

**THE PURSUIT OF POWER AND SECURITY**  
**THE INFLUENCE OF NATURAL RESOURCES AND GEOGRAPHY ON**  
**ATHENIAN FOREIGN POLICY**

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# ABSTRACT

The aim of this thesis is to define and explore the role of natural resources and the strategic value of geography for Athenian foreign policy, focussing particularly on the fifth and fourth centuries. In spite of the established position of natural resources in studies of Greek economic and political history, there remains no comprehensive treatment of the interrelationship between natural resources and the formulation of Athenian foreign policy. The thesis exploits the approaches established by previous scholarship, advances in epigraphy, modern studies of geography and classical philology to examine these two aspects, focussing primarily on the role of timber, grain, precious metals, red ochre, sea-routes and islands within Athenian foreign policy.

Chapter One examines the above resources, always with an eye on their strategic utility for the Athenian state, and identifies a number of regions of Athenian interest. Chapter Two explores the public political discourse within the Athenian polity regarding the nexus between strategic natural resources and foreign policy. Chapter Three continues this theme, considering acquisition through war and diplomacy as methods of access to natural resources. Chapter Four focuses on the ways in which Athens ensured that the necessary cargo did reach safely its harbours. Chapter Five shifts emphasis from natural resources to geography and strategy. Taking Rhodes as a case study it aims to explain how these elements affected the way in which natural resources came into Athens and what this could mean to foreign policy. Chapter Six puts together the various factors discussed in the previous chapters, and examines them within a set period of time.

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# Table of Contents

LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS .....	IV
TABLE OF FIGURES .....	VI
INTRODUCTION .....	1
1. STRATEGIC NATURAL RESOURCES.....	24
1.1 Timber, Grain, Precious Metals & Ochre.....	24
2. STRATEGIC NATURAL RESOURCES AND ATHENIAN POLITICAL DISCOURSE.....	60
2.1 Speeches in Historians .....	62
2.2 Fourth-Century Assembly Speeches .....	74
2.3 Other evidence of Athenian deliberation concerning natural resources.....	87
3. METHODS OF ACCESS TO NATURAL RESOURCES.....	107
3.1 Philosophy of acquisition: quest for <i>autarkeia</i> and <i>autonomia</i> .....	107
3.2 Coercive diplomacy .....	111
3.3 Peaceful diplomacy .....	134
4. PROTECTION POLICIES .....	154
4.1 Dangers related to trading resources .....	156
4.2 International treaties: <i>synthekai</i> and <i>symbola</i> .....	159
4.3 Security in harbour and at sea .....	172
4.4 Athenian Legislation.....	179
4.5 Security in Athens .....	189
5. STRATEGY, GEOGRAPHY, & TRADE .....	198
5.1 Mapping the Aegean.....	199
5.2 The case of Rhodes .....	211
6. NATURAL RESOURCES AS HISTORICAL EVIDENCE.....	239
6.1 Claiming Amphipolis.....	241
6.2 Claiming the Chersonese.....	247
6.3 Athens in Keos .....	253
CONCLUSION .....	260
BIBLIOGRAPHY .....	269



## List of Abbreviations

ATL	Meritt, B. D., Wade-Gery, H. T., & McGregor, M. F. (1939-1953). <i>The Athenian Tribute Lists</i> , 4 Vols. Princeton – Harvard.
AV	Austin, M., & Vital-Naquet, P. (1977). <i>Economic and Social History of Ancient Greece: An Introduction</i> . Berkeley - Los Angeles.
CAH	<i>Cambridge Ancient History</i> . (1961). 2 <sup>nd</sup> Edn. Cambridge.
Clara Rhodos	Maiuri, A; Jacopi, G; Laurenzi, L, (Eds). (1928-1941). <i>Studi e materiali pubblicati a cura dell' Istituto storico-archeologico di Rodi</i> . 10 vols. Rhodes.
EM	Epigraphical Museum, Athens.
FGrH	Jacoby, F. (Ed.). (1923-1958). <i>Die Fragmente der griechischen Historiker</i> , Berlin.
IG I <sup>3</sup>	Lewis, D. et al (Eds.), (1981-1998). <i>Inscriptiones Graecae: Inscriptiones Atticae Euclidis anno Antiores</i> , (3 <sup>rd</sup> edn). Berlin.
IG II <sup>2</sup>	Kirchner, J. (1913-1940), (Ed.), <i>Inscriptiones Graecae: Inscriptiones Atticae Euclidis anno Posteriores</i> , (2 <sup>nd</sup> edn.), Berlin.
IG XII	Hiller von Gaertringen, F., (Ed.). (1895), <i>Inscriptiones Graecae</i> , XII. <i>Inscriptiones insularum maris Aegaei praeter Delum</i> , fasc. 1. <i>Inscriptiones Rhodi, Chalces, Carpathi cum Saro, Cusi</i> , Berlin.
IOSPE	Latyshev, V. (Ed.). (1885-1901), <i>Inscriptiones Antiquae Orae Septentrionalis Pontis Euxini Graecae et Latinae</i> , Leningrad.
Lindos II	Blinkenberg, C. (Ed.). <i>Lindos. Fouilles et recherches, 1902-1914. Vol. II, Inscriptions</i> , Copenhagen – Berlin.
ML	Meiggs, R., & Lewis, D. (1988, revised edition), <i>A Selection of Greek Historical Inscriptions to the end of the Fifth Century B.C.</i> Oxford.

RO	Rhodes, P. J. & Osborne, R., (2003). <i>Greek Historical Inscriptions 403-323 BC</i> . Oxford.
SEG	<i>Supplementum Epigraphicum Graecum</i> . (1923-), Amsterdam.
Syll <sup>3</sup>	<i>Sylloge Inscriptionum Graecarum</i> , (1915-24), 3 <sup>rd</sup> Edn. Leipzig.
Tod II	Tod, M. N., (1948), <i>A Selection of Greek Historical Inscriptions, 403-323 B.C</i> , ii, Oxford.

## Table of Figures

Figure 1. Greece and the Aegean.....	vii
Figure 2. Summer winds in the Aegean Sea .....	214
Figure 3. Anti-clockwise movement of currents and the inflow from the Atlantic .....	215
Figure 4. Summer Currents in the Aegean and Eastern Adriatic seas.....	216
Figure 5. Rhodes between the areas of grain production and distribution in the Eastern Mediterranean and Black Sea .....	220



Figure 1. Greece and the Aegean.

# Introduction

Perhaps one of the best examples that illustrates the way the ancients understood the connection between warfare and resources comes from republican Rome. It is called the Fabian strategy, named after Quintus Fabius Maximus Verrucosus, the dictator general given the task of defeating Hannibal, whose outstanding strategies had annihilated the Roman army in the battle of Trevia and Lake Trasimene. Fabius looked around and saw the geography, population, and resources of Rome compared with those of Hannibal. He realised that there was no reason to offer him another pitched battle. Instead, he adopted a strategy of wearing down his opponent through a war of attrition. Fabius ordered his men to harass the Carthaginians through skirmishes, disrupt supply and affect morale. In this way, Hannibal would be deprived of victories that would give him hope and lure cities to his side. Eventually, the cost of maintaining a large mercenary force far away from his supply lines would wear Hannibal down. Time was on Rome's side.<sup>1</sup>

Fabius' strategy was a military success but a political disaster, as his tactics were unpopular with the Roman populace and the Senate, who wanted a clear-cut, honourable and shameless victory. This led to Fabius' removal from command. His replacement experienced the debacle of Cannae, which in turn taught the Romans that Fabius' strategy was the only feasible method to follow if they wanted to get rid of Hannibal.

Pericles was faced with a similar problem in the Peloponnesian War. Sparta threatened local agriculture and offered pitch battle in an attempt to force a swift end to the war. He refused to give one and instead, Pericles supported a strategy that aimed to cover losses from local agriculture by controlling maritime movement and to refuse accepting any

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<sup>1</sup> Polybios 3.87, 89, 93, 94, 103, 105.

pitch battle. Far from being impeccable, this strategy had its own pitfalls, which led the Athenian populace, inflicted by the epidemic, to repeat the pattern and deprive Pericles of his generalship, only to reinstate him as *strategos* shortly after.<sup>2</sup>

Two points are immediately apparent from these two examples. First, natural resources played an important part in strategy for both defensive and offensive purposes. Despite the enormous sufferings created by the Fabian and Periclean strategy, both Athenians and Romans were ultimately willing to adopt such a policy. Second, these decisions are the result of political deliberation. They provide a portrait of the weight allotted to natural resources within broader discussion of foreign policy. But what constitutes natural resources as strategic and how are they related to foreign policy?

Natural resources are an important contribution to the dynamics of foreign policy, because they acquire significance as strategic resources. For example, it is a practical issue to have access to specific types of timber deemed necessary to operate and build ships for the maintenance of Athenian power and, as in the case of grain, it is tied with the concept of vulnerability and sensitivity. This combination, along with the unequal distribution of natural resources across the Mediterranean, is what makes them a strategic resource. There is, of course, no consensus on which resources are regarded as strategic; that largely depends on a country's resource base (though we do not know the base capacity of Greek states). A strategic resource is then an indispensable source for important civilian (in times of peace) and military (in times of war) needs.

Another point this thesis wishes to make is that the value placed upon a resource was/is also a social construction. A resource is rendered valuable by people themselves, owing to evidence that proves it an instrument of policy and self-preservation. Had this

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<sup>2</sup> Recently, Platias and Koliopoulos, 2006, 98-99, 104, 119-120, 138 reject the various criticisms because the Athenians remained true to the larger Periclean strategy, and only departed from it in 415, and that was what caused their final defeat. For Thucydides's critics, Kagan, 1995, 54, 61-62, 83; Strauss and Ober, 1990, 47; Knight, 1970, 150-160; De Wet, 1969, 103-119; Delbrück, 1920, 137.

specific value not been placed upon such resources, they would have remained insignificant. For example, timber represents an important resource for making ships, but is not necessarily important to a state. Before the 490s', the Athenians did not need timber. But the war against Aegina persuaded the Athenians to invest the newly-discovered Laurion silver in the construction of 200 warships, enabling Athens to become a naval power.<sup>3</sup> For the Romans too, naval power was unimportant, until they were faced with the powerful Carthaginian fleet. This pushed people to reassess the importance of timber as a resource of war (ἐπεβάλοντο ναυπηγεῖσθαι σκάφη...οὐδέποτε ποιησάμενοι τῆς θαλάττης).<sup>4</sup>

Furthermore, resources carry with them a national attribute and can influence how other states view a region. Perhaps most apparent is the name of the Greek city Krithote, "barley town". Similarly, other Greek cities depicted their native resources on coins, such as ears of barley (Metapontum) and horses (Thessaly).<sup>5</sup> Some resources were very widely distributed, others could be found in a number of regions (e.g. grain in Egypt, Black Sea, Sicily etc) and others were restricted to a few areas (e.g. gold largely restricted to Thrace). As certain natural resources assumed a strategic role in Mediterranean politics, those in possession of them, such as the Macedonian and Bosporan kings incorporated natural resources into their foreign policy agenda to gain prestige, money and other benefactions from those who needed them most. A state then can consider an important resource that lies in its territory as a strategic national asset. In addition, the sale of resources raises state revenues, whilst the geographical fragmentation of natural resources categorises states into haves and have-nots. At the same time, however, important natural resources could become a curse, as other cities with enough power might want to take possession of these resources for themselves (e.g. Athenian intervention in Thasos and Keos).

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<sup>3</sup> Herodotos 7.144.

<sup>4</sup> Polybios 1.20.9-15.

<sup>5</sup> Kraay, 1976, 115-118, 179, 194.

In conclusion, natural resources become a foreign policy issue. Resources and their relation to geography financed and motivated war, and shaped strategies of power based on the specific value placed upon certain natural resources. At the same time, natural resources were an instrument of foreign policy that allowed Athens and other Greek states to utilise it in pursuit or defence of their national interests.

This is an opportune time for a study of natural resources in ancient Athenian foreign policy, since there have been many studies of particular issues in recent years, but no overall synthesis. Meiggs in his seminal study *Trees and Timber in the Ancient Mediterranean World* studied the supply and demand of timber in the ancient eastern Mediterranean world, discussing a variety of problems and uses, from problems of trade and deforestation to its use for military purposes. Several pages are devoted to Athens and its naval thalassocracy. Meiggs stressed the enormous amount of timber materials required by Athens to support its empire and considered several questions regarding Athenian timber supply and ship construction that ensured the maintenance and continual growth of the fleet.<sup>6</sup> This was followed by Borza's well written article "Timber and Politics in the Ancient World: Macedon and the Greeks".<sup>7</sup> Having discussed a wealth of material concerning one of Athens' timber suppliers, Borza tentatively concluded that Greeks did not stock surpluses of strategic materials because Greeks did not think about long-range planning. More recently, the Danish Research Foundation Centre for Black Sea Studies has concentrated on the northern and southern Black Sea coasts. The result is Hannestad's article on timber as a trade resource of the Black Sea, remarking on its usefulness in house building, temple building, and even as a luxury.<sup>8</sup> This has been accompanied by Andrianou's work on the furniture of Greek houses and tombs.<sup>9</sup> These works give a good overview of the timber

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<sup>6</sup> Meiggs, 1982.

<sup>7</sup> Borza, 1987.

<sup>8</sup> Hannestad, 2007.

<sup>9</sup> Andrianou, 2009.



resources of the Mediterranean and the trade that surrounded this commodity.

The other commodity which enjoys extensive scholarly discussion is grain. Over the past thirty years, questions regarding the Athenian supply of grain have become one of the most widely studied and debated areas of the classical world.<sup>10</sup> One such problem is whether grain import figures, and especially Demosthenes' 400,000 *medimnoi*, which according to him, equalled only half the amount of total imports, represent a typical annual shipment or an exceptional level from a particular year. Garnsey chooses to downplay this piece of evidence, since the speech allows no true figures to be derived for the grain imported from outside the Black Sea.<sup>11</sup> Moreno, on other hand, believes that the figures represent something close to reality. His argument is based on two things: first, the figures presented by Demosthenes and other sources give an average of about 300,000 *medimnoi* shipped yearly from Leukon's territory, and seem to be consistent;<sup>12</sup> second, Demosthenes references public records in his quotation of the amount of grain that came to Athens from Leukon.<sup>13</sup>

Part of this development sprang from an attempt to estimate the population of Athens by calculating how much grain Attica was capable of producing each year and how much grain the average Athenian consumed. The evidence is controversial as the surviving data is insufficient to draw undisputable results concerning population size, grain import, and food production. Literary evidence says little about fifth-century imports though it makes clear how detrimental the loss of this supply was to Athens;<sup>14</sup> nonetheless, there is

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<sup>10</sup> Oliver, 2007, 14-47; Moreno, 2007a, 3-32; Keen, 2000; Stroud 1998; Whitby, 1998; Garnsey, 1985, 62-75; Foxhall and Forbes, 1982, 41-90; Starr, 1977, 152-156; Noonan, 1973, 231-242; Grundy, 1948, 67-69; Gomme, 1933, 28-33.

<sup>11</sup> Garnsey, 1998, 97; 1985, 72-74. For relevant measures see, Moreno, 2007a, Appendix 1; Casson, 1995, 172.

<sup>12</sup> Strabo 7.4.6; Demosthenes 20.29-31, 33. Moreno, 2007b, 69-70; Whitby, 1998, 124-125.

<sup>13</sup> Demosthenes 20.31-32; [Aristotle] *Athēnaion Politeia* 51.3; Figueira, 1986: the superintenders (*epimelētai*) of the *emporion* required merchants to take two-thirds of the imported grain up to the Athenian marketplace, while the remaining one-third to stay in the Piraeus. Five guardians of the public grain supply (*sitophylakes*) were assigned to Athens and five to the Piraeus. At the time of *Athēnaion Politeia* their numbers increased to twenty and fifteen respectively.

<sup>14</sup> IG I<sup>3</sup> 78. Loss of supply: Xenophon *Hellenica* 2.2.1-10; 5.1.28-29, 4.60.1. Theopompos and Philochoros in Didymos *On the Chersonese* col. 10.49-62 in Harding, 2006.

more to say about Athenian dependence on imported grain in the fourth century.<sup>15</sup> For this reason there is no scholarly consensus about whether Athens was heavily dependent on imported grain in the fifth century, and whether this came from the Black Sea, the most widely attested source of Athenian grain imports. Garnsey published extensively on the problem of the grain supply, its volume and its overall importance to the Athenian policy and his model inspired others to explore the issue further.<sup>16</sup>

From the discussion over Athenian grain needs, a number of questions arose with regards to the importance of the Hellespontine route in Athenian foreign policy. Garnsey, producing a new set of demographic and grain-import figures, chose to diminish its importance, and argued more generally that Athens' reliance on imported grain had long been overstated, and that imperialism is only one response among many to which the Athenians turned to solve food supply problems (e.g., diplomacy, trade, incentive, and regulation).<sup>17</sup> Keen and Whitby acknowledged that we should not overemphasise the extent of Athenian grain needs, but insisted on the fact that grain and consequently, the Hellespont played an important part in Athenian foreign policy.<sup>18</sup> Braund recognised the importance of the Hellespont, but considered alternative routes.<sup>19</sup> Earlier, Bloedow argued that Corinth, which had only a slightly smaller population density than Athens and relied just as heavily on imported grain in the fifth century as Athens, but which did not turn to imperialism to procure its grain, proves that the need for grain was not the cause of Athenian imperialism.<sup>20</sup> The major problem with this interpretation is that any attempt to estimate Athens' and Corinth's territory, population, and cultivable land is hindered by the lack of precise and detailed evidence. Hence, we cannot take seriously Bloedow's argument from analogy. Finally, two notable monographs that came out in 2007 treat thoroughly Athens'

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<sup>15</sup> *IG* II<sup>2</sup> 1672; *Tod* II 196; *Demosthenes* 20.31-33.

<sup>16</sup> Garnsey, 1992; 1989; 1988; 1985.

<sup>17</sup> Garnsey, 1988, 117-144; 1985, 62-75.

<sup>18</sup> Keen, 2000; Whitby, 1998.

<sup>19</sup> Braund, 2007.

<sup>20</sup> Bloedow, 1975.

grain supply and offer new insights into the discussion. Moreno's *Feeding the Democracy: The Athenian Grain Supply in the Fifth and Fourth Centuries* re-examined the debate on the volume of Athens' grain trade. He argued for a model of insufficiency by examining production in the deme Euonymon, Euboea and the Bosporan Kingdom. To cover its fifth-century needs on imported grain, Athens looked for cleruchic lands, especially Euboea; whereas in the fourth century the main supplier was the Bosporan Kingdom. The latter presented new difficulties as it was a faraway place ruled by foreign dynasties. This difficulty was overcome by vigorous diplomacy between the Spartacids and the political elite controlling Athens' food supply.<sup>21</sup> Oliver's *War, Food, and Politics in Early Hellenistic Athens* shifts focus to the grain produced in the Attic territory in the years following Alexander's death. He rightly stressed that early Hellenistic Athens still faced problems in its food supply. Under Macedonian rule, Athens was deprived of the Piraeus, the navy and part of its territory. These three elements were crucial to its food supply. To compensate for these losses, the Athenians concentrated their efforts on producing grain in Attica and defending the countryside. Oliver, however, downplayed Demosthenes' reference to yearly 400,000 *medimnoi* of imports from the Pontus as an irregular and not a yearly-recurring shipment.<sup>22</sup> There is no right or wrong answer, but in light of Moreno's forceful arguments and unpredictable weather conditions, bad crop years, and war,<sup>23</sup> I am inclined to support Moreno's view of a more regular shipment. What I find important in Oliver's work is that the Athenians continued to find ways to ensure provisions of grain by upgrading their military capabilities, their institutions (*sitonia*), and maintaining links with friendly rulers and benefactors abroad. Overall, grain-supply is a requirement on which scholars build explanations of Athenian overseas involvements.

Aside from this most recent development, discussion of natural resources in Athenian

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<sup>21</sup> Moreno, 2007.

<sup>22</sup> Oliver, 2007, 20-21.

<sup>23</sup> Aristotle *Meteorologica* 2.4. Osborne, 1987, 27, 33; Garnsey, 1985, 104-105; Camp, 1982, 9-17.

foreign policy usually comes second to economic issues. Millett drew the conclusion that Greeks saw warfare as a potentially profitable enterprise.<sup>24</sup> Hunt, on the other hand, influenced by ancient authors that notice the notion of wealth through peace suggested that fourth-century Athenian wars were costly rather than materially beneficial.<sup>25</sup> This is occasionally called the “balance sheet” technique, where the costs of a campaign are compared with the profits from war. The profitability of a war can define its success.<sup>26</sup> Both scholars, nevertheless, support the argument that material results were instrumental as a driving force of foreign policy. Others, notably Garlan and Finley, stressed the material results of Greek warfare with a Marxian and Weberian materialist view respectively.<sup>27</sup> Garlan turned to Plato and Aristotle, who both highlight the limits of internal production that inevitably lead to violent resolution.<sup>28</sup> Finley acknowledged that various motives influence warfare, but emphasised the economic ones: “the hard fact remains that successful ancient wars produced profits and that ancient political leaders were fully aware of that possibility”.<sup>29</sup> Finley however, evaluated Athenian actions not in terms of economic behaviour, but as an instrument of power for political control.<sup>30</sup>

The work of Finley has attracted considerable debate as regards to his theoretical framework of understanding the economy of Ancient Greece. Studies in the role of governmental intervention and involvement in the trade of ancient commodities suggest, at the very least, that the Greeks were aware of economic realities when it comes down to amount and forms of polis intervention in the trade of commodities.<sup>31</sup> Although the opposition is right to stress Finley’s weaknesses, the focus in recent scholarship has been to study natural resources in terms of economy and not of foreign policy. Finley was right to

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<sup>24</sup> Millett, 1995, 184.

<sup>25</sup> Hunt, 2010, 33.

<sup>26</sup> Pritchett, 1991, 485-504.

<sup>27</sup> Garlan, 1989; Finley, 1985 and 1978.

<sup>28</sup> Garlan, 1989, 31.

<sup>29</sup> Finley, 1985, 74-76.

<sup>30</sup> Finley, 1982, 41-61.

<sup>31</sup> Bissa 2009; Reed, 2003; Engen, 2010; Finley, 1982, 41-61.

stress (as far as Athens is concerned) that the interest of Greek city-states in trade was limited by political concerns to ensure the adequate supply of consumable goods, war materials, and revenue that were geared towards war. Without consciously pursuing this theory, it will become evident in this thesis that I am in agreement with Finley's political explanation. Athens became a dominant power by procuring the necessary foreign supplies. Once there, Athens was slave to the Greek notion of hegemonial war; whose characteristic feature was political domination by all means necessary to secure all those advantages of prosperity. Before him, Hasebroek had argued that domination provided opportunity for enrichment by exploiting trade for revenue purposes and the utilisation of trade to secure the provision of food. There has been a long discussion on the topic, but I am only interested in the role of natural resources for the formation of foreign policy. Even Finley and Hasebroek, who took a very restricted view of the involvement of ancient states in economic activities, acknowledged the involvement of states in the provision of certain resources; this thesis wishes to build on this acknowledgement and examine it thoroughly.

Bissa's *Governmental Intervention in Foreign Trade in Archaic and Classical Greece* studied the state's involvement in the exploitation, production, and trade of four specific commodities – silver and gold, timber, and grain. Her investigation stressed the role not just of poleis but also of other forms of government. Several pages are devoted to Athens and its silver industry, to Macedonia and its trade of timber, and there is an interesting analysis of the provenance of coins in hoards discovered in Asia Minor. The latter is a welcomed addition to the study of governmental control of currency. Bissa concluded that governments did intervene in foreign trade and that state intervention depended on the kind of polity in question. That is, eastern kingdoms and poleis behaved differently on the control, production and export of goods. But Bissa is interested in such interventions only insofar as they pertain to the internal history of certain governments and the connection

between politics and economy. This dissertation uses Bissa's work as a first step to study the interconnection of resources in Athens' state policy, and expands it to argue for the influence of specific strategic natural resources on Athenian foreign policy in the fifth and fourth centuries. This will allow us to explain both the nature and objectives of Athenian policy.

Other works assess Athenian foreign policy in connection with particular persons and events. Sealey and Strauss rejected the existence of a party-system, broadly speaking a group of citizens with a shared consciousness, usually denoting a group whose political fortunes were tied to those of some influential man, or more abstractly, between different social and ideological groups of political powers (oligarchs, democrats, aristocrats); they focused instead on certain individuals, some of whom we can connect at times with certain political events or decisions as far as our literary and epigraphical sources allow.<sup>32</sup> Montgomery analysed Demosthenes' political speeches in an attempt to decipher Athenian inner workings that led to Chaeronea.<sup>33</sup> Mitchell described a fourth-century Athens in which people helped friends and harmed enemies, and where political leaders were tied together by kinship and friendship, not by programmes.<sup>34</sup> Cawkwell discussed Athenian fourth-century naval power, but he focused on the organisation and maintenance of the navy alongside the evidence surrounding this naval system.<sup>35</sup> Cargill analysed the creation, membership and history of the Second Athenian League and came to interesting conclusions regarding the way we should view this alliance.<sup>36</sup>

Recently new paths via cross-disciplinary studies have been explored in order to help advance our understanding of Greek interstate politics. Polly Low's *Interstate Relations in Classical Greece: Morality and Power*, provides an insightful analysis of Greek international

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<sup>32</sup> Sealey, 1993; Strauss, 1987 11-14.

<sup>33</sup> Montgomery, 1983.

<sup>34</sup> Mitchell, 1997.

<sup>35</sup> Cawkwell, 1984.

<sup>36</sup> Cargill, 1981.

law and practice which identifies the conceptual framework within which classical Greek international relations were conducted. As far as Athens is concerned, she finds that politicians had a wide range of concepts available to them, from which they chose according to their interpretation of what a particular situation demanded.<sup>37</sup> Hunt's *War, Peace, and Alliance in Demosthenes' Athens*, provides a comprehensive treatment of the Athenian assembly speeches of the second half of the fourth century which remarks also that the Athenians employed the best possible case by deploying a range of arguments to win the "hearts and minds" of the people.<sup>38</sup>

Back in the 1980s, there was an attempt to consider Athenian foreign policy by stressing its system of defence. Ober's *Fortress Attica* viewed Athenian foreign policy in regard to its defences.<sup>39</sup> He saw a complex system of forts and signals for territorial defence to explain Athenian defensive mentality. Though he was generally right to stress this commitment to protect Attica, Ober exaggerated the usefulness of these measures, something that Harding brings to the spotlight, arguing vehemently against Ober's thesis of an introspective policy offering no effective opposition to Philip II.<sup>40</sup> Soon after, Munn attempted to bridge the gap between Attic countryside fortresses and political history by taking a case study, that of the Dema Wall. This fortress was strategically situated between Mount Aigaleos and Mount Parnes in the pass between the plain of Eleusis and the plain of Athens, to deter King Agesilaus from invading Attica in 378. In the end this policy succeeded and, according to Munn, set Athens' agenda for years ahead. However, as Munn admits, the relation between the Dema Wall and the Boeotian War is based on probability.<sup>41</sup> More work is necessary to connect security at home with hard-headed calculation of what was best for Athens abroad. Here is where this thesis comes in.

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<sup>37</sup> Low, 2007.

<sup>38</sup> Hunt, 2010.

<sup>39</sup> Ober, 1989; 1985.

<sup>40</sup> Harding, 1990, 1988; Munn, 1986.

<sup>41</sup> Munn, 1993, 111-112; Jones, 1957.

Overall, contemporary studies have debated the character of Athenian foreign policy by looking at certain aspects of its expression, mainly studying trade and its economic consequences, or focusing on the pervasiveness of one natural resource, usually timber or grain.<sup>42</sup> What has not been done is to look at all these factors together in order to explore the interrelationship between natural resources and the formulation of Athenian foreign policy. Making natural resources the central aim of this thesis will provide an axis on which all these studies come together to offer a comprehensive examination of the role of natural resources in the pursuit of power and security. There is no reason to give preferential treatment to one particular kind of resource. Grain, timber, precious metals and ochre are all found playing a significant role in Athenian foreign policy. By influencing the way Athens evaluated the Aegean, they will be seen as a driving force in Athenian politics. How did Athens try to achieve permanent sovereignty over strategic natural resources and what could this mean when we consider Athenian foreign policy? My contention is that this was one of the principles of Athenian foreign policy since, at least, the end of the Persian Wars. During this period, Athens had sought to develop its place in the sun by asserting and strengthening Athenian position on the international scene. The principle of permanent sovereignty over strategic natural resources was never explicitly defined in our ancient sources, but evidence suggests strongly that this was the case. In short, Athens sought the opportunity to enjoy the benefits of resource exploitation in order to obtain the power to rule. What has not previously been stressed is that the Athenians entered a vicious circle whereby the pursuit of hegemony was closely tied up with dependence on natural resources and the routes to them.

The issue of natural resources in foreign policy is very familiar in our days. Modern theories explain how natural resources play a big role in conditioning the development of a

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<sup>42</sup> See de Ste Croix, 1954, 3-41.



state, to find security and exert influence in the international world.<sup>43</sup> A sound material base can create power factors in shaping foreign policy and international affairs. Duncan, Jancar-Webster, and Switky point to the focus of power in politics because “power is all about politics”, and politics can be defined as ‘the authoritative allocation of scarce resources’.<sup>44</sup> Just prior to the 9/11 attacks Klare published a book where he lays out a future in which most wars will be caused by conflicts over natural resources, most eminent being the cases of oil and water. He presents a persuasive case for paying attention to impending dangers in the South-East Eurasia. For this reason, American national security policy focuses on oil-field protection, the defence of maritime trade routes, and other aspects of resource security such as territory and important geographical positions (ports, canals, rivers, etc). This geopolitical ideology was the driving force in world politics of the past few centuries, from the American-Spanish war to Hitler, Mussolini and Japanese militarism, and Klare suggests that it has never faded away.<sup>45</sup> Previously, and on the same line of argument, Kennedy contended that “economic” factors (in the broadest sense) have the lion’s share, always to be measured on a relative basis. He acknowledges wealth as one of many factors; other factors include revenue raising, political geography, strategic and diplomatic control, public and elite morale, motives that enable leaders and people to make decisions.<sup>46</sup> Modern theories suggest strongly that the capital resources, human capital, and natural resources available to each side become advantages that tell the tale of victory. Hart demonstrated with simplicity how material resources can influence the outcome of wars:

There were some twenty basic products essential for war. Coal for general production. Petroleum for motive power. Cotton for explosives. Wool. Iron. Rubber for transport. Copper for general armament and all electrical equipment. Nickel for steel-making and ammunition. Lead for

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<sup>43</sup> Duncan *et al.*, 2010, 246.

<sup>44</sup> Duncan *et al.*, 2010, 97ff.

<sup>45</sup> Klare, 2003; 2001.

<sup>46</sup> Kennedy, 1988. See the polemic article by Nau, 2001.

ammunition. Glycerine for dynamite. Cellulose for smokeless powders. Mercury for detonators. Aluminium for aircraft. Platinum for chemical apparatus. Antimony, manganese, etc., for steel-making and metallurgy in general. Asbestos for munitions and machinery. Mica as an insulator. Nitric acid and sulphur for explosives. Except for coal, Britain herself lacked most of the products which were required in quantity. But so long as the use of the sea was assured, most of them were available in the British Empire...In striking contrast was the situation of the Berlin-Rome-Tokyo triangle...Here lay the greatest weakness of all in the war-making capacity of the Axis."<sup>47</sup>

Hart finds the outcome of the Second World War inevitable. Control of the distribution of material resources ensured the Allies' victory, provided they withstood the assaults of the Axis.

Wars are in many ways a battle of resources. We may not have the charts and data to make graphs of the types of resources each ancient state had, but it becomes evident that the distribution of resources can affect the outcome of war. Shipley finds this model to be plausible in ancient Greece. He applies this model to two chief cases: the Peloponnesian War and Philip's takeover of Greece. In both instances, many influential factors are acknowledged, like the *sarissa* and brilliant statesmanship. The tip of the scale, however, leaned heavily on the Spartan and Macedonian side, when Athenian power over-extended itself (Sicily, Hellespont, Thrace, all over the Aegean), becoming less and less able to replenish itself. Sparta, on the other hand, had the continuous backing of its allies and gradually acquired Persian gold; in Macedonia, Philip, through urbanisation and development, mobilised a pool of resources that effected a rapid change of Macedonian power.<sup>48</sup> Shipley concludes that these "are plausible explanatory determinants, or the prime

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<sup>47</sup> Hart, 1970, 23-24. Reproduced by Shipley, 2007, 15.

<sup>48</sup> Arrian *Anabasis* 7.9.

ones, of the outcome of the war.”<sup>49</sup> State ascendancy is connected strongly to economic durability and access to available resources. But as ambitions and security requirements become greater than their resource base can provide for, a state tends to militarily overreach itself in foreign and defence policy. Eventually this leads to relative decline, and eventually, its downfall. It is important to note, however, that this cannot explain the fourth-century Athenian defeat by Macedonia, though the same result would have been inevitable.

Furthermore, the perception of the role of natural resources in foreign-policy decision making is not simply a modern assumption; nor is it an attempt to modernise the past. As I will demonstrate in chapter Two, the above considerations were debated in fifth and fourth-century Athens, affecting the events of its classical history.<sup>50</sup> In addition, chapter One and Two observe how ancient writers referred to natural resources with an eye to their strategic value. Examples from Greek and Roman times highlight the uniformity of thinking in the ancient Greco-Roman world of the role of natural resources in regard to foreign policy. The usefulness of this set of evidence lies in the wide variety of their subjects and historical contexts.

The above modern models of analysis of the importance of natural resources have various arguments in favour of and against the use of natural resources. Though it was tempting to adopt, implement, or test any model or theory in this thesis, it was bound to bring other problems into the picture. As a result, I chose a “hands on evidence” approach that assesses the data, focuses on a specific time frame, and keeps an open mind to the possibilities that resources bring to our understanding of Athenian foreign policy. A thorough study of the Greek city-states, which adequately assesses the manifold factors influencing their rise and fall, as well as giving diligent consideration to the states

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<sup>49</sup> Shipley, 2007, 16.

<sup>50</sup> Garland, 1989; Finley, 1982; Harris, 1979 saw in the Romans an expectation and moral ethos geared to war making, induced by large profits of war and out of the expansion of the republic.

themselves and to all the above modern theories, would occupy several volumes of literature. Hence this thesis presents a brief analysis of the impact of natural resources on the self-interested calculation conducted by Athens [in its foreign policy].

This thesis explores the influence of natural resources and the strategic value of geography on Athenian foreign policy of the fifth and fourth centuries. It warrants mention that Athenian policy cannot be reduced to a single factor or cause since a hierarchy cannot be applied to the various causes of any event.<sup>51</sup> This thesis will probe Athenian foreign policy with an emphasis on both the diplomatic manoeuvres made to facilitate access to natural resources and the exercise of military might in order to acquire access to the same. Antiquity furnishes us with numerous examples: Thasos' silver tempted Athenian triremes to make landfall on the isle. Likewise, the dispute over the Hellespont illustrates the Athenian aim to control grain supplies, while the Athenian intervention in Keos indicates the drive to secure mineral deposits in the Aegean Sea. Diplomatic manoeuvres made over to the Bosporan Kings were meant to have a particular outcome: to facilitate access to Black Sea resources. At the same time, honours and privileges awarded to merchants and foreign potentates, and additional security in harbour and at sea complemented Athenian foreign policy and were used to secure trade of overseas areas with Athens. Natural resources play a central role in influencing state behaviour, motivating expansion, spurring commerce and sparking wars.

Finally, this thesis will emphasise the utility of considering natural resources as a mechanism for understanding historical situations, in particular where the evidence is

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<sup>51</sup> In 1996, Rigby produced a paper in which he examined the orthodox view that a hierarchy can be applied to the various causes of any event, and discussed the problems which beset this approach. It is agreed that most historical events have multiple causes. Rigby goes against traditional historiography, which sees the hierarchy of things as variously manifested, according to time, place, and other circumstances. Along the way, he demolishes the Marxist position that there is a universal hierarchy of causes. In short, since several causes are all necessary in order for an event to take place, and are all equal to each other, ranking them makes no sense. They are ranked only by the perspective of historians and their audiences. Each one is interested in different things and take different events as a given. In this, Rigby makes a strong argument against ranking causes. All causes are necessary; therefore, you cannot say one is more necessary than the other.

fragmentary and difficult to interpret. Analysing natural resources and the drive to acquire them, assists the contemporary historian in sifting through the fragmented data, and equips him with the tools which enable him to better understand the politics of the period. The aims of this thesis are twofold: on the one hand, to highlight the role of natural resources in shaping national and regional politics which safeguard national interest, on the other to use this knowledge in order to assess the political context of the period in question. This enables us to analyse the historical documents, to apply the theory that natural resources are drivers in state behaviour, and to hypothesise that our understanding of undocumented events can be enhanced through focusing on natural resources. The benefits of this thesis are that it focuses on understanding Athenian geopolitical thinking and the historical context that affected decisions and policy.

Therefore, this study will classify a variety of natural resources according to their strategic significance in order to evaluate their contribution in the event of a war. These are grain, timber, precious metals and red ochre. Precious metals were the metals of coinage, an important element for any state to have in order to fuel its political and military machine. Grain was the main staple of diet; ochre and, especially timber were strategic resources for the construction and maintenance of a strong navy, the instrument of Athenian hegemony. Thus all were subject to a high degree of state concern. Upon assuming leadership of the Delian League, Athens was quite active in the northern Aegean, capturing Byzantium in 478, and Eion and Scyros in 476. Carystos also surrendered to Athenian forces shortly after. Naxos, Thasos and Samos all were forcibly kept in the Delian League in the decades that followed, and the Athenians sent out colonists and cleruchies to settlements throughout the northern Aegean, the Propontis, and the Thracian Chersonese throughout the *Pentekontaetia*. Geographically all of these regions connect to indigenous natural resources or by offering access to resource-rich regions such as the Black Sea. But the Peloponnesian War will change

all that. Athens now placed a higher priority on maintaining control of maritime trade routes from the Black Sea, Rhodes and the Cyclades islands to Athens for the shipments of resources. After the Sicilian catastrophe, we observe Athenian attempts to secure timber rights from Macedonia, either through the efforts of private or official individuals. About this time, we also witness for the first time Athens honouring foreign potentates and traders for their assistance in supplying the city with vital natural resources. This trend will see a dramatic increase from the 340s onwards. Epigraphic evidence attest to more public honours bestowed to friendly cities and individuals, and this time, by conferring to them honours that are more beneficial in nature. The reason for this change is perhaps Macedonia's control of the north-east Aegean in 340. Nevertheless, as we shall see, Athens' conception of its interests, being related to important natural resources, remained the same throughout the fifth and fourth centuries, despite changes in power and methods of access.

This thesis is divided into six distinct chapters. Chapter One opens the investigation with a historical survey which identifies and explores certain strategic resources - grain, timber, precious metals and ochre - that will be the core upon which arguments will build. The relatively high survival rate of evidence from the ancient world concerning these commodities helps to identify to a reasonable degree these materials, their relation to Athens, their strategic utility for the Athenian state, and subsequently, since natural resources are to be found in dispersed geographic areas, a number of regions of Athenian interest. The chapter provides an essential foundation for the study of natural resources in Athenian foreign policy, as it demonstrates the different layers of interaction and its significance as an instrument of war.

Chapter Two explores the public political discourse within the Athenian polity regarding the nexus between strategic natural resources and foreign policy. This represents the first stage of our wider examination of natural resources, and begins with the chief

corpus of surviving orations from Attic politicians, the writings of classical historians, and the official inscriptions of the Athenian state. While placing these disparate artefacts in a shared setting may cause difficulty, each of the surviving texts have an independent value insofar as they each facilitate our research into the notion of natural resources as factors in foreign policy deliberation. In particular, we are able to juxtapose their divergent portrayals of natural resources within the context of foreign policy.

Chapter Three extends some of the themes from chapter Two, by focussing on the methods of access to natural resources. Two methods are identified - acquisition through war and through diplomacy - that help to analyse Athens' unwavering determination to control the supply of precious resources and prevalent strategies that allowed the city to compete successfully over resources in an emerging landscape of conflict. Under the section "Acquisition through war", we will see if, Athenian mentality was acquisitive for both political and productive reasons. Conflicts occurred in the local context – Keos, Thasos - and in the panhellenic one - the Peloponnesian War. All these cases engage one principal actor, Athens, whose claims regarding permanent sovereignty, as in the cases of Amphipolis, Lemnos, Imbros and Scyros, were at the outset motivated, among other things, by efforts to strengthen the city. When Athenian actions are considered in detail, it appears that they operated on a far more concerted and organised basis. Athenian control over the natural resources of the places mentioned above was motivated by a desire to secure the benefits of their exploitation for the interest of the Athenian state, floating in an anarchic world, and for the well-being of its people. Through this exploitation, Athens was able to fund its war efforts and extend the duration of war. This point highlights the vulnerability resulting from resource dependence, since Athens seems not to have had the native natural resources required to maintain its extraordinary foreign policy. It is worth stressing that natural resources were never the exclusive source of conflict, nor did they make it inevitable. But

the presence of strategic resources, especially in weak or unstable states, intensified the risks of foreign intervention. The other method of access to natural resources that will be touched upon in chapter Three is diplomacy. With a focus on the interstate agreements between Athens and Macedonian and Bosporan Kings, we will be able to witness the great diplomatic lengths the Athenians went into, in order to preserve their preferential treatment in the grain and timber trade. It will emerge from this discussion that, those in possession of an important resource, such as grain, could ask for a lot more than honours in return. Resources were a strong bargaining chip and fit well within the dynamics of foreign policy.

Chapter Four explores the ways in which Athens ensured the influx of natural resources into Piraeus. The Athenians achieved that by focusing their attention on the protection, safety, and legally just treatment of the individual merchant. *Symbola* agreements were signed with a number of Athenian suppliers, with whom it also sought to maintain good political alliances, which included clauses that regulated the treatment of its merchants abroad in order to guarantee the arrival of the shipment to the ports of Athens. Although scholarship has tended to overemphasise the commercial function and significance of these documents, I show that commercial considerations guided the structure of these agreements as much as political considerations. On a larger scale, Athens sought to protect vessels at sea from the dangers of piracy and accidents with force and diplomacy on those cities that threatened cargoes which were instrumental to the survival of the polis as a political unit. In order to ensure that the necessary cargo did reach its safe harbours, Athens also offered a number of honours and privileges to merchants as an additional incentive for trading in its ports. Finally, the threat of war to the natural resources pushed Athens to protect its ports, which provided most of its vital goods, and their connection to the fortified city through the creation of the Long Walls. We observe large defensive structures around Attica and an impressive number of triremes docked in the shipyards of Piraeus, even



though naval warfare, one would say, lost priority after the battles of Naxos and Leuktra. This mentality protected Athens and deterred opponents, or was intended to do so. Hence, the Long Walls' purpose was primarily to ensure that the people in Athens and Piraeus were not shut in or out, enabling the city to run, unhindered by foreign invasion. Military expenditure, as well as incentives to foreign traders and rulers for mutually profitable political and resource stability, highlights the security dilemma facing the Athenians, whereby the need for natural resources in an unstable environment motivated greater defensive expenditure. No Athenian in the fourth century could argue that a decade would pass without them finding themselves in some kind of difficulty.

Chapter Five shifts emphasis from natural resources to geography and strategy. It offers a case-study of the role of Rhodes in the Athenian (and Greek) geo-politics. While many places would provide a suitable case study, Rhodes will be a focal point, primarily to fill a gap in the existing literature, but also because it is illustrative of the interplay between natural resources and politics. The chapter demonstrates the significance of Rhodes' position as a trading hub in the Eastern Mediterranean, and shows how Athenian reliance on Rhodes was exploited (and undermined) by other Greek states. First, it considers the geo-strategic nature of islands and sea-routes, two elements which affected, favourably or unfavourably, the way in which natural resources came into Athens. The second section takes Rhodes as a case study to elucidate Rhodes, as far as Athens is concerned, as another important stretch of the military and commercial sea routes that traverse the Aegean. This will be achieved by examining the strategic importance of Rhodes in terms of the strategic value of space set by Athens. This shift of emphasis from natural resources to sea communications helps to explain the diverse Athenian enterprises which established permanent national strength. In addition, by taking notice of the similarities of movement between the Delian League and the Second Athenian League, in their initial Athenian steps

to naval hegemony, we can establish that such attention to places like Rhodes, Byzantium, and Euboea cannot be accidental. For Athens, Rhodes was an essential part for its longer-term ambition of controlling the sea-routes of the Aegean. Rhodes could draw on additional supplies, effectively increasing grain accessibility, and therefore relieving Athens of its dependence on the Hellespontine grain route, as well as a valuable base for war activities.

Having made steps to understand and prove the impact of natural resources on the self-interested calculation of Athens, Chapter Six will show that the Athenian quest for natural resources affected the events of its classical history.<sup>52</sup> This will be done by better assessing the political context of Athenian policy in Amphipolis, the Chersonese, and Keos, following the peace at Athens in 371 until the beginning of the Social War in 357. It will do so through three case studies that put together the various factors and examine them within a set period of time in the context of Athenian geopolitical strategies and natural resource acquisition, as discussed in the previous chapters.

Due to the nature of this subject and the limitations of evidence, the focus will be predominantly on literary and epigraphic information which is related to the classical periods. In particular, historical texts, orations, epigraphy and philosophical arguments all will repeatedly make their appearance in this thesis, to support the picture I draw of natural resources as a driving force of Athenian foreign policy. I seek to embrace all types of evidence in one discussion and try to find connections between events, measures, and consequences. Throughout this thesis, certain pieces of evidence will emerge time and again to illustrate different facets of foreign policy. Unfortunately, in some cases, the evidence the primary sources provide is given in vague terms, which leaves room for speculation.

A strictly chronological treatment has not been possible in every chapter. The aim,

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<sup>52</sup> Garlan, 1989; Finley, 1982. See the argument by Harris, 1979 on Roman republican foreign policy, and the criticism that arose from his thesis, i.e. North, 1981; Sherwin-White, 1980. Harris saw in the Romans an expectation and moral ethos geared to war making, induced by large profits of war and out of the expansion of the republic.

however, is to emphasise important elements of continuity and consistency in Athenian foreign policy; the organisation of my heavily documented chapters one to six is therefore topical. As far as footnotes are concerned, what I have chosen to do is to document my bibliographical references from newest to oldest. Translations are from the LOEB Classical Library (various editions and authors) and Perseus Digital Library, unless otherwise stated. Regarding the names of people and places in the Greek world, I have preferred to use a transliteration which is close to the Greek original (Histiaios, Myrkinos) except for those names and places where the latinised version is widely accepted (Thucydides, Cyprus). Furthermore, I have used a transliterated form of a few more specific terms, such as *philia*, *xenia* etc. All dates mentioned are B.C, unless otherwise stated.

# 1

## **Strategic Natural Resources**

The following discussion focuses on four commodities, grain, timber, precious metals and ochre - always with an eye to their strategic utility for the Athenian state - for two reasons. First, they were essential to the polis. Second, the relatively high survival rate of evidence from the ancient world concerning these commodities can help us to identify to a reasonable degree the role that they played in Athenian foreign policy. Most of the evidence concerns timber and grain, due to an inevitable consequence of the evidence, and the imbalance in the focus of recent scholarship. At this early stage, the aim is to identify these commodities, their relation to Athens, their strategic utility for the Athenian state, and subsequently, since natural resources are to be found in dispersed geographic areas, a number of regions of Athenian interest. In addition, this part will focus on the way(s) in which the main strategic resources combine to provide a basis for war. The purpose is to state clearly certain major considerations that are often lost sight of in the details of extended discussions on the character of Athenian foreign policy. I have treated the four resources separately in my discussion wherever possible.

### **1.1 Timber, Grain, Precious Metals & Ochre**

#### **1.1.1 Timber for triremes**

Timber is an easily exploitable, valuable and readily marketable commodity, and has been the resource of choice for classical Athenians in several national and international conflicts. This is because timber is the primary resource for making triremes. Before the

490s', the Athenians did not need timber. But the threat of Aegina (and perhaps, of Persia) in the late 480s, persuaded the Athenians to invest the newly-discovered Laurion silver in the construction of a 200 ship fleet.<sup>53</sup> Shortly after, the Athenian fleet built on the eve of Xerxes' expedition enabled the Greeks to resist the Persian invasion.<sup>54</sup> This decision paid off, and opened a path of growth and unprecedented success. From this point onwards, warships were added to Athens' military arsenal, creating an effective method of control, and in effect, were an instrument of foreign policy for a succesful Athenian thalassocracy and hegemony.<sup>55</sup> Triremes offered flexibility of attack, while the enormous cost of their construction and upkeep could be said to have functioned as a measure of military strength. Cook estimates that a trireme cost approximately 1 talent to build, 1 talent to fit for service, and 1 talent per month to man. The figures are immense. A ship fleet of 60 triremes, as in the case of Embata, would have cost 300 talents over a period of five months.<sup>56</sup> The Athenian fleet, in short, marked a new era in history and naval strategy.

As suggested by Meiggs, the amount of timber materials which Athens consumed was enormous,<sup>57</sup> as war and preparations for war necessitated a massive demand for natural resources. Besides the initial 200 ships built in the late 480s, Thucydides refers to an Athenian fleet of 300 triremes during the Peloponnesian War.<sup>58</sup> 170 ships were lost in the Sicilian Expedition,<sup>59</sup> and another 305 ships were lost between 415-404.<sup>60</sup> Although in 404 Athens was limited to only 12 ships,<sup>61</sup> by 376 it once again had the largest Greek navy in the Aegean. Athens had done some impressive work, above all, as the author of the Second

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<sup>53</sup> Herodotos 7.144.1-2; [Aristotle] *Athenaion Politeia* 22.7; Plutarch *Themistocles* 4.1-3; Thucydides 1.14.2.

<sup>54</sup> For Athenian naval power before 483 see Haas, 1985, 39-46.

<sup>55</sup> Herodotos 7.144. See chapter Three.

<sup>56</sup> Cook, 1990, 87-95.

<sup>57</sup> Meiggs, 1978, 131.

<sup>58</sup> Thucydides 2.13.8-9.

<sup>59</sup> Thucydides 6.43; 7.16, 60.

<sup>60</sup> Thucydides 8.20, 34, 42, 91, 102, 104; Xenophon *Hellenica* 1.5.14, 6.17, 34; 2.1.28.

<sup>61</sup> Xenophon *Hellenica* 2.2.20.

Athenian League and later acknowledged by Sparta as *hegemon* of the sea.<sup>62</sup> In 357, the city still possessed 283 ships,<sup>63</sup> of which two squadrons of 60 ships were sent to the battle of Embata,<sup>64</sup> and by 352/2, the number had risen to 349. More importantly, in 322, Athens, with its economic problems and various defeats on the battlefields of Greece, was still able to throw into the fight a force of 170 ships.<sup>65</sup> This detailed information about the fourth-century Athenian navy comes from a series of inscriptions spanning the years 377-322 that record the *epimeletai tou neoriou*. These officials were responsible for repairing or redesigning triremes.<sup>66</sup> The numbers speak for themselves. Even if we exclude a number of ships unworthy for sea travel, Athens still possessed a sizeable fleet of about 200 triremes. In addition, the number of trees which must have been needed to support the Athenian fleet, rises substantially when we consider ship equipment. Meiggs estimates, based on the naval inventories of 357/6, that about 50,000 oars were kept in the Athenian arsenal ready to equip the triremes.<sup>67</sup>

Hence the demand of timber placed upon the Athenians was enormous. This much is clear. However, timber and subsequently, ships are perishable objects due to destruction from warfare (i.e. ramming, fire), because timber is a biological material subject to decay, due to a number of biological factors (i.e. fungi), and due to such non-biological factors as weathering, wetting and drying. Estimations put the average life of a trireme at about twenty years.<sup>68</sup> We know that by 467 the Athenians could launch 300 triremes now better equipped for the war against the Persians.<sup>69</sup> During the Pentekontaetia we know of at least one major shipbuilding programme enacted after the loss of a number of triremes in the

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<sup>62</sup> IG II<sup>2</sup> 43; Xenophon *Hellenica* 7.1ff.

<sup>63</sup> IG II<sup>2</sup> 1611. 9.

<sup>64</sup> Diodoros 16.21.

<sup>65</sup> IG II<sup>2</sup> 1613. 302; 392 triremes in 330/329: IG II<sup>2</sup> 1627. 269; and 360 triremes in 326/5: IG II<sup>2</sup> 1628. 489.

<sup>66</sup> Diodoros 18.15.8. IG II<sup>2</sup> 1604-1632; IG II<sup>2</sup> 1612. 145-217. [Aristotle] *Athenaion Politeia* 46.1 refers to another team of officials concerned with ships. See also Bissa, 2009, 123, 134-140; Gabrielsen, 1994; Jordan, 1975.

<sup>67</sup> Meiggs, 1978, 131.

<sup>68</sup> Casson 1995, 88-92.

<sup>69</sup> Plutarch *Kimon* 12.2. Meiggs, 1972, 76 suggest these are newly build triremes *contra* Morrison and Williams, 1968, 161-163.

Egyptian expedition. Numbers of lost ships are estimated at between 100 and 230 Athenian and allied ships.<sup>70</sup> After the Sicilian disaster Athens was again spurred on a shipbuilding programme, “but to prepare a navy, bring in timber from wherever they could, and money and secure allies, especially Euboea” (παράσκειν ἄξεσθαι καὶ ναυτικόν, ὅθεν ἂν δύνωνται ξύλα ξυμπορισμένους, καὶ χρήματα).<sup>71</sup> Where did this great number of timber logs come from? Who supplied the Athenians after the Egyptian and Sicilian expedition with enough timber to rebuild, twice, their sizeable fleet? What arrangements were made and how was timber procured? In addition, we never hear of an established timber supply line, or problems similar to the ones facing the grain supply. These questions are result of the silence of the sources. Construction and preservation of the Athenian fleet is one of the great unresolved mysteries in the study of classical Athens. That is, Athens was never in short supply of ship-timber, or at least, we never hear of one.<sup>72</sup> Who, how, and which possible areas supplied Athens with timber?

Although Attica is mountainous, shipbuilding timber did not exist in substantial quantities to support big shipbuilding programmes, if at all. Critias describes Athens as having been well forested in the past, but Plato remarks: “[for shipbuilding] there is no fir, no pine to speak of, not much cypress, larch or plane.”<sup>73</sup> Hence, Borza estimates that the only trees remaining were mainly for furniture and fuel.<sup>74</sup> Yet, Themistocles proposed to use the silver from Laureion to fund the construction of a 200 ship fleet, an act that marked the beginning of Athenian thalassocracy.

As the timber in Attica was not enough to support such a large endeavour, the question where the Athenians found the necessary timber and a pool of expert craftsmen to construct their navy in such a short time becomes an intriguing one. Lack of time, expertise,

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<sup>70</sup> Thucydides 1.104; 1.109-110. Hornblower, 1991-2008, vol. I; Meiggs, 1972, 107-108.

<sup>71</sup> Thucydides 8.1.3.

<sup>72</sup> Bissa, 2009, 139-140.

<sup>73</sup> Critias 111C; Plato *Laws* 705C.

<sup>74</sup> Borza, 1987, 34; Meiggs, 1982, 188-190.

and seasoned trees posed severe problems for the Athenians to build 200 triremes in a short time. Meiggs finds an answer in that the Athenians probably had their 200 ships built in the West, specifically, Corinth, Corcyra, and the Sicilian poleis, areas with native resources.<sup>75</sup> It was not likely that the Persians would allow timber from Thrace and Macedonia to be exported to their enemies. However, care must be taken not to diminish the possibility of timber coming from the forests of northern Greece and of the eastern Mediterranean. Badian points out that “Persian operations were, until Xerxes’ invasion, scattered along the Thracian and Chalcidic coasts, regions not under Macedonian control”. He also casts doubt on Macedonia being a client state of Persia in the years between 486-480, and argues that the building of the Athenian fleet which was intended for the naval battles against Aegina, was in fact a masked attempt to deflect Persian suspicion.<sup>76</sup> Whether the Athenians went to such lengths for the building of their ship fleet need not concern us here. What should be taken under consideration is that there exists no report to suggest that the Persians feared of or tried to hinder the building of the Athenian fleet. For example, there is no evidence of an “embargo” on timber export imposed by the Persians like the one issued by Aemilius Paulus: in 167 Macedonian forests were excluded from all commercial activity following his ban on cutting and trading shipbuilding timber.<sup>77</sup> Nor should we preclude the power of ordinary channels of commerce.

In the fifth century, the Athenians, now head of the Delian League, requested a steady trireme supply from their allies in order to cover their needs. Unz has made this suggestion to account for the tribute imbalance, based on a comment by Plutarch that assessed Kimon’s behaviour towards the Delian allies who wished to avoid committing human personnel to the fight against Persia: “taking money and empty ships from those who did not want to

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<sup>75</sup> Meiggs, 1982, 122-126, 354.

<sup>76</sup> Badian, 1987, 42.

<sup>77</sup> Livy 45.29.14.



serve" (δὲ λαμβάνων παρὰ τῶν οὐ βουλομένων στρατεύεσθαι καὶ ναῦς κενάς).<sup>78</sup> Though Thucydides fails to mention this, Blamire argues convincingly that this is the case,<sup>79</sup> also supported by Diodoros, "from the new allies, he received (προσλαβόμενος) ships, and thus increased the fleet further".<sup>80</sup>

It was not only ships that could be imported, but also naval equipment. Andokides boasts that in 411 his ancestral links with the Macedonian royal family allowed him to secure timber rights from Archelaos, which had no limitations, from which he made oars, which he sold at cost price to the Athenian fleet at Samos.<sup>81</sup> In the 320s, Demades, probably in an official capacity, bought fifteen sets of oars for the *tetrereis*.<sup>82</sup> In order to provide their navy with the necessary materials, the Athenians also provided incentives for traders to import oars, as testified by the Phanosthenes decree.<sup>83</sup> Other examples exist of timber being exported to Athens as gifts from the royal Macedonian house (notoriously, Amyntas III granted a gift of timber to the general Timotheos) or, as bribes (Demosthenes attacks Lasthenes for using a gift of Macedonian timber to build the roof of his house).<sup>84</sup>

Bissa suggests that ships and ship-parts were being imported from outside and that this was a regular policy aimed at strengthening the state. She cites evidence for a Toroneian *naupēgeio* (shipyards) to support this claim. This is IG II<sup>2</sup> 1611, whereby the Athenians ordered in 358/7 the construction of a ship, named *Boêtheia* (assistance), from the Telegoneian shipyard (παρὰ λαβόντες ἐκ τῶν Τηλεγονείων [ναυπηγί]ων ἡμεῖς) (II. 127-133). Bissa acknowledges that the evidence is tentative, but she finds support in that the name Telegonos derives from a Toroneian hero, and that the one of the *architektones* of the

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<sup>78</sup> Plutarch *Kimōn* 11.2. Unz, 1985, 26, 36.

<sup>79</sup> Blamire, 1989, 137; Blackman, 1969, 189-190; ATL, III. 246, 250.

<sup>80</sup> Diodoros 11.60.5.

<sup>81</sup> Andokides 2.11.

<sup>82</sup> IG II<sup>2</sup> 1629. 348-351, 695-699. For all the evidence on Demades and his political career see Brun, 2000, 20-33.

<sup>83</sup> IG I<sup>3</sup> 182. Walbank, 1978, no.60; MacDonald, 1981, 141-146; Meritt, 1945, 130-132.

<sup>84</sup> Demosthenes 49.26-30; 19.265. IG I<sup>3</sup> 89.

ship has the Macedonian name Amyntas.<sup>85</sup> As Hypereides stipulates, there was no abundant supply of shipbuilding timber in Athens itself; instead, they imported it.<sup>86</sup> Since Athens imported timber, it is necessary to look at its possible suppliers.

### 1.1.2 Timber supply areas

Athens relied first on the timber resources of Attica and Euboea.<sup>87</sup> Later on, the city relied on Macedonian timber, provided by the kings of Macedonia and the colonies in that region.<sup>88</sup> For instance, in a fragmentary decree from Athens, dated to 407-6, the city honours Archelaos of Macedonia for his assistance in ship construction. As a result, Archelaos gained the status of *proxenos* and *euergetēs* for providing the material and facilities necessary for shipbuilding (*naupēgeia*) in Macedonia.<sup>89</sup> In IG I<sup>3</sup> 89 Perdiccas II agreed to sell oars exclusively to Athens, while Andokides implies the difficulties which Athens faced in importing shipbuilding timber in the last stages of the Peloponnesian War.<sup>90</sup> This, coupled with evidence of previous Atheno-Macedonian contacts suggests that Macedonia provided these services long before.<sup>91</sup>

The Athenians decided to create anew a strong ship fleet in the fourth century, which automatically meant reopening their trade agreements with Macedonia. Xenophon stresses Athenian needs in timber in the 370s: “they have not even enough for themselves unless they buy it”.<sup>92</sup> For this reason, Athens struck a deal with King Amyntas III of Macedonia. The provisions of the treaty have not reached us,<sup>93</sup> but they were probably concerned with shipbuilding timber. Amyntas III is known for supplying timber both officially through

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<sup>85</sup> Bissa, 2009, 136.

<sup>86</sup> Demosthenes 17.27-28. Milne, 2000, 205-206.

<sup>87</sup> Meiggs, 1982, 188-190.

<sup>88</sup> Thucydides 4.108.1. Gabrielsen, 1994, 31-39; 140-142; Borza, 1987, 32-52.

<sup>89</sup> IG I<sup>3</sup> 117.

<sup>90</sup> Andokides 2.11.

<sup>91</sup> ML no. 91; Walbank, 1978, no.90; IG I<sup>3</sup> 117; Merrit, 1932, 107ff.

<sup>92</sup> Xenophon *Hellenica* 6.1.11.

<sup>93</sup> IG II<sup>2</sup> 102.

treaties,<sup>94</sup> and through generals such as Timotheos.<sup>95</sup> The trade apparently continued into the 360s.

The problem with Macedonia was that at any given time the arrangement could break, like the one in 422 between the Athenians and Perdiccas II of Macedonia.<sup>96</sup> Macedonian friendship was never constant. With every new holder of the Macedonian throne, the situation in the region quickly changed,<sup>97</sup> as for example the conflicting policies towards Athens of Perdiccas II and Archelaos I during the Peloponnesian War. As we go into the fourth century, Macedonian favour drifted further away as King Perdiccas III (365-60) did not see in a good eye the Athenian wars against the Chalkidic League and Amphipolis, and chose the alliance of Thebes. Probably, Atheno-Macedonian timber-supply relations diminished after Philip II gained the Macedonian throne. There is some evidence to support this. Demosthenes complained about the now infrequent trade between Athens and Macedonia, and the reason was Philip II.<sup>98</sup> There is no indication if the peace of Philocrates (346) and the one offered two years later included commercial arrangements. Finally, we hear of an additional effort in 343/2, by Philip II to make a *symbola* agreement with Athens.<sup>99</sup> As it will be explained in chapter Four, *symbola* had a wide variety of meanings ranging from political to judicial and to economic. That Philip II was by 343/2 not awarded a *symbola* suggests that Atheno-Macedonian relations were strained at this time. We should not readily assume a regular existing trade between the two.<sup>100</sup> Consequently, Athens could not always rely on Macedonian kings for shipments of timber; other sources were needed to supply Athenian timber needs.

Braudel remarks that the “Mediterranean powers gradually began to look elsewhere

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<sup>94</sup> RO 12.9-18.

<sup>95</sup> Tod 129; Demosthenes 49.26-30. Cargill, 1981, 85-87.

<sup>96</sup> Thucydides 4.132.1-2; cf. 5.80.2; IG I<sup>3</sup> 89.

<sup>97</sup> Meiggs, 1982, 126.

<sup>98</sup> Demosthenes 7.12.

<sup>99</sup> Demosthenes 7.11-13. Cohen, 1973, 30, 61; Harrison, 1960, 248-252.

<sup>100</sup> *Contra* Borza, 1987, 46.

for what their own forests could not provide".<sup>101</sup> Where is elsewhere? Ancient writers make clear reference to Athens importing timber from Samos, Knidos, Crete, and Corinth.<sup>102</sup> Settlements created in Eion, Amphipolis, and Thasos were at least, partly intended to secure timber resources and *naupēgeia* for the Athenian state.<sup>103</sup> Archilochos, in particular, had noticed that Thasos is garlanded with untamed forest.<sup>104</sup> A strong Athenian presence would have affected nearby cities, such as Neapolis and Datum also known for their shipyards.<sup>105</sup> One of the aims of the Sicilian expedition, according to Alcibiades, was the acquisition of abundant Italian timber for the building of more triremes.<sup>106</sup> This led Michell to suggest that the decision to undertake the Sicilian Expedition may be connected to depleted ship supplies following the loss of Amphipolis and the resources connected with it.<sup>107</sup> What other possible timber resource areas existed?

Theophrastos recorded areas with shipbuilding timber (fir): Macedonia, Thrace, Italy, Cilicia, Sinope, Amisos, Mysia, Syria, Cyprus, and the Pontus.<sup>108</sup> The last of these draws our attention since, by the fourth century, it was no longer an inaccessible place. Grain traders ran up and down its lucrative sea-lanes. Numerous ancient sources speak highly of Pontic timber. In the *Anabasis*, as Xenophon narrated the journey of the Ten thousand back to Greece, he paused to notice the abundance of timber of various sorts in the area around the harbour of Kalpe Limen, halfway between Byzantium and Heraklea (south coast of the Black Sea).<sup>109</sup> In his description of its timber resources, Xenophon noted especially the large amount of fine ship timber. In addition to timber from the south coast of the Black Sea, Strabo noted that the mountains from Sinopitis to Bithynia had shipbuilding timber that

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<sup>101</sup> Braudel, 1996, 143.

<sup>102</sup> See Meiggs, 1982, 393 for a collection of sources.

<sup>103</sup> Thucydides 4.108.1. Bissa, 2009, 134-135.

<sup>104</sup> Archilochos Frg.21 cited by Meiggs, 1982, 33.

<sup>105</sup> Strabo 7. Frg. 33 and 36.

<sup>106</sup> Thucydides 6.90.3.

<sup>107</sup> Michell, 1940, 282.

<sup>108</sup> Theophrastos *On Plants* 4.5.2, 5; 5.7.1-2. Place names such as Elatea (fir) and Naupactos (*ναῦς* - ship and *πηνύειν* to fasten together, build) indicate that these areas had forests and a shipbuilding tradition.

<sup>109</sup> Xenophon *Anabasis* 6.4.4.

was excellent and easy to transport.<sup>110</sup> Dio Chrysostom refers to Prusa's timber,<sup>111</sup> while Pliny the Younger informed Trajan of the resources of a lake near Nikomedeia.<sup>112</sup> Pliny the Elder attests to Pontic timber being highly spoken of.<sup>113</sup> From the north coast of the Black Sea, information about timber resources comes from Theophrastos. Pantikapaion, he says, was rich in fig-trees and pomegranates, pears, apples, oak, elm, and manna-ash, but no fir, pine or any resinous trees. Hence, he concludes, the wood from Sinope is better (the implication being that is useful for shipbuilding), so local wood was used only for outdoor purposes.<sup>114</sup> Strabo talks about the eastern coast of the Black Sea and the forest of the Tanais River, and how its inhabitants were prone to piracy, the Caucasus being "wooded with all kinds of timber, and especially the kind suitable for shipbuilding", and refers specifically to the shipbuilding capability of Colchis. He further infers that Mithridates VI Eupator conquered the territory in order to raise timber for his fleet.<sup>115</sup> The richness and variety of thinking is not surprising when we consider the variety of our sources: orators, philosophers, historians, geographers, generals, kings and emperors acknowledged the importance of resources of timber and made sure to write down and comment on their usefulness for shipbuilding, and subsequently, to its acquisition. It suggests that Thucydides was not the only one who could view the role of natural resources as a source of power and cause of war.<sup>116</sup>

This reputation, and perception of timber, would have been widely known in Athens, a city whose entire fortune rested on the navigability of the high seas. Meiggs considers it possible that timber was being transported on long-distance journeys and on a massive

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<sup>110</sup> Strabo 12.3.12.

<sup>111</sup> Dio Chrysostom 40.30.

<sup>112</sup> Pliny *Epistulae* 10.41.

<sup>113</sup> Pliny *Natural History* 16.76.197.

<sup>114</sup> Theophrastos *On Plants* 4.5.3.

<sup>115</sup> Strabo 11.2.13.

<sup>116</sup> Thucydides 6.90.3.

scale.<sup>117</sup> To put it differently, Athens was never in short supply of ship-timber, or at least, we never hear of one. Either trade relations with Macedonia remained unaffected by fourth-century political turmoil, or more probably, Athens sought different suppliers to keep up with its timber needs. It then becomes possible that Black Sea timber, not excluding timber from Italy, Cyprus, and Syria, could have served as an alternative source for shipbuilding.<sup>118</sup>

In conclusion, Athens was a city that made pretensions to sea-power and as such, had to access adequate material for the construction and maintenance of a fleet. Although the Athenians needed a lot timber, the big irony is that we never hear of an established timber supply line, or problems similar to the ones facing the grain supply. Nevertheless, that the Athenians were able to construct time and again a sizeable war-fleet, especially amidst great difficulties, points to an import system that was successful for almost two centuries. Unfortunately, we do not know the exact details of this. But it has been noticed that both city and individual were at some point engaged with the trade in timber, which ultimately manifested itself in a grand Athenian navy. The building programme succeeded precisely because the Athenians made official arrangements with local states, like the ones with Macedonia, and cooperated with traders who traversed the Aegean. In addition, a certain level of control of areas outside Athens assisted in that direction. These types of arrangements will be further explored in chapter Three and Four.

### **1.1.3 Grain**

The obvious use of grain is to sustain the Athenian population. Numbers are ambiguous, but the data we have still present a quite impressive number of residents in Athens. Modern estimates put the number of fourth-century population from as low as 120,000 to as high as 300,000.<sup>119</sup> Athenian grain imports were primarily used for the

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<sup>117</sup> Meiggs, 1982, ch.12.

<sup>118</sup> Cyprus: Theophrastos 5.8; Diodoros 14.39.2 ; Ammianus Marcellinus *Historia* 14.8.4. Syria: Strabo 14.5.3.

<sup>119</sup> Oliver, 2007, 18; Whitby, 1998, 109-114.

population and while they are by no means essential during war times, food is necessary for survival, especially, when ancient Greek society was geared for warfare. All the more so as the Athenians decided to follow the path of hegemony. Under such policy grain became a double-edged sword in which the Athenians found their own necessity to make a case against them. In order to maintain healthy military personnel, to sustain the city in times of hardship, famine or siege, grain was needed in the Athenian granaries. Not only in Athens. Thucydides informs us that the Mytilenaeans were expecting a cargo of grain and archers from the Pontus before they could revolt from Athens,<sup>120</sup> while Ballin rightly suggests that Timomachos tried to relieve Stryme with a shipment of grain.<sup>121</sup>

Its more direct military application was to keep armies going.<sup>122</sup> In this sense, grain fell under the mandate of logistics. Our military logistics knowledge for ancient Athens has many gaps. One way to find provisions for the army was foraging as armies tried to live off the land, but this entailed risks, as it could lead the army to scatter, to be caught, or even to anarchy.<sup>123</sup> Another, and more effective, way was to make the state responsible for grain provision. In classical Greece, however, this presented many difficulties, as the administrative structure of ancient city-states was ill equipped to ensure army supply. A good sense of the limitations that existed can be seen by a series of innovations introduced by Philip II to enhance the speed and flexibility of movement. Philip II had forbidden wagons to be used by the army and limited the number of servants to a minimum (one for every ten soldiers and each cavalryman). These were to carry hand mills (for grinding grain), and other gear. By these means, Philip II reduced the logistical burden of his army substantially.<sup>124</sup>

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<sup>120</sup> Thucydides 3.2.

<sup>121</sup> Demosthenes 50.21, 32. Ballin, 1978, 142, 157.

<sup>122</sup> Pritchett 1971, 49-51 gathers the evidence for the food of classical Greek armies.

<sup>123</sup> Polyainos 3.10.5.

<sup>124</sup> Wagon-loads: Xenophon *Anabasis* 1.10.18; Diodoros 17.81.1; Plutarch *Lucullus* 17.3; Aeneas Tactician 28.3. Servants: Frontinus *Strategemata* 4.1.6. For Alexander: Frontinus *Strategemata* 4.2.4. In contrast, Greek hoplites had

Nonetheless, there are examples that show a degree of state concern for the supply of food to the army. In 479, the Persian cavalry had caught a train of five hundred mules bringing food to the army at Plataea.<sup>125</sup> As the winter of 425 approached, the Athenians feared that provisions would not reach the garrison of Pylos that was blockading Sphacteria.<sup>126</sup> The preparations for the Sicilian expedition saw thirty ships carrying grain.<sup>127</sup> Examples from the fourth century attest to how the Athenians could use islands to support ground logistics. From Demosthenes we learn that the winter bases at Thasos, Lemnos, and Skiathos could provide harbours, provisions and everything the army needed in order to assist in an anti-Macedonian campaign.<sup>128</sup> In addition, IG II<sup>2</sup> 207 the agreement between Athens and Orontes provides for the provision of grain to the Athenian fleet, and suggests that there was an official concern for the supply of food to the fleet. The inscription records three Athenian generals, Chares, Charidemus, and Phokion as being responsible for the provision of grain to the Athenian fleet,<sup>129</sup> and it brings to light what Glaukon was saying about the importance of knowing, as a politician, where Athenian grain needs lay.<sup>130</sup> Whether the necessities of the Persian and Peloponnesian War introduced a food-supply service is unknown. It seems, however, that the Athenian supply system was introduced in the fifth century to support the rising logistical needs of the Delian League and later, of the Second Athenian League. These hardships and difficulties vividly illustrate the relationship between grain supply and war effort, though we are unaware of the level of state concern and of an *ad hoc* service regarding the supply of army.

Inevitably, one will ask how the Athenians were able to draw on substantial amounts

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personal servants: Herodotos 7.229; Thucydides 3.17.4; cf. Thucydides 7.75.5, 4.16.1. The Spartans were accompanied by seven helots: Herodotos 9.10, 29. No women were to follow the campaign: Athenaios 557b. See Engels, 1980 on the logistics of Alexander the Great.

<sup>125</sup> Herodotos 9.39.

<sup>126</sup> Thucydides 4.27.1.

<sup>127</sup> Thucydides 6.44.1.

<sup>128</sup> Demosthenes 4.27, 32. Aristotle in *Athenaion Politeia* 61.6 informs us that a ἵππαρχος was regularly sent to Lemnos to take charge of the cavalry there.

<sup>129</sup> IG II<sup>2</sup> 207. 11-12.

<sup>130</sup> Xenophon *Memorabilia* 3.6.13.



of local and foreign grain to feed their population and keep their armies going. This was achieved by complex external relations with individuals and polities to support grain imports to the city (better explored in Chapter Three and Four). Gifts of grain came from kings and rulers. Psammetichus, King of Egypt, offered a gift of grain to the Athenians in the 440s.<sup>131</sup> Andokides secured unlimited timber rights from King Archelaos for the making of oars which he sold at cost price to the Athenian fleet at Samos (411). The Bosphoran Kings too shipped large amounts of grain to Athens. Demosthenes attests to 400,000 *medimnoi* of Bosphoran grain that came to Athens in 355, under the personal assistance of King Leukon.<sup>132</sup> Grain could reach to Athens in the name of a Bosphoran king, and a reciprocal relationship was built around this trade. The Bosphoran kings enjoyed the highest privileges at Athens including statues and *stēlai* defining their honours.<sup>133</sup> One such privilege was *ateleia* (exemption from taxes) which both parties granted to each other; a privilege with a real financial significance. Honorary inscriptions were also granted for importations of grain by traders that ventured the eastern Mediterranean.<sup>134</sup> Some merchants sold their goods at a reduced price some gave them as a gift.<sup>135</sup> In these cases Athens honoured those who had been responsible for the shipped goods to the Athenians. Grants were bestowed such as *proxenia*, *ateleia*, crowns and other public honours. On other occasions, the honorand provided protection to secure shipments of goods.<sup>136</sup> All known Athenian grants of honours and privileges to those who had secured shipments of goods occurred in the second half of the fourth century.<sup>137</sup> The consensus in recent scholarship is that the reason for these honours to be granted was Philip II, who from 340 onwards, made maritime commerce in the north Aegean particularly difficult for Athens.<sup>138</sup> The context in which so much grain

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<sup>131</sup> Scholia Aristophanes *Wasps* 718; Plutarch *Pericles* 37.4.

<sup>132</sup> Moreno, 2007a; 2007b; Bresson, 2000, 278 n.66; Garnsey, 1988, 97 and their respective bibliographies.

<sup>133</sup> IG II<sup>2</sup> 653 ll. 13-17. Demosthenes 20.36. RO 64.

<sup>134</sup> IG II<sup>2</sup> 407; 409; 342. Athenaeos 3.119f-120a.

<sup>135</sup> IG II<sup>2</sup> 360.

<sup>136</sup> IG II<sup>2</sup> 416 ll. 6-12; IG II<sup>2</sup> 407.

<sup>137</sup> Engen, 2010, 85.

<sup>138</sup> Bresson, 2000, 131-149; Engen, 2010, 85-86.

was coming from the Bosporan kingdom to Athens is complex and cannot be separated from the structures of commerce and the economic history of the institutions of Greek cities. Further discussion of these issues can be found in chapter Four, as this discussion would take us further afield.

Grain could also be acquired by local farms. The impact of local production, however, is not adequately recoded in the sources, and therefore, the degree to which the Athenians depended on importing grain is still dominating discussion in scholarship. One must take into account the inevitable consequence of the imbalance of the evidence, and the imbalance in the focus of recent scholarship (it is hard not to focus on the Black Sea when discussing the grain perhaps) as it will be evident in the upcoming discussion about grain supply. Hence, the purpose of this section is not to offer a full assessment of the problems of grain supply, but to emphasize the degree to which Athens was dependent upon its grain supply in times of both peace and war.<sup>139</sup>

One of the ways for scholars to determine whether imported grain was essential for Athens is to calculate the Athenian population and its need for grain.<sup>140</sup> A good assessment of the matter is presented in Moreno, which I summarise here: Boeckh estimated that an Athenian population of 135,000 and 356,000 slaves required an annual supply of 3.000,000 *medimnoi* of grain. Garnsey approached the problem slightly differently by estimating Athenian productive capacity in a positive light, but with a population fluctuating from 200,000 to between 120,000 and 150,000 in 323, concluding that dependency on imported grain was not so great. Whitby reacted to the matter by changing the variables, lowering the productive capacity of Attica and increasing the population. His theory concentrates on

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<sup>139</sup> Keen, 2000; Whitby, 1998; Stroud 1998; Garnsey, 1992; 1989; 1985; Boeckh, 1976; De Ste. Croix, 1972, 44ff urges on the economic motive.

<sup>140</sup> Grain formed an integral part of many Mediterranean societies. People worshipped grain gods and developed a variety of myths about the origin, growing, and harvesting of grain. The ancient Greeks had their own grain-goddess, Demeter, easily identified by holding ripe grain or wearing it as a crown. Finkel and Geller, 1997, 6 find close similarities in the depiction and myths with other Eastern Mediterranean grain-goddesses. Foley, 1994, 34, 40; Burkert, 1985, 160. Isocrates 4.28 saw in the cultivation of grain the distinction between man and wild animals.

three aspects: A) our fourth-century sources provide us with a picture where grain imports have greater importance. B) Athenian soil was poor in cultivation, productive arable land consisting of only 10-15 percent of the total Athenian territory. C) Attica's population amounted to between 250,000 and 300,000 people.<sup>141</sup>

While the above models are attractive for the investigation of a number of data which look into Athenian population numbers, productive capacity, and average nutrition of the average population, they cannot be relied upon, since the lack of data entails considerable uncertainty concerning population size, grain import, and food production. Garnsey himself, in the face of continued opposition, acknowledged that the existing sources yield only crude estimations of the average level of Athenian self-sufficiency in a given period.<sup>142</sup> What is undisputable is the fact that all accounts, even Garnsey's optimistic model, have classical Athens as a major grain importer, striving to overcome various factors in order to meet the needs of its population.<sup>143</sup> These conditions pressured Athens to meet the demands of its resident population, a demand that must have been enormous.

That Athens was dependent on foreign grain is not an issue. Whitby rightly notes that the Athenians believed it was necessary to import grain.<sup>144</sup> Moreno, in a recent study, has shown that Athens was never self-sufficient concerning grain, and had to cover it with annual imports for at least half of its population.<sup>145</sup> Foxhall estimates that most Greek cities thought it was necessary to import grain, since a shortfall in food supply could be expected at any time.<sup>146</sup> Aristotle did not fail to notice that "sometimes it happens that droughts or rain occur over a large area, sometimes over a part."<sup>147</sup> In the case of classical Athens, the importance of grain lay in a more oblique way – cutting down the Athenian grain supply

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<sup>141</sup> Moreno, 2007a, 3-32.

<sup>142</sup> Garnsey, 1988, 200.

<sup>143</sup> Oliver, 2007, 14-47; Moreno, 2007a, 32.

<sup>144</sup> Whitby, 1998, 117-119, 125-127, followed by Keen, 2000, 64.

<sup>145</sup> Moreno, 2007a.

<sup>146</sup> Foxhall, 2003, 75-92; 1993, 134-145 and 1982, 41-92.

<sup>147</sup> Aristotle *Meteorologica* 2.4.

meant defeating Athens, therefore securing grain meant safety for the Athenians.

#### 1.1.4 Grain supply areas

Literary evidence provides strong support for the Black Sea being the main exporter of grain to Athens. Imported grain played a vital role in Athenian policy even before the Peloponnesian War, the Athenians taking steps to protect the route that brought grain into Athens.<sup>148</sup> Yet there is also archaeological evidence for this from the sixth and fifth centuries.<sup>149</sup> The sixth century bore witness to increased imports of Attic pottery, and by the fifth century, Attic fine ware had achieved supremacy throughout the Greek colonies of the Black Sea: Olbia, sites on the Cimmerian Bosphorus and in Apollonia show substantial amounts of late Black Figure pottery. Bouzek concluded that the entire region experienced an increase of Attic pottery, which came to over-shadow Ionian pottery.<sup>150</sup> Furthermore, at Elaious, on the Thracian Chersonese, Athenian wares from the sixth and fifth centuries have been unearthed in great quantities, and the pattern of distribution of Attic pottery is similar to that in other regions.<sup>151</sup> Thus, the archaeological evidence of pottery provides proof of at least a certain amount of trade conducted between the Black Sea and Athens.<sup>152</sup>

Is there a correlation between fine pottery and the grain trade? Sceglov and Bouzek believe there was one, based on the discovery of Russian bread-wheat in much larger quantities in the Greek colonies on the Black Sea than on the Steppe.<sup>153</sup> This is an intriguing

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<sup>148</sup> Moreno, 2007a, 324. See Keen, 2000, 63-70 for a summary of previous scholarship, and a challenge to Garnsey's view. Cardinal points of travel such as Hieron therefore assumed military, commercial, and religious advantages, see Moreno, 2008, 655-709.

<sup>149</sup> Bouzek, 2007, 1223-1224; 1990, 19, 21-25, 29. From the early period of colonization in the seventh and sixth centuries, Bouzek shows that Ionian pottery (known as Wild Goat style, and produced in Chios, Miletus, and Rhodes) shared a large percentage of the imports with Attic vases (Black Figure). Ionian (33%) and Athenian pottery (20%) seems to be present at Histria and Berezan in larger amounts than pottery from Chios, Samos, Corinth, and Rhodes (10%). The conclusion seems to be that no particular area was able to dominate the trade in ceramic fine ware and that relationships between mother-cities and colonies were prevalent at these sites.

<sup>150</sup> Bouzek, 2007, 1228-1229; 1990, 42-29; Isager and Hansen, 1975, 39.

<sup>151</sup> Beazley and Pottier, 2001; Boardman, 1999; Tsetskhladze, 1998a, n.273.

<sup>152</sup> Tsetskhladze, 1998a, 51ff is sceptical about Athenian pottery as evidence of direct trade between Athens and the Black Sea. See the various views of Keen, 2000, 63-73; Garnsey, 1998, 110; Osborne, 1996, 31-44; Noonan, 1973, 235.

<sup>153</sup> Bouzek, 2007, 1228; 1990, 95. At the centre of this debate, lies Herodotos's claim (4.17) that local Scythian tribes traded with Greeks and that the Scythians grew wheat for selling. Tsetskhladze, 2008, 49-50; 1998b, 51-53 (citing Sceglov, 1990) argues against Scythian grain exports in the Archaic period. Sceglov, 1990a; 1990b, 112-113;

result, as these are the same areas identified with increases in finds of late Black Figure and Red Figure Attic pottery, such as the settlements at Olbia and the Cimmerian Bosphorus. Bouzek believes that the Greek colonies were growing and trading this desirable grain to the Greek mainland.<sup>154</sup> Then why is it that we do not have the same amount of Pontic evidence in Greece itself? His answer is that grain and flour were transported in bags, and so have not left any archaeological record.<sup>155</sup> Trade between Greece and the northern Black Sea would have been primarily agricultural in nature; the latter importing wine, olive oil, raisins and figs stored in amphorae, in exchange for grain.<sup>156</sup>

Caution, however, should be exercised. Athenian fine ware constitutes a weak link as direct evidence for an Athenian trading interest,<sup>157</sup> since there was no need for Athens to export anything in order to balance this trade. Independent merchants, some Athenian and some not, did the trade in classical antiquity. What merchants traded in the Black Sea was a matter of their own personal discretion, or the preferences of their customers.<sup>158</sup> Demosthenes tells us clearly that Apollodoros of Phaselis, on his contract journey from Athens to the Bosphorus (as far as the Borysthenes), was to carry with him only wine from Mende or Skione.<sup>159</sup> This was not the exception, but the rule. Later in the same work, Demosthenes tells us: “wine is carried to Pontus from places around us, from Peparethos, Kos, Thasos, Mende, and all sorts of other places; whereas the things imported here from Pontus are quite different”. We also learn from Demosthenes that, having loaded a large vessel with grain, Lampis, who was at the Bosphorus, obtained permission to export grain

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Janushevich, 1984, 267-269; 1981, 87-96 argued against this claim on the basis of palaeobotanical and archaeological evidence. They believe that the Scythians of the northern Black Sea coast and the inland tribes were subsistence farmers. Additional evidence confirm that Scythian farmers cultivated emmer (*Triticum dicoccum*), a hulled wheat thought to be unsuitable for trade. For research on Russian bread see Janushevich, 1984, 267-83; 1981, 87-96; 1979, 115-134. This was because the Greek populace preferred other varieties of wheat (*Triticum aestivum*, *Triticum durum*), as the process to convert it into bread took less labour, as well as other reasons. Also Sallares, 2008, 31-32.

<sup>154</sup> Scegllov, 1990, 157-158.

<sup>155</sup> Bouzek, 1990, 96.

<sup>156</sup> Bouzek, 2007, 1228; 1990, 95.

<sup>157</sup> Tsetskhladze, 1998a, 51f.

<sup>158</sup> Montgomery, 1986, 43-61 for grain.

<sup>159</sup> Demosthenes 35.10.

and an exemption from duty in the name of Athens, and then carried his cargo to Akanthos.<sup>160</sup> Furthermore, according to Xenophon's *Poroi*:

in most ports, merchants are compelled to take aboard return cargo because the local currency (νομίσμασι) has no value in other cities, but from Athens, merchants can export almost anything the people desire, and if the merchants wish not to take aboard return cargo, they can also do good business by exporting silver coins (ἀργύριον).<sup>161</sup>

From the late Bronze Age forwards, shipwrecks confirm the diversity of cargos. The Ulu Burun wreck, in southwest Lycia, included in its cargo ten tons of Cypriot copper, tin, logs of ebony, Canaanine jewellery, Cypriot pottery, Babylonian cylinder seals, gold and glass beads and other manufactured goods, all from different places.<sup>162</sup> The Cape Gelidonya wreck, in Lycia, in southwest Turkey, was also found with a plethora of copper ingots, pottery, jars of various sizes, and interestingly, tin-oxide.<sup>163</sup> The obvious conclusion is that merchants had an economic calculus which meant that they need not depend on a balance of trade, no one required them to trade Athenian products for Pontic ones. Rather, they transported what was thought to be most profitable at the markets to which they were to put in. In other cases, merchants even traded with silver coins. It is important to note, however, that the evidence as emerge in chapter Three and Four, suggest strongly that Athenian (state) interest controlled and directed trade to certain destinations, and at the same time, to provide a suitable environment in which trade transactions could take place.

Tsetschladze finds another problem. Scholarly research on the Black Sea grain trade had tenuous literary evidence as its starting point. Archaeological evidence tends not to confirm the ancient literary evidence, or the modern scholarly works that have been built on

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<sup>160</sup> Demosthenes 34.36.

<sup>161</sup> Xenophon *Poroi* 3.2.

<sup>162</sup> Pulak and Bass, 1977, v. 266-8.

<sup>163</sup> Gibbins, 2001, 279-291; Bass, 1961, 267-276. Foley, 2009 for Greek shipwrecks in the Mediterranean.

these. As most of the literary evidence comes from the fourth century onwards, there is little evidence for trade before this period. More often than not, the validity of these fourth-century sources is open to question, since they come from law court speeches, with Demosthenes 20.32 and his figures for 400,000 *medimnoi* of Bosphoran grain that came to Athens being the subject of much debate.<sup>164</sup> Tsetskhladze concludes that our evidence is not as strong as we would wish it to be, and that the data cannot support the existence of an extensive grain trade network between Athens and the Black Sea.<sup>165</sup>

Arguably, Tsetskhladze's concerns are justified concerning trade in the late archaic and early classical periods not being as extensive as in later centuries.<sup>166</sup> However, he invites us to believe that this is also true for the classical period. The basis of his argumentation is flawed, as he follows a negative methodology by presenting the lack of solid data to support such claims as evidence in itself.<sup>167</sup> For instance, in his review of the numismatic evidence, he considers Kyzikene coins found in the Black Sea area. This currency was used in international commerce, which has led some scholars to propose that the coin was used in the grain trade between Athens and the Black Sea. Tsetskhladze finds error in this judgment on the basis that scarcely any Kyzikenes have been found in the Bosphoran Kingdom. The same is true of pottery finds, with Tsetskhladze refuting the argument that the volume of Attic pottery found in the area is because it had been traded for grain.<sup>168</sup> Tsetskhladze is correct to emphasize the problem of over-interpretation of the evidence, but he seems to fall into the same trap himself. For example, Olbia yielded a large amount of Kyzikenes, as well as a fourth-century inscription, which mentions the exchange rate between Kyzikenes and

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<sup>164</sup> Moreno, 2007a; 2007b; Bresson, 2000, 278 n.66; Garnsey, 1988, 97 and their respective bibliographies.

<sup>165</sup> Tsetskhladze, 2008, 48-62.

<sup>166</sup> The discussion includes the colonisation movement. Tsetskhladze, 1994, 124 eliminates grain as a reason, and sees instead political reasons in the form of Persian pressure upon the *poleis* of Asia Minor. Roebuck, 1959, 129 argued for the presence of Greek settlements in the Black Sea being motivated by demand for grain. See also Boardman, 1999, 244; Solonev, 1998, 211. Noonan, 1973 sees the sixth century as the starting point for grain imports.

<sup>167</sup> Artz, 2008, 26-27; Graham, 1997, 250 is right in that Tsetskhladze belittles the literary evidence too much. This is a good opportunity to thank Artz for sending me his book.

<sup>168</sup> Tsetskhladze, 1998a, 61-62.

local coins.<sup>169</sup> In addition, the traders in Demosthenes 35.36 refer to Kyzikenes as the coin of trade in Pontus, and this cannot be an orator's whim. Although Tsetskhladze notes this evidence, he prefers to concentrate on their dearth elsewhere. As noted by Isager and Hansen, no clear explanation can be derived from the absence of Athenian silver coins from areas such as the Black Sea, Macedonia and Thrace.<sup>170</sup>

Tsetskhladze's arguments do help to dampen the claims of modern and ancient scholars who exaggerate the importance of the grain trade from Pontus to Athens. However, Tsetskhladze's argument gives no cause to doubt Demosthenes' statement that the Bosporan Kingdom was the main producing supplier of grain to Athens. He does not prove that Athens was not importing grain from the Black Sea before the fourth century. It is true that literary evidence from the fifth century does not give a similar picture of the grain trade to that found in the fourth century. However, deploring the lack of paleobotanical studies in the area, and negating ceramic fine ware and numismatic evidence, does not necessarily show that scholarly research has overestimated the conclusions to be drawn from the available evidence. Trade could have been conducted in products unrelated to Athens, or other goods that are not archaeologically visible may have played a part. Both Scegllov and Janushevich show that Russian bread-wheat, grown in the colonies, was desirable for export, and that there is a correlation between the sites which cultivated grain and the imported Attic pottery found at those sites.<sup>171</sup>

So, how are we to explain the amount of Athenian pottery in the Black Sea? There may be a simple solution to the problem. We should not try to identify trade and political allegiances between the two places just because in the fifth century there is an overwhelmingly large amount of Attic fine ware in the Pontus. Merchants traded whatever

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<sup>169</sup> Tsetskhladze, 1998b, 59. *SIG*<sup>3</sup> 218. De Ballu, 1972, 66-67. For kyzikene coins as a method of payment: Xenophon *Anabasis* 5.6.23, 6.2.4, 7.2.36, 3.10. Currency exchange: *IG* I<sup>3</sup> 376. 99-101.

<sup>170</sup> Isager and Hansen, 1975, 51-53, 165.

<sup>171</sup> Scegllov, 1990b, 112-113; Janushevich, 1984, 267-269; 1981, 87-96.



was thought to provide better profit, and our sources say that products came from all around the Aegean. It may be the case that a large amount of attic fine ware in the Pontus, that have the same pattern of distribution as elsewhere in the colonial world, was an attempt by merchants to provide their customers with pottery made by the most popular city of that time. After all, red-figure painting was an Athenian development that became an important style of Greek vase painting and remained in use throughout the archaic and classical centuries because of its innovativeness. When exactly this became the case is uncertain, but Athenian thalassocracy and the wealth accumulated after the Persian Wars must have played a role. Athenian success in the Persian Wars could not have given the product a better publicity. The only certain evidence we have is that by the late fifth century grain trade with the Black Sea was visible in Athens.

This result supplements our discussion. The model advocated here is one whereby the traders moved whatever was profitable. This is undeniable. However, it does not necessarily mean that trade was unorganised or that no economic or commercial considerations took place. Throughout this thesis, the stress is on state control interest in the trade of strategic resources. Cases such as the formal trade agreement between Athens and Sidon in the 360s whereby Sidonian traders were exempted from the metic tax (*metoikion*), the *choregia*, and from any *eisphora*, suggest that Athens wished to direct trade to and from Sidon.<sup>172</sup> Exemption from the metic tax and from taxation (*ateleia*) cost Athens monetarily in the form of forsaken revenue but, at the same time improved commerce in the Piraeus, since these methods increased profitability and lowered risk of those who performed trade-related services.

Grain was also taxable, from the beginning to the end of their journey. Laws granting

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<sup>172</sup> Gastaldi, 2004, 105ff; SEG LV 136. RO 21. 29-34. Also, Debord, 1999.

exemption from taxation proves this transaction in important commodities.<sup>173</sup> Thucydides and Isocrates, comment on the revenues (not tribute) extracted from Amphipolis, and demonstrate the economic considerations that lay inside the Athenian mind.<sup>174</sup> Harbour and market dues, taxes on sales and auction, and all imports and exports were taxed, levied at a flat rate according to value, with no distinction made between citizen or non-citizen, free or slave. A typical tax was one-fiftieth (*pentekoste*). This sum was levied at Piraeus on all goods imported or exported through the harbour, no matter their origin or nature, but not on goods in transit. It was payable when the goods were released.<sup>175</sup> However, indirect taxes were imposed on transit trade; Thrasybulos' 10% tax on all trade ships exiting the Hellespont, first introduced by Alcibiades (410),<sup>176</sup> was not a direct tax.<sup>177</sup>

Other exporters of grain are also found on the periphery of the Greek world. From Cyprus, *IG* II<sup>2</sup> 407 (c. 330) refers to a grain shipment from the island (σιτηγῶν εἰς τὸν ἐμπόριον τὸ Ἀθηναίων διατελεῖ [καὶ] τῇς τοῦ σίτου πομπῆς ἐκ Κύπρου); *IG* II<sup>2</sup> 360 (325/4) has a Cypriot honoured by the *demos* of Athens for his multiple services in providing Athens with grain;<sup>178</sup> *IG* II<sup>2</sup> 283 of 336/5 refers to a Salaminian who brought grain to Athens via Egypt: σιτηγήσεν ἐξ Αἰγύπτου; and we have the report of Andokides, who tried to win the favour of the Athenians by arranging for a shipment of grain from Cyprus.<sup>179</sup> It is possible that Cyprus served as an *entrepôt* for Egyptian grain, but Andokides does not imply this. When we come to Strabo, he clearly states that Cyprus is a fertile island and has a sufficient supply of grain, oil, and wine to be self-sufficient (ἡ Κύπρος τῇ θέσει. Κατ' ἀρετὴν δ' οὐδεμιᾶς τῶν νήσων λείπεται· καὶ γὰρ εὖοινός ἐστι καὶ εὐέλαιος σίτω τε

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<sup>173</sup> See Engen, 2010, nos 4, 7, 9, 10, 12, 34.

<sup>174</sup> Thucydides 4.108.1; Isocrates 5.2.5. See page 125.

<sup>175</sup> Demosthenes 35.29-30.

<sup>176</sup> Xenophon *Hellenica* 1.1.22.

<sup>177</sup> Demosthenes 20.60.

<sup>178</sup> In *IG* II<sup>2</sup> 337 Athens allows Kitian merchants to acquire land for a temple.

<sup>179</sup> Andokides 2.21.

αὐτάρκει χοῖται).<sup>180</sup> It is safe for now to say that grain exports from Cyprus reached Athens.

The Phoenician cities are a possible, but as yet unconfirmed, source of grain for Athens. We know that the produce they exported was fine flour (*semidalis*) and that Athens and Sidon had formal trade agreements, as is clearly publicized by a fourth-century inscription honouring King Straton of Sidon (c. 365-2),<sup>181</sup> which grants privileges to Sidonian merchants.<sup>182</sup> Unfortunately, there is no specification as to the products of trade concerned. However, we do know that the Phoenicians conducted an important transit trade in the manufactured goods of Egypt and Babylonia. Caravan trade in perfume, spices, and aromatics passed through Tyre and Sidon on its way to Greece as reported by Herodotos.<sup>183</sup> Lying close to the Fertile Crescent - a term resulting from the fertility of those regions of Mesopotamia and the Levant - Phoenicia could have been an important *entrepôt* for grain on its way to Greece. Herodotos paid special attention to the fertility of this region in grain.<sup>184</sup> The Fertile Crescent was one of the focal points of civilization owing to its environmental characteristics.<sup>185</sup>

The other exporter of grain to Greece was the region of northeast Africa, in particular, Egypt and Kyrene. Evidence for the classical and archaic period suggests that grain and other commodities from Egypt entered Greek harbours frequently.<sup>186</sup> Egyptian grain may have been the reason for the extensive commercial contacts that existed between Greeks and Naucratis.<sup>187</sup> That Egypt, as part of the Persian Empire, paid part of its tribute in grain,

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<sup>180</sup> Strabo 14.6.5.

<sup>181</sup> Gastaldi, 2004, 105ff; *SEG* LV 136. RO 21(dated c. 378-76). Also, Debord, 1999.

<sup>182</sup> For *semidalis*: Athenaeos 1.28a. RO 21.29-36.

<sup>183</sup> Herodotos 3.107; 1.1.

<sup>184</sup> Herodotos 1.192-3.

<sup>185</sup> A central pillar of Jared Diamond's theory of understanding human history, 1997, ch. 4 and 8.

<sup>186</sup> Demosthenes 56.7-9; Aristotle *Oeconomicus* 1352a18-b25. Boardman, 1999 for Greek and Egyptian archaeological finds. Milne, 1939, 177-183.

<sup>187</sup> Herodotos 2.178.

should alert us to its abundance in the classical era.<sup>188</sup> Athens' relations with Egyptian grain are highlighted by Psammetichus, King of Egypt, who offered a gift of grain to the Athenians in the 440s.<sup>189</sup> Meiggs suggests that Athenian interference in the Egyptian revolt was partly influenced by a desire for Egyptian grain.<sup>190</sup> That during a grain crisis in c. 328, Kyrene, the commercial centre of Libya, exported a total of 805,000 *medimnoi* to forty one different Greek city states (one eighth of it went to Athens) makes more plausible the theory of this region being an exporter of grain.<sup>191</sup>

The final grain producers of the periphery were Sicily and Italy since both exported grain to Greece from at least the fifth century.<sup>192</sup> Ancient writers note the fertility of the soil and the heavy rains that enabled large harvests.<sup>193</sup> In the early fifth century, Sicilian grain and men were the basis of negotiations between the Athenian representatives and Gelon, the fifth-century tyrant of Gela and Syracuse,<sup>194</sup> which were asked to support the Greek states for the war against Persia. This raises the possibility of earlier exports to Greece.

In mainland Greece, we know of two exporters of grain, Thessaly and Epiros. Both produced and exported grain, in the fourth century at least.<sup>195</sup> The only other source of information for these is their inclusion in a Kyrenean inscription of c. 328,<sup>196</sup> which might suggest that their surpluses were not sufficient to outlast a period of famine.<sup>197</sup> Finally, there were the three Athenian cleruchic islands, Imbros, Skyros, and Lemnos,<sup>198</sup> but these belong to another category, as non-independent exporters of grain.

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<sup>188</sup> Herodotos 3.91.3.

<sup>189</sup> Scholia Aristophanes *Wasps* 718; Plutarch *Pericles* 37.4.

<sup>190</sup> Meiggs, 1972, 95.

<sup>191</sup> RO 96; SEG IX 2. Whitby, 1998, 118-127 for the periphery.

<sup>192</sup> Thucydides 3.86.4; Demosthenes 56.9. RO 100. 217-227. Bresson, 2011, 66-96.

<sup>193</sup> Theophrastos *On Plants* 84.4, 6.6; Strabo 6.2.7.

<sup>194</sup> Herodotos 7.158.

<sup>195</sup> Xenophon *Hellenica* 6.1.11; 5.4.56-57; Lykourgos *Leokrates* 26.

<sup>196</sup> Thessaly: RO 96.8, 25. Epirus: RO 96.10.

<sup>197</sup> Thessaly is recorded as a supplier of Rome c. 150. Garnsey, Gallant and Rathbone, 1984, 30-44 discuss Thessaly's geology and topography. Surpluses existed, but there was nothing sufficiently exceptional in its production for Thessaly to be called a granary. Helly, 2008, 25-108 offers a new version of IG IX 2, 506, three decrees from hellenistic Larisa concerning privileges granted to Athens on the importation of Thessalian grain.

<sup>198</sup> Moreno, 2007a, 107-113, 316; Stroud, 1998; Cargill, 1995, 12-15.

### 1.1.5 Precious metals

There were several known and important metals in antiquity: gold, silver, copper, lead, tin, iron, and mercury. Each has its own value; for example, copper and tin were typically used for tools and weapons. However, literary evidence says little about these metals being mined in abundance on mainland Greece or of their trade. The possible scenario has copper and tin imported from Cyprus and western Europe (Britain, Brittany, Iberia) respectively where they existed in large quantities.<sup>199</sup> For the purposes of this thesis, the focus will be on precious metals; a term coined to denote rare metals that were used as currency. Gold and silver were the main metals of coinage.<sup>200</sup> It is possible to differentiate between the policies exercised by Athens for access to raw silver deposits and that for acquiring coinage, usually with the form of tribute or tax.

The most striking evidence we have is the Athenian war on Thasos in 465 for the control of its mine(s) on the opposite shore. This took place when, according to Thucydides, Thasos and Athens quarreled over the control of the *emporion* on the Thracian coast, opposite Thasos, and over the mine controlled by Thasos on the mainland.<sup>201</sup> After two years of fighting, the Thasians capitulated. One of the terms was for Thasos to surrender its possessions on the mainland, including the mine.<sup>202</sup> The details of this campaign, however, will be explored in chapter Three. What should be emphasised at this stage is that the Athenians found necessary to start a full scale war with an ally over the control of an area rich in natural resources, precious metals, timber, wine etc.<sup>203</sup> Surprisingly, this is the only evidence we have of an Athenian acquisitive foreign policy over the control of silver. Even

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<sup>199</sup> Penhalluric, 1986; Pulak, 2001 for the Uluburun shipwreck (c.1300) that carried tin ingots. Herodotos' famous passage 3.115 where he described tin as coming from the northern edge of the word, the Cassiterides (from the Greek "*kassiteros*" for tin).

<sup>200</sup> Healy, 1978, 239-242. Herodotos 1.94.1 credits the Lydians with the invention of coinage. For the exchange of currency, see *IKalchedon* 16; Plato *Republic* 371b.

<sup>201</sup> Plutarch *Kimon* 14.2; Thucydides 1.100.2; Diodoros 11.70.1; Polyainos. 2.33; 8.67 for the hardships endured during the siege.

<sup>202</sup> Thucydides 1.101.3; Plutarch *Kimon* 14.2; Polyainos. 2.33; 8.67; *IG I<sup>3</sup>* 1144 is a list of Athenian casualties in this campaign.

<sup>203</sup> See page 120.

more disappointing is the lack of evidence about the way(s) the Athenians exploited Thasian mine(s) and forests. Thucydides who owned the Scapte Hyle mine in the area tells us nothing.<sup>204</sup> For Thrace and Macedonia, we have no records of how the extraction of local resources took place, but we do know that in the region, the Athenians accumulated a tremendous amount of revenue through tribute.<sup>205</sup>

The Athenians were fortunate enough to have mines on their own. The Laurion mines in southeast Attica were extremely productive at certain periods providing Athens with a substantial amount of silver. In the 480s a large vein of silver was found, a 100 talents worth, which Themistocles proposed to use to fund the construction of a fleet.<sup>206</sup> In c. 330 the income from a mine lease was said to be 300 talents.<sup>207</sup> Wars could hinder their efficiency. It is estimated that the Peloponnesian War had taken its toll on the silver mines of Laureion, as the Dekeleian phase halted mining activity and reduced Athenian minting.<sup>208</sup> In the early fourth century, mining activity seems to have been of slow pace and suggests difficulty in recovering from the effects of the war. Xenophon, through the mouth of Socrates, points to the small revenues of the mines (360s).<sup>209</sup> Mine leases also seem to have been small in number in 367/6.<sup>210</sup> It is uncertain whether this evidence refers to a temporary decline in productivity or to a low level of mine production since 404.<sup>211</sup> Xenophon is awfully silent of the revenue from mine leases. Hence, the assessment of the evidence on the Laurion silver mines is not easy as no secured comparisons with the fifth century can be made.

Modern scholarship places its focus on the silver mines of Athens, drawing on the extensive archaeological investigation of the mines themselves and on the inscribed mine

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<sup>204</sup> Thucydides 1.101.3; Plutarch *Kimón* 14.2.

<sup>205</sup> See 3.2.3.

<sup>206</sup> Herodotos 7.144.1-2; [Aristotle] *Athenaion Politeia* 22.7; Plutarch *Themistocles* 4.1-3.

<sup>207</sup> Hypereides 4.35.

<sup>208</sup> Kelly, 1982, 25-54.

<sup>209</sup> Xenophon *Memorabilia* 3.5.4.

<sup>210</sup> Crosby, 1950, 189-312.

<sup>211</sup> Thompson, 1978, 420-421; Isager and Hansen 1975, 42-49; Hopper, 1953, 250-254. Thucydides 6.91.7; Xenophon *Memorabilia* 3.6.11-12; *Poroi* 4.1.13.

leases. Athens hired out mine leases to private individuals, who in turn, used private owned slaves to excavate ores. That is, state practice was to relieve itself of management responsibilities by hiring out public rights to individuals, such as mine leases and the collection of harbour tax.<sup>212</sup> The idea of selling out public domains in the form of leases or monopolies is found also in Xenophon, who suggests raising money for the city and making the silver mines more profitable by imitating private slave owners: “to acquire public slaves in order to hire them out to private individuals”.<sup>213</sup> Shipton has shown that the Athenian elite preferred leasing high-profit silver mines to public land, with the purpose to make productive investments for profit.<sup>214</sup> In turn, the elite funded the Athenian naval fleet by the obligation of *leitourgia*, the expensive offer of service to the people, and thus to the polis.

Silver minting was part of the polis’ economic activity. One of the most important roles it had was that silver currency paid for the Athenian fleet, its campaigns, and the construction of its ships. Notoriously, Themistocles persuaded the Athenians to invest the newly-discovered Laurion silver in the construction of 200 warships, enabling Athens to become a naval power. In addition, the revenues from the Athenian silver mines and the tribute collected from various allies financed the Athenian state. In particular, tribute in the form of money was the most notorious monetary resource available to the Athenians. The Athenians exacted tribute in the form of *phoros* or *synteleia*, and with it were able to fund their military machine. The amount of the Delian League tribute was said to be 460 talents in 477 and 600 talents in 432.<sup>215</sup> Kallet-Marx has offered a good discussion of the role of financial resources in Thucydides. Her treatment sufficiently appreciates the crucial connections in Thucydides: financial resources enable naval power, which enable empire and lead to *arche*. Power needs great expense, and Kallet-Marx remarks that this is not

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<sup>212</sup> Andokides 1.133. Hopper, 1979, 164-189.

<sup>213</sup> Xenophon *Poroi* 4.17. In 3.14, Xenophon proposes the establishment of a public merchant fleet, to be leased under securities.

<sup>214</sup> Shipton, 2001, 129-144.

<sup>215</sup> Thucydides 1.96.2; 2.13.3.

economic imperialism, but power does lead to enrichment: control is necessary to ensure revenue which is necessary to ensure control.<sup>216</sup> Money, the end product of mining activity, should be seen as an important resource for war.

The construction and maintenance of a sizeable fleet needed a lot of silver. But we do not know how much silver from Laurion and/or Thrace was allocated for that use. According to Thucydides, Pericles referred to 6000 talents of silver in reserve, (ἀργυρίου ἐπισήμου ἑξακισχιλίων ταλάντων) in his famous speech which enumerated Athenian resources. Most probably, this came from the revenue from mines,<sup>217</sup> and played an instrumental role in financing Athenian ships during difficult times of the Peloponnesian War. In spite of this wealth, the occupation of Dekeleia (413) and the subsequent defeat in 404 greatly affected the mines.<sup>218</sup> In the early fourth century, we would expect to see an energetic resumption of mine activity for the restoration of Athenian power and currency; if anything, to replace the loss of imperial revenue. But this seems not to be the case. The earliest mine lease we have is of 367.<sup>219</sup> A probable cause sees wealthy Athenians investing whatever property they had left to land leases rather than mine ones. We simply do not have sufficient factors to explain the reduced mining activity of the early fourth century. But something sparked change as we notice a considerable mining activity in the 350s, 340s and 330s.<sup>220</sup> This was a period of recovery according to Xenophon's *Poroi*, after Athens had lost the Social War (355). Perhaps there is a correlation between appeasement and mine activity. But, this was also a period where Athens witnessed Philip's continuous advancement over Athenian interests in the Chersonese, Amphipolis, Olynthus, Euboea, Byzantium etc. Let us see now where precious metals could be found in the ancient Aegean world.

On the periphery of the Greek World, the Black Sea had several precious-metal

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<sup>216</sup> Kallet-Marx, 1993, 7. Also, 2001; 1994.

<sup>217</sup> Thucydides 2.13, cf. 14.9.

<sup>218</sup> Hopper, 1953, 248-9.

<sup>219</sup> Crosby, 1950, no. 1.

<sup>220</sup> Hopper, 1953, 250; Crosby, 1950, no. 2-12.



deposits. Colchis and Dacia are each traditionally associated with gold resources (Armenian resources, on the northern coast of Asia Minor, are usually considered to be part of the Black Sea).<sup>221</sup> Asia Minor had gold deposits in two regions, the Troas and the Paktolos river area. In the Troas, ancient sources confirm the extensive finds of gold deposits in Astyra, near Abydos,<sup>222</sup> while Pliny the Elder reports precious stones at Lampsakos.<sup>223</sup> The Paktolos area and its homonymous river were famous for the gold washed from the sands, and said to have been the source of Croesus' riches.<sup>224</sup> Another possible source of precious metals on the periphery of the Greek world was Cyprus.<sup>225</sup> In the West, we may note the Huelva region of the Iberian Peninsula,<sup>226</sup> Gaul,<sup>227</sup> Sardinia,<sup>228</sup> Etruria,<sup>229</sup> and Damastion in Illyria, with which Epidamnus was probably connected.<sup>230</sup> These metals have been connected with Phoenician and Greek presence during the colonisation period.<sup>231</sup> It also relates to the theme of conflict between Carthage and Rome, as Hannibal's father Hamilcar made Spain his new base of operations against Rome.

Thrace and Macedonia were particularly rich in deposits of gold and silver. These came from the Gallikos River, the Axios River, and Mount Dysoron.<sup>232</sup> Chalkidike also had gold and silver deposits, of which those on Mount Stratonike and in the Lagkadas basin were notably extensive. The cities of Akanthos and Apollonia laid claim to these resources,

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<sup>221</sup> Strabo 11.2.19; Appian *The Mithridatic Wars* 103; Pliny *Natural History* 6.14, 30; 33.52. Tsetskhladze, 1998a, 64-65. Strabo 11.14.9 offers an account on Armenian resources.

<sup>222</sup> Xenophon *Hellenica* 4.8.37; Strabo 13.1.23. Cook, 1973, 290, 366; Treister, 1996, 188, Shepherd, 1993, 223. Theophrastos *On Stones* 32.

<sup>223</sup> Pliny *Natural History* 37.74.

<sup>224</sup> Strabo 13.4.5; Herodotos 1.69.4, 93.1; 5.101.2; Pliny *Natural History* 33.66. Healy, 1978, 46; Shepherd, 1993, 225; Treister, 1996, 112. See also Nonnus *Dionysiaca* 10.142; 43.400; 12.123 for the personification of the River-God and attested with gold and mines.

<sup>225</sup> Cyprus: Aristotle *Frg. Varia* 6.37.266. Bissa, 2009, 47; Hadjistavrinou & Constantinou, 1982, 226.

<sup>226</sup> Strabo 3.2.8, 4.2. Vasquez, 1989, 114-115, 153, 156-158.

<sup>227</sup> Evidence of exploitation comes from the Roman period, but we should not disregard the possibility that Greeks in Massalia were aware of its resources. Diodoros 5.27.1. Triester, 1996, 148.

<sup>228</sup> Treister, 1996, 186; Healy, 1978, 53.

<sup>229</sup> Athenaeos 1.28b. Treister, 1996, 252.

<sup>230</sup> Strabo 7.7.8. Shepherd, 1993, 106-107.

<sup>231</sup> Dietler, 2009; Neville, 2007; Bierling and Gitin, 2002.

<sup>232</sup> Bissa, 2009, 33 and n.16 and 17.

with the Olynthian cities vying for control.<sup>233</sup> Alluvial gold deposits were found in lower Thrace, on the Strymon River,<sup>234</sup> and Herodotos reports a silver deposit in the same area.<sup>235</sup> Most famous were the mines of Pangaion, Philippoi, Daton and Skapte Hyle. Another mine existed in Eastern Thrace on the river Ardas.<sup>236</sup> Moving on to the Aegean, we find Siphnos as a producer of gold and silver. Herodotos is quite definite that in the archaic age the Siphnians were the richest of the islanders (the flooding of the mine had caused the Siphnians to lose their wealth by the end of the archaic period).<sup>237</sup> For other islands, information is not substantial, but does suggest the exploitation of metal deposits at Samos, Melos, Kimolos, and at Methymna in Lesbos.<sup>238</sup> Last, but not least, the Athenian silver deposits of the Laureion mines have been repeatedly discussed, and little need be said about them.<sup>239</sup> Unfortunately, evidence of the Athenians extracting metals from the above areas is scant. The only reference we have about their interest in foreign mines comes from Thucydides, who describes the Athenian possession of Skapte Hyle mine, previously owned by Thasos.<sup>240</sup> For the rest of the regions we can only speculate at Athenian interests in the area; Melos, Kimolos, and Methymna in Lesbos were members of both the Delian League and the Second Athenian League.

In sum, there was a considerable volume of gold and silver available in the Mediterranean world, attested not only by ancient and contemporary sources, but by the extant obverse dies,<sup>241</sup> and wide circulation of metals in the form of coins. A big part of the amount of gold/silver circulation in the Mediterranean took place with trade, as for example the Thasian coins (c.525) that have been found widely distributed in the Mediterranean

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<sup>233</sup> Hansen and Nielsen, 2004, 553, 613; Healy, 1978, 46-47.

<sup>234</sup> Bissa, 2009, 34; Treister, 1996, 186; Shepherd, 1993, 96; Isaac, 1986, 10-15.

<sup>235</sup> Herodotos 5.17.2.

<sup>236</sup> Pliny *Natural History* 23.66. Bissa, 2009, 38 and notes; Shepherd, 1993, 103; Healy, 1978, 46.

<sup>237</sup> Herodotos 3.57; Pausanias 10.11.2. See Treister, 1996, 188; Healy, 1978, 46.

<sup>238</sup> Samos: Aristotle *Frg. Varia* 8.444.572; Treister, 1996, 186; Healy, 1978, 46. Melos: Aristotle *On Marvellous Things Heard* 44; Treister, 1996, 186. Kimolos: Shepherd, 1993, 112. Methymna: Treister, 1996, 186; Healy, 1978, 53.

<sup>239</sup> See Bissa, 2009, 40-42.

<sup>240</sup> Thucydides 1.101.3; Plutarch *Kimon* 14.2.

<sup>241</sup> De Callataj, 2011, 7-29; 2003, 87 supports the possibility of calculating coin production based on extant dies.

(Nile Delta, Metapontum, Tarentum, Balkan interior).<sup>242</sup> Tribute (6,000 talents = 36 million drachmas as the income of Athens from the entire Delian League),<sup>243</sup> revenue,<sup>244</sup> and taxes also contributed to the wide distribution of precious metals.<sup>245</sup>

### 1.1.6 *Miltos*

Ochre was a natural mixture of red ferric oxide with clay and sand, and was referred to in antiquity as *miltos*.<sup>246</sup> The *Lexicon* of Pseudo-Zonaras describes it as: Μίλοπαρείος, ἐρυθρὸς τὰς παρειάς. μίλτος γὰρ εἶδος ἐρυθρόν. Aristotle offers a similar description: ἐρυθρά ἐστιν ὥσπερ μίλτος.<sup>247</sup> *Miltos* can dissolve easily and was valued for its ability to impart red colour to a variety of objects. Thus “vases were washed with ochre to lighten the colour of the clay body”<sup>248</sup> and *miltos* gave the assembly ropes their distinctive red colour (ἡ μίλτος: Κατὰ γὰρ τὴν ἀγορὰν ἐσόβουν εἰς ἐκκλησίαν τοὺς Ἀθηναίους μεμιλωμένω σχοινίῳ).<sup>249</sup> It was even used for deception. The story goes that Amphiretos was captured by pirates, and taken to Lemnos to wait for his ransom. As he was kept under close guard, Amphiretos mixed *miltos* with sea-water and drank it. It was an ingenious device as this coloured his stools, deceiving the bandits in assuming that Amphiretos was suffering from haemorrhage. Fearing that his death would eliminate the prospect of a ransom, they released him in the hope that exercise would restore his health. However, Amphiretos escaped by night back to Akanthos.<sup>250</sup> Another exciting use of *miltos* was for medical reasons. Dioscorides and Hippocrates repeatedly mention *miltos* in their medical

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<sup>242</sup> Xenophon *Poroi* 3.2; money supply: Herodotos, 1.50-51, 3.96.2; Thucydides 2.13.4-5, 6.8.1; Diodoros 16.56.5-7. Pouilloux, 1954, 48-56 for.

<sup>243</sup> Thucydides 2.13.3; cf. Diodoros 12.40.1.

<sup>244</sup> Xenophon *Anabasis* 7.127 gives Athens' total external and internal revenue to be 1000 talents.

<sup>245</sup> E.g. the income from the 2 per cent harbour (*pentekoste*) tax in 2<sup>nd</sup> Delos amounted to c. 170 talents), Polybios 30.31.12. That raises a total of valued trading goods of c. 8300 talents. The comparable income from the *pentekoste* in 5<sup>th</sup> century Athens was 186,000 drachmas (Andokides 1.133), equivalent to a trade volume of c.1550 talents. See also Callataÿ, 2006.

<sup>246</sup> Healy, 1978, 253.

<sup>247</sup> *History of Animals* 6.2.1.

<sup>248</sup> Noble, 1965, 60-61.

<sup>249</sup> Aristophanes *Acharnians* 21-2; *Scholia Assembly Women* 378-9.

<sup>250</sup> Polyainos 6.54.

textbooks.<sup>251</sup> It is to be noted that red ochre is still used by an Australian Aboriginal people for medicine purposes.<sup>252</sup>

Its most useful application, however, was on ships.<sup>253</sup> Homer, Herodotos, and the *lexica* of Hesychius and the Suda associate *miltos* with ship-painting.<sup>254</sup> Katsaros attempted to understand these references by conducting an experiment, in which wood covered with *miltos* was put to the test. His results were fascinating: *miltos* protects wood from sea water and plant growth, and helps to secure the impermeability of ship's timber,<sup>255</sup> a result previously suggested by Tod,<sup>256</sup> and followed by Casson and Hopper.<sup>257</sup> Regardless of whether the ancients started using *miltos* for decorating purposes, the plausible scenario is that the ancient sailor took notice of the ability of *miltos* to protect wood from sea water and algae, allowing wood, and, consequently, ships, to survive longer (we must remember here the costly expense of triremes). Cherry *et al.*, note that pitch was the material used to make the seams in wooden ships watertight.<sup>258</sup> But despite the use of pitch, the ancients still thought it was not sufficient to prevent waterlog, as ships were occasionally dragged onto beaches or docked in order to permit their hulls to dry out.<sup>259</sup> Also, while Theophrastos' treatise *On Plants* describes pitch extraction from timber in various places, he says nothing of it being used to seal cracks between timbers on ships.<sup>260</sup> It is not a case of preferring one to the other. Any method or element of nature that could be beneficial to the longevity and navigability of a ship, would be used to protect an expensive ship like the trireme.

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<sup>251</sup> Dioscourides *De Materia Medica* 5.96.1-3, 126.5; Hippocrates *De Mulierum Affectibus* i-iii, 215.6.

<sup>252</sup> Peile, 1979, 214-217. Herodotos 4.191, 194 refers to the Maxyans and the Gyzantes, two Libyan tribes that smeared their bodies with red ochre.

<sup>253</sup> Photos-Jones *et al.*, 1997, 359-371 for other usages. *Miltos* seems also to go hand-in-hand with the construction of towers, temples, and roofs: IG II<sup>2</sup> 463. 90; IG IV<sup>2</sup>, 1 115; IG VII 3073. 103ff; ID 104 (5).3; IG XI,2 145.13; 163.11, even the name of a month: Μιλοφοριώνα μήνα, IG XII,7 389.38.

<sup>254</sup> Herodotos 3.58: τὸ δὲ παλαιὸν ἄπασαι αἱ νέες ἦσαν μιληλιφέες; Scholia Homer *Odyssey* 9.125.2: νέες πάρα μιλοπάροιοι μιλωτάς παρειὰς ἔχουσαι, τουτέστι πρῶρας κεχρισμένας; 2.B.67: νῆες μιλοπάροιοι; Suda: s.v. Μιλοπάροιοι νῆες; Hesychius s.v. μιλόπρωρος.

<sup>255</sup> Katsaros, 2008, 385-389.

<sup>256</sup> Tod II, no.162.

<sup>257</sup> Casson, 1995, 43-46; Hopper, 1979, 60, 164.

<sup>258</sup> Cherry *et al.*, 1991, 300.

<sup>259</sup> Morrison and Williams, 1968, 280.

<sup>260</sup> Theophrastos 9.2.2-5; 9.3.1-3. Note that Theophrastos refers to pitch as *πίττα*.

*Miltos* was found in Egypt, Carthage, Sinope, and on Lemnos and Keos.<sup>261</sup> Sinope did not produce *miltos*, but seems to have been a famous centre of re-export, so much so that *miltos* acquired in Sinope had its own distinctive name.<sup>262</sup> Nothing is known about the Athenian *miltos* trade with Sinope, Egypt, Carthage and Lemnos. Hence, nothing can be said or even assumed about an Athenian presence there. Consequently, this important, but neglected resource would have been left unnoticed if not for a single inscription found on the Acropolis, IG II<sup>2</sup> 1128, which points specifically to Athenian regulation of Kean *miltos* export in the mid-fourth century.<sup>263</sup> Theophrastos ranks Kean *miltos* at the top of his list of varieties.<sup>264</sup> Galleries found on the northeastern part of Keos, at Spathi, and on the eastern part, at Orkos,<sup>265</sup> support Theophrastos' reference to *miltos*, and iron, being exploited on the island in the same period.<sup>266</sup> IG II<sup>2</sup> 1128 and the Athenian relations with Keos offer a puzzling and very exciting theme for discussion, not least because the prominence given to the state organised operation at Keos concerning *miltos* may or may not be typical. However, the thematic approach of this thesis requires me to stop the discussion here and resume it in chapter 3.2.6 and 6.3.

Chapter One provided an essential foundation for the study of natural resources in Athenian foreign policy, as it demonstrated the different layers of interaction and its significance as an instrument of war. It identified the strategic utility of grain, timber, precious metals and red ochre for the Athenian state. It explored to a reasonable degree these materials, their relation to Athens, their strategic utility for the Athenian state, and

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<sup>261</sup> Theophrastos *On Stones* 8.52. Photos-Jones *et al.* 1997, 360.

<sup>262</sup> Eustathius *Commentarium in Dionysii Periegetae* 116, 32: Αὐτὸ δὲ τοῦτο Σινωπικὴ ἢ μίλτος λέγεται κατὰ τοὺς παλαιούς οὐ διὰ τὸ αὐτόθι γίνεσθαι, ἀλλὰ διὰ τὸ ἐκεῖ πρὸς τῶν ἐμπόρων κατὰγεσθαι. Διὰ τοῦτοδὲ τάχα καὶ σιναπίδιον παραφθείροντες οἱ τεχνῖται τὸ τοιοῦτον χρώμα φασιν. Strabo 12.10: Σινωπικὴ μίλτος ἀρίστη τῶν πασῶν Σινωπικὴ διότι κατὰγειν ἐκείσε εἰώθεσαν οἱ ἔμποροι πρὶν ἢ τὸ τῶν Ἐφεσίων ἐμπόριον μέχρι τῶν ἐνθάδε ἀνθρώπων διχῆθαι. According to Dioscorides *De Materia Medica* 5.96.3-3 *miltos* was extracted from the mountains of Kappadokia: μίλτος Σινωπικὴ κρατίστη ἢ πυκνὴ καὶ βαρεῖα, ἡπατίζουσα, ἄλιθος, ὁμόχρους, πολύχυλος ἐν τῇ ἀνέσει. Συλλέγεται δὲ ἐν τῇ Καππαδοκίᾳ ἐν σπηλαίοις τισί, διυλιζομένη τε φέρεται εἰς Σινώπην καὶ πιπράσκειται, ὅθεν καὶ τὴν προσωνυμίαν ἔσχηκεν.

<sup>263</sup> See page 95.

<sup>264</sup> Theophrastos *On Stones* 8.51-4.

<sup>265</sup> Mendoni, 1991, 94.

<sup>266</sup> Theophrastos *On Stones* 8.52.

subsequently, since natural resources are to be found in dispersed geographic areas, a number of regions of Athenian interest. A hypothesis is built from a subset of available observations, where throughout the classical period the Athenians remained vigilant to procurement of natural resources. This allowed them to remain a naval power and a state to be reckoned with. The function of the Athenian fleet as a power to enforce maritime movements, to exercise foreign policy and method of rule remained unhindered, until it was restricted effectively by Macedonian power. But, even after Chaeronea, the Athenian military fleet maintained its power. Similarly, we record Athenian vigour to develop relations with sources that supplied grain. The numbers cited above for both timber and grain supplies involve one core truth. That throughout the fifth and fourth centuries Athens remained depended on overseas suppliers. Networks of formal and informal associations were established or continued by the polis throughout the east Mediterranean. These networks relied on individuals and official intervention. Formal intervention might include, for example, the award of *ateleia* and *proxenia* to certain individuals. Using these features as its backdrop, the following chapters will consider how Athens was able to extract and gain access to natural resources from its relations with foreign individuals and communities. But above all, the decision to acquire naval power which in turn protected grain shipments drew the city even more inextricably into a web of international dependence. One way or another, resources transformed Athenian foreign policy and Athens' position in the Greek world. This chapter therefore sets up the study of identifying characteristics of Athenian policy abroad in relation to natural resources. Was this a rational policy? What were the difficulties that the Athenians confronted in the fifth and especially in the fourth centuries to access natural resources? Can we identify changes in the historical conditions that characterize the difficulties that the Athenians met? How did the Athenians respond to these problems? The following chapters will consider answering these questions.

One of the aims of this extended survey of identifying certain strategic resources has been to establish that the Greeks, and the Athenians in particular, understood the importance natural resources had for war efforts, survival, and prosperity. For this reason, the next step will be to investigate in more detail how the Athenians deliberated in the assembly in regards to strategic natural resources.

## **Strategic Natural Resources and Athenian Political Discourse**

This chapter endeavours to examine the public political discourse within the Athenian polity regarding the nexus between strategic natural resources and foreign policy. The chief corpus of our analysis consists of surviving orations from Attic politicians, the writings of classical historians, and the official inscriptions of the Athenian state. Placing these disparate sources in a shared setting, we are able to observe the difference in the attitudes of various texts. A comparison is historically interesting and important. In particular, historical texts recognise the importance of natural resources for foreign policy but fourth-century assembly speeches are rather quiet about them.

Classical historians, Herodotos, Thucydides, and Xenophon, bring two benefits into this study. First, quite often the historians commented on the natural resources of the places they talked about. Second, the speeches presented in their works are comparable to our assembly foreign-policy speeches. Although they are a summary of what was said, speeches in a historian's texts encapsulate political arguments, and are more numerous and vivid than assembly speeches. A useful juxtaposition between Thucydides with Xenophon will enable us to compare their conceptualisation through what the characters of their histories say on matters of natural resources. A historical speech is usually read in conjunction with the surrounding narrative and that helps the reader to appreciate the weight of argument. It may even reflect the idiosyncratic ideas of the individual historian; but so do speeches in the assembly. On the other hand, assembly speeches may be said to provide evidence for popular views contrary to that of the speeches in Thucydides and Xenophon. However, as



we will see, in the latter's work the speeches that refer to natural resources were composed to address a wider problem of foreign policy. Therefore, any mention to natural resources accompanies the overall argument, and can be said to reflect popular view like the assembly speeches. Here exists another difficulty; the history of Thucydides and to a lesser extent that of Xenophon were written in and about different periods than those of our assembly speeches. It must be emphasised that each of the surviving texts has an independent value insofar as they each facilitate our research into the notion of natural resources as factors in foreign policy deliberation. Even though their histories were written in different periods, and may only present the ideas of the individual historian,<sup>267</sup> they nevertheless provide evidence for foreign policy arguments. The problems concerning the authenticity and reliability of political speeches do have to be confronted in order to judge the value or nature of the evidence but, are limited in scope, as not to lose focus in this chapter. Hence I will discuss cases where Herodotos felt strongly about the role of natural resources in foreign policy, the problem of authenticity and reliability of Thucydides and of fourth-century politicians. Finally, inscriptions present the actions and decisions of the official Athenian state; thus, we witness the outcome of extensive deliberations in the Athenian assembly. Many were interstate agreements preserved on stone stelae that reveal what was actually agreed between Athens and the other party. They possess authenticity, as they are the decrees of the Athenian people, though their statements lack the descriptive nature of a historian's account. Moreover, inscriptions furnish the results of assembly debates, thus providing more evidence of the importance of natural resources within broader discussion of foreign policy. The latter is not without difficulties. There are important and significant changes in the epigraphical habit in the fifth and fourth centuries that make it extremely problematic to compare what the epigraphical evidence says about natural resources in these two centuries. Despite inconsistency and sparse evidence, by studying epigraphic

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<sup>267</sup> Morrison, 2006.

evidence we get a better sense of the political discourse in the Athenian polity regarding access to strategic natural resources.

Notwithstanding these difficulties, by making a distinction between historians, orators, and inscriptions we are able to juxtapose their divergent portrayals of natural resources within the context of foreign policy. Obviously, the complexity of Athenian policy cannot be reduced to a single factor. Nevertheless, this analysis will help us to answer whether Athens' ascent to power was driven, partially, by natural resources, and/or whether their period in power was based on natural resource considerations. In the end, I hope to demonstrate that today's perception of the role of natural resources in foreign-policy decision making is not simply a modern assumption.

## 2.1 Speeches in Historians

Herodotos was the first historian to stress the central position natural resources have as a precious commodity valuable for war efforts. A speech made by Megabazus, a Persian general, whom Dareius had left behind to complete the conquest of Thrace, expresses a clear disposition of how a Greek historian assumed that Greeks and Persians alike considered and deliberated about the use of natural resources in regards to the advancement of power. The event took place a little later than 514, as Histiaios, tyrant of Miletos and the main character of the story, was the same man who had saved the bridge across the Danube for the retreating Persians. Histiaios was offered a choice of whatever he wanted, for his loyalty to Dareius. He asked and received to take possession of Myrkinos in Lower Thrace (τὴν παρὰ Δαρείου αἰτήσας ἔτυχε μισθὸν δωρεὴν φυλακῆς τῆς σχεδίας ἐόντος δὲ τοῦ χώρου

τούτου παρὰ Στρυμόνα ποταμὸν τῷ οὐνομα ἐστὶ Μύρκινος).<sup>268</sup> When Megabazos understood the importance of Myrkinos, and what Histiaios was doing, as soon as he came to Sardis, he advised the King to recall his promise (μαθὼν ὁ Μεγάβαζος τὸ ποιούμενον ἐκ τοῦ Ἰστιαίου, ὥς ἦλθε τάχιστα ἐς τὰς Σάρδεις ἄγων τοὺς Παίονας, ἔλεγε Δαρεΐῳ τάδε). His argument is presented in direct speech:

King, what is this that you have done? You have permitted a clever and cunning Greek to build a city in Thrace, where there are abundant forests for ship-building, much wood for oars, mines of silver, and many people both Greek and foreign dwelling around, who, when they have a champion to lead them, will carry out all his orders by day or by night. Stop this man, then, from doing these things so that you will not be entangled in a war with your own subjects, but use gentle means to do so. When you have him in your grasp, see to it that he never returns to the Greeks.<sup>269</sup>

The speech of Megabazos allows Herodotos to make the scene more vivid for his audience, to present the sort of idea he wishes to convey without using his own voice. Herodotos' choice to report this event in direct speech is telling, especially when we acknowledge the fact that Megabazos' speech is a rare incident in the early books of his *Histories*.<sup>270</sup> According to Solmsen, speeches are placed in the content of *Histories* to serve certain purposes, and the Histiaios event, along with his removal and later instigation of Aristagoras' revolt, serve to make the connection between speeches and events, in this case, the Ionian revolt.<sup>271</sup> This is true, but it is Histiaios' actions to obtain an area rich in timber and metals for further aggrandizement of his power supply-base that caused Megabazos' speech, emphatically described at the court of Dareius. Such advantages raised sufficient concern for the Persians not to allow Histiaios to control Myrkinos. The impression of the

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<sup>268</sup> Herodotos 5.11, 23.1.

<sup>269</sup> Herodotos 5.23-24.

<sup>270</sup> Solmsen, 1943, 194.

<sup>271</sup> Solmsen, 1943, 195.

danger Histiaios presents is heightened by the very decision of the Great King to remove him.

At first look, the choice of the tyrant of Miletos seems at odds with the geographic distance of his realm, as one would expect him to expand on a neighbouring site. However, Histiaios knew exactly what he was doing. Myrkinos was an area rich in timber for shipbuilding and oar-making and silver mines, as Herodotos emphasises, and further positioned favourably to control the crossing of the Strymon River. Histiaios later attempted the conquest of Thasos in 493, an area also rich in timber and minerals.<sup>272</sup> However, there may be more to what Herodotos says than meets the eye. Dareius could and did bestow favours to loyal subjects, and Histiaios had done a great service to the King. Resources are the key here. Persia's policy at that time was to control the Hellespont and the Thracian-Macedonian coastal road. The area was successfully taken by Megabazos, under the auspices of Dareius (5.2), an area that is described by Herodotos as *τα παραθαλάσσια* (5.10). Myrkinos happens to be adjacent to Paeonia, the valley of the Strymon and near the gold mines of Thrace. Such place should have been noticed to Dareius by his advisors. In fact, Persia took the decision to expatriate the Paeonians (5.12-15), a measure that should be connected with its strategic and economic designs to further tighten control of Thrace. Thus, the event at Dareius' court concerning control of Myrkinos may be the case of Megabazos attempting to get rid of Histiaios from obtaining an important administrative position in the area. What Megabazos could not do was later accomplished through Artaphrenes.<sup>273</sup>

Histiaios and Megabazos were not the only men with the ability to evaluate the physical surroundings of an area in order to exploit its resources for personal benefit. In 497 Aristagoras, son-in-law of and successor to Histiaios, repeated the venture, but died at the hands of the Edonians whilst trying to secure the area around Myrkinos, probably Ennea

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<sup>272</sup> See page 120.

<sup>273</sup> Herodotos 6.30. Blamire, 1959, 142-144.

Hodoi.<sup>274</sup> In similar fashion, Herodotos described how Peisistratos became wealthy from activities around the Thasian *peraia*,<sup>275</sup> wealth that helped him regain power in Athens.<sup>276</sup> Later, Peisistratos launched expeditions to Mytilene and the Chersonese.<sup>277</sup> The addition of external areas of territory for use gave Peisistratos an edge over his opponents at Athens, as money, prestige and mercenaries came into play in gaining the tyrant a place in Athenian history.

Herodotos, from time to time, remarked upon the importance of sovereignty at sea.<sup>278</sup> For instance, he stressed it when Hekataios advised his Ionian friends that the best decision would be to obtain sovereignty of the sea by usurping the gold of a nearby city.<sup>279</sup> Furthermore, Herodotos expressed a similar concern when talking about Thasos' ships, revenue, and walls – resources whose existence should alarm Dareius.<sup>280</sup> Another episode concerns the story of Themistocles, who persuaded the Athenians to invest the newly-discovered Laurion silver in the construction of 200 warships, enabling Athens to become a naval power;<sup>281</sup> it was an investment of sorts in naval resources for the war against Aegina. There is a possibility that Themistocles foresaw the Persian invasion, or that Herodotos was not fully informed by his sources about Themistocles' vision. However, there is no reason not to believe Herodotos; the threat of Aegina was real enough to be used adequately in his speech in order to convince the Athenian people to vote for his grand shipbuilding programme. Later, we learn that beyond the initial building of a fleet, Themistocles put in motion a subsequent plan for constructing 20 triremes every year in order to ensure the maintenance and continual growth of the fleet.<sup>282</sup> This information adds value to the power

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<sup>274</sup> Thucydides 4.102; Diodoros 12.68.1-2.

<sup>275</sup> Herodotos 1.64; [Aristotle] *Athēnaion Politeia* 15.2.

<sup>276</sup> Cole, 1975, 42,44; Seltman, 1924, 56-59.

<sup>277</sup> Herodotos 5.94-95; 6.34-39.

<sup>278</sup> See Herodotos 3.122; 4.7-9; 5.23, 36; 7.139.

<sup>279</sup> Herodotos 5.36.

<sup>280</sup> Herodotos 6.46.

<sup>281</sup> Herodotos 7.144.

<sup>282</sup> Diodoros 11.43.3.

of Themistocles' vision to make Athens the number one naval power in Greece, as the ships were there to stay. In all of the cases outlined above, Herodotos acknowledged the role which natural resources could play in advocating foreign policy. The acquisition of natural resources could pave the way to power for adventurous individuals and states alike. In the case of Histiaios, Herodotos stressed the importance an area and its natural resources have in the overall geopolitical game of the ancient Greek world. These sharp remarks, however, never became a systematic idea in Herodotos' work.<sup>283</sup> In Thucydides, however, this became a theory, as we will now demonstrate.

Thucydides provided an extensive contemporary report of the debates that led to the Peloponnesian War and the Sicilian expedition. His vivid description of the contrasting arguments provides us with not only the expectations of the participants, but also a good picture of the war preparations, the preliminaries leading to the expedition, and the hopes for rich plunder. In particular, a speech made by Alcibiades stresses how fifth-century Athenian politicians could speak in material terms when engaging with matters of foreign policy. The general spoke up in the assembly and presented in simple clear-cut language the goals of the Sicilian expedition. One was the acquisition of abundant Italian timber for the building of more triremes to be used for the war against Sparta and its allies (τριήρεις τε πρὸς ταῖς ἡμετέραις πολλὰς ναυπηγησάμενοι, ἐχούσης τῆς Ἰταλίας ξύλα ἄφθονα τριήρεις τε πρὸς ταῖς ἡμετέραις πολλὰς ναυπηγησάμενοι, ἐχούσης τῆς Ἰταλίας ξύλα ἄφθονα), and the acquisition of money and grain (χρήματα δὲ καὶ σῖτον, ὥστε εὐπορώτερον γίνεσθαι τι αὐτῶν, αὐτὰ τὰ προσγενόμενα ἐκεῖθεν χωρὶα ἔμελλε διαρκῆ).<sup>284</sup> Timber and money, Alcibiades explains, are needed for the better accomplishment of Athenian aims. The other was to prevent grain from being exported to

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<sup>283</sup> De Romilly, 2007, 44 and n.10 *contra* Momigliano, 1944, 1-7.

<sup>284</sup> Thucydides 6.90.3.

the Peloponnese (βουλόμενοι δὲ μήτε σῖτον ἐς τὴν Πελοπόννησον ἄγεσθαι).<sup>285</sup> This meant gaining control of Sicily; however, the goal to further expand Athenian power by the procurement of more timber, and at the same time, to strategically deny the opposition from importing vital natural resources (namely grain) was clear. The assembly passed the motion.

This path towards expansion was an Athenian characteristic that grew over decades of successful foreign policy; it involved the belief that the advancement of the Athenian state depended upon the procurement of essential material goods. This statement finds its biggest exposition in the speech of Pericles, on the eve of the Peloponnesian War, which enumerates Athenian resources: 600 talents from the *phoros*, 6000 talents of silver in reserve, a great sum of gold and silver, the army, the Great Wall, and, 300 triremes (μὲν ἑξακοσίων ταλάντων ὥς ἐπὶ τὸ πολὺ φόρου...ἔτι τότε ἀργυρίου ἐπισήμου ἑξακισχιλίων ταλάντων...χρυσίου ἀσήμου καὶ ἀργυρίου...ὀπλίτας...γὰρ Φαληρικοῦ τείχους...κύκλον τοῦ ἄστεως...μακρὰ τεῖχη πρὸς τὸν Πειραιᾶ...τριήρεις.<sup>286</sup> In it, we find all the necessary resources that can support and run the Athenian war machine, and, in extension, its foreign policy.

The perspectives of such vast resources made the recourse to war appear more attractive to the Athenians. They created an atmosphere of expectation, superiority, and invincibility. According to Blainey, before a war, states tend to be optimistic and overestimate their power. It is only when war starts that the belligerents become more realistic as experience and disappointment banish the overestimation of power. Pericles was sure of his winning strategy, while the Spartans expected to win in a few years with their invasion strategy.<sup>287</sup> In turn, their fifth-century successes enabled politicians to deliberate in

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<sup>285</sup> Thucydides 3.86.4.

<sup>286</sup> Thucydides 2.13, cf. 14.9. Kallet-Marx, 1994, 238.

<sup>287</sup> Thucydides 3.45.4. Pericles: Thucydides 2.13.9; Spartans: 5.14.3; 7.28.3. As usual, the situation is not a simple or straightforward one: this arrogant state of mind may come from many factors, economic conditions, ideology and patriotism. See Hunt, 2010, 62-71 who analyses Athenian optimism and the recourse to war taking on the ideas of Johnson, 2004 and Blainey, 1973. Also, Holladay, 1978.

favour of a campaign by talking in material terms. At the top of this lay Pericles' famous quotation, "the magnitude of our city draws the produce of the world into our harbour, so that to the Athenian the fruits of other countries are as familiar a luxury as those of his own."<sup>288</sup> It was a statement not of the grandeur of Piraeus' *emporion*, but of the military and political achievements of Athens. Pericles implied that the muscle of Athenian hegemony could incorporate as its own anything it wished, including resources the Athenians were determined to hold on to when Sparta threatened to take them away.<sup>289</sup> In addition, the speech of Pericles on the eve of the Peloponnesian War supports the psychological effect of resources on people and the way masses vote for policy resolutions. Hence, the Athenians placed part of their confidence in materials themselves,<sup>290</sup> natural resources that could fund wars and preserve an arrogant state of mind.

That some speakers chose to argue in more materialistic terms should not surprise us. It had to do with the imperialist tendencies that existed in fifth-century Athens, policies grounded in constant activity, expansion, and aggressiveness. The opposition too argued strong points. But how could Nicias win the day? In the course of the Pentekontaetia, Athens almost never avoided external involvement, most of the time coming out of it victorious, and the Athenian people experienced the astounding earnings of the empire;<sup>291</sup> Nicias' argument was not as appealing as Alcibiades'. The latter articulated the rationale behind the Sicilian campaign as other generals had done before him, and with equal success. Alcibiades' speech was successful because it was straightforward and because it showed understanding of Athenian attitudes.<sup>292</sup> The Sicilian expedition was the high point of Athenian imperialistic foreign policy.

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<sup>288</sup> Thucydides 2.38.2.

<sup>289</sup> Thucydides 1.81.4 Archidamos understands that to win the Spartans need to block resources coming into Athens.

<sup>290</sup> Balot, 2001, 173; Foster, 2010, ch.4 and 6 for Pericles's material warfare.

<sup>291</sup> Finley, 1982, 1-15.

<sup>292</sup> Connor, 1985, 166.



Kallet-Marx rightly remarks that, “by the time the *arche* was fully established, control was exerted in one respect in order to ensure revenue necessary to maintain that control”.<sup>293</sup> Indeed, want for money made the Athenians dependent on the extortion of funds from others. However, this is no reason to draw a distinction between the motives for the creation of *arche* and those for its continuation. Whether the impetus driving one to *arche* is power, honour, and/or glory, the prerequisites are the same. When a state wishes to venture out on the water, certain requirements for war need to be covered. To be sure, the Athenians were not the first to aspire to the idea of naval warfare, as Thucydides reminds us in the *Archaeology*. However, when it comes to Athens, the idea is projected to thalassocracy. The pressing need for money, timber and other materials necessary to meet the conditions of naval warfare all coalesced emphatically during the rise of the fifth-century Athenian empire. To build, equip and man a fleet, a state needed to acquire certain resources and a surplus. To do that, the Athenians had to look beyond Attica. In the early stages of the Delian League, we witness Athenian triremes making a landfall on the isle of Thasos, tempted to make its own silver, on Eion, and later on Amphipolis, partly for its timber resources. They were not the only ones to focus on the pursuit of timber to build many ships and be able to attack nearby cities. The Mytileneans, says Thucydides, “would build plenty of ships since there was timber there, and Mount Ida was near, and many other supplies, and from this base easily move against Lesbos which was close at hand, and reduce the Aeolian towns on the continent”.<sup>294</sup> Ironically, Thucydides never openly admitted that the Athenians needed to look for more timber, and other resources, elsewhere. Yet he continuously makes reference to the advancement of naval power and of wealth after the Persian Wars that came with military victories and, as with the examples above, he surely knew what lay beneath. After all, Attica did not have the timber necessary to sustain its

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<sup>293</sup> Kallet-Marx, 1994, 7.

<sup>294</sup> Thucydides 4.52.3; cf. Xenophon *Hellenica* 1.1.25.

naval power. Thucydides only implies it with reference to Attica's soil deficiency,<sup>295</sup> or to the right of those in power to obtain what they want,<sup>296</sup> or to the criteria for successful military achievement, money, revenues, and navy.<sup>297</sup> In the end, however, when the Sicilian disaster (415/4) spurred on a shipbuilding programme, Thucydides admits the need to look elsewhere for resources: "but to prepare a navy, bring in timber from wherever they could, and money (παρασκευάζεσθαι καὶ ναυτικόν, ὅθεν ἂν δύνωνται ξύλα ξυμπορισμένους, καὶ χρήματα) and secure allies, especially Euboea".<sup>298</sup> In fact, it is at this time where we observe for the first time the Athenian practice of granting honours and privileges for trade-related services. These are all occasions written on stone, and represent a decision by the Athenian demos to honour those individuals for their services to Athens: to Lykon of Achaia (c. 414-412), Pythophanes twice (before 411, 411), Phanosthenes of Andros (c. 410-407/6), and King Archelaos of Macedonia (407/6). Not all services are recorded, but for the two latter we know the specific nature of the trade-related services. Both involve supplying Athens with oar spars for triremes. Athens needed to encourage trade, particularly timber imports to rebuild and maintain a new fleet.

Before we move on to the fourth century, one problem needs to be addressed. How representative are the speeches in historians? Did Athenian politicians debate openly about their plans in foreign lands? Did every politician speak as Thucydides presents him, or is it a case of a historian's interpretation of what was actually said in the assembly? I have assumed throughout this thesis that, although Thucydides' speeches may not be the actual quotations of what was said, they represent the essence of what was articulated by the speakers. First, Thucydides himself anticipated this problem, and took preliminary care to answer such questions: "I have made each speaker say what I thought the situation

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<sup>295</sup> Thucydides 1.2.6.

<sup>296</sup> Thucydides 5.85-113.

<sup>297</sup> See the analysis in 1.13.1 of the relationship of these three elements and the historical example of Corinth as an early naval power. Cf. Salmon, 1984.

<sup>298</sup> Thucydides 8.1.3.

demanded, keeping as near as possible to the general sense of what was actually said.”<sup>299</sup> We must not forget that Thucydides was a prominent Athenian general, from an illustrious family of political generals who often advised the assembly on matters of foreign policy, and in particular, military campaigns in Thrace. Perhaps he grew up in a family of political realists that moulded their views on him. In any case, Thucydides knew well the political arguments surrounding the assembly. Second, in many of his speeches, Thucydides covers a series of themes espoused in classical Greek history, which underpinned Greek international society: interest, reciprocity, honour, and *philia*.<sup>300</sup> In all of his speeches, no single theme seems to excel as primary. Nicias for example, argued for the Sicilian campaign in a more subtle way but equally effective; the Athenians he said should make a display of force and withdraw: “show our forces and come quickly away”,<sup>301</sup> a policy that closely resembles Pericles’ expedition in the Black Sea.<sup>302</sup> Therefore, we cannot accuse Thucydides of presenting one side of the argument over the other. Third, inscriptions from the Peloponnesian War (see further below), tell us that Thucydides reports closely what the assembly speakers said in regards to the control of strategic natural resources.

There may be still some disagreement. For this reason, I turn to Xenophon because he represents the best possible comparison with fifth-century historians, and provides historical sequence; even more so, as Xenophon wrote at a period in which the Athenians lost everything, yet, strove for resurgence. Thus, the period he covers from 411-362, should be covered with numerous assembly speeches urging and explaining the road to power. Sadly, Xenophon decided not to include any Athenian assembly speeches. There exist glimpses of assembly decisions in the form of short summaries, but nothing in regard to the

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<sup>299</sup> Thucydides 1.22.

<sup>300</sup> E.g. Thucydides 1.76; 3.12; 5.84-111. See Mitchell, 1997.

<sup>301</sup> Thucydides 6.9-13, especially 11.4.

<sup>302</sup> Plutarch *Pericles* 20; cf. [Aristotle] *Athenaion Politeia* 26.1; Thucydides 4.75. Oliver, 1957, 251-255. Before the Peloponnesian War, Athens had launched an ambitious project to establish connectivity with the Black Sea. Plutarch reports that Aristides died in c. 467, whilst in the Pontus on an official expedition and later, in c. 437-435, of Pericles’ notorious Pontic expedition. This expedition has received various interpretations, of which this is not the place for a full discussion; see Tsetskhladze, 1998b, 52-74 and 1997, 461-6 for a full reference to the debate.

way the Athenians deliberated after 404 about what needed to be secured to revive the state on the international stage. One would like to know what Thrasybulos of Steiria proposed before he embarked on his expedition against Rhodes and the Hellespont. Thrasybulos' career laid the foundations for a new Athenian hegemony, and it is astonishing how little this is remarked upon in Greek historiography. Strauss wonders "what Xenophon would have said had he been Thrasybulos",<sup>303</sup> and Buck suggested for this great man: "Thrasybulos suffered from an anti-democratic tradition of ancient historiography", which led many writers to minimise the accomplishments of one of democracy's strongest advocates.<sup>304</sup> We can also take into consideration the examples of several *strategoí*, Thrasybulos of Kollytos,<sup>305</sup> Leosthenes of Kephale,<sup>306</sup> Autokles of Euonymon,<sup>307</sup> and Eunomos<sup>308</sup> of whom no activity as *rhetor* is attested, despite their reputation as outstanding *rhetoíres*.

Despite the difficulties, one speech from the *Hellenica* offers a vibrant example of Xenophon's similarity in thought to that of Thucydides as far as natural resources for foreign policy are concerned.<sup>309</sup> In the 370s, Xenophon, through the speech of Polydamas of Pharsalos, reporting what Jason had said to him, contemplated the steps to supremacy: "And consider these points as well, he said, to see whether my thoughts are reasonable. Having Macedonia, from where the Athenians get timber, we will certainly be able to build more ships than them".<sup>310</sup> Jason was not the only one to see how timber was connected to power. The speech of the enemies of Olynthos, by Kleigenes of Akanthos says:

Reflect, how you can...prevent the solidifying of a much greater power...a power

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<sup>303</sup> Strauss, 1986, 92.

<sup>304</sup> Buck, 1998, 122.

<sup>305</sup> Demosthenes 18.219.

<sup>306</sup> Aeschines 2.124.

<sup>307</sup> Xenophon *Hellenica* 6.3.7

<sup>308</sup> Isocrates 15.93.

<sup>309</sup> See Thucydides 1.100.2 and the campaign over the Thasian *emporía*. While the *Poroi* says something about Xenophon's outlook on (economic) history, it is not relevant here. I deal only with political discourse. I will discuss the *Poroi* in chapter Four where it is most relevant.

<sup>310</sup> Xenophon *Hellenica* 6.1.11.

which is becoming formidable not on land only, but by sea. For what is there to stop [Olynthus], when the country itself possesses timber for shipbuilding and derives revenues from many harbours and emporia...abundant population...abundance of food. Further expansion is possible as they have for neighbours those Thracians who are under no king. These are already paying court to the Olynthians; and if they actually follow their lead, this would be a great power added to the Olynthians. With the Thracians under their sway, straightway the gold mines of Mount Pangaeum also would follow suit.<sup>311</sup>

The dramatic situation in this passage brings us deeper into the importance of natural resources for foreign policy. Kleigenes of Akanthos fully considers the three main resources, timber, food, gold. This passage also displays a recurring set of themes among Greek historians. The Melians,<sup>312</sup> the Corcyraians,<sup>313</sup> and now the Akanthians vied to protect themselves from annexation by employing arguments that play less on morality and more on interest. Perhaps, it is the case of weaker states looking to realism in order to convince a great power to come to their aid. But in doing so, they admit the importance of natural resources to the overall geopolitical game of the Greek world. Finally, Xenophon, like Thucydides, was aware of the importance of Mt Ida for the rebuilding of the Peloponnesian fleet.<sup>314</sup>

It was surely obvious to anyone in antiquity that if you have control over timber resources you could build more ships than your rivals. Triremes gain clout in naval power and in turn, offer security and further possibilities of success in foreign policy. A strong concept made possible by the incredible Athenian success at sea. By the fourth century, Kleigenes, and Jason seemed to reflect a wider Greek perspective on how to achieve naval power. It does not necessarily mean that resources alone determined imperial success or

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<sup>311</sup> Xenophon *Hellenica* 5.2.16-17.

<sup>312</sup> Thucydides 5.84-111.

<sup>313</sup> Thucydides 1.32-36.

<sup>314</sup> Xenophon *Hellenica* 1.1.25; Thucydides 4.52.3.

that all foreign policy was aimed at achieving control over resources, but they certainly played a significant part in Greek thinking.

## 2.2 Fourth-Century Assembly Speeches

Contrary to the speeches made in historical accounts, in many fourth-century assembly speeches it is difficult to find orators addressing the people in materialistic terms. This creates an obvious problem, as we can observe through fifth-century historical accounts and fourth-century decrees the considerable interest which the Athenians expressed in the assembly for the acquisition of natural resources. It is useful to inquire about the reasons for this dissimilarity. Is there a difference between Thucydides' speakers and Demosthenes that is indicative of Athenian mainstream attitudes, or is it a problem of the different perspectives of two different historical periods? Why do the historical accounts speak clearly of such acquisition, taking interest in its usage as a foreign policy tool, while fourth-century orators avoid speaking openly about such motives? This will be considered by discussing the chronological and historical scope of the speeches.

The vast majority of assembly speeches come from the second half of the fourth century, and thus are valid evidence only for their own time period. This only allows historians to witness Athenian opinions and policies in a concentrated period, a period of crisis, which saw the losses in the Social War and the constant advancement of Macedonian power. In this period, Athens was head of only a small number of allies, not important enough to tip the scale in Athens' favour, faced the threat of the rising power of Macedonia, and thus its foreign policy changed from an offensive to a defensive-oriented policy. This historical context weighs heavily upon our evidence, and inevitably affects it in three ways. First, the context determines the types of issues brought forward in the assembly. Although

it is not the only matter discussed in the assembly, the deliberations are concerned for the most part with the problem of Macedonia. Second, Athens could not exert the same level of influence on Greek international politics, which in turn changed its conception of what was important. Third, context affects the argument of a speech as orators evaluate their argument under a different light.

The new historical context in which the Athenians found themselves may explain this picture. If so, this rather careful change in rhetoric resembles a chameleon changing his colour to suit the surrounding environment. Politicians would need to choose their words carefully, as foreign policy deliberations had an extensive audience, including foreign ambassadors and the representatives of the allied *syndrion* of the Second Athenian League.<sup>315</sup> In contrast, Pericles prided himself on the fact that the Athenian democracy did not fear the presence of foreigners in its realm: “we leave our city open to all men, and never by alien acts exclude foreigners from any opportunity of learning or observing, although the eyes of an enemy may occasionally profit by our liberality”.<sup>316</sup> In his bold words, we see the results of Athenian imperialism, but that was no more by the fourth century. Were the Athenians more cautious in their official fourth-century deliberations? By studying Demosthenes, the answer seems to be ‘yes’.

Demosthenes carefully avoids the illustration of prospective material earnings that would portray Athens in a negative light. *On the Symmories* (354) provides an example of this chameleonic attitude.<sup>317</sup> Demosthenes argued for maintaining a non-aggressive policy towards Persia. The reason provided was the need for Athens to recover economically

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<sup>315</sup> IG I<sup>3</sup> 40.12-14; Mosley, 1973, 78-79. Demosthenes’s speech during the negotiations for the peace of Philocrates in 346 was allegedly made in the presence of ambassadors from all of Greece. Harris, 1995, 67-68 and notes, refutes this possibility. Nevertheless, the point is that foreign embassies could be present in the Assembly after requesting permission from the Council.

<sup>316</sup> Thucydides 2.39.1.

<sup>317</sup> For dating the speech see Sealey, 1993, 128-129 and Schaefer, 1885-87, I.193

before pursuing a new aggressive role in the Greek world.<sup>318</sup> In the speech, Demosthenes is forced by the audience's reactions to join two antithetical aims as mutually related: to prevent war, and to recommend preparations for future war. This results in an argumentative technique in which the antithetical terms are progressively compressed together. Three points confirm this: at the beginning, in §§3-7, Demosthenes proposes reorganisation of the Athenian navy, and projects the need to ensure some prerequisites before declaring war. In §§8-13, affirmation of Athens' weakness to sustain a war is stated, a fact that makes offensive war arguments unreasonable. From §§14-40, preparation (*παράσκευήν*) appears as the only possible and logical solution under the circumstances (*δυνατόν*). Defence against Persian and Greek danger can take no other form. Demosthenes' proposal follows a practical route. However, the existence of a binding treaty with the Persian King and its possible violation could create problems of justice and political morality. Demosthenes combines *sumpheron* with matters of political morality and justice, necessitated by Athens' interest in the given situation. This can be explained when we take into consideration the period in which they were written, that is, immediately after the Social War.

The speech offers a lively picture of the political situation in Athens immediately after the Social War. There was a group in Athens which, despite the losses of the Social War, still considered provoking war against Persia. Rumoured threats against Athens by the King of Persia (§§12, 27, 30, 31) must have created a warlike atmosphere. That soon after the Social War the Athenian assembly convened to discuss possible action against Persia can be explained only as a product of demagoguery and confusion. Having seen the result of the recent war, Demosthenes realised that Athenian interests would only be protected if Athens mastered a sufficient level of power. Demosthenes, in short, suggests reforming the Athenian navy, and military force in general, before embarking on any expedition. The

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<sup>318</sup> Demosthenes 14.2, 7.



speech offers a first glimpse of Demosthenes' belief that, when circumstances allowed, Athens could actively involve itself in Greek affairs. This would be expressed more dynamically in his next two speeches (*For the Megalopolitans* and *For the Freedom of the Rhodians*).

In *For the Freedom of the Rhodians*, 352/1, a speech delivered in the Athenian assembly on the matter of a possible Athenian intervention to reinstate Rhodes' democratic government, Demosthenes uses moral reasoning to argue for an intervention in Rhodes.<sup>319</sup> He focuses on how beneficial the outcome would be for Athens if it decided to help the Rhodians, as this would restore Athens publicly from the negative propaganda shed on it (διαβαλλόντων) during the Social War. He presents such help as a step necessary to prove all accusations as fabricated, to gain glory (δόξης), to portray Athens as defenders (σωτηρίας) of democracies and to win the friendship (φιλία) of states. The latter, Demosthenes says, is a necessary ingredient for cities that desire safety (σωτηρίας). Subsequently, Athens will achieve goodwill (εὖνοια), one of the benefits (ἀγαθόν) of foreign policy. In saving their fellow Greeks and misguided allies from the barbarians, Athens will gain good "press" throughout Greece.<sup>320</sup> From the records we have, this was Demosthenes' third assembly speech, and at such early stage of his political career, he may have thought wise to play things quietly. Demosthenes abstains from using the arguments of realism – he makes no mention of sea routes, supply of grain or revenues, as they will be explained in chapter Five – because he understood that such a line of argument would not benefit his cause. Yet, we must note, that Demosthenes was only one voice in the assembly, in a period where works of contemporary historians have not survived.

It is prudent to say that realism is used here in a distinctive, and quite narrow, sense,

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<sup>319</sup> Usher, 1999, 215 remarks of the inconclusive ending of this speech that has no practical recommendations, only a general call to action and a reference to a policy already agreed upon in principle.

<sup>320</sup> Demosthenes 15.1-2.

to “appeal to material resources”. However, on a more conventional definition Demosthenes 15 is a highly Realist speech. Realism emphasises how various and incompatible the interests of different states floating in an anarchic world can be. To provide for their security, states seek power and might enforce rules of conduct contrary to the codes of morality accepted within their societies.<sup>321</sup> In *For the Freedom of the Rhodians*, Demosthenes tried to persuade the Athenians to offer military support to some democratic exiles who wanted to wrest control of Rhodes from a Carian supported oligarchy. His main positive argument is a moralist one; Athens has an obligation and interest to assist democrats against oligarchs. Yet, Demosthenes believes the advantages of an interventionist policy outweigh those of non-intervention. He faced two important problems: a) the strong reaction of the non-aggression adherents who feared the King’s reaction, and b) the feelings of hatred towards the Rhodians. Thus, in the first part of the speech (§5-13), the orator tries to minimise the danger. He does so by proving that intervention in Rhodes will not cause the King’s wrath. Demosthenes’ argumentation is mainly logical, since it is part of the political context of the problem. Yet, Athenian claims should be based on legality. This is achieved by introducing a leading democratic city’s right to provide protection to friendly constitutions in her sphere of influence.<sup>322</sup> Demosthenes saw a way to justify Athens’ claim on Rhodes without contravening the peace and right of *autonomia*.<sup>323</sup> Demosthenes reinforced his argument via Timotheus’ Samian campaign and the expulsion of the Persian guard in 365.<sup>324</sup> Samos, a base in the eastern Aegean, served both the military and political interests of Athens.<sup>325</sup> In §9 Demosthenes uses *ἐλευθεροῦν* and *ἡλευθέρωσε* to emphasise

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<sup>321</sup> E.g. Haslam, 2002, 12, 250; Mearsheimer, 2001, 36, 45, 52; Waltz, 1979. The bibliography is endless.

<sup>322</sup> Rhodes after the Social War should not fall under any Athenian obligation, but Demosthenes deals with the problem by making reference to the contribution of the Rhodians as part of the league (§5-8,10,13,15,21).

<sup>323</sup> Such an approach to the legitimacy of intervention in favour of democracy is found consistently in Demosthenes’ opposition to Philip. In the Second Philippic, he asserts that Philip’s advancement into Thessaly and Olynthus is a danger for democratic states, to freedom, and law (§20-5).

<sup>324</sup> For the event see Diodoros 18.18.9; Isocrates *Antidosis* 111; Hornblower, 1982, 198,201.

<sup>325</sup> See Sealey, 1993, 106, who underrates the importance of Samos.

his point. Timotheus freed Samos in the same way Athens will now free the Rhodians.<sup>326</sup> He wishes to draw the conclusion that the removal of the Persian garrison from Samos did not trigger war with Persia. Thus, Athens is not entering Persia's sphere of influence.

The second problem is answered in §14-16, where *sumpheron* continues to be Demosthenes' motivation. However, in these two paragraphs justice as political moral becomes the main criterion for the *ethos* of democratic and oligarchic constitutions. It also serves as the basis for Demosthenes' arguments. Similarly, the term ἀναγκαῖον, what is necessary, comes to justify the making of a new Athenian political line. The first thing Demosthenes tries to achieve here is to convince the Athenians that feelings of hatred are justified, but a policy of revenge is not at the given time in Athens' interest (συμφέρειν).<sup>327</sup> In this way, a transition takes place from an international problem (Athens and Persia) to an interstate one (Rhodes and Athens). This section allows Demosthenes to turn attention from Persian intervention to Athenian non-intervention. If the latter happens, Athens faces extinction by a rapid decline of democratic states. He succeeds in doing so by using a reverse psychological procedure to dissolve any suspicions against him. Demosthenes tried very hard to emphasise his objectivity on the Rhodian matter, as he did at the beginning of the speech. At the same time, this prepares the ground for a more positive response on the Rhodian issue.<sup>328</sup>

If Demosthenes represented a pro-aggression side of the assembly, his stand for intervention is of a completely different calibre from that of Kleon, Diodotos, and Alcibiades.<sup>329</sup> The proem of *For the Freedom of the Rhodians* is telling; it seems to express Demosthenes' belief that extension of Athenian friendship, accompanied with determined political behaviour, will prove beneficial to future alliances. This possible scenario would

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<sup>326</sup> Demosthenes §9, forgets to mention the placement of Athenian cleruchies on the island.

<sup>327</sup> For an interesting comparison between Demosthenes' and Diodotus' arguments, see Thuc, 3.37-48.

<sup>328</sup> This is a characteristic of the Hellenic speeches. See, XIV, 1-2, 8-10, and XVI, 1-3, 23-24. The continuous repetition of the rhetor's attention to the interest of the city develops from a method to win goodwill into an evidence tool.

<sup>329</sup> For the former two, Thucydides 3.39.8, 46.3.

ensure Athens' best interest (οὐ μείζον οὐδὲν ἂν ὑμῖν γένοιτ' ἀγαθόν). Demosthenes believes this is achievable by a policy of friendship, which will regain the voluntary and unsuspecting goodwill of other democratic cities (παρὰ πάντων ἐκόντων ἀνυπόπτου τυχεῖν εὐνοίας), and with no hegemonic tendencies. Friendship then is a political goal. A political behaviour based on justice could ease Athens' problems when dealing with allies. Thus, the traditional competition between justice and interest, in Demosthenes' rhetoric, transforms to a functional duet for propagandistic reasons. If Athens' proclamation of just causes serves its political goals, justice should be part of its policy. In conclusion, the proem shows the logical structure that runs throughout the speech. Athens' intervention in Rhodes is a means to an end (μείζον ἀγαθόν). Demosthenes proposed a policy where Athens retains its traditional role as protective power and not a hegemonic one. However, one could not always see the difference. Probably the shadow of fifth-century Empire was too big to erase.<sup>330</sup>

However, that does not mean there was no Athenian concern for, or that Demosthenes was indifferent to, the preservation of resources. *Against Leptines* shows clearly that he was not. Leptines proposed legislation in 356/5 to abolish the law granting special exemption from taxation, a privilege required for business transactions in important commodities.<sup>331</sup> Freedom from taxation was called *ateleia*, and the scholiast of *Against Leptines* relates it to commerce and liturgies (ἡ ἀτέλεια διττή· ἡ γὰρ κατ' ἐμπορίαν ἐστὶν ἡ κατὰ λειτουργίαν).<sup>332</sup> The proposal, following Athenian losses in the Social War, was intended to secure the public revenue at a time of financial crisis. But it was not just revenues that were on the line. The holders of this privilege were kings and foreigners who offered Athens their services, specifically, those related with trade in natural resources; also descendants of Athenian heroes, generals, and other benefactors who ought to continue to

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<sup>330</sup> See Meiggs, 1972, ch.11-12; Cargill, 1981; Sealey, 1993.

<sup>331</sup> Athenaeos, 1.28 reports that the people from Naukratis could import Lesbian wine free of duty.

<sup>332</sup> Scholia to Demosthenes 20.113.

be honoured. The proposal was passed, but it was immediately attacked.<sup>333</sup> In the next year, 355/4 prosecution recommenced, this time supported by Phormion and Demosthenes. The latter argued that such a law would not safeguard public revenues,<sup>334</sup> but would rather damage them, since the benefits that Athens received from honoured individuals, both citizens and foreigners, far outweighed any loss of revenues from liturgies.<sup>335</sup> In particular, Demosthenes highlights the vitality of grain exports coming from the Bosporan Kings; in particular, a shipment of 400,000 *medimnoi* of Bosporan grain that Athens was in danger of losing, if, according to Demosthenes, Leptines law was passed.<sup>336</sup> All our information for this law comes from Demosthenes' speech. Hence, we do not possess the full text of Leptines' law, but it is clear that it succeeded.<sup>337</sup> Though the result of the last trial is not recorded, the law was finally condemned as Dio Chrysostom attests to its failure and *ateleia* grants continued to be awarded after 354.<sup>338</sup>

Xenophon's *Poroi* also attests to Athenians expressing a conscious awareness to the preservation of resources. The treatise (355/4) sets forth Xenophon's proposal to increase Athenian revenue by expanding the volume of taxable commerce and the number of foreign traders resident in Athens who could also be taxed. Having studied their value, Xenophon recommends five ways to increase revenues: a) get rid of measures that inflict *atimiai* on metics; b) exclude metics from hoplite service, c) grant them the privilege of service in the cavalry; d) allow "worthy" metics to gain the right of *enktesis*, and e) create a magistracy that will handle metic affairs (μετοικοφύλακες) as with the example of *orhanophylakes*.<sup>339</sup> Xenophon concludes with the remark that these measures will augment revenues (προσόδους ἂν αὖξοιεν). When we take into consideration, as Whitehead ably

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<sup>333</sup> Demosthenes 20.145.

<sup>334</sup> Demosthenes 20.25.

<sup>335</sup> Demosthenes 20.5.7, 16, 23, 30-40, 64.

<sup>336</sup> Demosthenes 20.32.

<sup>337</sup> Demosthenes 20.2, 29, 127, 160.

<sup>338</sup> 31.129-9; RO 64 where the sons of Leukon continued to enjoy grants of *ateleia*. MacDowell, 2009, 167.

<sup>339</sup> Xenophon *Poroi* 2.2-7.

demonstrates, that metics were not privileged alien residents, since epitaphs fail to record their status as metic, and as the Athenians made sure to reinforce the divide between citizens and metics,<sup>340</sup> it becomes clear that metics were assessed purely by Xenophon for their financial importance.

Xenophon wishes to draw many different kinds of metics to Athens, craftsmen, intellectuals, investors, sophists, philosophers, and poets.<sup>341</sup> The reason Xenophon focuses on metics as one of the best sources of income should then be apparent. Metics were a large mobile force that paid various sums to the Athenian state, and most importantly, they were not granted any state pay. In other words, metics were on the plus side of the Athens' balance sheet. Xenophon's target to raise the presence of residents and visitors corresponds to an analogous rise in imports and exports (εἰσάγοιτο καὶ ἐξάγοιτο), rents, sales, and harbour dues.<sup>342</sup> At *Poroi* 4.5 the connection between metics, trade, and revenue becomes more explicit: "with peace and the remedying of metics and traders, and with a larger population, increase in market and harbour dues...the greatest amount of revenue will be created". Xenophon's train of thought is clear; peace and good treatment of metics and residents will generate increase in imports, and subsequently, revenue. It is of note, however, that the role of metics went beyond long-distance trade; textual evidence suggests they had a role also as artisans and manufacturers.<sup>343</sup>

Another example of Athens' chameleonic political discourse behaviour is to be found in the theme of piracy. Naval rivals were often inclined to use piracy as a diplomatic strategy. The speech *On Halonnesos*, an island in the Aegean that had been occupied by pirates, from which Philip, in turn, captured it,<sup>344</sup> was an entire diplomatic "boxing match" between Athens and Philip. The speech reveals the political mechanisms surrounding the

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<sup>340</sup> Whitehead, 1977, 34-59; for the evidence, see 27-34.

<sup>341</sup> Xenophon *Poroi* 5.2-4.

<sup>342</sup> Xenophon *Poroi* 3.5.

<sup>343</sup> Jansen, 2007, 297-303.

<sup>344</sup> Demosthenes 12.12-15.

argument on piracy. Philip II proposed that both he and Athens should guard the sea against wrongdoers. Hegesippos, probably the author of *On Halonnesos*,<sup>345</sup> advised the Athenians to reject the offer, and through his explanation of it addressed the political mechanisms of the offer.<sup>346</sup> By accepting this proposal, the Athenians will be acknowledging Philip's political presence in the Aegean, confess weakness to protect the high seas, and furthermore, this would give Philip II a free hand to sail around the different islands under pretence of guarding against pirates, to corrupt the islanders and so take them away from the Athenians.<sup>347</sup> The irony is that by doing so, Hegesippos acknowledged the reality of intervention via a pretext such as piracy,<sup>348</sup> and through it, we can witness Athenian double standards. In addition, Athens is found able to issue decrees which commit the allies to protect merchants and punish non-compliant states with imposition of fines (Melos).<sup>349</sup> Piracy was a favourable medium for Athenian political discourse, especially in the mid-fourth century, which discussed it carefully as a pretext for intervention; still, Athens would freely accuse its enemies of ill-conduct. This was a norm where a naval power asserted political interference for "the greater good". In this, we find an Athenian political discourse, carefully discussed at the assembly in order to present their own aggressive and acquisitive policies under the guise of a genuine concern with the suppression of piracy.<sup>350</sup> In so doing, the Athenians found cause to intervene in another city-state, an involvement that met the criteria of just intervention, since its purpose was to avoid needless recourse to war and protect its political capital, especially in the 350s.

In this respect, it is also worth noticing that this norm had other guises. The accusation of medizing was a policy favoured by the Greeks following the events of the Persian Wars. Greek states sought out cities that had willingly entered the Persian lines, in

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<sup>345</sup> Libanius *Hypothesis* to Demosthenes 7.

<sup>346</sup> De Souza, 1999, 38-39.

<sup>347</sup> Demosthenes 7.14-15.

<sup>348</sup> Gabrielsen, 2001, 232.

<sup>349</sup> Demosthenes 58.56.

<sup>350</sup> Gabrielsen, 2001, 222; De Souza, 1999, 38-40, 48-51, 177, 241-242; Reger, 1994, 44-46; Ormerod, 1924, 139.

order to expel and punish them.<sup>351</sup> The Spartans were contemplating a wholesale expulsion.<sup>352</sup> It is possible that Timotheos politically justified his intervention in Samos (365) by accusing the Samians of medizing. On the same note, we can place the Athenian decision to expel the people of Delos in 422 under the pretext of pollution because of a crime they had committed in the past.<sup>353</sup> Finally, the norm of “helping the wronged” is found repeatedly in Athenian history.<sup>354</sup> Fourth-century Athenians proceeded cautiously and resorted to such reasons in order to establish an overt presence in the Aegean without being seen as imperialistic and giving reason for revolt. In short, affected by the historical context of their time, fourth-century orators were careful when deliberating about military intervention, often choosing to place their weight on arguments other than materialistic ones.<sup>355</sup>

The only time that they did not was concerning the safety of the Hellespont, and Athens in general.<sup>356</sup> This involved enemy campaigns against the city’s interests, and for that reason, orators found it easier to address their audience in material terms. For example, Demosthenes claimed that a possible motive for Thebes to ally with Philip II was the prospect of usurping cattle, slaves and other material.<sup>357</sup> Aristomachos claimed that Kersebleptes would not seize Chersonese because that would go against his financial interests.<sup>358</sup> The importance of keeping watch over Athenian interests around the Hellespont was stressed many times because Philip’s operations in the area intended to strangle Athens.<sup>359</sup> This portrayal of Athens’ enemies as intimately concerned with material and

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<sup>351</sup> Herodotos 7.132; 8.112.1-2; Diodoros 11.3.3.

<sup>352</sup> Herodotos 9.106.3.

<sup>353</sup> Thucydides 5.1; Diodoros 12.73.1; *FGrH* 401b F67-75.

<sup>354</sup> The norm of “helping the wronged” is a recurrent theme in military/diplomatic vocabulary, especially alliances; see Tod, Index 3; Hunt, 2010, 154ff. The phrase also appears in internal politics and friendships: for example, by Demosthenes, 21.225 - 30.25.

<sup>355</sup> Hunt, 2010, 6, 19.

<sup>356</sup> Demosthenes 8.3; 19.83,153. Notorious examples are Thucydides’s Melian dialogue, and Demosthenes’s *For the Megalopolitans*.

<sup>357</sup> Demosthenes 18.213.

<sup>358</sup> Demosthenes 23.110.

<sup>359</sup> In Demosthenes 8 and 9.



economic considerations highlights the careful deployment of Athenian deliberative oratory regarding natural resources in Athenian foreign policy, and the reversal of roles, by portraying Athens' enemies as actively motivated by greed, and Athens as the victim of foreign plots.

The speeches under discussion are not free from problems, however, particularly ones of delivery and publication. Let us start with the former.<sup>360</sup> The problem is discerning the extent to which the texts we have reflect what was actually said in the assembly. Orators did not read from a text in the assembly, nor did the state keep records of their speeches.<sup>361</sup> Practical difficulties, such as interruptions from the audience, bad performance, and time limitations may have prevented an orator from giving a speech in its entirety, and even led him to depart from the prepared draft.<sup>362</sup> Notoriously, people accused Demosthenes that his extensive writing "smelt of the lamp".<sup>363</sup> Ambition, career or even his famous stutter may have contributed to such diligence. But speeches have survived to us in writing. Thus the problem concerning assembly speeches is whether politicians actually published their own speeches.<sup>364</sup> One way to solve this was to look at forensic speeches, since, like *symbouleutic* ones were not read from a text. Worthington suggests that forensic speeches were revised and published after oral delivery.<sup>365</sup> In his examination of Deinarchos' speech *Against Demosthenes*, Worthington sees ring composition, and a symmetrical arrangement of themes, which are too intricate for delivery to an audience that lacked concentration. MacDowell on the other hand believes these stylistic features were not too prominent, and it could have

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<sup>360</sup> Hunt, 2010, Appendix 2 discusses the problems of assembly texts, from which I took guidance. See also Burke, 2002.

<sup>361</sup> Hudson-Williams, 1951. 68. Wooden tablets and papyri records of decisions were at least made and these may in some way have echoed some of the oratory or vocabulary on some occasions, see Sickinger, 1999.

<sup>362</sup> MacDowell, 2000, 22-26.

<sup>363</sup> Plutarch *Demosthenes* 8.3.

<sup>364</sup> For the relationship between clients and writers, and the problems of publication after trial see Worthington, 1993; Usher, 1976; Dover, 1968.

<sup>365</sup> Worthington, 1991, 55-74.

been Demosthenes' way of writing and preparing his draft.<sup>366</sup> But, he does acknowledge that *On the Crown*, and perhaps other speeches, did pass through revision after delivery. Usher has found such reworkings in the cases of *Against Leptines* and *For the Freedom of the Rhodians*, a symbouleutic speech.<sup>367</sup> Trevett finds some interesting peculiarities; for example, in *For the Freedom of the Rhodians*, 24 he refers in passing to Philip, a sentence probably added to enhance his image as a prophet.<sup>368</sup> Other evidence, however, suggests unrevised drafts; in *On the False Embassy*, a reference was made to Philocrates as if he were in Athens, although he had fled the city before the trial took place.<sup>369</sup> Trevett, therefore, put forward the argument that these were drafts collected and published after Demosthenes' death.<sup>370</sup> MacDowell also suggested that it is likely Demosthenes did not revise or distribute his speeches after delivery, and probably kept them at home, and that they were collected after his death by some relative and published. In conclusion, it seems that the majority of speeches we have were drafts prepared in advance to deal with the anticipated arguments of an opponent.

How or when the symbouleutic speeches were made has to be addressed, especially as the majority of our extant deliberative speeches are by Demosthenes. The surviving texts of symbouleutic speeches were probably based on drafts written in anticipation of oral presentation. Historical events unfolded rapidly in front of the assembly, and Demosthenes seems to have prepared speeches with an anti-intellectual slant aiming at a general audience. If any revisions were made after delivery, in a scenario where Demosthenes wanted to circulate his assembly speeches, revisions must have aimed at creating a more comprehensive, fluent and argumentative speech. That is, the stylistic features and the populist attitude of the speeches, which were aimed at a general audience, suggest that the

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<sup>366</sup> MacDowell, 2009, 8.

<sup>367</sup> Usher, 1999, 192, 215 n.155.

<sup>368</sup> Fox, 1997, 200; Trevett, 1996.

<sup>369</sup> MacDowell, 2000, 24-26.

<sup>370</sup> MacDowell, 2009, 7-9; Trevett, 1996.

changes were not extensive enough to reshape the actual argument and were closer to the attitudes and prejudice of the audience.<sup>371</sup> MacDowell remarks: “the surviving texts tell us what he hoped to say, rather what he actually said”.<sup>372</sup> This creates a difficulty, as a perfect combination of speech and text is improbable. In any case, the speeches represent the best case scenario of what some orators in the assembly actually said.

## 2.3 Other evidence of Athenian deliberation concerning natural resources

Evidence from other accounts provides a different picture. Contemporary evidence shows how more common in Athens were debates on the acquisition, necessity, and usefulness of natural resources for state policy. When describing the five main functions of political discourse, under the heading “for war and peace”, Aristotle asserts that politicians are bound to know the strength of the city in order to safeguard the state (περὶ δὲ πολέμου καὶ εἰρήνης τὴν δύναμιν εἰδέναι τῆς πόλεως, ὅποση τε ὑπάρχει ἤδη καὶ πόσῃ ἐνδέχεται ὑπάρξαι).<sup>373</sup> In the pseudo-Aristotelian *Rhetoric to Alexander*,<sup>374</sup> the orator sums up the interests of the state: “concord, strength for war, money, a plentiful supply of revenue, and excellence and abundance of allies”.<sup>375</sup> Specifically, strength for war (δύναμις πρὸς πόλεμον) implies the extensive quantities of materials needed to boost a state’s power. The author of this oratorical treatise wrote in a straightforward manner to give effective suggestions on how to argue a case in front of an audience. Rhetorical theory may be independent from assembly speeches, but the author took advice from available forensic and symbouleutic speeches to form his general views of how to develop an effective speech. It allows insight into a wide variety of assembly debate topics, strength for war through

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<sup>371</sup> Hunt, 2010, 273 and notes.

<sup>372</sup> MacDowell, 2009, 6.

<sup>373</sup> Aristotle *Rhetoric* 1360a.

<sup>374</sup> The question surrounding the time of composition is a difficult one, Chiron, 2007, 102-104; Kennedy, 1996, 417 places its period of composition as 360-334, and its essentially contemporaneous with our Assembly speeches. Rackham, 1937, 258.

<sup>375</sup> [Aristotle] *Rhetoric to Alexander* 1422a12-14.

natural resources being one of them. Both Aristotle and pseudo-Aristotle counted δύναμις as one of the elements necessary to safeguard the state, an element that we can assume it derives its power from war materials.

One such debate was the grain supply. Accounts report the Athenians' anxiety on this issue and provide ample evidence to contrast the picture we have of fourth-century assembly speeches not addressing the people in materialistic terms.<sup>376</sup> The citizens of Athens understood the importance of grain to their survival. Orators knew that, and Demosthenes did not miss the opportunity to remind them of the fact: "they [the Athenians] rely on imported grain more than anyone else."<sup>377</sup> Prior to the Sicilian expedition, Nicias pointed out to his fellow citizens that the Syracusans, contrary to the Athenians, could grow their own grain, rather than having to import it.<sup>378</sup> Aristotle included the subject of food supply in his *Rhetorica*, underlining that fourth-century political orators were bound to know about the imports and exports that supported the state.<sup>379</sup> It was a set item on the agenda facing the assembly each month and politicians were bound to know how and where Athens got its grain supplies from:

no doubt you have reckoned how long the grain grown in the country will maintain the population, and how much is needed annually, so that you may not make a mistake, should the city at any time be short, and may come to the rescue and relieve the city by giving expert advice about food.<sup>380</sup>

Xenophon, through the mouth of Socrates, tells us directly that grain imports were an ordinary supplement to local production. The phrase καὶ πόσου εἰς τὸν ἐνιαυτὸν προοδεῖται shows that the importation of grain was an annual consideration. Politicians had to know the grain's whereabouts in order to feed and protect its citizens in times of

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<sup>376</sup> See page 88.

<sup>377</sup> Demosthenes 20.31.

<sup>378</sup> Thucydides 6.20.4.

<sup>379</sup> Aristotle *Rhetoric* 1360a.

<sup>380</sup> Xenophon *Memorabilia* 3.6.13.

famine and war. In addition, he refers to the necessity to advise the city with the words: συμβουλευόν τῇ πόλει, which alludes to the politicians deliberating on the *bema* for matters of grain. Finally, according to the author of *Athenaion Politeia*, by the later fourth century grain supply was by law discussed monthly in the assembly.<sup>381</sup> Thus, food supply was an emerging issue of extreme importance, an issue of national security; therefore, Athens' concern was to ensure sustainable food security for its population. Athens strove to find enough food for all its present population, plus the ability to provide enough for the future. There is a strong, direct relationship between food supply and state policy.<sup>382</sup> Therefore, once a month the topic of the assembly was about grain, and *ipso facto* symbouleutic speeches addressed the problem of food supply.

Another topic in the Athenian assembly was the scarcity of money and resources. In the early fourth century, the Athenians did not have an empire from which to draw resources. Isocrates complained about the few profits Timotheos amassed from his campaigns, even though the general introduced twenty-four cities into the Second Athenian League.<sup>383</sup> Demosthenes estimated the costs of campaigns.<sup>384</sup> Money was scarce, and the various Athenian enterprises did not succeed in filling state coffers. Wars are in general costly, especially when the benefits correspond to small gains.<sup>385</sup> Here lies the problem with fourth-century Athens. The gamble did not pay off. The Corinthian War jeopardized their food supply, and more could have been lost, if Antalcidas' peace had been unforgiving. Campaigns at Sestos or on Samos could create tremendous strain on Athenian resources. If we are to match fifth-century campaign costs reported by contemporary evidence with those of the fourth century, we find that the campaign against Samos in 440/39 had cost

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<sup>381</sup> [Aristotle] *Athenaion Politeia* 43.4.

<sup>382</sup> Moreno, 2007a, Part 3.

<sup>383</sup> Isocrates 15.108, 109, 111, 113.

<sup>384</sup> Demosthenes 19.84.

<sup>385</sup> Demosthenes 3.3-5; 4.36-7; *Exordia* 21.2 often laments the Athenians' unwillingness to incur the necessary costs to save the security and honour of their city. Demosthenes 1.19-20; 3.19; 4.7, 28-9; 10.36-45 for the costs of war.

around 1000 talents,<sup>386</sup> the siege of Potidaea 2000 talents.<sup>387</sup>

After the catastrophic defeat of the Social War, Athens was again in a dire situation. This catastrophic and costly war led Isocrates and Xenophon to write at that time about the importance of resources in the Attic economy. In *On the Peace* Isocrates refers to the disruption of agriculture and trade during the Social War, and adds that Athens had been abandoned by traders, foreigners and metics.<sup>388</sup> He targets Athenian imperialism, claiming it as unprofitable; he contrasts imperialism with a policy of peace which can yield better profits because prosperity would allow the Athenians to devote their energy to their own resources.<sup>389</sup> He remarks on how beneficial it would be if the Athenians lived peacefully, cultivating their own land and sailing the sea without fear.<sup>390</sup> In *Poroi*, dated after the end of the Social War,<sup>391</sup> Xenophon makes a detailed account of the various possibilities afforded to Athens and the potential ways to exploit them in order to revive state finances. He starts by opposing the idea stated by leading politicians that imperialism is thought necessary to fight the poverty of the masses,<sup>392</sup> and suggests that the resources in Attica are capable of furnishing ample revenue. For this reason, he mentions the good Attic climate, the productivity of the land, the abundance in stone and silver, and the advantageous geographical position of Athens for trade.<sup>393</sup> Aristotle too placed revenues from agriculture and from precious and other metals high at his list.<sup>394</sup> The argument is that Athenian resources were the basis of Athens' economic strength. Without money, no campaign was possible. At the time, according to Demosthenes, state finances had dropped to only 130

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<sup>386</sup> Isocrates 15.111; ML 55.

<sup>387</sup> Thucydides 2.70.2; Isocrates 15.113: 2400 talents. See Meritt, 1984, 128 who discusses the expenses for the siege of Samos, and other Athenian ventures.

<sup>388</sup> Isocrates 8.21; Demosthenes 22 and 14; Xenophon *Poroi*. 2.1-7.

<sup>389</sup> Isocrates 8.6.

<sup>390</sup> Isocrates 8.20-21.

<sup>391</sup> Gauthier, 1976, 1-6.

<sup>392</sup> Xenophon *Poroi* 1.1-2.

<sup>393</sup> Xenophon *Poroi* 1.3-8.

<sup>394</sup> Aristotle *Oeconomicus* 1345b. Ober, 1985 rightly observes that fourth-century Athenians made efforts to guard Athenian produce in Attica.

talents.<sup>395</sup> The source of wealth on which Xenophon focused most in the *Poroi* was the silver mines. He hoped to raise capital by *eisphorai* and mining productivity. Although Xenophon's calculations of unlimited resources offered by the mines seem optimistic, there is evidence of increased mining activity after the Social War.<sup>396</sup> Xenophon in *Poroi* and Isocrates in *On the Peace* presented arguments about the active motivation of greed in Athenian policy. Of course, they are not assembly speeches, and express unofficial attitudes of Athenian citizens. However, in their effort to argue against the notion of wealth through war, they seem to indicate its pervasiveness.<sup>397</sup>

The Athenians of the fifth century also debated money expenses, as the debate between Nicias and Alcibiades, before the Sicilian expedition shows.<sup>398</sup> Pseudo-Xenophon also points to economic strength, and possibly reflects the imperial mentality in his equation of hegemonial power, and remarks that the state that controls the sea will not suffer from crop failures as it can always import its food from overseas.<sup>399</sup> Up to the Sicilian expedition, money was never the issue (or at least, we do not hear about it), and so, we never read of debates that argued about a policy economically onerous for the Athenians, as it was to become the case in the fourth century.<sup>400</sup> What the Athenians discovered in the mid-fourth century was that "money was a prerequisite for waging war, not a result of it."<sup>401</sup>

As for timber and navy in general, evidence suggests that it was a regular theme in the Athenian assembly. There may not be speeches by political figures to offer direct proof of this, but results do indicate the outcome of assembly debates. For example, new docks

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<sup>395</sup> Demosthenes 10.37.

<sup>396</sup> See the evidence in Cawkwell, 1963, 63-64.

<sup>397</sup> Isocrates 8.7-8, 19-20, 122, 125, 128, 140; Xenophon *Poroi* 3.6-8; 5.11-12. See Dillery, 1993, on Xenophon's *Poroi* and Athenian imperialism and 1995; Missiou, 1992, ch.3 for Andokides's oratory; Davidson, 1990 20-36 for Isocrates's imperialism; de Romilly, 1963 on Thucydides and Athenian imperialism.

<sup>398</sup> Thucydides 6.19, 22.

<sup>399</sup> [Xenophon] *Athenaion Politeia* 2.6, 11-12.

<sup>400</sup> Hunt, 2010, 33; Millett, 1995, 184 and 1991; Pritchett, 1991, 485-504.

<sup>401</sup> Hunt, 2010, 31.

were built after 355 and many war materials were stored in the *Skeuotheke*.<sup>402</sup> In fact, records from the year 330/29 refer to a quantity of shipbuilding timber that was bought by Eubulos.<sup>403</sup> The increase in the number of triremes is even more telling. In 357/6 Athenian naval power amounted to 283 triremes,<sup>404</sup> but by 353/2 the number had risen to 349 (those at the dockyard plus those commissioned).<sup>405</sup> In 330/29, the number had risen to 399 (392 plus seven at sea).<sup>406</sup> An inscription from 326/5 attests the existence of a total of 372 shipsheds, 196 in Zea, 82 in Mounychia, and 94 in Kantharos.<sup>407</sup> The increase of the fleet, specifically from 357 to 353, is impressive and underlines the active concern by Eubulos and others for the reorganisation of the naval strength of Athens. Strengthening Athens' military forces required the approval of the assembly; for that reason, orators needed to address this issue to the people of Athens.<sup>408</sup> What all these suggest is that during the course of the fourth century, the Athenians became increasingly concerned with scarcity of money, campaign problems, lack of resources, problems that inevitably created topics of debate in fourth-century Athens.

Finally, epigraphic evidence provides an account of Athenian resolutions. These are the decrees of the Athenian people, the official language of the Athenian state as evidenced by inscribed *stelae*, and though their statements lack the descriptive nature of a historical account, they are the official record of public deliberation. The decrees are no more the personal consideration of political men who at times found it necessary to argue in materialistic terms, but stress the role of natural resources as a motivator of interstate relations, one that supplements our analysis. Hagermajer has successfully shown that the impersonality of the formulae included in honorific decrees allows us to read them as

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<sup>402</sup> IG II<sup>2</sup>1668; IG II<sup>2</sup> 1627. 352.

<sup>403</sup> IG II<sup>2</sup> 1627. 352-4.

<sup>404</sup> IG II<sup>2</sup> 1611. 1-9.

<sup>405</sup> IG II<sup>2</sup> 1613. 284-302.

<sup>406</sup> IG II<sup>2</sup> 1627. 268-9.

<sup>407</sup> IG II<sup>2</sup> 1627. 398-405.

<sup>408</sup> See IG II<sup>2</sup> 505 that attests to the expenditure on military structure since Eubulos. Cf. Dinarchus 1.96



statements of the city, expressing its consensus on the issues communicated by the decrees.<sup>409</sup>

I have to remind my readers that the purpose here is to acknowledge in the epigraphic evidence the Athenian political discourse for successful access to foreign resources. It is not about examining in detail and comparing what the epigraphic evidence says about natural resources in the mid-fifth century and mid-fourth century. This task deserves a distinct analysis due to the significant changes in the epigraphic habit,<sup>410</sup> but constraints of words does not allow this to happen here.

In particular, inscriptions from the Peloponnesian War attest deliberations about natural resources for war effort. From Macedonia, we witness the Athenian interest in timber conjunctural with specific terms: “I will not export [oa]rs [to anyone] but an Athe[nian]” (οὐδένα. κο]πέας ἐχσάγεν ἑάσο ἑὰμ μὲ Ἀθε[ναίο).<sup>411</sup> From the Athenian treaty with Methone, a city in the Thermaic Gulf,<sup>412</sup> we learn of the many limitations Athens imposed on the Aegean grain traffic. The inscription is an Athenian decree, in which it regulates the tribute paid by Methone, the importation of a fixed amount (lost) of grain annually from Byzantium, and guaranteed freedom to sail the seas as long as grain purchases were conducted with Athenian permission. Another Athenian treaty, this time with Aphytis, a town of Pallene in Chalkidike,<sup>413</sup> issued at the request of the town, or by Athens, regulates the trade rights of the former, and secures its commerce from any wrongdoing. The people of Aphytis had an unlimited right to import and transport grain, as long as it was kept within the regulations of Athens and the allies, of which, unfortunately, we do not know.

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<sup>409</sup> Hagermajer, 2007, 239.

<sup>410</sup> Low, 2005, 93-111; Engen, 2010, 119-140.

<sup>411</sup> IG I<sup>3</sup> 89.3; ML 91; Walbank, 1978, no.90.

<sup>412</sup> IG I<sup>3</sup> 61. Hopper, 1979, 76; Mattingly, 1961, 154-165.

<sup>413</sup> IG I<sup>3</sup> 63.

From the fourth century, a treaty with Clazomenae in 387/6, an island off the coast of Smyrna, on the west coast of Asia Minor, tells us of Athenian efforts to maintain a level of control in another state's trade and accumulate profits in the form of taxation. Athens consents to the Clazomenaeans having a free hand to deal on their own with their grain suppliers, Chios, Phocaea (or Miletos), and Smyrna (l. 18). It is a remarkable change considering Athenian involvement in grain supply exemplified by the fifth-century decrees concerning Methone and Aphytis. Athens is careful to avoid rigorous control over resources, yet this offer is still evidence of indirect involvement, while taxation remains unavoidable in order to raise money for the war. Its exceptional characteristic is that the Athenians try to appear less interventionist.<sup>414</sup> Athenian hopes, however, ended shortly in 386, when the King signed a peace treaty with Sparta that saw the return of Clazomenae and Cyprus to Persia and ordered the independence of the Greek cities.<sup>415</sup>

In the 370s, Athens probably received timber from King Amyntas III of Macedonia; *IG* II<sup>2</sup> 102 reports a deal between Athens and Amyntas III, albeit the provisions of the treaty have not survived, but were probably related to timber supplies as it was accustomed. Furthermore, in an informative inscription between Macedonians and the Chalkidic League, alliance and timber trade are worked out together. King Amyntas III provided timber export rights to the Chalkidic League, but carefully designed the terms of trade between them to make sure his timber did not get into the hands of potential enemies.<sup>416</sup> We need not dwell about Athenian arrangements with the Bosphorus kingdom that lasted more than two centuries and bear witness of even more assembly debates on grain supply. The case of Keos, however, in the mid-fourth century, provides an intriguing example.

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<sup>414</sup> For the decree with Clazomenae: RO 18; *IG* II<sup>2</sup> 28; Tod II 114. In *IG* II<sup>2</sup> 24 Thrasybulos tried to introduce the *εἰκοστή* at Thasos. Dues were a reminiscent of fifth-century practice that came into play in 413 in an attempt to substitute the tribute list, Thucydides 7.28.4. The 5% harbour tax appears also in the Clazomenae, while Thrasybulos imposed a 10% tax on ships in the Hellespont, see Xenophon *Hellenica* 4.8.26-27; Demosthenes 20.60; Diodoros 14.94.2-4. *IG* II<sup>2</sup> 21 records the alliance with Seuthes.

<sup>415</sup> Xenophon *Hellenica* 5.1.31. See Ruzicka, 1983, 104-108 for the Clazomenae decree and Persian foreign policy in 387/6.

<sup>416</sup> RO 12.9-18.

Of the Kean resources, *miltos* was the one resource in which the Athenians showed extreme interest. Its socio-economic importance is highlighted when we explore the range of Athenian methods to exploit Kean *miltos* as portrayed in the inscription IG II<sup>2</sup> 1128, an Athenian decree of the mid-fourth century that records Athenian intervention in order to secure a monopoly in the *miltos* trade.<sup>417</sup> The *stele* refers to three resolutions, from the cities of Karthea, Iulis, and Koresia, which institutionalize the Athenian monopoly on the receipt of *miltos* exports. The provision of the Athenian monopoly is made abundantly clear: “export of *miltos* shall be to Athens” (l. 10). Next, the Athenians go on to impose provisions limiting Iulis, Karthaea, and Koresia from exporting *miltos* by identifying ships that will be the only ones to export *miltos* (l. 12). People are encouraged by rewards to prosecute offenders (l. 13). Room is made for future Athenian decrees concerning the security of *miltos* exports (l. 22, 32). If anyone dares to export elsewhere, both his vessel and his property will be confiscated (ll. 26-28). Furthermore, we learn that the Athenian arrangements concerning Keos and its export of *miltos* were not new, as in line 11 the decree resolves that “the export of *miltos* shall be to Athens...as it was previously (καθάπερ πρότερον ἦν).” Indeed, as the next line of the decree reaffirms past arrangements (ψηφίσματα) that Athens and Koresia had made (τὰ πρότερον γεγενημένα). Hence, its language offers an amazing insight into the Athenian foreign policy mentality for procuring resources around the Aegean. The monopoly on Keos, though a unique example of the Athenian bellicose treatment of its fourth-century allies raises more questions. One would like to know what other monopolies existed. If the Athenians could do that for *miltos* what were their actions concerning other natural resources? If this was the Athenian attitude in the fourth century, what had been the case in the fifth century? Unfortunately, we do not know.

It is of note that at around this time (357), another Aegean island is found under close surveillance. IG XII 7, 5 attests to the people of Arkesine on Amorgos granting the Athenian

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<sup>417</sup> IG II<sup>2</sup> 1128 = RO 40 = Tod II, no.162.

governor Androtion a gold crown, *proxeneia*, and *ateleia* from everything. The reason behind this was Androtion's action to waive the interest on a loan worth around a talent. One possible reason behind this benevolent action may have been Arkesine's valuable commodities. Arkesine had a clothing industry,<sup>418</sup> and *ateleia* from Athens that will benefit both exporting parties.<sup>419</sup>

There is another group of inscriptions called honorific decrees. In these decrees, Athens tried to establish and maintain its relations with other states and merchants by offering grants and honours. These gifts in turn encouraged other individuals to emulate those who have performed services worthy of honours. The core efficacy of the honorific system was to allow Athens to secure for itself material benefits in return for titles and other benefits. Thirty six grants for trade-related services are extant, and cover the period from c.414 to 309.<sup>420</sup> Honours were bestowed to kings, satraps, Athenian and non-Athenian merchants, i.e. King Strato of Sidon, Orontes of Mysia, Herakleides of Cyprian Salamis and Pythophanes respectively. To summarise, we hear of no trade-related services before c. 414 the year following the Sicilian catastrophe and Sparta's declaration of war. From that point onwards until 340, we find eleven inscriptions recording Athenian efforts to assist overseas trade. From 340-309, however, we have twenty five inscriptions.

The year 340 marks the time of Philip's II offensive campaigns in the Hellespont that culminated in the battle of Chaeroneia. During that time, Philip and Alexander controlled the Hellespont, while in the 320s grain shortages started to appear.<sup>421</sup> It is of course true that evidence is rarely, if ever, representative of a period, as we never have all the pieces of the puzzle. One may say that the evidence is misleading, coincidental, or incomparable due to the different calibre of each involved party. However, two things are of note; first, that all

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<sup>418</sup> IG II<sup>2</sup> 1514, ll. 2, 10, 22, 51, 63, 65.

<sup>419</sup> RO 51, ll. 16-34.

<sup>420</sup> Engen, 2010, 230-276.

<sup>421</sup> Garnsey, 1988, 154-162.

epigraphic evidence relate to grain and timber. Second, soon after the years 414 and 340 we have a sudden increase in epigraphical evidence concerning trade-related services. Engen has recently examined the trade-related services for which Athens granted honours and privileges and traced the historical development of Athenian grants of honours and privileges for a number of categories of trade-related services. His result can be summed up as follows: "Athenian trade policy did not develop according to a linear progression, but rather by fits and starts, in which Athens adapted its trade policy to meet unexpected and sporadic crises on an ad hoc basis".<sup>422</sup> If that is so, then the 340s represent an important transition period for Athens' trade. The Athenians, as seen from the honorific inscriptions of the latter half of the fourth century, changed their geographic interests. They diversify and intensify their concern in tapping into grain markets other than the Black Sea now that north regions have been largely controlled by Macedonia since 340. New destinations are sought out in the Adriatic, more honours are bestowed to merchants and better relations are forged with suppliers. *IG II<sup>2</sup> 212* recording the Athenian response in 347 to the sons of Leukon who just recently took power in the Bosporan kingdom is indicative of this attitude. The Athenians reconfirm to Spartokos and Paerisades the privileges granted to their father. But other issues are brought forward, more specific and unmistakably material. Spartokos and Paerisades asked that Athens pay the outstanding amount of money owed to them and that it lend them for service a number of skilled officers that made up the crew of a ship (see 3.3.4). The first request was referred to immediate consideration at the next assembly, while the second was granted without delay.<sup>423</sup> These clauses and their immediate acceptance reveal that Athens' preferential treatment to merchants and suppliers was not accidental but, showed commitment to protect Athenian interests in their spheres of trade. Similarly, this pattern is also supported by the change in attitude recorded in assembly speeches. The problem is not so about losing Athenian hegemony, but rather how to defend and retain

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<sup>422</sup> Engen, 2010, 76.

<sup>423</sup> Lines 53-63.

areas of Athenian interest, such as the Hellespont, Byzantium, and the Aegean islands. All areas connected to a big extent with trade and procurement of resources.

There is also the matter of the types of goods that were exchanged because of these trade-related services, which shed further light on the nature of Athenian interests in foreign policy. Every case that we know of in which Athens granted honours and privileges for trade-related services and in which the goods are indicated, involves grain or ship's timber, with the exception of one about fish. Engen identifies 18 of the 24 cases involving foodstuffs that occurred after 338, the time of Macedonian domination. The two occasions on which Athens honoured its timber suppliers occurred in the period between 410-407, when Athens, had lost most of its fleet in the Sicilian expedition.<sup>424</sup> Thus, it would seem that Athens' main interest in honouring those who had performed trade-related services was to provide its citizens with food to eat and timber for shipbuilding. Both connect with matters of security since both timber and grain were key factors in Athenian foreign policy as it was envisaged by the Athenians of the fifth and fourth centuries. Provision of timber and especially grain were a constant headache; more so when Athens was faced with problems in the international arena. *Ateleia euergesia*, crowns and other grants for trade-related services occur at the same time that Athens is found having trouble in the geopolitical game, and this cannot be a coincidence.<sup>425</sup> That is, lack of power to coerce needed imports, Athens devised incentives to reward and encourage traders and rulers to fulfil its interests in trade.

Grants such as the ones offered to Macedonian kings, Bosporan kings, and the satrap Orontes attest to crises even before the rise of Philip.<sup>426</sup> Athens' tireless cultivation of good relations with the Bosporan kingdom also derived from its need to import grain, especially in the fourth century. For that reason, Athens early on made official reciprocal agreements

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<sup>424</sup> Engen, 2010, 77.

<sup>425</sup> Engen, 2010, 189.

<sup>426</sup> IG I<sup>3</sup> 182; 117; Isocrates 17.57; Demosthenes 20.31. RO 64; IG II<sup>2</sup> 207.

with four consecutive Bosporan rulers Satyros I, Spartokos I, Leukon, and his sons Spartokos, Paerisades and Satyrus for the preferential loading of grain that point to continuity, and not to temporary arrangements. Once the Hellespont is blocked by Macedonia after 340, Athens is found bestowing honours and expanding its relations to people from Akragas and Tyre, and founding a colony at Sicily. Relation with these places probably came long before, but it is only now that we have firm evidence to support such hypothesis.<sup>427</sup> This geographic diversification – from the Bosporan kingdom to Tyre to Akragas – and intensification that Athens so clearly undertakes after 340 in its new policy of awarding civic honours to merchants active in the trade of grain offers an excellent example of the importance of natural resources in the overall Athenian foreign policy. The reciprocity in the relationship involving Athens and its foreign potentates who gave the provisions touches on the mutual commercial benefits in Athenian trading relations. Undeniably, Athens had an interest in drawing revenue from this trade, but it is unlikely that the primary interest behind the state's practice of granting honours and privileges rested in taxes. If obtaining revenue had been Athens' chief interest, then the specific good that were traded should not have been predominantly grain and timber.

Chapter Two set to prove the centrality of natural resources to Athenian political discourse as represented in historiography, oratory and inscriptions. Throughout the fifth and fourth centuries, grain was a topic in the assembly; incentives and rewards were offered to encourage traders and rulers to assist trade in important resources; treaties were struck with kings for the importation of timber and grain resources, and monopolies were imposed to other city-states for the same needs. The belief that Thasian, Amphipolitan, and Sicilian resources represented a strategic as well as an economic interest of Athens was expressed publicly by Thucydides.<sup>428</sup> Politicians allotted weight to natural resources within broader

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<sup>427</sup> *IG* I<sup>3</sup> 46; *IG* II<sup>3</sup> 342; Camp, 1974, no. 3.

<sup>428</sup> Thucydides 4.108; 1.101.3.

discussion of foreign policy. The Athenians listened to a variety of arguments, morality and interest could come into play to contribute to the centrality of resource issues. The disappearance of the materialism espoused in the fifth century, and of ideological conflicts did not change the weight given to resource issues. Inscriptions explain that the Athenians continued to pursue and protect critical natural resources, albeit with more effective diplomatic means. So, too today, states and political leaders, in most of their local deliberations regarding material gain avoid the language of acquisition, and instead turn to more subtle words.<sup>429</sup>

This suggests that Athenian thinking concerning natural resources was generally coherent; hope for material earning was pervasive. Egypt, the Black Sea, Macedonia, the Aegean islands, all repeatedly found their way into Athenian accounts because they possessed natural resources the Athenians needed, and could not ignore. For this reason, resource issues assumed central role in political planning. For almost two centuries, one of the overarching goals of Athenian political strategy was to access foreign markets in their effort to establish the necessary infrastructure that would in turn establish them as a dominant power in the Greek world. Furthermore, the growing emphasis on the procurement of natural resources had particular resonance; it also attests their central position in Athenian strategy and warfare.

This analysis suggests that the Athenians had an ample concern for the acquisition and exploitation of strategic natural resources, and that they understood the benefits they could bring for political and military success. It does not necessarily mean that resources alone determined imperial success or that all foreign policy was aimed at achieving control over resources, but they certainly played a significant part in Athenian thinking.

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<sup>429</sup> Diodoros 2.42 describes how Themistocles convinced the Athenians not to disclose his plans that aimed at the enhancement of Athens in public. Thucydides 1.23.6 famously explained for the causes of the Peloponnesian War there is a real cause, formally kept out of sight, and an alleged one, argued in public: ἀληθεστάτην πρόφασιν ἀφανεστάτην δὲ λόγῳ...αἱ δ' ἐς τὸ φανερόν λεγόμεναι αἰτίαι.



Yet, it has also emerged from the discussion that we should not look for a general political model. The Athenians did not try to create a general theory of the relation between resources and foreign policy. They were only concerned with its specific application. Contemporary sources saw in resources a vital tool to prosperity. This is what makes this chapter interesting. It end up demonstrating a quite different but no less interesting point, namely, a striking lack of interest in our surviving sources in the question of natural resources. As vivid as our sources are, there is still a gap in the nexus between natural resources and foreign policy. One is puzzled to understand the reasons for this. We can reasonably infer that these matters must have been in some way on the political “agenda” for much of the classical period. Xenophon, keen to note the resources of other regions he passed by, has nothing to say about the Athenian navy or how Athens so easily acquired for a second time naval hegemony. Questions arise too, on Thucydides’ relative silence. This is because Thucydides as a general, and probably, orator, is regarded as someone with specialist knowledge. For not only he had the opportunity to convert military power into political power in Athens, he was in a position to shape public opinion about Athens’ finances, arms, resources and the uses to which they should be put. But it is wrong to expect from him to give to his readers a complete micro-analysis of reasons for every Athenian enterprise or why every region was strategically important to Athens. For Thucydides other issues take primacy than the mundane problem of resources. He wanted to distinguish between *hegemonia* (legitimated leadership) and *arche* (control). One of the central tasks Thucydides sets himself is to understand historical causation. How had the war begun? What were the real causes? Thucydides is able to distinguish between underlying and immediate causes. Thus the war as a whole was due to the fear felt by the Spartans (and their allies, especially Corinth) of growing Athenian power (1.23), while he nonetheless goes on to give a detailed event of the specific events leading up to hostilities in 431 B.C., which included the Corcyran affair which can be viewed as an immediate cause but involving

complex issues of trust, reciprocity and the dangers of alliance systems. These are the issues Thucydides wished to highlight. The subject of natural resources for foreign policy seemed too mundane for Thucydides to explain to a war society. Similarly, Xenophon never focused on where and how Athenian timber was procured and to what purpose, though he did care to point out the importance of timber to the Olynthians.<sup>430</sup> Then again, Thucydides stressed the reason for the Athenian attack on Thasos, and the benefits of Amphipolis to the Athenians. That is not difficult to explain, Thucydides' family was long involved in the region and knew well the collective resources of Thrace. Probably for this reason, he was entrusted as general of a campaign force to Thrace (424), charged with preventing the defection of Athenian allied cities to the Spartan commander Brasidas.<sup>431</sup>

In addition, speeches, discussion and debate were very much part of the ancient Greek way of life generally, and even more so in a democratic society in which discussion before the assembly and debates before the law courts were a central part of political practice and the manipulation of power. Thucydides could not crowd his work with whole arguments and counterarguments. Rather "keeping as closely as possible to the general sense of the words used, to make the speakers say what, in my opinion, was called for by each situation."<sup>432</sup> In other words, Thucydides gives his speeches the good arguments and good form he thinks they should have had, even if he cannot remember them exactly. Here we can see that Thucydides' aim is more than didactic - in the speeches, he opposes fundamental viewpoints and concepts; some borrowed some of his own. Likewise, the speeches add a more dramatic and engaging aspect to his work, which is otherwise highly focused and compressed. Thus, Thucydides wanted to show antithetical pairs with opposing speakers presenting opposite arguments, i.e. the moral issues of the Melian

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<sup>430</sup> Xenophon *Hellenica* 5.2.16-17.

<sup>431</sup> Thucydides 4.104-106.

<sup>432</sup> Thucydides 1.22.

dialogue.<sup>433</sup> Immediately follows the speech of Nicias and Alcibiades at the Athenian assembly on the matter of the Sicilian expedition. Alcibiades' speech in particular, presents the example of materialism espoused in Athenian political discourse. In brief, Nicias is concerned about his city and gives his estimate of the equipment necessary, the enormously high demands for war material, the expedition's lack of money, difficulties of supply and supply lines, and the danger that will come from hostile cities. On the other hand, Alcibiades counters Nicias' objections by making his own estimations of how things will turn out and how profitable this campaign will be for the Athenians and their policy in general. Before one can lead a mind one must know the mind one wants to lead. If we are able to put aside all of Thucydides' masterful built up of events, Nicias' tragic figure and so on, what remains is Athenian blindness, ignorance and greediness to expand their own power by controlling another resource-rich region. There is no definite answer to explain Thucydides' relative silence for the centrality of natural resources to Athenian political discourse. Personally, I think it was a given. Can we believe that the assembly discussion for the Sicilian expedition was the first to which the Athenians discussed matters of supply, money and resources so vividly? We are better informed about the Sicilian expedition than about any other Athenian campaign because it was not a typical expedition.

The other answer I find plausible is that both Thucydides and Demosthenes must have expressed a significant part of Athenian opinion, both affected by the historical context they were living in. Evidence from other sources such as inscriptions and reports of assembly meetings, illustrate the importance of natural resources as a topic in Athenian foreign policy, despite a striking lack of interest in our sources in the question of natural resources. Though the differences in detail and emphasis may be linked to the particular period from which different evidence comes, the overall thinking is representative of Athenian beliefs for most of the classical period. Access to strategic natural resources was an

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<sup>433</sup> Thucydides 5.85-113.

important factor in the political calculus of classical Athens. Certain policies then were built, or were a reaction to situations and opportunities, around the expectation to increase material gains that would in turn, boost the Athenian war machine, fill state coffers, and elevate the expectations of the Athenian *demos*.

The epigraphic evidence is also surprisingly thin. Epigraphic evidence is a rich source of information about ancient Athens since many times texts uniquely preserve direct information concerning events of political significance. In our case, the significance of these cases normally emerges only when they are set into a broader historical context. However, the number and variety of inscriptions can always be said to be only an abstract number due to the chance survival of the evidence. Figures are small and statistical arguments are precarious. Yet, a picture is gradually being discerned, one which speeches of historians, of orators, and epigraphic evidence share a similar relative small number of examples. Is the acquisition/security of natural resources so mundane a part of Athenian policy that it does not even merit an inscribed monument? The answer seems to be yes. Because when it does, as in the example of the treaty with Macedonia, the Bosporan kingdom, the satrap Orontes, and the cases of Methone and Aphytis, the Athenians are highly motivated to inscribe their relation and their reciprocity with the other partner that will secure a smooth access to foreign resources. Similarly, it seems more than a coincidence that from the same time that Athens was becoming more pressed to find new sources of materials and revenue after 355/4 that the surviving evidence shows that Athens granted *proxenia* and *euergesia* more frequently for trade-related services than it had in the previous decades. Furthermore, the geographic diversification – from the Bosporan kingdom to Tyre to Akragas in Sicily – and intensification in terms of resourcing grain that Athens so clearly undertakes after 340 in its new policy of awarding civic honours to merchants active in the trade of grain offers an excellent example of the importance of natural resources in the overall Athenian foreign

policy.

Since all types of evidence have a relative material motivation then one can proceed to look at the expression of these sources. The suggestion in this chapter is that fifth century decrees and speeches have a more clear statement of purpose due to the historical context of a strong naval Athenian state. Fourth century orators are constrained by Athens' weaker political position. For example, the inscription for Clazomenae, the treaties with Macedonia in the 370s, the charter of the Second Athenian League take on a remarkable change as Athens tries to appear less interventionist. This is not difficult to fathom. The empire was no more and Athens was careful enough to avoid rigorous control over resources, yet still tried through indirect involvement, to make its presence known. A slight post-imperial bashfulness is the characteristic of the fourth century, while at the same time that "material motivations are typically ascribed to Athens' enemies. As we move closer to the 340s, we hardly find any inscription or speech which proposes a materialistic scheme abroad. What we do find, instead, is a large proportion of epigraphic evidence for trade-related services that cover a broad geographic spectrum of the Mediterranean world. Problems of dissimilarity with fourth-century symbouleutic speeches that had to remain diplomatic when addressing methods of access to natural resources can be explained when we take into consideration the period they were written in. The disintegration of the Second Athenian League in 355 left almost no room for Athenian politicians to advocate aggressive materialistic schemes abroad. They were more concerned with their image abroad, the recovery of the Athenian economy at home, and of overseas influence, methods that could bring resources in a more diplomatic way. One effective method was to grant honours and privileges to those who had performed trade-related services. The testimonia attest to traders and benefactors from around the Mediterranean. The connection being that Athens was trying to bypass the problem created by Macedonian control of the Hellespont. That is,

despite the failure to obtain hegemony, notable after 355, and the change in political deliberation, Athens continued to show coherence and consistency in its naval policy – especially, under the leadership of a political group who tried to avoid the debacles of previous decades – with regard to natural resources that would restore them in power. Indeed, this generally defines the relationship between Athens and its international environment. Athenian policy was in large part connected with timber and its final product, triremes, which in turn protected and controlled the trade of natural resources.

In other words, during the classical period, Athens' trade policy, whose aim was primarily to secure vital goods and revenue, such as timber and grain, was closely tied to political events. When Athens had a dominating military power, it was able to coerce others to supply it with the revenue and imported goods it required. When, however, the varying strength of Athens' navy and the shifting tides of external events limited Athens' ability to implement this policy, for the most part in the end, Athens had to employ more peaceful and more creative means of obtaining revenue and goods through trade.

But political discourse is not a sufficient factor to explain the centrality of natural resources. Concerns for resource had decisively moved to centre stage in Athenian interstate politics, suggesting that states that depended on natural resources for their military prowess adopted a discourse with emphasis on resource acquisition and protection. Several other features may emerge in this equation, such as resource scarcity, disputes over the ownership of valuable strategic natural resources, and protection of existing ones. Hence, the following two chapters will seek to analyse Athens' unwavering determination to control the supply of precious resources and prevalent strategies that allowed the city to compete successfully over resources in an emerging landscape of conflict.

### 3

## **Methods of Access to Natural Resources**

The aim of this chapter is to demonstrate how the Athenians employed all the elements of national policy at their disposal to acquire the necessary resources that would fund their policy in the Aegean. In the words of Edward Mead Earle, “strategy is the art of controlling and utilizing the resources of a nation--or a coalition of nations--including its armed forces, to the end that its vital interests shall be effectively promoted and secured against enemies, actual, potential, or merely presumed.”<sup>434</sup> Thus, national policy is designed to make use of all the elements of national power in order to secure the interests and objectives of the state. This is precisely the approach that this chapter will follow. First, I will consider the military face of Athens as it presented itself on Thasos, Eion, Amphipolis, and the cleruchies. This offers a strong model of the relationship between natural resources and military intervention. Then, I will consider the diplomatic aspects of this strategy; how Athens used diplomacy to promote and facilitate its foreign policy interests, always with an eye towards the procurement of foreign resources, and thus to provide a constant stream of natural resources into Athens. Before I begin this study, a digression is in order here regarding the philosophical subject of acquisition that would create anticipation towards the Athenian strategies of intervention.

### **3.1 Philosophy of acquisition: quest for *autarkeia* and *autonomia***

Thus, I take this opportunity to introduce the philosophical writings of Plato and

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<sup>434</sup> Earle, 1943, viii.

Aristotle into our discussion. Their comments on the legitimate grounds for the acquisition and usefulness of natural resources as a source of power and cause of war, offer emphasis to this study. Their discussions may be brief, as the subject was not of central concern of theirs, but they are nevertheless highly important for the insight they provide. Aristotelian and Platonic reasoning, however, is far too complex for a small digression such as this. For the sake of brevity, I will portray what I consider to be essential for the purposes of my argument.

Aristotle spoke of the importance of resources to the well-being of a state, and of a person, since he saw the need for resources (which, according to him, include friends) as means to achieve *eudaimonia* (loosely translated as happiness). *Eudaimonia* is associated with *autarkeia* (i.e. self-sufficiency). *Autarkeia*, is described as “an end, and a chief good” (ἡ δ’ αὐτάρκεια καὶ τέλος καὶ βέλτιστον),<sup>435</sup> a thing “lacking in nothing”.<sup>436</sup> For Aristotle, the process of attaining self-sufficiency was not a utopian whim; rather, it was a logical process, which sought to explain the behaviour of the poleis around him. Aristotle recognised that *autarkeia* was connected not only with the individual, but also with the polis, because the polis itself provided the medium to reaching *autarkeia*”.<sup>437</sup> Plato remarked: “a polis comes into existence when each of us finds that he is not self-sufficient”. A polis needed to be independent from external powers in order to survive and obtain *autonomia*,<sup>438</sup> while *autarkeia* was necessary in order to provide political independence. In itself, however, self-sufficiency entailed economic independence.

A completely self-sufficient region would be one that produced everything which it needed.<sup>439</sup> Greece, however, is a mountainous region, almost three-quarters of it is covered

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<sup>435</sup> Aristotle *Politics* 1253a1-2.

<sup>436</sup> Aristotle *Nicomachean Ethics* 1097b.

<sup>437</sup> Aristotle *Politics* 1281a1; Plato *Republic* 369b5.

<sup>438</sup> May, 1998 38ff for a political analysis of Aristotle’s concept of autonomy, as well as that of Kant and other philosophers. See also his bibliography.

<sup>439</sup> [Aristotle] *Athenaion Politeia* 1326b29.



by mountains, and thus impossible to cultivate. Only 18% could be farmed under ancient conditions.<sup>440</sup> At the same time, however, some coastal plains and islands are surprisingly fertile, as Homer notes for Crete: Κρήτη τις γαῖ' ἔστι, μέσῳ ἐνὶ οἴνοπι πόντῳ, καλὴ καὶ πῖσιρα, περίρρυτος.<sup>441</sup> No Greek city could be self-sufficient as geographical and political fragmentation prevented it. Pseudo-Xenophon made this clear:

yet no other city has even two of these things: the same city does not have timber and flax, but wherever there is flax in abundance, the land is smooth and without timber. There is not even copper and iron from the same city, not any two or three other things in a single city, but there is one product here and another there.<sup>442</sup>

A polis able to control the source or supply of some much-needed resources - grain, timber, silver - might be said to be on the road to self-sufficiency. Steps could be taken to establish self-sufficiency; therefore, Aristotle recommended that the ideal city be in close access to timber, and next to the sea in order to acquire a navy.<sup>443</sup> Plato, however, wished to have his ideal city away from fir, mountain pine and other timber that could be used to make merchant vessels, since "this would encourage trade, the great corrupter."<sup>444</sup> Polybios claimed that Lykourgos wished to make the city αὐτάρκεις and σῶφρον.<sup>445</sup> Aristotle, Plato, and Lykourgos shared different values but ultimately they are all concerned with the way natural resources interact with the city.

Coming back to Aristotle, the acquisitive process (κτητική), the ability to obtain, was part of the solution to achieve self-sufficiency.<sup>446</sup> For Aristotle, such a process was at the core

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<sup>440</sup> Apel, 2004, 5; Levi, 1980, 13.

<sup>441</sup> Homer *Odyssey* 19.172-3. Herodotos 1.32.8 One of the reasons for Greek colonisation was soil insufficiency; 7.102.1 Demaratus takes notice of the poverty of Greece. See also Thucydides 1.2.6; 15.1; 2.38.2. Horden and Purcell, 2000, 369.

<sup>442</sup> [Xenophon] *Athenaion Politeia* 2.13. Isocrates 4.42 expresses similar concerns on self-sufficiency.

<sup>443</sup> Aristotle *Politics* 1327a.

<sup>444</sup> Plato *Laws* 705c; Theophrastos *History of Plants* 5.7.1-3 and 4.5.5 for comments on trees suitable for shipbuilding.

<sup>445</sup> Polybios 6.48.7.

<sup>446</sup> Aristotle *Politics* 1256b23ff.

of human activity.<sup>447</sup> He found in nature many examples where self-sufficiency was attained; plants and animals have a relationship in which one exists in order to serve the other.<sup>448</sup> Among animals, the same property (κτῆσις) exists since some pasture and some hunt for sustenance. As his logic unfolds, Aristotle concludes that nature provided all animals to serve humans. He found this characteristic to be applicable to human relations as well.<sup>449</sup> Nature provides standards for political action,<sup>450</sup> and as Aristotle finds a connection between nature and the polis, he concludes that it is by nature just for humans to make war (ὡς φύσει δίκαιον τοῦτον ὄντα τὸν πόλεμον) in order to provide what is necessary. Aristotle does not specify the cause of war, but in his view, material factors motivate warfare. This is only one part of the picture, but it is nonetheless there.

Plato found the root of war to be greed rooted in the desires of the body. His theory implies materialism, and despite recent critiques,<sup>451</sup> it is a persuasive argument that human need, whatever it may be, can become a catalyst in history. Plato also argued for a materialistic explanation of war: cities make war in order to gain possessions, especially the land of their neighbours. He imagined that this was because cities needed to escape poverty. Plato argued that the unlimited acquisition of wealth would drive cities to war.<sup>452</sup> In the *Phaedo* Plato sums up the entire causal relationship:

And the body fills us with passions, desires, fears, and all sorts of illusions and foolishness...the body and its desires cause war, civil discord, and battles; for all wars arise from the desire to acquire money, and we are compelled to gain money [66d] for the sake of the body. We are slaves to its service. And so, because of all these things, we have no leisure for philosophy.<sup>453</sup>

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<sup>447</sup> Aristotle *Politics* 1256b1-4ff; 1256b23ff.

<sup>448</sup> Aristotle *Politics* 1256a1-25.

<sup>449</sup> Aristotle *Politics* 1256b17.

<sup>450</sup> Amber, 1984, 487.

<sup>451</sup> Hunt, 2010, 29-35.

<sup>452</sup> Plato *Republic* 2.372e-374a; cf. 8.547b-c.

<sup>453</sup> Plato *Phaedrus* 66b-d.

Plato attributed the drive to wage war to the needs of the human body, and the inability of self-restraint. In this, he found the main problem for his self-sufficient city. People must not go beyond the limits set by necessary wants.<sup>454</sup> Plato condemned acquisitiveness, as it leads to war, yet by doing so, he recognised the truth of the matter: materialism is a motive for war.

Aristotle's and Plato's philosophical ideas give a grossly over-simplified account of human warlike motivations. They are contingent on wider philosophical theories, rather than grounded in thorough study of Greek warfare, providing only a schematic account. Nonetheless, within its simplicity, we find a core truth. As certain poleis lacked something another polis had, one way to obtain what was missing was by waging war. Thus, according to its ambitions, and the depletion or inadequacy of its resources, a state had to embark on a drive towards self-sufficiency,<sup>455</sup> and in the process acquire all the materials of war. Thucydides was a proponent of this theory: in the Melian Dialogue,<sup>456</sup> the Athenian envoys argued in terms of realism, and suggested that one will obtain something by power if one has the ability to do so. It is surely no surprise then to begin the study of classical Athenian foreign policy concerning natural resources with a consideration of acquisition strategies through war.

## 3.2 Coercive diplomacy

### 3.2.1 A private hunt for resources

From an early period, ambitious men seeking to establish their power keenly sought the resources of other areas. Adventurism by leading men of the late archaic period, such as

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<sup>454</sup> Plato *Republic* 2.372e-374a.

<sup>455</sup> Isocrates 4.42.

<sup>456</sup> Thucydides 5.85-113.

Peisistratos and Histiaios, are recorded by ancient sources with a hint of adventurism.<sup>457</sup> Both men were familiar with the accumulated assets which some territories had to offer, and so made expeditions in order to acquire them. Histiaios of Miletos was to settle in Myrkinos of the Edonians, to take possession of the advantages of the region, an abundance of timber for shipbuilding and oar-making, silver mines and a large number of Greeks and barbarians who might accept the leadership of Histiaios at any time.<sup>458</sup> In 497 Aristagoras, son-in-law of and successor to Histiaios, repeated the venture, but died at the hands of the Edonians whilst trying to secure the area around Myrkinos, probably Ennea Hodoi.<sup>459</sup> Before them, Peisistratos became wealthy from activities around the Thasian *peraia* as both Herodotos and the author of the *Athenaion Politeia* describe. Herodotos briefly refers to his revenues from the Strymon River, while Aristotle, in greater detail, says that “he made (συνώρικσε) a settlement at a place near the Gulf of Thermae called Rhaecelus, but from there he went on to the neighbourhood of Pangaion, from where he got money (χρηματισάμενος) and hired soldiers”.<sup>460</sup> No indication is given as to whether Peisistratos amassed his wealth by force, or whether his encounters with the local tribes were peaceful or hostile. Peisistratos’ ventures concerning the Thracian mines occurred during his second period of exile in the mid-sixth century.<sup>461</sup>

Sources are vague on Peisistratos’ presence in Thrace. He is not reported as being an *oikist*, nor is it claimed that Rhaecelus was his settlement. Rather, he was part of an expedition to settle near the Thermaic Gulf. One possibility is that Peisistratos (who had fled to Eretria) made use of his Eretrian friends.<sup>462</sup> The latter were certainly no strangers to colonization as they were part of the Euboean colonisation.<sup>463</sup> Three colonies of Eretria in the

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<sup>457</sup> Evans, 1963, 113-128.

<sup>458</sup> Herodotos 5.23-24.

<sup>459</sup> Thucydides 4.102; Diodoros 12.68.1-2.

<sup>460</sup> Herodotos 1.64; [Aristotle] *Athenaion Politeia* 15.2.

<sup>461</sup> For the exiles of Peisistratos, see Lang, 1954, 59-73; Jacoby, 1949, 188ff; Adcock, 1924, 174-181.

<sup>462</sup> Cole, 1975, 42-4.

<sup>463</sup> See Agostino, 1999, 207-228; Boardman, 2009, 195-200; Popham, Hatcher and Pollard, 1980, 151-161.

Thermaic gulf are mentioned in the ancient sources: Methone, Dicaea, and Mende,<sup>464</sup> and suggest the probability that the settlement was made possible by collaboration with the Eretrians.<sup>465</sup> In any case, the result was that Peisistratos gathered wealth from the Strymon, which in turn helped him to regain power in Athens.<sup>466</sup>

As leader of Athens, however, Peisistratos was responsible for capturing Sigeion from the Mytileneans after a series of wars. Athenian control of the city was not secured, however, even at the time of Peisistratos who had to fight to keep the place.<sup>467</sup> Later Peisistratos founded Elaious on the other side of the straits and sponsored adventures in the Thracian Chersonese.<sup>468</sup> Notably, Miltiades' capture of Lemnos and Imbros for the Athenians, and the helmet dedication at Olympia which is inscribed: "The Athenians, from the [spoils] in Lemnos" associated with this capture of the island, support the supposition of official Athenian endeavour in the Chersonese.<sup>469</sup> Peisistratos was a man of vision and, of course, of success. He understood the possibilities and importance of dominating areas close to natural resources as they could pave the road to prominence.

After Cleisthenes' reforms, the Athenian state inherited the overseas relations

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<sup>464</sup> For a discussion of literary and archaeological finds, see Hammond, 1998, 393-399.

<sup>465</sup> Herodotos 1.60.4. [Aristotle] *Athenaion Politeia* 14.4; 15.2. Cole, 1975, 42-44. Cole suggests that Peisistratos was able to raise money peacefully by employing his diplomatic skills with the Thracian tribes, but I find this supposition inconceivable. Peisistratos was not acting in Thrace in an official capacity, Herodotos 1.64; hence, he had nothing to offer in return. The Phye story is only evidence of Peisistratos knowing a girl of possible Thracian origin. According to Herodotos, the girl was from the deme of Paeania; but Aristotle claims that she was a Thracian girl from Collytus. Even if Paeania was a mistake for Paeonian, it is still a weak argument to point out Peisistratos's diplomatic abilities with Thracian tribes. The girl was not reported to have been his wife from his time spent in Thrace, like in the case of Thucydides: Thucydides 4.104.4; Plutarch *Kimon* 4.1-2; of Herakleides: Xenophon *Anabasis* 7.3-7; of Xenophon: Xenophon *Anabasis* 5.8; 7.6.44 though we learn that Xenophon did not take Seuthes' offer to marry his daughter; of Iphicrates: Athenaios 4.131a; Nepos *Iphicrates* 3.4; of Charidemus: Demosthenes 23.129; of Athenodoros, Simon and Bianor: Demosthenes 23.11.

<sup>466</sup> Seltman, 1924, 56-59. See now Brok, 2000, 39-47.

<sup>467</sup> Graham, 1964, 32. For Sigeion: Strabo 13.1.38; Herodotos 5.94-9; 6.115 ff; 5.94.1; *Frg.* 428 in Lobel & Page, 1955, 287.

<sup>468</sup> For the Chersonese: Herodotos 6.34-39. There is also the possibility that Elaious was established as an Athenian *apoikia* in the last quarter of the seventh century, Pseudo-Skymnos 708-9. Keen, 2000, 67; Isaac, 1986, 192-3; Graham, 1964, 33, n.5. A century later, Athens in the face of the elder Miltiades established itself firmly in the Thracian Chersonese, Herodotos 6.34-38. Later, he was succeeded by his nephew, the younger Miltiades, also sent by the Peisistratids. Herodotos clearly identifies the Athenians being involved militarily in the region and possibly proves a link between Athens and colonial enterprises. Keen rejects Garnsey's 1985, 118, attempt to dissociate the elder Miltiades from the Peisistratid policy.

<sup>469</sup> Herodotos 6.34-39; 6.140; Nepos *Miltiades* 1-3; Diodoros 10.19.6. In the face of the Persian invasion, Miltiades fled but made sure Lemnos and Imbros, two nearby islands, were captured for the Athenians, Herodotos 6. 39, 140; Nepos *Miltiades* 1-3; Diodoros 10.19.6.

accumulated over the years by these influential families. These individuals may have lost their independent power base, but they could still maintain their links through their positions as generals. A look into Miltiades' genealogical tree will suffice to prove the point. The Thracian King Oloros gave his daughter Hegesipyle to Miltiades, and Kimon was the result of their marriage. Kimon continued his father's legacy *par excellence*, recasting himself as an expert on Thracian politics. Kimon's nephew was Thucydides,<sup>470</sup> and Thucydides' father Oloros bore the same name as the Thracian king Oloros of the Sapai. As expected, Thucydides would later inherit ownership of gold mines in Thrace (τὸν Θουκυδίδην κτήσιν τε ἔχειν τῶν χρυσείων μετάλλων ἐργασίας ἐν τῇ περὶ ταῦτα Θράκη καὶ ἀπ' αὐτοῦ δύνασθαι ἐν τοῖς πρώτοις τῶν ἡπειρωτῶν), and an influential position there through this family connections. Miltiades, Kimon, and Thucydides were all found serving the Athenian state in the Thracian region.

Individuals, usually generals and orators, had connections with regions and persons from all over the Aegean. Such connection fell sometimes under the institutions of *xenia* and *philia*, links that were common between generals and rulers of various cities.<sup>471</sup> *Xenia* was a specialized and institutionalized relationship which entailed the exchange of hospitality and a duty to look after one another. It was a way of extending protection to an outsider by making him a kind of member of the community he was visiting, but the *xenoi* could also be expected to look after each other's welfare, in a wider sense, by providing military or political support. These relations between individual Athenians and foreign kings were sometimes found to promote the benefit of the state, i.e. Thrasybulos' ventures during the Ionian War supplied new contacts in Thrace which he would later make of to rebuilt the Athenian hegemony.<sup>472</sup> But that was not always the case. This optimistic picture of unswerving loyalty to the democracy is not the whole picture. The line between individual benefit and the interest of

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<sup>470</sup> Thucydides 4.104.4; 105; Plutarch *Kimon* 4.1-2; cf. Isaac, 1986, 33. n. 169.

<sup>471</sup> Lysias 16.4; Xenophon *Hellenica* 2.29; Demosthenes 12.10; Isocrates 9.54.

<sup>472</sup> Diodoros 13.72.1; Xenophon *Hellenica* 1.1.12; 4.8.26. *IG* II<sup>2</sup> 31.

the state was blurry. Patriotism and guest-friendship would sometimes appear as antithetical terms in political rivalry. Demosthenes, for example, declared his preference for the common interest of Greece (and Athens) to the *gifts* and *xenia* of Philip II, but had no hesitation to accuse Aeschines of having put his *xenia* and *philia* with Philip above the fate of the city.<sup>473</sup> Kallistratos was accused of accepting bribes to propose decrees against the interest of the people in the assembly (361/0)<sup>474</sup> This ambiguity over what was best for the state had implications for charges of treason. Examples seem to be numerous in the 340s and 330s: Aeschines and Philocrates were charged with bribery at Athens; Demosthenes alleged that the Olynthians, Lasthenes and Euthykrates received gifts (*dora*) in return for betraying their city; Demosthenes even put together a list of traitors among the cities.<sup>475</sup> According to recent scholarship, gifts were frequently offered and equally accepted, and generated suspicion, but the Athenians seem to have accepted this situation so long as the politicians did not betray the interest of the city.<sup>476</sup>

In Athens, generals acted as *sumbouloi* (advisors) by speaking and making proposals. There is credible evidence of more than twenty occasions throughout the fifth and fourth centuries in which generals in office participated in campaign-related deliberation,<sup>477</sup> where the leading generals and influential orators had the first say on the matter, while the people in groups supported the one or the other.<sup>478</sup> Hamel rightly suggested that men currently serving in the *strategia* participated more frequently in the assembly and were likely to enjoy greater corresponding influence over military decision-making than other politically active Athenians.<sup>479</sup> The expertise of every general was known to the Athenians through their actions in the battlefield and from campaign reports. Not only to them, but also to the Persian

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<sup>473</sup> Demosthenes 18.109; 19.248.

<sup>474</sup> Hypereides 3.1-2.

<sup>475</sup> Demosthenes 19.264, 18.295 (the list); cf. Diodoros 16.53.2; Pausanias 4.28.4.

<sup>476</sup> Mitchell, 1997, 185-190; Herman, 1987, 75ff; Taylor, 2001.53-66.

<sup>477</sup> Hamel, 1998, 6-13.

<sup>478</sup> Plutarch *Pericles* 11.2; Thucydides 6.13.1. Sealey 1956, 241; Ober, 1989, 88.

<sup>479</sup> Hamel, 1998, 13. Dinarchus 3.19.

King who became one of the best employers of the Athenian generals.<sup>480</sup> That was their résumé which the *demos* undoubtedly, had in mind or, were reminded of when a general was called to the *bema*. Demosthenes' speech *On the Crown* frequently reminds his audience of his political exploits. The Athenians had seen that the demanding needs of warfare required experienced generals and these were the men who would address the people more often.<sup>481</sup> Even distinguished fourth-century orators, like Agyrrhios, Kallistratos, Demosthenes and Aeschines, served in the ranks of the Athenian war machine as trierarchs, soldiers or ambassadors.<sup>482</sup> Otherwise, their advice in foreign policy would not sound persuasive in the assembly and their opponents could find ground for attack by accusing them of cowardice.<sup>483</sup> Generals now served the Athenian *demos*, and had the same interests: to pursue a vigorous foreign policy that reflected the aspirations of the Athenians.<sup>484</sup>

That is not to say that men who were elected to Athens' *strategia* were the only ones to advise the assembly on matters of foreign policy. Kleon, who did not belong to a family with landed wealth and a known ancestry, usually marks a new type of politician in Athens' public life (third quarter of the fifth century). This is because he separated the military from the political role in Athenian public life, as was to become common in the fourth century.<sup>485</sup> Labelled as a "demagogue" by his contemporaries, he controlled policy through his speeches in the assembly.<sup>486</sup> Agyrrhios, Kallistratos, Demosthenes and Aeschines (all fourth century orators) were by no means generals. They made career as *rhetoires* and participated in assembly debates related to proposed or ongoing military campaigns in the fourth century.

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<sup>480</sup> Diodoros 15.29.3, 45.1.

<sup>481</sup> Mitchell, 1997, 96-108, esp. 105; Thucydides 6.15.2, 16.6.

<sup>482</sup> Agyrrhios was general in 389/8, Xenophon *Hellenica* 4.8.31; Diodoros 14.99.5; Kallistratos was general in 378/7, 373/2 and 372/1 in Develin 1989; Demosthenes served as trierarch in 360/9 in the north and Aeschines enlisted himself in the army, Aeschines 3.51-52; 2.167-9. The last two served as ambassadors in various delegations of Athens, Aeschines 2.18, 79, 82; Demosthenes 19.13, 17, 121. We can also note that Aeschines' brothers established political careers, one as a general and the other as ambassador, Demosthenes 19.237; Aeschines 2.149.

<sup>483</sup> Aeschines 1.29.

<sup>484</sup> Seager, 1967; Perlman, 1963 where they discuss the similarities of foreign policy between the prominent men of Athens.

<sup>485</sup> Ober, 1989, 93-96; 119-121.

<sup>486</sup> E.g. Thucydides 3.37-48; 4.2-23 and 26-41; Aristotle *Politics* 1305a10-15.



According to Hamel, whatever the extent of the influence which generals enjoyed over campaign-related deliberation, the Athenian *demos* retained final authority over the military decisions that were made in Athens' assembly.<sup>487</sup> In this, she follows Ober who saw the *demos* preserving its political supremacy merely by controlling ideology, institutions and legal means.<sup>488</sup> Recently, Moreno has argued that, by contrast to the system outlined by Ober, the elite were in fact able to maintain power over the masses in Athens. This was achieved principally through control of the grain trade. For Moreno, foreign connections with the Aegean clerouchies and allies in the fifth century and with the kingdoms in the grain-producing Crimea in the fourth were crucial to elite control of Athens. These elites were cynical enough to call themselves democrats while fostering despotic rule in the northern Black Sea in order to cement their position within the democracy.<sup>489</sup> Finally, we must not forget that Athenian decrees identify the proponent of each measure or provision, e.g. *IG* II<sup>2</sup> 141, 212, 226. This epigraphic practice reflected the emphasis on individual politicians' accountability for the measures they introduced.<sup>490</sup> In such a system, a politician could not easily have a change of heart about a foreign policy issue; rather he advocated more consistently his allegiance to a certain policy, and therefore, supported the continuation of that policy. But it was not only about accountability. Behind most interstate agreements lay personal connections of the politicians involved; connections that, in many cases, were stronger than the state's foreign policy.<sup>491</sup> Eunomos was a member of the embassy sent in 393 to Syracuse because of his ties of guest-friendship with Dionysios.<sup>492</sup> Andokides claimed ancestral ties with the Kings of Macedonia and Persia.<sup>493</sup> These connections were undoubtedly publicised by these individuals and their importance was recognized and often exploited by

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<sup>487</sup> Hamel, 1998, 14.

<sup>488</sup> Ober, 1989.

<sup>489</sup> Moreno, 2007a, 204, 322-323.

<sup>490</sup> Ober, 1989, 95, 327-328 (*graphē paranomōn*), 109-111 (*eisangelia*). Cf. Xenophon *Hellenica* 3.5.8 for an example of this practice outside Athens.

<sup>491</sup> Strauss, 1986, 150-151. Lysias 19.7.

<sup>492</sup> Lysias 19.19-20; Isocrates 15.93.

<sup>493</sup> Andocides 3.29; 2.11.

the state in entrusting these politicians matters of foreign policy. This skillful manipulation of personal connections and public sentiment was sometimes at odds with democratic ideology, but as long as this relation facilitated and benefited the aims of Athenian foreign policy and the communal interest, the politicians were safe from prosecution.<sup>494</sup>

To conclude, politicians could play an instrumental role, determine the course of events and influence the formulation of foreign policy, especially during war periods.<sup>495</sup> Notable exceptions notwithstanding, this was because they took the role of “experts”, as the people of Athens were more likely to vote the suggestions of those with previous connections to important areas. Pre-existing connections could introduce bias into the policy any given leader and his groups might follow, but equally they could be used to benefit the city and that was what the citizens wanted. The private hunt for resources did not stop after the Persian Wars and the Athenian polis made use of private connections in executing state policy. All now served the newborn Athenian democracy.

### 3.2.2 Eion

Kimon, the son of Miltiades, captured Eion from the Persian garrison left in northern Greece in 476,<sup>496</sup> an action that marks the beginning of Athenian state involvement in this region.<sup>497</sup> Its fall was acknowledged as a major conquest for Athens, as Eion was to become an important naval and trading base for future enterprises. The official reason for this attack was that Eion was under Persian control. For the Persians, the successful completion of the campaign in Greece required the maintenance of a supply-line between Asia and Greece,<sup>498</sup>

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<sup>494</sup> Braund, 2002, 115-118.

<sup>495</sup> Mitchell, 1997, 51-54.

<sup>496</sup> Scholia Aeschines 2.31; Plutarch *Kimon* 7.2-3; 8.2; Thucydides 1.94; 98.1. Some sources date this event to 470: Ephorus *FGrH* 70 F.191; Nepos *Kimon* 2.2; Polyainos 7.24; Pausanias 8.8.9; Demosthenes 23.199; Herodotos 7.106-7. See also, *Oxyrhynchus Papyri* 13.1610 F6<sup>3</sup> lines 40-45 in Fornara, 1977, no.61. Demosthenes 13.23 alludes to the help given by Meno of Pharsalus for the war against Eion.

<sup>497</sup> Isaac, 1986, 7, 19 makes room for an earlier expedition. He considers Miltiades's expedition against Paros in 489, and his promises of gold to have a far-reaching goal: to access Parian-held Thracian resources. For the expedition and promise, see Herodotos 6.132-6; Stephanus of Byzantium *s.v.* Πάρος. It is an attractive hypothesis, but as Isaac recognises it has some inherent problems.

<sup>498</sup> Isaac, 1986, 18 sees a fundamental difference between Persian and Athenian control of Thrace.

which the capture of Eion disrupted. Eion was also on the Strymon River, enabling its administrator to control access to the Thracian interior, and at the same time create a buffer zone between Greek possessions and Thracian territories. On the one hand, Eion served a strategic role; but, on the other, the earlier actions of Peisistratos suggest that the Athenians were well aware of the resources of the area. Was the capture of Eion connected to a desire to control Thracian resources?

Isaac believes that the Athenians were overwhelmed with excitement at the news of Eion falling into their hands, which he explains as an “Eldorado” effect. We have to note, however, that Plutarch does not refer to mines in describing Kimon’s successes. He writes of an inscription in which Kimon was given an extraordinary honour, though not mentioned by name. The inscription seems to confer his valour in battle and success against the Medes. The one achievement which Plutarch does mention was Kimon’s success in offering the Athenians a fertile and fair land to inhabit. Both Isaac and Plutarch are not primary sources and their judgment of events creates difficulties as to the reason for Kimon’s campaign.<sup>499</sup>

Upon its acquisition, the Athenians immediately started exploiting the area, seeing as the territory was given for settlement and all that that implies. Ion observes that Kimon knew how to make a city great and rich,<sup>500</sup> and hints at the possibility that larger designs lay behind this expedition. An Athenian *emporion* was also established at Eion (ἦν αὐτοὶ εἶχον ἐμπόριον ἐπὶ τῷ στόματι τοῦ ποταμοῦ ἐπιθαλάσσιον), which suggests economic exploitation as it gave access to a variety of resources traded in the area.<sup>501</sup> Eion seems to have been the door to Thracian/Thasian riches as from there the resources of the Strymon Valley could be accessed,<sup>502</sup> and only ten years later Athenian interests in the region were to come into conflict with those of Thasos (see further below). Kimon also took possession of

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<sup>499</sup> Isaac, 1986, 19-21. Plutarch *Kimon* 7.3.

<sup>500</sup> Plutarch *Kimon* 9.1.

<sup>501</sup> Thucydides 4.102.3.

<sup>502</sup> Isaac, 1986, 27-29.

Skyros, a strategic operation to remove the pirates from the area, an action that should be connected with the sea-route Eion to Attica and not to the Hellespont.<sup>503</sup>

Plutarch refers to the Athenian capture and settlement of both Eion and Amphipolis.<sup>504</sup> In the 470s, the latter was known as Ennea Hodoi, but nothing is known of the settlement's fortune. We do know, however, that nine recorded attempts for settlement were made by the Athenians (ἐννάκις ἐπὶ τὸν τόπον ἐλθοῦσα), the one at Ennea Hodoi being the first. Eight more attempts would follow, all met with disaster because of a mythical curse.<sup>505</sup> Probably the 476 settlement was short-lived, and this gives some indication of the inability of the Athenians to control the area further inland. Yet, what remain are Athens' early attempts, following the Persian Wars, to establish its presence in areas rich in timber and precious metal resources.

### 3.2.3 Thasos

Thasos lies in the northern Aegean, just opposite the Thracian coast,<sup>506</sup> and on the maritime route from Greece to the Black Sea.<sup>507</sup> Parians colonized the island early on, around the mid-seventh century,<sup>508</sup> though there had been a Phoenician presence on the island prior to this.<sup>509</sup> Following the settlement of the island, the Parians extended their

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<sup>503</sup> Plutarch *Kimōn* 8.3. The Sporades island complex made a good pirate base, as Demosthenes 7 explains for Halonnesos. For the sea-route see page 205.

<sup>504</sup> Plutarch *Kimōn* 8.2. Meiggs, 1972, 68-69 finds it difficult to accept the settlement of both areas. However, the scholiast on Aeschines 2.31 seems to indicate that Thracians expelled Athenians settlers from Ennea Hodoi; cf. Isaac, 1986, 20.

<sup>505</sup> Scholia Aeschines 2.31, see Fornara, 1977, no.62.

<sup>506</sup> The border between Thrace and Macedonia seems to have fluctuated over the course of the fifth and fourth centuries, depending on who was in the ascendancy. In the sixth century, the border between Macedonia and Thrace was the River Axios. The Athenian tribute lists considered even Methone and Pydna to belong in the Thracian district, while Thucydides 1.61.2 considered these to be part of Macedonia since the tribute lists were practically rather than geographically based. The area from the lower Axios to the lower Strymon was called Mygdonia, inhabited by the Edonians, Thucydides 2.99.4. See the introduction in Hansen and Nielsen, 2004, 854-56.

<sup>507</sup> Pouilloux's (1954) book on Thasos is a good starting point. This contains an invaluable guide and considerable number of inscriptions, as well as a number of discussions of both literary and epigraphic evidence. I will not attempt to cover minor related issues, such as the question of foundation by Paros, but will instead refer to Pouilloux. For his critics, see Finley, 1979, 28-32 and Fraser, 1957, 98-103 who have contested various aspects of his conclusions.

<sup>508</sup> The Delphic oracle sent Telesicles, King of Paros, and his son Archilochos, to settle Thasos, see Thucydides 4.104.41; Strabo 10.5.7; Archilochos F92-112; Stephanus of Byzantium 306.14, s.v. Θάσος; Graham, 1978, 62-98 and his reply to criticism in Graham, 2001, 228-29, 365-402. Graham puts the foundation of Thasos around 650.

<sup>509</sup> Pausanias 5.25.12 follows a tradition according to which the natives of Thasos descended from Phoenicians;

control over the coastal area opposite, which became known as the Thasian *peraia*. A number of small settlements are known to have existed: Apollonia, Galepsos, Oisyme, Neapolis, Pistiros, Antisara, Akontisma, and Stryme.<sup>510</sup> We have no clear picture as to the relationship between the settlements of the *peraia* and Thasos itself. They seem to have been small *emporía*, facilitating trade with inner Thrace; some were called *apoikiai*, and were legally under Thasos' control, but some of these settlements grew sufficiently strong to mint their own coins. Graham believes that Thasian control of its *peraia* was strong, but that it was not incorporated into the state. Hansen describes the settlements of the Thasian *peraia* as being "dependent poleis" of Thasos.<sup>511</sup>

Thasos and its *peraia* were continuously in the spotlight; therefore, it is prudent to enumerate their resources that drew states and individuals to their shores. Archilochos refers to the first immigrants of Thasos, saying, "All the misery of Greece had gathered at Thasos" (Ὡς Πανελλήνων οἰζὺς ἐς Θάσον συνέδραμεν) which is indicative of the opportunities the region promised.<sup>512</sup> These opportunities manifested themselves in a plethora of natural resources and were sufficient cause for settlements and immigrations to take place. From Neapolis and up to the Nestos River, we find cereals cultivated in the alluvial plain. Wheat and barley were the preferred crops.<sup>513</sup> Along the coast, the area between Oesyme and Neapolis was known for its viticulture.<sup>514</sup> Thasian wine was frequently cited for its good quality;<sup>515</sup> the wine in the Bibline region was specifically recorded for its perfumed fragrance.<sup>516</sup> Archaeology offers support to the reports of our

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Herodotos 2.44.3-4, in 6.47 tells us that the Phoenicians colonised Thasos because of its gold mines, which he had visited. Herodotos 4.147 also claims that the Phoenicians planted a colony in Thera, while Diodoros 5.59.2 makes the same claim in relation to Rhodes. Isaac, 1986, 4; Graham, 1978, 88-92.

<sup>510</sup> Isaac, 1986, 9-12 for an overview of the archaeological evidence. Thucydides 4.107.3, 5.61.1; IG I<sup>3</sup> 101. 7. See also Hansen & Nielsen, 2004.

<sup>511</sup> Hansen, 2006, 24; Lazaridis, 1971, 43 n. 60; Graham, 1964, 89-90.

<sup>512</sup> Archilochos F 102 in West, 1989.

<sup>513</sup> Hammond, 1972, 15; Lazaridis, 1971, 12; Athenaeos 3.112a.

<sup>514</sup> Lazaridis, 1971, 11-12; Athenaeos 1.31a.

<sup>515</sup> Aristophanes *Plutos* 1021; *Assembly Women* 1119; *Lysistrata* 196; Xenophon *Symposium* 41; Athenaeos *Deipnosophistae* 1.28c, 129c, 31-32. Pliny *Natural History* 14.9.

<sup>516</sup> Athenaeos 1.31a -1.57; Stephanus of Byzantium 168.10.

ancient sources. Remains of amphora production centres, amphora sherds found throughout the island, and especially amphora stamps, provide strong evidence for the high level of wine production and distribution on Thasos.<sup>517</sup> Lead, chromite, iron, zinc, copper and antimony also added to the riches of the Thasian mines,<sup>518</sup> while Pliny adds to Thasos' riches precious stones such as opal and amethyst. In modern times, Thasos has been exploited for its iron. Its deposits of iron ore are estimated at 20,000,000 tons, while 54 sulfide deposits have been counted in Thasos and coastal Thrace.<sup>519</sup> The most notable resource in the region was gold and silver. Much of the information we have concerning Thasos and the opposite shore is related to these two resources which are mentioned frequently from the classical period onwards. Herodotos mentions the Skapte Hyle (that belonged to Thasos), which seems to have yielded 80 talents of gold annually while Strabo records the richness of Mt. Pangaion and the surrounding area in gold and silver.<sup>520</sup> The riches in precious metals and other resources of the island and its *peraia* explain why this is a region that would repeatedly come into play in this thesis.

In 465, Thasos revolted from the Athenian League. The reason for this, according to Thucydides, was a quarrel over the control of the *emporion* on the Thracian coast, opposite Thasos, and over the mine controlled by Thasos on the mainland.<sup>521</sup> After two years of fighting, the Thasians capitulated. The terms of their surrender were cruel, but indicative of Athens' purpose; the Thasian fleet was to be surrendered, and the wall of the city

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<sup>517</sup> Osborne, 1987, 104-108 makes a case for a high level of state control over viticulture by the state of Thasos. For amphora stamps see Garlan, 1999; Lawal, 2005 for a discussion on chronology of amphora stamps. See the fragmentary inscription found on Thasos and dated to c. 480, SEG XVIII 347 = XXXVI.790. On this inscription, see Pouilloux, 1954, 43-45 who suggests that such close monitoring cannot account for a political interpretation. See also IG XII. suppl. 349 = SEG XXXVI.792 and IG XII suppl. 347, I and II, two inscriptions from the classical period that bear witness to Thasian control of resources, (mainly wine) and fell under the period of the First Athenian League.

<sup>518</sup> Osborne, 1987, 91; Lazaridis, 1971, 6. Pliny *Natural History* 37.22 and 40.

<sup>519</sup> Zachos and Maratos, 1973, 123-133, 168-170. Photos, 1988, 255ff; Sodini and Kolokotsas, 1984 for a study on the sanctuaries at Aliki and the marble quarries of the area; today, Thasos still quarries annually some 60,000 m<sup>3</sup>, in Herrmann, 1999, 57-74; Tsomos and Laskarides, 1999, 39-47; Bonias, 1999, 101-115.

<sup>520</sup> Herodotos 6.46; Strabo 7. F34; Appian *The Civil Wars* 5.13.106. Wagner *et al.* 1981, 263-264.

<sup>521</sup> Plutarch *Kimon* 14.2; Thucydides 1.100.2; Diodoros 11.70.1; Polyainos. 2.33; 8.67 for the hardships endured during the siege.

dismantled; Thasos had to pay a war indemnity and an annual tribute (instead of contributing ships), but, most importantly, Thasos had to surrender its possessions on the mainland, including the mine.<sup>522</sup> These concessions were both economic and military in nature. Whatever political or economic relationship existed between Thasos and Athens during the first years of the Delian League, they had clearly deteriorated by 465. Plutarch writes that Kimon led this campaign.<sup>523</sup> No peace terms were reported in his account, but the outcome was the same, as Kimon obtained these possessions for Athens.<sup>524</sup>

At the same time that Kimon was suppressing the Thasian revolt (Thucydides informs us that the mission took place after the Thasian navy was defeated), the Athenians dispatched ten thousand settlers to the territory in the Strymon valley to occupy Ennea Hodoi.<sup>525</sup> The mission was successful, but the settlers decided to advance further inland; a decision that would cost them their lives, as the Thracians annihilated the entire Athenian force at Drabeskos.<sup>526</sup> The attempt at Ennea Hodoi failed rather quickly. The Thracians did not proceed any farther, as no detachment is recorded as having been dispatched from the main Athenian force, laying siege to Thasos, in order to protect Eion.

The Athenian plans to control the resources of the region did not stop with Kimon. Under Pericles' leadership, Brea was founded (c. 446/5). We know of this *apoikia* only from IG I<sup>3</sup> 46, a fragmentary decree providing for this colony, which was probably sent out into the Thraceward region.<sup>527</sup> Its exact location is unknown, and opinions vary anywhere from Chalkidike to Bisaltia.<sup>528</sup> Consequently, it is difficult to come to any conclusions regarding

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<sup>522</sup> Thucydides 1.101.3; Plutarch *Kimon* 14.2; Polyainos. 2.33; 8.67; IG I<sup>3</sup> 1144 is a list of Athenian casualties in this campaign.

<sup>523</sup> Plutarch *Kimon* 14.2.

<sup>524</sup> Isaac, 1986, 31.

<sup>525</sup> Thucydides 1.100.

<sup>526</sup> Thucydides 4.102.2; Diodoros 11.70.5; Herodotos 9.75. Bradeen, 1967, 321-328; Meiggs, 1972, 83, 416; Isaac, 1986, 24-30.

<sup>527</sup> Graham, 1964, 34, 60 argues it is not a city (for comments on the foundation decree, and translation see 197-8); cf. Isaac, 1986, 51. Stephanus of Byzantium and Hesychius, *s.v.* *Βρέα*. See also Brunt, 1966, 71-92 on fifth-century Athenian settlements.

<sup>528</sup> Isaac, 1986, 52 disagrees with the colony at Brea being related with Pericles's expedition at Bisaltia. Archibald,

this settlement, in light of the limited available evidence.<sup>529</sup>

Next, Plutarch refers to 1000 settlers in Bisaltia,<sup>530</sup> west of the Strymon, which was under a Thracian King in the fifth century.<sup>531</sup> Whether a battle was necessary for the settlers to establish themselves is unknown. There have been suspicions that the Athenian settlement of Brea was in Bisaltia, and that the missions referred to by Plutarch and by *IG I<sup>3</sup>* 46 are in fact the same,<sup>532</sup> but this is difficult to prove. It is clear, however, that pressure from Athens in the 450s resulted in neighbouring towns transferring their allegiance to Athens.

If the attempt against Ennea Hodoi and the takeover of the Thasian trading posts and mine/s are considered together, it reveals a wider desire on the part of the Athenians to gain an even more effective control over the resources of the region. Athens' nine successive attempts to control Ennea Hodoi/Amphipolis reveal its belief that it was better to have resources under Athenian control, than to pay those who controlled them.<sup>533</sup> Although Athens failed to win control of the Strymon Valley at this time, Kimon's activities gave Athens control of the Skapte Hyle mine and the Thasian *peraia*, as well as the resources of the island and the surrounding area. We know that the Skapte Hyle mine remained under Athenian control until at least 406, since it is recorded in an inventory list of the treasurers of Athena.<sup>534</sup> Thasos itself remained an Athenian ally until 410, when it defected to the Spartans. Thrasybulos was sent to recover Thasos, and he accomplished this in 407/6,<sup>535</sup> with the help of Neapolis,<sup>536</sup> until finally capitulating to the Spartans themselves in 405/4.<sup>537</sup>

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1998, 116 following Hammond suggests Berge. Asheri, 1969, 337-340 lists all authors who expressed an opinion on the matter. See also Meiggs, 1972, 158-9, 602; Woodhead, 1952, 57-62.

<sup>529</sup> Isaac, 1986, 52.

<sup>530</sup> Herodotos 7.115.1; Thucydides 2.99.6, situated on the coast west of the lower Strymon. The river also separated Bisaltia from Edonia, see "Bisaltia" in Hansen and Nielsen, 2004, 810.

<sup>531</sup> Herodotos 8.116.

<sup>532</sup> Isaac, 1986, 36, 52.

<sup>533</sup> For this reasoning, see Demosthenes 7.12.

<sup>534</sup> *IG I<sup>2</sup>* 301. B.1.103f and 116f; cf. Meiggs, 1972, 577; Isaac, 1986, 31, n. 155 for further bibliography.

<sup>535</sup> Xenophon *Hellenica* 1.4.9; Diodoros 13.72.1-2. *IG XII* 8.262 refers to Athenian arrangements for the restoration of democracy on Thasos. Walbank, 1995, 64; Grandjean and Salviat, 1988 found another fragment of this decree, *SEG XXXVIII* 851.A.7; XL 740, in which the Athenians explicitly call the restored democracy δημοκρατία.

<sup>536</sup> *IG I<sup>3</sup>* 101.



### 3.2.4 Amphipolis

The most discussed Athenian colonisation on the Strymon is Amphipolis.<sup>538</sup> This, Pericles' strongest foothold in the region, was founded in 437, after half a century of projects in the area. The name of the *oikist* is also known, Hagnon, son of Nikias, succeeded in evicting the Edonians, and settled the location formerly known as Ennea Hodoi.<sup>539</sup> Located just north of Eion,<sup>540</sup> the new city was intended to provide Athens with a permanent position in southwestern Thrace. For that reason, Hagnon built a long wall around (τείχει μακρῷ) the acropolis,<sup>541</sup> and took in colonists from Athens and from nearby settlements (Argilos)<sup>542</sup> and garrisons (Bisaltia, Eion, perhaps Brea).<sup>543</sup> In addition, a bridge was built across the Strymon that was later used by Brasidas to cross over the river and take possession of Amphipolis' countryside. Thucydides notes that at the time there was no fort at the bridge, which means that either the Amphipolitans or the Spartans later built one in order to avoid repeating the mistake of the Athenians.<sup>544</sup> Despite this, Amphipolis was geographically better suited to control Lake Prasias, the lower Strymon and the river crossing by the coast-road than Eion. Thus, it was ideally suited for the "conveyance of timber and revenue" (ἡ πόλις αὐτοῖς ἦν ὠφέλιμος ξύλων τε ναυπηγησίων πομπῇ καὶ χρημάτων προσόδῳ).<sup>545</sup>

Thucydides admits that the main reason for the foundation of Amphipolis, and for the preceding expeditions, was control of the timber resources of the area, along with revenues from trade. These encompassed many more resources as traders coming down the

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<sup>537</sup> Nepos *Lysander* 6.1-3; Polyainos. 1.45.4; Xenophon *Hellenica* 2.2.5. Polyainos has Lysander capturing Thasos, while Xenophon has Eteonikos.

<sup>538</sup> Lazaridis, 1997; Isaac, 1986 for more bibliography and discussion.

<sup>539</sup> Thucydides 4.102.3.

<sup>540</sup> Diodoros 12.73.3 records a distance of 30 *stadia*.

<sup>541</sup> Thucydides 4.102.3. For the walls, see the bibliography in Isaac, 1986, 54, n.283.

<sup>542</sup> Thucydides 4.103.3.

<sup>543</sup> Thucydides 4.106.1; 103.3-4. Diodoros 12.32.3 says that some of the colonists were Athenians and some were from nearby garrisons. The status of the settlers is discussed by Isaac, 1986, 38-39; Graham, 1964, 199-200.

<sup>544</sup> Thucydides 4.103.5, 104.1.

<sup>545</sup> Thucydides 4.108. The noun *πομπή*, as noted by Bissa, 2009, 123, should be translated as conveyance and not import.

river would have no choice but to request access to pass or enter Amphipolis. It also encompassed use of the Athenian *emporion* at Eion. Having power over both Amphipolis and Eion, Athens secured command over the Strymon and its surrounding resources. In addition, Athenian settlements in lower Thrace took place under the auspices of the Athenian government, highlighting the high level of state involvement in pursuit of vital natural resources. Of course, other reasons may have co-existed, as Athens was now a leading player in the Aegean, and it would not be prudent to assign one motive to all actions. Yet ancient sources connect these Athenian actions with timber and precious metals, valid enough for Athens to wage war on Thasos, and nearby Thracian towns. Athens concentrated its efforts on Thrace not on Macedonia due to valid strategic reasons.<sup>546</sup> Macedonia could not be controlled piecemeal as could the Thracian chieftains and other small Greek cities on the coastline, and had a bad tendency to break long term alliances.<sup>547</sup>

The importance of Amphipolis to the Athenians cannot be overstated. Their longing for it can be seen over a period of sixty years, as the Athenians repeatedly tried to recover the area. When Brasidas took control of the region, Athens sent Kleon to recapture Amphipolis in 422. He took Galepsos,<sup>548</sup> but both Kleon and Brasidas were killed on the battlefield, and there was no substantial change to the status quo. Two more expeditions were recorded during the fifth century, one in 417 under Nikias,<sup>549</sup> and one in 414 under Euetion.<sup>550</sup> Both met with failure. Coming to the fourth century, we learn of certain Athenians, Simmichos and Protomachos, attempting to capture Amphipolis, possibly in the late 390s. Isaac suggests that these took place in the 370s, but these two expeditions went unnoticed by Xenophon and Diodoros. In addition, it would have been difficult to find a pretext for an attack on Amphipolis after the peace of Antalcidas, and before the Athenians

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<sup>546</sup> Bissa, 2009, 124.

<sup>547</sup> Meiggs, 1982, 126.

<sup>548</sup> Thucydides 5.6; for the campaign of Kleon see Thucydides 5.2-3; 6-11.

<sup>549</sup> Thucydides 5.83.4.

<sup>550</sup> Thucydides 7.9.

gained recognition of their right to take Amphipolis.<sup>551</sup> Still, it took a decade of continuous efforts on the part of the Athenians to regain control of Amphipolis from 369-5, they sent Iphicrates; from 365-3 Timotheos, then Kallisthenes, and Timotheos again in 360/359, but all met with failure. Athens' claim to the region provoked mixed feelings from neighbouring states, but mostly met with resistance, and this was critical in Athens' failure.<sup>552</sup> In the end, Philip II, who in 359 gained the Macedonian throne, took Amphipolis in 357, leaving the Athenians in shock.

The Athenian actions in the north Aegean may seem random at first, but they follow a pattern intimately connected with natural resources. The objective of the campaign against Amphipolis and Thasos was not to destroy its inhabitants, but rather to preserve the productive potential of the region and so economise the supplies coming from there into Athens. Besides, Thucydides described the Athenian presence in the Thasian *emporía* and mine with the word ἐνέμουντο. It was not a matter of annexation, but of the possession and exploitation of its resource-rich territory.<sup>553</sup> Mines and timber were the primary focus of Athenian interest. Rather than being purely destructive or only acquisitive in the short term, Athens was implementing a system where it could draw the necessary resources from a pool of allies and subjects. This enabled Athens to increase its resource supply, which in effect, gave the necessary boost to people and politicians alike to extend Athenian enterprises in faraway places such as Pontus, Egypt and Sicily.

### 3.2.5 Cleruchies: a blend of reasons

The best way to acquire, exploit, and make use of foreign resources is to own them. Between 508 and 404, sources record Athenian settlements on Salamis, Chalkis, Lemnos, Imbros, Skyros, Naxos, Andros, the Chersonese, Histiaia, Aegina, Lesbos, Melos, Thurii, and

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<sup>551</sup> Isaac, 1986, 47.

<sup>552</sup> Heskell, 1997 for an overview of the Athenian war of Amphipolis, matters of chronology and various Athenian difficulties presented by neighbouring states.

<sup>553</sup> Pebarthe, 1999, 133, 140.

the shores of the Black Sea.<sup>554</sup> New settlements appeared at Astakos, Neapolis, Sinope and Amisos, places correctly associated with the Athenian interest in trade with the Propontis and the Black Sea, and in local resources, rather than in military control over the allies. Skyros became an Athenian colony, providing an essential link to sea-communications with Macedonia and Thrace, and, at the same time, the sea was cleared of pirates. Amphipolis and Eion helped to secure the resources of the lower Strymon. In selecting settlements, the Athenians were naturally guided by strategic considerations, and by a desire to control resources essential to their own needs, and the routes to these resources. The control of Salamis and Chalcis by Athens seems to have been a successful prototype for many fifth-century cleruchies whose purpose was to provide a solution to the problem of food supply to an overpopulated city. A mechanism of distribution by lot took place that offered parcels of land to Athenians, mainly poor ones, fortifications were built and garrisons were deployed to protect cleruchies, and to provide safety to all adjacent routes.<sup>555</sup> The cleruchs farming their lots could become potential hoplites and would at the same time act as garrisons of cities.<sup>556</sup> In the fifth century, there was a continuous effort to expand control of locations with, or en-route to resources. Athenian efforts built hegemony. As Moreno has it, “an empire of cleruchies with Euboea as its crown jewel”.<sup>557</sup>

In 404 Athens lost all cleruchies, but in 386 the King’s Peace restored officially to Athens three islands: Imbros, Skyros, and Lemnos. The Athenians attached a great amount of importance to these islands, specially seen in the eyes of the Greek world as properly being Athenian possessions;<sup>558</sup> reasonably so, as Athenian settlers seem to have occupied the

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<sup>554</sup> For a detailed discussion of pre-fourth century settlements see Cargill, 1995, 2-8; Figueira, 1991, 217-225, 253-256, 260-262; Graham, 1964, 166ff.

<sup>555</sup> Moreno, 2007, 96-97.

<sup>556</sup> Salomon, 1997; De ste Croix, 1972, 43; Meiggs, 1972, 260-261.

<sup>557</sup> Moreno, 2007a, 143.

<sup>558</sup> Graham, 1964, 188. See *IG II<sup>2</sup> 30* (an Athenian decree regulating land tenure, residency, and probably other requirements for the inhabitants and cleruchs on Lemnos) and Andokides 3.12, which suggest possible Athenian control prior to 387; Xenophon *Hellenica* 5.1.31; Diodoros 16.21.2.

three islands throughout the period of Athens' fifth century hegemony.<sup>559</sup> The Athenians' refusal to sign any peace treaty with Sparta and Persia that did not include Imbros, Skyros and Lemnos into its possession stresses this.<sup>560</sup> One, who reads the negotiations between the Athenians on the one hand, and Persia and the Spartans on the other, is immediately surprised by the Athenian determination to regain control of these three little islands. Understandably, the islands in a sense "belonged" to the Athenians, since they were Athenian possessions for more than eighty years, and that they were on the route to the Black Sea.<sup>561</sup> But, so did other places. Consequently, these important islands would have been left unnoticed if not for a single, virtually intact, inscription found in the Agora excavations in 1986. It was a product of *nomothesia*, a law enacted in 374/3, whereby the Athenians turn their attention to the grain produced each year from the islands of Lemnos, Imbros, and Skyros. They imposed or redefined a tax on the wheat and barley grown in these three islands to be taxed in kind, for this tax in grain to be transported at a specific time to the Piraeus, and from there it was to be brought up to the city, to be sold later on in the Agora by public officials newly appointed for this purpose. Not only were Lemnos, Imbros, and Skyros strategically located on the route of the grain ships, and triremes, sailing from Chalkidike, Thrace, and the Hellespont to Piraeus and vice versa, but each also produced significant quantities of wheat and barley of its own.<sup>562</sup> However, it is incorrect to hypothesize that these places were acquired in the early fifth century primarily for their grain, as there is no evidence to support a theory of continuity in the productivity of the three islands in the classical period.<sup>563</sup> Nevertheless, the good harvests on Lemnos, Imbros, and Skyros in 329, and that the Athenians from 374/3 made a law to tax in kind their harvest

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<sup>559</sup> Salomon, 1997, 76-81, 91-95; Cargill, 1995, 1-8, 12-15, 42-66, 92-109; Figueira, 1991, 66-73; Graham, 1983, 167-192.

<sup>560</sup> In 392 the Athenians refused to make peace with Sparta if control of the three islands was denied to them, Xenophon *Hellenica* 4.8.15. The King's Peace in 387/6 had a special clause whereby Imbros, Skyros, and Lemnos were to be left to the Athenians: Xenophon *Hellenica* 5.1.31.

<sup>561</sup> Salomon, 1997, 120-139, 184-188. Demosthenes 18.77-78.

<sup>562</sup> Demosthenes 4.32; *IG* II<sup>2</sup> 1672, ll. 263, 275-279, 288-297; *IG* XII.8.51, l. 19 (2<sup>nd</sup> c.); Cargill, 1995, 270, no.126. For the overall value of these three islands, see Cargill, 1995, 4-6, 12-15, 42-58; Salomon, 1997, 175-188.

<sup>563</sup> See the random notices of the fertility of Lemnos, Imbros, and Skyros in post-Classical period in Stroud, 1998, 74, no.75.

suggests strongly that in the fourth century, when limitations on Athenian military power made the wide establishment of cleruchies impractical, Athens depended primarily on the surplus produced by Imbros, Skyros and Lemnos.

Two years before, in 376, the Athenians constituted the charter of the Second Athenian League, as preserved in the terms of *IG II<sup>2</sup> 43*. One such term was that Athens was to abstain from its fifth-century policy of establishing cleruchies on allied land. In other words, their hands were tied by the declaration of the decree of Aristoteles, but also, more fundamentally, by the need to reassure allies who would not otherwise have joined Athens' alliance. Since no Athenian landowners were allowed in allied cities, the percentage of Greek land available to the Athenians had been significantly reduced. However, the terms seem not to have been observed for a long time. Indeed, sources record a few, and substantial, fourth-century Athenian settlements: Potidaea (362/1),<sup>564</sup> Sestos (353/2)<sup>565</sup>, Lemnos, Imbros, Skyros (386), and Samos (365).<sup>566</sup> Other smaller settlements may simply be unattested.<sup>567</sup> But, as Cargill has showed, these settlements took place on regions that did not join the League, thus, were eligible to become cleruchies.<sup>568</sup> In addition, the vast difference between the number of fifth-century and fourth-century cleruchies may be explained by the new foreign policy guidelines of the Athenian state, as attested in the decree of Aristoteles.<sup>569</sup> In 336, Philip II ended the Second Athenian League; yet, the Athenians are found in 325, creating a new *apoikia* in the Adriatic with the purpose of convoying and protecting grain shipments.<sup>570</sup>

Some clarification is in order, since cleruchies were not established only for the

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<sup>564</sup> *IG I<sup>2</sup> 114*; Demosthenes 2.14.

<sup>565</sup> Diodoros 16.34.3.

<sup>566</sup> Demosthenes 15.9. Diodoros 18.18.9; Isocrates 15.111.

<sup>567</sup> Cargill, 1995, xxvi and n.17. Cargill, in a seminal study has amassed all available sources concerning Athenian settlements of the fourth century

<sup>568</sup> Moreno, 2009, 211-221; Cargill, 1981.

<sup>569</sup> *IG II<sup>2</sup> 43*.

<sup>570</sup> RO 100.217-227; Bresson, 1993, 177 for the late fourth-century Athenian colony in the Adriatic.

purpose of acquiring resources. They were also a means of acquiring land for poor Athenians,<sup>571</sup> of effectively revenue, (the Lesbian arrangement by which Athenian individuals got the revenue from the cleruchic lands that would be cultivated by the locals),<sup>572</sup> as well as for strategic means (the contingent of cleruchs sent to Samos in 365 to serve as a naval guard).<sup>573</sup> Their purpose varied and it could incorporate more than one reason, to enhance the links with foreign regions, to serve as garrisons for Athenian interests and to increase the economic power of Athens. Even cleruchies - Imbros, Skyros and Lemnos - that were not primarily acquired for resources could be used to provide Athens with grain. Moreno rightly emphasises that we should not neglect the financial benefits of cleruchies.<sup>574</sup> Cleruchies may constitute the biggest, most well-hidden asset behind the Athenian financial supremacy. Approximately forty years ago, Meiggs argued that, “the chief grievances of the allies in the period before the Peloponnesian War were not economic”.<sup>575</sup> Instead, tribute was a complex system that carefully assessed the productivity of the local economic resources.<sup>576</sup> In fact, according to the ATL, the Athenians reduced the amount of tribute on a number of occasions, e.g. Argilos was listed on the tribute lists (453) as paying 10 ½ talents; but in 446 and 438 the tax was dropped to the amount of 1 talent. By 432, 429 and 428 it was reduced further to 1000 drachmae.<sup>577</sup> Meiggs suggests that in cases when cleruchies were imposed (i.e. Naxos, Carystos, Andros, and the Thracian Chersonese) the Athenians partially waived the designated tribute.<sup>578</sup> In addition, many decrees between

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<sup>571</sup> Plutarch *Pericles* 2; the colony of Brea was limited by decree to *zeugitae* and *thetes*. Tod, I. 44.

<sup>572</sup> Thucydides 3.48.1.

<sup>573</sup> Polyainos. 6.2; Scholia Aeschines 1.53 a further dispatch of cleruchs. Cargill, 1983, 321-332; Cawkwell, 1981, 48. A force should have been present to prevent the many exiles Samians from taking back the island. In addition, Leosthenes summoned the naval force from Samos to join in a blockade of Peparethos in 361.

<sup>574</sup> Moreno, 2009, 211-221 whose discussion I follow here.

<sup>575</sup> Meiggs, 1972, 272.

<sup>576</sup> Osborne, 2000, 89-91; Nixon and Price, 1990, 148-151.

<sup>577</sup> Pébarthe, 1999, 147; Isaac, 1986, 54, n.283. Thucydides 4.103.4. ATL II, Meiggs, 1972, 159 believes in a stonecutter's error. Isaac following Hammond suggests that the figure is correct and has something to do with the gold and silver mines in Bisaltia. Further reduction of the tax is indicative of its decreasing importance. The impressive reduction came at the same year when the colonisation of Brea took place. This made Meiggs to suggest that the purpose of Brea was to bring the area under Athenian control. Of course, this depends on Brea actually being near Argilos.

<sup>578</sup> Meiggs, 1972, 121-123, 530.

Athens and its league allies allowed the latter to appeal to Athens for a more lenient treatment.<sup>579</sup> This obligatory tributary system was abandoned in the fourth century to assure prospective allies that fifth-century imperialist tactics would not be repeated.

This system of cleruchic exploitation yielded tremendous earnings. Osborne points out that from the 3,000 rented plots of land on Lesbos, the citizens of Lesbos paid the Athenian cleruchs 100 talents yearly; this amount exceeded the Athenians' expectations, as it was more than triple the tribute paid by other city states, such as Thasos and Aegina.<sup>580</sup> Moreno also notes the substantial amount of grain imports in the fifth century owing to the system of cleruchies.<sup>581</sup> Both scholars conclude that the amount of League tribute (460 talents in 477, 600 talents in 432) pales by comparison with the earnings of the Athenian exploitation of its cleruchies.<sup>582</sup> In fact, these profits increased in cases where the Athenians depopulated landscapes and exiled local populations in order to establish another lucrative cleruchy,<sup>583</sup> most probably so as to maximize their surplus.<sup>584</sup> In 365, the Athenians expelled all the Samians, and divided the land appropriately for three cleruch contingents to settle in.<sup>585</sup> In other cases, as in fifth-century Lesbos, the Athenians first took the land and then rented it back to its former, rightful, owners (a rent of 200 drachmas a year).<sup>586</sup> This system was intensified in the fourth century, in order to meet the demands of the Athenian state.<sup>587</sup> There is a connection between the substantial amount of grain imports and profit owing to the system of cleruchies.

To summarise the importance of the cleruchic system for supplying Athens with

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<sup>579</sup> IG I<sup>3</sup> 71. 20-2; ML 69; Meiggs, 1972, 240-241.

<sup>580</sup> Osborne, 2000, 91.

<sup>581</sup> Moreno, 2009, 214.

<sup>582</sup> Moreno, 2009, 215. For tribute amassed by the Delian League: Thucydides 1.96.2; 2.13.3.

<sup>583</sup> Plutarch *Pericles* 11.5-6 for the case of Andros and Naxos; For Mytilene see Moreno, 2007a, 317-18.

<sup>584</sup> Moreno, 2009, 215; 2007, 111-112, 316-317, 320-321 discusses the issue of labour and surplus in the cleruchies.

<sup>585</sup> Herakleides *FHG* II, 216; Strabo 14.1.18.

<sup>586</sup> Thucydides 3.50. These hirelings were called *pelatai*; for the term see Zelnick-Abramovitz, 2004, 336-342.

<sup>587</sup> Kallistratos of Aphidna devised the mechanism of *syntaxis*, a voluntary contribution, of the Second Athenian League. Agyrrhius was the proposer of the Grain Tax Law of 374/3 that imposed a heavier tax on rich Athenian owners of land. Kallistratos and Agyrrhius of Collytus did their best to amplify Athenian power.



grain: by mobilising the Athenian cleruchs, and by means of physical compulsion, Athens could control the islands and their agricultural produce.<sup>588</sup> The result of this was that large grain surpluses, almost equal to those coming from the Bosphorus, could be produced, consumed by Athens, and taxed by Athens.<sup>589</sup> Athenian mentality was acquisitive for both political and productive reasons. Land remained a very lucrative investment in ancient Greece, and thus that the Athenian state would invest, in its own unique way, in land should not be surprising. Cleruchies and colonies were part of the solution of the problem of scarcity of natural resources.<sup>590</sup> Some like Amphipolis generated timber, others like Lemnos, Imbros, and Skyros generated grain, though when the latter started remains unknown. Sestos was called the “bread-basket of the Piraeus.”<sup>591</sup> Bdelykleon addressed Euboea as a provider of grain to the Athenians and, with some comic exaggeration, he claims that the empire could feed the Athenians luxuriously.<sup>592</sup> Exploitation of foreign land enabled the Athenians to acquire an abundance of *trophē* as noted by Aristotle: “as it happened, the tributes and the taxes and the allies fed more than twenty thousand men” (συνέβαινεν γὰρ ἀπὸ τῶν φόρων καὶ τῶν τελῶν καὶ τῶν συμμάχων πλείους ἢ δισμυρίους ἄνδρας τρέφεσθαι).<sup>593</sup> After 404 Andokides complains about these people, who do not see the bigger picture in the peace negotiations: “some say, they do not understand the meaning of the treaty, if it is walls and ships the city will get; they are not to recover their private property from abroad, and walls cannot sustain (τροφήν) them”.<sup>594</sup> Indeed, in 387/6 the Athenians recovered Lemnos, Imbros, and Skyros, and later in the 360s, the cleruchies in Samos, Potidaea, and the Chersonese, places that could provide the Athenians access to

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<sup>588</sup> Moreno, 2007a, 77ff; Moreno, 2003, 145; Stroud, 1998, 29. Moreno’s recent study on Euboea as a fifth-century bread-basket for Athens, and the new interpretation of the Athenian Grain Tax Law of 374/3, present two valuable parallels.

<sup>589</sup> IG II<sup>2</sup> 1672. See Moreno, 2007a, 111 (Table.3); Sallares, 1991, 394 stresses the limited value of this isolated item, of evidence, but see Garnsey 1992, 147-8 and 1998, 58 Table 5 for a sensible defence of attempts to exploit IG II<sup>2</sup> 1672.

<sup>590</sup> For cleruchies and overseas settlements in the fifth and fourth centuries, see Osborne, 1999; Cargill, 1995, xxi-xxiii; Figueira, 1991, 61; Garnsey, 1988, 128-131; Meiggs, 1972, 121-123, 260-262; Brunt, 1966.

<sup>591</sup> Aristotle *Rhetoric* 1411a13.

<sup>592</sup> Aristophanes *Wasps* 707-9.

<sup>593</sup> [Aristotle] *Athenaion Politeia* 24.3.

<sup>594</sup> Andokides 3.36.

significant resources.

### 3.3 Peaceful diplomacy

Diplomacy is broadly defined as the conduct of international relations between representatives of states, and I take resource diplomacy to be concerned with the question of how the acquisition of resources enters into the conduct of international relations. Diplomatic measures were adopted as an effective method to approach resources abroad. Pseudo-Xenophon recognised how Athens needed resources from various places: “timber from one place, iron from another, copper from another, flax from another, wax from another.”<sup>595</sup> To obtain those necessary resources from various regions, Athens had to employ diplomacy in which resource-rich states were approached through commercial dealings, offerings of gifts and honours, and forming of friendships.<sup>596</sup> This allowed the Athenians to keep their fleet serviced and maintained, and their population in fighting spirit. As we shall see, this system of cooperation from which both consumer Athens and producing states participated and benefitted, carried with it a realisation of the interrelationship between resources and politics.

#### 3.3.1 Thasos and Macedonia

This realization prompted Athenian diplomats and generals to exercise peaceful diplomacy in order to ensure that the necessary resources were procured for the Athenian state. The first manifestation of this may be seen in the official relations between Athens and Macedonia from as early as 480. Herodotos in his description of the Persian Wars refers to

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<sup>595</sup> [Xenophon] *Athenaion Politeia* 2.11-12.

<sup>596</sup> Xenophon *Poroi* 51.5 advocates in favour a policy of peace because in this way the Athenians will invite many more benefits, especially in the form of revenues. Graham, 1984, 3-10.

Alexander I as *πρόξενός τε εἷη καὶ εὐεργέτης* and also *πρόξενόν τε καὶ φίλον* of the Athenians. This would imply that Alexander I was already a benefactor and a friend of the Athenians in the winter of 480/79.<sup>597</sup> The nature of Alexander's benefaction is not given by Herodotos, but we have by now a good idea that this cooperation may have entailed trade in timber and perhaps other resources that existed in the region.<sup>598</sup> The success of Athens' navy meant that the city had already started to rely on timber, with the Macedonian one being first on the list. More Macedonian Kings are now reported as *proxenoi* and *εὐεργέται*, and this time on stone. A very interesting decree, horribly fragmented, that between the Athenians and Archelaos of Macedonia of 407/6, details specific services connected to timber: ships, shipbuilding timber, even shipyards (*naupēgeia*). In return, honours are bestowed upon Archelaos and his children (*αὐτὸν καὶ παῖδας προχσένο]ς καὶ ε[ὐεργ[έτας]*), to enable the successful and fast (*τάχιστα*) completion of ships (*ἐς τ]έν πο[ί]σιν τὸν [νεὸν]*).<sup>599</sup>

In Thasos, Atheno-Thasian relations following the defeat of 404 seem to have become more subtle. With democracy re-established in Athens, the city did not waste any time in making friendly overtures to Thasos, as is made clear by a wealth of inscriptions concerning the relationship between the two states. *IG* II<sup>2</sup> 6 refers to the renewal of a *proxenia* decree for the five sons of Apemantos.<sup>600</sup> In *IG* II<sup>2</sup> 17, dated to 394/3, Athens grants citizenship to Sthorys because the latter had fought with the Athenian naval forces at Knidos in 394, and was probably a hereditary *proxenos* of the Athenians on Thasos.<sup>601</sup> The inscription emphasises the benefactions of Sthorys and those of his ancestors towards the city and army of Athens. These benefactions are not described in detail, but having witnessed Thasian

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<sup>597</sup> Herodotos 8.136.1, 143.1; Demosthenes 23.200; 13.24 notes twice that Perdikkas was awarded Athenian citizenship, though it was Alexander I king at that time. Walbank, 1978, no.1 for a discussion on problems of dating and authenticity.

<sup>598</sup> ML no. 91; Walbank, 1978, no. 90; Merrit, 1932, 107 ff; *IG* I<sup>3</sup> 117. See also Strabo 7 fr.33.

<sup>599</sup> *IG* I<sup>3</sup> 89.

<sup>600</sup> Tod II no.98.

<sup>601</sup> Osborne, 1982, 45-48 and 1981, no. D8, 43-45.

riches in natural resources which were deemed important for Athenian aspirations of power, they are suggestive of commercial and political links between Athens and Thasos that extended back into the fifth century. In an interesting addition to these events, *IG II<sup>2</sup> 24* informs us that Sthorys became archon of Thasos, while the Thasians Archippos and Hipparchos were granted various concessions. Furthermore, *IG II<sup>2</sup> 25* informs us that these two men were granted Athenian citizenship soon after. Osborne places *IG II<sup>2</sup> 24* around 388, following Thrasybulos' successful recovery of Thasos, with *IG II<sup>2</sup> 25* next.<sup>602</sup> He suggests that Sparta gained again control of the island because of the King's Peace in 386/5, which ended c. 375, at which time Chabrias was able to bring Thasos into the Second Athenian League. The consequence of this was *IG II<sup>2</sup> 33*, in which Athens offers privileges to a group of Thasian exiles, probably the result of Spartan recapture of the island.<sup>603</sup> Walbank found and dated another fragmentary inscription concerning Thasians to either c. 389-385 or 375.<sup>604</sup> Political relations remained good, as *IG II<sup>2</sup> 93*, dated in the 350s, records the final section of a *proxenia* inscription concerning Protis of Thasos.

In conclusion, epigraphic evidence strongly attests repeated Athenian efforts during the turbulent first half of the fourth century to regain Thasian friendship and support. Their persistence can be partly guessed at if we take into account the reasons for Athenian involvement in the area, as recorded by Thucydides few decades earlier. Only this time it was through diplomacy not war.<sup>605</sup>

### 3.3.2 Keos

There were four cities on Keos: Iulis, Karthaea, Koresia and Poeessa. By Strabo's time,

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<sup>602</sup> Osborne 1982, 45-47 has recently discussed the early fourth-century relations between Athens and Thasos, and I summarize his arguments here *contra* Pouilloux, 1954, 195-203. Demosthenes 20.59, 62 mentions Ecpphantus of Thasos as the man who assisted Thrasybulos.

<sup>603</sup> *IG II<sup>2</sup> 24*, 33; Demosthenes 20.61. Osborne 1982, no. D9B, 48-57.

<sup>604</sup> *SEG XLV 42*. Walbank, 1995, 61-65.

<sup>605</sup> See now Hahn, 1983, 30-36.

only the first two remained, a testament to the rising significance of Iulis and Karthaea.<sup>606</sup> Keos is situated close to Attica, to the southeast of Sounion. Its proximity was a matter of concern for the Athenians, as is made clear by Xenophon, who informs us, that as long as the Spartan fleet was in command of the sea around Aegina, Keos, and Andros, nothing could pass into Athens.<sup>607</sup> To close all exits and trap the Hellenes, Xerxes too stationed part of his fleet at Keos.<sup>608</sup> Vying for Athenian support, Antony offered Keos and other Aegean islands in return for their help.<sup>609</sup>

Keos was probably among the first to join the Athenian League. According to the *ATL*,<sup>610</sup> the Keans were inscribed under the Island district,<sup>611</sup> making their first payment of more than 1 talent in 451/50.<sup>612</sup> Its *phoros* was raised to four talents the following year,<sup>613</sup> reduced to three talents in 433/2,<sup>614</sup> raised again to 10 talents in 425/4,<sup>615</sup> and kept at this level in 410/9,<sup>616</sup> but they are found to be paying six talents in 417/16.<sup>617</sup> A number of Kean citizens seem also to have been particularly economically prosperous in Classical and Hellenistic times.<sup>618</sup> What stands out is that the Athenian *phoros* was overwhelmingly large for such a small island community. Iulis had roughly 480 men for military service, and a population of about 3,500.<sup>619</sup> Koresia's army numbered some 154 citizens, corresponding to a total population of about 1,200.<sup>620</sup> What was the reason for this dissimilarity?

Agriculture seems to have been one of the reasons for the rise of public and private

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<sup>606</sup> Strabo 10.5.6 refers to the Keans as Ionians from Athens; Herodotos 8.46; Thucydides 7.57.4; Scholia Dionysios Periegetes 525. A good starting article for the archaeology of Karthaea is Simantoni-Bournia, 2007/8, 14-28. For inscriptions, see Mendoni, 1989.

<sup>607</sup> Xenophon *Hellenica* 6.2.1.

<sup>608</sup> Herodotos 8.76.1.

<sup>609</sup> Strabo 5.1.7.

<sup>610</sup> *ATL* III. 198-199.

<sup>611</sup> *IG* I<sup>3</sup> 270.v. 23.

<sup>612</sup> *IG* I<sup>3</sup> 262.v. 22.

<sup>613</sup> *IG* I<sup>3</sup> 263. iv. 21.

<sup>614</sup> *IG* I<sup>3</sup> 279. i. 74.

<sup>615</sup> *IG* I<sup>3</sup> 71. i. 69.

<sup>616</sup> *IG* I<sup>3</sup> 100. ii. 3.

<sup>617</sup> *IG* I<sup>3</sup> 288.i. 110. Information also in Hansen & Nielsen, 2004, "Keos".

<sup>618</sup> Osborne, 1988, 319-329.

<sup>619</sup> *IG* XII.5.609. See Hansen and Nielsen, 2004, "Iulis".

<sup>620</sup> *Ibid*, "Koresia".

wealth.<sup>621</sup> Another may have been Keos' favourable geographical position on the Cyclades trade route, which probably made it a common port of call,<sup>622</sup> but we cannot reach any conclusion on this suggestion, as our information is scant. Schofield stressed Keos' position on the trade route on the ground that natural resources were insufficient on the island to generate such wealth. Mendoni, however, has argued convincingly that this is not the case, as archaeological surveys have shown a wealth of natural resources. Her archaeological finds, with the help of ancient literature, provide a wealth of information about Kean natural resources. Archaeological survey reveals that, from at least the fourth century, Keos was exploited for its deposits of *miltos* and iron. Galleries have been found on the northeastern part of Keos, at Spathi, and on the eastern part, at Orkos, supporting Theophrastos' reference to iron and *miltos* being exploited on the island at the same time.<sup>623</sup> Lead, silver, copper and iron deposits have also been found on the island.<sup>624</sup> In the accounts of the temple of Apollo at Karthaea, from the late fourth or early third century, the location of a place called Μέταλλα is recorded,<sup>625</sup> a name known to have been given to other locations in proximity to mineral deposits.<sup>626</sup> In sum, the trade of *miltos* and iron was probably the reason why the Keans were assessed at a high tribute out of keeping with the size of their population.

Of the Kean resources, *miltos* was the one in which the Athenians showed extreme interest. IG II<sup>2</sup> 1128 is an Athenian decree of the mid-fourth century that records Athenian intervention in order to secure a monopoly in the *miltos* trade on the island.<sup>627</sup> The stele refers to three resolutions, from the cities of Karthaea, Iulis, and Koresia, which institutionalize the Athenian monopoly on the receipt of *miltos* exports (ll. 10, 12). Tod

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<sup>621</sup> Mendoni, 1991, 92; Georgiou, 1985, 207-266.

<sup>622</sup> Schofield, 1982, 19.

<sup>623</sup> Mendoni, 1991, 94.

<sup>624</sup> Caskey, 1994, 311; Mendoni *et al.*, 1990, 1739-1745. On Keos's coinage see Papageorgiadou, 1997.

<sup>625</sup> IG XII 5, 544, B2 5-6; Mendoni, 1991, 92 n.9.

<sup>626</sup> Thomopoulos, 1963, 38-39.

<sup>627</sup> IG II<sup>2</sup> 1128 = RO 40 = Tod II, no. 162; Cargill, 1981, 138. See page 255.

believed Poeessa should be added too, but it is evident that the city was not involved in these dealings, since it lacked deposits of *miltos*, as the mines on Keos were located at Tripospylies, in the territory of Iulis, at Orkos in the territory of Karthaea, and at Koresia.<sup>628</sup> The importance of *miltos* as a waterproofing material suggests a possible reason for Athenian interference in the *miltos* export of Keos; while, it is worth noting the impressive number of fifteen, possibly even twenty, Athenian citizens being *proxenoi* of Karthaea in Athens during the fourth century.<sup>629</sup>

Having acquired Kean *miltos*, the Athenian state decreed a monopoly, and then made sure that certain ships would be singled out to carry out that trade. The next step may well have been for Athens to hire out the rights to export *miltos* to Athenian bidders, perhaps as many as the chosen ships. IG II<sup>2</sup> 1128, lines 12, 28 refers to a ship per city; therefore, three ships would be singled out, probably after auction, one for Koresia, one for Iulis, and one for Karthaea, to transport Kean *miltos* in Athens. The number is small, relatively speaking, but the quantities are still substantial, since a grain ship could carry up to 150 tonnes.<sup>630</sup> Thus a large amount of *miltos* was transported back to Athens (the inscription does not define time) and where it would later be sold out and accrue profit to the treasury in Athens. State practice was to relieve itself of management responsibilities by hiring out public rights to individuals, such as mine leases and the collection of harbour tax.<sup>631</sup> The idea of selling out public domains in the form of leases or monopolies is found in Xenophon, who suggests raising money for the city and making the silver mines more profitable by imitating private slave owners: “to acquire public slaves in order to hire them out to private individuals”.<sup>632</sup> These examples show that Athens could enter into leasing enterprises in order to help raise its revenues. In turn, public assets were hired out to private

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<sup>628</sup> Photos-Jones *et al.*, 1997, 360 n. 6; Caskey, 1994, 309; Cherry, 1991, 299-303.

<sup>629</sup> IG XII. 5 542.35-45.

<sup>630</sup> Casson, 1995, 172.

<sup>631</sup> Andokides 1.133. Hopper, 1979, 164-189.

<sup>632</sup> Xenophon *Poroi* 4.17. In 3.14, Xenophon proposes the establishment of a public merchant fleet, to be leased under securities.

individuals. The inscription also tells us that the shipping-charge paid to ship owners by the producers was set at one obol per talent of *miltos*.<sup>633</sup> That room was made for future Athenian decrees concerning the security of *miltos* exports suggests other provisions unknown to us. Unfortunately, nothing has been unearthed so far, and the fragmentary nature of this inscription obscures full understanding of the complex methods used by the Athenians for acquisition, exploitation, transportation, and taxation of the *miltos* trade.

Financial constraints were not new to Athens and the Greek world. Financial devices were already employed to remedy economic strains, and Aristotle wrote in the *Politics*: “some cities when short of funds create a source of revenue by establishing a monopoly of goods for sale.”<sup>634</sup> The philosopher describes how some people are able to acquire monopolies on goods, such as iron, though only for the purpose of sale. What we can deduce from this passage is that individuals and states alike could employ monopolies for making profits on sales, but not on production. Finally, a clear example of how the state profited from the exploitation of such resources comes from Xenophon who in his *Poroi* makes a series of recommendations as to how to improve Athens’ revenues without resorting to hegemonial practices. The Kean monopoly suggests that Athens had done exactly that. Some have maintained that Xenophon’s work was the blueprint for some of the changes brought about by Eubulos,<sup>635</sup> while others have stressed the fact that Xenophon anticipated future developments in ancient economic practices.<sup>636</sup> One could not help but wonder whether Xenophon was aware of the Kean monopoly.

Kean *miltos* (red ochre) seems to have been of a higher quality, but the Athenians could also acquire *miltos* (yellow ochre) from the Laureion mines.<sup>637</sup> With this in mind,

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<sup>633</sup> Lines 13-14, 28, 30-1.

<sup>634</sup> Aristotle *Politics* 1259a, 20.

<sup>635</sup> Cawkwell, 1963, 63-64 and n. 89-92 and bibliography. Lewis, 1990, 251, moderates the view, but follows the same path.

<sup>636</sup> Dillery, 1993, 1-11; Humphreys, 1978, 138; Finley, 1973, 164.

<sup>637</sup> Caley and Richards, 1956, 173-174.



Rhodes and Osborne express doubts as to the need for Athens to import Kean *milto*s.<sup>638</sup> Understanding the Athenian need to attain a monopoly on Kean *milto*s is best accomplished by considering the ancient environment and technology. First, ancient technology was incapable of predicting when the earth would stop producing the necessary resources. The Siphnians for example, had a rich vein of gold that ran out unexpectedly (the ore probably ran out, but also, flooding of the mine had caused the Siphnians to lose their wealth by the end of the archaic period).<sup>639</sup> As in the case of grain where drought and war could impose problems in supply, Athens looked to more than one exporter to cover its needs. Therefore, fear and the pursuit of self-sufficiency drove cities to become independent from external pressures by expanding their import options, and Kean *milto*s was one of them.

We must also take into consideration the distinction first made by Hasebroek between commercial interests and import interests.<sup>640</sup> He saw Athens as exercising a control on exports essential to the Athenian navy. Though he did not grasp the potential benefits of *milto*s (he refers to *milto*s only as a painting material for triremes), his observation was correct. Hasebroek argued that domination provided opportunity for enrichment by exploiting trade for revenue purposes and the utilisation of trade to secure the provision of food. Finley agrees with Hasebroek in that Athenian economic behaviour was an instrument of power for political control.<sup>641</sup> Once there, Athens was slave to the Greek notion of hegemonial war, its characteristic stamp of political domination with all means necessary to secure all those advantages of prosperity. In this, Finley was right to stress (as far as Athens is concerned) that the interest of Greek-city states in trade was limited by political concerns to ensure the adequate supply of consumable goods, war materials, and revenue which could be obtained from taxes on trade, revenue that was geared for war. However, if we are

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<sup>638</sup> RO 40.

<sup>639</sup> Herodotos 3.57; Pausanias 10.11.2. See Treister, 1996, 188; Healy, 1978, 46.

<sup>640</sup> Hopper, 1979, 60, 164; Hasebroek, 1965, 140-141.

<sup>641</sup> Morris, 1994, 351-366; Finley, 1982, 41-61; Pecirka, 1982, 117-125; Hasebroek, 1965, 103.

to argue that Athens was a rational predator or entrepreneur who extracted resources in its environment as a means to gain further political power, we ought to say that resources are also taxable.<sup>642</sup> Therefore, when Athens was imposing a monopoly on Kean *mitos* exports, it was merely an extension of traditional political policies, coercive diplomacy, in which a less violent form of acquisition, avoiding the imposition of a cleruchy or garrison on a league member was been undertaken. This was so in part because of the Greek socio-political emphasis on self-sufficiency, as Athenian territory could not produce the amount of resources required to sustain its war machine and population, which in turn were employed in the successful management of an Aegean hegemony.

The political context of Atheno-Kean relationship in the 350s, however, will be the topic of discussion in chapter Six.

### 3.3.3 The diplomacy of grain

The Athenians desired soft Russian bread-wheat, which was cultivated in the Greek colonies; the latter, however, were by the fourth century under the protection of the Bosporan kingdom of the Black Sea. A dedicatory inscription at Nymphaion refers to Leukon as “archon of Bosporus and Theodosia and of all Sindike, and of the Toretoi and Dandarioi and Psessoï”.<sup>643</sup> Hence, the Athenians needed to obtain permission from the Bosporan rulers. Before we go into Atheno-Bosporan diplomacy, it is necessary to show that the Bosporan kings had control over grain exports.

Leukon was called *kurios* of Bosporan grain (τὸ κύριον ὄντα τὸν Λεύκων).<sup>644</sup> He had the power to give *ateleia* from taxes and loading priority to merchants that took grain to Athens, a policy followed by his father and his sons. On the basis of a letter sent to Athens by Leukon’s sons, it seems both Leukon and his heirs took a personal interest in the

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<sup>642</sup> Thucydides 4.108.1; Isocrates 5.2.5. See page 125.

<sup>643</sup> Moreno, 2007a, 3, n.12.

<sup>644</sup> Demosthenes 20.31.

supervision of grain exports to Athens: “to take care of the sending-out of the grain (ἐπιμε[λ]ήσεσθαι τῆς ἐκ[π]ομπῆς τοῦ [σ]ίτ[ο]υ), as their father took care of it, and to minister enthusiastically to whatever the people need.”<sup>645</sup> Moreno notes the rural settlements, large farmsteads, that appear during the fourth century near or on the coast of the Sea of Azov and suggest a royal plan for the exploitation of Bosporan resources.<sup>646</sup> That the area was good for cultivation is also attested by Strabo, who tells us that Black Sea soil was rich, and remarkably fertile for grain. He further comments that it was for that reason that the local population was given the appropriate name γεωργοὶ (husbandmen).<sup>647</sup>

Leukon was also called a perpetual benefactor of Athens (εὐεργετῶν...συνεχῶς).<sup>648</sup> There are repeated occasions on which the Bosporan kingdom supplied Athens with grain. Demosthenes is our most direct evidence, as he makes reference to 400,000 *medimnoi* of grain being brought to Athens in 355.<sup>649</sup> He also attests to an unknown amount of grain in addition to this amount.<sup>650</sup> Business was so good that, according to Demosthenes, Leukon opened another depot at Theodosia with the same exemptions. Furthermore, 2,100,000 *medimnoi* from Theodosia were brought to Athens,<sup>651</sup> which is equivalent to about 260,000 *medimnoi* per annum for eight years in a row, between the opening of Theodosia in 355 and Leukon’s death in 349/8.<sup>652</sup> In addition, calculations of the size of the grain ships taken by Philip II at Hieron in 340 suggest that the amount of grain bound for Athens was at least 540,000 *medimnoi* (c. 700 talents).<sup>653</sup> Epigraphic evidence supports Demosthenes, since the sons of Leukon (Spartokos, Paerisades and Satyrus) renewed these concessions and honours

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<sup>645</sup> IG II<sup>2</sup> 212, 13-17.

<sup>646</sup> Moreno, 2007b, 70 and n.9.

<sup>647</sup> Strabo 7.4.6.

<sup>648</sup> Demosthenes 20.30.

<sup>649</sup> Demosthenes 20.29-30.

<sup>650</sup> Demosthenes 33.

<sup>651</sup> Strabo 7.4.6.

<sup>652</sup> Moreno, 2007b, 69-70 and n. 3.

<sup>653</sup> Moreno, 2007b, 70; Whitby, 1998, 124-25; Casson, 1995, 183-199 on ship capacities; Isager and Hansen, 1975, 200 n.3.

in 347/6.<sup>654</sup> Finally, Demosthenes could not have said that Leukon was a perpetual benefactor if this was not the case. He argued against Leptines' proposed legislation in 356/5 to abolish the law granting special exemption from taxation; a proposal that, according to Demosthenes, will cause the loss of large amounts of grain shipments from Leukon. The Athenians followed Demosthenes' reasoning at the end and cancelled Leptines' law.<sup>655</sup> They knew that it would be foolish of them to lose a benefactor like Leukon in the midst of international problems (the speech was made in 355, when Athens had lost its principal allies, Byzantium, Chios and Rhodes).

Other cities were also recipients of Bosporan grain. Mytilene and Heraklea Pontica (c. 350) received their grain from the King of Pantikapaion.<sup>656</sup> There is even a fragmentary fourth-century dedication to Leukon from Arcadia: ἔδοξεν τοῖς Ἀρκάσιν Λεύκωνα [τὸν Σατύ]ρο Παντικαπαῖταν,<sup>657</sup> which fits well with the supposition that Bosporan grain was widely circulated in fourth-century Greece. These grain shipments to Greece seem to have been regular, and not an exceptional occasion owing to extreme circumstances, as argued by Tsetskhladze.<sup>658</sup> Our written sources indicate the exceptional role of the Bosporan Kings, and should, as they were *kurioi* of the grain trade in their land.

It is questionable why Greek cities would avoid doing business with the friendly Bosporan rulers and only be ready to do so in extreme circumstances, as argued by Tsetskhladze. There was a high level of interannual climatic variability of the Greek mainland, varying around 60% from year to year.<sup>659</sup> Local agriculture was never stable as bad crop years, drought, and war were constant and unpredictable threats, and thus present a fluctuating denominator. For that reason, Athens early on made official agreements with the

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<sup>654</sup> Syll<sup>3</sup> 206 = RO 64.

<sup>655</sup> MacDowell, 2009, 167.

<sup>656</sup> Syll<sup>3</sup> 212. Aristotle *Oeconomicus* 1347b.

<sup>657</sup> Tod II 115A, ii. This small fragment does not make clear whether the Arcadians of the inscription are the Arcadian state or some Arcadians.

<sup>658</sup> Tsetskhladze, 2008, 58 and n. 60; 1998b, 58.

<sup>659</sup> Aristotle *Meteorologica* 2.4. Osborne, 1987, 27, 33; Garnsey, 1985, 104-105.

Bosporan Kings Satyros I and Spartokos I, the father and grandfather of Leukon, for the preferential loading of grain that point to continuity, and not to temporary arrangements.<sup>660</sup> Similarly, the relations between Evagoras, King of Salamis, and the Athenians had to do partly with grain supply.<sup>661</sup>

We may draw a parallel with what we know about Macedonian timber. Trade in the particular timber necessary for shipbuilding was a royal privilege. Borza distinguishes between land that belonged to members of the royal family, land that fell under royal jurisdiction, and private land that could be taxed and licensed.<sup>662</sup> Andokides, through his *xenia*, had rights of exploitation and export, which implies that the Macedonian king could grant special privileges to others. This was also the case in the Hellenistic period.<sup>663</sup> It has been suggested that the Macedonian royal family exercised similar privileges concerning the exploitation of the mines.<sup>664</sup> This suggestion derives from Diodoros' testimony that Philip II invested in the mines at Krenides in order to increase production,<sup>665</sup> and certainly the speed with which Philip II amassed his mining wealth, noted to be more than 1000 talents, must be connected with direct exploitation. The effect of this exploitation was widely felt, as this enabled Philip II to fund his successful campaigns. We need not hesitate to assume that transactions involving huge amounts of grain were also a royal monopoly on the part of the Bosporan Kings. For that reason, the vital factor governing Bosporan supplies was the personal attitude of the King. A general picture of the Bosporan grain trade begins to emerge, in which the local monarch took particular interest in supervising grain exports. Therefore, we must next consider the relationship between Athens and the Bosporan

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<sup>660</sup> Isocrates 17.57; cf. Demosthenes 20.31.

<sup>661</sup> Andokides 2.20-21. Lewis, 1979, 180-193.

<sup>662</sup> Borza, 1987, n. 29.

<sup>663</sup> Gauthier, 1989, n. 1.2-7; 3.3-10 an inscription found in Sardis, dated to 203, saves the last part of a letter from Antiochus III to Sardis. In this the Seleucid King considered the supply of timber for the reconstruction of the city. Another inscription/letter from Antiochus to Sardis concerned the arrangements for the regular supply of olive oil to the gymnasium.

<sup>664</sup> Aperghis, 2004, 152ff believes that the Seleukids probably controlled the most important resources from which state revenues came: timber, mines, and salt.

<sup>665</sup> Diodoros 16.8.6-7. Treister, 1996, 184.

kingdom.

The thesis of a strong, cordial relationship between the two parties, evident from the late fifth century, is not novel.<sup>666</sup> Moreno is its newest proponent, and finds me in agreement. His studies give special attention to the cultural parameters of the relationship between Athens and the Scythian monarchy. Atheno-Bosporan relations are evident from gifts of crowns, citizenship, *ateleia*, and even dedications of bronze statues and the provision of military assistance.<sup>667</sup> Freedom from taxation was called *ateleia*, and the scholiast on *Against Leptines* relates it to commerce or liturgies. In fact, the scholiast believes the Bosporan King benefited from both, in terms of sending grain in the Piraeus, and was exempted from *choregia*. Business transactions on important commodities required such privileges to be granted. For that reason a strong Atheno-Bosporan network was forged during the reign of Satyros I and Leukon.<sup>668</sup> This cultural and political network explains the economic context of their relationship; a system in which grain supply could run from Pantikapaion to Piraeus unmolested, as long as the goodwill of the Bosporan kings was maintained, and control of the route stayed in Athenian hands.

The Bosporan Kings exploited grain products as a source of revenue; this much is clear. Diplomatic friendship and honours were of course desirable for both parties,<sup>669</sup> but there was a more pressing agenda, material benefits. For this reason, grain was also exploited as a political weapon, as will become clear from a discussion of a stele found near the harbour at the Piraeus.

### 3.3.4 Resources as political weapon

The Black Sea region was one of the main producers of grain in the Mediterranean.

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<sup>666</sup> See Braund, 2002, 103-118; Tuplin, 1982 121-128; Burstein, 1978, 428 n, 1 and bibliography.

<sup>667</sup> For the statues see *IG II<sup>2</sup>* 653. 14 and 39-40 (note use of the plural); Dinarchus 1.43. Burstein, 1978, 429. For military assistance see *IG II<sup>2</sup>* 653. 19-20; *IG II<sup>2</sup>* 212. 59.

<sup>668</sup> Moreno, 2007b, 69-84.

<sup>669</sup> According to *IG II<sup>2</sup>* 212. 33-39 the Bosporan co-rulers chose to dedicate to Athena Polias the crowns which they received as gifts.

Using this resource in politics was a tempting option, especially if your neighbours depended on your surplus, and the consumers had few alternatives. Natural resources were the Bosphorans' strongest means and, of course, its rulers would use them in their foreign policy agenda. A very important amount of grain, slaves, fish, and metals consumed in Athens came from the Black Sea.<sup>670</sup> It is then fundamental to find out if, and how, the Bosphoran rulers used their natural resources, in this case, grain, for political gains. The Bosphoran kingdom was a major grain supplier to Athens and their interrelation would reveal how closely tied was Athens' foreign policy of diplomatic manoeuvres with that of the Bosphoran Kings. Thus, the dependence of grain-starved Athens upon such a plain-rich region provides an insight into the political relationships shared by the kingdom of the Bosphorus and Athens.

The story starts with Satyros I, the man who gained Nymphaion (a port on the Tauric Chersonese on the western shore of the Strait of Kerch, south of Pantikapaion) from Athenian control sometime between 410-405.<sup>671</sup> The Athenian in charge at Nymphaion at the time was Gylon, and Aeschines was eager to cast him in the role of traitor, using as evidence Gylon's marriage to a Scythian princess. The narrative about Gylon is obscure. The main information comes from Aeschines' speech *Against Ctesiphon*, which tries to cast Demosthenes in a negative light, because of his hereditary connection to Gylon. Aeschines' accusations were part of an attempt to compromise Demosthenes. Moreno instead sees practicality in Gylon's actions as Athens was entangled in the last stages of the Peloponnesian War at that time, and it made no sense to risk conflict with a distant ruler, especially, as Athens started to lose naval supremacy. Instead, a political compromise was reached, whereby a friendly relationship with Satyros I, who could guarantee Black Sea

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<sup>670</sup> Polybios 4.38.2-5; 43.3-44 records the inflow of supplies coming from the Black Sea: cattle, slaves, honey, wax, and dried fish, whereas Pontic cities imported Greek wine and oil. For the exportation of slaves see Avram, 2007; Gavriljuk, 2003; Braund and Tsatskheladze, 1989. For fish exports: Stolba, 2005; Curtis, 2005; Lund and Gabrielsen, 2005.

<sup>671</sup> Aeschines 3.171-172. Harpocration s.v. *Νυμφαίων* remarks that the city paid a tribute, one talent; in 425 it was increased to two talents see Shelov-Kovedjajev, 1985.

supplies, was established.<sup>672</sup> Athens had no choice but to embark on a series of diplomatic attempts to guarantee special treatment for exportation of grain to Piraeus. What is more, Satyros I provided refuge for Mantitheos during the rule of the Thirty,<sup>673</sup> and for other Athenians.<sup>674</sup>

I will mostly focus on in the evidence of *IG II<sup>2</sup> 212* and *IG II<sup>2</sup> 653*. The former is an Athenian decree of 347/6, honouring Spartokos II and Paerisades I, who were then on the throne of the Cimmerian Bosphorus. Athens had already sent envoys to them (l. 10), while the new rulers sent a letter, soon after the death of their father, Leukon, in which they offer to continue the policy of their father concerning grain exports and whatever else the people of Athens should require (ll. 15-17). Their father, Satyros I (l. 21), had also carried out this policy.<sup>675</sup> *IG II<sup>2</sup> 653* is a decree passed in 284 by the Athenian *demos* in honour of Spartokos III, in which past Atheno-Bosporan relations are re-confirmed. These inscriptions further stress the policy of continuity between Athens and Bosphorus, cooperation in grain trade that lasted more than a century. But it is something else that both inscriptions have in common that catches our attention, military assistance. They were not only about trade in grain supplies, but also about politics.

Foreign rulers acknowledged the advantages of having Greek advisors, generals and mercenaries at their disposal. One may recall the personal requests for the services of Iphicrates and Chabrias by the satrap Pharnabazos and King Akoris of Egypt, respectively.<sup>676</sup> While generals could hire officially their services to foreign rulers, or

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<sup>672</sup> Moreno, 2007b, 73.

<sup>673</sup> Lysias 16.4.

<sup>674</sup> Xenophon *Hellenica* 2.2.1.

<sup>675</sup> The succession of the Spartokidai has been established from epigraphic, numismatic, and literary evidence. For the epigraphic evidence, most Greek inscriptions from Bosphorus have been published in *IOSPE I, II, IV*. A new digital edition is en route (2011-2015) that will incorporate all known Greek and Latin inscriptions from the Black Sea. *CIRB* provides another useful tool as the 2004 edition was republished in a bilingual form (Russian and Latin) and with images. For numismatic evidence, a good introduction is MacDonald, 2005; Shelov, 1978. For literary evidence: Diodoros provides a general outline for the chronology of their rule: 12.31.1, 36.1; 14.93.1; 15.52.10; 16.31.6, 52.10; Strabo 7.4.4.

<sup>676</sup> Diodoros 15.29.2-3.



unofficially when seeking safe harbour because of the threat of exile and death hanging over their heads, *IG II<sup>2</sup> 212*, concerning Spartokos II and Paerisades I, sons of Leukon, informs us of something else – the co-rulers’ request for official Athenian services (ὕπη[ρ]εσί[α]ς). In the words of Rhodes and Osborne, ὕπηρεσῖαι were “skilled officers who together with the trierarch made up the full crew of a ship and could be regarded as the ‘assistants’ of the trierarch”.<sup>677</sup> Isocrates speaks of ὕπηρεσῖαι being sent to Konon’s Persian fleet,<sup>678</sup> and hints at the possibility that this was not the first time that the Athenians had done so. The *demos* ordered the men “to do the sons of Leukon whatever good they can in their post” (Il. 63-65); in other words, to foster better relations with the Bosporan rulers, the Athenians gladly accepted Bosporan requests. Like another Gelon (the fifth-century tyrant of Gela and Syracuse, who offered grain and troops for the Greek war against Persia in return for supreme command),<sup>679</sup> the Bosporan rulers used their grain supply to advance their agenda.

How are we to explain Spartokos II’s and Paerisades I’s request for Athenian naval expertise? The Bosporan kingdom was located on the Black Sea, with its busy waterways, and, as economic contacts between Greeks and the Black Sea population increased, so would have piracy, since they have a reciprocal relationship. The Bosporan kingdom must have suffered from marauding neighbours. Indeed, there is proof of this. First, Strabo tells of the people of this area that are accustomed to the sea and are fond of piracy, and then goes on to tell about the help the pirates get from cities for disposing of their booty.<sup>680</sup> Second, Eumelos, the successor of Paerisades I,<sup>681</sup> campaigned against pirates, and relieved the region from the predations of the Taurians, Heniochoi and Achaeans.<sup>682</sup> Since by the time of Strabo pirates still roamed the Black Sea, it becomes clear that the Bosporan

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<sup>677</sup> Morrison, 1984, 48-59 discusses previous bibliography. *RO 64. IG II<sup>2</sup> 212* l.59. *Tod II 167* believes these men were oarsmen. Morrison rejects this supposition. See Jordan, 1969, 259 who expresses a different view, and suggests ὕπηρεσία meant slave rowers, and perhaps “low-born foreigners, freedmen and fugitives”. Richardson, 1943.

<sup>678</sup> Isocrates 4.142.

<sup>679</sup> Herodotos 7.158.

<sup>680</sup> Strabo 7.4.6, 11.2.12.

<sup>681</sup> Diodoros 20. 22-24 provides the details of a war of succession.

<sup>682</sup> Diodoros 20.25.

kingdom faced repeated problems with piracy (it is not clear whether this was a problem of piracy or privateering),<sup>683</sup> and explains the request for Athenian naval expertise. In IG II<sup>2</sup> 653, a decree passed in 285/4, the people of Athens agree to go with all their strength both by land and sea in support of Spartokos III, the successor of Eumelos, against those who trespass in his realm (βοηθεῖν παντὶ σθένει κ[α]ὶ κατὰ γῆν καὶ κατὰ θάλατ[ταν]).<sup>684</sup> What this tells us is that three successive Bosporan rulers, Paerisades I, Eumelos, and Spartokos III, requested Athenian naval assistance. The Athenians praise this policy of continuity, as indicated by the use of the plural προγόνων with the phrase: ἐπὶ τὴν ἀρχὴν τὴν τῶν προγόνων αὐτοῦ ἢ τὴν Σπα[ρ]τόκου. This inscription is intriguing and poses many questions. Why do the Athenians go to such length as to offer full military assistance? Could the Athenians send such a force? It is surprising that from services of ὑπηρεσίαι we jump to παντὶ σθένει assistance. Is that something new or does it trace back in time? Let us start with the last question.

Burstein describes this relationship as a defensive alliance (*epimachia*) because of the clause βοηθεῖν παντὶ σθένει κ[α]ὶ κατὰ γῆν καὶ κατὰ θάλατ[ταν], and tries to place this defensive alliance after 346, and probably sometime in the 320s, under Demosthenes' diplomatic activities.<sup>685</sup> However, I am reluctant to agree, not only because we cannot rest on the inferences of Aeschines and Deinarchos,<sup>686</sup> but because there is no indication in the text that it is such a treaty. Previously, Paerisades I had asked (ἄς αἰτοῦσι) for military assistance, not an alliance.<sup>687</sup> Whether by the time of Spartokos III, an official alliance had been made, our sources do not allow us to confirm. In addition, Spartokos III was not asked to send military assistance to Athens, nor was he nor his ancestors praised for having sent

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<sup>683</sup> For piracy in the ancient world see De Souza, 1999; Ormerod, 1924.

<sup>684</sup> Spartokos II ruled for twenty years, from 304 to 285/4, Diodoros 20.100.7. See Burstein, 1978, 428-436 and his bibliography.

<sup>685</sup> Burstein, 1978, 430.

<sup>686</sup> Braund, 2007, 39-68.

<sup>687</sup> IG II<sup>2</sup> 212. 59.

such aid in the past.<sup>688</sup> The Athenians, so keen to record all their benefactions to the Bosporan Kings, fail to mention any official alliance. Instead, they inscribed only what they had at hand, their reciprocal relationship. This is a one-way offer, and the Athenians seem happy to report having given such aid on the stele.

From a historical point of view, the Athenians faced extreme problems during the early third century; the Macedonians held control of the Piraeus and strategic locations in Athens itself, and, in effect, the Athenians were struggling to protect even their own harvest, since the Piraeus remained in Macedonian hands without interruption until 229.<sup>689</sup> No man could be spared in such dire times. In essence, the Athenians' offer to help *παντὶ σθένει* represents a gesture of commitment and support, which in turn, generates, or hopes to generate reciprocal loyalty from the Bosporan kingdom. That is not to say that the Spartokids were unaware of Athens' inability to furnish the help they promised, or that Athens could only send a fraction of experienced mariners to support their benefactor. For Spartokos III it was a bargain, and for the Athenians a statement of their commitment to strengthen and hold onto their long-established relations with the Bosporan supplier. This kind of diplomatic courtesy finds a parallel in the early fourth century with the precise terminology used to describe Dionysios, as *ἄρχοντα* (ruler) of all Sicily.<sup>690</sup> The Athenians avoid the use of *tyrant*, which he was, since he had gained power with brute military force. Moreover, one third of Sicily was under Carthaginian control. It is all a grand gesture to curry favour with him. Such grandiose statements can only highlight the lengths to which Athenian diplomatic endeavours in the third century went in order to maintain access to Bosporan grain. Burstein has been deceived by Athenian diplomatic language.

What the Athenians desired was to preserve Bosporan goodwill towards their city,

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<sup>688</sup> Adcock and Mosley, 1975, 194 notice that many times treaties of unequal terms were imposed.

<sup>689</sup> See Oliver, 2007, 57-58.

<sup>690</sup> RO 33. 18; 34. 7.

διαφυλάττειν τὴν εὐνοίαν (Il. 27-28). They start by giving emphasis to the policy of continuity between the two parties: ἐπειδὴ [πρότερόν τε οἱ πρόγονοι οἱ] Σπαρτόκου (l. 8-9), and emphasize that there is οἰκειότης (kindred friendship) between them (l. 10). The inscription then moves on to give a summary of past relations and services rendered, which continue into the present; citizenship, bronze statues, gifts, and military aid.<sup>691</sup> In lines 23-4, we are given the reason why the Athenians offer Spartokos III so many benefits. King Spartokos III supplied 15,000 *medimnoi* of grain to Athens. This reciprocal relationship is further attested by a phrase in *IG* II<sup>2</sup> 212. 17-20, in which the Athenian *demos* tells Paerisades I and Spartokos II that, as long as they continue to protect Athenian trade interests, they will receive whatever they ask (ἀπαγγέλλειν αὐτοῖς τ[ο]ὺς π[ρ]όβ[ο]ις ὅ[τι] ταῦτα ποιοῦντες οὐδενὸς ἀτυχήσ[ουσιν] τοῦ δήμου τοῦ Ἀθηναίων). This again conveys the impression that kings and states used grain and other trade preferences as a political tool.

What these inscriptions tell us is that the Athenians went to great diplomatic lengths and were ready to forge deals in order to preserve their preferential treatment in the grain trade. As Aristotle remarks contracts and agreements should be made with those who can supply food.<sup>692</sup> On the other hand, those in possession of an important resource, such as grain, could ask for a lot more than honours in return. This was a major departure from previous Athenian policy, which had previously avoided such binding ties.<sup>693</sup> From the latter half of the fourth century onwards, Athens faced several obstacles to accessing grain supplies. Competition from other cities, vulnerability of the maritime routes, local hostilities, and regional shortfalls in harvest, would all have affected the politics of the grain trade. Athens' weak political position, evident also in the language of the above inscriptions, added to the problem, and at no point from the 340s to the 280s was it in a position to decline a request from its grain-rich supplier. In conclusion, gifts of valuable resources fitted

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<sup>691</sup> *IG* II<sup>2</sup> 653, 13-20.

<sup>692</sup> Aristotle *Rhetoric* 1360a.

<sup>693</sup> As observed by Burstein, 1978, 435.

into the dynamics of politics. Those who were in possession of these assets knew the strong bargaining chips which they held, and as a result, the conditions of these gifts were therefore closely linked to foreign policy.

This Chapter dealt with the methods by which natural resources were acquired or annexed. In particular, it highlighted Athenian policy in and around Thasos, and interpreted the *miltois* decrees – that the monopolisation of this resource can be seen as a variant form of colonisation/cleruchisation - and to suggest that this action can be connected to Xenophon's *Poroi*. The role of individuals in driving (and profiting from) these ventures was emphasised and at the same time acknowledged the influence of certain individuals in assembly decisions. This, in connection with recurring Athenian awareness of certain natural resources abroad is what makes this chapter important. Political decision-making in the Athenian assembly seems to be repetitive and in connection with places with or access to natural resources. For this to happen, both elite political leaders and mass were guided by a collective knowledge that came through a series of historical events, colonisation, trade, campaigns and the deliberation and rumour that evidently came before or after an event. But the situation is more complex than that. Therefore, the following chapter will look at “protection policies” used to safeguard resources and the merchants who conveyed those resources to Athens.

## 4

### **Protection Policies**

The protection strategy of natural resources requires the state's appreciation of their importance, and knowledge of interstate, local, and environmental threats. This involves specifically the relationship between exporter and importer, maintaining a steady supply of commodities, the vulnerability of sea journeys due to physical and/or human obstacles and therefore, various strategies such as deployment of legal measures for the protection of traders and cargo at home, and abroad, all to secure and ensure that natural resources reached Athens safely. To approach this matter, five areas of consideration have been identified.

First, I discuss various problems that relate to the entire route a resource had to go through in order to reach safely the Athenian ports. For this reason, Athens required a sophisticated network able to guarantee the maintenance of the link between importers and exporters. Therefore, we need to address the challenges the Athenians had to face in order to secure the importation of strategic natural resources.: a) the problem of seizure *sula* - *sulê* (σύλα - σύλη), b) the destructive nature of piracy, c) the attempts of different states to seize resources for their purposes, and d) the destruction of resources through warfare.

Second, I shall analyse the international agreements and treaties with foreign partners that took place to secure the importation of natural resources to Piraeus. The incentives and facilities that the polis had to offer to merchants who travelled to places where resources could be traced are one aspect of a very complex issue in the recent debate on ancient

economy: the relationship between the city and trade, in particular, maritime trade.<sup>694</sup> Our attention, however, will focus on one particular aspect: the international agreements signed by Athens in which merchants gained favour, protection, and which facilitated trade and its activity in order to bring the desired natural resources to Piraeus.

The third part considers the practical measures that were taken by Athens both in harbour and at sea for the safety of merchants, for the protection of their persons, vessels and cargo against reprisals, piracy or accidents, both in times of peace and war. The real capacity of a polis to protect the safety of those who wanted to reach its ports, along with their cargo, constituted an additional incentive for *emporoi* to make sure they went to Athens; while the significance of those resources for the political survival Athens offered the polis an incentive to ensure their protection.

Fourth, I will look at the internal legislation of Athens, as opposed to international treaties and military action. Thus, I will bring to the fore some more evidence of Athenian decrees that was favourable to merchants, laws favourable to Athenians, and then I will proceed to discussing Xenophon's proposed measures to remedy Athenian commerce and economy.

The last part will consider Athens' infrastructure and how it was designed to safeguard the city and its native and foreign natural resources. This will allow us to assess the possibilities around international relations given by policies regarding infrastructure. But one important clarification must be made before we move on to look at protection policies used to safeguard resources and the merchants who conveyed grain, timber, and other to Athens. Much of what is said in this chapter could apply to any form of trade, and probably did. This is because international treaties, decrees, and public laws refer to a wide spectrum of protection policies or sometimes to unknown trade relations. Though this

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<sup>694</sup> For example, Curtis, 2005; Reed, 2003; Millett, 2000; Engen, 2010; Cohen, 1992.

remains true, a considerable amount of surviving evidence relates to trade in grain or timber; two resources that have been identified in the previous chapters as strategic, as well as having a significant role to play in the development of external Athenian policies and procedures. When pieced together, these protection policies seem to have served to a large extent the Athenian needs of import in these valuable resources.

## 4.1 Dangers related to trading resources

We must remember that a citizen lacked rights outside his polis. In a world where inter-community hostilities were common, and personal reasons for either booty or revenge may come alive at any time, a world of constant danger existed for individuals travelling the Aegean. A remarkable business letter of c. 500, written on a lead tablet, found on Berezan, alludes to the problems facing merchants travelling on foreign land.<sup>695</sup> The letter is sent by Achillodoros to his son Protagoras, and to Anaxagoras, and addresses the problem of Achillodoros' seizure by a man called Matasys on the grounds that he is a slave of Anaxagoras. Matasys had seized Achillodoros and his cargo, on the basis that Anaxagoras has deprived Matasys of his female and male slaves and houses, and thus, in return Matasys seized Achillodoros as if he was a slave of Anaxagoras. The former denies the status of slave, and argues that his seizure is unjust.

The problem of seizure *sula* - *sulê* (σύλα - σύλη), on occasion regulated by *symbola*, was widespread in the Greek world. Early on Artaphrenes, Satrap of Lydia, compelled (ἡνάγκασε) the Ionians to make agreements (συνθήκας) among themselves that they would abide by the law and not rob and plunder each other (ἵνα δωσίδικοι εἶεν καὶ μὴ

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<sup>695</sup> See AV no. 41 for comments and bibliography.



ἀλλήλους φέροιέν τε καὶ ἄγοιεν).<sup>696</sup> In the *Suppliants*, the Argives resolve to protect the Danaids against seizure by the Egyptians.<sup>697</sup> Two communities of Ozolian Locris regulate seizures from each other's territory (with penalties for unjust seizure), but not at sea, except from the harbour.<sup>698</sup> Thucydides felt proud of such measures (ξυμβολαίαις), because instead of using force, Athens permitted citizens to use lawsuits to redress a supposed wrong.<sup>699</sup> The growth of *symbola* were designed to regulate the use of force in order to promote more secure commercial relationships, thereby assuring merchants that they would not be harmed in any way when lodged in a foreign port.<sup>700</sup> Under Athenian agreements, merchants obtained protection against arbitrary arrest or detention:

In our *symbola* treaties with other states, we make it a condition that no free man shall be imprisoned or placed in duress, and a heavy fine is prescribed as the penalty for so doing.<sup>701</sup>

This legal procedure aimed to find ways to protect traders abroad against unscrupulous complaints from citizens of other communities.<sup>702</sup> The implication is that *symbola* and the protection they offered to merchants would inevitably induce the skipper to set sail to the safest and most advantageous ports of call. Demosthenes explains in *Against Lacritos* that ships that failed to enter Pontus before the rise of Sirius (late July to early August, and thus would face stormy weather) would be forced to stay in the Hellespont and “disembark their goods at a port where the Athenians are not protected from acts of

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<sup>696</sup> Herodotos 6.42.

<sup>697</sup> Aeschylus *Suppliants*. 605-14; Euripides *Suppliants* 888-98.

<sup>698</sup> AV no.54.

<sup>699</sup> Thucydides 1.77.1.

<sup>700</sup> Gauthier, 1972, 193-195.

<sup>701</sup> Andokides 4.18-19.

<sup>702</sup> See the simile of Aristophanes *Acharnians* 496 where the citizens are compared to flour, in which some bran (immigrants non-citizens) cannot be separated from it. In Thucydides 7.63.3-4 Nicias speaks to the metics in a more elevated language. Two possible dates exist in scholarship for the origin/invention of metic status. Whitehead, 1977, 140-8 for a Cleisthenic date; Figueira, 1991, 250 for a mid-fifth century one.

seizure" (ἐξελόμενοι ὅπου ἂν μὴ σῦλαι ᾤσιν Ἀθηναίοις).<sup>703</sup>

A second problem was the endemic nature of piracy, since it could hinder the flow of resources coming into Athens. As Aristotle said, piracy was "a natural art of acquisition".<sup>704</sup> We can appreciate its importance quite easily by looking at the costs involved; in the aftermath of the Peloponnesian War, in 401/0, Athens imported commodities worth 1,800 talents.<sup>705</sup> The lively maritime trade offered piratical activity and seizure of persons and goods constituted a substantial source of profit to pirates. Piracy was a persistent factor in the Aegean; reports of Athenian concerns to offer protection from exaction force and highlight the endemic nature of piracy. Kimon led a campaign to Skyros to remove the pirates from the area.<sup>706</sup> We do know that Athens had a fleet of 60 ships patrolling the Aegean,<sup>707</sup> and that Pericles discussed with other Greek states the safety of the sea.<sup>708</sup> But nothing more is heard of that action. Another campaign led by Kimon tried to consolidate the Chersonese in the 460s, and Pericles was to install a cleruchy there, to protect the area from Thracian bandits.<sup>709</sup> In the aftermath of Athens' defeat in the Peloponnesian War, the sea was a haven for pirates, as Sparta seems not to have tackled this problem. Isocrates (who is not an impartial informant), writing in the 380s claims us that trading of valuables in the Hellespont was unsafe while the Spartans had control of the sea, a sea teeming with freebooters.<sup>710</sup> In the 340s, the Sporades island complex made a good pirate base, as Demosthenes *On Halonessos* tells us.

Alongside piracy there was commandeering, the attempts of different states to commandeer resources for their purposes.<sup>711</sup> In 362, the Byzantines were involved in acts of

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<sup>703</sup> Demosthenes 35.13.

<sup>704</sup> Aristotle *Politics* 1255b-1256b.

<sup>705</sup> Vlassopoulos, 2007, 134 based on Andokides 1.133-4.

<sup>706</sup> Plutarch *Kimom* 8.3; Thucydides 1.98.2; Diodoros 4.62.4; 11.60.2; Pausanias 1.17.6.

<sup>707</sup> Plutarch *Pericles* 11.4. Cartledge, 1979, 235.

<sup>708</sup> Plutarch *Pericles* 17.1. De Souza, 1999, 30; Ormerod, 1924, 108-109.

<sup>709</sup> Diodoros 11.88.3; Plutarch *Pericles* 11.5; 19.1.

<sup>710</sup> Isocrates *Panegyric*. 115; *Trapeziticus* 35-36.

<sup>711</sup> See Gabrielsen, 2001, 221-226.

seizure against Athenian grain ships,<sup>712</sup> which they intercepted again in the summer of 361.<sup>713</sup> Thasos and Maroneia asked to hire the services of the Athenian fleet to protect their grain vessels until they reached their destination.<sup>714</sup> Other communities seem to have cooperated with pirates; Melos was fined 10 talents for harbouring pirates,<sup>715</sup> and Philip II complained about the Thasian action to open their harbour to the Byzantine war-ships and to any pirates that chose to touch there.<sup>716</sup> Much activity is recorded in the northeast as it was a major point of consideration; it was the gate to the resources of the Black Sea, Macedonia, and Thrace. Stopping points along the trade routes, principally the routes from Athens to the Hellespont and vice versa, gave enough cause for concern for the Athenians to secure them against piratical activity and privateering.<sup>717</sup>

In sum, four things have been documented: a) the fact that foreigners did not have any *a priori* legal standing in a foreign city and could be seized, killed or enslaved, b) the endemic nature of piracy, c) the attempts of different states to commandeer resources for their purposes, and d) the destruction of resources through warfare. I now move on to show how the Athenians tried to deal with all these problems in various ways.

## 4.2 International treaties: *synthekai* and *symbola*

In his discussion of the five themes of political discourse essential for the political survival of a city, which include imports and exports,<sup>718</sup> Aristotle speaks of what a city must do to achieve this end, and takes food supply as a case study (ἔτι δὲ περὶ τροφῆς, πόση

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<sup>712</sup> Demosthenes 50.6.

<sup>713</sup> Demosthenes 50.4-12, 14-17. Garnsey, 1988, 146-149.

<sup>714</sup> Demosthenes 50.14, 20-21.

<sup>715</sup> Demosthenes 58.56; 50.4-12, 14-17.

<sup>716</sup> Demosthenes 12.2.

<sup>717</sup> De Souza, 1999; Ormerod, 1924. In 340, Philip II seized at Hieron the Athenian fleet of grain ships, Philochoros *FGrHist* 328 F 162; Theopompos *FGrHist* 115 F 292.

<sup>718</sup> Aristotle *Rhetoric* 1360a: τῶν εἰσαγομένων καὶ ἐξαγομένων.

[δαπάνη] ἱκανὴ τῇ πόλει καὶ ποία, ἢ αὐτοῦ τε γιγνομένη καὶ <ἢ> εἰσαγώγιμος). A city should “make agreements and commercial treaties with the countries concerned. It is necessary to protect its citizens from two types of concern: states stronger than its own and states useful for trade” (καὶ τίνων τ’ ἐξαγωγῆς δέονται καὶ τίνων <καὶ παρὰ τίνων> εἰσαγωγῆς, ἵνα πρὸς τούτους καὶ συνθῇ καὶ συμβολαὶ γίνωνται: πρὸς δύο γὰρ διαφυλάττειν ἀναγκαῖον ἀνεγκλήτους τοὺς πολίτας, πρὸς τε τοὺς κρείττους καὶ πρὸς τοὺς εἰς ταῦτα χρησίμους).<sup>719</sup> Aristotle’s concern has wider implications with regards to the way Athens conducted its foreign policy in order to secure vital imports. It deals with the making of agreements and treaties with states that had important resources to trade, and which took particular care to avoid any incidents abroad by looking after citizens and merchants. As we shall see, international treaties involved clauses related to merchants whose business was a crucial link between Athens and foreign markets.

The preserved *synthekai* are treated in scholarship mostly for their economic issues. Clauses of *asylia*, ensuring that people on both sides have security and protection for themselves and their goods, were clearly intended to protect merchants, facilitate movement and encourage trade. Similar considerations apply to *symbola*, aimed at regulating, among other things, legal aspects of trade to facilitate and accelerate the conclusion of disputes over traffic and business that inevitably accompanied trade. These have a wider business application, as any problem could find its solution in the court of law.<sup>720</sup> But, these bilateral agreements are essentially of two types; commercial and political, whereas many times they are recorded together.

The international treaties that regulated export of timber from Macedonia are related with both trade and politics.<sup>721</sup> *Synthekai* have been already touched upon in the previous

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<sup>719</sup> Ibid.

<sup>720</sup> Arnaoutoglou, 1998, 131; For *symbola*, see the specific study of Gauthier, 1972.

<sup>721</sup> IG I<sup>3</sup> 89.3; ML 91; Walbank, 1978, no.90. RO 12.9-18.

chapter, thus here are dealt with briefly. From the perspective of a Greek city, the reasons that pushed them to reach agreements with the Macedonian rulers may have to do with economic factors, as incentives to kings assured a favourable approach, which in turn allowed export of their products. For Athens, it was about securing the necessary natural resources, especially at times of war – since the agreement with the Macedonians was made during the difficult last years of the Peloponnesian War – in order to keep the state running both internally and externally. Hence, there were political considerations alongside economic ones. Similarly, King Amyntas II provided timber export rights to the Chalkidic League, though the inscription makes it transparent that this agreement had a strong political element.<sup>722</sup> We now move on to observe in more detail the other international agreement noted by Aristotle, *symbola*.

*Symbola* were bilateral treaties between Athens and another signatory city. As outlined by Gauthier, the purpose of *symbola* was to allow citizens of one city to gain access to justice in another.<sup>723</sup> Athens opened its courts to citizens of other states and vice versa, and judgements obtained in one city were enforced in the other. Thus, Athens made reciprocal arrangements with cities, which regulated cases involving Athenians and the citizens of another state.<sup>724</sup> It seems to be the case that fifth-century *symbola* were put in place in order to accommodate the business of an imperial city buzzing with trade.<sup>725</sup> These *symbola* ended with the end of the Peloponnesian War. In the fourth century, particularly soon after the establishment of the Second Athenian League, Athens established fresh *symbola* agreements with Stymphalos, Troezen, Naxos, a Cretan city, the Persian satrap Orontes, and Kyzikos.<sup>726</sup> Most of these *symbola* agreements are dated to the second quarter of the fourth century, with Troezen and Stymphalos in Arkadia said to have been among the

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<sup>722</sup> RO 12.9-18.

<sup>723</sup> Gauthier, 1972, a list of all the surviving decrees is found on 389-390.

<sup>724</sup> Lewis, 1975, 263.

<sup>725</sup> Gauthier, 1972, 157-166; Ziegler, 1975, 62-65. Only one survived into the 4<sup>th</sup> century, the renewed agreement between Athens and Samos in 403/2, IG I<sup>3</sup> 127.

<sup>726</sup> Gauthier, 1972, 166-171.

earliest.<sup>727</sup> I do not count the offer of Philip II for a συμβόλων treaty since it was rejected,<sup>728</sup> nor the abstract reference to Athenian τοῖς συμβόλοις treaties by Andokides.<sup>729</sup> After c. 355, *symbola* include detailed clauses concerning matters of crime, penalties and of legal procedures bound to the signatory cities.<sup>730</sup>

The judicial character of *symbola* is stressed when we juxtapose it with what we know of *dikai emmenoi* (*emporikai* and *eranikai*) that arose from fourth-century concerns of mercantile commerce.<sup>731</sup> Athens offered equality of access and treatment to foreign traders as well as a speedy settlement of disputes, allowing them to be ready to sail as soon as possible.<sup>732</sup> This was unlike any other polis. According to Cohen, these *dikai* “were open to individuals of varied citizenship. Special provisions were available for assuring a defendant’s appearance at the ensuing trial, and uniquely strong measures would be taken to enforce the judgement of the maritime tribunals. The courts were summary in procedure, rendering rapid decisions”.<sup>733</sup> Thus, Athens designed measures to meet the needs of its trade. *Dikai emporikai*, specifically, were designed to facilitate the grain trade, and *symbola* to deal, among others, with commercial dealings.<sup>734</sup> That does not mean that *dikai* were *symbola*. Their close resemblance in judicial matters was due to the aspect of trade and Athens’ need to protect merchants with every mean possible. Gauthier sees them as the result of political, social, and economic instability in Athens. Walbank remarks “the *dikai emporikai* were a response both to the importance of the grain trade in the changed conditions of the later fourth century and to the geographical distances involved”.<sup>735</sup> Both belong to Athens’ arsenal to protect, facilitate and attract trade into Piraeus.

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<sup>727</sup> Ziegler, 1975, 52-61 and Gauthier, 1972, 166-169 date the first to c. 400-375, but Woodhead, 1997, 35, 47 and Walbank, 1986, 350 n.41 suggest c. 368, as many other examples of *symbola* agreements are dated in the second quarter of the fourth century.

<sup>728</sup> Demosthenes 7.9.

<sup>729</sup> Andokides 4.18. Lewis, 1975, 263.

<sup>730</sup> Walbank, 1986, 350; Ziegler, 1975, 62-65; Gauthier, 1972, 157, 189-193.

<sup>731</sup> For an extensive discussion, see Cohen, 1973, 23ff.

<sup>732</sup> Demosthenes 33.23. Reed, 2003, Appendix 3.

<sup>733</sup> Cohen, 1973, 8.

<sup>734</sup> Walbank, 1986, 351.

<sup>735</sup> Walbank, 1986, 352.

To this effect, we must not forget grants of *asylia*, freedom from seizure. This honour offered to individuals was often combined with the status of *proxenos* and benefactor. Among the instances of grants to individuals, there is one made by the regime of 400, or that of the 5000, at Athens to Pythophanes for his services. The decree offers protection to him and his cargo, and though we do not know the magnitude of Pythophanes' services, the decree was renewed in 399/8.<sup>736</sup> *Asylia* could be offered by one community to another, as the agreement made between communities of Ozolian Locrians, seen above. In addition, evidence suggests that *asylia* was frequently declared for religious places and their associated communities, meaning that the people were immune from violence. The evidence for this phenomenon has been collected and presented by Kent J. Rigsby, who discusses its historical implications in a substantial introduction.<sup>737</sup> He argues that *asylia* stemmed from a hopeful intention of military neutrality. Therefore, while declarations of neutrality did not effectively stop armies from invading, cities nevertheless saw neutrality (simply proclaimed) as having a moral force, hence they competed for the honour. In any case, *asylia* was offered for many reasons, religious sentiment being one of them. Yet the institution must have had practical consequences as it stems from the need to protect travellers; cities - Athens among them - used *asylia* to further their policy of protecting traders who brought goods, and therefore wealth, to the city. Thus, a key function of *symbola* (and *asylia*) was to protect merchants from malicious prosecution, especially in foreign lands, execute a more impartial judgement, and offer a quick settlement to enable them to carry on their business. However, were they not affected by political considerations?

The Athenians were found in c. 460 concluding a treaty with Phaselis that has a clause

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<sup>736</sup> ML 80; IG II<sup>2</sup> 12. 17-21.

<sup>737</sup> Rigsby, 1997.

for a *symbolaion*.<sup>738</sup> This clause was interpreted as a contract whereby any breach made in Athens should be heard in Athens. De Ste Croix, following Hopper, argues persuasively, that in this case *symbolaion* should not be interpreted as “contract”, but as a legal right of action.<sup>739</sup> What is important for our purpose is de Ste Croix’s suggestion that here Athens offers a privilege to the Phaselitans not to come before the *thesmothetai*, the court normally used for cases arising from *symbola*, but instead before the polemarch’s court. The latter dealt with metics, and by the fourth century it heard cases of privileged foreigners, metics, *isoteles* and *proxenoi*.<sup>740</sup> Appearance before this court was better than being on trial as a temporary visitor. Finally, the privilege of coming before the polemarch’s court is conferred on the Phaselitans in a similar fashion to that conferred to the Chians (l. 11). Thus, Athens’ emphasis on this privilege was to ensure business with Chian and Phaselitan traders. Why was it given to these two cities? Chios was an Athenian League member, but at the time of the inscription (469-450) it was still a powerful ally, exempt from tribute, a maritime hub, and in fact, the one that negotiated the entry of Phaselis to the Delian League.<sup>741</sup> The Phaselitans excelled in maritime activity, trading with the ports of the Levant and with Greece.<sup>742</sup> However, Phaselis, on the coast of Lycia, was at the very fringes of Athenian control. Lycia was in Athenian hands only for a fraction of two decades. In fact, its presence on the Athenian Tribute List comes only for the years 452/1, 451/0, 446/5.<sup>743</sup> Athens had to satisfy good partners for, as Aristotle suggested, treaties were not only made to ensure that all imports were conveyed to Athens, but also to keep friends with the states involved in this trade. Not all cities aspired to the sentiment expressed by the Old Oligarch, “For there is no city which does not need to export or import; and these things it will not be able to do so

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<sup>738</sup> ML 31.

<sup>739</sup> De Ste Croix, 1961, 100-108.

<sup>740</sup> De Ste Croix, 1961, 100 and n.5.

<sup>741</sup> Plutarch *Kimón* 12.3.

<sup>742</sup> Thucydides 2.69; cf. Demosthenes 35.4, 10, 15, 36, 44.

<sup>743</sup> Keen, 1993, 70-77; *ATL* II; Bryce, 1986, 107.



unless it accepts the bidding of the power that rules the sea".<sup>744</sup> Let us now see some analogous cases of political considerations from the fourth century.

The *symbola* treaties with Stymphalos and Troizen raise a problem concerning the judicial nature of *symbola* and its economic function in protecting merchants and cargo. Both Stymphalos and Troizen are hardly commercial states. Walbank rightly remarks that Stymphalos is remote and inaccessible even today.<sup>745</sup> Why would Athens care to offer such advantages to a secluded town in Arkadia? Woodhead argues that military considerations weighed in Athenian minds. During the 360s, Athens played an active part in the military affairs of Arkadia, and hence of Stymphalos. The bilateral convention with Troizen, too,<sup>746</sup> could bring military advantages in the early years of the 4th century. Both cases fit well with the pattern of events in this period, and in the context of known Athenian interests in the area.<sup>747</sup> That is, it is in line with the new Athenian policy that began in 369, entailing alliance with Sparta, later alliance with Arkadia, and in essence, marks an Athenian policy of increased involvement in the Peloponnese.<sup>748</sup>

Two *symbola* treaties made, not between Greek cities, but with two foreign rulers, bring to the fore the political role of *symbola*. The first is IG II<sup>2</sup> 207, a bilateral treaty between Athens and Orontes, a Persian satrap of Mysia.<sup>749</sup> IG II<sup>2</sup> 207 has brought out various arguments from scholars concerning its date, its testament to Athenian involvement in the Great Satraps' Revolt, and, the identity of the Orontes in the inscription.<sup>750</sup> It is evident

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<sup>744</sup> [Xenophon] *Athenaion Politeia* 2.3.

<sup>745</sup> Walbank, 1986, 352 n.51.

<sup>746</sup> SEG XVII.17.

<sup>747</sup> For Troizen: Woodhead, 1997, 35, who makes a valid point in dating the inscription in the 360s. The Troizenians bestowed honors on the *boule* and the *demos* of the Athenians in 368/7, IG II<sup>2</sup>, 1425. 227-228. For Stymphalos: IG II<sup>2</sup>, 144; SEG XVII.18; Woodhead, 1997, 47.

<sup>748</sup> Sealey, 1993, 71, 82-84. Treaty with Sparta: Xenophon *Hellenica* 6.5.1-3. Treaty with Arkadia: Xenophon *Hellenica* 7.4.2-4; RO 41. Athens protects Phlius: Pausanias 9.15.4; Xenophon *Hellenica* 7.1.20-2; Diodoros 15.69.2-70.1. Collaboration with Sicyon: Xenophon *Hellenica* 7.3.2-12,

<sup>749</sup> The problem of Orontes's satrapy occurs from two different stories. Trogus *Prolegomena* X has Orontes satrap of Armenia while Diodoros 15.90.3 names him satrap of Mysia. On Orontes's career, see the well discussed article of Osborne, 1982; 1981; 1973.

<sup>750</sup> SEG LV. 126. Develin, 1988; Walbank, 1988; Moysey, 1987; Henry, 1983; Osborne, 1982; 1981; 1971; Parke, 1936; Rangabé, 1855; Pittakys, 1835.

though that from the first fragment of this very fragmentary inscription of the mid-fourth century, we are given the following information. “The Athenian ambassadors have reported to Athens, and on this account, the Athenian *demos* votes to grant Orontes a commendation, citizenship, and a gold crown.” Towards the end of the fragment (line 13), an alliance is mentioned, and a σύμβολον treaty (— — δήμου τοὺς μὲν Ἀθηναίους δίκας διδόναι ἐν τοῖς συμβόλοις — —). In fragment b, line 6, another mention to *symbola* is made (καὶ τὰ σύμβολα δειχθῆναι). Why was it necessary to make a *symbola* treaty with Orontes? Was the *symbola* treaty with Orontes an exception to the rule or, since western satrapies belonged to the immediate environment of Athens, should we hypothesize that Athens made *symbola* treaties with all the friendly satraps along the west coast of Asia Minor?

The political role of *symbola* starts to emerge when we read further into the inscription. Fragments (b), (c), (d), currently in the Epigraphical Museum in Athens,<sup>751</sup> inform us of provisions for the purchase of grain with silver taken from the military fund. The names of the men responsible for this are given: Chares, Charidemus, and Phokion, three prominent Athenian generals. Line 13 mentions the island of Lesbos and σύνταξις. It is possible that Lesbos was to contribute to the purchase of grain. Then a reference follows for the distribution of the grain with a provision that the soldiers are paid. Line 17 refers to treasurers and ambassadors, the people who are responsible to carry out the commands according to the decree. Another reference to those hindering the war is cast on line 19. This is followed by references to Chares, Charidemus, the allies, the treasurers, money for Orontes, and merchant ships. It seems that at that stage Athens is at war and the grain acquired has something to do with the military operations. Proxenos, another Athenian general, is reported in line 23, and right before the inscription breaks off we are informed about the provisions for travelling expenses and commendations.

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<sup>751</sup> EM 7035, 7035(a), 7036.

Kirchner in *IG II<sup>2</sup>* combined fragments (a) and (b), (c), (d) into one decree, and dated it to the year 349/8. As such, his became the standard view for many years. Osborne, however, having studied the career of Orontes, found several weaknesses in Kirchner's view, and proposed a new reconstruction for the four fragments. Unquestionably, fragments (a) and (b) + (c) + (d) share similar notes. Both refer to Orontes, probably the leader of the Great Satrap Revolt.<sup>752</sup> Both parts concern σύμβολα. Yet, as Osborne suggests, the difference in formulaic wording between fragments (a) and (b+c+d) tells us that we are dealing with two separate decrees involving the same dealings with the same man. It is difficult to decide whether the four fragments are part of one inscription, as Rangabé, Parke, Moysey and others have thought, or not. It is undeniable, however, that both fragments are concerned with a trading deal of grain between Athens and Orontes at a time of war. The presence of three *strategoi*, an alliance, and the procurement of grain in the Athenian treaty with Orontes, possibly twice attested, elevates the importance that *symbola* played in international treaties, and suggests that *symbola* involved wider trade and political implications. Lastly, the presence of a Persian satrap provides evidence for a Greek institution reaching outside the Greek *polis* system. Its interesting implication is that the Athenians reach out to Orontes not for military or economic assistance, though we cannot exclude such possibility, but for a shipment of grain that would help them in their time of need. Our next evidence suggests that this was not the only case.

The second inscription is *IG II<sup>2</sup>* 141, concerning Strato of Sidon (c. 365-2).<sup>753</sup> Athens and Strato agree on the exchange of *symbola*, in this case, with a provision about tokens that would identify the holder.<sup>754</sup> This exceptional provision, Rhodes and Osborne suggest, had to do with the infrequent contacts with each other, and because Sidonians were not

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<sup>752</sup> Diodoros 15.90-93 puts the rebellion under the year 362/1. Weiskopf, 1989, 19-23; 69-91; Hornblower, 1982, 170-82; Osborne, 1973, 537-551.

<sup>753</sup> Gastaldi, 2004, 105ff; *SEG* LV 136. RO 21(dated c. 378-76).

<sup>754</sup> Gastaldi, 2004, 105-123.

Hellenes.<sup>755</sup> However, according to Herodotos, the Phoenicians conducted an important transit trade in the manufactured goods of Egypt and Babylonia. Caravan trade in perfume, spices, and aromatics passed through Tyre and Sidon on its way to Greece;<sup>756</sup> and there is the case of Apollonides of Sidon who was honoured with *proxenia*, a gold crown, and the right of *enktesis* for his trade benefactions to Athens.<sup>757</sup> There is no reason to believe that relations were infrequent enough as to require such a secretive measure. Therefore, another reason is needed to explain why this secretive measure took place.

The token (*symbola*) provision says specifically: “so that the people of Athens shall know if the King of Sidon sends anything when in need of the city, and the King of Sidon shall know when the people of Athens send anyone to them”. Thus, these tokens correspond to a specific relation between Athens and Strato, and not for the sake of merchants. What could this relation be? Unfortunately, there is no specification as to the product of trade with Strato. In a similar token (*symbola*) provision of the mid-fifth century concerning the tribute payment of allied cities, Athens arranges certain *symbola* agreed between them that would serve against cases of fraud; that is, the courier would have to hand in the exact amount of tribute written on the tablet.<sup>758</sup> Thus the secretive provision with Strato and the example of tribute protection with the allies, may lead one to believe that the *symbola* agreement with Strato could have been related to a secret fund of darics, or a shipment of resources, fine flour (*semidalis*) or cedar.

The second part of this decree grants certain rights to Sidonian traders. They are exempted from the metic tax (*metoikion*), the *choregia*, and from any *eisphora* (ll. 29-34). In other words, Sidonian traders will not be treated as ordinary metics but will retain their status as Sidonians. Perhaps, Sidonian merchants were too few to warrant any real

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<sup>755</sup> RO 21.

<sup>756</sup> Herodotos 3.107; 1.1.

<sup>757</sup> IG II<sup>2</sup> 343. Gastaldi, 2004, 183-192.

<sup>758</sup> IG I<sup>3</sup> 34. 11-18.

importance, but taking into account the Phoenicians' reputation as sea-experts, traders and colonists, this can hardly be possible. Lastly, Athenian merchants staying in Sidon will be under the protection of Straton himself, as the latter is rewarded with *proxenia*, an honour also given to the Bosporan Kings.<sup>759</sup> *Proxenia*, offered to merchants in reward for their services and mobility,<sup>760</sup> could be hereditary,<sup>761</sup> and as in the case of Athens, used to serve its grain interests.<sup>762</sup>

Finally, the political role of *symbola* comes into prominence when we consider the matter of seizure at a state level. Evidence from the fifth century suggests that these interstate agreements seek to eliminate friction between communities. This friction is illustrated by Lysias, who remarks on the Boeotian act of seizure against certain Athenians because the latter could not pay up two talents: Βοιωτοὺς δὲ σύλας ποιουμένους, ὅτι οὐ δυνάμεθα δύο τάλαντα ἀποδοῦναι.<sup>763</sup> Similarly, Demosthenes in *Against Lacritos* says that the robbery of his goods by the Phaselites was “just as if rights of reprisal had been given to Phaselites against Athenians” (ὥσπερ δεδομένων συλῶν Φασηλίταις κατ’ Ἀθηναίων).<sup>764</sup> The latter comment has an interesting implication as it suggests that rights of reprisals could be sanctioned officially by a state against the citizens of another. Was a seizure sanctioned by the community, and did it coincide with its foreign policy? Bravo argued that, aside from strictly personal disputes, all known evidence suggest seizure as part of public policy.<sup>765</sup> Lintott argues that this is not entirely the case, and that “it might be better to think less in terms of rules and more in terms of practical necessity. In pursuing a quarrel with a foreigner, a man would be more ready to use seizure against one of that foreigners’ fellow-

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<sup>759</sup> Gastaldi, 2004, 105ff.

<sup>760</sup> IG II<sup>2</sup> 285.

<sup>761</sup> IG II<sup>2</sup> 49; IG II<sup>2</sup> 3 + 165; IG II<sup>2</sup> 342.

<sup>762</sup> IG II<sup>2</sup> 360; IG II<sup>2</sup> 343; IG II<sup>2</sup> 342 + *Hesperia* 40 (1971), 181 no.29.

<sup>763</sup> Lysias 30.22.

<sup>764</sup> Demosthenes 35.26.

<sup>765</sup> Bravo, 1980, 728ff.

citizen, if he believed that his own community would support him".<sup>766</sup> In either case, seizure was linked to the city's foreign policy. Cases from the Hellenistic period support the notion of seizure as a political response, a kind of Cold-War episode between communities. In Polybios, the people of Eleutherna, first retaliated to the killing of one of their citizens by Rhodian forces by proclaiming seizures against Rhodes (220/19), and then went to war with them.<sup>767</sup> Similarly, Philopoemen allowed the Achaeans to carry out seizures against Boeotians, in order to back the return of Zeuxippus to Boeotia (c. 188). This escalated into war.<sup>768</sup> Seizure then, was an informal act of violence, usually coming from individuals, which the city could support and/or orchestrate, in order to exert pressure or further its foreign policy; a mild response of self-protection by the community, not necessarily an act of undeclared war.<sup>769</sup>

It starts to emerge that *symbola* treaties were concluded for a variety of reasons, juridical, protection, and political, all connected with the way Athens sought to protect its resource trade from the depredation of states and individuals, and attract cities and traders alike to its ports. *Symbola* became complementary to the general form of a treaty of *philia* and *symmachia*,<sup>770</sup> as it gradually took a more active part in the public sphere. What is more, Orontes, Troezen, and Stymphalos were not members of the Second Athenian League. Probably, in the heyday of the Delian League *symbola* agreements encompassed all allied cities, but later on expanded to include cities that were out of the sphere of the Second Athenian League, and even satrapies willing to form a partnership – trading and political – with Athens. This supports the evolving role played by *symbola*, which must have adapted alongside political changes witnessed in the history of Athens. *Symbola*, though at first, judicial in nature, progressively obtained a more political character, perhaps an incentive to

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<sup>766</sup> Lintott, 2004, 347 and n.18 for criticism of Bravo's view.

<sup>767</sup> Polybios 4.53.2.

<sup>768</sup> Polybios 22.4.13.

<sup>769</sup> Lintott, 2004.

<sup>770</sup> Gauthier, 1972, 173ff.

political alliances, to foster good relations with cities which may have been politically remote from Athens.<sup>771</sup> Hegesippos advised the Athenians to reject the offer of *symbola* made by Philip II, as insincere and having ulterior motives.<sup>772</sup> The passage is not without difficulty, but it implies that other legal procedures were in force concerning Macedonia, which the Athenians were not happy to scrap.<sup>773</sup>

The intertwining of economical and political interests has important implications, as the presence of trade-related provisions in peace treaties indicates that economic relations between the contracting communities had a role to play in politics.<sup>774</sup> Treaties and alliances affect almost every aspect of international politics, from the flow of trade to the incidence of war. In general, this policy of international agreements, better attested in the fourth century, aimed at maintaining channels of exchange to facilitate the movement of people and goods into Athens. The protection of trade and those who exercise it was an important component of this attitude. Hagemajer has shown that the proportions of both Greek and non-Greek honorands who received commendation are nearly the same as each other, and demonstrated that the ethnicity of the grant recipient did not influence the choice of honors to be given on any particular occasion. On this basis, he concluded that the Athenian honorific system functioned uniformly across ethnic boundaries.<sup>775</sup> This conclusion supports the findings of this dissertation, that Athens' foreign relations were largely directed to facilitate the trade in important natural resources, irrespectively of which community was the exporter.

Thus, Athens first and foremost needed to sign deals with a number of suppliers, with whom it also sought to maintain good political alliances that ensured the protection and legally just treatment of its travelling merchants in order to guarantee the arrival of the

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<sup>771</sup> Woodhead *et alii*, 1957, 225.

<sup>772</sup> See page 83.

<sup>773</sup> Demosthenes 7.12.

<sup>774</sup> ML 42, the arrangements between Knossos and Tylissos that encompass both commercial and military clauses.

<sup>775</sup> Hagemajer, 2003, 199-250.

shipment to the ports of Athens. Although scholarship has tended to overemphasize the economic function and significance of these documents, I have tried to show that commercial considerations guided the structure of these agreements as much as political considerations. *Symbola* was an evolving institution. The collapse of Athenian *arche* made it difficult to conclude *symbola* treaties in the previous form, while the politico-economic consequences of the fourth century, pushed the Athenians to reassess this institution. Athens, however, did not count only on legal agreements to offer protection and safety to the individual merchant, which brings us to the second part of this chapter.

### 4.3 Security in harbour and at sea

Athens could deal with people engaged in commercial trade through the conclusion of legal agreements. But it also had available a series of measures for the safety of merchants, for the protection of their persons, vessels and cargo against reprisals, piracy or accidents, both in times of peace and war. In this sense, the real capacity of a polis to protect the safety of those who wanted to reach its ports, along with their cargo, constituted an additional incentive for *emporoi* to make sure they went to Athens; while the significance of those resources for the political survival Athens offered the polis an incentive to ensure their protection.

Of course, only some cities, like Athens or Rhodes, and then only in certain phases of their history, were able to offer this protection; which appears increasingly as the result of a strong political power, accompanied by a large fleet and a strong international prestige.<sup>776</sup> This must be an effect of the city's policy of "going out" into the world to secure the natural

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<sup>776</sup> For Hellenistic Rhodes: Gabrielsen, 1999; 1997, 48-50, 90-91, 108-111; Berthold, 1984, 58, 123, 144.



resources for its rapidly growing military and economic needs.<sup>777</sup>

A trader needed a secure port to conduct his business, to moor his ship to a dock in good and bad weather, and as a profitable market of valuable goods and silver. According to Xenophon, the Piraeus possessed all that.<sup>778</sup> He even attests to a rather popular belief among traders that “the city is the most agreeable and profitable for those engaged in trade” (ὥς γε μὴν καὶ ἐμπορεύεσθαι ἡδίστη τε καὶ κερδαλεωτάτη ἢ πόλις). About thirty years earlier, Isocrates expressed a similar sentiment: “For Athens built the Piraeus as an *emporion* in the middle of Greece, of such excellence that goods which it is difficult to obtain from other states one by one, can all be easily procured at Athens” (ἐμπόριον γὰρ ἐν μέσῳ τῆς Ἑλλάδος τὸν Πειραιᾶ κατεσκευάσατο, τοσαύτην ἔχονθ’ ὑπερβολὴν ὥσθ’ ἂ παρὰ τῶν ἄλλων ἐν παρ’ ἐκάστων χαλεπὸν ἐστὶν λαβεῖν, ταῦθ’ ἅπαντα παρ’ αὐτῆς ῥᾶδιον εἶναι πορίσασθαι).<sup>779</sup> Pseudo-Xenophon too, observed the ability of the Athenians to trade with different areas and import from abroad.<sup>780</sup> Let us see how the Athenians made this a reality.

The port of Piraeus was established with a view to fostering, encouraging, promoting, protecting, developing and establishing commercial enterprise.<sup>781</sup> This was achieved through the provision of services to traders in the form of *emporia*, a broad open display area comprising a line of *stoa*e to serve as warehouses,<sup>782</sup> together with what is called the *deigma*, where merchants exposed samples of their goods for sale.<sup>783</sup> The Piraeus had two *emporia*, one at the central square, *Hippodameia*, named after its architect, the other being the “Great Harbour”, or “*Megas Limen*”, or *Kantharos*.<sup>784</sup> The latter was an exclusive economic centre focused on overseas trade, while the former served merchants coming from inland. If we

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<sup>777</sup> Gabrielsen, 2001, 220-240.

<sup>778</sup> Xenophon *Poroi* 3.1-2.

<sup>779</sup> Isocrates *Panegyric* 42.

<sup>780</sup> [Xenophon] *Athenaion Politeia* 2.7.

<sup>781</sup> Blackman, 1987, 35-52; Garland, 1987; Panagos, 1968. A very concise discussion not only for the organization of the port, but, for Piraeus in general, see Garland, 1987.

<sup>782</sup> Scholia Aristophanes *Acharnians* 548.

<sup>783</sup> Harpocration s.v. Δεῖγμα; Aristophanes *Knights* 979; Demosthenes 23.

<sup>784</sup> Pausanias 1.1.2; Photius s.v. Ἰπποδαμεία.

consider the magnitude of classical Athens, such segregation was instrumental for the port authorities to effectively manage their affairs, i.e. checking merchants, avoiding congestion, testing out the currency, facilitating grain supply, and so on.<sup>785</sup> Isager and Hansen calculated that during the summer period a minimum of six grain ships would unload their cargo at Kantharos daily.<sup>786</sup> If one starts to add traffic from other imports and transit goods the figures become higher. Managing traffic coming into Piraeus required then an efficient system of organisation. The new city of Piraeus was the crown jewel, with dockyards, warehouses, taverns and inns, and the highest port security known to Greece all coalescing to make Athens a great commercial city, throbbing with life.

A trader also needed security at sea. Piracy, privateering, and warfare were a persistent factor in the Aegean, and a succession of states from the Minoans to the Romans attempted to suppress it. To protect precious cargo and provide effective security at sea, especially at the Hellespont, Athenian generals were assigned to provide safe convoy to merchant ships.<sup>787</sup> The importance of keeping watch over Athenian interests around the straits was stressed many times,<sup>788</sup> especially when Philip's operations in the area intended to strangle Athens (341/340).<sup>789</sup> In *Against Theocrines*, Epichares made an accusation in public against the generals exactly for not doing that: "the generals and those in command of your triremes, and not you (the *demos*), are responsible for mishaps which occur during a voyage".<sup>790</sup> The case refers to commercial voyages for two reasons. First, Epichares refers to Moerocles' decree (c. 340) to protect merchants by creating a force specifically intended to deal with pirates so "that the sea be swept clean".<sup>791</sup> Second, he contrasts the lack of

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<sup>785</sup> [Aristotle] *Athenaion Politeia* 51.1-4. Tax for all imports and exports: Aristophanes *Wasps*, 658; Demosthenes 21.133; 34.7; 35.29-30; 49.27. See also, Gabrielsen, 1995, 234, 237; Jordan, 1975.

<sup>786</sup> Isager and Hansen, 1975, 62.

<sup>787</sup> Diodoros 15.34.3; Demosthenes 50.4-6, 17-20; 18.87-8; Thucydides 2.69.1; Philochoros *FGrH* 328 F 162; Theopompos *FGrH* 115 F 292; *IG* II<sup>2</sup> 408. 8-10; *IG* II<sup>2</sup> 1628. 37-42.

<sup>788</sup> Demosthenes 50.36, 38.

<sup>789</sup> In Demosthenes 8 and 9.

<sup>790</sup> Demosthenes 58.55.

<sup>791</sup> Demosthenes 58.53-54. De Souza, 1999, 39, n.61. Moerocles followed an anti-Macedonian policy, see Arrian

responsibility abroad with the responsibility of the *demos* in Piraeus to keep greater surveillance over merchants and those men who violate the laws. In fact, soon after, there was an addition to the decree that included the allies in the battle against piracy, and as we shall see further below, penalties and complaints were issued against those who transgressed this policy;<sup>792</sup> all now joined forces for the protection of merchants. Piracy and privateering remained widespread.

Athens' network of resources in the fifth and fourth centuries expanded from the Black Sea to Sicily to Cyprus. In order to safeguard such a vast area of interest, the Athenians had no choice but to create a system of naval ports scattered all around the east Mediterranean, partly to offer protection to traders who travelled along the trade routes that eventually led into Athens. Of all the epigraphic evidence related to Athens, the decree concerning the Adriatic *apoikia* offers a fine example of how state consideration for the protection of natural resources functioned. This is IG II<sup>2</sup> 1629, the account of the curators of the dockyards for the year 325/4. A decree appears halfway down the inscription, which records an Athenian decision to establish a colony on the Adriatic coast. The decree has a clear statement of purpose:

in order that the people may for all future time have their own commerce and transport in grain, and that the establishment of their own naval station may result in a guard against the Tyrrhenians...and those who sail the sea and themselves sailing into the Athenians' naval station will have their ships and all else secure.<sup>793</sup>

This decree emphasizes in the most official language the state's concern for commerce and grain transport and, through the provision of the naval station, the intent to protect traders and cargo against piracy that would otherwise prevent resources from coming into Athens.

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*Anabasis* 1.10.

<sup>792</sup> Demosthenes 58.53, 56; 12.2.

<sup>793</sup> RO 100; IG II<sup>2</sup> 1629, ll.217-234. Reed, 2003, 48.

It should follow that one of Athens' concerns was the provision of friendly *emporía* across the whole of the Aegean, ready to serve as ports of trade, and stepping-stones for merchants coming to Athens.<sup>794</sup> Merchants probably stayed at friendly ports in a similar way as Lykourgos refers to late classical Rhodes as a place of residence for merchants who traverse the Greek world,<sup>795</sup> or as Phoenician merchants reside in Athens for the purposes of trade (360s).<sup>796</sup>

Driven by a desire to secure valuable natural resources, Athens, even after the defeat of the Social War, issued decrees which committed the allies to protect merchants from piracy and punished non-compliant states with imposition of fines. Epichares refers to an Athenian decree that fined the island of Melos 10 talents for harbouring pirates.<sup>797</sup> Philip II complained of the Athenians' reticence in imposing their own laws on piracy and privateering, "when the Thasians opened their harbour to the Byzantine war-ships and to any pirates that chose to touch there, you ignored the incident, in spite of the clauses expressly denouncing such acts as hostile".<sup>798</sup> From the decree honouring Herakleides of Salamis for his grain benefactions to the Athenian state, we learn that Athens is to send an envoy to Dionysios, tyrant of Heraklea, to protest on behalf of Herakleides against the theft of his sails by the people of Heraklea, and to arrange for the future protection of any man sailing to Athens.<sup>799</sup> That the concluding formula appeals to the tyrant's sense of justice, and does not follow the coercive policies of the past, provides an important implication; that, with or without its military resources, Athens still looks out for its important merchants in an official capacity.

This very interesting inscription deserves more discussion. Herakleides' incident at

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<sup>794</sup> For *emporía* see Pébarthe, 1999; Hansen, 1997; Bresson, 1993; Stanley, 1976. Greek *emporía* are recorded as far afield as Pistiros, in inland Thrace, Tsetskhladze, 2000; Velkov, 1996, 205-215 with translation and comments.

<sup>795</sup> Lykourgos *Leokrates* 15-16.

<sup>796</sup> IG II<sup>2</sup> 141.

<sup>797</sup> Demosthenes 58.56.

<sup>798</sup> Demosthenes 12.2.

<sup>799</sup> IG II<sup>2</sup> 360; RO 95. 36-44.

Heraklea reveals again the magnitude of the problem of seizure in international trade that Athens had to contend with. The men who seized Herakleides' ship are not mentioned by name, but the Athenians dispatch an embassy to Dionysios, and thus the act is viewed as originating from Dionysios' policy of seizing ships bound to Athens; although in this case, the men of Heraklea only took Herakleides' sails, not his precious cargo, an act which could highly offend the Athenians. The implication is that this may reflect grievances between Herakleides and some merchants of Heraklea, and seizure was a way to settle commercial disputes. That the Athenians responded with a dispatch of an embassy implies that the act of seizure had fulfilled its purpose. One remembers here the act of the Byzantines, Chalcedonians, and Cyzicenes in 362 and 361, forcing Athenian ships to put into their ports,<sup>800</sup> and the immediate Athenian response to send naval squadrons to regain naval security in the Hellespont. It has been hypothesised that this hostile action points to the separation of Byzantium from Athens.<sup>801</sup> But no source records a war between the two in 362/1 or a defection in the late 360s.

Finally, the decree honouring Herakleides brings to the fore a very interesting implication with regards to the way Athens conducted its foreign policy in order to safeguard the journey of natural resources. As we have seen, a *symbola* agreement was an international attempt to promote more secure commercial relationships between Athens and the signatory party. It involved the protection of foreign traders coming to Athens and those Athenian or metic traders that reached non-Athenian ports. Under this obligation, Athens could officially intervene on behalf of a trader who had been wrongly treated while present in another state bound by *symbola* treaty. Herakleides of Salamis, however, was not directly involved in any *symbola* treaty between Athens and Heraklea. He was not even an Athenian citizen. This is what really makes the inscription unique; the Athenians take an

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<sup>800</sup> Demosthenes 50.4-12, 14-17.

<sup>801</sup> Sealey, 1993, 91; Cargill, 1981, 169.

official step, and send an embassy to Heraklea to remonstrate with Dionysios for the theft of Herakleides' sails (!), essentially interfering with a *third* state on behalf of a trader who is not their own nor bound by a *symbola* treaty.

Athens sought to protect the commerce of its natural resources from a number of dangers: a) the seizure of her merchants abroad, b) piracy, and c) the commandeering of shipments by other states, for their cargo was instrumental to the survival of the polis as a political unit. The decree of Herakleides suggests that Athens could deploy measures and incentives at home for the protection of merchants, their vessel and cargo against reprisals, piracy or accidents, both in times of peace and war. This one-sided decree was not alone in the overall Athenian policy to protect natural resources and its trade from interstate, local, and environmental threat. *Emporoi*, however, were also aware that because of this anxiety, Athens could use power and diplomacy to guarantee the supply of necessities. Such power was exemplified in Keos in c. 360, in which Athens controlled the activities of the traders themselves. In a series of clauses, Athens designated how many ships were to transport the *mitos*, the punishment by confiscation of the goods of any trader found trading *mitos* with any city other than Athens, and even the shipping-charge paid to ship owners by the producers.<sup>802</sup> Official Athenian arrangements with the Kean cities embody both political and commercial provisions (as with the Spartokid dynasty), and is a testament of a long-term phenomenon.<sup>803</sup>

What follows will be a description of the internal legislation of Athens, as opposed to international treaties and military action. For this reason, I will bring to the fore some more evidence of Athenian legislation that looked to decrees, incentives and measures, and then I will proceed to discuss Xenophon's proposed measures.

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<sup>802</sup> RO 40. 30-31, 28, 14.

<sup>803</sup> See also Sallares 1991, 299; De ste. Croix 1972, 49.

## 4.4 Athenian Legislation

### 4.4.1 Decrees favourable to merchants

Some one-sided privileges were concerned with state-to-state relations and form good examples of Athens' overall policy of ensuring that the necessary cargo reached its harbours. At the beginning of the Peloponnesian War (428), Athens, still powerful in the Aegean, guaranteed to the citizens of Aphytis in Chalkidike free navigation, unhindered by obstacles, probably an allusion to regional enemies, "otherwise a fine of a thousand drachmas will be imposed".<sup>804</sup> Equally important is the decree concerning the city of Methone in 426/5.<sup>805</sup> An embassy was sent to King Perdiccas II with the order to damage neither Methone nor its trade activities at sea or on land. The garrison stationed at Potidaea would make sure of this (Il. 20-29). It should always be bared in mind that most decrees favourable to merchants, are part of a decree that deals with formal interstate relationship or the choice of individual honour, which were sometimes attached to alliances but more often granted in separate decrees, were shown to have been influenced by international events.

With regards to one-sided privileges conferred on merchants, in the years 425-410, the Achaean Lykos, honoured as *proxenos* and *euergetēs*, was granted the right to breach the blockade imposed on much of the Peloponnese at that time, by sailing his ship from the ports of Achaia. In addition to this, he was given the right to navigate and import goods all over the territory controlled by Athens and the Athenian *phrouria*: τὴν δὲ ναῦν ἣν δέται ἐκκομίσασθαι ἐξ Ἀχαιΐας ἐκκομίσασθω καὶ ἐξέναι αὐτῷ πλεῖν καὶ χρήματα ἐσάγειν

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<sup>804</sup> IG I<sup>3</sup> 63.

<sup>805</sup> IG I<sup>3</sup> 61; ML 65.

ὅσης Ἀθηναῖοι κρατοῦσι, καὶ ἐς τὰ Ἀθην[α]ίων φρόνεια.<sup>806</sup> Similar privileges were granted in 411 or 404 to Pythophanes of Carystos, already a *proxenos* and *euergetēs* of Athens: the safety of his ship and its goods in all cities of the empire. Added to that, the generals and the *boule* were made responsible for the effective implementation of the privileges decreed (Il. 23-26). Meiggs and Lewis suggest that this is an oligarchic decree from 411.<sup>807</sup> There is no explicit evidence in the Pythophanes decree that his activities related to vital natural resources. But the high level of consideration on behalf of the city, no matter what the constitution, for the protection of Pythophanes and his goods suggests that his cargo was of importance to Athens. It is of note that the status of *proxenos* and benefactor was combined with *asylia*, an honour that was dealt with above.

Furthermore, the aforementioned Herakleides was honoured with the right of *enktesis*, the right to acquire land and a house.<sup>808</sup> If *asylia* was one step on the ladder of international agreements, and proxyeny and benefaction was another, the Athenians with *enktesis* raised the bar of benefactions even higher. This was because the right of landownership was an exclusive privilege of an Athenian citizen. There are only four surviving grants for trade-related services, and all come from the late 330s.<sup>809</sup> Both Engen and Pečirkà find that Athens granted *enktesis* for a variety of trade-related services and did not discriminate between Greeks and non-Greeks who performed them.<sup>810</sup> Similarly, in 333/2 we find an official and favourable Athenian response proposed in the assembly by the financial administrator Lykourgos to a request by Kitian *emporoi* to acquire land for a temple.<sup>811</sup> Grants of *enktesis* for the purpose of building a sanctuary are rare; we have record of the Thracians for a temple to Bendis (IG II<sup>2</sup> 1283), and the above inscription which records

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<sup>806</sup> IG I<sup>3</sup> 174. 11-17; Reed, 2003, 48.

<sup>807</sup> ML 80. 15-23.

<sup>808</sup> Whitehead, 1977, 70-71.

<sup>809</sup> To Chairephilos and sons: Athenaios 3.119f-120a; Dinarchos 1.43. To unknown honorands: IG II<sup>2</sup> 409. To Herakleides of Salamis: IG II<sup>2</sup> 360. There is also Paerisades I and his sons: IG II<sup>2</sup> 653; Demosthenes 34.36 and Dinarchos 1.43 (c.327).

<sup>810</sup> Engen, 2010, 192; Pečirkà, 1966, 23,27-31,34,42,52f.

<sup>811</sup> RO 91. 40-45.



two grants; those to the Kitians (for Aphrodite) and to the Egyptians (for Isis). The reason was that the Kitians wanted to make sure of the legality of their action, hence, they inscribed a precedent: “just as the Egyptians have founded the sanctuary of Isis”. This straightforward text tells of Athenian extended efforts to attract even more traders by offering generous rights to metics, normally limited to citizens, to acquire land and own a house, this time a temple. The proposer of the grant of *enktesis* to the Kitians was Lykourgos, who exerted influence over Athens’ internal affairs in the period 336-324 due to his control of the city’s finances, as treasurer of the general revenues.<sup>812</sup> Plutarch praises Lykourgos for multiplying more than twentyfold the revenues of the state.<sup>813</sup> Lykourgos accomplishments in the areas of law, finance, politics, military preparedness, public works, and religion, as they were viewed by his contemporaries and later generations, attest to his intended measures to put Athens’ financial machinery in order.<sup>814</sup> Not unsoundly, as from 340 onwards Philip’s successes causes much headache in Athens, which needed to find new ways to keep up with its trade in natural resources and the coming political dangers. One may attribute such a specific attitude to the grain crisis of the 320s.<sup>815</sup> In sum, the decision to offer land to the Kitians displays a consistent, favourable, attitude to foreigners, another example of the continuity of the policy started under Eubulos, and advocated by Xenophon’s *Poroi*, being carried out in the so-called Lykourgan period.

Xenophon’s desire to increase the number of traders in the Piraeus pushed him to assess other problems that circumvented trade at the time, and to suggest ways for augmenting public gain. One solution was to offer rewards to the magistrates of the *emporion* to speed up the process of disputes between merchants.<sup>816</sup> These were the *dikai*

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<sup>812</sup> See Mitchel, 1970.

<sup>813</sup> 10 Oration 842F.

<sup>814</sup> Pausanias 1.29.16 summarises a decree that describes Lykourgos’ activities; IG II<sup>2</sup> 457 and 513. For the latter, see Osborne, 1981, 1772-174.

<sup>815</sup> For a concise description of the crisis see RO 95.

<sup>816</sup> Xenophon *Poroi* 3.3.

*emporikai*, which had a fame of being arduously long.<sup>817</sup> Sometime after 355, we learn that the Athenians also desired to speed up the process of *dikai emporikai*, and turned them into *δίκαι ἔμμηνοι* (monthly cases).<sup>818</sup> Another piece of advice had to do with honorific decrees and privileges that, as we saw, were given as incentives to merchants to bring grain to Athens and to kings to allow export to Athens. Xenophon raises the honours a step higher in order to increase revenues from trade even more. He suggests to “honour (τιμᾶσθαι) merchants and ship owners with seats in the theatre (προεδρίας), and to occasionally invite them to public hospitality (ἐπὶ ξενία), whenever they benefit the city by the high quality of their ships and merchandise (οἱ ἂν δοκῶσιν ἀξιολόγοις καὶ πλοίοις καὶ ἐμπορεύμασιν ὠφελεῖν τὴν πόλιν). With the prospect of these honours, they would be eager to make us friends not only for the sake of profit but also for honour”.<sup>819</sup>

Vidal-Naquet and Austin remark on these proposals as “deeply subversive”.<sup>820</sup> They rightly remark that these honours were exceptional, as normally seats in the theatre and public hospitality were reserved for magistrates and for the highest priests. In 330, we find Herakleides of Salamis granted a series of honours, but not hospitality in the prytaneum. Engen, who has recently studied the honours and privileges bestowed to individual traders for their services between 415-307, supports the above interpretation.<sup>821</sup> He comments: “In providing many of the same honours and privileges for those who had performed trade-related services as for those who had performed political and military ones, Athens was elevating trade, certain forms of which had been traditionally socially and morally unesteemed, to a level formerly occupied only by political and military matters. Moreover, the foreigners who performed trade-related services now had access to the τιμή formerly reserved for citizens or foreign benefactors who had performed political or military

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<sup>817</sup> See Cohen, 1973, 10-12. Lysias 17.8 remarks of a case that was going on for three years.

<sup>818</sup> AV, 367; Whitehead, 1977, 128; Cohen, 1973, 22.

<sup>819</sup> Xenophon *Poroi* 3.4.

<sup>820</sup> AV, 367.

<sup>821</sup> For a list and subsequent discussion, see Engen, 2010, 230-276.

services.” Xenophon stressed that the honours should be related to the high quality of ships and merchandise, and in fact, many of these decrees deal with gifts of grain and timber. Yet we should note that we do not have evidence of grants of *προεδρία* for trade-related services. There exists one grant to a Sicilian trader (331-324) for importing grain to Athens, honouring him with *θέα*, but the latter is only a place in the theatre during the Dionysia, not a permanent front row seat.<sup>822</sup> It may not have been as prestigious as the *προεδρία*, but it was still an exclusive honour held for Athenian citizens, as a seat was subsidised by the state.<sup>823</sup> Athens’ willingness to bend the rules of division between citizens and foreigners provides some interesting information on how Athens went out of its way in order to regulate imports to its benefit.

Finally, another way to direct movement of goods towards Athens was to offer protection through *xenia*, “ritualised friendship”, which created hereditary obligations.<sup>824</sup> More officially, this was done through the institution of *proxenia* where one citizen was a collective *xenos* and had the responsibility to look after all the citizens of a foreign polis coming to his own.<sup>825</sup> Andokides, *On the Mysteries*, boasted of his *xenia* relationship with the Macedonian royal family that resulted in his securing unlimited timber rights from Archelaos for the making of oars which he sold at cost price to the Athenian fleet at Samos (411).<sup>826</sup> In the classical age, we find many examples of *xenia* relationships forged between the Athenians and non-Athenian traders and kings.<sup>827</sup> Higher in the agenda was the *xenia* relationship with the Spartokid kings, which incorporated both trade in commodities and in gifts: the Spartokids received the gifts of tax-exemption in Athens, gold crowns, statues, and honorary citizenship, whereas the Athenians were bestowed with the gifts of grain, priority

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<sup>822</sup> Camp, 1974, no.3, 9-12, 24-29.

<sup>823</sup> Jansen, 2007, 326.

<sup>824</sup> Mitchell, 1997, 40; Gauthier, 1972, 17-18.

<sup>825</sup> For Athenian *proxenies* of the fourth century see Gastaldi, 2004; Marek, 1984.

<sup>826</sup> Andokides 2.11.

<sup>827</sup> IG I<sup>3</sup> 117. 23; IG II<sup>2</sup> 360b, 363.

in loading grain, and tax-exemption.<sup>828</sup> All these were well received, and their relationship continued throughout the classical era into the Hellenistic times. However, the problem concerns the relationship between the Athenians and non-Athenian merchants, as the latter were obliged to no-one but themselves. Xenophon makes this clear: “Whenever merchants need money, they do not unload their cargos of grain anywhere they happen to be, but wherever they hear that the price of grain is the highest and the people value it the most, to these places they deliver their shipments”.<sup>829</sup> Demosthenes’ case *Against Dionysodoros* also reaccounts the story of the self-titled merchant who decided to sell his shipment of grain at Rhodes for a better profit, even though his contract obliged him to return to Athens with the grain.<sup>830</sup> Despite measures and incentives brought forward by the Athenians, a merchant could disregard his legal agreement with the lender and dispose his cargo in states where prices were more advantageous.<sup>831</sup>

Xenophon was aware of this discrepancy. To answer such a problem, he argues, or rather hopes, that honour will remedy this: “they would be eager to make us friends not only for the sake of profit but also for honour”. He hoped to bring those who conduct short-term non-morally held trade transactions into the orbit of traditional long-term *xenia* relationships.<sup>832</sup> Jansen finds support in the words of Aristotle, who like Xenophon, recommends that friendship of those who perform services should be based on equality and proportion otherwise it will dissolve easily.<sup>833</sup> No matter how difficult or utopian this proposal sounds, it nevertheless, highlights how far Athenian thought went in order to engender relations between Athenians and traders that would ultimately ease financial transactions, and bring the necessary resources to Athens. Some, like Herakleides, played

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<sup>828</sup> Demosthenes 20.33; Dinarchus 1.43. RO 60. 20-3; See Rosivach, 2000, 40-43 for the Athenian *xenia* relationship with the Spartokid Kings.

<sup>829</sup> Xenophon *Oeconomicus* 20.28.

<sup>830</sup> Demosthenes 56.3, 8-10.

<sup>831</sup> Herman 1987, 80 remarks in a very simplistic view of the sociability in trading relationships; cf. Bloch and Parry, 1989 on the difference between the long-term and short-term transactional orders.

<sup>832</sup> Jansen, 2007, 327.

<sup>833</sup> Ibid.

along with this new scheme. In fact, Herakleides was willing to reduce his profit margin – his grain gift of 3,000 *medimnoi*, twice amidst international grain crisis, which implies that he forewent a significant sum of money which could have been earned – in order to remain a friend with the Athenians.<sup>834</sup> Both, however, still profited from the relationship.

#### 4.4.2 Laws favourable to the Athenians

The Athenian need for imports was expressed in a series of laws on the grain trade. Athens used its position as a great importer of grain in the Greek world to influence the mechanisms of trade and networks to its advantage in order to make merchants bound to transport grain to Athens, and only to Athens. This set of laws, which came into prominence in the fourth century, has been the subject of much debate. Here we summarise the laws and the discussion relating to them.<sup>835</sup>

First, it is forbidden to export any crop except olives.<sup>836</sup> Plutarch's reference to this law is obscure and cannot be taken as indication of a permanent deficiency, "but rather the coexistence of surplus and want in Athens".<sup>837</sup> The general trend in scholarship is that this law is grain-related.<sup>838</sup>

Second, it is a capital offence for persons residing in Athens to ship grain to harbours other than the Piraeus.<sup>839</sup> The meaning is quite clear; Athens targets *emporoi*, Athenians and metics alike, and closely monitors their activities.

Third, any grain-ship touching in at the harbour of the Piraeus is required to unload at least 2/3 of its cargo and take it to the *asty*.<sup>840</sup> This law has provoked much discussion in recent scholarship regarding the other 1/3. Garland interprets the law as regulating the re-

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<sup>834</sup> IG II<sup>2</sup> 360, ll. 9-11, 55.

<sup>835</sup> Isager and Hansen, 1975, 28-29.

<sup>836</sup> Plutarch *Solon* 24.

<sup>837</sup> Garnsey, 1985, 62 n.1.

<sup>838</sup> Gagarin, 2006, 267; Stanley, 1999, 230; Garnsey, 1988, 107; Isager and Hansen, 1975. Bissa, 2009, 178-179 argues for an oil law.

<sup>839</sup> Demosthenes 34.37; 35.50; Lykourgos *Leokrates* 1.27 the penalty for infringement was death.

<sup>840</sup> [Aristotle] *Athenaion Politeia* 51.4. Isager and Hansen, 1975.

export of grain from Athens.<sup>841</sup> Gauthier, followed by Bresson, offers an alternative theory. No re-export is envisaged (seen as anachronistic), while the remaining one-third was sold in the Piraeus, as opposed to the two-thirds bound to be sold in Athens.<sup>842</sup> Bissa argues that the law is only regulating domestic trade, and thus nothing forbids traders from re-exporting their product.<sup>843</sup> In light of the immense effort that Athens invested in accessing foreign grain is puzzling to think of the Athenians allowing its re-exportation. However, it is possible that Bissa is right in her hypothesis. That could be achieved if the *sitophylakes* having satisfied domestic need and did not require further grain to the Athenian market for regulating purposes; therefore, merchants would be able to re-export grain at the Piraeus.

Fourth, it is forbidden for persons resident in Athens to extend a maritime loan unless the ship under contract conveys grain to the Piraeus.<sup>844</sup> The power of this law lies in the inability of traders to sail without resorting to borrowing. Demosthenes says clearly that no ship can be put to sea without loans. Morley considers the maritime-loan law to be for voyages bringing grain to Athens.<sup>845</sup> Garnsey and Whitby regard the law to apply to imports in general, with grain imports being the main target.<sup>846</sup> Bissa has put forward the theory that the law cited by Demosthenes is the creation of a Hellenistic scholar and that the maritime-loan law existed as a general finance law that covered both imports and exports, and relates to the *dikai emporikai*.<sup>847</sup> Considering that loans were the financial backbone of maritime trade strongly suggests that Athens was in a position to exploit maritime trade, and did much to intervene in order to regulate sufficient control of imports to Piraeus.

Finally, the Grain Tax Law, as it is now known, regulated the tax in kind on wheat

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<sup>841</sup> Garland, 1987, 89.

<sup>842</sup> Gauthier, 1981; Bresson, 2000, 189.

<sup>843</sup> Bissa, 2009, 183; Oliver, 2007, 25-27; Garnsey, 1988, 140.

<sup>844</sup> Demosthenes 35.51; 56.6, 11. Jameson, 1983, 11; Isager and Hansen, 1975. See also Cohen, 1992, 140-1 about the importance of financial activities.

<sup>845</sup> Morley, 2007, 71.

<sup>846</sup> Whitby, 1998, 121; Garnsey, 1988, 139-140.

<sup>847</sup> Bissa, 2009, 184-187.

and barley from the Athenian cleruchies of Lemnos, Imbros, and Skyros, its collection, and transportation to the city of Athens.<sup>848</sup> The Athenian state takes provision for the public auction of the right to collect the tax - in grain - produced on the cleruchic islands of Lemnos, Imbros, and Skyros. Procedures follow on how these tax-farmers are to take care for the transport of the “people’s grain” to Piraeus and to the city of Athens. There is an elected board of Athenian magistrates responsible for this grain and supervise its sale to the citizens of Athens at a time and at a price to be determined by the Athenian assembly. A place of storage exists in the sanctuary of the hero Aiakos in the Agora, closed with a roof and a door until it is sold.

The Grain Tax Law of 374/3 by Agyrrhios and the Athenians, examined by Stroud and published in an *editio princeps* in 1998, has since then raised many new questions for the scholarly community regarding its interpretation.<sup>849</sup> This is because we know very little about Athenian agriculture, finances, food supply, the economy and its profits. The text of the Grain Tax Law is almost complete, and provides many new details on the way the Athenians collected grain: for example, the term *meris*, which may be a term designated for measuring unit of wheat and barley; the legislation governing the farming of taxes, the *dodekate*; and overall, the way in which the law regulates in minute detail the transportation, storage and sale of grain.<sup>850</sup> The new details are simply explained by the uniqueness of the law, as previously the tax was assessed and collected in cash, and not in grain.<sup>851</sup>

The way these provisions are cast shares similarities with the *mitos* arrangements at Keos in c. 360. Both are concerned with the problem of transportation and protection of natural resources from Lemnos, Imbros, Skyros, and Keos to Athens, and therefore, take steps to protect some aspects of this journey. However, there is a fundamental difference

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<sup>848</sup> Stroud, 1998.

<sup>849</sup> Stroud, 2010, discusses some of the most stimulating bibliographic responses to the publication of the “Grain Tax Law” inscription. Harris, 1999, 269-72.

<sup>850</sup> Stroud, 2010, 15-20.

<sup>851</sup> Ibid.

between the two. The Grain Tax Law regulates trade with three Athenian cleruchies - Lemnos, Imbros, and Scyros - while the *miltos* arrangement is with an ally. Hence, the strictness of the decree at Keos, where legal procedures are put in place to safeguard this trade, is not found at Imbros, Lemnos, and Scyros, i.e. line 16 refers to policemen (ἀστυνόμους), and court trial (δικαστήριον). The Grain Tax Law, however, shows no such concern, as the cleruchic islands were under Athenian supervision, and probably did not need a resort to strict inner control. Both sets of provisions, however, touch upon the main procedure of transportation and protection, placing due care on the way the state intervened to make sure resources reached Athens safely by regulating prices, assigning ships, and individuals for the collection of *miltos* and grain respectively.

It is then possible that the Kean inscription can provide a useful juxtaposition. For example, it can offer insight into the debate about whether one or more *priamenoι* emerged from the auction with state authorization to collect and/or transport the grain from the cleruchic islands to Athens. The problem, in its simple form, arises because the Grain Tax Law inscription, refers to one *priamēnos* five times (ll. 11, 18, 23, 27, 30), but twice in the plural (ll. 21, 47). Moreno sees only one *priamēnos* in charge of the collection of grain from the cleruchic islands,<sup>852</sup> but Stroud is sceptical, and retains, along with Hansen, the belief that more than one *priamēnos* emerged from the auction.<sup>853</sup> The case of Keos suggests strongly that Stroud's interpretation is correct, since the specifications for the collection of *miltos* make plans for three ships, one from each supply city (Iulis, Karthaea, Koresia). In other words, if the Athenians took the care to secure the import of *miltos* with multiple traders for multiple cities, it is unlikely that they would rely solely on one buyer to regulate the collection and/or transportation of this significant amount of grain from Lemnos, Imbros, and Scyros, amidst international dangers. This measure had many merits. It

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<sup>852</sup> Moreno, 2007a, 107 and n.146.

<sup>853</sup> Stroud, 2010, 19, 23.



avoided monopolies, raised the betting competition among traders, and most importantly, it minimised risk. That is, if one shipment fell victim to piracy or bad weather, the rest would still make it safe; therefore, it aimed to ensure that a large part of imports reached Athens successfully.

Leaving the problems of its precise mechanisms aside, the aim of the law is clear. Athens makes sure that the grain produced in Lemnos, Imbros, and Skyros comes to Athens. The importance of this law lies in the realisation of Athens that part of Athenian territory could provide significant amounts of grain, and thus necessitated the intervention of the Athenian government to regulate its export.

To sum up, Athens provided incentives to traders to maintain and ensure to the best of its ability, the flow of resources that came into Attica. Fourth-century Athens did not have the imperial power to draw resources and revenue unhindered. It had to become an attractive destination for traders, and new incentives helped to stimulate market exchange and foster redistribution, some of which are similar to Xenophon's recommendations.<sup>854</sup> In fact, fourth century forensic speeches speak of a vibrant trade in Athens and of increased revenue to 400 talents in 347/6.<sup>855</sup> However, the prominence of such measures highlights the uncertainty which the Athenians faced in the fourth century, as to their ability to provide their city with all necessary supplies.<sup>856</sup> To that end, Athens directly intervened, when necessary, in the essential commerce of the city, and did much to regain sufficient control of imports into Piraeus. This must be in direct relation with its international standing, as military defeats reflected negatively on Athens, and slowly, but progressively, we witness the rise of Rhodes and other players on the international scene of warfare and trade. We now turn our attention to Athens and its unique infrastructure, each in its own way

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<sup>854</sup> See Meyer, 2010, 49 n. 136 where she gathers Xenophon's proposals and Athenian improvements. Also, Purcell, 2005.

<sup>855</sup> Demosthenes 10.37-8.

<sup>856</sup> Tuplin, 1993.

provided merchants and Athenians alike the security they needed to conduct commercial activities, which brought valuable resources into Attica.

## 4.5 Security in Athens

### 4.5.1 Defensive infrastructure

Up to the early classical period, the Athenian defensive capabilities depended upon deployment of its hoplite forces and cavalry, and what fleet it possessed. Another way was to abandon the *chora* and take refuge on the Acropolis. Both strategies worked, but the new threat of Persia along with catastrophic damages made to the city in 480/79 was enough to cause a change. Themistocles was perhaps the first man to acknowledge Athens' weakness in defending its land. There was also the matter of how their new instrument of policy, pride, and glory, the 200 or so strong Athenian ship fleet, was to be protected. To that end, Themistocles persuaded the Athenians to embark onto a policy of making a viable defensive infrastructure, moments after the Persian Wars, which would increase the dominant position of their city; a building programme that continued throughout the Pentekontaetia, and emerged again in the fourth century.<sup>857</sup> Plato would later condemn Themistocles, Kimon, and Pericles for erecting harbours, dockyards, walls and other defences in Athens, his judgement clouded by the Athenians' reversal of fortune.<sup>858</sup> However, the Athenian fortifications were an important element in Athenian strategy and policy, securely joining landlocked Athens to the three harbours; their walls' importance highlighted by Spartan protests.<sup>859</sup>

Before that, Phaleron was the principal port, and according to Pausanias, "before Themistocles, Piraeus was not a haven, but Phaleron, because it had the least distance from

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<sup>857</sup> For a detailed reconstruction of the course and various fortification walls of Athens, see Theodoraki, 2011; Conwell, 2008 has documented four major building phases, and examines the structure and history of the Long Wall.

<sup>858</sup> Plato *Gorgias* 519a.

<sup>859</sup> Diodoros 11.39.4, 40. Thucydides 1.90-91, 107.4, 6 reports that prior to the battle of Tanagra, some Athenians wanted the Spartans to put an end to the democracy and the wall building.

the city.”<sup>860</sup> On the eve of the Persian Wars, Themistocles put forward his plan to fortify Piraeus, and later convinced the Athenians to take advantage of its natural harbours and turn it into a naval base, abandoning the sandy beaches of Phaleron. The fortification plan resumed after the battle of Plataea, and along with it the building of the city-walls, and the fortification of Piraeus.<sup>861</sup>

The importance of Piraeus’ port is directly related to the development of the Athenian state. It paid host to the Athenian triremes, the principal instrument of Athenian hegemony. Like every military harbour, Kantharos, Zea and Mounychia were protected by fortification walls and moles cleverly designed to narrow the entrance and for an iron chain to be suspended across the harbour entrance, blocking hostile ships.<sup>862</sup> The three ports sheltered the Athenian navy.<sup>863</sup> Thus, to fortify this war factory, an iron curtain, some thirteen kilometres in length, enclosed the whole of the Piraeus.

In 462-458, the Athenians built the Phaleric and the “Piraic” Wall (Ia phase) which joined the city-walls to the sea-port at Piraeus and at Phaleron,<sup>864</sup> turning Athens into a grand military and commercial harbour. In the 440s, Pericles placed the final seal on this masterpiece in adding a third wall (Ib phase), the Middle Wall, joining Athens with Piraeus.<sup>865</sup> These were the Athenian Long Walls (μακρά τείχη). Phase II, the rebuilding of the Walls, began in the mid-390s, when the Athenians decided to enter the Corinthian War. With Konon’s contribution in men and money, the project reached its final stages by the end of the 390s.<sup>866</sup> In the years following the battle of Chaeronea (338), the Long Walls entered a

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<sup>860</sup> Pausanias 1.1; Herodotos 5.63, 88; 6.116; 8.65, 91, 108; 9.32.

<sup>861</sup> Piraeus wall: Thucydides 1.93.3-6; Diodoros 11.41.2, 43.1-2. Fortification of Athens: Thucydides 1.89.3; Plutarch *Themistocles* 19.1-3; Diodoros 11.39.1.

<sup>862</sup> Garland, 1987, 163-169.

<sup>863</sup> Demosthenes 22.76, 23. 207; *IG II<sup>2</sup>* 1627-1631.

<sup>864</sup> Thucydides 1.107.1. Conwell, 2008, 37-64. Ellis, 1994, 13 Thucydides seems uninterested in the duration of the project.

<sup>865</sup> Conwell, 2008, 65-78. Garland, 1987, 163-169.

<sup>866</sup> Conwell, 2008, 109-131.

third phase of construction (337-334).<sup>867</sup> Finally, from 307-304 the Athenians carried a fourth fortification programme.<sup>868</sup> Let us now see the significance of this defensive infrastructure and its strategic context.

In the 480s, city and port were fortified. Yet the Long Walls were not built until c. 460. That is, for around 20 years, while the Athenians were pursuing naval dominance in the Aegean, the *asty* remained separated - 6 to 7 Km - from the port. Despite Athenian commitment to Piraeus, the decision to keep the *asty* as the religious and political centre had a major repercussion, in that should an enemy interpose itself between the *asty* and its ports, the Athenians would be cut off from their all-important ships. Hence, the Long Walls' purpose was primarily to ensure that the people in Athens and Piraeus were not shut in or out, enabling the city to run, unhindered by foreign invasion.<sup>869</sup> For the Athenians, the radical building of the Long Walls signifies a deliberate step to protect the city and connect its vital cords; a military strategy centred on naval strength. Perhaps, it was not apparent in the 470s, but, by the late 460s, Piraeus had become central to the running of Athenian economy, administration, and military affairs, due to a stream of Athenian military success abroad. The port had an urban population on its own, a city within a city. It is not then strange to find two theatres on the slope of Mounychia,<sup>870</sup> a *bouleuterion*, and a *strategion*.<sup>871</sup>

In the late 460s, its purpose was to secure the connection between city and port and so prevent entrapment. Most scholars suggest that this was a reaction to the First Peloponnesian War (460-446), while others see the event of the dismissal of Athenian troops from Mt. Ithome (462) and the Spartan pledge to help the Thasians' revolt (465-463) by invading Attica.<sup>872</sup> In either case, the Long Walls was a step to safeguard land, city and port

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<sup>867</sup> Conwell, 2008, 133-159.

<sup>868</sup> Conwell, 2008, 161-197.

<sup>869</sup> Conwell, 2008, 83.

<sup>870</sup> Thucydides 8.93.1.

<sup>871</sup> *IG* II<sup>2</sup> 1035. 43-44. Bieber, 1961, 232; Dinsmoor, 1928, 241-242.

<sup>872</sup> Conwell, 2008, 51-52 and notes.

against formidable land enemies, Spartans and Thebans. Its maritime orientation was already planted. This maritime orientation of defence walls intended to connect inland cities with the sea is also attested in other cities; in most cases, the Athenians had a hand in it.<sup>873</sup> The Athenians were not the only ones to realise the possibilities the navy-wall strategy had to offer. When faced with a Lydian siege in the Archaic period, the Milesians endorsed in similar fashion, a city-based strategy, because they could draw on additional food supplies from the Black Sea, as they held sway over the waters of the eastern Aegean.<sup>874</sup>

As Vlassopoulos remarks, “Athens and Rome are two characteristic examples of communities with inland centres and no important ports, which opted, or were forced, to build large and important *avant-ports* in the period of their history when they entered high politics and redistributive networks.”<sup>875</sup> Vlassopoulos rightly notes that, though it was feasibly possible in the aftermath of the Persian destruction for the Athenians to relocate their centre to Piraeus, they instead took a decisive step on building the Long Walls. A decision that did not follow the pattern of relocating the city to the sea, as other cities of classical Greece had done, when a position better situated to exploit the Aegean commercial traffic (service and redistribution) of the time appeared on the horizon.<sup>876</sup>

The Athenian decision to unify city and harbour by the Long Walls had another repercussion. It allowed its leaders to shape an alternative foreign policy, which broke from the traditional norm of the agonal system of land defence. Instead of confronting the enemy outside the walls in order to protect the countryside, the Athenians could stay inside their walls and ignore the devastation of their *chora*.<sup>877</sup> Its greatest manifestation came during the Peloponnesian War, under Pericles’ brilliant military strategy. Athens’ city walls were

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<sup>873</sup> Patrai: Plutarch *Alcibiades* 15.3; cf. Thucydides 5.52.2. Argos: Thucydides 5.82.5; cf. Diodoros 12.81.1. Tomlinson, 1972, 124. Megara: Plutarch *Phokion* 15.2. Legon, 1981, 188. A wall corridor at Sestos: Theopompos *FGrHist* 115 F 390. Kythnos: Mazarakis, 1993, 217-253.

<sup>874</sup> Greaves, 2000, 51.

<sup>875</sup> Vlassopoulos, 2007, 164.

<sup>876</sup> Vlassopoulos, 2007, 163-165.

<sup>877</sup> Thucydides 1.143.3-5, 2.13.2, 2.65.7.

massive and the inadequacy of siege methods at the time negated any Peloponnesian hope of breaching them. Pericles convinced the Athenians to gather their possessions, withdraw into the city, and to refuse to grant a land battle to the Peloponnesians. The Athenian population was to import all essential supplies from overseas to keep the city and their stomachs fed. In his *Funeral Oration*, Pericles took pride in Athens' ability to import just about anything from overseas.<sup>878</sup> This was a grand strategy, which looked for safety behind the walls, combined with control of sea routes.<sup>879</sup> A third factor was the supply of grain, at least to some extent, as it depended on the first two.<sup>880</sup> Successful defence was then possible, so long as the city-fortifications remained intact and the city could be supplied by sea. When Sparta removed one of the above factors (the defeat of the Athenian fleet at Aigospotamoi in 405), the city capitulated. Two of the terms imposed on Athens at the end of the Peloponnesian War are telling: the Athenians were required to destroy the Long Walls and to reduce the fleet to twelve ships.<sup>881</sup>

It is no surprise, then, to find the significance of the Long Walls to Athenian conceptions of power. Both Thucydides and the Old Oligarch adopted rhetoric whereby Athens represents an island insulated from outside dangers.<sup>882</sup> One of the most conspicuous results of this insularity, as well as a prerequisite for the survival of "island Athens" during enemy invasions, was that the Athenians replaced their own *chora* with the land of their empire. Constantakopoulou rightly observed the process through which the building of the Athenian Long Walls created the necessary circumstances for the transformation of Athens in to an island.<sup>883</sup>

In the fourth century, Xenophon, in a hypothetical scenario of an invasion of Attica,

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<sup>878</sup> Thucydides 2.38; cf. Isocrates 4.42.

<sup>879</sup> Thucydides 2.13.2, 65.5-7. Knight, 1970, 150-161.

<sup>880</sup> Xenophon *Hellenica* 2.2.10; Demosthenes 18.301-2.

<sup>881</sup> Xenophon *Hellenica* 2.2.20.

<sup>882</sup> Thucydides 1.143.5; *Hellenica Oxyrhynchia* 2.14-16.

<sup>883</sup> Constantakopoulou, 158-165, 175ff. cf. Thucydides 1.107.4, 1.69.1, 5.26.1.

expresses two options: the first, to face the attacker in an open battle; the second, to follow the strategy espoused by Pericles.<sup>884</sup> Pericles' concept remained as an option since retreating behind urban fortifications was common measure in Athens.<sup>885</sup> Central elements of Periclean strategy were maintained in the fourth century, now integrated with many more elements of territorial defence such as watchtowers and cavalry patrols.<sup>886</sup> Despite Ober's focus on the anti-Periclean rhetoric of the fourth century,<sup>887</sup> had fourth-century Athenians faced a major protracted invasion, how differently would they have dealt with the situation? Harding points out that, "the ability of the fourth-century system to preclude a serious attempt at invasion is an assumption that cannot be demonstrated, since there was no time in the fourth century, when it ever did".<sup>888</sup> The closest we get to such a scenario was when the Athenians under a state of panic, following the battle of Chaeronea, undertook a major building program to renew their fortifications in 337. Thus, the Periclean strategy was still feasible; the navy was still intact,<sup>889</sup> and it would take another decade for the Athenians to lose their navy completely at the battle of Amorgos. In fact, the first move in the Lamian War was to try to secure the grain sea-routes.<sup>890</sup> In addition, Lykourgos concentrated on military preparedness, restructured the Athenian defence system on land,<sup>891</sup> and invested a significant sum on the production of a 400-strong fleet and other naval structures.<sup>892</sup> The

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<sup>884</sup> Xenophon *On the Cavalry Commander* 7.2-4. Munn, 1993, 20-21 *contra* Ober, 1985.

<sup>885</sup> Hanson, 1998, Ch.5; Munn, 1993, 30-31.

<sup>886</sup> Munn, 1993, 187.

<sup>887</sup> Ober, 1985 stresses the psychological and economic impact of the Peloponnesian War that resulted in the Athenians rejecting the Periclean defence strategy. For disagreement, see Buckler, 2003, 234 n.3; Munn, 1993, 18-25; Sealey, 1993, 274 n.34; Harding, 1988. Cf. Ober, 1978, 119-130.

<sup>888</sup> Harding, 1988, 63.

<sup>889</sup> The Peace of Demades (338) allowed Athens to retain her navy, control of Samos, Lemnos, Imbros, and Skyros, and her position in Delos. However, Athens was obliged to dismantle the Second Athenian League, Aeschines 3.227; Demosthenes 18.282, 287; Nepos *Phokion* 1. Brun, 2000. A year later, the terms of the Corinthian League forbade Greek states from interfering with shipping, Demosthenes 17.19, 26-28. Griffith in Hammond and Griffith, 1979, 634. Philip II took the title *hegemon kata gēn kai kata thalattan*, in other words obtained command of the ships of all member states, see Polybios 9.33.7; Plutarch *Moralia* 240a. Griffith in Hammond and Griffith, 1979, 626, 629-30.

<sup>890</sup> Diodoros 18.15.8-9; *IG* II<sup>2</sup> 505. 19.

<sup>891</sup> For changes in the *Ephēbeia* system: [Aristotle] *Athenaion Politeia* 42.3. Mitchel, 1970, 37-38; Rhodes, 1993, 494-495; RO 89. Restructure of defence in Acropolis: Plutarch *Moralia* 852c. Sealey, 1993, 210-211; *IG* II<sup>2</sup> 1467. 48-56; Athens and Piraeus: Conwell, 2008, ch.6.

<sup>892</sup> Plutarch *Moralia* 852c. *IG* II<sup>2</sup> 1627. 266-278 list 392 triremes and 18 quadriremes. *IG* II<sup>2</sup> 1629. 783-819 list 360 triremes, 50 quadriremes, and probably 2 or 7 quinqueremes, see Gabrielsen, 1994, 127 and n.4.

policy after Chaeronea was probably preparation for conflict, waiting for the opportunity to present itself.<sup>893</sup> No one expected Alexander to be that successful. We can therefore say that there was continuity of purpose in the Athenian Long Walls. The primary purpose of the Long Walls remained unchanged, and could not change in classical Athens.

In sum, fear of economic coercion and invasion that could threaten Attic resources, and of course, determination to defend the state against its enemies, led to a system of defensive fortification, that, despite its shortcomings, was successful, for a short while, in deterring enemies from invading Attica.

Chapter Four has explored the ways in which Athens sought to protect the commerce of its natural resources from a number of dangers: a) the seizure of its merchants abroad, b) piracy, c) the commandeering of shipments by other states, and d) the destruction to the landscape caused by warfare. What is more, the aim of chapter Four has been to look at the measures with which the Athenians attempted to protect commerce:

a) By focusing its attention on the protection and safety of the individual merchant, Athens sought to ensure the protection and legally just treatment of its travelling merchants. The *symbola* that Athens signed with a number of its suppliers, with whom it also sought to maintain good political alliances, included clauses that regulated the treatment of its merchants abroad in order to guarantee the arrival of the shipment to the ports of Athens. Although scholarship has tended to overemphasise the commercial function and significance of these documents, I show that commercial considerations guided the structure of these agreements as much as political considerations.

b) On a larger scale, Athens sought to protect vessels at sea from the dangers of piracy and accidents, for their cargo was instrumental to the survival of the polis as a political unit.

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<sup>893</sup> Habicht, 1997, 17; Sealey, 1993, 219; Mitchel, 1970, 29-31.



Accordingly, Athens took great care in building up Piraeus as a safe harbour, featuring two *emporía* where merchants could safely unload and display their cargo and sell it at good prices. Beyond Piraeus, Athens created a vast system of allied ports throughout the Mediterranean where merchants could dock in safety on their long voyage from the origins of the resources to Athens, with a number of such agreements surviving in the epigraphic record.

c) In order to ensure that the necessary cargo did reach its safe harbours, Athens also offered a number of honours and privileges to merchants as an additional incentive for trading in its ports. Xenophon discusses many of these privileges and incentives in great detail in his *Poroi*, paying particular attention to the role of metics in Athenian trade, due to their foreign status that excluded them from state pay. Other measures, however, were also proposed by Xenophon, such as the offer of bonuses to magistrates who precipitated the settling of disputes between traders, and the extension of *xenia* to important business partners.

d) The threat of war to the natural resources pushed Athens to protect its ports, which provided most of its vital goods, and their connection to the fortified city through the creation of the Long Walls. Hence, the Long Walls' purpose was primarily to ensure that the people in Athens and Piraeus were not shut in or out, enabling the city to run, unhindered by foreign invasion. This variety of strategies was a result of shifts in power in Greece and in the way Athenians decided to deal with new threats that appeared at different phases in their history.<sup>894</sup> Athens became a top commercial polis because it managed to attract, and contain, the networks and relationships of exchange by a series of laws, treaties, and to deploy a defensive infrastructure that provided a higher degree of safety to traders.

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<sup>894</sup> See also the case of archaic Miletus, Greaves, 2010 and 2007.

## 5

### Strategy, Geography, & Trade

After looking at four separate fields: the strategic utility of grain, timber, precious metals, and red ochre for the Athenian state; the diplomatic manoeuvres made to facilitate access to natural resources; the exercise of military might in order to acquire access to the same; and the protection strategies of natural resources, we are now ready to discuss the geo-strategic nature of islands and sea-routes; two elements which affected favourably or unfavourably the way in which natural resources came into Athens. This shift of emphasis from natural resources to sea communications will explain the diverse Athenian enterprises which established permanent national strength. In the discipline of ancient history where information is limited and not absolute, geography offers a haven to the ancient historian. Ancient geography, excluding modern climate change, industrial revolution, and the discovery of new worlds, stayed unaltered for several centuries, though not around river deltas as there have been immense changes from silting around river mouths, i.e. Maiandros, Kaunos. Geography offers solid data to understand marine environmental systems as ancient and early medieval commerce world centred in the Mediterranean basin, the prime highway for maritime affairs.<sup>895</sup>

It is sensible to begin with an exploration of certain sea routes used by mariners to navigate safely from one port to another, and then to outline how islands of strategic significance were viewed by ancient Athenians. Finally, we will combine all these factors to decipher the role Rhodes played in the Athenian operations in the Aegean. This is important for two reasons. First, it explains the interrelation between geography, trade of natural resources, and strategy. Second, it helps to explain the binding relation between the main

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<sup>895</sup> This chapter adopts the ideas discussed in Morton, 2001; Casson, 1995; Pryor, 1988.

islands of the east Aegean and Byzantium,<sup>896</sup> which had a special role to play in the overall Athenian geopolitical game.

## 5.1 Mapping the Aegean

### 5.1.1 Sea routes

A sea route is a network that embodies a series of pathways and stopping places used for ships to navigate from point A to point B. It can be short or long distance routes, best conceptualised as arteries or trunk routes. Because of the technological limitations of ancient ships, whereby a ship had to make a stop at least once a day, sea-routes were routinely connected to ports, which in turn were attached to the trade routes. In addition to trade routes, there were also military, religious, diplomatic, and other such routes, pivotal in communication between people as they helped to transmit goods, new inventions, religious beliefs, arts and other customs.<sup>897</sup> Consequently, some cities along the trade routes acted as trade hubs and grew richer by providing services to merchants.

The Greeks understood well the importance of coastal routes to both the military and trade. For example, Byzantium, which commanded the northern-end communications, controlled access to the important markets of the Black Sea and the Near East; Thucydides and Xenophon talk specifically about Corcyra commanding the coastal route (παράπλους) to Italy and barring naval reinforcements from reaching the Peloponnese.<sup>898</sup> Sometimes, coastal routes' importance was reported indirectly; Pausanias remarks how the Spartans tried to organise the Cretan coastal cities “situated conveniently for the coasting voyage” (ἐν

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<sup>896</sup> This will also be the case in the Hellenistic age, Gabrielsen, 2007, 287-334.

<sup>897</sup> Morton, 2001, Appendix 4 for places of shelter which attracted votives, dedications, and marks on stones (graffiti) from passing mariners, and so ensure a safe journey, because they were ideally placed in areas where sailing could be dangerous.

<sup>898</sup> Thucydides 1.36.2; Xenophon *Hellenica* 6.2.9.

ἐπικαίρω τοῦ παράπλου συνοικιοῦντα ἅντ' αὐτῶν).<sup>899</sup> By making sure that a ship had a safe (and friendly) port to put in, Sparta was acting in accordance with the logic that had certain trade routes and stops of a defined geopolitical region under protection. Such well-defined sea-routes draw attention, particularly because they correlated with Athenian naval considerations. That is, the requirements of naval power, trade in strategic resources and the need for infrastructure (dockyards, arsenals, deep-water anchorage) form specialised geopolitical regions.

Let us start by mapping the principal sea-routes of the Aegean. The north-south sea route from Byzantium to Rhodes, henceforth the east Aegean, created a distinctive maritime milieu for the ancient traveller,<sup>900</sup> particularly since its line of visibility was extended and assisted by the long coast of western Asia Minor and the islands opposite its shores. Strabo described such a route that formed the basis of communication from Byzantium to the south-east Aegean:

I have stated in the earlier parts of my work (2.5.7) that, as one sails (πλέουσι) from Byzantium towards the south (πρὸς νότον), the route lies in a straight line (ἐπ' εὐθείας ἐστὶν ὁ πλοῦς), first to Sestos and Abydos through the middle of the Propontis, and then along the coast of Asia as far as Caria. It behooves one, then, to keep this supposition in mind as one listens to the following; and, if I speak of certain gulfs on the coast, one must think of the promontories that form them as lying in the same line, a meridian line (μεσημβρινῆς).<sup>901</sup>

Strabo provided a clear description of the coastal route that is said to have provided a visual line for ancient mariners to follow, with the islands and promontories of the coast keeping the ship on course since “the voyage from Alexandria to Rhodes, and thence by Caria and

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<sup>899</sup> Pausanias 3.2.7.

<sup>900</sup> See the journey of Herod (see further below); and of later travellers like Stephens, 1838; Lamartine, 1835; and Maundrell, 1703.

<sup>901</sup> Strabo 13.1.6.

Ionia to the Troad, Byzantium, and the Dnieper, is in a straight line with the course of the Nile".<sup>902</sup> Considering modern geographical measures, coastal sailing from Byzantium to Rhodes was not a straight trajectory. Morton answers this problem by making the case that, "a ship instead cut directly across the mouths of bays to reduce the amount of time, to avoid embayment without also reducing its ability to exploit lands and sea breezes".<sup>903</sup> Strabo estimated the distance from Byzantium to Rhodes to be 4900 stadia.<sup>904</sup> A *stadion* was an ancient Greek unit of length. Herodotos has one *stadion* equal to 600 feet.<sup>905</sup> The problem is that several different 'feet', existed depending on the area. Depending on which measure is used, calculations vary. Here we use the well-established ratio of one *stadio* = 185m.<sup>906</sup> When we multiply 4900 x 185 we find the distance from Byzantium to Rhodes to be 906.500 km. Casson, using modern measurements, gives the distance from Rhodes to Byzantium as 445 nautical miles = 716.158 km.<sup>907</sup> Strabo's calculation, which was based on that of Eratosthenes, was 200 km off.<sup>908</sup> The 200km margin of error can be explained since Byzantium to Rhodes is not in a straight line because the Hellespont interfered to curve the route. Thus, these 200km can be explained as "lost" in the Hellespont.

We do not know how long Strabo's journey lasted, but evidence does exist about a ship's journey with favourable or unfavourable winds that travelled in and out of the east Aegean. Marcus Diaconus in 398 A.D took five days to arrive at Rhodes. A trip with favourable winds from Rhodes to Alexandria took three and a half days. Another ship coming from Lake Maeotis made it to Rhodes in nine and a half days. There is evidence about voyages with unfavourable winds: Rhodes to Gaza took seven days because the sailors encountered a storm. The return trip of Marcus Diaconus from Rhodes to Byzantium

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<sup>902</sup> Strabo 13.1.6; 2.5.7.

<sup>903</sup> Morton, 2001, 160.

<sup>904</sup> Strabo 2.5.8.

<sup>905</sup> Herodotos 2.149.

<sup>906</sup> Walkup, 2005; Gulbekian, 1987; Engels, 1985; Hoyle, 1962.

<sup>907</sup> Casson, 1995, 269-273.

<sup>908</sup> Strabo 2.5.7. For Eratosthenes, see Roller, 2010.

took ten days, twice as long as it took when travelling with favourable winds.<sup>909</sup> Josephus talks of Herod's voyage from Palestine to Byzantium via Rhodes, Kos, Chios and Mytilene.<sup>910</sup> Lastly, Thucydides talks of the Spartan Mindaros not taking the fastest route from Chios to the Hellespont via the Aegean, keeping the islands on his right.<sup>911</sup> From the above, it becomes evident that the east Aegean islands connected the south and north Aegean and the places beyond, in particular, the eastern Mediterranean.

The east Aegean offered advantages to maritime transportation as it linked the north and the south Aegean via a line of offshore islands, some big enough to serve as barriers to strong sea winds and waves,<sup>912</sup> especially when opposite rocky and harbourless lands, a strategy recommended even today ("when any signs of these gales appear, shelter should be sought under the lee of the islands or in the nearest port").<sup>913</sup> Islands were useful docking stations for long voyages. Such voyages would require stops, and good harbours to rest both men and ships. Absence of harbours large enough to facilitate fleets could cause inconvenience. This is described by Ps-Demosthenes: "there was storm and the place had no harbour, making it impossible to go ashore and get a meal, for the country was hostile...so we had to lie at anchor all night long in the open sea without food and sleep..."<sup>914</sup> Natural harbours compensate for the lack of man-made harbours.<sup>915</sup>

Ships coming from the south-east and heading to Piraeus did not always need to sail around the coast of Asia Minor and northern Greece. They could cross over the Aegean using the Cyclades islands as stepping-stones. Themistocles used the Cyclades in the aftermath of the Persian Wars to reach the Hellespont and Ionia by sailing to Carystos,

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<sup>909</sup> Study by Casson 1995.

<sup>910</sup> Josephus, *Antiquities of the Jews* 16.17-20.

<sup>911</sup> Thucydides 8.101.

<sup>912</sup> Morton, 2001, 116-117.

<sup>913</sup> Mediterranean Pilot, 2009 advises sailors to take cover under the lee of the islands; for Chios, see 138, for Rhodes, 268.

<sup>914</sup> Demosthenes 50.22f. See the advice of Artabanos to Xerxes in Herodotos 7.49.

<sup>915</sup> Morton, 2001, 108ff.

Andros, and Paros.<sup>916</sup> Themistocles did not sail along the coast of mainland Greece, which was still hostile and hard to subdue, but chose to take a quicker route that crossed through the Aegean. The route taken by the Persian fleet in 490 also exemplifies this. After the main fleet gathered at Cilicia, the royal fleet first, besieged the island of Rhodes.<sup>917</sup> This account by the Lindian Temple Chronicle is not attested by Herodotos, who instead, informs us that the Persian fleet did not sail from Cilicia to the Hellespont and Thrace, but set sail to Samos. The voyage continued via the Icarian Sea to Naxos, which was also besieged, and following a stop at Delos to appease the gods the royal fleet set sail for Eretria.<sup>918</sup> The Lindian account seems the sort of event which would be invented/elaborated in later traditions. There is no evidence that the Rhodians provided support to either side during the Ionian revolt while it is also unclear to what extent the island was ever subject to Persia. However, important literary evidence does suggest that Rhodes was part of the Persian empire. A poem by the Rhodian Timocreon that will be discussed further below, describes an expedition undertaken by Themistocles in c. 479/8 to restore Rhodes' independence.<sup>919</sup> That is, it implies Rhodes was under Persian control at some unknown time. In addition, Aeschylus included Rhodes in the list of Dareius' subjects.<sup>920</sup> Diodoros documents that Rhodian ships were in Xerxes' navy during the invasion of Greece in 480.<sup>921</sup> The problem why Herodotus did not mention any of these in his books remains a mystery. A possible scenario is that after the Battle of Lade (493) Rhodes acknowledged Persian sovereignty in return for a yearly tribute, as with the parallels of Samos, Mytilene and even Chios, who also retained control of their *peraiiai* in Persian Asia Minor as subjects of the Great King.<sup>922</sup> This may explain the failed attempt by Datis to take Rhodes as recorded in the Lindian Chronicle, and the later expedition of Themistocles to free Rhodes, probably without a fight.

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<sup>916</sup> Herodotos 8.108.2, 112.

<sup>917</sup> Higbie, 2003, D 1-59. *FGrHist* 532 D.1. Hansen and Nielsen, 2004, 1202.

<sup>918</sup> Herodotos 6.95.2 - 98.1.

<sup>919</sup> Timocreon *Frg.*1 in Plutarch *Themistocles* 21.3-7. Fornara, 1966, 257-271.

<sup>920</sup> Persians 888.

<sup>921</sup> 11.3.8.

<sup>922</sup> Herodotos 6.31.1-2. Roebuck, 1986, 86. For Rhodes see Fraser and Bean, 1954, 96.

Another sea-route that led into Greece came from the north-east, the area of the Hellespont and the Propontis. This route had a specific geostrategic importance as it was linked with the fertile areas of the Black Sea, an important source of grain and other resources for Attica. Before reaching the Aegean, however, ships had to pass not one but two gateways. The first was the Bosphorus strait, with the city of Byzantium in a commanding place. Polybios makes this clear: “the Byzantines occupy a site, as regards the sea, more favourable to security and prosperity than any other city in the world, but as regards the land it is in both respects more unfavourable than any other”.<sup>923</sup> Herodotos, Strabo, and Dio Cassius record its favourable geographic position that embodied military and trading advantages.<sup>924</sup> Currents and winds contributed much to Byzantium’s ability to control shipping out of the Black Sea, since they forced all ships to sail close to the city.<sup>925</sup> So favourable were the currents to Byzantium that they drove massive amounts of pelamydes (tunny fish) into its harbour, while the Chalcedonians on the opposite shore could only watch. It is one of those rare instances where ancient scholars took the time to list and discuss the economic advantages of a site compared with those of another.<sup>926</sup> The second gateway was the Hellespont that had similar attributes to the Bosphorus strait. The Athenians placed great importance on the control of the Hellespont, because of its strategic location on the route to the Black Sea.<sup>927</sup> It was a focus of foreign policy, from the activities of Miltiades the Elder in the sixth century to the capture of Sestos in 353/2.<sup>928</sup> Vessels could not be engaged in any combination of possible routes, and the Hellespont was their only way out.

After exiting the Hellespont, the ancient mariner was faced with a choice: either to follow the Thracian coastline, leading onto the Chalkidician, Macedonian, Thessalian,

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<sup>923</sup> Polybios 4.38.1.

<sup>924</sup> Herodotos 4.144.2; Strabo 7.6.2; Dio. 75.10.1.

<sup>925</sup> Polybios 4.38.2-5; 43.3-44. Hansen and Nielsen, 2004, “Byzantium”. See also Walbank, 1957, vol.1, 486-487.

<sup>926</sup> Strabo 7.6.2; Polybios 4.45.1; Arcestratos frg. 38; Aristotle *Politics* 1291b23.

<sup>927</sup> Heskell, 1997, 53ff; Cargill, 1995, 23-30; Graham, 1964, 169f.

<sup>928</sup> De ste. Croix, 1972, 48. Importance of Sestos in Aristotle *Rhetoric* 1411a. 14; Herodotos 6.36 on Miltiades; Diodoros 16.34.3 on Chares’s capture and enslavement of Sestos.



Boeotian and Euboean coast to reach Athens, or turn south and attempt a crossing over to Euboea. That is, instead of calling at the numerous city-states of mainland Greece, ships heading to Athens could employ the help of the east Aegean islands as stepping-stones to sail across. This route was in use from Homeric times, and seems to have been an obvious choice:

...launched our ships in the morning...and swiftly sailed...But when we came to Tenedos, we offered sacrifice to the gods, being eager to reach our homes...but Zeus did not yet purpose our return...and late upon our track came fair-haired Menelaus, and overtook us in Lesbos, as we were debating the long voyage, whether we should sail to sea-ward of rugged Chios, toward the isle Psyria, keeping Chios itself on our left, or to land-ward of Chios past windy Mimas. So we asked the god to show us a sign, and he showed it us, and bade us cleave through the midst of the sea to Euboea, that we might the soonest escape from misery. And a shrill wind sprang up to blow, and the ships ran swiftly over the teeming ways, and at night put in to Geraestos...It was the fourth day...I held on toward Pylos, and the wind was not once quenched from the time when the god first sent it forth to blow.<sup>929</sup>

Nestor's return journey from Troy to Pylos offers a paradigm of the ingenuity and experience of human travellers in observing weather changes before planning their trip. Nestor first made a stop at Tenedos. It was an island close to the mouth of the Hellespont, an important stopover and shelter, before meeting the strong winds and currents of the Hellespont.<sup>930</sup> There, he assessed the weather for the next step of his journey, as a voyage in antiquity was divided into a number of short steps. The weather was not favourable, and Zeus was blamed for it. Therefore, Nestor opted neither to risk a direct sail across the Aegean nor to follow the Thracian coastline, and instead chose the next possible landfall, Lesbos. At Lesbos, another assessment was made, whether to go to Chios and thereby

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<sup>929</sup> Homer *Odyssey* 3.150-82.

<sup>930</sup> Morton, 2001, 174.

reduce the sailing distance or to go for the “long voyage”. Nestor decided that the weather was favourable this time, so he and his companions set sail to Geraestos, a promontory at the south-eastern point of Euboea. Thereafter, winds continued to be favourable, and the ships went their separate ways.<sup>931</sup>

Nestor’s original plan was to go from Troy to Tenedos and then to Geraestos. This Homeric journey was suggested by Strabo centuries later; Tenedos and Geraestos “are conveniently situated for those sailing across from Asia to Attica, since they come near to Sounion”.<sup>932</sup> Geraestos in Euboea and its exposed north-east coast gave sufficient cover from the etesians to ships travelling the northern Aegean.<sup>933</sup> In contrast, the Persian fleet encountered a storm while sailing the north coast of Euboea and sank.<sup>934</sup> Thus the harbour at Geraestos was a safe port along the coast of Euboea facilitating travel to or from the eastern Aegean. For that reason, several coastal harbours had cults dedicated to Poseidon: Samos Epaktaios (on the Coast), Rhodes Pelagios (Seagoing), Tainaron Pontios (of the Sea). Schumacher points to the relationship between Geraestos, Tainaron, and Kalaureia, three remote coastal sanctuaries which functioned as a place of asylum.<sup>935</sup> Overall, it shows the functionality and permanence of ancient sea-routes as several island ports had a role to play in navigation. Hence, to make sure ships carrying natural resources came safely to Piraeus, Athens needed to secure ports where ships could spend the night and, most importantly, ensure their protection throughout the voyage. Euboea, Tenedos, Samos, Chios, Rhodes were all found repeatedly to be the focus of Athenian foreign policy, either by conquest or alliance (see further below).

### 5.1.2 Islands

The geographical position of an island that was situated close to resource-rich areas,

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<sup>931</sup> Morton, 2001, 175 remarks how the voyage is gradually worked out step by step.

<sup>932</sup> Strabo 10.1.7.

<sup>933</sup> Morton, 2001, 116-117.

<sup>934</sup> Herodotos 7.188, 192

<sup>935</sup> Schumacher, 1993, 51-69.

along the trade routes or near hostile regions, further amplified its role in geostrategy. Demosthenes believed that Thasos, Lemnos, and Skiathos could serve as winter bases, able to provide harbours, provisions and everything the army needed for an anti-Macedonian campaign.<sup>936</sup> The Athenians did not agree with Demosthenes' suggestions, but that does not mean the orator was exaggerating. The Romans too appreciated the strategic possibilities of these islands. Appian records that Thasos offered a secured depot at a close distance for the army of Cassius and Brutus, whose triremes were anchored at Neapolis. This in turn offered greater advantage to Cassius and Brutus compared with Antony's depot.<sup>937</sup> When the conspirators lost to Octavius, the latter landed at Thasos to take possession of "the money and arms, besides abundant supplies and a great quantity of war material, there in store".<sup>938</sup> Thasos not only made an excellent naval base but also, served as a political refuge for Athenian sympathisers expelled from Macedonia.<sup>939</sup>

On the other hand, islands that were in enemy hands could become a source of weakness for Athens. Athens' vulnerability could be seen in a number of places: Aegina, an island next to Athens, was often hostile and an annoyance to trade vessels;<sup>940</sup> Euboea could serve as a base from which to threaten ships coming to Piraeus.<sup>941</sup> When Philip II gained control of Byzantium, Thebes, and Euboea, Demosthenes contemptuously told his Athenian audience that Philip II was now the man in charge of the grain trade.<sup>942</sup> In another speech, Demosthenes said that when Philip II "seized the shipping at Geraestos, he levied untold sums".<sup>943</sup> These untold sums seem to share similarities with the occasion of Philip's seizure of the grain ships at Hieron.<sup>944</sup> He evidently suggests that Geraestos was an important stop

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<sup>936</sup> Demosthenes 4.32.

<sup>937</sup> Appian *The Civil Wars* 4.13.106, 14.107.

<sup>938</sup> Appian *The Civil Wars* 4.17. 136.

<sup>939</sup> Demosthenes 7.15.

<sup>940</sup> Figueira, 1990, 45-49.

<sup>941</sup> Burke, 1984, 119.

<sup>942</sup> Demosthenes 18.241.

<sup>943</sup> Demosthenes 4.34.

<sup>944</sup> Philochoros *FGrHist* 328 F 162 and Theopompos *FGrHist* 115 F 292. See also the study by Moreno, 2008.

for merchant ships coming from the Black Sea.<sup>945</sup> By taking command of the grain supply Philip II was putting immense pressure upon Athens without the need to risk direct conflict. Thus, we should not underestimate the role of the movement of staple goods since it was also politically motivated, and adds to our understanding of how islands and coastal cities were partaken into account in foreign policy.

Chios, Samos and Lesbos were regarded by Aristotle as the guards of the Athenian empire (τούτους δὲ φύλακας εἶχον τῆς ἀρχῆς). For this reason the islands were allowed to have their own constitutions and to control whatever dependencies they had.<sup>946</sup> Their prominent role in the foundation of the Athenian League can be seen in their assistance in various campaigns,<sup>947</sup> whereby they provided ships, naval bases, and dockyard supplies on the east Aegean front.<sup>948</sup> These were the three biggest islands in the middle of the east Aegean sea-route and Aristotle named them φύλακας because of their ability to assist and control their respective areas, facilitating Athenian hegemony of the Aegean.<sup>949</sup> In 376 Athens, in the form of the Second Athenian League, was able to gather principal allies, notably the cities dominating the eastern Aegean sea-route, Rhodes, Chios, Mytilene, and Byzantium. Samos, however, a very loyal fifth-century ally, was under Persian control at that time. Despite difficulties, Timotheos captured Samos in 365. Demosthenes says, mendaciously, that he “freed” Samos,<sup>950</sup> even though a cleruchy was soon after installed on the island.<sup>951</sup>

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<sup>945</sup> Xenophon *Hellenica* 6.5.61 reports that the grain ships reaching Geraestos could not continue their voyage to Piraeus since the Spartan fleet had control of the islands of Aegina, Keos, and Andros.

<sup>946</sup> [Aristotle] *Athenaion Politeia* 24.2; Plutarch *Aristides* 23.4. Quinn, 1981, 50.

<sup>947</sup> Samos assisted Athens at Eurymedon and Egypt, Thucydides 1.100.1, 104.2; Chios to bring Phaselis into the alliance, Plutarch *Kimōn* 12.3-4.

<sup>948</sup> Thucydides 6.82.7, 85.2 the Chians and the Methymnians provided ships, and the others provide money; the Chians and Methymnians for their ship contributions were left *αὐτονόμους*. Other statements are made to the effect that Athens's relationships with her allies were strictly in accordance with self-interest; see Thucydides 1.75-76, 144.2.

<sup>949</sup> *Contra* Quinn, 1981, 51, n.7 who suggests that the phrase τούτους δὲ φύλακας εἶχον τῆς ἀρχῆς was metaphorical, referring to moral support.

<sup>950</sup> Demosthenes 15.9.

<sup>951</sup> Diodoros 18.18.9; Isocrates 15.111. Sealey, 1993, appendix 5; Shipley, 1987.

Samos was not a member of the Second Athenian League, and as such, it had no protection against the imposition of a cleruchy.<sup>952</sup> The expulsion of pro-Persians, and freedom from the Persian yoke, provide the political explanation for the presence of the cleruchy. Establishing firm control over an island called for harsh actions, and a common solution was to remove disloyal elements. Timotheos' reorganisation of internal affairs in Samos may not have broken any law abided by the Athenians but expelling the whole population of Samos was rather harsh. The steps taken by Timotheos on Samos can be explained when we note the possibilities an island close to the Persian mainland and on the eastern Aegean grain route offered to Athens as noted in chapter Five. Samos enabled the Athenians to tighten up the control of the east Aegean route into Piraeus. Demetrios and Antigonos also saw Samos' value as shown by the upgrade in fortifications.<sup>953</sup> Islands along important sea-routes and cities in a privileged position close to the straits were a natural point of gravitation, making any political power vastly prosperous if it could successfully manage the social and political tensions of the areas. According to Shipley, Samos was such a place in Polycrates' days or at times in the fifth century.<sup>954</sup> Furthermore, Samos and other eastern Aegean islands gained new significance in the context of imperial Athens. Now, the islands not only played a distinctive role in their respective areas but also gave access to strategically located harbours close to the Persian Empire and the crossroads of major trade routes that headed north to the Black Sea, and south to Egypt and the Near East. Samos was the principal base of the Athenian navy during the Peloponnesian War and reasonably so will be after 365.<sup>955</sup> This better explains the Athenian watchful eye over Samos which was favourably positioned along ports and sea-routes that facilitated trade and warfare. Therefore, the persistence shown by the Athenians in taking command of Samos attest to the connectivity between sea-routes, control of natural resources and Athenian pursuit of

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<sup>952</sup> Sealey, 1993, 107; Cargill, 1983, 321-332.

<sup>953</sup> Shipley, 1987, 249-268.

<sup>954</sup> Shipley, 1987, 12.

<sup>955</sup> Polyainos 6.2.1.

naval hegemony.<sup>956</sup>

But this is not to imply that the only point of Athenian control of the island was instrumental – maintenance of control. Samos and its *peraia* held important resources. There was plenty of cultivable land, production of wheat and barley, a significant amount of timber, olive trees, wine production, and some metal deposits. Samos had potential. The stories of Timotheos avoiding scourging enemy lands suggest that the general wished not to destroy the productive ability of an area. Rather, the aim was to use Samos and its assets for Athens' economic and strategic aims. Soon after, an Athenian large-scale cleruchy was sent to Samos.<sup>957</sup>

There was another big island in the area, Rhodes. The cities of Rhodes provided Athens with an experienced navy and the substantial amount of c. thirty talents (see further below). A century later, Isocrates would refer to the significance of controlling the islands near the coast of Asia Minor in terms of their use as stepping-stones for promoting the Athenian policy on the opposite shore:

If the barbarian strengthens his hold on the cities of the coast by stationing in them larger garrisons than he has there now, perhaps those of the islands which lie near the mainland, as, for example, Rhodes and Samos and Chios, might incline to his side; but if we get possession of them first, we may expect that the populations of Lydia and Phrygia and of the rest of the up-country will be in the power of our forces operating from those positions.<sup>958</sup>

Likewise, Demaratus advised Xerxes to take Cythera in order to inflict damage on Sparta.<sup>959</sup>

Hence, offshore islands were used as bases for expeditions on the mainland. The weight accorded by Athens to these islands is apparent in the opening stages of the Second

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<sup>956</sup> Garnsey, 1988, 128-131.

<sup>957</sup> Shippey, 1987, 138-143.

<sup>958</sup> Isocrates 4.163-4.

<sup>959</sup> Herodotus 7.235.2.

Athenian League; the Mytileneans, the Methymnians (two Lesbians cities), the Chians, the Rhodians and the Byzantines are the first to be invited to join the league.<sup>960</sup> Islands along important sea-routes and cities in a privileged position close to the straits were a natural point of gravitation, making any political power vastly prosperous if it could successfully manage the social and political tensions of the areas. Following the Persian Wars, the islands gained new significance in the context of imperial Athens. Athenian naval hegemony meant a new reality of maritime networks. Now, the islands not only played a distinctive role in their respective areas but also in the east Aegean; they gave access to strategically located harbours close to the Persian Empire and the crossroads of major trade routes that headed north to the Black Sea, and south to Egypt and the Near East.

This geographical approach to the east Aegean has pointed out the commercial, strategic and political importance of this region. Successful control of key islands and coastal cities should have enabled the possessor to exercise effective control of ships sailing from one point to another. This better explains the Athenian watchful eye over important ports and sea-routes that facilitated trade and war creates a strong correlated relation between them. Therefore, we will see in the next part the persistence shown by the Athenians in taking command of places that offered such potential, taking Rhodes as a case study. In doing so, we can attest to the connectivity between sea-routes, control of natural resources and Athenian pursuit of naval hegemony.

## 5.2 The case of Rhodes

In view of the conclusions in the previous chapters, this part attempts to shed light on

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<sup>960</sup> RO 20. 1.16; 23. 3–4. Diodoros 15.28.

the importance of the island of Rhodes with regards to the Athenian geopolitical view, and to examine its function as a gateway to the Aegean from the eastern Mediterranean. To do this, I will discuss the geographic, commercial and strategic factors inextricably connected with Athenian foreign policy. First, I will look at Rhodes' geography and see how its location made it a hub for international trade. Second, I will consider the position it held in Athenian policy and third, I will discuss how Athens' enemies developed plans to remove this asset from Athenian control. I will argue that classical Rhodes played a dual role as a significant trade port and as a military base; advantages that any aspiring power wished to obtain and control. While many places would provide a suitable case study, Rhodes will be a focal point, primarily to fill a gap in the existing literature, but also because it is illustrative of the interplay between natural resources and politics.

### 5.2.1 The geography and significance of Rhodes

First, we must remind ourselves of a few basic facts regarding ancient sailing. The picture of ancient sea communication starts with Hesiod. In his *Works and Days*, Hesiod recommended to his reader that all sailors should avoid the sea except for a period of fifty days, starting with the summer solstice.<sup>961</sup> Hesiod, a farmer himself, wrote at a time when commerce was not at its peak, and probably chose to suggest the safest days to his reader. At the other end of the spectrum, there is Vegetius, a writer of the Late Roman Empire who in his *Epitoma rei Militaris*, divided sailing season in three periods. The safest time for travel was between 27 May and 24 September; an uncertain period existed two months ahead and after the given period, while navigation must be closed during fall and winter months.<sup>962</sup> This gradual opening of the sailing season came as a result of improvements in ship design, navigation techniques and understanding of weather conditions.<sup>963</sup>

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<sup>961</sup> Hesiod *Works and Days* 663-665.

<sup>962</sup> Vegetius *Epitoma rei Militaris* 4.39.

<sup>963</sup> Morton, 2001, 256; Pryor, 1988, 87f.



The ancient sailing season was restricted by weather conditions and typically extended from March to October, but there were always exceptions, with factors such as food crises, war, etc. inducing the ancient mariner to risk the perils of travel out of season. For that reason a ship wishing to sail out of season had to pay a higher interest rate on maritime loans,<sup>964</sup> while grain retailers profited in times of war.<sup>965</sup> Furthermore, ships were in daily need of friendly coasts due to restrictions such as the absence of compasses and the shortage of storage space for food and fresh water.<sup>966</sup> Additionally, a convenient port offered mariners a place to sleep at night. Demosthenes' client Apollodoros reported his bad experience as a trierarch when the Athenian fleet was unable to find a friendly port at nightfall: "we had to spend the night at anchor in the open water without...sleep."<sup>967</sup> Weather and technological restrictions therefore dictated that ancient mariners lived in harmony with the forces of nature.<sup>968</sup>

To understand the role of Rhodes, its geographical significance and the climatic conditions of the area must first be considered. Two important natural elements controlled the sailing season; namely, winds and sea currents. The prevailing winds in the Aegean blow steadily from May to September,<sup>969</sup> with winds blowing from the north-east in the northern Aegean and from the north-west in the southern Aegean,<sup>970</sup> and were termed the etesian winds by the Greeks.<sup>971</sup> These are persistent winds caused by the geography of the surrounding area, and ships travelling south had a fast voyage due to the winds blowing

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<sup>964</sup> Demosthenes 35.10.

<sup>965</sup> Lysias 22.14-5.

<sup>966</sup> Xenophon *Hellenica* 6.2.27-30. See also Pryor, 1995, 208-9. For ancient warships and naval warfare see Wallinga, 1990, 132-149; Starr, 1989; Morrison-Coates, 1989; Coates-McGrail, 1984; Morrison-Williams, 1968; Blackman, 1968, 181-192; Gomme, 1937, 190-302.

<sup>967</sup> Demosthenes 50.22.


<sup>968</sup> Pryor, 1988, xiv.

<sup>969</sup> Murray, 1987, 139-167.

<sup>970</sup> Horden and Purcell, 2000, 137; Pryor, 1988, 20; Casson, 1959; 1951, 136-148.

<sup>971</sup> Aristotle *Meteorologica* 361b 35-362a 27 for an ancient scientific approach. Plutarch *Cicero* 47.4 and *Dion* 13.3 described the etesians as summer winds. In Herodotos 2.20.2-3 the etesians are considered to be among the reasons for the flooding of the Nile; cf. Diodoros 1.38.2-7; 4.82.2 as the dominate wind during the summer months; in 12.58.4 the etesian winds are able to cool the summer air, and its absence during the Peloponnesian War caused the plague in Athens; in 17.52.2 the poleodomic plan of the city of Alexandria took into consideration the effect of the etesian winds that cool the air of the city; Diogenes Laertios 8.60 attests to its power; Strabo 13.1.48; 15.1.13, 17; 16.4.18; 17.1.7, 48 has the etesians as a cause for various physical phenomena.

out of the Aegean. In July 2009, I visited the island of Rhodes and was able to confirm the strong steady winds that blow there, taking control of the channel between Rhodes and the mainland of Asia Minor. According to modern measures, these winds are between 5 and 7 on the Beaufort scale, the equivalent of 29-61 km/h. Etesians were so forceful that they were capable of preventing journeys from Egypt to Rome for weeks.<sup>972</sup> Demosthenes spoke about the etesian winds as a limiting factor in naval strategy: “and if you reflected that the winds and the seasons enable Philip II to gain most of his successes by forestalling us. He waits for the etesian winds or for the winter, and attacks at a time when we could not possibly reach the seat of war.”<sup>973</sup>




**Figure 2. Summer winds in the Aegean Sea.**

Voyages travelling from south to north or from east to west could not always count on favourable winds, but instead were able to rely on the currents. Currents flow into the Mediterranean from the inflow of Atlantic water, thereby creating an anti-clockwise

<sup>972</sup> Morton, 2001, 48f; Semple, 1931, 580.

<sup>973</sup> Demosthenes 4.31; 8.14 in a hypothetical language: “Philip II needs only to wait for the etesian winds to prevent Athens from sending aid to Byzantium.” See Cawkwell, 1978, 74 for the duration of the etesian winds (from mid-June to up to three months). Polybios 4.44.6 remarks how the winds prevail in the Hellespont and in 5.5 the winds are so strong that they prevent Philip II from returning to Macedonia.

movement and pushing the current stream from the shores of Africa to Egypt, and from there up to Antioch, around Cyprus, and on to Rhodes.<sup>974</sup> But, while these currents have a circular motion: “on reaching the south-eastern Aegean the current comes up against the northern limits of the main eastward-moving current, and so is deflected northwards, up the west coast of Asia Minor.”<sup>975</sup> The route taken by the Persian fleet in 490 exemplifies this.<sup>976</sup> Currents continued across the south coast of Crete, passing “through south Peloponnese and Cape Malea. At this point, the Hellespontine current meets the main



**Figure 3. Anti-clockwise movement of currents and the inflow from the Atlantic.**

eastward moving Mediterranean current which diverts its course sending it northwards up the west coast of Greece to Cephalonia and Corcyra, and from there across the straits of

<sup>974</sup> Horden and Purcell, 2000, 138.

<sup>975</sup> Morton, 2001, 38.

<sup>976</sup> Herodotus 6.95.2 - 98.1.

Otranto to Apulia, across the Gulf of Taranto to Calabria and then to the east coast of Sicily”.<sup>977</sup> A similar route was taken by the Athenian expedition to Sicily that followed the Greek coastal route and then from Corcyra to Italy. Thus weather conditions, as well as geography, created an environment for ancient mariners to follow in antiquity.<sup>978</sup>



**Figure 4. Summer Currents in the Aegean and Eastern Adriatic seas.**

Some areas along the sea routes, Rhodes amongst them, dominated the sea-lanes, owing to their privileged positions, and by extension became important naval bases and trading ports.<sup>979</sup> From a navigational point of view, Rhodes was a key port for access to the eastern Mediterranean as it commands the entrance to the southeast Aegean. Rhodes lies across the main sea route between the Aegean and the Phoenician coast, and so vessels

<sup>977</sup> Morton, 2001, 38.

<sup>978</sup> Thucydides 6.32. Morton, 2001, 38 and Pryor, 1988, 7 and n 24.

<sup>979</sup> Rutishauser, 2001, 197-204; Bresson, 2000, 101-108; Cyprus, Byzantium also has key priority even today.

following the main arterial route had to stop there before facing the northern gales of the Aegean. The other two possible points were Lycia and Crete. Keen discusses correctly the strategic value of Lycia and stresses its position as a gateway to the Mediterranean. However, as far as Athens is concerned, Lycia was in Athenian hands only for a fraction of two decades. In fact, its presence on the Athenian Tribute List comes for the years 452/1, 451/0, and 446/5. As Bryce states, Lycia's association with Athens was a "desultory one", and dropped all links by the 430s.<sup>980</sup> Crete was the island of a hundred cities, a den of pirates, and a valuable source for mercenaries. With such roster, traders would prefer to avoid bounding in Cretan ports.<sup>981</sup> In other words, if Athens wished to have any say on the south-eastern supply-route, the safest bet would be Rhodes.

Demosthenes informs us that a route also existed between Rhodes and Egypt and offered a continuous flow of goods even in difficult sailing seasons: "the voyage between Rhodes and Egypt is uninterrupted, and they [traders] could put the same money to work two or three times, whereas here [Athens] they would have had to pass the winter and to wait the sailing season".<sup>982</sup> Even Caesar and Pompey followed a similar route.<sup>983</sup> Could merchants travel to Egypt twice in a given month? Was Demosthenes exaggerating or did Rhodes actually hold an elevated place in trade? According to Diodoros, a voyage from Rhodes to Alexandria took three and a half days, in essence, four.<sup>984</sup> A return journey would require 8 days due to the unfavourable winds, as exemplified by the return trip of Marcus Diaconus. Adding to that a minimum of two days for the cargo to be unloaded and loaded afresh, we reach an average of fourteen days. It is of course an indication of the time it took as weather was unpredictable in this time of year and we lack data of loading and unloading cargo times. But, if we are to estimate a minimum of fourteen days for a return

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<sup>980</sup> Keen, 1993; *ATL II*; Bryce, 1986, 107.

<sup>981</sup> Brulé, 1978, 66-67 presents a list of 26 piracy raids by Cretans. See also Perlman, 1999, 132-161 for the marginalisation of Crete thought.

<sup>982</sup> Demosthenes 56.30.

<sup>983</sup> Appian *The Civil Wars* 2.13.89.

<sup>984</sup> Diodoros 3.33. cf. Casson, 1971, 293; 1951, 141.

journey, a ship could possibly make the voyage Rhodes - Alexandria two times in a given month. That would explain Demosthenes' reference: "they could put the same money to work two or three times". It is unclear how the route Rhodes - Egypt remained uninterrupted since sailing conditions forced most traders to limit their trade by sea to half a year. There is, however, another possibility. The hypothetical winter voyages between Rhodes and Egypt could have taken place during the uncertain travel period that existed between October-November, March-April. One important reason lay in the sub-tropical climate of Rhodes and Egypt (also, Cyprus experiences dry, mild winters with good temperatures), thus allowing trade between Egypt and Rhodes to remain uninterrupted.

Rhodian and Egyptian trade relations dated back as early as the archaic age, and possibly even before. Relations with Egypt are found in as early as in the archaic and geometric times, with Rhodian faience workshop and Egyptian sculpture found respectively.<sup>985</sup> An important piece of evidence is an offering to Athena Lindia from King Amasis of Egypt (ca. 570-526). The gifts, a "spectacular linen corselet", and "two statues of stone" seem to convey the good network of collaboration between Egypt and Rhodes, especially under Amasis,<sup>986</sup> who encouraged and fostered trade between Greeks and Egyptians by allowing certain Greek cities, Rhodes among them, to settle at Naucratis, build shrines for their gods, and oversee its unique trading post.<sup>987</sup> Herodotos tells us that Greek merchants customarily sailed to Egypt in search of grain even during the Persian Wars.<sup>988</sup> An Aramaic palimpsest from Upper Egypt has revealed the official record of the custom dues exacted by Persia at a port of the Nile in the year 475. It records thirty six Ionian Greek and six Phoenician ships over the course of 10 months, namely one sailing

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<sup>985</sup> Boardman, 1999, ch. 4; Francis and Vickers, 1984, 69-69 and notes 5-7. A story in Herodotos has a Samian merchant, Kolaïos, on his way to Egypt but stranded by winds. Nothing out of the ordinary is reported for this voyage (around 638) which suggests at least informal trade between east Greeks and Egypt in the 7<sup>th</sup> c.

<sup>986</sup> Herodotos 2.182; cf. 3.47.

<sup>987</sup> Herodotos 2.178.1-2 - 179.1. Bresson, 2000, who argues that Naucratis was an *emporion* and not a polis *contra* Austin, 1970. Also Moller, 2000; *Lindos II*, 16 refers to a Rhodian *proxenos* at Naucratis.

<sup>988</sup> Herodotos 3.139.

season. Imports included wine, wood, wool, various metals and empty jars, while duty was paid mostly in silver and gold.<sup>989</sup> Philochoros and Plutarch has a lavish gift of 30.000 or 40.000 *medimnoi* of grain coming to Athens from King Psammetichus in 455.<sup>990</sup> Egyptian ships found their way to Greece,<sup>991</sup> and even to Sparta.<sup>992</sup> In 338, the Rhodians were confident enough to divert ships sailing towards Piraeus to the Rhodian port; these ships presumably came from Egypt.<sup>993</sup> The infamous speech *Against Dionysodoros* from the Demosthenic corpus tells us of a trial concerning an export of Egyptian grain that was unloaded on Rhodes instead of following the pre-arranged destination Athens - Egypt - Athens. Reading these sources in the light of the geographic terms described above create a picture of Rhodes as a vital trading hub while maintaining strong connections with both importer Athens and exporter Egypt.

Hence Rhodes' location can therefore be described as a maritime hub for various important reas of grain production and distribution such as Egypt, Kyrene, Cyprus, the Ionian cities of the west coast of Asia Minor, and Phoenicia whose products needed to enter or exit the Aegean, thus facilitating traffic from north-south and east-west. We must not forget that not all merchants were willing to make the long journey to Egypt or the Crimea. Doubtless, certain harbours became places of re-distribution, accumulating grain, levying port dues and tolls on passing ships.<sup>994</sup> Plausibly Rhodian commerce had grown strong long before Alexander took Egypt. in Egypt, built on it.<sup>995</sup> By the late fourth century, export of Egyptian grain seems to have been a Rhodian affair, and Kleomenes, from the very beginning of his career.

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<sup>989</sup> Kuhrt, 2007, 669-672; Yardeni, 1994, 67-78; Porden and Yardeni, 1993, 82-195.

<sup>990</sup> Aristophanes *Wasps* 718 = Philochorus, *FGrH* 328 no. 90; Plutarch *Pericles* 37. For a brief discussion of the event, see Garnsey, 1989, 125-28.

<sup>991</sup> Thucydides 8.35.2.

<sup>992</sup> Thucydides 4.53.3.

<sup>993</sup> Lykourgos *Leokrates* 1.18-19.

<sup>994</sup> Xenophon *Hellenica* 1.122; Polybios 4.44, 46; Diodoros 13.64.2

<sup>995</sup> Lund, 1999, 188-204.





**Figure 5. Rhodes between the areas of grain production and distribution in the Eastern Mediterranean and Black Sea.**

A second condition that enhanced Rhodian naval and maritime standing was the acquisition and maintenance of its *peraia*, namely the control exercised by an island-state over the coastal area of the opposite shore, in this case on the Anatolian coast.<sup>996</sup> Similarly, other Aegean islands such as Mytilene, Tenedos, Chios, Samothrace, Thasos, and Samos also controlled land on their opposite shores from as early as the archaic age.<sup>997</sup> At the peak of its power (197-167 BC), Rhodes controlled most of the Dodecanese islands and the coastal areas of Saros, Loryma, Knidos, Kaunos, and Physkos.<sup>998</sup> Rule over these territories enabled Rhodes to acquire strategically located naval stations, commercial ports, supply and repair facilities, and obtain further revenues. This developed infrastructure dominated and protected the trade routes, and allowed Rhodes to flourish. Rhodes' control over its *peraia*

<sup>996</sup> Not only islands controlled a *peraia*, but mainland states too. The term *peraia* expanded onto the acquisition of neighbouring islands, see Constantakopoulou, 2007, ch.7.

<sup>997</sup> Constantakopoulou, 2007, ch. 7.

<sup>998</sup> Gabrielsen, 1997, 41-44.



was not confined to the Hellenistic period and there is evidence to support its existence from the fourth century onwards. An inscription found in Kameiros, dated in the late fourth century, refers to the *ktoina*, public land on the *peraia*, which is indicative of Rhodes' early success in exercising control of nearby mainland territories.<sup>999</sup> Advances in Rhodian history over the last twenty years have provided proof of the incorporation of mainland territories coming under the control of Rhodian cities even in earlier periods.<sup>1000</sup> Frazer and Bean, believe that Syme, Karpathos, and possibly other nearby small islands were incorporated into the Rhodian state before 408 based on the existence of the *ktoinai* system on the islands. Recently, Constantakopoulou has suggested that the mention of the Rhodians as a separate state in a decree of the people of Athens concerning the Eteocarpathians, an island south of Rhodes, dated by Meiggs based upon a re-examination by Lewis from the mid-440s to 430, confirms that the island had been detached from Rhodes by this time.<sup>1001</sup> For the record, in the decree Athens honours the *koinon* of the Eteocarpathians for the gift of a cypress-tree for the temple of Athena; they are granted in return autonomy and retention of their property; there is a clause that suggests Athens withdrew the troops from the acropolis, fixed a severe penalty to those wronging the Eteocarpatians, and an obligation is put on Kos, Knidos, and Rhodes to render assistance if any wrong happens. These *peraiiai* and dependencies were undoubtedly indispensable to the island of Rhodes as they created and maintained valuable links with Aegean cities, and provided an important yet neglected parameter of classical Rhodes.

An important question arises as to why all the other east Aegean islands did not also develop into major Hellenistic places like Rhodes. The answer must be found in a combination of factors. Rhodian cities were able to create a unified federal state early in 408.

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<sup>999</sup> IG XII 1 694, 1-2. Papachristodoulou, 1989, 43, 50. For the *ktoina*, see Gabrielsen 1997, 151-52 on their social function; Constantakopoulou, 2007, 188-190; Fraser and Bean, 1954, 145.

<sup>1000</sup> Constantakopoulou, 2007, 244; Gabrielsen, 1997, 47-53; Papachristodoulou, 1989, 49-50; Berthold, 1984, 167-78, Fraser and Bean, 1954, 107-117.

<sup>1001</sup> IG I<sup>3</sup> 1454. Brock, 2009, 149-66; Constantakopoulou, 2007, 190; Meiggs, 1982, 498 n.36; Hansen and Nielsen, 2004, 746; Tod 110; Fraser and Bean, 1954, 143.

The experiment did not fail, and with the signing of the King's Peace, Rhodes entered a new era of independence. Few years later, it was a founding member of the Second Athenian League enabling the island to prosper without restrictions. Combined with Rhodian naval experience, geographic position, and trade knowledge, which according to Strabo went back to the early archaic age,<sup>1002</sup> provided a platform for the island to prosper during the course of the fourth century. By the last quarter of the fourth century, Rhodes was ready to step into Athens' shoes after its defeat at the hands of the Macedonians. Finally, the expansion of Hellenisation through Alexander's campaigns, stressed even more Rhodes' central position on Mediterranean sea-routes.

Rhodes' position was significantly improved when in 408 Lindos, Ialysos, and Kameiros joined to form the city of Rhodes in the north of the island.<sup>1003</sup> The site of Rhodes city provided multiple harbours, and a long inland wall was built to protect a bigger mass of the population and to provide security for its naval facilities.<sup>1004</sup> Rhodian ports shared a similar aspect with that of Piraeus; they were situated in such a way that gave optimum access to sailing visitors from all directions.<sup>1005</sup> Excavations have showed that the architecture of the city took into account the terrain, functions and activities of Rhodes and its people.<sup>1006</sup> Aelius Aristides noted that the harbours were constructed to receive sailing vessels coming from Ionia, Caria, Egypt, Cyprus and Phoenicia.<sup>1007</sup> When in c. 397 hostilities between Persia and Sparta found their way into the Aegean, a Spartan fleet of 120 vessels was able to take refuge in Rhodian harbours,<sup>1008</sup> evidence of its rising importance and successful synoecism. This latter information comes in contrast with Thucydides' account. During the Ionian War, the Peloponnesian fleet had to "haul their ships up onto the shore"

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<sup>1002</sup> Strabo 14.2.10.

<sup>1003</sup> Diodoros 13.75.

<sup>1004</sup> Berthold, 1984, 54-56.

<sup>1005</sup> Strabo 14.2.5; Dio Chrysostom 31.163.

<sup>1006</sup> Kondis, 1958 and 1954.

<sup>1007</sup> Aelius Aristides 43.539.

<sup>1008</sup> Diodoros 14.79. 4-5; Isocrates 4.142.

(ἀνελκύσαντες τὰς ναῦς) on reaching Rhodes. At first, it seems odd that the Rhodian harbour would be insufficient to accept Peloponnesian triremes. However, the reason was that the Peloponnesian fleet stayed at Rhodes for 80 days, and thus the Peloponnesians wished to take the ships out of the water to avoid becoming waterlogged due to the long period of inaction. Triremes also required a great deal of upkeep.<sup>1009</sup>

The place of the synoecism cannot be accidental. The old Rhodian cities were ill-suited to cope with the new conditions. The site of Kameiros lacked a physical harbour, relatively open to the transgression of the winds. Lindos had a natural sheltered harbour, but it is small, best suited for a stop rather than for an entrepôt. Ialysos situated on a hilly acropolis has a magnificent view of the west sea but is rather isolated from the sea. A movement to a better suited location should have been at least motivated by trade. During the fourth century, Knidos and Kos also transferred their capitals to the west and east tip of their respective peninsulas.<sup>1010</sup> Bresson has shown that other cities of the Aegean, namely, Mytilene and Methymna, were located in such a way to align themselves with the trade routes of the east Aegean.<sup>1011</sup> To these economic attributions, we must add the continuous pressure exercised upon Rhodes by Athens and Sparta.<sup>1012</sup>

The above geographic and commercial data attest to Rhodes being an important trade hub of the eastern Mediterranean. But this may not be enough for some, as other cities may claim similar characteristics. A small comparison with Byzantium will support this hypothesis, stress the importance of Rhodes to Athens, and bring to the fore its hidden financial power. Rhodes did not exist prior to 408, instead three main cities, Ialysos, Kameiros and Lindos represented the dominant formation on the island. All are attested as

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<sup>1009</sup> Thucydides 8.44.4; Plutarch *Lysander* 32.3.3. Hornblower, 1991-2008, vol III, 8.44.4 and 8.60.3. Harrison, 1999, 168-171 discusses overnight beaching.

<sup>1010</sup> Strabo 14.2.19.

<sup>1011</sup> Bresson, 2000, 101-108.

<sup>1012</sup> Demand, 1990, 95-96 acknowledges that from 408-395 internal instability contributed to the early ineffectiveness of the early synoecism. Meiggs, 1972, 210.

registered members of the Delian-League tribute lists. Ialysos initially paid a *phoros* of ten talents,<sup>1013</sup> Kameiros nine talents,<sup>1014</sup> and Lindos the sum of eight talents and 2,700 dr.<sup>1015</sup> Thus, a total of twenty seven talents came from Rhodes into Athenian coffers compared with the fifteen talents coming from the prosperous city of Byzantium.<sup>1016</sup> In the decade 443-432, the three Rhodian cities dropped to the total of eighteen talents while Byzantium rose to 18 talents. However, during the peace of Nicias (421-415) the total sum of the Rhodian cities rose to 30 talents, Ialysos contributing five,<sup>1017</sup> Kameiros ten,<sup>1018</sup> and Lindos fifteen.<sup>1019</sup> These financial data support the geographic and commercial data of Rhodes and, suggest strongly that the island was an important trade hub of the eastern Mediterranean, and probably the cause why the Athenians wished to have control over a lucrative area such as this.

Control of Rhodes became a key priority for states with aspirations to sea power and commercial traffic control. Not surprisingly, the island became a battle zone not only between Greeks, but also between Christian and Muslim forces for many later centuries.<sup>1020</sup> Such an advantageous position could therefore not have been unnoticed by the Athenians. Modern analyses usually imply that the Athenians relied entirely on a grain supply from the Black Sea, but the supply of grain was too important for the Athenians to rely on a single source alone and consequently the impact of the southern routes should not be underestimated.<sup>1021</sup>

## 5.2.2 A dual Athenian interest: Rhodes and the Hellespont

Herodotos tells us that after the battle of Plataea “the Hellespont and the islands

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<sup>1013</sup> IG I<sup>3</sup> 263.I. 11; 265.II. 27; cf. 261.IV. 13; 262.V. 2; 264.II. 37.

<sup>1014</sup> IG I<sup>3</sup> 259.III. 8; 262.II. 15; 263.I. 13; 265.I. 9.

<sup>1015</sup> IG I<sup>3</sup> 259.IV. 6; cf. 261.IV. 14.

<sup>1016</sup> For details on Byzantine tribute, see note 1095-1098.

<sup>1017</sup> IG I<sup>3</sup> 285.I. 100 in 421/20.

<sup>1018</sup> IG I<sup>3</sup> 289.I. 34 in 416/5.

<sup>1019</sup> IG I<sup>3</sup> 285.I. 97, 290.I. 8 in 421/0 and 415/4.

<sup>1020</sup> Pryor, 1988, 7-8, 54.

<sup>1021</sup> Horden and Purcell, 2000, 139.

formed the prize for which they were to fight.”<sup>1022</sup> Indeed, moments after Plataea the victorious Greek navy had sailed to the Hellespont to assume control of the area.<sup>1023</sup> It is important to note that Athens had taken a particular interest in this region from the archaic period. Athens had spent many years trying to secure the area,<sup>1024</sup> as the Hellespontine cities and its extension the Propontis controlled the sea-link between the Aegean and the Euxine. Reasons for its control may have been different from time to time, but reasons were there. While the Athenians were trying to secure control of the Hellespont, an expedition was undertaken by Themistocles to restore Rhodes’ independence (478).<sup>1025</sup> Plutarch, who records a bitter poem by Timocreon concerning Themistocles’ actions, relates the story. The lyric poet from Rhodes assailed Themistocles because he had secured bribes for the restoration of exiles, but had neglected Timocreon himself, leaving him accused of medism. Bribe accusations were common against Athenian generals especially useful for political purposes.<sup>1026</sup> Herodotos seems to be familiar with the accusations put on Themistocles in 480 as he describes the acquisition of money from Karystos, Paros, and other islands.<sup>1027</sup> Whether the charges of bribe taking were true or false, need not concern us here. What concerns us is the action per se since it is the only evidence regarding Themistocles’ actions. What Timocreon does state, however, and there is no reason not to believe him, is that Themistocles did interfere with the internal politics of Ialysos.<sup>1028</sup> From the poem, it can be inferred that Themistocles was independent enough to interfere in the internal affairs of the

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<sup>1022</sup> Herodotos 9.101.

<sup>1023</sup> Herodotos 6.106.4. Xanthippos remained to besiege Sestos, Herodotos 9.114; Thucydides 1.89.2; Diodoros 11.37.4. There seems to be a disagreement in the accounts on the presence of allies.

<sup>1024</sup> Plutarch *Kimon*. 14.1 attests of the struggles between Athens and Persia for control of the Chersonese. Walls were built by Pericles and waves of settlers followed, Plutarch *Pericles* 19. New settlers came in 343 (*hypothesis* to Demosthenes 8).

<sup>1025</sup> Timocreon *Fr*.1 in Plutarch *Themistocles* 21.3-7. Fornara, 1966, 257-271 dates the poem no earlier than 479, after the battle of Mycale and probably around 478/7 when the Delian League arose and before Themistocles went into exile. See also, Robertson, 1980, 61-78; Berthold, 1980, 32 and Meiggs, 1972, 55, 414-15 put the revolt in 478.

<sup>1026</sup> See Taylor, 2001, 154-172; Hamel, 1998, 62, 170.

<sup>1027</sup> Herodotos 8.111-112.

<sup>1028</sup> Plutarch *Themistocles* 21.4-5.

polis of Ialysos, or at least to give the impression that he had the power to do so.<sup>1029</sup>

Paying close attention to Athens' first steps towards naval hegemony is revealing not only of the state's purpose, but also of its strengths and weaknesses. In the post-Persian-Wars era, Athens sought to set the foundations for a naval empire by securing these important gateways of the Aegean.<sup>1030</sup> Not surprisingly, when Athens made its second attempt at hegemony after its defeat in the Peloponnesian War, Rhodes and the Hellespont appeared once again on its agenda, as shown by Konon's activities in 396-5 and those of Thrasybulos in 390-388. Konon launched his expedition against Sparta, not before, however, making great efforts to secure Rhodes.<sup>1031</sup> He was finally able to destroy the Spartan fleet in 394 off Knidos,<sup>1032</sup> then turned to the east Aegean freeing Kos, Mytilene, Samos and other islands, and in reaching the Hellespont, besieged Sestos and Abydos, but in vain.<sup>1033</sup> Technically a Persian victory, Athens was keen to represent the victory as Athenian.<sup>1034</sup> Thrasybulos was ordered to free Rhodes from Spartan control, but, having learned of a strong Spartan presence on the island, decided to sail first to the Hellespont to restore the old trading links with the cities, installed democracies in Byzantium and Chalcedon, and levied *dekate* on ships exiting the Pontus at Chrysopolis. When the following year Thrasybulos led his fleet south to Rhodes, he died at a raid in Aspendos.<sup>1035</sup> Even when these early fourth-century attempts at empire failed, the Second Athenian League had Rhodes and Byzantium among the founding members.<sup>1036</sup> Throughout their history the Athenians showed extreme care on controlling access to these two areas, the Aegean

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<sup>1029</sup> Diodoros 11.3.8 reports a Rhodian squadron on the Persian side at Salamis and it was familiar practice for cities under Persian rule to have an administration friendly to Persia.

<sup>1030</sup> See Robertson, 1980, 65-67 who argues *ex silentio* that Themistocles did play his part in the rise of maritime Athens, even though he is not directly connected with it as Kimon and Aristides. I agree with Robertson, that the naval hero of Athens was cast away by internal Athenian politics which wished to detach Themistocles from his naval achievements.

<sup>1031</sup> *Hellenica Oxyrhynchia* 18; Androtion *FGrH* 324 F 46; cf. *IG* II<sup>2</sup> 19 Athenian honours for a Rhodian.

<sup>1032</sup> Xenophon *Hellenica* 4.3.10-12; Diodoros 14.83.4-7; Pausanias 3.9.6; Philochoros *FGrH* 328 F 145.

<sup>1033</sup> Xenophon *Hellenica* 4.8.3-6; Diodoros 14.84.3-4.

<sup>1034</sup> *RO* 11.

<sup>1035</sup> Xenophon *Hellenica* 4.8.20, 25-30, 5.1 cf. Xenophon *Hellenica* 1.1.22; Diodoros 14. 97, 99. See Cawkwell, 1976, 270-277, for matters of chronology and Thrasybulos's imperialism.

<sup>1036</sup> *IG* II<sup>2</sup> 43. 79-89.

gateways of trade to foreign resources.<sup>1037</sup>

However, Rhodes was not just a trading post and Isocrates and Demosthenes remind us of Rhodes' many attributes. Isocrates referred to the significance of controlling the islands near the coast of Asia Minor as stepping-stones for promoting the Athenian policy on the opposite shore,<sup>1038</sup> while Demosthenes described Rhodes as a fortress to overawe Caria.<sup>1039</sup> Rhodes seems also to have been a fertile land; Pindar, in his Ode for Dorieos' father Diagoras, said that the island was blessed with a rich land for men and teeming with flocks.<sup>1040</sup> Finally, the Athenian tribute lists are very telling of Rhodes' prosperity, which to a large part, must have come from trade. In conclusion, there seems to be a very strong link between the Hellespont and Rhodes. Both stood on the supply lanes that brought grain into Greece, something that Athens sought to control.

### 5.2.3 Seeing through the enemy's eyes

What was considered strategically important to Athens might be unimportant to Arcadia, e.g. Oropos. Moreover, the value changes depending on the national perspective a state has to this world. That is, the Hellespont was of crucial importance to Athens for its access to the grain markets of the Black Sea, yet of almost no importance to Sicily. It can be argued, however, that the importance of the Hellespont to Athens may be discerned from the amount of attention allotted to it by Sparta. Likewise, the same amount of attention can be allotted to Rhodes. Thus, the behaviour of Athens' enemies illuminates this study.

In 364, Epameinondas implemented a bold plan and sailed to Byzantium, Chios and Rhodes. His purpose is not clearly stated in Diodoros nor his reasons for visiting these cities

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<sup>1037</sup> See IG I<sup>3</sup> 1454; ATL 1. 497; Meiggs, 1982, 498 n. 36; Ma, 2009, 129-135 a decree concerning the Eteocarpaians, an island south of Rhodes, Athens honours the island for its benefaction, withdraws the troops from the acropolis, fixes a severe penalty to those wronging the Eteocarpaians, and an obligation is put on Kos, Knidos, and Rhodes to render assistance if any wrong happens (c. 445-430).

<sup>1038</sup> Isocrates 4.163-164.

<sup>1039</sup> Demosthenes 15.12.

<sup>1040</sup> Pindar *Ode* 7.63: πολύβοσκον γαῖαν ἀνθρώποισι καὶ εὐφρονα.

in particular.<sup>1041</sup> The discovery of a contemporary Knidian decree testifies to the Theban naval enterprise, but more importantly, it shows that more than three cities were paid a visit.<sup>1042</sup> In light of this decree it seems that Diodoros preferred to name in summary the key three cities that will later lead the rebellion against Athens, and which also happen to run the trade route from the Levant to the Hellespont. Though no official alliance is recorded, the enemy he sought help for was Athens as is deduced from Isocrates.<sup>1043</sup>

It is reported that Epaminondas led a hundred triremes, a fleet that required time and money to build, equip, and man.<sup>1044</sup> The Theban general opened diplomatic relations with the Byzantium, Chios, and Rhodes that are reported to have received him cordially, but none pledged its alliance to Thebes.<sup>1045</sup> The prospective allies may not have wished to risk Athenian reprisals, but Epameinondas' act probably stirred the waters in the eastern Aegean. The problem with this campaign was that it lacked ambitions of naval dominance, as although the Theban fleet may have appeared impressive, the experienced eyes of the islanders must have recognised that it was no match for the Athenian navy.<sup>1046</sup> It was one thing to have a strong assertive land power running up and down mainland Greece, and another to observe for the first time an infant Theban navy. Epameinondas should have known this too, but we cannot blame the general for lack of foresight. After all, it was not the first time that this general had cunningly plotted in this manner. Five years previously, in collaboration with the Arcadians, the Thebans dealt a lasting blow to Sparta's predominance in Peloponnese by liberating Messene and creating the city of Megalopolis. The city was created intentionally for the purpose of defence against Sparta and not for

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<sup>1041</sup> Diodoros 15.78.4 - 79.1.

<sup>1042</sup> Buckler and Beck, 2008, 199-210; Buckler, 1998, 192-205.

<sup>1043</sup> Isocrates 5.53; Plutarch *Philopoemen* 14.2. Cargill, 1981, 183, 192-193.

<sup>1044</sup> Diodoros 15.78.4-15.79.1; Justin 16.4.3-4; cf. Buckler, 1980, 155, 160-175 suggests the possibility of Persian finance. On a different estimation for the number of triremes built see Stylianou, 1998, 494-497; Cawkwell, 1972, 270-271.

<sup>1045</sup> Diodoros 15.78.4-15.79.1; Justin 16.4.3-4. Cf. Buckler, 1980, 155, 160-175; Cawkwell, 1972, 270-271.

<sup>1046</sup> Cawkwell, 1972, 270-271. Buckler, 2008, ch. 12 discusses the Boeotian fleet and its naval base in Aulis and the surrounded area.



trade.<sup>1047</sup> With a strong Arcadia close to Laconia and friendly to Messene, and with the Peloponnesian League dissolved, the seed for everlasting Spartan disorder was sown, keeping the Lakedaimonians busy whilst draining their resources. Epameinondas had done the unthinkable and freed Messene; why not do the same with Athens' allies whose allegiance was not to be depended upon? His policy may seem odd at first but, Rhodes, Chios, and Byzantium were the pillars of the eastern Aegean, vital for Athenian aspirations to power. When finally the simultaneous withdrawal of Rhodes, Chios, and Byzantium from Athens' sphere of influence takes place in 355 it will have significant results.<sup>1048</sup> This was what Epameinondas was hoping for. "Even if not accepted *de jure*, the *de facto* separation of key allies was a direct consequence – whether immediately or soon afterward – of the weakened state of the alliance and its hegemon."<sup>1049</sup> Chios, Rhodes and Byzantium, were part of Epameinondas' preemptive plan to constrain Athens, as he had done successfully in the Peloponnese against Sparta.<sup>1050</sup> Hence, I do not follow Ruzicka that Thebes was looking to gain naval hegemony in order to impress the Persians.<sup>1051</sup> Epameinondas clearly had an agenda to hit Athens where it hurt most. It is then highly possible that Epameinondas sought to accomplish the same feat with Athens being on the receiving end this time. His purpose must have been to instigate revolt inside the Second Athenian League that would ultimately cause Athens to lose principal allied cities, namely Byzantium, Chios and Rhodes. If successful, Athens would be too weak to voice any opposition against Thebes.

Two years earlier in 366, the Theban army, in collaboration with the tyrant of Eretria, successfully took the Athenians by surprise and held the city of Oropos.<sup>1052</sup> We cannot

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<sup>1047</sup> Demand, 1990, 119.

<sup>1048</sup> See page 90.

<sup>1049</sup> Cargill, 1981, 184.

<sup>1050</sup> Hanson, 2010, 93-117.

<sup>1051</sup> Ruzicka, 1998.

<sup>1052</sup> The loss of Oropos in 366 led to bitter sentiment in Athens towards the Thebans, whereas the Athenians in a surprising diplomatic breakthrough immediately signed a treaty offered by Lycomedes of Arcadia which had the

dismiss the obvious, namely that as in the case of Tanagra and Plataea, Oropos featured negatively in Atheno-Theban relations because of territorial disputes.<sup>1053</sup> However, the seizure of Oropos achieved more than this as it occupied an important role in strategy and trade communications and was highly valued by the Athenians. Ober observes from the fort of Oropos: “the view from the hilltop is excellent to the north, commanding the bay, the western Oropian plain, much of the Euripus straits, and a wide stretch of the coast of Euboea including the sites of Chalkis and Eretria.”<sup>1054</sup> As far as trade communications were concerned, transported goods coming from Euboea crossed over to Oropos and then travelled along the Dekeleia route to reach the markets of Athens.<sup>1055</sup> In fact Euboea was a key source of food for Athens during, before, and after the Peloponnesian War.<sup>1056</sup> From a military standpoint, Oropos was used as a naval base by the Athenians and according to Thucydides, while in Athenian hands it became a matter of great discomfort to Eretria and the whole of Euboea.<sup>1057</sup> Thus in a short period of time the Thebans tried to detach from Athens the principal areas of Rhodes, Byzantium, Oropos and Euboea. Was it accidental? To answer this, we now turn to Sparta, although the military history of the Ionian War is far too complex to discuss in this chapter.<sup>1058</sup> Snapshots of events, however, will show that although Sparta employed a different approach to the aforementioned places, their actions here were

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distinctive mark of been allied at the same time with both Sparta and Arcadia. The seizure of Oropos led to recriminations in Athens, with Kallistratos and Chabrias prosecuted in a trial so impressive that it was said that young Demosthenes first attested the speech by Kallistratos and was so impressed that at that moment knew what his future career will be, Plutarch *Demosthenes* 5.1-4, 7.

<sup>1053</sup> Alexander finally gave it back to them in 335. Demades, the orator who achieved this great act, was awarded the most exceptional honours the polis could give, Dinarchos 1.101.

<sup>1054</sup> Ober, 1985, 140. Thucydides 7.28.1; Herodotos 9.15 confirm this claim. Chalkis’s importance in controlling Euboea and Boeotia appears in the Hellenistic times with the famous “fetters of Greece”, reported by Constantine Porphyrogenitus *Embassies* 9 and Polybios 18.45.6.

<sup>1055</sup> For Oropos see Mazarakis, 2007; Cosmopoulos, 2001.

<sup>1056</sup> Andokides 3.9; Thucydides 7.28.1; Demosthenes 19.326; 18.87; Plutarch *Demosthenes* 17; cf. Thucydides 2.14. Moreno, 2007, 81 makes a good argument that the role of Euboea as a grain supplier should not be undervalued.

<sup>1057</sup> As Athenian base: Herodotos 6.100-1. Petrakos, 1997, 490-492, and a matter of great discomfort in Thucydides 8.60.1.

<sup>1058</sup> The complexity of Spartan policy at the beginning of the Ionian War is described in Thucydides 8.6-8. First, Agis wished to take Euboea, then to support the Lesbians. Some in the Spartan assembly wished to support Ionia and Chios. Others argued for the Hellespont. The Persian satraps also had a say on this. Pharnabazos supported the attack on the Hellespont, while Tissaphernes that on Chios. The Spartans resolved to support the Chians, but in the end, after diplomatic maneuvers, all four suggestions were carried out. Ships were sent to Lesbos, and Chios. A third mission under Clearchus went to the Hellespont, but without the help of Pharnabazos who withdrew after the initial decision. The mission to Euboea was carried out in autumn 411 (8.95).

of a similar magnitude.

The Spartan method of conventional ravaging proved inefficient, and eventually, the Spartans realised that Athens could only be pressured into submission. To this end, the Spartans gradually adopted new techniques of socio-economic warfare to exert pressure on the Athenians. One such method was *epiteichismos*, an offensive fortification established on enemy soil in order to serve as a centre for raiding and socio-economic destruction.<sup>1059</sup> Sparta took control of Dekeleia in 413 under King Agis II, in order to disrupt the movement of goods from Euboea to Athens via Oropos.<sup>1060</sup> It is to be noted that the Thebans were the ones who took Oropos in 411 as part of a plan to prevent Sparta from controlling the area.<sup>1061</sup> But that was not enough, and new approaches to increase the socio-economic pressure on Athens were also generated. The goal was now to cut the Athenian source of supply by attacking the Athenian empire rather than Athens itself (This indirect approach saw campaigns aimed at attacking Athens' supply lines, perhaps as early as the 420s with Brasidas' Thracian campaign).

Athens' ability to rely on Euboea ended in autumn 411 when after a naval defeat at the Euripus strait, Euboea broke out of the Athenian grasp.<sup>1062</sup> Thucydides refers to the event as a "terrifying loss, even more than the Sicilian one, for the Athenians were more dependent on Euboea than on Attica".<sup>1063</sup> Demosthenes provides further support to the importance of Euboea to Athenian geopolitics, when he explicitly stated to the Athenian audience, specifically after Philip II gained control of Byzantium, Thebes, and Euboea, that

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<sup>1059</sup> Thucydides 7.19.1-2, 27-28; Hellenica *Oxyrhynchia* 17.4-5.

<sup>1060</sup> Thucydides 7.28.1; 8.95, 96. Moreno, 2007, 118-126.

<sup>1061</sup> Thucydides 8.60. Cf. their support of the Lesbian initiative at Thucydides 8.5.2-4, partly to keep King Agis from intervening in Euboea, part also of the growing tension between the two states in these years. Note that the Peloponnesian fleet had already captured Rhodes before the seizure of Oropos, Thucydides 8.44.

<sup>1062</sup> Thucydides 8.60, 95-96 the Spartans refused an invitation from Eretria to attack Euboea and chose to attack Chios. The attack failed.

<sup>1063</sup> Thucydides. 8.96; [Aristotle] *Athenaion Politeia* 33.1. Much more evidence exists on the specific importance of Euboea for Athenian defence and supply, see Thucydides 2.26, 32; 3.17; 8.74, 86, 95.

Philip II was now the man in charge of the grain trade.<sup>1064</sup> Hence, Oropos-Dekeleia played a central role in the Athenian trade route, one that was intertwined with Euboea.<sup>1065</sup> It is to be noted that in 413/12 Agis wanted to seize Euboea, but he had been deflected from doing so.<sup>1066</sup> Theban pressure and Sparta's wish to assume first control of Ionia forced King Agis to prefer Lesbos to Euboea. Lesbos was a large Aegean island, close to the Hellespont, with ties to the Black Sea,<sup>1067</sup> and a supplier of ships to Athens.<sup>1068</sup> The revolt at Chios and Erythrai also assisted the Spartan decision.<sup>1069</sup>

In the following year 412/11, Sparta was asked to intervene in the Aegean when a series of Athenian allies revolted.<sup>1070</sup> Sparta attempted first to exploit the insurrection in Ionia and Chios, a significant source of money, ships and experienced marines. Lack of these resources posed Sparta problems and although some in the Spartan home government wished to attack the Hellespont, this would mean a decisive naval clash with Athens, one that in 412 Sparta was unable to execute. This explains why Sparta focused on Ionia, and did not immediately attack the Hellespont. At the same time, Sparta continued to reinforce herself with ships from various allies,<sup>1071</sup> but most importantly by signing a treaty with Persia.<sup>1072</sup>

In the winter of 412/411, twenty seven triremes and eleven Spartan advisors sailed for Ionia, but, having being spotted by the Athenians at Melos, continued southwards and ended up at Kaunos. The fleet was needed to relieve the Chians, as the Spartans were still struggling to control the east Aegean. There the Spartan naval general Astyochos made a far-reaching decision. He abandoned the mission of convoying reinforcements to Chios and

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<sup>1064</sup> Demosthenes 18.241; note that Rhodes was probably under the Carian thumb at this time.

<sup>1065</sup> Ober, 1985, 115.

<sup>1066</sup> Thucydides 8.5.2.

<sup>1067</sup> Keen, 2000, 64, Bresson, 2000, 164.

<sup>1068</sup> Thucydides 6.85.2; 7.57.5.

<sup>1069</sup> Thucydides. 8.5.4.

<sup>1070</sup> Thucydides 8.3.2 the Spartans were already planning a campaign on the Aegean.

<sup>1071</sup> Diodoros 13.38.4-5, 45.1. Thucydides 8.2.3.

<sup>1072</sup> After continuous negotiations in 412/11 with the Persian satrap of Lydia, Tissaphernes, Thucydides reports three treaties: a) in 8.17.4-18; b) in 8.29, 36-37; and 8.57-8 revised edition came in spring 411.

attacked Kos,<sup>1073</sup> shifting the theatres of war to the Dodecanese. The Athenian commander Charminos engaged him in a naval battle off Syme, which the Athenian lost and Astyochos then assumed control of Syme and Knidos.<sup>1074</sup> On hearing the news, the whole Athenian navy sailed to Syme from Samos (ἐκ τῆς Σάμου ναυσὶ πάσαις), but no battle ensued as no one was willing to attack.<sup>1075</sup> Following the Athenian fleet's departure back to Samos, Dorieos, an exiled Rhodian aristocrat from Ialysos and the probable head of the Rhodian oligarchy, invited the Spartans to take control of Rhodes.<sup>1076</sup> This triggered operations by the Athenians, who made raids from Kos and Chalce.<sup>1077</sup> It is to be noted that some in Sparta were from the beginning of the Peloponnesian War aware of the importance of the south-east Aegean to Athenian commerce. Peloponnesian pirates, as Thucydides calls them, lay on the shores of Caria and Lycia in order to hinder the navigation of merchant ships coming from Phaselis, Phoenicia and other parts of Asia.<sup>1078</sup>

An interesting event with Dorieos took place when Phanosthenes, the Athenian general to relieve Konon from the command at Andros, intercepted two Thurian ships and its crews. The captives were all imprisoned, with the exception of Dorieos who was released without ransom. Xenophon says that this happened out of pity.<sup>1079</sup> But why would Phanosthenes allow Dorieos to walk away, especially since this man had joined the Spartan fleet and had been sentenced to death by the Athenians and his native city? The most obvious response would be to send Dorieos for trial in Athens, and win political favour for himself. That he let Dorieos free might have to do with a personal arrangement; maybe Phanosthenes hoped that Dorieos would reconsider and support the Athenian cause in

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<sup>1073</sup> Thucydides 8.39; 8.40, 42.1-2. The Chians complained to Sparta about Astyochos's failure to help them, Thucydides 38.4.

<sup>1074</sup> Thucydides 8.41.4.

<sup>1075</sup> Thucydides 8.43.

<sup>1076</sup> Thucydides 8.44. Dorieus was a Diagorid (descendant of the Olympic victor Diagoras: Pausanias 6.7.1-4), who joined the Spartan fleet, Pausanias 4.24.2-3, 6.7.4; Xenophon *Hellenica* 1.5.19.

<sup>1077</sup> Diodoros 13. 69. 5.

<sup>1078</sup> Thucydides 2.69.

<sup>1079</sup> Xenophon *Hellenica* 1.5.7.

Rhodes. Yet the Athenians were unsuccessful, with the Spartans also wanting to secure Rhodes for their benefit. Sources report of Spartan generals present in Rhodes to raise ships,<sup>1080</sup> to recruit sailors and troops,<sup>1081</sup> to levy money (32 talents),<sup>1082</sup> and use the island as a base of operations.<sup>1083</sup>

While in control, the Spartan navy was successful in capturing a number of merchant ships coming from Egypt and probably heading to Athens.<sup>1084</sup> Andokides in a speech dated c. 410-405 refers to the difficulties of ships coming from Cyprus to Athens. The emphasis is in that he was able to secure a large number of grain ships from Cyprus amidst international dangers. Unfortunately, Andokides covers in a veil of mystery of how he was able to do such a thing.<sup>1085</sup> Hence Astyochos' decision had effectively stretched the Athenians too far, and consequently denied them access to an area rich in experienced sailors and tribute, and importantly the control of the south-east sea route.

Xenophon provides a crucial insight into what might have been the Spartan policy. As King Agis II stood at Dekeleia, he watched the grain-ships sailing into Piraeus, and realised the futility of land attacks unless Sparta could control the sources of food,<sup>1086</sup> something the Spartan government should also have identified. Following this an attempt against Byzantium was made, and in 411 Byzantium went over to Sparta.<sup>1087</sup> However, Alcibiades' efforts would see the return of the city in 409/8 and it remained there until the end of the war.<sup>1088</sup> Sparta again concentrated on Ionia and Rhodes, until Lysander during

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<sup>1080</sup> Xenophon *Hellenica* 1.5.1; Diodoros 13.70 infers clearly that Lysander added to his forces the ships possessed by Rhodes.

<sup>1081</sup> Xenophon *Hellenica* 1.6.3. Cf. Thucydides 6.43 Rhodes sent two pentekontors and 700 slingers to Sicily. Of importance, is also an inscription of 440-420 concerning Lindos, and refers to generals (στραταγοί), hoplites (τῶν στ[ρ]ατιωτᾶ[ν]), and pay (μισθόν) in SEG. 4.171; *Clara Rhodos* 9, 1938, 211.

<sup>1082</sup> Thucydides 8.44.4.

<sup>1083</sup> Xenophon *Hellenica* 2.1.15 -17. Doriaeus's actions against Athens were also part of Spartan plans, Diodoros 13.45.1; Xenophon *Hellenica* 1.1.2.

<sup>1084</sup> Thucydides 8.35.2. Hornblower, 1991-2008, vol. III uses caution, but speculates too that these ships were heading to Athens.

<sup>1085</sup> Andokides 2.20.

<sup>1086</sup> Xenophon *Hellenica* 1.1.35. Braund 2007 discusses Athens's ability to import grain from various places.

<sup>1087</sup> Thucydides 8.80.3; Diodoros 13.34.2.

<sup>1088</sup> Xenophon *Hellenica* 1.3.15-22, 1.22; Polybios 4.44.4; Diodoros 13.64.2. Byzantium surrenders to Lysander,

his second term was able to resume activities. Lysander sailing from Rhodes, intercepted ships at the Hellespont,<sup>1089</sup> causing a state of alarm in Athens. Later, he won the decisive battle at Aigospotamoi, blockaded the Hellespont,<sup>1090</sup> and forced Athens into submission. Pressure on the Hellespont would later be Sparta's tactic in 387/6 in order to force Athens into Antalcidas' peace.<sup>1091</sup> What Xenophon tries to explain is the understanding in Sparta that if Athens was to be defeated, a number of cities closely attached to Athens due to their role in trade and strategy needed to change hands. The move into Rhodes forms part of this plan and it seems it was necessary first. Following the capture of Rhodes and Euboea, the Spartans gradually felt powerful enough to move against the Hellespont.

In 394, Sparta lost sea supremacy at the battle of Knidos. A few years later, a telling event reminds us of the importance of Rhodes. Xenophon describes how in 391/90, a group of Rhodian oligarchic leaders came to Sparta and identified the danger of allowing an island like Rhodes to be subjugated to Athens, "they set forth that it was not expedient for the Lakedaimonians to allow the Athenians to subdue Rhodes and thus gain for them so great a power".<sup>1092</sup> Xenophon clearly states that the actions taken by the Spartans, in sending a fleet to assist the oligarchic party, was because they feared Athens would acquire great power if it controlled Rhodes (καὶ τοσαύτην δύναμιν συνθεμένους).<sup>1093</sup> Athens, alarmed by the possibility of Sparta "acquiring again such power on the sea" (πάλιν δύναμιν κατασκευάζεσθαι ἐν τῇ θαλάττῃ),<sup>1094</sup> sent Thrasybulos with forty ships to deal with the problem. Xenophon therefore clearly implies that there was a relation between Rhodes and sea power. Both Konon in 396-5 and Thrasybulos in 390-388 attempted to secure Rhodes and Byzantium.

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Xenophon *Hellenica* 2.2.1.

<sup>1089</sup> Xenophon *Hellenica* 2.1.17.

<sup>1090</sup> Xenophon *Hellenica* 2.2.9, 11, 16. See now Braund, 2007.

<sup>1091</sup> Xenophon *Hellenica* 5.1.28-29.

<sup>1092</sup> Xenophon *Hellenica* 4.8.20

<sup>1093</sup> Xenophon *Hellenica* 4.8.21-24; Diodoros 14.97.

<sup>1094</sup> Xenophon *Hellenica* 4.8.25.

Thucydides does not specifically tell us of Rhodes' position concerning the south-eastern Aegean route, although he says nothing about Byzantium either. Why Thucydides decided to ignore the revolt of Byzantium, and not even mention the Athenian reactions to its loss as he did in the case of Euboea and Chios, is one of the puzzling events of his narrative. Byzantium had a most prestigious position on the line of northern communications, and paid a high tribute to the Athenian League. In fact, the city paid one of the highest tributes of the League, surpassed only by Aegina's thirty talents. For the year 450/49 fifteen talents;<sup>1095</sup> in 432/2 the tribute was raised to eighteen talents and one thousand eight hundred drachmae.<sup>1096</sup> Two years later (430/29) the tribute adjusted to twenty one talents and 3,420 drachmae.<sup>1097</sup> Thucydides is not the only one to bypass Byzantium's importance. Demosthenes, in the crucial years before Chaeronea where Philip threatened to take control of Byzantium, discussed many times the importance of defending Byzantium (συμφέρει τῇ πόλει), but abstained from telling to his audience that the interest of Athens in this case, was the protection of the grain supplies coming from the Black Sea.<sup>1098</sup> He only did so in abstract terms during his famous judicial oration *On the Crown* delivered in 330, long after the Athenians were defeated by the Macedonians and at a time when there was grain scarcity. The latter may explain the reason for this specification. Finally, Isocrates in *To Philip*, refers too in abstract terms about the revenues extracted from Amphipolis.<sup>1099</sup>

Byzantium was considered one of the best situated, both geographically and strategically, cities in antiquity. Its rising wealth is evident from the fifth-century Athenian tribute lists. If the tribute money paid by the Byzantines to Athens is taken as measure of comparison then Rhodes was not far off, since during the peace of Nicias (421-415) the total sum of the Rhodian cities rose to 30 talents, and when the three cities merged in 408, the

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<sup>1095</sup> IG I<sup>3</sup> 263.v. 16.

<sup>1096</sup> IG I<sup>3</sup> 279.II. 32.

<sup>1097</sup> IG I<sup>3</sup> 281.III. 18.

<sup>1098</sup> Demosthenes 8.14-16; 9.34-35; 10.68; 18.71, 87, 241.

<sup>1099</sup> Isocrates 5.2.5; Thucydides 4.108.1.



revenues of Rhodes should have been substantially higher. In addition, Rhodes was positioned on the line of southern communications almost equal in importance as that of Byzantium. It should therefore follow that Rhodes and Byzantium were equally important to the overall Athenian foreign policy. Thus, the most plausible explanation for this omission is that the ancient sources did not need to describe in detail places whose importance was transparent to their contemporary audience.

Furthermore, a politician may have taken a different course of action instead of arguing on manifested interests such as sea routes and natural resources.<sup>1100</sup> In *For the Freedom of the Rhodians*, 352/1, a speech delivered in the Athenian assembly on the matter of a possible Athenian intervention to reinstate Rhodes' democratic government, Demosthenes uses moral reasoning to argue for an intervention in Rhodes. He focuses on how beneficial the outcome would be for Athens if it decided to help the Rhodians, as this would restore Athens publicly from the negative propaganda shed on it (διαβαλλόντων) during the Social War. Demosthenes abstains from using the arguments of realism – he makes no mention of sea routes, supply of grain or revenues – because he understood that such line of argument would not benefit his cause as I have shown in chapter Two. Hence, we should not follow the supposition that absence of ancient evidence is evidence of absence.

Several conclusions can therefore be reached from this analysis. First, Rhodes held a specific geostrategic and commercial position noticeable in the fifth and fourth centuries. Second, the initial Athenian steps to naval hegemony, (both the Delian League and the Second Athenian League) enlist Rhodes, Byzantium, and Euboea among their early members and such attention cannot be accidental. For Athens, Rhodes was an essential part for its longer-term ambition of controlling the sea-routes of the Aegean.<sup>1101</sup> Rhodes could

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<sup>1100</sup> See chapter 2.

<sup>1101</sup> See also Thucydides 1.36.2 and Xenophon *Hellenica* 6.2.9 whereby Corcyra was said to command the coastal route to Italy.

draw on additional supplies, effectively increasing grain accessibility, and therefore relieving Athens of its dependence on the Hellespontine grain route, as well as a valuable base for war activities. Third, the enemies of Athens thought it was vital to deprive Athens of such an asset. Both Epameinondas' plan and Spartan moves in the Ionian War embody an attack on cities adjacent to the three supply lanes (Rhodes, Byzantium, and Euboea) in a close timeframe. Fourth, the anti-Athenian strategy as applied to Rhodes demonstrates that this was not an isolated event but was connected with the Athenian supply-route. For this reason, Sparta and later Thebes went to great lengths to stop supplies pouring into Athens. This was in line with the role natural resources had in political conflict. To stay ahead of its opponent, a state needed to incorporate a policy that aimed at limiting access to resources (including money, ships and sailors) that otherwise would empower the opposition. A strategy that may be described as strategic denial. This is beautifully summarised in the words of an Athenian pamphleteer, "In addition, they will forbid export to wherever any of our enemies are, on pain of being unable to use the sea."<sup>1102</sup> Both Sparta and Thebes understood that to have any effect on Athens and to tip the scales of war in their favour, their strategy needed to incorporate attacks on places that were important for supplying the Athenians, evidenced by Athens yielding twice to the Spartans when the latter took control of the Hellespont.<sup>1103</sup> What has not been said is that in both cases Rhodes and Euboea were already out of Athenian reach. This explains why the loss of the Hellespont had the effect that it had at a particular time. In conclusion, it may be surmised that as far as Athens was concerned, Rhodes was another important area of the military and commercial sea routes that traverse the Aegean.

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<sup>1102</sup> [Xenophon] *Athenaion Politeia* 2.11-12. Demosthenes 18.302 also explains this reasoning: he gathered support for Athens and built its defences, and at the same time prevented Philip II from gaining resources which would have increased his power.

<sup>1103</sup> Xenophon *Hellenica* 2.2.1-10; 5.1.28-29. Harris, 1995, 62, 73-74; Sinclair, 1978, 49. The grain supply was again at risk in 376, but this time the Athenians proceeded to risk a naval battle at Naxos, and won: Xenophon *Hellenica* 5.4.60.1. Stroud, 1998, 119. The Peace of Philocrates in 346, partly came about because Philip II promised not to advance too close to the Hellespont and, thus, not to threaten the Athenian grain supply, see Harris, 1995, 73-74. Philip II does attempt against Byzantium and Perinthos, and seizes Athenian grain-ships at Hieron, Theopompos and Philochoros in Didymos *On the Chersonese* col. 10.49-62 in Harding, 2006.

## Natural Resources as Historical Evidence

I have drawn attention to continuity in Athenian policy towards strategic natural resources over a period of two centuries. Our picture so far suggests that natural resources played a central role in influencing state behaviour, motivating expansion, spurring commerce and sparking wars. A variety of actions undertaken by Athens reveals the impetus for natural resource acquisition. Athenian foreign policy placed emphasis on both diplomatic manoeuvres and military might in order to facilitate access to natural resources. Athenian history furnishes us with numerous examples: Thasos' silver tempted Athenian triremes to make landfall on the isle. Eion and Amphipolis provided access to Thracian timber and silver, while the Athenian dominance of Keos indicates the drive to secure mineral deposits in the Aegean Sea. It is to be noted, however, that to some extent it was as much trade as concern for natural resources that is motivating Athens. But, I see the two as interrelated since trade is the medium for resources to arrive in Athens. In addition, this thesis has placed emphasis on the geo-strategic nature of space, which includes location in relation to the lines of movement that carry natural resources. With Rhodes as the point of focus, the strategic importance of sea routes and islands in terms of the value Athens placed upon space has been revealed. Likewise, the dispute over the Hellespont, the diplomatic policies with the Black Sea rulers, and the Adriatic colony illustrate the Athenian aim of controlling trade in grain supplies. All are illustrative of the interplay between natural resources, geography and politics. In short, Athenian ventures in the Aegean were to a large extent tied up with the acquisition, protection and control of natural resources, all with the purpose of strengthening the city's defensive and offensive capabilities and, ultimately, as an effective method of obtaining hegemony.

These findings illuminate the underlying historical reality. They enable us to analyse some historical documents, to apply the theory that natural resources are drivers in state behaviour, and to hypothesize that our understanding of certain lacunose and fragmentary sources can be enhanced through focusing on natural resources. In view of the above, the final chapter will apply our understanding of the impact of natural resources on the self-interested calculation of Athens, to better assess the political context of its policy following the peace at Athens in 371 until the beginning of the Social War in 357. It will do so through a case study that puts together the various factors and examines them within a set period of time in the context of Athenian geopolitical strategies and natural resource acquisition, as discussed in the previous chapters. Thus its geographical scope covers Thraco-Macedonia, the Hellespont, and Keos. Athenian foreign policy on the Greek mainland, which aimed to ensure the balance of power, will therefore not be considered here. Fixed interests motivated Athens' mainland policy, following Sparta's defeat at Leuktra. With a hostile Arcadia, Argos, Elis, and Euboea, and a powerful neighbouring Thebes, Athens and Sparta found themselves confronted by a block of enemies that surrounded the two. Hard decisions had to be made, evidenced by the hot debates that sprung up in the Athenian assembly on what was the appropriate course of action. Finally, the Athenians extended the hand of friendly relations to the Spartans.<sup>1104</sup> This part of foreign policy is of course, very important, but it can be a thesis on its own. Furthermore, it is not related with methods of access to natural resources. The aim instead, was the preservation of balance of power in Greece. That is, to protect the sovereignty of Athens the latter had to counterbalance Thebes' power by assuming the mission of protecting Sparta, its northern Peloponnesian allies, holding the lines of communication open between the north and the south by preventing further Theban forces from coming into the Peloponnese. Hence a decision was made not to

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<sup>1104</sup> Xenophon *Hellenica* 6.3, 4-17; 7.1.12-14. Kallistratos was the proposer of the decree of 369/8, which explained to Mytilene Athens' change of alignment: the justification of Athens' new policy does not survive, *IG* II<sup>2</sup> 107; *RO* 31. He was remembered as the one who saved the Lakedaemonians, Demosthenes 59.27.

include such discussion as it will take the argument further afield.

## 6.1 Claiming Amphipolis

Athens' interest in Amphipolis was not new. Athens had long been involved in Thrace as far back as the 470s, taking control of Eion and the Thasian *peraia*. The crown jewel of this development was the colonisation of Amphipolis which intended to provide Athens with a permanent position in southwestern Thrace. Athens retained focus on this region, but the Peloponnesian War ended all that. While Athens was able to regain ties to the area in the 390s, it was not until the late 370s that Athens began a renewed and focused presence in southwestern Thrace, a presence driven by the need for resource access.

The major reason for Athens' renewed involvement in Amphipolis was the need for access to Thracian natural resources, primarily timber and silver. Since the catastrophe of 404 where it was limited to only 12 ships,<sup>1105</sup> Athens' fleet had grown rapidly to c. 100 triremes by 378.<sup>1106</sup> This level of growth demanded a substantial supply of timber materials if it were to maintain a sizeable fleet. The demand must have risen a little before the foundation of the Second Athenian League. Continued naval growth in Athens required access to foreign timber, as Athens did not have a substantial natural resource base that could meet the demands of an expanding naval building. For the 370s Xenophon stressed that the Athenians: "have not even enough [timber] for themselves unless they buy it".<sup>1107</sup>

The first step towards assembling this kind of navy was through commercial and diplomatic channels. Details for the early fourth century are scant, but it is possible Athens

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<sup>1105</sup> Xenophon *Hellenica* 2.2.20.

<sup>1106</sup> IG II<sup>2</sup> 1604. Clark, 1990, 47-67.

<sup>1107</sup> Xenophon *Hellenica* 6.1.11.

sought a northern connection to timber through the alliance with the cities of Chalkidike.<sup>1108</sup> In the 370s the picture improves, perhaps due to the rise of the Second Athenian League. A treaty was signed between Athens and the Macedonian King Amyntas III, which greatly improved the relationship between the parties and secured Macedonian timber for the Athenians.<sup>1109</sup> Even though the treaty as we have it is fragmentary and the details unclear, Xenophon is a witness to the Athenians procuring much wanted Macedonian timber in the 370s.<sup>1110</sup> Amyntas III also granted permission for export to private citizens; the general Timotheos received a considerable amount of timber, while in a law-court attack on Lasthenes Demosthenes connects Macedonian timber with bribery.<sup>1111</sup>

The possession of c. 100 triremes in 378 suggests that immediately after the King's Peace (386) the Athenians were again spurred on to a shipbuilding programme. This building programme succeeded precisely because the Athenians made official arrangements with local states, like the ones with Macedonia, although we would like to have better evidence for these. The Second Athenian League should have helped, as the alliance with Abdera, Samothrace, Ainos, and probably Thasos, provided access to northern timber, naval bases and friendly harbours. But whatever the relationship of these states with Athens, the latter believed it was not enough. The opportunity came in 371, when Sparta acknowledged Athens as *hegemon* of the sea,<sup>1112</sup> and a few weeks later the catastrophe of Leuktra completely removed from Sparta any thoughts of naval control. Athens felt it was time to reassert certain old claims.

In 371 or 369 the Athenians asked for and received recognition of their right to Amphipolis. Precisely when the Hellenes agreed to this is still uncertain, because Amyntas III of Macedonia, who had recognised the Athenian claim, died during the year 370/69. The

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<sup>1108</sup> Xenophon *Hellenica* 5.2.16. Tod II 199.

<sup>1109</sup> Tod II 129. Borza, 1987, 45; Cargill, 1981, 85-87.

<sup>1110</sup> Xenophon *Hellenica* 6.1.11.

<sup>1111</sup> Demosthenes 49.26-30; 19.265. IG I<sup>3</sup> 89.

<sup>1112</sup> IG II<sup>2</sup> 43. Xenophon *Hellenica* 7.1ff.

exact time of his death is not known and as two meetings were held in Athens during that period, one in 371 and one in 369, scholars have considered both possibilities.<sup>1113</sup> It is not difficult to recognise the main reason why the Athenians wished to reassert their rights in the north. Amphipolis was well placed to provide Athens with a permanent position in southwestern Thrace, on routes leading to Macedonia and close to the silver mines, and was ideally suited for the “conveyance of timber and revenue” (ἡ πόλις αὐτοῖς ἦν ὠφέλιμος ξύλων τε ναυπηγησίμων πομπῇ καὶ χρημάτων προσόδῳ).<sup>1114</sup> With the new shipbuilding policy well underway timber was a matter of importance if not necessity.

The importance of the claim to Amphipolis lies in the fact that despite friendly diplomatic overtures to the Kings of Macedonia, the Chalkidic cities, and other suppliers of timber who must have supplied Athens with enough timber to assert a Second Athenian League, Athens was not satisfied with short-term treaties or grants to traders, or access to timber through friendship. Thus in 371 or 369 Athens reasserted its rights in the north and sent expeditionary forces to take Amphipolis. This was the ninth attempt to control Amphipolis; the expedition lasted more than ten years and reveals the impetus for acquisition of natural resources. The details of the war over Amphipolis were the focus of chapter Three. Here it is deemed sufficient to stress only the actual attempt on Amphipolis, which can be explained by the Athenian desire to access and use the natural resources of the area. As highlighted by Plato,<sup>1115</sup> war was the natural means of acquisition. For Athens it could not have been any other way. From the moment the Athenians took the decision to become a naval hegemon, or at least to throw their military weight into building a navy, it became necessary that a tremendous amount of timber materials should be sought out. That inevitably forced the Athenians to look to conquest as a secure means of sustaining such a

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<sup>1113</sup> Aeschines 2.31-2; Tod II 129; Xenophon *Hellenica* 6.5.1; Demosthenes 7.29; 19.253. Diodoros 15.60.3. Heskyl, 1997, 20, 40 puts Amyntas's death in 370 and prefers to push the date of the claim to Amphipolis in 371. Sealey, 1993, 75-76 suggests early 369. Heskyl, 1997, 102-3 has the Persian King recognising the Athenian claim not in 371 but at some later point, probably in 366.

<sup>1114</sup> Thucydides 4.108.

<sup>1115</sup> Plato *Laws* 626A.

large shipbuilding programme.

This reveals a wider desire on the part of the Athenians to gain an even more effective control over the resources of the region. It was better to have resources under Athenian control than to pay those who controlled them.<sup>1116</sup> Of course, other reasons may have co-existed, as Athens was now a leading player in the Aegean, and it would not be prudent to assign one motive to all actions. Yet ancient sources connect these Athenian actions with timber and precious metals, valid enough reasons for Athens to wage war. However, the plan was never to conquer Macedonia or Thrace. Their size and geography would have made them impossible for a Greek city to control. What the Athenians wanted was access to Thracian and Macedonian timber and silver mines through control of certain key cities. To achieve this, one option entailed control of the sea, which was physically impossible. Although a significant number of islands and coastal cities joined the Second Athenian League, we never get the picture of an assertive Athens in control of the Aegean. The other option was to exercise diplomacy. During the 370s Athenian diplomacy was successful in that King Amyntas III signed a treaty and later acknowledged the Athenian claim to Amphipolis. However, his death came at an unfortunate time, when the Athenians were still working on how to invade Amphipolis and with Thebes ready and willing to fill the power vacuum. The result was that Athens lost the support of Macedonia and Olynthus, which did not look favourably on the Athenian military presence in the area and took a hostile position against the Athenians by supporting Amphipolis.<sup>1117</sup>

Thus the option now was to exercise military pressure on the Macedonian Kings and Olynthus. The Athenians took control of Methone, Pydna, and Torone,<sup>1118</sup> and in the late 360s a cleruchy was installed in Potidaea.<sup>1119</sup> These ports were far away from Amphipolis,

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<sup>1116</sup> For this reasoning, see Demosthenes 7.12.

<sup>1117</sup> E.g. Demosthenes 2.14; 23.149; Aeschines 2.29-30; Diodoros 15.77.5; 16.3.3.

<sup>1118</sup> Dinarchus 1.14; 3.17; Demosthenes 4.4; Polyainos 3.10.15. Tod II 146. De Ste Croix, 1963.

<sup>1119</sup> Isocrates 15.108, 113; Diodoros 15.81.6; Demosthenes 6.17, 20; 4.35; 7.10; Plutarch *Alexander* 3.4. IG II<sup>2</sup> 114. Tod II



but not wholly unrelated to the overall operation to control access to shipbuilding timber in the area. Under Athenian control these cities were meant to play a significant role in stopping Macedonia and Olynthus from supporting Amphipolis. As Demosthenes remarks, loss of Amphipolis and Potidaea would shatter Macedonian security,<sup>1120</sup> while Isocrates highlights the strategic importance of Potidaea and Torone.<sup>1121</sup> The addition of naval bases such as Abdera, Ainos and Samothrace along the coast of the northern Aegean provided a further grip on the area, closing the gap on Amphipolis. In sum, the Athenian forces operating on the west of the Chalkidic peninsula made Athenian power felt in Macedonia and Olynthus. At the same time these ports were considered for their commercial potential, as shown by Kallistratos.<sup>1122</sup> Xenophon also notes the riches in timber, revenues from trade and many *emporía* of the area around Olynthus.<sup>1123</sup> Back in 426, the Athenian garrison stationed at Potidaea had made sure that King Perdiccas II would not harm the trade activities of Methone, an Athenian ally.<sup>1124</sup>

Another and more longstanding aspect of the power struggle in this area had to do with security, which is directly connected with the procurement or denial of natural resources. Examples portray the strategic eye of many Greek cities in relation with the resources of the north Aegean. The people of Akanthos wanted to stop the Olynthians from controlling the timber resources of the area.<sup>1125</sup> Brasidas' campaign deprived Athens of the Amphipolitan timber depot, but he also used that timber to build ships on the Strymon to further Spartan strategy.<sup>1126</sup> King Amyntas III provided timber export rights to the Chalkidic League, but carefully designed the terms of trade between them to make sure his timber did

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146. Badian, 1995, 91; Cargill, 1995; 1985, 22-23.

<sup>1120</sup> Demosthenes 10.13.

<sup>1121</sup> Isocrates 15.108.

<sup>1122</sup> Aristotle *Oeconomicus* 1350a16.

<sup>1123</sup> Xenophon *Hellenica* 5.16.

<sup>1124</sup> *IG* I<sup>3</sup> 61. 20-29; *ML* 65.

<sup>1125</sup> Xenophon *Hellenica* 5.2.16-17.

<sup>1126</sup> Diodoros 12.68.4.

not get into the hands of potential enemies.<sup>1127</sup> The Athenians, though not in possession of Keos, arranged a treaty with the islanders in such a way that their precious *miltos* could only go into Athenian hands. Timber and grain as shown in chapter Three, because of their importance to certain cities, could be used as a political weapon from those who possessed them in order to promote their own political agenda. In light of these facts, Thebes' appearance into Macedonia and the Aegean in the 360s can be partly explained as an effort to prevent Athens from accessing the resources of these areas. For Athens, the policy of control over natural resources effectively eliminated any security threats that could arise, and at the same time, secured for themselves a steady flow of resources that would fund their foreign policy.

The bid for Amphipolis failed. Yet in 357 Athens possessed 283 ships,<sup>1128</sup> of which two squadrons of 60 ships were sent to the battle of Embata,<sup>1129</sup> and by 352/2 the number had risen to 349.<sup>1130</sup> The numbers are impressive and reflect the aspirations of the Athenians to seek security and power through naval dominance. Consequently, Athens had a continuous need for shipbuilding timber but, sadly, sources fail to explain in detail how Athens was able to obtain the necessary resources for building its grand naval fleet. That the Athenians were able, time and again, to construct a sizeable war-fleet, especially amidst great difficulties and without a fifth-century empire, points to an import system that was successful for almost two centuries.

In short, Athenian policy in Amphipolis was in large part connected with silver, timber and its final product, triremes. This was because Athens continued to show coherence and consistency in its foreign policy, which principally looked for naval dominance. For that reason, access to timber was pivotal, as it made the triremes that

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<sup>1127</sup> RO 12.9-18.

<sup>1128</sup> IG II<sup>2</sup> 1611. 9.

<sup>1129</sup> Diodoros 16.21.

<sup>1130</sup> IG II<sup>2</sup> 1613. 302. 392 triremes in 330/329; IG II<sup>2</sup> 1627. 269. 360 triremes in 326/5; IG II<sup>2</sup> 1628. 489.

protected and controlled the trade in natural resources. This relation with resources generally defines the relationship between Athens and its international environment. Throughout the fifth and fourth centuries both coercive and peaceful measures were in place in order to access and control the flow of timber from the northern Aegean. Evidence is scant, but testifies to a continuous Athenian interest in and use of foreign resources, despite a change in environment.

## 6.2 Claiming the Chersonese

In the 360s Athenian foreign policy also turned its attention towards the Chersonese. It was a vital gate on a sea route, at the end of which lay the Bosporan kingdom.<sup>1131</sup> Geography conspired to its strategic importance because it was the only waterway linking the Aegean to the Propontis and thence to the Black Sea. Thus transport lanes became easy to control. From an Athenian point of view, trading of grain was a major political concern. Control of the Chersonese, and generally, the Propontis, provided security for its Black Sea imports but also a powerful weapon, as whoever controlled this passage could cut off supply to any enemy or ally. As such, the Chersonese was an extremely politically complicated area, because in order for shipments of grain to reach Athens several poleis and kingdoms had to be friendly towards the Athenians. Intervention and involvement in the Chersonese provides us with a unique opportunity to witness the broad spectrum of Athenian military and diplomatic policies with some key players of the area, in order to secure safe passage of large quantities of grain shipments into Athens.

In the 370s, the only friendly port in the area was Elaious, along with the nearby

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<sup>1131</sup> Heskell, 1997, 53ff; Cargill, 1985, 23-30; Graham, 1964, 169f.

island of Tenedos,<sup>1132</sup> both members of the Second Athenian League. The situation in the Chersonese was equally troubling. The Odrysian King Kotys and his generals were vying with Persian satraps for control of the area. Most of the Chersonesian cities, Sestos, Hieron, Krithote and Elaious, were under their control and both sides were trying to wrest cities from each other.<sup>1133</sup> Neither antagonist was an easy target for the Athenian generals, who could do little to change the situation. Nothing was guaranteed to Athens. Despite this handicap, the Athenians decided to reassert their claim for the control of the Chersonese. It is not known when or how the Athenians gained recognition of their claim. Heskell hypothesises that Philiscus' visit at Athens in 368 entailed the Persian King's support for this right.<sup>1134</sup> However, no source makes specific chronological references to this claim or its recognition, apart from a general statement by Demosthenes: "your claim, which has been recognised by the King of Persia and by all the Greeks".<sup>1135</sup>

One of the first moves was to support the rebel satrap Ariobarzanes, who in 365 offered the Athenians Sestos and Krithote in recognition of their assistance against the forces of Mausolus and Kotys.<sup>1136</sup> Their success was not to last, however, as Miltokythes on behalf of Kotys took Sestos and Krithote from the Athenians in the spring of 362,<sup>1137</sup> while Kotys had occupied Hieron and sacked its treasures.<sup>1138</sup> In the following year, Timomachos, the general in command for the year 361/0, used Sestos as a naval base, guarded the grain ships from Hieron, and intervened in the affairs over Stryme between Thasos and Maroneia.<sup>1139</sup> It seems that Kotys then returned Sestos and Krithote to Athens in exchange

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<sup>1132</sup> See Rutishauser, 2001.

<sup>1133</sup> Demosthenes 23.157-163; Xenophon *Ages* 2.26. Veligianni, 2004, 201-260; Heskell, 1997, 53ff; Sealey, 1993, 81-82, 88.

<sup>1134</sup> Heskell, 1997, 111, 113-114; Cawkwell, 1961.

<sup>1135</sup> Demosthenes 9.16.

<sup>1136</sup> Xenophon *Ages* 2.26; Isocrates 15.107-108, 112; Nepos *Timotheos* 1.3.

<sup>1137</sup> Demosthenes 50.5.

<sup>1138</sup> Heskell, 1997, 145.

<sup>1139</sup> Demosthenes 50.18-20.

for the Athenians not supporting the usurper Miltokythes.<sup>1140</sup> This diplomatic success was not to last, since in the following year (360) the Athenian general Theotimos lost Sestos.<sup>1141</sup> Polyainos and Demosthenes concur that the city was lost after Kleon – co-phrourarch of the city with Theotimos – allowed troops from Abydos to enter the city.<sup>1142</sup> The latter handed over the city to Kotys. Kotys continued his aggressive policy and sent Charidemos, his general,<sup>1143</sup> to besiege Krithote and Elaious.<sup>1144</sup> He failed, but there is a possibility that Kardia fell at this time to Kotys.<sup>1145</sup> In other words, the Athenians failed to make any substantial progress in their plan to control the Chersonese.

In 360/59 Kotys died,<sup>1146</sup> and this presented an excellent opportunity for the Athenians to be in command of the Chersonese. Kephisodotos, the new general in command, approached Charidemos at Perinthos in order to discuss the new state of affairs and to arrange for the succession of a new Odrysian King,<sup>1147</sup> because Kotys' three sons were still minors. Charidemos, however, attacked Kephisodotos' troops, shattering any Athenian hopes for a peaceful resolution of affairs in the Chersonese.<sup>1148</sup> In the end, Charidemos forced Kephisodotos into making a treaty. The treaty shocked the Athenians, who deposed Kephisodotos and fined him the sum of 5 talents.<sup>1149</sup>

The Athenians now sent Athenodoros to take command of the forces at the Hellespont (359/8). He worked out a deal with the other Thracian Kings, Berisades and Amadocus, who were also not pleased with the turn of events. On hearing the troubling

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<sup>1140</sup> Demosthenes 23.114-115, 118.

<sup>1141</sup> Veligianni, 2004, 227; Sealey, 1993, 254.

<sup>1142</sup> Polyainos. 1.37; Demosthenes 23.158.

<sup>1143</sup> Demosthenes 23.138.

<sup>1144</sup> Demosthenes 23.158.

<sup>1145</sup> Veligianni, 2004, 230.

<sup>1146</sup> Demosthenes 23.119; his assassins, Python and Herakleides of Aenos were honoured with citizenship and a golden crown.

<sup>1147</sup> Demosthenes 23.163; cf. 129. Heskell, 1997, 59.

<sup>1148</sup> Demosthenes 23.167.

<sup>1149</sup> Demosthenes 23.167.

news of this new alliance, Kersebleptes agreed to sign a new treaty with the Athenians.<sup>1150</sup> Demosthenes tells us that Kersebleptes was forced to accept a common rule over a Thrace divided in three, and to leave the Chersonese to the Athenians.<sup>1151</sup> From the next treaty between Kersebleptes and Chabrias we learn that there was another term in the treaty signed with Athenodoros, whereby Kersebleptes was asked to surrender to the Athenians the son of Iphiades, who he was holding hostage at Sestos.<sup>1152</sup>

The treaty arranged between Athenodoros and Kersebleptes broke down when Charidemos got news of Athenodoros disbanding his army, and on his seeing the newly appointed commander Chabrias coming to the Chersonese with one trireme in 358/7.<sup>1153</sup> Charidemos renounced the previous agreement and offered new terms, worse than those in the agreement with Kephisodotos. Chabrias was forced to accept them: "Chabrias was obliged to acquiesce, I suppose because he had no force at his back".<sup>1154</sup> The Athenians in turn repudiated the treaty, and ten ambassadors were sent back to renegotiate.<sup>1155</sup> They achieved nothing.

In the following year (357) Chares was sent out by the *ekklesia* as general with plenipotentiary orders (*strategos autokrator*), with instructions to make an effective agreement with Kersebleptes concerning the Chersonese.<sup>1156</sup> After arduous negotiations, he succeeded in signing a treaty with Kersebleptes. This treaty was called the "best and most just".<sup>1157</sup> Chares' mission in 357 succeeded and the agreement reached lasted for some time, because both parties realised the danger to the region that was Philip II of Macedonia.<sup>1158</sup> Faced with this new danger, the Thracian Kings Berisades, Amadocus II and Kersebleptes,

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<sup>1150</sup> Demosthenes 23.175.

<sup>1151</sup> Demosthenes 23.170.

<sup>1152</sup> Demosthenes 23.176-177.

<sup>1153</sup> See Heskell, 1997, 62; Sealey, 1993, 255; Develin, 1989, 272 puts Chabrias as general in 359/8.

<sup>1154</sup> Demosthenes 23.171.

<sup>1155</sup> Demosthenes 23.172, 177.

<sup>1156</sup> For Chares, see Moysey, 1985, 221-227; Salmon, 1996, 43-53.

<sup>1157</sup> Demosthenes 23.173.

<sup>1158</sup> Diodoros 16.8. 2-7.

and the Athenians, came to realise that they had to put aside their differences. According to the treaty Kardias stayed under the control of Kersebleptes.<sup>1159</sup> The rest of the terms are not known, but it is likely that the two parties agreed to terms similar to those recorded in IG II<sup>2</sup> 126. The following year (356/5), a new alliance was created between Athens and the Thracian, Paeonian, and Illyrian Kings under the constant threat of Philip's advance.<sup>1160</sup>

IG II<sup>2</sup> 126 is the fragment of a treaty between the Athenians and the Thracian Kings Berisades, Amadocus II, and Kersebleptes. It has been dated to 357,<sup>1161</sup> as Berisades died in 357/6, though Veligianni suggests it is the Athenodoros treaty of 358.<sup>1162</sup>

- [...11.... βο]ι[η]θε[ῖν .....20.....]  
 [...9.... κα]ὶ οἱ σύμμα[χοι .....17.....]  
 [...11....]ν Μηδόδοκ[ος? .....18.....]  
 [... περὶ δὲ τῶν πόλεων ὅσ[αι ἐγράφησαν ἐν ταῖς στ]-  
 5 [ήλαις τελοῦ]σαι Βηρισάδε[ι ἢ Ἀμαδόκῳ ἢ Κερσεβλ]-  
 [έπτῃ τοὺς] φόρους καὶ Ἀθην[αίοις ὑποτελεῖς ὑπά]-  
 [ρχουσι, ἐὰ]μ μὴ ἀποδῶσιν Ἀθη[ναίοις αἱ πόλεις τὸς]  
 [φόρους, πρ]άττειν Βηρισάδην [καὶ Ἀμάδοκην καὶ Κε]-  
 [ρσεβλέπτ]ην κατὰ τὸ δυνατόν. κ[αὶ ἐὰν που Βηρισάδ]-  
 10 [ει ἢ Ἀμαδόκ]ῳ ἢ Κερσεβλέπτῃ μὴ [ἀποδῶσι τοὺς φό]-  
 [ρους αἱ πόλεις, πρ]άττειν Ἀθηναίου[ς καὶ τῶν ἀρχόν]-  
 [των τοὺς αἰεὶ ἐ]πὶ τῇ δυνάμει ὄντας [κατὰ τὸ δυνατ]-  
 [όν· τὰς δὲ πόλεις τὰς Ἑλληνίδας τὰς ἐ]ν Χερρονήσῳ]-  
 [ι ὑποτελούσας Β]ηρισάδει καὶ Ἀμαδόκ[ῳ καὶ Κερσ]-  
 15 [εβλέπτῃ τὸν φό]ρον τὸν πάτριον καὶ Ἀ[θηναίοις τ]-  
 [ὴν σύνταξιν, ἐλε]υθέρως εἶναι καὶ αὐτονό[μους συ]-  
 [μμάχους οὖσας Ἀ]θηναίοις καθὰ ὥμοσαν κα[ὶ Βηρισ]-  
 [άδει καὶ Ἀμαδόκῳ] καὶ Κερσεβλέπτῃ· ἐὰν [δέ τις τ]-  
 [ῶν πόλεων ἀφιστῇ]ται ἀπ' Ἀθηναίων, βο[ηθεῖν Βηρισ]-  
 20 [άδην καὶ Ἀμάδοκον] καὶ Κερσεβλέπτ[ην καθότι ἂν ἐ]-  
 [παγγέλλωσι Ἀθηναῖοι]· ἐὰν δὲ .....16.....

In either case this treaty records what the war between Athens and Kersebleptes was all about. Peace was made among the consenting parties, with the Thracian kingdom divided into three parts, Berisades taking the western, Amadocus the central, and Kersebleptes the

<sup>1159</sup> Demosthenes 23.178, 181-182; 7.42-43. Scholia Demosthenes 23.182.

<sup>1160</sup> IG II<sup>2</sup> 127; RO 53.

<sup>1161</sup> RO 47.

<sup>1162</sup> Veligianni, 2004, 248-260.

eastern part, and all three having joint rule.<sup>1163</sup> The Athenians, always eager to control the flow of resources around the straits, offered their alliance to the Thracian rulers. In return, the Thracian Kings would assist Athens as their agents in the area. Duties included exacting *tribute* from the cities on the Chersonese,<sup>1164</sup> and offering their assistance when allies defected from Athens. Cargill rejects the word *phoros* because contributions to the Second Athenian League were called *syntaxeis*. Cawkwell suggests *πρόσοδοι*. However, the term *syntaxeis* implies that the cities were members of the League, something that has not yet been proven. With no historical record in place, it is hard to accept such amendment.<sup>1165</sup> It is likely that Athens was to receive some sort of payments, and that finally she had the Thracian Kings on its side. Why is this treaty important?

The Thracian Kings did not have a navy to threaten the Athenian grain trade. But ships required frequent stops in secure harbours. Until they reached Athens, no cargo was safe, as Philip II would exemplify at Hieron a few years later when he usurped the Athenian grain fleet. Likewise, Thracian successes in the Chersonese caused alarm in Athens, as there was a sense of insecurity regarding this important piece of land that provided a crucial stop for the grain convoy before it entered the Aegean. Friendly *emporía* and naval bases, notably Sestos and Elaious,<sup>1166</sup> were constantly under threat. The benefits to Athens were simple: peace and co-operation secured safe passage to Athenian grain convoys at a time when nothing was safe. With this treaty at least, one problem out of the many surrounding the grain trade from the Black Sea was solved.

In addition, the Athenians secured important *emporía* along the Hellespontine route and revenues for their empty war-chest. It was said that in time of peace the income (*πρόσοδοι*) from the Chersonese reached thirty talents, while the *emporía* yielded 200

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<sup>1163</sup> RO 47.

<sup>1164</sup> The reading of Chersonese (ll. 13-14) is not secured but makes the most sensible solution.

<sup>1165</sup> See Veligianni, 2004, 251. Cargill, 1981, 127 n.36; 1995, 72 n.27; Cawkwell, 1981, 45 n. 25.

<sup>1166</sup> Herodotos 6.140.1; Thucydides 8.62.2; Xenophon *Hellenica* 2.1.25; 4.8.5; Strabo 13.1.2; Theopompus Frg. 390.



talents.<sup>1167</sup> This explains why the Athenians and the Thracian Kings were fighting. Demosthenes says that Kersebleptes' demands were to have: "right to take the port-dues and the ten percent customs duties (τέλη καὶ δεκάτας) from the Chersonese; he talked as though the land belonged to him" (ἐνθυμείσθ' ὅτι καὶ τέλη καὶ δεκάτας ἡξίου λαμβάνειν, καὶ πάλιν ὡς αὐτοῦ τῆς χώρας οὔσης τοὺς λόγους ἐποιεῖτο, τοὺς δεκατηλόγους ἀξιῶν τοὺς αὐτοῦ τῶν τελαῶν κυρίους εἶναι).<sup>1168</sup> Even without a fleet, the person in command of the Chersonese had a significant advantage over others. In the end, both Athens and the Odrysians shared the Chersonesian pie.

### 6.3 Athens in Keos

At c. 364/3 the Keans rose up in rebellion, took control of the city, killed the Athenian proxenos, and exiled those who inclined towards the Athenians.<sup>1169</sup> However, Iulis' uprising was short-lived, and in 363/2, the Athenians, under Chabrias (ἄς συνέθετο Χαβρία[ς σ]τρατηγός), swiftly regained control of the island.<sup>1170</sup> Despite this recent failure, some Iulietans renewed their resistance (l. 23, 54), but Athens again recovered control, this time with Aristophon in command.<sup>1171</sup> The context of the rebellion and subsequent Athenian intervention in Keos is not clear.

Kean dissent is remarkable, when we consider that Keos, as a member of the Second Athenian League, enjoyed all the benefits of membership, autonomy, naval protection, absence of tribute and garrisons. It is even more striking when we consider the small population of Keos, as compared to the manpower and resources of the Second Athenian

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<sup>1167</sup> Demosthenes 23.110,

<sup>1168</sup> Demosthenes 23.177.

<sup>1169</sup> *IG* II<sup>2</sup> 111. 27-40.

<sup>1170</sup> *IG* II<sup>2</sup> 111. 17; *RO* 39; *IG* II<sup>2</sup> 404. 11; *SEG* LV. 113.

<sup>1171</sup> Scholia Aeschines 1.64. He appears in *IG* XII 5, 542.43, a list of *proxenoi* of Karthaea.

League.<sup>1172</sup> The alternative is to connect this rebellion with the increased Athenian control over Kean *miltos* export. There are several reasons for this.

First, IG II<sup>2</sup> 1128, the inscription recording *miltos* arrangements, reveals recurring Athenian interference in the Kean *miltos* trade, a step towards securing a monopoly on the *miltos* trade. In line 11 the decree resolves that “the export of *miltos* shall be to Athens...as it was previously (κ]αθάπερ πρότερον ἦν).” All the more so, as the next line of the decree reaffirms past arrangements (ψηφίσματα) that Athens and Koresia had made (τὰ πρότερον γεγενημένα). Athens had long been interested in this resource. The regulation of Kean *miltos* export was aimed at controlling *miltos*, yet at the same time, it secured the political allegiance of the Keans.

Second, there seems to be a connection between IG II<sup>2</sup> 111 and IG II<sup>2</sup> 1128. A common finding in the two inscriptions is the relation between Kean cities and *miltos* depositis. IG II<sup>2</sup> 111 (363/2) states that the Kean city of Iulis and Karthaea broke the oaths and the agreement (παράβαντες τὸς ὅρκος καὶ τὰς συνθήκας) and made war with Athens, the Keans and the Allies (καὶ πολεμήσαντες ἐναντία τῶι δήμῳ τῶι Ἀθηναίων καὶ Κε[ί]οις καὶ τοῖς ἄλλοις συμμάχοις).<sup>1173</sup> Koresia is absent from the stele but, this is because the stele records Athenian arrangements for Iulis. Previously the Athenians made arrangements for Karthaea as noted in line 23. We do not know if Koresia rebelled in c. 364/3, followed up by another stele, but, we do know that around that time, made one arrangement there was one Athenian arrangement with the Koresians on the same basis as Iulis and Karthaea (IG II<sup>2</sup> 1128). This is because these three cities are the ones with deposits of *miltos*, as the mines on Keos were located at Tripospylies, in the territory of Iulis, at Orkos in the territory of Karthaea, and at Koresia.<sup>1174</sup> This arrangement records recurring Athenian interference in

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<sup>1172</sup> See page 137.

<sup>1173</sup> IG II<sup>2</sup> 111. 23, 27.

<sup>1174</sup> Photos-Jones *et al.*, 1997, 360 n. 6; Caskey, 1994, 309; Cherry, 1991, 299-303.

Koresia and suggests there may have been a reason for intervention. This hypothesis is also strengthened by the prospectus of the Second Athenian League; Poeessa appears as an insertion in line 82, while Iulis, Koresia and Karthaea appear later on as a block.<sup>1175</sup> Hence it is possible to assume that Koresia had also rebelled in c. 364/3. Poeessa on the other hand did not own mines and subsequently, refrained from revolt. The reference *πολεμήσαντες..καὶ Κε[ί]οις* should then refer to Poeessa. This city had stayed loyal to Athens throughout the preceding century and had joined earlier the Second Athenian League.<sup>1176</sup>

Thus, the specific reference to Iulis and Karthaea breaking oath and agreement in *IG* II<sup>2</sup> 111 should be related to *miltos* regulations and of course, to their Second Athenian League membership. The Keans were dissatisfied with this arrangement and decided to cancel it out. It is then possible to suggest that *IG* II<sup>2</sup> 1128 was a re-publication of previous agreements cancelled out by the rebellion. This can only be conjectured for the time being because *IG* II<sup>2</sup> 1128 is fragmented at the beginning, preventing us from dating it exactly. Rhodes and Osborne, Tod, and Cargill based mostly on letter-forms prefer to put a date in the middle of the fourth century.<sup>1177</sup>

How did the Keans find the courage to rebel, or how could the Keans believe that their rebellion was able to succeed in ousting the Athenians? A possible scenario links the Kean uprising with the Theban naval expedition (364/3) that revealed Athenian weakness to patrol the Aegean, as they took place around the same time.<sup>1178</sup> Epameinondas' expedition provided the prospect of successful secession from Athenian dominance.<sup>1179</sup> In addition, the treaty of *isopoliteia* forged between Keos - Histiaia and Keos - Eretria points to this because

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<sup>1175</sup> RO 22. 82, 119-122.

<sup>1176</sup> RO 22.119-122; *IG* II<sup>2</sup> 43.B. 23-26.

<sup>1177</sup> Tod II 162; RO 40; Cargill, 1981, 138. As for *IG* II<sup>2</sup> 404, an Athenian decree concerning the poleis of Keos, Brun, 2004 challenges earlier chronological and historical interpretations and suggests that the historical context of the Social War (357-355) better suits this inscription.

<sup>1178</sup> Sealey, 1993, 92 and n.78.

<sup>1179</sup> Diodoros 15.78.4-79.1.

the two Euboean cities had by 366 joined the Theban cause.<sup>1180</sup> Eretria was one of the first members of the Second Athenian League,<sup>1181</sup> but following the battle at Leuctra, the city probably abandoned the league, together with Thebes. Eretria would not have been a member in 366, when Themison, tyrant of Eretria, took the town of Oropos from Athens and handed it over to Thebes.<sup>1182</sup> As for Histiaia, in the very first lines of the treaty between them, a provision is made that Histiaia should not admit any exile from Keos: ἐ[ἄ]ν δέ τις [τῶν Κείων — — —] [φ]ύγ[η]ι ἐς Ἰστι[α]ί[α]ν ἢ τ[ῆ]ν Ἰστι[α]ιέων χώραν, μὴ [δε]κέσθω.<sup>1183</sup> This should be seen in line with the Iulis rebellion, in which those favouring Athens had been exiled. This is a working theory, but depends on the possible dating of the treaty with Histiaia and Eretria to the 360s.<sup>1184</sup> If this is the case, we can hypothesize that the presence of the Theban fleet in the Cyclades may have been motivated by a desire to prevent *milto*s from going into Athenian hands.

Keos also had a strategic-defensive role to play, but probably minimal, as we never hear of Athenian garrisons or naval bases to be present on the island. There may be the case that *milto*s' real importance was not in its usefulness as a waterproofing material, but as a cause for the Athenians to effectively be able to intervene into the internal affairs of Keos. But in light of Keos' high tribute assessment, Athenian expedition on the island to re-impose the *milto*s monopoly in c. 360 and with numerous decrees, one in each city with detail clauses of how *milto*s is to be traded, and finally, *milto*s' ability to protect wood from seawater casts some interesting suppositions about *milto*s' importance.

## Some preliminary thoughts

Sealey is right to recognise Athenian involvement in the Chersonese and Amphipolis

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<sup>1180</sup> Lewis, 1962, 1.

<sup>1181</sup> IG II<sup>2</sup> 4. 81.

<sup>1182</sup> Diodoros 15.76.1; Aeschines 3.85; Demosthenes 18.99.

<sup>1183</sup> IG XII 5. 594, ll. 1-3.

<sup>1184</sup> Brun, 1989, 124 dates both inscriptions in c. 364; Knoepfler, 2001 for Eretrian decrees.

as “a response to changes occurring independently in the north and threatening Athenian interests”.<sup>1185</sup> Athens’ fourth-century foreign policy was defensive in nature, adopting to a significant degree the norm of balance of power to counter imminent dangers.<sup>1186</sup> However, two things are of note. First, in 371 the Athenians had not yet contemplated resistance against Thebes on all fronts. Second, Athens had survived for many years without controlling Macedonia and the Chersonese. In addition, none of these places was under Athenian control at the time. In fact, Athens had asked for legal diplomatic approval of its right to control Amphipolis and the Chersonese. Even King Amyntas III of Macedonia agreed to it. That is, Thebes was not the primary reason why Athens was involved in the north. Another possibility needs to be considered. This has to do with the growing military need for resources (and revenues) of a rising naval hegemon free from the interference of Sparta. I argue that a large part of Athenian foreign policy in the first half of the fourth century focused on a strategy that aimed to regenerate the city by controlling access to strategic natural resources and their respective ports and funding through tribute, *syntaxeis*, taxes or tolls. The aim was to regenerate Athenian military effectiveness so that it could play a more decisive role in Greek affairs. The number of triremes continued to rise, and by the 350s Athens had more than three hundred. Athens was locked into the same game it had played successfully in the fifth century, a situation that reflects the growing importance of natural resources, geography and even the economic dimensions of security. Many factors contributed to this policy decision: Athenian naval tradition, political events, dependence on overseas resources, and most importantly, the fact that the Athenians continued to increase the strength of their navy. In other words, Athens was still making itself dependent on overseas resources. We can of course argue that the insistence upon conquering Amphipolis was unnecessary, as Athens could find supplies through diplomatic means.

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<sup>1185</sup> Sealey, 1993, 77-82.

<sup>1186</sup> Harding, 1995, 108-109. Xenophon *Hellenica* 6.5.39; Demosthenes 16.4-5, 23-4; 23.102 (for Thebes and Sparta), 103-17 (for Thrace).

After all, Athens had built more than a hundred triremes before and after the Peloponnesian War without controlling Amphipolis.<sup>1187</sup> But ambitions in the north and the Chersonese were a reality, most probably resolved upon as a result of the interrelation of Athenian foreign policy and natural resources.

One of the overarching goals of Athenian foreign policy was military effectiveness. Resources translate to strength in the battlefield, in the international political arena, and in commerce. They constitute an environment in which a state's foreign-policy activities take place, and influence how patterns emerge. To become an effective sea-hegemon, however, Athens needed - among other things - the ability to provide itself with highly important natural resources, those that increased its military effectiveness and decreased failure rates. Shortcomings in just one resource were likely to handicap its power in the event of a war. As Athenian native soil could not provide for all the necessities of its military programme, Athens embarked on a policy where close attention was given to places that could provide access to natural resources. It is difficult to harmonise Athenian activities and categorise them into geographic, strategic, political and so on because many are interrelated. Yet pressures and forces from the international arena were always present and it is intriguing how Athens sought to improve its position in this interstate competition.

In conclusion, the demise of the Spartan threat after 371 made Athens willing to explore possibilities in areas where, during the time of Spartan dominance as a result of the King's Peace, it had been unthinkable. Athens wanted to regain the prerequisites - material benefits - of empire; Andokides too spoke in the 390s of his opponents' desire to recover the Chersonese, the colonies, and the overseas land and debts.<sup>1188</sup> In addition, some members of the League were chosen by the Athenian generals for their capability to provide access to certain natural resources important for the Athenian state. The result was that the Athenians

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<sup>1187</sup> Amit, 1965, 18-27.

<sup>1188</sup> Andokides 3.15.

entered, once again, a vicious circle whereby the pursuit of hegemony was closely tied up with dependence on natural resources and the routes to them. This also suggests that Athens had a compelling reason for empire.<sup>1189</sup>

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<sup>1189</sup> De Ste Croix, 1972, 44ff suggested the economic reason of empire.

## Conclusion

The goal of this study was to investigate the relationship between Athenian state behaviour and natural resources. Some salient results emerged strongly. First, the Athenians' striving to acquire access to natural resources was factored into their political calculation. The *demos* engaged with issues concerned with supplies of grain, timber, *mitos*, precious metals, control of water-passages, and all activities necessary in order to preserve national security. It was recognised, for example, that Macedonian timber and silver was vital for the Athenian navy, leading the Athenians to focus their efforts on creating a foothold in the Lower Strymon and contemplating friendly relations with the Macedonian Kings. They appreciated the significance of the grain produced in Sicily and the Black Sea, whereas Euboea, Imbros, Skyros, and Lemnos became a granary, and at the same time served the Athenian defensive system.<sup>1190</sup>

Second, natural resources played a pivotal role in the expansion of Athenian power, which was at the same time its point of vulnerability. That is, the decision to acquire naval advantage was instrumental in shaping Athenian foreign policy in the fifth and fourth centuries because the 'investment' in military power saw unparalleled success. In turn, the Athenians created a grand port and a system of trade that was able to draw into Athens an impressive number of residents, Athenians, metics, and slaves. Modern estimates put the number from as low as 120,000 to as high as 300,000.<sup>1191</sup> This population needed to be fed, and it is here that grain comes into the picture. While it is by no means necessary for war purposes, food is essential for survival, especially in a society geared for warfare. In order to

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<sup>1190</sup> Demosthenes 18.301 remarks how his actions served the Athenian defensive system in Euboea, Boeotia and the Peloponnese, and at the same time provided for grain supplies.

<sup>1191</sup> Athenaeos 272C = Ktesikles *FGrH* 245 F1 who states a number of 21,000 citizens, 10,000 metics, and 400,000 slaves; cf. Herodotos 5.97.2; Aristophanes *Assembly Women* 1131-33. Oliver, 2007, 18; Whitby, 1998, 109-114; Sallares, 1991, 53; Garnsey, 1988, 90; Hansen, 1988, 12



maintain healthy military personnel, and to sustain the city in times of hardship, famine or siege, it was necessary that grain be present in the Athenian granaries. To protect such large convoys of grain, especially the substantial shipments from the Bosphorus and Egypt, a fleet was a prerequisite. It attained a new role as guardian of the resource routes that led to Athens. This was all the more true for the Athenians, who had decided to follow the path of hegemony. Hegemony needed timber, the population needed grain, the grain supply needed triremes, and triremes needed timber and silver. If one ring broke, Athens would find itself exposed. Hence, the Athenians entered a vicious circle whereby the pursuit of hegemony was closely tied to dependence on natural resources.

Third, this policy of ensuring access to timber, grain, red ochre and precious metals through conquest and diplomacy was consistent throughout the classical era. As for almost two centuries the Athenians found that the answers to international problems lay in improving their naval and defensive effectiveness, they came to rely more on imported supplies of critical materials, and the protection of resource flows became an increasingly prominent feature of Athenian foreign policy. It also went hand-in-hand with control of strategic locations and the sea routes that led to them. The case of Rhodes and the Hellespont underlines the geographic dimensions of strategy – the growing emphasis on operations in the eastern and northern Aegean and other resource producing areas or transit routes – but also its operational aspects. Many of the places that Athens tried to control or influence in the fifth century remain targets in the fourth century. In the fourth century, the empire had been lost. Efforts were now primarily concerned with the rebuilding of the empire, seeking to regain control of those locations and their resources. Rhodes, the Black Sea, Macedonia, the Aegean islands, all repeatedly found their way into Athenian accounts because they possessed natural resources the Athenians needed, and could not ignore. As

noted by Badian, “the ‘ghost’ of the fifth-century empire is never quite shaken off”.<sup>1192</sup> Athenian policies were repeated, making it all the more possible that the Athenians were more prone to violence, at least towards certain places, and more likely to be motivated by control over resources than by actual political differences.

Fourth, this study suggests that natural resources significantly increased the probability of war. Our sources make apparent that wars at Eion, Thasos and Amphipolis were waged with the specific purpose of acquiring material resources, which happen to be the primary components of building and maintaining a large and strong naval fleet. Resources need not be indigenous. No state wished to meet the perils of war whilst cut off from foreign resources. In the late fourth century, the first things that the Athenians had requested from Demetrios Poliorketes were grain, timber and the return of Imbros,<sup>1193</sup> elements that would strengthen its security. This impressive request is all the more striking since in the early Hellenistic period the object was survival, and no longer expansion. Athens’ sole focus would be upon military organisation on land, yet the request for timber betrays the Athenian mentality.<sup>1194</sup> The implication of this is that these resources were fundamental to Athens, and to the way in which it envisaged power and security. If managed correctly, natural resources can dramatically transform the fortunes of a state.

Finally, studying the role of natural resources and geography in historical situations where there is absence or scarcity of written evidence can sometimes enhance our understanding of that period. This is because natural resources can play a central role in influencing state behaviour, motivating expansion, spurring commerce and sparking wars. Once we establish that Athenian ventures in the Aegean were to a large extent tied up with the acquisition, protection and control of natural resources, it becomes easier to assess

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<sup>1192</sup> Badian, 1995, 79. Fourth-century Athenians remembered and missed the wealth made possible by their ancestors.

<sup>1193</sup> Syll<sup>3</sup> 334, 1. 29-30; Diodoros 20.46.4 ; Plutarch Demetrios 10.1.

<sup>1194</sup> Oliver, 2007, dedicates chapter 6 to the structure of command in Athens, but has nothing to say about the navy.

Athenian involvement - that usually appears abruptly in our lacunose and fragmentary sources - in places such as Keos, Samos, Amphipolis and the Chersonese. Involvement in these areas can partly be explained as having the purpose of tapping into their resources and acquiring the strategic and trading bases that would strengthen the city's defensive and offensive capabilities.

The level and range of dynamic control over Aegean resource-rich sites offered the Athenians a shrewd method of exercising a high degree of influence on the export of necessary natural resources. The case of Keos *mitos* is characteristic of that. Athens hoped to finance its foreign policy with a portfolio of various local resources, collection of customs revenues, or even controlling trade-routes by positioning itself on strategic islands. For a time, Athens had increased its bargaining power relative to the other Greek states, and even to Persia, the greater their monopolization of strategic resources, the greater its power was. War and the loss of empire only placed more emphasis on the significance of resources in overall Athenian policy. In hindsight, Athens failed to recover its power, which is a testament that a state cannot reach self-sufficiency or achieve power by relying solely on its own resources.

The Athenians possessed a general awareness that if they put the Laurion silver into building a navy, and if this navy was successfully deployed, they would become more secure and powerful, and that this security and power would probably lead to greater prosperity. Having seen the immense opportunities that a strong fleet could convey, once the war-fleet had served as the main instrument for the defeat of the Persian invasion, Athens continued to 'invest' in triremes, supported by a surplus of currency and overseas territories. The expeditions that followed in Thrace, Thasos, Amphipolis and the Chersonese, suggest a conscious understanding that to retain such advantage it was necessary to keep certain places of interest under close control. However, this was not

'investment' as a modern economist would understand it. There was no accountancy - no quantification of the likely overall net value of the silver or of its likely rate of return if put into a naval programme compared with that from other possible projects - and so no considered choice of such a programme as the most profitable use of resources.<sup>1195</sup> This was an instinctive, intuitive - sometimes right, sometimes wrong, essentially conservative - reaction to situations and opportunities. One may compare this Athenian reaction to Persia with Rome's reaction to Carthage, which led to the building of its first war-fleet. Van Wees remarks on situations in which a state takes a calculated gamble to increase material gains, while Xenophon's *Poroi* and Isocrates' *On the Peace* argue against the notion of profit through war.<sup>1196</sup> What we are in the presence of is an early mentality in ancient economic activity, both Greek and Roman, which understood the significance of natural resources for greater prosperity.<sup>1197</sup>

Concerned about the scarcity of resources in Attica that could not feed this impressive number of residents, or to support such a large agenda, and the optimum utilisation of natural resources during the classical age, Athens became aware of its dependence on resources from across the Aegean and of the vulnerability of its supply lines. State and individuals alike took into account the interests of Athens by taking the initiative to obtain natural resources and control the principal sea routes that led to them, in order to utilise them for political, financial and personal gain. If Athens had counted only on its local resources, it would never have been possible to become a naval power running an empire. Access to and control of natural resources is both a prerequisite for and a consequence of the pursuit of power.

Resources can prolong the length of war and strengthen the possibility of victory, and

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<sup>1195</sup> Millett, 1995, 183 remarks that we cannot impose neo-classical economics onto a 3000-year-old society.

<sup>1196</sup> Van Wees, 2004, 27. Xenophon *Poroi* 3.6-8; 5.11-12; Isocrates 8.7-8, 19-20, 122, 125, 128, 140.

<sup>1197</sup> I thank Prof. John F Drinkwater for pointing out to me the difference between investment and instinctive mentality of profitable use of resources.

so rival states will attempt to deny access to their opponents. That is, natural resources can be used as a military weapon. This is sometimes called strategic denial. In a narrowly defined sense, denial refers to the attempt by a state to block all routes by which an adversary could supply itself, thus preventing it from pursuing its goals. Denial would thus refer to all the methods used to safeguard valuable strategic resources, or the steps taken to deny particularly important natural resources to an adversary. For example, we can refer to certain events in Athens' history: the blockade of the Hellespont is the example *par excellence*. Thucydides explains that one of the reasons for sending support to Leontini against Syracuse was to prevent grain from being exported to the Peloponnese (the other was to gain control of Sicily).<sup>1198</sup> The Megarian Decree also provides an example of such behaviour, as the Megarians were excluded from the harbours of the Athenian empire. Sanctions were sufficient to cause harm to Megara by prohibiting access to resources otherwise readily available to them.<sup>1199</sup> In this respect, we should remark that ancient warfare often aimed to disrupt enemy harvests.<sup>1200</sup> In the Kean decree, Athens forbade any *miltos* export to other cities, and while reasons are not given on the inscription, the decision was possibly a way of putting political and economic pressure on Keos. A monopoly on certain strategic resources meant that the owner, in this case Athens, limited its opponents' access to these resources and at the same time enhanced its own power; a sound strategy if the Athenians were to stay ahead of the game. It is perhaps difficult to fathom that wars could take place over the monopoly on certain resources and their trade, but the evidence is convincing. There is also an example from the Hellenistic period; Byzantium and the people of Kallatis (a colony of Herakleia) and Istria waged war on one another over the control of the trading post at Tomis. The reason, as Memnon remarks, was that the people of Kallatis

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<sup>1198</sup> Thucydides 3.86.4.

<sup>1199</sup> Thucydides 1.67.4.

<sup>1200</sup> Hanson, 1998; Ober, 1985, 32ff. See Xenophon *Hellenica* 5.2.39, 43; 5.3.2-3; 5.3.8; 5.3.18-19; 5.3.26 where the Spartan campaign against Olynthus (383-379) demonstrates the effect of ravaging the enemy's territory. Trees and grain were destroyed, adding pressure to the inhabitants by trying to prevent them from harvesting. By 379 the Olynthians were facing famine and were forced to sue for peace

wanted to run it as a monopoly.<sup>1201</sup> The above cases suggest that states were exercising their sovereign prerogative by deploying various methods to control access to important materials and places of their trade, and correlate closely with the political goals set by the state. This is beautifully summarised in the words of an Athenian pamphleteer: “in addition, they will forbid export to wherever any of our enemies are, on pain of being unable to use the sea. And I, without doing anything, have all this from the land because of the sea.”<sup>1202</sup>

The more you have, the better your situation compared to your rivals.<sup>1203</sup> How effectively you use that advantage is another story. Factors such as failure in strategy, bribery, geography and other aspects can be invoked, and do play a part, but, to explain overall success and failure much depends on practical constraints. To be sure, these outcomes can be measured only as a trend over decades, even centuries. This theory explains much about foreign policy motives or results. In this light, Athens harnessed power and used it to respond to external conditions of fragmentation and anarchy, and to effectively pursue dominance. Such power also brought economic growth. The availability of and promise of such vast resources made recourse to war appear more attractive to the Athenians,<sup>1204</sup> creating an atmosphere of expectation, superiority, and invincibility. Hence,

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<sup>1201</sup> Memnon *FGrH* 434, 13.

<sup>1202</sup> [Xenophon] *Athenaion Politeia* 2.11-12. Demosthenes 18.302 also explains this reasoning: he gathered support for Athens and built its defences, and at the same time prevented Philip from gaining resources which would have increased his power.

<sup>1203</sup> In his work *Guns, Germs, and Steel: The Fates of Human Societies*, Jared Diamond reminds us of an important dimension of this discussion – environmental factors can have a decisive influence on human history. Indeed, we find in environmental factors one of the conditions that facilitated the emergence of empires. The development and increase of a state could be viewed as resulting from the ability of its people to successfully control the resources available (both internally and externally) in support of the growth, prosperity and dominance of their state. This would effectively put the usurping state in a favourable position to dominate competing states (and not only in military strength), as it would gain access to resources over a wider geographical area. The additional resources thus collected would further smooth the progress of its ascendancy. Dominating resources in this way would further enable a state to build a military force capable of marching into other regions, and thus to gain access to additional resources. Repeat this process several times and the result is the emergence of a strong, dominant empire.

<sup>1204</sup> Thucydides paid much attention to Athenian financial resources: 2.13.3-5, 70.2; 3.17.3-4, 19.1, also cash transactions in 1.27.1; 4.26.5, 52.2, 65.1. He specifies amounts: 1.96.2 (the first assessment); 1.138.5 (the tribute of Magnesia); 2.13.3-5 (Athenian resources in 431); 2.70.2 (for the siege of Potidaea); 3.19.1 (*eisphora*); 3.70.1 (the ransoms of prisoners). See also the speech of Sthenelaidas, 1.86.3-5 who is not afraid of Athenian resources.

the Athenians placed part of their confidence in materials themselves,<sup>1205</sup> natural resources that could fund wars and preserve an arrogant state of mind. Athens' foreign policy could function depending on the quantity and quality of natural resources at its disposal. Pericles' famous statement enumerating Athenian resources prior to the Peloponnesian War could not have been a better case in point.<sup>1206</sup> These included both the resources at home, and all those to which Athens had access as a result of the measures outlined above. Under such a policy, natural resources became a double-edged sword, whereby the Athenians found themselves undermined by their dependence when their enemies tried to break this vicious circle.

Hence, another salient conclusion that came from this analysis is that the enemies of Athens thought it was vital to deprive Athens of such assets. This was in line with the role natural resources had in political conflict. It also helps to explain Sparta's policy in the Peloponnesian War and why the move on the Hellespont had the success it had. The Spartan method of conventional ravaging proved inefficient, and eventually, the Spartans realised that Athens could only be pressured into submission. To this end, the Spartans gradually adopted new techniques of socio-economic warfare to exert pressure on the Athenians. One such method was *epiteichismos*, an offensive fortification established on enemy soil in order to serve as a centre for raiding and socio-economic destruction.<sup>1207</sup> The fort at Dekeleia forced Athens to divert the grain route from Euboea around Sounion and into Athens. But that was not enough, and new approaches to increase the socio-economic pressure on Athens were also generated. The goal was now to cut the Athenian source of supply by attacking the Athenian empire rather than Athens itself. This indirect approach saw campaigns aimed at attacking Athens' supply lines, perhaps as early as the 420s with Brasidas' Thracian campaign. It was not until the failure of the Sicilian expedition in 413 that

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<sup>1205</sup> See Balot, 2001, 173; Foster, 2010, ch.4 and 6 for Pericles's material warfare.

<sup>1206</sup> Thucydides 2.13. See Kallet-Marx, 1994, 238. Cf. Demosthenes 14.9.

<sup>1207</sup> Thucydides 7.19.1-2, 27-28; Hellenica *Oxyrhynchia* 17.4-5.

Sparta turned to the strategy of exerting military and economic pressure by targeting the Athenian supply sea-routes in both the southern and the northern Aegean.

To defeat Athens, a number of cities closely attached to Athens due to their role in trade and strategy needed to change hands. The move into Rhodes forms part of this plan and it seems it was necessary first. Following the capture of Rhodes and Euboea, the Spartans gradually felt powerful enough to move against the Hellespont. This explains why the loss of the Hellespont had the effect that it had at a particular time.

There are many other potential routes for further investigation. As touched on throughout this thesis, there is ample scope for exploring the role of natural resources within the foreign policy of other major Greek players, e.g. Macedonia, Sparta, and Rhodes. The latter in particular, can produce a study of analogy, which might reveal many insights into how Athenians and Rhodians perceived the world around them.

The approach of this thesis to ancient evidence may provide a useful case study for scholars of Greek and Roman politics, as well as those interested in the wider role of international politics across cultures. I hope, however, that its most significant contribution will be to the study of Athenian politics, for which this is the first comprehensive and detailed study of natural resources and geography. While it does not argue for the total revision of modern works on the subject of natural resources, it does highlight what I hope is a new and valid approach. Natural resources and geography helped to define Athenian foreign policy and, as we have seen throughout this investigation, they were a major drive for Athens' relation with foreign states. This thesis concludes that Athens' ascent to power was, to a great extent, driven by natural resources, and its period in power was based on natural resource-considerations, although it can be claimed that natural resources had a major part in the fall of Athens.



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