VIEWING SPARTA, VIEWING ASIA: VISION AND GREEK IDENTITY IN XENOPHON

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Abstract

What happens when we look at others, and when others look at us? How does the experience of looking at or being seen by others shape our perceptions of ourselves? This thesis addresses these questions with reference to a specific historical and cultural moment; I examine scenes of vision and display in the Athenian writer Xenophon's representations of Spartans, Persians and other non-Greek peoples in Asia as a means of investigating the place of Sparta, Persia and the non-Greek in fourth century Athenian thought. Focusing in particular on the Anabasis, Cyropaedia, Lakedaimonion Politeia and Agesilaus, I analyse the representation of the responses of spectators to foreign sights in order to consider how these texts position their readers in relation to Spartans, Persians and others, and also, therefore, how they articulate and interrogate what it means to be Athenian, and what it means to be Greek. I will argue that sight is involved in the construction of Greek identity; that although some of the ways in which Greek identity is represented imply its cohesion, more often Xenophon's scenes of vision reveal the uncertainties and manipulations involved in attempting to imagine or lay claim to Greekness; and that Xenophon reveals the complexities of Panhellenist thought and of the intellectual and political climate of the fourth century. This thesis contributes towards a history of Greek identity and a history of visuality; it also seeks to reappraise Xenophon as a writer, revealing him as a valuable source for Greek conceptions of political power and conflict, and of ethnic, political and cultural self-consciousness.
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1. Introduction

What happens when we look at others, and when others look at us? How does the experience of looking at or being seen by others shape our perceptions of ourselves? This thesis addresses these questions with reference to a specific historical and cultural moment; I examine scenes of vision and display in the Athenian writer Xenophon’s representations of Spartans, Persians and other non-Greek peoples in Asia as a means of investigating the place of Sparta, Persia and the non-Greek in fourth century Athenian thought. Focusing in particular on the Anabasis, Cyropaedia, Lakedaimonion Politeia (Lak. Pol.) and Agesilaus, I analyse the representation of the responses of spectators to foreign sights in order to consider how these texts position their readers in relation to Spartans, Persians and others, and also, therefore, how they articulate and interrogate what it means to be Athenian, and what it means to be Greek. I will argue that sight is involved in the construction of Greek identity; that although some of the ways in which Greek identity is represented imply its cohesion, more often Xenophon’s scenes of vision reveal the uncertainties and manipulations involved in attempting to imagine or lay claim to Greekness; and that Xenophon reveals the complexities of Panhellenist thought and of the intellectual and political climate of the fourth century. This thesis contributes towards a history of Greek identity and a history of visuality; it also seeks to reappraise Xenophon as a writer, revealing him as a valuable source for Greek conceptions of political
power and conflict, and of ethnic, political and cultural self-consciousness.

The identity of Xenophon

What does a reading of Xenophon contribute to the history of Greek identity? Xenophon is a writer caught between cultures.\(^1\) An elite Athenian and associate of Socrates, he was exiled from Athens,\(^2\) and had close personal association with Persians and Spartans, Athens' historical enemies. He joined a Greek mercenary army fighting for the Persian renegade Cyrus the Younger in his attempt to overthrow his brother the Persian King in 401; and he accompanied Agesilaus against the Boeotians in 394,\(^3\) may have fought on the Spartan side against the Athenians at the battle of Coronea,\(^4\) owned an estate at Skillous in Elis provided by the Spartans,\(^5\) and may have had his sons educated in the Spartan *agoge*.\(^6\) His "identity" is therefore hard to pin down; his exceptional cultural position as a writer who "crosses the boundaries of engagement between Greek and barbarian, Athens and Sparta"\(^7\) makes him a crucially important figure for understanding how such

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\(^1\) Goldhill (1998b) describes Xenophon as "a man who was exiled from his democratic country to live in the community of its worst military and political enemies, and who fought (and wrote about his fighting) for a charismatic barbarian revolutionary.... Xenophon should be seen as a figure of exemplary importance and attractively transgressive social positioning... Xenophon is ripe for rehabilitation."

\(^2\) *An.* 5.3.7 & 7.7.57; *Diog. Laert.* 2.51 & 2.58. The reasons for his exile are unknown.

\(^3\) *An.* 5.3.6; *Diog. Laert.* 2.51.

\(^4\) *Plut.* *Ages.* 18.2. *An.* 5.3.6 says he took part in Agesilaus' campaign against Boeotia but does not specify whether he was present at Coronea. See Humble (1997) 10-11 for discussion of the evidence.

\(^5\) *An.* 5.3.7; *Diog. Laert.* 2.52.


\(^7\) Goldhill (1998b). See also Azoulay (2004c) 15.
boundaries operated and were conceptualised. Xenophon offers us unique insight into what it meant to be Greek at this historical moment.

Xenophon’s political positioning has tended to be read in contradictory ways. He is either represented as a Hellenocentric writer, depicting Greeks as superior to barbarians, or as a writer “sympathetic” to barbarians and interested in showing how barbarians are not so very different from Greeks – a reading influenced by his personal association with Cyrus the Younger. These positions have sometimes been combined, producing Xenophon as an author generally “negative” about barbarians, but “positive” about certain barbarian individuals, or certain aspects of non-Greek societies. A similar approach can be found in responses to Xenophon’s attitude towards the Spartans. Whereas the majority view has tended to cast Xenophon as a “pro-Spartan” writer, an interpretation again influenced by his personal relationship with Sparta, others have seen him as condemning Sparta. Again these positions have been bridged by those arguing that Xenophon is generally pro-Spartan, but capable of noticing Sparta’s defects.

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10 E.g. Ollier (1933); Delebecque (1957); Luccioni (1947); Tigerstedt (1965); Lipka (2002).
11 Strauss (1939); Proietti (1987); Higgins (1977).
12 E.g. Cartledge (1987) 296–297. For Xenophon’s critical attitude towards Sparta see Cloché (1944); Tuplin (1993) and (1994); Humble (1997).
These contradictory views are a reflection of the contradictory nature of Xenophon's writing. The *Anabasis* contains statements on the superiority of Greeks to barbarians, yet it describes Greek military service to a barbarian, Cyrus the Younger, whom it presents as a powerful and impressive figure. It also describes factionalism and violence between different Greek groups in the army, and hostility between them and those Greeks they encounter on the Black Sea coast. The *Cyropaedia* sets itself up as an analysis of the successful methods used by Cyrus the Great in his conquest of the Persian Empire, and is seemingly an admiring portrait of him; yet its presentation of those methods is ambiguous, describing Cyrus as rejecting the deceptions used by Median rulers, yet showing him as indulging in similarly manipulative means of winning power. The *Lak. Pol.* presents itself as praising Lycurgus' organisation of Spartan society, yet not only describes customs which are extremely strange, but is full of contradictory assertions and inconsistencies in its argument. The *Agesilaus* similarly presents itself as a eulogy of the Spartan king Agesilaus as a champion of Greeks against barbarians, yet a considerable portion of the text describes his violence against non-Spartan Greeks.

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14 See discussions of these texts in their respective chapters for bibliography. Where inconsistencies in these texts have been noted, they have often been put down to Xenophon's failure as a writer. See e.g. Tatum (1989) 238 and Gera (1993) 299; cf. Nadon (2001) 9–12 for criticism of the claim of Xenophon's incoherence. The high esteem in which Xenophon's writings were held throughout antiquity indicates that the problem does not lie with Xenophon, but with the expectations of his modern readers: for a discussion of attitudes to Xenophon in ancient authors, see Tuplin (1993) 21–28.
The passages of Xenophon’s writing on Spartans and Persians which have perhaps raised the most problems for scholars are the concluding chapter of the *Cyropaedia* (8.8) and the penultimate chapter of the *Lak. Pol.* (14), both of which seem to contradict the arguments presented in those texts up to that point: whereas the *Cyropaedia* has tended to be read as an adulatory celebration of the life and career of Cyrus the Great,15 the final chapter of the text launches an attack on the morality and self-discipline of contemporary Persians; similarly, the *Lak. Pol.*, usually read as a eulogy of Spartan society,16 becomes in the fourteenth chapter a savage critique of contemporary Sparta.

These awkward passages have been approached in a number of different ways, which nevertheless all aim to smooth over the disturbing and challenging resonances of these texts. They have frequently been regarded as later interpolations;17 the 1914 Loeb translation of the *Cyropaedia* by Walter Miller interposes a note within the body of the text between chapters 8.7 and 8.8 commenting that although it has been deemed necessary to include the coming chapter as it is found in all manuscript versions, “the reader is recommended to close the book at this point and read no further”.18 Another approach has been to regard these chapters as later additions made by

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15 Due (1989); Gera (1993); Tatum (1989).
18 Miller (1914) 439.
Xenophon when his admiration for Persia and Sparta was dashed by historical events.\textsuperscript{19}

Of those who see the problematic chapters as original, the majority attempt to wipe out all sense of contradiction either by arguing that Xenophon's focus on contemporary degeneration gives added weight to his praise of the past achievements of Cyrus the Great and Lycurgus by showing the catastrophe that ensued when their models of rule were no longer applied,\textsuperscript{20} or (in the case of the \textit{Lak. Pol.}) by seeing Xenophon as offering a careful, dispassionate analysis of Sparta's positive and negative characteristics.\textsuperscript{21} Alternatively, these texts have been read as wholly condemnatory, either (in the case of the \textit{Lak. Pol.}) by reading the apparent praise of Sparta in the earlier portion of the work as a heavily veiled ironic pastiche through privileging the rather strange leaps and contradictions in its argument,\textsuperscript{22} or (in the case of the \textit{Cyropaedia}) by linking the final chapter to the disturbing aspects of the representation of Cyrus as a ruler which occur throughout the text.\textsuperscript{23}

These different interpretations have led to huge variations in dating, particularly in the case of the \textit{Lak. Pol.}, which has been dated to the 390s by those who see it as enthusiastic propaganda for Sparta written in thanks for Sparta's protection of Xenophon while in exile (on

\textsuperscript{19} On \textit{Cyr.}: Eichler (1880); Georges (1994) 234. On \textit{Lak. Pol.}: Delebecque (1957) 194–195; Luccioni (1947) 171. In the case of the \textit{Lak. Pol.} a problem for this interpretation has been the position of chap. 14 as the penultimate, not final chapter; this has led to the suggestion that chap. 14 was not originally in its current position, but was transposed with chap. 15 by later editors: Breitenbach (1967) 1751–1752.


\textsuperscript{21} Humble (2004).

\textsuperscript{22} Strauss (1939); followed by Proietti (1987) and Higgins (1977).

\textsuperscript{23} Too (1998).
this model chapter 14 is a later addition),\textsuperscript{24} but to the 360s by those who believe that it betrays Xenophon's disillusionment with Sparta and could therefore only have been written after Agesilaus' death (on this model chapter 14 is an original part of the work).\textsuperscript{25} On the assumption that it is a later addition, chapter 14 has been variously dated based on different suggestions as to which event could have disillusioned Xenophon about Sparta, such as Phoebidas' seizure of the Cadmea in 382 or Sphodrias' attack on the Piraeus in 378.\textsuperscript{26} A similar approach has been taken to the *Cyropaedia*: one reading places the rest of the text before, and the final chapter after, the betrayal of the leaders of the Satraps' Revolt in 362.\textsuperscript{27}

Such arguments are speculative. They use assumptions about Xenophon's biography to explain away complexities in his thought; I prefer to see these complexities as intrinsic. In my discussion of individual texts I will suggest not only that the unsettling nature of the contradictions in Xenophon's works must be taken seriously, but that they can be understood as evidence of fourth century Athenian uncertainty or anxiety about how to position oneself in relation to Spartans, Persians and others, and about how to understand oneself as an Athenian and as a Greek: Xenophon's works engage in the problem of Greek self-conception in a troublingly ambiguous and challenging

\textsuperscript{24} E.g. Ollier (1934) xxiii–xxix.
\textsuperscript{25} E.g. Cartledge (1987) 57.
\textsuperscript{26} See Ollier (1934) xxiii–xxix. However, MacDowell (1986) 12 dates Xenophon's disillusionment to his first visit to Sparta in the 390s. See Humble (2004) 219–220 for an overview of the different arguments about how to date both chapter 14 and the *Lak. Pol.* as a whole.
\textsuperscript{27} Georges (1994) 234.
way. They are highly revealing about the complexities of fourth century Greek self-consciousness.

**Greek identity in the fourth century**

Xenophon’s representations of Sparta, Persia and the non-Greek world must be understood within the political context of the early fourth century B.C. and the intellectual context of the rise of Panhellenist thought. A time of upheaval, conflict and violence, this period saw multiple shifting alliances and struggles for ascendancy between Greek states in the Corinthian War. It was also a period when, for Athenians, old certainties fell away. With the defeat of Athens in the Peloponnesian War and the fall of the Athenian empire, Sparta became the new centre of power in the Greek world, although Spartan supremacy itself soon failed following Sparta’s defeat at Leuctra in 371; and Persia, the traditional enemy of the Greeks since the Persian Wars, came to have an increasing role in Greek affairs, with Persia’s support for Sparta in the Ionian War of 413/12, the conflicts between Sparta, Athens and Persia in the aftermath of the Peloponnesian War, and Persian intervention in Greek affairs in and after the King’s Peace of 387/86.²⁸ Sparta and Persia therefore occupy a particularly fascinating, and troubling, place in the Athenian imagination of this time.

This period is associated with the development of what has been termed “Panhellenism”, the calls for an end to Greek-on-Greek conflict

²⁸ See Ryder (1965); Hamilton (1979); Kagan (1987).
and for collective Greek action against Persia which begin to appear around this time, especially in the writings of Isocrates. This period is also frequently associated with a new focus in the way that Greekness as such is understood. Jonathan Hall has argued that in the late fifth and early fourth centuries the way that Greek identity was conceptualised shifted, so that a concern with ethnicity - with blood-ties, ancestry and ethne - came to be replaced with a broader cultural model of Greekness based on education and shared customs; again, Isocrates is frequently viewed as a key figure in this development. I return to this argument in a moment.

I wish to make two broad points about the way Greekness is imagined in this period, before turning to a consideration of Xenophon. The first point I wish to make is that the conceptualisation of Greek identity in Panhellenist writing is often more complex and conflicted than it might at first sight appear. The works of Isocrates are far from straightforward or simplistic; as Too notes, “as an Athenian writer invoking what appears to be a panhellenic ideology, he is caught up in a complicated tension that exists in being both Athenian and Greek.” The Panathenaicus can be read as a Panhellenist tract in its

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29 The term “Panhellenism” can also be used more broadly to indicate a concern with a Greek identity above and beyond identities associated with the polis, the region (such as the Peloponnese) or the ethnic group (such as the Dorians or Ionians); in this sense it has a much longer history. “Panhellenism” has been used to describe the growth of collective Greek consciousness in the aftermath of the Persian Wars; see E. Hall (1989) 16–17. It has been used to describe the interest in a Greek community and culture in the Iliad; see Nagy (1979) 6–7 on the synthesis of local Greek traditions, especially in the representation of the gods, in Homer. For a discussion of the different ways in which the term “Panhellenism” has been used, see Mitchell (2007) xv–xxii.


praise of Athens for having worked for the collective benefit of the Greeks; it also contains a eulogy of Agamemnon for having united the Greeks and led a collective Greek attack on Asia (74–83). Yet it remains an encomium specifically of one state, Athens, and is structured around the condemnation of Sparta: the text sets out the differences between Athens and Sparta in order to show the superiority of Athens in championing the Greek cause and the inferiority of Sparta in failing to do so, revealing Athens and Sparta not just as enemies, but as fundamentally culturally opposed. While arguing for the importance of laying aside differences between Greeks, therefore, the text both represents and reinscribes those differences.

Further, the security of a reading of the _Panathenaicus_ as a praise of Athens and attack on Sparta is itself undercut: not only are the text’s accusations against Sparta framed by comparison with a list of Athens’ crimes against other Greeks which we are assured are not as bad (53–73), but the authority of the authorial persona receives internal criticism through the introduction of a competing voice which comments on the text’s argument. When, towards the close of the text, Isocrates claims to be unsure about what he has written about Sparta (231–232) and describes presenting the speech to his former pupils in order to gain their opinion (233), one pupil claims to perceive that its argument is deliberately constructed so as to be unconvincing and open to be read as a praise of Sparta (235–263). Importantly, Isocrates neither valorises nor dismisses this reading; he says that he praised his pupil’s ability but did not tell him whether or not he had correctly
surmised his intentions (265). The question of whether the pupil's interpretation is "right" is left unresolved;\textsuperscript{32} the text self-consciously challenges its readers to reconsider their responses, but provides only for a loss of certainty.

The second point I wish to make about the representation of Greek identity in this period is that claims about identity are frequently involved in the manipulation of power.\textsuperscript{33} A text often cited as evidence of a new cultural definition of Greekness is Isocrates' \textit{Panegyricus}, which asserts that the Athenians had so far surpassed all other men in thought and speech that "it is those who share our education who are called Greeks rather than those who share our common nature".\textsuperscript{34} This definition of Greekness opens up Greek identity beyond the confines of ethnic distinction, but it also closes it down, by making Athens the gatekeeper of Greekness, thereby asserting its cultural supremacy.\textsuperscript{35} As noted above, in the \textit{Panathenaicus} it is Athens which stands for Greece, whereas through the claim of their exploitation of other Greeks the Greekness of the Spartans is questioned\textsuperscript{36} - although the text's distinctions between Athens and Sparta are also undercut. Claims

\textsuperscript{32} Livingstone (1998) 276.
\textsuperscript{34} μάλλον Ἐλλήνας καλεσθεί τοὺς τῆς παιδεύσεως τῆς ἡμετέρας ἢ τοὺς τῆς κοινῆς φύσεως μετέχοντας: Isoc. \textit{Panegyr.} 50. This echoes Thucydides' Pericles' praise of Athens in his funeral speech as an "education for Greece" (τῆς Ἐλλάδος παιδευσάν, Thuc. 2.41.1).
\textsuperscript{36} Said (2001) 283 notes how \textit{Panathenaicus} 189–195 "goes so far as to include the invasion of Attica by the "Peloponnesians" led by Eurystheus among the wars waged by Athens against the "barbarians"."
about what it means to be Athenian, Spartan, Greek and non-Greek (and especially Persian) of this period must be understood as highly fraught; the definition of Greekness is open to be contested and fought over.\textsuperscript{37}

Xenophon must be understood as operating within this broad intellectual framework. His works are clearly informed by Panhellenist discourse; yet he is difficult to place within that framework – he cannot be associated either with a straightforward celebration of an overarching, unified Greek identity, or with its outright rejection. Rather we can see Xenophon as testing out the implications of Panhellenism in his writings, exploring what it might mean in practice, and more often than not running up against the difficulties, ambiguities and manipulations within claims about Greek identity. Xenophon also provides evidence of an interest in cultural manifestations of identity rather than a narrow focus on ethnic criteria in this period, as argued by Hall. As we shall see, Xenophon is interested in the visible signs of identity in a person’s body, dress and behaviour, as well as in exploring the implications of the act of looking at such signs for the identity of both the person viewed and the person viewing. However, Hall sees Xenophon’s representation of the cultural basis of identity as essentially inclusive – as denying fundamental differences between Greeks and barbarians. He describes Xenophon’s

\textsuperscript{37} Trédé (1991) 76–80 has demonstrated how definitions of Hellenism are debated and contested in the fourth century through competing representations of Philip of Macedon in Isocrates and Demosthenes: for Isocrates Philip is a Greek, whom he calls upon to unite the Greeks against Persia, whereas for Demosthenes, Philip is a barbarian, aiming like Xerxes to subjugate Greece. Cf. Usher (1993).
Cyrus the Great and Cyrus the Younger as “culture Greeks” - barbarians who think, talk and act like Greeks, and are to be valued on the same level.\textsuperscript{38} This reading treats Xenophon’s representation of such figures as self-evident or straightforward; yet surely for a Greek audience the experience of reading about “Greek barbarians” would not have been entirely unproblematic or easy. Whereas my analysis confirms Hall’s findings on the cultural basis of identity in Xenophon, it also reveals the difficulties and ambiguities which arise from such a valuation of identity: in Xenophon’s scenes of viewing, where spectators look at and respond to signs of similarity and difference in others, identity becomes open to challenge and manipulation. When identity is culturally defined, it becomes harder to pin down, own or contain.

Reading identities: Xenophon as ethnographer
How should we think about the issue of identity in Xenophon’s writings? In this thesis I approach my four central texts, the \textit{Cyropaedia}, \textit{Anabasis}, \textit{Lakedaimonion Politeia} and \textit{Agesilaurus}, as ethnography. Of course, these texts vary enormously from each other in genre, length, subject matter and purpose. By using the term “ethnography” I do not mean to impose narrow generic definitions on these texts or deny the important differences between them; in fact, as we shall see, a recognition of the specific concerns and rhetorical

\textsuperscript{38} J. Hall (2002) 210; he borrows the term “culture Greek” from Tarn & Griffith (1952) 160.
strategies of each text will be an important aspect of my interpretation. Rather I use the term “ethnography” as a heuristic tool for the analysis of Xenophon’s works by noting that all four of them, in different ways, are concerned with descriptions of and narratives about foreigners. The Cyropaedia and Anabasis can be described (at least in part) as Greek discussions of non-Greek peoples and places, especially Persia; the Lak. Pol. and Agesilaus are discussions of Spartans by an Athenian. Yet, as noted above, Xenophon’s varied biography complicates any simplistic attribution of identity; his personal involvement with Persians and Spartans militates against a straightforward reading of Xenophon as a detached outsider observing foreign customs.

What is at stake in reading the Lak. Pol., Agesilaus, Cyropaedia and Anabasis as ethnography? Ethnography often provides as much evidence of the cultural preoccupations of the ethnographer as it does about the ethnographic subject; it is also often a highly politicised genre, producing relations of power between the ethnographer who describes and the passive object of description. The most influential discussion of these issues has been Edward Said’s Orientalism, which, following Foucault’s articulation of the organisation of knowledge as a system of domination, argues that modern Western accounts of the Orient participate in a discourse of exoticism, eroticism and mystification whereby the Orient is constituted as Other

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41 Foucault (1972) and (1977).
to the West; the production of this Other enables the construction, through difference, of the normative Western subject.\textsuperscript{42} Said’s reading opposes an essentialist model of identity, instead viewing identities as culturally constructed – a concept which has received extensive theoretical elaboration;\textsuperscript{43} he also shows how the cultural construction of identities is bound up with the formation and articulation of power relations: “The Orient was Orientalised not only because it was discovered to be “Oriental” in all those ways considered commonplace by an average nineteenth–century European, but also because it could be – that is, submitted to being – made Oriental.”\textsuperscript{44}

However, Said’s interpretation of the relationship between Orient and West has been challenged by more recent post–colonial criticism for treating Self and Other as fixed and absolute terms, and for reading power as a one way process, owned entirely by the West. In particular, Homi Bhabha’s work on Western colonialism has argued for a more fluid relationship between coloniser and colonised, revealing ways in which the security of the colonisers’ control not only over the colonised but over their own identities as separate and dominant can

\textsuperscript{42} This theoretical move is referred to elsewhere via the term \textit{différance}. In analysing different theories of the subaltern, Grossberg (1996) 90 describes \textit{différance} as a theory of the marginalised Other whereby the Other, or subordinate term, is constructed as necessary and constitutive to the identity of the dominant term, or Self; he identifies this approach with Said’s \textit{Orientalism} (91).

\textsuperscript{43} Said (1978) 4: “...the Orient is not an inert fact of nature. It is not merely \textit{there}, just as the Occident itself is not just \textit{there} either.” See S. Hall (1996) for a discussion of the concept of identity in Lacan and psychoanalytic theory, Althusser and Marxist criticism, Foucault, Derrida and Butler.

\textsuperscript{44} Said (1978) 6. See also the argument of Laclau (1990) 33 that “the constitution of a social identity is an act of power” since it functions by repressing and excluding what is Other; and Judith Butler’s articulation of the discursive construction, regulation and social enforcement of sexual difference (1993).
be complicated and challenged.\textsuperscript{45} Indeed, writers in contemporary cultural theory (particularly following Michel Foucault and Judith Butler) have contested the concept of a stable or unified identity, arguing for the contingency and partiality of identity, and for its tendency to shift and fragment.\textsuperscript{46}

Xenophon's representation of Spartans and Asians in the \textit{Lak. Pol.}, \textit{Agesilaus}, \textit{Cyropaedia} and \textit{Anabasis} therefore poses a number of questions. Do these texts present Asians, as non-Greeks, as essentially "foreign", different and Other? How is power distributed? Are Asians exoticised, reduced to passive objects of ethnographic curiosity, or is the confident detachment of the ethnographer challenged? What about Spartans, as Greeks, but as non-Athenians? Is their representation similar to or different from the treatment of Asians? As has often been noted, Athenian representations of Spartans often stress their difference and exoticism: Millender has argued for the "barbarisation" of Spartans in fifth century literature, whereas Hesk reveals how Athenian representations of Spartan deceit function within a self-constituting democratic discourse of Athenian transparency, to which Sparta provides the foil.\textsuperscript{47}

\textsuperscript{45} Bhabha (1985) argues for the need to recover the autonomous voice of the colonised. Following Frantz Fanon's discussion (1967) of the colonial condition as a form of "imitativeness", whereby the colonial subject is seduced by and identifies with the power of the coloniser, imitating the coloniser's cultural behaviour (discussed by Gandhi (1998) 14–20), Bhabha argues that colonial relations produce "hybrid" identities, as the colonised appropriates and "misreads" the culture of the coloniser, interrogating, challenging and recreating it in a new form, thereby disrupting its absolute authority (but see Parry (1987) for criticism of this approach). I return to this issue in chapter 4.

\textsuperscript{46} See e.g. S. Hall (1992); Woodward (1997).

It is not just the author but also the reader of ethnography who scrutinises and engages with the peoples described: we can ask, therefore, what sorts of relationships are set up in these texts between the reader and those represented. Do these texts constitute the reader as a subject, objectifying the peoples under scrutiny, or is reading a less comfortable, self-validating experience? In investigating the positioning of the reader, I am clearly not attempting to reconstruct the responses of Xenophon’s actual, historical readers, which could have varied enormously and are hard to access, apart from through later ancient writers’ comments on Xenophon;48 rather I explore how each work constructs its implied reader – the reader as an effect of the text.

According to Iser, the concept of the implied reader “designates a network of response-inviting structures, which impel the reader to grasp the text”; it does not describe any real-life reader, but the reader as imagined by the text itself.49 The study of the implied reader allows a text for which contemporary responses are unavailable to be submitted to historical analysis: because every text is written within a certain political and cultural milieu, the cultural expectations it presupposes are encoded within it. (This clearly has nothing to do with the author’s intentions, given that an author whose mindset is

48 Lucian, for example, after commending Xenophon as a historian (Hist. conser. 39), says that a good historian should not be partisan but should be ξένος ἐν τοῖς βιβλίοις κατ’ ἀπολλίς (“in his books a stranger and stateless”, Hist. conser. 41). For this much later ancient reader at least, Xenophon’s cultural positioning is both hard to pin down and a key aspect of his authorial persona.

49 Iser (1978) 34.
conditioned by the attitudes of his or her own time can produce a text expressing those attitudes without being fully conscious of it.)

However, a text does not only reflect the cultural models of its period, but actively constructs those models, by reproducing and imposing on its readers certain ways of thinking about the world to which they are expected to conform, although there can often be great room for manoeuvre within the possibilities of reading which a text allows. Reading can therefore be understood as a politically constitutive act. It also raises important political and ethical dilemmas: will a text's real-life readers identify with the model offered by the text, or will they resist reading in the expected way? Unfortunately an answer to this question is unavailable to us in the case of Xenophon.

In studying Xenophon, we can ask exactly how the implied reader is constructed: what identity, or identities, do each of Xenophon's works require their implied reader to adopt? Is the identity of the implied reader the same or different across Xenophon's works, particularly if we compare his works on Spartans (Lak. Pol. and Agesilaus) to his works on Asians (Anabasis and Cyropaedia)? As the foregoing discussion indicates, the term "identity" is highly problematic, implying not an essential, natural, fixed or unified set of

50 Cf. De Lauretis (1987), who argues that representations of men and women, especially film, act as a "technology of gender", by not only reflecting contemporary ideas about gender relations but constructing them. It also therefore becomes a tool in the oppression of women. The violence inherent in representation has been forcefully argued by Kappeler (1986) in her work on pornography; arguing that under patriarchy representation as such reinscribes the oppression of women, she infamously concludes that "all art must go".

characteristics, but a mode of self-description which is culturally constructed and invested in modalities of power. My use of the term operates in this sense; I am interested in elucidating the “identity” of Spartans, Asians and reader as a construction of Xenophon’s texts.

Vision and Greek identity
What does an analysis of Xenophon’s representation of vision bring to the study of Greek identity? Historians of ancient vision have revealed that Greek conceptions of sight and display were implicated in the formation of political relations and social roles. Most importantly for our purposes, the period in which Xenophon lived and wrote has been associated with a new political valuation of sight under Athenian democracy, and therefore with an increased interest in and anxiety about what it means to look.

The importance of sight in the construction of social and political identity goes back to Homer. In the Iliad, the status of the heroes is visible in their impressive appearance; the heroes emit a luminous gleam at the moment of their aristeia, especially Achilles. When Helen and Priam look down from the walls of Troy in the

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52 There is a remarkable interest in sight and display across Greek literature: Greek culture has been described as “ocularcentric": Morales (2004) 8-9, Jay (1993) 21-26. In his study of the ancient visual experience of the Parthenon frieze, Osborne (1987) has shown how Greek viewing was an active process of engagement with the object of sight which reflected back on the position of the viewer. Cf. Cairns (2005) 137, who notes that across Greek literature “the degree of looking and eye-contact in a face-to-face interaction manifests and defines the status of the interactants”.

teichoskopia they see the figures of the kings and leaders standing out above all others around them.54 In contrast, the low social status of Thersites is visible in his ugly appearance.55 In the Odyssey, the relationship between social status and appearance is played with and reaffirmed as Odysseus assumes the disguise of the beggar, but is restored to a beautiful appearance each time he reveals his true identity.56

The Odyssey also depicts Odysseus as a viewer of the foreign and fantastical lands he visits. Placing the Odyssey in the context of early Greek thought about travel and colonisation, Dougherty has argued that Odysseus' surveying of foreign lands can be understood as a "proto-colonialist" act of cultural empowerment.57 Similarly, Herodotus makes widespread use of vision as a metaphor for interaction with the non-Greek world:58 he calls his text a display (apodeixis, 1.1),59 describes objects and places mentioned in his narrative as worth seeing (axiostheeta),60 repeatedly refers to the wondrous sights (thōmata) to be found in foreign lands,61 and verifies the authority of his narrative through the claim of having seen what he describes.62 Hartog argues that Herodotus' sight and display of foreign

56 Goldhill (1998a) 106.
57 See especially Dougherty (2001) 122–141 on Odysseus' experience of travel to Phaeacia and the land of the Cyclopes.
58 The relationship between travel and vision has also been discussed by Elsner (1992) and (1994) in regard to Pausanias.
60 Hdt. 1.14; 2.111; 2.163; 2.176 (two uses); 2.182; 3.123; 4.85; 4.162.
lands function as an ethnographic device, offering foreign peoples as the object of Greek observation and enquiry.63

In the late fifth century, interest in vision took on a new urgency.64 Goldhill has shown that under Athenian democracy the act of being a spectator was inextricably bound up with the act of being a citizen, whether in the theatre, the law–courts, the assembly, or other state rituals and institutions, and therefore that viewing itself became a political act. He argues that an evaluative, judging, analytical form of viewing became an ideal of civic participation,65 the speeches of Demosthenes and Aeschines, for example, show a repeated concern with the nature of spectatorship, invoking the power of the citizens to watch and judge their own and their opponents’ actions.66 This period saw a new self-consciousness about the effects of viewing, and an anxiety about the way viewers could be manipulated, deceived and controlled, especially given the context of the Sophistic Enlightenment and the association in Athenian thought between persuasive rhetoric and persuasive display.67 Gorgias’ Helen claims that sight acts as a

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63 See especially Hartog (1988) 230–237 on thômata. Hartog’s reading is opposed by Munson (2001) 232–265. Herodotus also uses claims about the visibility of what he describes (φανερός; cf. also τὸ ἀφανές) to back up his arguments; his use of visual language recalls the terminology of the Pre–Socratic philosophers and early medical writers, indicating that for Herodotus vision is associated with the acquisition of knowledge: Thomas (2000) 190–212, 221–228, 249–269 (discussed further in chapter 6). See Herodotus’ story of Gyges and the wife of Candaules: in a near–quotation from Heraclitus 22 B 101a (D.–K.). Candaules informs Gyges that the eyes are more trustworthy than the ears (Hdt. 1.8).

64 Goldhill (2000) 175 makes a “tentative suggestion of an increasing focus on visuality as the century progresses.”


form of compulsion against which resistance is futile (DK 82B 15–19). Thucydides' representation of audience responses to spectacle depicts sight as capable of stirring up emotions so powerful that the spectators' critical judgements about what they see are lost; Thucydides' Cleon berates the Athenians for becoming the “spectators of speeches” (theatai tôn logōn) of others, rather than relying on their own sight to make judgments (3.38) - for failing to use vision in the appropriate way.

The anxiety about the effects of vision associated with Athenian democracy is apparent in the work of Xenophon's contemporary, Plato, who uses the language of vision to express philosophical enlightenment, in particular through the term theoria, which can also describe the missions of state ambassadors to observe foreign festivals, and therefore has specifically democratic connotations (see below). This term appears most strikingly in the allegory of the Cave in the Republic, which represents the philosophical ascent to knowledge through the escaped prisoner's sight of the sun (7.514a–517c). However, as well as treating sight as a means of philosophical revelation, Plato is also famously suspicious of the illusory nature of

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68 Gorgias claims that the sight of a hostile army makes the viewer forget law and honour, and flee (15–16), and that a terrifying sight even has the power to drive people mad (17); he concludes that if it was the sight of Paris that caused Helen to run away with him she cannot be held accountable (19).
69 Walker (1993) 356 discusses the spectacle of the departure of the Athenian fleet from the Piraeus for Sicily (6.30–31), and the spectators' reaction to the naval battle at Syracuse (7.71): "In the Piraeus scene, the outstanding spectacle of the Athenian fleet all but overwhms the Athenians' misgivins about the wisdom of the expedition as a whole...conflicting feelings of hope and lamentation are alleviated by the impressive sight (opsis) of the powerful Athenian fleet...".
the phenomenal world.72 As in other democratic literature, vision may provide knowledge, but may also deceive.

The specific ways in which vision took on meaning in the intellectual context of Xenophon's time indicate that Xenophon's use of vision must be understood as participating within an Athenian democratic discourse of vision concerned with the nature and security of Athenian identity. Indeed, in an important article, whose argument I discuss in detail in chapter 2, Goldhill has shown how a short passage from the Memorabilia, in which Socrates discusses the effects of sight and display, can be understood in terms of the construction of the democratic Athenian citizen.73 This thesis takes these historical findings further - in relation both to the study of Xenophon and to the history of ancient vision. In my discussion of Xenophon's use of sight in his representation of Spartans and non-Greeks, I show that, in this author at least, the interest in the effects of sight manifested in late fifth and early fourth century Athenian literature goes beyond a

72 This contradictory attitude has been described by Bartsch (2000) 71-73 and (2006) 37-38, 41-56, in her discussion of Plato's representation of the mirror. In Alcibiades 1, Socrates advises Alcibiades that self-knowledge can be achieved by the philosophical equivalent of observing oneself in a mirror - by allowing one's soul to behold itself in the soul of another through the process of dialectic (132d). However, in the Theatetus the mirror is the purveyor of false visions in the way that it reverses the image it reflects (193c-d), while in the Republic the concrete world around us is compared in its unreality to the visions seen in a mirror (10.596d–e).

73 Goldhill (1998a); Mem. 3.10.1–3.11.18. With the exception of this article, Xenophon's interest in vision has received very little attention. Other scholars who mention Xenophon's representation of sight and display tend to do so as part of a discussion of other issues, such as dance or dress. See in particular Wohl (2004) on dance in the Symposium, which discusses how response to display is theorised by Socrates (discussed in chapter 2); and Azoulay (2004a) on dress in the Cyr. and Too (1998) on "seeming and being" in the Cyr., which both consider how Cyrus' method of visual self-presentation relates to his method of rule (see chapter 4). See also Dillery (2004) on Xenophon's representation of processions. Powell (1989) and L'Allier (2004) discuss Xenophon's treatment of vision in the context of the representation of Spartans and Asians, respectively: see chapters 5 and 3 for discussion of their approaches.
concern with the identity of the Athenian citizen within the *polis*, to encompass a broader concern with the place of the Athenian in the social, political and cultural context not only of Greece, but of the wider world.  

Reading vision in Xenophon

What can Xenophon’s scenes of sight tell us about his conception of Athenian, and Greek, identity? In the *Anabasis*, *Cyropaedia*, *Lak. Pol.*, and *Agesilaus*, viewing is largely cross-cultural: we are shown Greeks looking at barbarians, barbarians looking at Greeks, and different Greek groups looking at each other, frequently in situations of political struggle or conflict. The representation of internal spectators viewing and responding to events invites the reader to consider how far his or her own responses tally with or diverge from those presented. Indeed, in various places in his texts Xenophon invites the reader to look at what he describes. Xenophon’s scenes of spectatorship allow

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74 Cf. Dillery (2004) 274 on Xenophon’s representation of public processions, which he argues contain features reminiscent of Classical civic processions but also anticipate the processions of Hellenistic rulers: “Xenophon was thinking in ways that clearly went beyond conventional, *polis*-centred attitudes: the imagined spectators were not simply local citizens, but much larger, regional audiences.”

75 In his discussion of *enargeia* in Greek historiography, Walker (1993) 355-63 shows that the concept of the reader as a viewer of a text’s action was a concern of ancient literary criticism; he notes Plutarch’s comment on Thucydides’ description of the responses of spectators to the battle of the Athenian fleet at the harbour at Syracuse (Thuc. 7.71) – that Thucydides makes the reader into a spectator (θεατήν) who experiences the same responses as those who witnessed the event (ὁ γοῦν θουκυδίδης ἂν τὶς λόγῳ πρὸς ταύτην ἀμιλλᾶται τὴν ἐνάργειαν, οἷον θεατὴν ποίησα τὸν ἀκροατήν καὶ τὰ γενόμενα περὶ τοὺς ὀρώντας ἑκπληκτικά καὶ ταρακτικὰ πάθη τοῖς ἀναγινώσκουσιν ἐνεργάσασθαι λιχνευόμενος, Plut. *De glor. Ath.* 347a). Cf. Feldherr (1998) 4–12 for the visual role of the reader in Greco-Roman historiography; also G. Zanker (1981) and Webb (1999) on ancient *enargeia* and *ekphrasis*.

76 Xenophon both directly addresses the reader as a viewer (“you would see”, “someone present would see”), and invites the reader to view through the impersonal
us to access how each of his texts constructs the identity of its implied reader. We can ask whether the implied reader is invited to identify with the text’s internal spectators, or to be alienated from their responses;\textsuperscript{77} we can also investigate the political consequences of the reader’s response.\textsuperscript{78}

My approach is informed by theoretical discussions of viewing in studies of modern culture, which have revealed the relationship between sight and identity. Feminist scholars in film theory in the 1970s and 1980s, most notably Laura Mulvey, E. Ann Kaplan and expression “it was possible to see”: \textit{Lak. Pol.}: 1.10, 2.14, 9.1, 13.5; \textit{Cyr.}: 1.3.3, 4.2.8, 8.1.33, 8.8.27; \textit{Ages.}: 1.25–27, 2.14, 8.1, 8.7; \textit{An.}: 1.5.8, 1.5.9, 1.9.13; \textit{Hell.}: 3.4.16–18, 6.4.16, 7.2.9.

\textsuperscript{77} As with the concept of “identity” discussed above, “identification”, a term often associated with psychoanalysis, must be understood as a process of social, political and cultural self-construction. See S. Hall (1996) 2–3 on the problems of political and cultural identification. Freud’s analysis of a child’s development towards adulthood involved his progression through various stages of identification with, and separation from, one or other parent (“the Oedipal complex”); Lacan’s concept of the “mirror phase” describes the child’s sight of himself in a mirror as allowing his first self-identification as an independent subject separate from his mother: see Alcoff (2006) 62–67; Silverman (1983) 126–194. There has been much discussion in literary and film theory about the workings of audience identification. See Silverman (1983) 201–215 for discussion of the way that camera angles, cuts and editing are employed so as to manipulate the audience’s identification with a film’s characters, a process described through the term “suture”: “The operation of suture is successful at the moment that the viewing subject says, ‘Yes, that’s me,’ or ‘That’s what I see’” (205). See in particular the discussion of the shot / reverse shot technique (201–204): the shot/ reverse shot, where the camera presents a visual field, such as a view of a landscape, and then reverses its direction to show a character gazing into the camera, produces the impression that the first shot is the view seen by the character shown in the second shot. The effect is to obscure the controlling presence of the camera; this produces suture, the construction of a subject position for the audience through identification with the character’s visual experiences. See also Scheler (1970) and Silverman (1992) 185–213 for discussion of the different forms of identification, which can involve the audience’s sense of being like a character and sharing a character’s experience (“idiopathic” identification), or alternatively of not being like a character, but of wishing to be like them and aspiring to some aspect of their experience (“heteropathic” identification).

\textsuperscript{78} Cf. Griffith (1998), who interrogates the tendency of tragedy, a democratic genre, to invite identification with members of transgressive ruling families: “Monarchy is represented in Greek tragedy as being at the same time both a disreputable challenge to, or negation of, democratic norms, \textit{and} a desireable and irresistible object of admiration and fascination” (43).
Teresa De Lauretis,79 investigated the involvement of viewing in the construction of gender identities, arguing that in Western commercial cinema, especially Hollywood cinema, the act of looking is gendered so that the male is presented as the one who views, and the female as the object of view:80 the male viewer is constituted as an active, empowered subject, whereas the female is denied subjectivity. This conception of vision imagines looking as an act of empowerment which is owned by men, a theoretical move which has been termed "the male gaze". More recently scholars have developed and nuanced this model to consider the variety of positions a spectator can adopt, examining, for example, the experience of the female viewer.81

More importantly for our purposes, the act of looking has also been revealed as implicated in the construction of race and ethnicity through its use as an assertion of racial or colonial power, a concept usually referred to as "the imperial gaze". E. Ann Kaplan has examined how Western commercial film employs a visual language which denies black and Asian people control over how they are seen, as well as denying their ability to look at and pass judgement on whites;82 hooks analyses representations of black people, particularly black women, in mainstream American film, advertising and popular culture to show how they are persistently objectified and sexualised;83 and Mary Louise

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80 Cf. Berger (1972) 47. Berger argued that there are different "ways of seeing" represented in Western art which codify a gender hierarchy: "Men look at women. Women watch themselves being looked at."
82 Kaplan (1997).
Pratt’s study of 18\textsuperscript{th}–20\textsuperscript{th} century travel writing has examined how the Western traveller’s position as an empowered and assertive agent in control of his or her environment is formulated by his or her role as a viewer of African or Latin American people and landscape, rendered passive before the Western gaze.\textsuperscript{84}

However, the power created in vision is complex. It relies not only on the action of a controlling gaze, but on the viewed person’s sight of and response to the fact of being observed. Frantz Fanon’s critique of the operation of colonial power in \textit{Black Skin, White Masks} emphasises the necessity of the complicity of the “native” in his or her own subjugation. He describes the experience of a loss of self which overcomes the colonial subject when exposed to the gaze of colonialists,\textsuperscript{85} as well as the mixture of alienation and desire which inform his or her gaze back at the colonialists.\textsuperscript{86}

Foucault’s examination of the uses of vision in 18\textsuperscript{th} and 19\textsuperscript{th} century criminal punishment has similarly revealed the necessity of the viewer’s complicity in his or her own incorporation into systems of domination. In his discussion of Jeremy Bentham’s Panopticon, Foucault describes how the prisoners in their cells are continuously visible to the overseer in a central control tower, whose power depends

\textsuperscript{84} Pratt (1992). Similarly, Urry (2002) has argued that Western tourism structures specific forms of visual experience, as tourists’ gaze at “sights”, in their search for the romantic, the extraordinary and the “authentic”, is mediated by their cultural and economic separation from the places they visit.

\textsuperscript{85} Fanon (1967). Fanon famously recounts his painful realisation of his own blackness, and its codification by whites as something different, horrifying and to be objectified, when subjected to the white gaze: he describes his feelings of alienation from his own body and person on hearing a white child cry out at the sight of him, “Mama, see the Negro! I’m frightened!” (112).

not only on his sight of the prisoners, but on the prisoners' ability to see the control tower, and simultaneously their inability to see whether there is at any moment someone inside the tower looking out at them. The effect is that they are in a continual state of anxiety about being seen, and control their behaviour: "He who is subjected to a field of visibility, and who know it, assumes responsibility for the constraints of power; ...he becomes the principle of his own subjection." 87

Sight can also be disempowering when the viewer is confronted with spectacular display. Foucault discusses the necessity of the complicity of the viewer for the effectiveness of the spectacle of public torture and execution as a means of social control. He argues that the effectiveness of the display on the torturer's scaffold for the production of state power relies upon the spectator's identification with the executioner as the legitimate upholder of the law, so that the crowd acquiesces and participates in the ritual of execution; it also requires identification with the victim as a suffering body, in order to inspire fear and obedience. However, importantly, the subtleness of this balance of responses produces a danger that identification with the victim will move the spectator into resistance and civil disobedience: Foucault describes moments when the crowd changed its allegiance, attacking the executioner and rescuing the victim. 88

These approaches can usefully inform our reading of Xenophon by pointing up the various ways in which viewing can produce

88 Foucault (1977) 58-65. See also Bell (2004) 1-10 on collusion and dissent in the reactions of crowds at the fall of Ceauşescu. I discuss the issue of resistance and dissent as a response to display in chapter 4.
relationships of power and identity. Viewing can place the viewer in a position of dominance and security, but it can also be a destabilising and disempowering experience: importantly, political positioning is produced in the viewer’s response to sight, and therefore can shift or be challenged. 89 As we shall see, Xenophon’s scenes of cross-cultural sight produce a range of responses. The reader’s experience of foreign peoples is sometimes a confident, distanced viewing of the exotic; yet frequently the secure position of the reader as a viewer of foreign sights is put at risk. Through the complexity of responses to viewing, the Anabasis, Cyropaedia, Lak. Pol. and Agesilaus do not only reinforce the ethnocentrism of the reader, but also challenge it.

Xenophon’s language of vision

I treat the subject of visuality in Xenophon not only in passages marked by the use of specific visual vocabulary, but also in more broadly defined scenes of display and visual self-presentation; a narrow linguistic focus would not do justice to the richness of Xenophon’s concern with the visual. However, I also consider the resonances and implications of the different terms used for vision and the visible as they arise. Xenophon uses a variety of terms to express sight. The verb ὄραω often implies to see with a sense of recognition

89 Kaplan (1997) 135–291 compares Western commercial film to the work of independent women film-makers of black and Asian origin to investigate how a non-exploitative filmic language could be developed, which grants control over the gaze to non-whites. hooks (1992) 115–131 considers examples of what she calls “the oppositional gaze”: the ways in which black audiences have read white representations of them “against the grain” to reassert some control over their meaning, and have found ways to “look back” at whites. Cf. Urry (2002) 9, 59–73, on how people living in places visited by tourists take control of their environment to offer artificially constructed sights for economic gain.
or understanding. The phrase ὡς ὀρᾶτε ("as you see") is used rhetorically to imply that since those addressed can see what is being indicated, by necessity they must acknowledge the truth of the claim being made about it, which is sometimes deceptive (Hell. 3.2.18; An. 2.1.4, 4.6.7, 5.5.21, 5.6.28, 6.4.17).

The verb βλέπω (with various prefixes) can imply a socially meaningful look. Socrates uses this term when he asks whether there is a friendly and a hostile way to look at someone (τὸ τε φιλοφρόνως καὶ τὸ ἐχθρῶς βλέπειν πρὸς τινάς; Mem. 3.10.4); Seuthes says he wished to gain power so as not to have to look towards the table of another (ἀποβλέπτων, An. 7.2.33); the modesty of the Spartan Paidiskoi means that they are allowed to look at no-one (περιβλέπειν δὲ μηδαμοὶ, Lak. Pol 3.4); and ἀντιβλέπειν is used to describe the inability, through shame or fear, to return someone’s gaze (Hell. 5.4.27; Cyr. 3.1.23; Ages. 1.34; also ἀναβλέπειν: 1.4.12 Cyr.).

The verbs θεάομαι and θεωρέω and their cognates have been discussed by Goldhill as terms especially associated with spectatorship in the context of the institutions of Athenian democracy; he notes their increased use in tragedy as the fifth century progresses, with very rare

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90 Cf. the term περιβλέπτως, being “looked at from all sides”, which implies social prestige. The impressive reputation of the Spartans is indicated through their description as the most looked at people in Greece (περιβλέπτωτατοί, Hell. 7.1.30); Autolycus is understood to desire to be looked at from all sides (περιβλέπτως, Sym. 8.38) for having benefited friends and glorified his country (see also: Cyr. 6.1.5, Hiero 11.9); Nichomachides complains that the Athenians have elected as general a merchant who had never been looked at from all sides in the cavalry (περιβλέπτων, 3.4.1 Mem.). Cf. the ironic use of περιβλέπτως in the Cyropaedia, when Artabazus, who has been hoping to be honoured by Cyrus but is not, complains that he is looked from all sides because he waits all day to speak to Cyrus without eating or drinking – ie. he has been treated in such a way that the looks of others do not imply the prestige he deserves (Cyr. 7.5.53).
uses in Aeschylus but frequent uses in Sophocles and Euripides.\textsuperscript{91} θεωρέω can operate as a technical term for the travel of state delegates on missions to foreign festivals, and θεασμαι can imply presence at public ritual more generally.\textsuperscript{92} Both are used to suggest gaze at a spectacle, and can imply a reflective, evaluative viewing associated with the political engagement of the democratic spectator (see the discussion of the history of democratic viewing above).

In Xenophon θεωρέω and cognates can describe the viewing of festivals: they describe travel to foreign spectacles longed for by Hiero (\textit{Hiero} 1.11 and 11.10) and Cyrus the Younger's viewing of the Arcadians' Lycaean festival (\textit{An.} 1.2.10). The verb is also used to describe Agesilaus viewing the removal of captured property (\textit{Hell.} 4.5.6), the Persian King's brother viewing the Greeks pass by in an impressive formation (\textit{An.} 2.4.25–26), Cyrus the Younger viewing his army performing a military review (\textit{An.} 1.2.16) and the Greeks' gaze at the so-called Jason's Cape on the Black Sea coast (\textit{An.} 6.2.1); it implies a sense of active and engaged spectatorship.

Θεασμαι, θεατῆς and their cognates can also be used for spectatorship of festivals (\textit{Hipparch.} 3.1, 3.2, 3.5; \textit{Hiero} 1.11; \textit{An.} 4.8.27; \textit{Lak. Pol.} 4.2) and other public spectacles, such as sacrifice (\textit{An.} 6.4.15). It is used of watching the dance troupe in the \textit{Symposium} (2.12), and is often used of gazing at something pleasurable (e.g. \textit{Mem.} 2.1.31), beautiful (e.g. Abradatas as a beautiful sight, \textit{Cyr}.

\footnotesize
\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{91} Goldhill (2000) 174–175.
\item \textsuperscript{92} Goldhill (2000) 166–167.
\end{itemize}
6.4.11) or impressive (e.g. it is used to compare gazing at a well disciplined army to gazing at a successful chorus, *Cyr. 1.6.18*). Interestingly, it can express the sight of a spectacle which is exotic (*Oec. 8.11*: viewing a Phoenician ship; *An. 1.5.8*: spectacle of Persian discipline; *Ages. 8.7*: viewing the house of Agesilaus in Sparta) or unusual (*Mem. 3.11.2–3*: viewing Theodote; *Cyr. 5.1.7–8*: viewing Panthea). It implies looking at a sight that particularly draws the eye, as in the term ἀξιοθέατος ("worth looking at": discussed in chapter 6). 93

The last major verb of sight used by Xenophon is θαυμάζω, "I look with wonder" (with the noun θαυμα and cognates). 94 It occurs in the proems of the *Lak. Pol. (1.1–2)*, *Cyropaedia (1.1.1, 1.1.6)* and *Memorabilia (1.1.1)*, setting out the Spartans, Cyrus the Great and the Athenian decision to execute Socrates as open to wonder which prompts investigation. 95 The term appears frequently in Xenophon’s scenes of cross-cultural response. 96 Its use in Herodotus has been discussed by Hartog in terms of its function as an ethnographic marker; he argues that it sets up the object described as an exotic

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93 See *Ages. 2.14*: gazing at the battlefield in the aftermath of the battle of Coronea; *Cyr. 5.4.11*: Gadatas expresses the desire to gaze at Cyrus after he defeats the Assyrians.

94 For the visual connotations of this term and its etymological connection to θεόμω see Frisk (1958) 656; Chantraine (1984) 425.


96 Out of 50 uses of the verb θαυμάζω and its cognates in the *Cyr.*, 33 occur in a cross-cultural context, describing the responses both of internal audiences and of the narrator: 1.1.6, 1.4.20, 2.4.9, 4.2.14, 4.2.28, 4.5.20, 4.5.37, 4.6.4, 4.18.12, 5.1.6, 5.1.18, 5.1.27, 5.2.9, 5.2.12, 5.2.20, 5.4.7, 5.4.13 (2 uses), 5.4.19, 5.4.44, 5.4.43, 5.5.11, 6.1.12, 7.1.6, 7.2.29, 7.3.2, 7.5.2, 7.5.25, 8.2.5, 8.2.13, 8.2.14, 8.4.6, 8.8.11. In the *An*. 18 out of 29 uses are cross-cultural: 1.2.18, 1.8.16, 1.9.24, 1.10.16, 2.1.2, 2.1.10, 2.3.15, 2.3.16, 2.5.15, 2.5.33, 3.1.27, 3.2.35, 3.5.13, 4.2.15, 4.8.20, 5.7.18, 6.3.23, 7.7.10.
oddity available to the wonder of the ethnographer. However, Hartog’s politicised reading of θαύμα has been challenged by Munson, who stresses its narratological effects. As well as curiosity, θαύμα suggests awe. Prier argues that in Homer the term θαύμα, especially in the phrase θαύμα ἰδέσθαι, suggests something that is divine, yet which is not entirely separate from the human world: “the thauma αἰδεσθαι is lodged squarely between the loci of the gods and humans”. As will become clear, θαύμα in Xenophon combines alienation and identification.

Other terms used frequently in scenes of visual response are ἀποδείκνυμι / ἐπιδείκνυμι and cognates, and φανερός (cf. ἀφανής). In Herodotus these terms imply the demonstration of knowledge, as claims are justified through statements of visibility; they recall the language of early medical writers and Presocratic philosophy. However, in later writing these terms are associated with the Sophists and with forensic and epideictic oratory; display becomes associated with deception or manipulative allure. In Xenophon both these sets of connotations of display and visibility – as providing access to

99 Cf. the Armenian king’s envy of his son’s tutor in the Cyrr.: καὶ ἔγω ἐκεῖνῳ, ἔφη, ἔφθασον, ὅτι μοι ἔδοκε τόστοι ποιεῖν αὐτόν μᾶλλον θαυμάζειν ἦ ἐμὲ (“I envied him because he seemed to me to make [my son] wonder at himself more than at me”: 3.1.39). Cf. also Cyrus’ attempt to bolster the status of his followers by training them ...μηδὲ μεταστρεφόμενοι ἐπὶ θέαν μηδενός, ὡς οὐδὲν θαυμάζοντες (“...not to turn at the sight of anything, as if they wondered at nothing”. Cyrr. 8.1.42).
100 Prier (1989) 96. See his discussion of the armour of Rhesus, described as θαύμα ἰδέσθαι (ll. 10-436-441). Dolon says that the armour is not suitable for mortals, but for the immortals. As Prier notes, the armour “is quite clearly “other” in origin. It is, however, in the hands or in the sight of mortals and hence a property of the “this”” (95).
knowledge but also potentially as manipulative - are at play (see further discussion in chapter 6).103

However, not all uses of visual vocabulary imply a specifically visual meaning. The verb ὅρω is often used rhetorically in phrases like “I see that...” or “do you not see that...?” in contexts which have more to do with recognition or understanding than vision. Similarly, the verb ἀποδείκνυμι and its cognates can refer to display through speech as well as to visual display, as can the term φανερός. We are told in the Memorabilia that Socrates displayed himself as self-controlled more through his deeds than through his words (ἐγκρατέστερον τοῖς ἔργοις ἡ τοῖς λόγοις ἐαυτὸν ἐπεδείκνυεν, 1.5.6), and that in regard to his attitude to religion, he was visible / apparent in deed and word (φανερός ἦν καὶ ποιῶν καὶ λέγων, 1.3.1) conforming to the instruction of the Pythia, to follow the custom of the state. Words as well as deeds are open to be described as “displayed” or “visible”.104

104 This is an ambiguity directly addressed by the Mem.. Hippias attacks Socrates for criticising the views of others but not offering an argument (ὑπέχειν λόγον) or revealing his own opinion (γνώμην ἀποφαίνεσθαι, 4.4.9). Socrates retorts that he never ceases to display what actions he considers to be just (ἀ δοκεῖ μοι δίκαιον εἶναι οὐδὲν παύομαι ἀποδείκνυμενος, 4.4.10). When Hippias asks how this constitutes an argument (καὶ ποίος δὴ σοι, ἔφη, ούτος ὁ λόγος ἐστίν; 4.4.10), Socrates replies “If not in argument / words,” he said, “I display it in my actions. For do you not think that actions provide better evidence than arguments / words?” (εἴ δὲ μὴ λόγως, ἔφη, ἀλλ' ἔργων ἀποδείκνυμαι. ἢ οὐ δοκεῖ σοι ἀξιοτεκμαρτότερον τοῦ λόγου τὸ ἔργον εἶναι; 4.4.10). Display is understood as comparable to but different from rhetorical exposition. A distinction is drawn between display as action and display as speech which indicates self-consciousness about a tension within the meaning of “display” - a tension which Socrates attempts to manipulate. When, in spite of this exchange, Hippias goes on to use ἀποδείκνυμι to describe Socrates’ speech (“It is clear that even now, Socrates, you are trying to avoid displaying your opinion”, δῆλος εἰ, ἔφη, ὡς Σύκρατες, καὶ νῦν διαφρέγμεν ἔγχειροι τὸ ἀποδείκνυσθαι γνώμην, 4.4.11) the more active meanings of the term nevertheless remain in the reader’s mind.
How this thesis is structured

Let us now turn to some close readings of Xenophon. In chapter 2 I take a look at the uses of vision in the texts which do not form my main concern, the technical works, Hiero, Socratic works and Hellenica, in order to contextualise my discussion of cross-cultural vision in the central chapters of this thesis. I will show that viewing in Xenophon is concerned with the construction of identities and political positioning, in a variety of different contexts. In chapters 3 and 4 I turn to a detailed examination of the Anabasis and Cyropaedia to consider the specific issues that arise in the viewing of non-Greeks; in chapters 5 and 6 we will look at the Lak. Pol. and Agesilaus to see how cross-cultural vision is imagined when those represented are Greek, but Spartan. Although I place two “non-Greek” texts beside two “Spartan” texts, it must be noted that all four of these texts are very different from each other in genre, purpose and rhetorical strategy, and use vision in rather different ways. My discussion is alive to the differences between texts, as well as the similarities, taking each text seriously as a piece of literature in its own right. Nevertheless, this bipartite structure is useful in allowing the different strands of Xenophon’s political thought to emerge through juxtaposition: each set of texts can inform us, respectively, about the place of Asia and the place of Sparta in Xenophon’s imagination, revealing how they function in the construction of Greek self-consciousness.

Quotations from Xenophon use the Oxford Classical Texts editions of E.C. Marchant: Hell.: Marchant (1900); Mem., Sym. & Oec.: Marchant (1921); An.: Marchant (1904); Cyr.: Marchant (1910); Cyn., Peri Hipp., Hipparch., Hier., Lak. Pol. & Ages.: Marchant (1920).
2. Vision, power and political positioning in Xenophon

In order to introduce the main texts with which we will be concerned, the *Anabasis*, *Cyropaedia*, *Lakedaimonion Politeia*, and *Agesilaus*, I would like first of all to look at the uses of viewing in Xenophon’s other works: throughout Xenophon’s corpus vision is repeatedly represented, discussed and theorised in a wide variety of contexts. It will be my contention that the representation of vision and display in Xenophon is implicated, in different ways, in the production of power relations and political positioning, depending on the interests of the text within which it occurs. I argue that although visual interaction in Xenophon is always involved in the formation of political relationships, in those texts which deal with the representation of foreign cultures such scenes become more complex and conflicted: viewing and responses to sight become a means of working through problems of cross-cultural interaction, and thus a means of articulating, and interrogating, the nature of Greek identity.

A good place to start our investigation of vision in Xenophon is with the 1998 article by Simon Goldhill, “The seductions of the gaze: Socrates and his girlfriends,”¹ which takes as its focus an episode of viewing from the *Memorabilia*, Socrates’ encounter with the *hetaira* Theodote (3.11). In this scene, Socrates and his companions go to look at Theodote while she is being painted by an artist, on account of her reputation for a beauty which is beyond description (3.11.1). On

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¹ Goldhill (1998a).
arriving and looking at her, Socrates asks his companions whether they ought to be more grateful to Theodote for displaying her beauty to them, or whether Theodote ought to be more grateful to them for looking at her (Ὅ άνδρες, ἔφη ὁ Σωκράτης, πότερον ἡμᾶς δεῖ μᾶλλον Θεοδότη χάριν ἔχειν, ὅτι ἡμῖν τὸ κάλλος ἐαυτῆς ἐπέδειξεν, ἣ ταύτην ἡμῖν, ὅτι ἐθεασάμεθα; 3.11.2). He asks “Is it not so that if the display is more beneficial to her, she ought to be more grateful to us, but if the sight is more beneficial to us, then we ought to be grateful to her?” (ἀρ’ εἰ μὲν ταύτῃ ὑφελιμωτέρα ἔστιν ἢ ἐπίδειξις, ταύτην ἡμῖν χάριν ἔκτενον, εἰ δὲ ἡμῖν ἡ θέα, ἡμᾶς ταύτη; 3.11.2). He goes on to insist that it is Theodote who gains most benefit: she gains their praise and will profit yet more when they spread the news about her, whereas Socrates and his companions will be overcome by longing to touch what they have seen (ὡν ἐθεασάμεθα ἐπιθυμοῦμεν ἄψωσθαι) and will leave excited and full of desire (3.11.3).²

Goldhill places this passage, and the dialogue between Socrates and Theodote that follows it, in the context of the preceding chapter of the Memorabilia, in which Socrates visits a painter, a sculptor and an armourer (3.10). Socrates asks Parrhasius the painter if painting is the representation of what is seen (γραφικὴ ἔστιν εἰκασία τῶν ὁρωμένων, 3.10.1) and then asks if he tries to depict the soul of those he paints, to which Parrhasius objects that the soul is not visible (μηδὲ

Socrates argues that the nature of the soul is visible:

“Allā μὴν καὶ τὸ μεγαλοπρεπὲς τε καὶ ἐλευθέριον καὶ τὸ ταπεινόν τε καὶ ἀνελεύθερον καὶ τὸ σωφρονικόν τε καὶ φρόνιμον καὶ τὸ ύβριστικόν τε καὶ ἀπειρόκαλον καὶ διὰ τοῦ προσώπου καὶ διὰ τῶν σχημάτων καὶ ἕστώτων καὶ κινούμενων ἀνθρώπων διαφαίνει.

“Nobility and freedom, lowliness and slavery, self-control and good sense, arrogance and vulgarity are revealed in the face and in the gestures of men whether moving or at rest.” (10.5)

Socrates’ conclusion is that it is more pleasurable to look (ἡδιον ὀρὰν, 3.10.5) at the beautiful, good and lovable than the shameful, wicked and hateful. Similar issues are raised in the conversations with the sculptor and armourer.

Goldhill notes that “Socrates’ conclusion is designed to introduce the ethical – the qualities of a good citizen – into the process of visual representation”; he argues that in the discussions with the painter, sculptor and armourer, how to look is made a fundamental problem for the construction of Athenian identity. He reads the viewing of Theodote in the same light, suggesting that in his dialogue with Theodote Socrates is able to subdue the threat that she is imagined to pose to male self-sufficiency by himself replacing her as the object of desire, leaving her longing for more contact with him (rather than the

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3 The sculptor is advised that he must represent the activities of the soul (τὰ τῆς ψυχῆς ἔργα, 3.10.8) in his statues (3.10.6–8). The conversation with the armourer reveals that good armour is not ornamented armour but armour that fits the wearer, and therefore that a beautiful appearance is of less value than usefulness (3.10.9–15).

4 Goldhill (1998a) 111.
other way around); however, in doing so Socrates himself risks becoming just as much of a dangerous and disruptive figure as Theodote.

Goldhill's reading is of fundamental importance, because it places what is, on the face of it, a rather curious episode, with its highly theoretical philosophising about the nature of looking, within the social and political context of democratic Athens; the representation of vision is revealed as closely implicated in a discourse of Athenian self-consciousness. This approach is very useful for thinking about the significance of vision and display elsewhere in Xenophon's works. Indeed, the construction of identity through vision will be one of my principal concerns, as I trace the specific ways in which identities are formed, and contested, in moments of visual interaction in a variety of cultural settings.

However, Goldhill's reading of the relationships produced by sight—the specific ways in which identities are constructed in the viewing of Theodote—is problematic. Suggesting that Theodote's status as a *hetaira*—not a *gune*, who must obey her husband, or a *porne*, who can be bought—gives her an independence which makes her a threat to male power, he argues that "Looking at a beautiful woman is useful, even beneficial for her, but it is unsatisfying and even dangerous for the (male) viewer". Goldhill positions his reading of Xenophon in relation to the debate among cultural historians on the

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5 3.11.15-18; Goldhill (1998a) 120-122.
6 Goldhill (1998a) 122-123.
applicability of the model of the empowered “male gaze”, as posited by feminist film theorists of the 1970s and 1980s, to the ancient world – the question of whether ancient viewing inscribes gender oppression by producing an empowered male subject and a disempowered female object of the gaze, as it often does in mainstream Western cinema.\(^8\) Whereas Richlin, following the work of Kappeler on pornography, argues for the continuity of the “male gaze” from the ancient to the modern world,\(^9\) Goldhill uses the viewing of Theodote to stress discontinuity.\(^10\) He reads the viewing of Theodote as a fundamentally unsettling process, in which the security of male Athenian identity is set at risk.

There are a number of problems with this reading. Despite Socrates’ claim that she benefits from the encounter, Theodote is not presented as a powerful figure in this scene. Although, unlike the art objects of 3.10, Theodote speaks, as Goldhill himself notes, “her lines

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\(^8\) See discussion in chap. 1. The Greeks’ rather different conception of the mechanics of vision, as revealed in ancient optical theories of intromission and extramission, could be read to imply a more reciprocal model of visual relationships: Jay (1993) 30. Intromission, where particles emanate from an object and penetrate the eye (a theory broadly associated with the Atomists, Leucippus, Democritus, Epicurus and Lucretius) and extramission, where the eye emits rays which strike an object (a theory associated with the Stoics, Ptolemy and Galen) both imagine vision as an active, bodily encounter akin to the sense of touch; the viewer and the object of view are therefore not as separate as they are in modern conceptions of vision. See Van Hoorn (1972); Simon (1988); Morales (2004) 15–16. However, theoretical discussions of optics do not necessarily tell us that much about how vision was thought about in the wider culture. See Morales (2004) 31: “It is impossible to ascertain for sure the degree to which optical theories remained specialised areas of knowledge, or how much they became assimilated into everyday thought. Moreover, the reciprocal relations observed in materialist accounts of optics are by means the only models of visuality. When we come to some symbols and metaphors of vision, we find power structured very differently.”


\(^10\) Goldhill (1998a) 123. Cf. 115: “The gaze, for Xenophon’s Socrates, even – especially - when directed by a man at a beautiful woman, is not a unilinear process of objectification”. Cf. Cairns (2005) 138, who argues that Greek vision and visibility are interactive and reciprocal.
will be carefully directed by Socrates.” She may derive “benefit” from being looked at, but it is surely a most questionable “benefit” - the attraction of clients who will use her body: although *hetaira* and not *porne*, she is still a prostitute. As Morales points out, Socrates’ comparison of Theodote to a plate of food to be served to men (3.11.13) renders her “passive and there to satisfy male hunger”.

Unlike other scenes in book 3 in which Socrates offers advice to his interlocutors, such as his advice on how to become a successful general (3.1.1-11) or his advice on how to become a successful cavalry commander (3.3.1-15), Socrates’ advice to Theodote on how to be a successful prostitute (3.11.4-18) is not aimed at teaching her how to raise her social status above others, but how to make herself compliant and subservient to others.

My reading is supported by comparison with the representation of erotically motivated viewing elsewhere in Xenophon’s works: the claim of the dangerous power of the erotic object of viewing occurs repeatedly, including elsewhere in the *Memorabilia*, yet frequently

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12 Although Goldhill may well be right that the *hetaira* could be thought of by male Athenians as a threat to their control of women’s bodies, this does not make the *hetaira* a model of female power. Although the distinctions within the ancient terminology for sex-workers are important, a focus on such issues must not obscure the realities of the lives of those forced to sell their bodies. See Davidson (1997) 73-108.
14 In Socrates’ condemnation of Critobulus for having kissed the handsome son of Alcibiades, Socrates compares looking at a beautiful boy to being bitten by a venomous spider: οὐκ ὁίσθ’ ὅτι τούτῳ τὸ θηρίον, ὁ καλοῦσι καλὸν καὶ ὠραῖον, τοσοῦτον δεινότερον ἐστὶ τῶν φαλαγγίων, ὅσῳ ἐκείνῳ μὲν ἀψάμενο, τούτῳ δὲ οὐδ’ ἀπτόμενον, ἐὰν τις αὐτὸ θεάται, ἐνισχύτι καὶ πάνυ πρόσωπεν τοιοῦτον ὃς τε μοίνεσθαι ποιεῖν; (“Don’t you know that this creature which they call the beautiful and lovely is more terrible than venomous spiders, since spiders produce their effect by contact, whereas it does not require contact, but if someone even looks at it, it can inject even from quite a distance something which drives them...”)
these episodes fail to depict the one who is desired and viewed as a powerful figure. Following the viewing of Panthea by Araspas in the *Cyropaedia*, which takes place after her capture as war-booty when she is being allocated to Cyrus as a concubine (*Cyr.* 5.1.4–7), Cyrus claims that he will lose all power over himself if he looks at Panthea (5.1.7–8): “...εἶ νυνὶ σοῦ ἄκούσας ὅτι καλὴ ἐστὶ πεισθῆσομαι ἐλθεῖν θεασόμενος, οὐδὲ πάνυ μοι σχολῆς οὐσῆς, δέδοικα μὴ πολὺ θάττων ἐκεῖνη αὐθίς ἀναπείσῃ καὶ πάλιν ἐλθεῖν θεασόμενον. ἐκ δὲ τούτου ἱσως ἂν ἁμελήσας ἂν με δεὶ πράττειν καθήμεν ἐκεῖνην θεώμενος.” (“...if hearing from you that she is beautiful persuades me to go to see her now, even though I do not have much leisure, I fear that she in turn will much more quickly persuade me to come to see her again. Consequently I would perhaps sit gazing at her, neglecting what I need to do.” 5.1.7–8).¹⁵ Cyrus further claims that he risks becoming Panthea’s slave, even though Panthea is the one who has just been enslaved, with Cyrus her master.¹⁶

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¹⁵ Cyrus’ assertion that Panthea herself will persuade him to return to look at her is highly misogynistic; it denies her lack of agency in the encounter.

¹⁶ Cyrus describes men who succumb to passion as enslaved to those they desire (δουλεύοντάς γε τοῖς ἐρωμένοις, 5.1.12) and as “bound by some necessity stronger than if they had been bound in iron” (δεδεμένους ἵσχυροτέρα τινί ἀνάγκῃ ἢ εἰ ἐν σιδήρῳ ἐδέδεντο, 5.1.12). Cf. the transfer of the language of captivity and compulsion from Panthea to the one desiring her: when Araspas is sent to watch over Panthea we are told that he is captured by desire (ἡλίσκετο ἐρωτι, 5.1.18) and that desire seizes him and compels him to try to seduce her (ληφθεὶς ἐρωτί τῆς γυναικὸς ἡναγκάσθη προσενεγκεῖν λόγους αὐτῇ, 6.1.31). Ironically, he responds by threatening her with rape (ἡπείλησε τῇ γυναικὶ ὅτι εἷ μὴ βούλοιτο ἐκούσα, ἄκουσα ποίησοι ταύτα, 6.1.33. Cf. τὴν βίαν, 6.1.33; βιάζεσθαι, 6.1.34).
However, Araspas’ description of the experience of viewing Panthea emphasises, and eroticises, her powerlessness and distress.17

When she is told that she will be Cyrus’ concubine, she cries out and tears her clothing (5.1.6): Araspas’ reaction is to say that he could now see her face, neck and hands through her torn clothes, and that all those who saw her were overwhelmed by her beauty (5.1.7). Panthea’s visual effect does not place her in a position of power because she does not want to be looked at. As Morales notes, “Power is not just the ability to have an effect on someone, it is the capacity to control that ability, to use it if and when a person wants to, and for its effect to be a desired effect.”18 Panthea’s subsequent treatment, as she is threatened with rape by Araspas and manipulated by Cyrus, stresses her vulnerability.19

The erotic viewing of beautiful boys is often treated in a similar way. In the Symposium the visual effect of Autolycus is compared to the power of a king and to physical compulsion (Sym. 1.8-9),20 yet the

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17 In Araspas’ description, the confident, scrutinising gaze of himself and the other men as they survey the captured women is emphasised (περιεβλέψαμεν, 5.1.4), whereas Panthea is described as looking at the ground (εἰς γῆν ὄρῷσα, 5.1.4). Her powerlessness is stressed: she sits on the ground; she is dressed like her servants; she weeps; she stands with a submissive posture (ἐν ταπείνῳ σχήματι, 5.1.5). Cf. Richlin (1992b) on the eroticization of female distress.

18 Morales (2004) 162. Her comment concerns the very similar description of the powerful visual effect of the abject Leucippe in Achilles Tatius.

19 Panthea has been read as an active, assertive figure, exerting influence over Cyrus and the other men around her to her own ends. Baragwanath (2002) 133 claims that Panthea and Cyrus enjoy a “reciprocal relationship based on philia”. See also Cartledge (1993b): despite recognising the viewing of Panthea (5.1.4-7) as “a fragrant pot-pourri of the male gaze, visual striptease, and feminine pathos” (12), he asserts that “Pantheia mounts a challenge to the stereotypical Men: Women polarity” (13).

20 Εὕθος μὲν οὖν ἔννοιας τις τὰ γιγνόμενα ἡγήσατ’ ἄν φύσει βασιλικόν τι κάλλος εἶναι, ἄλλως τε καὶ ἀν μετ’ αἰδοὺς καὶ σωφροσύνης, καθάπερ Αὐτόλυκος τότε, κεκτήται τις αὐτό. πρῶτον μὲν γάρ, ὡσπερ ὅταν φέγγος τι ἐν νυκτὶ φανῇ, πάντων προσάγεται τὰ δῆματα, οὔτω καὶ τότε τοῦ Αὐτόλυκου τὸ κάλλος πάντων
wider representation of Autolycus, who barely speaks in the Symposium, emphasises his shyness, diffidence and dependence on his father and his lover, Callias. The viewing of Cleinias by Critobulus (Sym. 4.12, 4.21–24) functions in a similar way: Critobulus claims to lose all personal agency in looking at Cleinias, yet he makes this claim in order to explain his pride in the power of his own beauty over others. Just as Cleinias has this effect on him, he argues, so too can he have this effect on other people. Critobulus does not explain his erotic power by describing his experience of being looked at, but resorts to comparison with his experience of looking at another. Although the power of the erotic object of view is insisted upon, the text shies away from allowing the reader to identify with someone in such a position or imagine their experience: it is only the experience of the viewing lover which is of interest. An important exception to these examples is offered, however, by the viewing of Cyrus the Great as a young boy by Artabazus in the Cyropaedia (Cyr. 1.4.27–28), where

εἶλε τὰς Ὄμεις πρὸς αὐτῶν· (“Someone considering the matter would conclude that beauty is kingly in nature, especially when someone possesses it along with modesty and self-control as Autolycus did then. Just as when a light shines forth in the night it draws the eyes of all to it, so did the beauty of Autolycus drag the eyes of all towards him,” 1.8–9). Note, however, that it is Autolycus’ beauty, not Autolycus himself, which exercises compulsion. Cf. Cyr. 5.1.9: Araspas asks whether “...the beauty of a person is sufficient to force someone to act contrary to what is best against their will” (...κανὸν εἶναι κάλλος ἀνθρώπου ἀναγκάζειν τὸν μὴ βουλόμενον πράσσειν παρὰ τὸ βέλτιστον).

21 Critobulus states “I would more gladly gaze at Cleinias than at all the other beautiful things in the world. I would choose to be blind to all other things than to Cleinias alone.” (νῦν γὰρ ἔγω Κλείνιαν ἥδιον μὲν θεώμαι ἡ τάλλα πάντα τὰ ἐν ἀνθρώποις καλά· τυφλὸς δὲ τῶν ἄλλων ἀπάντων μᾶλλον δεξαίμην ἢ εἶναι ἦ Κλείνιοι ἔνος ὄντος, 4.12). Socrates describes how Critobulus’ gaze at Cleinias was like the gaze of someone looking at the Gorgons (ἡσπερ οἱ τὰς Γοργόνας θεώμενοι) – he stared at him as if turned to stone, never left his side and was incapable of even blinking (4.24). Critobulus compares his relationship to Cleinias to a slave’s relationship to his master (4.14).

22 Critobulus informs his audience: “I would walk through fire with Cleinias, and I know that you would do the same with me” (ἔγω γοῦν μετὰ Κλείνίου κἂν διὰ πυρὸς οἴην· οἶδα δ’ ἐς τι καὶ ὑμεῖς μετ’ ἔμοι, 4.16).
Cyrus retains control: Cyrus later takes advantage of Artabazus’ claim to be overwhelmed by the sight of him\(^{23}\) when he uses Artabazus in order to gain influence over the Medes (4.1.23).\(^{24}\) I return to these episodes in my discussions of individual texts below.

Although Socrates’ analysis of the viewing of Theodote presents a theory of female empowerment through exposure to the gaze of men, we must be wary of allowing the philosophical theorisation of viewing to obscure or override how viewing is actually represented as functioning in this scene.\(^{25}\) As Morales points out, in ancient culture viewing is imagined in a variety of different ways, some highly theoretical, which “may or may not be related to the ideologies of

\(^{23}\) Artabazus tells Cyrus: σῶν οἶσθα, φάναι, ὦ Κῦρε, ὅτι καὶ ὅσον σκαρδαμύτω χρόνον, πάνυ πολύς μοι δοκεῖ εἶναι, ὅτι σῶν ὄρω σε τότε τουοῦτον ἀντα; (Cyr. 1.4.28) “Do you not know, Cyrus,” he said, “that even so long as it takes me to blink seems to me to be an extremely long time, because I then do not see you, such as you are.”

\(^{24}\) Cyrus uses Artabazus to perform a de-facto coup, getting him to persuade the other Medes to desert their commander Cyaxares for him. In co-opting Artabazus to his side, Cyrus tells him: Νῦν δὴ σὺ δηλώσεις εἰ ἀληθῆ ἐλεγες, ὅτε ἔφης ἤδεσθαι θεώμενος ἐμέ. (Cyr. 4.1.23) “You will now show whether you spoke the truth when you said that you took pleasure in gazing at me.” Cyrus chooses Artabazus as intermediary specifically because he can exert complete control of him: see Gera (1993) 167 and Nadon (2001) 92.

\(^{25}\) As indicated in the above discussion, the male viewing of women in Xenophon often seems to function as an assertion of male power: see also e.g. Ischomachus’ viewing of his wife (Oec. 10.2–13) and Murnaghan (1988) (for a contrary view of the wife’s position see Gini (1992–3), Pomeroy (1984) and Scaife (1995)). There are, however, two examples of powerful women viewers in Xenophon. The Cilician Queen, Epyaxa, in the Anabasis and Mania in the Hellenica are independent political leaders, who are described watching the military exploits of their troops from a carriage: the Cilician Queen watches the mercenary Greek force, which she has financed, performing a military review for their commander, Cyrus the Younger (An. 1.2.12–18), whereas Mania watches her mercenaries (again Greek) capture new cities for Pharnabazus (ἀυτῇ δὲ ἔφ’ ἄρμαμόξης θεωμένη, Hell. 3.1.13). However, they are not represented as straightforwardly powerful figures; the Cilician Queen’s response to the sight of the Greeks is to run away (see discussion in chapter 3 for the complexities of power relations in this passage), and Mania comes to a grisly end, murdered by her son-in-law Meidias because he cannot bear to be ruled by a woman (Hell. 3.1.14).
viewing in contemporary practice". Further, it could be argued that the very claim of the "power" of female beauty over men is in itself inherently misogynistic: it opens the way for women to be blamed for their effect on men while removing responsibility from the men themselves, and thus becomes a tool of oppression. This does not mean that Socrates' claim of the danger of viewing should not be taken seriously as a mark of how vision is thought about and valued. As we shall see in due course, the allure or deceptiveness of display and its potential to subjugate the viewer is an important concern in Xenophon's representation of viewing in the contexts of political or cultural difference, especially in situations of class and ethnic conflict: the concept of viewing as a struggle for power and agency - as involved in political positioning which is often problematic - lies at the heart of Xenophon's treatment of vision.

Let us now turn to Xenophon's various uses of vision. In my discussion of the Cynegeticus, On Horsemanship and Cavalry Commander, I examine how vision is involved in the construction of elite Athenian identity and in the anxieties of elite self-conception within the context of Athenian democratic ideology. In the Hiero, vision and display become ways of marking different political roles and investigating the workings of political power. The Symposium, Memorabilia and Oeconomicus all, in different ways, deploy scenes of

26 Morales (2004) 34: "We should not reject the Kappeler/Richlin model of objectification through the gaze because ancient optical theories and philosophical discussions tend to present a less unilinear model of how vision works." See also 34 n.139, where she notes that Goldhill (1998a) is "too dismissive" of this model.
vision or the use of visual language to investigate and challenge the nature of Athenian self-consciousness, especially by staging a contest between the values embodied by the eccentric, but alluring, figure of Socrates and normative Athenian sensibilities. Finally, I turn to the *Hellenica*, to introduce the issues which will form the chief concern of this thesis: the use of vision in the representation of relationships between different Greek or non-Greek groups. I hope to indicate that although in Xenophon vision is always a matter of political positioning, viewing and responses to sight become more problematic, fraught and contested in the context of cross-cultural interaction and conflict.

**Technical works: Cynegiticus, On Horsemanship, Cavalry Commander**

I begin by looking at the focus on vision and display in Xenophon's works on hunting, riding and cavalry training - Athenian cultural institutions of fundamental ideological importance for elite self-definition. The *Cynegeticus* evinces concern with the visual effect of the hunt: not only is it necessary that the dogs are the correct colour (4.7–8) and are not misshapen and ugly to look at (ἐμορφοὶ δὲ καὶ ἀλοχραὶ ὀρᾶσθαι, 3.3), but the correctly organised hunt should create a spectacle which has an overwhelming effect on its viewers: οὐτω δὲ ἐπίχαρι ἐστι τὸ θέαμα, ὡστε οὐδεὶς ὡστὶς οὐκ ἂν ἴδων ἵχνευόμενον, εὐρισκόμενον, μεταθεόμενον, ἀλισκόμενον, ἐπιλάθοιτ’ ἂν εἴ τοι τοῦ ἔρψη.
“So pleasurable is the spectacle, that if anyone saw [a hare] tracked, found, chased and caught he would forget whatever else he loved”, (5.33.)

This concern can be read in terms of the production of socio-political values: as Johnstone notes, “the hunt was meant to be both beautiful, that is, an elite spectacle to be seen, and ennobling, that is, morally good in a class specific way”.27 The hunter’s elite identity is constructed both through his pleasurable sight of the spectacular hunt and through his own participation in that spectacle before the eyes of others. The production of elite identity through both seeing and being seen emerges in the text’s discussion of ἀρετή:

eἰδεῖν τοῦτο, ὅτι θεᾶται αὐτοῖς, ἰεῖντο ἃν ἐπὶ τοὺς πόνους καὶ τὰς παιδεύσεις αἳς ἀλίσκεται μόλις, καὶ κατεργάζοιντο ἃν αὐτήν.

"That all men desire (Virtue) is clearly apparent / visible, but because she must be gained through toil, many men give up. For conquering her is invisible, whereas the toils associated with her are visible. It may be that if her body were visible, men would be less careless about Virtue, knowing that just as she is apparent to them, so they are seen by her. For whenever someone is seen by his beloved, every man becomes better than himself and neither says nor does anything shameful or bad, in case he should be seen by him. But because men do not think they are seen by Virtue, they do bad and shameful things in her presence, because they do not see her. But she is present everywhere because she is immortal, and she honours those who are good in regard to her, but scorns those who are bad. If men knew that she watches them, they would long for the toils and the training by which she is with difficulty captured, and they would conquer her."

(12.18–22)

Vision is involved in the production of values, and thus in social positioning, which, as Johnstone (above) notes, can be understood as class specific. Vision is imagined both as a form of social policing (as the gaze of Virtue at men ensures their attempt to achieve, but also conquer, virtue) and as ensuring self-policing (as the men's sight of Virtue is the prerequisite for the power of her gaze over them): vision is imagined as constructing socio-political relationships which are
complex. The production of elite identities functions through a highly self-conscious network of interlocking gazes.

A similar concern occurs in the *Cavalry Commander* and the *On Horsemanship* with the spectacular display of horses; as Vilatte has argued, in these texts the horse is imagined to display the excellence of the master, and is therefore an important ideological signifier. As with the choice of dogs in the *Cynegcticus*, in *On Horsemanship* an important criterion in the choice of a horse is how it looks: wide nostrils "display the horse as more formidable / gorgon-like" (γοργότερον τὸν ἵππον ἀποδεικνύουσι, 1.10), whereas a double back is "more pleasant to look at" (ἰδεῖν ἡδίων, 1.11).

Further, a major concern is how to control the appearance of a horse in order to create a particular response in the spectator: after a description of a technique for making the horse bound forward elegantly, we are told

καὶ οἱ θεώμενοι τὸν ἵππον τοιοῦτον ἐπικαλούσιν ἐλευθέριον τε καὶ ἐθελουργόν καὶ ἵππαστὴν καὶ θυμοειδῆ καὶ σοβαρόν καὶ ἁμα ἡδύν τε καὶ γοργόν ἰδεῖν... (10.17)

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28 This passage is also of interest in terms of its presentation of gender: although Virtue is a personification and is described as immortal, she is imagined as female and is eroticized. Men are said to desire her (ἐρωταν), a verb specifically associated with erotic desire, and she is compared to an eromenos, a young boy who is normatively the passive love object. Men's relation to her is described in terms of their conquest of her (κατεργάσασθαι, 12.19; κατεργάζοντο, 12.22): the verb κατεργάζομαι can mean "conquer" or "subdue", as well as "acquire" or "achieve". She is also described as being captured (ἀλλισκεταί, 12.22). Although men are controlled by her when they see that she sees them, the passage does not set Virtue up as a figure of power, but as open to being seduced and conquered. Cf. the discussion of the viewing of Panthea in *Cyr.* 5.1.4–17.

29 Vilatte (1986) 274.

30 Cf. the more gorgon-like (γοργοτέρον) appearance of the horse which stands with hind legs well apart (1.14).
“Those who see such a horse call it noble, a willing worker, good to ride, high-spirited, impressive, and both pleasing and formidable / gorgon-like to look at.”

As Vilatte notes, “Xénophon cite avec ironie les exclamations populaires, car il sait que cette belle attitude n’est que le fruit de la maîtrise de l’homme sur le cheval et non la marque de la spontanéité de l’animal”.31 Display is understood as open to manipulation. This text’s repeated use of the adjective γόργων (which can be translated as “terrible”, “formidable”, but which derives etymologically from ἡ Γοργώ, the Gorgon)32 to describe the desired visual effect of the horse hints at the potentially overwhelming power of the sight over its viewers:

Οὔτω δὲ καὶ ἐστιν ὁ μετεωρίζων ἑαυτόν ἵππος σφόδρα [ἡ καλὸν ἡ δεινὸν ἡ ἀγαστὸν ἡ θαυμαστόν], ὡς πάντων τῶν ὀρῶντων καὶ νέων καὶ γεραστέρων τὰ ὀμματα κατέχειν. οὔδεις γοῦν οὐτε ἀπολείπει αὐτὸν οὔτε ἀπαγορεύει θεώμενος, ἐστ’ ἀν περ ἐπιδεικνύει τὴν λαμπρότητα. (11.8-9)

“A prancing horse is so very beautiful, terrible, admirable and wondrous, that it takes hold of the eyes of all who see it, both young

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31 Vilatte (1986) 274.
32 1.10, 1.14, 10.5, 10.17, 11.12. Cf. γοργούμενος, of a stallion prancing before mares (Peri Hipp. 10.4). See also Hipparch. 3.11, where γοργός describes a cavalry procession. According to Chantraine (1984) 233, the term γοργός is derived from γοργωπός, which itself derives from the proper noun ἡ Γοργώ, found in Homer and Hesiod. The term may recall the shield blazon, often shown as a Gorgon in Greek vase painting. The adjective γοργός (in positive, comparative and superlative) is used by Xenophon in a variety of contexts: Cyr.: of successful soldiers (4.4.3; 5.2.37); Sym.: of someone possessed by a god (1.10); Lak. Pol.: of Spartan men (11.3). In all examples except Cyr. 4.4.3 and Sym. 1.10, γοργός is a deliberately contrived effect. Cf. also τὰς Γοργόνας (Sym. 4.24): looking at the beautiful Cleinias is compared to looking at the Gorgons—his lover Critobulus is unable to look away but stares at him stonily (Λιθίνως). See Vernant (1991) 111-41 on the contexts of gorgon terminology.
and old alike. At any rate no-one either departs or grows tired of looking at it, as long as it displays its brilliance."33

Viewing is described as a physical compulsion. The production of elite identity is imagined as an assertion of power.

However, this raises a problem: who should control this power?

In the description of cavalry processions, the text evinces concern over whether horses should be manoeuvred so as most effectively to display the troop leader, or the troop as a whole. A horse managed in the correct way makes the rider look like a god or hero (ἐπὶ τῶν τοιούτων δὴ ἵππαξόμενοι ἵππων καὶ θεοὶ καὶ ἥρωες γράφονται, καὶ ἄνδρες οἱ καλῶς χρώμενοι αὐτοῖς μεγαλοπρεπεῖς φαίνονται, "It is on horses such as these that artists depict gods and heroes riding, and the men who can manage such horses well have a magnificent appearance," 11.8). Yet in a cavalry troop, the leader "should not try to make himself the single brilliant figure, but rather should try to make the whole troop appear worth watching" (οὐ δεῖ αὐτὸν τοῦτο σπουδάζειν, ὅπως αὐτὸς μόνος λαμπρὸς ἔσται, ἀλλὰ πολὺ μᾶλλον ὅπως ὅλον τὸ ἐπόμενον ἄξιοθέατον φανεῖται, 11.10).34 Despite the interest in the production of elite identity, this concern seems rooted

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33 This idea of the horse as "shining" or "brilliant" occurs throughout this passage: πάντα τὰ κάλλιστα καὶ λαμπρότατα ἐπιδείκνυσθαι (11.6); cf. 11.10, 11.11.

34 After a description of a leader prancing forward but his troops following at a walk, the question is posed "What can there be brilliant in such a sight?" (ἐκ δὲ ταύτης τῆς ὄψεως τι ἄν καὶ λαμπρὸν γένοιτ’ ἄν: 11.11). However, if the leader leads in such a way that all horses appear εὐθυμότατοι (most spirited), γοργοντάτοι (most formidable / "gorgon-like") and εὐστηκονέστατοι (most graceful), then not only he but all those accompanying him appear worth watching (ὡστε οὐ μόνον αὐτὸς ἀλλὰ καὶ πάντες οἱ συμπαρεπόμενοι ἄξιοθέατοι ἄν φαίνοιντο, 11.12).
in democratic ideology: the passage hints at a fear that the power available in display might be open to misuse.

There is a similar tension in the *Cavalry Commander*, which instructs the potential cavalry leader on how to make the cavalry displays for various Athenian festivals worth watching (όξιοθεότους, 3.1) and how to make the other city displays as beautiful as possible (κάλλιστα ἐπιδείξει, 3.1). The concern here is with the benefits that accrue to the city, which depend not only on the display of the individual leader but on the display of the group: πολύ ἔστι πρὸς τῆς πόλεως εὐδοξότερον τῇ τῆς φυλῆς λαμπρότητι κεκοσμήσθαι ἢ μόνον τῇ ἑαυτῶν στολῇ (“From the point of view of the city, it is far more glorious [for the commanders] to be adorned by the brilliance of the cavalry troop than only by their own equipment,” 1.22). However, although, as in *On Horsemanship*, this statement indicates a concern to regulate the power of the individual, it also imagines the cavalry troop as an adornment to its leader.

Attention is paid to creating the required response in the audience: the status of the commander is created through the production of processions which are “good, beautiful and pleasant for the spectators” (ἀγαθὰ καὶ καλὰ καὶ τοῖς θεαταῖς ἥδεα ἐσται, 3.5). However, the processions do not only construct the power of the cavalry leader, but display the military power of the state: lances are to

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35 See Seager (2001) on Xenophon’s interest in the conflict between individual and community advantage.
36 For the festival processions the audience is imagined as composed of both men and gods (πάντα ἐπιδεειμένα ἦσσαι καὶ τοῖς θεοῖς καὶ τοῖς ἀνθρώποις, 3.4); we are told that the processions must be “most pleasing to both gods and spectators” (τοῖς θεοῖς κεκαρισμενωτάτας καὶ τοῖς θεαταῖς, 3.2).
be pointed between horses’ ears so as “to be fearsome and stand out, and appear numerous” (φοβερά τε καὶ εὐκρινῇ ἔσεσθαι καὶ ἀμα πολλὰ φανεῖσθαι, 3.3); in the sham fight the spectacle should appear γοργόν (formidable, “gorgon-like”), σεμνόν (solemn) and καλόν (beautiful) (3.11–12); and manoeuvres are to be engineered “to appear more warlike and more terrible” (πολεμικῶτερά τε φαίνεσθαι ἃν καὶ καλντερα, 3.13). In mimicking successful warfare, the cavalry produces a spectacle of the power not of any individual, but of the city.37

**Hiero**

This concern with the political ramifications of vision also occurs in the **Hiero**, a discussion of tyranny staged between the Syracusan tyrant Hiero and the poet Simonides, where it is used to articulate different forms of political status. Simonides begins the discussion of the differences between the life of the private citizen and the life of a tyrant by suggesting that tyrants enjoy more pleasure through their use of their bodily senses, the first of those mentioned being sight (1.4).38 Hiero counters this claim:

Πρώτον μὲν γὰρ ἐν τοῖς διὰ τῆς ὁψεως θεάμασι λογιζόμενος εὐρίσκω μειονεκτούντας τοὺς τυράννους. ἄλλα μὲν γε ἐν ἄλλη χώρᾳ

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37 See Dillery (2004) 260–264 on the combination of the religious and the military in the cavalry processions of the Hipparch., which he sees as indicating a new development in the history of the Classical procession.

38 As Gray (1986) points out, the statements of Simonides about the benefits of a tyrant’s life in this portion of the text (which are each quickly refuted by Hiero) must be read as ironic. Gray compares Simonides to Socrates: as in a Socratic dialogue, Hiero is led to reach a self-critical conclusion (ie. that he gains nothing from ruling in the way that he does) through responding to the apparently simplistic assertions of his opponent.
First of all, in regard to the sights perceived through vision, I find on considering the matter that tyrants are at a disadvantage. In every land there are things worth seeing. On account of this, private citizens travel to whichever cities they wish for the sake of their sights, and to the public festivals where the things reputed to be most worth seeing are gathered together. But tyrants have nothing to do with missions to festivals.” (1.11)

Hiero explains that it is too risky for a tyrant to expose himself to a crowd (1.12); he also claims that he is unable to watch spectacles at home, as hardly any good purveyors of spectacles (οἱ ἐπιδεικνύμενοι) turn up, and those that do charge exorbitantly for their services (1.13). As Goldhill has noted, in this passage how one sees is understood to be an expression of political role; spectatorship is valued in such a way that it makes sense to think about the difference between tyrants and citizens in terms of their differential ability to look at interesting sights. Here sight is valued primarily in terms of pleasure.

Elsewhere in the text it is the tyrant himself who is imagined as on display. When Simonides suggests that the tyrant’s luxurious possessions are evidence of his superior happiness, Hiero retorts:

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39 Goldhill (1999) 7 and (2000) 168–9 discusses this passage in regard to its use of the terms θέωμα and θεωρία to mean travel to view a foreign festival. He argues that θεωρία implies travel to festivals as a state delegate, whereas θέωμα indicates presence at festivals in any capacity.
άλλα τὸ μὲν ἰπθὺς τῶν ἀνθρώπων, ὥς Σιμωνίδης, ἔξαπατάσθαι ὑπὸ τῆς τυραννίδος οὐδέν τι θαυμάζω· μάλα γὰρ ὁ ὅχλος μοι δοκεῖ δοξάζειν ὅρων καὶ εὐδαίμονάς τινας εἶναι καὶ ἀθλίους· ἢ δὲ τυραννίς τὰ μὲν δοκοῦντα πολλοῦ ἄξια κτήματα εἶναι ἀνεπτυγμένα θεᾶσθαι φανερὰ πάσι παρέχεται, τὰ δὲ χαλεπὰ ἐν ταῖς ψυχαῖς τῶν τυράννων κέκτηται ἀποκεκρυμμένα, ἐνθαυσαρία καὶ τὸ εὐδαιμονεῖν καὶ τὸ κακοδαιμονεῖν τοῖς ἀνθρώποις ἀπόκειται. τὸ μὲν οὖν τὸ πλήθος περὶ τούτου λεληθέναι, ὦσπερ εἶπον, οὐθενεῖν· τὸ δὲ καὶ ὑμᾶς ταύτι ἁγνοεῖν, ο pupper τῆς γνώμης δοκεῖτε θεᾶσθαι κάλλιον ἢ διὰ τῶν ὀρθαλμῶν τὰ πλείστα τῶν πραγμάτων, τούτῳ μοι δοκεῖ θαυμαστῶν εἶναι.

"I do not wonder at the fact that the majority of people, Simonides, are deceived by tyranny. For the crowd seems to me to judge that some men are happy and others are wretched wholly by sight. But tyranny presents its possessions, seemingly worth much, outspread to be gazed upon and visible to all. Yet its troubles it keeps hidden away in the souls of tyrants, where both the happiness and unhappiness of human beings lies. As I said, I do not wonder that this escapes the notice of the crowd; but that men like you do not know this, men who seem to see most things more clearly through their mind than through their eyes – this seems wondrous to me."

(2.3–5)

Sight is presented not only as potentially deceptive, but as open to manipulation in the service of political power: the tyrant offers a deliberately contrived display to impress, and therefore maintain
control over, his subjects. The ability to interpret sights is presented as a mark of social positioning: whereas the common crowd are taken in by superficial sights, the wise man is capable of “seeing through” the charade to access the hidden truth. Uncritical acceptance of appearances is presented as a mark of naivety, whereas the ability to judge a sight analytically is the sign of the sophisticated viewer. Here sight is understood as a means to knowledge; yet the text also indicates the potential difficulty of acquiring knowledge through sight.

When, in the later portion of the text, Simonides replaces Hiero as the main speaker to insist that Hiero is not going about the business of being a tyrant in the right way and should change his method of ruling, Hiero’s complaints of being unable either to see or to be seen in a satisfactory manner are taken up and reformulated. Simonides advises that a beautifully decorated palace is less of an adornment (κόσμου, 11.2) to him than a lavishly cared for city; that he will appear more terrible to his enemies if the whole city is well-armed than if he himself is adorned with the most terrifying arms (ὁπλοῖς δὲ

40 Cf. Pl. Rep. 577, where it is argued that the best judge of a tyrant’s life is someone who is not dazzled by the tyrant’s outward display of grandeur, like a child, but who has seen how a tyrant behaves in private when stripped of his props, and can therefore observe his inner character.
41 Gray (1986) 116 cites this passage to note the text’s ironic framing, which stages the wise Simonides as apparently believing popular notions about tyrants, and being “educated” by Hiero. Cf. the presentation of Simonides as wise man at the opening of the text (1.1), where Simonides asks Hiero if he can explain something to him, and Hiero responds by asking how someone so wise could need anything explaining by someone like him.
42 Cf. Goldhill (2001) 160–162 on Lucian's On the House, where the responses to sight of the educated and the uneducated are different: the uneducated gaze in silent astonishment, whereas the educated are prompted to speak analytically about what they see.
The positive results of this new method of ruling are imagined in terms of a change in Hiero’s visual interactions:

Periblettops δὲ ὃν ὅγε ὑπὸ ἰδιωτῶν μόνον ἄλλα καὶ ὑπὸ πολλῶν πόλεων ἀγαπῶ ἅν, καὶ θαυμαστῶς ὦκ ὅμοιο μόνον ἄλλα καὶ δημοσίᾳ παρὰ πᾶσιν ἅν εἰ, καὶ ἔξει ἡ μὲν ἅν σοι ἐκεν ἀσφαλείας, εἰ ποι βούλοιο, θεωρησοντι πορεύεσθαι, ἔξει ἦ δ’ ἅν αὐτοῦ μένοντι τοῦτο πράπτειν. ἀεὶ γὰρ ἅν παρὰ σοι πανήγυρις εἰῃ τῶν βουλομένων ἐπιδεικνύναι εἰ τίς τι σοφὸν ἥ καλὸν ἥ ἀγαθὸν ἔχω, τῶν δὲ καὶ ἐπιθυμοῦντων ὑπηρετεῖν. πᾶς δὲ ὁ μὲν παρῶν σύμμαχος ἅν εἰ, σοι, ὁ δὲ ἀπών ἐπιθυμοῖ ἅν ἰδεῖν σε.

43 Cf. the very similar reference to the cavalry leader’s use of group display as personal adornment in Hipparch. 1.22, discussed above.
"You will be looked at from all sides and loved not only by the private citizens, but by many states, and you will be an object of wonder not only at home, but in public in front of all. In regard to your safety, you will be able, if you wish, to travel to see sights, or equally you will be able to do this while staying at home. For there will always be a throng around you of those wishing to display something wise or beautiful or good, and of those longing to serve you. Everyone present will be your ally, whereas everyone absent will long to see you." (11.9–11)

Simonides indicates the transformation of Hiero's relationship with his people through a transformation in the way that he sees and is seen: he will be able to look at sights to his heart's content, and rather than being forced to present false appearances to his subjects, all will look at him with love.

Sevieri suggests that Simonides imagines Hiero "as much an object of admiration as those public festivals and natural or artistic sights he felt himself so painfully excluded from."⁴⁴ Although this passage does imply a degree of equivalence between Hiero's pleasurable gaze at spectacles and his subjects' and others' gaze at him, there are also differences between these forms of viewing. The loving, longing and wondrous gaze of Hiero's subjects implies submission to him (as those around him long to please him and to serve him), but also, simultaneously, identification with him: as Sevieri shows, the Hiero is intimately concerned with the problem of how to establish common bonds between the tyrant and his alienated

subjects. The passage poses the problem of what it means to look in the context of tyrannical power: simple pleasure in looking seems to be the province of the tyrant, whereas for his subjects looking at the tyrant may be a more complex and ambiguous process.

**Memorabilia**

The narratives of the *Memorabilia*, *Symposium* and *Oeconomicus* all take place within an explicitly Athenian cultural setting; Athenian places and events are referred to, and (unlike the representation of Sparta in the *Lak. Pol.*) comprehension of the Athenian way of life is assumed. Yet by presenting the personality and arguments of Socrates, all three texts, in different ways, open up for reflection the question of what it means to be Athenian.

In the *Memorabilia* the potential challenge posed by Socrates is made explicit by the text’s framing as an investigation into Socrates’ execution. In order to counter the accusations against him the *Memorabilia* presents Socrates as upholding normative values; yet at the same time it demonstrates his uniqueness in order to suggest the positive benefits he conferred on the city. For example, the

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45 Through a comparison with the ambiguous figure of the returning athletic victor in epinician poetry evoked by the *Hiero*’s use of Simonides as a protagonist, Sevieri (2004) discusses the text’s concern with how to overcome the threat which the tyrant poses to his city through the affirmation of their common identity.

46 The conversation between Socrates and Ischomachus in the *Oec.* takes places in the *agora*, and the narrative of the *Sym.* takes place in the wake of the Panathenaic games, and presents that most familiar of elite Athenian cultural institutions, the *symposium*.

47 Gray (1998) makes this argument from the point of view of literary genre: she demonstrates the participation of the *Mem.* within a tradition of wisdom literature, but also the unusual nature of Socrates’ dialectical approach within the context of that tradition.
Memorabilia insists that Socrates’ communication with his divine sign was not in any way more strange (κανόντερον) than others’ use of oracles, augury or sacrifices (1.1.3), while at the same time explaining that those who followed the advice he gave when under the influence of his divine sign prospered, whereas those who ignored the advice came to grief (1.1.4). This tension between familiarity and strangeness lies at the heart of the difficulty of this text, which invites the reader to identify with Socrates while at the same time posing such identification as problematic: identification with Socrates means a rejection of or, at least, a distancing from conventional Athenian perspectives, as Athenian values become the object of his and the reader’s scrutiny.

This problem is evident in the text’s programmatic opening statement of wonder: “I have often wondered by what arguments those who indicted Socrates could have persuaded the Athenians that he deserved execution by the city” (πολλάκις έθαυμασα τίς ποτέ λόγοις Ἀθηναίους ἐπείσαν οἱ γραψάμενοι Σωκράτην ὡς ἀξίως εἶνθανάτου τῇ πόλει, 1.1.1). As noted in chapter 1, θαυμάζω has visual connotations; it is etymologically linked to θεόμαι. The object of wonder can be read as twofold: the text offers both Socrates and the Athenians as open to investigation and re-evaluation (the terminology


49 A similar declaration of wonder (θαυμάζω) opens the discussion of Sparta in the Lak. Pol. (1.1–2), and of Cyrus and the rise of Persian power in the Cyropaedia (1.1.1, 1.1.6); θεόμαι is a privileged term throughout Xenophon’s works, as we shall see.
of wonder is applied to both elsewhere in the text, but is especially used by Socrates in his analysis of Athenian behaviour).\textsuperscript{50}

Sight functions as a means of characterising this process of investigation. Socrates is offered as an object of visual scrutiny - the reader is invited to look at him, and his visibility is repeatedly presented as a guarantee of the claims made about him; yet he himself is also frequently described as looking at the nature of Athens, or as displaying the nature of Athens to others. As Socrates and his values are set in opposition to those of the city in a series of encounters with other Athenians, the text's language of vision requires the reader to position him- or herself in relation to both.

Visual language is used repeatedly throughout the text. The enquiry of the narrator into the life of Socrates and the circumstances of his execution is framed as a visual investigation, as the narrator's claims are introduced by ὅρω.\textsuperscript{51} The visibility of Socrates is repeatedly mentioned. We are informed that he was always in the open (ἀλλὰ μὴν ἐκεῖνὸς γε ἀεὶ μὲν ἦν ἐν τῷ φανερῷ, 1.1.10): “in the mornings he used to go to the covered walkways and gymnasia, and when the agora became busy he was there in full view” (πρῷ τε γὰρ εἰς τοὺς περιπάτους καὶ τὰ γυμνάσια ἦει καὶ πληθούσης ἀγορᾶς ἐκεῖ

\textsuperscript{50} See 1.1.17, 1.1.20 and 1.2.1 for the use of the terminology of θαῦμα to describe the narrator’s wonder at the Athenian jurors’ conviction of Socrates. For Socrates as a source of wonder: 4.2.3; 4.8.2; 4.8.5-6. For the Athenians as a source of wonder: 1.2.7; 2.3.9; 2.3.2; 2.8.5; 3.5.13; 3.5.19; 3.6.17-18; 3.7.8; 4.2.6. Also: wonder at wise men and gods: 1.4.2-4; wonder at Heracles: 2.28.

\textsuperscript{51} E.g. 1.2.19-22: “I see” that those who do not train the body cannot perform the functions of the body (1.2.19); “I see” that just as poetry is forgotten if not repeated, so will instruction fade from the mind (1.2.21); “I see” that those who take to drink or lovers stop caring about good conduct (1.2.22). These uses do not always necessarily imply a purely visual meaning, but can also suggest recognition: see chapter 1.
The adjective φανερός is frequently used to describe him, as when the accusation that he rejected the city's gods is countered by the claim that he was visible (φανερός) making sacrifices, and was not invisible (οὐκ ἀφανής) using divination (1.1.2). The public sight of Socrates can imply social policing: we are told that no-one ever saw him do or heard him say anything impious or irreligious (οὐδεὶς δὲ πῶποτε Σωκράτους οὐδὲν ἀσεβὲς οὐδὲ ἀνόσιον οὔτε πράττοντος εἶδεν οὔτε λέγοντος ἥκουσεν, 1.1.11). Similarly, as a sign that Socrates had a positive effect on his associates we are told that they were virtuous not only whenever they were seen by other people (ὅποτε ὑπὸ τῶν ἀνθρώπων ὀρφύτο) but also whenever they were alone (ὅποτε ἐν ἐρημίᾳ εἶεν), since they thought that nothing they could do would escape the notice of the gods (θεοὺς διαλαθεῖν) (1.4.19).

Socrates' visibility not only acts as a proof of his virtue, but is involved in his educational effect. He made men καλοὺς κάγαθοὺς (1.2.2), "yet he never claimed to teach them this, but rather by being visible as such a man himself he led his followers to hope that through imitating him they would become such men" (καίτοι γε οὐδεπώποτε ὑπέσχετο διδάσκαλος εἶναι τούτου, ἀλλὰ τῷ φανερῷ εἶναι

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52 Similarly, we are told that he was visible (φανερός) as δημοτικός and φιλάνθρωπος (1.2.60); he was visible (φανερός) serving the gods and visible (φανερός) in trying to reform the wickedness of his associates (1.2.64); he was visible (φανερός) being in love not with bodies but with souls (4.1.2); and while awaiting execution he was visible (φανερός) living exactly as he had done before (4.8.2).

53 Similarly, we are told that he did not hide his opinion in regard to justice, but displayed it by his deeds (οὐκ ἀπεκρύπτετο ἢν εἶχε γνώμην, ἀλλὰ καὶ ἔργῳ ἀπεδείκνυτο) and that he was conspicuous before others in his orderliness (διάδημος εἶναι παρὰ τοὺς ἄλλους εὐτακτῶν) (4.4.1).
τοιούτος ὧν ἐλπίζειν ἐποίει τοὺς συνδιατρίβοντας ἑαυτῷ μιμουμένους ἐκεῖνον τοιούτους γενήσεσθαι, 1.2.3).54 His display is presented as equal in value and effect to his dialectic: ὦφελεῖν ἐδόκει μοι τοὺς συνόντας τὰ μὲν ἔργῳ δεικνύων ἑαυτὸν οἷος ἦν, τὰ δὲ καὶ διαλεγόμενος (“He seemed to me to be useful to his companions both in displaying through his actions what sort of a man he was, and in conversing with them” 1.3.1).55 Sight is imagined as involved in learning and self-development, and as such has political implications, as Socrates’ viewers are produced as good citizens. However, imitation is not the inevitable result of the sight of Socrates. Critias and Alcibiades are imagined as viewing Socrates’ way of life, but as nevertheless rejecting it: “had a god offered them the choice between living their whole lives just as they saw Socrates living (ὡσπερ ζῶντα Σωκράτην ἐῶρων), or death, they would have rather chosen death” (1.2.16).

Visual vocabulary is also applied to the process of examination which Socrates undertakes and promotes.56 We are told that by leading

54 We are told that just as all teachers display to those they teach that they themselves practise what they teach (αὐτοὺς δεικνύοντας τε τοῖς μαθηταῖς ἐπεί αὐτοὶ ποιοῦσιν ἄ διδάσκουσι, 1.2.17), so too Socrates displayed to his companions that he was himself καλὸν κάγαθὸν (Σωκράτην δεικνύον τοῖς συνοίσιν ἑαυτὸν καλὸν κάγαθὸν ὅτα, 1.2.17).

55 The pairing of display and dialectic as methods of education occurs elsewhere: Socrates was visible (φανερῶς) to his companions in training himself in self-control and also exhorted them to self-control through speech (διαλεγόμενος) (4.5.1). The assertion of Socrates’ usefulness makes a statement about the nature of his political role: see Goldhill (1998a). The visibility of his usefulness is also addressed: it was visible / apparent to anyone considering the matter and perceiving in an ordinary / measured way (τῷ σκοπούμένῳ τούτῳ καὶ [εἴ] μετρίῳς αἰσθησαμένῳ φανερὸν εἶναι) that nothing was more useful (ὑφελείμωτερον) than the companionship of Socrates (4.1.1). Of course, this statement implicitly raises the question of what sort of sight Socrates would make for someone who did not perceive in a μέτριος way.

56 See Nightingale (2001) and (2004) on the use of visual vocabulary to describe the process of philosophical investigation, especially in fourth century philosophy.
an argument back to a discussion of basic definitions Socrates allowed
the truth to become visible even to those with whom he was disputing
(καὶ τοῖς ἀντιλέγουσιν αὐτοῖς φανερὸν ἐγίγνετο τάληθές, 4.6.14).57
Similarly, Athenian customs are imagined as exposed to view and
analysis: for example, Socrates says that he sees that men brought up
under the same laws and customs differ widely in daring (ὁρῶ γὰρ ἐν
τοῖς αὐτοῖς νόμοις τε καὶ ἔθεσι τρεφομένους πολὺ διαφέροντας
ἀλλήλων τόλμῃ, 3.9.1).58 Such references might be read as rhetorical
rather than as actively implying visuality; nevertheless, the repeated
use of visual vocabulary links the philosophical enquiry of Socrates to
the text’s own enquiry into the life of Socrates.

The sight of events in the city involves not just analysis and
understanding, but a new way of thinking about how to engage with
one’s environment.59 In a discussion on how to choose a friend,
Critobulus asks how to test / judge (δοκιμάσαμεν) the qualities of a
man (2.6.6): the term has specifically democratic connotations through

57 Cf. 1.1.13: Socrates wondered that it was not visible (ἐθαύμαζε δ’ εἶ μὴ φανερὸν
αὐτοῖς ἔστιν) to the Sophists that their questions about heavenly phenomena were
unsolvable; 2.6.37: Socrates asks Critobulus if what he is arguing is not yet visible
(φανερὸν) to him.
58 Similarly, in arguing that Athenians are well-disciplined, Socrates asks Pericles if
he does not see (ὁρῶς) what good discipline they have in their fleets, how well they
obey the umpires in athletic contests and how readily they take orders from chorus
trainers (3.5.18). According to Socrates’ interlocutor Euthedemus, it is possible both
to see and hear (ὁράν τε καὶ ἀκούειν) works of justice and of injustice in the city
every day (4.2.12). Socrates is also imagined as watching and responding to the
behaviour of his companions. On seeing (ὁρῶν) that Aristarchus looked distressed,
Socrates questioned him (2.7.1); we are told that if he had seen (ὁρῶν) worthless
behaviour among his companions and condoned it, he could be blamed – but he did
not (1.2.29).
59 Cf. 3.5.8: Socrates argues that to make the Athenians virtuous it is necessary to
display to them (δεικτέον) that in ancient times they had been pre-eminent in virtue,
in the same way that if one wanted to encourage them to seize money, it would be
necessary to display (ἀποδεικνύντες) to them that it had originally been their
fathers’ money. Here response to display involves becoming a more virtuous citizen.
its allusion to the *dokimasia*, the public inspection of citizens. Socrates compares judging a friend to judging a sculptor: """"We judge sculptors,"" he said, """"not by witnessing their words, but rather if we see that someone has previously crafted statues beautifully, then we trust that his future works will also be well-made""'' (τοὺς μὲν ἀνδριαντοποιοὺς, ἔφη, δοκιμάζομεν ὡς τοῖς λόγοις αὐτῶν τεκμαίρομενοι, ἀλλ' ὅν ἀν ὄρωμεν τοὺς πρόσθεν ἀνδριάντας καλῶς εἰργασμένον, τούτω πιστεύομεν καὶ τοὺς λοιποὺς εὐ ποιήσειν, 2.6.6). Sight is involved in a process of judgement which determines the viewer’s relations with others.  

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60 Critobulus draws the conclusion that if a man appears (φαίνηται) to have done well previously by his friends, then it is clear (δῆλον) that he will treat his new friends well too (2.6.7); Socrates confirms this conclusion by noting that he sees (ὁρῶ) that if a horse owner has previously treated his horses well then, he will treat other horses well too (2.6.7).

61 Similarly, it is argued that in order to become a good general it is necessary to be able to distinguish good and bad men. The interlocutor states that it is easy to discover τοὺς φιλοτιμότατους (the lovers of honour / the ambitious): οὐ τοῖνοι οὔτοι γε ἄδηλοι, ἀλλ' ἐπιφανεῖς πανταχοῦ δόντες εὐσίρετοι ἄν εἶν, """"They are not unobvious, for they are conspicuous everywhere and would be easy to pick out""'' (3.1.10). Again, the good cavalry-man is apparent (φαίνηται) in being especially knowledgeable about the business of horsemanship (3.3.9). However, display is also acknowledged to be open to manipulation. Nichomachides complains about not being elected to the office of general despite his record of service, which he proves by a display of his scars (ἀμα δὲ καὶ τὰς οὐλὰς τῶν τραυμάτων ἀπογυμνοῦμένος ἐπεδείκνυεν, 3.4.1); he dismisses the man who has been elected on the grounds that as a merchant he has never been περιβλεπτόν (""""conspicuous""''; literally, """"looked at from all sides") in the cavalry (3.4.1). His self-display acts as an assertion of his suitability to command, and is intended to persuade. However, Socrates disagrees, arguing that a successful merchant can also make a successful general: whereas Nichomachides wishes his viewers to interpret his self-display in a way beneficial to him, Socrates sees things differently. Similarly, Socrates argues that the appearance of competence is an insufficient proof of competence: if a bad flute-player wanted to seem (δοκεῖν) a good one and therefore imitated (μιμήτεον) the trappings of the successful flute-player by wearing fine clothes and travelling with many attendants, he could never accept an engagement to play the flute without being exposed to ridicule (1.7.2); and someone who wanted to appear (φαίνεσθαι) a good pilot or general without actually being one would bring disgrace on himself as soon as he tried to take up the role (1.7.3). Cf. 2.6.38-39. Socrates advises Critobulus that false reputation for proficiency at a skill is unhelpful: if he wishes to seem good, he should try to be good (...ἀν βούλη δοκεῖν ἄγαθός εἶναι, τούτῳ καὶ γενέσθαι ἄγαθον πειράσθαι, 2.6.39).
Socrates also refers to sight as a metaphor for knowledge. In arguing for the existence of the gods, Socrates claims that although the gods themselves are unseen, yet their effects on the world are seen.

A comparison is made with natural phenomena. The sun seems to be visible to all but cannot himself be closely looked at by men and if anyone attempts to look at him shamelessly, he blinds them. Similarly, although it is evident that the thunderbolt is hurled from heaven, it is not seen as it comes, strikes or departs; the winds are not seen but

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62 Ignoring warnings from the gods is compared to choosing a blind rather than a sighted guide on a journey (1.3.4), and the omniscience of the gods is argued for by saying that if the human eye can travel across many stades, then the eye of god can surely encompass the whole world (1.4.17). The usefulness of sight is also employed as an analogy for the usefulness of personal relationships. In Socrates’ argument on the need for brothers to support each other he compares two brothers to a pair of eyes (as well as to pairs of hands and feet) in the way in which they are designed to work together: although eyes can act at a long distance (which hands and feet cannot), they are unable to be effective when their object is behind them, whereas brothers can act for mutual benefit wherever they are (2.3.19). Similarly, the help that is offered to a man by his hands, eyes, ears and feet are compared to the help offered by a friend (2.4.7). For the usefulness of eyes, cf. the arguments for the gods’ beneficent design of the world based on their design of the eye (1.4.5-6) and their design of the human body to allow the best possible field of vision (1.4.11). (See Sedley (2007) 52–54, 81, 124–125, 152–155 for the use of the eye as an example in the design argument in Greco–Roman philosophy.)

63 The gods reveal reasons for their worship even though they themselves are not apparent (eis to ἐμφανές) (4.3.13); the god who controls all things is seen in carrying out the greatest works, although he is unseen in the ordering of them (οὗτος τά μέγιστα μὲν πράττων ὁράται, τάδε δὲ οἴκονομῶν ἀργότας ἥμιν ἔστιν, 4.3.13).

64 The impossibility of looking at the sun reoccurs in Socrates’ arguments against the speculations of natural philosophers. Whereas Anaxagoras claimed that the sun is fire, he ignored the fact that men can look easily at fire, but cannot look at the sun (τὸ μὲν πῦρ οἱ ἀνθρώποι ῥήδιως καθορώσων, εἰς δὲ τὸν ἥλιον οὐ δύνανται ἀντιβλέπειν, 4.7.7). See Cairns (2005) 129 on looking ἀνακλησί – the idea that an overly direct look can indicate a lack of due respect.
their effects are visible (φανερά); and the human soul is visible in its rule over us, although it is not visible in itself (οὐ μὲν βασιλεύει ἐν ἡμῖν, φανερόν, ὀρᾶται δὲ οὐδ' αὐτή) (4.3.14). The conclusion drawn is that one should not “despise the unseen” (καταφρονεῖν τῶν ἀοράτων, 4.3.14). By stating that sight of the gods is not necessary to knowledge of them, Socrates seems to be arguing against the grain: the implicit expectation behind his statements is of the necessity of sight for knowledge. However, this expectation is fulfilled as Socrates develops his argument by relying on what can be seen. As vision is simultaneously dispensed with and relied upon, the relationship of sight to knowledge is raised as a problem. In the context of the wider uses of the visual in the text – in the representation of both Socrates and Athens – the question of how far vision allows knowledge and understanding is especially urgent.

The Memorabilia also presents how to look and be seen in moral terms. In Socrates’ parable of Prodicus, which describes how Heracles, when pondering whether to pursue the path of virtue or of vice, was approached by Virtue (Arete) and Vice (Kakia) in female form, moral personifications are imagined as presenting themselves, and seeing, in different ways. Virtue is modestly dressed and “fitting / appropriate / becoming to look at” (εὔπρεπῆ τε ἰδεῖν, 2.1.22); Vice is immodestly dressed and uses cosmetics and other means of deceptively enhancing

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65 The analogy between the invisibility of the soul and the invisibility of the gods also occurs in Socrates’ conversation with Aristodemus on the existence of the gods. When Aristodemus argues that he does not see (ὁρῶ) those who control and craft the world whereas he does see the craftsmen who are makers of things in the world, Socrates responds that since he also does not see (ὁρῶς) his own soul which controls his body, he must think that he does everything by chance rather than design (1.4.9).
her appearance.\textsuperscript{66} Virtue looks in a modest way ("she adorned her eyes in modesty": κεκοσμημένη... τὰ δὲ ὀμμάτα αἵδοι, 2.1.22),\textsuperscript{67} Vice has open eyes (τὰ δὲ ὀμμάτα ἔχειν ἀναπεπταμένα, 2.1.22) and "eyed herself, watched out whether anyone was looking at her, and often glanced at her own shadow" (κατασκοπεῖσθαι δὲ θαμὰ ἔαυτὴν, ἑπισκοπεῖν δὲ καὶ εἰς τὸς ἄλλος αὐτὴν θεὰται, πολλάκις δὲ καὶ εἰς τὴν ἐαυτῆς σκιὰν ἄποβλέπειν, 2.1.22). Further, Vice promises Heracles that if he should follow her path, he will be able to choose "whatever sights and sounds you will take pleasure in" (ὁ τί ἀν ἴδων ἡ ἀκούσας τερφθείης, 2.1.24); Virtue counters this claim by telling Vice "you cannot look at the most pleasurable sight of all, for you have never looked at any fine act of your own" (τοῦ πάντων ἡδίστου θεάματος ἀθέατος· οὐδὲν γὰρ πώποτε σεαυτῆς ἔργον καλὸν τεθέασαι, 2.1.31).

In regard to appearance and the constraints, or lack of constraints, on how to look, it is important to remember that the figures whose appearance and way of looking are described are female, and therefore that the modes of display and sight attributed to them may well be gendered as female. A modest appearance and downcast gaze are often presented as normative characteristics of women in Greek literature, although also of young boys; as Cairns points out, Vice's immodest use of her eyes resembles the physiognomists' descriptions of the characteristic behaviour of the

\textsuperscript{66} Cf. the discussion of female cosmetics at Oec. 10.2-13.

\textsuperscript{67} See Cairns (2005) 134 on the proverbial phrase "aidos in the eyes".
*kinaidos*, as well as of the female prostitute.\(^{68}\) It would be interesting if Xenophon had provided us with a comparable description of virtuous and vicious male self-presentation and ways of looking. In the absence of this, the least that can be said is that, at any rate as regards women (assuming that personified moral characteristics can be described as women), Xenophon imagines that how to be seen and how to look are open to moral censure or approbation. We can compare Socrates' assertion in his dialogue with the painter Parrhasius that the character of the soul can be represented in painting because it is visible; his first move in this argument is to claim that moral character can be seen in the way someone looks (3.10.4).\(^{69}\)

As regards the discussion of what sights to look at, for which the imagined viewer is Heracles himself, the choice of what sort of sight to take pleasure in also operates as a mark of the viewer's political role: whereas Vice promotes a life of self-interested ease (2.1.24–25), Virtue argues for an attempt to win the favour of gods, friends, the city and Greece itself through commitment and hard work (2.1.28) – a life

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\(^{68}\) Cairns (2005) 134. Cf. Ferrari (1990) 189. For the downcast eyes of modest boys, see *Lak. Pol.* 3.4–5 (the description of the Paidiskoi); *Cyr.* 1.4.12 (the youthful Cyrus' inability to look at his grandfather); *Hell.* 5.4.27 (Archidamus' inability to look at his father, Agesilas).

\(^{69}\) ΄Αρ' οὖν, ἔφη, γίγνεται ἐν ἀνθρώπῳ τὸ τε φιλοφρόνος καὶ τὸ ἐχθρώς βλέπειν πρὸς τινὸς; Ἔμοιγε δοκεῖ, ἔφη. Οὐκοῦν τοῦτο γε μιμτὸν ἐν τοῖς ὁμοιόν; Καὶ μᾶλα, ἔφη. (""Surely", he said, "there is both a friendly and a hostile way for a person to look at someone?" "It seems so," he replied. "Then cannot this be imitated in the eyes?" "Yes, of course," he said." 3.10.4). The concept of friendly and hostile ways of looking is also evident in the description of Aristarchus' relationship with his female dependants. Socrates describes how currently the women see that Aristarchus is resentful towards them (ἐκεῖναι δὲ σὲ ὁρῶσαι ἀχθόμενον ἐφ' ἐσταίρει, 2.7.9) whereas if he makes them work, seeing them useful to him he will like them (σοῦ μὲν ἐκεῖνας φιλήσεις, ὄρων ὑφελίμοις σεσαυτῷ οὐσῶς, 2.7.9) and instead of looking at each other suspiciously he and the women will look at each other with pleasure (ἀντὶ ύφορωμένων ἔστατος ἡδέως ἀλλήλους ἐὕρων, 2.7.12). Here different ways of looking mark not moral character but changing economic circumstances.
of political engagement. The question posed by the representation of vision in the *Memorabilia* - how to look at and respond to Socrates - is framed as a matter of political positioning.

The *Symposium*

The *Symposium* is intimately concerned with the nature of display and of responses to it. It is structured around a series of spectacles put on by hired dancers or produced by the guests themselves, followed by discussion among the group, and contains theoretical comment on the nature of looking at the object of erotic desire.\(^7^0\) In an important article on dance in the *Symposium*, Victoria Wohl argues that through his responses to the dances produced by the Syracusan dance troupe leader, and his description of his own dancing, Socrates produces a philosophy of dance by which he attempts to educate his fellow guests:\(^7^1\) as dance becomes involved in the production and analysis of values, it also becomes concerned with the proper behaviour of the ideal citizen.\(^7^2\) I wish to build on this reading by arguing that different modes of viewing are put forward by the text, both in the viewing of

\(^{70}\) Gray (1992) describes the text as a whole as a performance; setting it in the context of earlier "wisdom literature", she argues that Socrates makes his interlocutors reveal their wisdom (or lack of it).

\(^{71}\) Wohl (2004). Wiles (2000) discusses the dance acting out the marriage of Ariadne and Dionysus in terms of the cultural significance of Dionysus and the Dionysiac. Other approaches to the performances of the text have viewed them as part of a comic take on the realities of the symposia of the rich (Andrisano (2003)) or have focused on the text as a social document of symposium entertainments (Gilula (2002)), especially in relation to the history of theatre (Garelli-François (2002)).

\(^{72}\) This education is specifically a political education, as Socrates' professed skill at pimping (3.10, 4.56–62) is revealed to be aimed at urging young men to enter public life. Socrates is a lover along with the city (τῇ πόλει συνεργάτης, 8.41) of those who are good and desire virtue; he encourages Callias to enter politics (8.40–42), provoking the reply, "you are pimping for the city" (μαστροπεύσεις πρὸς τὴν πόλιν, 8.42). Wohl (2004) 350–351, 360. Higgins (1977) 18.
dance and in other scenes of vision,\textsuperscript{73} which offer different ways of thinking about how to be a citizen. I suggest that visual response is made a matter of the viewer’s agency, as Socrates attempts to replace a passive response with an active and empowered one, a distinction which has political resonances; that Socrates opposes unthinking awe as a response to sight with a critical evaluation which is, crucially, politically engaged; but that the text does not straightforwardly valorise Socrates’ position,\textsuperscript{74} revealing him as oddity with whom it is not always easy to identify.

The text opens with the luminous spectacle of the lovers Autolycus and Callias, in whose house the symposium is held:

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Εὐθύς μὲν οὖν ἐννοήσας τις τὰ γιγνόμενα ἡγήσατ’ ἀν φύσει βασιλικόν τι κάλλος εἶναι, ἄλλως τε καὶ ἂν μετ’ αίδοὺς καὶ σωφροσύνης, καθάπερ Αὐτόλυκος τότε, κεκτήτας τις αὐτό. πρῶτον μὲν γάρ, ὃσπερ ὅταν φέγγος τι ἐν νυκτὶ φανῇ, πάντων προσάγεται τὰ ὁμματα, οὔτω καὶ τότε τοῦ Αὐτολύκου τὸ κάλλος πάντων εἶλκε τὰς ὁψεις πρὸς αὐτόν· ἔπειτα τῶν ὀρώντων οὕδεις οὐκ ἐπασχέ τι τὴν ψυχὴν ὑπ’ ἐκείνου. οἱ μὲν γε σιωπηρότεροι ἐγίγνοντο, οἱ δὲ καὶ ἐσχηματίζοντό πις. πάντες μὲν οὖν οἱ ἐκ θεῶν του κατεχόμενοι ἄξιοθέατοι δοκοῦσιν εἶναι. ἀλλ’ οἱ μὲν εξ ἄλλων πρὸς τὸ γοργότεροι τε ὀράσθαι καὶ φοβερώτερον φθέγγεσθαι καὶ σφοδρότεροι εἶναι φέρονται, οἱ δ’ ὑπὸ τοῦ σώφρονος ἔρωτος ἐνθεοὶ τὰ τε ὁμματα φιλοφρονεστέρως ἔχουσι καὶ τὴν φωνὴν
\end{center}

\textsuperscript{73} Wohl (2004) 346-348 discusses the viewing of Autolycus and Callias (1.8-10) in addition to scenes depicting the viewing of dance: see below.

\textsuperscript{74} Hobden (2004); Hindley (1994, 1999, 2004).
Someone considering the matter would conclude that beauty is kingly in nature, especially when someone possesses it along with modesty and self-control as Autolycus did then. Just as when a light shines forth in the night it draws the eyes of all to it, so did the beauty of Autolycus drag the eyes of all towards him. There was not one of those looking who did not experience something in his soul on his account. Some of them grew quieter, others gesticulated. All those who are possessed by gods seem worth looking at, but whereas those who are inspired by the other gods are more gorgonlike to look at, speak in a more fearsome voice and have a more violent bearing, those inspired by self-controlled love have kindlier eyes, a gentler voice and act most like free men in their gestures. That was how Callias was behaving because of love, and he was worth looking at for the initiates of this god.” (1.8-10)

Although they respond in different ways, the viewers of the lovers are all similarly rapt by the sight: “this vision united them as initiates into a common mystery.”

This scene contrasts with the spectacle which closes the text, a pornographic tableau depicting the marriage of Dionysus and Ariadne laid on by the dance troupe, which sexually arouses its viewers (πάντες ἀνεπτερωμένοι ἐθεώντο, 9.5): the symposium comes to an

abrupt end as those of the guests who are married rush away to their wives' beds, and those who are unmarried swear to marry (9.7). This display of male–female sensuality offers a challenge to Socrates' arguments for the ideal love as a chaste love between men and boys given during the course of the symposium, by inviting the reader also to feel aroused at the scene. Noting how, in contrast, the spectacle of Autolycus and Callias does not scatter but unites its viewers, Wohl opposes the two scenes, reading the erotic dance as representing the antithesis of Socratic principles of desire, and the viewing of Autolycus and Callias as an enactment of Socrates' strictures on the ideal, pure love: she describes the pleasure of reading this scene as “the pleasure of watching philosophers in love”.

While there is much to recommend this reading, the lovers should not be understood as straightforwardly illustrating Socrates' arguments on love: as Hobden points out, “the symposiasts' appreciation of Autolycus contradicts Socrates' outright rejection of beauty”. The spectacle is highly alluring, yet its allure is also troubling. Autolycus exerts a powerful draw on the eyes of his audience. His visual effect is described in physical and violent language: his beauty “drags the eyes of all towards him” (το Αὐτολύκου τὸ κάλλος πάντων εἶλκε τὰς ὀψεις πρὸς αὐτὸν, 1.9). The

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76 Wiles (2000) 112. However, alternative reactions are also shown: Socrates and the others who remained, marked as separate by the use of δὲ (Σωκράτης δὲ καὶ τῶν ἀλλων οἱ ὑπομείναντες, 9.7), respond by going out for a walk.


78 Also N.B. these characters' notoriously scandalous lives in the real world, which Xenophon may well be playing on: Huss (1999) 399–400; Wohl (2004) 352-353.

description of beauty as βασιλικόν (1.8), “like a king”, formulates the power of beauty as comparable to political power. Such a comparison is problematic in the context of the Athenian democratic setting, recalled in the text’s opening, which frames Callias’ party as a celebration of Autolycus’ pancration victory at the Panatheniac games (1.2) – although we must remember that this is also specifically an elite celebration, concerned with elite erotic values.

The description of Callias is also unsettling: he too is a lure to the gaze (ἄξιοθέατος, 1.10), but in a rather different way. The passage stresses the terrifying effect that he does not have. Looking at him is not like looking at the Gorgon (γοργότεροι τε ὀρασθαῖ, 1.10), rather he has (literally) “more kind-minded eyes” (τὰ τε ὀμματα φιλοφρονεοςτέρως, 1.10) - a phrase which refers not just to his appearance, but to the nature of his own gaze. Although a fearsome appearance is mentioned only to be denied, the comparison to the terrifying implants an impression of Callias as a man transfigured, separated from his companions by his love. The description of his viewers as those initiated into the god (τετελεσμένως τούτω τῷ θεῷ, 1.10), a phrase which recalls mystery cult, might imply a sense of communality between Callias and those who look at him, as the other guests are able to identify with him in his state of love; so too might...

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80 We should note that it is Autolycus’ beauty, not Autolycus himself, who is kingly and who draws the eyes. Autolycus, who barely speaks and whose shyness and lack of independence are stressed throughout this text, is not presented as a figure of power: the viewing of Autolycus objectifies and eroticises him. See above.

81 See the discussion of the term γοργός above.

82 See Wohl (2004) 348 on the use of the language of initiation rites, e.g. the reference to a light appearing from the darkness, and the silence of the audience.
the reference to his own gaze, which suggests a similarity between Callias and his viewers (unlike Autolycus who is only the object, not the subject, of the gaze). Yet the cult connotations also inspire a sense of awe and otherworldliness. The result of looking at both lovers is that the guests dine in silence, “as if on the orders of someone in power” (ὡσπερ τοῦτο ἐπιτεταγμένον αὐτοῖς ὑπὸ κρείττονός τινος, 1.11): as with Autolycus, the visual effect of Callias is imagined as akin to political subjugation. The passage invites reflection on the significance of viewing, and being viewed, in the context of desire – specifically, elite Athenian desire; opening the story of the symposium, it stands in a programmatic relationship to the rest of the text.

The power of erotic vision is discussed later in the text, when Critobulus describes his visual relationship to his beloved, Cleinias:

νῦν γὰρ ἤγω Κλεινίαν ἥδιον μὲν θεώμαι ἣ τὰλλα πάντα τὰ ἐν ἀνθρώποις καλά· τυφλὸς δὲ τῶν ἄλλων ἄπάντων μᾶλλον δεξαίμην ἂν εἶναι ἣ Κλεινίου ἐνὸς ὄντος· ἄχθομαι δὲ καὶ νυκτὶ καὶ ὑπνῷ ὅτι ἐκεῖνον οὐχ ὃρω, ἡμέρᾳ δὲ καὶ ἠλίῳ τὴν μεγίστην χάριν οἶδα ὅτι μοι Κλεινίαν ἀναφαίνουσιν.

“I would more gladly gaze at Cleinias than at all the other beautiful things in the world. I would choose to be blind to all other things than to Cleinias alone. I hate both night and sleep since because of them I do not see him, whereas I feel the greatest gratitude to daylight and the sun because they reveal Cleinias to me.” (4.12)83

83 Diogenes Laertius’ biography of Xenophon reproduces this passage with minor alterations (2.49) as a quotation from Aristippus, whom he claims reports that Xenophon himself spoke these words about his own desire for his beloved, called
The claim of the disempowerment of the viewer of the beautiful is made explicit as Critobulus describes his relationship to Cleinias as like a slave's relationship to his master ("I would rather be a slave than a free man if Cleinias could be my master": ἦδιον δ’ ἂν δουλεύομι ἣ ἐλεύθερος εἰην, εἰ μου Κλεινίας ἁρχειν ἑθέλοι, 4.14).  

Socrates is presented as working to release Critobulus from the disempowered position in which his gaze at beauty is imagined to place him: he says that Critobulus was originally entrusted to his care by his father in the hope that Socrates could cure him of his infatuation with Cleinias, and that since Critobulus began associating with him he has much improved (4.24):  

πρόσθεν μὲν γὰρ, ὡσπερ οί τὰς Γοργόνας θεώμενοι, λιθίνως ἐβλεπε πρὸς αὐτόν καὶ [λιθίνως] οὐδαμοῦ ἀπῆει ἀπ’ αὐτοῦ· νῦν δὲ ἢδη εἶδον αὐτόν καὶ σκαρδαμύζαντα. (4.24)  

Cleinias. The biographical attribution perhaps indicates the importance of Xenophon's treatment of vision for the ancient reception of Xenophon.  

84 Not only is Critobulus desperate to see Cleinias, but he “sees” him even when away from his presence: Οὔκ οίσθα ὅτι οὕτω σαφές ἔχω εἰδωλον αὐτοῦ ἐν τῇ ψυχῇ ὡς εἶ πλαστικὸς ἢ ζωγραφικὸς ἢν, οὐδὲν δὲν ἦττον ἐκ τοῦ εἰδώλου ἢ πρὸς αὐτὸν ὁμοίον αὐτῷ ἀπειργασάμην; (“Do you not know that I have so clear an image of him in my soul that if I were a sculptor or a painter, I could produce a likeness of him from this image no less accurate than if I were looking at him himself?” 4.21). The effect of this internal “seeing” is to fill him with unsatisfied desire: ἢ μὲν αὐτοῦ ὃμις εὐφραίνειν δύναται, ἢ δὲ τοῦ εἰδώλου τέρψιν μὲν οὐ παρέχει, πόθον δὲ ἐρποιεῖ. (“Whereas the sight of him himself is able to delight, the sight of his image does not produce pleasure but implants longing,” 4.22). The intensity of his gaze at Cleinias renders him abject, caught in a trap from which there is no escape.  

85 Socrates also opposes Critobulus' larger argument on beauty. As discussed above, Critobulus' statement on the effect of looking at Cleinias occurs as part of his speech in praise of his own beauty, where it is used to prove the power of beauty. Socrates challenges Critobulus' system of values by asking about the social utility of his beauty: ἐξεῖς λέγειν ὅτι τῷ σῷ κάλλει ἴκανός εἰ βελτίως ἡμᾶς ποιεῖν; “Can you claim that you are capable of making us better men through your beauty?” (3.7) Critobulus picks up on this critique in his speech: ...μηκέτι ἀπόρει, ὦ Σωκράτες, εἰ τι τούμον κάλλος ἄνθρωπους ὄφελήσει, “No longer question, Socrates, whether beauty is of any benefit to men” (4.16).
"Previously he was just like those who look at the Gorgons - he would fix him with a stony stare and never go away from him. But now I have actually seen him blink."

Critobulus’ gaze at Cleinias is depicted as a pathological affliction which renders him helpless, as incapable of independent action as a stone, and which Socrates works to counteract. This is reminiscent of Socrates’ attempt to counteract the erotic threat and visual power claimed of Theodote in the *Memorabilia* (see earlier discussion).\(^86\) Yet, as I note above, there is a disjunction in both that scene and this between the claim of the lover’s loss of agency and the presentation of erotic relations: the *Symposium* focuses entirely on the experience of Critobulus as lover, sidelining his experience as beloved, despite the context of a discussion on the effect of his beauty on others (4.10–16). While taking seriously the theoretical claims made about erotic vision, we must also draw a distinction between the theorisation and the cultural practice of power in such scenes.

Socrates opposes this model of visual relations between lovers with another: he describes the mutual, pleasurable gaze of the virtuous lovers (οἶς γε μὴν κοινὸν τὸ φιλεῖσθαι, πῶς οὐκ ἀνάγκη τούτους ἡδέως μὲν προσορὰν ἀλλήλους...; (8.18), “Must not those whose love is shared look at each other with pleasure...?”), whereas the unequal love-making of couples whose relationship is physical is described through their unequal visual relationship (οὐδὲ γὰρ ὁ παῖς τῷ ἀνδρὶ ὀστέρ γυνῇ κοινωνεῖ τῶν ἐν τοῖς ἀφροδισίοις εὐφροσυνῶν, ἀλλά

\(^{86}\) See Goldhill (1998a).
νήφων μεθύοντα ὑπὸ τῆς ἀφροδίτης θεᾶται: "A boy does not share the pleasure of sex with the man like a woman does, but gazes, sober, at someone drunk on love," 8.21). At the end of Socrates’ speech, the newly educated Callias and Autolycus are described as gazing into each others’ eyes: ὁ δὲ Ἅιτώλυκος κατεθέατο τὸν Καλλίαν. Καὶ ὁ Καλλίας δὲ παρορῶν εἰς ἐκεῖνον ἐπέν... “Autolycus gazed at Callias; Callias replied [to Socrates], but all the while looked past him at Autolycus” (8.42). In presenting the ideal love Socrates imagines Autolycus as the object of the gaze of all, just as he appears at the text’s opening (1.8–10), but in a rather different context: encouraging Callias to strive towards political usefulness, he says that Autolycus would particularly honour anyone who could help him be looked at from all sides (περὶβλεπτός, 8.38) on account of having benefited his friends and glorified his country. Socrates not only replaces a physical and self-interested erotics with a chaste and politically engaged one, but he describes this transformation through a transformed erotic gaze.

The positing of an alternative way of seeing is also in evidence in Socrates’ responses to the displays of the dance troupe. Wohl has discussed how Socrates intervenes in and comments on the troupe’s performances. 87 He responds to each of the performances by drawing

87 Wohl (2004) 344. Socrates also intervenes in the dances by encouraging his interlocutors to entertain each other with speech rather than be entertained by the performers, since they consider themselves superior to the dancers (3.2). Their speeches are described through the language of display (ἐπιδεικνύεις: 1.6, 3.3, 4.1), vocabulary which also describes the text’s dance performances (2.1, 2.13, 6.6, 7.3), including Philip’s parodic dance (2.22): Wohl (2004) 346 n.22. Socrates replaces one form of display with another.
conclusions which bear on his listeners’ social behaviour. The female dancer’s dance with hoops prompts the comment:

έν πολλοῖς μέν, ὡς ἄνδρες, καὶ ἄλλοις δῆλον καὶ ἐν αἷς δ’ ἡ παῖς ποιεῖ ὅτι ἡ γυναικεία φύσις οὐδὲν χείρων τῆς τοῦ ἄνδρος οὕσα τυγχάνει, γνώμης δὲ καὶ ῥήξυος δεῖται. ὥστε εἰ τις ὑμῶν γυναῖκα ἔχει, θαρρῶν διδασκέτω ὅ τι βούλοιτ’ ἂν αὐτῇ ἐπισταμένη χρῆσθαι.

“It is clear from the girl’s feats, as well as in many other things, that a woman’s nature is no worse than that of a man, except that it lacks a mind and strength. Therefore if any of you has a wife, encouraged by this you should teach her whatever you wish to have her know.” (2.9)

Similarly, the dancing girl’s display of leaping through hoops ringed with swords draws the response:

οὗτοι τούς γε θεωμένους τάδε ἀντιλέξειν ἔτι οἴομαι, ὡς οὐχὶ καὶ ἡ ἄνδρεία διδακτόν, ὅποτε αὐτή καὶ περι γυνή οὕσα οὕτω τολμηρώς εἰς τὰ ξιφῆ ἴσηται.

“I think that those watching such feats could not deny that courage / manliness can be taught, when, although she is only a woman, this girl leaps so boldly through the swords.” (2.12)

Socrates’ interlocutor Antisthenes makes explicit the political relevance of this observation when he replies:

ἄρ’ οὖν καὶ τᾶς τῷ Συρακοσίῳς κράτιστον ἐπιδείξαντι τῇ πόλει τῆς ὀρχηστρίδα εἴπειν, ἐάν διδώσων αὐτῷ Ἀθηναίοι χρήματα, ποιήσειν πάντας Ἀθηναίους τολμᾶν ὁμόσε ταῖς λόγχαις ἱέναι.
"Would it not therefore be best for this Syracusan to display his dancer to the city, saying that if the Athenians pay him, he would make all Athenians courageous in facing spears?" (2.13)

Again, following the dancing boy’s dance, Socrates says that the dance makes the beautiful boy even more beautiful (2.15), and notes that οὐδὲν ἀργὸν τοῦ σώματος ἐν τῇ ὀρχήσει ἤν, ἀλλ' ἀμα καὶ τράχηλος καὶ σκέλη καὶ χεῖρες ἐγυμνάζοντο, ὥσπερ χρή ὀρχεῖσθαι τὸν μέλλοντα εὐφορώτερον τὸ σῶμα ἔξειν.

"...no part of his body was inactive in the dance, but his neck and legs and hands were all exercised together, which is just the right way to dance for someone who wishes to have a well-proportioned body.” (2.16)

The sight of spectacle becomes a process of learning how to be a citizen.  

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88 When a potter’s wheel is brought in on which the dancing girl is to perform an acrobatic spectacle (θαυματουργήσειν, 7.2), Socrates criticises this display as a θαύμα (7.3) which provides no pleasure (ἡδονὴν, 7.3). He offers an interpretation of what it means to look at a θαύμα: “It is not a rare thing to come upon wonders, if that is what someone is after, for one can wonder at whatever is immediately to hand – why a lamp produces light from having a bright flame whereas bronze, although it is bright, does not give light but rather reflects other things that appear in it; or why olive oil, although it is wet, makes flames increase, whereas water, because it is wet, puts fire out. However, such questions do not encourage the same effect as wine.” (καὶ γὰρ δὴ οὐδὲ πάνυ τι σπάνιον τὸ γε θαυμασίας ἐντυχεῖν, εἰ τις τούτου δεῖται, ἀλλ’ ἔξεστιν αὐτίκα μάλα τὰ παρόντα θαυμάζειν, τί ποτε ὁ μὲν λύχνος διὰ τὸ λαμπρὰν φλῶρον ἔχειν φῶς παρέχει, τὸ δὲ χαλκεῖον λαμπρὸν ὁν φῶς μὲν οὐ ποιεῖ, ἐν αὐτῷ δὲ ἄλλα ἐμφανίζομενα παρέχεται· καὶ πῶς τὸ μὲν ἔλαιον ὕψον ὃν αὐξεῖ τὴν φλόγα, τὸ δὲ ὕδωρ, ὅτι ὕψον ἔστι, κατασβένει τὸ πῦρ. ἀλλὰ γὰρ καὶ ταῦτα μὲν οὐκ εἰς ταῦταν τῷ ὁδύν ἐπιστεύεδεῖ, 7.4–5). Socrates presents looking at the wondrous in terms of a thoughtful, questioning analysis – an active engagement with one’s environment which aims to understand and assert control over it. Socrates imagines the dancer’s acrobatics as provoking an analytical response, rather than as provoking pleasure. He also says that turning somersaults among knives is a display of danger, which is out of place in a symposium (κυνόσυμου ἐπιδειγμά εἶναι, ὁ συμποσίῳ οὐδὲν προσῆκει, 7.3), and tells the Syracusan to replace these spectacles with a dance depicting the Charites, Horai and Nymphs (7.5) which he says would provide greater pleasure for those watching (μάλιστ' ἂν εὐφραταιεῖσθαι θεώμενοι,
However, Socrates’ authoritative voice is challenged, as each of his observations is followed by a humorous exchange in which the eccentricity of his responses is highlighted. Following the comment on the education of wives, Socrates is asked why he has not educated his own wife, who is the hardest to live with of all women, to which he replies that he uses the challenge of dealing with her as training for his wider social interactions, which feel easier by comparison (2.10). Antisthenes’ reaction to Socrates’ comment on the teachability of courage – that the Syracusan should train the Athenians for warfare – is similarly absurd, as is the conclusion of Socrates’ comments on dance as exercise, his desire to dance himself (at which everybody laughs: 2.17). Socrates’ way of responding to the displays is offered as an authoritative response, but is also shown as strange.

Further, the buffoon Philip’s response to the dances relates directly to Socrates’ analysis, impinging on the reader’s relationship to him. He imitates the dances (μυτούμενος τὴν τε τοῦ παιδὸς καὶ τὴν τῆς παιδὸς ὀρχησίν, 2.22) in a way which parodies Socrates’ comments by attempting either to render his observations ridiculous (he waves his arms, legs and head all at the same time because Socrates praised the male dancer for involving his whole body in the dance) or to contradict them (he makes himself as grotesque as possible because Socrates praised the way dance increased the male dancer’s beauty). Although he makes himself ridiculous (everyone

laughs: 2.23), his dance also potentially renders Socrates’ analysis ridiculous: if the reader too is caused to laugh, will he or she be laughing only at Philip, or also at Socrates?

Socrates’ arguments on how to respond to spectacle similarly invite scepticism in the beauty contest between the handsome Critobulus and Socrates himself, who is famously ugly (5.1–9).89 The pair exhibit themselves under lamplight (5.2, 5.9) for the scrutiny of the boy and girl dancers who act as judges. Socrates argues that he is the more beautiful by stating that beauty (τὸ καλὸν, 5.3) depends not on external appearance but usefulness. He details how various parts of his body are superior in their functioning – so his eyes, he claims, are more beautiful / finer (καλλίονες, 5.5) than Critobulus’ because by bulging out they allow him to see to the side as well as straight ahead, like a crab (5.5). In spite of Socrates’ arguments, the dancers award the prize to Critobulus. The act of looking becomes a process of evaluating and judging which is value laden. Socrates theorises a new way of looking at beauty, yet the dancers are unable to see things his way, rather seeing Socrates through normative estimations of beauty. Socrates’ authority is undercut by the verdict, as well as by the self-mocking tone of his exposition, which stresses his ugliness even while

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89 See P. Zanker (1995) 32–39 on the significance of the emphasis placed on Socrates’ ugliness in ancient textual and artistic representations. He argues that the comparison of Socrates to the divine Silenus (4.19; 5.7; also Plato Sym. 215B) figures him as “an extraordinary human being, transcending human norms” (38), but also as a challenging, disruptive presence when viewed “against the background of a city filled with perfectly proportioned and idealized human figures in marble and bronze embodying virtue and moral authority” (38).
arguing for his beauty. The reader is pulled in two directions: the response of the contest’s judges suggests a model for how to react to the sight and may lead the reader to reject the unconventional claims of Socrates, yet the reader may also reject the uneducated reaction of mere slaves.

A similar dynamic governs the scene in which Socrates informs his audience how to interpret his own dancing, offering an explanation which “situates dancing within a familiar philosophical discourse of personal askēsis” by listing its health benefits (2.17–19). Unlike the beauty contest, which is staged for the sight and judgement of the dancers, and more importantly, the other guests, Socrates does not present himself to an audience but dances by himself: ...οὐ δεήσει με συγγυμναστῆν ζητεῖν, οὐδ’ ἐν ὀχλῳ πρεσβύτην ὄντα ἀποδύσθαι... (“...it will not be necessary for me to seek out a partner to exercise with, or in my old age to strip in a crowd...,” 2.18). When he is seen, it is by accident: ἥ οὐκ ἵστε ὅτι ἐναγχος ἔωθεν Χαρμίδης οὐτοσὶ

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90 Hobden (2004) 132: “Critoboulos’ victory leaves a question-mark hanging over whose definition of beauty is correct.” Cf. Hindley (1994, 1999, 2004), who argues that Socrates’ views on desire need not always represent those of Xenophon. The self-mocking tone is flagged up as Critobulus pokes fun at Socrates by enthusiastically adding to his argument: he says that Socrates’ mouth must be the more beautiful because he can bite bigger mouthfuls, and his kisses softer because he has thicker lips – to which Socrates replies that according to such an argument he must have a mouth more ugly than an ass’s (ἐοικη, ἐφη, ἐγὼ κατὰ τὸν σον λόγον καὶ τῶν ὄνων σιδηρον τὸ στόμα ἔχειν, 5.7).

91 See Wiles (2000) 115 on the slave status of the dancers; he argues that by inviting the reader’s sexual arousal, the final tableau suggests that sexual relations and marriage are both inescapable and a form of enslavement. Contrast Wohl (2004) 352 who, in my view unconvincingly, sees the dancers as the children of the Syracusan, by reading the term παῖς as “child” instead of “slave” and by treating the Syracusan’s admission that he shares a bed with his male dancer (4.54) as a sign of a paternal rather than a sexual relationship.

κατέλαβε με ὅρχούμενον; “Don’t you know that Charmides recently caught me dancing early in the morning?” 2.19).93

Socrates subverts dance by giving it a function independent of its effect on an audience. The eccentricity of such a change of meaning is indicated in the representation of the exotic tribe of the Mossynoecians in the Anabasis: ...μόνοι τε ὄντες ὁμοία ἐπραττον ἀπερ ἀν μετ’ ἀλλων ὄντες, διελέγοντό τε αὐτοῖς καὶ ἐγέλων ἐφ’ ἐαυτοῖς καὶ ὑρχοῦντο ἐφιστάμενοι ὁποι τύχοιεν, ὡσπερ ἄλλοις ἐπιδεικνύμενοι. (5.4.34) “...they did alone the sorts of things that people usually do amongst others - they talked to themselves and laughed by themselves and would start dancing wherever they happened to be, as if putting on a display for others.” The Mossynoecians are described as βαρβαρωτάτους... καὶ πλείστον τῶν Ἐλληνικῶν νόμων κεχωρισμένους (“the most barbarian people... and the most far removed from Greek customs,” 5.5.34). Socrates’ solitary dance renders him strange. Indeed, when Charmides sees him he is overcome with perplexity, unable to comprehend his actions within a normative frame (καὶ τὸ μὲν γε πρῶτον ἐξεπλάγην καὶ ἐδείσα μὴ μοίνοιο, “At first I was astonished and feared you were going mad”, 2.19). His attitude changes on hearing Socrates’ explanation, but is contradictory: he goes home and does not dance, practising boxing instead (ἐπεὶ δὲ σου ἡκουσα ὁμοία οἶς νόν λέγεις, καὶ αὐτὸς ἐλθὼν οἶκαδε ὑρχούμην μὲν οὗ, οὗ γὰρ πώποτε τούτ’ ἐμαθον,

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93 His dance is also not “seen” by the reader. In contrast the other dances of the text, Socrates’ dance does not take place in the narrative moment of the symposium but is discussed in retrospect. We are not given a description of his movements - only an explanation of them.
Heis almost moved to copy Socrates, but not quite. His response to the bizarre but improving sight of Socrates is a mixture of alienation and identification.

Oeconomicus

A similar set of concerns motivates the treatment of vision in the Oeconomicus, although here the subject is not how to be a lover but how to manage an estate. An important problem for the text is the relationship between the speakers of the nested dialogues. As part of his conversation with Critobulus, Socrates relates his conversation with Ischomachus, who in turn relates his conversations with his wife. Do the values of Ischomachus represent the values of Socrates? Where does textual authority lie?

Ischomachus is a wealthy, landed, elite Athenian whom Socrates seeks out as part of his investigation into the nature of virtue, because he hears that everyone calls him kalos kagathos (6.16). Ischomachus' didactic speeches have been read as involved in the normative

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94 Wohl (2004) 345 discusses this scene in terms of its treatment of mimesis. Charmides says he did not dance because he has not been taught, whereas Socrates, although he expresses a wish to learn from the Syracusan, dances without need of teaching. Wohl argues that Socrates' dance therefore indicates that his virtue is not mimetic, but innate: “the όρέτη of the performer's character and the performance of that character are identical”.

95 Contrast Huss (1999), who reads this scene as a joke with which Charmides plays along.

construction of elite values. However, the meaning of the term *kalos kagathos* is questioned, as Socrates declares that wealth is not a prerequisite of being ἀγαθός (11.5) — indeed that it is possible for him himself to be ἀγαθός despite being poor (11.6) — and as he questions Ischomachus’ over-riding concern for material gain (11.9). The authoritative voice of Socrates is also potentially called into question. Socrates disparages himself in relation to Ischomachus, saying that he cannot possibly criticise him because he has the appearance of (δοκῶ) an idle talker and measurer of the air, and a poor beggar (11.3); yet, as Too points out, the mention of the appearance (not reality) of Socrates’ life marks these comments as heavily ironic.

Socrates’ unconventional, troubling and potentially disruptive persona and arguments are set in competition with the normative values of Ischomachus. The *Oeconomicus* sets out, and plays off against each other, different models of what it might mean to be *kalos kagathos*. The question of how to look recurs throughout these discussions: sight becomes a central problem in evaluating the proper action of the virtuous citizen.

98 See Stevens (1994). Also cf. Ischomachus’ complaint that the result of his activities for efficient wealth creation is not that he is called a *kalos kagathos* by many, but that he is falsely prosecuted by many (11.21).
99 Too (2001) 76. The irony of Socrates’ comments is flagged as Ischomachus responds, “you’re joking” (προίζεις, 11.7).
100 Johnstone (1994) argues persuasively that the *Oeconomicus* should be read as engaged in the construction of elite identity (cf. Vilatte (1986)). However, whereas he reads the text as bolstering and confirming elite identity, I would emphasise the text’s self-consciousness about the problems of such a discourse: the involvement of such a troubling figure as Socrates in the discussion of elite values produces a presentation which is self-questioning.
A key passage is Socrates' exchange with Critobulus on how to increase one's estate. Socrates tells Critobulus that the first step is to look about him in the city, which he is described as displaying to Critobulus (see the use of ἐπιδεικνύω / ἐπιδείκνυμι to describe Socrates at 3.1, 3.2, 3.4, 3.8, 3.10, 3.16 and 4.1). He asks whether if he displays (ἐπιδεικνύω, 3.4) that in some households the slaves are always running away whereas in others they work willingly, he will be making a display worth watching (οὐ καὶ τοῦτο σοι δόξω ἀξιοθέατον τῆς οἰκονομίας ἔργον ἐπιδεικνύναι; 3.4); and after describing how of those who work the same sort of land, some are poverty-stricken and others are wealthy, to Critobulus' enquiry as to the reason (αἵτινον, 3.6) he replies that if he looks at them he will find out (σὺ δὲ θεώμενος δήπου καταμαθήσῃ, 3.6).

A comparison is made between watching events in the city and watching theatre. Socrates tells Critobulus

Οὐκοὖν χρῆ θεώμενον σαυτοῖς ἀποπειράσθαι εἰ γνώσῃ. νῦν δὲ ἔγω σὲ σύνοιδα ἐπὶ μὲν κωμῳδῶν θέαν καὶ πάνυ πρῶ ἀνιστάμενον καὶ πάνυ μακράν ὄδον βαδίζοντα καὶ ἐμὲ ἀναπείθοντα προθύμως συνθεάσθαι· ἐπὶ δὲ τοιοῦτον οὐδὲν με πώποτε ἔργον παρεκάλεσας. "You must watch and test out whether you are able to understand. At present I know that to watch a comedy you get up very early, and walk a very long way, and enthusiastically urge me to watch it with you. But you have never invited me to such events as these." (3.7)

101 Vilatte (1986) 280-281 relates the use of the language of display (ἐπιδεικνύω / ἐπιδείκνυμι) in the Oec. to the text's concern with Ischomachus' display of his social identity through the correct behaviour of his wife and correct management of his household and estate.
The question of the purpose and effect of watching the city is self-consciously raised, as Critobulus expresses doubt about the possibility of learning anything from watching people around him. To Socrates’ offer to display (ἐπιδεικνύω) that some men become poverty-stricken through horse breeding whereas others prosper, Critobulus replies “I see and know both sorts but I do not in any way gain from it” (οὐκοὖν τούτους μὲν καὶ ἐγὼ ὅρω καὶ οἶδα ἑκατέρους, καὶ οὐδὲν τί μᾶλλον τῶν κερδαινόντων γίγνομαί, 3.8). Socrates responds by returning to the comparison with theatre to present a theory of spectatorship:

"The reason for this is that you watch them in the same way as you watch tragedies and comedies - not, I think, in order that you should become a playwright, but in order that you should take pleasure in seeing or hearing something. And perhaps this is correct, for you do not wish to become a playwright; but since you are forced to be involved in horse-rearing, don’t you think it would be foolish not to ensure that you are not ignorant of the matter...?" (3.9)

In this exchange Socrates imagines Athens as a theatre writ large - a place full of sights to be watched and contemplated. Further, he argues for a form of viewing which is active and assertive, not passive and receptive, and which replaces pleasure with self-education as its
aim. He brings spectatorship into the realms of the political: to look is to learn how to play one’s part as a citizen.

In contrast, Ischomachus imagines pleasure as a desirable response to sight when using sight as an analogy in his speech to his wife on orderliness. However, here pleasure indicates political engagement rather than detachment, as sight is imagined as capable of evoking feelings both of identification and of alienation, depending on the viewer’s relationship to the object of sight. A disordered army is a most ignoble sight for friends and totally useless (τοῖς δὲ φίλοις ἀκλεόςτατον ὑπὸν καὶ ἄχρηστότατον, 8.4), whereas an ordered army is a most beautiful sight for friends and a most unwelcome sight for enemies (κάλλιστον μὲν ἵδειν τοῖς φίλοις, δυσχερέστατον δὲ τοῖς πολεμίοις, 8.6). In the description of serried ranks of troops marching in line, the question is posed “Which friend would not watch in pleasure...Which enemy would not look in fear...?” (τίς μὲν γὰρ οὐκ ἂν φίλος ἥδεως θέασαιτο... τίς δὲ οὐκ ἂν πολέμιος φοβηθεῖν ἱδὼν..., 8.6). Similarly, a swiftly speeding warship is fearful for enemies but worth watching for friends (φοβερὸν ἐστὶ πολέμιος ἡ φίλοις ἡξιοθέστατον, 8.8). Pleasure is a matter of political commitment: the pleasant sight is the sight of something beneficial to one’s state. These sights are used to illustrate the necessity of order

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102 For the army as a beautiful sight, see Sappho Fr. 16 (L.-P.); for the army as a terrifying sight see Gorg. Hel. 15–16.
103 Too (2001) 74–75 views this passage as irrelevant, and treats it as the text’s implicit criticism of Ischomachus’ verbose and undirected pedagogical method.
104 Cf. the discussion of female beauty: Socrates says he takes more pleasure in learning about a real woman’s virtues than in looking at a painting of a beautiful
in the house, where the efficient storage of cloaks is a beautiful sight
(καλὸν δὲ ἰμάτια κεχωρισμένα ἴδεῖν, 8.19), and the ordered array of
pots is comparable to the beautiful spectacle (καλὸν θέαμά, 8.20) of
the chorus: Ischomachus has previously informed us that whereas a
disorderly chorus is unpleasant to watch (θεάσομαι ἀτερπές, 8.3), the
same men participating in an ordered chorus are worth watching
(ἀξιοθέατοι, 8.3). As in the city, the pleasurable sight is the sight of
what benefits the household.

The Oeconomicus is also self-conscious about the potential
problems involved in viewing others. In Socrates' description of his
quest for knowledge, sight is a means of analysing and learning; and
the proper objects of sight are the practices of citizens. Socrates
describes himself moving on from visiting good (ἀγαθοὺς, 6.13)
builders, smiths, painters and sculptors and looking at (θεάσομαι, 6.13)
their beautiful (καλὰ, 6.13) works, to trying to examine someone
who was beautiful and good in himself: “Whomever I saw who was
beautiful I would approach, and attempt to learn whether I could see
goodness in combination with beauty” (ὅτινα ἴδομι καλὸν, τούτω
προσήειν καὶ ἐπειρώμην καταμανθάειν, εἶποι ἴδομι προσηρτημένον τῷ καλῷ τὸ ἀγαθὸν, 6.15). However, Socrates is
baffled: he discovers that the beautiful of body are often ugly in their
soul (6.16), so decides no longer to rely on sight for the discovery of

woman (ὡς ἐμοὶ πολὺ ἡδιον ζώσης ἄρετήν γυναικὸς καταμανθάειν ἡ εἴ Ζεῦς
μοι καλὴν εἰκάσας γραφῇ γυναικα ἐπεδείκνυεν, 10.1).
106 Cf. Ischomachus' display of the household arrangements to his wife in order to
educate her in how to manage them, with the repeated use of the verb δείκνυμι or
the beautiful (ἀφέμενον τῇς καλῆς ὁψεως, 6.16), but instead seeks out Ischomachus, whom everyone calls kalos kagathos (6.17). Socrates presents the necessity, but also the limitations, of a politically engaged model of sight. This passage is reminiscent of the text’s well known diatribe against cosmetics (10.2–13), where the concern is with false appearances: under Ischomachus’ instruction, the wife asks “how to appear beautiful in reality rather than only to seem so” (ὡς ἄν τῷ ὄντι καλὴ φαινοιτο, ἀλλὰ μὴ μόνον δοκοίη, 10.9). The ironic privileging of “real appearances” over apparent appearances lays bare the text’s anxiety over how a viewer should cope with the potentially deceptive nature of sight.

Slightly different concerns are raised in Ischomachus’ speech on farming techniques, where sight is again understood to be equivalent to learning and understanding. Ischomachus insists that not only can Socrates learn how to farm by watching farmers, but because he has seen people farming in the past, he already has this knowledge. He reveals Socrates’ knowledge of farming techniques by asking him what he has seen. To see is automatically and immediately to comprehend:

107 Compare the description of the ignorance of the wife who had been brought up to see, hear and speak as little as possible (7.5) and had previously seen only how the spinning is given out to the maids (7.6).

108 Ischomachus claims that unlike other arts whose practitioners conceal their skills, farming lends itself to being watched: τῶν δὲ γεωργῶν ὁ κάλλιστα μὲν φυτεύων μᾶλλον ὕδατο, εἰ τις αὐτὸν βεβηλίζῃ, ὁ κάλλιστα δὲ σπείρων ὡσαύτως (“the farmer who plants best is most pleased if he is being watched, as is the farmer who sows best”, 15.11).

109 This seems to recall the Platonic theory of anamnesis: see Gini (1992–3) and Too (2001).

110 See e.g. the conversation on the digging of trenches: “I am sure you have seen (οἶδεν ὅτι ἕωρακας) what sort of trenches they dig for plants” (19.3) (answer: yes);
"I see," I said, "all these things."

"And since you see" he said, "which of them do you not understand?"

However, Socrates casts doubt on the efficacy of sight in the acquisition of knowledge, by asking whether he might also have knowledge of other arts, like smelting gold, playing the flute, or painting, without being aware of it: “For I have never been taught these things any more than I have been taught farming, but I see men working at these arts just as I see them farming” (ἐδίδαξε γὰρ οὔτε ταύτα με οὖδείς οὔτε γεωργεῖν· ὅρω δ’ ὕσπερ γεωργούντας καὶ τὰς ἄλλας τέχνας ἐργαζομένους ἀνθρώπους, 18.9). Ischomachus’ reply, that farming is distinguished from other arts in being the easiest to learn (18.10), acknowledges Socrates’ conclusion as problematic. Socrates points up the value invested in sight as a means of developing oneself in the context of the city, but he also reveals the contradictions and failures of such a valuation.

The problems of viewing are also of concern in Socrates’ story of the Spartan leader Lysander’s viewing of the activities of the Persian
prince Cyrus the Younger at Sardis.112 When Cyrus displays (ἐπιδεικνύοναι, 4.20) his “paradise” to Lysander, Lysander wonders (ἐθαύμαζεν, 4.21)113 at the beauty of the trees, the accuracy of the spacing, the straightness of the rows, the regularity of the angles and the many sweet scents.114 On being informed that Cyrus did much of the planting himself, “looking at him, and seeing the beauty of his clothing and noticing their scent and the beauty of his necklaces, bracelets and other adornments” (ἀποβλέψας εἰς αὐτὸν καὶ ἰδὼν τῶν τε ἰματίων τὸ κάλλος ὅν εἶχε καὶ τῆς ὁσμῆς αἰσθόμενος καὶ τῶν στρεπτῶν καὶ τῶν ψελίων τὸ κάλλος καὶ τοῦ ἄλλου κόσμου οὕτω

112 Cf. the use of the Persian king’s rule over his kingdom as an analogy for the successful estate-owner’s control of his estate, both of which are imagined as enforced through vision. In describing the correct management of subordinates, Ischomachus says that when the Persian king asked a man clever with horses by what means a horse could most quickly be fattened, “He is said to have replied, ‘The master’s eye’” (τὸν δ’ ἐπείνει λέγεται ὡτὶ δεσπότου ὁρθαλμός, 12.20). Similarly, Socrates explains the Persian king’s control over his empire through his watchfulness: “He personally inspects the men who are near his residence, and sends trusted agents to review those who live far away” (καὶ τοὺς μὲν ἀμφὶ τὴν ἔσωτον οἰκίσκοιν αὐτὸς ἐφορᾷ, τοὺς δὲ πρὸσω ἄποικοντας πιστῶς πέμπει ἐπισκοπεῖν, 4.6); “he personally inspects and examines the part of the land that he travels through, and the part that he cannot see he sends trusted agents to review” (ἐτὶ δὲ ὧποπείν μὲν τῆς χώρας διελαύνουν ἐφορᾷ αὐτὸς, καὶ δοκιμᾷ, ὅποσὴν δὲ μὴ αὐτὸς ἐφορᾷ, πέμπων πιστῶς ἐπισκοπεῖται, 4.8); we are also told that those of the Persian king’s subordinates whose territory he sees (ὅρᾳ) to be uncultivated or thinly populated, he punishes (4.8). Similarly, sight is imagined by both Socrates and Ischomachus as an assertion of the estate-owner’s control over his property. To run a successful estate, and make slaves work efficiently, says Ischomachus, “you must watch over and survey their work” (ἐφορητικῶν δὲ εἴναι τῶν ἔργων καὶ ἐξεταστικῶν, 12.19). He recounts: ὅταν μὲν γὰρ ἐπιμελημένους ἱδὼ, καὶ ἐπιστρέφοντας καὶ τιμῶν πειρώματα αὐτῶν, ὅταν δὲ ἀμελοῦντας, λέγειν τε πειρώματα καὶ ποιεῖν ὅποια δῆξεται αὐτῶν (“Whenever I see them working carefully I praise and try to honour them, but whenever I see them being careless I try to say and do whatever will hurt them”, 12.16). Ischomachus also presents the appearance of the master before the eyes of his slaves as contributing to their control: if the appearance of the master (τοῦ δὲ δεσπότου ἐπιφανέντος, 21.10) brings no response in the workers, he is not to be admired, but if at the sight of him (ἴδοντες, 21.10) they get busy, and are filled with enthusiasm, rivalry and desire for honour, “I would say such a man had something of the character of a king” (τούτον ἐγὼ φαίην ἃν ἔχειν τι ἡθοὺς βασιλικοῦ, 21.10).

113 Lysander is repeatedly described as wondering: θαυμάζων, θαυμάζω, 4.21; θαυμάζεις, 4.24.

114 Socrates also invites Critobulus to examine (ἐπισκοποῦντες, 4.5) the king, using the same verb as that used of the king’s agents who examine his domain (4.6 & 4.8).
Elxev, 4.23), he expresses surprise, before praising Cyrus as a virtuous man (ἀγαθός γὰρ ὃν ἀνὴρ εὐδαίμονείς, 4.25).

As elsewhere in the Oeconomicus, Lysander’s sight involves learning. Just as in Socrates’ claims about the necessity of watching people around one in the city, Lysander discovers something new about the world, and implicitly, therefore, about his own place in it: Socrates concludes from Lysander’s story that even the wealthiest men should not shun farming (5.1). Yet the implications of viewing in this scene are more complex. In its perfection, Cyrus’ orchard is reminiscent of the gardens of Alcinous in the Odyssey (7.112–132):115 it is a fantastical place both desirable and unattainable. The astonished and admiring gaze of Lysander potentially mediates the response of the reader, who might both be dazzled by Cyrus’ alluring appearance and alienated by his exoticism: Lysander’s response, which highlights the unlikelihood of someone like Cyrus involving himself in farming, marks the incongruity of the use of the Persian king as a model for the Athenian estate-owner, as well as indicating his appeal as a paradigm. However, Lysander’s response can also be understood as conditioned by his identity as a Spartan: Spartans were well known not only for their austere dress, but for their rejection of manual labour. This complicates the response of the reader, challenging the reader to consider how far he or she sees like Lysander, or sees differently. Sight offers a means of articulating both the value and the difficulty of

115 Cf. Odysseus’ gaze at Alcinous’ garden: ἐνθὰ στὰς θηεῖτο πολύτλας δίος Ὀδυσσεὺς, αὐτὰρ ἐπεί δὴ πάντα ἐὼ θηήσατο θυμῶ... (Od. 7.133–134).
encountering and comprehending others, as the problem of how to look at Cyrus becomes a problem of political self-positioning.  

**Hellenica**

This scene of cross-cultural visual response, and the problems it raises, offers a useful introduction to the representation of vision in the *Hellenica*, which itself introduces the sorts of issues with which we shall be concerned in the four central readings of cross-cultural vision in this thesis. In the *Hellenica*, looking becomes a means of articulating cultural, social and political relationships, as a series of scenes present the visual interactions of leaders and their men, of the armies of different Greek states, and of Greeks and Persians, frequently in situations involving conflict and the struggle for power.

Control over viewing in the *Hellenica* functions as an expression of power. Archidamus encourages the Spartan troops by urging them not to allow themselves to be made to feel ashamed but to look others in the face (νῦν ἀγαθοὶ γενόμενοι ἀναβλέψωμεν ὅρθοὶς ὁμμασίν, 7.1.30: literally, “Now being noble men let us look with straight eyes”), and he reminds them of their previous status as “the most looked at people of all the Greeks” (πρόσθεν γε πάντων τῶν Ἑλλήνων

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116 The sight of the foreign operates similarly in the scene of Ischomachus’ inspection (ἰδεῖν, ἐλπίζας ἐπὶ θέαν, ἔθεσαόμην: 8.11; εἶδον: 8.15) of the rigging on the Phoenician ship. His vision is to do with learning, analysing and drawing conclusions for the organisation of his household. He says that given that people aboard ship keep order despite being tossed by the waves, he and his wife ought be able to keep order in their house: ἔγω οὖν κατιδών ταύτην τὴν ἀκρίβειαν τῆς κατασκευῆς ἔλεγον τῇ γυναικὶ ὁτι... (“After seeing the careful order of the ship’s rigging, I told my wife that...”, 8.17). However, the intricacies of the ship’s organisation and the lengths to which the sailors go to keep order also open it up to an awe which is potentially both idealising and alienating: as in Lysander’s sight of Cyrus, Ischomachus’ sight involves wonder (θαυμάσας, 8.15).
piereblepptotatoi hemen, 7.1.30). Control over one’s look, as well as over how one is seen by others, acts as an assertion of power. Similarly, Spartan victory over the Corinthians is enacted in their production of a spectacle of the Corinthians’ defeat: “So many men fell in a short time that people accustomed to seeing heaps of grain, wood or stones then gazed upon heaps of corpses” (τότε γοῦν οὕτως ἐν ὀλίγῳ πολλοὶ ἔπεσον ὡστε εἰδισμένοι ὅραν οἱ ἄνθρωποι σωροὺς σίτου, ξύλων, λίθων, τότε ἑθεάσαντο σωροὺς νεκρῶν, 4.4.12).

Visual relationships can express relationships of power between a leader and his men. The Spartan leader Teleutias’ power over his men is articulated as they garland him and throw garlands into the sea in his wake, producing a spectacle of their honour for him (5.1.3-4), and as they look at him with joy: ως δὲ εἴδον αὐτὸν ἥκοντα οἱ ναῦται, ὑπερήσθησαν, (“When the sailors saw him coming, they were

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118 Responses to sight can indicate self-control, as when the Spartans line the road watching the defeated Mantinean democrats coming out of their city: although they hate them they keep their hands off them (...θεώμενοι τοὺς ἐξίοντας, καὶ μισοῦντες αὐτοὺς ὠρίσαν ἀπείχοντο αὐτῶν..., 5.2.6), an achievement which is described as great evidence of their good discipline (μέγα τεκμήριον πειθαρχίας, 5.2.6). A failure to look similarly indicates disempowerment. When requested by Cleonymus to appeal to his father Agesilaus on Cleonymus’ father Sphodrias’ behalf, Archidamus denies that he has the power to influence him: ἵσθι μὲν ὅτι ἐγὼ τῷ ἔμφροτρι ὀὖδ’ ἀντιβλέπειν δύναμαι, (“Be assured that I cannot even look my father in the face”, 5.4.27). In the sacking of Sparta the helplessness of the women is expressed through their inability to endure the sight of smoke, having never seen an enemy before (αἰ μὲν γυναῖκες οὐδὲ τὸν κατικνὸν ὰρῶσαί ἥμειχοντο, ἄτε οὐδέποτε ἰδούσαι πολεμίους, 6.5.28), whereas in their attempt to defend their city the Spartans are described as “both being and appearing few in number” (μάλα ὄλιγοι καὶ δντες καὶ φαινόμενοι, 6.5.28).
119 The control of vision is also used by the Thirty to secure control of Athens: when Theramenes is dragged away for execution he calls on both gods and men to see what is happening, but the council keeps quiet, as they can see the council chamber surrounded by armed men (καὶ θεοὺς ἐπεκαλεῖτο καὶ ἄνθρωποι κασθόραν τα γιγνόμενα. ἢ δὲ βουλή ἠσχύλιαν εἰχεν, ὀρώσα... 2.3.55); similarly, Critias orders for the casting of votes to take place in plain view (ἐκέλευε φανεράν φέρειν τὴν ψήφον, 2.4.9) to ensure the outcome he requires.
delighted beyond all measure," 5.1.13).120 The relationship between the men’s sight of Teleutias and his power over them is expressed as he informs them that his door stands open so that any of them can approach him (θύρα ἡ ἐμὴ... ἀνεῴξεται, 5.1.14):

"Therefore, whenever you have provisions in abundance, then you will also see me living well too; but if you see me putting up with cold and heat and lack of sleep, then expect that you too will have to endure all these things yourselves."121

The chiasmic structure of Teleutias’ statement (as at first, conclusions are drawn from the men’s experience to explain what they will see, and then from their sight to explain what they will experience) allows a change in the significance allotted to the men’s sight, with coercive effect. Sight shifts from a mode of accessing and judging the leader, implying a certain degree of levelling of status as they all share the same experiences, to a means of instilling obedience: the point of Teleutias’ speech is to ensure the men’s submission to his command despite the lack of provisions. Their submission to suffering becomes

120 We can compare the reaction of the Athenians to the arrival of Alcibiades: καταπλέοντος δ’ αὐτοῦ ὃ τε ἐκ τοῦ Πειραιῶς καὶ ὃ ἐκ τοῦ ἄστεως ὄχλος ἠθροισθή πρὸς τὰς ναῦς, θαυμάζοντες καὶ ἰδεῖν βουλόμενοι τὸν Ἀλκιβιάδην, ("When he sailed in, the common crowd from the Piraeus and from the city gathered around his ships, full of wonder and desiring to see Alcibiades," 1.4.13).

121 See the similar representation of Agesilaus at Ages. 5.7, and of Socrates at Mem. 1.1.10.
necessary by the admission of their own sight, as Teleutias’ self-display becomes an assertion of power.

The obedience of the Athenian commander Iphicrates’ men is similarly expressed through the spectacle that they create: when he orders the men to follow him, “Their enthusiasm was a sight to behold,” (ἀξία ἐγένετο θέας ἡ σπουδή, 6.2.34). However, further, Iphicrates’ effectiveness as a military leader is indicated by his visual control over his surroundings. He suspects reports which do not come from an eye witness (καὶ γὰρ τὰ περὶ τοῦ Μνασίππου αὐτόπτου μὲν οὖδενὸς ἦκηκόει, ὑπώππευε δὲ μὴ ἀπάτης ἑνεκα λέγοιτο, καὶ ἐφυλάττετο, 6.2.31); he sets up look-outs from the land, but also from the masts of ships who could see much further from their higher position (πολὺ οὖν ἔπι πλέον οὕτωι καθεώρων ἡ οInspector ὁ μαλοῦ, ἀν ὑψηλοτέρου καθορωντές, 6.2.29); and when expecting the enemy to approach he stations men “at a point from which it was possible to see those sailing up and from which those signalling to the city would be visible” (...δειν τοὺς τε προσπλέοντας δυνατὸν ἡν ὁράν καὶ τοὺς σημαίνοντας εἰς τὴν πόλιν καταφανεῖς εἶναι, 6.2.33).

For Iphicrates, control of the visual field implies control of the field of battle. The control of viewing is frequently depicted in the Hellenica as a means of asserting power over an enemy, and requires

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122 The power of a leader can be asserted through the spectacle created by his followers. Cf. the contest for influence between Lysander and Agesilaus based on the control of appearances: Agesilaus is angered when Lysander, by surrounding himself by crowds of petitioners, makes himself appear (ἐφοίνετο, 3.4.7; φαίνεσθαι, 3.4.9) more important than Agesilaus.

123 For similar military uses of vision, see Epaminondas’ tactics in keeping his camp concealed (ἐν ἀδηλοτέρῳ) from the enemy while making sure it was possible to see (ἐξῆν ὁράν) what the enemy was doing (7.5.8).
self-conscious manipulation of the viewer. After putting the rearguard of the Argive army to flight, the Phliasians put on a display:

Καὶ ἀπέκτειναν μὲν ὀλίγους αὐτῶν, τροπαίον μὲντοι ἑστήσαντο ὀρώντων τῶν Ἀργείων οὐδὲν διαφέρον ἢ εἰ πάντας ἀπεκτόνεσαν αὐτοὺς. (7.2.5)

“Although they killed only a few of them, with the Argives looking on they set up a trophy just as if they had killed them all.”

The Phliasians assert their claim to victory through a spectacle of victory. In contrast, following the Spartan defeat at Lechaeum, Agesilaus tries to maintain morale in his army by limiting what they see: when he must lead his army past Mantinea, “he passed by while it was still dark, so hard did he think the soldiers would find it to watch the Mantineans exulting in their misfortune” (...)ἐτι σκοταίος παρῆλθεν. οὔτω χαλεπῶς ἢν ἐδόκουν οἱ στρατιῶται τοὺς Μαντινέας ἐφηδομένους τῷ δυστυχήματι θεᾶσασθαι, 4.5.18).

Such displays can be deliberately calculated to persuade or to deceive. When Agesilaus wishes to make war on Phlius for the sake of the restored Phliasian exiles, he must counter the objection of the Spartans that they risk incurring the hatred of a state of more than five thousand men: “for the Phliasians held their assemblies outside the city in plain view, just for the purpose of making this fact evident” (καὶ

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124 When the Phliasians set up a trophy and sound the paean after defeating the Pelleneans, the Theban general and Euphron allow this to go on even though he had just been racing to aid the Pelleneans; they are described as acting “just as if they had been racing to a spectacle” (ὡσπερ ἐπὶ θέαν περιδεδραμηκότες, 7.2.15). Cf. the Spartan attempts to produce an appearance of success even in the midst of disaster: 4.5.10; 6.4.16.

125 The devastating potential of sight is indicated as the men of Anaxibius are terrified when they see the ambush set for them by Iphicrates (ἐκπεπληγμένους ἄπαντας, ὡς εἶδον τὴν ἐνέδραν, 4.8.38), and react by fleeing.
He devises a scheme (άντεμηχανήσατο, 5.3.16); he encourages the exiles to form common messes with their supporters and provide them with training and arms, at the end of which “they displayed more than a thousand men in splendid bodily condition, well disciplined and well armed” (άπεδειξαν πλείους χιλίων ἀνδρῶν ἄριστα μὲν τὰ σώματα ἔχοντας, εὐτάκτους δὲ καὶ εὐοπλοτάτους, 5.3.17). The result of this display is that the Spartans are persuaded that they need such soldiers.\footnote{An appeal to sight is also calculated to persuade in the speech of Procles the Phliasian to the Athenian assembly, as he encourages them to take the side of their Spartan petitioners against those from Thebes. He states that he used to admire Athens because he heard that those who were wronged came to Athens for assistance: ἐγὼ δέ, ὃς ἀνδρεῖς Ἀθηναίοι, πρόσθεν μὲν ἀκούων ἔξηλουν τὴν τὴν πόλιν (“Previously, men of Athens, I used to admire this state of yours from hearsay,” 6.5.45). He claims that he now sees the Spartans asking for assistance, but also sees the Thebans asking the Athenians to allow those who had saved Athens to perish: νῦν δὲ οὐκέτ’ ἄκοւω, ἀλλ’ αὐτὸς ἢδη παρὼν ὄρῳ Λακεδαιμονίους... ὤρῳ δὲ καὶ Ὀμβαίους... (“Now I no longer only hear, but being present here myself at this moment I see the Spartans.... I see the Thebans....,” 6.5.45–46). The contrast between hearing and seeing suggests that sight allows him fuller knowledge of the Athenians, and that they risk their reputation by their decision. Cf. Procles’ claim that the Athenians would be able to call on the Spartans in the future, as the fact that they had received benefits from the Athenians would have been witnessed by “the gods who see all things now and forever” (θεοὶ οἱ πάντα ὅρωντες καὶ νῦν καὶ εἰς ἄει, 6.5.41).} Agesilaus successfully presents a display which outweighs the display of the Phliasians.

Similarly, when the Spartan leader Dercylidas faces a battle with the Persians in which he will be vastly outnumbered, and is approached by messengers from Tissaphernes suggesting a conference, he responds with a display:

Καὶ ὁ Δερκυλίδας λαβὼν τοὺς κρατίστους τὰ εἰδη τῶν περὶ αὐτὸν καὶ ἵππεων καὶ πεζῶν προήλθε πρὸς τοὺς ἀγγέλους, καὶ εἶπεν:

126
"Dercylidas, taking with him the best looking of the men around him and of the cavalry and infantry, came forward to meet the messengers and said "I myself am prepared for battle, as you see. However, since he wishes to hold a conference, I do not raise any objection."

The phrase ως ὀράτε ("as you see") is deliberately manipulative: Dercylidas is far from ready for battle, being in much the weaker position, but uses display to empower himself over his enemies. 127

The function of sight in the assertion of power and the manipulation of sight and display in political relationships appear most strikingly in the scenes following Agesilaus’ successful capture of the Corinthian Piraeum. 128 When Agesilaus is approached by Boeotian ambassadors suing for peace, he pretends not to see them (ὁ δὲ Ἀγησίλαος μάλα μεγαλοφρόνως τούτους μὲν οὐδ’ ὀραν ἔδοκει, 4.5.6), instead sitting and watching the captured property being brought out (ἐθεώρει πολλὰ τὰ έξαγόμενα, 4.5.6).129 The Spartans

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127 This phrase is used in a similarly manipulative or coercive way in speeches in the Anabasis (see discussion ad. loc.). For other uses of deceptive display in the Hell., see the Spartan commander Pasimachus’ trickery of the Argives, when his own superior force takes over the shields of the Sicyonians in order to impersonate them: οἱ δὲ Ἀργεῖοι ὀρύντες τὰ σίγμα τὰ ἑπὶ τῶν στατιῶν, ώς Σκυκωνίους οὐδὲν ἐφοβοῦντο, ("When the Argives saw the sigmas on the shields, thinking that they were Sicyonians they were not afraid." 4.4.10). See also the deceptive appearances of Epaminondas, as he tries to give the impression that his army is not going to join battle but is getting ready to encamp (7.5.21-22), but then suddenly attacks: οἱ δὲ πολέμιοι ώς ἐἶδον παρὰ δόξαν ἐπίόντας, οὐδὲς αὐτῶν ἰσχύαν ἔχειν ἐδύνατο..., ("When the enemy saw then advancing unexpectedly, not one among them was able to keep quiet...", 7.5.22). Cf: 1.6.36; 1.7.8.

128 See Gray (1989) 158–162 on the focus on vision and spectacle in this portion of the Hell.

129 A similar distanced, empowered viewing by a commander of the spectacle of military success occurs in Mania’s viewing of her conquests of Larisa, Hamaxitus and Colonae by her Greek mercenary forces (αὐτὴ δὲ ἔφ’ ἄρμαμαξης θεωμένη, 3.1.13).
who are leading out the prisoners are described as being looked at intensely by the bystanders (μάλα ὑπὸ τῶν παρόντων θεωροῦμενοι): οἱ γὰρ εὐτυχοῦντες καὶ κρατοῦντες ἀεί πως ἄξιοθέατοι δοκοῦσιν εἶναι, ("For men who are fortunate and victorious always seem to be worth watching," 4.5.6). The control of visuality is presented as a mark of power: Agesilaus’ victorious position is articulated in his ability to look at what he wishes, and the Spartans’ success is marked by their transformation into an impressive spectacle.

However, everything changes after a messenger arrives reporting the Spartan defeat at Lechaeum. Now when the Boeotian ambassadors are at last interviewed they make no further mention of peace (περὶ μὲν τῆς εἰρήνης οὐκέτι ἐμέμνηντο, 4.5.9), saying instead that they wish to enter the city to join their troops. Agesilaus replies:

"'Allea oída méν, ἔφη, ὅτι οὐ τοὺς στρατιῶτας ἴδεῖν βούλεσθε, ἀλλὰ τὸ εὐτύχημα τῶν φίλων ὑμῶν θεάσασθαι πόσον τι γεγένηται. περιμείνατε οὖν, ἔφη· ἐγώ γὰρ ὑμᾶς αὐτὸς ἄξω, καὶ μᾶλλον μετ’ ἐμοῦ ὑντες γνώσεσθε ποῖον τι τὸ γεγενημένον ἔστι." (4.5.9)

"'I know" he said, "that you do not wish to see your soldiers, but rather wish to gaze at how great is the good fortune of your friends. Wait, therefore," he said, "for I will conduct you myself, and by being with me you will understand better what sort of thing has happened.'"

As Dillery remarks, the distinction drawn in this statement between ἴδεῖν and θεάσασθαι marks the latter term as a politically loaded
form of vision, implying that the ambassadors will glory in the sight.\textsuperscript{130} Agesilaus responds by leading the ambassadors to the city where he cuts down and burns all the fruit trees, and “displayed that no-one would come out against him” (ἐπεδείκνυεν ώς οὐδεὶς ἀντεξήει, 4.5.10). Agesilaus’ change in fortunes is expressed through the ambassadors’ potential ability to gaze at the success of their friends; Agesilaus attempts to reassert his dominance by maintaining control over the sight that the ambassadors will see, producing a spectacle of his power.\textsuperscript{131}

In these examples, the visual field becomes a site of contest in a struggle for power. With the exception of the scenes of viewing between leaders and men, where the power asserted through the control of viewing could be described as a form of class power, such struggles usually occur between opposing political or cultural groups. Strikingly, the \textit{Hellenica} contains some scenes of viewing between different cultural groups in which responses to viewing are explicitly presented as controlled by political or cultural position.

Following the meeting with the Persian king to discuss the terms of the King’s Peace, Antiochus the Arcadian ambassador reports back to the Arcadians on his experience of the king’s court:

...ἀπῆγγειλέ τε πρὸς τοὺς μυρίους ὡς βασιλεὺς ἄρτοκόπους μὲν καὶ ὀψοποιοὺς καὶ οίνοχοὺς καὶ θυρωροὺς πεμπλήθεις ἔχοι, ἄνδρας δὲ

\textsuperscript{130} Dillery (2008) 246.
\textsuperscript{131} Agesilaus is presented as the purveyor of spectacle elsewhere in the \textit{Hellenica}, notably the scenes of army training in Ephesus (3.4.16–19); I do not discuss these scenes here, as an almost identical passage which appears in the \textit{Agesilaus} (1.25–28) is discussed in chapter 6.
...he reported to the Ten Thousand that the king had bakers and cooks and wine-pourers and doormen in vast numbers, but that although he searched hard he was unable to see any men who could fight with Greeks. In addition he said that the king’s vast wealth seemed to him to be mere pretence, since the famous golden plane tree was not big enough, he said, to provide shade for a grasshopper.”

Antiochus’ sight of the king’s court is explicitly value laden: he sees many people, but no “real men” (ἄνδρας). However, his response is framed as partial: we are told that he reported in the way that he did because the Arcadian League had been belittled (ὅτι ἠλαττοῦτο τὸ Ἀρκαδικόν), whereas in contrast the Elean ambassador praised the king because he had honoured Elis above the Arcadians (7.1.38).

Antiochus’ response to the sight of the king’s court is controlled by his political relationship to it.

More complex is the meeting of Agesilaus and Pharnabazus in book 4. Agesilaus and his men lie on the ground in the grass (χαμαί ἐν πόσ πινὶ κατακείμενοι, 4.1.30) while they wait for a conference with Pharnabazus. Pharnabazus arrives dressed in a robe worth much gold

132 This recalls the famous statement of Herodotus about Xerxes at Thermopylae – that although he had many ἄνθρωποι, he had few ἄνδρες (7.210).
his reaction on seeing Agesilaus is described:

工地自动工程地土与总非但于中，求于万看欢享及，故工之非于于非非非。

4.1.30) "When his servants began to spread beneath him the rugs on which the Persians sit softly, looking at the simplicity of Agesilaus he was ashamed to enjoy luxury. So he too lay down on the ground just as he was.”

The narrative is interrupted by a brief ethnographic aside which explains the action in terms of generic Persian characteristics: the rugs are not just any rugs, but are the sort of rugs on which Persians sit in comfort (工于故万看欢享及，故工之非于于非非非)。However, we are not just offered ethnographic description of Persian habits, but what could be termed “metaethnography”, as we witness a Persian response to Spartan habits (we can contrast this scene with Lysander’s viewing of Cyrus the Younger at Oec. 4.20–25, discussed above, where a Spartan views a Persian). The reader’s experience of the Spartans is mediated through Pharnabazus’ sight of Agesilaus and his men. However, Pharnabazus’ response is presented as a specifically Persian response, shaped as it is by his own expectations of finery and comfort. He sees not just Spartans sitting on the ground, but Spartan hardiness and austerity, and responds with shame, followed by imitation. Sight is presented as culturally loaded. Pharnabazus’ shame and desire to imitate Agesilaus imply a certain level of identification
with him, yet his viewing of Agesilaus also reveals that from the Persian point of view, Spartan behaviour is curiously exotic. Further, this moment of visual interaction must be understood in terms of a contest for power. Pharnabazus and Agesilaus meet in order to discuss terms for peace or the possible renewal of conflict: visual display and response function as the first exchange in their parley.

Such scenes raise urgent questions for the reader of the *Hellenica*: how will the reader look at, and respond to, the scenes displayed in this text, which tells the story of bitter and violent Greek-on-Greek conflict, but also of Greek conflict with Persians? With whom will the reader identify? How is the reader’s relationship to the sights of the text complicated by the representation of display as an assertion of power? The *Hellenica* raises but does not resolve these

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133 Pharnabazus is presented in an attractive light earlier in the text, potentially encouraging identification with him. See e.g. his personal courage at the battle of Cyzicus, where he charges his horse into the sea (1.1.6) and his generosity to the Peloponnesian forces when short of resources following Cyzicus (1.1.24-25).

134 The *Hellenica* sometimes imagines the reader’s experience of the text as a visual experience: the Spartan responses to the news of the disaster at Leuctra are presented through the imagined experience of viewing the scene, using the impersonal third person “it was possible to see” (ἡν ὄραν) and the second person “you would have seen” (ἀν ἐῖδες): “On the following day it was possible to see those whose relatives had been killed going about in full view looking bright and cheerful, whereas you would have seen just a few of those whose relatives had been reported as still living, walking around looking sad and downcast,” (τῇ δέ ύστερα ἤν ὄραν, ὑν μὲν ἐστίνασαν οί προσήκοντες, λυπαροῖς καὶ φαινομένη ἐν τῷ φανερῷ ἀναστρεφομένοις, ὡς δὲ ζώντες ὑγιεμένοι ἔσαν, ὄλιγους ἄν εἶδες, τούτους δὲ σκυθρωποὺς καὶ ταπεινοὺς περιολντάς, 6.4.16). See also the description of the rescue of the Phliasian acropolis (θεᾶσασθαί παρήν, 7.2.9) and the description of Agesilaus’ troops in Ephesus (παρῆν ὄραν, 3.4.16; ἄξιον... θέας, 3.4.17; ἐπερμώσθη δ’ ἀν τις κάκεινο ίδὼν, 3.4.18), both of which scenes are imagined as spectacles before the eye of the reader. Cf. the description in indirect speech, in a report by an informer to the ephors, of Cinadon the revolutionary displaying (ἐπιδεικνύοντο, 3.3.5) to the informer which of those in the Spartan market place and streets are potential enemies and which are potential allies, and displaying (ἐπιδειξον, 3.3.7) the tools laid out in the iron market which could serve as weapons. The visual language allows not just the internal audience, but also the reader, to look at Sparta and comprehend Cinadon’s plan.
problems, and in doing so challenges the reader to consider, or reconsider, how he or she conceptualises him- or herself as Greek.

Very similar questions are posed by the use of vision in the representation of Persians and other Asians in the Anabasis and Cyropaedia and in the representation of Spartans in the Lak. Pol. and Agesilaus. Let us now turn to a detailed examination of these texts, in order to consider not only how vision is imagined in each case, but what the use of vision in the representation of various types of cultural and political difference can tell us about Xenophon’s conception of Greek self-consciousness.
3. Vision, travel and Greek identity in the *Anabasis*

How does the sight of the foreign frame the experience of travel? What effect does it have on the traveller’s sense of self? What happens to that sense of self when the traveller becomes the object of foreign scrutiny? These are just some of the questions which arise in the numerous scenes of spectatorship in Xenophon’s tale of Greeks in a strange land, the *Anabasis*, which tells the story of the travels through Asia Minor of an army of 10,000 Greeks in 401–399, among whom Xenophon himself numbered. Employed by the Persian renegade Cyrus the Younger in his attack on his brother the Persian King, they were stranded in Babylonia following his death at the battle of Cunaxa; the majority of the text narrates their journey back to the Greek world. Throughout their journey, the *Anabasis* presents the Greeks as looking at and responding to their foreign environment; there are also numerous moments when the Greeks look at and respond to each other, and when they become the object of the gaze of the various foreign peoples whom they encounter. I argue that Xenophon’s portrayal of these varied visual interactions has much to tell us about the complexities of Greek self-consciousness in the early fourth century.

The subject matter of the *Anabasis* is provocative, and politically charged. Set shortly after the end of the Peloponnesian War, the *Anabasis* chronicles an Athenian’s cooperation with an army led by
Spartans in the period of Spartan ascendancy over Athens;¹ it describes an elite man’s involvement with mercenaries, a potentially contentious activity for one of Xenophon’s class;² and it presents Greek military service for a barbarian. How would an Athenian reader respond to such a problematic narrative? Would the reader sympathise with the 10,000 as Greeks stranded in a foreign land, or are the 10,000 rather unappealing protagonists, from whom the reader might feel alienated? Can they, indeed, be understood as “Greeks”, or do the various state or regional ethnicities of the 10,000, frequently depicted in conflict with each other, disrupt such a simple categorisation?³ Is reading about Greek travel in Asia an affirmative, essentially comfortable act, or does it offer a more challenging experience?

Scenes of vision are useful in approaching these questions. The story of the travels of the Greek army through Asia Minor is told through a series of visual encounters with native peoples and landscapes.⁴ The reader of the Anabasis encounters foreign peoples

¹ Although the majority of the 10,000 were mercenaries operating independently, the Spartans sent an officially state-sanctioned contingent, consisting in a fleet under Samius, and seven hundred hoplites under Cheirisophus: Hell. 3.1.1; An. 1.2.21, 1.4.2-3. Before Cunaxa the army is largely led by Clearchus, and after Cunaxa by Cheirisophus along with Xenophon. See Hamilton (1979) 104-107.
² See Azoulay (2004b) 289 who argues that Xenophon tries to distance himself from “the disgraceful shadow of the mercenary”.
³ The question of how the 10,000 function as a community has been contentious. Nussbaum (1967) emphasises their collective action as a “polis on the march”; see also Flamarion Cardoso (2001), who argues that a unified identity among the 10,000 is created through collective action. However, see Gauthier (1985) 23 on their discord and factionalism.
⁴ Cf. Pratt (1992), who analyses how the representation of the Western traveller as a viewer formulates his or her political positioning in 18th to 20th century travel writing. For vision and travel in the ancient world, see Elsner (1992) and (1994) (on Pausanias); Nightingale (2001) and (2004) 40–71 (on the philosophical and cultural significance of theoria); and Hartog (1988) 248–58, 260–309 (on autopsy in Herodotus). The aims and fears of the 10,000 are articulated through the sights which are to be sought or avoided. After the murder of the generals the Greeks are
through the eyes of Greeks. Indeed, the events of the narrative are sometimes offered to the reader as visualised scenes to be observed and considered, through the phrase “it was possible to see”. The mediation of the reader’s experience through that of the text’s Greek protagonists might encourage identification with the 10,000; but how

unable to sleep through longing for their homelands, parents, wives and children whom they thought they would never see again (σε δυσλύπης καὶ πόθου πατρίδων, γονέων, γυναικῶν, παιδίων, οὕς οὗτοι ἵταμεν· ἐνάμιζον ἐπὶ ὀμφάσει, 3.1.3), and in Xenophon’s encouragement of the men he urges whoever desires to see his people again (ὅστις τε ὑμών τοὺς οἴκετος ἐπιθυμεῖ ἢδειν, 3.2.39) to be brave. On the other hand, he warns that inaction, and capture by the King, entails the risk that they might “see all the most horrible sights and experience all the most terrible sufferings” (πάντα μὲν τὰ χαλεπώτατα ἐπιδότατα, πάντα δὲ τὰ δεινότατα παθόντας, 3.1.13); in the balance of the μέν... δὲ... construction, the sight of horrors and the suffering of horrors are made equivalent in their undesirability. At the beginning of the main section of the narrative, the journey back to the Greek world, sight becomes a privileged means of organising the experience of the text’s protagonists.

When Cyrus’ Persian nobles extricate wagons stuck in the mud, their action is transformed into a spectacle offered to the eyes of the reader: ἕνθα δὲ μέρος τι τῆς εὐπαθείας ἦν θεάσασθαι. ρίψαντες γὰρ τοὺς πορφυροὺς κάνδους ὅπου ἔτυχεν ἔκαστος ἐστηκώς, ἱέντο ὡσπερ ἰδίῳ μίκα καὶ μάλα κατὰ πρανόις γνησίου, ἔχοντες τούτους τε τοὺς πολυτελεῖς χιτώνας καὶ τὰς ποικίλας ἀναξυρίδας, ἔνιοι δὲ καὶ στρετπτοὺς περὶ τοῖς τραχήλοις καὶ ψέλια περὶ τὰς χερῶν· εὔθως δὲ σὺν τούτοις εἰσπηδόσαντες εἰς τὸν πηλόν βάφταν ἢ ὡς τὶς ἄν ὑπετο μετεώρους ἔξεκόμισαν τὰς ἀμάξας. (“Then it was possible to behold an example of good discipline. They each threw off their purple cloaks wherever they happened to be standing, and sprinted, as if competing in a race, down a very steep hillside, wearing their expensive tunics and colourful trousers, with some of them even wearing torques around their necks and bracelets on their wrists. As soon as they got there, they leapt into the mud with all their finery and lifted the carts free of the mud more quickly than one would have thought possible,” 1.5.8). What the reader will “see” in this sight is left ambiguous: as Higgins (1977) 85 notes, it is unclear whether this scene should be read as expressing admiration for Persian εὐπαθεία, or as mocking “begrimed dandies sloshing in the mud”. Similarly, Xenophon describes travelling in Cyrus’ province through the experience of seeing the people whom Cyrus had punished: πολλάκις δ’ ἦν ἰδεῖν παρὰ τὰς στειβομένας ὀδοὺς καὶ ποδών καὶ χειρῶν καὶ ὀρθαλμῶν στερομένους ἀνθρώπους. (“It was often possible to see along the travelled roads people who had lost feet or hands or eyes,” 1.9.13). The description could be read as voyeuristic, presenting Cyrus’ province as a land of grotesque curiosities. However, it is also disturbing: these mutilations not only reflect Cyrus’ power, but through display, actively construct that power. Cf. the invitation to view the Persian Empire as a whole: καὶ συνιδεῖν δ’ ἦν τῷ προσέχοντι τὸν νοῦν τῇ βασιλείῳ ἀρχῇ πλῆθει μὲν χώρας καὶ ἀνθρώπων ἱσχυρά ὑσσα, τοῖς δὲ μῆκοις τῶν ὄντων καὶ τῷ διεστάσθαι τὰς δυνάμεις ἄσθενής, εἰ τις διὰ ταχέων τὸν πόλεμον ποιῶστο. (“For someone who paid attention to the matter, it was possible to see that the empire of the King was strong in the extent of its territory and the number of its inhabitants, but that it was weak by reason of the greatness of the distances and the scattered condition of its forces, in case one should be swift in making his attack upon it,” 1.5.9). This passage has been read as a call for a Panhellenist attack on Persia; see Dillery (1995) 61 n.7 for references.
easily is such identification made? What sort of experience of being Greek does it offer? And how is it affected by the representation of foreign responses to the sight of the 10,000? By considering the experience of the 10,000 in their visual encounters, and the relationships both among the 10,000 and between Greeks and native peoples and places constructed in the act of vision, I consider how the reader is positioned in relation to both foreigners and to the Greeks themselves.

The nature of Greek identity is a major concern of the *Anabasis*. Claims about the differences between Greeks and non-Greeks occur throughout the text. However, interpretation of such claims is often problematic; for example, the Persian prince Cyrus tells his Greeks troops that they are superior to his barbarian troops – the word is his (νομίζων ἀμείνονας καὶ κρείττους πολλῶν βαρβάρων ὑμᾶς εἶναι, 1.7.3). Dillery describes this statement as “autoethnography”, arguing that the placing of such an assertion in the mouth of a barbarian gives that assertion extra authority;\(^6\) examining the representation of the 10,000 as a utopian community in the light of contemporary Panhellenist thought, he reads the *Anabasis* as a Panhellenist call for Greek unity against Persia.\(^7\)

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\(^7\) Dillery (1995) 41 cites Xenophon’s desire to found a city on the shores of the Black Sea (5.6.15–16) as evidence that the text is a call for Panhellenist conquest of Asia, and refers to the description of the vulnerability of the Persian empire to attack (1.5.9) as “panhellenist big-talk’, designed to precipitate action” (61); however, he notes the failures of the 10,000 to act as an ideal community as well as their utopian potential (63–94). That the *An.* was open to be read as a call for an attack on Persia in its own time is evidenced in the comments of later ancient writers, who treat the success of the 10,000 in making the journey back to Greece as a sign of the weakness of Persia: Isoc. 4.148, 5.90; Polyb. 3.6.9–12; Arr. *An.* 2.7.8–9. See also...
However, as Rood notes, the text’s frequent appeals to Greek superiority and shared identity appear in the speeches of internal characters, where they function persuasively, and are not supported by the narrative context: the *Anabasis* frequently depicts antagonism between Greeks, both among the ranks of the 10,000 themselves and in the 10,000’s encounters with the Greek colonists on the Black Sea coast. Indeed, Ma reads the *Anabasis* through the lens of the fourth century concern with exile and migration to argue that the text’s representation of the geographical and cultural displacement of the 10,000 suggests the dislocation of Greek identity. In this chapter I argue that while the *Anabasis* must be read in the context of contemporary Panhellenist thought, offering in the story of the 10,000 a test case for how a unified Greek identity might function, it also reveals the limitations and complexities of such a valuation of Greekness by presenting the tendency of Greek identity to fracture into its constituent parts and to be manipulated for political ends.

Vision has not been a focus of interest in studies of the *Anabasis*. However, some visual aspects of the text have arisen in discussions of other themes. Through an examination of the ideological construction of landscape, Tripodi argues for “la prospettiva etnocentrica dello sguardo di Senofonte”, describing the

*Hell.* 3.4.2, where Lysander is prompted to persuade Agesilaus to attack Persia by the example of the 10,000’s successful return.

8 Rood (2004) 310: “All that Cyrus’ commonplace contrast between disciplined Greeks and unruly barbarian hordes shows is that he has judged his audience well.” Some uses of display function within a similarly manipulative context (see below). Cf. Gauthier (1985), who argues that the text’s ideological rhetoric of Greek-barbarian opposition is a means of masking or legitimating the mercenary motives of the 10,000’s adventure in Asia.

9 Ma (2004).
journey of the 10,000 as an “osservatorio itinerante” whose vision is politically charged. He argues that Xenophon’s expressions of admiration for abundant and fertile landscape must be understood as implicitly acquisitive, and reads the text’s language of discovery and “wonder” (θαύμα) as part of the exoticising rhetoric of foreign exploration. Offering a rather different view of the politics of the Anabasis, L’Allier argues, through an analysis of scenes of dance, that Xenophon presents the relativity of culture by showing barbarian incomprehension at Greek dancing displays (6.1.5–13); he claims “La conclusion que tire Xénophon est que certaines coutumes et certains modes d’éducation sont différents et peuvent sembler inférieurs, mais cela n’empêche pas qu’ils s’avèrent tout à fait valables.”

These treatments are useful in that they engage with the Anabasis as a text concerned with questions of Greek self-consciousness. My analysis will show that while Tripodi’s emphasis on exploitation and violence is important in raising the issue of power in Greek relations with the non-Greek, he does not consider moments where the empowered position of the Greeks is questioned. Similarly, L’Allier’s approach is helpful in that it considers the potentially destabilising effects of Greek exposure to the eyes of others, but is ultimately reductive in its depoliticisation of such encounters, and in its reliance on categories of value (concepts of superiority, inferiority,

11 Contrast Rzchiladze (1980) 314 who claims that Xenophon’s description of Persian and Median women as tall and beautiful is evidence of sympathy.
etc.) as a way of articulating responses to cultural interaction; rather the act of sight can be understood as a much more subtle and problematic process of cultural and political self-positioning. I will show that although the 10,000’s sight of their alien environment can be self-affirming, viewing the foreign is not always a comfortable process. Further, the Greek experience is expressed through Greek visions of fellow Greeks which are sometimes disturbing, revealing the divisions among them on ethnic and class lines. Also, importantly, the reader’s relationship with the 10,000 is challenged by moments where they are exposed to the eyes of foreign viewers.

**Greek views of the foreign**

I begin by considering the 10,000’s visual encounters with their foreign environment. What sort of experience of Asia does their vision offer the reader? Greek sight is frequently assertive and self-validating, placing the 10,000 in a position of power as they confidently survey the land and peoples before them. Sight becomes paradigmatic of exploration and conquest: the eye of the Greeks scanning the unfamiliar landscape is often presented as explicitly acquisitive. Encouraging the men to consider the opportunities with which hostilities with the Persians provide them, Xenophon describes himself

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13 In the territory around Cunaxa, palm dates of the variety that can be seen (ἔστιν ἰδέαν) in Greece are considered only fit for servants, whereas those reserved for the masters inspire wonder at their beauty and size (θαυμάσσαι τὸ κάλλος καὶ μεγέθους); the sight (δύσις) of them is similar to the sight of amber (2.3.15). When eating palm hearts the Greeks wonder at their appearance (ἔθοιμασαν τὸ τε εἴδος, 2.3.16). Cf. Tripodi (1995), esp. 46–47 on θαύμα, who discusses how descriptions of the landscape focus on the availability of its resources to Greek use.
...gazing upon the extent and quality of the land they possessed, and at what an abundance of provisions and what quantities of servants, cattle, gold and clothing they owned." 14

Similarly, when the 10,000 reach the metropolis of the Drilae, “...seeing many sheep and other property, they attacked the stronghold” (ὅρωντες πρόβατα πολλὰ καὶ ἄλλα χρήματα προσέβαλλον πρὸς τὸ χωρίον, 5.2.4), and in their attack on territory near Heracleia, “...they took from outside the villages whatever provisions could be seen within the limits of their line” (ἔξω τῶν κωμῶν ἐλάμβανον τὰ ἐπιτήδεια ὃ τι τις ὄρη ἐντὸς τῆς φάλαγγος, 6.5.7).

The Greeks’ sacking of the stronghold of the Taochians (4.7.1–14) is presented as producing a terrible or strange spectacle (ἐνταῦθα δὴ δεινὸν ἤν θέαμα, 4.7.13) when the defeated Taochians commit mass suicide by jumping from the rocks. The aim of the 10,000’s attack is acquisitive, as Xenophon’s matter-of-fact summary of the results of the conquest show: “Here very few people were captured, but they got cattle, many asses and sheep” (ἐντεῦθεν ἄνθρωποι μὲν πάνυ ὀλίγοι ἐλήφθησαν, βόες δὲ καὶ ὅνιοι πολλοὶ καὶ πρόβατα, 4.7.14).

The Greeks’ position as conquerors of the Taochians is enacted

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14 Xenophon says that previously the Greeks looked at the possessions of the Persians (ὅρωντες ἄγαθα, 3.1.22) but did not take them because of their oaths to the gods.
through their role as viewers; atrocity is transformed into spectacle, whose strangeness (δεινόν) is a mark of the foreignness of the people conquered, legitimating the limitation of responses to the sight to a concern for lost profits.\(^\text{15}\)

Such self-confident, self-validating Greek viewing also occurs in the famous scene of the sight of the Black Sea (4.7.20–26). The 10,000 are led by a local guide to a mountain-top from which they will be able to see the sea (ὁψονται θάλατταν, 4.7.20). Their vision is celebratory: “When those at the front reached the top of the mountain and saw the sea, a great shout went up” (ἐπεὶ δὲ οἱ πρῶτοι ἐγένοντο ἐπὶ τοῦ ὀροῦς καὶ κατεῖδον τὴν θάλατταν, κραυγὴ πολλῆ ἐγένετο, 4.7.21). The sight signifies the end of their journey in unknown, foreign lands, and their imminent arrival on the borders of the Greek world, the Greek cities of the Black Sea coast.

A striking element of the description is the level of confusion among those in the Greek army who have not yet seen the view; they do not know why the men ahead of them are shouting and fear that they are being attacked (4.7.22). The revelation of the view stems this confusion, producing certainty and self-assertion in the building of a trophy (κολωνών, 4.7.25).\(^\text{16}\) It is a moment of self-validation, and also

\(^{15}\) Anderson (2001) 42 reads the phrase δεινόν ἤν θέαμα as evidence of Xenophon’s compassion for the Taochians, but notes that the scene is governed by a concern for gain. Hanson (2001) 2 obscures the actualities of power relations between Greeks and Taochians, offering no hint of the Greeks’ responsibility for the suicide but presenting it as emblematic of the strange, irrational behaviour of Eastern peoples: “During their ordeal, the Ten Thousand were dumbfounded by the Taochians, whose women and children jumped off the high cliffs of their village in a ritual mass suicide.” The casting of the event as an ordeal for the Greeks is especially ironic.

\(^{16}\) The question of whether this should be understood as a trophy has been debated; see discussion in Ma (2004) 317. Dillery (1995) 77 sees it as a “monument to the Ten
of social cohesion, as men of all ranks respond to the view with the same joy: “Then they embraced each other weeping, the generals and captains as well” (ἐνταῦθα δὴ περιέβαλλον ἀλλήλους καὶ στρατηγοὺς καὶ λοχαγοὺς δικρύοντες, 4.7.25). The Greeks’ triumphant viewing of the land instantiates their ability to traverse and subdue it.¹⁷

In their joyous viewing of the Black Sea, the Greeks invest the landscape before them with their own set of meanings: they do not “just” see the sea, but see the edge of the Greek world. A specifically Greek way of seeing landscape is indicated as the army passes by ship along the Black Sea coast. The Greeks gaze upon Jason’s Cape (ἐθεώρουν τὴν τῇ Ἰασονίαι ἀκτῆν, 6.2.1), where it is said that the Argo moored (ἐνθα ἡ Ἀργὼ λέγεται ὀρμίσσασθαι, 6.2.1), and stop at a point where it is said that Heracles descended into Hades to fetch Cerberus (ἐνθα λέγεται ὁ Ἦρακλῆς ἐπὶ τὸν Κέρβερον κύνα καταβῆναι, 6.2.2): signs of his descent are on display (ἡ νῦν τὰ σημεῖα δεικνύασι τῆς καταβάσεως, 6.2.2). The repetition of λέγεται frames the landscape as belonging to a world which has already been narrated, in a prior narrative which is specifically Greek.¹⁸ The Greeks look and recognise signs which legitimate their presence, as they follow in the footsteps of legendary explorers who have come there

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¹⁷ The Greeks have been burning and devastating the land through which they have passed on the instructions of their local guide who belongs to a rival tribe.

¹⁸ Cf. the description of the Marsyas River as place where Apollo flayed Marsyas (1.2.8-9), and of Midas’ Spring as the place where Midas caught Silenus (1.2.13); λέγεται is repeated in both accounts, framing Asian sites within a Greek narrative history.
before them. Their narrative of travel becomes incorporated into a
tradition of Greek adventuring.\textsuperscript{19}

However, the confident, self-validating Greek vision presented so far only partly describes the Greeks' visual relationship with their foreign environment. Greek sight of the foreign is not always self-affirming, but can suggest, or produce, insecurity. The 10,000's joy in seeing the Black Sea hints at their desperation: they see in the view not just success but salvation. Their sight can be an anxiety-laden viewing of difficulties.\textsuperscript{20}

\begin{quote}
\addcontentsline{toc}{section}{Notes}
\end{quote}

\begin{quote}
\textsuperscript{19} The idea of visiting lands previously explored by the Argonauts goes back to \textit{Od}. 12.69–70. The traces left by the Argonauts are a repeated concern of Apollonius Rhodius' \textit{Argonautica}: see Goldhill (1991) 284–333. For description of the Black Sea in terms of the places visited by the Argonauts see also Arrian's \textit{Periplus}.
\end{quote}

\begin{quote}
\textsuperscript{20} In advising the army to attack the enemy before the enemy can creep up on them, Xenophon instructs: "consider / see whether it is better to go against these men with weapons advanced, or with weapons reversed to gaze upon the enemy coming upon us from behind" (\textit{OpCXTE \textit{TIOTEPOV KPEITTOV LEveXl eTIl TOUC;} (Xv8pcxC; \textit{TIPO~CXAAo~EvouC;} \textit{TeX OTIACX ~ ~ETcx~cxAAo~EvouC;} \textit{OTIlcr9Ev wv eTIlOVTCXC;} \textit{T~UC;} \textit{TIOAE~louC; 9ECXcr9cxl, 6.5.16}). Here it is implied that looking at the enemy advancing upon them might be an uncomfortable experience.
\end{quote}
Further, Greek vision often consists in a struggle to discern and interpret uncertain visual clues. 21 This is illustrated in the Greeks' sighting of the Persian army:

καὶ ἡδη τε ἦν μέσον ἡμέρας καὶ οὕτω καταφανείς ἦσαν οἱ πολέμιοι. ἡνίκα δὲ δείλη ἐγίγνετο, ἔφανη κονιορτὸς ωσπερ νεφέλη λευκή, χρόνω δὲ συχνῷ ύστερον ωσπερ μελανία τις ἐν τῷ πεδίῳ ἐπὶ πολὺ. ὅτε δὲ ἐγγύτερον ἐγίγνοντο, τάχα δὴ καὶ χαλκὸς τις ἠσπάσσετε καὶ λόγχαι καὶ αἱ τάξεις καταφανείς ἐγίγνοντο.

"Midday came and still there was no sign of the enemy. But early in the afternoon a cloud of dust appeared, looking at first like a white cloud in the sky. Some time later, however, it was as if there was a huge black smudge on the plain. Before long, as the enemy drew nearer, there were flashes of bronze, and then the tips of their spears and the divisions of the enemy became apparent." (1.8.8)

The Greeks are not in control of this viewing; through the gradually unfolding sight, they struggle to make sense of an ambiguous and threatening environment.

Here it eventually becomes clear what the Greeks are looking at; however, sometimes the Greeks' vision fails to produce knowledge. 22 In Armenia, sight produces a proliferation of conflicting reports. No

21 See also 2.2.14–18: As the Greeks try to determine the intentions of the Persians after Cunaxa, they think that they can see enemy horsemen ahead (Ἑδοξαν πολεμίους ὅραν ἰππεάς, 2.2.14). Look-outs (σκοποῖ, 2.2.15) are sent forward, but they come back with the report that it is not horsemen that have been seen but pack animals grazing; this makes the Greeks realise that the King must be camping nearby, as the sight of smoke (κατνός ἐφοίνυτο, 2.2.15) in villages ahead indicates. In the morning it becomes clear (ὁδιον, 2.2.18) that the enemy has fled overnight, for no pack animal, camp or smoke is visible (ἐφάνη, 2.2.18) anywhere nearby.

22 Contrast the view of the Black Sea: the revelation of the view stems confusion, bringing knowledge and certainty.
enemy has been seen (ἐὼρων, 4.4.8), but some of the stragglers
“...reported that they had seen the gleam of many fires in the night”
(...ἐλεγον ὅτι κατίδοιεν νύκτωρ πολλὰ πυρὰ φαίνοντα, 4.4.9). The
Greeks try to discover the meaning of the fires:

εντεύθεν ἔπεμψαν νυκτὸς Δημοκράτην Τημνίτην ἄνδρας δόντες ἐπὶ
tὰ ὥρη ἐνθα ἐφασαν οἱ ἀποσκεδασμένοι καθορὰν τὰ πυρὰ· οὗτος
gάρ ἐδόκει καὶ πρότερον πολλὰ ἡδη ἀληθεύσαι τοιάυτα, τὰ ὄντα
tε ὃς ὄντα καὶ τὰ μὴ ὄντα ὃς οὐκ ὄντα. πορευθεῖς δὲ τὰ μὲν πυρὰ
οὐκ ἔφη ἰδεῖν...

“They sent Democrats of Temnos with a body of troops during the
night to the mountains where the stragglers said that they had seen
the fires; for this man had the reputation of having given true reports
on many previous such occasions, describing what were facts as facts,
and what were fictions as fictions. When he returned he said that he
had not seen the fires.” (4.4.15–16)²³

Despite the store set by the accuracy of his statements, the Greeks are
none the wiser about the meaning of the fires; rather than producing
clarity and security, sight produces disabling confusion and a sense of
threat.²⁴

The obscurity of the environment articulates its foreignness.
However, the inability of the Greeks confidently to gaze upon and
identify their surroundings also reflects back on their position as

²³ The phrase τὰ ὄντα τε ὃς ὄντα καὶ τὰ μὴ ὄντα ὃς οὐκ ὄντα (“...what exists as
existing and what does not exist as not existing”, 4.4.15) recalls Protagoras 80 B1
(D.–K.), discussed in Pl. Th. 151e–152c.
489–498, where the uncertainty of the meaning intended to be communicated by the
lights is contrasted with the clarity of the spoken message of a herald.
viewers. The anxiety and alienation of the visual experience produces a sense of displacement and disempowerment. The reader, who experiences the landscape and people encountered in the *Anabasis* through the eyes of the Greeks, is implicated in this problem.

Greek sight can also be a matter of the detection and negotiation of obstacles and dangers. In a series of exchanges about what can be seen between Xenophon, who commands the rearguard of the army, and Cheirisophus, who leads the van, looking is an urgent process of discovering what the enemy is doing, what the landscape is like, and therefore how the Greeks should behave. When Xenophon and the rearguard rejoin the main body of the army who are besieging the Taochian stronghold, Cheirisophus explains the situation: “The only way of approach is the one that you see” (Μία αὕτη πάροδός ἦστιν ἦν ὀρᾶς, 4.7.4). They are prevented from taking this route by Taochians who roll stones at those who try to pass. Xenophon points out that once they get past the danger of the stones they will be safe: “There is nothing we can see on the other side except these few men, of whom only two or three are armed” (οὐ γὰρ δὴ ἐκ τοῦ ἐναντίου ὀρῶμεν εἰ μὴ ὀλίγους τούτους ἀνθρώπους, καὶ οὕτων δύο ἡ τρεῖς ὑπλισμένους, 4.7.5). He notes the extent of the dangerous stretch: “As you yourself can see, the distance we must cross under attack is about a plethrum and a half” (τὸ δὲ χωρίον, ὡς καὶ σὺ ὀρᾶς, σχεδὸν τρία ἡμίπλεθρὰ ἦστιν δὲ δεῖ βαλλομένους διελθεῖν, 4.7.6). Again, in the escape from the Carduchians, Cheirisophus refuses Xenophon’s request to wait for the rear while they were under attack; although it is evident (δῆλον,
4.1.17) to Xenophon that something is the matter, there is no opportunity to see (σχολή δ’ οὐκ ἦν ἰδεῖν, 4.1.17) the reason. When Xenophon reproaches him, Cheirisophus responds:

Βλέψον, ἔφη, πρὸς τὰ ὅρη καὶ ἵδε ὡς ἄβατα πάντα ἔστι· μία δ’ αὕτη ὁδὸς ἦν ὀρθὸς ὀρθία, καὶ ἐπὶ ταύτη ἀνθρώπων ὥραν ἔξεστί σοι ὁχλον τοσοῦτον, οἱ κατειληφότες φυλάττουσι τὴν ἐκβασιν. (4.1.20)

"Look," he said, “at the mountains and see how impassable they all are. The only road is that steep one you can see, and it is possible to see on it a great crowd of people who have taken possession of it and are guarding our way out.”

The invitation to look stands in for an explanation of his actions. Similarly, in their escape from Tissaphernes, Cheirisophus sees (ἐώρα, 3.4.38) the enemy ahead, so summons Xenophon to bring the peltasts up from the rear; Xenophon does not do so because he sees Tissaphernes coming into view (ἐπιφανόμενον γὰρ ἐώρα Τισσαφέρνην, 3.4.38). When he later asks Cheirisophus why he has been summoned, Cheirisophus invites him to look for himself (Ἐξεστιν ὥραν, 3.4.39).

In these exchanges, vision is a harried accounting of threats. Although it is to some extent an empowering activity for the Greeks through the implication of self-reliance and pragmatism as they see both dangers and how to overcome them, this is not a leisured or confident vision. The reader’s experience is mediated through Greek sight; circumstances are explained not in an impersonal narrative but through descriptions of what the protagonists can see. In some ways
the visions described represent a unified, inclusive experience. Xenophon and Cheirisophus are in similar positions, negotiating their way through hostile terrain, and they see in similar ways: at one point Xenophon describes what they can jointly see (ὁρῶμεν, 4.7.5). However, the splitting of visual experience between the two characters, as one sees one thing and the other sees another, emphasises the partiality or incompleteness of the Greek experience.²⁵ Along with the protagonists, the reader cannot see the bigger picture, and is presented with explanatory sights piecemeal. Although sight potentially positions the Greeks as resourceful opportunists, it is also an uncomfortable, fragmented experience.

The problem of the security of Greek sight, and its relationship to knowledge, becomes more urgent when viewing is involved in the assertion, and policing, of Greek identity. When Xenophon argues that the 10,000 should make their escape back to Greece after the disaster at Cunaxa, all the officers agree with him except a man called Apollonides, who speaks in the Boeotian dialect (βοιωτιὰκος τὴν φωνὴν); he stresses the difficulty of their position and argues that they must gain the consent of the Persian King for their actions (3.1.26). His dissent from the general opinion is cast as a problem for the security of Greek identity, as Xenophon complains: “This man is a disgrace to his homeland and indeed to the whole of Greece, because he is Greek yet of such a kind as this,” (ὁδεύτως γὰρ καὶ τὴν πατρίδα κατασχῦνει

²⁵ It also implies a sense of competition between the two leaders. See the discussion of conflict between Greeks below.
However, the sanctity of Greek identity is saved as one of the other officers announces:

'Αλλὰ τούτῳ γε οὕτε τῆς Βωοτίας προσήκει οὐδὲν οὕτε τῆς Ἑλλάδος παντάπασιν, ἐπεὶ ἐγὼ αὐτὸν εἶδον ὃσπερ Λυδόν ἀμφότερα τὰ ὑπά τετρυπημένον.

“But this man belongs to neither Boeotia nor to any other part of Greece, for I have seen that he has both ears pierced like a Lydian.” (3.1.31)

This explanation is summarily accepted, and Apollonides driven away. The sight of his ears speaks for itself, declaring his non-Greekness, and outweighs dialect as evidence of identity.26 Conversely, it is the other officers’ role as inspectors and castigators of Apollonides’ non-Greek body that positions them as Greek. However, this positioning is makeshift and expedient: there is no explanatory intervention from the narrator, making clear whether Apollonides really is non-Greek.27 The coincidence of his accent and ears is not explained, leaving the reader with the suspicion that he has been conveniently scape-goated. Sight provides not a determination of identity, but a means of justifying

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26 Xenophon hints that Apollonides’ own vision also reveals his identity. He tells him: Ὅ θαυμασιῶτατε ἀνθρώπε, σύγε οὐδὲ ὀρῶν γιγνώσκεις οὐδὲ ἄκουὼν μέμνησαί. “Oh most wondrous man, you see but you do not perceive; you listen but you do not remember.” (3.1.27) Apollonides’ failure to agree with Xenophon’s suggestion, which casts doubt upon his Greekness, is understood as a failure of sight (and also hearing), which makes him an object of the greatest wonder (θαυμασιῶτατε).

27 Ma (2004) 337 notes that depending on whether Apollonides was a Lydian who had lived in Cyme or Phocaea, learnt Aeolian Greek and therefore sounded “Boeotian”, or was a Boeotian who had lived in Lydia, Greek identity is being defined either on the grounds of descent, or alternatively, on the grounds of commitment to Greek ways of thinking: by the very act of disagreeing, Apollonides is disqualifying himself from being Greek. This conflict between ethnic or cultural models of Greekness relates closely to Panhellenist debates.
claims about identity made for political purposes. The ability of sight securely to position viewer and viewed is both asserted and called into question.

Despite the problems involved in looking at the foreign, these examples all present the viewing of the Greeks as an active means of overcoming and managing their environment. Yet barbarians sometimes also actively control how they and their lands are seen. The hostile faction of Mossynoecians cut off the heads of those they kill and display them to the Greeks, performing a dance as they do so (Ἀποτεμόντες τὰς κεφαλὰς τῶν νεκρῶν ἐπεδείκνυσαν τοῖς Ἐλλησι καὶ τοῖς ἑαυτῶν πολεμίοις, καὶ ἥμα ἐχόρευον νόμῳ τινὶ ἄδοντες, 5.4.17); the Greeks are distressed (μάλα ἡχθοντο, 5.4.18) at the enemy’s display and at Greek losses.28 The Chalybians also cut off the heads of their enemies, carrying them along with them as they march, and they dance and sing whenever they are likely to be seen by their enemies (ὅποτε οἱ πολέμιοι αὐτοὺς ὁψεσθαι ἐμελλον, 4.7.16). They are self-conscious about their visual effect, manipulating their appearance to their advantage.29

28 Xenophon encourages the Greeks by urging them to seem (δόξετε) to those of the barbarians who are their friends that they are better than they, and to show (δηλώσετε) to those who are their enemies that they are different from the men they have fought before, whom Xenophon accuses of indiscipline (5.4.21). The Greeks attempt to regain the advantage by making a display of their own in return.

29 Barbarians are also depicted as displaying themselves at moments where display is not linked to military strategy. The Mossynoecians are laid before the Greek reader in a way that seems exploitative, as their bodies are exposed for the reader’s ethnographic interest: “When the Greeks arrived among the friendly inhabitants, they exhibited to them the children of the well-off inhabitants who had been fattened up on a diet of boiled nuts and were soft and extremely pale, both their backs and their fronts were tattooed all over with multi-coloured flower patterns” (ἐπεί δὲ πορευόμενοι ἐν τοῖς φίλοις ἦσαν, ἐπεδείκνυσαν αὐτοῖς παιδὰς τῶν εὐδαιμόνων σπιτιτούς, τεθραμμένους καρύως ἐφθοίς, ἀπαλούς καὶ λευκούς σφόδρα καὶ οὐ πολλοῦ δέοντας ἰσοὺς τὸ μήκος καὶ
Similarly, the Persian Tissaphernes invites the Greek commander Clearchus not just to look at the landscape, but to see in it the precariousness of his position:

οὐ τοσαύτα μὲν πεδία ἢ ὑμεῖς φίλια ὠντα σὺν πολλῷ πόνῳ διαπορεύεσθε, τοσαύτα δὲ ὅρη ὧρατε ὑμῖν ὠντα πορευσάτα, ἢ ἡμῖν ἔξεστι προκαταλαβοῦσιν ἀπορὰ ὑμῖν παρέχειν...; (2.5.18)

"Do you not behold these vast plains, which even now, when they are friendly, you cross only with great toil; and also these great mountains you have to pass, which we can occupy in advance and make impassable?"

Rather than foreign lands lying passive beneath the gaze of the Greeks, here landscape is produced as a spectacle of Persian supremacy and Greek vulnerability. In his invitation to look, Tissaphernes attempts to foist onto Clearchus a way of seeing the environment which suits his own purposes; the attempt to control Clearchus’ response to the sight becomes an assertion of power.30

30 Greek sight of the foreign is also manipulated to the Greek advantage. When Tissaphernes’ men burn the land so that the Greek army cannot raid it for provisions, Xenophon asks “Do you see, Greek men, that they admit that the land is now ours?” (Ὅρατε, ὥ ἄνδρες Ἑλληνες, ὑφιέστατος τὴν χώραν ἡδή ἡμετέραν εἶναι; 3.5.5). In pointing out the paradox of the Persians burning their own land, Xenophon transforms the aggression of the enemy into a strange foreign sight to be scrutinised by the Greeks, and which is evidence of their own successful conquest. He also suggests that if the Persians conserve any provisions, they will watch the Greeks coming to take them (ὕμνονται καὶ ἡμᾶς ἐντούθα πορευομένους, 3.5.5). The Greeks’ vision of the Persians and the Persians’ vision of the Greeks are both, through the rhetoric of Xenophon, transformed into actions which bolster the Greeks’ position. However, Xenophon’s attempt to control how the troops see the enemy involves not
Greeks looking at Greeks

So far I have discussed how the *Anabasis* formulates the experience of being Greek through the representation of Greek visions of barbarian lands and people. However, the problems involved in Greek sight not only arise in the Greeks’ interaction with their foreign environment, but intervene in the Greeks’ relationship with each other. In the examples mentioned so far, the vision of the 10,000 often seems to operate collectively, as noted earlier, in the scene of the viewing of the Black Sea, the whole army see the same view and respond in the same way (4.7.25). When members of the 10,000 look at each other, viewing can articulate the inter-dependency of the Greeks as a functioning unit. Xenophon warns, “When the men in the battle line see their line break, they will immediately be discouraged” (καὶ εὐθὺς τοῦτο ἀθυμίαν ποιῆσε ὅταν τεταγμένοι εἰς φάλαγγα ταύτην διεσπασμένην όρώσιν, 4.8.10). Similarly, the men’s sight of each other in confident preparation for battle implies their social cohesion, and precedes an efficient and successful attack.

έπει δὲ πάντα παρεσκεύαστο καὶ οἱ λοχαγοὶ καὶ οἱ ὑπολόχαγοι καὶ οἱ ἄξιούντες τούτων μὴ χείρους εἶναι πάντες παρατεταγμένοι ἦσαν, καὶ ἀλλήλους μὲν δὴ ἕννεφρων...(5.2.13)

only the production of power over that enemy but also articulates his position as leader: see below.

31 An exception is the series of exchanges between Xenophon and Cheirisophus (3.4.38–41; 4.1.17–20; 4.7.4–6) discussed above: although their experiences overall are similar, they see different views. Their discussion of sights is collaborative, but it also implies a contest for leadership between them. See Dillery (1995) 70–71 on the interaction of Xenophon and Cheirisophus as a sign of the 10,000’s “mutual defence and cooperation”; however, he also notes the two commanders’ disagreements.
“When all the preparations had been made, the captains, lieutenants and those who considered themselves no worse than them in bravery all arranged themselves in the line and, moreover, looked at one another...”

However, the sense of mutual identification suggested in these examples is frequently challenged; vision among the 10,000 often highlights conflicts in the Greek army on ethnic and class lines, disrupting the cohesion of the “Greekness” of the 10,000.

I begin with ethnicity. After the dissolution of the army into contingents organised by ethnic affiliation, Xenophon and his men come to the rescue of the Arcadians and Achaeans who are under siege on a hilltop. What Xenophon’s contingent see is described in direct discourse; the Arcadians’ sight of the same events is then presented in indirect speech (ἔφασαν, 6.3.25). Xenophon’s men set up camp on a hilltop:

τὰ τῶν πολεμίων πυρὰ ἑώρων, ἀπείχον δὲ ὡς τετταράκοντα στάδιοις, καὶ αὐτοὶ ὡς ἐδύναντο πλείστα πυρὰ ἔκαιον. ἐπεὶ δὲ ἐδείπνησαν τάχιστα, παρηγγέλθη τὰ πυρὰ κατασβενύναι πάντα. (6.3.20–21)

32 Xenophon’s group are presented as highly aware of their own position as both viewers and potential objects of view. Before the episode on the hill, Xenophon orders Timasion to ride ahead, both keeping the rest of the contingent in sight and spying out the territory (ἦφορῶν ἡμᾶς καὶ σκοπεῖτω τὰ ἐμπερόθεν, 6.3.14), and sends out men to high ground, who are to signal if they see anything (ὅπως εἴ ποῦ τί ποθέν καθορίζει, σημαίνων, 6.3.15). The men burn everything they see (ἑώρων, 6.3.19) that is combustible, with the result that the whole country seems to be ablaze and their force appears large (ὡς τε πᾶσα ἡ χώρα αἴδευθαι ἐδόκει καὶ τὸ στράτευμα πολὺ εἶναι, 6.3.19).
"They could see the campfires of the enemy about 40 stades away, and kindled as many fires themselves as they could. But as soon as they had eaten, the order was given to extinguish all the fires."

In the morning they go to the hill where the Arcadians and Achaeans had been besieged. However, “They could see no army, either friendly or hostile” (καὶ οὕχ ὧρῷσιν οὕτε φίλιον στράτευμα οὕτε πολέμιον, 6.3.22). Their response: “It was a wonder to them what had happened” (θαύμα ἦν τί εἶη τὸ γεγενημένον, 6.3.23). As noted in chapter 1, θαύμα is a visual term, related etymologically to the verb θεᾶμα; it can suggest scrutiny of the strange or alien, but it is a highly ambiguous term which also implies awe.

Xenophon’s men set out again, after seeing (ἐώρων) the tracks of the Arcadians and Achaeans in the road (6.3.24). When the two groups meet, “They were overjoyed to see each other and embraced like brothers” (Ἅσμενοὶ τε εἶδον ἀλλήλους καὶ ἡσπάζοντο ὠστερ ἀδελφοὺς, 6.3.24). The interpretation of visual signs becomes a problem for the relationship between the contingents, as the Arcadians ask Xenophon’s men why they extinguished the fires, and explain their reactions to the sight: “We thought at first, when we could no longer see the fires, that you would come against the enemy during the night.” (ὅμεθα ὑμᾶς τὸ μὲν πρῶτον, ἐπειδὴ τὰ πυρὰ οὕχ ἐωρῶμεν, τῆς νυκτὸς ἥξειν ἐπὶ τοὺς πολεμίους, 6.3.25). When Xenophon’s men did not arrive, however, they reinterpreted the lights’ disappearance to mean that Xenophon’s men had learned of their predicament and had run away (6.3.26). This narrative takes place as a consequence of the
army's rejection of a joint Greek identity in its division into ethnic factions. The confusion in the interpretation of sight in the relationship between the two Greek groups hints at this loss of identity; although they embrace like brothers (ὡστερ ἀδελφοὺς, 6.3.24) the Greeks have become wondrously strange (θαυμα, 6.3.23) to each other.

The reader is also involved in this confusion. It is not made clear if the dousing of the fires was an act of deliberate trickery, in order to manipulate the enemy through the use of deceptive visual signs; its result, that there was no army to be seen on the hillside, is a matter of wonder (θαυμα, 6.3.23) to Xenophon's men. The reader, invited to see as the two Greek groups in turn are described as seeing, is potentially alienated from them both; the reader's identification with the 10,000 as "Greeks" is disrupted.

Another moment where vision involves questions of ethnicity occurs when, on reaching Trapezus and re-entering the Greek world, the 10,000 hold sacrifices and games in thanks for their deliverance from barbarian lands. We are told it produced a beautiful spectacle (καλὴ θέα ἐγένετο, 4.8.27), and that there was much rivalry because the companions (or possibly camp-followers) of the competitors were watching (ἂτε θεωμένων τῶν ἐταίρων πολλὴ φιλονικία ἐγένετο,

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33 Cf. the Greeks' use of visual trickery (2.3.3; 2.4.25-6; 5.2.29-30) discussed below.
34 Similarly, just before this incident, we are told that Xenophon's contingent burnt everything that they could see that was combustible, making the whole land appear to be on fire and their force appear large, but are not told that the burning was done deliberately for this reason; it is explained through a result clause, not a purpose clause: ὡστε πᾶσα ἡ χώρα αἰθεσθαί ἐδόκει καὶ τὸ στράτευμα πολὺ εἶναι (6.3.19).
4.8.27). Flamarion Cardoso argues that in these games a unifying Greek identity is produced and confirmed through communal ceremony and action. However, the games contain some incongruities: the majority of participants in the stadium race are boys from the Greeks’ captives (ἡγωνίζοντο δὲ παῖδες μὲν στάδιον τῶν αἴχμαλώτων οἱ πλεῖστοι, 4.8.27); Cretans are apparently the sole participants of the long race (4.8.27); the horse race takes place on a steep slope (4.8.28), a practice explicitly attributed to barbarians in Xenophon’s On Horsemanship; and (depending on a disputed textual reading) women may be present in the audience. L’Allier reads the incorporation of barbarians and barbarian customs into Greek ceremonial as the recognition and celebration of the non-Greek. Golden, on the other hand, sees the games as involved in the construction of Greek identity through “the production of difference”, the categorisation of participants by age, juridical status, ethnicity and (possibly) gender.

How do the games function as spectacle? The phrase κολὴθέα (4.8.27) has been read as triumphalist: “the ordered successful army holding athletic games is a thing of beauty.” However, a few lines before this, Dracontius the Spartan exile, the organiser of the games,  

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35 Golden (1998) 5 argues that τῶν ἑταίρων should be read as feminine not masculine, and that it refers not to the competitors’ companions in arms, but to their concubines; his reading is based on a 16th century textual emendation by Brodaeus. He is followed by Lane Fox (2004b) 202–203.
36 Flamarion Cardoso (2001) 145. Similarly Ma (2004) 338 reads the contests as allowing “the improvisation of community”.
37 Peri Hipp. 8.6.
describes a hard and overgrown hillside as κάλλιστος τρέχειν, excellent for running (4.8.26). On being asked how the men will manage to wrestle on such ground he replies that whoever is thrown will get hurt more (4.8.26). The joke is on Spartan hardiness; what seems κάλλιστος to Dracontius does not seem so to his interlocutors, “the Greeks”, the subject of the passage’s repeated third person plurals (named in the nominative at 4.8.19: οἱ Ἑλλήνες). This raises the question of focalisation. To whom is the spectacle of the games καλή? The audience’s raucous response of shouts, laughter and cheering (ἐνθα πολλὴ κραυγὴ καὶ γέλως καὶ παρακέλευσις ἐγίγνετο, 4.8.28) as horses roll down the slope might demonstrate their collective appreciation of the spectacle, but it also indicates the confusion and diversity of heterogeneous voices. The spectacle could be understood as a simultaneously unifying and unsettling experience, which problematises identities in the 10,000.

Moments of sight also involve the construction of class distinctions within the 10,000. In the scene of the siege and sacking of the Taochian stronghold (4.7.1–14), mentioned above in regard to the spectacular suicide of its inhabitants, another spectacle is presented: that of four Greek captains who contend in bravery, watching each other and treating the army as an audience for their actions. Callimachus runs out to attract the attention of the enemy: “When Agasias saw what Callimachus was doing, and that the whole army was watching, he became afraid that he might not be the first to make the run across to the stronghold” (ὁ δὲ Ἀγασίας ὡς ὅρφι τὸν Καλλίμαχον
In response Agasias runs forward, but when Callimachus sees him he grabs hold of his shield as he goes past; Aristonymus and Eurylochus join in the attack, and the stronghold falls. The capture of the stronghold is told not as a joint achievement of the army as a whole but as the exploit of individuals. They do not cooperate with others, or even with each other: Agasias runs out without telling Aristonymus and Eurylochus, and Callimachus even obstructs Agasias’ progress by grabbing his shield. Sight is used to formulate the captains in heroic mould; the captains, the elite of the army, become the stars of the narrative, with the common soldiers treated as a passive audience whose responses go unmentioned.

A more specific form of class difference formulated through vision is the relation between leader and men. At Cotyora, Xenophon’s surveying of the army’s potential to become a successful city enacts his power over and separation from them:

Ἐν δὲ τούτῳ τῷ χρόνῳ Ἐξοφρώντι, ὄρωντι μὲν ὅπλίτας πολλοὺς τῶν Ἐλλήνων, ὄρωντι δὲ πελταστὰς πολλοὺς καὶ τοξότας καὶ σφενδονήτας καὶ ἵππεας δὲ καὶ μάλα ἤδη διὰ τὴν τριβὴν ἱκανούς, ὄντας δ’ ἐν τῷ Πόντῳ, ἐνθα οὐκ ἀν ἀπ’ ὀλίγων χρημάτων τοσαύτη δύναμις παρεσκευάσθη, καλὸν αὐτῷ ἔδόκει εἶναι χώραν καὶ δύναμιν τῇ Ἐλλάδι προσκτήσασθαι πόλιν κατοικίσαντας. (5.6.15)
“At this time Xenophon, not only seeing the many hoplites of the Greeks, but also seeing the many peltasts, bowmen, slingers and horsemen who were now very proficient through experience, and were at the Euxine Sea, where it would have taken a large amount of money to organise such a large force, thought that it would be a fine thing to obtain territory and power for Greece by founding a city.” This passage has been discussed in terms of its Panhellenic resonances; the unusual concept of founding a city not for any mother city or ethnos but for Greece as a whole “aligns this passage with the views of those best represented by Isocrates who argued that complete panhellenic victory entailed not just the defeat of the Persians but also the colonization of their land by Greek mercenaries”.42 However, the repetition of ὃρωντι with μὲν... δὲ... marks the stimulus to foundation in the transformation of the army into a spectacle of its potential new use by the surveying eye of Xenophon the commander, and also, therefore, relations of power between them; when the men discover his thoughts they oppose him (5.6.19). Xenophon’s claim to be increasing the power of Greece (δύναμιν τῇ Ἑλλάδι προσκτήσασθαι, 5.6.15) is in the light of this rather strange: which Greeks will be empowered? Those referred to as “the Greeks”, the soldiers of the 10,000 (ὁρῶντι μὲν ὀπλίτας πολλοὺς τῶν Ἑλλήνων..., 5.6.15), are apparently excluded from this definition of Greek interests. The claim that foundation is beneficial to Greece veils the class interests at play.

The leaders’ power is also enacted in their control over how they are seen. Xenophon warns the Greek generals and captains to regulate their appearance before the eyes of their men in order to assert control:

οἰ γὰρ στρατιῶται οὖσαν πάντες πρὸς ὑμᾶς βλέπουσι, κἂν μὲν ὑμᾶς ὀρῶσιν ἀθύμουσ, πάντες κακοὶ ἔσονται, ἢν δὲ ὑμεῖς αὐτοὶ τε παρασκευαζόμενοι φανεροὶ ἦτε ἐπὶ τοὺς πολεμίους καὶ τοὺς ἀλλους παρακαλήτε, εὖ ἔστε ὅτι ἔφονται ὑμῖν καὶ πειράσονται μιμεῖσθαι. (3.1.36)

“All these soldiers are looking at you; if they see that you are faint-hearted, they will all be cowards; but if you are visible making preparations against the enemy and you call upon the others, know well that they will follow you and will attempt to imitate you.”

In his speeches as leader, Xenophon draws attention to the visibility of his actions:43 through the phrase ὃς ὀράτε (“as you see”) he appropriates the vision of his audience to reaffirm his power over them. In order to counter accusations that he performed sacrifices at Cotyora in the service of his own schemes, he insists on the visibility, and therefore the transparency, of his actions: “I offer, soldiers, as you see, all the sacrifices I can...” (ἐγώ, ᾧ ἄνδρες, θύματι μὲν ὃς ὀράτε ὁπόσα δύναμαι..., 5.6.28). At Calpe Harbour he invites the men to inspect his sacrifices (θεσομένον, 6.4.15) and states that they have seen the results (ὡς ὀράτε, 6.4.17) in order to prove that he has not

43 Cf. Xenophon’s display of visiting envoys to the men (ἐπεδείκνυεν, 6.6.4).
faked them, as has been rumoured. His appeals to vision are coercive, presenting vision as hermeneutically transparent, providing a claim to power against which there can be no rejoinder.

In these moments of conflict, the identity of the 10,000 as a cohesive, unified force breaks down. This problem is self-consciously addressed when claims about identity are used to affirm a leader’s power. When the army refuses to follow Clearchus in the service of Cyrus, and stones him when he tries to force them on, Clearchus replaces force with display:

“When he realized that he could not accomplish anything by force, he called a meeting of his own troops. First of all, he stood and wept for a long time. As they looked at him the men wondered and were silent.”

Clearchus persuades them to obey him, tricking them into believing he has given up his plan to follow Cyrus (1.3.3–8) by insisting on his loyalty to Greeks over barbarians: “Never shall any man say that after

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44 This phrase is also used deceptively, to manipulate a viewer’s interpretation of a sight. Following the death of Cyrus at Cunaxa, Clearchus sends a message to his barbarian ally Ariaeus, who is on the point of fleeing, that the Greeks have defeated the King “as you see” (ὡς ὅρατε, 2.1.4), and that he should therefore join them. By inviting him to see the Greeks as victors instead of as defeated, Clearchus tries to gain control of Ariaeus and strengthen his own position. Cf. 5.5.21, where Xenophon uses this phrase to threaten the ambassadors from Sinope with the readiness of the army to attack them. It is also used by Cheirisophus to explain the actions of the enemy to the Greek captains and generals (4.6.7).

45 Xenophon similarly both uses his own sight and appropriates the army’s sight as a method of control when, after a period of unrest in the army, he makes a speech in which he declares that he sees (ὁρῶ, 5.7.12) trouble beginning, which displays itself (ὕποδείκνυσιν, 5.7.12) in such a way as to make the army appear (ἀποφαινώμεθα, 5.7.12) shameful, and asks the soldiers to behold what will happen to them if such behaviour continues (θεάσασθε οἷα ἡ κατάστασις ἠμῖν ἔσται τῆς στρατιᾶς, 5.7.26).
leading Greeks into the land of barbarians, I betrayed the Greeks and chose the friendship of the barbarians” (καὶ οὖποτε ἔρει οὔδεις ὡς ἐγὼ Ἐλληνας ἀγαγῶν εἰς τοὺς βαρβάρους, προδούς τοὺς Ἐλληνας τὴν τῶν βαρβάρων φιλίαν εἰλόμην..., 1.3.5). Clearchus sets himself up before the eyes of the men as a spectacle of Greekness. However, later he tricks the men back into Cyrus’ service (1.3.9–1.4.21). The use of visual display is made equivalent to the use of force as an assertion of power. The rhetoric of ethnic affiliation is used to mask class difference, silencing dissent.

Clearchus re-establishes control by invoking their joint identity as Greeks, encouraging the men to identify with him as they watch him weep; however, as indicated earlier, the men’s response of wonder to the sight is ambiguous, implying not just awed subjection, but a sense of estrangement. The troops are won over by the display; their solidarity with Clearchus affirms and constructs their unified identity. However, the cynical deceptiveness of Clearchus simultaneously formulates divisions between them, through the reinscription of relations of domination.

This deceptiveness may also problematise the reader’s response; as Hesk argues, deception is often marked as a peculiarly Spartan characteristic in Athenian thought – and indeed, Clearchus is shown as the instigator of deceptive displays elsewhere in the text, although usually with barbarians as his audience (see below).46 Although

46 Hesk (2000) 23–40. For Clearchus’ deceptive displays see 2.1.4, 2.1.16–18, 2.2.16, 2.3.3 and 2.4.25–26; the viewers of these displays are barbarians except at 2.1.16–18, where Phalinus, the Greek envoy of the Persian King, is the viewer. Cf. the
Clearchus' Spartan origins are not mentioned at this point and his audience is specified as his own troops (1.3.2), for the (Athenian) reader the problem of identification and alienation raised by Clearchus' display may also become a problem of cross-cultural response.47

The political manipulation of Greek sight of Greeks appears particularly starkly when used to bolster appeals to a shared identity outside the ranks of the 10,000, and even across enemy lines. When the Greek Phalinus comes as a messenger from the Persian King to demand that the 10,000 surrender, Clearchus reminds him that the Greek force have seen him, and invites him to look at them in return: "I have looked at you with pleasure, Phalinus, and I think so too have all these others; for you are Greek just as we are, whose numbers you can see for yourself" (Ἐγώ σε, ὥ Φαλίνε, ἡσμενος ἑόρακα, οἶμαι δὲ καὶ οἱ ἄλλοι πάντες· σὺ τε γὰρ Ἔλλην εἶ καὶ ἡμεῖς τοσοῦτοι ὄντες ὀσοὺς σὺ ὄρξε, 2.1.16). Clearchus attempts to play on Phalinus' sense of deceptions of the Spartans Anaxibius (7.1.1-31) and Aristarchus (7.2.12-16). However, other Spartan characters, for example Cheirisophus, are not shown as deceptive, whereas some non–Spartans are deceptive. These include barbarians such as Cyrus, Tissaphernes and Seuthes, but also Greeks (5.6.35; 7.1.33-41); Xenophon himself could be included in the latter category in the sense that he is shown as carefully manipulating the responses of the troops. See Hirsch (1985) 14-38 on deception in the An..

47 The idea that Clearchus' Spartan origins may be understood to be "on display" in his spectacle before the troops is indicated in the exchange between Xenophon and Cheirisophus where they taunt each other about occupying, or "stealing", a mountain (4.6.13–16). Xenophon says stealing should be easy for Cheirisophus as he has been trained in it through Spartan education; he tells him to "display his education", (ἐπιδείξασθαι τὴν παιδείαν, 4.6.15). Cheirisophus retorts that Xenophon should find stealing no less difficult, as Athenians are practised in stealing public funds, and asks him in turn to "display his education" (ἐπιδείκνυσθαι τὴν παιδείαν, 4.6.16). The implication is that Cheirisophus' and Xenophon's actions in occupying the mountain will constitute, respectively, displays of Spartan and Athenian identity - yet the claims made about each of these "identities" are self-consciously focalised from the point of view of an outsider and are framed antagonistically, especially Cheirisophus' claim, which, unlike Xenophon's description of Spartan education, does not relate to any genuine aspect of Athenian education but "constitutes a critique of adult Athenian political leadership in the democracy": Hesk (2000) 136.
Greekness, wishing to boost morale in the army by having him advise the Greeks to refuse to give up their arms. The claim of pleasure in seeing Phalinus and the invitation to Phalinus to see the Greeks imply that their mutual viewing is to be imagined as producing a relationship of communality; but this suggestion is also undercut by the potentially intimidating reference to the large number of Greeks at whom Phalinus is invited to look (τοσοῦτοι).

In attempting to persuade him, Clearchus tells Phalinus that his actions will be reported in Greece (2.1.17) and even imagines how the story of Phalinus might be told should he switch sides ("Once upon a time Phalinus, when he was sent by the King to order the Greeks to surrender their arms, gave them, when they sought his counsel, the following advice," 2.1.17). The proposal of an alternative story of Greek solidarity in adversity functions as metanarrative, and is heavily ironic: the fact that the Anabasis is not such a comfortable narrative is paraded all the more starkly. Clearchus’ claim is described as a trick (ὑπῆγετο, 2.1.18), as is Phalinus’ response (ὑποστρέψας, 2.1.18), which dresses threat in the language of concerned advice (2.1.19). Clearchus’ invocation of mutual viewing as productive of common bonds is self-consciously undercut.48

Other viewers

48 See also the contrast between appeals to a shared Greekness and hostility between Greeks in the encounter with the Sinopeans (5.5.7–5.6.3), discussed by Rood (2004) 318.
I have so far examined the Greeks' experience of viewing their foreign environment, and their experience of looking at each other. However, the Greeks are not the only viewers in the text; it is to the experiences of non-Greek viewers that I now turn. The vision of others is usually only mentioned when the 10,000 are the object of it; there is usually little interest in the independent subjectivity of foreigners.49 Descriptions of the viewing of barbarians often focus on their subjection to the Greeks' assertive display.50 The 10,000 disfigure enemy corpses, to create the most terrifying sight possible for the enemy (ὡς ὁτι φοβερῶτατον τοῖς πολεμίοις εἶη ὃρᾶν, 3.4.5). They kill one hostage before the eyes of another (ὁρῶντος τοῦ ἐτέρου) in order to induce cooperation (4.1.23). When messengers arrive from the Persian king, Clearchus arranges the army so that it should be an impressive sight from all sides (ὡς καλῶς ἔχειν ὁρᾶσθαι πάντη, 2.3.3), and comes forward with the best armed and best looking troops about him (τοὺς τε εὐοπλωτάτους ἔχων καὶ εὐειδεστάτους τῶν αὐτοῦ στρατιωτῶν, 2.3.3). Similarly, when the illegitimate

49 An exception is the complex representation of Cyrus (for which see the discussion below).
50 Barbarian sight of the Greeks is also imagined as a hostile act which needs redress (“now they have seen us, these men must not be allowed to have a pleasant dinner or to camp wherever they want”, οὐ δεῖ ἔτι τοῦτους, ἔτει ἡμᾶς πάντως εἴδον, ἡδέως δειπνῆσαι οὔθ' ὁποῦ ἄν θέλωσι σκηνῆσαι, 6.5.21) or which implies the need for active self-presentation (“if we waste this day, the enemy who are now looking at us will be emboldened”, εἰ γὰρ διατρίψουμεν τὴν τήμερον ἡμέραν, οἱ τε γὰρ ἡμᾶς ὀρῶντες πολέμιοι θαρραλεύστεροι ἔσονται, 4.6.9). Similarly, the moment when the Greeks and their enemies first see each other is depicted as presaging the first clash in battle between them, and therefore in some ways as equivalent to it: “lead the way towards our adversaries...since now we have been seen and have seen our enemies” (προψτείθε τὴν πρὸς τοὺς ἐναντίους...ἐπεὶ ὑμήδημεν καὶ εἴδομεν τοὺς πολέμιους, 6.5.10). Cf. moments when Greek and barbarian sight of each other prompts or prefigures the first battle contact (4.2.7; 6.5.30). The barbarian sight of the Greeks can also imply a sense of threat, as when although the Persians do not attack them as feared, Glus watches what they are doing (2.4.24).
brother of the Persian king watches (ἐθεώρει, 2.4.25) the Greeks as they pass by, Clearchus organises the men so that they march two abreast and periodically halt; the effect is that the army seems very large, even to the Greeks themselves (καὶ αὐτοῖς τοῖς Ἐλλησι, and the Persian is astonished as he watches (τὸν Πέρσην ἐκπεπλήξθαι θεωρούντα) (2.4.26). However, some portrayals of non-Greek viewing describe more complex responses; the introduction of alternative perspectives impacts on the experience of the reader.

I begin with the spectatorship of the Paphlagonians. After inflicting much harm on Paphlagonia through pillage, the 10,000 entertain Paphlagonian ambassadors at dinner. The 10,000 present displays of dances belonging to different ethnic groups making up their army, not all of whom are in fact Greek (6.1.5-13); dances are performed by Thracians, Aenianians, Magnesians, a Mysian (who also dances the Persian dance), Mantineans and Arcadians. Emphasis is placed on reactions to the dances. We are told that the dance of the Mysian “...seemed a beautiful sight” (...δψιν καλὴν φαίνεσθαι (6.1.9),

51 The 10,000 also make use of deceptive appearances when they escape from the Drilae by setting up a false ambush: a group of soldiers pretend to be trying to escape the notice (λανθάνειν) of the enemy, but their shields now and then gleam (ἀλλοτε καὶ ἀλλοτε διεφαίνοντο). The enemy, seeing this (διορώντες), are afraid; the disturbance allows the Greek army to escape (5.2.29-30). Similarly, Clearchus wishes the army to flee while avoiding the appearance of flight (φυλαττόμενος μὴ δοκοίη φεύγειν, 2.2.16); and Xenophon urges them to set out on the journey for Greece without being visible (φανερῶς, 3.2.24) doing so because if the Persian king saw (ἐώρα, 3.2.24) that they wished to stay he would help them to leave

52 Descriptions of barbarian discomfiture at the sight of the Greeks do not always involve deliberate display. When the Greeks decide to reverse the direction of their march and go back the way they had come after reaching a river that is difficult to cross, they are described as producing a confusing spectacle for their enemies: “The result was that the enemy did not attack, but just watched, and appeared to be wondering where the Greeks would go and what they had in mind” (ὠστε οἱ πολέμιοι οὐ προσήλαυνον, ἀλλὰ ἐθεώντο καὶ ὁμοίως ἦσαν ἥθαυμάζειν ὅποι ποτὲ τρέφονται οἱ Ἐλληνες καὶ τί ἐν νῷ ἔχοιεν, 3.5.13).
but are not told whose reaction this represents. No Greek responses to the dances are described, but the responses of the Paphlagonians are presented. They cry out (καὶ ἀνέκραγον οἱ Παφλαγόνες, 6.1.6) when the Thracian dancers imitate killing one another; also, “The Paphlagonians, as they looked on, thought it strange that all the dances were performed in arms” (ὁρῶντες δὲ οἱ Παφλαγόνες δεινὰ ἐποιοῦντο πᾶσας τὰς ὄρχησεις ἐν ὀπλοῖς εἶναι, 6.1.11).

The Paphlagonian reaction is made the object of visual scrutiny: “At this the Mysian, seeing how astounded they were, persuaded one of the Arcadians who owned a dancing girl to let him bring her in...” (ἐπὶ τούτοις ὁ Μυσός ἐκπεπληγμένους αὐτούς, πείσας τῶν Ἀρκάδων τινὰ πεπαμένον ὄρχηστρίδα εἰσάγει..., 6.1.12). The Mysian gives the dancing girl a shield and has her perform the Pyrrhic. The Paphlagonians’ response to this display is to ask the Greeks whether their women fight alongside them (οἱ Παφλαγόνες ἠροντο εἰ καὶ γυναῖκες συνεμάχοντο αὐτοῖς, 6.1.13).

L’Allier reads this scene as demonstrating the relativity of responses to all cultural practices, by presenting the barbarian audience’s bafflement at Greek customs. Although useful in highlighting Greek exposure to barbarian eyes as potentially problematic, this reading does not take account of relations of power between the two groups. The Paphlagonians pose a threat to the Greeks – they have been kidnapping stragglers from the army (6.1.1). However, they have been doing this as a response to Greek pillaging of

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their territory; the Greeks entertain the Paphlagonians by sacrificing the Paphlagonians’ own cattle which they had previously stolen from them (6.1.4). The Paphlagonians have come to the Greeks in order to sue for peace; the decision about whether to make an alliance is put off until after the banquet. The display becomes a site for the contestation of power.54 The Greek (and Mysian) objects of viewing attempt to gain the advantage over their audience. In the armed dances they present themselves to the ambassadors as warlike and violent; the dances could be interpreted as a warning to these spectators who are still at this moment their enemies.55

Barbarian vision also problematises identities in the 10,000. The display highlights the army’s ethnic diversity. The dances presented by

54 See also the 10,000’s relations with Seuthes, where vision becomes the site of contest. Seuthes is presented as assertive in his use of vision. He leaves the Greeks to rest while he goes ahead to look around (σκεφάμενος, 7.3.41); he scans the snow (ἔσκεψαντο, 7.3.42) for footprints of his enemy and makes decisions based on what he sees (ἀποδέχεται ἄρα τὴν ὀθόνην, 7.3.42). He rides ahead of the Greeks “so that if we catch sight of anyone, he may not escape” (ὅτι μὴ ἄρα ὑπάρχοντας ὠδωμέν, μὴ δικαιοφυγών, 7.3.43); on seeing (κατίδων, 7.3.44) enemy villages, he attacks. On the Greeks’ first approach to his camp, Xenophon and his men come upon unmanned watch-fires placed in front of the pickets so that the pickets might remain unseen (μὴ ὄρῳντο, 7.2.18) in the darkness, whereas anyone who approached would be visible (καταρακτίζεις, 7.2.18). (Cf. the attack of the Thynians on the Greeks: they attack from the shadows those made vulnerable by the light of fires: ἡ ὁμίλησε τῷ δυνάμει τῷ σκότους, 7.4.18). When Xenophon seeks assurances from him of the security of a truce with the enemy, Seuthes tells him to have no fear and displays hostages to him as proof (ὅ δὲ θερρεῖν ἑκάπετο καὶ ἔδειξεν ὁμήρους παρόντας αὐτῶν, 7.4.12) – yet the enemy attack in the night. However, when relations between Seuthes and the 10,000 have broken down, Xenophon attempts to re-establish control over their visual relations. Xenophon informs Seuthes that he ought to be grateful to the Greeks because they have made him visible (εἰς τὸ φανερὸν, 7.7.22) by making him king over a wide territory. He presses him to honour his obligations by asserting that he sees (ὁ ὄρῳ, 7.7.24) that the words of the untrustworthy are without power (ἀνυπόθεσιν, 7.7.24), whereas if men are visible practising truth, their words have more power than does force (οἱ δὲ ἄν φανεροὶ ἡμῖν ἀληθεύειν ἀσκούντες, τοῦτον οἱ λόγοι, ἐν τι δείκνυσι, οὐδὲν μεῖον δύνανται ἀνύποθεσιν ἡ ἄλλως ἡ βία, 7.7.24). He asks Seuthes whether his newly conquered subjects are likely to feel more fear if they should see (ὁρᾶντες, 7.7.30) that the Greeks would be willing to return if he recalled them, or if they would not. Xenophon attempts to remodel their relationship by transforming Seuthes into the vulnerable object of the gaze of himself and others.55 See Ma (2004) 339.
the different groups are similar in that they are armed, but are very different in the way they are acted out and in the stories that they tell; and they include a Mysian dancing the Persian dance, and a female slave dancing the Pyrrhic. In response to the Paphlagonian question about whether the women accompanying the 10,000 fight alongside them, the Greeks reply that it was these very women who put the Persian King to flight from his camp (οἱ δ’ ἔλεγον ὅτι αὐταὶ καὶ αἱ τρεφάμεναι ἐὰν βασιλέα ἐκ τοῦ στρατοπέδου, 6.1.13). The reply emphasises the deliberate irony with which the display of the dancing girl is invested. Xenophon does not say how the Paphlagonians react to the Greek reply. Do they take it as a joke? Do they realise they are being duped? The evidence of vase painting informs us that women did dance the Pyrrhic in Greece (although it is unclear in what contexts).56 Yet the decision to use the female war dance to tease the Paphlagonians implies recognition of its likelihood to confound; and to complicate matters more, the dance is orchestrated not by a Greek but by a Mysian.

The response of the Paphlagonians marks their lack of sophistication, as they confuse representation with reality in their shock at the mimicry of battle (6.1.6);57 indeed, from Aristophanes'

56 Representations of women performing armed dances have been read as indicative of ritual, but also as the dances of hetairai. See Liventhal (1985); Poursat (1968) 586–615; Ceccarelli (1998) 58–80. Lane Fox (2004b) 191 speculates on where the dancing girl might have learned this dance – whether she had been brought from Greece and so might have learned it there, or whether she had been acquired during the course of the journey.

57 The inability to understand mimetic representation is a mark of ignorance and stupidity in ancient thought; cf. the fear of Encolpius on seeing a painting of a dog in Petron. Sat. 29.
Knights onwards, Paphlagonians were people to poke fun at.\textsuperscript{58} However, although the ingenuous confusion of the Paphlagonians might alienate the reader from their way of seeing, the incongruity of the dances complicates the reader’s identification with the 10,000: are their various dances a display of unity and cohesion, or of fracture? Is the ironic take on Greek culture in the Mysian’s staging of the female Pyrrhic a sophisticated insider’s joke which playfully reaffirms the collective identity of the 10,000 through the implication of their shared knowledge (from which the Paphlagonians are excluded), or is Greek culture being sent up by a foreigner?\textsuperscript{59} A similar question could be asked about the Mysian’s performance of the Persian dance: is he putting on a show of the exotic, or does he treat the Persian dance as his own, equally valid, contribution? The Greek reply to the Paphlagonians’ question about female warriors (6.1.13) implies that they are in on the joke, but no Greek reaction to the slave girl’s dance is given; we are told that the dance received great applause (ἐνταῦθα κρότος ἦν πολύς, 6.1.13) without mention of who is applauding. How is the reader to respond to the display? In the ambiguous responses of internal audiences, the reader’s identification with the text’s Greek protagonists is problematised.

Visual relationships are similarly complex in the description of the interaction between the 10,000 and Cyrus the Younger, whose position as a ruler is shown as produced through his own assertive

\textsuperscript{58} Ar. Eq. contains the humorous figure “the Paphlagonian”; see also Luc. Alex. where Paphlagonians are stupid (9), as brainless as sheep (15) and easily deceived (17).
\textsuperscript{59} See Urry (2002) on the construction of the culturally “authentic” in displays for foreign tourists.
sight, and through his control over his visual availability and the visual effect of others. Cyrus is sometimes described as viewing the Greeks in a way which implies his superior position as their commander, as when he surveys the ranks before the battle of Cunaxa:

καί ὁ Κῦρος παρελαύνων οὐ πάνυ πρὸς αὑτῷ στρατεύματι κατεθεάτο ἐκατέρωσε ἀποβλέπτων εἰς τε τοὺς πολεμίους καί τοὺς φίλους (“Cyrus, riding at some distance from his army, looking in

60 If Cyrus saw (ὅρῳ, 1.9.19) that someone was a just administrator, he would reward him; he gave gifts to friends according to whatever needs he saw them to have (καὶ δὲνό μάλιστα ὁρῶ ἔκαστον δεόμενον, 1.9.23). More ambiguous, however, is the moment when he catches sight of the Persian King (καθορῆξ, 1.8.26) and attacks: “And on the instant he lost control of himself and, with the cry “I see the man”, rushed upon him...” (καὶ εὐθὺς οὐκ ἦνέσχετο, ἀλλ᾽ εἰπών Τὸν ἄνδρα ὅρῳ ἔτο ἐπ᾽ αὐτῶν... 1.8.26). Although vision and violent self-assertion are equated in his battle-cry, Cyrus’ sight does not articulate power but a loss of self-command which leads to his death, when he is struck under the eye (ὑπὸ τὸν ὀφθαλμὸν, 1.8.27).

61 He displayed (ἐπέδειξεν, 1.9.7) the fact that if he made a treaty he would not break his word; he displayed (ἐπεδείκνυτο, 1.9.10) that he would not abandon the Milesian exiles; and he was visible (φανερῶς, 1.9.11) outdoing any benefit or harm that another might do to him. He is depicted as carefully controlling his visual effect: “Whenever he was on the march and was likely to be seen by very many people, he would call his friends to him and engage them in earnest conversations, in order to show whom he honoured.” (εἰ δὲ δὴ ποτε πορεύοιτο καὶ πλείστοι μέλλοιν ὃμοσθη, προσκόλλων τοὺς φίλους ἐσπουδαιολογεῖτο, ὡς δηλοῖν οὔς τιμᾷ, 1.9.28).

62 Under him the brave appeared (φαίνεσθαι, 1.9.15) prosperous and the cowards like slaves; if someone was visible wishing to display his upright character (εἷς γε μὴν δικαιοσύνην εἰς τις φανερῶς γένοιτο ἐπεδεικνύσθαι βουλόμενος, 1.9.16) Cyrus ensured he lived more opulently; and he appeared (ἐφαίνετο) to allow those who were openly (φανερῶς) rich to prosper, but confiscated the wealth of those who tried to conceal it (1.9.19). Like Cyrus The Great in the scene of the Indian embassy (Cyr 2.4.1–6), Cyrus replaces personal adornment with other forms of display: he considers a man’s greatest adornment to be well adorned friends (ὡς φίλους δὲ καλῶς κεκοσμήμενος μέγιστον κόσμον ἄνδρι νομίζει, 1.9.23; cf. Cyr. 8.3.4). Cf. the execution of Orontas, a Persian nobleman who betrays Cyrus: “When those who had previously prostrated themselves before him saw him, even then they prostrated themselves, although they saw that he was being led to his death” (ἐπεὶ δὲ εἰδὼν αὐτὸν οὔπερ πρόσθεν προσέκυνουν, καὶ τότε προσεκυνήσαν, καίτερ εἰδότες δὴ ἐπὶ θάνατον ἄγοι, 1.6.10). Orontas’ power over his followers is produced in the visual draw he exerts, so that the sight of him, even as a condemned prisoner, compels their subjection; Cyrus not only has Orontas killed but eradicates his influence by rendering him invisible: “After this no-one ever saw Orontas again, either living or dead, nor could anyone say from knowledge how he died - it was all conjectures, of one sort and another; and no grave of his was ever seen” (μετὰ ταῦτα οὔπερ ζῶντα οὐδὲ τεθνηκότα οὔδεις εἰδὼ πάσητο, οὐδὲ ὅπως ἀπέθανεν οὔδεις εἰδώς ἐλεγεν· εἰκαζον δὲ ἄλλοι ἄλλως· τάφος δὲ οὐδεὶς πάσητο αὕτω ἔρανη, 1.6.11).
either direction gazed upon both enemies and friends," 1.8.14).
However, his viewing can also imply a sense of communality with the
Greeks, as when he watches the Arcadians' Lycaean festival (ἐθεώρει
dὲ τὸν ἄγωνα καὶ Κῦρος, 1.2.10).63

A particularly ambiguous scene is the description of Cyrus' viewing of a spectacular Greek military display, after Cyrus arranges a
military review on the request of a Cilician queen who has given him
funds when he is unable to pay the army's wages. He looks at first the barbarians and then the Greeks (ἐθεώρει οὖν ὁ Κῦρος πρῶτον μὲν
τοὺς βαρβάρους... εἶτα δὲ τοὺς Ἕλληνας, 1.2.16) who make up his
army. Then Cyrus orders the Greeks to advance:

ἐκ δὲ τούτου θάττον προίόντων σὺν κραυγῇ ἀπὸ τοῦ αὐτομάτου
dρόμου ἐγένετο τοῖς στρατιώταις ἐπὶ τὰς σκηνὰς, τῶν δὲ
βαρβάρων φόβος πολύς, καὶ ἡ τῇ Κίλισσᾳ ἔφυγεν ἐπὶ τῆς
ἀρμαμάξης καὶ οἱ ἐκ τῆς ἀγορᾶς καταλιπτόντες τὰ ἄνια ἔφυγον. οἱ
dὲ Ἕλληνες σὺν γέλωτι ἐπὶ τὰς σκηνὰς ἠλθον. ἡ δὲ Κίλισσα ἰδοῦσα
τὴν λαμπρότητα καὶ τὴν τάξιν τοῦ στρατεύματος ἑθαύμασε. Κῦρος
dὲ ἥσθη τὸν ἐκ τῶν Ἕλληνων εἰς τοὺς βαρβάρους φόβον ἴδων.
(1.2.17–18)

63 Greek visions of Cyrus can suggest their abjection before him: Clearchus warns the troops who wish to rebel from Cyrus what a dangerous enemy he would make: "he has a power - infantry, cavalry and fleet - which we all alike see and know about" (ἐχει δὲ δύναμιν καί πεζὴν καὶ ἱππικήν καὶ ναυτικήν ἡν πάντες ὁμοίως ὁρῶμεν τε καὶ ἐπιστάμεθα, 1.3.12). Slightly more complex, however, is the wonder of the Greeks that Cyrus does not appear after the battle, which marks their vulnerability without him, but also suggests surprise at curious Persian behaviour: καὶ ἂν μὲν ἑθαύμαζον ὅτι οὐδομοῦ Κῦρος φαίνοιτο, 1.10.16; οἱ στρατηγοὶ ἑθαύμαζον ὅτι Κῦρος οὔτε ἄλλον πέμπει σημανοῦντα ὅ τι χρή ποιεῖν οὔτε αὐτὸς φαίνοιτο, 2.1.2. Cf. the wonder of the Greeks who see Persians riding about after the assassination of the generals (οἱ δὲ Ἕλληνες τὴν τε ἱππασίαν ἑθαύμαζον ἐκ τοῦ στρατοπέδου ὁρῶντες καὶ ὅ τι ἐποίουν ἠμφεγνόουν, 2.5.33).
"As they went on faster and faster, at length with a shout the troops broke into a run of their accord, in the direction of the camp. This terrified the barbarians; the Cilician woman fled in her carriage and the market workers abandoned their wares and ran away. The Greeks, meanwhile, with a roar of laughter came up to their tents. The Cilician woman, seeing the brilliance and discipline of the army, was filled with wonder; and Cyrus was pleased to see the fear with which the Greeks inspired the barbarians."

Internal responses to the display problematise the reader’s response. Whose display is it? Is it a triumphant, self-validating display of Greek success? Although the queen is afraid and runs away, the display of the army has been staged at her request; the queen attempts to display her status in the spectacle of an army which she has paid for. Her wonder (ἔθαύμασε, 1.2.18) at the sight is ambiguous. It indicates her curiosity at the surprising behaviour of foreigners, and also implies her abjection before them.

The Greeks advance on the order of Cyrus, but break into a run of their own accord (1.2.17). Their spectacular appearance receives attention: “They all had bronze helmets, crimson tunics, greaves and

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65 καὶ λέγεται δεδηνήαι ἢ Κίλισσα Κύρου ἐπιδείξατι τὸ στράτευμα αὐτῆς·

ουν ἐπιδείξατι ἐξέτασιν ποιεῖται ἐν τῷ πεδίῳ τῶν Ἑλλήνων καὶ τῶν

βαρβάρων, “It is said that the Cilician woman asked Cyrus to display his army to her. As he himself wished to make such a display, he held a review of the Greeks and barbarians on the plain,” (1.2.14). The repetition of the vocabulary of display (ἐπιδείξαι...ἐπιδείξαι), and the insertion of βουλόμενος to describe Cyrus’ desire for the display which the Cilician requests, suggests a conflict between them as to whose power the display enacts. Contrast Baragwanath (2002) 140: arguing for a reciprocal relationship between Cyrus and the queen, she claims "βουλόμενος, along with the repetition of ἐπιδείξαι, expresses the exact harmony of her wish with his desire to fulfil it" and is evidence of "their perfect philia".
uncovered shields" (εἶχον δὲ πάντες κράνη χαλκᾶ καὶ χιτῶνας φοινικοῦς καὶ κνημίδας καὶ τὰς ἄσπιδας ἐκκεκαλυμμένας, 1.2.16). Is the display Cyrus' display, asserting his military might, or is this an act of self-assertion by the Greeks which insists upon their independence from Cyrus' command? Their response of laughter, which no-one else shares, hints at their autonomy.

Despite the flouting of his orders (through an excessive interpretation of them), Cyrus is pleased. He feels pleasure at the fear with which the Greeks inspire the barbarians (τὸν ἐκ τῶν Ἑλλήνων εἰς τοὺς βαρβάρους φόβον, 1.2.18) despite the fact that he himself is a barbarian; apparently, from his point of view the display is a success, producing his power. How will the reader respond? Will the reader also feel pleasure at the Greek spectacle, identifying with the Persian potentate, or will the reader be alienated from Cyrus' way of seeing? What would a Greek response consist in? In Cyrus' gratified gaze the potential of vision to produce secure identifications is destabilised. The reader is left unsure how to look at the Greeks; equally, the reader's understanding of his or her own position as Greek is subtly undermined.

A similar moment occurs when Cyrus appropriates Greek sight, as he intervenes in the conflict between the troops of the Greek leaders Menon and Clearchus; he warns that if they fight each other, both he and they will be killed: “If things go wrong for us, all these barbarians you can see will be more hostile towards us than those fighting for the King” (κακῶς γὰρ τῶν ἡμετέρων ἐχόντων πάντες οὗτοι οὗς ὀρᾷε
The term “barbarian” is not only used by the narrator to explain Cyrus’ response, but is put into his mouth. The scene is highly ironic. Cyrus identifies his own followers as barbarians who risk becoming opposed to “us” (ἡμῖν). The Greeks are invited to look at and identify his troops’ barbarian status, and therefore, implicitly, their own united identity as Greeks; by offering this threatening sight, Cyrus also invites the Greeks to identify with him. The Greeks’ response is immediately to obey and abandon their quarrel. Viewing becomes involved in the production of identity; but the fact that it is a barbarian who presents this view subverts a straightforward reading of the formation of identities through sight. The constructed nature of claims about identity is self-consciously addressed.

Sight is also involved in the production of Cyrus’ power, as he asserts his control over the Greeks. As in Clearchus’ display to his troops discussed above, the implication of a united identity is used to suppress internal Greek conflict. Sight is appropriated to affirm the necessity of existing structures of domination. The political investment in the invitation to view is laid before the reader. Will the reader be convinced by the sight Cyrus offers, as the Greeks of the narrative appear to be, and identify simultaneously with the Greeks and with Cyrus, succumbing to his control? Sight becomes a fraught, contested

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66 Cf. Cyrus’ speech to the Greeks in which he says that they are superior to barbarians (1.7.3–4) discussed above.
moment of self-positioning, in which the construction of identity is self-consciously both over-determined and destabilised.

Conclusion

To conclude, what sort of experience of being Greek do the visual experiences of the Anabasis offer its readers? Although the Greek viewers of the text are sometimes placed in an empowered position, Greek visions of the foreign are often threatening, ambiguous or obscure; viewing the foreign can be a disturbing process. When Greeks view other Greeks, the reader's identification with the text's Greek protagonists is challenged through the involvement of vision in divisions among the 10,000 on ethnic and class lines and in conflicts between leaders and men. The problem of identification is also posed in the representation of non-Greek viewers: the reader is invited simultaneously to identify with and be alienated from both the barbarian viewers and the Greek objects of view. Further, issues of identity are often self-consciously addressed: the attempt to foster a shared identity through sight is manipulated in the domination of one group of Greeks by another, and in the domination of the Greeks by Cyrus.

By allowing the reader vicariously to experience travel in Asia through the eyes of the 10,000, but also critically to view the 10,000 both from the perspective of an inside observer and through the eyes of others, the Anabasis engages the reader in testing out the implications of Panhellenic unity. However, the text reveals not only
the possibilities offered by unified Greek action, but also the tendency for Greek identity to fragment and for claims about Greek identity to be put to work in political manoeuvring: although some moments of sight offer a self-validating model of Greekness, in the conflicts involved in vision and its manipulation in the acquisition of power, the processes of identity formation are destabilised. In its representation of vision, we can see the *Anabasis* engaging with the problem of what it means to be Greek in a troubling and uncertain period, in a way which is highly revealing for the history of Greek self-consciousness in the early fourth century.
4. Vision, imperialism and the politics of reading in the *Cyropaedia*

In the above chapter we have seen how the representation of the Greek sight of foreign lands in the *Anabasis* constructs the experience of being Greek: whereas sometimes the Greek viewing of the non-Greek is a comfortable, self-confident experience, frequently it can be much more unsettling, reflecting back on and undermining the secure, distanced position of the reader. Similar issues are raised in the *Cyropaedia* in a series of scenes in which the reader is confronted with barbarian, and particularly Persian, spectacles.

The *Cyropaedia* offers a number of challenges to the historian. In telling the story of Cyrus the Great’s conquest of one people after another, culminating in his establishment of the Persian Empire, Xenophon is narrating the antecedents to the eventual invasion and attempted conquest of Greece. No discussion of Persia from the Classical period onwards can have been written or read without an awareness of the threat Persia had posed, and in Xenophon’s day continued to pose, to Greek self-determination.¹ The subject is provocative, and politically charged. Xenophon never comments on the later consequences of his narrative for Greece.² How would a Greek

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¹ E.g. Persia’s support for Sparta in the Ionian War, 413/12; the conflicts between Sparta, Athens and Persia in the aftermath of the Peloponnesian War; Persian intervention in Greek affairs in and after the King’s Peace, 387/86. See Ryder (1965); Hamilton (1979); Kagan (1987).

² However, the “Greeks in Asia” are listed as one of the conquered peoples making up Cyrus’ empire (1.1.4).
reader respond to such a representation of Persians and Persian imperialism? Or alternatively, what sort of Greek subject is imagined by the text? In this chapter I wish to indicate some of the ways in which the *Cyropaedia* is valuable as a source for ancient conceptions of cultural and political identity, imperialism, political power and conquest, by considering how scenes of viewing position the reader in Xenophon’s representation of the Persian conquest of Asia.

The *Cyropaedia*’s Persian subject-matter has been treated as a problem to be discounted, as a mine of factual information, or as incidental to the concerns of the text. Early 20th century commentators denied that the *Cyropaedia* is about Persia in the first place. Unable to countenance what he reads as an idealising portrayal of a Persian, the Loeb translator Miller claimed that Persian virtues act as ciphers for Greek virtues; the *Cyropaedia* has even been read as an elaborate historical allegory which is “really” about Greeks, and whose aim is in fact anti-Persian. Where the representation of the Persians has been the subject of interest, it has been as a potential source for

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3 Miller (1914) IX: “...Cyrus’ invincible battle lines are not the wavering, unwieldy hordes of orientals, easily swept away by the Grecian phalanx like chaff before the strong south-wind, but the heavy, solid masses of Sparta.” Taking an “idealising” line on Cyrus, Griffith (1998) 48 n.93 notes “it is hilarious to see through what contortions the Loeb translator will go to explain that this glowing figure of virtue and manliness is really, in Xenophon’s mind, a cross between a Spartan and an Athenian.”

4 Prinz (1911), followed by Schwartz (1943), read it as a *roman à clef*, whereby Cyrus and the Persians represent Agesilaus and the Spartans, and the Assyrians represent Persia; they therefore saw it as a call for Panhellenic military unity against the contemporary Persian enemy. Carlier (1978) takes a diametrically opposed view, seeing the text as a warning to the Greeks not to attempt a Panhellenic conquest of Persia. More recently the Prinz/Schwartz approach has been adopted by Christensen (2006) to argue that the *Cyropaedia* is a call for military reform in Sparta.
Achaemenid history. The text's focus on Persia has been explained as generic, by emphasizing its participation within a body of political theory which used Persia, and specifically Cyrus the Great, as examples; it has also been argued that the Persian setting is necessary for the portrayal of the ideal, all-powerful leader, as absolute power was not imaginable in the contemporary Greek context.

Such approaches are reductive; they explain away the Persian subject-matter rather than considering its effect. The Cyropaedia can be read as ethnography: written for a Greek audience, it is entirely concerned with descriptions of and narratives about various barbarian peoples. What relationship is constructed between the Greek reader of

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5 Hirsch (1985) 61–131 attempts to use the Cyropaedia as a source for the historical Persia. At 72–6 he suggests that the text gives direct access to Persian self-conceptions, conjecturing a system of propaganda instituted by Cyrus the Younger by which he compared himself to Cyrus the Great, and to which Xenophon was responding. In contrast, Tuplin (1990) emphasizes "the patchiness of the novel's oriental veneer" (18).

6 Gera (1993) 2–13 frames Xenophon's interests within the writing of biography and the use of Cyrus in Hdt. 1, Ctesias' lost Persica, Pl. Leg. 694a–b and Menex. 239d–e and Isoc. Philippus 5.66; in particular she emphasizes the influence of the lost writings on Cyrus by Antisthenes, mentioned in Diog. Laert. 6.15–8.

7 Tatum (1989) 63. Due (1989) 22–5 takes a similar line, suggesting that the impressiveness of the Persian Empire made Cyrus a valuable paradigm.

8 The problem of the Cyropaedia's genre is notorious: see Reichel (1995). By reading it as ethnography I do not mean to impose narrow genre definitions or close down interpretations of it as a novel, historiography or political philosophy.

9 The main focus is on Persians and Medes, but Armenians, Chaldaeans, Hycranians, Assyrians, Egyptians, Indians (et al.) are also presented. Present tense ethnographic explanations of customs and articles of dress often interrupt the narrative (see discussion below); Xenophon's frequent aetiological asides, in which he claims that events in the narrative mark the beginnings of a Persian custom, also set up the text as an explanation of the behaviour of the contemporary Persians. For examples and discussion of authorial interventions see Due (2002). The text is often highly self-aware of its status as a Greek representation of foreign peoples: Xenophon describes the arming of Persian men with the explanatory comment that they carry οἱ πέροι ἔχοντες ("such things as the Persians are painted as having", 1.2.13), offering tacit acknowledgement that the reader's relationship to the Persians is mediated through his experience of previous Greek representations. Cambyses criticizes Greek education which teaches the art of deception as part of training in wrestling, saying that Persian education only teaches truthfulness (1.6.32); similarly,
the Cyropaedia and Cyrus and the Persians? Is the reader produced as a subject, and placed in a secure position of power over barbarians who are constructed as ethnographic objects of scrutiny, or does the imperial power of Cyrus and the Persians disrupt such a comfortable relationship? I argue that the text’s episodes of viewing give us a way into this problem.

Throughout the work the reader is repeatedly confronted with scenes of observation and spectacle, as well as highly self-conscious theoretical arguments on the purpose and effect of looking and being looked at. Although no study of the text has pursued vision as a theme, Cyrus’ use of deceptive visual display has been a concern. Most previous work on the Cyropaedia has tended to be polarised around the question of whether Cyrus should be read as an ideal ruler or a corrupt ruler; Cyrus’ display has generally been treated in the context of this debate. Too argues that Xenophon offers a critique of Cyrus as a ruler by contrasting Cambyses’ privileging of “being” over “seeming” with the use of deceptive display adopted by Cyrus in

at a dinner party a Persian makes a joke about another Persian behaving in a suspiciously Greek manner (κατά τὸν Ἐλληνικὸν τρόπον, 2.2.28) by bringing a young man with him. Through the irony of the pretence of a Persian voice, Xenophon makes the Greek reader aware of the Greekness of what he is reading.

10 Due (1989) reads Cyrus as exemplary of the virtuous leader. Gera (1993) 285–99 incorporates an acknowledgement of the despotic tendencies of Cyrus’ rule in Babylon into a reading of Cyrus as exemplary by seeing them as demonstrating the moral compromises necessary to imperial rule. Tatum (1989) emphasizes Cyrus’ Machiavellian qualities, seeing them as part of Xenophon’s didactic project on the art of rule.

11 Too (1998) reads Cyrus’ rule in the Cyropaedia as a representation of corrupt leadership.

12 An exception is Dillery (2004) 267–70; following the approach of Farber (1979), he discusses Cyrus’ Babylonian procession (8.3.9–18) as prefiguring the processions of the Hellenistic kings.
Babylon; Azoulay, on the other hand, argues for the appropriateness of Cyrus’ use of display because of the change in audience from friends in Persia to conquered enemies in Babylon.14

While I would by no means wish to downplay the importance of such concerns for our understanding of this highly politically self-aware text (and indeed this chapter will consider the representation of methods of rule), readings which foreground Xenophon’s presentation of Cyrus as either idealising or critical tend to treat the representation of Cyrus’ rule as part of an abstract theoretical treatise on ruling as such,15 and do not take into account the problematic nature of a text about Persian imperialism for a Greek audience. The text’s concern with Cyrus’ use of the visual in his acquisition of power, and with his conquered subjects’ responses to it, must be understood as directly engaged with this problem.

Viewing in the Cyropaedia is predominantly cross-cultural. In particular, as the Persian army travels across Asia, the reader is presented with repeated scenes in which Cyrus tries to control the way he and his army will be seen by the people they encounter; we are also shown the responses of those who see Cyrus. Through such scenes, the reader is made into a literary viewer of Cyrus and the Persians. Indeed, the visual nature of the reader’s engagement with the text is sometimes directly invoked. As mentioned in chapter 1, the opening of

14 Azoulay (2004a).
15 See Nadon (2001), who reads the Cyropaedia as a critique of both the republic and the empire as political systems.
the text presents Xenophon’s choice of subject through his wonder (θαυμάζω: 1.1.1; 1.1.6) at Cyrus – wonder in which the reader is implicitly invited to participate;¹⁶ this term implies the availability of Cyrus to ethnographic curiosity, but it can also imply awe.¹⁷ There are also explicit invitations to the reader to look at and come to conclusions about the Persians, both in the second person (ἐπέγνως δ’ ἂν ἐκεῖ οὐδένα οὗτε ὅργιζόμενον κραυγῇ οὕτε χαίροντα ύβριστικῷ γέλωτι, ἀλλὰ ᾧδ’ ἂν αὐτοῦς ἡγῆσω τῷ οὐντι εἰς κάλλος ζῆν, “You would not have perceived anyone there shouting in anger, or taking delight in insolent laughter, but on seeing them you would have held that they really lived nobly,” 8.1.33) and using the impersonal pronoun (εἰ δὲ τὰς τάναντια ἐμοὶ γιγνώσκοι, τὰ ἐργα αὐτῶν ἐπισκοπῶν εὑρήσει αὐτὰς μαρτυροῦντα τοῖς ἐμοῖς λόγοις, “If anyone thinks the contrary to me, looking at their actions he will find that they bear witness to my words,” 8.8.27).¹⁸

Representations of viewing operate as a site for the self-positioning of the reader. How might such self-positioning work? Of crucial importance to the interpretation of the Cyropaedia is the

¹⁶ See chapter 1 for discussion of this term. Xenophon also uses the verb ἔσκεψαμέθα (1.1.6), from σκέπτομαι, “I look at / consider,” to describe his investigation as a process of visual scrutiny.

¹⁷ To inspire θαύμα can be a sign of empowerment. The Armenian king explains his jealousy of the philosopher-tutor of his son as follows: καὶ ἐγὼ ἔκεινὼς, ἔφη, ἐφθάνον, ὅτι μοι ἐδόκει τοῦτον ποιεῖν αὐτόν μᾶλλον θαυμάζειν ἢ ἐμέ (“I envied him because he seemed to me to make [my son] wonder at himself more than at me.” 3.1.39). Similarly, on the establishment of the new regime in Babylon, Cyrus attempts to bolster the power of his followers by training them ...μηδὲ μεταστρέφομενοι ἐπὶ θέαν μηδενός, ὡς οὐδὲν θαυμάζοντες (“...not to turn at the sight of anything, as if they wondered at nothing,” 8.1.42).

¹⁸ Cf. also the use of the phrase “it is / was possible to see”: we are told that in Persia it was very rarely possible to see a horse (ἵδειν ἵππον πάνυ στάνιον ἄν, 1.3.3); and that even to this day it is possible to see Hyrcanians holding positions of trust and authority (καὶ νῦν ἔστιν ἢτι ἰδεῖν Ύρκανίους καὶ πιστευομένους καὶ ἄρχας ἑχοντας, 4.2.8).
absence of any Greek protagonists; Greeks only feature in brief references. Unlike the *Anabasis*, which, in its narrative of the travels of a Greek army across Asia, frames its discussion of the exotic peoples encountered through Greek reactions to what they see, the *Cyropaedia* relates its narrative of Persian conquest through the reactions of a series of barbarians. The representation of barbarian reactions to other barbarians raises a problem for the self-positioning of the reader. Will the reader identify with or be alienated from the text's internal audiences? The *Cyropaedia* self-consciously flags the issue of identification or alienation as critical to the hermeneutics of viewing, presenting some reactions to viewing as conditioned by the cross-cultural frame in which it occurs.

In this chapter, I argue that viewing is involved in the acquisition of Cyrus' imperial power; that his power is acquired through his control of the interpretation of viewing; but that there can also be alternative interpretations countering those which Cyrus attempts to foist on his various audiences. We begin by considering how the ethnographic context of viewing frames its interpretation, especially when viewing entails looking at the alluring sight of Cyrus, before moving on to consider Cyrus' use of sight and display in his acquisition of power over both his men and the foreign peoples he subjugates. We will see that through the representation of Cyrus as simultaneously a highly fascinating and an extremely troubling figure,

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19 Greeks from Asia are among those who are willingly Cyrus' subjects (1.1.4); relations between Hyrcanians and Assyrians are compared to those between Sciritae and Spartans (4.2.1); Croesus includes in his army a contingent of Greeks from Asia, and sends to Sparta to negotiate an alliance (6.2.10). Also cf. 1.6.32 and 2.2.28.
the problem of the Greek reader’s response becomes a problem of political and cultural self-identification.

Cross-cultural viewing

The problems of cross-cultural viewing are raised early in the text, in Cyrus’ boyhood travels to Media. In a programmatic scene, Cyrus gazes at his grandfather Astyages, king of the Medes:

καὶ ὄρων δὴ αὐτὸν κεκοσμημένον καὶ ὀφθαλμῶν ὑπογραφῇ καὶ χρώματος ἐντρίψει καὶ κόμαις προσθέτοις, ὁ δὲ νόμιμα ἦν ἐν Μήδοις· ταῦτα γὰρ πάντα Μηδικά ἔστι, καὶ οἱ πορφυροὶ χιτῶνες καὶ οἱ κάνδυες καὶ οἱ στρεπτοὶ οἱ περὶ τῇ δέρῃ καὶ τὰ ψέλια τὰ περὶ ταῖς χερσίν, ἐν Πέρσαις δὲ τοῖς οἶκοι καὶ νῦν ἐτὶ πολὺ καὶ ἐσθῆτες φαυλότεραι καὶ δίαιται εὐτελέστεραι· ὄρων δὴ τὸν κόσμον τοῦ πάππου, ἐμβλέπων αὐτῷ ἔλεγεν· Ω μήτερ, ώς καλὸς μοι ὁ πάππος. (1.3.2)

“He saw him adorned with eye shadow, rouge, and a wig – as was, of course, the custom among the Medes (for all these things are Median: purple coats, cloaks, necklaces, and bracelets on their wrists; but among the Persians who are at home, their clothes are even now much more ordinary and their diet much cheaper). So seeing the adornment of his grandfather, he said while looking at him, “Mother, how beautiful my grandfather is!”"

Astyages’ power as a ruler is not only reflected but produced in his display. Cyrus’ reaction offers a potential model for the reaction of the reader. However, not only is Cyrus’ awe-struck response framed as
childishly naïve, but an explanation of Median customs in the narrator's voice interrupts the narrative of Cyrus' gaze: the reader's vision of the pomp of the Median king is transformed into scrutiny of foreign behaviour, challenging the potency of his regal spectacle. Further, although awe before the impressive sight of a king is a mode of viewing familiar from Homer and Hesiod, in the context of Athenian democracy such a response becomes problematic; we might think of the concern with the appropriateness or inappropriateness of kingly display in the carpet scene of Aeschylus' Agamemnon, for example, where ostentation is marked as a barbarian act - something that Priam might do.

Cyrus' awe at the sight is predicated on a failure to "see through" the illusionism of Astyages' cosmetics - something which the reader, treated to a description of the contrivances used by Astyages to enhance his appearance, is able to do. However, this passage does more than allow the reader to feel superior to the ingenuity of a child. Cyrus' response is presented as conditioned not only by childhood innocence, but by his austere Persian upbringing, which has made such deceptive practices alien to him: the description of Astyages contrasts Median customs with Persian customs, which are also explained to the reader.

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20 For the king as the object of the gaze see the teichoskopia at Il. 3.161-242, and Hes. Th. 84-85.
Cyrus' Persian way of seeing presents a problem for the positioning of the reader. The *Cyropaedia* presents pre-imperial Persia, of which Cyrus is, at this moment of the narrative at least, a representative, as alien and strange, but also as a paradigm of an ideal, moral state. The expected surprise of the reader at pre-imperial Persian customs is inscribed, but also marked as a symptom of decadence, for example, as we are told that if anyone should think (ἐὰν δὲ τις...οἴεται, 1.2.12) that Persians do not enjoy their food when they eat only bread, greens and water, he should remember (ἀναμνησθήτω, 1.2.12) how pleasurable food is if one waits until one is hungry.23 Further, the description of pre-imperial Persian society recalls the representation of the Spartans in the *Lak. Pol.*, and uses terminology associated with Sparta.24 For the text's Athenian audience, Persia is offered as an exotic, unattainable, ideal society, but is also familiarly Greek - yet the Greek model through which Persia is to be read itself verges on an exotic, unattainable ideal (see chapter 5).25 Cyrus'

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23 The description of Persia is self-consciously framed from an Athenian viewpoint. We are told that in Persia boys go to school to learn justice, "...just as among us they go to learn their letters" (...ὡσπερ παρ' ἡμῖν ὅτι γράμματα μαθησόμενοι, 1.2.6); Gera (1993) 24 notes that the phrase παρ' ἡμῖν refers to the Athenian method of education.

24 See Rawson (1969) 50–52; Tigerstedt (1965) 179. A Spartan term, ἱπτρα, is used to refer to a Persian law forbidding youths to deceive (1.6.33): see Tyrt. 2.8, Plut. *Lycurg.* 6 and 13, Plut. *Ages.* 8 and discussion in Gera (1993) 70. As Hesk (2000) 132–133 notes, given that Sparta was, on the contrary, famous for encouraging its youths to steal as part of their education, the Cyr.'s discussion of attitudes towards deception in Persia can be read as engaging with contemporary equivocal attitudes towards Sparta.

25 See also the spectatorship of Persian customs in the description of the education of boys in pre-imperial Persia: διδάσκουσι δὲ τοὺς παιδῶς καὶ σωφροσύνην· μέγα δὲ συμβάλλεται εἰς τὸ μανθάνειν σωφρονεῖν αὑτοῦς ὅτι καὶ τοὺς πρεσβυτέρους ὄρωσιν ἀνά πάσαν ἡμέραν σωφρόνως διάγοντας. διδάσκουσι δὲ αὐτοὺς καὶ πείθεσθαι τοῖς ἄρχουσι· μέγα δὲ καὶ εἰς τοῦτο συμβάλλεται ὅτι ὃ ὀρώσει τοὺς πρεσβυτέρους πειθομένους τοῖς ἄρχουσιν ἰσχυρώς. διδάσκουσι δὲ καὶ ἕγκρατειν γαστρός καὶ ποτοῦ· μέγα δὲ καὶ εἰς τοῦτο συμβάλλεται ὅτι ὃ ὀρώσει τοὺς
response marks his foreignness, potentially alienating the reader, but also hints at an engaging moral simplicity. The self-conscious staging of the cultural and political conditioning of sight challenges the reader to consider what his or her own response as a Greek (or as an Athenian) would be.

Later episodes in Cyrus' visual scrutiny of Media have a similar effect, although in these scenes Cyrus is not impressed by the sight of the Medes, but rejects Median ways of doing things. When he attends Astyages' feast, he is disdainful of the unfamiliar dishes, and claims that he can see that Astyages is disgusted by them too:

...σε...όρω, οταν μὲν τοῦ ἀρτου ἄψη, εἰς οὐδὲν τὴν χεῖρα ἀποψώμενον, οταν δὲ τούτων τινὸς θίγης, εὐθὺς ἀποκαθαίρει τὴν χεῖρα εἰς τὰ χειρόμακτρα, ὡς πάνυ ἀχθόμενος ὅτι πλέα σοι ἀπ᾽ αὐτὸν ἐγένετο.

"...I see that whenever you touch your bread, you do not wipe your hand on anything; but whenever you touch any of these, you wipe your hand on your napkin as if you were most distressed that it became soiled with them," (1.3.5).

26 Cyrus' experience of Media is represented as a visual survey. Cyrus declares...
Although Astyages assures him that Medes like the dishes, Cyrus "sees" (ὁρῶ) that this is not true;

27 he interprets what he sees to fit in with his culturally conditioned preconceptions about the correct way to hold a dinner and to eat. 28 A similar exchange follows about drinking. Having never witnessed drunkenness in Persia, Cyrus refuses to taste the wine after "seeing" that it contains poison inducing odd behaviour (…upertino kai τοις γνώμαις και τοίς σώμασι σφαλλομένους, "...I saw you all making mistakes, both in your judgements and in your bodies," 1.3.10). The humour is based not only on the misunderstandings of children, but on that topos of travel writing, misunderstanding of unfamiliar sights. This misunderstanding is predicated upon cultural position; playing on the austerity of the Persians, the passage suggests that those from different cultural positions see the same thing in different ways.

How is the reader positioned? The reader may identify more easily with Cyrus' critique of Median decadence than with his awe at Astyages' appearance; yet it too is conditioned by the expectations of Persian asceticism. Cyrus' absolute rejection of the pleasures of the feast may be almost as alienating to the reader as Median self-indulgence. Although the reader experiences the Median feast through Cyrus' eyes, he or she is made aware of the Persianness (and

27 See also: Ἀλλὰ καὶ σέ, φάναι τὸν Κῦρον, ὁρῶ, ἢ πάππε, μυστάτομενον ταῦτα τὰ βρώμιατα, ("They say that Cyrus said, "And yet I see that even you, grandfather, are disgusted with these meats," 1.3.5). As this example indicates, much of the narrative of Astyages' feast is given in indirect speech (in a series of accusative and infinitive clauses governed by φασίν, 1.3.4). This adds to the sense of distance between the reader and events being described; the narrative becomes the subject of a sequence of retellings. The cultural mediation in the telling of the story is flagged.

28 See Nadon (2001) 44, who calls Cyrus' attitude "ethnocentrism".
childishness) of those eyes and their distance from his or her experience.

Cross-cultural vision becomes more unsettling when Cyrus is the object of the gaze. In another programmatic scene of Cyrus' boyhood travels in Media, the Mede Abradatas, who is struck by Cyrus' beauty (ἐκπεπλήχθαι πολύν τινα χρόνον ἐπὶ τῷ κάλλει τοῦ Κύρου, 1.4.27), claims to be overcome at the sight of him:

οὐκ οἶσθα, φάναι, ὦ Κῦρε, ὅτι καὶ ὃσον σκαρδαμύττω χρόνον, πάνυ πολύς μοι δοκεῖ εἶναι, ὅτι οὐχ ὄρω σε τότε τοιούτων ὄντων; (1.4.28)

"Do you not know, Cyrus," he said, "that even so long as it takes me to blink seems to me to be an extremely long time, because I then do not see you, such as you are."

We can compare Artabazus' viewing of Cyrus with the claims made about the effect of looking at the captured Susan woman Panthea (see chapter 2), who is called the most beautiful woman in Asia (5.1.7). Cyrus refuses to look at Panthea, claiming that such is her beauty, if he were to look at her he would become like a slave (5.1.12), losing all control over himself (5.1.7–8); yet, as discussed in chapter 2, there is a disjunction between the claims made about the effect of viewing Panthea and the description of the experience of looking at her, which emphasises, and eroticises, her helplessness and distress before the

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29 Cf. the viewing of Cleinias by Critobulus in the Sym.: Critobulus claims to hate night and sleep because they prevent him looking at Cleinias (4.12), and is said to be scarcely able to blink when in his presence (4.24).
30 Panthea is not named at this point in the narrative. For discussion of the omission of women's names see Schaps (1977); the failure to name Panthea indicates her lack of agency.
31 See Gorg. Hel. 15–19 for the overpowering effect of sight, especially in an erotic context.
confident, surveying gaze of her captors (5.1.4-7).\(^{32}\) The viewing of Panthea poses a problem for the reader. The narrative of the capture of the most beautiful woman in Asia can be read as paradigmatic of a fantasy of foreign exploration and conquest: an exotic beauty is disrobed and exhibited for the reader’s pleasure. However, the pleasure of looking at Panthea, which the reader also enjoys, is disrupted by the potential threat of domination. The passage hints at both the lures and the risks of looking at the foreign – lures and risks which, as we shall see, are important concerns in the text’s descriptions of the sight of Cyrus as imperial conqueror.

Artabazus’ viewing of Cyrus as a boy is self-consciously framed as cross-cultural viewing. On seeing Cyrus’ relatives kissing him goodbye (ἐώρα τοὺς συγγενεῖς φιλούντας αὐτόν, 1.4.27), which we are told is a Persian custom still practised today (τοὺς συγγενεῖς φιλούντας τῇ στόματι ἀποπέμπεσθαι αὐτόν νόμῳ Περσικῷ καὶ γὰρ νῦν ἔτι τοῦτο ποιοῦσι Πέρσαι, 1.4.27), he contrives to get a kiss by pretending to be Cyrus’ relative. He then asks about Persian kissing:

ʻἩ καὶ ἐν Πέρσαις νόμος ἐστίν ὁ ὁ τοὺς συγγενεῖς φιλεῖν; Μᾶλιστα, φάναι, ὅταν γε ἱδοσιν ἄλληλους διὰ χρόνου ἡ ἀπίσωσι ποι ἀπ’ ἄλληλων. (1.4.28)

“Is it a custom among the Persians to kiss one’s relatives?”

\(^{32}\) Cyrus is entirely in control throughout his dealings with Araspas and Panthea, manipulating both for his own ends: Tatum (1989) 178. After contriving a situation in which Araspas will try to rape Panthea, Cyrus is able to step in to prevent it, producing a contrite Araspas who can act convincingly as a double agent against the Assyrian king (ironically, Araspas, whose gaze at Panthea is so critical, is deemed a suitable κατόσκοπος; 6.1.31) and a grateful Panthea who will bring him a useful ally in the form of her husband (Cyrus tells Araspas that Panthea must be guarded as she is likely to be serviceable to them in the future: 5.1.17). When he finally does lay eyes on Panthea, no reaction on his part is described (7.8.3): Gera (1993) 239.
"Certainly," he said, "at least when they see each other after a length of time or when they are going away."

The ethnographic resonances of the scene are self-consciously flagged, as first the reader (in Xenophon’s comment), and then Artabazus, is made the viewer of Persian peculiarities. However, ethnographic curiosity is a smoke-screen for erotic ambitions: Artabazus uses his question in order to grab another kiss, on the grounds that he is now going away.\(^{33}\) The detached position of Artabazus as ethnographer is undercut by the irony of his not very well concealed erotic intentions.

Cyrus is in control throughout this scene; he orders Artabazus about, twice dismissing him from his presence (ἀποπέμπειν and εἶπείν αὐτῷ θαρρέων ἀπιόντι, 1.4.28).\(^{34}\) He is not hoodwinked by Artabazus’ pretence; his responses are full of knowing irony.\(^{35}\) We see in action the empowerment of the erotic object of viewing argued for, but not sustained, in the discussion on Panthea (as noted in chapter 2, this scene offers an exception to the passivity of the object of the erotic gaze as depicted elsewhere in Xenophon’s corpus). Looking at Cyrus is marked as a problematic and dangerous act: although he is a beautiful boy, he is also an emperor in the making.

\(^{33}\) Similarly, after being sent away and immediately returning, Abradatas claims yet another kiss on account of the fact that he is returning after a length of time, another condition put forward as requisite to Persian kissing.

\(^{34}\) See Cyrus’ promise to return to Media ...ὡστε ὡς ἐξέσται κἂν βούληται ἀκαρδακομικτὶ ("...so that it would be possible [for Artabazus] to look at him, if he wished, without blinking," 1.4.28).

\(^{35}\) See Cyrus’ response to Artabazus’ claim to be his relative: Ταῦτ’ ἄρα, εἶπείν τὸν Κύρον, καὶ ἔνεώρας μοι· πολλὰκις γὰρ δοκῶ σε γινώσκειν τὸτε ποιοῦντα ("This, then," said Cyrus, "is why you used to stare at me, for I think I often recognized you doing this," 1.4.27). Tatum (1989) 174 notes Cyrus’ “sharp eye for the gaze of his admirer.”
The question of how to look at him - with the look of a lover or the look of a subject - is a concern in the depiction of Artabazus' relations with the adult Cyrus. When Cyrus uses Artabazus to persuade the Median army to follow him, their previous erotic visual interaction is referred to and reformulated in the new context of military command. Cyrus tells Artabazus:

Νῦν δὴ σὺ δηλώσεις εἰ ἀληθῆ ἔλεγες, ὅτε ἔφης ἥδεσθαι θεώμενος ἐμὲ. (4.1.23)

"You will now show whether you spoke the truth when you said that you took pleasure in gazing at me."

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36 See Tatum (1989) 163-188; Tatum (1994) 21-24; Rubin (1989) for a discussion of the erotic nature of Cyrus' power as a ruler. Artabazus compares Cyrus to the leading bee in a hive, who has an erotic power over the other bees: οὕτω δεινός τις ἔρως οὕτως τοῦ ἄρχοντος ύπ' ἑκείνου ἐγγίγνεται. ("There exists within them a terrible desire to be ruled by him." 5.1.24). The question of whether in his position as commander Cyrus can exert erotic fascination is a concern elsewhere. After the trial scene in Armenia, the reactions of the newly conquered Armenians to Cyrus, who has humiliated and subjugated their king, are described: ἐπεί δ' ἦθον οἴκαδε, ἔλεγον τοῦ Κύρου ὁ μὲν τῆς τὴν σοφίαν, ὁ δὲ τὴν καρτέριαν, ὁ δὲ τὴν προσότητα, ὁ δὲ τις καὶ τὸ κάλλος καὶ τὸ μέγεθος. ἐνθα δὴ ὁ Τιγράνης ἐπήρετο τὴν γυναίκας Ἰᾳ καὶ σοί, ἔφη, ὡς Ἀρμενίως, καλὸς ἐδόκει ὁ Κύρος εἶναι; Ἀλλὰ μὰ Δί, ἔφη, οὐκ ἐκεῖνον ἔθεωμιν. Ἀλλὰ τίνα μὴν; ἔφη ὁ Τιγράνης. Τὸν εἰπόντα νὴ Δία ώς τῆς αὐτοῦ ψυχῆς ἄν πρόατο ὡς μὴ με δουλεύειν. (3.1.41) "When they went home, one spoke of Cyrus' wisdom, another of his steadfastness, another of his gentleness, and someone else of his beauty and height. Then Tigranes asked his wife, "Did Cyrus seem to be beautiful to you too, Armenian woman?" "But by Zeus," she said, "I did not even look at him." "At whom, then?" asked Tigranes. "At the one who said, by Zeus, that he would pay with his own life so that I should not be a slave."" Tigranes' wife only has eyes for her husband. That Cyrus' power is seductively alluring is both implied and rejected: the scene raises the question of how to look at Cyrus.

37 Cyrus deliberately picks Artabazus as his intermediary to the Medes because he can exert complete control over him: Gera (1993) 167; Nadon (2001) 92. See Artabazus' later comment on the event: ἐπεί δ' ἑτυχές ποτε καὶ ἔμοι δεινεῖς ἄν πρόατο ἔφης Ἁμοῦ μήδεις τὰ παρὰ Κυαξάρου, ἑλογιζόμης, εἰ ταῦτα προθύμως σοι συλλάβομι, ὡς οἴκεῖς τέ σοι εὐσίμην καὶ ἐξεσοίτο μοι διαλέγεσθαι σοι ὀπόσον χρόνον βουλομένην. (7.5.49) "When once you happened to need me to be enthusiastic in reporting Cyaxares' message to the Medes, I calculated that if I should embrace these affairs for you with enthusiasm, I would become an intimate of yours, and it would be possible for me to converse with you as long as I wished."
Artabazus’ response is to suggest that his pleasurable gazing might become reciprocal:38 ...ποιήσω καὶ σὲ ἡμέρησι θεάσθαι (“...I shall also make you pleased to gaze on me.” 4.1.23). The imagined returned gaze might be read as implying the hope of a returned desire in Cyrus, but it also suggests the approving gaze of the commander at his obedient follower.39 Artabazus’ gaze at Cyrus poses a problem for the positioning of the reader, as a viewer of exotic, and erotic, sights. The reader views strange Persian customs just as Artabazus does, but as the power of Cyrus disturbs the dynamics of the ethnographic gaze, the reader’s own position as an empowered, distanced viewer is put at risk.40

38 Reciprocity in viewing reflects and creates social reciprocity: the description of the Persian Peers as “radiant, educated and looking at each other” (φαίδροι [πεποτδεμένοι] καὶ παρορώντες εἰς ἀλλήλους, 3.3.59) indicates their functioning as a united force and prefaces their successful attack.

39 See below for the visual relations of commander and soldiers. Artabazus’ desire to be the object of the gaze is given a further ironic twist in the context of the imperial court. Artabazus’ hopes for a place of honour in the court are frustrated as Cyrus side-lines him: Artabazus complains that he περίβλεπτος (“looked at from all sides”: 7.5.53) only because he is so conspicuously snubbed. See also Artabazus’ speech in support of Cyrus’ command: ἐγὼ δὲ, ὥς Κῦρος, καὶ ὧν ἐγὼ κρατῶ καὶ μενοῦμεν παρὰ σοί καὶ ὀρῶντες σὲ ἀνεξόμεθα καὶ καρπετήσομεν ὑπὸ σοῦ εὐρεγετοῦνειν (“I, Cyrus, and those I control, will stay beside you: we will put up with seeing you and remain steadfast in the face of your benefactions.” 5.1.26). The promise to “endure seeing” Cyrus might be read as an ironic jibe at any who would doubt Cyrus’ benefactions, but it also suggests the problematic position of Artabazus as both lover and subject.

40 An interesting take on the erotic gaze is offered in the anecdote about the officer Sambaulas and the ugly guest at Cyrus’ dinner party (2.2.28–31): Cyrus notices that Sambaulas’ couchmate is “very hairy and very ugly” (ὑπερθάλπου τε καὶ ὑπερασχρόν, 2.2.28), so asks Sambaulas if he takes this man around with him “Greek-style”, because of his beauty (ὅτι καλὸν ἔστιν, 2.2.28). Sambaulas responds: Ἡ τὸν Δί’, ἔρη ὃ Σαμβαύλους, ἠδομιτο γοῦν καὶ ἐγὼ συνών τε καὶ θεώμενος τοῦτον. ἀκούσαντες ταῦτα οἱ σύσκηνοι προσέβλεψαν· ὡς δὲ εἶδον τὸ πρόσωπον τοῦ ἀνδρὸς ὑπερβάλλον σώζει, ἐγέλασαν πάντες, 2.2.28–29. (“Yes, by Zeus”, said Sambaulas, “I, at least, take pleasure being together with him and gazing upon him.” When they heard this, those in the tent looked [at him]. When they saw that the man’s face was surpassing in its ugliness, they all laughed.) Sambaulas explains his reason for his attachment to the man: he is the most obedient and efficient of his soldiers, always obeying orders at a run. The claim of the power of the object of erotic viewing is parodied: power is in the hands of the viewers who impose an objectifying scrutiny on the man, and in the hands of his supposed “lover” whose pleasure in viewing
Viewing and power: Cyrus as military leader

The problem of how to look at Cyrus becomes more urgent in the representation of Cyrus as commander of an army: his power over his soldiers is shown through his controlling gaze but also, more problematically, through his self-display and his attempt to control how sights are interpreted. Cyrus’ status as commander is both reflected and instantiated in his gaze at his men, as when he surveys the ranks before battle (7.1.10), or when he looks at those wounded resides in the effectiveness of his command over him. The context of the anecdote is a discussion on the abilities of the Persian “Commoners” to work as soldiers for the elite “Peers”. The soldier can only function as a parodic erotic object, it is implied, because of his humble origins. Responses to viewing here operate in the construction of social class.

In Cambyses’ instruction to Cyrus on how to be a successful ruler, the successful commander is imagined as viewing his men as a harmonious and pleasing spectacle. Cambyses assures Cyrus that if he holds contests among his men …[ἐπί τῷ ἄξονα τάξεως ἀντί τοῦ ἑλίου πλεονεκτοῦσα φανερώς εἶναι ἢ ἄξονα ἐν χειμώνι, τοῦ ψύχους ἢ ἄξονα διὰ μόχθων, τῶν πόνων.] 1.6.18) Another method for rule suggested by Cambyses is self-display: …[…”you will gaze upon the ranks always performing their proper parts, just like in a chorus.”] 1.6.25) “…if it is summer, the ruler must be visible in being greedy for a greater share of the heat; and if it is winter, of the cold; and if it is a time of toils, of labours.” In apparent contradiction, however, Cambyses also counsels Cyrus on the importance of being, rather than only seeming, virtuous: [οὐκ ἔστω ἐρήμη, ὥσπερ συντομωτέρα ὅρδος ἐπὶ τὸ τόρο, περὶ ὅν βουλεῖ, δοκεῖν φρονίμον εἶναι ἢ τὸ γενέσθαι περὶ τούτων φρόνιμον.] (“There is no shorter road, son,” he said, “to seeming to be prudent about such things as you wish, than becoming prudent about them.”) 1.6.22) Too (1998) argues that Xenophon offers a critique of Cyrus as a ruler by contrasting Cambyses’ privileging of “being” over “seeming” with the use of deceptive display adopted by Cyrus in Babylon (see below). However, Cambyses’ position on the use of appearances is not so clear cut. The distinction between seeming and being threatens to collapse as Cambyses states: [εὐ γὰρ ἵσθι ὅτι τῶν ὁμοίων σωμάτων οἱ αὐτοὶ πόνοι οὐχ ὁμοίως ἀποτελοῦσι ἄρχοντος τῷ ἁγίῳ καὶ ἰδιώτῳ, ἀλλ’ ἐπικουρίζει τι ἡ τιμή τοῦ πόνου τῷ ἄρχοντι καί αὐτῷ τῇ εἰδέναι ὅτι οὐ λανθάνει ὅ τι ἀν ποιῇ.] (“Be assured that the same labours do not affect similar bodies in the same way, when one of them belongs to a man who is ruling, the other to a common man. To the contrary, honour makes labours a bit lighter for the ruler, as does knowing that nothing he does goes unnoticed.”) 1.6.25). Being seen in virtuous labour produces a different ability in the body and so a different relationship with virtue; seeming and being merge. 1.6.25) See Cyrus’ exhortation to his men: [μεταξαμείθην] δὲ τῶν ἄρματων καὶ τῶν θυρακοφόρων διατομουμένοις ὅποτε προσβλέψει τινάς τῶν ἐν τοῖς τάξεις, τότε μὲν εἶτεν ἄν- ἦν ἄνδρες, ὡς ἦδο ὑμῶν τὰ πρόσωπα θεάσασθαι. (7.1.10) “As he passed between the chariots and troops in breastplates, whenever he looked at
in battle in order to examine how they have behaved (4.1.3–4). He also co-opts the gaze of his men for use against each other, ordering the rear-guard to keep an eye on those in front (ὑμεῖς γὰρ ὑπισθεν ὁντες τοὺς τ’ ἄγαθοὺς ἄν ἔφορωντες καὶ ἐπικελεύοντες αὐτοῖς ἔτι κρείττους ποιοίτε, καὶ εἶ τις μαλακίζοιτο, καὶ τούτων ὁρῶντες οὐκ ἄν ἐπιτρέποιτε αὐτῷ, “You who are in the back, by watching and encouraging the good, will be able to make them even better, and if you see anyone being slack, you should not allow it,” 3.3.41). Similarly, Cyrus attempts to control how his men interpret what they see. He orders:

ἀ γὰρ νῦν εἴδετε ἐν τῇ μάχῃ θηδε, ταῦτα ἐνθυμομένοι μήποτε παύεσθε, ἵνα παρ’ ύμιν αὐτοῖς αἰεὶ κρίνητε πότερον ἢ ἀρετὴ μᾶλλον ἢ ἡ φυγὴ σώζει τὰς ψυχὰς καὶ πότερον οἱ μάχεσθαι ἐθέλοντες ῥαῖν ἀπαλλάττουσιν ἢ οἱ οὐκ ἐθέλοντες, καὶ ποίαιν τινὰ ἥδονην τὸ νικάν παρέχει· (4.1.5)

“Do not ever cease taking to heart what you have just seen in this battle. You may then always judge for yourselves whether virtue saves lives more than flight, whether those who are willing to fight escape more easily than those who are unwilling, and what sort of pleasure victory provides.”

some in their formations, he would say “Men, how pleasant it is to look at your faces!”

43 After battle Cyrus praises Chrysantas, the captain who was nearest to him, and whose actions he knows about without the need for investigation (τὸν δ’ ἐμοῦ ἐγγύτατα ταξιαρχον Χρυσάνταν οὐδὲν ἄλλων δέομαι πυνθάνεσθαι, ἀλλ’ αὐτὸς οἶδα οἶδς ἥν, 4.1.3), but he declares his intention to examine the actions of the others: ἄλλους δ’, ἔφη, ὅρω τετριωμένους, περὶ ὃν ἐγὼ σκεφτόμενος ἐν ὁποῖῳ χρόνῳ ἐπρῶθησαν, τότε τὴν γνώμην περὶ αὐτῶν ἀποφανοῦμαι. (“I see others who have been wounded; I will disclose my judgement about them after I look into the time at which they were wounded,” 4.1.4).
Cyrus transforms the battle into a spectacle which he encourages his men to interpret in a way which will bolster their obedience to him.44

Cyrus also uses display to assert his power as a leader, as shown in the scene of the reception of the Indian embassy.45 Although Cyaxares sends him a beautiful robe meant to impress the ambassadors (... ἐβούλετο γάρ σε ὑς λαμπρότατα καὶ εὐκοσμότατα προσάγειν, ὡς ὑψωμένων τῶν Ἰνδῶν ὅπως ἀν προσίης, “...he wishes that you come as brilliantly and as splendidly as possible, since the Indians will see how you approach them,” 2.4.1), Cyrus appears clothed in an unostentatious Persian robe (ἐν τῇ Περσικῇ στολῇ οὖδὲν τι υβρισμένη, 2.4.5), with his troops organised into an efficient parade (2.4.2–4). Cyaxares’ response is pleasure at his promptness, but

44 Cyrus similarly manipulates the visual presence of Abradatas, ordering him to show himself to his men, “encouraging them with your face...” (...τῷ μὲν προσώπῳ πορφυρωμένῳ..., 7.1.18); he suggests that Abradatas can use his visual effect to inspire obedience from the men, and so success for Cyrus’ army: σὺ δὲ τοῦτο μέμνησο, ὅταν δὲ σε ἡδὴ ἀγωνίζεσθαι, ὅτι Πέρσαι οἱ τε θεασόμενοι ὑμᾶς ἔσονται ... (“Remember that when you must enter the contest, there will be Persians who will gaze upon you...,” 7.1.15). For Cyrus’ manipulation of Abradatas see Tatum (1989) 179–182.

45 The nature of Cyrus’ visual power as a commander is revealed by contrast with the very different visual effect of Abradatas. Whereas Cyrus’ visual effect is deliberate and manipulative, following Abradatas’ arming scene (6.4.2) we are told: Ἐτεί δὲ καὶ πρόσθεν ὄν ἀξιοθέατος ὁ Ἀβραδάτας ὑπελίθη τοῖς ὀπλοῖς τούτοις, ἔφανε μὲν κάλλιστος καὶ ἔλευθερώτατος, ἀτε καὶ τῆς φύσεως υπαρχόντης. (“Since Abradatas was a sight worth looking at even before he was clad in armour, he appeared most beautiful and most free, since his nature was already such,” 6.4.4). However much he alters his self-presentation, he can only be ἀξιοθέατος: he cannot control his visual effect. His visual power does not translate into political power. The depiction of Abradatas’ visual allure owes much to the Homeric representation of heroes, and could therefore be read as a sign of status; see Gera (1993) 235 on the Iliadic resonances of Abradatas’ arming scene. However, Abradatas’ visual effect is described as less alluring than that of Panthea: οἱ δὲ ἄνθρωποι, καλοῦ ὄντος τοῦ θέαματος τοῦ τὸ Ἀβραδάτου καὶ τοῦ ἄρματος, οὐ πρόσθεν ἑδύναντο θεάσασθαι αὐτὸν πρὶν ἢ Πάνθεα ἀπῆλθεν (“Although Abradatas and his chariot were a beautiful sight, the people were unable to look at him until Panthea went away,” 6.4.11). Here Xenophon seems playfully to be reformulating Iliadic models of visual allure: we can contrast the scene of teichoskopia at Iliad 3, where the eyes of Priam and the Trojan elders turn from admiring the outstanding beauty of Helen to gazing at the Greek heroes on the battlefield (II. 3.154–242). The fact that Abradatas commands less attention than his wife undercuts the suggestion of his heroic stature.
annoyance at the commonness of his robe (ἵδων δὲ αὐτὸν ὁ Κυαξάρης
tῷ μὲν τάχει ἥσθη, τῇ δὲ φαυλότητι τῆς στολῆς ἠχθέσθη, 2.4.5); he
complains

...ἐβουλόμην σὲ ὡς λαμπρότατον φανήναι· καὶ γὰρ ἐμοὶ ἀν κόσμος ἦν τούτῳ, ἐμῆς ὄντα ἀδελφῆς ὑλὸν ὅτι μεγαλοπρεπέστατον
φαίνεσθαι. (2.4.5)

“I wished you to appear as brilliant as possible, for it would have been
an adornment to me too for you to appear as magnificent as possible,
since you are the son of my sister.”

Cyaxares had wished to coopt Cyrus’ appearance into a spectacle of
his, Cyaxares’, own power. Despite his blatant exhibition of
insubordination, Cyrus attempts to persuade Cyaxares that his actions
are a sign of his honour for him, pacifying his anger and removing the
threat of his opposition:

Καὶ ποτέρως ἂν, ὡς Κυαξάρης, μᾶλλον σὲ ἐκόσμουν, εἰπερ
πορφυρίδα ἐνδύς καὶ ψέλια λαβῶν καὶ στρεπτῶν περιθέμενος
σχολῆ κελεύοντι ύπηκοοῦν σοι, ἥ νῦν ὅτε σὺν τοιαύτῃ καὶ τοσαύτῃ
dυνάμει οὐτῷ σοι ὁξέως ύπακοοῦ διὰ τὸ σὲ τιμᾶν ἰδρῶτι καὶ
σπουδῇ καὶ αὐτὸς κεκοσμημένος καὶ τοὺς ἄλλους ἐπιδεικνύς σοι
οὕτω πειθομένους; (2.4.6)

“Which would adorn you more, Cyaxares, if I heeded you by strolling in
at my leisure, after dressing in purple garments, selecting bracelets,
and putting a necklace around my neck; or now when, because I
honour you, I have heeded you so promptly with a power of such size

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and quality, and with myself adorned with sweat and zeal, and displaying the others as similarly obedient to you?"

This scene has been read as a moral critique of adornment, which reflects on Cyrus’ later decision to adopt Median dress in Babylon (see below). Gera notes that “The readers of the *Cyropaedia* can count on Cyaxares to say the wrong thing or hold the wrong views: he thinks, for instance, that putting on showy, impressive clothing is more important than appearing promptly at councils...”46 However, in offering a display of austerity and discipline to compete with Cyaxares’ display of finery, Cyrus is asserting his power as an independent leader, not only before the ambassadors, but before Cyaxares and especially before Cyrus’ own troops.47 Further, we must note the ethnographic context of display, and the challenge it poses for the

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47 Cyrus similarly trumps Cyaxares’ display before the army in the debate on whether to continue their campaign or to disband. Cyaxares adorns himself chairing the discussion: ἐν δὲ τούτῳ Κυσαχάρης σεμυνὼς κεκοσμημένος ἔξηλθέ καὶ ἐπὶ θρόνου Μηδικοῦ ἐκαθέζετο (“At this point Cyaxares came out augustly adorned and sat down on the Median throne,” 6.1.6). However, although Cyaxares appears to be in charge, opening the debate, it is Cyrus who has asked him to do so (5.5.43), who controls the discussion, and who decides the course of action they should follow; he makes open reference to the fact that Cyaxares is chairing the meeting on his instruction: τί δήτα ἐγὼ Κυσαχαρην ἐκέλευσα λόγον ἐμβαλείν περὶ καταλύσεως τῆς στρατιᾶς; (“Why then, did I bid Cyaxares introduce a discussion about dissolving the army?” 6.1.13). The adornment of Cyaxares is marked as politically ineffectual, and is contrasted with the influence exerted by Cyrus: ἐως οὖν ὁ Κυσαχαρης ἐκοσμεύτο, ἀκούον ὅτι πολὺς ὄχλος ἐπὶ τοῖς θύραις εἰς, ἐν τούτῳ οἱ φίλοι τῷ Κύρῳ προσήγων οἱ μὲν Καδουσίους δεομένους αὐτοῦ μένειν, οἱ δὲ Ὅρκανυίους, ὁ δὲ τις Σάκας, ὁ δὲ τις καὶ Γυμβρόνιον. (“While Cyaxares was adorning himself, he could hear that there was a great mob at his door. During this same time some of Cyrus’ friends presented Cadusians who begged him to remain, others Hyrcanians, another Sacians, and another Gadatas as well.” 6.1.1). Although Cyaxares makes an elaborate display, no-one is described as looking at him; in contrast, Cyrus is understood as the object of visual attention, as Hystaspas jokes that Cyrus will want to disband and go back to his father in Persia: ὅρῳ γὰρ σε ὑπερεπιθυμοῦντα ἐν Πέρσαις περιβλεπτον περιελθεῖν καὶ τῷ πατρὶ ἐπιδεικθοῦν ἡ ἐκάστα διεπτράξω, (“I see you are highly desirous of being looked at from all sides as you circulate among the Persians, and of displaying to your father how you have accomplished each particular.” 6.1.5). Although this is described as a joke, we are informed that it should be taken seriously: οἱ μὲν δὲ τοιαύτ’ ἐπαιξαν σπουδὴ πρὸς ἀλήλους (6.1.6).
reader: Median and Persian (τῇ Περσικῇ στολῇ, 6.1.5) methods of self-presentation are contrasted. Although Cyrus’ use of dress is to some extent valorised, it is also marked as specifically Persian. The manipulation of the language of κόσμος, as Cyrus replaces adornment (ἐκόσμουν) in robes with adornment (κεκοσμημένος) in sweat,\(^{48}\) marks the different sets of cultural assumptions at play in this scene about what constitutes an appropriate appearance - the term κόσμος implies not just adornment but a proper or right way of doing things.\(^{49}\) The reader may be won over by Cyrus’ display, succumbing to his visual power, but may also be alienated from exotic Persian asceticism almost as much as from exotic Median decadence.

**Vision and imperialism**

Cyrus’ control over vision also marks his acquisition of control over the foreign peoples whom he conquers or wins over as allies in his rise to imperial power. Viewing is often presented as paradigmatic of the conquest of foreign lands and peoples. Cyrus admits that although ruling seems a difficult task,

\[\text{όταν μέντοι γε πρὸς ἄλλους ἀνθρώπους ἵδων κατανοΗζω οἴοι ὄντες διαγίνονται ἄρχοντες καὶ οἵοι ὄντες ἀνταγωνισταὶ ἥμιν ἔσονται, πάνυ μοι δοκεῖ αἰσχρὸν εἶναι τὸ τοιοῦτος ὑποπτήξαι καὶ μὴ θέλειν ἱέναι αὐτοῖς ἀνταγωνισμένους.} (1.6.8)

\(^{48}\) See Azoulay (2004a) 164 on the repetition of this term.

\(^{49}\) See Walsh (1984) 7-9. In a discussion of the *Odyssey*, Walsh argues that Odysseus’ description of the song of Demodocus as “too much according to order” (λίην... κατὰ κόσμουν, *Od.* 8.489) implies that Odysseus holds a different world view from his Phaecian hosts: “Odysseus shows his difference from the Phaeacians by twisting the traditional language in which their assumptions are encoded” (7).
“...when I consider the matter by looking at what sort of human beings endure in their rule and what sort of human beings will be our antagonists, it seems to me very shameful to be intimidated before such men and to be unwilling to go in contention against them...”

For Cyrus, looking at the enemy is the first step to overcoming them. Cyrus' viewing is similarly active in the imperial exploitation of conquered resources: whatever he sees that is good for an army (ὁ τι που καλὸν ἵδοι ἐς στρατιῶν, 3.3.6) he acquires.

The conquests of both Armenia and Chaldaea are told through a narrative of a sequence of sights. There is a repetitive focus on what is seen in the course of both battles to the extent that the description of sights seems to replace direct description of action: Cyrus sees the plain full of Armenians trying to escape, so orders them to stay in their homes (3.1.3); Cyrus sees the Armenian king flee to the hilltop, and so encircles it with his army (3.1.5); Cyrus' men look down from the hills and see the Chaldaeans fleeing from their homes (3.2.10). The act of conquest is mirrored by and told through Cyrus' and his army's viewing of their enemy.

However, there is an equal emphasis on the role of the Armenians' and Chaldaeans' viewing in their own defeat: the Armenians see their king withdraw, so run to rescue their possessions (3.1.3); similarly ὡς δὲ διώκοντες οἱ Χαλδαῖοι εἶδον ἐναντίονς μαχαίρωφόρους ἱεμένους ἄνω, οἱ μὲν τινες αὐτοῖς πελάσαντες ταχὺ ἀπέθνησκον, οἱ δ' ἔφευγον... (3.2.10)
"When the pursuing Chaldaeans saw swordsmen rushing up in opposition, some were quickly killed when they got near, and others fled."

In the sequence of main verbs (εἶδον; ἀπέθνησκον; ἔφευγον) it is implied that the Chaldaeans' sight of Cyrus' army has a direct impact upon them; Cyrus and his men impose themselves not just through action but through the visual effect of that action on their enemy.50 Similarly we are told that in the attack on the Assyrian fortification, although the Assyrians were standing ready on the rampart,

...τοξεύειν μὲν ἡ ἄκοντιζειν εἰς τοὺς κατακαίνοντας οὔτε ἔφρονοιν οὔτε ἐδύναντο διὰ τὰ δεινὰ ὀράματα καὶ διὰ τὸν φόβον. (3.3.66)

"...as for shooting their arrows or throwing their spears at those who were doing the killing, they neither thought of it nor had the power because of the terrible sights and their fear."

The sight of Cyrus' onslaught is enough to make that onslaught successful; to view it is to be disempowered (οὔτε ἐδύναντο).51

50 The use of visual effect in battle is a theme of the Iliad: the sight of Patroclus in the arms of Achilles strikes fear into the Trojans (II. 16.278-83); the gleam of Achilles as he reappears at the edge of the battlefield produces confusion in the Trojans and gladness in the Achaeans (II. 18.202-38); Achilles in his new armour sends out a gleam (II. 19.373-83) which terrifies the Trojans (II. 20.44-6). Gorgias also refers to the overpowering visual effect of an army (Gorg. Hel. 16).

51 Similarly, Cyrus gains power over his newly-won Assyrian ally Gadatas through Gadatas' gaze at him. Cyrus expresses anxiety that he and his men might be unable to return Gadatas' gaze if they do not go to his aid (πῶς δ' ἂν ἀντιβλέψαι τις ἡμῶν δύνατο Γαδάτῳ, εἶ ἦττωμεθ' οὕτω εὖ ποιοῦντος τοσοῦτοι ὑπὲρ ἑνὸς ἄνδρος καὶ τούτου οὕτω διακεμένου; "How would any of us be able to return Gadatas' gaze, if we who are so many should be less than him in doing good, when he is but one man and is in such plight?" 5.3.33): the failure to return the look of another indicates a lack of status, whether of a child, as when Cyrus as a boy cannot look his grandfather Astyages in the face (οὐδὲ γὰρ οἶδ' τ' εἶμ' λέγειν ἐγώγε οὖδ' ἀναβλέπειν πρὸς τὸν πάππον ἐκ τοῦ ἴσου ἑτε δύναμαι, 1.4.12), or of a slave, as in Tigranes' claim that fear both enslaves people (καταδουλούσθαι, 3.1.23) and prevents them from looking at those of whom they are afraid (οὕς δ' ἂν σφόδρα φοβηθῶσιν ἀνθρώποι, τοῦτοις οὐδὲ παραμυθουμένοις ἐτε ἀντιβλέπειν δύνανται; 3.1.23). However, when he meets
Control over vision is also vital to Cyrus' position as imperial ruler in Babylon; as Too suggests, in Babylon “Cyrus creates a 'panoptic' state”. He uses spies, “the King's Eyes” and “the King's Ears”, who extend the reach of his vision (and hearing) to all spaces of the city, since the spies are believed to be everywhere, “...each man was disposed to whoever was present as if they were the Eyes and Ears of the king” (...ὡς ἐν ὀφθαλμοῖς πᾶσι καὶ ὑσὶ βασιλέως τοῖς ἀεὶ παρούσιν οὕτως ἕκαστος διέκειτο, 8.2.12). Strikingly, viewing becomes the direct application of Cyrus' rule: τὸν δὲ ἀγαθὸν ἄρχοντα βλέποντα νόμον ἀνθρώπος ἑνόμισεν, ὃτι καὶ τάπτειν ἱκανός ἐστι καὶ ὃραν τὸν ἀτακτοῦντα καὶ κολάζειν (“He believed that the good ruler was a seeing law for human beings, because he is sufficient to put into order, to see who is out of order, and to punish,” 8.1.22).

Cyrus is also depicted as meticulously controlling his exposure to view. He contrives to set up his court in such a way that “...he could appear seldom and with dignity” (...σπάνιός τε καὶ σεμνός

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53 See Too (1998) 297: “The king's 'eyes' and 'ears' enable him to watch the watchers and, in so doing, to disseminate his authority throughout the kingdom.”

54 Azoulay (2004a) 151: Cyrus “makes few but impressive appearances”.

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Gadatas after fighting off their enemies, his fear of a loss of status is resolved in Gadatas' enthusiastic gaze (ἴδουν δὲ αὐτὸν ὁ Κύρος ἡσθη τε καὶ εἶπεν. Ἐγὼ δὲ πρός σὲ ἡ ἐπισκεψόμενος πώς ἔχεις. Ἐγὼ δὲ γ', ἔφη ὁ Γαδάτας, ναι μά τούς θεοὺς σὲ ἔπανοθεσσάμονος ἦ σποδός τις ποτε φαίη ἰδεῖν ὁ τοιαύτην ψυχήν ἔχων. "Seeing him Cyrus was pleased and said, "I was coming to you to see how you are." "But I, by the gods," said Gadatas, "was coming to gaze again upon you, to see how you appear in sight, you who have such a soul."" 5.4.10–11). Not only is Cyrus' equality with Gadatas maintained in his ability to return his look, but his domination of Gadatas emerges in his ability to make the intensity of Gadatas' gaze exceed his own. Lack of control over one's gaze can indicate a lack of self-control, as in the crazed (μυγνόμενον, 1.4.24), overly intensive gaze of Cyrus as a boy at enemy corpses (ἐκείνος οὐδὲν ἄλλο ἡ τοὺς πεττωκότας περιελαύνων ἔθετο, καὶ μόλις αὐτὸν ἀρετλύσαντες οἱ ἐπὶ τοῦτο ταχθέντες, 1.4.24): see Barton (2002).
Even in his deathbed instructions to his sons he controls the visual availability of his body:

"If one of you either wishes to touch my right hand or wants to look me in the eye while I am still alive, let him approach. When I cover myself, I ask you, children, let no human being see my body any longer, not even you yourselves."

Cyrus uses his visual self-presentation to assert control over his subjects:

\[\text{τοὺς δὲ παρέχοντας ἑαυτοὺς ἑνόμισε μάλιστ' ἄν ἐπὶ τὰ καλὰ καὶ ἀγαθὰ ἐπαίρευν, ἐπείπερ ἥρκων ἦν αὐτῶν, εἰ αὐτός ἑαυτὸν ἐπιδεικνύειν πειρώτῳ τοῖς ἀρχομένοις πάντων μάλιστα κεκοσμημένον τῇ ἁρετῇ.}\ (8.1.21)

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55 This behaviour is explicitly contrasted with Cyrus' previous visibility; Cyrus comments: τοὺς δὲ σπανίους ἴδειν στρατηγοὺς πολλὰ ἑνόμιζον ὡν δὲι πρασθήναι παρέλαμεν. (7.5.46) "I used to consider that generals who are seldom seen neglect many of the things that need to be done." The emphasis on change is picked up in the response of Chrysantas: ἀλλὰ τὸ μὲν πρόσθεν, ὥς Κῦρη, εἰκότως ἐν τῷ φανερωθεῖν σαυτὸν παρείχες... (7.5.55) "Previously, Cyrus, you properly presented yourself out in the open...."

56 Cf. the proem's statement of Cyrus' extraordinary power as an imperial ruler: Κῦρῳ γοὖν ἰσμὲν ἑθελὴσαντας πείθεσθαι τοὺς μὲν ἀπέχοντας παμπόλλῳ ἤμερῶν ὁδόν, τοὺς δὲ καὶ μηνῶν, τοὺς δὲ οὐδ’ ἐμφακότας πώποτ’ αὑτῶν, τοὺς δὲ καὶ εὖ εἰδότας ὧτι οὐδ’ ἄν ἱδοιεν, καὶ ὅμως ἤθελον αὐτῷ ὑπακούειν. (1.1.3) "We know that Cyrus was willingly obeyed by some, even though they were distant from him by a journey of many days; by others, distant by a journey even of many months; by others, who had never yet seen him; and by others, who knew quite well that they would never see him. Nevertheless, they were willing to submit to him." The expectation seems to be that power is asserted through visual display; the ability of Cyrus to wield power even over those who had never seen him is offered as proof of his exceptional status.
“He believed that he would especially induce those who presented themselves [at court] towards what was noble and good if he himself, since he was their ruler, tried to display himself to his subjects as having been most of all adorned with virtue.”

Cyrus’ display of virtues enforces obedience by offering a model (παράδειγμα, 8.1.39) for behaviour; it is a topic which Xenophon discusses at length (8.1.21–39). We are told that he “...continually made his benevolence of soul every bit as visible as he could” (...διὰ παντὸς ἀεὶ τοῦ χρόνου φιλανθρωπίαν τῆς ψυχῆς ώς ἐδύνατο μάλιστα ἐνεφάνιζεν, 8.2.1), and contrived to gain influence over his courtiers “...by being visibly pleased along with them on good occasions and grief-stricken along with them on bad occasions...” (...καὶ τῷ συνηδόμενος μὲν ἐπὶ τοῖς ἁγαθοῖς φανερὸς εἶναι, συναχθόμενος δ’ ἐπὶ τοῖς κακοῖς..., 8.2.2).

57 This duality of seeing and being seen is repeatedly presented in Xenophon’s description of Cyrus’ organisation of Babylon, e.g. ἐμφανίζων δὲ καὶ τούτῳ ὅτι περὶ πολλοῦ ἔποιεῖτο μηδένα μὴτε φιλὸν ἄδικειν μὴτε σύμμαχον, ἀλλὰ τὸ δίκαιον ἱσχυρὸς ἀθρών, μᾶλλον καὶ τοὺς ἄλλους ὑπὲρ’ ἄν τῶν μὲν ἀισχρῶν κερδῶν ἀπέχεσθαι, διὰ τοῦ δίκαιου δ’ ἐθέλειν πορευέσθαι. (8.1.26) “He also thought that, if he could show that it was very important to him not to be unjust to any friend or ally, and if he should watch justice intently, others would abstain from shameful gains and be willing to make their way by the just course.”

58 Cf. Humble (1999) 343–344. In her comparison of Xenophon’s use of sophrosune and aidos in the Lak. Pol. and Cyropaedia she quotes the following definition, offered as part of the description of Cyrus’ use of moral display: [διήρει δὲ αἰδῶ καὶ σωφροσύνην τῇ, ώς τοὺς μὲν αἰδομένους τὰ ἐν τῷ φανερῷ αἰσχρὰ φεύγοντας, τοὺς δὲ σώφρονος καὶ τὰ ἐν τῷ ἀφανεῖ.] (Cyr. 8.1.31) “[Cyrus] distinguished aidos and sophrosune like this: those who show aidos flee what is shameful where it is in the open, but those with sophrosune do so even where it is invisible.” She contrasts the focus on sophrosune in Persian education in book 1 with the references to aidos in the Lak Pol to argue that Spartans only exhibit virtue in the public eye for the benefit of appearances, whereas Persian morality is real and internalised. I would rather stress the emphasis on display and appearances in the representation of Cyrus.

59 The operation of the display of virtue as an act of political manipulation is humorously flagged when after Cyrus’ courtier Hystaspas asks why another man is honoured above himself, only to be told that it is because that man is visible (φανερός, 8.4.11) acting to Cyrus’ benefit, he replies: ἐν μόνῳ, ἔφη, ἁγνοῷ, πῶς...
Sight and Interpretation

However, Cyrus’ construction of imperial power through display is often more nuanced and equivocal than these examples might suggest. The act of viewing is often self-consciously figured as a moment of political crisis, as its involvement in the production of power is made the subject of concern and debate. After Cyrus’ allies, the Cadusians, have been defeated by the Assyrian enemy, Cyrus makes the following speech:

καὶ ᾧμα μὲν θάψομεν τοὺς τελευτήσαντας, ἀμα δὲ δείχομεν τοῖς πολέμιοις ἔνθα κρατήσαι νομίζουσιν ἐνταῦθα ἄλλους αὐτῶν κρείττους, ἢν θεὸς θέλῃ· ἕαν δὲ μὴ ἀντεπεξισθεί, καύσομεν αὐτῶν τὰς κώμας καὶ δηώσομεν τὴν χώραν, ἵνα μὴ ἡ ἡμῶς ἐποίησαν ὅρῶντες εὑρῆσαν, ἀλλὰ τὰ ἐαυτῶν κακὰ θεώμενοι ἀνιώνται, καὶ ὅπως γε μηδὲ τὸ χωρίον ἡδέως ὁρῶσιν ἐνθὰ κατέκανον ἡμῶν τοὺς συμμάχους. (5.4.21)

“We will at once bury the dead, and show our enemies that on the very spot where they believe they conquered, others are stronger than they, if god is willing. If they do not come out in opposition we will burn their villages and ravage their land, in order that they do not take delight in seeing what they did to us, but to the contrary feel pain in

ἄν εἰην δήλος χαῖρων ἐπὶ τοῖς σοίς ἄγαθοῖς, πότερον κροτεῖν δεῖ τῷ χείρῃ ἢ γελάν ἢ τι ποιεῖν. καὶ ὁ Ἀρτάβαζος εἴπεν· Ὁρχείσθαι δεῖ τὸ Περσικὸν. ἐπὶ τούτοις μὲν δὴ γέλως ἐγένετο. (8.4.12) ““Of one thing only am I ignorant,” he said. “How should I make clear my delight in what is good for you? Must I clap my hands? Must I laugh? What must I do?” And Artabazus said, “You must dance the Persian dance.” At this, of course, a laugh arose.” The revelation of virtue to sight is parodically revealed as a self–conscious political ploy.
gazing on their own evils, and so that they do not take pleasure in looking on the place where they killed our allies.”

Cyrus articulates the balance of power between the two sides through the issue of how what is seen will be interpreted. The same location is open to be seen in different ways. Cyrus is concerned that the site where the defeat occurred might become a monument to that defeat in the eyes of the enemy, placing them in a position of power over Cyrus' army. In Cyrus’ reacquisition of power over the Assyrians, the emphasis is placed not on the concrete—the burning of their villages and the ravaging of their land—but on the visual effect this will have. The location of the defeat will be reclaimed as a monument to his own power, becoming a sight which will produce pain for the enemy when they gaze at it. The conquest of a piece of foreign land is instantiated in its transformation into the visual sign of its own conquest.

The experience of viewing does not produce only one possible response; rather viewing is shown as open to challenges, refusals and manipulations. The openness of a sight to be interpreted in different ways becomes a problem for Cyrus' imperial project. When Cyrus considers whether to lead his army past Babylon, his ally Gobryas advises that Cyrus keep the army as far from the city as possible, as the Assyrians have started refusing to give up their arms, “...because your force seemed small to those of them who saw it” (...ὢτι τοῖς

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61 A concern with the memorialisation of battles can be found in the Iliad: Hector imagines the burial mound of the man he defeats in single combat being seen by those passing in ships as a σημα of his glory (Il. 7.81-9). See also the epigrams of Simonides on the dead at Thermopylae (Simon. VI, XXIIa and XXIIb FGB).
62 See Bell (2004) 6: “...power...and its phenomenology are closely intertwined.”
Cyrus disagrees, arguing that it is far safer for the army to march right up to the walls:

"If they do not see us, and think that we are out of sight because we are afraid of them, be quite assured," he said, "that they will lose the fear that arose in them, and in its place will grow up courage that becomes greater as the time they do not see us increases."

The argument pivots on the issue of how sight, or the lack of it, functions within an economy of courage and fear, encouragement and discouragement, which is presented as part of a struggle between the two sides for power over each other. Viewing matters; it is the subject of serious strategic debate. Whereas Gobryas’ report of Assyrian resurgence suggests that being seen has led to a reduction in the power exercised by Cyrus’ army, Cyrus claims that it will give power to the enemy if they are not seen. He elaborates:

63 The concept of the battle-field as a visual arena watched from city walls is familiar from the Iliad in the teichoskopia of Helen and Priam (II. 3.161-242), reworked in Antigone’s teichoskopia in Eur. Phoen. 88–201. See Zeitlin (1994).

64 Elsewhere, Cyrus persuades Cyaxares of the importance of looking at the enemy for their army’s self respect: πολύ μέντοι ἡμεῖς βελτίσσι καὶ ἐρωμενεστέραις ταῖς ψυχαῖς τῶν στρατιώτων χρησάμεθα, ἥν ἰσομεν ἐπὶ τοὺς ἐχθροὺς καὶ μὴ ἄκοντες ὁρῶν δοκῶμεν τοὺς πολεμίως; (“We will avail ourselves of much better and more robust souls in our soldiers if we move against our foes and do not seem unwilling to look upon our enemy,” 3.3.18).
μὴ λανθανέτω δὲ σε μηδὲ τούτο, ἔφη, οτι ἔξεστι μὲν τοῖς πολεμίοις καὶ νῦν ἴδεῖν ἡμᾶς· γοργότεροι δὲ, σάφ' ἱσθι, σοῦδαμως ἄν αὐτοῖς φανείμεν ἡ λόντες ἐπ᾽ ἐκείνους. (5.2.37)

"Do not let it escape your consideration," he said, "that it is possible even now for our enemies to see us. Be assured that there is no way we could appear more gorgon-like to them than by marching against them."

Cyrus suggests that the army may well be seen anyway, and so it is necessary to control how it is seen. It is suggested that being seen by the enemy does not have one simple effect, but can cut two ways. It can involve the enemy fixing Cyrus' army with an intrusive, scrutinizing gaze, or Cyrus inflicting on the enemy an awe-inspiring spectacle. The adjective γοργότεροι, from γοργός, meaning "like the Gorgon," whose gaze famously could turn those who looked at her to stone, suggests the extremes of power available in being seen (see chapter 2). Viewing is presented not only as involved in the production of power, but as producing relationships of power which are contingent on the interpretation of the viewer.

Cyrus puts forward a theory about the way visual display affects its audience; however, the text is self-conscious about demonstrating the failure of vision to produce a fixed code of response. Cyrus' "theory" is picked up on and transformed in a second conversation with Gobryas, when after a successful campaign leading to increases in the army's size, Cyrus must again march past Babylon. This time Cyrus
does not wish to pass so close to the Assyrian king's city. Gobryas is surprised:

...ἀλλ' ἔγωγ', ἔφη, ὕμνην καὶ βουλεσθαι ἃν σε νῦν ὅτι ἐγγυτάτω τῆς πόλεως ἁγειν, ἵνα καὶ ἐπιδείξαις αὐτῷ ὅτι τὸ στράτευμά σου ἣδη πολὺ τέ ἑστι καὶ καλόν· ἐπειδὴ καὶ ὅτε ἔλαττον εἰχὲς προσήλθες τε πρὸς αὐτὸ τὸ τείχος καὶ ἐθέατο ἡμᾶς οὐ πολλοὺς ὄντας· νῦν δὲ εἰ καὶ παρασκευασμένος τι ἑστιν, ὡσπερ πρὸς σὲ εἶπεν ὅτι παρασκεύαζοιτο ὡς μαχούμενός σοι, οἶδ' ὅτι ἰδόντι αὐτῷ τὴν σὴν δύναμιν πάλιν ἀπαρασκευαστότατα τὰ αὐτοῦ φανεῖται. (5.4.42)

"But I thought," he said, "that you would wish now to march as near as possible to the city, so you could display to him that your army is now large and noble. For even when you had a smaller one, you marched right up to the wall itself, and he gazed on us when we were not numerous. But now even if he is in some way prepared, just as he said to you that he would be prepared to do battle with you, I know that when he sees your power, his own will seem most unprepared."

Cyrus counters that now it is no longer appropriate to be seen:

Δοκεῖς μοι, ὡ Γωβρύα, θαυμᾶζειν ὅτι ἐν ὑ μὲν χρόνῳ πολὺ μείονα ἑχὼν στρατιῶν ἦλθον, πρὸς αὐτὸ τὸ τείχος προσήγῃν· νῦν δ' ἐπεί πλείονα δύναμιν ἑχω, οὐκ ἐθέλω ὑπ' αὐτὰ τὰ τείχη ἁγειν. ἀλλὰ μὴ θαυμάζε· οὐ γὰρ τὸ αὐτὸ ἑστὶ προσάγειν τε καὶ παράγειν. (5.4.43)

"You seem to me, Gobryas, to be full of wonder that at the time when I came with a far smaller army I marched right up to the wall itself, but now, when I have a greater power, I do not wish to march under the
walls themselves. Do not wonder, for to march up to and to march by are not the same thing."

He goes on to explain that when marching by, the baggage train straggles out in a thin line, and in order that it does not appear (φαίνεσθαι) to the enemy to be unarmed the soldiers must spread out with it, and so are in weak order (5.4.45).

The argument is partly construed as practical (if the enemy attacks they will be stronger than the men at any point in the line). However, this practical reason is inextricably bound up with a concern for the visual: the army becomes weak because of their fear of looking weak. When marching by at close quarters the army will not be organised for impressive display. However, if marching by is performed at a distance

...τὸ μὲν πλήθος κατόψονται ἠμῶν· ὑπὸ δὲ τῶν παρῳδασμένων ὀπλῶν πᾶς ὄχλος δεινός φαίνεται. (5.4.48)

"...they will look upon our multitude. Behind the weapons which frame a formation, every mob appears terrible."65

65 Indeed, as they march past Babylon at a distance, Cyrus increases the strength of the troops in the rear (5.4.50), to produce the correct visual effect. Cf. 7.5.2: when Cyrus takes the army up to Babylon to survey (κατεθεάσατο) the walls, a deserter tells him that the Babylonians intend to attack as he withdraws, as the line looked weak to those of them who saw it (καταθεωμένους). Cyrus therefore has his troops fold together so that the line is deeper before he withdraws. The manipulation of viewing in military tactics is a recurring interest throughout the battle scenes. At one point the Assyrians are described as setting up their camp in a spot exposed to view (ἐν περιπετειασμένω μὲν καταφανεί βε, 3.3.28), whereas Cyrus chooses a place which is as little visible as possible (ἐν ἀφανεστάτω, 3.3.28), "...considering that everything pertaining to war is more fearful to the opposition when seen suddenly," (νομίζων πάντα τὰ πολέμια ἐξαιρήνυ ὁρώμενα φοβερώτερα τοῖς ἑναντίον εἶναι, 3.3.28). Similarly, on witnessing Assyrian manoeuvres in the final battle of the text, when he is asked if they are manoeuvring well, Cyrus answers, "Yes, for what they see, but for what they do not see they are coming at us in a worse way than in a column." (Πρὸς γε ἀ ὀρῶσι· πρὸς δὲ ἀ οὐχ ὁρώσιν ἔτι κάκιον ἢ ἐκ κατά κέρας προσήσαν, 7.1.8).
Power is not only based in the actual (is the army large or small?), but on how the actual is seen; previously a small army was seen in a way which gave it power, whereas now a big army, if it is seen, will seem (and therefore also be) weak. In the restatement and reformulation of the problem of the army's visual availability, it appears that openness to observation must be rigorously policed; the response of the viewer is not static, but subject to continual reinterpretation.66

Challenging the spectacle: Interpretation and dissent

As we have seen, the processes by which power is constructed through display are revealed as highly problematic; the empowerment of the viewed object implies that power is not imposed from above, but is a

66 A similar debate on sight occurs between Cyrus and Cyaxares, in which Cyaxares proposes taking the army right up to the fortifications of the Assyrian camp in order to produce a spectacle which will cow the enemy. He argues that “if they do not come out against us, our troops will go away more confident, and the enemy, having seen our daring, will be more afraid” (έαν μη ἄντεπεξίωσιν ἐκεῖνοι, οἱ μὲν ἡμέτεροι μᾶλλον θαρρήσαντες ἀπίασιν, οἱ πολέμιοι δὲ τὴν τόλμαν ἱδόντες ἡμῶν μᾶλλον φοβήσονται, 3.3.30). However, Cyrus disagrees: εἰ γὰρ ἡ δὲ ἐκφανέντες παρευσάμεθα, ὡς οὖ κελεύεις, νῦν τε προσιόντας ἡμᾶς οἱ πολέμιοι θέσασιν οὐδὲν φοβούμενοι, εἰδότες ὅτι ἐν ἄσφαλει εἰσὶ τοῦ μηδὲν παθεῖν, ἐπειδὰν τὲ μηδὲν ποιῆσαντες ἀπίστωμεν, πάλιν καθορώντες ἡμῶν τὸ πλῆθος πολὺ ἐνδεέστερον τοῦ ἔσοτών καταφρονήσουσι, καὶ αὐρίν ἔξεσθαι πολὺ ἐρρωμενεστέραις ταῖς γνώμαις. νῦν δ’, ἔρη, εἰδότες μὲν ὅτι πάρεσμεν, οὐχ ὀρώντες δὲ ἡμᾶς, εὐ τοῦτο ἐπίστω, οὐ καταφρονοῦσιν, ἀλλὰ φροντίζουσι τι ποτὲ τοῦτ’ ἐστι, καὶ διαλεγόμενοι περὶ ἡμῶν ἐγώδ’ ὅτι οὐδὲν παύονται. ὅταν δ’ ἔξεσθαι, τότε δὲι αὐτοῖς ἀμα φανεροὺς τε ἡμᾶς γενέσθαι καὶ λέναι εὐθὺς ὀμόσε, εἰληφότας αὐτοὺς ἔνθα πάλαι ἐβουλόμεθα (“If we march up while exposed to view, as you order, the enemy will gaze upon us as we approach but will not be afraid, knowing that they are safely protected from suffering harm. Further, when we go away without having done anything, and they see that our numbers are much fewer than theirs, they will hold us in contempt, and tomorrow will come out much more robust in their judgements. But now,” he said, “knowing that we are present, but not seeing us, know well that they do not hold us in contempt, but are asking themselves what is going on, and I am sure they do not stop talking about us. But when they come out, then we must at once reveal ourselves to them and immediately attack, having caught them where long ago we wished we would,”’’ 3.3.31-32). Although it will be harmful for the army to be seen while the enemy can look down at them in safety from their battlements, once the enemy attacks, then the army must show themselves. Again, sight does not have one fixed effect; power relations in viewing are continuously shifting and must be carefully controlled.

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two way process, dependent on the complicity of the viewer.\textsuperscript{67} The viewer’s response therefore becomes a site of concern: will the viewer see in the way that Cyrus wishes, or in another way?

The question of the viewer’s acquiescence to, or alternatively, dissent from Cyrus’ control of visual experience is self-consciously raised in scenes dealing with his acquisition and subjugation of allies.\textsuperscript{68} After Cyrus takes control of his Median uncle Cyaxares’ army, effectively assuming leadership of the Medes, he has a conversation with Cyaxares in which he claims that the latter has been benefited by his actions. The conversation is framed as a debate on the interpretation of the visual. On Cyaxares’ arrival at Cyrus’ camp, Cyrus organises a parade of troops, displaying his power to him (ἔπιδεικνύς τῷ Κυαξάρη τὴν δύναμιν, 5.5.5). Cyaxares interprets the display as a slight to him:

ο δὲ Κυαξάρης ἔπει ἐδε σὺν μὲν τῷ Κύρῳ πολλοὺς τε καὶ καλοὺς καὶ ἀγαθοὺς ἐπομένους, σὺν αὐτῷ δὲ ὀλίγην τε καὶ ὀλίγου ἀξίαν θεραπείαν, ἄτιμόν τι αὐτῷ ἐδοξέων εἶναι καὶ ἄχος αὐτὸν ἔλαβεν. (5.5.6)

“When Cyaxares saw many noble and good troops following Cyrus, yet with himself a retinue both small and of little worth, it seemed to him to be something dishonourable, and he was seized by grief.”

\textsuperscript{67} The concept of the complicity of the subjugated in their own subjugation has been articulated in postcolonial theory, as a way of describing the complex relationship between coloniser and colonial subject. See Gandhi (1998) 9–17 for discussion of the colonial subject’s desire for and identification with the culture of the colonisers as part of the operation of colonial oppression. Foucault (1977) argues that the pervasiveness of power is manifested through the engagement and cooperation of its subjects. See chapter 1.

\textsuperscript{68} For complicity and dissent as responses to display, see Foucault (1977) 58–65; Bell (2004) 1–10.
Cyrus challenges his reaction, asking what harsh sight he has seen to respond so harshly (τι χαλεπὸν ὀρῶν οὐτω χαλεπῶς φέρεις; 5.5.8). He proposes a visual examination of his actions: σαφέστατα κατίδωμεν ποιόν ἔστι τὸ παρ᾽ ἐμοῦ ἀδίκημα. (5.5.13) “Let us see most clearly what sort of unjust act I have committed.”

Cyrus presents the benefits which he claims Cyaxares has been given as a spectacle which ought to impress and persuade him. He implicitly claims that the visual quality of his actions makes their meaning transparent and therefore only open to the interpretation which he himself offers. By presenting his actions as visible, Cyrus tries to co-opt their meaning to his purpose: τί ἡμῖν πεπραγμένον οὐ φανερὸν ἔστιν;...χρήματά γε μήν τὰ τῶν φερόντων καὶ ἁγόντων τὰ σὰ πρόσθεν νῦν ὀρξὲς τοὺς σοὺς φίλους καὶ ἔχοντας καὶ ἁγόντας...τὴν μὲν σήν χώραν αὐξανομένην ὀρξῆς, τὴν δὲ τῶν πολεμίων μειουμένην. (5.5.23–24) “What did we do that is not visible? ...Now you see your friends possessing and leading away the valuables of those who previously used to carry and lead your valuables away ...You see your country being enlarged, and that of your enemies being diminished.”

However, Cyaxares challenges Cyrus’ interpretation. He sees the same things in a different way.69 The possibility of discrepancy in

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69 See Cyaxares’ response: Ἀλλ᾽, ὦ Kūre, ως μὲν ταῦτα ἀ σὺ πεποίηκας κακὰ ἔστιν οὐκ ὦτι διαφῳρὴ λέγειν· εὖ γε μὲντοι, ἔχει, ἵσθι ὅτι ταῦτα τάγαθα τοιαύτα ἔστιν οἷα διόμενα φαίνεται, τοσοῦτω μᾶλλον ἐμὲ βαρύνει (“Well, Cyrus, I do not know how one could say that the things you have done are bad. Be well assured, however, that they could be good in such a way that the more numerous they appear, the more they oppress me,” 5.5.25). In this apparent paradox, Cyaxares expresses the complexity of the interpretation of actions within relationships of contested power.
interpretations of the visual is flagged up, as Cyaxares requests of Cyrus:

ei δέ σοι, ἔφη, ταῦτα δοκῶ ἀγνωμόνως ἐνθυμεῖσθαι, μὴ ἐν ἐμοὶ αὐτὰ ἄλλα εἰς σὲ τρέψας πάντα καταθέασαι οἷά σοι φαίνεται.

(5.5.28)

"If I seem to you," he said, "to lack judgement in the way I take these things to heart, put yourself in my situation, and then look how these things appear to you."

What is seen is a matter of one's position. Cyaxares' self-positioning as a ruler in his own right, with autonomous interests separate from those of Cyrus, allows him to see something other than the sight Cyrus wishes him to see. The argument is resolved as Cyrus orchestrates a display of Median loyalty to Cyaxares, ordering the Medes to follow Cyaxares (5.5.37) and to court him with gifts (5.5.39). He then leaves him to his dinner while he holds a meeting with the allies (5.5.41-48.). Cyaxares has been both pacified and marginalised; Cyrus assumes full power over the Medes. However, crucially, Cyaxares, although eventually subjugated, is capable of challenging Cyrus' interpretation; the possibility of resistance to Cyrus' control of viewing is allowed.

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70 The Medes are also an audience of Cyrus' display. Cyrus orchestrates an appearance of happy resolution as a spectacle for his followers, ensuring that no rifts of loyalty occur and that they can continue to obey him as before, by asking Cyaxares publicly to kiss him and not to turn away from him as he did on their greeting (5.5.6). This gesture does not go unnoticed: Ὡς δὲ εἶδον οἱ Μῆδοι τε καὶ οἱ Πέρσαι καὶ οἱ ἄλλοι (πάσι γὰρ ἐμελεῖν ὅ τι ἐκ τούτων ἔσοιτο), εὐθὺς ἠσθησάν τε καὶ ἑφανερώθησαν ("When the Medes, Persians, and the many others saw this (for the result was a matter of concern to them all), they took immediate pleasure and beamed with joy," 5.5.37).
Complicity, dissent and the reader

The problem of interpretation in viewing has implications for the reader of the *Cyropaedia*, as an external viewer of Cyrus’ display. Can the reader observe Cyrus with detachment, or is his power over the viewer disturbingly invasive? Does his imperial success hold seductive appeal—especially, perhaps, for Athenian readers, with their own history of empire?\(^7^1\) The problems of complicity or resistance to visual display and of the reader’s interpretation arise strikingly in the presentation of Cyrus’ imperial procession in Babylon (8.3.9–18), which we are told is put on in order to cement his rule.\(^7^2\)

> Νῦν δὲ ἡδη διηγησόμεθα ώς τὸ πρῶτον ἐξῆλασε Κῦρος ἐκ τῶν βασιλείων· καὶ γὰρ αὐτῆς τῆς ἐξέλάσεως ἡ σεμνότης ἡμῖν δοκεῖ μία τῶν τεχνῶν εἶναι τῶν μεμηχανημένων τὴν ἀρχὴν μὴ εὑκαταφρόνητον εἶναι. (8.3.1)

“No we will narrate how Cyrus for the first time marched in procession out of his palace, for it seems to us that the majesty of the procession itself was one of the arts contrived so that his rule should not be easy to hold in contempt.”

We are shown Cyrus planning the procession with an advisor:

> ...συνεβουλεύετο αὐτῷ πῶς ἄν τοῖς μὲν εὔνοις κάλλιστα ἵδεῖν ποιοῖτο τὴν ἐξέλασιν, τοῖς δὲ δυσμενέσι φοβερῶτατα. (8.3.5)

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\(^{71}\) The question of how far the reader will identify with Cyrus also poses ethical problems for modern readers of the text in a post-colonial age.

\(^{72}\) See Herodotus’ description of the procession of Phya mocked up as Athena, used to reinstate Peisistratus in Athens (Hdt. 1.60).
"...he deliberated with him about how he could make his procession most noble for those of goodwill to see, and most frightening for those who harboured ill will."

Cyrus envisages two groups of viewers who will interpret what they see in different ways; he attempts to produce a single display capable of having different effects on these different audiences. When the procession takes place, however, Xenophon allows the possibility of intellectual, if not actual, resistance to Cyrus' display:

ίδόντες δὲ πάντες προσεκύνησαν, εἴτε καὶ ἀρξαί τινές κεκελευσμένοι εἴτε καὶ ἐκπλαγέντες τῇ παρασκευῇ καὶ τῷ δόξαι μέγαν τε καὶ καλὸν φανῆναι τὸν Κύρον. (8.3.14)

"On seeing him all prostrated themselves, either because some had been ordered to initiate it, or because they were stunned by the display and by Cyrus' seeming to appear tall and beautiful."

Cyrus' display is presented as open to alternative interpretations; the viewer may be awed by the display, or may be able to view it with detachment. How will the reader respond?

The description of Cyrus' display emphasizes his use of illusion and artifice; he is said to wish to bewitch (καταγοητεύειν, 8.1.40) his audience by taking on the deceptive Median robe, which conceals bodily defects and displays its wearers as especially beautiful and tall (αὗτη γὰρ αὐτῷ συγκρύπτειν ἐδοκεῖ εἶ τίς τι ἐν τῷ σώματι ἐνδεές

73 This passage occurs in the context of a discussion about how Cyrus devised strategies for ruling both his Persian subjects and the conquered Assyrians; although it is not stated, it is possible that the different reactions of the procession's audience are expected to belong to these different constituencies.

74 See Beard (2007) 136 on the problem of controlling the gaze of the viewer of the Roman triumph.
In the procession itself Cyrus is driven by a tall charioteer who is nevertheless made to appear shorter than him (παρωχεῖτο δὲ αὐτῷ ἡνίοχος μέγας μέν, μείων δ' ἐκεῖνου εἴτε καὶ τῷ ὄντι εἴτε καὶ ὁπωσοῦν. μεῖζων δ' ἐφάνη πολὺ Κῦρος, 8.3.14). These passages have been discussed by commentators on the Cyropaedia in terms of the morality of Cyrus’ use of illusion and its implications for his presentation as a ruler. What I rather wish to stress is the problematic position in which these passages place the reader. Cyrus’ visual presentation is highly seductive. As a viewer of Cyrus’ visual artifice, will the reader too be bewitched, falling under the spell of Cyrus’ power?

As in the scene of Cyrus as a child viewing the pomp of the Median king Astyages (1.3.2) discussed above, the reader’s response is complicated not only by the problematic connotations of monarchic display for a democratic audience, but by the ethnographic framing of the display; the description of Cyrus’ self-presentation can be read as an explanation of exotic and alien practices. The narrative is interrupted, both in the passage on Cyrus’ adoption of the Median robe (8.1.40–41) and the passage on the procession (8.3.13–14), by comments in the authorial voice in the present tense explaining customs and articles of dress to the reader: the Median robe is useful in making the wearer appear taller, it is explained, because the costume includes shoes under which platforms can be inserted (καὶ

γάρ τὰ ὑποδήματα τοιαῦτα ἔχουσιν ἐν οἷς μάλιστα λαθεῖν ἔστι καὶ ὑποτιθεμένους τι, ὡστε δοκεῖν μεῖζος εἶναι ἢ εἰσίν, 8.1.41); Cyrus' purple and white tunic is a costume reserved for the king (ἀλλ' δ' οὐκ ἔξεστι μεσόλευκον ἔχειν, 8.3.13); Cyrus and his relatives have a special sign on their tiaras, which the king and his family still use (καὶ νῦν τὸ αὐτὸ τοῦτο ἔχουσι, 8.3.13). These ethnographic and aetiological asides offer Cyrus and his followers for the enquiring scrutiny of their Greek audience; they also present an exposé of how the illusionistic effects are achieved, allowing the reader a privileged sight unavailable to internal audiences. Through the ethnographic self-consciousness of the description, the problem of interpretation becomes bound up with the reader's awareness of reading as a Greek.

Interpretation in cross-cultural viewing

The problem of the reader's position as an ethnographic viewer is brought to the fore by moments where the cross-cultural context of sight is self-consciously addressed as a problem for its interpretation. This concern occurs in the first meeting of Cyrus and Gobryas the Assyrian, who will become Cyrus' follower. When Cyrus and his army first approach Gobryas' fortress, the latter invites them to inspect it:

πέμψας δ' ὁ Γωβρύας πρὸς τὸν Κῦρον ἐκέλευσε περιελάσαντα ἰδεῖν ἢ ἡ πρόσοδος εὐπετεστάτη, ἐίσω δὲ πέμψαι πρὸς ἑαυτὸν τῶν πιστῶν τινας, οἵτινες αὐτῷ τὰ ἐνδον ἴδόντες ἀπαγγελοῦσιν. (5.2.3)

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76 Awe-struck gawping and analytical inspection are presented as contrasting responses to sight in later Greek literature: see Goldhill (2001) 160–167 on Lucian's de Domo.
“Gobryas sent to Cyrus and bade him ride around and see where the approach was easiest and to send to him some of his trusted troops, so these could see what was inside and report back to Cyrus.”

Cyrus examines the fortress and sees that it is impregnable (ἐώρα τε ἵσχυρότερα πάντα ἢ προσελθεῖν, 5.2.4). Next Gobryas displays his wealth:

ἐπειδὴ δὲ ἔνδον ἦσαν, ἑκφέρων ὁ Γωβρύας φιάλας χρυσὰς καὶ πρόχους καὶ κάλπιδας καὶ κόσμον παντοῖον καὶ δαρεικοὺς ἁμέτρους τινὰς καὶ πάντα καλὰ πολλὰ, τέλος τὴν ἰυγατέρα, δεινόν τι κάλλος καὶ μέγεθος...(5.2.7)

“When they were inside, Gobryas brought out golden cups, pitchers, vases, every sort of adornment, Darics without measure, and many other things, which were all beautiful. Finally he brought out his daughter, a marvel in beauty and stature...” 77

Gobryas attempts to impress Cyrus with his strength and wealth by a visual display. His aim is to get Cyrus to join him as his ally and help him take vengeance on the Assyrian king for the death of his son. Cyrus’ response is to refuse the proffered gifts, but to claim that he is grateful for one gift that Gobryas is offering him (5.2.8). He explains:

...πεποίηκας με δὴλον γενέσθαι πᾶσιν ἀνθρώποις ὅτι οὔτ’ ἂν ἄσεβεῖν περὶ ξένους θέλομι οὔτ’ ἂν ἀδικεῖν χρημάτων ἕνεκα οὔτε συνθῆκας ἄν ψευδοίμην ἔκών εἶναι. (5.2.10)

77 See also: ...τοὺς ἔνδοθεν πάντας ἔξηγε φέροντας οἶνον, ἀλφίτα, ἀλευρα, ἄλλους δ’ ἐλαύνοντας βοῦς, αἴγας, οἶς, σῷς, καὶ εἰ τι βρωτόν, πάντα ἴκανα προσήγων ὡς δειπνήσαι πᾶσιν τὴν σὺν Κύρῳ στρατιάν (“...[Gobryas] led out all those who were inside. Some carried out wine, barley meal, and flour, while others drove out cattle, goats, sheep, pigs, and if there was anything else to eat, they brought it all in a quantity sufficient to feed the whole of Cyrus’ army,” 5.2.5).
“You have made it clear to all human beings that I would not be willingly impious where hospitality is required, unjust for the sake of valuables, or voluntarily false in agreements.”

Cyrus claims that the greatest gift Gobryas has bestowed is to allow him the opportunity openly to refuse his gifts and therefore display his virtue. He takes control of the means of display, changing the meaning of the display of wealth to his own advantage by offering a new interpretation of it.

The shift in control over display is shown as Cyrus insists that his men are not impressed by Gobryas’ display but by his own:

σοὶ μέντοι εἴ ἦσθι ὅτι εἰσί τινες αὐτῶν οἱ ὃν μὲν σοῦ δίδως χρημάτων οὐδὲ μικρὸν τούτων ἐνεκὰ σε μᾶλλον θαυμάζουσιν· ἐμὲ δὲ ζηλούσι νυνὶ καὶ εὐχονται πᾶσι θεοῖς γενέσθαι ποτὲ ἐπιδείξασθαι ὡς πιστοὶ μὲν εἰσιν οὐδὲν ἦπτον ἐμοὶ τοῖς φίλοις...(5.2.12)

“Be assured, however, that there are some of my friends here who do not regard you with any more wonder because you are giving away these valuables. Rather, they are now jealous of me and pray to all the gods that it may sometime happen for them to show that they are not less faithful to their friends than I am…”

Cyrus claims to know the reaction of their joint audience; he circumscribes their response with his own interpretation. Crucially, Xenophon does not relate the actual response of this internal audience; we are not told whether Cyrus’ men really are thinking what he claims them to be. Gobryas’ reaction is slightly ambiguous. He asks about this audience:
Gobryas laughed and said, “By the gods, Cyrus, show me where they are, so that I may ask one of them to become my son.”

His laugh hints that he is unconvinced by Cyrus’ claims.

After this conversation, Gobryas invites Cyrus to dinner. Cyrus refuses, insisting that Gobryas should rather be his guest. Gobryas’ reaction to the Persian meal is described visually:

Now dining with them for the first time and seeing the coarseness of the food that was set beside them, Gobryas believed his people to be much freer than they. But then he noted the restraint of his tablemates, for none of the educated Persian men became visibly distracted in their eyes by food or drink...
controlled. By the end of the meal Gobryas is contrite, admitting that "...we are worth less than you" (...αὕτοι δὲ ἐλάττονος ὑμῶν ἄξιοι ἐσμεν, 5.2.20). Cyrus responds by ordering him to lay out his troops for inspection:

ό δὲ Κῦρος, Ἀγ’, ἔφη, ὥ Γωβρύα, ὡς πρὶ παρέση ἔχων τοὺς ἱππέας ἐξωπλισμένους, ἰνά καὶ τὴν δύναμιν σου ἰδώμεν... (5.2.21)

"Cyrus replied, “Make sure that you are here at dawn with your cavalry in their armour so we may see your force...”"

Gobryas has been successfully subjugated. His display of wealth is transformed into Cyrus' moral display, and his attempt to make himself a critical observer of Persian customs reduces him to a stunned spectator of a spectacle of Persian self-control. At the end of the scene, what belongs to him is once again put on display, but with a very different meaning; now it is on the orders of Cyrus, and the troops on display are about to become Cyrus' troops.

This passage raises important questions for the relationship of the reader to the text. As elsewhere, Cyrus' acquisition of power is shown through his control not only of scenarios of viewing, as he puts on a display, but also of the way that viewing fosters interpretation. Importantly, it is not always clear how easily Cyrus is able to exert this control; Gobryas is finally subdued to his will, but the possibility of his initial resistance is mooted, and the internal audience of friends whom Cyrus invokes is never given a voice. The reader's response to Cyrus'

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78 We are also told that the Persians think it necessary to appear to be moderate (οἶνται δὲ ἕν φρόνιμοι καὶ μέτριοι φαίνεσθαι, 5.2.17).
display, focalised through the eyes of these internal audiences, is therefore left open.

The question of whether the viewer accepts or rejects Cyrus’ interpretation of viewing, and therefore his rule, is played out within a self-consciously cross-cultural framework. Xenophon’s staging of the viewing of Gobryas’ wealth and of Cyrus’ refusal of wealth is informed by his presentation of Gobryas as Assyrian and Cyrus as Persian; anecdotes of spectacular wealth are a cliché of Greek writing on Asia,\textsuperscript{79} whereas material poverty has been exhibited throughout the \textit{Cyropaedia} as a hallmark of Persian self-presentation.\textsuperscript{80} Similarly, Gobryas’ disdain at the meagre Persian meal, and his awe at Persian self-control, are presented as contingent on his position as Assyrian.

The ethnographic context of viewing in this scene impacts on the reader. The transformation of Gobryas’ distanced, patronising, scrutiny of the Persian meal into his awe-struck subjection to spectacle raises a question about the reader’s own position as a viewer of Persian customs. How will the Greek reader see Cyrus and the Persians? Will he or she see through Gobryas’ eyes, and experience the same response, or does Gobryas’ own position as object of ethnographic observation alienate the reader from his way of seeing?

The self-conscious staging of the ethnographic conditioning of sight

\textsuperscript{79} We can compare Herodotus’ description of Solon’s viewing of the palace of Croesus (Hdt. 1.30).

\textsuperscript{80} See especially 1.2.2–16: the presentation of Persian society, and 2.4.1–6: the meeting with the Indian ambassadors, where Cyrus presents a display of Persian austerity to compete with Cyaxares’ display of Median pomp.
invites the reader to consider how far his or her own interpretation is controlled by, or constructs, a Greek way of seeing.

Conclusion

In this discussion, I have considered how the representation of viewing impacts on a reading of the *Cyropaedia* as ethnography. The power of Cyrus as imperial conqueror is constructed through his control over his viewers, in the production of spectacle. This has implications for the reader; the representation of Cyrus and the Persians as imperialists disrupts the secure, distanced position of the ethnographic viewer gazing on exotic sights, problematising the reader’s relationship with the text.

Relationships of power are produced in a complex and nuanced engagement between viewer and viewed. The visual field is presented as the site of argument and political struggle; it is hermeneutically flexible, and open to be contested. The power available in spectacle is not monolithic, but is presented as contingent on the complicity of the viewer.

I have indicated some of the ways in which Cyrus uses the control of interpretations of viewing in the acquisition of imperial power. The imperial procession in Babylon is engineered so as to produce the required reaction in different constituencies of viewers. Enemy armies are outmanoeuvred through the control of their interpretation of visual signs, and foreign rulers, like Cyaxares and Gobryas, are won over as obedient followers through Cyrus’ mastery
over the way they see him. If acceptance of Cyrus' attempt to control viewing means acceptance of his domination, how secure is the reader against his or her own (literary) subjugation by Persian imperialism?

However, I have also shown how the possibility of resistance is inscribed into the text. We are shown how the same sight can be seen in different ways, offering possible models of recalcitrant, oppositional viewing. Xenophon does not intervene in the narrative, telling the reader how to respond. The reader's relationship to Cyrus and to the text will depend on his or her interpretation, which is left open.

The highly self-conscious representation of cross-cultural viewing in the text reflects on this relationship. Responses to sights are sometimes presented as culturally conditioned. In witnessing foreign spectacle and the responses of internal audiences to it, the reader is reminded of his or her own position as a Greek as the foreignness of those responses is flagged.

The problem of the viewer's interpretation is made urgent by its formulation as the site of political struggle, producing either resistance or domination. I suggest that the reader is implicated in this problem. The interpretation of the reader—how far the reader acquiesces to Cyrus' control of visual experience and how far he or she resists such control—is involved in a double bind of political positioning. The reader's interpretation inscribes relationships of power between him-or herself and Cyrus' imperialism, and it also is both predicated on and informs the reader's own self-positioning as Greek.
5. Vision, Self and Other in the *Lakedaimonion Politeia*

In the discussions of the *Anabasis* and *Cyropaedia* above, we have examined how the representation of sight positions the reader in relation to Persians and other Asians. I have argued that the reader's identity as Greek is constructed in the sight of non-Greek cultures which these texts allow. Sometimes the experience of looking at the non-Greek is a self-validating affirmation of Greek identity. However, often it is much more fraught and conflicted, challenging the cohesion and security of Greekness, particularly when the reader is invited to look at the spectacle of Persian power. Let us now turn to Xenophon's representation of Spartans, to consider how the reader is positioned when looking at Greeks, but non-Athenians - and especially non-Athenians who, like the Persians, offer a potential source of threat to Athenian autonomy.

Xenophon's *Lakedaimonion Politeia* (*Lak. Pol.*), the earliest extant full-length account of Spartan society and perhaps the ancient source most heavily exploited by historians of classical Sparta, presents the Spartans as the object of observation and spectacle. It contains numerous self-conscious portrayals of Spartans viewing each other or displaying themselves to view, and the reader is repeatedly invited to imagine gazing at the Spartans. How can this striking and highly engaging method of representation be understood historically? In so far as the visuality of the *Lak. Pol.* has been discussed, it has been taken as evidence for the importance of visual scrutiny in Spartan
society and military strategy.\textsuperscript{1} Such an approach treats the \textit{Lak. Pol.} as a transparent window onto Spartan practice – a methodology motivated partly by the meagre nature of our evidence for Sparta, which has led to the desire to excavate Spartan reality from the sources we do have, and partly by a tendency to treat the works of Xenophon as naive and simplistic. In this chapter I argue that the \textit{Lak. Pol.}’s representation of vision is likely to tell us more about how the Spartans were conceptualised and Athenians conceptualised themselves in the fourth century than about Spartan society itself.

The \textit{Lak. Pol.} is a discussion of Spartans by an Athenian, yet an Athenian who had been exiled, and who had many personal connections with Sparta. Depending on the \textit{Lak. Pol.}’s problematic dating, Xenophon may have been living in the Peloponnese at the time of its writing.\textsuperscript{2} Written in Attic Greek, the \textit{Lak. Pol.} forms part of Athenian literary culture, even though its readership may well have extended to other areas of Greece. Although the \textit{Lak. Pol.}’s non-Spartan authorship is often mentioned in regard to the need for caution in using the text as a source for Spartan reality,\textsuperscript{3} its implications have not been explored. On the contrary, Xenophon’s

\begin{footnotesize}
\begin{enumerate}
\item Powell (1989). Not only does he provide very little evidence beyond Xenophon (a problem which he himself acknowledges at 188–189), but he does not note the recurrence of sight and display elsewhere in Xenophon’s corpus. The \textit{Lak. Pol.}’s interest in public or visible virtue (e.g. 10.4–5) has also been noted by Humble (1997) 218–220 and (1999) 344.
\item According to Diog. Laert. 2.52, Xenophon wrote his works while in exile at Skillous. The \textit{Lak. Pol.} has been variously dated, based on the evidence of ch. 14 and judgements as to its relationship to the rest of the work: see Tigerstedt (1965) 462–464 n.530. The location of composition also depends on the dating of Xenophon’s exile and of his receipt of the estate at Skillous, both uncertain; see Lipka (2002) 4 nn.9–10.
\item E.g. Cartledge (1981) 18.
\end{enumerate}
\end{footnotesize}
non-Spartan origins tend to be downplayed in favour of a focus on his personal involvement with Sparta.\textsuperscript{4} the fact that, with the possible exceptions of Tyrtaeus and Alcman, all our ancient sources for Sparta are written by non-Spartans leads to Xenophon's work being seized upon as the closest possible thing to an insider view. Such an approach fails to take seriously the real interest of Xenophon as a writer who bridges cultures, but is also excluded from them.\textsuperscript{5}

As mentioned in chapter 1, Sparta occupied a particularly captivating, and troubling, place in Athenian thought at this time. Following the defeat of Athens by Sparta in the Peloponnesian War and the fall of the Athenian empire, Spartan power was in the ascendancy, although it too was not to last. The increasing threat of Persia also complicated Athenian attitudes to Sparta: was Sparta also a threat, or a potential ally against the barbarians? Were Spartans just as much “other” as the barbarians, or were they, as Greeks, the “same” as the Athenians – or did the fascination of their power even make them paradigms of an idealised Greekness, rendering them both familiar and remote? This period gave rise to a great range of highly polemical Athenian writing on Sparta; Sparta offered both a utopian and a dystopian model for political theory, especially in the context of debates on the benefits or drawbacks of democracy.\textsuperscript{6} The representation of Spartans at this time is therefore highly problematic, and politically charged: the \textit{Lak. Pol.} poses urgent questions about how

\textsuperscript{4} E.g. Cartledge (1981) 19 on Xenophon as “participant observer”; Tigerstedt (1965) 167 on Xenophon as “eye witness”.
\textsuperscript{5} See Goldhill (1998b).
to think about the Spartans, and about how Athenians should think about themselves. Yet, as we shall see, it is difficult to distinguish "self" and "other" in this most slippery of texts.

The *Lak. Pol.* has often been considered "a puzzling document, difficult to interpret".\(^7\) It uses highly rhetorical language to offer apparent praise of Spartan institutions and customs, but frequently undercuts its own argument, making claims about the Spartans in one part of the work which contradict the logic of its assertions elsewhere; for example, we are told that Spartan society produces men without desire for material wealth (7.1–4) yet we are also offered a description of Sparta's methods of preventing people hoarding or using wealth (7.5–6).\(^8\) It also describes Spartan customs which may well have struck an Athenian reader as strange or disturbing, such as female gymnastic training (1.4), extramarital sex (1.7–9) or the education of boys in theft (2.6–7).\(^9\)

Scholarly discussion of the work has tended to be polarised around the question of whether it is a "pro-Spartan" or "anti-Spartan" text. As noted in chapter 1, controversy has centred on the interpretation of its 14th chapter which seems to contradict the rhetoric of praise in the rest of the work by criticising the Spartans. The traditional view is that the *Lak. Pol.* is an unmitigated idealisation of Sparta by a "Laconiser", with chapter 14 dismissed as a later addition.

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\(^7\) Tigerstedt (1965) 162.
\(^8\) Higgins (1977) 68.
or as not by Xenophon; where the peculiarities of the text’s rhetorical style have been noted, they tend to be treated as signs of Xenophon’s inadequacy as a writer.\textsuperscript{10} Alternatively, the text has been read as a heavily ironic critique of Sparta by emphasising Xenophon’s non-Spartan origins, and by interpreting the \textit{Lak. Pol.}’s contradictory and convoluted argument as evidence of Xenophon’s desire for the more sophisticated members of his audience to “read between the lines,” in order to discover an attack on Sparta concealed beneath a surface veneer of praise.\textsuperscript{11} Although the latter approach offers a useful corrective to the traditional reading of the text in that it evinces concern with the question of how the \textit{Lak. Pol.} functions as a piece of writing, it suffers not only from an overly mechanistic understanding of literary processes, but from its attempt to counter the “Laconizing” view by claiming an anti-Spartan position for the text.

The reductiveness of this notion of “bias”, either pro- or anti-Sparta, which dominates scholarship on the \textit{Lak. Pol.}, risks seriously impoverishing our reading of the text. It implies a view of the historical circumstances surrounding the text’s composition where political perspectives are polarised in the context of the Peloponnesian War and its aftermath. It also elides the important question of how securely we are able to tell what cultural descriptions would amount to a contemporary reading that was “pro-” or “anti-Sparta”. How sure can we be, for example, that Xenophon’s description of chastity within

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{10} See chapter 1.
\item \textsuperscript{11} Strauss (1939). See also Proietti (1987) and Higgins (1977).
\end{itemize}
pederastic relations (2.13), often interpreted by modern scholarship as an idealisation suggestive of cultural identification with Sparta,¹² would have been understood unproblematically as such by Xenophon’s contemporaries, and would not also have struck them as strange? As noted above, idealisation can be alienating as much as alluring. Indeed, Xenophon follows his comments on chastity by noting, “I am not surprised that these things are not believed by some people, for the laws/customs in many states do not oppose desire for boys” (τὸ μέντοι ταῦτα ἀπιστεῖσθαι ὑπὸ τινῶν οὐ θαυμάζω· ἐν πολλαῖς γὰρ τῶν πόλεων οἱ νόμοι οὐκ ἐναντιοῦνται ταῖς πρὸς τοὺς παιδας ἐπιθυμίαις, 2.14).

A more recent approach to the Lak. Pol. has attempted to reconcile these contradictory (“pro-” / “anti-”) positions by reading the text as a critical yet balanced examination of Sparta’s strengths and weaknesses.¹³ While this reading is useful in taking seriously the text’s peculiarities while avoiding a reductive retreat to irony, its answer is to deny that these peculiarities are in any way unsettling. It mitigates and smoothes over the jarring, disruptive quality of the text, disallowing the inherently problematic nature of the Lak. Pol. rather than investigating its effect. In contrast, I argue that the difficult, unsettling character of the Lak. Pol. can be understood as indicating the problem which Sparta posed to Athenian self-definition - the difficulty, for

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¹² See e.g. Lipka (2002) 17, where the text’s insistence on the Spartans’ chastity in pederasty is offered as proof of Xenophon’s “pro-Spartan bias”.

Athenians, of knowing how to think or feel about Sparta at this historical moment.

Let us turn now to the text itself, and the representation of sight and display. As we have seen in the preceding chapters, in the Anabasis and Cyropaedia scenes of viewing are involved in thinking through the complexities of how to relate to others; they also invite the reader to interrogate his or her own self-understanding as Athenian, and as Greek. Similar concerns can be found in the representation of viewing and visual self-presentation in Sparta in the Lak. Pol.

An important element of the way Sparta is approached in the Lak. Pol. is through comparison with other states. Of the mythical law-giver Lycurgus' organisation of Sparta we are told: "It was not in imitating other states, but in devising a system the opposite of most, that he displayed his native land as pre-eminently blessed," (1.2: ἐκείνος γὰρ οὐ μιμησάμενος τὰς ἄλλας πόλεις, ἄλλα καὶ ἕναντία γνοὺς ταῖς πλείσταις, προέχουσαν εὐδαιμονία τὴν πατρίδα ἐπέδειξεν). Sparta is put on display (ἐπέδειξεν) as the “opposite” of other Greek states. The language of difference and “oppositeness” recurs throughout the text.14 How far Sparta is similar to or different

14 1.3: οὐ μὲν ἄλλοι; οἱ άλλοι Ἐλλήνες. 1.5: τοὺς ἄλλους; καὶ τοῦτον τάναντια ἔγνω. 1.7: τάναντια καὶ τοῦτον ἐνόμισε. 1.10: τάναντια γνοὺς τοῖς ἄλλοις. 2.1: ἐκατέρων; τῶν μὲν τοῖνυν ἄλλων Ἐλλήνων. 2.2: ἀντί μὲν τοῦ. 2.3: ἀντί γε μὴν τοῦ. 2.4: ἀντί γε τοῦ. 2.12: οἱ μὲν τοῖνυν ἄλλοι Ἐλλήνες. 2.13: ἕναντία καὶ τοῦτος πάσι γνοὺς. 2.14: ἐν πολλαῖς γὰρ τῶν πόλεων; τῶν ἄλλων Ἐλλήνων. 3.1: οἱ μὲν ἄλλοι; τούτων τάναντια ἔγνω. 4.7: οὐ μὲν ἄλλοι Ἐλλήνες. 5.2: τοὺς ἄλλους Ἐλλήνας. 5.5: ἐν μὲν ταῖς ἄλλαις πόλεσιν. 6.1: ἕναντια γε μὴν ἔγνω καὶ τάδε τοῖς πλείστοις; ταῖς ἄλλαις πόλεσι. 6.4: παρά τοῖς ἄλλοις. 7.1: ἕναντια γε μὴν καὶ τάδε τοῖς ἄλλοις Ἐλλήσι; ταῖς ἄλλαις πόλεσι. 8.2: ἐν μὲν ταῖς ἄλλαις πόλεσιν. 9.4: ἐν μὲν γὰρ ταῖς ἄλλαις πόλεσιν. 10.4: πασῶν τῶν πόλεων. 10.5: τῶν ἄλλων

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from other Greek identities is a focus of concern; Spartan, and Greek, identity is made a central problem for the _Lak. Pol._. Reminiscent of Herodotus' portrayal of the Egyptians, the "oppositeness" of the Spartans figures them as ethnographic curiosities; it also potentially offers a challenge to other Greeks through its implicit polemical charge. Similarly, the comment on Spartan laws describes the attempt to form a response to Sparta as simultaneously producing identification and alienation:

"Although [the laws] are ancient, even to this day others find them most novel / strange. Indeed, the most wondrous thing of all is that all praise such institutions, but no state wishes to imitate them."

Despite the polarisation of cultural behaviour, no sense of an "us" is articulated in counter-balance to a "them". We are not told "Spartans do this whereas we do that". The only occasion where specific groups of "other Greeks" are named is in the discussion of pederasty (2.12), where Boeotian and Elean practices are compared with Spartan practices. In contrast, in Socrates' discussion of pederasty in Xenophon's _Symposium_ (8.34–35), the practices of the same groups, the Thebans, Eleans and Spartans, are contrasted with what "we" (Athenians) do. Here the Socratic setting frames the discussion

15 Hdt. 2.35–36.
from an explicitly Athenian viewpoint. In the *Lak. Pol.*, however, the cultural specificity of the narrator’s voice is elided.

The text’s examination of the Spartans is introduced through the verb θαυμάζω (“I wonder”), which occurs three times in the proem in the first person, with the narrator as the subject (1.1–2);16 the verb and its cognates recur throughout the text.17 As noted in chapter 1, the term appears frequently in Xenophon’s scenes of cross-cultural response, suggesting both curiosity and awe, and has a specifically visual meaning in Greek; it is connected etymologically to the verb θεάομαι.18 The proem sets up the narrator’s relation to his subject as visual investigation. The reader is implicitly invited to participate in this investigation, but the term leaves the reader’s relationship with the Spartans ambiguous. The reader is prompted to consider how far he or she will identify with the Spartans, or will be alienated from them as objects of scrutiny.

The reader is also explicitly invoked as a viewer. The reader’s presence as a viewing witness is imagined, both in the second person (“Seeing these things you would think...”, 13.5: ὅρων τοῦτα ἡγήσασθαι...) and through the indefinite pronoun (“Somebody watching would find...”, 9.1: ἐπισκόπων τις ἄν εὗροι...). Twice Xenophon suggests that the reader should test the truth of what he says by looking: “Whether (Lycurgus) succeeded in making men in Sparta

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16 This verb appears at the opening of *Cyr.* (1.1.1; 1.1.6) and *Mem.* (1.1.1), setting up each text as an examination of, respectively, Cyrus and Socrates, prompted by wonder.

17 2.14, 9.6, 10.8, 12.4, 12.7, 14.7.

18 See e.g. Frisk (1958) 656; Chantraine (1984) 425.
outstanding in size and strength, let whoever wishes look for himself,"
(1.10: ...ε' τι διαφέροντας καὶ κατὰ μέγεθος καὶ κατ' ἴσχυν ἄνδρας τῇ Σπάρτῃ ἀπετέλεσεν, ὁ βουλόμενος ἐπισκοπεῖτω); similarly we are told

'Ἡ μὲν δὴ παιδεία εἴρηται ἢ τε Λακωνικὴ καὶ ἢ τῶν Ἀλλων Ἐλλήνων· ἐξ ὅποτέρας δ' αὐτῶν καὶ εὐπειθέστεροι καὶ αἰδημονέστεροι καὶ ὅν δεὶ ἐγκρατέστεροι ἄνδρες ἀποτελοῦνται, ὁ βουλόμενος καὶ ταῦτα ἐπισκοπεῖσθω. (2.14)

"Lakonian education and that of the other Greeks has now been discussed. Which system produces men more obedient, respectful or self-controlled in relation to their needs, let whoever wishes look for himself."

Although Xenophon's readers may have been to Sparta, or had the prospect of going there, these invitations to look do more than refer the reader to experiences exterior to the text. They problematise the experience of reading, by attempting to make reading into a visual process. The invitations to look allow the reader imaginatively to exceed his or her distanced, readerly role; but at the same time they enforce that role, prompting awareness that reading cannot after all transport the reader into real experience.19 These moments of heightened self-consciousness generate a sense of ambivalence in the reader's relationship with the offered sights. Further, although the reader is sometimes told what reaction sight will bring (as at 9.1 and 13.5 above), sights are also self-consciously offered as a means of

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19 Cf. the discussion of ekphrasis in Whitmarsh (2002a) 112.
independent investigation where the interpretation of the reader is undetermined (1.10; 2.14). In the address to the reader at 2.14 above, the choice between Spartans and other Greeks involves a process of self-positioning between them which is open-ended.

One key passage in which the reader is addressed as a witness of Spartan behaviour and is also told what responses the experience would elicit is the description of Lycurgus’ laws concerning the deportment of the paidiskoi (Spartan teenage boys):

πρὸς δὲ τούτοις τὸ αἰδείσθαι ἴσχυρώς ἐμφύσαι βουλόμενος αὐτοῖς καὶ ἐν ταῖς ὁδοῖς ἐπέταξεν ἐντὸς μὲν τοῦ ἱματίου τῷ χείρᾳ ἔχειν, σιγῇ δὲ πορεύεσθαι, περιβλέπειν δὲ μηδαμοὶ, ἀλλ’ αὐτὰ τὰ πρὸ τῶν ποδῶν ὅραν. ἔνθα δὴ καὶ δῆλον γεγένηται ὅτι τὸ ἄρρεν φύλον καὶ εἰς τὸ σωφρονεῖν ἴσχυρότερον ἑστὶ τῶν τῆς θηλείας φύσεως. ἐκεῖνων γοῦν ἦττον μὲν ἢν φωνὴν ἄκούσας ἢ τῶν λιθίνων, ἦττον δ’ ἢν διματα μεταστρέψας ἢ τῶν χαλκῶν, αἰδημονεστέρους δ’ ἢν αὐτοὺς ἡγήσαι καὶ αὐτῶν τῶν ἐν τοῖς τόφθαλμοῖς παρθένων. καὶ ἐπειδὰν εἰς τὸ φιλίτιόν γε ἀφικωνται, ἀγαπητὸν αὐτῶν καὶ τὸ ἐρωτηθὲν ἄκούσαι. καὶ τῶν μὲν αὐταὶ παιδίσκων οὕτως ἐπεμελήθη.

(3.4–5)

“Wishing modesty strongly to become part of their nature, he ordered that in the streets they should keep their hands inside their cloaks,

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20 In the two invocations of the reader as a viewer in the Cyr. the reader is informed what reaction he or she will have to sights: “You would not have perceived anyone there shouting in anger, or taking delight in insolent laughter, but on seeing them you would have held that they really lived nobly,” (8.1.33: ἐπέγγυς δ’ ἢν ἐκεῖ οὐδένα ὄντε ὄργιζομενον κραυγῇ ὁμίλοντα ὑβριστικώ γέλωτι, ἀλλὰ ἰδὼν ἢν αὐτοὺς ἡγήσας τῷ ὄντι εἰς κάλλος ζῆν); “If anyone thinks the contrary to me, looking at their actions he will find that they bear witness to my words,” (8.8.27: εἶ δὲ τις τάναντια ἐμοὶ γιγνώσκοι, τὰ ἔργα αὐτῶν ἐπισκόπων εὑρήσει αὐτὰ μαρτυροῦντα τοῖς ἐμοῖς λόγοις).
should walk in silence, and should not look around them, but rather should look at the ground in front of their feet. In this too it is clear that even in the matter of moderation the male race is stronger than female nature. At any rate you would be less likely to hear their voice than that of stone statues; you would be less likely to make their eyes turn than those of bronze statues; you would consider them more modest than the pupils in their own eyes. When they attend the common mess, you would have to be content to hear an answer to a question."

In describing prescriptions about their behaviour in the street, the emphasis is on how the paidiskoi will be seen. Although the implicit audience of their self-presentation is other Spartans, the emphasis is on the reaction of the reader, imagined as present.\textsuperscript{21} Lycurgus is also concerned with how the paidiskoi should see: they must not look about them, but must look at the ground in front of their feet. The limitation of their gaze is made integral to their display to the public gaze: the paidiskoi are to be seen as not looking.

The representation of the paidiskoi is both implicitly erotic and normative. Covering up the body and keeping the eyes downcast are behaviours associated with the proper, modest deportment of young

\textsuperscript{21} Although the reader is not specifically described as "seeing", as in the addresses to the reader discussed above, the concern with the public bodily deportment of the paidiskoi – the arrangement of their clothing and hands, and the demeanour of their look – is a concern with their visual effect, to which the reader is exposed. The failure of the reader to make their eyes turn (δριματα μεταστρεψων, 3.5) might also imply that the paidiskoi do not return the reader’s look. Cf. Xenophon’s concern with the returned gaze (Cyr. 3.3.59; Hell. 7.1.30) or its failure (Ages. 1.34; Cyr. 3.1.23; Cyr. 5.3.33). See especially Cyr. 1.4.12, where Cyrus as a youth cannot look at his grandfather on equal terms, ἐκ τοῦ ἰσου, and Hell. 5.4.27, where Archidamus, the young son of Agesilaus, dare not return his father’s gaze.
boys - and also women - in Athenian thought. In this sense the passage offers the paidiskoi as attractive and familiar ideals; yet the excessiveness of their modesty also figures them as exotic and inaccessible figures whom it is difficult to communicate with or comprehend. The main thrust of the comparison with women (ἐνθα δὴ καὶ δῆλον γεγένηται ὅτι τὸ ἄρρεν φύλον καὶ εἰς τὸ σωφρονεῖν ἱσχυρότερόν ἐστι τῶν τῆς θηλείας φύσεως: “In this too it is clear that even in the matter of moderation the male race is stronger than female nature,” 3.4) is that the paidiskoi are behaving more like modest women than modest women: \(23\) sophrosunē is a virtue often associated with women in Greek literature. \(24\) Although we might expect men to be “stronger” (ἱσχυρότερόν) than women, the paidiskoi are not only “stronger” in the ways expected of males, but are “stronger” in their enactment of typically female characteristics as well. The modesty of the paidiskoi is figured as strange. \(25\)

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\(22\) See Cairns (2005) 134 on the downcast gaze as the proper behaviour of boys and women. On ὀξύς and the restriction of the gaze see Cairns (1993) 98-99 n.151, 158, 184, 217-218, 231, 292-293, 312, 352. The restriction of speech and sight is associated with feminine behaviour at Oec. 7.5: Ischomachus’ wife is brought up ...όπως ὡς ἐλάχιστα μὲν ὄφοιτο, ἐλάχιστα δ’ ἀκούσαίτο, ἐλάχιστα δ’ ἔρειτο (“...so that she should see, hear and speak as little as possible”).

\(23\) Strauss (1939) 506 reads the claim that the paidiskoi outdo women in modesty (3.4) as a criticism of Sparta, implying that Spartan women are immodest. See also the comparison with women implicit through pun in the term παρθένος (3.5), whose most common meaning is “girl” or “virgin”, but which is used here to mean “pupil”. It is unclear whether παρθένος can carry this sense itself as a medical term, or whether it is a pun on the term κόρη, which means “girl” and, in a medical context, “pupil”: see Lipka (2002) 139.

\(24\) See North (1966) 121–132 and North (1977) on sophrosunē as a traditional female virtue. Of course, the term is by no means exclusive to women. Pomeroy (1984) 104–105 notes Xenophon’s attribution of the term to men, arguing that Xenophon was interested in denying fundamental differences between men and women. See also Humble (1999) 343, who stresses the gender comparison evoked by the use of the term in this passage.

\(25\) Cf. the description of Agesilaus as advancing quietly like the most modest virgin (ἡσύχως δ’ ὤσπερ ἃν παρθένος ἢ σωφρονεστάτη προβαίνωι, Ages. 6.7).
Further, the passage characterises the relationship between reader and paidiskoi as a relation of power. The paidiskoi do not speak or look; emphasis is rather on the experience of the reader imagined as speaking, listening and judging, dramatized by the introduction of verbs in the second person. We are told not that the boys do not turn their eyes, but rather that you (the reader) would not make their eyes turn. They are compared to statues of stone or bronze: they are literally objectified. They are further compared to the pupils in their own eyes: they are reduced to being no more than eyes which are not allowed to look. The paidiskoi are offered for the reader's scrutiny in a way which objectifies and disempowers them, whereas their own ability to look is curtailed. This suggests a strong sense of distinction between Spartans and reader being set up in the text.

However, these disempowered viewers are merely young boys. The Lak. Pol. also presents influential or authoritative Spartans as viewers. The ephors, Sparta’s executive officials, exercise their authority through sight, as their title of "Overseers" suggests (ἐφοροὶ, from ἐφοράω, “to watch over”): “Watching what each man does, they make them all behave with moderation, as is to be expected,” (13.5: ὅρωντες δὲ ὅ τι ποιεῖ ἔκαστος πάντας σωφρονίζουσιν, ὡς τὸ

26 There is a textual problem here. [Longinus] Subl. 4.4 and Stob. 4.2.23 both quote Xenophon as using the phrase ἐν τοῖς ὀφθαλμοῖς παιδικῶν (the pupils in their eyes). All extant Xenophon manuscripts, which come from the same manuscript family, have the phrase ἐν τοῖς θαλάμοις παιδικῶν (virgins in their bedchambers). The problem has been discussed by Spina (1985), who argues convincingly for the ancient reading. Subl. 4.5 compares Xenophon’s phrase to Timaeus’ description of a shameless man as having whores instead of virgins/pupils in his eyes (ἐν ὀφθαλμοῖς κόροις, μὴ πόρνας ἔχων, Τίμειος 566 F122 = Plut. De vitioso pudore 528E).
The same is true of the *paidonomos* (the official guardian of the boys), whom Lycurgus makes responsible "...for gathering the boys together, and for keeping watch so that if someone was negligent he could punish him severely," (2.2: ...ἀθροίζειν τοὺς παιδας καὶ ἐπισκοποῦντα, εἰ τις ῥᾳδιουργοίῃ, ἴσχυρῶς κολάζειν). Sight imposes and constructs the operation of social roles, both of those inspected and of those doing the inspecting, whose positions of power are enacted though the operation of their controlling gaze. Vision is involved in the construction of power, but also of socio-political identities.

In addition to being the object of the narrator's wonder (1.2: θαυμάζω), Lycurgus is himself presented as a viewer (1.5; 1.7; 4.2: ὀρῶν): he watches people and constructs his laws in response to his observations. He is presented as looking not at his fellow Spartans but at "others" (1.5: τοὺς ἄλλους; cf. 4.2) and at generalised human behaviour (1.7). In Lycurgus' use of sight in the invention of the

27 Cf. the description of the ephors as ...ὡσπερ οἱ τύραννοι καὶ οἱ ἐν τοῖς γυμνικοῖς ἁγώσιν ἐπιστάται ("...like tyrants and judges at athletics contests": 8.4).

28 Cf. the construction of power through vision in military tactics: τοὺς γε μὴν πολεμίους ἵπτεις φυλάττουσιν ἀπὸ χωρίων ὧν ἀν ἐκ πλείστου προορίζειν ("The cavalry keep guard against the enemy from positions from which they can see the furthest": 12.2).

29 Cf. the use of vision to maintain control in the military camp: φυλακάς γε μὴν ἕποιήσε μεθημερινάς τὰς μὲν παρὰ τὰ ὀπλα εἰσὶν βλεπόσις; οὐ γὰρ πολεμίους ἔνεκα ἄλλα φίλων αὐταί καθιστάται ("(Lycurgus) also had day-time sentries posted by the arms, looking inwards: for they do not stand guard against the enemy, but against their own people": 12.2). Social identities are produced both in the sentries' gaze and in the exposure of those who are watched.

30 Cf. the description of Lycurgus as εἷς τὸ ἐσχάτα [μάλα] σοφόν ("wise in the extreme / to the furthest limits": 1.2). Strauss (1939) 512 n.4 reads this as referring to the extreme nature of Lycurgus' laws. The phrase also calls to mind ἡ ἐσχατίῃ, the borders or furthest bounds of a country; Lycurgus is "outlandishly" wise.

31 Observation of "others": ὀρῶν τοὺς ἄλλους τὸν πρῶτον τοῦ χρόνου ἅμετρῳ τοῖς γυναιξὶ συνόντας, καὶ τοῦτο τάναντια ἔγνω ("Seeing that immediately after marriage men elsewhere spend an unlimited amount of time having intercourse with
Spartan system, vision is involved in the production of identities.32 Further, his scrutiny and judgement of different types of conduct are comparable to the investigative vision invited of the reader:33 in Lycurgus’ inspection of “others” and of behaviour in general, non-Spartans are exposed to a similar ethnographic curiosity. Lycurgus’ investigative viewing challenges the security of the reader as a detached observer of foreign peculiarities.

It is not only how Spartans see but how they present themselves to the sight of others that involves the construction of power. They self-consciously display themselves to the enemy:

Their wives, (Lycurgus) decreed the opposite practice": 1.5). Generalised behaviour: eι γε μέντοι συμβαίνει γεραιμένες νέας έχειν, όρων τους τηλικούτους φυλακτοντας μάλιστα τάς γυναίκας, τάναντια και τούτου ένομισε (“Seeing that, if an old man happens to have a young wife, men of this age keep a close watch over their wives, (Lycurgus) instituted the opposite practice”: 1.7). See also: όρων ούν, οίς δ’ άν μάλιστα φιλονίκια ἐγγένηται, τούτων καὶ χρονοὺς ἀξιοθεοτοτάτους γεγονόμενους καὶ γυμνικούς ἄγανας ἀξιοθεοτοτάτους, ἐνόμισεν, εἰ καὶ τούς ἡβίωντις συμβάλλοι εἰς ἔριν περὶ ἀρετῆς, οὕτως δὲ καὶ τούτους ἐπὶ πλείστων ἀφικνέοντας ἀνδραγαθίας (“Seeing that in those peoples among whom there is most of all a spirit of rivalry, choruses are the most worth listening to and athletic contests are most worth watching, he thought that if he could bring the young men together in competition concerning virtue, in this way they would attain the highest level of manliness”: 4.2). Although these people are not specified as ἄλλους, their position as “others” is implied: see the discussion of this passage below. Unlike in the other two examples, at 4.2 Lycurgus does not make the Spartans the “opposite” of those he observes, but copies them.

32 Some of Lycurgus’ prescriptions for Spartan behaviour involve how to see and be seen: a husband should be ashamed to be seen (ἀφθηναι, 1.5) entering his wife’s room; a man should be able to choose as a sexual partner whichever woman he sees (ὁρώμη, 1.8) to be suitable for bearing children.

33 Cf. the concern in Plut. Lyc. 4 with Lycurgus’ travel in foreign lands and study of foreign customs in the preparation of his laws.
“Whenever a goat is sacrificed when the enemy is already looking on, it is the custom that all the flute players present should play and none of the Spartans should be without a garland; an order is also given that weapons should be made to shine.”

The Spartans take control of their exposure to the enemy, placing themselves at the advantage. Similarly, Lycurgus orders men of a certain age to wear long hair in battle ‘‘…considering that this would make them seem taller, freer and more formidable/gorgon-like,” (11.3:...νομίζων οὕτω καὶ μεῖζος ἄν καὶ ἐλευθεριστέρους καὶ γοργοτέρους φαίνεσθαι). The implicit comparison to the Gorgon, who famously turned those who looked at her to stone, suggests the potential of Spartan display to disempower the viewer.34

Spartan visual self-presentation produces more complex relationships, however, when directed not at enemies but at other Spartans. This is illustrated in the social exclusion of the man who is kakos, bad or cowardly. His exclusion does not make the kakos invisible; rather we are presented with a spectacle of exclusion where the presence of the kakos is made supremely visible: “Often he is left without a place after teams have been chosen for a ball game, and in choruses he is relegated to the most ignominious positions…,” (9.5: πολλάκις δ’ ὁ τοιοῦτος καὶ διαιρομένων τοὺς ἀντισφαιρισθέντας ἄχωριστος περιγίγνεται καὶ ἐν χοροῖς δ’ εἶς τὰς ἐπονειδίστους χώρας ἀπελαύνεται...).

34 For the term γοργός in Xenophon, see chapter 2.
Part of the punishment of the *kakos* is his exclusion from the visual self-fashioning of the socially validated: “He must not stroll around anointed with oil or imitate those without reproach, or else he must receive a beating from his betters,” (9.5: λιπαρόν δὲ οὐ πλανητέον οὐδὲ μιμητέον τοὺς ἄνεγκλήτους, ἡ πληγάς ὑπὸ τῶν ἀμεινόνων ληπτέον). The *kakos* must not perform a *mimesis* of those belonging to the group from which he has been excluded. His social marginalisation makes him visually distinguishable from the rest: his identity as *kakos* is created in his deliberate marking of himself as different.  

This identity is not only moral, but political: “by the bad and unmanly whole states are betrayed,” (10.6: ὑπὸ δὲ τῶν κακῶν καὶ ἀνάνδρων ὀλὰς τὰς πόλεις προδίδοσθαι). However, it is not just the identity of the *kakos* which is at stake. In beating him to enforce his visible difference, the socially included also mark themselves as visually different from him. Socio-political identities are created on both sides through self-presentation and its viewing; however, they are identities “in process”, which need policing and violent enforcement. This recalls Lycurgus’ infliction of punishment on those who are visible failing to live a virtuous life (ἐκεῖνον ζημίας μὴ ἐλάττους ἐπιθεῖναι εἰ τις φανερὸς εἰη ἀμελῶν τοῦ ὦς βέλτιστος εἶναι, 10.5): visual appearance becomes a site where civic values are enacted or enforced, and thus where socio-political identities are both formed and contested.

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35 Moral identity is portrayed as visible. Cf. the invocation of the reader at 2.14 discussed above, where the reader is asked to look at Spartan obedience, respectfulness and self-control.
A similar example arises in Lycurgus’ regulation of the hebōntes (the 20–29 year olds). He instigates rivalry among them concerning virtue (4.2: ἐρὶν περὶ ἀρετῆς), considering that: “...in those peoples among whom there is most of all a spirit of competition, choruses are the most worth listening to and athletic contests are most worth watching....”, (4.2:...οἵς ἀν μάλιστα φιλονικία ἐγγένηται, τοῦτων καὶ χοροὺς ἀξιακροατότατους γιγνομένους καὶ γυμνικοὺς ἀγώνας ἀξιοθεατότατούς...). The effect of the rivalry is that two opposing groups of hebōntes “...keep watch over each other in case they should lapse from the fine behaviour laid down by law,” (4.4:...παραφυλάττουσιν ἀλλήλους, ἔ anv τι παρὰ τὰ καλὰ νομιζόμενα ῥάδιουργωσί), and fight whenever they meet (4.6).36

The two groups eye each other, trying to identify each other as deviating from their expected role; as with the viewing of the kakos, identification of each other as deviant involves self-identification as socially validated. The use of competitive display as an analogy for the competitive performance of virtue in Sparta also sets up the hebōntes’ mutual viewing as a spectacle open to view. Their spectacle of virtue is a political spectacle: “This rivalry is the dearest to the gods and the most political, in which the things which a good man must do are displayed” (4.5: Καὶ αὕτη δὴ γίγνεται ἡ θεοφιλεστάτη τε καὶ πολιτικώτατη ἔρις, ἐν ἧ ἀποδέδεικται μὲν ὣ δεῖ ποιεῖν τὸν

36 For φυλάσσω as a visual term see Aesch. Ag. 8, where the term is used by the watchman to describe his sight of the light of the beacon.
Through both seeing and being seen, the *hēbōntes* perform their social identity—a identity which is continually being reinvented and fought over.

How do these representations of viewing position the reader? Whereas the limitation on the gaze of the *paidiskoi* figures them as passive objects before the reader’s inquiring scrutiny, the complacency of the reader is challenged in scenes where Spartans actively assert themselves through viewing and display, placing themselves in a position of power. In some scenes when Spartans look at and display themselves to each other, visual relationships become more complex. The viewer attempts to identify both the object of view and also himself, yet identities produced in the complex of sight and display are not fixed, but are continually in formation and open to contest. This has implications for the reader as a viewer of the text. The reader’s relationship to the Spartans of the *Lak. Pol.* is constructed through viewing and interpreting: the viewing of the reader involves his or her own self-positioning as Greek, yet self-positioning is a conflicted and equivocal process without resolution.

**Conclusion**

Just as in the *Anabasis* and *Cyropaedia* scenes of spectatorship are “good to think with” in exploring how to respond to the foreign and

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37 We are told of the *hēbōntes*: νομίζων τούτους, εἰ γένοιτο οἶους δεί, πλείστον ἔπειτα τὸ ἀγαθὸν τῇ πόλει (“Lycurgus) considered that if they were such as they ought to be, they would incline the state towards good”: 4.1).

38 Cf. *Cyn.* 12.18–22, where men are imagined to become virtuous by both seeing and being seen by Virtue; also cf. *Mem.* 3.10.4, where a person’s moral character is said to be visible in the way he looks at someone.
how to conceptualise oneself as a subject, similarly, the representation of viewing in the *Lak. Pol.* engages the reader in the problem of how to think about the Spartans and about his or her own relationship to them. Vision in the *Lak. Pol.* must be read in terms of its participation within an ethnographic discourse. My interest in saying this is not to deny the historicity of Spartan visuality. What I would say is that from this text (and from its position in a corpus of writing in which, as we have seen, vision is similarly imagined) we simply cannot answer the question of historicity one way or the other, and so we must consider what the text can tell us.

Scenes of viewing in the *Lak. Pol.* allow us access to how Sparta was conceptualised. They offer a challenge to the security of Athenian, and Greek, self-consciousness: in such scenes, Sparta is conceptually slippery and hard to pin down. Presenting the Spartans sometimes as passive objects, sometimes as empowered, assertive agents, and sometimes as engaged in a contest for social identity and power, the *Lak. Pol.*'s scenes of vision implicate the reader in a fraught, shifting process of identification and self-identification. The crisis of self-positioning in reading becomes a problem for the place of Sparta in Athenian thought. Read in this way, the *Lak. Pol.* becomes an invaluable source for the construction of both Sparta and wider Greek identities in the fourth century Athenian imagination.
6. Vision and the rhetoric of Panhellenism in the *Agesilaus*

In chapter 5, we saw that the representation of Spartans in the *Lak. Pol.* presents a problem for the Athenian reader: will the reader identify with the Spartans as fellow Greeks, or be alienated from them as an independent, foreign power? As we have seen, the *Lak. Pol.* leaves the reader’s response to this question open: Sparta becomes a conceptual space where anxieties about the security of Athenian, and Greek, identity are tested and played out. These issues reappear with all the more urgency in the *Agesilaus*.

The *Agesilaus* is an odd work. It praises the Spartan king Agesilaus as the champion and defender of Greeks: the text is imbued with the highly politicised language of Greek–barbarian opposition, claiming that Agesilaus’ anti-Persian military activities are necessarily “pro-Greek”. Through the language of praise, the reader is invited to identify with him; he is held up as a paradigm (παράδειγμα, 10.2) for imitation (μιμούμενος, 10.2). However, Agesilaus’ involvement in violent conflict against non-Spartan Greeks, which occupies a significant portion of the narrative, is also made the subject of praise: it too, we are assured, is the behaviour of the ideal Greek. How would an Athenian reader respond to such a text?

The *Agesilaus* has traditionally been treated as a Panhellenist text. Delebecque sees it as warning the Greeks of the need to unify
against the threat of Persia under Artaxerxes III Ochos.\(^1\) Dillery treats the *Agesilaus* as “unreservedly an attempt to glorify the Spartan king”,\(^2\) which is enthusiastically Panhellenist; he contrasts it with the *Hellenica’s* presentation of Agesilaus' involvement in internal Greek conflict, where he reads “disappointment and even anger” in Xenophon’s treatment of Agesilaus' actions against fellow Greeks.\(^3\) Such a straightforwardly celebratory reading of the *Agesilaus*, however, has been questioned; whereas Delebecque notes the apologetic denials of Agesilaus' corruption in money matters, Hirsch reads the text as a whole as apology. Noting its “peculiar” and “defensive” tone and choice of subject matter,\(^4\) he sees it as a response to lost contemporary critiques of Agesilaus, whose accusations he attempts to reconstruct. He states that “the panhellenism of the *Agesilaus* is motivated primarily by the unpanhellenic character of much of Agesilaus' activity”.\(^5\)

Such a description is paradoxical. If Agesilaus was so notoriously “unpanhellenic”, why would claims of Panhellenism be thought an effective persuasive strategy? In this chapter I argue that although the *Agesilaus* can be understood as a “Panhellenist” text in that it engages with questions about the nature of Greek identity current in contemporary Panhellenist thought, it reveals the complex, discursive

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1 Delebecque (1957).
5 Hirsch (1985) 51.
nature of Panhellenism by engaging in those questions in a troublingly contorted and challenging way. Agesilaus’ actions against the Persians are described in highly polarised, ethnocentric language which makes explicit reference to the Persian wars. Yet not only is attention paid to his Spartan identity, as indicated in the praise of Sparta which functions as praise of his genealogy at the beginning of the text (1.3-4) and in the later praise of his patriotism (φιλόπολις, 7.1), but more importantly, the most “Panhellenist” language of the text is reserved for the description of his wars on fellow Greeks.

We are told that although his fatherland was at war with Greeks he did not neglect the common good of Greece (δὲ καὶ πολεμοῦσις τῆς πατρίδος πρὸς Ἐλληνας ὄμως τοῦ κοινοῦ ἁγαθοῦ τῇ Ἐλλάδι

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6 Cf. Azoulay (2004c) 157, who frames Xenophon’s use of Panhellenic language in his depiction of Agesilaus’ attitudes towards political corruption in terms of a clash of democratic and elite ideologies.

7 It is described as <τὸ> μὴ περὶ τῆς Ἐλλάδος ἀλλὰ περὶ τῆς Ἀσίας τὸν ἁγώνα, “a contest not for Greece but for Asia”, 1.8. Cf. ἄν πολεμεῖν βούληται ὁ βάρβορος, ἄσχολαν αὐτῷ παρέξειν στρατεύειν ἐπί τούς Ἐλλήνας, “If the barbarian wished to fight, [Agesilaus] would pose a hindrance to his attack on the Greeks,” 1.7.

8 ἔπειθή ὁ Πέρσης πρόσθεν ἐπὶ τὴν Ἐλλάδα διεβη, ἀντίδιαβην ἐπὶ αὐτόν, “Since the Persian had previously invaded Greece, [Agesilaus] would invade his land in return,” 1.8.

9 The passages noted here are rather the exception. Although the reader cannot forget that Agesilaus is a Spartan, the text has very little direct to say about his Spartan identity. Delebecque (1957) 464 notes the lack of a partisan tone in the Ages., from either a Spartan or Athenian perspective: “Il ne se place plus au point de vue ni de Sparte ni d’Athènes seules... il s’exprime en citoyen de la Grèce.” Yet as Cartledge (1987) 57 notes, “the praise of an individual Spartan – admittedly an outstanding and so rather exceptional individual... – could not but rub off to some degree on his state.” Note correspondences with the representation of Spartans elsewhere in Xenophon, e.g. the appearance of happiness at moments of distress: Ages. 11.2 and Hell. 4.5.10 & 6.4.16; and the obedience of powerful men to the laws: Ages. 7.2 and Lak. Pol. 8.2. The public visibility of Agesilaus (5.6–7; 9.1) might also recall the focus on public visibility in the Lak. Pol. (10.4–5; see chapter 5) or the public visibility of the Spartan commander Teleutias in the Hellenica (5.1.14–15; see chapter 2); yet it also recalls the public visibility of Cyrus the Great in the Cyropaedia (7.5.46; see chapter 4), of Socrates in the Memorabilia (1.1.10; see chapter 2), and of Xenophon’s claims about himself in his speeches to his troops in the Anabasis (5.6.28, 6.4.15–17; see chapter 3).

10 Cf. the declaration that his virtue is confirmed through the judgement of the best men in the mightiest state to allot him the highest privilege (ἐν τῇ κρατίστῃ πόλει ὑπὸ τῶν ἀρίστων κριθέντα τοῦ καλλίστου γέρως ἀξιωθήναι, 1.5).
οὐκ ἡμέλησεν, 7.7), and that he looked on victory in a war against Greeks as a disaster (συμφοράν νομίζοντα τὸ νικᾶν ἐν τῷ πρὸς Ἑλληνας πολέμῳ, 7.4). He is even described as responding to the news that only eight Lakedaimonians but 10,000 enemy Corinthians had fallen in the battle of Corinth by bewailing the fate of Greece: Φεῦ <σου>, ὃ Ἑλλάς, ὅποτε οἱ νῦν τεθνηκότες ἰκανοὶ ἦσαν ζῶντες νικῶν μαχόμενοι πάντας τοὺς βαρβάρους (“Alas for you, oh Hellas, since those who are now dead would have been sufficient, had they lived, to have conquered in battle all of the barbarians!” 7.5). I return to this passage below.

Such claims strike an odd note. Yet the text presents all its arguments about the meaning of Agesilaus’ actions as equally valid and self-evident. All his actions, even those which seem mutually exclusive, are celebrated as pro-Greek, and are subsumed within a uniform rhetoric of praise. Arguing that the Hellenica, unlike the Agesilaus, is critical towards Agesilaus’ campaigns against fellow Greeks, Dillery comments that it describes Agesilaus’ route from Asia to Greece, as he turns from attacking barbarians to attacking Greek states, as following in the footsteps of Xerxes (Hellenica 4.2.8).11 He does not note that this same comparison is made in the Agesilaus: Agesilaus is praised for making the same journey as Xerxes but accomplishing it in a fraction of the time (2.1). What sort of praise is it that lauds Agesilaus for being better than Xerxes at being Xerxes? If Agesilaus’ virtue offers a paradigm to be imitated – if Agesilaus is a

paradigm of Greekness - what sort of Greekness is this? I argue that something more problematic, and interesting, is going on here, which reveals much about the complexities of fourth century Greek self-consciousness. I avoid the contentious and much discussed issue of the relationship of the Agesilaus to the representation of Agesilaus in the Hellenica;¹² I focus not on Xenophon's representation of Agesilaus the historical character, but on the Agesilaus as a text, considering what expectations the Agesilaus has of its readers, and what is at stake in the reader's response.

I approach these issues through examining how the text's scenes of display, vision and spectatorship position the reader. The Agesilaus implicitly imagines the reader as a spectator of the events of the narrative. The text describes itself as a display (ἐπιδειξειν, 1.9), and its argument is upheld through a rhetoric of visibility, as the assertions of the narrator are justified by appeals to the reader's ability to see what is described. The claim implicit in such appeals is that sight is a transparent, self-evident process, which provides direct access to knowledge, and therefore offers authoritative confirmation of the text's assertions. Elsewhere, however, the sight of Agesilaus and his actions is offered to the reader in a way that is more ambiguous: the reader is invited to look at Agesilaus' display of harmonious Greek troops in Ephesus (1.25–27), but is also offered the spectacle of the

carnage-strewn battlefield after the Greek-on-Greek battle at Coronea (2.14).

Further, there are numerous scenes of vision by spectators within the text in the description of Agesilaus' life and virtues. Agesilaus is praised for his visual availability; the sight of his viewers is used to back up the text's claims. He is also depicted as organising displays: there are scenes throughout the text in which viewers look at and respond to Agesilaus and his army. In the text's scenes of internal spectatorship, sight is revealed as a much more complex and conflicted experience than the narratorial rhetoric of vision would have us believe. Yet, as I will show, the text's rhetoric also continually undercuts itself, subverting its own claims even as it insists upon them: the presentation of the text as display self-consciously links the artifice of the text's own rhetoric to the processes of spectacle almost always associated in this text with Agesilaus himself.

Narratorial authority and the reader's sight

The Agesilaus makes claims for and simultaneously undercuts its own authority. This is partly a product of encomium discourse as such. In its opening claim of the difficulty of the task of praise familiar from fourth century encomia,13 the proem paradoxically both establishes and undermines the project of the text:

13 Isoc. Evag. 8. Cf. Thuc. 2.35.2, Lysias 2.1, Hyperides 6.1, Dem. 60.1. See Humble (forthcoming) for a discussion of the place of the Ages. within the literary history of the encomium. As she notes, although this text appears early in the development of the encomiastic genre, its operation within generic expectations can nevertheless be observed through comparison with examples of existing encomia, such as the
Οἶδα μὲν ὅτι τῆς Ἀγησιλάου ἀρετῆς τε καὶ δόξης οὐ ῥάδιον ἀξιον ἔπαινον γράψαι, ὡς δ' ἐγχειρηστέον. οὐ γὰρ ἂν καλῶς ἔχοι εἰ ὅτι τελέως ἀνήρ ἀγαθός ἐγένητο, διὰ τοῦτο οὔδὲ μειόνων ἂν τυχάνοι ἔπαινων. (1.1)

"I know that it is not easy to write praise worthy of the virtue and reputation of Agesilaus, but nevertheless it is necessary to set my hand to the task. For it would not be fitting if, for the very reason that a man is so completely good, he should not receive praise even of an inadequate sort."

This introduction is self-conscious, addressing the problems involved in writing. It also draws attention to the problem of reading: what will the reader get out of reading this text? The reader is informed that what he or she is about to read is incapable of fully carrying out the function that it attempts to fulfil, but is inadequate (μειόνων). At the opening of the argument, the reader is invited both to engage with and doubt the narrator's voice as an authoritative source of praise. This introduction also problematises the reader's relationship with Agesilaus. How will the reader respond to a figure whose virtue is so great as to be beyond representation? Will the reader identify with speech of Agathon in Plato's Symposium (194e4-197e8) and Isocrates' Evagoras, as well with rhetorical handbooks written not long after Xenophon's time, the Rhetorica of Aristotle and the Rhetorica ad Alexandrum. I am most grateful to Noreen Humble for kindly allowing me to read this article prior to publication.

14 The claim of the insufficiency of language to praise the virtue of Agesilaus is reminiscent of the claim made to Socrates about the impossibility of describing the beauty of the hetaira Theodote (Mem 3.11.1). Socrates' response is to go to look at her; he says that what cannot be described must be seen. His comment hints at the priority of sight in the acquisition of knowledge; the passage which follows, however, challenges the conception of vision as providing authoritative access to knowledge by showing how vision and display are manipulative and involved in a struggle for power between viewer and viewed. See Goldhill (1998a). Cf. responses to the
Agesilaus, or does the excess of his virtue transform him into an oddity from whom the reader can only feel alienated?

The formulation of the rhetoric of praise similarly invites doubt. Everything that Agesilaus does becomes a reason for praise in a way that can seem contrived. Again, this is partly in the nature of encomium. As Whitmarsh puts it: “Encomium invites polar thought: the praise–blame axis suggests an interpretative template, a fixed, schematic distribution of subjects into good and bad. But it also, of necessity, draws attention to the ‘constructedness’ of this distribution, and to this extent every encomium exposes its own arbitrariness.”

However, in the Agesilaus, this problem is also the subject of self-conscious concern, and is directly addressed by the narrator. In the description of Agesilaus’ preparations at Coronea, we are told

καὶ οὐ τοῦτο λέξων ἔρχομαι, ὡς πολὺ μὲν ἐλάττους πολὺ δὲ χείρονας ἔχων ὁμως συνέβαλεν· εἰ γὰρ ταύτα λέγομι, Ἀγησίλαον τ’ ἀν μοι δοκῶ ἄφρονα ἀποφαίνειν καὶ ἐμαυτόν μωρόν, εἰ ἐπαινοήην τὸν περὶ τῶν μεγίστων εἰκῆ κινδυνεύοντα· ἄλλα μᾶλλον τὰδ’ αὐτοῦ ἄγαμαι, ὅτι πλῆθος τε οὐδὲν μείον ἥ τὸ τῶν πολεμίων παρεσκευάσατο. (2.7)

“I am not going to say that he had far fewer and far inferior forces but that he nevertheless accepted battle. If I were to say this, I think I would show Agesilaus as foolish and myself as stupid, if I praised him for rashly endangering the greatest interests. On the contrary, I admire

exceptional beauty of Panthea in the Cyr.: Araspas advises Cyrus to look at her for himself (5.1.7).

him for this very reason — that he equipped himself with a force in no way smaller than that of the enemy."

As the narrator contemplates how best to praise Agesilaus, one possible option for praise is considered, only to be rejected and replaced with praise of an entirely contradictory characteristic. The self-criticism of the narratorial voice attempts to pre-empt the expected scepticism of the reader; the effect, however, is that the text undermines its own authority. In this self-conscious critique of the generic clichés of encomium discourse, the logic of praise elsewhere in the text is similarly laid open to evaluation and criticism.

The text’s simultaneous assertion and subversion of its own authority can be seen in its rhetorical manipulation of the language of display and visibility. We are told that the narrator will give an account (διηγήσομαι) of Agesilaus’ actions in order to make clear / visible (καταδήλους) his character (1.6);16 the narrator also asks

πώς ἃν τις σαφέστερον ἑπιδείξειεν ὡς ἐστρατήγησεν ἦ εἰ αὐτὰ διηγήσαιτο ἐπραξέν; (1.9)

“How could anyone display more clearly how he led the army than to narrate the things that he did?”

Not only does the text characterise itself as a display, but Agesilaus’ actions are framed as displays of his virtues. We are told that he

16 This vocabulary occurs elsewhere. In choosing to go to fight in Greece Agesilaus is described as showing (ἐνδηλον, 1.36) that he would not exchange the whole world for his fatherland, new friends for old, or safely won and disgraceful gains for just ones won amid danger (1.36). The Asian Greeks’ decision to follow him is described as showing (ἐδηλωσαν, 1.38) that their friendship for him was not feigned. On beginning the discussion of Agesilaus’ private virtues the narrator announces: νῦν δὲ τὴν ἐν τῇ ψυχῇ αὐτοῦ ἄρετὴν πειράσομαι δηλοῦν (“Now I will attempt to show the virtue in his soul,” 3.1).
displayed himself as keeping his oaths (ἐαυτόν δ’ ἀντεπιδείξας πρώτον μὲν ὀρκούς ἐμπεδοῦντα, 1.12); that he displayed his kingship as worthy of praise (πῶς οὐκ ἀξιεπαίνου βασιλέως καὶ τοῦτ’ ἔργον ἐπεδείξατο, 1.37) by bringing calm to the Asian cities which he took over; that he displayed courage more through good judgement than through risk-taking (ἄλλα μὴν ἀνδρείαν γε τὸ πλέον μετ’ εὐβουλίας ἢ μετὰ κινδύνων ἐπεδείκνυτο, 11.9); and that he was unique in displaying that although bodily strength weakens with age, strength of soul in good men does not (Δοκεῖ δ’ ἐμοί γε καὶ τὸδε μόνος ἀνθρώπων ἐπιδείξαι, ὅτι ἢ μὲν τοῦ σώματος ἰσχὺς γηράσκει, ἢ δὲ τῆς ψυχῆς ῥώμη τῶν ἀγαθῶν ἀνδρῶν ἀγήρατος ἑστιν, 11.14). We are also asked which of his deeds do not display his wisdom (Τὴν γε μὴν σοφίαν αὐτοῦ ποιαὶ τῶν ἔκεινου πράξεων οὐκ ἐπιδεικνύουσιν; 6.4). The use of the verb ἐπιδείκνυμι coincides with the vocabulary of signs (σημεῖα: 1.5, 6.2), memorials (μνημεῖα: 6.2, 11.7, 11.16), witnesses (μάρτυρις: 3.1, 4.5, 5.7) and evidence (τεκμήρια: 1.5, 3.1, 4.1, 4.3, 6.1) – terms which do not carry a specifically visual meaning but which are often used in a way that implies the visual in this text (see discussion of specific examples below).  

17 The term μάρτυς which occurs three times in the text, is once explicitly visual, when describing eyes (μάρτυρας τοῦ πάντων ὀφθαλμού τῆς σωφροσύνης ποιούμενος, 5.7). It is used once in a way that strongly implies the visual, when Agesilaus’ military exploits (ἔργον), which are said to have been witnessed (3.1), are contrasted in terms of knowability with his soul (τὴν ψυχὴν), understood as invisible elsewhere in Xenophon (Mem. 1.4.9 & 4.3.14). The third use of μάρτυς is not obviously visual: we are told that the whole of Lakedaimon is witness to the fact that Agesilaus gave half of his inheritance to his mother’s family (4.5). The term σημεῖα, which occurs twice, is once used to describe the marks on Agesilaus’ body left by fighting (σαρῆ δὲ καὶ αὐτὸς σημεῖα ἀπενεγκάμενος τοῦ θυμῷ μάχεσθαι, 6.2) which are specifically presented as visible. Its other use, however, is non-visual, referring to the decision to crown Agesilaus king (1.2). The term μνημεῖα, which
The history of this terminology is revealing. Herodotus introduces his work as ἀπόδεξις in his proem, and backs up his assertions with claims of autopsy. Rosalind Thomas has discussed Herodotus' concern with the problem of how to discuss the invisible (τὸ ἀφανές), his use of analogy of the invisible with the visible (φανερός), and his reliance on the language of evidence and proof (especially the terms τεκμηρίου and μαρτύριον) to support his claims. She argues that in addition to referring to the Homeric concern with the visible sign, this language draws on the terminology of the Presocratic philosophers and early medical writers. The assumption lying behind this invocation of the visual seems to be that sight is a secure means of acquiring knowledge, as is indicated in Herodotus' famous story of Gyges and Candaules' wife and in Candaules' near-quotation of the phrase of Heraclitus - that the eyes are more trustworthy than the ears (Hdt. 1.8).

In the democratic context of the late fifth century, however, this terminology becomes associated with the Sophists and with forensic and epideictic oratory, and therefore begins to carry slightly suspect connotations. Worman has discussed the relationship between the

occurs three times, is once explicitly visual, referring to memorials of fighting which are described as available to be seen (6.2). It is once not visual, referring to memorials of soul which are explicitly contrasted to the physical memorial of a statue (τὴς δὲ ψυχῆς οὐδέποτε ἐπαύετο μνημεία διαπονοούμενος, 11.7); and once it is ambiguous, referring to memorials of virtue left across the earth (μνημεία μὲν τῆς ἐαυτοῦ ἀρετῆς ἀνὰ πάσαν τὴν γῆν κτησάμενος, 11.16). The term τεκμηρίου is not generally visual, but seems to refer to the visual when we are told that Agesilaus offered "not unclear/invisible proofs" (οὐκ ἀφανή τεκμηρία, 6.1) of his courage by always fighting the strongest enemies and by placing himself on the frontline.

18 See chapter 1 and Hartog (1988).
19 See, for example, the comments on the existence of the river of Ocean, Hdt. 2.23.
20 Thomas (2000) 190-212, 221-228, 249-269.

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rhetorical and the visual in late fifth century Greek thought, arguing that both visual appearance and spoken word were understood as open to be used flamboyantly or deceptively in order to manipulate. Thomas traces the use of the verb ἀποδείκνυμι in fifth century prose, noting its widespread use in Antiphon and Gorgias and its near absence from Thucydides, with the significant exception of his protagonists' speeches, where it makes a frequent appearance. Here the term seems to imply a form of scheming persuasion from which Thucydides wished to distance his narratorial persona. The rhetorical use of display in the Agesilaus must be read through these contradictory connotations of display - the display of knowledge and manipulative display - in fifth century thought.

The Agesilaus is also structured by repeated appeals to the visibility of what it describes. Claims of visual accessibility urge the reader to look at and therefore believe not only the events presented but the interpretation of those events which the text offers. The reader's visual experience is appropriated as part of a discourse of persuasion. However, the expectation behind these asides seems to be that the narrator's claims are not likely to be believed. Although the voice of the narrator seems intent on limiting responses to the

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25 This is frequently made explicit: following the text’s description of Agesilaus’ sexual self-control, for example, the narrator adds, “What opinion some people hold in regard to these matters I know well enough,” (καὶ ὃ τι μὲν δὴ ὑπολαμβάνουσι τινὲς ταῦτα οὐκ ἁγνοῦ, 5.6). Cf. the Lak. Pol.’s expectation of doubt at its claims about Spartan pederasty.
narrative, making the reader passively accept what he or she is told, the expectation of disbelief also both prompts and licenses a more critical engagement with the text.

Moreover, the processes by which authority is garnered through vision are not straightforward. Proof is offered through the claim that the reader (who is invoked through the indefinite τις) can see not just the actions described, but the truth of the text’s assertions about their meaning. After an account of Agesilaus’ threats to Thebes and Corinth and his attack on Phleius on behalf of their exiled pro-Spartan factions, we are told

εἰ δὲ τις ἄλλῃ πη ταύτα μέμφεται, ἄλλ' οὖν ψευταρισ ἔπαρ έστι. (2.21)

"Although someone could criticise these actions on other grounds, it is clear / visible that they were done through friendship."

The correct interpretation to be put on Agesilaus’ actions is described as visible. The possible negative reaction of “someone” is countered by the claim of the visibility of Agesilaus’ virtuous motives.27

Similarly, the claim that Agesilaus showed reverence for religion is supported by the assertion that even his enemies trusted his oaths, which is backed up by a show of visibility:

26 The narrator is concerned to identify the genre in which he is speaking, claiming that the text should be read not as a funerary lament (θρηνόν) but as an encomium (ἐγκώμιον), and giving explanations as to why this designation is more appropriate (10.3). This generic quibbling evinces self-consciousness about how the text will be received; the reader is informed how to read.

27 Cf. τόδε γε μὴν πως οὐ σαφῶς πρὸς το γεννοιον ἔγνω, δτι... (9.7), "How could this not clearly show his nobility, that...".
“In case anyone does not believe this, I wish to name the most visible / famous among them.”

By making an argument which connects two things which do not appear to be logically related, as the visibility of the enemies is used as a sign of his religiosity, the text asks the reader to accept as inevitable the interpretative jump which it supplies. This is a strategy familiar from forensic oratory - to let an argument that is easy to substantiate but essentially irrelevant stand in for and do the persuasive work of the main claim.

In order to back up claims of Agesilaus' andreia, we are told that after each of his battles...

τρόπαιον ἐστήσατο, ἀθάνατα μὲν τῆς ἑαυτοῦ ἀρετῆς μνημεῖα καταλιπτῶν, σαφῆ δὲ καὶ αὐτὸς σημεῖα ἀπενεγκάμενος τοῦ θυμὸς μάχεσθαι· ὡστ' οὐκ ἀκούοντας ἀλλ' ὀρῶντας ἔξην αὐτοῦ τὴν ψυχὴν δοκιμᾶζειν. (6.2)

Similarly, Sparta is made into a visual sign for the excellence of Agesilaus: we are told that this is the only state, whether democracy, oligarchy, tyranny or kingdom, which is ὑπερεπά (visible / conspicuous) in having a government which has not been overthrown (1.4). This, we are told, is a sign of his family’s (and therefore his) praiseworthiness: κοινῆ δὲν ἔξων ἐπανένσαι τὴν τε πατρίδα καὶ τὸ γένος αὐτοῦ (“His fatherland and his family are worthy of being praised together”, 1.4).

In Aeschines' Against Timarchus, Aeschines insists that he is sure that all his listeners have been to Salamis and have seen there the statue of Solon standing with his hand modestly under his cloak; he insists that they can therefore observe the moral contrast between such men as Solon and Timarchus (Aeschin. 1.25-26). The undeniability of the sight of the statue's gesture becomes the undeniability of Timarchus' guilt. However, Demosthenes' On the Embassy revisits this argument in his attack on Aeschines, to claim that the statue is a modern one and therefore cannot be used as proof of Solon's actual demeanour (Dem. 19.251-252).
“...he set up a trophy, leaving undying memorials of his virtue, and bearing on his person clear marks of his spirited fighting. The result was that it was possible to judge his soul not by hearing but by seeing.”

Although the past tense (€ξῄν) could imply that those who are imagined as seeing Agesilas are those who were present, the impersonal construction also invites the reader to look. It is claimed that external visible signs allow access to Agesilas' soul. Sight is privileged above hearing in the acquisition of knowledge and is understood to be a matter of judgement and evaluation: the term δοκιμάζειν has specifically Athenian democratic connotations through its evocation of the dokimasia, the public inspection of citizens. However, the freedom of interpretation and judgement implied by the suggestion of a dokimasia of Agesilas' soul is circumscribed, as we are informed that the memorials are specifically memorials of virtue, and that the marks are marks of courageous fighting.30 Although the sight of "someone" is encouraged to judge visible signs, the signs have already been interpreted. Similarly, elsewhere the visible sign is omitted from the process of visual evaluation altogether, as we are informed that nobody could have observed any arrogance in Agesilas (τὸ μὲν μεγάλαυχον οὐκ εἶδε τις, 8.1).

30 This passage is immediately followed by the statement τρόπαια μὴν Ἀγησιλάου οὐχ ὡσα ἔστήσατο ἄλλ' ὡσα ἐστρατεύσατο δικαίων νομίζειν ("But the trophies of Agesilas should not properly be counted in terms of the number that he set up, but in terms of the number of battles that he fought." 6.3). It is explained that when no battle took place because the enemy did not wish to engage, this should also be considered a victory of Agesilas, just as in the games the unchallenged champion is crowned victor (6.3). The rhetoric of visibility is undercut, as the meaning of "trophy" shifts to include a victory unsupported by visible evidence.
In an address in the third person imperative, the reader is directed to look at Agesilaus’ home in order to believe the claim that Agesilaus lived very simply:

εἰ δὲ τις ταῦτα ἀπιστεῖ, ἵδετο μὲν οἷα οίκια ἦρκει αὐτῷ, θεασάσθω δὲ τὰς θύρας αὐτοῦ· εἰκάσειε γὰρ ἂν τις ἔτι ταύτας ἐκείνας εἶναι ἀσπέρ Ἀριστόδημος ὁ Ἡρακλέους ὁτε κατήλθε λαβὼν ἐπεστήσατο· πειράσθω δὲ θεάσασθαι τὴν ἐνδον κατασκευὴν, ἑννοησάτω δὲ ὡς ἐθοίναζεν ἐν ταῖς θυσίαις, ἀκουσάτω δὲ ὡς ἐπὶ πολιτικοῦ καννάθρου κατῆκε εἰς Ἀμύκλας <ἡ θυγάτηρ αὐτοῦ>. (8.7)

“If anyone doubts this, let him see what sort of house was sufficient for him, and let him gaze at his doors. Someone would think that they were still those same doors which Aristodemus, descendant of Heracles, took up and fixed in place when he came there. Let him try to gaze at the arrangements inside, let him notice how he entertained at sacrifices, let him hear how his daughter used to go down to Amyclae in a public carriage.”

The invitation to see is mixed with invitations to notice and hear; it forms part of a complete scrutiny of Agesilaus’ private arrangements. The reader is taken on a miniature visual tour which gradually narrows its focus and zooms in: first we look at the house, then we look at the doors, then we look inside – or rather we try. Will we be allowed to see inside, to enjoy the full voyeuristic experience? Although the direction to look makes the implicit claim that looking is a straightforward process which guarantees belief, the instruction to “try to look” seems to hint at the difficulty of really “seeing” and understanding Agesilaus.
The imagined response of τις, who would think that the doors were those of the mythical hero Aristodemus, frames the vision of Agesilaus’ house as a glimpse of a mysterious and inaccessible world. Although the reader is invited to gaze, he or she is not invited in.

The *Agesilaus* also invites the reader to look at Agesilaus and his behaviour in scenes which are not governed by the rhetorical inculcation of belief, but are more open-ended. The text sometimes presents the events of its narrative through the eyes of a hypothetical spectator, using the impersonal expression “it was possible to see”. These scenes allow the reader to imagine the experience of viewing the sights of the text, even though they leave the nature of the viewer’s feelings undetermined. The first such scene, part of the description of Agesilaus’ campaigns in Asia, presents Agesilaus’ organisation of his troops at Ephesus. His encouragement of training and exercise in his men is imagined as producing a sight to be watched:

> ἐκ τούτου δὲ παρῆν ὡρὰν τὰ μὲν γυμνάσια μεστὰ [τῶν] ἀνδρῶν γυμναζομένων, τὸν δὲ ἰππόδρομον ἰππεῖων ἴππαζομένων, τοὺς δὲ ἀκοντιστὰς καὶ τοὺς τοξότας ἐπὶ στόχον ιέντας. ἀξίαν δὲ καὶ ὅλην τὴν πόλιν ἐν ἦν ἦν θέας ἐποίησεν (1.25-6)

“Because of this it was possible to see the gymnasia full of men exercising, the race-course full of horsemen riding, and the javelin-men and archers shooting at targets. Indeed, he made the whole city in which he was stationed worthy of being gazed at.”

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31 See Dillery (1995) 30 on the equivalent passage in the *Hell.* (3.4.16-17), which he describes as “written in a way which imagines a reader who sees the camp.”
The μὲν – δὲ construction, the tricolon of activities, and the anaphora in γυμνάσια...γυμναζομένων and ἵπποδρομον ἵππεων ἵππαζομένων produces a sense of trim efficiency and social order, as people and things resolve to their appropriate roles (what else should γυμνάσια be full of than of men γυμναζομένων?). This image of social harmony is not just a spectacle of a virtuous and industrious city, but of the men's absolute obedience and Agesilaus' power as commander. The laying out of the Greeks' activities for the eye of the reader potentially invites identification with them: the reader cannot be impressed by the Greeks' unity and social cohesion, and identify with them as "ideal" Greeks, without identifying with Agesilaus as leader. However, identification is not the only possible response.

What is the effect of the description of Ephesus as a city worth looking at (ἀξίαν...θέας)? The phrase recalls Xenophon's use of the adjective ἀξιοθέατος. Most frequently this term refers to the sight of a group or community: it describes cavalry processions (Hipparch. 3.1; Peri Hipp. 11.10, 11.12), choruses (Oec. 8.4; Lak. Pol. 4.2), festivals (Hiero 1.11), a body of victorious Spartan troops (Hell. 4.5.6), an orderly warship (Oec. 8.8) and the sights of the city of Athens, both sacred and secular (Poroi 5.4). The term can also have erotic connotations: the beautiful Abradatas is worth seeing even before he arms himself (Cyr. 6.4), and Callias is worth seeing when inspired by love for Autolycus (Sym. 1.10). The erotic aspect of the latter example is tempered by religious or cult overtones as we are told that not just those inspired by the god of love but all those inspired by gods are
worth seeing (Sym. 1.10): the sight of the ἀξιοθέατος suggests both pleasure and estranging awe.

In the Oeconomicus the chorus that is worth watching is specified as orderly (8.4) whereas the sight of a disorderly chorus provides no pleasure (θεάσοσθαι ἀτερπές, 8.3): it is the obedience of the group to those in control that produces a sight worth watching. The pleasure of the viewer suggests a sense of identification with the group who are the object of sight: the sight of the chorus is compared to other sights of group activities, where a response of pleasure depends on the viewer’s relation to the group. An orderly army is a beautiful sight for friends but a most unwelcome sight to enemies (κάλλιοτον μὲν ἰδεῖν τοῖς φίλοις, δυσχερέστατον δὲ τοῖς πολεμίοις, Oec. 8.6), and the orderly warship is worth watching for friends but a frightful sight for enemies (φοβερὸν ἐστὶ πολεμίοις ἢ φίλοις ἀξιοθέατον, Oec. 8.8).

However, the term ἀξιοθέατος does not always imply identification with the object of sight. Although it is not directly specified, in the case of the spectacle of Spartan troops, mentioned above, those watching seem to be members of embassies from Boeotia and other states (Hell. 4.5.6). The worth-watching chorus of the Lak. 32

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32 The connotations of sights worth seeing are appropriated and transformed by Socrates, as the pleasurable sights of the city are replaced by philosophical sights: Antisthenes insists that poverty allows him the leisure to look at what is worth seeing, which for him is to be in the company of Socrates (Sym. 4.44); and Socrates insists that his “display” (ἐπιδεικνύοι) of well and badly organised households is a sight worth seeing (Oec. 3.4) which is more useful that watching tragedy or comedy, whose purpose is pleasure rather than self-improvement (Oec. 3.7–9). Socrates identifies pleasurable viewing as unreflective and passive; it is rejected in favour of a critically engaged, judging vision which, crucially, is involved in the formation of the ideal citizen. The attitude of the viewer and the responses that sight might engender become the subject of political concern.
Pol. is seen by the Spartan law-giver Lycurgus as part of his viewing of the practices of other states (Lak. Pol. 4.2). When used of festivals, the term describes the pleasures of travel to festivals in foreign cities (ἐν ἄλλῃ χώρᾳ ἔστιν ἀξιοθέατα, Hiero 1.11), and the worth-watching sights of Athens are referred to as something that will draw foreign visitors to the city (Poroi 5.4).33

These examples engage usefully with the sight-worthiness of Agesilaus’ Ephesus. Do Agesilaus’ men present a pleasurable vision of a community with which the reader is expected to identify, or does the absolute obedience of the army to Agesilaus offer a fascinating, yet alienating, glimpse of a curiosity? The phrase παρήν ὅραν is impersonal: no potential responses to the sight are described. The reader is informed in a second person address what he or she would think of the activity in the city (...τὴν πόλιν ὄντως ἂν ἡγήσω πολέμου ἔργαστήριον εἶναι, “...you would have thought that the city was a workshop for war,” 1.26), yet it is not stated how the reader is expected to feel before such an overwhelming sight.

Immediately following this, we are offered another vision of Agesilaus and his men in Ephesus. Here we are told how the viewer would respond:

ἐπερρώσθη δ’ ἂν τις κάκεινο ἰδών, Ἀγησίλαον μὲν πρῶτον, ἐπεῖτα δὲ καὶ τοὺς ἄλλους στρατιώτας ἐστεφανωμένους τε ὀποῦ ἀπὸ τῶν

33 Indeed, Goldhill (2000) 166–175 has discussed how the verb theaomai and its cognates function as part of a democratic terminology of vision, describing travel to other Greek states for the purpose of watching festivals. He argues that theaomai denotes travel to festivals by private individuals as opposed to state ambassadors, whose viewing is described by the term theoria; see also Goldhill (1999) 5–8.
γυμνασίων ἵοιεν, καὶ ἀνατιθέντας τοὺς στεφάνους τῇ Ἀρτέμιδι.
(1.27)

"Somebody would have been encouraged / strengthened in watching Agesilaus in the lead, then behind him the other soldiers returning garlanded from the gymnasion and dedicating their garlands to Artemis."

The introduction of τίς invites the reader to replicate the response described, feel encouraged by the sight and so identify with Agesilaus and his followers. Yet immediately the identity of the “somebody” is closed down, defined much more narrowly within the narrative frame, in the explanatory rhetorical question: ὅπου γὰρ ἄνδρες θεοὺς μὲν σέβοιεν, πολεμικὰ δὲ ἀσκοῖεν, πειθαρχίαν δὲ μελετῶεν, πῶς οὐκ εἰκὸς ἐνταῦθα πάντα μεστὰ ἐλπίδων ἁγαθῶν εἶναι; ("For where men reverence the gods, train in warfare and practise obedience, is it not likely that everything there would be full of good hopes?", 1.27). In this justification of the claim about the response the procession would evoke, τίς seems to be someone on the spot (ὅπου... ἐνταῦθα), watching the procession of men, participating in the virtuous activities of the city and experiencing “good hopes”; the imagined response to the sight becomes the response of a participant.34 The reader, reminded that his or her viewing of events can only be a distanced, literary viewing, may feel excluded from the response imagined.

34 See Dillery (2004) 265, who stresses that one of the main audiences for this procession is the men themselves.
The second key passage where events are described through the experience of an imagined viewer occurs at a very different moment: as a response to the Greek-on-Greek destruction on the battle-field at Coronea:

επει γε μὴν ἔληξεν ἡ μάχη, παρῄν δὴ θεάσασθαι ἐνθα συνέπεσον ἀλλήλοις τὴν μὲν γὴν αἵματι πεφυρμένην, νεκροὺς δὲ κειμένους φιλίους καὶ πολεμίους μετ’ ἀλλήλων, ἀσπίδας δὲ διατεθρημένας, δόρατα συντεθραυσμένα, ἐγχειρίδια γυμνὰ κολεῶν, τὰ μὲν χαμαί, τὰ δ’ ἐν σώματι, τὰ δ’ ἔτι μετὰ χεῖρας. (2.14)

“When the battle was over, in the place where they fought each other it was possible to look upon the earth stained with blood, the corpses of friends and enemies lying side by side, shields smashed to pieces, spears snapped in two, daggers bared of their sheaths, some on the ground, some embedded in bodies, some still gripped by hands.”

The series of μὲν – δὲ constructions and the asyndeton produce a sense of overwhelming scale. The phrase παρῄν δὴ θεάσασθαι offers the field of battle as a sight to be perused by the reader. No imagined responses are given. What is the hypothetical viewer to make of the sight? In this scene of violence and destruction, all sides are equally implicated: the bodies of friend and enemy are muddled up, shields for defence and spears for attack are both destroyed, and daggers are found in the lifeless hands of those who struck with them and in the bodies of those killed by them. The sight is carefully framed so that

35 Contrast Cartledge (1987) 60, who reads the description of the visual effect of the battlefield as evidence that Xenophon was himself an eyewitness to the battle.
the beholder is unable to take sides in the mutual frenzy of destruction: the scene is self-consciously not focalised from any one position. Crucially, both friend and enemy (φιλίους καὶ πολεμίους) are Greeks.

What lesson are we supposed to learn about Agesilaus from this?

His response is to order a spectacle of his own:

πρὶ ὁδὲ Γύλιν τὸν πολέμαρχον παρατάξας τε ἐκέλευσε τὸ στράτευμα καὶ τρόπαιον ἵστασθαι καὶ στεφανοῦσθαι πάντας τῷ θεῷ καὶ τοὺς αὐλητὰς πάντας αὐλείν. (2.15)

"In the morning Agesilaus ordered the polemarch Gylis to draw up the army in battle order and to set up a trophy and to have everyone wear garlands in honour of the god and to have all the flute-players play."

The sequence of infinitives, the καὶ... καὶ... καὶ... and the repetition of πάντας emphasises the efforts put into the staging of Agesilaus' display. The reader is allowed no pause to consider his or her response to the sight of the battle-field; the spectacle of Greek corpses is replaced by a spectacle of Agesilaus' triumph. But how easily is this sleight of hand performed – how far can one spectacle be elided into the other? If the reader is shocked by the sight of Coronea, what response will the celebratory display of Agesilaus provoke? Are we to identify with his self-congratulation, or be disturbed by it?

This openness or indeterminacy in focalisation also occurs in the description of the battle of Coronea itself, which is framed so that despite the text's overarching concern with the life of Agesilaus, the reader is left unsure whether this remains his narrative or has widened
into a larger narrative of Greek events. At the opening of the battle, a
scene of viewing is presented:

συνήσαν μὲν γὰρ εἰς τὸ κατὰ Κορώνειαν πεδίον οἱ μὲν σὺν Ἀγησιλάῳ ἀπὸ τοῦ Κηφισοῦ, οἱ δὲ σὺν τοῖς Θηβαῖοις ἀπὸ τοῦ Ἐλικώνος. ἐώρων δὲ τὰς τε φάλαγγας ἀλλήλων μᾶλα ἱσοτάλαυς, σχεδὸν δὲ καὶ οἱ ἵππεῖς ἦσαν ἐκατέρων ἱσοπληθεῖς. (2.9)

“They met on the plain of Coronea, those with Agesilaus coming from Cephisus, those with the Thebans coming from Helicon. They saw that each other’s battle-lines were equally matched, and that the cavalry of each side were equally numerous.”

Just as the verb συνήσαν (they met) has both armies as its subject, equally weighted in a μὲν – δὲ construction, so too the verb ἐώρων presents the experience of looking focalised through the eyes of both sides simultaneously. Before the battle proper begins, there is a moment of pause and reflection where each side views and weighs up its opponent – and this experience is presented as shared. The narrator’s justification for describing the battle similarly focuses on its communal significance:

dιηγήσομαι δὲ καὶ τὴν μάχην· καὶ γὰρ ἐγένετο οἷαπέρ οὐκ ἄλλη τῶν ἔρ’ ἡμῶν. (2.9)

“I will describe the battle, for there was none other like it among us.”

Who are ἡμῶν? Are “we” (as the “Greeks”) both sides, who are about to kill each other? In that case, is the text as a whole, as a narrative focused on Agesilaus, not in a full sense about “us”?
The text moves on into a description of the actions of first one side, then the other (2.10-11). For much of this description, Agesilaus is not the main instigator of action, and appears only when he is inappropriately garlanded in victory before the battle is over (although he reappears in control of the action at the end of 2.11). Those who act are rather the Thebans, the Argives, the men under Herippidas (who consist in those who came with Agesilaus from home and some of the remains of the 10,000), the Ionians, Aeolians and Hellespontines. Those who are next described as seeing are the Thebans (when they saw (ἐϊδον, 2.11) their allies taking refuge by Mount Helicon, wishing to break through to join them they marched forward robustly). The narrative is told as a narrative of various Greek groups; despite the text’s stated aim to praise Agesilaus, the reader is not invited to identify or side with any one group.

Internal spectators

In the scene of the battle of Coronea discussed above, the nature of the reader’s visual engagement with the text is informed by the way that internal spectators see the events described. Throughout the text there are numerous moments of display and sight, and it is to these that I now wish to turn: how does the representation of vision impact on the reader’s sight of Agesilaus? As with the rhetorical appropriation of the reader’s vision to back up the text’s argument, the visual experiences of spectators within the Agesilaus are also offered as
confirmation of the text’s claims. In the discussion of Agesilaus’ sexual abstinence, expected disbelief is countered by the claim of Agesilaus’ accessibility to view by others:

In the discussion of Agesilaus’ military exploits we are told: "When things are known only to a few, it is possible for many to disbelieve them. But we all know that the most visible are least able to escape notice in what they do. Certainly, no-one ever reported seeing Agesilaus doing such a thing, nor was anyone who conjectured such things do not require proof, but only mentioning them is sufficient and immediately they are believed. Now, however, I will attempt to show the virtue in his soul...." (5.6–7)

"When things are known only to a few, it is possible for many to disbelieve them. But we all know that the most visible are least able to escape notice in what they do. Certainly, no-one ever reported seeing Agesilaus doing such a thing, nor was anyone who conjectured such things do not require proof, but only mentioning them is sufficient and immediately they are believed. Now, however, I will attempt to show the virtue in his soul...." (5.6–7)

As mentioned above, μαρτύρων does not necessarily refer to visual witnessing; yet the context of Agesilaus’ military engagements and the contrast between deeds (ἔργων) and the soul, often depicted as invisible in Xenophon (Mem 1.4.9 & 4.3.14), imply that his deeds are imagined as seen. (This contrast is to some extent undercut by the claim that the narrator will show (δηλοῦν) the virtue of his soul.) The very presence of a witness is understood to authorise the truth of an assertion. However, it is left vague what aspects of the argument the witness is to be understood as confirming: what has been described so far (Καὶ ταῦτα μὲν δὴ εἰρήται...).
actions believed to speak the truth. For when away from home he never stayed in a house by himself, but always stayed either in a temple, where it was impossible to do such things, or in the open, where he made the eyes of all men witnesses of his self-control. If I lie about these matters against the knowledge of Greece, I do not praise him, but censure myself."

The implicit claim is that vision allows unmediated access to knowledge. However, importantly, the exposure of Agesilaus to the sight of those around him seems to be part of a self-conscious, deliberate self-fashioning: we are told not just that he is observed, but that he actively engages with his viewers, making the eyes of all witnesses to his self-control (μάρτυρας τούς πάντων ὁφθαλμοὺς τῆς σωφροσύνης ποιούμενος, 5.7). His self-exposure involves the acquisition of social and political influence.

The argument is based on assertions about what “we all” know (πάντες ἐπιστάμεθα, 5.6), and about what Greece knows (τῆς Ἑλλάδος ἐπισταμένης, 5.7), even while informing the reader what he or she should know.37 The appeal to the eyes of all (τοὺς πάντων ὁφθαλμοὺς, 5.7) constructs an imagined community of viewers in which the reader is invited to participate, and is thus both constitutive of political identity and coercive; the sceptical viewer, who might see

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37 This strategy is familiar from Socrates’ discussions with his interlocutors. At Sym. 8.11–12 Socrates claims to know that Callias is inspired by chaste “Heavenly” Aphrodite rather than carnal “Vulgar” Aphrodite; Hermogenes comments that in flattering Callias Socrates is in fact educating him in how he ought to behave (χαριζόμενος Καλλίς καὶ παιδεύεις αὐτὸν οἴόντερ χρῆ εἶναι, 8.12).
and know something different, is excluded from being part of “us”, or part of Greece.

Jarringly, however, the expectation of the passage seems to be that the narrator’s statements will not be believed; the passage invites scepticism even while ruling it out as the response of a proper Greek. Further, the description of Agesilaus’ behaviour, as well as inviting the reader to identify with him as a virtuous ideal, also offers up Agesilaus’ most private habits as a source of speculation and curiosity: the expectation of disbelief about Agesilaus’ sexual practices and sleeping arrangements suggests their exoticism and strangeness.38 His permanent exposure to the eyes of all, while acting as the guarantee of his virtue, figures him as an oddity. His sexual self-control is said to be worthy of mention because of its wondrousness (θαύματος ἐνεκα ἄξιον μνησθῆναι, 5.4); the term θαύμα suggests awe, but also scrutiny of the alien.39

Scenes of spectatorship in the Agesilaus are frequently involved in the construction of power relationships and of cultural identity. Through sight and display Agesilaus places himself in a position of military or political dominance; Agesilaus’ self-conscious manipulation of his and others’ visual effect poses a challenge to the functioning of the text as display, and its uncritical acceptance by the reader. Viewing is also depicted as involved in political self-positioning. In its scenes of sight and response, the text frequently presents sight as culturally

38 Of the weight placed on the claim that Agesilaus did not stay in a house when travelling, Hirsch (1985) 54 notes “Xenophon’s protestations here are excessive.” He reads this passage as indicating that Xenophon is contradicting a rumour of scandal.
39 Cf. 2.27: ἄξια θαύματος διεπράξατο.
determined: Agesilaus’ way of seeing is claimed as a Greek way of seeing. Yet Agesilaus empowers himself over not just barbarians but also Greeks: the rhetoric of these scenes invites the reader to identify with Agesilaus, but simultaneously reveals such identification as politically problematic.

**Internal spectators: power**

During the text’s sequences of battle narrative the actions of each side are often described in terms of how they see events. In the conflict with Tissaphernes, the Persians catch sight (κατιδόντες, 1.30) of the Greek camp-followers and kill them. Agesilaus sends in the cavalry to support them, but when the Persians see (εἶδον, 1.30) them coming they confront them. Here the Persians seem to be in control of both the visual field and the battle-field. Yet on achieving victory Agesilaus is able to turn things around:

...τούς μὲν πρόσθεν προσκυνεῖν Ἁληνας ἀναγκαζομένους ὁρών τιμωμένους ώρ’ ὑν ὑβρίζοντο, τοὺς δὲ ἀξιούντας καὶ τὰς τῶν θεῶν τιμὰς καρποῦσθαι, τούτους ποιήσας μηδ’ ἀντιβλέπειν τοῖς Ἀλησι δύνασθαι... (1.34)

“...On the one hand he saw the Greeks, who had previously been forced to bow down, honoured by those who had abused them, and on the other hand he caused those who had previously thought themselves worthy to enjoy the privileges of gods to be unable to return the gaze of the Greeks...”
Both actual control and visual control are transferred into Greek hands, as Agesilaus watches Persian submission, and the Greeks gaze at the Persians without the Persians being able to look back.\(^40\)

Agesilaus and "the Greeks" are identified: the μὲν – δὲ construction makes the viewing experiences and concomitant empowerment of each equivalent. However, Agesilaus remains the subject of the participles in both clauses. The story of Greek empowerment remains ultimately the story of his own power: in surveying Persian submission Agesilaus also surveys the Greeks being honoured by them. In this passage we are also told that the affairs of the barbarians became more hopeless and the position of Agesilaus was strengthened (τὰ μὲν τῶν βαρβάρων ἔτι ἀθυμότερα ἐγένετο, τὰ δὲ Ἀγησιλάου πολὺ ἐρρωμενέστερα, 1.35) as various peoples broke away from the Persian Empire to join him, with the result that he became the leader not just of the Greeks but also of the barbarians (ὡστε οὐκέτι Ἑλλήνων μόνον ἄλλα καὶ βαρβάρων πολλῶν ἡγεμῶν ἦν ὁ Ἀγησίλαος, 1.35). The blurring of two different groups of barbarians, the Persian Empire and its subjects, blurs the role of

\(^{40}\) There are a number of other occasions when Agesilaus’ sight manifests his control over his environment and those around him. On seeing (ἴδων, 2.18) that Piraeum was strongly guarded by the Corinthians, he tricked them by moving his camp during the night to a position before Corinth, drawing off men from Piraeum, which he then captured in its undefended state. He saw (ἐώρα, 2.25) that Sparta required money to gain allies, so tried to raise some, and gave half his inheritance to his mother’s kinfolk on seeing (ἐώρα, 4.5) that they were in want. On refusing to kiss the beautiful Megabates, he is said to have described his determination to overcome his desire for him as akin to a determination to overcome the desire to see advantageous sights: μᾶχεσθαι γε μέντοι πάλιν τὴν αὐτὴν μάχην ὄμως μᾶχην πάντας θεοὺς ἢ μὴν μᾶλλον βούλεσθαι ἢ πάντα μοι ὴ ρω μέρ χρυσά γενέσθαι ("I swear by all the gods that I would prefer to fight that same battle over again than to have everything that I see turn to gold", 5.5). The concept of a golden sight frames vision as an invasive assertion of control.
Agesilaus: is he conqueror of barbarians or their champion? It similarly frames Agesilaus' “leadership” of the Greeks as a conquest comparable to his treatment of barbarians, an implication made explicit when we are told that the Greeks of Asia mourned his departure as though they were bidding farewell not just to a ruler but to a father or comrade (οἱ ἐν τῇ Ἀσίᾳ Ἑλληνες οὐχ ὡς ἄρχοντος μόνον ἀλλὰ καὶ ὡς πατρὸς καὶ ἑταῖρον ἄπιόντος αὐτοῦ ἐλυποῦντο, 1.38). While the comparison to father or comrade suggests the Asian Greeks’ close identification with him, nevertheless the thrust of the sentence reminds us that that he is not such a relation, but their ruler.

Agesilaus is also repeatedly shown as the instigator of displays. When Tissaphernes tricks him by breaking their armistice and raising an army, we are told

"By revealing Tissaphernes as a breaker of oaths he made him distrusted by all, whereas by displaying himself as someone who after swearing oaths does not break his agreements, he encouraged everyone, Greeks and barbarians alike, to make agreements with him whenever he wished."

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41 See Whitmarsh (2002b) on the similar representation of Alexander the Great in Plutarch’s Alexander. Cf. also Trédé (1991) 76-80 on the representation of Philip of Macedon in fourth century rhetoric as either championing the Greeks in their opposition to the Persians (Isocrates) or as a second Xerxes, ready to subjugate Greece (Demosthenes).
An apparent failure, as Agesilaus is outmanoeuvred by a wily adversary, is transformed into a coup in the tactics of appearance. Similarly, while the Spartans and allies are visible (φάνεροί, 1.13) in their distress at Tissaphernes' deception, Agesilaus greets Tissaphernes' envoys with a beaming face (φοινίκι, τῷ προσώπῳ, 1.13), informing them that he is grateful to Tissaphernes for his deception as it has caused the gods to support the Greeks. Display is a matter of self-positioning in relationships of power: appearances are the subject of concern to the extent that they seem to stand in for and supersede the actualities of military manoeuvring.42

However, when Agesilaus goes on to trick Tissaphernes in his turn, we are told

στρατηγικὸν οὖν καὶ τούτῳ ἐδόκει διαπράξασθαι, ὅτι ἐπεὶ πόλεμος προερρήθη καὶ τὸ ἔξαπατὰν ὅσιὸν τε καὶ δίκαιον ἔξ ἐκείνου ἐγένετο, παιδὰ ἀπέδειξε τὸν Τισσαφέρνην τῇ ἀπάτῃ...(1.17)

"This also seemed to be an act of good generalship, that when war had been declared and deception was for this reason sanctioned and just, he displayed Tissaphernes as a child in deception..."

The way that things are seen is manipulated not just by Agesilaus himself but by the narrator, who frames all of Agesilaus' actions as

42 Elsewhere Agesilaus' reversal of expected appearances is a sign of his virtue: εἴδοστο δὲ φοβοῦμενος μὲν ἠλαρὸς φαινεσθοι, εὐτυχὸν δὲ πρᾶος εἶναι ("He was accustomed to look cheerful when in fear, but to be humble when successful." 11.2). It recalls the unexpected countenance of Spartans faced with disaster in the Hellenica: following defeats during the Corinthian War and at Leuctra, those whose relatives have died go around respectively "like victors with shining countenances" (ὡστερ νικηφόροι λαμπροί, 4.5.10) and "bright and beaming" (λυπηροῦς καὶ φοινίκι, 6.4.16). Such reversals depict Agesilaus, and the Spartans of the Hellenica, as morally superior to ordinary people who look fearful at times of fear or upset in disaster, but their reversed appearances also figure Agesilaus' and the Spartans' strangeness.
signs of his virtue and success, even those which seem mutually exclusive – so Agesilaus is virtuous in keeping his word (not stupid in being outwitted), but he is also a clever tactician (not an immoral deceiver). Yet the narrator’s apology for Agesilaus’ deceit – that it was now moral to deceive because open warfare had been declared – far from wiping out all traces of contradiction, draws attention to the tricky rhetoric of the argument, where every twist and turn is marshalled in the service of praise.

Agesilaus’ visual power is also deployed against Greeks. The Thessalians’ sight of Agesilaus’ army drives them into confusion:

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“When the Thessalians saw them attacking unexpectedly, either they did not rally or while attempting to rally were captured with their horses side-on.”

The sight of Agesilaus’ army has a direct effect on his opponents. Further, Agesilaus deliberately manipulates the visual effect of his army so as to intimidate his Greek enemies. At Coronea, when opposed by the Thebans, Athenians, Argives, Corinthians, Aenianians,

43 Hesk (2000) 122–142 discusses a similar claim made by Cambyses in the Cyropaedia in his education of Cyrus as a military commander that deceiving enemies is acceptable but deceiving friends is unacceptable (Cyr. 1.6.27–34); Hesk argues that Xenophon betrays anxiety about the potential uses to which deception might be put within a civic, and especially a democratic Athenian, context. See also Azoulay (2004a) 155 on the contrast between the deception of intimates and the deception of outsiders at Oeconomicus 10.8.

44 Agesilaus sets up a trophy on the site of his success (2.5), and is described as lingering there, delighting in his exploit (καὶ αὐτόν κατέμεινε, μάλα ἡδόμενος τῷ ἔργῳ, 2.5).
Euboeans and both tribes of Locrians, he arrays his army to face them in full view (ἐκ τοῦ φανεροῦ ἀντιπαρέταττε, 2.6) and arms them so that they appear a solid mass of bronze and scarlet (ὡπλισέν τε οὕτως ὡς ἀπαντὰ μὲν χαλκόν, ἀπαντὰ δὲ φοινικὰ φαίνεσθαι, 2.7).

He also inspires his men with rivalry against each other to appear the best (ἐτὶ δὲ φιλονικίαν ἐνέβαλε πρὸς ἀλλήλους τοῖς μετ' αὐτοῦ ὅπως ἐκαστὸι αὐτῶν ἀριστοὶ φαίνοιντο, 2.8), a form of display which is directed not just externally at his Greek enemies but internally at his own men, whose sight of and response to each other enacts and reinforces their obedience to him.\(^{45}\) Agesilaus also inculcates obedience through personal display. As evidence of his love of his country (φιλότοποις, 7.1), we are told that although Agesilaus was the most powerful man in the state he was visible (φανερός, 7.2) in being a servant to the laws. This statement is immediately followed by the explanation:

τίς γὰρ ἄν ἥθελησεν ἀπειθεῖν ὃρων τὸν βασιλέα πειθόμενον; (7.2)

“For who would wish to disobey when he saw the king obeying?”\(^{46}\)

The visibility of Agesilaus, which initially seems to be offered to the reader as a sign of his virtue, is shown as a means of garnering power over his subjects who are also his viewers.

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\(^{45}\) This is reminiscent of the behaviour inculcated in the hebontes described at *Lak. Pol.* 4.2–4.

\(^{46}\) Cf. *Lak. Pol.* 8.2: we are told that in Sparta the most powerful men in the state are enthusiastic in their obedience to the laws in order to instil obedience in others (…νομίζοντες, ἥν αὐτοὶ κατάρχωσι τοῦ σφόδρα πείθεσθαι, ἐψεσθαι καὶ τοὺς ἀλλούς).
Internal spectatorship: cultural positioning

Scenes of spectatorship are also involved in cultural positioning. This can be seen when Agesilaus provides a spectacle of defeated enemies in Ephesus for his troops:

"Considering that contempt for the enemy would inspire the strength to fight, he ordered his heralds to expose for sale naked those barbarians who had been captured by raiders. When his soldiers saw them on the one hand white from never stripping, and on the other fat and flabby from always going in carriages, they considered that the war would not be any different from fighting with women."

The display is self-consciously revealed as intended to manipulate its audience. It seems to be effective, boosting the confidence of its viewers and their willingness to fight, as intended. The soldiers enact their dominance over the prisoners through their gaze, but also enact their obedience to Agesilaus, whose power is bolstered through their readiness to see the spectacle in the way that he wishes it to be seen.

Further, responses to the display are value laden and culturally determined. The Greek soldiers do not just see the white, fat or flabby bodies of the prisoners, but see their failure to strip, their propensity..."
for carriages, and their femininity: the explanatory διὰ clauses appear to be focalised through the eyes of the soldiers. In their sight not just of the prisoners' bodily condition but the causes of it, they see the prisoners' "otherness", their cultural difference - a difference which is also gendered. The Greeks' gaze at the barbarian prisoners' exotic bodies formulates the masculinity, and the Greekness, of the viewers. Their response to the spectacle, to believe or think (ἐνόμισον), calls to mind the substantive νόμος, custom or law: the beliefs generated by the sight are culturally conditioned.

Similar processes are at work in a passage which compares the life and style of rule of Agesilaus with that of the Persian king. Higgins reads this passage as political theory, involved in the question of what

47 Agesilaus also uses display to bolster his position through claims about gender in another scene. We are told that by breeding hunting dogs and war horses he adorned his estate with the works and possessions of a man (τὸ αὐτὸν μὲν ἄνδρός ἔργοις καὶ κτήματι κοσμεῖν τὸν ἔωτον οἶκον, 9.6), but at the same time by persuading his sister Cynisca to breed chariot horses he displayed through her victories that to keep a stud was an accomplishment not of manliness but of wealth (...ἐπιδείξαι νικώσας αὐτῆς ὅτι τὸ θέρμῳ τοῦτο ὀν ἀνδραγαθίας ἄλλα πλούτου ἐπιδειγμα ἔστι: 9.6). Here display is involved in the construction of gender, and in the self-positioning through normative values that this implies: the display of Cynisca's wealth functions as a display of Agesilaus' own manliness and therefore superiority. However, the rhetoric of praise seems contradictory. Agesilaus is praised for his nobility and high-mindedness (ἐκείνῳ γε μην πῶς οὐ καλὸν κατὰ μεγαλογνώμον... 9.6) in denying that keeping a stud is manly, but he is simultaneously praised for his manliness in keeping a stud. A possible contrast between war horses and chariot horses goes some way towards explaining this: we are told that Agesilaus thought a chariot-race victory would not add to his reputation but that, among other things, victory in helping his fatherland and in punishing enemies would do so (9.7). Nevertheless, it seems to be the stud itself (τὸ θέρμῳ), not the type of stud, that is the subject of attention: Agesilaus is praised for everything, even mutually incompatible activities. The language of adornment (κόσμημα) used of Agesilaus is also somewhat jarring, given that the objection to chariot racing is based on a rejection of the ostentation of wealth. Although Xenophon elsewhere argues that true adornment is adornment of the soul not of the body (e.g. Cyrus claims superiority through having adorned himself in sweat and zeal rather than costly garments at Σύρ. 2.4.6: ἰδρύτι καὶ σπουδῇ καὶ αὐτὸς κεκοσμημένος), which might indicate that Agesilaus' adornment is the true adornment of a true man, the use of this term nevertheless has the effect of fudging the contrast between himself and Cynisca, potentially undercutting the value-laden rhetoric of gender. As well as highlighting his manly superiority, Agesilaus' display of his sister's ostentation also seems to redound on him.
makes a good king; he reads Agesilaus as the ideal king and the Persian as “the mere appearance of monarchy and not its substance”.48

The first point of comparison between them is that

πρῶτον <μὲν> γὰρ ὁ μὲν τῷ σπανίως ὃρᾶσθαι ἐσεμνύνετο, Ἀγησίλαος δὲ τῷ ἀεὶ ἐμφανῆς εἶναι ἡγάλλετο, νομίζων αἰσχροῦργίᾳ μὲν τὸ ἀφανίζεσθαι πρέπειν, τῷ δὲ εἷς κάλλος βιῶ τὸ φῶς μᾶλλον κόσμον παρέχειν. (9.1)

“First of all, [the Persian king] was proud of rarely being seen, whereas Agesilaus delighted in being continuously visible, considering that being unseen is fitting for shamelessness, but that light was rather an adornment of a life of nobility.”

As in the description of Agesilaus’ sleeping habits, a moral slant is placed on visibility; just the fact of being seen takes on meaning.49 However, visibility is not just made moral, but political: being seen makes Agesilaus the opposite of the Persian king. The implicit claim of the comparison seems to be that Agesilaus represents a paradigm of Greekness. However, although the passage insists on the difference between Agesilaus and the Persian, the rhetoric of contrast poses them as counterparts: through being compared, their parallel roles as objects of curiosity are stressed. On a scale of visual accessibility, the Persian and Spartan kings occupy opposite yet equally extreme points.

48 Higgins (1977) 79.
49 However, elsewhere, Agesilaus’ avoidance of self-display is claimed as proof of his modesty: καὶ τοῦ μὲν σώματος εἰκόνα στῆσασθαι ἄπέσχετο, πολλῶν αὐτῷ τούτο διωρέσθαι θελόντων, τῆς δὲ ψυχῆς οὐδέποτε ἐπαύετο μνημεῖα διαπονοῦμενος, ἤγούμενος τὸ μὲν ἀνδριαντοποιῶν, τὸ δὲ αὐτοῦ ἔργον εἶναι, καὶ τὸ μὲν πλουσίων, τὸ δὲ τῶν ἄγαθῶν. ("He refused to have a statue of his body set up, although many wanted to give him one, but he never ceased labouring over memorials of his soul; for he considered the one to be the achievement of sculptors, the other to be his own, the one to belong to the wealthy, the other to the good," 11.7).
In his absolute availability to view, Agesilaus risks appearing almost as much of an exotic oddity as the Persian king.

In the continuation of this passage, the differences between Agesilaus and the Persian king are presented not in the narrator’s voice, but through Agesilaus’ own sight of them:

...άλλα καὶ ἐνθυμοῦμενος ἡγάλλετο ὅτι αὐτὸς μὲν ἐν μέσαις ταῖς εὐφροσύναις ἀναστρέφοιτο, τὸν δὲ βαρβαρὸν ἐώρα, εἰ μέλλοι ἀλύπως βιώσεσθαι, συνελκυστέον αὐτῷ [ταῖς] ἀπὸ περάτων τῆς γῆς τὰ τέρψοντα. ἡφραινε δὲ αὐτὸν καὶ τάδε, ὅτι αὐτὸς μὲν ἦδει τῇ τῶν θεῶν κατασκευή δυνάμενος ἀλύπως χρῆσθαι, τὸν δὲ ἐώρα φεύγοντα μὲν θάλπη, φεύγοντα δὲ ψῦχη, δι’ ἄσθενειαν ψυχῆς, οὐκ ἀνδρῶν ἀγαθῶν ἀλλὰ θηρίων τῶν ἄσθενεστάτων βιόν μιμοῦμενον.

(9.4–5)

“...He was proud when he reflected that whereas he was surrounded by good cheer, he saw that the barbarian had to draw in pleasures from the ends of the earth if his life were not to become painful. He also rejoiced that whereas he knew that he could adjust without pain to the way the gods ordered the world, he saw that that man both fled heat and fled cold through weakness of soul, imitating the life not of noble men but of the weakest of wild creatures.”

In Agesilaus’ scrutiny of the Persian king’s habits, the reader is invited to identify with Agesilaus as he or she also scrutinises the Persian. Sight here is a matter of evaluation which is culturally loaded: Agesilaus sees not just the Persian king’s behaviour, but the reasons for and implications of his behaviour. As in the Greek soldiers’ scrutiny
of barbarian bodies at Ephesus, to look at a Persian is to see his
difference. As Agesilus looks at Persian peculiarities and responds to
what he sees, he potentially mediates the reader's own response.
However, Agesilus' response - pride in knowing that he is the
opposite of what he sees - might give the reader pause: when the
reader scrutinises the Persian king's desire for comforts and dislike of
heat and cold, he or she may not experience the same absolute
rejection of and alienation from his inclinations that identification with
Agesilus would require. The scene both allows the reader to look at
the Persian king through Agesilus' eyes and invites the reader to
question how far he or she sees things his way. The implicit claim that
Agesilus represents Greekness makes the problem of identification
with him into a problem of self-definition.

In another passage, being Greek is shown as a matter of both
how one appears and how one responds to a sight. As mentioned
above, as evidence of Agesilus' Philhellenism (φιλέλληνα, 7.4), we
are told that when he was informed that only eight Lacedaemonians but
10,000 Corinthian enemies had fallen at the battle of Corinth, he
showed no pleasure (οὐκ ἔφησείς φανερός ἐγένετο, 7.5), but
exclaimed "Alas, oh Hellas" (Φεῖ <σου>, ὡ Ἑλλάς), saying that those
who had died would have been enough to defeat all barbarians (7.5).
This is followed by a similar anecdote about Agesilus' attitude to the

50 Elsewhere, Agesilus' responses to sight are morally loaded: ἔχαυρε δὲ τοῦς μὲν αὐτουκερδέσις τένητας ὑπὼν ("He rejoiced to see the grasping poor," 11.3); ἐμίση...εἰ τις εὐεργετοῦμενος ἀχαίος φαίνοτο ("He hated...someone who, on being done a good turn, appeared ungrateful," 11.3.)
destruction of Greeks at a later point in the Corinthian War. However, strangely, in this latter episode Agesilaus is himself involved in an attack on Corinth: we are told that when the Corinthian exiles on whose side he was fighting informed him that the city was about to be taken, and displayed to him the siege-engines with which they hoped to capture the walls (μηχανὰς ἐπιδεικνύντων αἷς πάντως ἡλπίζον <ἀν> ἐλείν τὰ τείχη, 7.6), he refused to attack, saying that if our own people (ἡμῶν αὐτῶν, 7.6) are annihilated, ...ὅραν χρῆ μὴ οὖδ' ἔξομεν μεθ' ὦτου τῶν βαρβάρων κρατήσομεν. (7.6)

"...it is necessary to watch out lest we lack men with whom we can conquer the barbarians."

These responses are presented as the proper responses of a Greek: the passage containing these anecdotes is introduced with the phrase εἰ γε μήν αὖ καλὸν Ἐλληνα ὄντα φιλέλληνα εἶναι ("If it is good as a Greek to love the Greeks...", 7.4), and informs us that Agesilaus treated victory in war against Greeks as a disaster (συμφοράν νομίζοντα τὸ νικᾶν ἐν τῷ πρὸς Ἐλλήνας πολέμῳ, 7.4). Agesilaus identifies with the Corinthians, encompassing them in the collective "us" (ἡμῶν, 7.6), which he earlier names as "Greece" (Φεῦ <σου>, ὡ Ἐλλὰς), and imagines in opposition to "the barbarians".

The language of Greek-barbarian opposition, familiar from the opening section of the text describing Agesilaus’ anti-Persian campaigns, is followed up as the argument continues. The phrase which opens this passage, "If it is good as a Greek to love the
Greeks...” (εἴ γε μήν αὔ καλὸν Ἐλληνα ὀντα φιλέλληνα εἶναι..., 7.4), is paired with the phrase, “If it is good to hate the Persians...” (εἴ δ᾿ αὔ καλὸν καὶ μισοπέρσην εἶναι..., 7.7), in order to begin a new section which reintroduces Agesilaus’ actions in Asia. The crimes of the Persian king are listed – in earlier times he tried to enslave Greece, and now he allies himself and gives gifts to those who do most harm to the Greeks (δωρεῖται δ᾿ ἐκεῖνοις οὖς ἀν νομίζῃ λαβόντας πλεῖστα κακὰ τούς Ἐλληνας ποιῆσειν, 7.7) and he negotiates the peace agreement ...ἐξ ἦς ἂν ἡγήται μάλιστα ἡμᾶς ἀλλήλους πολεμήσειν (“...by which he might most easily lead us to make war on each other,” 7.7).

These crimes are presented as visually accessible:

δρῶσι μὲν οὖν ἄπαντες ταῦτα· ἐπεμελήθη δὲ τὶς ἄλλος πώποτε πλὴν Ἀγησίλαος...;

“Everyone can see these things, but who except Agesilaus has ever done anything about them...?” (7.7).

Agesilaus is included in the “everyone”, becoming not only one of “us” (note ἡμᾶς, 7.7), looking at the Persians just as “we” look, but the “one of us” whose reaction is offered as a model. The spectacle of Agesilaus as an ideal Greek in his response to the sight of Greek slaughter is matched by a spectacle of Persian crime to which, again, Agesilaus alone offers the right, truly Greek, response.

However, the rhetoric of this passage strikes an odd note. Earlier, Agesilaus has been depicted as overjoyed by victory over fellow Greeks in Thessaly (μάλα ἡδόμενος τῷ ἔργῳ, 2.5). The sudden return to Agesilaus’ anti-Persian wars immediately after a description of his
attack on fellow Greeks both distracts attention from the reality of his
tolerance against Greeks and simultaneously draws attention to it, by
throwing into high relief the jarring distinction between his two areas
of warfare. The listing of instigation of war between Greeks as a
Persian, anti-Greek, crime makes the claim that Agesilaus’ manner of
prosecuting such war manifests his pro-Greek sympathies appear
rather strained. The claim that “everyone can see” the crimes of Persia
attempts to draw the reader into a passive, complicit relationship with
the text’s rhetoric, recognising the Persians as utterly foreign
opponents, and therefore by contrast acknowledging Agesilaus as a
champion of Greekness; if you cannot “see” this, you are excluded
from “everyone”, and have failed in being a true Greek. The text’s
claims of what can be seen become not just a strategy of rhetorical
manipulation, but also of political manipulation.

The problem of how to look at and respond to Agesilaus is taken
up in a further passage which both allows and circumvents the
possibility that seeing Agesilaus may be a problematic or alienating
experience. In stark contrast to the rhetoric of visibility at play
throughout the majority of the text, Agesilaus’ visual obscurity and
trickiness is also stressed.

καὶ γὰρ νυκτὶ μὲν ὀσαπερ ἡμέρᾳ ἐχρήτο, ἡμέρᾳ δὲ ὀσαπερ νυκτὶ,
pollákiς ἄδηλος γιγνόμενος ὅπου τε εἶη καὶ ὅποι ἵοι καὶ ὁ τι
ποιήσοι. (6.6)
“For he used night as if it were day, and day as if it were night, and he often was invisible/unclear in relation to where he was, where he was going and what he was doing.”

The difference is that the audience of his visual trickery is specified as enemies, against whom he practised deception (ἐξαπατῶν, 6.5) and concealment (λήθων, 6.5):

πάντα δὲ τάναντια πρὸς τοὺς πολεμίους ἢ πρὸς τοὺς φιλοὺς ἐπιτηδεύων. (6.5)

“He practised all the opposite methods with enemies to those he practised with friends.”

This deceptive Agesilaus, whom it is difficult to see clearly, is transformed into the subject of praise, as his visual trickery is presented as a display of sophia:

Τὴν γε μὴν σοφίαν αὐτοῦ ποίαι τῶν ἐκείνου πράξεων οὐκ ἐπιδεικνύουσιν; (6.4)

“What of his deeds do not display his cleverness / wisdom?”

However, he is praised not only by his friends but also, oddly, by his enemies. The enemies are first described as “unable to find fault with him, although they were forced to hate him” (τοὺς γε μὴν πολεμίους εἶχε ψέγειν μὲν οὐ δυναμένους, μισεῖν δὲ ἀναγκαζομένους, 6.5). However, in a sudden change of tack, their responses are marshalled into becoming one voice in a general chorus of praise and love:

ωστε ἀκαταφρόνητος μὲν ὑπὸ τῶν ἕχθρῶν διετέλεσεν, ἀζήμιος δ’ ὑπὸ τῶν πολιτῶν, ἀμεμπτος δ’ ὑπὸ τῶν φιλῶν, πολυεραστότατος δὲ καὶ πολυεπαινετῶτατος ὑπὸ πάντων ἀνθρώπων. (6.8)
"The result was that he succeeded in never being despised by his enemies, never being punished by the citizens, and never being blamed by his friends, but was most greatly loved and most greatly praised by all of mankind."

The hyperbole of the superlative adjectives accentuated by the πολυ- prefix flags the strange shift that has occurred in the argument, especially the unusual term πολυεραστότατος, which implies that Agesilaus’ enemies, citizens and friends go as far as to feel erotic desire for him.

Through the distinctions drawn between the manner of Agesilaus’ self-presentation to friends and enemies, the viewer’s experience of seeing Agesilaus is made dependent on his or her relationship to him; yet all viewings of him, from whatever side, end in praise. The repeated insistence that in order to know about Agesilaus we must simply look, and the declaration that looking can only lead to praise, are framed as rhetorically manipulative as it becomes apparent that looking at Agesilaus is not always straightforward, but may be a puzzling, alienating experience. The passage attempts to smooth over and obscure political difference or opposition, as enemies respond in the same way as friends. Vision is presented as an analytical process of evaluation (for the enemy, seeing Agesilaus involves discerning where he is, where he is going and what he is doing), but the text attempts to close down the effective force of evaluative sight so that only the praiseworthiness of Agesilaus can be seen. Yet the representation of Agesilaus as elusive and stealthy might evoke a more dubious
response: the description of Agesilaus as advancing quietly like the most modest virgin (ἡσύχως δ’ ὡσπερ ἀν παρθένος ἡ σωφρονεστάτη προβαίνοι, 6.7) might recall the response of the Greeks at Ephesus to the exotic and sensual bodies of the naked barbarians – that fighting against such men would be like fighting with women.

Conclusion

In this discussion I have argued that the Agesilaus is a much more subtle and sophisticated text than has previously been recognised, and that through the problematic nature of its rhetorical engagement with and claims about Greek identity, it allows us insight into the complexities of fourth century Greek self-consciousness. We have seen not only that vision and display are an important theme of the Agesilaus, but that through the text’s self-conscious invocation of the reader as a viewer of the events and characteristics described, the representation of vision impacts on the reader’s relationship to Agesilaus. Through the self-positioning involved in the production of this relationship, scenes of vision challenge the reader’s conception of him– or herself as Greek.

The narratorial voice, which insists upon the paradigmatic status of Agesilaus as ideal Greek, also undercuts its own authority, inviting a more critical engagement with its assertions. The repeated claim that the reader can see the truth of what the text describes both assumes and provokes the reader’s doubt. In impersonal statements about what
can be seen, the implications of the reader's viewing are ambiguous: the reader is encouraged to consider his or her response to scenes of Greek unity but also of Greek violence.

The rhetorical appeal to the reader to look at and believe what is described makes the implicit claim that sight provides unmediated access to knowledge. However, in the text's scenes of vision, such a claim is revealed as coercive, as the manipulative nature of visual display is made clear: Agesilaus displays his army and his person as a means of acquiring power over his viewers. Further, scenes of vision are involved in the construction of identity: how one responds to a sight is made dependent on and indicative of the viewer's political relationship to the object of sight. Both how Agesilaus himself sees, and how his viewers see him and his displays, is determined by and determines their identity. These scenes reflect back on the text's displays to the reader: we are made aware of the cultural expectations which control the act of sight. What is it that the reader will "see" in the displays of Agesilaus? The text claims that particular forms of response to a sight are those of an ideal Greek; yet it also invites a more sceptical engagement with those sights. The problem of whether the Greek reader will identify with or be alienated from Agesilaus becomes a problem of determining what it means, at this period, to see (and read) "as a Greek".
7. Conclusion

This discussion has shown not only that sight and display are important concerns across Xenophon's very different works, but that in engaging in the question of how to relate to or think about others, scenes of vision articulate problems of political and cultural self-definition. In chapter 2, I argued that Xenophon's representation of vision engages in the construction of political power and citizen identity within the Athenian polis, but also, more problematically, in the articulation of relations between different class and ethnic groups. Chapter 3 investigated the conceptualisation of Greek identity in the *Anabasis* through the representation of travel as visual experience, finding that scenes of sight engage in, but also critique, the concept of Panhellenic unity. In chapter 4, we examined the problems of cross-cultural viewing in the *Cyropaedia*, investigating how in the representation of barbarian responses to Cyrus the Great's imperial display, the security of Greek ethnographic detachment is both asserted and destabilised.

In chapter 5, we moved on to consider how the representation of vision positions the Athenian reader not only in relation to the non-Greek world, but in relation to other Greek identities, examining how Sparta is imagined in the *Lak. Pol.*'s scenes of sight and response: we saw that through the representation of viewing as a complex and conflicted process of self-positioning, the *Lak. Pol.* problematises the reader's relationship to Sparta. Finally, chapter 6 considered how the
rhetorical manipulation of sight in the Agesilaus poses the problem of how an Athenian reader can relate to the Spartan king as both an idealised representative of Panhellenic values and as emblematic of Spartan power.

The juxtaposition of these different texts has shown the similarity of concerns in the representation of Persians and other Asians and in the representation of Spartans. The reader’s relationship with Cyrus the Great and Cyrus the Younger functions in a similar way to his or her relationship with Agesilalus, as Xenophon invites the reader to identify with these figures but also marks the complexities and risks of doing so for the reader’s sense of self: Sparta and Persia pose a conceptual threat to the security of Athenian self-consciousness. We have seen not only that Spartans can be thought about in a similar way to barbarians – that they are “barbarised”\(^1\) – but that the problems of power and political and cultural positioning raised in the representation of barbarians, and particularly in the representation of Persians, are also raised in the representation of Spartans, as each is involved in a discourse of Athenian, and Greek, identity.

We have seen that Xenophon engages in the concerns of contemporary political thought. His representation of Persians, other Asians and Spartans must be understood as participating within the discourse of Panhellenism, as the cohesiveness, unity and security of Greek identity are explored and tested: in this sense, Xenophon can be

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\(^1\) See Millender (1996) on the “barbarisation” of Spartans in fifth century literature.
understood as a “Panhellenist” writer. However, Xenophon’s works show the complexities, limitations and ambiguities of Panhellenism as much as its potential. They are highly revealing about the anxieties and uncertainties of an especially troubling period in Athenian history.

We have also examined how sight and display become particularly fraught terms in Xenophon, concerned with the security of knowledge and with the dangers of deception, seductive allure and political coercion. Whereas Xenophon’s treatment of vision can be understood in terms of the political valuation of spectatorship associated with the institutions of Athenian democracy in the late fifth and early fourth centuries, Xenophon’s representation of vision engages not only with the identity of the Athenian citizen within the democratic polis, but is concerned with the place of the Athenian within wider structures of identity, in relation to other Greek cultures and to non-Greeks. The anxiety about the lures and threats of vision associated with Athenian literature of this period takes on a new significance and a new urgency in Xenophon’s discussions of cross-cultural interaction and conflict.

Finally, this thesis reappraises the historical value of Xenophon as a writer, revealing him as an important figure in fourth century intellectual and cultural history, and as a vital source for Greek conceptions of cultural identity, political power, imperialism and social, political and cultural conflict. We have seen that the contradictory, unsettling nature of many of Xenophon’s texts, far from being a problem to be explained away, offers fundamental insight into the
complexities of fourth century Athenian self-consciousness, and the ambiguities and anxieties that attend the attempt to imagine or make claims about Greek identity in this period.
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