actor embedded within the global structure. Second, the analyses are ahistorical. In the case of Turkey, Europeanisation analyses do not consider the period before Turkey was declared as a candidate for EU membership. In other words, they overlook five decades of relations, and present the reform processes of the last decade as a major 'achievement' owing to the 'more credible carrot' of candidacy status. Third, the Europeanisation approach fails to consider state/society relations and conceives of the economy/market as autonomous from the political sphere and the operation of states, meaning that they reproduce neoliberal understandings (e.g. Derviş et. al. 2004; Diez et. al., 2005; Heper, 2005). For instance, Europeanisation would assume a negative correlation between undemocratic state structures and increasing EU integration, and so would be unable to explain why Turkey applied for membership in 1987, just four years following the end of its military regime. Here, Europeanisation fails to recognise that it was the coercive mechanisms of the capitalist state that were instrumental in the completion of the Customs Union and the neoliberal restructuring during

the 1980s through the containment of labour that is followed with further integration via completion of the Customs Union (this is further elaborated in Chapter 4). Paradoxically, the Europeanisation literature also conceives of the state and its 'bureaucratic elite' as 'dominant' (they believe it constrains the ability of the reform process to generate change), and in opposition to the consolidation of democracy. This is an outcome of the tradition of 'strong state', which, to quote Gramsci, believes in '[e]verything within the State, nothing outside the State, nothing against the State' (1971: 261). This denies class struggle and contributes to neoliberal restructuring. Europeanisation studies are therefore determinist in arguing for change at domestic level as they disregard the role of domestic actors and their strategies/policies (e.g. Rumelili 2003 and 2004; Tocci 2005; Schimmelfennig et. al. 2006). Finally, Europeanisation presents Europe as providing a progressive model for candidate countries to aspire to. This is a reflection of an embedded and hidden Orientalism that posits the European identity as superior to non-European identity and denies the fact that desires for EU membership are the results of class struggle.

2.4) Social Constructivism

2.4.1) The Constructivist Turn in International Relations and European Integration

A constructivist approach to European integration developed alongside the 'constructivist turn' in international relations. This problematises the idea of stable political identities (including, for example, the idea of a 'European identity'; and national identities), leading to an emphasis on rules and norms. For instance, the EU is defined as a 'different type of international actor' with 'normative power' that relies on civilian rather than military mechanisms (Diez, 2005: 613-614). The ideational impact of the EU's identity and role in the international sphere is emphasised (Manners, 2002: 238). For Manners, European integration is constituted on a normative base. Embarking on an analysis of the EU's move to abolish the death penalty, he contends that the EU 'act [s] in a normative way in world politics', and its impact does not stem from 'what it does or what it says, but what it is' (Manners, 2002: 252). Constructivist research also problematises the relation between knowledge and politics and asks to what extent 'Europe exists without the huge literature on it?' (Christiansen et. al., 2001: 13-16). The constructivist turn has been well received for furthering understanding of the impact of ideational in constructing Europe (Smith, 1999: 682). It is argued that constructivism explicates the effects of the European integration process on the European state system, explaining the change in actors' identity, interests and behaviour

(Christiansen et. al., 1999: 528-44). According to Checkel, the constructivist approaches enrich our understanding of socialisation and the identity-shaping effects of the European project on national agents (Checkel, 2001: 50).

Yet constructivist accounts have also been subject to criticism. Moravcsik accuses them of operating solely at the 'meta-theoretical level' and failing to contribute to empirical and theoretical understandings of European integration. Accordingly, he argues that constructivism fails to formulate a clear empirical research programme to test its claims (1999: 669-70). Smith does not share these claims, however – he argues that constructivism's weakness lies in its diversity. He argues that as there are a number of social constructivism(s) there is more agreement 'on what is being rejected than what is being proposed' (1999: 690). Van Apeldoorn et. al., meanwhile, differentiate between 'liberal constructivism' and 'critical constructivism', and accuse the former of analysing identity in isolation from material interests. They also claim that constructivism lacks 'a sociology of interest formation that is mediated by identity' (van Apeldoorn et. al., 2003: 30-32).

2.4.2) Constructivism and Enlargement

Schimmelfennig and Sedelmeier seek to explain enlargement by drawing on the constructivist turn. They argue that as the costs to member states of enlargement outweigh the benefits they can expect to receive, rationalist

accounts cannot explain why they are in favour of EU enlargement to include states from Central and Eastern Europe (Schimmelfennig, 2001: 47; Sedelmeier, 2005: 120-26). Thus, they adopt a sociological perspective and member states' support for enlargement as norm-based, making references to collective European identity and regulative norms (Schimmelfennig, 2005: 90-92). They just work to further a process of 'international socialisation' determined by the 'logic of appropriateness' and the internationalization of norms, values and rules (Schimmelfennig et. al., 2006: 2). Their main focus is on measuring the impact of the EU on the democratic transformation of candidate countries.

It can be argued that constructivist approaches focus largely on two aspects of EU enlargement. First, they consider rule adoption and the impact of conditionality in stimulating domestic changes in candidate countries. In the case of Turkey, emphasis is placed upon topics such as the recognition of the Kurdish population as a minority, human rights and civilian control over the military, with constructivism adopting a stance in perceived opposition to the 'statist' doctrine of Kemalism and Turkey's unitary state structure. In this sense, the Kemalist national identity is seen as a barrier to rule adoption (Schimmelfennig et. al., 2006: 97). It is argued that the period between 1987 and 1999 was not conducive to rule adoption as international conditions were not supportive, and Turkey was ruled by 'strongly Kemalist governments'. During the last decade, rule adoption has increased in Turkey, however, and it is posited that this is the result of a combination of domestic and international factors. The EU recognised Turkey as a candidate at the 1999 Helsinki

European Council, increasing the credibility of the EU within Turkey, and the AKP devoted itself to policies seeking to reform the prevailing Kemalist approach (Schimmelfennig et. al., 2006: 103).

Second, constructivist studies generally debate the Turkish membership question in relation to identity issues. They are critical of essentialist and fixed definitions of identity, a stance that denies any membership perspective for Turkey due to religious differences and the continued perception of the Ottoman Empire as the 'other' to European identity. Following their claim that identities are open-ended; socially negotiated; and constantly being constructed and contested, they argue that Turkish and European identities will be constituted in relation to each other throughout the process (Rumelili, 2008: 97-99 and 108). Rather, it can contribute to the creation of a European identity that is 'inclusive, multicultural, tolerant and universalistic' and can act as a bridge among civilisations (Grigoriadis, 2009: 4; Rumelili, 2008).

However, constructivism has six major flaws. First, the debate surrounding Turkey's compliance to EU norms is constrained around the supposed dyadic opposition of rationalism (the logic of consequences) and idealism (the logic of appropriateness) (e.g. Schimmelfennig, 2005; Schimmelfennig et. al., 2006). Second, constructivism operates with a Eurocentric bias through which Europe is presented as an ideal case in terms of its record on human rights and democracy. Third, the social purpose of constructivism is to present EU as a 'civilian power' in the international system. This overlooks the imperialist and

expansionist policies of the EU. As imperialism is interpreted as autonomous from economics, it becomes abstracted from capital accumulation and reduced to military interventions. This prevents debates on uneven capitalist development from being considered. Fourth, Turkey's status as a country short of full membership is explained as the outcome of Turkey's inability to comply with certain European norms and standards. In this sense, the explanation is ideational, and neglects material forces (Rumelili, 2008). Can every country that fulfils the political conditions of membership become a member? It is important to remember that 'ideas do not float about in an endless universe of meaning, but are produced by human agency in the context of social power relations' (van Apeldoorn, 1998: 15). Moreover, this reading of Turkey is based on a liberal reading of civil society, which conceives of them as operating autonomously from the state. This consolidates neoliberal restructuring and presents liberalisation as a progressive process opening up space for civil society (e.g. Schimmelfennig et. al., 2006). Fifth, the structural factors that determine the EU are ignored. For example, constructivist approaches fail to consider the effects of the economic crisis on the Turkish membership question. Finally, constructivist approaches develop a reading of the AKP Government as progressive, believing it wishes to comply with international rules and is seeking the consolidation of democracy (Schimmelfennig et. al., 2006). In this sense, intellectuals subscribing to constructivism should be seen as traditional intellectuals, whose knowledge serves to reproduce 'common sense' and consolidate neoliberal restructuring in the struggle over hegemony. If Turkey is more 'democratic' due to rule adoption (as assumed by constructivist approaches), how can we explain the rising authoritarianism in

Turkey especially during the AKP's third term in office; the high numbers of dissenting journalists and students in prison; and the AKP's recourse to force in attempting to deal with the Kurdish problem.

2.5) A Critical Approach: Gramscian Historical Materialism

It cannot be argued that there is a single 'neo-Gramscian school': there are a number of nuances and internal tensions between scholars of Gramscian historical materialism (Morton, 2001: 25-26). This is manifested through the number of different labels used to define such scholarship, with terms such as 'neo-Gramscianism' and 'transnational historical materialism' used - Gramscian historical materialism is adopted in this research - (Cafruny and Ryner, 2003b: 1; Overbeek, 2000: 170-172). There are points of commonality, however, and these revolve around the development of a historical materialist reading of European integration (Overbeek, 2004: 133). For these approaches, European integration is situated against a background of structural changes resulting from globalisation and neoliberal restructuring, and integration is seen as a market-oriented, neoliberal hegemonic project (van Apeldoorn, 2000 and 2002; van Apeldoorn et. al., 2009; Bieler and Morton, 2001; Bieling, 2003; Cafruny and Ryner, 2003a; Gill, 1998 and 2001; van der Pijl, 1998 and 2006), whilst enlargement is seen as the expansion of neoliberal restructuring (Bieler, 2000; Holman, 1996 and 1998; Shields, 2003 and 2004).

Gramscian historical materialism builds on critiques of mainstream theories of integration and enlargement, which revolve around the 'revival of Europe'. They argue that such approaches cannot account for structural changes and globalisation, as they take existing power structures for granted (Bieler, 2002: 577; Bieler and Morton, 2001: 5; van Apeldoorn, 1998: 13). More importantly, they fail to explain the nature and distribution of power constitutive of the capitalist market structures in European integration as power is defined in a narrow sense which relates it solely to the political authority of a state or supranational institution. The way mainstream theories conceive of power as confined to interstate affairs and market as 'the realm of freedom' in opposition to state is criticised (Cafruny and Ryner, 2003b: 5). Rather, Gramscian historical materialism aspires to problematise *social power* 'in both its material and its normative dimension' (van Apeldoorn, 1998: 14, emphasis in original). Thus, they understand it as a force engendered by social forces, upon which state power is formed. Moreover, such approaches focus on the 'form' of integration and enlargement and overlook their socio-economic content and their 'social purpose' (Bieler, 2002: 577; van Apeldoorn, 1998: 14).

Gramscian historical materialism also questions the relationship between knowledge and politics. For Cox, there is 'no such thing as theory in itself', as 'theory is always for someone and for some purpose' (Cox, 1981: 128). Accordingly, it seeks to formulate a critical theory of European integration that not only makes structural changes accountable, but also aspires to deconstruct the 'political' within mainstream theory. Bieler and Morton argue that the social purpose of neo-functionalism is to foster further integration, whilst

intergovernmentalism aspires to preserve national sovereignty (2001: 23). Based upon these insights, Gramscian historical materialism reads the revival of Europe against the background of globalisation and the transnationalisation of production and finance which superseded the historical bloc founded upon the 'embedded liberalism' of Fordist accumulation, demand-side economic management and the Keynesian welfare state, which was dissolved in the 1970s (van Apeldoorn et. al., 2003: 37; Bieler, 2002: 576-77). Its research agenda is to study 'transnational struggle over Europe's socioeconomic order' (van Apeldoorn, 1998: 16).

Gramscian historical materialism advances an alternative reading of enlargement by situating it within the structural dynamics of globalisation and neoliberal restructuring (Bieler, 2002: 576). For instance, Holman compares the transitions in Spain and Central and Eastern Europe by focussing on enlargement, and historically situates these two enlargements within the structural dynamics of globalization. He argues that the industrial backgrounds of Spain and CEECs constitute differing points of departure (whilst Spain had a mixed economy, CEECs had command economies), and so their 'mode of insertion' into the world economy differ. CEECs are incorporated into the European transnational production heartland in a 'dependent way', in which there is no national bourgeoisie seeking liberalisation (as there was in Spain) (Holman, 1998: 19-21). He also notes that the international context within which Europe is embedded had altered: during Spain's accession, the European Community was embedded within a programme of international/Atlantic

Fordism, whilst at the time of Central and Eastern European accession, the EU was embedded within neoliberal restructuring (Holman, 1998: 12-14).

Analyses adopting Gramscian historical materialism begin by considering the social relations of production and offering readings of globalisation as a force engendering a process of transnationalisation of both production and finance. Bieler defines globalisation in relation to the transnationalisation of finance (the deregulation and liberalisation of financial markets); the transnationalisation of production (the rise of transnational corporations (TNCs) and/or FDI); and argues that it is neoliberalism that drives globalisation (Bieler, 2000: 36). Transnationalisation is different from internationalisation as it transcends geographical expansion but encompasses the organisation of worldwide production by processes of 'fragmentation and [the] decentralization of complex production chains' (Robinson, 2004: 14-15). Yet, although production is decentralised, the 'command and control of the economy' is centralised with the rise of a transnational capitalist class (Robinson, 2004: 9-10 and 15). Thus, the internationalisation of production has engendered a global class structure (Bieler, 2002; Cox, 1981: 147; van Apeldoorn, 1998: 15) and a transnational managerial class (van der Pijl, 1998: 98), that is both a class in itself and for itself (Cox, 1981: 147; Robinson, 2004: 48).

Indeed, following Cox, enlargement is approached on three levels: the social relations of production, the form of the state and the form of the world order,

none of which is determinant in a one-way relationship (Cox, 1981: 138). My fourth chapter presents a reading of Turkish political economy that provides a more detailed analysis of this framework. Here, it is sufficient to say that the social relations of production are not limited to the production of goods but are determined by three categories: material capabilities, ideas and institutions (Cox, 1981: 136). A particular configuration of social forces engendered by production underpins a particular form of state and so there are different forms of state based on the configuration of social forces (Cox, 1987: 147-148). The world order not only is shaped by the social relations of production and the forms of state, but renders particular social forces structurally privileged in the hegemonic struggle.

Holman's work on Spain's post-Franco socialist Government adopts such an approach. He reads their 'European option' as the outcome of a transnational historical bloc that was pioneered by structurally powerful transnational capital, and believed that it entailed two processes: the incorporation of Spain into spheres of transnational production, and the internationalisation of the Spanish state (Holman, 1996: 30, 65 and 99). Meanwhile, in debating Polish transition, Shields unravels the institutional and political mechanisms through which capital has been structured, a process that also engenders a transition to the neoliberal state form (Shields, 2003 and 2004). In explicating ideas determining transition, he contends that neoliberal restructuring is advocated as 'the natural and rational course of transition'. For instance, 'Shock Therapy' is articulated as possessing an 'expert, objective and non-ideological character', as

if it were proposed by technical economists independent of any organisation. Rather, membership was determined by the transnationalisation process and the limits of the structural power of the transnational capitalist class (Shields, 2003: 229-232).

The outcome of enlargement is thus understood as an instance of class struggle (Bieler, 2002: 577). Bieler argues that enlargement should not be read as an automatic process resulting from a self-interested, economic rationale. However, situating enlargement within the structural dynamics of globalisation does not automatically lead to a structurally deterministic account, which simply states that enlargement is caused by globalisation (Bieler, 2002: 581). Rather, the argument is that enlargement is an outcome of an open-ended struggle among different nationally, internationally and transnationally oriented social forces whose interests are determined by the structural factors of globalisation, the transnationalisation of production and finance (Bieler, 2000: 1-4). In this sense, class struggle is not confined to national capital and labour but it is examined in relation to various fractions of capital and labour ('intra-class struggle'), that in turn unravels agency and renders it intelligible (Bieler and Morton, 2001: 17). Accordingly, Gramscian historical materialism abandons state-centrism in explaining the role of transnational actors/class formations (Bieler, 2005b: 79).

Indeed, enlargement is an open-ended struggle, whose outcome varies depending on class struggle and specificities in each country. Bieler compares

the integration of Austria and Sweden into the EU (Bieler, 2000 and 2002). He notes that in Austria, accession was an outcome of a historical bloc pioneered by internationally oriented capital, which conceived of membership as the means of safeguarding participation in the Internal Market. It was supported by internationally oriented labour, which conceived of integration as a mechanism to struggle against globalisation at the international level. Sweden's accession was the result of a pro-EU alliance. Production there was dominated by transnationally oriented capital, which did not need to develop strong political alliances as it had the structural power to transfer investment and production to other units in the EU. Thus, transnational labour formed its own pro-membership campaign (Bieler, 2002: 586-587). In Central and Eastern Europe, however, pro-membership perspectives were based on an alliance between elites in state institutions, who sought to guarantee restructuring; and the transnational capitalist class, which is seeking to expand capitalist accumulation (Bieler, 2002: 588). Bohle, meanwhile reads Central and Eastern European enlargement as the outcome of passive revolution – 'bourgeois revolutions without a bourgeoisie' (Bohle, 2006: 75). States were integrated within a transnational historical bloc not through the actions of a national historical bloc or a pro-European alliance pioneered by a domestic bourgeoisie, but by intellectuals and elites in the state (Bohle, 2006: 75-76). In Western Europe, compromise on the issue of enlargement is reached through 'embedded neoliberalism'; in Central and Eastern Europe, it is expanded into a 'market-radical variant of neoliberalism' – the redistributive aspects of the EU are not imported, and the free movement of labour is blocked ' (Bohle, 2006: 78). On the basis of these analyses, I adopt a Gramscian historical materialist

framework to debate the question of Turkey's membership of the EU. This is for a number of reasons.

First, it is important to read Turkey's membership question against the background of globalisation and the transnationalisation of production and finance. Turkey is an interesting case: its integration began as early as the 1950s, and it is the only country to have completed the Customs Union prior to membership. Moreover, the transition from import-substitution to neoliberalism materialised through a military coup in 1980, at a time when the relations between Turkey and EEC were frozen. Yet, this does not mean that Turkish economy liberalised independently of the European integration process. Rather, it gradually liberalised trade in the run up to the completion of the Customs Union in the 1990s, and the EU operated as an anchor in the consolidation of macroeconomic restructuring in the last decade. This resonates well with Gramscian historical materialism's rejection of the 'reductionism implied in structuralist as well as in actor-oriented approaches', and its insistence upon examining social phenomena to understand 'the *dialectic totality* of structure and agency' (Overbeek, 2000: 169). In my view, the merit of such an approach is that it approaches the political and economic development of Turkey neither as independent from nor determined by the European integration process.

Second, Gramscian historical materialism paves the way for a discussion of the socio-economic content and the social purposes of European integration and

enlargement. This is crucial in the case of Turkish enlargement as it allows debates surrounding the social purpose of integration to be considered, without necessarily being wedded to the 'end state' of negotiations. Indeed, the form of Turkish integration is a non-debate as the outcome of negotiations remains unknown, and the AKP Government has opted to comply with the reform process without necessarily attaining full membership status. In this sense, the contribution of Gramscian historical materialism is decisive as it allows for debates regarding the pre-eminent power relations that underpin Turkish integration.

Third, Gramscian historical materialist perspectives do not treat state as a 'thing in itself': an object above human agency. Embedded in its concept of the 'integral state' or the 'ethical state' is a conception of the state in relation to society. Cox criticises the treatment of state in mainstream international relations theory as 'a singular concept: a state was a state was a state' (1981: 127) when, in fact, there are a number of state forms, all of which are defined in relation to different configurations of state/society complexes (.ibid). This means that the state is not fetishised but is explained with reference to its historicity. Hence, as Morton highlights, rather than taking the state as a 'thing in itself', it is conceived as a form of social relation upon which the hegemonic struggle is expressed (Morton, 2007a: 120). In mainstream Turkish political science, the treatment of the Turkish state as a 'strong state' that keeps society underdeveloped can be seen as a 'common sense argument' (e.g. Buğra, 1994; Heper, 1985; Keyder, 1987; Mardin, 1973). Yet, in my view, this perspective contributes to neoliberal restructuring by presenting the 'withering away' of the

state as the means for the opening of space in civil society, an argument that has enabled the ruling class to posit its vested interests as 'universal', allowing it to develop its hegemony by taking the consent of subordinate classes (I discuss the relationship between the state and society further in the following chapter). Taking a Gramscian approach permits me to analyse the capitalist state *per se*, consider its role in the struggle over hegemony and unravel the mechanisms of hegemony operated by the ruling class in civil society.

Finally, Gramscian historical materialism conceives of enlargement as an open-ended struggle between social forces. This allows me to consider labour as an agent in processes of enlargement and integration. It also allows consideration of actors debating alternatives to globalisation and neoliberal restructuring. In particular, the analytical tool of 'hegemony' is of use in debating open-ended struggles. Contrary to the state-centric definition in mainstream international relations approaches, the Gramscian concept of hegemony is not limited to state domination, but encompasses material resources, institutions and ideas. For Gramsci, hegemony is a moment in which the ruling class takes 'moral and intellectual leadership' by transcending 'the corporate limits of the purely economic class, and can and must become the interests of other subordinate groups too...' (Gramsci, 1971: 181). Thus, hegemony, is a form of class rule secured both by consent and the coercive mechanisms of the state (Overbeek, 2000: 173). It constitutes the 'concepts of control' that create 'normalcy and [the] general interest' at a particular stage in history. It is determined by processes of capitalist accumulation at the structural level, and concrete social

forces engendered by relations of production (Overbeek and van der Pijl, 1993: 5-6). As hegemony is constantly contested and consolidated, it opens the door to an analysis of alternatives to neoliberal restructuring among groups disadvantaged by globalisation and enabling the constitution of a politics of resistance.

2.6) Turkish Production Structure in the Global Period and Coordinates of Intra-class Struggle

This research debates the struggle over hegemony by taking the social relations of production as its base. In this, it follows Cox, who notes that '[p]roduction creates the material basis for all forms of social existence, and the way in which human efforts are combined in productive processes affect all other aspects of life, including the polity' (1987: 1). Thus, production is not limited to the 'supply of the physical requisites of life', but rather entails the creation of historical structures, institutions and relationships that determine modes of life and the accumulation of resources, which collectively constitute the 'material reproduction of society' (Cox, 1987: 396). The social relations of production entail three inter-related elements: the social context of production that determines the nature of production (what is produced on the basis of needs of society and/or how it is produced for example); the structure of authority determined by the division of labour in the production process; and the distribution of rewards of production (Cox, 1987: 11-12). In other words, '*relations* of production' are central to Gramscian historical materialism, rather

than '*forces of production*', pinpointing the material's dependence on social structures (van Apeldoorn, 2002: 17).

Yet, 'due to the diversity of the way production is organised, there are rarely two homogenous classes opposing each other in capitalism' (Bieler, 2006: 32). Hence, in the open-ended struggle, intra-class struggle can be studied by emphasising functional or geographical fractionalisation. On the basis of the accumulation process and the subordination of labour to capital, van der Pijl debates intra-class struggle in relation to money capital and productive capital (van der Pijl, 1998: 13-14). Yet, as the main concern here is integration of a peripheral country to a regional bloc, using geographical fractionalisation as an analytical pointer seems more plausible. Accordingly, following Bieler, functional fractionalisation is treated as secondary, given that globalisation and the transnationalisation of production render it apposite to conceive of intra-class struggle within the national, international and transnational fractions of capital and labour (Bieler, 2006: 34; Bieler, 2000: 10).

In a similar vein, Robinson remarks that accumulation in global capitalism entails not simply the geographical expansion of capital across national boundaries (internationalisation) but 'the fragmentation and decentralisation of complex production chains and the worldwide dispersal and functional integration of the different segments in these chains' (transnationalisation) (Robinson, 2004: 14-15). Therefore, the main struggle in the period of global capitalism is between national and transnational fractions of classes, along the

contradictory logics of national and global accumulation (Robinson, 2004: 37 and 49-53). Likewise, van Apeldoorn reads the current state of globalisation as a new phase in capitalism, determined by the transnationalisation of production, creating spatial fractionalisation and related rival class strategies increasingly important in analysing the social relations of production (van Apeldoorn, 2002: 27 and 32).

It is necessary to establish the main mechanism of integration of a particular country to the global capitalist structure. Internationalisation occurs when trade is the main mechanism used, whilst transnationalisation occurs when the flow and outflow of FDI is determinant of the integration pattern (Bieler, 2006: 65). The principal mechanism of integration of Turkish economy with globalisation is trade. As Table One (below) reveals, Turkey conducts approximately 50% of its imports and exports with the EU.

Table 1: Ratio of Foreign Trade to Gross Domestic Product (GDP)

	Imports of Goods and Services (% of GDP)	Exports of Goods and Services (% of GDP)	Total Foreign Trade (% of GDP)
1981-1990	17,2	13,7	30,9
1991-1995	19	16	36
1996-2000	24	21	45

2001	23	27	50
2002	24	25	49
2003	24	23	47
2004	26	24	50
2005	25	22	47
2006	28	23	51
2007	27	22	49
2008	28	24	52
2009	24	23	47
2010	26	23	49

Source: OECD National Accounts Exports and Imports of Goods and Services to GDP (1981-2010)

<http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/NE.EXP.GNFS.ZS/countries?display=defa>
[ult; http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/NE.IMP.GNFS.ZS](http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/NE.IMP.GNFS.ZS)

The data on inward and outward FDI can be accepted as an indicator of the level of transnationalisation of production (Bieler, 2006: 47-67). Table Two (below) indicates that FDI is still negligible in terms of capital accumulation.

Table 2: Foreign Direct Investment in Turkey

	Inward (Millions of US Dollars)	Outward (Millions of US Dollars)	Inward FDI as Percentage of Gross Fixed Capital Formation	Outward FDI as Percentage of Gross Fixed Capital Formation
1985-1995 (Annual Average)	522	37	1,7	-
1998	940	367	-	-
1999	783	645	1,9	1,6
2000	982	870	2,2	2,0
2001	3,266	497	12,4	1,9
2002	1,063	175	3,5	0,6
2003	1,753	499	4,7	1,3
2004	2,733	859	5,1	1,6
2005	10,031	1,064	-	-
2006	20,223	926	-	-
2007	22,023	2,104	15,9	1,5
2008	18,148	2,532	12,5	1,7

2009	7,611	1,551	7,3	1,5
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Source: UNCTAD (2003), World Investment Report, Country Fact Sheet Turkey. UNCTAD (2010), World Investment Report, Country Fact Sheet Turkey.

Indeed, although the Customs Union was expected to attract FDI, it is argued that inward FDI is still negligible, especially in comparison with Eastern European countries (Dutz et.al., 2005: 261). As Table 3 illuminates FDI inflows lags behind especially the Czech Republic, Hungary and Poland until 2005. Though the FDI flows doubled in 2005 that stayed constant until the Euro-zone crisis, as the Table 4 reveals the percentage of FDI within GDP in Turkey is considerably low when compared with EU-27 and major industrialised countries. Moreover, it is also negligible when compared with particular CEECs whose FDI within GDP has increased rapidly with membership. Thus, Turkey's integration path can be analysed as an instance of internationalism.

Table 3: Inward FDI to Turkey compared to Eastern Enlargement

	1989- 1994	1995- 1999	2000- 2004	2005	2006	2007	2008	2009	2010
Turkey	707	827	1980	10031	20185	22047	19504	8411	9071
Czech Republic	-	3067	5237	11653	5463	10444	6451	2927	6781

Hungary	1417	3843	3219	7709	6818	3951	7384	2045	2377
Poland	787	5346	7346	10293	19603	23501	14839	13698	9681
Slovakia	-	864	2569	2429	4693	3581	4687	-50	526
Slovenia	-	196	651	588	644	1514	1947	-582	834
Estonia	-	299	621	2869	1797	2725	1731	1838	1539
Latvia	-	357	347	707	1663	2322	1261	94	349
Lithuania	-	398	500	1028	1817	2015	2045	172	629

Source: UNCTAD (2010) Inward and Outward Foreign Direct Investment

Flows, Annual (1970-2010).

<http://unctadstat.unctad.org/TableViewer/tableView.aspx?ReportId=88>

Table 4: FDI stocks as of GDP

	Turkey	EU-27	UK	Germany	France	Poland	Hungary	Czech Republic
1999	-	-	48.4	19.9	24.3	0.6	-	1.2
2000	-	-	60.2	25.4	33.2	0.6	-	1.3
2001	-	-	60.0	30.0	38.6	0.6	3.0	1.9
2002	2.2	-	55.4	28.1	36.2	0.7	2.9	1.6
2003	1.8	-	57.3	27.2	38.0	0.9	3.4	2.1
2004	1.6	19.1	51.7	26.6	39.7	1.2	5.4	3.0
2005	1.8	21.9	55.4	30.3	45.3	2.2	7.5	2.9
2006	1.6	23.5	56.6	32.4	47.1	4.0	10.5	3.2
2007	1.7	25.8	60.8	34.9	50.8	4.6	11.9	4.4

2008	2.6	26.6	62.6	34.6	51.0	4.7	11.7	5.8
2009	3.5	31.2	70.6	37.6	56.2	6.6	14.5	7.3
2010	2.9	33.9	71.4	42.5	60.4	8.2	15.1	7.3

Source: Eurostat

<http://epp.eurostat.ec.europa.eu/tgm/table.do?tab=table&init=1&language=en&pcode=tec00047&plugin=1>

Accordingly, the following hypothesis will be tested in relation to the Turkish membership question: the transnationalisation of production and finance has generated a new division between internationally oriented social forces of capital and labour on the one hand, and national social forces on the other. The former are more likely to be in favour of an open economy and support regional integration, as they benefit from a borderless world; whilst the latter can be expected to adopt a more critical stance on integration as they are dependent on national protectionism and expect subsidies and protection from state (Bieler, 2000: 48; Bieler, 2005a: 465; Bieler, 2006: 38). Yet, this hypothesis is established not as in a positivist method but as a coordinate providing an analytical framework in debating intra-class struggle within the context of Turkish membership. The position of social forces can only be established as an outcome of empirical study.

2.7) Conclusion

In this chapter, I have argued that mainstream approaches are incapable of situating Turkish membership of the EU within structural dynamics of globalisation and questioning power relations and socio-economic content of ongoing integration of Turkey to the European structures. Rather, I have suggested Gramscian historical materialism as an alternative and explained my reasons for adopting it as an approach in this thesis.

I began by considering neo-functionalist and intergovernmentalist approaches. I noted that they fail to consider the structural dynamics within which European integration is embedded, remaining preoccupied with the form of integration and failing to interrogate the power relations underpinning the integration of Turkey into the capitalist structure through the European integration process. Moreover, I noted that functional logic posits that integration occurs automatically as a result of self-interested economic actors, but that this is incorrect in the Turkish case, and cannot explain the AKP government's approach, which is committed to EU reform process without necessarily attaining the membership status; nor why Turkey's integration has lagged behind CEECs. Intergovernmentalism, meanwhile, cannot explain why Turkey completed the Customs Union without receiving benefits in return (such as membership status or benefits from EU structural funds). Furthermore, trade unions are completely omitted from analyses and domestic actors

considering alternatives to EU membership remain invisible. The only alternative considered is 'privileged partnership', and this provides further evidence of their preoccupation with the form of enlargement.

I then turned to consider the comparative political approaches which were developed during the 1990s, and sought to contribute to integration debates based on the assumption that the EU is no longer just an international organisation, but has become a polity in itself, and so cannot be analysed using the methods of conventional international relations approaches. I noted that they are preoccupied with the repercussions of enlargement on EU politics and only examine the effects of Europeanisation and political conditionality on the domestic politics of candidate countries.

Following this, I considered the Europeanisation literature, which has dominated the debate surrounding Turkish membership since Turkey was declared as a candidate country. I also found this approach to be unsatisfactory. I noted that it overemphasises the role of Europe in creating domestic changes, and that this results from a neglect of wider global structure. It is ahistorical and fails to analyse state/society relations. It subscribes to the 'strong state tradition' pre-eminent in Turkish political science, which views 'state, military and civilian bureaucracies' as simultaneously in power and forming the opposition. This recalls Gramsci's criticism of the claim that '[e]verything [must be] within the State, [with] nothing outside the State, nothing against the State' (1971: 261). Thus, Europeanisation literature has the social purpose of

consolidating neoliberalism by denying class struggle and presenting liberalisation as a progressive process constraining the power of the 'strong state'. Finally, I argued that implicit in the Europeanisation literature is the assumption that Europe is a progressive model that candidate countries aspire to 'catch up' with, an assumption which lays bare the Orientalism at the heart of Europeanisation.

Next, I considered the constructivist turn in international relations. I argued that constructivist research views enlargement as a normative goal, and focuses on measuring the impact of the EU on the domestic politics of candidate countries. I argued that constructivism proves equally unsatisfactory for approaching the Turkish membership question. Its social purpose is to present the EU as a 'civilian power' in the international system: a reading based on a conception of politics as autonomous from economics. Thus, it ignores the EU's imperialist and expansionist policies. It reduces imperialism to military intervention, failing to see that capital accumulation is a form of imperialism, meaning that there is no room for resistance to uneven development. Moreover, Europe is interpreted as a progressive model – an 'ideal type' that candidate countries have to comply to by rule adoption. Again, this is a Euro-centric reading. I noted that constructivism views Turkey's prolonged candidacy as the result of its failure to comply with EU rules and norms, a reading that overlooks material structures. Moreover, I noted that constructivism cannot explain the effects of the economic crisis on the Turkish membership question as it fails to situate Europe within wider processes of globalisation, and subscribes to a liberal reading of civil society as independent and autonomous

from the state. In this, I argued that constructivist scholars should be seen as 'traditional intellectuals', whose knowledge serves to consolidate neoliberalism by hiding capitalism's contradictions behind a 'system of fortresses and earthworks...' (Gramsci, 1971: 235 and 238) or a 'thick ideological veil' (Femia, 2002b: 122).

On the basis of this critique, I argued that a Gramscian historical materialist approach is needed to analyse the Turkish membership question. I showed how this fills the gap left by other approaches by situating the membership question within the structural dynamics of globalisation and processes of neoliberal restructuring. As Turkey is a unique case (in that the EU has already ruled that the outcome of its accession negotiations is open-ended, and that it is the only country to have completed the Customs Union outside of membership), Gramscian historical materialist analyses are especially needed to consider the socio-economic content and the power relations underpinning ongoing integration of Turkey with globalisation via European perspective. I noted that Gramscian historical materialism conceives of the process of European integration as an open-ended struggle. This not only unravels the agency behind neoliberal restructuring, but also creates space for the consideration of labour. I noted how this enables Turkey to be situated within the transnational production structure, and creates space to debate the role of the transnational sphere in the process. I then observed that as Gramscian historical materialism conceives of the state and society as constituting a social relationship, it is capable of developing a critique of the 'strong state tradition' preeminent

among Turkish political science, which assumes that the state deliberately leaves civil society (conceived of as a progressive entity monolithically) underdeveloped – leading to widespread belief that state power should be curtailed. The social purpose of this tradition is consolidation of neoliberal restructuring. In this view, Gramscian perspectives can critique a treatment of state as autonomous and independent from civil society and an equally problematic stance that conceives civil society as a monolithic and progressive sphere.

Chapter 3 - Two Perspectives in Debating Hegemony: Gramsci and Discourse Theory

‘The idea that complete and perfect political equality cannot exist without economic equality... nevertheless remains correct’ (Gramsci, 1971: 258).

‘...it often happens that people combat historical economism in the belief that they are attacking historical materialism...’ (Gramsci, 1971: 163).

3.1) Introduction

Having criticised mainstream theories and introduced Gramscian historical materialism, this chapter engages with Laclau and Mouffe's critique of Gramsci, which they lay out in the *Hegemony and Socialist Strategy*. They pose difficult questions regarding the base/superstructure model and political subjectivity and offer an alternative definition of hegemony. This chapter will consider the underlining disagreements between Gramsci and Laclau and Mouffe with regards to political subjectivity, the base-superstructure model, hegemony, materialism and political praxis at the theoretical level. Can it be said [with Laclau and Mouffe] that Gramsci is a class reductionist and/or an

economic determinist? Do Gramscian studies overlook social movements and plural forms of social antagonisms in society, confining agency to a counter-hegemonic strategy built around trade unions and political parties? I will argue, however, that the debate between Gramscian historical materialism and Laclau and Mouffe should not be confined to defending a particular theoretical camp. Rather, it is important to question to what extent a united front can be formed among disadvantaged groups in society against globalisation and neoliberal restructuring.

This chapter engages with an additional theoretical debate. It aims to re-think hegemony and considers different conceptions of counter-hegemonic strategy, drawing on the works of Gramsci and Laclau and Mouffe. There are five reasons behind such an endeavour. First, Laclau and Mouffe's criticism to Gramscian historical materialism constitutes an important critique that has not been adequately addressed in the literature (an exception is Bieler and Morton, 2008).

Second, it aims to provide a conceptual framework regarding political subjectivity and agency for the empirical research which follows in subsequent chapters. Is the hegemonic struggle in Turkey over the membership question essentially a struggle of 'capital and labour' and a struggle among class fractions, or is there also a need to include struggles over political recognition amongst alternative subjectivities, which primarily operate within the sphere of identity politics? This latter claim resonates with one of the central postulates

of Laclau and Mouffe, who argue that 'the Left need[s] to tackle issues of both “redistribution” and “recognition”' (Laclau and Mouffe, 1985: xviii). I will argue in the following that rather than embarking on theory of discourse, it is possible to approach new social movements as resistance to commodification in the sphere of social reproduction following van der Pijl (1998).

Third, this theoretical stance would then enable me to integrate women rights groups, human rights groups and environment groups into the research design as an instance of class struggle. Indeed, these groups are expected to develop a critical stance vis-a-vis EU membership in the seventh chapter. This is important considering that political issues have begun to prevail and the struggle for membership is shaped by issues around democracy, human rights and/or the Kurdish problem following the completion of the Customs Union.

Fourth, this theoretical engagement also sheds light why there is not one but two class strategies contesting pro-membership project in the struggle over hegemony (that will be analysed in the sixth and seventh chapters). Although intra-class struggle is prioritised in explicating the absence of a united front around a counter-hegemonic strategy, theoretical coordinates of the way different fractions conceive of state-society relations and political economy of European integration sheds light in understanding their respective positions *vis-a-vis* membership. Indeed, this debate contributes to scrutinise contemporary fractions of the Turkish Left and the disagreements.

Last, this engagement between different analytical frameworks strengthens analysis on hegemony that is vital to uncover pre-eminent power relations and ultimately contest them. Particular organic leftist intellectuals not only read the EU as a 'democratization project' but also subscribe to the myth of the 'strong state', two arguments decisive in consolidating neo-liberalism's pro-membership project. On the one hand, they gave consent to AKP's neoliberal hegemony (that will be further elucidated in the subsequent chapter) believing that its rule would challenge the 'hegemonic' republican order underpinned by statist-secular elites to use their jargon (İnsel, 2003: 301). They read AKP rule as in government but without power and interpret 2002 victory of the AKP as opening a new path for democratisation (Öniş and Keyman, 2003). Implicit in this reading is the strong state tradition and separateness of economics and politics. A similar critique can be conducted for particular social forces that read EU membership perspective in relation to democratisation. In this reading, as the social base is left underdeveloped in Turkey – due to strong state, elites and military – membership is articulated as an anchor to consolidate democracy.

I shall argue that Laclau and Mouffe depict Gramsci as taking classes and/or production as a structure, whilst it is the social relations of production that lie at the core of struggle over hegemony in Gramscian historical materialism (Bieler, 2000; Cox, 1987; Morton, 2007a; van der Pijl, 1998; Rupert, 1995; Robinson, 2004). It is material capabilities, ideas and institutions, in a non-determinant and reciprocal way, that are taken as the basis for an analysis of

social relations (Cox, 1981: 136). From such a vantage, Gramscian historical materialism does not exclude contradictions around patriarchy, human rights and/or the environment. I then introduce van der Pijl's analysis in integrating these struggles in the research design. According to van der Pijl, it is the 'discipline of capital over the entire reproductive system' and its 'exploitation of the social and natural substratum' that has to be resisted (van der Pijl, 1998: 36 and 47). It is the struggles around social reproduction and the deepening and expansion of the capitalist discipline that 'subjects new spheres to the logic of exploitation and profit', including 'the destruction of the biosphere, and all the terrains on which the corrupting influences of money and profit are souring the joys and quality of life-from sports and leisure to art, education and health – even a funeral' (van der Pijl, 1998: 48).

In the first section, Gramsci's understanding of hegemony and his theorisation of counter-hegemonic strategy is explained. This is followed by a summary of Laclau and Mouffe's critique of Gramsci and an outline of their project of 'radical and plural democracy', through which they aspire to 'radicalise hegemony'. The final sub-section summarises my own position *vis-a-vis* five separate (though related) aspects of the debate: the status of materialism, state/society relations, the role of the international sphere, historicism and agency-structure; and explains the underlining rationale behind adopting a Gramscian conception of hegemony in this research in each of these five areas. This chapter engages with the early writings of Laclau and Mouffe, in particular their post-structural reading of hegemony in *Hegemony and Socialist*

Strategy. In that sense, recent writings which are influenced by the 'Lacanian turn' (Howarth, 2004: 262) fall outside the scope of the chapter.

3.2) Gramsci, Hegemony and Theoretical Directions of Counter-hegemonic Strategy

Gramsci belonged to the 'proletarian moment' (Hall, 1987: 16) and queried why socialist revolution occurred in Russia rather than in a capitalist social setting, as had been anticipated by the stagist and economist interpretations of historical materialism pre-dominant in the Second International. On the basis of this question, he laid the foundation of his analysis on a differentiation between state-society relations in the East and the West and concluded that the way revolution is conditioned in the West is more complicated as a result of 'political super-structures, created by the greater development of capitalism' (Gramsci, 1978: 199). This is to say that he posits that the contradictions of capitalism would not automatically prepare the ground for a socialist revolution in the West, as 'the superstructures of civil society are like the trench-systems of modern warfare'; they provide a 'system of fortresses and earthworks...' (Gramsci, 1971: 235 and 238). In other words, Gramsci emphasises the mechanisms of civil society that hide capitalism's contradictions behind a 'thick ideological veil' (Femia, 2002b: 122).

Embarking on this analysis on state-society relations, Gramsci advances two strategies: the 'war of manoeuvre' (a mode of 'frontal attack') and the 'war of position' (Gramsci, 1971: 238-39). He contends that in the West, 'the question of so-called permanent revolution...would subsequently be absorbed and superseded by the concept of "civil hegemony"' (Gramsci, 2007: 267). Indeed, he interpreted the 'united front' and strategies of Lenin and Comintern as being in line with a 'war of position' (Gramsci, 2007: 168-169, Q 7, §16). Henceforth, Gramsci elaborates, there is a need to study "'in depth" which elements of civil society correspond to the defensive systems in a war of position' (Gramsci, 1971: 235). This struggle entails ideological preparation through conquering 'one after another all the instruments of ideological diffusions' (Femia, 2002a: 483-484). Hence, the struggle over hegemony is expanded to civil society and is directed to challenge various institutions of capitalist rule such as 'publishing houses, newspapers, journals, literature, libraries, museums, theatres, art galleries, schools, architecture, [and] street names' (Morton, 2007a: 92-93). It is in relation to this conception of hegemony and struggle that Morton reads Gramsci as a 'theorist of capillary power' (2007a: 88).

In the war of position, the concept of hegemony entails a central position in explicating and challenging the capitalist rule. To quote Gramsci, 'in politics, the war of position is the concept of hegemony...' (Gramsci, 2007: 267). The concept of hegemony can be traced back to *gegemonia* in Russian Social-Democratic Movement as a political strategy in the struggle of working class against Tsarism (Anderson, 1976: 14-17). The Gramscian understanding,

however, advances the classical conception from one concerned with class alliance and/or dictatorship of the working class, to one that 'describes structures of bourgeois power in the West' (Anderson, 1976: 20). Thus, as Gibbon notes, Gramsci enhances 'both the scope of the concept of hegemony (to include ideological leadership in the socialist revolution and bourgeois ideological domination in capitalist society) and its content – to focus directly on its material mechanism and vehicles: organizations, apparatuses and intellectuals' (2002: 516-517).

Hegemony, according to Gramsci, is a condition in which the ruling class takes a role of 'moral and intellectual leadership' by transcending 'the corporate limits of the purely economic class, and can and must become the interests of other subordinate groups too...' (Gramsci, 1971: 181). Implicit in this definition are two stages in the struggle over hegemony. Whilst in the economic-corporate level, the 'tradesman feels obliged to stand by another tradesman, a manufacturer by another manufacturer, etc...', the hegemonic moment is reached when 'the corporate limits of the purely economic class' is transcended by forming relations of force (Gramsci, 1971: 181-82). The hegemonic level is political - it 'marks the decisive passage from the structure to the sphere of complex superstructures' (Gramsci, 1971: 181-182). This occurs when a particular social group prevails and gains an upper hand in the conflict by 'bringing about not only a unison of economic and political aims, but also intellectual and moral unity, posing all the questions around which the struggle rages not on a corporate but on a "universal" plane' (Gramsci, 1971: 181-82). Bates neatly sums up the Gramscian concept of hegemony by stating that it

refers to a form of rule led by a particular class which has convinced 'others of the validity of its world view' (Bates, 1975: 352 and 355). In other words, hegemony emphasises that 'man is not ruled by force alone, but also by ideas...' (Bates, 1975: 351). It stands as a form of intellectual and moral unity on a 'universal' plane (Gramsci, 1971: 181-82).

There are two particular merits of this definition. First, Gramsci observes that 'even bourgeois hegemony is not automatic but achieved through conscious political action and organisation' (Hobsbawn, 1977: 209). Second, he extends struggle over hegemony to working class and subaltern groups. Indeed, his reference to the 'need for the Left to break out of an "economic-corporate" outlook and construct a hegemonic politics of its own' was a decisive theoretical opening (Forgacs, 1989: 72). In 'Some Theoretical and Practical Aspects of "Economism"', Gramsci cogently observes that theoretical syndicalism prevents 'a subaltern group...from ever becoming dominant, or from developing beyond the economic-corporate stage and rising to the phase of ethical-political hegemony in civil society, and of domination in the State' (Gramsci, 1971: 160). Henceforth, he is received as a figure within historical materialism who emphasises 'the active, voluntarist side of Marxist theory, as opposed to the fatalistic reliance upon objective economic forces and scientific laws' (Femia, 2002b: 117). His critique of spontaneity sits alongside his reference to the need for political contingency (Gramsci, 1971: 196). Following Thomas, it can be said that 'Gramsci's carceral research can be succinctly characterised as the search for an adequate theory of proletarian hegemony in

the epoch of the "organic crisis" or the "passive revolution" of the bourgeois "integral State" (2009: 136).

Gramsci's clearest explication of what a counter-hegemonic struggle will look like comes in his analysis in the *Political Writings* of the Turin factory councils movement of 1919-1920. Here (drawing on Machiavelli), he develops his concept of the political party as a 'Modern Prince', working alongside trade unions to present a united front among subaltern classes. Gramsci notes how – in the Turin struggle – the movement built its own leadership among the working class and avoided industrial collaboration, remaining fiercely independent (1977: 159). This, he argued, can generate consciousness based on production, unify the working class and form the basis of proletarian power and the socialist state (Gramsci, 1977: 100 and 111-112). In view of this, Gramsci elucidates, the capacity to overthrow capitalism cannot be expected to arise naturally from the trade unions. Gramsci reads syndicalism as 'an utter failure' (Gramsci, 1977: 74 and 109) and posits that 'objectively, the trade union is nothing other than a commercial company, of a purely capitalistic type, which aims to secure, in the interests of the proletariat, the maximum price for the commodity labour...' (Gramsci, 1978: 76). In their evolution, Gramsci observes, trade unions could not immediately accomplish the emancipation of the working class by eliminating 'capitalist private property ownership' so instead their aims lay in 'improving the proletariat's living conditions...higher wages, shorter hours of work and a body of social legislation' (Gramsci, 1977: 104). Thus, Gramsci criticises reformist trade

unionism and 'pseudo-revolutionary syndicalism' due to their narrow approach based on bureaucratic and technical expertise regarding general industrial matters (problems which are specific to capitalist society); and their failure to debate the problems of production (Gramsci, 1977: 159; Gramsci, 1978: 76). However, Gramsci argues that 'our criticism of the errors and mistakes of the trade-union movement should not lead us to condemn the unions, but to strengthen them' (1977: 241 and 242).

In this counter-hegemonic strategy in the war of position, Gramsci places a particular emphasis on the concept of the 'united front', through which the working class can transcend its interests and form class alliances by gaining the consent of peasants and certain semi-proletarian urban categories (Gramsci, 1978: 443 and 448). The proletarian united front is a strategy which entails organising 'all the popular forces in revolt against the capitalist regime' among the oppressed and exploited classes, 'toiling classes', by the leadership of the working class (Gramsci, 1977: 376; Gramsci, 1978: 11 and 34). This meant forming an alliance between industrial workers and peasants (Gramsci, 1977: 376) and a conception of proletarian revolution achieved through factory control and land seizure (Gramsci, 1977: 140-141).

Gramsci's political writings, however, contain a number of points of debate with the social democrats. Particular areas of disagreement were the debate on participation to parliamentary electionsⁱⁱ (Gramsci, 1978: 32-33, 39-40); the adequate response to the rise of fascismⁱⁱⁱ (Gramsci, 1978: 61); and the position

of the Italian Socialist Party (PSI) for advocating 'trade-union officialdom' (Gramsci, 1978: 13 and 17). Although he started his political life within the PSI, Gramsci was in favour of communist fractions splitting from the party and maintained this position until the Livorno Congress of 1921, when the Italian Communist Party (PCI) was formed. Gramsci saw the PSI as 'merely a parliamentary party, one which could set itself the target of "correcting" or sabotaging the bourgeois state, but could not set itself the target of founding a new state' (1977: 370). For him, the socialists failed to break with the historical reality produced by capitalism and shared liberal economists' 'mistaken mentality' regarding the 'perpetuity and fundamental perfection of the institutions of the democratic State' (1977: 76). Against this, Gramsci argued that 'industrial autocracy' endures as long as capitalist private property ownership is not challenged, and this can hardly be reformed by democracy (1978: 10). Moreover, Gramsci argued that the state cannot be founded upon the institutions of the capitalist state (including parliamentary democracy), and must, fundamentally, be a new creation (Gramsci, 1977: 76). Drawing on 'Lyons Thesis', presented to the PCI's third congress in 1926, Gramsci argues that social democracy should be interpreted 'not as a right wing of the working class movement but as a left wing of the bourgeoisie' (Gramsci, 1978: 259).

Many recent analyses of Gramsci question whether the theoretical coordinates provided by Gramsci are still applicable given that he was working within a particular temporal and spatial reality (see, for instance, Bellamy, 1990 and 1994; Germain and Kenny, 1998). Gibbon interprets relevance of Gramsci's

solutions to contemporary social problems as 'accidental' (2002: 529). The issue of historicising Gramsci's conceptual tools to engage with current struggle over hegemony is also debated by Hall and Morton. The former argues that an 'easy transfer of generalisations from one conjuncture, nation or epoch to another' is inconsistent with 'thinking in a Gramscian way'. Rather, he reads Gramsci as a thinker who provides the tools to 'ask the right kinds of questions' rather than someone to follow like 'an Old Testament prophet' who "'has the answers" or "holds the key" to our present troubles' (Hall, 1987: 16). Concomitantly, Morton takes Gramsci's own method of 'absolute historicism' as a pointer in treating the history of ideas (2007a: 17). Thus, he criticises both an ahistorical, or mechanical application of Gramsci's theory, and aspires to develop a method of 'thinking in a Gramscian way'. This involves internalising Gramsci's method of immanent thinking and 'focusing on the rhythm of thought in his work', in order to conceive of 'ideas in and beyond their context and engage critically with Gramsci's work without seeing him 'as some sort of prophet' (Morton, 2007a: 35-38). An example of Gramsci's historicism can be found in his treatment of Machiavelli. Gramsci embedded the writings of Machiavelli to his time, but argued that the idea of Modern Prince resonated with the political context in Italy. Yet, he re-defined the 'Modern Prince' as the political party, the vanguard of the working class (Gramsci, 1971: 129, 140 and 147).

On the basis of this theoretical stance, Gramscian scholars focus on alternatives to globalization. Notably, there is a developing literature seeking to introduce an alternative Gramscian framework. Cox identifies the key challenge here as

building a 'coherent coalition of opposition' (1992: 40-41). A number of Gramscian historical materialist analyses focus on the role of labour as an international actor and debate the prospects for labour internationalism; transnational solidarity; and co-operation between labour and social movements in challenging neo-liberal restructuring (Bieler, 2005a, 2006; Bieler et. al 2008; Bieler and Morton, 2004; Bieler and Lindberg, 2011). A further group of literature approaches counter-hegemony in relation to sub-altern, social movements and localised oppositional forces from below, and underlines the need to resist the rule of global transnational ruling class at the global level in addition to national level (Robinson, 2004: 145-79). Yet, it is also posited that primary focus of Gramscian historical materialist scholars is on the hegemony of the ruling class and the structural power of transnational capital in the world economy. They are criticized for giving only secondary status to the debates surrounding resistance and counter-hegemonic strategy (Drainville, 1994: 121; Eley, 2002: 43).

3.3) Radical and Plural Democracy in Debating Alternatives / Intervention of Laclau and Mouffe in Debating Hegemony

In the early stages of their academic work, both Laclau and Mouffe drew on Gramsci and criticized economism by emphasising the superstructural and cultural aspects of his research on political contingency, hegemony, collective will and the integral state (Laclau, 1979; Mouffe, 1979a and 1979b). Later on in the development of their discourse theory, they came to conceive of

economy as a discursive formation (Torfing, 1999: 39). In *Hegemony and Socialist Strategy*, they criticise the Gramscian conception of hegemony for prioritising class over non-class identities, failing to acknowledge the autonomy of the political and for conceiving of a single hegemonic nodal point (Laclau and Mouffe, 1985: 137-138). They argue that Gramsci subscribed to two forms of essentialism embedded in Marxism: class as the sole unifying element of hegemonic formations; and the economic base as the determinant of antagonisms and the political sphere (Laclau and Mouffe, 1985: 69). Hence, Laclau and Mouffe aspire to go beyond Gramsci by 'radicalising hegemony'. They seek to radicalise democratic struggles in which political identities are not subsumed under class but rather in the plural form as 'multiple hegemonic articulations' (Laclau and Mouffe, 1985: 137). They argue for a plurality and diversity of social antagonisms in society, a position echoed by Howarth (2000), Howarth et al. (2000) and Torfing (1999) that criticize assigning a privileged position in the hegemonic struggle to social class due to their position in the relations of production.

In explicating the underlining rational in this endeavour, Laclau and Mouffe refer to 'structural' changes within capitalism (the decline of the classical working class in post-industrial countries; atypical forms of political struggle – especially in the periphery – and the penetration of capitalist forms into social life) on one hand, and the proliferation of new forms of political struggle and new social movements such as feminist, ethnic and ecological protest movements on the other (Laclau and Mouffe, 1985: 1). Moreover, in an interview conducted in 1982, Laclau and Mouffe criticise the 'classical

conception of "the seizure of power", identifying it as a 'vanguardist conception'. Rather, they argue that 'power is not something one can seize, because power is constitutive of the ensemble of social relations' (Laclau and Mouffe, 2002: 146-147). Accordingly, they articulate a strategical praxis of 'radical democracy' through which they believe the Left must come to terms with democracy and pluralism (Laclau and Mouffe, 1987). This project of 'radical and plural democracy' integrates the struggles for 'redistribution' and 'recognition' within the Left (Laclau and Mouffe, 1985: xv and xviii). It is not a case of 'back to class struggle' but rather the advocacy of 'a chain of equivalence' through which workers' struggles can operate alongside new social movements of identity and ecologically based struggles (Laclau and Mouffe, 1985: xviii). Stated bluntly, 'the strategy of war of position involves a plurality of democratic struggles' (Laclau and Mouffe 2002: 147).

Laclau and Mouffe, in *Hegemony and Socialist Strategy*, break with base/superstructure model and argue that centrality of working class as the revolutionary subjectivity and production structure as determinant of antagonisms in society constitute 'limits to hegemony' (Laclau and Mouffe: 1985: 48-57). They define hegemony on a post-structural terrain through deconstructing two 'narratives' conditioning hegemony within historical materialism: the primary structure determining the antagonism between the working class and bourgeoisie; and Trotsky's 'permanent revolution' (Laclau and Mouffe: 1985: 48-55). These are interpreted not only as constituting 'limits to hegemony', but also producing a form of 'political authoritarianism' (Laclau and Mouffe: 1985: 54 and 56-57). Laclau and Mouffe criticise the positioning

of the working class as the privileged subjectivity whose unity (assumed by historical materialism) is constituted by their position in the relations of production (Laclau and Mouffe: 1985: 118). Accordingly, they posit that the centrality attributed to the working class as the 'universal class', 'is not a practical but an ontological centrality, which is, at the same time, the seat of an epistemological privilege' (Laclau and Mouffe: 1985: 56-57).

It is on the basis of this critique that Laclau and Mouffe aspire to 'radicalise' the Gramscian notion of hegemony. They argue that it is structural undecidability which conditions hegemony (Laclau and Mouffe, 1985: xii). In parallel with poststructuralism, they conceive of society as an 'impossible object of analysis'. The terrain of the social can never be closed and there can be no absolute or determinant fixing of the identities of social subjects in articulatory practices or political subjectivity (Laclau and Mouffe, 1985: 112-13). Thus, Laclau and Mouffe define the hegemonic relation as one through which 'a certain particularity assumes the representation of a universality entirely incommensurable with it' by linking different identities and political forces around a common project (Laclau and Mouffe, 1985: x-xiii). Dismissing the base/superstructure model, they indicate that the relation between the hegemonised task and class is contingent rather than necessary, a relation whose 'identity is given to it solely by its articulation within a hegemonic formation' (Laclau and Mouffe: 1985: 86). Breaking with the constitution of agency and interests in the relations of production, they argue that 'a relation of contradiction can exist between two objects of discourse' (Laclau and Mouffe:

1985: 110). Hegemony is no longer conceived of as the unification of political forces around externally constituted interests, but rather 'the concept of hegemony supposes a theoretical field dominated by the category of articulation' (Laclau and Mouffe, 1985: 93). Hegemonic projects aspire to stabilise meanings or hegemonic formations by articulating 'nodal points' or 'master-signifiers' which serve to partially fix the identities of particular signifiers (Howarth, 2000: 110).

3.4) Two Perspectives in Debating Hegemony

Embarking on a criticism of Gramsci for economic essentialism, class reductionism and an insistence on orienting hegemony around a single nodal point, Laclau and Mouffe aspire to radicalise hegemony. In their view, this endeavour is conducted to apply the concept of hegemony to social movements operating within the sphere of plural and radical democracy.

Indeed, both Laclau and Mouffe and Gramscian historical materialist scholars pose a number of difficult questions. To help clarify the key issues of the debate in re-thinking the concept of hegemony I will establish categories to cover key areas of disagreement. I argue that Laclau and Mouffe's conception of hegemony separates politics and economics; fails to adequately deal with the relationship between state and civil society; fails to theorise the social totality;

and overlooks the international dimension in the hegemonic struggle. In so doing I make clear why I adopt a Gramscian framework for this research.

At the heart of the debate between Gramsci and Laclau and Mouffe is the status of materialism. Both theoretical approaches aspire to transcend the duality between idealism and materialism. Whilst the former emphasises dialectics (Gramsci, 1971: 435) and conceives of ideas as material forces (Gramsci, 1971: 165), the latter highlights the 'material character of every discursive structure' (Laclau and Mouffe, 1985: 108-109). Laclau and Mouffe criticise Gramsci for subscribing to economic essentialism and class reductionism in conceiving of hegemony. They argue that the separation of economics and politics is 'established *a priori* in an essentialist conception' (Laclau and Mouffe: 1985: 120). In view of this, they aspire to transcend the 'classical dichotomy between an objective field constituted outside of any discursive intervention, and a discourse consisting of the pure expression of thought' (Laclau and Mouffe, 1985: 108). They reject claims that discourse theory is itself idealist (Geras, 1987). Instead, it is posited that discourse theory is materialist (Torfing, 1999: 45 and 94). From this, they claim that the material character of discourse cannot be unified around a founding subject such as the Gramscian notion of 'class' or Althusser's 'logic of reproduction' (Laclau and Mouffe, 1985: 104-105). Gramscian scholars, however, criticise poststructural analyses such as Laclau and Mouffe's for separating and prioritizing the ideational over the material, an error which prevents poststructuralism from unravelling the social actors behind power mechanisms and questioning the underlying power structure behind a particular discourse (Bieler and Morton,

2008: 112-113). Morton posits that this conception of struggle over hegemony ends up 'abstracting forms of collective agency from the prevailing social order and isolating and separating issues from social conditions and material interests' (Morton, 2006: 48-49). From such a perspective, the social function of Laclau and Mouffe is the promotion of liberal values (Morton, 2006: 56). Against this, Gramscian historical materialism conceives of ideas as 'material social processes' within which material capabilities and ideas are interrelated and reciprocal (Bieler and Morton, 2008: 105). Moreover, Gramscian studies conceive of production not solely in terms of physical goods, but in a broader sense which includes material capabilities, ideas and institutions (Cox, 1981: 131-138).

Laclau and Mouffe are wrong in their interpretation of Gramsci as an essentialist. Gramsci criticises the 'fatalism of philosophy of praxis' and/or 'vulgar materialism', reading it as a consequence of the failure to develop an 'immanent thought to [the] philosophy of praxis' (1977: 34). Indeed, he explicates a differentiation between 'historical economism' and 'philosophy of praxis' (1971: 158-68), and posits that it is the former which overlooks relations of class formations and 'is content to assume motives of mean and usurious self-interest' (1971: 163). Furthermore, in 'Revolution Against Capital' he reads the Bolshevik Revolution as 'the revolution against Karl Marx's Capital' and argues that Bolsheviks developed an immanent philosophy of praxis in the sense of taking men rather than raw economic facts into consideration (1977: 34-35). Concomitantly, in 'Some Theoretical and Practical Aspects of "Economism"', Gramsci interprets economism as a 'direct

descendant of liberalism, having very little connection with the philosophy of praxis' (1971: 159). He reads 'laissez faire liberalism' and 'theoretical syndicalism' as two forms of economism (1971: 159). Thus, it is not historical materialism but theoretical syndicalism, Gramsci claims, that sacrifices the independence and autonomy of subaltern groups to ruling class hegemony and stands as 'an aspect of *laissez-faire* liberalism – justified with a few mutilated (and therefore banalised) theses from the philosophy of praxis...' (1971: 160). In this sense, Gramsci ultimately argues that economism has to be combated both in the theory of historiography and the theory and practice of politics (1971: 165). Given this, Gramsci cannot be labelled an economic essentialist – his analyses are based on a 'broader conception of *social politics* encompassing the state, the economy, and cultural spheres of a social formation' (Rupert, 1995: 31). The way Gramsci depicts the effects of Americanism upon Italian social relations is illustrative in this regard:

...it might seem that in this way the sexual function has been mechanised, but in reality we are dealing with the growth of a new form of sexual union shorn of the bright and dazzling colour of the romantic tinsel typical of the petit bourgeois and the Bohemian layabout. It seems clear that the new industrialism wants monogamy: it wants the man as worker not to squander his nervous energies in the disorderly and stimulating pursuit of occasional sexual satisfaction. The employee who goes to work after a night of "excess" is no good for his work' (1971: 304-305).

Laclau and Mouffe aspire to transcend the dualism between idealism and materialism. However, the status of materialism in discourse theory left deconstructed. Indeed, Laclau and Mouffe aspire to develop 'a non-economistic understanding of economy' (2002: 136). Those drawing on the work of Laclau and Mouffe argue that class is not a category to be denied

scrutiny, but rather that it is a subject that can only be constituted by discourse (Glynos and Stavrakakis, 2004: 204). There is a notable tendency, however, to neglect economy. This is manifest when Laclau and Mouffe conceptually stretch 'democratic struggles' in *Hegemony and Socialist Strategy*, and interpret anti-capitalist struggles of the nineteenth century not as proletarian struggles, but as 'resistance to the destruction of artisanal identities' (Laclau and Mouffe, 1985: 156). Here, class struggle is rejected and understood instead as the defence of a certain worker identity which has been acquired in relation to 'skills or...organizational functions in production' in a reductionist manner (Laclau and Mouffe: 1985: 158). It is no surprise, then, that works employing Laclau and Mouffe's theory of discourse predominantly focus on social phenomena in relation to identity politics and overlook struggles of material inequality and relations of distribution in empirical studies (see, for example, Howarth et. al., 2000).

Hence, in my view, Laclau and Mouffe operate within capitalism's structured separation of economics and politics – a condition that 'de-socialises the material'^{iv}. As convincingly argued by Wood, the separation of economics and politics has always been immanent to capitalism, and constitutes its 'most effective defence mechanism' (Wood, 1981: 67). Similarly, Aronowitz criticises Laclau and Mouffe for leaving little room for political economy (Aronowitz, 1986-1987: 11-12), whilst Žižek posits that the absence of class analyses in postmodernist critical thought (such as Laclau and Mouffe's) signifies a 'theoretical retreat from the problem of domination within

capitalism' (2000: 97). In this sense, whilst post-modernism politicizes language and gender, drawing attention to issues that were previously viewed as apolitical or private, it fails to re-politicize capitalism. Its reading of the political is predicated on a 'depoliticization of the economy' (Žižek, 2000: 98). For Žižek, it is the form of contemporary capitalism that renders political subjectivities dispersed, shifted and contingent; and postmodern analyses will never be sufficiently political so long as they continue to neglect the economic sphere (2000: 108). Similarly, Wood argues that one of the functions of post-Marxism is 'to conceptualize away from capitalism' (Wood, 1990: 60). For her, what is alarming is not that post-Marxism 'violate[s] some doctrinaire Marxist prejudice concerning the privileged status of class', but rather that it fails to critically engage with capitalism, seeking 'to sweep the whole question under the rug' (Wood, 1990: 79). Concurrently, Gill's criticism regarding Foucauldian analyses can be read in relation to post-structuralism. For him, 'despite its preoccupation with localised, capillary forms of power/knowledge, the Foucauldian view often lacks a convincing way of linking these forms of power to macro-structures'. Thus, 'this epistemological revolution' overlooks 'any sustained analysis of the rise of capital as a social relation' (Gill, 1995: 403).

This theoretical retreat from the problem of economic domination and distribution of income can be observed in the position of particular women rights/feminist groups (this argument is further developed in the seventh chapter). For instance, interviewee from Ka-mer - a feminist organisation that struggles for violence against women especially in the Eastern Anatolia –

highlighted that there has never been a debate on the Customs Union and/or economic implications of globalisation though they operate in poor and economically underdeveloped regions (Interview No. 79). Similarly, particular women rights/feminist groups have never discussed liberalisation of trade via the Customs Union and its implications to Turkish economy in debating membership (Interview No. 69 and 79). The interviewees also stressed that economic aspects of membership are interpreted as 'technical' related to particular industrial sectors (Interview No. 29 and 79). In other words, neoliberal 'common sense' which reads the economy as operating in an apolitical field and its strategy of de-politicising the economy are internalised.

A further area of disagreement between Gramsci and Laclau and Mouffe concerns the state. For Gramsci, the state is embedded within political and civil society that is manifested in coordinates of integral state and/or ethical state (1971: 263). Such a standing enables us to designate mechanisms of capitalist state and contest them. Laclau and Mouffe, on the state debate, criticise Marxist accounts to ask the wrong kind of questions around the problem of 'relative autonomy of state' (Laclau and Mouffe, 1985: 139). As social can hardly be sutured around two antagonistic camps state can hardly be approached as a sphere of class struggle. Thus, Laclau and Mouffe deconstruct Marxist conception of state as an instrument of ruling class in capitalist accumulation. However, following they do not give hints in approaching the role of state in hegemonic struggle. On the one hand, this is consistent with their critical stance to classical conception of power. In line with post-structuralism, they argue that 'power is not something one can seize, because

power is constitutive of the ensemble of social relations' (Laclau and Mouffe, 2002: 146-147). On the other hand, according to Laclau and Mouffe, hegemony is 'a type of political relation and not a topographical concept' (1985: 141). They posit that 'a situation in which a system of differences had been so welded together would imply the end of the hegemonic form of politics' (Laclau and Mouffe, 1985: 138). Accordingly, the field of articulatory practices within the 'open, non-sutured character of the social' is defined as the core of hegemonic relations. It is the existence of a variety of hegemonic nodal points – that are antagonistic – which renders relations as hegemonic (Laclau and Mouffe, 1985: 138-139). To put bluntly, according to Laclau and Mouffe, 'hegemony is, quite simply, a political type of relation, a form, if one so wishes, of politics, but not a determinable location within a topography of the social' (Laclau and Mouffe, 1985: 139). In this conception of hegemony, the struggle over hegemony is no longer related to seizure of state power. That is why they remain silent on the role/status of state within the struggle over hegemony in the *Hegemony and Socialist Strategy*. In my view, this position has the political consequence of overlooking the role of the state in the struggle over hegemony and failing to contest instruments of capitalist state.

This emphasis on pluralism within radical democracy rather than seizure of power can be observed in the interviews I conducted with women rights/feminist groups. Indeed, in the 1970s, the women rights movement was structured within leftist politics. For instance, the Progressive Women Association (İKD) was founded by the initiative of Turkish Communist Party (TKP) and it was banned by the military in 1979. The second wave of feminist

movement in Turkey however arose in 1980s – around the motto that private sphere is political - within a de-politicized social setting of neoliberal restructuring. A feminist activist highlighted that women rights/feminist groups resisted neoliberal restructuring as it entailed a process in which women labour has been increasingly subjected to flexible forms of employment. However neoliberal restructuring also opened floor for pluralism (Interview No. 77). They criticised confining struggle against patriarchy around exploitation of working class proletarian women and/or delimiting problems of women within class struggle and public sphere (Interview No. 18).

Moreover, as the emphasis within the radical and plural democracy is openness of the social and plurality of antagonisms, it overlooks neoliberal civil society that actually contributes to ruling class to articulate its vested interests on a universal terrain. Given that state is under-theorised and neoliberal civil society is not contested – and coupled with their separation of politics and economics – their discourse theory operates within the neoliberal order's separation of the state and civil society. This separation has been widely criticised. Buttigieg contends that it risks misconstruing 'power relations within, among and across states', strategically disabling leftist struggle (2005: 35-37). A similar concern is raised by Wood, who states that the conceptual opposition of the state and civil society means that "'civil society" [is] in danger of becoming an alibi for capitalism' (1990: 60). Though this definition of civil society opens new avenues for emancipatory projects of the left, it retreats from the problematic of capitalism (Wood, 1990: 63). In this sense, Wood cogently observes, such a

stance overlooks the 'oppressions of civil society' (1990: 63). More importantly, such a definition of civil society generates 'new forms of freedoms and equality', but equally 'constitute[s] a new form of social power, in which many coercive functions that once belonged to the state [are] relocated in the "private" sphere, in private property, class exploitation, and market imperatives' (Wood, 1990: 73). Indeed, Wood claims that the 'irony' of these 'new pluralisms' is that they end up 'making invisible the power relations which constitute capitalism', despite aspiring to articulate 'an antagonism to all power relations in all their diverse forms' (Wood, 1990: 78). Similarly, Bieler and Morton criticise a direct treatment of global civil society as a platform generating resistance, given that such a reading conceives of the state's relationship with the market as one of exteriority and fails to recognise that civil society frequently operates as an agent of globalisation (2004: 307-308).

For instance, Çelik employs discourse theory to analyse Turkey, arguing that increased democratization will open up more space in the political sphere to articulate identity politics (around Kurdish or Islamic identities, for example), which she sees as progressive (Çelik, 2000). Indeed, it is possible to unfold the debate with reference to the Turkish Left, where the repercussions of conceiving of the relationship between state and society as one of externality are clear. In parallel with the conception of the state as a 'strong state' as subject to transhistorical statolatry, a fraction inside the Left consents to the neoliberal hegemony of the AKP, seeing it as a progressive force challenging the mechanisms of the 'strong state' (the military, in particular). Moreover,

AKP was also supported to open up space for debates around political Islam and Kurdish identity in tandem with pluralism. AKP hegemony is thus depicted as a force under the discourse of political Islam – outside of and external to the mechanisms of the 'strong state' – and hence a force with the potential to constrain it. This is the view articulated by a number of leftist Turkish organic intellectuals who read AKP as in government but without power (İnsel, 2003: 301; Öniş and Keyman, 2003): a claim that overlooks how AKP hegemony reproduces the neoliberal project by strengthening executive power, and the coercive mechanisms of the state. Rather, it is my contention that the AKP hegemony is an instance of 'trasformismo', as its social content is in the consolidation of neoliberal restructuring through the containment of social unrest (I develop this argument more fully in Chapter Four, below). The AKP achieves this by presenting its rule as a rupture with previous orders which, they claim, pitted the elites versus the people in appearance. Thus, discourse theory is interpreted and used against the state, but not the *capitalist state per se*.

On the basis of this critique, I argue that Gramscian framework enables us to critique the 'common sense' approach to the 'Turkish strong state tradition'. Yalman reads the 'strong state' literature (Heper, 1985; Keyder, 1987; Buğra, 1994) as a paradigm, salient for both institutional and Marxist accounts^v (2009: 118). This reading depicts the Turkish state as *sui generis*, having a rationality and 'substantive ends' of its own; and posits that the main social cleavage is between the bourgeoisie and office-holders (Yalman, 2009: 160 and 200). Yet,

Yalman indicates, the strong state tradition is an indispensable part of bourgeois hegemony (2009: 313).

Thus, Gramsci's conception of the relationship between state and society is more plausible in understanding the struggle over hegemony than Laclau and Mouffe's. Gramsci – through the concepts of the 'integral state', the 'ethical state' and the 'state as an educator' that provide the tools to grasp the role of capitalist state in the struggle over hegemony. The notion of the 'integral state' is often seen as one of Gramsci's key contributions to Marxist theory (Thomas, 2009: 137). It refers to the condition arising when a particular group of social forces leads society whilst being in possession of 'all the intellectual and moral forces...needed to organise a complete and perfect society...'¹ (1971: 271). He conceives of the state as the 'economic-political organization of the bourgeois class' that settles class disputes and 'unifies different groupings and gives the class a solid and united external appearance' (Gramsci, 1977: 39-40). He then develops a critique of the liberal conception of the state which sees "[e]verything within the State, nothing outside the State, nothing against the State" by proposing 'Where there is "freedom", there is no State' (Gramsci, 1971: 261). In this sense, Gramsci reads the idea of the 'State without a state', as an 'image', a 'pure utopia, since [it is] based on the premise that all men are really equal and hence equally rational and moral, i.e. capable of accepting the law spontaneously, freely, and not through coercion, as imposed by another class, as something external to consciousness' (1971: 263).

For Gramsci, the reading of the State as a 'politico-juridical organisation', or 'policeman', 'whose functions are limited to safeguarding of public order and of respect for the laws' is too narrow: for him, the state and civil society are embedded, 'in the sense that one might say that State = political society + civil society, in other words hegemony protected by the armour of coercion' (Gramsci, 1971: 263). Additionally, Gramsci interprets the capitalist state as an 'educator' through which 'the bourgeois class poses itself as an organism in continuous movement, capable of absorbing the entire society, assimilating it to its own cultural and economic level' (Gramsci, 1971: 260). The state in a capitalist society is ethical as well, 'as much as one of its most important functions is to raise the great mass of the population to a particular cultural and moral level, a level (or type) which corresponds to the needs of the productive forces for development, and hence to the interests of the ruling classes...' (Gramsci, 1971: 258).

This reading of the state/society relation does not, however, reduce the state to society. In 'Notes on Italian History', Gramsci suggests that statolatry is a state form, explaining it in relation to conditions of passive revolution and underlining that 'the Italian bourgeoisie was incapable of uniting the people around itself' (1971: 53), so the state took a role of 'manufacturing the manufacturer...' (1971: 67). Indeed, according to Gramsci, 'for some social groups, which before their ascent to autonomous State life have not had a long independent period of cultural and moral development on their own..., a period of statolatry is necessary and indeed opportune...' (1971: 268). Hence, he conceives of the function of the state within Italian Risorgimento, as that of a

‘ruling class’ (Gramsci, 1971: 104-105) - the State replacing social groups ‘in leading a struggle of renewal’ (Gramsci, 1971: 105-06). Passive revolution is thus a form of hegemony 'in which these groups have the function of "domination" without that of "leadership": dictatorship without hegemony...’ (Gramsci, 1971: 105-06). Following this, Gramsci reminds us that ‘...the intellectual who is not firmly anchored to a strong economic group will tend to present the State as an absolute...’ (1971: 117).

Third, the status of the international is a decisive factor in analysing hegemony. I argue that the international sphere remains under-theorised in discourse theory. Indeed, as the status of the international escapes theoretical elucidation, Laclau and Mouffe implicitly subscribe to a structuralist conception of the international. In *Hegemony and Socialist Strategy*, they differentiate between advanced industrial societies in which politics is dominated by democratic struggles and the Third World, where struggles are saturated around two camps. Consequently, in analysing the international sphere, Laclau and Mouffe posit a dichotomy between democratic states and authoritarian states. This contradicts their critical stance regarding dualisms in social science. To quote Laclau and Mouffe on the international:

...the proliferation of points of antagonism permits the multiplication of democratic struggles, but these struggles, given their diversity, do not tend to constitute a 'people', that is, to enter into equivalence with one another and to divide the political space into two antagonistic fields. On the contrary, in the countries of the Third World, imperialist exploitation and the prominence of brutal and centralized forms of domination tend from the beginning to endow the popular struggle with a centre, with a single and clearly defined enemy... (1985: 131).

In Gramscian studies the international sphere is salient not only in relation to the uneven and combined development of capitalism but more importantly for its role within the struggle over hegemony in a national context. Although Gramsci was primarily writing within the context of the national state, he emphasises the role of the international. For him, 'international relations... follow (logically) fundamental social relations...' and the 'geographical position of a national State follows (logically) structural changes, although it also reacts back upon them to a certain extent' (1971: 176). He further posits that 'the line of development is towards internationalism, but the point of departure is "national" – and it is from this point of departure that one must begin. Yet the perspective is international and cannot be otherwise...' (Gramsci, 1971: 240). Moreover, Gramsci argues that 'capitalism is a world historical phenomenon, and its uneven development means that individual nations cannot be at the same level of economic development at the same time' (Gramsci, 1977: 69). It is on this basis, Morton contends, that Gramsci presents a theoretical framework that 'displays an awareness of the uneven development of social power relations and class struggle that provides a stimulus to taking the "national" social form as a point of arrival intertwined with the mediations and active reactions of "the international" dimension' (Morton, 2007b: 621). Additionally, the unevenness of capitalist development is not limited to the international context, Morton remarks, as Gramsci's analyses are informed by a spatial awareness based on 'uneven development of social powers at national, regional, and international levels', manifested in "Some Aspects of the Southern Question" (Morton, 2007a: 4).

Furthermore, the Gramscian conception of hegemony and Gramscian historical materialist studies on transnational capitalism pave the way to conceive of hegemonic struggle at the national level within the conditions of the international. Gramsci contends that '[t]he more the immediate economic life of a nation is subordinated to international relations, the more a particular party will come to represent this situation and to exploit it, with the aim of preventing rival parties gaining the upper hand' (1971: 176). Similarly, in Gramscian historical materialist studies, there is a reciprocal relationship between hegemonic struggle at the national level and the world order (Cox, 1987). As Rupert contends, Gramsci provides a 'critical reconstruction of the historical interplay between socio-political processes within particular states, and global relations and processes' (1995: 34).

More importantly, references to the international are not confined to Gramsci's mode of thought and his analyses, but also shaped his political strategy – his praxis was based on internationalism. The *Political Writings* explicates his strategy of internationalism in relation to the concept of the 'united front' and the Bolshevization of the PCI. In opposition to Comintern's tactic of creating a 'United Front' drawing together socialists and communists, Gramsci argued that the PCI should remain independent from the PSI. He did not support the manifesto endorsed by Bordiga, believing it could generate a crisis and/or polemic with the Comintern. Gramsci sought to oppose Comintern by conquering the International Executive rather than through an open conflict with the International, which could end up isolating the struggle at the national level (Gramsci, 1978: 191-200). In a later dispute, Gramsci supported

internationalism and, following Lenin, the Bolshevisation of the Party against a backdrop of increasing fascism, placing him in conflict with the far-left fraction of the PCI led by Bordiga (Gramsci, 1978: 313-334). Subsequently, he criticised that fraction for emphasizing the 'originality' and 'historical' value of the positions of the Italian Left, rather than the Marxist and Leninist conception of the Communist International (Gramsci, 1978: 361). In this sense, it has been argued that Gramsci developed a specifically 'Italian road to socialism' and is an influence on the later trend of 'Eurocommunism' (Mouffe 1979a and 1979b, Sassoon 1980). Yet, this depicts Gramsci as a 'moderate' Leftist; a 'European' or 'Western' thinker advocating the formation of class alliances with [social] movements to create a counter-hegemony within the war of position in a democratic system (Femia, 2002a: 482 and 487). Indeed, in agreement with Femia and Gibbon, Gramsci was decisively concerned with the policies of the Comintern (Femia, 2002a: 487 and 494; Gibbon, 2002: 505-509).

An additional category that shapes the debate between Gramsci and Laclau and Mouffe is historicism. In his criticism of 'vulgar materialism', Gramsci refers to 'absolute historicism' (Gramsci, 1971: 419-72):

It has been forgotten that in the case of a very common expression (historical materialism) one should put the accent on the first term – "historical" – and not on the second, which is of metaphysical origin. The philosophy of praxis is absolute "historicism", the absolute secularisation and earthliness of thought, an absolute humanism of history. It is along this line that one must trace the thread of the new conception of the world (1971: 465).

Yet Laclau and Mouffe argue that Gramsci fails to develop a 'radical historicist' analysis. They attribute this to the essentialism they believe Gramsci develops around the political centrality of the working class (Laclau and Mouffe: 1985: 70). Morton, meanwhile, criticises Laclau and Mouffe's treatment of history, arguing that their reading of Marxist theory constitutes a form of 'austere historicism', 'that reduces past forms of thought to their precise historical context and tends to relegate Gramsci to history' (Morton, 2007a: 27). By asserting a break with the past, Laclau and Mouffe prevent 'the texts of historical materialism (such as the *Prison Notebooks*) from generating new meanings in different contexts' (Morton, 2007a: 26). Moreover, Morton accuses Laclau and Mouffe of conducting a closed reading of Gramsci that fails to internalise his historicist method of thinking (2006: 48). Hence, according to Morton, antagonism is defined independently of historical processes and history 'becomes a succession of articulatory practices discursively produced and formed' (Morton, 2006: 49). As Rupert argues, 'Gramsci insisted that the "philosophy of praxis" was a *situated knowledge*, constructed within and relevant to the historical relations of capitalism in particular times and places' (Rupert, 2006: 96).

On historicism, Gramsci reminds us of the link between ideas and the material context. Indeed, for Gramsci, a philosophy can only become 'historical', 'purify itself of intellectualistic elements of an individual character and become "life" if 'it never forgets to remain in contact with the "simple" and indeed finds in this contact the source of the problems it sets out to study and to resolve' (1971: 330). If such a reading of historicism in relation to historical praxis is followed,

discourse theory itself is historical, as Laclau and Mouffe strategically articulate the politics of discourse as a method of integrating alternative subjectivities into the leftist project. Yet discourse theory implicitly operates within a liberal context, abandons revolutionary objectives and equates historical materialism with fascism through the binary opposition they posit between democracy and fascism. Moreover, Laclau and Mouffe close the possibility of analysing capitalist development historically. They over-emphasise rupture from industrial societies without considering the continuities and re-definitions and re-constitutions of the hegemony of the ruling class within capitalist societies.

The final area of debate concerns agency and structure. It can hardly be posited that post-structural research erases agency. Yet I shall argue that discourse theory's preoccupation with the plural reduces agency to subject positions. This fails to provide a stable standing from which to create a structural emancipatory struggle. Although Laclau and Mouffe aspire to conceptualise unity through the emphasis they place on the conceptual tool of hegemony (it can be argued that they attempt to theorise unity more thoroughly than other post-structuralist thinkers considering the debate on universality and particularity), their discourse theory is better able to explain diversity than unity, that in return operates in individualism.

The divergent positions of Gramsci and Laclau and Mouffe regarding structure and agency are largely due to their differing ontological approaches. Laclau

and Mouffe draw on poststructuralism to criticise 'essentialist' and structuralist conception of society and agency. Structure has a negative connotation. It is believed to stand in the way of freedom and emancipation. They argue that society is not a fully intelligible and structural totality, but rather that it encompasses an 'excess of meaning'. Hence 'society as a unitary and intelligible object... is an impossibility' (Torfing, 1999: 113). Accordingly, agency is not the product of a 'self-identical subject endowed with a set of objective interests' (Torfing, 1999: 113). Following Derrida, poststructuralists reject pre-given and underlining essences which fix social identities around a determinant centre (Torfing, 2005: 13). They argue that meaning can only be partially fixed in and through discourse (Laclau and Mouffe, 1985: 112).

Moreover, although Laclau and Mouffe are cautious not to replace 'essentialism of the totality' with an 'essentialism of elements' (Laclau and Mouffe: 1985: 103), the definition of 'social totality' they offer remains ambiguous and does not go beyond a vague claim that 'radical' struggles over 'the seizure of power in the classical sense' (by which they mean struggles in which political space can be divided in two) tend not to be sutured in advanced industrial societies (1985: 131-132).

Indeed, Laclau articulates emancipation(s) in the plural sense (Laclau, 1996: vii) whilst Mouffe states that the 'explosion of particularisms' presents 'an increasing challenge to Western universalism' (Mouffe, 1993: 1). Moreover, Laclau and Mouffe are cautious not to propose a form of unity from these

particularisms as a new subjectivity, believing it as a standing against radicalism (Laclau and Mouffe: 1985: 167). Rather, they articulate a 'proliferation of particularisms' based around the logic of autonomy through which each struggle 'retains its differential specificity' (Laclau and Mouffe: 1985: 164 and 182), a stance criticised for confusing authority with authoritarianism (Sim, 2000: 31). Describing this 'proliferation of particularisms', Laclau and Mouffe write that:

we are faced here with a true polysemia. Feminism or ecology, for example, exist in multiple forms... we have a radical feminism which attacks men as such; a feminism of difference which seeks to revalorize "femininity"; and a Marxist feminism for which the fundamental enemy is capitalism... therefore a plurality of discursive forms of constructing an antagonism on the basis of the different modes of women's subordination. Ecology, in the same way, may be anti-capitalist, anti-industrialist, authoritarian, libertarian, socialist, reactionary, and so on... (1985: 168).

What is evident here is that Laclau and Mouffe do not analyse autonomous subjects such as classes. They deny a unified or unifying essence of the subject and this denial underlines the plurality of subjects (Laclau and Mouffe, 1985: 181). Torfing summarises this stance, claiming that Laclau and Mouffe fail to theorise the 'subject before its subjectivation' (Torfing, 1999: 56). In this they follow the poststructuralist position that emphasises the formation of political subjectivities while avoiding the formulation of a new theory of subject. This stems from the attempt to understand various new social movements within gendered, racial, urban and environmental politics following the abandonment of the idea of 'universal class' (Torfing, 1999: 56). Indeed, Laclau and Mouffe highlight that 'every relation of representation is founded on a fiction'; as a presence that is absent (1985: 119). In other words, they argue that 'political

practice does not recognize class interests and then represent them: it constitutes the interests which it represents' (1985: 120). To phrase alternatively, they subscribe to the position that the political constructs identities and interests.

Based on that critique, I adopt van der Pijl's position that approaches class struggle in the extended field of social reproduction. This enables me to integrate women rights/feminist groups, human rights and environment groups into the research design. It approaches struggles against patriarchy, environmental degradation and human rights violations as an instance of class struggle against commodification and discipline of capital. Indeed, van der Pijl refers to the 'twin concepts of commodification and socialisation' in explicating capitalist discipline over society (van der Pijl, 1998: 32 and 37). There is not one form of exploitation in the production process of physical goods, but rather 'different forms in which society and nature are subjected to the discipline of capital' (van der Pijl, 1998: 47). Capitalist discipline is imposed and can be contested through 'the process of social reproduction in its entirety, the exploitation of the social and natural substratum, which likewise has to be made subject to the requirements of capital accumulation' (van der Pijl, 1998: 36). In this sense, class struggle is understood in relation to the 'reproduction of labour power in the broadest sense', including bodily exhaustion; processes of socialisation through institutions such as schools and hospitals; the subjection of the public sphere to market rule; and the exhaustion/destruction of the biosphere through which life itself is subordinated to capitalist cost-accounting (van der Pijl, 1998: 43-49). In a similar vein, Gill characterises the current

world order as one of 'market civilisation', as capitalist logic and practices penetrate everyday life through a liberalised and commodified set of historical structures to a far greater extent than previous periods under welfare-nationalism and state capitalism (Gill, 1995: 399). As Gill contends, market civilisation entails social disintegration and the implementation of exclusionary and hierarchical forms of social relation, which generate 'ahistorical, economistic, materialistic, "me-oriented", short-termist, and ecologically myopic' patterns (Gill, 1995: 399). From such a perspective, the discipline of capital extends beyond the workplace to processes of social reproduction, in turn paving the way to conceive of new social movements as class struggle (Bieler, 2000: 11-12).

3.5) Conclusion

This chapter is the result of two primary concerns: the easy dismissal of social movements as 'false consciousness' by certain sections of the Left; and a careless conclusion of ignoring criticisms of Laclau and Mouffe by arguing that their criticism is related to economism of the Second International, that is irrelevant to historical materialism. Accordingly, it aims to come to terms with key criticisms directed by Laclau and Mouffe. In agreement with Laclau and Mouffe, it argues that dismissing new social movements as 'liberal', is a standing that is open to 'the danger that they may be articulated by a discourse of the Right' (Laclau and Mouffe: 1985: 164). Yet although I am sympathetic to this concern – and believe it is important to integrate social movements into

counter-hegemonic strategy – I have articulated a number of theoretical concerns with the conception of hegemony offered by Laclau and Mouffe.

I disagreed with Laclau and Mouffe's reading of Gramsci, which sees him as an economic essentialist and class reductionist. In that sense I argued that it is possible to integrate social movements in the struggle over hegemony within a Gramscian historical materialist framework. Concomitant with van der Pijl, class struggle is interpreted as 'the extension of exploitation within the sphere of social reproduction' (1998: 46-48). In this sense, I argued that the current struggle over Turkish membership of the EU can be conceived of as resistance to the forms of social reproduction imposed by the neoliberal mode of production and its capitalist discipline. Understanding the struggle as such paves the way to include struggles around, for example, feminism/women's rights, environment and human rights in a potentially counter-hegemonic strategy. On the contrary, Laclau and Mouffe fail to adequately articulate what they mean by 'a non-economistic understanding of economy' (Laclau and Mouffe, 2002: 136), and that they operate within capitalism's structured separation of economics and politics: a condition that 'de-socialises the material'.

I then analysed the Gramscian concept of hegemony, showing it to be superior to that developed by Laclau and Mouffe. It is Gramsci more than Laclau and Mouffe to deliver necessary conceptual tools to analyze hegemony of ruling class and develop strategies to contest it. On the one hand, Gramscian

conception of the state and civil society as 'integral state' and/or 'ethical state' enables us to account for the role of state in hegemonic struggle. Contrarily, though Laclau and Mouffe's approach criticises the state, it fails to critique the *capitalist state per se*. That is why it remains silent on the role/status of state within the struggle over hegemony. On the other hand, Gramsci conceives of civil society as a terrain on which hegemony is both contested and consolidated paving the way to contest neoliberal civil society that operate as 'fortresses and earthworks' in the war of position (Gramsci, 1971: 235 and 238). Laclau and Mouffe define hegemony as a form of politics emphasizing the existence of multiple hegemonic articulations within the open and indeterminacy of the social. This in turn fails to unfold instruments of neoliberal civil society that actually contributes to ruling class to articulate its vested interests on a universal terrain. As the state is under-theorised and neoliberal civil society is overlooked, it resonates all too easily with an approach that promotes neoliberal hegemony through advocating the withering away of the state from economy – that results in operating within the neoliberal order's separation of the state and civil society. It is possible to observe repercussions of this theoretical stance in the political sphere. It is this stance that paves the way for particular leftist organic intellectuals to give their consent or to remain silent to AKP hegemony that is interpreted as external to secular strong state due to its references to political Islam. They turned a blind eye to AKP's neoliberal agenda and conceive it as an alternative path to democratisation. Though, following Gramsci, AKP hegemony can be read as a typical transformism, reproducing hegemony of ruling class with a new face while containing social unrest in society due to neo-liberal restructuring (these points are further

developed in the following chapter).

Additionally, I argued that the international sphere is left under-theorised in the work of Laclau and Mouffe, who have no account of the international dynamics of struggle over hegemony in a national context. Claiming a break with past forms of industrial society, they fail to analyse the history of capitalist development. In their pre-occupation with explicating diversity and pluralism, they fail to produce the coordinates for a politics of unity, operating within neoliberalism's individualism.

Finally, I showed that Laclau and Mouffe fail to engage with the strategies used by the ruling class to lead subaltern groups through coercive and consensual mechanisms; issues that lie at the core of Gramsci's concepts of *trasformismo* and passive revolution. In this sense, Laclau and Mouffe's interpretation of hegemony is one-sided. It pre-eminently criticizes the failure of the Left to come up with a universal vision that would enable it to lead other classes. Thus, this critique speaks with a debate on counter-hegemony but falls short to define hegemony of the ruling class and examine its contradictions. That is to say, their concept of hegemony is either incomplete – lacking an account of the discipline of the dominant hegemonic system - or it operates within pre-eminent hegemonic order.

Chapter 4 - Integration of a Peripheral Country into the Capitalist World

System: Political Economy of Turkey

4.1) Introduction

This chapter provides a political economy reading of Turkey's integration into the capitalist world structure. Analogous to the criticism to mainstream literature to conceive of European integration process independent and autonomous from structural dynamics of globalisation (as elaborated in Chapter Two), in this chapter I aim to situate Turkey-EU relations within broader structural dynamics and provide a historical background of social relations of production and highlight particular coordinates of class struggle historically. This prepares the ground for debating current struggle among social forces in the three empirical chapters which follow. It is also intended to address how peripheries are situated within particular world orders and how the world order conditions the integration of Turkey into the European structure. As stated in the previous chapter, Gramsci in *Prison Notebooks* provides the hints to conceive of class struggle at the national level within the conditions of the international (1971: 176). I also aim to present a reading of political economy of Turkey from a Gramscian historical materialist theoretical lens.

The analysis for the two following sub-sections is structured on three levels: the social relations of production, the form of the state, and the world order.

According to Cox, production is not limited to the production of goods but encompasses social relations of production (Cox, 1987: 11-12). Social forces engendered by relations of production structure particular historical blocs, ‘upon which state power ultimately rests’ (Cox, 1987: 105). Hence, the state ceases to be a ‘black box’ beyond human agency. On the contrary, there are different forms of state conforming to particular configurations of social forces (Cox, 1987: 147-148). Thus, the world order is shaped and conditioned by particular forms of state and social relations of production (Cox, 1987: 109). Drawing on this analytical framework, this chapter examines the integration of Turkey into the European structure against the background of configuration of social forces, forms of state and world order. Particular attention will be devoted to pre-eminent accumulation strategy and state-society relations for each period.

After summarizing the Kemalist period and the etatist project, I will turn to consider post-war reconstruction under Pax Americana. It was during this period that the integration of Turkey into the Western bloc began. Although the relationship between Turkey and the EEC can be traced back to the 1950s, I will argue there was little consensus regarding membership or the liberalization of trade until the neoliberal turn in the 1980s. Indeed, the socio-economic order and development understanding of the ‘import substitution industrialization’ (ISI) period under Keynesian embedded liberalism were incompatible with the liberalization envisaged by the completion of the Customs Union, meaning that the period can be identified as tug-of-war between structural adjustment and industrialization/development. Until the 1980s, Turkey repeatedly failed to

liberalize its trade regime as envisaged by the Additional Protocol. Yet, as development was dependent on technology transfer and foreign capital from the core countries of the capitalist world structure, industrialization and development can hardly be interpreted as a counter-hegemonic strategy *vis-a-vis* structural adjustment. In the second sub-section, I highlight that it was after the neoliberal turn and the containment of the labour movement in the 1980s that Turkey applied to become a full member of the EEC; it was then that completion of the Customs Union was presented as the only viable means of becoming a member afterwards.

4.2) Embedded Liberalism, Pax Americana and Planning Development in Turkey

4.2.1) Historical background

The integration of the Ottoman Empire in the capitalist world system can be traced back to the nineteenth century and the liberal world order under Pax Britannica. A popular Turkish saying from the nineteenth century, ‘If you want to hang yourself, use an English rope’ (quoted in Boratav, 2007: 1), illustrates that the Ottoman economy had begun to be integrated via exchange and trade relations. Yet, as Cox highlights, ‘hegemony, though firmly established at the centre of the world order, wears thin in its peripheries’ (1987: 150), and in light of this it is important to note that the Ottoman economy was pre-capitalist,

based on agricultural production (Zürcher, 2005: 16). However, the Empire was compelled to pursue liberal policies in tandem with the liberal world order due to capitulations to and dependence on international capital for modernizing the declining Empire. Though the Ottoman Empire had never been a colony per se, it was subject to concessions, a standing Keyder refers to as ‘debt imperialism’ (1987: 37-38). Within this context, Europe was primarily concerned with the potential for structural imbalance generated by the probable dismemberment of Ottoman Empire. This was known as the ‘Eastern Question’ (Zürcher, 2005: 38), and it was felt that this in turn could upset the balance of power in Europe instrumental to sustaining free trade and open market economy.

This liberal world order was succeeded by a welfare-nationalist consensus as a non-hegemonic configuration of rival imperialisms among major industrial powers (Cox, 1987: 151-210), in which the Turkish Republic came into being. In the core capitalist countries, Taylorism began to transform the social relations of production from workshops to mass production assembly lines (Rupert, 1995: 59-78). Cox uses the term ‘welfare-nationalist’ to refer to the form of state of this era and remarks that the state was involved in national planning as state capitalism and/or corporatism (Cox, 1987: 161). Yet, as Cox reminds us, the welfare-nationalist state should not be seen as a departure from the liberal state: it merely provided compensation for the social defects of the market without challenging its liberal essence (1987: 165-166). In the core states of the global system, the welfare-nationalist state promoted industrialization through protectionism and the expansion of markets and

colonies (Cox, 1987: 154). In the periphery, the welfare-nationalist state took the form of a fascist/corporative state, a form Cox reads as a ‘catch-up’ model for the constitution of capitalist regimes through a process of ‘passive revolution’ (1987: 163). Morton conceives passive revolution as a pointer in analyzing modern state formation within the ‘causal conditioning of “the international”’ and uneven and combined development of capitalism (2007a: 41). He (2007b: 601) identifies passive revolution with ‘class strategies of transitions to capitalism by tracing mechanisms tied to the state, which have assisted in the emergence of capitalism to become the primary organ of primitive accumulation and social development’ (conditions of passive revolution (s) is debated below). Similarly, van der Pijl examines the condition of passive revolution within the context of Hobbesian state and associates emerging state/society complex with slowness of social class formation and a strong state that ‘confiscates’ society thanks to its power that rests on bureaucratization (van der Pijl, 1998: 79). In relation to the thesis of world capitalist economy, van der Pijl concludes that ‘One might say that by aiming to catch up with the leading social system of production in the world economy, every contender state has by definition been “capitalist” already before it “turned capitalist”’ (van der Pijl, 1998: 80).

Gramsci reads the bourgeois revolution in Italy as a passive revolution - an outcome of the programme of Italian liberals (1971: 114). He remarks that ‘what was involved was not a social group which “led” other groups, but a State which... “led” the group which should have been “leading” and was able to put at the latter’s disposal an army and a politico-diplomatic strength...’

(1971: 105). In his analysis of passive revolution, Gramsci emphasizes the “Piedmont”-type function’ of the state that ‘replaces the local social groups in leading a struggle of renewal’ and he reads the function of social groups as of “domination” without that of “leadership”: dictatorship without hegemony...’ (Gramsci, 1971: 105-106). One of the originalities in Gramsci’s reading of passive revolution is his embedded reading of developments in Italy within the uneven and combined development of capitalism. To cite Gramsci:

‘...when the impetus of progress is not tightly linked to a vast local economic development which is artificially limited and repressed, but is instead the reflection of international developments which transmit their ideological currents to the periphery-currents born on the basis of the productive development of the more advanced countries-then the group which is the bearer of the new ideas is not the economic group but the intellectual stratum, and the conception of the State advocated by them changes aspect; it is conceived of as something in itself, as a rational absolute...’ (Gramsci, 1971: 116-17).

In Turkey, the late nineteenth century witnessed the rise of a reformist bureaucracy, through the Young Turks, who were organized under the Committee of Union and Progress (CUP). Although there were liberal and protectionist fractions within the CUP, the project of building a ‘national economy’ prevailed particularly during the period following World War I, in which the liberal foreign regime had been accused of leaving domestic industry underdeveloped (Toprak, 1995; 2-17). Within this context, the newly founded Republic began to pursue a policy known as ‘etatism’. This followed a protectionist trade regime and supported state initiative designed to foster indigenous industry and the development of a national bourgeoisie. It should be understood as a coalition between the nascent bourgeoisie and state

bureaucracy as an accumulation strategy built on the oppression of the working class and the exploitation of the agricultural sector (Keyder, 1987: 106-107).

The Kemalists conducted bourgeois revolution as a passive revolution. The specificity of passive revolution in the Turkish social formation needs to be raised with regard to three points. First, the Ottoman bourgeoisie was constituted mostly by the non-Muslim population and the Kemalist regime smashed the non-Muslim bourgeoisie. In this regard, the figures vary, but Keyder argues that following the evacuation of the Armenian population and population exchange with Greece, 'about 2.5 million Greeks and Armenians had perished, departed or been expelled, a number which probably contained 90 percent of the pre-war bourgeoisie' (Keyder, 1987: 69). Second, the Republic was founded after an anti-imperialist war and it must be questioned to what extent an anti-imperialist struggle can culminate in the institutionalization of capitalism. Third, the economic policies pursued after the Independence War were directed to provide economic independence that was conceived as imperative to safeguard political independence.

However, there is strong evidence to suggest that the Kemalist regime conducted capitalist modernization as a passive revolution and these reservations are not sufficient to conclude that it was not a capitalist transition. Rather, the regime institutionalized capitalist modernization by manufacturing a national bourgeoisie through etatist policies. The indigenous bourgeoisie was not developed and the state took the initiative in institutionalizing capitalism as

a revolution from above without a national-popular base. Etatism can thus be read as a 'policy of manufacturing the manufacturer' (Gramsci, 1971: 67). Moreover, the Kemalist regime outlawed all interest-based associations including workers' associations; and in 1925 prohibited strikes (Keyder, 1987: 104). In this sense, capitalist restructuring was carried out under populism as a modernising catch-up project and class conflict was suppressed under caesarism. Its official rhetoric was populist promoting a harmony of interests through the discourse of 'a classless and unified society without any privileges' (Işıklı, 2003; 66).

4.2.2) Fordism and Hegemony under Pax Americana

Following the end of World War II a new world order was established under the hegemony of United States. It was founded upon Fordism: mass production and mass consumption of consumer products. It was expanded through a process of multilateralism such as the Marshall Plan and the internationalisation of production. Internationalisation of production engenders a process in which production is organised on a transnational scale through conducting its different phases in different countries (Cox, 1981: 146). It is also identified as a transnationalisation process that goes beyond a structure within which national economies are linked by global trade and main pattern is 'geographical extension of economic activity across borders' (Robinson, 2004: 10 and 14). Transnationalisation re-organizes production on a global scale and entails a process of 'the fragmentation and decentralization of complex

production chains and the worldwide dispersal and functional integration of the different segments in these chains' (Robinson, 2004: 14-15).

The Bretton Woods system rested on two pillars: a fixed exchange rate which provided stability for trade and investment; and the 'most favoured nation' principle, which would help to foster free trade. This post-war compromise was based on 'embedded liberalism', which encompassed multilateralism/international expansionism and a reliance on state intervention in economy for full employment (Ruggie, 1982: 393). In that sense, it can be differentiated from rival imperialisms of laissez faire through the increased role of the state in employment and welfare mechanisms and the state's direct involvement in the economy through stimulation of unprofitable economic spheres (Cox, 1987: 220; Ruggie, 1982: 399).

According to Cox, two forms of state coexisted under Pax Americana: neoliberal states formed the core of the capitalist world system, whilst neo-mercantilist developmentalist states predominated in the periphery. The neo-mercantilist developmentalist states were founded upon a coalition of petty-bourgeoisie 'very largely bureaucratic and consisting of government and big corporation employees', small businessmen; and small organized workers groups (Cox, 1987: 235). Yet, Cox notes that this developmentalist state was dependent on world capitalist accumulation due to foreign capital and technology transfer (Cox, 1987: 232). In the periphery, embedded liberalism took the form of state-corporatism. The developmentalist state not only

planned national economic development and controlled external economic impact, but found compromise among industrial capital and organized labour through corporatism (Cox, 1981: 145-146). It also intervened in relations of distribution to create demand in the domestic market. Within this period, planning offices, ministries of industry and labour were more decisive at the institutional level in shaping policies (Cox, 1987: 234).

4.2.3) Import-Substitution Industrialisation and the Social Relations of Production

In the post-war context, Turkey was incorporated into Pax Americana by adopting liberal policies in the 1950s through promoting exports and foreign capital; and by liberalizing its trade regime. The motto that ‘development is unattainable without foreign aid’ turned out to be common sense, that would be followed with the Truman and Marshall grants received by Turkey. Accordingly, it integrated with the Western alliance and became a member to the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO), the Council of Europe, the World Bank (WB) and the Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD). The Soviet demands on the Straits and territories of Kars and Ardahan were also effective for Turkey to approach Western alliance. Turkey was equally essential for containment strategy due to its geographical proximity to the Soviet Union.

The elections in 1950 signified the end of the one-party regime. The Democrat Party (DP) government came into power with the slogan of ‘enough is enough, let the nation speak’, and the element of populism was echoed in the DP’s positioning of itself as an ‘anti-elitist’ government. It is depicted in the literature as a government aspiring to protect economic freedom *vis-a-vis* state intervention and local tradition; and to protect religious freedom *vis-a-vis* the political impositions of the one party rule of the Republican People’s Party (CHP) during the modernization process (Keyder, 1987: 117). In this sense, a group of studies read the period as a departure from etatism and depict the period as a ‘watershed’ which marked the transformation from ‘capitalism under bureaucratic tutelage’ to one determined by market principles. These studies also depict the so-called DP ‘opposition’ as similar to a ‘later day liberal resistance to absolutist rule’, a reading within the tradition of the ‘strong state’ (Keyder, 1987: 123). These studies further analyse the period with reference to the demands of larger farmers and small-town merchants for a more liberal programme designed to secure foreign capital (Sakallıoğlu, 1992: 713). Accordingly, it is argued that the DP shelved industrialization and endorsed agrarian development as the engine of the economy, giving consent to Turkey’s role as a supplier of food and raw materials in the new international division of labour in return for securing inflow of foreign capital (Aydın, 2005: 28-29). These studies also refer to the liberal environment in promoting multi-party politics and note the end of the ban on class based organizations for workers and employers in 1946 (Hale, 1976: 61; Sakallıoğlu, 1992: 713). Yalman, however, identifies the period as ‘planless industrialization’, and disagrees with literature that depicts the era as a rupture from the period of

planned economy (2009: 190 and 198). For him, neither was the balance of forces undermined, nor was the etatist hegemony based on fostering industrialization and creation of a nascent bourgeoisie abandoned (2009: 190 and 211). Moreover, although the ban on class based organizations was eliminated, the freedom to trade unionism and the right to strike were not assured (Yalman, 2009: 211). Indeed, the free market strategy could only be pursued to the extent that external borrowing was guaranteed. Thus, the 1950s witnessed an oscillation between state intervention and the free market (Aydın, 2005: 32). Despite the economic boom of the early 1950s (a result of post-war demand for food and raw materials in Europe), the economy began to experience stagnation, with rising inflation and declining economic growth by 1954. The liberal trade regime caused external balance deficits as imports could not be compensated by agricultural exports. The strong anti-communist stance of the DP - especially during its second term in office - alienated the liberal intelligentsia.

In 1960 Turkey experienced a military coup that restructured social relations of production. In tandem with Fordist accumulation and embedded liberalism in world order, Turkey started to follow an industrialization strategy based on import-substitution, with the economy planned through three successive five-year plans from 1963 to 1978. These policies were implemented through an investment program in the pioneering of the public sector and the protection of national industry via quotas, high tariff rates and an overvalued exchange rate mechanism. The production structure of the country was transformed and contribution of the industrial sector to Gross National Product (GNP) was

equal to agriculture by 1973 and overtook it thereafter (Ahmad, 1993: 134). It was claimed that these plans could trigger a regime change, or could be instrumental in developing a counter-hegemonic strategy as they were built on decreasing dependence on foreign resources. Furthermore, the 1961 constitution granted rights to the working class. However, scholars argue that a de-linking from the world economy was not intended (Aydın, 2005: 34; Yalman, 2009: 224). Indeed, claims that there was the potential for a counter-hegemonic strategy during this period are questionable. On the one hand, the plans set forth a mixed economy model within which private and public sectors were depicted as complementary rather than antagonistic (Aydın, 2005: 34-35). On the other hand, industrialization remained dependent upon core states in the capitalist world system due to the need for technology transfer and external borrowing (Aydın, 2005: 11).

Yalman distinguishes this period as a new hegemonic project under developmentalism (2009: 217). The historical bloc was based on a compromise among the Kemalist bureaucratic cadres, the industrial bourgeoisie, industrial workers and the peasantry. Its populism stemmed from the belief that ISI would prove beneficial for all segments of society: for peasants through minimum prices and agricultural subsidies; for workers by higher real wages and improved working conditions; and for industrial capital through protecting the market (Boratav, 2003: 130-41). The private sector took advantage of high profits and rents in return for providing the peasants and workers with high real wages and internally produced terms of trade. The accumulation model rested

on high wages and a high agricultural income to consolidate an internal market (Aydın, 2005: 42).

4.2.4) The Developmentalist State

The ISI worked in tandem with the structural dynamics of embedded liberalism and a system of accumulation based on demand-management. In tandem with state corporatism in the peripheral context under Pax Americana founded upon a compromise between petty-bourgeoisie and small organised worker groups (Cox, 1981: 145-146), the state not only protected the domestic market on behalf of industrial capital but controlled foreign exchange and foreign trade. At the institutional level, the State Planning Organization (DPT) was effective in supervising and directing the economy. Moreover, the 1961 Constitution identified the state as a 'social state', and it granted the working class the right to strike and collective bargaining power creating a period of institutionalized corporatism (Önder, 1999: 45). Thus, the ISI worked closely with mutual accommodation in labour-capital relations where real wages could be determined through industrial bargaining among the industrial bourgeoisie and labour aristocracies (Keyder, 1996: 151). In that sense, the period was a turning point for the labour movement. Not only did unionisation increase, but trade unions became stronger through politicization. Moreover, as the accumulation of the period necessitated the creation of domestic demand, the state intervened in relations of distribution. Accordingly, real wages were construed as an instrument of demand triggering production for capital (Boratav, 2003: 124).

This belief lead to state intervention designed to provide income distribution in order to keep real wages and agricultural income high.

4.2.5) Turkey-EEC Relations: A tug-of-war between Development and Liberalisation

Within the liberal context under Pax Americana, Turkey applied to the EEC for associate membership following Greece's application in 1959, and signed the Ankara Agreement on 12 September 1963. It envisaged a three-stage process which was to culminate in completion of the Customs Union, with a full membership status to be considered in the process. The first stage was to be preparatory, with the EEC unilaterally decreasing its customs, liberalizing quotas and providing financial assistance to Turkey, with the stated objective of preparing its economy for the transitional period. The second stage was to carry out that transition and was to begin with the signing of the Additional Protocol on the 1 January 1973 – this would set a timetable for eliminating tariffs and quotas. During this transitional period, Turkey was to gradually adopt the EEC's common external tariff and begin to decrease its protectionism for two different groups of products in two lists, 12 years and 22 years for industrially sensitive products for Turkish economy. In return, the EEC would eliminate its tariffs on industrial products, with the exception of particularly sensitive goods such as textiles. The final stage would comprise completion of the Customs Union. Agricultural products were not included within the Customs Union with the exception of processed agricultural goods.

However, there was little agreement on EEC membership or elimination of protectionism among Turkish social forces during the ISI period. Indeed, as social relations of production was determined by an alliance between petty-bourgeoisie and organised labour under neo-mercantilist developmentalist state, Turkey-EEC relations in this period can be understood as a tug-of-war between those in favour of development and industrialization by protectionism and those who supported the liberalization required for completion of the Customs Union. This tension can be seen in the fact that on the day before the signature of the Additional Protocol, Turkey increased its tariffs to 50% by a decision of the Council of Ministers (Tekeli and İlkin, 1993: 92). As planning institutions and ministries of labour were influential to establish state policies under Fordism and the neo-mercantilist developmentalist form of state that was directed to protect external economic impact on national economy in the periphery (Cox, 1981: 145-146), Turkey constantly delayed the elimination of protectionism *vis-a-vis* European products in the 1970s and in 1978, asked for a five-year exemption as a result of economic crisis. During this period, there were proposals within the DPT and the CHP to revise the Additional Protocol – these stemmed from concerns over the development of Turkish industry and agriculture (Tekeli and İlkin, 1993: 216-222). In addition, Tekeli and İlkin argue that the manner in which relations with the EEC was envisaged in the development plans demonstrate that an eclectic approach was adopted. They note that the plans prioritized ISI strategy and declared a wish that ISI should be implemented by taking the relations with the EEC into consideration (Tekeli and İlkin, 1993: 19-24).

Tekeli and İlkin categorize social forces during the negotiation process of the Additional Protocol into three groups. In the absence of an empirical study on the period, this analysis can provide an insight into the debate among social forces. The liberal Justice Party and majority of the country's commercial-industrial bourgeoisie advocated signing the Additional Protocol without delay to increase productivity and strengthen Turkey's standing within the Western alliance. However, the CHP in the centre-left of the political spectrum, a fraction inside the DPT, and various domestically oriented chambers of industry in Anatolia suggested delaying liberalization, expressing concerns of development and industrialization. A third group, including Workers Party of Turkey (TİP) resisted the EEC, convinced that liberalization was contradictory to the industrialization and development of Turkey. They believed that the proposed relationship was to exploit Turkey, a standing summarized as 'they are the partners and we are the market' (Tekeli and İlkin, 1993: 56-59 and 94-104). The position of labour was also divided. The Türk-İş – organized for the most part in state-economic enterprises - supported membership perspective and articulated that this would render Turkey 'an equal party in the Western Alliance', but criticized the lack of social mechanism in the Ankara Agreement. The Disk, meanwhile, saw the EEC as an economic dimension of imperialism (Tekeli and İlkin, 1993: 113-15). However, as developmentalism was not a counter-hegemonic strategy and the ISI model was dependent upon foreign finance and technology transfer, it is important to note that dissident voices could not be hegemonic around an anti-membership stance in this period.

4.3) Globalisation, the Neoliberal Turn and Structural Adjustment

4.3.1) Transnationalisation of Production and the Social Relations of Production

The economic crisis engendered by inflation and indebtedness impelled the United States to abandon the fixed exchange rate and gold parity, signifying the end of the Bretton Woods system. Inflation then spread internationally, in tandem with increasing costs of raw materials such as oil; the growth of the unregulated Eurodollar market; and flexible exchange rates (Cox, 1987: 277-278). The historical bloc founded upon Fordism and Keynesian demand-management began to dissolve. Cox refers to Gramsci in depicting the situation as an organic crisis that yields one of two outcomes: the 'constitution of new hegemony or caesarism' (Cox, 1987: 273).

The new emerging model transformed the social relations of production. The production structure is transnationalised through the integration of different phases of production set in different geographies on a transnational scale (Cox, 1981: 146). This process entails a new division of labour among the core and periphery. Whilst the core holds capital-intensive phases of production through technological innovation – requiring a supply of high-cost labour – the periphery carries out labour-intensive production, conducted by standardized technology and cheap labour, and remains dependent upon the core for its software requirements (Cox, 1987: 319).

Cox reads Thatcher-Reagan model as a form of hyper-liberal state, as it retrieves social policy accomplishments and discards demand management and redistributionist tools (Cox, 1987: 286). Not only is tripartism abandoned, but the government-business alliance is consolidated through a weakening and fragmenting of the working class. Cox posits that internationalisation causes further fractions among the working class around two cleavages, established/non-established and national/international labour. Established workers are relatively skilled, unionized and generally employed in larger enterprises with considerably secure and stable conditions, whilst non-established workers have less skills, are de-unionized and are often recruited from ethnic minorities, immigrants and women (Cox, 1981: 148). Moreover, globalization causes an additional split between workers employed in national and international oriented production structure. Workers employed in sectors of international production, meanwhile, possess a tendency to be potential allies of international capital. This does not result from the absence of class antagonism but international capital has the resources to address their concerns and they are isolated from general labour question within enterprise corporatism and so do not see the expansion of international production as a concern of the working class (Cox, 1981: 148). Moreover, Cox refers to particular strategies which pushed labour into a defensive position. First, the link between wages and unemployment disintegrates, leaving workers in established employment disaffected from general conditions of labour, in order to confine established workers dependent on employers (Cox, 1987: 283-284). Second, the alliance between government and business creates a cleavage between state and private sector workers and depicts state-sector workers as

damaging the public interest. Private-sector workers, meanwhile, are pictured as ‘taxpayers interested in reducing government spending’ (Cox, 1987: 284). Last but not least, new categories such as migrant workers, illegal workers, and part-time women workers are left outside trade union solidarities (Cox, 1987: 284). Precarious work also damages class consciousness, rendering the worker to conceive of work instrumentally (Cox, 1987: 380).

As production is integrated in a transnational setting, the role of state as a buffer between the external economic environment and the domestic economy under Fordism is re-visited. The state is also internationalised (Cox, 1981: 146), transforming state structures and national policies and practices in accordance with the interstate consensus determined by the needs and requirements of international production (Cox, 1987: 253-254). State intervention in the economy is re-oriented to increase the competitiveness of industries and is shaped around the interests of exporters (Cox, 1987: 290). States also subsidize leading sectors in order to boost industrial competitiveness and provide transitional assistance to disadvantaged groups in society (Cox, 1987: 290-291).

In periphery, the internationalisation of the state signifies that the adjustment policies of world economic institutions – imposed in return for debt renewal programmes – had to be taken into account (Cox, 1981: 146). Thus, internationalisation of the state advances the position of those state institutions which are related to structural adjustment. Ministries of finance and Prime

Ministers' offices thus gain increasing influence in shaping economic policy, while ministries of industry, labour ministries and planning offices decline in importance (Cox, 1981: 146). Moreover, Thatcherism and Reaganism envisage a more liberal structure, substituting Keynesian demand-management with monetarism. While a certain rate of inflation was tolerated under Keynesian demand-management in return for employment, inflation is now established as primary obstacle to economic growth and as a clear indicator for unpredictability of economic environment (Cox, 1987: 279).

4.3.2) The 24th January 1980 Structural Adjustment Programme and the 1980 Military Coup as Passive Revolution

Analogous with neoliberal restructuring at the structural level, the ISI model came under question in the 1970s in tandem with world recession, the foreign exchange crisis, balance of payment deficits and political instability. As the ISI strategy rested on foreign capital, the economic crisis resulted in financial bottlenecks and a foreign currency shortage. The United States embargo following Turkey's 1974 intervention in Cyprus worsened the foreign currency bottleneck. Accordingly, ISI was discarded for rendering the economy dependent on foreign borrowing and vulnerable to external shocks. The DPT was accused of intervening in the market whilst its oversight of competition and protectionism was discredited and labelled cumbersome, inefficient and expensive (Öniş, 1987: 28; Öniş and Webb, 1998: 325). Indeed, the historical bloc founded upon the neo-mercantilist development state began to dissolve.

Within the context of rising inflation, there was a rapid reaction within the working class and labour was mobilized to protect real wages. The bourgeoisie began to perceive the Disk as a serious threat after it openly supported the TIP and advocated socialism. Meanwhile, violence and street fighting between Grey Wolves – the militants of youth movement affiliated with Nationalist Action Party (MHP) – and the Federation of the Revolutionary Youth of Turkey became commonplace. The military junta took over the administration on the 12 September 1980 and ruled the country until the November 1983 general elections.

Notably, just before the military coup, the ISI strategy was replaced with a major adjustment programme – the 24th January 1980 Stabilization Programme. This envisaged a liberal trade regime supported by export promotion and the liberalization of imports. The programme was depicted as a means to 'reduce the rate of inflation...improve the balance-of-payments situation through rapid export-growth and, thereby, re-establish Turkey's international creditworthiness' (Baysan and Blitzer, 1990: 10). Exports were promoted through tax rebates, credit subsidies and incentives, and the import regime was liberalized through a reduction in tariffs and other protectionist restrictions. The size and scope of state involvement in the economy was reduced by 'rationalizing' state economic enterprises. The exchange rate regime was liberalized through the introduction of flexible exchange rates and the Turkish lira depreciated 4.2% annually from 1981 to 1987 to promote exports (Baysan and Blitzer, 1990: 11). The programme was designed to decrease

inflation through tight monetary control whilst the distribution of income was left to market forces.

The role of the Turkish military cannot be understood as autonomous from class struggle. Concomitant with Yalman, the 1980 transition can be read as a passive revolution (2009: 311). However, particular unease is raised in the literature in relation to stretching the concept of passive revolution from 'a particular path *to* capitalist domination' during modern state formation process, towards strategies of '*maintaining* capitalist domination' and/or 'restorations of capitalism' in understanding neoliberal transitions (emphasis in original, Callinicos, 2010: 491-92 and 503). Yet, for Morton, passive revolution is not limited to a condition of revolution without mass participation, but encompasses processes which enable us to understand

‘...how a revolutionary form of political transformation is pressed into a conservative project of restoration while lacking a radical national-popular “Jacobin” moment... Definitionally, then, a passive revolution can be a technique of statecraft which an emergent bourgeois class may deploy by drawing in subaltern social classes while establishing a new state on the basis of the institution of capitalism, as in the Risorgimento, or the expansion of capitalism as a mode of production, as in the case of “Americanism and Fordism” (2010: 317-318).

Hobsbawm contends that one of Gramsci's originality is the concept of passive revolution, as a strategy of 'long-term weakening of the forces of progress' in the war of position (Hobsbawm, 1977: 210). Similarly, Forgacs reminds us that 'passive revolution within capitalism might reabsorb a failed revolutionary initiative from below' (Forgacs, 1989: 82). Indeed, Gramsci also asks whether passive revolution can 'be related to the concept of “war of position” in contrast to “war of manoeuvre?”' (Gramsci, 1971: 108), paving the way for an

interpretation of the condition of passive revolution as a strategy of the ruling class within the long lasting war of position, rather than a condition linked exclusively to bourgeois revolution.

Within the context of the Turkish social setting of 1980s, the key question in debating passive revolution is the status of the bourgeoisie *vis-a-vis* transition from an inward oriented to an export-oriented model. A group of studies refer to the development of a fraction inside the industrial bourgeoisie that was advanced under protectionism (Pamuk, 1981: 28-29), and accordingly read transition as something demanded by 'big business' who wanted to renew relations with international capital (Önder, 1999: 46).

Yalman, however, does not agree that there was an export-oriented group leading the neoliberal turn, or that there was a split between the domestic-oriented and the export-oriented bourgeoisie (2009: 265 and 274-278). Rather, he refers to the partial structure of the bourgeoisie in substantiating his argument on passive revolution. In this sense, it can hardly be argued that the bourgeoisie was in a position to lead society around a new hegemony. It should also be noted that following the coup the military regime guaranteed its commitment to the adjustment programme to both international financial institutions and the domestic bourgeoisie (Yalman, 2009: 300). More importantly, as the new division of labour among the core and periphery within transnationalisation of production imposes the periphery a role of labour-intensive production conducted by cheap labour, the labour had to be contained. Indeed, the military regime was instrumental in implementing the

economic transition by providing political stability, containing the labour movement and controlling the democratic process. For instance, the number of workers on strike rose from 6,414 on January 1980 to 57,000 after the structural adjustment programme was introduced and workers returned to their work three days after the military coup of September 12th 1980 (Koç, 1998: 186-87). The military regime suspended unionism, banned strikes, adjudicated unionists and smashed organic intellectuals on the Left of the political spectrum. The military regime was also instrumental to reduce wages without serious resistance from the labour movement (Boratav, 2003: 150).

Further evidence lending support to the reading of the transition as a passive revolution comes from the strong financial support provided during this period by the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the WB^{vi}. Funding was granted to Turkey within the context of the end of detente following the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan and the Iranian revolution of 1979, and was articulated as strengthening the southern flank of NATO (Öniş and Kirkpartick, 1991: 11). More importantly, a reading of 1980 as a passive revolution shows the importance of the capitalist state in capitalist restoration, serving as a reminder for leftist intellectuals in Turkey who conceive of the military and the strong state independently of capitalist social relations. Therefore, it achieves additional significance for political praxis.

4.3.3) The Neoliberal State

In this period, the state withered away from production by privatization of state economic enterprises and welfare state was cut back with relations of distribution were left to market forces. Indeed, the neoliberal turn is defined as 'capital's counter-attack against labour' (Boratav, 2003: 149). In tandem with abandonment of tripartism and the alliance between bourgeoisie and neoliberal state in containing labour in the post-Fordist period at the structural level, the new regime severely curtailed social rights guaranteed by the 1961 constitution. There was a strong campaign against 'overpaid workers' which presented wages as an obstacle to the competitiveness of Turkish products in global markets. In parallel with the objective set to render national economy competitive in international markets, the export-oriented strategy redefined the role of labour as a production cost (Önder, 1999: 54). Nominal wage increases were systematically kept below the level of annual inflation rate (Boratav, 1990: 209). The state withered away from the agrarian structure and peasant incomes were left to be determined by market forces (Boratav, 1990: 218). Yalman describes strategies designed to contain the labour movement, including confining bargaining to real wages rather than general economic policy, declaring various sectors in the economy as 'strategic' to ban industrial action in these sectors, and promotion of new trade unions while 'outlawing' the Disk for a decade (2009: 316-317). Alongside the new conception of social policy in the hyper-liberal form of state, social expenditures of the state fell and the state actively encouraged charities (Yalman, 2009: 324). For instance, in the 1980s, there was an increase in the populations in shanty-towns and the

working-class quarters of cities. Municipalities increased their services and granted partial property-rights to shanty-towns by allocating building-licenses and land permission. Boratav concludes that 'lower wages may lose their significance in a social atmosphere where the wage as such starts to become a secondary element determining the welfare of the family' (Boratav, 1990: 224). Such a strategy was designed not only to erode class consciousness but also to decrease the burden on the bourgeoisie and ultimately sought to prevent a social explosion without touching upon declining real wages. Moreover, this strategy of creating social mechanisms outside unionism was also instrumental in externalizing trade union solidarity (Boratav, 2005: 152-53). At the ideational level, Yalman reads the new hegemony as 'putting an end to class based politics' (2009: 308). The policies were directed to the elimination of the 'saliency of class as the basis for collective identification and action' through a strategy of de-politicising society (Yalman, 2009: 309).

The structural adjustment directed industrialists to rentier activities and industrial capital developed a tendency to suspend production in order to benefit from the quick returns of the speculative economy (Boratav, 2005: 61; Önder, 1999: 68). The surplus accumulated within the export-led strategy was largely shared by the rentier fraction; financial bourgeoisie that was able to take advantage of high interest rates; and exporters of agricultural and industrial goods (Boratav, 2003: 167-69). The wages of workers and peasants were squeezed. The disadvantaged social forces were fixed income groups, wage earners, low-ranked bureaucrats and agricultural workers. (Boratav, 1990: 224). The tax system was illustrative of the new dynamics of relations of

distribution. The tax burden shifted to wage-earners with regular salaries (Boratav, 2003: 154).

4.3.4) Financial Liberalization, Economic Crises and the Rise of AKP Government as an Instance of Trasformismo

Turkey's adjustment to neoliberal restructuring can be analysed in two phases: a period of trade liberalisation and export promotion from 1980 to 1988; and a period of financial market liberalisation and deregulation from 1988 to 2003 (Yeldan, 2006: 196). In the late 1980s, the export-led model came to its limits as public sector borrowing requirements and inflation soared and the restored unionist movement began to confront the erosion of real wages (Öniş, 1994: 106). In 1989, Turkey abolished controls on foreign capital transactions, declared the convertibility of the Turkish lira and opened its domestic asset markets to international competition (Cizre and Yeldan, 2005: 389). Financial liberalization triggered de-industrialisation as industrialists turned their attention to speculative gains with rapid and high returns and speculative capital was invested in state bonds rather than the productive sector (Aydın, 2005: 113-115). Aydın highlights that to understand the processes of accumulation behind financial liberalization, it is important to note that 'the state had borrowed externally at a cheaper rate in order to pay its internal debts with phenomenally high interest rates' (2005: 134).

The Turkish financial market was opened to the cycle of short-term speculative foreign capital movement, causing the appreciation of currency which resulted in reduced exports and accelerated current account deficits, followed by rising exchange rate risks and a rapid exit of foreign lenders (Akyüz ve Boratav, 2003: 1555). Hence, the Turkish economy in the last two decades can be described as going through cycles of growth, crisis and adjustment as a result of the dependence of accumulation to short-term financial capital flows (Yeldan, 2006: 199-200). The rentier type of accumulation, current account deficits, short-term capital inflows and contraction in the productive sector created a foundation for economic recession as inflation and interest rates reached three digits, and were followed with the 1994 financial crisis (Akyüz and Boratav, 2003: 1552). The crisis was short-lived, with 7% of growth in the following three years in parallel with a depreciation of lira and the recovery of exports and attraction of capital flows. Yet following a short period of growth, the East Asian and Russian crises triggered another crisis in 1999. Eight banks had to be taken over by the Saving Deposit Insurance Fund, which in turn worsened public debts and deficits (Akyüz ve Boratav, 2003: 1552). In the context of this economic contraction and with a fragile banking system, Turkey signed a further stand-by agreement with the IMF in 1999.

This vicious circle turned out to be unsustainable in the period leading up to the crisis of 2001. As the state starved from public income, it resorted to internal and external borrowing, to such an extent that before the 2001 crisis almost half of budget expenditures were allocated to pay interest (Aydın, 2005: 106-107). Turkey was offering real rates of 80% in 2001, 60% in 2002 and 75% in

2003, whilst the average OECD interest rates were around 2.5%-4% (Yeldan, 2006: 202). The rate of total public debt to GDP was 29% in 1990 and increased to 61% by 1999 (Central Bank, 2001: 1). The domestic debt deteriorated in tandem with the sale of state bonds and treasury bills, and increased from 36.4 quadrillion Turkish lira in 2000 to 170 quadrillion Turkish lira by the end of 2002 (Aydın, 2005: 123).

In May 2001, Turkey adopted the 'Transition to a Stronger Turkish Economy' programme (Central Bank, 2001). Kemal Derviş was recruited from the World Bank and worked – along with a team of technocrats – free from political interference. There was the expectation that he would generate security in the financial markets and that his links with transnational capital and foreign creditors would guarantee external support. In addition to internal borrowing and unstable banking sector, the programme blamed 'irrational' public expenditures, 'excessive' employment in the public sector, disproportionate wage increases in public employment, financial deficits in social security institutions, 'redundant' agricultural subsidies and 'inefficient' public economic enterprises for the financial crisis (Central Bank, 2001: 1 and 4). Accordingly, the programme sought to provide macroeconomic stability and suggested a tight fiscal policy through decreasing inflation, placing restrictions on public expenditures and wages, reforming the banking system, substituting subsidies for agricultural products with direct income support mechanism and hastening privatization. In other words, the programme was directed to consolidate structural reform to convince foreign capital to invest in Turkey as an 'emerging market' (Aydın, 2005: 132).

The economic crisis prompted conflicts among coalition governments. Against this background, the AKP came to power in the 2002 elections that signified a radical change in the make-up of parliament. None of the three political parties, the Democratic Left Party (DSP), MHP and Motherland Party (ANAP), that formed coalition in 1999 elections could pass 10% threshold and be represented in the Parliament. Scholars read 2002 election results as an expression of a deep anger in society towards the political parties who had formed the previous coalition governments. The AKP came to power by taking 34% of votes in the 2002 elections and consolidated its hegemony with 46% of votes in the 2007 elections and 49% of votes in 2011. The hegemony of the AKP can be explained by reference to two transformations. First, the *Milli Görüş*^{vii} (National View) movement underwent an internal transformation with a reformist fraction – organized under the AKP – transforming anti-European, statist/developmentalist and nationalist components (Uzgel, 2009: 18). Second, the AKP defined itself as a 'conservative democratic' party, a concept that highlights its new orientation which seeks to associate globalisation with traditional societal and religious values (Uzgel, 2009: 21-22). The international context was convenient as it enabled Turkey to be presented as a model for 'Muslim democrats' in the Middle East by the New Right.

It is my belief that the AKP hegemony can be read as 'trasformismo'. Gramsci originally used the term to describe the process whereby the political programmes of right and left wing parties converge to such an extent that 'there cease[s] to be any substantive difference between them' (footnote 8, Gramsci, 1971: 58). In other words, the concept expresses a condition of 'formation of an

ever more extensive ruling class' (Gramsci, 1971: 58). Yet, he also refers to *trasformismo* in relation to a strategy of the ruling class to lead 'even those [who] came from antagonistic groups and seemed irreconcilably hostile' (Gramsci, 1971: 59). In accordance with Cox, I would argue that although 'trasformismo worked to co-opt potential leaders of subaltern social groups', it can be extended to the 'strategy of assimilating and domesticating potentially dangerous ideas by adjusting them to the policies of the dominant coalition and can thereby obstruct the formation of class-based organised opposition to established social and political power' (Cox, 1983: 166-167). In this sense, and in disagreement with Tuğal, the AKP hegemony does not stand as a passive revolution (Tuğal, 2009). It can, however, be read as *trasformismo* to the extent that the ruling class managed to include SMEs and disadvantaged groups from globalization to the capitalist discipline (that Tuğal refers as Islamic opposition). The AKP adopted the macroeconomic policies of the 'Transition to a Stronger Turkish Economy' programme and presented a strong political position to implement it with a majority in Parliament. A word of caution is needed regarding this reading of *trasformismo*, however, as the AKP is not coming from a leftist tradition. Yet, as Cox highlights Islam 'can be seen as a metaphor for the rejection of western capitalist penetration', carrying a progressive potential in terms of alternatives to globalization in the peripheral context (Cox, 1992: 41). In that sense, social forces that are disadvantaged from globalization bearing a progressive potential are incorporated to the neoliberal AKP hegemony that served to disarticulate dissent. This means that there is a need to consider the specificities of Turkish social formation whereby the social base of the AKP overlaps with the popular masses that the Left

(which failed to recover from the military coup) might ordinarily be expected to organise.

In this sense, the AKP hegemony consolidated the neoliberal transition following the 2001 crisis by presenting itself as a rupture from previous governments and/or right-wing political parties and depicting the main struggle in society as 'people versus elites' via a populist discourse. As underlined in the previous chapter, hegemony is related to moral and intellectual leadership. Hence, the reading of the AKP as hegemonic does not stem solely from election results: winning an election is not sufficient to label a particular government hegemonic. Rather, its status as hegemonic stems from the fact that it succeeds in leading different segments in society within the neoliberal project. Although the AKP defines its social base as SMEs and farmers, both internationally oriented bourgeoisie and national oriented SMEs provide support: the former group underpins its economic programme – believing it can be implemented smoothly under a strong majority in the Parliament – whilst the latter group supports its policy of making SMEs export-oriented by enabling them to become competitive in international markets. In drawing support, the AKP develops a particular reading of state and society relations. It is argued that the 'strong state' supported 'big economic enterprises' and turned a blind eye to the SMEs in tandem with the 'state' policy (etatism) to create a strong bourgeoisie. AKP highlights that this tradition has constrained domestic production and made economy uncompetitive because it is dominated by the pattern of taking licences from foreign countries and getting support from the state (Interview No. 50). From such a perspective, the AKP aspires to

restore SMEs that are identified as real ‘competitive’ and productive segments in industry (Interview No. 50). Accordingly, it is allegedly argued that this policy will distribute welfare to society equally and justly and consolidate democracy by increasing welfare of middle-income groups (Interview No. 50).

The AKP even aspires to present itself as a social democratic party by referring to the concept of ‘development’ and ‘justice’ in the name of the Party (Interview No. 50), a move that is well-received by low-income groups. However, the AKP social policy coincides with hyper-liberal standing on social policy. It is co-opted to the idea that employment can only be created on the condition of economic growth and it endorses individualistic solutions and charities - a process that began in 1980 with the neoliberal policy of containing labour. Indeed, in election manifestos, AKP debates social policy in relation to unemployed, poor, diseased, handicapped and retired people that require medical care. There is a shallow reference to labour (AKP, 2001: 40). AKP conceives social state as providing social justice for mostly socio-economically disadvantaged groups by developing social assistance and contributions such as distributing coal and schoolbooks for poor people, compensating health expenses for dependent people and increasing salaries of handicapped people (AKP, 2007: 90-96). AKP acknowledges that concrete steps are taken to economically and socially integrate handicapped people, constituting around eight and a half million people (AKP, 2007: 104). However, despite the AKP’s social base, the Party did not take any initiative to transform relations of distribution. The Party turns a blind eye to informal economy and unemployment and the tax burden still relies on middle and low income groups

by indirect taxation (Bakırezer and Demirer, 2009: 167). More importantly, the party continues to perceive Turkey's low wages as giving the country an advantage in global markets for competitiveness of the economy (Bakırezer and Demirer, 2009: 175). Thus it can be said that the AKP's policies comply with the structural dynamics of the withering away of the welfare state and that they rely on an individualistic hyper-liberal form of social welfare.

Despite this, particular intellectuals from radical liberal and leftist groups gave their consent to the AKP - in particular during its first and second terms in office. This is a result of an analysis that conceives state and society separately that in turn misconstrues power relations (as explicated in the previous chapter). Indeed, the interviewee from Kurdish political party – BDP – (that will be analysed as emancipatory left in Chapter Seven) acknowledged that they gave consent to AKP rule in its first term in office due to its reference to dialogue in solving Kurdish problem, its commitment to democratisation and struggle against mechanisms of 'strong state' (Interview No. 60). Yıldızoğlu interprets this support as *trasformismo* (Yıldızoğlu, 2009: 121). These intellectuals read the AKP's hegemony as progressive, seeing it as 'an alternative form of modernity' which comes from below and will be instrumental in curbing the so-called 'state mechanism'. Yıldızoğlu contends that this reading depicts democracy as tolerance of the 'individual's need to practice religion as an individual freedom' based on identity politics. In that sense, Yıldızoğlu argues, it hides a dark fantasy embedded in a passive nihilism/elitism stemming from consecutive traumas, including 1968 trauma, the 1975-78 collapse of the Mao regime and the 1981 military coup (2009:

117). These intellectuals have adopted hostility towards the state in the name of societal peace and rather than being a part of the democratic struggle against capitalism, they subscribed to neoliberal ideology (Yıldızoğlu, 2009: 118 and 124).

Another instrument of the AKP hegemony is the ‘new’ foreign policy orientation^{viii}, that envisages a more active role for Turkey in the region and global politics. Turkey is conceived as ‘unique’ due to its geographical location and multiple identities that should aspire a more active regional role. Yet, due to concerns over neo-Ottomanism and imperial assertiveness, Foreign Minister Ahmet Davutoğlu, that is treated as architect of this new orientation, stresses that this pro-active role is embedded within supranational organisations, and is based on soft power via civil and economic mechanisms (Davutoğlu, 2008: 77-79). The policy aspires to find ‘harmony’ between Turkey’s Western orientation and further develop relations with Turkish Republics in Middle Asia and countries in Caucasus, Middle East, Balkans and Black Sea Region (Davutoğlu, 2010). This policy aspires to have ‘zero problems’ with neighbours (AKP, 2007: 214-215). AKP endorses economic relations as the basis to open dialogue in solving political problems (AKP, 2001) and develop pro-active policies such as the initiative to find a joint committee to study 1915 events among Turkish and Armenian historians (AKP, 2007: 215).

4.3.5) Turkey-European Union Relations following the Neoliberal Turn

Turkey did not liberalize its protectionist policies during the ISI period in the 1970s as envisaged by the Additional Protocol. Rather, having frozen liberalization in 1978, Turkey waited until 1980s to resume a process of liberalization. For instance, in 1988, Turkey had reduced 20% of the tariffs in the '12 year list' – despite the Additional Protocol envisaging full liberalization of these tariffs by 1985 – and 10% of its tariffs on the '22 year list' (Tekeli and İlkin, 2000: 185-186). Moreover, Turkey continued to protect its economy through the use of non-tariff barriers such as duties and equities. Following 1989, however, Turkey did begin to implement tariff reductions.

Turkey applied for full membership to the EEC on 14 April 1987. The right-wing ANAP presented membership to Turkish society as the means to consolidate democracy, complete the modernization project and put an end to the isolation of Turkey in the international sphere following the Cyprus intervention and subsequent problems with Greece. Tekeli and İlkin highlight that membership was presented as decisive to render an export-led growth strategy sustainable and provide additional financial assistance to implement the programme (Tekeli and İlkin, 2000: 100-101). Membership application was received positively domestically. Right-wing political parties supported the process. Contrary to their former critical stance, a number of left-wing oriented intellectuals, Kurdish groups, and social democratic political parties began to see membership as a road to reforming anti-democratic practices

institutionalized following the military regime (Tekeli and İlkin, 2000: 103-104). Of the political parties it was only the religious-conservative parties who objected to membership (Tekeli and İlkin, 2000: 100-104). As far as labour was concerned, the Disk was banned from 1980 to 1992 and the Türk-İş supported the government's policy. Hak-İş rejected membership on the grounds that membership would be inconsistent with trade unionist rights (Tekeli and İlkin, 2000: 105-106).

The European Commission recognized Turkey as an eligible country, but underlined that Turkey could not undertake the obligations stemming from EU membership as a result of its uncompetitive economy, inadequate social protection for workers, macro-economic instability, high inflation and unemployment rates, undemocratic practices and its record of violating human rights. It was also stressed that the EU was not ready for another enlargement given its goal of introducing the Single Market by 1992. The Commission suggested Turkey to deepen further its relations with the EU by completing the Customs Union (European Commission, 1989).

Following its application, Turkey presented a 'precipitated tariff reduction list' to the EU in 1988 and started tariff reductions (Interview No. 36). The international oriented capital fraction supported the Customs Union for increasing economies of scale and stimulating competitiveness (Interview No. 5, 32, 43 and 63; TÜSİAD, 2008a: 19). It was expected to decrease prices of raw materials, rendering international oriented capital more competitive in world markets (MESS, 1994: 17). The liberal think-tank, Economic

Development Foundation (İKV) endorsed that international trade is increasingly organized around economic blocs and Turkey should not be isolated from that structural imperative (MESS, 1994: 12-13). Membership was conceived as a step to integrate with neo-liberal structure, through consolidating macro-economic stability with reference to Maastricht criteria and contributing to adopt the rules of international trade (TÜSİAD, 1996: 55-56).

Within the context of its export-promotion strategy and the neoliberal turn Turkey was in a position to liberalize its trade regime *vis-a-vis* the EU and completed the Customs Union by a decision of the EU-Turkey Association Council on the 6th March 1995. Internationally oriented capital pioneered completion of the Customs Union that is expected to stimulate competitiveness, accelerate production capacity and bring technology transfer (Interview No. 5 and 11). In line with the hypothesis introduced in Chapter Two, both labour and capital in international oriented textile sector endorsed completion of the Customs Union due to elimination of quotas (Interview No. 64). In parallel with internationalisation of state and its priority to subsidise leading sectors to stimulate international competitiveness of the country, concerns of textile sector, that has a pre-eminent position in export-promotion strategy, were prioritised during the negotiations. At the institutional level, the organic link between bureaucracy and exporters was provided by exporters' unions, which are institutionally affiliated with the Under-secretariat of Foreign Trade (Interview No. 36). The automotive industry supported the Customs Union on the condition that imports of second hand motor vehicles would be

subjected to a special permission^{ix} (Interview No. 36 and 63). The international oriented labour formed an alliance with the international oriented capital for the completion of the Customs Union, on the condition that the membership would be attained. For instance, both the Textile Trade Union (Tekstil-İş) and the Textile, Knitting and Clothing Industry Workers' Union (Teksif) supported the Customs Union (Interview No. 9 and 31). The current President of Tekstil-İş Rıdvan Budak was then the President of the Disk and visited Brussels to convince the socialist group in the European Parliament not to block the Customs Union.^x The Tekstil-İş posits that the Customs Union provided standardization of production in textile and increased quality of textile products (Interview No. 9).

As expected from the hypothesis, nationally oriented capital raised concerns before completion of the Customs Union. It is highlighted that the SMEs would not be able to compete with European products (MÜSİAD, 1996: 109). The Customs Union was expected to stimulate imports of raw materials that would negatively affect SMEs and public economic enterprises that provided raw materials for major industries. Moreover, it is stressed that increasing imports would cause foreign exchange bottleneck and overvalue exchange rates (İSO, 1995: 16 and 30; MESS, 1994: 28; MÜSİAD, 1995: 53). Turkey would be subjected to terms and conditions of international trade that would put extra pressures upon SMEs (MÜSİAD, 1996: 108). Additionally, Turkey would be dependent on EU's foreign trade regime that would negatively impact its privileged relations with other economic blocs such as Economic Cooperation Organization, Islamic Conference Economic Council and Black Sea Economic

Cooperation (MÜSİAD, 1995: 53). Indeed, MÜSİAD was suggesting a new economic bloc - Cotton Union – among dependant countries in Middle East and Turkish Republics (MÜSİAD, 1996: 4).

There were dissident voices among labour such as ‘membership first’ policy of the Türk-İş or ‘they are the partners and we are the market’ of the Hak-İş. It is underlined that the Customs Union will deteriorate economic problems by accelerating unemployment and constraining independence on foreign trade regime (Türk-İş, 2002c: 235-241). However, Türk-İş gave its consent to the Customs Union on the condition to get prior guarantees for membership and protective measures for SMEs (Türk-İş, 2002b: 345). The Hak-İş objected to completion of the Customs Union on the grounds that it would negatively affect industry due to pressures of competitiveness and generate dependency to EU without participating to decision making - in contradiction with independence of foreign trade regime and foreign policy (Hak-İş, 1992: 180-181; 1995: 82-83; 1999: 49).

4.4) Conclusion

This chapter sought to provide a reading of Turkish social formation from the perspective of political economy to provide a background for subsequent empirical chapters. It did so by embedding Turkey's relations with the EU within the history of Turkey's integration into the capitalist world system. The chapter was structured in two sub-sections. In the first, the debate surrounding

Turkey's integration into the EEC was embedded within an analysis of hegemony under Pax Americana and the social relations of production shaped by Fordism; embedded liberalism; and ISI and neo-mercantilist developmental states in the periphery. The second sub-section examined Turkey-EU relations following Turkey's neoliberal turn within the wider context of globalisation.

The chapter began by reading Kemalist modernization and the following etatist period as a passive revolution designed to foster national industry and create a bourgeoisie under the world order of rival imperialisms. Then it was argued that during the neo-mercantilist-developmental period there was no clear consensus on EEC membership or on the elimination of protectionism among the pre-eminent coalition of social forces which formed the neo-mercantilist developmentalist state. Rather, the relationship was identified as a tug-of-war between social forces in favour of development by protectionism and those which supported the liberalization engendered by the Customs Union. It was noted that tariff reductions were constantly delayed during this period. Notably, there were critical groups inside the national chambers of commerce in Anatolia, including a fraction within the DPT, social democratic political parties, and Türk-İş. Whilst these groups were not against membership *per se*, they supported delays in liberalisation, citing concerns over development and industrialization. Moreover, the leftist oriented TİP and Disk opposed membership, interpreting membership as the economic dimension of imperialism and organising around the slogan 'they are the partners and we are the market'. However, it can hardly be argued that these dissident groups were able to form an alternative historical bloc around an anti-membership

perspective. Indeed, Turkish economy was dependent on core countries for development as a result of the need for foreign capital investment and technology transfers.

I then showed how, in parallel with the accumulation crisis of Fordist period, the ISI model was replaced with an export-oriented model which was enshrined with the 24th January 1980 economic programme. This programme aimed to stimulate economic growth by liberalizing foreign trade regime and increasing the creditworthiness of the economy through reducing inflation and 'rationalising' the state's involvement in the economy. This chapter, then, reads the 1980 military coup as a passive revolution within the struggle of war of position. It suggests that the bourgeoisie was not strong enough to lead society around a new hegemonic project and so the structural adjustment programme was instituted through a military coup. This proved instrumental in suppressing the labour movement and transformed real wages from a factor used to create demand for a domestic economy to a production cost. It is within this context that Turkey applied to become a member of the EEC in 1987. This move was presented as a natural part of the export-promotion strategy and – it was argued – was necessary in order for Turkey to receive financial assistance so that it could finance its export-promotion model. There was no pre-eminent labour perspective shaping the debate. After the EEC found Turkey's membership application to be premature, Turkey adopted a liberalization list and completed its Customs Union by 1995.

I have shown how the 1990s saw a vicious circle of growth, crisis and adjustment in tandem with the liberalization of Turkey's financial system during the neoliberal period. Accordingly, the chapter reads the rise of AKP against the background of the 2001 economic crisis. It argues that the AKP's hegemony can be interpreted as *trasformismo* that consolidated neoliberal restructuring. It did so by expanding the ruling class through incorporating nationally-oriented SMEs into neoliberal hegemony, and by eliminating a potentially progressive movement through the integration of popular masses who are disadvantaged by globalization. It achieved this latter tactic by presenting itself as a rupture from previous right-wing political parties, that is interpreted as a populist movement struggling on behalf of the people 'versus elites'. It is within this background of state-society relations that the current struggle among social forces in Turkey regarding EU membership is shaped.

Chapter 5 - European Membership and Intra-class Struggle among Capital

5.1) Introduction

I examine the position of capital *vis-a-vis* globalisation and membership perspective and debate intra-class struggle in this chapter. Following the hypothesis that transnationalisation of production has generated a new division between internationally and nationally oriented social forces of capital and labour, it is presumed that internationally oriented capital will develop a supportive stance conceiving of membership as the means to stimulate exports and consolidate open market economy. Contrarily, nationally oriented capital is expected to oppose membership as they will be exposed to pressures of competitiveness via two processes. On the one hand, they have to compete with European enterprises as a result of participating in the Internal Market. On the other hand, membership entails a process through which Turkey adopts EU's foreign trade regime and decreases its tariffs for global products. Thenceforth, they will equally be subjected to rising competition from cheaper intermediate products of the third world including South Korea and China.

The chapter starts by operationalising intra-class struggle for capital. Particular industrial sectors are selected - on the basis of their position in the production structure - to unfold position of different fractions of capital. Whilst the textile

and automotive industries are examined as internationally oriented industries, agriculture constitutes a nationally oriented sector. It is a sheltered sector that continues to produce for domestic market. The debate is followed with an analysis on civil society. Guided by Gramsci's conception of civil society as a terrain where hegemony is both contested and consolidated, particular institutions within civil society are examined in questioning whether capital can transcend its economic-vested interests and present neoliberal membership on a universal terrain. These institutions are approached as platforms for organic intellectuals of capital to articulate the neo-liberal discourse on a universal terrain. To put bluntly, at issue here is the hegemonic status of pro-membership project.

5.2) Revisiting Intra-Class Struggle inside Capital within the Context of Globalisation

As outlined in the second chapter, the principal means of Turkey's integration into the global capitalist structure is via trade rather than FDI. Thus, Turkey's integration path constitutes a case of internationalism more than transnationalism. There are some enterprises that operate transnationally. However, transnational fraction remains far from constituting an additional category or establishing a hegemonic position within employer associations. In this sense, transnationally oriented capital is analysed within internationally oriented fraction.

As representatives of internationally oriented capital, Turkish Industrialists' and Businessmen's Association (TÜSİAD), the Turkish Exporters' Assembly (TİM) and the Turkish Confederation of Employer Associations (TİSK) have been interviewed. TÜSİAD represents 55% of the private sector operating in the manufacturing and service sectors and its members in total conduct almost 80% of exports in Turkey (Interview No. 5). It is defined as a 'voluntary based organisation', established to lobby governments for pro-market reforms and to enact policies that increase competitiveness (Interview No. 5). It is possible to identify organic links with European capital: it has been a member of Business Europe since 1987 and during the last two decades a number of TÜSİAD members^{xi} have become affiliated with the European Roundtable of Industrialists (ERT). TİM represents the interests of exporters organized in sixty exporter unions and twenty-six sectors as an independent but affiliated institution of the Under-Secretariat of Foreign Trade (Interview No. 65). TİSK is composed of twenty-three employer associations, whose members mostly operate in international markets (Interview No. 32). It is the institutional platform that represents employers in corporatist structures such as Economic and Social Council, Turkish Employment Agency and the Tripartite Advisory Board (Interview No. 32).

In explicating intra-class struggle, particular industries are selected. The textile and automotive industries are examined as internationally oriented sectors given their privileged position within the export-promotion strategy since the 1980s. Moreover, following Cox's analysis on internationalisation of state (1987: 290-291), these two sectors were subsidised by the neoliberal form of

state as leading sectors to stimulate international competitiveness. Textile and automotive industries constitute the majority of Turkish exports to the EU (Togan et.al, 2005b: 90). In this context, the Turkish Textile Employers' Association (TÜTSİS) and Automotive Manufacturers Association (OSD) are analysed. The majority of members in TÜTSİS operate in international markets and approximately 65-70% of its exports are conducted with EU countries (Interview No. 64). Similarly, OSD is composed only of private sector members who operate in international markets and conduct approximately 70% of their exports with the European market (Interview No. 63).

Nationally oriented capital is composed of sheltered sectors that primarily produce for domestic market. It is examined in relation to SMEs and the agricultural sector. It is inferred that these would be negatively affected by the opening of markets to competition and the elimination of state subsidies. Furthermore, as they primarily produce intermediate goods, they would be subjected to competition with cheaper goods produced in global markets. Thus, it is expected that they develop a critical stance *vis-a-vis* globalisation and EU membership. The Union of Turkish Chambers and Stock Exchange (TOBB), the Association of Independent Industrialists and Businessmen (MÜSİAD), İstanbul Chamber of Commerce (İSO) and OSTİM industrial zone in Ankara are interviewed as institutions representing the interests of SMEs. TOBB was founded in 1952 as the first compulsory membership employer association. It is comprised of 1.2 million enterprises from various sectors, and the majority of its enterprises are SMEs (Interview No. 80). The İSO has 15,000 members, 97% of which are SMEs operating in manufacturing, representing 40% of

Turkish firms in manufacturing and comprising a collective total of 35% of Turkish exports (Interview No. 13). MÜSİAD is composed of around 3,000 SMEs and was founded in response to a belief that the state prioritised large, İstanbul based enterprises represented by TÜSİAD (Interview No. 7 and 8). The OSTİM industrial zone in Ankara is composed of 5,000 SMEs, operating in manufacturing, commercial and logistical sectors (Interview No. 22).

In this sense, agriculture will be particularly affected by participation in the Internal Agriculture is a sheltered sector in that – with the exception of processed products – it is not subjected to the Customs Union Market. Indeed, as far as trade policy is concerned, agriculture is highly protected in Turkey, with tariffs reaching to 124% for fish, sugar and sweets (Togan et.al, 2005a: 45). The Union of Turkish Chambers of Agriculture (TZOB) is an official professional platform based on compulsory membership, which organises the interests of 5 million farmers (Interview No. 49). The majority of these are small scale producers who produce for the national market, though there are also larger firms operating in international markets (Interview No. 49). The Agricultural Credit Cooperatives of Turkey was founded in 1863 to provide support for farmers. It has 1.3 million members, most of which operate in the national market (Interview No. 53).

The Gramscian notion of the 'war of position' extends the struggle over hegemony to civil society. In this view, it is pertinent to unravel the 'fortresses and earthworks' – defence systems - in superstructure of civil society that are

cogently conceptualised by Gramsci as 'the trench-systems of modern warfare' in the war of position (1971: 235 and 238). My contention is that such an endeavour is decisive to enquire hegemonic status of a particular project in civil society – to what extent ruling class presents its economic vested interests as a universal vision by transcending its economic-corporate phase.

In view of this, the Turkish Economic and Social Studies Foundation (TESEV) and the İKV are analysed as institutional platforms, whose studies are decisive in shaping and articulating ideas regarding the membership debate. These institutions also have the social function of opening certain sensitive issues to public debate by asking 'experts' (who, from a Gramscian perspective can be seen as 'traditional intellectuals') to write opinion papers. Both TESEV and İKV are presented to society as cultivating 'independent and scientific' knowledge that is 'objective and technical' in a positivist sense. They are understood to represent an independent and alternative view of 'civil society', an argument substantiated by the fact that they are financially independent from state (Interview No. 4 and 76). Yet, in parallel with neoliberal hegemony, the knowledge they produce is depicted as autonomous from the economic base; and remains independent from political authority and the 'strong state'. Hence, they are largely composed of traditional intellectuals, who form part of a 'social utopia by which the intellectuals think of themselves as "independent", autonomous, endowed with a character of their own' (Gramsci, 1971: 7-8).

Yet it is possible to unravel organic links between these intellectuals and capital. The İKV was founded by the İstanbul Chamber of Commerce and the İstanbul Chamber of Industry in 1965 as a platform to prepare reports and develop a 'specialised' perspective regarding integration with the EEC on behalf of the private sector (MESS, 1994: 11). The administrative boards of these institutions are formed by entrepreneurs. For instance, Jak Kamhi – the İKV's President between 1987 and 1992 – was a TÜSİAD Executive Committee member and acted as a businessman in ERT for twelve years. The interviewee from İKV displayed intolerance towards this aspect of my dissertation and suggested that I should have rather picked a topic on the Europeanisation of any *acquis* chapter for my dissertation (Interview No. 62), an indicator that reveals acceptance of ideas associated with pro-membership as common sense and intolerance among the orthodox stance *vis-a-vis* critical approaches.

5.3) Transnationalisation of Production, Capital and Membership

5.3.1) International Oriented Capital, Globalization and Membership

As expected by the hypothesis, internationally oriented capital conceives of globalisation positively, as a process providing technology transfer, delocalisation and accelerating the volume of trade (Interview No. 65). In return, closed economies are discarded for resulting in high prices and

downgrading quality of products and services in the domestic market (Interview No. 5 and 65).

Internationally oriented capital endorses membership to stimulate competitiveness and exports (Interview No. 5). For TÜSİAD, it is economically beneficial to be in the European economic area (Interview No. 43). Moreover, European market is essential for Turkish industry as Turkey conducts more than 50% of its foreign trade with the EU countries (Interview No. 65). Yet, it is acknowledged that Turkish industry has already undergone effects of opening its market to international competition via the Customs Union (Interview No. 65). Indeed, Turkey has already integrated with the European market (Interview No. 65) and internationally oriented capital has secured expected economic advantages via the Customs Union (Interview No. 43). In this view, interviewees highlight that there are no additional economic benefits of membership except participating to the decision making (Interview No. 6, 32, 63 and 64). However, it is highlighted that membership perspective and ongoing reform process consolidate a functioning market economy. For instance, interviewees give references to consolidation of a transparent public administration and enactment of competition law during the reform process (Interview No. 43). Moreover, membership perspective brings predictability and consolidates market stability, factors named as decisive to stimulate FDI flows (Interview No. 5 and 6).

Yet, internationally oriented capital endorses arguments transcending its vested economic interests in promoting membership. TÜSIAD identifies membership as a 'national project' (TÜSIAD, 2002: 1) and articulates a strategy to debate it as an issue above party politics (Interview No. 5). In this strategy, membership is presented as a necessity required by an international treaty that is no longer open to debate in Turkish society. Indeed, TÜSIAD asks traditional intellectuals to prepare reports – that is presented as expert opinion – on sensitive topics in critical junctures – such as before European Council meetings - in drawing support for pro-membership project (TÜSIAD, 1997, 1999 and 2001). This varied between reform proposals on constitutional change to publishing position papers to open sensitive topics to public debate such as Kurdish question and human rights. This illuminates its strategy to transcend its vested interests in presenting membership on a universal terrain as a progressive process for society to consolidate democratisation and rule of law.

Moreover, membership project is defended not only on economic grounds that can be taken as another hint for its hegemonic status. On the one hand, European Social Model and Europe's neoliberal turn are supported. Indeed, the neoliberal conception of social policy that presents competitiveness as a condition for employment and extends social rights on the basis of economic conditions is promoted (Interview No. 32). More importantly, social dialogue – directed to protect the interests of the workplace collectively and cooperate to increase the competitiveness of the enterprise – is endorsed as a viable model (Interview No. 32). The 'confrontational' industrial relations of 1970s and

'politicised unions' are criticised (Interview No. 32). On the other hand, the EU is also presented as an anchor for the consolidation of democracy, the rule of law and respect for human rights, which are interpreted as preconditions to safeguard market economies (Interview No. 6, 43 and 65). It is argued that problems in democracy cause material deficits (Interview No. 5). The populist argument which links membership with modernisation also persists, viewing membership as the means to reach the standards of 'contemporary civilisation', a process that supposedly began with the founding of the Republic and its Western orientation (Interview No. 32).

The EU is also perceived as a 'peace project' (Interview No. 11) and membership is believed to lead to improved dialogue in foreign policy (Interview No. 6). As a counter-argument to criticisms on the grounds of national interests, TÜSİAD re-defines the 'violation' of national interest as reaching a deadlock resulting in the persistence of problems such as Cyprus and/or Armenia, which – they claim – generate 'material deficits' (Interview No. 5). On this issue, the Cyprus problem constitutes the bulk of the debate. It is acknowledged that Turkey cannot become a member of the EU without a solution due to the likelihood of a veto by Cyprus. The Cyprus problem also affects current accession negotiations as the EU froze eight chapters in 2006 on the grounds that Turkey has not extended the Customs Union to the Republic of Cyprus. The situation in the island is seen as unjust by TÜSİAD, as the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus (KKTC) – which accepted the Annan Plan^{xii} – is refused membership while the Republic of Cyprus – which rejected the Plan – was granted EU membership (Interview No. 6). In extending the

debate beyond narrow economic interests, TÜSİAD published two reports analysing the Northern Cypriot economy (TÜSİAD, 1998 and 2009). In these, TÜSİAD claims that there are economic problems in the KKTC, which arise from its political isolation and the pre-eminent state role in running the economy (TÜSİAD, 1998: 53 and 69; TÜSİAD, 2009: 35). The EU process is supported as the EU constitutes the second biggest trade partner of the KKTC following Turkey (TÜSİAD, 1998: 39), and it is believed that EU membership and standardisation of EU rules lie at the core of development of Northern Cyprus (TÜSİAD, 2009: 59). Yet despite these claims, it cannot be argued that internationally oriented capital proposes a solution beyond further negotiations. It is believed that membership will contribute to solve the Cyprus problem.

5.3.2) The Position of Textile and Automotive Industries

Interviewees from internationally oriented textile and automotive industries conceive of globalisation positively as a process that forces industries to comply with rules of international competition (Interview No. 63 and 64). Textile and automotive industries support membership perspective (Interview No. 63 and 64). Yet, in debating probable economic impact of membership to Turkish industry, the Customs Union is identified as a milestone to open Turkish industry to international competition. The Customs Union transformed the textile sector by accelerating its exports (Interview No. 64). Interviewee from automotive industry defined the Customs Union as an ‘educative process’

to render Turkish industry competitive in the world market and a ‘global actor’ in automotive production (Interview No. 63).

Thenceforth, it is remarked that participating to the Internal Market will have no further economic effects to Turkish economy (Interview No. 63). Automotive industry has already consolidated their markets outside and independent of membership framework (Interview No. 63). Interviewees from automotive and textile industries highlighted that they establish international links^{xiii} outside membership framework, which in return renders its economic activities within the Internal Market independent of membership status (Interview No. 63 and 64). Moreover, demand to Turkish products is contracting in tandem with the economic crisis in Euro-zone, a situation that drives Turkey to develop policies directed to diversify its foreign economic relations with alternative markets and to decrease its trade dependence to European market (Interview No. 63 and 64).

The textile sector is negatively affected from EU’s liberalisation in 2005 that rendered China the major supplier to the EU market. The market share of China in the EU increased 50% from 22% to 40% between 2005 and 2010 (Interview No. 64). Textile sector considers opening the Customs Union into question and proposing to downgrade it to a free trade agreement (Interview No. 64). It is posited that free trade agreements that the EU signs with third countries engender asymmetric relation as Turkey faces difficulties to convince third countries to sign free trade agreements separately (Interview No. 14 and

64). It is also acknowledged that after the stalemate in the Doha talks, the EU increasingly resorts to bilateral free trade agreements in trade liberalisation (Interview No. 64). For instance, Mexican, Pakistani and Iranian products are delivered in Turkish market with 10% customs, although Turkish products are subjected to 40% customs (Interview No. 63).

5.3.3) National Oriented Capital Adapting to Globalisation and Membership

Analogous to aforementioned hypothesis, it is expected that nationally oriented capital will oppose membership as they will be negatively affected from competition as a result of participating to the Internal Market. In tandem with transnationalisation of production, SMEs that predominantly produce intermediate goods will be exposed to competition with cheaper world products. Moreover, it can also be assumed that they will oppose elimination of state subsidies in tandem with withering away of welfare state. Yet, on the basis of the empirical research, I argue that contrary to the expectation, national oriented capital supports membership, as it has been integrated with transnational production structure, and develops mechanisms of adoption.

Indeed, SMEs stress that there is no alternative to globalisation, (Interview No. 80; MÜSIAD, 2005: 16). They conceive of competitiveness, the market economy model and export-orientation as the only viable strategies for survival in the neoliberal period (Interview No. 22; MÜSIAD, 2005: 41-42; TOBB,

2011a: 454-55). They also revisit 'nationalism' and aspire to develop a proactive strategy calling for 'national champions' who are able to compete in the global market through their export capacity (TOBB, 2011b: 733). Equally, SMEs adopt the role neoliberalism assigns to the state in relation to the economy. For instance, TOBB discredits protectionism and defends the withering away of the state from industrial matters on the condition that it is to be eliminated as a long-term strategy (TOBB, 2011a: 422). MÜSİAD defends the withering away of the state's role in the economy in order to consolidate the principles of market economy and to contain the political power of the 'bureaucratic elite, secular capital and central authority', which is depicted as enjoying economic and political privilege from the inception of the Republic (MÜSİAD, 2002: 122). Notably, most of the SMEs organised under MÜSİAD were founded after the 1980s (Buğra, 1998: 525), at a historical conjuncture when the state had begun to wither away from the economy. In this sense, the SMEs organised within MÜSİAD did not experience a period of protectionism under the ISI model. Moreover, internationalism was decisive for MÜSİAD from its inception: it relied on attracting savings from Turkish immigrants settled abroad, particularly in Germany and, by the 1990s it had founded 22 offices abroad (Özdemir, 2006: 64-66). In this sense, MÜSİAD's claim that the state has supported TÜSİAD and so-called 'secular capital' in its jargon are not related to the 'strong state'. Rather, SMEs within MÜSİAD flourish at a particular historical juncture and in a particular form of state.

SMEs, therefore, claim that seeking EU membership is the only viable strategy for Turkey to take due to globalisation (TOBB, 2011b: 687). They claim that

the membership process forces Turkey to comply with international rules and standards; and increases the quality and competitiveness of Turkish industry (Interview No. 7, 8 and 13; MÜSiAD, 2004a: 99). Membership is conceived of as an 'anchor' for stability and security that will increase Turkey's credibility, attracting FDI and to guaranteeing democracy and the rule of law (Interview No. 7 and 80; MÜSiAD, 2001: 38-39). Economic integration with the EU is defined as 'irreversible', based on the fact that Turkey conducts more than 50% of its trade with the EU, and that more than 60% of tourism income and foreign investment originates in EU countries (MÜSiAD, 2001: 38-39). It is also argued that EU membership would consolidate institutionalisation, helping develop a political culture governed by rules and meritocracy rather than patronage relations (Interview No. 80).

It is too great a step to argue that the majority of SMEs are internationally oriented. Thus, it is pertinent to consider their position within transnational production structures in order to understand their support for membership. In chapter two, trade is established as the main mechanism for integration of Turkish production structure with world capitalist structure. However, it is important to note Robinson's argument that the global economy operates through 'multilayered networks of outsourcing, subcontracting, collaboration, and so on, that increasingly link local and national agents to global networks' within which agents either 'globalize or perish' (Robinson, 2004: 19-20). Indeed, it should be noted that SMEs are integrated in transnational production structure either through outsourcing or contract manufacturing, in parallel with globalisation and the delocalisation of production. For instance, export-oriented

SMEs constitute a numerical minority within TOBB, but most SMEs either produce intermediate goods for the European market or conduct contract manufacturing on behalf of EU based companies (Interview No. 80). Similarly, SMEs operating through OSTİM (an organised industrial zone in Ankara) are sometimes presented as the 'backyard' of Europe's production structure as they engage in contract manufacturing (Interview No. 22). Indeed, the OSTİM model is shown as an example of cooperative mechanisms^{xiv} among SMEs within the context of declining subsidies in the neoliberal form of state (Interview No. 22). The interviewee from OSTİM explained it as a mechanism operating through three circles. The first of these is relatively small in number and size and employs no more than ten workers. These enterprises operate in assemblies for montage, and are internationally oriented. They create demand for small enterprises/suppliers at the second and third circles, which constitute the majority of OSTİM members (Interview No. 22). Hence, although the majority of the SMEs produce supplier products for the domestic market, their products are assembled and then exported, meaning that nationally oriented capital is dependent upon international markets, making them – to an extent – internationally oriented.

Second, many SMEs have already encountered the effects of globalisation and the liberalisation of foreign trade especially after the completion of the Customs Union, either through bankruptcy or through adapting to new conditions. Concerns over the competitiveness of Turkish industry as a consequence of its integration to the Internal Market are considered to be 'out of the question' following the Customs Union (Interview No. 7).

Third, internationally oriented capital develops strategies for integrating SMEs into their discourse, articulating the interests of the 'private sector', which is presented as a monolithic entity with homogenous interests. For instance, the Turkish Enterprise and Business Confederation (TÜRKONFED), which mostly organises SMEs in the Anatolian periphery, was initiated under the leadership of TÜSİAD (Özsaruhan, 2005). Similarly, SMEs form the majority within TOBB, yet it is difficult for them to develop an alternative policy. Their interviewee explicated three reasons for this. First, membership in TOBB is compulsory for all enterprises: members of TÜSİAD and MÜSİAD must also be members of TOBB. This means TOBB is cumbersome and finds it difficult to take action (Interview No. 80). Second, the structure makes it difficult for SMEs within TOBB to form an alternative policy as internationally oriented enterprises (mostly members of TÜSİAD) are more influential in the final decision making process (Interview No. 80). Third, TOBB is a semi-official platform which is financially dependent upon state contributions. Thus, it is difficult for TOBB to form policy independent from political authority and pro-European Governments (Interview No. 80). Indeed TOBB sees the pro-EU membership perspective as 'state policy' (Interview No. 80).

Criticism of the EU membership process from SMEs is related to national sensitivities and not economic competitiveness. The EU's approach to the Kurdish and Armenian problems is criticised (Interview No. 22; MÜSİAD, 2004a: 17) and proposals regarding permanent derogations and restrictions on the free movement of workers are considered unacceptable (MÜSİAD, 2004b:

13-14). There is also a belief that the EU's policy on Cyprus problem is biased to the disadvantage of Turkey and Turkish Cypriots (MÜSİAD, 2006: 159).

5.3.4) The Position of the Agriculture Sector

Agriculture is not included in the Customs Union (with the exception of processed agriculture products), and remains protected within the structural constraints of World Bank policies. However, the food processing industry is subjected to the neoliberal regime and is integrated within global production structures. Hence, it can be argued that whilst processed agricultural products are integrated with the international market, unprocessed agricultural products are produced for the domestic market and need to be protected. However, the neoliberal state supports the internationalisation of agriculture as well. For instance, a special 'state support mechanism' called the 'Inward Processing Regime', has been established for exporters of flour and sugar, enabling them to import raw materials at cheaper prices from world markets, allowing them to process the raw material and export at world prices and operate in international markets. This mechanism seeks to eliminate custom duties for nationally oriented capital, allowing it to create a competitively priced product to be exported to the global markets. However, if the imported raw material is going to be consumed in the internal market, it is subject to customs. For instance, Turkey is a major exporter of flour. Yet, the interviewee highlighted that it is not possible to compete in world market if flour is processed with nationally produced wheat flour. Thus, it has to import wheat flour - that is subjected to

the Inward Processing Regime and is exempt from customs – in order to operate in international markets considering that Turkish wheat is 50% more expensive than wheat prices in global market (Interview No. 49).

It should be noted that the TZOB (which organises 5 million farmers producing for the domestic market) and the Agriculture Credit Cooperatives (who have begun to operate in international markets) endorse very different arguments regarding globalisation and membership (compare Interview No. 49 with Interview No. 53). The TZOB is critical about the effects of globalisation on the agriculture sectors of developing countries, with their main concern being competitiveness. They stress that Turkey cannot compete with agriculture and animal husbandry in global markets because Turkish farmers are poor; the agricultural structure is inefficient and fragile; unionisation is limited; holdings are divided into small plots; and technology remains underdeveloped (Interview No. 49). Moreover, they argue that globalisation not only curbs employment in the agriculture sector but also decreases prices and leaves agricultural industries incapable of generating sufficient income (Interview No. 49). They note that in the last decade, globalisation has reduced employment in agriculture from 35% to 24% (Interview No. 49).

The TZOB, therefore, adopts a critical stance to EU membership in line with the main hypothesis. They claim that Turkish farmers cannot compete with European farmers (except in fruits and vegetables), a fact that would lead to the closure of small farms if Turkey joins the EU. They believe that competitive

European products would further decrease the prices of agricultural goods. They also argue that the levels of support for the EU's new Eastern and Central European members are around 75% lower than for older members (Interview No. 49), that the EU refers to permanent derogations in agriculture and that its new support mechanism (which will be implemented during 2012) will considerably curb agricultural support. Thus, they conclude that as a regional institution the EU cannot protect Turkish agriculture from globalisation (Interview No. 49). Moreover, the policies of the EU and the World Trade Organisation (WTO) overlap, as EU countries are decisive in shaping WTO regulations. Both the WTO and the EU consider direct support mechanisms provided on the basis of crops to deter liberal trade and instead recommend 'direct income support' models, which support farmers on the basis of size of land or number of animals. This has been applied in Turkey since 2003 and has been criticised for discouraging production. Thus, it is felt that the EU abandons agriculture to market mechanisms (Interview No. 49).

Contrarily, the Agricultural Credit Cooperatives support membership, believing that the process of membership will increase the competitiveness and export capacity of agricultural products (Interview No. 53). They claim that Turkey will benefit from agricultural funds and complicity with EU standards in agriculture, and argue that farmers should learn to comply with market mechanisms (Interview No. 53). Liberalisation is defended as a means of integrating agriculture into the global market and increasing efficiency (Interview No. 53).

5.3.5) 'Neoliberal' Civil Society and Membership

Both İKV and TESEV endorse EU membership as a 'development and democratisation project' in the 'public interest' (Interview No. 4 and 76). There is a tendency to discredit closed economies to endorse anti-democratic regimes (Interview No. 76). These institutions play a decisive role in shaping the membership debate by commissioning researchers and scholars to write reports and by opening sensitive topics to public debate at critical junctures. For instance, the İKV initiated a platform supporting the elimination of the death penalty after Abdullah Öcalan, the leader of Kurdish Workers' Party (PKK) was arrested. They opened a signature campaign supported by various intellectuals at a critical juncture before 1999 Helsinki European Council (Interview No. 4). The TESEV, meanwhile, published a report (in both Turkish and English) by a well-known scholar Umut Özkırımlı with his work on nationalism, which debated nationalism and EU membership. This report sought to address public concerns over sovereignty transfer, the loss of national sovereignty and the dismemberment of Turkey, seen as major impediments to gaining public support for membership. The report states that these fears are groundless, and references Milward's work on the European rescue of the nation state to argue that although membership constrains national sovereignty, it strengthens the nation state (Özkırımlı, 2008: 63 and 104-109).

Similarly, these institutions are directed to shape public opinion and decision makers at the European level. A booklet was jointly published by Centre for European Policy Studies (CEPS) in Brussels and Economics and Foreign

Policy Forum in İstanbul in 2004, at a strategic time just before the EU was to decide to open accession negotiations with Turkey. One of the writers is Kemal Derviş, who was well-known in Turkey with the 2001 'Transition to a Stronger Turkish Economy' programme (his role in financial liberalisation is mentioned in chapter four). The report gives the message that the EU policy-makers should not act on the basis of religious and/or geographical prejudices, but has to rely on universal norms and 'fairness and objectivity' in assessing compatibility of Turkey for membership based on Copenhagen criteria (Derviş et. al. 2004: 25). Rather than culturalist and essentialist discourses that would deny Turkey from the membership process, it is articulated, that probable Turkish membership would contribute to 'the process of democratic consolidation and societal modernisation' in Turkey and contribute to Europe to reshape its political identity based on multiculturalism 'governed by the universal norms of democracy and a modern socially-caring market economy' (Derviş et. al., 2004: 25).

5.4) Conclusion

Grounded in an analyses on configuration of social forces as established in the second chapter that Turkey's integration pattern to world capitalist structure is an instance of internationalism rather than transnationalism, I have examined the position of capital taking spatial fractionation as the basis of analysis. The following hypothesis is tested in the case of Turkish capital: whilst internationally oriented capital will develop a supportive stance *vis-a-vis*

membership for elimination of protectionism in trade, nationally oriented capital will oppose membership due to rising competition and declining protectionism in their sheltered sector. Emphasis has been devoted to particular industrial sectors in analyzing intra-class struggle. Textile and automotive industries are observed as internationally oriented considering that they hold a pre-eminent role among other industries in export-promotion strategy implemented since the neoliberal turn of 1980s. Agriculture is selected as nationally oriented taking into account that it is not included in the Customs Union and it is a protected sheltered sector.

Empirical analysis reveals that internationally oriented sectors pioneer pro-membership hegemonic project to stimulate competitiveness and exports in line with the hypothesis. Membership is presented as a process to provide economic development, macroeconomic stability and increase competitiveness of the economy and quality of production. Yet, interviewees from internationally oriented capital highlight that participating to the Internal Market does not entail additional economic benefits for industry as Turkey has already opened up its market to international competition via the Customs Union. In view of this, I argue that internationally oriented capital has already attained its economic interests via the Customs Union. Yet, membership is defended to consolidate the infra-structure of a functioning market economy model. It is also argued that membership perspective provides stability and security for Turkish market, a factor decisive to attract FDI.

Contrary to the expectation stemming from the hypothesis, the nationally oriented capital does not oppose membership. SMEs and the agriculture sector give their consent to the pro-membership project. SMEs read globalisation as an irreversible process and conceive of developing 'national champions' through adapting to export-orientation and competitiveness as the only viable strategy for survival under globalisation. Thenceforth, SMEs have either adapted to globalisation, believing competitiveness in international markets to be the only viable strategy of struggle within globalisation; or they have integrated into the transnational production structure via outsourcing and contract manufacturing, in parallel with delocalisation of production. Accordingly, membership is defended through references to international rules and standards, believing that these will discipline industry and render it competitive in international markets.

In line with the expectation of the hypothesis, the TZOB develops a critical stance on the grounds that membership will engender closure of small farms, impoverishment and unemployment as Turkish farmers will not be able to compete with European enterprises as a result of participation in the Internal Market. Indeed, the EU policies on agriculture coincide with the policies of WTO and WB and they abandon agriculture to market mechanisms. Moreover, the argument that membership will provide protectionism for Turkish agriculture is not promising given that agricultural support to CEECs is considerably reduced when compared with previous cases of enlargement. The interviewee also refers to proposals for privileged partnership in which case

Turkish agricultural sector will not be able to benefit from agricultural funds. However, this fraction is marginalised. Even processed agricultural products - such as food processing industry - are integrated with the international market and they are supportive of membership perspective.

I have also debated the hegemonic status of pro-membership project as hegemony is a moment of intellectual and moral leadership that is presented at a universal terrain entailing transcendence of economic vested interests. It is plausible to argue that pro-membership project is hegemonic. On the one hand, internationally oriented capital transcends its economic vested interests by articulating universal arguments at the ideational level in defending membership. The EU is presented as an anchor for the consolidation of democracy and the civilising of politics against the mechanisms of the 'strong state'. European social model and neoliberal turn in the EU is well-received and social dialogue and social partnership is seen as a viable model for social policy. Moreover, dialogue in foreign policy is defended and Europe is articulated as a peace project. On the other hand, arguments associated by membership are presented as progressive by particular institutions – that are interpreted as neoliberal civil society - that aspire to produce 'objective and scientific' knowledge. They have a role to articulate ideas in favour of membership on sensitive topics at critical junctures. They are also instrumental for organic intellectuals of capital to endorse membership on a universal terrain. Yet, it is plausible to unfold their organic links with capital and to read them as 'fortresses and earthworks' (Gramsci, 1971: 238) that consolidates neoliberal membership project.

Chapter 6 - Labour Debating European Membership Perspective within the Struggle against Globalisation

6.1) Introduction

In the previous chapter I have analyzed the position of capital vis-a-vis globalisation and membership question. I have argued that internationally-oriented capital pioneers membership that is presented as an anchor to stimulate competitiveness and to consolidate a functioning market economy model. The EU is equally presented as an anchor to consolidate democracy and a peaceful project. Contrary to the propounded hypothesis that it can be expected from nationally oriented capital to oppose membership as it will increasingly be exposed to competitiveness in the global market, it either adopts to globalisation by a strategy of promoting 'national champions' by export-promotion - that is seen as the only viable strategy of survival in the global period - or integrates with transnational production structure via outsourcing and/or contract manufacturing. The chapter concludes by conveying the idea that pro-membership project is pioneered by internationally oriented capital and adopted by nationally oriented capital.

In this chapter, I am primarily concerned with the position of labour *vis-a-vis* membership. It is debated by situating labour question within the context of globalisation and neoliberal restructuring. I follow a similar method and analyse labour movement and intra-class struggle in both nationally and internationally oriented industries. What strategies does labour develop *vis-a-*

vis globalisation and where does labour stand *vis-a-vis* membership within the structure of transnationalisation of production? Can labour come up with an alternative to neoliberal pro-membership perspective? And if not, how can we account for their failure to develop an alternative?

It might be expected that the Turkish labour movement would develop a critical stance towards EU membership in light of the fact that participation in the Internal Market would increase the pressures of competition on Turkish industry, leading to cuts in wages and social standards. Yet, following Bieler, it should be noted that globalisation has engendered cross-class alliances between nationally oriented and internationally/transnationally oriented capital and labour (Bieler, 2000: 155). Accordingly, the hypothesis I wish to analyse in relation to labour debate is as follows: trade unions that are organised in internationally oriented sectors – sectors that are integrated with the European production structure via the Customs Union – can be expected to develop a supportive stance to membership as they have already been economically integrated with the Internal Market and will conceive of regional integration as a mechanism providing protectionism against globalisation (incentive for positive integration) and membership as a platform to regain rights that are lost at the national level. On the contrary, trade unions organising workers for nationally oriented sectors will develop a more critical stance with concerns over de-industrialisation and de-unionisation as they will increasingly be exposed to pressures of competitiveness and loss in welfare gains (these claims further draw on the work of Bieler, 2000: 48; 2005: 461; 2006: 42).

I have interviewed trade unions organized in the internationally oriented textile and automotive industries; and trade unions in the nationally oriented agricultural sector and public employees. Whilst the former is well embedded within global markets, the latter would be negatively affected by increased exposure to globalisation. Furthermore, agriculture is a sheltered sector and agricultural products are not included in the Customs Union (with the exception of processed products), so the sector would be newly exposed to competition by products from EU countries. Trade unions organized in public sector are examined as nationally oriented expected to develop a critical stance vis-a-vis globalisation, privatization and de-regulation considering that they would be placed under increased pressure from neoliberal forces calling for social cuts and public sector 'efficiency'. Indeed, the public sector has already been subjected to structural adjustment reforms by the AKP Government, with budgetary cuts and the introduction of 'flexible employment' for public employees. Moreover, agricultural labour and public employees will be exposed to cuts in subsidies and social benefits with negative welfare implications in line with neoliberal measures of disciplining 'state budget'.

The chapter begins by analysing the position of trade unions operating in internationally and nationally oriented production sectors in relation to globalisation and EU membership. This is followed by analysing the reasons behind their failure to form a united front to oppose neoliberal restructuring via the EU membership perspective.

6.2) Operationalising Labour and Intra-Class Struggle

As it stands, the main division in labour is between industrial workers and public employees. There is no differentiation on the basis of industrial workers employed in the public sector and the private sector. The structure is highly fragmented. There are three confederations for industrial workers: the Türk-İş, Disk and Hak-İş; and four confederations for public employees: The Confederation of Unions of Public Employees of Turkey (Türk Kamu-Sen), the Confederation of Public Employees Trade Unions (Kesk), the Confederation of Public Servants Trade Unions (Memur-Sen) and the Confederation of United Public Workers' Unions (Birleşik Kamu-İş).

Internationally oriented labour is examined through the textile and automotive industries and Disk and Hak-İş confederations. There is no public sector in the textile industry (Interview No. 9, 31 and 45). Approximately 70% of textiles production is exported, and 50% of these exports are conducted with the EU (Interview No. 31). In the automotive industry, the United Metal Workers' Union (Birleşik Metal-İş) is organised only in the private sector, and operates in the metal, automotive, coal and steel sectors. During the last two decades, most of the enterprises in which Birleşik Metal-İş is organised began to operate in international markets, or became integrated within transnational production structures by operating as supplier enterprises for international firms (Interview No. 67). At the confederation level, the Disk^{xv} is primarily organised in the private sector and has 420,000 members (Interview No. 12). Parallel to the

development of globalisation, it has begun to organise in international and multinational enterprises as well (Interview No. 33). Hak-İş is mainly organised in the private sector (accounting for approximately 80% of the firms in which it organises) and operates mostly in big enterprises – including transnational firms and former state economic enterprises that have been privatised (Interview No. 28 and 56).

Nationally oriented labour is analysed in relation to the agricultural sector and public employment. The Türk-İş^{xvi} confederation is organised among industrial workers in public economic enterprises that primarily produce industrial goods for the domestic market. Türk-İş has the highest number of industrial union membership at the confederation level. Privatisation is transforming its membership profile in favour of private sector, though – with the exception of the textile and metal sectors – Türk-İş is still fundamentally organised in the public sector (Interview No. 2). In agriculture, both the Turkish Forestry-Soil Water, Agriculture and Agricultural Workers Trade Union (Tarım-İş) and the Real Trade Union for Workers in Agriculture, Land and Water Industry (Öz Tarım-İş) are mostly organised in the public sector (Interview No. 56 and 78). As the public sector decreases in size as a result of structural adjustment policies privatisation and sub-contracted work (outsourcing within public sector) increases. As a result, the interviewee from Tarım-İş remarked that membership has reduced from 25 branches organising 20,000 workers in 2000, to 10 branches organizing 13,000 workers in the last decade (Interview No. 78). Additionally, the Union of Public Employees in Agriculture and Forestry of Turkey (Türk Tarım-Orman-Sen) and the Agriculture and Forestry Union

(Tarım Orman-İş) organise public employees in agriculture, forestry, animal husbandry and environment.

Public employees can be expected to develop a critical stance *vis-a-vis* globalisation and neoliberal restructuring that is consolidated via membership perspective. Neoliberal restructuring entails social cuts in the welfare state and declining employment in public sector. The neoliberal campaign against the 'inefficient public sector' has created new spheres for private initiative. Moreover, as the state has withered away from regulating relations of distribution, public employees have seen decreasing standards of welfare. As Robinson has noted, in addition to *extensive* enlargement to new geographies, capitalism operates by *intensive* enlargement through the deepening of commodification to include new spheres (such as health and education), incorporating them to logics of profit and capitalist production (Robinson, 2004: 6-7). Intensive enlargement and capitalist penetration in new spheres - such as health system and education – and commodification have negative welfare repercussion for public employees. Henceforth, it can be expected that they will develop a critical stance that can once again only be unveiled through empirical research.

Trade unionism among public employees flourished during the 1990s. Although public employees initially sought to be organised within established industrial unions and confederations, they faced a number of legislative obstacles. Thus, a separate platform was created for public employees. It must

be noted, however, that political authority developed a strategy which sought to keep this movement illegal: as the first law in this regard (numbered 4688) was enacted in 2002, constituting a huge disappointment for public employees. Law 4688 bans the right to collective bargaining and the right to strike that is interpreted by an interviewee as a strategy to reduce confederations to the status of an association (Interview No. 68).

Public employees are organised in four confederations. Türk Kamu-Sen has 370,000 members and is organised in eleven branches in the public sector. It criticises trade unionism conducted on the basis of class struggle, articulating instead unionism as a social mechanism. It places emphasis on strengthening central authority and the state and defines its ideology as one of nationalism (Interview No. 48 and 57). Kesk has 250,000 members: it promotes class struggle and believes struggles for democracy and the Kurdish problem to be inseparable from class (Interview No. 68). Memur-Sen increased its membership from 35,000 in 2005 to 400,000 in 2010 under the AKP hegemony (Interview No. 48). This is through a policy of populism and the creation of a 'labour aristocracy'. Memur-Sen defines its approach to trade unionism as 'societal trade unionism', and advocates collaborative capital-labour relations built around social partnership (Interview No. 61). Birleşik Kamu-İş currently has 30,000 members (Interview No. 54) and was founded in 2008 by former Kesk members. Eğitim-Sen is a trade union organising teachers affiliated with Kesk. It defended the right of students to be educated in their specific mother tongue including Kurdish, resulting in another split among public employees over issues concerning Kurdish and Turkish nationalism. Particular Kesk

members accused Kesk of orienting unionism to solve the Kurdish problem. They claimed that this undermined unionism's basic principles, placing class struggle in a secondary position (Interview No. 54). They founded Birleşik Kamu-İş.

6.3) Labour, Globalisation and European Integration

6.3.1) Internationally Oriented Labour

6.3.1.1) Internationally Oriented Labour and Globalisation: 'Another Globalisation is Possible'

Trade unions organised in internationally oriented sectors define globalisation as 'irresistible' (Interview No. 31). Disk considers globalisation as a process which creates a new division between countries whose production is based on advanced technologies produced by a skilled work force; and countries whose production is less reliant on technology, is labour intensive and relies on an unskilled work force (Disk, 1996: 69). Turkey falls within the latter category and the state operates to 'intensify the exploitation of labour' by overlooking unionist demands and creating divisions among the working class in the interests of being competitive in international markets (Disk, 1996: 69; Disk, 2000a: 6). Globalisation decreases the bargaining power of labour and

generates de-unionization, whilst flexible, part-time and atypical forms of work increases (Interview No. 31 and 45; Disk, 2004b: 21 and 27). It creates opportunities for capital to attack demands for unionisation and collective bargaining by threatening to move to other countries or cut wages for the sake of competitiveness (Interview No. 3, 45 and 67). Additionally, globalisation alters the stable industrial bases of the Fordist period and transforms the structure of enterprises through mergers, takeovers and contract work, processes which further serve to make it difficult for unions to organise workers. More importantly, globalisation attacks internationalism by generating competition and antagonism among workers in developed and developing countries (Interview No. 67). At the ideological level, meanwhile, Disk believes that globalisation endorses individualism and weakens collectivism (Interview No. 67).

Indeed, the position of internationally oriented labour vis-a-vis globalisation corresponds to the expectation from the hypothesis. Globalisation is taken as a fact that necessitates a struggle at the international level. It is stated that free movement of capital has 'dynamited' social rights acquired at the national level (Interview No. 33) and globalisation necessitates re-thinking about unionism (Disk, 1996: 69). Globalisation has transformed the structure of production from big industrial complexes and mass production to small workplaces which employ three to five workers in informal economies, often in atypical and/or part-time employment. Accordingly, the classical tools of struggle operative during the Fordist period (such as strikes and unionisation on the basis of 'industrial sectors') have to be further developed in the global era to integrate

these excluded groups into the working class (Interview No. 68). From this perspective, internationally oriented labour conceives of the internationalisation of labour as the only viable way to struggle against globalisation (Disk, 1996: 70-72 and 2004a: 35; Interview No. 12). Disk, therefore, believes that ‘another globalisation, in the interest of workers, is possible’ (Interview No. 33). Indeed, Disk refers to the strategies of international solidarity to enable collective bargaining at the international level, a move designed to organise all workers employed in a multinational enterprise (Interview No. 12 and 33). Interviewees gave concrete examples of international solidarity such as 'social responsibility declarations' and/or framework agreements^{xvii} (Interview No. 12, 33, 67 and 68).

Disk believes that trade unions should not confine their struggles to collective bargaining, however. They seek a united struggle of ‘societal resistance’, designed to create unity among retired and unemployed people, white-collar workers, female labour, students, migrant workers, peasants and workers employed in informal economies, as part-time and atypical work is promoted (Interview No. 12; Disk, 1996: 70-71; Disk, 2000a; Disk, 2004b). They argue that the strategy of international capital is gendered and that globalisation targets women as a form of cheap labour easily employed in atypical forms of work within the informal economy. This leads to labour migration among women, especially within the service sector (Disk, 2004a: 30 and 32). Moreover, in each capitalist crisis, female workers are expected to make sacrifices first (Disk, 2004b). Disk reads the confining of unionism to collective bargaining as a neoliberal strategy demarcating class struggle as a

form of narrow economism. This is done to block organic links between trade unions and politics, and to present trade unions as narrowly 'utilitarian' platforms with concerns over collective bargaining (Disk, 2000b). This effort can only be addressed by questioning capitalism ideologically through class consciousness and class struggle (Disk, 2000b). It is this position in trade unionism that renders the Disk foremost among other trade unions to read EU as a capitalist integration model.

Hak-İş – the second confederation I engage in this chapter as internationally oriented labour – perceives globalisation in a positive light, believing that it engenders economic growth through the transformation of inefficient state enterprises and the questioning of traditional power mechanisms between the state and so-called 'big capital' (Interview No. 28). Hak-iş internalizes the conditioning of employment to economic growth (Interview No. 3) whilst a policy of internationalism and regionalism is seen as the only way to struggle against globalisation (Interview No. 46). Indeed, particular trade unions affiliated with Hak-İş are organized in transnational enterprises such as Real Trade Union for Workers in Food and Tobacco and Beverages Industry (Öz Gıda-İş) that conceive transnational corporations as preferable platforms to organize workers when compared with national enterprises. The interviewee argues that transnational corporations are more inclined to safeguard rule of law and social standards (Interview No. 46). It is my contention that Hak-İş – and its associated unions – constitutes a social force that gives consent to AKP hegemony and its neoliberal socio-economic content, and should be included in the neoliberal historical bloc. They operate as agents of *trasformismo* by

organising disadvantaged groups within a neoliberal form of unionism (as I argued in chapter four). In this sense, their references to internationalism are deficient as they fail to advocate class struggle at the national level. As it will further be elaborated below, it is only Hak-İş that internalizes conception of labour-capital relations around the notion of social partnership.

6.3.1.2) Membership and Internationally Oriented Labour in Manufacturing

In line with the hypothesis, both Disk and Hak-İş support EU membership, though they do so for different reasons. Disk defines the EU as a capitalist integration model, but supports membership, citing the belief that 'another Europe is possible' (Disk, 2000a: 8-9; Interview No. 12). This motto confirms the assumption that internationally oriented labour would defend membership to regain their bargaining power that is lost at the national level due to globalisation. Yet, the interviewees from Disk did not raise any concerns regarding integration into the Internal Market – which reveals that workers they organise are employed in workplaces that are already integrated with the European market via the Customs Union. Indeed, they stated that Turkey has already been economically affected by the completion of the Customs Union (Interview No. 33). Thus, the membership debate is interpreted in relation to political criteria and social policy (Disk, 2000a: 33), with the EU seen as a tool which can be used to develop social conditions^{xviii} in Turkey (Interview No. 12 and 33). Additionally, interviewee from Disk noted that membership will provide free movement of workers (Interview No. 33). The membership

process is also read as instrumental for the consolidation of democracy in Turkey. It is argued that as Turkey lacks the social base for democratisation and the reformation of union and minority rights, an international anchor is needed to enable it to develop (Interview No. 9). Thus, Disk develops a 'holistic' stance which underlines that – in Turkey – problems of labour cannot be separated from democratisation and the Kurdish problem (Disk, 2000b).

In this sense, the Kurdish problem is posited as another reason for supporting Turkish membership of the EU. Disk stipulates that finding a democratic solution to the Kurdish problem and increasing unionisation are two priorities for the consolidation of democracy (Disk, 1996: 24 and 30). Additionally, the EU is seen as a peaceful project capable of providing the stimulus for a decrease in military spending on combating terror in Eastern Turkey and *vis-a-vis* Greece (Interview No. 33). The membership process is thus understood in relation to internationalism and is seen as integral to the development of mechanisms of compromise in international relations which combat the nationalist reflexes that have historically defined Turkey's attitude to Cyprus, Armenia and the Kurdish problem (Interview No. 9 and 12).

Hak-İş has changed its stance on European membership since the 1990s, when it pursued a critical approach to the Customs Union and European integration, neatly summed up by the phrase: 'they are the partners and we are the market' (Interview No. 3 and 28). Now, Hak-İş has maintained a policy of unconditional support for membership in all its economic, political and social

dimensions, without any 'reservations' (Interview No. 46). The interviewee identified the European Social Model as an 'ideal model' for industrial relations (Interview No. 3); and the EU is read as a democratisation project and an 'anchor' to 'civilize' politics through freedom of speech and a culture of dialogue (Interview No. 3 and 46).

Notably, the unionism advocated by Hak-İş operates within neoliberalism. This stance is identified by Cox as 'social partnership in Western Europe and business unionism in North America' (1987: 374). Hak-İş describes its approach to trade unionism as facilitating an 'industrial democracy' (Interview No. 3) – an aim compatible with the mechanisms of 'social dialogue' proposed by the European model. Moreover, Hak-İş conceives of 'class' as a social phenomenon rather than a 'front' (Interview No. 3 and 46). In this sense, it is argued that labour and capital are 'social partners' and trade unionism should be conducted on the basis of cooperation rather than conflict (Interview No. 45). Accordingly, Hak-İş conceives of competitiveness and quality as 'common' problems shared by both workers and employers; and of social dialogue as an important mechanism to facilitate cooperation (Interview No. 28). Analogous to this, collective bargaining is not defined as a frontal battleground, but rather a 'technical platform' (Interview No. 3). Additionally, Hak-İş presents itself as offering a 'private sector trade unionism' and discredits public sector unionism for being 'bureaucratic' and conducting wage bargaining, a tool that it believes has become 'obsolescent' due to its failure to adopt to the challenges posed by global capitalism (Interview No. 46). It is argued that rather than 'conducting trade unionism on the basis of slogans', Hak-İş is 'efficient', contributing to an

increase in the 'quality, efficiency and competition' of the workplace; an approach that in return saves the workplace and generates employment (Interview No. 28).

6.3.1.3) Position of Labour in Textile and Automotive Sectors

Labour organised in textile and automotive industries are content with the economic repercussions of liberalisation. They note that Turkey conducts more than 50% of its trade with the EU (Interview No. 9) and interpret the Customs Union positively as it consolidated market principles, rendering the textile sector competitive in global markets (Interview No. 45). Thus, concurrent with the expectation from the hypothesis internationally oriented labour has already integrated with the European production structure and is no longer concerned with the repercussions of participating in the Internal Market (Interview No. 31 and 45).

Accordingly, membership is defended in relation to social policy conceiving of the EU as a platform to regain bargaining rights at the international level. In defending Turkish membership of the EU, textile labour refers to social policy. Interviewees affiliated with Tekstil-İş and Öz İplik-İş highlight that the European Social Model will improve working conditions in Turkey (Interview No. 9 and 45). Moreover, the EU is seen as an anchor triggering political reforms that will develop trade unionism, improve human rights and help consolidate democracy. They argue that the current political system rests on a

political 'oligarchy': a top-down approach that leaves the social base underdeveloped (Interview No. 9). As the Customs Union is completed without positive integration, an additional argument to support membership is endorsed that membership will bring social standards (Interview No. 67).

However, the Teksif and Birleşik Metal-İş unions adopt a more critical stance. The interviewee from Teksif argued that the Customs Union has curtailed domestic production as Turkish producers cannot compete with products from East Asia, which are covered by the EU's free trade agreements. This pressure to compete with Asian products has resulted in further de-unionisation and an increase in atypical work (Interview No. 31). Despite this, Teksif welcomes the economic and social repercussions of membership, basing the majority of its criticism on the potential for the EU to interfere with Turkey's 'national interests' in relation to Cyprus and the Kurdish problem (Interview No. 31).

It is the Birleşik Metal-İş that believes EU integration and enlargement to be capitalist processes operating to the disadvantage of labour (Interview No. 67). Moreover, the interviewee noted that trade unions in other European countries did not secure advances in social policy through EU integration but rather national legislation (Interview No. 67).

6.3.2) Nationally Oriented Labour

6.3.2.1) Nationally Oriented Labour and Globalisation as De-unionisation and De-industrialisation

Nationally oriented labour is expected to develop a critical stance to globalisation and membership as they will be increasingly exposed to pressures of competitiveness resulting in closure of workplaces that they are employed. Moreover, globalisation entails de-unionisation and cuts in social standards gained at the national level. In line with this expectation, Türk-İş, agriculture sector and public employees oppose globalisation due to its effects on industry and the welfare state. However, when it comes to the membership question, the issues are either considered in isolation from globalisation, or EU membership is supported due to the perceived benefits in social policy and/or agricultural funds. Thus, these groups have developed a policy of 'membership on equal terms and conditions', highlighting that their support is conditional on Turkey benefitting from structural funds and the free movement of workers.

The interviewee from Türk-İş accused globalisation of generating de-industrialisation and de-unionisation, with negative effects on economic development. Export-orientation endows capital with the capacity to search for cheaper intermediate goods in world markets, meaning that globalisation forces the closure of domestic enterprises that cannot compete with global prices

(Interview No. 34). They also believe that it provides capital with the opportunity to move to other countries (Interview No. 56) and that so-called economic 'growth' fails to generate employment (Interview No. 34).

Agricultural labour argues that globalisation operates to create markets for international capital by curbing domestic production through direct support mechanisms, providing subsidies on the basis of land rather than production (Interview No. 47). The interviewees highlighted that Turkey is no longer agriculturally self-sufficient due to globalisation (Interview No. 48 and 78). In this sense, globalisation curbs domestic production, impoverishes the agricultural sector; and generates proletarianisation, internal migration and illegal work (Interview No. 30 and 47). Public employees criticize globalisation and the neoliberal campaign against the 'inefficient public sector', arguing that it generates commodification and views 'profitability' rather than the 'public good' as the determinant factor in the provision of public services (Interview No. 47 and 68). Privatisation, they note, curbs employment in the public sector and the state withdraws from fundamental sectors such as education and health (Interview No. 57 and 68). There is an increase in individualism and collectivism is eroded (Interview No. 54).

The effects of globalisation on social policy are also highlighted. It is noted that globalisation curbs the welfare state (Interview No. 48 and 52) and generates de-unionisation as national oriented capital squeezes wages and cuts working standards by invoking the need for 'competitiveness' (Interview No. 30 and 61). It weakens the bargaining power of labour (Interview No. 56). In the

agricultural sector, globalisation is seen to engender impoverishment, unemployment, the rise of informal economies and internal migration (Interview No. 56 and 78). It is believed to increase unemployment and threaten the stability of employment for public sector employees (Interview No. 68). For instance, rather than creating employment, public schools turn to private firms to obtain services (Interview No. 68). The public sector is especially concerned by cuts made to the welfare state (Interview No. 47). Interviewees from public sector unions criticised the expansion of income disparities and decreasing welfare for public employees which have arisen from globalisation (Interview No. 54 and 61).

6.3.2.2) Membership and Nationally Oriented Labour in Manufacturing

Concurrent with the expectation from the hypothesis, the Türk-İş that organizes state economic enterprises opposed membership conceiving of the EU as an imperialist integration bloc seeking to dismember Turkey. However, its stance has changed in the last decade on the grounds that economic integration has already been completed via the Customs Union and membership can contribute to improve social standards in Turkey. Hence, contrary to the assumption that nationally oriented labour would develop a critical stance, Türk-İş supports membership with reserving that membership has to be attained on 'equal terms and conditions'.

In the 1990s, Türk-İş' stance was critical towards the European social model and sceptical about the viability of internationalism as a strategy against

globalisation. This was largely based around the work of Yıldırım Koç^{xix} (1998, 2004 and 2006), who can be treated as an 'organic intellectual', decisive in shaping the policies of Türk-İş from 1993 to 2002. To quote Gramsci:

`every social group, coming into existence on the original terrain of an essential function in the world of economic production, creates together with itself, organically, one or more strata of intellectuals which give it homogeneity and an awareness of its own function not only in the economic but also in the social and political fields` (Gramsci, 1971: 5).

In this sense, writings of Koç shed light to the former Türk-İş stance. Koç reads the EU as an imperialist bloc. He contends that workers of core and peripheral countries will not cooperate due to imperialism. He proceeds to argue that European trade unions are 'partners' with capital, as they share the surplus from imperialist exploitation. He asserts that supporting membership in the belief that it will result in improved social policy is a fatal mistake (2006: 71 and 106), and draws an analogy between struggle against membership perspective and the Independence War of the Republic against imperialism. This leads him to the claim that the nation state can act as a site of resistance against imperialism and consolidate welfare regimes (Koç, 1998: 254 and 2004: 10-11). In 2001, Türk-İş initiated a campaign resisting common projects financed through the European Trade Union Confederation (ETUC) by the MEDA resources and published a booklet, written by Koç, asserting that the EU did not intend to take Turkey as a member on 'equal terms and conditions', but rather was pursuing a colonial strategy designed to dismantle its unitary state structure (Koç, 2001: 12-14). Türk-İş presented a report to President Ahmet Necdet Sezer, highlighting that whilst Türk-İş would support full membership

of the EU, they believed that EU policy was reviving the Sevres Treaty^{xx} and seeking to dismember Turkey (Türk-İş, 2002d).

This policy has been re-considered during the last decade, however. In 2005, the Türk-İş administration launched its 'Brussels Initiative' and organised a conference in collaboration with the Central Organisation of Finnish Trade Unions (SAK), signifying a turning point in Türk-İş policy. Its former stance was criticised for excessive nationalism and for isolating Türk-İş from the accession process (Interview No. 1). Contrary to its previous position, Türk-İş now conceives the process of EU membership as presenting an opportunity to improve union rights and freedoms (Türk-İş, 2007: 12). Accordingly – though it decided to retain reservations concerning EU membership in relation to political issues such as the Kurdish, Cyprus and Armenian problems – it developed a policy in support of the membership process, premised on a belief that it would lead to improved social conditions. This policy seeks – and is named – 'membership on equal terms and conditions' (Interview No. 1). With it, Türk-İş argues that the process of becoming a full member of the EU can help Turkey realise the right to unionise, guarantee work; and fight against informal economies and unemployment. Additionally, it is believed that the EU can act as an anchor for the implementation of the European Social Charter and standards of International Labour Organisation (ILO) (Interview No. 2).

6.3.2.3) Agriculture as a Sheltered Sector

It is expected that agricultural sector would oppose membership considering that it is a sheltered sector that is protected from liberal trade. Moreover, it is not included in the Customs Union and thus will be negatively affected from participating in the Internal Market via membership. Membership and liberalisation will lead to closure of small farms and de-unionisation and further cuts from state subsidies. However, trade unions in the agriculture sector are divided on the issue of whether EU membership will provide a form of protectionism against the forces of globalisation or trigger further liberalisation. On the one hand, it is argued that EU membership entails further liberalisation that has to be resisted. The Tarım-İş and Tarım Orman-İş oppose membership and criticise the socio-economic content it would impose. They argue that membership will not provide economic welfare, nor result in improvements to social policy (Interview No. 47 and 78). The EU is read as a capitalist union (Interview No. 78), shaped in parallel with the liberal policies of the WB and WTO (Interview No. 47). In this sense, it is argued that integration into the Internal Market will result in de-unionisation, the sub-contraction of work, increases in black market work and further drops in social standards as a result of the pressures of being 'competitive' (Interview No. 78). They criticise the European social model, and the conception of 'social partners', arguing that this policy not only aims to protect the workplace but puts labour under the tutelage of capital (Interview No. 47 and 78). Moreover, the European Social Model is understood as a mechanism designed to sustain imperial exploitation (Interview No. 47).

On the other hand, it is also posited that agriculture has already been subjected to liberalisation as a result of structural adjustment policies adopted in parallel with WTO and WB rules. In this view, the EU as a regional model can provide protectionism from globalisation. The interviewee from Türk Tarım-Orman-Sen, takes globalisation as a fact and supports regionalism as a mechanism for protection (Interview No. 48). From this perspective, the EU's agricultural funds and social policies are viable mechanisms for the protection of agriculture. The EU's agricultural policy is also depicted as a 'model' directed to providing self-sufficiency and protecting domestic production (Interview No. 48), in contradiction with the policies of WTO, IMF and WB (Interview No. 48).

However, agricultural trade unions are united on political issues. They believe that the EU discriminates against Turkey in relation to the Cyprus problem, asking for unilateral concessions from national interests regarding problems with Cyprus and Greece (Interview No. 48 and 78); and supports a separatist solution to the Kurdish problem (Interview No. 48). Thus, they reject the idea that the EU is a democratisation project, arguing that its imperialism functions as an impediment to the consolidation of democracy (Interview No. 47). Indeed, they believe that democratic regimes can only be stabilised by internal societal dynamics (Interview No. 78). They reject the EU's position on issues such as privileged partnerships, permanent derogations on the free movement of workers, and structural funds (Interview No. 48).

6.3.2.4) Position of Public Employees

Public employees are also presumed to take a critical stance *vis-a-vis* membership. As pro-membership process entails further liberalisation, public sectors – such as education and health - would be subjected to privatisation and commodification. Additionally, they would also negatively be affected from social cuts and withering away of the welfare state. However, contrary to this assumption, public sector unions are supportive of EU membership.

The Kesk sees the EU as a capitalist integration model and criticise its socio-economic content. However, it reads the EU membership in relation to the consolidation of democracy reasoning that Turkey currently lacks the necessary social base for it to develop internally (Interview No.68). It is also posited that EU membership will force/enable Turkey to improve social policy and contribute to find a democratic solution to the Kurdish problem (Interview No. 68).

Memur-Sen and Türk Kamu-Sen support the socio-economic content of membership. Memur-Sen is in favour of a free market economy and believes membership would be progressive as it would increase welfare provision through increasing exports and attracting investment (Interview No. 61). Participation in the Internal Market is seen in a positive light, with the belief that it would increase standards for public employees (Interview No. 61).

Moreover, they interpret European social model as an ‘ideal’ type fostering dialogue in industrial relations (Interview No. 61). Similarly, Türk Kamu-Sen is positive regarding EU membership, believing that it would result in the adoption of international norms and rules regarding social policy, and the elimination of restrictions on the freedoms and rights of unions. It maintains a critical stance towards the effects EU membership would have on key political issues, however (Interview No. 57). Türk Kamu-Sen accuses the EU of discriminating against Turkey with regards to Cyprus by asking for concessions from national interests; and adopting a separatist perspective over the Kurdish and Armenian issues (Interview No. 48).

It is only the Birleşik Kamu-İş that opposes membership. Birleşik Kamu-İş reads the EU as an imperialist bloc founded upon the exploitation of developing countries. It defends internationalism but criticizes the European working class for sharing in the surplus extracted through imperialist exploitation (Interview No. 54). They further argue that the EU as an imperialist power is inclined to develop strategies to dismember Turkey (Interview No. 54).

6.3.3) Intra-Labour Debate: Why not a united front among labour?

The reasons for division among working class are manifold that has to be unravelled in clarifying the reasons for the failure of the left to come up with a

counter-hegemonic project against pro-membership perspective. These are explained below in relation to structural factors and reasons stemming from national trajectory. As far as structural factors are concerned, globalisation has generated two processes: an intra-class struggle between internationally and nationally oriented labour (Bieler 2000: 155), and the development of a cleavage between formal and informal labour (Bieler et. al., 2008a: 6), putting the latter at the risk of 'underbidding' and under constant 'threat of relocation' (Bieler et. al, 2008b: 272). My empirical research supports these observations. On the one hand, it reveals that labour organised in internationally oriented sectors is no longer concerned about unemployment and de-industrialisation that can arise from integration with the Internal Market. Additionally, as globalisation is increasingly accepted as a 'fact' – a process that cannot be reversed – analogous with transnationalisation of production undermining the struggle at the national level, internationalism and the struggle over 'social Europe' are defended. On the contrary, it is the nationally oriented labour that is concerned with economic repercussions of integrating in the Internal Market. They oppose globalisation and EU membership on the grounds that membership will generate de-industrialisation in addition to de-unionisation and hinder economic development.

On the other hand, a considerable amount of nationally oriented labour operates in informal economy that weakens the base for unionisation. Notably, the bulk of SMEs and workers in the informal economy are not organised at all (Interview No. 28). This recalls Cox's description of working class polarisation within the form of hyper-liberal state, with a 'relatively secure and protected

minority, encompassed as a rule by enterprise corporatist relations' on one hand, 'and a fragmented and relatively unprotected majority of non-established workers' on the other (1987: 281). Notably, the mechanisms of 'wild capitalism' are operative mostly within the informal economies of domestically oriented enterprises in the private sector, which feature sub-contracted work and atypical forms of employment (Interview No. 33). Indeed, Turkey integrates into the transnational production structure with small workplaces within the informal economy. These function as sites of sub-contracted work and employ atypical labour, de-stabilising the production base for unionisation. It was highlighted in interviews that the classical tools of trade unionism target the small workplaces themselves rather than transnational capital, resulting in capital fleeing in response to demands for unionisation (Interview No. 30). Thus, globalization has reinforced the split among formal and informal labour in transnational chain of production.

As far as reasons stemming from national trajectory are concerned, position of nationally oriented labour is weakening in the struggle. First, public economic enterprises, that constituted mass production sites under the period of import substitution policy, are privatised. The neoliberal campaign on 'inefficient' public sector erodes production base and weakens position of nationally oriented labour. This process generates de-unionisation and the replacement of stable jobs with private sector positions built around competitive export-promotion, which define labour as a 'production cost' (Interview No. 31). Twenty-five thousand workers employed in public economic enterprises and

organised mostly within Türk-İş lost their jobs in the last two decades (Interview No. 34).

Second, the right to strike is banned for public employees and legal restrictions place limits on their involvement in politics. These obstacles downgrade the status of public sector unions to 'associations' (Interview No. 52 and 54).

Third, there is also a cleavage between private sector and public sector unionism in industry. This cleavage prevented an effective common action in response to privatisation and its ideological attack that defines public sector as 'inefficient'. Indeed, interviewees from both Disk and Hak-İş highlight that they face obstacles when seeking to organise labour in state economic enterprises due to the former's revolutionary ideological orientation and latter's organic links with political Islam (Interview No. 12 and 28). As the state directs workers to Türk-İş, it has created a platform to check and control the militant unionism of the 1970s and there is now a general understanding among Disk and Kesk that public sector trade unionism – often called 'yellow trade unionism' – is not progressive for class politics as it generates labour aristocracy and 'surrenders' by collaborating with the state and capital (Interview No. 67). It is argued that class consciousness is generated in the private sector (Interview No. 67). Hence, concomitant with Marx's conception of capitalism to be historically progressive at a particular stage, there is an implicit assumption here that private sector would further consolidate capitalist

production relations that in turn will prepare the ground for the working class to form a class for itself.

Fourth, the position of agriculture labour is marginalized. As processed agricultural products are included within the Customs Union, unions organized in food processing industry start to operate in international market and support membership (Interview No. 21), creating further fraction within the same sector. The EU agricultural policy is referred as a model to provide protection vis-a-vis globalisation (Interview No. 23). Seasonal work among agricultural workers causes 60% decrease in unionisation in winters, which renders membership profile fragile (Interview No. 26), and weakens agriculture trade unions to shape policies at the confederation level. Besides, Öz Tarım-İş conceives agriculture trade unions affiliated with other confederations as 'rivals' and finds it problematic to organize joint platforms to discuss common concerns over agriculture sector independent of dialogue among confederations (Interview No. 26).

Fifth, the AKP hegemony has created its own labour aristocracy, which conceives of unionism in terms of 'social partnership' rather than class struggle. Both Hak-İş among industrial workers and Memur-Sen in public employees are content to define themselves as 'partners' to capital. For instance, Eğitim-Bir-Sen (union organized in education affiliated with Memur-Sen), increased its membership from 2,000 in 2001 to 150,000 in 2010. The interviewee from Eğitim-Sen highlighted that this is not only related to its organic links with the

Government, but also a result of 'new conception' of trade unionism that integrates market dynamics and operates on the promise of individual gains for members (such as promotions in public housing for those who join it). From such a perspective, trade unions act as a part of 'populist politics' and work to settle tensions in society endorsed by neoliberalism (Interview No. 52). For instance, when the AKP hegemony was in the process of transforming secure employment in the public sector, trade unions protested against the imposition of flexible, temporary forms of employment. To combat this, the AKP Government directed newly employed public sector workers on contract status (that is known as 4B status) to Memur-Sen. This was largely responsible for Memur-Sen increasing its membership from 35,000 in 2005 to 400,000 in 2012 (Interview No. 48). In return, Memur-Sen is authorised to conduct collective bargaining, weakening opposition to new, insecure forms of employment and the imposition of flexible markets in the public sector (Interview No. 54). Interviewees from both Türk Kamu-Sen and Birleşik Kamu-İş criticised Memur-Sen for accepting 4B status whilst acting under the patronage of the Government (Interview No. 54 and 57). The mechanisms used to create a labour aristocracy are also evident in the fact that various municipalities ran a campaign under the slogan 'either Hak-İş or no jobs' in threatening workers to choose Hak-İş or be unemployed (Interview No. 12).

In view of these examples, I read these syndicalist trade unions as operations of *trasformismo*. I have argued in chapter four that the AKP power can be interpreted as an instance of *trasformismo* once it is defined in relation to the strategy of ruling class to co-opt potentially antagonistic groups to the capitalist

discipline. The AKP integrates potentially antagonist and disadvantaged groups from globalisation to the neoliberal project by drawing support from SMEs – that is explicated in chapter five in debating nationally oriented capital - and low-income groups through populism. Hence, the AKP policies disarticulate dissent from globalisation and neoliberal restructuring by presenting itself as a ‘rupture’ from previous right-wing political parties and main struggle in society as ‘public versus elites’ via a populist discourse. I have also argued previously that social policy of the AKP rests on a hyper-liberal understanding that takes employment in relation to economic growth and prioritizes individualistic mechanisms such as charities and social assistance mechanisms. Notably, it is plausible to observe institutions among organized labour that are co-opted to this mechanisms of trasformismo under AKP hegemony and its neoliberal conception of social policy. It is only the confederations of Hak-İş among industrial workers and Memur-Sen in public employment that internalize definition of labour-capital relations as social partnership. They articulate market economy model and conceive of employment in relation to economic growth. More importantly, they are co-opted to the idea that ‘collective’ problems of labour and capital can be addressed through mechanisms of social dialogue (Interview No. 28 and 61). In view of this, they subscribe to neoliberal understanding of social policy that puts survival of ‘workplace’ at the centre and conceives of industrial relations as one of co-operation rather than conflict. That is why I have previously read reference of these groups to internationalism as deficient.

6.4) Conclusion

Turkey stands in the periphery of Europe. Throughout the research I have argued that EU membership question should not be read independent and autonomous from globalisation and neoliberal restructuring. Neoliberal restructuring, consolidation of market economy model and integration of Turkey's production structure with transnational production are processes closely related with the European integration process. It was in the process of completing the Customs Union that Turkey eliminated its protectionism in trade. In the last two decades, financial liberalisation and monetary reforms are conducted under the surveillance of EU reform process. Indeed, the EU and IMF are often named as 'double anchors' in presenting structural adjustment programmes. Moreover, it can be assumed that there is more space in Turkey to expect an alternative to neoliberal pro-membership perspective as Turkey completed the Customs Union prior to membership. To phrase alternatively, it is economically integrated with the EU via the Customs Union, a situation which fails to offer any benefits to socially disadvantaged groups. It is subjected to competition with European and global enterprises via the Customs Union without any compensatory social measures associated with full membership – such as regional funds; agricultural and structural funds; and the free movement of workers – mechanisms that result in the liberalisation of society and can serve to alleviate social tensions. This chapter has examined the position of labour and considers whether such an alternative has indeed emerged.

As the structure of production in Turkey is primarily integrated with global production via trade, I posit that an intra-class struggle is likely to develop between the nationally and internationally oriented production sectors. Accordingly, I have examined the following hypothesis in the Turkish case: trade unions that are organised in internationally oriented sectors – sectors that are integrated with the European production structure via the Customs Union – can be expected to develop a supportive stance to membership conceiving of regional integration as a mechanism providing protectionism against globalisation (incentive for positive integration) and membership as a platform to regain rights that are lost at the national level. On the contrary, trade unions organising workers for nationally oriented sectors will develop a more critical stance with concerns over de-industrialisation and de-unionisation as they will increasingly be exposed to pressures of competitiveness and loss in welfare gains (these claims further draw on the work of Bieler, 2000: 48; 2005: 461; 2006: 42).

On the basis of the empirical research, I have argued that labour is split with regard to the membership question. On the one hand, internationally oriented labour - textile and automotive industries and Disk and Hak-İş confederations - criticises globalisation for generating de-unionisation, increasing flexible work and putting labour on the defensive. However, globalisation is accepted as 'irresistible' that can only be struggled at the international level. In this sense, in line with the hypothesis struggle at the international and European levels is defended, with the motto 'Another globalisation and Europe in the benefits of workers is possible' neatly stating the basic claim. Moreover, as the Customs

Union is already completed, there is no concern among internationally oriented sectors on the probable implications of participating to the Internal Market. In this view, struggle on economic integration is already lost in the 1990s with the completion of the Customs Union. Accordingly, membership is debated in relation to social policy and democratisation. Internationally oriented labour contends that European Social Model will contribute Turkey to improve its social standards and membership will offer free movement for workers. Moreover, societal dynamics in promoting democratisation in Turkey are believed to be constrained due to so-called 'strong state' mechanisms. In this view, EU reform process is instrumental to contain instruments of strong state – military and Kemalist cadres - and stimulate democratisation, a reading of democracy and state that can be linked with discourse theory at the theoretical level.

Yet, support to EU social regulation does not necessarily denote that internationally/transnationally oriented labour accords with neo-liberal restructuring (Bieler, 2006: 103). Indeed, although internationally oriented labour defends membership, its rationale is different from pro-membership project. In their view, globalisation has dynamited struggle at the national level. Moreover, the struggle over membership in the economic sphere is already lost with the completion of the Customs Union. That is why membership is debated in relation to social policy and democratisation. Indeed, Disk has not accepted neo-liberal restructuring and names EU as a capitalist integration model. However, it defends internationalism and conceives of EU membership as a platform of struggle to create Social Europe. It also defends

membership as a mechanism to regain trade unionist rights that suffered from severe setbacks following 1980 military coup and as a platform to check and balance excess market mechanism embedded within globalisation. Hence, I argue that support provided by the internationally oriented labour should not denote that it is incorporated to the pro-membership project and instead has to be analysed as an alternative rival class-strategy. They indeed defend Ha-vet (No – Yes) project - that stands as no to capitalist Europe but yes to Social Europe – supporting membership to create Social Europe (I will further elaborate this argument in the conclusion).

Yet, I have also argued that particular unions – such as Hak-İş – internalise neo-liberal restructuring and their reference to internationalism is regressive and deficient, as they fail to advocate a struggle at the national level. I have read these platforms in relation to *trasformismo* as they seek to integrate disadvantaged groups into the AKP hegemony. Hak-İş considers globalisation positively and ‘progressive’ to generate economic growth; internalises conception of employment in relation to economic growth; and is co-opted to neoliberal conception of social policy that defines labour-capital relations as social partners and prioritizes survival of ‘workplace’ that can be secured via social dialogue. Moreover, rather than articulating a struggle at the European level for a more progressive one transcending European Social Model, they internalize market economy model and are content with mechanisms of social dialogue. Indeed, they consider European Social Model as an ‘ideal’ model.

It is the nationally oriented labour that is presumed to develop a critical stance *vis-a-vis* membership as they will increasingly be exposed to pressures of competitiveness. In line with this hypothesis, the Türk-İş, agriculture sector and public employees interpret globalisation as generating two processes: de-unionisation and de-industrialisation. It is seen to curb domestic production and negatively affect economic development/industrialisation. It impoverishes agricultural labour and generates proletarianisation and internal migration. It results in the commodification of the public sector and generates cuts to the welfare state and public sector employment.

Yet, nationally oriented labour is divided on the socio-economic impact of European membership – on the question of whether membership will provide protection from globalisation via structural funds or will trigger further liberalisation. On the one hand, European integration is seen as a capitalist integration model and its policies coincide with policies of the WTO and WB. Thus, participating in the Internal Market will have negative economic implications and membership will engender de-industrialisation and cuts in social standards as a result of the pressures of being 'competitiveness'. Moreover, European social model rests on 'social partnership' that not only puts labour under the tutelage of capital but sustains imperialist exploitation in the periphery as well. European workers share the surplus created by imperialist exploitation. In this view, internationalism can hardly be pursued as long as imperialism endures. On the other hand, particular unions interpret membership as progressive to improve social standards after the struggle regarding the Customs Union is lost. Moreover, agricultural sector will be

exposed to competition in tandem with structural adjustment policies outside membership. In this view, regionalism provides protection against globalisation and common agricultural policy of the EU is in contradiction with structural adjustment policies of the WB. Yet, nationally oriented labour is united on national concerns. It is posited that the EU is an imperialist bloc directed to dismember Turkey by putting additional conditions regarding Cyprus, Armenian and Kurdish problems. Moreover, democracy can only be stabilized by internal dynamics rather than an incentive endorsed by an international anchor.

On the basis of my empirical research on labour, it is possible to unravel two class strategies contesting pro-membership. The internationally oriented labour articulates a strategy of Ha-vet (No-Yes) that opposes capitalist nature of European integration but stands for Social Europe. In line with the hypothesis they are supportive of the membership process but for a different rationale. Contrary to the hypothesis, the nationally oriented labour supports membership on the condition that Turkey will benefit from social policy, structural funds and free movement of workers. Yet, it supports neo-mercantilist project that advocates 'membership on equal terms and conditions' (this rival class strategy is further elaborated in the conclusion). However, the struggle over hegemony extends to political and civil society. Social forces have to be able to transcend their economic vested interests - the economic-corporate phase - in articulating their project on a universal plane for the hegemonic moment. It is this debate that is the main focus in the following chapter.

Chapter 7 - Social Relations of Production and the Struggle in Political and Civil Society

7.1) Introduction

Throughout the research, I have argued that it is the social relations of production that lie at the core of my analysis on the current struggle over hegemony. In this chapter, I aim to examine how the debate is reflected in political and civil society. There are two aims behind this endeavour. First, it enables us to comprehend whether there is any hegemonic pro-membership project. In other words, can the ruling class transcend its economic-corporate phase and present pro-membership project on a universal terrain? Second, it unravels the reasons behind the failure of rival class strategies to come up with an overall alternative in the struggle over hegemony. To phrase alternatively, it questions to what extent the counter-hegemonic social forces can transcend their economic corporate phase and contest pro-membership in political and civil society?

Gramsci's analyses on integral state and ethical state provide hints in understanding the role of state in the hegemonic struggle. Throughout the research, I have criticised conceiving of civil society and state as two separate and autonomous entities. In this chapter, the state is treated as a social relationship. Drawing on the work of Cox (1981: 145-46) on 'internationalisation of state', state institutions are analysed in relation to state-

society complex – ‘form of state’ - determined by pre-eminent accumulation strategy. It is neoliberal form of state that empowers state institutions linked to global economy such as finance ministries, central bank and prime ministers’ offices in shaping policies. It can be expected that these institutions will be in favour of membership as it entails a process of adjustment to ‘international rules’ determined by global consensus and transnationalisation of production. Contrarily, state institutions that are related to policies for groups disadvantaged from globalisation and welfare regime such as planning offices and ministries of labour can be expected to be sidelined and subordinated within national policy making due to their concerns over relations of distribution and welfare cuts.

A second category is political parties. Gramsci attributes an essential role to political parties as the Modern Prince. I am primarily concerned with the role of political parties in the hegemonic struggle in reflecting upon and reacting to the interests of social forces. They are approached in relation to their social base. It is presupposed that right-wing political parties will pioneer membership akin to their support to globalisation. However, political parties whose social base rests on workers, SMEs, peasants and public employees can be expected to develop a more critical stance to globalisation and membership perspective.

Following, I approach struggles against the discipline of capital over society as an instance of class struggle. In this I draw on van der Pijl's claim that 'the issue

is no longer that “capitalism” is showing signs of collapse, and “socialism” is around the corner. What is failing today is not capital but the capacity of society and nature to support its discipline’ (van der Pijl, 1998: 48). Hence, class struggle is not confined to the manufacturing sector and my empirical research engages with women's rights/feminist groups, environmental groups and human right groups, and questions to what extent they might be able to form a united front with labour resisting EU membership and neoliberal restructuring.

The chapter starts with debating the stance of state institutions and political parties. I then turn to analyse struggles among alternative subjectivities in the extended sphere of social reproduction. In the next section of the chapter, I consider whether there is a united front among labour and struggles against the discipline of capital *vis-a-vis* the dominant neoliberal perspective regarding membership and explicate the reasons behind their failure to form a united front.

7.2) Operationalising Political Society and Civil Society

7.2.1) State Institutions under the Neoliberal Form of State

The debate on hegemony is not limited to the society. Rather, it is the state and society as a social relationship that lies at the core of the struggle over hegemony. As argued in chapter three, the Gramscian notions of the integral

state and the ethical state pave the way to conceive of the state as a sphere of struggle over hegemony. Implicit in the concept of the integral state is the embedded relationship between political and civil society (Gramsci, 1971: 263). Indeed, the role of state in the struggle is a salient feature in the thought of Gramsci.

`... the State must be conceived of as an “educator”, in as much as it tends precisely to create a new type or level of civilisation... because one is acting essentially on economic forces, reorganizing and developing the apparatus of economic production, creating a new structure, the conclusion must not be drawn that superstructural factors should be left to themselves, to develop spontaneously, to a haphazard and sporadic germination. The State, in this field, too, is an instrument of “rationalisation”, of acceleration and of Taylorisation. It operates according to a plan, urges, incites, and “punishes”...` (Gramsci, 1971: 247).

Gramsci integrates role of the international sphere in understanding hegemonic struggle. However, it was Cox who comes up with the conceptual tool of 'internationalisation of state'. This entails two processes: first, an intra-state compromise on adjusting national policies on the basis of needs and the requirements of international production; second, a transition in state structure that empowers ministries related to the economy (such as central banks, ministries of finance and prime ministers' offices) to transmit the global consensus to the national level (Cox, 1981: 146; 1987: 253-254).

On the basis of this framework, it can be expected that state institutions related to international production and linked to global economy will defend membership as Europeanisation entails a process within which state institutions will comply with `international rules` whereas institutions that develop policies

for segments of society disadvantaged by globalisation are more likely to be sidelined and subordinated in national policy-making over issues such as globalisation and EU membership. State institutions are analysed on the basis of two categories. First, the Central Bank of Turkey, the Ministry of Commerce and Industry and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Secretariat General for EU Affairs (ABGS) are examined as institutions related to the economy, and so as particularly influential in the shaping of policy in the neoliberal form of state. On the other hand, the DPT, the Ministry of Labour and Social Security, the Ministry of Agriculture and the Rural Affairs and Small and Medium Enterprises' Development Organisation (KOSGEB) are institutions whose influence in shaping policies are downgraded when compared with the period under the welfare nationalist state – when the form of state rested on the accumulation strategy of the ISI model of 1960s and 1970s. It is this category that is presupposed to develop a more critical stance *vis-a-vis* open economy and membership perspective.

7.2.2) Political Party System

Analogous to his activism inside the PSI and his role in founding the PCI, Gramsci names political parties as the new prince in the modern epoch. He establishes political parties as ‘the nomenclature for a class’ and attributes a central role in the hegemonic struggle that of forming a ‘collective will tending to become universal and total...’ by founding a new type of State (Gramsci, 1971: 129, 247 and 152). Indeed, according to Gramsci, political parties do not ‘mechanically’ express classes. Rather, they ‘react energetically upon them in

order to develop, solidify and universalize them` (Gramsci, 1971: 227). The role of political party as the 'Modern Prince' within revolutionary politics is debated in relation to historicizing Gramsci's thought (Morton, 2007a: 207-208). For instance, the idea of post-modern prince is conveyed drawing on and transcending beyond Gramsci's Modern Prince - the communist party - with globalised forms of resistance (Gill, 2002: 244-248). This debate falls outside the scope of this research. Rather, I am primarily concerned with the role of political parties as an organism reflecting and reacting back to the interests of social forces in the struggle over hegemony. It is expected – on the basis of their social base - that whilst right-wing political parties will support globalisation and open economy, it is the political parties in opposition that will be more sceptical about socio-economic content membership envisages.

Turkey developed a multi-party political system following the end of the Second World War. In the 1950 elections the right-wing DP ended the centre-left CHP's twenty-seven year rule, and since then Turkey has been ruled by right-wing governments – either in coalition form or under majority rule (with the exception of the 1973 and 1977 elections, when the centre-left CHP won 33% and 41% of the votes respectively). The mainstream literature approaches party politics through the analytical category of the 'centre-periphery cleavage', in which the centre is depicted as a composition of nationalist, Kemalist and secular elites, whose authority is challenged by a 'periphery' composed of ethnic and religious groups (Mardin 1973; Heper, 1985; Kalaycıoğlu, 1994). This literature reads the right-wing single-party majority governments under the DP during the 1950s, the ANAP during the 1980s and the AKP during

2000s as mobilisation against – and opposition to – the dominance of the centre. This reading turns a blind eye to neoliberal transition and consolidation, reproduces neoliberal knowledge and presents right-wing governments as constituting an opposition to the 'strong state'. This reinforces neoliberalism by depicting the main struggle as one of 'elites versus society' in a populist sense. Against this, I embark on a class analysis and approach parties in relation to their social bases in society.

In this chapter, I examine the period from 1999 and 2002 under the coalition government formed by the right-wing ANAP, the DSP and the MHP; and the AKP Government that has been in office since the 2002 elections. As Table Five (below) reveals, there are discontinuities in right-wing political parties. During the 1950s it was the DP that stood at the centre of right-wing politics, but by the 1980s the ANAP was the governing party promoting neoliberal restructuring. Here, I read the AKP as the new conservative face of neoliberalism. This shift at the right-wing is cogently observed by Gramsci:

‘The problem arises of whether the great industrialists have a permanent political party of their own. It seems to me that the reply must be in the negative. The great industrialists utilise all the existing parties turn by turn, but they do not have their own party. This does not mean that they are in any way “agnostic” or “apolitical”. Their interest is in a determinate balance of forces, which they obtain precisely by using their resources to reinforce one party or another in turn from the varied political checkerboard...’ (Gramsci, 1971: 155).

The AKP was founded by former members of the religious-conservative Welfare Party and transformed itself into a centre-right wing party coming to terms with globalisation and neoliberalism. Though the AKP identifies its

social base as formed by farmers, artisans and SMEs (Interview No. 50), it stands at the centre-right of the political spectrum in the last decade. As Table Three illustrates, since the 1999 elections the AKP has appealed to voters of centre-right parties - the True Path Party (DYP) and the ANAP - though with a populist discourse that serves to differentiate it from these traditional right wing political parties. The Party defines itself as 'conservative democrat' (Interview No. 50).

Table 5: Election Results 1983-2011

	AKP	CHP	MHP	ANA P	DYP	SHP	DSP	Refah	Indepe ndent
1983				45,1%					
1987				36,3%	19,1%	24,8%	8,5%	7,2%	0,4%
1991				24,0%	27,0%	20,8%	10,8%	16,9%	0,1%
1995		10,7%	8,2%	19,6%	19,2%		14,6%	21,4%	0,5%
1999		8,7%	18,0%	13,2%	12,0%		22,2%		0,9%
2002	34,3%	19,4%	8,4%	5,1%	9,5%		1,2%		1,0%
2007	46,6%	20,9%	14,3%						5,2%
2011	49,8%	25,9%	13,0%						6,5%

Source: Turkish Statistical Institute, www.tuik.gov.tr

The MHP is a right-wing nationalist party that identifies its social base as lower income groups and SMEs (Interview No. 59). In its election manifestos,

the SMEs are presented as the 'backbone of the economy' which requires support (MHP, 2007: 46-48). According to Çınar and Arıkan, contrary to its fascist, anti-communist orientation of the 1970s, the MHP has – in the last decade – articulated its policies around ethnic and cultural identities rather than a racial identity, seeking to appeal to the centre-right electorate (2002: 25 and 38). The MHP identifies its ideational orientation as one of '*ülkücülük*' (idealism), promoting 'the love and ideal of serving to one's state' and a 'devotion to the well-being of the state' (Çınar and Arıkan, 2002: 26 and 34).

As far as social democratic parties are concerned, both the DSP and the CHP occupy the centre-left of the political spectrum. The DSP appeals to workers, public sector employees, peasants, retired people and SMEs (Interview No. 44). The CHP has constituted the main opposition in the Parliament since the 2002 election. It was founded by Atatürk and ruled the country under a single-party regime between 1919 and 1950. Its election manifestos reveal that it seeks to appeal to a group composed of nationally oriented capital, SMEs, artisans, and groups disadvantaged by globalisation, such as retired workers, peasants, workers, public officials and the military (CHP Election Manifesto, 2007: 30-42). It is possible to unravel two fractions within the CHP: one that conceives of the Party as a leftist social democratic organisation, operating a programme based on the welfare state, and another fraction known for its statist and elitist tradition (Güneş-Ayata, 2002: 104). This struggle between the two fractions still endures under the current Kılıçdaroğlu administration (Interview No. 75), with the latter aspiring to conduct policies around republicanism, *ulusalcılık* and modernism, and shaping its opposition to AKP

hegemony through a discourse centred on secularism and political Islam. Although this fraction identifies farmers, retired people, workers and SMEs as its social base, they prioritise the 'educated segments' in society as the main cleavage in shaping party politics (Interview No. 58). It is also contended that the Turkish political landscape cannot be explained in reference to social class, a sociological category that they believe to have been developed by intellectuals in developed countries and which 'has an artificial status' in Turkish social formation (Interview No. 51). The social democratic fraction, however, accuses this fraction for limiting the party's social base to 'urban educated sects', the 'middle classes' and elitist groups concerned by secularism and modernism. It seeks to conduct politics around the nodal point of poverty, employment and the way neoliberalism is implemented by the AKP in order to appeal to low-income groups (Interview No. 75). The CHP has been a member of the Socialist International since 1976 and the Party of European Socialism since 1999.

Another fraction inside the Turkish left is the 'emancipatory left', which aspires to unite class struggle with identity struggles by bringing together social democrats, socialists, and citizens of Kurdish and Alevi origin (Interview No. 27). The Peace and Democracy Party (BDP) is the successor of the Democratic Society Party (DTP), dissolved on the 12th December 2009 due to its alleged connections with the PKK, and for threatening the unity of state, country and nation. The BDP is a social democratic political party, which highlights the lack of developed industrial structure in the south-eastern Turkey and Eastern Anatolia (Interview No. 60). Its social base is identified as labour and the 'poor'

(including, for example, unemployed people). The BDP also appeals to the Kurdish population, drawing support from capital deployed in the region in relation to identity politics and Kurdish sensitivities (Interview No. 60). Pressures have been exerted on the BDP (and former Kurdish parties) to stay as a marginalised single-issue party united around Kurdish identity, but it remains a mass leftist party with organic links to the emancipatory left (Interview No. 27 and 60). It is a member of the Party of European Socialists and has observer status in Socialist International. The Equality and Democracy Party (EDP) and the Freedom and Solidarity Party (ÖDP) are also affiliated to the emancipatory left. However, those parties are denied representation as they cannot pass 10% threshold in parliamentary elections. Because of this blockage *vis-a-vis* small parties, politicians resort to be elected to Parliament from the independent list. It is plausible to argue that the emancipatory left conceives of the problems of democracy and the Kurdish problem as interconnected, and develops organic links with Kurdish political movement. Notably, a recent instance reveals the organic links. The DTP group in the Parliament faced the risk of dismissal from the Parliament as they cannot number twenty after the ban on DTP. Ufuk Uras – the former leader of the ÖDP – who was elected from the independent list, joined the newly founded BDP group in eliminating the risk of dismissal.

7.2.3) Struggles Against the Discipline of Capital

This research does not confine class struggle to the workplace, but conceives of it in relation to the commodification of social relations. As I have argued in the

third chapter, I disagree with Laclau and Mouffe that Gramscian historical materialism is class reductionist and economic determinist. Rather than drawing on a post-Marxist position in approaching social movements and alternative subjectivities, I draw on van der Pijl's reading of class struggle as resistance to the discipline of capital across the entire reproductive system. It is the penetration of capitalist logic in the process of social reproduction and its exploitation of nature and social relationships that have to be resisted (van der Pijl, 1998: 36). Thenceforth, struggles around patriarchy, the environment and human rights are examined as an instance of class struggle. Interviewees are queried on the economic and social aspects of globalisation and EU membership; conceptions of emancipation; and relations of force with other actors on the left of the political spectrum.

The women rights/feminist movement was situated within leftist politics in the 1970s. The İKD was founded by the Turkish Communist Party (TKP) and was active between 1975 and 1980. This period was defined within the first wave of feminism that is associated with struggle for legal and political equality. The 'second wave' of feminism (Arikan et. al, 1996), however, flourished in Turkey during the 1980s operating in a depoliticised setting following the military coup and the neoliberal turn. It sought to struggle against patriarchy and oppression in everyday life, often around the motto 'the private is political' (Diner and Toktaş, 2010: 56; Özçürümez and Cengiz, 2011: 23 and 25).

The Turkish women rights'/feminist movement flourished in a number of different fractions. The Association for the Support and Training of Women Candidates (Ka-der) was founded in 1997 to support female candidates in municipal and general elections, and to increase the number of women in political decision-making positions. It seeks equal representation in all political platforms and aspires to establish 30% of decision making positions to be filled by women (Interview No. 15, 16 and 26). The Association in Support of Contemporary Life (ÇYDD) was founded in 1989 to defend secularism and modernity. It provides scholarships for female students and seeks to help women acquire economic independence (Interview No. 17). Kamer was founded in 1997 to fight against domestic violence, honour killings and poverty, especially in Eastern and South-eastern Anatolia (Interview No. 79). The Socialist Feminist Collective was founded in 2008 to increase cooperation among women for the feminist struggle against 'patriarchal capitalism', and seeks to raise consciousness of salaried and unsalaried female labour, and obtain recognition of 'emotional labour' in the private sphere (Interview No. 69). The Capital City Women's Platform defines itself as a conservative-religious fraction of the women's rights movement. It was largely founded by professional female theologians following the '28th February process', when 5,000 conservative women employed in the public sector were dismissed due to wearing headscarves. It aims to problematise the status of women among conservative Muslim communities and campaigns against headscarf ban in the public sphere (Interview No. 29).

The Human Rights Association (İHD) was founded in 1986 by a plurality of victimised groups, their relatives and human rights activists in order to raise consciousness of human rights among the public, and to institutionalise the protection of human rights at the state level (Interview No. 19). The Helsinki Citizens Assembly was founded in 1993 to work for the peaceful co-existence of different cultural groups and for an integrated and a borderless Europe with values such as the rule of law, the respect of human rights and citizenship. Within the Turkish context, its focus is on the Kurdish problem, the Cyprus issue and relations with Armenia (Interview No. 70 and 71). Mazlumder seeks to present the headscarf ban as a violation of 'human rights' and seeks to find a solution to the Kurdish problem (Interview No. 20). Greenpeace Mediterranean works as a regional office of Greenpeace International and works for the environment, peace and increased dialogue domestically and internationally (Interview No. 74).

7.3) The Struggle over Hegemony in the Political and Civil Society

7.3.1) European Membership Question in the Neoliberal Form of State

There has been very little internal debate among state institutions regarding the membership question. Rather, interviewees stated that membership is accepted as 'state policy', independent of political parties and/or social forces (Interview No. 24, 37 and 40). It is argued that although there are political vacillations in

relationships with the EU, there has never been any departure from the pro-membership perspective under any Government (Interview No. 36). For instance, ABGS continues to perform technical work independent of the political context (Interview No. 35), whilst the Ministry of Agriculture and Rural Affairs continues to work adaptation of EU acquis, despite the suspension of the eleventh chapter on Agriculture and Rural Development; and the thirteenth chapter on Fisheries (Interview No. 41). Institutionally, the process establishes EU Directorates in each institution, creating a 'European fraction' within state bureaucracy (Interview No. 55). There is a tendency to conceive of the process as a technical issue based on the adaptation of EU acquis.

7.3.1.1) State Institutions that are related to Global Economy and Support Neoliberal Restructuring

Ministries that are closely linked to the global economy, including the Ministry of Industry and Commerce; the Undersecretariat of Foreign Trade; and the Central Bank have developed a stance supportive of liberalisation and economic implications of EU membership as expected from the hypothesis. Indeed, their rationale in defending membership is in parallel with ideas articulated within pro-membership project. The interviewee from the Ministry of Industry and Commerce sees liberalisation through the Customs Union as a decisive factor in stimulating the competitiveness of national industry and improving the quality of products (Interview No. 38). The liberalisation of trade is read as a 'progressive' process that transformed Turkish exports from

agricultural products to industrial goods (Interview No. 38). The interviewee from the Undersecretariat of Trade interpreted the Customs Union as critical in consolidating a market economy model (Interview No. 36), whilst the Central Bank names the EU and IMF as double anchors providing macroeconomic stability. The interviewee from the Central Bank defends membership perspective that is considered decisive to maintain price stability, low inflation, macroeconomic development and efficiency (Interview No. 23). Membership is believed to provide standardisation through adapting international rules and maintain security for Turkish markets; two decisive factors in attracting FDI (Interview No. 37 and 40).

The pro-EU perspective is equally supported in relation to foreign policy and democratisation. The Ministry of Foreign Affairs defines membership as a strategic objective for Turkey in relation to its Western orientation and modernisation (Interview No. 37 and 42). They argue that there are no strategic alternatives to European integration in the international system (Interview No. 42), and the EU is seen as a platform through which the consolidation of democracy can be ensured. The reform process is interpreted as significant in forcing complicity with international rules on human rights, the rule of law, and democracy (Interview No. 35). In that sense, it is remarked that compliance to the EU norms is the means to compliance with United Nations Convention, European Council Convention and/or decisions of European Court of Human Rights and ILO standards (Interview No. 35). It is argued that the social base in Turkey is weak and that the EU offers a 'stronger anchor' for the reform of democracy (Interview No. 35). It is also stressed that the pro-

membership perspective helps to civilise politics, ensuring that government and civil society are mutually accountable and responsive (Interview No. 35).

Yet, there are two sensitive issues related to foreign and security policy. The membership of Greek Cyprus in the name of the island prior to a solution is criticised. Moreover, the EU is accused of breaking the Annan Plan's promise to end the isolation of the KKTC (Interview No. 37). It is stressed that recognising the Greek administration as the representative of the Republic of Cyprus is unacceptable for Turkey as it would *de facto* name Turkey as an occupation force on the island (Interview No. 42). However, it is acknowledged that the EU made an extension to the Additional Protocol on Cyprus meaning that – technically speaking, at least – each negotiation chapter cannot be closed until this deadlock is solved (Interview No. 42).

On a different note, interviewees complain that Turkey's position within the European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP) was downgraded. Whilst Turkey declares its support for ESDP in principle, it seeks the creation of a consultation mechanism for non-EU countries who are NATO members. In other words, following the Berlin Plus formula^{xxi}, Turkey wants to be consulted if ESDP missions will benefit from NATO assets and Turkey will be asked to provide military personnel (Interview No. 42). The main concern is that although the Republic of Cyprus is not a member of NATO, it can benefit from NATO assets under the ESDP framework (Interview No. 42). Moreover, Turkish military personnel and assets are utilised via NATO for ESDP policies

without Turkey being consulted. In this sense, the EU is criticised for failing to keep its promise to consult Turkey with regards to ESDP operations (Interview No. 37). Additionally, regarding Justice and Home Affairs, the EU expects Turkey to sign a readmission agreement, through which it would be required to accept any refugees who had passed through it as a transit country, either to grant them leave to remain or to deport them to their home countries. It is contended that Turkey will also hesitate to give its consent without any concessions from the EU about visas applied to Turkish citizens (Interview No. 35).

7.3.1.2) State Institutions that Struggle to Integrate with Globalisation

In line with the argument of Cox on ‘internationalisation of state’, the roles played by the DPT, KOSGEB, the Ministry of Agriculture and Rural Affairs, and the Ministry of Labour and Social Security in state policy are secondary under the neoliberal form of state. Moreover, they are related to groups disadvantaged by globalisation: labour, agricultural groups, and SMEs. For instance, the interviewee from the DPT acknowledged that the DPT plays only a limited, indirect role with regards to the membership question (Interview No. 39). Despite this, empirical research reveals that these institutions adapt to ideas associated with neoliberalism's conceptions of the economy and social policy. In a nutshell, they are supportive of the membership project and justify this support with references to social policy; and regional and agricultural funds.

During the 1990s the DPT believed the completion of the Customs Union could have negative repercussions on domestic industry (Interview No. 39). However, this stance has been revised and the DPT now conceives of membership as important to ensure complicity with international standards concerning economic competitiveness and democracy. Moreover, as Turkey has already been integrated via the Customs Union, membership is endorsed as it will enable Turkey to participate in EU decision-making (Interview No. 39). Additionally, the DPT internalises and operates on neoliberalism's ideas prioritising efficiency and competitiveness in the economy. The planned economic model with a large role for the public sector is discredited for being inefficient. It is argued that as a result of globalisation, the state's role is no longer to plan the economy, but to act as a regulatory institution 'promoting' the private sector and the functioning of the economy in a competitive manner (Interview No. 39). Similarly, alongside the strategy of export-promotion and neoliberalism's understanding of development, the KOSGEB is directed to help SMEs increase their exporting capacity and their competitiveness in international markets (Interview No. 21). However, the membership process is conceived of as a decisive factor in stimulating the competitiveness of SMEs and the quality of products (Interview No. 21).

Concurrent with the hypothesis, the Ministry of Labour and Social Security and the Ministry of Agriculture and Rural Affairs are concerned with negative economic repercussions of participating to the Internal Market. However, they support membership in relation to social policy and agricultural funds,

conceiving of globalisation as 'irresistible' and EU regionalisation as a mechanism that can provide protectionism. The Ministry of Labour and Social Security reads globalisation as a process that engenders unemployment and negatively affects trade unions and the bargaining power of labour. Moreover, they place the 'workplace' at the core of industrial relations. However, the interviewee conceived of globalisation as an irreversible process (Interview No. 24). Similarly, the Ministry of Agriculture and Rural Affairs argue that integrating to the Internal Market will stimulate competition and negatively affect particular items in the agricultural sector such as livestock production, milk and meat (Interview No. 41). It is argued that as the Turkish agricultural structure is one of small and partitioned holdings, it cannot compete with larger, more economically oriented farms in the Western Europe (Interview No. 41).

However, these institutions defend the pro-membership perspective, taking the EU as a progressive model for Turkey and referring positively to EU social policy and/or structural funds. The interviewee from the Ministry of Agriculture and Rural Affairs, for example, saw the EU's agricultural support mechanisms in a positive light (Interview No. 41). More importantly, the liberalisation of agriculture is conceived of as 'irreversible'. It is argued that even though customs for agricultural products will not be eliminated by membership, the Millennium Round compels Turkey to decrease its protectionism independent of the EU process. Hence, the interviewee underlines, membership should be seen positively as it will allow Turkey to benefit from EU structural funds (Interview No. 41).

In a conference organised by the TZOB to debate the agricultural question, the Minister of Agriculture and Rural Affairs – M. Mehdi Eker – argued that membership will contribute to agricultural development in the long-run (TZOB, 2006: 34). The EU's Common Agricultural Policy is presented as a mechanism that will increase the competitiveness of agricultural products and increase welfare and social standards for agricultural workers (TZOB, 2006: 32). Similarly, the Ministry of Labour and Social Security is positive about the European Social Model and social dialogue as a way of negating class antagonism and struggle. It is argued that this model not only contributes to the democratisation of industrial relations, but provides a viable alternative to the 'ultra-liberal' American model (Interview No. 24). It is argued that as an international platform the EU can provide mechanisms to protect workers against globalisation (Interview No. 24). Moreover, it is believed that the EU reform process strengthens Turkish trade unions and would eliminate restrictions on unionisation. For instance, there are criteria in Chapter Nineteen on 'Social Policy and Employment' of the European acquis, which require social partners to be more effective in social dialogue, fight informal economies and strengthen unionisation (Interview No. 24).

7.3.2) Position of Political Parties in the Debate over Membership

7.3.2.1) AKP Government and Membership

In chapter four, the AKP's rule is defined as hegemonic in the sense that it successfully ordered a number of social forces around the neoliberal project. This hegemony has established a consensus among internationally and nationally oriented capital (see chapter five). In parallel with the interests of internationally oriented capital, the AKP guaranteed the implementation of the 2001 structural adjustment programme and is committed to monetarism and neoliberal transformation through parliamentary reforms (under the guidance of EU, IMF and WB) (AKP, 2001: 18-19). It remains committed to neoliberalism's macro-economic objectives: low inflation, tight budgetary discipline, price stability and the independence of the Central Bank. It aspires to complete the privatisation process, restructure the public sphere on the basis of the market economy, and provide growth through privatisation and attracting FDI (AKP, 2002: 37-39; AKP, 2007: 30). However, it believes the structural adjustment programme to be inadequate in addressing the concerns of SMEs. Thus, it promises to provide support of SMEs (AKP, 2002: 45-46). In this sense, the social purpose behind the AKP hegemony is the consolidation of neoliberal restructuring through the integration of nationally oriented capital with global structures and neoliberal forms of accumulation; and the co-opting of groups disadvantaged from globalisation through individualistic social policy mechanisms based on the charity model. This supports my earlier

argument that the AKP hegemony should be seen as an instance of trasformismo.

Analogous with its policies, the AKP can be examined within the pro-membership project. In fact, the AKP identifies membership as a 'primary objective' in its 2002 election manifesto, stating that it will provide economic development and the consolidation of democracy (AKP, 2002: 37). Concurrent with the stance of nationally oriented capital, they claim that globalisation is a fact and that it can only be compensated by increasing the competitiveness of SMEs in international markets (Interview No. 50; AKP, 2001: 18). They read the current state of economic integration positively, arguing that the Customs Union is decisive in stimulating exports and enabling Turkey to operate competitively in global markets. Turkish SMEs are content with the delocalisation of European production (Interview No. 50). However, there are no further economic benefits to becoming a member, with the exception of participating in the decision making process and eliminating visa barriers (Interview No. 50). Although the AKP underpins the reform process, they argue that the EU has double standards and uses the accession negotiation process instrumentally to force concessions regarding Cyprus and the Kurdish problem (Interview No. 50). Moreover, the attractiveness of membership decreases as the economic crisis takes hold of the Euro-zone. Further doubts are expressed regarding the inability as of EU members to keep to the Maastricht criteria; Europe's aging population, which makes it difficult to provide welfare; and rising xenophobia in Europe against Muslims and migrants (Interview No. 50). Despite this, the AKP conceives of the EU as

instrumental in developing standards and retains membership as a goal (Interview No. 50).

7.3.2.2) Political Parties in Opposition

7.3.2.2.1) Centre-Left Political Parties: ‘Social Market Economy’

Analogous to their social base that relies on workers, public sector employees, peasants, retired people and SMEs, centre-left political parties can be expected to oppose membership. Indeed, they conceive of globalisation negatively and raise concerns over cuts from social welfare state. They believe globalisation to be a fact and regionalism as a platform that can provide protectionism. They support membership on the condition that Turkey will benefit from structural funds and free movement of workers and they raise their opposition in relation to national sensitivities. Indeed, the interviewees summarise their position neatly with the motto ‘membership on equal terms and conditions’. Indeed, centre-left political parties should be analysed within neo-mercantilist rival class strategy.

Turkey's centre-left political parties – the CHP and the DSP – see globalisation as a fact. They fail to propose an alternative to the market economy and criticise globalisation only in relation to social policy and national interests (Interview No. 51, 58 and 75). This is in tandem with their supportive stances towards the market economy model (Interview No. 44). The CHP proposes a

model it calls 'social market economy', whilst the DSP refers to a form of 'Societal Competitive Economy' (CHP, 2007: 24-25; Türker, 2005a: 3). Both of these models consider competitiveness in global markets, low inflation and growth to be primary objectives; but include a social dimension prioritising employment, equal distribution of income and a welfare state (CHP, 2010: 143-144). The role of state is depicted as supporting and supervising the private sector and acting in a regulatory (interventionist) capacity for those sectors where private investment fails to materialise (Türker, 2005b: 3; Türker, 2005c: 3). They do not question export-orientation and depict welfare state regimes as failed projects. Accordingly, they argue that the only viable option is to promote production and employment within a market economy (Interview No. 44 and 51). Opposition to the AKP is conducted on the basis of the manner in which neoliberalism is implemented through an 'irregular market economy model', rather than neoliberalism per se (Interview No. 75).

Centre-left political parties make clear their position with the motto, 'membership on equal terms and conditions' (Interview No. 44; CHP, 2002: 53-54). They view the social and economic implications of membership positively and state that membership will boost production by stimulating exports and competitiveness, increasing the quality of goods and services; and providing technology transfers (Interview No. 44 and 58). They believe it will improve social standards, provide a more equal distribution of income and eliminate regional disparities (Interview No. 44 and 51; CHP, 2006: 513). They refer to the role of the EU's structural funds in compensating disadvantaged groups by globalisation (Interview No. 58). They also propound the populist argument

that membership of the EU would constitute a decisive step towards 'contemporary civilisation', a goal set by Ataturk for modernisation (Interview No. 44 and 58; CHP, 2006: 512). Moreover, it is argued that membership will not only strengthen Turkey's role as a regional power in foreign policy but also eliminate threats such as fundamental Islam and/or the dismemberment of Turkey (Interview No. 44). The only criticism related to the socio-economic content of membership is levelled at the unwillingness of the EU to recognise the free movement of labour (Interview No. 44).

Criticism of the process is largely based on political issues and national sensitivities. The Cyprus problem^{xxii} constitutes the key issue. CHP refuses to debate Turkish membership question in relation to the Cyprus problem (CHP, 2006: 20 and 119). DSP identifies the Cyprus issue as an issue of national sensitivity affecting the security of both Turkish Cypriots and Turkish citizens, who should not be 'sacrificed' for membership (DSP, 2004: 7). Both the CHP and the DSP argue that the solution for the Cyprus problem can only be founded by acknowledging two separate, equal and independent states that have equal sovereignty (Interview No. 58; DSP, 2004: 12). Second, the EU is accused of pursuing imperialist policies seeking to divide and rule Turkey by demanding the recognition of the Kurdish and Alevi populations as minorities: additional concessions 'specific' to Turkish membership (Interview No. 44 and 58). Third, Turkey's status in the EU's defence initiative within ESDP and the Berlin plus agreement is criticised as – although Turkey was an associate member of the Western European Union (WEU), it will not be able to participate in the planning and control of military operations under the EU

Armament Agency (Interview No. 58). Fourth, the EU is criticised for asking Turkey to recognise the 'Armenian genocide' (Interview No. 58). Finally, permanent derogations for the free movement of labour and structural funds, and any form of 'special status' outside of the membership framework are considered unacceptable (Interview No. 44 and 58; CHP, 2006: 5-7 and 234). It is argued, then, that the negotiation process 'discriminates against Turkey', has 'double standards', and that the EU strategy is designed to keep Turkey at arm's length by proposing a 'privileged partnership' (Interview No. 44; CHP, 2006: 159). Neither the CHP nor the DSP are against membership per se, then, but demand the right for Turkey to become a full member of the EU on conditions of equality (CHP, 2006: 9-10). The CHP even published a book titled *Yes to Full Membership, No to Special Status* to refute the general impression in Turkish society that it was an anti-European party (CHP, 2006: 1).

7.3.2.2.2) Nationalist Action Party (MHP) and Membership

The MHP takes globalisation as a structural imperative that cannot be resisted. As its social base consists of SMEs, it sets itself a 'strategical priority' to render Turkish SMEs competitive in international markets by means of 'an independent and a national' industrialisation programme (MHP, 2007: 7 and 12). This strategy is portrayed as endorsing national champions to create Turkey as an actor in globalisation (Interview No. 59). In tandem with this stance, EU membership is supported under the motto of 'honourable membership on equal terms and conditions' (Interview No. 59). Membership is

interpreted as instrumental for increasing the competitiveness of Turkish industry and for realising higher institutional standards. The main focus of criticism is, again, national interests; the MHP is critical about permanent derogations and/or any form of privileged partnership (MHP, 2010: 23-25); EU policies regarding Cyprus and Armenia are interpreted as intervening in the domestic affairs of Turkey (MHP, 2007: 117); and the EU's policies concerning the Kurdish problem are believed to threaten the unitary structure of the Turkish state, contradicting the Lausanne Treaty (Interview No. 59). The EU is also accused of excluding Turkey from its security and defence initiatives (Interview No. 59), whilst the MHP remains critical about sovereignty transfer (Interview No. 59).

7.3.2.2.3) Emancipatory Left and Social Democratic Political Parties

The social democratic parties and Kurdish political parties refer to themselves as the 'emancipatory left', seeking to distinguish themselves from the 'centre-left'. The BDP, ÖDP and EDP – none of which has passed the 10% threshold in an election – fall in to this category. The emancipatory left aims to rethink and redefine leftist politics by unifying class politics with the struggles of citizens of Kurdish and Alevi origin (Interview No. 27). With the weakening of class politics and unionisation, emancipatory left no longer conceives of struggle operating around class conflict as the fundamental struggle in society (Interview No. 27), aiming instead to be open to pluralism. Debates concerning class and identity politics caused a split within the ÖDP, however, with critics

claiming that it conducts 'sterile leftist politics' and turns a blind eye to struggles focussed on forms of oppression other than exploitation (Interview No. 27).

The emancipatory left reads the EU as a capitalist integration model and criticises the economic aspects of integration as well as its defence initiative. Yet it accepts globalisation as an inevitable process that can only be resisted at the international level, meaning that it supports EU membership under the motto 'another Europe is possible'. Moreover, the EU's political reforms are well received. They also believe that Turkey will participate in decision-making through its membership (Interview No. 27). In this sense, its stance coincides with internationally oriented labour and can be analysed under the Ha-vet rival class strategy. The membership perspective is supported as globalisation necessitates a struggle at the international level. Moreover, as struggle at the economic level has already been lost by the completion of the Customs Union, membership is debated in relation to social policy and political issues.

Contrary to the expectation from the hypothesis, the BDP support membership due to political reasons. Its support is based on a different rationale than social forces within neoliberal pro-membership project. The interviewee from BDP reads globalisation as a process accelerating inequality and income disparities. However globalisation is equally interpreted as a positive process to stimulate information exchange and technological development, factors seen as potentially lessening the isolation of the Kurdish movement (Interview No. 60).

Moreover, internationalisation/supranationalism is defended for implementing decentralisation through the transfer of power from sites of central authority to supranational and local levels, a move which provides increased space for the enactment of ethnic and cultural rights (Interview No. 60). They also argue that as the industrial base in Eastern Anatolia is not developed, regional funds from the EU and laws requiring the free movement of workers will help solve the economic and social problems of the region (Interview No. 60). Moreover, the EU is read as enabling a democratisation process which may contribute to the defeat of authoritarian state mechanisms and nationalism (Interview No. 60). The interviewee referred to human rights violations and noted that there are currently some two thousand Kurdish people in prison in Turkey, many of whom have had their right to expression assembly violated –rights that would be guaranteed by EU membership. In this sense, EU membership is seen a process forcing Turkey to adjust to international human rights norms (Interview No. 60).

7.3.3) Struggles against the Discipline of Capital in Civil Society

7.3.3.1) Women's Rights/Feminist Groups and Membership Question

The women rights/feminist activists can also be examined under the Ha-vet project. Although they do not develop a position resulting from an economic analysis, membership is seen instrumental to consolidate democratisation; to

constrain mechanisms of 'strong state' and to further develop civil society. The interviewees also highlighted that EU reform process was instrumental to improve women rights in Turkey.

The women's rights/feminist movement is not homogenous but is made up of a number of strands. Thus, feminism cannot be said to have developed a unified stance regarding state-society relations and/or globalisation. On the one hand, globalisation is read as a capitalist process which renders female labour more vulnerable to flexible forms of work and exploitation (Interview No. 18 and 77). In this reading, women constitute a disadvantaged group. For instance, the interviewee from Ka-der reads liberalisation as a process impoverishing women. She argues that liberalisation and ensuing economic crises increase poverty, which impacts disproportionately on women – who are often first to lose their jobs and are expected to perform social services in parallel with social cuts. Thus, globalisation serves to reduce female participation in employment and politics (Interview No. 26). The interviewee from the Socialist Feminist Collective criticised globalisation for the fact that women are often expected to make sacrifices for the family and that female labour is often the first category to be subjected to flexible working conditions (Interview No. 69). On the other hand, globalisation is interpreted by some aspects of the feminist movement as a process opening new space in the political sphere for female involvement. It does this by increasing international mobilisation and international links (Interview No. 18 and 77). Other women's groups have not debated globalisation, meanwhile. The interviewee from Kamer highlighted that many of its members are illiterate, unemployed, powerless

and unable to develop a critical stance *vis-a-vis* globalisation (Interview No. 79).

Women's rights/feminist groups' approaches to membership are largely shaped in relation to social, political and cultural aspects rather than economic implications (Interview No. 77 and 79). For instance, the interviewees from Ka-mer and the Socialist Feminist Collective highlighted that the women's movement has never debated the implications of the Customs Union for the Turkish economy (Interview No. 69 and 79). In this sense – and resonating with neoliberal common sense - the Customs Union is seen as a ‘technical’ issue. The economic effects of EU membership are reduced to financial support and projects: Ka-mer refers to the financial assistance given to the Eastern and South-Eastern Anatolian region by the EU, and to joint projects designed to raise consciousness about violence and honour killings (Interview No. 79).

From a women's rights/feminist point of view, there is a common understanding that the EU sets the minimum criteria for women's standards and that membership will be positive for women's rights (Interview No. 17 and 26). Indeed, the women's movement takes EU legislation as a progressive model for gender equality – noting, for example, that Western European countries were among the first to apply positive discrimination and quotas (Interview No. 18). Moreover, it is stated that EU standards are used strategically to institutionalize women's rights, especially following the 1999 Helsinki Council (Interview No. 10). For instance, in amending the Turkish Civil Code and Criminal Code, the women's movement successfully lobbied for more than thirty enactments,

taking European countries as a model (Interview No. 25), and the enactment of the article which rules that the state is responsible for providing gender equality is named as a decisive moment (Interview No. 15). Moreover, it is argued that although the women's movement proposed this change in 1992, it was only passed in the Parliament in 2005 thanks to the EU reform process (Interview No. 17). It should also be noted that there are organic links between the women's movement and the EU: the Representative of the European Commission in Turkey consults women's rights/feminist and human rights groups before publishing their regular reports (Interview No. 25), a relationship seen as instrumental for changing legislation (Interview No. 29, 71 and 79). Additionally, many women's rights movements are already members of institutions at the European level^{xxiii} (Interview No. 19, 25, 26 and 29).

In this sense, the process of EU membership is read in relation to the consolidation of democracy. Women's rights groups criticise 'military tutelage' and the mechanisms of the 'strong state' for maintaining strict controls on society, and read the EU as an international anchor capable of filling the gap in the Turkish political sphere, which results from an underdeveloped civil society. This, it is argued, will open up space for civil society and democratisation (Interview No. 10, 16, 18 and 77).

In parallel with their critical stance regarding Turkish nationalism, the process of joining the EU is conceived of as a peace project. For instance, it is argued that membership will help solve Turkey's problems with Greece and result in a peaceful Aegean Sea (Interview No. 18). There is also reference to the concept

of a 'Social Europe' (Interview No. 16): the EU process is seen as instrumental for the adaption of international norms and values regarding human rights, women's rights and democracy (Interview No. 79). It also provides a stimulus for debates concerning democracy and the Kurdish problem (Interview No. 79). The interviewee from the conservative Capital City Women's Platform reads the EU as instrumental in subjecting the 'authoritarian' policies of 'state secularism' to scrutiny and providing a 'free secular' structure within which conservatives have more freedom to practice their religion (Interview No. 29).

However, the EU acquis on flexible work and the tendency to direct EU funds to 'female entrepreneurship' are criticised (Interview No. 10). The EU's references to efficiency and the market in relation to gender are acknowledged (Interview No. 25). In this sense, women's movements do not define their stance as one of unconditional support (Interview No. 10 and 25).

It is only the Socialist Feminist Collective that develops a strong anti-European stance. The argument that the EU reform process is progressive for women's rights is seen by them to be a misinterpretation, and claims that the EU increases levels of democracy is read as a 'distortion' (Interview No. 69). The Socialist Feminist Collective defines emancipation in the context of a struggle against 'patriarchal capitalism' (Interview No. 69). On the one hand, they see the EU as an economic integration model, within which social policies sustain its capitalist economic essence (Interview No. 69). On the other hand, they criticise the EU for developing a reductionist reading of women's rights which limits them to the public sphere. They argue that women's labour in private life

cannot be ignored, and note that EU legislation is confined to female employment in the workplace, with issues such as equal payment taking centrality. This, it is argued, is a policy motivated by economic incentives and which seeks to protect the interests only of particular women, with employed white women the most likely to benefit. Hence, the EU's policies ignore the exploitation of low-income women, poor women, migrant women, single mothers and uneducated women. This approach is further criticised for dividing the feminist movement into a group of relatively powerful, masculinised women, who have abandoned 'rebellious' feminist discourse; and a group whose domestic labour is exploited by the former (Interview No. 69).

7.3.3.2) Human Rights Groups and Membership

Human rights groups conceive of internationalism and the EU as instrumental for democratisation as it can curb the so-called 'authoritarian republican oligarchy' Turkey experiences under a 'military and bureaucratic tutelage'; a controlling society which continues 'despite and upon the will of public' (Interview No. 19, 20, 70 and 71). In this sense, interviewees support EU membership as they believe it will open up space for civil society, democratisation and improvements to human rights legislation (Interview No. 19, 20, 70 and 71). According to the İHD, the fundamental problem is 'juridical pressure', which leads to charges against İHD members for being members of an illegal/terrorist organisation, or for insulting 'Turkishness' (Interview No. 19). The İHD criticizes the 'security doctrine' of the military and the 'İttihadist

official ideology' that 'invents' internal and external enemies and 'artificial conflicts' with Armenians, Greeks, Kurds, Alevis and human rights groups in order to perpetuate its existence (Interview No. 19). It is argued that the EU process problematises the falsity of this official ideology by finding peaceful solutions and questioning operations of military tutelage within the political sphere (Interview No. 19). It is asserted that the Turkish state neglects differences in ethnicity, religions and sects. Thus, the role of EU in helping to construct a democratic solution to the Kurdish problem is supported, especially when compared to the US' military approach (Interview No. 19 and 20).

7.3.3.3) Why not a united front against neo-liberal restructuring?

I will now turn to consider whether it is possible for disadvantaged social groups to form a united front which resists neoliberal restructuring and Turkish membership of the EU as a struggle against the discipline of capital around social reproduction. Remarkably, my empirical research reveals that women's rights/feminist groups read globalisation as a capitalist process, within which women are conceived of as a disadvantaged group who are expected to bear the brunt of unemployment, or who are subjected to flexible work and increased exploitation (Interviews No. 18 and 77); as well as being expected to make sacrifices for the family in parallel with social cuts in welfare state (Interviews No. 26 and 69). Similarly, the interviewee from the Helsinki Citizen Assembly highlights that liberalisation engenders human rights violations as health and education are within the sphere of human rights. The interviewee from

Greenpeace Mediterranean acknowledges that the economic system causes environment problems and criticises predominant narratives that present environmental standards as 'economically costly' (Interview No. 34). Moreover, interviewees interpreted the relationship between feminism and human rights within leftist politics as 'natural', as both struggle against exploitation and develop a critical perspective (Interview No. 77 and 79).

Yet, I argue that there are four main obstacles to combining relations of force to create an alternative historical bloc that contests neoliberalism and EU membership. First, the economy has secondary status in these groups' analyses of globalisation and the membership question (Interview No. 71). Membership is debated in relation to social, political and cultural aspects (Interview No. 77), whilst there have not been debates on the repercussions of the Customs Union (Interviews No. 25, 73 and 79). The interviewee from Capital City's Platform argues that the Customs Union is a 'technical' issue relevant only to particular industrial sectors (Interview No. 29). In other words, neoliberal 'common sense', which reads the economy as operating in an apolitical field, is internalised. The repercussions of globalisation and neoliberalism are approached in relation to effects on women, human rights and the environment, meaning that they remain issue-specific rather than developing a structural approach. Furthermore, globalisation is not read as an entirely negative process. Although some interviewees acknowledge globalisation as capitalist expansion, it is equally articulated as a force which opens space in the political sphere by increasing internationalisation and constraining the power of the

'strong state'; a progressive process working to increase freedom and democracy (Interview No. 18 and 77).

Second, pluralism and autonomy from class politics are understood to be opening space for struggles articulated around gender, human rights and the environment. In relation to the feminist movement, the key motto is 'woman is not only exploited but oppressed' (Interview No. 18). In this sense, interviewees highlight that the status of women and human rights should not be 'secondary' within the working class movement. They argue that abolishing gender hierarchies and adapting the 'universal language of human rights and freedoms' constitute primary forms of struggle that should not be 'subordinated' within a working class struggle (Interview No. 18 and 19). On this understanding, feminism should not be reduced to merely 'politics for women' (Interview No. 69). Rather, feminism *per se* is defined as an ideology (Interviews No. 15 and 77), signifying not only a consciousness of the exploitation of women but also engendering collectivism and developing a political strategy (Interview No. 77). During the 1970s^{xxiv}, female emancipation was conceived of in relation to the labour struggle and the overthrow of capitalism. Thus, although de-politicisation engendered by the neoliberal turn is criticised, feminist activists welcome neoliberalism for 'opening up space' for democratisation and critical thinking regarding former conception of gender and human rights politics within working class movement (Interview No. 77).

Accordingly, class politics is accused of operating hierarchically and failing to acknowledge the autonomy of feminism and human rights in the political sphere (Interview No. 77). However, the Socialist Feminist Collective, among other feminist groups, defends the socialist system and posits classless society as the emancipatory structure for women, in which feminist principles can best be practiced. For them, the emancipatory struggle is thus understood to operate against 'patriarchal capitalism' (Interview No. 69). Furthermore, they argue that the socialist system will ultimately erase the differentiation of labour into salaried and unsalaried labour; eliminate gender differences; provide equality in domestic work; and eliminate the nuclear family as the predominant social relation of society (Interview No. 69). Yet, the interviewee referred to obstacles to forming relations of force around an anti-capitalist agenda. She argued that class politics constrains the gender question to providing equality in the public sphere, against feminism's claim that the 'private sphere is political' (Interview No. 69). In other words, the gender question is not limited to the public sphere and salaried work – female labour in the domestic work also constitutes labour under the category 'emotional labour' (Interview No. 69). Furthermore, she highlighted that one of the major principles of the organisation is to remain independent from institutions of 'state, men and capital' (Interview No. 69). This relates to wider critiques surrounding the private sphere brought about by second wave feminism. For instance, domestic violence was not a political topic until the 1980s, and it was feminism's break from class politics that allowed it to be conceived of politically (Interview No. 15). For reasons like this, class politics is criticised for approaching gender question 'instrumentally' (Interview No. 77). For instance, before the 1980s, the collapse of the capitalist

system was articulated as the solution to patriarchy, and the Soviet Union was considered to bare the proof of this. However, it became increasingly clear that this was an 'illusory' argument (Interview No. 18).

Third, the idea of 'structural emancipation' is no longer considered. As a result of the 'explosion of particularisms' (Mouffe, 1993: 1) and/or 'emancipation(s)' (Laclau, 1996: vii), there is no longer a single definition of emancipation (Interview No. 18). Though emancipation is defined as struggle against patriarchal structures in general, it is conceived of as a pluralist struggle; a struggle against the absence of women in formal political mechanisms (Interview No. 15); against violence and honorary killings (Interview No. 79); against inequality in education and employment (Interview No. 17); and against the secondary status of women in society (Interview No. 29). More importantly, the relationship between the emancipation of women and a structural anti-capitalist struggle is abandoned and the possibility of revolution is called into question (Interview No. 18 and 26).

Finally, alternative subjectivities have an alternative conception of political praxis that weakens the capacity for action around a common principle. Contrary to the rhetoric of a mass movement, the women's rights movement is organised as a social movement around small horizontally organised groups, mostly founded on an *ad hoc* basis in a flexible manner (Interview No. 18 and 79). A system of rotation is used to prevent leadership from emerging in the movement (Interview No. 18). Some campaigns are run by volunteers and are

dissolved after the project ends (Interview No. 70). Alternative, postmodern forms of struggle such as the internet are utilised (Interview No. 15).

In relation to Gramsci's concept of a 'Modern Prince', women's groups develop a critical stance *vis-a-vis* political parties, believing them to be unsuitable vehicles for the articulation of their interests in the political sphere. Indeed, they stay independent from political parties – claiming that this prevents the movement from becoming an instrument of a particular political party (Interviews No. 16, 18, 69, 74 and 79). More importantly, women's right/feminist groups remain issue specific. Alongside their failure to develop politics at a structural level, their primary concern is not to establish relations of force in society so that they may enhance their strategic ends. For instance, the interviewee from Ka-der defined employers and trade unions as platforms that are founded and run by men (Interview No. 10). Similarly, another interviewee remarks that Ka-mer never takes an ideological position in the political spectrum (Interview No. 79). It is even stated that the women's movement never sought to claim political authority (Interview No. 18).

7.4) Conclusion

This chapter aims to extend the debate on struggle over hegemony among social forces to political and civil society. I have aimed to question to what extent the ruling class can articulate its economic vested interests embedded within neoliberal pro-membership project in universal terms in political and

civil society. Additionally, this debate also sheds light whether alternative class strategies - introduced in the previous chapter - can form a united front with disadvantaged groups and struggles against the expansion of discipline of capital in the sphere of social reproduction and whether they can form an alternative historical bloc by presenting their project on a universal terrain.

In tandem with the hypothesis, state institutions related to global economy supports pro-membership to stimulate competitiveness and to provide security in attracting FDI. It is equally defended to civilise politics and consolidate democracy. Membership is interpreted in relation to modernisation project and the EU is also considered to be a peaceful project. Interviewees from the Ministry of Agriculture and Rural Affairs and the Ministry of Labour and Social Security raise concerns regarding participating to the Internal Market. However, they conceive of globalisation as a fact and Europe as a regional bloc able to provide protection. Hence, contrary to the expectation from the hypothesis, state institutions that are related to disadvantaged groups from globalisation such as labour, agriculture sector and SMEs adapt to neoliberal conception of role of state in economy and welfare regime. Accordingly, they refer to structural funds and social policy in defending membership. Notably, it is highlighted by interviewees from state institutions that compliance with the EU acquis is carried independent from the membership perspective. This condition illuminates the hegemonic status of pro-membership perspective as reform process and its neoliberal socio-economic content is adopted as 'progressive' despite uncertainty on prospects of membership. Indeed, echoing Cox's argument that European integration constitutes 'a microcosm of the larger

internationalizing process' (Cox, 1987: 259), interviewees from state institutions conceive of membership in relation to compliance with international rules of global economy and international standards of human rights and rule of law. Thenceforth, neoliberal content is carried without necessarily the goal of attaining membership.

Subsequently, the AKP hegemony is read as instrumental in embedding nationally oriented capital within the neoliberal project. Although it identifies its social base as SMEs, farmers and artisans, its social purpose is the consolidation of the neoliberal transition. It is the AKP Government that promotes neoliberal pro-membership project for competitiveness and democratisation. Yet, it is the reform process rather than membership perspective that is conceived of as decisive to comply with rules and standards. The interviewee from AKP highlighted that the EU has double standards and its attractiveness decreases in tandem with economic crisis and xenophobia.

The political parties in opposition are analysed in relation to two fractions: the centre-left and emancipatory left. The centre-left political parties – the CHP and DSP - cannot come up with an alternative to globalisation and market economy model. They aspire to develop social policy within market economy, neatly summarised by models proposed as 'societal competitive economy' and/or 'social market economy'. They adapt to economic and social aspects envisaged by membership and emphasise structural funds and free movement of workers in defending membership. However, they raise concerns over

national issues such as Cyprus problem, Kurdish and Armenian issues, and oppose a form of privileged partnership in which Turkey will be exempt from structural funds and free movement of workers. That is why their position is neatly summarised as ‘membership on equal terms and conditions’ and they can be analysed within neo-mercantilist rival class strategy.

It is the political parties affiliated to ‘emancipatory left’ that criticise European integration as a capitalist integration model and economic aspects of membership. Yet, contrary to the expectation from the hypothesis, these political parties endorse membership perspective for political reforms and democratisation. Additionally, internationalism and supranationalism is defended as instrumental to contain nationalism and mechanisms of so-called strong state. They refer to free movement of workers and regional funds in supporting membership that would contribute to solve regional inequality in the Eastern Anatolia. Although European integration is a capitalist process, however they support Social Europe. In that sense, the political parties within emancipatory left is examined in relation to Ha-vet strategy.

The following sub-section on civil society examines struggles among women rights/feminism, human rights and environment that are conceived of as class struggle in the sphere of social reproduction against the discipline of capital. Contrary to expectation stemming from the hypothesis, these groups support membership perspective in relation to its political and social policy aspects. Interviewees are concerned about effects of globalisation on women rights,

human rights and environment. However, they fail to develop a stance on economic implications of membership. Women rights movement takes EU legislation on women as progressive – that sets the minimum criteria to improve women rights situation in Turkey. The membership perspective is equally interpreted as a process opening up space for civil society and democratisation. It is read as a peace project to curb the role of ‘strong state’ and military expenditures. Indeed, it is possible to unravel four reasons behind the failure of disadvantaged groups in society to form an alternative *vis-a-vis* neoliberal membership perspective. First, economic implications of globalisation are debated in relation to effects on women and human rights. In this view, not only neoliberal 'common sense' on the separateness of economics and politics is internalised, but their criticism of globalisation remains issue-specific – that echoes the criticisms that I conducted for theory of discourse in chapter three. Second, class politics is accused of operating hierarchically and failing to acknowledge the autonomy of feminism and human rights in the political sphere. Third, the idea of 'structural emancipation' is no longer considered that in turn renders it more difficult to form relations of force around a structural emancipatory project. Finally, contrary to mass movement rhetoric they develop an alternative conception of political praxis that in turn renders common action more difficult.

On the basis of my empirical study on political and civil society, I argue that pro-membership project is hegemonic as ideas associated with membership are defended on universal terms in political and civil society. Rather than one project for and one project opposing membership, there are two rival class

strategies contesting pro-membership in the Turkish context: neo-mercantilism and Ha-vet ('No-yes'). However, I contend that neither of these constitutes a counter-hegemonic historical bloc. This is further elaborated in the overall conclusion.

Chapter 8 - Conclusion

This research has analysed the current struggle over hegemony among social forces in Turkey relating to its bid for EU membership. It has debated the trajectory of Turkey's integration into European structures within the structural dynamics of globalisation and neoliberal restructuring, with attention focussed on the role of European integration in liberalisation. Turkey's liberalisation and its neoliberal restructuring are often interpreted autonomous from membership process reasoning that neoliberal restructuring of the 1980s was carried at a time when Turkey-EU relations were frozen following the military coup. However, I argued that it was through the Customs Union that Turkey eliminated its trade protectionism for European products and globally as it has to comply with the EU's common external tariff. Additionally, Turkey adopted macroeconomic policies under the guidance and surveillance of the EU and the IMF. The EU therefore played a decisive role in Turkish complicity with structural adjustment policies. Accordingly, throughout this thesis, I have read the position of social forces *vis-a-vis* membership against the background of globalisation.

Conclusion chapter is structured as follows. It summarizes main coordinates that guides the research design and reviews main conclusions from each chapter. It is followed with presenting the main empirical findings on the current struggle over membership as a pro-membership project whose status is interpreted as hegemonic and two rival class strategies that contest it: neo-

mercantilism and Ha-vet. Following I argue that these two class strategies cannot come up with an overall alternative and unfold the reasons behind their failure. The discussion proceeds by speculating about probable future coordinates of class struggle and ends by a particular optimism referring to examples from current struggles in Turkey.

The struggle around EU membership has been read as an open-ended struggle among social forces whose outcome can only be established by class struggle. I have queried whether there is a dominant pro-EU hegemonic project pioneering the pro-membership perspective and considered who the social forces behind any such project might be. I also explored groups disadvantaged by globalisation and neoliberal restructuring and considered whether they might form an alternative historical bloc that opposes and resists both membership and neoliberal restructuring in Turkey. I have asked whether they can form a united front and how we might be able to unravel the reasons for a lack of an alternative to neoliberal restructuring.

The analysis took the social relations of production as its core. It began by establishing the main mechanism of integration of Turkey's production into the transnational production structure (which is trade rather than FDI). Thus, it was shown that Turkey's path of integration is an instance of internationalism rather than transnationalism. Accordingly, intra-class struggle was debated in relation to both the national and international forces of capital and labour. This research was guided by a hypothesis developed in relation to intra-class

struggle, namely that the transnationalisation of production and finance has generated a new division between internationally and nationally oriented social forces of capital and labour. The former could be expected to develop a supportive stance to membership seeing it as the means to stimulate exports and consolidate an open and a functioning market economy. It was expected that it would defend regional integration as a platform for struggle in a battle that has already been lost at the national level due to the transnationalisation of production. Contrarily, the latter was expected to oppose membership as they will increasingly be exposed to the pressures of competition; and lose state subsidies and gains from the welfare state. However, the aim of this thesis was not to verify or falsify this hypothesis. Rather, it was taken as a contour in the research design, enabling me to map the position of social forces. Indeed, empirical research reveals that various social forces adopted a position contrary to the expectation from the hypothesis – as in the case of nationally oriented capital or emancipatory left political parties.

In debating intra-class struggle, particular industries were selected. The textile and automotive industries were examined as internationally oriented sectors. They were endorsed as pioneering sectors within the export-promotion strategy following neoliberal turn in 1980s and continue to hold a privileged position in Turkish exports. The stance of SMEs and agriculture sector was analysed in relation to nationally oriented forces of capital and labour. Agriculture is a sheltered sector that is not subjected to tariff reductions via completion of the Customs Union (with the exception of processed agricultural products). In addition to nationally oriented sectors, public employees were also expected to

develop a critical stance to neoliberal membership project due to social cuts and the consolidation of neoliberal form of state. Additionally, I drew on van der Pijl's claim that 'the issue is no longer that "capitalism" is showing signs of collapse...What is failing today is not capital but the capacity of society and nature to support its discipline' (van der Pijl, 1998: 48). In accordance with this, I approached struggles around patriarchy, the environment and human rights as instances of class struggle against the discipline of capital in the field of social reproduction. I expected social forces in these areas to contest Turkish membership of the EU, and neoliberal restructuring more generally.

I have not read the Turkish state as a *sui generis* entity as does the 'strong state' tradition in political science literature on Turkey (Heper, 1985; Keyder, 1987; Buğra, 1994). This, in my view, is a myth and is problematic for three reasons. First, it presents the main struggle in the society as one of elites versus people (in a populist sense) - a reading that masks class struggle. Second, it reads the state as having a rationality and 'substantive ends' of its own (Yalman, 2009: 160 and 200). Thus, the state is seen as 'withering away' from the economy in order to constrain its power. To counter this, I adopted the Gramscian notion of the integral state, which paves the way to understand state apparatuses (such as the military or bureaucracy) not as monolithic entities, but as platforms of class struggle among competing fractions. Finally, the strong state tradition is problematic as it takes state and civil society and politics and economics as operating separately and autonomously from one another, presenting the state as a 'black box' beyond human agency, and civil society as a progressive sphere for democratisation. In place of this view, I conceive of

particular mechanisms of civil society as ‘fortresses and earthworks’ (Gramsci, 1971: 238) that contribute to the ruling class’ project of gaining consent from subordinate classes in society. From this critique, the ‘politics’ behind the strong state tradition is shown as the consolidation of neoliberal restructuring. I highlighted Buttigieg's concern over the effects of strategically misconstruing power relations in disabling leftist struggle (2005: 35-37), a point relevant for discussing the leftist fraction that supports the neoliberal AKP hegemony in Turkey. This fraction views the AKP as a progressive force that - through the discourse of political Islam – operates outside of and external to the mechanisms of the 'strong state', and so as a force with the potential to constrain state power (and the power of the military in particular). I argued that this is a transhistorical reading of statolatry that is based on conceiving of the relationship between state and society as one of externality. It is short of class analysis and ultimately ends up reinforcing neoliberal restructuring. It is in relation to this point that I objected to discourse theory.

On the basis of this critique, I adopted a conception of the state-society relationship that understands it as a social relationship embarking on Gramscian historical materialism. This reading paves the way for criticising the mechanisms of the capitalist state, rather than presenting state as a black box. Drawing on Cox’s analysis on the internationalisation of the state, state institutions are considered in relation to their links with the global economy and the neoliberal form of state. Hence, state institutions that are closely linked with the global economy are expected to support membership, whilst those that

are related to disadvantaged groups from globalisation such as planning offices and labour ministries will be sidelined in the struggle.

This reading also unravels the neoliberal ideas and institutions embedded within civil society. These are instrumental in enabling the ruling class to transcend its narrow vested economic interests and develop a universal project. Thus, I examined civil society in two distinct aspects, both of which lead to empirical findings. In chapter five, particular institutions that have organic links with the ruling class were examined. I noted that although they aspire to present 'expert' opinions as independent knowledge in a positivist sense, these institutions can be seen as 'trench-systems' in the war of position. I highlight their organic links with capital and read the knowledge they produce as 'common sense', with the social function of presenting ideas associated with membership as universal. Against this, I approached women rights/feminist, environmental and human rights' struggles in civil society as having the potential to develop a counter-hegemonic historical bloc in chapter seven.

In chapter two, I reviewed European integration theories and existing analyses of the Turkish membership question. The classical integration theories – neofunctionalism and intergovernmentalism – were shown to constrain the debate to the particular 'form' of enlargement. This was shown to be a non-debate as Turkey continues to integrate with European structures independent of the question of whether it will become a member. Thus, such understandings fail to engage with the power relations underpinning the ongoing integration

process and its socio-economic content. The Europeanisation literature treats integration as autonomous from globalisation and subscribes to a liberal conception of state and society relations. It concurs with the 'strong state' tradition, meaning that it subscribes to neoliberal restructuring. Meanwhile, I showed that the constructivist approach neglects the material, and that its social purpose is to present the EU as a civilian power. This is a reading that abstracts imperialism and exploitation from capitalist accumulation and reduces it to military intervention. To correct these readings, I introduced Gramscian historical materialism, citing four particular strengths that make it appropriate for analysing Turkish integration. First, it situates the Turkish membership question within the structural dynamics of globalisation and neoliberal restructuring - opening the floor for debating the power relations behind ongoing integration. Second, the socio-economic content of the pro-membership perspective and the power relations underpinning it can be questioned. Third, it operates to combat 'common sense' arguments that operate around the strong state-weak civil society dichotomy by analysing state-society relationship through the social relations of production. Finally, integration is not explained behind automaticity of an economic rationale. Rather, it is read as an open-ended struggle whose outcome will be determined by class struggle.

In chapter three I summarised the debates between Gramscian historical materialism and Laclau and Mouffe's discourse theory. I focused on five key areas of disagreement and adopted Gramsci's conception of hegemony. First, I highlighted that in Gramscian historical materialism, agency is not limited to a

reductionist notion of class and the production of physical goods, but is based around the social relations of production, encompassing institutions and ideas. I then criticised Laclau and Mouffe for failing to adequately articulate what they mean by 'a non-economistic understanding of economy' (Laclau and Mouffe, 2002: 136), and for operating within capitalism's structured separation of economics and politics: a condition that 'de-socialises the material'. Second, I noted that the Gramscian notion of integral state and ethical state not only captures the role of capitalist state *per se* in the struggle over hegemony, but uncovers the 'fortresses and earthworks' within civil society (Gramsci, 1971: 238). In other words, it understands that civil society is a sphere where hegemony is both contested and consolidated. On the contrary, in the *Hegemony and Socialist Strategy*, the status of state is under-theorised and neoliberal civil society is not contested – and coupled with their separation of politics and economics – discourse theory operates within the neoliberal order's separation of the state and civil society. Third, whilst the international sphere remains under-theorised in discourse theory, Gramscian historical materialism paves the way to conceive of hegemonic struggle at the national level within the conditions of the international and unevenness of capitalist development. Fourth, I argued that in claiming a break with past forms of industrial society, Laclau and Mouffe close the possibility of analysing capitalist development historically. My final objection was related with the conception of structure in theory of discourse. I noted that they conceive structure negatively, seeing it as an obstacle to freedom and emancipation. This, in my view, operates on the terrain of individualism and fails to provide a stable standing from which to create a structural emancipatory struggle.

In concluding the debate, I observed that the critique of Laclau and Mouffe speaks with counter-hegemony but falls short of defining the hegemony of the ruling class and examining its contradictions. Hence, their concept of hegemony is either incomplete – lacking an account of the discipline of the dominant hegemonic system - or it operates within pre-eminent hegemonic order. On the basis of this theoretical critique, I argued that Gramscian historical materialism does not necessarily exclude struggles of political recognition and introduced van der Pijl's argument that it is the 'discipline of capital over the entire reproductive system' and its 'exploitation of the social and natural substratum' that has to be resisted (van der Pijl, 1998: 36 and 47). In this sense, I observed the current struggle over Turkish membership of the EU as resistance to the forms of social reproduction imposed by capitalist discipline. Understanding the struggle as such paves the way to include struggles around feminism/women's rights, the environment and human rights as an instance of class struggle.

In chapter four I historically situated Turkey's integration to European structures by reading its political economy under two periods. I showed that, in the 1960s and 1970s, Turkey followed an industrialization strategy based on import-substitution in tandem with Fordist accumulation and a developmentalist state. I argued that during this period, Turkey-EU relations took the form of a tug-of-war between structural adjustment working through a controversy between liberalisation of trade with the EEC and industrialization/development under ISI. In agreement with Yalman (2009: 30) I read Turkey's transition to neoliberalism as a passive revolution. Although

Turkey adopted an export-oriented strategy with the Stabilisation Programme of 24th January 1980, it was unable to implement this in the context of rising social unrest. I argued that the coup was instrumental in containing labour and limiting its resistance to liberalisation. I showed that it was after the neoliberal restructuring that Turkey applied for full membership in 1987 and began tariff reductions. I observed that neoliberal hegemony was strong enough to endorse completion of the Customs Union as a prelude to membership. I then identified the 1990s with financial liberalisation, opening the Turkish economy to speculative short-term capital that engendered a vicious cycle of growth, crisis and adjustment and caused crises in 1994, 1999 and 2001. Following this I read the AKP's hegemony within this background of economic crisis as an instance of *trasformismo* - the 'formation of an ever more extensive ruling class' (Gramsci, 1971: 58) which worked 'to co-opt potential leaders of subaltern social groups' (Cox, 1983: 166-167). Though the AKP presented itself as a 'rupture' from previous right-wing political parties, it consolidated neoliberal hegemony. The AKP was key to including nationally oriented capital to neoliberal project and containing disadvantaged groups through a populist and hyper-liberal individualistic conception of social policy.

The following three chapters presented my empirical findings. Though the chapters are structured on the basis of positions of capital and labour, this is followed with extension of the debate to include political and civil society, it is plausible here to frame the current struggle around three projects. There is not a single pro-membership project and a single alternative project (as presumed by the hypothesis). The contours of current struggle are much more complex:

whilst the pro-membership project is hegemonic, it is contested by two rival class strategies: neo-mercantilism and Ha-vet.

I observed that the neoliberal pro-membership project is underpinned by internationally oriented capital, right-wing political parties, nationally oriented capital and state institutions related to the economy. It is presented as a process to providing economic development, macroeconomic stability and increases in the competitiveness of the economy and quality of production. The EU is presented as an anchor for the consolidation of democracy and the civilising of politics, operating against the mechanisms of the 'strong state'. The membership perspective is identified as hegemonic. Indeed, the neoliberal hegemony is shown to be strong enough to sustain the reform process without necessarily attaining the membership status.

In line with the hypothesis, I showed that internationally oriented capital is the pioneering force behind the pro-membership perspective. Membership is endorsed in order to stimulate exports and economic growth; provide competitiveness; technology transfer; and to safeguard a functioning market economy and macroeconomic stability – both of which are seen as decisive factors in stimulating FDI. Furthermore, the neoliberal turn in European integration that revisits social policy by prioritising workplace around social partnership and conditioning of employment to economic growth is well-received. The membership process is also understood as a peace project that will help end the isolation of Turkey on the international stage. Finally, the

process is articulated through populist arguments that link it with modernisation and Westernisation.

Contrary to the hypothesis, I found that nationally oriented capital – that is debated in relation to SMEs and agricultural sector – is also in favour of the open market economy model. It reads globalization as an inevitability and argues that the only viable strategy for survival under globalisation is to increase competitiveness through an export-oriented strategy that will create ‘national champions’ to operate on the international markets. I observed that nationally oriented capital is integrated with the transnational production structure via outsourcing and contract manufacturing, in parallel with delocalization of production. This resonates with the argument of Robinson, who notes that transnationalisation is a process of decentralisation and fragmentation of transnational production, and that it operates through ‘multilayered networks of outsourcing, subcontracting, collaboration, and so on, that increasingly link local and national agents to global networks’ within which agents either ‘globalize or perish’ (Robinson, 2004: 14, 15, 19 and 20). I argued that nationally oriented capital have either adapted to globalization, setting themselves the goal to operate competitively in international markets; or have been integrated into the transnational production structure through outsourcing and contract manufacturing. My interviews revealed that the effects of liberalisation engendered by the Customs Union have already been felt - either through bankruptcy, or by adapting to new conditions. Thus, they are no longer concerned with integration to the Internal Market. Accordingly, membership is seen as a process through which the consolidation of

international rules and standards can be adopted, enabling the discipline of industry so that it can operate competitively in international markets. I did find, however, that a fraction inside the agriculture sector has acted as I had expected and adopted a critical stance *vis-a-vis* membership on the grounds that Turkish farmers will not be able to compete with European enterprises. It is believed membership would force the closure of many small farms, creating impoverishment and unemployment. Moreover, I found many argue that agricultural support provided to CEECs reveals that EU mechanisms would not protect Turkish agriculture from globalisation. Such perspectives are marginalised, however, and even actors involved in processed agricultural products - such as food processing industry - are integrated within the international market and are supportive of membership.

Thus, I have observed that the pro-membership project is pioneered by internationally oriented capital and adopted by nationally oriented capital. Yet, Gramsci conceives of hegemony as a moment when ruling class transcends its economic corporate interests and takes a role of 'moral and intellectual leadership' by posing the questions on a 'universal plane' (Gramsci, 1971: 181-82). Given this, the hegemonic status of the pro-membership project can only be ascertained by discovering whether the social forces transcend their vested economic interests. I found that they have, and so argued that neoliberal pro-European perspective is indeed hegemonic: the project is no longer debated in relation to narrow economic interests of the dominant class and/or class fraction. It successfully articulates a hegemonic world view by delivering persuasive ideas covering a wide range of issues including social policy;

foreign policy; democratization and modernization - to such an extent that the reform process is carried out without necessarily an explicit focus on attaining the membership status. I noted that its hegemonic status is further apparent in civil society, where particular institutions aspire to cultivate 'objective and scientific' knowledge claiming their independence due to being financially independent from state. However, I read this process as providing the 'fortresses and earthworks' (Gramsci, 1971: 238) for the hegemonic project. Thus, civil society plays a significant role in presenting ideas associated with membership as 'universal'. It has the social function of opening particularly sensitive issues to public debate by asking 'experts' - 'traditional intellectuals' in a Gramscian sense - to write opinion papers. These institutions present membership perspective as progressive - a process that consolidates democracy and civilizes politics moving it away from the conception of the 'strong state'.

Moreover, analysis of political and civil society revealed that the pro-membership project is adopted by state institutions in the neoliberal form of state. In line with Cox's analysis on the 'internationalisation of the state' and function of state institutions related to global economy under the neoliberal form of state (which focuses on the way in which state institutions related to the global economy are adjusted to meet the requirements of international production), I found that institutions closely linked to the economy defend the membership process in order to stimulate competitiveness; provide macroeconomic stability and consolidate the market economy model. They see

the process as a decisive factor enabling compliance with international rules, and maintain security for Turkish markets - two key factors in attracting FDI.

The pro-membership project is also defended by the right-wing AKP Government as it is seen as providing economic development, consolidating democracy and complying with international rules and standards. I read the socio-economic content of AKP rule as the consolidation of neoliberal hegemony. Though the social base of the AKP is made up of SMEs, farmers and artisans, its policies seek to integrate groups disadvantaged by globalisation whose interests could potentially be articulated around a counter-hegemonic struggle. Indeed, its strategy in the 2002 election campaign articulated the need for a 'rupture' from previous right-wing governments, and this was instrumental in obtaining support from disadvantaged groups. However, contrary to its social base, it adopted the programme of 'Transition to a Stronger Turkish Economy' and its macro-economic objectives. This is the key to the support AKP rule has obtained from internationally oriented capital which interprets it as capable of using its parliamentary majority to carry out neoliberal restructuring. Nationally oriented capital is supportive of the policies seeking to make SMEs competitive in international markets. Moreover, party policies are directed to co-opt disadvantaged groups through an individualistic conception of social policy which revolves around the charity model under the hyper-liberal form of state. For these reasons, I argued that AKP rule should be understood as an instance of *trasformismo*.

In line with this argument on *trasformismo*, I showed that fractions inside internationally oriented labour – Hak-İş among industrial workers and Memur-Sen in public employment – become integrated to the neoliberal hegemony. Although internationally oriented labour supports membership with a different rationale (hence why it forms a different class strategy) these platforms adapt to the market economy model and are in favour of conducting trade unionism through the ‘social partnership’ model. Hak-İş interprets globalisation positively and articulates ‘unconditional’ support for all of the economic, social and political aspects of membership. In this sense, rather than defending struggle at the European level as a result of the structural constraints of globalisation, they support globalisation and membership in order to increase the competitiveness of economy. Indeed, competitiveness is endorsed as a way to save the workplace and generate employment - a stance that adopts the conditioning of employment to economic growth. Moreover, though most of the interviews are critical about mechanisms of social partnership positing that dialogue can only be developed among two ‘equal’ sides (Interview No. 30, 67 and 68), it was only the interviewees from these confederations and affiliated unions who defined labour as a partner of capital (around a model that they articulate as ‘industrial democracy’). These platforms have increased their membership in the last decade. This resulted in the formation of new cadres of labour aristocracy under the AKP rule. Hence, I read their reference to internationalism as regressive and deficient.

I argued that the pro-membership project is contested by two rival class strategies: neo-mercantilism and Ha-vet. Whilst they are both hostile to

particular aspects of EU membership, neither neo-mercantilism nor Ha-vet posits an overall alternative. Neo-mercantilism ends up supporting membership on equal terms and conditions whilst Ha-vet articulates a struggle at the European level – a position that can be neatly summarised with its motto that: 'Another globalisation and Europe is possible'.

The Ha-vet ('No-yes') strategy is underpinned by internationally oriented labour, the Kesik among public employees, social democratic political parties, certain feminist groups and human rights groups. These social forces criticise the capitalist nature of the European integration process, but promote the concept of 'Social Europe'. The current membership debate is criticised for being trapped between nationalist reflexes and an unconditional support for neoliberalism. In this sense, Ha-vet aspires to propose an alternative. The group can be linked with a fraction inside Left as the 'new left' or the 'emancipatory left'.

In line with the hypothesis, I showed that internationally oriented labour (the textile and automotive industries and Disk) have developed a supportive stance, albeit one which follows a different rationale to the social forces underpinning pro-membership project. Here, globalisation is criticised for creating de-unionisation and the rise of flexible work. However, internationally oriented labour is no longer concerned with the pressures of competitiveness due to participation in the Internal Market. They argue that globalisation is a 'fact' that has undermined – 'dynamited' even – the struggle at the national level. Thus, the internationalisation of labour is defended as the only viable

strategy for struggling against globalisation and the organisation of production at the transnational level. It is argued that a 'Social Europe' has to be supported, and that globalisation has to be struggled in order to turn it to the benefit of workers' interests. It is posited that the impact of integration on the Internal Market has already been felt as a result of the Customs Union. Interviewees articulated the view that the struggle over the economic aspects of integration has already been lost with the completion of the Customs Union. Thus, they relate membership primarily to issues around social policy and democratisation. They argue that the European Social Model is progressive and will contribute to the development of social rights in Turkey. Moreover, they hold that the strong Turkish state has resulted in an underdeveloped civil society. They therefore see international actors such as the EU as progressive anchors, capable of working for the consolidation of democracy by constraining the mechanisms of the 'strong state'. European integration is also interpreted as a 'peace project' that can contribute to solutions to Turkey's problems in Cyprus, its relationship with Greece, and the Kurdish and Armenian issues.

I noted that Ha-vet is also supported by social democratic parties and Kurdish political parties. The 'emancipatory left' differentiates itself from the centre-left through its critical stance on capitalism and its opposition to membership debates conducted in relation to national concerns. This fraction aspires to unite struggles around class and identity and advocates a united struggle among the segments in society that have been disadvantaged by processes of globalisation. These political parties criticise globalisation for generating

inequality and income disparity. However - in line with other social forces within Ha-vet - they accept globalisation as a fact and articulate a struggle at the international level. Contrary to the hypothesis, I found that Kurdish political parties support membership on political grounds. For instance, whilst they interpret globalisation as a process accelerating income disparity, they argue that globalisation has the potential to decrease the isolation of the Kurdish movement. Similarly, they have developed a stance supportive of membership. They argue that whilst Turkey's eastern region is economically under-development, there is an expectation that free movement of workers and regional funds will help solve the economic problems of the region. Membership is also perceived as a democratisation process that scrutinises human rights violations in Turkey, and as a decentralising process that would constrain and shift the state power to supranational and local levels.

Most of the women's rights/feminist groups and human rights support Ha-vet as well. These groups do not take a homogenous stance critical of globalisation though there is a general tendency to perceive of globalisation negatively. In the case of women's rights/feminist groups it is argued that globalisation impoverishes women rendering their labour increasingly vulnerable to flexible forms of work. Human rights groups criticise globalisation for subjecting new spheres of public life (such as health and education) to commodification. As receiving healthcare and accessing education is a human right, they argue that globalisation violates human rights. I found that globalisation is also interpreted negatively by certain environment groups for causing environment problems. However, contrary to the expectation from the assumption, there is a

tendency among these social movements to support the political aspects of EU membership. Most of the women's rights/feminist groups and human rights groups agree that membership will improve social and human rights for minorities and women; and will engender a process of democratisation through the expansion of civil society and a reduction in the influence on the strong state and its 'military tutelage'. The EU pushes Turkey to comply with international norms and values regarding human rights, women's rights and democracy. The role of EU in helping to construct a democratic solution to the Kurdish problem is supported. Thus, the EU is read as a peace project that will contribute to solve Turkey's problems in foreign affairs.

Thus, Ha-vet's strategy cannot be seen as an overall alternative to pro-membership project. In my view, there are three problems with the strategy of Ha-vet, which show why it is incapable of transcending its economic-corporate phase presenting a universally appealing bloc. First, the critiques I made of discourse theory in chapter three can be applied: Ha-vet criticizes state but fails to contest capitalist state *per se*; and neglects to unfold mechanisms of neoliberal civil society. In this, they implicitly re-iterate the neoliberal conception of state and civil society as two separate phenomena reproducing 'common sense' understanding of the strong state. Their critique of Turkish statolatry is based on a dichotomy between the state and civil society, and an equally problematic dichotomy between politics and economics. This reading fetishes the 'strong state' and conceives of civil society as autonomous from the economy and fails to detect 'fortresses and earthworks' (Gramsci, 1971: 238) within civil society. Thus, Ha-vet's understanding further serves to

neoliberal hegemony at the ideational level. The political repercussions of this stance can be evidenced in the support given by particular social democratic forces within Ha-vet to the hegemonic alliance formed under the AKP to reform the mechanisms of the strong state as argued in chapter four. Another indicator of Ha-vet's understanding of economics and politics as separate spheres is its reading of EU as a peaceful project. It is argued that the EU is a capitalist but not an imperialist bloc. This reading equates imperialism to military intervention, abstracting its content from the material conditions of capitalist accumulation and the exploitation of peripheral countries. This reproduces a similar form of argument to social constructivism's conception of Europe as a civilian power. Social forces supporting Ha-vet needs to reconsider imperialism. As Cox reminds us, imperialism is 'a rather loose concept which in practice has to be newly defined with reference to each historical period' (Cox, 1981: 142).

Second, political parties whose social base relies on social forces within Ha-vet are yet to pass the 10% threshold in national elections. Their deputies are elected from independent lists and are incapable of forming a bloc in the Parliament. Moreover, particular social forces underpinning Ha-vet strategy – for instance women's rights/feminist groups, human rights and environment groups – are not inclined to resort to political parties as viable mechanisms to convey their interests in the political sphere. This largely stems from their alternative conception of political praxis, which is based on social movement rhetoric. A word of caution is necessary here, however: this criticism should not be taken as a claim that parliaments provide the only viable political

platforms. However, it should be noted that particular women's rights/feminist activists even underlined that women have never aspired to take power in the political sphere. This again echoes with conception of power within theory of discourse and its criticism to classical forms of seizure of power in the vanguardist sense. As highlighted by Laclau and Mouffe, 'power is not something one can seize, because power is constitutive of the ensemble of social relations' (Laclau and Mouffe, 2002: 146-147).

Third, the criticisms of globalisation made by these groups remain issue-specific. Indeed, in line with my criticisms of discourse theory's conception of structure as a hindrance to political action, these social forces remain incapable of developing a structural emancipatory project. In this sense, their criticism politicises the private sphere, but fails to critique the de-politicisation of the economy.

The neo-mercantilist strategy is supported by nationally oriented labour, Türk-İş (a confederation primarily organised in state economic enterprises), public employees, agricultural labour, and centre-left and nationalist political parties. It stands at the centre-left and on the far-right of the political spectrum. It is critical of globalisation for engendering de-industrialisation, de-unionisation and creating cuts to welfare. However, the socio-economic content of membership is received positively, with the exception of the EU's failure to recognise the free movement of workers (in contravention of the Ankara Agreement). Furthermore, membership is read as a process of modernisation

and westernisation. Thus, forces supporting this strategy have developed a policy of 'membership on equal terms and conditions', highlighting that their support is conditional on Turkey benefitting from structural funds and the free movement of workers.

Nationally oriented labour – Türk-İş, agriculture sector, public employees - is concerned with the repercussions of integrating with the Internal Market. Here, globalisation is read as a process that generates both de-unionisation and de-industrialisation for nationally oriented labour. However, nationally oriented labour is divided on the socio-economic content of membership. On the one hand, it is argued that the EU will provide protection from globalisation through the structural funds. For instance, it is posited that even agriculture has already been subjected to liberalisation in tandem with structural adjustment policies adopted in parallel with WTO and WB rules. In this view, the EU membership is to be supported as the EU - as a regional model - can provide protectionism from globalisation and contribute to develop social standards in Turkey. On the other hand, it is posited that the EU policies coincide with the policies of the WTO and the WB and will trigger further liberalisation. Furthermore, the European social model is accused of placing labour under the tutelage of capital and operating as a mechanism justifying imperialist exploitation. In this view, workers of developed and developing countries cannot cooperate as long as imperialism endures. Indeed, it is argued that conducting social policy around social partnership is testimony to the argument that European workers share surplus with European capital extracted through imperialist exploitation. Membership is not understood to be related to

democratisation, as it is believed that democracies can only be consolidated by domestic dynamics. However, nationally oriented labour adopts a unified stance in relation to national concerns, including the Cyprus problem, and the Kurdish and Armenian questions. Here, it is argued that the EU has a tendency to discriminate against Turkey and asks for unilateral concessions that would damage its national interests. Moreover, as the EU is seen as an imperialist bloc, its policies *vis-a-vis* Cyprus and Kurdish questions are understood as deliberate attempts to dismember Turkey. Thus, the nation state is articulated as a viable site for struggle against this 'dismemberment strategy' and to regain welfare achievements.

The centre-left political parties fail to propose any alternative economic model other than a form of social market economy. Indeed, both the CHP's 'social market economy' model and the DSP's 'Societal Competitive Economy' (CHP, 2007: 24-25; Türker, 2006: 3) consider increasing competitiveness in global markets as essential for economic growth, and articulate a social dimension prioritising employment, equal distribution of income and a welfare state. This is in tandem with their criticisms to globalisation centred on social policy and national interests analogous to their supportive stance towards the market economy model. Accordingly, centre-left political parties conceive of EU membership as having positive effects for both the economy and social policy. They support membership, believing it will stimulate competitiveness, increase the quality of goods and facilitate technology transfer. They also refer to the European social model and regional and structural funds in defending membership. Accordingly, their opposition is constrained to national

sensitivities and they offer conditional support to EU membership, provided it is carried out on the basis of 'equal terms and conditions'.

In my view, neo-mercantilism does not stand as an alternative. First, neo-mercantilism as a rival class strategy loses ground within globalisation. In terms of economic policy, EU membership is considered from the perspective of 'development'. Here, its ideas concerning economic and social policy echo a long defeated Keynesian welfare regime, in which the priorities are the protection of national industries, tripartism and moderate redistribution of income under the supervision of the state. It is argued that latecomer countries to the capitalist system are incapable of developing and industrialising through liberalisation and market mechanisms (Soral, 2009: 20). In this sense, structural adjustment policies and export-orientation resulting from the membership process constrain industrial development and compel Turkish industries to create a form of 'montage industry', which fails to trigger production within the national economy. Hence, the export orientation is seen to have triggered de-industrialisation rather than economic growth, and industry is left underdeveloped. Dependence upon international markets not only impedes economic development but also generates political dependence (Soral, 2009: 57). Indeed, the consolidation of the market economy in Turkey is related to the imperialist project designed to dismember Turkey (Interview No. 30 and 78).

This argument echoes the debates within the left during the 1970s between Maoists, the developmentalist school and those supportive of the strategy of

de-linking. Mao makes a distinction between the contradiction between the proletariat and the bourgeoisie, which is to be resolved by socialist revolution; and the contradiction between colonies and imperial powers, which can only be solved by national revolutionary war:

In our country, the contradiction between the working class and the national bourgeoisie belongs to the category of contradictions among the people... The national bourgeoisie differs from the imperialists, the landlords and the bureaucrat-capitalists. The contradiction between the national bourgeoisie and the working class is one between the exploiter and the exploited, and is by nature antagonistic. But in the concrete conditions of China, this antagonistic class contradiction can, if properly handled, be transformed into a non-antagonistic one and be resolved by peaceful methods. However, it will change into a contradiction between ourselves and the enemy if we do not handle it properly and do not follow the policy of uniting with, criticizing and educating the national bourgeoisie, or if the national bourgeoisie does not accept this policy of ours (1967: 56-57; see also, 1967: 50).

Thus, the neo-mercantilist strategy relies on a particular reading of imperialism, against which the nation state is seen as the platform providing protection. Yet this strategy is regressive as it overlooks the capitalist nature of the developmental state. In my view, the second reason why it fails to offer an overall alternative is the fact that although the critique is anti-imperialist, it is not anti-capitalist.

Third, analogous with Gramsci's conception of struggle that is conditioned by the international, it needs to be stressed that social forces supporting neo-mercantilism are structurally disadvantaged within the neoliberal world order. As they articulate corporatism and forming alliances with nationally oriented capital, they are further defeated by the inclusion of nationally oriented SMEs within the transnational production structure. Moreover, privatisation weakened the position of nationally oriented labour by generating de-

unionisation and unemployment. Many mass production sites operating under state economic enterprises – once state owned – have now been privatised, whilst the bulk of nationally oriented labour operates on a sub-contractual basis, often in a position of precarity. Thus, their workers cannot be organised using the classical tools of unionisation under the Fordist period, a trajectory that regrettably weakens the legitimacy of trade unions in society. Equally, there is a fraction that is co-opted to neoliberal hegemony such as in the case of processed agricultural products.

Fourth, the economic and social arguments of neo-mercantilism– such as the claim that the European social model sustains the exploitation of European imperialism inside Türk-İş - have been defeated as nationalist. Indeed, neo-mercantilism overlooks internationalism and sees labour in Europe solely as a partner in imperial exploitation. This overlooks ongoing class struggles over the European order. This defeat constrained the opposition to national interests – meaning it focuses on issues such as discrimination against Turkey regarding Cyprus, Greece, and the Kurdish and Armenian issues - and protests against privileged partnership. The opposition is centred on permanent derogations and the possibility of a privileged partnership, both of which would deny the benefits to disadvantaged groups that would be granted with full membership. In this sense, it fails to develop persuasive arguments regarding economic and social order and cannot go beyond its economic-corporatist phase in the struggle over hegemony.

The future trajectory is uncertain considering that 'hegemony is never constant but always contested' (Bieler, 2005a: 466). However, it is possible to observe particular coordinates that provide hints of future class struggle. Currently, it is the European orientation, consolidation of liberalisation and political reform process that is hegemonic. For instance, it is highlighted by interviewees from state institutions that the adoption of EU *acquis* endures independently of the process of membership. This is often debated in relation to neo-Ottomanism and the AKP's commitment to reform process without necessarily attaining membership status as an alternative (e.g. Moore and Dannreuther, 2009: 138). Yet, this is far from constituting an alternative given that the socio-economic content of reform process is identical with membership. On the contrary, it further illuminates the hegemonic status of pro-membership perspective, as the reform process and its neoliberal socio-economic content is seen as 'progressive' without Turkey needing to seek full membership status.

However, I have argued that capital might prefer to maintain the current status quo through which open trade is guaranteed by the Customs Union, but the costs associated with implementing European social standards are avoided. Indeed, internationally oriented capital has already put reserves to Turkey's compliance to European social model on the grounds of competitiveness of Turkish enterprises (Interview No. 32). This is why capital detains adaption of social *acquis* on the condition that membership would be materialised (Interview No. 34), a position that reveals that the current state of integration has fulfilled the material interests of internationally oriented capital.

Indeed, interviewees from internationally oriented capital highlighted that membership is instrumental for Turkey to be competitive in international markets and that membership perspective can be re-considered (Interview No. 64 and 65). They highlight that there are no additional economic benefits to be obtained via membership, aside from tangential gains made through participating to the decision making (Interview No. 6, 32, 63 and 64). Notably, particular members within TÜSİAD have already begun to operate transnationally by investing in European markets. This decreases their dependence on membership for providing them with material gains from the European market. Interviewees from nationally oriented capital posited that EU production has already become dependent on Turkey, suggesting that they have stabilised the delocalisation of production. In this view, options other than membership can be considered (Interview No. 7 and 22). The interviewee from TİM acknowledged that the Customs Union should be debated if Turkey does not become a member. Here, compliance to the common external tariff is particularly criticised. It is argued that the EU's free trade agreements causes asymmetrical relations and creates dependence on the European trade regime, preventing Turkey from diversifying its foreign trade with other regions (Interview No. 65). It is also believed to be unsustainable as Turkish enterprises are subjected to decisions taken at the European level without being able to participate in the decision making procedure (Interview No. 5 and 6). The SMEs are critical of dependence of trade to Europe advocating a multilateral trade regime and the adoption of strategies to diversify trade with neighbours (MÜSİAD, 2003: 65-67; MÜSİAD, 2004b: 50). An interviewee from the internationally oriented textile sector acknowledged that there is a

proposal to downgrade the Customs Union to a free trade agreement (Interview No. 64).

The economic crisis further complicates the picture. It is argued that demand for Turkish products is contracting in tandem with the economic crisis in Euro-zone, a situation that drives Turkey to develop policies seeking to diversify its foreign economic relations to incorporate alternative markets in North Africa, the Far East and China; and so decrease its trade dependence on the European market (Interview No. 63, 64 and 65). For instance, trade with the Middle East and North Africa increased five folds from 2002, reaching 20% of overall foreign trade (Interview No. 65). The interviewee from the Central Bank believes that the EU's economic crisis means that membership would be to Turkey's economic disadvantage. It was noted that participation in the Euro-zone is highly risky under the current situation as it means losing national sovereignty over monetary policy (Interview No. 23), and that Turkey complies with the Maastricht criteria in relation to price stability and inflation outside of the membership framework; thus the need for Turkey to become a member will decrease as Turkey approaches EU standards (Interview No. 23).

Similarly, the interviewee from the AKP argued that the attractiveness of membership decreases as the crisis in Euro-zone progresses (Interview No. 50). The political climate in Europe, with conservatives opposed to Turkish membership, and a rise in nationalism and xenophobia were criticised (Interview No. 36, 50 and 63). There is also the impression that the EU uses

and abuses the Cyprus problem to block Turkey's bid for membership (Interview No. 63 and 64).

An interviewee from the internationally oriented automotive trade union highlighted that welfare regimes in Europe are radically retreating as a result of the economic crisis, and that this places in doubt the potential for the European Social Model to contribute to Turkish working class (Interview No. 67). Moreover, the social forces underpinning neo-mercantilism that have given their consent to the process on the condition of benefitting from agricultural/structural funds and ensuring free movement of workers can develop a more openly critical stance in the case of a form of privileged membership.

Although there is not an overall alternative to neoliberal pro-membership perspective, resistance to globalisation and neoliberal restructuring is alive in various platforms. A few examples in the last couple of years will suffice to conclude with some optimism. The Tekel protest was decisive in providing a renewed impetus to class struggle. This occurred following privatisation of Tekel - a former state enterprise in the tobacco and alcoholic beverage sector – when workers resisted to be employed on a 4-C status (precarious employment in public sector). The protest lasted for 78 days and was supported by workers nationally and internationally. In March 2012, members of teachers' unions accused the recently adopted Education Bill of promoting child labour and Islamic schooling. The struggle of unemployed teachers – who numbered around 300.000 - who are waiting to be appointed provides another instance of

resistance against precarious employment and the commodification of services. Meanwhile, medical doctors and medical students are protesting against neoliberal transitions in the health sector. The struggle continues in the sphere of social reproduction as well. In May 2011, a group of protesters gathered to demonstrate against AKP policies and the plan to construct a hydroelectric plant in Hopa during a visit of Prime Minister Erdoğan. The police intervened using force, and Metin Lokumcu, a retired teacher, suffered a fatal heart attack as a result of a gas bomb. In the last year environmental protests have continued, over continuing environmental destruction in the construction of hydroelectric plants, commodification of water, the death of Metin Lokumcu, and the government's authoritarian stance more broadly. Very recently, protests have been organised to demonstrate against the AKP policy of privatising municipal and state theatres. The authoritarian policies of AKP rule and the capitalist state are accelerating creating social unrest. More than 100 journalists still remain in prison. The government continues to arrest Kurdish intellectuals – on terror charges including the activist and publisher Ragıp Zarakulu and Prof. Büşra Ersanlı, who was arrested for teaching on Kurdish politics in the BDP's political assembly. There was also protest against the murder of the Turkish-Armenian journalist Hrant Dink, with the court finally reaching a verdict - five years after his murder - which sentenced his murderer to life prison but failed to investigate the existence of an organised illegal organisation. This resulted in a large march with banners stating 'We are all Armenians, We are all Hrant', and protesters accusing the Government of backing down nationalist police and military forces. However, re-thinking the ways and means to overcome disagreements among different fractions is

decisive for the future prospects of an alternative to globalisation and neoliberal restructuring.

Endnotes

ⁱ The Empty Chair Crisis is engendered by De Gaulle when he protested participating to the Council meetings and blocked the decision-making process due to the proposal of Commission President Hallstein to finance the Common Agricultural Policy via European Community's own budgetary sources. The Crisis was overcome by the Luxembourg Compromise that stimulated unanimity in decision-making by safeguarding unilateral veto right over any negotiated matter if one of the member states declares that its interests are at stake (Dinan, 1994: 39-69).

ⁱⁱ The communists decided to protest the parliamentary elections and formed the abstentionist communist fraction. For Gramsci, working class should not collaborate with other classes in constitutional and parliamentary mechanisms of bourgeois democracy to reform parliamentary system. It is only a different institutional platform that can provide the working class with its autonomous development as a class and accomplish its historical function under a new state. The relations of production can only be transformed under a new state, rather than the parliamentary means (Gramsci, 1978: 32-33, 39-40).

ⁱⁱⁱ In the debate to find an adequate response to the rise of fascism, the PCI accused social democrats for their pacifism for being to the advantage of fascists. Gramsci refers to the speech of Giacomo Matteotti, who stated in the Parliament that 'We must not let ourselves be provoked, for even cowardice is a duty, an act of heroism' (Footnote 15, Gramsci, 1978: 465). Yet, according to Gramsci, fascism was not limited to a particular force. The working class was confronted with 'the whole State apparatus, with its police, its courts, its newspapers which manipulate public opinion as the government and the capitalists please' (Gramsci, 1978: 57-61).

^{iv} The term 'desocialize the material' is owned to Ellen Meiksins Wood (Wood, 1981: 70).

^v Though those Marxist studies conduct class analyses, they end up arguing for the strong state. For instance, Keyder compares pre-capitalist periods of the Ottoman Empire and European feudalism and underlines that feudal social context that engendered capitalist production in Europe was non-existent in Ottoman Empire (Keyder, 1987: 7). Keyder compares Ottoman Empire with core capitalist countries and refers to two specificities in Ottoman social formation, absence of large-scale land ownership in the agrarian structure that in return rendered position of bureaucracy unchallenged by a landed class, and the expulsion of a majority of the Christian bourgeoisie during and after World War I that dislocated class struggle and capitalist transformation. Accordingly, as the argument goes, agrarian structure and ethnically differentiated bourgeoisie are enumerated as reasons behind the lack of constitution of a capitalist state under bourgeois domination, that in return reads Kemalist regime with 'bureaucratic reformism' (Keyder, 1987: 2). This reading based on differences between pre-capitalist social formations in European feudalism and Ottoman Empire ends up with argument on "peculiar status of bureaucracy" in Turkey as a ruling class (Keyder, 1987: 77-79).

Yet, it is Heper's *The State Tradition in Turkey* (1985) that pioneers scholarly work on strong state tradition. Heper reasons existence of strong state tradition with the so-called inability of local notables to rise to a status of nobility and/or aristocracy and absence of a middle class in Turkish social setting (Heper, 1985: 101). This has rendered Turkish social setting as a strong state and weak civil society, inherited from the Ottoman Empire, and based on patriarchy, a setting that 'subdues' periphery (Heper, 1985: 14 and 16). Class as a category, it is argued, loses its explanatory power as strong state prevents development of bourgeoisie and consolidation of democracy accordingly (Heper, 1985: 98-100). Then, Heper explains absence of civil society in relation to absence of a developed 'private sector' and leading industrialists and businessmen due to the mechanisms of 'transcendental state' and bureaucracy (Heper, 1985: 102-103).

^{vi}Turkey signed five Structural Adjustment Loans Agreements with the WB between 1980 and 1984, getting 1,6 billion dollars in total. Moreover, in 1980, Turkey signed three-year IMF stand-by agreement through which Turkey was given one of the highest amount of credit. For a more detailed analysis of the financial support given by the IMF and the WB, please see Önis, Z. and Kirkpatrick, C. (1991) 'Turkey' in P. Mosley et. al. (eds.) *Aid and Power the World Bank and Policy Based Lending*, London: Routledge: 2: 9-37.

^{vii}According to Uzgel, the 28th February process was a turning point for the transformation within the National View. After 28th February process and the failure of Erbakan to stay in power, the 'Green capital' started to look for a new political party, that will not only align with globalisation but also be more cautious with the secular/statist establishments (Uzgel, 2009: 18). Yet, it is important to trace historical development of the AKP within the *Milli Görüş* (National View) that formed the basis of the Party. The *Milli Görüş* was founded by Necmettin Erbakan in 1969 and its ideas were embodied in a number of subsequently founded political parties. The Milli Nizam Partisi (MNP - National Order Party) was founded in 1970 and closed in 1971 with allegations of aiming to find a state based on Islam. Subsequently, the Milli Selamet Partisi (MSP – National Salvation Party) was founded in 1972 that was closed by 1980 military coup. As a successor, on 19 July 1983, supporters of Erbakan formed the Refah Partisi (RP - Welfare Party) without initially his formal participation. The RP got the 4,4% of votes in 1984 election; %7,1 in 1987; %9,8 in 1989 and %17 in 1991. In 1995 elections, the RP got 21,4% of votes, that rendered the RP the largest political party in the parliament with 158 seats out of 450. Erbakan formed a coalition government with the centre-right party, the Doğru Yol Partisi (DYP - True Path Party) led by Çiller in June 28, 1996 and stayed in power until July 2, 1997. Yet, February 28, 1997 silent coup forced Erbakan to resign. Analogous with that the RP was closed in 1998 and substituted by Fazilet Partisi (FP - Virtue Party). The FP was closed by a decision of the Constitutional Court in June 2001. Hitherto, the National View is represented by two political parties, the traditionalists mostly under the Saadet Partisi (SP - Felicity Party), founded on July 20, 2001 and the so-called reformists under the AKP (founded on August 14, 2001).

^{viii} Ahmet Davutoğlu is the Minister for Foreign Affairs since May 1, 2009. He has acted as chief advisor to Prime Minister Erdoğan and is well-known as the architect of the so-called 'new' foreign policy orientation. Davutoğlu articulates five principles that lies at the core of this orientation. First, Turkey should try to find a balance between security and democracy, by providing security without undermining freedoms and human rights. Second, a policy of zero-problems towards Turkey's neighbours is envisaged that aims to strenghten relations without creating fears of imperial expansion. Third, Turkey undertakes to develop relations with neighbours and in the Balkans, the Middle East, the Caucasus, Central Asia and the US, the EU and the West. Davutoğlu reasons the PKK factor and mutual negative images for the limited influence of Turkey in the region and welcomes the AKP initiatives to forge economic interdependence, state cooperation and societal links, that in return forges Turkey's influence in the Middle East. Fourth, Turkey pursues a multi-dimensional foreign policy, that conceives sustaining special relations with the US and membership objective to the EU, good neighbourhood with Russia and synchronization policy in the Euro-Asia as parts of a consistent strategy. Davutoğlu highlights that this strategy is not competitive but complementary with policies of global actors. Finally, Turkey aims to follow a 'rhythmic' diplomacy within which active involvement to international organisations and issues in international relations is pursued (Davutoğlu, 2010; Davutoğlu, 2008: 79-83). Please see Davutoğlu, A. (2001) *Stratejik Derinlik, Türkiye'nin Uluslararası Konumu [Strategic Depth, Turkey's International Position]*, İstanbul: Küre Yayınları. Davutoğlu, A. (2008) 'Turkey's Foreign Policy Vision: An Assessment of 2007', *Insight Turkey* 10, 1: 77-96. Davutoğlu, A. (2010) 'Turkey's Zero-Problems Foreign Policy', *Foreign Policy*. <http://jft-newspaper.aub.edu.lb/reserve/data/s11244/s11244.pdf>

^{ix} The automotive industry put forward three arguments. First, the decision to complete the Customs Union could be deferred in order to restore negative effects of 1994 economic crisis. Second, a transitional period was requested given that adoption of regulation regarding implementation of the Customs Union is very detailed. Third, the automotive industry resisted

free movement of second-hand motor vehicles that can be destructive and turn the domestic market into a second-hand market (Interview No. 63).

^x Letter of Rıdvan Budak, President of Tekstil-İs to President of the European Commission Rose Manuel Barrosa. <http://www.disktektstil.org/tr/?i=pages&id=334>

^{xi} For instance, Jak Kamhi was a member of ERT between 1991 and 2003, and served in the Executive Committee of the TÜSİAD. Currently, Bülent Eczacıbaşı is a member of both the TÜSİAD and the ERT. Recently, Güler Sabancı has become a member to ERT.

^{xii} In the referenda, 60% of the Northern Cypriots accepted and 75% of Greek Cypriots rejected the resolution achieved with the Annan Plan. After the referenda, the EU starts to take some measures such as providing free movement of goods, people and services in Northern Cyprus through the 'Green Line' regulation, giving financial assistance and taking initiatives for adjustment to EU legislation (TÜSİAD, 2009: 91-96). TÜSİAD well-receives these developments and highlights that potential deadlock can suspend the process, that will in return culminate in further isolation of Northern Cyprus and deterioration of economic problems (TÜSİAD, 2009: 97). Moreover, Turkey can be accused for the deadlock that can cause international sanctions and suspension of Turkey's membership process (TÜSİAD, 2009: 98).

^{xiii} Institutionally, international oriented automotive and textile industries are represented in almost all European platforms in which members from Turkey take administrative posts (Interview No. 63 and 64). For instance, TÜTSİS has four members in the Administrative Board of European Textile and Apparel Confederation (Euratex) and President of TÜTSİS, Halit Narin acts as Deputy President within Euratex (Interview No. 64).

^{xiv} OSTİM develops cooperation mechanisms on the basis of needs of SMEs such as employment, vocational training, energy, exporting, advertisement, fairs and research and development. SMEs within OSTİM formed OSTİM Investment Joint Stock Company by establishing firms each directed to solve the problems of SMEs such as international fairs, research and development and/or advertisement. For instance, OSTİM Investment Joint Stock Company built an electric power plant on its own to decrease prices of energy (Interview No. 22).

^{xv} Disk was founded in 1967 among former trade unionists within Türk-İş upon a severe criticism to the latter for being collaborative with the state and keeping an apolitical stance with reference to above-party politics (yellow trade unionism). The 1980 military coup was more reactionary towards Disk due to its former revolutionary stance and Disk was banned from 1980 to 1992. Disk defines trade unionism as a democratic and class based mass unionism that should be independent from state, capital and political authority (Disk, 2008). The Disk is a left-oriented trade union that supports leftist political parties (Interview No. 33). Yet, before 1980s, Disk was defined as a socialist union in its founding statute and this article is removed after 1992 (Interview No. 33). The Disk became a member to the European Trade Union Confederation (ETUC) in 1985, as the first member confederation from Turkey.

^{xvi} Türk-İş is the first confederation, founded in 1952 by the state under the state corporatist period of 1945 and 1961. Within the historical context of Cold War, the Türk-İş categorized trade unionism as 'evolutionary and revolutionary' and sided with the former as a model (Türk-İş, 2002a: 5). For instance, the Türk-İş from its inception has adapted a principle of 'above-party politics' underlining that party politics renders trade unions dependant to political parties (Türk-İş, 2002a: 127). Moreover, in the 1960s and 1970s, the Türk-İş supported mixed economy model within which the state planned economic development and industrialisation and set itself the goal to stimulate private sector (Türk-İş, 2002a: 123 and 203-205).

^{xvii} The international mechanisms are defended in the struggle against globalisation. For instance, trade unions in Europe collaborated with Turkish trade unions to issuing 'social responsibility declarations' which protested working standards in an international enterprise's workplace set in Turkey (Interview No. 12). Another interviewee referred to framework agreements designed to control wage policies and the application of equivalent social standards

at the global level. For instance, Birleşik Metal İş cooperates with European Metalworkers' Federation (EMF) to sign framework agreements (Interview No. 67). Yet, this mechanism cannot go beyond having a status of moral declaration as it lacks recourse to legal sanctions in cases of misconduct (Interview No. 33). Moreover, international platforms are criticised for failing to develop a concrete strategy which goes beyond organising conferences and opposing IMF programmes (Interview No. 68).

^{xviii} There are three major obstacles to unionisation in Labour Law. First, workers have to obtain a notary certificate to register to and resign from trade unions. This renders unionisation cumbersome and costly for workers. Second, a trade union has to represent at least 10% of the workers employed in the same sector to be able to participate to collective bargaining. Third, a trade union has to get support of '50% plus one' workers in the same workplace to set up a trade union. Further obstacles are raised by interviewees such as cases in courts on the grounds of fake notary certificates, legal issues surrounding whether a particular trade union is authorised to negotiate collective bargaining, and employers' insistence that they operate on another sector (Interview No. 12). One interviewee highlighted that these cases last around ten years, serving to intimidate workers and severing the organic link between workers and trade unions (Interview No. 12).

^{xix} Türk-İş' former stance was shaped around a nodal point of imperialism, which they viewed as a force impeding the internationalism of the working class movement (Interview No. 30). It is possible to come across organic links between this idea and the work of Yıldırım Koç, who acted as the Chief Advisor and responsible for International Relations of Türk-İş between 1993 and 2003. He lectures in Middle East Technical University (METU), and has published intensively. Koç contends that it would be a mistake for trade unions in Turkey to support EU membership with reference to the European social model, arguing that social standards in European countries are achievements obtained through national legislation rather than through the contributions of the European social model (Koç, 2004: 40-43). Moreover, Koç asserts that the European Social Model can only be attained through imperialist exploitation (Koç, 2006: 106). In this sense the workers of developed countries do not cooperate with workers of developing countries. Indeed, European trade unions are partnerships of imperialist exploitation that not only shares the surplus but sustains the system. Koç asserts that this partnership manifests itself through discourses of 'social partnership' or 'social dialogue' (Koç, 2006: 71). Accordingly, the ETUC is criticised as a platform unable to struggle against European capital, as most of its activities are financed by the European Commission (European capital, in other words). This is manifested in the documents of ETUC, in which it is difficult to find critical approaches to privatisation and imperialism; and there are few references to class struggle. Moreover, Koç argues that policies of the IMF and WB are shaped by US and EU countries. The EU's strategy *vis-a-vis* Turkish membership resembles the divide-and-rule strategy of the imperialist powers (Koç, 2004: 10-11; Koç, 2006: 21). That is why, for Koç, the current pro-membership perspective resembles the Independence War of the Turkish Republic, and nation-state is the institution that can resist imperialism and consolidate welfare regimes (Koç, 1998: 254).

^{xx} Türk-İş criticises the European Parliament and the political criteria at six points. First, the EU's claim that Turkey is an 'occupier' in the Republic of Cyprus is unacceptable and constitutes 'infringement of international law'. Second, the European Parliament expects Turkey to recognize the Armenian Genocide. Third, the EU policies towards minorities are criticised for triggering ethnic separatism. Fourth, the EU supports Greece regarding the problems in the Aegean Sea. Fifth, the EU reference to declare the Patriarchate as ecumenical and open the Clergy School in Heybeliada (which is seen as a War Academy central to Greek expansionism) is unacceptable. Finally, the EU supports IMF policies in Turkey (Türk-İş, 2002c).

^{xxi} The NATO and the EU agreed on 16 December 2002 on the Berlin plus arrangement that enables the EU to benefit from NATO's military assets for its crisis management operations - for those cases that the NATO declines to intervene. Turkey is the only non-EU NATO member and its position within decision making structures and missions of the European Security and Defence Policy stimulated controversy. Turkey expected equal participation in

planning, control and strategic direction of EU mission if the EU uses NATO assets. The EU objected to give a veto right to Turkey that is a non-EU member. However, Turkey blocked initiatives of the EU to provide access to NATO assets on various occasions. Turkey's major concern stems from a probable EU mission regarding its conflict with the Republic of Cyprus and bilateral disputes with Greece. At the Brussels European Council of 2002, the EU endorsed Ankara Document to eliminate Turkey's veto on ESDP-NATO cooperation. Turkey was given an assurance that ESDP missions would not be directed to an ally and cooperation with Turkey will be provided for ESDP missions.

^{xxii} For instance, the CHP did not support the Annan Plan, arguing that if Greek Cypriots became members in the name of the whole island, the Turkish armed forces would have the *de facto* status of an occupying force in EU territories (CHP, 2006: 16). There were four primary reasons for CHP's objection to the Annan Plan. First, although the UN made three amendments following Greek Cypriot concerns, there were no amendments resulting from the claims of the Turkish side. Second, the script was not publicised fully before the referenda took place. Third, the accord was proposed for referenda before Governments had reached an agreement. Finally, Kofi Annan used his initiative to fill the gaps about disagreements (Interview No. 58). Similarly, the CHP also opposes the AKP Government's initiative to extend the Customs Union to Cyprus and eliminate the isolation of Greek Cypriots (CHP, 2006: 448). It is highlighted that extending the Customs Union to Cyprus would mean recognising Greek Cypriots as representative of the island (CHP, 2006: 233 and 438).

The DSP published a booklet *Ecevit, Cyprus and Reality About Helsinki in Turkey's EU Membership Process* highlighting that – contrary to accusations which alleged that the Ecevit Government made concessions against the national interest during the Helsinki negotiations – the Helsinki European Council envisages an unconditional candidacy process for Turkey on equal terms and conditions, and that DSP won a guarantee that issues concerning Cyprus would not be put forward as a precondition for membership (DSP, 2004: 19). There were two issues arising before the Helsinki Summit, and Ecevit received a guarantee letter from the then President of Council of Ministers, Prime Minister of Finland Lipponen. This stated that Turkey does not have to take its problems with Greece in the Aegean Sea to the International Court of Justice if both sides cannot reach a political solution by 2004 (DSP, 2004: 32); and that Turkey is accepted as a candidate country on equal terms and conditions without any additional preconditions including a political solution for the Cyprus problem. Moreover, Ecevit underlined continuities in Turkish policy, which recognises the existence of two separate, equal and independent states in Cyprus, and stated that the accession of Greek Cyprus in the name of the entire island is unacceptable for Turkey. Moreover, if Greek Cyprus became a member, Turkey has stated that it will further integrate with the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus (DSP, 2004: 33). It is underlined that the existence of Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus is decisive not only for the security of Turkish Cypriot society but also the security of Turkey and the Mediterranean (DSP, 2004: 135).

^{xxiii} Ka-der is a member of the European Women's Lobby, and benefits from international mechanisms enabling groups to lobby Brussels to put pressure on national governments to enact reforms in favour of women (Interview No. 25). Ka-der's Ankara branch runs the secretariat of the Turkish Coordination of the European Women's Lobby (Interview No. 26), whilst the Capital City's Platform is a part of the Executive Board of the same group (Interview No. 29). In a similar way, the İHD has a regular exchange of ideas with European institutions within the European Parliament – especially the European Commission (Interview No. 19).

^{xxiv} The Progressive Women Association (İKD) was founded by the initiative of Turkish Communist Party (TKP) and was active between 1975 and 1980. It had 15,000 members in thirty-three branches in İstanbul and Anatolia before it was banned by the military in 1979. Within the context of 1970s, emancipation of women was conceived within labour struggle and overthrow of the capitalist system (Interview No. 16). Yet, at the second phase of feminist struggle after 1980s, women activists questioned subordination of women problems within working class struggle. It is highlighted that women activists subscribe to the argument that women problems go beyond economy (Interview No. 18) and that Marxism had to be saved from defining exploitation on class basis and economic order (Interview No. 77). An interviewee

highlights that 'she divorced from Marxism' as 'sexual hierarchy is as important as class hierarchy' (Interview No. 18). Classical interpretations of Marxism ignored exploitation of women in gender relations (Interview No. 77). In that sense, former relations within working class politics are criticised. First, it is accused to operate within hierarchical structures and to fail to acknowledge autonomy of feminism and human rights in the political sphere (Interview No. 77). In that sense, feminism represents a rupture to not only define women as a subject of and an agent in politics but also to define main contradiction for feminism as 'gender equality', based on exploitation and oppression of women (Interview No. 77). Second, it is argued that women struggle within working class struggle under the former İKD confined women question to problems of women workers and wives of workers, which in return turned a blind eye to problems of peasant, middle-class and/or bourgeois women. On the contrary, 'plural' conception of women problems, embracing all women that were previously externalised, such as middle classes, lower classes, Kurdish women, religious women, heterosexuals and Marxist feminists are welcomed (Interview No. 77).

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- 3) President of HAK-İŞ since 1995, former General Secretary for Education in HAK-İŞ (1980-1995); Ankara, 29 January 2008 (Author and Prof. Dr. Mustafa Türkeş)
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 - 7) Deputy Secretary General and Coordinator to EU Affairs, Association of Independent Industrialists and Businessmen (MÜSİAD); İstanbul, 12 April 2010.
 - 8) Deputy Secretary General, Association of Independent Industrialists and Businessmen (MÜSİAD); İstanbul, 12 April 2010.
 - 9) President, *Textile Trade Union (TEKSTİL-İŞ)*, and former President of DİSK (1994-1999) and former Deputy from Democratic Left Party (DSP); İstanbul, 13 April 2010.
 - 10) Former President of Ka-Der; İstanbul, 14 April 2010
 - 11) Chair of Industry, Services and Agriculture Committee, *Turkish Industrialists' and Businessmen's Association (TÜSİAD)* and Vice President of Kibar Holding; İstanbul, 19 April 2010.
 - 12) President of *Confederation of Progressive Trade Unions of Turkey (DİSK)* since 2000; İstanbul, 20 April 2010.
 - 13) Deputy Secretary General, İstanbul Chamber of Industry; İstanbul, 20 April 2010.
 - 14) Deputy Manager, Department of the European Union and Foreign Affairs, İstanbul Chamber of Industry; İstanbul, 20 April 2010.
 - 15) Member of Executive Committee, Ka-der; İstanbul, 21 April 2010.

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 - 17) President of CYDD (Association for Modern Living); İstanbul, 22 April 2010.
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 - 19) President of Human Rights Association (İHD); Ankara, 27 April 2010.
 - 20) President of MAZLUMDER; Ankara, 27 April 2010.
 - 21) Head of Department of EU and Foreign Relations, KOSGEB; Ankara, 29 April 2010.
 - 22) Secretary General, *OSTİM Industrial Zone*; Ankara, 29 April 2010.
 - 23) Director of Research and Currency Policy, Central Bank of Turkey; Ankara, 30 April 2010.
 - 24) EU Coordination Department, Ministry of Labour and Social Security; Ankara, 3 May 2010.
 - 25) Member of Consultation Board of Ka-der and Member of Executive Committee of European Women' Lobby; Ankara, 4 May 2010.
 - 26) Member of Ka-der and European Women's Lobby (EWL) Coordinator for Turkey; Ankara, 4 May 2010.
 - 27) Member of Parliament from Peace and Democracy Party; Ankara, 5 May 2010.
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- 32) Specialist, Research, Education and Foreign Affairs, *Turkish Confederation of Employer Associations (TİSK)*; Ankara, 10 May 2010.
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- 34) Expert, Directorate of Research, TÜRK-İŞ; Ankara, 10 May 2010.
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- 46) General Education Secretary, Real Trade Union for Workers in Food and Tobacco and Beverages Industry (Öz Gıda İş - affiliated to Hak-İs); Ankara, 16 December 2010.
- 47) President, Tarım Orman-İş (Agriculture and Forestry Union, affiliated to Birleşik Kamu-İş – Union of United Public Workers); Ankara, 17 December 2010.
- 48) President, Türk Tarım Orman-Sen (Union of Public Employees in Agriculture and Forestry of Turkey, affiliated to Türk Kamu-Sen – Confederation of Unions of Public Employees of Turkey) and General

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- Secretary for Foreign Affairs, Confederation of Unions of Public Employees of Turkey; Ankara, 20 December 2010.
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- 50) Co-founder, Board Member and Deputy Chairman (Administrative and Financial Affairs), Justice and Development Party; Ankara, 22 December 2010.
- 51) Deputy Chairman Responsible for Elections and Legal Affairs, Republican People's Party; Ankara, 22 December 2010.
- 52) International Relations Expert, Eğitim Sen (Education and Science Workers' Union - affiliated to KESK Confederation of Public Employees Trade Unions); Ankara, 23 December 2010.
- 53) President of Board of Directors Central Union, Agricultural Credit Cooperatives of Turkey; Ankara, 23 December 2010.
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- 58) Deputy Chairman between 2003 and 2010, Republican People's Party; Ankara, 29 December 2010.
- 59) Deputy of Izmir and Deputy Chairman of the National Movement Party Group (MHP) at the Parliament; Ankara, 30 December 2010.
- 60) Coordinator and Member of Foreign Affairs Commission, Peace and Democracy Party (BDP); Ankara, 30 December 2010.
- 61) Secretary for Press and Public Relations, Memur-Sen (Confederation of Public Servants Trade Unions); Ankara, 30 December 2010.
- 62) President, Economic Development Foundation; İstanbul, 5 January 2011.
- 63) General Secretary, Automotive Manufacturers Association; İstanbul, 7 January 2011.
- 64) Expert, Statistics and Research, Turkish Textile Employers' Association; İstanbul, 7 January 2011.
- 65) Deputy Director General, Turkish Exporters Assembly (TIM); Istanbul, 10 January 2011.
- 66) President, Türk Eğitim-Sen (Education Union of Turkey affiliated with Confederation of Unions of Public Employees of Turkey); Telephone Interview, 10 January 2011.

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- 67) President, Birleşik Metal İş (United Metal Workers' Union affiliated with the Disk); İstanbul, 11 January 2011.
- 68) Former President of Confederation of Public Employees Trade Unions (KESK); İstanbul, 11 January 2011.
- 69) Socialist Feminist Collective; İstanbul, 11 January 2011.
- 70) Project Coordinator, Helsinki Citizens Assembly; İstanbul, 12 January 2011.
- 71) Project Coordinator, Helsinki Citizens Assembly; İstanbul, 12 January 2011.
- 72) Deputy Secretary General, Women Entrepreneurs Association of Turkey; İstanbul, 13 January 2011.
- 73) Campaigns Unit-Head, Green Peace Mediterranean; İstanbul, 13 January 2011.
- 74) Assistant of Campaign for Climate and Energy, Green Peace Mediterranean; İstanbul, 13 January 2011.
- 75) Deputy Chairman Responsible for Administration and Finance, Republican People's Party; İstanbul, 14 January 2011.
- 76) Founding Member, Program Director of Good Governance, Turkish Economic and Social Studies Foundation (TESEV); İstanbul, 14 January 2011.

77) Women Activist, Scholar and Codirector of Women`s Studies and Implementation Centre of İstanbul University; İstanbul, 12 January 2011.

78) International Relations Expert, Turkish Forestry-Soil Water, Agriculture and Agricultural Workers Trade Union (Tarım-İş); Ankara, 17 January 2011.

79) President of Kamer; London, 10 February 2011.

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