“OUT OF PLACE” IN THE POSTWAR CITY: PRACTICES, EXPERIENCES AND REPRESENTATIONS OF DISPLACEMENT DURING THE RESETTLEMENT OF LENINGRAD AT THE END OF THE BLOCKADE

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Abstract

This thesis explores the repopulation of Leningrad following the blockade of the city during the Second World War. In the years after the lifting of the siege blockade survivors remaining in Leningrad were joined annually by hundreds of thousands of incomers. However, while the siege has recently been the subject of a number of scholarly and literary treatments, much less attention has been paid to what happened next in terms of the mass resettlement of the city. Accounts of the consequences of the blockade that touch upon the postwar population have deployed the term ‘Leningraders’ as shorthand for a cohesive community of blockade survivors, embedded in the culture and landscape of the city. Even pieces of work that have portrayed post-siege Leningrad as a ‘city of migrants’ have concentrated on the impact of the loss of the prewar population rather than on the multifarious experiences of its itinerant populations.

The thesis addresses the role of widespread experiences of displacement and resettlement in structuring relationships among individuals and between citizens and the authorities in the post-siege civic environment. It examines the repopulation in the context of evolving Soviet practices of population management after the war and in terms of the intersection of population movements with the re-affirmation of a civic community in a city which had lost a vast proportion of its population, just as it gained the basis for a powerful new narrative of belonging. It demonstrates how competing visions of the desired postwar order on a national and local scale were constructed and contested in relation to displaced people who were often targeted as a potentially transgressive presence in the postwar landscape.
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Chapter 1. Introduction

1.1 “Quickly-quickly they settled all our empty space.”

This thesis is a study of the repopulation of Leningrad in the wake of the devastating blockade of the city in the Second World War. On 27th January 1944, Soviet troops on the Leningrad front had the German army in retreat, and the freedom of the city from its almost nine hundred day encirclement was announced. The American journalist and war correspondent Harrison Salisbury described the moment thus:

On January 27 at 8 p.m., over the sword point of the Admiralty, over the great dome of St. Isaac’s, over the broad expanse of Palace Square, over the broken buildings of Pulkovo, the dilapidated machine shops of the Kirov works, the battered battleships still standing in the Neva, roared a shower of golden arrows, a flaming stream of red, white and blue rockets. It was a salute from 324 cannon marking the liberation of Leningrad, the end of the blockade, the victory of the armies of Generals Govorov and Meretskov. After 880 days the siege of Leningrad, the longest ever endured by a modern city, had come to an end.¹

The shower of golden arrows and red, white and blue rockets roared over a city, as this passage suggests, much of which was still standing, but which was scarred by the preceding years of bombardment and blockade, of military mobilisation and mass starvation. The poet Vera Inber, who only came from Moscow to stay in the city in the wake of the German invasion but lived there through the whole of the siege, recalled jumping on a crowded tram to travel to watch the dazzling light show from the Kirov

¹ H. Salisbury, The 900 Days: The Siege of Leningrad (London: Pan Books, 2000), p.566; Salisbury points out in a footnote that the exact length of the siege is variously calculated at 880, 882 or 872 days depending on the start date used. The fall of Shlisselburg on 8th September 1941 is commonly accepted today as marking the start of the blockade, which then continued for 872 days, although the encirclement was breached in January 1943.
Bridge, which was completely filled with people. According to some estimates, however, less than a fifth of the pre-war population of Leningrad remained in the battered city at the end of the siege to witness the victory salute. The other four fifths had mobilised to the army at the front, evacuated to the east or starved to death in an urban famine of unprecedented scale. In the most severe period of the blockade, the winter of 1941-2, rations fell to as low as 125g of bread a day and inhabitants remaining in the city endured bitter cold and hunger without fuel, running water, or means of transport. Thousands of people died every day and bodies piled up on streets and courtyards. The diary of a schoolgirl, Tania Savicha, who died in spring 1942, recorded the deaths of her family members one by one as the winter progressed. After the death of her mother she wrote “The Saviches are dead, they all died”. In these conditions, the number of people inhabiting the city dropped from over 3,000,000 at the start of the war to under 600,000 by the time the siege ended. Leningrad, in the words of John Barber, “suffered the
greatest demographic catastrophe ever experienced by one city in the history of mankind".  

As the majority of the city’s residents left or perished, apartments and districts became cold, dark, silent and empty. Whole areas of the city were burnt to the ground by German bombing or knocked down to provide remaining residents with firewood. One woman who lived through the blockade noted in her recollections of the first winter that “whole families, whole apartments with collectives of families disappeared. Houses, streets, blocks disappeared”. By 27th January 1944, the ‘second capital’ had become an emptied space.

Harrison Salisbury evokes the eerie emptiness of the blockaded city and its reversion almost to the sparsely populated city of the pre-industrial era. He describes how, in 1943:

The city now bore little resemblance to the majestic capital of prewar 1941. It was more like that Petersburg of which Turgenev wrote: “… these empty, wide, gray streets, these gray-white, yellow-gray, gray-pink peeling plaster houses with their deep-set windows – that is our Northern Palmyra. Everything visible from all sides, everything clear, frighteningly sharp and clear, and all sadly sleeping.” The city [in 1943] did not sleep, but it was empty. There were not many more people walking the streets of Leningrad than walked the streets of Turgenev’s Petersburg in 1860 or 1870.

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9 A section in Lisa Kirschenbaum’s study of the legacy of the siege is entitled ‘Cold, Hunger, Darkness: The Winter of 1941-1942’: Kirschenbaum, The Legacy of the Siege, p.56.
10 From the reminiscences of the classicist Ol’ga Freidenberg, written in spring 1942 and published in the almanac Minuvshee in 1987, as cited in Kirschenbaum, The Legacy of the Siege, p.123.
11 The city (called St Petersburg from its founding in 1703, then renamed Petrograd in 1914 and Leningrad in 1924, reverting to its original name after the collapse of the Soviet Union) had been the capital from the early eighteenth century until 1918, when the Bolsheviks moved the capital back to Moscow. On the continuing symbolic power of Leningrad as a second capital see Kirschenbaum, The Legacy of the Siege, p.31.
12 Salisbury, The 900 Days, p.552.
Indeed, a poem composed in April 1945 about life in the blockaded city by Ol’ga Berggol’ts, a Leningrad poet who lived through siege, echoes Turgenev’s portrait of the empty streets of mid-nineteenth century Petersburg. Berggol’ts, too, depicts derelict and uninhabited expanses of the city, clearly apparent to the spectator:

“We lived high up – on the seventh floor.
From there the city was visible for a long way.
It was scorched, quiet and proud,
It was deserted
And all (of it), up to the ashes, – (was) ours”.

For survivors of the blockade, as a recent investigation by Lisa Kirschenbaum indicates, it seemed like the prophecy made by Peter the Great’s first wife that “the city will be empty” had been on the verge of fulfilment. In fact, the population recorded in the city took until early 1961 to recover to prewar levels. From the moment the city was liberated and the rockets of the victory salute flew over its battered expanses, however, a frenetic growth of the population did take place. In the three years from the start of 1944 to the end of 1946 over 1,500,000 people came to live in Leningrad, according to the official registration of incomers. An interviewee in a recent oral history project on the blockade, conducted by the European University, St Petersburg, recalled how “our city

14 Eudoxia was the first wife of Peter the Great, the tsar who decreed the founding of St Peters burg in 1703. Peter had forced Eudoxia to become a nun in 1698 after she objected to his rejection of Muscovy traditions. See Kirschenbaum, The Legacy of the Siege, p.21-22 and p.28; see also E. Hellberg-Hirn, Imperial Imprints: Post-Soviet St Petersburg (SKS Finnish Literature Society, 2003), p.118 for the point that this widely known ‘prophetic curse’ has been variously attributed to Eudoxia or to an old-believer severely punished by Peter.
15 Statisticheskoe upravlenie goroda Leningrada, TsGASPb, f.4965, op.8, d.738, ll.4-4(ob); this assertion is based on figures for the city of Leningrad, without the inclusion of the suburban settlements which also came under the jurisdiction of the Leningrad City Soviet – the distinction will be explained further in chapter two.
16 Calculation based on figures assembled at the time by the city’s Statistical Administration: TsGASPb, f.4965, op.8, d.738, ll.5-5(ob).
very quickly filled up, our house filled with people….quickly-quickly they settled all our empty space”\(^{17}\).

There has been some very valuable scholarly, and literary, work produced in Russia and the west in the last decade on daily life in besieged Leningrad, on the lasting effects of the widespread starvation and the memorialisation of the blockade by survivors.\(^ {18}\) Much less attention has been paid to what happened next in terms of the rapid resettlement of the cityscape, despite the scale of this event in numerical terms alone. Social histories that do feature the post-siege city tend to focus either on the life stories of blockade survivors or on the population lost to the city forever during the war and the repercussions of their absence.\(^ {19}\) This is understandable, given the scale of suffering in wartime Leningrad. This work argues, however, that the aftermath of the siege can only be properly understood by considering the way the city ‘filled up’ again, the diverse experiences of displacement and resettlement undergone by many of its population and the way that central and local authorities treated incomers to the city – both returnees and new migrants - from 1944 onwards.

The thesis picks up the story of everyday life in the city once the blockade was lifted and the victory salute was over. Specifically, it tells the neglected tale of how the city’s expanses, its ‘broken buildings and machine shops’, were quickly repopulated by hundreds of thousands of in-migrants and how this migration was experienced, shaped

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\(^{17}\) Interview with V.Kh.Y., Arkhiv Tsentra Ustnoi Istorii Evropeiskogo Universiteta St. Peterburga, henceforth ATsUI, Interview No. BL-1-006, p.23.


\(^{19}\) These works will be discussed in more detail later on in this chapter. Kirschenbaum, *The Legacy of the Siege*, is a good example of work that conflates postwar Leningraders with blockade survivors. For one example of a study that concentrates on implications of the lost population see B. A. Ruble, ‘The Leningrad Affair and the Provincialization of Leningrad’, *Russian Review*, Vol.42, No.3 (July 1983), pp.301-320.
and represented. It addresses questions such as who were the people who repopulated the scorched and deserted city? Where did they come from? How did they figure in the practices and discourses of central and local authorities at the end of the war? How did they experience and shape their own displacement and resettlement? What was the nature of their encounters with the city, with its government, its physical spaces, its rich mythology and its other inhabitants? What role did they play in both the physical and discursive reconstruction of the cityscape at the end of the war?

In conceiving the post-blockade history of the city in a framework of displacement and resettlement, the thesis does not disregard the local dimensions of Leningrad’s postwar history, the background of the extraordinary suffering of the siege and the distinct position of St Petersburg-Leningrad in Russian culture. Instead, it seeks to combine these with both the history of Soviet population management and the global history of migration. It examines, above all, how the powerful civic narrative of belonging, constructed by officials and survivors during and after the siege, intersected with the massive sweep of population movements at the end of the Second World War. This approach, it argues, allows for a re-examination and enrichment of existing portraits of ‘Leningraders’ after the war and illuminates ways in which membership in the civic community was actually constructed and contested. The investigation has significance as a case study in practices of population politics and polity building and contributes to our understanding of relationships between state and society and between central and local authorities in the postwar Soviet Union.20

This introduction will outline the main arguments of the thesis and their relation to bodies of work on St Petersburg-Petrograd-Leningrad and on population movement in the Soviet

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20 The research for this work has been carried out within the framework of a collaborative AHRC funded project, ‘Population, state practice and social experience in the USSR and Easter Europe, 1930-1956’. The project addressed issues such as the relationship between ‘space’ and ‘place’, between ‘sedentarism’ and ‘itinerancy’, and between state practice, the everyday experience of displaced persons and individual identity. Some of the findings of this thesis have been published in the edited volume Warlands, which was one outcome of the project, alongside discussions of population resettlements in other parts of the Soviet Union, the Baltic countries and Poland at the end of the war: in P. Gatrell and N. Baron (eds.), Warlands: Population Resettlement and State Reconstruction in the Soviet-East European Borderlands, 1945-1950 (London: Palgrave Macmillan, 2009).
Union and beyond. It will set out the theoretical and methodological approaches that have been employed in the study and will also address the impact of this type of work on our understanding of the postwar period of Soviet history as a whole. First, however, why is there a need to reassess scholarly depictions of ‘ordinary Leningraders’ after the war?

1.2 A motley crowd: questions of identity in postwar Leningrad

Chapter two of the thesis is devoted to discussion of the diversity of people who constituted the post-blockade public. It begins with the description of a throng of people at a fair in Leningrad in 1946, taken from the recollections of Anatolii Petrov, a city resident who was nine years old at the time. Petrov recalls how, as a lad, he walked among the “motley crowd” (pestrota) at the fair and, as he relays his encounters with a variety of postwar characters, he wonders about the identity of the public as a whole, repeating to himself “who are you? Who are you?”21 This chapter and the following one attempt to reconstruct the population of the city of the immediate post-blockade years, in a way that reflects Petrov’s articulation of heterogeneity and uncertainty.

This approach is intended to serve as a corrective to existing scholarly accounts of the city in the postwar years, which tend to deploy the term ‘Leningrader’ as straightforward shorthand for particular types of inhabitants of this period. The current work is, on this level, an engagement with previous publications that have provided limited, one-sided, or seemingly contradictory portraits of the postwar population.

Until the late 1990s, postwar Leningrad tended to feature in western historiography principally as the backdrop to high political wrangling and cultural and political repressions. Scholarship concentrated in particular on the city as the location of the first targets of the cultural crackdown orchestrated by Andrei Zhdanov from 1946, which began with an attack on Leningrad-based writers Akhmatova and Zoshchenko and local journals Zvezda and Leningrad, and as the site of the purge of Zhdanov’s protégés and

other local officials following his death in 1948, in what became known as the Leningrad Affair. Some accounts of the origins of what David Brandenberger has more recently called “this enigmatic purge” have made links between the ‘high politics’ of the struggle for influence between blocs centred on Zhdanov, former first party secretary in Leningrad, and Georgii Malenkov, and the self-assertiveness of local Leningrad officials based on an understanding of the city’s wartime experience as a uniquely heroic episode.

Recent accounts of the legacy of the siege by Lisa Kirschenbaum, among others, have focussed on postwar Leningrad as the site of attempts by survivors to endow the painful experience of the blockade with meaning. The postwar city is understood by Kirschenbaum as the site of memorialisation of the extraordinary and unique experiences of the blockade by a ‘community of Leningraders’ and the local authorities. She maintains that city dwellers and officials in Leningrad during and after the war, like Londoners in the Blitz, created a small-scale ‘we’, a community of people who had stayed and struggled, “that was in many ways defined by and identified with well-known urban spaces”. Residents’ longstanding practices of imagining the city, in conjunction with the state’s efforts to impose meanings on the cityscape, facilitated the production of local myths which meaningfully plotted the chaos and affliction of life in the blockaded

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23 Brandenberger, ‘Stalin, The Leningrad Affair’, p.241: Brandenberger mentions, for example, the frequent use of rhetoric like “us Leningraders” by a local party apparatchik in the context of the onset of the Affair; for an account which emphasises the purge as an attack on the independent cultural identity of the city that had been underscored as a result of the blockade experience see V. Kalendarova, ‘Formiruia pamiat’: blokada v Leningradskikh gazetakh i dokumental’nom kino v poslevoennye desiatletia’, Loskutova (ed.), Pamiat’ o blockade, pp.275-295, here pp.284-285.

24 Kirschenbaum. The Legacy of the Siege, p.34.
city. These myths shaped a civic cultural identity that for some transcended the horrors of war and persisted into the post-Soviet era.⁵

In this context, Kirschenbaum writes, for example, that “the individual memories that Leningraders brought to Soviet sites of memory…complicated, without necessarily rejecting, the closure and cant of official myths…Leningraders used official narratives to validate loss and to fill in the gaps that they (adaptively) allowed to form in their own recall”.⁶ ‘Ordinary Leningraders’ of the postwar years in this treatment, therefore, are equated to blockade survivors, the blokadniki, understood as long-term residents who identified closely with well-known urban spaces and narratives and who had suffered with the city during the siege.

This thesis makes use of, and corroborates, many of Kirschenbaum’s findings on the mythology of the siege. However, it argues that her frequent reduction of ‘postwar Leningraders’ to a fairly cohesive community of blockade survivors, embedded in the culture and landscape of the city, disregards a major significance of the ‘demographic catastrophe’ that had befallen the city. The drastic fall in the population in the course of the siege, to which Kirschenbaum herself, of course, makes reference, points to the small proportion of the prewar population who remained the city at the end of the blockade and to another possible history of the wartime and postwar city: one of displacement and resettlement.

In fact, Blair Ruble, in his 1990 survey of the social, economic and political forces which shaped the historical development of Leningrad, had already characterised the postwar city as “a city of migrants”.⁷ He has argued in several publications that by September 1945 the population of the city had already doubled in comparison with March 1943, on

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⁵ Ibid, pp.7-16; a similar treatment, but which emphasises the blockade and its aftermath as the moment when many in the population began to understand their experiences in the framework of high Petersburg culture can be found in C. Simmons, ‘Leningrad Culture Under Siege’, in H. Gosciło and S. M. Norris (eds.), *Preserving Petersburg: history, memory, nostalgia* (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2008), p.179.


account of in-migration. According to Ruble, the initial rapid replacement of the population could not have occurred on account of the return of prewar Leningraders who had been evacuated from the besieged city and were “spread halfway to Vladivostok”, as it is unlikely that they could have made the hundred and thousand mile treks across the war-torn Soviet Union back to their native city in significant numbers at this time. The incomers were, on the whole, therefore, made up of demobilised soldiers and in-migrants from rural regions. As a result, he writes, by as early as 1945, “a large number, perhaps even a majority of the city’s residents had not lived in the city before the outbreak of hostilities, had limited personal or familial ties to the city and, as a rule, had fewer work skills…than did the city’s prior inhabitants”. This “reliance on migration” he concludes “magnified the demographic chasm created by the horrific losses of the blockade”.

Elsewhere, Ruble elucidates the significance of the losses of the siege and subsequent in-migration in terms of the erosion of Leningrad’s links with its own past and its irrevocable provincialisation. According to Ruble, the 1940s represented a historic break in the history of Leningrad, and its decline in status from capital city to ordinary provincial centre was cemented, as the population of the city of Peter and Lenin was quickly reconstituted “by new residents with few historic ties to either founding father”. These new inhabitants, he asserts, threatened the city’s unique way of life with oblivion.

Migration and social transformation in the wake of the blockade and the threat these posed to a unique civic culture have been, more recently, the focus of local Russian historian A. Z. Vakser. In his book on postwar Leningrad published in 2005, Vakser does provide a broad picture of the city’s population in the first few years following the blockade. His discussion encompasses the blokadniki and also demobilised soldiers, evacuees and new city-dwellers directed into the workforce by official organisations, including adolescents sent into Leningrad’s trade schools. He also refers to an “invisible

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29 Bubis and Ruble. ‘The Impact of World War II on Leningrad’, p.190.
30 Ruble, Leningrad, p. 51.
31 Ibid.
“population” of prisoners of war, other types of prisoners and people arriving illegally, without government sanction, who do not show up in official statistics.33

Vakser’s emphasis, though, is also on the city’s repopulation on the basis of the immigration of newcomers. He argues, in a similar vein to Ruble, that up to forty percent of the prewar population had been lost for good, perishing in the blockade, at the front or in evacuation or resettling permanently elsewhere and concludes that, “together with them…the city irretrievably lost a whole human layer…bearers of a mentality, of a culture that was specific to Petersburg-Petrograd-Leningrad”.34 Elsewhere, he elaborates vividly on the implications of the post-blockade replacement of the population, writing that the as a result of the cataclysm much of the population had “disappeared into oblivion”, disrupting the “normal course of the reproduction of a unique way of life, (and) material and spiritual culture”. He adds: “it is possible to restore the numerical size of the population. But you don’t resurrect the dead”.35

In contrast to Kirschenbaum’s reconstruction of an enduring civic and cultural community, therefore, the research of these authors suggests a tale of social discontinuity. The latter viewpoint has been summed up by another local historian, Alexander Panchenko, in an interview that appeared in May 2000 in the St Petersburg edition of the newspaper Argumenty i Fakty. In the words of Panchenko, a large part of the population died in the blockade, “then…the village by fair means or foul exploded into the city. And…Piter stopped being Piter – …in the sense of the composition of the population”.36

A third narrative of events has been touched upon, however, by Elizabeth White, whose recent work focuses on the successful return by prewar inhabitants who had been transported out of the blockaded city. White has argued that the tropes of unprecedented

34 Ibid, p.6.
loss and discontinuity in the “narrative of the non-return of ‘native’ Leningraders” have to be interrogated, as not only did many evacuees resettle back in Leningrad at the end of the war but massive population gains and losses were, in any case, nothing new for the city, which had not long before experienced civil war and rapid industrialisation.  

The story of the unprecedented and permanent loss of native city-dwellers as a result of the siege, while not entirely untrue, according to White, is itself an element of the rich mythology of the ‘Northern Capital’ and its cultural memory and she calls for the positing of a “more dynamic relationship between the city and its residents, new and old”.  

White’s argument that the demographic transformation of the 1940s, while great, was not entirely unprecedented, finds support in the earlier work of Vakser and Ruble. Vakser, for example, while arguing that the blockade interrupted the normal, or regular, reproduction of Leningrad’s way of life, also notes that this was the second time in fifty years that various groups of people were faced with the task of the renewal of the city. Blair Ruble also refers, alongside his characterisation of 1940s as a historic break in the history of the city, to the plummeting of the city’s population in the wake of the revolutions of 1917 and the civil war and to the subsequent rapid repopulation. He describes how many Petrograd residents fled their city after the Bolsheviks seized power, the seat of government moved to Moscow and food supplies were disrupted by fighting in the surrounding countryside. The gentry and middle classes sought refuge abroad in numbers, while other inhabitants, in particular those who had joined the ranks of the city’s workers in preceding decades, disappeared to the villages to seek food as hunger and cholera took hold. In this way, the number of people living in the city fell from about 2,500,000 in February 1917 to less than 750,000 by August 1920.  

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38 Ibid.
A rapid influx of people into the city, now called Leningrad, Ruble continues, occurred from 1928, as Stalin’s campaign to force peasants into collective farms and deport rich peasants or ‘kulaks’, together with his industrialisation drive, launched a “torrent of peasants fleeing the countryside”. The city’s population increased by almost 1,500,000 between 1929 and the census of 1939, which documented a record population of over 3,000,000 and another 300,000 living in the suburbs.

A sense of some of the similarities between the 1940s and the previous periods of civil war and industrialisation is reinforced by other accounts that evoke the emptying and filling up of the cityscape in the earlier years. Mary McAuley has termed the civil war period the first “emptying of the city” of the twentieth century. It was accompanied, she states, by the common appearance of empty apartments, boarded-up buildings and ghostly districts. Victor Serge, in 1919, recorded his impressions of an “abandoned city”, in which a square where Lenin gave a speech “was no more than a white desert surrounded by dead houses”. Slump gave way to furious growth in the 1930s, Marina Vitukhnovskaia attests, as some people were forced out of the city, and exiled and arrested in the terror, but many more arrived. The city now expelled, now absorbed streams of people many-thousand strong, she writes, summarising that the fate of the city in the early twentieth century was “extremely dynamic and dramatic”.

Vitukhnovskaia’s work, in places, applies a narrative of a fracture in the city’s history, and the threat posed by newcomers to its unique culture, to the earlier Stalinist period. She also acknowledges, however, that the rapid influx of people into the city was not an exclusively Soviet or twentieth century phenomenon. The work of James Bater shows that the population of the city had begun growing frenetically from the mid-nineteenth century, as an influx of new inhabitants was catalysed by the stirrings of industrialisation.

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42 Ibid, pp.41-2.
43 McAuley, *Bread and justice*, p.265.
44 Cited in ibid, p.263.
46 Ibid, p.104.
Between 1850 and 1890 the population doubled from just over 500,000 to over 1,000,000 and by 1914 it had doubled again.\textsuperscript{47} Blair Ruble, interestingly, contends at one point in his survey that from the moment of the city’s foundation its population had been mobile, changing and transient. In a chapter on ‘the Petersburg tradition’ he too highlights the rapidly changing society of late nineteenth century St Petersburg in particular. He describes, for example, how over 1,000,000 new residents moved to the city between 1870 and 1914, many “fresh off the farm”, and how “prince and peasant alike regarded their residence in the capital as only transitory”.\textsuperscript{48}

Once one considers the significance of the history of comings and goings in the city, then notions of a longstanding community of city-dwellers, either cemented or destroyed by the experiences of the blockade and repopulation, become problematic. This is not to ignore the existence of a strong local mythology that shapes the meanings attached to experiences and identities within the city or to deny that this local narrative of belonging was reinforced during and after the experience of the terrible catastrophe of the blockade. It is important, however, to recognise that these civic narratives of belonging have been formulated and reformulated in conjunction with a mobile and changing population. It is also important to recognise when these narratives are shaping the work of historians themselves.

The tropes of destruction and oblivion that have informed the work of those historians who foreground the lost population of the blockade and the threat posed by migrants to a unique culture, also run throughout the city’s mythology. The apparent transience of life in the city is perhaps one reason why loss, death and even apocalyptic destruction have had continued resonance as dominant themes in the mythology of the city, alongside others such as the triumph of culture over nature and barbarism.

From the nineteenth century, in particular, both the myth of a “city of culture”, formed out of a desolate and boggy wilderness by the will of one man, Peter the Great, and the

\textsuperscript{48} Ruble, \textit{Leningrad}, p.39.
“antimyth” of a city founded on the “tears and bones” of those who died building it and subject to periodic catastrophes in which it is reclaimed and almost destroyed by elemental forces, have coexisted in oral lore and literature.\textsuperscript{49} Both are crystallised in what Katerina Clark calls the ‘locus classicus’ of the Petersburg myth. Pushkin’s long poem The Bronze Horseman, in which the city, Peter the Great’s resplendent creation, is engulfed by flood waters, drowning the fiancée of a lowly clerk and driving him insane. The poem concludes with the clerk running “through the deserted squares of Petersburg”, believing he is being chased by the statue of Peter on a horse, and dying of hunger and exhaustion.\textsuperscript{50} V. N. Toporov has encapsulated the productive tension between the antithetical images of the city in the “Petersburg text”, writing that “P[etersburg]. – is the abyss, the “other” realm, death, but P. is also the place where national self-awareness…reached that limit, beyond which new horizons of life open up, where Russian culture celebrated the greatest of its triumphs”.\textsuperscript{51}

The ‘city of death’ and the ‘city of culture’ both became common themes in written and oral reminiscences on the horrors and deprivations of the blockade. Kirschenbaum writes how “the ghosts of the blockade inhabited an already haunted landscape” of a city steeped in myth.\textsuperscript{52} The images and themes characterising the older Petersburg myth – those of destruction as well as redemption, of apocalypse as well as spiritual purification and the triumph of civilisation – provided a frame for giving meaning to the suffering of the blockade.\textsuperscript{53} A compiler of the city’s legends has also noted how oral folklore that arose after the war reflected the real tragic losses and destruction of the siege, and conveyed the sense of an emptied city and a threatened culture. These included popular stories manifesting anxiety about the disappearance of local artistic and architectural treasures, despite the fact that almost all of these had been preserved or were quickly

\textsuperscript{50} Ibid, p.5.
\textsuperscript{52} Kirschenbaum, \textit{The Legacy of the Siege}, p.15.
\textsuperscript{53} See also Hellberg-Hirn, \textit{Imperial Imprints}, p.111 on the “two versions” of the siege, with an accent on either heroic action or tragic suffering.
reconstructed. One such story told how one of 29 lions supporting a fence on the banks of the river Neva had suddenly disappeared in the siege and would be found one day in one of the southern Soviet republics.\textsuperscript{54}

The terms of the myth of Petersburg, Katerina Clark has argued, have proved tenacious as frames for interpreting changing reality in both Soviet Leningrad and post-Soviet Petersburg. The great illusion contained in the Petersburg myth, she adds, is that of its uniqueness.\textsuperscript{55} Certainly, even when recent scholarship has portrayed postwar Leningrad as a ‘city of migrants’, conclusions about its history have attended more to local myths of place than to the multifarious experiences of its itinerant populations.

This thesis builds on Elizabeth White’s call for a more dynamic understanding of the relationship between the city and its varied residents after the blockade. It does so by examining the role of widespread experiences of displacement and resettlement in structuring relationships among individuals and between citizens and the authorities in the post-siege civic environment. Life in the city at the end of the war was heavily marked by the imprints of the extraordinary suffering of the blockade, while at the same time the city was being reconstituted once more through diverse migrations. The thesis explores how these aspects of civic life interlocked, in particular – and insofar as the sources permit - from the perspective of the population on the move that has been largely lacking so far. It examines the way that more general Soviet practices and experiences of displacement were given form, perpetuated and transformed in the local context of the post-siege city.\textsuperscript{56} In particular, it examines the ways in which these wider trajectories and practices of displacement intersected with the re-affirmation of a civic community in a city that had lost a vast proportion of its population, just as it gained the basis for a powerful new narrative of belonging.

\textsuperscript{54} N. A. Sindalovsky, \textit{Sankt-Peterburg: Istoriia v predaniakh i legendakh} (St Petersburg: Norint, 2005), pp.422-423.
\textsuperscript{55} Clark, \textit{Petersburg}, p.6.
\textsuperscript{56} For a discussion of writing local history that notes how particular local experiences have condensed within them “more general experiences that are larger than the local”, see D. J. Raleigh (ed.), \textit{Provincial Landscapes: Local Dimensions of Soviet Power, 1917-1953} (Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press, 2001), p.5.
Understanding the post-blockade period in these terms it is possible to avoid replicating the self-image of the city as entirely unique, and rather to interrogate the (re-)generation of these types of civic myths after the war in the context of broad and complex practices of population movement. The next section will outline further how this research engages with a mobile, itinerant, perspective and the implications of integrating this approach into an historical survey of Soviet migration.

1.3 “What is lacking is a nomadology”: integrating an historical study with theories of space, place and displacement

The observation that histories of post-siege Leningrad tell us more about local myths than about its repopulation, even when it is characterised as a ‘city of migrants’, echoes the claim made by the philosophers Deleuze and Guattari in the 1980s that “history is always written from the sedentary point of view…even when the topic is nomads. What is lacking is a Nomadology”.  

In the past twenty years, scholars from a wide range of disciplines have addressed the importance of mobility across space in shaping social life. In the words of Tim Cresswell:

Everyone is travelling in the field of ‘theory’ today. Metaphors of movement parade across the pages of cultural theorists, social theorists, geographers, artists, literary critics. Mobility is the order of the day.

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57 Kirschenbaum does argue that although the blockade period was incomparable, its legacy needs to be understood in terms of broader frameworks. She tends to limit these frameworks to the distinct cultural history of the city, however, rather than taking into account broader national and global connections: Kirschenbaum, The Legacy of the Siege, p.29. Peter Gatrell and Nick Baron highlight the need to contextualise local claims to victimhood by setting them in a much broader comparative framework of complex displacements in a volume that will be discussed in more detail below: P. Gatrell and N. Baron, ‘Violent Peacetime: Reconceptualising Displacement and Resettlement in the Soviet-East European Borderlands after the Second World War’, in Gatrell and Baron (eds.), Warlands, pp.257-258.


Three years after Cresswell wrote this John Urry elaborated a ‘mobile sociology’. This sociology, he stated, should be one that registers the “geographical intersections of region, city and place, with the social categories of class, gender and ethnicity”, but that also registers that “there are crucial flows of people within, but especially beyond, the territory of each society”.  

Often the ‘travelling theories’ that have been developed, however, have emerged from scholars interested in contemporary communities. These theories have even been explicitly counterposed to the study of supposedly more settled societies of the recent past. Urry, for example, claims that flows of people and things are a property of “the new global order”, in which “diverse mobilities are transforming the ‘social as society’ into the ‘social as mobility’”. Another sociologist, Rob Shields, refers to the “contemporary paradoxes of everyday life” when discussing the intersection of culture, space and flows of people. Lisa Malkki notes that throughout recent scholarship “what [Edward] Said…calls a “generalised condition of homelessness” is seen to characterise contemporary life everywhere”. In this way, Cresswell concludes, the nomad has become the “geographic metaphor par excellence of postmodernity”.

In the theoretical literature the prominence of flows – of people, information and objects – is, moreover, frequently associated with the flourishing of capitalism and in this way would seem doubly unsuited to a history of the Soviet Union. John Urry explicitly juxtaposes his vision of modern, horizontally mobile societies to former East European socialist societies and the USSR. The latter cases are, he explains, exemplars of Zygmunt Bauman’s ‘gardening’ states, in which people and information are bounded and frozen

61 My emphasis.
65 Cresswell, ‘Imagining the Nomad’, p.360.
and subject to the state’s concerns with ordering, regulating and weeding humanity or, to mix a metaphor, “with the detailed cultivation of each animal in each particular place”.

This is in contrast to the return of the ‘gamekeeper’ state in the West and in post-socialist Eastern Europe, which is concerned only with regulating the mobilities of its roaming stock, especially across national borders.

The ‘ordering’ and ‘gardening’ intentions of the Soviet state are acknowledged in this thesis. The Soviet ‘gardening’ enterprise was an attempt at the transformation and purification of society, the remaking of the citizenry, with the aim of creating a harmonious and loyal socialist community, within a secure Soviet territory. This social engineering was to be accomplished through the refashioning of identities and the brutal removal of the ‘weeds’ that did not have a place in the new socio-economic order. It entailed policies for reconstructing and then fixing the geographic, social and ethnic boundaries of the country and the identities and locations of its population. These attempts at ordering Soviet citizens and territory were encapsulated in the application of the internal passport system, which was introduced in 1932, in conditions of rural famine and industrialising frenzy that had prompted the flight of desperate peasantry from the villages and high labour turnover between factories and towns.

The passport system delineated places of strategic importance to the state, which within a year or two encompassed most urban areas and the country’s border-zones. It required

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people over sixteen living within these areas to take out and register a passport, record in it details of their identity such as class background, ethnicity and occupation, and on the basis of this obtain a permit for residency that was registered to a particular address. Peasants who had been rounded up into collective farms were not issued passports, and hence were denied the right to resettle into ‘regime zones’ without further government involvement. The regime also refused passports to certain categories of people already living in these areas, including those without state employment (other than the disabled and pensioners); suspected former ‘kulaks’; those who had arrived without a formal invitation of work from an enterprise or who were ‘obvious flitters’; people deprived of the right to vote, who were often former gentry; people with a criminal record; and refugees from abroad.69

In the course of passportisation the political police formalised the practice of regularly ‘cleansing’ cities and borderlands of these undesirable elements, who were evicted to live in non-strategic areas or, in the case of some labelled as kulaks or criminals, exiled to labour camps or special settlements in remote parts of the country.70 The priority of the passport system, as David Shearer has suggested, was to “fix” the urban population” in place and to purge and protect core Soviet spaces, and secondly to control further movement into these areas.71 In the words of Tova Höjdestrand, the aim was “keeping ‘matter out of place’ out of places that matter”.72

A number of scholars, including Shearer, however, have drawn attention to the fact that these ‘gardening’ aims and practices to fix the population did not eliminate ‘crucial flows’ of people across the Soviet Union, in particular from the countryside into urban areas. In 1948, Eugene Kulischer, an American sociologist of Russian origin and commentator on wartime and postwar refugee movements, conceived the repopulation of

71 Shearer, ‘Elements near and Alien’, p.874.
Leningrad after the siege as part of numerous interrelated migrations that stretched across Soviet, Russian, European and world history. These migrations were made up of the organised, government-sponsored movement of peoples and also the desperate flight of people from zones of conflict, the cumulative decisions of individuals to move, often from village to city, and the wide-ranging travels of adventurers. 73

In the Soviet Union, the regime intended the mass movements of people to be effected through organised government transfers following the introduction of the passport system. Population shifts continued up to the eve of the war in part on the basis of these organised movements. These included the mobilisation of labour to cities and industrial settlements across the Soviet Union in a national scheme of organised recruitment (orgnabor). 74 In 1940 the government supplemented this planned transfer of people into the workforce with a decree making teenagers, especially in rural areas, liable to compulsory relocation to train and work in industries across the Soviet state. 75 The introduction of the passport regime, moreover, facilitated the ongoing deportation of different groups of people away from certain areas of the country. These included people in urban areas who were marked as socially marginal, harmful or criminal by their lack of a residence permit for the city in which they were living, and also other groups of people who came under suspicion and could be identified by the social, ethnic or other entries in

74 On orgnabor as a means of channelling labour recruits into passportised areas see Kessler, ‘The Passport System’, p.490; on both orgnabor and deported peasants as the key source of labour on the construction sites of the new city of Magnitogorsk in the early 1930s see S. Kotkin, Magnetic Mountain: Stalinism as a civilization (Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1997), p.84; on the Soviet Union as a ‘mobilising’ state that “would have decreed the whole country mobilized” in order to succeed, and in a way did just this in its recruitment mobilisations, see ibid, p.77; also R. Service, Stalin: A Biography (London: Pan Books, 2005), p.9 on Stalinist aims for the ‘controlled agitation’ of Soviet society.
75 In the decree of October 1940 the Soviet government announced that henceforth the replenishment of the working class would be secured on the basis of the mobilisation of young people aged between 14 and 17 into the labour reserve system: Sbornik zakonov SSSR i ukazov Prezidiuma Verkhovnogo Soveta SSSR (1938г – noiabr’ 1958г) (Moscow: Gosudarstvenoe izdatelstvo iuridicheskoi literatury, 1959), pp.417-18; see also D. Filtzer, Soviet Workers and Late Stalinism: Labour and the Restoration of the Stalinist System After World War II (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2002), p.34 on this form of ‘labour conscription’; according to Filtzer millions of adolescents were directed into factories across the Soviet Union through the system of labour reserve factory and trade schools from its inception until it was abolished in March 1955.
their passports.\textsuperscript{76} Between 1935 and 1938, for example, the Stalinist regime forcibly resettled thousands of members of particular diaspora ethnic groups from the country’s eastern and western borderlands, to special settlements in Siberia and Central Asia, where they added to the population of peasants exiled from the countryside as ‘kulaks’ in earlier years.\textsuperscript{77} Thirty percent of the Finnish population of the Leningrad region was deported in these years.\textsuperscript{78}

Displacement and resettlement, however, occurred not just as part of the state’s strategies for developing the economy, mobilising, controlling and engineering the population, and reordering Soviet space. People also repeatedly chose to relocate in contravention of the new restrictions fixing them in place, which in turn prompted renewed efforts from the authorities to settle them.\textsuperscript{79}


\textsuperscript{79} Sergei Medvedev has suggested that one way of understanding the relationship of Russians to the broad spaces that for centuries have made up the states in which they have lived is in terms of the “contradiction between the population’s desire to spread across the territory, and the efforts of the authorities to fix and settle the people down”: S. Medvedev, ‘A General Theory of Russian Space: A Gay Science and a Rigorous Science’, in J. Smith (ed.), Beyond the Limits: The Concept of Space in Russian History and
Kulischer and others have estimated that the urban population more than doubled between 1926 and 1939, largely on account of continuing in-migration, which fell off briefly in 1933 following the introduction of the passport system but resumed again in 1934.\textsuperscript{80} This in-migration remained out of the complete control of the central authorities, who expressed concern at the people continuing to throng railway stations across the country. A station in Leningrad region in the mid-1930s, for example, was described as “more like a flophouse than a decent station”.\textsuperscript{81} In the new Soviet city of Magnitogorsk the “bacchanalian fluidity” of the population, in the words of Stephen Kotkin, may have slowed down after 1932 but this was probably due more to improved living conditions than to the passport system, and migration both organised and haphazard persisted.\textsuperscript{82} The high geographic, as well as social, mobility of workers persisted throughout the chaos of the second five year plan and the years of the terror, and in 1932-1935 and again in 1937, the number of workers recorded as leaving jobs exceeded total manpower.\textsuperscript{83}

As the Soviet workforce continued to be characterised by fluidity the regime issued decrees stipulating increasingly severe penalties for unauthorised departures from the workplace. In 1940 the regime made unauthorised changing of place of work a criminal


\textsuperscript{82} Kotkin, \textit{Magnetic Mountain}, p.97 and p.102.

offence, that could be punished with two to four years imprisonment. These decrees aimed not just at fixing a stable workforce for the economy but also intertwined with a number of measures intended to discipline new arrivals to form a settled and ‘civilised’ socialist urban population and to ‘cultivate’ proper conduct in them, as part of the regime’s mission to mould a country of “backward, individualist peasants” into “efficient, cultured, and responsible workers and collective farmers”. Throughout the Soviet period, though, as Cynthia Buckley has demonstrated, citizens found methods for circumventing restrictions on movement between workplaces and residences.

The inability of the regime to constantly monitor the population, inefficiencies in the residency registration system, the high labour demand for low prestige jobs and the prevalence of a second, unofficial economy and personal networks of assistance and exchange all encouraged people to risk migration without an official passport or permit. Corruption and fraud further facilitated migration to cities by those who could obtain permits through semi-legal and illegal means. People who could not obtain the documents needed to move utilised bribes, false documents and bogus marriages, or in

85 The Soviet mission was summarised in these terms by an unknown contributor to a 1934 edition of American Marxist magazine New Masses, cited in B. Lewis, Hammer & Tickle: A History of Communism told through Communist Jokes (London: Phoenix, 2008), p.82. Other ‘civilising’ measures included harsh penalties for absenteeism, which could be punished with six to twelve months in a corrective labour camp from 1940, and, on the other hand, the allocation of urban housing to new workers and exhortations to live and work as a “cultured” collectivity. On the penalties for absenteeism, see Rittersporn, ‘From Working Class’, p.264 or Filtzer, Soviet Workers, pp.233-5; for the Stalinist ‘civilising’ project, which will be returned to in the thesis, see Kotkin, Magnetic Mountain; and also V. Volkov, ‘The Concept of Kul'turnost’: Notes on the Stalinist civilizing process’, in Fitzpatrick, Stalinism, pp.210-230: Volkov highlights the links between repressive, punitive and violent policies aimed at disciplining and organising the labour force and ‘positive’ policies to impose social order through the promotion of values of culturedness, or ‘kul’turnost”, see, for example, p.215; on ‘cultivating’ proper conduct in urban public space see also A. Weiner, ‘Introduction: Landscaping the Human Garden’, in Weiner (ed.), Landscaping the human garden, pp.1-18, here p.4.
87 Ibid, pp.905-8; also on the notorious inefficiencies of the passport system see Shearer, ‘Elements near and Alien, p.845 and on the ease with which determined people could bypass the laws, pp.880-881; on the importance of personal connections and favours in the daily functioning of Soviet state and society see A. Ledeneva, Russia’s Economy of Favours: Blat, Networking and Informal Exchange (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998) and S. Lovell, A. Rogachevskii and A. Ledeneva (eds.), Bribery and Blat in Russia: Negotiating reciprocity from the early modern period to the 1990s (Basingstoke: Macmillan, 2000).
some cases just hid from the authorities during document checks. Buckley concludes, was a myth and total control over the placement of the population an illusion. Despite, as well as because of, the efforts of the authorities to manage and ‘cultivate’ the population, in order to ensure the stable functioning of the economy and the harmonious order of the Soviet state, it seems that the ‘quicksand society’ of the early 1930s never fully solidified.

This is not to say, though, that the restrictions did not matter. Buckley points out that managed migration may have been a ‘myth’, but that the system, as both a symbolic and administrative mechanism, shaped individual decisions. She argues that, in a way, the operation of the system was quite similar to market-based signals, in terms of individual perceptions of costs and benefits, although the nature of the costs and benefits were different from those of market economies. The system was selective, in that migrants weighed up the benefits of moving against the difficulties of obtaining a residence permit through unofficial channels, or resettling illegally, which meant living outside of the official distribution of resources, including housing. The system, Sheila Fitzpatrick avers, while not preventing movement altogether, “complicated life enormously for many people”.

David Shearer maintains that the system under Stalin functioned not only as a tool to enforce the physical removal of stigmatised people from certain areas of the state’s territory, but also to compel the Soviet population to think in terms of certain social and geographical categories, which occupied different places in a hierarchy of privileges,

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88 Kotkin, Magnetic Mountain, p.100 and p.166.
90 The ‘quicksand society’ is Moshe Lewin’s famous term for the situation in the Soviet Union in the early 1930s in which “workers, administrators, specialists, officials, party apparatus men and, in great masses, peasants were all moving around” and “social, administrative, industrial and political structures were all in flux”: M. Lewin, The Making of the Soviet System: Essays in the Social History of Interwar Russia (London: Methuen & Co. Ltd, 1985), p.221.
92 Fitzpatrick, Everyday Stalinism, p.6.
restrictions and exclusions. These classifications cut along class and ethnic lines but also fostered clear divisions between good, organised populations and bad, unorganised ones.\textsuperscript{93} In this way the regime imposed a framework of stratified identities, while also creating conditions for individuals to reconstruct and manipulate these identities “through illegal migration, falsification of passport information, multiple moves…or other means”.\textsuperscript{94} The movements of people in this context can be seen as contributing to the formation and also the transformation of models of ‘homo sovieticus’.\textsuperscript{95}

The Second World War and the Nazi invasion of Soviet territory had a dramatic impact on the regime’s ongoing efforts to order its population and space and on the movements of millions of Soviet citizens. Eugene Kulischer describes the massive displacement, and the shattering of borders and population controls that the war brought across Europe, in the following terms:

Frontiers where each immigrant had once been carefully filtered were crossed by millions whose passports were guns and whose visas were bullets. They set in motion millions of others who marched unarmed between streams of blood and tears.\textsuperscript{96}

Soviet society was convulsed not only by the violation of its external borders, across which moved armies, prisoners and forced labourers in both directions, but also by evacuation and mobilisation on the home front. Barber and Harrison depict how millions of Soviet citizens moved from west to east into evacuation, and millions of others moved in the opposite direction as part of the Red Army. As they note, the “boundaries between urban and rural society were endlessly crossed” in these years, by town dwellers in search

\textsuperscript{93} Shearer, ‘Elements near and Alien’, p.850.  
\textsuperscript{94} Ibid, p.881.  
\textsuperscript{96} Kulischer, \textit{Europe on the Move}, p.255.
of food; peasants mobilised to wartime industries; prisoners and former exiles sent to farms, work benches or the front.\textsuperscript{97}

The Soviet authorities enacted policies once more to assert power over the placement of the population and to enforce a certain vision of society. Workers from all but very peripheral industries were declared to have been mobilised for the war effort and were to be directed into whatever factory, in whatever location, the regime chose. Penalties for ‘desertion’ from the workplace became even harsher. New laws introduced in 1940, which were only gradually repealed from 1948, stipulated that industrial workers who left their places of employment without authorisation should be sentenced to five to eight years in a labour camp, workers on transport to three to ten years and teenage trainees to one year.\textsuperscript{98}

The regime also conceived the evacuation as a form of managed migration, to be administrated in a similar manner to previous population resettlements, such as the organised redistribution of labour and the prewar deportations.\textsuperscript{99} Officials established criteria for evacuation which reflected the resources, human and material, that were conceived as necessary for the war effort. The plan also reflected and imposed the operative categories of the Soviet system and its social and geographic stratification. It envisaged the evacuation as taking place largely from the threatened cities, rather than the countryside, and did not cover the whole population of these urban areas. Civilians were to be evacuated not as an endangered population but as workers of a particular enterprise, as privileged members of the state apparatus or the new Soviet intelligentsia and their wives, and as mothers with young children.\textsuperscript{100}

Wartime policies to manage the population did not simply act to reinforce prewar images of the polity, however. The authorities organised coercive population relocations in these

\textsuperscript{98} Filtzer, \textit{Soviet Workers}, pp. 8 and 158.
\textsuperscript{100} Ibid, pp.34-41.
years to assert their control over newly acquired Soviet borderlands. On the eve of the war and at the end, for example, the Soviet political police deported hundreds of thousands of people from western Ukraine and Belarus and the Baltic states, in addition to arresting and executing many of their number. The deportations targeted social groups such as ‘former people’, the privileged classes and officials of the old regimes in these places, and ‘kulaks’ who resisted collectivisation. These groups were removed in a campaign of Sovietisation that was, however, also understood by the people affected as an attack on their nationality.\(^\text{101}\)

Ethnic categories were further to the fore in the deportations carried out in the state’s prewar territory. These deportations reflected shifts in categories for inclusion and exclusion, status and stigma in the Soviet polity and an adjusted framework for conceiving state-society relations in the light of wartime experience. The war reinforced the purification drive of the regime, Amir Weiner has argued, confirming the gardening ethos within which it sought to create a more harmonious, unified and pure community through its welfare and punitive policies.\(^\text{102}\) It also increased the importance of ethnic identities, along with service to the state, in the regime’s definitions of belonging and added criteria of wartime behaviour to these. These categories were manifested in the resettlements of whole peoples at this time.\(^\text{103}\) In 1941, the Soviet authorities deported hundreds of thousands of Volga Germans as a pre-emptive measure against suspect

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\(^{103}\) For the primacy of ethnicity as a category during and after the war see Weiner, *Making sense of War*, pp.149-154; on calls from Stalin and other leaders to ‘cultivate’ a Russian-centred and statist Soviet patriotism appearing before the war and consolidated during it see D. Brandenberger, *National Bolshevism: Stalinist Mass Culture and the Formation of Modern Russian National Identity, 1931-1956* (Cambridge, Massachusetts and London: Harvard University Press, 2002). David Shearer argues that the deportations should not be read as a shift away from a revolutionary class state to a nationality-based one but rather as the continued purging of Soviet space according to the fears of Soviet leaders about threats to the integrity of the state: including the threat of class war, social disorder, collaboration with foreign regimes and ethnic separation. In this context he argues that the significance of the war was that it underlined service to the state as the key marker of status in society: Shearer, ‘Elements near and alien’, pp.875-879; also on wartime experience and service as a benchmark of one’s place in the polity see Manley, *To the Tashkent Station*, p.3.
loyalties. Finns and Germans were also sent into ‘special evacuation’ from Leningrad and its surrounding region at the start of the war. Later, as the Red Army pushed back the German forces, the political police organised the forcible resettlement of entire nationalities labelled as collaborators, removing Crimean Tartars, Kalmyks, Balkars and the Ingush-Chechen and Karachai nationalities from the northern Caucasus and Crimea into Central Asia.\textsuperscript{104}

Many people, though, were crossing the country under their own steam. Official priorities may have shaped the evacuation from some areas of the Soviet Union, for example, but so too did mass flight in the face of the German advance and the personal decisions of individual Soviet citizens.\textsuperscript{105} Even the organised evacuation from Moscow broke down and on 16\textsuperscript{th} October 1941 Georgii Efron noted in his diary that an “enormous number of people depart \textit{n’importe ou} [any which where], overloaded with bags and trunks….It seems that 50 percent of Moscow is evacuating itself”.\textsuperscript{106} Later in the war, a front page article in \textit{Pravda} simultaneously underlined the harsh penalties for ‘deserting’ one’s place of employment and hinted that high turnover was still widespread due to the desperation of employers for labour and the desires of people to leave their places of evacuation. It gave the example of one boss at an aluminium factory who had been sentenced to ten years imprisonment for sheltering labour ‘deserters’ from other enterprises.\textsuperscript{107} The war also swelled the numbers of orphaned, homeless and unattended


\textsuperscript{105} Manley, \textit{To the Tashkent Station}, for example p.47 and p.76.


children who were a perennial feature on the Soviet streets in the first half of the twentieth century.¹⁰⁸

The exigencies of the war propelled many people into movement. For some this was a desperate and miserable dislocation, that could potentially mark them as ‘deserters’.¹⁰⁹ For others it was an opportunity to change their location and refashion their identity. Some peasants, exiled kulaks and prisoners volunteered to join the army or move into industry in order to eradicate old stigmas.¹¹⁰ Other members of the population changed their places in the polity by flouting identification laws, in a situation where even the ‘illusion’ of effective barriers to movement at times ceased to operate. In his memoir, Alexander Wat recalled a scene at Saratov train station during the Second World War, reflecting that:

> all of Russia was on the move, everyone, peasants, collective farmers, and especially people whose passports had been taken from them and who had only identification cards. An enormous percentage of the population. They had not been able to leave their district without an NKVD pass. But suddenly all that was overturned; the wave of war had destroyed all those barriers, and Russia was on the move.¹¹¹

This thesis takes up the story at the end of the war, as the Soviet regime sought to mobilise the population for feats of socio-economic reconstruction in a landscape that historian J. Duskin has described as “cities strewn with smoldering rubble and roads

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¹⁰⁹ On the possible stigma of desertion to the rear for evacuees, in particular those who had not left in an organised evacuation and above all for Jews, see Manley, *To the Tashkent Station*, for example pp.266-269


clogged with destitute migrants”. It examines the repopulation of Leningrad in relation to evolving Soviet practices of population management after the war, as well as the individual trajectories of millions of Soviet citizens. It seeks to uncover the diverse experiences of people journeying to the city. It also aims to give greater analytic visibility to the conjuncture of the ‘gardening’ and ‘ordering’ aims of the state, the socio-economic reconstruction of the polity, the rebuilding of its physical infrastructure and the ongoing movements of the Soviet population at the end of the war.

The anthropologist Liisa Malkki in her ‘ethnography of displacement’ has elucidated the way in which an itinerant perspective or ‘nomadology’ can shed light on practices and discourses constructed around human mobility in the past and the present, and in Europe and beyond. She invokes Deleuze and Guattari’s ‘nomadology’ as a “clarifying exercise”: an exercise which should not suppose that territorial displacements are exclusively contemporary, postmodern phenomena or that they have not been written about before. Instead, she argues, the exercise provides a new scholarly lens for understanding how the displaced become an object of knowledge, and also a category in the socio-political construction of space, and for understanding the complexity of ways in which people construct and lay claim to places as ‘homelands’.

Putting displacement at the centre of an analytical framework, Malkki argues, not only helps us to understand the lived experience of many people on the move but also allows us to interrogate the widespread assumptions about the links between people and places that are made by scholars, as well as by governments and their populations. These assumptions, she points out, tend to naturalise attachments between people and place and to pathologise those ‘out of place’. They entail powerful and common metaphoric practices which conceive the connections of people to a particular territory in botanical or kinship terms. Governmental, scholarly and commonsense languages and practices take for granted that people are naturally ‘rooted’ in a ‘native soil’ or attached to a ‘motherland’. People who are ‘uprooted’ or ‘rootless’ represent, in this sedentarist

113 Malkki, ‘National Geographic’, pp.24-5.
thinking, a violation of cultural and territorial roots and, as such, an aberration of the natural order of things. This aberration is associated with lost moral bearings and potential contamination of stable, territorialized existence in discrete homelands.

These assumptions, she argues, underpin many articulations of community, nation and homeland. They also provide the context to technologies that have been adopted by states to control the movement and settlement of ‘peoples out of place’. The refugee camps which stretched across Europe after the Second World War are, in this view, instances of practices directed at the “care and control” of people who are seen to be dangerously “torn loose” from their soil and culture.\(^{114}\)

In developing her itinerant perspective, Malkki builds on the work of another anthropologist, Mary Douglas. Douglas argued that the process of organising the external environment and imposing orders and meanings on society is accompanied by a confrontation with matter which is deemed ‘out of place’ in that order. This confrontation, according to Douglas, can frequently generate rhetoric of pollution and contagion and practices of purification.\(^{115}\) Persons who are in a marginal state, ‘who are placeless’, transgress against the stable order and classifications of society. As elements deemed anomalous, they are reacted to as a symbolic danger, deviant and polluting.\(^{116}\) Malkki argues, however, that there is a difference between the classification of non-human objects as ‘matter out of place’ and the classification when people are in question: “people categorize back”.\(^{117}\) Displaced people may live at some level within categories not of their making but they also forge their own visions of exile and refugee-ness, and of belonging and home.

Malkki’s observations that displacement gives rise to discourses and practices which are both creative and, sometimes brutally, constraining, also draw on comments by

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\(^{114}\) Ibid, p.34.
\(^{116}\) Ibid, p.95.
anthropologist James Clifford. In Clifford’s analysis of the routes and crossings made by people, communities from nations to cities to neighbourhoods and villages become cultural centres “constituted relationally...through historical processes of displacement”, as much as through stasis.\textsuperscript{118} Clifford contends that human location and cultural meanings attached to different sites are produced through encounters between people in transit and those who dwell in a certain place, who themselves may have a complex personal history of displacement and travel. Community boundaries and their ‘insides’ and ‘outsides’, are also maintained through practices of power aimed at “disciplining the restless movement of people”.\textsuperscript{119} Borders are policed against transgression by unauthorised outsiders and the “stasis and purity” of locales are “asserted – creatively and violently – against historical forces of movement and contamination”\textsuperscript{120}. A view that gives visibility to both travelling and dwelling, therefore, can reveal how homelands are defined as community insides and outsides are “sustained, policed, subverted [and] crossed” by various historical subjects.\textsuperscript{121}

Both Clifford and Malkki utilise ideas developed by Michel Foucault about space and power in their conceptions of how experiences of displacement are linked with the exercise of power in the process of community construction. Foucault observed that “space is fundamental in any form of communal life; space is fundamental in any exercise of power”.\textsuperscript{122} He explored how mechanisms of power have been exercised in the classification and labelling of social groups in conjunction with the partitioning of space. Power is asserted in the regulating of contacts across the boundaries of the regions formed by partitioning, as well as in controlling and promoting certain modes of behaviour within them.\textsuperscript{123} One of the primary objects of these disciplining and governing techniques, he noted in the 1970s, is to fix floating populations; discipline “is an anti-

\textsuperscript{119} Ibid, p.3.
\textsuperscript{120} Ibid, p.7 (Clifford’s emphasis).
\textsuperscript{121} Ibid, p.36.
nomadic technique”. He also examined how deviance was constructed as part of this exercise of power. Malkki and Clifford combine a similar focus on disciplining practices with their awareness of the possibilities for self-definition produced by human movement. They explore how identities are lost, made and remade as people are variously compelled into movement or empowered by it, as they move in and out of territories and traverse regions, or have their movements constrained.

This thesis applies the theoretical approach of these anthropologists who, in the words of Mike Crang and Nigel Thrift, “do space” by “questioning how communities are constituted”, to the study of community building and structuring in Leningrad at the end of the war. It employs this approach to highlight the intersection of diverse articulations of ‘insiders’ and ‘outsiders’, ‘native’ and ‘uprooted’, by the civic as well as central authorities and by various groups of the post-blockade population themselves, including migrants to the city.

The investigation is informed by Malkki’s emphasis on the language which scholars themselves use to write about and categorise displaced populations. It draws, for example, on the research of Katerina Gerasimova and Sofia Chuikina and Marina Vitukhnovskaia, who have teased out the diverse and nuanced everyday interactions, or dialogue, that took place in the 1920s and 1930s among groups of city-dwellers who had


125 On the disciplinary question of the normal and abnormal, or deviant, see for example ibid, p.206.


been resident in Leningrad-St Petersburg for various lengths of time and between these residents and the changing physical environment of the city. It transfers their analysis to the post-blockade context, but also attempts to move beyond their delineation of ‘rooted’ and other populations, and in particular Vitukhnovskai’a’s concern with the extent to which newcomers succeeded in ‘sinking their roots’ (vrastaniia) into the city. Instead the thesis concentrates on the mechanisms by which degrees of alien-ness and belonging were established, enforced and negotiated in the urban environment at the end of the war.

Malkki’s insistence on the commonality of botanical metaphors in ‘fixing’ populations also suggests that efforts to regulate the repopulation of post-blockade Leningrad can be understood in a broader context than Soviet attempts at population management. The work of scholars such as Amir Weiner and Peter Holquist has productively discussed how the drive of the Soviet state to monitor, reshape and purge society pursued particularistic Marxist goals but also operated according to a modernist ethos of social engineering that was widespread in states across Europe and European colonies from the end of the First World War, at work in the creation of welfare systems as well as in ethnic

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cleansing campaigns. Malkki’s ‘itinerant perspective’ suggests how the modernist goals and disciplining technologies adopted by the Soviet state also interlaced with attitudes to people ‘out of place’ that have been manifested in the ordering of communities at international and local, as well as state, level and that have predated and outlasted the height of the ‘modern project’ in Europe in the first half of the twentieth century.

Refugee camps, for example, have been and remain a feature of attempts to organise, contain and isolate flows of people. Peter Gatrell has written of displaced persons camps across Europe after the Second World War as chief among the institutions that governed the experiences of refugees. Malkki’s work is based on an investigation of the experience of exile in shaping the construction of national identity in the setting of a camp in western Tanzania for Hutu refugees who fled the genocidal massacres of 1972. Recently, the Internal Displacement Monitoring Centre has drawn attention to the Sri Lankan government’s internment of people fleeing conflict in the country in closed military-run camps. The government have argued that this is necessary in order to screen the displaced for their affiliation and to de-mine their areas of origin, even though, according to the Monitoring Centre, many could have been released to live with families in areas free of mines.

The intersection of the state’s desire to ‘fix’ people in certain spatial and social orders with ongoing processes of displacement is clearly not just a feature of former east European socialist regimes. Not only can historical works on the region productively

130 Weiner, Making Sense of War, pp.27-30; P. Holquist, ‘“Information Is the Alpha and Omega of Our Work”: Bolshevik Surveillance in Its Pan-European Context’, The Journal of Modern History, Vol.69, No.3 (September 1997), p.450; see also M. Mazower, Dark Continent: Europe’s Twentieth Century (London: Penguin Books, 1999), for example p.x; David Shearer has argued that socialist modernity was more a vision than a coherent ideology, but it was nevertheless a powerful vision of modern civilisation that generated practices of state surveillance, programmes of social, economic and cultural reconstruction and the isolation of ‘dangerous’ populations: D. R. Shearer, ‘Modernity and Backwardness on the Soviet Frontier: Western Siberia in the 1930s’, in Raleigh (ed.), Provincial Landscapes, pp.194-216, here pp.195-196.

131 Weiner, for example, argues that the transformative drive waned in Europe and was scaled down from the mid-1950s: Weiner, Making Sense of War, p.29.


133 www.internal-displacement.org/countries/srilanka, accessed 02/06/2010.
employ certain theories linking space, place and displacement but such investigations can serve as useful case studies of how these linkages have operated. In other words, not only does history need concepts of space and displacement, but conceptualisations of contemporary societies based on the prevalence of human movement, and some recent theories accentuating a migratory sensibility, can benefit from history.

This becomes apparent in a critique by Rafael Perez-Torres of the ‘nomadic’ philosophy of Deleuze and Guattari. According to Perez-Torres, the conception of current societies by Deleuze and Guattari as systems caught between regimes of stratified order and unfettered flows entails inscribing the fluid movement as a positive, empowering and joyful chaos. Perez-Torres points out that the lack of historical grounding in this work results in the neglect of the re-territorialising processes which haunt migration. He insists that “rather than allow the term “migration” to remain metaphorical…an astute critic would insist upon the fact of deterritorialisation as a historically grounded, painful, and often coerced dislocation”.

James Clifford has also raised concerns about a ‘nomadology’ that celebrates movement as a universal imperative. He calls instead for explorations which track “the worldly, historical routes which both constrain and empower movements across borders and between cultures”.

This thesis forms part of a body of work, led by Nick Baron and Peter Gatrell, that has recently sought to bring an historical approach to the literature on practices and experiences of displacement, an approach “that establishes the larger geopolitical, political, legal and economic framework to which displaced persons were subject”. Following their 2003 article which set out their use of a theoretical framework which privileged an ‘itinerant perspective’, Baron and Gatrell edited a volume, *Homelands*, that brought together essays which applied this perspective to events in eastern Europe.

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following World War One.\footnote{Baron and Gatrell, ‘Population Displacement, State-Building’, p.52: they define the perspective in this article as one that recognises the tendency of states, and publics and even historians, “to privilege place of being over space of movement”}{137} The volume discerns how, as the old empires fragmented, the “exigencies of new state-building…lent added urgency to the strivings of political leaders and government officials to ‘fix’ their populations and define their new ‘homelands’” across the region.\footnote{N. Baron and P. Gatrell (eds.), Homelands: War, Population and Statehood in Eastern Europe and Russia, 1918-1924 (London: Anthem Press, 2004), p.3.}{138}

The present work is one of a number of investigations that shift the focus of this analysis to population resettlements in the region in the wake of World War Two, a period of boundary redrawing, population transfers and massive dislocation and relocation not only across Europe but beyond. It seeks to apply the ‘itinerant’ approach to an exploration of the constitution of a ‘homeland’ within a ‘homeland’ at this time: the attempt to reorganise the territory of the city of Leningrad and to define its social composition in relation to a migrant population, at the same time as the frontiers of the Soviet state as a whole were being reaffirmed through the attempted distribution and fixing of populations.

The next section of the introduction will set out how this endeavour to capture the intentions of the central and local authorities, and the responses of people within the city and on the move at the end of the war, has informed, and been informed by, the methodology of the research.

1.4 Notes on methodology

The thesis draws on a variety of sources, including central and local archival documents, interviews, literary works, memoirs, contemporary newspaper accounts, and published letters to the editor. The basic methodological approach is implicit in the ‘itinerant perspective’ outlined above but will be elucidated further here. In relation to official documents found in the central archives in Moscow and in several local St Petersburg
archives, the analysis follows the observations of Peter Holquist that the true significance of materials generated by the Soviet regime, as by other regimes, is not so much as a repository of information to be strip-mined for details about society, but rather as an indication of the desires, intentions and practices of the regime itself.\textsuperscript{139} Population statistics, for example, often “did not correspond neatly with the reality [they] purported to describe”.\textsuperscript{140} Instead, they interacted with reality in a kind of feedback loop. Concerns about social issues led the state to employ statistics to create a representation of the social field. These statistics in turn constituted different categories of the population as elements that could be manipulated by the state and fixed the attention of the authorities on particular social problems. David Shearer has argued that the passport system in the Soviet Union can be understood in just such a way, as one of many schemes “that tell us more about the categorisers…than about the population it was supposed to categorise”.\textsuperscript{141} This approach resonates with Malkki’s focus on the language used by governments and individuals to categorise the displaced. In his seminal work on the ‘quicksand society’ of the early Soviet years Moshe Lewin notes the “morally charged vocabulary of Soviet sources” on labour turnover, but states himself a few lines below that as ‘floods’ of people moved around the country “morality dissolved”.\textsuperscript{142} This thesis tries to keep the focus on what lies behind such morally charged vocabulary and its effects on the population.

The thesis combines this approach to official documents with an examination of other types of sources, in order to try to obtain a sense of how official categories structured the experiences and views of individuals, and to what extent they were adapted or challenged in the actions and interpretations of people themselves.

The thesis uncovers an intersection between official rhetoric and popular concerns in articles and readers’ letters published in the daily local party newspaper, \textit{Leningradskaia Pravda}, in the years 1944 to 1947. It approaches the newspaper articles in some respects

\textsuperscript{139} Holquist, “‘Information is the Alpha and Omega’, pp.415-17 and p.448.
\textsuperscript{140} Holquist, ‘To Count, to Extract’, p.113.
\textsuperscript{141} Shearer, ‘Elements near and Alien’, p.844.
\textsuperscript{142} Lewin, \textit{The Making of the Soviet System}, p.221.
in a similar way to Jeffrey Brooks in his survey of the official press from the Revolution until Stalin’s death.\textsuperscript{143} That is, it explores the way the press contextualised the Soviet experience, framed a picture of society and imposed a structure for thinking about issues, even among those who were non-believers. Unlike the work of Brooks, however, who analyses samples of various newspapers to compare the space devoted to different themes throughout the Stalin period, this study is based on readings of every issue of one local newspaper within a short time frame. As a local, rather than national, party newspaper it reveals the cracks and tensions between the images of postwar society being projected in editorials controlled by the central authorities and those which reflected and constructed a more particularistic, local discourse. This was especially noticeable in the Leningrad press from the start of the war until the onset of the Leningrad Affair in 1949, which was targeted, at least in part, against pretensions to local independence. Before 1949, replications of articles from the central \textit{Pravda} newspaper and reports of speeches by state officials in Moscow reaffirming the centrality of the Party and Stalin in Soviet life appeared slightly uneasily alongside pieces which read like a “hymn to the city”.\textsuperscript{144}

The study also tentatively suggests that letters to the editor published in the paper reveal something about the way some citizens engaged with and informed these projections of society, as well as much about the regime’s vision of the citizenry. Alex Inkeles and Kent Geiger, in 1952, analysed critical letters to the editor published in a number of Soviet newspapers in 1947 which complained about defects in Soviet institutions and problems of everyday life.\textsuperscript{145} They concluded that the language of the letters suggested that the average letter was written by someone other than an assigned official or professional and was not substantially re-written by an editor. The criticism, nevertheless, was expressed within narrowly defined limits and the letters published in order to fulfil certain functions in the system. Soviet citizens wrote letters on topics permitted and encouraged by the official press and any that touched on other themes were screened out by editors. Convention also dictated the short business-like style of the letters published. The regime

\textsuperscript{144} Kalendarova, ‘\textit{Formiruia pamiat}’, p.277.
encouraged letters which held lower level administrators responsible for everyday difficulties encountered by citizens, which fostered an image of a community-conscious citizenry and acted as a safety valve for the everyday tensions of Soviet life.

Despite the heavily structured nature of the correspondence, though, as Jim Riordan and Sue Bridger discuss, even letters published under Stalin reveal some ways that people thought about their grievances and their society and made demands on it. This thesis argues, furthermore, that through their letters some citizens were writing themselves into an image of society and perhaps even shaping and adjusting it in the process.

The thesis also examines sources produced by Soviet citizens in perhaps a less heavily structured context, in particular recent memoirs and interviews. The interviews used were carried out by the Oral History Centre at the European University, St Petersburg between 2001 and 2003 as part of two projects on the blockade. Six of these interviews have been published in full in the book *Pamiat’ o blokade* but the archive at the Oral History Centre contains transcripts of a much larger collection of interviews. While the focus of the projects was the experience of the blockade, the interviewees included people who were evacuated from the city during the siege and then returned. The interviews, moreover, were largely unstructured, beginning with the request for the interviewees to talk about their lives, and in some interviews the post-siege period and the repopulation process loomed quite large.

There are obvious drawbacks to drawing extensively on transcripts of interviews conducted by other researchers, not least the difficulties in grasping the nuances, emphases and emotion imparted in the telling. One of the aims of the projects, however, was to provide scholars from a range of disciplines access to people’s life histories, and the subjects, symbols and references, both to official discourse and personal experience,

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that they employ in their recollections.\textsuperscript{148} This is the spirit in which the interviews are discussed in the thesis. The argument that is constructed in the thesis on the basis of this research will be outlined in the following section of the introduction.

1.5 A complex story of travelling and dwelling in the post-siege city: an outline of the thesis

The work of the anthropologist James Clifford proceeds from the assertion that field-sites should not be treated as “ancient and settled” but as opening onto “complex histories of dwelling and travelling”.\textsuperscript{149} This thesis aims to tell just such a complicated story of travelling and dwelling in relation to Leningrad after the siege.

The story begins with the attempt to produce a portrait of the population living in and travelling to the city after the siege. Chapters two and three examine statistics quantifying the heterogeneous mix of residents who constituted the growing population in the first few years after 1943. Chapter two discusses the number of people living in the city after the war who had survived the blockade, while chapter three turns the attention to returnees from evacuation and the front, and new in-migrants to Leningrad. As they progress the chapters note the impossibility of a precise statistical recreation due to the unreliability of Soviet population statistics and also the ‘statistical invisibility’ of certain groups, especially those travelling to the city outside of official channels. It discusses how flows of people by their nature complicate the efforts of states to count their populations, to make society “legible”, in the words of James Scott, which is one reason that states seem to be “the enemy of “people who move around””.\textsuperscript{150}

\textsuperscript{148} V. Kalendarova, ““Rasskazhite mne o svoei zhizni”: sbor kollektsi biograficheskikh interv’iu so svideteliami blokady i problema verbal’nogo vyrazhenia travmaticheskogo opyt’a”, in ibid, pp.201-229, here p.202 and ibid, p.20.

\textsuperscript{149} Clifford, \textit{Routes}, p.2.

The chapters also argue that the reconstruction of groups making up the postwar population is complicated by the tangled experiences of location and displacement that marked most of the post-siege population in different ways, which defy straightforward classification by scholars as well as the state. What of the *blokadniki*, for example, who were not long term residents but recent migrants to the city when war broke out, or even refugees from the Leningrad suburbs at the start of the war? Or evacuees who had actually lived in the city for the worst of the blockade? Conclusions about the extent to which the post-siege city was a city of *blokadniki* or a city of migrants, and assessments of the numbers of ‘Leningraders’ who perished in the siege, the numbers who returned from elsewhere and the quantity of new arrivals, are dependent on classifications imposed by the researcher, as much as by the authorities.

Chapter three concludes that, while identifying the presence of a range of populations in the city is a useful corrective to earlier one-sided accounts, an examination of life in the post-siege city should not just seek to replicate official attempts to count the number of people in particular categories. Rather, it should uncover how notions of a ‘native’ community and categories of outsiders were constituted and contested at the time, in reference to widespread processes of displacement and resettlement, as well as myths of ‘home’.

Chapter four of the thesis explores the criteria according to which both the physical repopulation of the city and the discursive construction of a ‘family of Leningraders’ took place at the end of the war. It highlights how criteria for inclusion in the core civic community were articulated and, to an extent, enforced, and civic identities remade, in relation to the phenomenon of massive population movement.

To begin with, the chapter examines how migration to the city was the object of stringent regulations by the central Soviet authorities, as they sought to reconsolidate power over the territory of the state as a whole and to reinforce a vision of the desired spatial and social order within it. This vision was one in which everyone had a ‘place’, both social and geographic, according to their contribution to the state economy, their level of
culture, ethnicity, gender and wartime behaviour. Some of these markers were introduced and forged during the war years, others were prewar ones that had been consolidated or adapted as a result of wartime developments.

The chapter explores how these state aims initially, in some ways, came into conflict with those of the Leningrad authorities, who sought to regulate settlement in the city according to different criteria, based on an understanding of ‘Leningraders’ informed by the distinct local experience of the blockade. As the authorities set about reintegrating central priorities into local practices, the chapter continues, the visions of both were subverted and the repopulation shaped, just as evacuation from it had been, by “the countless individual decisions made by individual Soviet citizens”.151 Individuals both inside and outside the city displayed a range of understandings about who should make up the post-siege population and these became manifested in practice, as citizens utilised a variety of contacts to enter the city regardless of official obstacles.

As the city began filling with people, the lack of available housing, much of which had been destroyed during the siege, meant that many experienced continued displacement within the city. Competing conceptions of belonging crystallised around claims made upon the limited housing that remained intact. Against this background, organs of the city government attempted to impose an image of a ‘family of Leningraders’ that excluded some of the new arrivals while offering a model for integration for others. The chapter concludes that this model reinforced local wartime narratives, while treating groups of incomers and itinerants as ambivalent elements in the post-siege cityscape.

The next chapter of the thesis uncovers in further detail how the ambivalent position of those arriving to repopulate and reconstruct Leningrad translated into discourses and practices that marked them out as transgressive bearers of disease, disorder and criminality. This chapter highlights how those crossing the city’s boundaries became the

151 Manley, To the Tashkent Station, p.76.
focus for urban anxieties and their movements the subject of a dialogue about desirable civic populations and behaviours.\footnote{152 James von Geldern has written about representations of migrants symbolising the “threshold between…decent and indecent society” in late Imperial Russia: J. von Geldern, ‘Life In-Between: Migration and Popular Culture in Late Imperial Russia’, \textit{Russian Review}, Vol.55, No.3 (July 1996), pp.365-383, here p.368; this thesis engages with von Geldern’s work while recognising the evolving norms of ‘decent urban society’ in the Soviet Union and in the wake of the war; also on boundaries as zones of crisis in the imagination of communities, including zones across which the community can become ‘infected’ by other populations see E. Harvey, ‘Pilgrimages to the ‘Bleeding Border’: gender and rituals of nationalist protest in Germany, 1919-39’, \textit{Women’s History Review}, Vol.9, No.2 (2000), pp.201-229, here p.215.}

It details how enforced sanitary checks and treatments punctuated the journeys of many of those travelling to Leningrad. Government regulations obliged all incomers to the city to undergo inspections for lice and to have their bodies and belongings disinfected upon arrival. Upon entry to the city they, like other residents, had to contend with an urban environment blighted by a breakdown in sanitation. Rhetoric in the local press, however, related the dirtiness of the cityscape to the disorderly nature of the new arrivals, a disorderliness that shaded into hooligan and criminal behaviour. When incidents of typhus rose in 1947, rather than focusing on improvements to the public health infrastructure the authorities linked up sanitary checks with the raids conducted by police within the city to round up people perceived as leading a ‘vagrant form of life’ and remove them from the city.

The chapter argues that this reflected the tendency of states to link the regulation of populations in a spatial order with the implementation of sanitary controls and the ‘filtering’ of criminal or subversive individuals, as displayed across Europe in the treatment of refugees and other displaced or ‘surplus’ groups.\footnote{153 See in particular on this P. Weindling, \textit{Epidemics and Genocide in Eastern Europe, 1890-1945} (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000), for example p.7.} It also discusses how this tendency intertwined with a specifically Soviet purification drive and Soviet norms of cultured-ness (\textit{kul’turnost’}) in behaviour.\footnote{154 On the prominence afforded middle class norms of culturedness after the war in Soviet culture as part of the regime’s efforts to stabilise of society see V. Dunham, \textit{In Stalin’s Time: Middleclass Values in Soviet Fiction}, enlarged and updated edition (Durham and London: Duke University Press, 1990), for example p.14.} It adds, however, that in post-siege Leningrad these practices and discourses acquired a distinctive inflection as they became
part of the definition of a postwar homeland and the ‘moral and cultured’ community that belonged to it on both a national and local level.

After the siege officials aimed to impose authority over the spatial order, not only in terms of controlling the way the emptied city filled with people, but also, concomitantly, the way its social spaces were ordered and the city was filled with significance as a place. This accorded with the aim of the central authorities to ‘remake the streets’ in order to manifest in public space an understanding of the war as a triumphant victory for the Soviet order, for Russian traditions, and for the might of the state. It also suited the distinct desires of local officials to commemorate the triumph and renewal of the ‘eternal city’, and to give meaning to the blockade in terms of the defence of every stone of its famous architecture by Leningraders whose blood had thickly watered the soil of the city during the siege. The representations and treatment of certain groups of newcomers and itinerants as bearers of crime, dirt and disease were not just bound up with regulating movement into the city, but also with articulating requirements for membership of the Soviet and civic communities and formulating desirable relationships to the postwar cityscape and its appearance. The disorderly, hooligan or criminal behaviour of incomers were discussed in terms of offences against the socio-economic and spatial fixing of the population and the fashioning of a moral and cultured postwar family, as much as in terms of the violation of legal norms.

This chapter concludes that this interpretation of crime in the post-blockade city suggests a way of understanding accounts of the growth of crime in cities and industrial centres.

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155 On the Soviet authorities’ awareness of the possibility of “ordering and using space to achieve social and political ends, while the inhabitants had ideas of their own” in the prewar era see, for example, Kotkin, Magnetic Mountain, p.160.

156 Catriona Kelly uses the phrase ‘making the streets Bolshevik’ in her discussion of policies directed at homeless children in the 1930s: Kelly, Children’s World, p.223.

157 The thesis will discuss further these types of narratives which appeared in the local press but examples of tropes such as the defence of the city’s priceless monuments; love for the city as manifested in the preservation of its historic buildings; the soil of the city thickly watered with the blood of Leningraders; curing the wounds of the war by making the city more beautiful; and the survival of the ‘eternal city’ can all be found in the first issue of Leningradskaia Pravda of 1944: Leningradskaia Pravda, 1/1/1944, pp.1-3; on investing links between place, people and culture with particular significance in the wake of war, as land meant soil that had been irrigated with the blood of its population see Baron and Gatrell, ‘Population Displacement, State-Building, and Social Identity’, p.87.
across the Soviet Union in the postwar years. In Leningrad, as in other towns and cities, there was a brief increase in levels of recorded crime between 1945 and 1947, but this took place within a overall significant fall in registered crime that occurred from 1940. Jeffrey Burds and Elena Zubkova have both noted how letters, newspapers and other documents from many places in the Soviet Union at the time nevertheless convey a sense among the population that it was increasingly unsafe to walk the streets, or travel on trains, as bands of criminals were terrorising peaceful citizens. Burds explains this disjuncture between popular impressions and the modest increase in overall crime as the result of the fact that the increase in crime occurred disproportionately on account of rises in particularly violent and public crimes, such as ‘social banditry’, in these years. He directly opposes his argument to that of Zubkova, who attributes the disjuncture to the heightened public fear of falling victim to crime in the difficult living conditions after the war.

This work proposes that anxiety about social disorder, actual confrontations between police and social criminals, as well as the regime’s continued criminalisation of many of the population in its legislation and rhetoric, all overlapped in the attempts of the state to establish a particular socio-geographical order at the end of the war and the subversion of, and at times resistance to, these efforts. Public assertions of moral panic and increased police vigilance, as well as some of the rise in recorded crimes and arrests, can therefore be understood in the context of the re-ordering of society and the remaking of a ‘civilised’ peacetime Soviet population. The war had reinforced many elements of the Soviet system at the same time as it created permanent shifts in social groups,

158 J. Burds, ‘Bor’ba s banditizmom v SSSR v 1944-1953 gg’, Sotsial’naia Istoriia. Ezhegodnik (2000), pp.169-190, for example p.172 on how Soviet crime statistics show manifestations of social banditry increased by 547% between 1940 and 1947; these types of statistics will be discussed further in chapter 6, see Shearer, ‘Crime and Social Disorder’, pp.121-123 on the different ways of interpreting Soviet crime statistics.


160 Filtzer makes reference to the criminalisation of a large minority of the population in the stringent laws against quitting jobs in force until 1948, as well as later in the harsh penalties for petty theft laid down in the anti-theft law of June 1947: Filtzer, Soviet Workers, pp.27-29.
expectations and the touchstones of personal experience. The reconsolidation of the social and geographical boundaries of the state, as well as local communities, and the reconstruction of the Soviet order in the light of wartime experience did not prompt the scale of arrests that had been carried out in the late 1930s. In these earlier years a mass repression of socially ‘deviant’ elements in the form of former kulaks, former convicts, petty criminals, refugees, unruly peasants, déclassé social groups, beggars and the homeless had been carried out. Nevertheless ‘itinerants’ and others who were out of place in the postwar polity were targeted in ruthless policing practices and given prominence in public discourse as contaminants of the order under reconstruction.

The thesis concludes that its findings have relevance for how we conceive postwar Soviet state and society more generally. The research, it suggests, complicates and enhances the portrait of “collective invention and survival” in Leningrad after the siege and brings into focus the experience of people on the move in the postwar Soviet Union, but also has ramifications for interpretations of the late Stalinist period as a whole. Ongoing displacements and resettlements, arrivals and departures that it has discussed in relation to Leningrad suggest an alternative to recent scholarly work which characterises the period in terms of a ‘normalisation’ of Soviet life, understood as the unmaking of the consequences and upheavals of the war and a return to stability. The thesis contends that

161 Amir Weiner, for example, states that “the war reinforced key institutions of the Soviet system, primarily the socioeconomic order, the endurance of the party, and the drive to purge the polity of elements that hindered the desired social and political harmony. But it also shifted conceptions and practices of the Revolution, superimposing a new set of tropes onto prewar categories”: Weiner, Making Sense of War, p.8; this thesis concurs with many of Weiner’s assertions but contends that there were some significant shifts in the social order during the war, for example the mobilisation of many adolescents into the workforce and the return of large numbers of war invalids, as well as the creation of new tropes by which people could define themselves and be defined: on the possibility of identifying with a ‘frontline generation’ or ‘generation of victors’ see E. S. Seniavskaia, Frontovoe Pokolenie, 1941-1945: Istoriko-psikhologicheskoe issledovanie (Moscow: Institut rossiiskoi istorii RAN, 1995), for example p.3 and also Zubkova, Russia After the War, p.23; also see Zubkova on changed and frustrated popular expectations as a result of the war, ibid, p.101; on the differentiated nature of wartime experiences defining a generation see, for example, Manley, To the Tashkent Station, p.273 on evacuation and M. Edele, ‘Strange Young Men in Stalin’s Moscow: The Birth and Life of the Stiliagi, 1945-1953’, Jahrbücher für Geschichte Osteuropas, Vol.50 (2002), pp.37-61 on the emergence of a sub-culture among elite urban youths, who had been too young to fight in the war and defined themselves against the returning ‘assertive veterans’ and Dunham, In Stalin’s Time, pp.12-13 on the citizenry divided by war and the state’s alliance afterwards with a Soviet middle class.

162 Shearer, ‘Crime and Social Disorder’, p.143.

163 The phrase “collective invention and survival” is taken from Clifford, Routes, p.2.
the postwar period can be characterised instead as one of continuing unsettlement, as much as of resettlement, and as one in which society was being remade, often in coercive ways. The next section will briefly outline developments in the historiography of the period and the way in which the current work supplements, and challenges, the available scholarship.

### 1.6 Postwar enigmas

In her book on Russia after the Second World War, published in 1998, Elena Zubkova observed that in the historiography of a country which for many remains a ‘mysterious sphinx’, few eras “have been as obscure and enigmatic as the high-water mark of Stalinism, the period between the victory of 1945 and Krushchev’s famous denunciation of the tyrant in 1956”. The book’s editor and translator noted that attention paid to the postwar period so far had been largely limited to foreign affairs or infamous political events, such as the concocted Jewish Doctors’ Plot to murder Stalin in early 1953. He reiterated the reflection of Alexander Werth, a correspondent for the British press in Russia during and after the war, that it “is the most unexplored period in the whole history of the Soviet Union”.

The introduction to Zubkova’s book called for the development of this partial research on the postwar period, by means of an amplification of the approach taken by Vera Dunham in her notable earlier work on middle class values in postwar Soviet literature. In this study, Dunham had not adopted a purely political focus but had explored the spectrum of values and dynamics of behaviour of the Soviet middle class and the interaction of this group with the Stalinist regime in the wake of the war. Further work, Zubkova contended, should address the relationship between state and society at every level and seek to reflect

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164 Zubkova, *Russia after the war*, p.3.
the public attitudes, interests and strategies for survival of various social constituencies and categories of the postwar population.\textsuperscript{166}

In the decade since the appearance of Zubkova’s book historians have, indeed, increasingly turned to the study of the late 1940s and beyond. A mass of new scholarship has augmented Zubkova’s history of everyday life and public opinion in postwar Russia and, on the basis of access to rich archival sources, has illuminated much more vividly the formerly opaque and enigmatic postwar Soviet society.\textsuperscript{167} The recent accounts of the memorialisation of the blockade, with which this work engages, can be numbered among these illuminating publications. While shedding light on socio-cultural developments after the war, however, some of the scholarship on the period frames these developments in a rubric of a postwar ‘normalisation’, or ‘return to normalcy’, which is employed in inconsistent and contradictory ways,

Mark Edele, for example, in his study of the social integration of war veterans, points to the years 1947-8 as a major turning point in the period of ‘high Stalinism’: the beginning of the ‘return to normalcy’ in terms of the unmaking of the consequences of the Second World War. He suggests that this framework makes sense of the winding up of the demobilisation of the army in 1948; the dismantling of privileged welfare provision for soldiers and their families after 1947; and the decision to make Victory Day into a regular workday at the end of 1947. It also integrates Elena Zubkova’s discussion of a renewed wave of state repression after 1948 and Donald Filtzer’s narrative of progress from immense poverty to a slight improvement in living standards from this year.\textsuperscript{168} Julie Hessler has also argued in her examination of Soviet trade patterns that “the late Stalin

\textsuperscript{166} Zubkova. \textit{Russia after the war}, pp.4-5.

\textsuperscript{167} For a good overview of the scholars who have been working on this period and their research interests see the recent volume edited by Juliane Fürst, in particular the summary at the end on increased scholarly interest in this formerly ‘opaque’ period by Sheila Fitzpatrick: S. Fitzpatrick, ‘Conclusion: Late Stalinism in historical perspective’, in J. Fürst (ed), \textit{Late Stalinist Russia: Society between reconstruction and reinvention} (London and New York: Routledge, 2006), pp.269-282; Fitzpatrick was among several authors, including Blair Ruble, who contributed to the 1985 volume edited by Susan Lintz on the consequences of the war in the Soviet Union, which also began to address economic and socio-cultural, as well as political, issues: S. Fitzpatrick, ‘Postwar Soviet Society: The “Return to Normalcy”, 1945-1953’, in Lintz, \textit{The Impact of World War II}, pp.129-156.

period brought a measure of normalisation in the economic and social spheres” and has identified the watershed as occurring around 1948, when the postwar famine weakened its grip. Hessler, however, defines Soviet normalisation not as a return to prewar ‘Stalinist normalcy’, as Edele does, but as an end to the provisioning crises which had been a recurrent feature of Soviet life ever since the Revolution. In this view the watershed in high Stalinism marked the beginning of a new period of mundane shortage, which would last until the end of the Soviet Union.

The work of Sheila Fitzpatrick equates postwar normalisation with a release from wartime obligations, relaxation in social tensions, loosening of state control and the lessening of demands for extraordinary sacrifice. She concludes that, due to economic problems and the policies of the regime, the wartime atmosphere persisted and a ‘return to normalcy’, as imagined and hoped for by most of the population, did not occur until after Stalin’s death in 1953. For her, the immediate postwar years were ones marked by the delay of the return to normalcy.

These authors provide rich accounts of postwar events and processes, however it is not clear why they should all fit into a discourse of normalisation. Fitzpatrick herself indicates problems with ascertaining a return to normalcy in the Soviet context, pointing out that the turmoil of the prewar Soviet Union “did not provide a very satisfactory or complete model for normalcy” and that the regime and the population often had very different ideas of what constituted ‘normal life’. It cannot be assumed, moreover, that the population themselves held homogenous notions about what a return to normalcy entailed. The use of the term raises questions of whether people themselves experienced and conceived of events in relation to a ‘normalisation’, and how and when they felt that a return to normalcy had occurred. If, for the millions of Soviet individuals, as for the scholars who have written about them, a sense of when, how and if normalisation took

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170 Ibid, p.452.
172 Ibid, p.150; see also Gatrell and Baron, ‘Violent Peacetime’, p.255 on the history of the Soviet-East European borderlands in the mid-twentieth century as “a continuum of violence, social crisis and radical state intervention that pre-dated, spanned and continued beyond the Second World War”.
place varied from person to person, then this casts further doubt on the usefulness of an exercise to identify the nature and timing of a return to normalcy.

The findings of this thesis reinforce the inadequacy of conceiving the period in terms of these types of normalisation, either effected or delayed. Fitzpatrick details that her use of the concept of the ‘return to normalcy’ also implies “going home, and settling down”. 173 The thesis, as a study of the rapid repopulation of the city of Leningrad that lasted from 1944 until 1947, after which time it slowed down, might seem at first to corroborate the accounts which hold that the late 1940s witnessed the settling down of Soviet life. In fact, however, it uncovers diverse stories of settlement and displacement, which did not necessarily start with the war and end with arrival into post-siege Leningrad.

For some individuals an odyssey of wartime wanderings did come to an end in the late 1940s, with their arrival in the city and obtainment of somewhere to live. For others, however, migration into the city heralded further displacement, as they were not allocated housing or were moved from one unsuitable or occupied dwelling to another. For some, a sense of return to ‘normal life’ was delayed, or made incomplete, by the non-return of their prewar housing and belongings, as well as the wartime loss of family, friends and neighbours. Others understood their postwar displacement or resettlement in relation to pre-war lives that had already entailed a great deal of geographic, as well as social, mobility. For many, including a large number of adolescents, their organised settlement in the city at the end of the war was experienced as a forced dislocation, and some of these individuals took opportunities later to run away from the places of work and accommodation to which they had been attached.

The situation in Leningrad illustrates how the war, moreover, had transformed the physical boundaries and appearance of many parts of the country and had generated shifts in conceptions of home and criteria for belonging, with which officials and members of the population were grappling at the end of the war. This was the case not only on the local level, but also on the level of the state, as wartime behaviour and movements, as

173 Ibid, p.150.
well as ethnic identities, overlaid and often superseded earlier criteria for membership in the ‘Soviet family’. ¹⁷⁴ In this context, ‘settling down’ or even ‘going home’, whenever it occurred, was not simply a ‘return to normalcy’.

The diverse resettlements and unsettlements undergone by Soviet individuals after the war, this thesis argues, should be understood in the context of the remaking of Soviet society, rather than just the unmaking of the consequences of the war. The experience of resettlement could be, but was not necessarily, understood as a return to normalcy by Soviet citizens. It was, however, often marked by the attempts of the Soviet authorities at various levels to impose a particular set of norms and a vision of society on its postwar territory by moving and fixing, and isolating and punishing, different populations, a process which was challenged and subverted by the behaviours and movements of some of the people themselves. This understanding incorporates Zubkova’s analysis that, while repression was increased after the war against political and cultural elites from 1949, the peak period in terms of numbers of political and criminal convictions was 1945-1946, when the victims were “returning POWs, repatriates, former soldiers of the Vlasov army, Ukrainian national separatists…and other elements of the population classified as “socially dangerous persons””. ¹⁷⁵

The term ‘normalisation’ has been used by scholars drawing on the work of Foucault in other contexts to denote not a general settling down of life but the active, often coercive, structuring of communities, classifying and ordering of populations, defining of decency and abnormality and the ‘regularisation’ of the status of groups in relation to this community. ¹⁷⁶ It is ‘normalisation’ in this very specific, often coercive, as well as

¹⁷⁵ Zubkova, *Russia after the War*, p.130; recent work by Mark Edele and also Nick Baron has highlighted, though, that the actual number of repatriates and returning POWs arrested and sent to the camps was not that great: Edele, “‘A Generation of Victors?’”, pp.75-92 and N. Baron, ‘Remaking Soviet Society: the Filtration of Returnees from Nazi Germany, 1944-49’, in Gatrell and Baron (eds.), *Warlands*, pp.89-116, here, p.105.
constitutive sense, that is shown in this thesis as pertinent to an understanding of the repopulation of Leningrad after the siege and the experience of displacement in the postwar period of Soviet history.

working class `hooligans` in early twentieth century St Petersburg; and N. Baron, `Remaking Soviet Society`, p.91 on the normalisation of repatriated citizens at the end of the war through their `filtration` in holding camps that acted, in part, as `remoralizing` institutions.
Chapter 2. “Who are you?” Reconstructing the population of the post-siege city (part one)

2.1 The spring fair crowd

The question “Who are you? Who are you?” is a recurrent refrain in the reminiscences of St. Petersburg resident Anatolii Petrov, published in the literary journal Neva in 1995, about the public at a spring fair organised in Leningrad in 1946. The fair took place for a month from 19th April in the centre of the city, on a public square on the bank of the river Neva overlooking the Peter and Paul fortress, and was announced with much fanfare in the local Party newspaper, Leningradskaia Pravda. By this time the population registered with the authorities at addresses in the city had grown from well under 600,000 at the start of 1944 to over 1,700,000. The front page of Leningradskaia Pravda on 24th April proclaimed that over one and a half million people had visited the spring fair in the five days since it opened, including half a million inhabitants on the Sunday alone.

The newspaper’s editors made clear the impressions that Leningrad residents should take away from their visit. The “eye is gladdened”, wrote the author of an article celebrating the fair.

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177 Petrov, ‘Ver zind zie? Ver?..’, pp.220-223, the question is posed in some form on each page.
179 The local NKVD, which was responsible for regular policing as well as matters of state security, administered the passport and registration system, however there are no total population figures given in the monthly NKVD reports to the City Soviet for March or April 1946. The monthly report compiled by the head of the Leningrad and Leningrad region People’s Commissariat of Internal Affairs (NKVD) and sent to the Chairman of the Executive Committee of the City Soviet for February 1946 indicated a population of 1,700,928 in the city at the end of that month: TsGASPb, f.7384, op.36, d.186, II.30-37, here I.37; this is the figure for 19 urban areas, incorporating 15 districts of the city centre and 4 suburban towns, the difference the territorial delineation makes to population statistics will be explored in more detail in the next section of this chapter.
the opening of the fair on 19th April, by the variety of goods on offer: the huge window display of a snack bar, stuffed with every possible kind of refreshments, sandwiches and buns, sweets and biscuits; on other stalls the teapots, aluminium dishes, children’s bicycles, table lamps, milk cans; overcoats, suits, tablecloths and napkins, suitcases, briefcases, handbags, every possible kind of finery, perfumes, musical instruments; preserves made from plums, apricots, cherries and strawberries, apple jellies, halva, juices and tomatoes; an abundance of sprats and caviar; and the beauty of the plentiful fresh collective farm produce, including vegetables, potatoes, meat and dairy products. 181

This was at a time when bread was still distributed to over half the Soviet population through the centralised rationing system. 182 Deficits of many goods and constantly rising prices meant that workers earning the average of 500 roubles a month struggled to buy even the rationed foodstuffs and manufactured goods in state stores to which they were entitled. 183 By autumn 1946 problems of food supply, exacerbated by a poor harvest and government policies of forcible grain procurement, raising prices and curtailing the issue of ration cards, would precipitate a country-wide famine. 184 While briefly touching on the trade done at the spring fair, newspaper accounts made clear that its significance was as a spectacle. 185 The head of the department of trade of the Leningrad City Soviet stressed the festive “external form” of the 180 brightly coloured pavilions and their array of goods. 186 The article of 19th April listing the produce on display featured a description of the fair as a “fairytale” city of fantastical installations, reminiscent of the colourful

183 V. F. Zima, Golod v SSSR, 1946-1947 godov: proiskhozhdenie i posledstviia (Moscow: Institut Rossiiskoi istorii RAN, 1996), p.50: in contrast to the images of abundance at the spring fair, Zima characterises food supply in 1946 as a ‘meagre’ or ‘starvation’ market (golodnyi rynok).
184 Zima, Golod v SSSR; and Zubkova, Russia After the War, pp.40-50, especially p.47.
185 On Soviet bazaars by the late 1930s as places not so much of trade as of “explanatory, cultural-social and agitation work” see V. Kalugin, Vselenskii bazaar (St Petersburg: Kul’t-inform-press, 1998), p.203; on the provision of bread as a spectacle closely linked to other Soviet spectacles, from local circuses to show trials, in being symbolic of the obligations of the state to the citizenry and vice versa see Kotkin, Magnetic Mountain, p.238; on the passive spectator rather than the activist becoming the model Soviet citizen from the mid-1930s see J. Von Geldern, ‘The Centre and the Periphery: Cultural and Social Geography in the Mass Culture of the 1930s’, in R. G. Suny (ed.), The Structure of Soviet History: Essays and Documents (Oxford and New York: Oxford University Press, 2003), pp.177-188, here p.184.
illustrations accompanying popular folk tales. The fantastical sights included a brightly painted carousel springing into life and a kiosk with a roof in the shape of a saucepan overflowing with milk and a cat twice human height catching it in his paw, as well as the consumer goods themselves.

From the mid-1930s the utopian promises of the Soviet project encapsulated in the popular song that proclaimed “we were born to make fairy tales come true” increasingly took the form of images of coming plenty. Celebrations of consumer goods served to justify the sacrifices required in the present, to educate the population in a ‘cultured’ lifestyle which they should strive to achieve and to demonstrate that life was becoming more joyful. In the wake of the war the regime added ‘rising from the ashes’ to the repertory of Soviet fairytales. The images of the spring fair in the post-siege Leningrad press superimposed the theme of recovery from the war onto earlier tropes: the fair was to exemplify the healing of the city’s wounds and the restoration of the links between Leningrad and the rest of the country, as well as the pinnacles of current Soviet culture and industry, the abundance of the future and the gaiety of old Rus’.

Petrov recalls being stunned as a nine year old boy by the fair which suddenly appeared before his eyes in all its splendour. He was so struck by the brightly decorated beer stalls

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189 Fitzpatrick, Everyday Stalinism, p.68 on popular songs delivering messages that by building socialism the population was taming space and time and making fairytales come true and p.90 on the shift in the mid-1930s in the regime’s orientation from an anti-consumerist approach and the ascetic puritanism of the Cultural Revolution to a celebration of consumer goods that was “virtually a consumer goods pornography” and which coincided with the end of the rationing of the early Soviet period.
190 Ibid, pp.89-103.
191 On the Soviet excursion into the world of fairytales before the war, including the tale of a magic tablecloth producing an extravagant array of food and drink on its own accord see Fitzpatrick, Everyday Stalinism, p.89; articles in Leningradskaiia Pravda at the end of the war and in the immediate postwar years frequently contained the observation that a particular urban district or nearby village was ‘rising from the ashes’ as it was rebuilt out of the rubble created by the German invasion: for an example see L. Kokotov, ‘Vozrozhdenie iz pepla’, Leningradskaiia Pravda, 27/7/1944, p.3.
192 The head of the trade department declared the fair to be a “step on the path of reconstruction and of linking up trade relations between Leningrad as a major industrial centre and other cities, regions and republics”, he indicated that it signified the end of the first postwar year and the healing of wartime wounds, as well as imparting the rich festive traditions of ancient Rus’: Andreenko, ‘Nakanune vesennei iarmarki’, Leningradskaiia Pravda, 17/4/1946, p.3.
in the shapes of a bear with a can in its paws and three giant cans of beer that, despite his age, his dislike of beer, and his lack of money, he mentally approached the waitress in white and made the imaginary purchase which the fair was encouraging thousands of citizens to make. The splendour of the physical appearance of the fair, however, forms only a small part of his impressions and becomes just the backdrop to an attempt to make sense of the diverse and incongruous post-blockade population encountered milling around its stalls. Petrov depicts himself moving through the postwar crowd, observing the rest of the public at the fair and hearing the question ‘who are you’ echoing in German in the sounds of the cries of birds flying above the brightly coloured pavilions: “Sind sie wer? Sind sie wer?[sic] (“Who are you? Who are you?”)”. In an abortive attempt to answer the nagging issue of the collective identity of the crowd gathered at the bazaar, he characterises it in the following way:

We, that is the public at the fair, for the main part were paupers, impecunious and starving. Beggars sat and stood on the pavements, pickpockets darted among the crowd. In this motley collection (pestrota) of people, the soldiers looked fine, especially those who were decorated with military awards. Over the heads of very well dressed women (fox fur collars, high quality coats, jackets, suits, hats) it looked liked something shone, as if these ladies radiated something, just like their companions, (who) in their appearance were reminiscent of a far away, perhaps non-existent time - Soviet aristocrats, dandies in white scarves, leather gloves and boots, polished to an unbearable shine...But the recent war constantly reminded of itself – in the stripes on the shirts of demobilised soldiers, in the scars and traces of burns on their faces, in the crutches and prostheses in the form of wooden legs, in the empty sleeves, neatly tucked into the soldiers’ belts...Stop!\textsuperscript{194}

The persistent uncertainty of the query ‘who are you?’ punctuates Petrov’s encounters with a variety of characters in particular. These include a grey-haired and wrinkled old

\textsuperscript{193} Petrov, ‘Ver zind zie?’, p.220.
\textsuperscript{194} Ibid.
woman, in a tattered overcoat missing its right sleeve, who holds out her shaking bare arm in the hope of alms; a handsome war invalid without both legs who moves around with the help of a cart on ball bearings and sings along to an accordion, getting ‘dead drunk’ together with other invalids in the crowded taverns and on the streets; a grey, faceless mass of German prisoners of war who ‘swarm about’ in the nearby ruins, clearing up the wreckage of houses; and a peasant man, a former kulak, whose family had previously violently clashed with Petrov’s father during his participation in the campaign to collectivise the countryside. Now, following the death of his three sons at the front, the peasant with a ‘Pugachev’ beard sits drinking together with Petrov’s father, who himself has been recently demobilised from a penal battalion, where he ended up after his incarceration in the course of the mass arrests of the late 1930s.

For Petrov, therefore, the collective entity of his family and neighbours and the wider Leningrad crowd, brought together in shared social spaces around the fair, is remembered as a diverse and disorientating assortment of figures. His public incorporates a ravaged, female countenance, betokening the lasting legacy of the wartime siege of the city, which was a predominantly female experience of starvation and survival, and also embodiments of the ‘war come home’, in the form of both decorated soldiers and destitute war invalids.195 His portrait is a confusing mixture of well-dressed regime elites and ragged beggars, waifs and petty thieves, of ambiguous former ‘class enemies’ and pitiful prisoners of war and of the markedly peasant and rural in the centre of the city. Together these various elements of the crowd provoke questions of social identity and trajectory that Petrov cannot resolve. At the end of his reminiscences the puzzle ‘who are you?’ still

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195 On the siege of Leningrad as a “woman’s experience”, as men left for the front or died in the early months of blockade see Simmons and Perlina, *Writing the Siege of Leningrad*, p.2 and for one of the many accounts of how the physical effects of blockade caused even young women to be mistaken for ‘grandmothers’ see E. O. Martilla, ‘Grave Months for the Blockaded City (excerpts)’, in ibid, pp.177-182, here p.180; these excerpts are also kept in the Museum of the Defence of Leningrad. The gendered construction of notions of belonging and settlement in the city after the war will be discussed in the next chapter. On disabled veterans as a lasting legacy of war, or the ‘war come home’, see, for example, in relation to the First World War: D. Cohen, *The War Come Home. Disabled Veterans in Britain and Germany, 1914-1939* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2001).
hangs in the air and is coupled with the secondary question “where (are we heading) to?”

While Anatolii Petrov depicts a disparate post-blockade population, destabilising his notions of civic identity, scholarly discussions of the city in the wake of the siege have tended to produce narrowly bounded characterisations of its social composition, defining it as a city of blockade survivors (blokadniki), a city of migrants, or a city of re-evacuees. This chapter and the next challenge these simplifications, assert the limitations of attempts to classify the population in these ways and affirm instead the fluidity of the composition of city inhabitants, the permeability of the dividing lines between the various categories used to describe them and the cross-cutting self-identifications of residents.

The chapters are structured around an appraisal of demographic data compiled by the Leningrad authorities. The details contained in statistical records on the composition of the population during and after the siege reveal something of the variety of inhabitants in the post-blockade city. At the same time the gaps and inconsistencies that can be identified in these records hint at further complexities in the make up of the population obscured by the aggregate figures. The chapters reveal how definitions of who counts as a ‘Leningrader’ imposed by officials or adopted by researchers themselves affect the visibility of people in statistical representations and how the range of comings and goings shaping the structure of the populace defied these efforts at quantification and classification. Rather than arriving at a precise numerical answer to the puzzle ‘who are you?’ this analysis of demographic figures prompts further reflection on how criteria for belonging to the civic community have been established, articulated, enforced and undermined by scholars, officials, the various inhabitants of the city and people on the move themselves. The rest of this chapter is dedicated to the question of the extent to which the postwar city was a ‘city of blockade survivors’.

196 Petrov, ‘Ver zind zie?’, p.223; these questions may also have been bound up, of course, with his contemporary uncertainties about the fate and identity of the city and its population following the collapse of the Soviet Union.

197 See Baron and Gatrell, ‘Population Displacement’, pp.53-54 on how historians, as well as politicians, strive to assign identities based on places and overlook fluid and cross-cutting self-identifications.
2.2 The blokadniki

In her book *The Legacy of the Siege* Lisa Kirschenbaum uses the terms Leningraders and blockade survivors, *blokadniki*, fairly interchangeably, even when her topic is the post-blockade population. She writes of the post-siege reconstruction of the city and Stalin’s increasing suppression of local commemorations of Leningrad’s unique fate that:

In Leningrad, the “restored” city was not always a forgetful city. The survivors’ ability, or perhaps propensity, to see the city simultaneously as it is and as it was constitutes a vital point of reference in the examination of how Leningraders rebuilt their city after the war. After 1949, Leningraders lacked a public repository of artefacts and stories about the blockade. They lacked places to mourn the dead. But because memories were so closely associated with spaces that they continued to interact with and “see” – even if they had changed substantially – the erasure of memory was never complete.  

Kirschenbaum’s postwar Leningraders are in the main, therefore, prewar inhabitants who had lived and worked in besieged Leningrad and survived through the terrible hunger and cold of the winter of 1941-2 to participate in the city’s reconstruction. She addresses the relationship to the city of the largely female population who had made enormous efforts to maintain daily life in the city under the extreme conditions of the blockade. These are the inhabitants whom Ol’ga Berggol’ts described, gave voice to and united in the poetry that she read out over the local radio throughout the siege, for example in these lines composed in the winter of 1941 addressed to a Leningrad housewife:

198 Kirschenbaum, *The Legacy of the Siege*, pp.149-150.
199 Ibid, p.79 on the “feminized experience of war on the city front” and p.61 on the effects of starvation, cold, bombing, and breakdown of infrastructure on everyday activities such as obtaining water; on the effort of daily life during the worst months of the siege for a weakened population struggling to live and work and move around the city in the freezing cold, caught “between the Scylla of starvation and the Charybdis of vast mental and physical burdens”, see also Cherepenina, ‘Assessing the Scale of Famine’, p.42; on the women of Leningrad carrying out daily tasks of domestic life and labour and also the responsibilities of air raid defence in the starving city see Simmons and Perlina, *Writing the Siege*, p.2.
And to you – yes to you they will erect
A monument on a large square.
In immortal stainless steel
They will engrave your simple appearance.

In such a way: emaciated, brave,
In a hastily tied headscarf,
Just like, when under fire
You go out with your purse in hand.200

Berggol’ts later recognised, Kirschenbaum points out, that in the immediate postwar years, the central authorities were not likely to sanction the commemoration in steel of people who “didn’t blow up any tanks”.201 As soon as the war was over, Stalin called for the country to curtail talk of the war and move on to tasks of reconstruction. While monuments were hastily erected to fallen Red Army soldiers in the newly acquired Soviet territories and on the foreign soil of Germany and Eastern Europe, within the pre-1939 borders of the Soviet Union monuments were slow in coming and modest, taking forms such as grim stone obelisks.202 Stalin certainly had no interest in commemorating catastrophic, local and domestic wartime episodes, above all ones that promoted pride in the autonomy of Leningrad.203 Even before the attack on Leningrad’s independence of

201 Kirschenbaum, The Legacy of the Siege, p.79; Berggol’ts later wrote a poem about her role as a poet in the siege, which included the following lines: “And there, where you did not erect any monuments…where you glorified no-one…there I fulfilled your proud command”: cited in Z. Dicharov (ed.), Golosa iz blokady: Leningradskie pisateli v osazhdennom gorode (1941-1944) (St Petersburg: Nauka, 1996), p.243.
202 On the “blatant” monuments erected in Germany, Austria, Poland, Czechoslovakia and Romania and the modest ones that went up in the Soviet Union see N. Tumarkin, The Living and the Dead. The Rise and Fall of the Cult of World War II in Russia (New York: BasicBooks, 1994), p.101; foremost among the Soviet regime’s efforts to “inscribe its story of victory on conquered territory” was the memorial complex completed in 1949 in East Berlin’s Treptower Park, at the centre of which towered a bronze statue of a Soviet soldier bearing a rescued child and crushing a swastika: P. Stangl, ‘The Soviet War Memorial in Treptow, Berlin’, Geographical Review, Vol.93, No.2 (April 2003), pp.213-236, here p.214 and p.215 for an image of the statue; on the evolving appearance of memorials as the war cult developed after Stalin’s death, in this case in Vinnytsia, Ukraine, see images in Weiner, Making Sense of War, pp.380-381.
203 Kirschenbaum, The Legacy of the Siege, p.116 on Stalin’s fears about commemorating wartime ordeals such as the siege and pp.140-141 on his special hatred towards the city that had been a power base for his rival Grigorii Zinoviev in 1925.
1949, during which the Museum of the Heroic Defence of Leningrad was shut down, there was no attempt to build a monument to the ‘ordinary’ women of the blockade.

Instead the authorities set about removing traces of the war from the cityscape through the reconstruction effort. Local officials and architects in the initial post-blockade years, however, did not necessarily envisage the repairs to the city’s bomb damaged edifices in terms of forgetting the recent past but rather regarded them as a way of commemorating survival and renewal in the city at the same time as “recovering what was lost”. The ‘ordinary Leningraders’ living in the city who now applied themselves to rebuilding the postwar cityscape, Kirschenbaum argues, similarly felt a desire to remember the sacrifices of the blockade, while also marking the return to life that had begun by the end of the siege. Their efforts in reconstructing the city’s buildings and their everyday interactions with urban spaces allowed them “to preserve the familiar places in which they had led their prewar lives and survived the blockade”.

But how many of the individuals who could be met in Leningrad’s domestic and public spaces in the years after January 1944 were prewar residents who had survived the siege? To what extent were those carrying out its reconstruction the emaciated women in headscarves from 1941 who had survived to rebuild their city and their prewar lives?

Kirschenbaum states that only about 640,000 people remained in the city at the end of 1942, a total that had fallen to 575,000 people by 27th January 1944, when the blockade was lifted. Within two years, according to the residence records of the local police, the number of people recorded as living in the city had grown by over a million. The number

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205 Kirschenbaum, The Legacy of the Siege, p.117.

206 Ibid, p.73.
of inhabitants at the end of January 1946, states an NKVD report from this month, was 1,675,332.\textsuperscript{207} During the two years after the lifting of the siege, moreover, people left the city as well as arrived there. The poet Vera Inber, having lived through the entire blockade and witnessed the fireworks of the victory display, wrote “farewell Leningrad” in her diary entry of 7\textsuperscript{th} June 1944 and made her way to Moscow a few days later.\textsuperscript{208} Inber may have been unusual in that she had only travelled to Leningrad from Moscow two weeks before the start of the siege to be together with her husband, a Leningrad doctor, during the war.\textsuperscript{209} She was not, though, it would seem, the only siege survivor to move away at the end of the war. The City Soviet’s Statistical Administration made note of the departure of over 50,000 people from the city in 1944 and over 80,000 in 1945.\textsuperscript{210} These figures indicate that Leningrad residents who had been in the city when the siege was lifted declined in number in absolute terms in the ensuing years, while also forming a smaller and smaller proportion of the growing population. Just two years after the end of the blockade those who had lived the whole way through it appear to have made up only about a third of the city’s recorded inhabitants.\textsuperscript{211}

Some of those arriving, however, in the immediate post-siege years were themselves former residents of the city who had left for the front or into evacuation during the war. Evacuation from the city had continued, after a brief interruption at the beginning of the

\textsuperscript{207} TsGASPb, f.7384, op.36, d.186, ll.1-7, here l.7; this again is the figure for the 19 districts of the wider city.

\textsuperscript{208} Inber, \textit{Leningrad Diary}, p.207; Inber’s poetry was probably only second to that of Ol’ga Berggol’ts in its importance to many blockade survivors as a universal expression and validation of their experience. It was attacked by the central authorities in 1945 for its personal tone and descriptions of starvation, but after the death of Stalin the cultural historian and blockade survivor Dmitrii Likhachev, wishing to emphasise the gap between accounts published under Stalin and reality, labelled Inber’s work “Odessa pap”, referring to her origins outside Leningrad: Kirschenbaum, \textit{The Legacy of the Siege}, p.67, and also pp.141 and 254 on Inber.

\textsuperscript{209} Inber, \textit{Leningrad Diary}, p.11.

\textsuperscript{210} The Population and Health Sector of the Leningrad Statistical Administration recorded 53,578 people leaving in total from all 19 city districts, including suburban towns, in 1944 on the basis of registration vouchers filled out by the police: TsGASPb, f.4965, op.1, d.4746, l.11ob; it recorded a figure of 51286 for those leaving from the 15 inner city districts, without suburban towns: ibid, l.1; for 1945 the Population and Health Sector recorded 88,406 people leaving from the 19 districts of the wider city and 81,180 from the 15 inner districts: TsGASPb, f.4965, op.1, d.4748, l.6ob and l.5ob; some of those included in the statistics for departures, of course, may have been post-siege arrivals who stayed briefly and left: the disruption of statistical certainty by complex comings and goings will be a recurring theme of the chapter.

\textsuperscript{211} Based on 575,000 people who lived through the blockade representing 29\% of 1,675,332 inhabitants in January 1946 and bearing in mind that thousands had also left the city in these two years.
siege, for the entire of its duration and some of those arriving in the post-blockade years had lived through its most severe days and considered themselves ‘blockade survivors’. Before discussing the composition of the incoming population who made up the rest of the city’s residents after the war, though, there is more that can be said about how closely the figures for those living in the city at the end of the blockade approximate to the situation at the time. A closer analysis of the demographic records and the manner of their production demonstrates various reasons to treat the statistics with caution.

Kirschenbaum’s figure of 575,000 people living in the city in January 1944 is based on a reference made by Richard Bidlack in 2002 to a statistic originally published in the journal Voprosy Istori, in 1967. The author of the journal article, N. A. Manakov, obtained his demographic figures from documents generated by the Main Trade Administration of the City Soviet. Alternative data for the number of residents, however, emerge from reports filed by other branches of the local state and party administration. Recent archival investigations by several scholars, for example, have uncovered documents held by the city’s Party Committee and by the Health and Statistical Administrations of the City Soviet, among other organs, recording in the region of 556,000-558,000 inhabitants at the start of 1944. The Statistical Administration also compiled a collection of data in 1967 on the development of Leningrad that includes a table of population figures in which the number of people left in the city at the start of 1944 is put as low as 546,000.

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212 Bidlack cites an actual figure of 575,900: Bidlack, ‘Foreword’, p.xxvi; Kirschenbaum also references several other secondary sources on population losses but Bidlack’s work is the only one of these to stipulate a demographic low of about 575,000.


214 Poliakov and Zhiromskaia cite in a footnote to their chapter on the tragic demographic consequences of the blockade, based on research in the local party and state archives including the records of the city’s Party Committee, that the population at the end of 1943 was 556,000: Poliakov and Zhiromskaia, Naselenie Rossi, p.374, footnote no.29; the St Petersburg archivist Nadezhda Cherepenina refers to documents of the City Soviet’s Health Administration and also its Statistical Administration when discussing the population in 1944, which she puts at 557,760 at the start of the year, 77.5% of whom were female: Cherepenina, ‘Assessing the Scale of Famine’, p.62.

215 TsGASPh, f.4965, op.8, d.738, l.4; Cherepenina also cites this figure without reference to the source in an earlier contribution to a volume based on papers given at a conference on the blockade in St Petersburg in April 2001: N. Iu. Cherepenina, ‘Demograficheskia katastrofa blokirovannogo Leningrada’, in Zhizn’ i smert’ v osazhdennom Leningrade, pp.7-16, here p.7; the extensive data on the population collated by the Statistical Administration in 1967 was intended for publication in an anthology celebrating 50 years of the city under Soviet rule, however none of the figures on the population between the two censuses of 1939 and
The variations in the figures can partly be accounted for by differing bureaucratic delineations of the city of Leningrad. By 1939 the four suburban towns of Kolpino, Kronstadt, Pushkin and Peterhof had been added to the territory administered by the City Soviet. Henceforth the civic authorities regularly recorded two sets of statistics for the population, one for the inner city of Leningrad, made up of 15 districts, and another for the wider city comprising 19 central and suburban sectors. For the duration of the siege, though, the towns of Peterhof and Pushkin were occupied by German forces and until their liberation in February 1944 the figures for the greater city referred to 17 rather than 19 districts. As regards the population data for January 1944, the Statistical Administration’s total of 546,000 inhabitants refers to people living in the 15 central city districts, while the higher figures include the suburbs remaining in the purview of the City Soviet.

Differing definitions of the city’s territorial limits cannot account for all the variations in the demographic statistics reported, however. The decisions and intentions of the compilers and their classifications of the population affected the methodology they used to calculate the number of residents, and the figures at which they arrived, in other ways as well. The city’s Trade Administration, for example, gathered data on residents as part 1959 actually appear in the published booklet, most likely due to the sensitive nature of population figures in the Soviet Union, in particular figures pertaining to the losses of the siege, which will be discussed further in the next section: Leningrad za 50 let. Statisticheskii Sbornik (Leningrad: Lenizdat, 1967), pp.20-24; on the repression of statisticians under Stalin for reporting data that revealed the large excess mortality in the Soviet Union in a national census of January 1937 see Kessler, ‘The Passport System’, pp.496-497; as we will see the catastrophic population losses in besieged Leningrad were minimised after the war and again under Brezhnev in the 1970s.

The name of the town of Peterhof was changed from the German sounding designation given to the imperial palace and surrounding area by Peter the Great in the early 18th century to Petrodvorets in 1944; it became Peterhof once more in the 1990s and the names are used interchangeably in the secondary literature, the thesis will refer to the name in usage at the time, which in the immediate postwar years was Petrodvorets.


TsGASPh, f.4965, op.8, d.738, l.4 for the statement that the figures in the Statistical Administration table relate to the city without the suburban towns administered by the City Soviet; Poliakov and Zhiromskaia, Naselenie Rossii, pp.41-42 for evidence that their figures for the population of the city include the suburban towns not under occupation; Manakov, ‘Ekonomika Leningrada’, p.29 for his reference to 575,900 people living in the city with suburbs: it is unclear whether he is referring to all 4 suburban towns or the 2 which had not been occupied, however it is likely that the Trade Administration gathered data on the 17 districts remaining within the purview of the city authorities.
of the process of ascertaining the number of people in the wider city, including suburban towns, who qualified for ration cards in a given month.\textsuperscript{219} During the war local government organs administering the distribution of ration cards were prominent among institutions involved in regular efforts to count the population.\textsuperscript{220} The local police and the city’s Health and Statistical Administrations at the same time continued to work out demographic data for both the central city and the suburbs on the basis of the numbers of people registered at addresses in these localities in accordance with the internal passport and residence permit system.\textsuperscript{221}

People living in the city who were incorporated into assessments about the allocation of ration cards overlapped, but were not coterminous, with those registered as permanent Leningrad inhabitants, as the possession of a residence permit was not the sole condition for receiving a ration card. Data calculated by both methods excluded people housed and fed in state institutions, from prisons to hospitals and invalid homes, but figures based on the issue of ration cards also left out residents who were fed in special canteens or had been sent to work at that time in rural areas outside the city to lay in peat and firewood for the city.\textsuperscript{222} The number of people worked out on the basis of residence permits generally included these groups but, on the other hand, did not incorporate individuals

\textsuperscript{219} Manakov, ‘Ekonomika Leningrada’, p.29.
\textsuperscript{220} Cherepenina, ‘Assessing the Scale of Famine’, p.29.
\textsuperscript{221} Ibid, pp.33-34.
\textsuperscript{222} Manakov, ‘Ekonomika Leningrada’, p.29 and Cherepenina, ‘Assessing the Scale of Famine’, p.30 on those excluded from the general issue of ration cards and p.50 on the feeding of privileged categories of the population, including defence workers on important assignments, creative and scientific intellectuals and Party workers, in special canteens. Workers in the forestry and peat cutting industries in rural areas outside the city boundaries formed a category of the population with its own specificities: people mobilised to work in these industries overlapped with both the privileged and punished sections of Soviet society and with valued, ordinary and indentured labourers. City dwellers deemed not to be engaged in socially useful work or classified as a ‘hooligan element’ by the NKVD were conscripted for a time into this backbreaking labour outside the city, in accordance with a Sovnarkom decree of August 1942 about labour conscription in wartime, while Komsomol members were also mobilised to participate, with the incentive of better rations: on conscription see, for example, TsGASPb, f.7384, op.36, d.148, l.75 and TsGASPb, f.327, op.10, d.12, l.8; see Gouré, \textit{The Siege of Leningrad}, p.160 on the extra ration issue to workers in lumber camps and peat bogs, p.228 on the “involuntary” nature of the mobilisation of thousands of workers to take up saws, axes and spades and cut firewood and dig for peat and also on the active role of the Komsomol, p.265 on the importance of peat from local sources in providing a supply of fuel to the city; after the war people arriving in Leningrad with a valid passport but without official permission to enter the city under the stringent regulations of the time were among those sent to work in the peat fields and lumber camps of the region for a few months, after which they might be given a position in the city, this will be discussed in the following chapter, see see Filtzer, \textit{Soviet Workers}, p.15 on the “vast army” of semi-free labourers of one kind and another employed after the war.
who were working inside the city but had not yet been granted the right to stay permanently.  

A memorandum produced for the Leningrad City Party Committee towards the end of 1943 by the head of the City Bureau for Ration Cards illustrates well how the very attempts of state officials to map, categorise, stratify and isolate groups within the population for various purposes, including provisioning, welfare, punishment, and assigning privilege, determine the data available and create divergences and blank spots in statistical representations of society. In this report, the head of the Leningrad bureau set out to reconstruct the age and gender make up of the population of Leningrad, together with the suburban towns of Kronstadt and Kolpino, on 1st June 1943, on the basis of documents presented by individuals to receive ration cards for that month. He cites in the course of the analysis two different figures for the aggregate population of these territories. At first, the document states that the total population at the start of June 1943, worked out on the basis of assessments about the issuing of ration cards, was about 621,000 people. In the table outlining the age and gender composition of the population later in the report, however, the figure for the total number of inhabitants is fixed at 569,397.

What happened to over 50,000 of the population? The author of the memorandum explained that the data used to calculate the structure of the population did not include 45,600 people who were not ultimately issued ration cards as part of the central system: about 16,000 who were ascertained as being treated in hospitals in the city; an assortment of people in other institutions including invalid homes and prisons; people confined to corrective labour colonies; and workers in particularly vital industries, including over

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224 Trifonov, Nachal’nik Gorodskogo biuro prodovol’stvennykh i promtovarnykh kartochek and Gromova, Nachal’nik sektora kontingentov, ‘Iz dokladnoi zapiski gorodskogo biuro prodovol’stvennykh i promtovarnykh kartochek v GK VKP(b) o sostave naseleniia Leningrada, Kronshtadta i Kolpina po polu i vozrastu na 1 iunia 1943g’, TsGAIPD SPb, f.4000, op.20, d.84, ll.35-44; reproduced in A. R. Dzeniskevich (ed.), Leningrad v osade. Shornik dokumentov o geroicheskoi oborone Leningrada v gody Velikoi Otechestvennoi voiny, 1941-1944 (St. Petersburg: Liki Rossii, 1995), pp.346-349.
11,000 engaged in military-reconstruction work. In his elaboration of the structure of the population, therefore, the author rendered invisible the city residents removed from the general supply system due to their segregation in state institutions or to their status as either indentured or particularly valued workers. The report demonstrates how statistics produced by the authorities created partial reflections of the population, reflections that shaped aspects of people’s everyday lives, such as access to food, but which represent only a slice of reality.

The second set of data on the population composition also excluded, according to the report, about 6,000 people who had initially been counted as civilian, urban residents but were discovered to be working for military organisations and units of the Administration of Defence Construction and living on the territory of the surrounding Leningrad region. This inconsistency points to the fact that discrepancies between the various figures available and gaps between these figures and the situation in reality arose both from deliberate decisions about who should be counted and also from the frustration of neat delineations of the civic population in practice.

The blurring and crossings of boundaries between frontline and rear and the inside and outside of the city confounded the structures used by the authorities to describe, count and act on the population during the war, through the end of the siege. The contours of the German encirclement around Leningrad complicated distinctions between military and civilian populations and between the city and its outskirts. In places the frontline ran right through the city suburbs, coming close to some of the inner city districts. As we have seen, the German army occupied the suburban towns and imperials palaces of Pushkin and Petrodvorets, and fierce fighting in the Kolpino suburb established the front just south of the area’s Izhorsk metal-working factory. At some points the front ran

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228 Scott, Seeing like a State, p.3 on states creating ‘abridged maps’ of society, of people’s identity and location and other details, that “represented only the slice of reality of interest to the compiler”, while enabling the reality to be remade.
230 Glantz, The Battle for Leningrad, pp.79-81, see especially p.79 on the fierce fighting in Kolpino, involving the Izhorsk factory militia and for the entry in one inhabitant’s diary of 16th September 1941 that
within ten miles of Palace Square in the centre of Leningrad and within just two and a half miles, eight tram stops, of the Kirov plant, formerly the Putilov works, known for the activities of its striking workers in the revolutions of 1905 and 1917.231

It was possible to travel to and from the front on Leningrad’s trams and trolleybuses when public transport was functioning in the city. Harrison Salisbury describes the journey of the war correspondent Alexander Rozen from his newspaper offices to the front at the start of the blockade in a streetcar with a machine gun mounted on front:

As Rozen waited at the Kirov Gates for his pass to be checked, a 60-ton KV tank emerged from the passageway, wheeled majestically into Stachek Prospekt and headed for the city limits. Just behind, racing to catch up, went the streetcar. The trolleycars ran as far as the Kotlyarov streetcar barns. There they halted and the conductor shouted, “All off. This is the front. End of the line.” Beyond that you went by foot, picking your way through the military trucks, the barricades, the tank traps, the dugouts, the machine-gun nests, past the Krasnensk Cemetery and Forel Hospital to Sheremetyev Park. The trenches began there.232

The city came under the administrative jurisdiction of a Military Soviet as well as the civilian City Soviet and was divided into six defence sectors, corresponding to six of the inner city districts, where barricades were maintained by local NKVD officers, regular police and factory workers.233 Military organisations, including military hospitals, were located within the inner city, employing civilian as well as military personnel and treating...

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231 Glantz states that German divisions captured territory just 7.5 miles from the city’s centre, at the terminus of the southwest tram line: Glantz, The Battle for Leningrad, p.81; Salisbury writes that the front was 10 miles from Palace Square: Salisbury, The 900 Days, p.339; on the proximity of the frontline to the Kirov works see R. Bidlack, ‘Workers at War: Factory Workers and Labor Policy in the Siege of Leningrad’, The Carl Beck Papers on Russian and East European Studies, No.902 (March 1991), p.12; for a discussion of the role of workers of the Putilov works in the events of 1917, see W. Rosenberg, ‘Workers and Workers’ Control in the Russian Revolution’, History Workshop, No. 5 (1978), pp.89-97, here p.93


civilian and military casualties. To the west of the city, on the other hand, German forces had halted over twenty miles outside of the established city limits, cutting off some territories within the ring of the blockade which formally belonged to the surrounding Leningrad region. Many of the city’s remaining inhabitants spent time building fortifications both in and around the city erecting pillboxes, camouflaging factories and turning workshops into machinegun nests. In this situation ‘civilian’ and ‘municipal’ records could not correspond to discrete populations caught within the siege.

This is not to say that distinctions between the city, surrounding areas and the frontline were completely effaced during the siege. The point is that the relationship between

234 Cherepenina, ‘Assessing the Scale of the Famine’, p.29; also interview with interview with V. Kh. V., ATsUI, Interview No. BL-1-026, p.9 on the wounded coming into the city from the front and being treated at his school, which had been turned into a hospital.

235 These included regional areas such as the Vsevolozhskii and Pargolovskii districts, part of the Oranienbaumskii and Slutskii districts and the Sestroretsk district, which was officially transferred from the Leningrad regional government to the city government in 1946: Cherepenina, ‘Demograficheskaia katastrofa’, p.8 on the various administrative-territorial definitions of Leningrad, the unusual circumstances of the siege and the relevance for population statistics; from 1947 figures for the wider city were given for 21 districts now under the administration of the City Soviet that included the Sestroretsk and Kurortnyi districts: TsGASPh, f.4965, op.1, d.4756, ll.1-24.


237 It is common practice in the scholarship to refer to Leningrad as a “city front” to denote not just its proximity to the frontline but also the work of the civilian population in barricade building, ammunition industries and in air raid defence teams (MPVOs): see, for example Cherepenina’s phrase that “frontline city was no empty phrase for Leningrad”, Cherepenina, ‘Assessing the Scale of the famine’, p.28 or Bidlack’s assertion that on the “so-called “home front”” the Stalinist state effectively organised its ordinary citizenry for “total” war and that “no other city during World War II channelled such a large percentage of its civilian population, particularly women, into such a variety of wartime service roles”, Bidlack, ‘Workers at War’, p.36 and also on the mobilization of girls, teenage boys and elderly men into defence work, Bidlack, ‘Survival Strategies in Leningrad during the First Year of the Soviet-German War, in R. Thurston and B. Bonwetsch (eds.), The People’s War: Responses to World War II in the Soviet Union (Urbana and Chicago: University of Illinois Press, 2000), pp.84-107, here p.87. As Lisa Kirschenbaum points out, however, the representation of Leningrad as a ‘city front’ was promoted by the Soviet authorities immediately after the war and as the war cult built up following Stalin’s death in order to minimise the suffering of starving civilians. This is not to say that the depiction of women in the blockade as ‘heroes of the Leningrad front’ or ‘soldiers in civvies’ was not embraced by survivors as a narrative that made sense of their experience. It does efface, however, not only the extent of starvation but also the gender specific physical, domestic and everyday aspects of life under siege: L. A. Kirschenbaum, “The Alienated Body”: Gender Identity and the Memory of the Siege of Leningrad’, in N. M. Wingfield and M. Bucur (eds.), Gender and War in Twentieth-Century Eastern Europe (Bloomington and Indianapolis: Indiana University Press, 2006), pp.220-235. Nina Tumarkin, for example, reacts against the Soviet honouring of victims of the blockade as ‘defenders of Leningrad’, referring to Elena Kochina’s Blockade Diary and asking “in what way did she defend Leningrad? Like most of her fellow sufferers, she lived from day to day obsessed with the 125 grams of bread that she and her daughter each received as a daily ration. And she worked at preventing her crazed husband from stealing their child’s food”: Tumarkin, The Living & The Dead, p.118; other personal accounts adopted the theme of the heroism of blockade survivors but not always a frontline
‘rear’ and ‘front’ and the city and its limits was complex and movements between them thwarted simplifications, not that the attempt to make such distinctions was abandoned or did not matter to the authorities or people themselves.  

The archivist Nadezhda Cherepenina has suggested that statistics on demographic processes in the city during the siege period should be treated with caution as local administrative organs were not always concerned with the identity of people coming in and out of the city, neglecting to record whether they were residents of the city or of the region, or people from elsewhere who had been evacuated as far as Leningrad or were on assignments in the city. This thesis contends, in contrast, that the local civilian and military authorities acted to document and verify the identities of those on the move and to reinforce distinctions between the city centre, its suburbs, the regional areas under siege and the frontline zone. They continued to make calculations about the population according to these spatial categories and heightened the regulation of movement across boundaries between them. As in the prewar period, though, official controls and classifications floundered on messy human realities, above all on widespread

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238 This section of the chapter will focus mainly on the population movements in and out of the city limits. For more on the variety of relationships between “military and civilian society, home and front, men and women”, in a situation of ‘total war’, in this case in a German context, see K. Hagemann and S. Schüler-Springorum (eds.), *Homefront: The Military, War, and Gender in Twentieth-Century Germany* (Oxford and New York: Berg, 2002), here p.x.


240 The city had been separated administratively from the region in 1931, when debates over the desired nature of Soviet space – urban or de-urban – were brought to an end in favour of rapid industrialisation, focussed on existing or newly founded cities: Ruble, *Shaping a Soviet City*, pp.4-7; from 1932 the territory of the city, together with a zone of 100km surrounding it, was further distinguished from the region by the passport controls governing residence there: on the “new and powerful consciousness of the border” by the mid-1930s and also the stiffening of an internal geographical as well as social hierarchy see Von Geldern, ‘The Centre and the Periphery’, pp.180-181, here p.181; and on the Soviet “preoccupation with the stratification of space” that was canonised in the postwar period see E. Dobrenko, trans. G. Worthey, *The Art of Social Navigation. The Cultural Topography of the Stalin Era*, in E. Dobrenko and E. Naiman (eds.), *The Landscape of Stalinism: The Art and Ideology of Soviet Space* (Seattle and London: University of Washington Press, 2003), pp.163-200, here p.175; for the ‘zone’ as a key spatial concept in Soviet Russia, in this case in relation to ex-prisoners who referred to society at large as the ‘big zone’ (*bol’shaia zona*) and the prison camps as the ‘little zone’ (*malaia zona*) see N. Adler, ‘Life in the ‘Big Zone’: The Fate of Returnees in the Aftermath of Stalinist Repression’, *Europe-Asia Studies*, Vol.51, No.1 (1999), pp.5-19, here p.5 and the story *Zona* by the author Sergei Dovlatov, who was born in Ufa in 1941 to parents who were in evacuation from Leningrad and who later worked as a prison guard in the camps and then as a journalist before emigrating to America: S. Dovlatov, *Zona. Zapiski Nadziratelia* (St Petersburg: Azbuka-klassika, 2006).
dislocations, both planned and unplanned, prompting renewed attempts to order and count the population according to certain bureaucratic visions.241

Aggregate population statistics compiled by the Statistical Administration from the system of passportisation and population registration had been fraught with inaccuracies from the system’s inception. Before the war, the administration’s attempts to monitor fluctuations in the population of the city and its suburbs on the basis of registration slips filled out by people arriving and leaving, together with records of births and deaths in these localities, had been undermined by the lack of control over population movements in practice. Just as the passport and residency permit system was ineffectual in preventing independent and uncontrolled movement by people into passportised areas, it also failed to provide reliable records of population flows.

Gijs Kessler has discussed in detail the considerable discrepancies between registration data and actual numbers of residents in the passportised areas of the Soviet Union before the war. Periodic checks by the Central Administration for Economic Accounting revealed wildly inaccurate registration of urban arrivals and departures by local police authorities. Many houses and barracks harboured scores of people without residence permits, while large numbers of people registered at particular addresses in fact no longer lived there, having left without annulling their residence with the police. The actual figures for arrivals and departures in and out of urban centres were likely to have been far higher than the registration data suggested.242

In 1939, for example, for every 1,000 registered arrivals in Leningrad, there were 1,655 people who had indicated their departure to the city from other places. The Administration for Economic Accounting concluded that the people who had gone

241 See L. Viola, ‘The Aesthetic of Stalinist Planning and the World of the Special Villages’, Kritika: Explorations in Russian and Eurasian History, Vol.4, No.1 (Winter 2003), pp.101-128, here pp.127-128 on the Soviet drive to master and control society through “rational” visions of order, discipline and productivity that ended up as a façade grafted onto a complex society and bureaucracy that resisted order and continued in more “messy, human ways”; also Holquist, ‘New Terrains and New Chronologies’, p.171 for his commentary on Viola’s conception of the mutual reinforcement of hyper planning and chaotic enactment of Soviet goals and p.164 for his comment that these poles are “dialectically related”.
missing on the road must have been refused residence in the city or been unable to obtain housing and so settled in nearby rural areas of the Leningrad region. It seems likely, though, Kessler concludes, that some of these people had ended up in the city as illegal immigrants. Taken together with those who left without notifying the authorities it is clear that on the eve of the war party and state organisations did not have reliable information on the number of inhabitants within the city limits and that aggregate population statistics may either have under- or over-represented the actual number of urban residents at any one time.243

The onset of war propelled many more people into movement. The rapid incursion of German forces and the Soviet mobilisation of the population engendered mass displacement, especially in the western border areas of the Soviet Union. Attempts by the Soviet state to organise the transfer of people to and from the frontline that was moving ever deeper into Soviet territory, and closer to Leningrad, frequently devolved into, or merged with, unplanned comings and goings, crossings and stoppages.244 Between the beginning of the German invasion on 22nd June 1941 and the start of the blockade the local authorities recorded hundreds of thousands of people on the move into and out of the city, across and around it. These people were joined by many others who were making their journeys without official direction, often in contravention of government laws, who do not appear in the statistical reports.

From the first days of the war hundreds of thousands of inhabitants of Leningrad who had been drafted into the army and navy or volunteered for a people’s militia (narodnoe opolchenie) marched towards the front.245 As the frontline came to meet them, many

244 German forces entered the Leningrad region on 6th July 1941: Simmons and Perlina, Writing the Siege of Leningrad, p.xxxvii; on the “arbitrary or contingent” nature of the distinction traditionally drawn between forced and free population movements see Baron and Gatrell, ‘Population Displacement’, p.54.
245 A total of 431,000 people had marched from Leningrad by 1st October 1941 according to local party records: TsGAIPD SPb, f.24, op.2v, d.4819, 145, cited in Poliakov and Zhiromskaia, Naselenie Rossii, p.43; some 130,000 of these were the largely skilled workers who had voluntarily enrolled in the militia: TsGAIPD SPb, f.25, op.12, d.13, ll.92-96, reproduced in Dzeniskevich (ed.), Leningrad v Osade, pp.131-135, here p.132; see Barber and Harrison, The Soviet Home Front, p.73 on Leningrad leading the way in setting up a volunteer army, enrolling over 100,000 recruits by 8th July, an idea which was then taken up in Moscow, where an official militia policy was established.
ended up fighting and dying in battles in the Leningrad region, between the Luga river and the city. Several of the poorly trained and equipped militia divisions were wiped out almost immediately in the lines along the Luga river: Bidlack, ‘Workers at War’, p.8; Barber and Harrison, The Soviet Home Front, pp.73-74; and C. Merridale, Ivan’s War: The Red Army 1939-1945 (London: Faber and Faber Limited, 2005), p.106 on the “heartbreaking loss of life” among the Leningrad opolchentsy.

Thousands of civilians were sent out along with them in the direction of the front to perform auxiliary work such as burying mines, digging trenches, building barricades. Travelling out of the city they passed thousands of other people coming the other way ahead of the German advance and the retreating Soviet forces.

On the trains heading towards Leningrad came deportees and evacuees who were being transported by the Soviet government from the Baltic states, the Karelo-Finnish republic and the south-west areas of the Leningrad region to destinations in Siberia and central Asia. Families who ordinarily lived in Leningrad city but were spending the summer at dachas in surrounding rural areas when war broke out also boarded trains heading to the city, as did several hundred thousand children who had been evacuated into the path of German troops in the countryside to the south and east of the city and had to be sent back. Some people went from one displacement to another. One interviewee in the

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246 Several of the poorly trained and equipped militia divisions were wiped out almost immediately in the lines along the Luga river: Bidlack, ‘Workers at War’, p.8; Barber and Harrison, The Soviet Home Front, pp.73-74; and C. Merridale, Ivan’s War: The Red Army 1939-1945 (London: Faber and Faber Limited, 2005), p.106 on the “heartbreaking loss of life” among the Leningrad opolchentsy.


248 The city’s Evacuation Commission recorded that 147,500 people ‘evacuated’ from Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania and the Karelian-Finnish SSR towards Leningrad were evacuated further onwards between the end of June and the end of August 1941: TsGASPb, f.7384, op.3, d.50, ll.189-193, reproduced in Dzeniskevich (ed.), Leningrad v Osade, pp.301-305, here p.301; groups of citizens from the newly incorporated Baltic states, western Ukraine and western Belarus, as well as Soviet citizens of Finnish, as well as German and Greek nationality, including Germans and Finns from the Leningrad region, were subject to forcible resettlement on the eve of the war and shortly after it began: Polian, Against Their Will, pp.115-140; Rebecca Manley has discussed how evacuation and deportation both stemmed from an approach to population displacement based on state regulation and planned distribution of populations and both were implemented with the involvement of the NKVD. Carried out, she writes, “within overlapping spaces and modelled on a similar operational procedure, evacuation and deportation became imbricated in the official mind”: Manley, To the Tashkent Station, p.42; documents pertaining to the transfer of ethnic Finnish and German residents of the Leningrad region and the city itself to remote regions in the rear, for example, refer to the procedure variously as ‘evacuation’ (evakuatsiia) and ‘exile’ (vyselenie); see ibid, p.42 on the “ambiguity” of these resettlements; and TsGASPb, f.7179, op.53, d.58, ll.4-6, in Dzeniskevich (ed.), Leningrad v Osade, II.430-431; TsGASPb, f.7179, op.53, d.49, l.1178, in ibid, p.60; and TsGAIPD SPb, f.24, op.2-b, d.1323, ll.83-85, in ibid, pp.441-443.

249 Salisbury, The 900 Days, p.206 on the “on-again off-again” evacuation, especially of children sent at first to the nearby countryside and later into the Urals and p.210 on families leaving their dachas in the country for Leningrad who, with thousands of others, “swarmed the roads”. The local Evacuation Commission sent over 660,000 women, children and workers of particular enterprises into the rear in July and August 1941, according to their records. About 400,000 of this number were children and half of these had to return to Leningrad when their trains took them into the path of oncoming German troops to the east.
European University project recalls being at the dacha about 60 miles from the city with her grandmother when they heard the war had begun. Her grandmother quickly took her back to Leningrad, whereupon she became one of a group of 200 children evacuated out to a town in the region who within a month had to travel in goods wagons back to the city to escape the German advance.\\footnote{250}

At the same time, people from areas to the south and west of Leningrad who had not been incorporated into organised evacuation procedures were making their own way along the railways and roads into the city.\\footnote{251} The official evacuation of parts of the population had broken down quickly in western areas of the Soviet Union, including the Belarusian and Ukrainian republics, especially once soldiers in retreat could be seen passing on the roads through towns and villages.\\footnote{252} In rural areas, including parts of the Leningrad region, many people were left to flee the German advance by themselves, compelled to disregard increased wartime restrictions on the independent movement of individuals if they wished to escape occupation.\\footnote{253} According to an executive member of the regional Soviet in August 1941, for example:

Thus far from the frontline regions we have mainly evacuated the families of party and Soviet activists, children and their mothers from the cities, but the

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\\footnote{250} Interview with A. A. V., ATsUI, Interview No. BL-1-017, p.1; some of these children were later evacuated a second time into the ‘deep rear’ in other Soviet regions and republics: A. R. Dzeniskevich, ‘The Social and Political Situation in Leningrad in the First Months of the German Invasion: The Social Psychology of the Workers’, in Thurston and Bonwetsch (eds.), The People’s War, pp.71-83, here p.74.\\footnote{251} See Manley, To the Tashkent Station, p.53 for a photograph of people with horses and carts loaded with children and belongings leaving their homes in the Leningrad region.\\footnote{252} Ibid, p.52 on ‘self-evacuation’ prompted by the sight of Red Army soldiers in retreat.

\\footnote{253} Evacuation plans, targeted at urban centres, often did not even exist for rural areas at all; see ibid, p.40 on the inhabitants of villages and smaller settlements being “largely left to their own devices” and p.52 on ‘self-evacuation’ without direction or permission from the authorities violating a “whole web of laws regulating population circulation”; in addition to the prewar passport laws and the strict laws on ‘desertion’ from the workplace in force from 1940, additional prohibitions on the unorganised movement of people were enacted from the start of the war, including new restrictions on travel which limited access to train tickets to inhabitants of urban areas and required the permission of the NKVD for travel between any two points in the country: ibid, p.40 and p.44.
collective farm population has been left until the last minute and has departed on its own.\textsuperscript{254}

Often, in practice, even people living in towns in the region had to flee the advancing troops on their own accord.\textsuperscript{255} A woman interviewed in the European University blockade project recalled the journeys being made on the road between Leningrad and Gatchina, a town in the Leningrad region about 30 miles south of the city, on the eve of the blockade. The woman herself was travelling with fellow students from Leningrad towards the town, where they were charged with digging trenches. They soon became aware that German forces must already be drawing near as they encountered people coming the other way who “were fleeing from Gatchina”: the “whole time [we were] on the road”, she relates, “we saw people with bags, with a few belongings, leaving Gatchina”.\textsuperscript{256}

Unable to completely organise and direct the displacement of certain civilians through evacuation procedures, or to restrict the movements of the rest of the population by means such as limiting the issue of train tickets, the central and local authorities implemented measures to identify people trying to enter the city of Leningrad and to tighten control over access to the city, in particular the inner urban districts.\textsuperscript{257} A succession of decrees issued from the end of June 1941 by the Supreme Soviet, the City Soviet and the Military Soviet of the Leningrad Front limited entry to the city to people already registered at accommodation inside Leningrad who had the permission of the authorities to come in; those living in suburban areas who could provide certificates to attest that they worked in an enterprise within the city; or people mobilised with the

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\textsuperscript{254} Ibid, pp.40-41.
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\textsuperscript{255} Ibid, pp.51-58 on the breakdown of organised evacuation in towns and cities in general; Manley gives the examples of cities such as Minsk and Vitebsk in Belarus, although evacuation from the town of Gomel’ took place in a more ‘planned’ manner, and on the devolvement into mass flight of evacuation from cities in the RSFSR such as Kalinin and even Moscow.
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\textsuperscript{256} Interview with anonymous, ATsUI, Interview No. BL-1-024, p.10.
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\textsuperscript{257} Manley, \textit{To the Tashkent Station}, p.45 on the adoption of measures designed to ‘protect’ specific spaces from population flows, especially the two major urban centres of Moscow and Leningrad: Manley focuses on the specific measures introduced in relation to Moscow, including the posting of NKVD agents along railway lines and roads leading to the capital.
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sanction of the head of the police administration or the chairman of the City Soviet.258

The decrees obliged the local police to organise a defence line (zagraditel’naiia liniia) in the southern part of the city near to the front and set up special checkpoints on the approaches to Leningrad, in its outskirts and within the city proper, where they would check the identity documents of pedestrians and people travelling on public transport.259

Additional police patrols were also instituted throughout the city to verify people’s documents on the spot and special police groups were established at train stations, jetties and evacuation centres to oversee departures from the city into the rear.260

By heightening checks and controls over people moving across the composite borders of wartime Leningrad, the authorities sought to regulate more closely the number of people in different parts of the city, to organise the allocation of labour and resources such as food and housing and to preserve social and spatial stratifications by excluding people who were not entitled to enter and settle in the different civic zones.261 The tightened identification procedures were also, though, a product of state concerns about the nature or ‘true identity’ of people on the move and were aimed at protecting the core space of the city from displaced citizens suspected of concealing dangerous anti-Soviet intentions and loyalties.262

258 TsGASPb, f.7384, op.36, d.186, ll.14-17; and I. Karpenko, ‘Sotsial’naia podderzhka reevakuantov (leningradskii opyt 1940-x godov)’, in E. R. Iarskaia-Smirnova and P. V. Romanov, Sovetskaia sotsial’naia politika: stseny i deistvuiushchie litsa, 1940-1985 (Moscow: Variant, 2008), pp.83-95, here, p.88; entry to the city for ‘personal reasons’, rather than as part of planned mobilisations, became completely forbidden.

259 TsGASPb, f.7384, op.36, d.186, ll.10-17; for the idea that an ‘obsession’ with layers of bounded spaces and concentric borders is a typically Russian characteristic, embodied in the Matrioshka doll – a national symbol in which “all available space is stuffed with borders” see E. Hellbirg-Hirn, ‘Ambivalent Space: Expressions of Russian Identity’, in Smith (ed.), Beyond the Limits, pp.49-69, here p.64 and p.69 for the conclusion that “boundary then emerges as the central spatial concept” in Russian identity; on the increasing prewar obsession of the Soviet state with borders and crossing points, together with internal mobility and settlement, and the Stalinist regime as “border centric” see Baron, ‘Remaking Soviet Society’, p.97.

260 TsGASPb, f. 7384, op.36, d.186, ll.14-17.

261 On the managing of population flows by states as bound up with policing social boundaries through measures to identify and register newcomers, assign rights and obligations, and exclude undesirable outsiders see Baron, ‘Remaking Soviet Society’, p.96.

262 Manley, To the Tashkent Station, p.44 on wartime regulations on the circulation of the population aimed at limiting the number “and the nature” of people on the move, directed against peasants and others threatening to clog transit routes and also at ‘elements’ deemed dangerous to social order; Malkki, ‘National Geographic’, pp.32-34 and Purity and Exile, p.7 for a theoretical discussion of how ‘rootless’ people are treated by policymakers and scholars as having lost their moral bearings, having a damaged nationality, being no longer trustworthy as ‘honest citizens’ and threatening national security.
The regime was especially wary of people from the newly annexed regions that had not yet been fully Sovietised. The Leningrad police paid particular attention to escorting those in transit from the Baltic republics across the city and ‘filtering’ them en route in search of criminal and other ‘suspicious’ individuals.\(^{263}\) The concerns of the authorities also extended more generally, however, to people travelling into and across the city. According to a survey of the wartime activities of the local police compiled for the chairman of the City Soviet towards the end of 1943, evacuees from the Leningrad region being transported in and out of the city and urban residents going into evacuation were also closely guarded and ‘filtered’ for dubious ‘elements’.\(^{264}\)

While the police account from 1943 does not make reference to anyone managing to enter Leningrad without the authorisation of the regime, a journalist for *Leningradskaia Pravda* was reportedly told by an officer on patrol in the city outskirts in August 1941 that the main purpose of the guard was to “prevent Germans entering the city in the guise of refugees”.\(^{265}\) The term refugee appeared rarely in Soviet policy documents from the end of the 1930s onwards as all discussion of the possibility of wartime displacement was formulated under the rubric of organised evacuation, conceived as the antithesis of the spontaneous flight of ‘refugees’ that occurred inside Russia during World War I.\(^{266}\) The use of the word by a police official implies, therefore, a large number of people making it into the city outside of state plans and procedures. This “disorderly flow of refugees into

\(^{263}\) TsGASPb, f. 7384, op.36, d.186, l.14.

\(^{264}\) TsGASPb, f. 7384, op.36, d.186, l.14; see Holquist, ‘To Count, to Extract’, pp.113-116 on the origination of the idea that the population comprised discrete “elements” with different qualitative traits that could be manipulated for reasons of state in late Imperial Russia, in the discipline of military geography and statistics.


\(^{266}\) Manley, *To the Tashkent Station*, pp.17-21 on the reorganisation in the 1930s of Soviet policies on population displacement in case of war from a rubric of ‘resettling refugees’ to one of ‘organising evacuation’, and evacuation conceived as a procedure in which the state was the sole agent of displacement; the term ‘refugee’ had earlier acquired common currency in Russia in the wake of World War I in reference to civilian inhabitants dispersed within the state rather than forced outside it, “as a phenomenon denoting not statelessness but homelessness”: ibid, p.10; the replacement in the Soviet Union of the term ‘refugee’ with ‘evacuee’ to conceive of wartime population movements on its territory does, however, bring to mind Hannah Arendt’s comment about the Allies invention of the term ‘displaced person’ during the war to replace the term ‘stateless person’, “for the express purpose of liquidating statelessness once and for all by ignoring its existence”: H. Arendt, *The Origins of Totalitarianism* (New York: Harcourt Brace, 1958), p.279, as cited in Gatrell, ‘From ‘Homelands’ to ‘Warlands’, p.6.
“the city” was suspected, according to the journalist’s source, not just of harbouring Germans but also deserters from the front, spies and other “hostile elements” in disguise.267

When, at the end of August, German bombardment and occupation of the railway lines and stations on the approach to Leningrad brought train travel in and out of the city to a halt, the closing blockade did not just circumscribe people living in a mixture of administrative territories but also encircled the different groups of people who had been on the move or were about to set off, trapping them in transit.268 On the railways, for example, according to Cherepenina, “tens of thousands of people congregated in the station buildings and on trains at suburban stations awaiting a possible breakout to the east”, a miracle which failed to happen.269 As the blockade closed, the authorities looked to order the groups of people displaced by war and further fortify local borders and spatial hierarchies, underscoring distinctions between who belonged in the city proper and who in the rural regional areas or the suburban buffer zones.270

From the start of the blockade on 8th September, special permission had to be granted by the authorities to purchase even suburban train tickets and on 13th September the Military Soviet of the Leningrad Front issued a decree about the distribution within the blockaded territory of evacuees from frontline areas.271 These were the people who had been brought from the Baltic states, the Karelo-Finnish Soviet Republic and from parts of the Leningrad region who had not yet been evacuated further into the rear. The decree stipulated that within two days 32,000 people who had arrived from these areas and were

268 By 22August, for example, the railway line through the regional town of Gatchina, for example, had been destroyed by bombing and the employees of the town’s three stations departed themselves: TsGASPb, f.7384, op.3, d.23, ll.183-184, in Dzeniskevich (ed.), Leningrad v Osade, pp.143-144
269 Cherepenina, ‘Assessing the Scale of Famine’, p.35.
270 J. C. Torpey, The Invention of the Passport: Surveillance, Citizenship and the State (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000), p.13 on states compelled “to define who belongs and who does not, who may come and go and who not, and to make these distinctions intelligible and enforceable” as part of their drive to monopolise the legitimate means of movement.
currently living in trains at the Leningrad railway junction or at evacuation centres inside the city must be moved out into the farms, schools, hostels and flats of the Leningrad region that were located inside the blockade ring, although in practice thousands more of these evacuees were accommodated in the city itself. The decree also charged the chief of the rear guard troops with carrying out further checks on anyone arriving into the city on foot or on carts, by trams or suburban trains, and instructed the Regional Soviet to create assembly points on main roads and at railways stations around the city to prevent any more new arrivals getting through to the urban centre.

Three days later the Military Soviet turned its attention to the relocation of women with children, and hospitals and nurseries out of the southern outskirts of Leningrad that were adjacent to the frontline. The Soviet ordered that those living in the suburbs to the south of the city were to be resettled within two days into areas of the Leningrad region. About 51,000 women and children living within the southern limits of the inner city, on the other hand, were to be moved into other districts in the centre of Leningrad. The local police were charged with arranging their settlement in the rooms of people who had been evacuated from the city prior to the onset of the siege or moving them in with other residents.

The ongoing implementation of measures to order and verify the people moving across and around the various zones of Leningrad suggests both the importance to the authorities of establishing the origins and whereabouts of those present in the city and also their

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272 According to records kept by the Evacuation Committee, as many as over 100,000 people who had arrived from the Baltic states, Karelia and the Leningrad region before the start of the blockade remained living within the city itself once the siege began: TsGASPb, f.330, op.1, d.10, ll.4, 6, 8, cited in V. M. Koval’chuk and G. L. Sobolev, ‘Leningradskii “rekviem” (o zhertvakh naseleniia v Leningrade v gody voini i blokady), Voprosy Istorii, No.12, 1965, pp.191-194, here p.193; the Statistical Administration registered about 80,000 people at addresses in the city in the first three months of the siege, most of whom, according to Andrei Dzeniskevich, were from among the Baltic and Karelian populations: Dzeniskevich (ed.), Leningrad v Osade, pp.350 and 590 and Cherepenina, ‘Assessing the Scale of Famine’, p.37; others remained living in evacuation centres in the city and its suburbs, as well as the region: TsGASPb, f.7384, op.3, d.5, ll.71-74, reproduced in Dzeniskevich (ed.), Leningrad v Osade, pp.274-276; those living in the poorly supplied evacuation centres were among the first people to display the effects of starvation in November 1941: ibid; many who survived were sent out of the city as part of the evacuation which soon resumed and continued throughout the blockade: TsGASPb, f.7384, op.3, d.50, ll.189-193, in ibid, p302; none of these figures, of course, include people making their own way into the city.


274 TsGASPb, f.7384, op.36, d.63, ll.3-4, in ibid, pp.56-57.
fears that their knowledge and control of the population were being undermined by an unorganised and incalculable influx of people ‘torn loose’ from their previous positions in the polity.275

Leon Gouré estimated in his work of 1962 that, despite state regulations, on the eve of the blockade there were anywhere between 400,000-800,000 ‘refugees’ in the city who had arrived outside of official mobilisation and registration and that to these must be added refugees who continued to arrive even after the blockade had begun.276 He makes this very rough calculation on the basis of daily bread output which went up in the city in July and August even as people were being evacuated out of Leningrad and, therefore, he reasons, must have been for consumption by the incomers. The point is, however, that the number of unofficial migrants in the city and their subsequent fate cannot be established with any reliability.277 What is likely, however, is that many of those who escaped territories coming under occupation but found themselves caught within the blockade were deprived of access to basic foodstuffs as a corollary of their statistical invisibility.

By evading state controls over their movement and residence they enabled the Soviet authorities to exclude them from the provisioning of food through the ration system, as well as the allocation of housing. This unintended consequence of the registration system, as Cynthia Buckley has argued, provided the state with a minimum level of power over the distribution of resources in times of scarcity, when their controls over the placement of people proved to be ineffective.278 Non-residents who circumvented barriers to entering the city were likely, as a result, to have been among the first to die when hunger and cold began to take hold in Leningrad in November.

275 See Scott, Seeing like a State, p.2 on state efforts at sedentarisation as part of the attempt to make a society legible, “to arrange the population” in ways that simplified state functions from taxation and conscription to prevention of rebellion; see Malkki, ‘National Geographic’, p.34 for how the territorially displaced are easily seen as “torn loose” from their culture, p.34.
277 The number of ration cards issued in the city increased by about 13,000 between October and November, decreasing by about 50,000 in the course of November. The Leningrad Registrar Department, on the other hand, calculated, on the basis of unknown sources, that the population of the city grew by over 450,000 in October but declined by about 430,000 in November: Cherepenina, ‘Assessing the Scale of the Famine’, pp.35-36.
Some, however, may have found means to obtain access to food and shelter. They may have been able to obtain work in the city’s factories, hired by directors who had lost much of their labour force, both skilled and manual, to the Red Army and the doomed Leningrad people’s militia, but who were still, in the first months of the blockade, required to meet high production targets. Factory employment could provide access to a canteen or a ration card or edible raw materials and to somewhere to stay, from living space in an apartment to a workshop floor, with or without formal residence registration. Even a worker’s ration did not necessarily protect people from the ravages of starvation but some unofficial migrants may have survived in the city through the end of the blockade and some, but not all, may have eventually shown up as civic inhabitants in sets of demographic statistics based on the issue of ration cards or residence permits.

Minutes from a meeting of the City Party Committee in January 1942 on ‘strengthening vigilance’ reveal that the local party leadership worried that insufficient checks on people recruited to factories were undermining the final level of state control over access to distributional networks in the city. Aleksei Kuznetsov, second regional party secretary at the time, claimed at the meeting that factories were persisting in hiring people or admitting them onto the premises without asking to see identity documents, even at a time when many enterprises were without light and fuel and had effectively shut down work. Kuznetsov and several of the other party secretaries present voiced fears that this practice had enabled people, particularly those with origins outside the city, to utilise strategies of visibility and invisibility and to lose and acquire categorical ‘identities’ for their own ends, disrupting the “surveillance order” by means of which the party state deployed labour and determined entitlements.

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279 Managers and party officials responsible for ensuring production targets were met were so concerned about their labour shortage they would sometimes drag workers back off the trains taking them to the front: Barber and Harrison, The Soviet Home Front, p.75.

280 On employment at a factory enclave as “the focal point of survival strategy” during the siege see Bidlack, ‘Workers at War’, pp.23 and ‘Survival Strategies in Leningrad’, pp.90-95.

281 ‘Iz protokola zasedaniia biuro GK VKP(b) ob usilenii bditel’nosti’, TsGAIPD, f.25, op.2-a, d.166, ll.13-16, reproduced in Dzeniskevich (ed.), Leningrad v Osade, pp.416-418.

282 The term ‘surveillance order’ for the practices of the Soviet state that entailed classifying, monitoring and controlling place of residence, career and designated nationality of its citizens, deploying and redistributing whole populations in the process, is used by Mark Garcelon who adapts it from Foucault: M
alarm that at several factories a “fairly large” collection of people would turn up at the start of the month, receive a ration card and then “vanish” from the sight of the authorities. Another secretary raised as a problem the large group of people who had arrived into his city district from regional towns like Luga, and were managing to become temporarily registered as party members in the city by paying dues for a few months in advance and thereby acquiring “the rights of a full citizen of the city”, without actually possessing any documents to this effect.

Once again these fears about loss of power to ascribe and verify who people were, and to confer or restrict access to spaces and resources accordingly, were bound up with perceived threats from people adrift from their social moorings, with a “spoiled identity”, to the security of the city and the state. Kuznetsov gave the particular example of one worker at the Stalin factory, a former Red Army soldier, who had been recruited without verification of his passport or military papers, and was one of those who received a monthly ration card and then ‘disappeared’. And who, asked Kuznetsov rhetorically, did he turn out to be? The answer, apparently, was a serviceman who had earlier been taken prisoner by the Germans and, according to Kuznetsov, would spend the time away from the workplace “systematically” crossing the frontline to give information to a German spy.

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285 Malkki, ‘National Geographic’, p.35 on refugee-ness regarded as a ‘spoiled identity’; Baron and Gatrell, ‘Population Displacement’, p.53 on the transient subject assumed to be “adrift from the moorings of social identity and markers of status” and therefore dangerously distanced from means of state control.

Another official present at the January meeting averred that the local police could not maintain patrols to monitor the population, as they themselves were suffering from the effects of hunger, and had told him they believed they would collapse on the way to their posts. Kuznetsov retorted immediately “they are lying, they have lost their discipline”, adding that the police were fed three times a day in special canteens and were obliged to work.\footnote{Ibid, p.417.} It is likely, however, that in the extreme conditions of the winter of 1941-42 lower level agents of the administration responsible for the surveillance of the population or the maintenance of demographic records, although better provisioned than many people in the city, themselves died of starvation or, weakened with hunger and cold, struggled to continue to work. Despite the opening of a route across frozen lake Ladoga from November 1941, that winter few foodstuffs reached Leningrad, except for flour and, reportedly, an abundance of supplies for those at the apex of the party elite, and even in some of the ‘closed’ cafeterias the availability of food was only marginally better than the pitiful bread rations provided for the rest of the population.\footnote{Cherepenina, ‘Assessing the Scale of the Famine’, p.43 and Bidlack, ‘Survival Strategies in Leningrad’, pp.95-96.} According to an official at the Elektrosila works, in January and February:

people were dying everywhere: in the yard, in the shop, in the canteen, in the street. They walked about all black, sooty, wrapped in rags, leaning on sticks, barely moving their legs. The healthiest, strongest men died.\footnote{Cited in Gourè, \textit{The Siege of Leningrad}, p.218.}

The report on the wartime activities of the police commented upon the deaths and physical exhaustion among rank and file officers during the winter and the Statistical Administration ceased functioning altogether from the end of December until the following spring.\footnote{TsGASPh, f.7384, op.36, d.186, II.8-29, here l.11; Cherepenina, ‘Assessing the Scale of the Famine’, pp.33-34.} Throughout the winter of 1941-42, therefore, these agencies in charge of registering and de-registering residents and collating information on the population operated poorly and intermittently. At the same time, people in the city were dying in vast numbers; others were managing to leave Leningrad as evacuation resumed.
by air and boat shortly after the blockade began and later took place along the ‘road of life’ across the frozen lake; as the housing of “hundreds of thousands of inhabitants of the city” was damaged by bombing and fires or broken up for firewood, many more people, regardless of their physical weakness, the heavy snow and cessation of public transport, were moving themselves and what belongings they could into apartments of acquaintances or people who had left Leningrad. Some made their way in from the city suburbs near the frontlines on their own accord to settle in empty rooms in the city centre.

One interviewee in the European University project moved with her mother from their house in the outskirts of the city when it burned down completely at the start of the blockade and then, she relates, had to ‘roam’ around the flats of their relatives living in central districts.

These circumstances no doubt exacerbated the patchiness of the records of how many inhabitants were living at which addresses within the city. This led to further inaccuracies in demographic statistics compiled on the basis of the issue of ration cards.

Several accounts by interviewees suggest that breakdowns in the system of annulling the residence of inhabitants who had moved away or died was used by people who remained as one means of illegally claiming additional ration cards that could be vital to survival.

In response, the local authorities conducted almost monthly re-calculations of who was to be issued with ration cards, regularly reporting thousands of falsely claimed cards

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291 According to the report of the City Commission for Ascertaining and Investigating the Crimes of the German-Fascist Invaders, at work in Leningrad from May 1943, thousands of houses in the city were destroyed by bombing or broken up for firewood and “the Germans had deprived hundreds of thousands of inhabitants of the city of shelter”: ‘Iz akta gorodskoi komissii po ustanovleniu i rassledovaniu zlodeianii nemetsko-fashistskikh zakhvatichkov i ikh soobshchikov ob ushcherbe, prichinnennom leningradu voinoi i blokadoi’, TsGASPb, f.8557, op.6, d.1109, ll.1-43, published in Dzeniskevich, Leningrad v osade, pp.562-572, here p.569; also Vakser, Leningrad poslevoennyi, p.71.

292 Interview with G. I. P., ATsUI, Interview No. BL-1-043, p.1.

293 Poliakov and Zhiromskaia, Naseleennost Rossi, p.42 for calculations of the number of people still living in the city being complicated by the continuing evacuation of inhabitants, for example, and Cherepenina, ‘Assessing the Scale of the Famine’, pp.54-55 on weak documentation of evacuation statistics in the winter of 1941-2 showing up in the large discrepancies between the numbers of residents recorded in housing registries and the people actually living there, as revealed during verifications conducted from spring 1942.

294 Interview with V.G.G., ATsUI, Interview No. BL-1-026, p.10 on ‘carelessness’ in the de-registration of people leaving apartments in Leningrad and also interview with L.P.V., ATsUI, Interview No. BL-1-029, p.44.
throughout the blockade. Dmitrii Pavlov, a representative of the State Committee of Defence in charge of food supply in Leningrad from September 1941 to January 1942, for example, later railed against the continued fraudulent acquisition of extra ration cards by “swindlers” who didn’t turn in their cards, claimed them for people actually living outside the city limits and imaginary individuals, or “printed false ration cards by hand”. The discovery of such “cases of misuse”, he asserts, was the main factor in the reduction of the number of ration cards issued by 97,000 in October 1941. A report on the registration of ration cards of April 1942 stated that 9173 illegally obtained ration cards had been discovered that month by the authorities. In July and August 1942, once the severe winter was over and the supply route across lake Ladoga was functioning well and easing conditions within the city, the Leningrad police conducted a re-registration of passports, prompted by the belief that enemy troops were falsifying Soviet documents. On the basis of the re-registration the Statistical Administration attempted to make more precise calculations about the size and composition of the population, and the police sought to remove transgressors of the passport system and other “undesirable elements” from the city.


297 ‘Spravka I. G. Stozhilova A. A. Kuznetsovu ob itogakh registratsii prodovol’stvennykh kartochek v aprele 1942g’, TsGAIPD SPb, f.24, op.2-v, d.5932, ll.12-13, reproduced in Dzeniskevich (ed.), *Leningrad v Osade*, pp.234-235; not all of these would have been extra cards obtained fraudulently by the population, however. According to Nadezhda Cherepenina, NKVD data available in the archives suggest that up to 4 per cent of cards in circulation at any time were illegal but that the main abuses took the form of acquiring cards for a higher population category: Cherepenina, ‘Assessing the Scale of Famine’, p.30.

298 In October 1942 the Statistical Administration reckoned the population of Leningrad, Kolpino and Kronstadt to be 790,024 on the basis of the re-registration of passports: TsGASPb, f.2076, op.4, d.52, l.190, reproduced in Dzeniskevich (ed.), *Leningrad v Osade*, p.313; on the origin of the re-registration of passports in a decision of the State Defence Committee of February 1942 which was prompted by concerns about the falsification of Soviet documents by enemy troops see Cherepenina, ‘Assessing the Scale of Famine’, p.58; the re-registration as an occasion to clarify accounts of the population and “cleanse the city of a criminal, socially parasitic and undesirable element” is referred to in the survey of the activities of the Leningrad police during the war so far compiled by the regional NKVD chief in October 1943: TsGASPb, f.7384, op.36, d.186, ll.8-29, here l.114.
The verification of documents in summer 1942 formed the basis for subsequent statistics on the population, however there is evidence that the re-registration did not expose all the demographic consequences of the mortality and displacements of the winter. Some interviewees in the blockade project, for example, claimed that members of their family and neighbours who left the city into evacuation were never removed from the residence records for particular houses. One woman, for example, recalled that her sister-in-law

299 This is contrary to Cherepenina, who claims that the re-registration of passports established the actual size of the population, on the basis of which future statistics could be calculated: Cherepenina, ‘Assessing the Scale of Famine’, p.30 and p.58.

300 Interview with L.A.S. and L.F.L., ATsUI, Interview No. BL-2A-014, p.7; interview with V.A.A., ATsUI, Interview No. BL-1-007, pp.7-8; interview with A.G.U., ATsUI, Interview No. BL-1-015, p.20; interview with S.M.L., ATsUI, Interview No. BL-1-016, p.17; interview with A.A.V., ATsUI, Interview No. BL-1-017, p.20; interview with V.G.G., ATsUI, Interview No. BL-1-026, p.10; interview with L.P.V., ATsUI, Interview No. BL-1-029, p.44; interview with O.V.A., ATsUI, Interview No. BL-2A-017, p.9; it is difficult to tell, though, how representative these accounts are. The interviews were conducted in 2002-2003, by which time the documentation of one’s continued residence in the city during the blockade had acquired a renewed practical and emotional significance. Under Gorbachev the city government created an award entitled Inhabitant of Blockaded Leningrad for those who had lived in the city during the siege and who had not received the medal For the Defence of Leningrad issued during the war. The medal had been handed out to people working in the city’s factories and institutions, whereas the new award applied to all who could prove they had been residents at the time. In 1994 Yeltsin’s government granted the Inhabitants of Blockaded Leningrad similar privileges to war veterans. They were entitled, for example, to reduced rents and free travel on city transport; on the award for Inhabitant of Blockaded Leningrad see Kirschenbaum, The Legacy of the Siege, p.259 and on the medal For the Defence of Leningrad see TsGAIPD SPb, f.24, op.2-v, d.6258, II.252-254, reproduced in Dzeniskevich (ed.), Leningrad v Osade, pp.482-483. Several interview respondents underscore the importance of the context of the introduction of the label ‘Inhabitant of Blockaded Leningrad’ for bringing to the fore concerns about inaccuracies in official documents. A man whose neighbour had remained erroneously registered in the city, for example, claimed that “no-one thought about it, and then all these privileges began to appear for inhabitants of the blockaded city”: Interview with V.G.G., ATsUI, Interview No. BL-1-026, p.10. At the same time as privileges for those who could prove they were former inhabitants of the blockaded city increased, the dwindling numbers of this generation were contending with the disappearance of Leningrad from the map. In 1991 ‘heroic Leningrad’ became Petersburg once more as the territory of the Soviet Union was transformed into post-Soviet spaces. Together with the disappearance of Leningrad, Elena Hellberg-Hirn writes, the pride of the blokadniki was being taken away: Hellberg-Hirn, Imperial Imprints, p.114. An interviewee who complained of her sister-in-law’s continued registration in the city conveyed a sense of a community threatened with extinction in the new Russia, while she also placed an emphasis on unfair entitlement to privileges, stating that there were few “genuine” blokadniki left and bemoaning that her sister-in-law was counted as a blokadnitsa and received a larger pension but “she doesn’t even know when the ring of the blockade closed [around Leningrad]!...when the bombs exploded, when there was starvation! She didn’t experience any of this but is counted as a blokadnitsa!...And they, the younger generation, behave very badly towards the elderly, towards...veterans”: interview with A.G.U., ATsUI, Interview No. BL-1-015, p.20. What these accounts do convey is an awareness among city-dwellers that chaos in the counting and recording of the population remaining in the city at the end of the blockade was entirely possible and that this awareness much later shaped the expression of fears by some inhabitants about threats to a community of blokadniki or, as one interviewee put it, true ‘Leningraders’: interview with A.V.V., ATsUI, Interview No. BL-1-017, p.20.
was among many people who returned from Central Asia to discover that according to official paperwork she had been living in the city for the entire of the blockade.\textsuperscript{301}

The ever-changing demographic situation in the city, moreover, soon rendered any data on the population out of date.\textsuperscript{302} While there were many fewer deaths in the besieged city from starvation after the spring of 1942, the increasingly effective functioning of transport across lake Ladoga from this time and a breach in the German encirclement in January 1943 facilitated the passage of more people in and out of the blockaded area. The decrees limiting travel in and out of the city remained in force and population movements in the second half 1942 were organised by the authorities as part of a plan to turn the city into a “military encampment” by sending out mothers with several children, the injured, pensioners, students and workers of evacuated factories and keeping just “necessary” personnel in the city.\textsuperscript{303} This plan, however, was not translated seamlessly into action, partly due to large inaccuracies in the population estimates on which it was based, noted later in the year by administrators.\textsuperscript{304} It is likely, moreover, that people also continued to travel on their own initiative in the latter months of the blockade, disregarding the visions and controls of the authorities. According to Elizabeth White, many people resisted evacuation and “some returned illegally even before January 1944”.\textsuperscript{305}

Certainly Dmitrii Pavlov, the State Defence Committee representative later claimed in a polemic about establishing the number of blockade victims that:

\textsuperscript{301} Interview with A.G.U., ATsUI, Interview No. BL-1-015, p.20.

\textsuperscript{302} See Ruble, ‘The Leningrad Affair’, p.305 for the argument that a lacuna in wartime population data for Leningrad results from the fact that many pressing concerns confronted the overburdened wartime leadership, and from the speed with which population shifts were taking place, well into 1945.

\textsuperscript{303} TsGASPb, f.7384, op.36, d.79, ll.105-108, reproduced in Dzeniskevich, \textit{Lenngrad v Osade}, pp.84-87 and TsGAIPD SPb, f.25, op.2-a, l.219-a, ll.1-14, in ibid, pp.87-95.

\textsuperscript{304} The plan, set forth in a decree by the Military Soviet of the Leningrad Front at the start of July 1942, foresaw the evacuation of about 300,000 wounded, women with children, pensioners, students and workers of evacuated factories, and that this would reduce the population in the city from 1,100,300 to 800,000: Dzeniskevich, \textit{Lenngrad v Osade}, pp. 85 and 88; the re-registration of passports conducted in July and August, however, yielded a population figure of 790,024 who had actually survived the winter in the city: TsGASPb, f.2076, op.4, d.52, 1.190, in ibid, p.313; mass organised evacuation of several hundred thousand people did, nevertheless, continue across lake Ladoga until the end of the year: Poliakov and Zhiromskaia, \textit{Naselenie Rossii}, p.44.

\textsuperscript{305} White, ‘The Civilian Return to Leningrad’, p.1147.
in the ensuing 11 months [after the breach of the blockade in January 1943] until the end of the year huge changes occurred in the number of inhabitants of the city. How many people left Leningrad and how many arrived using railway transport no-one knows.306

Pavlov may have been overstating the case in order to support his argument that estimates about the number of people who died in the blockade based on who was left at the end are not accurate and over-represent the total number of victims. The frustration of numerical certainties by population movements, though, was a perennial feature of Soviet data gathering that did not cease even in besieged Leningrad and none of the official figures for the population of January 1944 is likely to capture the actual number of people who remained in the city.

While it is not possible to arrive at a reliable total of people surviving in Leningrad when the blockade was lifted, the discussion of the comings and goings of the population during the siege does reinforce the argument that the post-siege population was more complex than Kirschenbaum’s community of blockade survivors occupying and rebuilding haunted yet familiar spaces. Interviews conducted by the European University reveal ways in which survivors have defined themselves and their experiences during the blockade not just in relation to a community of people defending their native city but also with regards to their own displacement or that of others. They demonstrate how widespread itinerancy and the state’s response to people on the move shaped self-perceptions, even among those who stayed in the city for the whole 900 days.

References to the ‘refugees’ of the blockaded city in several interviews highlight both the significance and the complexity of wartime dislocations for some people in Leningrad during the blockade. While the label ‘refugee’ was replaced in official policy by ‘evacuees’, denoting population “contingents” being resettled in an orderly fashion by the state, it remained common currency among the population at large during the war.307 One

307 Manley, To the Tashkent Station, p.19.
interviewee in the European University project, a young girl when war broke out, recalled that in July 1941 “we heard this word refugees, that refugees were fleeing”. According to Leon Gouré, people from Leningrad questioned after the siege “were greatly impressed by the number of refugees in the city”. But who were the refugees who made such an impression? The European University interviews demonstrate how multivalent popular notions of ‘refugeedom’ stand in for a variety of wartime upheavals that mark some narratives of life within the besieged city. These notions are used by the interviewees to express not only the breakdown, but also the reconstitution of daily life or a sense of self.

One man, Vladislav, also a child during the blockade years, spoke in his interview of how:

at the start [of the blockade] a mass of refugees poured (khlyynula) towards us into the city from the Baltics there, probably, from…from Belarus. I don’t know where they were from. And, basically, these refugees began to occupy empty rooms that part of the people had left. And there were some children – they didn’t speak quite in the right way. And they were dressed somehow, how can I say…in a rural fashion. More sort of simply…And all the same we somehow began to…Began to make friends, to mix.

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310 According to Michael Marrus, the term ‘refugee’ “normally” refers to persons who have crossed some international frontier, been forced to leave the state in which they once lived: M. Marrus, The Unwanted: European Refugees in the Twentieth Century (New York and Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1985), p.4; in the Russian and Soviet empires, as we have seen, it often denoted homelessness or flight more broadly, the root of the word ‘bezhenets’ (refugee) being ‘begat’ (to run or to roam): on definitions of refugees that differ from the ‘ideal refugee’ defined by the United Nations and on the discursive field within which ‘refugee’ as a phenomenon is embedded more generally see E. V. Daniel, ‘The Refugee: A Discourse on Displacement’, in J. MacClancy (ed.), Exotic No More: Anthropology on the Front Lines (Chicago and London: University of Chicago Press, 2002), pp.270-286.
311 Ibid, p.278 on construction of the ‘refugee’ and various senses of self and Malkki, ‘National geographic’, p.33 on how displacement may or may not be a “shattering” experience, although states and scholars tend to treat the ‘refugee’ as a psychological and moral, as well as political, problem.
312 Interview with V.G.G., ATsUI, Interview No. BL-1-026, p.10.
In his account the ‘pouring in’ of people from a different, unfamiliar, national republic is mixed together with the appearance of troops on the city streets, the continuous departure of family and neighbours from their apartment, some of whom died at the front, and the onset of hunger and bombing in the city. As he begins to befriend the refugee children, he notes how they all mastered fire fighting, even teaching the adults how to put out fires and raise an air raid warning. In his narrative, “hydrophobic metaphors” yield not to expressions of the symbolic danger of ‘refugee-ness’.  

For Vladislav, his acceptance of the ‘flows’ of refugees and their otherness signified his assimilation of the “asocial chaos” wrought more generally by the war and blockade on the once familiar terrain of the city.

Many residents of the city would not have been so struck by the speech and dress of arrivals from the western republics or the rural Leningrad region. Some of the interviewees who were resident in Leningrad at the start of the blockade had themselves been born in Vitebsk or Gomel’ in Belarus, or in settlements in the Leningrad region and other Soviet regions. Some had only just arrived shortly before the war, for example one woman from Gomel’ who had come to Leningrad after leaving school in 1939 and settled in with the help of many acquaintances from Gomel’ living in the city. The parents of others had made the journey earlier from these areas or from the Baltic countries.

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314 Malkki, , Purity and Exile, p.109 on the theme of ‘asocial chaos’ in narratives of displacement.
315 For example interview with S. A. I., ATsUI, Interview No. BL-1-033, p.1; interview with anonymous, ATsUI, Interview No. BL-1-024, p.1; interview with S. A. I., ATsUI, Interview No. BL-1-033, p.1; interview with M. V. V., ATsUI, Interview No. BL-1-004, p.1; interview with M. S. Sh., ATsUI, Interview No. BL-1-020, p.1.
316 Interview with anonymous, ATsUI, Interview No. BL-1-024, p.1; the woman observed that the town of Gomel’ always somehow had more connections with Leningrad than with Moscow and that Gomel’ school leavers always strove to study in the city. She gives examples of how she was helped with finding a place to study or provided with information about the fate of loved ones during the war by a network of former Gomel’ residents (Gomel’chane): ibid, p.2 and p.20; on the continuation of traditional migration patterns to Moscow and Leningrad through the 1930s see Hoffman, Peasant Metropolis, pp.58-59 and ibid pp.60-63 on the role of networks of fellow in-migrants from the same place in facilitating settlement in a city (a practice known as zemliachestvo).
317 Interview with B. M. A., ATsUI, Interview No. BL-1-040, p.1; interview with M. S. Sh., ATsUI, Interview No. BL-1-020, p.1.
For other inhabitants, people just crossing the internal civic boundaries from the suburbs or the outskirts of the city into the city centre were conceived as a “fleeing mass” and as representing the disintegration of the familiar.\(^{318}\) One woman, when recalling her terrible fear during the bombing raids emphasised the “strange” habits of the new inhabitants in their apartment, the family of her father’s colleague who had moved in with them in the city centre from the outlying southern district of Avtovo. Particularly strange, she related, was the colleague’s wife, who “was very, that kind (of woman), well, of course appearance, she smoked and spoke somewhat sharply” and left her adopted son in bed for the duration of the air raids.\(^{319}\)

Another interviewee, Anna, in contrast, incorporates an account of her own ‘refugeeness’ into the “emplotment” of her experiences and sufferings during the blockade.\(^{320}\) Anna and her mother, father and brother lived before the war in the Dachnoe neighbourhood in the southern outskirts of the city. When the German forces closed in on the city and began to bombard the area heavily, they made their way under fire on foot and then by tram away from the frontline areas to stay with her aunt in a wooden house on Krestovskii ostrov, an island near the centre of Leningrad. In the course of the blockade, Anna relates, all her immediate family died and the wooden house where they had been living on Krestovskii Ostrov was demolished. Anna spent some time sleeping in a factory canteen and then serving at a sentry post in another outlying city district as a member of the local civilian air defence force (MPVO), before she started work “to reconstruct Leningrad” and was allocated a room in another wooden house and later in a flat belonging to a man who had been evacuated and was working in Moscow.\(^{321}\)

\(^{318}\) In the words of one interviewee “a mass of people from the suburbs fled into Leningrad”: interview with N. G. S., ATsUI, Interview No. BL-1-005, p.5.

\(^{319}\) Interview with M. A. T., ATsUI, Interview No. BL-1-014, p.8.

\(^{320}\) On ‘emplotment’ see M. Somers, ‘The narrative constitution of identity: A relational and network approach’, Theory and Society, Vol.23, No.5 (1994), pp.605-649, here p.616; Vieda Skultans has demonstrated how people undergoing more or less the same experiences, in particular the dislocation caused by invasion, can experience them variously as completely shattering or as productive of coherence in life depending on the meaning attached to them through emplotment in narrative: Skultans, The Testimony of Lives, especially chapter 9, “Meanings Lost and Gained”, pp.124-141.

\(^{321}\) Interview with A. M. S., ATsUI, Interview No. BL-1-008, p.11.
Describing the early days of the blockade, Anna detailed a return visit by the family to their prewar house in defiance of official prohibitions, where they found their room destroyed. Above all she remembers her brother’s mandolin and her mother’s large pot for dough lying broken into fragments. She reflects shortly after that:

We didn’t have any foodstuffs, we [left] with nothing...we had no foodstuffs from the very start. In short, we were refugees. Besides the fact that we, so to speak, were blokadniki, we were also refugees. Moreover, you understand, no-one advised us, when we were leaving. We simply assembled ourselves and left.\textsuperscript{322}

Utilising a compound concept of refugee-ness based on an absence of food and loss of personal possessions, including a room of one’s own, and on the failure of the state to organise, care and provide for its civilians, she frames her experiences in terms of a hybrid identity as both refugee and blockade survivor.\textsuperscript{323} Anna’s story is an interesting counterpoint to the poetic representation of estrangement from one’s former home during the blockade by Ol’ga Berggol’ts. Berggol’ts was one of the many Leningrad residents who, during the war, had to move into another apartment whose owner had left for the front or evacuation. A poem written by her in October 1942 foregrounds the experience of having lived among someone else’s belongings, and a feeling of having become a ‘foreigner’ without leaving the city. Unlike Anna, however, her sense of dislocation, however, is reinforced by the very practices used by the authorities to document and verify identity and the right to residence, the demand to know ‘who are you?’, rather than the breakdown of government efforts to order and monitor the population. While Anna’s much later account weaves displacement and loss into a composite identity as a city-dweller who survived the blockade and a ‘refugee’, moreover, Berggol’ts asserts her

\textsuperscript{322} Ibid, p.4.
\textsuperscript{323} Her understanding of the experience of being a ‘refugee’ reinforces Daniel’s assertions that minimise the nation-state-generated distinction between an ‘internal refugee’ and a proper refugee and instead maintain that one can become a refugee even before fleeing the society in which one lives, as the formation of a refugee is triggered the moment the state “that is supposed to protect fails to do so” and “by a radical and violent disjunction between a person’s familiar way of being in the world and a new reality of socio-political circumstances that not only threaten this habitual way of being in the world but also force the affected person to see his world differently”: Daniel, ‘The Refugee’, p.279.
physical identification with the besieged city against an experience of displacement that threatens her sense of self:

The muted (slepen’kii) yellow torchlight flickers
And your heart suddenly clenches with anguish
When you hear:
- Your permit, comrade… -
As if you were a stranger, a foreigner.
- There is my permit. Please, check it.

I am from here, and this city – is mine.
We share one breath, one mind, one heart…
I am from here, comrade sentry. –

…but I live in a flat, where this winter
Someone else’s family died.
All that is around – was amassed not by me.
All – is not mine, as if I – am not me.

And indeed in other latitudes of the world,
Two whole quarters (blocks) away from me,
Is my other – former flat,
Without the smell of the living, without light.324

These complex, “cross-cutting and contradictory” renderings of displacement in blockaded Leningrad intersect with official wartime Soviet understandings of refugee-ness as the negation of orderly resettlement or with fears about a spoiled identity but refashion them in a variety of ways.325 In the years between Berggol’ts writing her poem

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On the stubbornly unclassifiable “fluid, cross-cutting, and often contradictory nature” of the itinerant’s social and self-identifications.
and the collapse of the Soviet Union, though, there was little scope for stories of dislocation in the emerging public memory of the war and blockade.\footnote{Even the evacuation remained on the margins of public memory of the war, as tales of panic and flight threatened to undermine the carefully constructed state history of the war as a vindication of the Communist party and Soviet system: Manley, To the Tashkent Station, p.271.}

The final war years and immediate postwar period in Leningrad witnessed a public process of ascribing meaning to the siege that was reined in and then obliterated by Stalin but later resumed along with the mythologising of the war on a national scale after Stalin’s death.\footnote{Kirschenbaum, The Legacy of the Siege, p.34; Tumarkin, The Living & The Dead, p.100; and Brooks, Chapter 5: ‘The Theft of the War’, Thank you, Comrade Stalin!, pp.195-232, especially p.198 on the chief postwar domestic story quickly becoming not the wartime achievements of the people but the task of “socialist construction”.} This public commemoration of the siege in published texts effaced the multiplicity of interactions between home and front and the comings and goings of the population in favour of the metanarrative of ‘Leningraders who stayed and struggled’.\footnote{Kirschenbaum, The Legacy of the Siege, p.14.}

The particular sufferings of civilians and displaced people were minimised or reputed, the state preferring to represent those trapped in the blockade as “heroes of the Leningrad front”: prewar inhabitants who defended as one their city, streets and buildings.\footnote{Kirschenbaum, “The Alienated Body”, p.220.}

The early production of this narrative can be seen, for example, in a series of articles published in Leningradskaia Pravda throughout 1944 under the title ‘All efforts to the reconstruction of our native (rodnyi) city’, which called upon Leningraders who had worked day and night to defend their beloved city to begin to rebuild it.\footnote{Leningradskaia Pravda, 6/6/1944, p.2; 9/6/1944, p.2; 15/6/1944, p.2; 16/6/1944, p.2; 18/6/1944, p.3; 8/7/1944, p.3; 13/7/1944, p.3; 15/7/1944, p.3; 22/7/1944, p.3; 28/7/1944, p.3; 30/7/1944, p.2; 1/8/1944, p.3; 6/8/1944, p.2.}

The heroic mythic narrative had resonance for many people who lived through the siege, enabling them to make sense of their experience as something other than victims, and capturing the attachment many felt to “their city” in the wake of the blockade.\footnote{Kirschenbaum, “The Alienated Body”, p.224 for survivors whose accounts were published outside of the reach of Soviet censor – in emigration or the post-Soviet era – and who criticised the Soviet state nevertheless employing the rhetoric of heroism to make sense of their experiences; and Kirschenbaum, The Legacy of the Siege, p.33, for the example of Vera Karatygina, curator of the Public Library’s Petersburg-Leningrad collection, noting at the end of 1942 that Leningraders had braved the hunger, cold and bombs in order to have the right to say after the war “I was in Leningrad during the blockade, and I did all that was in my power to defend my city”.}
however, entailed the persistent ‘enforced forgetting’ of certain aspects of life in the besieged city.\textsuperscript{332} Even under Khrushchev, when some of the wartime stories of “the people” emerged as part of the formation of a cult of the war, the largely female experiences of the siege were figured as a parallel to male heroism, deflecting attention away from the failures of wartime planning and provisioning.\textsuperscript{333} Flight, disorder and unplanned resettlements of the population remained blank spots in the remembrance of the war and blockade.

This is encapsulated in the fate of the painting \textit{Roads of War}, submitted as a graduation piece at the Repin Institute of Painting in Leningrad by the artist Ilia Glazunov in 1957 and based on his observations of the crowds on the routes in and out of Leningrad in 1941.\textsuperscript{334} As a boy, Glazunov had been among the last people who managed to board a train into Leningrad before the railway lines into the city ceased running at the end of August 1941 as he returned with his parents from their dacha.\textsuperscript{335} Glazunov’s parents later died during the siege and he was evacuated in 1942 into a village in the Novgorod region, from where he returned in 1944 and entered the art school. In the painting \textit{Roads of War} an assortment of peasants, workers, warriors, and women with children group at the side of a dusty road, all facing in different directions, while a division of soldiers and a herd of sheep pass each other on the track, seeming to emerge from and disappear back into the dust itself.\textsuperscript{336} The painting was unanimously rejected by the board of the institute for

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\textsuperscript{332} Kirschenbaum, \textit{The Legacy of the Siege}, p.140 on ‘enforcement of forgetting’ after the war.  
\textsuperscript{333} Tumarkin, \textit{The Living & The Dead}, p.111; Kirschenbaum, “‘The Alienated Body’”, p.222 on the Soviet state seeking to deflect attention from the Soviet failure to stockpile food in the city and onto the efforts to combat German bombs and artillery.  
\textsuperscript{336} These became stock figures in Glazunov’s depictions of Leningrad and then his later militantly nationalist paintings: for Glazunov as a member of the nationalist Russian intelligentsia that began to organise during Glasnost’ and his pictorial themes of stoical peasants, decent mothers and warriors see R. Service, \textit{Russia: Experiment with a People} (London: Pan Macmillan Ltd, 2003), pp.73, 184 and 245-246; it is interesting that his civic and nationalist pictorial typologies should have first been evident in embryonic form in his depiction of wartime displacement. This supports the idea that the ‘refugee’ experience is not simply disruptive but also constitutive of social and national, as well as individual, identities: see P. Gatrell, \textit{A Whole Empire Walking: Refugees in Russia during World War One} (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1999), pp.162-165 on “the crystallization of Russianness” with reference to refugeedom during the First World War; see also Baron and Gatrell, ‘Population Displacement’, for example p.54 and Holquist, ‘New Terrains’, p.167. 
\end{flushright}
distorting the meaning of Soviet victory in the war and was later destroyed by the authorities after it was displayed at the Manezh Exhibition Hall in Moscow.337

The Soviet regime had earlier grappled with the statistical invisibility of displaced citizens then subsequently ensured the cultural invisibility of its ‘refugees’, an invisibility that is often replicated in the scholarship on the blockade.338 Also missing from accounts such as that by Kirschenbaum, when touching on the post-siege period, are the hundreds of thousands of people who arrived into the city every year once the blockade was lifted. The following chapter investigates what it is possible to glean about the incomers, their number and ‘identities’, from archived statistics and reports.

337 On Glazunov’s website it seems to imply that the painting was removed and destroyed as part of Khrushchev’s infamous attack on an exhibition by contemporary artists at Manezh, however the website also gives the date that the painting was exhibited as 1964, whereas Khrushchev’s excoriation of the abstract artists took place in 1962: see, for example, W. Taubman, Khrushchev: The Man, His Era (London: The Free Press, 2005), pp.588-592 for a description of the November 1962 exhibition.
338 See Malkki, Purity and Exile, p.7 on the structural or “systematic invisibility” of unclassifiable refugees in policy, literature and scholarship.
Chapter 3. A “City of Migrants?” Reconstructing the population of the post-siege city (part two)

3.1 The village rushed in

Viktor, the interviewee who reflected on the repopulation of the city that “quickly-quickly they settled all our empty space”, was responding to a question about whether the arrival of re-evacuees in the city was noticeable. His reply, in more detail, was:

Yes. In greater part it was not even evacuees. I mean. Clearly the city required a great number of builders, of, on the whole, such (people). As we say, the whole village rushed in, you know, from the former Leningrad region. And our city very quickly filled up, our house filled with people, who had not lived in a city. These were people from villages, from small towns….quickly-quickly they settled all our empty space. And we had many vacated rooms, in the hostel.

Was Viktor’s hostel typical of the city as a whole? The work of Blair Ruble would suggest that it was. Ruble’s post-siege city is very different from the one depicted by Lisa Kirschenbaum. Instead of a “city of memory”, whose spaces and buildings were being reconstructed and navigated by inhabitants who knew them intimately and mapped their memories onto them, his is a city “in shambles”, its population depleted by evacuation as well as deaths from starvation, disease and bombardment, and its housing, streets and water lines destroyed. It is a city which “would be repopulated and rebuilt, but not necessarily by…[its] prewar residents”, many of whom had been hauled along with most

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339 Interview with V. Kh. V., ATsUI, Interview No. BL-1-006, p.23.
340 The borders of the Leningrad region were altered in 1944, when the Novgorod and Pskov regions were formed from territories previously belonging to the Leningrad region: Vakser, Leningrad Poslevoennyi, p.20 on the political reasons for forming new regions from parts of the former Leningrad regions that had been under evacuation and therefore were to be carefully monitored.
341 Interview with V. Kh. V., ATsUI, Interview No. BL-1-006, p.23.

of the city’s factories “halfway across Russia to the Urals, Siberia or the Chinese border”. It was, rather, reconstructed by demobilised soldiers and unskilled, predominantly female “peasants in workers’ clothing” from regions such as Iarosavl’, Kalinin, Saratov and Sverdlovsk, and became, in short, a “city of migrants”.

His inhabitants are not the emaciated blockade women of Berggol’t’s poetry, but instead resemble Tat’iana in the postwar parody of Evgenii Onegin written by Aleksandr Khazin. In Khazin’s humorous verses Pushkin’s story is relocated to the post-blockade city and Tat’iana is recast as a woman recently come to Leningrad from the countryside, who finds work as a house painter.

Ruble bases his claims about the ‘city of migrants’ primarily on the assertion that the population of Leningrad doubled between March 1943 and September 1945, from 639,000 to 1,240,000. As we have seen, according to a range of figures recorded by local government institutions, the population dropped even lower than 639,000 before the end of the blockade, however none of the aggregate figures can be taken as reliable. Figures collated by the Statistical Administration for migration in and out of the city in the post-blockade years, though, do indicate that whatever the number of people living in the city in January 1944, they were rapidly joined by hundreds of thousands of people travelling to Leningrad once the blockade was lifted. The following table is a

344 Ibid, p.304 on peasants in workers clothing; Ruble, Leningrad, p.51 on the city of migrants.
345 The verses are recalled by an interviewee in the blockade project as he describes the “mass of new arrivals” (massoi priezhiie) after the war: interview with V. N. N., ATsUI, Interview No. BL-1-001, p.19; the verses were published in the journal Leningrad in 946 and were attacked by Zhdanov as slander against contemporary Leningrad for its portrayal of crime and crowding in public civic spaces in the same Central Committee resolution that censured the journals Zvezda and Leningrad and condemned the writers Akhmatova and Zoshchenko in particular: ‘O zhurnalakh Zvezda i Leningrad’, published in Kul’tura i Zhizn’, No.6 (20/8/1946), p.1.
346 Ruble, ‘The Leningrad Affair’, p.305; Ruble cites the population figure for September 1945 with reference to a piece in the journal Leningradskaiia Panorama from 1982 that gives this statistic without any reference to the primary source: ‘Iz letopisi sobytii. 1945-1950gg’, Leningradskaiia Panorama, No.6 (1982), p.7; A. Z. Vakser relates the same figure in an article where it appears without reference: Vakser, “Chudo” Vozrozhdeniia, p.321 and in a book, where he references a document of the city Party Committee that I was not permitted to access: TsGAIPD, f.24, op.2v, d.7666, ll.101-102, cited in Vakser, Leningrad poslevoenny, p.6; in any case, as we have seen, all recorded aggregate population figures for the city are likely to be inaccurate.
347 This chapter is concerned with the demographic shifts which occurred in the city on account of migration. It should be noted here, however, that the population of the city also grew on the basis of natural
reconstruction of the growth of the population of the wider city of Leningrad on account of migration in the years immediately following the blockade. It is composed from data recorded by the Population and Health Sector of the Statistical Administration on the basis of registration vouchers filled in by the police upon the issue of residence permits:

Table 1: Arrival and departure from Leningrad, 1944-1947, including suburban settlements under the authority of the Leningrad City Soviet (19 districts 1944-1946, 21 in 1947)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Arrived during year</th>
<th>Left during year</th>
<th>Mechanical growth</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1944</td>
<td>448,455</td>
<td>53,578</td>
<td>394,877</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1945</td>
<td>660,102</td>
<td>88,406</td>
<td>571,696</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1946 (famine year)</td>
<td>489,162</td>
<td>161,518</td>
<td>327,644</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1947 (famine year)</td>
<td>254,331</td>
<td>194,740</td>
<td>59,591</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

increase in the immediate post-blockade years but that the increase in population due to higher numbers of births than deaths was negligible in comparison with what is termed ‘mechanical growth’ by the Soviet statisticians, i.e. growth due to migration: according to the 1967 compilation of data by the Statistical Administration the recorded natural increase in the population of Leningrad and suburban towns was in the region of 10,600 people in 1944, 26,200 in 1945, 39,000 in 1946 and 32,200 in 1947; the death rate, which had already fallen below the 1940 levels in 1943, rose slightly in the famine years of 1946-1947, while the birth rate jumped from 31 per thousand in 1944 to 35.5 per thousand in 1945, then flattened out at 35.1 per thousand in 1946, before dropping to 29.2 per thousand in 1947; this represented a baby boom of sorts as soldiers returned from the front. The birth rate fell further in later years, levelling out at 8-8.6 per thousand from 1950, lower than anywhere else in the Soviet Union, apart from Moscow and Odessa. The post-siege natural increase in the population by tens of thousands, however, is dwarfed by the migration of hundreds of thousands of people to the city in the immediate post-siege years: for figures on natural population growth see TsGASPb, f.4965, op.8, d.738, l.6 and also Vakser, Leningrad Poslevoennyi, pp.10-11.

There are some discrepancies between this table and the one produced by Vakser on arrival and departure from Leningrad in the post-blockade period: Vakser, Leningrad Poslevoennyi, p.7; this is partly because Vakser’s table is incomplete and uses the more approximate figures from the 1967 Statistical Administration data file, rather than the detailed breakdowns contained in the files of the Population and Health Sector and also reproduced by N. E. Chistiakova, to whose work Vakser makes reference: N. E. Chistiakova, ‘Problemy izucheniia demograficheskikh protsessov v Leningrade (Sankt-Peterburge): 1930-1950-e gody’, in Narodonaselenie: sovremennoe sostoianie i perspektivy razvitia nauchnogo znanija (Moscow: Dialog MGU, 1997), pp.175-6; there is a particularly large difference – of over 20,000 people – between Vakser’s figure and that given by the Population and Health Sector and cited by Chistiakova for ‘mechanical’ population growth in 1944 but this can be explained by the different territorial definitions of the city used in the primary sources for this year. Local Statistical Administrations sent copies of the tables of demographic data they compiled to the government in Moscow and so this information can also be found in the records of the demographic department of the Council of Ministers: for 1945, for example, see Rossiiskii Gosudarstvennyi Arkhiv Ekonomiki (RGAE), f.1562, op.20, d.616, ll.53-43 and for 1946 see ibid, d.661, l.31.
These figures must also, of course, be treated with caution. It is likely, though, given that data based on residence registration do not include people housed in state institutions, or anyone arriving or leaving without notifying the police, that these numbers underrepresent the turnover of the population. In all, then, over 1,852,050 people came to live in Leningrad in the first four post-siege years, while more than 498,242 left. These figures attest to the fact that many thousands of people were making journeys into, as well as out of, the city at the end of the war and in the first years of reconstruction. The expansion of the population registered as resident in Leningrad slowed significantly in 1947, in part on account of fewer arrivals, although also because of almost 200,000 recorded departures in this famine year. On their own, however, the data tell us little about the extent to which this constituted a ‘replacement’ of prewar residents with post-siege newcomers.

\[349\] In the course of the famine, government policies forcing collective farmers to surrender more grain, rescinding the entitlement of workers and employees of other rural institutions to ration cards and also removing some urban residents form the rationing system compelled some people into Leningrad from the starving countryside and smaller towns: Zubkova, Russia After the War, pp.40-47, see especially p.47 on industrial enterprises in Leningrad, whose workers still received ration cards for themselves and their dependents, hiring twice as many employees in October as September after the Party’s Central Committee issued a decree on 1st October reducing the number of people entitled to provisioning through the ration system. Food scarcity and price increases also affected people living in the city, however. In March 1947, for example, medical staff determined that over 30 per cent of the workers they examined at factories in the city were suffering from the effects of hunger and malnutrition: At some enterprises over a half of workers were identified as suffering from the effects of severe hunger. At the Sevkabel’ factory, for example, of 300 workers examined 42% were diagnosed with ‘alimentary dystrophy’ (the Russian term for a complex of symptoms arising from acute malnutrition, including emaciation, swelling and weakness and, if untreated, death) and 10% with vitamin deficiency. A similar situation was discovered at other enterprises, including the Izhorsk factory and prestigious Kirov plant: Zima, Golod v SSSR, pp.75-76 and D. Filtzer, ‘The Standard of Living of Soviet Industrial Workers in the Immediate Postwar Period, 1945-1948’, Europe-Asia Studies, Vol.51, No.6 (September 1999), pp.1013-1038, here p.1025 and p.1035, footnote no.23, on the definition of ‘alimentary dystrophy’; see also Cherepenina, ‘Assessing the Scale of Famine’, p.41 for a definition of dystrophy, in relation to the mass starvation of the blockade when over 75 per cent of deaths according to Leningrad doctor were from dystrophy; the unthinkable levels to which the death rate rose in the blockade will be discussed below, in 1946 and 1947 the death rate in Leningrad was actually lower than that in the last full prewar year but higher than in subsequent years: TsGASPb, f.4965, op.1, d. 4746, ll.11-11ob; d. 4748, ll.6-6ob; 4751, ll.7-7ob; 4756, ll.16-16ob; it seems that while a very rough estimate puts the number of deaths caused by the postwar famine across the Soviet Union at 2,000,000 in Leningrad the effects were mainly non-fatal malnutrition and psychological: see Zubkova, Russia After the War, p.47 on famine deaths and interview with A.A.V., ATsUI, Interview No. BL-1-017, p.21 on the constant feeling of hunger, even in 1948, as a result both of continuing meagre meals and sensations from the blockade that did not pass for some time.  

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Some individuals, for example, may have come and gone during these years and may show up in the figures more than once. A personal letter written by a student at a Leningrad medical institute in October 1946, that was intercepted by the local department of the Ministry of State Security (MGB), suggests that as the hunger and deprivations of the postwar famine years began to affect even the urban Soviet population, a number of the people who had recently come to study or work in the city went back ‘home’, at least temporarily. In the letter, the student writes that she has just embarked on study in the institute but that the standards of living have dropped sharply that autumn and “many of the girls have left for home”. It is not possible to glean from statistical reports how many people arrived for a short time and left like this. Another letter quoted in an MGB report, though, written this time by a student at a teaching college, indicates that some of those leaving were likely to have been not post-siege incomers but blockade survivors who feared the return of famine conditions experienced during the siege and who themselves, as we have seen, may have still had strong ties to places outside the city. The teaching college student relates:

Many of us in the college are being put on grants, and that means that you receive just 170 rubles a month…for shoes, clothes and food, everything. Many are now moving away to stay with someone, to relatives…Things are also bad with me and towards winter it will be even worse…I really wish that I could slip

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350 TsGASPb, f.7384, op.36, d.214, ll.71-83, here l.76; the Ministry of State Security (formerly People’s Commissariat of State Security, or NKGB) was responsible for counterintelligence activities. All people’s commissariats became known as ministries in March 1946, for example the People’s Commissariat of Internal Affairs, NKVD, became the Ministry of Internal Affairs, MVD. The thesis will refer to whichever institutional name was in use at the particular time being discussed.
351 TsGASPb, f.7384, op.36, d.214, ll.84-90, here l.86; it is difficult to assess how representative this letter is of the situation in the city. Firstly, the sender may be exaggerating. Secondly, it refers to the situation in higher education institutions, which had just returned from evacuation out of the city during the war and which even in peacetime conditions probably contained a greater concentration of people arriving in the city from elsewhere than other places of work and study did. Thirdly, it is one of a group of letters collated by the local department MGB in part with the aim of demonstrating the circulation of ‘false rumours’ about mass departures from institutes, so reveals perhaps as much or more about the focus of the security services than about commonplace activities of the population. The letter also raises the issue of people who were inhabitants of the city but did not feel themselves to be at home or were not seen to be at home by others and the more general question of what it means to be at home which will be discussed in more detail in chapter 3.
away...leave for the village, so that I am not returned to what I witnessed in 1942. 352

The data also do not reveal whether those recorded as arriving in these years were in fact new in-migrants or former inhabitants returning from the front or evacuation, several hundred thousand of whom had themselves lived through the worst of the blockade in the winter of 1941-1942. 353

3.2 The varied population

Reminiscences by workers about “labour heroism” during the period of reconstruction in Leningrad that were collected by the local party organisation in later years characterise the people rebuilding Leningrad in a number of different ways. 354 Memoirs by workers and employees of the frontline Izhorsk factory, for example, kept by the local party Institute of History variously foreground the presence of those who had lived through the terrible blockade days; the arrival of young men and women from rural areas such as the Orlov region who were trained at the city’s trade schools; and the return of workers from evacuation in the Urals or from service at the front, including in the Izhorsk workers’ battalion; as well as the reconstruction carried out by German Prisoners of War. 355 In 1977 local historians published a set of recollections gathered from the archives of the party History Institute and from contemporary contributions by people living in the city about the postwar period. One contributor described the return of soldiers demobilised

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352 Ibid, 1.89; we don’t know, of course, whether this correspondent, or any of the others, actually left. Also she may well have been someone who evacuated after the worst blockade winter of 1941-1942 and then returned, rather than a resident who was still in the city at the end of the blockade. The problems with making a clear distinction between re-evacuees and blockade survivors will be discussed further below. This source, nevertheless, does reflect the fears of people who had experienced the siege, which could inform a decision to leave Leningrad in the years after it had ended. It also demonstrates the contacts people had outside of the city that could enable this.

353 According to the figures cited by Poliakov and Zhiromskaia, for example, in the periods of mass evacuation from the city that lasted until the end of 1942 871,000 prewar residents were evacuated, almost 400,000 of whom after the end of May 1942: Poliakov and Zhiromskaia, Naselenie Rossii, p.44


355 TsGAIPD, f.4000, op.18, d.68, ll.53-92.
from the Izhorsk battalion and of re-evacuees to their former factory.\(^{356}\) Another wrote of the role of prewar workers of the Kirov factory in its restoration, some who had started when it was the Putilov works in the pre-Revolutionary era, and who had stayed in the city during the war or come back from evacuation and the front in the first post-siege years.\(^{357}\) Others emphasised the re-builders of Leningrad who came from the ranks of young trade and factory school trainees, many of whom had been brought in from the villages in areas such as the Voronezh and Kalinin regions.\(^{358}\)

The people who were replenishing the population and the workforce no doubt varied depending upon the occupation or workplace in question.\(^{359}\) These impressionistic accounts suggest that among the immediate postwar workforce were people who had lived in Leningrad before the war and had made the journey back. What proportion, however, of all incomers did the returnees make up? The figures on migration in and out of the city produced by the Population and Health Sector of the Statistical Administration, from which the data presented in the table above are drawn, break down the incoming and outgoing population according to gender; the city or region from which they had departed and whether the point of departure was urban or rural. The tables of statistics in these files note, for example, that from 1944-1946 about one third of the incomers registered in the city each year had arrived from rural areas, and slightly under 10 percent from the Leningrad region, but also that the point of origins of tens or hundreds of thousands of other arrivals had not been established.\(^{360}\) These tables do not,
however, include a section on whether the in-migrants were former inhabitants of the city who had been in evacuation or were new arrivals from the towns and villages of other regions.

This lack of attention by the authorities to the differentiation between prewar inhabitants and newcomers initially seems surprising in the light of the wartime efforts of the local administration to retain distinctions between the city and surrounding areas and monitor people crossing the civic boundaries. The templates according to which local Statistical Administrations collated information on the population on a regular basis, however, were issued by the central authorities. The Central Statistical Administration of the State Planning Agency (Gosplan) was interested not in the relationship of incomers to the city but in checking the numbers of people on the move and confirming their immediate points of origin and departure, in particular whether or not they had been in the countryside before their arrival. The data reveal, in this way, something about the priorities and interests of Moscow, including the desire of the regime to locate fixed points between which people were moving and continuing Soviet concerns about the influence of the village and fears about the ‘ruralisation’ of the cities.\(^{361}\) At the same time they say little about the complex wartime and postwar movements of the population.

Other central and local organs of government with jurisdiction over incomers to the city compiled partial statistics on the post-siege population, categorising and counting according to their own criteria and aims. These records also tell us a little, scattered

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blockade years. In 1945, a little under a third (30.6\%) of the 660,102 in-migrants had travelled from villages, an absolute number of 201,945, of the remaining 458,157, there were 245,197 people from towns and a large number, 212,960, whose origin had not been identified and about 7\% of the total arriving population had come from the surrounding Leningrad region: TsGASPb, f.4965, op.1, d.4748, l.6 and l.1-2; finally, in 1946, the last year of such large scale postwar in-migration, again a third (34\%) were fixed as arriving from rural areas, 166,119 of the total of 489,162, and 179,588 people from towns, leaving 143,455 with an unknown point of departure: TsGASPb, f.4965, op.1, d.4751, l.7.

\(^{361}\) On the actions of policymakers and officials, and also historians, to locate the migrant in place and time by assigning them identities qualified, for example, by place of origin, sojourn or destination see Baron and Gatrell, *Homelands*, p.2; on the mistrust of the peasantry as by nature ‘petit bourgeois’ in the forming Soviet system, the simultaneous settlement of millions of peasants in cities in the 1930s, and the part played by the reaction to this ‘ruralization’ of the towns in the coalescing Stalinist system of violence see Lewin, *The Making of the Soviet System*, p.300-304, especially p.303 for the term “ruralize”.

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information about the different people organised by the government to come to reconstruct the post-blockade city.

From the end of 1943 until May 1946, for example, a local bureau of the Committee for the Accounting and Distribution of the Labour Force operated to recruit, mobilise and direct groups of people into work in the city while the stringent wartime controls over individual entry into Leningrad remained in force.\(^{362}\) The records of the local bureau include details of the 790,530 people channelled into Leningrad’s industry from outside the city in this way from 1st December 1943 until 15th April 1946.\(^{363}\) They identify these incomers according to age, gender and whether they were capable of working, or had arrived as dependents, and also break down their numbers by nationality. The records show, for example, that individuals with many different national identities stamped in their passport, both Soviet and non-Soviet, were brought in to work by the Committee but that by far the largest group, as in the prewar population, were identified as ethnic Russians.\(^{364}\)

The Committee was also responsible for organising the employment of demobilised soldiers and its central organisation made note of how many former servicemen were going to live in each republic, region and city of the Soviet Union, whether they had found work and if they had done so independently or through local Labour Force bureaus. From the files of the Committee in Moscow it can be ascertained that 211,199 of all the in-migrants recorded by January 1947 were demobilised soldiers.\(^{365}\)

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\(^{362}\) Gosudarstvennyi Arkhiv Rossiiskoi Federatsii (henceforth GARF), f.9517 Komitet po uchetu i raspredeleniu rabochei sily pri SNK, 30/6/1941-15/5/1946, op.1, ‘Predislovie’, on the functions of the committee, i.e. to mobilise the non-working population into industry and distribute the workforce around different branches of the economy. In May 1946 the Committee was merged with the Main Administration of Labour Reserves into the Ministry of Labour Reserves, mainly responsible for the recruitment, often involuntary, of young people into trade and factory schools; the limitations on the travel of individuals into Leningrad, even former residents, to those with special permission from the City Soviet lasted until June 1946: Karpenko, ‘Sotsial’naia podderzhka reevakuantov’, pp.88-89.

\(^{363}\) TsGASPb, f.327, op.5, d.304, ll.1-24.

\(^{364}\) Ibid; see Vakser, *Leningrad Poslevoennyi*, p.20 on the prewar ethnic composition of Leningrad’s population being predominantly Russian (up to 90%), followed by Ukrainian, Belorusian, Tatar and Polish; the main change after the war was the non-return of exiled Germans and Finns, which will be discussed in the next chapter.

\(^{365}\) GARF, f.9517, op.1s, d.56, ll.1-129, here 1.1; mass demobilisation from the wartime army occurred in several waves from 23\(^{rd}\) June 1945 when the first demobilisation law was passed until March 1948, but
In addition, from 1940 the Leningrad City Administration of Labour Reserves was charged with sending adolescents between the ages of 14 and 17 to train for two years in trade schools or six months in factory schools in the city, after which they would then be required to work for four years in state enterprises according to the direction of the Central Administration of Labour Reserves. The City Administration produced monthly and quarterly reports for the Central Administration in Moscow on the fluctuations in the numbers of young people attached to each type of school, how many had been recruited in that period, and how many sent out to work; how many had been released due to illness, been expelled, or had run away and how many been brought back. The reports indicate that at any one time there were thousands of teenagers present in Leningrad who had been brought in and compelled to train at labour reserve schools in the city. At the start of April 1946, the time of the spring fair recollected by Petrov, for example, 8,600 trainees were registered at Leningrad’s factory schools and 20,878 at the two year trade schools. The secretary of the city committee of the Leningrad Komsomol organisation remarked at a national Komsomol conference which took place at the end of 1947 that by this time 40 percent of all the city’s industrial workers were young people, most of whom had arrived from the trade schools.

Once again the preoccupations of the central Soviet authorities at the end of the war shape the data. The records point, for example, to the importance of ethnicity in classifying the population and particularly to an emphasis on identifying the proportion of Jewish people among those entering the city. People determined to be of Jewish ethnicity were counted by the city’s Committee for the Redistribution of the Labour Force not just

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366 On mobilisation to the labour reserve schools as a widespread form of migration in the war and postwar years see Poliakov and Zhiromskaia, Naselenie Rossi, p.280.
367 See, for example, ‘Svodnye otchety o dvizhenii kontingenta uchashchikshiia remeslennykh uchilishch i shkol FZO (kvartal’nye otchety), ianvar’ 1946 – dekabr’ 1946’, TsGASPb, f.5016, op.2, d.50
368 Ibid, ll.30-31.
369 Rossiiskii Gosudarstvennyi Arkhiv Sotsial’no-Politicheskoi Istori, henceforth RGASPI, f.1M, op.5, d.33, l.125.
in absolute numerical terms, as were other nationalities, but also as a percentage of the total number of people coming into Leningrad in this way. Fixing people at a place of employment (trudoustroistvo) also emerges as a key organising concept in the marshalling of statistical information on the population, especially on veterans and young people. The available statistics from these sources do not, though, provide evidence for or against Ruble’s claim that the city was repopulated and rebuilt by complete newcomers to the city, largely from rural areas of the Soviet Union.

It cannot be assumed, for example, that all the demobilised soldiers were prewar residents returning to Leningrad, like the surviving fighters of the Izhorsk workers’ battalion. Work by V. N. Donchenko has suggested that about half of all those demobilised settled in urban areas, which, given that two thirds of the Soviet population lived in rural areas on the eve of the war represents a significant shift among this group from the countryside into cities such as Leningrad. By the same token, not all students of the trade and factory schools were adolescents transported into Leningrad from the collective farms of various regions. Newspaper accounts from the post-siege years about the biannual call up of young people to factory and trade schools mention Leningrad children taken out of the regular schooling system, or returning from the places across the Soviet Union to which they had been evacuated, as well as boys and girls recruited from the peasantry of the Leningrad, Kalinin and Orlov regions among others.

The breakdowns of the composition of the population arriving in Leningrad as part of official mobilisations into the labour force or with permission of the authorities,
moreover, exclude a potentially large number of statistically “invisible people” altogether.\textsuperscript{373} As with the people left in the blockaded city, the invisible incomers include both those deliberately excluded from representations of the population by the authorities and those who travelled outside of official regulation.

Several groups of people mobilised by the state into Leningrad in the reconstruction years after the blockade do not show up in figures based on residence registration and could not be mentioned by historians writing during much of the Soviet era. These were the so-called “special contingents” of un-free labourers, made up of prisoners; repatriated citizens and former Soviet prisoners of war who were not allowed to return to their previous residences; and German prisoners of war captured on Soviet territory.\textsuperscript{374}

That these groups played a significant role in the rebuilding of the cityscape can be gleaned from fragmentary evidence that can now be accessed in the archives and in recollections recounted in recent years. A report by the director of factory no.936 filed at the end of the 1940s, for example, objected to the closure of an MVD labour camp appended to the factory because the “special contingent” of labourers were fulfilling up to 75 percent of heavy construction.\textsuperscript{375} German prisoners of war, moreover, seem to have been a striking presence in the cityscape for many post-blockade inhabitants, in contrast to their lack of visibility in statistical surveys. An interview respondent in the European University project, for example, recounted meeting and observing a large group of German workers under escort rebuilding houses many times on the way to his institute after the war.\textsuperscript{376} Another claimed that German prisoners had been responsible for the reconstruction of the suburbs of Pushkin and Pavlovsk and had also worked as engineers in the factory in which she was employed, sharing the common canteen.\textsuperscript{377}

\textsuperscript{373} Vakser, \textit{Leningrad Poslevoennyi}, p.33 for the term “invisible people” (\textit{nevidimki}) denoting those not captured in official data and reports.
\textsuperscript{374} Ibid, p.31.
\textsuperscript{375} TsGAIPD, f.24, op.2v, cited in ibid, p.31 without reference to the specific file.
\textsuperscript{376} Interview with A. F. F., ATsUI, Interview No. BL-1-030, pp.12-13.
\textsuperscript{377} Interview with R. M. K., ATsUI, Interview No. BL-2A-027, p.6.
The frustration of attempts by the authorities to manage and monitor in-migration to Leningrad in 1944 is conveyed in comments made by the heads of the police service in that year. In the summer of 1944 the deputy chief of the Leningrad police, Ivan Averkiev, described the attempt to control movements of people into Leningrad in the following way:

Filtration is being carried out on all major stations and in Moscow. Constant checking is conducted on the (railway) routes. Apart from that, there are special defence posts (zagraditel’nye posty) on pedestrian routes crossing into Leningrad. But, so far as the striving to return to Leningrad is very great, individual people are getting through all the same, using various illegal routes. They are repeatedly thrown off trains. They cling on to goods wagons, to coal boxes. They get close to Leningrad and then try to pass through on military vehicles or on foot.\textsuperscript{378}

A report sent to the chairman of the City Soviet from the chief of the NKVD, Shiktorov, on the activities of the police in Leningrad in 1944, echoed this assessment about the violation of legal obstacles over entry to the city:

After the lifting of the blockade the size of the population sharply increased in connection with the re-evacuation of Leningraders and the mobilisation of workers for Leningrad’s industry. Regardless of the stringent restrictions on entry, all the same a significant influx has been observed of individuals not possessing documents for the right to live in Leningrad, who have ‘seeped through’ by means of various illegal routes.\textsuperscript{379}

Given the shortfall in the labour force experienced by most factories for the entire Soviet period and in particular in the postwar years, it is likely that many individuals continued

\textsuperscript{379} TsGASPh, f.7384, op.36, d.148, ll.11-17, here l.15.
to ‘seep through’ illegally, find work and settle in the city but how many and to what extent they were people who had lived in the city before the war cannot be calculated.\textsuperscript{380}

3.3 The lost population

Ruble acknowledges that any reconstruction of the postwar population is attempted “on the basis of scattered and incomplete information” and that the numbers cannot be established with any certainty.\textsuperscript{381} He supports his assertion that Leningrad became primarily a city of in-migrants in the first two years after the blockade, though, with the argument that substantial numbers of prewar city-dwellers died in the blockade, at the very least 632,253, and that many evacuees would not have made the trek back to the city in the first few years after the lifting of the siege. Aleksandr Vakser makes a similar case, although he claims that it was later, by the middle of the 1950s, that newcomers after the blockade came to constitute over half of the population.\textsuperscript{382} He attempts to prove this claim by quantifying the numbers of the prewar population who were lost during the war and could not have survived or returned to live in the post-siege city.

\textsuperscript{380} See White, ‘The Civilian Return’, p.1153 for the claim that those returning illegally no doubt found it easy to get work in places desperate for labour; see also a report by the city’s Sanitary Inspectorate that detailed fines it had issued in the early post-siege years to enterprises for recruiting workers independently, without obtaining the necessary permission from the Inspectorate based on the condition of the available accommodation: ‘Otchet o deiatel’nosti’, GARF, f.9226, op.1, d.897, l.101.

\textsuperscript{381} Ruble, ‘The Leningrad Affair’, p.305.

\textsuperscript{382} Vakser, “Chudo vozrozhdeniia”, p.322; a telephone survey carried out by the opinion poll company ‘TOI-Opinion’ in a joint project with the journal ‘Teleskop’ in November and December 2001 also reached a similar conclusion based on answers to questions about whether or not people were ‘indigenous Petersburgers’. The survey, designed to canvas the opinion of city-dwellers on a number of matters in the run-up to the 300 year anniversary of the city, encompassed 1007 respondents in the November poll and 1005 in December and asked them to state whether they were migrants to the city, whether they were born there as first generation ‘Petersburgers’ or whether they were ‘indigenous Petersburgers’. Residents of the city aged 50 and over comprised 37% of all those questioned but 51% of those who labelled themselves as migrants. According to the article produced on the basis of the polls, moreover, exactly 50% of this age category was made up of migrants. The article proposed that this could be explained “by a peak period of migration in the postwar years, which provided the replacement of the population of the city, which had perished in the time of the war and blockade”. In the December poll all respondents were also asked from where they or their ancestors had arrived and people 50 years old and over made up 71% of all those migrants who had arrived from the country: M. Ille and N. Iadov, ‘Peterburzhtsy. Otkuda my rodom?’, Teleskop, Nabludeniia za za povsednevnoi zhizniu peterburzhtev: Sankt-Peterburgskii zhurnal, No.1 (2002), pp.9-12, here p.10; the data here are based on a very small sample but what is most interesting is the attempt to categorise respondents according to their proximity to being ‘indigenous’ inhabitants.
Vakser posits that of a prewar population of 3,400,000 only 600,000 were left in the city when the blockade was lifted. Up to 1,200,000 died in the city during the siege, he continues, while of the 1,000,000 who were evacuated over 200,000 perished, as did 120,000-140,000 of the 600-700,000 who joined the army, navy and people’s militias. This produces an approximate total of 1,500,000 residents who did not survive the war. As a result, he states, theoretically only about 1,300,000-1,400,000 of the pre-war population could have returned from evacuation or the front to the city to join those who remained in the city. In practice, according to Vakser, far from all of these returned. He estimates the number of those who remained in their place of evacuation or settled in other cities and villages as a minimum of 100-200,000 and concludes, therefore, that the maximum possible number of “Leningraders returning to their native land” could not have exceeded about 1,100,000.³⁸³ When added to the 600,000 left in the city this comes to 1,700,000 people. As the recorded population grew to 2,814,000 by the middle of the 1950s, primarily on account of in-migration, it reached a level of over twice the number who could have been prewar city inhabitants.³⁸⁴

In his attempt to quantify the ‘lost population’ Vakser uses very approximate figures, without reference to his sources. If all Soviet demographic statistics should be treated with caution, moreover, then this is never more the case than when dealing with estimates of the number of people who died in the course of the blockade and evacuation from Leningrad. Assessments of these figures are particularly beset by issues such as the frustration of the efforts of institutions responsible for demographic records to keep pace with developments; the impact of the definitions and criteria employed by observers; and the effects of the political climate, in particular the implications of the evolving myth of the war for investigations made within the Soviet Union.

A total of 649,000 deaths was established by the Leningrad City and District Commission for Ascertaining and Investigating the Crimes of the German-Fascist Invaders by the end of the war on the basis of lists compiled by 6445 members of the commission working in

the districts and suburbs of Leningrad from May 1943 and drawing on the records of the city’s registry offices (ZAGSy). These included 632,253 deaths from starvation in the fifteen city districts and two suburban settlements of Kolpino and Kronstadt and 16,747 fatalities as a result of the bombing of the city.\footnote{Svedeniia gorodskoi komissii po ustanovleniu i rassledovaniu zhloedianii nemetsko-fashistskikh zakhvatchikov i ikh soobshchikov o chisel pogibshego v leningrade naselenienia’, TsGASPb, f.8557, op.6, d.1108, ll.46-7, as published in Dzeniskevich, (ed.), Leningrad v osade. pp.573-574.} According to Andrei Dzeniskevich, a Russian historian still working on the subject of the blockade, a special commission was been set up by Andrei Zhdanov in 1944 to check conclusions about the number of starvation victims but if it produced any findings then these must have disappeared along with other documents of his personal file after his death.\footnote{A. R. Dzeniskevich, Blokada i politika. Oborona Leningrada v politicheskoi kon’iunkture, (St Petersburg: Nestor, 1998), p.51.} The figures of 632,253 people dead from starvation and 16,747 from bombardment were submitted evidence at the Nuremberg Trials, which took place from November 1945 to October 1946.\footnote{Ibid, p.52 and Koval’chuk and Sobolev, ‘Leningradskii “rekviem”’, p.191.} Then, in the words of Dzeniskevich “for ten long years the subject of the heroic defence of Leningrad was practically excluded from the historiography of the Great Patriotic war of the Soviet Union”\footnote{Dzeniskevich, Blokada i politika, p.11.}.

The experience of the siege and the number of victims became a topic of study once more during the Thaw occasioned by Krushchev’s secret speech of 1956. Initially publications appearing in the wake of Khrushchev’s speech tended to reproduce the Nuremberg figures, however a number of works were issued in the Soviet Union throughout the 1960s and 1970s that questioned the officially accepted figures for the number of blockade victims.\footnote{For works which continued to cite the Nuremberg figure see A.V. Karasev, Leningradtsy v gody blokady, 1941-1943 (Moscow: Izdatel’stvo Akademii Nauk SSSR, 1959), p.185; N.D. Khudiakova, Vsia strana s Leningradom (1941-1943gg). KPSS – organizator vseroadoi pomoshchi Leningradu v gody blokady (Leningrad: Lenizdat, 1960), p.57.} Some referred to documents produced by organs of the city administration which suggested that many more people had been buried or cremated in the city during the siege than those accounted for in the Nuremberg figures and some accounts maintained that no fewer than a million people had died in all.\footnote{Figures compiled in a report by the Leningrad party committee’s department of city management and city transport on the basis of information provided by cemeteries, for example, gave totals of 1,093,000
researchers Koval’chuk and Sobolev made calculations based on the number of people living in the city at the beginning and end of the blockade and concluded that “no fewer than 800,000 Leningraders died from hunger”.\footnote{391}

The higher figures for people who did not live through the blockade were reproduced in publications in the west that appeared at this time. In his book of 1969, for example, Harrison Salisbury maintained that the death toll in Leningrad had been minimised by Stalin and the Leningrad leadership to suppress questions over their wartime failures and mask the country’s weakness at the end of the war. He reported a number of alternative figures from those of 800,000 and just over 1,000,000 to estimates apparently made by foreign students that as many as 2,000,000 people had died.\footnote{392} He speculated that a number in the vicinity of 1,300,000 deaths seemed reasonable, and a similar conclusion was reached by Leon Gouré.\footnote{393}

Then in 1975 any further investigation, clarification and debate on the numbers of blockade victims within the Soviet Union ceased for another ten years. From the early 1970s Brezhnev, his personal authority secured, promoted an increasingly narrow and idealized version of the war as a legitimising myth for the Soviet polity. For the next decade, in the words of Tumarkin, “a full blown cult of the Great Patriotic War trumpeted...
a nationwide celebration of a tinsel-covered triumph of the Forces of Good over Forces of Evil”.394

It was in this context that Dmitrii Pravlov, who had railed angrily against the suppression of the story of the siege in the wake of the Leningrad Affair but who, as the official responsible for food supply in the city in the early part of the blockade, wished to emphasise the successful struggle with the invaders and with hunger waged by the party leadership and the Leningrad population, sent a letter to Central Committee secretary Mikhail Suslov. Pavlov demanded that the figure of 649,000 dead presented at the Nuremberg trial should be preferred in Soviet publications to the higher numbers, which had been seized upon by “falsificators of history in the west”, who wished to show that practically the entire population left in the city after evacuation perished.395 The Nuremberg figures, being the most reliable, according to Pavlov, and buttressed by evidence from the number of ration cards issued throughout the siege, were evidence that “the absolute majority of inhabitants of the city, thanks to the efforts of the party Central Committee and the Government, was saved”.396 The deputy head of the Central Committee’s Propaganda Department and the head of the Administrative Organs Department concurred with Pavlov’s assessment and, in response to his request not to allow the publication of any other figure, advised Suslov that a strict approach should be enforced with regards to publishing data about losses during the blockade.397

In the wake of this correspondence the censor did not allow figures to appear in print that deviated from the official position and subsequent works on the city and the blockade, including the well known collection of memoirs edited by Ales Adamovich and Daniil Granin, which came out in 1982, avoided printing any statistics on the number of deaths.398 The historiographical landscape shifted once more with the introduction of

394 Tumarkin, The Living & The Dead, p.124.
396 Ibid.
397 ‘Spravka k voprosu o zhertvakh naseleniia Leningrada v period vrazheskoi blokady’, in ibid, p.90.
398 Discussed in Dzeniskevich, Blokada i Politika, p.53; the third edition of the book Nepokorennyyi Leningrad, edited by Dzeniskevich, Koval’chuk and Sobolev, among others, which had first come out in 1970, did not provide a figure either for the complete death toll of the blockade when it was issued again in 1985. Instead, the authors vaguely referred to “the death of many hundreds of thousands of inhabitants of
“Glasnost’ and then the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991, the opening up of the archives and the removal of restrictions on debates over Soviet victims of the Second World War. Interestingly, while scholars from the west tend to reiterate a figure of about 1,000,000 deaths, Russian researchers who have resumed their investigations often cast doubt on both the lower and higher totals.\textsuperscript{399} Koval’chuk’s more recent assessments of the archival evidence of changes in the population have led him to conclude that in Leningrad itself during the blockade, “not 800,000 but roughly 700,000 Leningraders died” and a similar number is arrived at by Poliakov and Zhiromskaia.\textsuperscript{400}

The analysis of the number of deaths offered in a particular account depends not just on the changing political climate but on the definition of a ‘siege victim’ and of a ‘Leningrader’ employed by the researcher themselves. The argument made in different accounts varies according to how the author approaches questions such as whether the total should include deaths from starvation or from bombing and other causes as well; deaths in the entire blockade period or just the winter of 1941-2; military as well as civilian deaths; and deaths in evacuation or only those that occurred within the city limits. Where the aim of researchers has been to establish the number of ‘Leningraders’ who died then the conclusion reached is also affected by differing social and geographical delineations of the population, such as whether a ‘Leningrader’ includes the soldiers posted in the city, people in the regional areas under siege, and of course the ‘refugees’ from the Baltics and Leningrad region.

As we have seen it is not possible to clearly separate these different groups in practice but the attempt to do so affects statistical representations of demographic consequences of the blockade. The authors of one account from 1965, for example, argued not only that the Nuremberg figure was inaccurate but also that to it should be added deaths from starvation in regional areas such as Oranienbaum, Sestroretsk, which were situated within

\textsuperscript{399} Kirschenbaum, \textit{The Legacy of the Siege}, p.122; Glantz, \textit{The Battle for Leningrad}, p.468; Bidlack, ‘Workers at War’, p.27.
\textsuperscript{400} Koval’chuk, ‘Tragicheskie tsifry blokady’, p.365; Poliakov and Zhiromskaia, \textit{Naselenie Rossii}, p.46.
the German encirclement. Another volume published the following year in the Soviet Union, which made reference to a figure of over a million people buried, stipulated that servicemen who had been buried within the city and those who had died before November, that is from causes other than starvation, needed to be deducted from the data, while the large but unknown number who had died going into evacuation should be added to it. Koval’chuk and Sobolev in 1965 included 100,000 refugees from the Baltics and Leningrad region in their calculation of population numbers and losses in the blockade, while more recently Poliakov and Zhiromskaia have attempted to separate out data for these ‘non-Leningraders’, while also stating that to their figures should be added uncalculated numbers of deaths among evacuees.

Any of the methods that have been used for establishing the number of deaths within the blockade, and also in evacuation, are unreliable in the final analysis. There is validity to criticisms levelled by Dzeniskevich, Koval’chuk and Sobolev at both the Nuremberg figures and the higher data based on the records of the Funeral Trust and city cemeteries. Koval’chuk and Sobolev argue, for example, that the Nuremberg figures based on lists of the dead who had been registered in the city towards the end of the war were not likely to include all those who had died as:

Leningraders registered the death of their friends and family in ZAGSy, standing for many hours in sorrowful queues in order to do this. But with the onset of winter and the sharp increase in deaths, the weakened population, not having the strength to bury the dead, far from always registered their deaths.

They cite a document generated compiled by the City Commission, attesting that statements were still being received by the commission from demobilised soldiers about the death of their family in 1947, after the figures had been presented at the Nuremberg

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401 Iablochkin, Na zashchite nevskoi tverdnyi, p.24.
403 Koval’chuk and Sobolev, ‘Leningradskii “rekviem”’, p.193; Poliakov and Zhiromskaia, Naselenie Rossi, p.45.
Trials. Koval’chuk also took issue with Dmitrii Pavlov’s defence of the figure on account of evidence provided by the number of ration cards issued, citing Pavlov’s own admission that there were many abuses of the ration card system. Dzeniskevich demonstrates that the document produced by the city’s cemeteries claiming that over a million people had been buried or cremated was also unreliable and prone to exaggerate the actual number of people buried. According to Dzeniskevich, a report by the chief of Leningrad’s police provides evidence for the possibility of overstatements in the records of bodies transported for burial at the cemeteries. The report confirms that progressive pay was introduced for drivers and labourers engaged in this task in order to speed up the removal of bodies from the streets. There was very little control over the work of these people and cases were discovered in which their delivery records claimed for more bodies than had actually been taken to the cemeteries in order to receive the additional vodka and bread.

The figures calculated on the basis of population numbers are also, however, likely to be inaccurate. No reliable data on death rates or population levels are likely to have been established given the situation in the winter of 1941 described thus by Dmitrii Pavlov himself:

Death overtook people anywhere…Employees of the municipal public services and health service cruised the streets and alleys to pick up the bodies, loading them on trucks. Frozen bodies, drifted over with snow, lined the cemeteries and their approaches. There was not strength enough to dig into the deeply frozen earth. Civil defence crews would blast the ground to make mass graves, into which they would lay tens and sometimes hundreds of bodies without even knowing the names of those they buried.  

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405 Ibid; for Pavlov’s work supporting the Nuremberg figure see, for example Pavlov, *Leningrad 1941*, p.125 and *Stoikost* (Moscow: Politizdat, 1979), p.109.
407 Dzeniskevich, *Blokada i politika*, p.60.
M.I. Frolov, who has worked with Dzeniskevich, avers that a precise figure cannot be obtained on the basis of demographic data from the archives, however his approach using registers of household tenants (domovyе knigi) has its own problems. Many of these registers were destroyed in the war, however, and Frolov’s method of extrapolating from registers of a ‘typical’ street for which data is available is flawed. The household registers, moreover, themselves became very quickly out of date as people ‘roamed around’ the city to find secure places to live. It is likely, therefore, that the final word on the number of blockade deaths will have to remain the statement from the Soviet government made in 1964 in response to an official Swedish enquiry was published in the military newspaper Krasnaia Zvezda, in which it admitted that “no-one knows exactly how many people died in Leningrad and the Leningrad area”.

Certainly no-one knows how many people died in evacuation from Leningrad. Recollections by survivors of the journey into evacuation often refer to the deaths of fellow passengers on the trains on the way. Vera, an interviewee in the blockade project, for example, related how “when we were travelling, many people died. They didn’t make it (into evacuation), and were taken off the train somewhere”.

How many actually died though is not likely to be ascertained from the fragments of data available. A memorandum written by the head of the transport section of the NKVD of the northern railway in March 1942 mentioned “cases of mass illness and death” among evacuees from the city in transit. He gave several examples, including the case of a trainload of people arriving into Vologda from Leningrad on 22nd February from which 62 bodies had already been removed at other stations and 8 were discovered on arrival at

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409 M.I. Frolov, ‘K voprosу o chisle pogibshikh v blokadu (po materialam domovykh knig)’, in Dzeniskevich (ed.), Zhizн i smert v osazhdennom Leningrade, pp.86-95, here, p.86.
410 ‘Otvet Sovetskogo pravitel’stva na zapros Shvedskogo pravitel’stva’, Krasnaia Zvezda, 28/6/1964, as cited in, among others, Samsonov (ed.), Vtoraia Mirovaia Voina, p.160 and Koval’chuk and Sobolev, ‘Leningradskii “rekviem”’, p.192; the conclusion that the number of victims of the blockade, whose remains lie in mass graves in Leningrad’s cemeteries and whose ashes rest in the city’s Victory Park, will never be known has recently been underscored by John Barber on the basis of an examination of the files of the city’s Funeral Trust: J. Barber, ‘Bor’ba s katastrofоi: Leningradskii trest “pokhoronnoe delo”’ v 1941-1942gg’, Klio: Mezhvuzovskii zhurnal dlia uchenykh, No.3 (2000), pp.174-179, here p.179.
411 Interview with V. N. K., ATUI, Interview No. BL-2A-024, p.6.
412 TsGASPh, f.7384, op.3, d.50, ll.36-38, published in Dzeniskevich, Leningrad v Osade, pp.292-294, here p.293.
Vologda. In total in February and March 1942, according to Poliakov and Zhiromskaia, 2102 bodies were removed from the trains carrying Leningrad evacuees on the way to Vologda alone.\textsuperscript{413} Poliakov and Zhiromskaia give other figures for deaths at particular stations in certain time periods, stating for example that in the town of Iaroslavl’ and the Iaroslavl’ region more than 8,000 evacuees from Leningrad died in 1942.\textsuperscript{414} They make no claim for a complete, overall total of those who died based on these various scattered pieces of data, however.

In a recent monograph A. Sokolov extrapolates an aggregate number of deaths in evacuation from figures of about 20,000 evacuees buried in Vologda and Iasrolsavl’ in total and a death rate of about 26.9% among students evacuated from the special Air-Force school, from which Sokolov himself graduated in 1944, into Oirot-Tura, 4105km away from Leningrad in Siberia. On the basis of these he projects that 200,000 to 300,000 Leningraders perished in evacuation, in railway wagons, in hospitals at stations en route or on arrival.\textsuperscript{415} The examples from which Sokolov draws his conclusion, however, are not necessarily representative of the evacuation as a whole and Sokolov himself admits that “not in every collective were the victims the same as in the special school”, adding that losses were higher among some groups and lower among others.\textsuperscript{416}

Finally, Vakser’s claim that a minimum of 100-200,000 people remained in their places of evacuation or settled in other cities and villages is also impossible to substantiate. Impressionistic accounts from other sources suggest that this figure may be too high. M. N. Potemkina discusses in her work on re-evacuation the “suitcase” moods (chemodannye nastroeniia”) among the evacuated population in general at the end of the war and among those from Leningrad in particular, which contributed to high labour desertion rates in places of evacuation, as they strove to return home.\textsuperscript{417} Interview respondent Tamara described how there were many people from Leningrad in evacuation

\textsuperscript{413} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{414} Poliakov and Zhiromskaia, \textit{Naselenie Rossii}, p.45.
\textsuperscript{416} Ibid, p.272.
in the Kirov Region and as soon as they heard the city had been liberated the mood was: “Home. Home. Home. Home”. 418 Many of these evacuees, whose sense of attachment to Leningrad as a collective homeland was being simulated by their absence from the besieged city rather than, or as well as, their presence there, were no doubt among those who got through into Leningrad without being counted by the authorities on goods wagons and on foot. 419

3.4 The unruly population

In addition to large wartime losses among the population in Leningrad, both Ruble and Vakser advance other claims for a postwar ‘city of migrants’. In particular they both assert a qualitative change in the population as well as a quantitative one. Ruble, for example, identifies three characteristics of the postwar population from the regime’s records that suggest many of its members were newly arrived from rural areas rather than returning evacuees: “[it] was predominantly female, it was relatively undisciplined, and relatively unskilled”. 420 Leningrad had, of course, like other Soviet cities, lost many of its prewar male residents and workers, however Ruble imputes particular significance to this occurrence in the second capital as marking a rupture with its past. In the postwar years, “behind the neo-classical and baroque facades of the Moika and Fontanka”, he writes, were no longer living “dispossessed gentry and honoured revolutionary heroes” but dislocated, female, untrained and unruly peasants. 421 The same premise underlies Vakser’s framing of the demographic consequences of the blockade in terms of the loss of a particular culture and style of behaviour belonging to “Petersburg-Piter-Leningrad”. 422

418 Interview with T. P. Kh., AtsUI, Interview No. BL-1-035, p.21.
419 Baron and Gatrell, ‘Population Displacement’ p.57 on how displacement may stimulate a longing for home, a collective identity and a shared nostalgia.
420 Ruble, ‘The Leningrad Affair’, p.305; see also Vakser, Leningrad Poslevoennyi, p.29.
422 Vakser, “Chudo Vozrozhdeniia”, p.322; The term ‘Piterskii’ is used to refer to industrial workers living in the city from before the revolution whose identity was bound up with the city’s renowned factories and ‘Peterburgskii’ to an elite and intellectual pre-revolutionary myth and identity: M. V. Rabzhaeva and V. E. Semenkov, ‘Kakaia identichnost’ u zhitelei Sankt-Peterburga?’: http://socis_isras.ru/Soc/sArticles/2003_03/Rabzhaeva_Semenkov.doc, 2003, p.12, last accessed 17/2/2009.
Ruble’s claim that official documents bemoaning the unruliness of the postwar population are evidence of the qualitative demographic change from a city of nobles and skilled workers to a city of ill-disciplined in-migrants belies a ‘sedentarist’ perspective that not only replicates the equation of displaced people with disorder but does not take into account the migrations that had played a role in the constitution of the city for many years before the siege.

A quick look at the data on migration recorded by the city’s Statistical Administration for prewar years, however, points to the high turnover in the population that had been taking place since the revolution:

Table 2: Arrival and Departure from Leningrad, including suburban towns

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Years</th>
<th>Arrived (thousands)</th>
<th>Departed (thousands)</th>
<th>Mechanical Growth (thousands)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1923</td>
<td>201.9</td>
<td>135.9</td>
<td>66.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1924</td>
<td>376.1</td>
<td>245.3</td>
<td>130.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1925</td>
<td>426.2</td>
<td>299.1</td>
<td>127.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1926</td>
<td>465.0</td>
<td>380.7</td>
<td>84.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1927</td>
<td>464.5</td>
<td>421.0</td>
<td>43.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1928</td>
<td>491.7</td>
<td>404.8</td>
<td>86.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1929</td>
<td>524.8</td>
<td>398.1</td>
<td>126.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1930</td>
<td>719.4</td>
<td>414.1</td>
<td>305.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1931</td>
<td>867.5</td>
<td>380.8</td>
<td>486.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1932</td>
<td>767.7</td>
<td>576.4</td>
<td>191.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1933</td>
<td>408.1</td>
<td>387.7</td>
<td>20.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1934</td>
<td>450.4</td>
<td>427.4</td>
<td>23.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1935</td>
<td>438.0</td>
<td>462.3</td>
<td>-24.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1936</td>
<td>512.4</td>
<td>444.5</td>
<td>67.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1937</td>
<td>502.6</td>
<td>485.4</td>
<td>17.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1938</td>
<td>492.9</td>
<td>461.2</td>
<td>31.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1939</td>
<td>273.7</td>
<td>373.8</td>
<td>-101.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1940</td>
<td>383.6</td>
<td>332.6</td>
<td>51.0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

TsGASPb, f.4965, op.8, d.738
These figures again, if anything, underestimate the annual fluctuations in the city’s population as they do not include people arriving and departing outside the purview of the authorities. They show that the arrival of several hundred thousand people into Leningrad in a year was nothing unusual. Many of these in-migrants, furthermore, came from rural areas, for example in 1932 less than 20 percent of all recorded migrants came from towns.\textsuperscript{423} The Soviet regime, at the same time, had encouraged, and at times enforced, the occupation of rooms in houses in the centre of the city formerly belonging to the local upper and middle classes by workers and new arrivals. This process, resisted by many at first, accelerated during the early 1930s as the first Five Year Plan prompted particularly high migration into the city. The social structure of much of the city’s housing behind the baroque facades on the eve of the war, therefore, was already heterogeneous.\textsuperscript{424}

The interviewee Vladislav, who spoke of the friendships he formed with the children of ‘refugees’ during the blockade, also provides a glimpse of the diverse residents of his parents’ communal flat on a central Leningrad prospect on the eve of the siege. In two rooms of the flat lived Vladislav, his sister, his father, an engineer who had been born in Kronstadt, and his mother, a member of the old ‘intelligentsia’ from Moscow who had been denied entry to study in an institute because of her undesirable class background. They had lived there since the early 1920s. A party member, formerly a worker at the Putilov works and now a director of a cardboard enterprise, lived with his wife and daughter in one large room and a family who had arrived from the countryside after the revolution lived in another. A couple of teachers and their children occupied two big rooms at the front of the building and another family inhabited a small space in the corner of the kitchen. In the late 1930s a young woman from the countryside outside Leningrad arrived to live with Vladislav’s family as a nanny.\textsuperscript{425} In short, Vladislav recalls, “there were various kinds of people”.\textsuperscript{426}

\textsuperscript{424} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{425} Interview with V.G.G., ATsUI, Interview No. BL-1-026, pp.2-3.
\textsuperscript{426} Ibid. p.28.
Katerina Gerasimova has explored how people from different backgrounds, who had lived in the city for different amounts of time, often lived side by side, in some cases distancing themselves from each other, in others spying on each other and in others providing mutual assistance and exchanging protection, knowledge and traditions. Vladislav emphasises both the friendly relations in his communal apartment, where families baked together in the kitchen, for example, and also habits that marked him out as different from the children of workers and peasants in the flat, such as his tendency to stay at home, indoors. The conditions of the siege prompted further moves, overturned the substance of everyday life, and interrupted in some ways the developing interrelations and creation of “micro orders” inside the city’s housing. At the same time the blockade period can be understood in many ways as a continuation of such prewar processes and their intensification.

Vladislav, for example, relates the death of some of the prewar residents of his apartment at the front or from starvation, the arrival of new residents into their rooms, the departure of his father to start a new family with a woman he met while digging trenches, his own evacuation and return and that of others, in a narrative that foregrounds both the continually shifting landscape of the communal apartment and the centrality of connections formed there in his life. For others, the blockade period was their first experience of the movement of people from the traditional workers’ districts and accommodation into flats in the city centre, which, even if emptied of their former inhabitants, were often still full of their possessions. One interviewee, for example, recollected how her father moved from an outlying workers’ settlement that had been heavily bombed into a more central apartment, where “what struck me was that there was someone else’s furniture there. Still more, there was a piano, something which my father had never had in his life”. The unfamiliar surroundings of the apartment here engender not so much a sense of ‘homelessness’ but of social change.

428 Interview with V.G.G., ATsUI, Interview No. BL-1-026, p.29.
430 Interview with V.G.G., ATsUI, Interview No. BL-1-026.
431 Interview with S. P. S., ATUI, Interview No. BL-1-003, p.11.
The recollections of other interviewees also reflect on the blockade as a period of social transformation and exchange, often manifested in the bartering of once valuable items for any kind of food with Soviet officials, army officers, black marketeers or with people from the suburbs who were able to grow some food. One interviewee, for example, depicted the trade of her mother’s antiques, including a porcelain clock and a candelabra, for some grain and coconut oil. They later used the remaining money to buy a hut and a cow while in evacuation in Siberia. Another recalled bartering clothing for vegetables with people “not of the highest social standing” who came in from the suburbs. His mother also traded their antique crystal with the wife of a director of a wood treatment factory, who “took what she liked…some wine glasses, a decanter…And gave us joiner’s glue in return”.

Richard Bidlack has discussed this process of barter in terms of the entrenchment of the privilege of a Soviet elite likely to possess valuable trading items. Wartime population movements in the city and exchanges of goods, however, also probably informed the creation of narratives that understood the hunger, sufferings and deaths of the blockade in terms of a civic transformation. These narratives included ones that gave meaning to the war as a time of social levelling and the formation of a cohesive community of Leningraders and also ones that conceived the siege in terms of the loss of prewar Leningrad, the loss of ‘Petersburg’.

In a short story written for children in 1975, for example, Liudmila Matveeva drew on her own wartime childhood experiences in a depiction of the clothes, belongings and habits that marked out ‘bourgeois’ residents of a house in Leningrad from the rest of its working class occupants. The story traces how these two worlds are bridged during the war by a common experience of maintaining fortitude and dignity in the face of hunger. The family from the pre-revolutionary intelligentsia in this tale retain some of their

432 Interview with E. S. M., ATsUI, Interview No. BL-1-010, p.6.
433 Interview with A. N. K., ATsUI, Interview No. BL-2A-002, p.5.
434 Ibid, p.6; joiner’s glue was one of the notorious substitutes for food consumed by starving Leningraders
luxurious possessions and habits but become no longer alien as they share their dinner of small, brown potatoes with bitter cotton-seed oil. It “was before the war that they were rich and now it is another story” comments one of the neighbours. On the other hand a Leningrad poet who survived the blockade wrote in 1996 of his reaction to reading the document that stated over one million people had been buried during the blockade. He describes how he commented to a friend that it was as if all Leningrad had died and “only we were saved by a miracle”. Well, replied his friend, “the prewar Leningrad, about which you speak, those who were still Petersburgers – they all died”.

This chapter has shown that the actual number of people who did die in the blockade, and the extent of the “non-return” of members of the prewar population in general, cannot be established. It is possible to conclude, however, that the argument made by historians such as Ruble and Vakser that Leningrad changed fundamentally from a city of gentry and skilled workers to a ‘city of migrants’ as a result of the blockade is based on a commemoration of loss that, as with Kirschenbaum’s story of blockade survivors, actually effaces many of the different comings and goings that were occurring before, as well as after, the war. Prewar residents returned from evacuation alongside newcomers, where they joined a population of blockade survivors many of whom had experienced their own displacements before or during the war.

This chapter and the proceeding one have highlighted some of the diverse mobilities and cross-cutting identities of the city’s post-siege population that resist attempts at categorisation and quantification by government officials and scholars alike. The next chapter will examine further the processes by which the population was reconstituted after the blockade. It will explore the decisions by the authorities and by individuals that shaped demographic growth in the city. It will discuss, for example, how the composition of the population was affected by competing visions of the civic and national polity

438 Ibid, p.308.
developing at the end of the war and how these visions were forged, enacted and undermined through the movements of the population.
Chapter 4. The constitution of a ‘Family of Leningraders’

4.1 ‘Pure’ and ‘Impure’ Leningraders

On 23rd January 1944, while Soviet troops were still fighting German forces in the suburban towns of Pushkin and Pavlovsk, and the last shells were falling on the territory of the Izhorsk factory, the chairman of the Leningrad City Soviet, Piotr Popkov, wrote to the Leningrad party leadership about preparing the city’s housing for the return of evacuees. Popkov had been responsible for much of the day to day administration of the besieged city while Andrei Zhdanov, first party secretary at the time and a member of the Politburo, was involved in military matters and executing instructions emanating from Moscow. Popkov recounted to Zhdanov and other secretaries of the city’s Party Committee, Aleksei Kuznetsov and Iakov Kapustin, how the proximity of the frontline, the devastation of the housing stock by German bombing, and the sequestering of wooden buildings for firewood had necessitated “the resettlement of a large number of citizens who had remained in Leningrad”. The rooms of servicemen had, in accordance with a government decree, been preserved for them, as had the accommodation of the city’s scientific and cultural figures. A “significant part” of the housing of people

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441 'Dokladaia zapiska P.S. Popkova sekretariam GK VKP(b) A.A. Zhdanovu, A.A. Kuznetsovui, Ia.F. Kapustinui o poteriakh zhiloego fonda goroda i merakh po podgotovke k vozvrashcheniu v Leningrad evakirovannykh', TsGAIPD, f.24, op.2-v, d.6687, ll.204-206, as published in Dzeniskevich (ed), Leningrad v osade, pp.559-560, here p.559.
442 Most city-dwellers did not own their apartments, as most urban housing was owned by the city Soviet and other organisations including enterprises, trade unions and central ministries. Those registered as tenants had, in theory at least, certain rights to their rooms, but according to a law of 1937 an absence of more than six months from one’s apartment could result in a loss of occupancy rights: R. Manley, ‘“Where should we resettle the comrades next?” The adjudication of housing claims and the construction of the post-war order’, in Fürst (ed), Late Stalinist Russia, pp.233-246, here pp.234-235 and footnote 13, p.243.
evacuated to the east, however, was now inhabited by those in the city who had lost their prewar rooms, as well as by people who had arrived from occupied territories.443

Now, Popkov continued, the city authorities had to prepare for the impending task of placing in accommodation the “citizens who will return to Leningrad”. 444 In order to facilitate the allocation of living space to returnees, he proposed that several changes should be made to Soviet wartime housing laws in the case of Leningrad. Firstly, he suggested that the additional measures limiting ‘unplanned’ (samoupravnyi) entry into Leningrad should be buttressed by a law that accommodation would only be given to people who had been resident in housing in Leningrad previously and were returning to the city with the permission of the municipal Soviet. Returning evacuees, however, should not be guaranteed their pre-war accommodation. Decrees issued by the Soviet government in 1942 stipulated that people who had been evacuated with institutions or as individuals, although not those who had left with their factories, retained their entitlement to the rooms in which they had lived before the war. If the Leningrad administration were to abide by this law, though, Popkov argued, it would entail the “resettlement of a large number of citizens who had lived in and looked after the space for more than two years in the conditions of the siege”. 445 Instead he proposed that those returning from the east be allocated accommodation from the general housing stock.

Finally, Popkov concluded, anyone who had moved into their current living space on their own initiative before 1st July 1943, without the sanction of the authorities, should be evicted. Those citizens who had arrived during the war as a result of the occupation of the Baltic republics, Karelian isthmus and Leningrad region and had been granted somewhere to live in the city, “not being Leningraders”, should be deprived of the housing they had been given and returned to their regions.446

444 Ibid.
446 Ibid, p.561.
It seems that the Council of People’s Commissars did consider ruling that in Leningrad re-evacuees should not necessarily be returned their prewar accommodation but that this foundered on objections from the state prosecutor, who had ultimate responsibility for adjudicating competing housing claims.447 In the meantime, Zhdanov, who was shortly to leave the city to become the Soviet envoy in Helsinki and then to return after the war to Stalin’s inner circle in Moscow, formulated a sharply worded resolution in response to Popkov’s request. In this resolution, Zhdanov objected to the proposition to remove people from Leningrad who had been evacuated out of the Leningrad region and the Baltic states in 1941. It was not acceptable, he remonstrated, to display such a “lordly” attitude and to make distinctions between “pure” (chistye) and “impure” (nechistye) Leningraders.448

The main themes of this chapter are crystallised in this exchange. These include the importance of the “housing question” in shaping the contours of the post-siege migration into Leningrad; the allocation of rights to travel and settlement and the obligation to resettle as crucial sites in the articulation of the desired postwar order on a national and local level; and the potential for conflict as well as overlap between competing visions of belonging, entitlement, hierarchy and exclusion expressed by different actors at the end of the war.449

The chapter begins with a section examining the attempts of the central regime to control the distribution of the population after the war as part of its reassertion of power over the whole of Soviet territory, in particular newly liberated areas, its attempts to manage the country’s heavily destroyed and overburdened infrastructure, and its imposition of a postwar order in which service to the state and tasks of economic reconstruction loomed

447 Manley, “‘Where should we resettle’”, pp.235-236.
448 Dzeniskevich (ed), Leningrad vosade, p.561.
449 Manley, “‘Where should we settle’”, p.234 on the ranking of conflicting housing claims as a principal site in which postwar hierarchies were articulated; the problem of housing shortage was a perennial one in the Soviet Union that, just like that of labour shortage, was exacerbated by the havoc and destruction wreaked by the war on Soviet territory. The significance of the inadequacy of housing for Soviet people was evoked in Mikhail Bulgakov’s novel Master and Margerita, unpublished until after Stalin’s death. See, for example, Woland’s comment in the story that Muscovites are ordinary people, “the apartment question only has spoilt them” as well as many scenes in the novel based on this sentiment: M. Bulgakov, Master i Margerita (Moscow: Eksmo-Press, 1999), p.135.
large. The chapter explores how these priorities could be at odds with the expectations of the Soviet population themselves and with the particularistic imagining of a community of Leningraders by the municipal authorities and the city’s inhabitants. The final three sections discuss the ways in which the evasion and negotiation of controls over their movements by many people, and the response of the Leningrad administration to the incoming population, operated in tension with the aims of the centre. The actions of the local authorities and of people on the move were also at play in shaping the physical and discursive post-siege city.

4.2 Everyone is needed in their place

Derek Summerfield has outlined how war and invasion involve the rupture of the external boundaries of a state and also disruption of its physical infrastructure and social orders of place, roles and behaviour. The challenge of peacetime rebuilding in the aftermath of war, he maintains, entails reconstructing boundaries and also a “mode of communal order”. In the case of the Soviet Union during the Second World War the state borders had shifted back and forth. A great swathe of territory had been occupied and undergone wholesale destruction and the material cost of the war was put at thousands of billions of rubles by a state commission. This included the destruction of cities and towns, of industrial enterprises, agricultural stock and railway bridges. The country faced deprivation and reconstruction tasks on a level with the defeated powers. The war, moreover, had left an estimated 27 million Soviet citizens dead “but also millions of

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450 Benedict Anderson famously coined the idea of ‘imagined communities’ in relation to the creation of nations that made a powerful claim on human loyalties. He also noted that “all communities larger than primordial villages of face-to-face contact (and perhaps even these) are imagined. Communities are distinguished not by their falsity/genuineness, but by the style in which they are imagined”: B. Anderson, *Imagined Communities: Reflections on the Origin and Spread of Nationalism*, revised edition (London and New York: Verso, 1991), p.6.


452 Zubkova, *Russia After the War*, p.20.
widows, orphans and invalids”. Millions more people had been dislocated across and within Soviet borders, including soldiers, prisoners of war, people sent by the invading forces into forced labour in Germany, and also evacuees and the ethnic groups exiled to the east. The society emerging from the war was made up of new groupings, marked “by a mentality born of the war”, including assertive veterans and also people distinguished by their type of displacement, such as evacuees or repatriates. Despite the surge of unifying patriotism other “centrifugal impulses” had affected wartime Soviet society, including the separation and alienation of family members from each other and divisions in the citizenry, for example between ethnic groups or between those who had been at the frontline and those in the rear. In short, the “whole social order was in disarray”.

The process of ending the war, moreover, Sheila Fitzpatrick has indicated, “produced social dislocations almost comparable with fighting it”, as tens of millions of people had to be demobilised, repatriated, returned from evacuation or released from wartime jobs to which they had been drafted. The poet Joseph Brodsky depicts in his memoir the scene at a railway station near Leningrad in 1945:

The war was just over, twenty million Russians were decaying in makeshift graves across the continent, and the rest, dispersed by war, were returning to their homes or what was left of their homes. The railway station was a picture of

453 B. Fieseler, ‘The Bitter Legacy of the ‘Great Patriotic War’: Red Army disabled soldiers under late Stalinism’, in Fürst (ed), Late Stalinist Russia, pp.46-61, here p.46; for a discussion of the demographic problems of postwar society and also disputes over the exact number of Soviet citizens who died in the war see Zubkova, Russia After the War, p.20; also on Soviet wartime deaths and on more territorial changes after the war see Poliakov and Zhiromskaia, Naselenie Rossii, pp.131-136.
454 Poliakov and Zhiromskaia, Naselenie Rossii, pp.140-165.
455 Zubkova, Russia after the War, pp.91-92.
456 Dunham, In Stalin’s Time, p.12; and also Merridale, Ivan’s War, pp.199-214 for evocative descriptions of the gulf between those who had seen battle and all the rest, the ‘rats’, and of divorce, promiscuity and the alienation of soldiers from their families during the war. Merridale concludes that “the war had shattered, not united, the Soviet people”: ibid, p.202; see Manley, To the Tashkent Station, p.191 on the rise in homeless and neglected children and pp.267-268 on the stigma of evacuation giving shape to postwar anti-Semitism.
457 Dunham, In Stalin’s Time, p.11.
primeval chaos. People were besieging the cattle trains like mad insects; they were climbing on the roofs of cars, squeezing between them and so on.\textsuperscript{459}

Letters and telegrams sent to the party Central Committee’s transport department by local party secretaries similarly convey how the railway system, damaged and commandeered for military purposes during the war, was overwhelmed throughout 1945 by people characterised in terms of their wartime experience who had been propelled into movement by the cessation of hostilities.\textsuperscript{460} In February, for example, the removal of a passenger train from service that ran between Khar’kov and Voroshilograd led to the “accumulation of a large number of local passengers and people in transit” at stations along the railway line, where, according to the Voroshilgrad party secretary, they waited days out in the open for passing trains, often ending up travelling illegally in goods wagons.\textsuperscript{461} Later in the year, once the war was over, another secretary wrote to Georgii Malenkov at the transport department to complain that the one train a week running between Stalinabad in the Tajik republic and Moscow was in no way sufficient. Large numbers of passengers were mounting up in the republic and servicemen, demobilised soldiers, and war invalids were hanging around near stations for months waiting for a train.\textsuperscript{462} Other letters remarked on the numbers of re-evacuees or repatriated citizens crowding at train stations whose buildings were in ruins.\textsuperscript{463}

Against this background, the Soviet state engaged in the task of establishing and enforcing actual and metaphorical external frontiers and internal orders.\textsuperscript{464} The motto of

\textsuperscript{459} Brodsky, \textit{Less Than One}, p.18.
\textsuperscript{460} According to Holland Hunter, the railway connections needed to support the general economy were gradually being restored towards the end of the war, though the rebuilding of passenger stations came some years later. While this gradual restoration was taking place, however, a surge occurred in passenger numbers that “exceeded the expectations” of the authorities: H. Hunter, ‘Successful Spatial Management’, in Linz (ed), \textit{The Impact of World War II}, pp.47-58, here p.55; see also Zhiromskaia and Poliakov, \textit{Naselenie Rossii}, pp.140-141 on how population movement in the form of returning evacuees and ‘refugees’, combined with the lack of accommodation at stations, meant that the railways were overloaded.
\textsuperscript{461} RGASPI, f.17, op.124, d.27, l.6.
\textsuperscript{462} Ibid, l.33.
\textsuperscript{463} Ibid, ll.42, 60.
\textsuperscript{464} On the re-imposition of order by the Soviet state in the wake of the material destruction and social dislocation caused by the war see P. Dukes, ‘The Social Consequences of World War II for the USSR’, in A. Marwick (ed), \textit{Total War and Social Change} (London: Macmillan, 1989), pp.45-57, for example p.55 on relationships being reconstituted and redefined in the postwar period.
the regime in the immediate postwar years became “social and political harmony”, often figured in familial terms.\textsuperscript{465} Soviet publications asserted that the war had forged the Soviet people into “one united whole”, a kinship of blood, led by father Stalin and the Russian nation.\textsuperscript{466} Accompanying this motto of harmonious, but hierarchical, unity was another maxim less often discussed in the scholarship on the postwar period: that everyone was needed “in their place”.\textsuperscript{467} At the heart of these intertwining sets of rhetoric was the imperative of “service to the Stalinist state”.\textsuperscript{468} The implication was that Soviet citizens would be assigned a geographic and social place in the postwar Soviet polity, based, at least in part, on their service in the war effort, as well as on categories such as gender and ethnicity, and on state priorities for the reconstitution of the country’s population, economy and infrastructure.\textsuperscript{469} Images of home and family were utilised to represent this obedient national service and to “suffuse state policy with a warm glow”.\textsuperscript{470} The regime’s own actions to establish its vision of the postwar state and to manage the distribution of the Soviet population, however, often prolonged the separation of people from their families and their prewar homes and prompted further dislocations for others.\textsuperscript{471}

Across Europe the postwar settlement which confirmed new borders for many states involved what have euphemistically been termed “population exchanges”: the mass

\textsuperscript{465} Weiner, \textit{Making Sense of War}, p.23.
\textsuperscript{466} N. V. Romanovskii, \textit{Lik Likh Stalinitzma, 1945-1953} (Moscow, 1995), p.70; and L. Kirschenbaum, “‘Our City, Our Hearths, Our Families’: Local Loyalties and Private Life in Soviet World War II Propaganda”, \textit{Slavic Review}, Vol.29, No.4 (Winter 2000), pp.825-847, here p.842 on Stalin appearing as the “father” of the Soviet family in official narratives produced at the end of the war; in a speech on 24\textsuperscript{th} May 1945, Stalin praised the “Russian people” as “the leading force of the Soviet Union among all the people of our country”: cited in Zubkova, \textit{Russia After the War}, p.29.
\textsuperscript{467} As recollected in interview with A. G. U., ATsUI, Interview No. BL-1-015, p.19; and can be seen in articles in the postwar war press, for example I. Golovan’, ‘‘Svoe mesto v zhizn’’, \textit{Leningradskaia Pravda}, 11/5/1945, p.3.
\textsuperscript{468} Kirschenbaum, “‘Our City, Our Hearths, Our Families’”, p.846; in another speech, delivered on 25\textsuperscript{th} June 1945, Stalin spoke of the Soviet people as ‘‘screws in the great machine of state’’: Zubkova, \textit{Russia After the War}, p.29.
\textsuperscript{469} See Weiner, \textit{Making Sense of War}, pp.68-69, for example, on wartime exploits superseding and ‘redeeming’ past sins of social origin; see Edele, “‘A Generation of Victors?’”, p.178 for the point that the state did not care only about performance during the war, as opposed to prewar stigmas; also, as the decree stating that prewar housing be preserved for the scientific and cultural elite suggests prewar privilege also continued to define people’s relationship to the state and their access to particular places after the war.
\textsuperscript{470} Kirschenbaum, “‘Our Cities, Our Hearths, Our Families’”, p.846.
\textsuperscript{471} Fitzpatrick, ‘‘Postwar Soviet Society’’, p.130.
expulsion and resettlement of people with the aim of consolidating political boundaries by creating ethnically homogenous or reliable borderlands.⁴⁷² The Soviet Union participated in these large-scale transfers of people, most notably in connection with the regulation of its borders with Poland and Czechoslovakia.⁴⁷³ Over 1,500,000 Poles were deported from the territory of the Soviet Union, for example, in return for Ukrainian citizens from Poland.⁴⁷⁴ Russians and Ukrainians living in Siberia and Kazakhstan were brought in to repopulate the western Soviet borderlands and the Baltic territories, which had lost many of their citizens during wartime and prewar deportations. About half a million peasants from European Russia were moved to the border areas of Kaliningrad, Sakhalin, Eastern Siberia, the Far East and elsewhere.⁴⁷⁵

At the same time, the Soviet administration policed the boundaries of postwar society by carefully screening groups of its citizens who were coming back across the country’s western borders and whose wartime experience marked them out as suspect. These were the several million people who had been taken from the Soviet Union by the Germans either as prisoners of war or as civilian forced labourers, known as Ostarbeiter. Upon their return they were isolated at first in collection points and special ‘filtration’ camps and interviewed by the security services. Pavel Polian maintains that “as a rule” the repatriated prisoners of war were sent to special settlements in remote regions for terms of six years.⁴⁷⁶ Recent work, however, by Mark Edele and by Nick Baron, suggests that filtration was not solely, or principally, about retribution or exclusion.⁴⁷⁷ Mark Edele, for example, has demonstrated that a minority of prisoners of war were in fact arrested and exiled for being spies or collaborators, although officers fared much worse than rank and

⁴⁷² See M. Kramer, ‘Introduction’, in P. Ther and A. Siljak (eds), Redrawing Nations: Ethnic Cleansing in East-Central Europe, 1944-1948 (Lanham: Rowman & Littlefield, 2001), p.2 on the anodyne phrases such as exchanges that palliated the often grim reality of forced resettlements at the end of the war; see Mazower, Dark Continent, pp.217-221 on people being moved at the end of the war in order to consolidate political boundaries; and Kulischer, Europe on the Move, pp.291-293 for a description of the ‘exchanges’.
⁴⁷⁴ Zhiromskaia and Poliakov, Naselenie Rossii, p.140.
⁴⁷⁷ Edele, “A Generation of Victors?”, pp.75-92 and Baron, ‘Remaking Soviet Society’, p.105; see also Weiner, Making Sense of War, pp.23-26 for the logic of the Soviet ‘moral-political unity’ that demanded the excision of intruding elements and also ‘purification’ practices by citizens as part of their integration into the body politic.
file soldiers. Instead many were re-enlisted in the army and then released some time after the end of the war. As they were permitted to rejoin the ‘united Soviet family’, however, their suspect status meant they remained subject to specific “structures of place and power”.

Edele lists the details of the particular regime of surveillance, identification and regulation of movement and settlement governing former prisoners of war. They were not allowed, for example, to settle in the ‘capitals’ Moscow, Leningrad and Kiev, unless they still had “family ties” there, but otherwise were required to return within a month to their prewar place of residence and to register there with the NKVD immediately. A dossier prepared on them during their ‘filtration’ was sent to the branch of the MGB in that locality. After registration the former prisoners of war received special identity documents valid for just six months at a time that did not entitle them to travel elsewhere in the Soviet Union. They could only be issued with a regular internal passport by a resolution of the local screening commission. Baron has shown that repatriated civilians were also carefully ‘filtered’ for ‘spies and collaborators’ but were in the main allowed to resettle at their former places of residence, where their ‘filtration’ file followed them. He concludes that the filtration of repatriates, in the eyes of the regime, served to enmesh them once more in the bureaucratic machinery of surveillance. It also served to define their relationship to the state and their place in the postwar Soviet order, which remained marked by the stigma of their wartime displacement on enemy territory.

The symbolic manifestation of the stigmatised status of repatriates and former prisoners of war in postwar Soviet society in laws curtailing their access to certain spaces is conveyed in a letter from a former student of the Leningrad Polytechnic Institute sent to Stalin in 1945. The student wrote to Stalin that he had volunteered for the front and

479 Baron, ‘Remaking Soviet Society’, p.91.
481 Both prisoners of war and civilian repatriates remained vulnerable to arrests in the postwar years by the security police under the category ‘socially dangerous persons’: Baron, ‘Remaking Soviet Society’, p.106.
482 See Shearer, ‘Elements Near and Alien’, pp.871 for the argument that “the passport regime did not just included and exclude” but created a hierarchical system in which a person’s status was marked by degrees.
escaped from German captivity in April that year. Having made his way back to Leningrad, he protested, “I was not permitted to remain in the city or continue my education...I am treated with suspicion...I was given a temporary document with the inscription “without the right of departure from the Pavlovskii [suburban] district”...And so already for more than a year I have not been able with this document...to take a single step, without provoking cautious glances, distrust”.483

In contrast, soldiers who had not been taken prisoner and were demobilised from 1945, as well as war invalids, were distinguished in the first few postwar years as belonging to a privileged category of Soviet citizen.484 This privilege was enshrined in their status in the postwar Soviet spatial order. Not only did they retain their right to their prewar housing but they were also exempt from the continuing wartime restrictions on movement that applied to the majority of the population. They were specifically spared, for example, the obligation to obtain permission from the police before purchasing tickets for train travel, a requirement that remained in force for the majority of the population until well into 1946.485 Their theoretical freedom of travel and settlement was buttressed by the labour shortage and demobilisation laws which stipulated that local bureaus for labour distribution should assist them in finding jobs on the same or higher level than they had before but also permitted veterans to find work outside of official channels.486 The stringent labour desertion laws of the war and immediate postwar years were even

of restrictions, degrees of social inclusion or separation, which were tied to geographic location, so that alienness became a matter of degree and status defined by regulations of travel and residence restrictions.

484 See Edele, ‘“A Generation of Victors?”’, pp.177-183 on the ‘making and unmaking’ of veterans as a privileged cohort of ‘victors’.
485 For the exemption of servicemen from this law see ‘O poriadke proezda grazhdan po zheleznoi doroge i vodnym putiam SSSR’, RGASPI, f.644, op.1, d.405, ll.205-207; on continuing application of the law itself see also Manley, To the Tashkent Station, p.240; initially, Red Army servicemen were given their papers on the spot when they were discharged and “allowed to go where they pleased”, although later according to some accounts they had to pick up their papers at the place where they had been inducted into the service: Fitzpatrick, ‘Postwar Soviet Society’, p.137; according to Fitzpatrick this change in policy was introduced to ensure that peasant soldiers returned to the collective farm after demobilisation, but there were many ways of evading this requirement: ibid, p.138. Fitzpatrick also notes that the treatment of veterans was not generous in comparison with other Allied countries, but that privileges did exist and service for many was a channel of upward mobility.
486 Edele, ‘“A Generation of Victors?”’, p.189; Fitzpatrick, ‘Postwar Soviet Society’, p.136; both Fitzpatrick and Edele have found that many did secure employment on their own.
waived for war invalids, if they wished to leave work to return to the place of residence of their families.\textsuperscript{487}

The meagre pension which most disabled soldiers received was not enough to live on, however, and further assistance given to them by the state after the war was predicated on their integration into the labour force and contribution to “the needs of reconstruction”.\textsuperscript{488} The rhetoric of Soviet publications at the end of the war, moreover, made it clear that all returning soldiers should find ‘their place in [civilian] life’ and that ‘place’ in this context equated primarily to a position in the difficult work of reconstruction. An article describing the adjustment to peacetime life of an army captain appeared in \textit{Leningradskaiia Pravda} in May 1946, for example, under the title ‘One’s place in life’.\textsuperscript{489} The author of the article, I. Golovan’, outlined how the captain had marched into Germany during the war, been injured there and then returned to his wife and daughter in Leningrad in June 1945. Upon his return, he had struggled to settle into civilian life, becoming irritated by his wife’s concern and by the ‘easy’ work being offered to him. Then suddenly one day all became clear. He would undertake the difficult task of training young trade school students, making “real people” of them.\textsuperscript{490} Now he had embarked on this work he felt that he had finally returned home and found his own place in life, just as many others like him were doing. The article suggests that following this decision his domestic life also improved, however it is finding his place at the factory and his fatherly role in relation to the new recruits that give meaning to his ‘return’ and to ‘home’.

A short novel published in the journal \textit{Zvezda} towards the end of 1947 similarly dealt with the adjustment of frontline soldiers to a de-heroiised postwar landscape.\textsuperscript{491} Entitled \textit{Finally at Home (Vot my i doma)} it too provides a depiction of the successful integration

\begin{footnotes}
\item[487] Edele, "‘A Generation of Victors?’", p.138.
\item[488] Fieseler, ‘The bitter legacy’, p.58; and see articles such as ‘Vozvrashchenie k trudu’, \textit{Leningradskaiia Pravda}, 7/1/1944, p.4 for an emphasis on the return of war invalids to work; in this particular article a nurse who is blind herself helps war invalids across the city, especially those who are blind, to return to work and “be useful to their motherland”; and also, for example, O normirovanii truda invalidov’, \textit{Leningradskaiia Pravda}, 15/11/1945, p.3.
\item[489] ‘Svoe mesto v zhizni’, \textit{Leningradskaiia Pravda}, 11/5/1946, p.3.
\item[490] Ibid.
\item[491] Zh. Gauzner, ‘Vot my i doma…’, \textit{Zvezda}, No.11 (1947), pp.4-106; see Dunham, \textit{In Stalin’s Time}, pp.102-103 on the grey deheroization substantiated in the story.
\end{footnotes}
of soldiers into postwar life through their devotion to the dictates of a factory. Once again, moreover, the factory also represents a site for the satisfaction of yearnings for domestic and family ties. The positive characters in the story are the returning veterans who enter the workshop like they are going into their “native home”, and the type who could be said to have been “a modest hero in the war, a modest and persistent re-builder of peace”. They include Semen II’ich, who cannot feel at home in his empty flat without his wife and son who have died in evacuation but who resumes work at the factory and eventually meets an orphaned trade school student there. The boy’s family have all been killed by the Germans but he escaped and joined the partisans before being sent via a children’s home to the wallpaper factory at the heart of the story. By the end of the tale the boy has moved in with Semen to live with him as a son.

In a gendered discourse of ‘place’, ‘home’ and ‘public duty’, the character of Semen is complemented by the veteran army nurse Taia. The demobilised frontline nurse is disappointed in her plans to work with a surgeon at the city hospital but eventually acquiesces to be sent to work where she “is needed”, looking after the children at the factory’s nursery. She takes pride in the fact that she has “found herself a place” by putting aside her personal wishes “for the good of the country” and spends the rest of the tale trying to secure her personal happiness by finding a husband. Both of these characters are contrasted to the negative figure of a returning soldier who cannot settle into the life of a simple worker in a provincial town. Instead, he dreams of moving away and working at a large, prestigious factory in the Urals and spends his days drinking and dealing on the black market.

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492 See Kirschenbaum, “Our City, Our Hearths, Our Families”, pp.828 and 838 on the conflation of a prewar emphasis on the public sphere, which equated to the factory, with the personal language of wartime representations of home and family in accounts produced by the Soviet press towards the end of the war and after.


494 Again see Kirschenbaum, “Our City, Our Hearths, Our Families”, p.843 on the “return to the language of state planning” at the end of the war that did not entail a rejection of the personal but an effort to incorporate personal language into the Stalinist narrative of service; Sarah Ashwin, however, has demonstrated how even before the war, in the course of the 1930s, as the regime strengthened its position, “gender became the basis on which the duties of citizens to the new polity were defined”: S. Ashwin, ‘Introduction: Gender, state and society in Soviet and post-Soviet Russia’, in Ashwin (ed.), Gender, state and society in Soviet and post-Soviet Russia (London and New York: Routledge, 2001), pp.1-29, here p.1.

495 Gauzner, ‘Vot my i doma’, ibid, p.21.

496 Ibid.
In practice the limited postwar horizons were resented by veterans, despite their privileged position. One former serviceman who actually arrived in Leningrad following his demobilisation wrote to a friend about the restrictions of civilian life. He described the bureaucracy of demobilisation, with its documenting practices, its questionnaires, its certificates and its photos “as if I am a criminal”.\textsuperscript{497} He also complained that higher education institutes were not enrolling anyone for a year.\textsuperscript{498} Finding himself in Leningrad with nowhere to live and no ration card he felt obliged to register at a railway college. It would not be possible, he lamented, to leave the college to enter an institute at a later date as anyone no longer wishing to study there was not discharged with their documents but directed into the labour force at the disposal of the Oktiabr’skii Railway. Is this really life, he concluded, “when they make me do what I don’t want to and live where I don’t want to”.\textsuperscript{499} The former soldier understood the bureaucratic procedures to document his return as a demonstration of state power to define his identity and place in postwar life, a power to discipline and even criminalize people crossing the boundaries of the civilian community.\textsuperscript{500}

While demobilised soldiers were encouraged in official discourse to find or accept their ‘place’ in the postwar economy, most of the population was being given an even more explicit message that they were obligated to work and live wherever the state required. A discussion about cadres on 11\textsuperscript{th} January 1944 in Leningradskaiia Pravda, for example, emphasised that they must be developed from workers already in the factories, without

\textsuperscript{497} TsGASPb, f.7384, op.36, d.186, l.85.
\textsuperscript{498} Soviet legislation granted war participants certain privileges with respect to access to higher education, including “easier access to stipends, preferred admission to preparatory courses, technicums, and vuzy, tuition exemption for preparatory courses and technicums, the right to return to one’s studies after the war, and the right to take advantage of one’s former status as an otlichnik (which allowed the student to enter vuzy and tekhnikumy without exams)”: Edele, “Generation of Victors?”, p.122.
\textsuperscript{499} TsGASPb, f.7384, op.36, d.186, l.85.
\textsuperscript{500} The regime was keen to restate discipline over assertive returning soldiers who had formed closed bonds and displayed a sense of being part of a distinct community to whom the broader Soviet ‘family’ was beholden: on an “invisible network” of veterans, a “combat community” that was maintained after the war see, for example, Zubkova, Russia After the War, p.27; on self-assertive veterans, imagining themselves as a separate community, to whom the larger Soviet one owed a debt, see Edele, ‘A “Generation of Victors?”’, pp.13 and 25; on perceptions of the ‘danger’ of people in a liminal condition and the attempts by the apparatus of the state to “domesticate liminality” see Malkki, Purity and Exile, p.254; the following chapter discusses further the merging of liminality and criminality within state discourses and practices.
waiting for returning specialists from evacuation, as every person in the country is “needed in their place of work” (*nuzhen na svoem uchast’e*).\(^{501}\)

Again the social integration and attachment to ‘place’ of the women who had been displaced by war was figured within a distinct symbolic framework in which women functioned not only as paragons of self-sacrifice but also as emblematic of national suffering and the nexus between the people and the state as provider.\(^{502}\) When an article appeared in the newspaper devoted to ‘Russian women’ in September 1945, for example, it depicted the “sufferings and torments” of [ethnic] Russian mothers who had been evacuated half dead from the blockade or taken to Germany against their will and who were now returning and “assembling in their corners, their nests”.\(^{503}\) In the narrative the women returning from German prison do not come under suspicion as they are represented as the passive victims of German aggression who have been rescued by the Soviet state, in the guise of the Red Army, that acts in the stead of their ‘real’ husbands. The particular story of one woman is told in detail in the first person. She reportedly describes the road home to the “Soviet motherland” as a journey to becoming “happy Soviet people”, enabled by the care shown them by the Red Army soldier, who feeds them and keeps them warm.\(^{504}\) We knew, she is quoted as saying, “that Iosif Vissarionovich [Stalin] cared about us…saw our mother’s torments and tears, saved us and our children”.\(^{505}\) Her husband, she states, had looked for them in Germany but had not been able to locate them, it was “Soviet power” (*Sovetskaia vlast’*) that had found them.\(^{506}\)

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\(^{501}\) *Leningradskia Pravda*, 11/1/1944, p.3.

\(^{502}\) Kirschenbaum, “‘Our City, Our Hearths, Our Families’”, p.825; see articles also such as ‘Zabota sovetskogo gosudarstva o materi i detiakh’, *Leningradskia Pravda*, 11/7/1944, p.2 and ‘Stalinskaia zabota sovetskogo gosudarstva o materi i detiakh’, ibid, 13/7/1944, p.2; ‘Sovetskaia vlast’ zabotitsia o materiakh pomogaet vospityvat’ detei’, ibid, 14/7/1944, p.2 among others.

\(^{503}\) ‘Vozvrashchenie 2. Russkie zhenshchiny’, *Leningradskia Pravda*, 5/9/1945, p.3; the article refers to the women as ‘russkie’, or ethnic Russian, as opposed to ‘rossiiskie’ which denotes more broadly an inhabitant of a Russian political and territorial unit.

\(^{504}\) Ibid.

\(^{505}\) Ibid.

\(^{506}\) Ibid; and see Ashwin, ‘Gender, state and society’, pp.12-14 on the symbolic sidelining of men in the personal sphere and Stalin’s symbolic appropriation of the roles of husband and father.
Women, in this way, were confronted with both the imperative of being fixed to a labour collective that applied to ‘every person’ and also a domestic role, both of which were formulated as a concordat with the state not as a matter of individual attachments and wishes. The state’s particular definitions of the ‘place’ of people in the postwar order meant that at the end of the war many women and men who had not served in the army were enmeshed in a web of regulations over their movements that in practice meant continued or renewed dislocation from their families and prewar residences. In addition to the continuing application of the limits in train travel well into 1946, the draconian legislation on labour force desertion remained in place for the first three postwar years. The regime envisaged that the main vehicle for the distribution of workers to industrial sites across the country at the end of the war would be through the institutions of organised recruitment and training. Access to certain urban spaces within the ‘united whole’ of the Soviet Union, including Leningrad, was particularly tightly controlled at first. Of those who had evacuated from the city, for example, only children who had left with state institutions were automatically permitted to return. Other evacuees who were not brought into the city as part of an organised labour mobilisation had, like all individuals seeking to travel there before June 1946, to obtain a special permit from the city’s authorities as well as a document releasing them from their work in evacuation.

An article published on the front page of Pravda towards the end of the war asserted that the demands of the state economy would entail the channelling of new workers into areas

507 This was a continuation of the conflicting imperatives with which the regime confronted women in the prewar years – a traditional domestic role, ‘liberation’ through membership of a labour collective and bearing and transmitting the values of the revolutionary state – but was given renewed significance after a war in which many men had been lost and families had been separated from each other, some permanently, and as the regime promoted the task of repopulation: see ibid, pp.10-12 on the conflicting prewar imperatives; M. Nakachi, ‘Population, politics and reproduction: Late Stalinism and its Legacy’, in Fürst (ed.), Late Stalinist Russia, pp.23-45, especially p.31 on reproductive laws introduced at the end of the war that encouraged women without husbands to reproduce.

508 Filtzer, Soviet workers, p.30; see also White, ‘The Civilian Return’, p.1149 that no free labour market was supposed exist in Leningrad at the end of the war; White, who is focussing on the experience of evacuees doesn’t mention demobilised soldiers, however, who could obtain work without the direction of the City Bureau for the Distribution of the Labour Force if they chose.

in need of reconstruction and the retention of evacuees at factories in the east. The article emphasised the importance of enlisting new workers into Soviet industry and directing them into the branches of heavy industry and geographical areas most in need of a labour force for reconstruction, in particular those that had undergone occupation. It underscored that “to recruit workers and to distribute them – does not mean that the whole task is done. Now, as before, the most important task is securing the workers in production”. The mobilisation of new workers into the regions of reconstruction was to be accompanied, the article continued, by efforts to fix evacuees from frontline and occupied localities at enterprises which remained in the Urals, Siberia and Central Asia. Any personal attachments to a native hometown that were undermining the reconstruction and production effort by contributing to high labour turnover must be overcome. While, the article’s author acknowledged, the “attraction is understandable of Muscovites and Leningraders, Kievians and Donbass-ers, Kharkovians and Odessites, to their native cities…the interests of the socialist state demand the preservation of evacuated enterprises in the east”. The solution proposed was not only the enforcement of desertion laws but the improving of conditions to encourage their settlement in these areas.

This article illustrates the dismissal by the authorities of understandings of ‘home’ and attachments to ‘place’ that conflicted with its tenets of membership in the united Soviet family and service to the state. Refuting the intensity of sentiments of belonging that were not defined by loyalty to a Union-wide or Russian homeland but which centred on a region, a city, an individual family, the government promoted criminal sanctions and improving living standards as means to guarantee people stayed put.

A letter sent in January 1946 to Molotov by a group of 69 factory workers living in Saratov who had been evacuated from Leningrad in 1941 indicates the way in which the

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511 Ibid.
512 Ibid.
513 White, ‘The Civilian Return’, p.1152; and also see Y. Tuan, Space and Place: The Perspective of Experience (Minneapolis and London: University of Minnesota Press, 1977), p.149 on different scales of attachment to homeland and the importance and intensity of the city or region as a medium scale homeland.
punitive restrictions on movement impacted on people’s postwar lives and on the reconstitution of Leningrad’s population. It also points, however, to how government measures continued to run up against individual concepts of native home that were only strengthened by the consequences of the state’s policies of population distribution. Finally it shows that expressions of these personal connections could draw on the state’s own rhetoric of the family and motherland as well as particular local narratives of place. In the letter the workers do refer to the influence of the poor living conditions in Saratov but they stress that, having been transferred out of the blockade and forced to leave their families and then having worked hard for years:

We wish to go to our...families and the native places, where we all grew up, where we were raised, where each of us left an old father, or mother, who needs material help...Sending us home to our places will give us more strength to devote to the fatherland. And we will gather our shattered families into one united indestructible family.

Unfortunately the reply from Molotov, if there was one, has not been kept with the document.

Enacting the social and spatial priorities of the central authorities after the war also required the involvement of local officials, some of whom had developed a keen sense of autonomy and local identity during their wartime experience. Nowhere was this perhaps more so than in Leningrad, a city cut off from the rest of the country to a certain extent during the war, where the local administration and population were engaged in

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514 In the early years of the war the central authorities had actually sought to utilise the trope of the “threatened native place” as a focus for the emotional rhetoric in the Soviet media designed to encourage the patriotic defence, in later years this was reined in as part of the reassertion of Stalin and the party hierarchy: Kirschenbaum, “Our City, Our Hearths, Our Families”, p.836.
515 GARF, f.5446, op.82, ll.299-300; for a similar letter sent to Mikhail Kalinin, the chairman of the Supreme Soviet from a woman from Moscow who asks to be given permission to return to the city, find her husband and “arrange our family life” see GARF, f.7523, op.30, d.416, ll.176-176(ob), reproduced in A. Ia. Livshin, I. B. Orlov (eds), Sovetskaia povsednevnost’ i massovoe soznanie, 1939-1945 (Moscow: RO SSPEN, 2003), p.126.
516 See Qualls, ‘Local-Outsider Negotiations’, p.297 on officials arguing for “local autonomy” and preserving local traditions after the war, in this case in relation to Sevastopol’.
making sense of a particular type and scale of suffering endured on its territory, drawing on local mythic narratives in the process.

This does not mean, however, that the visions of the central and local authorities for the postwar repopulation were completely opposed. Elizabeth White is right to point out that, contrary to Ruble’s analysis, the discouragement of the immediate return of the city’s former inhabitants was not a deliberate strategy by the centre to ‘provincialise’ Leningrad.\(^\text{517}\) Local officials, for example, had their own reasons to be interested in tightly controlling and regulating the number of people arriving in the city. Above all, as we have seen, this was connected with the damage that had been done to the city’s housing stock during the war. Individuals, including those in evacuation, applying for the permit to be allowed to travel to the city had to include information about whether or not they were certain of acquiring lodgings in the city, for example with a friend or relative. The summons was often issued on this basis.\(^\text{518}\) In early 1944, moreover, the State Committee of Defence began to issue quotas for the number of people to be sent to work in Leningrad that included tens of thousand of re-evacuees whose departure would not harm production in the east, as well as thousands of young people from other regions.\(^\text{519}\) A decree passed the Defence Committee in September 1944 which brought a halt to any re-evacuation into the city until 1945 arose out of concerns of the City Soviet that the population was increasing too rapidly for local infrastructure to accommodate.\(^\text{520}\)

The intentions of the city and state authorities did not entirely overlap either. The letter sent to Zhdanov by City Soviet chairman Popkov about the allocation of housing demonstrates that the local authorities may have wished to control the timing and conditions of a re-evacuation but nevertheless they conceived of the repopulation entirely in terms of the impending ‘return’ of its inhabitants. Popkov ranked the claims of these former inhabitants to specific places of residence below those of the people who had lived in them during the blockade. He was clear, however, that it was prewar inhabitants

\(^{518}\) Karpenko, ‘Sotsial’naia podderzhka reevakuantov’, p.89.
\(^{519}\) RGASPI, f.644, op.1, d.222, ll.131-151, especially ll.148-151; and Kutuzov, ‘Vernite v Leningrad’, p.16.
\(^{520}\) Ibid, d.301, ll.21-23; and White, ‘The Civilian Return to Leningrad’, p.1151.
who should join the siege survivors in the city as a whole. This differentiation between people based on the level of their connection to the city was anathema to the central regime that regarded “everything in its territory as re-placeable” according to its requirements.\textsuperscript{521} As the central regime resumed sending trainloads of newcomers, as well as re-evacuees, to take up work in Leningrad in 1945, city officials tried to find ways to impress their model of a community of Leningraders on the re-population process.

The minutes of a meeting of the City Soviet’s Executive Committee in March 1945, for example, contain a resolution on ‘ordering the entry and registration of recruited workers who have not lived in the city of Leningrad before’.\textsuperscript{522} The resolution expresses the conviction of Popkov and other members of the committee that new arrivals without any previous ties to the city were agreeing to come to work in the city simply in order to receive a permanent residence permit there and then were disappearing from the factories, constantly changing their place of work and disrupting the functioning of the city’s enterprises. It specified a number of special measures to be targeted at this category of incomer that made use of the passport system and police force in order to circumscribe their presence in the city. The police were only to provide them, for example, with temporary six month residence permits initially and if they refused to start work at the enterprise to which they had been mobilised then the police should remove them from the city altogether. These in-migrants should only be granted a permanent residence pass, according to the resolution, if the enterprise petitioned the city authorities for one once the temporary permit had run out. In addition, factories were instructed not to recruit newcomers with dependents and the police not to register any dependent family members.

Throughout the first few post-siege years the local Leningrad newspaper, moreover, printed articles and letters reinforcing the notion of an indissoluble bond between the fate of the city and its inhabitants currently in evacuation or the army. These pieces insisted

\textsuperscript{521} Argenbright, ‘Space of Survival’, p.217.
\textsuperscript{522} Vypiska iz protokola zasedania ispolkoma komiteta leningradskogo soveta deputatov trudiashchikh ot 6 marta 1945 no.140, p.27s: O poriadke vvoza i propiski zaverbovannykh rabochikh, ranee ne prozhivaushchikh v gorode Leningrada’, TsGASpB, f.327, op.10, d.12, l.9
that ‘native Leningraders’ displaced by the war continued to share a link with the city, either through their attempts to understand the experiences of the blockade or by behaving in a way that was worthy of Leningrad culture.

In January 1944, for example, a letter attributed to the director of a school in evacuation asserted that “we are a small particle of Leningrad and sacredly preserve the traditions of the battling city”. The letter by a director of a factory evacuated to Siberia similarly highlighted the unbroken connection between evacuees and Leningrad. The director claimed that workers from Leningrad had been distinguished from others while in evacuation by the culture, harmony and friendship of their work collective, and by a “Leningrad style of work cultivated in us in our native and beloved city”. He claimed that they were prompted to work determinedly in evacuation by the “constant, invisible but extremely palpable bond with Leningrad” and repeated the verses of Ol’ga Berggol’ts that:

We cannot be cut off from you now  
Wherever the war has conveyed us  
The soul is filled with its greatness  
And here, there and everywhere we are –  
Leningraders.525

In another letter published that month the author claimed on behalf of herself and other girls separated from Leningrad in faraway Siberia that:

With all our thoughts and feelings we are with the heroes of the city of Russian glory, the city of Lenin. Together with the whole country here, in a small fishing village, we are defending the city in which we were born and in which we laboured. The city which taught us to love our motherland boundlessly.526

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523 Pis’ma v redaktsiiu: ‘Gordimsia muzhestvom leningradtsev’, Leningradskia Pravda, 9/1/1944, p.3.  
524 N. Manin, ‘Leningradskii stil’’, ibid, 3/1/1944, p.3.  
525 Ibid.  
526 Pis’ma v redaktsiiu: Nina Gor’kaia, ‘Privet iz dalekoi sibiri’, ibid, 5/1/1944, p.3.
Articles and letters promulgating similar sentiments continued to be published in the following years. A piece from September 1945 on the return of 200 specialists evacuated from Leningrad to the Urals elucidated the significance of their continuing connection with the city for the integration of evacuees into a postwar and post-blockade Leningrad community. It compared the evacuees who left their home and family to soldiers going to the front and noted that “the concept of Leningrad for them was wider than the city’s borders and there, in the East, they strove to be Leningraders”. This broad understanding of the entity of Leningrad, according to the article, meant that the evacuees, although cut off from their city, obtained news about its blockade, endured its pain and sufferings, fought for its honour and, when they returned, “arrived in its factories not as its guests, but as its own people (svoi liudi), as direct participants in its revival”. Former soldiers from the city were also depicted as remaining ‘Leningraders’ at the front, through reminiscing by the campfire about common acquaintances, streets, and houses in the city or acting as an example to others and commanding respect in their service conduct. As former inhabitants or defenders of the city they could also be considered to be returning to ‘their own city’.

This rhetoric did not affect the right to return for former residents in the first few post-blockade years. The primary criteria according to which individuals were issued summons to come to the city by the local authorities remained access to housing and the temporary limitations set on numbers. Evacuees who accentuated their ‘rootedness’ as ‘natives’ of the city in their applications in late 1944 and early 1945 were denied permits along with almost everyone else writing when the limit was in force. These included a navy major and his wife living in evacuation with their children in Ul’ianov who supplied

527 See, for example, O. Aleferov, ‘Budem dostojnyi imeni leningradstev’, ibid, 7/7/1944, p.3; N. Manin, ‘Dlia rodnogo goroda (Pis’mo iz Sibiri)’, ibid, 13/10/1944, p.4; ‘Vdaleke ot rodnogo goroda’, ibid, 28/7/1945, p.3; M. Dubianskaia, ‘V etom – zhizn’’, ibid, 2/11/1945, p.2.
528 N. Lebedev, ‘Litoi instrument’, ibid, 9/9/1945, p.3.
529 Ibid.
531 See, for example, D. Ostrov, ‘Vozvrashchenie’, ibid, 8/7/1945, p.2.
532 Manley, To the Tashkent Station, p.246 on the success of appeals made by evacuees or on their behalf depending on the timing of their requests as the places to which they sought to return.
references to the effect that all the family were ‘natives’ (urozhentsy) and that the major’s wife had “lived continuously (bezvyezdno) in the city of Leningrad” from her birth in 1907 until her evacuation in 1941. Another rejected application made on behalf of a woman to secure her return in January 1945 “is a native (korennoi) inhabitant of the city of Leningrad”.

One woman, Mariia Razumova, who appealed to party secretary Kuznetsov in March 1945 to have her application reconsidered was, following his intervention, granted permission to return. The majority of Mariia’s letter was devoted to the service carried out by members of her family as longstanding party activists or to substantiating the ways in which the family belonged to the city of Leningrad and a community of Leningraders. In this regard, she pointed out that her husband was a native of Petersburg, had been a Piterskii worker and that all his “revolutionary and party life”, as well as the happy domestic existence and party work of all the family, was closely bound to the city. She particularly underscored their presence in the city for some of the blockade, repeating several times that they had experienced the blockade along with other Leningraders and had only left when forced to by reasons of health, when they could no longer act as the city’s active defenders. We lived, she wrote, “through the most severe period in Leningrad, together with all Leningraders, and think that we have a right to return to our native city”. It is not apparent from the archives why the decision was made to give her a summons to return to the city, however it may well have been due to the increase permitted in the population of Leningrad from April 1945 or to Mariia’s record as a party member rather than her claim to ‘nativeness’.

Through the language of the local press, however, the city administration sought to fashion a discursive community of rooted, moral and civilised Leningraders that was

533 TsGASPh, f.7384, op.17, d.1508, l.62; they also added that they were by nationality ethnic Russians (russkie), perhaps here speaking the increasingly Russo-centric language of the central regime.
534 Ibid, l.131; the adjective ‘korennyi’ is usually translated as native, however it derives from the Russian word for ‘root’ (koren’) rather than the words for ‘kin’ or ‘birth’ (rod, rodit’) from which the other Russian term for native (rodnoi) is derived: the figuring of attachment to place in botanical and biological terms is discussed further below.
535 Ibid, ll.207-207(ob).
536 Ibid, l.207.
structured around the experience of the blockade but could incorporate those who had left the city and would at some point, it was hoped, return. While the local authorities were ‘negotiating’ and ‘accommodating’ the demands of the centre, the pressures on local infrastructure, and their own vision for the postwar city, however, the population of Leningrad was being altered day by day by the decisions of people to travel there even without the sanction of the authorities.537

4.3 “Everyone thought up their own way of how to get to Leningrad”

Despite the additional laws and penalties governing population movements in the immediate postwar years, people continued to circumvent the administrative restrictions. Official strictures aimed at sculpting the population were overlaid or undermined by people’s own wishes and the resources at their disposal.

Prewar residents wanting to return, for example, could be helped by relatives and friends still living in the city who could obtain a summons for them by vouching that they would provide them with somewhere to stay. Vera, an interviewee in the European University project, for example, recalled how she and her mother and brother returned to Leningrad from Tobol’sk in August 1945 with the assistance of an aunt who procured a summons for them by agreeing to register them in her accommodation. Having secured the necessary documents they sold Vera’s doll at a market to pay for their tickets home and made it back by foot, boat and goods wagon.538

Other prewar residents and newcomers managed to receive a pass to come to the city by offering bribes or favours to employees in the municipal bureaucracy. There were likely to have been plenty of opportunities for the use of bribery and connections with officialdom to enter and settle in Leningrad. Material bribes, informal exchanges, the use of personal networks and contacts, all encapsulated in the Russian word blat, were a

537 Both terms are used by Karl Qualls to describe central-local relations in the immediate postwar period: Qualls, ‘Local-Outsider Negotiations’ and ‘Accommodation and Agitation’.
538 Interview with V. N. K., ATsUI, Interview No. BL-2A-024, p.6.
permanent feature at the core of the everyday workings of the Soviet state.\textsuperscript{539} The deprivations, dislocations and breakdowns in formal state mechanisms caused by the war and its aftermath had, moreover, according to a recent study, facilitated the proliferation and entrenchment of these methods of conducting business and securing services in the Soviet Union.\textsuperscript{540}

In October 1944, for example, the local party newspaper \textit{Leningradskaja Pravda} publicised the sentencing by the city court of an employee of the district Bureau for the Accounting and Distribution of the Labour Force who had been dispensing permits to enter Leningrad in return for bribes.\textsuperscript{541} According to the article, the employee, N. Chernoushenko, had provided permits for the relatives of one woman who could arrange for a coat to be mended ahead of the waiting list. She also formulated official documents for entry and work in Leningrad for a man who had arrived without a permit, in return for a length of material for her coat, some honey and other products. She issued permission for another woman’s husband to enter the city, on receipt of a gold pendant and a box of perfume. The court sentenced her to imprisonment for seven years with the confiscation of her property and gave two of her clients prison terms of three years and another one year of corrective labour.\textsuperscript{542} The advertisement of such penalties did little, however, to prevent the widespread use of \textit{blat} among the population.

People without contacts in the city found other ways of making it into Leningrad without an official summons. Vasilisa is another interviewee who lived through the first blockade winter and then went into evacuation.\textsuperscript{543} She refers in her interview to her use of a number of devices in order to bring about her return journey. According to Vasilisa, she made up her mind to return to Leningrad from Krasnoiasrsk in central Siberia in autumn 1944 but was not able to secure an authentic summons, as she could not provide evidence of guaranteed accommodation in the city. The housing where she lived in Leningrad at

\textsuperscript{539} Ledeneva, \textit{Russia’s Economy of Favours}, p.1.
\textsuperscript{540} J. Heinzen, ‘A “campaign spasm”. Graft and the limits of the “campaign” against bribery after the Great Patriotic War’, in Fürst (ed), \textit{Late Stalinist Russia}, pp.123-141.
\textsuperscript{541} ‘V gorodskom sude’, \textit{Leningradskaja Pravda}, 5/10/1944, p.4.
\textsuperscript{542} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{543} Interview with V. V. K., ATsUI, Interview No. BL-1-047, p.50.
the start of the war had been destroyed to provide firewood and she had departed into evacuation from someone else’s flat. She had no immediate family left in the city, moreover, in 1944. Her brother had gone to the front and her grandmother had been buried during the first year of the blockade in a communal grave in the Bogoslovskii cemetery. Vasilisa’s mother, a party member, was not allowed to accompany her into evacuation but was later sent into the remote north of the Soviet Union due to her German ethnic origins. In addition, of course, very few people were being officially permitted entry to the city towards the end of 1944.

Without the necessary legal documents Vasilisa decided she had to come up with an alternative, unofficial means of returning. Everyone, she claims in her interview, “thought up their own way of how to get to Leningrad” at the end of the blockade.\(^{544}\) In Vasilisa’s case, she narrates that she and a friend employed several tactics including subterfuge, forgery, their status as ‘Leningraders’, the information network among students and even flirtation, to make it back illegally.

Fortunately, Vasilisa recalled, she had been evacuated as a student with a medical institute and the students there “could devise anything you wanted”.\(^{545}\) The first step was to secure permission to leave the evacuated institute in Krasnoiarsk and then to create fake documents to get them to Leningrad. At that time, medical students were being invited to transfer to an institute in newly liberated Odessa and Vasilisa wrote off and secured a place there. She justified this move to the director of the Krasnoiarsk institute by claiming that she wished to transfer to a warmer climate. The director, according to Vasilisa, understood, of course, “that we Leningraders (were) all bursting to get to Leningrad”, however there was nothing he could do once she had been accepted at Odessa and so he signed the statement that she was released from his institute.\(^{546}\) She and her friend then wrote out documents which claimed that they were being sent on a business trip to Leningrad to secure equipment for the Krasnoiarsk institute and managed

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\(^{544}\) Ibid.
\(^{545}\) Ibid, p.48.
\(^{546}\) Ibid, p.49.
to obtain signatures and stamps for these attestations. The certificates were apparently full of mistakes but no-one paid any attention to this and they were ready to go.

They travelled from Krasnoiarsk to Kirov, just west of the Urals, without incident. At Kirov, however, they had to change trains for Leningrad and there they ran into difficulties. It was impossible, Vasilisa recollected, for the two of them to get a place on a train. There were long queues and people stood in the station for days on end trying to obtain tickets. Those with money could manage to secure themselves a place but Vasilisa and her friend had nothing. Her friend, however, came up with a way round this difficulty. She told Vasilisa to wait with the suitcases while she went to enquire at the military ticket office, as after all, “we are blokadniki, we are Leningraders”.

Vasilisa never found out what her friend, who had no connection to the military at all, said at the office but they acquired tickets and were allowed onto a military carriage travelling to Leningrad. She hints, though, that it may have had something to do with the fact that her friend was quite an attractive girl.

The next obstacle was to pass through Mga, a railway town about thirty miles southeast of Leningrad. Two other students from the institute who had earlier attempted to enter Leningrad without permission had warned them about the situation in Mga, which was still under strict military control. The documents of all those travelling through Mga into Leningrad were being checked thoroughly, including the permits to enter Leningrad. The other students had been caught out there, thrown off the train and obliged to return to Krasnoiarsk. Vasilisa and her friend had more luck. As they approached Mga they curled up together on the third level bunk and pretended to be asleep. The soldiers in the carriage convinced the inspectors not to wake the girls up, arguing that they were coming to Leningrad for work purposes and were tired out from the difficult journey. The inspectors left them alone and they made it into the city.

Ibid.

Vasilisa’s story of return has much in common with the tale of return to Moscow without a permit in 1942 recounted by the American Mary Leder in her memoir. Mary had come to live in the Soviet Union from America as a fifteen year old girl in 1931, after her parents, left-wing Ukrainian Jews, decided to make a new life in Birobidzhan, the Jewish enclave in the Soviet Union. Mary left the Jewish province to make her own way in Moscow, applied for Soviet citizenship and married a Russian man. She was not
Documents indicate that the Leningrad authorities were particularly concerned about the number of people, those who had not lived in the city before, who were entering Leningrad based on illegitimate documents certifying they were being sent there on official assignments.\(^\text{549}\) In February 1945, Averkiev, the deputy police chief, sent a report to the City Soviet about a number of such instances. In one case, he highlights, the mother of a director of a Leningrad factory, who had not previously lived in the city, obtained a false attestation that she was going to Leningrad on official work signed by the Commissariat of the Tank Industry, even though she had never been employed in this industry at all.\(^\text{550}\)

Other in-migrants who arrived without permission from the authorities relied solely on a strategy of ‘invisibility’, making their way to the city without the required documents by dodging the police patrols and identity checks en route. NKVD reports tell us something about when these attempts failed. In January 1945, for example, 10,163 people were detained at police barriers for illegal passage and the attempt to enter Leningrad without permission. Of that number 4,590 were returned to regions in the rear of the country, and fines were imposed on all those arriving illegally.\(^\text{551}\) Many other people, however, did make it into the city outside of the official system of identification and verification. In a personal letter of 12\(^{\text{th}}\) March 1946, intercepted by the Military Censor, an inhabitant permitted to return with her family to the United States when they left in 1933. She was evacuated from Moscow at the start of the war and made it to Engels, where her newborn baby died. She decided that she needed to leave Engels as soon as possible and, when a friend received a summons back to Moscow in March 1942, she made up her mind to return with her. Like Vasilisa and her friend Mary managed to purchase a train ticket from the special ticket office reserved for military personnel, in her case using her position as the wife of an officer at the front. She too could only obtain a ticket as far as a provincial station, situated just outside the 100km zone around Moscow that was also governed by entry regulations. With a bit of luck and the help of fellow passengers, who hid her under a blanket, she managed to evade the soldiers who came aboard to check travellers’ documents and make it into Moscow, where she escaped through a back entrance of the train station and out into the city: M. Leder, *My life in Stalinist Russia: an American woman looks back*, ed Laurie Bernstein, (Indiana: Indiana University Press, 2001), p.222

\(^{549}\) A summary of police activities in January 1945 noted that attempts to enter Leningrad with illegally issued certificates of official business continued to take place and that 687 people had been caught with this type of document: TsGASPb, f.7384, op.36, d.148, l.27.

\(^{550}\) Ibid, l.76.

\(^{551}\) Ibid, l.27.
wrote about the difficulties facing those who had not lived in Leningrad previously, particularly as, the writer averred, “the majority, like me, arrive without permits”.\footnote{552}{Ibid, l.78.}

An interviewee, Nina, described her journey to Leningrad illegally on the trains without any permits or tickets.\footnote{553}{Interview with N. I. P., ATsUI, Interview No. BL-2A-029, p.8.} Nina had been evacuated from Leningrad with a children’s home as a thirteen year old, when she was left all alone by the death of her family in the blockade. In evacuation in Omsk she was sent, along with fourteen other children from the home, to a newly formed factory school and after studying there for several months was dispatched to work at a military factory. In 1945 she made an attempt, with another girl and some men, to run away from the factory and they joined an assortment of people journeying towards Leningrad on the roofs, footboards and platforms of railway carriages. Some, like them, travelled with nothing but the clothes on their back and others with suitcases full of things, which were often stolen during stops at stations. She recalled how they were frequently chased off by the officials who were present in every carriage to check people’s documents but nonetheless they made it all the way into Leningrad.

What happened next to those who made it into the city without official sanction? Upon arrival in Leningrad the fates of the two interviewees, Vasilisa and Nina, differed dramatically. Their stories highlight various factors determining the continued presence in Leningrad of those who arrived outside of official channels. Once again the trajectories of this incoming population could be shaped by personal networks and assets, as well as by the visions of the central and local authorities for the postwar spatial order and social composition of the city.

Once in Leningrad, for example, Vasilisa and her friend were given assistance from friends and family living there. They stayed with various relatives and former classmates on alternate nights, thus managing to avoid the raids of flats regularly being carried out by the police to check the documents of residents and seek out the people who had arrived in the city illegally. At the same time, Vasilisa sought help at the branch of her
medical institute that had not gone into evacuation to obtain official registration in some accommodation and to receive a ration card. This took time but the director of the institute undertook to act on behalf of Vasilisa and a group of 10-15 other people who had arrived in similar circumstances. This was partly, in Vasilisa’s opinion, because the institute had suffered losses and was greatly in need of students, particularly from the higher years of study. The director also told the group that he would approach the city authorities for them because “it is our students who have arrived. Our native (korennye) Leningraders, not just anyone”.\(^{554}\) He settled them in a hostel in the grenadier barracks in the Petrogradskii district and upon payment of a fine of 100 rubles Vasilisa was granted a residency permit for Leningrad.

Vasilisa was convinced that she was aided by her level of study, as well as her status as a ‘native Leningrader’. First year places at the institute, she relates, were given to people already registered properly in the city, among whom there were enough eligible candidates to fill the places. If she had been in the first year of her course, rather than at a higher level of study, then as someone who had arrived in Leningrad without a summons, she asserts, she would have been sent away to spend a year working at logging sites or peat bogs, before being able to start at the institute. Another interview respondent, Tamara, who had returned to Leningrad from evacuation towards the end of the war, living there without a residence permit with an aunt, told of her narrow escape from being assigned menial labour when she tried to take up her studies at a medical institute.\(^{555}\) In her case the institute refused to accept her without proof of a residence permit, despite the fact she had several years of study behind her. She decided then to go to the recruitment office in her aunt’s district and request to be assigned to the institute. The official there, according to Tamara, took one look at her passport and announced “tram depot”.\(^{556}\) Tamara managed to grab the passport back, however, before an order for two years labour at the depot was stamped onto her documents.

\(^{554}\) Interview with V. V. K., p.51.
\(^{555}\) Interview with T. P. Kh., ATsUI, Interview No. BL-1-035, pp.24-25.
\(^{556}\) Ibid, p.25.
Following this attempt she recalls that she continued to leave without registration at her aunt’s house in the city centre, panicking everyday when she passed a policeman and hiding in a cupboard at night if she heard a rustle. Eventually she acquired official residence through a friend’s acquaintance who worked at a passport office. She concealed from the acquaintance that she had gained a permit to access the city on the basis of a fake business trip and instead professed to have made her own way on transport and then on foot. Apparently impressed by her bravery he signed a resolution registering her and she was able to enrol in her fourth year at the medical institute.

It seems from these accounts, therefore, that prewar inhabitants who possessed a valid passport but not all the required residency documents were not necessarily ejected completely from the city if caught. Those who were less skilled or without connections, though, may have been forced to work in undesirable workplaces in and around the city for a year or two before being granted registration as a resident once more. Again an incomer, either from the prewar population or new to the city, who had the means to bribe the employees they encountered at workplaces, passport offices, labour bureaus and housing offices could become registered as inhabitants of the city immediately. The prices related by correspondents in the letters seized by the Military Censor for a permit securing permanent residence in the city ranged from 400 to as much as 5000 rubles.  

Unlike Vasilisa, the returning Nina was immediately arrested and removed from the city on her arrival. Once she had made it into Leningrad she went with her companions straight to the counterpart of the military factory where they had been working in evacuation, just as Vasilisa had done with her institute. In Nina’s case, however, as she recounts, this turned out to be a foolish step. They went into the department of cadres and announced that they had just run away from Omsk, without official dismissal from the factory there. They were asked to wait for a minute and then two policemen came in,

557 In one letter a man complains that “if you do not have any money or high-ranking acquaintances, then they send you, whatever your speciality, to work in seasonal labour”: TsGASPb, f.7384, op.36, d.186, l.78; the seasonal work in question was probably temporary labour in the logging or peat industries; in another the price of a residence permit from someone in a passport office was set at 400 rubles: ibid, l.78; the author of another letter claims that a housing manager has offered to register her for 1300 rubles and that some people are paying as much as 5000 rubles: ibid, l.83.

558 Interview with N. I. P., p.2.
grabbed them by the collar and threw them into prison. A group was then gathered together from the prison for deportation and they were sent back to Omsk, to work at the same factory as before and live in the same hostel.

What had made the difference in Nina’s treatment? In contrast to Vasilisa and Tamara, Nina did not even have an internal passport, having been too young to be issued one before she left Leningrad with the children’s home. She had left work in evacuation without an official document legitimising her departure, moreover, from a factory that was still engaged in military production, and so she would have been considered a ‘deserter of the labour front’. As a graduate of a factory school, furthermore, she was effectively an indentured labourer, who had been drafted to work at that particular factory and could not seek her own employment elsewhere until she had worked out her four years wherever the Ministry of Labour Reserves sent her.

Police reports from the time suggest that a small proportion of those caught by the city’s police for violations of the passport regime were immediately removed from Leningrad like Nina. Of the 40,834 people picked up for breaking passport regulations in 1944, according to one report, about half were issued with fines like Vasilisa, while only 1799 were evicted immediately from Leningrad. Others who had entered illegally were obliged in signed statements to leave within 24 hours. It is not entirely clear from the report, though, how many people were given notice to leave the city within a certain time period. One anecdotal account, however, suggests that not everyone obliged to leave the city within one or two days necessarily obeyed this injunction, despite the fact that one of the main tasks of the Leningrad police for 1945 was to effect “daily control over the departure of people being removed from the city, (who are) required to leave in signed statements”.

A respondent in the blockade interview project recalled how a neighbour returned from evacuation with her two sons and found that her husband had been charged with spying

559 TsGASPh, f.7384, op.36, d.148, l.15.
560 Ibid, l.17.
for the Germans and shot. She learnt that, as the family of a traitor, their room had been sealed up and they were deprived of anywhere to live and the police, on discovery of her return, immediately gave her twenty four hours to leave. Her relatives who were living in the same house were too afraid to take her in with them. The interviewee’s sister, however, had been friends with the woman and their mother took pity on her family and let them live in hiding together with them in their room. Some time later, following the death of one of the sons, who was run over by a tram, the woman and her remaining son managed to secure a residence permit and their own accommodation. Even those stigmatised by their wartime behaviour or associations could sometimes, therefore, manage to continue to avoid the gaze of the authorities and to circumvent the ‘needs of the rulers’.

Nina herself made another attempt to leave Omsk permanently in 1947 and eventually, with difficulty, succeeded in becoming an official resident in Leningrad. She took some official leave from the factory in March to visit her grandparents in the Tver’ region between Leningrad and Moscow and although she reassured her boss that she would return, in fact she intended never to go back. In Tver’ region she got a job at a milk factory and a friend of her father managed to obtain a passport for her. Nina’s grandparents worried nevertheless that she would be apprehended and taken to court for her refusal to return to Omsk but she was sure that it was such a large distance between Tver’ and Siberia that she would be safe. One day, however, she received a summons to go to court, where she was judged by a military tribunal as an underage criminal for deserting a defence factory. The tribunal was lenient with her, however, and she was given a one year suspended sentence and permitted to remain in Tver’.

Nina’s intention remained to return to Leningrad, however, and from Tver’ she made her way back to the city, where she settled with the help of the contacts and accommodation which her family had possessed before the war. She managed to secure a right to permanent, legal residence in the room where her family had lived before they had all died in the blockade and which had been transferred into an aunt’s name until Nina

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561 Interview with L. V. D., ATsUI, Interview No. BL-1-002, pp.8-10.
returned, whereupon the room reverted to her. She was also given work at the ‘Progress’
factory, the enterprise in which her father had worked before the war. Once more,
however, according to Nina, things turned out not as she planned but “as was necessary
to our rulers”. In order to develop shipbuilding in Leningrad after the war workers
were mobilised into this industry and Nina was moved on from her factory to work
instead at the ‘Marti’ shipyard.

The restrictions imposed by the central authorities on population movement according to
social and geographical hierarchies and the needs of the economy, therefore, shaped post-
siege migration into Leningrad, especially its timing, the nature of the journey for many
people and the possible consequences of travel. The repopulation of the city was also
contingent, however, on the decisions, actions and interrelationships of Soviet citizens
and by local officials open to bribery or subscribing to particular ideas about the form a
post-siege community of Leningraders should take. Arrival into Leningrad and even the
possession of a permanent residence permit, moreover, often did not signal an end to
displacement for large numbers of the population. With much of the city’s housing
damaged or disputed, many people’s ‘place’ in the physical cityscape and in the postwar
civic order remained uncertain or contested.563

4.4 Endless resettlements

A letter from a war invalid, N. Khvorost’evskii, to the editor of Leningradskiaia Pravda
was published in September 1945 under the title ‘Endless resettlements’ (Beskonechnye
pereseleniia). The letter described his family’s experience during and after the war in the
following way:

562 Interview with N. I. P., p.3.
563 See Manley, “Where should we resettle” p.234 on housing as a contested terrain after the war and the
articulation and adjudication of competing claims as sites for determining a postwar order of hierarchies,
entitlements and exclusions.
In 1941 our flat in house no.58 on Liteinyi prospekt was destroyed by a bomb. My family was re-settled into flat no.10 and again in spring 1942 to flat no.29 of this house. After five months our room was needed by a caretaker and my relations had to move to flat no.33. But because the ceiling threatened to cave in, the Kuibyshev district housing department (zhilotdel) “kindly” granted a flat in house no.15 on Vladimirskii prospekt. After some time it turned out that it was not possible to occupy this flat either. The necessity arose of a fifth resettlement. Last year I returned home following injury at the front. When some other accommodation was put aside for me in that same house I, informed by bitter experience, decided to ascertain in advance to whom the flat belonged. The house-manager (upravkhoz) and district housing department (raizhilotdel) assured me that it would not be necessary to move again. I moved in, made repairs and….again received notification about the vacation of the flat.564

This letter imparts the continuing dislocation that was the hallmark of the immediate postwar years for many people. It also underscores how narratives about postwar settlement that were being articulated by officials on a local and central level and by people themselves were undermined by the realities of persistent unsettlement and resettlement. The war invalid’s ‘return home’, the state’s ‘care for the family’ of a serviceman, the veteran’s privileged status in post war society and the notion of a ‘rooted’ local community all seem to be belied by the ‘endless resettlements’ experienced by Khvorost’evskii in practice.565

The continuing displacements of people in Leningrad at the end of the siege took many forms. For some people who were returning to the city their journey remained “incomplete” even if they were evacuees or soldiers who managed to return to the city

564 ‘Beskonechnye pereseleniia’, Leningradskiaia Pravda, 15/9/1945, p.3.
565 Many articles appeared in the war and immediate postwar years under titles such as ‘nationwide care for families of fighters’, often specifically couching this care in terms of attention to their housing needs: see, for one example, ‘Vsenarodnaia zabota o sem’iaikh voinov’, Leningradskiaia Pravda, 13/1/1944, p.4; and ibid, 9/2/1944, p.2; ibid, 12/5/1944, p.3; ibid, 6/7/1944, p.3; ibid, 29/12/1946, p.3; see also Edele ‘A “Generation of Victors”’, p.126 on housing rights for war invalids and demobilised soldiers that included from 1945 special entitlements to newly built housing.
and to their prewar housing. As Yi-Fu Tuan discusses, attachment to ‘place’ can operate at the scale of a “favourite armchair”. This is the way in which the author Evgenii Shvarts in his diary entry of 23rd July 1945 wrote about his return home from evacuation:

17th July 1945 I moved into my old flat, which in February 1942 was badly damaged by a shell. The flat has been restored. The walls have been painted. I sit behind my former writing table, in the same armchair. A lot of the furniture has been preserved. To be more exact – it seems to us that it is a lot, because we thought that it had all perished. Some of our things were stowed for us by Pinegina, who lives in the flat diagonally across from us. She went away to the front. Her flat was sealed up and therefore the things were protected. And so, after the blockade, hunger, (the towns of) Kirov, Stalinabad, Moscow, I sit and write behind my table in my own home, the war is finished, Katiusha is in a room nearby, and we even brought a cat from Moscow, so that, when going out, I open the door as carefully as four years ago, in order that the cats do not escape. Before my eyes are the former windows of the flats opposite – only the inhabitants are not the same. Of the approximately eight flats, with which we had become so familiar in the course of seven years of peacetime life that we immediately knew if familiar faces were approaching the window, no-one was left. No, one flat has remained, where three reckless boys used to eternally hang out over the windowsill…They are all here now. They have become older, of course, but hang out over the windowsill as before…And so, I sit in my former place, and my old porcelain inkwell has returned to me, but a strange feeling worries me…But I am home, home.

566 Manley, “‘Where should we resettle the comrades next?’”, p.233 on “incomplete” journeys home due to issues with returning one’s housing and belongings.
567 Tuan, Space and Place, p.149.
568 Published in E. Shvarts, Memoary (Paris: La Presse Libre, 1982), pp.204-211, here, pp.209-10; Shvarts no doubt had his former home preserved for him as part of the decree protecting the rights of the scientific and cultural elite.
While Shvarts is disturbed by a strange feeling, he feels that he is ‘home’ as he sits in his ‘place’ in his armchair and watches the boys lean out the window ‘as before’. Many other people who came back to their former residences, however, did not return to any of their prewar belongings or to familiar, if aged, faces.

The deaths of so many people during the blockade, including whole families and households meant that former residents of Leningrad who had been in evacuation or at the front often found on their return that, even if they could move back into their pre-war accommodation, they could not re-settle into a familiar environment and way of life.\(^{569}\)

Several interview respondents who were evacuated during the blockade evoked the disconcerting experience of walking around houses in the city on their return, attempting to locate the people they had left behind. One woman spoke of how, on return:

people went to see each other with trepidation. To be more precise, they did not know, they went round to an address and whether those there were alive or not – no-one, or many people, did not know. So you go there and you don’t know. You arrive – perhaps there are completely different people there and where those (you seek) are – is completely unknown. And they found out about many people, that many had died.\(^{570}\)

Feliks D.S., a schoolboy when the war started, recounts how, having made the journey back from evacuation, he immediately began to search for his old classmates and a beloved teacher. He recollects that “it was horrible, those awful, difficult moments, when I went around the old addresses and was asked ‘who do you want, boy?’”\(^{571}\) As a result of his efforts, Feliks discovered that all of his close prewar school mates, and the lads

\(^{569}\) The fate of the family of the schoolgirl diarist Tania Savicha, all of whose members died, was not exceptional. In a chronicle of the blockade published in the journal \textit{Neva}\ in 1995, Nadezhda Reiman remembered the loss of five members of her family in the course of the blockade and the disappearance of their neighbours, who either moved away or died, from the \textit{Narvskaiia} outpost of the city where they all lived, close to the front line. In a phrase reminiscent of the final lines of Tania’s diary, Nadezhda writes that “of all our family there remained only two – myself and mama”; N. Reiman (Buldakova), ‘Iz vsei sem’i ostalos’ dvoe: Blokadnaia letopis’’, \textit{Neva}, No.9 (1995), pp.212-215, here p.215.

\(^{570}\) Interview with E. S. M., ATsUI, Interview No.BL-1-010, p.16.

\(^{571}\) Interview with F. D. S., ATsUI, Interview No. BL-2A-007, p.4.
with whom he had played in the backyard, had died in the blockade or not returned from evacuation: “no-one was left”.572

The struggle to trace friends and family in the context of the mass deaths and extensive evacuation of the blockade was made harder by the resettlement of people around the city and the poor functioning, it seems, of the city’s address bureau. An article in Leningradskaya Pravda of July 1944 condemned the bureau for issuing false information in response to inquiries about the residence of particular inhabitants. It gave examples of employees at the bureau incorrectly informing people that their loved ones were no longer living in the city. One woman was told, for example, that her husband was not in the city when he was living in a house on Nevskii prospekt.573

Vadim Shefner has communicated the loss of people and the damage done to places in blockaded Leningrad in a poem that also suggests that a material object can somehow preserve something of these. In the poem ‘The Mirror’, he evokes a house half demolished by a blast, in which a mirror has by some miracle remained intact:

People are dead, walls are swept away, -
It (still) hangs, the blind kindness of fate,
Over the abyss of sadness and war.

A witness of pre-war comfort,
On the wall eaten away by damp
It preserves in its glassy depths
The warmth of a breath and someone’s smile.574

572 Ibid, p.5; this was not the experience of everyone, of course, other interviewees recall that most of their family and neighbours had survived: interview with N. V. M., ATsUI, Interview No. BL-1-036, p.4; interview with L. V. D., ibid, Interview No. BL-1-002, p.8 and interview with M. F. Sh., ibid, Interview No. BL-2A-001, p.22.
573 ‘Nel’zia li bez “nedorazumenii”’, Leningradskaya Pravda, 7/7/1944, p.3.
According to one blockade survivor, however, often people found when they returned that much had changed in the city, and much could not be recovered, including domestic furnishing. In the case of some people, according to the interviewee, “their accommodation was occupied, for others all their furniture and everything had been taken, others had been bombed”.

The property of servicemen was in principle safeguarded, under resolutions of the City Soviet from 1942 and 1943, and preserved for their return. Special warehouses were also created under the auspices of the district housing authorities, in which the belongings of evacuees were to be stored and retained for collection by the owners until September 1946. Investigations by the City Department of State Provision and Social Support for Families of Servicemen and by the Leningrad police, however, concluded in early 1944 that there were many deficiencies in the implementation of these orders and that the theft of belongings from the flats of servicemen, evacuees and residents who had died was widespread. Accounts of thefts from one’s former apartment during the blockade are common among interviewees and in memoirs. One woman recalls how many of her mother’s belongings had been traded for food by another inhabitant of the building where they had lived. She adds that she did not even manage to retrieve their personal effects: a

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576 See, for example, ‘O sostoyanii okhrany zhilploshchadi i imushchestva voennosluzhashchikh i ikh semei (Reshenie Ispolnitel’nogo Komiteta Leningradskogo gorodskogo Soveta deputatov trudiashchikhsia ot 9 marta 1944g No.108, p.4-z)’, published in Biulleten’ Ispolnitel’nogo komiteta Leningradskogo gorodskogo soveta deputatov trudiashchikhsia, no.5 (1944), pp.7-8.
578 ‘O sostoyanii okhrany zhilploshchadi i imushchestva voennosluzhashchikh i ikh semei’, p.8; TsGASPh, f.7384, op.36, d.186, II.8-29, here 124.
579 One woman interviewed recalled that when she settled back in her former flat at the end of the blockade it had been cleaned out of most of her belongings, from valuables to clothes to a basket of dirty linen: interview with T. N. A., ATsUI, Interview No. BL-1-039, pp.13-14, here p.14; see also V. G. Levina, Ia pomnui…Zametki leningradki (St Petersburg: Nestor-Istoriia, 2007), p.91; other accounts by survivors emphasise the necessity for survival of selling any valuables and burning furniture during the blockade: see, for example, interview with I. V. L., ATsUI, Interview No. BL-2A-018, p.10 for an account of how in the cold blockade winter “we burnt all the window-sills, we burnt the doors….we burnt the doors….of neighbours who had left. We burnt the furniture which remained. Yes, we burnt all the furniture, of course”.

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table cloth sewn by her grandmother, a gold locket with a Pushkin poem inside, her grandmother’s treasured Singer sewing machine and the family photographs.\textsuperscript{580}

Not just personal belongings but entire buildings had been lost, destroyed and damaged in the city during the blockade, moreover. Leon Gouré has discussed the damage caused not only by bombing but also by the weather in houses where the roofs were broken, He cites that there was hardly a “single building in the city which did not suffer to some extent from the war”.\textsuperscript{581} Buildings which had remained intact had been used to house people from other areas and the reconstruction of housing, moreover, proceeded slowly at the end of the war.\textsuperscript{582} For some people arriving in the city their journey was made ‘incomplete’ by the non-return of their prewar accommodation. For others, both prewar residents and newcomers, arrival brought difficulty securing any accommodation at all. At the same time people who had moved into a flat during the blockade found themselves threatened with eviction when someone else arrived with a valid claim to it.

As we have seen, evacuees who had left the city with factories were not entitled to their prewar accommodation. The extensive damage to the city’s housing, moreover, meant that the former housing of other returnees no longer existed. A report on the reception of the first demobilised soldiers in Leningrad in July 1945, for example, commented that some had found their previous living space occupied, others discovered that it was completely destroyed.\textsuperscript{583} The regulations did not stipulate the entitlements of servicemen and their families whose prewar accommodation was demolished or temporarily unfit to

\textsuperscript{580} Interview with S. P. S., ATsUI, Interview No. BL-1-003, pp.23-4; the theft of belongings left in vacated rooms was not ubiquitous, however, the interviewee’s grandmother, for example, returned to a communal flat where, apparently, everything, even a dirty rag, apparently still lay where she had left it.
\textsuperscript{581} Gouré, \textit{The Siege of Leningrad}, p.174; according to Gouré, for example, “eighty per cent of all windows are said to have been broken in the end”; Zubkova discusses the poor state of housing in the postwar Soviet Union more generally, in particular the phenomenon of people living in dugouts, makeshift structures, ruins of buildings, and dark basements as late as 1956: Zubkova, \textit{Russia after the War}, pp.102-3.
\textsuperscript{582} This was the object of a critical article in \textit{Leningradskaia Pravda} in September 1945, which discussed the Moskovskii district of the city where, apparently, in the course of seven months of 1945, enterprises and institutions had only reconstructed 10% of the planned housing: N. Skliar, V. Beliakov, ‘Medlenno pospeshaia’, \textit{Leningradskaia Pravda}, 11/9/1945, p.3; by 1947 only 58% of the planned living space had been made ready for utilisation, according to a delegate to the City Soviet: TsGASPb, f.7384, op.25, d.733, l.12.
\textsuperscript{583} TsGASPb, f.7384, op.36, d.148, ll.153-155.
move into.\textsuperscript{584} The adjudication of some claims to specific accommodation after the war, furthermore, was incredibly complicated in practice. There were many scenarios in which several parties made valid claims on the same living space. In some cases, for example, despite the assertions of Popkov that the former living space of servicemen had been kept free, it transpired that the family of one Red Army man had been moved into the former flat of another soldier’s family.\textsuperscript{585} Both were entitled to it as ‘their’ living space according to the housing laws. Re-evacuees who did not necessarily retain the right to their prewar accommodation could also make claims as relatives of servicemen.\textsuperscript{586} Disputes and appeals could take many months to sort out, especially as different institutions involved, including the procuracy, people’s courts and district housing offices, could favour different resolutions.\textsuperscript{587} This was particularly the case if there was

\textsuperscript{584} Edele, ‘A “Generation of Victors?”’, p.122; see, for example, the case of one serviceman whose prewar flat was under reconstruction when he was demobilised and who was initially told by the district Soviet and housing office that he would have to join the general waiting list for housing and that his flat, once repaired, would be allocated to whoever was next on the list. The deputy procurator, district party committee and editors of \textit{Leningradskaiia Pravda} intervened on the soldier’s behalf, however, and as a result he did not receive his prewar housing but was given somewhere bigger to live in the same area without having to wait: TsGASPb, f.4948, op.1, d.145, ll.15-22; there was a slightly different outcome, however, in the case of another demobilised soldier whose house was destroyed for firewood in the blockade and whose furniture has been stolen. He was placed on a waiting list in November 1945 and despite the intercession of the editorial board of \textit{Leningradskaiia Pravda} on this occasion the Sverdlov district housing office refused to speed up the allocation of accommodation. On 20\textsuperscript{th} December 1946 the office confirmed that Sharamygin remained in the queue to receive a room: TsGASPb, f.4948. op.1, d.145, ll.36-40.

\textsuperscript{585} \textit{Leningradskaiia Pravda} reported in March 1944 that in many districts the rooms of those currently serving remained occupied by other inhabitants: ‘V ispolkom Lengorsoveta’, \textit{Leningradskaiia Pravda}, 8/3/44, p.4; for detail of the wartime housing laws preserving the prewar accommodation of soldiers and their families see ‘Iuridicheskaia konsul’tatsiia’, in \textit{Biulleten’}, No.6 (1944), p.1; and also ‘Iuridicheskaia konsul’tatsiia’, in \textit{Biulleten’}, No.3-4 (1944), p.15.

\textsuperscript{586} Ivan Matveev, a former soldier, for example, sent a letter to Stalin in March 1946, requesting intervention in his family’s unsettled living conditions. The letter detailed how his family had lived in Leningrad before the war but their room had been damaged by a shell in 1942 and they had been forced to move, with the official authorisation of the housing manager, into a room which had been left vacant. His family occupied this room until 1945, when the former inhabitants returned and demanded the return of their living space through a people’s court. The court initially rejected their claim on the basis that they had not lived there for two years and awarded the room to Ivan’s family. The former inhabitants appealed to the courts a second time, however, and on this occasion the decision was made in their favour on the basis that the husband was a soldier serving in the army. Ivan’s family were supposed to be allocated alternative, habitable lodging from the district housing office. According to Ivan, however, they had been “thrown out onto the streets” in fulfilment of the court resolution but had still not been allotted somewhere else to live: TsGASPb, f.4948. op.1, d.145, ll.53-58, here l.56.

\textsuperscript{587} For a series of appeals made by two women contesting the same apartment, both relatives of servicemen, one currently occupying the flat and the other who lived there formerly, that began in July 1946 and had still not been resolved in February 1947, and involved the district procurator, the housing office, the house manager, the city police and the central Soviet authorities, including Stalin, see: Leningradskii Oblastnoi Gosudarstvennyi Arkhiv (LOGAV), f.4380, op.2, d.220, ll.1-32.
insufficient housing available in a district to fulfil a decision made by the courts. The ubiquitous blat of course added to the intricacies and unpredictability of determining access to a particular apartment and undermined the articulation of housing rights as a hierarchy of entitlement further.

Some returnees to the city and people forced to leave houses where they had lived during the blockade were awarded housing from the ‘general stock’. The poet Ol’ga Berggol’ts, who conveyed the dislocation involved in being estranged from her former home during the siege, composed a poem entitled ‘My Home’ after the war in which she depicted the sensations of passing one’s previous apartment but not being able to walk in, not being able to ‘return’ to the place that is still ‘home’. One day, she writes, “I will not resist knocking on the door, coming into my home, standing on the threshold”, after all “I have come here to my home, and I remember it all and believe in our happiness”.

An interviewee, Vera, however, recollecting her return from evacuation, reflects that to have any housing after the war was the source of happiness. Vera had lived with her family before the war in a house in a Leningrad suburb that had been built by her grandfather. The house had quickly been destroyed by bombing and on return from evacuation she and her mother had lived in the house of an aunt in the outskirts of the city. Her mother, however, managed to solicit a room in a communal apartment in the city centre. According to Vera’s description, the new room was small, cold, without gas or central heating, on the fourth floor at the top of a terrifying staircase:

In general, there were no kinds of comforts. The water, naturally, was only cold. But this was good fortune (schast’e). This was such happiness. Your own roof over your head. Because when you don’t have your own housing – you envy

588 In the case of Ivan Matveev, for example, the district Soviet informed him, following his application for Stalin’s intervention, that it was still not possible to hasten the fulfilment of the second court resolution awarding him alternative living space, due to a lack of free housing in the district: TsGASPb, f.4948, op.1, d.145, ll.53-58, here l.53.
589 See, for example, complaints made in personal letters about people using money or contacts to obtain housing ahead of those next in the list or entitled to it for example as veterans: TsGASPb, f.7384, op.36, d.186, ll.74-77, l.83.
590 O. Berggol’ts, ‘Moi Dom’, in Sobranie Sochinenii, tom 3, pp.16-17; my thanks to Anna Reid for pointing me toward this poem.
everyone. We walked around the streets. And you look in the basements where people were living. You think how fortunate they are. They have their accommodation. But when we obtained this room, with difficulty, true, with all kinds of obstacles, but we somehow managed it via the institute, we were happy.  

For many people the obstacles to obtaining any housing persisted for months and even years. Some of the people who could not secure their prewar accommodation joined a long waiting list of people yet to be allocated somewhere to live. An article on Party activities which appeared in Leningradskaiia Pravda in September 1945 reproached housing departments of district Soviets for the delays in housing provision. The article referred to files in the housing department of the Vyborgskii district Soviet, whose pages were:

filled with lists of names of people, who are officially in the “primary queue” for receiving living space. Perhaps for some, who are optimistically inclined, the words “primary queue” summon up high hopes. But optimists among the visitors to the housing department of the Vyborgskii district Soviet are becoming fewer and fewer.

At a meeting of deputies to the City Soviet in April 1949, one deputy declared in his address that more than 3000 families in the Oktiabr’skii district of the city were registered on a waiting list for permanent accommodation, many of whom had not been

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591 Interview with V.N.K., ATsUI, Interview No. BL-2A-024, p.7; other people, as we have seen, would only recently have arrived to the city before the war and may have already been living in temporary, makeshift accommodation.

592 A letter published in 1944 in Leningradskaiia Pravda detailed a similarly chaotic situation in the housing department of the Petrogradskii district, where “hundreds of citizens arrive daily, waste time and cannot obtain anything”, including one mother of several frontline servicemen who had apparently been waiting five months for the return of her living space: Pis’ma v redaktsiiu: V. Konovalova, A. Mikhailova, A. Denezhkina, E. Shmeleva, A. Nikiforova, A. Vasenin, N. Borisov, I. Iurinov, ‘Besporiadki v raizhilotele’, Leningradskaiia Pravda, 22/8/44, p.3.

provided with living space from as far back as 1944. Again there was a sense among people in the city that housing was being allocated not according to one’s turn in the list or to one’s entitlement as laid out in the regulations but according to the ability to bribe or make use of contacts. In a personal letter, of April 1946 an ex-serviceman described his long wait for accommodation and expressed the view that “the queue for receiving living space exists as a screen, and the living space goes according to blat, bribes”. People frequently found that when they did receive their own room the flat in question was either occupied or in need of major reconstruction. According to Leningradskaiia Pravda in March 1944 in a number of districts an inventory had not been made of the condition of the housing stock and living space was allocated to people which was already occupied, or did not even exist anymore. The article illustrated this with an account of a woman who had been assigned accommodation seven different times, in each instance discovering that she was unable to actually live there.

Some people, especially those coming to the city as part of organised recruitments, were accommodated in a growing number of hostels. The central and civic authorities expressed concern that factory directors in need of labour were settling many more people in the hostels than had been authorised by the administration. An investigation by Leningradskaiia Pravda in August 1944 apparently found that half of the hostels investigated had been settled without permission and concluded that “many rooms are crammed over and above any kind of norm”.

594 TsGASPb, f.7384, op.25, d.733, l.127.
595 Ibid, l.89.
596 Ibid, 189.
598 ‘Ochet o deiatel’nosti’, GARF, f.9226, op.1, d.728, l.70 and l.80.
599 An official injunction set out in a central government decree of April 1944 and a subsequent resolution by the Executive Committee of the City Soviet required that enterprises and institutions only summon people to work in the city if they could guarantee provision of suitable accommodation: referred to in GARF, f.9226, op.1, d.685, l.82.
Even people arriving as part of the ‘planned’ resettlement found they were not provided with either housing or space in a hostel on arrival.\(^{601}\) Workers of a number of enterprises were settled in factory workshops, in basements, in the ruins of buildings and, in the case of the Kirov factory, under the stands of the factory’s stadium.\(^{602}\) Workers and their families who were re-evacuated with factory no.206 in 1944 could not all be accommodated within the two houses that had been allocated by the city administration. As a result, according to a letter addressed from the People’s Commissar for the Shipbuilding Industry to the Chairman of the Leningrad City Soviet at the end of 1944, 1200 people were currently living in the factory’s office premises and in schools that needed to be vacated by May 1945. The vice chairman of the Soviet replied that it could only provide the factory with houses in need of major repairs for its workers and no flats or rooms with just minor damage.\(^{603}\)

The provision by factories of housing to its workers that was still in need of major repairs was a common practice.\(^{604}\) In August 1945, *Leningradskaia Pravda* reproduced a letter about the inadequate accommodation provided for 800 workers brought into the city according to a contract with a construction trust. The workers described in the letter how on their arrival they had been taken from the station in cars and dropped at a house along the Moscow highway which was to form the hostel where they were supposed to live. It was impossible, however, to enter any of the rooms of the building, as they were in the middle of reconstruction: the walls were still being painted, the ceilings whitewashed and

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\(^{601}\) For cases of factories in the city being reprimanded by the State Sanitary Commission for bringing in trainloads of workers without having arranged anywhere for them to live see: GARF, f.9226, op.1, d.728, l.103 and d.897, l.101; also ‘Ne zabotiat sia o vosstanovlenii zhilogo fonda’, *Leningradskaia Pravda*, 25/5/44, p.2; and for the recollection of an interviewee that the Stalin Metal Works recruited workers without providing anywhere to live see interview with A. G. U., ATsUI, Interview No. BL-1-015, p.11

\(^{602}\) Vakser, *Poslevoennyi Leningrad*, p.91; the makeshift Kirov factory hostels, according to Vakser, were nicknamed ‘concentration camps’.

\(^{603}\) TsGASPh, f.7384, op.17, d.1345, II.2-3.

\(^{604}\) The paper cited a letter in November 1945 which reproached the Izhorskii factory for not preparing a hostel for its workers returning from factories in the Urals and instead placing them in “dilapidated barracks (vetkhom barake)”: Pis’ma v redaktsiiu: B. Semenov, ‘V kolpine ne gotoviat obshchezhitii k zime’, *Leningradskaia Pravda*, 1/11/1945, p.3.
the window panes erected. The new workers, therefore, had to “settle on the street”. By evening it had begun to rain and so they sheltered with their bags and suitcases in the basement and slept on the damp cement floor. The head of the trust’s housing-utilities department refused to discuss their problem and so they spent a further five days living in the basement. Then, the workers declared, they began to settle in the unfinished rooms, regardless of the threats of the hostel warden. At the time the letter was written the kitchen had not yet been built in the hostel, however, and, according to the letter’s authors, “the “lucky ones” manage to make fires and cook out on the street.”

Some people among those on the waiting list for accommodation, or those not entitled to a room, also slept out in various public places in the city. One demobilised soldier wrote to an acquaintance that in his experience no consideration was shown to those who had been demobilised, even if “you go without clothes and sleep on the streets”. A woman described in a letter of February 1946 how she had endured a lot on account of the lack of a room, had approached the regional party committee, the district party committee and the district housing office but had been refused everywhere and was spending the nights with her children in the city’s train stations. Another demobilised soldier, M. I. Kasatkevich, claimed in an appeal to the City Party Committee of October 1947 that he had been in the queue for housing provision for three years, during which time he had been registered in his sister’s room but, not wishing to interfere with her personal life, he stayed only occasionally with her. Otherwise, he stated, he passed the nights “in basements, staircases, by fences, on benches in parks and gardens, in toilets”.

The official system of housing allocation that was intended to provide people with a physical ‘place’ in the city, to determine who was to be included in its re-settlement and who excluded and to rank entitlements according to the ‘place’ of people in the postwar social order, was breaking down. In some cases personal networks could once more fill

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606 Ibid.
607 TsGASPh, f.7384, op.36, d.186, l.90.
608 Ibid, l.76.
609 Ibid, d.214, ll.64-66, here l.65.
the vacuum for people trying to arrange the basic elements of their everyday lives. Flats filled up according to family relationships in some cases. The crowding of those who arrived at the end of the blockade, in particular from the front and evacuation, into the rooms of friends and acquaintances that had remained intact, is conveyed in the memoirs of V. G. Levina. She depicts the scenes in the single room in which she lived with her husband, Vladimir, and her mother-in-law, once their relatives began to arrive from the front and from evacuation towards summer 1945 and discovered they were without a flat of their own. Levina and her family squeezed ten extra people into their room in all, so that:

There were thirteen of us, including three adolescents. Of course there weren’t enough places to sleep. People slept on the stove in the kitchen, on the writing desk, one of our nieces – on the narrow couch, which was slid under the piano for the night, someone slept top to tail in the bed with my mother-in-law. An elderly aunt slept on two Voltaire armchairs pushed together, and in the morning we had to extract her from the abyss which had formed between them. A schoolgirl-niece did her homework on a large box for firewood in the hallway. We lived in such a way for three years and only dispersed our guests among other family and friends at the end of 1947, because Vladimir was diagnosed with tuberculosis in the lungs.\(^{610}\)

Other people utilised new friendships forged in wartime experiences to help them make their living arrangements after the war. In the case of Aleksandr Gorodnitskii’s family, for example, they found on their return to Leningrad that their house had burned down and “there was nowhere to live”.\(^{611}\) They were accommodated by a family with whom his parents had made friends at the start of evacuation, on the goods wagon on the way to Omsk. Aleksandr’s family lived with them for half a year while repairs were made to a house in which they were to receive their own room.

\(^{610}\) Levinia, *Ia pomniu…*, p.98.
Some people, however, depicted their postwar living situation at the time as one of endless wanderings and tensions and divisions between the city’s inhabitants, as a “fight for living space”. In letters sent at the time to public institutions and to friends and family people wrote of their lives in terms of ‘roaming’ around the city. In September 1944, Leningradskaiia Pravda reported the situation of Evdokina Dubrovina, who was not given any housing immediately upon her return to the city and so spent the nights with her children “wherever comes along (gde pridetsia)”. In June 1945 another re-evacuee to Leningrad protested in a letter to Leningradskaiia Pravda that, due to the wait for living space to be sorted out, “it will soon be a year that I have been wandering”. A woman whose previous room was occupied by people entitled to remain there and had not yet been provided with accommodation informed the city procurator in 1945 that she and her family had been forced “to roam around other people’s places (chuzhim uglam) for more than a year”. In February 1946 a woman wrote a personal letter to a friend advising her not to come to Leningrad for another year as even demobilised soldiers were not receiving rooms. If her friend did arrive, she warned, then she too would have to “roam around hostels”. Another former soldier addressed an appeal to Mikhail Kalinin, Chairman of the Supreme Soviet, at the start of 1946 to help him with his housing difficulties in Leningrad. In it he described how he had not been allocated anywhere to stay and although registered with aunt he was having to “roam around” (skitat’sia) other people’s living space, and sleep on the floor covered with his greatcoat.

The tensions between residents that these arrangements could cause are illustrated by the appeal of a woman who had been re-evacuated to Leningrad for help from Mikhail Kalinin. Her husband had died and her prewar housing been destroyed and she remained in March 1946 on the waiting list for housing. Burganova, along with her mother and young son, had found a place to stay temporarily with acquaintances but in February, she claimed, they were forced to leave the room where they had been staying by the tenant,
who threw their personal belongings out into the corridor. As a result, Burganova continued, “I spend the nights with my family in the corridor. The inhabitants of my flat curse (us), forbidding us to pass the night here either…my elderly mother roams (shataetsia) as well around the city of Leningrad, asking to be allowed to spend the night somewhere”.618

There were instances in which people lived in corners in communal areas outside rooms to which they believed they were entitled, while the rooms remained registered to, or occupied by, the other inhabitants claiming the right to live there. A letter to Voroshilov from a demobilised soldier of March 1946 pleaded for his assistance “in my wanderings” (v moikh skitaniiah) and portrayed his current living conditions in the kitchen of the flat where he had lived with his aunt before the war.619 According to the veteran, his former room had been occupied after the death of his aunt from starvation in 1942 by a new tenant who had subsequently been convicted of the theft of his belongings. The room remained registered, nevertheless, in the name of this woman, while the former soldier was, in his words, “roaming around, living in the cold kitchen, without a permit”.620

Rebecca Manley has described how housing claims were often settled on the contested terrain itself: in apartments, hallways and buildings under contention.621 The way in which some disputes could be settled is described in a letter discussed in Leningradskiaia Pravda in August 1944. The author of the letter, A. Nikiforova, wrote of how the room allocated to her was already occupied and that the occupant had refused to leave. Nikiforova, therefore, moved into the room that had been made available for the person in ‘her’ room. She was subsequently evicted, however, from the alternative room when it was awarded to someone else. According to her letter, she arrived home to find her things thrown out into the corridor and she found herself on the street.622

618 TsGASPb, f.4948, op.1, d.145, ll.64-75, here l.75.
619 TsGASPb, f.4948, op.1, d.145, l.92.
620 Ibid.
621 Manley, ““Where should we resettle?””, p.241.
The perception of unfair treatment in the allocation of housing, along with tensions arising between inhabitants as people ‘wandered around’ flats and contested rights to specific rooms, formed an arena in which people articulated their own notions not just of people’s place in the postwar Soviet social order but also of who belonged in the community of Leningraders.

In the interviews with those who lived through some, or all, of the blockade, some respondents insisted that harmonious relations prevailed among postwar inhabitants. This is accompanied, however, in many interviews by references to the values of true Leningraders and blokadniki that suggest distinctions made between those who lived through the entire blockade, those who were in evacuation and complete newcomers to the city after the war. Sources from the time indicate that people were engaged in making judgements about who merited housing in Leningrad after the war in terms of differing conceptions of local identity. They articulated these in personal letters and also fashioned them in appeals to the central and local regime, appropriating public discourses of belonging and entitlement in the process but also disclosing their own delineations of the postwar community.

The authors of some of these letters and appeals emphasised wartime service. The demobilised soldier Aleksei Zvonov couched his appeal to Kalinin for assistance with housing, for example, couched them in the rhetoric of entitlement on the basis of wartime behaviour. He stressed that he deserved better living conditions on account of his wartime service as an officer of the Soviet army. He underscored that “I have worked and fought honestly”, noting his decorations for service at the front. Another former soldier wrote a personal letter to his father about access to housing in Leningrad in which he underscored his sense of a divide between those who fought and those who stayed in the rear. He expressed bitterness that “those who were giving their lives for Leningrad have

623 See interview with L. P. V., ATsUI, Interview No. BL-1-029, pp.31-32 on the “unpleasantness” that arose from the situation with flats and resettlements and also on the different types of relationships that were possible between people who had remained in the city and people arriving.
624 TsGASPh, f.4948, op.1, d.145, ll.4-7, here l.6(ob).
been left on the street and those who were engaged in different affairs and in speculation, sometimes have two flats” 625

In some applications for official intervention mention of the applicant’s war record was accompanied by references to the strength of bond with the city of Leningrad and the blockade. In his appeal for Stalin’s assistance in securing somewhere for his family to live, the demobilised soldier Ivan Matveev recounted not only his service record at the front but also his family’s connection to the city, in particular their presence and service in Leningrad during the blockade. He noted his service in defence of the motherland from 1941, on the Leningrad front and right up to Berlin, during which he was wounded four times and earned government decorations and medals for the defence of Leningrad and for victory over Germany. In addition he related that his wife and sixteen year old son had been awarded medals for the defence of Leningrad, in recognition of their work in the city during the blockade and he began his letter with the assertion that “my family lived in the city of Leningrad before the war and during the war in the severe conditions of the blockaded city of Lenin” 626

Some people employing a narrative of the community who lived through the blockade contradicted the model of a broad community of Leningraders, cemented by the blockade but incorporating the prewar residents scattered across the country in the army and in evacuation, that was being constructed in the local media. Arguments marshalled by a woman appealing against her eviction from the room into which she had been resettled during the blockade included her husband’s service in the navy and decoration with medals, and also the assertion that the evacuee to whom the room belonged “did not live in Leningrad for the entire war” 627

625 TsGASPb, f.7384, op.36, d.186, l.81.
626 TsGASPb, f.4948, op.1, d.145, l.56.
627 LOGAV, f.4380, op.2, d.220; the recollections of a woman who worked in the komsomol committee of the Kirov factory during and after the siege describes the possibility for strains between those arriving from the rear and those who had served at the ‘Leningrad front’: “in May 1944 workers began to return to the factory from the Mainland…It happened that some workers related hostilely to those who arrived, called them deserters, who had saved their skins in the rear, at the same time as those who remained at the factory endured huge difficulties. It was necessary to explain (to them). You see, people had not gone to a resort, they had also not had it easy”: cited in Potemkina, Evakuatsiia v gody Velikoi Otechestvennoi voiny na Ural, p.195.
People returning from the front or evacuation on the other hand made claims about who should manage to settle in postwar Leningrad which highlighted the relevance of a longstanding connection to the city, stretching back before the war. Demobilised soldier M. I. Kasatkevich in an appeal to the City Party Committee for housing alluded to the state’s duty to invalids of the war but recited as well his biography as a “native” (korennoi) inhabitant of Leningrad, who had been born there in 1916 and left his family’s home there to join the army in 1938. Some proceeded from assertions of their status as ‘natives’ to distinguish between people who had lived in Leningrad for some time and new arrivals. In a request to Kalinin for his intercession on her behalf, to help reclaim her former housing from the man who had occupied it during the war, A. Nazarova, a re-evacuee to Leningrad, asserted that “my motherland – is Leningrad”. She defined the relationship of her family to the city in terms of longstanding residence, their service in its factories and contribution to its defence during the war. My daughter and I, she writes:

are true Leningraders. I was born in Leningrad and lived in the city for 48 years, and my daughter was born in Leningrad in 1925 and lived there until 1942. My husband was mobilised into the civil defence organisation of the city of Leningrad from 22nd July 1941, where he remained until February 1942. In view of an illness he was released from service in the civil defence organisation and in March 1942 he died.

A woman, writing to an acquaintance in 1946 drew on other aspects of identity, including class, to construct a model of the Leningraders who should be given privileged access to housing that excluded recent incomers. She makes clear, though, that the most important

628 TsGASPb, f.7384, op.36, d.214, l.65.
629 TsGASPb, f.4948, op.1, d.145, ll.124-129, here l.129; the equation of Leningrad to a motherland or nation was expressed by the chief Petersburg artist in a polemic of 1997 entitled ‘Nationality – Petersburger’ in which he wrote: my mama told me of Petersburg, Petrograd, of deceased relations, of the blockade of Leningrad. Since those very years I have put an equals sign between the ideas of Motherland and St. Petersburg, between our fates: the fate of the city and the fate of the city-dweller”: I. Uralov, ‘Natsional’nost’ – Peterburzhets’, Vesy Femidy. Rossiiskii pravovoi literaturno-publitsisticheskii zhurnal, No.1 (1997), pp.58-9, here p.58.
630 TsGASPb, f.4948, op.1, d.143, l.128.
criteria for inclusion and entitlement should be to have lived in houses in Leningrad for some time before the war and to have ‘seen’ the city. Declaring that everything was still wrong with their living situation, she expounds in the letter:

we are living in some kind of absurd sort of peasant house (khalupe nesuraznoi), and besides it is not our own. People who had never even seen Leningrad at all before the war, or who had arrived a year before the war and lived in hostels, have now obtained rooms by some means and have become big proprietors, while you can have lived here for eleven years and you don’t have the right to live as people and the people are impudent and these house managers and people registering passports – it is terrible…Give them bribes, and then give them some more, then they will talk with you.631

Interestingly a letter written by a newcomer to the city at the end of the war expresses his conviction that he was discriminated against in the provision of accommodation, work and registration documents as someone who had not lived in Leningrad before but also that he was able to arrange everything as he wished on the basis of favours and money.632

Finally, Pavel Luknitskii, a Leningrad writer, held a specific group of incomers, those arriving in the city without official summons, responsible for overwhelming Leningrad’s available housing, noting in a diary entry of June 1944 that:

the city authorities provide those who returned to Leningrad according to a summons, who received a residence permit, giving them the right to return from evacuation, with new accommodation. But many return in an unauthorised fashion and, of course, it is impossible to provide them straight away with lodging in a city shattered by the fascists.633

631 TsGASPh, f.7384, op. op.36, d.186, l.75.
632 Ibid, l.86.
While various branches of the city bureaucracy were engaged in untangling competing claims to housing the local administration also confronted the conflicting visions of the postwar community being elaborated in their memorialising of the blockade, imposed from Moscow and articulated by various residents. They attempted to reconcile them in a rhetoric of ‘place’, figured in terms of ‘family’ and ‘roots’, that asserted the necessity of newcomers coming in from the front or mobilised for the economy to be cultivated in Leningrad culture and to prove themselves worthy members of the community. This rhetoric implied the exclusion of any of those who remained ‘rootless’. The elaboration of this discourse will be discussed briefly next.

### 4.5 Powerful Roots

The attitude of the Leningrad city government to those arriving after the war was clearly ambivalent. On the one hand, Leningrad officials needed to promote the speedy integration of hundreds of thousands of people into the post-war urban environment and economy. On the other, they had participated in creating a powerful local wartime myth of the city and its inhabitants during the blockade as a special, unique moral and cultured community, purified in the course of withstanding unprecedented suffering and barbarism. Local officials were concerned with the integration of new arrivals not just into the physical environment of the workplace and the city but also into this discursive community, which they feared might thereby be weakened or dissolved. The main task that we have set ourselves, said the secretary of Leningrad’s Komosomol organisation at a conference in 1947, has been to ensure that students arriving in the trade and factory schools of the city as ‘non-Leningraders’, have left them as ‘Leningraders’. 634

Articles in the press at the time expressed this ambivalence, establishing degrees of belonging to the city and the need for some groups to prove that they could fit into a normative order in Leningrad that had been cemented in the blockade. While evacuees were represented as ‘particles’ of the city, its ‘own people’, who could easily be

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634 RGASPI, f.1M, op.5, d.33, l.126.
reincorporated by it, newcomers with official permission to enter the city had to be
inculcated in its traditions and culture and prove themselves to be ‘Leningraders’. An
article printed in *Leningradskaiia Pravda* in September 1944, for example, stated that:

Into Leningrad are arriving thousands of new workers, in the main women,
village youths and students of trade schools. To them a great honour has fallen –
to live and work in the city of Leningrad… By selfless work they must earn
(*zavoevat’*) the honoured right to call themselves Leningraders’. 635

Later articles echoed the necessity for the increasing numbers of newcomers to become
cultured labourers, steeped in Leningrad traditions and imbued with love for their factory
and the city. 636

At the end of the blockade the discourse of local officials had conflated the conceptions
of the city of Leningrad and the motherland and naturalised ties to the city in images of
blood and soil, as well as purity, in the process of understanding the meaning of the
blockade for Leningraders. An editorial by Popkov from the start of 1944 emphasises the
importance of the love of Leningraders for their native city, which had found its most
vivid expression in the care shown for its preservation in the difficult conditions of the
blockade. 637 An article from in the same edition of the paper stressed the place of the feat
of morality and strength achieved by Leningraders during the blockade in the legendary
history of the city and also asserted the role of this past, as preserved in the hearts and
souls of Leningraders, in creating the city’s future. It concluded that, in the achievement
of new feats, “that which is new, which is developing steadily, is growing from a soil

636 See, for example, ‘Povyshat’ obshchuiu kul’turu i gramotnost’ novykh rabochikh’, *Leningradskaiia
Pravda*, 27/12/1944, p.1; Partiinaia Zhizn’: L. Vinokurov, ‘V remeslennom uchilishche’, *Leningradskaiia
Pravda*, 15/5/1945, p.3; ‘Vyrastim novye kvalifitsirovannye kadry dlia leningradskoi promyshlennosti:
obiazatel’stva starykh proizvodstvennikov Kirovskogo zavoda’, *Leningradskaiia Pravda*, 12/8/1945, p.2
637 P. Popkov, ‘V novom godu s novymi silami za rabotu!’; *Leningradskaiia Pravda*, 1/1/1944, p.2; other
articles on the love for the city manifested in the behaviour of people during the blockade include that of
the secretary of the City Soviet, A. Bubnov, ‘Vse sily – na vosstanovlenie rodnogo goroda!’;
*Leningradskaiia Pravda*, 6/8/1944, p.2 and these sentiments were echoed in letters to the editor, for
example, B. Semenov, ‘Gotovit’ zhilishcha k zime (Obzor pism v redaktsiiu)’, *Leningradskaiia Pravda*,
14/9/1944, p.3.
thickly watered with the blood of the best people of the city, in an atmosphere of
everseous love for the motherland”.

The portrayals of those in the city without a prior claim on the Leningrad soil also
entailed the application of biological metaphors as the construction of a heroic civic
community purified by the blockade shaped – and was shaped by – representations of
those crossing into it. These metaphoric practices did not exclude new arrivals to the
industrial, public and domestic spaces of the city from membership in a community of
Leningraders but highlighted the unnatural character of their current position as in-
migrants and the significance of their task of integration into the family of Leningraders.
An article of September 1944, for example, specified the importance of inculcating new
workers from other areas of the country with the political, cultural and production habits
of Leningraders, so that they could acclimatise to and master their tasks, know their place
in the workshop and “join the glorious labouring family of Leningraders”.

The attainment of membership of this family could not be achieved by a superficial
mastery of its culture and traditions, according to the local official discourse. An article
from Leningradskaja Pravda of September 1945, for example, outlined how the glorious
traditions of Leningrad’s workers should be inculcated into the young people mobilised
into the city’s trade schools and underlined that this culture of behaviour “should enter
the flesh and blood of the youths”. In April 1946 an article conceived this process in
botanical imagery. The article was published under the heading ‘Powerful Roots’. The
article noted that although very few of the old workers remained at the factory and the

\[638\] N. Tikhonov, ‘Na poroge reshauushchego goda’, Leningradskaja Pravda, 1/1/1944, p.2; the idea that the
experience of the war and blockade manifested and augmented heroic qualities which had been
characteristic of the people of the city is also reflected in the article ‘Steny rasskazyvaют’, Leningradskaja

\[639\] James Von Geldern has explored the way in which migrants in late imperial Russia, by crossing the
boundary between city and countryside, simultaneously posed a threat to and shaped popular experience
and the way contemporaries saw the world and their place in it. Representations of migrants of all sorts,
who were suspended in the space in-between the places of town and village and the social identities of
peasant and worker associated with them, acted as theatres for dialogues on city and country life and social

\[640\] ‘Zabotit’sia o bytovom ustroistve i trudovom ispol’zovanii novykh rabochikh’, Leningradskaja Pravda,

\[641\] S. Livanov, ‘Bo’l’shoe nachinaetsia s malogo’, Leningradskaja Pravda, 19/9/45, p.2 and ‘Novoe
majority of the labour force was made up of new cadres of women and youths, nevertheless the old traditions were being kept alive, as embodied in the person of an old worker who was both teaching the new recruits and acquainting them with stories about the past of the factory. In such a way, the article concluded, “powerful roots are nourishing the young shoots”. 642

This chapter has shown how different, cross-cutting conceptions of attachment to place and belonging to a postwar family were articulated at the end of the war on a central and local level, by the authorities and by residents of Leningrad. Liisa Malkki has argued that the same metaphoric practices that create and naturalise links between people and place are also “deployed to understand and act upon the categorically aberrant condition of people whose claims on, and ties to, national soils are regarded as tenuous, spurious, or nonexistent”. 643 The next chapter will examine how this privileging of place translated into practices and discourses that marked all of those on the move at the end of the war as potentially deviant and as sources of contamination. It discusses how people in transit or who were deemed ‘out of place’ in the postwar cityscape were treated in the practices and rhetoric of the central and local authorities as bearers of dirt, disease, disorder and criminality. The ‘markedness’ of itinerant and marginal groups served to reinforce certain visions of the postwar civic community.

643 Ibid, p.27.
Chapter 5. Matter out of place: the repopulation of Leningrad and the ‘danger’ of social contamination

5.1 Protecting the city from ‘dissolute elements’

In July 1946, three months after the city’s spring fair with its ‘motley crowd’ of visitors took place, the chief of the Leningrad department of the Ministry of Internal Affairs (MVD), I. Shiktorov, penned an article in Leningradskaia Pravda highlighting incidents of crime and social disorder in the postwar cityscape.\(^{644}\) The article was one of a number of pieces that appeared in the paper from January 1945 written by the city’s head of police or its main procurator, A. Falin, about menaces to public order on the streets of Leningrad.\(^{645}\) The new five year plan, Shiktorov began in the July 1946 article, was opening up “monumental vistas” (velichestvennye perspektivy) for the city.\(^{646}\) Leningrad was reviving as an industrial and cultural centre and a model socialist city. There was much left to do, however, to combat incidents of crime, social disorder, hooliganism and ‘mischief’ in Leningrad’s public places.

Persistent violations of the civic order, according to Shiktorov, included drunken brawls between inhabitants in clubs, parks and on trams and hooligan acts committed in cinema foyers. Children and adolescents, he added, were travelling to the outskirts of the city and playing with the ammunition they found there, making up games on bridges and the footplates of trams in the city centre, and bothering passers-by. The ‘model’ order and cultured external appearance of Leningrad, moreover, was being upset by the untidiness of its streets, yards and buildings. Even the central streets of the city, Shiktorov noted,


\(^{645}\) See also A. Falin, ‘Usilit’ bor’bu s narushitelami obshchestvennogo poriadka’, Leningradskaia Pravda, 10/1/1945, p.3, this article was later reprinted for employees of the NKVD in its institutional journal for NKVD employees: Post Revoliutsii, 30/01/1945, p.1; and I. Shiktorov, ‘Ukreplim obshchestvennyi poriadok i bezopasnost’ v Leningrade’, Leningradskaia Pravda, 23/10/1945, p.2, also published in the journal for employees of the NKVD: Post Revoliutsii, 29/10/1945, p.1.

\(^{646}\) Shiktorov, ‘Leningradu – obratsovyi obshchestvennyi poriadok’, p.3.
were rarely swept and washed down, while inside houses there were often no numbers on flats and no lists of residents posted up anywhere.

The city’s police chief left no doubt in the article where the main responsibility for these “intolerable” manifestations of social disorder in the cultured city of Leningrad lay. Although, he claimed, the number of cases of hooliganism had fallen substantially in recent months, order on the streets had to be maintained in the face of the rapid flow of people into the city. The numbers of people arriving in Leningrad had increased in recent months following the removal of restrictions for travel on the railways and, Shiktorov continued, the population was changing not just quantitatively. The majority of the hundreds of thousands of people who had arrived in the city recently, he reassured his readers, were immediately integrated into factories and institutions. Among the mass of people travelling into Leningrad, however, there was a certain proportion of ‘unstable’ and even criminal elements. These people refused ‘socially useful work’ and formed a “breeding ground” for hooliganism and crime. Young people who had been brought in to train at the city’s labour reserve schools were frequently among those who, having spent the day getting up to mischief on the streets, ended it in police departments. Many children, and adults, who had been living in the countryside in the last few years, finally, had become unaccustomed to the ‘discipline’ of observing regulations for moving about the streets on foot or by public transport.

In the interests of ensuring public order and calm, Shiktorov averred, it was necessary to uphold strictly the passport regime. Not only the police but also directors of enterprises and housing managers should watch newcomers carefully and rigorously check their documents, their passports and residence permits. The stringent application of the passport system would serve to protect and “cleanse” the city from “all types of dissolute elements”. Those young people and other incomers who were entitled to settle in the city, Shiktorov concluded, must be educated in norms for behaviour in public places and elementary habits of ‘discipline’.

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647 Ibid.
648 Ibid.
649 Ibid.
Blair Ruble refers to the comments made by Shiktorov and other local officials about levels of crime, hooliganism and indiscipline in public places and at factories within the city to reinforce his argument that the city lost its historic character and declined in status after the war, as it filled “with a new population fleeing a war-ravaged countryside”. In doing so, he replicates the police chief’s conflation of criminality with general ‘social indiscipline’ and his equation of this type of conduct with large numbers of rural immigrants. Ruble maintains that reports by the authorities bemoaning high crime rates, problems with hooliganism and also inordinate levels of labour turnover point to behaviour that “could be expected” of peasant-workers who had been demobilised from the army or had migrated directly from the village. These trends were further evidence, therefore, that “the highly skilled workers of whom Leningrad officials had been so proud had been swamped by…[a] wave of migrants from the countryside.”

In the article of July 1946, however, Shiktorov stated that incidents of hooliganism, and of certain other crimes, had been falling in preceding months, just as the number of people travelling into the city had risen further. Nevertheless, he maintained, “the task of organising a model social order in the city remained vital”. His association of itinerants with crime, disorder and untidiness on the city streets, this chapter will argue, is best understood not as indicative of the inherent unruliness of a ‘city of migrants’ but as symptomatic of language and procedures that accompanied the socio-spatial ordering of the population by the central and local Soviet authorities at the end of the war.

Rhetoric and practices targeting itinerant populations as potential contaminants, responsible for introducing not just crime but also manifestations of dirt and disease into the civic community, attended the journeys of people towards the city and their arrival there and also marked their continued presence in the cityscape. The chapter will explore how these discourses and measures emanated in part from a state approach which linked

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652 Ibid, p.308.
653 Shiktorov, ‘Leningradu – obratsovyi obshchestvennyi poriadok’, p.3.
the restoration of the population in a settled spatial order with the establishment of control over a menacing sanitary situation and with the imposition of a particular normative order in the postwar urban environment. This process was buttressed in Leningrad by the ambiguous relationship of the local authorities to the task of integrating hundreds of thousands of new arrivals annually into both the physical and mythological post-blockade cityscape. The ‘markedness’ of itinerant and marginal populations as potentially disorderly, unsanitary and deviant was bound up with the construction of the local narrative of a cultured and civilised community, living in a space purified by the sufferings and heroism of the blockade, and the establishment of degrees of belonging to this community. The chapter begins with a discussion of the obligatory sanitary treatments that interpenetrated the regime’s attempts to regulate the movements of the population at the end of the war.

5.2 “Where are you crawling to, louse?” Sanitary processing and the passport regime

The previous chapter discussed the way in which the central and local authorities sought to order the postwar population physically and discursively according to certain economic and social priorities. The anthropologist Mary Douglas on the symbolic functions of dirt has argued that the process of organising the external environment and imposing orders and meanings on society is accompanied by a confrontation with matter which is deemed out of place in that order, and that this confrontation can generate rhetoric of pollution and contagion and corresponding purification behaviours.

Douglas proceeds from the premise that in any society dirt is a relative concept, constructed by the beholders in as much as it offends against their idea of order. In her view, if “dirt is essentially disorder”, or “matter out of place”, then the attempt to eliminate dirt, to purify, is part of a movement to structure the environment, to impose an ideal, unified order upon it. Ideas of pollution and defilement work in the life of society to express and reinforce a general view of the social order, its morals and

Douglas, Purity and Danger, p.2.
boundaries. They serve to define social rules, uphold values and establish an orderly pattern of what and who belongs inside the boundaries of a society, clarifying what should be rejected and what can be incorporated.

The unclean, therefore, is what is marked as not fitting the desired order during a process of creating a stable, permanent world, from a chaos of shifting impressions. The stable societal order is envisioned as one with external boundaries and internal lines delineating place, role and behaviour, the transgression of which is treated as a dangerous pollution. This definition of dirt as ‘matter out of place’ suggests that a society would be likely to fear contamination from people who have been physically displaced. Douglas writes that persons who are in a marginal state, “who are placeless”, transgress against the stable pattern and classifications of society and as elements deemed anomalous, ambiguous, contradictory, are reacted to as a pollutant.

Liisa Malkki engages with these ideas in relation to people displaced by violence from post-colonial Burundi. In her ‘ethnography of displacement’, she explores how refugees are regarded as an aberration of categories and a challenge to accepted boundaries within the system of nation-states, which place a moral value on rootedness, territoriality and a single national or categorical identity. Those on the move, as well as other ‘liminal’ groups perceived as neither one thing or another, neither here nor there, between all the recognised fixed points in cultural classification, are therefore regarded as immoral and contaminating. This explains neatly, she writes, a markedness of refugees in both commonplace and official discourse and in state practices as a danger or pollution. She shows how this was manifested in the administration of refugee camps in Tanzania. In this context, she notes the tendency for the governmental and international agencies to impose a spatial order on the displaced population in conjunction with establishing other kinds of order, including sanitary and legal, regimes.

655 Ibid, p.36.
656 Ibid, p.139.
657 Ibid, p.95.
658 Malkki, Purity and exile, p.4.
660 Ibid, p.112.
The adoption of practices linking sanitary measures with control over uprooted populations has also been illuminated in the work of Paul Weindling in relation to fears about epidemic diseases in Europe from the late nineteenth century. Weindling charts how an evolving medical discourse of infection and parasites intertwined with the political stigmatisation of ‘surplus’ populations, migrants and minorities. The threat from lice as carriers of typhus was particularly prominent in public representations of epidemiological danger and became associated with certain groups of people, who were classed as human hosts of parasites and disease. In this way, migrants, deportees, seasonal labourers, vagabonds, apprentices, peddlers, Jews and gypsies became demonised as “human parasites menacing national hygiene”.661 The medical discourse was soon extended to social ills and generated concerns about the ‘germs’ of deviant behaviour, which were connected with the same population groups.662

The association of migrants with an unnatural ‘uprooted’ state and, consequently, with the threats posed to a ‘core’ community by parasites and disease operated in the everyday parlance directed at people from Leningrad living in evacuation.

Valentina, an interviewee who had been evacuated with an aunt during the blockade, recalled like many others how they strove “by every means possible” to make it to Leningrad as soon as the siege was over.663 They moved closer and closer to the city in stages, making “dashes” (perebezhki) first from the village where they had been living into the nearest city of Novosibirsk and then to Iaroslavl’ in the west of the Soviet Union.664 They did not, however, obtain permission to enter Leningrad until 1946 or 1947. On arrival, Valentina’s “odyssey” of return was marked by further re-

661 Weindling, Epidemics and Genocide in Eastern Europe, p.7.
662 On the linkage of medical discourse, conceptions of cleanliness and perceived social ills beyond the borders of Europe, as part of the exercising of colonial power, see D. Chakrabarty, Habitations of modernity: essays in the wake of subaltern studies (Chicago and London: University of Chicago Press, 2002) on India and T. Mitchell, Colonising Egypt (Berkeley and London: University of California Press, 1991) on Egypt; thanks to Jamie Furniss for pointing me towards these references and the concept of ‘colonial hygienism’.
663 Interview with V. I. V., ATsUI, Interview No. BL-1-025, p.4.
664 Ibid.
settlements. Her aunt did not manage to secure her former accommodation, in which Valentina had also lived in the early months of the siege following the death of her mother while digging trenches. Instead they moved into alternative living space that she was allocated in the same district. When Valentina’s father came out of the army in 1948, moreover, he did not want to stay in the room where he and Valentina and her mother had lived before the war and where they remained registered, but which now stood empty of all their previous belongings. He quickly married again and insisted the teenage Valentina come to live together with him and his new wife in her flat near the city centre.

Describing her interrupted, and in many ways incomplete, return to the city Valentina underscores nevertheless how vital it was to her and her family to make the journey back towards Leningrad. For one thing, she relates, they had to try any way they could to get out of the “God forsaken village” in Siberia where she and her aunt had been living for a year in evacuation. Relations between evacuees and the collective farmers with whom they were lodging had not been good. The villagers, according to Valentina, resented the extra mouths to feed, and “called us ‘the uprooted’ (vykovyyrennye) and counted the days until we would leave”.

Interactions between evacuees and the people with whom they lived in the east were not always marked by such antagonism. Several other interview respondents, however, similarly remember being referred to as ‘the uprooted’ rather than ‘evacuees’ by an “unwelcoming” population in their place of evacuation. At times, these tensions were

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665 Manley, To the Tashkent Station, p.241 on the ‘odyssey’ of return shaped in part by bureaucratic regulations and restrictions as well as by lack of housing.
666 Interview with V. I. V., p.4.
667 Ibid.
668 See Manley, To the Tashkent Station, pp.220-236, especially p.229, on relations between evacuees and ‘locals’ in Tashkent ranging from friendship, cultural exchange and the adoption of evacuee children, to mutual incomprehension, to resentment at “parasitical evacuees”, tensions and even violence, particularly directed at Jewish arrivals.
669 See, for example, interview with F. D. S., ATsUI, Interview No. BL-2A-007, p.12 on how the population in Siberia could be “not very welcoming” and didn’t understand the word “evacuee”, instead referring to the new arrivals “more simply” as ‘uprooted’, perceiving them as having been “uprooted from over there and cast over here”; see also interview with V. G. G., ATsUI, Interview No. BL-1-026, p.39 for an interpretation of ‘uprooted’ as being used as a very offensive term for evacuees near Kazan”; and also interview with L. P. V., ATsUI, Interview No. BL-1-029, p.25; interview with N. V. Iu., ATsUI, Interview No. BL-1-031, p.48; interview with S. K. S., ATsUI, Interview No. BL-2A-000, p.9.
expressed in a language that equated evacuees to disease-carrying animals, to vermin or parasites. One woman who had been sent to live in a children’s home in the Sverdlov region recalled that the local residents referred to them as “Leningrad rats”. Another interviewee spoke, like Valentina, of how evacuees in the rural areas of the Novosibirsk region evacuees were labelled ‘the uprooted people’. Some, he adds, particularly boys and girls who had arrived with children’s homes from Belarus, were given other nicknames as well. It was common, or example, for people to approach these groups with the taunt “orphaned louse, where are you crawling to?”

For many people travelling to Leningrad at the end of the war, the journey did not signal an end to treatment as an uprooted, parasitical ‘element’ threatening the health of settled communities. Individuals returning to the city with the sanction of the authorities, or those mobilised in large trainloads to come and work in the city’s factories, encountered a network of government institutions conducting ‘anti-epidemic measures’ that entailed the isolation, medical surveillance, inspection for lice, and ‘decontamination’ of people in transit.

At the end of the war the authorities feared massive outbreaks of disease, above all of typhus, similar to those that had followed in the wake of the First World War and subsequent civil war in the lands of the former Russian Empire. The destruction wreaked on Soviet territory by the events of the Second World War included severe damage to the country’s sanitary infrastructure. This exacerbated prewar difficulties in keeping urban settlements clean, turning “a sanitary nightmare into a sanitary catastrophe”. Little rubbish was collected in towns and cities in the immediate postwar years and cesspits were rarely cleaned, many urban residents did not have indoor running water and sewerage systems were either non-existent or in disrepair. In addition, severe shortages of soap and the reduced capacity of municipal laundries and bathhouses (bania)

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670 Interview with E. G. I., ATsUI, Interview No. BL-2A-010, p.5.
671 Interview with F. D. S., ATsUI, Interview No. BL-2A-007, p.12.
672 At the start of 1920, for example, there had been a major outbreak of typhus in Bolshevik-controlled Petrograd: V. A. Shishkin (ed), Petrograd na perelome epoch. Gorod i ego zhiteli v gody revoliutsii i grazhdanskoj vojny (St Petersburg: Dmitrii Bulanin, 2000), pp.117-122.
meant that “just maintaining basic levels of cleanliness and hygiene for yourself and your family was drudgery”. 674 Donald Filtzer has pointed out how these conditions “made the population highly vulnerable to a whole host of diseases, including tuberculosis, typhus, typhoid, dysentery and upper respiratory infections”. 675 However, the regime focussed its efforts at disease prevention not on improvements in the country’s public health infrastructure but on stringent controls over what it deemed a potentially ‘harmful’ itinerant population. 676

In an article published in June 1945 in the journal of the Soviet Ministry of Health a member of the Academy of Medical Sciences, A. N. Marzeev, wrote of the necessity of the “sanitary treatment of the masses on the move”’. 677 He described the situation in the Soviet Union and other combatant countries at that time as one in which “almost the whole population” was in transit. 678 This itinerant population included armies on the move, prisoners of war, refugees, the evacuated and re-evacuated population, labour reservists, settlers, waifs, the homeless, vagrants and demobilised soldiers. The increased movement of migrants, the article proceeds, harboured within itself “vast dangers” for the “rooted population” in the form of epidemic disease. 679 Of particular significance were those suspected of hosting the parasites, or lice, which were carriers of typhus. Marzeev reassured his readers, however, that these itinerant figures could be rendered completely harmless, both for themselves and for the population with whom they will come into contact.

674 D. Filtzer, ‘Standard of living versus quality of life. Struggling with the urban environment in Russia during the early years of post-war reconstruction’ in Fürst (ed), Late Stalinist Russia, pp.81-102, here p.93; see also Filtzer, The Hazards of Urban Life, especially chapter 1: The impossible task: keeping cities clean, pp.22-66.
675 Filtzer, ‘Standard of living versus quality of life’, p. 95; on how the scene is set for epidemics of typhus by “crowding, inadequate housing, lack of bathing facilities, lack of fuel, and such continued cold weather that people wear their garments for long periods of time”, see C. J. D. Zarafonetis, ‘The Typhus Fevers’, in Medical department, United States Army, Internal Medicine in World War II. Volume II: Infectious diseases (Washington D.C., 1963), pp.143-223, here p.144.
676 Filtzer, The Hazards of Urban Life, pp.149-151.
678 Ibid.
This would be achieved by strengthening the sanitary ‘servicing’ of the transient population, both ‘organised’ and ‘unorganised’, already occurring at train stations and along rail routes. Methods would be used which had already been worked out and put into practice during the war, including the surveillance and medical inspection of all those on the move, compulsory washing of their bodies and disinfection of their clothes and other belongings, as well as vaccination and quarantine if necessary. This would all be carried out before they were allowed to mix with the local population. Such extensive intervention, said the author, was the sole guarantee of the epidemiological well-being of the motherland.680

The extension and systemisation of sanitary procedures aimed at the itinerant population had actually already begun in 1944. At the start of September of that year the People’s Commissariat of Health of the RSFSR ordered that People’s Commissars of Health in the autonomous republics and the directors of regional and republican city health departments laid responsibility for the organisation of medical-sanitary measures in relation to the itinerant population on the State Sanitary Inspector at that level.681 The inspectors had to work out in a ten day period an all-embracing plan of sanitary measures to be implemented at the locations from where people were leaving, those where they were arriving and settling and in transit, to be confirmed in resolutions by regional and city soviets and those of the autonomous republics.

The Health Commissariat set out the measures which to be incorporated into the plans. These included the careful medical examination and compulsory ‘sanitary processing’ of families in the places from which they were leaving and a second sanitary treatment of the whole itinerant population and their baggage in baths and disinfection chambers before they boarded special trains (eshelony). Evacuation posts near train stations, wharfs and population centres, were equipped with premises where the population on their

680 Ibid, p.38; on the “system of hygiene and sanitary controls over human railway traffic” implemented during the war that entailed the ‘sanitary processing’ of both civilian and military passengers before they were despatched onwards see Filtzer, The Hazards of Urban Life, p.152.
681 ‘Prikaz Narodnogo Komissariata Zdravookhraneniia’, GARF, f.A-482, op.47, d.2342, ll.31-6, here l.31; the inspectorate was founded in 1935 primarily to check the sanitary condition of enterprises dealing with food products, but was also given the task of working out anti-epidemic measures: On the history of the State Sanitary Inspectorate, henceforth GSI, see ‘Predislovie k opisi’, GARF, f.9226, op.1.
journey home could be housed temporarily, be fed and where they would be registered. They also were required to contain isolation wards, medical and quarantine premises and bathhouses with disinfection chambers for the treatment of re-evacuees on their arrival and departure. Some kind of ‘sanitary educational work’ was also to be conducted there among the departing population.

Each of the trains had to be accompanied by medical personnel who would make checks en route, working together with the sanitary-control centres established at smaller train stations and localities en route. At these centres those suspected of carrying an infectious disease were to be hospitalised, the train wagons to be cleaned and, if deemed necessary, the whole trainload of passengers to be ‘processed’ again. At the final destinations, living premises had to be prepared before the arrival of the trains and provision made for the continuous operation of baths and disinfection chambers. Those arriving were to undergo another careful medical inspection and be unloaded a wagon at a time. Before settling in new accommodation a further sanitary treatment was obligatory, including the disinfection of people’s belongings. Incomers were to be kept under medical observation in their new premises for twenty five days, the time period for the incubation of typhus.682

The population arriving in Leningrad, therefore, may well have already been through several obligatory inspections and disinfection treatments during their journey to the city at evacuation centres and sanitary control points along transport routes or in sanitary checkpoints around other cities. At the main railway junction of the city of Sverdlov in April 1944 up to 2,000 re-evacuees each spent about three hours being treated at the sanitary checkpoint on their arrival. Most were then stranded at the regional evacuation centre on the train station premises with other people in transit, for up to 13 days in unhealthy, filthy and overcrowded conditions while they waited for available transport.683

682 GARF, f.A-482, op.47, d.2342, ll.31-6.
683 Ibid, ll.5-13; an interviewee in the European University blockade project recalled how, returning to Leningrad from a children’s home in the Sverdlovsk region in summer 1944, their train was held up for two days in the city of Sverdlov and they were forced to wait “in this dirt”: interview with E. G. I., ATsUI, Interview No. BL-2A-010, p.4.
In addition, resolutions passed by the Leningrad City Soviet between 1944 and 1948 coupled the measures advocated by the Commissariat for Health to clean up and contain the population on the move with the internal passport system governing settlement in the city. The local police were forbidden to give residence permits to anyone in these years until they had presented a certificate, a so-called ‘sanitary passport’, attesting that they had passed through sanitary observation or treatment upon their arrival to Leningrad, regardless of whether or not they had already undergone sanitary processing in their places of departure or on the journey. The staff of the Leningrad sanitary inspectorate began to organise the regular quarantine and sanitary processing of the incoming population. The annual reports of the Leningrad GSI from 1945 to 1948 contained detailed sections on its activities under headings such as ‘Sanitary control over the itinerant population’. These laid out how the inspectorate had ensured that those arriving underwent compulsory observation and treatment of their bodies, clothes and belongings at sanitary checkpoints or in polyclinics before they were settled in the city.

According to the inspectorate reports, re-evacuees and enlisted workers and trade school students, brought to the city in large organised trainloads particularly in 1945 and 1946, were kept in isolated premises on their arrival, until specially reserved places were made available for their treatment in the city's sanitary checkpoints. Most of the trainloads were processed on the day of arrival but particularly large groups were kept in isolation over two or three days. Subordinate inspectorates in the city districts were charged with control over the quarantine and accommodation of these groups after their treatment. People arriving individually, rather than in organised groups, were required to undergo sanitary inspection in observation centres at polyclinics in Leningrad and those suspected

684 ‘O prokhozhdenii litsami, pribyvaushchimi v gorod Leningrada, obiazatel’noi sanitarnoi obrabotki’, Biulleten’, No.22 (30th November 1945), p.14; Subsequent resolutions called for strengthening systematic control over the timely sanitary treatment of those arriving in the city to prevent infectious illnesses in the city: ‘O merakh preduprezhdeniiia infektsionnykh zabolevaniy v gorode Leningrade’, Biulleten’, No.5 (15th March 1946), p.5 and ‘O prokhozhdenii litsami, pribyvaushchimi v gorod Leningrada, obiazatel’noi sanitarnoi obrabotki’, Biulleten’, No.23 (15th December 1947, no.23), p.20; see also GARF, f.9226, op.1, d.685, l.83; for the term ‘sanitary passport’ used to describe certificates that were issued to confirm that a person had been through sanitary processing and were required to be presented in order to obtain train tickets or accommodation on arrival see Filtzer, The Hazards of Urban Life, p.155.

685 GARF, f.9226, op.1, d.685, l.121.

686 Ibid, ll.82-3; ibid, d.728, l.102; ibid, d.799, ll.118-9.
of carrying lice infestations or typhus were sent to sanitary checkpoints in the city for treatment.\textsuperscript{687} Only once they had undergone thorough inspection and treatment could incomers be integrated into the civic environment and community.

In reality, for most of the four immediate postwar years, occurrences of typhus did not reach the levels feared. In the case of Leningrad, for example, cases of typhus per 10,000 of the population fell from a peak of 43 in the severe blockade year of 1942 to roughly 9 in 1946.\textsuperscript{688} Confirmed monthly cases of typhus did begin to increase rapidly in July 1947 in the midst of famine conditions but levels began to drop again by December and reached ones similar to those of 1946 by February 1948.\textsuperscript{689} Incidents of other diseases such as dysentery were actually a much greater problem in terms of frequency, with over 80 cases of dysentery per 10,000 of the population recorded in both 1946 and 1947.\textsuperscript{690} Fatality rates from typhus infections, moreover, even during 1947 remained low.\textsuperscript{691} The authorities remained particularly anxious about the threat of a typhus epidemic, however, throughout this period.

Filtzer argues that it was because of the “controls over human railway traffic” put in place from the early days of the war that epidemics in fact rarely occurred in the Soviet Union during and after the German invasion.\textsuperscript{692} Considering these controls in the light of Paul Weindling’s work on the development of ‘sanitary policing’ in Eastern Europe, however, suggests a rather different interpretation. According to Weindling, it was exaggerated fears about the spread of typhus that translated into practices of sanitary policing directed at unwanted inhabitants of a locale and itinerant populations. Fears of an epidemic spreading like wildfire legitimated international administrative responses of isolation, containment and cleansing that operated as elements of state systems designed

\textsuperscript{687} GARF, f.R-9226, op.1, d.685, l.82 and ibid, d.728, l.102.
\textsuperscript{688} Figures from TsGASPb, f.7384, op.36, d.254, in particular ll.149-150.
\textsuperscript{689} The number of cases of typhus increased by almost 400% between 1946 and 1947, from a total of 429 to 2,043 and the number of deaths rose from 12 to 81: Filtzer, \textit{The Hazards of Urban Life}, p.157.
\textsuperscript{690} TsGASPb, f.7384, op.36, d.254, ll.149-150.
\textsuperscript{691} Filtzer, \textit{The Hazards of Urban Life}, p.158.
\textsuperscript{692} Ibid, p.152.
to control population movements, such as border points and passports. Delousing, disinfection and quarantine became routine in Europe during and after the First World War, such that “by the time of the Second World War migrants and deportees had become conditioned to expect the ordeal of delousing at border crossing, ports, railway junctions, and on entry to camps”. The work of other scholars corroborates the notion that sanitary controls and medical surveillance over migrants in Europe and the United States, which were introduced by some governments even before compulsory travel identity documents, have not functioned simply as anti-epidemic measures. Alison Bashford has referred to them as early practices designed to stake out borders on the ground and Amy Fairchild as means of initiating newcomers to ‘societal expectations’, in particular about industrial culture.

A. N. Marzeev referred to these widespread and “age-old” international practices in his article in the journal of the Soviet Ministry of Health as a justification for the conclusion that mass population movements played an incomparable role in the spread of the most dangerous infections.

Whether or not the sanitary controls targeted at populations on the move did contribute to the generally low rates of occurrence of typhus, what is interesting is that the regime chose to expend so many resources on isolating, treating and quarantining the itinerant population instead of adequately addressing the unsanitary living conditions that prevailed in many cities during and after the war and that posed a variety of health risks to the urban population.

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693 Weindling, *Epidemics and Genocide*, p.16; on a more symbolic level, Gatrell notes that “typhus borne by refugees became a powerful metaphor for refugeeedom”: Gatrell, ‘War, Population Displacement and State Formation’, p.29.


The next section of the chapter will discuss how official measures to improve living conditions in the urban environment remained inadequate and erratic into the 1950s. People arriving in the city had to contend, just like those already living there, with a squalid urban environment lacking comprehensive sewerage systems and well-organised rubbish collection. They also had to contend with further rhetoric and measures that treated the displaced population entering Leningrad not only as an extra burden on infrastructure but as an inherent threat not just to the city’s health but also its ‘cultured’ appearance. The section explores how the sanitary practices and discourses directed not at the dirtiness of the urban environment but at that other ‘matter out of place’ - people arriving into the city and itinerant groups living at its margins - were closely intertwined with official practices to ‘protect’ the city from other kinds of ‘disorder’, to assert control over behaviour on the streets and to ‘cleanse’ the city of criminals.

5.3 Cleansing the cityscape

The re-evacuees, demobilised soldiers, enlisted workers, factory school students and people arriving on their own initiative into Leningrad in the immediate post-blockade years found themselves in an environment severely blighted by a breakdown in sanitation. The author of a letter posted from Leningrad to Tashkent, which came to the attention of the Military Censor in spring 1946, contrasted conditions he encountered in the city with those of pre-war years and depicted the post-war streetscape in the following way:

The snow was cleaned up badly in winter – there is soot, dirt and construction debris everywhere and it even floats along Nevskii – with an uproar, dirty, stinking streams shoot out from under gates, in the houses the gutters don’t work and all the water flows onto the pavement, onto passers-by. The public is grey, dirty, nervous.  

697 TsGASPb, f.7384, op.36, d.186, l.80.
Leningrad had possessed possibly the most developed sanitary infrastructure of any city in the Soviet Union before the war, however the severe conditions of the blockade had taken their toll. In the winter of 1941-2, for example, the water supply system had suffered significant damage and from 1945 it was necessary to construct it almost completely anew.⁶⁹⁸ The sewerage system had been incomplete even before the war, with sewage emptied into the river Neva and the city’s canals. After the war, the sewerage system in the city’s old districts had to be reconstructed, new networks built and wooden pipes replaced with concrete ones.⁶⁹⁹

Transport available for clearing rubbish and cleaning the streets in the city fell dramatically during the war and did not recover quickly. In the first quarter of 1945, for example, only 41% of homes and 59% of dirty yards were cleaned of rubbish.⁷⁰⁰ The debris which was removed from damaged buildings in the course of reconstruction, moreover, was often collected at the expense of everyday household waste.⁷⁰¹ Spontaneous rubbish dumps sprang up in many yards at the back of the city’s houses and in urban wastelands created by the bombings and the break-up of buildings for firewood.⁷⁰² In the first few months of 1945 the Sanitary Inspectorate recorded up to 100 unauthorised dumps in the rubble of destroyed housing.⁷⁰³ Scrap-iron, construction debris, household waste and sewage, along with tram tickets, cigarette ends and scraps of paper littered the streets, waterways and backyards of Leningrad.⁷⁰⁴

⁶⁹⁹ Ibid, p.255; despite improvements made to the sanitary condition of the water basin throughout the 1950s, however, it was still deemed unsatisfactory in 1966.
⁷⁰⁰ GARF, f.R-9226, op.1, d.685, l.51.
⁷⁰¹ Ibid, d.799, l.63.
⁷⁰² Ibid, l.51; on the formation of wastelands see ‘O meropriiatiaakh po uborke proezdov, ulits, ploschadei i naberezhnykh goroda v zimnii period 1944-45 goda’, Biulleten’, No.20 (November 1944), pp.4-5
⁷⁰³ GARF, f.R-9226, op.1, d.685, l.51.
Letters written to the editor of *Leningradskaia Pravda* once the blockade was lifted described the struggle with maintaining cleanliness at home when sewage was not removed, and there was no water to clean dirt from stairwells and yards. In addition, laundries in houses often did not function due to a lack of fuel and still only 25 public laundries existed in the city at the end of 1947, compared to over 160 before the war. There were also fewer public baths and in order to wash at a *bania* or to give clothes in to be laundered, residents had to queue for several hours, in some cases half a day. Once inside the public baths, hot water and soap were provided intermittently and customers had to wait up to two months for the return of clean clothes from the laundries. The problems with fuel supply also meant that many people had to sleep in their clothes in order to keep warm.

Officials of the Leningrad city Soviet noted in 1944 the presence of lice infestations in the city’s dirty, overcrowded hostels, where inhabitants had to sleep in their clothes, on hay or unclean linen. The following year the Anti-epidemic Commission of a district Soviet in central Leningrad recorded that unsanitary conditions in 11 of the district’s hostels had created an environment for the spread of infectious diseases, a number of the hostels were significantly lice-ridden and cases of typhus had recently broken out as a result in the hostel of the cadet school. A city Soviet resolution of February 1946 called for the necessity of improvements in cleaning Leningrad’s districts of rubbish and sewage, greater order in the work of public baths and laundries and overcoming the unsanitary conditions in houses, as measures to combat the spread of diseases.

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705 As a typical example, see Pis’ma v redaktsiiu: ‘Kogda privedut v poriadok nash dom’, *Leningradskaia Pravda*, 18/2/44, p.3.
706 TsGASPh, f.7384, op.36, d.254, ll.15-16.
708 See ‘O sanitarnom sostoiании obshchzhitii dla stroitel'nykh rabochikh’, *Biuilet'en*, No.12 (June 1944), pp.5-6.
709 TsGASPh, f.4948, op.2, d.19, l.1.
710 ‘O merakh preduprezhdlenii infektsionnykh zabolevanii v gorode Leningrade’, *Biuilet'en*, No.5 (15th March 1946), pp.5-6; see also V. A. Ivanov, ‘“Skorpiony”: korruptsiia v poslevoennom Leningrade (operatsiia organov gosbezopasnosti po likvidatsii organizovannoi gruppy prestupnikov v ianvare 1946 goda’, in *Politicheskii sysk v Rossii: Istoriiia i sovremennost*’ (St Petersburg: Izdatel' stvo Sankt
Several resolutions were carried out by the city Soviet in the course of 1945, as a result of material sent by the Sanitary Inspectorate, to reinforce the cleansing of the city. In August, for example, one such resolution resulted in 10 new trucks and extra drivers and petrol being provided for this purpose. The report concluded that despite these measures, however, at the end of 1945, as before, there remained a significant accumulation of sewage and rubbish in the city.

The main measure employed for addressing problems created by deficiencies in the urban sanitary infrastructure was the mobilisation of urban populations in mass biannual clean-up campaigns. In well-publicised campaigns each March and April in Leningrad from 1942 onwards, thousands of people and hundreds of vehicles were mobilised in the ‘Sunday clean-ups’ (voskresniki) of the city streets. As measures to improve conditions in the city, these clean-ups were inadequate. While they tended to result initially in significant drops in the number of unauthorised rubbish dumps and filthy yards, the reports of the Leningrad Sanitary Inspectorate for the immediate post-war years demonstrate how after the initial success of spring campaigns the problems would reappear. Streets, courtyards and cesspits again become fouled and waste carted to makeshift dumps, and this necessitated the often less successful autumn campaigns. By the end of every year dumps had reappeared and the proportion of yards whose territory was deemed dirty by the inspectors had increased once more.

The Sanitary Inspectorate’s report for 1946 noted, for example, that by the end of the first quarter of the year the proportion of dirty yards had reached 78% and the number of spontaneous dumps was 67. Resolutions by the city Soviet of March and April 1946

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Peterburgskogo universiteta ekonomiki i finansov, 1997), pp.238-250, here p.238 on how the local authorities generally kept hidden from the public their conclusions about the dirt and anti-sanitary conditions which fostered infectious diseases among city-dwellers at the end of the war.

711 TsGASPh, f.7384, op.25, d.733, l.53.
712 Ibid, l.50.
713 Ibid.
715 GARF, f.R-9226, op.1, d.685, II.51-3; ibid, d.728, l.54; ibid, d.799, II.58-63.
716 Ibid, op.1, d.728, l.54.
launched a spring cleaning campaign, involving 39,000 people, which reduced the proportion of dirty yards recorded to 5.5% and the number of unauthorised rubbish dumps to 22. The quantity of the latter continued to fall for the rest of the year, reaching 15 but the percentage of filthy yards began to rise again, though only to 6.2% and 9.2% in the third and fourth quarters respectively.

Piles of refuse continued to be a feature of streets and courtyards all across Leningrad throughout 1947 and 1948, however. By the end of 1947 there were still only 60 vehicles available for sanitary transport, as opposed to 180 before the war, and these were in such bad condition that a third of them needed to be written off. Regular organised rubbish collection still occurred in only three districts of the city in 1948. According to the city Soviet, in the central Dzerzhinskii district in May 1947 almost a quarter of 532 courtyards checked were littered with scrap-iron, construction debris and household waste and in over 30 houses the yards had been turned completely into rubbish dumps. It was not only the yards, moreover, but also a whole number of streets in the district which remained in a filthy state.

At the end of 1947 thousands of flats, furthermore, were still without water and a significant number of basements remained flooded with sewage. In addition, access to soap became even more difficult for the population when it was no longer given out by ration cards from the end of 1947. The arrival of hundreds of thousands of people into

717 Vakser, Leningrad poslevoennyi, p.85.
720 TsGASPb, f.7384, op.25, d.733, l.154; and ‘O sostojanii eksplootatsii zhilogo fonda goroda Leningrada i podgotovke ego k zime’, Leningradskia Pravda, 2/9/1947, p.2: according to the article the plan for the reconstruction of water supply and sewage systems had only been fulfilled by 20%. There was still no provision of running water in 3,425 flats in the Primorskiy region, 1,816 in Leninskiy and 1,066 in Oktiabrskiy. In over one thousand buildings in the city, moreover, the basements were flooded with water and sewage.
721 TsGASPh, f., f.7384, op.36, d.254, l.16.
the city annually in the first few post-siege years of course placed further strain on the strapped urban infrastructure. Immigrants to the city, in particular enlisted workers, students mobilised to trade schools and re-evacuees who had lost their pre-war housing, were often accommodated in premises completely unfit for habitation.

A publicised ‘raid’ by employees of *Leningradskia Pravda* in 1944 found new workers in the city living in dreadful conditions. In one hostel for new workers, for example, the lack of working toilets meant that for people living on the fourth or fifth floors it was necessary to use the neighbours’ toilet on the third floor, find one in another hostel or go into the yard where “it is possible to literally get stuck in the sewage”.\(^{722}\) Workers of a number of re-evacuated factories were settled in the factory workshops, in basements, in the ruins of buildings and, in the case of the Kirov factory, under the stands of the factory’s stadium.\(^{723}\) The sanitary situation was so poor in these temporary ‘hostels’, nicknamed ‘concentration camps’ by inhabitants, that the GSI insisted in 1946 that part of them be closed down and those living in them resettled.\(^{724}\)

The measures and rhetoric adopted by official bodies, however, treated the displaced population entering Leningrad not only as an extra burden on infrastructure but as an inherent threat to the city’s cleanliness, its orderly appearance, and its culture and purity more generally. The local authorities often framed the need to address the problem of the unsanitary cityscape in terms of the desirable aesthetics of the postwar urban environment, in particular the city centre, rather than the threat of disease. A letter to the editor that was printed in *Leningradskia Pravda* in 1944, for example, described the disagreeable experience of life on the central Stremiannaia street:

> The July heat has begun. In all the houses the windows are open. But we, residents of house number nineteen on Stremiannaia ulitsa, are deprived of this possibility. For more than two weeks at our very windows…..there has been a


\(^{723}\) Vakser, *Poslevoennyi Leningrad*, p.91.

\(^{724}\) *‘Otchet o deiatel’nosti’, GARF, f.R-9226, op.1, d.728, l.80; on the nicknames for the hostels see White, ‘The Civilian Return’, p.1155.*
In resolutions about improving the appearance and infrastructure of Leningrad, the city Soviet discussed the removal of plywood from windows of houses on central streets, the repair and painting of railings and the washing of shop windows, together with the necessity of clearing rubbish from the city’s wastelands and dealing with dirt and disorder at markets. Items appeared in the local press about the need for improved cleanliness, order and ‘culturedness’, above all on display in the historic centre of the city. An article in Leningradskaia Pravda in September 1944, titled ‘On the culture of the city’, linked care for the cleanliness of the streets with the restoration of the beauty of the city’s buildings, which also entailed getting rid of dirty and ungrammatical posters displayed on houses and shops, in particular those with old slogans left over from the blockade.

In other issues of the newspaper the authorities made clear that the unpleasantness and untidiness of the urban environment, its streets, workplaces and domestic arenas, should be addressed by the demonstration of more civilised, cultured and hygienic behaviour by the population. A speech made by Georgii Malenkov in 1945 insisting that a “Soviet factory should be a breeding ground of cleanliness and order” was reiterated in Leningradskaia Pravda with the additional admonition that “enterprises and institutions must be hearths of culture”. The responsibility of residents for the health and appearance of domestic environment appeared, for example, in an article of 1944 under

725 Pis’ma v redaktsiiu: Egorov, ‘V tsentre goroda’, Leningradskaia Pravda, 19/7/1944, p.3
726 See, for example, ‘O meropriiatiiakh po uluchsheniiu vneshnego blagoustroistva goroda Leningrada’ Biulleten’, (August 1944, no.16), pp.1-3 and ‘O vypolnenii reshenii Ispolkoma Lengorsoveta ot 28 marta 1946g “O meropriiatiiakh po uluchsheniiu vneshnego blagoustroistva goroda v Petrogradskom raione”’. Biulleten’, (15th June 1946, no.13), pp.2-3.
728 ‘Za chistotu i poriadok na proizvodstve’, Leningradskaia Pravda, 8/9/1945, p.3.
the heading ‘Kazhdyi dvor v gorode dolzhen soderzhat’sia v poriadke’, in February 1944.729

Newcomers, who had yet to be fully integrated into urban culture, were depicted as particularly vulnerable to the corrupting influence of visible signs of untidiness, dirt and disorder in the city. Accounts in the press also discussed this type of disorder as an indicator of the uncultured behaviour of people who had yet to acquire the habits appropriate to the city.730

A newspaper article of September 1944, for example, titled ‘Concern about the living arrangement and labour use of new workers’, admonished factory authorities about the dirty conditions in hostels and the breakdown of the water and sewage systems. The article framed its accusations not just in terms of the welfare of the new inhabitants, but also in terms of the need properly to educate workers who had been sent “from all ends of our motherland”.731 Care had to be shown towards the environment of these new workers so that they knew ‘their place’ in the workshop.732 The association of a dirty and untidy environment with the demonstration of appropriate habits and culture to newcomers can also be seen in an article of October 1945. This article purported to describe a textile factory, ‘through the eyes of a newcomer’, as:

… such a picture: in the centre of the factory yard, where the display case of the factory’s indicators stands, several bushes have been planted. On top of their branches has been thrown linen, some sort of rags. In the factory administration itself there are dirty staircases, corridors which have not been washed for a long time. In the office and in workshops an ungrammatically written slogan stands out vividly.733

729 ‘Kazhdyi dvor v gorode dolzhen soderzhat’sia v poriadke’, Leningradskaiia Pravda, 8/2/1944, p.4
730 On the expression of fears about the corruptive influence of the city and also about the debased character of peasant immigrants in the popular culture of the later imperial era see von Geldern, ‘Life In-between’, pp.374-375.
732 Ibid.
The article later notes the workshops’ dustiness and a scrap heap found in one of them as further elements of what did not fit with the desired cleanliness, order and ‘cultured external appearance’. The article praises the newly arrived students from factory schools for not yet succumbing to the influence of the dirty surroundings and constantly washing the dust from their machines. At the same time it admonishes the factory’s directors to ensure that newcomers, not accustomed to industrial work and vulnerable to the influence of messy surroundings, are taught how to be neat and orderly from the very first day of their arrival. It expounds that now people are arriving at the factory who have not worked in the industry before:

it is necessary to ensure that they do not see scattered everywhere – on the floor, on windowsills, on staircases – spools, reels, wisps of cotton, skeins of threads. It is necessary immediately to teach them not to hang out or strew their personal things over windows, higgledy-piggledy (gde popalo).\textsuperscript{734}

In September 1947 \textit{Leningradskaiia Pravda}, published a letter to the editor from a local resident, expressing concern about the lack of cleanliness and order on the city’s streets. The author of the letter, I. Pikin, protested that:

After the war the composition of the population of Leningrad was significantly renewed. Many of the new arrivals have still not managed to acquire the skills which are demanded of inhabitants of a big city, have not cultivated in themselves a sense of discipline. They violate traffic regulations and throw cigarette ends, scraps of paper and wrappers from ‘Eskimo’ ice creams onto the pavement…..A scrap of paper dropped on the street – that is a sign of a lack of culture (nekul’turnosti) and lack of respect for the city in which you live.\textsuperscript{735}

\textsuperscript{734} Ibid.
In this complaint, Pikin wove together everyday encounters with piles of rubbish in the post-war urban environment, the fact of the mass replacement of the population in a narrative which associated newcomers to the city with the degradation of the spatial, normative and sanitary order.

In other articles and letters the lack of sanitary order in urban spaces that betokened the potentially unruly and uncultured disposition of in-migrants shaded into other types of disorderly, offensive and even criminal behaviour. In March 1945 a letter was published from two servicemen and a war invalid complaining about the dirty appearance of the ‘Kolizei’ cinema and the indecent behaviour of a group of adolescents who “swore and pestered visitors”.  

A letter printed later in the year associated the filthy conditions in a city marketplace with other social problems, such as crowding and bad behaviour. The author of this letter linked issues such as congestion at the market entrance, the dirt filling the market square and the ceaseless swearing and fighting of drunken hooligans, who gathered in a corner where vodka was sold, as examples of reigning disorder.

As we have seen, an article by the NKVD chief Shiktorov of July 1946 related the untidiness of its streets, yards and buildings to the violation of traffic regulations by new arrivals from the countryside and to more serious disorders and including drunken fights among inhabitants.  

In an earlier article of October 1945 article he had averred that, since the lifting of the siege, crime and social disorder had been on the rise as:

> The population size of the city has increased by 2.5-3 times. In August and September alone 200,000 people arrived in Leningrad. In the course of this year all the children who were in evacuation have returned. Those who have arrived have swiftly been taken into work and conscientiously labour for the reconstruction and further development of our industry, economy and culture. but among the large mass of those returning to Leningrad a certain number of unstable and criminal elements have seeped through. Particular individuals, not

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736 Pis’ma v redaktsiiu: ‘Ni chistotu, ni poriadka’, Leningradskaia Pravda, 23/3/1945, p.3.
737 Pis’ma v redaktsiiu: R. Semenov, ‘Na Mal’tsevom rynke’, Leningradskaia Pravda, 25/9/1945, p.3.
738 Shiktorov, ‘Leningradu – obratsovyi obshchestvennyi poriadok’, p.3.
occupied in socially useful labour, evade work under all sorts of pretexts. They prefer to engage in speculation, fraud and [the pursuit] of easy gains.\textsuperscript{739}

He gave some examples of the criminal activity of those who had ‘seeped’ through. The case of a man, for example, who met a woman “unknown to him” on the trolleybus and gave her his address and other personal information, only to return from work at a later date to find his flat broken into and his valuables stolen. The woman when arrested turned out to be a ‘tourer’ (\textit{gastrolersha}), a thief without permanent residence in Leningrad and in possession of a pile of fictitious documents in several different surnames.\textsuperscript{740} In another case a woman with close ties to the criminal world permitted “shady people, who are not registered anywhere” to sleep at her apartment, where they engaged in “drunken orgies” and divided up stolen goods between them.\textsuperscript{741} What most outraged Leningraders, however, wrote the police chief, were the activities of the hooligans who were violating normal life, fighting and causing uproar on the city streets, in parks and in other public places. This included the felony committed by a drunken teenager who did not have any ‘fixed employment’ and had shot and wounded four people at a cinema on Nevskii prospekt, as well as people crossing the street in the wrong place, jumping onto the buffers of overcrowded trams and out of buses that were still in motion.\textsuperscript{742}

\textsuperscript{739} Shiktorov, ‘\textit{Ukreprim obschestvennyi poriadok}’, p.2.

\textsuperscript{740} A ‘gastroler’ in Russian usually refers to someone touring with an artistic company but can also mean a seasonal worker. In police reports after the war, as we will see, the term was used frequently in relation to fears about criminals criss-crossing the country: see, for example, I. V. Govorov, \textit{Prestupnost’ i bor’ba s nei v poslevoennom Leningrade (1945-55): opyi istoricheskogo analiza} (St Petersburg: Izdatel’stvo Sankt Peterburgskogo Universiteta, 2004), p.84 and V. Chalidze, \textit{Criminal Russia: Essays on Crime in the Soviet Union}, trans. P.S. Falla (New York: Random House, 1977), especially chapter 3 on the professional underworld, including a section about the language of thieves and beggars, for example p.56.

\textsuperscript{741} Shiktorov, ‘\textit{Ukreprim obschestvennyi poriadok}’, p.2.

\textsuperscript{742} The category of person ‘without fixed employment’ or ‘not engaged in socially useful labour’ was often conflated by the police with that of ‘without a permanent place of residence’, i.e. denied a permanent permit to stay in the city as usually one was a condition of the other. Both were elided with other categories such as ‘déclassé elements’, beggars, prostitutes and criminals who were defined as ‘socially dangerous elements’. These groups were often among those who were sentenced as ‘violators of the passport regime’ in the 1930s: see Hagenloh, ‘“Socially Harmful Elements”’, especially p.297; the teenager here was too young to be issued a passport or residence permit but his classification as ‘without fixed employment’ in the article is cited as another indicator of his criminality and the danger from those not ‘fixed’ by the state.
The ‘lumping together’ of social ‘disorders’ such as litter on the streets and the improper use of transport with more serious public crimes suggests that the attention paid to the presence of deviant behaviour by migrants in the city was as a function of the assertion of power over the people and behaviour belonging on display in the city as much as, or more than, a response to a genuinely growing danger.

Joan Neuberger, has discussed how the merging of public rowdiness, offensive pranks and horrendous crimes in published discussion about hooliganism transcends the specific crimes to focus on larger social, political and cultural issues. Attention to hooligan and disorderly behaviour in the popular press of late imperial Petersburg, she writes, was a product of attempts to demonstrate control over the culture of the street at a time of social transformation. In the local party newspaper of Leningrad in the post-blockade years, marketplaces and cinemas in the city centre, as well as trains and stations and the ‘streets’ more generally, recurred as sites of concern with respect to dirt, disorder and crime. Members of Soviet social organisations (obshchestvennost’), Shiktorov affirmed in

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743 Neuberger, Hooliganism, p.2.
745 See, for example, a letter of April 1946 complaining about the filthy state of three of the city’s markets, which, the writer claimed, were rarely cleaned. The author worried about the sale of food products on the territory of these markets, where “holes, puddles and diverse types of refuse were all underfoot”: Pis’ma v redaktsiiu: P. Liupin, ‘O chistote na rynkah’, Leningradskiaia Pravda, 24/4/1946, p.3; police records made note of other activities of markets, for example in 1946 two tricksters were arrested for operating at Mal’tsevskii market, where they offered lengths of good quality, deficit material for sale, which later turned out to be newspapers, plywood and rags, covered in thin ribbons of cloth: Govorov, Prestupnost’ i bor’ba s nei v poslevoennoi Leningrade, pp.42-43; in December 1944 Leningradskiaia Pravda reported on a teenager sentenced in a people’s court to one year imprisonment for hooliganism for rudely demanding that another visitor to the Shturm cinema give up his chair and striking him during the ensuing quarrel: ‘V narodnom sude’, Leningradskiaia Pravda, 13/12/1944, p.4; a letter to the editor published in the same month bemoaned the presence of pickpockets and hooligans on the suburban train between Kolpino and Leningrad, cases of hooliganism and theft in a factory hostel, frequent fighting in a House of Culture in the Oktiabr’ski district and disorderly conduct at the “Kolizei” cinema: Pis’ma v redaktsiiu: ‘V poezde no.214’, Leningradskiaia Pravda, 2/12/44, p.3; a police report made note of a case in October 1945 when a group apparently broke down the foyer door of the “Temp” cinema, beat up the director and chased out the general public. In other cinemas in the same year, employees were threatened with revolvers: TsGASPb, f.7384, op.17, d.1507, ll.30-32, here l.30. A headline proclaiming that ‘Youths are bringing cleanliness and order into train stations’ appeared in Leningradskiaia Pravda in April 1944, illustrating the ideal behaviour to be demonstrated in public places by certain groups of the population: ‘Molodezh navodit chistotu i poriadok na vokzalakh’, Leningradskiaia Pravda, 20/4/1944, p.3.
October 1945, were participating in patrols around the city streets with the police to combat crime and hooliganism, helping to man posts at cinemas and also markets.  

David Shearer has written in relation to the upheavals of the 1930s of how high Stalinist officials hated market places and railroad stations as sites of spontaneous, private trade, of the intermingling of the population, and of potential contamination by the presence of unchecked migrants.  

They feared the reality, moreover, was undermining Soviet propaganda heralding bustling markets and trains as part of the grand achievement of socialist modernity, of rapid movement forward and the state as provider.  

In the short story *Finally at Home* the heroes who were successfully integrating into postwar life at the factory and in the home were contrasted to:

the usual crowd of ‘market loafers’, people without occupations and without an address, roaming from city to city, from one police department to another and who once more had appeared at train stations, markets, jetties, at the lit-up entrances to cinemas, in bars and cafes. There is that type of people in all cities, and you are always astounded at where they have all come from.

At the end of the war, cinemas were particularly emphasised by the authorities as part of their efforts to define who had a place in core sites of the city and the conduct expected there. On the 9th July 1945 the Leningrad city Soviet passed a resolution declaring the need to combat ‘hooliganism’ among ‘déclassé elements’ visiting cinemas and in the previous year it had laid out the behaviour expected of children at cinemas and other

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746 Shiktorov, ‘Ukreptim obshchestvennyi poriadok’, p.2; the Russian word obshchestvennost’ is hard to translate. As Michael David-Fox has discussed, it carries with it connotations of public sphere, civil society, the educated public, socially engaged groups but in the 1930s Soviet Union it was restricted to referring to a small number of mass-membership organisations that were closely tied to the party-state, including trade unions and the Komsomol: M. David-Fox, review article, *Kritika: Explorations in Russian and Eurasian History*, Vol.3, No.1 (Winter 2002), pp.173-181; see also C. Kelly and V. Volkov, ‘*Obshchestvennost’, Sobornost*’: Collective Identities’, in C. Kelly and D. Shepherd (eds), *Constructing Russian Culture in the Age of Revolution, 1881-1940* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1998), p.27.

747 Shearer, ‘Crime and Social Disorder’, p.135.


749 Gauzner, ‘Vot my i doma…’, p.27.
Cinemas were also among the symbols of socialist modernity. In addition, they were places where other achievements were to be on display. The targeting of cinemas in the wake of the war for manifestations of disorderly behaviour was perhaps related to the culmination of the transformation of the ‘model Soviet citizen’ into a passive spectator.

To what extent, though, was rising crime as a whole actually menacing the city in the years? An article printed in 2002 in the journal of the Ministry of Internal Affairs of the Russian Federation that was based largely on pronouncements made by Shiktorov in the NKVD journal Post Revoliutsii at the end of the war, has described the post-siege city in the following way:

Postwar Leningrad was gloomy and dangerous. Ruins of buildings, destroyed in strikes by bombs and shells; empty embrasures of pill-boxes and military emplacements not yet taken down; broken-up roadways. The shine of the military decorations of demobilised soldiers and officers – and hundreds of horribly crippled frontoviki, becoming drunkards from hopelessness. Ration cards, spontaneously appearing flea markets, speculators, packs of homeless children, “hot” (palenaia) vodka, some prototype of today’s game of “thimble” (napерсток), “roulette”...And an outburst of hooligans and criminals unseen since the legendary times of Len’ka Pateleev...The city was terrorised by...gangs, in whose wake stretched a bloody trail of armed raids on flats, shops, warehouses. Large-scale dens of thieves flourished. Distinct zones appeared in the city, where the police were forbidden to tread...during the warm months of the year, criminals (блатные) lived in burial vaults in the cemeteries and when, in the

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750 TsGASPh, f.7384, op.17, d.1507, l.30; ‘Ob uporiadochenii poseshcheniia uchashchimsia nachal’nykh, semiletnikh i rednikh shkol g. Leningrada kino, teatrov i drugikh zrelishch’, Biulleten’, No.3-4 (1944), p.2; Shiktorov also mentioned in his October article that visits of children to the cinema and other ‘spectacles’ should be carefully controlled and these sites were specified in a city Soviet resolution about the behaviour of children in public: Shiktorov, ‘Ukreplim obshchestvennyi poriadok’, p.2; Mikhail German recalled in his memoirs how on his return to Leningrad from evacuation there was always a policeman present at cinemas during the children’s showings, who would pick on any boys just suspected of jumping the queue: M. German, Slozhnoe Proshedshhee, (St. Petersburg: Pechatnyi Dvor, 2006), p.111.

daytime, sounds of shots carried over from cemetery territory, passers-by were not particularly worried, guessing that this was the “blatata” amusing themselves by knocking off the noses and wings of marble angels with bullets”.

Some scholarly accounts have given a similar, if slightly less colourful, impression. Aleksandr Vakser, for example, describes the increase in criminal activity across the city in the reconstruction years in the following terms:

Criminals – alone or in gangs, acted in all districts of the city. Robberies of depots of foodstuffs and manufactured goods, of shops (and) flats, armed attacks on the streets, in yards (and) entranceways, followed one after the other.

V. A. Ivanov of the St Petersburg University of Economics and Finance has written in his treatment of the operations of the local security organs in 1946 that postwar Leningrad became a “different city”, one imprinted with “moral devastation”. Do the figures on the number of crimes committed in these years support these assertions? Figures on crime rates are highly problematic. Elena Zubkova, for example, points out that statistical accounts of crime in the Soviet Union in the postwar years were incomplete and contradictory and included different categories of crime depending on the source. Data on registered crimes in the city can be used as a rough indicator, however, of the extent to which actions defined as criminal by the authorities increased in the immediate postwar period.

A review of the work of the Leningrad police in 1944, sent to the Chairman of the City Soviet by the Chief of the City and Regional NKVD at the start of 1945, reported growth in crime in the city taking place from the second quarter of 1944. In the course of 1944

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753 Vakser, Leningrad poslevoennyi, p.90.
755 Zubkova, Russia After the War, p.39.
756 TsGASPh, f.7384, op.36, d.148, l.11-17, here l.12.
a total of 12,374 crimes were registered by police organs and the city’s NKVD administration, as opposed to 10,573 in 1943, according to the research of V. A. Ivanov.\textsuperscript{757} In the special monthly summary on crime in the city of Leningrad produced by the local NKVD for the City Soviet for December 1944, the number of registered crimes was reported as 1226.\textsuperscript{758} The summaries for the first 6 months of 1945 documented similar levels of registered crime in the city of just under 1000 to about 1350 cases per month.\textsuperscript{759} The number of felonies registered increased in the final quarter of 1945 and in January of 1946 the number recorded was 1917, over double that of the same month in 1945.\textsuperscript{760} Levels of recorded crime remained at about the same level until the final quarter of 1946 when they went up once more.\textsuperscript{761} Monthly NKVD summaries for March and April 1947 give totals for registered crime in the city comparable to those of early 1946, with 1769 cases reported for March and 1841 for April.\textsuperscript{762} Reports for subsequent months indicate a progressive fall in the numbers to under 1000 in June and to 502 in November 1947.\textsuperscript{763}

The fall in the level of crime from the spring of 1947 can be partly ascribed to changes in the categories of crime considered in the summaries. After April the monthly reports to the city Soviet did not include the total number of registered crimes and instead recorded the sum of ‘general criminal phenomena’, which included crimes such as theft, murder, robbery and hooliganism, but not economic offences like embezzlement, swindling, speculation and bribery. Nevertheless the figures do seem to point to a brief jump in the numbers of crimes reported that began in 1944, tailed off and resumed again in the course of 1946, and then subsided significantly in the middle of 1947.

\textsuperscript{758} TsGASPh, f.7384, op.36, d.148, ll.1-5, here l.1.
\textsuperscript{759} Ibid, ll.19-27, here l.19; ll.35-42, here l.35; ll.63-70, here l.63; ll.82-90, here l.82; ll.99-106, here l.99 and ll.132-136, here l.132.
\textsuperscript{760} Ibid, d.186, ll.1-7, here l.1; Govorov, Prestupnost’ i bor’ba s neiu v poslevoennoi Leningrade, p.14
\textsuperscript{761} Govorov, Prestupnost’ i bor’ba s neiu v poslevoennoi Leningrade, p.14; the NKVD reports to which I had access are patchy and do not contain data for every month, but generally they support the claims made by Govorov on the basis of his access to files kept by the security services.
\textsuperscript{762} TsGASPh, f.7384, op.36, d.214, ll.31-34, here l.31.
\textsuperscript{763} Ibid, ll.35-6; ll.37-40, here l.37; ll.41-2; ll.43-4; ll.63-4; ll.108-112, here l.108.
The data accord with the pattern in postwar crime figures for the Soviet Union as a whole that has been elaborated in the the work of both Jeffrey Burds and Elena Zubkova. They have demonstrated that in the Soviet Union as a whole there were slightly higher levels of crimes registered and people sentenced in 1946 and 1947 than in the war years.\textsuperscript{764} This low level increase, however, transpired within the context of an overall decrease in crime from 1940 to 1954. Data indicate, for example, that recorded crime in these two years was substantially higher than in 1948 but “was on the whole significantly lower then the prewar rate”.\textsuperscript{765}

The majority of criminal offences registered in the years following the end of the blockade, according to the available statistics, were not public or aggressive crimes but petty and domestic thefts, particularly of items such as linen and food from people’s flats. The local NKVD review of the work of the Leningrad police during 1944 observed that the growth in the number of crimes registered during that year occurred primarily in the category of thefts.\textsuperscript{766} This crime of theft constituted, on average, 60-70\% of all registered criminal offences throughout the postwar decade, including the period 1945-1947.\textsuperscript{767}

There are a number of possible ways to account for the growth that did occur in reported crime at the end of the blockade. Firstly, as we have seen, many of the people who were returning to the city at this time arrived to find that their belongings had been stolen or destroyed during the siege. Even the author of the 2002 article from the journal of the Russian Ministry of Internal Affairs stated that the growth in crime from early 1944 could be explained primarily on account of citizens returning to the city, discovering that their property had been stolen and submitting statements to the police organs about these thefts, which had actually been committed in 1941-1943 but not been registered by anyone at the time. During the war and blockade, weakened city dwellers and overwhelmed officials may have also been unable or unwilling to record other criminal

\textsuperscript{764} See Zubkova, \textit{Russia After the War}, p.39 and Burds, ‘Bor’ba s banditizmom’, p.189.
\textsuperscript{765} Zubkova, \textit{Russia After the War}, p.39.
\textsuperscript{766} TsGASPb, f.7384, op.36, d.14, ll.11-17, here l.12.
\textsuperscript{767} Govorov, \textit{Prestupnost’ i bor’ba s nei v poslevoennoi Leningrade}, p.32; the monthly NKVD reports put theft at close to 60\% the first five months of 1946. The proportion dropped to about 50\% in March and April 1947 but was back to about 60\% in November and remained about the same into June 1947: TsGASPb, f.7384, op.36, d.186, ll.1-7; ll.30-37; ll.50-57; ll.61-5; ibid d.214, ll.31-40.
incidents as they occurred during the war and blockade. The crime rates of the siege years are probably a distorted benchmark against which to assess postwar trends.

The high figures for 1946 and early 1947 in comparison with immediately proceeding years may also be connected with the postwar famine. The famine, as we have seen, impacted on the population of Leningrad, although conditions did not come close to the hunger and starvation of the blockade years in the city or to those prevailing in rural areas after the war. Nevertheless the poverty in which many people were living may have prompted them to respond in the same way as Rodion Nakhapetov, who has written of the post-war famine conditions as so difficult that he was taught at five years old to go out and steal in order to feed his grandmother.\footnote{\citeref{768}}

The number of thefts registered as criminal offences could also be connected to the changes in the laws on theft adopted in 1940 and then again in 1946 and 1947. The law of 1940 set a new minimum punishment for petty theft from factories at one year.\footnote{\citeref{769}} The subsequent laws of 1946 and 1947 increased penalties for the theft of state property, in some cases to as high as 15 years imprisonment.\footnote{\citeref{770}} The increased severity of laws on theft may have translated into an increase in incidents deemed to constitute criminal cases of theft, although Solomon maintains that the 1940 law on theft from factories was often not enforced in practice and the issuing of the June 1947 theft law coincides with a fall in the level of reported crime in the city of Leningrad.\footnote{\citeref{771}} The 1940 law that penalised petty theft at factories had also reinforced the edict that made labour fractions such as truancy and quitting a criminal offence and set a minimum of one year imprisonment for hooliganism. These may also have been enforced more stringently in the famine and reconstruction years than during the war.\footnote{\citeref{772}}

\footnote{\citeref{770} Zima, \textit{Golod} v SSSR, p.100.  
\footnote{\citeref{772} Shiktorov, ‘Ukreplim obshchestvennyi poriadok’, p.2.}
Whatever the cause of the brief rise in crime rates after the war in the context of an overall downward trend, it is possible to conclude that the regime translated exaggerated fears about the growth in criminality into representations of incomers that acted as “theatres for dialogues” on social, cultural and moral concerns. They also linked these fears into judicial and extra-judicial practices to monitor, fix or remove ‘suspect’ itinerant populations.

The article by NKVD chief Shiktorov from October 1945 was published in connection with a city Soviet resolution to ‘combat social disorder’ which also made a connection between the character of incomers and growth in crime and violations of order. The resolution and accompanying article made clear that an important measure to counter rises in criminal and disorderly activities should be the education of new arrivals, especially young people, in the ‘disciplined’ habits required of people using the streets of the city. The main instrument in the fight against social disorder, however, was the strengthening of the passport regime to remove those who did not belong in the civic community from the space of the city altogether. Unfortunately, Shiktorov noted in his newspaper piece, in many enterprises and houses at the moment employees were neglecting their duties to check up on new arrivals and were even helping ‘shady people’ find work or somewhere to live. The passport system must be reinforced, he underlined, to facilitate the “organised cleansing of our city from thieves, hooligans, parasites and other people who do not have a place in Leningrad”.

Passport sweeps that targeted people moving into the city without official sanction not just for their breach of the passport regulations but for harbouring in their midst an incorrigible “criminal element” were extensively used in prewar years and continued during the war and immediate postwar period, along with the ‘filtration’ of people...

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774 The resolution, which reiterated the obligation of house managers and enterprise directors for checking the passports of incomers, the sentencing of hooligans in people’s courts, the responsibility of various adults for the supervision of children and the “bringing to account” of those who neglected this duty can be found in Biulleten’, No.21 (15th November 1945), p.7.
775 Ibid.
arriving on trains.\textsuperscript{776} The head of the local NKVD noted in his reports to the city Soviet not only the numbers of people discovered every month living in Leningrad or arriving there without valid passports or residence permits, but also the numbers of ‘labour deserters’ and people categorised as ‘criminal’ among their number.\textsuperscript{777} Police reports from the first few post-siege years also highlighted the proportion of people bracketed together under the classification ‘without fixed occupations or places of residence or déclassé elements’ who were among the total number of people convicted of criminal activities.\textsuperscript{778} These amorphous categories incorporated a variety of people judged to be without stable ties or legal means of existence within Leningrad, including people entering the city without all the correct documents, as well as tramps, beggars and deserters from the army and from industrial enterprises and runaways from trade schools.\textsuperscript{779} In this way, not only was displacement without official authorisation itself criminalised, therefore, but large numbers of criminals were defined in official records as people who were no longer ‘fixed’ spatially or socially.

\begin{footnotesize}
\textsuperscript{776} TsGASPb, f.7384, op.36, d.148, l.15; chapter 2 of the thesis discussed the re-registration of passports in Leningrad in 1942 during which the police carried out operations to ‘cleanse the city of a criminal, social-parasitic and undesirable element’; in the first post-siege year of 1944 operations carried out by the Leningrad police in houses, flats, hostels, on the streets and in other public places to check residency documents and “expose criminal elements” encompassed over 400,000 people. Of these, about one tenth, according to the police report, had infringed the regulations of the passport system in some way, most by living in Leningrad without the required passports or permits. The police issued fines to just over 20,000 of the 40,834 people caught ‘violating’ the passport regulations and summarily exiled 1799 people from the city. The report identified that among those sent out of the city were just over a hundred people ‘not engaged in socially useful work’ but noted vaguely that the majority had been removed “for other reasons”: In addition, the police had obligated an unspecified number of the people discovered illegally arriving in Leningrad to make their own way out of the city within 24 or 48 hours: TsGASPb, f.7384, op.36, d.148, l.15; In December 1944, police chief Shiktorov informed the executive committee of the local Soviet, his officers had gone round almost 8,500 houses, hostels and workplaces with the purpose of enforcing the passport regime and inspected the documents of over 20,000 people in cinemas, ‘palaces of culture’ (doma kul’tury), in restaurants and at markets. They had also made checks on people coming into the city that, Shiktorov noted, had brought to light just over 1000 people “disturbing the order” of entry into the city by attempting to come in without permits. Among this number they had identified 99 labour deserters, 58 people formerly exiled from Leningrad and 117 ‘criminals’. In total, the police fined 2,942 people for their infringements, exiled 247 people immediately and handed over 99 individuals to the courts: ibid, l.5.

\textsuperscript{777} The city Soviet files, as mentioned in previous chapters, do not contain reports written by the NKVD chief about police activities for every month of the immediate post-siege years. These assertions are based on the materials which are available in the city Soviet archive, including a review of police activity in 1944: f.7384, op.36, d.148, ll.11-17; the monthly reports for December 1944 through June 1945: ibid, ll.1-6, ll.19-25, ll.26-27, ll.35-42, ll.63-70, ll.82-90, ll.99-106, ll.132-136, here l.132; and January through July 1946: ibid, d.186, ll.1-7, ll.30-37, ll.50-55, ll.61-65, ll.105-115; and March through November 1947: ibid, d.214, ll.31-34, ll.35-36, ll.37-40, ll.41-42, ll.43-44, ll.45-47, ll.62-63, ll.108-112.

\textsuperscript{778} TsGASPb, f.7384, op.36, d.148, ll.19, 35, 132 and 175; ibid, d.186, ll.2, 31, 51 and 62; ibid, d.214, ll.31(ob), 39, 46, and 112; and see Govorov, \textit{Prestupnost' i bor'ba s nei v poslevoennoi Leningrade}, p.65.

\textsuperscript{779} Govorov, \textit{Prestupnost' i bor'ba s nei v poslevoennoi Leningrade}, p.65.
\end{footnotesize}
Following the 1945 resolution on combating growing crime and social disorder in the city that called for increased vigilance by employees at factories and housing blocks responsible for scrutinising the documents of newcomers, the police authorities periodically stepped up their own activities to bolster the passport system as a crime-prevention measure.

The scattered data available point to the fact that in February 1946 and throughout 1947 many more people in breach of the passport regime were summarily exiled from the city than had been in December 1944 and the first half of 1945. While in the earlier period several hundred people living in Leningrad in transgression of the residency system had been sent immediately out of the city by the police each month, in February 1946 and for most of 1947 the number was several thousand. In April 1947, for example, 4076 people caught up in passport sweeps were ejected straight away from Leningrad, compared to 205 in the same month of 1945. The MVD report on criminal activity in the city in November 1947 contained data showing that officers had patrolled 14,306 locations, including houses, bars, buffets and markets, to find people who had illegally entered the city, almost double the number of places visited every month between December 1944 and June 1945. Almost 2,000 of the people discovered without valid documentation were exiled immediately in this month, even though incidents of criminal activity had become much fewer and far between. According to comments by Shiktorov in the November 1947 report, recorded crime in that month was under half what it had been in the same month of the preceding year.

In addition, when the rates of occurrence of typhus in Leningrad began to increase in mid-1947, the response of the authorities was to tie in anti-epidemic procedures with the policing of the passport regime. Decrees issued by the city’s Extraordinary Anti-Epidemic Committee in August 1947 called upon the local police to strengthen the

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780 TsGASPb, f.7384, op.36, d.148, ll.5(ob), 27, 42, 70, 90, 106, and 136; ibid, d.186, l.37; ibid, d.214, ll.34, 36, 40, 42, 44, 64, 110.
781 Ibid, d.214, l.32 and ibid, d.148, l.90.
782 Ibid, l.110.
783 Ibid, l.109.
passport regime as an anti-epidemic procedure.\textsuperscript{784} The peak period for recorded arrivals of people into the post-siege city, often in trainloads organised by organs responsible for the distribution of the labour force, was over by this point. The police, nevertheless, were required to take steps to improve the timely registration of new arrivals to the city and provisions for their sanitary treatment prior to settling in any accommodation.\textsuperscript{785} The August decrees stipulated, furthermore, that practices to prevent the spread of typhus should also be linked to the punitive and exclusionary facets of the enforcement of the passport system. The struggle to combat the growth of disease in the city was to be closely bound to the ‘struggle’ more generally to combat, if necessary by removing or even bringing criminal charges, people leading a “vagrant form of life”.\textsuperscript{786}

It should be noted that the displaced population had not been merely a passive object of state intervention and discipline. Official measures aimed at the bodies of the itinerant population could be avoided or challenged and people adopted a variety of responses to the imposed sanitary conditioning. Accounts of arrival in Leningrad which deal with sanitary treatment have proved hard to find. However evidence regarding sanitary processing during the evacuation from the city suggest a range of reactions. One evacuee from Leningrad describes the experience thus: “the bath for the evacuated was an event which cannot be scorned. It allowed one to be cleansed not only from dirt but from black thoughts”.\textsuperscript{787} An interviewee in the blockade project, however, recalled how the journey into evacuation was particularly unpleasant because of the periodic sanitary stops, when the train suddenly halted and passengers were ordered to split up into men and women to undergo “all these things”.\textsuperscript{788} Another interview respondent remembered how it was possible to refuse to undergo the sanitary treatment. On arrival in evacuation her mother, she recalled, would not have anything to do with the disinfection, baths and head shaving, and they were left with their hair to deal with any lice themselves.\textsuperscript{789} People who came to Leningrad on their own initiative, regardless of the strict legal restrictions on settlement

\textsuperscript{784} Ibid, d.254, l.9.
\textsuperscript{785} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{786} Ibid, l.21.
\textsuperscript{787} V. P. Zaitsev, quoted in Sokolov, \textit{Evakuatsiya iz Leningrada}, p.211.
\textsuperscript{788} Interview with E. S. M., ATsUI, Interview No.BL-1-010, p.13.
\textsuperscript{789} Interview with G. I. G., ATsUI, Interview No.BL-2A-020, p.10.
in the city, by evading the residency controls were also able to avoid the accompanying sanitary measures.

Those who circumvented the passport system and arrived in Leningrad without residence permits, however, were among those targeted in the anti-epidemic measures implemented by the Extraordinary Anti-Epidemic Commission in August 1947. The measures were aimed above all at unaccompanied children and people without fixed employment or registration at a place of residence, as categories posing the main danger to the health of the city’s existing population. At the city’s marketplaces, police stationed at special sanitary posts, sometimes accompanied by medical personnel of mobile anti-epidemic brigades, detained beggars, waifs and other people deemed by these officials to be “slovenly” or “dangerous for the spread of typhus” and sent them for treatment at sanitary checkpoints on a daily basis.

Other sanitary measures which were emphasised at this time focussed on the territory of the city’s train stations. This involved work to repair the infrastructure and improve the appearance of stations, including the provision of station toilets connected to the sewerage system and competitions for the station in the best sanitary condition. In addition to improving the cleanliness of the environment of stations, these measures charged the Ministry for State Security (MGB) guard on the Leningrad railway with systematically checking and ‘cleansing’ stations and train depots of unaccompanied children, homeless people, beggars, people without documents or train tickets and anyone breaking the station rules and causing disorder. These groups had to be detained, removed from the station premises and subsequently sent for sanitary processing and disinfection. On the trains themselves, medical workers were deployed daily to make checks of passengers travelling towards Leningrad and conductors were exhorted to lead

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790 TsGASPb, f.7384, op.36, d.254, l.6.
791 Ibid, l.17, l.57 and l.101.
792 GARF, f.R-9226, op.1, d.799, l.118-9.
793 TsGASPb, f.7384, op.36, d.254, l.21 and l.112.
the anti-epidemic struggle against those without tickets, waifs, ‘touring’ elements (gastroliruiushchego) and ‘baggers’ (meshochniki).^794

At the end of 1947 the police were sending several thousand people each week for sanitary treatment who had been rounded up in these patrols as ‘homeless’, ‘in violation of the passport regime’, ‘disorderly’, or ‘dangerous’. Following the sanitary screening and disinfection of these groups, the authorities ‘sorted’ them according to the level of harm they posed to the city. In December 1947 and the first few months of 1948 tens of people were sent after sanitary ‘processing’ to criminal courts every week where they were sentenced for passport violations, the police exiled several hundred more individuals, and several hundred received fines.^795

The measures were maintained and bolstered in the first quarter of 1948, even as occurrences of typhus were dropping. Interestingly, the Extraordinary Anti-Epidemic Commission made note of only one recorded case of the illness being spread by a homeless person in December 1947. The ‘homeless’ person singled out as the source of infection was N. Tarasova, a woman who had been given work and accommodation by a vegetable processing plant in the city but who was an ‘illegal’ settler, without a passport or resident permit and, it was noted, was also wanted by the police for theft.^796

The practical and symbolic linkage of responses to a feared typhus epidemic with a battle with other types of ‘contaminating’ behaviour borne by itinerant groups resonates with Weindling’s comments about European ‘demonology’ of refugees from countries to the east in the nineteenth and early twentieth century. Typhus control and eradication

^794 Ibid, l.50 and l.112; ‘baggers’ usually refers to people who transported food without official authorisation: on the repressive Bolshevik treatment of ‘baggers’ as a hostile class of speculators as part of efforts to monopolise food provision and assert command over the use of the railways and over social space more generally during the civil war see R. Argenbright, ‘Bolsheviks, Baggers and Railroader: Political Power and Social Space, 1917-1921’, Russian Review, Vol.52, No.4 (October 1993), pp.506-527, here p.521.

^795 As many as 6,000 people were sent for sanitary ‘processing’ in this manner some weeks: TsGASPb, f.7384, op.36, d.254, ll.4, 30, 32, 37, 38, 39, 41, 46, 53, 81.

^796 Ibid, l.96.
measures, he writes, constituted a medical discourse on the “barbaric threats” to European civilisation and the integrity of European nations from the margins.  

Tomas Balkelis has written in a similar vein about the quarantine facilities established by the German military authorities in Lithuania at the end of the First World War. The purpose of these facilities was to filter out from the ranks of refugees from Soviet Russia those believed to pose a political threat to the regime, above all Bolshevik spies, as well as to prevent the potential danger of epidemic disease. At one of the quarantine centres, refugees were forced through something like a sauna, cleaned and scrubbed, after which they were subject to political screening by a Commission of Refugee Control. This screening entailed the verification of identity documents and checks on personal belongings for signs of civil and political loyalty. Once they had been washed and screened, the refugees were permitted to travel onwards but had their movements restricted to certain districts. At the same time, negative articles in the press vilified refugees as the bringers of epidemic diseases such as cholera and typhus, the source of the “dangerous misfortune of our nation”.

At the end of the Second World War the victorious powers conducted epidemic prevention procedures on millions of refugees and people on the move as part of an imposition of control and surveillance across the territory of Europe. Allied policy was to “collect and incarcerate” people labelled displaced persons (DPs) in special camps, where they were registered and classified in advance of their ‘re-placement’ through repatriation. A priority of the camps was the medical inspection of the DPs and their ‘delousing’ as well as the prevention of crime and acts of retribution. According to Weindling, from April 1945 the occupying authorities also “imposed a strict cordon

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797 Weindling, Epidemics and Genocide, p.17.
799 Ibid, pp.93-95, here p.93.
800 Weindling, Epidemics and Genocide, p.397.
801 Ibid, p.396.
802 Latvian DPs in Germany, for example, underwent intimate physical inspections and health checks that affected their possibilities for future resettlement, for example subsequent immigration to Britain: Gatrell, ‘From ‘Homelands’ to ‘Warlands’’, p.7.
sanitaire along the Rhine” and DDT dusting to combat lice and other parasites was stringently applied at all allied crossing points.\textsuperscript{803}

The linking of sanitary controls with policing and the passport regime as part of both the integration and exclusion of people from the urban community also, though, drew on specific prewar Soviet practices. Weindling points out that in Germany the modernist European state ethos, which incorporated the regulation of the cleanliness of social space and containment of the flow of populations, became intertwined in Germany with a Nazi ideology of racial purification.\textsuperscript{804} The Soviet Union, as the work of Amir Weiner has shown, was engaged in its own quest for purity.

In the Soviet state, according to Weiner, the modernist European ethos of social engineering combined with a Bolshevik Marxist eschatology in a revolutionary campaign to transform society into a beautiful, pure and harmonious body.\textsuperscript{805} This campaign entailed the excision of those who did not belong in the cleansing operations of the purges, alongside practices to transform individuals and society into an ideal image. In this ‘purification’ process, groups and individuals perceived to be hostile to the harmonious social body were continuously referred to in biological-hygienic terms, as vermin, pollution or filth.\textsuperscript{806} The entire society was mobilised in both the punitive and welfare facets of the road to purity and harmony, through denunciations and also in ordinary daily practices of hygienic and ‘moral’ behaviour. Weiner writes that, “each and

\textsuperscript{803} Weindling, *Epidemics and Genocide*, p.397.

\textsuperscript{804} Ibid, p.xvii for example; on the development from the eighteenth century within Germany of processes whereby an itinerant lifestyle could be sufficient to be deemed dangerous and a potential criminal, the increasing power of the police from 1870 to label as deviant and undesirable all kinds of behaviour including unhygienic housing, suspect mobility and other ‘social ills’ and the connection of the history of these activities to the persecution and stigmatisation of gypsies and other travellers by the Nazis see L. Lucassen, “‘Harmful tramps’: Police professionalization and gypsies in Germany, 1700-1945”, *Crime, Histoire & Sociétés/ Crime, History and Societies*, Vol.1, No.1 (1997), pp.29-50.

\textsuperscript{805} See, for example, Weiner, ‘Nature, Nurture and Memory’, pp.1114-1155, especially p.1115 on the Soviet purification campaign and the constant tension in the Soviet drive for purity between nurture and nature, between a Marxist premise of the primacy of acculturation and a desire to eradicate members of classes and (increasingly by the Second World War) nationalities, which were perceived to threaten the ‘moral-political unity’ of the Soviet state.

\textsuperscript{806} Ibid, p.1121.
every member of the Soviet polity was expected to be an active agent in the purification of himself and his surroundings.”  

As the Bolshevik regime confronted the major disorders resulting from their policies of the late 1920s and early 1930s, above all the upheavals of the collectivisation and industrialisation campaigns, fears about the contamination of the body social increasingly began to focus on the population arriving into urban areas. Attempts were made to transform the newly arrived population into the loyal and cultured urban workers desired by the regime. A major facet of the campaign to inculcate cultured-ness (‘kul’turnost’) was the attempt to impose norms of hygiene in the new workers’ barracks, which were seen as repositories of filth and deviance, offensive smells and coarse speech. The civilising of the barrack space was intended to be instrumental in changing people’s habits of cleanliness and, in turn, their attitudes and manners, producing, in this way, public order.  

Neat and clean curtains, lampshades and tablecloths in the barracks were intended both to transform the uncultured people and to function as symbols demonstrating their ability to live in accordance with the norms of kul’turnost’. This was, Volkov claims, reminiscent of Foucault’s ideas about the creation of disciplinary space, in which “each individual has its own place”.

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807 Weiner, *Making Sense of War*, p.25; see also I. Halfin, *Terror in My Soul. Communist Autobiographies on Trial*, (London: Harvard University Press, 2003) on self-purification; E. Naiman, *Sex in Public: The Incarnation of Early Soviet Ideology* (Princeton and Chichester: Princeton University Press, 1999), p.15 on the Soviet utopian project “insistently excising sources of contamination”; Daniel Beer has discussed the way in which the Bolshevik purification drive was also informed by the party’s origins in imperial Russia. In the last decades of the 19th century in Russia a discourse had emerged which linked images of illness and contagion to representations of social problems and deviance from a social normality. Beer traces the origin of this discourse in the pan-European modernist tendency to medicalise threats to social and moral order as an epidemiological threat and also in the rhetoric of Russian cultural and political actors, including cultural critics in ‘thick journals’, underground parties and the Orthodox Church: D. Beer (diss), ‘The Hygiene of Souls: Languages of illness and contagion in late imperial and early Soviet Russia’, pp.9-11; the similarities between the discourse of the Orthodox Church and the Bolshevik party’s obsession with curing its illnesses has been noted by Oleg Kharkordin. In fact, the term purge (chistka) originated in the practice of getting rid of undesirable Orthodox clergy through recruitment to the army: O. Kharkordin, *The Collective and Individual in Russia: a study of practices* (Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1999) pp.135-6.


809 Ibid, pp.221-225.

The mass of people entering into the urban areas, new workplaces and barracks had to be inspected for signs of dirt and disease and cleaned before being ‘placed’ in them. In the Ukrainian industrial region of the Donbass before the Second World War, the Soviet authorities had developed medical-provisioning centres for migrant workers from the Tsarist era into a network of large sanitary-observation centres. These centres conducted sanitary inspections, treatments and sometimes quarantine of newly arrived and seasonal workers before they could be assigned to urban accommodation.811 Earlier, ‘sanitary control centres’ had also been set up towards the end of the civil war in Petrograd to disinfect passengers coming into the city who, it was feared, were the source of an outbreak of typhus. Their belongings were also disinfected and each was given a towel and soap before they could enter the Bolshevik-controlled civic territory.812

In the 1930s, the language of ‘hygiene’ and ‘danger’ also informed the implementation of the passport system as police began to use the passport system to ‘quarantine’ and ‘cleanse’ urban areas from marginals believed to be the cause of crime and disorder.813 David Shearer, for example, has discusses how, by the mid-1930s, both the civil and political police were using passport sweeps in cities as a primary way to bring in tens of thousands of people who fit the profile of the ‘socially harmful’. Increasingly, this meant not just ‘class aliens’ but social ‘marginals’ more broadly, conflating criminals and associates of criminals with itinerants, the unemployed, beggars, prostitutes, persons caught repeatedly without proper residence permits or returning to places where they were forbidden to live, and children over twelve caught in a criminal act. Some of those

812 Shishkin (ed.), Petrograd na perelome epoch, pp.117-122: Petrograd during the civil war encountered many of the problems which faced Leningrad as a result of the Second World War, including difficulties with sanitation and the growth of disease. The water supply system didn’t work in the majority of homes, dirt piled up in houses in winter and rubbish on the streets and in 1921 there was still a shortage of transport and people to remove it. Market places and barracks were sites of particular concern with regards to unsanitary conditions. These problems combined in this period with a deficit of soap, a lack of doctors, a malnourished and cold population and public baths that didn’t function to cause the development of a series of epidemic and other diseases. These included a widespread outbreak of cholera in July 1918, due to the dirty water in the Neva and of Spanish flu in October of that year. Then at the start of 1920 there was a major outbreak of typhus, which was attributed to the military units which were frequently passing through the city at this time and to deserters from the Whites. At this point it was decided by the Department of health to prevent further development of the disease by several means, including the disinfecting arriving passengers.
813 Hagenloh, ‘Socially Harmful Elements’, p.287.
picked up would be charged with crimes such as speculation or convicted of passport violations and others expelled from the city.\textsuperscript{814} During ‘mass operations’ conducted in 1937 and 1938, in addition, special police boards continually sentenced ‘harmfuls’ to five years of exile or camp sentences.\textsuperscript{815}

Shearer underscores that the police conceived passport sweeps as a means of ‘cleansing’ urban streets from ‘social trash’ and points to several instances when documents produced by police officials associated the sweeps with measures for public hygiene.\textsuperscript{816} In 1932, for example, as the passport system was being introduced, a police report referred to the presence of socially marginal people as “filth or dirt (zagriaznenie) on the face of our cities”.\textsuperscript{817} On the very next page the report urged local police to lead the fight for public hygiene by literally clearing rubbish from the streets.

Postwar anti-epidemic measures, therefore, built on methods used in the past in attempts to ensure that those permitted to settle in towns were appropriately clean and not carrying infection before they could come into contact with the urban environment, and that they demonstrated appropriate ‘cultured’ behaviour. They also intertwined with practices continued from the prewar period which entailed rounding-up, detaining, processing and sometimes excising people who did not belong in the cityscape. The expression of concerns about the effect of the incoming population after the end of the blockade on the sanitary, normative and cultural order of the city, however, also had distinctive local and postwar dimensions and served the construction of visions of people’s place in the national and civic ‘family’ once the war and siege were over.

\textsuperscript{814} Shearer, ‘Elements near and Alien’, pp.847, 851 and 875.  
\textsuperscript{815} Hagenloh, ‘Socially Harmful Elements’, p.301.  
\textsuperscript{816} Shearer, ‘Elements near and Alien’, p.850.  
\textsuperscript{817} Ibid: Shearer also mentions in this part of the article that police and health officials in a circular of 1933 jointly ascribed the spread of epidemic diseases such as typhus to ‘mobile’ groups in the population, in particular nomads, wanderers, orphans.
5.4 Repopulating a purified space

The rhetoric and practices constructing displaced populations in post-siege Leningrad as potential ‘contaminants’ must be understood not just in terms of the imbrication of measures to combat crime and disease with the integration or excision of incoming populations. They also formed part of efforts by the Soviet state to impose a particular normative, social and cultural order upon postwar urban landscapes and the Soviet ‘homeland’. 818

Roger Argenbright has noted in his study of the wartime evacuation in the Soviet Union, based on arguments by the geographer David Sack, that attempts to govern ‘in/out-of-place’ relationships” are linked to the ability to control spatial interactions and also to impose specific meanings on a place. 819 The Stalinist state in the postwar period was engaged in reconstituting a Soviet homeland that had been purified spatially and demographically. 820 The Stalinist regime which, in the words of Boris Groys, pursued complete “dominion over signs” and total victory in the “symbolic occupation of space”, acted quickly to demonstrate its control over Soviet territory and the ascription of meanings to Soviet landscapes at the end of the war. 821 Gatrell and Baron, for example, have written of the Stalinist state’s reconstitution of the Soviet ‘home’ after the war in practical and symbolic ways, for example in the staging of a car rally in 1947 that staked out and reclaimed territories formerly occupied by the Nazis and extended to the newly incorporated Baltic republics before passing through Leningrad and returning to the centre of power in Moscow. Earlier mass cross-country runs in liberated territories had similarly celebrated the vitality of the Soviet motherland and the reoccupation of Soviet space that had been purified and cleansed from the Nazis. 822

818 See Baron and Gatrell, ‘Population Displacement’, p.92 on the earlier use of population politics by the Soviet authorities to establish a new spatial order of society on micro-social levels such as apartments and public places of cities.
820 Gatrell and Baron, ‘Violent Peacetime’, p.262.
822 Gatrell and Baron, ‘Violent Peacetime’, p.262; on Soviet land having been ‘cleansed’ from the enemy in the war see, for example, ‘Bol’shaia obshchenarodnaia zadacha uspeshno razreshaetsia’, Leningradskaia Pravda, 6/2/1944, p.1; this article was reprinted from an editorial in Pravda of 5/2/1944.
On the level of the Leningrad cityscape, the Soviet government made efforts to impose its authority over the way in which the emptied city spaces filled with objects and significance, as well as people, through the management of the reconstruction process. While the repair of the city’s destroyed housing and sanitary infrastructure progressed slowly after the war, the restoration of façades, monuments and parks in the city centre had begun before the war even ended.\textsuperscript{823} Articles appeared regularly in the local press celebrating the number of façades that had been repaired and painted and the number of trees that had been planted.\textsuperscript{824}

The rapid return of the city to the ‘neoclassical grandeur’ of its prewar appearance, Kirschenbaum points out, suited the Stalinist preference for classical forms that embodied the power of the harmonious, rational, hierarchical and centralised state.\textsuperscript{825} Repairs to the exteriors of the city’s high profile buildings, public monuments and open spaces also signified the rapid overcoming of the disarray of the war and a return to “order”.\textsuperscript{826} Society was resuming its prewar march but, having been through the experience of the war, was even closer to a harmonious, pure and civilised communist polity.\textsuperscript{827} The ongoing drive of the regime to mould a healthier, more cultured and “more aesthetic society” had, according to Amir Weiner, became even more urgent after the victorious

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\item \textsuperscript{823} Local newspaper articles boasted of how ‘Leningraders’ were restoring the city even as the enemy was bombing its homes, schools, historic buildings and monuments: P. Popkov, ‘V novom godu s novymi silami za rabotu!’, \textit{Leningradskaiia Pravda}, 1/1/1944, p.2 and ‘Liubov’ k rodnomu gorodu’, \textit{Leningradskaiia Pravda}, 31/1/1944, p.1.
\item \textsuperscript{826} Kirschenbaum, \textit{The Legacy of the Siege of Leningrad}, p.135.
\item \textsuperscript{827} Weiner, \textit{Making Sense of War}, pp.364-365.
\end{itemize}
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outcome of the war.\textsuperscript{828} The appearance of the city, just as the Soviet system itself, was not to be fundamentally altered by the experience of war, but as the author of one article put it, made “even more beautiful…even more splendid and even more monumental”.\textsuperscript{829} This also accorded with the desires of local planners and also some among the population to manifest the renewal of the city following its sufferings in the reconstruction of its monuments and facades.\textsuperscript{830}

Both the central and local authorities were engaged at the end of the war in the delineation of the social and geographic place of several new categories of people created by the war in this purified Soviet ‘home’ and a renewed normative order. Several of these population groups were among those who featured prominently in the authorities’ rhetoric of social disorder at the end of the war. They included the war veterans, above all those who were now classed as invalids, and also teenage labour reserve students, who had begun to appear in the postwar Soviet landscape.

There have been two memorable portrayals of postwar criminals filmed in the Soviet Union and Russian Federation in the last thirty or so years: the elusive ‘Black cat gang’ of adolescent robbers that terrorises postwar Moscow in the 1979 television series ‘The Meeting Place Cannot Be Changed’ (\textit{Mesto Vstrechi Izmenit’ Nel’zia}) and the travelling thief and con-man who identifies himself as a war veteran in Pavel Chukhrai’s 1997 film...

\textsuperscript{828} Weiner, ‘Introduction: Landscaping the Human Garden’, p.2; also Weiner, \textit{Making Sense of War}, p.35; on the further elevation of ‘middle class’ values of kul’turnost’ as the only desirable conduct see Dunham, \textit{In Stalin’s Time}, p.22.

\textsuperscript{829} This phrase was used to describe the reconstruction of the city in an article in \textit{Leningradskaiia Pravda} in August 1944: A. Bubnov, ‘Vse sily na vosstanovlenie rodnogo goroda!’, \textit{Leningradskaiia Pravda}, 6/8/1944, p.2; for an expression of the idea that the city and country should be reconstructed ‘as before’ in terms not of going backwards but as a renewed post-war order see ‘Petrogradskii raion segodnia’, \textit{Leningradskaiia Pravda}, 26/1/46, p.3.

\textsuperscript{830} See Pis’ ma v redaktsiiu: S. Frolova-Bagreeva, ‘Zabota o svoem dome’, \textit{Leningradskaiia Pravda}, 17/2/1944, p.3 for the opinion of a local resident that “each of us loves our city, its splendid avenues and squares, houses and parks. And during the war this love became stronger. The city was wounded by barbaric fire and bombings. Great is the wish to restore that which has been destroyed as quickly as possible”; a rather different view was expressed by another resident in a piece of personal correspondence intercepted by the local organs of the Ministry of State Security in 1946. In the letter the city-dweller writes that “life is nightmarish with us if you dig a little deeper – all on the surface is splendour, just like today’s houses, on the outside they paint and paint facades, but inside all is disorder”: TsGASPb, f.7384, op.36, d.214, l.75.
‘The Thief’ (Vor). These fictional criminals reflect contemporary descriptions of various felons who gained notoriety in the Soviet press of the immediate postwar years.

In April 1946 Leningradskaia Pravda printed a lengthy article about the arrival in the city and subsequent behaviour of two “swindlers” 831. These petty con-men were posing as demobilised soldiers, possessed forms attesting to a host of decorations and awards for bravery received during the war and wore proof of their heroic feats in the shape of the rows of ribbons on their soldier’s blouses. Impressed by the list of medals and the presence of a hero in their midst, employees at the city Soviet’s trade department found a place for one of these characters, Aleksandr Mukhin, as the head of one of its district branches. The other, Igor’ Galchenkov, presented attestations about his heroism and his talent for drawing to the Academy of Arts, where he was taken on as a student in the painting faculty. Both received rooms in the city immediately, without having to be placed on a waiting list. One, the article continued, even managed to obtain a large war invalid’s pension.

Once they had been assigned their workplaces, according to the article, Mukhin spent his time helping himself to beer and other goods from the stalls in his charge while Galchenkov systematically removed paintings, lithographs and even sheets and pillowcases from the academy. Both engaged in petty theft from the people they encountered. The instructors at the academy of arts gradually began to investigate their student more carefully, the article stated, while Mukhin, despite the lack of any documents confirming any of the details listed in his form, “held on firmly to his place”. 832. It was left to the city’s criminal investigation organs to establish without any real difficulty that they were both ‘rogues’ and impostors, self-styled heroes whose past ‘deeds’ consisted not of heroics but of hooliganism and rough and ready forgery. One had to be surprised, the article concluded, at the willingness of state employees to succumb to the hypnosis of glory. Heroes of the war, crowned with government laurels, had earned

831 ‘Eksploatatsiia gluposti’, Leningradskaia Pravda, 15/5/1946, p.3.
832 Ibid, p.3.
Sheila Fitzpatrick has written of the flourishing of this kind of “entitlement imposture” after the war. Identity documents and records had been lost or destroyed during the war, while at the same time new forms of status and attendant privileges had been forged. As before the war, members of a mobile population could attempt to refashion themselves with each move. Secondary accounts of postwar tricksters, including that by Fitzpatrick, usually refer to the case of Borukhovich Vaisman, a thief who turned to swindling in 1946 after he lost both legs and a hand to frostbite during an unsuccessful escape attempt from a labour camp. Vaisman, like the Leningrad con-men, obtained an attestation about his status as a Hero of the Soviet Union and decorated his jacket with orders and medals and represented himself as a wounded war hero. His targets were rather more highly placed, however, and he managed to obtain all sorts of goods, services and gifts, from top Soviet administrators. He received tens of thousands of rubles, many items of clothing and even some high quality artificial limbs.

The tone of the intelligence reports on Vaisman, Fitzpatrick notes, is not strongly judgemental and show something of an appreciation of the trickster’s skills. This was also characteristic of prewar newspaper reports on swindlers as well as the novels by Ilf and Petrov featuring the conman Ostap Bender. The Leningradskaya Pravda article on the two postwar impostors similarly reserve more judgement for the softheaded officials who fell for the scams than for the pair themselves. This was perhaps because these ‘rogues’, although committing petty offences, were also performing impeccable postwar Soviet identities, confirming the hierarchical order in which decorated veterans returning

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835 Fitzpatrick, ‘The World of Ostap Bender’, p.548; on Vaisman see also, for example, Moskovskaya Militsiia: Materialy k lektsiiam po kursu “sotsial’no-politicheskaiia istoriia xx veka” (Moscow: MVD RSFSR Vysshia iurodicheskaiia Zaochnaia Shkola, 1991), pp.22-23.
to work and study were particularly privileged.\textsuperscript{837} The discussion of their behaviour served as a theatre for reiterating this order, while also calling for greater vigilance on the part of those responsible for upholding it.

Local police reports from Leningrad in the post-siege years expressed graver concern about other crimes committed by war invalids at the time, despite their fairly small share as a category of all those who had been convicted of offences.\textsuperscript{838} In a memo of March 1945 to the chairman of the city Soviet, for example, the NKVD chief wrote of his disquiet about war invalids engaged in crime, specifically about invalids who were travelling to other cities at this time under false pretences and were exploiting their privileged freedom of movement to speculate in deficit goods. One roving war invalid, the head of police noted, had received permits to travel from the Leningrad Soviet on false pretexts on four occasions between May 1944 and January 1945.\textsuperscript{839} Another had been issued a permit to make the journey to the town of Iaroslavl’ to attend his wife’s funeral but instead was found to be illegally transporting and reselling large amounts of foodstuffs.\textsuperscript{840}

The newspaper account of increased crime and social disorder also emphasised the unacceptability of disruptions to social order on the streets by war invalids. Mark Edele has discussed a “subculture” of beggars, vagrants and small-time con-men in the postwar and famine years who lived at train stations, travelled from town to town, begged, stole

\textsuperscript{837} Alexopoulos, ‘Portrait of a Con Artist’, p.790 on self-fashioning by a Soviet con-man that embraced many of the features of the Stalinist order, while also being subversive of it.

\textsuperscript{838} Police reports and correspondence from the initial post-blockade years made particular note of the proportion of war invalids among the total number of people convicted for criminal offences. Govorov notes that while the participation in criminal activity by war invalids in Leningrad in the first postwar years aroused serious concern among the authorities, “at the same time it must be admitted that the number of war invalids engaged in criminal activity was very small”, constituting on average 0.4-0.8\% of all those convicted in 1945-1948: Govorov, \textit{Prestupnost’ i bor’ba s nei v poslevoennoi Leningrade}, p.68; the scattered data to which I had access give a slightly higher proportion but still less than 5\%; in January 1945, for example, 3.3\% of the 789 people convicted were invalids, and in the same month of 1946, of the 1538 people given criminal sentences, 4\% were classified as servicemen or invalids: TsGASPb, f.7384, op.36, d.148, l.19-27 and ibid, d.181, l.1-7.

\textsuperscript{839} The previous chapter discussed how war invalids and other former servicemen were exempted from the obligation in force at this time to obtain permission from the police prior to purchasing tickets for train travel, however they still required some official documentation confirming the purpose of a journey made for personal reasons.

\textsuperscript{840} TsGASPb, f.7384, op.36, d.148, l.44-5.
and engaged in small-scale trade, a culture of which war invalids were a major part. 841 One woman interviewed as part of the blockade project recalled that what struck her about the postwar city was the “abundance of cripples” and the “abundance of beggars”, of people who had returned from the front and were now asking for alms and getting drunk on the streets of the city. 842 The negative portrait of a war invalid ‘impostor’ in the story Finally at Home, published towards the end of 1947, shows him not as a convincing Soviet employee but as one of the ‘market loafers’. He had lost his legs to frostbite during a drinking bout but after the war had travelled to a different town, “crowned” himself a war invalid and spent his time “in the far corner of the market”, where the ramshackle wooden kiosks began, drinking with suspect acquaintances like the purveyor of homemade tobacco or the fortune teller. 843

The invalids who drank together out on the city streets often may not have been in breach of any article of the criminal code, but the newspaper piece by the city procurator, Falin, published in January 1945 suggests that their mere presence in public places was construed and represented by the authorities as a violation of the desired postwar ‘order’. 844 A number of disruptions to social order, Falin noted, had been committed by war invalids. This was particularly unacceptable because:

Soviet power surrounds its war invalids with care, granting them a number of privileges. The whole Soviet people relates to them with care and love. They have deserved this. They have shed their blood, lost their health in battles for the motherland. For this reason the struggle with those who bring this title into disrepute should be all the more severe. 845

842 Interview with V. I. V., ATsUI, Interview No. BL-1-025, p.10.
844 On how official control over the meanings and uses of public space were challenged by inhabitants conducting the everyday tasks of going to work or buying shopping as well as by social groups claiming and transforming locations through their recreational activities see Gerasimova and Chuikina, ‘Ot kapitalisticheskogo Peterburga’, p.45.
845 Falin, ‘Usilit’ bor’bu’, p.3.
The care of Leningraders for their war invalids and the families of servicemen, he added, should serve as a moral example to all. Many invalids, however, who had “not found their new place in life” still required help to find work and learn a new profession.\textsuperscript{846} The war, he concluded, had shown that the Soviet order was unshakeable, now was the time to sort out any defects. War invalids who were not at work or being cared for in Soviet institutions undermined what Beate Fieseler has termed “the performance of a state devoted to welfare”, the demonstration of inclusive, paternalistic care for wounded members of the Soviet family.\textsuperscript{847} They also destabilised the regime’s attempt to deny its war scars and project an image of a victorious society moving on to the tasks of reconstruction and settling in a grey, de-heroised, middle-class domesticity.\textsuperscript{848} The gathering of war invalids, and other veterans, to talk and drink in cafes, snack bars and open air ‘taverns’ could be seen, furthermore, as a display of belonging to a separate community within the wider Soviet one and of the attribution of space with unsanctioned meanings and uses.\textsuperscript{849}

There is anecdotal evidence to suggest that at some point in the late 1940s the Leningrad authorities responded by excising these invalids from the cityscape altogether. The local historian Aleksandr Panchenko, for example, has spoken of how there were many


\textsuperscript{848} See Zubkova, \textit{Russia After the War}, p.27 on how these taverns, or ‘blue Danubes’ sprung up in the ruins of houses and other places as refuges for veterans and how they gave rise to a kind of ‘tavern democracy’ among patrons; see also the reminiscences of Eduard Kochergin on how Leningrad was “flooded with establishments selling liquor” after the war, including ones in the restored Summer Garden, and on how veterans and invalids inscribed this space with their own meanings through their drinking and storytelling: E. Kochergin, ‘Rasskazy “brodiachei sobaki”’: “Vania-zhid”, \textit{Peterburgskii Teatral’nyi Zhurnal}, No.9 (1996), pp.24-5; for the argument that that Foucault’s analysis of the functioning of power and mechanisms of discipline should be complemented by an analysis of popular ways of operating, the “innumerable practices by means of which users reappropriate the space organized by techniques of sociocultural production”: M. de Certeau, \textit{The Practice of Everyday Life, vol.1}, trans. Steven Rendall (Berkeley and London: University of California Press, 1984), p.xiv; popular tactics of operating in cities include the “contradictory movements that counterbalance…panoptic power”, p.95.
invalids in the city after the war, of how it was common when walking along it streets to meet people without legs, on noisy carts, who made ends meet by trading something or sharpening knives. Then, suddenly, in one day, he claims, “they were no more: they had been sent to [the island of] Valaam”.\textsuperscript{850} I have not been able to locate any documents referring to a decision to move invalids forcibly to this small island on lake Ladoga, however many certainly ended up in a shelter on the island. An interviewee recalls visiting her grandmother there in the late 1940s and being terrified by the corridor full of people without their limbs.\textsuperscript{851} The war invalids of Valaam have also formed the subject of the novella \textit{Patience} by Iurii Nagibin and of paintings by the artist Viktor Antonov.\textsuperscript{852}

There are many documents attesting to the extra-judicial practices employed by the local police to pick up unsupervised and homeless young people from public places in the city, a common practice in prewar years that after the war was closely connected to attempts by officials to control the placement and behaviour of students of the expanding labour reserve system.\textsuperscript{853}

As in the case of war invalids, police reports from the time made note of the proportion of adolescents who had been convicted for criminal offences and detailed the felonies committed by young people assigned to the city’s trade and factory schools in particular.\textsuperscript{854} Police officials highlighted in their records, for example, incidents of theft

\textsuperscript{850} Panchenko, ‘Kogda Peterburg byl Leningradom’, p.12; Paul Hagenloh has referred to the removal of prewar removal of beggars from the streets as part of the passport sweeps targeted at ‘harmful’ and ‘marginal’ populations: Hagenloh, ‘“Socially Harmful Elements”’, p.297.

\textsuperscript{851} Interview with A. A. V., ATsUI, Interview No. BL-1-017, p.14.


\textsuperscript{853} On the prewar purging of the streets from “waifs and unruly children” see, for example, Kelly, \textit{Children’s World}, p.224; on the postwar raids to ‘weed out’ homeless youth from stations, trains, bazaars and ruined houses see Fürst, ‘Between Salvation and Liquidation’, pp.247-250; on the homeless, abandoned or simply delinquent children as the “alter ego” of youthful workers from the labour reserve schools see Filtzer, \textit{Soviet Workers}, p.120; for documentation of the removal of ‘unsupervised’ trade school students from the streets by the police for public disorder and for the placement of ‘unsupervised’ or ‘homeless children’ from the streets into these homes see, by way of an example: TsGASPb, f.7384, op.36, d.148, l.175.

\textsuperscript{854} Again the proportion of all those convicted of crimes made up by adolescents as a whole was generally less than 5%, some of whom were trade school students, while others were pupils in the regular school
and drunken assaults by bands of teenagers who had been mobilised into these institutions.\textsuperscript{855} These included the activities of a group of students from a Leningrad labour reserve school calling themselves the ‘Black Cat gang’.\textsuperscript{856}

According to Aleksandr Tarasov, the proliferation of gangs identifying themselves by the sign of the ‘Black cat’ was a postwar phenomenon in cities across the Soviet Union. The reality was often, however, much “more modest” than the scenes from the series \textit{The Meeting Place Must Not Be Changed}.\textsuperscript{857} The activities of the Leningrad gang, for example, consisted of the classmates swearing loyalty to each other, giving themselves a tattoo and then committing a few petty thefts from apartments, usually belonging to neighbours of members of the group.\textsuperscript{858} Only three of the group when caught were sentenced to periods of imprisonment of one to three years. The students appear less like violent ‘bandits’ than impoverished teenagers who, alienated from the myth of the war, formed an alternative community identifying with rumours about the culture of the criminal underground.\textsuperscript{859}
Most of the trade school students who were dealt with by the police in these years were not actually prosecuted in the courts. Newspaper articles by Falin and Shiktorov that drew attention to misdemeanours by youths, in particular those arriving at the trade schools, noted low-level ‘social disorders’ such as trading in cigarettes, vodka and tickets at markets and cinemas, or simply “getting up to mischief” on the streets and bothering passers-by.\textsuperscript{860} While under a hundred labour reserve students and other adolescents were actually convicted of crimes each month in 1945 and the first two months of 1946, over 5000 were picked up from the streets for transgressions such as street trade, jumping on and off trams and other undefined ‘violations of order’. The police subsequently returned most of them to their parents or placed them in factory and trade schools.\textsuperscript{861}

The focus in the rhetoric and practice of the authorities on the criminal and disorderly behaviour of adolescents in general, and those from the labour schools in particular, can also be understood in the context of the enforcement of a spatial and normative postwar order and the efforts of the regime to ‘remake the streets’ as well as the population according to these norms. Labour reserve students, after all, were semi-indentured selling them to get money for alcohol. Some pupils were even forced to leave work to trade on the markets to make money for the staff: TsGASPb, f.7384, op.17, d.1507, ll.21-3; ibid, op.36, d.148, ll.108-113; ibid, d.186, ll.56-7; figures from the Leningrad militia for adolescent crime as a whole in the city in 1945, testify that the overwhelming majority of convictions were for petty thefts particularly from apartments and bread shops: TsGASPb, f.7384, op.36, d.186; on the spreading of rumours and tales of ‘bandit’ adventures such as those of the Black Cat gang and on teenagers placing threatening notes with the signature ‘Black Cat gang’ for fun see Govorov, *Prestupnost’ i bor’ba s nei*, pp..284-285; for a study of more privileged groups of young people whose age also excluded them from the formative experience of the war, in particular university students and children of the elite, that shows how sections of these youths began to proclaim alternative values and cultural manners to those approved of by the regime after the war see, for example, Mark Edele’s work on the ‘stiliagi’, who adhered to a subculture marked by a dedication to stylish, Western-looking dress: Edele, ‘Strange young men in Stalin’s Moscow’, pp.37-61; on a working class youth culture informed by the values of the ‘backyard’ which could be influenced by criminal fashions and jargon see S. V. Kuleshov, ‘Razmyshlenia o sovetskom mentalitete’, in *Stalin. Stalinism. Sovetskoe obschestvo* (Moscow, 2000), p.352; C. S. Walton, *Ivan Petrov. Russia through a shot glass* (New Orleans: Garrett county press, 1999), p.36; and the memoirs of Moscow mayor Iurii Luzhkov: Iu. Luzhkov, *Moi deti tvoi, Moskva* (Moscow: Vagrius, 1996), pp.125-133 and A. Kozlov, *Kozel na sakse – i tak vsiu zhizn’* (Moscow: Vagrius, 1998), especially ‘chapter I: Dvorovaiia zhizn’ – igry i razvlechenia’.\textsuperscript{860} Falin, ‘Usil’ bor’bu’, p.3 and Shiktorov, ‘Leningradu – obratovoi obschestvennyi poriadok’, p.3.\textsuperscript{861} TsGASPb, f.7384, op.36, d.186, ll.38-49; see also M. V. Smirnova, ‘Deiatel’nost’ organov NKVD-MVD v bor’be s besprizornost’iu i beznadzornost’iu nesovershennoletnikh v Leningrad oblasti 1941-9’ (diss.), MVD Rossii Sankt Peterburgskia Akademiia, 1997, ppp.153-155 on the numbers of children removed from the streets in the course of 1946.

\textsuperscript{860} Falin, ‘Usil’ bor’bu’, p.3 and Shiktorov, ‘Leningradu – obratovoi obschestvennyi poriadok’, p.3.\textsuperscript{861} TsGASPb, f.7384, op.36, d.186, ll.38-49; see also M. V. Smirnova, ‘Deiatel’nost’ organov NKVD-MVD v bor’be s besprizornost’iu i beznadzornost’iu nesovershennoletnikh v Leningrad oblasti 1941-9’ (diss.), MVD Rossii Sankt Peterburgskia Akademiia, 1997, ppp.153-155 on the numbers of children removed from the streets in the course of 1946.
workers whose unauthorised absence from the workbench was itself illegal.\textsuperscript{862} They were also represented in the Soviet media as a symbol of the reconstruction effort and regeneration of the workforce. Numerous articles in the Leningrad edition of the newspaper Pravda from 1944 to 1947 emphasised the contribution of young people in general and trainees from labour reserve schools in particular to the city’s economy and housing.\textsuperscript{863} One such article depicted how hundreds of boys and girls who had recently arrived at a Leningrad factory school got up at 6.30 in the morning to begin work as builders, describing them as “the generation who has to reconstruct our Leningrad”.\textsuperscript{864} In addition, newspaper accounts portrayed them, like war invalids, as emblematic of the state’s inclusive ‘care’ for its people. The whole country, articles in \textit{Leningradskai\a Pravda} proclaimed, was generously providing for them and surrounding them with attention.\textsuperscript{865}

The uncontrolled movements about the streets of these adolescents, who were often poorly clothed and under nourished, disrupted the image of a society structured according to concepts such as ‘employment’, ‘care’, ‘middle class cultured-ness’ and ‘renewal’. In October 1944 the city Soviet has issued a resolution according to which students of trade and factory schools were not allowed out in the city without notification of authorised leave.\textsuperscript{866} This resolution must be upheld by, Shiktorov reminded the directors of trade and factory schools in his article a year later, in order to prevent the “aimless wandering of teenagers about the city”.\textsuperscript{867}

The city Soviet’s department of cultural and enlightenment work made detailed proposals as to the manner in which the newly arriving young students and workers should conduct themselves around the city, the way in which they should use and also interpret the public

\begin{footnotes}
\item[862] Govorov, \textit{Prestupnost’ i bor’ba s nei v poslevoennoi Leningrade}, p.65.
\item[864] I. Golovan’, ‘Shkola stroitelei’, \textit{Leningradskai\a Pravda}, 30/3/1944, p.3.
\item[865] See, for example, the articles ‘Prizvy v uchilishcha i shkoly trudovykh rezervov’ and ‘Zabotlivo vstrebit’ novichkov’ in \textit{Leningradskai\a Pravda}, 15/9/1945, pp.1-3.
\item[866] TsGASPh, f.7384, op.36, d.148, l.109.
\item[867] Shiktorov, ‘Ukrepim obshchestvennyi poriadok’, p.2.
\end{footnotes}
spaces of the centre. The central library, for example, proposed activities with young workers mobilised to the city, “to acquaint new Leningraders with “the city of Russian glory” Petersburg-Petrograd-Leningrad, with the history of our miraculous city, with its glorious revolutionary past, with its monuments of art and culture”. This was to be achieved through exhibitions, public readings, directed excursions and a quiz based on these. The suggested excursions included details of the route each one should take and the selection of material which should be read to accompany the visit and inform an understanding of the historical walks. The library also recommended a poster to be put up in workers’ hostels and trade schools on the ‘city of Russian glory’, with illustrations of the city’s monuments and excerpts from poems written by Ol’ga Berggol’ts and Vera Inber during the blockade. The local authorities sought to control in this way both the assimilation of civic symbols by new city-dwellers and, conversely, their own assimilation into the cityscape.

On a local level, therefore, the attention paid by officials to the relationship of particular incomers to the appearance of the postwar cityscape was bound up with the construction of belonging to a particularistic civic community and environment. The ambivalent attitude of the Leningrad city government to those arriving after the war had been demonstrated in the previous chapter. On the one hand, Leningrad officials needed to promote the speedy integration of hundreds of thousands of people into the post-war urban environment. On the other, they had participated in creating a powerful local wartime myth of the city and its inhabitants during the blockade as a special, unique moral and cultured community, purified in the course of withstanding unprecedented suffering and barbarism. The confrontation with this ambiguity generated a discourse which was often centred around issues of cleanliness and morality. Articles appeared in

868 Tsentral’nyi Gosudarstvennyi Arkhiv Literatury Isskustva Sankt Peterburg (TsGALI SPb), f.277, op.1, d.69, ll.11-19, here l.11.
869 An exhibition on this topic was held in conjunction with a public walk for workers of the Primorskii district in the central Kirov Park in September 1945, ‘Gulian’e trudiaishchikhsia Primorskogo raiona’, Leningradskaja Pravda, 1/9/1945, p.4. Lectures were also planned for workers on the architectural monuments, gardens and parks of their district, see, for example, ‘Chto vy znaete o svoem raione?’, Leningradskaja Pravda, 19/7/1944, p.3.
870 TsGALI SPb, f.277, op.1, d.69, ll.11-19, here l.12.
the press in which people’s relationship to the cleanliness, tidiness, culture and ‘order’ of the city’s spaces was closely tied to their inclusion in the community of Leningraders.\textsuperscript{871}

Shiktorov averred in one of his articles, for example, that the community of Leningraders, always marked by high levels of culture, had been cemented by their preservation of order in the city during the blockade. Tens of thousands of this population had displayed mass heroism, he wrote, in defending their beloved city, guarding its buildings and protecting the lives and property of other inhabitants.\textsuperscript{872} In the city, in particular, therefore, manifestations of disorderly behaviour were unacceptable.

Lisa Kirschenbaum has demonstrated the way in which official local media accounts of the blockade during the war and for several years afterwards infused and shaped the experiences and memories of ‘Leningraders’ with mythic narratives that encouraged them to understand themselves as heroic defenders of a moral and civilised community. A recurring element of this shared narrative of local officials and inhabitants of the blockade city was the spring cleaning of the city in 1942. The narrative that ‘Leningraders in spring 1942 voluntarily went out to clean their native city despite the cold and hunger, as a result of which heroic effort no epidemics appeared in the city’ was continually repeated in the media at the time and after and recurs in interviews with blockade survivors decades later.

A front page article in \textit{Leningradskaja Pravda} of March 1944, for example, reiterated the message that Leningraders risked enemy fire to clean yards, streets and squares out of a love for their native city that was stronger than cold, tiredness and hunger, thus demonstrating their culture and heroism.\textsuperscript{873} That the 1942 spring cleaning became one of the standard symbols of the resilience of the city’s population during the blockade is demonstrated by interviews conducted during the recent oral history project on the blockade. Almost identical phrases about the spring cleaning occur in over twenty of their

\textsuperscript{871} A series of letters, for example, appeared in Leningradskaja Pravda from 3\textsuperscript{rd} July 1946 to 17\textsuperscript{th} July 1946 discussing the dirt, untidiness and uncultured external appearance, which met people walking around the city. These letters frequently referred to the identity of being a Leningrader.

\textsuperscript{872} Shiktorov, \textit{Ukreplim obshchestvennyi poriadok’}, p.2.

73 transcribed interviews with blockade survivors. The following statement of one blokadnik can be seen as representative: “in March 1942 Leningraders achieved a real feat. They saved the city from epidemics….you could barely hold the spade in your hands…This is love for the city.” 874

Re-evacuees could write themselves into the narrative of cultured, moral Leningraders, concerned with the cleanliness and order of the city, by means of several narratives. These narratives were utilised by respondents in interviews over five decades later. Those who were in the city during the most terrible blockade winter of 1941-42 and who did not leave until after the spring clean up, of course, mobilised the standard version of the feat of morally good Leningraders in their accounts. 875 Others emphasised their upbringing as Leningraders, which, for them, meant precisely that they did not drop rubbish after the war. 876 Another interview respondent, who had not taken part in the spring clean up before she was evacuated, nevertheless emphasised her connection to these events, and thereby to the city’s revival. She described how she had witnessed exhausted people with spades cleaning Leningrad’s main street, Nevskii Prospekt, before she left and, moreover, how she had heard about the clean ups in evacuation where ‘we lived the life of Leningrad’. 877

This was not the case with two other groups: adolescents mobilised into trade schools, whether they had been evacuated from Leningrad as children or were new to the city, and new arrivals in general. 878 There were many public representations of these groups, by the municipal authorities and native population, which expressed doubts about their sanitary discipline and the requirement for them to prove they had been ‘acculturated’ on the city’s terms.

An article of February 1944 about a trade school dealt at length with the issue of whether the adolescent arrivals to the school were ‘Leningraders’ or not. Interestingly, many of

874 Interview with A.V.L., ATsUI, Interview No. BL-1-032, p.11.
875 See, for example, interview with E.A.D., ATsUI, ibid, Interview No. BL-1-021, p.2.
876 See, for example, interview with V.I.V., ATsUI, Interview No. BL-1-025, p.8.
877 Interview with V.V.K., ATsUI, Interview No. BL-1-047, p.38.
them were originally ‘natives’ of the city. The article noted that most of them had lived in the city before the war and ‘only some had left at the start of the war and do not know how we lived and others were taken away in spring 1942. They lived together with us that winter’. The article emphasised that they had needed actively to re-integrate into the trade school community and ‘family’ by learning, or re-learning, and demonstrating what were termed Leningrad traditions of behaviour.

The article described how the new arrivals had striven to integrate with the old to prove by their behaviour that ‘we are also Leningraders, we won’t let you down’. The most basic commandment of the work collective, which the new arrivals had managed to grasp, was to ‘do everything ourselves’, in particular the cleaning of the hostel. It was emphasised that the youths themselves, both new and old, were now responsible for the cleanliness that shone in the hostel, the smell of freshly washed floors and the neatly arranged bunks. As a result of their proper conduct, the article concluded that they could indeed now properly be considered ‘Leningraders’.  

Adult migrants arriving in Leningrad for the first time were also depicted as in need of sanitary instruction in order to belong to a cultured community of Leningraders. The letter published in the newspaper from I. Pikin, in which he wrote that a scrap of paper on the street was the sign of a lack of culture by new residents of the city, underscored that this was particularly salient in Leningrad, a city always renowned not only for the beauty of its architecture but also for exemplary order, for high levels of discipline. A newspaper article of September 1944 titled ‘Concern about the living arrangement and labour use of new workers’ admonished factory authorities about the dirty conditions in hostels and the breakdown of the water and sewage systems. Care had to be shown

879 ‘Dvenatsatoe remeslennoe’, Leningradskia Pravda, 26/2/1944, p.3.
880 Ibid.
881 This message was echoed in other articles, for example, I.Golovan’, ‘Shkola stroitelei’, Leningradskia Pravda, 30/3/1944, p.3.
towards the environment of these new workers so that they knew “their place” in the workshop and so they could assimilate “not only the culture of production but also traditions of the collective (and) join the glorious family of Leningraders”. 884

This discussion of ‘crime’ and ‘disorder’ in the city in the framework of state and community building practices aimed at ‘placing’ people in the postwar order and environment helps to make sense of the disjunction between the actual numbers of crimes and outbreaks of disease registered and the prominence of threats to the health, appearance and morality of Soviet society in discourse at the time. Jeffrey Burds and Elena Zubkova have attributed this discrepancy to different causes. 885 Burds takes issue with Zubkova’s assertion that this it reflects increased public fear of falling victim to crime in the poverty-ridden postwar years and suggests instead that it is connected with the growth in particularly violent crime.

Examining the materials in the light of the ‘itinerant’ perspective has suggested another reading altogether, however. In the rhetoric of the law enforcement agents serious crime shaded into petty disorders and both become imbricated in a discussion of the ‘dangerous’ character of people on the move into the city. Particularly threatening groups were those with unknown or false identities and those who shirked from work and got up to mischief on the streets. In this discourse certain urban spaces had to be protected, above all market places and cinemas, as well as public space more generally. It is both their safety and their tidy appearance that must be ensured. In short, these representations can be understood as part of the elaboration of the social and spatial postwar order by the authorities and the disciplining of those who disrupted attempts to fix their ‘place’ within it.
Chapter 6. Conclusion

6.1 The postwar Soviet family

At the end of 1946, a short story by Platonov was published under the title ‘The Family Ivanov’ (Sem’ia Ivanova) in the journal Novyi Mir. It depicts the broken and incomplete ‘return’ of a demobilised soldier, Ivanov, to his family at the end of the war. On the journey, while waiting for a train, he meets a woman whom he had known when she was working in an army canteen. He senses that she, too, feels “orphaned” without the army and they embark on a brief affair during the trip. Ivanov accompanies her all the way to her home town, from where her mother and father had been driven by the Germans never to return, and which now seems an almost “foreign land” to her. After two days, however, he parts with her to travel onwards to his “native place”. When he arrives home he discovers a son who has become old beyond his years and a wife who herself has been unfaithful. He is left feeling usurped from his roles as father, husband and provider in his now unfamiliar home. The story does not end with his reintegration into the family but with the veteran standing on a path, with no indication of whether he will follow the direction home.

Platonov’s story reflected the actual experience of many whose families had been dispersed by the war or who had become alienated from each other by wartime experience. The authorities could not, however, countenance the implications of a story in which domestic life was turned upside down, paternally roles were challenged,

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888 Ibid, p.244.
889 Ibid, p.245.
890 The dispersal of families by the war was discussed in chapter three; an actual story of an officer and a pioneer leader meeting at a train station in the course of their journeys at the end of the war and the pioneer leader deciding to leave with officer instead of returning to Leningrad was recounted by an interviewee in the blockade project: interview with Іu. P. G., ATsUI, Interview No.BL-1-046, p.5.
‘homelands’ had become foreign places and the future trajectory of the protagonist was uncertain. There was a furious official reaction to its publication and Platonov was never allowed to publish again. It was attacked on the pages of Literaturnaia Gazeta and in the Central Committee decree of 14th August ‘On the journals Zvezda and Leningrad’ and was ritually denounced by other Soviet writers in their responses to the decree as a “vulgar” and “defamatory” tale that “denigrated” the Soviet family.\(^{891}\)

Lynne Viola has discussed how prewar work by Platonov captured the realities of the times, above all the contradictions of the Bolshevik drive to control and master society through ‘rational’ visions of order, discipline and productivity and its chaotic results. Platonov exposed how Bolshevik planning ended up as a façade grafted onto a complex, messy society resistant to such ordering.\(^{892}\) His tale of the Ivanov family, and its subsequent treatment by the authorities, encapsulate in a similar manner the ongoing unsettlements of the postwar period that both engendered and frustrated official efforts to impose a certain order, to implement a vision of a purified Soviet family in which everyone had a place.

This thesis has attempted to show how the processes of displacement, state power and the construction of ‘home’ interacted during the repopulation of Leningrad in the wake of the siege. It has done so through the adoption of what Liisa Malkki has termed the “scholarly lens” of the itinerant perspective.\(^{893}\) This lens, it has argued, enables us to view this period of the city’s history and the history of the Soviet Union in a new way.

6.2 A new lens

We are accustomed, Eric Naiman writes in the introduction to his monograph on early Soviet culture from 1997, to viewing the Soviet Union of the 1920s “through the lenses

\(^{891}\) RGASPI, f.17. op.125, d.565, ll.1-39.
\(^{893}\) Malkki, ‘National Geographic’, pp.24-5.
of a few well-worn pairs of glasses. It is time, he argues, to feel less nervous about trying on new visual aids. The same could be said of the postwar period of Soviet history until recently. The common lens through which scholars viewed the years immediately following the war was that of ‘high Stalinism’, bringing into focus political and cultural repressions and the “lethal logic” of the regime. Some researchers maintained the focus on high politics but instead of a ‘lethal logic’ saw policy disputes, factions and compromise among a wide circle of senior officials. Only Vera Dunham trained her gaze on Soviet society more widely and through a reading of postwar fiction observed a concordat between the regime and some sections of the population, a ‘Big Deal’ between the Stalinist state and the values of the middle classes.

Since Elena Zubkova published her social history of the postwar years in 1997, many more scholars have begun to follow suit. Most, however, have ‘spied on’ postwar Soviet society through a lens of ‘normalcy’, looking for a settling down in everyday life and concluding either that this return to normal existence was effected after the war or that it was delayed by postwar events. Those who turned their attention to Leningrad in the aftermath of war and the siege, on the other hand, adopted a uniquely local view that refracted all postwar events through the experiences of the blockade.

This thesis has attempted to incorporate the history of postwar Leningrad into that of the Soviet Union as a whole and to examine both through a new ‘visual aid’: that of the ‘itinerant perspective’. The lens of the itinerant perspective helps us to understand the processes of displacement that are involved in constituting communities on a national

894 Naiman, Sex in Public, p.3.
896 See Dunmore, Soviet Politics, p.2.
897 Dunham, In Stalin’s Time, p.22.
898 Zubkova, Russia After the War, p.11; Fitzpatrick, ‘Conclusion: Late Stalinism in historical perspective’, pp.269-282 on subsequent scholarship.
level and on the scale of the city or the neighbourhood. It shows how the movements of people and the practices and discourses adopted by governments and other agencies aimed at constraining and disciplining their mobility create and define ‘homelands’, their boundaries and their outsides.

Adopting this perspective has revealed both the diverse mobilities and the normalising practices to which they gave rise that were an important feature of the reconstruction years in Leningrad and in the wider Soviet state. It has allowed us to view these in the context of longer term and more widespread processes of displacement and measures to ‘fix’ populations. Observing that experiences of flux characterised the postwar period for many and that these experiences, furthermore, were not an aberration from a sedentary normality sheds new light on ‘ordinary Leningraders’ after the war, on the nature of Soviet society and on the interactions among the population and between people and the authorities.

The post-blockade city, in this light, can no longer be neatly defined as a ‘city of blockade survivors’, coming to terms with their experiences through an identification with well-known civic myths and urban spaces, or as a ‘city of migrants’, newly arrived from the village to replace a lost population of residents who had been the bearers of a unique Leningrad culture. The post-siege population included blockade survivors who had arrived in the city as migrants or ‘refugees’ shortly before the siege began or who had been displaced from their prewar homes within the city during the course of the war; re-evacuees who had lived through much of the siege or who felt they had ‘lived the life of Leningrad’ in evacuation; a range of newcomers, including demobilised soldiers, mobilised workers and trainees and people arriving on their own initiative, often illegally. Some people arriving in the city understood their journey as a ‘return home’, while many among the population, including newcomers, re-evacuees and blockade survivors,

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902 Ibid, p.36.
903 Baron and Gatrell, ‘Population Displacement, State-Building and Social Identity’, p.55 on how the experience of flux should not be understood as an aberration from a sedentary and unchanging normality.
continued to encounter displacement and resettlement inside the city as part of the ‘struggle for housing’.

The ongoing migrations that shaped the city intersected with the mythologizing of the blockade by local officials, cultural figures and siege survivors and with the state building practices of the Soviet regime. Visions of a ‘community of Leningraders’ and a ‘postwar order’ were formulated, developed and imposed through measures and rhetoric aimed at the ‘population on the move’, in which itinerants figured as a potentially transgressive, contaminating ‘element’. People travelling to the city at the same time manifested their own understanding of who belonged in the city and their own forms of social identification and in so doing prompted renewed attempts by the authorities to regulate their presence in the urban landscape or to remove them altogether. The picture is not so much one of a ‘return to normalcy’ as the interaction of continued unsettlement with a set of practices and representations aimed at ‘normalising’ populations who had not found their ‘place’ in postwar society and the local or national ‘family’.
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