

**Ideology through Modality  
in  
Discourse Analysis**

by

Dany Badran

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## Abstract

This study is broadly concerned with the analysis of ideology in discourse. More specifically, it investigates the role modality plays in reflecting underlying ideologies as well as ideological inconsistencies in three practical analyses of discourse.

Achieving these objectives is, I argue, dependent on a view of discourse which is not only functional but also pragmatic. The functional aspect of this view reflects the broad objectives of functional linguistics: i.e. relating linguistic structures to social structures. The pragmatic aspect reflects an emphasis on the need not to exclude 'the reader' from the process of interpretation. Whereas previous studies have either entirely neglected or presented an unsatisfactory account of the reader, the proposed functional-pragmatic approach to discourse analysis resolves this issue by allowing a systematic variance in interpretation. This is done in the light of a systematic account of modality which helps present a realistic and practical consideration of the role of the reader in approaching discourse analysis.

Again, in line with a functional and pragmatic view of discourse, the argument put forward in this study is that all 'types' of discourse can be approached in a similar manner for critical analysis. Consequently, practical analyses of ideology through modality in three instances of discourse: *literary* texts, *political* texts and *scientific* texts are presented. The overall aim is to show how a systematic, functional and pragmatic analysis of modality is adequate in critically analysing the ideologies present in all texts.

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## Introduction

The motivation behind this project initially arose from personal fascination with the power of language and its potential in influencing people at the ideological level. By observing the effects language, in all its linguistic manifestations, can have on people, whether through journalistic writing, advertising, literature, politics, science, etc, it became apparent that not all aspects of the language have the same persuasive weight. The broad objectives of this study thus became an attempt to investigate how and which aspects of language play more significant roles in ideologically manipulating hearers/readers, and ultimately, how these aspects of language could be systematically analysed.

After thorough readings on the notion of ideology, both Marxist and Post-Marxist, and other related readings on applications of theories of ideology in discourse analysis, the need to focus on the linguistic aspect of modality became more obvious. It was seen that modality has not only received little consideration at the practical level, but that it had also been handled rather unsatisfactorily through the process of modal categorisation; i.e. at the theoretical descriptive level. Indeed, modality was seen as one indispensable but “sorely neglected interpersonal” aspect of meaning (Weber 1992: 22), whose practical potential was relatively unexplored despite views like Fowler’s (1977) who sees that:

in real texts and utterances there is no content without modality, no communication of ideas except in the framework of interpersonal values and relational language.

(Fowler 1977: 79)

The reasons behind the blatant disregard of this apparently highly influential aspect of language were not to be underestimated. As Lakoff (1972: 229) points out, accounting for modality in English is an extremely complex task since modals are in fact “semantically highly irregular and unpredictable”. And this explains both the

diversity in approaches that have attempted to undertake that task as well as the obvious gaps in the available categorisation.

Following from that, this thesis seeks to investigate the role modality plays in reflecting the ideological positions of text producers in discourse. This is done by providing a practically applicable approach to critically interpreting ideology in discourse through a systematic analysis of modality. In the light of the broad objectives of functional linguistics and the multifunctional view of language proposed by Halliday (1978, 1985), i.e. analysing the relationship between the linguistic system and social structures, the more specific aim of this thesis is to relate the linguistic feature of *modality* to that central aspect of social structures known as *ideology*.

The goals of each chapter in this thesis are thus divided in the following manner. In the first chapter, the search for an adequate underlying theoretical and practical framework starts by accounting for the difficulties in doing discourse analysis in general. Adopting Halliday's (1978, 1985) functional theory of language inevitably leads to a systematic review of those necessary constituents of discourse in the light of that theory.

In the second chapter, I intend to argue for the position that all types of discourse, even literary discourse, can be approached in the same manner for critical analysis. This involves a set of positions concerning the issues of style and stylistics as well as to how the notion of 'the reader' can be accounted for in such a view of discourse. The objectives of the second chapter are therefore to describe and analyse the associations and interactions among a set of traditionally controversial terms: literary language and non-literary language, style and stylistics, ideology and discourse. The view put forward is that literature does not constitute a *special* type of discourse since it is subject to the same linguistic and social determinants as any other

type of discourse. Therefore, and in line with the aims of this thesis, if we are to approach literary discourse from a critical perspective, then this means that the area of focus is no longer the aesthetic features of a text but rather ideological aspects. As long as a text (literary or non-literary) addresses ideological concerns, and as long as the primary objective of analysing it is to explore the ideological implications of that text within a social setting, no approaches which specifically target literary discourse as opposed to non-literary discourse can be justified. All this serves as a prerequisite for Chapters Five, Six and Seven which involve three analyses of three different ‘types’ of discourse: literary discourse, political discourse and scientific discourse.

Chapter Three then targets the issue of modality by providing a critical review of most approaches to categorising modality in the last four decades. The main objective behind this review is to arrive at a clear position concerning what constitutes modality and how it can be practically accounted for in the light of our functional purpose. It mainly focuses on both the *diversity* of approaches that undertook that task as well as the *incompleteness* of each of them. This is meant to reflect the complexity of modality as a notion and the difficulty of accounting for it in a systematic and neat manner.

Based on the advantages and shortcomings of these approaches, the fourth chapter proceeds by providing a more appropriate account of modality, which satisfies the intended tasks of Chapters Five, Six and Seven by directly relating it to ideology. The aim of Chapter Four is to outline a framework which focuses on the two main modality systems in the English language (*epistemic* and *deontic*) as playing a decisive role in indicating the *type* and *degree* of involvement a speaker has in the content of his/her message, and ultimately, an attitude/position towards the object of his/her message. This attitude/position is directly related to the notion of ideology in

the light of a view of an existing relationship between modality and ideology in discourse. Keeping the multifunctional nature of discourse in mind, the proposed account of modality which will be used for the analysis of ideology in discourse is both *systematic* and *flexible*. These are necessary constituents of an approach, one of whose objectives is to provide a realistic and practical account of the role of *the reader* through the extended role of context in a variety of texts. In view of the underlying functional theoretical basis to the suggested approach, the way modality and ideology interact provide a useful and suitable field for examining how the ideational, interpersonal and textual metafunctions of language and meaning interact.

In Chapter Five, the main objective is to provide a practical examination of how modality and ideology interact with specific reference to two *literary passages* from Conrad's *Heart of Darkness*. The first reason for doing so is to present the first of three practical implementations of the theoretical issues discussed by then. The second is to show the workability of the approach proposed with what is unanimously acknowledged as a work of literature. And finally, the analysis aims at providing a reading of what is generally deemed as the ambiguous and/or dualistic ideological position of the main narrator in the novel, Marlow. All these are done through a *pragmatic* and *systematic* analysis of the way modality and ideology *functionally* interact in discourse.

In Chapter Six, the plan is to examine the different effects of the varying use of modality in reflecting the ideologies put forward by two *political texts* addressing the same political issue. After tracing the political backgrounds which the two speakers represent, the differences in the frequency, type of modal expressions, and degree of strength of these expressions between the two political speeches will be analysed and interpreted. This will be done in light of the enveloping ideologies of the

two political parties, the varying audiences and the differences in the situation for each of the USA and the UK.

Finally, in Chapter Seven, the analyses of the two *scientific texts* are intended to firstly, explore the ideological implications of the traditional and historical view of science and scientific discourse as reflecting objectivity and relating to 'the truth'. More specifically, and based on Post-Marxist views, the chapter also aims to assess the way modality functions and is utilised in scientific discourse and how that relates to the ideological claims of the two texts under study. Finally, and in line with the view adopted in this thesis, the non-political ideologies of the two texts are foregrounded in order to emphasise the existence of ideological struggles in discourse which are not always necessarily and exclusively political in that their main objective is political hegemony.



# **I Discourse Analysis: A Critical Review**

## **1.1 The First Obstacle: Defining Discourse**

A researcher in the field of discourse analysis faces quite a number of obstacles, the first of which is discouragingly at the onset of any discourse-related research: the definition of the term *discourse*. In the search for an adequate definition of the term, several complexities arise. The first of these is, according to Mills (1997), an etymological one. Apart from its Latin and Middle English roots, confusion in defining discourse has arisen mainly due to a discrepancy between the core meaning of the term *discours* in French (where it is essentially synonymous with ‘speech’) and its more current use in English. Following that, although the English ‘discourse’ does not correspond exactly with its French counterpart, it was confused with the French sense of the word for a period of time (Mills 1997: 2-3). Ultimately, this muddle affected both writers as well as readers/interpreters of literature on discourse.

Another source of difficulty in defining discourse is that the use of the same term in different contexts has eventually diversified its meaning. As van Dijk (1997d: 1) points out, ‘discourse’ can generally be used in reference to “a form of language use, public speeches or ... to spoken language or ways of speaking” when making reference to, for instance, “the discourse of former President Ronald Reagan”. Yet this is only one of its senses. In speaking of “the discourse of neo-liberalism” for example, van Dijk (1997d: 2) points out that the term ‘discourse’ would not refer only to “the language use of neo-liberal thinkers or politicians, but also to the ideas or philosophies propagated by them”. Therefore, different contexts are seen to bring out different senses in the meaning of the term which consequently contribute to the

difficulty in being precise in its use and definition. How ‘discourse’ is defined depends on the area of meaning the term is seen to cover.

However, one common factor which underlies both these reasons for the fuzziness in the definition of the term is that the researcher’s understanding of it depends largely on and is motivated by a diversity of underlying disciplines. Disciplines such as linguistics, psychology and sociology, for example, which naturally have selective and dissimilar interests in discourse, tend to focus on one or another area, thus highlighting or undermining some of the different dimensions of discourse. Therefore, the dependence of the term ‘discourse’ on other underlying disciplines gives rise to definitions reflecting a variety of perspectives, thus branching and shaping these branches of ‘discourse’ in such a way to suit different objectives. Although there are positive outcomes to this diversification, such as how it eventually leads to more precise and specified uses of the term, there are less positive consequences mainly in that the number of definitions increases. Ultimately, faced with the large number and variety of definitions of the term ‘discourse’ arising from the number of dissimilar views and related factors that are considered, the analyst’s task becomes increasingly complex. Nonetheless, in spite of these difficulties, it is crucial to explore the meaning of ‘discourse’ in order to limit the sense in which it will be used in this thesis.

## **1.2 The Second Obstacle: The Structure-Function Controversy**

Apart from the problems associated with defining the term ‘discourse’, the second major obstacle facing the discourse analyst is selecting the appropriate approach to its analysis. This is a complex task due to a) the large number of available approaches springing from b) more than one underlying theoretical linguistic basis. In

other words, a prerequisite to selecting the adequate approach to discourse analysis is another decision regarding the underlying theoretical basis for it. This is a necessary decision since different underlying linguistic theories reflect and emphasise different dimensions of discourse and consequently suggest *which* aspects of discourse should be analysed and *how*. The main point is that the existence of more than one theoretical linguistic basis to discourse as well as the diversity in the approaches to its analysis does not make the whole project any easier.

Still, this is not an endless, futile endeavour. According to Schiffrin (1994), the numerous existing branches in discourse analysis are not varied to a point where they are fundamentally disparate. There are unifying theoretical factors. In her book, *Approaches to Discourse Analysis*, Schiffrin convincingly argues for two main underlying theoretical bases to all approaches to discourse analysis. These are the *structural* and the *functional* views of discourse, which respectively find their roots in structural and functional theories of language and linguistics. Therefore, before elaborating on the different approaches to discourse (which will be done in section 1.4), it is crucial to briefly chart the main principles behind the two most influential theories of language and linguistics since these constitute the bases and backgrounds from which structural and functional approaches to discourse adopt their principles.

### **1.2.1 Structural Theories of Language**

The structural and functional theories of language are those respectively advocated first by Bloomfield (1933) and then Chomsky (1965) on the one hand, and by Firth (1935) and then Halliday (1978) on the other. Starting with the structural view, Bloomfield (1933: 22) proclaims the goal of linguistics as that of describing regularities in language according to “well-defined procedures”; i.e. mainly based on

structural notions like phonology and syntax. A prerequisite to this description is the collection of the largest number of actual *spoken* utterances (a corpus), which would originate from “the language of all persons alike” and which would therefore be representative of a speech-community (Bloomfield 1933: 22). Taking the language of a speech-community as its basis, structuralist linguistics would then try to rearrange this “primary data in as economical a way as possible” (Atkinson *et al* 1989: 32) in order to highlight the *structured* nature of language. This is usually done using a set of general rules and abstract principles.

However, one of the numerous problems encountered by this theory, and which led to direct criticisms by behaviourists such as Skinner (1957), was related to the manner in which data were collected. Such data usually originated from reports by individual subjects of events taking place in their consciousness. This highly “introspective” method of data collection was viewed as the primary technique in producing the subject-matter of investigation (Atkinson *et al* 1989: 32). Direct objection to this method of data collection by Skinner (1957) for instance eventually led to the intervention of behaviourist psychology in the process. There, attention was drawn away from “introspectionism” as a means for collecting data to collection done at the level of the group. However, with this positive step came the view of language that emerged in the light of behaviourist psychology: language as behaviour (Mackey 1978: 6). This meant that the main objective of the structuralist-behaviourist theory became the study of the structure of language behaviour and grouping these different behavioural patterns into sets with structural headings. Grammatical rules were deducible and could be generalised based on linguistic choices made collectively by language speakers and not through the intuitions of individual language users.

This was the main point contested in Chomskian, transformationalist linguistics: i.e. the claim that language is considered to be simply a set of behaviours which can be easily conditioned and controlled. According to Chomsky (1965: 4), linguistic theory should instead be concerned “with discovering a mental reality underlying actual behaviour”. This reflects Chomsky’s view that linguistic theory should be essentially *mentalistic* rather than *mechanistic* (Mackey 1978: 5). In parallel with Saussure’s notions of *langue* and *parole*, Chomsky (1965: 4) proposed to study language *competence*, where competence refers to “the speaker-hearer’s [intrinsic] knowledge of his language”, rather than *performance*, which refers to “the actual [extrinsic] use of language in concrete situations”. Interest in language competence then led to the introduction of Chomsky’s (1965: 3) “ideal speaker-hearer” who (or rather which) is a theoretical construct only present “in a homogeneous speech community, who knows its language perfectly, and is unaffected by such grammatically irrelevant conditions as memory limitations, distractions, shifts of attention and interest, and errors (random or characteristic) in applying his knowledge of the language in actual performance”. The aim of linguistic theory is to produce an adequate grammar which “must assign to each of an infinite range of sentences a structural description indicating how this sentence is understood by the ideal speaker-hearer”(Chomsky 1965: 4). This would be a “universal grammar”, an underlying system of rules which no speaker is aware of or “can become aware of” (Chomsky 1965: 8). It would also be a “generative grammar”: a system of rules, serving as the basis for any externalised form of language use (i.e. performance) in that it underlies all the surface differences of various languages (Chomsky 1965: 8).

In short, Chomsky (1965) is only interested in the study of language as a feature of the human mind as present in an idealised situation and not in the actual

language used by real people in real situations, since any form of deviation from “universal grammar” is the result of that language being affected by “irrelevant” factors. At the same time, although Chomsky’s views appear to be radically variant from the earlier structuralists’, they are still seen to fall into the structural frame since the main differences between the two structuralist views of language relate to whether language structures are to be studied as a feature of competence (Chomsky’s view) or performance (Bloomfield and Skinner’s views).

In the light of the structuralist theories of language, the roots of the structural view of discourse can be easily traced. Here discourse is regarded merely as another level of structure, as “an organized linguistic unit above the sentence or clause” (Stubbs 1983: 1). This is based on the premise that although language might have “social and cognitive functions,” these functions do not affect the “internal organization of language” (Schiffrin 1994: 22-23). As a result, in their emphasis on the structured nature of language, a structuralist analysis would focus on “the way the different units function in relation *to each other*” (Schiffrin 1994: 22-23), disregarding “the functional relations with the context of which discourse is a part” (van Dijk 1985: 4).

### **1.2.2 Functional Theories of Language**

On the other hand, the more recent functional theory of language as advocated by Halliday (1978) presents a completely variant position and starts off from the earlier Firthian (1935) view that linguistics should deal with *meaning* rather than structure. According to Firth (1935), “all linguistics [is] the study of meaning and all meaning [is] function in a context” (in Firth 1964: 8). As a result, and following Firth, Halliday (1985: xxxi) emphasises the interconnection between language structures

and language functions and his distance from the earlier mentalistic structuralist theory. For instance, Halliday's notion of "meaning potential" is defined in terms of culture, not mind, since meaning potential is related to "what speakers can do and can mean, not what they know" (de Beaugrande 1991: 225).

In his book *An Introduction to Functional Grammar*, Halliday (1985: 10) emphasises these points by arguing that "grammatical phenomena" are directly related to "features of culture ... in extremely complex and abstract" ways. This view of language presented a linguistically innovative position concerning the relationships between the three main categories: *structure*, *function* and *meaning*, thus highlighting the social dimensions of language. People, Halliday (1978: 2) explains, "by their everyday acts of meaning, ... *act out the social structure affirming their own statuses and roles and establishing and transmitting the shared systems of values and knowledge*" [emphasis mine]. What this means is that when language users "actively engage in text and talk", they both display and construct their roles and identities (van Dijk 1997c: 3), and this gives rise to the view of language as "a form of social practice" (Fairclough and Wodak 1997: 258).

From Halliday's statement above, his view can then be seen as functional in different ways and at several levels: i.e. what Halliday refers to as "multifunctional". Firstly, in the very act of using language, people necessarily perform functions at the basic linguistic communicative level. However, there are other functions performed through the use of language such as the "acting out the social structure," and "affirming their own statuses ...". This means that people use language for purposes other than only communicating a message at the level of relating signs or sounds to agreed-upon notions of meaning (which goes beyond simple 'sense' and 'reference'). Instead, they "act out" or *display* their "statuses", "roles" and ideologies in the

process: i.e. they engage in “social interaction”. This is another functional level. Finally, people not only “act out” these statuses, roles and ideologies, but they also *establish* and *transmit* them. This functional level hints towards the significance and weight given to the interaction between language and society, emphasising the role of language in transmitting not only meaning, but also relations between participants in a linguistic interaction.

Each functional level pointed out above reflects one or more of Halliday’s (1985: 53) three *metafunctions* which are the three aspects of meaning that are present in each clause in each language: the *ideational*, the *interpersonal* and the *textual* metafunctions. Ideational meaning according to Halliday (1985: 53) refers to “the representation of experience: our experience of the world that lies about us, and also inside us, the world of our imagination. It is meaning in the sense of ‘content’”, the initial level of relating signs and sounds to meanings. Interpersonal meaning is “meaning as a form of action: the speaker or writer doing something to the listener or reader by means of language” (Halliday 1985:53). Here, establishing the language users’ statuses and roles and transmitting these statuses and roles is evident. Finally, textual meaning is “relevance to the context: both the preceding (and following) text, and the context of situation” (Halliday 1985: 53). And these different levels of meaning are evident in all texts at the same time.

A simple way for explaining simultaneous presence and interaction amongst these three levels of meaning can be done by analogy to three types of maps: geographical, political and road maps. There, each type of map highlights different yet simultaneously-present features of various countries (Halliday 2001: personal communication). The ideational level of meaning can be compared to geographical maps which highlight locations, heights, natural phenomena etc. of different



countries. This level expresses the *field* of discourse: i.e. what the discourse is about (Halliday and Hasan 1989: 24). The interpersonal level of meaning can be understood by analogy with political maps which focus on geo-political borders between nations drawing upon the roles and relations between countries. In discourse, this is referred to as the *tenor* of discourse: i.e. who the participants are and what their roles and relationships between each other are (Halliday and Hasan 1989: 24). Finally, the textual level can be compared to road maps which show the different ways to take in order to get from one point to another. This, by analogy, is referred to as the *mode* of discourse: i.e. what part the language is playing in the interactive process (Halliday and Hasan 1989: 24). It follows then that just as all of these maps constitute different areas and angles of looking at one or another country and are all necessary for a more complete knowledge of the country, the field, tenor, and mode of discourse are all simultaneously present and necessary to consider in any functional analysis of discourse.

Consequently, within this functional perspective, discourse is necessarily seen as “language in use”, where language is a “complex cognitive and social phenomenon” (Brown and Yule 1983: 1, 271). This view assumes both that language has “functions that are external to the linguistic system” and that these functions *affect* “the organization of the linguistic system” (Schiffrin 1994: 22). As a result, functional approaches are seen to highlight the inseparability of language from the medium in which it is used, placing particular (and varying degrees of) emphasis on the relationship between language and context. At the same time, an essential feature of the functional view is its acknowledgment of the role of structure in discourse. This is reflected in the way Halliday equates the textual metafunction with the other two (the ideational and interpersonal) in his functional theory. It follows that the initial point of

difference between structural and functional approaches is the *perspective* since in functional approaches, it is the context which determines the status of an utterance rather than its syntactic structure. And the difference in perspective ultimately affects the *objectives* and the *outcomes* of a functional analysis. Yet the central position in functional linguistics is that structure and function remain two sides of the same coin.

To summarise, the main differences between both types of approaches to analysing discourse are the following. While structural approaches to the study of discourse mainly describe the structured nature of discourse by drawing “attention to systematic organizational properties” of texts and providing ways of describing them (Fairclough 1992: 15), functional approaches emphasise the functional dimension of discourse through “accounting for the linguistic features in the discourse as the means employed in what [language users] are doing” (Brown and Yule 1983: 26).

In line with these differences, the temptation is to draw a definitive dividing line between these views of discourse and to ultimately speak of approaches to its analysis as either exclusively structural or exclusively functional. Yet this would in no way be a representative division since both approaches are more appropriately regarded as complementary if viewed as a natural/chronological progression. While there are definitive theoretical divisions between structural and functional approaches to discourse analysis, discourse could never be viewed except as “language in use” since language *not* in use does not exist except as a theoretical (Chomskyan) construct, an inadequate notion from a practical perspective. An important point to make is that this theoretical division between the two main schools has had its positive effects on the development of both approaches and has been quite constructive in that it contributed towards expanding our understanding of the various

dimensions of discourse by providing a better descriptive and analytical coverage of each of these dimensions.

In that light, despite the possibility that the two starting points of any analysis may be predominantly either structural or functional, Schiffrin (1994), for example, convincingly argues for the inseparability of such approaches. She speaks of the presence of functional elements in what are considered as the most structural approaches to the analysis of discourse and a presence of structural element in the most functional ones. She finally demonstrates this by placing the various approaches on a continuum with the headings *language structures* on one end and *language functions* on the other, and showing how each *type* displays elements of the other. The point she makes is this: just as in a study of language one needs to consider the connections between language and the world, one cannot simply disregard the connection between structure and function in analysing discourse. This last statement constitutes a major premise in the analysis of discourse: i.e. the existence of a relationship between language and social structures which is paralleled by the existence of a relationship between structure and function within the plane of meaning.

Yet all in all, having to decide on the more appropriate theoretical view of language to be adopted in this thesis, the above argument aimed to show that the more balanced view is that which does not overlook the interaction between language structures, functions and meaning. This is specifically a functional view of language and not a structural one.

### 1.2.3 Structure *and* Function in Discourse

Trying to be more specific in selecting the relevant approach to the analysis of discourse, which would have those broad functional basis mentioned above, the discourse analyst has to make decisions concerning:

- 1) the *type* of relationship that exists between structure and function as well as the *degree* of dependence and effect of one on the other, and
- 2) what other extralinguistic and contextual factors to include in any analysis.

From the Hallidayan functional perspective, the relationship that exists between structure and function (where function reflects all three metafunctions of language discussed above) in discourse cannot be separated from social structures within a social context. This is evident in Halliday's (1985: xxxi) assertion that "grammatical phenomena" are *directly* related to "features of culture". Yet the more urgent issue to address here concerns the type of relationship between language and social structures: i.e. *how* these affect each other. The starting point in any functional approach to discourse analysis is an acknowledgement that the use of language structures reveals more than surface meanings of utterances. As Fowler puts it:

Linguistic expressions 'package' experiences of the world and encode different views of the ways objects and events are organized. When we speak or write about something, the words we choose, the structure of our sentences, convey an implicit analysis of the topic, an attitude to it. These attitudes relate to the way we were brought up with language, and to the purpose for which we are using it - these are social, even political factors.

(Fowler 1986: 33- 4)

The argument proposed here is the same made by Toolan (1988: 247- 8) who explains that both the speaker's lexical choices and the manner in which s/he syntactically arranges these choices convey a way or ways of viewing the world and an attitude or attitudes towards it. This claim has been taken up in several analyses of various syntactic features. For instance, Trew (1979) in his article *Theory and*

*Ideology at Work*, concentrated on the grammatical feature of *voice* where the choice between active and passive structures in political headlines was seen to reflect different degrees of emphasis on different parts of the utterances. Also, Halliday's early (1973) analysis of *transitivity* in Golding's *The Inheritors* as well as Weber's (1992) reference to *modality* in different works of fiction have again highlighted the same point: i.e. that linguistic choices (the textual metafunction) reflect the attitudes of a speaker (interpersonal metafunction) as well as affecting the content (ideational metafunction) of a message.

An elaboration of and an extension to this line of reasoning are outlined by Fairclough (1989: 29) who further argues that the relationship (between language and social structures) is a *dialectical*, "two-way relationship". He bases his argument on Althusser's (1972) view that "social institutions may have diverse 'ideological formations'" as well as on Pecheux's (1982) position that "corresponding to different ideological formations are different 'discursive' formations". Fairclough then (1988: 13) devises a combined term of "ideological-discursive formation" which he explains, adequately reflects the dialectical nature of the relationship between social structures and language. In short, not only is the "discursive event ... shaped by situations, institutions and social structures, but it also shapes them" (Fairclough and Wodak 1997: 258).

This essentially socio-political view of discourse highlights its "socially constitutive" nature since discourse is seen to help "*sustain* and *reproduce* the social status quo" as well as contributing considerably towards "transforming" it [emphasis mine] (Fairclough and Wodak 1997: 258). Hence the suggestion here is that the relationship between language use and social structures is that of mutual interdependence and partial governing. It is important to note that these statements

neither claim that social structures completely determine the use of language nor that language use totally determines the shape of social structures. Both are mutually interdependent and both partially constitute one another.

The significance of this argument with respect to the theoretical view of discourse adopted is that it both highlights the importance of the interrelationship between discourse and social structures and points to its complex nature. At the centre of the argument is the effect this has on language users, both as producers and receivers especially through the role of *ideology*. Consequently, in the light of the multifunctional view of language, the importance of accounting for the ideational and interpersonal levels is reflected in their respective contribution to the content of communication between language users (at the basic linguistic level) as well as to the negotiation of the relationship between them as social beings engaged in social interaction. Moreover, these contributions are reflected (whether implicitly or explicitly) in the *form* the language is used: i.e. in the choice and arrangement of certain linguistic features at the textual level. As Macdonell (1986: 1) puts it, “discourse is social. The statement made, the words used and the meanings of the words used, depends on where and against what the statement is made”.

Finally, the dialectical nature of the interrelationship between discourse and social structures suggests that the notion of ideology is clearly a major factor to consider. This is the case since ideology plays a central role in acting at the interpersonal level by directly affecting participants and the dynamics of power relations between them. Furthermore, the view that the relationship between discourse and ideology is an indirect one (Hodge and Kress 1993: 6) makes ideology a more effective tool in enhancing “unequal power relations”. It is therefore an essential constituent of the functional view of discourse.

However, before elaborating on the role ideology plays in discourse (as viewed from a functional perspective in its relation to the three metafunctions discussed above), it is crucial to clarify the term since it too has a certain degree of vagueness associated with its use in more than one sense mainly by Marxist and Post-Marxist thinkers and critics.

### 1.3 The Third Obstacle: Confusing Discourse and Ideology

In her book, *Discourse*, Mills (1997) addresses this issue of confusion in the use of the term ‘ideology’. She adopts a more or less Foucauldian view of the difference between discourse and ideology and argues for a theory of discourse rather than a theory of ideology for the analysis of texts. While ideology carries the connotations associated with “a vulgar Marxist model”, discourse “because of its lack of alliance to a clear political agenda”, offers a way of thinking about hegemony “without assuming that individuals are necessarily simply passive victims of systems of thought” (Mills 1997: 29, 30). She quotes Foucault who writes:

The notion of ideology appears to me to be difficult to use for three reasons. The first is that, whether one wants it to be or not, it is always in virtual opposition to something like the truth ... The second inconvenience is that it refers, necessarily I believe, to something like a subject. Thirdly, ideology is in a secondary position in relation to something which must function as the infra-structure or economic or material determinant for it.

(Foucault 1979: 36)

Of course, each of these arguments might be valid depending on the view of ideology considered. It is therefore quite crucial to clarify Foucault’s reasons by discussing each separately.

The first point that Foucault makes concerning the difficulty in dealing with term ‘ideology’ reflects his criticism of an earlier Marxist view developed mainly in the work of Louis Althusser. In his book, *Politics and History*, Althusser (1972) refers

to the term ideology as “false consciousness”, arguing that the theorist’s position and mission is that of “scientific critique”. Here Mills rightly echoes Foucault in arguing that the only way to apprehend this falseness is from a position of critique standing outside the influence of ideology. This, of course, is dismissed as a possibility since no one’s position “is completely outside the ideas and practices [one] is analyzing” (Mills 1997: 33).

However, Mills only marginally presents other accounts of the other sense in which the term ‘ideology’ can be understood. More recent views of ideology (mainly that of the Critical Linguistics and Post-Marxist theory) are in fact only briefly mentioned at the end of her second chapter, without serious elaboration. This is the sense referred to by Carter and Nash (1990: 20- 21) “as a socially and politically *dominant* set of values and beliefs which are not ‘out there’ but are constructed in all texts especially in and through language” [my emphasis]. Here, in speaking of a “dominant” ideology, indirect reference is made to less dominant and even dominated ideologies: i.e. the term “dominant” presupposes some form of struggle to reach the status of dominance, and this struggle would in effect be between one and another potentially dominant ideology. The “opposition” that Foucault speaks of would therefore exist between one and another ideology and not between ideology and the truth.

Of course, this more recent view of ideology appeared as a result of increasing criticism concerning the way Althusser first defined and handled the term, and this is evident in the progression from Critical Linguistics to Critical Discourse Analysis (see section 1.4 for further discussion). In this sense, Foucault’s influential arguments have helped develop the term into one which is more convincing at the theoretical level and relatively less troublesome to implement at the practical level. This view of



ideology dismisses the claim of a scientific approach to analyse discourse *objectively* (Fairclough 1989, Simpson 1997) and is especially cautious about defining ideology as “false consciousness” (Fowler 1986). Within this more recent view of ideology, Foucault’s argument and the problems he distinguishes are no longer valid.

The second point that Foucault (1979: 36) makes is very much related to the first. The trouble with ideology referring to a “subject” is that it presents a contradictory situation: i.e. a situation where the subject is both the origin of this ideology as well as its outcome. This creates a dilemma from a Foucauldian perspective since it would be impossible to place the subject, who is already affected by an ideology, in a position to expose this “false consciousness”. In fact, if the goal of an ideological analysis of a text were to bring out “the truth”, then this would create an internal conflict. Yet again, more recent views of ideology dismiss the uncovering of the truth as an achievable goal, and reference to the subject only highlights the importance of accounting for different points of view when analysing texts. It is assumed that the subject is partly an effect of discursive structures; however, the ability of that subject to identify ideologies in a text, to possibly disagree with them and to challenge them is not to be undermined either (see section 1.4 for further discussion).

Finally, Foucault’s (1979: 36) view of the position of ideology as a secondary one to the “economic or material determinants for it” would also hold in the light of Althusser’s Marxist reading of ideology but not within later, Post-Marxist views put forward by Linguistic Criticism and Critical Discourse Analysis for instance. According to these approaches, the relationship between ideology, discourse and the socio-economic factors that influence power relations in a society is a two-way relationship. Post-Marxist critique, such as the work of Lukacs (1971: 3), argues

against the traditional view that ideology is situated in the superstructure. Indeed, the whole distinction between base and superstructure in Lukacs's reading of *Capital* is placed under scrutiny and retains no validity (1971: 147). Different social groups within the same society may produce discourses with opposing ideologies which may, in turn, either reproduce existing ideologies or challenge them. Consequently, social institutions may either change as a result of an ideological challenge or grow stronger if the challenge is suppressed in one way or another. This relationship between discourse and social structures is described as a "dialectical" one since both affect one another.

In short, the point argued for here is that in the light of more recent views of discourse and ideology, dividing, contrasting or arguing for one or another of these two terms is not justified. In a way, ideology as we know it now, and discourse are different in that they cannot be compared, or rather contrasted, along the same set of criteria. However, being different does not in any way suggest that they are either unrelated or that they work in opposition to one another. On the contrary, the more recent view of the relationship between discourse and ideology is that of mutual interdependence, and even partial governing. CDA and CL (see section 1.4) argue that a discursive event can reflect one or more ideologies while at the same time, one ideology can be manifested through a variety of different discourses. Yet at the same time, the functions of discourse are not limited to a simple expression of ideology, a position adequately explained in Halliday's multifunctional view of language.

In short, placing the two in competition or opposition with each other as Mills (1997) does, is not in any way constructive to the field of discourse analysis, especially at a stage where the earlier view of ideology is becoming increasingly challenged by more recent work. One is therefore led to conclude that while

Foucauldian criticisms of the difficulties with the term ‘ideology’ are justified in the light of a Marxist model, they are not in relation to the other sense of using the term. In Aronowitz’s (1988: 146) words, ideology is “an ineluctable feature of social life” and therefore, “the reason for the persistence of ambiguity with respect to its meaning does not reside in some slipperiness of social thought, but in the dependent nature of the concept itself”. This dependent nature is a central feature of ideology within a multifunctional view of discourse.

As a result, my own future reference to ideology coincides with Carter and Nash’s (1990: 20- 21) definition of the term; i.e. “as a socially and politically dominant set of values and beliefs which are ... constructed in all texts especially in and through language”. Here, the socio-political partial determinants of ideology as well as the centrality of the linguistic system in the evolution of ideology are highlighted. This therefore carries the suggestion that the role ideology plays in discourse can potentially be explored and interpreted by functional-linguistic analyses which considers the socio-political as well as the linguistic elements of context. Moreover, Carter and Nash’s (1990: 21) statement that, “the ways in which ideologies impregnate a society’s modes of thinking, speaking, experiencing and behaving [are] a necessary ‘condition’ for action and belief within a social formation and hence are crucial in the construction of personal identity” points out a partly individual (as opposed to simply social) dimension to ideology. Ideology is therefore a socio-individual phenomenon (see Chapter Four for a further discussion). Finally, the view that ideology is “a necessary ‘condition’” falls in line with the position adopted in this thesis that ideology is a necessary constituent of discourse and therefore, there is no ideology-free discourse.

The interdependence of the notions discussed above (discourse, ideology and socio-economic-political structures) raises the final obstacle facing the discourse analyst. A prerequisite to deciding on the most appropriate functional approach to discourse analysis is resolving what I see as the dilemma of selection. In other words two main rival forces are:

- 1) what *should* be accounted for in an analysis as opposed to
- 2) what *can* realistically and practically be accounted for.

Of course, theoretically speaking, the more factors one is capable of taking into consideration, the more ‘complete’ an analysis would be. In fact, this is the view proposed by integrationalist approaches to language (Toolan 1996; Harris and Wolf 1998; Harris 1998) which advocate the first of the two rival forces. Integrationalist linguistics raises sound (though slightly outdated) theoretical questions such as the “segregationist” division between ‘competence’ and ‘performance’, ‘langue’ and ‘parole’. According to Harris and Wolf (1998: 4), one cannot approach language based on these “segregationist” polarities since language simply “cannot be decontextualised” in the way suggested by earlier Saussurian and Chomskyan linguistics. Rather, language displays a natural integration among all its aspects (linguistic and non-linguistic) and should therefore be approached in a way to account for this integrationalism: i.e. without presuppositions of pre-existent rules or grammars (Harris 1998a: 5-14; Harris 1998c: 15-26). This position is also echoed by Toolan (1996) whose integrationalist theory of “*total* speech” carries the full weight of the title.

Of course, although this might make theoretical sense, the question of how to approach linguistic analysis in a practical manner following integrationalist suggestions is relatively disregarded. Knowing that it is impossible to approach the

whole of the language as is, the very few practical integrationalist analyses of texts are a complete disappointment (Harris 1998b: 27-45). These focus more on pointing out the shortcomings of earlier 'non-integrationalist' approaches rather than proposing their own convincing analyses. In fact, this I argue is the expected outcome of an unrealistic, over ambitious Integrational view of language. Attempting to account for all variables and factors when analysing discourse runs the risk of losing focus and accomplishing very little mainly because one is incapable of accomplishing so much. As a result, integrationalism finds itself facing the problem of selection once again.

On the other hand, looking at what is realistically and practically feasible is still quite a complex process. Here, the analyst is placed in a position of an arbitrator regarding the selection process and has therefore to decide on a certain hierarchy of significance and justify it in the face of inevitable criticisms. In relation to this thesis, the two questions which relate to the second of the two views above are:

- 1) which linguistic feature is the one considered more significant to approach if the objective of the analysis is to examine the underlying, possibly inconsistent ideologies in specific instances of language use?
- 2) how is that feature best approached and analysed?

These two questions set up the general frame of the fourth chapter and attending to them will be the task of that chapter. However, the central idea here is that the hierarchy of selection mentioned above must be based on some criteria which make selected linguistic features more appropriate than others, in the light of a critical-functional approach. Thus, in attempting to justify the choices made in this thesis (both relating to selected approach to discourse analysis as well as to the selected linguistic feature), it is crucial to discuss the distinction between *non-critical* and *critical* approaches to the analysis of discourse. Weighing the advantages and

disadvantages of each approach with regards to this general categorisation, one would be better equipped in deciding on a more appropriate approach. As a result, a brief review of the main objectives and methodologies of both types of approaches follows in the next section.

## **1.4 Discourse Analysis: Non-Critical versus Critical Approaches**

The first point to make is that the division between the two approaches is not an absolute one. In fact, a distinction in the ‘criticalness’ or ‘non-criticalness’ of approaches has arisen mainly as a result of evolution in the views of a certain group of discourse analysts who later became known as *critical linguists*. Hence, this section will briefly review a selection of approaches to discourse analysis which fall under one or the other category. The main objective is to demonstrate the appropriateness of critical approaches to discourse analysis and justify their use in my upcoming analyses by contrasting the two.

### **1.4.1 Non-Critical Approaches**

One such ‘non-critical’ approach to discourse analysis is Sinclair and Coulthard’s (1975). Its starting point is a reaction to previous linguistic tendencies which concentrate on analysing the structure of the sentence, i.e. analysis at sentence level. Motivated by Firth’s (1935) interest in trying to understand “what language really is, and how it works,” Sinclair and Coulthard’s (1975: 4) approach aims at analysing “the *function* of utterances and the structure of discourse” above the level of the sentence [emphasis mine]. They attempt to answer questions like: “how are successive utterances related; who controls discourse; how does he do it; how, if at all, do other participants take control; how do the roles of speaker and listener pass

from one participant to another; how are new topics introduced and old ones ended” etc. (Sinclair and Coulthard 1975: 4).

Yet although they aim at analysing “functions” of utterances, their approach is not functional in the traditional sense. This is evident in their departure from Sinclair’s (1966) approach which aimed at examining “the relationship between the grammatical structure of an utterance and its function in discourse”: i.e. in the sense of accounting for the functional realisations of declarative, interrogative, and imperative structures of clauses as statements, questions, and commands (Sinclair and Coulthard 1975: 2). Thus, Sinclair’s (1966) main point of emphasis was his distance from the Chomskian (1965) view that had introduced the notion of deep and surface structures of clauses in order to explain instances where a declarative sentence functions as a question. Sinclair’s (1966) answer to that is to account for context.

At the same time, Sinclair and Coulthard’s (1975: 12) functional view is not functional in the Hallidayan sense since the Hallidayan view of the ideational, interpersonal, and textual functions found in the clause does “not provide [them] with a useful starting point”. They argue that Halliday’s (1970) discussion “is pitched at a different level [in that] he is concerned not with the function or meaning of a given utterance of a sentence, but rather with the function of the presence and surface ordering of elements within a sentence” (12). And finally, they also reject the functional dimension of speech-act theory of Boyd and Thorne (1969) (see Chapter Three for further discussion) and argue that their approach is functional in the sense that it concentrates on those functional relationships within the text which are beyond the boundaries of the sentence; i.e. whether utterances are “intended to evoke responses”, for instance, or whether they are “intended to mark a boundary in the discourse”, etc. (Sinclair and Coulthard 1975: 14). In other words, it is how different

levels of discourse function in relation of each other and to the context of the utterance.

Therefore, since their main objective is to find linguistic evidence “for discourse units larger than the utterance”, Sinclair and Coulthard’s (1975: 19-59) approach provides a functional descriptive system of discourse using larger units of analysis (*transactions, exchanges, moves, and acts*) which have a *hierarchical* relation between each other just as sentences and clauses, for example, have a structural hierarchical relationship between them. Finally, this descriptive system is followed by a proposed set of interpretative rules which take into consideration the linguistic form of sentences as well as the situational factors.

Another similar functional approach to discourse analysis is that of Conversation Analysis which finds its basis in the view that “language is not merely a mode of action, but a means of interaction” (Edmondson 1981: 32). As a result, non-verbal acts are seen to be as significant as verbal acts “in terms of the development of a conversation” (Edmondson 1981: 32). This meant that Conversation Analysis emphasised the view that *linguistic, extralinguistic* and *paralinguistic* factors are equally structurally significant in discourse. Therefore, the role of silence, turn taking and sequence of utterances, usually underemphasized in previous approaches, is considered in detail (Edmondson 1981: 33-43). Its medium of analysis is mainly informal conversation and this helped produce accounts of various aspects of conversation like openings and closings, how topics are established, developed and changed, etc.

Moreover, Conversation Analysis developed in the light of *ethnomethodology*, the branch of sociology that deals with the codes and conventions that underlie everyday social interactions and activities. The effects of social structures such as age,



sex or class categories were a major concern in Conversation Analysis (Goffman 1983: 2). Yet the main area of interest was more that of describing and understanding “how actors deploy the mechanisms of talk-in-interaction to accomplish institutionally oriented activities” rather than specifying “the extent to which these interactional mechanisms enable the production and reproduction of the varieties of social formations found in society” (Zimmerman 1991: 4).

This led to criticism mainly by Critical Discourse Analysts such as Fairclough (1989: 19) who argued that since data are interpreted “on the basis of a shared orientation among the participants to a single discourse type”, one chief problem with such analysis is that the general picture of a harmonious and co-operative conversation is given. Of course, this is far from being a realistic picture.

From the perspectives of critical linguists, the main reason both these approaches are considered ‘non-critical’ is because they lack “a *developed* social orientation” reflected in their failure “to consider how relations of power have shaped discourse practices” [emphasis mine] (Fairclough 1989: 15). The centrality of the social-functional dimensions to discourse is emphasised in Fairclough’s (1995) summary of all discourse-related notions which he lists as follows:

<i>discourse</i> (abstract noun)	language use conceived as social practice.
<i>discursive event</i>	instance of language use, analysed as text, discursive practice, social practice.
<i>text</i>	the written or spoken language produced in a discursive event.
<i>discourse practice</i>	the production, distribution and consumption of a text.
<i>interdiscursivity</i>	the constitution of a text from diverse discourses and genres.
<i>discourse</i> (count noun)	way of signifying experience from a particular perspective.
<i>genre</i>	use of language associated with a particular social activity.
<i>order of discourse</i>	totality of discursive practices of an institution, and relations between them.

(Fairclough 1995: 135)

As for those approaches (whether functional or structural) which ignore the social and ideological dimensions of discourse, these are consequently deemed as *descriptive* in nature, since being analytical, from Fairclough's (1989: 15) perspective, involves accounting for the relationship between discourse and issues of power and ideology.

However, although it is true that these approaches mentioned above overlook social and ideological factors, their branding as merely descriptive seems rather harsh and unfounded. Firstly, the critical/non-critical division adopted by such Critical Linguists or Critical Discourse Analysts as Fairclough, Fowler, Kress, Hodge, van Dijk, etc. is based on a much specified view of what constitutes *criticalness*. Following this view, an approach is considered critical if, and only if, it accounts for the relationship between language, power and ideology: in other words, only if its main objective is an "interventionist" one, aiming at "[making] explicit an awareness of control in order to resist it critically" (Stockwell 1999: 3). Yet this is an obviously narrow view of what a critical analysis entails. Criticalness is based on questioning the foundations, methods and results of specific claims by different fields of enquiry. Yet the issue of hegemony is only one of several aspects of the interaction between language and social structures that can be subject to critical analysis.

Secondly, the main area emphasised by critical approaches is that where non-critical approaches failed rather than they succeeded. In other words, they undermine how critical these approaches were and are in contrast with previous theories and tendencies to, for instance, concentrate on and analyse short and invented sentences as opposed to considering the context of an utterance within the larger and more authentic medium of discourse. These non-critical approaches are necessary

constituents in the evolution of critical linguistic thought. One must also confess that such approaches are not merely descriptive since they do more than provide an ‘objective’ description of what is present and evident at the surface structure of a text. Mills (1995) makes that point clear by arguing that these approaches do in fact relate different levels of structure to others (both micro and macro) as well as relating structural patterns to *functions* of language. This is an important issue since it ultimately clears up the possible confusion of mapping structuralist approaches with non-critical ones.

### 1.4.2 Critical Approaches

The other side of the division, then, brackets together a large number of ‘critical’ approaches to analysing discourse, two of which are discussed in detail since they are more appropriate for the upcoming analyses. These are the earlier Linguistic Criticism (LC) of Fowler *et al.* (1979) and Fowler (1986) on the one hand, and the more recent Critical Discourse Analysis (CDA) of Fairclough (1989, 1995). The division between these two is chiefly due to minor differences in the scope and coverage of these approaches rather than major theoretical ones. This becomes more obvious when looking closely at each approach where one can detect similarities relating to the most fundamental issues.

At the theoretical level, both approaches share the same *linguistic* theoretical background traceable back to Halliday’s (1978; 1985) functional theory, particularly the view of language as essentially multifunctional in nature. Moreover, the two approaches are influenced by Marxist *socio-political* thought concerning issues of power, ideology, social institutions and the complex relationships among them. They do not “simply use linguistics to talk about what is objectively present at the surface

structure of the text”, but they see these “objective structures as always having some further meaning in a given social context” (Fowler 1995: 14). And in order to carry out this interpretive aim, LC and CDA need “a particular kind of grammatical model as its basis”, namely, the functional model (Fowler 1995: 14) although Fairclough (1995) considers Halliday’s (1985) functional-systemic grammar as merely provisional.

Both these theoretical inspirations have direct implications on the practical side of LC and CDA. On the one hand, the linguistic background is reflected in the tools and methodologies used in text analyses which spring mainly from Hallidayan models (such as transitivity analyses). On the other hand, the socio-political influence motivates the main objectives of critically analysing discourse: i.e. to examine the ways in which ideologies of social and political institutions affect discourse in general and how that effect is a dialectical one.

Consequently, in the light of these theoretical backgrounds, both approaches to discourse analysis are branded by Fowler (1996: 3) as “instrumental linguistics”, the objective of which is to expose ideologies which are “coded implicitly behind overt propositions,” in order to examine them “in the context of social formation”. As van Leeuwen (1993: 193) suggests, CDA and CL (Critical Linguistics) “should be concerned with ... discourse as the instrument of power and control as well as with discourse as the instrument of social construction of reality”. The underlying presupposition is that words and structures chosen by the language users are ‘motivated’ and that they “communicate a cultural semiotic in addition to the literal meanings of the words and sentences” (Fairclough 1995: 15). Both “‘selection’ and ‘transformation’ are guided by reference, generally unconscious, to ideas and beliefs” (Fowler 1991: 2).

Of course, ideologies cannot be simply “read off the linguistic forms because the same form has different significances in different contexts” (Fowler 1996: 9). However, certain interpretations may be made of constructions that fall into a recurrent regularity. Finally, both (CDA and CL) see the ultimate effect of the reproduction of governing ideologies in discourse as bringing about what Fairclough calls ‘naturalization’ and what Fowler calls ‘habitualization’. These very similar terms mainly focus on how ideology can be hidden in language. This problem is handled in the aims of CDA and CL at exposing those less visible aspects of discourse that indirectly position people in ways serving the ideological interests of those in power.

The differences between both approaches, on the other hand, are the following. Whereas Fowler’s approach to text analysis is mainly linguistic (or ‘textual’), Fairclough’s is both ‘textual’ and ‘intertextual’ (Fairclough 1995: 188). Fowler concentrates predominantly on the ‘linguistic’ level of text analysis. This covers both “the traditional levels of analysis within linguistics (phonology, grammar up to the level of the sentence, and vocabulary and semantics)” together with “analysis of textual organization above the sentence including intersentential cohesion and various aspects of the structure of texts which have been investigated by discourse analysts and conversational analysts (including properties of dialogue such as organization of turn-taking)” (Fairclough 1995: 188). Fairclough (1995: 188), on the other hand, considers it essential to account for the ‘intertextual’ level of analysis. This essentially “shows how texts selectively draw upon *orders of discourse*- the particular configurations of conversationalized practices (genres, discourses, narratives, etc.), which are available to text producers and interpreters in particular social circumstances”. Influenced by Bakhtin (1981), he believes that the concept of *context* should also include “intertextuality as well as sociocultural knowledge” which

means that “discourses are always connected to other discourses which were produced earlier, as well as those produced synchronically and subsequently” (Fairclough 1995: 276). This, of course, increases the number of variables to be considered, and although serving the purpose of making discourse analysis more accurate, it nevertheless makes the task much harder and time consuming. It also paves the way for questions concerning the practicability of expanding the scope of analysis to account for more variables and where the analyst can draw the limiting line.

Such issues together with the problems of difficulty, one-sidedness, descriptive and interpretive potential of CDA are raised by Widdowson (1995a, 1995b, 1996), Fairclough (1996) and Toolan (1997). In their heated debates, Widdowson and Toolan question some of the terminology of CDA as well as its claims in terms of the interpretive capacity of this approach to discourse analysis. While Widdowson is mainly interested in terminological ‘contradiction’, Toolan focuses on how CDA differs from stylistics and how they sometimes work in opposition. The main point, however, is an agreed acknowledgement of the importance of the direction in which CDA is proceeding and the positive promise of further improvements in the analytical abilities of the approach.

From such debates, therefore, springs the agreement that conforming exclusively to one model of text analysis can be dangerously limited. This lack of satisfaction with adopting only one or another model for the analysis of discourse (see Birch 1989) is acknowledged by critical linguists throughout. Therefore, the tendency in future analyses should be directed towards being more selective in adopting a combination of models. However, one vital characteristic of any model or any combination should be its/their ability to present a *systematic* analysis of a text through utilising a set of linguistic features *systematically* described (Toolan 1990:

28). Another characteristic should be its *flexibility*. Such a tendency is based on the premise that as long as ways of analysing texts can help clarify that view of the relationship between discourse and social structures in a relatively neat manner, these ways are useful and can therefore be adopted. Such a tendency is pragmatic in nature.

As Birch (1989: 151) puts it:

The key to any future success would lie with *interdisciplinary* approaches to analysis. This would mean recognizing the restrictions and constraints of single disciplinary approaches to the subject... .

(Birch 1989: 151)

## 1.5 Conclusions

In this first chapter, I have tried to address the difficulties associated with the use of the term ‘discourse’ and with approaches to its analysis. After pointing out the reasons for the vagueness associated with defining the term, the next obstacles facing a discourse analyst were identified as selecting the appropriate approach to analysing discourse with its prerequisite underlying theoretical framework. This led to a consideration of the two main theories of language (structural and functional) and a discussion of the way each accounted for the relationships between language structure and functions. It was seen that structural theories, on the one hand, largely undermined the association between language structure and meaning, the effects of which were deemed as either “the weak point in language study” (Bloomfield 1933: 140) or simply “irrelevant” to the theory of linguistics (Chomsky 1965: 3). On the other hand, the functional view generally presented a more balanced position of the indispensability of structure in any functional theory of language (Halliday 1978, 1985). Indeed, this balanced functional view of language was seen to be supported by numerous approaches to discourse analysis which concluded that, from a practical perspective, structure and function do not exist in isolation from one another and that

the relationship between the two is that of mutual interdependence (Schiffrin 1994). Insisting on isolating language structure and function would inevitably lead to a disregarding at least one dimension of meaning since neither can be spoken of independently from the other. As Pratt (1987: 52) adequately concludes, “the point is not that standard [structuralist] descriptive approaches are altogether wrong, but that they are *limited* in ways they themselves do not acknowledge” [emphasis mine].

Consequently, an initial decision was made concerning the appropriateness of a broad functional theoretical basis to approaching discourse analysis, a functional basis which is in line with the Hallidayan multifunctional view of language and its broad objective of analysing the relationship between the linguistic system and social structures. The next step was to decide on those factors that should be accounted for in this analysis, and consequently, which practical approach to select. Here, a central factor governing the relationship between language and social structures within the multifunctional view of language was acknowledged as the notion of ideology. Consequently, after clarifying the vagueness associated with the use of the term mainly in Marxist and Post-Marxist contexts, ideology was seen as a necessary constituent of discourse playing a decisive role in the interaction between the three metafunctions of meaning: the ideational, interpersonal and textual.

Hence, in the light of the broad objectives of a multifunctional view of language, i.e. analysing the relationship between the linguistic system and social structures, ideology was seen as an indispensable notion to account for in any multifunctional analysis of discourse. Discourse and ideology are simply inseparable notions especially in the light of critical approaches to discourse analysis which put forward a view of discourse as essentially socio-culturally conscious.



Subsequently, in attempting to provide an answer to the question, “what is discourse?” the following suggestion can be made. Discourse can be regarded as a contextually occurring instance of language use which is not determined by the length and/or grammaticalness of its component utterance/s, but by the involvement of a speaker/writer and a hearer/reader in an act of communication, in a context saturated with ideologies resulting from cultural, religious, political, gender-related, etc. modalities. Analysing discourse would then involve a consideration of these constituents.

## II Literature, Stylistics and *The Reader*

### 2.1 Introduction

Given the vagueness associated with the term *discourse*, the previous chapter focused mainly on narrowing down its fundamental constituents and deciding on its main characteristics. The conclusion reached was that ‘discourse’ could be defined as a contextually occurring instance of language use; it is not determined by the length and grammaticalness of utterance/s, but by the involvement of a speaker/writer and a hearer/ reader in an act of communication, in a context saturated with ideologies (conflicting or otherwise) emerging from and affected by personal as well as cultural, religious, political, gender-related, etc. modalities. Discourse, as an instance of language in use, then necessarily reflects the multifunctional dimensions of language in general, and this suggests that any approach to its analysis will have to take into account both linguistic as well as extra-linguistic features, the latter of which are a combination of subjective/personal and intersubjective/cultural factors.

In the light of this definition, one main proposition put forward in this thesis is that all texts as instances of discourse can be approached in essentially the same manner for critical analysis. This would specifically include those texts (namely literary texts) traditionally viewed as unique and different from all other instances of discourse in that they exhibit unique and different ‘types’ of language. Yet considering these types as different would naturally cause problems to an otherwise uniform view of discourse, the analysis of which could not then be approached from the same angle. Consequently, the aim of this chapter is to revisit and, where relevant, redefine a set of traditional notions which do not conform with the view of discourse discussed above. These include such notions as *literature*, *literary* and *non-literary*

*language, style* in language and its effects on *stylistic analyses*, and the positions and roles of *text producers* as well as *the reader* in interpreting texts. The need to attend to these issues springs from their centrality in critical approaches to discourse analysis. Handling them rather loosely can run the risk of undermining the feasibility, objectives and value of a functional and critical analysis of discourse as defined above.

## 2.2 Literature as Discourse

### 2.2.1 ‘Literary’ and ‘Non-Literary’ Language

The unique status associated with literature and literary language is an old issue traceable back to the times of the Greeks. Plato distinguished poetry from other types of discourse and went to the extreme position of expelling poets from his *Republic* mainly due to the dangerous effects their use of language – literary language – can have on people. Yet although numerous and divergent views have evolved since then, the distinctiveness of literature and of literary language as a characteristic feature has far from faded out. This is a tricky issue which complicates the task of the discourse analyst since it creates the need to justify treating literature *as* discourse: i.e. “literature [as] an example of language in use” (Carter 1982: 12) especially when literature has traditionally been considered as a *special* type of discourse displaying a distinctive *type* of language. Treating literature as discourse would then imply that literature be regarded merely as an instance of “real communication in [a] real social context” (Carter and McCarthy 1994: 135): i.e. “mediating relationships between language-users: not only relationships of speech, but also of consciousness, ideology, role and class” (Fowler 1981: 80). This would ultimately bring the status of literature

to that of everyday discourse, a view historically rejected by literary figures and literary critics.

Adopting a position concerning this issue is, therefore, not a simple straightforward decision since dismissing the traditional view of the specialness of literature and literary language runs contrary to a set of mainstream historic beliefs and positions. As a result, my intention in this section is to test the viability and bases for the two: i.e. those which distinguish between literary and non-literary language (where the first is considered as not only “special” and “different” from, but also *superior* to, “normal-everyday” language or non-literary language) on the one hand, and those which regard literary and non-literary language as essentially the same, on the other. These views can be seen to constitute the two boundaries of a continuum.

At one end of the continuum is Chapman’s (1973: 3-13) view which regards literature as offering language that is completely different from what may be loosely termed “the ‘normal’ or ‘everyday’ usage of a speech-community” in that it is “special, heightened and prestigious”, thus presenting features “peculiar to itself which are not found in other areas of expression”. More importantly, literature “is the work of men who were specially sensitive to the language of their time and who used the skill of language to make permanent their vision of life” (Chapman 1973: 5). They have managed to do so by manipulating language “to make it contain a unique series of experiences and interpretations” (Chapman 1973: 5). For him, literature can be defined as “the art that uses language ... as an artistic medium, not simply for communication or even expression. It is not spontaneous ... it is considered and developed in a way that is impossible for everyday conversation ...” (Chapman 1973: 7, 13). Rephrased concisely, Chapman’s rather vague view (discussed in section

2.2.2) distinguishes between literary and non-literary language based on differences which are fundamentally structural and marginally functional.

Another slightly variant and less vague view is that of Jakobson (1960) who is, to begin with, more specific in his treatment of the issue since he is interested exclusively in poetry as a specific form of literature rather than literature in general. Although he argues that literature exhibits language which has structurally and functionally unique characteristics, the language of literature is, nevertheless, not completely different from normal everyday language since it shares common functions. His approach is based on a multifunctional view of language which argues that there are six basic functions of verbal communication: “emotive”, “referential”, “metalingual”, “conative”, “poetic” and “phatic” (Jakobson 1960: 58), and the language of literature reflects all these functions. Yet in contrast with Halliday’s (1978; 1985) view, Jakobson’s (1960) reference to the multifunctional nature of language concerns those more basic functional dimensions of language with their corresponding structural manifestations. For instance, the “conative function”, according to Jakobson (1960: 55, 56) is oriented “towards the addressee” and therefore “finds its purest grammatical expression in the vocative and imperative which ... deviate from other nominal and verbal categories”.

Consequently, Jakobson’s (1960: 57) emphasis on the “poetic function” as essential to poetry reveals poetry’s characteristic feature of focusing “on the message for its own sake”. This is reflected in what Jakobson (1960: 59, 60) describes as the “well-ordered shape of the message” found mainly at the phonetic level and carried on syllabically as forms of internal measurement to ensure “equivalence”. Yet while the poetic function is not the only function in poetry but is the dominant one, Jakobson (1960: 59) points out that “measure of sequences is a device which, outside

the poetic function, finds no application in language”. In fact, this is characteristic only of poetry.

In short, from Jakobson’s (1960) perspective, what makes poetry different at the functional level is its *additional* and *unique* function which is not characteristic of other types of discourse: the poetic function. Yet interestingly enough, this functional definition of poetics is still a largely structuralist one since what he characterises as poetry, for instance, is that which exhibits specific measurable structural features like the phonetic and syllabic rhyme and rhythm.

A broader treatment of the notion of multifunctionalism is later taken on by Leech (1987: 77) who, following Jakobson (1960), argues that literature in general is different since it is “that kind of text in which the poetic function is dominant over others”. Again, he emphasises that while *all* texts are seen to combine more than one function, which may include the poetic function, that which is labelled as literature would be the one where the dominant function is the poetic function. In other words, it is seen to exist along with other subsidiary ones. However, where Leech differs significantly from Jakobson is in his lack of emphasis on structure of language. He argues that “in functional terms, there is no discontinuity ... between everyday communication and literature,” and this lack of discontinuity is explained not in structural terms, but rather by including the hearer or reader as central to the process of interpretation. He states that:

... multiplicity and indeterminacy of meaning are characteristic of both literature and conversation; and in both literature and conversation, as readers or hearers, we have to engage our minds fully (in terms of background knowledge, intelligence and imagination) to reconstruct the addresser’s intention as well as we can.

(Leech 1987: 83)

As a result, Leech's (1987: 78) re-evaluation of Jakobson's positions towards literature and the quality of "literariness" is entirely dependent on the "evaluation or interpretation of the text by readers, by a social or linguistic community".

Further along the continuum, a fourth view concerning the status of literature and literary language is that of Pratt (1981). She argues that from the critic's point of view, there is no motivation for viewing literary discourse "as generically distinct from other linguistic activities or as exploiting any kind of communicative competence other than that which we rely on in non-literary speech situations" (Pratt 1981: 377). She points out the view that "linguistic deviance" as tolerated by literary works is one of the main arguments which are "most often adduced to support the poetic language doctrine" (Pratt 1981: 409). This is the case since the function of language in literary works is considered as "not primarily communicative" whereas its function elsewhere is (Pratt 1981: 409). This, she contests, is not a unique characteristic of literary language. This kind of "flouting" is common in everyday communication and more importantly, is in itself as communicative as the lack of it. In other words, deviance is used for a purpose which is communicative as well as effective not only in literary language, but also in everyday-ordinary language. As a result, Pratt adopts the position that there are no differences between literary and non-literary language either on the functional or the structural levels.

Other writers like Kress (1988), Simpson (1997), and Weber (1992) push the argument against a distinction between literary language and other types of discourses all the way, taking into account both linguistic and socio-cultural factors. Kress (1988: 127), for instance, sees that "all texts are subject to the same linguistic and social determinations, so-called literary texts no less than so-called non-literary texts". We then cannot isolate literary works from the same factors that affect everyday

conversation and this would as a result place literary texts under the influence of political and cultural pressures just as is the case with non-literary texts. The effect of this view of literature is that it changes the traditional (usually historical and/or autobiographical) approaches to analysing literary texts into more culturally and politically motivated approaches. In Kress's words, it is an attempt "to bring literary texts fully into the arena of cultural and political concerns" (1988: 127).

Simpson (1997: 7) also supports this view. He argues that there are no items of modern English vocabulary or grammar that are "*inherently and exclusively* literary". As a result, we can better understand literary communication only if it is viewed as "contiguous with other discourses" (1997: 7). This view is finally echoed by Weber (1992: 1) in stating that "there are no linguistically identifiable distinctions between literary and non-literary texts ... [since] ... literature is a culturally defined notion".

### **2.2.2 Is the Distinction Justified?**

After outlining these views, obvious problems emerge in some, especially the earlier ones. For instance, in claiming that the language of literature is "special, heightened and prestigious" and that "literature is the work of *men* who were specially sensitive to the language of their time and who used the skill of language to make permanent their vision of life" [emphasis mine], Chapman (1973: 5) neither clarifies how the language of literature is "heightened" nor does he offer any justification for his implication that non-literary discourse is produced by "men" who are not as sensitive to the language of their time. The vagueness of these generalisations and the absence of a detailed systematic basis for differentiating the two shed doubt on the viability of this distinction in the first place.



Yet the root of the problem, I argue, lies in the definition of Literature (with a capital L), which is constantly presented in a way to suggest that all instances of literature constitute one uniform category. Of course, this is not the case as there are several degrees of structural (even functional) restrictions and determinants associated with different forms of literature, each with their variant bearings on the language. In fact, different literary genres can be seen to fall in a continuum of structural rigidity where a sonnet, due to its high level of structural restrictions (in terms of the number of lines, rhyme, rhythm, etc) would be an instance of one extreme and a novel an instance of the other. Following that, while the extreme ends of the continuum present a more or less clear categorisation of the genre under study, there are middle-grounds cases which according to Pratt (1988) are problematic in their categorisations. As she explains, there are “conventions of representation relatively independent of ... genre distinctions” (Pratt 1988: 18) which makes the classification of different texts a challenging task.

Following this, if, on the one hand, the definition of literature and the quality of ‘literariness’ depends on those structural restrictions, then the distinction between literature and non-literature blurs the further we move along the continuum. This would only give rise to another graver problem of having to decide where the main dividing line is when attempting to make further sub-genre divisions. While one cannot deny the existence of certain structural restrictions characteristic only of some instances of literature (such as in a sonnet), the language exhibited in other instances (such as in a novel) is almost indistinguishable from other ‘non-literary’ forms of discourse.

On the other hand, if the quality of ‘literariness’ depends on how figurative, “special, heightened and prestigious” (Chapman 1973: 13) the language of a text is

(i.e. in terms of aesthetic functional effects), then this is an essentially subjective matter left for the reader and the influence of social, historical and educational institutions to decide. In this case, the same text could be considered literary by some readers, less literary by others and even non-literary by some others. Again here, one faces a potentially more serious impediment: deciding on the degree of decorativeness, specialness, etc. language structures have to exhibit in order to fall under either category. In both cases, these conclusions contribute only to further enhance the difficulty in drawing a separating line and provide no assistance towards clarifying the controversy.

Nonetheless, both views are partly valid, and the situation is not necessarily a mutually exclusive one since all of these factors do play some role in deciding on what is considered as literature and literary language. As mentioned above, the degree of structural restrictions in the language of a text can at one extreme determine its status as literary while in many other cases it does not. Moreover, even the labelling of a genre as a literary one does partly determine the status of the language it embeds as literary language (as revealed in Fish's (1980) classroom experiments) both at the production and reception levels. This is evident in genre theories (Swales 1990; Kress 1985; O'Toole 1988) which argue for an existing association between the overall genre which a text conforms with on the one hand, and the language it exhibits or even *should* exhibit as a result of belonging to that genre on the other. As Kress (1985: 31) explains, just as a specific genre is seen as the outcome of "meanings, forms and functions of ... conventionalised occasions of social interactions", the genre can also affect structural choice. For instance, *history* as a genre is seen to exhibit a predominance of clauses of causation while *scientific writing* reflects impersonal and factual statements, and this is due to the nature of the requirements of

both genres (Kress 1985: 55-57). In short, choice of language is “partly determined by the norms of the socially appropriate genre for these functions” (O’Toole 1988: 1).

Finally, the reader also plays a vital role in this controversy where the quality of literariness would be viewed in terms of functional *effects* of a use of language on a *reader*. This is the point Simpson (1997: 8) supports when arguing that “‘literary’ is a quality conferred upon texts not according to what they *are*, but according to what they *do*. It is ... a *functional* description”. Of course, this is too simplistic. There are other complications which arise as a result of the need to specify what these effects are, who *the reader* is and how s/he reacts to and is affected by which functional dimension of the language used in a text; and a whole section will be devoted to that later in this chapter. While for instance, these effects were action-prompting effects in Plato’s view of poetry (the reason that caused him to dread and expel poets from his Republic), in Jakobson’s view, these are a combination of effects ranging from giving the reader pleasure (aesthetic) to teaching her a lesson (didactic) even to prompting her to action (conative). Yet again, the effects referred to by critics like Simpson, Kress and Weber are socio-cultural-political ideological ones. These issues will be dealt with in a following section of this chapter, but the main point that arises from all these arguments is that both traditional as well as more recent views of literature are only partly valid. At one extreme, there exist some structural qualities characteristic only of specific literary genres and the language exhibited in these genres. At the other extreme, literariness can be determined in terms of broad functional effects of a use of language on readers.

In the light of this argument, the view argued for in this thesis is that Literature is the result of a long-standing socio-historical institutional, educational tradition, which is currently perceived as the standard status quo. This means that Literature is

approached by readers as a “complex and opaque” form of discourse “because the experiences [it] describe[s] and elicit[s] in the reader are *considered, necessarily* to be complex and deep” [emphasis mine] (Birch 1989: 86). Therefore, what makes some (and very few) literary genres distinctive forms of discourse results partially from a set of structural restrictions (which are not characteristic of all literary genres), some broad functional effects on the reader (which are not exclusive to literature), and most importantly because literature is read differently in the first place.

However, looking at this whole controversy from a critical-functional perspective, the need to isolate literary language as a unique category becomes of little significance. Unlike traditional approaches, those functions that are of interest for a critical analysis of discourse are not aesthetic but ideological ones. In this sense, whether a literary text is highly decorative or not is of relatively little importance as long as it addresses socio-cultural issues, issues relating to the effects of a use of language and the power of language on a reader at the ideological level. Unless those aesthetic characteristics of language play a functional role in affecting, for instance, the consistency of a writer’s ideological positions or the reader’s interpretation of these positions, there would be no motive or motivation to differentiate between literary and non-literary language since both are subject to the same set of determinants and can therefore function in similar ways in terms of ideological effects on readers. And this is the position adopted in this thesis, that there is no structural or functional motivation for isolating literary language as a different *type* of language use.

## 2.3 Style and Stylistics

The next set of notions directly related to the traditional view of literature and literary language are those of style and stylistics. These too do not conform to the functional/critical view of discourse discussed above, and therefore, clarifying them becomes crucial due to their central role in determining the directions in which the analysis of literary texts proceeded. As a result, the following section aims at examining the role and value of these notions from the perspective of a functional theory of discourse and a critical approach to its analysis.

### 2.3.1 Definitions and Role of Style

Similar to the notion of literary language, the term *style* was traditionally used with positive connotations to describe “written” language as “praiseworthy, skilful or elegant” (Chapman 1973: 11). However, the two core senses of style which developed subsequently were those viewing it either as “an intimate, individuating index” or as “an evaluative index” (Crystal 1969: v). From a practical point of view, this meant the following. In the first case, emphasis is laid on those linguistic features considered unique to a specific author and characteristic of his/her language. In the second, the evaluative aspect of style is stressed by comparing and contrasting linguistic features of different works in order to determine the value and, more importantly, *superiority* of one over another.

Still, both views have common bases. As Enkvist (1973: 15) explains, in both cases style is necessarily seen as some kind of “DEPARTURE” from a set of linguistic patterns labelled as a “norm” or the “syntactically neutral or unmarked”, an “ADDITION” of stylistic traits to expressions deemed as “neutral or styleless, or pre-stylistic”, and/or as “CONNOTATION”, whereby linguistic features acquire their

value from the “textual and situational environment”. However, even at the structural level, these common features are quite problematic. For instance, there is a general lack of clarity concerning what is considered as the norm (those syntactically neutral and unmarked forms) and what traits are therefore considered stylistic. And Enkvist’s (1973: 15) further distinction between “stylistic choice” and “pragmatic and grammatical choice,” the latter of which has no stylistic value, only contributes to further enhancing this difficulty. This is the case since no clear guidelines to determine which choice is stylistic and which is not can be offered. Moreover, such bases for distinction as choice and deviance (especially of those unmarked syntactic patterns) are not only subjective but also rather *non-distinctive* since choice for instance is characteristic of all language use. In this sense, approaching style on the basis of these features would present quite a circular definition.

Apart from the highly inadequate bases for defining style as a notion, the two senses in which style developed are also unsatisfactory. On the one hand, looking at style as “an intimate, individuating index” (Crystal 1969: v) presents an extremely narrow view of style with highly limited practical value. On the other hand, approaching style in terms of “the impressions of the reader” (Enkvist *et al.* 1964: 10-11), which characterises a large portion of the second sense of style: i.e. as “an evaluative index” (Crystal 1969: v), faces the same obstacles as those discussed under literary language arise; namely relating to the identity of what is constantly referred to as *the reader*. The risk of associating the general identity of the reader with the one directly responsible for a reading of a specific text is an ever-lurking possibility. Moreover, there are always questions concerning the uniformity of those reader-impressions in the presence of the inevitable element of subjectivity. Finally, the difficulty in providing a systematic account of those criteria the reader considers in

order to make these judgements concerning which style is better renders the move from the theoretical to the more practical arena a very complex one.

In the aftermath of these drawbacks, approaching the notion of style from a critical-functional view of discourse promises a more useful account. Carter and Nash (1990: 21) attempt just that by defining style as “a textual phenomenon [which] should be studied both in terms of particular linguistic forms in a text and as effects generated by those same forms on the consumer (the reader) by the producer of the text (the writer)”. This falls in line with the above view of discourse, where discourse is a functional and therefore a dynamic process reflecting an interaction between the author, the reader, linguistic structures in the text as well as a set of social factors. In this process, the author, reader, text and consequently styles are also influenced by socio-cultural factors, thus bringing to light an important dimension in the question of style: the role of ideology as a crucial determinant in the interplay between structure, function and meaning (Kress 1988: 127; Carter and Nash 1990: 21). This finally results in a view of style as the product of a use of language which is affected by both individual and social factors. Rephrased by Birch and O’Toole (1988: 1), stylistic choices are partly determined by the functional and ideological needs of the producer of the text and partly by “the norms of the socially appropriate genre for these functions”.

Yet these latest additions to what constitutes style have serious implications. While under the first structuralist view, doubt was shed on the viability of distinguishing style on the basis of non-distinctive features, in the latter functional view, all the bases for isolating style are completely wiped out. If one’s style is reflected in one’s choice of the content and form of a message which is also affected by social and individual factors, then this suggests that one’s style is indistinguishable

from one's discourse. The only justification for singling out the notion of style would be when accounting for regularities and irregularities in patterns that become characteristic of an individual's discourse, and these according to Leech (1987: 48) are "purely statistical" matters. At one extreme, i.e. when relating to those recurrent and typical patterns in language use, this is what characterises genres. At the other extreme, i.e. when discussing only one isolated instance of discourse, then style and the language of discourse are identical. As a result, style would be a redundant term from a functional view of discourse, and a stylistic analysis would be essentially the same as discourse analysis. And this is the position adopted in this thesis, that a stylistic analysis which specifically targets literary genres can simply be replaced with a critical analysis of discourse which targets all instances of discourse including those referred to as literary.

Yet looking at the way stylistics developed, one is faced with a completely different picture to that argued for in this thesis. Historically, the three main theoretical branches of stylistics outlined below barely correspond to the functional view of discourse and the main objectives of a critical analysis of discourse. It is crucial, therefore, to provide a brief description of these approach in order to set the bases from which this thesis differs.

### **2.3.2 Branches in Stylistic Analysis**

At the theoretical level, there are three main branches of stylistics. The first regards it as "that part of linguistics which concentrates on variation in the use of language ... with special attention to the most conscious and complex uses of language in literature" (Turner 1973: 7). Here stylistics is essentially part of "linguistics" (Crystal 1969: 9) which takes the analysis of literary texts as its medium. The second



branch is that regarding it as “an extension of practical criticism, enabling the critic to sensitise his grasp of detail together with his grasp of structure wholes” (Cluysenaar 1976: 10). In this sense, stylistic analysis is used as *back up* to the analysts’ intuitions about the meaning of texts (Mills 1995: 7). It therefore falls as part of literary criticism, where linguistics is used “instrumentally” as a matter of convenience because of its practicality in providing some sort of “toolkit” for analysts of literature and for students to use when undertaking literary interpretation (Leech and Short 1981: 13).

The differences between these two views are summarised by Carter (1986: 8-12) who labels the first “linguistic stylistics” and the second “literary stylistics”. “Linguistic stylistics” is described as “the purest form of stylistics” since it uses the study of style to derive “a refinement of models for the analysis of language and thus contribute to the development of linguistic theory” (Carter 1986: 8). It is therefore *linguistic* in orientation in the sense that the ultimate objective is in the benefit of linguistic theory and description, and where literary texts serve as the medium used to refine models that are linguistic in essence (Carter 1986: 10). On the other hand, “literary stylistics” is that approach to text analysis where the ultimate objective is to arrive at a reading of the text under study. As a result, the tendency, argues Carter (1986: 12), would be “to draw eclectically on linguistic insights” used to serve “what is generally claimed to be fuller interpretation of language effects”, and which will in turn be more than what is possible without resorting to linguistics. In this sense the approach is *not linguistic* since linguistics is used only as a tool to support the analysis of the content of a literary work and is not the aim of the study altogether.

Finally, the third branch is that which considers stylistics as “a means of linking” literary criticism and linguistics (Widdowson 1975: 3). This view attempts to

find the middle grounds between both fields of study, and its definition as “the analysis of the language of literary texts, usually taking its theoretical models from linguistics” (Mills 1995: 4) reveals the presence of elements from both fields.

Yet moving to the practical level, only the third view of stylistics makes practical sense and is reflected in practical analyses since there are serious doubts whether Carter’s branches of stylistics do exist in their pure forms. In fact, except for the analysts’ openly declared aims and institutional affiliations, it is difficult to think of specific stylistic analyses which have contributed solely and exclusively to one field. The findings of “linguistic stylistics” are used by “literary stylistics” in order to help interpret texts; and if these findings are non-applicable or irrelevant when applied, then there usually is, or should be, a rethinking of the orientations and analytical potential of the linguistic model used. Normally, the linguistic model is modified in the light of the extent and range of its applicability in more than one linguistic medium. The more applicable, the more valuable it is both for the study of linguistics and literary criticism. Indeed as O’Toole (1988: 12) explains, the three characteristics of a stylistic analysis are:

- 1) “[providing] as detailed a description as possible of the transmitted text of the work in question”
- 2) “inevitably [prompting] and [deepening] the process of interpretation” and
- 3) “[testing] the power of the chosen model of linguistic description”.

In short, stylistics is, or should be, a discipline “which genuinely tries to combine both approaches [linguistics and literary] to the study of literary texts” (Van Peer 1988: 2).

Yet Carter's distinction is not unfounded. There have been approaches to stylistic analysis which did *attempt* to perform one or the other task. Their limitations, however, are what brought about the third more balanced view. These limitations boil down to highly specified contributions to one or the other field of study with no account for the social dimension of language, the role of ideology or their functional effects on readers. Even when earlier approaches speak of *effects* on *the reader* of a specific style, the use of the first term usually referred to some sort of vague aesthetic effect which is essentially a subjective, difficult-to-specify evaluation on the one hand, or to *meaning* (Tompkins 1980: ix) in general. In fact, both these terms are unclarified and unspecified as are many of factors that were considered as part of earlier approaches to stylistic analysis.

This explains the variety of approaches which emphasise different components of the text at the expense of others. Firstly, there are those which stress the role of the producer of the text in their analyses. As a result, they focus on analysing textual features in the light of the personality, background and environment of the generators of the text (Enkvist 1973: 14). Other analyses concentrate on the role of the receiver in terms of his/her reactions to the "textual stimuli" generated by the producer of the text. This is based on the assumption that analysts would have better access to the stylistic effects of texts through the readers' responses to the text than through trying to analyse what is in the mind of the writer and what motivated him/her to write this way (Enkvist 1973: 14). Finally, there is a third group of analysts who pay attention only to the text as a structural-syntactic unit with minimal references to the producer or the receiver. Their aim, Enkvist (1973: 15) explains, is to "objectify" their approach by looking for stylistic clues in the text at the descriptive level.

Yet as mentioned above, each of these approaches necessarily faces problems of being too narrow and positioned. One must acknowledge the fact that language in a text is not merely a medium through which an author “encodes” certain meanings and effects that are either “decoded” or not by a reader (Fludernik 1993: 60). There are other extra-textual factors and forces (social, individual, political, historical, racial, etc.) that are indisputably significant. A more comprehensive analysis of text *has* to take into consideration those elements determining “the meaning of a text in its social context” not only in its linguistic context (Mills 1995: 8). This should be done in addition to accounting for the role of the reader, author and linguistic make up of the text and not as a replacement for it.

As discussed in Chapter One, the seriousness of this issue (i.e. what factors to consider and why) is translated into questioning the underlying criteria used in selecting and setting the parameters for a framework whose aim is to provide an analysis of a text, literary or non-literary, which is of practical value. Even when the main objectives of such an analysis are specified as presenting a reading of underlying political, racist, sexist, religious, economic, etc ideologies in a text, questions of determining what factors *should* be accounted for as opposed to what *can* be realistically accounted for are raised. Here, the starting point towards any answer to the above question is an agreement concerning the insufficiency of accounting for the exclusive role of either the producer of the text, the text (as a structural unit) or its receiver. Within the functional view of language adopted in this thesis, the position argued for is that all these three basic levels need to be considered. The way these are considered is another matter, and this will be taken up in the last section of this chapter and then again in Chapter Four. However, it is crucial to note that what occupies a predominant position in an analysis whose main objectives are examining

the functional *effects* of a specific use of language on a reader is the reader her/himself. Even with more recent *critical* stylistic approaches to literary criticism (such as in the work of stylisticians like Carter, Fowler, Mills, Simpson, Toolan, Weber, etc.), the role and position of the reader is under-specified in the reading process.

In fact, this branch of stylistic approaches is the only one which falls in line with the functional view of language proposed by Halliday. However, while it does view the reader as affected by the interaction among the some or all those factors discussed above, it still does not provide a practical way of realistically accounting for the role of the reader in a practical analysis of a literary text. Yet this is not the reason for not mentioning this branch of stylistics earlier. The reason is the argument made in the previous section where I contested the use of the term *stylistics* to refer to a specified version of a critical analysis of discourse which takes Literature as its medium. This term, I argued, is derived from the notion of *style* which is necessarily seen as a distinctive feature of language. However, this I argued was a hard position to justify whether at the structural or functional levels since an analysis of style (which is based on the concept of choice) is essentially the same as analysing language in use, i.e. discourse. There is, in other words, no styleless discourse and stylistics as a term is therefore an unfortunately misrepresentative one. Consequently, before deciding on the parameters of a critical approach to literary/non-literary discourse, the notion of the reader needs to be clarified and elaborated on.

## 2.4 The Problem of *The Reader*

As apparent from the above arguments, central to understanding, defining and specifying all those issues of literary and non-literary language, style and approaches

to stylistic analysis is the role of the reader. However, questions regarding whether the reader referred to is an individual reader or a representative of a certain group or community of readers are raised. Also, how that reader is affected by both internal and external factors (in the broadest sense) in the process of reading and interpretation are essential issues to address. Finally, since any view of the reader is dependent on a corresponding view of the relationship between that reader, the writer and the text, a clear and specific position regarding the interaction among these three is crucial in light of the definition of discourse outlined above. This is precisely what this final section will try to achieve; i.e. to examine these issues in the light of those theories which regard the reader as central in the process of interpretation. These theories are known as Reader-Response Criticism.

#### **2.4.1 Reader-Response Criticism**

The roots of reader-response criticism are traditionally traceable to Husserl's (1960) theory of *phenomenology*. This philosophy or method of inquiry is based on the premise that reality consists of objects and events as they are perceived or understood in human consciousness and not of anything independent of human consciousness. And this is what, according to Mailloux (1982: 20), different reader-response approaches share: "the phenomenological assumption that it is impossible to separate perceiver from perceived, subject from object". As a result, in their quest to locate the meaning of a literary work, it was imperative for reader-response critics to place the role of the reader centrally in the equation since meaning is seen to have "no effective existence outside of its realization in the mind of a reader" (Tompkins 1980: ix).

This, naturally, brought about a set of diverse views regarding such traditional notions as *text* and *the reader* particularly as deviating from Formalists' and New Critics'. Most of these views are clearly summarised and presented, more or less chronologically, in Tompkins' (1980) account of most approaches to reader-response criticism of the time (from the '50s to the late '70s) and are seen to follow a 'coherent progression' from formalism through structuralism and phenomenology to psychoanalysis and post-structuralism. Despite the variety of approaches, Tompkins finds that the one objective they all share is the specification of meaning. One group of approaches reflects a more text-based position; another a more reader-centred one. While in the first the role of the reader as an individual is, although present, less important in determining meaning in the text, the emphasis in the second shifts to the process of reading and the reader rather than the object of reading.

Yet of the different arrangements of approaches to reader-response criticism, Steven Mailloux's (1982) presents the most convenient one. According to Mailloux, the three main directions in reader-response criticism can be represented in the following manner: Holland's (1975) and Bleich's (1978) "psychological" models reflecting a "subjective" view of reader-response, Fish's (1970) and Iser's (1974) "intersubjective" models, a "phenomenological" view, and Culler's (1975) and Fish's (1976) "social" models, a "structuralist" view. Of course, these are only a small selection of the numerous approaches, but they nevertheless are representative of the three main directions in reader-response criticism up till the late '70s. The different positions each branch adopts with respect to the reader and her role in the reading process constitute the points of relevance in this argument and are therefore briefly outlined below.

## 2.4.2 Three Directions in Reader-Response Criticism

### 2.4.2.1 Psychological Models

To begin with, Holland's (1975: 40) mainly subjective or psychoanalytic approach claims to take "as its subject-matter, not the text in supposed isolation, ... , nor the self in rhapsody, ... , but the *transaction* between the reader and the text". Holland introduces the notion of *identity theme*, which is in fact an innate unique individual characteristic, the unchanging core of an individual's personality. He then argues that it is in line with each person's identity theme that interpretation occurs. In this sense interpretation becomes an essentially subjective process since differences in identity themes influence the reader's *defences, expectations, fantasies*, and *transformations* (DEFT) in the process of reading. To him, uniformity of response is not possible since individual personality is responsible for all response. It is the reader's mind which occupies the centre of textual meaning and unity since "interpretation is a function of identity" (Leitch 1995: 41). Of course, Holland's view is open to criticism such as Mailloux's (1982: 25) pointing out this theory's inability to account for the "phenomenon of similar responses" since meaning becomes "the result of ... interpretive synthesis, the transformation of fantasy into a unity which the reader finds coherent and satisfying". In other words, if different people possess different 'identity themes' then how can this theory explain similarity in responses?

Yet whether this is a crucial issue in Holland's (1975) theory remains questionable since his model does open the possibility for the existence of similar identity themes which bring about similar interpretations. The more challenging criticism is Culler's (1975) indication that what Holland has essentially done is "[transfer] the concept of unity from text to person" (Bennett 1997: 38). The



seriousness of this criticism, in my opinion, arises from the fact that making this shift leaves Holland's theory essentially untestable and therefore unverifiable. In other words, the practical usefulness of such a theory would be minimal since the closest one can get to identifying the 'identity theme' of another individual would be through another interpreter's subconscious 'identity theme'. Although one cannot deny the existence of the individual 'personality factor' that plays a role in reading and interpretation, taking such a factor into consideration in a practical account of reading and interpretation and placing it centrally in this account is a different issue. Another common criticism is that Holland's account also exhibits little commitment to "historical inquiry, formalist explication, or ideological analysis" and instead gives the primary role of shaping and determining the text to the reader (Leitch 1995: 43). This adds to the subjective nature of interpretation and response in Holland's model.

Another 'psychological' and 'subjective' approach to reader-response criticism is Bleich's (1978), and in it he emphasises the role of the reader as the source of meaning. In his book, *Subjective Criticism*, he places the reader at the centre of the reading process by distinguishing between three levels of reading. The first is the "subjective response", the 'symbolization' which is the reader's first reaction to a text as first perceived and identified by that reader (Bleich 1978: 98). The second is the "resymbolization" which occurs after perception and identification, which in turn create in the reader "a need, desire, or demand for explanation" (Bleich 1978: 39). In other words, the need for explaining the initial reaction to the text is what brings about what is "commonly known as interpretation" (Bleich 1978: 67). Finally comes the level of 'negotiation' among the members of an interpretive community of those individual interpretations. In that, he distinguishes between interpretation and response. While response is the initial *emotional* reaction to a text (a private process),

interpretation is the more belated and objectified individual subjective experience (a communal process). His aim is to stress the primary emotional response at the expense of interpretation seeking to demonstrate “the subjective ground of all objective formulation” (Leitch 1995: 45). In his pedagogical orientation, he is more interested in what students feel rather than what they think. Therefore his main point of emphasis is the primacy given to the individual self as creator of texts, and this brings about several criticisms such as Mailloux’s (1982) which sheds doubts on the ability of Bleich’s model in accounting for agreement in negotiation.

Mailloux (1982: 32) questions Bleich’s argument and asks how different subjectivities can “participate in a *negotiating* process” since texts are individually constituted. He elaborates by saying that since there could be different versions of each negotiator’s response statement constituting different versions of the same literary text, then “no negotiating process is comprehensible” unless the text is prior to individual initiative (Mailloux 1982: 33). Mailloux (1982: 33) concludes by pointing out the impossibility of a task whose objective is to account for “interpretive agreement after having established the absolute primacy of the individual as interpreter”. And this seems to be the main point of criticism when it comes to ‘psychological’ and ‘subjective’ approaches. In concentrating on the individual mind as the main producer of meaning, and in stripping individuals and individual minds from any realistic sense of a social dimension, such accounts inevitably fail to explain similarity in response. In this, their contribution to our understanding of the role of the reader in the reading process remains less empirical, more theoretical, and therefore minimal from a practical perspective.

#### 2.4.2.2 *Phenomenological Models*

Another direction in reader-response criticism is Fish's (1970) 'phenomenological' and 'intersubjective' view. In his article *Literature in the Reader: Affective Stylistics*, Fish (1970) regards the text not as "an object, a thing-in-itself, but an *event*, something that *happens* to, and with the participation of, the reader" (in Fish 1980: 25). To him, the text becomes alive through the act of reading, in the process of reception. Yet since reading happens through time, his proposed method of analysis aims at monitoring the temporal flow of sentences which are "structured by everything the reader brings with him, by his competences" (Fish 1980: 46). He suggests that "it is by taking these into account as they interact with the temporal left-to-right reception of the verbal string that [one is] able to chart and project *the* developing response" (Fish 1980: 47).

Yet although the reader seems to lie at the centre of meaning, since "the place where sense is made or not made is the reader's mind rather than the printed page," (Tompkins 1980: xvii), Fish is in fact interested in the "interaction" between the words on the page and "the actively mediating consciousness of the reader-hearer" (Leitch 1995: 36). And a major part of this 'interaction' lies in the intentions of the author. Fish argues that readers 'react' to words, sentences and texts in one way or another because they (i.e. readers) operate "according to the same set of rules that the author used to generate them" (Tompkins 1980: xvii). His notion of the 'informed reader' represents a reader who is able to understand the text the way the author intended it. It follows then that the reader is eventually manipulated by the text which is the creation of the author, thus enacting the author's will. Meaning is ultimately created in the reader by the author, and this in Leitch's (1995: 38) words, elevates the authorial consciousness to a level where it controls "the complications of meanings

through the manipulation of linguistic and poetic conventions”. In this sense, Fish’s position presents a conflicting and a partly misleading view which starts off giving the impression that the reader lies at the centre of the interpretive activity. However, later on, Fish takes meaning back to the author’s arena and strips the reader of the power to go beyond what was intended by the author. The fact remains that in Fish’s approach, whether we are looking at the text or at the reader’s cognitive process (his reaction to text), the same goal is sought: the intended meaning of the author which is concretised in the text when it is read. As a result, the possibilities for an intersubjective interpretation become more tangible since meaning is not the product of a subjective process located in the mind of the reader but in the temporal interaction between the reader and the text. Finally, Fish’s model is also criticised because it brushes aside extrinsic social realities and historical issues (Leitch 1995: 37).

A similar position is adopted by Wolfgang Iser (1974: 80) in his account of the reading process and the position of the reader. According to Iser, a reader actively participates in the production of textual meaning in that s/he acts as “co-creator of the work by supplying that portion of it which is not written but only implied”. From a phenomenological viewpoint, the text is concretised when the reader’s imagination comes into play where different readers “[fill] in the unwritten portions of the text, its ‘gaps’ or areas of ‘indeterminacy,’” in their own ways (Tompkins 1980: xv). In this sense, the act of reading *is* the text since both constitute one another. Yet there are limits as to the type and amount of ‘filling in’ that can be done. According to Iser, these limits are *implied* by the text, *circumscribed* by it and *traceable* to it so that the interpretations arrived at are not “mere subjective fabrication[s] of the reader’s,” but are proof of both the text’s inexhaustibility as well as its limited intentions (Tompkins 1980: xv). Therefore, this co-creation gives the reader the authority to fill in only what

is implied by the text. In short, the reader's activity is both a fulfilment of what is already implicit in the structure of the work as well as a partly subjective process. As Iser (1971: 4) explains, while meanings "are the product of a rather difficult interaction between the text and reader", the focus is more on the "intersubjective nature of the time-flow of reading and the textual perspectives that guide the consistency-building and put restrictions on the range of configurative meanings". In this sense, Iser's reception theory both refuses "to dissolve the text into the reader's subjectivity or the interpretive community's codes and conventions" while at the same time promoting "the creativity of the reader" (Leitch 1995: 53). Yet in practice, Iser gives primacy to the text which is responsible for constantly readjusting the reader's expectations and evaluations and where the response of the reader depends on how attentive s/he is to textual cues. And it is this precise point which Sauer (1988: 85) contests when he argues that "reception is not at all merely the filling in of spaces left open in the text" since "differences, misunderstandings, discontinuities and exploited potential will surely remain". In other words, apart from Iser's brushing aside the social dimension of reading, the indeterminacy of the text is one major characteristic which is always a possibility.

#### **2.4.2.3      *Social Models***

The third direction in reader-response criticism is Culler's (1975) 'social' model which has a structuralist basis in that it attempts to account for the reader's understanding of literary texts from a linguistic point of view. He speaks of 'literary competence' as a set of conventions which "[direct] the reader to pick out certain features of the work corresponding to public notions of what constitutes an 'acceptable' or 'appropriate' interpretation" (Tompkins 1980: xviii). In that, reading is

presented as a “highly determined operation of decoding” mainly directed “by textual and cultural constraints” (Leitch 1995: 60). It is a rule-governed process, and it is this underlying system of rules, their ‘literary competence’, that determines literary meaning since readers do not approach a text without preconceptions. In this sense, literary meaning is a publicly agreed-upon institutionalised matter. Therefore, the organising principles of textual interpretations are located not in the reader, as Iser suggests, but “in the institutions that teach readers to read” (Culler 1981: 120). This is best summarised by Culler’s (1981: 125) statement that “meaning is not an individual creation but the result of applying to the text operations and conventions which constitute the institution of literature”. Yet despite its ‘social’ branding, Culler’s approach presents only a narrow view of the social and cultural aspects of reader-response. It is mainly targeted at pointing out those conventions in reading which come in the form of an “underlying social and historical system of rules determining literature and its interpretation” (Leitch 1995: 60). In that, other ideological aspects, for instance, are left completely unmentioned.

A similar position is adopted by Fish (1976: 167) who substitutes his earlier (1970) notion of the “informed reader” with the concept of “interpretive communities”. Here he suggests that the interpretive strategies of the readers are those constituting the text and thus seeks to account for both “the variety as well as the stability of reader responses to the text” (Leitch 1995: 38). This, according to Mailloux (1982: 23), signals his shift from a phenomenological emphasis “to a structural or even post-structural position”, a position which stresses “the underlying systems that determine the production of textual meaning and in which the individual reader and the constraining text lose their independent status”. His notion of an ‘interpretive community’ is made up of “those who share interpretive strategies not

for reading (in the conventional sense) but for writing texts, for constituting their properties and assigning their intentions” (Fish 1980: 171). These strategies “exist prior to the act of reading and therefore determine the shape of what is read rather than, ... , the other way round” (Fish 1980: 171). What this means is that interpretation is no longer a ‘response’ to the author’s intended meaning but rather the outcome of interpretive strategies. The reader is seen to ‘negotiate’ the text so that when a line seems ambiguous, it is the reader (as part of a community of interpreters) who has to decide on the meaning in a manner demanded by his/her community’s interpretive strategies. Yet despite Fish’s change in approach, the same criticisms concerning his neglect of the social dimension still surround him. Such criticisms question the value of Fish’s ‘interpretive communities’ without specific detail concerning the ‘situation’, the ‘historical and social configuration’, and “what political interests are concretely entailed by the very existence of interpretive communities” (Said 1983: 26). It is these drawbacks that set the direction in which reader-response criticism proceeds in the following years.

Yet as far as the earlier years of reader-response criticism are concerned, there exists a continuum that moves from psychological reading models which emphasise unique responses, through phenomenological models which include subjective and intersubjective readings, to the social models that stress shared responses.

### **2.4.3 Other Directions in Reader-Response Criticism**

As mentioned earlier, there are several shortcomings to each of these approaches. In fact, Tompkins (1980: 201) singles out a set of weaknesses which all approaches to reader-response criticism share. For instance, she argues that these approaches do not essentially depart from New Criticism as is assumed, and this is

reflected in their similar objective; i.e. the location of meaning. Whether meaning is located in the text or in the reader is the only concern that divides them. Yet the two main issues which seem to have dictated the directions of later criticism are the fact that none of the above approaches consider language as an instrument of power, nor do they include an adequate account of the social dimension. By adequate I mean an account which is systematic, which manifests itself convincingly and realistically in the theory and which has practical potential.

This drawback and the dissatisfaction with the kind of coverage reader-response criticism made of the issues involved are what prompted at least one of the two main directions which reading theories took in the '80s and the early '90s. One of them was based on the view of readers as "historically or socially constructed, rather than abstract and eternal essences" (Bennett 1995: 4). It emerged from the recognition that "readers are *different*, that no single identity can be demanded of or imposed on readers" and that, as a result, "questions of social, economic, gender and ethnic differences" are simply unavoidable. In contrast with the conventional view of reading as "a solitary affair" constituting an escape from the world, these later approaches saw reading as inseparable from political and historical factors in the sense that the choice of what to read, where to read, when to read and how to read are "determined by social, religious or political restraints" (Bennett 1995: 5). In another sense, the emergence of the "resistant reader" foreshadowed the rough path awaiting those who do not comply with the demands of those determining reading conventions. Following this line of reasoning, reading becomes a struggle, and the reader, in constant battle with the text and those external constraints. This view was best exemplified in feminist criticism such as Pratt's (1986: 29) who, in adopting the view



of the resistant reader, argued for the need to regard reader-response as a “socially and ideologically determined process”.

The other direction in reading theory involves what Bennett (1995: 4) calls “a problematization of the very concept of ‘reading’ and ‘the reader’, a recognition not only that readers are different from one another, but that any individual reader is multiple, and that any reading is determined by difference”. This manifested itself mainly in deconstructionist theories which highlight the complexities in approaching the notion of ‘the reader’ rather than help explain or simplify it.

According to deconstructionist theorists such as Samuel Weber (1987) and Jacques Derrida (1992), readers face a dilemma of identification and distance. According to Derrida (1992: 74), readers are drawn by the “impulse” of identifying themselves with the text while at the same time trying to distance themselves and differ in reading. And this is what Weber (1987: 92) refers to in his statement, “if [reading] succeeds it fails” since in their attempt to interpret the text as the text dictates it, readers are in fact recreating the act of writing and are not really reading. If they differ in interpretation, then they miss the intended point and purpose of the text. In other words, a deconstructionist view contests both the notion of a single shared reading as well as that of several subjective readings. Yet although this can make sense at the theoretical level (that it is not an either-or situation) deconstructionists do not seem to take this view in a constructive direction. Another example to demonstrate the kind of complication characteristic of deconstructionist theories is Derrida’s (1992) and Felman’s (1977; 1982) positions which raise existential questions concerning the notions of the text and the reader. Derrida (1992: 74) starts by arguing, for instance, that the reader, by definition, “does not exist” but is merely the product of the reading process. But at the same time, the text only comes into

existence through the act of reading, remarks Felman (1977: 124): i.e. it does not exist prior to the reader. It follows then that the “priority, the originary locus and even the temporal primacy of text and reader are uncertain” (Felman 1977: 124). The points such arguments are meant to make correspond to the deconstructionists’ doubts of the communicative ability of reading since “the action by which communication is produced – reading – is necessarily inhabited by its ... own resistance” (Bennet 1995: 11). These views are addressed next.

## **2.5     Accounting for *The Reader***

In the light of these deconstructionist views regarding the role of the reader in the reading process, there exist several reservations pertaining to the theoretical and practical contributions of these arguments. Issues like whether or not a text exists in isolation of the reader and whether or not the reader brings the text to life seem quite pointless if the intention is to analyse these texts for any purpose and only complicate the notions of the text and the reader. My point is that our interest in a text is in the context of reading and not the text in isolation or the reader in isolation. And in this process of reading, both (the text and the reader) exist through the interaction between them.

On top of that is the reality of the reader. The reader is, after all, a real entity living in a society, and is affected and partly shaped by both individual and social factors. And these constantly changing factors reflect upon the reader who is also undergoing constant change and development. This is why it is unrealistic to speak of one definitive interpretation. Even the same person changes her mind during the temporal flow of the reading process as well as after the reading is done. Therefore, while there can be a limit as to the range of possible interpretations which are

relatable to the text at the intersubjective level, there can be no one definitive interpretation. And this, I believe, is as ambitious an aim as can realistically be achievable. The closest one can get to pinning down the possible range of interpretation is being categorical about what do not constitute intersubjective interpretations.

As a result, in this extremely complex process of reading and interpretation, the reliable constants are in fact identifiable variables. Taking into account the role of the reader in discourse analysis is therefore a major difficulty in that it includes elements of individual subjectivity, socio-cultural and institutional intersubjectivity and textual pseudo-objectivity. And the view that all these factors are present makes the linguistic makeup of the text in the light of social constraints equally important. The position proposed in this thesis concerning the role of the reader is therefore the following.

In the presence of these already mentioned elements and variables, accounting for the role of the reader in the process of interpretation should start by primarily acknowledging the need for opening the possibility for variance in interpretation. The way this is done is discussed in the analytical framework proposed in Chapter Four, as well as the practical applications of this framework in Chapters Five, Six and Seven. While at the one hand, accounting for the variability in reader interpretation reflects the flexibility of the proposed framework, the systematic nature of the proposed framework reduces the danger that interpretation might turn into a completely loose process without any restraints. All this falls in line with the broad objectives of the analysis which are investigating the power of language in its multifunctional nature in terms of its effects on the reader at the ideological level. These objectives necessarily

project the view of the text as a functional and therefore a dynamic process reflecting an interaction among all the constituent elements of discourse.

All in all then, and in agreement with the objectives of critical-functional analyses of discourse, the approach put forward in this thesis will target ideological issues in various instances of discourse (both literary and non-literary, both overtly and non-overtly ideological). Its basis falls in line with one of the premises set in the first chapter: that a critical analysis of discourse should involve a *systematic* utilisation of a relevant set of linguistic tools for that purpose. Consequently, this analysis would be based on a systematic approach which is adequate in that it manifests itself convincingly and realistically in the theory as well as having practical potential.

Relating this to a more specific linguistic tool, the forthcoming analyses will be based on a systematic analysis of *modality* in discourse in order to provide a reading of ideology. And the grounds for selecting modality as the main linguistic feature are its direct relationship with ideology and the key role it plays in reflecting or obscuring ideology in general. This relationship will be discussed thoroughly in Chapter Four, yet mentioning it at this point is only to signal and emphasise the need for a systematic description of modality on which a systematic analysis of ideology could be based. And this is the upcoming task of the next chapter: presenting the different approaches to defining and categorising modality in general so that the most relevant, systematic and practically useful account could be utilised for these specified objectives.

## 2.6 Conclusions

This chapter addressed a set of traditional and controversial issues which required redefinition in the light of the view of discourse discussed in the previous chapter. These related to notions such as literary and non-literary language, style and stylistics and the role of the reader in discourse analysis. The conclusions reached were mainly concerned with determining where these controversial issues fit in light of the objectives of a critical analysis of discourse. Both structural and functional bases which set literary language apart as a special type of language were examined and scrutinised. It was concluded that each of these bases was only partially valid depending on the perspective from which the issue is approached. While structural restrictions did at one extreme determine the status of a work as literary (such as in a sonnet), these restrictions became less effective the more we move on a continuum of literariness. At the same time, while certain literary functions (such as those detailed in Jakobson's work) can be characteristic of works of literature, these were not exclusive to literature.

Moreover, a similar set of conclusions was reached with respect to the issue of style which was traditionally (from a structural perspective) considered as some special and positive characteristic of one's use of language. However, whether style was seen as an evaluative index or an individuating one, there were serious doubts concerning its role as a distinctive feature in language. Even when considered from a functional perspective, in terms of its effect on readers, there were still no justifications for setting it apart from language use in general. Based on that, the different stylistic approaches which aim at analysing style in literature were examined and conclusions regarding the inadequacy of most of them were made in light of the multifunctional view of discourse presented in the first chapter.

Finally, as a prerequisite to deciding on the most appropriate approach to analysing discourse, the role of the reader was also examined in considerable detail in order to provide an adequate account of that reader which is both theoretically and practically workable in the approach. This was done in the light of reader-response theories and special emphasis was laid on the need to consider the individual as well as the social role of reader in her interaction with the text. This was based on the view that while there is a substantial degree of conformity in interpretation, the possibility that different readers may vary in interpretation should also be accounted for. This was seen possible only through an approach which allows for a consideration of all the mentioned variables in a systematic way where modality (the proposed linguistic feature to be analysed) is the key feature.

### III Searching for a Practically Useful Account of Modality

#### 3.1 Introduction

Analysing a text from a critical perspective presupposes an interaction amongst a large number of factors, and accounting for them is a very delicate process. The first two chapters have tried to identify many of these factors and clarify those which are problematic as well as those which do not correspond with the view of discourse agreed upon. It was concluded that the main challenge to accounting for those factors and the interaction among them in the light of the main objectives of a critical analysis of discourse would be the potential chaos that might arise out of that. This is due to the sheer number of sub-factors that belong to each which adds to the complexity of their interaction. It was concluded, therefore, that the only way to achieve this goal is through an approach which involves a 'systematic' utilisation of a relevant set of linguistic tools (Toolan 1990: 28) for the main purpose of providing a systematic reading of ideology in a text. And modality was identified as the linguistic tool with obvious potential.

Consequently, since the aim of the fourth chapter is to highlight the importance of modality in text analysis and propose a model for doing so, it is crucial first to provide a review of the most relevant studies which have tackled this topic. This would set the necessary background serving as a basis from which the overall view of modality adopted in this thesis departs and/or on which it is partially based. Doing this, the *diversity* in approaches which have sprung from different theoretical views of language will be of primary focus. However, only those more useful accounts which correspond more closely to the view adopted in this thesis (both at the theoretical and practical levels) are elaborated on in any detail. This narrowing down

is determined in the light of the main objective of this chapter: the selection of the most appropriate account of modality which is both systematic as well as potentially practically useful for the analysis of ideology in discourse. And this usefulness is defined in line with the functional view of discourse outlined in the two previous chapters.

Before embarking on this review, one must first point out the complexity associated with attempting to identify the main criteria which the different accounts of modality rely on. Although there sometimes are more obvious and dominant ones, detecting and pinpointing those elements is not that straightforward since they are not always openly signalled in the approach itself. In effect, my attempt to classify these approaches will be based both on their claims as well as on my own reading and evaluation of each. It is, in most cases, a chronologically structured review.

### **3.2 Accounting for Modality: Complexities and Diversities**

Throughout the last few decades, several approaches springing from various perspectives have tried to define the term ‘modality’ and provide a systematic account of it. These have varied widely due to the fact that the main bases for the diversity in categorisations were deeply rooted in and dependent on one or more of the following criteria: syntactic, semantic, functional, cognitive, etc. Hence, each approach has faced its own difficulties and has produced a more or less narrow and positioned account of what modality entails and which expressions should be included under the heading of modality. This is, to some extent, justifiable, the reasons behind it being related to how vast the topic initially is, the difficulty, degree of ambiguity and subjectivity associated with interpreting modal expressions in language, and the tendencies to adopt one or another approach based on what is the popular theory of



language at the time. This meant that various approaches have targeted the topic of modality from different angles and for diverse reasons, having their roots in several linguistic backgrounds, and in this sense, “the nature of the goal has come to be defined in terms of the means of approach” (Perkins 1983: 1).

### 3.2.1 Twaddell’s (1960) Restricted Structural Approach

One of the earlier treatments of modals is Twaddell’s (1960), which concentrates exclusively on a subset of English verbs: modal auxiliary verbs. The criteria on which Twaddell bases his selection are essentially a set of syntactic features shared by these modal auxiliaries but not characteristic of other main verbs. These unique features are summarised as follows: modal auxiliaries are distinguished by their ability to occur:

- 1) before ‘not’ such as in “you **must** *not* leave the house” as opposed to other main verbs
- 2) before the subject for interrogation, as in “**may** I leave?”
- 3) as a substitute for an entire verb phrase as in “John can play the flute but I **can’t**” and
- 4) as the locus of grammatical stress as in “he **must** do it” (Twaddell 1960: 18).

It is these same properties, later referred to by Huddleston (1976: 333) as the “NICE” properties, an acronym formed from “negation”, “inversion”, “code” and “emphatic”, which became central in all syntactic categorisations of modals.

Twaddell then makes a further division between modal auxiliaries and those he calls “primary auxiliaries” (*be*, *have* and *do*). Again, the distinction between them is drawn on syntactic grounds in that unlike “primary auxiliaries”, modal auxiliaries neither show signs of agreement with the subject as in “\* he may<sub>s</sub> go” nor do they have a full past tense (except for ‘can’ of ability). Finally, the last set of properties that distinguish modal auxiliary verbs is distributional. By this Twaddell refers to

their inability to co-occur as in “\*John may could leave”. In short, these three main syntactic features characteristic of modal auxiliary verbs clearly and neatly distinguish them not only from other full verbs, but also from ‘primary auxiliaries’, making them a category of their own.

The first point on which Twaddell is criticised (Hermeren 1978; Coates 1983) is that his syntactic criteria do not permit him to account for any other expressions of modality. This is argued by Huddleston (1976) who explains that the NICE properties necessarily create a set of ‘marginal’ modals such as ‘need’ and ‘dare’ which satisfy some but not all these properties. Another problem is the presence of some auxiliaries such as *have* and *be* which satisfy the NICE properties but for which there are no *semantic* grounds to consider as modal. This leads to the next main criticism which is the inability for Twaddell’s approach to account for the issue of meaning. In fact, this approach represents an extremely popular linguistic tendency stressing the view of language as a structured system which can be accounted for in a neat systematic manner. Of course, this is only possible at the expense of other important issues, such as that of meaning in this case, in which Twaddell expresses no interest. This main criticism will be a recurrent one in some later approaches to grouping and categorising modals.

### **3.2.2 Joos’s (1964) Restricted Semantic Approach**

A completely different approach is that adopted by Joos (1964). His is a complex semantic approach to classifying only eight modal auxiliaries (*will, shall, can, may, must, ought to, dare* and *need*), and these are grouped based on the differences in the kinds of semantic oppositions between them. Modals are considered to belong to a subgroup in which each modal is “either ‘adequate’ or ‘contingent’, and

either ‘casual’ or ‘stable’; and each either ‘assures’ the event or specifies that it is ‘potential’” (Joos 1964: 149). This means that the differences between modals depend on which of those characteristics are exhibited by which modals. The reader is then invited to visually place the eight modals on the eight corners of “an abstract semiological cube” with the six characteristics on the six faces of that cube. Each face would then have four modals at its four corners which are listed below:

Casual modals (WILL, SHALL, CAN, MAY) *take* that relation from the *minimal* social matrix of events, where the determining factors are the resultant of chance and whim operating upon the items that populate the factual world of accepted reality, but the

Stable modals (MUST, OUGHT TO, DARE, NEED) *find* that relation in the *maximal* social matrix of events, where the determining factors are eternal and omnipresent: they are the community mores. Accordingly, stable modals exclude remote tense.

Adequate modals (WILL, CAN, MUST, DARE) derive their force from *completeness* in the set of determining factors; but the

Contingent modals (SHALL, MAY, OUGHT TO, NEED) get their weakness from some *deficiency* in the determining factors.

Assurance (WILL, SHALL, MUST, OUGHT TO) comes from *penalties* for failure of the specified event to occur; but

Potentiality (CAN, MAY, DARE, NEED) comes from *immunity* in case the actor brings the event to completion.

(Joos 1964: 149-150)

The first observation to make about Joos’ classification of modal auxiliary verbs relates to his attempt to present a “symmetrical or exceptionless semantic arrangement” (Ehrman 1966: 9). This brings out several criticisms doubting the extent to which such a categorisation is a representative one when it comes to the numerous unaccounted for ‘meanings’ of modals as well as the unaccounted for modals. For instance, as Hermeren (1978: 18) argues, such classification suggests that Joos considers each modal to have a ‘unitary meaning’ which is “independent of the various contexts in which the modal occurs”. This is echoed by Coates (1983: 9) when describing Joos’ approach as generally “monosemantic” since it attempts to provide a “basic meaning for each modal” thus facing problems of deciding which of

the meanings constitutes the ‘core meaning’. It follows that the definition of each modal is both vague and general in order to account for the diversity in the possible interpretations of the modal (Hermeren 1978: 18). Consequently, this kind of definition of modals is not informative enough and not very useful from a practical point of view.

### 3.2.3 Palmer’s (1965, 1974) Early Structural Approaches

Palmer’s (1965) approach to classifying modals is essentially based on syntactic criteria. His initial division between main verbs and auxiliary verbs is not based on “such notional categories [as] the expression of futurity, potentiality, obligation, etc.” but rather on “four clearly statable formal characteristics of the auxiliary verbs” (Palmer 1965: 20-21). These are “negation”, “inversion”, “code” and “emphatic affirmation”. Echoing Twaddell’s (1960) structural account outlined above, he also makes further subdivisions within auxiliary verbs between “primary” (*be*, *have*, *do*) and “secondary” auxiliaries of which the latter are the modals (Palmer 1965: 36). Finally, completely disregarding the issue of meaning, he only points out those problematic cases which do not fit his categorisation (*dare*, *need*, *used*) without attempting to directly address the problem.

Realising this drawback, only in his later account does Palmer (1974) start to take the issue of meaning more seriously, although his main emphasis still lies on further detailed and systematic subdivisions of modal auxiliary verbs based on formal criteria. At the structural level, his later account (1974: 30-32) includes what he calls the “paradigm test” for defining auxiliaries, a test which takes into consideration the different positions of verbs (including modals) in a verb phrase as well as restrictions on combinations and order of these different verbs. At the semantic level, on the other

hand, Palmer (1974: 102) refers to a distinction between “epistemic” and “non-epistemic” uses of mainly the modals *will*, *may* and *must*, taking into account those ambiguities associated with the use of modals in different utterances.

However, his emphasis still centres on how the semantic notion of “epistemic” functions with respect to formal notions such as that of “tense” (Palmer 1974: 103). For instance, he suggests that there are three types of modals which are most clearly distinguished by their tense marking. These are “discourse-oriented”, “subject-oriented” and “epistemic” (Palmer 1974, 100). Their correspondence with the formal feature of tense is the following. With the first, there is no tense marking as in “he may not leave”; with the second, the modal may be marked for tense as in “John could run 10 miles”; with the third, the full verb may be marked for tense as in “John can’t have been there yesterday”. This is perhaps one major criticism towards Palmer’s earlier (1965; 1974) approaches although he does admit that these formal distinctions are not general enough and points out some exceptions. As Kalojera (1982: 5) argues, Palmer always seems to imply that the meaning of modals “is in one way or another reflected in their form, and a difference in the meaning of the same modal should be accompanied by a difference in the structure of the verb phrase”. This is also evident in Palmer’s suggestion that the difference between the two meanings of the modal ‘must’ (obligation and logical conclusion) is signalled out by the fact that only the “logical conclusion” sense can be reflected in the verb phrase “must have + past participle” (Kalojera 1982: 5). Again, these are precisely the same points queried by Huddleston (1971); the idea of an existing set of “formal corollaries” reflecting semantic differences between modals. All in all, these criticisms indirectly signal the incompatibility of semantic and syntactic criteria for

grouping modal auxiliary verbs, and this too will be a recurrent criticism in some future accounts.

### 3.2.4 Ehrman's (1966) Corpus-Based Approach

Ehrman's (1966) approach to the study of modals is the first to be based on a corpus. Her starting point is a reaction to Joos' classification of modal auxiliaries and a test of whether his classification is a valid one. She argues that Joos' appealing "idea of symmetrical or exceptionless semantic arrangements" has distracted researchers in a way that they tend to "overlook arrangements which are less tidy but which correspond better to present-day usage" (Ehrman 1966: 9). Based on that, her aim is to not argue for a well-organised system, but rather to "determine just what each modal auxiliary means" (Ehrman 1966: 9). She acknowledges the presence of dialectal variations and hopes her 'meanings' would cover most of the variations in American standard speech. Yet although her approach is different from preceding ones in that it is based on a corpus, she still concentrates only on "that closed set of verbs" termed as the "present-day modals": *can, could, may, might, will, would, shall, should, must, ought to, dare* and *need* (Ehrman 1966: 9). There, she attempts to work out three types of meanings:

- 1) the 'basic meaning' which is "the most general meaning" of each modal auxiliary and which "applies to all its occurrences"
- 2) 'overtones' which are derived "from the basic meaning" but "*add* something of their own" [emphasis mine], and
- 3) 'use' which is "conditioned by specific sentence elements and features of nonsemantic interest".

(Ehrman 1966: 10)

However, Ehrman's (1966: 9) 'monosemantic' approach still falls short of her goal: determining "just what each modal auxiliary means", and this is evident in her findings. For instance, since both 'dare' and 'need' seem to have no "basic meaning"

in her account, she concludes that they are “no longer in use as modal auxiliaries” (Ehrman 1966: 73). Moreover, the basic meaning of ‘may’ is considered not as one meaning but “a two-dimensional continuum”. Other conclusions are made without a convincing explanation such as her view that the difference between ‘will’ and ‘shall’ is merely ‘stylistic’ (Ehrman 1966: 9). And this is what lead to criticisms such as Coates’ (1983: 9) who points out the general difficulty and problems associated with having to assign a “basic meaning for each modal” (the ‘core meaning’). In short, although Ehrman’s (1966) approach is based on actual uses of modals, her interpretations are still highly subjective, and the nature of her restrictive ‘monosemantic’ goal (one meaning per modal) makes her findings also quite narrow.

### **3.2.5 Boyd and Thorne’s (1969) Speech Act Theory-Based Approach**

Boyd and Thorne’s (1969) approach to describing modality in English presents yet another perspective: that based on the notion of speech acts as introduced by Austin (1962). Instead of trying to offer a neat classification of modal auxiliary verbs in English, they propose an approach to paraphrasing modal auxiliaries in English using Speech Act Theory metalanguage. They argue that their account of modality presents a more precise interpretation of the meanings of modals in specific instances of use. Yet selecting their modals is done on the following bases. As is the case in Speech Act Theory, the “illocutionary force” of any verb phrase is seen as determined by a set of formal features to be associated with the verb phrase in question. These features are “first person”, “present tense”, “non-progressive aspect” and “non-habitual aspect” (Boyd and Thorne 1969: 58). Following from that, modal auxiliary verbs indicating the ‘illocutionary potential’ of the sentence are also subject to these restrictions, and such restrictions constitute the bases for selection.

Yet this is not all that clear. There are several criticisms of their approach. Firstly, at the general level, although Boyd and Thorne (1969: 59- 60) claim that their “interests in [their] paper are almost entirely confined to the semantic level”, they rely exclusively on grammatical features of distribution in trying to differentiate between verbs like ‘demand’ and ‘order’, for instance. Secondly, as pointed out by Hermeren (1978: 28), when following the above-mentioned criteria, then the past forms of auxiliary verbs (such as would) would not be considered modal. Moreover, when looking closely at their discussion of the difference between the terms “illocutionary potential” and “illocutionary force”, there seems to be some confusion in the sense that both refer to the same instance of language use in two different places in their article (Hermeren 1978: 28). And finally, their choice of examples is not only decontextualised, but also selected in such a way “to avoid possible confusion” like those which arise “from the existence of considerable dialectal variation” (Boyd and Thorne 1969: 62). This, in conclusion, does not only present a very restrictive view of modality in general, but also an unrealistic one since it is precisely these variations in using the same modals in English which reflect their semantic richness. Again, such an account is less useful at the practical level.

### **3.2.6 Halliday’s (1970) Functional Approach**

Halliday’s (1970: 324) approach to defining and categorising modals is essentially functional in orientation because, as he argues, “in order to explain the structure of language we need to consider its use”. And this is precisely what he does in his classification and differentiation between modality and modulation which he further supports by emphasising grammatical differences between the two groups (Halliday 1970: 339). According to Halliday (1970: 349), modality is “the speaker’s



assessment of probability and predictability”, the first of which is seen to cover two other notions: “possibility” and “certainty”. The difference between “probability” on the one hand and “possibility” and “certainty” on the other is that while the first is described as “uncommitted”, the second two are “committed” (Halliday 1970: 347).

Moreover, since modality is referred to as “a form of participation by the speaker in the speech event”, and since it is through modality that “the speaker associates with the thesis an indication of its status and validity in his own judgement”, thus “intruding” and taking up a position (Halliday 1970: 335), modality is placed as part of the *interpersonal* function. This is the case since it expresses “a role relationship between the speaker and hearer” in the sense that “the speaker is taking upon himself a particular communicative role” through which he determines both his own role as well as the hearer’s in relation to each other (Halliday 1970: 325).

As for modulation, Halliday (1970: 335) does not consider it as “a form of participation by the speaker in the speech event”. It is not the “speaker’s comments” since it forms “part of the content of the clause, expressing conditions on the process referred to” (Halliday 1970: 338). Under modulation, the speaker is not seen to intrude or take up a position, and therefore modulation lies under the *ideational* function of language which is mainly concerned with expressing “a content, relatable to the speaker’s experience of the real world” (Halliday 1970: 325). It is concerned with notions such as ‘ability’, ‘inclination’, ‘permission’, ‘obligation’ and ‘compulsion’ (Halliday 1970: 340).

Despite the fact that Halliday (1970) presents a much more inclusive and functionally sensitive categorisation of modality in its wider sense, a couple of shortcomings are worth pointing out. Firstly, although Halliday includes both “verbal”

and “non-verbal” forms of modality, his “verbal” forms are restricted to modal auxiliary verbs. He does not mention or include other verbal but non-auxiliary modals. This is mainly due to a set of syntactic restrictions which he places on verbal modals and which are only fulfilled by modal auxiliary verbs (Halliday 1970: 330). In this sense, it seems that *function* becomes secondary to *structure*.

Secondly, in differentiating between the interpersonal and ideational functions of language, Halliday (1970) seems to suggest that the first is primarily participants-oriented while the latter is primarily content-oriented. He then places modality under the first and modulation under the second. Although Halliday (1970: 349-350) later attempts to bring the two together, it seems hardly justifiable to place modulation as primarily part of the ideational function of language since the roles of the participants are of paramount importance. In fact, these roles and positions of the participants are central in giving the content of the message its semantic value. The same utterance exchanged by different participants of different social statuses even in the same context of situation would have a completely different meaning, let alone effect. Similarly, modality not only affects, but rather lies at the heart of and is therefore inseparable from the content of the clause<sup>1</sup>. In short, although this approach is both functional and has practical potential, a more adequate view of modality and modulation should account more accurately for the intermingling of these two main branches of modal use especially in the light of the involvement of the participants.

### **3.2.7 Marino’s (1973) Semantic Approach**

Marino’s (1973) account of the meaning of modals is based on the presence or absence of a set of distinctive semantic features. After acknowledging the difficulties

and “nuances of the modal system” in terms of accounting for the multiplicity of meanings, he declares the need for a “system of description [which] should be at least powerful enough to account for the range of meanings in modality” (Marino 1973: 312). He then proposes eight categories under which modals are arranged (categories such as *obligation*, *advisability*, *possibility*, etc.) each of which depends on the presence of the following three features (*necessity*, *possibility* and *execution*). These three features are in turn labelled as pluses or minuses to indicate the strength or weakness of each feature in specifying the meaning of the modal. The way meanings of modals are derived is thus based on the strength or weakness of the above features. For instance, OBLIGATION is seen as [+ necessity, – possibility, + execution]. Although Marino is not suggesting that his approach presents a neat taxonomy of categorised modals, he argues that his proposed features represent an “apparatus ... for generating and discussing the multiple meanings” of modals in English (Marino 1973: 318).

This is where Marino’s (Marino 1973: 318) discussion stops since he does not present an analysis of modals in English but is instead satisfied by calling for one. This, however, seems only to suggest the difficulty in taking up the extra step especially in the light of a set of unjustifiable and essentially subjective decisions he makes. For instance, the reasons why FUTURE is given the feature “+ execution” while IMPERATIVE “–execution” (Marino 1973: 315) are left without adequate explanation. Surely that should depend on who is involved and the power-relation between the participants in that instance of language-use. Moreover, the very bases for selecting those features proposed by Marino are also questionable since these are founded on a subjective view concerning what he considers present in the meaning of

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<sup>1</sup> And this explains Halliday’s later (1985) re-evaluation of both these categories of modals in the light of his multifunctional theory of language. There he realises that the divisions are not that clear-cut.

a specific modal and absent in another. In short, these decisions represent a very narrow view of language with minimal reference to the role of context as a key factor in assigning meanings to modals. And consequently, his account of modality becomes less useful when dealing with real instances of language use.

### 3.2.8 Johannessson's (1976) Functional/Pragmatic Approach

Johannessson (1976) adopts a functional approach to classifying six modal auxiliary verbs (*can, may, must, ought to, shall, and will*). He argues that his approach is considered functional and not semantic since the basic question asked is not “What is the meaning of this modal auxiliary?” but rather “For what purpose can a speaker use a sentence with this modal auxiliary?” (Johannessson 1976: 11). It is therefore intended to show how sentences with modal auxiliaries “can be used to express the speaker’s (or in certain cases, some other participant’s) involvement with a proposition”. In this sense, Johannessson claims that his aim will not be to “devise a neat system with ‘one meaning per modal auxiliary’” (Johannessson 1976: 11), thus avoiding a monosemantic approach.

His categorisation is then based on three main types of speaker involvement which he distinguishes. These are the speaker’s “volition”, his/her “attitude to the truth of a proposition”, and the “speaker’s evaluation of an event” (Johannessson 1976: 7). Under the first type of involvement which establishes or describes “relations between person and person” (Johannessson 1976: 71), he groups the following categorising functional-semantic units “obligation, permission, willingness and insistence” on the basis that they have “one member in common, the concept of volition” (Johannessson 1976: 13). Each modal expression (not just modal auxiliary verbs) is then assigned a functional paraphrase and grouped accordingly. Examples of

these are “desperative sentences”, “desiderative sentences”, “insistence sentences” etc.

Under the second type of involvement which establishes or describes “relations between person and proposition” (Johannesson 1976: 71), he groups different types of “commentative sentences” such as “evidential constructions”, “conjectural sentences” and “predictive sentences”; i.e. those expressing possibility, probability, prediction, etc (Johannesson 1976: 49). Finally, under the third type of involvement are “fictive sentences” which are used by the speaker to express “a conditional relationship between two propositions” (Johannesson 1976: 71).

In these groupings, it is evident that Johannesson (1976) tries to account for as many meanings (or interpretations) of specific modals as possible. For instance, we see the modal auxiliary ‘must’ under several ‘functional’ headings with different interpretations for each mapped by a description of the syntactic-functional context within which they are found. Such a heading is, for example, “covert desiderative sentences” like in “you must tell me the truth”, where ‘must’ is characterised by the following conditions: “if the speaker is the modal agent, if the volition is simultaneous with the speech moment, and if the addressee is the agent of the modal object proposition” (Johannesson 1976: 25).

Also, Johannesson (1976: 52) argues for the inclusion of other extra-linguistic factors which can play a part in determining the interpretation of ‘must’ such as “stress patterns”. In this case, “you must be 'very 'careful ...” has a desiderative interpretation, while “you must be very 'careful...” has a commentative interpretation (Johannesson 1976: 51). Other sets of conditions also apply for instances when ‘must’ expresses ‘necessity’ and ‘propriety’ rather than ‘volition’. Again, ‘must’ is seen to communicate “strong evidence” (Johannesson 1976: 50) as in “you must be worn out,

you poor darling,” as well as “eligibility” like in “you must be under 22 of age at the time of departure” (Johannesson 1976: 82).

Although he is not trying to present a neat system with ‘one meaning per modal auxiliary’, what Johannesson (1976) actually does is propose one meaning per modal auxiliary within a defined context. In other words, he is suggesting that given a specific context with a limited set of accounted for variables, only one possible interpretation of the modal used is available. Yet this contradicts the very basis on which modality stands: the concept of ambiguity (as will be discussed later). And this concept stands mainly for two reasons: a) because no one can account for all the variables which surround an utterance within a context, and b) because different people can interpret the same modal use differently. Following this, how can one, for instance, decide whether “the modal agent *believes* (at the moment of volition) that it is possible for the ‘object of volition’ to come true” (emphasis mine) (Johannesson 1976: 19)? Even in Johannesson’s (1976) supposedly most obvious situations like the difference between ‘must’ in these two sentences,

- 1) You must be very careful when you draw your diagrams, and
- 2) You must be very careless when you draw your diagrams

one cannot rule out the interpretation where ‘must’ is be seen as “a realisation of a desiderative proposition” (Johannesson 1976: 26) in both sentences. It seems that Johannesson (1976) is indirectly attempting an exhaustive account of all possible meanings of modals under a functional disguise.

### 3.2.9 Hermeren’s (1978) Semantic Approach

Hermeren’s (1978: 14) approach to categorising modals is based on semantic criteria with the main objective of making “a semantic classification of the modals in

contemporary English”. His first promising step is his acknowledgement that modality can be expressed by different parts of speech: nouns, adjectives, adverbs, and verbs (both main and modal) as well as combinations of them (Hermeren 1978: 10-11). This, he argues is simply a natural “consequence of the rather comprehensive content of modality in linguistics”, and it is therefore “only to be expected that the number of its manifestations in language will be equally comprehensive” (Hermeren 1978: 10). In short, modal auxiliary verbs are only one way of expressing modality.

Hermeren (1978: 68-71) adopts the view that meaning is neither completely independent of context, nor completely dependent on it. His position is that meaning of modals (specifically modal auxiliary verbs) is reflected through the grammatical context in which it is found and indirectly argues for a formal corollary (similar to Palmer’s) between meanings of modals in relation with other parts of speech in a sentence. For instance, Hermeren (1978: 71) holds the position that “changes in various types of sentences” (active-passive, positive-negative, statement-question, etc.) as well as “changes in basic sentence units (subject, verb, etc.) affect the meaning of the modal”. Therefore, both semantic and syntactic categories which affect the meaning of modals “should be accounted for in a description of the semantics of the modals” (Hermeren 1978: 74).

After going through the different notions expressed by modals, he groups them under three categories. ‘Internal modalities’ are those which are “inherent in their surface subjects” like in ‘John can work hard’ and ‘John won’t eat his supper’. These modals express “ability” and “volition” respectively and are justified as “inherent” since in both cases it is John who is able and determined (Hermeren 1978: 95). The second category is that of “external modality” which includes those modal expressions referring to notions like “necessity” and “permission” as in ‘John must

sleep in the car' and 'John may sleep in the car'. This is essentially the same as what is referred to "as root" modality and is justified on the basis that "someone or something outside the subject decides what the subject is obliged or permitted to do or be" (Hermeren 1978: 95-96). The third and last category is that traditionally referred to as the epistemic senses of modals, and these are termed by Hermeren (1978: 97) as "neutral modalities" since they are neither internal nor external. Finally, the different modals in each system are arranged on the assumption of implication (i.e. what they imply). They are placed on some sort of a continuum fulfilling this criterion.

Looking closely at Hermeren's (1978: 98) main chart of modality, it becomes obvious that although he claims a semantic approach, the different groupings of modals under each system are done based on a combination of semantic and syntactic criteria, where in some cases, syntactic criteria override semantic ones. For instance, internal modalities comprising the notions of "determination", "intention" and "willingness" are grouped together since they share the concept of "volition" as well as a relationship of "implication" (Hermeren 1978: 99). However, the notion of ability is also grouped with the first three although it does not express the notion of "volition" nor does it share a relationship of "implication".

Yet Hermeren (1978: 100) justifies this decision for the reason of "keeping all four modalities in the same scale ... [since] ... for all four the surface subject of the modal in the active sentence is also deep subject both of the modality and the process".

Moreover, although Hermeren (1978) in his criticism of earlier approaches to categorising modality in English promisingly lists the various forms of modality, he does not actually consider them in his analysis of the Brown corpus. Instead, like most of his predecessors he restricts his description, categorisation and analysis to modal



auxiliary verbs mainly because these are the ones which fulfil those syntactic criteria discussed above. In this, he again contradicts his declared objective which is to provide a semantic account of modals in English.

### 3.2.10 Coates's (1983) Semantic/Pragmatic Approach

Coates' (1983) main contribution to the ongoing struggle of adequately accounting for modality in English is her inclusion of "indeterminacy" as an essential criterion for subcategorising modals. Her investigation into the meanings of the modal auxiliaries in modern British English is based on a corpus of both written and spoken English (Coates 1983: 1). She explains that the reason behind this corpus-based study is to avoid relying on the researcher's own intuition (both in terms of providing invented and targeted examples as well as interpreting the meanings of modals), which she considers to be a subjective way of going about the project, characteristic of earlier defective approaches (Coates 1983: 3). Moreover, such a corpus would allow her to take into consideration stylistic variations (Coates 1983: 1).

Coates (1983: 4) begins by restricting her account to only ten modal auxiliaries: *must, should, ought, may, might, can, could, will, would, shall* and this choice is based on formal characteristics (the NICE properties as well as Palmer's (1974) "paradigm test" outlined above). She then criticises earlier approaches by pointing out that the problems they faced were due to their attempts to either define one core meaning for each modal or to account for all meanings. In the first "monosemantic" case, the account is unrepresentative and too general to be of any use, while in the other "polysemantic" account, it is "messy and untidy" (Coates 1983: 9-10). In that, she argues that the main problem with these earlier approaches is their failure to consider "indeterminacy" as a basic feature in modality, which she

believes is. And she maintains that this does not have to be at the expense of precision in description since “it is surely not impossible to be precise about indeterminacy” (Coates 1983: 10). Therefore, attempting to do that, Coates (1983: 9) distinguishes three kinds of indeterminacy: gradience, ambiguity and merger, and explains the differences between them in the following manner.

She clarifies “gradience” by illustrating how the meaning of ‘can’, for instance, lies on a “continuum of meaning [extending] from the core of ‘Ability’ to the periphery of ‘Possibility’” (Coates 1983: 14). Her decision on which is considered as the “core” meaning of a modal as opposed to the “peripheral” meaning is based on the degree of frequency of a modal in the corpus. This meaning is then fixed based on set of consistent semantic/ syntactic/ functional features exhibited by the whole utterance. For example, the “core” meaning of ‘can’ is said to be distinguished by the following features:

- 1) subject is animate and has agentive function;
- 2) main verb denotes physical action/activity;
- 3) the possibility of the action is determined by inherent properties of the subject.

(Coates 1983: 14)

A similar set of features set the bases for all “core” and “peripheral” meanings of all those modal auxiliary verbs she analyses.

As for “ambiguity”, Coates (1983: 15) explains that “an indeterminate example is said to be ambiguous when it is not possible to decide which of two meanings is intended”. For instance, the modal ‘must’ in the utterance “He must understand that we mean business” could be “epistemic” (Surely he understands that we mean business) or “root” (It is essential that he understand that we mean business) (Coates 1983: 16).

Finally, “merger” is “indeterminate in the sense that the context fails to exclude one of the two possible meanings”. Yet it is different from ambiguity in that

“it is not necessary to decide which meaning is intended” before the utterance can be understood (Coates 1983: 16-17). The example she gives is the following:

A: *Newcastle Brown is a jolly good beer.*

B: *Isn't it?*

A: *Well it ought to be at that price.*

Here she argues that although it is not clear whether the speaker is referring to the maker's “obligation to provide good beer (Root OUGHT)”, or whether he is “making a logical assumption – ‘it costs a lot, therefore it is good’ (Epistemic OUGHT)”. Both ways, the meanings involved “are mutually compatible” (Coates 1983: 17).

Coates (1983: 18) then explains the differences between “epistemic” and “root modality” in that the first is concerned with “the speaker's assumptions or assessment of possibilities and, in most cases, it indicates the speaker's confidence (or lack of confidence) in the truth of the proposition expressed” while the latter are defined in terms of the “syntactic patterns associated with them, which distinguish them from their Epistemic counterparts”. These features associated with Root meaning are “animate subject, agentive verb and passive voice” as well as certain “stress and intonation patterns” (Coates 1983: 18).

Finally she suggests that “gradience is an essential feature of Root modality” since while epistemic modals “vary only in terms of Subjectivity (with Objective cases occurring rarely)”, root modals “vary both in terms of Subjectivity and in terms of a strong-weak continuum” (Coates 1983: 21). In this sense, “the strength or otherwise” of, for instance, “Root MUST seems to depend on the person of the subject, and on the involvement of the speaker (subjectivity)”. And the relationship between subjectivity and strength is reflected in the following manner where “subjectivity is typically associated with the strong end of the continuum” and where

weak examples are normally objective, but that “this is not necessarily true” (Coates 1983: 36-37).

In statements like the last one, Coates (1983) allows for possible incongruous interpretative standpoints despite the set of restrictive features she argues for. She seems to be doing all of the following. While she appears to be trying for a neat categorisation of a limited set of modal auxiliary verbs in English, she still tries avoiding the trap she points out for anyone who does so. On the one hand, in her attempt to propose as many meanings of modal auxiliaries as possible, her approach vaguely resembles ‘polysemantic’ approaches although she refuses to label it as such. On the other hand, she is simultaneously interested in the ‘core’ meaning of a modal, and in this sense her approach appears to be a ‘monosemantic’ one. This opens the door to more serious criticisms.

To begin with, the idea of a fixed corollary between the meaning of a modal and a group of set features (whether they be syntactic, semantic, or even functional) is always subject to criticism. This is because generally speaking, the process of arriving at this corollary is necessarily based on a certain degree of subjectivity since ‘meaning’ is not an objective label inherent in and reflected through ‘form’. And this is evident in copious cases where different language users interpret the same modals in the same contexts differently. As illustrated by Perkins (1983: 37), ‘can’ in its “ability” sense “has been regarded by various linguists within the space of a few years exclusively as a root modal, exclusively as an epistemic modal, and as not a modal at all”.

The same could be argued about determining the force and subjectivity of a modal where the lack of consensus can have highly disruptive effect on the ‘rule’ or those defining features. Close (1975: 273), for instance, arranges modals on a

continuum of certainty ranging from the least to the most certain in the following manner: might, may, could, can, should, ought to, would, will, must. She differs from Leech (1974) for example because he considers ‘may’ as more probable than ‘can’, in his selected examples (“the pound may be devalued” as opposed to “the pound can be devalued”). Moreover, according to Palmer (1986: 62), in the light of the argument where “*may* indicates a possible judgment, *WILL* a reasonable judgement and *MUST* the only possible judgment”, then “*WILL* falls between weak *MAY* and strong *MUST*”, a view which contradicts Leech’s intuition. In short, deciding on the force of a modal is dependent on an interpretation, and this is not an entirely objective process reflected in an occurrence of certain structural features since indeterminacy in interpretation does exist. And this leads us to the issue of questioning why gradience, according to Coates (1983: 21), is a feature of only root modality in the sense that it varies “both in terms of Subjectivity and in terms of a strong-weak continuum”. Surely, epistemic modality can also be seen to vary not only in terms of subjectivity, as Coates suggests, but also in terms of strength. Strength can also be reflected in terms of degrees of certainty: i.e. knowledge as strength (see Chapter Four for further discussion).

Finally, the same argument applies for ‘core meaning theory’. One cannot deny that whether the meaning of a modal is deemed to be close to the core or not depends on an interpretation of that modal. Although the notion of ‘indeterminacy’ offers a way out of the dilemma (and has potential from a practical analysis perspective), in presenting a formal corollary between the meanings of modals and certain fixed grammatical, textual and contextual features, Coates does not make the most efficient use of a notion with such potential.

### 3.2.11 Perkins's (1983) Semantic Approach

In a more inclusive account of modality in English, Perkins (1983) takes into consideration those previously neglected modal expressions. His decision is based on the view that a use of a modal auxiliary verb on the one hand, and what is commonly regarded as its paraphrase (such as 'may' and 'it is possible that') on the other are different. He therefore sets out to provide an account of modality which takes into consideration these differences. At the same time, he adopts a 'monosemantic' approach which aims at isolating "a core meaning for each modal" and then proposing an analysis of these core meanings (Perkins 1983: 25). This springs from his belief in the presence of a single core meaning for each of the English modals which is "independent of its context of use" (Perkins 1983: 26).

According to Perkins (1983: 1-2), the origin of the problem lies with traditional approaches which have restricted the notion of modality "to a syntactically defined subset of auxiliary verbs" as these were considered to constitute "the only formally coherent class of modal expressions in English". This meant that the tendency has always been to isolate this class "on distributional grounds, and only then to attempt to characterize them semantically" (Perkins 1983: 19). However, he argues, since "there is a wide range of linguistic devices in English which are equally deserving of the semantic label 'modal'", the "*semantic* concept of modality" should serve as the basis [emphasis mine] (Perkins 1983: 2). Therefore, his account of modality would be more "exhaustive" than previous accounts extending "far beyond the formal category of modal auxiliaries" and incorporating "dynamic and boulomaic modality" as well as "alethic, epistemic, and deontic modality" (Perkins 1983: 4).

One key issue in his view is the importance of accounting for both "the particular conceptual subcategory of modality which a given expression realizes" as

well as for “the way in which it interacts with the function of the utterances in which it may be used” (Perkins 1983: 18). He argues that “modality itself may be regarded as a single conceptual system which takes on different characteristics according to the various other semantic and pragmatic systems with which it intersects” (Perkins 1983: 18). And there are so many factors that play a role in determining the meanings of modals within a specific context.

He bases his core-meaning approach to the modals on that used by Wertheimer in his analysis of OUGHT where he describes its “anomalous behaviour ‘in terms, not of different senses, but of [its] employment in connection with various more or less independent systems of laws’” (Perkins 1983: 28). These laws are summarised as follows:

(a) a system K of organized belief, (b) a set of circumstances C under which the system is relevant, and (c) the consequence y that the system specifies under those circumstances.

(Perkins 1983: 28)

Perkins’ own analysis of the meaning of modal CAN is done in the following manner.

To him, CAN ‘roughly’ relates:

the event referred to in the propositional content to some external circumstance which is not explicitly identified but whose existence is presupposed, and the precise relationship between the circumstance and the event appears to be that the nature of the circumstance is not such as to preclude the event occurring.

(Perkins 1983: 33)

In this sense, the following example is analysed as follows:

John can swim.

K (C does not preclude that e occur)

where: i. K = natural laws  
 ii. C = an empirical circumstance  
 iii. e = an event  
 iv. K(x) = x is the case relative to K

Speaker → Asserts → Circumstances exist which do not preclude → John swim.

(Perkins 1983: 34)

When used in this sense, he continues, “CAN expresses dynamic modality – i.e. it is concerned with the disposition of certain empirical circumstances with regard to the occurrence of some event” (Perkins 1983: 34).

He defends such a characterisation of the meaning of a modal as non-circular since it is not merely a paraphrase. Moreover, such a characterisation emphasises that the meaning of any modal cannot be adequately stated without considering and referring to the above mentioned variables. In this sense, the semantics of modal auxiliary verbs can be expressed as “a relationship between a system of organized belief  $K$ , a set of circumstances  $C$ , the truth of a proposition  $p$ , or the occurrence of an event  $e$ , and, in the case of the secondary modals, a condition  $Z$ ” (Perkins 1983: 28-9). One does not even have to specify the values of these variables for a particular context in order to define the core meaning of a modal (Perkins 1983: 29). This core meaning can be characterised as “a relationship between, at most, these four variables, and such a relationship may thus be regarded as a semantic definition of ‘modal expression’” (Perkins 1983: 59).

Of course, there are problems with this approach, the most serious of which is proposed by Perkins’ own analysis of ‘deontic MAY’ whose core meaning is ‘permission’. If the utterance ‘you may go’ is uttered by “someone in a position of authority to someone of much lower authority” it would ‘probably’ be understood as a command and not as permission. He justifies this by saying that although such “pragmatic factors may override ... the core meaning of MAY”, they are nevertheless separate from it (Perkins 1983: 36-7). Yet this is close to what he himself criticises Huddleston for doing; i.e. finding a paraphrase for MAY in each environment and turning it into a label for a category of use (Perkins 1983: 36). True that Perkins’ approach does account for these different uses in “a less *ad hoc* manner by relating a



core meaning to a limited set of laws”, he does not escape accounting for individual pragmatic inferences from the context of use.

Moreover, the fact that Perkins does not specify the values for his proposed parameters opens possibilities where those parameters of the same modal expression together with the relationship between them are given different specifications by different language users, and thus interpreted differently. In other words, setting up the parameters/ the factors that play a role in determining the meaning of the modal neither accounts for exceptions to what is considered as the ‘core-meaning’ of a modal, nor does it consider the possibility for different interpretations by different people. In short, the possibility that specific circumstances may ‘override the core meaning of’ a modal means that this approach is neither general nor specific enough. In other words, it is not inclusive enough.

Finally, there is a great degree of ambiguity in Perkins’ choice of terminology. For instance, terms like “entails” or “does not preclude” which describe the meaning of a modal are not that precise (Perkins 1983: 34). Maybe these are indirectly signalled by the use of modalised expressions (such as “typically”) to describe such rules (Perkins 1983: 37). All in all, the highly theoretical, general and therefore ambiguous nature of Perkins’ account makes it less implementable practically.

### **3.2.12 Palmer’s (1986, 1990) Semantic/Structural Approach**

Palmer’s (1986) account of modality is somewhat different from his earlier accounts since he is interested in the way modality is grammaticalised not only in English, but also in other languages. In this sense he openly relies on semantic criteria for grouping modals and does mention, although briefly, other modal expressions than traditional modal auxiliary verbs. He maintains a division between “epistemic

modality” which is concerned with “language as information, with the expression of the degree or nature of the speaker’s commitment to the truth of what he says” and ‘deontic modality’ is concerned with “language as action, mostly with the expression by the speaker of his attitude towards possible actions by himself and others” (Palmer 1986: 121). He elaborates on the term ‘epistemic’ and explains that it should not simply apply “to modal systems that basically involve the notions of possibility and necessity, but to any modal system that indicates the degree of commitment by the speaker to what he says” (Palmer 1986: 51). This means that it should include ‘speculative,’ ‘deductive’ and ‘quotative’ types of modalised utterances.

Following Givon (1982), he argues that these three types belong to two separate systems of epistemic modality where “opinions and conclusions involve judgments by the speaker” [i.e. the system of judgements], while “reports indicate the kind of evidence he has for what he is saying” [i.e. the system of evidentials] (Palmer 1986: 53). Although Palmer (1986) does not explicitly state it, he seems to be suggesting that what differentiates these two systems of epistemic modality has to do with varying degrees of subjectivity. He concludes his discussion of epistemic modality by suggesting a typological system within which to handle epistemic modals. This would take into account:

- (i) The two main modal systems, Evidentials and Judgements, plus the related system of Discourse.
- (ii) The sub-systems of Judgements: Inference and Confidence.
- (iii) The different sub-systems of Evidentials in terms of the treatment of sensation.
- (iv) Possible equivalences in different systems, especially Declarative, but also involving Deductive and Assumptive and the problem of Interrogative.
- (v) The notion that some terms are stronger than others and that one may be unmarked.

(Palmer 1986: 94)

As for deontic modality, which has to do with “language as action”, the meanings associated with each system are naturally quite different from those associated with epistemic modality (Palmer 1986: 121). The two most important types

of deontic modality are “Directives” and “Commissives” (Palmer 1986: 97).

Borrowed from Searle’s (1983: 166) rethinking of speech-act theory, directives are defined as those expressions in which “we try to get our hearers to do things”, and commissives as “where we commit ourselves to doing things”. Again, similar to the weak and strong system of epistemic modality, there is also a weak and strong system of deontic modality (at least of directives) (Palmer 1986: 98).

Although at the semantic level, “epistemic and deontic modality might seem to have little in common”, there are two features that they share: subjectivity, i.e. the involvement of the speaker, and non-factuality (Palmer 1986: 96). As Palmer (1986: 16) explains, “modality in language is ... concerned with subjective characteristics of an utterance”. In this sense, modality would be defined as “the grammaticalization of speakers’ (subjective) attitudes and opinions”. As for “non-factuality”, he adopts Lyons’ (1977) distinction between “straightforward statements of fact” (categorical assertions) which may be described as “epistemically non-modal” on the one hand, and modalised utterances on the other (Palmer 1986: 17).

Yet Palmer is not entirely satisfied with the first of these two criteria. In fact, he contests it by pointing out that if we take “subjectivity” as essential semantic criterion for modality, then the auxiliary verb ‘can’ which expresses ability would (following that criterion) be outside the realm of modality. Also, the modal auxiliary ‘must’ in “you must leave at once”, can be interpreted as indicating “the speaker’s insistence or a general (objective) necessity for leaving, or it could well be indeterminate between the two readings” (Palmer 1986: 17). He concludes that the chief reason for treating both types of modality as a single category lies in the fact that “in English, and many other languages, the same forms (e.g. modal verbs) are used for the expression of both” (Palmer 1986: 96).

And this is reflected in his later (1990: 1-3) account where although he speaks of modality in English as an essentially “semantic-grammatical category”, he still insists on discussing only modal auxiliary verbs because they can be distinguished by “formal criteria”. In that, it seems that Palmer (1990) is only interested in the phenomenon that one modal form can be used to express more than one meaning, and this makes ‘form’ of primary importance in his accounts. Yet the view of modality as a “semantic-grammatical category” is potentially paradoxical except in a very restricted sense in referring to an even more restricted set of modal auxiliary verbs. Such a description can only make sense at the descriptive level in that the term ‘modal’ is essentially semantic while the term ‘auxiliary’ is syntactic. For one thing, we cannot deny the existence of a syntactically well-defined set of auxiliary verbs in English. However, even within this set, there are cases where semantic *and* grammatical criteria are of conflicting rather than complementary nature<sup>2</sup>. In other words, these criteria are not compatible, and trying to account for modality within both the semantic and syntactic frames creates a dilemma even when only dealing with modal auxiliary verbs (let alone modal expressions in general). And this self-contradictory nature of the “semantic-grammatical” character of modality makes Palmer’s (1990) account unconvincing at the theoretical level and even less convincing at the practical level.

### **3.2.13 Werth’s (1999) Text World Theory-Based Approach**

Werth’s (1999) approach to categorising modality in English is based on text world theory. In fact, his approach is not targeted at providing an account of modality

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<sup>2</sup> This is the case with “can” (in reference to ability) which Palmer finds difficult to account for because it does not strictly fulfil semantic criteria but is still treated as a modal auxiliary because it fulfils grammatical criteria.

inasmuch as clarifying the workings of text world theory itself where modality fulfils a central function in discourse: that of “world building” (Werth 1999: 182).

According to Werth (1999: 176), modality broadly reflects the “relationship between the speakers and the text” and is therefore defined as generally dealing with the speakers’ “assessment of such factors as truth, probability and reliability”. This speaker-assessment, however, is not done in terms of whether propositions are true or false but rather reflecting the various levels and degrees of *possibility* (Werth 1999: 177).

Based on text world theory’s distinction between the “**informational**” and the “**modality** part of a discourse”, where modality is characteristically “world building” while the informational part of discourse is concerned with “propositional meaning”, modality’s world-building function is attained by “situating ... information with respect to the current context” in terms of “**location**, physical or abstract, ... **interaction**, or social relationships, ... or **probability**” (Werth 1999: 157, 182, 183). These are the three types of modality from which the three categories of sub-worlds respectively emerge: “deictic sub-worlds”, “attitudinal sub-worlds” and “epistemic sub-worlds” (Werth 1999: 216). Finally, based on the notions of ‘accessibility’ and ‘remoteness’ each of these sub-worlds reflects the type and level of modality’s world building function, its relationship between the speaker and the text. In other words, depending on the accessibility and remoteness of each sub-world, different types and levels of the relationship between the speaker and the text can be distinguished.

For example, “the deictic sub-worlds”, according to Werth (1999: 217-227), are created through “temporal”, “spatial” and “entity displacement”. Here, the remoteness and accessibility of these sub-worlds are based on each type of ‘locative’ displacement and dependent on the levels of deictic/modal displacement. This means

that the 'here-now' deictic spatio-temporal marker is, for instance, more accessible and less remote to a speaker than the 'there-then' spatio-temporal marker. In other words, the sub-world 'built' through one or the other type of deictic displacement is more or less accessible to a specific participant.

Similarly, "attitudinal sub-worlds" are divided into three main sub-worlds reflecting interactional displacement. These are "**desire** (*want* worlds), **belief** (*believe* worlds) and **purpose** (*intend* worlds)" (Werth 1999: 227). Again, the degrees of accessibility and remoteness of these sub-worlds depends on the "predicates" associated with each of these sub-worlds (Werth 1999: 227). This means that 'wishes', for instance, are seen to be more remote and less accessible than 'desires'.

Finally, the "epistemic sub-worlds" are those covered under "the scale of certainty-impossibility" (Werth 1999: 239). The three main epistemic sub-worlds are "hypothetical", "assumptions" and "modal" worlds, all of which reflect displacement in terms of the notions of possibility and probability. In that sense, the 'probability' sub-world is seen as more accessible and less remote than the 'possibility' sub-world (Werth 1999: 239-248).

All in all, and as mentioned above, Werth's categorisation of modality is primarily employed in order to clarify the workings of text world theory rather than to provide an account of the notion of modality *per se*. In other words, it is a practical account whose main objective is to see how modality functions in a text world approach to discourse analysis. This, in my view explains some of the vagueness and overlapping that the notions of modality, tense and deixis undergo. Modality in Werth's view seems to be understood in terms of a relationship of *distance* between the speaker and the text. The modal sub-worlds 'built' function in relation to how accessible they are to a participant and this justifies Werth's inclusion of deixis in his

coverage of the notion of modality. In fact, deixis to Werth (1999) is a subsection of modality. Similarly, tense is seen to fall under both the hypothetical and deictic sub-worlds as well as part of the “conditional”, “politeness” and “narrative” applications of the epistemic sub-world (Werth 1999: 240), and this makes tense also an essential part of modality.

However, this I argue constitutes a dangerously inclusive, non-distinctive approach to categorising modality since modality can but does not correspond exclusively to the notion of distance. This is and should be the task of deixis (as envisaged by Levinson (1983)). Modality, as Werth admits at the beginning of his account, is traditionally concerned with two main areas of meaning and functions (epistemic and root modality). Yet while deixis or tense can have modal functions, the notions of accessibility and remoteness which constitute the core of the notion of modality from a text world theory perspective seem too accommodating modal criteria. Distance can indeed reflect modal uncertainty in certain contexts. However, deictic sub-worlds are not necessarily always subsections of modality. The same is the case with tense.

Another limitation in Werth’s account is the placement of the “belief” sub-world under “attitudinal” rather than “epistemic” sub-worlds. This is an interesting categorisation which Werth (1999: 233) subdivides in terms of accessibility by distinguishing between two different kinds of “belief-contexts”, “depending on the status of the propositions involved in the Common Ground (CG)”. If for instance the proposition syntactically below the “belief-predicate” is “given” (as in ‘John believes that *a Pear is better than a Banana*’ where a pear is known to be better than a banana), then the only “new” information corresponds to John’s position and therefore both given and new information are accessible to the participants in the

discourse. If, on the other hand, both are new information, then the participants accessibility is relativised to John's position, where the "credibility and authoritativeness of John's beliefs largely depend on who John is, relative to the content of his beliefs" (Werth 1999: 233, 234). In short, the first sub-world is more accessible than the latter. Yet what Werth fails to justify is the inclusion of the whole "belief" sub-world under "attitudinal" rather than "epistemic" sub-worlds.

### **3.2.14 Papafragou's (2000) Semantic/Cognitive Approach**

Papafragou's (2000) 'monosemantic' account of modality in English presents a 'cognitive' approach to the meaning of modals. It is cognitive in the sense that she proposes a "univocal semantic analysis of the English modals" which corresponds with data from "the acquisition of modal interpretations by the language-learning child" (Papafragou 2000: 8). Rejecting what she calls the 'ambiguity view' and the 'polysemy view' of modals in English, she proposes that meanings of modals should be treated as 'underspecified' or 'incomplete' rather than ambiguous or polysemous. She argues that as is the case in natural language, it is the manipulation of context which yields "the rich modal concepts" (Papafragou 2000: 7, 10) and insists that "an adequate theory of modality should address the nature of ... background assumptions and explain when and how such assumptions are recovered and monitored during verbal communication. And in the light of these objectives, she approaches modality based on "a cognitive account of utterance comprehension" (Papafragou 2000: 13), an approach which finds its roots in 'relevance theory'.

Her aim is not to "provide a fully comprehensive account of the state of affairs in the English modal system" (Papafragou 2000: 9), but rather to "contribute towards the characterisation of the context-dependence of modal expressions" in order to shed



more light on the nature of the “interaction between lexical semantic information and pragmatic inference”. And due to the sheer number of factors involved in undertaking such a task, she focuses mainly on what she calls “a representative sample of modal verbs in English” (mainly *must*, *may*, *can*, *should*, and secondarily *ought to*) (Papafragou 2000: 7).

She argues that “the semantic content of modals consists of two components: a logical relation R (basically: entailment or compatibility), and a domain D of propositions”. It follows that modals are used to convey that “a certain proposition p bears a certain logical relation R to the set of propositions in a domain D” (Papafragou 2000: 40). She then distinguishes between several ways in which a proposition can be “entertained and stored in memory”, and these are: as a ‘factual’ domain, a ‘regulatory’ domain, a domain of ‘moral beliefs’, a domain of ‘desirability’ and of ‘abstract representations’ (Papafragou 2000: 42). Domains of propositions then serve a ‘two-fold purpose’: they offer “the means for pragmatically restricting modal relations”. Moreover, they provide “a conceptual pool for grammaticalisation processes to draw on” (Papafragou 2000: 42). To illustrate, the modals (*can*, *may*, *must*, and *should* for instance) reflect the following grammatical information:

<b><i>Can:</i></b>	p is compatible with D factual
<b><i>May:</i></b>	p is compatible with D unspecific
<b><i>Must:</i></b>	p is entailed by D unspecific
<b><i>Should:</i></b>	p is entailed by D normative

(Papafragou 2000: 43)

This is elaborated on through the following example and its analysis:

‘Computer-aided instruction can co-occur with more traditional methods of teaching’ which is presented as:  $p$ [Computer-aided instruction can co-occur with more traditional methods of teaching] is compatible with D factual (Papafragou 2000: 48). This is further narrowed down (or ‘restricted’) contextually to “pick out a sub-domain of factual assumptions” which are:

- a. In view of the way schools are run these days,
- b. In view of the technical equipment available for education purposes,
- c. In view of the teachers' encouraging stance,

Computer-aided instruction can co-occur with more traditional methods of teaching.

(Papafragou 2000: 48)

She then explains that each of these paraphrases “captures a different concept of potentiality, which may be constructed ... during comprehension”. Therefore, in the derivation of a modal interpretation, a number of variables interact in an optimally relevant way to provide an interpretation which is “accessible enough for the hearer, and capable of achieving adequate cognitive effects in a way compatible with the speaker’s abilities and preferences”. Thus, the resulting interpretation “should be one that the speaker could reasonably have intended to be optimally relevant for the addressee”. There, the hearer “typically makes use of assumptions which are easily accessible from the encyclopedic entries of the concepts in the complement proposition and other assumptions which are contextually available”. Finally, this is all based on the ‘familiarity presupposition’ for domain selection where the hearer “aims at reconstructing the type of background propositions the speaker has in mind” (Papafragou 2000: 49).

What Papafragou seems to be doing is attempting to provide a systematic account of possible variables which play a role in pushing forward one or another interpretation of a modal within a pseudo-Gricean set of assumptions/rules about what ‘normally’ is the case if communicative interaction is to proceed with no hindrance. And these variables are mainly related to Context in all its phases, both in relation to the speaker/hearer as well as to the situation (linguistic and extralinguistic), but with special emphasis on the cognitive aspect of acquisition and language processing. Naturally (and rightly so), these variables are very general since the only way to capture the richness and variety in meanings and interpretations of modals is to be as

least restrictive as possible. Still, in a situation where a modalised utterance is ‘underspecified’ at the contextual level, this approach does not present any groundbreaking account of this ‘ambiguity’. There seems to be a suggestion that in the light of a given context, all speakers/hearers interact, or should interact, in the same way. The extreme version of this position would lie within Chomsky’s (1965) “homogeneous speech community”. This ‘ideal situation’ for communication is, however, only attractive at the theoretical level. In reality, there are several unanswerable questions which shed doubt on, for instance, the hearer’s ability to practically account for these variables; i.e. the intention of the speaker, what is available for the hearer, etc. In short, her attempt at providing “a broad description of the intended modal domain” is based on what *she* deems as “necessary for the comprehension of a modal utterance” (Papafragou 2000: 50). And her main drawback, apart from the extremely restricted set of modal auxiliary verbs that she selects, is the absence in her ‘cognitive’ model of a realistic account of those socio-cultural determinants which influence the hearer’s process of acquisition. The mind, after all, does not work in isolation from these social variables.

### 3.3 Discussion and Conclusions

In view of the list of approaches outlined above, the following conclusions can be made. Firstly, one cannot but comment on the large number as well as the diversity of approaches tackling, more or less, the same topic. The fact that ‘modality’ is approached from so many perspectives points at both the differences in the ways linguists perceive the term as well as the degrees of vagueness and generality that accompanies it. While in some cases modality is viewed as merely a grammatical category, in others it is considered strictly semantic, and yet in others as a

combination of both, etc. Yet apart from the strictly syntactic or strictly semantic ones, most approaches seem to be dealing with essentially the same set of variables which are reshuffled in terms of varying degrees of emphasis. Most approaches seem to acknowledge the presence as well as the importance of 'form', 'meaning', and 'context' as general categories. And despite sharing some common factors, each approach claims complete detachment from previous ones. However, one main characteristic they all share is their limitations both at the theoretical and practical levels.

Starting with syntactic approaches (Twaddell (1960); Palmer (1965; 1974)), their main problems are that they do not pay enough attention to meaning (if they do at all), and that they usually target only and exclusively modal auxiliary verbs. The less the role of meaning is acknowledged in these accounts, the more limited such accounts are. However, the more they acknowledge the role of meaning (Palmer (1986; 1990)), the more inconsistent the account is. This is due to the fact that strict formal (syntactic/distributional) categories are largely incompatible with strict semantic ones, and trying to provide a meeting point between the two will inevitably result in contradiction and inconsistency. The reasons for this are simply the rigidity and incompatibility of both criteria.

The same type of controversy also faces predominantly semantic approaches (Perkins (1983)) which try to account for a relationship between form and meaning. Although sometimes there are recognisable consistencies and patterns between structure and meaning, one questions the value and usefulness of accounting for them in the light of the many exceptions which sometimes outweigh these consistencies. In all cases, the existence of so many exceptions is a constant reminder that no one-to-one correlation exists.

As for those strictly semantic approaches which do not try to account for a relationship between form and meaning, they too have their shortcomings. Starting with ‘monosemantic’ approaches (Joos (1964); Ehrman (1966)), in order for these approaches to make sure that the area of meaning of a modal is covered, they have to be general in order to be inclusive. The more general they are, however, the less informative the account is. This is the dilemma Coates (1983) has to deal with where, according to Papafragou (2000: 25), she constantly “has to expand the semantic component so that it includes information about the degree of ‘subjectivity’ or ‘strength’ of the modality”.

With ‘polysemantic’ approaches (Marino (1973); Hermeren (1978)), on the other hand, the tendency becomes an attempt to cover all the possible meanings of each use of a modal, and this is impossible in the sense that meaning is never detached from interpretations, and different readers can disagree about the meaning of the same modal in the same utterance. Again, the rigidity of strictly semantic approaches, where precision in description and use of terminology is essential, lies at the heart of the problem. This is because one cannot dissociate the variety of meanings expressed by modals from the contexts in which they occur, and one cannot account for all possible contexts. In short, it seems that the more rigid an approach is, the more limitations it has. At the same time, it seems that a general characteristic of the semantics of modals is irregularity. As Lakoff (1972, 229) points out, modals are “semantically highly irregular and unpredictable”.

More flexible approaches on the other hand are those which rely more openly on context for modal interpretation (such as functional approaches like Halliday (1970); Johannesson (1978)). Yet, these seem to provide an account of modality which is not only general, but also relatively individualised and partly subjective.

However, this does not signal a dead end for these approaches. In fact, those notions of generality and partial subjectivity lie at the heart of the concept of modality. For instance, while trying to explain and justify the different interpretations of modals from a semantic point of view necessarily leads to one of those tricky situations discussed above, a pragmatic approach would not face such a problem mainly because of its flexibility. Acknowledging the existence of so many variables (such as context with all its sub-variables) that interact in the production of meaning is a direct indication that, unlike semantic approaches, precision in description is hardly the goal in more pragmatic approaches. This, to begin with, is the first step out of the traditional descriptive trap.

It follows that, as far as context is concerned, the argument of whether there are ‘core’ meanings (monosemantic approaches) to modals or not (polysemantic approaches) is irrelevant and unimportant. This means that the questions of whether different contexts bring out the different meanings of modals, or whether the meanings of modals are inherent in the actual word but vary with differences in contexts are quite trivial and unessential. What is more significant is that there is an interactive relationship through which context plays a decisive role in the interpretation of a modalised utterance both at the semantic and functional levels. At the same time, context does not ‘determine’ meaning. There are individual differences not resolved by context and this accounts for the fact that not everyone arrives at exactly the same interpretation of the same modalised utterance in the same context. Ambiguity is present and is quite often deliberately sought. This is an indication that speaker and hearer-related factors are also central in any approach. Whether ‘indeterminate,’ ‘fuzzy,’ ‘ambiguous’ or ‘underspecified’, the main point remains that the process of interpretation is partly subjective and therefore not straightforward.

This ultimately raises the following question: in the absence of a precise and neat system of categorising modality, is a systematic use of modality in text analysis an impossible task? The answer to this question is a strict ‘no’, an answer based on the view that despite the possible variance in interpretation, the range of this variance still falls within very limited parameters, accountable within a system. And this is evident from the substantial level of consensus regarding the general area of meaning of modals in a text or, in the worst-case scenario, a consensus concerning what such modals do not mean. This would however be entirely dependent on an approach to categorising modals which is both *functional* and *pragmatic*, an approach which will be tackled in detail in the following chapter. The need for these two bases for such an approach is reflected in one of the most descriptive definitions of modality as defined by Halliday (1985: 356): that which covers “the area of meaning that lies between yes and no”. In short, since modality is characteristically general, subjective, and therefore vague, accounting for these characteristics must be done in the light of a more pragmatic, inclusive approach. This would be the only way an account of modality has practical potential.

## IV Ideology through Modality in Discourse

### 4.1 Introduction

After an overview of those major difficulties and problems surrounding the definition of discourse in the first chapter, the issues tackled in the second chapter dealt with relating other key yet problematic notions to that view of discourse and redefining most of them in the light of the main objectives of a *critical* analysis of discourse. The major underlying motivation behind these discussions was and is the argument that different instances of discourse can be approached in essentially the same manner, using the same analytical model. As long as the main purpose of a critical analysis of discourse is the examination of the underlying ideologies and possible ideological inconsistencies and effects in these texts, there should be no obstacles to approaching this issue by utilising the same linguistic tools in a framework which would relate linguistic features to underlying ideological stances and attitudes. This was seen to fall in line with the broad objectives of a functional view of discourse: analysing the relationship between the linguistic system and social structures.

Modality was selected as the linguistic feature with such potential, and the third chapter attempted to provide an overview of those approaches which defined that linguistic notion together with the different groupings of its various manifestations. It was concluded that only a pragmatically oriented categorisation of modality which corresponds to the functional view of discourse discussed above would be of practical use.

The aim of this chapter is to outline such a framework which focuses on the two main modality systems in the English language (*epistemic* and *deontic*) as playing a decisive role in indicating the *type* and *degree* of involvement a speaker has in the



content of his/her message, and ultimately, an attitude/position towards the object of his/her message. This attitude/position can be directly relatable to the notion of ideology in the light of a view of an existing relationship between modality and ideology in discourse. Therefore, the overall claim which the framework proposed in this chapter is based on is that an analysis of modal expressions in a text can give us at least a reading of, if not access to, the ideologies communicated in that text.

## 4.2 Ideology and Discourse Analysis

As discussed in the first chapter, ideology and discourse intersect and interact in a complex manner. To begin with, the view of ideology as “a system of beliefs which has come to be constructed as a way of comprehending the world” (Fowler 1981: 26) presents ideology as a necessary constituent of the cognitive makeup and development of people as social beings in social communities. This view is supported by Burton (1982: 196) who points out that “*all* observation, let alone description, *must* take place within an already constructed theoretical framework of socially, ideologically and linguistically constructed reality”. This means that it cannot be *removed* but can only be *replaced* by alternative ideologies since “no person can engage with the world without the cognitive support of ideology” (Fowler 1981: 26). It is therefore omnipresent in that it represents those ways in which our language as well as our thoughts interact with society.

The importance of this view lies in its implication that ideology is both a *social* and a *cognitive* phenomenon, as well as highlighting the principal intermediary role that language plays. The social aspect of ideology corresponds to those shared values and beliefs which result from the individual’s interaction with society and its institutions. However, ideology is not only social and shared. Speaking of ideology as

also a cognitive phenomenon illustrates, in my view, the importance of the individual factor. Fairclough (1989: 24) alludes to this dimension of ideology in his discussion of “member resources” which encompass knowledge structures that “people have in their heads and draw upon when they produce or interpret texts”. These, according to Fairclough (1989: 24) are “cognitive in the sense that they are in people’s heads, but they are social in the sense that they have social origins”. Yet characterising the cognitive aspect of ideology in this manner (i.e. cognitive = in people’s heads) is a non-distinctive way of highlighting this aspect of ideology since the individual cognitive mind acts as a filter to everything that individuals are in contact with. In other words, there is no ‘non-cognitive’ interaction with any aspect of life, and in this light, Fairclough’s definition is not a helpful one.

Weber’s (1992; 1998) view on the matter is of more practical relevance. In his book, *Critical Analysis of Fiction*, Weber (1992: 13) argues that in the reading process, for instance, the reader “has to rely on his/her own background knowledge of the world in his/her own ideological assumptions”, those “stored in the memory” in the “inferential process of meaning construction”. On the one hand, readers often use different assumptions in their inferential processing of one and the same text, and this leads to a possible “divergence in interpretation”. On the other hand, “where readers share similar assumptions and reach similar interpretative conclusions”, then they form an interpretive community, and in this line of argument, ideology becomes precisely that “set of assumptions that they have in common” (Weber 1992: 13-14). In 1998, he elaborates this view by discussing the same issue in the light of schema theory. Weber writes that information is stored in the mind:

... not individually but in trunks, sets of beliefs, assumptions and expectations... If the speaker's schemata are highly similar to the hearer's, with many shared assumptions, they will find it easy to communicate and understand each other ... Such a set of shared pre-set positions, assumptions, beliefs, values and cultural practices constitutes a world-view, a version of reality which comes to be accepted as 'a common sense' within that particular community.

(Weber 1998: 115)

In speaking of “schemata” which serve as cognitive representations of the way language users see the world, construct and reconstruct it, Weber (1992; 1998) makes this cognitive relationship between ideology on the one hand and the conceptual mind and memory on the other much clearer and more useful. Yet still, following Weber's cognitive, schema-dependent characterisation of ideology, one essential distinction must be made between *personal-experience* related schemata and *shared-experience* related schemata even within the same “interpretative or discourse community”. In this sense, the difference between the two is meant to highlight the personal/individual side to ideology which is nonetheless existent within each individual in a community, and this essentially arises due to different personal individual experiences.

In my view and in line with the objectives of this thesis, this distinction reflects an emphasis on the *individual* side to ideology. In other words, ideology is not a completely socially governed phenomenon since there are both individual/personal as well as social/shared bases for it. And this is a central tenet in the case argued for concerning the process of reading and interpretation (see Chapter Two). There it was seen that the main forces at work included the central role the reader played at the socio-individual level; i.e. both as an individual with his/her own view and private experiences as well as belonging to a society, a group of interpreters. Hence, the ability of the individual reader to differ from and disagree with a group-interpretation is more than just a possibility. This stands in opposition with the view that ideology is a completely socially-determined, or indeed, merely a social phenomenon.

Here, the implications of a socio-cognitive view of ideology are translated into a set of theoretical and practical restrictions and demands made on any approach to its analysis. At the theoretical level, because ideology is so intermeshed with language, society and thought in general, the only adequate view of discourse to fit such an approach will necessarily have to be one which considers language *not only* “in the context of social systems and institutions” (Carter and Nash 1990: 21) but one which also allows for individual variety in interpretation. In other words, it should be a view which accounts for both the social as well as the individual variable since as Miller (1990: 22) argues, reading is affected by, but always exceeds what is predictable from “certain historical, personal, institutional and political ... circumstances”. Of course, the more serious problem is how to consider this individual/cognitive aspect of ideology in a critical analysis of discourse at the practical level. The ability and intention to do so are, I argue, central characteristics of a functional-pragmatic view of discourse, and these issues will be taken up in the framework proposed in this chapter as well as the practical applications carried out in the following three chapters.

However, the main point concerning the place of ideology in discourse analysis is based on the view that ideology is “an ineluctable feature of social life”, that it is a highly “dependent” feature (Aronowitz 1988: 146), and that it has an individual-cognitive side to it. Consequently, ideology cannot be analysed in isolation especially “by linguistic analysis at a single level or with reference only to decontextualized sentences” (Carter and Nash 1990: 21), but rather through an approach which both considers the shared aspect of context (in its widest scope) as well as allowing for variance in interpretation by different readers. Of course, all this is dependent on the central role language plays in acting as a primary medium responsible for transmitting different ideologies in a social community. It is in this

sense that ideology can be referred to as “a socially and politically dominant set of values and beliefs which are not ‘out there’ but are constructed in all texts especially in and through language” (Carter and Nash 1990: 20).

Finally, the motivation for analysing ideology in discourse corresponds with the multifunctional view of language where language is regarded as a tool (at the textual level) for communication (at the ideational level), of social interaction (at interpersonal level), as well as, in Hodge and Kress’ (1993: 6) words, “an instrument of control” (a subsection of the interpersonal level). In this light, language becomes a distinctive and central site of struggle since it can be “used by powerful groups to re-enforce [a] dominant ideology” (Simpson 1993: 6), and this is illustrated by Carter and Nash (1990) in their consideration of the dynamics of the relationship between writers and readers. According to Carter and Nash (1990: 51) “many writers want to gain a reader’s attention and to persuade him to action or to a particular view of things”. Yet because this cannot be done blatantly without the risk of displacing the reader “from a secure place in the normal scheme of things”, writers resort to more subtle and implicit methods in order to represent the world as “essentially unproblematic” (Carter and Nash 1990: 51). Following from that, one of the main objectives of analysing ideology in language becomes to highlight those sometimes delusive discursive practices in order for these practices to be challenged.

Yet despite its departure from the classical Marxist stance (i.e. ideology as false-consciousness), the notion of ideology as presented here still falls in line with an essentially left-wing position highlighting the negative goals of ideology; where manipulation of the weak by the strong is ideology’s primary goal. Even a milder view like Weber’s (1992) explains ideology in terms of those oppositions:

Reading is both transformatory and reproductive, a matter of constructing and reconstructing. In so far as the reader draws upon his/her own background knowledge in the inferential processing of the text, s/he constructs its meaning; but at the same time the text metaphorically fights back, text-based assumptions interact dynamically with the reader's assumptions, and the latter can be positively or negatively manipulated. In the case of negative manipulation, the reader's prejudices or stereotypes are strengthened to the point of hardening into more and more irreversible attitude schemata; whereas positive manipulation shakes the reader out of his/her complacency by opening up seemingly monologic schemata and setting free their polyphonic reverberations.

(Weber 1992: 27)

In my view, there is more to ideology than simply qualifying it in terms of a negative-positive scale, a position still present in (Weber 1998: 114) who, as mentioned above, clarifies his cognitive, schemata-dependent characterisation of ideology in those terms. Following Weber's cognitive, schemata-dependent characterisation of ideology, the reason we speak of ideologies [as opposed to an ideology] reflects the differences in ways by which people regard and construct their ideas of the world and experiences as well as influencing others' ideas and attitudes. Yet although these views can never be neutral, it is these differences in points of view reflecting the differences in human perceptions and experiences that call for more attention than an evaluation of these ideologies. In line with Mills' (1997: 29) argument (see Chapter One), no theory whether of discourse or ideology can offer an apolitical way of thinking about hegemony. However, the idea here is that political hegemony is not the only ideology that is worth investigation.

Therefore, in this thesis, approaching the issue of ideology in discourse is mainly targeted towards stressing the differences in, and variety of, ideological positions adopted by different speakers in different instances of discourse, where there are personal as well as shared aspects to ideology. It is an attempt to pinpoint the range of underlying ideological affiliations and ideological objectives in the texts analysed where, although these objectives might fall in line with the struggle towards hegemony in the political sense (outlined by left-wing proponents), the possibility that some writers display no such objective in their ideological positions is also existent.

In that light, the upcoming critical analyses will investigate the underlying ideologies present in the different instances of discourse and examine non *ad hoc* possible interpretations behind their presence. The main reason behind doing that is ultimately to raise the awareness of language users concerning the power of language in its multifunctional nature, where one manifestation of this power is indeed political hegemony.

### **4.3 Modality and Ideology: Setting the Theoretical Bases**

After clarifying the intended specific objectives for analysing ideology in discourse, the next immediate task concerns relating modality (the key linguistic feature to be used in the analyses) to ideology both at the theoretical and practical levels. This is a particularly complex and thorny issue especially in the light of those accounts of modality discussed in the previous chapter. The problem with regards to these accounts is that a vast majority of them either does not fall in line with the functional view of discourse, or is not targeted at a practically applicable and workable objective. In fact, most of them have tried to provide a systematic categorisation of modality in English based on entirely descriptive criteria for the inherent purpose of classifying these modals. This has constantly led to criticisms that each approach has produced a more or less narrow and positioned account of what modality entails (both at the theoretical and practical levels) and which expressions to be included under the heading of modality.

And the main drawbacks that all these approaches share boil down to the following areas (which are discussed in detail in Chapter Three). The first relates to their restrictive selection of modal expressions where most approaches have focused either exclusively or mainly on modal auxiliary verbs as the one class comprising,

representing and summarising modality in general. This effectively resulted in a narrow and non-inclusive view of modality as is evident in the works of several linguists discussed in the previous chapter.

Secondly, most approaches have aimed at presenting modality as a *neat* system, and this resulted in overemphasising one or another criterion which helped towards that goal. On the one hand, with some predominantly semantic approaches, this precision in categorisation often led to an unrealistic view of modality which is not only decontextualised, but is also quite distant from the general intuitions of native speakers. On the other hand, some purely syntactic accounts (and by far the most popular) have inaccurately viewed modality as a purely grammatical category, while the issue of meaning (let alone interpretation) lay in the background.

Thirdly, some of the less restrictive but non-functional accounts carry internal contradictions. This is evident in Palmer's (1990: 1) description of modality as an essentially "semantic-grammatical" category, a description which is potentially paradoxical even when modality refers only to that restricted set of modal auxiliary verbs. Even with this limited set, such a description is sensible only at the theoretical level in that the term 'modal' is in essence a semantic description while the term 'auxiliary' a syntactic one. In reality, however, these criteria are incompatible, and trying to account for modality within both the semantic *and* syntactic frames creates a dilemma even when only dealing with modal auxiliary verbs (let alone modal expressions in general). Consequently, in a more inclusive account of modality, none of the above criteria seem satisfactory or appropriate.

Based on the drawbacks of such approaches, the following observations and conclusions are made. On the one hand, there seems to be a conflict between presenting both an inclusive as well as a neat system of categorised modals, and in



their attempt to avoid this conflict, most approaches have restricted their accounts to modal auxiliary verbs. On the other hand, there appears to be a general neglect of the interpretative dimension in the light of contextual restrictions, and this is mainly due to the inability of semantic-syntactic criteria to account for a variable which both lies outside the scope of semantics and syntax as fields of study and is, on top of that, so difficult to control.

These two points suggest that any practically useful account will need to sacrifice *neatness* for *inclusion* and will have to take into consideration the possible range in interpretation. And both goals can go hand in hand in the light of a more pragmatic account of modality. In fact, the more pragmatically oriented an account is, the more inclusive it can be, and this is due to the fact that excessive and meticulous attempts at precision in description, categorisation and use of terminology would no longer be a goal, a view indirectly arrived at in Palmer's (1986) account.

#### 4.3.1 Modality and Subjectivity

In his book *Mood and Modality*, Palmer (1986) tackles the issue of modality at the cross-linguistic level, and therefore both the perspectives and objectives of that account are considerably different from his earlier approaches. Because at the cross-linguistic level structural criteria do not present adequate and reliable bases for modal categorisation, Palmer is forced to resort to more inclusive ones thus pointing out *subjectivity* (along with indeterminacy and non-factuality) as the first basic and common characteristic shared by all modals in all languages. Unfortunately, for the one reason that it lacks structural foundations, he expresses his reservations concerning subjectivity as a useful criterion for a neat categorisation of modals. In other words, Palmer's (1986) conclusion concerning the inadequacy of subjectivity to

serve as a basis for categorising modals only arises because of his refusal to acknowledge the inability for structural and semantic approaches to fully account for modality cross-linguistically. This insistence on a structural-semantic basis seems to fall in line with theoretical tendencies associated with structural schools of linguistics, which have consistently aimed at presenting language as a structured system of systems. However, the limitations of such approaches only draw attention to the need for more functional-pragmatic bases of any inclusive account which, in effect, highlights the need for considering such criteria as subjectivity for categorising modals.

#### 4.3.2 Modality and Indeterminacy

The other main pragmatically useful criterion<sup>3</sup>, which also transcends cross-linguistic barriers, is that of *indeterminacy*. Initially suggested by Coates (1983) as part of an essentially semantic approach to categorising modals, indeterminacy, along with its three sub-divisions discussed in the previous chapter is unfortunately not stretched out to its full potential. This is evident in Coates's (1983) restrictive selection of only ten modal auxiliary verbs as opposed to other expressions of modality in general. However, indeterminacy is a notion which, I argue, is founded on fundamentally pragmatic bases since interpretation lies at the heart of indeterminacy. Consequently, it can serve as another essential foundation for a functional and potentially more inclusive account of modality.

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<sup>3</sup> The third and final criterion (non-factuality) is not accounted for in this thesis because it does not relate to the notion of ideology in a way that could be utilised in a practical analysis. Although ideology is non-factual in the sense that it is positioned, as mentioned, the notion is of little practical use.

### 4.3.3 Ideology and Subjectivity

The significance of these two criteria (subjectivity and indeterminacy) can be illustrated through the role they play in providing the bases for generally characterising modality in English as well as relating modality to the notion of ideology. As Palmer (1986: 6) argues, modality in language is “concerned with *subjective* characteristics of an utterance” and could thus be defined as “the grammaticalization of speakers’ (subjective) attitudes and opinions” [emphasis mine]. It is essentially “the qualification of the categorical and the absolute as realized [in linguistics] within the code of language” (Perkins 1983: 18). This qualification is the main indication of subjectivity since it represents an involvement of the producer of an instance of language in his/her production. More specifically it can be an indication of the producer’s point of view in terms of types and degrees of this modal involvement.

Yet subjectivity is also an essential feature of ideology. According to Hodge and Kress (1993: 6), ideology can be defined as “a systematic body of ideas organized from a particular point of view”, and this definition places considerable emphasis on the notion of subjectivity. Although the point of view referred to could be the aggregate sum of different sources of presenting states of affairs, and is subject to many restrictions, the role of the immediate producer’s point of view is recognised as the last filter through which ideology is organised and ultimately presented. Here modality can potentially represent one fundamental linguistic feature through which the speaker’s point of view can be detected in an utterance.

As Perkins (1983: 34) explains, modal expressions can be regarded as “a realisation of a semantic system which intervenes between the speaker and some aspect of the objective world”. This interesting metaphor of intervention suggests both

a facilitating role as well as a hindering role to modality. In the first case, modality can intervene in a 'positive' way by serving as some sort of link or a mediation between the speaker and the objective world and is thus a carrier of at least part of the speaker's meanings and intentions. However, in the second case, modality could simultaneously serve as some sort of obstacle between the language producer and receiver. And this is particularly relevant when addressing the issue from the receiver's end since any 'negative' hindering characteristic of modality can play a significant ideological role in masking some aspects of the message communicated as well as possible inconsistent ideological positions. In both cases, subjectivity, which is regarded as an indispensable notion associated with the use of modality, is also quite crucial when considering ideology.

#### **4.3.4 Ideology and Indeterminacy**

Secondly comes indeterminacy. As Coates (1983: 9) argues, indeterminacy, which is characteristic of all natural languages, is of particular relevance to modal auxiliary verbs<sup>4</sup>. Her three different types of indeterminacy (outlined in Chapter Three) exemplify various ways through which modals seem to have more than one sense of meaning in which the same forms are used. Indeterminacy, she argues, lies at the heart of the meanings and interpretations of modal auxiliary verbs and is therefore an indispensable criterion for categorising and sub-categorising such auxiliaries.

Again, this main feature works hand in hand with ideology whose effectiveness is maximised "when its workings are least visible" (Fairclough 1989: 85). Indeterminacy directly serves one of the main objectives of an ideology of hegemony as well as the masking of possibly inconsistent ideologies. It is therefore

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<sup>4</sup> Indeterminacy is characteristic of all forms of modality as will be shown in the upcoming analyses.

through these less visible workings of ideology that modality plays its most decisive role. It serves as a linguistic tool which, in line with their ideological stance, language users can resort to in order to *reflect*, *refract* or totally *obscure* their views and attitudes. In that sense, modality is seen as “a major exponent of the *interpersonal* function of language” (Simpson 1993: 47).

Consequently, in the light of the relationship between ideology and discourse, the significance of modality as a linguistic tool for the analysis of ideology becomes more visible and can be more easily highlighted. Its significance in terms of its practical potential is based on the two central aspects of modality which it combines:

- 1) a coverage of an extremely *wide* area of meaning as well as
- 2) a *structured* system within which different meanings fall.

This means that modality can be simultaneously quite *general* in one sense, and *systematic* in another. These are areas where modality systems both correspond perfectly with the objectives of ideology and also help its analysis in discourse at the practical level.

First of all, it is undeniably easier for ideologies to be more vaguely communicated when one is being more general in expressing one's views towards states of affairs. Generality seems to be an essential feature of both modality and ideology. Then again, according to Hodge and Kress (1993: 20), “if a systematic theory, an ideology, is guiding the use of language ... then we would expect a systematic use of linguistic forms to be evident”. Analysing this systematic use of linguistic forms becomes easier when these forms display a certain level of internal organisation, and this is another feature of modality as will be illustrated below. Consequently, a systematic reading of modality has the potential of providing insight into the different underlying ideologies and possible ideological inconsistencies in

discourse. It seems that modality combines those characteristics which provide both the lock and its key.

As a result, and based on this relationship between modality and ideology, the main argument put forward in this thesis is that a reading of modality in a text can give us a clearer and more accurate idea about where a speaker/writer stands, at the ideological level. Of course, this presupposes an account of modality which is inclusive, systematic, as well as interpretation-sensitive in that it is able to accommodate the possible range in interpretation within contextual (social, cognitive and linguistic) restrictions. Ultimately, this means that the account should essentially be a pragmatic-functional one, which should also have practical potential so that it could be used in analysing discourse.

#### 4.4 A Pragmatic-Functional Account of Modality

Trying to implement all those variables mentioned above to achieve a *pragmatic-functional* account of modality which is *systematic*, *inclusive* as well as *practically useful* is a particularly challenging task in the light of all the contradictions and lack of compatibility of criteria and variables. From a pragmatic perspective, this means that any account “does not stop at the system of linguistic devices, but develops the system from the quality of action connected with the linguistic forms” (Hoffman 1988: 156) in their context of use. In other words, as Lakoff (1972) points out:

In order to define the class of modals, or to provide the set of environments in which a modal may be correctly or appropriately used, one must refer to many levels of language: the purely syntactic environment, ... the logical structure, ... and the context of the utterance; the assumptions that are shared by speaker and addressee, whether or not previously given linguistic expression in the discourse; the social situation assumed by participants in the discourse; the impression the speaker wants to make on the addressee; and so on.

(Lakoff 1972: 229-230)

Here, the key for accomplishing this lies primarily in ensuring a functional basis for such an account. This is the case since an inherent component of a functional theory of language and discourse is, in fact, the interaction of most of the above mentioned variables. As a result, before proposing my own categorisation of modality which is intended for practical use, a brief preview of the two main approaches which illustrate the functional view of modality is the next immediate task. These are Halliday's (1985) and Simpson's (1993) accounts.

#### **4.4.1 Halliday's (1985) Functional/Pragmatic Account**

Halliday's (1985) account of modality is based on his multifunctional view of language discussed in previous chapters. As an extension to his examination of *mood*, which covers the four basic clause structures: declarative, imperative, interrogative and exclamatory, Halliday tackles the notion of modality. He describes modality as representing those choices in language which lie between the two polarities ("yes" and "no"), thus covering all intermediate degrees as well as the "various kinds of indeterminacy" that fall in between these two extreme, categorical choices (Halliday 1985: 85-86).

His functional bases emerge quite clearly as he subdivides modality into *modalization* and *modulation*, depending on the two types of communicative activities to which it relates, the two areas of meaning which it covers. The first area of meaning deals with *propositions* and is tackled under modalization. This branch of modality is seen to reflect the speaker's judgement of the likelihood of the proposition, and is, according to Halliday further subdivided into two sections depending on the two kinds of intermediate possibilities: degrees of *probability* and degrees of *usuality* (Halliday 1985: 86). The second area of meaning deals with

*proposals* and is covered under modulation, the second main subsection of modality. This branch of modality, Halliday (1985: 86) explains, essentially reflects the speaker's desirability of the proposition and is also divided into two kinds of proposals: *obligation* and *inclination*.

Based on these main divisions, Halliday (1985) points out the three variables which modality is subject to. The first is the already mentioned distinction between the two different types: modalization and modulation. The second is what Halliday (1985: 336) refers to as the different *orientations* in modality. These are four which could be either *subjective-explicit* (I think Mary knows) or *subjective-implicit* (Mary'll know) on the one hand, or they could be either *objective-explicit* (it's likely that Mary knows) or *objective-implicit* (Mary probably knows) on the other. And finally, the third variable is what Halliday refers to as the different *values* attributed to modal forms and these can be *low*, *median* or *high* (Halliday 1985: 337). In that light, modalization would include various intermediary degrees of *probability* (possible/ probable/ certain) and *usuality* (sometimes/ usually/ always), while modulation would cover different degrees of *obligation* (allowed/ supposed/ required) and *inclination* (willing/ keen/ determined) (Halliday 1985: 335). These correspond respectively to the low, median and high values (See Figure 1).

Halliday (1985) concludes his account by discussing the different structural realisations of modality. Here he suggests that modalization is typically realised by finite modal operators (such as *might*) and/or modal adjuncts (such as *certainly*), while modulation is typically realised by finite modal operators (such as *must*), a passive verb predicator (such as *supposed*) or an adjective predicator (such as *anxious*) (Halliday 1985: 87).






Figure 1

Two noticeable features about Halliday’s (1985) account are its *functional* and its *pragmatic* dimensions. The first is explicitly pointed out since Halliday’s theory of language which modality is part of is a functional one. The second, however, is only implicitly signalled out by the central role that *interpretation* plays in determining the meanings of different modals. Doing that, Halliday (1985) avoids the trap which monosemantic approaches fall into and does not assign one interpretation per modal. This suggests that although he makes such accurate divisions under the different orientations of modality, these only serve as guidelines as to the variables involved in assigning different meanings of modals. In fact, assigning the exact orientation for different modal expressions in English is extremely hard, if not impossible since one cannot rule out the possibility where different readers do not interpret the same modal in exactly the same way. And the same argument holds when discussing Halliday’s examples of the different values assigned to different modals. This drives Halliday (1985: 339) to the conclusion that “the actual number of semantic distinctions that can

be recognized as systematic within the modality system runs well into the thousands''. In short, the essence of Halliday's account and its usefulness lies in its setting of the theoretical bases from which any practically useful account of modality can depart. This directly links it to Simpson's (1993) more practically oriented approach.

#### 4.4.2 Simpson's (1993) Practical Account

Simpson's (1993) categorisation of modals is specifically targeted at presenting a workable account of modality. Although he does not provide an extensive and exhaustive description of the modal system in English, his proposals reflect a much more inclusive as well as a practically useful account. It is an approach which is quite similar to Halliday's (1985) account discussed above.

Simpson (1993: 47) starts by defining modality as referring "broadly to a speaker's attitude towards, or opinion about, the truth of a proposition expressed by a sentence" as well as their attitude "towards the situation or event described by a sentence". He then subdivides modality into four main categories. These are the *deontic* system, along with the closely related *boulomaic* system on the one hand, and the *epistemic* system, with its subsystem of *perception* modality on the other (Simpson 1993: 47).

Deontic modality is defined as the system of *duty* since it is "concerned with a speaker's attitude to the degree of obligation attaching to the performance of certain actions". And this generally manifests itself on "a continuum of commitment from *permission* through *obligation* to *requirement*" (Simpson 1993: 47). It includes modal auxiliary verbs (MAY, SHOULD, MUST, etc) as well as other deontic adjectives plus participle constructions (BE ... THAT) as in "it is necessary that you leave" which reflect the same attitude.

Deontic modality is closely related to *boulomaic* modality “which is extensively grammaticized in English in expressions of ‘desire’” (Simpson 1993: 48). This includes modal lexical verbs indicating the wishes and desires of the speaker (such as HOPE, WISH and REGRET), adjectival and participial constructions (as in BE ... TO and BE ... THAT) as well as modal adverbs (HOPEFULLY, REGRETABLELY). In short, Simpson’s (1993) deontic modality parallels Halliday’s (1985) “obligation” branch of “modulation” while boulomaic modality falls close to, but not quite in line with Halliday’s “inclination” branch of “modulation” outlined above.

The *epistemic* system on the other hand is associated with “the speaker’s confidence or lack of confidence in the truth of a proposition expressed” (Simpson 1993: 48). It includes different types of epistemic expressions like modal auxiliary verbs (MAY, MIGHT, MUST), modal lexical verbs (BELIEVE, SUPPOSE, THINK) and epistemic modal adverbs (PROBABLY, POSSIBLY) and adjectives in “BE ... TO” and “BE ... THAT” constructions (“you are sure to be right”, “it is certain that you’re right”) (Simpson 1993: 48). It largely manifests itself on a continuum of epistemic commitment to a proposition.

Directly related to the epistemic system is *perception* modality which is regarded as a subcategory of epistemic modality. It also manifests itself in “BE ... THAT” constructions (“it is apparent that you’re right”) as well as through modal adverbs (APPARENTLY, OBVIOUSLY). Following Perkins (1983), Simpson (1993: 50) argues that the difference between the two is only due to the fact that “the degree of commitment to the truth of a proposition is predicated on some reference to human perception, normally visual perception”. In comparison to Halliday’s (1985) account, Simpson’s (1993) epistemic and perception modality would both be seen to fall under

the former's "probability" branch of "modality" while Halliday's "usuality" branch is not accounted for.

Yet this sub-branching in epistemic modality has its purpose. When analysing point of view, distinguishing between epistemic and perception modality could signal the difference between internal and external narratorial stances. Since Simpson's (1993) account of modality is specifically targeted at the examination of point of view in discourse (specifically literature), his division is well founded and therefore utterly justifiable. In contrast, although Halliday's divisions do have practical potential, they are not targeted at any specific manner of application. Hence, they are more general, theoretical and they include other sections of modality which are of less value for Simpson.

Nevertheless, as argued earlier, both accounts share common basic functional grounds, and this is reflected in a set of more specific and valuable criteria shared by both accounts (which are, nonetheless, not always explicitly highlighted and signalled out). These include the three main scales on which modality wavers: a subjective-objective scale, an epistemic-deontic one and a strong-weak one, bringing into light both the functional-pragmatic nature of these accounts as well as their dependence on the concepts of subjectivity and indeterminacy. The main premises are that an account of modality is characterised both by the type of activity modality communicates and corresponds to (at the functional level) as well as by the involvement of a speaker/writer in making propositions and proposals in addition to negotiating the degree of strength, subjectivity and indeterminacy propositions and proposals correspond to (at the pragmatic level). And on top of it all is the significant and central role these features play in accounting for ideology in discourse.

Consequently, both Halliday's (1985) and Simpson's (1993) categorisations of modality are quite valuable in serving as bases on which the upcoming proposed account will depend. The only central difference will then be in terms of the practical objectives which the proposed account will be tailored to serve as opposed to any fundamental difference in the functional-pragmatic bases of all these accounts.

## 4.5 An Inclusive Account of Modality

Ensuring a functional-pragmatic basis for a systematic and practically useful account of modality is therefore an initial and fundamental step to take at the theoretical level. Yet moving on to the practical level calls, first, for a decision regarding which expressions to incorporate under the heading of modality if the account is to be an inclusive one. And this decision is, in turn, necessarily dependent on a definition of modality which is both general as well as adequate from a functional-pragmatic point of view.

In order to ensure such a definition of modality, a primary point to acknowledge is that modality does not express a single area of meaning. There are, in fact, two main types of meaning. The first is covered under *epistemic* modality which, according to Palmer (1986: 121), is roughly concerned with "language as information". The second is dealt with under *deontic* modality which is generally concerned with "language as action" (Palmer 1986: 121). Defined more specifically by Simpson (1993: 48), the epistemic system is associated with "the speaker's confidence or lack of confidence ... in the truth of a proposition expressed". The deontic system, on the other hand, "is concerned with a speaker's attitude to the degree of obligation attaching to the performance of certain actions" (Simpson 1993: 47).

Yet before deciding what expressions to include under each type of modality defined above, one point worth mentioning here is the use of the term “commitment” by Palmer (1986: 51) and Simpson (1993: 50) as well as the term “confidence” by Coates (1983: 18), Palmer (1986: 64) and Simpson (1993: 48) in describing the speaker’s modal position. This, I argue, can be a misleading notion in that carries a suggestion that the speaker is quite conscious in communicating her/his position and is rather aware of the positions s/he undertakes. Of course while this is a possibility, it is not always the case. Therefore, my proposition is to replace these expressions by the term *involvement* which serves the purpose of linking the speaker to what s/he says while at the same time opening the possibility that the speaker’s position is not always a deliberate, conscious one. In that light, modality would very broadly refer to the speaker’s involvement in what s/he says, and this involvement would vary in type as well as degree (see the next section for further discussion). Hence, while the speaker is no doubt ‘involved’ in what s/he might have said, the direct responsibility of the speaker regarding the possible effects his/her words may have will always be a debatable issue. And this summarises one of the main characteristics of the use of modality in language.

Going back to the earlier argument, in order to avoid the drawbacks of earlier approaches, all expressions reflecting these two areas of meaning should to be included under modality. Consequently, under the epistemic set, not only epistemic modal auxiliary verbs but also different manifestations and realisations of the epistemic modal system should be included. In English, epistemic and deontic modality can be realised in different forms. Most of these are best captured in the following examples which reflect the majority of these expressions.

**Realisations of Epistemic Modality**

- He <i>is</i> crazy.	<i>declarative sentence (factual)</i>
- He <i>must be</i> crazy.	<i>modal auxiliary</i>
- He <i>is probably</i> crazy.	<i>modal adverb</i>
- It <i>is possible</i> that he is crazy.	<i>modal adjective</i>
- It <i>is a possibility</i> he is crazy.	<i>modal noun</i>
- I <i>think</i> he is crazy.	<i>mental perception</i>
- I <i>assure</i> you he is crazy.	<i>speech act</i>
- He is crazy, <i>isn't she?</i>	<i>tag question</i>
- He is <i>sort of</i> crazy.	<i>filler</i>
- It is <i>apparent</i> that he is crazy.	<i>sensory perception adjective</i>
- It <i>seems</i> he is crazy.	<i>implicit subjective reference</i>
- It <i>seems to me</i> he is crazy.	<i>explicit subjective reference</i>
- <i>I'm told</i> he is crazy.	<i>evidential (hear-say)</i>
- It is <i>as though</i> he is crazy.	<i>analogical metaphor</i>

**Realisations of Deontic Modality**

- <i>Leave.</i>	<i>imperative sentence (command)</i>
- You <i>must</i> leave.	<i>modal auxiliary</i>
- You <i>are obliged</i> to leave.	<i>modal adjective</i>
- It is <i>best</i> that you leave.	<i>adjective</i>
- It is <i>an order</i> that you leave	<i>noun</i>
- I <i>order</i> you to leave.	<i>speech act</i>

These examples clearly show that there are numerous manifestations of modality, and in order to be more accurate and inclusive in an analysis which is based on an examination of modality in a text, all of these must be accounted for.

**4.6 A Practically Useful Account of Modality**

After deciding which modal expressions to include under the heading of modality, the second step is accounting for these expressions in a systematic manner that is functional and pragmatic in essence; i.e. an account which both reflects a functional view of discourse while simultaneously being flexible enough to allow for

a pragmatic approach to its analysis, serving the main objective of analysing ideology in discourse. As repeatedly pointed out earlier, the two key features which constitute the bases for such a task are subjectivity and indeterminacy. Whether deciding on a meaning of a modal expression or on the force of that expression, both subjectivity and indeterminacy are central at the levels of production and reception. Therefore, the starting point in this section springs from the view that any systematic functional-pragmatic account of modality which has practical potential needs to acknowledge the importance of these two basic factors.

At the interpretive level, subjectivity in the use of modality signals the writer/speaker's type and degree of involvement in what is being said as seen from the reader/hearer's perspective. Subjectivity is therefore directly related to the notion of interpretation in that it highlights the role of the reader/hearer who acts as the final stage responsible for deciding on the general area of meaning within which a modal falls. Translated into practical terms, the notion of subjectivity is essential in accounting for modality since it rules out the misconception that there is a one-to-one correspondence between a modalised expression and its meaning(s) since it is the language user who plays a central role in determining that meaning. This implies that any adequate model for categorising modals should allow for differences in interpretation as an essential facet of modality in general. Of course, that does not imply that interpretation is an entirely subjective process since the reader/hearer is not the only one responsible for assigning meanings and interpretations. There is in fact a set of restrictions which an interpretation of a modal cannot go beyond.

This is an extremely delicate issue since two opposing forces/processes appear to be simultaneously present. While on the one hand subjectivity can, taking the argument to an absolute extreme, potentially lead to a countless variety of



interpretations, there also exists, on the other hand, a general area of meaning as well as contextual restrictions which an interpretation of a modal cannot surpass. The main feature here is the presence of boundaries on subjectivity that set the parameters within which an interpretation of a modal is allowed to manoeuvre. In short, just as important as the role of subjectivity in categorising modals is the function of this control on subjectivity by contextual restrictions. Both this variance and control on it are best captured at the practical level by the use of scales within continua. As a result, an essential constituent of a pragmatic account of modality is the presence of a set of scales under which modal interpretations will be seen to vary. This brings us to the next essential criterion – indeterminacy.

Indeterminacy is, again, a fundamental constituent of a pragmatic account of modality. In fact, indeterminacy is directly related to the notion of subjectivity here since the area within which an interpretation of a modal expression is seen to manoeuvre is essentially an indeterminate area. And this is evident at more than one level. Indeterminacy is present in determining the *sense* in which a modal is used (i.e. epistemic or deontic), the *degree of strength* of the modal (i.e. authority of the speaker) and *degree of subjectivity* reflected in the use of the modal expression (i.e. the explicit or implicit interference of the speaker).

As a result, when accounting for modality from a pragmatic point of view, we are in effect looking at a three-dimensional continuum, and both subjectivity and indeterminacy are evident in each of these dimensions: in the sense of the modal, in terms of degrees of strength, and of degrees of subjectivity. This means that the three scales that make up this practical continuum, the last two of which correspond with Halliday's (1985: 336, 337) "orientations" and "values" to modality, are:

- 1) an *epistemic – deontic* scale,
- 2) a *weak – strong*<sup>5</sup> scale and
- 3) a *subjective – objective* scale.

The first of these scales targets the two main systems of modality, thus reflecting the speaker/writer's *type* of involvement in an utterance. The second two sets are essentially indicative of the speaker/writer's *degree* of involvement and therefore authority in an utterance, both in terms of degrees of strength and subjectivity. As a result and for practical purposes, the most efficient way of fitting these variables in a framework is through the use of two continua reflecting the two types of modal involvement – the two main senses of modality (epistemic and deontic).

Under the epistemic system, the continuum reflecting degrees of certainty would include such modal notions as *possibility, probability, necessity, prediction, certainty* (as well as other epistemic notions) ranging from the lowest to the highest degrees. However, even at this level of generality, it is not always accurate or straightforward to map each modal expression used in the upcoming texts to one area of meaning listed above. There will still be areas of meaning which overlap, and therefore, the most appropriate branches of epistemic modality which reflects the degrees of certainty on that scale are best captured by Halliday's (1985: 337) three values: low, median and high. This can be exemplified by the utterances below.


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<sup>5</sup> Here deciding on the weakness and strength of the modal are made in terms of degrees of authority communicated through the use of the modal expression.

**The Scales of Epistemic Modality** (*Degrees of Certainty*)

That <b>may, might, could</b> be the postman	<b>low</b>
That <b>should</b> be the postman	<b>median</b>
That <b>must, will</b> be the postman	<b>high</b>
That <b>is</b> the postman	<b>factuality</b>

The degree of certainty reflected in the use of a modal expression would correspond to its level of placement on the epistemic scale. The lower the speaker’s degree of certainty, the lower level of authority s/he displays and visa versa. This seems highly logical since knowledge can be equated with authority and consequently, with power. In that light, the continuum representing the epistemic scale would reflect these varying degree of certainty from low, through median and high, all the way to factuality. Between these values are a number of arrows and these are meant to emphasise the continuity, lack of boundaries as well as possible variations in interpreting modals among different readers. This opens the door for the possibility that the same modal might be interpreted as falling under one or another category, somewhere between the two or as part of both. Again, with the subjective-objective scale, there is a possibility that an expression be placed closer to one or the other end by different readers.




Under the deontic system, on the other hand, the scale of obligation would include such notions ranging from *permission* to *command* including *duty*, *obligation*, *insistence* (as well as other deontic notions). Again, these reflect Halliday’s low, median and high values to modality as exemplified in the following utterances.

**The Scales of Deontic Modality (*Degrees of Obligation*)**

You <b>may, can</b> leave	<b>low</b>
You <b>should</b> leave	<b>median</b>
You <b>must, will</b> leave	<b>high</b>
<b>Leave</b>	<b>command</b>

Here too the lower end of the scale corresponds with the weaker level of authority while the upper end with the stronger one. In this case, it is the degree of obligation associated with the use of a modal expression which reflects the authority of the speaker on the deontic scale.



One central point to clarify in light of the modal categorisation proposed above is how this categorisation is considered pragmatic rather than purely semantic. Initially, it is not a semantic in the traditional sense (monosemantic or polysemantic)

in that no specific meanings are attached to specific modals. The only ‘meanings’ attached to modals reflect the division between epistemic and deontic modality, and that is more a functional rather than a semantic one. Moreover, any ‘meaning’ attached to modals is dependent on the context in which it is used. It is in fact an *interpretation* of a specific modal in a specific *context*, both linguistic and extralinguistic. This is the other dimension to the pragmatic nature of the modal categorisation proposed: the involvement of a hearer/reader in the process of interpretation of a specific use of a modal in a unique linguistic and situational context.

Looking at these two continua then, the next point to clarify concerns the relationship between the subjective-objective scale and the strong-weak scale. The question asked relates to whether there exists a direct and consistent relationship between either end of each scale. Attempting to answer this question, it is crucial to point out that the general tendency is to relate subjectivity and weakness (see Coates 1983). Yet this is not always a clear-cut case as is evident in the dilemma Hodge and Kress (1993) face in their discussion of the difference between first, second and third person point of view.

Hodge and Kress (1993: 92) argue that with *I* as subject, for instance, the utterance has “all the reliability of a first-hand claim”. This makes its source or authority “absolutely clear, and if it seems less than certain that is because of doubts about the honesty of the speaker” (Hodge and Kress 1993: 92). With the third-person form, on the other hand, there is detachment from any particular speaker. Yet this distance and detachment give the utterance an impersonal force rather than making seem unreliable since its modality no longer depends on “an assessment of the reliability of its source” (Hodge and Kress 1993: 92). As a result, in comparison with

the first-person form which according to Hodge and Kress (1993: 92) is seen to limit the scope of the utterance, the “third-person form implies a neutral transmitter and ... is the form in which to present a statement as authoritative”.

Following this line of reasoning, Hodge and Kress (1993) seem to provide support for each end of the argument at the centre of which is the role, reliability and power status of the source of a proposition or proposal. Therefore, while it is a valid argument that the less overtly subjective a proposition is, the more impersonal and authoritative it seems, one can also argue for the other equally valid point where explicit subjective interference of a recognised authoritative source in a proposition would have a stronger effect than an implicit engagement of this source. In short, while authority is expressed in different manners (i.e. both in term of knowledge as well as power status), there is no one-to-one correspondence between each end of the scale from a pragmatic point of view. In line with the pragmatic nature of the proposed framework, it is crucial that every modal utterance be considered as a unique case in its context of use where context refers both to the immediate linguistic context as well as the context of situation in general. Interpretations should then be negotiated depending on the unique factors present in each case, where just as essential as the area of meaning covered by a modal is the power status of the source of that expression. Hence, approaching the subjective-objective issue in the pragmatic way suggested is essential to arrive at a functional-pragmatic interpretation of ideology.

The final question concerns the practical potential of this framework for categorising modality in English in the light of the general objective for this functional-pragmatic categorisation: i.e. the analysis of ideology in discourse. As argued above, ideology and modality can be related based on the two notions

characteristic of both: subjectivity and indeterminacy. Therefore, the case pushed forward is that an analysis of modal expressions in English can give us insight as to the *type* and *degree* of involvement of a speaker/writer in his/her propositions and proposals. Depending on this information, categorising modalised expression in a text under these two continua would serve as the bases for providing a more accurate reading of the position(s) of the producer(s) of a text regarding specific areas of content. And depending on the speakers' positions, their worldviews at the ideological level concerning the issues communicated would emerge.

This last point helps justify my inclusion of those expressions of “neutral modality” (Lyons 1977: 793) like factuality and commands in the continua. Although these expressions are epistemically and deontically “non-modal” (Lyons 1977: 793), the main reason for including them in the continua serves the main purpose of analysing ideology in a text. From that perspective, the absence of explicit modality does not render such expressions neutral on the ideological scale since they do express the speaker's highest degrees of certainty and/or obligation. In effect, not accounting for them would present an incomplete picture of the degrees of strength and subjectivity of the ideologies involved. And that is what renders this account more pragmatic rather than strictly semantic in nature since the goal is to see how different types of modalised utterances function in a variety of contexts of use in terms of strength and, consequently, ideological effects.

As a result, analysing ideology through an analysis of modality in discourse starts from an isolation of modalised expressions in a text and grouping them under the two continua. These groupings would reflect several characteristics of the framework used. They should therefore be primarily based on an interpretation of each modal expression within the context of the utterance, both the immediate

linguistic context as well as background information. Moreover, they should reflect a serious and practical consideration the role of the producer of the text (the source) in terms of his/her social power/status. In this sense, modalised utterances will be grouped under specific or a number of categories based on the way they interact with the relevant variables in that specific linguistic and extralinguistic context. Finally, these groupings should display the framework's pragmatic flexibility in allowing for possible variability in interpretation, i.e. the interpretive role of the reader.

Consequently, at the practical level, the proposed analyses will proceed in the following manner. First, both modalised and non-modalised expressions in each text are isolated and grouped under the more appropriate categories within each continuum. Deciding on what constitutes an 'utterance' is dependent on the function of modality in one specific utterance in relation to preceding and following ones. This means that the length of an utterance may vary from a string of clauses with no change in the type and degree of modal involvement to a subsection of a clause where modal involvement varies in each of these subsections.

Secondly, based on the clustering of modality under each continuum (epistemic/deontic) as well as under a general area of strength and subjectivity, the *type* of speaker/writer involvement as well as the *degree* of that involvement in his/her proposition/proposal becomes clearer. As discussed above, this grouping will involve an analysis and interpretation of each modal utterance in light of the linguistic and extralinguistic context with special emphasis on the role of the producer of the text and his/her power status. And this serves as the basis for clarifying the producers' ideological positions regarding the issues involved which is originally overshadowed by the possible ambiguities usually associated with the use of modality. In short, the



systematic, more inclusive reading of modality is what provides an overview concerning the ideologies communicated.

## 4.7 Conclusions and Implications

In this chapter, the main objective was to provide functional-pragmatic account of modality which had practical potential. Its main purpose would be to relate modality to ideology in analysing discourse in order to bring to surface the underlying, possibly inconsistent, ideological affiliations and positions of producers of texts. This task was seen as feasible only in the light of functional-pragmatic criteria which are both inclusive and systematic. In that, the account would comprise different manifestations of modality (not just modal auxiliary verbs) in a systematic way to help provide a systematic analysis. The suggested criteria were named as subjectivity and indeterminacy, and these essentially pragmatic criteria were seen to provide the bases for modal categorisation which not only has practical potential, but is specifically targeted at areas which help the analysis of ideology in discourse.

After reviewing the two directly related accounts of modality put forward by Halliday (1985) and Simpson (1993), the parameters of the framework proposed in this chapter were set. A key feature was the use of a continuum in order to ensure the functional-pragmatic bases of the proposed account. More specifically, a three dimensional continuum, which included an *epistemic – deontic* scale, a *weak – strong* scale and a *subjective – objective* scale, was proposed in order to account for possible variation in interpretation by the reader. Consequently, placing modals on a continuum means a consideration of not only the type of meaning covered by a modal, but also the degree of strength and subjectivity reflected by its use within each specific context of use. This would ultimately be related to ideology in that the type

and degree of involvement a speaker has in what s/he says reflects a position, an attitude towards the ideas communicated and towards the participants involved in that discourse. In short, it reflects the speaker's worldview at the ideological level.

Following from that, the main direction in which this thesis will next proceed is based on the findings and arguments of the previous four chapters. In the light of the view of discourse adopted in this thesis, the plan in the next three chapters is to present practical analyses of modality and ideology in six instances of discourse which traditionally fall under three different genres. The rationale behind doing that is twofold. First, it is to support the view argued for earlier – that all instances of discourse can be approached in essentially the same manner for this very specific purpose in critical analysis. Second, it is to reveal the different ideological affiliations (political, racist, religious, ethical, economic etc.) of the speakers/writers of these texts.

More specifically, the next three chapters target literary discourse, political discourse and scientific discourse for the following reasons. The choice of these genres is meant to highlight the different objectives usually associated with their use. While political discourse is usually expected to have an explicit ideological agenda, literary discourse is expected to be only implicitly ideological while scientific discourse explicitly non-ideological. Therefore, the goal in analysing these three different types of discourse emphasises both the different underlying ideological bases for these texts as well as the significance of using modality to analyse these ideologies no matter how different texts are.

## V     Modality, Ideology and Literary Discourse

### 5.1   Introduction: Literature and Literary Discourse

The objectives of the second chapter were essentially to describe and analyse the associations and interactions among a set of traditionally controversial terms: literary language and non-literary language, style and stylistics, ideology and discourse. There, it was argued and concluded that literature did not constitute a *special* type of discourse since it is subject to the same linguistic and social determinants as any other type of discourse. Therefore, and in line with the aims of this thesis, if we are to approach literary discourse from a critical perspective, then this means that the area of focus is not as much the aesthetic features of a text but rather its ideological aspects. In other words, as long as a text (literary or non-literary) addresses ideological concerns, and as long as the primary objective of analysing it is to explore the ideological implications of that text within a social setting, no unique approaches which specifically target literary discourse as opposed to non-literary discourse can be justified.

These basic assumptions fall in line with the guiding view adopted in this thesis, that all texts are essentially ideological. In effect, the extent to which texts may vary on the ideological scale relates to differences in both the levels of ideological commitment and to the degrees of explicitness of this commitment. As argued in Chapter Four, modality is seen as a basic linguistic tool which, in line with their ideological stance, language users can resort to in order to *reflect*, *refract* or totally *obscure* their views and attitudes. It can be utilised by the text producer<sup>6</sup> in order to

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<sup>6</sup> Of course, the level of consciousness suggested here is not characteristic of all text producers. Nevertheless, modality still performs the function stated.

help finely adjust and attune those various degrees of ideological involvement and explicitness. At the same time, it was suggested that a systematic reading of modality has the potential of providing insight into ideological twists in discourse by helping point out some of these inconsistencies. In other words, modality can serve the requirements and objectives of both text producers and receivers and is a valuable tool for the analysis of ideology.

Until now, all the above arguments were kept at the theoretical level. This chapter, however, aims to provide a practical examination of how modality and ideology interact with specific reference to two literary passages from Conrad's *Heart of Darkness*. The first objective of doing so is to present the first of three practical implementations of the theoretical issues discussed so far. The second objective is to show the workability of the approach proposed with what is unanimously acknowledged as a work of literature. And finally, the analysis aims at providing a reading of what is generally deemed as the ambiguous and/or dualistic ideological position of the main narrator in the novel, Marlow. All these are done through a pragmatic and systematic analysis of the way modality and ideology functionally interact in discourse.

## **5.2 Texts and Backgrounds**

The texts selected for analysis are two excerpts from *Heart of Darkness*, a novel (or novella) written by Joseph Conrad at the turn of the twentieth century (in 1902). The main incentives behind selecting *Heart of Darkness* are a) its content which, although fictional, addresses a set of highly controversial ideological issues of the time such as racism, colonialism, and imperialism, and b) the high level of

ambiguity involved in tackling these matters<sup>7</sup>. These two reasons make the novel particularly relevant and appropriate for the intended analysis. Indeed, the high level of ambiguity in the novel has sometimes led to conflicting opinions and interpretations of these controversial topics. Obviously, the analysis presented in this chapter does not aim at resolving the issue of ambiguity and presenting the ‘correct’ interpretation; however, the claim made here is that the forthcoming analysis will shed light on at least some reasons behind this ambiguity, helping narrow the margin for misinterpretation.

Before embarking on the analyses, however, it is essential to start by providing an overview of the historical, socio-economic background of the period. This serves as a prerequisite which helps clarify the underlying ideological setting of the novel. Moreover, it is crucial to briefly outline the range of available and conflicting interpretations in order to narrow down the key areas regarded by most critics as controversial. This ultimately helps illuminate the correlation between the central topics in this thesis: ideology and modality.

### 5.2.1 The Victorian Period and the ‘*Fin de Siecle*’

The time-phase coinciding with the publication of *Heart of Darkness* in 1902 is that commonly referred to as the “*fin de siecle*” (Ledger 1999: 217). Yet apart from its literal meaning (‘the end of the century’), this was generally a period characterised by change and a rethinking of the previously unquestioned way of life. The *fin de siecle* signalled both the end to an era of unrivalled British supremacy as an imperialist power and all those matter-of-fact ways of life. It was the first step away

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<sup>7</sup> In addition, what further motivates this project is argument that Conrad’s use of language is highly conscious since English is his third language. This strongly suggests that ambiguity in *Heart of Darkness* is not merely an accident and is thus worth investigating.

from the preceding Victorian Age which covered the period between the 1830s and the 1880s.

During the Victorian Age, Britain economically “ruled the world” since it exclusively dominated world marketplaces due to the large number of British colonies spread worldwide (Ledger 1999: 216). Moreover, that period was characterised by a prevailing set of beliefs, views and circumstances relating to the status and mission of imperialist Britain. These greatly influenced and were influenced by the way Britain (and to a large extent imperialist Europe) conducted its affairs in colonised countries.

To begin with, there was a general positive attitude towards Britain’s role as a coloniser. The dominant view of the time was that Britain’s mission in Asia and Africa was similar to that which Rome fulfilled in Europe, “the greatest function which any Government can ever be called upon to discharge” (Childs 1999: 4-5). This elevated the status of the British endeavours all over the world to that of a civilising mission. The British Empire, it was believed, would bring a new era of “peace in which unity and good would spread over the world as in the best years of the Pax Romana” (Childs 1999: 4).

Moreover, earlier British and European views concerning Africa had changed with the onset of the Victorian Age. According to early nineteenth century Romantics, Africa was considered to be a place of “innocence, a possibly Edenic, paradisiacal garden”, a view which had served as a primary factor culminating in humane socio-political positions such as the British abolition of slavery in 1833 (Childs 1999: 11). However, for the Victorians who followed in the 1830s, Africa became “a site of sin and cannibalism, a ‘Dark Continent’ of licence and barbarity, not innocence and simplicity” (Childs 1999: 11). This view was perfectly compatible with the dominant religious moral ideologies of Puritanism with its “disquiet over sexuality, the body

and the uncivilised other” (Childs 1999: 11). This meant that one of the main objectives of Victorian’s missions in these ‘uncivilised’ continents was, in Milton’s (1643) words, “teaching nations how to live” (Childs 1999: 4). And this provided *religious* and *moral justification* to utilise all the means available (no matter how immoral they could be) to achieve this ‘civilising’ goal.

In addition, advances in the fields of biological sciences had the deepest and the most pervasive effects on the way man perceived his “personal and historical destiny” (Watt 1979: 155), thus complementing the above view. In light of the development of Darwinism, ethnology and anthropology as well-established disciplines in the 1860s, these relatively new sciences further promoted the ideas of there being a “gulf between African and European” (Childs 1999: 11). Following that line of thought, Europeans would constitute the advanced race while the Africans were seen as being “arrested in the infancy of the species” (Childs 1999: 12).

These studies ultimately led to the founding of ‘practical Darwinism’ by Francis Galton who argued that civilisation had been on the decline since it reached its climax of intellectual accomplishment represented by the Greeks. The historical end of that time of intellectual supremacy raised fear that the same fate was awaiting the “confident ‘civilisation’ of mid-Victorian Britain” with its ethos of progress and domination of the world (Ledger 1999: 219). In fact, the historical reality of how the Greeks civilisation died out and the similarity in what was almost imminent for Britain represented no less than a reversal to the course of nature, to the ‘natural selection’ of Darwinism. Hence, serving the call of nature provided the *scientific justification* for colonial practices.

In line with the above arguments, the agenda for the future became quite obvious. Galton’s “eugenics project” aimed at counter-reversing “the process of ‘race’

degeneration” (Ledger 1999: 218), a *scientific* mission which also coincided with the *religious* puritan outlook regarding individual morality. In that, there were now even more imperative reasons for “widening the gap between civilised man and his animal antecedents” (Watt 1979: 156). Consequently, the traditional view of man’s supremacy in the divine plan was reinforced with the idea that “an equivalently splendid status could be attained through the working-out of humanity’s secular destiny” (Watt 1979: 156). Man was perhaps meant to actively find his way to the top of the evolutionary chain rather than just wait for changes to occur. This ultimately underlay and justified the ideology of colonial expansion. As Watt (1979: 156) adequately phrases it, “by occupying or controlling most of the globe, the European nations had demonstrated that they were the fittest to survive”. Yet all this was on the verge of change by the end of the century – the *fin de siècle* – i.e. at the time when *Heart of Darkness* was written.

During the writing of *Heart of Darkness*, according to Watt (1979: 161), it had become increasingly evident that the Victorian world order was collapsing. At the economic level, the prosperous years of the mid-Victorian age had come to an end in the 1880s as increasing competition from abroad meant that Britain no longer dominated world marketplaces with the ease which had been accomplished earlier in Victoria’s reign. There were concerns as well as realisations that Britain was increasingly becoming “a parasitic rather than a competitive world economy, living off the remains of world monopoly” (Ledger 1999: 216-217).

Furthermore, at the socio-political level, the end of the nineteenth century witnessed the renaissance of the women’s movement as well as the formation of the first tiny Marxist parties in England (Ledger 1999: 216). This, along with revelations of atrocities which began appearing in the British press from as early as 1888 (during



a period when “the population of Congo was decimated, perhaps halved”) (Brantlinger 1999: 193), meant that the previously dominant and unchallenged view of the legitimacy of imperialist and colonialist endeavours became a less prominent and increasingly less convincing. In other words, changes in the economic, social and political status quo gave rise to what in my view was an *inquisitive* and doubtful attitude which was the seed for later challenging that status quo.

In the midst of this transitional period, Conrad published *Heart of Darkness*. As is normally the case during intermediary, transitional periods, the looming changes in the dominant ways of life and ideas of the age were the roots for more questions and uncertainties. And this, in my view, is adequately reflected in *Heart of Darkness*. It is an ideology of uncertainty, a rethinking of unsatisfactory states of affair and an inquisitive search for alternatives.

### 5.2.2 Conrad, *Heart of Darkness* and Ambiguity

The greatest authors are rarely representative of the ideology of their period; they tend rather to expose its internal contradictions or the very partial nature of its capacity for dealing with the facts of experience.

(Watt 1979: 147)

As mentioned above, *Heart of Darkness* was published in Britain during the period directly following one characterised by absolute certainty in the civilising effects and legitimacy of imperialism in Europe. It was initially published serially in *Blackwood's* magazine in 1899, and this meant that the immediate audience were the subscribers to this magazines who, according to Parry (1983: 1), were at that time an upper-class, educated audience “still secure in the conviction that they were members of an invincible imperial power and a superior race” and for whom “colonial possessions appeared a natural extension of their own national boundaries”. In short,

the novel was written in English and the immediate audience was British<sup>8</sup>. Yet although its setting was a geographical location which Britain was not directly involved in (i.e. Belgian Congo), the general topics of imperialism and colonialism addressed by *Heart of Darkness* were matters that Britain was quite familiar with. These were the same controversial issues which at that time were subject to scrutiny and serious rethinking. Briefly then, *Heart of Darkness* was written at a time characterised by change and uncertainty, addressing issues which were the subject to rethinking, to an audience still secure in a way of life which was, in fact, no longer accessible.

In this sense, Harris's (1999: 228) description of *Heart of Darkness* as "a frontier novel" is quite a representative one in that it reflects the mixed ideologies of that period of change. According to Harris (1999: 228), Conrad was more or less prophetically conscious of the changes in those times and therefore, of the task he was undertaking. And this is evident in a novel which is seen to anticipate "an original necessity for *distortions* in the statuses of appearance that [seemed] sacred and that cultures [took] for granted" [emphasis mine] (Harris 1999: 228). The indirectness and "distortions" in representing those mixed ideologies have indeed branded *Heart of Darkness* as one of the most ambiguous and controversial works of literature of that period giving rise to numerous, sometimes conflicting interpretations. Whether Conrad's ambiguous 'style' was seen as "his most praiseworthy quality", or a negative quality, "a means of obfuscation, allowing [Conrad] to mask his nihilism or to maintain contradictory values, or both" (Brantlinger 1999: 192), the fact remains that the large number of interpretations all arose from Conrad's indirectness and vagueness. This vagueness is evident at three main levels:

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<sup>8</sup> This makes the background of Britain's Victorian time discussed earlier of more relevance than Belgium's although the incidents of the novel take place in Belgian Congo.

- 1) the framing and discrediting of narrators,
- 2) the linguistic ambiguity of the novel and
- 3) the symbolisms which the novel evokes.

To begin with, the type and depth of narrator framing which the various tales are composed of and subject to are particularly complicated. Apart from the author, there is a first anonymous narrator who is the initial source of the narration. He describes the story of Marlow, who in turn narrates a story in which he as well as other participants are characters, characters who also occasionally narrate their own experiences. This is best illustrated in the following manner:

Conrad [ First narrator [ Marlow (Nar) [ Marlow (Chr) and other characters ] ] ].

In addition, each and every stage of narration is shrouded with a high degree of narratorial discreditation. According to Parry (1983: 26), just as the speech of the anonymous first narrator “discredits the authority of the opinions he advances, so does Marlow’s narration draw attention to the lacunae and inconsistencies in his own outlook”. In other words, the distance created through the levels of narratorial framing is not the only form of indirectness in advancing the content of the novel and the issues involved; there is also direct doubt in the authority of the two framing and therefore filtering narrators as signalled by their own words.

Moreover, the language used in the novel, mainly at the semantic level, is also highly unspecific and, it seems, deliberately ambiguous. For instance, Marlow’s descriptions of the geographical locations in the book are almost always extremely vague. He is always seen travelling along “a formless, featureless coast, as if still in the making” (Conrad 1902: 37). This apparent reluctance in being explicit and specific in describing situations is further reinforced by Marlow’s joining of

disparities through his semantic choices. According to Parry (1983: 38-39) self-contradictory phrases like “abominable satisfactions”, “exalted degradation” and “diabolic love” also reflect Conrad’s unorthodox ways and are seen as overt signs of the novel’s “heterogeneous and incompatible meanings”. Such patterns lie at the root of Conrad’s ambiguous novel and partly justify the numerous and conflicting readings present.

Finally, there is a high degree of vagueness in the symbolisms the novel evokes. As Parry (1983: 20) suggests, the title of *Heart of Darkness* can be seen to signify “a geographical location, a metaphysical landscape and a theological category”. Even more specific and traditionally straightforward symbolisms are quite elusive. For instance, the symbolic terms ‘white’ and ‘light’ are used both in the long-established traditional sense to denote “truth, integrity, knowledge, decency and reason” (Parry 1983: 5) as well as, in a diametrically opposite sense in describing the clean white city of Brussels for instance which “is the place from where a rapacious colonialism is organised” and which serves as an emblem of avarice and an agent of corruption (Parry 1983: 20).

Accordingly, the outcomes of all these levels of complication ultimately manifested themselves in an array of analyses of the novel and the issues which it addressed. These covered a wide area of interpretations ranging from those which considered the book as “an attack on imperialism, a parable about the construction of ethical values, a mythic descent into primal underworld” as well as those viewing it as “a night journey into the unconscious self and a spiritual voyage towards transcendent knowledge” (Parry 1983: 20). However, apart from this abundance in the number of readings, a more significant aspect (from the point of view of this thesis) is that some analyses of the ideological issues in the novel are in fact in total opposition with each

other. For instance, *Heart of Darkness* has been interpreted as an attack on imperialism by some critics (Watts 1983; Said 1993), a racist defence of imperialism by others (Achebe 1997), or a mixture of both by still a third group (Watt 1979; Parry 1983). Ultimately, this disagreement in accounting for the ideological issues in the novel is attributed to the already discussed ambiguous style of Conrad. Hence, this ambiguity constitutes a central issue to address.

The first step towards approaching that topic is, in my view, by clarifying some terminological mix up. After acknowledging the key role Conrad's ambiguous language played in the generation of these conflicting interpretations, it is imperative not to confuse 'complexity' or 'ambiguity' with 'inconsistency'. These are very distinct matters in that the presence of the first two notions does not necessarily imply the presence of the third. The main question to answer in the upcoming analyses then becomes the following: Is there any contradiction and inconsistency in ideological involvement of Marlow the narrator, for instance, or is his involvement merely ambiguous? If it is a matter of ambiguity, which is the view argued for in this chapter, then a systematic examination of modality should help clarify the 'ambiguous' and 'complex' ideological positions of the character under study. If, on the other hand, it were a matter of inconsistency, then Marlow's dualistic position would emerge through the analysis.

Of course, at the heart of the problem is the difficulty in determining whose point of view is responsible for what information or set of events. Addressing this issue is also vital because a prerequisite to determining the ideologies attributed to one or another character is deciding whose point of view is responsible for filtering these positions (Weber 1989: 95). This is directly related to the above question of consistency and ambiguity since an apparent inconsistency in a character's ideology

could simply be the result of two intermeshing points of view rather than the dualistic standpoint of one character's perspective. In short, the upcoming analyses will approach two texts from *Heart of Darkness* bearing in mind the questions raised above:

- 1) whose point of view is responsible for the information (and by extension, the ideologies) presented,
- 2) are the ideologies put forward inconsistent and contradictory or merely complex and ambiguous, and
- 3) how does an examination of modality help clarify the ideological positions suggested?

As a result, the plan in the next section is to start by locating the modalised expressions in the texts and grouping them under the two modal scales reflecting the two main types of modality (epistemic and deontic). In doing that, a clearer systematic view of the *type* and *degree* of involvement and authority expressed by the different speakers in reflecting their ideological stances is arrived at. As discussed in the preceding chapter, the presence of epistemic modality would reflect, in various degrees, the speaker's certainty in the truth-value of the proposition s/he makes and therefore his/her various degrees of epistemic authority in presenting information as factual or as doubtful. On the other hand, the presence of deontic modality reflects the speaker's level of (interpersonal) power in relation to other participants. These strengths in positions are in turn related to the force of the ideologies communicated in each text.

### 5.3 Texts and Analyses

The two texts selected for analyses represent two different first encounters: a) between Marlow and Kurtz (text 1, see appendix 1), and b) between Marlow and the Intended (text 2B, see appendix 3). These are seen to demonstrate two very dissimilar interactions between modality and ideology. In comparison with each other, the first text is the more ambiguous one in terms of the directness in which the ideologies involved are communicated. In its depiction of Marlow's initial encounter with Kurtz, this first text suggests a possible contrast in Marlow's attitude towards Kurtz, on the one hand, and towards the natives, on the other, a feature which is worth investigation (see analysis below). At the face of it, the text seems to present a vague and inconsistent position adopted by Marlow towards both Kurtz and the natives. However, an analysis of the way modality functions in relation to the ideologies in the text helps produce a more coherent interpretation.

In the second text, ambiguity is not a major issue. However, the high frequency of modalised expressions signals a possible internal ideological struggle within Marlow as well as an external one between Marlow and the Intended. And it is these ideological struggles that occupy the focal point of the second analysis. By paying particular attention to the way modality functions, it becomes possible to provide a consistent reading and even a partial justification for some of Marlow's seemingly conflicting positions. Moreover, an analysis of modality reveals the dynamics of the power relations between the two characters highlighting the level of strength of each position and each character. In short, the main objective of the upcoming analyses is to show how a systematic analysis of modality does help clarify the dominant ideologies in a text irrespective of the level of ambiguity in that text.

### 5.3.1 Analysis 1

Two general points emerge at the onset of this first analysis in relation to the nature of the text under investigation. Initially, the almost total absence of deontic modality in the text implies that only one area of modal meaning is the dominant one. Effectively, this means that the type of speaker involvement present relates almost exclusively to reflecting that speaker's various degrees of certainty in the truth-value of the propositions expressed and the events and states described. Secondly, a division in point of view between Marlow the narrator and Marlow the participant (character) becomes apparent in the text. Both the effects of this branching in point of view as well as the consequences of the dominance of epistemic modality are quite significant in relating the ideologies communicated in the text. These are explained in detail later in the analysis and indicated in the table below (see table 1).

Overall, the main categories discussed in the analysis convey the speaker's different degrees of epistemic involvement. These respectively express the speaker's

- 1) certainty and commitment to the truth of the propositions,
- 2) lack of certainty and commitment to the truth of the propositions, and
- 3) detachment from the source of the propositions<sup>9</sup>.

The main division in the utterances grouped above seems to be almost exclusively between the highest and the lowest category on the epistemic scale with the majority under the Factuality end. There are indeed very few utterances under the Median and High categories. Under the Factuality branch of the epistemic scale are those utterances which reflect a categorical unmodalised certainty in the truth-value of the propositions and evaluations made. These emphasise the narrator's highest

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<sup>9</sup> The utterances that signal this category are the underlined verb phrases under the factuality branch of the epistemic scale.



degrees of epistemic force through his non-negotiable certainty in what he says. This forcefulness corresponds to the following three content areas: the natives and their actions (3, 23, 25), Kurtz’s appearance and actions (5, 10, 14, 15, 17, 18, 20, 22) and Marlow’s feelings and attitudes (6, 7, 12).

Low	Med	High	Factuality
4- ... <b>as if</b> petrified 8- ... <b>as if</b> to be at the mercy of that atrocious phantom had been a dishonouring necessity. 13- He <b>looked at</b> least seven feet long. 16- It was <b>as though</b> an animated image of death carved out of old ivory had been shaking its hand with menaces at a motionless crowd of men made of dark and glittering bronze. 19- <b>as though</b> he had wanted to swallow all the air, all the earth, all the men before him. 24- ... and <b>almost</b> at the same time ...	→→          →→	→→→  11- Kurtz- Kurtz- that means short in German- <b>don't it?</b>  ←←←  21- He <b>must have been</b> shouting	1- The bushes shook, the grass swayed for a time, 2- ... and then everything stood still in attentive immobility. 3- The knot of men with the stretcher had stopped... <b>→→→→→→→→→→</b> 5. <u>I saw</u> the man on the stretcher sit up, lank and with an uplifted arm, above the shoulders of the bearers. 6- ‘Let us hope that the man who can talk so well of love ... will find some particular reason to spare us this time,’ I said. 7- I resented bitterly the absurd danger of our situation... 9- <u>I could not hear</u> a sound, 10- ... but through my glasses <u>I saw</u> the thin arm extended commandingly, the lower jaw moving, the eyes of that apparition shining darkly far in its bony head that nodded with grotesque jerks. 12- Well, the name was as true as everything else in his life- and death. 14- His covering had fallen off, and his body had emerged from it pitiful and appalling as from a winding sheet. 15- <u>I could see</u> the cage of his ribs all astir, the bones of his arm waving. 17- <u>I saw</u> him open his mouth wide ... 18- it gave him a weirdly voracious aspect, ... 20- A deep voice reached me faintly. 22- He fell back suddenly. 23- The stretcher shook as the bearers staggered forward 25- <u>I noticed</u> that the crowd of savages was vanishing without any perceptible movement of retreat.

Table 1 representing Marlow’s authority on a scale of certainty

Yet even within that Factuality category, more than one attitude is projected. Starting with the simplest and briefest of all descriptions (relating to the natives), Marlow the narrator categorically describes them as “a knot of men” (3), “the bearers” (23) as well as “the crowd of savages” (25). These illustrations can carry more than one interpretation. On the one hand, they could suggest an overall negative attitude

towards the natives through describing them as men with 'savage' characteristics and tendencies. Here, by highlighting the savagery of the Africans and by portraying them as lacking in civilisation, Marlow indirectly emphasises the contrasting civilising power of imperialism. This juxtaposition encourages the reading that Marlow's negative attitude towards the natives portrays him as a sympathiser with imperialism, indirectly justifying the imperialist mission. On the other hand, the other possible interpretation of these descriptions would be that highlighting Marlow's mixed attitude towards the natives. In describing them as both 'men' and 'savages', Marlow simultaneously endows them with human and subhuman qualities. This would ultimately present Marlow either as the self-contradicting narrator or one projecting a dualistic attitude. Yet, as argued later, neither of these problematic views represents the reading arrived at through a comprehensive analysis of the way modality and ideology interacts in the text.

Again, similar potential inconsistencies reflect Marlow's representation of Kurtz. On the one hand, Kurtz is described as the "lank" "man on the stretcher" who is seen by Marlow to "sit up" with his arm "uplifted" probably in order to halt the movements of his bearers. Marlow's initial classing of Kurtz as a "man" is also reinforced by the other complementary images also placed under the Factuality end of the epistemic scale, thus reflecting Marlow's extreme certainty. These essentially recount all the components Kurtz the man is made of (arms, jaws, eyes, head, a body, rib cage, bones and a mouth) as well as a set of human-like dynamic movements and behaviours (Kurtz is a "man who can talk so well of love", he sits up, talks, extends his arm, moves his jaw, nods his head, waves his arm and opens his mouth). In short, two main area of focus in Marlow's categorical descriptions are the *active* and *manlike* qualities of Kurtz.

On the other hand, there are some actions surrounding Kurtz which portray him as an inactive, lethargic character. For instance, Kurtz's covering falls off and his body emerges from it without any attempt on his behalf to hold the cover. Also, Kurtz is seen to fall back suddenly, an action which also stresses Kurtz's inability to control his movements. And finally, even some of the more active human-like performances by Kurtz are rendered inactive through emphasising an alternative point of view. For instance, the act of shouting is not directly attributed to Kurtz since the dominant point of view is that of Marlow's ("a deep voice reached me faintly") (20).

Yet one consistent and indisputably clear set of evaluations and categorical descriptions is that relating to the malicious and negative nature of Kurtz and his actions. Kurtz's eyes shine "darkly", his head nods "with grotesque jerks" and his body emerges "pitiful and appalling" (10, 14). Such evaluations culminate with Marlow's portrayal of Kurtz as an "atrocious phantom"<sup>10</sup> (8) which deprives him of the human characteristics previously endowed with. This is further emphasised by Marlow's assessment of the situation that Kurtz inflicts upon him as not only 'dangerous' but also "absurd" thus deserving Marlow's expression of 'bitter' 'resentment' (7).

One possible interpretation for these mixed views is the following. In describing Kurtz as non-human, Marlow is asserting his negative attitude towards Kurtz, his actions and all the ideologies that he stands for. Yet at the same time, his reluctance to strip him completely of human characteristics reflects Marlow's stronger connection with Kurtz in contrast to that with the savage Africans. In this sense, it seems that although Marlow dislikes Kurtz, he indirectly acknowledges some sort of

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<sup>10</sup> Here, the use of the epistemic modal phrase "as if" refers more to a lack of certainty in describing the situation as a necessity. Yet although it does not necessarily doubt the evaluation of Kurtz as an "atrocious phantom", the metaphorical nature of the utterance explains its placement under the lower

bond with him, possibly a biological bond which he does not share with the natives. The two issues in the balance become Marlow's disagreement with Kurtz's deeds, on the one hand, and his bond with him at the human level, on the other. As these two are weighed against each other, the outcome is the mixed, non-committed attitude by the narrator.

All in all then, the picture drawn under the factuality branch of the epistemic scale relates to Marlow's utmost certainty in his evaluations of Kurtz as a man with all the active dynamic characteristics and components of a man, as well as his categorical evaluation of him as a non-human creature with inactive characteristics. Similarly, Marlow categorically describes the natives as "men" as well as "savages". In this sense, Marlow's attitude regarding Kurtz and the natives seems to be a struggle towards singularity in point of view. While Marlow cannot discount the human characteristics and qualities of Kurtz, he cannot but see his subhuman (or possibly his harmful superhuman) qualities and is therefore repulsed by him. Concurrently, his views of the natives seem to emphasise Marlow's dualistic position where, in seeing the natives simultaneously as men and savages, Marlow cannot disregard the savage subhuman nature of these, otherwise, human beings. This culminates in the only clearly unopposed attitude in the text: that of utter resentment of the situation as a whole. Such descriptions can only be interpreted as a suggestion of Marlow's dualistic position and lack of commitment to one consistent attitude.

Under the other main category, the Low end of the epistemic scale, is a set of modalised utterances expressing the speaker's lowest degrees of certainty regarding the following areas: the natives and their feelings (4, 16), Kurtz's appearance and

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end of the epistemic scale with the arrows pointing towards the factuality end symbolising the strength of the evaluation.

actions (13, 16, 19, 21) and Marlow's feelings (8, 11)<sup>11</sup>. One significant point to note is that the uncertainty in most of these utterances is coupled with, and partly springs from, their metaphorical nature. In other words, since the relationship of similarity between the two compared areas is not a direct one, the evaluations and descriptions are not literal ones, making the position of the speaker lower on the scale of certainty. These expressions are signalled by the use of the modal expression "as if" and "as though". However despite their indirectness, the argument made here is that these expressions still serve the purpose of reflecting the speaker's attitudes towards and evaluations of the issues involved.

Starting with the non-metaphorical modalised expressions, the first example (4) indicates Marlow's doubt in his judgement that the men were indeed "petrified". Although the strength of Marlow's position on the scale of certainty is relatively low, being unsure of the feelings of another entity is nothing unusual. In fact, rather than undermining the narrator's power of knowledge, this uncertainty only emphasises his credibility as a faithful reporter of events. In a similar fashion, Marlow seems to exaggerate Kurtz's height by describing him as "[looking] at least seven feet long" (13). Again, in reflecting the narrator's uncertainty of the height of Kurtz when this height is an exaggerated one, the modality in this utterance also seems to serve the purpose of making the speaker more reliable and stronger. Indeed, being categorical with such a description would achieve the opposite effect: that of shedding doubt on the credibility of the speaker since it is highly unlikely that Kurtz is in fact at least seven feet *tall* especially seen from that distance. At the same time, this exaggeration allows for the extra dimension of interpretation. It suggests the non-human characteristics of Kurtz through depicting him as someone with abnormal height. In

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<sup>11</sup> The italicised numbers reflect the utterances falling under the High category of the epistemic scale.

other words, the use of the modalised expression coupled with the use of exaggeration here serves the double purpose of presenting Marlow as a truthful reliable source while at the same time allowing his hinting at the non-human characteristics of Kurtz, thus revealing Marlow's attitude towards Kurtz. This interpretation falls perfectly in line with subsequent expressions.

In the next set, modality is used as a tool in aiding a metaphorical description and evaluation of three successive situations. In its metaphorical use, modality is a tool facilitating the comparison of two objects or situations where the relationship of similarity is an implicit one. In its epistemic use, it signals the speaker's degree of involvement on a scale of certainty in the (metaphorical) judgements and evaluations he makes.

The first utterance, ("as if to be at the mercy of that atrocious phantom had been a dishonouring necessity") (8), primarily underlines Marlow's doubt that the situation at hand is a necessity. Yet this utterance involves several evaluations. For instance, there is the metaphorical description of Kurtz as an "atrocious phantom". This picture is seen to signal an implicit relationship of similarity between Kurtz and the entity he is being compared to. Through doing that, I argue, the strength of Marlow's negative feelings towards Kurtz are accentuated since using a metaphorical utterance in this situation clusters and concentrates several layers of negative associations in extremely concise form. Such a metaphor evokes a set of negative associations far wider in referential (denotational and connotational) scope than can be expressed in the two words used. Some of the more obvious attributes linked with the word "phantom" in this context would be both the skeleton-thin features as well as the non-human ghostly associations. Yet there is also a set of negative symbolic references to the word "phantom" which are beyond this specific context, all of which

are evoked through the use of the metaphor. Together with the other evaluation of the situation as “dishonouring”, Marlow’s negative attitude towards Kurtz and the situation he is placed in are further intensified.

Another issue is the area covered by the use of the modalised expression “as if”. In my view, the uncertainty of the modal expression “as if” relates more to the description of the situation as “dishonouring” and less to the description of Kurtz as “an atrocious phantom”. In other words, Kurtz’s portrayal as “an atrocious phantom” is stronger on the epistemic scale than Marlow’s assessment of that situation as necessary. Hence, this utterance emphasises Marlow’s categorical negative attitude towards Kurtz, his resentment of the situation he is in and his doubt in the necessity of the situation. This is indicated by the use of arrows signifying the movement of the utterance on the whole towards the stronger end of the epistemic scale thus reflecting the possible variation in interpreting the utterance as a stronger form of modality than it initially appears to be.

The next two metaphorical utterances (16, 19) differ from the first one in that the modal expressions cover all levels of the situation described and evaluated. The utterance “It was as though an animated image of death carved out of old ivory had been shaking its hand with menaces at a motionless crowd of men made of dark and glittering bronze” suggests the following interpretation. To begin with, the metaphorical modalised utterance in this instance emphasises the reliability and credibility of Marlow, the source of the evaluation, while at the same time revealing Marlow’s attitude towards Kurtz. In using a modalised expression, Marlow is further accentuating the non-literal metaphorical association between Kurtz and “an animated image of death”. Yet at the same time, the correlation between Kurtz and “death” from the narrator’s perspective highlights the latter’s negative projected attitude.

Extending this line of argument to the other sections of the utterance, Marlow also seems to express doubt in some aspects of the “shaking [of the] hand” as well as some aspects of the “motionless crowd of men made of dark and glittering bronze”. By focusing on the aspect of ‘dynamism’, placing these two in contrastive juxtaposition accentuates the differences between Kurtz and the natives from the narrator’s perspective. This is reflected in Marlow’s position of doubt concerning any dynamic characteristic of Kurtz which is juxtaposed with his doubt of the static nature of the men as ‘motionless’ and their idol-like composition ‘made of dark and glittering bronze’. Here, in doubting Kurtz’s dynamism and the natives’ lack of dynamism, Marlow indirectly achieves the opposite effects; i.e. emphasising the staticness of Kurtz as opposed to the dynamism of the natives.

Again, a similar interpretation can be conferred on utterance 19 (“as though he had wanted to swallow all the air, all the earth, all the men before him”). Here, the use of the metaphorical modalised expression also stresses the reliability of the source of this evaluation as well as the depiction of Kurtz’s uncontrollably gluttonous desires. By extension, Kurtz is portrayed as a voracious character willing to do anything and everything to achieve his egotistical goals.

In short, the utterances placed under the modalised categories of the epistemic scale seems to present a very consistent picture of Kurtz and the natives as opposed to those under the Factuality end of the scale. Yet despite this partial uniformity, the overall pictures drawn of Kurtz and of the natives in the text as a whole is still an incoherent one. While Kurtz is described by Marlow as a man with human characteristics, he is also portrayed as a non-human character. Again, he is seen both as an active dynamic character as well as an inactive one. Similarly, the natives appear to be represented as the active/inactive, men/savages. At this level of analysis,



it seems that Marlow is indeed presenting a self-contradictory dualistic standpoint regarding the issues at hand. It follows that his attitudes towards the ideological issues of colonialism and imperialism (symbolised by Kurtz) also waver from support and justification to resentment and repulsion. As argued above, being repelled from the savage natives while exhibiting an indirect bond with Kurtz (the man) suggests his acceptance of imperialism's civilising mission. At the same time, in portraying Kurtz as a non-human character who is less active than the natives suggests Marlow's comparative closeness to the natives and therefore his rejection of the need for imperialism. This is underlined by his resentment of the non-human, static Kurtz and his evil deeds.

Yet this apparent discrepancy, I argue, only reflects the ambiguity in the text rather than the dualistic position of the narrator. Accounting for one additional structural pattern in the text within a slightly variant grouping of the utterances involved allows a clarification of the situation. As mentioned earlier, a third category can be highlighted in reflecting the speaker's involvement in the content of his discourse. This category is signalled by a conspicuously frequent structural pattern in this text: the first person singular pronoun 'I' followed by a perception verb 'see, hear, and notice'; i.e. I + perception verb + embedded clause structure.

The overwhelming frequency, and therefore foregrounding, of the structure under discussion can in my view achieve several effects in this context. Firstly, since the embedded clause serves as the grammatical object of the perception verb with 'I' as the subject, the role of the grammatical subject of the embedded sentence becomes secondary in terms of the dominant point of view. For instance, in the utterance "I saw the man on the stretcher sit up", although "the man" is the grammatical subject of the verb "sit up", "the man" is head of the sentence serving as the grammatical object

of the verb “saw,” the subject of which is “I”. In other words, the dominant viewpoint is that of the entity to which the first person singular pronoun refers. Consequently, one of the possible effects of this structural recurrence is highlighting the perspective of the speaker (which at this level could be either Marlow the narrator or Marlow the character).

Secondly, by subjectifying the source of these descriptions, a dominant interpretation of this repetition could be one of emphasis as to the *realism* of these events and the credibility of the speaker. Such emphasis arises from foregrounding structural patterns which link the perceiver of these events to their reporter. In that, the objective behind repeating the utterances “I saw” and “I heard” would be to possibly stress and ultimately persuade the narratees of the realism of the narrated events. And this is quite common in situations when the reported events are bizarre to a point where they require such repetitive weight to stress their realism.

Finally, the third possible effect and interpretation that may arise out of this type of foregrounding is that of *distance*. The pattern discussed above could be seen to serve as a dividing line between the one doing the seeing and the one reporting it. Instead of directly describing the events in the following manner (the man on the stretcher sat up, his thin arm extended commandingly, the lower jaw moving, the eyes of that apparition shining darkly far in its bony head that nodded with grotesque jerks, the cage of his ribs all astir, the bones of his arm waving, he opened his mouth wide, the crowd of savages was vanishing without any perceptible movement of retreat), there is an insertion of the first person pronoun and a perception verb making the involvement of the narrator more explicit.

Looking at the utterances under discussion within the context of situation, the next step is to query the most probable justification for this structural shift. This signal

to an explicit and direct narrator involvement through the shift from the objective realism of third-person narration to first-person narration makes Marlow (the narrator) the explicit and undisputed centre of focalisation.

Yet the set of events and evaluations reported as part of this structure do not reflect any unusual situation. These are merely seen to refer to the human actions of Kurtz, a weak and thin man, and to a group natives labelled as savages. In short, there are no inconceivable peculiarities about the events described which justify such consistent and persistent emphasis.

It therefore follows that the most convincing interpretation for the possible effects of the recurrence of the “I saw” and “I heard” pattern would be to underline the split in point of view between Marlow the narrator and Marlow the character. Doing that would emphasise the faithfulness of Marlow the narrator in truthfully reporting what Marlow the character witnessed without committing himself ideologically (as a narrator). The direct interference of the narrator shifts the centre of focalisation, redirecting the reference of the act of perception from the here/now of Marlow the narrator to the there/then of Marlow the character. In that, by highlighting the role of the character who does the seeing, the narrator is emphasising the detachment between the person *doing* the seeing and the one *reporting* the seeing. Knowing that all of these utterances only describe Kurtz as a “man” doing actions that are characteristic of human beings, I would argue that Marlow the narrator wishes to express his detachment at the ideological level from Marlow the character seeing Kurtz as human in any form. In that light, a more consistent reading of the text emerges.

These three groups of utterances draw an extremely uniform image reflecting the narrator’s standpoint. His attitude towards Kurtz is clarified as that expressing his

highest degree of categorical certainty in seeing Kurtz as inhuman, doubt in his humanity, and detachment from anyone (including himself at an earlier time) regarding Kurtz as human. At the same time, while Marlow (the narrator) is certain of Kurtz's inactivity, he is uncertain of his activity and detached from Marlow (the character) perceiving Kurtz as active. The narrator's attitude can be clearly summarised as that of 'bitter resentment' of the situation (an 'absurdly dangerous' and "dishonouring" situation) which someone or something (a "phantom") as "atrocious", 'pitiful', and "appalling" as Kurtz, someone as incapable of any action (apart from evil deeds) as Kurtz, someone not even once described categorically as a "man" is putting him through.

This now apparent reluctance in categorically describing Kurtz as a man is contrasted by Marlow's descriptions of the natives as "men". Again, although described a lot less often than Kurtz is, a similar uniformity in views is highlighted in the form of the narrator's certainty of the natives' activity and his uncertainty in their inactivity ("motionless" crowd of men). Concurrently, the narrator is emphatically portraying the natives as active men while detaching himself from the view suggesting their inactivity and savagery.

By clarifying these binary divisions, Marlow's ideological positions become more obvious. On the one hand, Marlow's extremely negative attitude towards Kurtz, at all the possible levels, represents his rejection of, or at least his distance from, the imperial mission that Kurtz stands for. On the other hand, his positive attitude towards the natives reflects his closeness and sympathy towards their ordeal which is largely due to and arising from the imposition(s) of the colonial world. As argued earlier, Marlow's ambiguous position neither represents an inconsistent nor a dualistic one. And this reading was possible only after considerable pragmatic-functional analysis of

the system of modality in the text and how it functions in relation to the ideologies in that text.

### 5.3.2 Analysis 2

In the above analysis, the targets of examination were the implicitness and ambiguities of ideologies in text 1. In the following text, however, the effects of the high frequency of modalised expressions do not extensively correspond with ambiguity in interpretation. Rather, they signal the ideological struggles and the dynamics of the power relations between the two participants in the text. As a result, the target of the upcoming analysis relates to the role modality plays in reflecting the dynamics of the interaction between the two participants and how that largely determines the ideological positions of each participant.

As mentioned earlier, there are two main conflicting ideological positions: the first surfaces through the dialogue between Marlow and the Intended (text 2A, see appendix 2), while the other is reflected through Marlow's internal thoughts (text 2B, see appendix 3). These ideological disparities intermingle throughout the passage, yet for ease of analysis, the text is divided into two sections reflecting these main poles. Making this division is helpful from a practical perspective in that each section is respectively the closest pure representation of the Intended's and of Marlow's ideological positions. This ultimately makes the analysis of each text more consistent for later comparison and contrast.

Starting with text 2A, and placing the modalised utterances under the epistemic and deontic scales, the following pictures emerge (see tables 2, 3, 4, and 5). In tables 2 and 3 we see an extremely positive image of Kurtz drawn by his Intended and represented at the highest levels of authority (both certainty and obligation). This

image is not disputed by Marlow (in tables 4 and 5) although in text 2B, it is apparent that Marlow strongly disagrees with her. This raises a familiar question: why does Marlow not openly object or stop her when he shows his disapproval of what she is saying in 2B? Is, in other words, the absence of his explicit protest an indication of his dualistic position, an internal struggle of indecisiveness and lack of ideological affiliation, and does this explain his lie at the end of the text? This I argue can be better clarified by looking at the way modality reflects the power relations in the interaction between Marlow and the Intended. In my view, one of the main reasons for the manner by which the conversation proceeds is the uneven power relation between the two participants. This becomes quite explicit through analysing the use of modality in each of the participants' utterances.

Generally, the Intended's words (see table 2) are seen to communicate the following information in the following manner. She expresses the highest degrees of certainty in portraying Kurtz as a "noble" and 'great' person whose "goodness shone in every act," who has immortal words, "vast plans" and who attracts "men by what is best in them". He is a man that one would be "proud" to be "worthy of", and she strongly believes that she knows Kurtz better than anyone else. All of these evaluations and descriptions of Kurtz are presented under the highest degree of certainty. From her perspective, therefore, there is no dispute concerning these issues.

Yet looking more closely at the factuality branch of the epistemic scale, it becomes apparent that the utterances grouped there generally fall into three main categories. First, there are those which relate to the Intended's highest degrees of certainty concerning what *she* knows and feels. Then there are others which reflect her position towards what *Kurtz* wanted and how great he was. But most interestingly, there are utterances which strangely enough pertain to *Marlow's* internal processes.

Low	Median	High	Factuality
10- I feel I can speak to you 26- I could not perhaps under- stand 43- perhaps no one to hear...	3- <u>it was impossible to know him and not to admire him.</u> <u>Was it?</u>  9- you must have been (his friend), if he had given you this and sent you to me          44- <u>don't you understand?</u>	4- ( <u>it was impossible not to</u> ) <u>love him.</u> <u>→→→</u> 15- <u>who was not his friend who had heard him speak once?</u> <u>→→→</u> 23- <u>It is impossible that all this should be lost – that such a life should be sacrificed to leave nothing- but sorrow.</u> <u>→→→</u> 28- <u>something must remain</u>  38- I would have treasured every sigh, every word, every sign, every glance 42- nobody near him to understand him the way I would have understood	→→→→→→ 1- you knew him well 2- you admired him 5- no one knew him so well as I 6- I had all his noble confidence 7- I knew him best 8- you were his friend →→→→→→ 11- you who have heard his last word 12- I have been worthy of him 13- I am proud to know I understood him better than anyone on earth 14- he told me so himself 16- he drew men by what was best in them 17- it is the gift of the great 18- you have heard him 19- you know 20- what a loss to me – to us! To the world. 21- I have been happy ... and now I'm unhappy for life 22- nothing remains but memory 24- you know what vast plans he had 25- I knew of them too 27- others know of them 29- his words at least have not died 30- men looked up to him 31- his goodness shone in every act →→→→→→ 32- but I do not. 33- I cannot believe. I cannot believe [that I shall never see him again, that nobody will see him again] 34- he died as he lived 35- and I was not with him 36- I believed in him more than... 37- he needed me →→→→→→ 39- I have mourned so long in silence 40- you were with him- to the last? 41- I think of his loneliness 45- I loved him – I loved him – I loved him 46- I knew it 47- I was sure

Table 2 representing the Intended’s authority on a scale of certainty in 2A.

The most curious examples of the third set are the following categorical statements: “you knew him well” (1) and “and you admired him” (2). Normally, the unmarked syntactic structure for such utterances would be the interrogative and not the declarative form since the Intended only assumes that this information is true

(which in fact are incorrect assumptions). However, using the interrogative structure would portray her as someone lacking in knowledge which considerably weakens her position. This, of course, does not correspond with the overall objectives of her mission which, I argue, seem to be more a matter of seeking confirmations of her views rather than a matter of authentic enquiry. The forcefulness and power of her positions spring from her certainty that she knows everything related to Kurtz. Therefore, in order to ensure that the outcome of that enquiry falls in line with her expectations, the Intended asks using statements. Even when Marlow's reply is probably a hesitant one ("it was impossible not to..."), she gladly completes his statements with what she wants to hear ("... love him").

The strength of her position continues even with utterances of non-factuality. She is quite certain about what she would have done if she had been given the chance to. Utterances like, "I would have treasured every sigh ..." and "I would have understood him", I argue, carry the force of a conditional but unfulfilled prediction, thus falling under the High end of the epistemic scale. The fact that the conditions for the fulfilment of these statements were non-existent, and the fact that such conditionally-bound events did not happen as a result do not in any way undermine her certainty. In reality, the only reason that these utterances are not factual is that they did not happen and not that they lack the forcefulness or strength. This interpretation is reflected through the arrow movements which point towards the Factuality end of the scale.

Moreover, other sets of utterances placed under the Median and High branches of the epistemic scale (and distinguished by underlining) are doubly forceful in that they allow for both a deontic and an epistemic interpretation. Even with some of the utterances grouped under the weaker Median category of the epistemic scale, the



Intended's approach to extracting information from Marlow is still quite forceful. This is the case since many of these utterances are extensions of other unmodalised expressions. For example, the Intended starts with the factual utterances "you knew him well" (1) and "you admired him" (2) and then concludes with a sweeping generalisation linking the first to the second "it was impossible to know him and not to admire him" (3). She therefore constructs a necessary and sufficient condition between knowing him and admiring him, and later on, loving him. Such generalisations, I argue, set solid and specific norms which indirectly place considerable pressure on the participants in that conversation to be integrated in that norm.

However, the reason this relatively strong utterance is placed under the Median branch of the epistemic scale is the presence of the tag question "was it?" which indicates some degree of weakness on behalf of the speaker. It seems, therefore, that there are two forces working in opposition in this utterance: the almost categorical strength springing from the absence of possibility in the compatibility of the two conditions, and the relative uncertainty of the tag question. The outcome of these two non-complementary forces is represented by placing this utterance under the Median branch of the epistemic scale with the arrows going all the way to the Factuality end of the scale. The arrow movement signifies the strength of the Intended's utterances and position as well as allowing for an array of interpretations falling within the arrow's parameters.

In fact, this example perfectly demonstrates the deficiency in assigning one definitive interpretation and position for the force of a modalised utterance. Here, this specific utterance exhibits two kinds of indeterminacy<sup>12</sup>: that reflecting the *type* of

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<sup>12</sup> The first kind of indeterminacy is tackled under the discussion of table 5.

speaker involvement on the epistemic-deontic scales, and that reflecting the *degree* of speaker involvement on the low-high end of each scale. Yet at the same time, this indeterminacy does not suggest that any subjective interpretation stands. There are limits on the degree of variation within the epistemic scale in that it is extremely hard to justify an interpretation which claims that this utterance communicates low modality.

As discussed in Chapter Four, the partial subjectivity which characterises interpreting such utterances reflects both the flexibility of subjective interpretation and the rigidity of contextual restrictions on this subjectivity. The interface between these two seemingly opposing forces ensures the pragmatic nature of the approach in that there is room for a limited variation in the analysis of a text without distorting the overall picture (as becomes evident later). It also emphasises the view that the utterances under investigation acquire their effects from the contextually-bound functions they serve both at the communicative and ideological levels more than from the semantic correspondence of the modal expression used.

A similar strength of effect is achieved by the rhetorical question, “who was not his friend who had heard him speak once?” (15). Again, although this utterance is placed under the High branch since it expresses a necessary-sufficient condition (if you had heard him speak once, then you were necessarily his friend), its strength seems to exceed that category as shown by the arrow movement. Like earlier expressions, this utterance seems to have the strength of a generic factual statement with the force of imposing what is considered as the norm.

Finally, what the Intended feels the least confident about is her ability to speak to Marlow and her ability to understand Kurtz’s vast and complicated plans. Here, the main cue for placing these utterances under the low modality branch is the presence of

the sensory verb “feel” and the evaluative adverb “perhaps”. It is not the effect achieved by the auxiliary “can” since can of ability does not reflect any form of uncertainty and is therefore not treated as an epistemic modal verb. This view explains the reason the utterance “I cannot believe that I shall never see him again ...” (33) is placed under factuality since it reflects the speaker’s highest degree of certainty in her inability to accept the permanent absence of Kurtz. It follows that the Intended’s attitude towards Kurtz remains quite positive and consistent even in those cases where she expresses the least certainty. These statements, I argue, do not contradict her overall position since her only doubt is towards her own ability to understand Kurtz’s vast plans but not his character. In fact, these achieve the conforming effect of elevating Kurtz’s status to that endowed with superior intelligence.

These positions are consolidated and confirmed by looking at the way modalised utterances function under the deontic scale. Here, the Intended is not only forceful in presenting what she knows, but also in what she wants to know from Marlow and what she wants Marlow to know (see table 3).

Low	Med	High	Command
		1- <u>it was impossible to know him and not to admire him</u> 2- <u>(it was impossible not to) love him</u> 3- I <b>must</b> speak 5- <u>who was not his friend who had heard him speak once?</u> 6- <u>it is impossible</u> that all this <u>should be lost</u> 7- that such a life <u>should be lost</u> 8- something <b>must</b> remain 10- <u>don't you understand?</u>	4- I want you to know →→→→ 9- forgive me 11- repeat them  →→→→

Table 3 representing the Intended’s authority on a scale of obligation in 2A.

The one threatening uncertainty she had earlier (doubting her ability to speak to Marlow), she immediately endorses with a subsequent expression of high necessity

and self-obligation (“I must speak”), an obligation initiated by her love for Kurtz which drives her to impose it on Marlow rather than share it with him. The use of this structural formation as in “I must speak” (3) and in “I want you to know” (4) to communicate self-obligation and desire, is, I argue, the strongest pragmatically acceptable forms. The only stronger deontic forms would be the use of the pragmatically inappropriate imperative form such as “\*speak ...” in reference to herself and “\*know that ...” in reference to Marlow. The Intended is in fact utilising the most powerful means to express her views, and this is represented by the use of arrows for utterances 3 and 10 which move towards the Command end of the deontic scale.

Moreover, as mentioned above, some of the utterances (the underlined ones) originally placed under the epistemic scale are also placed under the deontic scale. This results in an additional dimension of force being conferred upon these expressions. For instance, utterance (1) which has an almost generic force in its epistemic interpretation (knowing him necessarily meant that one admired him) can also carry deontic force in such an interpretation as (knowing him forced/obliged one to admire him). Most importantly, the blatant force of such statements is persistent irrespective of Marlow’s position. As argued later, the power of the Intended’s ideological position is transferred not to what Marlow says, but to what the Intended has made him say.

The last set of forceful utterances, grouped under the High category of the deontic scale, relates to the Intended’s refusal to accept the loss of all Kurtz’s great life. These culminate with the utterance “something must remain” (8) whose deontic interpretation suggests her decision to actively ensure that something does indeed remain. The deontic interpretation of these utterances would emphasise the Intended’s

resolution not to allow “all of this” (6) and “such a life” (7) to be lost<sup>13</sup>, a position strong enough to have the force of not only obligation, but also insistence, almost a command.

In short, the Intended’s use of modality in her utterances only serves one purpose: the unconditional exaltation of Kurtz. All her words are an exclusive reflection of how noble a man she feels and knows Kurtz is, and how desolate she is for his loss. The overwhelming numbers of factual utterances and high epistemic and deontic modality also reflect how heroic she believes everyone else feels Kurtz is, and how they *must* feel (both necessity and obligation). In this, she is both consciously and unconsciously forcing her position on the only participant in the dialogue: Marlow. Ironically, her confidence is built on partial ignorance. Her certainty (“I knew it – I was sure”) is based on a lie.

Marlow’s utterances in 2A therefore reflect his position as a passive recipient, or possibly someone who agrees with all the Intended says. However, as discussed above, the forceful nature of the Intended’s discourse favours the view that Marlow’s words reflect almost exactly what he is forced to say without any overt attempt for resistance. In his very limited words, overshadowed completely by the Intended’s, he faithfully rehearses all she wants to hear. The only noticeable attempt for resistance is in table 5 through the utterance “don’t” (3). This indication of his desire for her to bring to a complete halt whatever she is doing, whether feeling sorry for Kurtz or simply talking about Kurtz the way she is, is the strongest suggestion of resistance. However, this utterance is unacknowledged, misinterpreted or simply unnoticed by the Intended.

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<sup>13</sup> The way I interpreted the use of the negative + permission (or prohibition) here is that it would have the same force as obligation. ‘Not allowed to’ would be interpreted as ‘obliged not to’.

Low	Med	High	Factuality
		4- it <u>was impossible</u> not to ... 7- we <u>shall</u> always remember him 8- his words <u>will remain</u>	1- intimacy grows quickly out there 2- I knew him as well as it is possible for one man to know another 3- he was a remarkable man 5- you knew him best 6- yes I know 9- his end was in every way worthy of his life 10- I heard his very last words 11- the last word he pronounced was your name

Table 4 representing Marlow’s authority on a scale of certainty in 2A.

Low	Med	High	Command
		1- it <u>was impossible</u> not to... 2- his words <u>will remain</u>	3- don’t

Table 5 representing Marlow’s authority on a scale of obligation in 2A.

In conclusion, the analysis of text 2A suggests the overwhelming strength of the Intended’s discourse in comparison with Marlow’s. By analysing the way modality is utilised by both speakers, the dominant role of the Intended in the dialogue becomes apparent, thus suggesting one possible explanation for why Marlow reacts the way he does. Through the high level of authority she has in what she says which is reflected in both uses of modality (i.e. her degree of certainty about her knowledge and beliefs on the one hand, and her power in communicating obligation and duty at the interpersonal level), she easily dominates the conversation, forcing her views on Marlow who in response seems to occupy the role of a passive recipient both through the quantity and quality of what he says. Moreover, the Intended’s use of modality not only reflects her strong feelings of love and respect for Kurtz, but also her strong positions regarding what she believes Kurtz stands for, the ideologies he

represents. However, as discussed in detail in the next section, this does not suggest that Marlow accepts her views.

In the second section of the text (2B), Marlow's views seem to be in direct opposition with those of the Intended's discussed above. Placing the utterances on the epistemic scale of certainty (since deontic modality is generally absent in 2B), the main division in the categorisation of these utterances seems to be between those reflecting the highest and lowest degrees of certainty. The following picture then emerges (see table 6).

Looking at the factuality branch of the epistemic scale, it seems that Marlow is experiencing a set of conflicting feelings. On the one hand, he is repeatedly angered ("appalling", "dull anger") by the Intended's forceful remarks which impel him into saying something he disagrees with and which cause him to feel the room growing darker and darker. On the other hand, her radiating "smooth" and "white" forehead "illuminated by an inextinguishable light of belief and love" together with her deep "pain" gives him an overwhelming "feeling of pity". Therefore, while he feels infuriated by her strong remarks, he cannot help but respectfully bow his "head before the faith that was in her". This mixed position portrays Marlow as someone on the verge of exhibiting a dualistic non-committed attitude: a simultaneous self-contradictory acceptance and rejection, anger and pity towards an embodiment of a set of ideologies he is faced with.

Yet these two potentially contradictory attitudes are not coexistent. In fact, arranging both (what he is certain of and what he is uncertain of) in chronological order, a very consistent interpretation emerges. Marlow seems to move from questioning what he is uncertain of to relying on what he is certain of and what he sees. When he entertains the thought that The Intended might actually know Kurtz the

way he does, it stirs a feeling of anger in him. When, however, Marlow is certain that she is ignorant of Kurtz's deeds, his anger turns to pity. The result is that he decides not to tell her the truth. Based on what he now knows and feels, he is able to predict his inability to defend her from the darkness that accompanies her possible knowledge of the truth. He lies.

Comparing the Intended's way of communicating her ideas to Marlow's, two completely opposite senses which reflect completely different ways of viewing the world, or different ideologies emerge. The Intended appears to be totally dependent on her own internal interpretation of the way the world is as the source of reality. Her starting point is the certainty of her beliefs ("you knew him well", "you admired him", "you were his friend") and based on them, she makes assumptions about the external world. Her strategies to achieving her desired effects are the following. On the one hand, she starts by a generalisation ("it was impossible to know him and not to admire him") forcing her view of the world on others and then makes sure she has achieved her goal ("was it?"). On the other hand, she starts by making sure she has the consent of the other participant in the dialogue ("you must have been his friend if he had given you this and sent you to me") and then generalises based on that consent ("who was not his friend who had heard him speak once?"). Both ways, the starting point is her own worldview and the final point is a forcing of her ideologies. It follows that in her mind, everything that Kurtz represented is noble in every sense. As Hawthorn (1990: 182, 184) argues, the Intended plays the role of "the preserver of idealism" not knowing the effects of this "corrupting alliance with imperialism". All her conclusions are therefore based on simple ignorance.



Low	Med	High	Factuality
<p>3-that <b>seemed</b> to watch for more words on my lips</p> <p>5-<b>perhaps</b> she did (know Kurtz)</p> <p>9-I <b>was not even sure</b> I had given her the right bundle</p> <p>10-I <b>rather suspect</b> he wanted me to take care of another batch of his papers</p> <p>14-he wasn't rich enough <b>or something</b></p> <p>15-and <b>indeed I don't know</b> whether he had been a pauper all his life</p> <p>18-and the sound of her low voice <b>seemed</b> to have the accompaniment of all the other sounds full of mystery, desolation, and sorrow...</p> <p>19-I said <b>with something like despair</b> in my heart</p> <p>26-her fair hair <b>seemed</b> to catch all the remaining light</p> <p>37-I felt <b>like a chill</b> grip on my chest</p> <p>44-whisper that <b>seemed</b> to swell menacingly</p> <p>51-it <b>seemed to me</b> that the house <b>would collapse</b> before I could escape, that the heavens <b>would fall</b> upon my head</p> <p>54-<b>would</b> they have fallen <b>if</b> I had rendered Kurtz that justice which was his due</p>	<p>16-he had given me <b>some reason to infer</b> that it was his im-patience of com-parative poverty that drove him out there</p> <p>43-<b>don't you hear</b> them?</p> <p>→→→</p> <p>→→→</p> <p>→→→</p> <p>→→→</p>	<p>21-the triumphant darkness from which I <b>could not have defended</b> her</p> <p>22-from which I <b>could not have even defended myself</b></p> <p>24bof tears that <b>would not fall</b></p> <p>33-I <b>shall</b> see his eloquent phantom as long as I live</p> <p>→→→</p> <p>34-I <b>shall</b> see her too a tragic and familiar Shade resembling another one, tragic also and bedecked with powerless charms</p> <p>42-i was <b>on the point of crying</b> at her</p> <p>56-i <b>could not tell</b> her</p> <p>57-it <b>would have been</b> too dark...</p>	<p>1-I said unsteadily</p> <p>2-before the appealing fixity of her gaze</p> <p>4-she finished eagerly, silencing me into an appalling dumbness</p> <p>6-the room was growing darker and only her forehead, smooth and white remained illuminated by the inextinguishable light of belief and love</p> <p>7-I listened</p> <p>8-the darkness deepened</p> <p>11-after his death, I saw the manager examining (the papers)</p> <p>12-the girl talked, easing her pain in the certitude of my sympathy</p> <p>13-I had heard that her engagement with Kurtz had been disapproved by her people</p> <p>17-she looked at me with intensity</p> <p>20-bowing my head before the faith that was in her, before the great and saving illusion that shone with an unearthly glow</p> <p>→→→→→→→→</p> <p>23-she corrected herself with beautiful generosity</p> <p>24-I could see the glitter in her eyes full of tears-</p> <p>25-she stood up</p> <p>27-I stood up too</p> <p>→→→→→→→→</p> <p>28-she went on mournfully</p> <p>29-I said hastily</p> <p>30-she put her arms out...</p> <p>31-never see him again! (irony)</p> <p>32-I saw him clearly enough then</p> <p>35-said I, with dull anger stirring in me</p> <p>36-my anger subsided before a feeling of infinite pity</p> <p>38-I said in a muffled voice</p> <p>39-I said shakily</p> <p>40-I stopped in a fright</p> <p>41-she murmured in a heart-broken tone</p> <p>45-she insisted</p> <p>46-I pulled myself together and spoke slowly</p> <p>47-I heard a light sigh and my heart stood still, stopped dead short by an exulting and terrible cry of inconceivable triumph and unspeakable pain</p> <p>48-she knew, she was sure (irony)</p> <p>49-I heard her weeping</p> <p>50-she had hidden her face in her hands</p> <p>52-but nothing happened</p> <p>53-the heavens do not fall for such a trifle</p> <p>55-hadn't he said he wanted only justice</p>

Table 6 representing Marlow’s authority on a scale of certainty in 2B.

In Marlow's case, the opposite is true. While his position towards the Intended is reflected through the changes in his feelings, his position towards Kurtz is left unchanged. Just like the previous text, the descriptions associated with Kurtz and his deeds are either directly or metaphorically negative. However, Marlow neither forces his position on the Intended nor is he forced to change his position towards Kurtz. This is evident since his audience on board of *The Nellie* (and by extension, the reader) knows that what he decides to tell the Intended is a lie. This last decision to lie is in direct relation with the preceding utterance "[rendering] Kurtz that justice which was his due" (54). His words "I could not tell her" (56) signal his inability (I was unable to tell her) or the impossibility (it was not possible for me to tell her) of the fulfilment of the act suggesting that telling her was beyond him. Overall, both interpretations reinforce Marlow's doubt that telling her would in fact achieve justice. At that point, justice was already lost. The Intended's knowledge of reality would not make Kurtz pay for his crimes. Only she will.

## 5.4 Conclusions

In this chapter, the main objective was to present the first of three practical applications of the framework proposed in Chapter Four. The specific targets for analysis were two *literary* passages, and the aim was to show how, as long as literary texts address ideological issues (presupposing that all texts are ideological), these texts could be approached using this pragmatic-functional framework.

Firstly, the dominant historical, social, scientific and religious ideologies of the period were considered. The aim was to set the ideological backgrounds against which or based on which the novel departs. The period was seen to be one of *change* and therefore the altering ideologies of the period were of considerable magnitude. It

was argued that these altering ideologies were adequately captured in the novel, and this partially explains the ambiguity in positions communicated in the texts. Unlike previous views that that altering ideologies imply a dualistic position and consequently an inconsistent ideology in the text, an analysis of the way modality is utilised in the two texts suggested otherwise. It was concluded that while the two texts were indeed ambiguous, these ambiguities were not seen as signs of duality or inconsistency in positions. By relating the way modality functions in association with ideology, it was seen that, in the first text, Marlow exhibited a highly consistent position and attitude regarding characters and issues involved. His position towards Kurtz and what Kurtz symbolically stands for was seen as standing in stark contrast with his position towards the natives and what they represent. In fact, at one point, it was argued that Marlow even tries to distance himself as a narrator from an earlier image of himself as a character in the story he narrates. All this was seen to fall into one consistent reading of Marlow's positions at the ideological level.

More specifically, in completely rejecting the image of Kurtz as human or active, Marlow points out the inhuman or subhuman qualities of imperial Europe and its inactivity and therefore inability to bring about the necessary positive change to Africa. It is a direct criticism of the inhumane imposition of western ideologies. At the same time, in portraying the natives as the direct contrast of Kurtz, i.e. human and active, Marlow emphasises his view that the West's imported ideologies have done nothing but hinder and obstruct life. And finally, by distancing himself from his early positions in his narrative, he achieves the same effect.

In the second text, the analysis of modality again showed the independently consistent, though contrasting, ideologies of Marlow and the Intended. On the one hand, the Intended's strong use of deontic and epistemic modality was seen to reflect

her extremely strong authoritarian position regarding what she believes and what she wants everyone else to do in line with those beliefs. On the other hand, Marlow's thoughts and feelings concerning the issues argued for by the Intended and towards Kurtz reflected his utter rejection of the propositions made by her. The Intended's idealistic view of imperialism and her belief in 'the idea' behind Europe's actions in Africa were placed in direct opposition with Marlow's realism and knowledge of the negative outcome of Europe's intervention in Africa. Yet her extreme use of deontic and epistemic modality magnifies her forcefulness to a point where she is completely isolated from the reality that surrounds her. In that contrast between her false impression of the reality of the situations she refers to and Marlow's undeclared views, only a sense of irony remains. This reading, it is argued, emerged from a pragmatic and systematic analysis of the way modality functions with respect to ideology in 'literary' discourse. Consequently, the same is to be attempted with 'political' and 'scientific' discourse in Chapters Six and Seven below.

## VI Modality, Ideology and Political Discourse

### 6.1 Introduction

The central role that language has played in the evolution of political thought as well as the transmission of political agendas cannot be overemphasised. In fact, the relationship between language and politics has always, and especially more recently, been an openly targeted field of exploitation in political discourse. This is the case since the relationship is an essentially dialectical one in the sense that political doctrines develop alongside their terminological manifestations. Just as political ideas, particularly new ideas and positions, create a need and consequently give rise to *labels* whose task is to describe and popularise these views, it is these labels which eventually define, shape and restrict the scope of meaning and connotations of these ideas and views. Based on this dialectical relationship between language and politics, this chapter aims at examining the manner by which different ideological positions are reflected through a distinctive use of modality in two political speeches.

### 6.2 Politics and Political Discourse

The use of the word *politics* has undergone considerable change during different stages of the last century, mainly reflecting the various phases of political development and changes in the structure of society, its needs, requirements and ambitions. According to Hudson (1978: 1) for instance, in the early 20<sup>th</sup> century during the times when Conservative views in Britain were “as natural as breathing and eating”, Conservative politics “were not politics at all”. In that sense, the use of the word politics was associated merely with the introduction of socialist ideas and

was therefore “almost synonymous with controversy and disturbance of the peace, a distasteful and antisocial activity, a piece of bad manners” (Hudson 1978: 1).

Similarly, reflecting the moods of the early thirties in Europe, i.e. those of early Nazism, Fascism and Stalinism, Hudson (1978: 2) quotes the *Oxford English Dictionary* of 1933 which defined politics as “the science and art of government; the science dealing with the form, organisation, and administration of a state or part of one, and with the regulation of its relations with other states” as well as “the political principles, convictions, opinions or sympathies of a person or party”. Here, the general connotations associated with the word politics are its organisational-administrative potential and almost scientific status. This perfectly corresponds with the rising political figures as well as political ideologies and organisational tendencies of the age, namely those of Nazism and Fascism.

In the early seventies, Roberts (1971: 222) defines politics as referring “both to an activity and to the study of that activity”:

As an activity, politics is the process in a social system – not necessarily confined to the level of the national state – by which the goals of that system are selected, ordered in terms of priority, both temporarily and concerning resource allocation, and implemented. It thus involves both co-operation and resolution of conflict by means of the exercise of political authority and if necessary coercion.

Roberts (1971: 222)

Here, the use of the word carried not only these organisational properties of politics, but also the relationship between a ruling power (which can possibly be unjust as in the case of military dictatorships) and the ruled as a society. This too reflected the various political systems present by the seventies which varied between democracy through communism to military dictatorships.

However, the one recurrent and common theme associated with the use of the term is the overwhelming negative connotations it conveys. This has been the case since the days of Plato who described politics as “nothing but corruption” and have

continued through the days of Jonathan Swift<sup>14</sup> and George Orwell, whose description of politics is that of “a mass of lies, evasions, folly, hatred and schizophrenia” (Beard 2000: 4-5). In fact, it is these negative connotations that have fuelled the search for more adequate positive replacements (like ‘statesman’ instead of ‘politician’) in situations where a political figure is regarded with universal respect like in the case of Mahatma Gandhi, Martin Luther King, or Nelson Mandela (Beard 2000: 4-5). Yet one of the most representative and appealing words in Orwell’s description of politics is the adjective “evasive” as it carries two suggestions: first, that the process of evasion is a conscious one, and second, if evasion were to succeed, it would have to open possibilities for a number of different interpretations. This matches any definition of the adjective evasive, which in fact is based on concepts like “generality”, “imprecision” and “ambiguity”. It is the area where politics and *modality*, as a specific aspect of language, go hand in hand particularly in the light of Halliday’s (1985: 356) definition of one major section of modality as referring to “the area of meaning that lies between yes and no”.

The central implication of the above view is the value and effectiveness of modality as a linguistic tool in political discourse. Since language is a highly “committing medium” of communication (Fowler 1977: 76), one way for language users to be “evasive” within this “area of meaning between yes and no” (Halliday 1985: 356) is by drawing on modalised expressions. Therefore, it is not in the least surprising to see a high dependence on, and I argue, a conscious utilisation of such expressions in political discourse. Yet the level of frequency of modalised expressions largely depends on an interaction among a set of factors. It depends on who is involved (who the addresser and addressee/s are), the power relations between them

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<sup>14</sup> There was a period of time in the late 18<sup>th</sup>- early 19<sup>th</sup> centuries where the term ‘politick’ also meant polite and tactful. In this sense, its negative connotations have not been uninterrupted.

(namely at the socio-political/economic level), the content of the political text and its objectives, the context of situation, etc. This means that no one-to-one relationship necessarily exists between all instances of political discourse and a high frequency of modal expressions. The utilisation of modality is an extremely delicate process and its overuse may have undesirable effects. This is precisely what I aim to show in my analysis: i.e. the effects of the use of modality on the ideological positions of two speakers in two political speeches. More precisely, it is how differences in the frequency, type of modal expressions, and degree of strength of these expressions between the two political speeches present two completely diverse ideological positions reflecting the ideological restrictions of the two different political parties and the demands of the two very different audiences.

### **6.3 Texts and Political Backgrounds**

The texts chosen for analysis are two political speeches by George Bush (see Appendix 4), the current president of the United States of America, and Tony Blair (see Appendix 5), the current Prime Minister of the United Kingdom. These two speeches were both delivered on the 7<sup>th</sup> of October 2001 following the historic terrorist attack on the Twin Towers buildings and the Pentagon in USA. Both essentially revolve around a very similar set of themes mainly announcing the beginning of the military strike against Afghanistan, the involvement of subsequent military forces, the objectives of the mission and the justness of the cause. Of course, each lays different degrees of emphasis on various sections and themes in the text, and this is what differentiates both speeches ideologically more than content-wise.

However, although both address the same issue, the fact that Bush's speech preceded Blair's by a few hours signals the first explicit difference in content in that



while the first introduces novel information, the second does not. Another difference relates mainly to the varying degrees in how directly each country is involved in the conflict. For instance, it is only common sense to argue that the USA is more directly involved in the incident since the terrorist attacks took place on US soil destroying US landmarks, financial centres and governmental buildings, and claiming more US citizens' lives than of any other nationality. Nonetheless, Blair portrays the UK as being just as directly affected by the terrorist attacks on the USA as the USA itself. The support for his position comes from the view that the death of British citizens in the attack makes the UK equally involved. My point is, however, that the urgency for military action and the power arising from that urgency are not the same for both countries since the directness of involvement is quite different, a view which needs to be acknowledged.

Additionally, the two texts distinctly differ in audience and, consequently, the types of potential oppositions. In the light of the directness of involvement of the USA and the UK in the attacks, Blair faces potentially more dangerous ground to tread especially in the English Parliament in a country known for its outspokenness regarding such controversial and dangerous endeavours as partaking in a war. Finally, the most significant area of difference between the two texts is the distinct political background behind each. Bush is head of the Republican Party (a right wing party) in the USA while Blair is the leader of New Labour (a centre-left wing party) in the UK. The political and ideological foundations of these two parties have a dramatic effect on the content and underlying ideologies of each speech. This point is a central one and needs considerable elaboration since one of the main constraining factors in the content of each speech is the underlying ideology or ideologies behind these political parties which affect, restrict and even possibly dictate the policies reflected in each

speech. It is necessary, therefore, to start by presenting a brief description of the two concerned political parties in light of which the content of these speeches can be better understood and interpreted.

### 6.3.1 The Republican Party

Generally speaking, unlike their European counterparts which have “quite vivid public images based on class, regional, religious, linguistic, ethnic or ideological divisions”, American political parties cover a “much narrower band of the ideological spectrum” (McKay 1997: 87). In that, they “appear non-ideological [and] organizationally weak” (McKay 1997: 87), a view supported by other political analysts such as Roche (1999: 8) who also argues that “the framers of the Constitution should be remembered less for their ideological commitment than for their political skills”.

Yet by and large, The Republican Party has always been regarded as a traditionally right wing, more conservative party which came into existence in its opposition to monarchy (Miller 1987: 433) as well as opposition to “the extension of slavery in the territories” (McCarthy 1962: 136). Its very broad ideological bases are the two notions of *liberty* and *virtue*. By liberty, republicans mean both “private liberty – such as property rights”, and “public liberty – the right of the people to have a collective say in government” (Mirrof *et al.* 1998: 18). It is both “freedom from the arbitrary power of tyrants, together with the right of the citizens to run their common affairs by participating in government” (Miller 1987: 433). As for virtue, they mean “patriotism and public spirit”, “the willingness of individuals to subordinate their private interests to the common good” (Miller 1987: 435, 436). In this sense, virtue supersedes liberty as it is seen to act as some sort of self-control on liberty, since

liberty pushed to an extreme would inevitably lead to anarchy in the visions of the Republicans. Republicans therefore rely on a people “characterized by virtue, ... a passion for the public good superior to all private passions” (Mirrof *et al.* 1998: 18, 19).

However, the main danger in the notion of liberty as an ideological basis for the republicans today is that it seems to lie in a constant state of tension with *democracy*. As Hofstadter (1999: 22) argues, liberty in the minds of the Founding Fathers “was linked not to democracy but to property”. This is why the Republicans today are the party most interested in “defending free enterprise and corporate power” (McKay 1997:89) and least interested in “the active intervention of the government” to limit free enterprise (Aldrich 1995: 8). Ultimately, Republicans have sought support from those people who favoured these policies; i.e. the middle class and up, forging coalitions consisting mainly of “a religious/moral component (the fundamentalist Christian right) and an economic/ideological component (the middle classes and supporters of a ‘return’ to free enterprise)” (McKay 1997:89).

In short, these economic and religious routes are what constitute the ideological bases of the politics of the Republican Party today. At the economic level, and based on the concept of liberty, the Republican Party favours free enterprise, corporate power and the lack of government intervention. They seek a decentralised government to ensure more power to states and localities and therefore lower federal taxes. Finally, they encourage national isolationism by using a strong defensive military. At the religious level, the Republican notion of virtue is inextricably linked to traditional American Christianity, which was heavily influenced by Calvinist and Puritan ideals. This means that personal moral issues are of extreme importance, and in this sense, “punishment”, for instance, is seen as the preferred alternative to

“rehabilitation” (Wilson 1998: 24). This is evident in Republican views on such ‘moral’ issues like the death penalty (which they favour), abortion and homosexual marriages (which they oppose), etc.

### **6.3.2 New Labour**

New Labour, on the other hand, is slightly less straightforward. Historically, it is based on a relatively recent set of political views labelled the “Third Way”, a way which claims both to find a meeting ground between the left and right, as well as to transcend those classic divisions (Fairclough 2000: vi). However, the ideological affiliations and positions of New Labour are not that clear-cut, a situation which initially resulted in a high degree of confusion especially on behalf of other political parties and political factions’ understanding of New Labour. According to Ludlam (2001: 1, 2) for instance, the Tories, Socialists and Social Democrats were at first unable to decide whether the Third Way is merely “diluted Thatcherism”, “diluted social democracy”, or indeed, “a new political ‘paradigm’, a visionary ‘radical centre’” which presented its own unique way of delivering economic growth and social justice. This confusion was the root of numerous theories, views and speculations as to the political standing of New Labour on the traditional right-left political scale. Again, such speculations varied from those who argued that New Labour has developed a synthesis which really is “beyond Left and Right” to others who saw the politics of New Labour as “pragmatic and beyond ideology”, to even others who suggested that “Labour’s new politics have sealed a right-wing consensus in British politics just ‘beyond Left’” (Driver and Martell 1998: 175).

The main reason behind this confusion is that New Labour today is founded on a selective set of policies from ‘old’ Labour as well as another set from the right

wing Thatcherite views. On the one hand, it both distances itself mainly from the economic policies of the extreme left wing Labour Party of the late seventies and beginning eighties (which had planned complete nationalisation and unilateralism) while at the same time holding on to “traditional socialist ideas”, morality and values (Smith 1992a: 9). On the other hand, New Labour seems to accept the Thatcherite agenda by “appealing to individualism, the market and private ownership” (Smith 1992b: 14), the eminency and inevitability of economic change due to globalisation (Newman 2001: 2), while at the same time opposing decentralisation of the government.

In short, New Labour’s policies are an attempt to retain the economic gains of Thatcherism, while invoking a set of moral and civic values through which Labour seeks to reshape civil society (Coates 2000:2). And this is best summarised directly in Blair’s words:

The socialism of Marx, of centralised state control of industry and production, is dead. It misunderstood the nature of development of a modern market economy...  
By contrast, socialism as defined by certain key values and beliefs is not merely alive, it has a historic opportunity now to give leadership. The basis of such socialism lies in its view that individuals are socially interdependent human beings – that individuals cannot be divorced from the society to which they belong...  
It is from this combination of analysis of the world as it is and prescriptions of the means of changing it that the values of democratic socialism – social justice, the equal worth of each citizen, equality of opportunity, community – came.

(Blair 1994: 3-4)

These two directions in the politics of New Labour are reflected in what Fairclough (2000: viii) calls the “rhetoric of reconciliation”, which portrays it as both a supporter of “‘economic dynamism as well as social justice’, ‘enterprise as well as fairness’”. However, the Third Way does face its own self-contradictions since, according to Fairclough (2000: 11), its intention to make us believe that “the two previously incompatible terms ... are made compatible” does not always stand.

Indeed, it is this multidirectionalism which places New Labour in an unorthodox position in terms of ideological consistency. This implies that many New Labour policies are seen to waver on the right-left ideological scale influenced by each unique situation.

In conclusion, the disparity between the two speeches arise out of the following three areas: a) the situation itself and the directness of its effects on each country, b) the audiences and their varying degrees of political awareness and outspokenness, and c) differences in the speakers and the distinct ideologies of the parties which they represent. Consequently, the main objective in this chapter is to examine the role modality plays in reflecting the ideological positions of the two speakers in the light of these three main areas of difference.

## **6.4 Texts and Analyses**

Based on the differences between the two texts discussed above, this chapter will analyse each text independently and then compare and contrast them by focusing on how the use of modality in each dictates the differences in the forcefulness and ultimately in the ideological positions of the two speakers – George Bush and Tony Blair. It also questions the consistency of ideologies communicated in each text independently and in contrast with each other.

### **6.4.1 Analysis 1: Bush**

Starting with Bush's speech (see appendix 4), and following the information grouped under the Factuality branch in a chronological manner, three main sets of utterances are seen to fall into general areas of content. The unifying factor in all them

is their indisputably factual content communicating the highest degrees of non-modalised certainty as reflected in their syntactic makeup (see table 1).

The first of these groups, (4-8), relates to America’s allies in its mission. It outlines the actual actions of those supporting the American-initiated war in terms of what they have offered or will offer in practical factual terms. Then comes another set of factual utterances which directly relate to America’s position towards the Afghani people as well as Islam in general, one which is contrasted with its stance towards the Afghani government and the terrorist network (18-23, 25-30). Here, the main forceful message is America’s position which on the one hand supports the Afghani people since they constitute a central part of a peaceful Moslem world. On the other hand, America is seen to oppose the Taliban government because of the latter’s support of an “evil” terrorist organisation. This theme continues in the next set of utterances (33-36) in which both the Afghani people and Islam are viewed as victims of the same enemy that threatens the United States of America and all it stands for ideologically. These are the ideological notions of liberty and freedom which carry the force of America’s readiness and willingness to defend those beliefs at any cost. This too is presented in the highest form of certainty and is linked by the transitional sentence (33) “we did not ask for this mission” to another set of views relating to the feelings of the Americans (37), the sacrifices being made by America’s “dedicated”, “honorable” “sons and daughters” who are defending it (42), and the president’s confidence in them and in the justness of their cause (43, 45).

Low	Med	High	Factuality
3- to disrupt and to attack the military capability	→→ ←←	→→→ ←←←←←←←← 11- And now the Taliban <u>will pay</u> a price. 16- At the same time, the	1- On my <u>orders</u> , the United States military <u>has begun</u> strikes 2- These carefully targeted actions <u>are designed</u> ... 4- We are joined in this operation 5- Other friends ... have pledged forces. 6- More than 40 countries ... have granted air transit ... 7- Many more have shared intelligence.

<p>13- the terrorists <b>may</b> burrow deeper into caves</p> <p>15- to clear the way for ... operations <b>to drive</b> them out and <b>bring</b> them to justice.</p> <p>41- patience in all the sacrifices that <b>may</b> come.</p>	<p>... people of Afghanistan <b>will know</b> the generosity of America.</p> <p>22- we <b>will win</b> this conflict</p> <p>26- If any government sponsors the outlaws, they <b>have become</b> outlaws themselves</p> <p>27- And they <b>will take</b> that lonely path at their own peril.</p> <p>31- there <b>can be no peace</b> in a world of sudden terror.</p> <p>34- but we <b>will fulfill</b> it</p> <p>40- our patience <b>will be</b> one of our strengths -- with the long waits that <b>will result</b> from tighter security; patience and understanding that it <b>will take time to achieve</b> our goals;</p> <p>46- and you <b>will have</b> every tool you <b>need to carry out</b> your duty.</p> <p>54- We <b>will not waver</b>;</p> <p>55- we <b>will not tire</b>;</p> <p>56- we <b>will not falter</b>;</p> <p>57- and we <b>will not fail</b>.</p> <p>58- Peace ... <b>will prevail</b></p>	<p>8- We are supported by the ... world.</p> <p>9- I <b>gave</b> Taliban leaders specific <b>demands</b>:</p> <p>10- None of these demands were met.</p> <p>14- Our military action <b>is also designed</b> ...</p> <p>18- The United States of America <b>is</b> a friend to the Afghan...</p> <p>19- and we are the friends of almost a billion ... who practice the Islamic faith.</p> <p>20- The United States of America is an enemy of those who aid terrorists and of the barbaric criminals who profane a great religion by committing murder in its name.</p> <p>21- This military action is a part of our campaign against terrorism, another front in a war that has already been joined through diplomacy, intelligence...</p> <p>23- Today we focus on Afghanistan, but the battle <b>is</b> broader.</p> <p>24- Every nation <b>has a choice to make</b>.</p> <p>25- In this conflict, there <b>is</b> no neutral ground.</p> <p>28- I'm speaking to you today from ... a place where American Presidents have worked for peace.</p> <p>29- We're a peaceful nation.</p> <p>30- Yet, as we have learned ...</p> <p>32- the <b>only way to pursue</b> peace <b>is to pursue</b> those who <b>threaten</b> it.</p> <p>33- We <b>did not ask</b> for this mission...</p> <p>35- The name of today's operation is Enduring Freedom.</p> <p>36- We defend not only our precious freedoms, but also the freedom of people everywhere to live and raise their children free from fear.</p> <p>37- I know many Americans feel fear today. And our government is taking strong precautions. All law enforcement agencies are working ...around the clock.</p> <p>38- At my <b>request</b>, many governors <b>have activated</b> the National Guard <b>to strengthen</b> airport security.</p> <p>39- We have called up Reserves to reinforce our military capability and strengthen the protection of ...</p> <p>42- those sacrifices are being made by members of our Armed Forces who now defend us so far from home...</p> <p>43- A Commander-in-Chief sends America's sons ... into a battle ... only after the greatest care and a lot of prayer.</p> <p>44- They are dedicated, they are honorable; they represent the best of our country. And we are grateful.</p> <p>45- I say this: Your mission is defined; your objectives are clear; your goal is just. You have my full confidence</p> <p>47- I recently received a touching letter that says a lot about the state of America</p> <p>49- This is a precious gift, the greatest she could give.</p> <p>51- This young girl knows what America is all about.</p> <p>52- Since September 11, an entire generation of young Americans has gained new understanding</p> <p>53- The battle is now joined on many fronts.</p>
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Table 1 representing Bush’s position on a scale of certainty.

The second set of utterances categorised under Factuality are those whose extensions are epistemically non-factual (2,14). These are syntactically variant in that



while the first section of the verb phrase (the enveloping verb) is a pseudo-factual one, the embedded clause acquires a degree of non-factuality. In these utterances, for instance, the verb phrases “is designed” and “are designed” are both passive structures, thus suggesting an element of forceful objectivity, as well as appearing to be non-modalised straightforward factual verbs. However, while no degree of uncertainty characterises these verbs and the initial parts of the clauses (i.e. there is no doubt as to the design of these actions), the second parts are far from being factual and are, as a result, grouped according to the level of modality they reflect – in this instance, low modality. This is the case since a verb phrase like “is designed to” carries a certain degree of internal modality, some doubt (i.e. low certainty) in the ability to deliver, which is projected onto the second section of the verb phrase. The whole verb phrase, “is designed to disrupt”, therefore foreshadows the possibility that this “military action” might fail to disrupt. In other words, while in theory the referred to military action *should* disrupt the military capabilities of the Taliban, this disruption is in no way a definite one. This explains the two arrow movements from the factuality category (under which these utterances are grouped) towards the lower end of the scale (under which their extensions are located).

The third and final set of utterances categorised under “factuality” are those which carry both an epistemic as well as a deontic interpretation. These are initially grouped under “factuality” mainly because they are either reports of a deontic action (rather than a performative verb or the deontic action itself), or they are indirect commands, demands, etc., which have the form of a factual statement. An example of the first instance is the utterance “I gave the Taliban specific demands” (9) which is a report of a demand that is both an expression of factuality as well as a bearer of deontic force. An example of the second is the utterance “every nation has a choice to

make” (24) which carries both an epistemic as well as a deontic interpretation without being a report of some degree of duty. It can be interpreted as a statement of fact as well as some form of duty or even obligation that every nation does make the choice. This final group reports a set of requests, demands or commands directed at the U.S. army (1, 38) to mobilise and at the Taliban (9) and all nations (24, 32) to make a choice (between good and evil) and work towards peace through action. Most importantly, the content areas they tackle are presented in the highest degree of non-modalised certainty making it categorically forceful on the epistemic scale.

All in all then, the main picture that can be drawn from looking at the non-modalised, Factuality end of the scale is the speaker’s highest degree of certainty and therefore forcefulness in

- 1) The allied support for America,
- 2) The view of the Afghani people as victims,
- 3) The view of Islam as a peaceful religion,
- 4) The view of the Afghani government as evil in its support for an evil organisation,
- 5) The justness of the actions requested and demanded of the American army, the Taliban and the world, as well as
- 6) The need and urgency for action in light of America’s set of ideologies in order to restore the pre-September 11<sup>th</sup> status quo.

Under the High end of the epistemic scale is a set of utterances which are primarily non-factual. Divided in terms of the content areas which they cover, the first set mainly contrasts the American view of the Taliban (11, 27), with their view of the Afghani people (16). It reflects some form of prediction, a relatively high degree of

certainty regarding what will happen to the Taliban and the Afghani government on the one hand as opposed to the Afghani people, on the other. The first “will pay a price” and “will take that lonely path at their own peril” while the latter “will know the generosity of America”. The second set of utterances also communicates a high level of certainty in what will happen to America and the American people, how their objectives will be fulfilled and what America will be able to achieve (22, 34-58).

Through “patience [which] will be” one of America’s strengths, and although it “will take time” for this conflict to be over, America “will [ultimately] win” the war.

Finally, the last set grouped under the High category of the epistemic scale is that in which the utterances have the force of categorical statements of an almost prophetic nature (26, 31) but nevertheless are not full factual statements. The first of these is a conditional statement “if any government sponsors the outlaws,” with factual consequences “they *have become* outlaws themselves”. In the light of these consequences (“have become” rather than ‘will become’), this utterance no longer represents a hypothetical situation, and therefore it wavers in strength towards the factuality end of the scale as signified by the use of the arrow. The second is a statement with a negated modal expression “there *can be no peace* in a world of sudden terror” (31), where the absence of possibility takes the utterance from the low end of the scale (which would be the case in the absence of the negative as in “there can be peace” – i.e. it is possible for there to be peace) to the high end. Still, although it falls short of being a completely factual statement, it is seen to have an almost factual force as signified by the arrows.

In short, the content areas presented under the High modality category are those reflected through the use of high modal certainty and which consequently communicate a relatively high degree of forcefulness. These relate the highest degrees

of modal certainty that the Taliban “pay a price” for their evil deeds while the Afghani people “know” the generosity of America. Also a strong position is reflected in the view that while the whole campaign will take time and patience from the American people, eventually America is most certain to win the war. And finally comes the high certainty of a conditional statement which explicitly equates an outlaw-sponsoring government with an outlaw. Likewise, it reflects high certainty in the impossibility for the coexistence of peace and terror in the same world where America (and all it stands for) exists. All these utterances are highly certain and forceful; yet it is essential to accentuate the fact that they nevertheless fall short in terms of forcefulness from those factual statements discussed above, and are therefore less emphatic on the epistemic scale.

Finally, under the Low end of the epistemic scale are the extensions to two of the factual statements mentioned above. These relate to “‘disrupting’ and ‘attacking’ the military capabilities” of the Taliban (3) as well as “‘clearing’ the way for ... operations to drive them out and bring them to justice” (15). As discussed above, these utterances are placed under the lower end of the epistemic scale mainly because these verbs are subordinate to the other verb in the verb clause “are designed to” and “is also designed to” which carries a certain degree of internal modality. Following this uncertainty, both subordinating expressions are primarily placed under the lower end of the epistemic scale. However, the existence of a high level of vagueness opens the door for more than one possible interpretation. The expression “is designed to disrupt” could vary in interpretation from as low a modal force as “may disrupt” through a median modal force like “should disrupt” up to a high modal “must disrupt”. Yet while it cannot extend its interpretation to a factual statement, the most likely interpretation is the second middle ground interpretation which places the

utterance under the Median category on the epistemic scale. Finally, the other two separate utterances grouped under the lower end of the epistemic scale (13, 41) relate to the existence of possibilities that terrorists manage to hide (“the terrorists may burrow deeper into caves”) and that sacrifices from the American people are to come (“all the sacrifices that may come”).

On the other hand, grouped under the Command category of the deontic scale (see table 2) are straightforward orders by Bush for the Afghani government to perform certain actions (3-5). Although described by Bush as a list of “demands” (2), these utterances are expressed in the highest form of deontic force; i.e. through the absence of any form of explicit modality and the use of the imperative-mood structure. At the syntactic level then, these expressions take the form of direct commands (“close”, “hand over”, and “return”) which infuses them with maximal force. This force is further accentuated in a context of situation where these “demands” are backed by the full might of the United States army. Additionally, the directness of the action involved is what differentiates them from utterances (1) and (2). Following that, the first two utterances are grouped under the High category on the epistemic scale with two arrows showing the direction of the force of these “orders” and “demands”. In short, while the first two are reports of what Bush ordered and demanded, the second set is a list of direct orders.

As for those utterances grouped under the High end of the deontic scale, three different sets of expressions can be isolated depending on the different grammatical subjects of each verb and on the content area each corresponds with. One of these sets is that where the Taliban and the people of Afghanistan are the grammatical subjects (6, 8, 12). As noted above, these expressions were initially grouped under the High end of the epistemic scale which mainly refers to what will *predictably* happen to the

Taliban and the Afghani people. However, as well as their epistemic interpretation where these expressions “will pay”, “will know” and “will take” are interpreted as “they will *most probably/predictably* pay, know and take”, they also allow for a deontic sense in their meaning. In other words, they can also be interpreted as “we will *make sure* that they pay, know and take”, or “we will *make them* pay, know and take” thus carrying a deontic orientation and therefore, deontic force. It is a form of enforced obligation or even insistence that these actions do happen.

Low	Med	High	Command
<p>16- At my <u>request</u>, many governors <u>have activated</u> the National Guard <u>to strengthen</u> airport security.  <b>1&lt;&lt;&lt;&lt;</b></p> <p>18- We <u>ask</u> a lot of those who wear our uniform. We <u>ask</u> them <u>to leave</u> their loved ones, <u>to travel</u> great distances, <u>to risk</u> injury, even <u>to be prepared to make</u> the ultimate sacrifice...</p> <p>21- "I'm willing to give him to you."</p>	<p>11- every nation <u>has a choice to make</u>  <b>&lt;&lt;&lt;&lt;</b></p> <p>14- We <u>did not ask</u> for this mission...</p> <p>20- "As much as I <u>don't want</u> my Dad <u>to fight</u>," she wrote,</p> <p><b>→→1</b></p>	<p><b>→→1</b></p> <p>1- On my orders, the U. S military <u>has begun</u> strikes</p> <p>2- I <u>gave</u> Taliban leaders specific <b>demands</b>:</p> <p>6- the Taliban <u>will pay</u> a price</p> <p>7- we <u>will make</u> it more <b>difficult</b> for the network <u>to train</u> new recruits and <b>coordinate</b> their evil plans.</p> <p>8- the people of Afghanistan <u>will know</u> the generosity of America.</p> <p>9- we'll also <b>drop</b> food</p> <p><b>→→1</b></p> <p>10- we <u>will win</u> this conflict</p> <p>12- they <u>will take</u> that lonely path at their own peril.</p> <p>13- the only way <u>to pursue</u> peace <b>is to pursue</b> those who <b>threaten</b> it.</p> <p><b>→→1</b></p> <p>15- but we <u>will fulfil</u> it</p> <p>17- our patience <u>will be</u> one of our strengths -- with the long waits that <u>will result</u> from tighter security</p> <p>19- and you <u>will have</u> every tool you <b>need to carry out</b> your duty.</p> <p>22- We <u>will not waver</u></p> <p>23- we <u>will not tire</u></p> <p>24- we <u>will not falter</u></p> <p>25- and we <u>will not fail</u></p> <p>26- Peace <u>will prevail</u></p>	<p><b>→→1</b> <b>→→1</b></p> <p>3- Close terrorist training camps</p> <p>4- hand over leaders of the al Qaeda network;</p> <p>5- return all foreign nationals...</p>

Table 2 representing Bush’s position on a scale of obligation

The second set is where the USA, its president, or its people are grammatical subjects (1, 2, 7, 9, 10, 12, 14, 17, 19, 22-25). Again most of these utterances were initially grouped under the Factuality or High end of the epistemic scale but are also seen to have a deontic sense and interpretation. Apart from the first two discussed

above, the other set of utterances refers to what America *will* do to the Taliban (making it difficult for them to train and coordinate their evil plans), to the Afghani people (dropping food for them) and regarding the general outcome of the war (winning the conflict, fulfilling the mission, not wavering, not tiring, not faltering and not failing). Again, all these expressions are interpretable as a form of self-enforced obligation or a determination in making sure these actions do or do not happen. As a result, they are placed under the High end of the deontic scale. However, one expression stands out and that refers to America's intentions to prevent the Taliban from training and coordinating their "evil plans" (7). Similar to those discussed under the Factuality category on the epistemic scale ("is designed to"), the presence of the adjective "difficult", which is epistemically modal, lessens the overall force of the utterance. While there is no doubt as to the *difficulty* the Taliban plans will face, the subordinate section of the verb phrase ("to train" and "to coordinate") does not carry that same force in terms of degrees of certainty. There will not be any prevention of further training and coordination but merely an attempt to make it harder to achieve. This epistemic form of modality is seen to affect the deontic force of the utterance as a whole and this is signalled by a motion towards the weaker end of the deontic scale as represented by the arrow which moves all the way through the Median to the Low category.

Finally, the third set is that where the subjects are universal ones (13, 26). Again here, both utterances were initially grouped under the Factuality and High ends of the epistemic scale respectively; yet both are seen to have deontic senses. The deontic interpretation of the first utterance would have the following form: "to pursue peace *forces us* to pursue those who threaten it", and this interpretation becomes more acceptable in the light of the subsequent utterance – "we will fulfill it" which also

carries a deontic force. As for the second, the following deontic interpretation is also possible: “we will make sure that peace does prevail”. Here, the main contributor to the force of these utterances is the underlying objectivity which characterises their sources. In fact, it is a seeming objectivity which masks the actual but implicit agent necessary for the fulfilment of these actions. And this is characteristic of all the utterances placed under the High category of the deontic scale: that the force behind all these utterances is either explicitly or implicitly, directly or indirectly, the United States of America.

Under the Median category within the deontic scale are two utterances (11, 20), the first of which carries deontic force although it resembles a non-modalised statement. In saying “every nation has a choice to make”, Bush is indirectly pointing out the duty or even an obligation (even possibly a threat since this statement is backed by the full military force of America) that each nation *has to* make the choice of siding with America or with “evil”. Like the other modalised utterances which are essentially indeterminate, this one is characterised by both types of indeterminacy: the epistemic-deontic interpretation and force, as well as the direction of its force which is seen to move from the Median category towards the High end of the deontic scale. As for the second utterance, it is a statement of desire expressing a young girl’s lack of *desire* that her father goes to battle. This too is seen to waver towards the High end of the deontic scale to reflect the strength of the girl’s desire, a desire which culminates in her expressed *willingness* to let her father go to battle (21). This second section of the girl’s utterance (21) is placed under the Low end of the scale as it expresses at least a lower degree of desire than the first part. Still, as the first section of the utterance wavers upwards on the deontic scale, the second section is seen to follow with one step behind.



Finally, under the Low end of the deontic scale are a number of expressions which reflect a lower degree of forcefulness. They mainly correspond to a set of requests made by the president of the USA, directed at his governors and army (15, 16, 18). These are placed under the Low end of the deontic scale simply because the noun “request” and verb “ask” are clear indications of the exact type of modality communicated, which narrows the margin for manoeuvre. However, taking context into account (that of an army’s chain of command), in the light of the political background and power status of the initiator of these actions, a request made by a country’s president to his army is closer to a command than a request. What comes across as a clash between the context of situation and the linguistic choices made highlights an alternative interpretation of the force passed on through these utterances and their effects. Using Low modality, especially when higher modality would be the less marked structure, emphasises the close, possibly paternal, relationship that the American president conveys through his words to his governors and army. And this relative softness in communicating (as a superior) with his under-staff is in sharp contrast with the directness and forcefulness used when communicating with the Taliban. With the first it is a “request”, with the latter, a “demand”, a situation which contradicts the unmarked scheme of things but highlights the positions and possible intentions of the speaker.

To summarise, the expressions grouped under the deontic scale reflect the speaker’s varying positions with respect to the following issues: the speaker’s highest degree of forcefulness is expressed through a number of orders and demands directed at the Taliban as well as a High level of forcefulness that the Taliban will pay a price, that the Afghani people will get help and that the USA will win the conflict. Expressed under the Median and Low levels of forcefulness is the need for every

nation to make a choice and the lack of desire Americans (as represented through the little girl) feel in relation to launching this war. This is followed by other weaker deontic expressions regarding the *requests* made by the president for the army to perform certain actions together with the sacrifices that may follow.

#### 6.4.2 Interpretations and Implications

Looking at the categorisation of modalised expressions in both scales, the following picture of the position of the speaker, his forcefulness and ideology emerges. The speaker is most forceful when presenting facts relating to the support America is getting from its allies, still quite forceful when demanding that support from all other nations, and the least forceful when requesting it from the American people and the American army. Here, the image of Bush that seems to be projected as a result of this variety in degrees of modal strength is respectively that of a popular world leader whose cause is supported worldwide, a strong world leader who has the power to create quite a following, and finally of a father to his nation who understands their concern regarding the issue at hand. It is the power of a speaker who undoubtedly believes in the justness of his cause and hence in his own judgements and evaluations of what is right and wrong.

Moreover, Bush is both highly certain and emphatic when describing the Afghani government as “evil” in its support for an evil organisation, when making a set of demands on them, and when both predicting and insisting that they will pay a price. This again indicates his unquestionable belief in the correctness and justness of his own judgement concerning what constitutes an evil entity and what does not. It is an extension of the moral ideologies of the USA which are indirectly forced on the rest of the world through that binary division which Bush makes between good and

evil. This evaluation is backed by the high power reflected through High epistemic and deontic force associated with the view that the USA and all who support it are 'good' while those who stand against it are 'evil'. Indeed, "every nation has a choice to make", a choice which would define its location on the American good-evil scale along with all the responsibilities and penalties that accompany that choice.

Yet despite all this strength and forcefulness, the speaker relatively uncertain about the impact his war will have on the Afghani government and the al Qaeda network. The possibility that this mission will "disrupt and ... attack [their] military capability" and that it will "clear the way for operations to drive them out and bring them to justice" is communicated with a low degree of certainty. On top of that, there also appears to be a possibility that initially, "the terrorists *may* burrow deeper into caves", suggesting that they might escape that price which earlier on the audience was told that the terrorists "will pay". This inconsistency and discrepancy in the message communicated has serious repercussions. On the one hand, through expressing doubts in the achievability of the main objectives of the mission, the certainty, emphaticness and ultimately the forcefulness behind the mission as a whole is seriously undermined. However, on the other hand, this seemingly contradictory position does not disagree with the religious bases of Republican ideology. The speaker's certainty and insistence that the terrorists will pay a price without the certainty that they will be brought to justice highlights the higher degree of importance that Bush (and by extension the Republican Party and the American people) pays to immediate and direct punishment in contrast with long-term justice, a position which falls in line with the radical Christian right basis of the Republican Party. In that, Bush's varying use of modality emphasises a position which is closer to vengeance than justice.

Moreover, the two notions of freedom and duty occupy a central position in the speech and are basic in determining the forcefulness of the speaker. After stressing the importance of freedom as a central trait of America, which the Americans defend on behalf of themselves and the rest of the world, the possibility of “sacrifices that *may come*” is introduced with low epistemic modality. It immediately follows a string of high modalised utterances, where those sacrifices seem less eminent than the rest of the propositions.

In the months ahead, our patience *will be* one of our strengths -- patience with the long waits that *will result* from tighter security; patience and understanding that it *will take time to achieve* our goals; patience in all the sacrifices that *may come*.

The first impression given is that sacrifices are not something any government wants. However interestingly enough, sacrifices are later linked to the notion of duty which is the price for freedom, and it is done with categorical certainty. This is where sacrifices become more eminent and inevitable, even something to be desired by all American people as exemplified by Bush’s anecdote about the young girl. Just like this young girl, all Americans have “gained a new understanding of the value of freedom, and its cost in duty and in sacrifice”; i.e. that freedom is only achievable through sacrifice and this sacrifice is the people’s duty. All these positions are communicated with the highest degrees of certainty and forcefulness giving Bush’s speech ultimate potency. It is power arising from the full ideological backing of the Republican Party based on which Bush was elected president. It is therefore something expected of the American people and should not require any persuasive effort on behalf of the speaker.

### 6.4.3 Analysis 2: Blair

In Blair's speech on the other hand, the way modality is utilised by the speaker helps present a somewhat different picture both of the speaker and of the overall situation (see appendix 5). To begin with, on the Factuality branch of the epistemic scale, Blair projects an image of extreme strength and confidence through his categorical certainty when addressing the topics of:

- 1) the involvement of British forces, (which he is confident and proud of) in the action,
- 2) the need for the action (in the absence of any other alternative) and its moral and economic justifications and
- 3) the internationality of the effort.

Yet when tracking the chronological development of Blair's argument, an interesting mix of modalised expressions surfaces (see table 3). Looking at the epistemic scale, Blair starts by confirming the engagement of UK forces in the military action against Afghanistan (2, 3), stating his pride in and confidence in these forces as they are "amongst the very best in the world" (4, 7, 8). The reasons and justifications for this offensive are, however, based on a set of modalised utterances. The first is conditional where the British "part in [this] action" is dependent on knowing "who was responsible" (9), an utterance placed under the Median branch of the epistemic scale due to the lack of certainty and factuality of this condition. Again, this condition is followed by a subjective statement with an embedded negative – "no doubt in my mind, nor in the mind of anyone who has been through all the available evidence..." (10). In comparison with the previous utterance, this one is slightly higher on the epistemic scale despite the high subjectivity of the utterance. This is

justified due to the high power status and consequently power-reliability of its source.

Finally the third consequent modalised utterance is used to establish the connection between the Taliban government and the terrorist network (11). The latter is again slightly stronger on the epistemic scale since its source of reference, in contrast to the previous, is objective. In short, these three consecutive modalised utterances become respectively stronger in terms of degrees of certainty until we get to the next set of factual statements.

Low	Med	High	Factuality
33- The coalition has, I believe, strengthened not weakened in the 26 days since the atrocity occurred.  58- about what the terrorists may seek to do in response.  69- so that those responsible could be yielded up by those shielding them.	→→I  9- that we would take part in action once it was clear who was responsible.  44a- But even if no British citizen had died it would be right to act.	1- As you <b>will know</b> from the announcement by President Bush... 5- They and their families <b>are, of course, carrying</b> an immense burden at this moment  →→I  ←←←  6- and <b>will be feeling</b> deep anxiety as <b>will</b> the British people  →→I  10- There is <b>no doubt in my mind, nor</b> in the mind of anyone who <b>has been through</b> all the available evidence, that these attacks <b>were carried out</b> by the al-Qaeda network...  11- Equally <b>it is clear</b> that his	2- military action against targets inside Afghanistan has begun. 3- I can confirm that UK forces are engaged in this action. 4- There is no greater strength for a British PM ... than to know that the forces we are calling upon are amongst the very best... 7- But we can take pride in their courage, their sense of duty and the esteem with which they're held throughout the world. 8- No country lightly commits forces to military action ... but we made it clear following the attacks... 12- It is now almost a month since the atrocity occurred, 13- it is more than two weeks since an ultimatum <b>was delivered</b> to the Taliban <b>to yield up</b> the terrorists or <b>face</b> the consequences. 16- They <b>were given</b> the choice of <b>siding</b> with justice or <b>siding</b> with terror and they chose to side with terror. 17- There are three parts to the operation of which we're engaged: 20- This military plan has been put together mindful of our <b>determination to do all we</b> humanly <b>can to avoid</b> civilian casualties 23- We have set the objectives to eradicate bin Laden's network and to take action against the Taliban regime that is sponsoring it. 24- As to the precise British involvement I <b>can</b> confirm that ... 25- the US <b>made a specific request</b> that a number of UK military assets <b>be used</b> in the operation which has now begun. 26- And <b>I gave authority</b> for these assets <b>to be deployed</b> . 27- They include the base at Diego Garcia, ... Missile firing submarines are in use tonight. 29- The United States are obviously providing the bulk of the force <b>required in leading</b> this... 30- this is an international effort. 31- as well as UK, France, Germany, ... have also committed themselves to take part in the operation. 32- in the time I've been Prime Minister I cannot recall a situation that has commanded such a powerful coalition... 34- And this is in no small measure due to the statesmanship of President Bush to whom I pay tribute tonight. 35- The world understands that whilst, <b>of course</b> , there are dangers in acting the dangers of inaction are far, far greater. 36- we are assembling a coalition ... which is as vital as ... 37- Even before 11 September four million Afghans were on the move. There are two million refugees...

	<p>network is <b>harboured and supported</b> by the Taliban</p> <p>14- It is <b>clear beyond doubt</b> that <b>they will not do</b> this</p> <p>18- The military action <b>we are taking will be targeted against</b> places <b>we know to be involved...</b></p> <p>22- I <b>cannot disclose</b>, <b>obviously</b>, how long this action <b>will last</b> but <b><u>we will act</u></b> with reason...</p> <p>28- The air assets <b><u>will be available for use</u></b> in the coming days</p> <p>45- We <b>know</b> the al-Qaeda network <b>threaten</b> ... any nation that <b>does not share</b> their views.</p> <p>57- People <b><u>are bound to be concerned</u></b> ...</p> <p>65- We only <b>do</b> it if the cause is just.</p>	<p>38- so that people from that region stay in that region.</p> <p>39- Britain, <b>of course</b>, is heavily involved in that effort.</p> <p>40- So we are taking action on all those three fronts...</p> <p>41- ... why this matters so much directly to Britain.</p> <p>42- ... the attacks ... represented the worst terrorist outrage...</p> <p>43- The murder of British... whether it happens overseas or not, is an attack upon Britain.</p> <p>44b- This atrocity was an attack on us all...</p> <p>46- So <b><u>we have a direct interest in acting</u></b> in our own self defence <b><u>to protect</u></b> British lives.</p> <p>47- It was also an attack ... on livelihoods.</p> <p>48- We can see ... how economic confidence has suffered with all that means for British ... industry.</p> <p>49- We act also because the al-Qaeda and the Taliban regime are funded on the drugs trade.</p> <p>50- 90 per cent of all the heroin sold on British streets originates from Afghanistan.</p> <p>51- Stopping that trade is, again, directly in our interests.</p> <p>52- ... that this is not a war with Islam.</p> <p>53- It angers me, as it angers the vast majority of Muslims, to hear bin Laden and his associates described as Islamic terrorists.</p> <p>54- They are terrorists pure and simple.</p> <p>55- Islam is a peaceful religion and the acts of these people are contrary to the ... Koran.</p> <p>56- These are difficult ... times.</p> <p>57- ... there is at present no threat that we know of and that we have in place tried and tested plans which are the best possible response</p> <p>59- This, <b>of course</b>, is a moment of ... gravity...</p> <p>62- We are a peaceful people.</p> <p>63- But we know that <b>sometimes</b> to safeguard peace...</p> <p>64- Britain has learnt that lesson many times...</p> <p>66- This cause is just.</p> <p>67- The murder of almost seven thousand people was an attack on our freedom...</p> <p>68- We waited ...</p> <p>70- That offer was refused,</p> <p>71- we have now no choice</p> <p>73- And our determination in acting is total.</p>
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Table 3 representing Blair’s position on a scale of certainty.

These modalised utterances have a significant impact on the overall certainty and forcefulness of the propositions conveyed. When relating the degrees of epistemic modal force to the content area which each of these utterances cover, the following reading emerges. While there is a high degree of certainty in relating the Taliban and al Qaeda, this certainty decreases when relating al Qaeda to the terrorist attacks, thus providing a weak basis to satisfy the conditions for the British involvement in the action. In fact, it is ultimately the (subjective) credibility of the Prime Minister which

serves as a central pillar to help present the information as reliable since what constitutes the bases for the decision to take part in the military offensive is merely a set of modalised utterances.

The subsequent two factual utterances address the “ultimatum” given to the Taliban “to yield up the terrorists or face the consequences”, to side “with justice or [side] with terror” (13, 16). Here again, an important decision is arrived at following and based on a modalised utterance: “it is clear beyond doubt that they will not do this” (14). Although this utterance is a relatively strong form of epistemic modality, and is thus placed under the High end of the continuum, it nonetheless communicates a lack of absolute certainty in what serves as grounds for drastic measures (a war) taken against a whole country. Similar to the expressions discussed above, the underlying basis for yet another set of factual utterances lies in a preceding modalised expression. This, I argue, undermines the categorical forcefulness associated with these factual statements and consequently the content which they communicate.

The following set of factual utterances describes the operation and its objectives (17,20,23). It includes both a set of factual verbs as well as one specific verb which carries some form of internal uncertainty (“our determination to do all we humanly can *to avoid* civilian casualties”). Initially, there is no doubt as to the absoluteness of the “determination” of the British forces to do all they can “to avoid” civilian casualties (20). However, the verb “avoid” is in no way categorical in terms of ruling out the possible/probable/almost certain unavoidability of civilian casualties. In addition to that, the presence of the adverb “humanly” in this verb phrase further stresses and foreshadows such inevitability since humans are vulnerable, inaccurate and susceptible to miscalculations. This interpretation is signified by the use of arrows that point out the tendency for that verb to move downwards on the epistemic scale



reflecting its lower epistemic force. Here, the use of arrows is intended to foreground the internal modality of a verb disguised as a factual one, which in turn reflects the possible variability in its interpretation along the epistemic scale.

The next set of utterances describes in more detail the mission which is specified in response to American requests. In fact, it is these requests (25) which are directly translated to an *authorisation* given by Blair for specific “assets to be deployed” (26-29). These utterances are mere reporting of processes that have already occurred and are therefore presented with the highest degree of certainty since they convey a set of factual events (“made a specific request”, “gave authority”, “they include”, “are providing”). The same is the case of the next set whose content area relays the fact that the mission is “an international effort” joined by different countries (30, 31), and that Britain is also “heavily involved” (39, 40). The only utterance which stands out, in that it is placed under the High category of the epistemic scale, is that whose non-factuality is related to the futurity of the event to come (28).

The following utterances also placed under Factuality refer to moral as well as economical justifications for the mission (37, 38, 41-51). These start by describing the current situation of the Afghani people (37, 38), and move on to explain “why [the military action] matters so much directly to Britain” (41). The primary objective of this mission is the protection of British lives, livelihoods and the economy. Moreover, Blair characterises potential military action as both a defence against Afghani terrorists and the drugs which originate from Afghanistan under the current regime (49-51). In short, it is a necessary action which is aligned with Britain’s ideological disposition.

Next, Blair describes Islam as “a peaceful religion” stressing the contrast between the followers of Islam on the one hand and Moslem terrorists on the other

(52-55). This is followed by a final section which targets the topics of the need, urgency and most importantly, absence of choice concerning how to tackle this problem of terrorism. All these utterances are placed under the highest degree of epistemic force as they present a summary of what has happened in America (67), how Britain has learned lessons of history (64), how the cause is just (66) and how there is no choice but military action (68, 70, 71, 73).

In sum, the non-modalised utterances grouped under the factuality end of the scale present the speaker's highest degree of certainty and therefore forcefulness in reporting on

- 1) The involvement of British forces in the action
- 2) The Prime Minister's pride and confidence in these forces
- 3) The need for the action paralleled with absence of any other alternative
- 4) The moral and economic justifications for this action
- 5) The internationality of the effort, and
- 6) The absence of a connection between Islam and terrorism.

However, as mentioned above, not all these statements have the categorical force of factuality. In fact, some of the most critical ones which relate more directly to the British people have underlying modality in that they are either straightforward factual inferences that spring from modalised bases, or that the main verb in the verb phrase carries some kind of internal modality. Further, these critical utterances shed doubt on the justifications for military action in light of the proof needed for such justifications. They also shed doubt regarding an extremely important moral issue for the British people, which is the unavoidable killing of innocent civilians in these attacks by British forces. Yet the indirectness in presenting this information stems

from the way by which modalised utterances are backgrounded while non-modalised ones are foregrounded in light of what presumably serves the purposes and ideologies of the speaker. This is quite significant since those seemingly factual utterances are not explicitly related to their underlying modal bases and this plays the central role in backgrounding the modal determinants for these utterances while foregrounding their outward factuality. In other words, and more specifically, while no doubt whatsoever overshadows the actual involvement of British forces in the action, the Prime Minister's confidence and pride in these forces and the internationality of the effort, there is considerable doubt concerning the certainty and hence the forcefulness regarding the justification for this action especially at the moral level, as well as the direct confirmed involvement of the party deemed to be the guilty one. In short, the point made here concerns what appears to be an inconsistency in the relationship between the varying degrees of importance of different topics and the amount of attention given to them. It is argued that most of those utterances that require a more urgent need to be presented as categorical are modalised and backgrounded, while the less urgent and significant ones are foregrounded and unmodalised.

The utterances placed under the High end of the epistemic continuum are divided into two main groups:

- 1) those which exhibit explicit subjectivity in the source of the judgement (10, 18, 45) and
- 2) those which are essentially non-factual in that they either make reference to a future incident which has not occurred yet (11, 14, 22, 28, 72, 74) or are based on an indirect judgement by the speaker concerning certain states of affairs (5, 6, 57).

The overall effects of these utterances are to communicate a high but not a categorical degree of certainty in the propositions put forward. This, of course, is characteristic of the “will + infinitive” construction which is the unmarked structure with utterances referring to future events, specifically those where the speaker is the subject of the main verb or directly responsible in making the decision of the agent. Yet, curiously enough, several utterances under this epistemic category express the speaker’s high degree of certainty in what *someone* or *something else* is doing whether it is the British people and the army (1, 5, 6, 57), as well as the terrorists whom the speaker is highly certain “will not do this” (14). For instance in the last utterance, the speaker communicates his high degree of certainty in his own judgement concerning what the Taliban are highly unlikely to do, a modalised judgement which serves as a basis for justifying military action.

Moreover, the speaker seems to make use (whether consciously or unconsciously) of the indeterminacy characteristic of modality. For instance, Blair’s statement (22), “I cannot disclose, obviously, how long this action will last...” carries several interpretations. One interpretation is that the Prime Minister has intentionally decided not to “disclose” such information mainly because it constitutes some sort of top-secret military information. This implies that the speaker has prior knowledge regarding the possibly planned duration of this operation, but prefers, through a conscious decision, not to disclose this knowledge. Another interpretation suggests his inability (or mere absence of possibility) to disclose such information since he is uncertain of how long it will last. This dual<sup>15</sup> interpretation is quite significant in that it outlines the difference between a forceful, reliable speaker who has everything planned and under control, and a less forceful, less reliable speaker who is uncertain

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<sup>15</sup> There is a third interpretation where “cannot disclose” is interpreted as “am not allowed to disclose”. Yet this interpretation seems quite improbable here since the PM is the head of government.

of the temporal margins of a mission he is proposing. At the same time, this possible multiplicity in interpretations can be seen to serve the interests of the speaker especially since the latter interpretation is quite probable. In other words, opening the possibility for an interpretation which portrays the speaker as reliable and certain is always a sought after effect especially when juxtaposed with the latter more probable interpretation. However, a deeper analysis of the modality in this utterance sheds serious doubt concerning this extremely crucial information as far as the British people are concerned.

In short, the main content areas placed under the High modality category of the epistemic scale are those communicating a high degree of modalised certainty in:

- 1) what the British people and army know and the way they feel,
- 2) the responsibility of the al Qaeda behind the terrorist attacks and how dangerous they are
- 3) the unwillingness of the Taliban to hand in these terrorists
- 4) the temporal boundaries of the mission and
- 5) the availability of air support for the American led mission.

Under the Median category of the epistemic scale are two hypothetical utterances which relate to the involvement of British forces in the military action. These exhibit lower modality in that their possible factuality is conditional on the availability of evidence and dependent on the overall British views of right and wrong. Yet again, as argued above, these modalised utterances set the grounds from which other non-modalised pseudo-factual implications are derived. This explains why they are placed under the Median category since the fulfilment of their

conditions is based on a subjective assurance of the availability of adequate incriminating evidence.

Finally, under the last category of the epistemic scale are low modality utterances which reflect the lowest commitment as to the truth-value and factuality of the propositions involved. These exhibit a combination of subjective and low modality verbs such as “I believe” (33), or they simply reveal the lack of certainty in what may happen as in “what the terrorists may seek to do” (58). Once more, what makes these uncertainties significant is the content area to which they relate. They communicate the lowest degrees of certainty and therefore strength and forcefulness when describing the state of the “coalition” and the possible actions of the Taliban, both of which are extremely critical issues which necessitate the utmost certainty.

In conclusion, the main picture that can be drawn from looking at Blair’s utterances as grouped under the epistemic scale is a very mixed one. While it exhibits a clear majority of non-modalised utterances, the far fewer modalised utterances have substantial effects on the overall strength and forcefulness of the speaker with regards to specific content areas. As discussed above, the issues which relate to the evidence, justifications, objectives and temporal parameters behind the campaign are either modalised (with the possible addition of a subjective reference) or they are factual deductions with modalised foundations. The other strictly factual non-modalised utterances communicate such matters as the Prime Minister’s pride and confidence in the British forces and the involvement of these forces in the action. They also relate information regarding the internationality of the effort as well as the absence of a connection between Islam and terrorism. Comparing the two in terms of how critical the issues are, it seems that the topics that are most likely to demand much higher certainty and forcefulness on behalf of the speaker are those which are receiving less.

Of course this can be justified and is understandable from a political point of view since while the speaker is uncertain about these issues, he is still under immense pressure to act in support of the USA.

Looking at those utterances grouped under the deontic scale (see table 4) the most obvious feature is the absence of direct commands. An analysis of the distribution of all the utterances under that scale yields four main categories. The first groups a set of indirect commands initiated by an unspecified protagonistic power, which the speaker associates with, and aimed at the Taliban (3, 4). These utterances portray their source as a forceful entity, assuming a superior power status than that of the receivers of the action. They are the origins of “an ultimatum ... delivered to the Taliban to yield up the terrorists” as well as a “choice” for them to “[side] with justice or ... terror”. In fact, the modal area here varies between a requirement-duty and a demand-obligation and is even quite close to a command-threat, hence the High classification in the deontic scale.

The second is a set of utterances where the speaker or other protagonist’s political or military powers are not the source of this deontic force, but its receivers. These are instances where the speaker, the British people and army, or other supporting nations are requested, required, or obliged to do perform some action (6, 8, 9, 14, 15, 17). In the first instance (6), it is the US which is making “a request that a number of UK military assets be used”. Although this is placed under the Low end of the scale, the request has greater force when considering the political context of situation and the power statuses of participants involved. The arrows showing the movement of this utterance towards the higher end of the scale reflect the very unlikely possibility (and even inability) that the UK refuse the US “request”. This would indicate that such a request could in fact have a stronger interpretation and

therefore stronger placement on the deontic scale having the force of a requirement, almost a demand. The existence of this possibility is signified by the arrows that move all the way to the High end of the scale.

Low	Med	High	Command
6- the US <u>made a specific request</u> that a number of UK military assets <u>be used</u> in the operation	→→→→→→→→→→→→→→→→ 1- I <u>want to pay tribute</u> at the outset to Britain's armed forces 2- ... <u>if I might</u> ... 8- the force <u>required in leading</u> this operation 10- I also <u>want to say</u> very directly to the British people why this <u>matters</u> so much directly to Britain. 11- First <u>let us not forget</u> that the attacks ... <u>represented</u> the worst terrorist outrage 12- So <u>we have a direct interest in acting</u> ... <u>to protect</u> British lives. 13- I <u>wish to say</u> finally ... that this is not a war with Islam. 14- Our prosperity and standard of living ... <u>require us to deal</u> with this threat. 16- I <u>should say</u> there is at present no threat 18- None of the leaders <u>want</u> war. None of our nations <u>want</u> it.	→→→→→→→→→→→→→→→→ 3- an ultimatum <u>was delivered</u> to the Taliban <u>to yield up</u> the terrorists or <u>face</u> the consequences. 4- They <u>were given</u> the choice of <u>siding</u> with justice or <u>siding</u> with terror 5- our <u>determination to do all we humanly can to avoid</u> civilian casualties 7- And <u>I gave authority</u> for these assets <u>to be deployed</u> 9- We <u>have to act</u> ... <u>to alleviate</u> the suffering of the Afghan people and <u>deliver</u> stability... 15- People <u>are bound to be concerned</u> 17- ... <u>we have to fight</u> . 19- so we <u>will act</u> . 20- The air assets <u>will be available for use</u> in the coming days 21- We <u>will not let up or rest</u> until our objectives <u>are met</u> in full.	→→  →→  →→

Table 4 representing Blair’s position on a scale of obligation

Then, under the Median category are two utterances (8, 14) where the UK and the US are also “required to deal” with the situation. And in both cases, the force behind this “requirement” is an inanimate subject. It is either an unknown source where the US and the UK are required, presumably by the need to act, to provide the necessary force (8), or it is “our prosperity and standard of living” which require the UK “to deal with the threat” (14). And finally, under the High category, the three utterances (9, 15, 17) also communicate similar information, where the people “are bound to be concerned” and where the UK and the US “have to act” and “have to fight” in order to help themselves as well as the Afghani people. These utterances



portray the receivers of these varying degrees of obligation as only reacting to higher forces and not initiators of any action since they are left with no choice.

The third set mainly communicates the desires of the speaker. The five utterances placed under the Median category are those reflecting the speaker's desire to "pay tribute ... to Britain's armed forces if [he] might" (1,2), "to say ... to the British people why this matters" (10), "to say ... that this is not a war with Islam" (13), and that "there is at present no threat" (16). As for the last utterance communicating this type of information, it is placed under the High end of the deontic scale as it reflects more than the speaker's desire but rather his "determination to do all we humanly can to avoid human casualties" (5).

Finally, the last set of utterances consists of a mixture of the second and third categories above; i.e. those which communicate the speakers' desires as well as their being required or even forced to perform an action. Utterances like "let us not forget that the attacks ... represented the worst terrorist outrage" (11), "we have a direct interest in acting ... to protect British lives" (12), and "none of the leaders want war" (18) reflect this mixed position of both desire as well as an imposed or even some sort of self imposed duty or obligation to act. These utterances are placed under the Median category of the deontic scale since they mark a relatively low degree of forcefulness to perform the actions desired/required. These can be interpreted as "we should not/ must not forget ..." (11) and "we want to and should act to protect ..." (12). As for the last utterance, this is moved towards the High end of the scale since the absence of desire becomes closer to an obligation. As this utterance (18) is preceded by a stronger utterance of obligation ("we have to fight"), not wanting to fight but doing it anyway suggests an extension of that interpretation; i.e. being forced into it. This is followed by the two concluding utterances placed under the High end

of the scale “so we will act” (19), and “we will not let up or rest until our objective are met in full” (21). These two communicate a mixture of the speaker’s desires and obligation, and here, even insistence that this does happen.

#### 6.4.4 Interpretations and Implications

In light of the ideologies of New Labour discussed above, this speech is quite a representative one. To begin with, the situation that Blair faces is in fact rather similar to that which New Labour faced in their campaign to win the elections in Britain. In other words, it is a highly complex situation reflecting the need to reconcile several variables in virtual opposition. In this sense, the language used in this speech does, in a way, attend to a familiar situation.

Two ideological poles reflect this opposition. On the one hand is the socialist moralistic ideology based on which a large part of New Labour’s national electoral support stems. This involves doing what is considered *right* and *moral* from the socialist as well as the humanitarian perspective. On the other, there are matters relating to economic globalisation which are issues in need of international rather than national support and which, in return, require political and economic ‘favours’. These revolve around the capitalist mentality of a profit-oriented economy mainly headed by the USA, a set of beliefs which can be in direct opposition with socialist ideology. Yet these two potentially conflicting views are reconciled through the role that the Taliban and al Qaeda play in the terrorist attacks. And it is done in the following manner.

First of all, the speech portrays the Taliban and al Qaeda as evil entities and organisations whose effects are seen in the September 11<sup>th</sup> attacks on the USA and where many British civilians died. In that, it establishes common ground through emphasising the destructive role of these two organisations which stands in stark

opposition common western moral ideologies. Following that, the British are forced to *react* in such a way to stop future inevitable attacks from such organisations. However, central to the argument is the use of modality in association with different information. The two very important issues which are presented using modality are a) the evidence that these organisations are indeed behind these attacks and b) the manner by which the British themselves can deal with the situation without falling into the ‘immoral’ trap themselves; i.e. by not killing as many, if not more, civilians on the other side of the conflict. These two issues are backgrounded through the use of low, medium or high modality, marginalizing both the evidence on the basis of which the attacks are justified as well as the moral question of the active British involvement in a potentially destructive war.

Moreover, the contrast in emphasis which Blair places on the actions of the Taliban as opposed to those of the British forces also contributes to that effect. Blair stresses the centrality of moral ideology only when describing the terrorist attacks as well as the drug problem in Britain which is directly related to the same group of terrorists. These issues are presented in the highest degrees of certainty through the absence of any form of modality. In contrast, the view that Britain might inflict death on innocent civilians is modalised to emphasise the low certainty that this might happen as well as to justify, or at least minimise it when it does happen.

As discussed above, despite the fact that such information is sometimes relatively high on the epistemic scale, it is very hard to justify any force less than that of factuality to serve as bases for waging a war. In other words, having undisclosed evidence (non-factual proof) which is backed (and therefore potentially masked) by the high socio-political status and power of the speaker might raise suspicion regarding the urgent need to wage war. Modalised utterances simply do not constitute

reliable bases for such a decision. Concurrently, utilising them in this specific situation does rhetorically demarcate the degree to which involvement is necessary.

It follows then that Blair's speech carries dualistic non-complementary justifications since it reflects a need to juggle and balance the ideologies of moral socialism, profit-oriented capitalism as well as a politically and morally conscious audience. There is an incessant need both to emphasise the link between moral and economic issues (where the al Qaeda and the Taliban are seen as a threat to human lives as well as the economy) as well as to present the situation at hand as imposed on the British (where the British are not and cannot, from a moral perspective, be initiators of it).

In short, the differences in the use of modality reflect the differences in the issues at hand. Modalised utterances relate to the evidence, justifications, objectives and temporal parameters behind the campaign while factual non-modalised utterances target such matters as the Prime Minister's pride and confidence in the British forces and their involvement in the action as well as the internationality of the effort and absence of a connection between Islam and terrorism. And the proportion of one to the other adds to the effects sought in the speech. Statistically speaking, non-modalised utterances greatly outnumber modalised ones, and this type of foregrounding (at the level of frequency) encourages an interpretative view of the text as a straightforward, categorical and forceful one. However, comparing the two in terms of how critical the issues are, it seems that the topics that are most likely to demand higher certainty and forcefulness on behalf of the speaker are the ones receiving less.

## 6.5 Conclusion

The aim of this chapter was to examine the different effects of the varying use of modality in reflecting the ideologies put forward by two political texts addressing the same political issue. After tracing the political backgrounds which the two speakers represent, the differences in the frequency, type of modal expressions, and degree of strength of these expressions between the two political speeches were analysed and interpreted. This was done in light of the enveloping ideologies of the two political parties, the varying audiences and the differences in the situation for each of the USA and the UK.

Comparing the texts with each other, I pointed out that both speeches initially reflect the ideologies of the political parties of which they are a part. In this light, Bush's speech was shown to exhibit clarity. It reflected not only the more straightforward ideologies of the Republican Party but also the more direct involvement of the USA in the attacks and therefore the expectations of the American people to take action against these attacks. This gave rise to Bush's propositions: that the USA will attack whom it thinks is behind the assault especially after that party failed to comply with US demands, a proposition reflected in the high frequency of deontic modality.

The overall use of modality in the Bush speech was seen to represent the speaker, and by extension the nation that backs him, as a very forceful one especially in his high certainty and emphaticness when describing the Afghani government as evil in its support for an evil organisation, when making a set of demands on them, and when both predicting and insisting that they will pay a price. This indicated his unquestionable belief in the justness of his own judgement concerning what

constitutes an evil entity, and when demanding that support from all other nations, thus indirectly forcing America's moral ideologies upon the rest of the world.

On the other hand, the speaker's position becomes weaker when addressing other issues. He seems to open the possibility that this mission may not completely achieve its objectives as reflected in his uncertainty about the impact the war will have on the Afghani government and the al Qaeda network. Still, insisting that the terrorists will "pay a price", he settles for that objective rather than bringing them to justice. As discussed above, this highlights the higher degree of importance that Bush (and by extension the Republican Party and the American people) pays to immediate and direct punishment in contrast with long-term justice, a position which falls in line with the radical Christian right leanings of the Republican Party. In other words, he is under no pressure to justify the mission at the moral level mainly because of the direct involvement of the USA in the September the 11<sup>th</sup> terrorist attacks which creates a sense of urgency to react. As a result, even in his uncertainty, Bush has a relatively strong position.

In short, the image of Bush that seems to be projected as a result of this variety in degrees of modal strength is his might as a world leader whose cause is just and supported both nationally and internationally regardless of the effects that the war might have on the rest of the world.

Blair's speech, on the other hand, involves more variables and is therefore less singular in purpose. Yet it too falls in line with the ideologies of New Labour and the Third Way which seeks to reconcile the morality of socialism and the economic market forces of capitalism. This is evident in the varying use of modality to reflect the altering strength and forcefulness of the speaker concerning the issues at hand. Blair is most certain and thus forceful when announcing the involvement of British

forces in the action, his pride and confidence in them, the need for the action and the internationality of the effort. Yet as argued above, the less certain but highly relevant moral issues are backgrounded by the use of modality and drowned by the overwhelming majority of non-modalised utterances. While non-modalised utterances relate to those matters mentioned above as well as the absence of a connection between Islam and terrorism, modalised utterances target the evidence, justifications, objectives and temporal parameters behind the campaign. And the proportion of one to the other adds to the effects sought in the speech. The vast majority of non-modalised utterances in comparison to modalised ones suggests a reading of the text as a straightforward, categorical and forceful one. However, this lies in contrast with the criticalness of the issues involved. As concluded earlier, it seems that the topics that are most likely to demand higher certainty and forcefulness on behalf of the speaker are the ones receiving less.

Of course, the motive behind Blair's use of modality also springs from the disparity in the situation between the USA and the UK. As mentioned above, the urgency for military action which arises out of the directness of involvement of the two countries is quite different. Moreover, the ideologies of the two ruling parties as well as the differences in the audience in each country makes it particularly important for Blair to convincingly justify war for the British people while this is not of equal weight for Bush. All this is handled by the use of modality.

In conclusion, this chapter has tried to present practical examination of the central role modality plays in analysing political ideologies in political texts. This was done through a systematic analysis of the two different types and of modality and the way these reflect the speakers' types and degrees of involvement and authority. The placement of each modal expression under one or more categories of each or both

scales depended on each unique context and the way that particular context of use. This allowed for controlled variance in different interpretations which, I argued, was characteristic of a pragmatic view of discourse. More importantly, however, this served as a practical method by which the role of the reader in text analysis is realistically and practically considered. To summarise, by considering all those factors relating to the producers of the texts (along with their backgrounds and ideological affiliations), the texts (in the contexts of their writing and delivery) and the readers (as influenced by socio-cultural/political/economic factors), and through a reading of modality in these texts, the speakers' levels of involvement and authority were analysed. This ultimately helped determine the speakers' ideological positions towards specific information and beliefs on the one hand, and towards their relationships with others on the other.



## VII Modality, Ideology and Scientific Discourse

### 7.1 Introduction

The historical view of Science as a field of enquiry has always placed it in virtual opposition with literature, on the one hand, and with religion, on the other. In the first case, contrasting science with literature symbolised the stereotypical split between ‘rational’ and ‘objective’ detachment on one end, and ‘emotional’ and ‘subjective’ involvement on the other. The effects of this split following the “scientific revolution” in Europe lead to people feeling quite “disturbed by the picture that science presented, of a universe regulated by automatic physical laws and of a vast gulf between humanity and the rest of nature” (Halliday 1993: 2). Science had certainly enlarged the size of the universe; however, it had turned it into “a lifeless machine, which worked by forces that could be expressed in mathematical formulae, not in poetry” (Davie 1963: 2). This was referred to as “the paradox of classical science” since while science was seen to initiate “a successful dialogue with nature”, the first outcome of this dialogue was “the discovery of a silent world” (Prigogine and Stengers 1984: 6). In their book *Order out of Chaos*, Prigogine and Stengers write:

[science] revealed to men a dead, passive nature, a nature that behaves as an automation which, once programmed, continues to follow the rules inscribed in the program. In this sense the dialogue with nature isolated man from nature instead of bringing him closer to it. A triumph of human reason onto a sad truth. It seemed that science debased everything it touched.

(Prigogine and Stengers 1984: 6)

From a scientific perspective, what was judged as ‘real’ was, therefore, “what could be measured, weighed, and expressed in numbers” (Davie 1963: 2). Unlike literature which focused on the emotional, experiential and sensual aspects to life, science presented a stark contrast of a dry, lifeless “mechanistic universe run on

mathematical principles and devoid of colour, scent, taste and sound” (Davie 1963: 1).

Viewing science as standing in opposition with religion, on the other hand, reflected the threat that science posed to the dominant religious powers at different times and its direct challenge to religion’s sometimes totalitarian authority. The reason for that threat was that science provided an alternative way of perceiving the world and how it operated; i.e. a new understanding of the world and a more ‘rational’ account of many previously unexplained natural phenomena. This largely affected people’s lives, sometimes in extreme ways whereby science became the new religion. Such effects in the developments of the numerous fields of science, especially at earlier stages of scientific evolution, can be easily traceable in the altering modes of thinking of societies at different times. According to Aronowitz (1988: 129) for instance, “the Enlightenment and its aftermath imposed the rigors of scientific thought” upon the whole of society in a fashion resembling the traditions of religious institutions. Instead of regarding science and its rules as one mode of thinking among others, “instrumental reason became the only possible mode of thinking, and all other modes were relegated to the realm of myth”, especially those of religion (Aronowitz 1988: 129).

In line with the guiding view adopted in this thesis, i.e. that all texts are essentially ideological, science and scientific discourse<sup>16</sup> seem to address the issue of ideology in a unique way. While political discourse explicitly addresses ideological issues, literary discourse (the examples selected for analysis) was seen target ideological matters in an implicit manner. Here, scientific discourse seems not to fall within any of these categories. Indeed, historically, science seems to occupy the status

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<sup>16</sup> As will be explained later, the development in the field of science is hard to separate from that of scientific discourse.

of an objective truth-oriented field of inquiry whose ultimate goal is the understanding of human and natural phenomena as they are. This consequently gives the impression that science is that field of inquiry which has no ideological motivation except the good of all.

In the light of this argument, the multiple aims of this chapter are the following: firstly, I wish to argue against this historical notion of science and scientific discourse based on more recent Post-Marxist views. Secondly, I aim to assess the way modality functions and is utilised in scientific discourse and how that relates to the ideological commitments of the two texts under study. Finally, and in line with the view adopted in this thesis, I argue that ideologies and possible ideological struggles in discourse are not always political struggles whose main objective is political hegemony.

## **7.2 Science, Truth and Objectivity: A Historical Review**

The evolution of science was the evolution of scientific thought. The evolution of science was ... the evolution of scientific grammar.

(Halliday 1993: 12)

The type and level of interdependence of the field of science, scientific discourse, scientific language and the philosophy of science on one another are rather intricate in that their development has historically been interrelated. Commenting on this interrelationship, Sankey (Forthcoming: 1) describes the “linguistic aspects of science” as key factors in almost all topics in science, “from the topics of confirmation and explanation to those of laws of nature and the dynamics of theory change”. Moreover, one of the main areas of interest in the philosophy of science is “the semantic and epistemic features of scientific discourse” which are mainly

concerned with the traditional philosophical/linguistic Fregean ‘sense’ and ‘reference’ of the vocabulary used by scientists. Hence, the centrality and importance of using the most suitable and appropriate language and terminology in scientific discourse reflects not only the importance of precision as a fundamental quality in scientific description but also the precision of science in general and therefore, its image as a reliable field of inquiry.

In fact, historically speaking, major views in scientific theory have been highly influenced by, and have sometimes even sprung from, philosophical and linguistic arguments concerning the objectives and methodologies of science. One of the earliest is that of the logical positivists which was the dominant view between the 1920s and 1930s<sup>17</sup>. This group mainly argued that the bases for scientific data were “sense-data”, and therefore, the central theme of logical positivism in Sankey’s words is “the principle of verifiability” (Forthcoming: 5). This view had its toll on scientific circles from within since “verificationism” became indeed the central objective and methodology adopted by physicists, for example, to gain general acceptance in these circles and beyond (Forthcoming: 5). At that time, verificationism proved as one arbitrator for differentiating between valid sciences and invalid ones, valid arguments and invalid ones. This meant that metaphysics, for instance, was dismissed as “meaningless nonsense” since metaphysical claims about a transcendent reality lying beyond experience were essentially unverifiable (Sankey Forthcoming: 6).

The verifiability of claims by reference to sense-data meant that science sprang from what was considered “indubitable data” and such data can therefore “be described in a *neutral observation-language* independent of all theories” (Barbour 1974: 94). Emphasis was therefore laid on “*observation* and its independence from

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<sup>17</sup> Logical positivism has usually been regarded as an extreme form of empiricism.

theory” (Barbour 1974: 94). Then, experimental verification served as the main ‘objective’ criterion for judging between rival theories. In short, the positivists’ accounts of science which were prevalent during that time defended the ‘objectivity’ of science through three claims:

- 1- that science starts from “publicly observable data which can be described in a pure observation-language independent of any theoretical assumptions”,
- 2- that theories can therefore be “verified or falsified by comparison with this fixed experimental data”,
- 3- and that the choice between rival theories is “rational, objective, and in accordance with specifiable criteria” (Barbour 1974: 92-93).

As a result, whether implicitly or explicitly stated, science was equated with *the truth*, and this, according to Aronowitz (1988: viii) meant that science was “held immune from the influences of social and historical situations”. This dominant view that “the aim of science is to discover the truth about an objective reality, and that scientific progress consists in an increasing convergence on the truth about such a reality” (Sankey Forthcoming: 22) remained the prevalent one until the 1950s.

In the 1950s, a milder and modified version of ‘empiricism’ sprang from philosophers of science like Nagel, Hempel, Braithwaite and Popper who argued for two distinct levels in science: an unproblematic lower level of unchanging, objective data, “describable in a pure observation language on which all observers can agree” and a separate upper level of theoretical constructs, acknowledged as “products of man’s creative imagination” (Barbour 1974: 94).

This first level of science, for Popper (1959: 36), is established by statements that can be subjected to refutation, or “empirical validation”. Although there might be some serious and often profound “disputes of interpretation” within “true science”, there is a common basis which “all scientists share” and that is the “method” which underlies all scientific endeavours (Popper 1959: 36). This dominance of shared methods is what guarantees “the reliability of what counts as science” and it can be reduced to two procedures:

- a- mathematical calculation, and
- ḃ- experimental validation/falsification of results.

These two work hand in hand in that the role of mathematics is to ensure “the rigor of investigation, establishing measurable relations” while that of experimentalism is to “[restore] to observation its role as final arbiter of knowledge” (Aronowitz 1988: 8). Here, again, experimental data was seen to fulfil the role of the unbiased final arbitrator testing the validity of theories in a neutral manner. And the most important criterion in doing so is “the number and variety of *supporting experimental observations*” (Barbour 1974: 92). This means that a theory is valued if it “accurately accounts for known observations and yields precise predictions of future measurements” (Barbour 1974: 92).

It follows that for most scientists contemporaneous with post-positivist thought, the experimental method was believed to be “ideology-proof” and constituted the only device to ensure the neutrality of inquiry with respect to interests that contaminate the results (Aronowitz 1988: 149). This is the case since the truth claims of science are “tied to the methodological imperative” which are directly founded on and constituted of these unarguable agreed-upon bases. (Aronowitz 1988: viii). This ideology promotes a definition of science as “the concatenation of

empirical and a priori mathematical knowledge whose determining moment is independent experience” (Aronowitz 1988: 239). The only troublesome level of science was the second theoretical one since it was possibly subject to a priori ideological influence. However, this level was completely disregarded as less important by shifting emphasis to the first empirical level with which “true science” was concerned (Popper 1959: 36).

Even the highly sceptical Marxist theory shared this scientific understanding and its ideology. According to Aronowitz (1988: 37), Marxism treated empirical scientific theory and the development of technology “as an outgrowth of these sciences that arise from observation and experiment rather than from ideologically mediated institutions”. In fact, Marxism believed only in a partial ideological basis to science. While it acknowledged the possibility that the findings of science could be used to serve the purposes of one class with one dominant ideology, it did not recognise the ideological sub-basis for scientific research in the first place. In Aronowitz’ (1988: 38) words, Marxist theory has not generally acknowledged the way in which “bourgeois” social relations “influence the relations of humans to nature, determine or condition the nature of scientific discovery, and provide a basis for a critique of the methodology of the sciences”.

Based on such opinions, even these moderate views of science were subject to mounting criticism in the 1960s. The argument gaining increasing credibility was that the “expectations” and “conceptual commitments” of both scientists and non-scientists influence perceptions whether in everyday life or in science (Barbour 1974: 95). At every stage of a scientific experiment, the scientist’s presuppositions influence the way she formulates a problem, the kind of apparatus she builds, and which variable she considers important. In other words, the theory in light of which a

scientist is working permeates observation, and this is reflected in the language in which observations are reported. There are, in brief, “*no bare uninterpreted data*” (Barbour 1974: 95).

In line with this view, the late 1950s and early 1960s witnessed the rise of the historical school of the philosophy of science which highlighted “developmental and contextual aspects of science” in what Sankey (Forthcoming: 10) calls “the historical turn”. In a direct challenge to the earlier empiricists’ views that anything that can be theorised is based on corresponding “sense-data”, the first counter-argument put forward by the historical school is that science does not always deal directly with natural phenomena. As Von Weizsacker (1980: 183) points out, theoretical physics, for instance, “may posit phenomena for which the data not only are unavailable but cannot be observed or measured”. For reasons of physical difficulty of experimenting with the primary system or the sheer abstractness of the system, scientific models are used to serve as a practically manageable representation or illustration of the system under study. Of course, as Barbour (1974) rightly argues, the model can bring into prominence only certain aspects of the world while other aspects are neglected. This means that science models are highly selective since they allow scientists to deal with only restricted aspects of scientific and natural phenomena. Moreover, the fact that science deals with the unobservable means that the claim that scientific models lead to theories which can be tested against observations does not always stand.

Another counter-argument put forward by Kuhn (1962: 94, 103) stressed that individual scientific theories are developed within the context of a set of underlying theoretical assumptions which he termed “paradigms”. These underlying bases for the thought and action of a scientific community, its “paradigms”, are defined as “standard examples of scientific work which embody a set of conceptual,



methodological and metaphysical assumptions” (Kuhn 1962: 94). This meant that scientific theory is both paradigm and context dependent, and consequently, as the history of science shows, scientific ‘method’ according to the historical school is also “open to revision” and change as ‘theory’ is (Sankey Forthcoming: 12). Such change during a scientific revolution is, however, hardly “a matter of logical argument” but rather “of conversion” (Kuhn 1962: 103).

In short, in their rejection of the three initial claims of the logical positivists, and the paradigms of the post-positivist empiricists, the three counter-claims advanced by the historical movement are:

- 1- that “*all data are theory-laden*; there is no neutral observation-language”,
- 2- that “*theories are not verified or falsified*; when data conflicts with an accepted theory, they are usually set to one side as anomalies, or else auxiliary assumptions are modified”,
- 3- and that “*there are no criteria for choice between rival theories* of great generality, for the criteria are themselves theory-dependent” (Barbour 1974: 93).

And the main point in this latest movement is to stress the ideological underlying basis for all levels of scientific research: scientific theories, scientific data, scientific methods and scientific language. While Wittgenstein (1968) maintains that observation is “theory laden”, Heisenberg (1958: 9) concludes that, *facts* “are theory, language, and technique laden, making *relations*, not things, the true object of inquiry in contemporary science”. Thus, the main critical issue remains whether and to what extent that which is considered as scientific knowledge is subordinate to ideology/power, not only in relation to the social conditions necessary for its

emergence development or its political and social uses, but also and more importantly with respect to the constitution of scientific facts, laws and methodology.

### 7.2.1 Scientific Discourse, Power and Ideology

As mentioned above, the different views regarding the relationship between science, objectivity and the truth came about and developed more from the philosophy of science and discourse *on* science rather than the discourse *of* science. Indeed, philosophers of science like Wittgenstein and Heisenberg were the ones who highlighted the direct relationship between language and scientific terminology. It was they who pointed out that the language used in interpreting the data and which “supplies the categories of interpretation” is just as “influenced by prior theories” as the finding themselves (Aronowitz 1988: 250). Consequently, in line with the main view adopted in this thesis concerning the dialectical relationship between language and ideology, the position taken on in this chapter is that the underlying theory not only influences ‘observation’ and the methods of undertaken in science, but also the language that frames and reports what is seen. In other words, the ‘names’ for the observed in science are generated by language which can in turn be theory-laden (Aronowitz 1988: 250). As Halliday (1993: 8) adequately phrases it:

The language of science is, by its nature, a language in which theories are constructed; its special features are exactly those which make theoretical discourse possible. But this clearly means that the language is not passively reflecting some pre-existing conceptual structure; on the contrary, it is actively engaged in bringing such structures into being. (Halliday 1993: 8)

Therefore, science – just like any type of discourse – cannot be free of historical and discursive presuppositions. Here, the main outcome of the presence of these presuppositions is an overall undermining of the autonomous power of science and its claims of truth and objectivity. As Aronowitz (1988: viii-ix) suggests, the

claim of authority by science can result only from science's alleged "possession of legitimate knowledge, of which scientific discourses are supreme" and is sustainable only within that argument. Such power, I argue, has been achieved in scientific discourse through several layers of distancing and self-isolation.

From a Hallidayan multifunctional view, looking at the question of distance is reflected in the relationship between linguistic and social structures (particularly ideology). According to Halliday (1993; 1998), science seems to make use of linguistic choices and features namely "nominalisation" for two distinct ideological/functional purposes:

Ideationally, the nominalising grammar creates a universe of things, bounded, stable and determinate; and (in place of process) of relations between the things. Interpersonally, it sets itself apart as a discourse of the expert, readily becoming a language of power and technocratic control. In both aspects, it creates maximum distance between technical scientific knowledge and the experience of daily life.

(Halliday 1998: 228)

A similar view is adopted by Kress (1985: 57) who argues that "the ideology of science insists on ... objectivity" since historically speaking, the traditional aim of science has been the 'objective' uncovering of the truth behind natural phenomena. This claim of non-ideological commitment, therefore, is reflected and reinforced by what Kress (1985: 57) describes as "the appearance of immutable truth and factuality to the statements of science". This according to Kress (1985: 57) typically characterises the structure of scientific discourse.

Another angle of looking at the issue of distance in the discourse of science, is Aronowitz's (1988: 147) argument that today's scientific circles are heavily reliant on "the notations of mathematics" and "adaptations of symbolic logic", and this is seen as a quality exclusive to intellectuals, and more specifically, to those who have undergone the necessary education in accredited institutions. In such scientific circuits, ordinary language, its syntax and characteristic modes of utterance give way

to mathematics and specialised discourses, which in fact “count as scientific knowledge” (Aronowitz 1988: 148). In this sense, the general view of science which emerges is that where science is seen to concern itself not with “‘meaning,’ only with truth, which [in turn] is construed as the conformity of a proposition to the outcome of a procedure of scientific experiment” (Aronowitz 1988: 148). And all this is accessible only to that very exclusive group mentioned.

Moreover, this exclusivity brings out further related arguments which complete the circle of distancing and self-isolation and intensify the view that science belongs to a close-knit circle of intellectuals. Such arguments highlight science’s claims of “self-referentiality” where the only possible criticism of science would have to spring from within the boundaries of its own normative structures. This means that “only those inducted, by means of training and credentials, into its community are qualified to undertake whatever renovations the scientific project requires” (Aronowitz 1988: viii). Indeed, science’s legitimatisation of its power has been achieved and is achievable through its claims of “self-referentiality” (Aronowitz 1988: viii).

This view of science as a type of discourse with special languages, rules of investigation, and forms of inquiry that determine the form of the result reinforces the ideology which equates science with the truth. And it is the type of linguistic distancing discussed above which serves as one central tool utilised by scientific discourse in order to maintain its authoritative status.

### **7.2.2 Scientific Discourse and Modality**

Rephrasing the conclusions reached above, the use of mathematical notations and symbolic logic in the language of science are two main characteristics which

serve the objective of helping maintain science's authoritative status. Moreover, the use of nominalised structures (Halliday 1993; 1998) and of passive structures (Kress 1985) are two specific linguistic structures which achieve the distance-power effect. Yet another prominent but less discussed area, which surfaces more visibly in light of the sometimes-incompatible views discussed above, is the use of modality. In light of the importance of the role and functions of modality in this thesis, the next issues to address are the manner by which scientific discourse utilises modality and the effects of its use on the field of science in general.

Modality is a central notion in science and scientific discourse since according to Blackburn (1986: 127), science deals more with necessities and less with facts. The centrality of the concept of modality is evident, to begin with, in standard scientific deductions where modality is a common feature in the phrasing of these statements. As Blackburn (1986: 119) argues, "conclusions properly drawn" in science "*must* be true when the premises are" (emphasis mine). And this is quite common in scientific, especially mathematical, theorems which are more often phrased as *necessarily* true rather than being plainly true. The reason for the presence of modality, according to Quine (1986), is that the truth of scientific deductions depends on the truth of underlying premises, which in turn is based exclusively on the criterion of "obviousness".

The criterion of obviousness is, nonetheless, problematic on two levels. First, being 'obvious' is a relative circumstantial evaluation since while the expression "'it is raining' is obvious *only* in particular circumstances; '1+1=2' is 'obvious outright'" (Blackburn 1986: 129). Secondly, regarding "'1+1=2' as necessary" is more because "we have chosen to do so" rather than because "we *have* to do so" (Blackburn 1986: 128). This means that the very bases on which scientific deductions rely are in effect a

set of agreed upon presuppositions rather than outright 'obvious' objective facts.

Here, the underlying conditions for the obviousness in " $1+1=2$ " is an agreement on what '1' and '2' stand for as well as on the relationship of addition and equality, all of which are agreed upon constants, on the basis of which and in relation to which different variables function. In short, the criterion of obviousness constitutes the bases for what count as "paradigms" in Kuhn's (1962) terminology and is therefore not always an effective way assessing the truth-value of propositions because of its partial subjective nature. This partly subjective assessment is directly linked to the notion of modality, and this means that modality is a central notion in describing scientific, particularly mathematical notions and theorems.

Of course, the use of modality, which reflects different degrees of subjectivity, indeterminacy, certainty and authority, is not done in the same way in all branches of science. The type and level of modality utilised by different scientific fields depends on how 'factual' and 'objective' a particular field regards itself and is regarded to be. On a scale of subjectivity, and influenced by positivists and post positivist scientific theory, there is a tendency to view mathematics as the purer, more objective/pure form of science while other forms are less objective/pure. This scale becomes, in fact, a continuum of 'scientificness', where mathematics occupies one end while social sciences the other. And this is the case since mathematics is founded on a limited number of axioms (paradigms of mathematics) which constitute a recognised *factual* bases of mathematics (Lindberg 2002: personal communication).

However, even with those axioms which are agreed upon at the intersubjective level within the field of mathematics and the sub-group of mathematicians, there are other groups of mathematicians (such as the constructivist group) who do not approve on all these bases (Lindberg 2002: personal communication). In other words, even

with 'extreme' and 'pure' science, those 'objective' bases do not constitute completely reliable, agreed-upon footing. This makes axioms in mathematics a set of agreed-upon presuppositions constituting pseudo-factual foundations on which mathematical theorems are based. And this explains why even within this least subjective field of science (mathematics), there are few factual non-modalised statements. In fact, mathematical theorems are mostly made up of "necessary-sufficient" conditional statements. As Blackburn (1986: 127) concludes, in science "we allow possibilities, rule out impossibilities, and insist upon necessities". Science is, in brief, a field of inquiry which is based on the modalities of subjectivity, possibility and necessity, and the language of scientific discourse reflects these bases. Therefore, modality should be present in the 'purest' sciences as well as social sciences.

Moreover, another and a principal dimension to the presence of modality in scientific discourse is the role of ideology in science. This is an extension of the previously discussed philosophical views of science. On the one hand, there is the unchallengeable authority of scientific enquiry which springs from the certainty and objectivity claims of positivist thought. This is reflected through science's non-modalised, nominalised and passivised statements of facts stressing the "immutable truth and factuality" of science, and an ideology of objectivity as referred to by Kr ss (1985: 57). On the other hand, more recent scientific discourse reflects two conflicting views and directions in science. The first is that which pushes for the authority and strength of the more objective, less ideologically motivated quests in scientific research and experimentation. The second is a view which reflects the weakness of the partiality of scientific knowledge and the underlying ideological determinants for scientific research.

However, the relative modal weakness that reflects the uncertainty and partiality of scientific knowledge is, as I argue in detail below, what guarantees the continuity of science as we know it. In the interest of accuracy to scientific findings, the use of modality in the discourse of science plays a central role in acknowledging science's uncertainties, thus both maintaining the view that the 'truth' is its ultimate goal as well as drawing a clear dividing line between what is considered indisputable evidence (non-modalised, nominalised and objective-passive utterances) and that considered experimental (modalised, yet still nominalised, objective-passive utterances). This, I claim, falls in line with what I see as an ideology of *preservation*, a preservation of the traditional dichotomy between scientificness and non-scientificness, and the *continuity* of science.

Therefore, in line with these arguments and claims, the aim of the next section is to practically explore the role of modality in reflecting the ideologies in two scientific texts. The main objective is to show how, through a systematic analysis of the way modality is utilised in these two scientific texts, different ideologies are communicated, and whether these ideologies reflect the positions brought up by the philosophical arguments discussed above. This will start, however, by first introducing and justifying the choice of the two scientific texts selected for the analyses.

### **7.3 Texts and Backgrounds**

The two texts chosen for analysis are those targeting the issue of the role of vitamins in nutrition and combating disease. The first text is a selection from a scientific article entitled "Modification of Neoplastic Process by Vitamin A and Retinoids" (1984) found in the edited book, *Recent Vitamin Research* (see appendix



6). This book is essentially a collection of scientific articles targeting a highly specific audience who is supposedly familiar with the jargon of that particular field of science. It is an article written by a medical doctor addressing the medical circle.

The second is a selection from a text on a website which essentially deals with nutritional products including vitamin supplements. Although this text also discusses the role of vitamins in nutrition and fighting disease, it is not targeted at a restricted group of readers. This is suggested through its presence on a website with easy access as well as through the elaborate explanation in non-scientific jargon of any use of scientific terminology, probably to make its comprehension more accessible. The title of the article is “Homocysteine and Cardiovascular Health” (1998) and it is also written by a Ph.D. holder although no specification is made whether the author is a medical doctor (see appendix 7).

Both texts are therefore comparable in that they target a very similar topic: vitamins and their nutritional and disease combating properties. Their areas of difference, however, are essentially related to the type of audiences they target as well as the way information is displayed in each article. The first one, which targets a highly specified audience, is quite descriptive. It describes a number of experimental processes, findings and conclusions which deal with the possible associations between vitamin A and a skin curing process. This is done in a highly speculative manner acknowledging the limitations of the field’s knowledge. The second text, while also being descriptive, is nevertheless significantly more argumentative. It argues for a specific view concerning the positive effects of vitamins and consequently the link between vitamins and vitamin supplements.

In this sense, and as will be shown later, while the ideologies of the first text do not greatly depart from those more traditional claims of scientific discourse

mentioned above (and discussed in more detail below), the underlying commercial bases behind the second text seem to determine its ideological affiliation. These readings are clarified through a systematic analysis of modality in both texts and how modality reflects the ideological positions of each text. First, however, it is crucial to justify the choice of the selected texts in the light of the historical views of science introduced above and the inseparability of science as a field of inquiry and the language of scientific discourse.

The main reason the general area of ‘vitamin research’ was selected is due to its high controversiality in the views of many experts in the field. This controversy can be seen to go to the roots of what are considered by many as the unshakable foundations of our knowledge about vitamins and nutrition: “the guidelines for Recommended Dietary Allowances (RDA)” (Tolonen 1990: 35). In his book *Vitamins and Minerals in Health and Nutrition*, Tolonen (1990: 36) argues that although RDA constitutes the core of our reference, “very few people, and this includes most doctors, really know what the recommendations are based on, or precisely how these figures are arrived at”. In fact, the bases on which RDAs stand are not only over 60 years old, but also arise from ways of experimentation which are referred to as “nutritional experiments” (Tolonen 1990: 38). Such experiments, according to Tolonen (1990: 38, 39) were either methodologically flawed, or took animals as their subjects knowing that animals react very differently to different vitamins than humans do. In short, “our knowledge about vitamin and mineral requirements is so lacking” that dietary experts and “many doctors tend to be of the opinion that a varied diet is sufficient, and that food supplements are therefore unnecessary” (Tolonen 1990: 36, 38).

The same argument is made by Bender (1980: 40) who concludes by saying “there is no evidence that these [vitamins] are necessary, but equally there is no

evidence that they are harmful (apart from the possibility of massive, toxic overdoses)”. The controversial nature of the general area of research (i.e. that referred to by Bazerman (1998: 17) as “science-in-the-making”) from which the two texts are selected is what constitutes the main interest for analysis. This interest springs from Bazerman’s (1998: 17) view that this controversial science would be “deeply competitive and contentious, [while] science-once-made appears co-operative and harmonious”. In other words, both texts should exhibit certain ideological struggles, possibly inconsistencies, which an analysis of modality can potentially help shed light on.

## 7.4 Analysis 1

As discussed earlier, the first text is a selection from a scientific article written by a medical doctor addressing the medical circle, a highly specific audience who should at least be familiar with the jargon of that particular field of science. In that, the level of formality of the text is very high and this is exemplified in the overall absence of the first person pronoun. Also, the text is generally less argumentative and more descriptive, addressing a number of experimental processes, findings and conclusions that deal with the possible associations between vitamin A and a process which cures skin disease.

The first noticeable aspect of text 1 (as far as modality is concerned) is the presence of a vast majority of non-modalised factual utterances. This reinforces the view that scientific discourse is essentially concerned with presenting relatively factual descriptions of the workings of science, where science characteristically deals with natural phenomena as well as with experiments on these phenomena conducted in a systematic, methodological way.

Another prevalent characteristic of the text is the predominance of passive structures which also contributes to the sense of objectivity highlighted through describing scientific processes and findings. Therefore, both the factuality of unmodalised utterances along with the uninvolved objectivity of passive structures overwhelming projected in this text play the leading role in reflecting the degree of knowledge communicated and the power associated with that knowledge. The combined effects of these two features ultimately underline the force and forcefulness of the information in the text.

Yet the overall picture of the presentation of knowledge throughout text 1 is not that constant. Going through both the modalised and non-modalised utterances systematically, the following features concerning the positions conveyed in the article arise. Under the factuality end of the scale, the utterances presented in the highest degree of authority relate to two main areas. The first is a set of definitions of certain biochemical categories such as vitamin A (2) and retinol reductase (4). The second is a set of factual descriptions of states and techniques which, presumably, constitute generally agreed-upon, intersubjective-factual bases in the medical/biochemical world. They describe processes by which certain bio-chemical reactions occur and their well-known effects such as the fact that “Retinol is ... re-esterified with unsaturated fatty acids and transported in chylomicrons to the liver” (6). These are straightforward groupings (see table 1).

The groupings of utterances under the modalised branches of the epistemic scale are, on the other hand, not that straightforward. These constitute of a set of utterances which are graded in terms of the level of confessed knowledge or ignorance associated with different hypothetical situations. These are either entirely

contemplative situations or ones based on variant types and degrees of supporting evidence: whether direct explicit evidence, perceptions or other scientific suggestions.

Low	Med	High	Factuality
25-If epoxidation is blocked, the function of retinoic acid is not inhibited, <b>suggesting</b> that epoxidation is not a necessary metabolic step for biological activity. 27-The 4-oso and 5,6-epoxy metabolites <b>appear to have less</b> biological activity than retinoic acid. 29-Oxidation of retinoic acid is <b>believed to be mediated</b> by a cytochrome P-type enzyme system. 31- ... and <b>may be</b> either an active metabolite or a tolerated modification. 32-The <b>suggestion</b> has been made that glucuronida-tion ensures conservation of vitamin A in the body by enterohepatic circulation;	<b>→→→→</b> 13-this protein associates with prealbumin, <b>presumably</b> to form a larger molecule that is not filtered by the glomerulus. 21-However <b>recent evidence suggests</b> that retinoic acid stimulates testosterone production by Leydig cells in the testis. 26-The reaction is <b>probably</b> a non-specific lipid peroxidation reaction. 37- Liver stores of vitamin A are <b>probably</b> the best index of vitamin A status; <b>→→→→</b> 38-plasma levels of vitamin A <b>show</b> little correlation with dietary intake and	5- <b>there is evidence</b> of reduced conversion of β-carotene to retinol in zinc deficiency. 15- ...and <b>estimation</b> of retinol-binding protein in urine <b>has recently been proposed</b> as a means of detecting disturbed renal tubular function. 19- <b>There is evidence</b> that retinol is metabolized to retinoic acid in several species; 20-retinoic acid has all the biological properties of retinol except that it <b>will not</b> support vision and reproductive functions. 44- <b>There is evidence</b> that the low serum vitamin A is due to increased renal loss in these circumstances	1-Animal species lack the biochemical pathways necessary to synthesize the carotenoid structure, a precursor of vitamin A. 2-Vitamin A is a generic term for compounds with the biological activity of retinal and was initially called fat-soluble A, as it is absorbed in the small intestine with lipids. 3-Carotenoids are likewise absorbed and are split in the intestinal mucosa into two molecules of retinal which is then reduced to retinol. 4-Retinol reductase is a zinc-dependent enzyme and 6-Retinol is then re-esterified with unsaturated fatty acids and transported in chylomicrons to the liver. 7-At the liver, the ester linkage is hydrolysed and the molecule enters the liver cells as retinol, where it is re-esterified and stored associated with lipid droplets. 8-The esterification of retinol is analogous to that of other cellular lipids, such as cholesterol, and is catalysed by fatty acyl coenzyme A retinol acyl transferase. 9-Much retinol (19% of liver vitamin A) is found in high molecular weight lipoprotein complex in rat liver cytosol; this complex also contains the cytosol – retinol-binding protein, retinyl palmitate hydrolase as well as triolein, cholesterol oleate, and dipalmitoyl phosphatidylcholine hydrosylase activities. 10-The complex was isolated by gel filtration and ultracentrifugation, but it may represent an artifact generated during tissue homofenization. 11-The principal liver cell involved in storage of retinol is the Ito or stellate cell which <b>can be found</b> in the space of Disse adjacent to the sinusoids. 12-If retinol is required by the peripheral tissues, it is transported by a retinol-binding protein, which is synthesized in the liver and migrates with the serum globulins; 14-The retinol-binding protein concentration in plasma and plasma retinol is increased in chronic renal disease... 16-Retinol-binding protein interacts with specific cell surface receptors at the retinol requiring peripheral tissues. 17-Free retinol exerts a detergent-like action on membranes and is responsible for vitamin A toxicity effects. 18- The synthesis and secretion of retinol-binding protein is regulated by vitamin A status, which is decreased in deficiency states, and by factors that alter liver protein synthesis. 22-There is some in vivo isomerization of <i>all-trans</i> retinoic acid to 13- <i>cis</i> -retinoic acid, which is further metabolized as to more polar derivatives such as 5,6-epoxy retinoic acid and 4-hydroxy-and 4-oxo derivatives in various rat tissues, including liver. 23-There is a retinoic acid 5,6-epoxidase in rat kidney microsomes which is dependent on ATP, NADPH, and O2.

<p>34-As the 4-hydroxylation reaction <b>may represent</b> a catabolic pathway, this <b>could</b> account for the decrease in liver vitamin A in rats consuming ethanol.</p> <p>36-...where its further metabolism <b>may be</b> defective.</p> <p>39-Plasma levels <b>māy decline</b> when the liver stores are exhausted.</p> <p>46-The <b>suggestion</b> that vitamin A plays an essential role in steroid hormone dynamics is borne out by...</p> <p>49-this has some <b>possible</b> bearing on the increased <b>risk</b> of hepatic neoplasm in persons with alcoholic cirrhosis.</p>	<p><b>reflect</b> the amount of plasma retinol-binding protein.</p> <p>→→→→</p>	<p>24-It is stimulated by Fe<sup>2+</sup> and has properties like microsomal lipid preoxidases.</p> <p>28-However, there are multiple metabolites which are <b>at least partially</b> tissue specific and retinoids induce retinoic acid metabolism in vitamin A-deficient hamsters.</p> <p>30-However, retinol-β-glucuronide, a major metabolite of retinoic acid in the small intestine that is also produced by incubating 5,6-epoxy retinoic acid with uridine diphospho 1α-D-glucuronic acid in the presence of liver micorsomes, has increased biological activity ...</p> <p>33-retinol, retinoic acid and 13-<i>cis</i>-retinoic acid are likewise excreted in the bile as β-glucuronidation in the presence of uridine diphosphoglucuronic acid (UDPGA).</p> <p>35-In human skin extracts, the major retinoids are <i>all-trans</i>-retinol and 3,4-dehydroretinol, the latter compound being found in dyskeratotic skin ...</p> <p>40-If a dose of radioactively labelled retinol is given to a deficient rat, there is an increase in the excretion of labelled metabolites in urine is comparison with an animal of normal vitamin A status.</p> <p>41-This is because incoming retinol in such circumstances is preferentially utilized by the peripheral tissues rather than stored.</p> <p>42-The minimum liver concentration of retinol necessary to favor storage rather than immediate turnover and breakdown is 60 IU/g liver.</p> <p>43-When animals or humans are subjected to a variety of stressful stimuli, there is a decrease in serum vitamin A, although there is no change in the amount of the vitamin in the liver or testis.</p> <p>45-During stress there is an accumulation of vitamin A in the enlarged adrenal glands.</p> <p>47-the fact that vitamin A accumulates preferentially in the adrenal glands when the vitamin is first administered to animals depleted of vitamin A.</p> <p>48- Interestingly, liver vitamin A stores are very low in alcoholics even with mild liver damage, even though plasma vitamin A levels are <b>often</b> normal;</p> <p>50-Both uptake and liver storage of vitamin A are equally effective when the vitamin is administered in an aqueous suspension or an oily solution, thus administration of vitamin A and E in solutions given for total parental nutrition (TPN) maintains blood levels and leads to storage.</p> <p>51-Illness, infections and prematurity affect both the storage and tissue requirements of vitamins A and E.</p>
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Table 1

For instance, under the low end of the epistemic scale are utterances expressing the lowest degree of certainty in the available knowledge. The modal expressions “appear to have” (27), “is believed to be mediated” (29), “may be” (31, 36), “may represent” (34), “may decline” (39) and “possible” (49) represent the contemplative characteristics of some of the information and conclusions presented

there. Although these vary in form, the main feature here is the low modality covering the general area of possibility. And this is what differentiates expressions 25, 32 and 46 from the rest since the modal expressions “suggesting” and “suggestion” reflect a possible-probable range of interpretation as it is based on more reliable evidence. This is signified by the use of arrows moving towards the Median category of the epistemic scale.

Expressions characterised by stronger modality are placed under the Median category of the epistemic scale since they express notions of probability rather than possibility. More specifically, the decision to place utterance 21, for instance, under this category is based on the comparison in degrees of modal strength among the three utterances: 32, 21 and 20. The claim made here is that utterance 32 (placed under the low end of the epistemic scale) is weaker than 21, which in turn is weaker than 20 (which is consequently placed under the High end of the epistemic scale).

In utterance 32, “the *suggestion* has been made that glucuronidation ensures conservation of vitamin A ...”, the decision to place this utterance under the Low category is due to the absence of reference to any ‘experimentally validated’ evidence behind the suggestion which is of substantial significance in the field of science. In other words, it is vague whether the suggestions springs from an individual’s personal (subjective) opinion or from more reliable experimental evidence. This renders the utterance a mere unsupported “suggestion” which ultimately reflects an unsupported possibility among many.

In utterance 21, on the other hand, the verb “suggests” is based on evidence: “recent *evidence suggests* that retinoic acid stimulates testosterone production by Leydig cells in the testis”. Here, although the source behind the “recent evidence” is not explicitly referred to, the presence of the word “evidence” constitutes a stronger

basis for the suggestion than its absence in 32. In this light, the reader is assured that the basis for the suggestion in this utterance is not a subjective opinion but some form of evidence available for possible refutation. This makes the suggestion in 21 stronger than that in 32.

By extension, utterance 20, “there is *evidence* that retinol is metabolized to retinoic acid in several species” is placed under the High end of the epistemic scale. This is the case since the proposition put forward here is not a suggestion, but of pure evidence. Therefore, while the suggestions of 21 are elevated in degrees of certainty through the underlying available evidence, in 20 there are no suggestions at all. Nevertheless, utterance 20 is still considered non-factual since the word “evidence” is, in my view, a form of strong supported suggestion, ultimately a type of proof which is open for debate and possible refutation, but not a fact.

All in all then, despite the variety of utterances and the combination of modalised and non-modalised utterances in this text, the overall picture presented is a consistent one. To begin with, the detachment of the writer from the definitions and descriptions is maintained throughout the text. This falls in line with the conventions of scientific discourse which require such distance in order to maintain the appearance of objectivity. In other words, whether utterances are modalised or not, the overall objectivity reflected through the general absence of the individual investigator in the reported findings, this lack of “intrusion of [the writer’s] ‘subjectivity’” gives what Kress (1985: 57) describes as the “appearance of immutable truth and factuality to the statements of science”.

These effects are especially significant in the modalised sections of the text where the presence of modality, which typically lessens the degree of certainty in the propositions, is in direct conflict with the objectivity of the text. In other words, the



subjectivity and weakness of modalised utterances which work in opposition with the objectivity and strength of passive structures do not, I argue, undermine the objectivity of the descriptions and definitions. Thus, in terms of the force and forcefulness of the language exhibited in this text, there are two separate forces at work: the weakness and subjectivity of modality, and the strength and objectivity of the passive structure.

Yet although the presence of modality appears to work in opposition with the characteristically objective appearance of scientific discourse, its effects, I argue, fall in line with the overall ideology underlying the aims of science. The use of modality in this text serves the purpose of presenting this specific field of study as objectively incomplete. This self-confessed lack of current knowledge only emphasises the desired view that the approach adopted is genuinely nonbiased, objective and therefore, scientific. This makes the information in the text quite consistent since it is presented in a pseudo-factual manner without jeopardising the scientific project and mission.

Therefore, one noteworthy point to add to Kress's description of the language of science is the possibility for utilising modality in the service of the ideology of objectivity, self-preservation and continuity<sup>18</sup>. The two perhaps conflicting interests in scientific endeavours are a) the desire and possibly need to be as truthful as possible in presenting information and b) the desire to be knowledgeable and, therefore, powerful and authoritative. The first entails a likely acknowledgement of ignorance or at least, partiality of knowledge while the second a discourse of absolute certainty. Yet whereas focusing solely on the second interest may jeopardise the overall scientific project, taking into account the second has the potential of re-emphasising

the view that science is a reliable field of enquiry. Although modality can present science as less knowledgeable than desired, its presence reinforces the ideology that science is the most truthful, reliable and objective field of enquiry. In short, it is a faith-building project.

## 7.5 Analysis 2

As mentioned earlier, the second text is a selection from website which essentially deals with nutritional products including vitamin supplements. In that, it is similar to the first one since it also discusses the role of vitamins in nutrition and disease fighting, although it is not targeted at a restricted group of readers. This makes the text a lot less formal than the first one and this is exemplified by the overall easy-access medical terms which are explained in everyday language for easier comprehension as well as the presence of the first and second person pronoun (we, you). Finally, while the text is partly descriptive, it is nevertheless significantly more argumentative. This is significant in that the ideology behind the author's attempt to persuade readers is easier to track than in predominantly descriptive texts.

The first noticeable aspect of text 2 (as far as modality is concerned) is the presence of a high number of modalised non-factual utterances. This lies in contrast with the predominant view that scientific discourse is essentially concerned with presenting relatively factual descriptions of the workings of science, where science characteristically deals with natural phenomena as well as with experiments on these phenomena conducted in a systematic, methodical way.

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<sup>18</sup> One possible extension to this line of argument is linking this ideology of self-preservation to the larger underlying economic and political powers. However, in my view, this is a farfetched claim which does not find support in my argument.

Another prevalent characteristic of the text is the predominance of active structures which are also in contrast with the view that science aims at maintaining distance from the object of description. In that, both the non-factuality of modalised utterances along with the direct involvement of the writer create a sense of high subjectivity to the text, which, yet again, is not characteristic of the traditional view associated with scientific discourse.

This mixture of modalised and non-modalised utterances create an inconsistent picture of the content of the text. Going through both the modalised and non-modalised utterances systematically, the following features concerning the positions conveyed in the article arise (see table 2).

Low	Med	High	Factuality
<p>5-What is news is that in the U.S. between 13,500 to 50,000 of these deaths <b>could easily be prevented</b> by taking just 25 cents worth of vitamin supplements a day.</p> <p>6-For a mere quarter's worth of vitamins, you <b>can significantly eliminate</b> a major independent <b>risk factor</b> for heart attack.</p> <p>30-"Because high levels [of homocysteine] <b>can often be easily</b> treated with vitamin supplements, homocysteine <b>may be</b> an independent, modifiable risk factor," the authors concluded.</p> <p>33-Although only a small number of the subjects in this study</p>	<p>21-Specifically patients with stroke and other cardiovascular diseases <b>tend to have</b> higher blood levels of homocysteine than subjects without disease.</p> <p>40-<b>Probably</b> the most important contribution to elevated homocysteine levels for most people is inadequate intake of folic acid, vitamins B6 and B12, and betaine.</p>	<p>4-None of this is news, <b>of course</b>.</p> <p>13- ...the <b>conclusions are strongly supported by</b> numerous articles and editorials that have appeared in the two most prestigious American medical journals...</p> <p>19- ...<b>essentially</b> eliminating this very important <b>risk often</b> within a few days. (although the damage done by long-term elevated homocysteine takes longer to resolve).</p>	<p>➔➔➔➔➔➔</p> <p>1-Cardiovascular diseases ... kill <b>at least</b> 12 million people each year.</p> <p>2-In the U.S., cardiovascular diseases are the <b>primary</b> cause in <b>about</b> half of all deaths.</p> <p>3-In 1995 cardiovascular diseases killed <b>about</b> 455,000 men and 505,000 women.</p> <p>7-You can't even buy a candy bar for a quarter any more.</p> <p>8-This is not hyperbole.</p> <p>9-This is not snake oil.</p> <p>10-This is not some quack cure.</p> <p>11-This is hard science, incontrovertible evidence, based on the results of hundreds of studies going back more than 30 years.</p> <p>12-Although conservative organizations like the (AHA) still refuse to endorse the conclusions of these studies and to recommend that people take these vitamin supplements, ...</p> <p>➔➔➔➔➔➔</p> <p>14-We are referring to the link between the amino acid homocysteine and cardiovascular disease and the fact that supplements of vitamins B6 and B12, folic acid, and betaine have been proven to sever that link.</p> <p>15-Homocysteine is an amino acid formed from the metabolism of another amino acid, methionine, which is commonly found in meats-especially red meat.</p> <p>16-High homocysteine levels are now</p>

were taking vitamin supplements, the authors noted that those who were taking supplements **appeared to have a "substantially lower risk of vascular disease a proportion of which was attributable to lower plasma homocysteine levels."**

34- High homocysteine in the blood **can arise** from three **primary** causes

36-The most serious defects **may result** in premature death, as in the cases McCully encountered early in his investigations.

37-**More common** are **less severe** defects, which **may produce** mild or moderate elevations of homocysteine.

38-These defects are quite common, occurring in **perhaps** 30% of the population, and **may account, at least in part,** for the inheritability of cardiovascular disease.

39- Although the high fat content of certain meats is **usually blamed** for **increasing the risk** of heart disease and stroke, the high methionine content of meat **may be equally culpable.**

41-No matter what the cause of hyperhomocysteinemia, even when there is a genetic defect, it is **almost always possible** to reduce levels to the healthy range by taking sufficient quantities of these nutritional

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44-Study after study has demonstrated **beyond the shadow of a doubt** that the **risks** associated with elevated homocysteine can be quickly and easily eliminated by taking adequate amounts of folic acid, vitamins B6 and B12, and betaine.

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22-Stampfer points out that homo-cysteine levels do not have to be elevated by very much to increase risk, since most of the patients in these studies had levels that were within what is generally **regarded** to be the normal range.

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56-d. **On average,** as intake of folic acid, betaine, vitamin B6, and vitamin B12 increases, the **risk** of cardiovascular disease declines, and vice versa.

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widely recognized as an independent **risk factor** for cardiovascular disease.

17-This means that high homocysteine levels along with cigarette smoking, obesity, high blood pressure, high-fat diet, diabetes, and a sedentary life style increase your **risk** of developing cardiovascular disease and dying of a heart attack or stroke.

18-Taking supplemental B6, B12, folic acid, and trimethylglycine quickly and effectively restores homocysteine to safe levels,...

20- More than 20 case-control and cross-sectional studies on more than 2,000 subjects have provided what Harvard epidemiologist Meir J. Stampfer, MD, calls **"remarkably consistent"** findings regarding the relationship between homocysteine levels and cardiovascular diseases.

23-A meta-analysis found a positive **association** between hyperhomocysteinemia and thrombosis (formation of clots in blood vessels) in eight out of 10 studies involving 2,400 patients.

24-In these eight studies, the **risk** of thrombosis was two to 13 times greater in people with hyperhomocysteinemia.

25- One cross-sectional study conducted by Dr. Jacob Selhub of Tufts University and his associates, involved more than 1,000 elderly people from the long-running Framingham Heart Study. The investigators examined the relationship between the degree of carotid artery blockage (stenosis) and plasma homocysteine levels.

26-After adjusting for other risk factors, they found that those individuals with the highest levels of homocysteine had twice the **risk** of a carotid stenosis than those with the lowest levels.

27-Moreover, the authors reported that those patients who had the most carotid artery stenosis had the lowest intake of folic acid and vitamin B6.5

28-The Physicians' Health Study, a Harvard-based study that tracked **nearly** 15,000 male physicians (aged 40-84 years) for up to five years, came to a similar conclusion. At the start of the study, none of the physicians had ever suffered a heart attack or stroke. During the course of the study, 271 of the men subsequently suffered a heart attack.

29-... they found that the men whose homocysteine levels were in the highest five percent had **about** three times the **risk** of heart attack as those with the lowest levels.

31-Homocysteine's role as an **independent risk factor** for cardiovascular diseases was **confirmed** in a large multicenter European study that included researchers from nine

<p>supplements.</p> <p>43-the ease with which homocysteine levels <b>can be brought down</b> and maintained within the safe range by taking vitamin supplements containing folic acid (folate), vitamin B6 (pyridoxine), vitamin B12, and betaine is truly remarkable.</p> <p>50- While most studies have concentrated on using the B vitamins to normalize homocysteine metabolism, some people do not respond to this regimen, <b>possibly</b> because of a genetic defect.</p> <p>51-Studies have shown that by adding betaine to the standard B vitamin regimen, homocysteine <b>can be reduced</b> to safe levels in <b>nearly</b> everyone.</p> <p>54-b. Several mechanisms by which homocysteine <b>appears to promote</b> atherosclerosis have been identified.</p> <p>57-e. At the doses recommended for normalizing homocysteine metabolism, the B vitamins and betaine <b>appear to be</b> completely safe.</p>		<p>different countries.</p> <p>32-The results showed a 2.2-fold greater incidence of cardiovascular disease in those whose homocysteine levels were in the top 20%.</p> <p>35-The first is a genetic defect that impairs homocysteine metabolism. Actually, several different genetic defects related to the formation of the various enzymes required to metabolize homocysteine have been identified.</p> <p>42-Given the deadly consequences of elevated homocysteine,...</p> <p>45-Selhub's 1993 cross-sectional analysis of people from the Framingham study found that (1) homocysteine levels increased with age, (2) plasma homocysteine levels dropped as folate intake increased, and (3) 67% of the cases of hyperhomocysteinemia were related to inadequate plasma concentrations of one or more of the B vitamins.</p> <p>46- In a German study, injections of folate and vitamin B6 reduced homocysteine concentrations in 175 elderly people, with maximum effect seen within five to 12 days. Homocysteine levels returned to normal in 92% of the vitamin-treated group compared with only 20% of those treated with placebo.</p> <p>47-Another study compared 130 Boston area patients hospitalized with their first heart attack with 118 matched controls who had never had a heart attack.</p> <p>48-The authors found that (1) homocysteine levels were 11% higher in the heart attack patients, (2) dietary and plasma levels of vitamin B6 and folate were lower in the heart attack patients, and (3) ...</p> <p>49- ...as intake of folate and vitamin B6 increased, the <b>risk</b> of heart attack decreased, independently of other risk factors.</p> <p>52- To sum up the homocysteine-cardiovascular disease-B-vitamin story, there is no doubt that:</p> <p>53-a. As homocysteine levels in the blood stream rise, the <b>risk</b> of cardiovascular disease also rises, and vice versa.</p> <p>55-c. As intake of folic acid, betaine, vitamin B6, and vitamin B12 increases, homocysteine levels decline, and vice versa.</p>
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Table 2

The first section of the text (utterances 1 to 19) is concerned with introducing the main topic. It starts with a number of non-modalised utterances (1-3) highlighting the seriousness of cardiovascular diseases by quoting statistical evidence of the

number of deaths in the world in general and the USA in particular. The only uncertainty in these utterances relates to the lack of extreme precision and accuracy of the statistics (“*at least* 12 million people”; “*about* 455,000 men and 505,000 women”), which is not unexpected in such situations. In other words, this uncertainty does not undermine the forcefulness of the utterances since the main point is merely showing how high the number of deaths is rather than being meticulously precise in these statistics.

The next set of utterances (4-7) is concerned with making claims about the availability of the means for preventing some of these deaths. The main point of emphasis is the affordability for these means which are accessible to the majority of people. However, these claims have two levels of modalisation. These have to do with the availability of a) a *possibility* for avoiding fatality in only b) a *small percentage* of the numbers quoted earlier. More specifically, what the author is claiming in 5 (“between 13,500 to 50,000 of these deaths *could easily be prevented*”), is that there exists a possibility for 1.3 to 5 percent of the people with cardiovascular diseases to be saved from death.

The following utterance that one “*can significantly eliminate* a major independent *risk factor* for heart attack” (6) is also worth close investigation. To begin with, the role of the adverb “significantly” is to emphasise the degree to which the recommended treatment is helpful. However, this adverb does not conform with the following verb “eliminate” which is normally a no-gradience verb. In other words, one can either eliminate or fail to eliminate, but cannot partially eliminate. The more accurate and common collocation with the adverb “significantly” would be a verb like ‘reduce’ or ‘diminish’. In this sense, in attempting to stress the possible positive

effects of taking vitamin supplements, the writer faces the problem of using accurate language.

Moreover, the phrase “risk factor” involves some kind of internal modality since a *risk* is in fact a possibility, at most a probability. Again, the adjective “major” also suggests that this risk is one of many. In other words, the whole utterance can be interpreted and therefore paraphrased in the following manner: There is a possibility (can) that taking these vitamin supplements will \*greatly eliminate one (major) of several possibilities (risk factor) which lead to heart attacks, which in turn, can possibly lead to death. These layers of modality suggest high level of uncertainty but which the use of the adverb “significantly” tries to undermine. Still, the overall force of the utterance is weakened and it therefore is placed under the Low end of the epistemic scale.

The following set of utterances (8-14) reassume a high level of certainty and are therefore placed under the Factuality branch. These are a set of categorical statements rejecting any other view but that of clear-cut scientific bases for the claims made earlier. The use of the expressions “hard science” and “incontrovertible evidence” (11) are meant to accentuate the “fact that supplements of vitamins B6 and B12, folic acid, and betaine have been proven to sever” the link between “homocysteine and cardiovascular disease” (14). These expressions fall in line with positivist and post-positivist ideology which stresses the objectivity and reliability of experimental validation in science.

Then, homocysteine is defined and its connection with cardiovascular diseases is described in utterances 15 to 17. First, this definition is conducted in a very precise and factual manner using the adequate scientific jargon of the field (15). Next, the following utterance explains the link between homocysteine and cardiovascular

diseases, where homocysteine is described less categorically as one “risk factor” leading to cardiovascular disease (16). Then, and more interestingly, utterance 17 (“This means that high homocysteine levels along with cigarette smoking, obesity, high blood pressure, high-fat diet, diabetes, and a sedentary life style increase your risk of developing cardiovascular disease and dying of a heart attack or stroke”) combines a number of risk factors to reach what appears to be a factual conclusion.

However, looking closely at the different layers of modality employed here, the following overall interpretation becomes the more prominent one. High homocysteine levels are recognised as one of many possible factors which increase the risk for developing cardiovascular disease which in turn can lead to heart attacks which can lead to death. The large number and different layers of modality employed in this utterance can be illustrated by the use of brackets where each bracket signifies one layer of modality.

Factors[homocysteine[increased risk[cardiovascular disease[heart attack [death]]]]]

This can be read in the following manner:

- 1- Death from heart attacks is one of many possibilities.
- 2- Heart attack resulting from cardiovascular disease is one of many possibilities.
- 3- Cardiovascular disease resulting from a high level of homocysteine is one of many possibilities.
- 4- Homocysteine the only one of many “risk factors” (which in turn is a possibility) which is treatable with vitamin supplements.

While at the face of it, the initial utterances seem to have factual bases, the implicit, but gradually rising modality in the immediately following utterances considerably lowers the level of certainty and ultimately the power of these statements.



On top of that, even the last unmodalised claim does not hold unchallenged. The use of the adverb “essentially” in utterance 19 “...*essentially* eliminating this very important *risk*, often within a few days” sheds doubt on the confidence in the ability of the suggested vitamin supplements to eliminate this risk. Although the level of doubt is not high, thus explaining the placement of this expression under the High category of the epistemic scale as opposed to the lower one, it still removes it from the factual arena. In fact, this scepticism is later seen to intensify thus raising the level of uncertainty in what initially appears to be a factual claim.

The next section of utterances under the heading “Homocysteine Increases Cardiovascular Risk” (20-33) draws upon a number of scientific experiments and findings in order to find support for the claims made earlier on. These start with non-modalised descriptions of the processes undergone in the experiments (20, 23, 25-28) giving an air of factuality and objectivity to the whole scientific procedure. However, the only strictly non-modalised expressions are those which refer solely to the descriptions of the experiments and not to the conclusions and findings. The statements reporting the findings of the experiments are characterised either by explicit low modality suggesting an overt lack of certainty in the conclusions arrived at or they occupy the form of a pseudo-factual statement with an implicit internal modality.

An example of the first is utterance 21 (“Specifically patients with stroke and other cardiovascular diseases *tend to have* higher blood levels of homocysteine than subjects without disease”) where the modalised expression “tend to” is an explicit indication of the existence of a probability for the fulfilment of the proposition. In the other instance, utterances like 23 and 24 (“A meta-analysis found a positive *association* between hyperhomocysteinemia and thrombosis in eight out of 10 studies

involving 2,400 patients” and “In these eight studies, the *risk* of thrombosis was two to 13 times greater in people with hyperhomocysteinemia”) appear to be quite categorical but are, I argue, modalised in a less explicit manner. In 23, the “association” spoken of is found only partially “in eight out of 10 studies” while in 24, the “risk” of developing blood clots varies between “two [and] 13 times” more in “people with hyperhomocysteinemia”. In short, none of these statements are strictly categorical but are rather probabilistic in reference, thus raising other serious questions. Such questions relate to the implications of the various degrees of probability in differentiating between twice as risky, 13 times as risky, and maybe even 100 times as risky. The problem would be determining the position on a scale of certainty of relatively low probabilistic claims such as “two times” as risky in contrast with the much higher probability of “13 times” as risky.

This pattern of inconsistency and vagueness is recurrent throughout this second section where most of the descriptions of the experiments are categorical and factual, while most of the conclusions and implications of these scientific experiments are modalised, selective and partial. Most interesting of all are the direct quotations that the writer of the article makes use of (30, 33). In the first one “‘Because high levels [of homocysteine] *can often be easily* treated with vitamin supplements, homocysteine *may be* an independent, modifiable risk factor,’ the authors concluded”, the conclusions of the authors are enveloped with low modality, thus placing the whole utterance under the Low end of the epistemic scale. In the second utterance, the whole quotation is framed with the modalised expression “appeared” (“the authors noted that those who were taking supplements *appeared to have* a ‘*substantially lower risk* of vascular disease, *a proportion of which was attributable* to lower plasma homocysteine levels’”). Again, all these conclusions deal with the degree with which

vitamin supplements can be associated with lowering the level of one substance in the blood which is one of many “risks” leading to vascular disease. There are again more than one layer of modality and the findings deal with a possibility of another possibility.

The next section, under the subheading “Why Homocysteine Levels Rise”, (34-43) also echoes the same patterns. In a way, its content consists of a complication of the problem through listing several factors which are partially responsible for cardiovascular disease. This complication is further intensified by the use of numbers and statistics which are, in my view, meant to highlight the associations characteristic of positivist and post positivist thought between mathematics and objectivity, and consequently to stress the reliability of science. Yet, again, while the only categorical statements are those describing the procedures of the experiments, modalised expressions frame the majority of the concluding statements, thus shedding doubt on the certainty of these claims and consequently, on the overall credibility and force of the argument.

Moreover, in the effort to characterise the statements made under this section with categorical power, some later statements seem to lie in contradiction with earlier ones. This is evident in utterance 42 for instance, where the “consequences of elevated homocysteine” are categorically characterised as “deadly” although in utterance (17) it is only *high* levels of homocysteine which are described as, again, one of many *risk* factors which, “along with cigarette smoking, obesity, high blood pressure, high-fat diet, diabetes, and a sedentary life style increase your *risk* of developing cardiovascular disease and dying of a heart attack or stroke”. Based on the evidence repeatedly quoted in the article, the more likely interpretation falls in line

with the earlier one; i.e. that of the *possible* deadly consequences of elevated homocysteine.

In the fourth and penultimate section (44-51), this pattern of inconsistency continues. Again the author's conclusions are not directly deduced from the previously quoted scientific evidence. His initial statement (44) makes use of emphatic modalised utterances like "beyond the shadow of a doubt" which is meant to stress the certainty of the author's claims. However, what according to the author is "demonstrated *beyond the shadow of a doubt*" is the *possibility* that "the *risks* associated with elevated homocysteine" are "quickly and easily eliminated by taking adequate amounts of folic acid, vitamins B6 and B12, and betaine". And even the verb "eliminated" is challenged in utterance (49) where according to the findings of the referred to experiment, there is a *decrease* (rather than an elimination) in the *risk* of heart attack "as intake of folate and vitamin B6 increased".

In the last section, similar conclusions are also made under the guiding factual statement "there is no doubt that" (52). However, each of the five concluding statements carries one or another form of modality. While the first one speaks of a increase in the *risk* of cardiovascular disease as homocysteine levels in the blood increase, the third one speaks of a decline in homocysteine levels "as intake of folic acid, betaine, vitamin B6, and vitamin B12 increases". These two utterances are connected in that the claim made by both put together is that of a certainty in the ability of these vitamins to decrease one possible risk factor which might lead to cardiovascular disease. This is also the claim of the fourth utterance "*On average*, as intake of folic acid, betaine, vitamin B6, and vitamin B12 increases, the *risk* of cardiovascular disease declines". In short, these three are not factual statements in that

their main topic of discussion is a risk factor which is a probabilistic matter rather than a factual one.

Finally, the last two utterances express a different type of uncertainty through the explicit use of the modal perception verb “appear”. Yet of the two utterances, more interesting is the uncertainty associated with the modal expression in the last utterance, “At the doses recommended for normalizing homocysteine metabolism, the B vitamins and betaine *appear to be* completely safe” (51e). The intriguing matter is the fact that this conclusion effectively introduces a novel argument: that which concerns the safety of taking vitamin supplements. In other words, this topic is both introduced and brought to an end in one concluding yet modalised statement.

Considering the seriousness of the claim made and the centrality of the topic, one statement, although modalised, does not give the issue any justice in terms of coverage. More importantly, it raises questions relating to the ideological objectives behind referring to this previously unmentioned link to vitamin supplements. The first and most convincing interpretation is that of an underlying economic motivation for doing making this reference considering that the article is published on a website which advertises a certain brand of vitamin supplements. In fact, when considering the general inconsistent picture that can be drawn by looking at the way modality is utilised in the text, the economic factor seems to lie at the core of these sometimes incompatible arguments.

To begin with, the use of modality is predominantly associated with the more crucial claims which are central to the overall argument. Such arguments are either foundations on which non-modalised conclusions are based, or they are deductions which are derived from sometimes unrelated evidence. Moreover, some of the categorical deductions made by the author are based on modalised conclusions quoted

from different sources. And on top of it all, there are several levels of modality associated with most of these arguments which not only contribute to the overall inconsistency in the propositions made by the text, but also to the low level of authority associated with the claims arguments and conclusions made. All of these discrepancies arising from portraying possibilities as facts serve the one purpose of underlining the vital role vitamins play in nutrition and health.

In comparison with the earlier text, this text is a lot less 'scientific'. It is motivated by what appears to be capitalist economic ideologies to a point where the old ideologies of science's quest for the truth are not only jeopardised but almost completely lost.

Yet this text is not representative of the discourse of science in the traditional sense. In fact, it seems to make use of elements from more than one genre such as journalistic reports as well as medical articles. In that while it is sometimes quite sensationalised in its claims, the fact of the matter remains that it makes use of the power and authority associated with the field of science. It does that by addressing a medical issue, making use of medical jargon and making reference to medical research. Moreover, the fact that it is written by someone who holds a PhD (although the precise field the author is qualified in is unknown) adds to that power and authority. Therefore, taking into consideration the authority associated with science as a field of enquiry, the author makes modalised, incompatible and sometimes incoherent arguments and claims.

## **7.6 Conclusions**

In this chapter, the target of investigation was the manner by which modality functioned in reflecting the ideologies present in two examples of scientific discourse.

In line with the initial premise that all types of texts (genres) can be approached using the same framework for analysis, the main objective was to examine the underlying ideologies in two scientific texts through a practical analysis of the system of modality in these texts. Based on the differences between the two texts in terms of formality, the intended audience and purposes, the use of modality in each text was expectedly dissimilar.

In the first text, the overall picture was seen as an ideologically consistent one. The conventional positivist and post-positivist views of science as an objective field of enquiry were the dominant ones, emphasised by the detachment of the writer from the definitions and descriptions evident throughout the text. This was maintained in light of the relatively rare use of modality and the high presence of nominalised and factual passive structures. Moreover, despite the subjectivity and relative weakness associated with the presence of modalised utterances (which ultimately works in opposition with the objectivity and strength of nominalised and passive structures) it was argued that the overall air of objectivity was, nonetheless, retained. Instead, these two seemingly conflicting forces were seen to work towards one consistent reading of the underlying ideologies in the text. As argued above, the use of modality was seen to support one main aim of science which is its concern with 'the truth'. In that, this self-confessed partiality of current knowledge was only seen to emphasise the desired view that the approach adopted is genuinely nonbiased, objective and truthful. It was concluded that in this first text, even the presence of modality was utilised in the service of the ideology of objectivity, self-preservation and continuity. It did not in any way undermine the authority and power associated with the field of science. There were, in short, no apparent ideological conflicts or contradictions.

The second text, on the other hand, made use of modalised structures much more frequently, and the analysis of the modal system suggested an ideologically inconsistent reading of the text. The first problematic area was the fact that these modal expressions were associated with the more critical and central claims. While factual utterances characterised those less significant, more descriptive straightforward definitions and procedures, modalised utterances were seen to govern those more fundamental and critical statements and conclusions. Moreover, there surfaced several levels of modality associated with most of these crucial arguments which not only contributed to the overall inconsistency in the propositions made by the text, but also to the low level of authority associated with the claims, arguments and conclusions made. As a scientific text, the second text was therefore seen to display high subjectivity, inconsistency and an overall weakness.

However, it was argued that the ideological motivation for these contradictions seemed to reside in the underlying economic bases governing the objectives of the article. As revealed above, the article was found in a website which essentially advertised a certain brand of vitamin supplements. This meant that the arguments and conclusions arrived at in this text were seen to serve the financial aims of the advertisers. In this sense, the partial informality, subjectivity and high level of modality in the text serve the purpose of portraying possibilities as facts in the economical interest of the aims of the website.

This conclusion encourages the view that the second text draws upon different “orders of discourse” (Fairclough 1995: 188) for multiple purposes. Firstly, the presence of this text on a website which advertises vitamin supplements points out its advertising characteristic. This is supported by the numerous arguments which aimed at highlighting the beneficial nature of vitamins and the detrimental consequences to



their absence in the human body. At the same time however, the fact that these arguments make use of scientific language usually characteristic of medical discourse suggests the hybridisation of the language in this text which draws elements from both types of discourse: advertising and medical science. This ultimately results in a hybrid text which unconvincingly argues in pseudo-scientific language for the benefits of a scientifically controversial bio-chemical substance.

This explains why each passage is different in the ideologies it communicates and reflects although they are still both ideological. While the presence of modality in the first text serves science's ideology of continuity and self-preservation, modality in the second text is, I argue, meant to mask the controversial nature of the topic of discussion. Hence, while the use of modality in the first passage stresses the non-biased nature of its language and its interest in pursuing the 'truth', its use in the second passage undermines the ideological consistency of the text and leads to a low level of authority.

## VIII Conclusion

The aim of this thesis was to provide a practically applicable approach to critically analysing ideology in discourse through a systematic analysis of modality. This very broad objective required a number of clarifications and discussions as to what constituted each of its elements and how these interacted with one another. In other words, before being able to embark on this project, it was seen as imperative to decide on:

- 1) what exactly is meant by 'discourse' and how to select the most relevant approach to its analysis
- 2) how to address the issue of literary discourse in the light of the adopted view of discourse
- 3) how to account for the notion of interpretation through a consideration of the role of the reader
- 4) why modality is essential in the selected approach to critically analysing discourse and how it is practically utilised in this approach
- 5) how the notion of ideology is related to the whole endeavour
- 6) and finally, how this can be practically and systematically achieved through a pragmatic-functional approach.

Chapter One attempted to address the first issue: that of defining discourse and selecting the broad theoretical bases to its analysis in the face of a number of obstacles. These related to difficulties arising from:

- a) the varied uses of the term 'discourse' (section 1.1)

- b) the diverse underlying linguistic theories of discourse and approaches to discourse analysis (sections 1.2 and 1.4) and
- c) the institutional confusion between ‘discourse’ and ‘ideology’ (section 1.3).

It was seen that the definition of the term ‘discourse’ (i.e. the first obstacle) was not initially a straightforward matter for etymological reasons, contextual reasons and discipline-restrictions. This had given rise to varied and selective interests in ‘discourse’ which ultimately led to a variability in its definition and use.

In order to adequately define ‘discourse’, therefore, it was necessary to make a set of decisions, first with regards to the most appropriate linguistic theory underlying such a definition. This led to the second obstacle in approaching ‘discourse’ and its analysis. Deciding on the underlying linguistic theory would necessarily carry the demands and restrictions of that theory on the general constituents of discourse, and ultimately on any approach to its analysis. Hence, it was essential to examine the viability of the two main theories of language: the *structural* and *functional* theories, in order to analyse their views of discourse through exploring the manner each accounted for the relationships between language structures, functions and meaning in discourse.

Through reviewing the tenets of each of these approaches, it was seen that while structural theories largely downplayed the roles of functions and meaning, functional theories generally presented a more balanced position of the indispensability of structure in any functional theory of language. Whereas structural theories deemed non-structural features of language as either “the weak point in language study” (Bloomfield 1933: 140) or simply “irrelevant” to the theory of

linguistics (Chomsky 1965: 3), the more balanced functional theory stressed the interrelationship between language structure and function as part of Halliday's (1978; 1985) multifunctional view of language. In fact, this more balanced view of language was seen to constitute the underlying bases for the majority of practical approaches to discourse analysis. As Schiffrin (1994) concluded, in all approaches to discourse analysis (i.e. from a practical perspective), structure and function did not exist in isolation from one another. Insisting on isolating these two necessary constituents would inevitably lead to a narrow view of language.

In the light of these conclusions, an initial decision was then made in the first chapter concerning the appropriateness of a broad functional theoretical basis to approaching discourse analysis and the definition of 'discourse'. This functional basis was derived from the Hallidayan (1978; 1985) 'multifunctional' view of language (the ideational, textual and interpersonal) and his view of the relationship between the linguistic system and social structures. There, the broad objective of discourse analysis was seen as the examination of the relationship between the linguistic system and social structures. And at the centre of this connection between language and social structures within the multifunctional view of language was the notion of ideology. However, since that notion also had a certain degree of vagueness associated with its varied use mainly in Marxist and Post-Marxist contexts, the next step (and hence the next obstacle to resolve) was to clarify this vagueness and confusion between discourse and ideology due to the fundamental role ideology played in approaching discourse analysis from a multifunctional perspective.

Initially, the Marxist view of ideology as "false-consciousness", which is located in the "superstructure" and whose objective is to mask the underlying "base" which is the "truth", was completely rejected in light of more recent Post-Marxist,

less deterministic views. Indeed, the idea of maintaining a division between the base and superstructure was questioned, and the view of the mutual interdependence of ideology and social institutions was forwarded instead. This was a view which stressed the dialectical co-constitutive relationship between ideology and social structures as well as an emphasis on the ability for individuals to locate and challenge certain worldviews, whether political and non-political, rather than simply submit to them.

Subsequently, in the light of the clarified relationship between discourse and ideology, and in the light of the broad objectives of a multifunctional view of language, i.e. analysing the relationship between the linguistic system and social structures, the following functional definition of ‘discourse’ was suggested. Discourse was defined as “a contextually occurring instance of language use which is not determined by the length and/or grammaticalness of its component utterance/s, but by the involvement of a speaker/writer and a hearer/reader in an act of communication, in a context saturated with ideologies resulting from cultural, religious, political, gender-related, etc. modalities” (see section 1.5). This definition of discourse consequently raised other thorny issues relating to the inclusive nature of this definition in what was considered as discourse, as well as issues relating to the nature of this speaker-hearer involvement and how it could be accounted for in a practical way in discourse analysis. These two points were tackled in the second chapter.

The Hallidayan multifunctional view of discourse as social interaction (see section 1.2.2) suggested that all instances of discourse (including literary discourse) could be approached in a similar fashion. This inclusive view was the guiding principle behind the second chapter which aimed at addressing those controversial notions that lay in opposition with the above view of discourse. Such notions as

‘literature’, ‘literary’ and ‘non-literary language’, ‘style’ in language and its effects on ‘stylistic analyses’, and the positions and roles of ‘text producers’ as well as ‘the reader’ in interpreting texts and in determining the directions in which discourse analysis can proceed were seen in opposition to our inclusive functional view of discourse and, therefore, had to be addressed. This was done in the following manner.

First, the bases for distinguishing literature as a *special* type of discourse were questioned in the light of the functional view of discourse argued for above (see section 2.2). It was argued that treating literature *as* discourse meant that discourse would be treated as an instance of “real communication in [a] real social context” (Carter and McCarthy 1994: 135), and that meant that literature would also mediate “relationships between language-users: not only relationships of speech, but also of consciousness, ideology, role and class” (Fowler 1981: 80). In that light, both structural and functional bases which set literary language apart as a special type of language were examined and scrutinised. It was concluded that each of these bases was only partially valid. While structural restrictions did at one extreme determine the status of a work as literary (such as in a sonnet), these restrictions became less definitive the more we move along a continuum of literariness. On the other hand, functional features characteristic of literary texts (such as Jakobson’s (1960) poetic function) were deemed as not exclusive to literature. In other words, the dividing line between literary and non-literary discourse was seen to blur both from a structural and functional perspectives, and the elevated status that Literature enjoyed was seen to be resulting from a long-standing socio-historical, institutional and specifically educational tradition, currently perceived as the standard *status quo* (see section 2.2.2).

Similarly, the notion of style as a special, positive and distinctive characteristic of one's language use was criticised (see section 2.3). It was argued that traditionally, structural views of style as 'an evaluative index' or 'an individuating index' had serious flaws since the notions of 'choice' and 'deviation' constituted non-distinctive criteria for defining style as a distinctive feature in language. The same conclusions were reached when considering style from a functional perspective (i.e. in terms of its effect on readers) where there were still no justifications for setting it apart from language use in general. Finally, in line with these decisions, the different approaches to stylistic analysis which aimed at analysing 'style' in literature were examined and criticised in the light of their inadequacy to correspond to the balanced multifunctional view of discourse adopted in this thesis, especially the role of the reader.

That led to a consideration of the other issue arising from the definition of discourse proposed in the first chapter which is a major constituent of any critical analysis of discourse: the reader and her/his role in determining the directions in which interpretation proceeds. As part of the aim of providing an adequate account of that reader which was both theoretically and practically workable in the proposed approach, the different views of 'the reader' were examined in the light of reader-response theories. It was initially observed that the location of meaning was the underlying objective in all early approaches ('50s to early '80s) to reader-response criticism (see section 2.4.2). For some approaches, meaning was regarded as the property of the author; for others, a property of the text, while with others still, determined by the reader. With more recent approaches ('80s – '90s), different issues became prominent such as the implications of the social and historical determinants in what constitutes the notion of the reader (with feminist criticisms) or the

problematisations of deconstructionist views which questioned the existential nature of the text and the reader.

The dissatisfaction which arose in light of these approaches to reader-response criticism emphasised the need to consider both the individual as well as the social role of the reader in her/his interaction with the text. This was based on the view that while there is a substantial degree of conformity in interpretation, the possibility that different readers may vary in interpretation should also be accounted for. And this was seen possible only through a functional-pragmatic approach which allowed for a consideration of all the mentioned variables in a systematic way.

Modality was then identified as a key feature in the proposed analysis and the third chapter aimed at finding the most appropriate (i.e. systematic and practically useful) account of modality which was flexible enough to allow for a serious consideration of those elements of discourse discussed above. This involved a review of the most relevant approaches to categorising modality which have tackled this issue, and emphasis was laid on the *diversity* in approaches which have sprung from different theoretical views of language as well as the *limitations* of each. The diversity and limitations of these approaches pointed out both the differences in the ways linguists perceived the term as well as the degrees of vagueness and generality that accompanied the notion of modality.

It was seen that the main problems strict syntactic approaches faced resulted primarily from their dismissal of the semantic aspects of modality. Moreover, their exclusive focus on the relatively neat, syntactically distinguishable category of modality (modal auxiliary verbs) further contributed to their limitations. The same was characteristic of strict semantic approaches which avoided accounting for a relationship between form and meaning. While 'monosemantic' approaches faced the



problem of having to be general in order to be inclusive, 'polysemantic' approaches aimed at covering all the possible meanings of each use of a modal. In the first case, 'monosemantic' accounts faced the problem of being too general and relatively less informative while in the second case, 'polysemantic' approaches could not account for all possible meanings of modals which surface in all possible contexts.

Yet again, when some syntactic approaches tried to acknowledge the role of meaning, or *vice versa*, they faced the drawback of being inconsistent. This dilemma, it was concluded, was due to the fact that strict syntactic categories were largely incompatible with strict semantic ones, and trying to provide a meeting point between the two would inevitably result in contradiction and inconsistency. The rigidity and incompatibility of both criteria were seen to constitute the centre of this problem. Although there were sometimes recognisable consistencies and patterns between structure and meaning, the value and usefulness of accounting for them in the light of the many exceptions which sometimes outweighed these consistencies were questioned. The existence of so many exceptions was seen as a constant reminder that no one-to-one correlation existed or should be sought.

Potentially more useful approaches were those which relied less on strict structural and/or semantic features of modality, and more on context for modal interpretation. These were seen as more flexible and inclusive in their accounts of modality since their partial subjectivity in assigning meaning to modals as well as the diverse interpretations of different modals were deemed as imperative criteria to consider in any approach to categorising modality. These were in essence pragmatic approaches which negotiated different meanings of modals depending on the contexts in which these modals were found. Yet their overall tendencies and drive to ultimately

present a neater categorisation of modality either in structural or semantic terms at the expense of function constituted their main weaknesses.

In consequence, the general dissatisfaction with available approaches to modal categorisation was one of the principal incentives behind the task undertaken in Chapter Four. In that chapter, the aim was to provide functional-pragmatic account of modality which had practical potential from a functional perspective. And this practical potential was directly concerned with the analysis of ideology in discourse in order to point out different and possibly inconsistent ideological affiliations and positions of producers of texts.

Therefore, in line with the two most relevant approaches to modal categorisation (Halliday 1985; Simpson 1993), the parameters of a functional-pragmatic account of modality which was both inclusive and systematic were set. The importance of the criterion of inclusion was highlighted through the variety of modal expressions actually considered under epistemic and deontic modality (see section 4.5). As long as modalised expressions reflected the areas of meaning covered under epistemic and deontic modality, these were included as expressions of modality. Structural features were not considered as essential criteria for grouping modal expressions.

Then, the use of continua was seen as the only feasible way to capture the two essential features of modality (subjectivity and indeterminacy) in a functional-pragmatic categorisation which is systematic, flexible and carries practical potential. This led, more specifically, to a three dimensional continuum which included an *epistemic – deontic* scale, a *weak – strong* scale and a *subjective – objective* scale. The presence of these scales was necessary in order to account for possible variation in interpretation by the reader. Consequently, placing modals under one or more

categories in a continuum suggested a consideration of not only the *type* of meaning covered by a modal, but also the *degree* of strength and subjectivity reflected by its use within each specific context of use. This, it was proposed, would ultimately be related to ideology in that the type and degree of involvement a speaker has in what s/he says reflects that speaker's position and attitude towards the ideas communicated and towards the participants involved. In short, it was proposed that a systematic, functional and pragmatic analysis of modality would reflect the speaker's worldview at the ideological level.

Modality was seen as the most suitable linguistic feature for the proposed analysis in that it carried the adequate theoretical and practical potential to accomplish this task. Theoretically, modality could be related to the notions of 'ideology' and 'the reader' through its characteristic features: subjectivity and indeterminacy. It was argued that both subjectivity and indeterminacy were essential in order to account realistically and practically for the role of the reader in communicating her/his worldviews and consequently ideologies. This was, in fact, the only way the variety of interpretations could be considered systematically, without losing focus (see section 4.6). This was then carried out in Chapters Five, Six and Seven.

The aim of the fifth chapter was therefore to present the first of three practical examinations of how modality and ideology interact in discourse in line with the proposed approach. This was done with specific reference to two passages from Conrad's *Heart of Darkness*, where the choice of literary text sought to show the workability of the approach initially with literary discourse. Hence, this first analysis was meant to highlight the ability for the proposed pragmatic-functional framework to deal with literary discourse in the same fashion as other types of discourse. Concurrently, it was intended to present a reading which ultimately helped clarify

what was traditionally deemed as ambiguous and/or dualistic ideological positions of the main narrator in the novel, Marlow.

The chapter started by introducing the dominant historical, social, scientific and religious ideologies of the period since these constituted the ideological backgrounds against which the novel was set. Indeed, the ideological relevance of a period characterised as one of *change* was apparent and relatable to the altering ideologies adequately captured in the novel (see section 5.2). It was argued that these ideological backgrounds constituted one justification for the apparent ambiguities characterising the selected passages, and indeed the novel at large.

In contrast with previous interpretations which saw altering ideologies in the extracts as signs of dualistic positions and consequently, inconsistent ideologies, analysing modality in the two passages suggested that the ambiguities there were not necessarily signs of duality or irregularity. In fact, by focusing on the way modality functions in relation with ideology, it was argued that Marlow exhibited a highly consistent position and attitude regarding characters and issues in both excerpts. That was interpreted, in the first passage, as a complete rejection of Kurtz and what Kurtz symbolically stands for, and an acceptance of the natives and what they represent. To recapture the conclusions of that first part of the analysis (see section 5.3.1), in completely rejecting the image of Kurtz as human or active, Marlow emphasised the inhuman or subhuman qualities of imperial Europe and its inactivity, and therefore its inability to bring about the claimed positive change to Africa. At the same time, in portraying the natives as the direct contrast of Kurtz (i.e. human and active), Marlow stressed his view that the West's imported ideologies achieved nothing except hindering and obstructing life as it was. And finally, by distancing himself from his

early positions in his narrative, Marlow recaptured and rehearsed the same attitudes and effects.

Again, in the second passage, the analysis of modality showed the independently consistent, though contrasting, ideologies of Marlow and the Intended. It was argued that while the Intended's strong use of deontic and epistemic modality reflected her extremely strong position on a scale of authority concerning what she believed and what she wanted everyone else to do in line with those beliefs, Marlow's thoughts and feelings reflected his utter rejection of the propositions made by her. It was therefore concluded that the Intended's idealistic view of imperialism and her *belief* in 'the idea' behind Europe's actions in Africa were placed in direct opposition with Marlow's realism and *knowledge* of the negative outcome of Europe's intervention in Africa. However, while that contrast in positions did not undermine her forcefulness, it only pointed out a sense of prevalent irony.

The same approach was followed in the sixth chapter but with special emphasis on two political texts. The aim was to examine the different effects of the varying use of modality in reflecting the ideologies put forward by these texts. Here again, it was important to set the historical, political, economic and moral ideological backgrounds which the two speakers represented through their heading two distinct political parties. This meant that, along with the varying audiences and the dissimilarity in the situation for each of the USA and the UK, the differences between the ideologies of the two political parties signalled the most relevant area of divergence in the political affiliations of the speeches (see section 6.3).

Consequently, in line with these differences, it was argued that Bush's speech clearly reflected the ideologies of the Republican Party as well as the more direct involvement of the USA in the attacks and, therefore, the expectations of the

American people to take action against these attacks. His use of modality was seen to represent the speaker, and by extension the nation that backs him, as a very forceful one. This related to his high certainty and emphaticness when:

- 1) describing the Afghani government as 'evil' in its support for an 'evil' organisation,
- 2) making a set of demands on them
- 3) and when both predicting and insisting that they will pay a price.

The use of modality in this manner was seen to indicate the speaker's unquestionable belief in the justness of his own, and by extension his nation's, judgement concerning what constitutes an evil entity, right and wrong.

His weaker positions arose when addressing issues of presenting a temporal estimate of the duration of the war as well as the achievability of its objectives. Yet although Bush is relatively uncertain of the impact the war might have on the Afghani government and the 'evil' *al Qaeda* network, it was argued that his insistence that the terrorists "will pay a price" foregrounded a moral view which fell in line with the radical Christian right leanings of the Republican Party. In other words, even in his weakest positions, Bush was seen as quite forceful since he is under no obligation to justify the mission at the moral level.

Blair's speech, on the other hand, did not reflect the same directness in involvement of Britain in the events although it too was seen to fall in line with the ideologies of New Labour and the Third Way. However, since the Third Way was argued to exhibit its own internal conflicts (see section 6.3.2), Blair's speech, by extension, exhibited these internal conflicts. Through his varying use of modality, Blair was seen to reflect the altering strength and forcefulness of the speaker

concerning the issues at hand. While he was quite certain and forceful when announcing:

- 1) the involvement of British forces in the action,
- 2) his pride and confidence in them,
- 3) the need for the action and
- 4) the internationality of the effort,

this certainty drops when discussing moral issues. It was pointed out that the topics that were thought to be more urgent and which required higher certainty and forcefulness on behalf of the speaker were the ones which received less. This anomaly was justified in the light of the internal conflict of the Third Way one of whose aims is to reconcile the morality of socialism and the potential immorality arising from the economic market forces of capitalism. Blair was in other words faced with a sceptical British audience on the one hand, and an indispensable economic/political giant (the USA) on the other. And through an analysis of the way modality was utilised by Blair, this ideological inconsistency was seen to surface.

In the final chapter, the arenas for investigation were two scientific texts. In line with the initial premise that all types of texts (and by extension, different genres) could be approached using the same framework for analysis, the main objective was to examine the underlying ideologies in these two scientific texts through a practical analysis of the system of modality. Here again, the historical, political, moral ideologies of science and scientific discourse were addressed in order to set the background against which the two texts were set (see section 7.2). Moreover, based on the differences between the two texts in terms of formality, the intended audience and intended purposes, the use of modality in each text was analysed.

In the light of positivist and post-positivist views concerning the relationship between science and popular notions such as ‘the truth’ and ‘objectivity’, the overall picture in the first text was seen as an ideologically consistent one (see section 7.4). It was argued that conventional positivist and post-positivist views of science as an ‘objective’ field of enquiry were the dominant ones, emphasised by the detachment of the writer from the definitions and descriptions evident throughout the text. The consistency of this position was reinforced through the relatively rare use of modality and the high presence of nominalised and factual passive structures. Although the use of modalised utterances gave an air of subjectivity and consequently relative uncertainty concerning the issues involved, it was nonetheless argued that the dominant air of objectivity of the text was retained. In fact, it was argued that these two seemingly conflicting forces worked towards one consistent reading of the underlying ideologies in the text. It was pointed out that the use of modality supported one main aim of science: its concern with ‘the truth’.

Hence, it was concluded that the self-confessed partiality of scientific knowledge was in fact an emphasis on the nonbiased, ‘objective’ and ‘truthful’ nature of scientific inquiry. In other words, even the presence of modality was seen to serve science’s ideology of objectivity, self-preservation and continuity without either undermining the authority and power associated with the field of science enquiry or presenting any ideological inconsistencies or discrepancies.

In the second text (see section 7.5), a different picture emerged. An analysis of the more frequent uses of modalised structures suggested an ideologically inconsistent reading. Similar to Blair’s speech above, it was seen that modal expressions which undermined the certainty and force of the propositions were associated with the more critical and central claims while factuality characterised those less significant, more



descriptive straightforward definitions and procedures. Another important feature of utterances in the text also surfaced: the presence of several layers of modality associated with most of these critical arguments. This, it was argued, both affected the overall consistency of the propositions made by the text as well as reducing the authority associated with the claims and conclusions made. It became apparent that the second text presented a completely different approach to presenting scientific information than the first. This, it was argued, served the underlying economic ideological motivation and drive behind the second text. In other words, the ideological inconsistencies in the text reflected the incompatibility in views between the 'morality' of genuine scientific inquiry on the one hand, and the potential superseding 'immorality' of the financial objectives of scientific inquiry. Of course, all these readings emerged from a systematic analysis of modality which is functional and pragmatically oriented.

Based on these discussions and conclusions, the culminating and quite significant point raised here relates to the contribution the project undertaken in this thesis has made to the field of discourse analysis. In other words, what was/were the justification/s for undertaking this project and what has it achieved or attempted to achieve? In order to address this issue adequately, I intend to focus on presenting how those areas covered in this thesis differ either partially or fundamentally from earlier coverage/s of the same areas, and how that ultimately tackles different dimensions of discourse previously neglected.

To begin with, though, it is crucial to restate the general theoretical linguistic basis underlying the modality framework in this thesis: i.e. the functional theory of language and linguistics. This is an important issue as reflected in the more balanced nature and scope of the theory which avoid the limitations of the structural view by

accounting for both areas of *function* and *structure* in discourse. Moreover, adopting a *critical* view of discourse in this thesis meant that the functional nature of the proposed approach diverged from earlier less critical approaches to discourse analysis in that 'critical' referred to analysing discourse in a context saturated with ideologies, both shared and personal.

This critical view of discourse and critical approach to its analysis adopted in the thesis are seen to differ, initially, from more traditional approaches (such as Conversation Analysis) which aimed at relating primary communicative functions to a set of linguistic structures. Moreover, these were also different from early Critical Linguistics which laid emphasis predominantly on the immediate linguistic context. Instead, the approach proposed in this thesis stresses the importance of both linguistic and situational context, where the latter includes historical, situational, intertextual context as well as the role of the reader. In a similar fashion, this proposed approach differs from later Critical Discourse Analysis mainly in the way ideology is perceived. While with Critical Discourse Analysis, the view of ideology adopted was essentially a left wing political view, the position argued for in this thesis is that of ideology as a partly individual, partly social phenomenon which does not correspond merely to the a narrow politically-oriented and politically-dominated view of society and thought. In the proposed analysis, emphasis is instead laid on the diversity of ideologies present in discourse and most importantly, on ideological inconsistencies in a text rather than political ideologies.

The view that ideology is partly the result of personal (individual) experience, and partly of shared (social) experience means that the role of the reader (both as an individual as well as belonging to a social community) and the role of ideology (as both partly personal and partly shared) are seen as two inseparable entities in the

practical analysis of discourse. Therefore, analysing ideology in discourse demands a realistic and practically feasible consideration of the role of the reader, an account which can capture the individual/personal aspect of ideology by allowing for variance in interpretation yet without jeopardising the overall consistency of the process of interpretation. This constitutes a major challenge usually avoided by critical linguists and critical discourse analysts, and inadequately covered by reader-response critics. This is seen only possible through an approach which is not only functional, but also *pragmatic* in that variation in interpretation is accounted for realistically and practically in the analysis.

Accounting for the reader is therefore not done in terms of aesthetic effects characteristic of early stylistic approaches. These stylistic effects are seen as impossible to pin down to any identifiable and specific structural/functional features of the text. Similarly, the reader's role is not defined in terms of where 'meaning' is located, the task undertaken by early reader-response approaches. Such effects, it is concluded, were predominantly based on a non-functional view of text and were consequently deemed less useful from the perspective of this thesis. Finally, the role of the reader is also different from critical linguistics' account since this role is not based on a set of assumptions about the reader's political-ideological positions in the reading process. Instead, it is an account which allowed for variability in interpretation and therefore variability in ideological commitment based on shared as well as personal/individual aspects of ideology.

This was done by focusing on the linguistic notion of modality, again, a "sorely neglected interpersonal" aspect of meaning (Weber 1992: 22). Because of its indeterminate and vague nature (Lakoff 1972: 229), modality was generally avoided by critics since it was seen as an extremely problematic notion to handle, especially at

the descriptive level. In that linguistic line of logic, a notion which metaphorically 'resists' a systematic description becomes harder as well as less desirable to account for in practical linguistic analyses, which ultimately derive their authority from the reliability of a structured linguistic system.

However, modality was viewed as an indispensable notion from the perspective of this thesis in that it embodies and reconciles those necessary features characteristic of a pragmatic-functional approach to critical analysis. First, modality essentially reflects the subjective 'interference' of a speaker in what s/he said. In other words, it signals the speaker's subjective involvement in projecting his/her attitudes and ideological positions. Secondly, modality is also characteristically vague or indeterminate, thus giving the speaker space to manoeuvre and not be entirely specific in her/his ideological involvement. This point has greater significance from the reader's perspective. In its indeterminate nature, modality opens the door for a variety of interpretations thus reflecting the different, yet limited possibilities in interpreting the positions communicated in a text. Here, in this limited permitted variability in interpretation, the subjectivity of the reader can be captured without running the risk of becoming a completely chaotic process.

In short, the notion of modality adequately serves the pragmatic nature of the proposed approach. It works both at the level of expression and at the level of interpretation where both the speaker/writer and the hearer/reader are metaphorically allowed limited manoeuvre with expressing/interpreting utterances. In this manoeuvre, the speaker/writer and hearer/reader are allowed the same space in expressing/interpreting utterances and consequently ideological commitments. Of course, the most important aspects of this process are the limitations on the variability within which the meaning of a modal is allowed to manoeuvre. This is why the use of

continua is seen as the most adequate framework to express these subjective-indeterminate interpretative qualities of modality. This is also why different modal expressions are placed under more than one modal category within each scale with the use of arrows to signify these possible multiple interpretations.

Answering the questions posed earlier, the justifications behind undertaking the project of this thesis are a number of dissatisfactions with the way earlier approaches tackled notions such as ideology, modality and the reader. Whether it is a *narrow* view (ideology), a *sceptical* view (modality) or an *unpractical* view (the reader), earlier treatment of these notions presented unsatisfactory accounts. This means that the contribution of this thesis to the field of discourse analysis lies in proposing a *wider*, more inclusive view of ideology, a *structured* account of modality which has *practical* potential in realistically considering the role reader in discourse analysis. This has been achieved, I argue, through a practically workable framework which reflects the more acceptable functional view of language in use.

More importantly, the claims of this thesis are reinforced by the three different applications of this framework which targeted three traditionally different genres. The main objectives behind these analyses were twofold. First, these analyses were meant to emphasise the universality of this framework in transcending historical, institutional, structural and functional divisions between genres, especially between literary and non-literary texts. It was an attempt to show that language is best analysed when considering it in its ideological context with equal emphasis paid to the text and its background of production as well as to the text in its context of reception by readers who vary in interpretation. It was approaching language in use.

Second, these analyses were intended to enrich, reinforce or undermine different reading of the texts under study. In the case of *Heart of Darkness*, the

analyses were meant to argue for a reading of the novel which challenged the view of Marlow as a racist, colonialist supporter of western political, religious and moral ideologies and values. It was argued that the vagueness of Marlow's words and his use of modality in specific did not present inconsistent ideological positions.

In the case of Bush's and Blair's political speeches, the analyses were intended to shed light on the underlying political, economic, religious and moral ideologies of the two political parties which they head, and place these in juxtaposition with the same ideologies in the two texts. By contrasting the ideologies reflected in each speech with those of the political parties which the speech presenters represent, it was possible to point out the ideological inconsistencies in the contents of these speeches. It was concluded that Blair faced a bigger challenge than Bush since his speech constituted an attempt to reconcile fundamentally disparate notions (morality and economic interest) in the face of a highly sceptical audience and in the light of dubious evidence. His use of modality, it was argued, reflected that ideological split.

Finally, the analyses of two scientific texts were intended to clarify some of the linguistic techniques utilised by scientific discourse in the light of positivist and post-positivist ideologies. In the first text, the uncertainty arising from the use of modality was not seen to undermine the credibility and force of the claims made there. In fact, it was argued that that only contributed to reinforcing the view of science as an 'objective' field of inquiry whose aim is truthful accounts of scientific findings. This, it was argued, served the ideology of continuity and preservation of science. In the second text, however, the use of modality greatly undermined the persuasive force of the text. The duality in ideological affiliations between the 'morality' of science and the superseding economic factors led to an apparent

inconsistency in ideological positions, reflected adequately through the use of modality.

Based on these arguments, analyses and conclusions, the picture drawn by this thesis may seem fairly final. Far from it. There are several areas which need further specification, elaboration and, most importantly, empirical corroboration: namely, the role of the reader in interpreting modality and the variations in these interpretations. In order to support and be more specific in narrowing down the variations in reader interpretations, one must account for further group sub-divisions within what constitutes the notion of 'the reader'. Surely readers with a scientific background assign different values to modality than readers with a literary background. And this is only within the context of academic institutions.

In fact, such projects are undertaken by some statisticians and reported in the journal *Statistical Science*. Interestingly, this is not an overtly linguistic project (although it is intrinsically linguistic) but an attempt to provide a "codification of probability phrases" in order to better understand what writers really *mean* when they use such phrases (Mosteller and Youtz 1990). Attempts are made to propose numerical percentage-correspondences of the most common probability phrases, namely in scientific discourse. These yielded interesting results such as the fact that "*certain* does not mean 100 percent" (Morris 1990: 1). Also, while some words like 'even-chance' were seen to be quite precise, others such as 'possible' were seen to "vary dramatically among individuals" (Morris 1990: 1).

The variables considered by a number of statisticians ranged from a consideration of different audiences (Wallsten and Budescu 1990) to those which emphasised the linguistic and situational contexts in which such expressions were found (Hormann 1983). Also, some studies concentrated on the effects the time

element has on interpretation. Simpson (1963) for instance studied the variability in meaning for 20 quantitative terms by comparing responses of two questionnaires, one completed in 1942, the other in 1962. It was seen that the results were strikingly similar.

Again, others like Grigoriu and Mihaescu (1988) focused on possible variance in translated expressions of probability. They found that “the average numerical values were similar for different professional groups [physicians, medical students, and medical related professionals] and very close to the values reported in the English literature” (Grigoriu and Mihaescu 1988: 364).

On the more overtly linguistic front, Stubbs (1996) concentrated on the differences between modality in spoken as opposed to written discourse. He quotes Bell (1984) who studied how news stories arriving in New Zealand “in a form designed essentially for printed transmission in newspapers” were abbreviated “for transmission on radio news” (Stubbs 1996: 228). He then points out how the shortening of news stories affects the degree of commitment between the original and broadcasted version of the text.

Similarly, he quotes Slembrouk (1992) who studied how the spoken language “of parliamentary debate is represented in a written form” (Stubbs 1996: 228). Again, the point is to show how those changes made to the spoken text in order to make it fit for written discourse significantly alter the intentions of the speakers and, consequently, the content of the message.

Finally, Badran (2001) emphasises the differences in ideological commitment in two versions of the same political text: one in Arabic, the other, a translation into English. There he argues that the reasons for the differences in commitment arise



mainly due to sloppiness in translating modal expressions, but also because of the mismatch between the modal systems in English and Arabic in the first place.

The possibilities for further research on the topic are, in short, endless, and this thesis constitutes one of numerous routes that approaching this topic can take. It neither accounts for differences between spoken and written discourse nor does it look at cross-linguistic variables which would not only be quite helpful at the theoretical level, but also in a classroom situation. Looking at how modality is perceived by second language learners as opposed to native speakers of English, for instance, would be quite useful in drawing cross-linguistic connections between the various manifestations of the notion.

Yet all in all, the project undertaken in this thesis signals a very realistic starting point to future empirical work that should subsequently arise. It represents a practical shift from the more theoretical to the more applied, from the more restricted and limited to the more inclusive. It is, in short, one major step forward towards the pragmatic tendencies of doing discourse analysis.

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## APPENDICES

### APPENDIX 1

#### Literary Passage 1

"The bushes shook, the grass swayed for a time, and then everything stood still in attentive immobility.

"Now, if he does not say the right thing to them we are all done for," said the Russian at my elbow. The knot of men with the stretcher had stopped, too, halfway to the steamer, as if petrified. I saw the man on the stretcher sit up, lank and with an uplifted arm, above the shoulders of the bearers. 'Let us hope that the man who can talk so well of love in general will find some particular reason to spare us this time,' I said. I resented bitterly the absurd danger of our situation, as if to be at the mercy of that atrocious phantom had been a dishonouring necessity. I could not hear a sound, but through my glasses I saw the thin arm extended commandingly, the lower jaw moving, the eyes of that apparition shining darkly far in its bony head that nodded with grotesque jerks. Kurtz -- Kurtz -- that means short in German -- don't it? Well, the name was as true as everything else in his life -- and death. He looked at least seven feet long. His covering had fallen off, and his body emerged from it pitiful and appalling as from a winding-sheet. I could see the cage of his ribs all astir, the bones of his arm waving. It was as though an animated image of death carved out of old ivory had been shaking its hand with menaces at a motionless crowd of men made of dark and glittering bronze. I saw him open his mouth wide -- it gave him a weirdly voracious aspect, as though he had wanted to swallow all the air, all the earth, all the men before him. A deep voice reached me faintly. He must have been shouting. He fell back suddenly. The stretcher shook as the bearers staggered forward again, and almost at the same time I noticed that the crowd of savages was vanishing without any perceptible movement of retreat.

## APPENDIX 2

### Literary Passage 2A

The Intended: You knew him well.

Marlow: Intimacy grows quickly out there. I knew him as well as it is possible for one man to know another.

The Intended: And you admired him. It was impossible to know him and not to admire him. Was it?

Marlow: He was a remarkable man. It was impossible not to...

The Intended: Love him. How true! How true! But when you think that no one knew him so well as I! I had all his noble confidence. I knew him best.

Marlow: You knew him best.

The Intended: You were his friend. His friend. You must have been, if he had given you this and sent you to me. I feel I can speak to you – and oh! I must speak. I want you- you who have heard his last words- to know I have been worthy of him... It is not pride... Yes! I am proud to know I understood him better than anyone on earth- he told me so himself. And since his mother died I have had no one – no one – to – to – Who was not his friend who had heard him speak once? He drew men towards him by what was best in them. It is the gift of the great. But you have heard him! You know!

Marlow: Yes, I know.

The Intended: What a loss to me- to us! To the world. I have been very happy – very fortunate – very proud. Too fortunate. Too happy for a little while. And now I am unhappy for- for life. And of all this, of all his promise, and of all his greatness, of his generous mind, of his noble heart, nothing remains – nothing but a memory. You and I -

Marlow: We shall always remember him.

The Intended: No! It is impossible that all this should be lost – that such a life should be sacrificed to leave nothing- but sorrow. You know what vast plans he had. I knew of them too – I could not perhaps understand – but others knew of them. Something must remain. His words, at least have not died.

Marlow: His words will remain.

The Intended: And his example. Men looked up to him- his goodness shone in every act. His example -

Marlow: True, his example too. Yes, his example. I forgot that.

The Intended: But I do not. I cannot – I cannot believe – not yet. I cannot believe that I shall never see him again, that nobody will see him again, never, never, never. He died as he lived.

Marlow: His end was in every way worthy of his life.

The Intended: And I was not with him.

Marlow: Everything that could be done -

The Intended: Ah, but I believed in him more than anyone on earth – more than his own mother, more than – himself. He needed me! Me! I would have treasured every sigh, every word, every sign, every glance.

Marlow: Don't

The Intended: Forgive me. I – I – have mourned so long in silence- in silence... You were with him – to the last? I think of his loneliness. Nobody near to understand him as I would have understood. Perhaps no one to hear...

Marlow: To the very end. I heard his very last words...

The Intended: Repeat them. I want – I want – something – something – to – to live with. His last word- to live with. Don't you understand I loved him – I loved him – I loved him!

Marlow: The last word he pronounced was – your name.

The Intended: I knew it – I was sure.

## APPENDIX 3

### Literary Passage 2B

'You knew him well,' she murmured, after a moment of mourning silence.

"'Intimacy grows quickly out there,' I said. 'I knew him as well as it is possible for one man to know another.'

"'And you admired him,' she said. 'It was impossible to know him and not to admire him. Was it?'

"'He was a remarkable man,' I said, unsteadily. Then before the appealing fixity of her gaze, that seemed to watch for more words on my lips, I went on, 'It was impossible not to --'

"'Love him,' she finished eagerly, silencing me into an appalled dumbness. 'How true! how true! But when you think that no one knew him so well as I! I had all his noble confidence. I knew him best.'

"'You knew him best,' I repeated. And perhaps she did. But with every word spoken the room was growing darker, and only her forehead, smooth and white, remained illumined by the unextinguishable light of belief and love.

"'You were his friend,' she went on. 'His friend,' she repeated, a little louder. 'You must have been, if he had given you this, and sent you to me. I feel I can speak to you -- and oh! I must speak. I want you -- you who have heard his last words -- to know I have been worthy of him.... It is not pride.... Yes! I am proud to know I understood him better than any one on earth -- he told me so himself. And since his mother died I have had no one -- no one -- to -- to --'

"I listened. The darkness deepened. I was not even sure whether he had given me the right bundle. I rather suspect he wanted me to take care of another batch of his papers which, after his death, I saw the manager examining under the lamp. And the girl talked, easing her pain in the certitude of my sympathy; she talked as thirsty men drink. I had heard that her engagement with Kurtz had been disapproved by her people. He wasn't rich enough or something. And indeed I don't know whether he had not been a pauper all his life. He had given me some reason to infer that it was his impatience of comparative poverty that drove him out there.

"'... Who was not his friend who had heard him speak once?' she was saying. 'He drew men towards him by what was best in them.' She looked at me with intensity. 'It is the gift of the great,' she went on, and the sound of her low voice seemed to have the accompaniment of all the other sounds, full of mystery, desolation, and sorrow. I had ever heard -- the ripple of the river, the sighing of the trees swayed by the wind, the murmurs of the crowds, the faint ring of incomprehensible words cried from afar, the whisper of a voice speaking from beyond the threshold of an eternal darkness. 'But you have heard him! You know!' she cried.

"Yes, I know," I said with something like despair in my heart, but bowing my head before the faith that was in her, before that great and saving illusion that shone with an unearthly glow in the darkness, in the triumphant darkness from which I could not have defended her -- from which I could not even defend myself.

"What a loss to me -- to us!" -- she corrected herself with beautiful generosity; then added in a murmur, 'To the world.' By the last gleams of twilight I could see the glitter of her eyes, full of tears -- of tears that would not fall.

"I have been very happy -- very fortunate -- very proud," she went on. 'Too fortunate. Too happy for a little while. And now I am unhappy for -- for life.'

"She stood up; her fair hair seemed to catch all the remaining light in a glimmer of gold. I rose, too.

"And of all this," she went on mournfully, 'of all his promise, and of all his greatness, of his generous mind, of his noble heart, nothing remains -- nothing but a memory. You and I --'

"We shall always remember him," I said hastily.

"No!" she cried. 'It is impossible that all this should be lost -- that such a life should be sacrificed to leave nothing -- but sorrow. You know what vast plans he had. I knew of them, too -- I could not perhaps understand -- but others knew of them. Something must remain. His words, at least, have not died.'

"His words will remain," I said.

"And his example," she whispered to herself. 'Men looked up to him -- his goodness shone in every act. His example --'

"True," I said; 'his example, too. Yes, his example. I forgot that.'

"But I do not. I cannot -- I cannot believe -- not yet. I cannot believe that I shall never see him again, that nobody will see him again, never, never, never.'

"She put out her arms as if after a retreating figure, stretching them back and with clasped pale hands across the fading and narrow sheen of the window. Never see him! I saw him clearly enough then. I shall see this eloquent phantom as long as I live, and I shall see her, too, a tragic and familiar Shade, resembling in this gesture another one, tragic also, and bedecked with powerless charms, stretching bare brown arms over the glitter of the infernal stream, the stream of darkness. She said suddenly very low, 'He died as he lived.'

"His end," said I, with dull anger stirring in me, 'was in every way worthy of his life.'

"And I was not with him," she murmured. My anger subsided before a feeling of infinite pity.

"Everything that could be done -- " I mumbled.

"Ah, but I believed in him more than any one on earth -- more than his own mother, more than -- himself. He needed me! Me! I would have treasured every sigh, every word, every sign, every glance.'

"I felt like a chill grip on my chest. 'Don't,' I said, in a muffled voice.

"Forgive me. I -- I have mourned so long in silence -- in silence.... You were with him -- to the last? I think of his loneliness. Nobody near to understand him as I would have understood. Perhaps no one to hear....'

"To the very end,' I said, shakily. 'I heard his very last words....' I stopped in a fright.

"Repeat them,' she murmured in a heart-broken tone. 'I want -- I want -- something -- something -- to -- to live with.'

"I was on the point of crying at her, 'Don't you hear them?' The dusk was repeating them in a persistent whisper all around us, in a whisper that seemed to swell menacingly like the first whisper of a rising wind. 'The horror! The horror!'

"His last word -- to live with,' she insisted. 'Don't you understand I loved him -- I loved him -- I loved him!'

"I pulled myself together and spoke slowly.

"The last word he pronounced was -- your name.'

"I heard a light sigh and then my heart stood still, stopped dead short by an exulting and terrible cry, by the cry of inconceivable triumph and of unspeakable pain. 'I knew it -- I was sure!'... She knew. She was sure. I heard her weeping; she had hidden her face in her hands. It seemed to me that the house would collapse before I could escape, that the heavens would fall upon my head. But nothing happened. The heavens do not fall for such a trifle. Would they have fallen, I wonder, if I had rendered Kurtz that justice which was his due? Hadn't he said he wanted only justice? But I couldn't. I could not tell her. It would have been too dark -- too dark altogether...."

## APPENDIX 4

### President Bush Announces Military Strikes in Afghanistan

The White House

Office of the Press Secretary

October 7, 2001

Statement by the President The Treaty Room 1:00 P.M. EDT

**THE PRESIDENT:** Good afternoon. On my orders, the United States military has begun strikes against al Qaeda terrorist training camps and military installations of the Taliban regime in Afghanistan. These carefully targeted actions are designed to disrupt the use of Afghanistan as a terrorist base of operations, and to attack the military capability of the Taliban regime.

We are joined in this operation by our staunch friend, Great Britain. Other close friends, including Canada, Australia, Germany and France, have pledged forces as the operation unfolds. More than 40 countries in the Middle East, Africa, Europe and across Asia have granted air transit or landing rights. Many more have shared intelligence. We are supported by the collective will of the world.

More than two weeks ago, I gave Taliban leaders a series of clear and specific demands: Close terrorist training camps; hand over leaders of the al Qaeda network; and return all foreign nationals, including American citizens, unjustly detained in your country. None of these demands were met. And now the Taliban will pay a price. By destroying camps and disrupting communications, we will make it more difficult for the terror network to train new recruits and coordinate their evil plans.

Initially, the terrorists may burrow deeper into caves and other entrenched hiding places. Our military action is also designed to clear the way for sustained, comprehensive and relentless operations to drive them out and bring them to justice.

At the same time, the oppressed people of Afghanistan will know the generosity of America and our allies. As we strike military targets, we'll also drop food, medicine and supplies to the starving and suffering men and women and children of Afghanistan.

The United States of America is a friend to the Afghan people, and we are the friends of almost a billion worldwide who practice the Islamic faith. The United States of America is an enemy of those who aid terrorists and of the barbaric criminals who profane a great religion by committing murder in its name.

This military action is a part of our campaign against terrorism, another front in a war that has already been joined through diplomacy, intelligence, the freezing of financial assets and the arrests of known terrorists by law enforcement agents in 38 countries. Given the nature and reach of our enemies, we will win this conflict by the patient accumulation of successes, by meeting a series of challenges with determination and will and purpose.

Today we focus on Afghanistan, but the battle is broader. Every nation has a choice to make. In this conflict, there is no neutral ground. If any government sponsors the outlaws and killers of innocents, they have become outlaws and murderers, themselves. And they will take that lonely path at their own peril.

I'm speaking to you today from the Treaty Room of the White House, a place where American Presidents have worked for peace. We're a peaceful nation. Yet, as we have learned, so suddenly and so tragically, there can be no peace in a world of sudden terror. In the face of today's new threat, the only way to pursue peace is to pursue those who threaten it.

We did not ask for this mission, but we will fulfill it. The name of today's military operation is Enduring Freedom. We defend not only our precious freedoms, but also the freedom of people everywhere to live and raise their children free from fear.

I know many Americans feel fear today. And our government is taking strong precautions. All law enforcement and intelligence agencies are working aggressively around America, around the world and around the clock. At my request, many governors have activated the National Guard to strengthen airport security. We have called up Reserves to reinforce our military capability and strengthen the protection of our homeland.

In the months ahead, our patience will be one of our strengths -- patience with the long waits that will result from tighter security; patience and understanding that it will take time to achieve our goals; patience in all the sacrifices that may come.

Today, those sacrifices are being made by members of our Armed Forces who now defend us so far from home, and by their proud and worried families. A Commander-in-Chief sends America's sons and daughters into a battle in a foreign land only after the greatest care and a lot of prayer. We ask a lot of those who wear our uniform. We ask them to leave their loved ones, to travel great distances, to risk injury, even to be prepared to make the ultimate sacrifice of their lives. They are dedicated, they are honorable; they represent the best of our country. And we are grateful.

To all the men and women in our military -- every sailor, every soldier, every airman, every coastguardsman, every Marine -- I say this: Your mission is defined; your objectives are clear; your goal is just. You have my full confidence, and you will have every tool you need to carry out your duty.

I recently received a touching letter that says a lot about the state of America in these difficult times -- a letter from a 4th-grade girl, with a father in the military: "As much as I don't want my Dad to fight," she wrote, "I'm willing to give him to you."

This is a precious gift, the greatest she could give. This young girl knows what America is all about. Since September 11, an entire generation of young Americans has gained new understanding of the value of freedom, and its cost in duty and in sacrifice.

The battle is now joined on many fronts. We will not waver; we will not tire; we will not falter; and we will not fail. Peace and freedom will prevail.

Thank you. May God continue to bless America.



## APPENDIX 5

### STATEMENT BY THE PRIME MINISTER, TONY BLAIR, DOWNING STREET, SUNDAY 7 OCTOBER 2001

#### 'START OF MILITARY ACTION AGAINST TARGETS IN AFGHANISTAN'

As you will know from the announcement by President Bush military action against targets inside Afghanistan has begun. I can confirm that UK forces are engaged in this action. I want to pay tribute if I might right at the outset to Britain's armed forces. There is no greater strength for a British Prime Minister and the British nation at a time like this than to know that the forces we are calling upon are amongst the very best in the world.

They and their families are, of course, carrying an immense burden at this moment and will be feeling deep anxiety as will the British people. But we can take pride in their courage, their sense of duty and the esteem with which they're held throughout the world.

No country lightly commits forces to military action and the inevitable risks involved but we made it clear following the attacks upon the United States on 11 September that we would take part in action once it was clear who was responsible.

There is no doubt in my mind, nor in the mind of anyone who has been through all the available evidence, including intelligence material, that these attacks were carried out by the al-Qaeda network masterminded by Osama bin Laden. Equally it is clear that his network is harboured and supported by the Taliban regime inside Afghanistan.

It is now almost a month since the atrocity occurred, it is more than two weeks since an ultimatum was delivered to the Taliban to yield up the terrorists or face the consequences. It is clear beyond doubt that they will not do this. They were given the choice of siding with justice or siding with terror and they chose to side with terror.

There are three parts all equally important to the operation of which we're engaged: military, diplomatic and humanitarian. The military action we are taking will be targeted against places we know to be involved in the operation of terror or against the military apparatus of the Taliban. This military plan has been put together mindful of our determination to do all we humanly can to avoid civilian casualties.

I cannot disclose, obviously, how long this action will last but we will act with reason and resolve. We have set the objectives to eradicate Osama bin Laden's network of terror and to take action against the Taliban regime that is sponsoring it. As to the precise British involvement I can confirm that last Wednesday the US Government made a specific request that a number of UK military assets be used in the operation which has now begun. And I gave authority for these assets to be deployed. They include the base at Diego Garcia, reconnaissance and flight support aircraft and missile firing submarines. Missile firing submarines are in use tonight. The air assets will be available for use in the coming days.

The United States are obviously providing the bulk of the force required in leading this operation. But this is an international effort as well as UK. France, Germany, Australia and Canada have also committed themselves to take part in the operation.

On the diplomatic and political front in the time I've been Prime Minister I cannot recall a situation that has commanded so quickly such a powerful coalition of support and not just from those countries directly involved in military action but from many others in all parts of the world. The coalition has, I believe, strengthened not weakened in the 26 days since the atrocity occurred. And this is in no small measure due to the statesmanship of President Bush to whom I pay tribute tonight.

The world understands that whilst, of course, there are dangers in acting the dangers of inaction are far, far greater. The threat of further such outrages, the threat to our economies, the threat to the stability of the world.

On the humanitarian front we are assembling a coalition of support for refugees in and outside Afghanistan which is as vital as the military coalition. Even before 11 September four million Afghans were on the move. There are two million refugees in Pakistan and one and a half million in Iran. We have to act for humanitarian reasons to alleviate the appalling suffering of the Afghan people and deliver stability so that people from that region stay in that region. Britain, of course, is heavily involved in that effort.

So we are taking action therefore on all those three fronts: military, diplomatic and humanitarian. I also want to say very directly to the British people why this matters so much directly to Britain. First let us not forget that the attacks of the 11 September represented the worst terrorist outrage against British citizens in our history. The murder of British citizens, whether it happens overseas or not, is an attack upon Britain. But even if no British citizen had died it would be right to act.

This atrocity was an attack on us all, on people of all faiths and people of none. We know the al-Qaeda network threaten Europe, including Britain, and, indeed, any nation throughout the world that does not share their fanatical views. So we have a direct interest in acting in our own self defence to protect British lives. It was also an attack not just on lives but on livelihoods. We can see since 11 September how economic confidence has suffered with all that means for British jobs and British industry. Our prosperity and standard of living, therefore, require us to deal with this terrorist threat.

We act also because the al-Qaeda network and the Taliban regime are funded in large part on the drugs trade. 90 per cent of all the heroin sold on British streets originates from Afghanistan. Stopping that trade is, again, directly in our interests.

I wish to say finally, as I've said many times before, that this is not a war with Islam. It angers me, as it angers the vast majority of Muslims, to hear bin Laden and his associates described as Islamic terrorists. They are terrorists pure and simple. Islam is a peaceful and tolerant religion and the acts of these people are wholly contrary to the teachings of the Koran.

These are difficult and testing times therefore for all of us. People are bound to be concerned about what the terrorists may seek to do in response. I should say there is at present no specific credible threat to the UK that we know of and that we have in place tried and tested contingency plans which are the best possible response to any further attempts at terror.

This, of course, is a moment of the utmost gravity for the world. None of the leaders involved in this action want war. None of our nations want it. We are a peaceful people. But we know that sometimes to safeguard peace we have to fight. Britain has learnt that lesson many times in our history. We only do it if the cause is just. This cause is just. The murder of almost seven thousand innocent people in America was an attack on our freedom, our way of life, an attack on civilised values the world over. We waited so that those responsible could be yielded up by those shielding them. That offer was refused, we have now no choice so we will act. And our determination in acting is total. We will not let up or rest until our objectives are met in full. Thank you.

## APPENDIX 6

### Metabolism and Tissue Distribution of Vitamin A

Animal species lack the biochemical pathways necessary to synthesize the carotenoid structure, a precursor of vitamin A. Vitamin A is a generic term for compounds with the biological activity of retinal and was initially called fat soluble A, as it is absorbed in the small intestine with lipids. Carotenoids are likewise absorbed and are split in the intestinal mucosa into two molecules of retinal which is then reduced to retinol. Retinol reductase is a zinc-dependent enzyme and there is evidence of reduced conversion of  $\beta$ -carotene to retinol in zinc deficiency. Retinol is then re-esterified with unsaturated fatty acids and transported in chylomicrons to the liver. At the liver, the ester linkage is hydrolysed and the molecule enters the liver cells as retinol, where it is re-esterified and stored associated with lipid droplets. The esterification of retinol is analogous to that of other cellular lipids, such as cholesterol, and is catalysed by fatty acyl coenzyme A retinol acyl transferase. Much retinol (19% of liver vitamin A) is found in high molecular weight lipoprotein complex in rat liver cytosol; this complex also contains the cytosol – retinol-binding protein, retinyl palmitate hydrolase as well as triolein, cholesterol oleate, and dipalmitoyl phosphatidylcholine hydrolase activities. The complex was isolated by gel filtration and ultracentrifugation, but it may represent an artifact generated during tissue homogenization. The principal liver cell involved in storage of retinol is the Ito or stellate cell which can be found in the space of Disse adjacent to the sinusoids. If retinol is required by the peripheral tissues, it is transported by a retinol-binding protein, which is synthesized in the liver and migrates with the serum globulins; this protein associates with prealbumin, presumably to form a larger molecule that is not filtered by the glomerulus. The retinol-binding protein concentration in plasma and plasma retinol is increased in chronic renal disease and estimation of retinol-binding protein in urine has recently been proposed as a means of detecting disturbed renal tubular function. Retinol-binding protein interacts with specific cell surface receptors at the retinol requiring peripheral tissues. Free retinol exerts a detergent-like action on membranes and is responsible for vitamin A toxicity effects.

The synthesis and secretion of retinol-binding protein is regulated by vitamin A status, which is decreased in deficiency states, and by factors that alter liver protein synthesis. There is evidence that retinol is metabolized to retinoic acid in several species; retinoic acid has all the biological properties of retinol except that it will not support vision and reproductive functions. However, recent evidence suggests that retinoic acid stimulates testosterone production by Leydig cells in the testis. There is some in vivo isomerization of *all-trans* retinoic acid to 13-*cis*-retinoic acid, which is further metabolized as to more polar derivatives such as 5,6-epoxy retinoic acid and 4-hydroxy- and 4-oxo derivatives in various rat tissues, including liver. There is a retinoic acid 5,6-epoxidase in rat kidney microsomes which is dependent on ATP, NADPH, and O<sub>2</sub>. It is stimulated by Fe<sup>2+</sup> and has properties like microsomal lipid peroxidases. If epoxidation is blocked, the function of retinoic acid is not inhibited, suggesting that epoxidation is not a necessary metabolic step for biological activity. The reaction is probably a non-specific lipid peroxidation reaction. The 4-oxo and 5,6-epoxy metabolites appear to have less biological activity than retinoic acid. However, there are multiple metabolites which are at least partially tissue specific and retinoids induce retinoic acid metabolism in vitamin A-deficient hamsters. Oxidation of

retinoic acid is believed to be mediated by a cytochrome P-type enzyme system. However, retinol- $\beta$ -glucuronide, a major metabolite of retinoic acid in the small intestine that is also produced by incubating 5,6-epoxy retinoic acid with uridine diphospho 1 $\alpha$ -D-glucuronic acid in the presence of liver micorsomes, has increased biological activity and may be either an active metabolite or a tolerated modification. The suggestion has been made that glucuronidation ensures conservation of vitamin A in the body by enterohepatic circulation; retinol, retinoic acid and 13-*cis*-retinoic acid are likewise excreted in the bile as  $\beta$ -glucuronidation in the presence of uridine diphosphoglucuronic acid (UDPGA). As the 4-hydroxylation reaction may represent a catabolic pathway, this could account for the decrease in liver vitamin A in rats consuming ethanol. In human skin extracts, the major retinoids are *all-trans*-retinol and 3,4-dehydroretinol, the latter compound being found in dyskeratotic skin where its further metabolism may be defective.

Liver stores of vitamin A are probably the best index of vitamin A status; plasma levels of vitamin A show little correlation with dietary intake and reflect the amount of plasma retinol-binding protein. Plasma levels may decline when the liver stores are exhausted. If a dose of radioactively labelled retinol is given to a deficient rat, there is an increase in the excretion of labelled metabolites in urine in comparison with an animal of normal vitamin A status. This is because incoming retinol in such circumstances is preferentially utilized by the peripheral tissues rather than stored. The minimum liver concentration of retinol necessary to favor storage rather than immediate turnover and breakdown is 60 IU/g liver. When animals or humans are subjected to a variety of stressful stimuli, there is a decrease in serum vitamin A, although there is no change in the amount of the vitamin in the liver or testis. There is evidence that the low serum vitamin A is due to increased renal loss in these circumstances. During stress there is an accumulation of vitamin A in the enlarged adrenal glands. The suggestion that vitamin A plays an essential role in steroid hormone dynamics is borne out by the fact that vitamin A accumulates preferentially in the adrenal glands when the vitamin is first administered to animals depleted of vitamin A.

Interestingly, liver vitamin A stores are very low in alcoholics even with mild liver damage, even though plasma vitamin A levels are often normal; this has some possible bearing on the increased risk of hepatic neoplasm in persons with alcoholic cirrhosis.

Both uptake and liver storage of vitamin A are equally effective when the vitamin is administered in an aqueous suspension or an oily solution, thus administration of vitamin A and E in solutions given for total parental nutrition (TPN) maintains blood levels and leads to storage. Illness, infections and prematurity affect both the storage and tissue requirements of vitamins A and E.

## APPENDIX 7

Name: *Homocysteine and Cardiovascular Health*

Author: *Lane Lenard, Ph.D.*

Issue Date: *September 1998*

### **Homocysteine and Cardiovascular Health September 1998**

*by Lane Lenard, Ph.D.*

Cardiovascular diseases, especially myocardial infarction (heart attack) and stroke, kill at least 12 million people each year throughout the world. In the United States, cardiovascular diseases are the primary cause in about half of all deaths. In 1995 cardiovascular diseases killed about 455,000 men and 505,000 women.

None of this is news, of course. What is news is that in the U.S. between 13,500 to 50,000 of these deaths could easily be prevented by taking just 25 cents worth of vitamin supplements a day.

For a mere quarter's worth of vitamins, you can significantly eliminate a major independent risk factor for heart attack or stroke. You can't even buy a candy bar for a quarter any more.

This is not a hyperbole. This is not snake oil. This is not some quack cure. This is hard science, incontrovertible evidence, based on the results of hundreds of studies going back more than 30 years. Although conservative organizations like the American Heart Association (AHA) still refuse to endorse the conclusions of these studies and to recommend that people take these vitamin supplements, the conclusions are strongly supported by numerous articles and editorials that have appeared in the two most prestigious American medical journals, the *Journal of the American Medical Association* and the *New England Journal of Medicine*, as well as many other journals.

We are referring to the link between the amino acid homocysteine and cardiovascular disease and the fact that supplements of vitamins B6 and B12, folic acid, and betaine (trimethylglycine, TMG) have been proven to sever that link.

Homocysteine is an amino acid formed from the metabolism of another amino acid, methionine, which is commonly found in meats-especially red meat. High homocysteine levels are now widely recognized as an independent risk factor for cardiovascular disease. This means that high homocysteine levels along with cigarette smoking, obesity, high blood pressure, high-fat diet, diabetes, and a sedentary life style increase your risk of developing cardiovascular disease and dying of a heart attack or stroke. Taking supplemental B6, B12, folic acid, and trimethylglycine quickly and effectively restores homocysteine to safe levels, essentially eliminating this very important risk, often within a few days (although the damage done by long-term elevated homocysteine takes longer to resolve).

## Homocysteine Increases Cardiovascular Risk

More than 20 case-control and cross-sectional studies on more than 2,000 subjects have provided what Harvard epidemiologist Meir J. Stampfer, MD, calls "remarkably consistent" findings regarding the relationship between homocysteine levels and cardiovascular diseases. Specifically, patients with stroke and other cardiovascular diseases tend to have higher blood levels of homocysteine (hyperhomocysteinemia) than subjects without disease.

Stampfer points out that homocysteine levels do not have to be elevated by very much to increase risk, since most of the patients in these studies had levels that were within what is generally regarded to be the normal range.<sup>3</sup> A meta-analysis found a positive association between hyperhomocysteinemia and thrombosis (formation of clots in blood vessels) in eight out of 10 studies involving 2,400 patients. In these eight studies, the risk of thrombosis was two to 13 times greater in people with hyperhomocysteinemia.<sup>9</sup>

One cross-sectional study conducted by Dr. Jacob Selhub of Tufts University and his associates, involved more than 1,000 elderly people from the long-running Framingham Heart Study. The investigators examined the relationship between the degree of carotid artery blockage (stenosis) and plasma homocysteine levels. After adjusting for other risk factors, they found that those individuals with the highest levels of homocysteine had twice the risk of a carotid stenosis than those with the lowest levels. Moreover, the authors reported that those patients who had the most carotid artery stenosis had the lowest intake of folic acid and vitamin B6.<sup>5</sup>

The Physicians' Health Study, a Harvard-based study that tracked nearly 15,000 male physicians (aged 40-84 years) for up to five years, came to a similar conclusion. At the start of the study, none of the physicians had ever suffered a heart attack or stroke. During the course of the study, 271 of the men subsequently suffered a heart attack. When the researchers compared the homocysteine levels in these men with those of matched controls who had remained healthy, they found that the men whose homocysteine levels were in the highest five percent had about three times the risk of heart attack as those with the lowest levels. "Because high levels [of homocysteine] can often be easily treated with vitamin supplements, homocysteine may be an independent, modifiable risk factor," the authors concluded.<sup>4</sup>

Homocysteine's role as an independent risk factor for cardiovascular diseases was confirmed in a large multicenter European study that included researchers from nine different countries. The results showed a 2.2-fold greater incidence of cardiovascular disease in those whose homocysteine levels were in the top 20%. Although only a small number of the subjects in this study were taking vitamin supplements, the authors noted that those who were taking supplements appeared to have a "substantially lower risk of vascular disease, a proportion of which was attributable to lower plasma homocysteine levels."<sup>11</sup>

## Why Homocysteine Levels Rise

High homocysteine in the blood can arise from three primary causes. The first is a genetic defect that impairs homocysteine metabolism. Actually, several different genetic defects related to the formation of the various enzymes required to metabolize homocysteine have been identified. The most serious defects may result in premature

death, as in the cases McCully encountered early in his investigations. More common are less severe defects, which may produce mild or moderate elevations of homocysteine. These defects are quite common, occurring in perhaps 30% of the population, and may account, at least in part, for the inheritability of cardiovascular disease.<sup>3</sup>

You can also elevate your homocysteine levels by consuming too much methionine-rich food. Recall that the converts methionine directly into homocysteine.

Although the high fat content of certain meats is usually blamed for increasing the risk of heart disease and stroke, the high methionine content of meat may be equally culpable.

Probably the most important contribution to elevated homocysteine levels for most people is inadequate intake of folic acid, vitamins B6 and B12, and betaine. No matter what the cause of hyperhomocysteinemia, even when there is a genetic defect, it is almost always possible to reduce levels to the healthy range by taking sufficient quantities of these nutritional supplements.

Given the deadly consequences of elevated homocysteine, the ease with which homocysteine levels can be brought down and maintained within the safe range by taking vitamin supplements containing folic acid (folate), vitamin B6 (pyridoxine), vitamin B12, and betaine is truly remarkable.

### **Keeping Homocysteine Levels Low**

Study after study has demonstrated beyond the shadow of a doubt that the risks associated with elevated homocysteine can be quickly and easily eliminated by taking adequate amounts of folic acid, vitamins B6 and B12, and betaine. Selhub's 1993 cross-sectional analysis of people from the Framingham study, for example, found that (1) homocysteine levels increased with age, (2) plasma homocysteine levels dropped as folate intake increased, and (3) 67% of the cases of hyperhomocysteinemia were related to inadequate plasma concentrations of one or more of the B vitamins.<sup>20</sup>

In a German study, injections of folate and vitamin B6 reduced homocysteine concentrations in 175 elderly people, with maximum effect seen within five to 12 days. Homocysteine levels returned to normal in 92% of the vitamin-treated group compared with only 20% of those treated with placebo.<sup>21</sup> Another study compared 130 Boston area patients hospitalized with their first heart attack with 118 matched controls who had never had a heart attack. The authors found that (1) homocysteine levels were 11% higher in the heart attack patients, (2) dietary and plasma levels of vitamin B6 and folate were lower in the heart attack patients, and (3) as intake of folate and vitamin B6 increased, the risk of heart attack decreased, independently of other risk factors.<sup>17</sup>

While most studies have concentrated on using the B vitamins to normalize homocysteine metabolism, some people do not respond to this regimen, possibly because of a genetic defect. Studies have shown that by adding betaine to the standard B vitamin regimen, homocysteine can be reduced to safe levels in nearly everyone.<sup>22,</sup>  
23



## How Much Do You Need?

To sum up the homocysteine-cardiovascular disease-B-vitamin story, there is no doubt that:

1. As homocysteine levels in the blood stream rise, the risk of cardiovascular disease also rises, and vice versa.
2. Several mechanisms by which homocysteine appears to promote atherosclerosis have been identified.
3. As intake of folic acid, betaine, vitamin B6, and vitamin B12 increases, homocysteine levels decline, and vice versa.
4. On average, as intake of folic acid, betaine, vitamin B6, and vitamin B12 increases, the risk of cardiovascular disease declines, and vice versa.
5. At the doses recommended for normalizing homocysteine metabolism, the B vitamins and betaine appear to be completely safe.

